propessor'shields' course. FIRST PART. THEMES AND QUESTIONS FROM PRIIVTED FOR THE USE OF THE STUDENTS, AND SOLD ONLY BY STELLE & SMITH, PRINCETON, N. J. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1868, by CHARLES W. SHIELDS, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for the District of New Jersey. Stanharp Office Print. ir -^1 ■ 4-t ■it ■ 45 ii 1 4^ -a * MAR 31 19] THE LOGIC APPLICABLE TO RELIGION. (INTRODUCTION. ) PROBABILITY. I. The Nature of Probability. 1. Probability distinguishable from Demonstration. How is probable evidence distinguished from demonstrative evidence ? Between wliat limits does it range ? What are the two reasons why one slight presumption does not consti- tute certainty ? 2. Probability susceptible of increase to Certainty. How may the slightest presumption amount to moral certainty ? What example is given ? II. The Foundation of Probabiliit. 1. Probability founded upon Livelihood. What word expresses that which constitutes probability ? In what three ways may one truth or event be like another ? On what ground do we determine that an event will probably come to pass ? 2. Probability measured by Recurrence. By what are a presumption, an opinion, or a full conviction that an event will come to pass respectively produced ? What examples are given ? How is it shown that likelihood or analogy enters into our whole expe- rience ? What incident illustrates the opposite conclusions which may be drawn from analogy ? III. The Value of Probability. 1. Probability limited in its Information. Why does probable evidence afford only an imperfect kind of informa- tion? To what kind of beings alone does it relate ? Why cannot it relate to the Infinite Intelligence ? But to us, what is Probabilitj^ ? 2. Piohahility decisive in Speculatioji and Practice. What questions are described as properlj^ admitting of* probable evi- dence ? In matters of speculation what should be the effect of even the lowest flivorable presumption ? In matters of practice what should be its force ? and why ? In questions of great consequence what should be the effect of even a balance of probabilities ? How is this shown in the common actions of men ? EELIGIOUS ANALOGY. I. Analogy in General. 1. llie Phihscqihj of Analogy. What are the three topics relating to Probability which Butler decl nes further to examine ? What question relating to the formation of our presumptions, opinions, and convictions does he also waive ? 2. The Logic of Analogy. To what subject or science does reasoning from analogy belong? On what grounds does Butler decline to treat of its rules? 3. Hie Uses of Analogy. Notwithstanding any ignorance of the intellectual powers or the exer- cise of them, what weight actually has analogy? What class of persons are most ai)t to object to it ? and on what grounds? What in general is the proper estimate of it? What instance is given in which its force would be unquestioned ? II. Analogy, as applied to Religion. 1. Exampleji of Religious Analogy. How does Origen apply Analogy to the comparative difficulties of Na- ture and Scripture? How may it likewise be applied to the question of the Divine Author- ship of Nature and Scripture? How far can analogy go in proving that they both have the same author? 2. Grounds of Religious Analogy. How does it appear that the analogical method is practical ? To what extent, and in what proportion, is it conclusive ? What other reason is given for its introduction into the subject of reli- What is presuj^posed or assumed in these reasonings? On what grounds is this assumption made ? What renders this assumption especially allowable ? III. The Superiority of Religious Analogy. 1. Analogy superior to mere JL/2)othesis. What was Des Cartes' method of reasoning ui)cn the constitution and government of the world? What other kindred method of reasoning upon such subjects is adduced and what example is given ? Wherein do these two methods differ and agree ? How is the analogical method distinguished from both these methods, as applied to the Divine government and the future state? 2. Analogy siiperior to mere Speculation. In what speculations concerning the constitution of nature do another class indulge ? What may be said beforehand of the best speculations of the wisest men upon such a subject ? What three plans of nature might such a theorist imagine ? To what extravagant conclusions would such speculations lead in regard to happiness and virtue and the consistency of one with the other ? What is a full direct answer to them ? (1.) The Precise Limits of Religious Speculation. What must be admitted as to our judgment of ends in general and of virtue and happiness as ends ? AVhat consequently must we conclude to be the ultimate ends designed in Nature and Providence ? Why, however, are we incompetent to judge of the means necessary to such ends ? What are the a fortiori proofs of this incompetency afforded by the judgments of men concerning one another? (2.) The True Grounds of Religions Speculation. By what are we led to ascribe all moral perfection to God ? . To whom, and why, is this a practical proof of His moral character ? How do we thence reach the above conclusion as to the true ends of Di- vine Providence? (3.) The greater Certainty of Religious Analogy. What now is recommended in i)lace of such idle speculations ? To what other sure method of scientific investigation is this likened ? With what is it proposed to compare the known constitution of Nature and the acknowledged dispensation of Providence ? And what is anticipated as the result of this argument ? THE PllOPOSED ANALOGY. I. The Extent and Force of the Proposed Analogy. What will be its extent and de.i^'vec of exactne.s.^ ? What will be its force in different instances ? What will it undeniably- show in regard to the sj'stem of religion, both natural and revealed ? What class of objections will it almost entirely refute ? What class will it at least measurably refute ? What is the difference between these two classes of objections ! II. The Outline of the Proposed Analogy. In what two departments may Religion or the Divine Government of the world be considered ? 1. The ArgiuneiLt for Katural Religion. (1.) . What will be proved as to a Future State ? (2.) What will be proved as to the destinies of men in that state? (3.) Vriiat will be proved as to the Divine Government in the future state ? (4.) What, as to the relarion of the present state to the future state? (5.) What, as to the design of the present probation ? (6.) What speculative objections from the constitution of Nature will be refuted ? (7.) What speculative objections from the Divine Attributes will be refuted ? '1. Tlie Argument for Revealed Religion. (1.) What will be proved as to the occasion for an additional dispensa- tion of Providence ? (2. ) What, as to the character of its evidences? (3. ) What, as to our pre-conceptions of its contents ? (4. ) What, as to its structure or scheme ? (5. ) Wliat, as to the agency by which it is carried on ? (6.) What, as to the prevalence and clearness of its evidence 1 (7.) What, as to the evidence itself? III. The Design of the Proposed Analogy. What is it designed to show in respect to the things principally objected against in this scheme of Natural and Revealed Religion ? What, as to the chief objections themselves alleged against it? And what, as to the weight and validity of this whole argument from analogy ? With what article of religion is it proposed to begin ? and for what reason ? THE PROBLEMS OF NATURAL RELIGION, AS SOLVED BY AxNALOGY. (PART I.) PRELIMINARY. AS TO THE EELiaiOUS CAPACITIES. (Appendix.) THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN A FUTURE STATE. (Dissertation I.) THE QUESTION OF A MORAL FACULTY IN MAN. (Dissertation II.) SECTION I. AS TO THE SYSTEM OF NATURAL ^^ELIGION. (Chaps. I-V.) THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE. (Chap. I.) THE PROBABILITY OF A DIVINE GOVERNMENT. (Chap. II.) THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE PERFECT MORAL GOVERN- MENT. (Chap. III.) THE PROBABILITY OF A PRESENT STATE OF PROBATION. (Chap. IV.) THE PROBABILITY OF A MORAL EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE LIFE. (Chap. V.) SECTION II. NATURAL AS TO THE EVIDENCE OF REVEALED RELIGION. :Cliaps. V— VII. THE FATALISTIC OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION. (Chap. VI.) THE MORAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION. (Chap. VII.) THE PROBLEMS OF REVEALED RELIGION, AS SOLVED BY ANALOGY. (PART II.) SECTION I. AS TO THE SYSTEM OF REVEALED RELICrlON. (Chap«. I-V.) THE PRESUMPTIVE IMPORTANCE OF BEVEALED RELIGION. (Chap. I.) THE PROBABILITY OF A MIRACULOUS REVELATION. (Chap. II.) THE PROBABILITY OF A PARADOXICAL REVELATION. (Chap. III.) THE PROBABLE WI/S'DOM AND GOODNESS OF A REVEALED S^YS- TEM. (Chap. IV.) THE PROBABILITY OF THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF REDEMP- TION. (Chap. V.) SECTION n. AS TO THE EVIDENCES OF REVEALED RELIGION. (Chaps. VI, VIII.) THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES. (Chap. VL) THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES ANALOGICXLLY ESTIMATED. (Chap. VII.) THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. (Chap. VIII.) THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. AS PRELIMINARY TO THAT OF A FUTURE LIFE. (dISSEKTATIOX I, APPENDIX.) To what extent is the question of a future life important and intelligible ? How has it been perplexed b}^ the question of personal identity ? And how are such difficulties to be estimated ? Personal Identity more readily ascertained than defined. How should attempts to define personal identity be regarded 1 1. ,The Idea, simple and spontaneous. To what other simple ideas may it be likened ? and what illustrations show how these ideas immediately arise to the mind ? 2. The Fact, a matter of consciousness or reflection. What corresponding facts do these lilustrations show ? And how is the fact, as well as the idea of personal identity ascertained ? How is this otherwise described as due to reflection ? I. The Negative Definition. L Personal Identity distinguishahle frorti Consciousness. Why is not consciousness necessary to personal identity ? What renders this self-evident, and to what is it analogous ? How may the singular mistake of confounding consciousness with iden- tity have arisen ? How is this mistake exposed by distinguishing between present con- sciousness and past conduct ? 1. Personal Identity distinr/uishahle from Organization. W^hat are the two reasons why the question of personal identity is to be distinguished from that of other organized substances, such as vegetables ? (1.) Sameness of Organization, the loose popular sense of identity. When a man swears to the identity of a tree, in what sense does he use the word same ? Can such identity of organization consist with change of particles ? (2.) Sameness of Substance, the strict philosophical sense of Identity. 8 Why cannot a man swear to the identity of a tree in a strict, philo- sophical sense ? Why cannot 8uch identity of substance consist either with change of imrticles or properties ? What now is the difference between the popular and the philosophica sense of identity, and why cannot personal identity subsist with diver- sity of substance as well as of organization 1 II. The Positive Definition. 1. Identity in general cousisfs in sameness of substance or being. How is the question accurately stated by Locke ? 2. Personal Identity consiMs in the sameness of a rational being. What is Locke's own deSnition of person, and consequently of personal i .entity ? Why does the question, "Whether the same rational being is the same substance, need no answer ? ]st Objection^ That consciousness of one's existence in different periods imphes different consciousnesses. What is said to be the ground of the doubt, wdiether the same person be the some substance 1 How is this refuted by the analogy of dill^rent perceptions of the same object ? 