' .J 
 
 ! 
 
 0i 
 
# 
 
DEFENCE 
 
 O F 
 
 Reveal'd Religion 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 'The EXCEPTIONS of a late Writer, 
 
 in his Book, Intituled, 
 Chrijlianity as Old as the Creation^ 8cc. 
 
 By J O H N "t) O N Y B E A R E, D. D. 
 
 ReQor of Exeter-CoUege in O x f o r d. 
 
 Nunc parvtdos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malts moribui 
 opinionibufque depravati Jic rejlinguimus, uf nufquam nature/ 
 lumen appareat : Sunt enim ingeniis noftris femina innata vir- 
 tutum 5 quA ft adolefcere liceret, ipfa nos ad beatam vitam 
 natura perduceret, Nunjc autem, fimul atque editi in lucem 
 ^ fufcepti fumus, in omni continuo pravitate, ^ in fummd 
 opinionum perverfitate verfamur : ut pene cum lade nutrieis 
 err or em fuxijfe videamur. 
 
 Cicer.Difp.Tufcul. Ed. Dav. Cant. 1713. p. i6(5. 
 The Second Edition. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for S. W i L M o T, Bookfeller in Oxford : 
 And Sold by James and John Knapton, R. Knaplock, 
 W. Innys, T. Astley, J. Crownfield, in St. Paul's Church- 
 yard ; J. Battley, C. Hitch, in V at er-nofter Koto y S. Birt 
 in Ave Marie Lane ; R. Williamson, and T. Osborn, near 
 Crays-Inn, BookfcUcrs in London. M.DCCXXXII. 
 
T O T H E 
 
 Right Reverend Father in GOD, 
 
 EDMUND 
 
 Lord Bishop of LONDON. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 HE following Work humhly 
 craves Tour Lordjloip's Ac^ 
 ceptance 5 to 'whom I Jhould 
 he indue d to addrefs it^ from 
 the Nature of the ^efign^ and Tour 
 Lordjhip's great Concern for the Interefls 
 i^ \-^' ' Cf "^^^^ of 
 
 ^. PRliTCETOIT ^*- ^ 
 
 I ..tC. NOV 1881 
 
 \ THEOLOGICAL 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 of Rel'tgionj tho I had not been ohligd 
 to do foj in Acknowledg77ient of many 
 perfonal Favours receivd from Tour 
 LordJIolp, 
 
 Indeed the Book itfelf owes its Birth 
 to Tour Lordjhip's Encouragement 3 in 
 twbich if I have not fucceeded according 
 to my WifheSj I may plead that it was 
 drawn up amidp a Variety of Inter' 
 ruptions, and under a had State of 
 Health. This will in fome Sort excufe 
 the Juthor, tho' it may detra6i from 
 the Performance, 
 
 But the Caufe I am defending will 
 receive lefs Prejudice from the T)efe6is 
 of inferior Advocates, when it is con^ 
 Jiderd in how Majierly a Way Tour 
 Lordflo'tp hath already fupported it, 
 The principal ^eflions in this Con^ 
 troverfy have been determined in Tour 
 
 Lord" 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 Lordfhips Pastoral Letters, to 
 the Sathfa6iion of e^very reafonahle 
 Enquirer 5 in nsjhich n^e fee mth 'Plea* 
 Cure bow much additional Force JlrgU" 
 ment receives, 'when it is managd njoith 
 Temper, 
 
 How different is the Conduct of our 
 j4dverfaries ! in whofe Writings no" 
 thing is more remarkable than an entire 
 Contempt of ^Decency : Fit Method to 
 ie us'd in fo had a Caufe ! 
 
 Buty let our jidverfaries go on in 
 their own Way 5 Truth will maintain 
 itfelf notwithfand'tng : And that which 
 could fupport itfelf under Ten dreadful 
 PerfecutionSj is not to he horn down 
 at this Time of Day hy hard Words. 
 Religion will enlarge its Credit^ whilji 
 it is defended hy Tpur Lordfhip's Pen, 
 and illujlrated hy Tour Example, 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 IJhall add no more^ hut my Jincevefl 
 Wijhes for Tour Lordjhip's Happinefs 
 and long Life ; and in this I wijh one 
 of the greatefl BJeJJings fwhich can hap^ 
 pen to this Church and Nation. 
 
 Permit me to fulfcrihe myfelfy 
 Tour Lordship's 
 
 
 mo^ dutiful. 
 
 
 mojt de'voted. 
 
 
 humble Servant^ 
 
 MAY 4th, 
 
 1732- 
 
 
 John Cont beare. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, j 
 
 to begin anew, and to fee forth the Original 
 Title by which we hold. 
 
 Had indeed our Caufe been carried on in 
 a fufpicioiis Manner ; never fairly decided ; 
 but fupported merely by Artifice, and the 
 Mifapplication of Civil Force • there might 
 have been fome Reafon to call us back, and 
 to put us upon proving thofe Matters, which 
 hitherto had not been prov'd at all. But as 
 every thing of real Moment in this Caufe, — 
 every thing which could afford juil: Ground 
 of Debate, hath.^ fome Time or other, been 
 thoroughly fifted, and fully fettled, itfurely 
 becomes Matter of Complaint that thefe 
 Things are any more brought in Queftion ; 
 That the Minifters of The Gofpel are inter- 
 rupted in difcharging a main Part of their 
 Office ; — are call'd off from inftruding 
 their People in the Dof^rines and Duties of 
 Chriftianity ; — and oblig'd to guard them, 
 as well -as they may, againfl: a total Revolt 
 from this Rcii?;ion. 
 
 Yet This is in Truth the Cafe. More hath 
 of late Years been attempted this Way than 
 in many former Ages. Several Methods h.ave 
 been us'd to this Purpofe by different Pcr- 
 fons : And, as foon as One Schem.e hath been 
 deicafed, we have feen a new one advanc'd 
 with equal Affurance, and recommended 
 With equal Diligence. 
 
 1 fliall not concern myfclf at prcfent with 
 
 thofe Performances, which h^ive been prin- 
 
 B 2 cipally 
 
4 ^DEFENCE o/ 
 
 cipally levelled at the external Proofs of cut 
 Religion. Thefe have been thoroughly ex- 
 amined by feveral Learned and Good Men. 
 And tho' it cannot but prove Matter of Grief, 
 that a Caufe fo important fhould meet with 
 any kind of Oppofition, yet we have this 
 Comfort however, that fomc Advantages 
 have arifen to us from this very Oppofition. 
 The Grounds of our Holy Faith have been 
 hereby more diflinctly confider'd : And, I 
 hope, we are the more firm Believers from 
 obferving how much our Adverfaries have 
 fail'd in their Attempts againft us. 
 
 Hitherto, for the molt Part, Objeftions 
 have been pointed, Either, at the Prophe- 
 cies, (which, 'tis affirm'd, have been imper- 
 tinently alledg'd on our Side ;) Or, at the 
 Miracles, (which, 'tis pretended, were never 
 really and in Fad wrought;) Or, at fome 
 particular Dodrines, (which our Adverfaries 
 have thought fit to rejed as impoflible.) At 
 length a Gentleman appears, refolv'd to carry 
 the Matter farther. Not content to reft the 
 Controvcrfy on a colr.mon Foot, he boldly 
 undertakes what few have been adventurous 
 enough to maintain before him : And, be- 
 fides what he alledges, in fome Parts of his 
 Book, againli the Fads or Tradition of The 
 Gofpel, he direds his chief Aim at the Foun- 
 dation of the Whole. 
 
 His grand Defign, is. To prove, that there 
 neither hath been, nor pofTibly can be any 
 
 Revelation 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c\ 5 
 
 Revelation at all : And the main Principle 
 on which he builds, is This; That the Light 
 of common Reafon is abundantly fufficient 
 without it. Revelation, he maintain?, can 
 teach us nothing, which every Man's Rea- 
 ibn might not as perfedly teach him before. 
 From hence he would have us conclude, 
 that all Information this Way mufi: be entirely 
 fuperfluous ; utterly unworthy of God, be- 
 caufe ufelefs and unprofitable to Man. 
 
 Were there really none Occafion for The 
 Interpofition of The Supreme Being to fup- 
 port and carry on the Affairs of Religion ; 
 and could this Negative be fully made ap^ 
 pear, we fliould be forc'd to give up our 
 Caufe. For, a perfedly wife Being cannoc 
 a<^ in vain. Whenever He interpofes, fome- 
 thing is intended worthy of his Care, and 
 which cannot be fo well obtain'd with', 
 out it. 
 
 But then, it lies on our Adverfarics to 
 make full Proof of this Point, " That a Re- 
 " velation, cannot poffibly be of any Ser- 
 " vice to us." They fhould fhew, that no 
 important Dodrine can poffibly be inculcated 
 this Way, which might not be as well de- 
 duced from the Principles of human Reafon ; 
 - — no Precepts given, which Men were noC 
 
 equally concerned to obferve before ; • 
 
 nothing of any kind dcclar'd, which every 
 Man could not perfectly and eafily difcover 
 
 without this Aid ; no Means, no Af- 
 
 B 3 fiilances^ 
 
6 y^DEFENCEo/ 
 
 fifiances, no Enforcements with Regard to a 
 virtuous Life afforded, which did not lie 
 clearly before Men's Minds antecedently to 
 any Revelation about them. All thefe Par- 
 ticulars, befides feveral others of a like Na- 
 ture, ought to be evinc'd beyond Exception : 
 And whether The Gentleman I am no>v con- 
 cerned with hath lucceeded in this, is the 
 Point in Qijeftion. 
 
 It may not be improper to reprefent This 
 Gentleman's Scheme Ibmewhat more diftind- 
 ly ; the principal Branches of which, are, I 
 conceive, truly exprefs'd in the following 
 Propofitions. 
 
 Prop. I. God always intended Men Ihould 
 have fome Religion. 
 
 1. This Religion is the Religion of Nature. 
 
 3. The Religion of Nature is abfolutcly 
 per feci. 
 
 4. As fuch, it muft be immutable ; nei- 
 ther capable of having any of its Precepts 
 canceird, nor of receiving any additional 
 Precepts. 
 
 5. Therefore, if any Revelation be vouch- 
 fafed us, it muft entirely fall in with The 
 Religion of Nature. 
 
 6. This Religion of Nature is eafily, and 
 perfectly difcoverable by every Man, even 
 by thoie of the meaneft Capacity. 
 
 7. It is more eafily, and more perfe£tly 
 difcoverable by every Man, than either the 
 Proof or lyleaningof any Revelation can be. 
 
 From 
 
ReVEAl'd PvELlGIOK, &C. 7 
 
 From whence he would have us infer, 
 
 8. That a Revelaiion is perfectly needlcls, 
 and fupcrfluous. 
 
 I do by no Means affirm that every thing 
 advanc'd by This Gentleman, in the Per- 
 formance now before me, is indeed reduci- 
 ble to the foregoing; Proportions ; but only, 
 that they contain the principal Branches of 
 his Scheme ; that they give us a real Viev/ 
 both of the End he aims at, and the feveral 
 Steps by which he purfues this End. This 
 is all which I think myfelf concern'd wiih 
 here : And if I can fucceed ^o far as to fup- 
 port the Caufe of Religion againft the At- 
 tempts made on it in thele feveral Articles, 
 I Ihall gain what I contend for j and this 
 Work will anfwer the Title I have fet be- 
 fore it. 
 
 As I have already unfolded the Scheme 
 which I defign to examine, and by reducing 
 it to a few Propofitions have brought it into 
 View at once, fo it will be equally proper 
 for me to give the Reader forne Infight into 
 the Particulars of mine own Management. 
 
 I propofe therefore to give iome Satisfac- 
 tion to the following Enquiries ; 
 
 1. What we are to underftand by The 
 Law or Religion, of Nature ; FYom whence 
 the Obligation of it arifes ; and how far it 
 extends. 
 
 2. Whether This Religion of Nature be 
 abiblucely perfcd. 
 
 B 4 3. Whc- 
 
8 A DEFENCE of 
 
 3. Whether it be immutable, in fuch a 
 Senfe ss to be incapable of admitting any 
 additional Precepts. 
 
 Under this Head I fhall handle the Cafe 
 of Podtive Precepts in Matters of Religion. 
 
 4. Whether Natural, and Reveal'd Reli- 
 gion be necefTarily One and the fam.e ; and 
 if not, wherein the proper Diftinclion be- 
 tween them doth conlift. 
 
 5. W^hether a proper Rule of Life be 
 eafily, and perfectly difcoverable by every 
 Man, even by thofe of the meaneft Ca- 
 pacity. 
 
 6. Whether it be more eafily, and more 
 perfectly difcoverable by every Man, than 
 the Proof, or Meaning of any Revelation 
 can be. 
 
 7. Whether a Revelation be not expedient 
 in order to a more eafy, more perfect, and 
 more general Knowledge of this Rule of 
 X.ife. 
 
 8. Whether a Revelation be not expe- 
 dient in order to enforce the general Pradice 
 of this Rule. 
 
 ■ lo which I fnall add, 
 
 Laftly, Whether there be fufiicient Grounds 
 to believe the Reality of a Revelation, and 
 efpecially of the Chrillian. 
 
 My Defign being thus far explaln'd, I fliall 
 now purfue thefe feveral Particulars in their 
 proper Order, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 9 
 
 CHAP, L 
 
 What ^ve are to underjland hy Tloe 
 La^^ or Religion of Nature 3 From 
 whence the Obligation of it arifes 3 
 and ho'dv far it extends. 
 
 H E Law of Mature, and The Re^ 
 I'lgion oj 'Nature are Terms promif- 
 caoufly us'd by this Gentleman ; 
 and fo far as this I follow him 
 readily. Only thus much Ihould be obferv'd, 
 that all along, when I fpeak of Religion, I 
 would be underflood to include as well the 
 Dodrines as the Precepts of it : Which 
 Dodrines being not merely fpeculative, but 
 having a greater or lefs Influence on Prac- 
 tice, fhould be confider'd, Either as Princi- 
 ples from which moral Rules follow as Con- 
 clufions ; or, as Means, by attending to 
 which Men are encourag'd to moral Duties. 
 Thefe are not peculiar to Reveal'd Religion, 
 but make a confiderable Part even of Na- 
 tural, 
 
 I know 
 
10 ^DEFENCE o/ 
 
 I know a Diftinclion is ufually made be- 
 tween Dodiines and Duties ; and a Diftincti- 
 on there doubtlefs is between them. Yet 
 ftill it fliould be remembered how clofely 
 they are connected together ; and that many 
 of thefe Duties themfelves cannot be per- 
 ceiv'd diftindly, or difcharg'd advantage- 
 oufly without the Behef and Influence of 
 thefe Dodrines. Men are concerned there- 
 fore to fearch out and to difcover fuch Points, 
 as far as they are by them difcoverable ; To 
 render them familiar to their Minds, when 
 difcover'd ; To purfue them thro' all their 
 proper Confequences ; and to fuffer them to 
 have fuch ati Effed on their Gondud and 
 Behaviour as xhey have a dired Tendency to 
 prod Qce. 
 
 To proceed ; The Term Religion may be 
 confidcr'd, Either as it fignifies that com- 
 prehenfive Rule, to which v.x fhould con- 
 form our Sentiments and Adions, in refe- 
 rence to God and Man ; or elfe, as it implies 
 the inward and habitual Senfe we have of 
 thefe Matters on our Minds. Our Author in 
 different Places ufes this Term in each of 
 thefe different Senfes. But, to avoid Gonfu- 
 fion, I fhall confine mylclf to the former ; 
 fince we are now debating about the Rule 
 itfelf, and enquiring " What Syiiem of 
 " Dodrines and Precepts we ought to em- 
 " brace as our Religion." 
 
 ' ■ Having 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 1 1 
 
 Having fettled this Term, I am to ob- 
 ferve, in the next Place, That the Lazv, or 
 Rellgton of Nature is fo call'd, Either, be- 
 caule it is founded in the Reaion hnd Nature 
 of Things; or elfe, becaufe it is difcover- 
 able by us in the Ufe and Exereife of thofc 
 Faculties which we enjoy. The Religion of 
 Nature, as it is confider'd in thefc dilfcrenc 
 Views, will import quite different Things. 
 In the former, it fignities a Perfect Collection 
 of all thofe moral Doctrines and Precepts 
 which have a Foundation in the Reafon and 
 Nature of Things : But in the latter, it is 
 fuch a Collection only, as may be discover 'd 
 by lis in the Exereife of our proper Facul- 
 ties, according to the Means and Opportuni- 
 ties we enjoy. 
 
 Our Author was aware of thefe feveral 
 Senles of the Term. He hath noted and 
 cbferv'd them both : But then he hath pro- 
 ceeded fo unhappily, that whilit In the Be- 
 ginning of his Work he defines it in One 
 Senfe, the Courfe of his Argument moil 
 plainly requires Another Senfe : And in fome 
 Places he exprefly, and in Words, gives it a 
 Meaning different from what he had before 
 deliver'd in his Definition of the Term. I 
 fhall confirm this Remark by fome Citations 
 from this Author's Performance. 
 
 He begins his Second Chapter with an Ex- 
 plication of what lie means by T'he ReJigion 
 of ISIatHi'e. " By Natural Hehg'wn^ iaith he, 
 '' 1 underftand the Belief of the Exiftence 
 
1 z A DEFENCE of 
 
 *' of a God ; and the Senfe and Practice of 
 *■' thofe Duties, which refuit from theKnovv- 
 '' iedgc we by OUR REASON have of 
 *' him and his Perfedions ; and of ourfelves, 
 '' and our own Imperfedions, and of the Rc- 
 *' lation we ftand in to him and our Fellow 
 *^ Creatures." A 1 3. According to this Ac- 
 count, Natural Religion can reach no far- 
 ther than Natural Light and Reafon can 
 carry us : For it comprehends under it thofe 
 Duties only, which refuit from the Know- 
 ledge we by our Recifon have of God, and his 
 Perfedions, &c. 
 
 Yet, notwithftanding this plain Expreflion 
 of his Meaning, he immediately fubjoins, 
 *>' So that the Religion of Nature takes in 
 " every thing that is founded in the Reafon 
 
 " and Nature of Things." What ! 
 
 doth the Religion of Nature take in every 
 thing that is founded in the Reafon and Na- 
 ture of Things, when, according to this Gen- 
 tleman's own Account, it reaches no farther 
 than we by our Reafon are able to carry it ? 
 And if it reaches no farther than we by our 
 Reafon can carry it, doch it therefore follow, 
 that it takes in every thing which is founded 
 in the Nature and Reafon of Things ? I 
 know but one Way to get over this DifFi- 
 culty ; v'lt. by afferting roundly, that Hu^ 
 man Keajon is commenfurate to all Truth ; 
 and that we by cur Reafon are capable of dif- 
 coverini^ cvcr}^ thing which is founded in the 
 Nature and Rcafons of Things. 
 
 This 
 
Reveal'd Religion, (^c, ij 
 
 This is not the only Place in which this 
 Gentleman hath adventured to give us diffe- 
 rent Accounts of the Religion of Nature* 
 Thus, P. 37<S. he alTerts, " The Law of 
 *' Nature is nothing but what the Light of 
 " Nature, or Reafon diclates/' And yet, he 
 had maintain'd before, P. 114, " That Na- 
 '' tural Religion takes in all thofe Duties, 
 " which flow from the Nature and Reafon 
 ** of Things ; and the Relation we ftand in 
 " to God and our Fellow-Creatures." The 
 former Account, he faw plainly, would by 
 no Means anfvver his Purpole. He could not 
 prove the Law, or P^eligion of Nature to 
 be, in That Senfe, an ab/olutely perfef^ Law. 
 A fundamental Point in the Scheme he was 
 upon could not receive the leaft Appearance 
 of Support, but from this other Notion of 
 the Law of Nature. He varies therefore his 
 Account of this Point, as may beft ferve a 
 prefent Purpole. He defines it in one Senle; 
 and then reafons, and concludes liom it in 
 another. 
 
 In order to State this Matter more truly, 
 and to fettle the proper Notion of The Law, 
 or Religion of Nature, (as it bears a Part in 
 the prefent Queftion,) I fhall diftindly con- 
 fider it in both the Views already men- 
 tioned. 
 
 The lirft Senfe, is This; It (ignifies a pcr- 
 fed CoUedion of all thofe moral Dodrincs, 
 and Precepts, which have a real P'oundation 
 
 in 
 3 
 
14 A DEFENCE of 
 
 in the Nature and Realbn of Things. This 
 is what the prelent R. R. Lord Bifhop of 
 Bavgor muft be underilood to intend, when 
 he calls it " That Original Religion, which 
 *' was as Old as the Creation/' \_Sermon he^ 
 fore the Society jor Propagating the Gofpel^ 
 p. 13.] and afterwards, when he tells us, 
 " That [Chriil] came into the World, not 
 *' merely to reiiore the Religion of Nature, 
 " but to adapt it to the State and Condition 
 *' of Man ; and to fupply the Defeds Not 
 ** of Religion, which continued in its iirft 
 " Purity, and Perfection, but of Nature." 
 f' 10. If by Religion of Nature His Lord- 
 fhip had not intended iuch a perfed' Collec- 
 tion of all thofe moral Truths, and Precepts, 
 which I have menticn'd above, He would 
 never have aflerted, that this Religion [ftill] 
 continued in its firit Purity and Perfedtion ; 
 and that our BleiTed Saviour did not come 
 to fupply the Defeats of It, but of Na- 
 ture. 
 
 The Term is iis'd in the fame Senfe by 
 another very Learned Writer • who, (in his 
 Difcourfe concerning The Nature^ Obligation^ 
 and Efficacy of the Chriflian Sacraments^ V'9) 
 tells us, " That many the Scripture Duties 
 " which we have otherwiie no Knowledge 
 " of, are yet juftly refcrr'd to the Law of 
 " Nature ; fince Scripture' hath difcover'd 
 " what Foundation thcv have in the Nature 
 '' and Truth of Things," 
 
 Our 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 15 
 
 Our Author himfelf, as I obferv'd juft 
 now, hath, in fevcral Parts of his Perfor- 
 mance, confider'd the Law or Religion of 
 Nature in this View ^ and pretended to draw 
 Conclufions from it, taken in this Senfe, in 
 Prejudice of Divine Revelation. 
 
 in Oppofition to what he maintains I fliall 
 therefore obferve, 
 
 I. That this Notion is entirely wrong, as 
 us'd and apply 'd by this Writer. And, 
 
 1. Were it the true one, yet it will not 
 come up to his Purpofe j nor really fupport 
 the Conclufions he draws from it. 
 
 P'irft then, this Notion, as apply'd by the 
 prefcnt Writer, is wrong. He tells us, that 
 " Natural and Reveal'd Religion differ only 
 " as to the Manner of their being com- 
 
 " municated." p. 5. That, " the Divine 
 
 " Precepts mufl be the fame, whether inter- 
 " nally or externally reveal'd : '' p. p. And 
 it is the great Defign of his whole Perfor- 
 mance to prove, that an external Revelation 
 is needlefs, becaufe every thing, in which 
 we can poflibiy have any Concern, is com- 
 jirehended under That Law or Religion, 
 which is founded in Nature, and as Old as 
 the Creation. I would obferve from hence, 
 That Natural and Reveal'd Religion are here 
 both of them fuppofed to be comtnanicated ; 
 
 That the Divine Precepts (as he terms 
 
 them) in both, are fuppofed to be equally 
 reveafd^ in the one internally^ in the other 
 
 extemally j 
 
i(S yfDEFENCEo/ 
 
 externally ^ and, that to prove an exter-^ 
 
 nal Revelation needlefs, becaufe every thing 
 we can have any Concern in, is compre- 
 hended under That Law which is founded 
 in Nature, muft evidently imply, that we do, 
 or may know what is contained under that 
 Law: Otherwife an external Revelation may 
 be highly ferviceable in order to dilcover 
 thole Matters, which cannot be known with- 
 out it ; and fo the Conclulion which he draws, 
 will not feem to have the leaft Relation to 
 the. Principle laid down. 
 
 Natural Religion therefore muft fignify 
 Such a Collection of Doctrines and Precepts, 
 as is difcoverable by us in the Ufe of our 
 natural Faculties. It cannot include every 
 thing which is founded in the Reafon and 
 Nature of Things, unlefs every thing fo 
 founded is by us difcoverable. And tho* it 
 ihould be allowed, that every thing of that 
 Kind is really difcoverable by us, yet ftill 
 thefe Matters will conftitute the Law or Re- 
 ligion of Nature, i. e. will be to us The 
 Law of Nature, Not merely as founded in 
 the Nature of Things, but as we have Abi% 
 lities to difcover that they are fo. 
 
 Every one knows that Promulgation is 
 e.Tential to a Law. NothinG; therefore can^. 
 ftriCtly fpeaking, be Part of a Law, which 
 is incapable of being known to be fuch. 
 And tho' human Magiftrates content theni- 
 felves with making a publick Declarati.pn,J^f, 
 
 their 
 
Reveal'd Rfxigion, &c, 17 
 
 their Will, and do not enter into the parti- 
 cular Opportunities of each (ingle Perfon to 
 difcern it, yet the Cafe is othervvife with re- 
 gard to the Supreme Being. Ignorance may- 
 be pleaded in a human Court, in Cafes, where 
 Men cannot pollibly judge concerning the 
 Truth and Reafonablenefs of the Plea. They 
 are oblig'd therefore to fet all Pretences of 
 this Kind afide \ and fometimes to lay Hard- 
 fhips on the Innocent, that they may not 
 give too many Advantages to the Guilty. 
 But God knov/s thoroughly the Capacities 
 and Opportunities of all his Subjeds. To 
 him therefore are they accountable for their 
 Conformity to thole Rules only, which they 
 did know, or might have known to be his 
 Will : For Things entirely out of their Reach, 
 are, with regard to them, no Matters of 
 Law, and carry with them no Obligation 
 at all. 
 
 If this be not thought fo clear, as to fu- 
 perfede all Occafion of Proof whatfoever, 
 let us only confider, upon what Account it 
 is, that Brutes are exempted from moral Obli- 
 gation, and the Reftraints of Law. It is not, 
 that a certain Rule and Meafure of Adion 
 would not really add to the Happinefs they 
 enjoy at prefent^ or better fecure their En- 
 joyments to them. It is not, that they are 
 abfolutely unfurnifh'd with natural Powers of 
 doing any thing, either to promote each 
 Other's Good, or to prevent each other's Mif- 
 
 C chief, 
 
i8 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 chief, on any Occafion whatfoeyer. No 7 
 This is far from being the real State of the 
 Cafe. But the Point refts here : They are 
 not endu'd with fuch Meafures, and Degrees 
 of Reafon, as may enable them to judge 
 concerning the Caufes and Confequences of 
 Things. They are neither capable of form- 
 ing to themfelves a Rule j nor of difcover- 
 ing a Law-giver ; nor of having the Rule 
 enforc'd on them by the Profped of future 
 Good or 111, They neither know a God, 
 nor can difcern his Will at all, Kow, if 
 Brutes are Therefore exempt from all Law 
 Avhatfoever, becaufe they are ablblutely in- 
 capable of knowing it ; what Conclufion can 
 we draw from hence but This, That all other 
 Beings are juft fo far oblig'd, as they, in their 
 Circumftances, are capable of knowing a Law; 
 or, in other Words, that nothing can pofli- 
 bly become Matter of Law to any one, which 
 he is abfolutely incapable of knowing. 
 
 Let us afcend from Brutes to Men. Ideots, 
 and Mad-men are like wife exempt from mo- 
 ral Obligation ; and treated as Perfons en- 
 tirely unaccountable even by Civil Powers, 
 in all thofe Cafes, where the Want of Reafon 
 is clear, and indifputablc. But whence, I 
 pray, doth this arife ? Is it not built on this 
 Principle, that no one is accountable for not 
 conforming his Adions to a Rule entirely 
 above his Comprehenfion ? 
 
 Once 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 19 
 
 Once more ; I would defire to know, How 
 far Children, in their more tender Years, may- 
 be reckoned as moral Agents. At firfl: not at 
 all ; no more than even Brutes thcmfelves. 
 They are put under juft the fame Reflraints 
 as Brutes are ; and by no Means left to their 
 own Condud or Difcretion. As Reafoii 
 opens, and proper Rules are fuggefted to 
 them, which they are able to difcern, and to 
 retain, they become gradually accountable ; 
 They are fo far ftridly and properly oblig'd : 
 And, as Reafon is ftill farther improved, and 
 more learnt, their Obligations are enlarged : 
 'Till, at length, when they come to Matu-^ 
 rity, they are freed from the ordinary Re- 
 ftraints of Difciplinc ; are turn'd over to their 
 own Condud; and confider'd on the fame 
 Foot with other Men. But, whence all this ? 
 "Whence is it that Law and Obligation do 
 not commence with our very Being j but are 
 gradually enlarg'd, in Proportion to thofe 
 Degrees of Reafon which v/e acquire ? The 
 Cafe is plain enough : Obligation cannot 
 reach farther than a Capacity of Knowledge ; 
 and Law cannot be extended farther than 
 Obligation itfelf reaches. To fuppofe a Law, 
 in regard to us, without a Capacity of dif- 
 cerning it, is altogether as abfurd, as to make 
 Things impoffible the Subjed, and Matter of 
 Law. 
 
 Our Author himfelf is not infenfible of 
 this 5 F Or he tells us, p. 4. That " a Law, 
 
 C a "as 
 
lo A DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 *' as far as it is unintelligible, ceafes to be a 
 " Law/* What therefore he calls The Law 
 of Nature, muft, with refped to us, ceafe 
 to be a Law any farther than it is by us in- 
 telligible ; or, (as I fliould rather chufe to 
 expreft it,) any farther than it is by us dif^ 
 coverable in the Ufe of Reafon. 
 
 I cannot but obferve, as I go along, our 
 Author's Condud on this Point. He tells 
 us, 
 
 *' God hath given Men a Law. 
 " This Law is The Law of Nature. 
 " This Law of Nature takes in every 
 " thing founded in the Reafon and Nature 
 ■" of Things. 
 
 " Therefore, Every thing founded in the 
 " Reafon and Nature of Things niufl be by 
 " us difcoverable. 
 
 " Otherwife, This Law of Nature will 
 " ceafe to be a Law. ^^'^-^^^^f- 
 
 " For nothing can be a Law which is un- 
 " intelligible." 
 
 Let us only afTume this laft Principle as 
 undoubtedly true, (and our Author will allow 
 us thus much, lince he hath plainly laid it 
 down himfelf,) the Confequence from hence 
 is clear ; If^ we are not capable of difcover- 
 ing every thing which is founded in the Rea- 
 fon -and Nature of Things ; then, fuch a 
 perfed Colledion of Precepts, &€> as was 
 mencion'd before, is not properly The Law 
 of Nature. 
 
 It 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 21 
 
 It is true indeed, our Author maintains, 
 that every thing of that Kind is difcoverable 
 by us : And the Caufe why it is not in Fad 
 difcovered, is only This ; Men will not 
 make Ufe of their Reafon for thofe Purpofes 
 for which it might and ought to ferve. But 
 to Affert is one Thing, and to Prove is ano- 
 ther. Surely This will not pals for a firft 
 and felf-evident Principle. Something there- 
 fore ought to be alledg'd in Support of a 
 Point, which the Generality of Mankind will 
 be very apt to queftion. -.^^^^ ^.^^ 
 
 Now, what is alledg'd by our Author to 
 this Purpofe, is This ; " If God hath given 
 " Mankind a Law, he muft in like Manner 
 " have given them fufficient Means of know- 
 " ing it ; He would otherwife have defeat- 
 " ed his own Intent in giving it." p. 4. The 
 Confequence I allow ; and that for the Rea- 
 fon immediately fubjoin'd, that " a Law as 
 " far as it is unintelligible ceafes to be a 
 " Law." The Gentleman's Error therefore 
 lies in This : He iirft fuppofes a certain Law 
 given ; and then proper Means afforded for 
 difcovering this Law ; whereas, in Truth, 
 To give a Law \ fo promulge it ^ or T'o afford 
 Means of hnowifig it^ do fignify one and the 
 fame Thing. What we are capable of dif- 
 covering to be fit and reafon able ^ and con- 
 fequently, to be the Will of God, is to us a 
 Law : What we caniiot lb difcover, is to us 
 na Law ; And if we cannot, in the mere Ufe 
 
 C 3 of 
 
11 ^/^ DEFENCE o/ " 
 
 of Reafon, difcover every thing which is 
 founded in the real Truth and Nature of 
 Things, then a perfed Colleclion of that 
 Kind, is not the Law of Nature. The Ar- 
 gument therefore, which our Author here 
 produces, amounts to nothing : It leaves the 
 Point jufl as it found it : And we mufl try, 
 from other Confiderations, whether Men have 
 really fafficient natural Abilities, and Oppor- 
 tunities to difcover every thing which is 
 founded in Nature. 
 
 The fame kind of Reafoning, which I have 
 noted above, occurs again, p, 5. I Ihall beg 
 Leave to tranlciibe the whole Paffage, be- 
 caufe I may findOccafion of Advantage from 
 a particular Sentence ; in which, (though he' 
 intended it as a Guard,) he hath fuggefted 
 fomething, not very conliftent either with 
 his general Defign, or the particular Argu- 
 ment he is there reprefentmg. " If, faith 
 he, God never intended Mankind fhould 
 at any time be without a Religion, or have 
 falfe Relieions ; and there be but One true 
 Religion, which all Men have been ever 
 bound to believe and profefs ; I cannot 
 fee any Heterodoxy in affirming, that the 
 Means to eftect this End of infinite Wif- 
 dom muft be as univerfal and extenfive as 
 the End itfeif; Or, that all Men, at all 
 Times, muft have had fufficient Means to 
 difcover vvhateverGod defign'd They fhould 
 know and pradife. / do not m?an by this^ tha'e 
 
 U all 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 23 
 
 '' all Jhould have equal Ktiowkdge^ but that: 
 *' alljhould have what is fuffictent for the Cir- 
 " cumflances they are hi," The Argument 
 carryM on in this PalTage is the fame with- 
 that infifted on juft before, tho' our Author 
 hath thought fit to give it a Turn fomewhat 
 different in the Expreffion. In the former 
 Way of Reprefentation, he fuppofes a Law 
 actually given ; and then infers, that God 
 muft have given fufiicient Means of l<:nowing 
 it. Here he fuppofes, that God always in- 
 tended Men lliould have fome Religion ; 
 which Religion he farther fuppofes can be, 
 but One • from hence likewife he infers, that 
 all Men, at all Times, mull have had fufii- 
 cient Means to difcover it. •- 
 
 1^0 give a Law ; ■ T'o give a Religion ; 
 
 and To intend Menjhould have a Religio}/^ are: 
 Exprellions which niuft be interpreted ia 
 one and the fame Senfe. And the Law, ■ or 
 Religion which this Author afiirms God gave 
 Men, and intended they iliould have, is re- 
 prefented by him as abfolutely perfect, and 
 containing under it every thing which is 
 founded in the Reafon and Nature of Things. 
 He concludes from hefice, If infinite Wif- 
 dom hath appointed this End, then the 
 Means to cffed it niufl: be as iiniverfal as the 
 End i^felf. 
 
 I have remark'd on this Argument already ; 
 and therefore fliall only obferve farther, that 
 (he following Paflagc, which is intended by 
 
 G ^ thist 
 
24 /^ DEFENCE of .A 
 
 this Gentleman as a Guard to fave himfelf, en- 
 tirely deftroys the Defign he is upon, and the' 
 Argument he hath produc'd. " I do not, laith 
 '' he, mean by this, That all fhould have 
 ^ equal Knowledge ; but that all fhould 
 " have fufficient for the Circumftances they 
 '* are in." But, by this Gentleman's Leave, 
 if God gave Men a Religion, or intended 
 they fhou'd have a Religion ; if this Religion 
 contains under it every thing which is founded 
 in the Reafon and Nature of Things ; and, if all 
 Men, at all Times, muft have fufficient Means 
 
 of difcovering this Religion ; They muft 
 
 likewife have fufficient Means of difcovering 
 every thing which is founded in the Nature 
 and Reafon of Things. It follows from 
 hence, that all Men muft have the Means 
 and Opportunities of equal Knowledge .♦ I do 
 not fay, They muft have equal Knowledge, 
 but only the Means of it ; which Means they 
 may, if they pleafe, neglect. It is in this 
 Senfe our Author ought to be underftood, 
 tho' he hath exprefs'd himfelf in an improper 
 Manner. " All Men, faith he, muft have 
 <* fufficient Means to difcover whatever God 
 
 *« defign'd, (S'<r. " Then it follows, — - " I 
 
 *' don't mean that all fhould have equal 
 ♦' Knowledge^ [the Courfe of his Argument 
 requires it ftiould be the Means of equal 
 Knowledge^ but that all fliould have fuffi- 
 <* cient for the Circumftances they are in." 
 How confiftent this is with the Argument 
 ;*,;* he 
 
&'^y 
 
 Reveal'd Religion, '&c. 25 
 
 he is here upon, The Gentleman is concern'd 
 
 to fheW. t /:V(;j 
 
 Hitherto I have obferv'd, that we neith^ 
 are, nor poflibly can be oblig'd to any thing, 
 for the Knowledge of which we want either 
 Abilities, or Opportunity ; and confequcntly, 
 That the Law, or Religion of Nature, taken 
 in that Senfe, in which it ought to be un- 
 derftood in the prefent Debate, muft fignify 
 Such a Syftem, as Man may, in the due Vfe 
 of his natural Faculties, dilcover. Whether 
 Thefe will reach to every Thing founded in 
 the real Nature and Reafon of Things 
 comes now to be conlider'd more diftindly. 
 
 Our Author endeavours to dilcover what 
 is founded in the Nature and Realbn of 
 
 Things, by confidering The Exiftence, 
 
 and Perfedions of God ; The Nature, 
 
 and Imperfedions of ourfelves ; and. 
 
 The Relation we ftand in to God, and our 
 Fellow-Creatures. [See Chapter 2.] To which 
 he ought to have added one Thing farther, 
 viz. The Nature of all other Beings with 
 which we have any Concern, and from the 
 Ufe and Application of which we are capa- 
 ble of receiving any confiderable Advantage, 
 or Prejudice : For, without this, we Ihail be 
 liable to do or omit a great Number of 
 Things of the moft important Confequence 
 both to ourfelves and others. A 
 
 And, firft, for the Exiftence and Perfec- 
 tions of God ) Ic is confefs'd on all Hands 
 
 that 
 
26 A DEFENCE of 
 
 that fome Light may be had here. It may 
 be prov'd, That there muft have been 
 a Firft, Independent^ Eternal Principle ; 
 
 . That This Being is every where ; 
 
 ' knows every thing ; is ab- 
 
 folutely Powerful, Wife, Juft, Good, and 
 the like. Things of this Kind may be dil^ 
 coverM : And it may be fhewn likewife, 
 That this firft Being muft be pofTefs'd of 
 every real Perfedion, in all the Degrees of it 
 which are poftible. Yet, however certain it 
 be in the general, that every real Perfedion 
 muft neceffarily belong to God, I queftion 
 very much whether we are able to difcover 
 diftindly what all thefe Perfections are. I 
 queftion whether it can be fafely affirmed. 
 That as the before-mention'd Atrributes, and 
 the like, do belong to God, fo likewife that 
 there are none others befide Thefe, which be- 
 long to him. To know This we muft have 
 a full and comprchenfive View of all Per- 
 fedion ; of every thing which can de- 
 
 fcrve that Charader. But if we fail here, 
 as we are deficient in our Knowledge of the 
 Nature -of Things, fo muft we likewife be 
 of their feveral Refults and Confequences ; 
 and therefore ftiall be unable, by our Reafon, 
 to difcover every thing that is founded in 
 the Natures and Reafons of Things. 
 
 Again ; As to thofe Perfedions which 
 may be prov'd to belong to God, I doubt 
 much whether we have any adequate and 
 
 compleat 
 
Reveal^'d Religion, &c, 27 
 
 compleat Ideas of them. This perhaps will 
 readily be allovv'd me with regard to his na- 
 tural Perfettions : And if it be difputed in 
 reference to thofe which are of a Moral 
 Kind, I would only defire to obferve, that 
 however fully we may be fuppos'd to under- 
 ftand what thefe Attributes mean, yet there 
 muft be feveral other Things likewife difco- 
 ver'd in order to know How they will be 
 exercised on emergent Occafions. Thus, fup- 
 pofing it ftridly demonftrable that God is 
 Juft and Good ^ and that the full Import of 
 thefe Attributes is likewife known ^ yet we 
 muft know what is, in every Cafe, Jufl and 
 Good, before we can determine in what Man- 
 ner God muft ad or condud himfelf ; and 
 confequently, what may be moft fitting for 
 Creatures to exped, or do, on fucli Occa- 
 fions. Here therefore we are incompetent 
 Judges of Matters founded on the Natures 
 and Reafons of Things. 
 
 Once more ; We do, or may know,That there 
 is a God j and that This God can be but One, 
 There is no Mannerof Gontradidionin fuppo- 
 fmg fome fuch Diftindions in the Divine Na- 
 ture as are analogous to perfonal Diftindions 
 amongft Men : And yet, it cannot be prov'd, 
 from any Principles of Human Reafon, that 
 fuch Diftindions do really fubfift. Now if 
 
 fuch do fubfift in Fad ; and each Per- 
 
 fon, fo fubfifting, hath different Offices, and 
 bears a different Relation to Mankind, then 
 %l is apparent there will be fomething in the 
 
 Divine 
 
i8 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Divine Nature undifcoverable by Human 
 
 ReafoQ ; fomething, which as foon as 
 
 known, may prove the Foundation of parti- 
 cular and special Duties. This is what The 
 Chriftian Religion teaches ; and in Confe- 
 quence of This, Things are required in this 
 Difpenfation, which could not be learnt from 
 the mere Reafonings of our own Minds about 
 them. 
 
 The next Thing which our Author confi- 
 ders, is, The Nature and Imperfedions of 
 ourfelves. Here it might be expeded we 
 Ihould have a full View of Matters ; for, 
 what can be thoroughly known by us, if we 
 do not know ourfelves ? And yet perhaps a 
 great Number of Qiieftions may be ftarted, 
 of which no tolerable Solution can be given-^j^ 
 and Qiieftions too, from the Determination' 
 of which no fmali Advantage might arife. 
 
 To explain myfelf a little here ; I will 
 confider Man in thefe Two Refpeds, viz. as 
 an Animal cndu'd with Senfe and Percep- 
 tion J and likewife as endu'd with a Princi- 
 ple of Reafon. The former he enjoys in 
 common with Brutes, but the latter fets 
 him above them, and gives him his proper 
 Charader and Diftindion. -''• 
 
 In reference to both thefe it muft be al- 
 lowed, that each Man for himfelf is confcious 
 of what happens to him, or paffes within 
 him ; and we are apt to prcfume, that as the 
 o-eneral Frame and Make of human Kind is 
 the fame, fo the fame Pkafures or Pauis arife 
 
 to 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 20 
 
 to diJBTerent Men from the fame Imprellions 
 
 of external Objeds ; That they have 
 
 equal Capacity of Realbn and Knowledge; 
 and enjoy or fuffer alike from the fame Stn- 
 timents of Things. Yet it is moft certain 
 that there is a vaft Difference between Men 
 in thefe feveral Refpeds ; and fiich, as no 
 Perfon in the World can adjufl and fettle. 
 The fame Things, to different Peribns, may 
 prove either agreeable, or difagreeable, /. e. 
 Good, or Evil : And as we are not entirely 
 ^acquainted with thefe Particulars, fo we can- 
 not exadly know How to regulate our own 
 Behaviour towards them. 
 
 General Rules may be laid down, viz. To 
 
 do as much Good as we can, and as 
 
 little Mifchief as poflible : Yet ftill, for want 
 of knowing what is the real State and Condi- 
 tion of each particular Peribn, we may err 
 in the Application of thefe general Rules ; 
 and become unavoidably ignorant of feveral 
 Matters, which have a real Ground in the 
 Natures and Reafons of Things. 
 
 I have obferv'd before, that Men, not- 
 withftanding they are Reafonable Beings, 
 are yet poffefs'd of various Degrees of Rea- 
 fon. And tho' we are conlbious of; our own 
 •perfonal Powers or Attainments, yet we. are 
 far from knowing how Matters really ftand 
 with other Men. Here is another Source of 
 Difficulties. We cannot, in many Inftances, 
 determine What- Men ought, or ought not 
 -!• to 
 
50 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 to do ; or how far they are either to be 
 commended, or cenfur'd. In many Points 
 they muft be left to an higher Judge; be- 
 caufe the true State of Matters is entirely 
 beyond our Reach. 
 
 Once more ; A confiderable Part of Men's 
 real Characters will arii'e either from their 
 -private Condud, or from that which palTes 
 within their own Minds ; and confequently, 
 it is impoffible to lay, in many Inftances, 
 who is really a Good, or a Bad Man. In 
 fuch Cafes as thefe we are concerned to ufe 
 the beft Light we have, and to ad accord- 
 ingly. Yet, if we could fee farther into 
 Matters, we fiiould reaibnably proceed in a 
 different Way : Different Meafures would 
 appear to be proper for us, arifing from luch 
 Reafons, as in the prefent State are entirely 
 concealed from us. 
 
 From conlidering the Nature and Imper- 
 feclions of Men, our Author goes on, and 
 mentions another Source of Duty, viz. The 
 Relation we Hand* in to God and our Fellow- 
 Creatures. 
 
 The Firfl and Original Relation in which 
 we ftand to God, is that of a Creature to his 
 Creator : But This will infer nothing, unlefs 
 we confider God likewife as exercifing a Pro- 
 vidence over us ; as noting and obferv- 
 
 ing our Adions ; — - as prefcribing a Rule 
 to them ; and exading an Obedience to it. 
 
 This 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. ^i 
 
 This then is the firft thing which arifes 
 frcftn our Relation to God, That we pay an 
 unfeign'd Obedience to his Will ; but where^ 
 in this Will confifts, ftill remains to be en- 
 quir'd. To this Purpofe then it Ihould be 
 confider'd, that in order to prove a Provi- 
 dence, in the full Senfe of the Word, we 
 are obligM to evince the feveral Perfedions 
 of the Divine Nature ^ at leaft thofe which 
 relate to us ; fuch as are. Power, Knowledge, 
 Wifdom, Juftice, Goodnefs, Truth. From 
 thefe it will follow. That we ought to Love 
 
 him, to Reverence him, to Truft 
 
 in him, to Worfhip him, and the like.' 
 
 So far as this, I hope, there will be no Dis- 
 pute. 
 
 But then we fhould confider likewife, that 
 as God is known to be related to us as a 
 Creator and Preferver, fo there may, (for 
 uny thing we can affirm to the contrary,) 
 be feveral other Relations to us which He 
 fuftains. He may be related to us as a Re- 
 deemer and a San6lifier. I know thefe Points 
 are entirely exploded by The Gentleman I 
 am now concerned with : But it is much 
 cafier to laugh at a Do<ftnne than to refute 
 it. It fhould be prov'd therefore that the 
 Notions of a Redeemer and a Sandifier are 
 utterly abfurd and contradidious ; otherwife 
 thefe Dodrines may pofiibly be true. And 
 if we have fufficient external Evidence thiit 
 they are fo, we may claim a Right of aflign- 
 
 ing 
 
ji /^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 ing fome other Relations of God to us, than 
 thole founded in Creation and Prefervation. 
 
 Let us fuppofe then, that Thefe Relations 
 do fubfift, and fee what may be the Confe- 
 quences arifing from them. If it be faid, 
 that Duty will he ftill the fame, the Afler- 
 tion may perhaps be true in a certain Senfe. 
 No Duties may arife of a different Kind from 
 thofe deduciblc from Creation and Preferva- 
 tion. Yet it will be apparent at firft Sight, 
 that here will be new Enforcements and Re- 
 commendations of Duty ; and new Reafons 
 for the punctual Performance of them. If 
 thefe therefore are undifcoverable by mere 
 natural Light, how can it be affirm'd, that 
 we may have a perfed Knowledge of all the 
 Relations in which we ftand to God ; and of 
 all that is founded in the Nature and Reafon 
 of Things ? 
 
 Next to the Relations in which we ftand 
 to God, we fliould confider Thofe which 
 fubfift between us and our Fellow-Creatures. 
 Here I am apt to think our Author hath confi- 
 der'd Matters very imperfectly : For, by 
 FellGZV'Creatures he feems to mean no more 
 
 than Human Kind in general ; none but 
 
 thofe of the fame Rank and Order with our- 
 felves. This may appear pretty plainly from 
 his Courfe of Reafoning in the Second Chap- 
 ter. Now, however the Relation in which 
 we ftand either to Mankind in general, or to 
 fingle Pcrlbns in particular, iliould be fuffi- 
 
 cicnt 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ &c, ;; 
 
 dent to difed us to the fecial Duties in gent-* 
 ral, yet certainly thefe Duties will not take 
 in every thing which hath a Foundation in 
 the Nature and Reafon of Ihings. There 
 may be feveral other Matters fit and proper 
 to be done, or avoided ; and for which there 
 may be very important Reaibns affignablej 
 however remote from common Notice and 
 Obfervation* 
 
 We ftiould confidef ourfelves not only as 
 Individuals of a certain Species or Members 
 of a Society, but like wife as Parts of a whole 
 Syftem \ and as Beings capable of doing 
 Things either ferviceable or inconvenient to 
 the Whole, or any particular Branches of it. 
 But do we really know all the feveral Rela- 
 tions in which we ftand to every fenfible or 
 intelligent Creature ? Can we tell how far 
 our Adions may affed them ; and aflign aU 
 the Reafons which have a Foundation in the 
 Nature of Things, either for, or againft a 
 particular Behaviour ? Is it not polliblc there- 
 fore, that fomc Matters may appear, in our 
 Views of Things, as flight and inconfider- 
 able, which are yet of great Moment to the 
 Good and Advantage of the Whole ? 
 
 Let us only refled how difficult it is for 
 private Perfons, and thofe who are unexpe- 
 rienced in the Greater Affairs of Life, to ac- 
 count for all the Meafures of Condud which 
 a Wife and Able Politician may find it nccef^ 
 fary to enter into. Thefe are all built on 
 
 D the 
 
j4 A DEFENCE o^ 
 
 the feveral Relations fubfifting either between 
 different States, or the particular Parts of the 
 fame State. Were every thing of this kind 
 clear and apparent, it would be more eafy to 
 judge concerning a right or wrong Admini- 
 ftration. But if thefe Things are fo difficult 
 to be judged of j and the narrow Schemes of 
 Human Policy are lb far beyond the Reach 
 of moft Men, How fhall we determine con- 
 cerning the Whole Syftem of Nature? How 
 fhall we judge concerning God's Proceedings, 
 and the Adminiftrations of Providence ? And 
 how Ihall we be certain, from our own weak 
 Reafon, what is in every refped fit and pro- 
 per to be done by us ? 
 
 To what hath been fuggefted by this 
 Gentlem.an as neceffary and fufficient to dif- 
 cover all that is founded in the Reafon of 
 Things, I fhall crave Leave to add One Thing 
 farther, fince he hath been pleased to over- 
 look it : And I cannot but think it of confi- 
 derable Moment, fince the general Rules de- 
 ducible firom the foregoing Confiderations, 
 will be frequently unferviceable without it. 
 I mean, the Nature and Powers of all thofe 
 feveral Beings by which we are furrounded, 
 and with which we have any manner of Con- 
 cern. Here then a very large Field opens. 
 It takes in a confiderable Part of Nature : 
 For without a deep Knowledge in thefe 
 Things, we fliall be incapable of difcerning, 
 on numberlefs Occafions, What is really fit 
 
 to 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 35 
 
 to be done, either with refped to ourfelves 
 or others. 
 
 Be thefe general Rules therefore, in refer- 
 ence to ourfelvcs, however perfedly known, 
 viz. That we ought to do nothing which will 
 Deftroy Life, Prejudice Health, Im- 
 pair the Reafon, Heighten the Pallions, 
 
 and the like ^ yet ftill, before they can ferve 
 us, we muft know What particular kinds of 
 Adions or Omiflions will contribute to thefe 
 feveral Ends : And, in order to This, we 
 muft know What are the Natures and Powers 
 of thofe leveral Beings with which we have 
 any manner of Concern ; becaufe, other- 
 wife, by an undue Application of them, 
 we may really produce the Evils we would 
 avoid. 
 
 Thus again, with refped to our Neigh- 
 bours j It may be known with Certainty 
 enough, that we ought to perform to them 
 
 all the Offices of Juftice and Humanity; 
 
 That -w^' ought neither to do them any un- 
 neceflfary Prejudice, nor to decline any fair 
 Opportlinities of ferving them. Thefe Things 
 will arife fronl confidering, that as we are 
 Creatures of the fame Kind, io we are equal- 
 ly the Subjeds of the fame Divine Care and 
 Providence. Notwithftanding this, many 
 other Things muft likewife be known in or- 
 der to difcover how it will be fit to a6l on 
 every emergent Occafion. We muft know 
 What will prejudice or ferye our Neigh- 
 
 D 2 bour 1 
 
36 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 bour ; and, for this Purpofe, What Influence, 
 whether good or bad, the Uie and Applica- 
 tion of natural Things, may, in certain Cir- 
 cumftances, have on them. 
 
 It is true, indeed, Obfervation and Expe- 
 rience will teach us fomewhat here, without 
 much Infight into natural Science : But then, 
 it Ihould be noted at the fame Time, that this 
 will carry us no farther than the groffer and 
 more obvious Appearances. Things which 
 operate with Difpatch, and to a Degree im- 
 mediately perceivable, can fcarce efcape our 
 Notice. But, what if their Influences fhould be 
 remote, and the Working flow and gradual ? 
 In fuch Cafes, Experience will do little Ser- 
 vice : We Ihall know fcarce any thing at 
 all ; and confequently, be liable, on num- 
 berlefs Occafions, to be deceived into a Con- 
 duct, which upon fuller Information wc 
 might, and would have avoided. 
 
 The Refult is This ; Since Nothing can 
 be properly to us a Law, which is by us un- 
 difcoverable ; Since there are many Things, 
 even in thofe Sources of Duty laid down by 
 this Author, undifcoverable by us j Since 
 we are far from knowing all the Natures of 
 
 Things, all the feveral Relations they 
 
 have to one another, and confequently, all 
 that is founded in, and mull reliilt from 
 thefe Confiderations, were Matters fully laid 
 open to us ; it follows, that The Law or Re- 
 ligion of Nature cannot include every thing 
 
 which 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 37 
 
 which is founded in the Nature and Reafon 
 of Things. 
 
 Before I proceed farther, it will be proper 
 to fupport the foregoing Reafbnings by fblv- 
 ing an Objedion which we meet with, p. 16. 
 Our Author there argues for the Sufficiency 
 of Human Reafon to difcover every thing 
 which is fit and proper to be done ; and the 
 Argument is drawn from confidering the End 
 for which the Faculty of Reafon was given 
 us. " The End, faith he, for which God 
 " hath given us Reafon, is, to compare 
 " Things, and the Relation they Hand in to 
 " each other ; and from thence to judge of 
 " the Fitnefs and Unlitnefs of Adions. And 
 " could not our Reafon judge foundly in 
 '^ All fuch Matters, it could not have an- 
 ** fwer'd the End for which infinite Wif- 
 " dom and Goodnefs beftow'd that excellent 
 " Gift." 
 
 All Arguments alledg'd to prove that a 
 Thing really is, which in Fad is not, muft 
 be vain Prefumptions. And therefore, if it 
 fhall appear, from what hath been already 
 obferv'd, that Human Reafon cannot dilX 
 cover all the Fitnefs of Things ; what is now 
 advanced by this Gentleman muft be ground* 
 lefs and inconclufive. 
 
 Were his Reafoning of any Force, it 
 would prove abundantly too much. It would 
 equally prove, that Human Reafon is com- 
 menfurate to all Truth ; For Reafon was 
 
 P 3 given 
 
38 A DEFENCE of 
 
 given us to difcover Truth ; And therefore^ 
 (to ufe his own Words) " If it could not 
 " judge foundly in all fuch Matters, it coulcj 
 " not anlwer the End for which God be- 
 *' llow'd it on us/ ■ To which may be added, 
 that all Men, on this Foot of arguing, muft 
 
 neceflarily have equal Degrees of Reafon, 
 
 or equal Capacities to difcover all Truth. 
 For, as all Men have Realon, fo the End of 
 beftowing that Faculty on them mud be the 
 fame in all : Every Man therefore muft be ca- 
 pable of difcovering all Truth \ and confe- 
 quently, all Men muft have equal intelledual 
 Capacities : unlefs it may be affirm'd, that 
 whilft every Man is capable of difcovering 
 all Truth, fome are capable of difcovering 
 more than all. 
 
 The real State of the Cafe feems to be 
 This ; Whatever thofe good Purpofes are 
 for which the Reafon we enjoy will ferve, 
 Thefe were the Ends for which God beftow'd 
 it on us : By knowing therefore how far our 
 Reafon, confider'd as a Means, will carry \\^^ 
 we may know how extenfive the End itfelf 
 muft be : For we may be fure that an all- 
 wife Being cannot propofe an End impoliible 
 to be obtained. If therefore our Reafon can- 
 not lead us into the Difcovery of every 
 Truth, nor of all the real Fitneffes of Things, 
 it i's apparent, that all Matters of this kind 
 were not defign'd to be difcover'd by our 
 Ileafon. The Principle on which our Author 
 
 builds^ 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 39 
 
 builds, viz. " That Reafon was given us 
 " to difcover the Fitnels or Unfitnefs of 
 " Aclions/' if it be underftood inanuniver- 
 
 fal Senfe, is wrong • if in a limited one, 
 
 his Conclufion fails : And his great Error 
 lies in This, that his Inference is more exten- 
 five than his Premifes. The one being true 
 only in a limited Senfe, the other cannot be 
 true in an univerfal one. 
 
 But befides that the Notion of the Law or 
 Religion of Nature, which this Gentleman 
 purfues, is entirely wrong, as apply'd by 
 him in the prefent Debate, we may obferve 
 farther, that it will by no means come up 
 to his Purpofe, nor fupport the Conclufions 
 he deduces from it. 
 
 His general Purpofe, is to fhew. That a 
 Revelation is perfedly needlefs and fuper- 
 lluous ; and his Method of proving it is This ; 
 That the Religion of Nature is every way 
 fufficient, and abfolutely perfect. But how 
 does This appear ? We fhall fee imme- 
 diately : This Religion, fays he, contains 
 under it every Thing which is founded in 
 the Nature and Reafons of Things : It muft 
 therefore be abfolutely perfcd, and incapable 
 either of receiving Addition, or admitting 
 Diminution. Well : all this might be fup- 
 pos'd, and yet this all-perfed Religion be of 
 little Service to us. For, what if the Gircum- 
 fiances of Mankind fhould be fuch, as to dif- 
 able them from difcovering what this Reli- 
 
 D 4 gion 
 
40 jDEFENCEo/ 
 
 gion of Nature is ! Of This our Gentleman 
 was aware ; and he endeavours to obviate it 
 by obferving, That this Religion of Nature 
 was originally given by God to every 
 Man ; - — That every Man muft therefore 
 be enabled to know it perfectly ; and of 
 Conlequence, Nothing remains to be done by 
 Revelation which was not as effedually fe^ 
 cured without it. 
 
 1 Ihall fay nothing here concerning the 
 abfolute Perfection and Immutability of this 
 Law of Nature. Thele are Heads which 
 fhall be diftindly confider'd hereafter. At 
 prefent I Ihall obferve, upon Suppofition 
 that thefe extraordinary AfTertions were true, 
 (which yet 1 am fo far from admitting, that 
 1 fhall endeavour to difprove them in ano- 
 ther Placed; I fay, upon this very Sup-- 
 
 pofition, it will by no Means follow that a 
 Revelation is ufelefs and fuperfluous. 
 
 1 fhall afTign Two Reafons for this Pur- 
 pofe ; 
 
 1. Becaufe, by laying before Men in One 
 View a regular Syftem of Religious Truths 
 and Precepts, it mull very much aflifl: Men 
 in Enquiries of this Nature, and make 
 fuch Difcoveries abundantly more eafy to 
 them. 
 
 2. Becaufe, the Authority by which fuch 
 a Revelation is made, will engage their At- 
 tention ; and more etfedually imprefs upon 
 ^hei? Minds a Senfe of thefc Things, than 
 
 ^hQ 
 
Revealed Religion, &c\ 41 
 
 the mere Workings of their own Thoughts 
 about them could poflibly do. 
 
 I do here fuppofe the utmoft which our 
 Author himfelf contends for, viz. That Men 
 are furnifh'd with natural Powers fufficient 
 for the Difcovery of every Thing which is 
 founded in the Nature andReafon of Things: 
 Yet Hill Experience ihews us, that Men do 
 not actually, and in Fad, know every thing 
 which might poffibly have been dilcover'd 
 by them. There is a great deal of Difference 
 between the mere Power of Reaibning, and 
 the Exercife of this Power : And even when 
 it is exercifed in fome meafure, the Sue* 
 cefs of Men's Enquirjes will be different in 
 proportion to the Ways and Methods in 
 which they make them. From hence arifes 
 the Neceffity of Teaching and Inftruclion; 
 
 the Expediency and Ufefulnels, I mean : 
 
 For however ftrong Men's natural Parts may 
 be, they muft be rightly directed in order 
 to attain their End. Otherwife, by making 
 a wrong Choice of Principles from which to 
 argue, they may be led off from their Point; 
 and the Matter intended to receive a Decifion 
 be left as much in the Dark as ever. 
 
 Let us therefore confider a Divine Revela- 
 tion none otherwife than as a noble Means of 
 Inftruftion. Even in This View its Ufefulnels 
 will appear to Advantage. For, by pro- 
 pofing a juft Scheme both of Dodrines and 
 J'recepts, Mpn's Enc^uiries will be pointed 
 
 Tight ; 
 
42 J DEFENCE of 
 
 right : They will fee and know how to di- 
 red their Aims : And confequently, muft 
 attain their End with much more Eafe, than 
 if they had been left to their own unallifted 
 Reafon. 
 
 All this will be confefs'd in reference to 
 other Matters. A Skill in other Arts and 
 Sciences is obtain'd with much more Readi- 
 nefs by confulting judicious Syftems already 
 fram'd, than by labouring to make the full 
 Difcovery ourfelves. I do not here take 
 Notice, that many Perfons are capable of 
 apprehending a Thing already invented, who 
 are utterly incapable of making the Difcovery 
 by their own Force of Thought : (For thefe 
 two Things require very different Talents) : 
 This, I fiy, ihall be left out of the Queftion 
 here. Be Men furnifh'd with Abilities as 
 well to invent for themfelves, as to appre- 
 hend what is offer'd by others : Notwith- 
 ftanding this, Invention itfelf may be forwarded 
 and aflifted ; and the Knowledge of Truth 
 be attained with much greater Facility and 
 Difpatch when regularly pointed out to them, 
 than if they had never heard, or thought of 
 it before. 
 
 And indeed, on any other Foot than 
 this, thofe worthy Perfons, who have labour'd 
 in the Purfuit of Knowledge, have labour'd 
 only for themfelves. If their Difcoveries 
 have been of no Ufe to others, they might as 
 well have kept them fecret j and have left 
 
 <;hc 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 4^ 
 
 ^fe reft of the World to trace oat fuch Mat-^ 
 tersin their own Way. But if this be really 
 the Cafe with regard to other Arts, why may 
 not like Advantages arife in the Difcovery of 
 Religion, from fetting before Men a juft and 
 proper Scheme of it ? And if this be once 
 allow'd, then a Revelation for this Purpofe 
 neither is, nor can be ufeleis. 
 
 If it be faid here, that every thing this 
 way may be as well perform'd by the Labours 
 of Men, who are concerned to teach and in- 
 ftiiid their Fellow-Creatures ; and that mere 
 Inftrudion, whether it come from God or 
 Man, will amount to much the fame, and 
 
 produce the fame JEffeds 5 If this, I fay, 
 
 be alledg'd, we muft obfcrve a vaft Difference 
 betw^een them. Divine Inftrudion, if known 
 to be fuch, will carry with it much greater 
 Authority, and claim Attention in a higher 
 Degree than any Inftitution merely human 
 can pretend to. Thole who beheve it will 
 think themfelves concerned to receive it with 
 Reverence, and to ftudy it with Diligence. 
 The necelfary and effential Dependance of 
 The Creature on The Creator will enforce 
 this on them. But can the like be pleaded 
 in Behalf of any mere human Inftruction, 
 how wife and excellent foever it may be in 
 itfelf ! Are not Men, in fuch Cafes, apt to re- 
 fled, That no one Man, merely as fuch, hath 
 any Authority to didate or prefcribe to others ? 
 rr — • That they have therefore a Liberty to 
 
 ftudy 
 
44 J DEFENCE o/ 
 
 ftudy or neglect his Inftrudions, as they 
 pleale ? In conlequence of which, they will 
 be apt to remit their Labours, and to give off, 
 upon the firft Difcouragement of Difficulty 
 in the Enquiry. This, furely, is no fmall 
 Advantage, that the Things proposM will 
 recommend themfelves to our Confideration 
 in proportion to the Weight and Authority 
 of the Propofer. 
 
 Over and above this it may be added far- 
 ther, That the Religious Knowledge gain'd 
 this way, will be embraced more fteadily jj 
 and the Senfe of thele Things will become 
 more vigorous and lively. Whatever Ad- 
 vantages can arife from mere rational Deduc- 
 tion, are all equally enjoy 'd by That Perfou,- 
 who is inftruded by Revelation. He is fup- 
 pos'd, in the prefent Gale, equally to difcern 
 the Fitnefs and Reafon of Things, as being di-- 
 reded to them by the Revelation itlelf. How- 
 ever, it is remarkable, that habitual Know- 
 ledge is not always the Rule of our Adions. 
 If it be enquired from whence this arifes, we 
 fliall eafily fee, that good Rules, and fuch as 
 we acknowledge to be fo, are apt to be for- 
 gotten ; That our Pailions blind us, and 
 
 Temptations lead us aftray ; and we are by 
 thefe Means feduc'd into a Behaviour, which 
 in our more ferious and thinking Hours we 
 muft condemn. To aid this Infirmity, it 
 becomes expedient, that the proper Rules of 
 Gondiict fhould come recommended to us, 
 
 and 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 45 
 
 and enforc'd upon us by fbmething more than 
 
 the mere Rcafons of Things themfelves; 
 
 by fomething which fhall fix and imprint 
 them deep upon our Minds ; and make them 
 recur to us as often as fit Occafions and Op- 
 portunities require. This is moft efFedually 
 done by having them delivered and confirm/d 
 to us as the exprefs Will of God ; by having 
 them proposed, not ftierely as the prudenc 
 Advices of Wife Men, but the firm Decrees 
 of The Almighty. This, if any thing, will 
 fix our Attention : And where this fails, all 
 other Methods will be vain. 
 
 I might carry on this Point much farther^ 
 and fupport it by many other Refledions; 
 from whence The Expediency of a Revela- 
 tion may appear, as well to make the Know- 
 ledge of a moral Rule more cafy, more per- 
 fed and more general, as to enforce it more 
 ftrongly on the Confciences and Lives of 
 Men. But I retreat at prefent, fince theie 
 are Matters which belong more properly to 
 another Part of my Defign. I'hus much 
 however is not amifs to have been hinted 
 here ; that whilft I have been endeavouring 
 to prove this Author's Notion of the Reli- 
 gion of Nature, as applied by him, to be 
 wrong, it may appear at the fame Time that 
 *tis ufelels and unferviceable to thofe Pur- 
 pofes for which He advances it. 
 
 Hitherto I have confider*d the Law or 
 Religion of Nature, as it is us'd to fignify a 
 
 per- 
 
4^ J DEFENCE o/ 
 
 perfect Colledion of all thofe Dodrines and 
 Precepts, which have a real Foundation iri 
 the Truth and Reafon of Things ; and havd 
 endeavoured to fhew, that, taken in this Senfe^ 
 it cannot, properly fpeaking, be to us a Law 
 or Religion. I lliall now confider it in an- 
 other View, viz. as it implies fuch a Col- 
 ledion only, as may be difcoverM by us in 
 the Ufe of our proper Faculties ; fuch a one, 
 as we are able to make out in the Ufe of 
 thofe Means and Opportunities we enjoy. 
 In this Senfe only it can be properly to us a 
 Law ; becaufe, in this Senfe only it can 
 oblige : For, it is impoflible we fhould be 
 oblig'd to any thing we are incapable of 
 knowing. 
 
 For the more diftind Explication of this 
 Notion, the general Truth of which is cleaf 
 and certain enough, it Ihould be obferved, 
 that as the Law of Nature is fuch a Col- 
 ledion, &c. as we are capable of making iii 
 the due Ufe and Exercife of Reafon, fo the 
 State and Condition of human Reafon ought 
 to be thoroughly confider'd by us. 
 
 A Diftindion therefore fhould be made 
 between Reafon as it fubfiftcd in its moft 
 perfed State, whilft Man lived in a State of 
 Innocence, and as it now fubfifts in the pre- 
 icnt corrupt Condition of human Nature. 
 For, no Conclufions can be made from the 
 Powers of Reafon in the one Cafe, to the 
 like Powers of it in the other. 
 
 This, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. ^7 
 
 This, I think, is certain. But yet I Ihall 
 not inlift on it at prefent j becaufe our Au- 
 thor denies all Ground and Foundation for 
 this Diftinclion ; and maintains, that human 
 Nature is ftill in the very fame Condition, 
 in which it was at lirft created. \_P"id, p. 
 ^yS.~\ I fliall therefore coniider human Rea- 
 fon as it now really and in Fad fubfifts. 
 
 In the next place, we ftiould diftinguilh 
 between human Realbn as it is difpers'd thro* 
 all human Kind, and as it fubfifts feparately 
 in particular Perfons. If it be confider'd in 
 the former Senfe, Nothing is above human 
 Reafon, which is capable of being dilcover'd 
 by the particular Reafon of any particular 
 Man, or the joint Reafon of all Men. In this 
 View human Reafon may mailer every thing, 
 which either hath been, or may be mafter'd 
 by Man ; which either hath been difcover'd 
 by the former Learned, or may be difcover'd 
 by the future Learned. 
 
 To fee the better how far this concerns our 
 prefent Purpofe, we muft obferve, that no 
 One Man, even of the ftrongeft Parts, and 
 under the moft advantageous Circumftances, 
 ever yet exhaufted any Art or Science. Its 
 feveral Branches have been varioufly im- 
 prov'd by different Men ; and fucceflive 
 Writers have added fomething to the Stock 
 already gathered in by thofe who have gone 
 before them. What is obfervable in other 
 Arts is elpecially to be remarked in Matters of 
 
 Morality. 
 
4? A DEFENCE of 
 
 Morality. This likevvife hath gradually im- 
 prov'd ; but with This Difference however, 
 that fometimes thofe who have improv'd, in 
 certain Particulars, on the preceding Scheme, 
 have yet corrupted it in others : And how- 
 ever valuable a Colledion may poflibly be 
 made from the Writings of feveral Authors, 
 yet no compleat and unexceptionable Syftem 
 hath been offered the World by any One of 
 them. 
 
 We may complain therefore with great 
 Juftice of our Adverfaries on this Head. 
 They argue from what human Reafon can 
 do, confider'd as *tis difpers'd thro' all hu- 
 man Kind ; and conclude for a like Power, 
 
 as it fubfifts in particular Men : Juft as 
 
 reafonably as it would be to infill, that what- 
 ever Effects can be produc'd by the joint 
 Foi:ce of all Men, the fame may be produc'd 
 by the lingle Power of any. 
 