2d Objection, That different consciousnesses (or states of consciousness) imply different personalities. What extreme views of personality are taken by some of Locke's fol- lowers ? Upon their theory, why is it immaterial whether our substance is con- tinually changing or not ? What absurd consequences flow from their theory ? And why arc such consequences legitimately deducible ? How might they seek to evade those conclusions ? By what abuse of language do they confuse the question, but what must they consistently mean ? What is then the best confution of their notion ? (L ) This notion opposed to all experience. How is it shown to be opposed to all our natural convictions and daily ex]ierience ? How far is it possible to act upon it ? In what light would it appear, if applied to temporal concerns? To what then must any perverse application of it to a future life be at- tributed? (2. ) Tliis notion opposed to the very definition of an intelligent being. What distinction is made between«an idea or quality and a being? What must be confessed as to all beings during their whole existence ? 9 How is this shown to be true of all living beings ? (3. ) This notion nullified hy consciousness itself. How does consciousness, by the memory of former actions, assure us of our personal identity ? Whence arises the most absolute assurance of an action having been done ? If a person be regarded as a substance, what does consciousness testify ? If a person be regarded as the property of a substance, why does con- sciousness still testify to the identity of that substance ? Objection. That our consciousness or memory of personal identity may possibly deceive iis. Why might this objection be raised at the end of any demonstration whatever ? What other kinds of perception would it equally invalidate ? How is the absurdity of the objection shown ? THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE. (chap. I.) To what is the present argument restricted, and what is the question to be pioved ? I. The Presumption from the Law of Developaient in favor OF A Future Life. What do we find to be a general law of nature in our own species ? How do we ascertain the existence of this law ? How is this law illustrated in other creatures, in worms, birds, and in- sects ? To what extent are instances of it afi'orded ? How does it establish the probability of a future life ? II. The Presumption from the Law of Continuance. With what powers or capacities do we find ourselves now endowed? What is the presumption from having these powers before death ? What is the degree of this presumption-, and what alone could remove it ? 1. This Presmnption foimded upon all expeiience. Upon what general result of our experience is it founded ? What word expresses this kind of presumption, and how does it appear that we act upon it in regard to the whole course of the world, or indeed any existing substance ? If men were assured that death would not destroy their living powers, what would they inevitably conclude ? How does this state of the question show the high probability of a fu- ture life ? 2. No Rational Presumption to the contrary. What must be acknowledged, prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life ? Yet, even prior to these proofs, what must still be maintained? On what two grounds alone can 'the apprehension of annihilation at death be argued ? 11 (1.) No ADVERSE PRESUMPTION FROM THE REASON OF THE TlIING. Why cannot we argue the destruction of living agents from the nature or effects of death ? Why cannot we argue it from the manner in which our living powers exist or are exercised ? What does sleep, or a swoon, demonstrate as to the existence of these powers, the capacity of exercising them, as well as the actual exercise of them ? How then does our ignorance concerning them show that there can be no rational probability that death will destroy them ? And what is the effect of the argument from the reason of the thing, upon the question ? (2.) No ADVERSE Presumption from the Analogy of Nature. What is the effect of the whole analogy of nature upon the question? Why cannot we reason as to what becomes of the living powers of ani- mals after death ? What is the only visible bearing of that event upon them ? What alone is destroyed by that event in respect to them ? What positive probability is afforded by our knowledge of them as far as it can extend ? How is this probability confirmed and made credible by our own experi- ence and observation ? 3. Qnly Imaginanj Presumptions to the contrnry. How is the imagination prone to influence the reason in this case ? How has this influence been aggravated ? How is that faculty characterized? Into what kind of conceptions does it mislead us ? Whence do the imaginary presumptions that death will be our destruc- tion arise ? And what will the consideration of them show ? (I.) The Imaginary Presumption that Death will be the Destruction of the whole living Being. Upon what supposition must this presumption proceed ? (1.) This Presumption unsupported by Consciousness. {a.) The Divisibility of Self utterly inconceivable. How does Consciousness attest the indivisibility of Self? What illustration is employed to show the indivisibility of consciousness and consequent indivisibility of the living being ? [b.) The Absolute Oneness of Self perfectly Conceivable. Is it any more difficult to conceive the supposition just proved than the reverse ? ' That supposition being proved, what follows as to our organized bodies ? 12 By what analogy is tliis absolute oneness of self, as contrasted with the dissoluble body, shown to be perfectly conceivable ? By what imaginary cases of past or future bodies, successively animated, is this shown to be perfectly conceivable ? And how is it shown that the dissolution of such bodies would have no conceivable tendency to destroy the living agent who animated them ? (2. ) This Presumption unsupported by Experience. Why cannot the absolute oneness of self be proved properly by experi- mental observations ? How then do they bear upon the supposition ? What question, however, relative to the living substance, do they leave undetermined 1 What does experience show as to the loss of limbs, organs, and even the greater part of the body by the living agent 1 What does it also show as to the bulk of the body at different periods of life? And what is certain as to the state of the particles in all animal bodies ? What unavoidable distinction are we taught by such observations, and how do they affect the question of personal identity ? {a.) No Experimental Eoidence that Death could dissolve the whole hodij of a Living Agent. Why cannot we determine what is the certain bulk of the living agent or self? And yet, what must be determined as to its bulk before we can prove it dissoluble by death ? Why may the elementary particles or material germ of the body sur" vive the event of death ? How does this argument affect the general question of the absolute in- dissolubility of self? (5. ) No Experimental Evidence that the Dissolution of the lohole body would he tfie destruction of the Living Agent. From our having already lost certain S3'stems of matter, in which we have been interested, without losing our identity, what follows as to any other (internal) systems of matter? What is the ground of this inference respecting them, and what must we conclude as to any effect of death upon them ? From our having already several times over lost the greater part or the whole of the body, without losing our identity, what follows as to the effect of death upon ourselves? By what analogous means in both cases is the loss effected ? 1st Objection. That the alienation of matter at death is sudden rather than gradual as in life. 13 How may ths objection be answered from our present experience? 2d Objection. That the matter alienated at deatli is original rather than adventitious as in life. What is the first answer to this objection from our present experience ? If this be not admitted, what answer then remains? What is to be maintained as to the relation of such adventitious matter to the living agent ? And 5'et what does the relation itself amount to ? In what respect alone does it differ from that subsisting between the living agent and all foreign matter? How far do these observations nullify the imaginary presumption that the dissolution of the body would be the destruction of the living agent ? (c.) No Experimental Evidence that the Dissolution of the x^esent Phy- sical Organnizm icoulcl he the Destruction of the Living Agent. In what light is it proposed next to consider the body ? \st. Organs of Perception. By what experiments and observations can it be shown that our eycg are mere instruments of perception ? How may the same thing be shown in respect to the sense of feeling or hearing ? How are such artificial contrivances and tne bodily organs shown to be analogous in their relation to the perceiving agent ? How are they shown to be analogous in their relation to external ob- jects? . Between what sense and what mechanical contrivance is this analogy most evident ? What may thence be inferred respecting the other senses ? In the above comparison, what is acknowledged and what alone is maintained concerning the apparatus of perception ? How is this view confirmed experimentally by the loss of the senses ? How is it also confirmed by the experience of dreams ? 2c?. Instrumsnts of 3Iotion or Volition. How is it shown from experience that the limbs are mere instniments of voluntary motion by the living agent? What artificial contrivances illustrate their relation to the ^hing agent? How is the analogy between such artificial and bodily instruments of motion heightened by what appears in the mechanism of the latter " What illustration is used to show r\tht b -uh What do the essential tendencies of virtue and vice imply on the part of the Author of Nature? What is the presumption afforded by every natural tendency, and to what is its degree proportioned ? What is the distinctive force of this proof as to the completion of the moral government established in nature ? THE PROBABILITY OF A PRESENT STATE OF PROBATION. (chap. IY.) (Section I.) The Nature of Probation, as implying Trial and Danger. What is the general doctrine of religion as to the relation of the present to the future life, and what several things are comprehended under it? Why is this doctrine implied in that of a moral government ? What, then, is the difference between being on probation and being subject to government ? What particular features or elements of probation are now to be consid- ered? The General Analogy between Natural Probation and Religious Probation. What kind of probation or trial is implied in the moral government of God? What kind of probation is implied in the natural government of God? How is probation implied in the natural temptations which men en- counter ? How is it implied in their common language in regard to misconduct in temporal affairs ? How is it implied in their worldly errors and failures ? How is it implied in the hazards of the young ? How is it implied in vices which are contrary to our worldly interest? To what is this natural probation analogous ? 33 I. The Analogous Ocoasioxs of Xat'/r.\i> and ok |{kli(5ious Pro- HATIOX, Wliat are two constitiicuts or occasions of trial in botli natural and reli- gions i)rol)ation 1 How is it shown that temptations may arise from external circumstances? How is it shown that tliey may arise from internal passions or habits? How is it shown that such temptations i'rom without and from within imply each other ? How does it appear that we are in a like state of trial respecting: our temporal and our eternal interests ? Wlat description is given of our natural probation, and how will it ap- ply to our religious probation ? ir. The Analogous Effkcts of Naturai, and of Rkligious Puoba- TION. How is it shown that some men are as reckless of their temporal as of their eternal interests ? By what are some men as much blinded in worldly as in religious con- cerns ? How are some carried away, in both cases, even against their better judgment ? How do others seem even to court their temporal as well as eternal ruin ? What in general is the liability, and often the actual conduct, of human creatures as respects both interests ? III. The Analogous Aggravations of Natural and of Keli- Gious Probation. 