 Upon Suppofition therefore that a per- 
 feft Scheme of Moral Rules might be 
 gathered from the Writings of the feveral 
 Philofophers ; and confequently, was not 
 abfolutely undifcoverable by mere human 
 Reafon, (which yet can never be prov'd) 
 ftill, before this can be of Service to the 
 Gentleman I am now debating with, he muft 
 prove thefe Two Points ; 
 
 I. That whatfocver v/as difcoverable by 
 Mankind gradually, and in a long Courfe 
 of Years, was equally difcoyerable at once. 
 
 For, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 49 
 
 For, if it were not dircoverable at once, then 
 a Time may be affiga'd when certain iVIoral 
 Points were not at all difcoverable ; and 
 conlcqnently, that human Reaion hath not, 
 at all Times, been able to mailer every 
 Moral Truth and Precept. 
 
 He mufl prove likewiie, 
 idly^ 1 hat whatlbever is difcoverable by 
 all colledively taken, is difcoverable by 
 every one feparately confider'd ; or, at leaft, 
 that whatsoever is once difcover'd by Ibme, 
 is compreiienfible by all. But both thefe 
 Points are falfe in Facl ^ and fb obviouily 
 ialfe, that no thinking Perfon can miftake 
 about them. There is not only an Incapa- 
 city in fingle Perfons to dilcover what may 
 eaiily be found out by the united Labours of 
 all 5 but there is likewiie a vaft Difference 
 between Men in point of Natural Parts and 
 Abilities. And where thefe are really alike, 
 there is yet a great Difference as to the Op- 
 portunities of ufing them. Upon thefe Ac- 
 counts it is fecn every Day, That however 
 defirous of Knowledge and Improvement 
 different Men may be, yet they are inca- 
 pable of the fame Attainments ; fome evc^r 
 exceeding others in proportion to the De- 
 grees of their natural Talents, and the Occa-^ 
 fions they have of ufing them. 
 
 To go on^ Human Reaion, as it fubfifts 
 feparately in every particular Perfon, may 
 
 E likewife 
 
50 ^DEFENCE of 
 
 like wife be confider'd, Either as it is enjoy 'd 
 by Men under the moft advantageous Cir- 
 cumftances ; or elfe, as it is pofTefs^d under 
 the worft ^ or, Laftly, as it is ordinarily 
 feen in the Bulk and Generality of Man- 
 kind. 
 
 The Lord Bifhop of London hath diftindly 
 confider'd it in the Two former Views j and 
 fhewn, with Great Accuracy, what have been 
 the feveral Conclufions, as well of the Wileft 
 and moft Learned, as of the Weakeft and 
 moft Ignorant. His Lordftiip hath prov'd, 
 to the great Advantage of our Caufe, that 
 even The Philofophers, who carry*d Matters 
 of a Religious or Moral Nature to a great 
 Heighth, have yet in feveral Particulars been 
 ignorant^ uncertain^ or mifiaken. They muft 
 therefore be unfit to be the abfolute Diredors 
 of other Men, fince they were fo liable to 
 err themfelves. 
 
 But if the very wifeft have err'd here, we 
 ihall be lefs furpris'd at the Groflhefs of the 
 rude and barbarous. Thefe being Strangers 
 to all the Improvements of Education and 
 Art, can go but a little way in the Difco- 
 
 very of Truth ; are incapable of direding 
 
 or controuling their Paflions in any tolerable 
 Degree. And Experience itfelf ihews, that 
 as their Ignorance is extreme, fo their Opi- 
 nions and Pradices in religious Matters are 
 monftrous. 
 
 Here 
 
kfeVEALD PvELlGION, &C. J I 
 
 Here we fhall be told, That the State and 
 Condition of human Reafon ought not to be 
 judg'd of from the Capacities of the Meaneft 
 Perlbns, and thcfe likewife labouring under 
 the greateft Diliid vantages. True: And 
 therefore, as we mufl not judge concerning 
 the Reafon of Philofophers by the Reafon of 
 Barbarians, fo neither muft we meafure the 
 Reafon of Barbarians by that of Philofo- 
 phers. This is the very thing which I com- 
 plain of in our Adverfaries. They are apt 
 to infer from the noble Difcoveries w^hich 
 have been made by the deepcft Thinkers, 
 that the fame may be made by every One 
 elfe, who will give hinifelf the Pains of 
 making them. Whereas the real Truth is, 
 a great Number of Men are not only inca- 
 pable of making theie Difcoveries themfelves, 
 but of apprehending the Reafons on which 
 they are built when difcover'd by others, 
 and fairly laid before them. Nothing there- 
 fore can be more extravagant than to argue 
 from the Capacities of the One, to the like 
 or equal Abilities in the other. 
 
 After all, in order to judge concerning 
 the general Compafs of human Reafon, I 
 Ihall confider it neither in its beft, nor yet in 
 its worft View : 1 fhall take it as it fubfifts 
 in the Bulk and Generality of Mankind^ 
 and fee how far it may and will carry Men. 
 
 Here then it Jhould be confider'd, that 
 the greateft Part of the World haye always 
 
 K a been, 
 
52 ^ DEF EN CE o/ 
 
 been, and e^^er will be oblig'd to ad a Part 
 in low Life : in which, (tho' we fhould fup- 
 pofe the natural Capacities of Mankind to be 
 originally equal,) they cannot receive the 
 Advantage of a proper Education in the 
 Beginning ; Nor have they Time to purfue 
 Matters of Reafoning very far, how defirous 
 foever they may be of doing it. In things 
 which fall under common Obfervation, (fuch 
 as are the ordinary Arts of Life,) they may 
 fhew Sagacity enough. Yet, even here we 
 Jhall find, for the moft Part, that their Skill is 
 reftrain'd to thofe Matters which lie within 
 their proper Buiinefs. Different Men excel 
 in different Ways •, But in Matters out of the 
 common Road of Thinking they feem as 
 much at a Lofs, as tho' they were entirely 
 without any Power of Reafoning at all about 
 them. 
 
 What hath been obferv'd concerning the 
 feveral Arts of Life, towards which Men 
 have not been us'd to dired their Thoughts, 
 will appear more evidently in Matters which 
 depend on abftrad Reafoning. Philofophy 
 is not born with a Man, but learnt by much 
 Pains and Application. To make a Figure 
 this way he muft devote himfelf almoft 
 
 entirely to it ; muft view things in every 
 
 Point of Light ; and determine upon a long 
 Comparifon of one Thing with another. 
 
 Yet, Morality, it feems, may prefently be 
 difcover'd. Every thing in all Circumftances 
 
 fit 
 
Reveal'd Religion, c^c. 5^ 
 
 fit to be done, may be feen with Eafe : And 
 no Man can need Inftrudion, iince the 
 Means of Kno-vvledge are entirely within 
 hinifelf. Were 1 his the Cafe, (as the Gen- 
 tleman I am now concern'd with contends,) 
 one might expert that the noblcft Remains of 
 The antient Philolbphers might be eqiiali'd 
 by every Day-Labourer. But doth Fa^l 
 anfvver thefe Expedations ? Do we find that 
 the Generality of Men are fuch notable Rea- 
 
 foners in Moral Matters ; or, that every 
 
 thing lies fo clear before them ? The Thing 
 is in its own Nature impoffible. As they 
 are not train'd up to Enquiries of this Na- 
 ture, fo neither have they Leifure nor Op- 
 portunities for purfuing them : And we 
 might as well exped that, in fuch Circum- 
 llances as thefe, they fhould gain an exact 
 Skill in Natural Philofophy as Moral. 
 
 Upon the whole; Men, confider'd in thefe 
 different Views, have different Capacities 
 and Opportunities of Knowledge; in pro- 
 portion to which their feveral Schemes of 
 Moral Condud muft be various. And as 
 That only is to them a Law, which is by 
 them difcoverable, it follows, that this Law 
 itfelf, as it regards different Men, muft be 
 
 various ; by no means One and the 
 
 Same to all ; but of a greater or lefs Extent, 
 as they are capable of making greater or lels 
 Difcoveries in Moral Science. In fhort, it is 
 Such a Colledion of Moral Rules, as each 
 
 E 3 Perfon, 
 
54 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 Perfon, according to the Circumftances he is 
 plac'd in, is capable of making for him-^ 
 felf. 
 
 Thus f^ir I have endeavoiir'd to State the 
 Law or Religion of Nature, and to fhew 
 "What ought to be underftood by the Term, 
 I am concernM, in the next place, to enquire, 
 From whence the Oblig-ation to obferve this 
 Law arifes. And to this I am led, not only 
 becaufe The Gentleman, whofe Performance 
 is now before me, fpeaks varioufly on the 
 Point, and ailigns different Grounds, as he 
 hath different Purpofcs to ferve by it ; but 
 likewife, becaufe fome other Matters to be 
 infifted on hereafter, may be influenc'd by a 
 right Determination here. 
 
 It muft be own'd that our Author for the 
 moft part fpeaks of The Law or Religion of 
 Nature as 'the Will of God'^ - — as- God's, 
 
 ff'tll internally reveal' d'^ as a Law given 
 
 lis by God. And one Argument whereby he 
 would prove it to be an abfolutely perfed 
 Law, is This ; " Becaufe it comes from a 
 *' Being of abfolute WiJdom and Perfcdion." 
 According to thefe PaiTages Obligation muft 
 
 be derived firom the Divine Will j The 
 
 Will of That Being who is reprefented as 
 The Caufe and Author of this Law. 
 
 Yet, in other Places he ftates the Point 
 otherwife ; and derives Obligation from the 
 Nature and Reafon of Things themfelves. 
 Thus he tells us, *' The eternal Reafon of 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 55 
 
 ** Things is the fupreme Obligation. " 
 f p. 5^7.] And, in another place, he fpeaks 
 of " Man's being good by the Original Ob- 
 " ligation of the Moral F'itnefs of Things, 
 " in Conformity to the Nature, and in Imi- 
 « tation of the perfcd Will of God. " p. 
 36'8. He does not liiy, in Ohedlejice to the 
 per fed Will of God, but in Imitation of it. 
 This PafTage feems to intimate that God 
 himfelf is properly obliged by the Moral 
 Fitnefs of Things ^ and, that whilft we are 
 good by this Original Obligation, we imitate 
 God, who is likewife govern'd by the fame 
 Original Obligation. 
 
 1 know feveral Worthy and Good Men 
 have often exprels'd themfelves in fuch a 
 manner, as tho' they imagined Obligation did 
 arife from the abftract Natures and Fitnefles 
 of Things. They have fpoken of Obliga- 
 tion as antecedent to the Will of God, at 
 leaft in order of Conception; and fometimes 
 of God himfelf as the Subjecl of Obligation. 
 Thefe feem to be inaccurate Expreflions : 
 And I hope I fhall be pardon'd, if I repre- 
 lent the Reafons of my Difagreement with 
 them on this Head. 
 
 It is allow'd readily, that as there are 
 feveral Relations fubfifting between Men and 
 other Beings, fo thofe Kinds of ading which 
 are truly expreflive of theie Relations may 
 be faid, in fome Senfe, to be lit, proper, 
 $nd reafonable. And as there arc certain 
 
 E 4, Ends 
 
56 J DEF ENCE of 
 
 Ends fuitable to our Nature, fo thofe Adllons 
 which are proper to obtain thefe Encis, may 
 on that account be faid to have a Fitnefs in 
 them. By Fitnefs therefore I do underftand, 
 Either the Relation of a Sign to the thing 
 
 fignilied by that Sign ; or, of a Means 
 
 to the End obtainable by that Means. 
 
 It may be allow'd farther. That fuch Fit- 
 neffes as thefe are, at leail in order of Con- 
 ception, antecedent to the Will of God ; I 
 mean the Will of God, as it relates to the 
 Conduit and Behaviour v of his Creatures, 
 For, if God requires a certain Conducl be- 
 caufe it is iit, it is evident, that a Fitnefs it 
 had antecedent to the Command, and on 
 which the Command itfelfis built: Other- 
 wife, God would not command it, becaufe it 
 is fit, but it mAift Therefore alone be fit, be- 
 caufe God commands it. This, I mufi: con- 
 fefs, is attended with Difficulties I knew not 
 how to m after. 
 
 Yet Hill I do by no means maintain, that 
 thefe Fitneffes are abfolutely before all Will 
 of God, and entirely independent on it. Here 
 then we muft diflinguilh between the Will 
 of God, as it regards the Order and Confli- 
 tution of Things, and the fame Will, as it 
 ref?-ards the Adions and Conduct of his Crea- 
 tures. The Fitnefs of Thmgs muft be fub- 
 fequent to the Will of God, if we underftand 
 his Will in the former Senfe of the Expref- 
 fipq ; For Things are therefore fit, becaufe 
 
 God 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 57 
 
 God hath conftituted Natlire in fuch a man- 
 ner as to make them fo : But then it mAift 
 precede God's Will, when underflood in the 
 latter Senfe ; fmce God therefore wills Things, 
 becaufe they are fit and proper. 
 
 But however this be, yet I cannot fee how 
 Obligation, ftridly fo call'd, arifes from the 
 mere Fitnefs of Things, whedier we under- 
 lland by it the Suitablenefs of certain Adlions 
 to the feveral Relations in which we ftand, 
 as being truly expreffive of them ; or elfe, 
 their being conducive as Means to thofe good 
 Ends they are naturally capable of pro- 
 ducing. 
 
 If we underftand Fitnefs in the former 
 Senfe, it falls in with Mr. WooUafton\ Notion 
 of Truth \ and therefore we muffc enquire 
 what Oblic-ations Men are under, to Truth, 
 merely as fuch, v/hether it be exprefs'd by 
 Words or Actions. 
 
 It is reafonable, you will fay, for a reafon^ 
 able Being to conform to Truth, and abfurd 
 to do the contrary. Well : But then another 
 Queftion arifes, 1)1%. What Obligation is a 
 reafonable Being under to fpeak or ad: thus 
 reafonably, fuppofing that a Conformity to 
 Truth is in all Cafes reafonable ? There can 
 be no Obligation, where there is no kind of 
 Motive to a(ft or to forbear. Mere Reafon 
 may indeed dire<ft and fliew the Way; but 
 fomething clfe is necelllu-y i:i order to induce 
 and influence us. 
 
 Tq 
 
58 J DEVEnCE of 
 
 To this poffibly it will be reply'd, that a 
 reafonable Being, whilfl he attends to Reafon, 
 cannot but take a Pleafure in afting accord- 
 ing to it, and feel a Pain in deviating from 
 it ; and confequently, tliat the Obligation to 
 act agreeably to thefe Fitneffes of Things, 
 arifes from the Pleafure and Satisfaction which 
 attends this Courfe, and the Uneafmefs and 
 DilTatisfadiion which follows the contrary. 
 Be this then the real State of the Cafe: It 
 will appear from hence, that Fitnefs, even 
 in the former Senfe of the Word, can infer 
 Obligation no farther than it ferves as a Means 
 
 o 
 
 to fome farther End; and this leads me on 
 to coniider what Obligation arifes from Fitnefs 
 in the latter Senfe. 
 
 The End which we propofe to ourfelve?, 
 whatever it be, muft regard Either the Syftem 
 in general, or fome particular Beings in this 
 Syftem, or Ourfelves. 
 
 Be the End therefore fome Good or other 
 relating to the Syftem in general, or fome 
 particular Beings in the Syftem; Then this 
 Queftion will arife, How are we obliged to 
 purfue this Good, or What Motive can we 
 have to do fo ? If it be faid, that the Good- 
 nefs of the Thing is itfelf a fufiicient Motive, 
 a futiicient Inducement, a fufhcient Obliga- 
 tion, we may ask, To whom is the 
 
 Thing propos'd Good ? If to others only, it ~ 
 remains tobefhewn, How the Good of others 
 gm at all affedt us^ unlefs we ourfelves have 
 
 fome 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 59 
 
 fome Intereft or other in their Good : If to 
 the Man, who is concern'd to ad:, then he 
 purlbes it under the Notion of a private and 
 perfonal Good. He purfues it, Either becaufe 
 his own Interefts are fome way or other de- 
 pendent on fuch a Courfe ; or at leaft, be- 
 caufe he takes a Pleafure in confidering the 
 Good which he does to others. On either 
 Suppofition, Obhgation muft at lufl: be founded 
 in a Defire of his own particular Happinefs: 
 And tlie Fitnefs of Things, fo far as it is 
 capable of having any Influence over him, 
 muft im.ply a Suitablenefs of Things to the 
 promoting, fome way or other, liis own Hap- 
 pinefs. 
 
 I have now driven the Point fo far as This; 
 Thex'e can be no Motive, no Obligation at all 
 to 2.<t\ or to forbear, v/here our own Good is 
 entirely out of Qiieilion. The next Point to 
 be enquir'd into, is This ; Whether the mere 
 Satisfa(5tion which may arife from a certain 
 Action, with its Contrary; or elfe, the mere 
 natural Conducivenefs of that A6tion to a 
 certain Good, with its Contrary, be a fufficient 
 Ground on which to build Moral Obligation: 
 And if the Negative fhall appear, we mufl go 
 fomewhat farther in order todifcover whereto 
 place Obligation, and what it is. 
 
 Now there are fome Objedions, to me in- 
 fuperable, againll; building it on Either of 
 thcfe Foundations. If you found it in the 
 mcr^ Satisfadion which arifes to the Mind 
 
 from 
 
6o ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 from a certain Action, &c. with its Contrary, 
 then Obligation can reach no farther than the 
 Adiion propos'd is really fitted to produce 
 this Effeft. Be it, for inftance, an Ad: of 
 Humanity or Good Nature: On this Suppo- 
 lition a Man is no farther obliged to it, than 
 he is adually poffefs'd of tender Sentiments 
 towards his, Kind. Should he happen to be 
 void of This Tafte, This inward Spirit of Be- 
 nevolence ; and find no Pleafure in the 
 Thought of doing good to others, he muft 
 be perfedly free, and under no Obligation to 
 do the ieaft Inftance of Kindnefs to his Bre- 
 thren. 
 
 Nay, fliould it be fuppos'd that, by any 
 means whatfoever, he hath contracted a mali- 
 cious DifpOiition, and takes any kind of Satis- 
 faction in the Misfortunes or Miferies of 
 others, it v/ill follow from this Principle, 
 that he is oblig'd to do them all the Mifchief 
 he may have it in his Power to do. Kence 
 may appear what a Scheme of Virtue can be 
 eredted on this Foundation. 
 
 Should this Hypothefis be quitted; and 
 fliculd it be affirm'd, That the mere Ten- 
 dency of an Adlon to the prefent natural 
 Good of the Agent, and fo vice verfd^ is the 
 proper Ground on which to build Moral 
 
 Cbli2;ation; Then it muft foUov/, that 
 
 no Man is oblig'd to do, or omit any Acflion 
 farther than it hath a real Tendency to pro- 
 mote or hinder his own prefent natural Good. 
 
 No 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 6x 
 
 No Man can be oblig'd to do any Service to 
 another, unlefs by doing it he promotes his 
 own prefent Advantage, or lays a Foundation 
 for fome future greater Expedations. What 
 muft, in this Cafe, become of Friendfhip, 
 Love of Country, Humanity, and the Hke ? 
 
 Jt muil follow, in the next place, upon the 
 prefent Suppoiition, that if a temporal Ad- 
 vantage may be made to a Man's felf by In- 
 juftice, Unfaithfulnefs, betraying his Country, 
 
 or bringing Mifery on Mankind, • he is 
 
 not merely at Liberty to do all thefe j but 
 ftridily and properly oblig'd to it. Llis own 
 prefent temporal Good, it feems, requires it; 
 which being, in this way of fiiating it, the 
 Ground of Obligation, it muil likewife be the 
 Meafure of it. 
 
 I fhall go on to add. That as the Notion 
 of the Religion of Nature, conlider'd as a 
 Religion, muft refer us to God, The Author 
 and Objed; of it, — - fo the Notion of The 
 Law of Nature, conlider'd as a Law, xmsSk. 
 refer us to fome Superior, The Author of this 
 Law; and from whofe Will, directed by 
 Wifdom and Goodnefs, and fupported by 
 Power, all Obligation, ftridlly and properly 
 fo call'd, muil be at lafl dcriv'd. 
 
 The Notion of Law in general coniifts in 
 This, That it is the Decree or Command of 
 a Superior. If this be admitted, then The 
 Law of Nature can be no otherwife a Law, 
 than as we conceive it to be the Will and 
 
 Com- 
 
6i J DE T En CE of 
 
 Command of That Being to whom we arei 
 naturally fubjed: 3 and who is able and willing 
 both to reward our Obedience, and to punifli 
 our Obflinacy. On any other Foot than This, 
 we fliali run ourfelves on fome of the Diffi- 
 culties mention'd before, "viz. Either, There 
 may be a Law, where there is no Obligation; 
 
 — Or, There may be Obligation where 
 
 there is no Motive or inducement ; Or 
 
 elfe, Laftly, jMen are oblig'd by The Law of 
 Nature to ail thofe Things for which they 
 have fome Motive, be the Matter in itfelf 
 however pernicious to the Good or Safety of 
 others. Were this once admitted. Virtue 
 might be Vice, and Vice Virtue: The Law 
 of Nature would be the moft inconfillent 
 thing imaginable : And the very fame Perfons, 
 upon a litde Change of Circumflances, oblig'd 
 to be either Juft or Unjufl, Merciful or Cruel. 
 
 But the real State of the Cafe is This ; 
 There is an All-perfed; Being exiiling. The 
 Author of theUniverfej who in like manner 
 exercifes a Providence over that World he 
 firft created. Becaufe He is All-perfed, He 
 mull; be abfolutely Juft and Good -, and con- 
 fequently, mufl: will the Happinefs of his 
 Creatures. As He wills their Happinefs, He 
 mufl will the proper Means of itj and there- 
 fore, that Men fliould not only purfue their 
 own real Good by fuitable Means, but like- 
 wife the Good and Happinefs of their Bre- 
 thren. For, fince all ^len have the fame 
 
 Rela-' 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 6^ 
 
 Relation to God as Creatures, they muil 
 therefore be all of them the Objeds of his 
 Care. Should it therefore happen in fome 
 Cafes, that ading according to his Will, 
 might be inconiiftent with a prefent Interefl, 
 yet flill Obedience is abundantly fecur'd: Be- 
 caufe, The fame Being who prefcribes to us, 
 will reward our Obedience, or puni£h our 
 Difobedience. 
 
 The Law of Nature then is, to us, a Law, 
 becaufe it is, and muft be The Will of God, 
 on whom we are abfolutely dependent : And 
 our Obligation to conform ourfelves to it, is 
 founded on fome Profpedt we have of a fuitabl® 
 Reward or Punifliment. 
 
 In the Ufe of Reafon Men are capable of 
 difcovering, in fome Sort, the Matter of this 
 Law ; and the Enforcements by which it pro- 
 perly becomes a Law to us. So far as thefe 
 are by us difcoverable, fo' far this Law ex- 
 tends, and no farther : So far are Men flridlly 
 oblig'd ; For it is impoffible that the Law 
 fliould itfelf fubfiil where Obligation ceafes. 
 
 Upon the Wholes Moral Obligation figni- 
 fies the Neceffity we are under, to do or for- 
 bear fome Action in Obedience to the Com- 
 mand of a Superior, who hath a Right to 
 prefcribe to us, with a Power of enforcing 
 his Commands ; and from whom, in confe- 
 quence of this, we muft either hope for fome 
 Reward or. fear fome Punifliment : And the 
 Obligation to the Law of Nature fignifies, the 
 . V . " Neceffity 
 
 t 
 
<$4 ^DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 NeceiTity we are under of conforming our- 
 felves to thofe Precepts, which our Reafon 
 Ihews us to be the V/ill of God ; by which 
 Rule God will acquit or condemn, reward or 
 punifh us. Unlefs we conlider it in this 
 View, it is to us no Law at all; and carries 
 with ir, flridly fpeaking, no Obligation : But 
 as foon as \Ye regard it in this .Light, it be- 
 comes not only a Lav/ but a Religion. 
 
 After all, I muil: confefs that this lail Point 
 I have been coniidering, is a tender one ; and 
 am fenfible that I have difFer'd from fome very 
 worthy Men, v/hcfe Affed:ion to the common 
 Caufe of Religion mufl not be queftion'd. 
 This may create fome Prejudices ; v^hich v/ill 
 be heighten'd farther by Apprehenfions, that 
 the Caufe of Natural Religion muft fufter by 
 the prefent Way of treating it. V/ere This 
 in Truth the Cafe, I iliould not only decline 
 this Method, but abhor it ; for, certain it is, 
 that Revelation itfelf cannot fubfifl, if Na- 
 tural Religion be defcroy'd j which, as it aids 
 and llirengthens, it mufl in like manner pre- 
 fuppofe. But let me defire to know Whence 
 thefe Fears ? Is not Natural Religion affected 
 by this Point in the very fame manner as Re- 
 veal'd ? Is not God equally tlie Author of 
 both ? And is not our Obligation to both re- 
 folveable into the fame common Principle, 
 'viz. That they are the Will of that Being on 
 whom we muft depend abfolutely ? 
 
 The 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 6f 
 
 ^ The Gentlemen with whom I am now de- 
 bating, will allow me, that Religiofi muft ne- 
 cellarily refer us to God : But then, they will 
 diftinguifli between Religion and Morality^ 
 They will tell us, that as Morality hath a Foun- 
 dation in the Nature and Reafons of Things, 
 fo it derives its Obligation from the veiy fame 
 Principle: And as Fitnefs is antecedent, in. 
 order of Conception, to the Divine Will, Ob- 
 ligation to conform ourfelves to this Fitnefs 
 muft be fo likewife. In a Word, as Reafon, 
 abftrad:ing from any Concern of the Divine 
 Being about our Adiions, may point out what 
 is fit and proper, fo the fame Reafon may 
 fcifedually oblige us to it. 
 
 I am by no means fond of differing from 
 any one merely for the Sake of differing: 
 Much lefs willing fhould I be, to have un- 
 neceflary Debates with Perfons concern'd on 
 the fame Side of the general Queflion. And 
 therefore, in order to make my Sentiments ori 
 this Head more clear, I fhall fum up in a 
 Series of Propoiitions, what I take to be the 
 real State of the Cafe, 
 
 Prop. i. There is a real and effential Dif-^ 
 ference between Things ; on account of v/hich 
 fome Things are fit and proper to be done^ 
 others to be omitted. 
 
 2. There is in every Man, who hath the 
 iife of thofe Faculties which are proper to his 
 Nature,- a Power whereby he difcerns, in fome 
 
 F Sort^ 
 
J DEFENCE of 
 
 Sort, the Difference between certain Adions ; 
 in confequence of which he likes and approves 
 fome, he diflikes and condemns others. Unlefs 
 this be admitted, all Foundation of Natural 
 Morality mufl: fail ; and there will be little 
 Diftind:ion, as to moral Matters, between 
 Men and Brutes. 
 
 3. This moral Difcernment is in different 
 Men different : In fome more nice and exten- 
 iive ; in others lefs fo. From whence it fol- 
 lows, that a moral Rule, founded only on this 
 moral Difcernment, mufl vary as much as the 
 Difcernment itfelf varies. 
 
 4. As all other Faculties are capable of 
 Improvement or Decay, fo we may affert the 
 fame of this likewife : And tho' I dare not fay 
 k is ever totally extinft whilft any Degrees 
 of Underftanding remain, yet this muft be 
 allow'd, diat it may in a great meafure be 
 impair'd. 
 
 £. Such Anions, as, in confequence of this 
 moral Difcernrrtent, are approv'd or con- 
 demn'd, muft likewife produce a Liking or 
 Efleem of the Agent on the one hand, or a 
 Diflike or Difefteem of him on the other; 
 and this feparate from any Confideration of 
 Advantage or Difadvantage arifing to Us. On 
 this Foot we are delighted with a Good and 
 Virtuous Characfler,' or abhor its oppolite ; 
 and this, when by Diflance either of Time 
 or Place, it is impoffible thgit our own Interefl 
 fhould be at all affed:ed. 
 
 6. Thofe 
 
ReVeal'd Religion, &c, 6t 
 
 6. Thofe Adlions which a Man likes and 
 approves in others, he muft much more dd 
 fo in himfelf, and fo 'vice verfd. From 
 whence it follows, that as he efteemS and ho- 
 nours others on this account, or difefteems 
 and condemns them ; io^ for the fame Reafon, 
 he muft be pleas'd and fatisfied with himfelf 
 whilft he adls what he judges right, or con- 
 cerned and anxious whilft he does what he 
 reckons wrong. This I take to be a true ac- 
 count of Natural Confcience. 
 
 7. It will follow from hence, that this Ap- 
 probation of what is right, and Difapproba- 
 tion of its contrary, together with its confe- 
 quent Satisfaction or Uneafinefs, is a natural. 
 Motive to purfue the one, and to avoid the 
 other; and if all Hindrances were remov'djj 
 Would be fuffieient of itfelf to influence him. 
 
 8. But then, as the moral Difcernment itfelf 
 is different in different Perfons, on which 
 account they vary much as to their natural 
 Knowledge in moral Matters j fo liketvife 
 their moral Tafle is found to vary greatly. 
 From whence it comes to pafs, that different 
 Men are pofTefs'd of greater or lefs Degrees 
 
 of AfFediion for what is right, widi greater 
 
 or lefs Degrees of Averfion from what is 
 wrong. 
 
 9. The natural Motive therefore, mention'd 
 under the Seventh Article, will have a diffe- 
 rent Influence over different Menj and whilft 
 
 F 2! il 
 
^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 it may poflibly be fufficlent for fome, it may 
 be far from beins; (o for others. 
 
 ID. For, however it may be fupposM, that 
 Men would be intluenc'd by this Motive in 
 its loweft Degree, were there no Principles^ 
 fubfifting by which it iscounter-ad:ed, yet we 
 £nd in Fa6t that Men have a great Variety 
 of Pallions and Aifeftions. Thefe frequently 
 draw a contrary way ; and difappoint the good 
 Effedis which might other wife arife from our 
 moral Difcernment and Taftc. To whicli 
 may be added. That fome prefent Advantage 
 is frequently loft, or ibme prefent Difad- 
 vantage incurr'd by continuing firm to the 
 Rules of Righteoufnefs. It may be thought, 
 that in fuch Cafes as thefe, Men are concern'd 
 to have fome Regard for themfelves. And 
 therefore, unlefs the Pleafure of purfuing what 
 is fuppos'd right ihall overballance the Incon- 
 veniences attending it, there can be no fufH- 
 cicnt Motive, on the prefent Foot, for pur- 
 fuing it in fuch Cafes. 
 
 II. It follows from hence, That this in- 
 ward Approbation of what is right, &c, with, 
 its confequent Satisfadion, &c. muft be utterly 
 ihfufficient to recommend and enforce the uni- 
 form Pradlice of what is term'd Virtuous, 
 And confequently, we muft examine fome- 
 what farther into this Point, in order to dif- 
 cover what Neceffity lies upon us to adhere 
 invariably to thefe Rules. 
 
 iz. The 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 6^ 
 
 12. The real Differences of Things known 
 to us by our natural Diicernment, will point 
 out to us a Rule of Action, which we cannot 
 but approve fo far as we difcern it. But then 
 we {liould obferve, that if we go no farther. 
 This will be only a Rule, and not properly a 
 Law. A Rule may fubfilf without any Sup- 
 pofition of a Superior decreeing it, whereas 
 a Law, ftrid:ly Ipeaking, always fuppoles a 
 Superior. 
 
 13. However the inward Satisfatflion or 
 Uneafinefs which refults from Anions fuitable 
 or unfuitable to a known Rule, may in manv 
 Cafes recommend and enforce that Rule, vet 
 This Recommendation or Enforcement is notj, 
 fiddly fpeaking, Obligation. A Man m^ay, on 
 numberless Occafions, be induc'd to do what 
 he is not by any means oblig'd to. Obliga- 
 tion doth not fignify Inducement of any Kind, 
 whatfoevcr it be; but That only which arifes 
 from The Will of a Superior, who hath a 
 Right and Power of enforcing his Will by 
 Suitable Rewards and Punifliments; and from 
 whom, in Confcquence of this, we either 
 hope the one, or dread the othei'. 
 
 14. Therefore I aflert, that as all Obliga- 
 tion, flridly fo caird, mufl be deriv'd at laffc 
 from the Will of God, fo without taking God's 
 Will into account there can be no futiicient 
 Enforcement of the general and uniform 
 Prad:ice-of what is term'd Virtue. 
 
 F 3 But 
 
70 y/ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 But perhaps the chief Difference on this 
 Head is verbal, and relates to the Ufe of thefe 
 Terms Law and Obligation. Both thefe Ex- 
 preffions are fometimes us'd in a more loofe 
 and popular Senfe, and at other times in one 
 more ftrid; and proper. If the Gentlemen 
 mean by Law, any proper Rule of Action, 
 whether confirm'd by the Will of a Superior 
 pr not; and by Obligation, any kind of moral 
 
 Inducement, whatfoever it be ; This is a 
 
 Ufe of the Terms which feems to be too loofe, 
 and may poffibly give fome Occalion of Ad- 
 vantage to our Adverfaries. Yet, however 
 this Matter prove, I hope others may be 
 allow'd to ufe thefe Terms in a ftri(5ler Accep- 
 tation without Offence ; efpecially when the 
 Meaning is declar'd, and Guards thrown in 
 againfl: all Inconveniences thought to arifefrom 
 
 this Ufe of them, But not to quarrel 
 
 about mere Words, where we fee and under- 
 ftand one another : On what hath been ob- 
 ferv'd, I think thefe Refleiflions may beoffer'd, 
 in which, I hope, wns fliall all agreej what- 
 foever thofe Terms may be in which we may 
 chufe to exprpfs ourlelves. 
 
 I. Upon Suppofition that Obligation in a 
 certain Senfe, arifes from the Difterences of 
 things perceiv'd by us, and the confequent 
 Approbation or Difapprobation of Acfliong, 
 &c. yet muft it be confefs'd, that Obligatioq 
 like wife ^rifes from the Will of a Superior, 
 
 who 
 
Reveal'd Religion, ^c. 71 
 
 who enforces his righteous Commands by 
 the Sanations of Reward and Punifliment. 
 
 2. Forafmuch as the mere Approbation or 
 Difapprobation of Aftions, together with the 
 oonfequent Efteem or Difefteem of the Agents, 
 muft be entirely inefFe6tual, where contrary 
 Affections or Paflions overballance them j or 
 where fome extraordinary prefent Interefl in- 
 terferes J all the fuppos'd Obligation arifing 
 from thence muft, in fuch Cafes, fail ; and 
 confequently, Obligation founded only in that 
 Principle muft, be defective, as not reaching to 
 all thofe Cafes to which Virtue is fuppos'd to 
 extend itfelf. 
 
 3. The Will and Command of God, and 
 what follows upon it, fuitable Reward or 
 Puniflimeiit, is not only a Superaddition to 
 this natural Motive to Virtue, but likewife 
 muft extend to all poftible Cafes and Circum- 
 ftances ; and confequently is the only thing 
 which can carry with it univerfal and never- 
 failing Obligation. 
 
 I ftiall leave it therefore to the Judgment 
 of any reafonable Man, whether the prefent 
 Hypothefis, which derives moral Obligation 
 from the Will of God, be not much more 
 ferviceablc to the Caufe of Virtue, than the 
 Method of building it on the mere Appro- 
 bation of our Minds, &c. arifing from our 
 Perception of the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of 
 F 4 Adions. 
 
72 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Aftions. If thefe Refledions are allowed, I 
 hope I may be excus'd in the prefent Attempt, 
 by thofe worthy Gentlemen at leaft, from 
 whom perhaps I differ only in Expreffion; 
 and efpecially lince both Sides have the fame 
 fend in View. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 73 
 
 C H A P. II. 
 
 Whether The Law or Religion of ISIature 
 he alfohtely perfeR* 
 
 N the former Chapter I have en- 
 deavour'd to fettle the Meanins: of 
 Thefe Terms, Law or Religion of 
 Nature 'y and have fhewn that no- 
 thing more can properly be underftood by 
 them, than fuch a Colledion of moral Prin- 
 ciples and Precepts as Men are capable of 
 drawing out for themfelves in the Ufe of that 
 Reafon, and thofe feveral Opportuni«ties they 
 enjoy. If this be true, it will follow beyond 
 Contradiction, that fuch a Religion cannot be 
 abfolutely perfed. It cannot be more perfed; 
 than human Reafon itfelf is : And therefore, 
 if human Reafon is not abfolutely perfecft, 
 neither can that Religion be fo, which reaches 
 no farther than human Reafon can carry us. 
 
 However, 
 
74 A DEFENCE of 
 
 However, tho' I conceive this general 
 Argument is fufficient to overthrow our Au- 
 thor's bold AfTertions on this Point; yet, for- 
 afmuch as he builds much upon it, and would 
 infer from hence that any Revelation of a 
 new Law is ufelefs and impolTible, it may not 
 be improper to confider him more diftindtly. 
 
 Much were it to be wifli'd, that before he 
 had adventur'd to maintain with fo much AfTu- 
 rance a Point, in which the foberer Part of 
 the World would be apt to differ from him, 
 he had endeavour'd to make his Meaning 
 clear, by explaining the feveral Terms he 
 ufes J That he had told us What he intends 
 by Ferje5iion^ as apply'd to Law ; What by 
 ahfolute Perfedfion ; and had then produc'd 
 fuch Arguments as appear'd to prove the Pro- 
 portion laid down, according to the Senfe in 
 \vhich he had before explain'd it. 
 
 But it is remarkable throughout this Au- 
 thor's whole Performance, that he affe(5ls Ob- 
 fcurity beyond meafure. He feldom defines 
 his T^rnis at all : And if, upon certain Oc- 
 cajfions, he appears to be fomewhat more ex- 
 plicit, yet in other Parrs of his Book he forgets 
 himfelf, and deferts his own avow'd Inter- 
 pretations. 
 
 Not to go off too far from my Point : Since 
 cur Author hath not been fo kind as to at- 
 tempt an Explication of thefe Terms^^ I fhall 
 introduce what I defign to offer, by obferving, 
 That 
 
 Thofo 
 
Reveal'd Religiots:, &c. 75 
 
 Thofe Things are perfed, to which No- 
 thing is wanting, 
 
 Thofe Things are perfed: in their Kind, tq 
 which nothing is wanting that belongs to 
 Beings of that Rank and Order. And, 
 
 Thofe are abfolutely perfed:, to which No- 
 thing of any Kind can poffibly be added, 
 which would render their State in any Degree 
 better than it is at prefent. 
 
 A Difference therefore we fee there is be- 
 tween Perfediioji in its Kind, and PerfeEiion 
 abfolute. Every Sort of Creatures, as enjoying 
 all the Powers which belong to Beings of that 
 Sort, is perfect in its Kind : And yet, not- 
 withftanding this, there are various Degrees 
 of Perfediion in Creatures ; nor are there any 
 fo entirely excellent, in which Something 
 might not be conceiv'd capable of making 
 their State truly better, and confequently more 
 perfedt. But the Supreme Being can receive 
 no Additions of Excellency whatfoever. No- 
 thing can be imagin'd capable of improving 
 or bettering his State. And therefore we affirm 
 of Him, not merely that he is perfe(ft, but 
 that He is abfolutely h. This I take to repre- 
 fent the general Notion of Perfed:ion. How 
 it may be apply'd to Law or Religion, and 
 what it imports when thus applied, comes 
 now to be confider'd. 
 
 Several Things might here be noted in 
 order to the full Explication of this Article. 
 But not to infifl on Matters of IclTer Moment, 
 
 Ifhall 
 
76 A DEFENCE of 
 
 I fhall obferve, that Perfedion, as referr'd to 
 Law, muft principally be deduc'd from con- 
 iidering the Nature, and the End of it. 
 
 The Nature of Law confifts in This, that 
 it is the Decree of a Superior, given us for the 
 Dire(ftion of our Actions, and to which we 
 are oblig'd to conform ourfelves. And the 
 End for which fuch a Law is, or ought to 
 be given us at all, is, the Attainment of fome 
 Good either of ourfelves, or others. This End 
 likewife may be confider'd, either, as That 
 ultimate one, to which all Laws whatfoever 
 aim ; or elfe, as That which is the immediate 
 View of each particular Branch of it. For 
 this is remarkable, that over and above a ge- 
 neral Tendency to their laft End, which all 
 Means, confider'd as fuch, muft unavoidably 
 have, in frequent Inflances they have a more 
 immediate Reference to fomething elfe; and 
 by producing This, they help forward and 
 promote their laft and moll general End. 
 
 Thefe Things being laid down, it will be 
 proper to obferve, 
 
 1. That as Laws are given us for the Di- 
 rection of our Anions, and the very Nature 
 of Law doth partly confift in This, fo the Per- 
 f?dion of it mufl require, that it be perfedly 
 dirediive; i,e. That the Authority on which 
 ic refts be certain ; and the Meaning of it 
 clear and z-d^], For where eitlier the Impofcr 
 
 is 
 
Reveal'd Religiois, &c: yj 
 
 i« unknown ; or his Authority queftionable > 
 or Doubts may arife What his real Meaning 
 is, there the Decree wants fomething, of 
 ■which it was capable, in order to direct: thofe 
 Perfons for whom it was made. 
 
 2. Wc may obferve. That Law is the De- 
 cree, of a Superior to which we are obliged X<y 
 conform our Actions ; and lince we are bound 
 to Obedience by thofe Sanctions which enforce 
 the Law, its Perfed:ion muft require, that ic 
 be perfedily enforc'd; z. e. its Sandiions mufl 
 be entirely fufficient to influence the Subje(fl > 
 fo clearly denounced, that no Doubts can arife 
 about Them ; and fo weighty, as reafonably 
 to overballance all Temptations to Difobe- 
 dience. Without this, the befl and moil 
 xvholefomeDire<5lion&will be conlider'd rather 
 as prudent Advices, than as ilrid:ly and pro- 
 perly Laws, 
 
 3. We may obferve, in reference to the' 
 End of Law, That as the Adting what is^ 
 good, fit, proper, in order to promote The 
 Honour of God and the real Happinefs of 
 ourfelves and our Fellow Creatures, is that 
 which ought to be aim'd at by it, fo tiie Per- 
 fection of this Law mull require, that it pre- 
 (cribe every Thing which is nccelTary or fer- 
 viceable to this purpofe ; every thing whereby 
 the Honour of God may be fuitably exprels'd> 
 and the Good both of ourfelves and our 
 Fellow Creatures effeftually promoted ; In 
 
 ihorty 
 
7% ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 Ihort, that it be univerfal as to the Matte? 
 of it. 
 
 To which may be added, Laftly, That as 
 the Perfedlidn of Law requires, that it pre- 
 fcribe every Thing which is fit, proper, and 
 good, as having a neceflary and immediate 
 
 Reference to the ultimate End of Law; • 
 
 {o hkewife the fubordinate Parts of it fhould 
 be fiich, as are befl and fittefl to obtain their 
 
 particular and fubordinate Ends : That 
 
 as it fhould prefcribe every thing, which 
 being performed is projfjerly virtuous ; f6 
 fhould it like wife {tt forth the befl and mofl 
 fuitable Means, whereby the Pradice of Virtue 
 may be fupported and forwarded. 
 
 Agreeably to this, Abfoliite FerfiBkn^ as 
 applied to Law, muft requirej "'* < ^^'''^ 
 
 Such a Clearnefs as to the Meaning and 
 Authority of the Law, as can admit of No- 
 thing more in any poffible Circumflance. 
 
 Such a Strength of Enforcement j as cannot' 
 be heighten'd in any way whatfoever. 
 
 Such an Extent of Matter, as cannot ad- 
 mit the Addition of any poffible Article. 
 
 Such a Suitablenefs of Means and Motives, 
 that Nothing can ever be laid before us of 
 more or greater Importance. Let the Law 
 or Religion of Nature be examin'd on this 
 Foot. 
 
 I. Then I do affirm that the Law of Na- 
 ture is not abfolutely perfed:, becaufe it is 
 deficient in point of Clearnefs ; and capable 
 
 of 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, y^ 
 
 of being made more plain by immediate, or 
 even Traditional Revelation, than it is by 
 the meer Reafoning of our own Minds 
 about it.. 
 
 And here, how much foever I am obliged 
 to differ from this Author on other Occaiions, 
 I am fupported by him in the prefent Con* 
 clulion ; fince he affirms roundly, " As far as 
 *' you fuppofe God's Laws are not plain to 
 ** any Fart of Mankind, fo far you derogate 
 " from the Perfediion of thofe Laws. " [p. 107. 
 1. I.] The Gentleman, you fee, is full and ex- 
 plicit. He maintains, that the Perfe^ion of 
 God's Laws requires, not only that they be 
 plain, but likewife that they be plain to all. 
 Should he therefore be able to prove, that 
 every Particular of the Law of Nature is clearly 
 demonftrable by the Philofopher, yet even 
 This would not evince the abfolute Perfedtioii 
 of this Law : It flill remains, upon his own 
 Foot of Arguing, that thefe Particulars muft 
 be equally demonftrable by every Man ; For, 
 *' As far as you fuppofe God's Laws are 
 " not plain to any Fart of Mankind, fo far 
 " you derogate from the Perfe6i;ion of thofe 
 " Laws." 
 
 I know this PalTage is applied by this Gen- 
 tleman to a Purpofe very different from that, 
 for which it is here produc'd by me. He 
 maintains, (and hath endeavour'd to evince by 
 Arguments which fhall be confider'd hereafter) 
 that the Law of Nature is abfolutely perfed:, 
 
 If 
 
8b \^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 if fo, it mufl, faith he, be clear and plain t6 
 every Man ; becaufe it is inconfiftent with 
 The Notion of abfolute Perfection in this 
 Law, That it flioiild be difficult or obfcure to 
 any. We difagree therefore in This j Our 
 Author would infer from the fuppos'd abfolute 
 Perfection of this Law, that it mull be clear 
 and plain to all j I, on the other hand, con- 
 tend againft this abfolute Perfection, from its 
 Deficiency in point of Clearnefs. 
 
 Our Author, we have feen, maintains, that 
 ^he Law or Religion of Nature is plain and 
 
 clear to all, ■ to every Part of Mankind; 
 
 An Alfertion this too bold, where it is in the 
 t'ower of any lingle Perfon to contradict him 
 without any Poffibility of being refuted. For 
 tho' it fhould be admitted^ (which I am yet 
 very far from granting,) that every Article in 
 the Law of Nature is plain and evident to 
 
 Some, to Perfons, for inftance, of Parts 
 
 and Learning ; yet. How does it follow from 
 hence, that it muft be plain and evident to 
 Every one ? Surely fome Difference will be 
 made between Men ; and the Slave will not 
 be put on an equal F6ot with the Philofo- 
 pher. 
 
 This Gentleman fhall be allow'd to under- 
 l^and his own Abilities perfe<5tly 3 and to tell us,, 
 if he pleafes, not only what he actually knows> 
 but likewife what he is capable of knowings 
 if he will take any Care about it. But theny 
 I hope he will make fome Return for this 
 
 €oncefliQ!>> 
 
Reveal'd Religion, (^c. 8i 
 
 Conceffion; and acknowledge that he is not 
 quite fb well acquainted with the Capacities 
 of other Men. And if he expedts to be cre- 
 dited when he aflures us, that The Law of 
 Nature, as comprehending under it every 
 Thing fit and proper, is perfedly known to 
 him, and fo exceedingly obvious that nothing 
 can make it more evident ; he fhould allow 
 that others are as proper Judges of dieir own 
 Abilities as he is of his. 
 
 Let us go no farther than his own Draught 
 of natural Religion : This, fhort and imper- 
 fed: as it is, contains feveral Things in it, 
 which, tho' they {hould be in themfelves 
 true, and proveable to Men of Parts and 
 Skill, are yet far from being plain and obvious 
 even to Them j much more are they from being 
 fo to all Men. Put the Cafe of a Debate 
 arifing about the Meaning or Evidence of 
 fome of his Proportions. This furely may be 
 fuppos'd at leaft : How, I pray, would this 
 Gentleman behave on the Occafion ? Would he 
 think it fufficient to affirm, that every Thing 
 was too plain to need either Explication or 
 Proof? Might not his Adverfary reply, that 
 He was beft Judge of his own Underftanding; 
 that the Proportions were to him doubtful 
 and obfcure, and the Evidence of their Truth, 
 in whatfoever Senfe undcrftood, precarious ? 
 Surely, as every Man is befl acquainted with 
 his own Capacities, fo in Cales of this Nature 
 he muft be allowed to anfwer for himfelf. 
 
 G Some 
 
8i J DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 Some Points there are felf-evident ; which 
 neither need nor are really capable of Proof. 
 Others are fo immediately conned:ed with 
 felf-evident Proportions, that as foon as laid 
 before us their Truth appears, and we can 
 entertain no Doubt about them. Thus, " The 
 " Whole is greater than a Part"j and confe- 
 quently " Things may be affirm'd of The 
 " Whole, or of all the Parts taken together, 
 " which cannot be affirm'd of any lingle Part 
 " feparately taken. " Matters of this Kind 
 are plain and obvious j fince they muft be 
 clear to every one who is capable of thinking 
 at all about them. But the Cafe is different 
 where Ideas are exceedingly complex, and the 
 Proportion advanc'd mufi; receive Proof from 
 a long Train of Arguing. In fuch Inftances 
 few are capable of entering far into Matters. 
 Truth becomes obfcure ; and cannot eafily be 
 difcover'd by themfelves, or made plain by 
 others. 
 
 To apply this to the Cafe in hand : The 
 more general Rules of Morality, fuch as are 
 thefe J " That God is to be honour'd and 
 
 " obey'd ; That the Rules of Juftice and 
 
 *' Charity fhould be obferv'd, " and the like, 
 are, I conceive, fo plain, that no Doubts can 
 arife about them. But then I would beg to 
 know, Whether every thing elfe be fo exceed- 
 ingly clear to all ? Whether many Queftions 
 may not arife, How and in What Manner God 
 lliould be honour'd j— In What Particulars 
 
 we 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c\ 83 
 
 we may bcft exprefs our Obedience^ 
 
 What are the fevcral Inftances of Juflice j and 
 What the Meafures and Extent of Charity ? 
 Thefe Things are not quite fo clear to all, 
 merely on the Foot of their natural Reafon; 
 and concerning which each Man hath a R.ight 
 to anfwer ibr himlelf, how far they are cleat 
 and plain. 
 
 But not to reft in this, I muft obferve far- 
 ther, That as Religion implies not only the 
 leveral Precepts which immediately dire^ 
 our Actions, but likewife the feveral Doc- 
 trines which ferve either to prove or enforce 
 thefe Precepts ; fo the Clearnefs of a Reli- 
 gion muft require a like Clearnefs in thele 
 Doftrines. And fince our Author affirms, 
 that the Perfedion of the Law or Religion of 
 Nature requires it ftiould be plain to all Man- 
 kind, the Perfedion of this Law or Religion 
 muft require, that every Part of it, as well 
 Dodrines as Precepts, fnould be clear to all: 
 To which I may fairly add, that they muft 
 be not only clear, but abfolutely fo ; evi- 
 dent to fuch a Degree, that nothing can 
 poffibly make them more fb. Yet, is this 
 Fad ; or, is there the leaft Shadow of Truth 
 in the Aftertion ? 
 
 The Gentleman I am contending with muft 
 allow, that all thofc Points are Dodrines of 
 Natural Religion, which, having iome Re- 
 ference to natural Duty, are either adually 
 known, or at leaft capable of being fo. Such 
 
 G 2 arc. 
 
84 ^DEFENCE of 
 
 are, " The Exiftence of a God " ; the firft 
 Ground and Foundation of all Religion 
 whatfoever ; " The Reality of a Providence ; 
 " The feveral Propofitions which regard 
 '' The Divine Perfed:ions ; and Thofe like- 
 " wife, which exprefs the Relations in which 
 " we ftand to God and other Beings. "" I do 
 not affirm that every thing of this Kind is 
 fimply difcoverable in the U^o. of every 
 Man's Reafon : Indeed I cannot think it is : 
 Yet, fuppofing it were 1lo^ flill many Things 
 may be fimply difcoverable, which are not 
 plain. 
 
 And indeed in Proof that feveral Matters, 
 with reference to the Divine Perfe6lions, are 
 not quite fo clear to all Mankind, we need 
 only oblerve the frequent, and fometimes 
 general Errors they have run themfelves into 
 on thefe Heads. Truths, plain and evident 
 to all, will be difputed by few ; at leaft in 
 thofe Inftances, in which their Interefts and 
 Pailions are not immediately concern'd. In 
 Matters Self-evident, it is fcarce poflible to 
 impofe on any one. In Matters immediately 
 conneded with things Self-evident, it is diffi- 
 cult to deceive Men. But in things remote 
 from common ApprehenfionS; and where ex- 
 traordinary Attention is neceffary, Errors are 
 frequent. But then I affirm that Matters of 
 this Nature are not clear and plain to all ; If 
 they were ib, Men would be no more liable 
 to err in thefe Points, than any others allign- 
 2 able : 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 85 
 
 able : And if ablolute Evidence be irrefift- 
 able, where fuch Evidence is, Error muft be 
 impoflible. 
 
 From Dodrines let ns proceed to Precepts, 
 and fee how Matters ftand there. What bath 
 been obferv'd above will be found propor- 
 tionably true on this Head likewife ^ with 
 this Difference however, that Men's Corrupt 
 Pailions being more immediately interefted in 
 Matters of Pradice than Belief, they will 
 from hence be induc'd to confider Things 
 with a greater Mixture of Partiality. This 
 muft, I think, be allowed : Yet, on the other 
 hand, it ought to be confider'd, that as thefe 
 Rules of Life are oftentimes deducible from 
 Religious Dodrines, they muft be ftill far- 
 ther removed from Firft and Self-evident Pro- 
 pofitions, than thefe Dodrines themfelves 
 are ; and confequently, they muft in Pro-- 
 portion be lefs clear and plain. 
 
 Our Author afferts, that to deny a Law 
 is plain to all, muft derogate from its Per- 
 fection. To maintain therefore its abfolute 
 Perfedion, we muft maintain its abfolute 
 Clearnefs. And lince The Law or Religion 
 of Nature includes under it not only a few 
 general Rules, but likewife the feveral par^ 
 ticular Precepts relating to what is right and 
 fit; it follows, that thefe Precepts likewife 
 muft be abfolutely clear to ail ; and, of 
 Conlequence, they muft all of them be 
 equally clear ; it being impoftlble there 
 
 G 3 fhouid 
 
U jDEFENCEo/ 
 
 Ihould be any Difference of Degrees with 
 regard to abfolute Clearnefs or Perfection. 
 Let us fee therefore, whether all the feveral 
 Precepts of Morality are equally clear and 
 plain. 
 
 And here it might be obferv'd in general, 
 that as thefe Precepts are more nearly, or 
 more remotely conneded with iirft Princi- 
 ples, they mult of courfe be proveable with 
 greater or lefs Difpatch and Eafe ; and con- 
 fcquently, the Evidence of fuch Points muft 
 admit different Degrees of Clearnefs. 
 
 Or, if this be queftion'd, the Matter may 
 be put beyond all manner of Doubt by pro- 
 ducing Inftances. To deltroy the Life of 
 another Man without fufficient Caufe or Pro- 
 vocation, is fb clearly wrong, that no Per- 
 Ibn, who thinks at all, can misjudge about 
 it ; and fo the Precept againft Murther may 
 be thought abundantly plain and evident. 
 But can the fame be affirmed of Suicide ? 
 May it not feem at firlt Sight, and to a Per- 
 fon unus'd to think deeply, that Men have 
 fomewhat greater Power over themfelves, 
 than they have over other Men ? and that as 
 Life is valuable, only confider'd as the 
 Foundation of Happinefs, fo when it be- 
 comes the Ground of Mifery, Men have the 
 fame Liberty to quit Life, as they have to 
 decline IMifery ? I am not novv^ pleading for 
 Self-Murther; nor do I do think in the leait 
 that ArgjUments of this Kind are Itrictly con- 
 
 chifive, 
 
Revealed Religion, &c, Z7 
 
 clufive. All I contend for, is, that the Un- 
 lawfulnefs of Suicide, (how unfit ibever the 
 thing may be in itfelf,) is not quite fo clear, 
 as the Unlawfulnefs of Murther; That fome 
 Points therefore in Morality are lefs clear 
 than others; and confequently, that all are 
 not abfblutely clear and plain. 
 
 Thus again ; The common Offices of Hu- 
 manity are ^o exceedingly fuited to our na- 
 tural Inclinations, and the plain Reafon of 
 the Thing, that no Qiieftions can arife, 
 Whether we are not concerned to embrace 
 every Opportunity of difcharging them. 
 This Point therefore is plain and clear to all. 
 However, it may be juftly thought, that as 
 we are concern'd to Ihew a proper Regard 
 for others, fo we have ftill a Right to have 
 fome Rcfped to ourfelves: And it is not 
 quite fo clear. How far we ought to facri- 
 fice our own Interefts to thofe of other Men. 
 At leaft every one will not be able to fee 
 immediately, that he is oblig'd to lay down 
 his Life for others ; not only to throw up all 
 Advantages he enjoys, but the very Foun- 
 dation of them likewife. This is indeed pro- 
 per to be done on certain Occafions ; But we 
 are not now difcourfing about the real Fit- 
 nefs of the Thing, but the Evidence of the 
 Precept. 
 
 Once more; There is hardly any one 
 Point in Morality, which doth not admit of 
 various Degrees of Clearnefs in different Pe- 
 
 G 4 riods 
 
88 J DEFENCE of 
 
 riods of Life. The very fame Man muft 
 perceive things in different Lights, as Ex- 
 perience and Study fhall open his Mind, and 
 gradually improve his Reafon. Can any one 
 affirm, that he had the fame View of every 
 Point of Morality when he firft employed 
 his Thoughts abont it, which he afterwards 
 had upon Increafe of Years, and a Maturity 
 of Confideration ? But if fome Things are 
 capable of becoming more clear by an ad- 
 vantageous Change of Circumftances, then 
 'tis certain they are not abfolutely clear to 
 all : and every Man who doth but refleft a 
 little on his own gradual Progrefs in moral 
 Wifdom and Knowledge, muft be confcious 
 of this Truth. 
 
 If it fhould be replyM to this, that the 
 Qiieftion before us relating to the Law or 
 Religion of Nature, muli concern thole only 
 who are arriv'd at a Maturity of Judgment; 
 and confequently, no Room can be allowed 
 for putting Cafes of unripe or uncultivated 
 Reafon; If This, I fay, fhould be all edg'd, 
 I muft beg to know. Whether Men are not 
 to be accounted Moral Agents till they come 
 to the full Ufe and Exercile of their Judg- 
 ment : If they are, then the Religion of Na- 
 ture muft concern Them as well as other 
 Men : For, Thofe only are free from Law, 
 who are abfolutely incapable of knowing it. 
 Obfcurity may detrad from its abfolute Pcr- 
 feclion, but doth not deftroy its Nature. 
 
 After 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 89 
 
 After all, tho' we fliould give up this 
 Argument, and confine our Debate to thofe 
 Perfons only, who are arrived at a Maturity 
 of Years; yet ftill, Can it be affirm'd, that 
 every Point of moral Import is plain and clear 
 to all ? Hath it ever provM fo to the beft 
 and wifeft Philofbphers ? Whence then hath 
 arifen their great Uncertainty in fome Points, 
 and their Error in others ? Whence fuch 
 
 Contradictions in their feveral Syflems, 
 
 fome teaching as Matters of Duty what others 
 condemned as impious ? It would be fufficient 
 for my purpofe if I produc'd any one lingle 
 Inftance, either of Doubt, or of Miftake in 
 any One Philofophcr, who appear'd to have 
 confider'd Matters with tolerable Care ; be- 
 caufe our Author allows, that the abfolute 
 Perfection of the Law of Nature requires it 
 fhould be plain to a/l. But when we find 
 that all of them have err'd in many Points, 
 What other Conclufion can we draw than 
 This, That however attainable a full and 
 diftind Knowledge in thcfe Matters may be 
 thought, yet there is great Difficulty in 
 making fuch Attainments ; and conlequently, 
 that The Law of Nature is not, even with 
 refped: to the Wifeft Men, abfolutely clear 
 and plain. 
 
 But, if this fhall be found true even with 
 refped to Wife and Great Men, and thoie 
 who have devoted themfelves to the Study 
 of moral Truth, What greater Clearnefs can 
 
 we 
 
90 A DEFENCE of 
 
 we exped to find with regard to the Vulgar 
 and Illiterate ? Things are clear and plain in 
 reference to the Apprehenfions of thofe Per- 
 fbns to whom they are proposed. To Men 
 of lefs Capacities, they mull confequently be 
 lefs plain : and therefore, we may argue a 
 fortiori,, that all Things of a moral Nature 
 neither are, nor can be abfolutely plain to 
 all. 
 
 This, which may appear by reafoning from 
 the Nature of Things, will be farther con- 
 firmed if we confider Fad, and what are the 
 real Sentiments of Mankind concerning moral 
 Matters. Upon Examination we may find, 
 that the Generality have clear and full Con- 
 ceptions of very few Things : The'ir Ideas, 
 in moft Cafes, are obfcure and perplex'd : 
 and thofe they have, will be found to be 
 rather borrowed, in their laft Refult, from 
 fome Divine Inftrudion, than produced by 
 their own Reafonings about them. So far is 
 human Underftanding, as it fubfifts in Fad, 
 from being capable of thofe Great Matters 
 which are fometimes afcrib*d to it ! 
 
 2. The next Point to be confiderM is 
 This; Whether The Law or Religion of 
 Nature be enforc'd in a manner abfolutely 
 perfcd, /. e. by Sandlons not only clear and 
 certain, but fuch likewife, that nothing 
 greater or more forceable can polllbly be 
 conceiv'd by us. 
 
 Yet, 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c, 91 
 
 Yet, before I enter on this Point, it will 
 be proper to guard againft Mifapprehenfion, 
 and to fliew in what Senfe I defire to be 
 underftood here. I do fiippofe therefore that 
 there is a Liberty fubfifting in human Na- 
 ture, /. e. a Power of ading or not ading as 
 we pleafe. Without this there could be no 
 fuch Thing as moral Agency in Man at all: 
 All Laws would be vain ^ and their Sanc- 
 tions of courfe fruitlels. Of this Liberty 
 every Man is confcious. And tho' Difficul- 
 ties may be ftarted as well on this, as feveral 
 other Points, to which we may not be able 
 to give diffcind Solutions, yet we are certain 
 of the Thing itfelf ; and as intimately con- 
 fcious of it, as we are of our very Being. 
 
 This Liberty being fuppos'd, I do affirm, 
 that the moft abfolute Enforcement of Law 
 muft confift with this Liberty ; and confe- 
 quently, muft be fuch, as may be either 
 negleded, or withftood. I do therefore by 
 no means argue againft the ablohite Per- 
 fedion of the Law of Nature from hence 
 merely, that the Sandions of it do often mifs 
 their Effed. This might happen, however 
 perfed we ftiould fuppofe thefe Sandions in 
 their own Nature. For, whilft Liberty fub- 
 fifts, a Power muft remain of negleding 
 thefe Sandions ; and what Law itfelf elfen-p 
 tially fuppofes, the Sandions of Law cannot 
 poliibly dcftroy. 
 
 This. 
 
91 yf DEFENCE o/ 
 
 This, I fay, being fuppos'd, vfz. That 
 there is a Liberty eflential to Human Nature, 
 "which no Enforcements of Law whatfoever 
 can deftroy ; and confequently, that as Law 
 itfelf is a moral Rule, fo the Enforcements 
 of Law muft be moral Enforcements; which 
 not being abfolutely irrcfiftible, may mils 
 their EfFed, either thro' Inattention or Ob- 
 ftinacy ; I proceed to Ihew, on What Foot 
 I maintain, that the Sandions of the Law of 
 Nature are not abfolutely perfect. 
 
 Kow the firll and moft obvious Sanc- 
 tions are thofe which arife from the natu- 
 ral Tendencies and Confequences of Men's 
 Adions. Thus, Temperance, Contentment^, 
 Patience, Meeknefs, and the like, are 
 really conducive to our natural Good ; and 
 the contrary Vices carry with them certain 
 Degrees of natural Evil. This holds true 
 in all thofe Duties which properly refpect 
 ourfelves. But then it liiould be obferv'd, 
 that the Connedion between Duty and Hap- 
 pinefs is not equally apparent in all Gales. 
 In fome the Effeds, however real, are yet 
 fo remotely join'd to their Caufes, that every 
 Man is not apt to difcover them : And fo far 
 forth as Sandions of this Kind efcape Obfer- 
 vation, they muft lofe their proper Ufe, viz. 
 the Enforcement of the Law. 
 
 But the greateft Difficulties will arife with 
 regard to the Offices between Man and Man ^ 
 in which, tho' there be fome natural Ad- 
 
 vantages 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. ^; 
 
 vantages which frequently attend the Dif- 
 charge of Duty, yet, on many Occafions, In- 
 terell; may draw the other Way. Men may- 
 find a prefent Account much better by In- 
 juilice or Treachery, than by Faith and Up- 
 rightnefs : And it may happen, by a Concur- 
 rence of untoward Circumftances, that an Ad- 
 hering to the ftridl Rules of Virtue fhall ruin 
 thofe very Interefts, which ought to be fup- 
 ported by it. 
 
 If, in aid of thefe natural Sanations, (which 
 cannot but appear infufficient to fupport the 
 univerfal Practice of Virtue i ) If, I fay, in 
 aid of thefe. The Civil Power be called in, 
 yet ftill This Expedient will fail us : — — Not 
 onlv, becaufe Sanations of this Kind not be- 
 longing to The Law of Nature, purely as 
 fuch, concern it only as that Law is confirm'd 
 by The Civil Power j but likewife, becaufe 
 on this Foot Virtue will be enforced no far- 
 ther than perhaps weak or corrupt Men are 
 pleas'd to fupport it: And if Civil Authority 
 fhould come into bad Hands, Virtue may 
 find Difcouragement ; and the Interefls of 
 Vice be fupported by thofe Powers, which 
 ought to fupprefs it. To which may be added, 
 that however jiift, wife, and good the Admi- 
 niftration of Things may be, yet ftill as Abun- 
 dance of Evil may be committed, which 
 muft efcape the Obfervation of Men, fo the 
 univerfal Practice of Virtue can find no Sup- 
 port this way. Men have neither Power 
 
 enough 
 
94 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 enough to reward every Thing which is right, 
 nor to punifh every Thing which is wrong j 
 nor have they Knowledge fufficient to dired: 
 the Exercife of that power they enjoy. 
 
 After all, it may perhaps be thought, that 
 what-ever is wanting either in the Natural or 
 Civil Sanations of Virtue, will be made up 
 by the ordinary Difpenfations of Providence ; 
 and confequently, that Men may expert from 
 The Divine Adminiilration the Support of 
 thofe Laws, which cannot, on any other 
 Foot, be maintain'd. But then, will Fad: 
 and Experience juflify thefe Prefumptions ? 
 Is it found, that every good Man profpers in 
 Proportion to his fteady Love of Virtue, and 
 that every bad Man fuifers as he turns alide 
 from the Paths of Righteoufnefs ? Hath not 
 the Queflion concerning The unequal Diflri- 
 bution of Good and Evil in the prefent Life, 
 exercifed Mens Minds in all Ages j and put 
 them upon feveral Expedients, either to folve 
 or to break thro' the Difficulty ? 
 
 The wifer and better Sort indeed have 
 reafon'd well ; and argu'd, that as God muil 
 have an unalterable Love of Righteoufnefs, 
 fo He cannot be fuppos'd to leave its Litereils 
 entirely unfupported. If therefore the prefent 
 Management of Things will not admit a per- 
 fed: Adjuilrricnt, yet Am.ends may be made 
 hereafter ; and this hath led them to the Per- 
 fualion of a fiture State. 
 
 And 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. pj 
 
 And yet it appears by the Remains of the beft 
 Writers of Antiquity, that they rather wifh'd 
 and hop'd for fomething of this Kind, than 
 firmly and fteadily believed it. Not a few ex- 
 prefly rejedied this Doctrine: And thofe others, 
 who upon fome Occalions difcover'd a great 
 Forwardnefs to entertain it, or had advanc'd 
 exceeding probable Auguments for the Support 
 of it, yet could not forbear intimating their 
 Diftruft, and a Sufpicion at leafl that Matters 
 might poifibly prove other wife. 
 
 However, let us make the moft of this ; 
 and fuppofe that Thefe Great and Good Men 
 had not only fatisfy'd their own Minds in fo 
 concerning a Point, but (which is more,) had 
 happily gain'd a ftridt Demonftration on this 
 Head : Yet ftill, before this Doctrine of fu- 
 ture Rewards and Punifliments can have its 
 full Force on the World, the reft of Manki'nd 
 muil be equally fatisfied likewife. They muft 
 either difcover the Proof themfelves, or ap- 
 prehend it clearly when difcover'd by others. 
 Any thing fliort of this mufl fail them. For 
 the Force of Temptations will not be born 
 down by flight Prefumptions of what (for any 
 thing They can prove) may never be. 
 
 Now to this Purpofe it is neceifary, that 
 the foUwing Points be clear'd : 
 
 I. That the Mind or Soul is really diftind: 
 from the Body ; and that it may, and necef- 
 
 farily 
 
<>6 y^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 farily muil furvive the Deftrudlion of it. For, 
 without this, there is no fufficient Foundation 
 left for a future State, nor confequently for 
 future Rewards or Punifhments. 
 
 2. It muft be prov'd, That as The Soul 
 furvives the Body, fo it muft likewife exifl: in 
 a confcious State ; For, to exift without a 
 Confcioufnefs of what happens, is to all In- 
 tents and Purpoles the fame as not to exifl: at 
 all. And, 
 
 Laftly, That in this future State The Soul 
 (hall be confcious either of Happinefs or Mi- 
 fery in Proportion to its good or evil Con- 
 du(fl in the prefent Life. For otherwife, 
 what-ever Good or Evil fhall happen, it can- 
 not be confider'd under the Notion of Reward 
 or Punifhment ; nor confequently, as the 
 Sand:ion of Divine Laws at all. 
 
 Thefe Points, I fay, are neceffary to be 
 clear'd, in order to prove a future State, on 
 the Foot of natural Reafon. And tho' I am 
 fully perfuaded they are all of them capable of 
 Proof; and perhaps have, many Ages iince, 
 been made good by fome Wife and Good Men ; 
 yet, they are Matters too much involv'd to be 
 made apparent to the Bulk and Generality of 
 Mankind. How few are there capable of en- 
 tering fo far into abftradt and metaphyiical 
 Reafoning, as to difcern clearly all the feveral 
 Steps neceffary in this Argument ? And if thefe 
 cannot be perceiv'd diflin61;ly, as the whole 
 
 Evidence 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ &c. <)y 
 
 Evidence will be cbfcure, fo the EfFed:s of 
 this Dc6trine on the Lives of Men will be 
 proportionably fmall. 
 
 I do by no means deny but a certain Per- 
 fuafion there hath generally been amongft 
 Mankind, that they ihall, fome time or other, 
 enjoy or fuffer in Propottion as they have be- 
 haved well or ill. And That little Virtue, 
 which hath been pradlis'd in the World, hath 
 received its chief Support from this Principle. 
 But then it deferves to be coniider'd, that a 
 Difference ought to be made between common 
 and extraordinary Occafions. Where Tempta- 
 tions are flight, and the Profpect even of 
 temporal Convenience fliall help to ballance 
 them, Men may eafily be induc'd by the 
 Hopes, and even Sufpicions of a future State. 
 But let us fee how Matters are like to ftand, 
 when Paffions or Appetites urge ftrongly ; 
 when Opportunities of doing ill prefent them- 
 felves, without the Hazard of prefent Difco- 
 very or Punifhment ; when the flicking firm 
 to Virtue fhall not only hinder prefent Ad- 
 vancement, but perhaps draw after it a long 
 Train of Inconvenience : Let us only fuppofe, 
 that by turning afide from the Rules of 
 Righteoufnefs, Men may fecure to themfelves 
 all the Advantages This Life can give them ; 
 and by an obflinate Adherence to its Interefiis, 
 mufl forfeit even Life itfelf. What fhall, in 
 fuch a Cafe be fufftcient to fix their Choice ? 
 
 H If 
 
pg ^DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 If indeed they are as certain of the future' 
 as they are of the prefent, then a wife Man 
 v/ill have no Room to dehberate. But if thefe 
 Profped:s are doubtful and infecure > and fup- 
 ported only by a Perfuafion, of which they 
 know not how to give a rational Account, 
 the Effed of it muft be as flight as the Per- 
 fuafion itfelf is. For we may eafily affure 
 ourfelves, Men will not, in any very con- 
 cerning Points, throw up prefent Certainties 
 for the Sake of future PoffilDilities. 
 
 After all, Let us fuppofe that the Evidence 
 of a future State were equally clear to all 
 Men. On this Foot the Laws of Nature 
 would be attended with Sandlions trvily ex- 
 cellent ; and fuch as could not but have a 
 confiderable Weight with all thofe who fhould 
 ferioully attend to them. Yet ftill I can by 
 no means agree with this Gentleman, That 
 even Thefe Enforcements would be abfolutely 
 perfect. My Reafon, in fhort, is This : No 
 Enforcements can be abfolutely perfedl, where 
 any thing more pcrfed: in That Kind can be 
 conceiv'd : And whether a future State of 
 Rewards and Punifliments in the general, 
 (which is all that can be concluded from na- 
 tural Reafon,) can come up to this, deferves 
 our Confideration. 
 
 All that Human Reafon, how much foever 
 improv'd, can fuggefl on this Plead, is. That 
 tlic Advantages of Obedience fhall, upon the 
 
 whole,. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 99 
 
 whole, over-ballance the Dii^id vantages ; and 
 that a Man fliall gain more by flicking firm. 
 to the Caufe of Virtue, i than can potlibly be 
 had in a contrary Courle. What therefore 
 
 thefe Rewards or Punifliments fliall be ; 
 
 How great; How lafting, • doth by no 
 
 means appear. But will any one affirm, that 
 iuch general Sandiiciis are quite fo perfed: as 
 thofe which are more diftindt, more full, 
 more explicit ? Are Temporary Enforcements 
 to be compar'd with Eternal ; or, are Men 
 full as likely to be influenc'd by the View of 
 fome indeterminate Good or 111, (how great, 
 how lafting they know not,) as they are by 
 the certain Expedtations of exceeding Happi- 
 ncfs or Mifery, to v/hich nothing can ever 
 put an End ? 
 
 The Sanations of Law are to be confider'd 
 under tlie Notion of Means ; the End of 
 which muft be Obedience to the Law. Thofe 
 therefore which are moft apt to produce this 
 End, are in their Nature m.oft perfedt. And 
 if the Profpcdl of Eternal Happincfs of Mi- 
 fery be more likely to attain this End, than 
 the Profpcdt of fuch only as is temporary or 
 fhort J then it follows, that the former Sandi- 
 dns muft be more perfedt than the latter. 
 The Confequence from hence is certain ^ 
 That foralmuch as mere Natural Reafon can- 
 not prove the Eternity of future Rewards or 
 Punifliments, it cannot fuggeft to us fuch 
 H a Sandliona 
 
100 ^ DEFENCE (?/ 
 
 Sand:ions of The Law of Nature, as are abfo- 
 lutely perfect. 
 
 3. A Third Article on which I would ex- 
 amine the Perfedion of this Law, is, Whether 
 it be univerfal as to its Extent ; I mean, 
 "Whether it comprehends under it every Thing 
 which is, or may be fit and proper Matter of 
 that Law. 
 
 To this Purpofe a good deal hath been al- 
 ready oifered in the former Chapter. I have 
 there endeavour'd to evince, that Nothing 
 can be to us a Law which is not by us dif- 
 coverable -, from which it follows, that No- 
 thing is to us a Law, or Part of The Law of 
 Nature, which is not by us difcoverable in 
 the Ufe of Reafon. If therefore the Law of 
 Nature be univerfal as to its Extent, it follows, 
 that every Man is capable of difcovering all 
 Things which are in their Nature fit, and 
 therefore proper Matter of Law. But is this 
 really Fad ? Is there exadly the fame Capa- 
 city in all ? and do not the very fame Perfons 
 vary from themfelves in this RefpecS, as they 
 grow more in Years, and greater Opportuni- 
 ties of Learning and Improvement are put 
 into their Hands ? 
 
 It will be in vain to reply here, that " All 
 " Men have Means of Knowledge fufficient 
 " for the Circumftances They are in, " If 
 the Gentleman intends, that a Juil and Mer- 
 ciful God will treat Men in Proportion to the 
 
 Means 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, loi 
 
 Means and Opportunities they enjoy, and the 
 Ufe they are found to make of them, what 
 he aflerts is true. In this Senfe every Man 
 hath fuiTicient Means of Knowledge : And it 
 is on this Foot I maintain, that no Man is, 
 or can be oblig'd to Rules he is abfolutely in- 
 capable of knowing. But then the Quefl:ion 
 is, Whether every Man is capable of knowing 
 all Things, which are of real Moment to 
 him ; all thofe Fitnefles, which if difcover'd 
 would point out to him the Will of God, 
 and carry widi them moral Obligation ? If 
 not, then however his own Law of Nature 
 may be to him fufficient, and in that Senfe 
 perfed:, yet it cannot be jullly thought all- 
 fufficient, or all-perfe6l ; it cannot be reafon- 
 ably efteem'd abfolutely perfed:. 
 
 In Proof of the Point, I am here concern'd 
 to make good, feveral Things have indeed 
 been fuggefled in the former Chapter ; from 
 which I would not willingly borrow, nor 
 trouble the Reader with needlefs Repetitions. 
 Yet 'tis a difficult Matter to avoid every Thing 
 of that Kind : And fince thefe Arguments are 
 now produc'd for a Purpofe different from 
 what they ferv'd before, I fliall be excus'd if 
 I refume them here, whilft I endeavour to 
 give them a new Turn, and place them in a 
 different Order. 
 
 It hath been obferv'd, That Nothing can 
 be to us a Law, which we are incapable of 
 knowing j and therefore. Nothing can be to 
 
 H 3 us 
 
loi ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 us any Part of The Law of Nature, which 
 we are incapable of difcovering by our natural 
 Reafon. 
 
 Thefe Things being laid down, we may 
 argue, 
 
 I. That as foon as Men come to fuch a 
 Degree of Reafon as to difcover the Being of 
 a God, and to be fatisfied of his Providence 
 over us. They muft be feniible of their Ob- 
 ligations to obey his Will ; But, Wherein 
 his Will confifls, or, What are the Particulars 
 in which they may teftify their Obedience, is 
 the great Point in Queftion. 
 
 Thus much in general may appear obvious 
 enough : That as God is The Author of 
 Nature, He muil: be prefum'd to will what- 
 foever (hall be found fuitable to the Condi- 
 tion and Relations in which Men ftand : But 
 then, What Particulars are really proper in 
 thefe Refpedis, is another Queftion, and not 
 fo eafily to be decided. 
 
 Some Inflances may be clear enough, and 
 ■cflier themfelves to the Mind upon the very 
 firfl Refledion. Yet others are more remote : 
 Time, and Obfervation, and Study may be 
 necellary as well in Moral as Natural Science ; 
 and it is feen in Fad, that Men gradually 
 improve as well in the one as the other. 
 
 Now, if this be 'the Cafe ; and if Nothing 
 can be properly a Law to any Man, whilft 
 
 he 
 
Revealed Religion, &c, 105 
 
 he is incapable of knowing It 3 it will follow, 
 that our Law of Nature, in our more early 
 Years at leafl, is defed:ive in Extent ; For, 
 it Then comes fhort of thofe things which are 
 afterwards knowable j and which, as foon as 
 they are fo, cail-y with them moral Obliga- 
 tion. To fay, that fuch a Law as This, is 
 abfolutely perfed, is to affirm, that a Part is 
 equal to the Whole. 
 
 It may be obierv'd, 2dly, That as Men 
 differ very much from each other in Degrees 
 of natural Capacity, and the Opportunities, 
 whether of improving their rational Powers, 
 or of applying them to the Difcovery of thofe 
 Truths to which they are perhaps equal; (o 
 it is evident, their feveral Syflems of moral 
 Precepts muft be more or lefs compleat. I 
 have noted heretofore, how much the Philo^ 
 fophers had, in this Refped:, an Advantage 
 over the Bulk of Mankind. But, if Nothing 
 is to any Man a Law which he is incapable 
 of knowing, whether thro' Want of Capacity 
 or Opportunity ; it follows, that The Law 
 of Nature, as it regards The Bulk of Mankind, 
 muft be defedive in Extent ^ becaufe, with 
 regard to them, it muft be lefs extenfive than 
 with regard to The Philofopher. 
 
 It will be to no Purpofe to reply, That as 
 no one can be bound to thofe Things he is 
 incapable of knowing, fo every Man's Law 
 reaching to all Things which are to him 
 Matters of Duty, it muft therefore, with 
 H 4 regard 
 
104 J DEFENCE of 
 
 regard to him be perfectly extenfive : This 
 Anfwer, I fay, is vain : For^ the prefent 
 Queftion, is, Not Whether every Man's Law 
 be to him a perfed, i. e. a fufficient Rule of 
 
 Duty ; but, Whether it be fo perfed, 
 
 as to take in every thing which is proper 
 Matter of Law : Not, Whether his Law be 
 relatively perfed ; but, Whether it be abfo- 
 lutely fo. 
 
 To go on ; 3dly, W"e may obferve, that 
 the feveral Schemes of Morality advanced by 
 the Philofophers were in many relpeds dif- 
 ferent from each other; fome of them incul- 
 cating what others either neglcded or op- 
 posed. The main Points were indeed admit- 
 ted and contended for by the feveral Seds ; 
 But whilft they differed in others, the Laws 
 which the Reafon of each feveraily taught 
 them, could with no Propriety be term'd the 
 fame. Now, as far forth as any of thefe 
 Schemes fell fhort, in any Point of moral 
 Concern ; I fay, as far as they fell Ihort of 
 what Was well advanced by any other Sed, 
 fo far, at leafl, it faifd in point of Extent. 
 And, Whether This hath not proved the 
 Cafe, muft be fabmltted to every one who 
 will give himfelf the Pains to fearch. 
 
 To this fhall be added, Laftly, That as 
 Human Reafon, whether we confider it as 
 fubfifting in fingle Perfons, or as dilpers'd 
 thro' our whole Kind, is imperfed, fo it 
 cannot take in all the Relations fubfift- 
 
 ing 
 
Revealed Religion, c^c. 105- 
 
 ing in Nature; nor confequently, all the 
 Fitnefles refulting from thefe Relations. 
 Now, if all thefe Relations, and all thefe 
 Fitneffes are not difcoverable by iis in the 
 Ufe of our Reafon ; and if nothing is to us a 
 Law, which is by us undifcoverable; it muft 
 follow, that our Law of Nature cannot pof- 
 iibly reach to every thing which is fit and 
 proper Matter of that Law ; and confequent- 
 ly, as it is not abfolutely exienfive, it cannot 
 be abfolutely perfed. 
 
 On the other fide of this Qiiefl:ion our 
 Author hath alledg'd Two Arguments. The 
 Firfl: is prefumptive, and defign'd to prove, 
 that our Law of Nature muft take in every 
 Thing which makes for the Good of our 
 Souls, i.e. muft be perfedly extenfive; be- 
 caufe he apprehends it is inconfiftent with 
 the Goodnefs of God to order Alatters other- 
 wife. The Second maintains, that all the 
 particular Rules of Morality are reducible to 
 One or Two Principles, which are allow'd 
 on all Hands to be knowable by every Man 
 concern'd in the prefent Queftion. 
 
 The former we meet with ^. ii. where 
 this Gentleman exprefifes himfelf in the fol- 
 lowing manner ; ** Can it be fuppos'd, that 
 *' an infinitely Good and Gracious Being, 
 " which gives Men Notice by their Senfes 
 " what does Good or Hurt to their Bodies, 
 *■*'■ has had lefs Regard for the immortal Part, 
 " and has not given them at all Times, by 
 
 ^' the 
 
io6 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 ^' the Light of their Underftanding, fuffi- 
 *' cient Means to difcover what makes for the 
 " Good of their Souls ^ but has necelFitated 
 *' them, or any of them, to continue from 
 " Age to Age in deftrudive Ignorance or 
 ^' Error ? '' 
 
 There are Two Things contain'd in this 
 Argument ; F/r/Ij that the Goodnefs of God 
 requires he fhould give Men by the Light 
 of their Underftanding fufficient Means to 
 difcover What [/. e. whatfoever] makes for 
 the Good of their Souls. And idfy, That 
 sthis is fuitable to his Condud towards the 
 animal Part of us ; For, He gives Men No- 
 tice, by their Senies, what does Good or 
 Hurt to their Bodies. 
 
 I fhall chufe to begin my Remarks on this 
 latter Pofition ; becaufe, by overthrowing 
 this, I fhall weaken the former, which de- 
 rives a great Part of its Strength from it. 
 Now, is This Fad, That God gives Men 
 Notice by their Senfes what does Good or 
 Hurt to their Bodies ? Is it true, that Men 
 perceive before-hand whatfoever is likely to 
 be ferviceable or prejudicial to them ? I fay, 
 before-hand, becaufe the Notices, which 
 come afterwards, come too Jate to dired 
 them what they lliould either chufe or avoid. 
 So far is this from being the real State of 
 Things, that in moft Cafes Men learn what 
 is Good or Bad rather from Experience of 
 if,hc.x feveral Eficds, than from any forego- 
 ing 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 107 
 
 ing Notices which their Senfes give them : 
 And this is the true Realbn why Perfons, in 
 their earlier Years, are apt fo frequently to 
 err this way. Now, if our Author's AlTer- 
 tion here be groundlefs and wrong, then his 
 Argument for a like extenfive Knowledge of 
 what relates to the Mind, muft be defedive 
 likewife. 
 
 But, the Gentleman carries the Matter 
 ftill farther; and endeavours to infer his 
 Point from the infinite Goodnefs of the Di- 
 vine Being. " This, he fays, requires, He 
 " ihould give them, by the Light of their 
 " Underftanding, fufficient Means to difco- 
 *' ver What [i. e. whatlbcver] makes for the 
 ^' Good of their Souls " : Thefe Means there- 
 fore He hath in Fa6l given them. 
 
 Now, I conceive, it is much fafer and 
 more reafonable to argue from known Fad: 
 to What is really fit and right for God to 
 do, than to endeavour the Overthrow of 
 What is certain Fad, by uncertain Prefump- 
 tions what the Divine Attributes require. 
 We are fure, fince our Knowledge is imper- 
 fect, i. e. fince our Nature is fb, we neither 
 do, nor pofilbly can know ail the Rcafons 
 and FitnefTes of Things : W^e cannot poflibly 
 dilcover every thing, which might conduce 
 to our moral Perfedion ; nor conlequently, 
 every thing, which might make for our 
 Good. From hence we may juftly infer, that 
 fuch a Conftitution is really confiltent with 
 
 The 
 
io8 J DEVF.nCE cf 
 
 The Divine Goodnefs : And, if this Gentle- 
 man ftill thinks otherwife, I would defire 
 him to confider the Principle into which the 
 Argument he alledges muft unavoidably re- 
 Iblve itfelf, viz. Abfolute Goodnefs requires 
 the Produftionof all that Good, which is ca- 
 pable of being produced. If this be admitted, 
 then it mull: require likewife, that every Man 
 fhould be capable of all poffible Good ; and 
 confequently, that he ihould be pofTefs'd of 
 all poffible Perfection-, and That, as there 
 ought to be no Difference between particular 
 Men in this refped, fo neither fhould there 
 
 be fo between any Creatures whatfoever. 
 
 I forbear purfuing this Matter farther : It 
 will end, we fee, not barely in Dt'ijm^ but 
 Athetfm, 
 
 To return ; Thus much may indeed be 
 concluded from the Divine Goodnefs, that 
 no Man is plac'd in fuch Circumftances, as 
 fhall make him miferable [finally and irre- 
 coverably fo] without his own Fault ; and 
 confequently, that every Man enjoys the 
 Means of Knowledge, fo far as may be fuf- 
 ficient to prevent the Anger of God, and the 
 Miferi'es of another Life. But how far God 
 is concern'd to bellow Favours, /. e. in what 
 Meafure and Proportion, is a Matter of which 
 we are entirely incapable ofjudging. And, if 
 we cannot affirm that Goodnefs requires Men 
 Ihould enjoy the higheft Degrees of Happi- 
 nefs, neither doth it require they fliould en- 
 
 I jo/ 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 109 
 
 joy equidly the Means and Opportunities of 
 attaining it. The Conlequence from hence 
 is clear ; That notvvithftanding God is infi- 
 nitely, /. e. abfolutely Good and Gracious, 
 yet He may not give Men, by the Light of 
 their Underftanding, fufiicient Means to dif^ 
 cover what [i. e. whatfoever] makes for the 
 Good of their Souls. 
 
 The next Argument by which our Author 
 would prove The Law of Nature to be abfo- 
 lutely extenfive, is This ; All the particular 
 Rules of Morality whatibever are reducible 
 to One or Two Principles, which are allow'd 
 on all Hands to be knowable by every Man 
 concern'd in the prefent Qiieftion. 
 
 It is varioufly ftated in the Beginning of 
 his Seventh Chapter ; and that I may not be 
 thought to injure him, I fhall chufe to repre- 
 fent it in his own Words. " If, fays he, 
 " our natural Notions of the Divine Per- 
 " fedions demonftrate that God will require 
 " Nothing of his Creatures but what tends to 
 " their Good ; Whatfoever is of this Kind, 
 " is a Superftrudure which belongs to the 
 " Law of Nature. " Again; " It is evi- 
 ** dent by the Light of Nature what are 
 *' thofe Relations we Hand in to God and 
 " our Fellow Creatures ; and neither God, 
 ** nor Man, without ading tyrannically, can 
 " require more than thefe require. " Again ; 
 *' Original Revelation contains every thing 
 " obligatory upon account of its Excellency; 
 
 i. e. 
 
tio A DEFENCE of 
 
 " /. e. every thing which tends to the Hd- 
 *' noLir of God, or the Good of Man. " 
 Once more ; " By The Law of Nature, as 
 " well as the Gofpel, The Honour of God 
 " and the Good of Man being the two Grand 
 *' or General Commandments, all particular 
 " Precepts mufi: be comprehended under 
 " Thefe Two. " 
 
 In the laft way of Stating this Matter it 
 is afferted, that all particular Precepts muft 
 be comprehended under thefe Two General 
 ones, viz. To honour God, and to do Good 
 to Man ; and thefe, it is faid, reach to every 
 Thing obligatory upon account of its Excel- 
 lency. It had been afferted juft before, that 
 neither God nor Man can require any Thing 
 more than the Relations we ftand in to God 
 and our Fellow Creatures require^ and all 
 this is ftill farther refolv'd into One lingle 
 Principle, viz. that of Self-good ; more than 
 this God will not require of any one. 
 
 We fhall allow readily, that every Man is 
 concerned to ad for the Honour of God, and 
 the Good of Men ; and that, in the laft Re- 
 fult, thefe Rules will be found to coincide : 
 fo that the Moft general Principle is This, 
 All men fhoujd ad what tends fome way or 
 other to promote their own real Good. Let 
 us fee whether this general Principle will 
 comprehend under it every thing of moral 
 Import, fo as to fix every fuch Particular as 
 a Branch of the Law of Nature. 
 
 Here 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 1 1 1 
 
 Here then I muft recoiled what hath been 
 mention'd i'o often before, That nothing can 
 be to us a Law, or a Branch of the Law of 
 Nature, any farther than it is by us difco- 
 verable. However certain therefore Men 
 may poflibly be of fome One general Point, 
 and confequently lie under a general Obliga- 
 tion arifing from thence, yet ftill, unlefs all 
 the particular Conclufions, from thence de- 
 ducible, are apparent, as well as the general 
 Principle itfelf, thefe Conclufions will not be 
 to them Parts or Branches of their Law. The 
 general Principle may be known or know- 
 able ; and confequently, may carry with it 
 moral Obligation : But then, the Particulars^, 
 however really contain'd under k^ or dedu-' 
 cible from it, may to Ibme Perfons not be 
 knowable ; and fb far as this carry with 
 them no moral Obligation. Be it, that Men 
 are perfedly fatisfied, they ought to purfue 
 their own real Happinefs, The Good of their 
 Fellow Creatures, and the Honour of God ; 
 or, (to alter the Expreflion a little,) Be 
 it, that they lliould ad fuitably to their 
 
 feveral Relations; do what is fit and 
 
 proper ; and purfue what is truly excellent : 
 Yet notwithftanding, unlefs we may know 
 diftindly every thing which conduces to our 
 own Happinefs, the Good of our Fellow 
 Creatures, and the Honour of God; unlefs 
 we can point out cxadly all the feveral Re- 
 l^ions in which we ftand, and difcern pcr- 
 
 fedly 
 4 
 
fii J DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 fcdly what is in Truth faitable to thefe Re- 
 lations ; Unlefs every Thing which is fit, 
 proper, excellent, lies open to us ; Thefe 
 general Rules, however extenfive they may 
 be in their own Nature, will not be per- 
 fedly extenfive to us ; and confequently, 
 cannot prove, that The Law or Religion of 
 Nature, (in the flrid Senfe of the Expref- 
 fion,) takes in every Thing which is fit and 
 
 proper Matter of that Law. As I fhall 
 
 have Occafion to refume this Point hereafter, 
 in another Part of my Work, 1 fhall difmifs 
 it for the prefent, and haften to the 
 
 4th Article, on which the Perfection of 
 The Law of Nature fhould be examined, 
 viz. Whether This Law propofes the beft 
 and moft fiiitable Means for the Support and 
 Improvement of Virtue ; and fuch, that no- 
 thing of greater or higher Moment can pof- 
 fibly be propos'd to us. 
 
 The Means, I have now in View, arc 
 not necelfary in every State and Condition of 
 Man, but founded on the prefent Circum- 
 ftances of our Nature ; in which it is ob- 
 fervable, and acknowledgM by the beft and 
 wifeil Men we know of, that there is a 
 ftrong Tendency and Propenfion to things 
 in tliemfelves wrong. 
 ^ Thofe who have confider'd Matters with 
 no better Light than Human Reafon could 
 give them, have been apt to conclude, that 
 our Nature was not always in the fame 
 
 State 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. 1 1 j 
 
 State in which we find it now ; that as 
 
 it came pure out of the Hands of our Maker, 
 our Underftanding mull have been clearer 
 and more extenfive, and our Affections or 
 Paflions more governable. Of this, which 
 could only be conjcdur'd by natural Light, 
 the lacred Writings have given us a dillinct 
 Account ; informing us, that our Nature, 
 originally upright, hath been deprav'd and 
 corrupted by the Tranfgreffion of our firft 
 Parents. 
 
 On this we build a Diftindion concerning 
 the Twofold State of Man : The one, in 
 which his Underftanding ferv'd him for every 
 purpofe to which Human Underftanding can 
 ferve ; The other, in which it is defedive as 
 to thole Points which are of the hi^heft Im- 
 
 o 
 
 portance to him : The One, in which Men's 
 PafTions were entirely regular or governable ; 
 The other, in which they are heightened 
 beyond due Bou£)ds, leading Men either to 
 bad Ends, or to good ones in a bad and irre- 
 gular way. 
 
 In confequence of this Evil State we find, 
 
 that every Man hath in Fad finned ; 
 
 violated, in fome refped or other, the Rules 
 which his own Reafon taught him ; and 
 confcquently, hath expos'd himfelf to the 
 Difpleafure of that Being, who prefcrib'd 
 thelc Rules. The prefent State of Man is, I 
 fay, This j He is a Sinner, as having bro- 
 ken that Law which he knew or might have 
 
 I known ; 
 
,114 A DEFENCE of 
 
 known ; on which account He is liable to 
 Punilhments he knows not how to avoid : 
 And, as being corrupt likewife, he hath not 
 an Heart to combat the Difficulties of a 
 future Obedience. He needs therefore Af- 
 furance of Pardon in the one cafe, and fome 
 extraordinary Aids and Affiftances in the 
 other. On any other Foot, the Caufe of 
 Virtue cannot be fufficiently maintain'd ; 
 Confequently, That Law or Religion, which 
 cannot account for thefe Particulars, muft 
 fail us in a very important Concern ; and 
 therefore, cannot be efteeni'd abfoliitcly per- 
 fed. 
 
 I begin with obferving, that mere Human 
 Reafon cannot give us full Aifurance of Par- 
 don for paft Offences. 
 
 Thus much will be allow'd on all Hands, 
 That Offences, merely as fuch, cannot claim 
 a Pardon. If they could, then firewel to the 
 Sandions of God's Laws; to the Doc- 
 trine of a Providence • and to the Juftice 
 and Wifdom of God. On this Foot, the 
 Caufe of Virtue muft lofe its main Support ; 
 and it would be indifferent in a manner, 
 whether Men acted right or wrong. Now, 
 if Offences, as fuch, cannot claim a Pardon, 
 the Offender muft hope to efcape Puniihment 
 on account of fomething or ether done in 
 order to atone for them; and what may be 
 done this way, deferves Confideration. 
 
 The 
 
Revealed Religion, &c. \ \ f 
 
 The wifer and better Part of Mankind 
 have fix'd on thefe Two ways, viz. Sacrifice 
 and Repentance. Now, if Human Realbn 
 cannot neceflTarily infer a Pardon on the Per- 
 formance of Either, or Both of thefe ; it 
 follows, that it cannot give us any abfolute 
 AlTurance of Pardon at alj ; and conlequent- 
 ly, without fomc farther Light, muft leave 
 us in fltd Doubts and Perplexities. 
 
 As to Sacrifices, if they are conlider'd 
 merely as prefcrib'd by Human Reafon, and 
 without Regard to any Divine Inftitution, 
 they feem to carry with them Nothing more 
 than an Acknowledgement of our own De- 
 merits. They reprefent to us indeed the 
 Death, which we ourfelves deferve ; Butj 
 What Connexion is there between the merit- 
 ing Punifiiment, and the efcaping it? 
 
 It muft be confefs'd, that in another way 
 they may feive Purpofes truly excellent. By 
 keeping up a quick Senfe of the Demerit of 
 Sin, they ferve to prevent it for the future ; 
 and conlequently, lay the Foundation of 
 Obedience for the Time to come. But then, 
 What Relation hath This to Pardon for Sins 
 already committed? If it hath any, we muft 
 refolve it into This Principle ; That Repent- 
 ance being a fufficient Atonement, Sacri- 
 iices muft conduce to the fame End, as be- 
 ing conducive to Repentance. And this leads 
 me to enquire, Whether Repentance can in 
 
 I a this 
 
\\6 yi DE FEN CE of 
 
 this Cafe effed, what Sacrifice of itfelf can- 
 not. 
 
 In Repentance thefe Two Things are 
 efpecially implied, viz. A Sorrow for what 
 is pail, with firm Refolutions of Amend- 
 ment for the future ; which, if they end in 
 actual Amendment, the Repentance is com- 
 pleat, and our Refolutions entirely jufti- 
 fied. 
 
 It will be allow'd by every one, that 
 mere Sorrow mufl: be entirely fruitlefs. What- 
 ever Effeds therefore it hath, mull arife from 
 That Amendment which accompanies it ; 
 and whether This can give fufficient Affu- 
 rance of Pardon, deferves to be confider'd. 
 
 I know, in all Ages of the World Men 
 have been willing to hope thus much, That 
 a Good and Merciful Being will not be ex- 
 treme to mark what is done amifs, but rather 
 accept thofe who have offended in the pall, 
 upon their Return to him for the future, 
 ^ut Hope is One Thing, and Certainty is 
 another. Hope they mull in This, if in 
 any Thing at all : This is the utmoll, and 
 indeed the only Thing they can do in fuch 
 Circumllances : And therefore, if they have 
 no Encouragement from hence, their Cafe 
 muft be entirely defperate ; and no fufficient 
 Inducements remain for attempting their Re- 
 covery from a vicious State. Hope there- 
 fore they did, and might : But the Queilion 
 at prefent, is, Whether we can conclude 
 
 with 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. ij/ 
 
 with Certainty from the mere Principles of 
 Human Reafon, tliat abfoliite Pardon mull 
 necefTdrily follow Repentance. 
 
 The Negcitive feems to be pretty evident 
 from hence, that the Relation between The 
 Creator and the Creature as fuch, continuing 
 thro' all Parts of the Creature's Exigence the 
 fame, it is clear, that an abfokite Obedience 
 in every Particular mull be always due: 
 Obedience therefore for the future mull as 
 really be due, as Obedience was in the pall; 
 and Repentance idelf (compleat Repentance 
 I mean) is nothing elfe but a future Obe- 
 dience fucceeding a part Tranlgreffion. This 
 Obedience which would have been his Dutv, 
 on Suppofition of pall Innocence, can make 
 no Amends for paft Tranlgreffion : The mere 
 View of this cannot be a Reafon why fuch 
 Tranfgreilion fhould be pardon'd : It may 
 recommend the prefent, but cannot excufe 
 the pall. 
 
 Let us confider That Obedience which is 
 owing to God thro' every Moment of our 
 Being as a Debt charg'd upon us, and which 
 we are concern'd to anfwer as often as call'd 
 upon. Imagine therefore a Perlbn who hath 
 rcfus'd this Payment on a certain Occafion, 
 and contracted an Arrear of Debt ; Will a 
 conllant Payment for the future be fufficient 
 to difcharge this Arrear ? If this cannot be, 
 then neither can a future Obedience, (which 
 is none other than the anfwering thofe De- 
 
 I 3 mands 
 
ii8 yfDEFENCEo/ 
 
 mands which are made on us for the future,) 
 give full Affurance of Pardon for the paft 
 Violation of God's Laws. 
 
 And as it may appear from confidering the 
 Nature and Extent of our Obligations to 
 God, that mere Obedience for the future, or, 
 if you pleafe, Repentance, cannot of itfelf 
 enfure our Pardon ; fo are there likewife, 
 Secondly, fome Grounds for fufpeding, that 
 the Supreme Being will not wholly overlook 
 the Sinner, nor refuore him to full Favour 
 merely on Account of fuch Obedience. 
 
 A wife Law-giver is concern'd to guard 
 his Laws by the Execution of proper Sanc- 
 tions ; which to remit entirely, is, in effed, 
 to give up the Law. If God is concern'd 
 to give Men Laws at all, He is equally 
 concern'd to enforce theObfervance of them; 
 and confequently, to punifh their Violation 
 in fome Sort or other. From henc6 it might 
 feem, that God would not be fully recon- 
 cird to the Sinner merely in Confcquence of 
 his future Obedience ; but would take fome 
 Method or other to vindicate his Honour, 
 and to imprefs a Senfe of the Obligations 
 Men are under to a conftant and never-fail- 
 ing Obedience. 
 
 To which may be added, Thirdly, That' 
 as Wifdom is a Perfedion in The Divine 
 Being as \vell as Goodnel's, ib Nothing can 
 be properly an Ad of Goodncfs, which is 
 not confident with Wifdom ; and confe- 
 quently,' 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 119 
 
 quently, in order to know for certain How 
 far a future Obedience will avail for our 
 Pardon, we mnft not only confider what 
 might be hop'd from The Divine Goodnefs, 
 but likewile whether it be confiftent with a 
 perfe^lly wife Adminiflration to accept Re- 
 pentance for this Purpofe. Now, this we 
 cannot, by our natural Reafon, be entirely 
 fure of, unlefs we are able to fee through 
 the whole Scheme of Things; unlefs we 
 are able to determine concerning every par- 
 ticular End which may be anfwer'd by Pu- 
 nifliment ; and to prove that Wifdom is con- 
 cern'd to pardon every Man upon Repen- 
 tance and Amendment. 
 
 If God indeed fhall offer Pardon ; and de- 
 clare that this is done in View of fomething 
 accepted by him as a Satisfadion, the Point 
 will be clear. Our Hope will then become 
 AlTurance, and the Difficulty before-men- 
 tion'd vanifh. We fhall then be certain 
 Things are fb ordered by him, as to magnify 
 at once his Wifdom and his Mercy. But, 
 without fuch a Declaration, however ftrong 
 our Hopes may be, they muft ftill have this 
 Allay, that poffibly we may be miflaken : 
 The Conftitution of Things, to us unknown, 
 may poffibly not admit of abfolute Pardon ; 
 and confequently, on fuch a P^oot, this con- 
 cerning Queftion concerning the Pardon of 
 Sin muft be perplexM and doubtful, 
 
 I 4 The 
 
120 J DEFENCE of 
 
 The principal Things alledg'd by this 
 Author in Proof that Pardon miiil neceffarily 
 follow Repentance, may be reduc'd under 
 the following Heads ; Firft, That Sin being 
 the only Ground of God's Difpleafure, Re- 
 pentance mull render Men . the proper Ob- 
 jeds of God's Favour ; and confequently, of 
 itfelf entitle them to Pardon. And, Second- 
 ly, That as Repentance is the only End of 
 Punifhment, fo where this End is obtain'd, 
 Puniihment muft ceafe. 
 
 The Firft Argument is thus reprefented by 
 our Author ; " Can any Thing be more 
 " evident, than that if doing Evil is the 
 " only Foundation of God's Difpleafure, 
 '' ceafing to do Evil, and doing the contrary, 
 f' muft take away that Difpleafure? As long 
 *^ as Men continue in their Sins, they muft 
 " continue the proper Objeds of God's Re- 
 '' fentment j but when they, forfaking their 
 " Sins, ad a Part fuitable to their rational 
 '' Nature, they of courfe become the proper 
 *' Objeds of his Approbation."^. 417, 418. 
 
 There is Something fpecious enough in 
 this Argument, which may deceive an un- 
 wary Reader. Sin, or the doing Evil, is 
 doubtlefs the Foundation of God's Difplea- 
 fure, and the only Foundation of it. So far 
 as this we agree ; But then we differ widely 
 as to the Conclufion which he draws from 
 this Principle, v/z. That ceafing to do Evil, 
 and. doing the contrary, muft take away that 
 
 pilpleafure. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, m 
 
 Difpleafure. It is true indeed, when a Man 
 eeales to do Evil, and does the contrary, 
 his Actions muft fo far be appro v'd by God ; 
 fo far he is the proper Objed of Appro- 
 bation. His Condud for the prefent is right; 
 and confequently, cannot draw on him Di- 
 vine Difpleafiire. But all this is foreign to 
 the Point. The Queftion, is, Not whether 
 ading right for the prefent be approveable ; 
 but whether it be fufficient of itielf to re- 
 move all Difpleafure for having aded wrong 
 formerly. 
 
 The Negative muft be here maintain'd ; 
 and that upon the Principle laid down by 
 this Gentleman, viz. That doing Evil is the 
 Foundation of God's Difpleafiire. If this be 
 true, (as is agreed on both Hands) then the 
 having done Evil is a like Foundation of 
 Difpleafure ; For a bad Adion, which is 
 ccnfurable in the Ad", will not ceafe to be 
 fo when it is paft. 
 
 I cannot but remark, that according to our 
 Author's Way of Arguing, Difpleafure for 
 any Sin can continue no longer than the Sin 
 itfelf is in Ad ; For, ceafmg to do Evil, 
 faith he, muft take away that Difpleafure. 
 He adds indeed thefe Words, " Doing the 
 " contrary ;'' but it is evident that Thefe are 
 referr'd to fomething elfe, viz. The Divine 
 Approbation attainable by Obedience. This 
 lurely implies fomewhat more tharv bare Re- 
 moval of Difplealiire. Now if Difpleafure 
 
 for 
 
Ml A DEFENCE of 
 
 for any Acl of Sin muft continue no longer 
 than the Sin itfelf is in Ad, what will be- 
 come of the Divine Sanftions ? On this Foot, 
 there can be no Piinifhments, properly fpeak- 
 ing, inflicted at all : For thefe always carry 
 with them a Retrofped ; and import an Evil 
 iniiided on account of an Evil done. Our 
 Author therefore hath carry 'd this Matter to 
 an extravagant Length. He attempts to 
 prove, that Repentance muft necelfarily be 
 attended with full Pardon, by an Argument, 
 which, if it proves any thing at all, muft 
 prove at the fame Time, that no Punifti- 
 ments for Sin can be at all inflicted ; and 
 confequently, that no Sins whatfoever need 
 any Pardon in the leaft. 
 
 This Second Argument to the fame Pur- 
 pofc fets forth, That as Repentance is the 
 End of Punifl:iment, fo where this End is 
 obtained, Punifliment muft ceafe. The Fourth 
 Chapter of his Book is principally fpent on 
 this Point. He there aflferts, " That as it 
 " was for the Sake of Man, that he [i. e. 
 " God] gave him Laws, fo he executes 
 
 " them purely for the fame Reafon. 
 
 ", That even amongft Men none ought to 
 " be puniflfd, (fince what is paft can't be 
 " help'd,) but to prevent a future Breach of 
 
 " The Law. p. 38. That ^bur greateft 
 
 " Felicity confifts in having fuch an impar- 
 " tial and difmterefted Judge, as well as Le- 
 " giildtor, that whether He puniflies or re- 
 
 ^' wards, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 12; 
 
 " wards, he acls alike for our Good ; That 
 " being the End of all his Laws, and con- 
 " fequently, of the Penalties as well as Re- 
 
 " wards which make them Laws. f. 40. ■ 
 
 That the EfFeclrs of God's Juftice, (they 
 never extending to Annihilation,) mull not 
 only be for the Good of others, but even 
 
 of the Perfons punilh'd. f. 41. Laft- 
 
 ly. That all Punifhment for Punifhment 
 
 " Sake is mere Cruelty and Malice ; 
 
 " and confequently, whatever Punifhments 
 *' God inflids mufl be a Mark of his Love/' 
 f. 42. 
 
 In thefe PafTages the following Aflertions 
 are contained ; That Men ought not to be 
 punifhM, but to prevent a future Breach of 
 
 God's Law : That therefore all Puniih- 
 
 ments are for the Good of the Perlbn pu- 
 
 nifii'd j And, that every thing beyond 
 
 this is mere Cruelty and Malice. In Oppo- 
 fition to which Aflertions I Ihall endeavour 
 to prove. That the Reformation of the Of- 
 fender is not the only End of Punifhment ; 
 
 That in many Cafes the Execution of 
 
 Punifhments may prove not at all for the 
 
 Good of the Perfon punifh'd ; And that 
 
 the Execution of fuch is no Argument of 
 Cruelty or Malice. 
 
 Punifhment is one of the Sanctions of God's 
 Laws ; the great End of which muft be, To 
 enforce Obedience to them. Its primary End 
 therefore is, not fo much to reform Offences, 
 
 as 
 
124 J DEFENCE of 
 
 as to prevent them. It is threatened with 
 this View only : And tho' the Execution of 
 it may promote Ends fomewhat different, yet 
 fach ought always to be coniider'd as fubor- 
 dinate to that great one, which was clearly 
 the original Intention. But, what if Men 
 will not be influenc'd by thefe Threats ? 
 What if they oifend even with a View to 
 Mercy ? Muft Punifliment therefore be fuf- 
 pended, and The Divine Threatnings entirely 
 vain ? Certainly Laws may, and ought to be 
 fupported, whatever the Offender fuffer by 
 it j and what may reafonably be threatened, 
 may as reafonably be executed. 
 
 Be it therefore, that Punifhment is exe- 
 cuted ; yet ftill the Qiieftion remains, whe- 
 ther the Execution of it can have any other 
 End than the Reformation of the Offender ; 
 and confequently, whether this End being 
 once obtain'd, Punifhment muft not ceafe of 
 courfe. To which I reply, That the Exe- 
 cution of Punifhment may be intended, not 
 merely to reform the Offender, /. e. to bring 
 him out of that bad moral State in which 
 he is at prefent, but likewife to prevent his 
 relapfing into it, for the future. And if this 
 be the Cafe, then a prefent Reformation may 
 not be fufficient to remove Punifhment ; 
 which, having a farther End, muft continue 
 'till that End. itfelf be gain'd. Tho' after all, 
 the Evil which Men fuffer, when confider'd 
 in this View, is not fo properly Punifhment 
 
 as 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &Cs 125 
 
 as Difcipline. In this manner it. is confider'd 
 in Holy Scripture. And conleqiiently, Re- 
 pentance is fo far from being the only End 
 of Punifhment, that, ftridly Ipeaking, it is 
 no End of it at all. 
 
 Yet this I will not infift on at prefent. I 
 ■will allow that the Reformation of Offenders 
 may be One End of inflicting Punifhment in 
 certain Cafes. But will it follow from hence, 
 that it mull be the only End of it in all Ca- 
 fes ? Will this Gentleman aifert, that The 
 Execution of capital Punifhment tends to the 
 Reformation of the Offender himfelf, and is 
 
 for his Good ? or, if it be not fo, it 
 
 muft be abiblutely unlawful ? On this Foot, 
 What Civil Government can be fupported ? 
 
 But, I fhall be told, Wliat have we to do 
 with Civil Punilhments, when the Divine 
 only are in View ? Right ; and I Ihould not 
 have ftep'd out of my Way, if the Gentle- 
 man had kept himfelf within tolerable Bounds, 
 and had not exprefs'd himfelf in fuch a Man- 
 ner, as to fubvert Civil Government itfelf. 
 However, I will confine myfelf to thofe Pe- 
 nalties, which are properly Divine Sanctions. 
 Concerning which I muft affert, That the 
 Execution of them may ferve for general Ex- 
 ample, and to contain other Perfons befide 
 the Sufferer within the Bounds of Duty. 
 The Honour and Authority of Laws are then 
 fupported, when the Obedience of fome is 
 lecur'd by the Punilhment of others. This 
 
 will 
 
\i6 A DEFENCE of 
 
 will eafily be allowed to be a nobler and more 
 extenfive End, than the mere Reformation 
 of the Offender himfelf ; and confequently, 
 to be more fit and proper to be purfu'd. 
 
 Suppofe this The Cafe j Suppofe a Man is 
 punifh'd for a Terror to others : Is this Pu- 
 nifhment then for the Offender's Good ? why, 
 Yes, perhaps our Gentleman will reply ; Both 
 Ends, to wit, the private Good of the Offen- 
 der, and the publick Good of Mankind may 
 be purfu'd at once. Admitting this likewife^ 
 yet muft The Punifliment ceafe as foon as 
 One End, viz. The Offender's own Good is 
 obtained ? And muft no farther Regard be 
 had to that more extenfive End, the Terror 
 of others ? And if Regard muft like wife be 
 had to This, muft not the Punifhment con- 
 tinue 'till this End likewife be fufficiently 
 obtained ? The Confequence is plain ; a 
 Man may, confiftently with the juft Rules 
 of Government, be punifh'd beyond what is 
 ncceffary for his own mere Amendment ; and 
 therefore, may fuffer Puniihments, which 
 are not for his own Good at all. 
 
 But our Author Hill goes on, and fays, 
 This is mere Cruelty and Malice. All Pu- 
 nifliment for Punifhment Sake muft be fo : 
 And what he means by this is explained juft 
 after, when he infers from hence, " What- 
 " ever Punifhment God inflids, muft be a 
 
 *' Mark of his Love." Of his Love : 
 
 - — To whom ? To the Offender ; for fo it 
 
 follows, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, c^r. 127 
 
 follows, " in not fuftering his Creatures 
 
 " to^ remain in that miferable State, which 
 " is infeperabie from Sin and Wickednels, 
 /. 42. ^ 
 
 To inflid Punilhments which are not mere 
 Marks of Love to the Offender, is, fays he, 
 mere Cruelty and Malice. If this be the 
 Cafe, then all Punifhment, confider'd asfuch, 
 muft be Cruelty ; For, confider'd in this 
 View, it hath refped only to a Sin commit- 
 ted ; of which it is the proper Effed and 
 Conlequence. 
 
 Put the Cafe, that in the firft Appoint- 
 ment of Things God had ordered. That a 
 certain Courfe, in itfelf fitand proper, fhould 
 be followed by certain Advantages, and the 
 contrary by proportionable Sufferings, over 
 and above what Ihould neceffarily arife from 
 natural Conftitution : Suppofe likevvife that 
 he had given Men Intimations of this : On 
 this Foot, Men would have their Choice ; 
 Life or Death, Happincfs or Mifery would 
 be fet before them : Let us now Hippole, 
 that Man obftinately purfucs what he 
 knows will be attended with Mifery ; Is it 
 Cruelty to let him have his Choice ? 
 
 If this be affirm'd, let us fee how Matters 
 will ftand in Affairs relating to the natural 
 Order of Things. Temperance and Sobriety 
 ffrcngthen the Conftitution, and promote 
 Health : On the other Hand, Intemperance 
 impairs both j and Hiings may be carry 'd 
 
 fo 
 
128 ^^ DE FE NCE of 
 
 lb far, that no After-wifdom, no Repentance 
 and Amendment fhall be able to repair the 
 Lois. Is this Confticution wrong ? or, is 
 God, in luch a Cafe, concern'd to break thro' 
 the fettled Courfe, and to remove the EviLs 
 a Man hath foolilhly brought on himlelf ? 
 Thele Things cannot be affirm'd. What 
 Wifdom hath ordain'd, it is the Concern of 
 Wifdom to fiipport. Goodnefs and Mercy 
 are here entirely out of the Qiieftion • which 
 (as I noted before) cannot require any thing 
 inconfiftent with Wiidom. 
 
 In this I am fupported by a rcm.arkable 
 Affertion of our Author himfelf : " Thefe 
 " [/. e. Juftice and Mercy] oblige not God 
 " either to punifli or to pardon any farther 
 " than his infinite Wifdom fees fit/* f. 41. 
 The Qiieftion therefore, on this Foot, will 
 be, whether W^ifdom requires, that no Of- 
 fender fhould be punifh'd but for his own 
 Good ; or rather, whether it doth not much 
 more require he Ihould be punifh'd for the 
 Terror of others : The Queftion, I fay, is, 
 Whether the Nature of Government, and 
 confequently the Wifdom of its Adm.iniftra- 
 tion, doth not require this : And if it doth, 
 then Punifhment may be inflided with a 
 View to pubhck Service ; And to do fo, is 
 not to ad with Cruelty but Wifdom ; In 
 fhort, 'tis to ad in a Way, which the Offen- 
 der muft approve, at the fame Time he 
 fjffers. 
 
 A Gen- 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. up 
 
 A Gentleman indeed, fuppos'd to be the 
 fame with the Author I am now dealing 
 with, in his Second Acldrejs to the luhah'i-^ 
 tants oj London and VVeftminfter, endea- 
 vours to carry the Matter Ibmewhat farther ; 
 alTcrting, '' That the Wifdom of God will 
 " oblige him to forgive the Penitent/' This 
 is fomething : But then, How does he make 
 it good ? Why, thus ; " He then becomes 
 " what God in his Wifdom requires him to 
 " be \ and it would be Cruelty and Rage, 
 ''• not Wifdom and Juftice, to aitlict him un^ 
 " necefTarily/' To which he adds, " Pu^ 
 *' nifhment hath never a Retrofped, (for 
 *' what is paft cannot be helped) ; but is de- 
 '• fign'd only to prevent the like for the 
 " future/' p. 7. 
 
 By Repentance, /. e. a prefent State of 
 Obedience after Tranfgrefiion, Man is what 
 .God's W'ifdom requires he fliould be now ^ 
 and therefore, to be fure, no Punifhments 
 can be laid on him upon That, Account^: 
 .Such would be inconfiftcnt with Juftice and 
 Wifdom. But will a prefent Obedience 
 prove that he hath always obey'd ? And may 
 not a Man be liable to fufFer, as well for a 
 paft as a prefent Difobedience ? Why, No, 
 lays he; what is paft cannot be help'd. This 
 is true indeed \ But if this be an Objedion 
 againft punifhing paft Tranfgreftions, it equal- 
 ly holds againft all Puniftiment whatfoever: 
 For no Tranigreflions can be punifh'd 'till 
 
 K they 
 
i;o A DEFENCE of 
 
 they are committed ; and as foon as they arc 
 once committed, they are paft and irrecover- 
 able. So far is This from being true, " Pu- 
 " niftiment has never any Retrolped," that 
 the very Nature of Puniihment neceffarily 
 carries us back to a foregoing Crime. 
 
 Well ; but he will tell us, the Strefs of 
 his Argument lies in another Point, viz. 
 That by Repentance Man becomes what God 
 would have him be ; and therefore, to afflid 
 him, in fuch a Cafe, would be to afflid him 
 
 unnecelfarily. But how doth this Confe- 
 
 quence appear? May not the Support of 
 Government and Laws make this necelfary ? 
 May not common Good, and the general En- 
 forcement of Obedience, require it ? If this 
 prove the Cafe, fuch a Perfon would not be 
 afflided unnecelfarily. For tho* no Necef- 
 fity ftiould be fuppos'd to arife from the pre- 
 fent Condition of the Offender, yet it is fuf- 
 ficient for our Purpofe, if it be found to arife 
 from the Condition of the World. 
 
 To conclude this Point ; Forafmuch as Pu- 
 niftiment is one of the Sandions of God's 
 Laws, the primary Defign of which muft be, 
 To enforce Obedience to them ; it follows, 
 If it be confiftent with Juftice and Goodnefs 
 to make this Sandion at firil, it muft equally 
 be fo to execute it. But then, how far it is 
 necelfary to deal either with Tendernefs or 
 Rigour, and to grant or to with-hold a Par- 
 don, is a Point which Wifdom only can 
 
 determine j 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ &c. i j i 
 
 determine ; For Goodnefs and Mercy can ne- 
 ver determine on one Side, vvhilft Wifdom 
 takes the other. To know therefore How 
 far Men can alTuredly depend on abfohite 
 Pardon, upon Repentance, they muft know 
 all the Meafures of Divine, i. e. Infinite Wii^ 
 dom ; which being above Human Reafon, 
 Nothing can, in That way, be proved. Hope 
 Men did, and reafonably might ; But we are 
 not now fpeaking of Hope, but AlTurance. 
 Upon the Strength of this we muft affirm, 
 That as Human Reafon cannot give us full 
 Affurance of Pardon upon our Repentance, 
 fo it fails in one of the moft important Arti- 
 cles, whereby the Intereft of Virtue in the 
 preient State of Things muft be fupported. 
 
 1 fhall have lefs Occafion to enlarge on my 
 next Point, viz. That confidering the prefent 
 Corruption of Human Nature, a tolerable 
 Refoi-mation cannot be expe6led without ex- 
 traordinary Aftiftance : The Aflurance of this 
 is one of the greateft Encouragem.ents to fet 
 about it heartily; and without it, few will 
 have Courage enough to attempt any Thing 
 of Moment. 
 
 On this Part of mine Argument Two 
 Things are to be confider'd. i . The Ufeful- 
 nefs and Expediency of fome extraordinary 
 Aftiftance, for carrying on the Interefts of 
 Virtue. And, in the next Place, The Im- 
 poffibility of proving, on the Foot of mere 
 natural Reafon, that fuch Afliftance will be 
 
 K a given 
 
132 A DEFENCE of 
 
 given us. The later Point will be readily 
 granted by ovir Adverfaries ; and therefore 
 we have Nothing to do but to evince the 
 former. 
 
 Now, 1 fiiall defirc nothing to be allowed 
 me here, but what is plain and known Mat- 
 ter of Fact ; Nothing but what muft be 
 granted by every Man, who' will confidef 
 either what happens abroad, or paffes within 
 his own Mind at home. That there are a 
 great Number of Temptations to turn afide 
 from the Rules of Righteoufnefs ; That there 
 is a ftrange Pronenefs in the Temper and 
 Difpofition of Mankind, to comply with thele 
 Temptations ; That there are Affedions and 
 Pallions, which *tis difficult to keep within 
 due Bounds ; That however various thefe 
 may be in different Men, yet every one is 
 in fome Particular or other liable to be go- 
 vern'd by them ; That Education, Cuftom, 
 Way of Life, and the like, do ftrengthen 
 and confirm thefe Difpofitions ; and as They 
 render immoral Ads agreeable for the pre- 
 fent, muft throw great Difficulties in the 
 Ways of Obedience : All this, I fay, muft 
 be allowed me. Upon this Foot I argue, 
 That without Something more than mere 
 Philofophy can fuggeft to us, we cannot ex- 
 ptdi any great Matters to be performed. For, 
 however it may be fuppos'd, that human 
 WliHom would be fu fficient, were Men in an 
 equal Poife between Virtue and Vice ; yet 
 + what 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 155 
 
 what can This do, when Men are inflnenc'd 
 by fuch Defires, as they know not how to 
 contradict ? In inch a Cafe, Reafon and the 
 Senfe of Duty, if they cannot influence Men, 
 will but aggravate their Misfortune; fince 
 they muft reproach them for having done 
 what they had not Refolution enough to fbr-^ 
 bear. 
 
 The Gentleman I am arguing againft, fre- 
 quently tells us of the Frailty and Imper- 
 fedion of Man. What is this but a Confef- 
 fion of the Point I am contending for ? If 
 Men are really i^o exceeding frail, and unapt 
 either to attend to Duty, or to profecute it 
 with Refolution ; what great Matters can be 
 expeded ? In this State of Things fomewhat 
 muft be done, either to deftroy Temptations, 
 or to enable Men to conquer them. If 
 therefore The Supreme Being Ihall, in great 
 Companion, encourage us by the Promife of 
 his own Affiftance ; if every Pcrfon, who is 
 fincerely willing to attempt his Recovery, 
 fhall have Affurance that his Attempts will 
 
 not be vain, then a Foundation will be 
 
 laid for profecuting this Point with Vigour : 
 In fuch a Cafe no Difficulties will be fuffici- 
 ent to difcourage Men; For they may confider 
 that God's Strength will be made ferfecl in 
 a^eaknejs. i Cor. xii. ^. 
 ■ V The Gonclufion from hence is manifeft; 
 Forafmuch as the State of Things is fuch, 
 that fomething more is expedient as a Means 
 
 K3 of 
 
134 A DEFENCE of 
 
 of Virtue, than mere Human Realbn can fur- 
 nifh us withal ; and forafmuch as the Law 
 or Religion of Nature can reach no farther 
 than Human Reafon can carry us, This Law 
 or Religion muft fo far fail ; and therefore is 
 not, as This Author contends, abfolutely 
 perfect. 
 
 Before I quit this Subje6l, it will be pro- 
 per to examine what this Gentleman hath ad- 
 vanced on the other Side. His Arguments 
 are loofely fcatter'd in fcveral Parts of his 
 Book : But the whole Amount of them may 
 be reduced to thefe Three Points j 
 
 1. The Law of Nature proceeds from 
 God, who is abfolutely wife and perfect. 
 
 2. It is the Rule whereby we muft judge 
 concerning the Perfedion of every other 
 Law. 
 
 3. It is that Law whereby the moft per- 
 fect Being direds and governs his own 
 Adions. 
 
 I. The Law of Nature muft be an abfo- 
 lutely perfect Law, becaufe it proceeds from 
 God, who is infinitely Wife and Perfect. 
 Thus, p. 3. '■'' A. If God from the Beginning 
 " gave Man a Religion, I ask, Was that 
 ^' Religion perfect, or imperfed ? B. Moft 
 ^' perfect, no doubt ; fince no Religion can 
 " come from a Being of infinite Wifdom and 
 " Perfection, but what is abfolutely perfed.'* 
 The fame Way of Reafoning occurs again, 
 p, 8, 20j 60^ 283^ befides feyeral other 
 
 Places, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, ijy 
 
 Places. Our Author, we fee, lays no fmall 
 Strefs on it. But whether it really deferves 
 fuch Regard, ftiall be conlider'd immedi- 
 ately. 
 
 The Law of Nature is, without Doubt, 
 The Law of God ; and without fuppofing it 
 to be foy we ihall be unable to prove it 
 Itridly obligatory, /. e. To be properly fpeak- 
 ing any Law at all. 
 
 We admit, in the next Place, That God 
 cannot prefcribe imperfeclly. If He gives us 
 Laws, thefe muft be perfed, or faited to 
 the Ends for which they were given. The 
 Law of Nature therefore is perfedin its Kind; 
 and will anfwer thole Purpofes, which a Law 
 of That Kind can anfwer. But it will not 
 follow from hence, that it is abfolutely per- 
 fect, and incapable of any Addition whatfo- 
 ever. Every Species of Creatures is perfed; 
 
 perfed, I mean, in its Kind ; But who 
 
 will aflert, that any One Species is abfolute- 
 ly perfed, and incapable of receiving any 
 farther Degrees of Excellence? The fame 
 which I have obferv'd concerning the Crea- 
 tures of God's Power, will equally hold as to 
 the Prefcriptions of his Will. They are both 
 perfed in their Kind : But as the One, when 
 compar'd with more noble Creatures, may be 
 faid to be relatively imperfed, fo may the 
 other likewife, when compar'd with more 
 excellent Difpenfations. 
 
 K 4 I have 
 
1-^6 A DEFENCE of 
 
 I have oblerv'd before, that The Law of 
 Nature cannot be more perfect than onr Rea- 
 lon itfelf is ; becaufe it cannot reach farther 
 than our Reafon itfelf can carry us. Had 
 God therefore created us with lower Degrees 
 pf Reafon than what we now enjoy, our Na- 
 ture would ftill have been in its Kind perfcd ; 
 and the Law, which our Reafon muft, in 
 fuch a Cafe, have taught us, would, in this 
 ^eni'e, have been perfect likewife. But would 
 it. Jiave been as perfect, or fo extenfive as 
 itisat prefent? No certainly : Several Things 
 •iitting and proper, and which are now plain 
 and evident, would then have efcap'd our 
 Notice, Should God add to us any new Fa- 
 culties, new Meafures of Duty would arife i 
 Our Obligations would be different ; and 
 The Law of Nature enlarg'd : Additions 
 would, in fuch a Cafe, be made to it. And 
 if this be true, then The Law of Nature, as 
 it now fubfifts, neither is, nor can be, abfb- 
 lutely perfed. 
 
 Nor» doth this at all derogate from the Wif- 
 dom and Perfection of The Supreme Being, 
 the Author of this Law. ' For the Defeds of 
 it arife, not from the Nature of God, but of 
 the Creature. This Law hath a Power of 
 obliging, /. e. it is properly a Law, juft fo 
 far as Men do or may fee the Reafons and 
 Fitnefie^ of Things, ft fails therefore on this 
 Account only, becaufe Men themfelves are 
 deficient a,nd imperfed. 
 
Reveal D ReligiOxV, &c. x-^f 
 
 In the original State of Purity and Excel- 
 lence, in which Man was at firft created, I 
 queftion not but it reached to every thing 
 morally fit for Man, in thele Circumftanccs 
 to do. But, when our Nature became cor- 
 rupt, the Underftanding being darken'd, and 
 the Will perverted, /'. e. when Men had funk 
 beneath themfelves, then this Law itfelf fuf- 
 fer'd likewife. From that Time forward, 
 The Law of Nature, and The Rule of Fit- 
 pefs were no longer commenfurate to each 
 other; and the former fell fhort of the later, 
 in Proportion as human Capacities chanc'd to 
 be impaired. 
 
 A ,If it be laid, That God was concernM to 
 preferve his own Laws in their original Ex-* 
 tent, by preventing fuch Corruptions in hu- 
 man Nature as ihould be prejudicial to them; 
 - — This is rather a bold Prefumption what 
 God ought to have done, than a proving 
 what He adually hath done. And befides, 
 if any Allowance fhould be made to the Ar- 
 gument, it may be turn'd, I conceive, to our 
 Advantage-, as fhewing. How fit and pro- 
 per it was for The'Supreme Being to aid the 
 Imperfections of our Reafon ; and to reftore 
 and reinforce that Law, by a fpecial Reve- 
 lation, which was in a great Degree loft thro* 
 Ignorance and Error. 
 
 2. The Second Argument is This ; The 
 Law of Nature is the Rule by which we muft 
 judge concerning the Perfedion of every other 
 
 Law J 
 
138 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Law ; and confequently miift be abfolutely 
 perfed itfelf. His Words are Thefe ; "If 
 " This Law [/. e. The Law of Nature] is 
 " the Teft of the Perfedion of any written 
 " Law, muft not that be the moft perfed 
 ^' Law, by which the Perfedion of all others 
 " is to be try'd V p. 1 5)5). 
 
 If the Gentleman, by Law of Nature in 
 this Place, means, that Syftem of moral Prin- 
 ciples and Precepts, which is by us difcover- 
 able in the Ufe of Reafon, we fhall eafily fee 
 the Fallacy of his Argument ; And if he in- 
 tends any thing elfe, there is a manifeft In- 
 confiftency in his Method of Proceeding. This 
 Law, fays he, is the Teft of the Perfedion 
 of any written Law : But, To whom is it 
 
 fuch a Teft ? To Men certainly. Now 
 
 if this be true, then it is evident, he muft in- 
 tend, by Law of Nature, juft {^o much as the 
 Perfon, who ufes this Teft, is Mafter of: 
 For no Man can examine the Truth of a Pro- 
 pofition by any Principles, to which he is an 
 entire Stranger. The Queftion therefore, is 
 This ; Whether this Law, as being the fup- 
 pos'd Teft of every other Law, be, for that 
 Reafon, abfolutely perfed ? I conceive, Not ; 
 and this will appear from confidering How 
 far, and in What Senfe, other Laws arc to 
 be try'd by it. 
 
 Thus much is evident, that as nothing can 
 poftibly be true, which is really inconfiftent 
 with a felf-evident or demonftrated Truth, 
 
 fo 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 139 
 
 fo nothing can pofiibly be the Will of God 
 by Revelation, which is contradidory to the 
 Will of the fame God manifeited by Reafon. 
 What is evidently required, from confidering 
 the Natures of Things, cannot pofTibly be 
 forbidden by Revelation ; and i^o^ what is ma- 
 nifeftly forbidden in the former way, cannot 
 pofiibly be reqiiir'd in the later. The Pro- 
 vince of Reafon is, in this Cafe, to judge, 
 not whether an acknowledged Law is to be 
 received or rejeded, but whether Ibmething 
 proposed to us as a Divine Law, be really 
 fuch or no. And even here we judge by our 
 Reafon, not abjolutely \w\\Qt\'\QT it ought to be 
 rejeded or not, but only juft fo far, as the 
 Teft whereby we try it, reaches. For, when 
 we arc got beyond this, we are unable to 
 prove any thing either way ; and therefore, 
 fince Nothing can be fufficiently proved from 
 the Nature of the Thing, as far as it appears 
 to us, we call for Proof from external Evi- 
 dence. It is plain then, that our Law of 
 Nature, or the moral Principles and Precepts 
 which our Reafon teaches, however it may 
 be admitted as a Teft, yet is not any abfo- 
 lute Teft, whereby every Law proposed muft 
 be try'd. And if it be a Teft only in a li- 
 mitted Senfe, then we cannot infer its abfo- 
 lute Perfedion from the prefent Argument. 
 
 Put the Cafe, that Men have no other Rule 
 or Teft to judge by : This hath been, and 
 ftill is the Cafe in many Parts of the World. 
 
 In 
 
140 J DEFENCE o/ 
 
 In fiich Circumftances they are concerned, no 
 doubt, to make the heft Ufe of It they can ; 
 and Ihall accordingly be acquitted or con- 
 demn'd by God, as they adhere to, or deviate 
 from this Rule. But will it follow from 
 hence, that becaufe this is the beft, indeed 
 the only Rule they have, it is therefore ab<r 
 folutely perfed ? By no means : And for the 
 fame Reafon, our Author would maintain the 
 abfolute Perfeftion of this Law, z'iz. That 
 it is the only Teft fuch Men have of moral 
 and religious Matters ; we may afTert like- 
 wife, that the Senfes of Brutes are abfblutely 
 perfed; For thefe likewife are Their only 
 Teft of outward and fenfible Objects. 
 
 3. Our Author endeavours to evince the 
 fame Point by a Third Argument, viz. This 
 is The Law by which God direds his own- 
 Adions j and confequently it muft be ablb-r 
 lutely perfed. " I am furpriz'd, fays he, 
 " to find The Dodor, [i. e. Dr. C/ark'j ar- 
 " guing as tho' that Law, which is a nioft 
 " perfed Rule to the moft perfed Being, is 
 *' not perfed enough for his imperfed Crea- 
 " tures ; tho' their whole Perfedion confifts in 
 " imitating him, and governing their Adions 
 " by the lame Rule.'' p. 35)8. Two Thi.ng$ 
 are here aiiirm'd ; i. That The Law of Na- 
 ture is the moft perfed Rule to the moft per- 
 fed Being. And, 2. That our whole Per- 
 fedion confifts in imitating God, and govern- 
 ing our Adions by the fame Rule. ^ 
 
 Singe 
 
Reveax^'d Religion, &c, 141 
 
 Since this Gentleman affirms, that the 
 Law of Nature is the moft perfed Rule t6 
 the moft perfect Being, I muft remind him. 
 of his own Definition of the Term, with 
 which he fet out in his Second Chapter. 
 There he declares e^prefly, " By Natural 
 *' Religion I underftand the Belief of i 
 *' God, and the Senfe and Praclice of thofe 
 " Duties which refult from the Knowledge 
 " we, by our Reafun^ have of him and his 
 " Perfedions, &€*' Now is This really 
 the moft perfect Rule to the moft perfed 
 Being ? Is human Knowledge the Mealure 
 of the Divine ? And are thefe Rules, even 
 the moft compleat CoUedion of them we 
 are able to frame ^ Are thefe, I fay, the 
 cxad and adequate Meafures of The Divine 
 Condud? If not, Why does this Gentle- 
 man change the State of the Queftion ? and 
 when he is debating concerning the Perfcdi- 
 on of that Law of Nature, which human 
 Knowledge is capable of difcovering. Why 
 does he tells us, that the Rule by which 
 God direds his own Adions is abfolutely 
 perfed ? This is arguing entirely befide 
 thePurpofe; and may ierve as well to prove 
 any other Propofition as This. 
 
 The Rule of God's Adions is indeed an 
 abfolutely perfed Rule. But our Law of 
 Nature may, and certainly docs, fall vaftly 
 ftiort of it. The former is the Rule which 
 a perfedly wife Being fets himfelf The 
 
 later 
 
142 A DEFENCE of 
 
 later is the Rule, which weak and imperfed' 
 Creatures are able to difcover : And therefore 
 thefe muft differ as much from each other as 
 Infinite from Finite j or Divine Wifdom from 
 Human Ignorance. 
 
 Nor is the Second Pofition in this Argu- 
 ment true, ^iz. That our whole Perfection 
 confifts in imitating God, and governing 
 our Actions by the fame Rule by which He 
 governs his. It is true indeed, there are 
 feveral general Rules common to The Su- 
 preme Being and his intelligent Creatures ; 
 fuch as are the Rules of Juflice, Goodnefs, 
 and the like. But even here, many Things 
 may be Inftances of Juflice or Goodnefs in 
 the One, w^hich will not be fo in tlie Other ; 
 And God hath a Right to do, what Man can 
 have no Right to imitate. 
 
 The Reafon of this is clear. The State 
 and Condition of The Supreme Being is in- 
 finitely different from ours ; and Therefore 
 what is fit and proper for him, may be unfit 
 and improper for us. A Magiflrate may 
 take away a Life, not only with Innocence, 
 but Praife ; which to do, in a private Sub- 
 jed:, would be Murther. We muft conclude 
 therefore, that human Perfediion cannot con- 
 fifl in imitating God fimply, but only fo far 
 as our Condition will make His Actions imi- 
 table by us. 
 
 And if our Perfection doth not confift in 
 imitating God fimply, much lefs can it be 
 
 aihrm'd 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 145 
 
 affirm'd that our whole Perfedion confifts 
 in it. If this were the Cafe, What would 
 become of Obedience to God ? For I can- 
 not conceive but the moral Perfection of the 
 Creature, muft imply an abfolute Subjedion 
 to the Creator: "What again, would become 
 of Patience, Temperance, Sobriety ? Virtues 
 furely which carry with them fome Perfecti- 
 on in Beings compounded of an animal, as 
 well as a rational Part. Thefe are Perfed:ions 
 proper to us: Things in which we cannot 
 poflibly imitate God 5 and therefore our whole 
 Perfedion cannot pofTibly confift in an Imita- 
 tion of him. 
 
 In fhort ; The Rule of Fitnefs with re- 
 gard to God is One Thing j and the Rule 
 of Fitnefs with regard to Creatures is an- 
 other. The Rule of the Divine Actions is, 
 no doubt, an abfolutely perfect Rule; But 
 this, I have obferv'd, in many Inilances, 
 cannot reach to us at all. And with regard 
 to us, we ought always to diftinguifli be- 
 tween a Rule of Fitnefs, and a Law of 
 Duty. The Fitnefs of Things will be to 
 us a Law, juft fo far as we are capable of 
 knowing it, and no farther. And when 
 we are treating concerning the Law of Na- 
 ture, as we ought to underftand by it what 
 is to us properly a Law, fo it is evident, 
 the Perfedion of this Law muft reach jufl 
 fo far as the Perfedion of our rational Fa- 
 culties reaches j which, if they come fhort 
 
 of 
 
144 -^^ DEFENCE of 
 
 of abfolute PerfeClion, the Rule or Law dif- 
 cover'd by them mull do (o likewife. Any 
 other ablbluteiy perfesfl Law of Nature is, 
 with regard to us, an imaginaiy Thing; and 
 fubiifts no where, but in the Mind of Him 
 who is abfoluteJy perfect. 
 
 C H A P. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 145 
 
 CHAP. IIL 
 
 Whether The Law or Religion of Nature 
 be immutable^ in fuch a Senfe efpe^ 
 daily ^ as to he incapable of adm'ittiitg 
 any additional Precepts. 
 
 IFROM the abfoiute Perfedion of 
 The Law or Religion of Nature, 
 our Author proceeds to infer, that 
 it mufl be incapable of any Kind of 
 Alteration, incapable of Addition or Diminu- 
 tion, and as immutable as The Author of it. 
 *' Can Revelation therefore, fays he, add any 
 " Thing to a Religion abfolutelyperfed:, uni- 
 " verfal, and immutable ? " p. 3, 4. We 
 fee in thefe Words his Application of the 
 Principle before examin'd. If the Religion 
 of Nature be abfolutely perfed:, it mufl be 
 immutable ; it can admit of no Addition or 
 Diminution j and confequently, God cannot 
 require any thing by Revelation, vv^hich was 
 
 L^ not 
 
146 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 not antecedently requir'd by The Law of 
 Nature. 
 