1. Aggravations from tJie lll-heJiavior of others. In "what ways are the difficulties of religious probation increased or made by the ill-behavior of others ? How are the difficulties of natural probation increased in like manner ? 2. Aggravations from their own ill-behavior. How do some persons increase the difficulties of both probations by their own ill-behavior? How do they especially increase them in youth ? IV. The Analogous Objections to Natural and to Religious Probation. 1st Objection. That such Probation is inequitable. What does our condition in the creation seem to be as respects both our temporal and our future interests ? Why is this no more to be complained of in religious than in natural probation ? And why have we no reason to complain of it, with regard to the Author of Nature ? 34 How does tlie i^rcvious ar^Miinent rctidcr tlie doctrine of religious proba- tion cnidible ? 2(1 Objection. That it is improhnhU that our future iiiteirst should de- pend upon our present hehainor. What changes supposed in our natural condition, or in our natural char- acter, might give room for this objection ? Were there no natural iiro])ation as to tem])0i'al interests, how might the objector then argue ? But what are the evidences of natural probation wliich render religious probation credible? 3f? Objection. That it is improbable that there should be caq/thiuff of hazard in ths Divi)ie ForehiiovJedge. In what case might this objection have been speciouslj' urged ? and on what ground ? And what must be conceded as to the difficulty ? But what are still the facts in our condition ? What instances are named of contingencies left dependent upon our conduct ? How flu- do these observations refute objections to the credibility of a state of probation? How do they show our danger of foiling of our future eternal mtei'cst? THE PROBABILITY OF A MORAL EDUCA- TION FOR THE FUTURE LIFE. (chap. V.) (Section II.) The Design of Probation as intended for the FoR:\rATioN of Character. What difficult question ari.ses from the consideration of our probation- state. How might its difficulties be lessened ? But what must be acknowl- edged in regard to it ? What considerations may reconcile us to our ignorance 1 How much may be affirmed as certain concerning it? What more important question than the origin of probation does tliis answer ? What, then, is the known object or design of probation ? Analogy between Natural Education "and Religious Educa- tion. To what is the beginning of life in the present world analogous ? and in what respect ? How is it proposed to show the extent and force of this analogy ? I. Preliminary Principles of all Education. ^4. The Necesscu-y Correspondence hetwecn (Jliaracter and Condition. What two constituents enter into every creature's way of life? and how are they related to each other ? How are they shown to be essential in man ? How is this expressed by an ancient writer ? How are human life and happiness connected with this correspondence ? What is the inference as to the future character and condition ? B. The Capility of New Character corresponding to JVeia Condition. What capability exists in the constitution of man and other creatures? 36 What differently eoii:on jiractical i)rii)ciples, absolutely as well as relatively ? And what is the effect upon the whole character and life ? II. The Consequent 1*rinciples of Natural Edkation. Why, in general, have we these faculties of knowledge and ha})it ? IIow^ far are they necessary to us even in our temporal capacity ? C. The Neces^iti/ for QiuiUfication for Mature Life. How is it shown that Nature does not ro\e(l by tlie nnconscioiisiiess and iuiiorance of children during their development and education ? Even without considering God's moral government, what would still be Fiui)i)Osahle iVoni :inalogy as to the relation of the present to the future life? But. with that considoration. how can it be explained? and in what particulars will the ]>ro])Osed analogy hold ? (A.) Thk.jMokal CiiARArTER Proper TO our Future Condition. I Tmk Aotivk Virtltr^ Rkquisitk in a Future State. What is the proof that the future state will not be solitary and inactive ? What is conceded and what is maintained with regard to the Scripture representation of it as under the more immediate sensible government of God ? Notwithstanding our ignorance of this happy community, what virtues prevail in it, and what may be affirmed respecting them ? What m;iy al-o be true, there, of the character formed by the practice of the same virtues here ? What, in general, must be held to be the qualification for our future happiness? and on what ground? (B.) Our Capability of tbk Moral Character proper to our Fu- ture Condition. How lias it been already shown that we are capable of moral improve- ment ? {C.) "i riE Necessity of Moral Qualification for the Future Life. How is the necessity of moral improvement obvious from general obser- vation as well as from the consciousness of the best men ? To what lu'gher source, however, must this necessity be traced ? { /. ) Our Original Need of Virtuous Hahits as Finite Creatures. (1.) The Moral Constitution of all Finite Creatures. What constitutional peril probably exists in all finite creatures ? and what is the security against it? ( roved, only exceptional. How will the concession airect the previous argument ' x\llowing for exceptions, what is the general view to bo taken oi" the present life ? To what is moral improvement likened? '2d Ohjection. That in fact the present life is :«o generally pervertcM.l into a discipline of vice rather than of virtue. What is conceded with respect to the present state ? and to what extent can it be accounted for ? (1.) The Failures of the Vicious only increase the Discipline of the Virtuous. To what class is the viciousness of the world the great temptation? Amidst the general corruption, what is their character md conduct ? Why is the present world more disciplinary to them than a perfectly virtuous society would be ? (2. ) The Failures of the Vicious are sufficiently in accordance icith the analogy of nature. What analogous failures occur in plants and animals, and in what pro., portion ? How may the antilogy be applied to the mystery of the ruin of so many moral agents ? 3d Ohjection. That a Moral Discipline proceeding from Hope and Fear is only an exercise of Self-love. What course of behavior may seem open to this objection ? (1.) Proper iSelf-lov*, though subordinate, not antagonistic, to Religious Obedience. What is religious obedience ? and how is it affected by self-love ? What will result from a course of such obedience ? What will result from a constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, and how, and to what extent will it subordinate self-love? (2. ) Proper Self-love an element and motive of Religious Character. What other moral principles besides self-love enter into our actions, 42 ami why is tlun-e no ground for nice distinctions between them ? How will u life begun in one in\H)lve progress and perfection in the others ? IT. 'J'lii: Tassive Virtues Requisite in the Future State. How does tlie whole previous reasoning apply to the virtue of passive resignation as well as to ac tive obedience ? What difficulty may be imagined as to the exercise of such virtues in the future state, but why must it be treated as imaginary ? (C.) The Necessity for Habits of Resignation in the Future State. What occasion may even prosperity give for the passive virtues ? How does imagination more than any external condition give ground for them ? What is conceded and Avhat maintained with regard to patience in a state where there is no sorrow ? (1.) The Need, of Resignation in all Creatures. Why is the principle of self-interest coincident with the principle of obedience ? But how far may it be questioned whether the mere desire of self-inter- est can be thus absolutely coincident with tlie will of God 1 Why, then, may habits of resignation be necessary for all creatures ? (2.) The Need of Resignation in Human Creatures. What, at least, are the effects of mere passive self love in human crea- tures, and of what does it therefore stand in need^? (D.) The Opportunity for Acquiring Habits of Resignation IN THE Present State. What is the efl'ect of a long course of active obedience upon the passive affections, and how does it tend to habituate the mind to resignation ? What, however, is the proper discipline of resignation, and how does it tend to habituate the mind to that virtue ? What character results from this combination of the active and passive habits of virtue ? Why cannot such a character be regarded as a blind submission to mere power ? What now is the whole previous argument, and the conclusion from it ? General Objection. That we might have been spared all this discipline by being made at once what we are to be. How does experience show this objection to be vain ? And how does the general conduct of nature refute it ? What qualifications are the natural supply to our deficiencies ? and why is it natural to us to seek them ? What general law of nature plainly governs our temporal interest throughout our present life ? 43 What alternative does it leave us ? What, therefore, follows from analogy as to the future life? (Section III.) The Effect of Probation as involving the Manifestation of Character. In what third light may we regard the present world as related to the future world ? To whom may it be possible that such manifestation of character should be made ? How may this feature of probation be related to the other two features already presented ? 1. This View siqiported hy sound conjecture. What, at least, is possible as to the manifestation of persons' characters in the present state ? What ends may it serve, both as respects the persons themselves and as respects the rest of the creation ? 2. This Vieiv supported hy Analogy. (1.) The Manifestation of Character involved in Natural Government. How does the manifestation of character now enter into the general course of nature respecting mankind ? (2.) The Manifestation of Character involved in Moral Government. In what two senses has probation been treated in this chapter ? and in what sense in the foregoing chapter ? Why are the two former especially, as well as the latter, implied in moral government? THE FATALISTIC OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION. (chap. VI.) % Throughout the foregoing argument, what analogy has been maintained ? What must a fatalist assert with respect to our temporal condition ? and what question, therefore, arises in the way of analogy ? What is meant by saying that the question is not absolute but hypo- thetical ? What will be its bearing upon the fatalist ? What renders the puzzle and obscurity of arguing such a question excu' sable 1 I. Necessitarianism Reconcilable with the Preliminary Doc- trine OF Theism. What fundamental doctrine of all religion has been taken for granted throughout tte previous argument ? What objection may be raised to it from the opinion of universal neces- sity ? What is to be shown in opposition to this objection ? and why is such an argument at this point requisite ? 1. Nature, if Necesitated, might still have been Designed. What does the fatalist or necessitarian affirm respecting the whole con- stitution of nature? What analogical proof have we that such necessity does not exclude intelligence or design ? What circumstance alone does necessity explain with regard to the origin and continuance of nature ? AVhat question does it leave untouched, and what is the real question which it answers? 