 But, what if this Law be not abfolutely 
 perfed: ? Then, I hope, it may be capable of 
 Ibme Additions ; and certain Things may be- 
 come Duties by Revelation, which were not 
 fo before. 
 
 This Point concerning the Immutability of 
 the Law of Nature, may be neceffary to be 
 flated clearly ; not only becaufe our Author 
 builds much upon it, but likewife, becaufe 
 the grofs Denial of a Dodrine, generally al- 
 low'd, may perhaps give Caufe of Offence to 
 ferious and good Men. And yet, lince I have 
 explain'd myfelf fo diftindly in my firft Chap- 
 ter, and fliewn, that by Law of Nature no- 
 thing more fhould be underftood, than fuch 
 a CoUedlion of moral Principles and Precepts, 
 as human Reafon teaches; after this, I fay, it 
 may be hoped, that no Difficulties will ariie 
 on this Head. For, if the Extent of this Law 
 muft be meafur'd byFIuman Reafon, the Law 
 itfelf cannot be more immutable than Hu- 
 man Reafon itfelf is : It muil vary as Human 
 Reafon itfelf does 3 and be capable of the very 
 fame Additions or Diminutions. 
 
 There are indeed Two Senfes in which the 
 Expreffion is fometimes ufed. It either iig- 
 nifies a perfed Colledion of all thofe moral 
 Principles and Precepts which liave a Foun- 
 dation in the Nature and Reafon of Things; 
 or eife, fuch a one as v/e are capable of mak- 
 
 ing 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 147 
 
 ing in the Ufe of Reafon. In the later Senfe 
 it is plainly mutable; and of this every one 
 muft be confcious, who confiders that his 
 Duty is daily enlarg'd, as he makes greater 
 Improvements in moral Science. And, as to 
 the former, tho' it be not properly to us a 
 Law, yet if it w^ere fo, I queftion whether it 
 would be found immutable, as contended for 
 by this Author. 
 
 The Law, in this View, takes in every 
 Thing which is morally fit to be done ; yet 
 ftill it cannot be more immutable than thofe 
 Fitnefies are on Vv^hich it is founded ; norihefe 
 Fitneffes, than the Relations in which Men 
 ftand to other Beings ; nor thefe Relations, 
 than the Beings are which are thus related. 
 i\ny confiderable Change here may affcd: the 
 whole in fome Degree ; may produce new 
 Relations, new Fitneffes ; and, upon that 
 Account, become the Ground of nev/ Duties. 
 If one Relation be deflroy'd, the Law which 
 before fubfifted, will fuffer Diminution ; and 
 if a new Relation arifts, it mufl admit Ad- 
 dition. 
 
 I know it is frequently maintain'd by very 
 learned Writers, that The Law of Nature is 
 immutable j And the Affertion, when rightly 
 underftood, is true. What is fit and right, 
 muft be agreeable to the Will of God ; And 
 what He, upon that Account, wills at one 
 Time, He muft will for ever. The State and 
 Condition of Things ftill continuing in every 
 
 L 2 refpedt 
 
148 ^DEFENCE of 
 
 refped: the fame. Virtue and Vice are not 
 merely arbitrary Things. What is morally fit 
 and proper, is virtuous; what is morally unfit 
 and improper, vicious : And the fame Wife 
 and Good Being, who conftituted Nature in 
 fuch a manner, that this Fitnefs or Unfitnefs 
 (hould immediately refult from it, muft intend 
 that every Intelligent Being, as far as he is ca- 
 pable of difcerning thefe Things, fliould adl 
 agreeably. Had Men exifted in any other 
 Part of infinite Duration, under the fame Cir- 
 cumflances as They do at prefent, as the fame 
 Adions would have been fit or unfit, fo the 
 fame Precepts muft have conftituted their Rule 
 or Law. And ftiould human Kind continue 
 to exlft, as they do now, in any fuppofable 
 Portions of Futurity, the fame Rules muft 
 ftill continue; and The Supreme Being muft 
 exadl a Conformity to them, as far as Men 
 fhall be capable of knowing them. In this 
 Senfe, and this only, can it be maintairi'd, that 
 The Law of Nature is eternal and unchange- 
 able. It is eternal and unchangeable upon 
 Suppofition that Things always were, and al- 
 ways v>^ill be, in the fame State and Condition, 
 and no otherwife ; For, if any confiderable 
 Changes happen in thefe, a proportionable 
 Chanee muft iikev/ife follow in the Rule of 
 Fitnefs, and, confequently, in the Law of 
 Nature. 
 
 It is frequently fuppos'd by This Writer, that 
 the Condition of human Nature, as far as 
 
 Morality 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 149 
 
 Morality is concern'd, hath always been, and 
 ever muft continue as it is at prefent : I fliall 
 tJierefore aflign Three very remarkable States, 
 with the coniequent Alterations from the one 
 to the other ; and point out fome of the more 
 obvious Changes in the Rule of Condud; which 
 mufl: refult from thence. 
 
 And, Firft, it is very certain that Man came 
 originally from the Hands of God pure and in- 
 nocent ; with fuch a Sufficiency of intellectual 
 Powers, and fuch a Ballance of the Affed:ions 
 and Pafiions, as might anfwer the original 
 Purpofe of his Creation. That fuch a State 
 there once was, cannot be difputed by this 
 Author, who contends that this is ftill the 
 Condition of our Nature. In fuch a State, as 
 Man's intelledual Abilities mufl be fuppos'dto 
 reach to every thing by which he might an- 
 fwer the End of his Being, fo his Law of Na- 
 ture or Scheme of Duty mufl be equally ex- 
 tenfive. And as his Affections and Pafiions 
 were nicely ballanc'd, fo no Abatements could 
 be pleaded for the leafl Deviation from this 
 Rule. Such a Perfection of his Condition, 
 mufl require a like Perfection in his Obedi- 
 ence. Still, as Man was free, and his Perfe- 
 ctions, however great, yet were not abfolute 
 or unlimited, it was poffible he might one 
 Time or other tranfgrefs j which, if it fliould 
 prove the Cafe, we are concern'd to fearch the 
 Confequence. 
 
 J- 3 Thg 
 
150 A DEFENCE of 
 
 The firft Thing which mull follow, is, He 
 mufl be obnoxious to Punifliment. In the 
 next Place, His Tranfgreffion may be of fuch 
 a Kind, as to diminifh both his intelledlual 
 and moral Abilities ; To cloud his Reafon; 
 To diflipate his Thoughts 3 and to inflame his 
 Paffions : So that he ihall not only be iill'd 
 with Anxiety for what is pad, and Fears of 
 what is to come, but likewife find the Return 
 to Duty difficult and painful. It may happen, 
 Laflly, That his very Frame and Conftitution 
 {hall be diforder'd to fuch a Degree, as to be 
 propagated in the very fame manner to Pofte- 
 rity; From whence it may follow. That Hu-^ 
 man Nature, which was at firft pure, fliall 
 become corrupted j and Man neither capable 
 of difcovering every thing fit and proper to 
 be done, nor yet difpos'd to prad:ife uniform- 
 ly what is known. 
 
 This leads me to conlider a Second State 
 of Human Nature ; which is by no means 
 imaginary, but the real Condition in which 
 it fubfifls at prefent. This then is a State of 
 Corruption : And as every Man hath, in Con- 
 fequence of this, gone off from the known 
 Rules of Duty, it is likewife a State of Guilt» 
 Upon account of his Corruption, (that Part 
 oi it, I mean, which relates to the Defeds of 
 his Underflanding) the proper Rules of Con- 
 duct will be lefs open to him, and fo far as 
 this, his very Lav/ itfelf will be impair'd ; 
 But then in another Refped: a new Duty mufl 
 
 arife 4 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 151 
 
 arifej As He is a Sinner, Repentance is ne- 
 cefTary, which was impoffible in a State of In- 
 nocence. Under Repentance I do here com- 
 prehend, Sorrow for Sin, Supphcation for Par- 
 don, and Refolution of Amendment ; all 
 which, as they do necelTarily arife from our 
 prefent Circiimftanccs, fo mufl they Hkewife 
 require every other Particular, which may 
 ferve to promote and finifli our Repentance. 
 Who does not fee, that, in this View of Things, 
 the Rule of human Condud: muil be fome- 
 what different from what it would have been, 
 had Men continued in their original Perfe- 
 d:ion, and maintain'd their Innocence invio- 
 late ? 
 
 Let us fuppofe then, upon Mens fincere 
 Endeavours to difcharge their Duty, that God 
 ihall accept them, pardon their Tranfgreffi- 
 ons, and receive them to Favour: In a Word, 
 after removing; them into another World, fliall 
 beftow on them thoie Rewards, which were 
 originally intended them. This will bring on 
 a Third State, by Divines term'd a State of 
 Glory. In this, however it fliould be fup- 
 pos'd, that the Relation between God and 
 Man, as Creator and Creature, and between 
 all other intelligent Beings as Fellow Creatures, 
 ftill fubfifting, the Rule of Conduct muft fo 
 far be iijvariably the fame ; yet other Relati- 
 ons being alter'd, the Refult of them muft 
 vary likewife. Tho', as St. Paul tells us, Cba- 
 rity never failethj (i Cor. xiii. 8.) yet Faith 
 
 L 4 and. 
 
151 y^ DEFENCE of 
 
 and Hope, as Inftruments only for the Attain- 
 ment of Perfecflion in the prefent Life, muft 
 ceafe hereafter. When the Ties of Civil So- 
 ciety fliall be dilTolv'd, all the Duties arifing 
 from them muft fail of courfe ; feveral new 
 Engagements, founded on the then State of 
 Things, mufl fucceed, of which we have no 
 diilindl Conceptions now : And whether Men 
 may not advance infinitely in Degrees of Per- 
 fediion, be ahvays acquiring new Relations, 
 and ilill enlarging their Duties to all Eternity, 
 is a Point, which as it cannot be certainly 
 evinc'd on the one hand, fo neither can it be 
 clearly difprov'd on the other. 
 
 Yet be this Matter as it will: Suppofing 
 The Law of Nature to be as immutable as 
 this Author contends ; all that can follow 
 from it is. That The Law of Nature, as fuch, 
 will be incapable of Addition or Diminution; 
 /. e. nothing which was once a Part of this 
 Law, will ever ceafe to be fo ; and nothing 
 can ever in Time become a Part of this Law, 
 which was not fuch always. If all this were 
 allow'd the Gentleman, I cannot fee what Ad- 
 vantage he can make of it. For, can any 
 Cbnclufions be drawn from hence to prove, 
 that no other Law can poilibly be given us ? 
 Will it follow, that God cannot command 
 any thing elfe ; cannot exercife our. Obedi- 
 ence by any one Particular, which Reafon 
 doth not ihew to have been our Duty always ? 
 
 This 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 15} 
 
 This indeed is llrenuoufly contended for 
 by our Author, who hath fpent no fmall Part 
 of his Book on this very Point. " TheQue- 
 " ftion, fays he, is, Whether God, who for 
 " many Ages did not command or forbid any 
 *' Thing but what was moral or immoral ; 
 " nor yet does fo to the greatest Part of Man- 
 " kind, has, in fome Places, and fome Cafes, 
 " broke into the Rule of his own Condud:, 
 *' and iflu'd out certain Commands which 
 *''have no Foundation in Reafon, by oblig- 
 ** ing Men to obferve fuch Things as would 
 ** not oblige, were they not impos'd ; or, if 
 " the Impofition was taken off, would imme- 
 " diately return to their primitive Indiffe- 
 
 " re nee ? To fuppofe then fuch Com- 
 
 " mands, is it not to fuppofe God adts arbi- 
 " trarily, and commands for commanding 
 " Sake? Can fuch Commands be the Effe(5t 
 " of infinite Wifdom andGoodnefs? " p. 1 16. 
 Here then he aflerts, that fuch Commands 
 cannot be given us, becaufe they cannot pro- 
 ceed from infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs. 
 Not content with this, he advances a Step far- 
 ther ; and maintains, it would be Tyranny in 
 God to require any Thing of a pofitive Na- 
 ture. " Can fo kind and tender a Parent as 
 " God play The Tyrant, and impofe Com- 
 ^' mands on us, which do not flow from the 
 " Relations we fland in to him and one an- 
 ^' other? " p. 30. And as tho' he had not 
 yet carry'd the Matter hi2;h enough, in another 
 
 Place 
 3 
 
iy4 --^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 Place he tells us, that in giving Precepts, 
 God muft deal with us, jufl: as one Man does 
 by another ; /. e. not by dictating and pre- 
 fcribing to him without affigning the Reafon 
 of the Precept, but " only by propofmg Ar- 
 " guments to convince his Underftanding and 
 
 " influence his Will ; For, to go beyond 
 
 *' this, would be making Impreffions on Man 
 " as a Seal does on Wax, to the confounding 
 " his Reafon and Liberty inchufing," p. 199. 
 
 As this is a favourite Point with our Au- 
 thor, and of conliderable Moment in the pre- 
 fent Debate, I fliall confider it diftindly ; and, 
 to make the Matter clearer, (hall, 
 
 I. State the Queftion ; ■ In the next 
 
 Place propofe fach Arguments as feem proper 
 
 to determine it ; and then examine the 
 
 principal Objediions alledg'd by our Author. 
 
 The Queilion itfelf is fet forth to us under 
 different Terms, as it occurs in different Parts 
 of this Author's Performance. Sometimes 
 he demands, " Whether God can give us 
 " Precepts not founded in Reafon ? Some- 
 times " Precepts concerning Things 
 
 " which would not oblige unlefs they were 
 
 *' impos'd ; Sometimes • *' Precepts 
 
 " concerning Things indifferent ; ■ And 
 
 fometimes again — - " Precepts pofitive. " 
 I take it hisDodrlne is moil fully reprefented 
 under this lall ExprelTion ; and therefore I 
 
 fliail 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 155 
 
 fliall chufe to propofe the Queftion Thus, 
 Whether pofitive Precepts can proceed from 
 God? 
 
 My Firft Remark, in order to ftate The 
 Queftion, fhall be this; The Term Politive 
 may be underftood either in a relatrce, or ehe 
 in an abjoliite Senfe. 
 
 Pofitive Precepts, in the former Senfe, are 
 thofe, which however founded in the real 
 Natures and Reafons of Things, yet to Per- 
 fons unacquainted with their proper Grounds, 
 mufl appear to be founded in the mere Will 
 and Authority of the Impofer. Thefe, what^ 
 ever they may be in themfelves, are to them 
 pofitive ; and thofe who obferve them, mufl 
 acfl entirely on the Authority of the Prefcriber. 
 
 By politive, in the later Senfe, I mean thofe 
 Precepts, which are not founded in the Rea-r 
 fons of Things ; Matters which we are con- 
 cern'd about, not in virtue of any Principles 
 antecedent to the Command, but purely in 
 Confequence of the Command itfelf ; and 
 therefore, as they owe all their Force to ex- 
 prefs Command, fo when that ceafes, all Con* 
 cern of ours about them muft ceafe likewife. 
 
 I muft obferve, in the next Place, with 
 reference to this later Senfe of the Term Po- 
 fitive, that it excludes either thofe Reafons 
 only which are of a 77ioral Kind, or tlioie 
 likewife v/hich are natural. By the one I 
 would be underftood to m.ean That Fitnefs or 
 Uiifitnef& of Things, upon account of. which 
 
 we 
 
\^6 yf DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 we term Actions virtuous or vicious j By the 
 other, thofe temporal Advantages or Difad- 
 vantages, Conveniences or Inconveniences, 
 which arife from certain Actions. Thefe, 
 tho' in Fadl they more frequently determine 
 Men than moral Reafons are found to do, yet 
 are in Truth of an inferior Kind; And he 
 who foregoes an Advantage, or incurs a Dif- 
 advantage, hath a very different Senfe of it, 
 on the Reflediion, from what That Perfon 
 feels, who performs a worthy A6tion, or is 
 guilty of a bafe one. The one may be the 
 Rule of private Prudence or of Civil Policy ; 
 The other, as manifefling a Divine Com- 
 mand, is the 'Ground of ftridl and proper 
 Duty. 
 
 Over and above what hath hitherto been 
 noted, we fliould obferve befides, that a Di- 
 fl;in(5tion may be made between Means and 
 Ends, and this principally with reference to 
 moral Reafons. By moral Ends, I under- 
 fland thofe Actions, which being iminediately 
 fuited to the Relations in which we ft*^d, have 
 jio reference to any other Actions of a moral 
 Kind J and by Means, thofe which only con- 
 duce to promote and forward what I have 
 above call'd moral Ends; which, as they are 
 piore nearly or more remotely connedied with 
 them, mufl be efteem'd of greater or lefs Im- 
 portance. 
 
 Of thefe likewife there are fome, which 
 pn proper Occafions, do naturally conduce to 
 
 the 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. \^7 
 
 the Pradtice of Virtue. I would inftance in 
 Self-denyal-: This ferves to give us a more 
 entire Command over ourfelves, and enables 
 us the better to keep widiin proper Bounds. 
 Others conduce to this End, not thro' any 
 natural Efficacy, but merely in Confequence 
 of Inftitution and Appointment. Thus, that 
 reverent Pofliure, which is ufed in Prayer, 
 ferves to promote Devotion ; not indeed by 
 any neceffary Connexion with the Duty, but 
 purely as fuch a Pollure is appointed to ex- 
 prefs Humility. 
 
 Thofe Means which naturally conduce to 
 moral Ends, are, proportionably as they con- 
 duce to them, of moral Coniideration ; and 
 as the Ends at which they are aim'd ought to 
 be chofen by us, fo thofe Means fhould like- 
 wife be chofen, as naturally conducive to thofe 
 Ends. But the Cafe is fomewhat different in 
 reference to inftituted Means. Thefe, as hav- 
 ing nq neceffary Connexion with the Pra<5lice 
 of Virtue, are ilridly Pofitive. Other Means 
 might poffibly have been appointed equally 
 ferviceable to their Endsj and confequendy 
 other Means may be prefcrib'd to us, equally 
 confiftent with Fitnefs and the Reafon of 
 Things. 
 
 Thefe Remarks having been offer'd, in 
 order to flate this Point more clearly, I fliall 
 pafs on to fhew what I think myfelf concern'd 
 to maintain. 
 
 I dp 
 
158 A DEFENCE of 
 
 I do affert therefore, in the firft Place, 
 That God may give us Pofitive Commands, 
 in the relative Senfe of that Expreflion ; or, 
 That he may require us to perform or abftain 
 from certain Anions, without affigning the 
 proper Grounds and Reafons of the Com- 
 mand. Such, for Inftance, The Precept 
 given to our firfl: Parents, in reference to the 
 Tree of Good and Evil, feems to be. I fliall 
 not prefume to determine Whether there 
 might not be fome poifonous Quality in the 
 Fruit which occafion'd the Command : Per- 
 haps there might: But yet, in the Injundion 
 given to our firft Parents, nothing of this ap- 
 pears J and therefore, their Obfervance of it 
 m.ufl: have been refolv'd rather into the abfo- 
 lute Authority of the Commander, than any 
 appearing Reafon of the Command. 
 
 I do affert, in the next Place, that God 
 may give Men Precepts not founded in the 
 moral Reafons of Things; Precepts relating 
 to Matters which are not to be confider'd as 
 moral Ends, or as moral necelTary Means ; 
 and, the Matter of which is not originally fit, 
 nor immediately connected with Things which 
 are fo. And yet I muft maintain, that even 
 in fuch Cafes as thefe the Precepts given may 
 not be without a Reafon. The Point requir'd 
 may have a reference to fome moral End ; 
 and contribute to it, tho' not from the Rea- 
 fon and Nature of Things, yet in virtue of 
 poiitive Appointment. This probably was 
 
 the 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 159 
 
 the Ground of feveral Inftimtions in the Jewirti 
 Law. They were impos'd as Signs and To- 
 kens \ and having once rcceiv'd a Signification 
 this way, the Ufe of them did properly fug- 
 geft the Things fignify'd. 
 
 Beyond this I muft obferve farther, that 
 Precepts which are not founded on moral 
 Reafons, nor have any reference to Matters 
 of that Nature, may yet be built on Reafons 
 of Convenience ; may contribute to fome na- 
 tural Advantages, or ferve to guard againil 
 Inconvenience and Difadvantage. This per- 
 haps may be obferv'd likewife in fome Arti- 
 cles of The Jewilh Law : And the Precept in 
 relation to Swine's Flefli, (if the eating it 
 fubjecfled The Jews to greater Inconveniences 
 than were incident to other People) may not 
 miproperly be rank'd under this Head. 
 
 I muil advance a Step farther, and ailerr, 
 that fuch pofitive Precepts may proceed from 
 God, as exclude not only moral, but likewife 
 natural Reafons, in the Senfe before given to 
 thefe Words j or. That God may confiftently 
 with his Attributes enjoin thofe Things, which 
 are indifferent both in a moral and a natural 
 View. We have an Inffance of this in the 
 Cafe of Naaman, who was requir'd, as a 
 Condition of being cur'd of his Leprofy, to 
 waJJ: J even times in the River Jordan. [2 Kings 
 V. 10.] No Queftion can arife whether there 
 were any moral Fitnefs in this Action. And 
 if it be fuggefted, that pofTibly there misjht 
 
 ^be 
 
i^o ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 be fome natural Virtue in thefe Waters, we 
 may flill demand, What natural Virtue could 
 there be in Numbers ? Why was Naaman re- 
 (juir'd to wafh rather leven, than ten times ? 
 or, W^hat Reafon of either Kind can be af- 
 fign'd why one Number fliouldbe preferr'd to 
 another ? 
 
 But what then ! will This Gentleman re- 
 turn upon us ; Doth not God, in fuch a Cafe, 
 ad: arbitrarily'^ " and if He ad:s arbitrarily 
 " in any one Inftance, He muft or may do 
 " fo in all. " p. 124. 
 
 What is here fuggefted, is built on an equi- 
 vocal Ufe of the Word arbitrary j The Term 
 may be underftood in different Senfes -, and 
 is frequently fo ufed by this Vv^riter himfelf. 
 Now thus much I do readily allow, If God 
 may ad arbitrarily in any one Inftance, He 
 may do fo in any other Inftance, the Word 
 being underftood in the fame determin'd 
 Senfe of it. But I do deny this Confequence, 
 if the %t\A{^ and Meaning of the Term be 
 vary'd. What I have noted will be clearer, 
 by pointing out the feveral Significations of 
 the Word in reference to our prefent Pur- 
 pofe. 
 
 Arbitrary fometimes implies an ading con- 
 trary to the moral Reafons and Fitneffes of 
 Things. But here I do affirm, in as flrong 
 Terms as this Writer, That God is by no 
 means arbitrary. He neither doth, nor pofii- 
 bly can deviate from the Rules of Righteouf- 
 
 nefsi 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. i6i 
 
 nefs ; and in this Senle doth nothing by 
 mere abibhite Will. 
 
 At other times it fignifies an ading with- 
 out regard to moral Re:ilbns, where they are 
 properly a Rule. Here likewile I do affirm, 
 that God cannot ad arbitrarily. Thofe 
 things which are morally fit, muft be the 
 Objcds of Divine Approbation ; thofe which 
 are morally unfit, muft be condemned by 
 him. The eternal and neceflary Reditude 
 of his Nature requires it. 
 
 But then there is another Senfe of the 
 Word, in which I may, and do, affirm, that 
 God is Arbitrary ; that he may ad by mere 
 Will and Pleafure ^ and mull do fo, if he 
 ads at all. 1 mean in thofe Cafes, where 
 the before-mention'd Reafons of Things are 
 entirely unconcern'd, and cannot come into 
 Qijeftion. 
 
 Thus, whether God ihould create the 
 World in this or that Point of Duration, 
 
 in this or that Part of Space, is in itfelf 
 
 perfedly indifferent. And yet, if it were 
 ever created at all, it muft have been pro- 
 duced in iome particular time, and fome 
 determm'd Space. To affirm therefore round- 
 ly, that God cannot do any thing by 
 arbitrary Will, is inconfiftent with his ha- 
 ving created the World ; and will carry 
 Men not merely into Deifm, but into Atheifm 
 itfelf. 
 
 M Thus 
 
i6z A DEFENCE of 
 
 Thus again, in reference to the Divine 
 Commands, I do aflert, that where the 
 moral and natural Reafons of Things are out 
 of Queftion, and therefore incapable of be- 
 ing a Rule, God may prefcribe arbitrarily, 
 and command (if the Expreffion be under- 
 ftood rightly) for commanding fake. In fuch 
 Cafes, His Will is a fufficient Reafon for " 
 our Obedience; and the Exercife of our 
 Obedience is a fufficient Reafon for his 
 Will. 
 
 I do not therefore maintain, that even in 
 filch Cafes as thefe, God determines without 
 a Reafon. I conceive every thing of this 
 kind is entirely impoffible to an intelligent 
 Being. We ourlelves, imperfed as we are, 
 have fome Reafons, right or wrong, for 
 every deliberate Adion ; and no Qiieftion 
 can be made but the fupreme Intelligence 
 is conftantly determin'd by fome Reafons, 
 and thofe the beft which the Nature of the 
 Thing will bear. 
 
 What I mean here will be beft explained 
 - by obferving, that there may be a general 
 Reafon ta determine things indifferent, where 
 there is none allignable for the particular 
 Determination, or the Preference of one in- 
 different Thing before another. Thus, in. 
 the Inftance before produced, a Reafon there 
 was, why the Supreme Being fhould create 
 the World ; and confequently, a general 
 Reafon there muft be for producing it in 
 4 fome 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 16^ 
 
 fome determin'd Time : But yet, as it was in 
 itfelf perfectly indifferent, whether it were 
 created fooner or later, fo there can be no 
 Reafon aflign'd for the particular Determi- 
 nation of Time, or why that one Seafon was 
 chofen in preference to another. 
 
 Thus again, on Suppofition, that a certain 
 Adion is fit and proper, there may be feveral 
 Means equally ferviceable for the Perform- 
 ance of that Adion ; and feveral Circum- 
 ftances equally fuited to it. In fuch a Cafe 
 as this, there may be a general Reafon for 
 fettling either the Means or Circumftances j 
 the Decency of Life, or Uniformity of Beha- 
 viour may fometimes require it. But yet, 
 as thefe feveral Means and Circumftances 
 are fuppos'd to be equally fuited to the 
 Adion, in that View there can be no parti- 
 cular Reafon of Preference ; and therefore 
 the Being, who determines them, muft fo 
 far act by mere Will and Pleafure. 
 
 Again ; Where there are no Reafons, 
 either moral or natural, in the Senfe before 
 explained, for the particular Determination 
 made, there may ftill be a lit and proper 
 Occafion ; and this, in fuch Circumftances, 
 will become a Reafon. I fhail explain what 
 I mean by the following Inftance. The 
 Sacrament of The Lord's Supper confifts in 
 Eating Bread, and Drinking Wine, in Re- 
 membrance of Cbrifi, i. e. This outward 
 Adion is prefcrib'd to us as an ExprelEon of 
 
 M 2 our. 
 
\6^ ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 our Gratitude tovvards him. Now Gratitude 
 is a moral Duty ; and the Duty of receiving 
 the Holy Sacrament, confidcr'd as an Acl of 
 Gratitude, is of a moral Kind. But then, 
 whether the Eating Bread and Drinking Wine, 
 or the Performance of any other outward 
 Ceremony fnould be appointed to exprefs 
 
 our Gratitude^ T his, I fay, is both in 
 
 a moral and natural Account, indifferent ; 
 and the Inftitution, in this refped, is pofi- 
 tive. Notwithftanding this, I muft affirm, 
 that there was a proper Occafion for this 
 particular Inftitution. It is well known, 
 that to eat Bread, and to drink Wine, in an 
 Euchariilical Way, had obtain'd among the 
 Jezvs^ and was in Ufe in our Saviour's 
 Time. He confecrates therefore this Cere- 
 mony; and takes Occalion from the Pradice 
 of tlie Jczvlfl:) Church, to fix and fettle an 
 Inftitution of his own. 
 
 Once more; Tho' we fliould fuppofe no 
 Reafons either natural or moral ; and no 
 fuch particular Occafion as was mentioned 
 before, for giving the Command, yet ftill I 
 muft affert, that fuch a Command may pol- 
 fibly proceed from God : For, if every other 
 Reafon were v/anting, yet the mere Trial 
 and Exercife of our Obedience is of itfelf 
 lufficient. Whether any Precepts of this 
 Kind have ever been in fact prefcrib'd, is 
 another Qucftion, and which we are no 
 Y/ays concern'd to anfwer. However, I 
 4. muft 
 
Reveal'd Religion,, c^f. 165 
 
 miift maintain, that fiich Precepts may be 
 given us ; and that no Concliifions can be 
 drawn to the contrary, either from the Rea- 
 fon of the Thing, or the Perfe6\ions of the 
 Divine Nature. 
 
 I muft nov/ produce fiich Arguments as 
 are proper to conlirm the point betbre Hated : 
 And my 
 
 Firft Proof fliall be drawn from the Rela- 
 tion which God bears to us as Creator, and that 
 abfolute Authority he muil necelfarily have 
 over us on that Account. Now, an Authority 
 of this kind muft imply in it a Right to com- 
 mand every Thing which is the Objed of 
 Command ; every Thing in itfelf poffible to 
 be done, and capable of being requir'd ; in 
 fhort, every Thing confiftent with the Rea- 
 fon of Things and the Attributes of the 
 Divine Nature. 
 
 What Objedions then can be alledg'd 
 againft God's Right of determining Things 
 indifferent ? Are Precepts of this Kind inca- 
 pable of being obey'd ? By no means : Are 
 fuch Things incapable of being requir'd ? 
 No: For, ifwitiiout a Command every Man 
 hath a Right to determine for himfelf, no- 
 thing can be plainer than this, that God 
 may, if he pleafes, determine for him : And 
 there is nothing which Man may rightly 
 perform, but God may as juftly require 
 it. 
 
 M 3 Things 
 
\66 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 Things in themfelves ill and wrong, arc 
 not the Objeds of Command ; and there- 
 fore cannot be properly required by any Au- 
 thority whatfoever. Things in themfelves fit 
 and right, are, I will not fay barely the 
 Proper^ but the Necejpiry Matter of juft and 
 wife Command : And it is on this Principle 
 I maintain, that the Rules of Virtue muft be 
 the Commands of God. But then there are 
 other Matters, which are not the necelfary, 
 but only the poffible Objects of Authority* 
 Things, which may be either required or 
 forbidden, or left undetermin'd as the Su- 
 preme Legiflator pleafes ; and it is in refer- 
 ence to thefe chiefly that an abfolute Autho- 
 rity is Ihewn. 
 
 In a Word ; if Things indifferent are 
 capable of being determin'd by any Power, 
 then a Right to determine them muft be 
 implied in abfolute Authority ; and if abfo- 
 lute Authority may not determine them, 
 then neither ought they to be determin'd by 
 private Will ; from whence thefe notable 
 Confequences may be deduc'd, that there is, 
 ftridly fpeaking, nothing as to its Ufe indif- 
 ferent, nor hath any Man the leaft Liberty of 
 Choice at all. 
 
 I would argue, in the next place, from 
 the Relation which we bear to God as Crea- 
 tures, and that full and entire Subjedion to 
 him which this Relation muft neceffarily lay 
 us under. As therefore we are bound from 
 
 hence 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 167 
 
 hence to obey every Precept which God 
 gives us, fo on the other hand God may give 
 us any Precepts which are fitted to try this 
 Obedience. But will a ferious Perfon aflert, 
 that Things indifferent cannot become Mat- 
 ter of fuch a Trial ? May we not perform 
 thofe Things in virtue of a Command, 
 which we might juftly have performed with- 
 out a Command ? And if we dct fo, Do wc 
 not by this exprefs our Obedience ? Nay, 
 Do we not exprefs it in the molt ample man- 
 ner by performing thofe Things, for which 
 we have no Reafon but purely the Com- 
 mand itfelf ? If this be true, then I may 
 venture to affert, that pofitive Precepts are 
 not only capable of being given us, but the 
 moft proper Exercife of our abfolute Sub- 
 jection to the Supreme Being. 
 
 Obedience may indeed be ftiewn in other 
 Cafes too. We may, and I hope all of us 
 do regard the Will of God in performing 
 thofe Things which are in themfelves fitting. 
 In thefe Caies we are a6ted by two diltind 
 Principles ; the appearing Fitnefs of the 
 Thing, and a Senfe of the Divine Pleafure. 
 But it is the later Principle only which 
 makes our Actions Inltances of Obedience. 
 Any farther than we confider moral Virtues 
 as the Will of God, and praCtife them upon 
 that account, we do not properly obey God 
 at all ; we may indeed be term*d moral 
 ^en, but not in the leait religious. 
 
 M 4 Now, 
 
i68 A DEFENCE of ' 
 
 Now, if Religion itfelf confids in obeying 
 God, or the acting in virtue of a Divine 
 Command, then 1 conceive it is plain, that 
 thofe Things may become Inftances of Duty 
 and Matter of Religion, for which no Rea- 
 fon can be affign'd but the Command. Our 
 Author indeed denies this, and aflerts, that 
 we are obliged to acl no farther than the 
 Thing reqnir'd had an antecedent Fitnefs, 
 and was proper to have been done without 
 any Injunction. Nay, as tho' he had not 
 carried the Matter high enough, he main- 
 tains over and above, that nothing can be 
 Matter of Duty, the Reafon and Fitnefs of 
 which is not laid open to us. This is bold 
 indeed ! and I conceive at one Siroke diredly 
 overthrows all Obligations of Obedience to 
 God. for, if we are concern'd to perform 
 every thing, the moral Fitnefs of which ap- 
 pears, even without the Intervention of a 
 Precept ; and if the Divine Authority itfelf 
 cannot oblige us but by afiigning the moral 
 Reafbns of the Precept ; then all Engage- 
 ments on our Part mufl: arife, not from the 
 Confideration of the Divine Will, but of 
 our own Reafon. On tiiis Foot all Autho- 
 lity on God's Part, and all Obedience on 
 ours, muft be perfedly deftroy'd. 
 
 To this I will defire Liberty to add ano- 
 ther Argument drawn from the manifeft and 
 inexcufable Abfurdities of the contrary Opi- 
 nion, if God cannot give us positive Prcr 
 
 ceptSj 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. \6^ 
 
 cepts, nor require any thing to be done by us 
 which was not equally neceffary before the 
 Command, then I conceive this Confequence 
 arifes ; neither hath any other Being a Right 
 to prefcribe in Matters of this Nature ; for, 
 there can be no Risht or Power in the Crea- 
 ture, which doth not fubfift more eminently 
 in the Creator. Let us fee how, on this 
 Foot, Society and Government can be fup- 
 ported. 
 
 In the firfl place, Nothing can be required 
 by the Civil Power, which was not, upon its 
 own account, incumbent on us antecedently 
 to the Prefcription : And where different 
 Meafures may equally conduce to the lame 
 End, there they muft be left entirely unde- 
 termin'd ; becaufe, in fuch Cafes, there can 
 be no particular Reafon for Choice or Pre- 
 ference. From whence it will follow, that 
 one of the great Defigns of Civil Power is 
 entirely voided, I'iz. An uniting the whole 
 Force of the Community, and a joint profe- 
 cuting the fame End by the fame aMeans. 
 
 In the next place j Before any Civil In- 
 junclions can take place, the particular Rea-» 
 fon and Fitnefs of the Injunction muft like- 
 wife be given. This hath been afTerted 
 with regard to God j and therefore muft 
 equally hold with regard to the Civil Magi- 
 ftrate. Now, if no Command can be effec- 
 tual unlefs the Reafons of it be diftin£lly fet 
 fonh, it is equally neceffary, that th^ 
 
 -Strengtl^ 
 
170 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 Strength and Force of thefe Reafons fliould 
 be diftin6lly perceiv'd : For, to that Perfon, 
 by whom they are not perceiv'd, they are 
 not Reafons. From hence it follows, that 
 no Subjed: is bound to ad in any Inftance 
 farther than he himfelf thinks fit, and is in- 
 clined to do fo. For, on this Hypothefis, 
 he can be under no Obligation but what 
 arifes from the Reafons perceiv'd by him ; 
 of \vhich he only is the proper Judge ; and 
 therefore, he only can determine whether 
 the Command fhall be obferv*d or no. If 
 this be the Condition of Things, and Liberty 
 is to be underftood in fuch a Latitude, then 
 are we reduc'd to a State of Nature indeed : 
 Every Man hath a Right to ad in all 
 refpeds as in his own great Wifdom he fhall 
 judge fit : No one hath any Pretence to cen- 
 fure or punifh him : Every one who offers 
 to controul him, doth fo far ufurp on his 
 native Privilege: He is plainly Lord of 
 himfelf, and entirely independent on any 
 Authority whatfoever. Thefe are Pofitions 
 no more confiftent with general Intereft than 
 common Senfe. 
 
 Let us fee now what Objedions are 
 alledg*d by our Author againfl the Poffibi- 
 lity of pofitive Precepts in Matters of Reli- 
 gion. And, 
 
 f . He objeds, that if God be unchangea- 
 ble, our Duty to him muft be fo too ; from 
 the Beginning of the World (o the End of it 
 
 always 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 1,71 
 
 always the fame; incapable of being changed 
 either in whole or in part : And confe-^ 
 quently, that no Perfon, if he comes from 
 God, can teach us any other Religion, or 
 give us any Precepts but what are founded 
 on the Relations in which we ftand to God 
 and Man [p. 20.] 
 
 We allow and contend that God is un- 
 changeable in his Nature and his Will ; and 
 the general Duties which we owe to him are 
 likewife unchangeable. Love, Thankful- 
 nefs, Truft and Obedience ever were, and 
 ever will be Duties ; to which may be 
 added all the feveral Methods of Condud, 
 which refult from the Relations in which we 
 ftand either to God or our fellow Creatures. 
 But the Qiicftion before us, is, Whether 
 God may not fuperadd to thefe fome Points - 
 of a pofitive Nature ; whether, fince Obe- 
 dience in the general is a Duty founded on 
 the moral Reafons of Things, God may not 
 aflign fome particular Inftances for the Ex- 
 ercife of this Obedience ; and efpecially, if 
 the Things infifted on be, in fome refpeds, 
 naturally convenient, and adapted to the 
 Service and Improvement of Vertue ? 
 
 Our Author maintains the contrary ; and 
 alledges, '* that to fuppofe any things [en- 
 " join'd by Revelation] which are not of a 
 " moral Kind, and did not oblige perpe- 
 ** tually, muft fuppofe a Change in the 
 « Mind of God. " [p. 131.] If there be 
 
 any 
 
172 .^DEFENCE of 
 
 any Force in this Kind of arguing, it miift 
 be relblv'd into the following Principle, 
 viz. God cannot will that any thing Ihonid 
 be done in Time, which he did not will 
 llioiild be done from Eternity. If this be 
 admitted, tlien mull we deny, that the 
 World was ever created by him; and that 
 he can, confiftently with his Attributes, 
 exert any Ads whatfoever ad extra ; for 
 fuch Acts muft be exerted in Time ; and 
 confequently, muft fuppofe lome prior and 
 antecedent Duration. But, according to this 
 Gentleman, fuch a Change in reference to 
 the Adls of God, muft infer a like Change of 
 Will ; and therefore muft entirely deftroy 
 his Immutability. 
 
 The real truth of the Cafe is this ; God 
 neither does, nor wills any thing in Time, 
 which he did not will from Eternity : But 
 then, what he will'd from Eternity may 
 receive its EfFed and Accomplifliment in 
 Time ] And the particular Scafon in which 
 it is accomplifh'd, is that very Scafon which 
 God determin'd from ail Eternity. The 
 'Jewifi Jnftitution was what God will'd from 
 all Ages : But then he decreed, that this 
 Inftitution ftiould take place in fome deter- 
 min'd Tin^e ; Ihould laft for a certain Pe- 
 riod ; ftiould at length give way to another 
 Inftitution more perfect, and better accom- 
 modated to the then State and Condition of 
 Things. In this way of thinking, however 
 
 the 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 175 
 
 the particular Inftances of Obedience be va- 
 ried, the Divine Will is one and unvaried. 
 
 1 have taken occafion to obferve before, 
 that God never does or injoins any thing 
 without fome lufficient Realons ; as thefe 
 Realbns therefore vary, his Ads mult vary 
 likevvile : His Will however is unchanged, 
 as being always fuited to that which is pro- 
 per and realonable. In this 1 am fupported 
 by a notable Concellion of our Author him- 
 felf, viz. " To alter one's Condud as Gir- 
 " cumftances alter, is not only an Acl of 
 " the greateft Prudence and Judgment, but 
 " is confiilent with the greatelt Steadinefs." 
 p. loj. If this be true, then to give us 
 pofitive Inftitutions on proper Occafions ; or, 
 to alter thefe Inftitutions as Gircumftances 
 alter, is entirely defenlible ; is an Act of 
 Reafon and Prudence ; is conliftent with the 
 greateft Steadinefs ; or, with that very Im- 
 mutability from which the prefent Objedion 
 is drawn. 
 
 'That Precepts of this kind therefore may 
 be alter'd, doth not arife from any Change 
 in the Will of God, but from the Gircum- 
 ftances of Things themfelves. They were 
 originally impos'd, whenever they have been 
 impos'd, not ablolutely without any Reafon ; 
 this State of the Gafe we rejed entirely ; 
 there are, and always muft be fome Reafbns 
 for them, tho' they may not appear to us. 
 But as thefe very Realbns are themfelves 
 
 mutable, 
 
174 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 mutable, fo thefe Precepts muft be fb too : 
 And the Change of fuch Inftitutions, as the 
 Reafons of them alter, is, in truth, an 
 Argument of the Stability of God's Will, 
 which unalterably reiblves upon thofe things 
 which are beft and fitteft upon the whole. 
 
 A fecond Objedion, drawn from God's 
 Wifdom, is thus fet forth ; '' Whatfoever 
 ** is in itfelf indifferent^ either as to Matter 
 " or Manner, muft be fo to an all-wife Being, 
 *' who judges of Things as they are : And 
 *' for the fame Reafon that he commands 
 ** Things that are Good, and forbids thofe 
 '^ which are Evil, he leaves Men at Liberty 
 
 " in all Things indifferent " [p. 122.] 
 
 " To fuppofe [the contrary] would be to 
 *' make God ad unreafonably ; fince all 
 *' thofe Reafons which oblig'd him to com- 
 " mand Good, and to forbid Evil Things, 
 *' muft wholly ceafe in relation to a Sub- 
 " jed, which by being indifferent partakes 
 *' of neither. " [p 134, 135.] 
 
 If there be any Force in the Argument 
 here ailed g'd, it will carry us a great deal 
 farther than this Writer himfelf intends : It 
 will conclude not only againft God's deter- 
 mining in Things indifferent, but likewifc 
 againft all Determinations of this Kind, tho' 
 they Ihould arife from private Will and 
 Pleafure j and confequently, whilft our Au- 
 thor would feem to enlarge Men's Liberty, 
 he doth moft effedually fubyert it. For, 
 
 if 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 175 
 
 if it be inconfiftent with Wifdom in God to 
 command or forbid Things in themfelves 
 indifferent, (becaufe it is fuppos'd there can 
 be no End or Reafon for fuch Determination) 
 it muft be equally inconfillent with Wifdom 
 in Men to make any Choice in Cafes of this 
 Nature ^ and fo far forth as they prefume to 
 ad either way, they muft deviate from 
 what is fit and proper, as chufing without 
 any fufficient Grounds or Reafons of Choice. 
 According to this way of arguing, Things 
 by being indifferent in themfelves, are not 
 indifferent as to their Ufe ; and to leave 
 Men to their Liberty is to dcftroy it. 
 
 1 do readily allow, that to an all-wife 
 Being every Ihing appears as it really is ; 
 Things effentially Good, as fuch ; Things 
 cfTentially Evil, as Evil ; and Things in 
 themfelves indifferent, as indifferent : But 
 then 1 do deny the Confequence which our 
 Author would deduce from thence, viz, 
 that Gc"' cannot, conliftently with his Wif^ 
 dom, give us any Precepts in reference to 
 Things indifferent. I muft maintain the 
 dired oppofite Conclufion ; and affert, That 
 if an all-wife Being judges of Things indif- 
 ferent as flich, he muft judge of them as 
 the poftible Objeds of Command ; for the 
 very Nature of Indifferency confifts in this, 
 that Things of that Kind may equally be 
 determined to either Side. 
 
 Nor 
 
\76 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Nor will it at all follow, that if Points of 
 this Kind fliould be fectled by a Divine 
 Command, God would in fuch Cafes ad 
 unreafonablv. I do admit, that all thofe 
 Reafons which oblig'd him to command 
 thofe Thing's which are in themfcives Good, 
 and to forbid thofe Things which are in 
 themfcives Evil, muft wholly ceafe in rela- 
 tion to a Subject, which by being indifferent 
 partakes of neither, Thefe Realbns, I grant, 
 muft ceafe : But what then ? Does it follow, 
 that becaufe Precepts of this Kind are not 
 founded on moral and neceffary Reafons, 
 therefore they can be built on none at all ? 
 If Precepts of this Kind may prove fubfer- 
 vient to the Interefts of Virtue; if they may 
 conduce to fome temporal Convenience ; if 
 they may promote the Order and Decency 
 of civil or religious Life ; if, laftly, they 
 may be a proper Exercile of our entire Obe- 
 dience to the Divine Will, then there may 
 be Reafons for giving them : And if Inch 
 Reafons there really are, then to determine 
 Points in a moral View indifferent, is not to 
 act unreafonably. 
 
 Of this our Author was aware ; and 
 therefore fubjoins, *' If there were any Rea- 
 " fon to deprive Men of their Liberty in 
 " Things indifferent, they would then ceafe 
 " to be indifferent." The Fallacy of the 
 Argument lies in the Ufe of the Word Indif- 
 ferent^ which muft be oppos'd, not to pru- 
 dential. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 177 
 
 denti'al, but to moral and abfolutely nccel- 
 iary Reafons. It is in this Senfe our Author, 
 on moft Occafions, ufes it j and the Queftion 
 I have all along been debating is thus Hated 
 by himfelf, v^z. " Whether God, who for 
 ** many Ages did not command or forbid 
 " any Thing, but what was moral or im- 
 " moral, hath in fome Cafes iflu'd out Com- 
 " mands, which have no Foundation in 
 " Reafon. '* Commands which have no 
 Foundation in Reafon, muft plainly fignify 
 Commands not founded in moral Reafons : 
 And, on feveral other Occafions, he ftre- 
 nuoufly maintains, that nothing can become 
 Matter of Religion, which is not in itfelf, 
 and eternally obliging. If this be the Cafe, 
 then Things may ftill remain in themfelves 
 indifferent, notvvithftanding the foregoing 
 Reafons for determining their Ufe ; and to 
 fettle them, may, in a prudential View, be 
 proper, tho' it were not abfolutely and eter- 
 nally necelfary. 
 
 A Third Objection is drawn from God's 
 Goodnefs, the whole Amount of which is 
 this ; to give us pofitive Precepts, or to 
 determine Things in themfelves indifferent, 
 muft fo far impair that Liberty, in which 
 our Happinefs itfelf confifts : • [V. p. 1 35.] 
 It hazards, without any Neceffity, our eter- 
 nal Concerns, and muft place Men in a 
 much worfe Condition, than if they had 
 
 N been 
 
178 J DEFENCE of 
 
 been only fubjed to the Law of Nature. 
 [V.p. laj.] 
 
 It is afferted, in the firft place, that God 
 cannot prefcribe to us in Matters indifferent, 
 becaufe this is inconfiftent with human Hap- 
 pinefs ; and it is alTerted farther, that human 
 Happinefs mull depend on our Liberty in 
 all fuch Things. Yet, notvvithftanding this, 
 our Author is fo little fenfible of the Diffi- 
 culties which arife from hence, that, in 
 another place, he reprefents the extream 
 Eafinefs of obeying fuch Precepts; and tells 
 us, " There is nothing of this Kind which 
 " fome Men will not punctually obferve, 
 *' in hopes to attone for their darling Vices." 
 [p. 142, 177.] Thus far indeed he afferts 
 truly, and may be juftified by Fad and 
 Experience. But doth not this fuppofe, 
 that there may be lefs Trouble in obeying 
 Precepts of a pofitive, than of a moral 
 Kind ? and confequently, that mere Obe- 
 dience is no more inconfiftent with prefent 
 Happinefs in the one Cafe, than in the 
 other ? 
 
 In truth, to give us pofitive Commands 
 on proper Occafions, is fo far from deftroy- 
 ing, that it really tends to improve our 
 Happinefs. If the Commands are any way 
 inftrumental to moral Virtue ; or ferve to 
 promote fbme temporal Advantage ; or to 
 guard againft fome temporal Difadvantage, 
 the Point before us is clear: Things are 
 
 then 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ &c. 179 
 
 then determin'd for our Good ; and the Ufe 
 of our Liberty is reftrain'd in thofe Cafes, 
 in which we might otherwife turn it againll 
 ourfelviJs. 
 
 To this we may add, that if there be in 
 human Nature a ftrong Appetite of Free- 
 dom, (as indeed there is) yet Itill no moral 
 Pleafures can arife from the Exercife of fuch a 
 Freedom. The Satisfaction of having made 
 a Choice on trifling Confiderations is itielf 
 trifling : But to coniider, that whihl we ad, 
 we pay an Obedience to an all-good and an 
 all-wife Being, this cannot but minifter to 
 us a Pleafure indeed : And we fliall reap a 
 Satisfadion from the Confcioufnefs of obey- 
 ing God vaftly fuperior to any Thing wc can 
 gain by gratifying ourfelves. 
 
 To go on ; It is alledg'd, in the next 
 place, that to give us pofitive Commands, is 
 to hazard, without any NeceiTity, our Eter- 
 nal Concerns. And as God cannot punilh 
 us for neglecting thofe* Things vvhich have 
 no Worth or Value in themfelves, fo it is 
 equally impollible he fhould give us any 
 Precepts in relation to them. [V. p. 122.] 
 
 But I would defire to know, whether Obe- 
 dience to the Will of God be not a moral 
 , and neceffary Duty : If it be fo, then Dif- 
 obedience muft be eflentially wrong and 
 puniihable ; and Men incur the Divine Dif- 
 pleafure, not by neglecting a Thing indif- 
 ferent, but difobeying a Divine Command, 
 N 2 The 
 
i8o A DEFENCE of 
 
 The Cafe therefore is not fairly ftated in the 
 Objedion. The doing or forbearing Things 
 indifferent, are not the Terms of Salvation : 
 It is placed on quite another Foot, viz. An 
 Obedience to the Will of God : This furely 
 is by no means unnecelfary ; becaufe it is in 
 its own Nature and eternally unfit, that 
 thofe fliould enjoy the Divine Favour, who 
 are regardlefs of the Divine Pleafure. 
 , How far God's Will reaches in this re- 
 gard, is, or may be known by us certainly ; 
 for nothing can be to us a Matter of Duty, 
 which is plac'd beyond our Knowledge. 
 But then, if we wilfully negled to inform 
 ourfelves ; or being inform'd, perverfly 
 difpute the Point, we ad difagreeably to 
 that Relation in which we ftand to God; 
 and the Miferies which we incur thereby, 
 do not arile from the Will of a capricious or 
 unkind Being, but the unalterable Determi- 
 nations of infinite W.ifdom and Goodnels. 
 
 There remains but one Thing farther to 
 be confider'd under this Head, viz. That 
 to give Alen pofitive Precepts muft place 
 them in a worfe Condition, than if they 
 were only fubjed to the Law of Nature. 
 Thoie who have no other Law, can be 
 judged by that alone ; and therefore cannot 
 hazard the Favour of God by a Difregard 
 to Things indifferent. 
 
 The Objedion is built on this Principle, 
 viz, that our Condition muft be neceffarily 
 
 either 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, i8i 
 
 cither w(xfe or better, in proportion as our 
 Obligations are of a greater or lefs Extent ; 
 thofe being fuppos*d the happicft who have 
 leaft to do, and feweft Duties to difcharge. 
 If this extravagant Principle be admitted, 
 then muft we aflert, that the wifeft and 
 greateft Men are more unhappy than the 
 meaneft and moft illiterate ; becaufe their 
 Circumftances and Views of Things will 
 proportionably increafe their Duties ; and 
 feveral Points will be to them obligatory, 
 from which the Condition of other Perfons 
 might excufe them. From hence it follows, 
 that as Improvement in Wifdom and Know- 
 ledge is a Misfortune ; and Men's Happinefs 
 condfts, not in knowing, but being igno- 
 rant, fo thofe Beings which know the leaft, 
 (and therefore are moft free from religious 
 Obligations) are moft happy. Let our Ad- 
 verfaries purfue this Conclufion, and prefer, 
 if they plcafe, the Condition of Brutes be- 
 fore that of Men : Thefe Creatures, as they 
 are incapable of any Obligations, fo can they 
 run no Hazards. 
 
 In truth, our Happinefs is not impair'd, 
 but increas'd by the Extent of our religious 
 Knowledge. If our Obligations are from 
 hence enlarg'd, the Advantages which will 
 arife from anfwering thefe Obligations muft 
 be proportionable : And the Rewards of 
 Obedience will always ballance the Punifti- 
 ments of Difobediencc. 
 
 N 3 I have 
 
i8i A DEFENCE of 
 
 I have noted already, that abfohite Sub- 
 million to the Divine Will is a neceflary 
 Duty. The Trial and Exercife therefore of 
 this Submiffion cannot place us in a worfe 
 State than the Exercife of any other Duty. 
 It ferves to improve and better us, and to 
 render us more fie Objects of Favour. 
 
 Still the Argument will be ftronger, if 
 the Matters in which our Obedience is try'd 
 fhall like wife help forward the common In- 
 terefts of Virtue j if they are Fences againft 
 Temptations ; apt to fuggeft to us proper 
 Sentiments ; or, in any other refped:, conduce 
 to the Improvement of a virtuous Temper. 
 If this be the Cafe, then Precepts of this 
 Kind ferve not to hazard, but to feciire and 
 facilitate our Salvation ; and to negled them, 
 when given, is to defert the Interefts of that 
 V^irtue, they are intended to liipport. 
 
 I am carried on by this Remark to confi- 
 dcr a fourth Objedion alledg'd by our Au- 
 thor, viz. That pofitive Precepts are preju- 
 dicial to the real Interefts of Virtue ; and 
 lead the way to the grolTefl: and moft- fenfe- 
 lefs Superftition. The Objedion is thus 
 ftated p. 141. " It is certain that the Mind 
 " may be overloaded as well as the Body: 
 " And the more it is taken up with the 
 *■ Obfervation of Things which are not of a 
 ** moral Nature, the lefs will it be able to 
 *' attend to thofe that are ; which requiring 
 ^ the Application of the whole Man, can 
 
 ^^ never 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. iSj 
 
 " never be rightly performed, while the 
 " Mind, by laying flrefs on other Things, 
 " is diverted from attending on them ; efpe- 
 " cially if it be confider'd, that Superftition, 
 " if once fufFer'd to mix with Religion, will 
 ** always be gaining Ground. If Reafon is 
 " to be heard ; no imnecefTary Things 
 " will be admitted ; but, if it be not, 
 ^' where Ihall we flop ? If People are once 
 *' brought to believe that fuch Things are 
 " good for any Thing, they will be apt 
 " to believe that they are good for all 
 « Things." 
 
 Two Things are here aflerted ; i. That 
 pofitive Precepts muft overload the Mind, 
 and draw it olf from attending to Things of a 
 moral Nature. 2. That they introduce 
 Superftition ; becaufe, if Men are brought 
 to believe that thefe Things [/. e, pofitive 
 Inflitutions] are good for any Thing, they 
 will be apt to believe they are good for all 
 Things. 
 
 With reference to the former Part of the 
 Objedion, it muft indeed be own*d, that 
 real Virtue and Religion, may, in certain 
 Cafes, be prejudiced by ritual and ceremo- 
 nious Performances. This ill Confequence 
 muft arife, when they are either too nume- 
 rous ; or elfe, when they are not properly 
 expreflive of that Religion they are pre- 
 tended to fupport ; or, laftly, when they 
 are not fuited to the State and Condition of 
 N 4 thof© 
 
i84 A DEFENCE of 
 
 thofe Perfons on whom they are impos'd. 
 j^ut, if pofitive Inftitutions may, in fome 
 Cafes, be prejudicial, doth it follow, they 
 muft therefore be fo in all ? Are Fire and 
 Water abfolutely ufelels and mifchievous, 
 becanfe in certain Circumftances the worft 
 Confequences have arifen from them ? In 
 like manner, pofitive Inftitutions may be of 
 real Service in fome Cafes, whatever Incon- 
 veniences may poffibly arife in others ; for 
 the Prejudice they may occafion, doth by 
 no means arife from hence, that they are 
 pofitive, but from another quite different 
 Confideration. 
 
 Let us admit, tliat the Mind may be 
 overloaded j and that too much Shew and 
 and Outlide may divert us from attending to 
 Matters of more Importance. What then ! 
 Is nothing of this Kind to be allow'd of ; 
 and mull we rejed the Ufe, becaufe Incon- 
 veniences will arife from the Abufe of it ? 
 Our Author indeed aiTerts, ^^ 'lliat Things 
 " of a moral Nature require the Application 
 " of the whole Man, and therefore can 
 '' never be rightly performed vvhilft the 
 '' Mind, by laying Strefs on other Things, 
 " is diverted from attending to them/' To 
 which we reply. That altho' the Matter of 
 pofitive Inftitutions be not, as to its Nature, 
 moral, yet Obedience to them, when com- 
 manded by God, isib; and the Strefs which 
 is, ©r ought to be laid on them, does not 
 
 regard 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 185 
 
 regard their mere Matter, (which is con- 
 feis'd to be in itfelf indifferent) but the 
 Will and Authority of the Impofer ; from 
 whence it follows, that the Mind is fb far 
 from being diverted, by Inftitiitions of this 
 Kind, from attending to moral Duty, that 
 the right Obfervation of them implies and 
 requires a ftrid Attention to it. To which 
 may be added farther, that pofitive Inftitu- 
 tions themfelves may have a dired View to 
 Morality or Religion ; They may be of 
 lingular Ufe and Service this Way ; and 
 confequently, they are fo far from being 
 eflentially injurious, that Ibmething of this 
 Kind may be highly neceffary to fupport 
 it. 
 
 To make this more evident, I fliall ob- 
 ferve, that no Religion hath ever yet fub- 
 fifted in Fad: without fome Inftitutions. 
 Mere Natural Religion, without any thing 
 inftituted of any Kind, is nothing but Idea, 
 and hath no Exiftence but in the Mind, 
 Where God hath not been pleas'd to make 
 Appointments of this Nature, Men have 
 done it for themfelves; and hence 'tis that 
 fuch Inftitutions have been liable to the 
 fame Imperfedions to which Men themfelves 
 are fubjed. Yet, however frequently they 
 have err'd in their particular Determinations, 
 their Judgment concerning the general Point 
 is unqueftionable ; and the Argument to be 
 drawn from hence hath all that Force, which 
 
 general 
 
lU A DEFENCE of 
 
 general, I may fay, univerfal Confent 
 
 can give it. 
 
 Let it be obferv*d, in the next place, that 
 one great Point of Religion, is. The Wor- 
 Ihip of the Supreme Being. Now, admit- 
 ting that the Excellency of religious Wor- 
 fhip will depend on the inward Senfe of the 
 Worfhipper, yet ftill, this Worfhip itfelf 
 cannot be performed without fomething ex- 
 ternal. It requires Rites and Ceremonies of 
 fome Kind or other. It implies not only an 
 inward Senfe of the Divine Perfeftions, and 
 of our Engagements to the Supreme Being, 
 but likewife fuch an outward Expreffion of 
 it, that the reft of Mankind may be Wit- 
 nelTes of our Piety. But can this be done 
 without any Rites at all ? Are Men intimate- 
 ly confcious to each other's Thoughts ; or, 
 are they capable of knowing them, other- 
 wife than they are reveal'd by fomething 
 external ? As well might we reafon and 
 difcourfe with each other, without the Ufe 
 of Signs, as exprefs our Piety, in the prefent 
 Cafe, without fomething external. 
 
 It may be noted farther, that as external 
 Rites are neceffary, as being Expreffions of 
 our inward Piety, fo are they likewife ufe- 
 ful to ftrengthen and cherifh this Piety itfelf. 
 I do by no means affirm, that Rites of every 
 Kind are ferviceable in this Cafe. A wrong 
 Choice may indeed be made. But what I 
 maintain, is this 3 Rites, when fitly chofen, 
 
 may 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 187 
 
 may become the Signs of fomething internal; 
 and when they are fb, the right Ufe of 
 them will fiiggeft thofe Sentiments of which 
 they are the Signs. Thus it happens in 
 other Cafes likevvife : Words, whether fpo- 
 ken or written, have no necelTary Connec- 
 tion with Ideas, nor are they naturally figni- 
 ficant : But yet, when the Senfe of them is 
 once determinM by Ufe, they fuggeft to us 
 the Ideas they are defign'd to reprefent, and 
 become ufeful even in the Exercile of our 
 own inward Reafbning. 
 
 I hope it may appear from this kind of 
 arguing, that pofitive Inftitutions are not 
 Incumbrances on real Virtue and Religion ; 
 that they do not neceffarily divert the Mind 
 from that which is in its own Nature excel- 
 lent ; but may, when difcreetly chofen, be- 
 come ferviceable to the beft Purpofes. Still 
 it will be infifted, that whatever Ufe may 
 poilibly be made of them, yet this is bal- 
 lanc'd by Confequences of another Kind. It 
 hath been affirm'd, that they lead the Way 
 to Superftition ; " For if Men are once 
 ^* brought to believe that thefe Things 
 *' are good for any Thing, they will be 
 " apt to believe that they are good for all 
 " Things/' 
 
 In reply to this, I muft acknowledge, that 
 it is difficult to account for all the Follies of 
 Mankind. There are no Principles, how- 
 ever certain or important, from which weak 
 
 Men 
 
i88 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Men may not pretend to draw bad Conclu- 
 fions \ nor are there any Matters, however 
 iileful, which may not be applied to evil 
 Purpofes by the perverfe. The Queftion 
 therefore, in the prefent Cafe, ought to be, 
 ISloty Whether weak Perfons may not fome- 
 times make a bad Ufe of pofitive Inftitu- 
 tions ; but, Whether fuch Inftitutions do of 
 
 themfelves lead to it : Not^ Whether 
 
 Men may not, by perverting thefe Inftitu- 
 tions, become fuperftitious ; but, Whether 
 the right Ufe of them doth, in its own Na- 
 ture, tend to Superftition. 
 
 Our Author, who objeds againft pofitive 
 Inftitutions on this Foot, in another Place 
 tells us, that Religion itfelf hath been made 
 the Caufe of Mifchief, and render'd deftruc- 
 tive of the common Welfare. To this pur- 
 pofe he obferves [p. 1^5.] " Tho' we cry 
 " up the great Advantage we have above 
 " other Animals in being capable of Reli- 
 <^ gion, yet thofe Animals we defpife for 
 *' the Want of it, herd moft focially toge- 
 
 " ther, &c, '* And afterwards, " Men, 
 
 " tho' they cannot fubfift but in Society, 
 <' and have Hands, Speech, and Reafon to 
 " qualify them for the BlelTmg of it above 
 " all other Animals \ nay, what is more, 
 ** have Religion, defign'd to unite them in 
 *' the firm Bonds of Love and Friendlhip, 
 " and to engage them to vie with one ano- 
 '* ther in all good Offices j and the good- 
 
 '< natur'd 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 189 
 
 natur'd Laity too have, at a vaft Expencc, 
 hir'd Perfons to inculcate thefe generous 
 Notions ; yef, alas ! in ipite of all thele 
 Helps and Motives, Religion has been 
 made, by thefe very Perfons, a Pretence 
 to render Men unfociable, fierce, and 
 cruel, and to aft every thing deftrudive 
 to the common Welfare. " What then ; 
 muft all Religion therefore be difcarded? 
 One might be tempted to fufpect that theie 
 are our Author's Sentiments ; for he introduces 
 his Reflexions in this Place by intimating, that 
 Animals which want Religion are in better 
 Circumftances than thofe which have it. But, 
 whatever this Gentleman may think of the 
 Matter, it will be difficult to pcrfuade Man- 
 kind to part with their Religion on this 
 Score. They will be apt to imagine that 
 thefe Mifchiefs arife rather from the Want 
 of inward Religion, than the having it ; 
 and confequently, that this is a ftrongsi Ar- 
 gument for cultivating Religion, than dif- 
 carding it. 
 
 Yet be this as it will ; as to the Cafe of 
 pofitive Inftitutions I muft obferve, that they 
 do not of themfelves lead to Superftition. 
 This confifts in laying greater Strels on 
 Matters which refped Religion, or are fup- 
 pos'd to do fo, than they can bear : Whilft 
 therefore Men conlider Things as they really 
 are, no Superftition can arife. To obferve 
 pofitive Inftitutions as fuch, is to ad agree- 
 ably 
 
ipo A DEFENCE of 
 
 ably to the Nature of Things ; it gives 
 them their juft and proper Weight j and 
 confequently, is neither lliperllitious in it- 
 felf, nor hath it the leaft Tendency that 
 Way : And to obferve them as appointed 
 by God, when they have in fad been fo ap- 
 pointed, is to confider Things as they really 
 are; it afcribes to them juft fo much as 
 Things lb coniider'd, demand ; and there- 
 fore muft be highly fitting and reafonablc. 
 
 With reference to this Point, Men betray 
 their Superftition principally in thefe Three 
 Gales, VIZ, Either by confidering Things 
 which are merely Politive, as excellent in 
 themfelves, and in their own Nature Moral; 
 Or elfe, by confidering Inftitutions merely* 
 Human, as Divine ; Or, laftly, by laying 
 too great Weight on any Inftitutions, whe- 
 ther Human or Divine. And it muft be 
 confefs'd that JVIen have, at different Times, 
 err'd in each of thefe refpeds. However, 
 is this a Reafon why God ftiould give us no 
 pofitive Inftitutions at all? 
 
 Our Author, I have obferv'd, chufes the 
 Affirmative, and builds on this Principle, 
 *' that if Men are brought to believe that 
 " pofitive Inftitutions are good for any 
 " Thing, they will be apt to believe they 
 *' are good for all Things. " They will be 
 
 apt to believe this : But from whence 
 
 doth this Aptnefs, this Tendency to Super- 
 ftition arife ? From the Nature of pofi- 
 tive 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 191 
 
 tive Inftitutions ? By no means ; for pofitive 
 Inftitutions, as fuch, do not lead us to 
 think them Moral ; Human Inftitutions, as 
 Human, do not lead us to think them 
 Divine ; and, admitting that pofitive Infti- 
 tutions are good for fomething, it doth by- 
 no means follow, nor doth it feem to follow, 
 that they muft be good for all Things. 
 
 The Cafe is plain enough from our Au- 
 thor's own State of it. " If, fays he, Men 
 " arc brought to believe that pofitive Infti- 
 " tutions are good for any Thing, T'hy will 
 " be apt to believe, that they are good for 
 *' all Things/' This Error arifes purely 
 from themfelves, and the fad Corruptions 
 they give way to. They are willing to 
 compound Matters at the eafieftRate; and 
 becaufe the outward Ceremonies of Religion 
 arc more cafily gone thro', than inward and 
 Cncere Piety, they endeavour to make theie 
 Performances ferve inftead of it. A fatal 
 Error this, no doubt, and fuch as takes off 
 from all the Worth and Value of thefe Per- 
 formances themfelves. But if, in order to 
 avoid this Confequence, all pofitive Inftitu- 
 tions were difcarded, would this at all mend 
 the Matter ? Would there be lefs Impiety, 
 or lefs Superftition than there is at prefent ? 
 I believe not : By giving up thefe Out- 
 guards of Religion, we cannot long preferve 
 the inward Senfe of it ; for Natural Religion 
 never yet fubfiftcd without fomething of In-, 
 
 ftituted. 
 
ipi A DEFENCE of 
 
 ftltuted. And as to Superftition, pray how 
 is this entirely remov'd by difcarding Infti- 
 tutions ? May we not fhew as much Super- 
 ftition by an unreafonable Avoiding, as by 
 a groundiels and fond Pradice of certain 
 Things ? Is not This, to lay greater Strefs 
 on an Omiflion, than the Nature of the 
 Thing will bear ; and confequently, Is not 
 this a real Inftance of Superftition ? 
 
 One thing more I muft note on this Occa- 
 fion, viz. that Men may as really difcover 
 Superftition in the Pradice of Moral Duties, 
 as the Performance of Inftituted. For, if 
 Superftition implies the laying greater Strefs 
 on any Matters relating to Religion, than 
 they can realbnably bear, then in all thofe 
 Gales where Men over-rate any moral Per- 
 formances, and make one Duty fupply the 
 room of others, they are really fuperftitious. 
 But is this an imaginary or groundlcfs Sup- 
 pofition ? Have we not daily Inftances of 
 Perfbns, who hope to attone for their Mif- 
 carriages in one Kind by an extraordinary 
 Rigour in others ? Is not Benevolence, and 
 Good-nature itfelf fometimes made the Whole 
 
 of Religion ; To cover every other Defe£t, 
 
 and to fupply the Want of every other Vir- 
 tue ? Pray what is this, but a Superftition in 
 Morals ? What then • Muft Morality there- 
 fore be difcarded, and to avoid Supperftition, 
 muft we run ourfelves into Profanenefs ? No 
 certainly. This is an Error in the worft 
 
 Extream, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 19; 
 
 Extrcam, and will be foUow'd by Confe- 
 qucnces Ten thoufand times more dangerous 
 than the worft Kind of Superftition can lead 
 Men into. 
 
 I muft grant indeed, that Superftition is bad, 
 and we are concern'd to guard againft it as well 
 as we can. But How, after all, muft we 
 
 do this ? By reducing every Thing to 
 
 Natural Religion ? This, alas ! is an im- 
 practicable Scheme ; and, if practicable, yet 
 would not reach the Purpofe, unleis we could 
 make Men in every refped Wife •, which, if 
 we were able to do, no Difficulties would 
 ever arife from Matters Inftituted. 
 
 In fhort, there is but one way of doing 
 this to any Purpofe : Let us endeavour 
 heartily to difcover the Will of God, Whe- 
 ther by the Light of Human Reafon, or from 
 Divine Revelation. Whatever ftiall appear 
 to be the Divine Will from either Confidera- 
 tion, we muft adhere to it inviolably • 
 Whatever cannot be prov'd on this Foot, is 
 no Part of Religion. This is the general 
 Rule, to which we muft add Nothing, and 
 from which we muft diminifli Nothing. To 
 do the one is Superftition, to do the other is 
 Impiety. 
 
 O CHAP 
 
194 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Whether Natural and Reveafd Reli' 
 gton he neceffarily one and the fame ^^ 
 and if not, Wherein the proper 'Dtf" 
 tin6tion between them doth conjljl. 
 
 j] H I S Queftion naturally ariles 
 from the two laft,* and will 
 receive a Determination from 
 confidering what may realbn- 
 ably be offered on thofe former Heads. 
 If the Law, or Religion of Nature be ab- 
 folutely perfect • and if it be immutable in 
 fuch a Senfe as to be incapable either of 
 Addition or Diminution, we muft, I think, 
 conclude (as our Author does) " That Na* 
 tural and Reveard Religion are one and 
 the fame ; that they differ only as to the 
 Manner of their being communicated ; 
 [p. 3.] and that Chriftianity, tho' the 
 " Name be of a later Date, muft be as old 
 " and extenfive as human Nature/' [p* 4-] 
 But, on the other Hand, If the Law or Re- 
 ligion 
 
 i< 
 
 (( 
 
 (C 
 
 (C 
 
ReVEAL'd RELlGlOlvf, &C. IpJ 
 
 igion of Nature be not abfolutely perfcd ; 
 hor immutable in that Senfe in which our 
 Author contends it is, then we fliall be ob- 
 liged to take the other Side of the Queftion, 
 and to maintain that they differ from each 
 other, as well with regard to the Subjed 
 Matter of each, as the Way and Manner 
 of their being made known to us. 
 
 But however, tho' our Author be thus fat 
 regular in his Dedudion, whilft he infers 
 the entire Unity of Natural and Reveard 
 Religion, from the ablblute Perfeftion and 
 Immutability of the former, yet I cannot 
 fee why, upon the Whole of his Scheme, 
 he fhould be led to take any Notice of this 
 Conclufion at all. It is the great Defign of 
 his Book to prove, That there neither hath 
 been, nor can be any Revelation. If this 
 be ih, then what Occafion is there for in- 
 iifting, that Natural and Reveal'd Religion 
 muft be the fame ? What Occafion for fup- 
 pofing a Point, which, upon his Principles, 
 he muft not fuppofe ; and which it is his 
 great Purpofe to overthrow ? It muft feem 
 odd to every By-ftander, that this Gentle- 
 man ftiould concern himfelf with proving 
 fuch extraordinary Points as thefe, " That 
 " Natural and Reveal'd Religion are one 
 " and the fame ; " and, " That Chriftiani- 
 " ty is as old as the Creation," whilft his 
 real Sentiments moft apparently are. That 
 there is no fuch Thing as Reveal'd Religi- 
 
 O 2 on. 
 
\^6 yf DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 on, and that Chriftianity in particular is a 
 grofs Impofture. For, the Gentleman who 
 here maintains that Natural and Reveal'd 
 Religion are one as to Matter, in other Pla- 
 ces contends as heartily, that there is but one 
 Way, one Method of difcovering Religion, 
 viz. by the Ufe of our natural Faculties, p. 5. 
 If this be true, then we can learn Nothing 
 from Revelation at all j and if Nothing can 
 be learn'd from it, then it is to all Intents 
 and Purpofes no Revelation. 
 
 The Truth is. The Gentleman did not care 
 to fpcak out at once. He hath endeavour- 
 ed therefore to draw his Readers on gradu- 
 ally. At firft he played fall and loofe with 
 the Notion of the Law of Nature ; which 
 Point being, as he thought, fufficiently ob- 
 fcur'd, he proceeded to fhew, that this Law 
 muft be ablblutely perfecl ; if lb, it muftbe 
 immutable, incapable of Addition or Dimi- 
 nution ; and confequently, Nothing can be 
 requir'd in Time which did not equally ob- 
 lige always. From hence he infers, that 
 there caabe no Manner of Difference between 
 Natural and Reveal'd Religion : He tells us, 
 That both having the fame End, their Pre- 
 cepts muft be the fame ; and " That they 
 " muft prefcribe the fame Means, fince thofe 
 .*^ Means which at one Time promote hu- 
 " man Happinefs, equally promote it at all 
 " Times." p. 104. Beyond this he attempts 
 to prove farther, That every man knows, 
 
 or 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 197 
 
 or may eafily know all that this abfolutely 
 perfed Law of Nature contains under it ; — 
 That a Revelation therefore is entirely need- 
 lefs ;— That this Revelation cannot make 
 any Thing more clear than it was before j — 
 That, as on the one Hand, there is none Oc- 
 calion for a Revelation, fo there can be no 
 fufficient Proof that fach a Revelation hath 
 ever been made at all ; That the Pretences 
 to it have given Birth to many monftrous 
 Opinions and Pradices, to which a wife and 
 good Being could never poflibly afford Oc- 
 cafion : In fhort. That Superftition and Im- 
 morality cannot be avoided on any other 
 Foot, than by adhering entirely to Natu- 
 ral Religion, and dilcarding all Pretences 
 whatfoever to Revelation. 
 
 Had this Scheme been open*d all at once, 
 and fct forth in exprefs Words at firft, it 
 would have fhock'd almoft every Reader, 
 and have prevented thofe Impreilions, which 
 it was our Author's Defign to make. This 
 oblig'd him to fpeak fometimes with Re- 
 ferve ; fometimes to make Suppolitions con- 
 trary to the very Scheme he would incul- 
 cate ; and fometimes even to acknowledge 
 the Reality of that Revelation he would dii^ 
 prove. There is none other way than this, of 
 accounting for his Condud on certain Occa- 
 fions ; for I cannot by any Means think, 
 that he erred in this reiped cafually, or did 
 not fee that he had really acknowledged 
 O 3 or 
 
J DEFENCE of 
 
 or fuppofed what, on his Principles as ex- 
 plain'd in other Places, he was obliged nei- 
 ther to acknowledge nor fuppofe. 
 
 The latter Part of the foregoing Scheme 
 fhall be examined hereafter in its proper 
 place ; at prefent, I am concerned to fearch, 
 Whether Natural and Reveard Religion, if 
 a Revelation there be, mull be neceifarily 
 one and the fame. 
 
 The Negative, I conceive, will appear from 
 hence ; That God may, if he pleafes, ilTue 
 out Commands, which are not built on the 
 moral Reafons of Things ^ that he may give 
 lis pofitive Precepts, which Precepts cannot 
 be given us otherwife than by Revelation : 
 For Natural Religion, as our Author him- 
 felf contends, includes nothing of a pofitive 
 Nature. If therefore Precepts of this kind 
 may be given us ; and fuch cannot be given 
 by God, unlefs reveal'd ; then the Matter 
 of Revelation may be in fome refpeds dif- 
 ferent froni the Matter of Natural Religion. 
 If the one may contain Points not contained 
 under the other, it is evident beyond Dif- 
 pute, that the one may lb fa-r differ from 
 the other- or, to vary the Expreffion a little, 
 That Natural and Reveal'd Religion are not 
 neceifarily one and the fame. Thus far I 
 think it clear they may be different : Whe- 
 ther they really are fo or not, is another 
 Queftion, and to be determined by other 
 Arguments^ 
 
 Tq 
 
Revealed Religion, &c. ipp 
 
 To which Piirpole I fhall obferve, 
 
 1. That it might on feveral Accounts be 
 cxpeded, if God fhould ever vouchfafe 
 us a Revelation of his Will, it would con- 
 tain in it fonie Matters of a pofitive Nature ; 
 and confequently, fuch as are not Matters of 
 Natural Religion. And, 
 
 2. That every Revelation, whether real 
 or pretended, which hath ever been offered 
 us, hath adually and in fad contained fuch 
 Points. 
 
 As to the former, I muft obferve. That if 
 God fhould ever vouchfafe us any Revela- 
 tion of his Will, it might realbnably be pre 
 fum'd his firft Care would be to imprefs on 
 Men's Minds a deep Senfe of this fundamen- 
 tal Point, viz. of his own fupreme Domi- 
 nion and Authority over us. His Right to 
 give us any Commands at all muft be built 
 on this ; and therefore a quick Senfe of it 
 is by no Means a flight Matter, but a Point 
 of the utmoft Importance to us. But how 
 may this be done moft effedually ? By pre- 
 fcribing nothing but Matters of a purely 
 moral Nature ? This furely cannot be main- 
 tained on our Author's Principles, who af- 
 ferts in fome Places, that Matters of this 
 Kind being excellent in thcmfelves , are 
 equally obligatory, whether God ftiall com- 
 mand them or no. " If this be true, and 
 Men are really obliged to certain Adions 
 from the Nature of Things, without con- 
 
 O 4 fidcring 
 
100 ^DEFENCE of 
 
 fidering them as the Will of God, I cannot 
 for my Life fee how the Performance of 
 them is any Expreffion of our Obedience 
 to him. How do we exprefs any Regard to 
 his Authority, or acknowledge his Dominion 
 at all, whilft in every Article we perform 
 nothing, which we were not equally con- 
 cerned to perform, and which we would not 
 equally have perform'd, tho' God Ihould 
 be fuppofed entirely unconcerned about it? 
 
 The Cafe indeed is fomewhat different upon 
 my Principles. I have endeavoured to de- 
 duce all moral Obligation firom the Will of 
 God. On this Foot virtuous Performances 
 will be Ads'of Obedience to him ; and con- 
 fequently, Acknowledgments of his Authori- 
 ty. But then, as our Obligation, ftridly 
 fpeaking, mull be built on the Will of God, 
 fo a Senfeof his Authority muft be imprelTed 
 on us in the firft Place ; otherwife we flrall 
 perform A6l:s of moral Virtue upon Principles 
 which will not make them Inftances of Obe- 
 dience ; we fhall perform them merely, be- 
 caufe we like to do foj and if we lik'd to 
 do the contrary, we might as eafily be led 
 to do it. Now, as in Commands purely po- 
 fitive, we have none other Reafon to deter- 
 mine us, but the Will of the wife Prefcriber, 
 {o by our Obedience we do the moft fully 
 exprefs our Senfe of his Authority. To give 
 Men fuch Commands therefore, is a proper 
 Tryal or Exercife of their Obedience ; it 
 
 ferves 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. loi 
 
 ferves to imprefs on them, and to cultivate 
 in them a Senfe of God's fupreme Authority: 
 And confequently, as fomething of this Kind 
 is expedient in order to lay the Foundation 
 of our Obedience moreiirmly, io it might be 
 prefumed, if God fhould ever vouchfafe us 
 a Revelation of his Will, fome Precepts of 
 this Nature would be given us. 
 
 It will be vain to alledge, That this is to 
 command for commanding Sake, and to de- 
 prive Men of their Liberty without any View, 
 End or Reafon whatfoever. This is fre- 
 quently affirmed by our Author ; but with 
 how little Juftice, we fhall fee immediately. 
 Thus much indeed muft be own'd (and I 
 have noted it heretofore) that as the Mat- 
 ter of fuch pofitive Commands muft be in its 
 own Nature indifferent, fo there can be no 
 fuch Realbn for the particular Command, 
 which Ihall make it abfolutely neceffary to 
 be given ; yet ftill, there may be a general 
 Reafon why fomething of this Kind Ihould 
 be injoined. And for this it would be fuf- 
 iicient to alledge, had we nothing elfe to 
 offer, That whilft it exercifes our Obedience, 
 it cultivates in our Minds a Senfe of the 
 Divine Authority. This furely is an End 
 not unworthy of Regard. For tho' the 
 Aft prefcribed be in itfelf indifferent, yet 
 the Obedience fhewn by performing it is 
 moral, and the End promoted by the Exer- 
 cife of this Obedience excellent. It habitu- 
 ates 
 
joz A DEFENCE of 
 
 ates us toaSenfc of our abfolute Dependance 
 on the fupreme Being \ and confequently, 
 hath a general Influence on the Pradice of 
 all our religious Duties. 
 
 A fecond Reafon why we might realbn- 
 ably expect, ifGodfhould grant us Reve- 
 lation, it would contain fome Matters of a 
 pofitive Kind, fhall be This ; Precepts of 
 this Nature may ferve to promote the Uni- 
 formity and better Order of outward Religi- 
 on. What I defign in this Place, hath a prin- 
 cipal Regard to religious Worlhip; which, 
 however plain and certain a Duty it may be 
 in general, yet the particular Manner of per- 
 forming it, cannot be fo eafily determined, if 
 at all. 
 
 I am not here concerned about the ieve- 
 lal inward Ads of Devotion. Thefe may be 
 difcovered by human Reafon in -the fame 
 Way that the Necefiity of Devotion in ge- 
 neral is difcovered. The Point at prefent is 
 of a diiFerent Nature. It relates to the out- 
 ward F'orms and Rites of W^orihip. To de- 
 termine thefe is furely a Matter of fome Con- 
 fequence : And tho' it fhould be fuppofed, 
 that there are various Ways in which they 
 may be determined with equal Advantage ; 
 and confequently, that it is in itfelf indiffe- 
 rent which W^ay they be determined ; yet it 
 is by no means indifferent whether they be 
 at all determined any v/ay. 
 
 It 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. loj 
 
 It hath been obferved under the former 
 Chapter, that publick Worihip cannot be 
 performed without fome Rites and Ceremo- 
 nies : To which I fhall add here, that Or- 
 der and Decency mull require likcwife, that 
 the fame Ceremonies fhould be obferv'd by- 
 all ; at leaft, where feveral Perfons are at the 
 fame Time, and jointly concerned in the 
 fame Kind of Worihip. This is ib very ap- 
 parent, that I fhall not give myfelf the 
 Trouble of a Proof : For to affert the con- 
 trary, is to maintain, either that Uniformity 
 doth not contribute to Order, or that Order 
 is of no Confequence in the publick Wor- 
 ihip of God. He who can difpute either 
 of thefe Points is not to be argued with. 
 Now if this be allowed, then there ought 
 to be fome Rule, which all who join them- 
 felves in publick Worihip are concerned to 
 follow ♦ and how fuch a Rule may be fuf- 
 iiciently eftablilhed, is the Queftion. 
 
 Our Author perhaps will tell us, That 
 the Fitnefs of the Thing is the Rule ; and 
 farther, that this Rule is enforced on us by 
 our common Reaibn. Very well : But then 
 it defervcs to be confidered at the fame time, 
 that there may be feveral Rites equally 
 fuitable to the Worfhip we are to perform. 
 If this fhall prove the Cafe, the Fitnefs of 
 the Thing can be no Rule at all j for where 
 feveral Things are equally fit, there it is 
 impoffible to make a Choice from the mere 
 
 Con- 
 
204 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 Confideration of Fitnefs; and coniequently, 
 we muft have Recourfe to fomething elfe in 
 order to fix and determine us. 
 
 If our Author ihall reply. That in Cafes 
 where it is entirely indifferent what Men 
 chufe, each Man hath a Right to determine 
 for himfelf ; This might be faid with fome 
 Shew, were tlie Thing of private Concern. 
 But as we are now fpeaking, not concerning 
 the Rites of private Worfhip, but of pub- 
 lick, fb I conceive the Cafe is widely dif- 
 ferent : For, in this Cafe Uniformity re- 
 quires that the Rites ufed by different Per- 
 fons fhould be the fame : But can Unifor- 
 mity be maintained on this Foot ? Or rather, 
 were every Thing left to private Choice, 
 would there not be almoft as many different 
 Rites as there are different Men ? 
 
 Or, if to guard againft this Inconvenience 
 it be affirm'd, that fuch Matters ought to be 
 determined by our Superiors ^ I muft fo far 
 agree as to allow, that this may properly be 
 done, where nothing of this Kind is deter- 
 mined by any higher Power. But then it 
 fhould be remembred, that if Determina- 
 tions may be made, and Things of this Na- 
 ture may be prefcribed to us by our Supe- 
 riors, furely God hath an equal Right to do 
 the lame ; And if it be upon feveral Ac- 
 counts fit and proper that fuch Matters fhould 
 be determined, I cannot lee why God may 
 not as reafonably determine them as Man ; 
 
 efpe- 
 
Revealed Religion, &c, loy 
 
 eipecially fince the Divine Authority is much 
 more indifputable, and fuch, as muft (if 
 Men are thoroughly perfuaded of its being 
 Divine) have an infinitely greater Weight 
 with them. 
 
 I am aware it will be alledged (for it hath 
 feveral Times been fuggefted to us by this 
 very Writer) That eternal Difputes may 
 arife about Pofitive Injunctions j — That al- 
 moft all the Qiiarrels which have ever been 
 about religious Matters have arifen from 
 hence ; — That thefe have given Birth to 
 Perfecution and Cruelty, and to almoft every 
 Calamity which can happen. From whence 
 our Author would have it concluded, that 
 every Thing of this kind fhould be thrown 
 entirely out of Religion ; and that the fu- 
 preme Being cannot interpofe in an Affair, 
 where his very Interpofition muft prejudice 
 the Ends of Religion itfelf As I have not 
 taken Notice of this Objedion any where 
 elfe, I ftiall defire Leave to offer fome Re- 
 marks on it here. 
 
 It is afferted in the Objedion, that al- 
 moft all the Quarrels which have ever hap- 
 pened about religious Matters, have related 
 to things purely Pofitive, and arifen from 
 the Determinations given concerning them. 
 But then I muft defire to know, how, and 
 by what Means have they arifen ? From 
 their being really made and given us by 
 God ? This ought to be intended in the 
 
 Ob- 
 
io6 J D E F E N C E 0/ 
 
 Objedlon ; For if any thing elfe be meant 
 by it, the Divine Interpofition in Matters 
 of this Nature is not afFeded in the leaft. 
 But this is fo far from being true, that fuch 
 Quarrels have ever arifen from God's Deter- 
 minations, that had Matters been fo deter- 
 mined, and acknowledged on all hands to 
 have been fo, no Quarrels could probably 
 have arifen about them. For, however Men 
 may frequently negle£t things which they 
 acknowledge to be their Duty, it is fcarce 
 ever feen that they directly and obftinately 
 oppofe them. It feems rather that the Con- 
 lequences above-mention'd are owing to the 
 Want of a divine Determination. For if That 
 would probably have compofed Matters, the 
 Calamities infilled on are not the Effeds of 
 Divine Determination, but Human. 
 
 The Truth of the Cafe is plainly this : In 
 order to enforce politive Injundions more 
 ftrongly on the World, Thofe who had not 
 Credit or Power enough of their own to in- 
 fluence Mankind, have pretended to a Divine 
 Authority, which they really wanted. Such 
 Pretences, we may eafily imagine, would 
 fometimes be oppofed with Vigour ; and 
 by how much the more they were oppofed 
 on the one hand, by fo much the more eager- 
 ly would they be contended for by the op- 
 poftte Party. Hence 'tis that fuch Qiiarrels 
 have arifen. Thofe who had no fufficient 
 Authority of their own, were refolved to 
 
 carry 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 207 
 
 carry their Point by bringing God into the 
 Queftion. The Confequence of this is plain 
 enough. Nothing could be expefted to 
 arife, but bitter Animofity, Perfecution, 
 Cruelty, with every thing elfe which might 
 ferve to fupport a weak and unjuftifiable 
 Caufe. But muft this be charged to the Ac- 
 count of Divine Pofitive Injundions ? Is it 
 not owing entirely to the Wickednefs of Men, 
 who have many times profan'd God's Name, 
 by making him the Author of fuch things as 
 have been the Effeds of their own Folly ? 
 The Objedion then amounts to this, and 
 this only ; God cannot give us any Pofitive- 
 Precepts, however ferviceable the giving 
 
 them may prove to us, becaufe wicked 
 
 Men have fometimes pretended his Authori- 
 ty, have prefcrib'd the moft trifling and 
 
 ridiculous Things, — and enforc'd them on 
 the World by all the Methods of Cruelty and 
 Terror : Or, if you pleafe. There can be 
 no good Coin, nor any Authority any where 
 
 lodg'd of making it current, becaufe, this 
 
 may fometimes be counterfeited, and the 
 Publick fuffer by the Artifice of Impoftors. 
 
 But to return to the dired Proof of the 
 Point before me. I have obferved, that the 
 Decency and Order of religious Worlhip 
 feem to require fome Pofitive Inftitutions : 
 
 • That if nothing of this kind be pre- 
 
 fcribed by God, it muft be done, either by 
 
 each Mandiftinctly by himfelf ; or elfe, by 
 
 3 our 
 
ao8 y^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 our lawful Superiors. I have obferved far- 
 ther, that if Matters of this kind were entire- 
 ly referr'd to each Man's private Difcretion, 
 there would probably be almoft as many 
 different Rites as there are different Men : 
 The Confequence niuft be, not only the De- 
 ftrudion of Decency and Order, but likewife 
 of publick and joint Worfhip itfelf ; For, 
 Men cannot be faid to perform thofe Offices 
 jointly, in which they are found almoft en- 
 tirely to differ from each other. Nor can 
 this be done fo advantageoufly by our Supe- 
 liors ; not only, becaufe their Authority, in 
 Matters of this kind, will be fometimes 
 queftion'd, and confequently be fb far in- 
 effectual, but likewife, becaufe the 
 
 Exercife of fuch a Power muft be liable to 
 all thofe Errors, to which Human Nature 
 itfelf is fubjed. I think we may fairly con- 
 clude from hence, that in Matters which 
 have lb immediate a Regard to God himfelf. 
 He would interpole, and give Men fome Di- 
 redions, if He Ihould ever interpofe in an 
 
 extraordinary Way at all ; That He would 
 
 fettle certain Matters at leaft in the Ceremo- 
 nial of his own Worfhip ^ and afford his 
 Creatures the Satisfaction of thinking, that 
 whilft they addrefs themfelves to him, they 
 do it in that way, which is upon all Ac- 
 counts the beft, becaufe prefcribed by that 
 very Being they worlhip. 
 
 3. To 
 
ReVeal'd Religion, &c. 209 
 
 3. To what hath been already offer'd I 
 ihall add a Third Argument , viz. We 
 might reafonably exped fome Pofitive Inftitu- 
 tions, if God fhould ever reveal himfelf at 
 alJ, ior the better Promotion of inward and 
 fincere Piety. 1 do fuppofe here, that in- 
 ward and fincere Piety is the Thing which 
 renders Men acceptable to God ; and propor- 
 tionably as they make greater Advances and 
 Improvements this Way, fo fhall they ob- 
 tain greater Degrees of Favour. This, doubt- 
 lefs, muft be the main Point aim'd at by a 
 Wife and Good Being, whenever He makes 
 any extraordinary Manifeftations of himfelf. 
 A Revelation therefore cannot be defigned 
 merely to lay greater Burthens upon us ; It 
 muft be intended to give us a more exad, 
 pcrfed, and diftind View of what is fit and 
 
 proper to be done ; To enforce the Rule 
 
 more ftrongly • To recommend it more 
 
 powerfully^ and to put us in a better way, 
 not only of ading, but likewile of cultivat- 
 ing thofe Habits and Difpofitions, which are 
 of a moral or religious Nature. 
 
 Now there are Two Ways efpecially in 
 which Pofitive Inftitutions may be, in this 
 refpect, ferviceable. 
 
 1. By guarding us againft fuch Tempta- 
 tions as we may not be able to conquer 
 eaflly. And, 
 
 2. By fuggefting to our Minds fuch Sen- 
 timents as are of a moral or religious Nature. 
 
 P If 
 
210 Ji DEFENCE of 
 
 If there are certain Things which have 
 been generally abufed, and human Frailty is 
 fuch, that it cannot well be expeded but 
 they will be abuled , an Injundion that Men 
 fhould abftain entirely from thefe things is 
 by no means improper. And yet, if the 
 Abufe be not ablolutely unavoidable, the 
 Injunction will not be abfolutely neceffary ; 
 and confequently, if any thing of this kind 
 fiiould ever be given us, it muftbe Pofitive; 
 there being nothing in the nature of Things 
 which can make an Abftinence of this kind 
 univerfaily incumbent on us. In Matters of 
 a Civil Nature we exped fuch Diredions 
 from a Wife and Good Governour. Why 
 therefore might not the like be hoped for 
 from the All- wife Governour of the World, 
 Ihould the Circumftances of Things make 
 them lit and proper to be given ? This Re- 
 mark will fufficicntly juftify feveral Inftitu- 
 tions in the Law of Mofis ; which being de- 
 livered to a particular People, and intended 
 to guard them againft fuch Errors as they 
 were more efpecially expos'd to, are of fuch 
 a Nature as might rcafonably be expeded, 
 Ihould God ever reveal to them any Laws 
 at all. 
 
 But the main Thing I would chufe to ob- 
 ferve here, is, the Ufefulnefs of certain Infti- 
 tutions, as they are capable of fuggefting to 
 our Minds fuch Sentiments as are of a moral 
 or religious Nature. Such Helps as thefe 
 3 would 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. hi 
 
 would indeed be needlefs, if Men were per- 
 fect either as to their intelledual or moral 
 Capacities ; if they were patient to attend, 
 and quick to difccrn the Fitnefs and Reafon 
 of Things • if they were always mindful of 
 what they once knew • if they were difpos'd 
 of themfelves to difcharge their Duty when 
 known - and, laftly, if no foreign Temp- 
 tations were apt to draw them off from theii* 
 good Purpofes. But this is far from being the 
 prefent State and Condition of Human Na- 
 ture. Men are unapt to think and confider 
 fufficicntly j They are heedlefs, forgetful j 
 expofed to numbcrlefs Temptations ; and, 
 which is worfe, they are exceeding liable to 
 be feduced by them. In this View of things 
 we need not only a Syftem of moral Pre- 
 cepts to dired us, but like wife a Scheme of 
 moral Difcipline, by which thefe Precepts 
 may be rendered more effedual. This we 
 cannot fo well fix and fettle for ourfelves. 
 Every one cannot fo cafily difcern the remote 
 Influence of certain Things on their Virtue ; 
 or, if they could, yet they would not think 
 themfelves concerned to pradife Matters 
 which are not direct Inftances of Virtue. Be- 
 fides, that many Things receive a Ufefulnels 
 this way from the mere Will of the Inftitu- 
 tor. Something of this Kind is apparent even 
 in civil Matters* The Seal is a Token of 
 Confirmation, which receives its Signification 
 not from any thing in its own Nature, but 
 
 P 2 only 
 
Ill A DEFENCE of 
 
 only the Appointment of Laws. So like-* 
 wife certain Things may be prefcribed by 
 the Supreme Being, as Hints and Intimations 
 of our Duty *, which being fo prefcribed, Ihall 
 obtain a Signification, and, in their Ufe, fug- 
 geft thofe Refledions which are of the higheft 
 moral Importance. 
 
 Shall any one then affirm, that Matters of 
 this Nature are utterly unworthy of God ; 
 
 that becaufe they may not be in them- 
 
 felves excellent, they muft therefore be en- 
 tirely ufelefs • that as fuch, they muft be 
 
 excluded out of Religion ^ and tiiat God 
 himfelf cannot impofe them ? This Conclu- 
 fion is fo abfolutely wrong, and judg'd to 
 be fo by, all Mankind, that no Religion hath 
 ever yet fubfifted, whether really or pre- 
 tendedly reveal'd, which hath not contain'd 
 in it Ibmething of this Nature. 
 
 The firft, and indeed the only reveaPd 
 Precept which Mofes reprefents as given to 
 our firft Parents, in the very State of Inno- 
 cence, was..of a Pofitive Kind • from the 
 V'iolation of which, Sin entered into the 
 World, and Death by Sin. And in thofc 
 Maniteftations which are laid to have been 
 afterwards made to the Patriarchs, we find the 
 fame. Noah and Abraham are Inftances of 
 this, too well known to be dilputed. As to 
 the Law delivered tc the 'Jews^ the Matter is 
 fo very plain, that one Objedion which our 
 Author hath fuggefted to the Difad vantage 
 3 of 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 213 
 
 of that Law is built on this very Confidera- 
 tion : And in Reference to Chriftianity, I 
 need not prove, what every Chriftian who 
 knows his Reh'gion at all, acknowledges. 
 This Gentleman may, if he pleafes, difpiue 
 whether any Thing of this Kind ought ori- 
 ginally to have been prelcribed by our Reli- 
 gion ; but, whether it actually hath been lb 
 or not, cannot fure be queftion*d. Amongft 
 the feveral Religions of the ancient Gentlksy 
 doth it appear that there was ever any One 
 of them, which did not prefcribe fome Mat- 
 ters Pofitive, if thofe Matters may be allow- 
 ed to be Pofitive, which are not founded 
 on the moral Reafbns of Things ? In Truth, 
 they carried Matters of this Kind into Ex- 
 tremes ; and whilft they pretended to fup- 
 port Religion, they injur'd it : For, they 
 not only over-burthen'd true Piety by too 
 numerous Ceremonies, but frequently pre- 
 fcrib'd fuch as were really inconfiftent with 
 it. Yet in thefe Things the greateft Part of 
 the Religion they taught confifted. They 
 imagined that fcarce any Thing elfe was 
 pleafing to God : And in this they agreed 
 entirely in the general, however they might 
 differ from each other as to the particular 
 Ceremonies they pradifed. To come down 
 lower; Do we not fee the fame in the Reli- 
 gion of Mahomet ? And do not all the Accounts 
 given us, concerning the feveral Religions 
 profds'd amongft the Heathens to this Day 
 
 P ^ conJ 
 
214 A DEFENCE of 
 
 confirm it likewife ? This is fo well known, 
 that as I would not trouble the Reader with 
 needlefs Proofs, fo I prefume our Author, 
 who complains fo much of the Superflition 
 of Mankind, will not exped it. How much 
 foever we may differ from each other in our 
 Sentiments on other Points, yet I flatter my 
 felf we ftiall eafily agree in this Point of 
 Fad. 
 
 But if this once be admitted, then I muft 
 demand of this Gentleman, whether any One 
 of all thefe feveral Religions did really pro- 
 ceed from God in the Way of Revelation ? 
 If he fhall anfwer me in the Affirmative, then 
 the Point I have been hitherto contending 
 for, is allowed me • and certain Things may 
 be, and adually are Matters of Reveal'd 
 Religion, which do not belong to Natural. 
 But, if on the other hand, he fhall anfvvcr in 
 the Negative (as the main Defign of his 
 Book manifeftly ihews he muft) then I may 
 draw an Argument from the Concurrence 
 of Mankind in this one general Point, not- 
 withftanding their wide Difference from each 
 other in Particulars ; and fet the united Opi- 
 nion of the World in all Ages of it, againft 
 the particular Opinion of this fingle Gentle-^ 
 man. Be it (as this Gentleman is difpofed 
 to think) that thofe who have profeffed any 
 of thefe feveral Religions, have either for- 
 ged them, or given too eafy Credit to For- 
 geries j yet ftill their Opinion, that Pofitive 
 
 PrC". 
 
Reveal'd Religion, c^^. 215 
 
 Precepts might proceed from God, is clear 
 and manifeft. Had they thought othervvife, 
 or had this Point been lb plainly demon- 
 itrable in the Negative, as our Author 
 would have us believe, would every one of 
 thofe who pretended to teach a Religion as 
 from God, have run into this Blunder ? 
 Would he have impofed Things on the 
 World as the Will of God, of which he was 
 not only confcious that they had no, fuch 
 Foundation, but which he knew God could 
 not pollibly be the Author of; nay, which 
 were fo plainly contrary to his Will, that he 
 could not exped but the Forgery muft be- 
 tray it felf ? Wife and crafty Men do not 
 ad in this Manner : And therefore we muft 
 conclude, that the mixing fome Pofitive 
 Precepts with other Matters in Religion, 
 was what all the W^orld prefum'd would be 
 the Cafe, fhould God ever reveal himfelf at 
 all : Otherwife fuch Impoftors would not 
 have run the Rifque ; or if they had, they 
 could not always have fucceeded ; Some Re- 
 ligion or other would have fubfifted without 
 any Inftitutions, at leaft without fuch as 
 were pretended to have come from God. 
 
 Thus I have, in this Place, carried the 
 Point with regard to pofitive Precepts fome- 
 what farther than I did in the hil Chapter. 
 All that I contended for under that Head, 
 was. That fuch Precepts might be given us, 
 and that our Author's Objedions to the con- 
 P 4 trary 
 
i\6 A DEFENCE of 
 
 trary were inconclufive. Here I have not 
 only infifted that fiich Precepts may be given 
 us, but endeavoured to fbevv likewife, that 
 Ibme fuch might reafonably be expelled, if 
 God fhould ever reveal himfelf at all ; and 
 this I have fupported from the Reafon of the 
 Thing, and the concurrent Senfe of Man- 
 kind in all Ages of the World. If this Ar- 
 guing be juft, then it follows clearly, That 
 Natural and Reveal'd Religion are Not necef- 
 farily one and the fame, but that certain 
 Points may, and probably would become 
 Matter of the one, which do not at all be- 
 long to the other. 
 
 But what then, it will be perhaps be faid; 
 Is this the whole in which Reveal'd Religion 
 differs from Natural ? Is it worthy the ex- 
 traordinary Interpofition of an all-wife Being 
 to prefcribe thofe Things, which by being 
 indifferent, might as well have been let alone ? 
 Is this all the Perfedion which Reveal'd Re- 
 ligion hath above Natural, That it makes 
 fome Things ncceflary to be done or avoided 
 by us, which have no Excellency in them^ 
 felvcs, and therefore cannot contribute to the 
 Excellency of Religion ? At this Rate Men 
 might as well have been left to themfclves. 
 
 In Reply to which, I muft obferve, That 
 Pofitive Inftitutions, confidered either as 
 Marks of God's Authority, and of our De- 
 
 pendance on him ; or, as Determinations 
 
 pf Ibmething proper to be determined in the 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 217 
 
 Exercife of our outward Piety ; or, as 
 
 Means whereby inward Religion is cultivated 
 and improved, are not Matters of fuch flight 
 Importance as the Objedion fuppofes ; and 
 therefore, upon Suppofition that the feveral 
 Particulais of inward Religion were fo clear 
 and indifputable^ as to need no farther Ma- 
 nifeftation, yet ftill thefe Aids and Afliftances 
 for the more orderly and better Pradice of 
 it would not be Matters unworthy of the 
 Divine Care. The Things prefcrib'd, the* 
 allowed to be indifferent in fuch a Senfe, 
 that they were not originally neceffary, nor 
 Matters of natural Duty, yet might not, (as 
 the Objection affirms,) be as well let alone, 
 if there are any real Ufes of them, or Advan- 
 tages to be obtained by them : And Things 
 which have no Excellency in themfelves, and 
 therefore are not excellent in an abjohite 
 Senfe, may yet have a relative Excellency ; 
 and when confidered in this View, may 
 contribute to the Excellency of that Scheme, 
 the Defign of which is not only to teach us 
 the bcft Precepts, but to accommodate them 
 to the prefent Condition of Man. Upon this 
 State of the Matter it will appear, that Po- 
 fitive Precepts may very fitly be given us 
 by God ; and that it is not, and cannot be 
 quite as well for us to be left entirely to 
 ourfelves. 
 
 However, I muft defire not to be mii- 
 iindcrftood here. I do by no Means affirm, 
 
 that 
 
2i8 A DEFENCE of 
 
 that This is the Whole in which Natural 
 and Reveal'd Religion diflfer from each 
 other. There are other Articles of much 
 higher Importance, to which we are con- 
 cerned to attend carefully, in order to have 
 a full View of this Matter. 
 
 It Ihould be remembred then, that human 
 Reafbn, even in its beft State, is imperfe6l : 
 And tho' it muft be allowed, that nothing 
 can be, ftriclly fpeaking, a natural Duty, 
 which is not difcoverable by natural Reafon, 
 yet there may be feveral other Matters of 
 Confequence to be known ; Things which 
 would contribute highly to our Perfedion, 
 and confequently, to our Happinels. Now, 
 if a Revelation, I mean, a Revelation of a 
 Rule of Life, Ihould be given us, it would 
 furely include fome Matters either not know- 
 able at all on any other Suppofition, or at 
 leaft not knowable in the lame Degrees of 
 Clearnefs and Perfedion : And if thefe 
 ftiould become Parts of it, then there will 
 be a main Difference between them as to the 
 Subjed of each, over and above the particu- 
 lar Ways of conveying this Knowledge. 
 
 Thus, if there be any References or Re- 
 lations, of the Supreme Being to us, befides 
 thofe which our Reafon teaches from the 
 Certainty of Creation and Providence, it may 
 be of Importance to us to know thefe Re- 
 lations : A Fitnefs of certain Actions may 
 refult liom them j and the Knowledge of 
 . . fuch 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ C^c. 219 
 
 fuch Relations may {hew them to be God's 
 Will, and bind them on us as Duties. Or, 
 if our Reafon fhould be fo weak as not to 
 make out exactly the feveral Dependencies 
 of one Thing upon another, and to trace 
 out the Fitnefs of Things in a long Courfe 
 of Reafoning (which is the Cafe, 1 will not 
 fay barely of the Generality in many Things, 
 but of All in fome) a Divine Revelation may 
 
 remedy thefc Imperfe6lions ; may either 
 
 Ihew, how thefe Deductions may be made, 
 mark out the feveral Steps, and fettle Mat- 
 ters on their proper Principles ; or elfe, 
 
 (which is to us the fame) may enforce on us 
 the Concluiion as the Will of God, without 
 pointing out the Reafon of the Thing at all. 
 Is not this then delirable ? And would not 
 a ferious Perfon, who thinks himfelf con- 
 cerned to act what is fie and proper, wilh, 
 that where his own natural Difcernment fails 
 him, he might be inform'd fome other Way ? 
 If this be the Cafe, then fomething of this 
 Kind might be hoped for, if God Ihould 
 ever vouchfafe us a Revelation ; and this is 
 fo entirely agreeable to his Attributes, that 
 I cannot fee how any one, who hath a due 
 Senfe of them, can difpute it. Here then are 
 two Particulars more, in which ReveaFd Re- 
 ligion might differ from Natural, and pro- 
 bably would do fo, v'fz. As to Principles 
 or Doctrines not difcoverable by natural 
 Light j and likewife as to Precepts, which 
 
 tho' 
 
220 yf DEFENCE o/ 
 
 tho' founded in the Reafon of Things, 
 yet are not knowable in the Ufe of our Rea- 
 ibn. 
 
 Or, if thefe Matters arc, or may be known 
 by us in fome Meafure, whilft we ufe the 
 Faculties given us ; yet poflibly the Know- 
 ledge, in this Way attainable, may be diffi- 
 cult to be gain'd ; may be fhort and imper- 
 fed ; may be in feveral Refpeds indiftinct. 
 In fuch a Cafe Revelation may make Mat- 
 ters eafy y may fave us the Pains of hard 
 Study, and long Deduction ; may clear up 
 Things farther than our natural Reafon 
 may be able to do ; in fhort , may fet 
 them in a fuller View, and a ftronger Light. 
 Let this then be the Cafe ; Will not Reveal'd 
 Religion differ from Natural, fome what more 
 than barely the Manner of making Things 
 known to us ? Will it not likewife differ 
 in the Degree and Perfection of that Know- 
 ledge which is acquired ? Admitting that the 
 heavenly Bodies may be viewed by the na- 
 ked Eye, yet will the Ufe of Telefcopcs 
 difcover nothing farther ? And fliall any one 
 affert, that becaufe thefe Bodies may be dif- 
 cerned, in fome Sort, both Ways, therefore 
 the Difcoveries made in each differ none 
 otherwife than as to the particular Mechods 
 of making them ? This Inftance is exadly 
 fimilar to the former ; and therefore, the 
 fame Judgment muft be paffed on both. 
 
 Tq 
 
Revealed Religion, &c, 221 
 
 To go on ; Tho* it might, from confider- 
 ing the Nature of Things, be known, that a 
 certain Courfe of Life is fit and proper, and 
 upon that account the Will of God, yet ftill 
 there is fomething farther neceflary in order 
 to influence our Adions. As there are 
 Temptations to be combated, and many 
 Difficulties in a virtuous Courle to be over- 
 come, fo it is neceffary that there Ihould 
 be fomething more to move us than the 
 mere Reafon of the Thing, or Beauty of 
 Virtue, For, let us fuppofe, that chefeCon- 
 fiderations are fufficient to determine a rea- 
 fonable Being, yet what if. Men are not dif- 
 pos'd to attend to Reafon ; what if we 
 fubfift in a corrupted State, and under a 
 wrong Biafs ? Then Ibmething elfe may 
 be needful to keep them within proper 
 Bounds. 
 
 It muft be confelTed indeed, that Natural 
 Reafon may give us fome Relief here. 
 What God wills, mufl be approved and re- 
 warded by him ; and that which is incon- 
 fift'^nt with his Will, muft be condemn'd 
 and puniftied in the Doer. This is certain 
 in the general ; and every Man is capable of 
 getting fome Light into it. But yet, as 'tis 
 necelfary, in order to difcern this Matter 
 fully, that Men Ihould be able to think 
 clofely, and to purfue an Argument thro' a 
 long Chain of Reafoning; fo the Generality 
 of Mankind cannot carry it fo fir, as it may 
 
 per- 
 
211 A DEFENCE of 
 
 perhaps, in the Nature of Timgs, be car* 
 ry'd. Or, if they fliould be able to do this, 
 yet the whole Amount of their Difcoveries 
 will be, that fomething Good or 111 fhall 
 await us, as the Reward or Punifhment of 
 our Behaviour : But What, or When, or 
 Where; Thefe are Matters which hu- 
 man Reafon cannot at all reach to. A Re- 
 velation therefore, in this Cafe, may difco- 
 ver fomething more than Natural Religion 
 teaches ; and confequently, upon this View 
 of the Matter, may be more full and exten- 
 live than mere Natural Religion is, or can 
 be. 
 
 I might obferve farther, That as Natural 
 Religion prefcribes to us certain Duties ; 
 and may give us fome AlTurance of Accept- 
 ance with God upon the Performance of thefe 
 Duties ; fo, if we violate them, it muft leave 
 us under That Sentence, which our Sins 
 deferve. For we neither do, nor can pof- 
 libly know for certain, in the mere Ufe of 
 our Reafon, how far God will remit thofe 
 Punifhments we have incurr'd. But yet, 
 Go4 may make known to us his intended 
 Proceedings in this Cafe by Revelation ; 
 which, if he fhould do, another Article of 
 Difference will arife, and that of the utmoft 
 Confequence, to have fome AlTurance in : 
 For certainly nothing can be more defire- 
 able than to have fome Light into an Affair, 
 in which we are concernM fo deeply, and by 
 
 which 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 22 j 
 
 which our Condiid in our future Courfe will 
 be fb greatly influenced. In thele, as well 
 as fome other Particulars, which have been 
 fuggefted heretofore, Reveard Religion 
 may differ from Natural ; and in thefe it 
 might be expeded it would differ, if God 
 Ihould ever grant us a Revelation. We 
 may conclude therefore, that they are fo far 
 from being necefTarily One and the Same, as 
 This Gentleman contends, that the contrary- 
 is true ; a very important Difference in the 
 Matter of each being in feveral rclpeds fit 
 and proper. 
 
 But, when I alTert a Difference between 
 thefe two Laws, both which muftbe the Will 
 of the fame infinitely Wife and Gracious Go- 
 vernor, I do not mean by it a Difference of 
 Oppo/jtioUy or, that the one fhall really con- 
 tradid and deflroy the other. This muft 
 not be affirm'd by any means. What is, in 
 its Nature, fit and proper, muff be agree- 
 able to the Will of God: What is, in its 
 Nature, unfit and improper, muft be dif^ 
 agreeable thereto : And thefe, as far as they 
 are difcoverable by us in the \J^q of Reafon, 
 and confider'd as the Divine Command, 
 conllitute the Law, or Religion of Nature. 
 This Law, (as I have allowed heretofore) is 
 immutable, in fuch a Senfe, that all Circum* 
 ftances continuing the fame, the Fitnefs the 
 fame, and the Knowledge of that Fitnefs 
 the fame like wife, it muft perpetually oblige. 
 
 It 
 
214 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 It is very true therefore, as our Author 
 hath maintain'd, " that Reveal'd ReHgion 
 " cannot command what Natural Religion 
 " forbids; nor, on the other hand, can it 
 " forbid what that commands." p. 6j. From 
 hence it follows, that their Precepts muft 
 be entirely confident with each other; and 
 tho' in fome refpeds different, yet in none 
 contrary, 
 
 I do maintain likewile, that the feveral 
 Precepts of Natural Religion, muft be either 
 fuppos'd or exprefsM in Reveal'd; and con- 
 fequently, will thus far become Parts of it, 
 and be confirmed by it. So far as this They 
 are One and the fame : One, as a Part is 
 One with the Whole, which includes that 
 Part in it ; and different, as a Whole is dif- 
 ferent from a fingle Part, to which, by the 
 Superaddition of other Parts, it becomes a 
 Whole. 
 
 But fuch a Difference as this, our Author 
 . tells us, will amount to an Oppofition : and 
 his Argument is this ; That the Law of Na- 
 ture being of a certain Extent, w^hatfoever 
 is not contained under it, either as com- 
 manded or forbidden, muft be indifferent ; 
 and confequently, what God, by this Law, 
 leaves us at Liberty about. If therefore 
 any thing fhall afterwards be required or 
 forbidden by Revelation, which was not lb 
 determined by the Law of Nature, this will 
 be a reftraining our Liberty, and a Contra- 
 
 didion 
 
Reveal'd Religion, ^c. 225 
 
 Qiftion to that Part of thfe Law of Nature 
 which before allow'd it. See our Author's 
 own Words : " To fuppofe that God, by 
 " the Law of Nature, leaves Men at Li- 
 " berty in all indifferent Things ^ and yet^ 
 " by a pofitive Law, reftrains this Liberty 
 " in certain Parts and Ages of the World, 
 " is to fuppofe God determines one Way by 
 ** immediate, and another Way by mediate 
 " Revelation ; both Laws too fubfifting at 
 " the fame Time." p. 134. 
 
 This is an Argument fo much out of the 
 Way, and of fo little Force, that I am 
 really furpriz'd it Ihould proceed from our 
 Author, who is capable of faying Things 
 which have a much better Shew of Reafon- 
 ing. It will not be expeded that I Ihould 
 fcrioufly reply to fuch Arguing as this. It 
 \vill be fufficient juft to obferve, that upon 
 this Foot, every new Law, enaded by the 
 Civil Power, is an Oppofition to, and a 
 Subverfion of the Laws before fubiiitino; ; 
 and this notvvithftanding it fhould only fup- 
 ply their Defefts, and carry on the fame 
 End with them : For, in this Cafe like wife 
 a Liberty allow'd by the preceding Laws, 
 is reftrain'd by the fucceeding ; and con- 
 fequently, as our Author expreffes it, the 
 Law-giver determines one Way by one Set 
 of Laws, and another Way by another j 
 both too fubfiiliftg at the fame Time. Yet he 
 fcaree expe£ls by fuch kind of Objections to 
 
 Q wref^ 
 
iz6 J DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 wrefl from The Supreme Power the Authori- 
 ty of making new Laws 5 nor will He, I be- 
 lieve, affirm. That every new Ad: is virtually a 
 Repeal of all thofe which were ever tnade be- 
 fore. 
 
 Be it then, that forafmuch as Natural Reli- 
 gion mufl, one Way or other, be contained un- 
 der Reveal'd ; muft be either fuppos'd or 
 
 exprefs'd in it, and confirm'd by it, and, fo 
 far as this, One with it : Be it, that Chrijtia- 
 nity is in this refped:, a Refiiihlication of the 
 Law of Nature, and confequently, fo far as 
 this Matter of it reaches, as Old as the Crea- 
 tion -, yet what will all this avail, if allow'd, as 
 allow'd indeed it muft be ? We contend, that 
 altho' it be a Republication of the Law of Na- 
 ture, yet it may be, and adually is, fomething 
 more J and that notwithftanding this Unity in 
 one refpedy there is a Difference fufficient 
 between them in Others. 
 
 Natural and Reveal'd Religion, we arffim, 
 differ in Extent. Under which Head we may 
 reckon, i. Principles, difcover'd by Revela- 
 tion, which are abfolutely undifcoverable by 
 natural Reafon. 2. Precepts ^ fome of which 
 tho' founded on the Reafons of Things, yet 
 cannot be trac'd out by us in our prefent Cir- 
 cumffances; and others God hath prefcribed 
 
 to us, as Tokens of his Authority, for 
 
 the Decency of his Worfhip, or, for 
 
 the Increafe and Advancement of inward 
 Piety. 
 
 5 They 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. iif 
 
 They differ again, in Point of Clearnefs, 
 wirh refpe(5t to thofe Things, which tho' diA 
 toverable in fnme fort both Ways, are yet not 
 (o fully made known to us in the mere Ufe of 
 Reafon, as they are by exprefs Revelation from 
 God : And tho' their Difference is not Such un- 
 der this Article, as what we affirm'd under the 
 former, yet it amounts to fomewhat more than 
 Dur Author allows, who hath contended that Na- 
 tural and Reveal'd Religion differ only as to the 
 manner of being communicated to us. 
 
 They differ, Laftly in Efficacy -, For Reve- 
 lation eftablifhes fuch San(flions both of Re- 
 ward and Punifhment as mere human Reafon 
 could never difcover ; It gives us Affurance of* 
 full Pardon upon Repentance j and the Com- 
 fort of hoping for the Aids of the Holy Spirit 
 in the Difcharge of thofe Things, which may 
 otherwife prove too difficult for us, whether 
 from the Urgency of Temptations, or the In- 
 firmity of our Nature. 
 
 Thefe are fuch important Articles of Dif- 
 ference, and fo plainly vifible in the Chriftian 
 Scheme, that to deny there can be any Diffe- 
 rence between Natural and Revealed Religion, 
 is virtually a Denial of Revelation itfelf: And 
 to affirm in the Grofs, and without any Di- 
 ftindtion, that Chrijiianity is as Old as the Cre- 
 atioji, is to affirm, that all which is proper and 
 peculiar to Chriftianity, and upon Account of 
 which it paffes under that Denomination, is 
 groundlefs and an Impofture ; to affirm which, 
 CL2 is 
 
228 A DEFENCE of 
 
 is not only to make it Not as Old as the Ci'ea- 
 tion, but to deny it any manner of Exiflencc 
 as a real Religion at all. 
 
 To conclude this Head ; If the Matter of Re- 
 velation may differ from the Matter of Na- 
 tural Religion ; If it may fairly be pre-* 
 
 fum'd that the Matter of each would differ in 
 fome fort, if a Revelation fliould be ever given 
 
 us at all 3 If every Religion, v^^hich hath 
 
 yet been offer'd to the World as Reveal'd, hath 
 
 differ'd from Natural Religion; and if 
 
 that in particular , v^hich , upon the beft 
 Grounds imaginable, we receive as Reveal'd, 
 doth a(5tually contain fome fuch Articles of 
 Difference ; then, I conceive. Nothing far-* 
 ther need be offer'd in Difproof of our Au- 
 thor's bold Affcrtions. I fhall therefore pafs 
 on to fome other Points ;. and endeavour to fup- 
 port, in the following Chapters, The Ufeful- 
 nefs, Expediency, and Reality of a Revela- 
 tion againft the Objedions of This Gentle- 
 man. 
 
 C H A E 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 229 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Whether a proper Rule of Life he per' 
 fe6ily and eajily difcoverahle hy ei^ery 
 Man, enjen hy thofe of the meaneji 
 Capacity: 
 
 HIS General Quejftion refolves it- 
 felf into thefe Two; viz. i. Whe- 
 ther a proper Rule of Life be per- 
 fed:iy difcoverable by every Man, 
 &c. 1. Whether it i3e eafily difco- 
 verable. Concerning both thefe fomewhat hath 
 been occaiionally obferv'd before ; But as the 
 more full Difcuffion of thefe Queftions be- 
 longs to this Place, I (hall here puriue them. 
 
 Yet, before I proceed, one Thing mufl be 
 noted carefully, namely, That I am not here 
 debating concerning That Law, from which 
 Duty, ftricflly fpeaking, arifes, but that Rule 
 of Fitnefs, which, if difcover'd, and conli- 
 der'd as the Will of God, would conftituteour 
 Law. What each Man is properly oblig'd to 
 in Point of Duty, is doubtlefs knowable by 
 each Man. In this refped: the very meaneft 
 hath a Sufficiency of Knowledge ; and that 
 as for 
 
2?o A DEFENCE of 
 
 for the Reafon formerly infifted on, That no, 
 one can be accountable for thofe Things,, 
 which he is abfolutely incapable of knowing. 
 But then, many Things may be fit and proper 
 to be done, and therefore fall under That ge- 
 neral Rule, which I call the proper Rule of 
 Life, which yet may, on feveral Accounts, 
 exceed the Diicoveries of certain Perfons. 
 This muft be allow'd to be poffible at leafl:, 
 by thofe who copfider Fitnefs as Something 
 founded in the Natures of Things, and con- 
 fequently, as having no Relation to the 
 Thoughts, and Apprehenfions of Men con- 
 cerning it. But fuppofing this to be poffible 
 in Theory, yet whether it be Fa6l or no, is 
 another Point, and the Queflion which comes 
 now to be confider'd. 
 
 From the foregoing Diflincflion, carefully at- 
 tended to, it will appear, that all fuch Arguings 
 as thefe are vain , " That if God hath given 
 *' Mankind a Law, He muft have given them 
 " fufficient Means of knowing it: He would 
 " otherwife have defeated his own Intention in 
 *' giving it. " p. 3. *' That as Men have no 
 ^' other Faculties to judge with, [but their Rea- 
 " fon,] fo their uling thefe after the beft manner 
 •' they can, muft anfwer the End for which 
 *' God gave them, and juftify their Condud: ; — : 
 " That if God will judge all Mankind as they 
 f are accountable, /'. e. as they are rational, 
 S' the Judgment muft hold an exad: Proportion 
 ^f to the Ufe they make of their Reafon, and 
 
 '' it 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c'. 251 
 
 " it would be in vain to ufe it, if the due life 
 *' of it would not juftify them before God. " 
 p. ^, 6. All thefe, and fuch like Arguings, 
 are nothing at all to the Purpofe. For, What 
 if Men, by doing their Bejft, may be juftify'd; 
 or, rather, if you pleafe, What if upon thisSup- 
 poiition they cannot be condemn'd in Equity ? 
 Doth this prove at all, that every Thing, 
 in its own Nature fitting, is therefore knowable, 
 by every Man ? And if this be not knowable by 
 every Man, in the Ufe of his Reafon, then a 
 Revelation may be exceedingly ferviceable in 
 order to make it fo. The Terms Law and 
 Diify ought not to mix themfelves in the Que- 
 flion before us. The Point at prefent is. Not 
 whether every Man is capable of knowing all 
 that He is flridlly oblig'd to, but, whe- 
 ther every Man hath Abilities and Opportunities 
 fufficient for difcovering every thing which may 
 be fit and proper to be done. And that our 
 Author thinks every Man, even thofe of the 
 loweft Parts, and meaneft Capacities, are ca- 
 pable of doing this, v/ill, I conceive appear 
 from feveral Paffages of his Book; tho' He 
 hath ftudy'd Confufionfo much, andexprefs'd 
 himfelf in fo odd a Manner, that it may not be 
 always eafy to fix and fettle his Meaning. 
 
 I have fhewn heretofore , that however 
 truly, in the Beginning of his Second Chapter, 
 he defines The Law or Religion of Na- 
 ture, yet he immediately deferts his own De- 
 finition, and tells us, " that The Religion of 
 *^ Nature takes in every thing, which is 
 Q^^ " founded 
 
%li A DEFENCE of 
 
 ^' founded in the Nature and Reafon of 
 " Things. " It is on this foot he argues all 
 throughout his Book: and therefore, where- 
 cver he fpeaks of Religion, T^rue Religion^ 
 Natural Religion, Laiv of Nature, God's 
 Law, and the like, he muft be underftood 
 to include under it, every Thing in itfelf 
 fit and proper ; or, what I have call'd above 
 A proper Rule of Life. This being noted 
 in order to underftand what our Author 
 means, I (hall proceed to fome of thofe Paf- 
 fages, in which his Opinion on the prefent 
 Point is reprefented to us. 
 
 To this Puroofe he tells us, " that the 
 '* End for vs^hlch God hath given us Reafon, 
 " is, to compare Things, and from thence 
 " to judge concerning the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs 
 ,*■' of Actions. And could not our Reafon 
 *■' judge foundly in all fuch Matters, it could 
 " not have anfwer'd the End for which Inii- 
 " nire Wifdom and Goodnefs beftow'd that 
 " excellent Gift, " p. 26. Here he claims 
 to Human Reafon an unlimited Extent, as to 
 the Fitnefs or Unhrneis of A(5tions. And tho* 
 he afferts this to Human Reafon in the gene- 
 ral only, yet the Foundation of his Arguing 
 will make it equally applicable to every Man's 
 Reafon. He builds his Argument on the End 
 for which Human Reafon was given us; 
 which being the fame in all, the fame Pri- 
 vilefijes are virtuahv here afferted to all: and 
 vonfequentiy every Man, even thofe of the 
 
 meaneft 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 235 
 
 meaneft Abilities, muft be (according to him) 
 capable, as of comparing Things, and from 
 thence judging concerning the Fitneis or Un- 
 iitnefs of Actions, fo likewife of judging 
 foundly in '411 fuch Matters. Again, " I 
 " cannot help thinking, but (fuch is the Di- 
 *^ vine Goodnefs) God's Will is fo clearly 
 " and fully manifefted in the Book of Na- 
 ^' ture, that he who runs may read it. This 
 ^' cannot be deny'd, if the Book of Nature 
 " fhews us, in Charaders legible by the 
 *' whole World, the Relation we ftand in to 
 " God and our Fellow Creatures, and the 
 ^' Duties refuking from thence; for then it 
 " mufh teach us the Whole of our Duty, ^. 
 p. 28. Once more; " 'Tis impolTible Men 
 *? fhould have any ]ufl Idea of the Perfecftion 
 <' of God, who think that the Dictates of 
 " Infinite Wifdom do not carry their own 
 " Evidence with them, and are not by their 
 " own innate Worth difcoverable to all Man- 
 " kind, " p. 125. The fame ^s flill more 
 explicitly fet forth, p. 198. '' Religion, 
 " (which way foever reveal'd) carries fuch 
 *^ internal Marks of Truth, as at all Times 
 " and Places jfhews itfelf, even to the meaneil 
 " Capacity, to be the Will of a Being of 
 " univerfal and impartial Benevolence. " I 
 might fupport the fame by numberlefs other 
 PaSages to the fame Purpofe : But, if thefe 
 are not thought fufficient, I would refer the 
 Reader to our Author's whole Cqurfe of 
 
 argu- 
 
2H ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 arguing from p. 278, to' p. 283. In Oppoii- 
 tion to all which, I ihall, 
 
 1. Shew diredly, that a proper Pvule of 
 Life is not perfedlly difcoverable by every 
 Man, even by thofe of the meanefl Capacity. 
 And, 
 
 2. Examine what our Author hath ad- 
 vanced to the contrary. 
 
 As to the dired: Proof of this Matter, we 
 need go no farther than the common Expe- 
 rience of Mankind ; for, I think, we may 
 fafcly conclude fomewhat concerning the 
 Abilities of Men this way from confider- 
 ing what they have adually, and in fad: 
 done. 
 
 Now, is it feen that Men of the loweft 
 Rank as to intelledual Accomplifhments, 
 have fo perfedl an Acquaintance with every 
 Thing which is fit and proper to be done ? 
 Do they fhewthis upon every Occaiion ? Have 
 they ever drawn out any line Syftems of Mo- 
 rality? Or, does it appear from their Con- 
 dud:, that they have fo nice, quick, and 
 perfed a Senfe ofthefe Things? So far from 
 it, that all other Circumftances being alike. 
 Men are more or lefs regular in their Con- 
 dud in proportion to the Degrees of their in- 
 telledual Capacity. 
 
 I deny not indeed, but the more general 
 Points are knowable by every Man, even by 
 thofe of the meanefl Parts : And unlefs they 
 were io, Men could not be reckon'd Moral 
 
 , Ag^^nts^ 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 235 
 
 Agents J and confequently, would not pror 
 perly come within the prefent Queflion : But^ 
 to difcern a Truth in the general ; and to be 
 capable either of applying it on every parti- 
 cular Occafion, or of deducing from it all 
 pofTible Conclufions, are quite diiterent 
 Things. The firft Principles of all Sciences 
 are felf-evident ; and confequently, fuch as 
 are knowable even by the meaneft. This is 
 efpecially true in mathematical Knowledge. 
 But what then ? Is every Man a Mathemati- 
 cian ? Or, hath every Man a Sufficiency of 
 Natural Talents whereby to purfue thefe Prin- 
 ciples thro' that infinite Variety of Conclu- 
 fions, which skilful Perfons are able to draw 
 from them ? No certainly ; And for the fame 
 Reafon it cannot be concluded, that becaufe 
 the fundamental Principles of Moral Know- 
 ledge are open to every Man, Therefore the 
 Whole of Moral Science muft be fo likewife; 
 or, that becaufe fuch general Precepts as 
 thefe, " God is to be honour'd, worfliipp'd, 
 
 " and obey'd ; We ought to do what 
 
 <* Good we can to all, and to abftain from 
 
 " offering Injury to any; . We ought to 
 
 " be temperate, fober, chafle, and the like;" 
 
 I fay, we cannot conclude, that becaufe 
 
 fuch Precepts as thefe may be fuppos'd to be 
 obvious. Therefore every thing elfe is clear, 
 plain and eafy. 
 
 Every one, who is at all acquainted with 
 Books, knows what Reputation fome few of 
 
 the 
 
tl6 A DEFENCE of 
 
 the Philofophers have obtain'd by their Moral 
 Syftems ; tho', by the Way, there are many 
 undeniable Defed:s in every one of them, and 
 Ibch as we are now able to difcern plainly by 
 that Light which Chriilianity hath given us. 
 But, could this ever have happen'd, had the 
 SubjeclofMorals been fo exceedingly eafy, that 
 ever)-' Man, even the meaneft, might make 
 Iiimfelf entirely Miller of it ? Was it ever 
 ieen that Men gain'd Credit by performing what 
 every one elfe was able to perform as well 
 as themfelves ? On this Foot their Fame was 
 purchas'd at an eafy Rate indeed ; and, for 
 the future, we muft rather admire their good 
 Fortune, than their Merit. But whatever 
 this Gentleman may advance, i cannot think 
 their Reputation will be fo eafily overthrown. 
 Their Works have hitherto maintain 'd their 
 Ground, and will do fo, as long as Men have 
 Senfe enough to difcern what is great in 
 others, or defective in themfelves. 
 
 In the lafl Century there arofe a very ex- 
 traordinary Genius for Philofophical Specula- 
 tions; I mean Mr. Lock, the Glory of that 
 Age, and the Inftrudor of the prcfent. This 
 Gentleman had examin'd into the Nature and 
 Extent of Human Underllianding beyond any 
 Pcrfon before him, and made fuch Difco-r 
 veries as have highly oblig'd the Curious. In 
 the Cnurfe of his Enquiries it occurr'd tq 
 him, from confidering the Nature of Moral 
 Idcfs, that Et Licks v/as capable of ftric^ De- 
 
 monfta- 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. tir 
 
 ilionftration, as well as Mathematicks. He 
 well knew that The Great Mafterson the 
 Subject of Morals had done little this Way; 
 and prefum'd, (as well he might) that this 
 had hitherto been thought impoffible. *' Yet, 
 " fays he, upon this Ground, {viz. the Prin- 
 " ciples before advanc'd) I am bold to think 
 " Morality is capable of Demonftration, as 
 " well as Mathematicks. " (See his Elfay, 
 &c. L. 3. C. ii.§. 16.) See, however, with 
 what Caution this Great Man maintains his 
 Point! He doth not affirm by any means, 
 that every Thing in Morality is capable oi 
 being demonftrated ; but only, (as he tells us 
 afterwards, L. 4. C. 12. §. 8.) " I doubt not 
 " but, if a right Method were taken, a 
 *' great Part of Morality might be. made 
 *' out with that Clearnefs, that could leave, 
 " to a conlidering Man, no more Reafon tQ 
 " doubt, than he could have to doubt of the 
 " Truth of Propoiitions in Math-em at icks, 
 *'* which have been demonlirated to him. '' 
 Doth this look as if he imagin'd that every 
 Man, even thofe of the meanefl Capacities, 
 were thoroughly acquainted with every Thing 
 on this Subjed:? If he thought fo, why- 
 does he introduce it as a Difcovery, that Mo- 
 rality is Cf'.pable of Demonftration ? And 
 whilft he afferts this. Why doth he affert it 
 with fo much Refervc and Caution? Why 
 doth he extend the Aflertion Not to the 
 whole of Morality, but to a great Part of it 
 
 only I 
 
258 A DEFENCE of 
 
 only? To this I mufl add farther. He doth 
 not, in the laft cited PalTage, maintain, that 
 every Man is capable, by his own Force, of 
 demonftrating whatfoever is really capable of 
 being demonflrated in Morality; but only^ 
 that if a right Method were taken, a great 
 Part of Morality might be made out with 
 that Clearnefs that could leave to a conjider^ 
 
 ing Man no more Reafon to doubt, Gfr. 
 
 To a confidering Man, i. e. to one who is 
 willing to attend, and hath Abilities to judge. 
 
 Mr. Lock'?, Hints on this Subject were read 
 with great Pleafure by feveral ingenious Men : 
 Mr. MolineuyCj in particular, was fo highly 
 delighted with them, that he could not for- 
 bear prefiing his Friend to purfue this Matter 
 more diftindly, and to oblige us with a Body 
 of Moral Philofophy drawn up in the demon- 
 ilrative Way. But how did Mr. hock reply 
 to this ? Why, in thefe Words, " Tho' by 
 *' the View I had of Moral Ideas whilft I 
 " was confidering that Subje(fl, I thought I 
 " faw that Morality might be demonftratively 
 " made out, yet whether I am able to make 
 " it out, is another Quellion. Every one 
 " could not have demonflrated what Mr. 
 " Newtonh Book hath fhev/n to be demon- 
 « ftrable. " \LocK% Fam.il iar Letters, p. 10.] 
 What then ! Was this fo difiicult a Tafk to 
 Mr. Lock^ which yet the meanefl:, and mod 
 illiterate Mechanick is fo entirely equal to ? 
 Or, did this accurate Reafoner know fo little 
 
 of 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 239 
 
 of his own Abilities, or judge fo meanly of 
 them, as to think himfelf fcarce qualify'd to 
 undertake what, it feems, every Man elie was 
 able to do with Eafe? This furely cannot be 
 faid. And therefore we mufl conclude, tliat 
 whatever Abilities the Gentleman I am now 
 contending with may enjoy, and how much 
 foever he may be able to do to this Purpofe, 
 in the Ufe of his Natural Reafon, yet every 
 Man is not equally capable of doing the fame. 
 'Nlv.Lock^ we fee, vv'ould not attempt it ; and 
 therefore it mull be vain for others, fo very 
 much inferior to this Great Man, to attempt 
 it after him. 
 
 We have lately, indeed, had a Noble Per- 
 formance much in the Way which Mr, Lock 
 propos'd; and the Defign hath been fo well 
 executed by Mr. Woollafton^ that however fome 
 Objedions may be made againft certain Parts 
 of his Book, yet it hath been receiv'd, in the 
 general, with the higheft Applaufe. I be- 
 lieve it will be allow'd by every one, that 
 This is the moft compleat Syflem of Moral 
 Principles and Precepts, which hath been yet 
 given us on the mere Foot of Natural Rea- 
 fon; tho' poflibly fome one or other may 
 arife hereafter, and carry the Matter ftill far- 
 ther. But whence came it to pafs, that Mr. 
 Woollajlon alone fliould fucceed fo well, and 
 go fo far beyond his PredecefTors on this Sub- 
 jedl, if the Matter had indeed been fo very 
 plain and eafy ; "if God's Will, [/. e. what 
 
 " is 
 
24D A DEFENCE of 
 
 " is lit and proper] is fo clearly and fuller 
 " manifefted in the Book of Nature, that he 
 " who runs may read it ; " and if " Reli- 
 *' gion [another Word us'd by our Author 
 " in the fame Senfe;] if This, I fay^ carries 
 " fuch internal Marks of Truth, as at all 
 '' Times and Places plainly fhevvs itfelf evefi 
 " to the meaneft Capacity, &c. ? " Surely 
 thofe Perfons who have fet lb great a Value 
 on Mr. fVooUaJfon's Performance, have not 
 miftaken Matters fo much, as to beftow the 
 higheft Praife on him for doing what was in 
 itfelf a mean and low Work, and what 
 every other Perfon was capable of doing as 
 well as He. Thus much I am fure may be 
 concluded from the general Applaufe with 
 which this Gentleman's Book hath been re- 
 ceived, that it was thought to contain fome- 
 thing extraordinary ; which, if admitted, it 
 muft follow of Courfe, tfiat this Propofition, 
 viz. A proper Rule of Life is perfedly dif- 
 coverable even by thofe of the meaneft Ca- 
 pacities, is contrary to the common Senfe 
 and Experience of the World. 
 
 Over and above this Argument drawn 
 from Experience, I Ihall evince the fame 
 from the Nature and Reafon of the Thing 
 itfelf. The Proportion affirm'd by our Au- 
 thor, is thus exprefs'd by him ; " Religion 
 " [or the proper Rule of Life] carries with 
 " it fuch internal Marks of Truth,- as ^t all 
 " Times and Places plainly lliews itfelf even 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 241 
 
 *^ to the meaneft Capacity, &c, " I miift 
 charge this Propofition with a clear and evi- 
 dent Contradidion ; becaufe, if Religion [as 
 he loves to exprefs himfelf ] hath really fuch. 
 internal Marks, as muft make it plain and 
 apparent to every Man, then all Men are 
 equally capable of knowing every Thing this 
 Way ; and if this be admitted, there can be 
 no fuch Thing as greater or lefs Degrees of 
 Capacity: How then can there be any Sup- 
 pofition made of the meaneji Capacity ? How 
 can there be different Degrees with regard to 
 a Point in which all are equal ? Or, if it 
 Ihall ftill be maintained, that Capacity, in 
 this refped, doth admit Degrees, then it is 
 evident, that Some are capable of knowing 
 more than Others : And if this be once al- 
 lowed, then How is every Man, even he 
 who is fuppofed to have the meaneft Capa- 
 city, able to difcover every Thing? Turn 
 it which Way you pleafe : Either every 
 Thing on the Subject we are now fpeaking 
 of, is not equally capable of being known 
 
 by every one; or, if it be, there can be 
 
 no fuch thing as Degrees of Capacity : For 
 thefe two are entirely inconliftent with each 
 other. 
 
 But our Author will perhaps alledge, 
 that the different Degrees of Capacity refer 
 not to Matters of Morality, (in which re- 
 fped Men are all equal) but to fomething 
 elfe, VIZ. to Men's general Abilities ; and 
 
 R that 
 
24i A DEFENCE 0/5 
 
 that it is his Intention to affert,. that thofe 
 who are leaft furniHi'd with intelledual Abi- 
 lities, are capable of dilcovering every 
 Thing which is fit and proper to be done. 
 This poflibly may be alledgM by our Au- 
 thor. But then I muft beg leave to rernind 
 him of a Pafllige which occurs at the fifth 
 Page of his Book ; " I do not mean by this, 
 '* that All fhould have equal Knowledge, 
 ^' but that all Ihould have what is fufficient 
 " for the Circumftanccs they are in. ■" The 
 Knowledge here mentioned relates entirely to 
 
 Matters of Morality; to Religion, as he 
 
 terms it ; to That Religion, which he 
 
 fuppofes to contain every thing morally fit 
 and proper. Here he fuppofes that all Men 
 have not equal Knowledge this Way ; " I 
 " do not mean that all fhould have equal 
 '' Knowledge ; " What then ? Why, " that 
 " every Man fhould have fufficient for the 
 " Circumftances he is in. •" According to 
 this Account there may be higher, or lower 
 Degrees of Capacity in reference to Moral 
 Matters, as no doubt there may : But then,; 
 upon this State of the Thing, How will he 
 make good the Propofition I am now op-, 
 pofing, viz. that all Things of moral Im- 
 port are plain and evident, and equally ca- 
 pable of being known by every one ? 
 