45 2. Nature, if Necessitated, might still have had an Author. Wherein would a Libertarian and a Necessitarian agree, and wherein would they differ, as to the construction of a house? How might they also express themselves with regard to the constitution of nature 1 But what musi they really mean ? Why is the Necessitarian obliged to imply an agent acting necessarily ? Objection. Tiiat we may ascribe to Nature the peculiar necessary exist- ence ascribed to God What kind of necessary ex'stence do we ascribe to God ? (1. ) Dii/)i)/iitr Ui)ii of th:i Neccsmrtj Existence of God. What is that idea of Infinity which we find within ourselves? What do we intuitively discern respecting it external to ourselves, and why cannot it be a mere abstract in our minds ? What, tlerefore, must be the concrete or archetype of our idea of in- finity ? For what reason, then, and in what sense do we attribute the word ne- cessity to God 1 (2.) Ahsurdity of attriLn^ing such Necessary Existence to Nature. How is this kind of Divine Necessity distinguished from that of the fa- talist before defined ? Why cannot such necessity be attributed to Nature, or everything that exists ? 3. Necessitariatmm, therefore, no Letter theory than Libertarian ism. What are the two conclusions from the previous reasoning respecting Necessity, which the fatalist is obliged to accept ? Why, then, would the theory of Necessity account for the formation of the world no better than the theory of Liberty 1 And what proof of an Litelligent Author of Nature would remain as real on the theory of Necessity as on the theory of Liberty ? 11. Necessitarianism Reconcilable with the System of Eeli GION. What is the mair> question ensuing upon the previous argument ? On what supposition will it be argued that the opinion of necessity is reconcilable with religion? and to what extent? (I.) HuAL\N Conduct, if Necessitated, might still involve Moral Accountability. (1.) Manifest Absurdity of Eatalism in Common Life. What case is supposed to illustrate the practical absurdity of fatalism ? How does this illustration serve to show the lack of common sense in such speculations, their disastrous tendency in practice, and their final issue in utter failure ? What other illustration is given of the absurdity of acting on the theory of necessity ? 46 On tiie contrary, what are the efi^cts of acting on the theory of freedom ? What may, therefore, be inferred as to the opinion of necessity practi- cally considered ? and what, perhaps, also as to the opinion of freedom, speculatively considered ? (± ) Aaalogona Absurdity of Fatalism in Religion. What is the precise point insisted upon in the previous argument, with regard to our present worldly interest? What may now be inferred as to the ])ractical application of fatalistic opinions to the more general interest of religion ? Why cannot we conclude from such opinions that we are free from the obligations of religion ? To what is the fallacy of such conclusions likened ? Why. then, is the evidence of religion as conclusive on the theory of ne- cessity as of freedom ? And why is this no reflection upon reason ? (II.) Divine G-oyernment, if Necessitated, might still in- volve Moral Character. (1.) Necesni.f.i/ Reconcilable wiili sonic Cliaractcr in God. What is the analogical proof of this afforded by our own consciousness? What is the in-oof afforded by natural government and final causes? [N'ote. In what sense are the terms iciU and character here em].)loyed ?J (2.) Necessity Reconcildhle icith AToral Character in God. With what particular Divine attributes, fundamental to religion, is ne- ces.«ity reconcilable ? What is the analogical proof of this aflorded by our own experience and observation ? 1.9^ Ohjection. That it would be inconsistent with such a Moral Char- acter in God to punish necessary agents 1. The Ohjection ahsurd on its oicn terms. On what supposition does this objection proceed, and what plausible reason is dven for it? How is its absurdity exposed on its own ter ms 2. The Ohjection recoils into a Proof. What proof does it incidentally afford of those very moral qualities at which it is aimed ? 2(7 Ohjection. That the proof of such a Moral Character in God would be invalidated by Necessitarianism. How is the Moral Character of God related to religion, and what ques- tion may here be raised as to the proof of that character ? 1. The Ohjection refuted hy our oxen experience- How does our experience of happiness and misery refute all fatalistic theories % 2. The Objection refuted by the necessity of the case. 47 Wliat is the experienced natural government of God, and what makes it plain, in spite of fatalistic theories, that it must be exercised on moral principles ? III. Necessitarianism Reconcilable avith the Proof of Ee- LIGION. What two reasons are given for showing more particularly' that the proof of religion is not destroyed by the theory of necessity ? (I.) 'VuK Internal P^vidkxoe not Invalidated. ( 1. ) Thr Pioof of an Intdligcut Author of Kature. ■ On what supposition of the necessitarian will this proof remain un- affected? and why? (2. ) The Proof of a Divine Government hif Rewards and 1 inu'shnents. Why does this proof also remain unimpaired? (3.) The Proof of a Moral Government of God. [a.) The Direet Proof of a Moral Facvlty ivithin ?/.tions to be considered? (1.) A Recealed iSi/sfem might he ivhoJhj Unanalogous. Why cannot we presume that things revealable must be like things known. (2.) The Natural System itself contains things Unanalogous. Why ought w^e not to wonder at any unlikeness between things visible and invisible ? (3. ) The Revealed System will he found suj/lciently Analogous. What v/ill appear on comparison of the Scheme of Christianity with the Scheme of Nature ? II. No Rational Presumptions against a Miraculous Revela- tion OF Religion. What is the notion of a miracle, as stated by divines? What other, and different, class of miracles is mentioned ? Is a revealed system, like Christianity, necessarily miraculous ? But how is revelation itself to be regarded ? (/.) iVo Presumption against a Primitive Revelation., prior to the pres- ent order of nature. What is the first of the two presumptions wdiich may be brought against a miraculous revelation ? (1.) A Revelation at Creation not strictly Miraculous, What is implied in the very notion of a miracle relative to a course of nature ? Why, then, could there have been no miracle at the beginning of the world ? or, at least, why cannot we tell if there could have been one ? What follows as to the nature of the question of a primitive revelation • And how does it compare with the other facts of antiquity ? What ex- ample is given ? (2.) A Revelation at Creation no more incredihle than Creation itself. What was the power exerted in creation as related to the present course of nature? If we suppose that power was exerted still further in giving a revelation, what will be the nature of the question ? If we suppose that power to have been miraculous, why will not the question be any different ? How is this illustrated by the miraculous power of our Saviour ? (3.) A Revelation at Creation a fully attested fact. What evidence of a primitive revelation is afforded by tradition and history ? What evidence of it is afforded by the first ages ? 64 Is tins evidence sufficient, without that of the Scriptures ? How does it bear upon the question of a subsequent revelation? (77.) No Prcsiuni^tion against a Subsequent Revelation^ interrupting the joresent order of nature. What presumption remains to be considered ? General Proof. A Revelation since Creation not Impossible. What is needed, before we can even argue the question of a revelation miraculously introduced into our world ? What alone would be a i)arallel case from which to reason ? What would be the value of the presumptive proof aiforded by one such case? Particular Proof. A Revelation since Creation not Incredible. ( 1 . ) Ordinary facts before jyroof are only less incrediblt than miracles. How is the presumption against common truths or facts overcome? What is the degree of the presumption against the story of Caesar or of any other man ? What supposition is made to show that unproved common facts are al- most as readily doubted as miracles ? What is the only material question as to the matter before us ? (2.) TJiere might be natural reasons for miracles ivhich do not exist for ordinary facts. Apart from religion, how far are we acquainted with the causes or rea- sons of the present course of nature ? What is supposable in regard to it during the lapse of six thousand years ? Prior to evidence, which would he the more credible, such needed mira- cles or mere ordinary facts ? (3. ) There certainly are moral or religious reasons for miracles ivhich do not exist for ordinal^ facts. What particular reasons for miracles are afforded by the moral or reli- gious system of the world ? How does this render the supposition of miraculous interpositions cred- ible? (4. ) Some natural facts, before proof are really more incredihle than any miracles. With what class of natural phenomena ought miracles to be compared, and what examples are given ? How could we determine that miracles are no more incredible than the marvels of magnetism or electricity ? What are the three conclusions as to the credibility of miracles, from the foregoing argument ? THE PROBABILITY OF A PARADOXICAL REVELATION. (PART II. CHAP. III.) What two classes oi' objections are brought against Christianity? What examples are given of objections against its substance or system 1 What particular objections are brought against the style of the Scrip- tures ? Why are the prophetical Scriptures especially so scornfully treated ? What is the general sweeping answer to all such objections, and how are they to be estimated comparatively ? Preliminaiiy Cautions. 1. Recisoii not to he villi fled. Why should we be cautious how we villify reason ? How can a supposed revelation be proved false by a reason ? Might anything else than the two things specified prove it false ? Allowing this province of reason, what is still to be maintained? 2. Reason herself not to villify. What two reasons are given why it would be unreasonable to cavil at the proposed argument on account of any unacceptable consequences ? I. The Incompetency of Heason to Prejudge a Eevealed Keligion. What is the scheme ol' nature, and how is it made known to us? What is the corresponding scheme of Providence, and how is it made known to us? What 5ire tlie points of resemblance between the two schemes, and what is the analogical argument to be drawn from them ? 1. An A\Priori Philosophy of Religion as impossible as an A Priori Philosophy of Nature. 66 What is the experienced course of nature as compared with what might have been expected, before experience ? And what may thence be inferred as to the revealed dispensation ? Whj' is it supposable beforehand that in our preconceptions of it we shouhi fall into infinite follies and mistakes ? Is there any ground to expect that it should appear to us clear of ob- jections ? 2. An A Priori Philosophy of Revelation as impossible as an A Priori Philosophy of Science. How is it to be shown that this incompetency of reason to prejudge Christianity in general extends to inspiration or revelation in particular ? In what several respects are we incompetent to prejudge anything re- specting natural knowledge ? ( 1 . ) As to the Amount of Knowledge given. Why could we not tell beforehand anything as to the amount of revealed knowledge 1 (2.) As to its Transmission to Posterity. Why cannot we prejudge anything as to the qualifications of the sacred writers ? (3. ) As to the Extent of its Evidence. Why cannot we tell whether its evidence would be certain or doubtful, universal or local ? (4. ) As to its Historic Development. Why could we not tell whether it would be unfolded at once or grad- ually ? But could not we tell whether it should be WTitten or oral, kept pure from age to age, or for a time corrupted ? Objection. That we are at least competent to judge of the fitness of a revelation to its own purpose. On which of these points, especially, do we seem competent to prejudge a revelation ? Would a different revelation from the present necessarily have been a failure ? Why could we not determine beforehand anything as to the divine pur- poses of a revelation ? Why, then, are all a priori objections against a revelation frivolous ? 1st Inference. The Paramount Authority of a Real Revelation. What is, and what is not, the question to be decided concerning Chris- tianity, and concerning the Scriptures ? In what case alone would obscurity, ambiguity, or diverse interpreta- tions of the Scriptures be valid objections against them ? What are the only valid objections which could be brought against them? While any proof of miracles and proi)liecies remains can tlieir i)ractical authority be overthrown ? 2d Inference, The Paramount Authority of the Language of Scripture. What follows, also, as to the Scriptures as compared with other writ- ings ? Why cannot we argue that the language is obscure or figurative, be- cause difficult of comprehension ? What is the reason of this diiference ? And what is the only proper question as to the language of Scripture ? Ohjection. That Internal Improbabilities weaken External Proof How is this objection shown to be impractical and founded on our igno- rance ? II. The Liability of a Revealed Religion to Objections FROM Reason. • What has become self evident in respect to all a jrriori objections from reason ? Yet what does analogy teach in respect to revelation, however really un- exceptionable it may be ? L Natural Knowledge as Paradoxical as Re:vealed Knowledge. Prior to experience, in what respects would men probably object to natural knowledge ? ( L ) As to its Disproportions. How is it illustrated by our astronomical as compared with our medical knowledge ? (2.) As to the Faculty of its Acquisition. How is it illustrated by the faculty of invention ? (3.) As to the Method of its Communication. How is it shown by the imperfections of language ? (4.) As to its Certitude. How is it shown by the comparative sagacity of men and brutes? What is to be inferred as to revealed knowledge ? Are the objections against it at all greater than might have been ex- pected ? Example. Natural Endowments as Paradoxical as Supernatural En- dowments. What is the general objection brought against the manner in which the miraculous gifts of the apostolic age were exercised, and by what supposed analogy is it to be refuted ? What are the more particular objections brought against the miraculous endowments themselves ? How are such objections refuted by the incompetency of reason, by the ordinary conferments of Providence, and by the analogy of our natural education ? G8 2. Scietitijic Kaoidc(hje aud Theological Knowledge Analogous. What is practical Christianity as distinguished from theology, and to what is it likened ? (1.) ^4.? to thr/'r Processes. What is required in the study of the doctrinal and prophetical Scrip- tures as well as in natural an 1 civil science ? (2. ) As to their Hinderances. What is said of the hinderances of both kinds of knowledge ? (3. ) As to their Imperfect Development. What must be owned as to our knowledge of the Scriptures 1 How might it be instantly completed ? and when ? (4. ) As to their Means of Increase- What are the means of increase for both ? (5.) As to their Prospect of Increase* Why is it not incredible that our knowledge of the Scriptures should be so limited ? How may it have been intended that new light should be shed upon the Scriptures ? \st Objection. That Science is of little Consequence. (1.) The Objection Irrelevant. What is the exact point of the analogy ? In what respect must natural knowledge be admitted to be important? (2.) The Objection refuted by the Analogy of Providential Gifts. If the analogy fails on this point, how can it be supplied? 2c? Objection. That Revelation, as a great Spiritual Eemedy, is largely a failure. In what respects does Christianity, as a spiritual remedy, seem objec- tionable ? (1.) The Objection refuted by the analogy of Natural RemedieJi. How ps it shown that natural remedies are neither universal in their prevalence, nor perfect in their nature, nor certain in their application? (2.) The Objection reducible to an Absurdity. To what absurdity would the objection lead ? And how does our experience expose this absurdity ? III. The True Province of Reason in judging of a Revela- tion. Why cannot we then infer that reason is in no respect to judge of a revelation ? 1. Reason a Proper Critic of its Meaning. Should reason judge of its meaning ? Of what else can, and should it judge ? 2. Reason a Proper Critic of its Morality. What is, and what is not, meant by judging of the morality of Scripture ? (39 On wluit iiToiiiid may the i^encral molality ui' Scrii)turc be vinclicatcd against objections? Kcccptiou. The Su[)posed Immorality of some Particular Precei^ts. What precepts in Scripture seem to be of this nature 'i (1.) Such Precepts not Contran/ to Immutahle Morality. How do such precepts affect the nature of the action ? In what case would this be otherwise ? How is this illustrated ? (2.) Such Precepts too exceptioual to he of an Immoral Tcjulenci/. | What would be the effect of a course of apparently imujoral acts with out such precepts, and why do not such precepts have this effect ? (3.) Such Precepts Dijjicult only to the Weak or Wicked. What is the only difficulty in tlieni ? Wliy are objections on this ground not tenable[? 3. Reason a Proper Critic of its Evidence. How far is reason a proper judge of the evidence of revealed religion? 1st Conolusion. Ree'ison, therefore, no Proper Critic of a Receah.d System of Religion as distinguished from its Evidence. What is the question upon which the truth of Christianity de])ends ? How are objections against its system, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, to be estimated ? and why ? (1.) Rationalistic Criticism, when applied to the natural system, is found inconclusive. How does this way of objecting appear when applied to the constitution of nature ? Into what misleading princii)les and suppositions is it resolvable ? (2.) Ratiomdistic Criticism, when ajJplied to the Christian System, will he found inconclusive. How will this way of objecting appear when ap])lied to the Christian System, in detail ? and by what means will it be refuted ? 2d Conclusion. Reason, however, a, Proper Critic of the Intermd Evidence aj^'orded hy a Revealed System of Religion. How might a supposed revelation contain within itself presum])tive evi- dence of its truth ? And why are we competent judges of such evidence ? THE PROBABLE WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF A REVEALED SYSTEM OF RELIGION. (part It. CHAP. lY.) What has been shown as to all ax>i'iori objections to revelation? Why, however, may it be paid that this is but a partial or unsatisfactory answer to them ? How is it proposed to meet all objections against the wisdom, justice, and .iroodness of the Christian System ? What are the three heads of the analogical argument for the perfection of the Christiam Sj'^stem ? T. The Revealed System, like the Natural, is IncomprehEx\sible. How is the general moral government of God exercised, and to what ends ? How is Christianity related to it? 1. Christianity a System or Scheme. What are the nature, object, and extent of Christianity V What are the parts of this scheme as related to Christ ? What are the parts of it as respects the Holy Grhost ? How is it to be completed in the final judgment ? (2.) The Christian Scheme TncomprehensiUe. What do the Scriptures expressly assert respecting this scheme ? What is the effect of reading any passage relating to it ? How does the extent of it, as far as revealed, compare with the known extent of nature ? And what follows as to all objections against either the perfection of Christianity or of Nature ? n. The Revealed System, like the Natural, is one in which Ends are accomplished through Means. How arc ends accoiiiplislied jiotli in Nature and in I'rovidence? What class of" olyections against either are refuted hj' this view? and how does it refute them ? Why is the ap])arent f'ooli.-hness of some means no ])resumption against them ? Ill, i UE Rkvkaled System, t.ikk tud Natural, is one in WHirn End-! are accomplisued by Means of Laws. o 1. Uiiu'ersalit}/ of Lair in Nature. How is the whole common course of natiu-e said to be carried on ? How far does our actual knowledge of natural laws extend? What meteorological and geological })henomena have not .yet been re- duced to laws ? What psychological and social jihenomena have not yet been reduced to laws ? How do we show our ignorance of such phenomena in our manner of speaking of them ? What, liowever, do all reasonable men conclude respecting them ? and on what ground do they thus conclude ? 2. Correspondhig Universality of Law in Providence On the same ground, what may we conclude as to God's miraculous in- terpositions ? What examples are instanced? and how is it shown that our ignorance of the laws regulating such cases is no objection against the existence of such laws ? How is it shown that unprovided exigencies might arise under such a supernatural system, and yet be no objection to its wisdom and goodness ? Conchision. That the Scheme of Christianity is as Unobjectionable as the Scheme of Nature. To what is the a]ipeai'ance of deficiencies and irregularities in nature owing 1 Is there any more reason why Nature should be a scheme than why Christianity should? What makes it credible that Christianity should be a scheme carried on by general laws ? How does this repel all objections to its wisdom and goodness? GENERAL OBJECTION. That in the Christian Scheme, the Enps are accomplished by tardy and intricate Means. What two classes of general objections against Christianity have now been obviated ? How are the particular objections to be answered ? How does the first of them partake of a general character? What kind of means does this objection attribute to the Christian scheme ? 72 1. The Ohjcction proceeds from ignoreince hi regard to the whole subject of Means and Ends. What is certain in this matter, both as to Nature and Christianity? What alone do we know respecting it, and of what are we greatl}' igno- rant ? What may be the character of all our conceptions of it? and why? 2. Tlie Objection is refuted by the whole Analogy of Nature. What kind of a scheme or system is the whole natural world, and what kind of means are used to accomplish its ends ? What examples of this are brought from the material world ? What examples are brought from human experience ? 3. The Objection only illustrates the Infinite Wisdom of the Author of Nature and Christianity. Wherein does the Author of Nature appear to differ from men in His mode of procedure ? How does the plan of nature require such a mode of procedure '? How is it shown that gradation and progression characterize the whole universe ^ * THE PROBABILITY OF THE REVEALED SYS- TEM OF REDEMPTION. (part II. CHAP. V.) How is the Mediation of Christ commonlj' viewed by objectors ? I. Thr Analogy between Religious and Natural Mediation. What is the eifect of the whole analogy of nature as to the general no- tion of a Mediator ? How does this principle appear in the birth and nurture of all living creatures ? How far does it prevail in the visible government of Grod? What is supposable, also, as to its prevalence in the invisible govern- ment of God ? How. then, does our experience show that there is no natural objection to the Christian doctrine of a Mediator ? II. The Analogy between Religious and Natural Punishment AS to Mode of Sequence. What article of natural religion is presupposed in the doctrine of the world's redemption ? What is necessarily implied as to future punishments under the Divine government? Is it supposable that we should know precisely how or why such punish- ments shall follow ? In what way may we, without absurdity, suppose them to follow ? ac- cording to the analogy of what exani})les 1 What may lead to such natural seiiuence of future punishment, and how is it illustrated ? 74 Objection. That this is taking the execution of justice out of the hands of God and giving it to Nature. Why are such natural punishments to 'be regarded as due to the Author of Nature, and to what are the.y ascribed in the Scriptures? What must be admitted in regard to the sequence of future punishments, and what is it allowable to supi)o.se respecting it ior the sake of illustration ? III. The Possibility of some Divine Prevention of Future Punishment. What provision do we find in Nature and Providence as to the bad nat- ural consequences of men's actions? 