 Not to infill longer on this, I fhall ad- 
 vance a Step farther, and endeavour to fliew 
 difiinclly, from the very Nature of the. 
 
 ^^ Sub- 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 143 
 
 Subject, that a proper Rule of Life is not 
 perfcdly difcoverablc by every one, efpe- 
 cially by thofe whom he exprefsly men- 
 tions, Men of the loweft and meaneft Capa- 
 city. To be perfedly acquainted with this, 
 it is neceffary, in the Firft Place, Tliat all 
 thofe feveral Principles fhould be thoroughly- 
 known, from which Moral Precepts may, 
 and ought to be deduced ^ otherwife we 
 muft maintain, that Conclufions may be 
 drawn without the Uie of Premifes. And, 
 in the next Place^ that the Gonnedion be- 
 tween thefe Principles and Precepts is fo ex- 
 ceedingly clear, that every Perfon concernM 
 may immediately and diftinctly difcern it in 
 every Inftance. On any other Foot, thefe 
 fupposM Principles arc, with refped to fuch 
 a Man, no Moral Principles at all ; and the 
 Precepts which he lays down for himfelf, 
 can have no fufficient Force with him, as 
 not being built on any appearing Fitnefs of 
 the Thing. Thefe Queflions therefore arife, 
 Whether a Perfon of fuch a fuppos'd mean 
 Capacity, may gain a full View of all the 
 feveral Moral Principles ? and, if he may do 
 this, and actually hath done it, Whether he 
 muft necclfarily be capable of deducing from 
 them all thofe Moral Conclufions, which 
 may in juft Rcafoning follow ? 
 
 The Principles of Moral Science are none 
 other than the Natures of Things, and the 
 feveral Relations which fubfifl between 
 
 R 2 them. 
 
i44 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 theni. Now thefe are fo far from being ap- 
 parent to every Man, even to thofe of the 
 meaneft Capacities, that I have diftinftly fhewn 
 under my Firft Chapter, they are perfedly dif- 
 coverable by no Man, in the mere Ufe of 
 Natural Reafon, In reference to God, tho* 
 Something may be known, yet it muft be 
 confefs'd that many Things are fecret to us : 
 In reference to ourfelves. How many Diffi- 
 culties may be ftarted even about our own 
 Perfons, of which we can give no tolerable 
 Solutions ? And if we are fo much Strangers 
 to our own perfbnal Condition, How much 
 lefs can we determine with Certainty as to 
 Things which relate to others ? Little do 
 we know concerning the Nature and Powers 
 of vifible Beings; and ftill much lefs con- 
 cerning thefe which are invifible. Now if 
 the Nature, State, and Condition of Things 
 be, in feveral refpeds, undifcoverable by 
 us, it is certain that the feveral Relations 
 which fubfift between them muft be fo like- 
 wife. We know God as our Creator and 
 Preferver; but then, there may be feveral 
 other Relations which he fuftains, to us ut- 
 terly unknown. We are related to other 
 Men as Fellow Creatures of the fame Kind : 
 This general Relation we know perfedly : 
 But do we know as perfedly all the other 
 Refpeds we may have to one another ? We 
 may prefume, upon ftrong Reafons, that 
 Men are not the only intelligent creatures in 
 
 the 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 245 
 
 the Univerfe : But can we fay how the Af- 
 fairs of thefe intelligent Beings are intermixed 
 with ours ? How far we are mutually de- 
 pended on one another ; and confequently, 
 capable either of forwarding or obftrucling 
 our feveral Interefts ? We know fomething 
 of Natural Beings : But are we fuch com- 
 pleat Philofophers, as to be intimately ac- 
 quainted with all their feveral Powers ? And 
 yet, without knowing thefe, How can we 
 lay what is fit to be done or avoided on 
 every Occafion ? 
 
 Our Author himfelf builds his Scheme of 
 Duties on the Natures and Relations of 
 Things. In proportion therefore as thefe 
 feveral Natures and Relations arc undilco- 
 vcrable by us, fo far muft our feveral 
 Schemes of Duty be defedive ; or, to fpeak 
 more properly, fo far muft we fall Ihort in 
 our Defcription of the proper Rule of Con- 
 dud. And if the wifeft, and moft inquifi- 
 tive, muft frequently be at a Lois, can the 
 meaneft gain a perfed Knowledge of thele 
 Things ? Can the uneducated and illiterate fo 
 far exceed the Philofophical Enquirer- and 
 Men of no Parts go fo much beyond the 
 greateft and moft extenfive Genius ? At this 
 Rate, Folly can teach us more than Wifdom. 
 
 But I forbear, in a cafe {o exceedingly 
 
 plain, that nothing more is rcquifite either to 
 illuftrate or confirm it. 
 
 R q After 
 
t^6 ^DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 After all, let us fuppofe that the feveral 
 Principles of Moral Science were thoroughly 
 knowablc; Will it follow from hence, that 
 all the feveral Conclufions deducible from 
 them are equally knowable? Doth the like 
 appear in any other Art or Science ? Are 
 we to learn, that Truth is almofl: infinite, 
 whilfl: the original Principles from which it 
 is deducible, are in many cafes few and 
 plain ? Are Men therefore able to reach all 
 thefe Truths ; to trace them in all their 
 feveral Steps ; and to make out every. 
 Thing which is, in itfelf capable of being 
 proved ? 
 
 Let us only confider how few and fimple 
 the firft Principles of Geometry are. Thefe 
 may be known eafily by a Perfon of tolera- 
 ble Parts and Capacity. But doth it follow, 
 that he is equally capable of maftering the 
 whole Science, and of making out all the 
 feveral Conclufions of a NewtGii^ or a Halley? 
 No certainly; and therefore a Diftindion 
 ought to be made between the Capacity of 
 apprehending Principles, and of drawing 
 Conclufions. The Ground and Reafon of 
 xhis is plain enough. In order to make out 
 a Conclufion, efpeciaily when it is remote 
 from its firft and original Principle, Men 
 ought to have a Sagacity in difcerning the 
 
 feveral Relations between Ideas, • a Fix- 
 
 ednefs and Attention of Mind, that none of 
 f^efe Relatic?3s may cfcape without fufficient 
 
 Qb- 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. 147 
 
 Obfervation, Patience and Refolution to 
 
 bear the Fatigues of a painful and laborious 
 Search ; To wliich may be added, Oppor- 
 tunity and Freedom from fuch other En- 
 gagements as may either cmbarrafs them in 
 the Enquiry, or oblige them to break off too 
 foon. But are all thefe the Portion of every 
 Man ? Is every Man fagacious, attentive, 
 patient, at leifure ? Whence then comes it 
 to pals that there is really ^o great a Dif- 
 ference between the intellectual Attainments 
 of Men ? Were every Thing fo eafy, and 
 attainable in this refpe<^", furely Men could 
 not fall fo very Hiort of one another : The 
 niere Pleafure of maftering a Truth would 
 move them, if there were not fomcthing of 
 fuperior Difficulty in the W\ay. 
 
 All this will, perhaps, be allowed by our 
 Author in reference to what he may call 
 5!peculative Science : But he will tell us, 
 that the Cafe is different with regard to Prac- 
 tical : There every Thing is, and nuifl be 
 eafy, and obvious to every Enquirer. But 
 let me ask this Gentleman, Is not Reafoning 
 as necefTary to deduce praftical Conclufions 
 from pradical Principles, as fpeculative Con- 
 clufions from fpeculative Principles? Doth 
 not Reafoning, as well in the one Cafe as the 
 other, imply a Perception of the Conncclion 
 or Difagreement of Ideas in the feveral Steps 
 of the Argument ? Doth not this in like 
 manner ilippofe, that the heforc-mcntion''d 
 
 R 4 Qua- 
 
248 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 Qualifications are equally neceiTary in both 
 Cafes ? And if this be true, mlift there 
 not be Difficulties arifing in both ? 
 
 To make this more apparent, let us only 
 confider That Scheme of Morality, which 
 this Author himfelf hath given us; Let us 
 fee, whether He. with all the Advantages 
 he enjoys of Learning, Parts, Converfation, 
 Leifure, Books, and the like, hath hit mat^ 
 ters off fo nicely ; or, if he ihall be fup^ 
 pos'd to have done fo. Whether the fame 
 might as well have been done by the lllite^ 
 rate, or the Dull, or the Solitary, or the 
 Buify. If it could not, then I conceive this 
 Point muft be yielded me ; and the Gentle- 
 man I am contending with muft allow, that 
 a proper Rule of Life, however difcover- 
 able by him,- is not fo perfectly difcoverablc 
 by every one. 
 
 His Scheme of Natural Religion, is This: 
 *' 'Tis evident by the Light of Nature that 
 *' there is a God ; or, in other Words, a 
 ^' Being abfolutely perfed, and infinitely 
 ^* happy in himfelf,' who is the Source of 
 '^ all other Beings. " In the next place, 
 *^ The Creatures can neither add to, nor 
 '* take from the Happinefs of that Being ; 
 ^^ and he could have no Motive in framing 
 ^' his Creatures, or, in giving Laws to fuch 
 ^' of them, as he made capable of knowing 
 <' his Will, but their own Good. '* Fron;i 
 }ienc? he inf^rs^ '-' Tlia^ Nothing can be a 
 
 ■■ fan 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 149 
 
 ** Part of the Divine Law, but what tends 
 " to promote the common Intereft of his 
 ^' Rational Creatures ; and every Thing 
 " which does fb, mult be a Part of it. " In 
 like manner, " He who cannot envy us any 
 " Happinefs our Nature is capable of, can 
 *' forbid us thole Things only, which tend 
 " to our Hurt. '' Thefe are the general 
 Principles on which he builds. To which 
 he adds this farther Remark, " Our Reafon, 
 " which gives us a Demonftration of the Divine 
 ^' Perfections, affords the fame concerning the 
 ** Nature of thofe Duties God requires; not 
 ^* only with relation to himfelf, but to our- 
 *' felves, and one another : Thofe we Ihail dif^ 
 " cern, if we look into ourfelves, and confider 
 ** our own Natures, and thofe Gircumftances 
 " God hath plac'd us in with relation to our 
 " Fellow-Creatures, and fee what conduces 
 " to our mutual Happinefs: Of this our 
 ^' Senfes, the Experience of others, as well 
 *' as our own, can't fail to give us fufficieni 
 " Information. " 
 
 He had juft before mentioned the Three 
 common Heads of Duty, viz. thofe which 
 relate to God, to ourfelves, and to one ano- 
 ther. He now proceeds to give us a more 
 diltind Account What thofe feveral Duties 
 are. " With relation to ourfelves, he tells 
 " us, Forafmuch as God hath endowed Man 
 ♦' with fuch a Nature as makes him necef-r 
 ^^ farily defire his own Good, therefore 
 
ijd \^ DEFEf^CE of 
 
 ** he cannot require any thing of him in 
 " prejudice of it ; but, on the contrary, 
 ^' that he ihould do every th'ing which tends 
 
 " to promote the Good of it, In con- 
 
 " fequence of this, That we Ihould avoid 
 " all irregular Paffions, ail unfriendly Af- 
 " fedions, all Excels of fenfual Delights, 
 " with all immo(Jerate Defires. " And then 
 he fums up all in thefe Words, " Whofo- 
 " ever fo regulates his Natural Appetites as 
 " will conduce moft to the Exercife of his 
 " Reafon, the Health of his Body, and the 
 " Pleafure of his Senfes, taken and con- 
 " fider'd together, may be certain he can 
 *' never offend his Maker. 
 
 " As to what God expefts from Man with 
 " relation to each other, every one, he af- 
 *' firms, muft know his Duty, who confi- 
 " ders that the common Parent of Mankind 
 ** has the whole Species alike under his Pro- 
 *' tedion •, and will equally punilh him for 
 *' injuring others, as he would others for 
 " injuring him ; and confequently, that it is 
 " his Duty to deal with them as he experts 
 " they Ihould deal with him in like Cir- 
 
 " cumftances. That Human Nature is 
 
 " fo conftituted, that Men cannot live with- 
 " out Society and mutual Afliftance ; and 
 " that God hath endowed them with Rea- 
 " fon. Speech, and other Faculties, evi- 
 ^' dently fitted to enable them to afiift each 
 *' other in Matters of Life , That therefore 
 
 '' 'tis 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 25 1 
 
 " 'tis the Will of God, who gives them this 
 " Nature, and endows them with thefe Fa- 
 " ciilties, that they fhould employ them 
 ** for the common Benefit, and mutual 
 
 '« Afliftance. That therefore every Man, 
 
 " for the fake of others as well as himfelf, 
 " is not to difable his Body or Mind by fuch 
 *■' Irregularities, as may make him lefs fer- 
 
 " viceable to them. In Ihort, we cannot 
 
 " but know, if we in the leaft confider, 
 " that whatever Circumfiances Men are 
 " placM in by the Univerfal Gaufe of all 
 " Things, that *tis his eternal and immuta- 
 " ble Will, by his placing them in thefe 
 " Circumftances, that they ad as thele re- 
 
 " quire. This Confideration alone will 
 
 " direct a Man how to ad in all Conditions 
 " of Life, whether Father, Son, Husband, 
 " Servant, Matter, King, &c, " 
 
 This is our Author's Sum of Morality or 
 Natural Religion, taken from the Second 
 Chapter of his Book ; the Title prefixed to 
 which is This ; *' .That the Religion of Na- 
 " ture confifts in obferving thofe Things, 
 " which our Reafon, by confidering the 
 " Nature of God and Man, and the Rela- 
 " tion we Hand in to him, and one another, 
 " demonftrates to be our Duty ; and that 
 " thofe Things are plain ; and likev/ife, 
 " What they are. '* Whether this be a juft 
 and pcrfed Account of Natural Religion, 
 ;(hall be confider'd immediately: But, if it 
 
 were 
 
252 J DEFENCE of 
 
 were allovv'd to be fuch, doth our Author 
 think that a Perfon of the loweft Attain- 
 ments, or Abilities would, or could have 
 drawn oiit the fame by himfelf ? Or, doth 
 he indeed think, that now he hath done the 
 Work for him, Things are made fo exceed- 
 ingly plain and eafy, that every one muft 
 affent to his Scheme, and prefently difcern 
 the true Ground and Foundation of every 
 Duty ? For mine own Part, I am fo far from 
 thinking fo, that I cannot perfuade myfelf 
 our Author thoroughly underftands himfelf 
 in every Branch of it. Either his own 
 Ideas were confus'd ; or el(e, he hath endea- 
 vour*d to impofe upon his Readers by a 
 ftudied Gonfufion in his Expreflions. This 
 I fliall fupport by offering fome Remarks on 
 the Scheme itfelf. 
 
 Our Author, before he proceeds to a dif- 
 tind Account of the feveral Duties incum- 
 bent on us, offers fbme previous Refledions 
 neceff^ry for the right underftanding the 
 general Nature of thele Duties. To this 
 purpofe he obferves, " That as the Creature 
 *' can neither add to, nor take from the 
 " Happinefs of the Creator, fo he could 
 *^ have no Motive in framing his Creatures, 
 *' or in giving Laws to fuch of them as he 
 **■ made capable of knowing his Will, but 
 *' their own Good. '' Here I would defire 
 to know, whether by fhe'/r ozvfj Good our 
 iVutiior means the particular and perfonal 
 
 Good 
 
Reveal'd Religion, c^c lyj 
 
 Good of each Creature on whom fuch Laws 
 are impos'd , or elfe, the Good of fome or 
 other of his Creatures. If he means the for- 
 mer, the Principle is entirely faife, and 
 will prove the Foundation of fuch a Scheme 
 of Morality as is monftrous* For, upon 
 this Foot, we are concerned to perform no 
 Adions whatfoever with regard to another, 
 which do not of thcmfelves, and diredly 
 tend to produce fome Good to ourfelves. 
 What, in this Cafe, will become of Bene^ 
 volence. Love of the Publick, and the like? 
 But if he means the latter, we may allow it 
 to be in fome refpecls true. However, I 
 conceive, he fhould have exprefs'd himfelf 
 more diftindly ; efpecially when he was 
 fetting forth a Scheme, which he intended 
 as a perfed Model, and which was to Ihew 
 us how plain and eafy every Thing in Mo- 
 rality might be made. 
 
 Again ; " Nothing can be a Part of the 
 *' Divine Law, but what tends to promote 
 " the common Intereft of his rational Crea- 
 " tures. '" Here the Gentleman feems to 
 carry Matters into another Extream. Before 
 he had alferted, that the only End of the 
 Creator in giving Laws to his Creatures, was 
 their own Good j Now he afferts, that Nothing 
 can be a Part of the Divine Law, but what 
 tends to promote the common Intereft. The 
 Truth really lies between both Aifertions, 
 when they are rightly underftood : Every 
 
 Thing 
 
i54 o^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 Thing is a Part of the Divine Law, by 
 which our own Good may be promoted con- 
 fidently with the Pubiick, or by which the 
 Publick Good may be promoted confiftently 
 with our own • and we fhall run ourfelves 
 into the moft extravagant Errors, if we pro- 
 pofe either of thefe in Exclufion of the 
 other. For, tho' in certain Cafes a Man may 
 be oblig'd to forego his own private and 
 perfbnal Good, in order to promote the In^ 
 tereft of the Publick, yet this can be built 
 on none other Foundation, than that a gra- 
 cious God will make us Amends hereafter ; 
 and foy upon the whole, the publick and 
 the private Intereft will be entirely re- 
 concird, and made confiftent with each 
 other. 
 
 To go on ; Our Author affirms, " He 
 '' who cannot envy us any Happinels our 
 " Nature is capable of, can forbid us thofe 
 " Things only which tend to our Hurt. " 
 This is a Propofition, which however it 
 might be allow'd as Handing by itfelf, yet 
 hath no manner of Dependence on that 
 Point which is here afiign'd as the Principle 
 from which it flows. For, " God cannot 
 ^' envy us any Happinefs our Nature is 
 " capable of. " What then ? The natural 
 Inference is This ; He cannot forbid us any 
 
 Thing which tends to our Happinefs, 
 
 Not, " that he cannot forbid us any Thing, 
 " but what tends to our Hurt. " However, 
 
 tho' 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ ^f. 255. 
 
 tho' the Inference be wrong, the Propofitioii 
 may in fome fort be admitted : Only we 
 muft underftand it with this Reftridion, the 
 Hurt of ourfelves, or of any other Being ; 
 and confidex. the Propofition, even thus un- 
 derftood, with a View, not to the Prohibi- 
 tions of Reveal'd Religion, but merely of 
 Natural. . ^ , 
 
 He obferves afterwards, ^* Our Senfes, 
 " and the Experience of others, as well as 
 " our own, can't fail to give us fufficient 
 
 " Information " of what ? Why, " of 
 
 " that which conduces to our mutual Hap- 
 " pinefs. " Senfe and Experience may in- 
 deed do fomething here, but not quite fo 
 much as this Gentleman pretends. Reafon 
 ihould be allowed its proper Share in deter- 
 mining this Matter ; otherwife we Ihall not 
 make a fufficient Difference between Men 
 and Brutes. And yet after we have taken 
 all thefe together, I queftion whether many 
 Things will not be overlooked, which are 
 really conducive to our Happinefs. The 
 Effeds indeed we may feel fenlibly; but 
 how far Experience, or that Portion of 
 Reafon which we enjoy, may be able to 
 trace them up to their original Caufes, is 
 another Point j and I am apt to think there 
 would not be fo much Unhappinefs in the 
 World, if we could fo ealily difcern the 
 Remedy. But if this be true, then as a 
 perfed Diredion cannot be had this way, 
 
 we 
 
156 A DEFENCE of 
 
 we may hope for fomething of that Kind 
 in another. Yet thus much we allow readi- 
 ly, That our Scheme of Natural Law muft 
 be influenced by this Principle, and, fo far as 
 this, would have been rightly propos'd by 
 our Author, had it been as perfedly repre- 
 lented. 
 
 With regard to the Duties to ourfelves, 
 this Author informs us, " Whofoever fo 
 " regulates his natural Appetites, as will 
 " conduce moft to the Exercife of his Rea- 
 " fon, the Health of his Body, and the 
 *' Pleafure" of his Senfes, taken and con- 
 *' fider'd together, may be certain he can 
 " never offend his Maker. *' This Paffage 
 is exprefs'd fo obfcurely, that I cannot be 
 certain how far I underftand it in our Au- 
 thor's Senfe. Perhaps it may not be very 
 plain What the Gentleman here means by 
 " Natural Appetites. " One might be 
 tempted to think, that he intends by this 
 Expreffion, Senfual appetites ; For, fincc 
 thefe only have a Relation to the Pleafure 
 of the Senfes, which is particularly men- 
 tion'd in the Clofe of the Sentence, the Na- 
 tural Appetites before mentioned in the Be- 
 ginning of it, fhould, one might think, 
 iignify the fame. I am the more inclined 
 to th,is, from another Paffage in the very 
 fame Paragraph ; " The Health of the 
 " Body, fays he, and the Vigour of the 
 " Mind, being highly conducing to our 
 
 - ** Good, 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. 257 
 
 "f* Good, we miift be fenfible we offend our 
 « Maker, if we indulge our Sefi/ej to the 
 " Prejudice of Thefc. " 
 
 As uncertain am I, what our Author means 
 by the Term '' conduce; " This Word, un- 
 derftood in its proper Senfe, implies feme 
 Efficiency, fome direct Contribution of a 
 proper Gaufe to the Produdlion of its EfTccl. 
 But, in this Senfe, the Government of our 
 Appetites cannot be faid to conduce either to 
 the Exercife of our Reafon, or the Health 
 of our Body. The Regulating our Paffions,^ 
 &c. doth indeed remove an Hindrance of 
 the EfFeds before mention'd, but it doth not 
 diredly produce them. I fhould be apt 
 therefore to fufpe£t, that he really intends 
 thus much ; Whofoever fo regulates his na* 
 tural Appetites, as ftiall be mop conjtfient with 
 the Exercife of his Reafon, &c. cannot of- 
 fend his Maker. 
 
 A Queftion likewife may arife, What he 
 means by " The Exercife of Reafon. " Is 
 it only the internal Exercife of the Faculty ? 
 or. Does he intend likewife, the Influence of 
 that Exercife on our ConduiH: and Behaviour ? 
 I fhould be apt to think that our Author in- 
 tends it in the latter Senfe, from confidering 
 a PafTage in his 2 id p. where he tells us, 
 " The Happinefs of all Beings whatfoever 
 " confifts in the Perfection of their Nature : 
 " And the Nature of a Rational Being is 
 " mofl perfed, when it is perfedly Rational^ 
 
I 
 
 158 A DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 " /'. e. when it governs all its actions by thd 
 " Rules of right Reafon. '' If this be what 
 he means, the whole Amount of the Re- 
 flexion given us above, is This ^ He who 
 governs his natural Appetites lb, as to ad 
 confiftently with the Rules of right Reafon, ■ 
 &c, may be fure he cannot offend his Maker. 
 Upon this View of the Exprcffion, there was 
 no manner of Occafion to mention any Thing 
 about Health or Pleafiire \ for, the Rules of 
 right Reafon had already taken in every 
 Thing of that Kind. But, if our Author 
 really intends no more than the internal Ex- 
 ercife of the realbning Faculty, then I con- 
 ceive there may be feveral other Objedions 
 made to the Truth and Ufefulnefs of the 
 Reflexion, which fliall be noted imme- 
 diately. 
 
 Again ; our Author obferves, " Who- 
 " ever lb regulates his natural Appetites, 
 " &c. may be certain he can never offend 
 " his Maker. " But what hath this Reflexion 
 to do here, where it was his Bufinefs to tell 
 us Not merely what is lawful, but, what we 
 are bound to in Point of Duty ? Or, if he 
 fhall affirm, that This is really what he in- 
 tends by the Exprefl[ion, ( as perhaps he 
 may,) befides that this is an unaccountable 
 Abufe of Language, I muff obferve, that 
 fome great Difficulties will arife about the 
 Truth and Propriety of his Reflexion con- 
 fider'd in this Light. For upon this Foot, 
 3 it 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 259 
 
 It will be the Duty of every Man to indulge 
 his Appetites in all thofe Inftances, which 
 conduce to the Pleafure of the Senfes, if they 
 be only confiftent with the Exercife of Rea- 
 fon, and the Health of the Body. This is 
 a new Duty indeed, and undifcoverM by all 
 who have gone before this Gentlenjan in 
 moral Enquiries. Thefc have contented 
 themfelves with barely aflerting the Law- 
 fulnefs of gratifying our fenfual Appetites 
 on certain Occafions ; but no One hath ever 
 carry M the Matter fo far, as to infift on it as 
 a Point of Duty. In the next Place, it is 
 infilling on a Matter as ftridly obligatory in 
 fo loofe a manner, as muft run us into num^ 
 berlefs Irregularities of a monftrous Nature* 
 It is our Duty, it feems, to indulge our 
 Senfes : . — But, how far ? Why, fo far^ 
 as is confiftent with the Exercife of Reafon, 
 and the Health of the Body. This indeed 
 may guard Men againft Exceffes in Degree, 
 but not at all againft thofe Enjoyments which 
 are irregular as to Kind. If fuch do not im- 
 pair the Reafon, not deftroy the Health, 
 they are not only allowable, but our Duty. 
 The moft monftrous Pradices may be jufti- 
 lied on this Principle. 
 
 The next General Head comprehends thofe 
 
 Offices which are due to others. Here he tells 
 
 us, that 'tis our Duty, in the Firft Place, " Not 
 
 ". to injure others j " and in the next, " To 
 
 S 2 " employ 
 
i6o A DEFENCE oj 
 
 " employ the feveral Faculties we have for the 
 ** common Benefit. " Ail this is moft certainly- 
 true ; and yet I cannot but objed fomevvhat 
 againlt our Author's Management : For^ how 
 doth he make out thefe two Conclufions? Why, 
 He deduces them from this fingle Principle, 
 VIZ. That all Mankind are alike under the 
 'J^rotedfion of God j " Every one ( fays he ) 
 " muft know his Duty, who confiders, that 
 " the common Parent of Mankind has the 
 " whole Species' alike under his Protedion. '* 
 This is an Argument indeed why One Man 
 fliould not injure another \ but is none at all 
 why he ftiould employ his feveral Faculties 
 for his Service. This muft be deduc'd from 
 another Principle, viz. That God wills not 
 only the common Safety, but the common 
 Happinefs \ which Happinefs cannot be 
 promoted without the mutual Intercourfe of 
 kind offices. 
 
 However, let us fuppofe our Gentleman 
 to have been entirely right in his arguing ; 
 and that all the feveral Offices due from one 
 man to another, are reducible to thefe Two 
 Points : ftill it may not appear fo plainly, 
 what Kind of Actions may, on certain Occa- 
 fions, be ferviceable, or prejudicial to others. 
 Hath this Gentleman pretended to point out 
 all thele ? So far from it, that he hath not 
 fo much as hinted at feveral of the moft 
 important : And when he comes to fpeak 
 of the Relative Duties, we have Nothing 
 
 more 
 
Reveal'd Rfligion, &c, i6\ 
 
 more than This ; " We cannojt but know, 
 " if we in the leaft confider, that what- 
 " ever Circumftances Men are plac'd in 
 *^ by The Univerfal Caiile of all Things, it 
 " is his eternal and immutable Will, by pla- 
 *' cing them in thefe Circumftances, that they 
 " ad as thefe require. This Confideration 
 " alone will dired a Man, How to act in 
 **• all Conditions of Life, whether, Fatlier, 
 " Son, Husband, Servant, Mafter, King,^^^. " 
 Now, if this be really enough, The^ Gen- 
 tleman might have fpar'd all his Pains in 
 drawing out a Moral Scheme ; and have 
 told us, That our Duty implied every Thing, 
 which the Circumftances we are placed in 
 require. This might have been allow'd him 
 as true, when rightly underftood : But then 
 it could ferve to very little Purpofe, unlefs 
 he could ftiew us diftindly. What thefe Cir- 
 cumftances do require. And if this would 
 really have been a very ufelefs Account of 
 Morality in the General, 1 conceive it will 
 be as little ferviceable, when us'd to fet forth 
 to us thofe particular Duties, which ought to 
 have been defcrib'd diftindly. 
 
 I ftiall add one Obfervation more on his 
 Scheme, viz. That notwithftanding this 
 Gentleman had reduc'd our feveral Duties to 
 thefe Three Heads, viz. Things which re- 
 late to God, our Neighbour, and ourfelves, 
 yet the Duties to God arc in a manner neg- 
 ieded. This is the more remarkable, be- 
 
 S 3 caufe 
 
%6z ^- DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 caufe he propoles to lay before us a per-* 
 fe6l: Scheme of Duty ; in which, as the 
 Duties to God are the principal, and apt tQ 
 have the greateil Influence on all the reft, 
 fo one might expect that thefe fhould have 
 been trac'd with particular Care, and fet 
 forth with all the Advantages they delerve. 
 What he hath juft hinted in relation to thefe, 
 he pretends to build on God's infinite Hap- 
 pinefs, Goodnefs, Wifdom, and Power ; 
 ^' From the Confideration of which Perfec- 
 *' tions, he tells us, p. 15. we cannot but 
 " have the greateil Veneration, nay the 
 ** greateft Adoration and Love for The Su- 
 " preme Being ; who, that we may not fail 
 " to be as happy as poffible for fuch Crea- 
 " tures to be, has made our ading for oiir 
 " prefent^ to be the only Means of obtaining 
 *' our future Happinefs. " It appears from, 
 hence, That the Confideration of the Divine 
 Perfections mention'd before, is carry'd no 
 farther than the Manifeftations we have of 
 them in the Laws which God gives us : And 
 confequently, he builds all the Duties we 
 owe to God, merely on the Equity and 
 Tendernefs of his Laws ; whereas I Ihould 
 be apt to think, that Duty in general was 
 owing to him, antecedently to the Confidera- 
 tion of any particular Laws, and founded in 
 thjit Right which The Supreme Being hath 
 to give us Laws, But not to infill on the 
 general Duty \ve owe to God, it may be 
 
 pbfery'd;^ 
 
Reveax^'d Religion, &c, 16^ 
 
 obferv'd, that in his Definition of Natural 
 Religion, he tells us, it fignifies " The 
 " Senfe, &c. of thofe Duties which refult 
 " from the Knowledge we have of God, 
 
 " and his Perfedions, &c, " Of God, 
 
 and his Perfections ? but how ? 
 
 confider'd in one View only ? no, certainly ; 
 but taken in every View in which they may 
 be confider'd by us. On any other Foot 
 than this, as we Ihould build our Duty on 
 too weak a Foundation, fo fhould we give it 
 too little an Extent. And what, after all, 
 are the Duties which he inculcates ? Why, 
 Veneration, and Love ; to which he after- 
 wards adds ^' Gratitude, and a ftriving to 
 '^ imitate him in our extenfive Love to our 
 " Fallow Creatures. " Honour, Love,- and 
 Gratitude, are indeed Branches of the Duty 
 we owe to God, however lamely they have 
 been made out by this Gentleman : But 
 then, are there none other Duties befide 
 thefe, which it became him to take Notice 
 of, in a Scheme which was to reprefent to 
 us, How far Natural Reafon can carry us 
 on this Subjed, and to fuperfede every 
 Thing which Revelation can offer ? 
 
 I v.'ill not fay that this important Part of 
 Natural Religion was flighted with Defign ; 
 tho' one might be tempted to think i^o^ by 
 this PafTage at the Clofe of his Second Chap- 
 ter : " We may define True Religion to con- 
 ^^ fill in a conftant Difpofition of Mind to do 
 
 34 '' aU 
 
264 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 *' all the Good we can, and thereby to rendejr 
 " oarfelves acceptable to God, by anfwering 
 " the p^nd of his Creation. " To' do all the 
 Good we can, is, it leems, the Sum of Re- 
 ligion: But then, To whom are we to do 
 Good ? That he tells us cUevvhere : Some- 
 times, he affirms, we are to a6t for our own 
 Good only ; Sometimes , for the common 
 Good only. If either of thefe Senfes be 
 what he intends here, he muft exclude all 
 thoie Duties which we owe to God j For, I 
 luppofe it will hardly be allow'd , that an 
 Endeavour to render ourfelvcs acceptable to 
 God merely by doing Good to ourfelves or 
 other Men, is, properly fpeaking, any In- 
 lltance of Duty to God at all. 
 
 Several other Reflexions might have been 
 offcr'd on this Gentleman's Scheme of Natural 
 Religion : But thefe are fufficient for my 
 prefent Purpole, viz. To fhew, that in his 
 Exprelilons, he is perplex'd, oblcure and 
 doubtful ; in his Arguings, weak and incon- 
 cludve; and in the Scheme itfelf, confider'd 
 only as a Syitem of Precepts, miferably de- 
 fcclive. And yet this Gentleman had not 
 only his own good Senfe to dire(51: him, the 
 Learning of all thofe worthy Enquirers into 
 moral Matters, who have gone before him, 
 for his Ailiftance, but likewife the Advan- 
 tage of the Chriftian Revelation, if he had 
 not thought himfelf above taking any Ad- 
 vantages, ftom confulting itj From which, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. i6^ 
 
 however, fome Benefit he hath received, no 
 doubt, by thofe Imprellions which were 
 once made on him, and which he hath not 
 been able to efface entirely. But if This very 
 Gentleman, under all thefe favourable Cir- 
 cumftances, and whilft he pretended to give 
 us a perfe<5l Scheme, (which Delign he exe, 
 cuted, without queftion, as well as he could) 
 hath yet fail'd lb grofsly, What might wc 
 exped from thofe, whom he terms Perfons 
 
 of the meaneft Capacity ? Perfons lefs ' 
 
 capable either of making out the feveral Prin- 
 ciples of moral Science, or of drawing them 
 forth into thofe Practical Conclufions, which 
 do truly, and in juft Rcafoning follow from 
 them ? • — I ihall add nothing more to the 
 dired Proof of this Point, but pafs on^ 
 
 2. Tofupport it, by examining what This 
 Writer hath advanced to the contrary. I fhall 
 not trouble mylelf with confident Affirma- 
 tions, where no Rcafon is alledg'd in Proof 
 of them, but only with fuch as he hath pre- 
 tended to fupport \vith Ibme Shew of Argu- 
 ing. Something to this purpofe we meet 
 with p. 26. where our Author argues from 
 the End for which Human Reafon was given 
 us, viz. To compare Things, and to judge 
 concerning the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of Adi- 
 eus ; From whence he concludes thus: 
 '' Could not our Reafon judge Ibundly in 
 *' all fuch Matters, it could not anfwcr the 
 ** End for which God bellowed it on us, " 
 
 But 
 
^66 A DEFENCE of 
 
 But this Ihave already confider'd in my FIrft 
 Chapter, p. 37. I fball therefore pafs on to 
 fome other Matters which may deferve Exa- 
 mination, and of which no Notice liath been 
 taken hitherto. And, 
 
 I. It is alledg'd, " That were we not ca- 
 *' pable by our Reafbn of diftinguilliing Good 
 '' from Evil, or knowing from the Confidera- 
 '' tlon of the invariable Perfedions of God, 
 '' what the Divine Goodnefs could command, 
 *' or forbid his Creatures, antecedently to 
 *' any external Revelation, we could not di- 
 <' ftinguilh the true inftituted Religion from 
 *' the many falfe ones. '* p. 6(5. 
 
 It is here allow'd freely, that every Man, 
 u e, every Moral Agent, is capable, in fome 
 Senfe, of diftinguilhing Good from Evil ; For^ 
 if he were abfolutely incapable of this, he 
 would ceafeto be a Moral Agent at all. But 
 the proper Queftion is here perplex'd, and 
 mifreprefented by our Author. We are not 
 enquiring, Whether Men are capable of do- 
 ing this in any Inftances, but whether they 
 are capable of doing it in all Inftances. 
 
 Befides, The Gentleman hath exprefs'd 
 himfelf fbmewhat unfortunately in Thefe 
 Terms, " diftinguilhing Good from Evil. '* 
 I fuppofe he means; the difcovering that to 
 be Good, which really is Good, and that to 
 be Evil, which really is Evil. If this be his 
 Senfe, I muft obferve, that a Man might be 
 incapable of doing this in many Cafes, in, 
 
 whi^U 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. i6y 
 
 which hefhould by no means confound Good 
 with Evil. For, there is plainly a Medium 
 between Good and Evil, viz. Indiflerent ^ and, 
 the Errors into which Men are moft apt to bj 
 betray 'd, confift in the confounding one or 
 other of thefe Extremes with the Middle. 
 
 But, not to criticize on Words, I will take 
 the Objedion thus, (as it muft be taken if he 
 intends it as any Objedion at all,) " Unlefs 
 " Men are capable, by their Reafon, of dif- 
 " covering every thing which is lit and pro- 
 " per on the one Hand, or unfit and impro- 
 " per on the other, and this antecedently to 
 *' any external Revelation, they will be in- 
 " capable of Judging concerning the Reve- 
 *' lation itfelf, and of diftinguilhing the true 
 ^' inftituted Religion from the many falfe 
 ** ones. 
 
 The Infufficiency of what is here alledg'd, 
 will appear by a parallel Inftance. Suppofe 
 aQiieftion fhould arife. Whether every Man 
 be capable of maftering the feveral Arts and 
 Sciences without a Teacher ? and it were al- 
 ledg'd, That every one muft be capable of 
 this, or elfe he would be unable to judge 
 Whether his Mafter lliould teach him right 
 or wrong j and confequently , that fucli 
 Teaching could be of no Service to him; 
 Would fuch Arguing as this, I pray, be ad- 
 mitted ? No, certainly : And that for thisj 
 Reafon, viz. That Things which might not 
 ]be known, or perhaps knowable without 
 
 Teaching, 
 
268 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Teaching, may yet immediately approve 
 themlelves to the Mind when taught: In 
 like manner, Things which could not be dii- 
 covered without a Revelation, may yet upon 
 that Revelation appear lb plainly agreeable 
 with Reafon , that a Man may not entertain 
 the leaft Doubt whether they are capable 
 of being true or no. In liich a Cafe, where 
 nothing can be concluded from the Nature 
 of the Thing, the External Evidence of the 
 Revelation mull take Place \ and if Men will 
 carefully attend to this, there can be no Room 
 for Error. 
 
 Befides, fuppofe I Ihould admit that the 
 Generality of Mankind want either the Capa- 
 city or Lciiure to try a Revelation thorough- 
 ly by its internal Charaders , and to judge 
 concerning every Part of it by the Rule of 
 Fit, and Unlit ; What then ? Is there no 
 Criterion whereby to diflinguilh the true in- 
 ftituted Religion from the many lalfe ones ? 
 I think there is; and that many, and incon- 
 teftable Miracles will ferve thePurpofe; con- 
 cerning the Evidence of which, confider'd 
 as Fads, Men are much more capable of 
 judging, than they are concerning tedious and 
 abftrad Realbnings. 
 
 And tho' it hath been alledg'd by this Au- 
 thor, that Miracles are no Proof, becaufe 
 thefe are capable of being wrought by Evil 
 Spirits to confirm an Impofture; yet he muft 
 allow, if he confidcrs that thefe Evil Spirirs 
 
 are 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 2^9 
 
 are fubjed to their Creator ; he muft, I fay, 
 allow, that no natural Powers they enjoy can 
 be exerciled without God's Permiflion : And 
 when he refleds that God is Wife and Good, 
 he mull allow likewife, that He will not per- 
 mit them to uie this Seal of his Authority to 
 confirm an Impofture ; at lead in thofe In- 
 ftances, where Men are incapable of guard- 
 ing againft the Delufion. On this Foot we 
 may fecure ourfelves againft all Difficulties 
 arifing from this Argument. For if Men are 
 capable of judging concerning miraculous 
 Fads ; and it God will not permit thofe to 
 be wrought in Confirmation of an Impo- 
 fture, where Men are of themfelves incom- 
 petent Judges of the Dodrines taught, 
 
 then there is none Occafion , in order to 
 fecure themieives from Delufion , that they 
 fliould have a full View of thefe^ Things an- 
 tecedently to a Revelation. The Wifdom 
 and Goodnefsof God are a fufficient Security, 
 notwithftanding the Imperfedion and Weak- 
 nefsof Man. 
 
 2. A Second Objedion to the fame Pur- 
 pofe is drawn from the Univerfality of the 
 Divine Government, and confequently, the 
 Univerfality of God's Laws. It occurs p. 
 ip7. and is thus reprefented by our Author ; 
 " When God ads as Governor of the Uni- 
 *' verfc, his Laws are alike defign'd for all 
 " under his Government, i.e. all Mankind j 
 
 " and 
 
17b A DEFENCE of 
 
 " and confequently, what equally con-* 
 " cerns all, muft be equally knowable by 
 " all. " 
 
 Laws which concern all Men, /, e. by 
 which all Men are obliged, muft be capable 
 of being known by all Men. This is cer- 
 tain ; becaufe no one can be pbligM to thatj 
 which he is incapable of knowing. So far 
 as this I muft allow what our Author con- 
 tends for, with this Referve only, tho' fuch 
 Laws may be knowable by all, yet they 
 may not be equally knowable, if by equally 
 he means, in the fame Degrees of Clearnels 
 and Perfedion. But then I muft obferve, 
 that this doth by no means come up to the 
 prefent Purpofe. The Qiieftion at prefent 
 is. Not whether every Man is capable of 
 knowing every Thing which is properly to 
 him a Law ; but, Whether every Man can, 
 in virtue of his natural Reafon, difcover all 
 the Fitnefles of Things ; and confequently, 
 all that is fuppos'd capable of becoming a 
 Law by being known. Thefe are quite 
 different Things, and therefore ought not to 
 be confounded. 
 
 And, if he ftiall tell us, (as the Argument 
 now under Examination requires he ftiould), 
 that forafmuch as all Men are equally under 
 God's Government, they muft have the very 
 lame Laws given them; and if the fame 
 Laws are given to all, they muft be equally 
 knowable by all j I muft deny the In- 
 ference, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, lyx 
 
 ference, and maintain, that the Univerfality 
 of Government doth by no means prove the 
 Identity and Univerfality of all God's Laws 
 with regard to his Creatures. This is appa- 
 rent even in Civil Conftitutions, in which 
 the fame Supreme Magiftrate doth by no 
 means govern all his Subjeds by the very 
 fame Laws, but by fuch different Rules as 
 are adapted to their feveral different Cfr- 
 cumftances. Thus likewife The Supreme 
 Being, tho', as Governor of the Univerfe, 
 He be Lord as well of the LTational as the 
 Rational Part of the Creation, yet He ftill 
 governs them by different Meafures; the 
 One by Inftind, the Other by the Rules of 
 Reafon. But whence comes this to pafs? 
 From hence certainly, that the One not 
 having fuch a Mealure of Capacity as to be 
 able to form to themfclves a Moral Rule, 
 and to confider it as The Divine Will, can- 
 not dired their Actions by fuch a Rule: For 
 the fame Caufe truift we affert, that fince 
 Reafonable Beings are to govern themfelves 
 by the Rules of Reafon, it muft be in Pro- 
 portion to the Degrees of Reafon they enjoy, 
 and the Opportunities they have of ufing it : 
 For, as to any Rules of Fitnefs by them un- 
 difcoverable, however evident they may be 
 to other Beings of fuperior Capacities, they 
 are upon the very fame Foot with Brutes 
 themfelves, and muft be exempted from all 
 
 Obli- 
 
272 J DEFENCE of 
 
 Obligation to them as the Brutes thcmfelvcs 
 are. 
 
 The Difference therefore between this 
 Gentleman and myfelf on the prefent Argu- 
 ment, is This ; I maintain that the Rules 
 of Fitnels are juft lb far univerfal Laws, as 
 they are univerfally knowable; and con- 
 fequently, if they are not univerfally know- 
 able, they are not univerfal Laws : He, on 
 the other Hand, fuppofcs, without any fuf^ 
 ficient Proof, that thefe are univerfal Laws; 
 and from fuch a fuppos'd Univerfality of the 
 Laws, concludes, that they muft be univer- 
 fally knowable. I fhall only add, that this 
 is a Begging the Qiieftion, and a Taking 
 that for granted, which he is concern'd to 
 prove. 
 
 3. The third Argument by which he en- 
 deavours to evince this Point, That a proper 
 Rule of Life is perfedly knowable by Men 
 of the meanefl Capacity, amounts to this ; 
 That the meaner Peoples 'Circumftances are, 
 the fewer are the Particulars they are con- 
 cern'd in ; and confequently, tho' they 
 Ihould be luppos'd to fall Ihort of others in 
 Point of Knowledge, yet they may be per-- 
 fedly acquainted with all thofe Things in 
 which they have any manner of Concern. 
 We meet with it in the 281ft p. where 
 our Author thus exprelTes himfelf^ ^' The 
 " meaner People are, and the lower their 
 " Station, the fewer are the Things their 
 
 " Duty 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 17 j 
 
 ** Duty confifts in ; and thofe fo very plain, 
 " that they cannot well miftake with Rela- 
 " tion either to God or Man, were they not 
 " impos'd on by artful Men. "' 
 
 What are the Matters in which their 
 
 Duty, properly fpeaking, confifts, i. e. which 
 
 they are Itridlly oblig'd to, is, as hath been 
 
 faid above, befide the prefent Queftion ; 
 
 fince we are now enquiring Not about The 
 
 Law which makes Duty, but that proper 
 
 Rule of Life which is built on Fitneis. 
 
 Thus much, however, muft be allow 'd this 
 
 Gentleman, that the meaner Men are, the 
 
 fewer will thofc Things be which are fit and 
 
 proper for them to do ; becaufc^ by this 
 
 means, they will fuftain fewer Relations, 
 
 and confequently, have lefs to acl in Life. 
 
 But what, I pray, can be concluded from 
 
 this ? That thele Perfons muft therefore be 
 
 capable of difcovering for themfelves every 
 
 Thing which is fit and proper for them to 
 
 do? Will this, I fiiy, follow? or is there 
 
 • the leaft Colour for making this Conclufion ? 
 
 Let me obferve, that all the feveral Fitnefles 
 
 which refuit from the Confiderations of 
 
 Creator and Creature ; of the Relations which 
 
 fubfift between Intelligent Beings as fuch ; 
 
 and of thofe likewife which are built on the 
 
 Confideration of Man as a Rational Animal, 
 
 are the fame with refped to Perfons in the 
 
 mcaneft Condition of Life, as to thofe in 
 
 the higheft. In this regard there is no Dif- 
 
 T ference 
 
274 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 ference between Men, under whatever Va- 
 riety of Circumftances they live. But are all 
 thefe io perfedly difcoverable by Men in 
 the lowed Condition ? 
 
 Befides, the Gentleman hath us'd fomc- 
 what of unbecoming Art in wording his 
 Argument. He tells us, " The meaner 
 " People are, and the lower their Station, 
 " the fewer are the Things their Duty con- 
 " fifts in. " But the Queftion doth not 
 relate merely to the Meannefs of their Cir- 
 cumftances, but the Meannefs of their Ca- 
 pacity. " Religion, fays he p. 1^7, which 
 '* way fbever revealed, carries iuch internal 
 ** Marks of Truth, as at all Times and 
 *' Places Ihews itfelf even to the meamft 
 *' Capacity^ 6Cc. " So again p. 284. He 
 declares, " That it makes moft for the 
 " Honour of God, and Good of Men, to 
 " fuppofe, that all God's Laws fhould carry 
 ^* with them fuch evident Marks of Good- 
 " nefs and Kindnefs for the whole Race of 
 " Mankind ; that Men odh^meamft CapacU 
 " ties^ even tho' they can't read their native 
 " Language, may know their Duty. " ''Tis 
 the Capacity which is the principal Thing 
 to be confider'd in this (^icftion : And there- 
 fore, tho' it Ihould be fuppos'd, that the 
 bare Meannefs of Condition Ihould not pre- 
 vent their difcovering every Thing which is 
 fit and proper; yet, I hope, the Meannefs of 
 Mens Capacities might. This I do, and 
 
 cannot 
 
Reveal D Religion^ C^c-. 175 
 
 cannot but maintain. This I have cndea- 
 vour'd to evince, as well from common 
 Experience, as the Reafon and Nature of 
 the Thing itfelf : On the other Hand, This 
 Gentleman confidently efpoufes the other 
 Side of the Queftion : Is frequent in his Af- 
 firmations, and thinks that thefe muft pals 
 for Proofs ; for, as to any Thing of real 
 Argument, he is entirely deficient ; and, if 
 he ever aims at any thing that Way, all the 
 Shew that it even feems to have at firft 
 Sight, is owing to Nothing more than this, 
 that his Expreffions are equivocal, and the 
 Point he fpeaks to mif-ftated by him. Fit 
 Methods to be us'd in fo bad a Caufe ! 
 
 So much having been offer'd on the Firft 
 Queftion, which I propos'd in the Beginning 
 of this Chapter, I fhall be very brief on the 
 Second ; becaufe, if a proper Rule of Life 
 be not perfectly difcoverable by Men of the 
 meaneft Capacity, it will follow a fortiori^ 
 that it cannot be eafily difcoverable. Yet 
 fomething to this Purpofe may be necelTary 
 on another Account. For, upon Suppofi- 
 tion that I fhould grant all our Author con- 
 tends for on the former Qiieftion, yet I 
 might ftill difpute this Point with him, and 
 be able to maintain the Expediency of a 
 Revelation, in order to make the proper 
 Rule of Life more eafily difcoverable by 
 Perfons of mean Capacity, than it could 
 T 2 have 
 
176 J DEFENCE o/ 
 
 have been from the jnere Workings of their 
 Minds. 
 
 Let us then fuppole that all Things fit 
 and proper to be done are fimply difcover- 
 able by all ; Doth it follow from hence that 
 it muft be eafily difcoverable ? Is every 
 Thing eafily to be done, which is poffible 
 to be done ? No certainly : And therefore 
 we mufi: try, whether it will appear from 
 other Confiderations, that this is fo very eafy 
 a Matter as this Author contends it is ; in 
 doing which, I ihall proceed, as I did be- 
 fore j and argue as well from the Experience 
 of ATankind, as the Nature of the Thing. 
 
 Now, the very Wifeft and Greateft Men 
 have not found it fo eafy a Matter to trace 
 out all Things of a Moral Concern. The 
 Philofophers have bufy'd thcnifclves this 
 Way, and found full Employment for their 
 Minds ; and after all, have been fo far from 
 difcovering every Thing they enquired after, 
 that fucceeding Writers have frequently 
 added to the Difcoveries of their Prede- 
 celfors. Be it therefore, that thofe who 
 err'd did not ^rr unavoidably^ yet ftill I 
 muft affirm, that the Confideration of thefe 
 Errors fufficiently proves, that the Truths 
 from which they err'd fo often, were re- 
 mote; That there were Intricacies in the 
 
 feveral Quefiions before them, Things, 
 
 to them at leaft, difficult ; and confequently, 
 that the Subjed they were upon, was not 
 
 3 fo 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 277 
 
 fo very plain and eafy as this Gentleman 
 reprefents it. 
 
 And indeed, had Matters been fo exceed- 
 ingly obvious, what Occafion would there 
 have been for taking any Pains at all? What 
 Occafion for labouring a Point, which, it feems, 
 " is fo clearly and fully manifefted in the Book 
 " of Nature, that he who runs may read it ? '' 
 p. 28. What Occafion for writing Books on this 
 Subied, and pretending to teach Mankind 
 Matters " v/hich (hew themfelves fo plainly 
 " to the meaneft Capacities ? *' On this 
 Suppofition Study were trifling ; and the 
 publifhing to the World Schemes which 
 every one knew before-hand, or might 
 eafily know without AfTiftance from others, 
 muft be abfolutely ridiculous. 
 
 Nay, let me ask This Gentleman, Whe- 
 ther his own Scheme of Morality, defective 
 as it is, coft him no Pains or Thought at 
 all ? Or, if it did not. Whether he could 
 have drawn it out fo eafily, had he never 
 accuftom'd himfelf to clofe Thinking ; had 
 he not formerly^ examined certain Principles 
 with Care, and treafur'd them up for future 
 Ufe in arguing? Can this therefore be thought 
 fo very eafy a Work, even to a Perfon of 
 the meaneft Capacity, which hath requir'd 
 long preparatory Studies, and a fettled Ha^ 
 bit of Thinking in a Gentleman of good 
 
 natural Talents? Or, will he affirm, 
 
 that the Scheme which he hath now ofFcr'd 
 
 T 3 to 
 
278 J DEFENCE of 
 
 to the World is obvious to every Under* 
 ftanding, and that Perfons of the meaneft 
 Capacity muft take it immediately, Let 
 him try an ordinary and illiterate Perlbn, if 
 he pleafes : And if it fhall appear upon 
 Trial, that he hath Stated (I will not fay 
 all Matters of Moral Import, for this he hath 
 not done by any means, but) the feveral 
 Particulars niention'd by him fo clearly, as 
 to be immediately underftood and afTented 
 to by every one to whom they are proposed, 
 I will on this Condition give up the Point. 
 
 But fure I am that this is impollible : 
 For, from the Nature of the Thing it is cer- 
 tain, that the more remote any Conclufions 
 are from their original Principles, the greater 
 Attention and Sagacity are requir'd to the 
 making them. Now, where thefe are re* 
 quir'd, Things cannot be obvious and eafy 
 to every one. Attention itfelf is painful 
 even to the fagacious : How much more 
 muft it be fo where the Want of Parts fhall 
 ftill increafe the Difficulty ! Are there no 
 Moral Conclufions then which depend on a 
 
 long Train of Reafoning ? Perhaps our 
 
 Author will tell us. No: Every thing is 
 immediately reducible to the Rule of Fit- 
 
 nefs. Be it fo : But then the next 
 
 Qiieftion is, What are the Things which 
 are fit and proper ? The Anfwer will be, 
 Thofe which are fuitable to the Relations in 
 which we ftand to God and our Fellow 
 
 Creatures. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 279 
 
 Creatures. Very well ; yet Two new 
 Queftions will arife, What are thofe Rela- 
 tions; and What are thofe Adions which 
 are really fuited to them ? Both thefe miift 
 be fettled ; and each of them will ftill mul- 
 tiply themfelves into a vaft Variety of other 
 Queftions. For, in order to know Wha-c 
 thefe feveral Relations are, we muft know, 
 in a good Degree, the feveral Natures re- 
 lated j and this will carry us on to fome of 
 the deepeft Enquiries in Natural Philofophy, 
 and Metaphyficks. Or, fuppofing all thefe 
 known, yet ftill it remains to be enquir'd, 
 What Adions are really fuited to thefe 
 feveral Relations ; to determine which we 
 fhall be oblig'd to enquire farther into the 
 certain, the probable, and, in fome Cafes, 
 the poflible Confequences of our Adions: 
 For, without knowing Thefe, we cannor, 
 in all Cafes, determine What is fit to be 
 done ; or, if you pleafe, What is fuitable 
 to, and expreliive of the feveral Relations 
 we fuftain. 
 
 From this {h<ftt View of Matters it will 
 appear, (if it did not fufficiently appear be- 
 fore, upon the very firft Reflexion,) that 
 a proper Rule of Life, however difcover- 
 able fimply, yet is not eafily difcoverable 
 by every one. In Truth, our Author's 
 Affertion on this Point, is fo very grofs, and 
 contrary to common Senfe and Experience, 
 that he hath not pretended to fupport it 
 
 T 4 by 
 
tio J DEFENCE of 
 
 by Argument. He hath, indeed, Once of 
 Twice leem'd to intimate fomething this 
 way, and but leem'd to do it. Thus, " I 
 ^' can't help thinking but, fuch is The Di- 
 " vine Goodnefs, God's Will is fo clearly 
 " and fully manifefted in the Book of Na- 
 " ture, that he who runs may read it. " 
 p. 2.8. And in another Place, '^ Let any one 
 " fay, how 'tis poffible God could more 
 ^' fully make known his Will to All intel- 
 ^' ligent Creatures, than by making every 
 " Thing within and without them a Decla- 
 " ration of it, and an Argument for obfer- 
 " ving it. '■ p. ip. In the former PaiTage 
 our Author feems to build his Alfertion 
 on the Coniideration of The Divine Good- 
 nefs. But fince he hath not endcavour'd to 
 iliew, how The Divine Goodnels proves his 
 Point, the bare mention of the Divine Good- 
 nefs can by no Means pals for an Argument. 
 As to the other PaiTage, in which The Gen- 
 tleman demands, How 'tis poffible God 
 ihould more fully make known his Will, 
 than by making every 'Aing within and 
 without a Declaration of it ; or, as he ex- 
 prefTes himfelf in another Pl.ace, " [God] 
 *^ cannot fpeak more plainly than he hath 
 *' already done by the Things themfelves ; " 
 p. 27. Here likewiic he confidently affirms 
 a Point without proving it. And his Confi- 
 f3ence is the more furprifing, becaufe he 
 f arries Matters fb much farther than any one 
 
 hatl^ 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 281 
 
 hath ever pretended to carry them before 
 him. Still, this is not all; Our Author, not 
 content barely to aflert, that God cannot 
 make Things plainer in any other Way, 
 than he hath done by the Nature of 
 Things, goes on to maintain. That if a Re- 
 velation fhould be given us, yet it will be 
 more difficult to underftand the Proof, and to 
 comprehend the Meaning of it, than it is to 
 difcover what is fit and proper from the 
 Nature and Reafon of Things. This is bold 
 indeed : And if he can make this AfTertion 
 good, the Credit of Revelation muft fink 
 entirely. For That is no Revelation where 
 Nothing is reveal'd ; and Nothing can be 
 xeveal'd, if Things cannot be made more eafy 
 than they were before. A Point of this Con- 
 fequence will defcrve to be copfider'd in a 
 Chapter by itfelf. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
282 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Whether a proper Rule of Life he more 
 eajily^ and more perfectly difcover* 
 able hy m, than the 'Proof or Mean' 
 ing of a Ren^elation can he. 
 
 EFORE I proceed to the parti- 
 cular Examination of this Qiie- 
 ftion, I muft oblerve fomewhat on 
 Two or Three Diftinclions, which 
 frequently occur in this Gentleman's Perform- 
 ance, and which may be apt to confound 
 and miflead his Readers, if they are not right- 
 ly imderftood, and carefuly attended to. 
 
 He diftinguifhes then, between Revelation 
 Internal^ and External ; Immediate^ and Ale- 
 (tiate ; Onginalj and TraditionciL By Reve- 
 lation internal, immediate, and original, he 
 means the Dilcovery which is made of Things 
 in the Ufe of our natural Reafon ; and by 
 Jlevelation external, mediate, and traditional, 
 he underftands what the World generally un- 
 derltands by the wo^d Revelation, /. e. fuch 
 
 ft Pifgo- 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 18} 
 
 a Difcovery as God is pleas'd to make, or 
 is fuppos'd to make to us in an extra- 
 ordinary Way. I prefume, he calls it ex- 
 ternal, becaufe it is confirm'd to us by ex- 
 ternal Signs, fuch as Miracles, or the like ; 
 mediate, becaufe it is delivered to us by the 
 Mediation of Prophets ; and traditional, be- 
 caufe delivered down from one to another 
 fucceilively, in the fame way as other Tra- 
 ditions are. 
 
 But, is This fuch a Ufe of the word Re- 
 velation as can be juftify'd by the common 
 Forms of Speaking ? Have the Generality of 
 Authors diftinguilh'd concerning Revelation 
 in the way he hath ? Do not Writers under- 
 fland by it, fuch a Manifeftation of the Divine 
 Will, as is made by fome extraordinary Acl 
 of God himfelf ? Do we ever read that Ma- 
 thematical or Natural Philofophy is made 
 known to us by inteynal^ immedlatey and 
 prighml Revelation ? But why might not 
 Thefe be as well faid to be reveal*d as 
 Ethicks, if Revelation neceffarily imported 
 nothing more, than a Difcovery made in the 
 mere Ufe of Reafon ? The Truth is, I 
 cannot but think the Gentleman had a 
 Defign to ferve by this afFeded Singularity 
 of Expreflion ; and that his Intention was, 
 10 perplex and deceive his Readers. 
 
 However this Matter be, I muft infift 
 on it, That Revelation, in th^e proper Senfc 
 of the Word, fignifies, The Difcovery of 
 
 fome- 
 
284 J DEFENCE of 
 
 Ibmething made to us by an extraordinary 
 Ad on God's Part. If this be true, then 
 Internal Revelation will be, the making this 
 Dilcovery by Ibme internal Ad upon the 
 Mind of that Perlbn to whom it is made : 
 Revelation is Immediate, when no fubordi- 
 nate Agent is employ'd, in order to convey 
 the Difcovery ; and Original, when the 
 Difcovery is not delivered down in Succef- 
 fion, as Traditional Matters are. On the 
 other hand, Revelation external fignifies, 
 the making Difcoveries of certain Things, 
 and confirming the Truth and Reality of 
 them by external Evidence ; Revelation me- 
 diate, is, the communicating to fome, the 
 Difcoveries made to others, by immediate 
 Revelation • and- Traditional fignifies, the 
 conveying down from one to another, in 
 Succeflion, thofe Difcoveries, which may 
 be trac'd up to original Revelation, 
 
 I might, after having noted the general 
 Ufeof thefe Terms, and explain'd myfelf 
 on the proper Meaning of them, apply them 
 in a Senfe different from this Author. But 
 I fhall chufe rather to forbear : And where 
 this Author ules the term Internal Revela- 
 tion, I lliall exprefs my felf by the Dif- 
 covery of Natural Reafon ; and what he 
 calls External Revelation, 1 fhall term Ex- 
 traordinary Revelation. 
 ■ This being noted, I fhall pafs on to the 
 Great Point, which muft be the Subjed of 
 
 the 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c: 285 
 
 the prefent Chapter ; and obferve, that Two 
 Qiicftions will here arife : 
 
 1. Whether a proper Rule of Life be 
 more eafily and more perfedly difcpverable, 
 in the mere Ule of our Reafon, than it can 
 be by any immediate Ad of The Supreme 
 Being upon our Minds, revealing it to us ? 
 And, 
 
 2. Whether it be more eafily and more 
 perfectly difcoverable in the Ufe of Reafon, 
 than the Proof or Meaning of that Revela- 
 tion is, which hath either been deliver'd to 
 us by the fubordinate Inftruments of Provi- 
 dence, or convey 'd down to us from one to 
 another in the traditionary way ? And tho* 
 this latter QiiefHon is what I am principally 
 concerned to examine, ytt the former muft 
 not be left untouched. 
 
 Let it be fuppos'd then, if you pleafe, 
 that a proper Rule of Life is difcoverable 
 by us in the Exercife of Realbn : Let it be 
 fuppos'd again, that this may be difcover*d 
 in the utmoft Perfection, and without any 
 difcouraging Diiticulties : Yet Hill, cannot 
 The Supreme Being make the fame Difco- 
 veries to us by an immediate Adion upon 
 our Minds, and without the Intervention of 
 Reafon in colleding them ? No doubt but 
 he may do this, if he plcafcs : For, as the 
 doing this implies no manner of Contradic- 
 tion, and confcquently muft be the Objed 
 of Power ; fo it muft be free and open to 
 
 him 
 
lU ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 him who is the original Fountain of Powef. 
 It is abfurd to affirm, that He who created 
 our very Beings, is incapable of ading upon 
 them ; or that he cannot as well imprefs 
 Sentiments on the Mind, capable of receiv- 
 ing them, as produce Motion in Bodies 
 capable of being mov'd. Now, fuch a Re- 
 velation as this, is commonly exprefs'd by 
 the word Infpiration ; which, if God Ihould 
 be pleased to grant Men, this Qiieftion will 
 arife ; Whether Matters, difcoverable by the 
 ordinary Exercife of Reafon, be more eafily 
 and perfedly dilcoverable that way, than 
 they can be by Infpiration itfelf ? 
 
 To determine this Qj.ieftion, I muft 
 obferve, That by Reafon, in this Place, 
 muft be meant theFaculty of deducing fome 
 Truths from others which were known be- 
 fore ; This fuppofing fome original Prin- 
 ciples to build upon term'd Self-evident, 
 makes out Conclufions by Ihewing their ne- 
 cefTary Connexion with thefe Principles. 
 The Rule of Life therefore confifting of a 
 Variety of Precepts not evident of themfelves, 
 but proveable, muft be made out by our 
 Reafon in the way of Inference : In which 
 Cafe, in Proportion to the Degrees of Reafon 
 enjoy'd by any one, his Colledion of Pre- 
 cepts will be more or lefs perfed:, and made 
 with greater or lefs Difpatch and Eafe. 
 
 Give me Leave therefore to ask, Whe- 
 ther, upon Suppofition that God ftiould im- 
 prefs 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 28/ 
 
 prels on Mens Minds, in the way of In- 
 I'piration, a Senfe of thofc Precepts which 
 
 conftitute the proper Rule of Life \ 
 
 Let me ask, I fay. Whether the Know- 
 ledge acquir'd this way, might not be as 
 perfe6i: or extenfive, and as eafily attained, 
 as by the ordinary Exercife of Reafbn in 
 the way of arguing. This furely cannot be 
 made a Qiieftion, when we confider, that if 
 God can make any one Kind of Impreflions 
 on us, he may make any other Kind which 
 we are capable of receiving : And when he 
 does fo, the Precepts imprefs'd will have as 
 certain an Evidence as that which belongs 
 to Principles Self-evident : They will be per- 
 ceived with the fame Eafe ; and therefore, 
 cannot be more difficult to be apprehended, 
 than thofe which are made out in a long 
 Courfe of Arguing. 
 
 There is a PaSage in our Author which 
 feems to contradid what is alTerted by me 
 here ; and upon which I muft offer Ibme 
 Remarks before I difmifs this Point. " Were 
 " it not (fays he) for thofe Self-evident 
 " Notions, which are the Foundation of all 
 " our Realbnings, there could be no intel- 
 " ledual Communication between God and 
 " Man ; Nor, as we are frani'd, can God 
 " afcertain us of any Truth, but by fhew- 
 " ing its Agreement with thcfe Self-evident 
 " Notions, which are the Tefts whereby 
 " we are to judge of every Thing, even 
 3 «' the 
 
i88 A DEFENCE of 
 
 *' the Being of a God, and Natural Religion-. 
 p. 184. 
 
 I conceive from what hath been faid 
 above, there might be an intellectual Com- 
 munication between God and Man, without 
 any Regard had to thofe Self-evident No- 
 tions, of which our Author fpeaks. No one 
 troubles himfelf about Self-evident Notions, 
 in the mere Exercife of his Self-confcious 
 Power, or the bare Perception of what pafles 
 within him. Whenever therefore God fhall 
 make any Impreffions on us, Thefe alio may 
 . be perceiv'd, without any regard to Selt- 
 cvident Notions, And, as the Impreffions 
 may be thus perceiv'd, fo likewife may 16 
 be known from whence thefe Impreffions 
 come. For, no one can reckon it impoffible 
 but God may, if he pleafes, make us as in-^ 
 timately confcious that thefe Impreffions are 
 made by him, as that any Impreffions are 
 made on us at all. Now, if this be true, 
 then 6od may hold intelledual Communica- 
 tion with us, notwithftanding he ffiould not 
 refer us back to lirft and Self-evident No- 
 tions. 
 
 Our Author goes on ; *' Nor, as we are 
 *' fram'd, can God afcertain us of any Truth, 
 " but by fhewing its Agreement with thole 
 " Self-evident Notions, which are the Foun- 
 " dation of all our Rcafoning. " This is a 
 very bold Limitation of The Divine Power ; 
 and the more inexcufable, becaufe it is fc> 
 
 evidently 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 289 
 
 evidently void of all manner of Foundation. 
 But, whilft our Author is alTcrting fo boldly-j 
 and telling us fo magifterially, what God can, 
 or cannot do, it would have become him to 
 have exprefs'd himfelf in a clear and deter- 
 minate manner ; which, I conceive, he hath 
 by no means done in the prefent Cafe. What, 
 I would beg to know, does he mean by the 
 ^gr€eme?itofTiuth. with Self-evident No- 
 tions ? Does he mean a Confiftency with 
 them ? or. Does he mean a Connexion with 
 them ? If he intends the latter, ( as I am 
 led to think he does, from confidering the 
 Courfe of his Reafoning in this Paragraph), 
 then his AfTeition will amount to this, That 
 God cannot afcertain us of any Truth, but 
 by arguing us into it, and proving it to us 
 in the vifible Connexion it hath with firft 
 and Self-evident Principles. His Sentiments 
 to this Purpofe are plainly reprefented in 
 another Place, p. ipp. where he tells us, 
 " The Holy Ghoft cannot deal with Men 
 " as rational Creatures, but by propofing Ar- 
 " guments to convince their Underftandings, 
 " and influence their Wills, in the fame 
 " manner as if propos'd by other Agents j 
 " For, to go beyond this, would be making 
 *' ImpreiTions on Men as a Seal does on 
 " Wax, to the confounding of tlieir Reafbn 
 " and Liberty in chufmg ; and the Man 
 " would then be merely paflive ; and the 
 " At^ion would be the Adion of another 
 
 U " Being 
 
ipo y/ DEFENCE of 
 
 *' Being aQiiig upon him, for which he 
 " could be no ways accountable. " 
 
 Upon this State of the Matter I fhall offer 
 Two Remarks : 
 
 "-''iiV That our Author's Affertipns are abfo- 
 lutely falfe, and in their Conlequences mon- 
 ftrous. And, 
 
 2. If they were true, they would not pre- 
 judice the main Point contended for under 
 this Head. 
 
 As to the Truth of his Aflertion, " That 
 *' God cannot afcertain us of any Truth, but 
 " by {hewing its Agreement with Self-evi- 
 " dent Notions ; And, that The Holy Ghoft 
 " cannot deal with Men as rational Crea- 
 " tares, but by propofing Arguments, (S''r. in 
 " the fame manner as proposed by other A- 
 *' gents ; "' I muft obferve, that we may be, 
 and often are certain of many Truths, with- 
 out recurring to thofe Arguments, which fhevv 
 their Connexion with Principles felf-evident. 
 In many Things we depend on the Authority 
 of Men, whole Skill and Veracity weeltecm ; 
 and this in Proportion to the AfTurance we 
 have of their intellectual and moral Cha- 
 la^iers. It is true indeed, our Affent to 
 Matters on this Foundation cannot be pro- 
 perly termed Knowledge : But the Queftion 
 is not here. Whether we can be properly 
 faid to know this way ; but, Whether we 
 can receive Affurance from it. It muft be 
 confefs'd farther, that forafmuch as Men are 
 Jmpcrfed, as well with regard to their intel- 
 ^' Icdual 
 
Revealed Religion, &c. ipi 
 
 ledlual Charader as their moral, fo we can- 
 not receive any abfolute Aflurance in Mat- 
 ters which depend on mere human Authori- 
 ty. But yet, were there any Men abfolute- 
 ly incapable of being deceived themfelves^ 
 and of deceiving Others, we might then re- 
 ceive as great an Aflurance concerning the 
 Truth of Propofitions affirm'd by them, as 
 we are able to draw from Demonftration it- 
 lelf. The Certainty would be the fame in 
 both Cafes , how much loever the Methods 
 of producing it might differ. Put the Cafe 
 then, that God himfelf iliall affirm a Propo- 
 
 fition ; fhali either imprefs it on a Man's 
 
 Mind in the Way of Inlpiration, or convey it 
 to Men confirm'd by fuch Proofs as are fuffi- 
 
 cient Evidences of a Divine Authority : 
 
 In this Cafe, I fay, the Truth of the Propo- 
 fition will be entirely certain; not perhaps 
 from any appearing Connexion which the 
 Propofition has with Notions felf-evident, but 
 from another Confideration which will equally 
 fecure its Truth, viz. That God hath affirm'd 
 it, who can neither err, nor deceive. 
 