1. Such a Prohahility favored hy the actual constitution of Nature^ (1.) Goodness as well as ISeverity in Nature. How are we apt to imagine the world might have been constituted ? What, however, is its actual constitution, and how are both severity and goodness displayed in it ? How can a former illustration be used to show this ? What two means does the general constitution cf the world afford for preventing the natural consequences of men's follies? (2.) Comjoassion as ivedl as Goodness in Nature. What different constitution of the world may be supposed ? and would it have been really evil or good ? What, then, besides mere general goodness does its actual constitution display ? What hope as to the ruinous consequences of vice does analogy warrant? and to what extent? 2. Such a Prohahility, however, coidd not amount to a Certainty. How will many regard this question, and to what is their feeling to be attributed ? (1.) Evil Consequences of mere Irregularity. How can it be shown that mere rashness, neglect, or wilfulness will be attended with bad consequences ? To what are such consequences proportioned ? (2.) Greater Evil Consequences of Irreligion. How is it shown that there is no comparison between mere irregularity and irreligion as to their evil consequences ? Do such consequences issue only in the future world? Why, then, is it by no means intuitively certain that they could be pre- vented ? What, however, would there be large ground to hope? IV. The Improbability of any Human Prevention of Future Punishjient. Yet could anything we might do prevent punishment ? 1. Siich Human Prevention at least not Certain. 75 Why cannot this be thoiiirlit certain ? Why cannot we know whether anytliinsz' wc miiilit do woiikl make it fit to remit punishment ? Why cannot we know whether nnytliinir we niiglitdo would be sufficient to prevent punishment ? 2. /S'»c/i Ilinnan Prevention contrary to the Analogy of Providence. How far will analogy go in settling this question? What examples are given to show that mere sorrow and reformation will not prevent the natural consequences of misconduct? How does the misconduct of men affect their natural abilities or their need of the assistance of others? What, then, is the argument a fortiori iigiimat the sufficiency of mere repentance or reformation to prevent future punishment? But does misbehavior in the higher capacity render repentance or refor- mation useless ? 3. Such Human Prevention contrary to all our notions of Government. How ought we to reason concerning the Divine conduct ? Yet why cannot we suppose that reformation might i)revent judicial punishments? If we suppose it could in some cases, could we determine in what cases, or in what degree ? By whom is the efficacy of mere repentance to prevent such punishment insisted on. and what custom shows this notion to be contrary to the gen- eral sense of mankind ? What, then, must be our general conclusion as the future punishment ? Y. The Revealed System of Prevention through the 3Iedia- TioN OF Christ. In this state of the question, what recourse have we ? 1. Ths Revealed System complrmentary to the Natural System. AYhat natural fear does revelation confirm ? How does it confirm the teaching of nature as to tlie state of the world, and the efficacy of repentance ? What just hope of nature does it also confirm ? How does it complete the lessons of God s experienced government, and what merciful provision in His more general goveinment does it disclose? 2. This Revealed System Analogous to the Natural System. What does Scripture teach as to the Love of God for the world? To what in His natural Providence is this analogous? but in what res pect does the analogy fail? x What docs Scripture teach as to Christ's love for us, and to what does He himself compare it ? Are such comparisons complete? 76 What was the real object of Christ's interposition as related to the di- vine appointments or the general laws of the divine government ? [Note] This Revealed Ibystem. however, far transcends the Natural System. ^ What question is left untouched by this discussion ? What two questions are cited from a class of questions which ought carefully to be kept out of it ? What is the answer to the first, and the general answer to both of them? How should the inquiry, What would have followed if Grod had not done as he has, be regarded ? \st Objection. That this system seems inconsistent with the Divine Goodness. By what a fortiori argument is this objection refuted ? 2d Objection. That this system supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. Granting the fact, why is it no argument against Christianity ? What particular considerations prove it to be a fict, even if unaccount- able ? What is the Scripture account of the origin of the fact, and to what ether fact is it analogous in nature and revelation ? yi. The Office of Christ as Mediator in the Redemption of THE World. In what , particular manner did Christ interpose, and between what parties ? 1. The Scriptural Account of Christ's Mediatorial Office. What Scripture phrases severally represent Him as a Revealer of the Divine Will, a Propitious Sacrifice, and a Voluntary Offering? What is the Scriptural proof of the two latter characters especially ? Objection That Christ s Sacrificial Character is merely figurative or typical. (1.) The Mosaic Sacrifices are described as mere types of the Atonement. What texts prove the ancient sacrifices typical rather than real ? What texts prove the sacrifice of Christ real rather than typical? (2.) The Atonement is desa'ibed variously a^ having an efficacy [beyond mere instruction or example. What texts prove the efiicacy of Christ's death and sufi"ering ? What are the texts which describe Him as our Ransom, Advocate, and Propitiation ? What texts describe His Humiliation, ©xaltation, and Worship in Heaven 1 2. The Theological Definition of Christ's Mediatorial Office. Under what three heads is Christ's Mediatorial office usually treated by divines ? 77 (1.) The Office of Christ as Prophet. How is Christ pre-eminently the Prophet ? How does He execute this office in respect to truths of natural religion ? In respect to what truths of revealed religion was He a proi>het as no other ever was 1 And how did He practically illustrate His teachings? (2.) The Office of ChrUt as King. What is the nature of Christ's Kingdom ? With what design did He found a Church ? What kind of government does he exercise over that part of it which is militant here on earth ? Who are the members of this church ? What are His purposes respecting it and its enemies ? 3. The Office of Christ as Priest. How did Christ execute the office of a Priest? How did Expiatory Sacrifices arise among the Jews and other nations ? What part have they fulfilled in the religion of mankind ? How did the sacrifice of Christ differ from them, and in what may it be compared with them ? (1. ) The Efficacy of Christ s Sacrifice inexplicable. Do we know how the ancients understood sacrifices to become effica- cious. How have the Scriptures rendered all conjectures about it uncertain ? Why has no one any reason to complain of this ? (2) The Efficacy of Christ's Sacrifice nevertheless Unquestionable. What opposite extremes have been pursued in this question ? Besides teaching the efficacy of repentance, how did Christ render it efficacious ? Besides revealing salvation, how did he put us in a capacity of salva- tion ? What is the part of wisdom in practically dealing with the question ? VII. The Futility of A Priori Objections against the Christian System of Redemption. (/.) Such Objections proceed from our own Ignorance. By what considerations is it shown that we are not competent judges, before revelation, of the necessity of a Mediator ? How is it shown that we are no better judges of the office of a Mediator? What follows as to any objections urged against the expediency or use- fulness of particular parts of His office ? In what case alone might such objections have a show of reason ? Exception. That the Doctrine of Vicarious Punishment appears to be neither requisite nor suitable. 78 What objection appears to be of this positive kind? And how is it stated ? (1.) Vkariovs Finu'shne^its occur in Natural Providence as well as m Christianity. How is it shown that the objection to them concludes as much against natural providence as against Christianity ? Does their infinitely greater importance in Christianity vitiate this analogy ? Why is the objection even stronger against Natural Providence than against Christianity 1 (2.) Vicarious Punishments may he necessary to the comjjietioji of the Divine Government. How may vicarious punishments be consistent with the doctrine that every one shall finally receive according to his personal deserts 1 a. llieir Usefulness in Natural Providence. How does the neces' ity or occasion fiDr them arise ? What provision has God made for their occurrence'? Why are not men shocked by them, as they appear in daily life, and why do they object to them as they appear in Christ ? What do they ignorantly conclude must be the only manner in which the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of the world ? h. T heir Tendency to Vindicate Divine Justice. What apparent natural tendency in vicarious punishments has been urged in defence of the doctrine ? How is this argument to be estimated ? (3). Vicarious Punishments., efven if inscrutahJe, might he requisite and suitahle. Is this an objection against Christianity, or against the whole constitu- tion of nature ? How is its futility shown from our ignorance? (//.) S^ich Ohjections end m Presumption and Folly. How are objections of this kind viewed by reasonable men? How far is such reasoning legitimate, and when is it infinitely absurd ? How does our own experience increase the folly of such objections? What issue is made between reason and revelation in regard to them? What heightens the absurdity of them in the present case? (III.) Such Ohjections are wholly Irrelevant and Inexcusable. What should reason and analogy teach us not to expect in regard to the divine conduct as compared with our own duty ? (1.) Natural Providence as Mysterious as the Christian Dispensation. How, and what, does God teach us concerning our conduct? In what respect is such instruction sufficient ? How much of natural providence does it disclose ? 79 How is it shown that the same is the case with regard to the Christian Dispensation ? In what, then, are the Natural and Christian Dispensations analogous, and wliat information has been given under tliem respective!}' ? (2.) Tlic Chn'stnoi Precepts are sitjficiently Evldoit. If there were anything unaccountable in the Christian precepts, why would they still be obligatory ? What, Jiowever, is the fact respecting them ? What reasons exist for positive institutions? What reasons exist for our duties to Christ ? THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN THE CHRIS- TIAN EVIDENCES. (part II. CHAP. VI.) What objection has been brought against the evidence of religion, and upon what supposition ? What kindred objection as to the diffusion of religion has also been in- sisted on ? I. The Alleged Deficiencies are objected to on absurd grounds. How may the weakness of these opinions be shown ? On what absurd propositions are they respectively founded ? How, and to what extent, are these suppositions contradicted ? n. The Alleged Deficikncies are not without Analogy. 1. Such Deficiencies exist aromid its under present Providence. (Z ) Natural Evidence as douhtfid as Religious Evidence. How are those who object to the evidence of religion as doubtful to be answered ? a. Doubtfulness as to ivhat is our true temporal interest. What makes it difficult to decide in regard to many an object of tem- poral pursuit ? What renders it doubtful whether we could enjoy it if obtained ? h. Doidjtfulness as to the most probable means of attaining our true temporal interest. How may our best concerted schemes be disappointed ? What kind of objections often render them extremely doubtful ? c. Douhtfidness as to Eventtial Success. 81 To what (leceit.s are we liable, both from without and iVoiu witliin ? Yet how do men act in view of .such doubtful evidence ? (77.) Ndtinnl BrnefltH as nncqunlly distrihutcd (is Rrliyious Bciujits. How are those wlio object to the lack of univ^Tsality in revelation to ))e answered ? How does the Author of Nature appear to bestow his gifts among his creatures 1 and what examples are given ? To what is the variety of human characters and conditions likened? Yet ^oes this disprove a divine government or affect human conduct under it ? 2. Such Deficiencies^ in different degrees, have existed under jxist Provi- dence. (1.) Revelation has hith rto had different degrees of diffusion. How is it shown that neither the Jewish nor the Chilstian revelation has been universal ? (2.) Revelation lias hitherto had different degrej^ of evidence. What different degrees of evidence have existed under the Jewish reve- lation V What diflferent degrees of evidence have existed under (lie Christian revelation ? ^\'hat different degrees may still arise "? 3. Such Deficiencies., in any su}yposahle degrees, icould not he beyond the Analogy of Providence. (1.) Any supposahle degrees of evidence of revelation would not he be- yond this Analogy. What varieties of religious conviction are supposed to prevail ? What varieties of religious enlightennient are supposed to have been intended 1 To what would all this be analogous ? (2.) Any sup2)0sahle degrees of diffusion of revelation would not he be- yond this Analogy. What portions of mankind may be supi)0sed to have been wholly with- out revelation ? AVhat portions may be supposed to have had natural religion, without a genuine complete revelation ? What portions may be supi)osed to have had the true revelation inter- polated and corrupted ? What portions may be supposed to be in some ignorance, even under a true, full, and pure revelation ? To what would all this be analogous ? HI. The Allegro Deficiencies are -xot Inequitable. Why is there nothing shocking or unjust in all this various economy of Providence ? 82 To wliat ;iro our s('n^i»]es <>ii tliis i-oint due? How unicli will 1)0 expoeted of every one. and how is tliis expressed in Scripture lantiUdpre? What wr(~>nir inference, however, shonld l>e avoided? What siiows the absurdity of refnsin, what ougjit to bf fulness involves nccoiinfiihilifii pro}>ortionnl to the evi- dence of religion. [a.) Degrees of Evidence are necessoril)/ iiiiplicd in doubt as v:ell as in belief How is it shown that where there i- no evidence there is no doubt ? How is it shown that the case of an even chance involves evidence a> w^ell as doubt ? Relatively, what degrees of evidence are implied in doubt, belief and certainty ? What degrees exist in the scale of evidence below as well as above the point of doubt ? [b.) Degrees of Evidence, in proportion ds tlu'ii ore discirned, should in- fluence conduct. Can we distinguish the (hfferent degrees of evidence? Why should they influence practice in proportion as they are discerned? In what proportion are men enabled to discern evidence ? and in what proportion to act upon it ? How is their treatment of evidence shown to involve practical as well as intellectual pro))ation ? Considering, then, both the importance and the evidence of religion. what does doubting concerning it involve? 84 (3.) SpecuJatice Difficulties in the Christian Evidences nutji promote the disciplinary or educational ends of xwohation. By what atuilogy is it to be shown that difficulties in the evidence of re- hgion afford no just ground of complaint ? {A.) Such Speculative Difficulties are of like disciplinary tendency with External Temptations. How do temptations affi^rd moral discipline and improvement? How may want of obviousness in the evidence of religion serve as a temptation ? How may supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion serve as a temptation, practically as well as intellectually, and to what common temi)tation is it likened ? How may such supposed doubtfulness discipline the virtuous principle ? {B.) Such Speculative Difficulties are no more unaccountahle than Ex- ternal Difficulties. ^^What, in general, is meant by temptation, and what purposes does it serve V How may we account analogically for the difficulty of a want of obvious- ness in the evidence of religion ? How may we account for the difficulty of an appearing doubtfulness in that evidence ? How may we account lor the combination of external with internal temptations in some persons ? ( C. ) Such Speculative Difficulties may affiord the peculiar discipline required by speculative natures. What are the chief temptations of the generality of mankind in respect to morality and religion ? What class of persons are described as not liable to such gross tempta- tions 1 (a.) Speculative natures could not othericise he fully disciplined. Why would religion, if self-evident, fail to be a discipline to such per- sons ? Yet how far might they stand in need of moral discipline "? Or what further design of probation might it be requisite for them to meet ? What, then, may be the peculiar and distinguishing trial of such persons? {h. ) Speculative natures are so disciplined in common life. How are some persons, in their temporal capacity, situated with regard to prudent conduct ? What is the principal exercise of some persons in regard to conduct ? VI. The Alleged Deficiencies may be largely men's own FAULT, AS WELL AS PART OE THEIR PROBATION. 85 What has hitherto been conceded in rci^ard to men's dissatisfaction witli the e\idence ot'rehj^ion, but on what ground may (lie o])posite b(; maiii- .tained ? . (1.) Want of Conviction In/ the. Christidu Erick'ncca nioij be oicing to neglect and levity. What i)ersons are not likely to see the evidence of religion, however certain and demonstrable ? What persons are not likely to see that evidence of religion whicli reall}^ is seen by others ? (a.) Neglect and levity have thin effect naturally. What is the natural efiect of neglect and levity in matters of common speculation and practice, as well as in religion? Will the eiiect be the same if the neglect of evidence proceed from mere carelessness as from grosser vices ? Does it necessarily imply anything ludicrous in the truth itself? [b.) Neglect and levity may also have this effect providentially. In what further manner may neglect and levity prevent knowledge and cjnviciion of moral and lelig^oas sdbjects? What does fc'eiiplLue decla'-e on this point? [Note. How is the same idea expressed in other Scriptures and by Grotius ?j Does it make any difference by what providential conduct this comes to pass ? (2. ) Want of Conviction cannot be owing to any jjractical insuj/iciency in the Christian Evidences themselves. [a.) They are snffcientfor common minds. To what class of common men is the general proof of natural and re- vealed religion level ? What only is required on their part ? How much of natural religion can they be convinced of? How is Christianity related to their natural sense of things, and what supernatural evidences of it are they capable of seeing ? (6.) They appear insufficient only to superficial objectors. How far are objections to this proof answerable, and who are capable of answering them ? What, however, does a thorough examination into such objections re- (luire ? If any, without such examination of them, take tliem at second hand, what must be the result ? and to what will it be analogous ? Objection. That the Author of religion would make its evidences as indubitable as the directions of a master to a servant. Why is it supposed that a prince or master would take care that his directions should be well attested and plain ? 86 (1.) The alleged analogy is imicarrantahlc and contrary to experience- Wow is this objection shown to be unwarrantable and contrarj^ to expe- rience ? From whence is a full answer to the objection to be taken ? [a. ) Religion concerns the motives as well as externals of an action. Wiiy would a prince give his directions so plainly ? and in what respect is tin's no parallel case to that of morality and religion ? What must be supposed in order to make the cases parallel ? (/>. ) Religion may expre^ the conditional as well as absolute will of God. When may God's will respecting morality and religion be said to be ab- solute, and how, then, would we stand related to that will? When may His will be considered as conditional, and to what extent are instances of it to be found ? Conclusion. That Doubtful Evidence may be only part of our Reli- gious Probation is not incredible. What is necessarily implied in a state of religion, and why, then, is there no peculiar incredibility in supposing the evidence of religion doubtful ? { 1 ) Reason favors this Conclusion. If probation involved certain information and full conviction, what would be the only danger of miscarriage ? But is this the only equitable probation which, from the reason of the case, is possible ? If probation, then, involves ignorance and doubt, what is the peculiar danger of failure ? (2.) Experience favors this Conclusion. How is it shown that in our temporal capacity probation involves igno- rance and doubt, both as to our interest and our conduct? And how does our experience prove such ju-obation to be as decisive as one involving certain information and conviction ? How is the whole argument practically applied to such exceptions as disregard religion under pretence of insufficient evidence ? THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCES OF CHRISTI- ANITY ANALOGICALLY ESTIMATED. (part II. CHAP. VII.) With what argumentative design is it proposed now to consider the positive evidences of Christianity 1 Division of the Christian Evidences into Direct and Col- lateral. AV'hat are the two direct and fundamental proofs of Christianitj' ? How are other and collateral proofs to be treated ? What kind of an argument for Christianity do they afford, and to what may the conviction arising from it be compared '^ How is it proposed to divide and treat the Evidence of Christianity ? SECTION I. DIRECT EVIDENCE. I. MIRACLES. I. Historical Evidence of Miracles. 1. Historical Evidence from the Holy Scrij'ttvres. For what pur])0.se were miracles wrought, and what kind of evidence of them is to be adduced ? (1.) The Scriptural accounts of Miracles, as of natural events, are plain, unadorned narratives. What sort of evidence does the Old Testament afford of the miracles of Moses and the Prophets? What sort of evidence of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles do the Gospels and Acts afford ? ^88 How might other historians have treated miracles, and how would we then naturally account for the introduction of them into a narrative ? But how arc both miraculous and natural facts related in Scripture ? (2.) The Scripture accounts of Miracles are quoted as c/enuine down to the x>rese)it day. How is the genuineness of the Scripture accounts of miracles proved by quotations from them ? (3.) The Scripture accounts of Miracles are confirmed by subsequent events. How may common history, and the common Scrii)ture history be greatly confirmed 1 To what extent may the miraculous history in ScriDture be thus con- firmed, and by what events ? What is the .only satisfactory account of the establishment of the Jewish and Christian Religions? (4. ) The Scripture accounts of Miracles are themselves most easily ex- plained on supposition of their truthfulness. What is the most obvious and direct way of accounting for the existence and general reception of this miraculous history itself? What may be conceded in regard to a less obvious and direct explana- tion, but what cannot be conceded ? How far will mere supposition and possibility go as proof against his torical evidence ? (5.) The Scripture accounts of Miracles are .