 Thus much with regard to fpeculativc Pro- 
 pofitions: In reference to practical, or thofc 
 Precepts by which we are to dired our Be- 
 haviour, the Point will be, if poflible, clear- 
 er. Th? proper Queftion on this Head muft 
 be, What is the Will of God : And this muft 
 be difcover'd to us, either in the Ufe of our 
 natural Reafon, or elfe by extraordinary 
 U 2 Com- 
 
2pz A DEFENCE of 
 
 Communication from God himfelf. In the 
 former Way Men argue from the Nature and 
 Fitncfs of the Thing, that the Wife and 
 Good Author of our Being mull will it; from 
 whofe Win, thus difcover'd, our Obligation 
 to conform ourfelves to thefe Precepts is de- 
 rived- Now if fuch Rules, founded in Fit- 
 neis, become to us Precepts or Laws, not 
 merely on Account of the Fitnefs itfelf, but 
 bccaufe they are the W ill of God ; and if the 
 Confideration of Fitnefs is o'nly one Way 
 whereby we come to learn What God's Will, 
 
 in this refped, is ; then , whatever elfe 
 
 will point out God's Will, muft equally dif- 
 cover thofe Precepts. Put the Cafe then that 
 a Body of Laws is deliver'd : May we not be 
 aflur'd, that thefe Laws are the Will of God, 
 from the very Delivery and Confirmation of 
 them, unlefs we are argued into it in the 
 other Way , by tracing Matters up to felf- 
 evident Principles ? Is it any more impoffi- 
 ble for God to manifeftlxis Will by an expreis 
 Declaration of it, than it is for Man to do fo ? 
 And yet we lee, this is done every Day in 
 Civil and Domeftick Concerns : and we think 
 ourfelves fufficiently apprized of the Will of 
 our Superiors by their exprefs Declarations, 
 without enquiring nicely on what Reafons 
 they proceed, and what Connexion there is 
 between the Precepts given and other necefla- 
 ry and felf-evident Truths. 
 
 Nor 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &€, 19^ 
 
 Nor will ic follow at all from hence , as 
 our Author contends it muft, that if The 
 Holy Ghoft fliould deal 'with us otherwifc 
 
 than merely by propofing Arguments; • 
 
 that if he fhould inform us directly what God 
 requires , without afligning the Ground and 
 Reafon of the Command, " This would be 
 ** a making Impreffions on Men , as a Seal 
 " does on Wax, to the confounding of their 
 " Reafon , and Liberty in Choofing. '" Let 
 the Gentleman IhcNvme, How this confounds 
 Reafon at all: Let him tell me, What One Prin- 
 ciple of Reafon it contradids ; or, in what 
 refpecl it crofTes upon, or hinders the Exer- 
 cife of Reafon. For, even in this Cafe, tho* 
 the Precept be delivered without afligning the 
 Reafon of it, yet Men are flill at Liberty 
 to fearch out the Reafon, if they pleafe : 
 And whilftthey maintain an unreferv'd Obe- 
 dience to the Divine Will, the Application of 
 their Reafon to this purpofe will be proper, 
 and; upon that Account, acceptable to God. 
 But What if, after all, the real Ground of the 
 Precept given ihall Hill conceal itielf ? Why, 
 even in this Cafe there will appear a fufScient 
 Reafon for Obedience, becaufe God himfelf 
 injoins it : So far as this, Reafon ftill directs 
 us; and confequently, cannot be opposed, 
 or confounded this Way. 
 
 But he adds farther, that this deftroys Liber- 
 ty \ that " the Man would then be paffive; 
 
 " and the Action vvould be the Adion of 
 U 3 " another 
 
294 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 ** another Being acling upon him, for which 
 " he could be no ways accountable. "' But 
 let me ask, In what refpeft is the Man paflive? 
 What is the A<^ion, concerning which our 
 Author here fpeaks ? and, What is that 
 Thing for which he cannot, in this Cafe, be 
 accountable? Why, All this muft be rcferr'd 
 to the Ad of Infpiration, or that Ad where- 
 by the Will of God is made known to him 
 in a Way extraordinary. In this refped Man 
 is , no doubt , paflive : The Adion is the 
 Adion not of the Man but of the Infpirer ; and 
 for having or not having this Adion exerted 
 upon him he cannot be accountable : Whe- 
 ther a Man fhall be really infpir'd or not, is 
 not the Concern of his own Liberty, but God's. 
 But, what then ? Is not a Man ftill free 
 either to obey thofe reveal'd Precepts, or to 
 difobey them ? and confequently. Is not the 
 natural Liberty of Adion as well maintained 
 in this way as in our Author's? Surely this 
 cannot need a Proof. 
 
 Hitherto I have endeavour'd, in the dired 
 way of Argument, to refute our Author's 
 grofs AlTertion, *' That God cannot afcertain 
 ^* us of any Truth, butby fhewing the Con- 
 " nexion it hath with felf-evident Notions : *• 
 I fhall now advance a Step farther, and point 
 out fome of the monftrous Confequences 
 which will follow upon Suppofition that the 
 before-mentioned AfTertion is true. 
 
 Thg 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, ip% 
 
 The Aflertion muft refolve itfclf into this 
 Principle, viz. That we cannot be afcertain'd 
 of any Truth whatfoevcr, but in that way of 
 tracing Matters which our Author hath infift- 
 ed on. If this be admitted, then how came 
 we to be afcertain'd of thel'e firft Principles 
 or felf-evident Notions themfelves? Notfure- 
 ly by tracing them back to other felf-evident 
 Principles : This our Author, bold as he is, 
 will not fuppofe : Or, if he Ihould, he muft 
 be reduc'd to this Abfurdity, vfz. That we 
 cannot be afcertain'd of any Thing but by 
 tracing it back from Principle to Principle 
 in itijinttumy i. e. We can never be certain of 
 any Thing at all. What, again, will he fay 
 of Senfitive Knowledge, or the AfTurance we 
 have of Things without us in the Exercife of 
 our Senfes? This certainly is not made out by 
 any Connexion which thefe Things have with 
 other felf-evident Truths. Or, will he affirm, 
 That we cannot be fure of any Thing upon 
 the Credit of Human Teftimony ? Then fare- 
 well not only to the Faith of Hiftory, but to 
 all civil Faith : The Ties of Society, and 
 the Grounds of Commerce are deftroy'd en- 
 tirely. Or, will this Gentleman affirm, That 
 civil Governors cannot prefcribe to their 
 Subjeds otherwifc than by teaching them the 
 
 Realbn and Fitnefs of their Commands, 
 
 by applying to them in the demonftrative 
 Way, and arguing them into Obedience jaft 
 as Philofophers inftrud their Pupils ? And 
 
 U 4 yet, 
 
1^6 yf DEFENCE o/ 
 
 yet, this he muft affirm, if the Pofition he 
 hath laid down be true, unlefs he will allow 
 more to Civil Magiftraces, than he doth to 
 the Supreme Governor of the Univerfc. 
 Thefe are Confequences fb manifeftly follow- 
 ing from what our Author hath advanced, 
 and fo extravagant in themfelves, that I can- 
 not think any Thing farther is neccffary to 
 overthrow this Pofitionj than to point out 
 thefe Confequences. 
 
 After all, fuppofing what our Author 
 hath here afferted were true, yet ftill it 
 would not prejudice the main Thing con- 
 tended for under this Head ; nor prove in 
 the leaft, that a proper Rule of Life is more 
 perfedly and more eafily difcoverable by us 
 in the ordinary \]{^c of Reafon, than it can 
 be by a fpecial Revelation from God. 
 
 Let us imagine then, however extravagant 
 the Imagination may feem, " that God can- 
 ** not alcertain us of any Truth but by fhew- 
 *' ing its Agreement with felf-evident No- 
 " tions : And, that The Holy Ghoft cannot 
 " deal with Men as rational Creatures, but 
 *' by propofing Arguments, &c. in the 
 *' fame manner as propos'd by other Agents^" 
 yet ftill I fay, If God may ad diredly upon 
 the Mind, he may, by this Means, aflift 
 our natural Powers ; He may make fome 
 Matters appear to us, which would never 
 have appear'd otherwife ; He may fhe\v 
 their Connexion with felf-eyident Truth? 
 
 more 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 297 
 
 more diftindly ; or, carry us on from one 
 Conclufion to another, thro' the whole 
 Coiirfe of the Argument, with much greater 
 Difpatch and Eafc. Don't we fee, that 
 notwithftanding we all of us enjoy certain 
 Portions of natural Reafon, by the Ufe 
 of which we are capable of making Im- 
 provements in the feveral Sciences, yet we 
 act this Way with much better Succels 
 whilft direded by fome skilful Perfon, than 
 if we had been left entirely to ourfelves. 
 The Reafon of this is plain enough : It is 
 not the mere Power of Reafon, but the Ex- 
 ercife of this Power which difcovers Truth 
 to us : And in this Exercife it is neceffury, 
 that the feveral Ideas by which a Conclufion 
 is made out, ihould be laid in their proper 
 Order : This a faithful Teacher may inftrud 
 us to do ; in Confequence of which thofe 
 Truths Ihall become manifeft, which might 
 otherwiie not have appear'd at all. Sup- 
 pofing therefore, that God cannot deal with 
 us as rational Creatures, but by applying to 
 our Reafon ; yet if we allow, (as we muft 
 allow), that he may order a proper Train 
 
 of Ideas in our Minds, that he may 
 
 ftrengthen the very Faculty of Reafon it- 
 fclf, and fix our Thoughts on thofe Matters 
 we are concerned to attend to, it will follow, 
 not only that fome Things fhali appear in a 
 ftronger Light, but likewifc that others fhall 
 
 offer 
 
298 A DEFENCE of 
 
 offer themfelves, which might not have been 
 difcover'd on any other Foot at all. 
 
 I do by no means affirm, that this is 
 the whole Amount of Divine Infpiration. 
 Doubtlefs it reaches much farther than this 
 comes to. All that is intended here, is 
 This ; that our Author cannot maintain his 
 Ground even upon his own Terms, and that 
 fome of the great Branches of his Scheme 
 may be overthrown even by granting the 
 main Principles he contends for. 
 
 But ftiil it will be alledg'd, that what I 
 have advanced hitherto doth not come up to 
 the Point. For, fuppofing that God might 
 make Matters clearer to us by immediate 
 Infpiration, than they are in the ordinary 
 Ufe of our Faculties, yet How is the Caufe 
 of Reveard Religion at all fupported ? Is it 
 pretended on our Part, that this Religion is 
 made known to all Men by immediate Re- 
 velation ? Was it not, (if ever reveal'd at 
 all), originally reveal'd to a few, and deli- 
 vered by them to others ? Was not the Reli- 
 gion, now received by us as reveal'd, deli- 
 vered down from one to another in a long 
 Succeflion of Ages, if it hath really been fo 
 delivered down, and was not rather the In^ 
 vention of Priefts in fome dark Ages ? In 
 ihort, whilft Matters ftand on this Foot, our 
 Author thinks a proper Rule of Life may 
 be difcover'd more perfectly and more eafily 
 in the Ufe of Reafon, and that by Perfons of 
 
 the 
 
Revealed Religion, &c, 299 
 
 the meaneft Capacities, than cither the Proof, 
 or Meaning of fuch a traditional Revelation 
 can be. 
 
 I have ftiewn in my former Chapter, by 
 
 feveral PafTages cited from this Author's 
 
 Book, that he reckons every Man, even 
 
 thofe of the meaneft Underftanding, capable 
 
 of difcovering a proper Rule of Liie per- 
 
 fedly and with Eafe. Things of this Kind, 
 
 he tells us, are ftridly demonftrable tioin 
 
 the Natures of Things, and the Relation 
 
 which we bear to God, and our Fellow 
 
 Creatures. But the Cafe is other wife as to a 
 
 traditional Revelation : " That God reveal'd 
 
 ^' himfelf by Fijjons^ Dreams^ -Trances^ or 
 
 ^* any other Way befides the Light of Na- 
 
 ^' ture, can only -come under the Head of 
 
 ^' Probability. And if it be but probable 
 
 " that God made any external Revelation at 
 
 ^' all, it can be but probable, tho', perhaps, 
 
 " not in the fame Degree of Probability thac 
 
 ^' he made this or that Revelation. And 
 
 ^* this Evidence all pretend to, (ince, per- 
 
 " haps, there never was a Time or Place, 
 
 ^' where fome external Revelation was not 
 
 ^' believed, and its Votaries equally confi- 
 
 " dent that theirs was a true Revelation. 
 
 " And, indeed, the prodigious Numbers of 
 
 •" Revelations, which from Time to Time 
 
 ^' have been in the World, fhew how eafily 
 
 ^' Mankind may in this Point be imposM 
 
 f* upon. And as there can he no Demon- 
 
 " ftratioa 
 
300 J DEFENCE of 
 
 " ftration of the Revelation itfelf, fo neither 
 '' can there be of its Conveyance to Pofte- 
 " rity ; much lefs, that This or That has 
 " been convey 'd entire to diftant Times and 
 *' Places ; efpecially if a Revelation be of 
 " any Bulk, and which may have gone 
 " thro' the Hands of Men, who not only in 
 *' the dark Ages of the Church, but even in 
 *' the Beginning, if we judge by the Num- 
 *' ber of corrupted Paffages, and even forg'd 
 " Books, were capable of any pious Fraud. 
 " Nay, the very Nature of Probability is 
 *' fuch, that were it only left to Time itfelf, 
 *' even that would wear it quite out. "' p. 184, 
 185. The Paffage here produced, takes in the 
 principal Things alledg'd by this Writer, to 
 fliew the Uncertainty which every traditio- 
 nal Revelation muft carry with it; and con- 
 fequently, how ineffedual it muft be, when 
 compared with common Reafon, to afcertain 
 SL proper Rule of Life. 
 
 But, however certain and evident the Proof 
 of the Revelation fliould be, yet ftill our 
 Author maintains it muft be obfcure and 
 difficult as to its Meaning. To this purpofe 
 he obferves, " Had there been but one Lan- 
 ^' guage, and a Book writ in that Language, 
 ^' in indelible Charaders, (fo that there could 
 <* be none of thofe Thirty Thoufand vari- 
 ^* ous Readings, which are own'd to have 
 <* crept into the New Teftament,) and all 
 " could have Accefs to it, yet even then, 
 
 " con- 
 
a 
 
 Reveal'd Religion, &c. jor 
 
 confidering how uncertain the Meaning of 
 " Words are, and the Intereft of defigning 
 " Men to put a wrong Senfe on them, it 
 " mull be morally impoffible that this Reli- 
 " gion could long continue the fame. "p. 288. 
 There is another PalTage, p. 25)0, in which 
 our Author carries the Matter fomcwhat far- 
 ther. " There are , fays he , fcarce any 
 " Words in any one Language, except of 
 " fuch Things as immediately ftrike the 
 " Senfes, that are adequately anfwer'd in 
 " another, fo as exa^ly to comprehend the 
 " fame Ideas : And if the Ideas are only 
 '' fewer or more, what Confufion may not 
 " that occafion ? How great and frequent 
 " muft the Miftakes Then be in tranflating 
 *' the antiquated Languages of People who 
 " liv'd at a vaft Diftance of Time, as well 
 " as in Countries far remote ; and affecbed 
 ** hyperbolical, parabolical, myftical, alle- 
 " gorical, and typical Ways of exprelling 
 << themfelves, as oppofite to the Ufage in 
 " other Parts as Eaft is to the Weft ? And 
 " not only this, but it will be likewife ne- 
 cefTary to have an accurate Knowledge 
 " of their Manners, Cuftoms, Traditions, 
 Philofophy, Religious Notions, Seds, 
 Civil and Ecclefiaftical Polity ; of all which 
 the common People know as little as they 
 do of the original Languages ; who hav- 
 ing very obfcure and incompetent Con- 
 ceptions of the principal Words and Phra- 
 
 <( 
 
u 
 
 302 J DEFENCE of 
 
 fes us'd in the Verfions, their Religion 
 " muft needs be a very odd Jumble of con-*- 
 " fus'd and inconfiftent Notions, were it to 
 " depend on Words, and their precife Mean- 
 ** ing, and not on the Things themfelves, 
 " and their Relations, which are plain and 
 '* obvious to common Capacities^ they would 
 ** be in a manner entirely governed by Sounds, 
 " fbme of which, fuch as they us'd to hear 
 *' fpoken of with refped, they would high- 
 " ly reverence ; while others, tho' of the 
 *' fame Signification, they would as much 
 " abhor, 'till Cuftom had made them fami- 
 « liar. " 
 
 I fhall begin with examining what our Au- 
 thor hath advanc'd in relation to the Proof 
 and Evidence of a traditional Religion ; the 
 Sum of which may, I think, be rcducM to 
 the following Particulars ; i. That the Proof 
 of a traditional Revelation can only come un- 
 der the Head of Probability ; whereas the 
 Evidence of a proper Rule of Life is, upon 
 Principles of natural Reafon, demonftrative. 
 2, That this Argument from Probability 
 labours under great Difficulties upon account 
 of the feveral Pretences to Revelation which 
 have been confidently infifted on in almoft 
 every Age of the World, and the Cre- 
 dulity of Mankind in admitting fuch Pre- 
 tences. 3. That there is great Uncertainty 
 in the Conveyance, arifing from the Frauds 
 of Men, who may corrupt fome Things, and 
 
 forge 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 305 
 
 forge others, and have feveral Times in Fact 
 done fo. To which he adds, 4. That if the 
 foregoing Difficulties were given up, yet the 
 Nature of Probability is fuch, that were it 
 only left to Time itfelf , even that would 
 wear it quite out. 
 
 Upon the ill Branch of this Gentleman's 
 Objedion I muft obferve, that however a 
 proper Rule of Life may be in itfelf demon- 
 ftrable, yet What doth This fignify in order 
 to fix and fettle it, if Men are incapable of 
 making out this Demonftration ? How diffi- 
 cult this really is, even to Men of Thought 
 and Learning, may appear by the PafTage 
 before cited from Mr. Locky who car'd not 
 to attempt the Work, tho' he faw clearly it 
 was in itfelf capable of being done. 
 
 Having mentioned Mr. Lock here, I ihall 
 take the Liberty to add another Paffage in 
 his Familiar Letters^ [p. 144] as very perti- 
 nent in this Place. " When I confider that 
 
 ** a Book of Offices ought not to be 
 
 " flightly done, efpecially by me, after 
 '' what I have faid of that Science in my 
 
 *' EJp^yy 1 am in Doubt whether it would 
 
 *' be prudent in one of my Age and Health, 
 ** not to mention other Difabilities, to fet 
 " about it. Did the World want a Rule, I 
 " confefs there could be no Work fo ne- 
 *' ceffary, nor fo commendable. But the 
 " Gofpel contains fo perfed a Body of 
 *' Ethicks, that Reafon may be excus'd from 
 
 " that 
 
?o4 A DEFENCE (/ 
 
 " that Enquiry ; fince Ihe may find Man's 
 " Duty clearer and eafier in Revelation, than 
 *' in herfelf. Think not this the Excufe of 
 " a lazy Man, tho* it be perhaps of one, 
 '' who having a fufficient Rule of his A6li- 
 *' ons, is content therewith. '" We fee this 
 excellent Perlbn had other Notions of tradi- ^ 
 tional Revelation than the Gentleman I am 
 now debating with. He tells us, that Rea- 
 foil may be excused from the Enquiry, fincc 
 fhe may find Man's Duty clearer, and eafier 
 in Revelation, than in herfelf And this he 
 affirms, tho* he knew well at the fame Time, 
 that the Proof of a traditional Revelation was 
 not of that Kind which is ftridly and pro- 
 perly demonftrative. 
 
 To return : I muft aflTert, that altho' Mo- 
 rality be in itfelf demonftrable; yet fo few 
 Men being capable of making it out in the 
 demonftrative Way, they muft, for the moft 
 Part, ad upon Evidence which is onl'y pro- 
 bable. This, I fay, muft be the Cafe, even 
 tho* we fhould fuppofe that Religion fub- 
 iifted only as the Prefcription of human Rea- 
 fon. Even here Men do, and muft de- 
 termine themfelves on numbeilefs Occa- 
 fions by Arguments probable \ by Argu- 
 ments, where the Principles they build on 
 are to them only probable ; or at leaft where 
 the Connexion, and Dependance of one Part 
 of the Argument upon another ftiall only ap- 
 pear to be fo. Yet ft ill Morality is not fub- 
 
 yerted 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c» 305 
 
 verted by this : Men are concern'd in this 
 Gale, to do the beft they can ; and muft con- 
 tent themfelves . with ftrong Probabilities, 
 where ftrid and proper Demonftration may 
 not be had by them. 
 
 I Ihall advance a Step farther, and affirm, 
 that in many Inftances the AfTurance arifing 
 from the Concurrence of feveral Probabilities, 
 is as effed:ual, and will lay as ftrong a Foun- 
 dation to determine us in our Condud, as De- 
 monftration itfelf. It is on this Foot we regu- 
 late our Behaviour in Civil Life. He who 
 Ihould refufe to obey a Civil Law 'till he had 
 ftrict Demonftration that it really was a Ci- 
 vil Law, would be quickly taught to alter 
 his Meaiiires, in a way he would not like. 
 In all Cafes of this Nature we do, and muft 
 build on fuch Probabilities, as the Nature of 
 the Thing will admit of. Thefe, I fay, 
 Men ad upon, and upon thefe they muft ad, 
 if they ad at all. 
 
 Nor is it any Prejudice to our Affurance, 
 that in Matters built on probable Evidence, 
 there remains a Poflibility of Miftake ♦, or that 
 in fuch Cafes we havefometimes beendeceiv'd 
 formerly : Will it follow from hence, that we 
 can have no fufficient Affurance this Way ? 
 Are we to give no Credit to the Evidence of 
 Senfe, becaufe we have fometimes err'd by 
 depending on it? Or, may we not be certain, 
 in any one Cafe whatfoever, that we are not 
 deceiv'd, becaufe we difcover that in fome 
 
 X Cafes 
 
3o6 J DEFENCE of 
 
 Cafes we have been deceived ? I think the' 
 very contrary to this is true ; and becaufe 
 we know that in fome Cafes we have been 
 deceived, we are therefore certain that we 
 are not deceiv'd always. 
 
 Let us admit then, that the Evidence of 
 a traditional Revelation is not ftridly a de- 
 monftrative Evidence ^ What ConcluOon, 
 I pray, can be drawn from hence ? Is it 
 therefore no Evidence at all ; or, Muft it 
 therefore be an infufficient and precarious 
 one? Is it, in the Nature of Things, im- 
 poffible that any Man ftiould have fuch Proof 
 of a Revelation made in any diftant Age, as 
 fhall carry with it fufficient Weight to deter- 
 mine the Affent of a fober and thinking 
 Man ? He who will alTert this, muft alfert 
 withal, that 'tis impoffible to have any fuf- 
 ficient AlTurance of paft Fads at all ; and 
 confequently, all the Evidence of ancient 
 Hiftory muft fall of Gourfe. 
 
 But our Author will return upon us, That 
 the Qireftion at prefent is, Whether the 
 Evidence of Natural Religion, and of Re- 
 veal'd, be equally ftrong : And in Proof of 
 the Negative, he ailedges, That the One is 
 demonftrable, whilft the other can fubfift 
 only on Probability. The Evidence there- 
 fore in the one Cafe muft be more perfed, 
 than it is, or can poflibly be in the other. 
 
 I conceive, what is here alledg'd, will 
 amount to nothing, if it be true, ( as hath 
 
 bccii 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 307 
 
 been noted before ) that however demon- 
 Itrable in themfelves feveral Particulars of 
 \vhac he calls Natural Religion may be, yet 
 many Parts of it are not demonftrable by the 
 Generality of Men, and fome may be aflign'd 
 which arc not demonftrable by any Man ; 
 That whilft fome Things, in themfelves fit 
 and proper, are abfolutely undifcoverable in 
 the mere Ufe of our Reafon, others require 
 more Pains and Care than moft Men are 
 willing to lay out about them. Revelation 
 therefore, tho' the Evidence of it jQiould not 
 be ftridly demonftrative ; yet as it gives us 
 an Infight into fome Things not at all 
 difcoverable by our Natural Reafon, muffc 
 of Gonfequence make the Difcovery of a 
 proper Rule of Life more perfeO:. To which 
 we may add. That while it faves us the 
 Trouble of tedious Reafoning, and long De- 
 dudion, the Difcovery muft he made with 
 greater Difpatch and Eafe. And tho* to 
 build on fuch a traditional Revelation, is 
 not to build on ftrid Demonftration ; yet 
 if the Evidence in this Gafe be as perfed as 
 the Nature of the Thing will admit of, we 
 Ihall have no more Gaufe to doubt concern- 
 ing the Certainty of the Evidence, than we 
 have to queftion the Force of Demonftra- 
 tion. 
 
 But, admitting that probable Evidence 
 may be in fome Cafes abundantly fufficient, 
 yet our Author objeds, Secondly, that in the 
 
 X 2 prefent 
 
;o8 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 prefent Inftance the Point labours under ex- 
 traordinary Difficulties, oeveral groundlels 
 Pretences to Revelation have been confidently 
 infifted on in feveral Ages of the World; and 
 have llicceeded fo far, as to gain Credit from 
 a confidtrable Part of Mankind. 
 
 I am furpriz'd that this Gentleman fhould 
 lay fuch Strefs on an Gbjedion, which hath 
 been fo often anfvver'd, without endeavour- 
 ing to fupport it by making the leaft Reply 
 to Matters ofFer'd in Bar of this Objedion. 
 Let us fuppofe that there have been as many 
 Pretences to Revelation, as he pleafes ; Doth 
 it follow, that thefe Pretences muft all of 
 them be alike ? If there have been many 
 Impoftures, can there be no fuch Thing as 
 Truth in the World ? Or, if feveral Men 
 have made groundlefs Claims to a Divine Au- 
 thority, can there be no real Ground of Di- 
 vine Authority at all ? One might be rather 
 apt to conclude the contrary, and to think 
 that if there had never been any Divine Reve- 
 lation, Men would not have been fo forward 
 either on the one hand to make Pretences of 
 this Kind, or, on the other, to give Credit to 
 them. For, as Fallhood always fuppofes 
 fome Truth, fo Impofture cannot fucceed 
 unlefs it puts on the Appearance of that 
 which is, or hath been real. 
 
 To take the Objedion in another Light ; 
 I will fuppofe it is defign'd, not fo much to 
 prove that there never hath in Fad been 
 
 any 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. 309 
 
 any Divine Revelation, as to flievv the Dif- 
 ficulty of forming a Judgment about the 
 Reality of a particular Revelation. The 
 Difficulty arifes from hence, that " there 
 " never was a Time or Place where Ibmc 
 " Divine Revelation was not believ'd, and 
 " its Votaries equally confident that their's 
 " was a true Revelation* " But what, 
 after all, can be concluded from this ? 
 Why, juft thus much, and no more, that 
 Men are very often lazv, unapt to think for 
 themfelves, and ready to give Credit to every 
 confident AfTertor. This is indeed true, and 
 mull not be contefted. But then the Qiieftion 
 is, not what Men may be apt fometimes 
 to do, but v/hat they are capable of do- 
 ing on fuch Occafions. The Queftion is, 
 not whether indolent Men will give Ear to 
 bold Pretenders, rather than examine their 
 Pretences ; but. Whether they have any 
 fufficient Abilities to diftinguilh between 
 Reality and Impofture. This, I prefume, 
 they may do, if they pleafe ; «efpecially fince 
 the Point to be confider'd is a Point of Fad, 
 concerning which, in other Inftances, we 
 find Men are fagacious enough, and not lb 
 liable to err, whilft they give themfelves 
 proper Pains. 
 
 After all, if our Author thinks there is 
 really any Thing fo formidable in the Ob- 
 jeftion, and that Men cannot diftinguifh be- 
 tween a real Divine Authority and a pre- 
 
 X 3 tended 
 
310 ^DEFENCE o/ 
 
 tended one, amidft fuch a Variety of Pre* 
 tences, let me defire him to fhew, how they 
 arc capable of judging concerning philofo- 
 phical and abftrad Reafbning. Is it fo much 
 ealier to go thro' a long Train of perplex'd 
 Arguing, than to determine concerning the 
 Probability of Fafts, to which Men were not 
 themfelves WitnelTes ? Do we not fee, in 
 daily Experience, that Perfons, who having 
 been unusM to clofe Thinking, can make 
 out very few JNIatters that way, can yet re- 
 late Things with Exadnefs enough which 
 they have done themfelves, and pafs very 
 ihrewd Judgments on the Truth or Falfhood, 
 Probability or Improbability of Things af- 
 firm'd to have been done by others. And 
 doth not our Civil State itfelf prcfume them 
 fo capable of doing this, as to commit the 
 Trial of fuch Matters of Fad even to a Jury 
 of ordinary Perfons ? Where then is the 
 Impoflibility, or Difficulty, according to the 
 common Senfe of the World, that fuch 
 Perfons fhould judge rightly of the Pretences 
 to Revelation, whilft thefe Pretences are to 
 be determined by the Evidence of Fads, 
 concerning which they are allow'd to judge 
 in civil Matters, 
 
 But, fays our Author, This is not all : 
 Several other Things are to be confider'd : 
 Difficulties will not only arife from the va- 
 rious and confident Pretences to Revelation, 
 |3Ut likevvife. Thirdly, from the Uncertainty 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. y\ i 
 
 of the Conveyance. Books may, in Trad 
 of Time, be forg'd, or Paflages corrupted : 
 and How Ihall Men diftinguifh between the 
 true original Revelation, and thole Corrup- 
 tions which may have been made, or have 
 ill feveral Ages crept in ? 
 
 It will be enough, in Reply to this, to 
 alledge, That mere Poffibilities are of no 
 Moment in the Cafe : That if, on the one 
 hand, it be afBrm'd, fuch Things maj he j on 
 the other, it may as well be faid, they may 
 not he ; That we are not now debating con- 
 cerning abfolute Demonftration, which ad- 
 mits no Poflibility on the other Side, but only 
 concerning Probability : To which it is no 
 manner of Prejudice that Errors are pollible; 
 lince poflible, in the ftrict Senfe of the Word, 
 they muft be ; otherwife the Evidence would 
 not be probable only, but abfolute. 
 
 Let our Author therefore call upon us as 
 much as he pleafes, to prove that our tra- 
 ditional Revelation is -genuine, and that it 
 hath fuffer'd Nothing from Either Forgery 
 or Corruption. On this Head we are not 
 oblig'd to anfwer him at all. It is his Bujfi- 
 nefs to prove the Forgery or Corruption ; 
 or at leaft to to fupport his Point by Argu- 
 ments as probable as thofe are by which 
 we evince the Revelation in general. If this 
 be not done, we may fafely prefume, that 
 DO PoJts of what we receive as a Revelation 
 
 X 4 from 
 
311 A DEFENCE of 
 
 from God, have been really forgM •, and that 
 no fiich Corruptions have crept in, as fhall 
 make any material Difference in the Cafe. 
 
 But he prefles us farther ; and maintains, 
 that Sufpicions of this Kind are well grounded ; 
 That the Perfons thro' whofe Hands thefe 
 Books have gone, have been eminent this 
 way y and " that they were capable of any 
 " pious Frauds, if we may judge by the 
 " Number of PafTages corrupted, and of 
 " Books forged by them. " 
 
 But how comes this Gentleman to know 
 that any Books have been forg'd, or any 
 PafTages corrupted ? Why, principally by 
 this Means ; that Perfons, capable of difcover- 
 ing the Fraud, have made it out to him. 
 Very well ; Upon this Foot fuch Books and 
 PafTages are entirely given up by us ; and 
 when any Thing of the fame Kind is equally 
 prov'd of other Books or PafTages, we fhall 
 as readily give them up too. But mull we 
 be ever fufpicious and doubtful, and admit 
 Nothing as Truth, bccaufe Some Falfhoods 
 have been detected ? I fhould rather be 
 tempted to think, that the Detedion of fuch 
 Frauds gives us a Security, that other Books 
 which concern our Religion, and againlt 
 which no Objedion can be made, are ge- 
 nuine. For the fame Zeal and Honeily, 
 by which fome Frauds have been deteded, 
 wpuld equally have carry'd Men on to dif- 
 
 povef 
 
Revealed Religion, &c. 31^ 
 
 cover others, had any others been indeed 
 difcoverable, or rather, had there been any 
 others remaining. 
 
 1 need not enter minutely into the feveral 
 Methods by which Forgeries c^ Corruptions 
 have been, or may be difcover'd. The 
 chiefeft are, I conceive, Thefe ; Either the 
 
 Tcftimony of ancient Writers ; or, the 
 
 Variety of ancient Copies ; or, the 
 
 Nature of the Writings themfelves. Let all 
 the Remarks which can be drawn from thefe 
 Heads be applied, if this Gentleman pleales, 
 on the prefent Occafion. Let the Scriptures 
 be tryM on this Foot. And let us lee whe- 
 ther the Genuinenefs of thefe Writings can 
 be defended, or no. If they cannot, I have 
 no more to fay. But if they can be defended 
 fhall this Gentleman's groundlefs Prefump- 
 tions be taken for Proof ? Shall it be fuffi- 
 cient to fay. In a long Trad of Time Cor- 
 ruptions may have crept in ; and there- 
 fore You muft prove They have not in 
 Fad crept in ? This, Sir, we are by no 
 means bound to prove. No one can be put 
 on proving the Negative in fuch a Cafe as 
 this. It is your Bufinefs to evince and fup- 
 port your pofitive Side of the Queftion ; 
 Other wife, what you advance, muft pafs for 
 fo many bold and groundlefs Aflertions. 
 
 We have the more Reafon to infilt on 
 this, bccaufe, from the very Nature of the 
 Thing,, it appears, that fuch Forgeries or 
 
 Corrup- 
 
314 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Corruptions could not have obtained Credit 
 fo univerfally, as to make the particular 
 Detedion of them either impoffible or diffi- 
 cult. We do not lay the Strefs of the Point 
 on This onlyi^ (as our Author pretends we 
 do ), " That no Change could be made in 
 " our Religion in Atter-times ; the Care 
 '' Men have of their own Souls, as well as 
 " their natural Affedion for their Pofterity, 
 " obliging them, from Generation to Gene- 
 *' ration, to hand down their Pvcligion as 
 ^' they reeeiv'd it. " p- 2.33. This is a Uling 
 us ill ; and a Reprefenting us as affirming, 
 not what we really do affirm, but what it 
 is moft for his Purpofe we fhould affirm. 
 The real State of the Cafe is This ; Numerous 
 Copies of thofe Writings, in which our Reli- 
 gion is contain'd, were immediately difpers'd 
 Abroad ^ They were kept as a facred Trea- 
 fure \ They were read, and ftudied with 
 Care ^ Some of the principal Parts of them 
 were conftantly recited in the publick Aflem- 
 blies of Chiiftians ; They were tranflated 
 into a Variety of Languages ; fpread thro' 
 the moft diftant Parts of the World ; and 
 Paflages from them cited by numerous Wri-* 
 ters : To which may be added, that there 
 fprung up, in the very earlieft Ages, a Va* 
 riety of Seds, which oppos'd and hated each 
 other, and therefore were a conftant Guard 
 againft Impofture and Corruption from any 
 hand. Now, if it fhali appear, under all 
 
 rhcfe 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 315 
 
 thefe Gircumftances, that the very fame Books, 
 have thro' all Ages been generally admitted 
 as Canonical ; If thefe Books are, as to every 
 Thing of Moment, the fame in all the feveral 
 Copies and Verfions ; If the Texts cited from 
 them by the feveral Writers, who built on 
 their Authority, agree, as to the main, with 
 thefe Copies ; What can be concluded, but 
 the Genuinenefs and Incorruptnefs of thele 
 Writings ? He, who notwithftanding thefe 
 flrong Prefumptions, Ihall flill fufped the 
 contrary, muft run himfelf on thefe mon- 
 ftrous Abfurdities ; That a great Part of Man- 
 kind have at once, in very remote Parts of 
 the World, agreed in the Forgery, or Cor-» 
 ruption ; That they have agreed to deftroy 
 all the old Copies, and to forge new ones ; 
 to alter all the feveral Verfions which had 
 been made of them j to corrupt Paffages in 
 a Variety of Authors, which likewife could 
 not be done without altering the main Drift 
 of the Books themfelves ; And, ( which is 
 ftill more incredible) that this fhould be 
 done by Perfons who hated and perfecuted 
 each other, and who could not have brought 
 either more Credit to their own Side, or Re- . 
 proach on their Adverfaries, than by deted- 
 ing fuch Impoftures. He who is capable of 
 believing all this, muft not complain of Cre^ 
 dulity in others. 
 
 Our Author will proceed ftill, and demand, 
 How ftiall the common People determine 
 
 upou 
 
3i6 A DEFENCE of 
 
 wpon the Point ? Are They able to have 
 Recourfe to all thefe leveral Copies, and 
 Verfions, &c. Do they underftand the very- 
 Languages in which they are written ? Or, 
 if they did, Are They capable of forming 
 any tolerable Judgment upon the Whole ? 
 If not, then " all Mankind, very few 
 " excepted, are alike bound in all Places 
 « to pin their Faith on their Priefts, and 
 « believe in Men, who have an Intercft to 
 «* deceive them, and who have feldom fail'd 
 << to do fo when Occafion ferves ? " 
 
 I fhall make no Return for the Compli- 
 ment here paid to the Priefts, or to any other 
 of thofe unjuft Reproaches which this Gen- 
 tleman hath caft on that Order of Men. I 
 (hall only obferve, in reference to Priefts, 
 that whilft he Abufes them in one refped, 
 as a Set of Knaves and Villains, he inlinuates 
 fomething too much to their Advantage in 
 another. For to fay, (as fay it he does), 
 " That Religion muft carry fuch internal 
 " Marks of its Truth, as Men of mean Capa- 
 
 " cities are able to difcover ; or elfe, 
 
 *' all Mankind, a very few excepted, arc 
 « alike bound, in all Places, to pin their 
 « Faith on their Priefts • " i§, to make the 
 Priefts almoft the only Perfons in the World 
 of Senfe and Learning, and capable of judg- 
 ing concerning the external Evidence of a 
 Revelation. This, I muft confefs, is an 
 Honour which we cannot by any means lay 
 
 Claim 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ &c. j t/ 
 
 Claim to. There are great Numbers amongft 
 the Laity of fingiilar Parts and Learning j 
 and we are obliged to thefe worthy Gentle- 
 men for fome remarkable Defences of our 
 Religion. How then is it, upon this Sup- 
 pofition, neceflary, that all Mankind, a few 
 only excepted, fhould pin their Faith on 
 their Priefts ? What I is Nothing to be 
 learn'd from any of the Laity ? or, Are thefe 
 Gentlemen content with judging for them- 
 felves, without giving any manner of Aflift- 
 ance to others ? 
 
 Well, but what of all this ? If the Genera- 
 lity of Mankind cannot examine either thefe 
 feveral Copies in the Original Language, or 
 the feveral Verfions which have been made of 
 them, &c. from whence the Incorruptnefs 
 of the Scriptures may be proved, it is plain 
 they mull build on the mere Authority of 
 other Men ; they muft pin their Faith on 
 Men, whether Priefts or Laity it matters not : 
 And is this a Circumftance to be admitted in 
 fo important a Matter as Religion ? 
 
 1 he Points here are Matters of Fad ; viz. 
 Whether there really are numerous Copies of 
 the Records of our Religion in the original 
 Language; Whether there have been, and 
 Hill are fubfifting numerous Verfions of thele 
 Records; Whether a vaft Number of PaiTages 
 have been from Time to Time cited from 
 them in Books which are ftill extant ; And 
 Whether thefe do all of them fo far agree as 
 
 to 
 
^i8 A DEFENCE of 
 
 to Ihew the Genuinenefs and Incorruptnefs 
 of thefe Records. Concerning thele Points 
 the greatcft Part of Mankind cannot fearch 
 for themfelves : They neither underftand all 
 the feveral Languages in which they are 
 written ; nor, if they did, have they fuffici- 
 ent Opportunity to examine them pcrfonally, 
 or to gain Aflurance from their own immedi- 
 ate Searches. But what then ! Can they have 
 no fufficient Affurance at all concerning 
 Matters of this Nature ? Are we to believe 
 Nothing upon the Tcftimony of others ? Are 
 we not tobe.determin'd by the beft Evidence 
 which the Nature of the Thing, and our 
 
 own Circumftances will allow of ? by 
 
 fuch Evidence, that we could not obtain 
 greater in our prelent Condition, tho' the 
 Thins; itfelf were true ? Mult we infill on 
 Demonftration where Nothing can be had 
 but human Tcftimony; or deny all Weight 
 to it, where we are unable to confirm it by 
 our own Experience? If there have been 
 Ibme Impoitures, yet is Knavery fo elfential 
 to Humtm Nature, that all Men muft on that 
 account:, be fufpeded ? To come more clofe 
 to the Point : Shall Nothing be allow'd to 
 the General Reputation which Men have ob- 
 tained for their Skill, and Integrity ? to 
 
 the Concurrence of many, nay of all who 
 
 have examined into thefe Matters ; of 
 
 Perfons, tho' Pricfts, yet of different Com- 
 munions, and willing to find as many Faults 
 
 as 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 319 
 
 as they could with one another ; — • nay, 
 
 not only of Priefts, but of the Laity like- 
 wife ; and where there is not a fingle Perfon, 
 not even amongft this Gentleman's diligent 
 and quick-fighted Acquaintance, who hath 
 pretended to make out any one particular 
 Inftance of Inipofture, or any one important 
 Corruption in the Sacred Writings ? On fuch 
 a Foot as this I fhould prefume the Matter is 
 fo thoroughly fettled, that there can be none 
 Occafion, even for the Learned themfelves, 
 to enter jfarther into the Enquiry. What is 
 attefted as a Fad by fo many Perlbns of Skill 
 and Honefty, and who had all the Induce- 
 ments to crois one another, l»ad they any fair 
 Occafion of doing it, may furely be depended 
 on. But thefe Fads once admitted, will im- 
 mediately prove our Point 5 and of this Con- 
 fequence every Man can judge, who is ca- 
 pable of drawing any Conclufions at all. 
 
 There is a Fourth Branch of our Author's 
 Objedion ftill remaining, viz, "That the Na- 
 " ture of Probability itfelf is firch, that were 
 " it only left to Time, even that would wear 
 " it quite out. " This Objedion againft the 
 Evidence of a traditional Revelation he 
 endeavours to fupport, by referring us to 
 Mr. Craig^s ^rhiclpki Mathemat'ica fheologtce 
 ChriJIhWiVy and by a Citation from Mr. Locke's 
 Ejp.,y. 
 
 The Gentleman feems to lay fo little Strefs 
 on Mr. Craigs Demonftration, haying only 
 
 juft 
 
310 A DEFENCE of 
 
 juft referred to it, that I cannot think myfelf 
 any farther concernM than to obferve, that 
 this Subject hath likcwiie been handled in 
 tho.PhllofophicalT'ranfLidiions^ No. ^^^. Thi- 
 ther I fhall in my Turn refer him. But as 
 the PafTage from Mr. Locke is introduced with 
 an Air of Confidence, it may be proper to 
 confider it as here apply'd by this Gentleman. 
 " I think (fays Mr. Locke) it may not be 
 " amifs to take Notice of a Rule obferv'd 
 " in the Law of England '^ which is, that 
 " tho' the attefted Copy of a Record be good 
 *' Proof, yet the Copy of a Copy never fo 
 *' well attefted, and by never fo credible 
 " WitneiTes, *vill not be admitted as Proof 
 " in Judicature. This is fo generally ap- 
 " prov'd as reafonable, and fuited to the 
 " Wifdom and Caution to be us'd in our En- 
 " quiry after material Truths, that I never 
 '* yet heard of any one that blam'd it. This 
 " Prafticc, if it be allowable in the Decifion 
 " of Right and Wrong, carries this Obferva- 
 " tion along with it, viz. That any Tefti- 
 " mony, the farther off it is from the origi- 
 " nal Truth, the lefs Force and Proof it has. 
 " The Being and Exiftence of the Thing it*- 
 " felf is what I call the original Truth. A 
 " credible Man vouching his Knowledge of 
 " it, is a good Proof. But if another equally 
 *' credible do witnefs it from his Report, 
 *' the Teftimony is wpaker : And a third 
 " that attefts the Hearfay of a Hearfay, is 
 
 " yet 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 321 
 
 " yet iefs confiderable : So that in traditi- 
 *' onal Truths, each Remove weakens the 
 *' Force of the Proof ^ and the more Hands 
 " the Tradition has fucceffively pafs'd thro*, 
 *' the Iefs Strength and Evidence does it re- 
 " ceive from them. '* Lockers Ejjay^ L. 4. 
 C. i^. §. 10. 
 
 What Mr. Locke hath here advanc'd is true 
 and reafonable : But our Author hath been 
 pleas'd to apply it to a Purpofe quite diffe- 
 rent from what Mr. L. intended, and for 
 which it will by no means ferve : So that, 
 admitting what is here laid down as true in 
 the Premifes, we may deny all the Conclufi- 
 ons which our Author would deduce from 
 them. 
 
 There are Two Things here alTerted. 
 I. That, tho' the attefted Copy of a Record 
 be good Proof, yet the Copy of a Copy, never 
 fo well attefted, and by neyer fo credible 
 Witnelfes , will not be admitted as Proof in 
 "judicature. And, 2. That in traditional 
 Truths in the general, each Remove weak- 
 ens the Force- of the Proof prod uc'd. 
 
 The Matter of Fad afferted under the firft 
 Article is admitted ; And the Ground of this 
 Proceeding in Civil Courts feems to be. That 
 the Original Record, or an attefted Copy is 
 capable of being produc'd. In general, it 
 is as eafy to produce one of thefc, perhaps 
 more fo, than to get Evidence at a greater 
 Remove from the Original. If this be true, 
 
 y then 
 
^11 ^DEFENCE of 
 
 then why lliould any fuch diftant Proof he 
 offer *d ? Muft it not look as tho' fome Art 
 were intended to corrupt Matters, and to dif^ 
 giiife the Truth, when Men chufe to ftep fb- 
 much out of the Way, and to offer re- 
 mote Evidence, in Cafes where a nearer one 
 may be had with greater Difpatch and Eafe? 
 
 But, can any fuch Reafon be alledg'd 
 
 in the prefent Cafe ? Is it, in the Nature of 
 Things, as poffible and eafy to produce the 
 Originals, or attefted Copies of the Scriptures, 
 even fuppofing there is no Forgery or Cor- 
 ruption, as 'tis to do fo in Matters which 
 come before a Civil Court ? If not, then thefe 
 Two Cafes are vaftly different ; and a Rule 
 which may be thought reafonable in the one,, 
 will be unreafonable and abfurd in the other. 
 After all, it muft be allowed, that, whilft 
 Men are fallible, and capable of ading wrong, 
 abfolute Certainty cannot arife from human 
 Teftimony. Upon this Account we muft 
 allow likewife , that , in every Remove of 
 traditional Truths , the Force of their Evi- 
 dence is weakened : In Traditions by Hear- 
 fay, the Point is apparent at firft Sight ; and 
 will be found to hold proportionably as to 
 written Traditions. Suppofing it therefore, 
 in this View of Things, poffible that Time 
 itfclf may wear out all the Force of Proof 
 depending on traditional Evidence, Can no 
 Evidence, no Probability arife from Tra- 
 dition at all? If in an Hundred Thoufand 
 
 Removes 
 
Reveal D Religion^ ^c 32 j 
 
 Removes the Probability would be loft en- 
 tirely ^ Muft it likewife be loft in the Third 
 or Fourth Remove ? And yet this is perhaps 
 the Cafe with reference to the Gofpel Tradi- 
 tion : PolTibly fome of the Copies ftill re- 
 maining may have been taken from the very 
 Originals themfelves : If not, yet it is not at 
 all unlikely but they may have been Copies 
 of Copies : Or, if we ftiould fuppofe them 
 to have been taken at a much greater Re- 
 move from the Originals , yet ftill Corrupti- 
 ons are not fo eafily introduc'd , where nu- 
 merous Copies are difpers'd : To which may 
 be added, that thcfe muft eafily betray or 
 correft one another, in cafe of Corruption. 
 So that, with regard to the Gofpel, I am 
 perfuaded , notwithftanding the gradual De- 
 creafe of Evidence in traditional Propofitions, 
 the Decreale is fo very little, that it may, 
 like the infinitely fmall Quantities in Mathe- 
 maticks, be rejeded, as making no confider- 
 able Difference in the Point at all. 
 
 Upon the whole of what our Author hath 
 advanc'd upon the Evidence of our traditio- 
 nal Revelation, as compar'd with the Evi- 
 dence of his abfolutely perfed Law of Na- 
 ture, we muft obferve, that the one may be 
 clear'd up to the Satisfaction of any impartial 
 Perfon , with much greater Eafe and Cer- 
 tainty than the other ; That the Evidence we 
 infift on , tho' not demonftrative , is yet the 
 •higheft which the Nature of the Thing will 
 Y 2 admit 
 
324 A DEFENCE of 
 
 admit of j is what cannot be refifted without 
 throwing up all Evidence of diftant- Fads ; 
 and, which is more, without difputing aH 
 Matters to which we ourfelves were not Wit- 
 nefles. He who can hold out here, may 
 equally hold out againft Demonftration itfelf. 
 His Incredulity is not owing to the Want of 
 Evidence, but of a Difpofition to receive it. 
 
 The next Courfe of Arguing by which 
 our Author would prove, That a proper 
 Rule of Life is more eafily difcoverable by 
 every Man in the Ule of his Reafon, than a 
 traditional Revelation can make it, amounts 
 to this j That the very Senfe and Meaning 
 of the Revelation itfelf cannot be fix*d and 
 afcertain'd. What he advances to this Pur- 
 pofe, may bereduc'd to the following Heads : 
 I. That W^ords in any one Language are 
 Icarce poffible to be tranflated into another 9 
 becaufe, excepting Matters which imme- 
 diately flrikc the Senfes, the Words of one 
 Language are not exadly anfwer'd by thofe 
 in another. 2. Becaufe the hyperbolical, 
 parabolical, myftical, allegorical, and typical 
 Ways of Exprellion familiar to Perfons in the 
 Eaftern Parts, are entirely difagreeable to 
 the Ufage of other Nations. And, 3. Be- 
 caufe we want fuch an accurate Knowledge 
 of the Manners, Cuftoms, &c, of the An- 
 tients, as will enable us to underliand their 
 Writings, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 315 
 
 1 muft, before I proceed farther, take No- 
 tke of one Thing, which properly belongs 
 to this Head of Objedions ; and which, tho' 
 it be not diftindly infifled on in this Place, 
 ^s yet, in fcveral others, urg'd with Confi- 
 -dence : It is this ; That whatever the Lan- 
 guage be in which a traditional Religion is 
 exprefs'd, if it be not a iiniverfal Language, 
 it muft lay a great Part of Mankind under a 
 Neceflity of taking their Religion on the Au- 
 thority of th£ Tranflators. 
 
 But will the Gentleman fay, wc can hav« 
 no fufficicn't AfTu ranee that a Tranflation 
 of any Baok is made faithfully, if we are not 
 acquainted with the Original Language, or 
 have not examin'd it nicely ? On this Foot, 
 to what Purpofe are any Tranflations ever 
 made at all ? Or can we entertain any juft 
 Sufpicions concerning the Faithfulnefs of the • 
 Verfion , whilft it palTes uncontradided 
 by Men of eminent Skill in Criticifm, and 
 both able and willing to deted the Cheat, if 
 ^ny fuch be attempted ? Nay, more, whilft 
 there are Men, no Friends to the Religion 
 itfelf, or the Perfons who embrace it, who 
 would be forward enough to expofe fuch 
 Pradices, and could not but gain lingular 
 Advantages by informing the World, that 
 the Religion taught, differs vaftly from tha^ 
 which is laid to have been rcveal'd origi- 
 jially ? He who is capable, after all this, 
 of entertaining Doubts concerning the genera? 
 
 y 3 Faitl) 
 
^i6 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Faithfiilnefs of the Tranflation, may doubt 
 or difpute any Thing. 
 
 However, admitting that if Tranflations 
 may be made faithfully, there may be fuffi- 
 cient Affurance that they are io made ; 
 yet What if no Tranflations whatfbever can 
 be exad ? Our Author affirms they can- 
 not : and that, for this Reafon, amongft 
 others. That the Words in any one Lan- 
 guage, excepting Matters which immediately 
 ftrike the Senfes, are not exadly anfwer'd 
 by Words in another. 
 
 What is affirm'd here, is void of the very 
 Shew of Truth ; and every one who knows 
 any thing of different Languages can contra- 
 dict him. Yet, fuppofing it true, I muft ob- 
 ferve to him, There is no manner of Occa- 
 fion that Tranflations fliould be verbal, or 
 anfwer the Original exadly Word for Word. 
 What is exprefsM in one Language by one 
 Word, may be anfwer 'd in another Lan- 
 guage by many Words : All the Ideas in- 
 tended to be convey'd, may, in this way, be 
 preferv'd ; and the Tranflation be entirely 
 juft, tho' it fliould be not literal. 
 
 But, 2. The Eafl:erns, it feems, were much 
 given to a bold and figurative Way of Wri- 
 ting : " They affe^ed hyperbolical, para- 
 *' bolical, myftical, allegorical, and typical 
 ** Ways ofExprefling themfelves, as oppo- 
 *■' fite to the Ufage in other Parts, as Eaft 
 " is to the Weft. '' 
 
 Iwiih 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. ^ly 
 
 I wifli our Author, when he iirg'd this 
 Objedioii, had drawn it out at full Length, 
 and told us plainly how much he defign'd 
 fhould be concluded from it. Would he 
 have us infer, that the Writings of the 
 Eafterns miift therefore be abfolutely unin- 
 telligible ? Doth he think they were inca- 
 pable of being underltood by the Eafterns 
 themfelves, and in thole very Times in which 
 they were compos'd ? This, furely, will 
 not be afferted, if this Kind of W^riting was 
 then ufual and familiar to them. Or, Doth 
 he intend no more than this, That the Dif- 
 ference between the Eaftern Way of Waiting 
 in thofe early Times, and the Manner of 
 Expreflion now in Ufe with us, is fo great, 
 that no Man doth, or can underftand what 
 is meant ? If this be what he intends, I 
 muft obferve, That Difficulties will fbme- 
 times arife from fuch a bold and figurative 
 W^ay of Expreilion j but at the fame time I 
 muft contend, and appeal to all the Learned 
 for the Truth of what I maintain. That the 
 general Meaning even of thefe figurative 
 Writings is capable of being underftood by 
 the Skilful : And if it may be underftood, 
 then it muft be capable of being truly ren- 
 der'd in modern Language.. Difficulties, I 
 muft own, will arife as to the full Meaning 
 and Import of particular Exprcftiions : But 
 then Difficulties are not Impoftibilities. Even 
 iiich Expreftions may be underftood, and, 
 
 Y 4 for 
 
3i8 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 for the moft part, have been underftood, 
 and rightly explain'd, by fome one or other. 
 ■And if Men have not equally facceeded in 
 every Thing of this Kind, yet 'tis fufficient 
 that the main Drift and Dcfign of the Wri- 
 ting is intelligible. This may anfwer the 
 full Purpofe of the Work ; and then we need 
 not concern our lelves any farther. 
 
 The Objeftion before us is, I know, pointed 
 at the Sacred Writings : In reference to 
 -which, and farther to Ihew the Weaknefs of 
 the Objedion, we may obferve. That thefe 
 "Writings are of different Kinds, and relate 
 to different Matters. Some of them are Pro^ 
 phetical ; Some of them Hiftorical ; Some 
 i'oetical ^ Some Do<^rinal ; and Some Pre* 
 ceprive : And again, amongil: thefe, Some 
 had a more immediate, if not a lole Regard 
 10 the Perfons who liv'd in thefe more early 
 Ages, as Others have a general Reference 
 to all Men in all Ages.: 
 . That the Prophetical Parts fhould be frcr 
 quently cxprcfs'd in Figures, and in fucli 
 a Manner as not to be underftood dilHndly 
 even by Perfons who liv'd in thole early 
 Times, ought not to be wonder'd at ; The 
 very Nature of the Thing might Ibmetimc's 
 require it lliould be lb. And tho' the Ac^ 
 complifliment ©f, thofe Predictions clear'd 
 Things up to thole who , liv'd when the 
 Predidions were accomplifh'd, yet at this 
 Dil^ance of Time the Notice of l^veral Mat- 
 ters 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c, ^29 
 
 ters may be loft, ufeful for the explaining 
 them. Should this prove the Cafe, ( as in 
 fome Inftances it hath prov'd), I cannot fee 
 what Hurt arifes. Many Prophecies are 
 fufficiently clear ; and enough appears to 
 confirm our Faith in the great Articles fup- 
 ported by them. 
 
 The Style of the Hiftorical Parts is vaftly 
 different from that of the Prophetical. This, 
 for the moft Part, is plain and fimplc ; and 
 no great Matters of Difficulty can arife about 
 it. Or, if there did, yet, as the main End 
 of Revelation is to give us a Scheme of Vir- 
 tue and Religion, and to enforce it on us in 
 the moft effedual Manner, all Objections 
 arifing from Difficulties in the Hiftorical Style 
 are of no Moment. For, the Queftion at 
 prefent is. Whether a RevealM Rule of Life 
 can be, or in Fad hath been deliver'd in 
 fuch a Manner as to be plain and intelligible 
 to thofe Perlons for whom it was intended. 
 
 To pafs on • Other Parts of Scripture arc 
 Poetical, in which the Style, from the very 
 Nature of the Thing, muft be bold and 
 figurative ; and, confequently, more remote 
 from ordinary Apprehenfions than the fim- 
 ple and common Forms of fpeaking. Yet, 
 will any one maintain, that the Poetical Wri- 
 tings of the Ancients cannot be underftood ? 
 Or, if they may, that they cannot be ren- 
 dered truely in the Tranflation ? But, if this 
 canqot be affirm'd, then, whatever Pains it 
 
 may 
 
?5o ^DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 may coft the Tranflators to render fuch Wri- 
 tings in modern Language, yet, when they 
 are once truely render 'd , the main Difficul- 
 ties are over. Befides, that thefe Difficul- 
 ties themfelves rather regard the Beauty and 
 Elegance of the Expreffion, than the princi- 
 pal Matters intended to be reprefented. 
 
 As to the Dodrinal and Preceptive Parts 
 I mull affirm, i . From the Nature of the 
 Thing, that, as fuch Matters are capable of 
 being reprefented clearly, fo if the Supreme 
 Being Ihould ever vouchfafe us a Revelation 
 about them, fuch would be let forth to us in 
 a clear and intelligible Manner : For, no 
 wife Law-giver ever chufes to give us his 
 Laws in Riddles. And, 2. That this hath 
 proved fo in Fad, with Reference to thofe 
 Matters which are delivered in Holy Scripture. 
 This I ihall content myfelf with affirming 
 here, fince the Point hath been fo often clear'd 
 in our Difputes with the Papifts. 
 
 Let our Author then talk, with as much 
 Confidence as he pleafes, of the hyperbolical, 
 parabolical, myftical, allegorical, and typi- 
 cal Ways of Expreffion, familiar to the 
 Eafterns, yet, if thefe are capable of being 
 underftood by others, in any diftant Age, they 
 muft be capable of being render'd in modern 
 Language and modern Terms. And the Ob- 
 jedion is ftill of lefs Moment, if Things ex- 
 prefs'd in this Way are Matters in which our 
 
 Faith and Practice are not concein'd ; 
 
 Matters 
 
Revealed Religion, &c. 3^1 
 
 Matters which were proper to thofe Times, 
 when they might be, and eafily were under- 
 ftood ; Laftly, Matters which rather try the 
 Abilities of the Curious, than affect the Con- 
 dud of ordinary Believers. Such kind of Ob- 
 jedions our Author himfelf would difalJovv 
 in any other Cafe than ours. 
 
 But, 3. It is objeded againft traditional 
 Revelation, That we want fuch an accurate 
 Knowledgeof the Manners, Cuftoms, &c. of 
 the Ancients, as will enable us to underftand 
 their Writings rightly. 
 
 As far as Things relate merely to Dodiines 
 or Precepts, I cannot by any Means fee how 
 fuch an accurate Knowledge of ancient Man- 
 ners, Cuftoms, &(;. can be neceflary. Truths 
 which concern Men in all Ages, and Precepts 
 which have the fame Reference to all Men, 
 in whatever Times they live, are not of fuch a 
 Nature as to depend on the peculiar Manners 
 or Cuftoms of any Age. I do in no wife de- 
 ny, but it is poflible to exprefs Matters with 
 fuch a View to the Cuftoms peculiar to a cer- 
 tain Time, that the right Apprehenfion of 
 them ftiall be exceedingly difficult in future 
 Ages. But I do, and muft deny, that this is 
 abfolutely neceflary and unavoidable : And 
 confequently, this is no manner of Objedion 
 againft an ancient traditional Religion, mere- 
 ly as fuch. Moral Truths have been let forth 
 to us with the utmoft Clearnels, by the anci- 
 ent Philofophers ; I mean, the Senfe and Im» 
 
 port 
 
35t ^ DEFENCE «/ 
 
 port of their Precepts hath been clear, what^ 
 ever Judgment we may be forced to pais on 
 thofe Reafonings by which they fupportecj 
 them. And what hath been fo clearly ex- 
 piefs'd by fome, may be as plainly repre-p 
 fented by others. 
 
 There are indeed Two or Three Things, 
 efpecially in ancient Writings , which may 
 have a Reference to the Cuftoms, &c. of thofe 
 Ages, and prove in a great meafure inexpli- 
 cable without a Skill that Way ; vtz. Pre- 
 cepts given with a fpecial View to the Cir- 
 cumftanecs of thofe Times, tho* they may 
 not pollibly be unferviceable in other Times ; 
 Reafonings intended to draw Men to aflent to 
 certain Matters, or to comply with certain 
 Precepts, built on Ibme preceding Notions or 
 ^radices of that People : To which may be 
 added, Occafional Directions, built on fome- 
 thing either proper to the Perfon to whom 
 they are given, or, atleaft, to that Place and 
 Age. 
 
 In all thefe, I conceive, we are not much 
 concerned. What, tho* we fhould not be 
 able to fay. What might be the Occafion of 
 every Precept in the Jewifh Law- to what 
 Heathen Ufage it was opposed ; or what 
 Failing amongft the Jews it guarded againft ? 
 Doth it follow from hence, that we know not 
 the very Senfe and Meaning of the Precept ? 
 What tho* we cannot make out clearly all 
 the Reafonings of St. ^aul in his Epiftlcs? 
 
 — Reafon- 
 
Revealed Religioi<j, &c. 355 
 
 Reafbnings, no doubt, clear and full" to 
 
 thofe Perfons for whom they were defign'd ^;- 
 Is the Point concluded Therefore obfcure? 
 May not the Propofition he would inculcate 
 be clear enough, tho'we fhould not compre- 
 hend theForceof thofe Arguings whereby he 
 combated the Prejudices o{ the Jews againft 
 it ? And will not the Conclufion fubfift on 
 the Authority of the Apoftle, tho* we fhould 
 not be able to make out exadly every Step 
 in the Apoftle's Argument ? Once more ; 
 What tho' we fhould not underftand the Oc- 
 cafions of thofe Times, nor every particular 
 Circumftance relating to Men who then My'^^ 
 fo perfedly, as to account for every Paffagc 
 in ancient Writings ? Will it follow, that we 
 cannot have any general and competent 
 Knowledge of them at all ? That we can- 
 not underftand any thing which is affirmed 
 
 or taught in them ; That we cannot learn 
 
 from them thofe important Truths , or Pre- 
 cepts, which it was the Defign of thefe Wri- 
 tings to record for common Ufe ?» There is 
 no debating with Perlbns who will ferioufly 
 maintain fuch extravagant Things as thefe. 
 
 Upon the whole ; If God may reveal him- 
 felf to us by a dired A6lion upon Men's 
 Minds, of which He can give them as clear a 
 Senfe as they have of their own Exiftence : 
 If fuch a Revelation made diredly and im- 
 mediately to one, or a few Perfons, may be 
 communicated by them to others, and con- 
 
 firm'd 
 
JJ4 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 firm'd as the Word of God by undoubted 
 Proofs of Divine Authority, (as furely this is 
 in the Nature of Things pofTiiDJe at leaft) : If 
 a Revelation thus made and publifli'd maybe 
 recorded in Writing, and deliver'd down 
 from one to another in a traditionary Way : 
 If there may be good Evidence that this 
 traditionary Revelation hath been conveyed 
 down in fufficient Purity : If the Senfe and 
 Meaning of fuch a Writing may be fuffici- 
 ently underllood and explained, as to all the 
 great Ends intended to be ferv'd by it : And, 
 Laftly, If Men, who are incapable of enter- 
 ing far into abftrufe and metaphyfical Rea- 
 fonings, and confequently cannot receive a 
 moral or religious Rule on the mere Foot of 
 Natural Reafon, may yet have Evidence 
 fufficient to convince them, that this tra- 
 ditionary Revelation is the genuine Will of 
 God, and what the Meaning and Import of 
 it is ; then, 1 conceive, the Point contended 
 for in this Chapter is abundantly fupported. 
 I fliall thtrefore pafs on to fuch other Quefti- 
 ' ons as naturally follow, and will receive 
 Light from the foregoing Obfervations. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Revealed Religion, &c, 3 3 j 
 
 CHAP, VII. • 
 
 Whether a Revelation he not expedient^ 
 in order to a more eafy^ more per' 
 fe6ty and more general Knowledge of 
 the Rule of Ijfe. 
 
 H E greateft Part of what hath 
 been offered hitherto is prepara- 
 tory to this important Queftion ; 
 on the right Decifion of which 
 the Credit of our whole Religion 
 doth in a great Degree depend. And I have 
 been the more full and particular on the fore- 
 going Heads, purely with a View to this. 
 Our Author fees full well of what Moment 
 the Points formerly difcufs'd muft be ; other- 
 wife he would not have infilled on them Hy 
 Itrenuoufly ; He would not have repeated 
 Matters v/ith relation to them fo frequently ; 
 He would not have endeavoured to make 
 good his own Side of thefe leveral Queftions 
 with {Jo much Art and Subtlety. He knew 
 what he was doing; and that, upon the 
 Foot he would have Revelation put, it could 
 not poffibly maintain itfelf. If 
 
J3<5 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 If the Law or Religion of Nature were ab» 
 Iblutcly perfed ; If it were 'immutable in 
 that Senfe in which he contends it is ; If it 
 were perfectly and eafily difcoverable by 
 every Man, even by thofe of the mean eft 
 Capacities ; If, Laftly, it were more perfedly 
 and more eafily difcoverable by them in the 
 Ufe of Reafon, than either the Proof or 
 Meaning of a Revelation can be, then the 
 Conclufion he would obtrude on us would 
 he certain and unqueftionable : A Revela- 
 tion would then be fuperfluous ; it could 
 ferve no End or Purpofe j would be utterly 
 unworthy of God, and conlequently what 
 we could not exped, and ought not to ad- 
 mit of : For this is moft certain, that a per- 
 fectly Wife Being cannot act in vain. 
 
 On the other hand, If the Law or Reli- 
 gion of Nature, when rightly underftood, 
 be not abfolutely perfect ; If it be not im- 
 mutable in the Senie by him contended for j 
 If a proper Rule of Life be not difcover- 
 able by every one perfcdly, and with Eafe ; 
 and if it be not difcoverable in greater Per- 
 fedion, and with greater Eafe, than the 
 Evidence and Meaning oi a Revelation can 
 
 be ; then we may claim the Liberty of 
 
 making thefe Conchifions : God may give 
 us a Law more pericct than the Law of Na- 
 ture, ftrictly fo called, is ; He may, with- 
 out contradicting that Law, fuperadd to it 
 fome Particulars j He may teach us the 
 
 proper 
 
Reveal'd Religion, c^f. i^y 
 
 proper Rule of Life, in a Way which fhall 
 give us a more full, clear, and eafy View 
 of it, than we could have gained in the mere 
 Ufe of our Reafon ; And, Laftly, He may- 
 order Matters fo, that the Meaning and Evi- 
 dence even of a traditional Revelation, fhall 
 be more clear and eafy to us, than a moral 
 Rule would be in the mere Exercife of our 
 natural Faculties. If therefore the Mattel's 
 before infilled on by me, are prov'd, ( as I 
 hope they have been ), then a Revelation is 
 not only poflible, and confiftent with the Di- 
 vine Attributes, but, on our Part, highly de- 
 lirable : And the Wifhes of fome of the wifeft 
 Heathens, upon a ftrid View of the Condi- 
 tion of human Nature, are a farther Confirm- 
 ation of our Sentiments on this Head. 
 
 To this maybe added. That this is not only 
 defirable, (as indeed every Kind of Good is, 
 and muft be), but likewife upon confidering 
 that we are moral Beings, originally capable of 
 great moral Perfedion, and intended for it by 
 our wife Creator, it will appear, that this is 
 highly fitting and proper ; and what we 
 might exped would, one time or other, be 
 given us, when the giving it fhould fall in 
 with the general Government, and be con- 
 fiftent with the grand Scheme of Things. 
 This is the Point which I fhall diitindly 
 purfue in this Chapter, as far as it relates to 
 the more eafy, more perfed, and more 
 general Knowledge of the Rule of Life ; 
 
 Z which 
 
3^8 A DEFENCE of 
 
 which being difpatch'd, I fhall hereafter 
 endeavour to evince the Expediency of a 
 Revelation to enforce the general and uni- 
 form Obfervance of this Rule. 
 
 I fhall not repeat at large what I have 
 occalionally noted heretofore concerning the 
 Poflibility of Revelation. It will appear at 
 firft fight, that God may communicate his 
 Will to us, by immediate Adion, upon our 
 Minds, with much greater Clearnefs and 
 Certainty, than any one Man can convey 
 his Sentiments to another,^ either by Words 
 or Adions. But whether this be fit and 
 proper to be done, is another Queftion ; and 
 will be determined, by enquiring. Whether 
 the Effed of a Revelation can be as well 
 obtained in the ordinary Meafures of Pro- 
 ceeding ? If it may, a Revelation will be 
 fuperfluous ; And we may argue againft the 
 Probability of any Thing in that Kind, juft 
 as Mr. Locke did againft Innate Ideas. He 
 alledg'd, That God hath given us na- 
 tural Faculties, by which all our feveral 
 Ideas of Senfation and Reflexion may be 
 gain'd : It muft therefore be fuperfluous 
 and unaccountable, to imprint thefe on us 
 in our original Conftitution, for the Acqui- 
 litlon of which we have natural Faculties 
 given us. In like manner, If a proper Rule 
 of Life be as eafily and perfedly difcover- 
 able by the Ufe of our Reafon, as it can be 
 by extjaordinary Revelation, Then fuch an 
 
 extra- 
 
Reveal'd Religion, <^c. ^ 35J 
 
 (Extraordinary Revelation muft be needlefs. 
 On the other hand, If this be neither per- 
 fed:ly nor eafily difcoverable by any one, 
 nor, in any confiderable Meafure, dif- 
 coverable by moft, in the ordinary Way, 
 Then an extraordinary Information muft be 
 of high Importance ; It muft concern us, as 
 much as it does to be fully informed of thefe 
 Matters at all : For, nothing can be clearer 
 than this, If we are concerned to have any- 
 full Information of thefe Matters ; and if 
 this Information is not to be had in the or- 
 dinary Way ; Then we are equally con- 
 cerned to have it given us in a Way extra- 
 ordinary. 
 