^therefore., to be accepted wt til positively disproved. Though all this histoilcal evidence were but doubtful, yet how should it be treated ? What three kinds of counter proof would alone be sufficient to invali- date it? 2, Historical Evidence of Miracles from St. Paul's E2)istles. What are the proofs of the genuineness of St. Paul's wiltiugs, and how are they to be estimated ? What particular proof of the genuineness of his Epistle to the Corinth- ians is mentioned? ( 1. ) They afford' detached a?id independent evidence. How is it shown from the Apostle's own declaration, and the history in the Acts, that his testimony is to be considered as independent of the othcj. Apostles ? (2. ) They afford peculiarly credible evidence. How do his Epistles show that miraculous works and gifts were pub- licly known among his readers ? What was his design in bringing forward the subject of miraculous gifts ? 89 How does bis manner of speaking of those gifts prove tlieir actual ex- istence at the time ? 3. Iliaton'cal Evidence of Mirddes from the success of Chrisddulh/ us a Miraailous Religion . On what allegation or pretence did Christianity offer itself to the world, and on what belief was it actually received ? (1.) Miracles were the peculiar Credentials of Christianity. How far was Christianity distinguishable from other religions in this respect ? To what extent can it be said that Mahometanism was not at first ])roi)- agated by miracles ? How is it shown that tiie alleged miracles of Paganism and l-'oi)ery are not parallel cases? , How did Christianity differ from them in the manner of its rise and progress 1 (2.) Miracles ice re universally credited hy the first Christian converts. What fiict is allowed in regard to the introduction of Christianity into the world ? and what would its first converts have alleged as their reason for embracing it ? What were the diflSculties in the way of their conversion ? and what did their conversion show as to their own belief and testimony in regard to miracles ? (3. ) Miracles are thus x>roved hy circumstantial as iccU as direct histori- cal evidence. How does this testimony of their conduct compare with written testi- mony ? ^ Why is it to be accepted as real evidence ? How is it shown to be, at the same time, distinct from the direct his- torical evidence of the sacred writers ? Why cannot this general belief in the Christian miracles be attributed the credulity of mankind ? What difficulties then stood in the way of belief in Christianity? What is the presumption from the immediate conversion of such num- bers, and how is it to be valued ? II. The FuTiLiTi' of IxNfidel Objections against this Histori- cal Evidence of Miracles. Upon whom does it lie to bring olijections against this evidence? What, however, is the proper question in regard to it ? What course have unbelievers taken ? 1st Infidel Objection. That the primitive Christians might have been mere enthusiasts deceived into a belief in Miracles. . How is it alleged that enthusiasts often act in regard to the most idle follies imaginable ? 90 (1.) The Ohjection assumes that miracles are matters of jojiinion rather than of fact. What distinction is overlooked in this objection ? Hov7 do facts differ from opinions in respect to testimony? What is the strongest proof any one could give of his believing factn or opinions ? How did the Apostles show their belief in miracles, and why must their belief be admitted as proof of them ? Wliat was the peculiar proof of them oiven by the martjTs of the next age? (2.) The Ohjection assumes that entlmsiasm could destroy testimony to matters of fact. What is alleged to be the effect of enthutiasm upon testimony even for facts in religion? [a. ) En thusiasm migh t destroy testimony to things incredible or wq^roved. What kind of testimony is the strongest evidence we can have for any matter of fact ? In what two ways might such testimony be overcome? And in that case how alone could such testimony be accounted for? But in the absence of intrinsic incredibility or counter testimony, how is such an explanation to be regarded ? ^ [h.) Enthusiasm coidd not destroy testimony to the Christian Religion. How is such an explanation of testimony to be regarded when the things attested are credible and fully proved ? How has it been shown that the testimony to Christian revelation can- not thus be explained? (c.) E)dhvsiasni and other like influences do not destroy testimony in common matters. To what influence is religion supposed to be peculiarly liable ? What influences akin to enthusiasm affect men in common matters ? Why are they to be considered as of a like kind to enthusiasm ? Yet what is the effect of human testimony, notwithstanding? 2d Infidel Objection. TJiat the jn-imitite Christians might have heen enthusiastic impostors^ deceiving others as well as themselves into a helief in miracles. How is it supposed that the Apostles might have deceived themselve s as well as others ? and why is this thought to be credible ? (1.) Such imjyostures are confessedly not imjiossihle. What is conceded to be the testimony of observation and Scripture in regard to the possibility of such enthusiastic impostures ? But what is the inconsistency of the objector 1 (2.) ^Sueh impostures do not destroy actual testimony. 91 How is it sliown that men are naturally protected against ini posture:^-, and yet at the same time liable to countenance them? But what is the natural effect of human testimony iiotwithstandinL'- ? (3.) SiicJi i'mposfurm are not in fact pfciJifir to religion. If it is objected farther that in point of fact mankind has been strangely deluded by pretences to miracles, what may be replied ? (4. ) Sncli impoKtnres. hoiccrrr stronr/h/ !^iq)portc(l In/ Jiisftn-icaJ n-idcncf\ cannot invaJiilate the Christian Religion. What further objection is added to ])rove the Christian miracles impos- tures ? Is it to be admitted that the historical evidence for fabulous miracles is like that for the Christian ? If this were allowed, why would it be absurd to bring it as an objection against the Christian miracles ? How is. this absurdity illustrated ? Is^ General Ansioer to both Infidel Objections. Enthusiasm and Impos- ture at worst could only weaken the miraculous evidence of Christianity. In what proportionable degrees will these tilings confessedly weaken the evidence of testimony ? But what two things alone could destroy such evidence 1 In the absence of such counter proof, why must that evidence be ad- mitted ? How do those who bring forward the mere general fiillibility of human nature against this historical evidence expose the weakness of their own position ? 2d General Answer. . Enthusiasm and Imposture are largely precludeil by the very nature of Christianity. How does the importance of Christianity heighten the testimony of its first converts ? How also do the moral obligations it imposed upon them make a pecu- liar presumption in favor of their testimony ? Conclusion. Even Infidels must admit the Miraculous Evidence of Christianity to be considerable. What is the value of assertions in an argument like this? What, then, must be concluded as proved by the foregoing discussion with unbelievers ? In what cases would infidels admit the evidence of such testimony as we have been considering ? But v;hat makes the case still stronger for Christianity ? 92 II. PROPHECIES. How is it proposed to treat the evidence from proi)hecy ? I. Partial Obscurity in the Prophecies does not destroy THE Proof of Foresight. (1.) Tlie ichoJe sense might not he understood. Why does not the obscurity of unfulfilled prophecies invalidate the proof afforded by fidfilled prophecies? How is the absurdity of such an objection illustrated? "What, indee'd, would be the only proper inference from obscure prophe- cies ? (2. ) The 2vhoIe /(dJiJment might not he understood. How might common men be incapable of judging of fulfilled prophecies and yet be convinced of a divine foresight in them ? How might the same be true even of the most learned men ? What was the probable intention of the fulfilled prophecies ? II. Partial Inapplicability in the Prophecies does not de- stroy the Proof op Foresight. When a course of prophecy is applicable to a course of events, what is the fair inference 1 and how is this to be proved ? What objection does this principle refute ? (1.) General Applicahility in Human writings is a proof of their In- tention. What two kinds of writing resemble prophecy in this respect? How might one learn the intention of a flible or a parable, though the author had left it without a moral or application ? How might one learn the intention of a satire, though but partially ac- quainted with the persons or events intended ? and what would be the measure of his satisfaction in reading it ? (2.) General Applicahility in the Prophecies is a. Proof of their Inten- tion. On the same principle may we prove the intention of the prophecies concerning the church, civil affairs, and the Messiah ? What further proof of their intention is afforded by the manner in which ancient Jews and modern Christians understand them ? III. Occasional Misapplication of the Prophecies, by the Prophets themselves or their interpreters, does not destroy the Proof of Divine Foresight. If it could be shown that the prophets in their predictions thought of other events than those of which Christians now think, or that their pre- dictions were applicable to other events than those to which Christians now apply them, what would be state of the argument? (1.) True Propliecies might he misapplied hy the Projjhets themselves. 93 AVhat illustration is used to show that the Scriptures uiight have other or further uieaning than those persons had wlio first recited or wrote tlieni ? How is the absurdity of the contrary view shown ? Why does the actual fulfihncnt of j)rophecies in a sense different from that of the projjliets prove such fulfilment to have been divinely intended? What, then, is the only question to be decided respecting prophecies, and what (juestion resi)ecting the prophets themselves may be left unde- cided ? (2.) True. Prop] ICC ica )ni^(rposes. What is, and what is not, strictly speaking, the practical question in common matters? What evidence may determine an action to be prudent, besides the satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness ? V. Objection. That this Analogy is not likely to be influentla.l UPON men's belief and practice. What two considerations, before mentioned, show this objection to be nothing to the point ? 101 1. The ohjfctioii is not nlevant to tin purpase of this tiratisr. What is, and what is not the purpose of this treatise ? Where Hes the responsibility for the littlt' iiiHuence of tlie evidence of rehgion upon men. 2. The ohjrcfion does not affect tlieeiuh of rrJif/ion or of l^roridcnc.e. How are tlie ends of relia:ion still aeejouipli.shed ? And, tlu! desi.i^ns of Providence ? 3. The objection allows enough to justify the foregoing argument. What is allowed by the very terms of the objection as to the whole ar- gument, and why therefore should it be laid before men 1 General Answer to the whole of tfie foregoing objeci ions. [Note. What distinction does Butler make between arguing upon and arguing //-o;??. the i)rinci])les of others, and what illustration is given?] 1. This Analogy is only objectionable in so far c(S it has proceeded njion the principles of others. What reason does Butler give for having argued upon the piinciples of others rather than his own ? What principle of others has been hitherto admitted, and what princi- ple of his own has been omitted ? How is this latter principle illustrated as applied to Goersons acquainted icith Christian it I/. Why is immorality greatly aggravated in any who knowingly reject Christianity ? 2. That Scepticism does' not relax the claims of Christianity. What middle state of mind may exist with regard to Christianity ? What class of sceptics are sup^ '^'=^ed to be in this state of mind? What two reasons are given why we cannot include in this class all who have ever heard of Christianity ? How far are such sceptics under the obligation of Christianity ? 3. That Blasphemy with regard to Christianity is ahsolnteJy icithout ex-' ciise. What is the only temptation to such blasphemy? and why do such temptations afford no excuse ? What degree of obduracy and unbelief does it argue ? "^m