 But, let me not be mifunderftood here. 
 When I affirm, that Men are concerned to 
 have an extraordinary Information of the 
 Rule of Life, I mean, that fuch an In- 
 formation will be of vaft Ufe and Import- 
 ance to us. I would not be thought in any- 
 wife to affirm, that fuch an Information is 
 abfolutely necefTary, or that Divine Juftice 
 is concern'd in giving it. This Attribute 
 will be cleared entirely from hence, That 
 Men are accountable for their Anions, no 
 farther than their Capacities of Knowledge, 
 and Powers of A6ling reach. In all thole 
 Inftances therefore, in which Men are left 
 entirely to their natural Reafbn, they can- 
 not be ccnfurable whilft they do their bcft. 
 A Revelation indeed would be highly ufeful, 
 
 Z 2 and 
 
J40 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 and give them Advantages which cannot be 
 had any other way ; It would enable them 
 to do more Good to others, and to purchafe 
 a greater Happinels to themfelves. But 
 then we muft remember, that Juftice is not 
 concern'd in the Diftribution of Favours, but 
 the rendering what is due. If therefore 
 a Revelation, in the prefent Cafe, be not 
 ftridly and properly a Debt, Then the 
 Vouchfafing, or the With-holding it, as not 
 being the Concern of Juftice, muft be referred 
 to fome other of The Divine Attributes. 
 
 Upon this View of the Matter, we muft: 
 conftder Revelation as an Inftance of Favour; 
 as fomething which, tho* it would conduce 
 highly to our moral Perfedion, yet could 
 not be demanded as a Right : And therefore 
 we muft Enquire, Whether, upon this Foot, 
 it will appear, that it was proper for God to 
 grant it, and for us to exped it. To this 
 Purpofe, I ftiall confider, 
 
 I. The Condition of the wifer and better 
 
 Part of Mankind ; And, 2. of thofe 
 
 in lower Rank, and of meaner Abilities. 
 Only before I proceed, this ought to be 
 noted, That, in confidering the State and 
 Condition of Mankind, I have a View to 
 That State only in which they fubfift at 
 prefent, or in which they have been for 
 more than Three Thoufand Years paft. This, 
 probably, may have been very different 
 from what it was before ; and confcquently, 
 
 thofe 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 341 
 
 thofe Arguments which may ftievv the Ex- 
 pediency of a Revelation in thefe Circiim- 
 ftances, may not equally conclude for vouch- 
 fafing the lame in the more early Ages. 
 
 In reference to the former , I muft allow, 
 That a proper Rule of Life may be dif- 
 cover'd in a good Degree. The Remains 
 of feveral ancient Writers on the Subject of 
 Morals, Ihevv a great Reach this Way : 
 And no doubt, but in this, as well as other 
 Parts of Philofophy, Abundance may be 
 done, if Men are furnifh'd with competent 
 Abilities, favoured with fufficient Opportu- 
 nities, and willing to apply themfelves with 
 Care : Much, I fay, may be done under thefe 
 Circumftances, becaufe much hath been done 
 in Fad. Yet it muft be confefs'd withal. That 
 'tis difficult to fay exadly, how far mere un- 
 inftruded Reafon might have carry'd Men. 
 Somewhat muft be abated in the Argument 
 drawn from Fad, and in Proof how much may 
 be done this Way, from confidering what hath 
 been done by Heathens, becaufe we cannot 
 be certain what Afllftances thefe very Wri- 
 ters themfelves borrowed from Revelation. 
 To fay Nothing here, of fome Revelation 
 probably made to the firft Man, of a Rule 
 of Morals, which might, notvvithftanding 
 the Corruptions which gradually crept in, 
 fnpply noble Hints ; This is remarkable, 
 That the Scheme of Morals contain'd in the 
 Old Teftament, is vaftly older than any 
 
 Z 3 Writings 
 
34^ A DEFENCE of 
 
 Writings of the Heathen Philofophers. Whe^ 
 ther thefe might not be confulted by thofc 
 inquifitive Men, who omitted fcarce any 
 Means of Inftrudion in their Power ; or, 
 Whether many of the more important Pre- 
 cepts might not be propagated by the Jews 
 difpers'd in different Parts of the World, 
 cannot be determined with ablblute Cer- 
 tainty. But, if either of thefe hath prov'd 
 the Cafe, then the Precepts of Philofophers 
 have not been {o much their own Growth, 
 as fome Men would perfuade us. They 
 have been either diredly taken from Reve- 
 lation, or at leaft fuch Hints have been 
 drawn from thence, as they have improved 
 afterwards by the Force of Parts and Appli- 
 cation. This, I fay, probably hath been, 
 or poffibly may have been the Cafe. 
 
 However, as we are not able to determine 
 this Point with Certainty, Let us fuppofe the 
 utmoft which our Adverfaries can demand j 
 Let us fuppofe that the Philofophers wrought 
 every Thing out of their own Stock : Yet 
 ilill a Revelation would have been exceed- 
 ingly ufeful even to fuch Great Men as thefe, 
 as well to render their Scheme of Morals 
 more perfed and compleat, as to difcover 
 it with greater Readinels. 
 
 Had the Scripture Morality been received 
 by them as a Divine Revelation, could they 
 poflibly have err'd from Truth, as we fre- 
 quently find they did ? Could they haye 
 
 taught 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 345 
 
 taught certain Things as Virtues, or at leaffc 
 as excufable, which are vicious in a very- 
 high Degree, and fome of them even mon- 
 ftrous ? Could they have been guilty of 
 fuch Miftakes with Regard to our Gondud 
 towards the Supreme Being ? Could they 
 have differed fo much from one another about 
 the focial Duties ; or have given us fuch 
 lame Inftruftions in reference to ourfelves ? 
 Or, if we fhould fuppofe that every Virtue 
 of higher Moment, and more general Con- 
 cern, was really taught by fbme one or other, 
 ( which I will not affirm pofitively was not 
 the Cafe) ; yet how came it to pafs that the 
 fame was not equally taught by all ? The 
 Cafe feems to be plain enough : All had not 
 equal Abilities to difcover Truth ; or they 
 were not equally capable of apprehending 
 the Ground of thofe Difcoveries which were 
 made by others ; or, they were not equally 
 difpos'd to attend and confider, and confe- 
 quently to enter into the Reafonings of their 
 PredecefTors : Or, if in fome Points they 
 might eafily diftinguifh between Truth and 
 Falfhood ; yet Prejudice, PafJion, and the 
 like, prevented their judging rightly con- 
 cerning other Matters : They had been us'd 
 to think otherwife ; and therefore could 
 not difcern the Force even of plain Argu- 
 ments on that Side of the Queftion they dif- 
 Uked. 
 
 Z 4 This 
 
344 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 This hath been, and always will be the 
 Caie, where Men have nothing left to truft 
 to but themfelves. But would it have been 
 lb, had Men enjoy 'd and acknowledg'd a 
 Revelation ? No, certainly : On this Sup- 
 pofition, an unerring Rule would have been 
 before them : Perfons of fuperior Parts and 
 Sagacity would probably have trac'd moft 
 Precepts up to their original Principles : Or, 
 if they fhould be incapable of this, yet the 
 Authority of the Revelation muft have over- 
 ruled their Doubts : If corrupt Nature fiiould 
 have biafs'd them another Way, and turn'd 
 them out of the Paths of Obedience, yet the 
 Rule would have ftill remain'd : The Scheme 
 of Morality would have been ftill the fame ; 
 and acknowledged even by thofe Perfons 
 who car'd not to comply with it. Such then 
 are the Advantages of a Divine Revelation, 
 with regard to Perfons of fuperior Rank and 
 Abilities. 
 
 But there is another Thing behind, which 
 may fhew the Ufefulnefs of Revelation, even 
 fuppofing that Men were capable of making 
 the full Difcovery of a moral Rule on the 
 Foot of Reafon ; and that is, it would have 
 rendered fuch a Difcovery more plain and 
 cafy, and have led Men into juft Notions 
 of Things with much greater Quicknefs and 
 Difpatch. 
 
 I think this is too clear to admit Difputc, 
 where the Revelation is Original and Imme- 
 diate : 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c> ^45 
 
 diace : For to aflert the contrary, would be 
 the fame as to maintain, That 'tis eafier to 
 purfue a Demonftration thro* a long Series of 
 Proofs, than 'tis to perceive that Self-evident 
 Principle on which it miift at lait be founded. 
 I fhall therefore, without enlarging on a 
 Point fo clear, chufe rather to obferve fomc- 
 what concerning Traditional Revelation. 
 
 I have noted in my laft Chapter, That 
 notwithftanding all the Difad vantages which 
 may be fuppos'd to attend a traditional Evi- 
 dence, yet Proof of that Kind may be fuffi- 
 cient to determine any reafonable and impartial 
 Man • I have noted farther. That fuch Evi- 
 dence may be judg'd of by Men of ordinary 
 Abilities ; and that Perfons of that Charader 
 are more capable of determining concerning 
 Facts, than concerning abftrad and perplcx'd 
 Reafonings. The Objection therefore againft 
 the traditional Revelation of a proper Rule 
 of Life, built on This, that 'tis eafier to fix 
 this Rule on the Foot of Reafon, than to 
 judge concerning the Evidence of a tradi- 
 tional Revelation, hath no Force at all. 
 
 To this I Ihall beg Leave to add here, 
 That Revelation hath one fpecial Advantage, 
 viz. That by Settling this One Point, every 
 Thing elfe is fettled of Courfe. As the 
 Divine Authority is fupreme, it mufi: over- 
 rule every Objedion : And therefore, when 
 we are once fecure that any Particular is 
 commanded by God, we have nothing left 
 
 us 
 
34^ A DEFENCE of 
 
 us but to obey. On what Foot is it, I 
 would defire to know, that we are, ftridly 
 fpeaking, oblig'd to ad agreeably to the 
 Rules of Reafon, and to purine thofe Things 
 which appear to be fit and proper ? Is it 
 not, becaufe by doing fo, we obey the Will 
 of God ? For, if God's Will were entirely 
 out of Queftion, however we might be con- 
 cerned on feveral Occafions to act in Point of 
 Prudence, yet we could not be properly 
 oblig'd; Nothing would, in fuch a Cafe, 
 be Matter of ftrid Duty. If this be true, 
 then the Exercife of our natural Reafon is 
 but one Way in which the Will of God is 
 difcoverable ; and confequently, if there be 
 any other Method, in which it may be dif^ 
 cover *d with greater Eafe, this Method will 
 have a vaft Advantage over the other. 
 
 Now the Difference between them lies in 
 this ; He who builds merely on human 
 Reafon, muft have a diftind Proof of every 
 Article in Morality: He muft trace every 
 Thing back to its firft Principles : And tho* 
 we Ihould allow, that all moral Precepts are 
 relblvable at laft into one or two general 
 Rules, which Rules may be obvious enough ; 
 yet 'tis no fuch eafy matter to carry Things 
 back fo far : It will require much Time, 
 and great Attention. On the other hand, 
 by evincing the Revelation, the Whole is 
 provM at once : Every Precept contained in 
 it will be a Part of our Duty : We need not 
 3 enquire 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 347 
 
 enquire into the natural Ground and Reafon 
 of the Precept : God's Will muft be the 
 Rule of our Adions ; which being once 
 lix'd this Way, we have nothing left but to 
 examine the Record, and to aft agreeably. 
 In fhcrt, a Revelation, with regard to the 
 Rule of Life, is, when comparM with a par- 
 ticular Inveftigation of every Precept, much 
 the fame as a general Demonftration in Ma- 
 thematicks, compar'd with the particular 
 Demonftrations of each Cafe ; it lets the 
 whole before us at once, and laves us the 
 Trouble of rninute and particular Enqui- 
 ries. 
 
 Having thus offer'd fome Obfervations on 
 the Ufefulnefs of a Revelation to the wifer 
 and better-inftru6led Part of Mankind, I 
 fhall now, in the fecond Place, confider its 
 Ufefulnefs with relpecl: to Perlbns of lower 
 Rank, and meaner Abilities. 
 
 Every Thing which hath been alledg'd 
 above, will equally conclude here; For 
 moft certainly, if Advantages may be derived 
 from hence, even to Perfons of the belt Ca- 
 pacity, the fame, or rather greater, muft 
 arife to thofe of lower Senfe and meaner 
 Attainments. Such Perlbns (as I have had 
 Occafion to obferve frequently) cannot carry 
 Matters very far on the Foot of Reafon : And 
 therefore, to talk as if all Men were equally 
 capable of doing all Things, is to treat 
 human Nature differently from what it can 
 
 in 
 
34B A DEFENCE of 
 
 in Fad admit of. It fuppofes that Men are 
 really more perfed than they are ; and is 
 the very fame Abfurdity, as it would be to 
 meafure the Abilities of Brutes by the Abi- 
 lities of Men. 
 
 If this be the Cafe, then How will the 
 Gentleman inculcate his Scheme of Morality, 
 (however perfed we fhould fuppofe it), on 
 the Generality of Mankind ? Not, I pre- 
 fume, in the Vv^ay of human Terror: This 
 will be, in his Account of Things, Perfecu- 
 tion. And befides, if the Order of the 
 World fhould require, that the Precepts of 
 Morality be enforced by the Execution of 
 Penalties, yet it fhould be remember'd, that 
 this rather ferves to guard the Good, than 
 entirely to reclaim the Vicious. A Man may 
 be very bad in himfelf notwithftanding his 
 outward Adions are reftrain'd : The inward 
 Principle may ftill remain untouch'd, and 
 ready to betray itfelf as often as Men can ad 
 with Safety ; as often as they can either 
 conceal their Crimes, or bribe Juftice, or 
 evade, or refill: it. 
 
 It remains that we enquire, What can be 
 done by Inftrudion or Authority : Thcfe, 
 we allow, are of fome Confequence ; But 
 if, after all, they fhall be found defedivc, 
 and infufficient for the Purpofe before us, 
 we muft carry the Matter farther. 
 
 I. Then let us fee, What may be done 
 on the Foot of Inftrudion. This doubtlefs 
 
 may 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 349 
 
 may be ferviccable : It may fiiggeft Things 
 which would not otherwife have been thought 
 of: And Mens Ideas may be fo order'd this 
 way, that Conclufions (hall appear in a very 
 ftrong Light, which would not have been 
 dilcern'd without fuch Affiftance. This is 
 feen in the feveral other Sciences, or Arts of 
 Life ; and therefore might reafonably be 
 cxpeded in the prefent Cafe likewile. 
 
 Yet, whencefoever it hath come to pais, 
 the great and important Affair of Mor.ility 
 hath been neglected exceedingly. The Priefts 
 amongft the Gentiles concerned themfelves 
 only about the Forms of Worfhip, which 
 they attended with Care enough ; whilft the 
 proper Rule of Life was untouched by them; 
 and the lower Part of the World, who moft 
 needed Affiftance, were left to fearch out 
 their Duty in fuch ways as they could 
 find. 
 
 It muft not indeed be deny'd, but there 
 have been in feveral Ages fome Perfons of a 
 noble Temper- Men who have purfued this 
 great Subjed with Diligence, and ereded 
 Schools, in which they endeavour'd to 
 communicate their Difcoveries. Something 
 might be expeded from hence. However, 
 it is obfervable, that as there were a few 
 Perfons only who undertook this Work, fb 
 the Effeds muft be conlin'd within narrow 
 Bounds. Their Inftrudions were ufeful to 
 their Scholars j But what could this avail 
 
 others 
 
350 A DEFEiSTCE of 
 
 Others who wanted the Advantage? The 
 Method, however excellent in itfelf, was of 
 little Service, whilft not one in a Thoufand 
 could reap any Profit from it* 
 
 But perhaps it v/ill be faid, The prefcnt 
 Queftion doth not relate to the Inftru&ion of 
 former Times : This may have been, and 
 probably hath been, too much negleded. 
 This was the Fault of Men, and doth not 
 argue any Defeds in the Method. But may 
 not Things be put on a better Foot ? May 
 not the good Effeds of Inftrudion be ren- 
 dered more general under proper Regula- 
 tions ? And the Gaufe of Virtue be lufficient- 
 ly provided for, if due Care be taken ? Let 
 us fuppofe this done : Then the Point will 
 reft on the Sufficiency of the feveral Inftruc- 
 tors, and the Capacity, Lei fare, and other 
 Qualifications of the Perfons to be inftruded. 
 
 The Inftrudors muft proceed in the Way 
 of Realbn ; muft point out the Natures of 
 Things, the Relations they have to one an- 
 other, and the moral Precepts which will 
 arife from thence. In thefc Perfons there- 
 fore it muft be required, that they have not 
 only a full View of fuch Matters, but like- 
 wife the Art of communicatino; their Know- 
 ledge, and of reprefenting it in a proper 
 Light to others. Yet is this really the Ta- 
 lent of every Man, who hath good Senfe 
 enough to order his own Searches ? Is every 
 one who may be capable of Learning, capa- 
 ble 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 351 
 
 ble likewifc of Teaching ; of exprefling 
 
 himfclf clearly ; and of adapting himfelfto 
 the Underftanding of his Hearers? It is very 
 obfervable, that Men who poffefs the greateft 
 Share of Learning themfelves, arc not al- 
 ways the moft happy in fhewing it. Thofe 
 who fee the Agreement or Difagreement of 
 Ideas, difcern it fometimes at fuch a Diftance, 
 as others, who have a lefs quick Senle of 
 Matters, could never have difcern'd it at all. 
 Thefe pafs over many of the intermediate 
 Ideas as unneccffary to be diftindly noted ; 
 and therefore, when they come to explain 
 Things to Perfbns of inferior Abilities, are 
 perfedly unintelligible. 
 
 Or, if this Ihould not prove the Cafe ; If 
 the Teacher fhould order his Thoughts in 
 the moft regular Way, and dilpofe Things 
 ib as will be moft apt to beget a right Senfb 
 in the Hearer; yet ftill Ideas cannot be 
 conveyed immediately from one Man to an- 
 other : They muft be expreifed and repre- 
 lented by Words. This draws on another 
 Thing, and Ihews the Neceftity of a Skill 
 in Language. Yet is This a Talent, which 
 every one poifefles in that Degree of Per- 
 fcdion, which may enable him to convey 
 his Thoughts Clearly and with Readinefs ? 
 
 To this may be added farther. That fuch 
 a Teacher ought to have a good Infight into 
 human Nature ; I mean, not only a general 
 View of the Genius and Temper of Man- 
 kind, 
 
;5z A DEFENCE of 
 
 kind, but likewile ibme Acquaintance with 
 the particular Abilities, Ways of Thinking, 
 Conftitutions and Inclinations of his feveral 
 Hearers. Without this, his beft Inftrudions 
 mull many times mifcarry. For, there is a 
 confiderable Difference between fpeculative 
 Teaching, and moral. In the former, where 
 no Paffions are concerned, plain Realons, 
 when laid in a proper Order, and exprefs'd 
 in fitting Language, may prevail : But, in 
 moral Matters, where Men labour, perhaps, 
 under ftrong Prejudices, and are embarafs'd 
 by inward Paflions, many Difficulties will 
 arife. In this Cafe the skilful Teacher will 
 find himlelf concern 'd to adapt his very Rea- 
 fons to the Temper and Condition of the 
 Perfon he would inftrud ; to exprefs them 
 in fuch a Manner, and to fet them in fuch a 
 Light as fhall give them the greateft Weight 
 with him ; Ihall create Attention ; fhall 
 obviate Prejudices ; Ihall engage his Liking ; 
 and, at length, gain his Afient. All thefe 
 feveral Qiialifications, as well as others 
 which might be infiftcd on, are neceifary on 
 the Part of that Inftrudor, who would en- 
 deavour, on the mere Foot of Reafon, to 
 argue Men into their Duty, 
 
 Yet all this will avail Nothing, unlefs the 
 Hearers likevvife are properly difpos'd to be 
 infl:ru<5Ved. Something furely is needful on 
 their Part ; and without which every Thing 
 the Teacher can offer mufl be inefieclual. 
 
 Now 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c» '^<^l 
 
 Now the Firft which occurs is This ; 
 They muft be ready and willing to learn. 
 Inftrudion cannot be forc'd on any Man. 
 He may, if he pleafcs, fhut his Eyes, and 
 refufe to fee : which if he fhould do, Ob- 
 je£ls will prefent themfelves in vain. 
 
 It is requifite, in the next Place, that the 
 Learner be attentive, diligent, and conttant. 
 Without fomewhat of Attention, nothing will 
 be perceiv'd but firft and felf-evident Truths ; 
 Without Diligence there is no carrying on 
 an Enquiry thro* a great Variety of Particu- 
 lars : And, without Conftancy, all thofe 
 Conclufions which demand repeated Pains, 
 and Confideration, muft efcape him. 
 
 Let us fuppofe, however, (tho' it doth 
 not prove the Cafe frequently,) that Men 
 are as attentive, diligent, and conftant as 
 You pleale ; yet forafmuch as, in the pre- 
 fent Way, every Thing muft be done by 
 Dint of Reafon, there is one Thing farther 
 necelfary, viz. That Men have a Sufficiency 
 of Parts and Abilities. It is difficult to fay 
 how far Men are furnilh'd in this refped, 
 by Nature ; and what might have been 
 built on the native Stock, if every Thing 
 had been rightly order'd in the Beginning. 
 Thus much, however, will be allowed me 
 here. That all Men are not upon an exadt 
 Level ; that Some have a much greater na- 
 tural Difccrnment, and quicker Ufe of their 
 reafoning Faculties, than others have j and 
 
 A a con- 
 
354 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 confequently, are capable of thole Improve- 
 ments, which cannot be attain'd by others 
 with their iitmoft Care. But however the 
 Matter relating to Mens original Parts fhall 
 prove, it is certain, that in every Part of 
 Life, Mens Capacities will be proportion'd to 
 the State and Condition in which they have 
 liv'd, and the Ule they have made of their 
 Faculties. Thofe who have been train'd up 
 in an advantageous Manner, may be capable 
 of great Things ; whilft thofe, who have 
 either been negleded, or had a wrong Turn 
 given them, may lofe their very natural 
 Vigour. It happens in fome fort to the 
 Mind as to the Body : Its Powers are capa- 
 ble, by different Management, of being 
 heightened or impaired to almoft any De- 
 gree affignable ; and the Man fhall, on thefe 
 Accounts, ad either vaftly above, or as ex- 
 ceedingly beneath himfelf. 
 
 Thefe Things being premised, I muft ob- 
 ferve, that, in order to carry Matters of 
 Morality to any conliderable Height on the 
 mere Foot of Inftrudion, we muft fuppofe 
 that the Perlbns to be inftruded have not 
 only an original Fund of Parts, but likewife 
 that Nothing hath been loft thro' Negligence 
 or Mifmanagement : We muft fuppofe that 
 the Generality of Men have been exercised 
 in a rational Way, and train'd up to argue, 
 and collect a Truth from a long Train of 
 Inferences. Without this it will be vain to 
 
 deal 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. J5J 
 
 deal with them in the prelent Method : For 
 Arguments have no Manner of Force, where 
 Men want Senfe and Capacity to underftand 
 them. 
 
 To this let me add, that forafmuch as 
 many Conclufions of a moral Kind are diffi- 
 cult to be made out in a tedious Courfe of 
 Reafoning, it is requifite that the Perfons 
 to be taught this Way ihould have Leifure 
 and Opportunity for fuch Refearches. For, 
 the Abihdes of Men can fignify little, if 
 Bufinefs of another Kind fhall take up their 
 Time^ if the necelTary Employments of 
 Life Ihall divert them ; and prevent their- 
 Application to thofe Matters, to which they 
 may be equal as to Capacity, and led by 
 IncHnation 
 
 Now, if it cannot be expeded that there 
 fhould be a competent Number of In- 
 ftrudors, who have a full View of moral 
 Matters : If thofe who have fuch a View 
 may yet be unhappy in reprefenting Things; 
 may want either Propriety of Method, or 
 Clcarnefs of Expreffion, or the right Manner 
 of addrelling themfelves to the Capacities 
 
 and Tempers of Men : And, if the 
 
 Perfons to be inftruded Ihall really prove 
 (what we find the Generahty of Mankind 
 are in Fact) backward to learn, inattentive, 
 lazy, inconftant : If, befides this, they fhall 
 want the Capacity for clofe Reafoning, whe- 
 ther from a Defect of natural Parts, or of a 
 A a 2 proper 
 
^■)6 J DEVEKCE of 
 
 proper Education ; or be fo fully employ'd 
 in the common Affairs of Life, as to have no 
 Leiliirc for deep Study and Reflection j If 
 any, and much more, if all thefe Cafes hap- 
 pen frequently, I may conclude with Safety, 
 that the Method of Inftrudion will be of it- 
 felf infufficient to inculcate a compleat Rule 
 of Morality. 
 
 I am aware of an Objection which may be 
 thought to arife here. It may be faid, If 
 there be any Force in this Kind of Arguing, 
 it will equally conclude againft the Suffici- 
 ency of Chriftian Inftrudion, as that which 
 is purely Moral ; againft inculcating Chriftian 
 Duties on Chriftian Principles, as Moral Du- 
 ties on the Principles of Human Reafon ; 
 and confequently, againft the Ufefulnefs of 
 the Chriftian Priefthood itfelf 
 
 Upon which it fiiould be obferv*d, That 
 I do by no means affirm. No Good what- 
 foever can be done this Way : I am far from 
 maintaining, that Inftruction muft be abfo- 
 hitely ufelefs, and confequently, to be laid 
 afide entirely. Whilft Men had Nothing 
 elfe to depend on, they were concern'd to 
 make the moft of This •, and to Something of 
 this Kind, to domeflick Inftitution princi- 
 pally was it owing, that there were any Foot- 
 ftcps of Virtue and Religion in the World, 
 All that I have afferted in the foregoing Ar- 
 gument is only This ; That the prefent 
 Method, howt^ver feryiceable it may be in 
 
 fome 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 357 
 
 ibme refpccts, muft be infufficient to incul- 
 cate a perfed and compleat Syftem of Mora- 
 lity ; That there are frequently fuch Defeds 
 on the Part both of the Teacher and the 
 Learner, as muft render this Method ineffec- 
 tual : And therefore, fince the Generality of 
 Mankind are incapable of learning a proper 
 Rule of Life this Way, they may wilh and 
 hope for it in fome other. 
 
 A Divine Revelation is the Method I have 
 now in View. This, we affirm, God hath 
 been pleas'd to grant us in Fad : Yet, not- 
 withftanding this, the Ufefulnefs of Inftruc- 
 tion is by no means fuperfeded. If this was 
 in a great meaiure ineffectual before, becaulc 
 many Perfons are incapable of being taught 
 in the Way of Argument ; yet, fince God 
 hath been pleafed to declare his Will, the 
 State of Things is alter'd. On the prefent 
 Foot, the Bufinefs of an Inftruclor is vaftly 
 different from what it was formerly. The 
 Dodrines and Duties of Religion are now 
 laid down in Scripture ; and to be prov'd by 
 the Teacher, not by running Matters back, 
 in an argumentative Way, to the Natures 
 andReafons of Things, (of which the Gene- 
 rality of the World cannot judge fufficiently), 
 but by fhewing that they arecontain'd in the 
 Word of God. This makes all other Kinds 
 of Arguing needlefs : For, Divine Autho- 
 rity is fupreme and indifputable. 
 
 A a 3 'I'o 
 
358 A DEFENCE of 
 
 To return : I have endeavour'd to fhew 
 above, That the Caiife of Virtue cannot be 
 provided for fufficiently on the mere Foot of 
 human Inftrudion : For this requires fuch 
 Advantages, as the greateft Part of Mankind 
 are by no means Mafters of. But then it 
 will be faid, that thofe who are incapable of 
 being fufficiently taught this Way, may yet 
 be influenced by the mere Credit and Autho- 
 rity of their Teachers ; and confequently, 
 that the Reputation of the One may fupply 
 all the Defeds of the Other. 
 
 This may, perhaps, be faid, as there is 
 hardly any Thing but fome one or other is 
 capable of affirming. Yet, is there any Pro- 
 bability in the Thing ? Is it found that Men 
 are fo very humble and modeft, and willing 
 to give Way to others in thofe Points in 
 which they are leaft capable of judging for 
 themfelves ? Doth not Experience fhew, that 
 Men are obftinate and perverfe in proportion 
 to their Ignorance ; conceited of thofe very 
 Abilities they want ; and apt to prefume they 
 know Every Thing, merely for this Reafon, 
 that they know Nothing ? 
 
 Somewhat might be alledg'd to this Pur- 
 pofe, and the Propofal would be plaufible 
 enough, if Men thoroughly knew themJel ves ; 
 if they were confcious of their own Defeds ; 
 and ready to borrow that Afliftance from 
 others, which the Circumftances they are 
 placed in make necelTary. But^ whofoever 
 
 reckons 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 359 
 
 reckons upon this, miift betray his Ignorance 
 of the real State of the World. Men, efpc- 
 cially the lower Part of them, are conceited^ 
 proud, felf-vviird, obftinate. How are fuch 
 Perfons as thefc to be influenced by mere hu- 
 man Authority ? 
 
 Or, if it fliould be fuppos'd, they might 
 give fome Way to others, or take their Word 
 for Matters in which they have no manner of 
 Concern; If they fhould credit them in their 
 leveral ProfefTions, or thofe Arts or Sciences 
 to which they have had no Opportunities of 
 applying themfelves; yet we Ihall find the 
 Cafe is different, when we come to give 
 them Directions about their ow^n Condud 
 and Behaviour. Here they will be apt to 
 think No Man whatfoever hath a Right 
 to prefcribe to them ; that as all Men are by 
 Nature equal, fo every Man is to give a Law 
 to Himfelf; and that each Man for himfelf 
 is befl capable of doing this, not only be- 
 caufe he is moft fenfible of his own Plea- 
 lures or Pains, but likewife becaufe he is 
 more interefted in the Confequences of his 
 own Adions than any one elfe can be. 
 
 Let us fuppofe however, that this Diffi- 
 culy were gotten over ; Let us imagine that 
 there were no fuch Principles of Self-conceit 
 and Perverfcnefs in Mankind, as we fee in 
 
 Fad there are ; that they were confcious 
 
 of their Defeds, and willing to fubmit them- 
 
 felves to the Diredions of wifer Men ;*How, 
 
 A a 4 I de- 
 
3^0 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 I defire to know, will Matters ftand on this 
 Suppofition ? 
 
 Why, Things will be manag'd rightly- 
 enough, if another Suppofition can be juftly 
 made, viz. That all theie feveral Inftrudors 
 ihall have the fame View of moral Matters, 
 and teach juft one and the fame Thing. 
 But, if this fiiould not prove the Cafe, (as 
 it never yet hath prov'd fo) then another 
 Difficulty will arife, viz. Hov/ to make a 
 proper Choice of the Teacher : Is This to 
 be left to each Man's private Difcretion ? or 
 is it to be determined by fome higher Power ? 
 If the later Point be affirmed, then poiTibiy 
 the Teacher, however he may be qualified 
 for the Work he undertakes, may yet be un- 
 acceptable ; may lofe his Credit and Autho- 
 rity with thofe he fhould prefcribe to ; and 
 confequently, his Pre.cepts may become en- 
 tirely fruitlefs and ineJBfedual. For, this is 
 certain, If the Effed of his Precepts muft 
 depend on his Authority, they can have no 
 greater Force than what his Authority gives 
 them ; which depending likewife on the 
 Opinion Men have of him, a Regard muft 
 be always had to fuch an Opinion. 
 
 On the other Hand ; If, to avoid the In- 
 conveniences arifing from hence, it be affirmed, 
 that each Man muft chufe for himfelf, then a 
 new Set of Difficulties will prefent themfelves. 
 For, I beg to know, whether thofe who moft 
 want Direction, are the fittefi: Judges of the 
 
 Abilities 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. i6i 
 
 Abilities of a Diredor ? Do Thefe Perfons 
 know fo exadly the Integrity and Skill of 
 thofe they apply to? Will they not from 
 hence be laid under the unhappy Chance of 
 making as well a bad Choice as a good one? 
 Or rather, will they not be apt to lean too 
 much to the wrong Side, and to chufe the 
 Perfon rather who favours their Inclinations, 
 than him who would lead them through the 
 difficult Paths of Virtue ? This is not only in 
 itfelf poflible , but probable. And , if it 
 Ihould once prove the Cafe, muft be attended 
 with this farther Confequence, that the Er- 
 rors they are brought into by this Means, 
 muft be entirely without Remedy. Where 
 Men give themfelves up entirely to Autho- 
 rity, that Authority ought furely to be in- 
 fallible • becaufe, if it Ihould lead them 
 wrong, they can have Recourfe to Nothing 
 farther for Dircdion. As their Errors are 
 unavoidable, fo the Corruptions arifing from 
 thefe Errors muft be incurable. 
 
 After all, it muft be own'd, That our Au- 
 thor is not at all affedted by what I have ad- 
 vanced here. He does by no means maintain 
 that Human Authority is to be regarded in 
 theprefent Cafe: Every Thing is referr'd by 
 him to each Man's own private Senle : And he 
 carries the Matter fo far as to exclude the Di- 
 vine Authority itfelf Let us fee what he 
 advances to this purpofe, p. i8d. " If you 
 ♦* are to be governed by [Revelation,] that 
 2. " fuppofes 
 
^6z A DEFENCE of 
 
 '* fuppofes yoa muft take every Thing upon 
 *' Truft ^ or merely becaufe it is fair! by 
 <' thofe for whofe Dictates you are to have 
 *' an implicit Faith : For, to examine into 
 <* the Truth of what they fay, is renouncing 
 *' their Authority : As, on the contrary, if 
 *' Men are to be govern'd by their Reafon, 
 *^ they are not to admit any Thing farther 
 •^ than as they fee it reafonable. To fup- 
 *' pofe both confiftent, is to fuppofe it con- 
 " fiftent to take and not to take Things on 
 " Truft. To receive Religion on Account 
 '* of Authority, fuppofes, that if the fame 
 *' Authority promulgated a different Reli- 
 *' gion, we fhould be oblig'd to receive it. 
 *' And indeed, it is an odd Jumble, to prove 
 " the Truth of a Book by the Truth of the 
 *' Dodrines it contains, and at the fame 
 *' Time conclude thofe Dodrines to be true, 
 *' becaufe contained in that Book. And 
 " yet, this is a Jumble every Man makes, 
 " who contends for Mens being abfolutely 
 *' govern'd, both by Reafon and Authority. " 
 This PafTage muft be confider'd • becaufe, 
 if our Author's Pofition in this Place be true, 
 viz. That we are not to be govern'd by any 
 
 Authority whatfoevcr , no, not by 
 
 the Authority of God himfeif, all that we 
 can offer concerning the Weaknefs of human 
 Reafon will fignify Nothing : It may fhew 
 indeed the Unhappinefs of Man, but cannot 
 point out the Remedy. This cannot prove 
 
 that 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. ^6-^ 
 
 that a Revelation is needful, becaufe, on this 
 Suppofition, a Revelation muft be unfervice- 
 able. 
 
 Our Author*s prefent Argument is built 
 on a fuppos'd Inconfiftency between being 
 govern'd by Reaibn, and being govern'd by 
 Revelation : " If we are govern'd by Reve- 
 " lation , ( fays he ) we muft take every 
 
 " Thing upon Trull ; and this iuppofes, 
 
 " that if the fame Authority promulgated a 
 *' different Religion, we fhould be obliged 
 " to receive it. " On the other Hand, if we 
 are to be govern'd by our Reafon, " we are 
 " to examine into the Truth of what [is faidl 
 " and not to admit any Thing farther than 
 *' we fee it reafonable. To fuppofe both 
 " confiftent, is to fuppofe it confiftent to take 
 " and not to take Things on Truft. " 
 
 One Thing I muft obferve, before I proceed 
 to the diftind Examination of what our Au- 
 thor alledges here, viz. Altho' the Autho- 
 rity concerning which he is here Ipeaking be 
 Divtne Authority, the Authority of Re- 
 velation ; yet this Writer hath fo artfully 
 manag'd Matters in the Progrefs of his Argu- 
 ment, as pollibly to deceive his Readers in- 
 to a Belief, that he is only contending againft 
 abfolute Hainan Authority. " That [i. e. 
 ' — - the being govern'd by Revelation, ] 
 " fuppofes you muft take every Thing up- 
 " on Truft • or merely becaufe it is faid by 
 *^ thofefor whofe Didates you are to have an 
 
 " im- 
 
364 A DEFENCE of 
 
 « implicit Faith. " If the Gentleman had 
 cxprefs'd himfelf in this Manner, " Bccaufc 
 " it is affirm'd by God, who cannot deceive, 
 " or be deceived, '* no Inconveniencies could 
 arife from taking Things on fuch a Truft. 
 But this would not have ferv'd his Purpofe : 
 He therefore takes another Way, and en- 
 deavours to lead his Readers off from the 
 true Point in Queftion. 
 
 But to the Point itfelf. In Oppolition to 
 our Author's Aflertions in this Argument, I 
 Ihall endeavour to fhbw, 
 
 1. That there neither is, nor poffibly can 
 be, any Inconfiftency between Reafon and 
 Revelation ; or, between Things known by 
 human Reafon, and taught by Divine Reve- 
 lation. And 
 
 2. That an abfolute Submiflion to both is 
 poffible and proper. Under this later Head 
 I fhall clear Matters from the feveral Diffi- 
 culties which our Author alledges. 
 
 Reafon is that natural Faculty, in the 
 Ule of which we perceive the Evidence of 
 certain Truths : And Revelation is that ex- 
 traordinary Ad of God, by which certain 
 Truths arc imprefs'd upon us, or manifefted 
 to us. Nov/, there cannot be any more In- 
 confiflency between chefe, than there can be 
 between real Truths themfelves. Truths are 
 the Objects both of Reafon and Revelation, 
 which are only different Ways of arriving at 
 the Knowledge of them. Suppofing there- 
 fore 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, ^6'^ 
 
 fore that the Truths themfelves are different 
 from each other, as well as the feveral Ways 
 by which the Knowledge of them is attain'd ; 
 Doth it follow, that they muft therefore be 
 repugnant ? To affert this, is to bid Defi- 
 ance to common Senfe and Reafon. 
 
 By Reafon, here, I mean that whidh pafTes 
 under the Name of right Reafon, or the 
 Faculty confider'd as properly exercis'd about 
 its proper Objed. In fuch a Cafe, the Things 
 difcover'd by Reafon are, and muft be true ; 
 And the Evidence of the feveral Truths 
 fo difcover'd, makes it impoffible to with- 
 hold AlTent. So again, by Revelation, I 
 mean, not merely a pretended Revelation, 
 but a true one ; fome real Manifeftation of 
 the Supreme Being, by which he declares 
 his Will and Pleafure to the World. I am 
 obligM to be thus cautious, in order to avoid 
 Difputes with reference Either to the Con- 
 cluiions of an ill-conduded Reafon, or a 
 merely nominal and pretended Revelation ; 
 and to guard againft fuch Inconfiftencies as 
 may be found to arife from an improper Ufe 
 of thefe Terms. I'his being noted, I muft 
 affirm. That as every Thing really demon- 
 ■ ftrable by Reafon, and knowable by it, muft 
 be trae ; fo every Thing really declared by 
 God, in the Way of Revelation, muft be 
 true likewife. On any other Foot, we muft 
 maintain one or both thefe Points, viz. That 
 God may be deceiv'd himfelf, or may deceive 
 
 and 
 
^66 A DEFENCE oj 
 
 and miflead his Creatures. But to maintain 
 Either of thele, is inconfiftent with the moft 
 certain Principles of Reafon ; with thofe, 
 from which the abfolute Wifdom and Redi- 
 tude of the Divine Being are evidently con- 
 cluded. If the Colledions therefore of right 
 Reafon are certainly true ; And if the Dif- 
 coveries made by Divine Revelation muft 
 likewife carry with them certain Truth ; 
 And if there can be no real Inconfiftency 
 between the feveral Truths we difcover, 
 whatever the Ways may be in which we dif- 
 cover them, then my lirft Pofition is fuffi- 
 ciently evinc'd, viz. That there is no Incon- 
 fiftency between Reafon and Revelation. 
 
 However, That an abfolute Submiflion 
 to both thefe is in its Nature poffible, and 
 upon many Accounts proper, is the main 
 Point I am conccrn'd about. By an ablblute 
 Submiflion to thefe, muft be underftood, an 
 Alfent to every Propofition taught by either, 
 and an unreferv'd Obedience to every Pre- 
 cept inculcated by either. I conceive the 
 Poffibility of tnis is evident at firft Sight, if 
 there be no Inconfiftency between Reafon 
 and Revelation ; If the Things, each Way 
 difcover'd, are either coincident, (as in 
 fome Cafes they are ) ; or elfe fuch as mu- 
 tually confift with, and even fupport each 
 other. But if this be poffible, I am certain 
 it muft, on feveral Accounts, be reafonablc. 
 
 As 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 3(^7 
 
 As to our SubmiiTion to the Rviles of 
 Reafon, I can have no Difpnte with this 
 Gentleman. We both of us allov/, and even 
 contend, That Reafon will be heard. The 
 only Qiieftion to be debated, is This • Whe- 
 ther Revelation hath a like Claim to our 
 Submiflion ? This is by me affirmed, and 
 by This Gentleman deny'd ; upon what 
 Grounds we fhall fee immediately. 
 
 Yet before I proceed to examine the Ob- 
 je6lions alledg'd by this Author, give rac 
 Leave to ^sk a few Queftions. Doth not 
 Reafon it felf tell us. That there is a God ? 
 — That this God is Wife, Juft, and Righ- 
 teous ? That if He be fo, every Thing 
 
 which He declares, muft be true ? And, if 
 it muft be true. Doth not this Realbn teach 
 us again, That our AlTent is due to it ? If 
 the Revelation be immediate, /. e. if it be 
 made by an immediate AS: of the Supreme 
 Being on the Mind of a Prophet, no Diffi- 
 culties can poflibly arife to fuch a Perfon 
 about the Reality of the Revelation ; Be- 
 caufe God cannot want the Means of making 
 his Will as certainly known by immediate 
 Impreflion, as by the cleareft Demonftrations 
 of Reafon. But, where the Revelation is 
 mediate or traditional, the Gale may be fome- 
 what different. However, even here, the 
 Grounds or Motives ibr receiving the Reve- 
 lation, are rational Grounds or Motives ; to 
 be try'd by Reafon, and approvable by if. 
 
 3 ir 
 
3(58 ^DEFENCE of 
 
 If therefore we receive the Revelation itfelf 
 upon rational Motives of Credibility • And, 
 if Reafon itfelf teaches us, that what is thus 
 received as a Divine Revelation, ought to be 
 credited, and fubmitted to ; then I muft 
 conclude, that thefe Two are far from being 
 unfriendly to each other ; and that Reafon 
 itfelf, duly exercis'd, whilit it conduds us to 
 Revelation, fupports us in obeying it. We 
 are convinc'd what is a mediate or traditional 
 Revelation, by the right Ufe of our rational 
 Faculties : We arc convinc'd likewife by 
 the fame Reafon, that fuch a Revelation 
 ought to be obeyM entirely ; It follows, tha& 
 an Obedience to both thefe, is fo far from be- 
 ing inconfiftent, that we cannot really obey 
 Reafon, without paying an abfolute Regard 
 to Revelation. 
 
 What our Author objeds on this Head, 
 amounts to This i i • '* That to be governed 
 " by Revelation, is to take every Thing 
 " upon Truft ; and, To be governed by 
 " Reafon, is Not to admit any Thing farther 
 ** than we fee it reafonable. To fuppofc 
 " both thefe to be confiftent, is to fuppofe 
 ** it confiftent to take, and not to take Things 
 « upon Truft. " 
 
 And, if it be alledg*d, (as he knows wc 
 fhall alledge). That we are to try, by our 
 Reafon, What is, or is not a real Revela- 
 tion, Then he objeds, 2. " That this is 
 " an odd Jumble, To prove the Truth of 
 
 " a 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 3(^9 
 
 " a Book by the Truth of the Dodrines ic 
 *^ contains ; and at the fame time to con- 
 " dude thofe Dodrines to be true, becaufe 
 " contain'd in that Book. '' 
 
 In reference to the former, I muft allow, 
 That to be govern'd by Revelation, is to 
 take every Thing upon Truft, concerning 
 which we are fatisfy'd that 'tis reveal'd ; or, 
 merely becaule it is faid, Not by thofe 
 [ fallible Men ] for whofe Dii^ates we have 
 an implicit Faith, but, by that infal- 
 lible and all-righteous Being, on whom we 
 may depend fecurely. To take Things 
 upon Truft, in this Cafe, is not only con- 
 fiftent with Reafon, but likewife a neceffary 
 Conclufion of Reafon itfelf. On the other 
 Hand, To be govern'd by Reafon, is not 
 to admit any Thing further than we lee it 
 reafonable : This likewife I muft allow : 
 But then, let me obfcrve to this Gentleman, 
 That there are Two Ways in which we may 
 fee a Thing to be reafonable ; i. From the 
 internal Evidence of the Thing itfelf : And 
 here. He who yields to any pretended A\\<^ 
 thority againft fuch internal Evidence, ads 
 unreafbnably, no doubt. But it may hap- 
 pen, that the Meafure of our Capacities, or 
 the Want of Opportunities, may be fuch, as 
 (hall difqualify us for difcovering the Truth 
 from the internal Evidence of the Thing. 
 What, I pray, muft be dcfiie in fuch a Cafe 
 as this ? Arc we to give Credit to no one ? 
 
 B b Are 
 
570 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Are we to admit Nothing ^ and to ad No- 
 thing ? This, furely, will not be maintained 
 by any one, who confiders the Confequences 
 which muft arife from it. In this Cafe^ 
 Reafon will teach us to pay fuch a Deference 
 even to human Authority, as the Skill and 
 Integrity of the Perfon whom we credit will 
 juftify. To do this, muft be reafonable and 
 fitting, becaufe it is doing the beft we can ; 
 tho' in the particular Prefcriptions of this 
 Authority we may not difcern the real Fit- 
 nefs of the Thing prefcrib^d. But, where 
 the Authority which prefcribes to us, is 
 abfolutely infallible^ and where we own and 
 acknowledge it to be fo, there I will not 
 affirm merely that it may be reafonable to 
 fubmit, but that it is neceiTary to do fo : 
 There Reafon will require us to take the 
 Thing upon Truft; There we fhall fee that 
 our Affent is reafonable in the higheft De- 
 gree : And conlequently, by believing, in 
 fuch a Cafe, we do not admit any Thing 
 farther than we fee it reafonable to do ib. 
 
 Upon the Whole ; To the Inconfiftency 
 which our Author alledges between taking. 
 Things upon Truft, and not taking them 
 upon Truft, I muft reply ; That Reafon 
 doth by no means require us. Not to take 
 a Thing upon Truft, where the Authority 
 "we depend on is infallible ; and efpecially,, 
 where we have not Reach enough to deter- 
 mine for ourfelycs on the internal Evidence 
 
 of 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 571 
 
 of the Thing. Now, if Reafon doth not 
 require this, but the contrary, then our 
 Author's Objedlon fails, as being built on 
 a Principle in itfelf groundlefs and falfe. 
 
 But he adds, " To receive a Religion on 
 " Account of Authority, fuppofes, that if 
 " the fame Authority promulgated a dif- 
 " ferent Religion, we ftiould be obhg'd to 
 " receive it. " What then ? What Diffi- 
 culties, I pray, can arife, where we are 
 alfur'd, that the Authority is fupreme and 
 infallible ? None certainly, but what might 
 equally arife, (if any can arife,) from Rea- 
 fon itfelf. To receive a Religion on the 
 Score of Reafon, fuppofes, that if the fame 
 Reafon taught a different Religion, we 
 fhould be oblig'd to receive it. This may 
 be very True, (if the Suppofition can be 
 made,) and yet of no Confequence in the 
 Point we are debating. All that I fhall ob- 
 ferve farther, is This ; that right Reafon 
 can teach us Nothing which is inconfiftent 
 with Truth or Fitnefs : Neither can God do 
 lb, who is elTentially and abfolutely reafon- 
 able. And if any Suppofitions of the Na- 
 ture abovemention'd, would be thought ex- 
 travagant in the one Cafe, they muft equally 
 be ib in the other. 
 
 I have obferv'd above, that we are to pay 
 an abfolute Obedience to Pvcvelation. But 
 then the Ufe of Reafon is not entirely ex- 
 cluded : For, we muft try, by this very 
 B b 2 Rca- 
 
^7^ A DEFENCE of 
 
 Reafon, what is, or is not a Revelation ; wc 
 muft examine what is offer'd as reveaPd,, 
 whether it be capable of being reveal'd, or 
 not, /. e. whether it be confiftent with the 
 liire and known Principles of Reafon. And 
 if every Thing be, clear on this Head, then 
 we muft try, whether there be fufficient 
 external Evidence to prove the Revelation. 
 If there be, (and Reafon is to determine on 
 thefe Points,) then Reafon itfelf leads us to 
 Revelation. 
 
 But our Author obferves, " It is an odd 
 " Jumble, to prove the Truth of a Book by 
 *' the Truth of the Dodrines it contains ; 
 ** and at the fame Time to conclude thefe 
 *' Dodrines to be true, becaufe contained in 
 '* that Book. '* But, by this Gentleman's 
 Leave, the Matter is by no means ftated 
 fairly. We do not prove the Truth of the 
 Book by the Truth of the Dodrines : We 
 do not affirm, that Reafon leads us to ac- 
 knovv^ledge a Revelation, by antecedently 
 proving the Truth of the Things reveaPd, 
 This would be a Jumble indeed. But, what 
 we affirm, is This ; That Reafon tries the 
 Dodrines or Precepts as far as it can ; and 
 fees, whether any Objedions can be made 
 againft them, from confidering the Principles 
 of natural Light. If not, then, for any 
 Thing which appears to the contrary, thefe 
 Dodrines may be true, and the Precepts 
 dcliver'd may be agreeable with the Will of 
 
 God. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 37} 
 
 God. Whether they are fo, or not, is an- 
 other Queftion, and to be determin'd in 
 another Way. Here Reafbn comes in again; 
 and tries the Matters of Fad which arc 
 alledg'd as external Evidence, in the fame 
 way as other Matters of Fad are try'd. If 
 every Thing fhall appear right here, then 
 the Things propos'd muft be receiv'd as 
 reveal'd ; And when this Point is gain'd, 
 we then infer, that the Particulars contained 
 in the Revelation muft be true. In this 
 Way of reprefenting the Matter, all is clear. 
 Here are none of our Author's imaginary 
 Jumbles. Reafon leads us to acknowledge 
 
 the Revelation : How ? Not by proving, 
 
 antecedently to a Revelation, the parti- 
 cular Truths reveal'd ; but by proving the 
 Revelation itfelf. And the Revelation is 
 
 proved, How ? By fhewing, from the 
 
 Nature of the Thing, that Reafon hath no 
 Objedion againft the Pollibility of Matters 
 declared by it; and afterwards. That the 
 Fads alledg'd are fufficient to confirm it. 
 The Confequence from this muft be, That 
 the Things fo reveal'd are certain ; That, in 
 this Procefs, every Thing is afcrib'd to Rea- 
 fon, which doth, or pollibly can belong to 
 
 Reafon ; That we are govern'd abfo- 
 
 lutely by Reafon, as far as Reafon carries 
 us ; and when it hath led us on to Revela- 
 tion, we are then to be governed abfolutely 
 by Revelation. 
 
 13 b 3 Thus 
 
374 y^ DEFENCE of 
 
 Thus I have confider'd what our Author 
 hath alledg'd againft The Expediency of a 
 Revelation, in order to the more perfed, 
 more eafy, and more general Knowledge of 
 the Rule of Life. I have endeavour'd to 
 ihew, that there is no Inconfiftency in the 
 Regards we pay to Reafbn, and to Revela- 
 tion ; and that notwithftanding we affirm, 
 we are to be abfblutely govern'd by both, 
 yet there is no fuch Jumble or Confufion 
 in the Cafe, as this Gentleman imagines. 
 
 This, I fay, I have endeavour'd to ihew ; 
 Not that thefe Objections, as ftated by him, 
 are fo very formidable, or contain any 
 Thing fpecious; but becaufe they are the 
 only Arguments he alledges in dired Proof 
 of his Point ; and, becaufe he infills on 
 them with fuch an Air of Confidence, and 
 carries on this Way of Reafoning for feveral 
 Pages together. Had it not been for this, 
 I fhould not have troubled myfelf with 
 offering any Remarks on fuch Kinds of 
 Arguing • which, however weak they are, 
 and will appear to be to confidering Men, 
 may yet deceive unwary Readers, who take 
 Confidence for Strength, and may be apt to 
 credit a Man for affirming roundly, and 
 
 repeating frequently. But enough of 
 
 this. The farther Expediency of a Revela- 
 tion will appear from what fhall be offer'd 
 in the following Chapter, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 375 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Whether a Revelation he not expedient^ 
 in order to enforce the general 
 ^ra6ike of the Rule of Life, 
 
 ilTHERTO I have endeavour'd 
 to ihew the FA'pediency of a 
 Revelation, in order to fix and 
 determine, for general Ufe, a 
 proper Rule of Life : Which, 
 tho' it fhould be thought difcoverable by 
 fome, in the Ufe of Reafbn, who enjoy the 
 Advantages of flrong natural Parts, a liberal 
 Education, and fufficient Leifure, muft yet, 
 in a great meafure, be out of the Reach of 
 others, of lower Station and Condition. 
 
 At prefent I fhall fuppofe this proper 
 Rule known, and aflented to ; and Enquire, 
 What muft be the Confequence on this Sup- 
 pofition ? In this Cafe, I think, it muft be 
 allow'd, that as every rational Being muft 
 take a Pleafure in ading agreeably to the 
 Rules of Reafon, as far as thefe Rules ap- 
 
 B b 4 pear 
 
37^ A DEFENCE of 
 
 pear to him ; fo, were there no Hindrance 
 in the Way, Men would doubtlefs ad the 
 right Part uniformly. For, tho' a Liberty 
 there muft be in Man, as there is in every 
 intelligent Being ; yet ftill Men are in Fa6t 
 determined to that Side which appears the 
 bcft, fo long as it appears to be fo : It fol- 
 lows, that as long as they carefully attend 
 to Reafon, and feel a Satisfaction in ading 
 agreeably, (which Satisfadion cannot, and 
 they are confcious cannot, be obtained in any 
 other Way), lb long, we may affure our- 
 felves, they will behave as reafonable Beings, 
 are concern'd to do. Upon this I pre- 
 fume that the Angels in Heaven, tho' not 
 abfolutely impeccable, will not in the Event 
 condud themfelves a'mifs ; as having a 
 quick Senfe of what is fit and proper to be 
 done, and no Temptations to deviate from 
 this Rule : And upon the fame Ground may 
 we prefume like wife, that Good Men, in 
 the other World, will preferve their Inno- 
 cence inviolate. 
 
 But thofe who reckon upon fuch a right 
 State of human Nature in the prefent Con- 
 flitution of Things, feem to have confider'd 
 Matters ilightly. For, over and above 
 the Imperfedion of our intelledual Capaci* 
 ties, (of which enough hath been faid here- 
 tofore), we have a Variety of ftrong Paf-s 
 iions to combat. Some Tendencies are con- 
 flitutional 3 Others arife from Education^ 
 
 Cuftopij^ 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c: %yj 
 
 Cuftom, or perhaps the very Kind of Life 
 we are obllg'd to live in. To which may 
 be added, outward Temptations of almoft 
 every Kind ; Example, Solicitation, Intereft, 
 Pleafure, Power. Men receive fuch a ftrong 
 Biafs from fome or other of thefe, as requires 
 very powerful Motives on the other Side ; 
 and without which, it cannot be hop'd they 
 Ihould be kept right, or be prevented from 
 ading that Part, which in their cooler Hours 
 they miift condemn. 
 
 In fuch a State as this. Men cannot be 
 prevailed on to purfue an uniform Courlc 
 of Virtue, but upon one or other of thefc 
 Suppofitions. 
 
 I. That the mere Pleafure of ading Well, 
 Is a Balance for all the Inconveniencies of 
 doing otherwife, of whatever Kind they be ; 
 and that amidft all the Embarafments of 
 Paflions and Temptations, the Confideration 
 of this virtuous Pleafure hath fufficient Room 
 to ad upon the Mind, and to influence the 
 Choice. Or, 
 
 1. Ifthisfhould not prove the Cafe, that 
 there are fome external Motives, arifing froni 
 the EfFeds and Confequences of our Adions, 
 fufficient to produce what the mere Fit- 
 nefs and Reafonablenefs of the Thing 
 cannot do, 
 
 ^ Ftrji then, It may perhaps be affirm'd. 
 That the mere Pleafure of doing Well, is a 
 balance for all the Inconveniencies of ading 
 
 other«i 
 
37? yf DEFENCE o/ 
 
 otherwife, of whatever Kind they be. Upon 
 which I muft obferve, That this Affirmation 
 fuppofes, not only that Men, as rational 
 Creatures, take a Satisfadion in Truth, and 
 the Confcioufnefs of afting agreeably to 
 Truth *, but likewife, that there is fuch a 
 moral Tafte implanted in us, as Ihall carry 
 ns farther than a mere AfFedion and Regard 
 for Truth can do. This, I conceive, is evi- 
 dent from hence ; That if Men were influ- 
 enc'd no fiirther than mere Truth, as fuch, 
 could carry them, they would be equally 
 influenc'd by all Truths ; and confequently, 
 by Metaphyfical or Natural Truth, as much 
 as by Moral. Now, do we find in Fad, 
 that ivietaphyfical or Natural Truth, when 
 it is combated by any of the afore-mention'd 
 Difficulties, is fufficient to gain our Appro- 
 bation, or to determine our Choice ? Would 
 a Man die, to confirm the Truth of a Phi- 
 lofophical Problem ? Or, if this fhould be 
 thought too extravagant a Queftion,Let me de- 
 mand, Whether theAfFedion for mere Truth 
 be fuch, as will prevail with Men, in the gene- 
 ral, to forego any extraordinary Pleafure, or 
 to incur any extraordinary Pain ? to throw 
 up any Advantages in View, or to incur any 
 confiderable Lofs or Calamity ? I do not 
 affirm but Inftances may fometimes be pro- 
 duc'd of Men, who, for the fake of fome 
 favourite Truths, have ventur'd all this ; 
 and fjch Inftances there poiTibly may be 
 
 agaiuo 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 379 
 
 again. But then it is worth remarking, that 
 if this were done for the fake of Truth, 
 merely as fuch, it would equally hold with 
 regard to any Truth whatfoever. Yet, hath 
 the World ever produced a Man, who thought 
 himfelf concern'd to purfue every Kind of 
 Truth at this Rate ? If not, then 'tis evi- 
 dent, that there mufi: be fomething very par- 
 ticular in thofe Truths, which a Man purfues 
 {o ardently j Something which recommends 
 them to his Approbation and Efteem in a 
 lingular manner ; Or, fome Suitablencfs in 
 them to the particular Genius and Temper 
 of the Man. 
 
 That which I call Geniiis, with reference 
 to any other Kind of Truths, and by which 
 a Man is not only qualify'd to penetrate far 
 into Matters, and to diftinguilh nicely, but 
 likewife to purlije Things of that Kind, in 
 Oppofition to every Sort of Difcouragement, 
 That, in the Point I am now upon, I ihall 
 term a Moral Senfe or Tafte. This implies 
 fuch a quick Perception of the Agrceable- 
 nefs and Beauty of what is fitting, as gains our 
 Approbation, and determines us ftrongly to 
 purfue it. The Pradice of Virtue, as fuch, 
 can be fupported on no other Foot than this : 
 For, if there be implanted in us a natural 
 Defire of what is good or pleafing, and a 
 natural Averfion from what is evil or dif^ 
 pleafing, we cannot pofi[ibly chufe Virtue, 
 as fuch, in Oppofition to thefe, but where 
 
 there 
 
3S0 J DEFENCE o/ 
 
 there is fomething in Virtue which makes it 
 more defirable than any other Good, fome- 
 thing in Vice which is worfe than may be 
 found in any other Evil we are expos'd to. 
 And this, I fay, can be built on Nothing 
 elfe but the Senfe or Tafle above men- 
 tioned. 
 
 Thus much indeed muft here be granted, 
 that there is fomewhat of this Kind im- 
 planted in human Nature : There is a Power 
 not only of diftinguifhing, in fome meafure, 
 what is right or wrong in Adions, but like- 
 wife a Tendency or Inclination to a8: agree- 
 ably ; to purfue the one, and to avoid the 
 other. But then we fhould obferve withal, 
 that this moral Senfe doth not prevail alike in 
 all Perfons. Different Men have it in different 
 Degrees. Perhaps the very Original Prin- 
 ciple itfelf may be various in feveral Men, 
 jull as many other Faculties are found to be : 
 Or, if it Ihould be affirm'd, That in the 
 original Conftitution of human Nature this 
 Principle muft be every-where the fame ; 
 we find, That, as Things now fubfift, it is 
 not in Fad alike every-where : For, fome 
 Perlbns abhor what others pradile not only 
 without Remorfe, but with Pleafure. 
 
 But, to allow £3 much as can be ask'd in 
 Favour of this Moral Senfe, and original Ten- 
 dency to Virtue, Let us fuppofe it were every- 
 where uniform ; yet. before this Principle can 
 have its Effed, we muft fuppofe, that Men 
 
 are 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ C^r. 381 
 
 are inclined to regard and attend to an Ad- 
 monition of this Kind. Without this, the 
 general Principle will fignify nothing. An 
 habitual Knowledge of Truth is of no Mo- 
 ment without anadual Knowledge of it, i.e. 
 unlefs Men attend to, and confider it. Juft in 
 the fame manner the having a general Ten- 
 dency to conduct ourfelves aright muft be 
 ufelefs, if there be any contrary Movements, 
 which fhall turn us afide from confidering the 
 Truth of the Cafe, and, confequently, dis- 
 appoint the Effed of that moral Inclination, 
 which would otherwife arife from the right 
 View of Things. 
 
 Now, I think it obvious, that inward 
 Affedions and Paflions, awaken'd in us by 
 outward Temptations, and thofe efpecially 
 which have fome very great apparent Good 
 6r Evil for their Objects, are apt to over- 
 power the Mind. Let the Generality of Man- 
 kind be try'd, and let it be feen how they 
 do, or will act on fuch Occafions. If, in 
 fome few, the Virtuous Principle hath gain'd 
 fuch Poffeflion, and prevail'd fo far, as to be 
 ever prefent, much may be expeded, no 
 doubt : But, if it fhall happen, cither thro' 
 wrong Education, or any other Caufe, that 
 Mens Thoughts are diffipated, and their 
 Paflions become ftrong, they will be hurried 
 away immediately, and be found to ad in 
 juft the fame irregular Manner, when Temp- 
 tations wge them, as tho' they had never 
 
 been 
 
?8i A DEFENCE of 
 
 been pofTefs'd of any fuch Principle at alL 
 At leafl", this muft prove the Cafe, as often as 
 any great or fudden Terror prefents itfelf to 
 them ; or, any very important and immedi- 
 ate Advantage in Life is to be gained. To 
 fay, that, in fuch a Cafe, the mere Senfe of 
 Virtue, and of what is really fit and proper 
 in Life, will bear them out, and to affirm 
 this, not only of fome few Perlbns, of an 
 extraordinary moral Tafte, but likewife of 
 the common and ordinary Sort, is to contra- 
 did the well-known Experience of the 
 World, in all Ages of it. 
 
 If this be the Cafe, What can we farther 
 fuppofe in Aid of Virtue? Some poffibly 
 may tell us, That the real Advantages 
 arifing from it, in the natural Eflfeds which 
 it produces, are fufficient for this Purpofe. 
 But, are there, in Fad, fuch Advantages 
 which fpring univerfally from the Pradice 
 of Virtue ? It muft indeed be own'd, that, 
 upon the Whole, a virtuous Courfe is pre- 
 ferable to a vicious one, even tho* we Ihould 
 look no farther than the prefent Life ; or, if 
 you pkafe, that a Man of a general good 
 Condud, will, for the moft Part, and in the 
 ordinary Courfe of Things, enjoy more Hap- 
 pincls than can be had in a contrary Way : 
 And, If the Pradice of Virtue were univerfal 
 and uniform, I may be bold to affirm, that 
 all that Happincfs would be really enjoy'd, 
 which can be had in the prefent Conftitution 
 
 of 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 385 
 
 of Things. But then, it fhould be remem- 
 bered, that, whilft Some are well difpos'd, 
 and defirous of ordering their Actions right. 
 Others are as ftrongly inclin'd another Way. 
 Thefe will take Advantage of the Honefty 
 and Simplicity of the truly virtuous Man ; 
 and, perhaps, bring Misfortunes on him by 
 Means of the very Virtue he enjoys. It 
 may happen, and Ibmetimes does fo, that to 
 be refolute in the Caufe of Virtue, fhall de- 
 prive a Man of every Advantage he can 
 hope for in Life, and, perhaps, even of 
 Life itfelf j as, on the other hand, One bafc 
 and villainous Adion fhall gain him lingular 
 Advantages, and fet him above being ac- 
 countable to any Man. Shall any one affirm 
 therefore, that, upon this State of the 
 Matter, the natural Advantages of Virtue 
 arc fufficicnt to keep up the uniform Pradice 
 of it ? This would be to affirm, that the 
 Miferies which it occafions are in themlelves 
 eligible. 
 
 Yet, we may give up this too, and fup- 
 port our Point upon almofl: any Conceflions 
 which can be made. Be it therefore that 
 Virtue is, in every Inftance of it, really at- 
 tended with natural Advantages ; and that 
 Men are fo far from fuffering, upon the whole, 
 this Way, that they gain to themfelves fuch 
 natural Goods as cannot be fecur'd in any other : 
 Let this, I fay, be fuppos'd j Yet I may de- 
 mand, Whether every Thing of this Kind 
 
 be 
 
384 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 be fo clear and apparent, that all Men Ihall 
 fee it immediately. Is not the Evil, which 
 is many Times incurr'd on the Account of 
 Virtue, prefent and fenfible, whilft the good 
 Confequences of it are remote and out of 
 Sight ? Is not the Management of Providence 
 ifuch as requires much Thought and Obferva- 
 tion, to clear up Difficulties, and to ihew, 
 that, upon the Whole, it is really better to 
 ad virtuoufly, in every Inftance, than other- 
 wife ? If this be true, then How, I would 
 defire to know, can the Generality of Man- 
 kind be influenced from hence ? It will be 
 vain to alledge, that, in every Inftance of 
 virtuous Condud, a Man's own Intereft is 
 really confalted, either in a dired Way, as it 
 happens frequently ; or elfe, by contributing 
 to the publick Good, in which his own like- 
 wife is included : It will, 1 fay, be vain to 
 alledge this, (however true it may be in itfelf,) 
 unlefs Men can be made fenfible, that thefe 
 Allegations are true, and fuch Impreilions can 
 be made on them as fhall bring thefe Thoughts 
 to their Mind whenever fit Occafions offer. 
 
 After all, if the former Methods of re- 
 commending and enforcing the Pradice of 
 Virtue Ihould fail, there ftill remains another, 
 which, it may be thought, will fupply their 
 Defeats ; viz. The Annexing fome Advan- 
 tages or Difad vantages to Mens Aclions, over 
 and above the natural Confequences of them : 
 Thefe, if they are of any high Importance, 
 
 and 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 385 
 
 and Co clearly denounc'd, that every Man 
 Ihall, in Fatl, know them, or may know 
 them, if he pleales, will be ftrong Enforce- 
 ments, and fufficient to obtain their End. 
 
 This may, indeed, be faid : But will not 
 this Scheme be attended with as many Diffi- 
 culties as the former ? Let me demand, Who 
 ihall fix the Rewards or Penalties proposed ? 
 How fhall Men be afllu'd, that fuch Sancli- 
 ons are really fix'd, and will, in Fad, be 
 executed ? If we are referred to the Civil 
 Power, for Support of this Scheme, then, be- 
 lides what hath been advanc'd heretofore, p. 
 ^3. I may obferve. That, to do this efFeclually, 
 we mufi carry Matters farther than either the 
 Ends of Civil Government will jufS:ify, or 
 the Condition of human Nature allow of. 
 
 The End of Civil Government is, I con- 
 ceive, Protcdion, whether from foreign in- 
 juries, or domeftick. To this Purpole it is 
 necefTary, i. That the whole Force of the 
 Community be united, fome Way or other, 
 in order to repel Invaders j and, a. That 
 fuch Ads be reftrained amongft the Mem- 
 bers of this Community, whereby the Peace 
 and Profperity of it are impeach'd. 
 
 If this be the Cafe, then Civil Govern- 
 ment is concerned , i . Rather to punifh 
 Crimes, than to reward V^irtues j And, 2, la 
 punilhing Crimes, it can regard thofe only 
 which have fome dired Influence towards 
 deftroying the Peace or Profperity of that 
 G c Society. 
 
38<$ J DEFENCE of 
 
 Society. Thus, It may reftrain, infomemea- 
 fure, the groffer A<Sts of Injury and Injuftice j 
 and, for this End, Penalties are inflicted. But 
 doth it, in like manner, reward the Juft, or 
 affign any fpecial Advantages to be enjoy'd 
 by thofe who conform themfelves to Law ? 
 This, I believe, is feldom feen, and not at 
 all agreeable to the Ufages of thofe States 
 which are thought the beft regulated. 
 
 Nor can this, in the Nature of Things, be 
 done fi.ifficiently : For, let us fuppofe, that 
 a Man's outward Actions are regular ; Upon 
 this Suppofition, he hath performed all that 
 Civil Laws require ; His inward Thoughts 
 sre not cognizable in an human Court ; Thefe 
 are incapable of being known; or, if they 
 were known, yet cannot be punifh'd. In 
 this Senfe, mere Thought is free, that, as no 
 Man can prefcribe to it in the Way of Au- 
 thority, fo neither can He reward or punifh it. 
 
 Beyond this, there are many outward Ads 
 of Virtue, which muft be exempt from hu- 
 man Prefcription. Thus, Gratitude, Charity, 
 and the like, muft be free as Thought itfelf. 
 To require thefe in the fame manner as other 
 Acts are required, would alter the very Nature 
 of the Things : They would then become 
 properly Debts ; and Men would be con- 
 cern'd to^difcharge them, not as Inftances of 
 Humanity or Thankfulnefs, but purely as 
 the Prefcriptions of that Law they durft not 
 difobey. For fome fuch Reafbn as this St. <Taul 
 
 declares. 
 
Reveal D Religion^ &c. 387 
 
 declares, (what is true, whether he intended 
 it of the Civil Law or not) that the Law is 
 not made for a righteous Man^ but j or the law~ 
 lefs and dijhhedlent. i Tim. 1,9. It is in- 
 tended, not as a compleat Meafure of what 
 is fit and right, and agreeable to the Will of 
 God, (which cannot be fully pointed out 
 this Way, or fufficiently enforced in "it) but 
 only to guard againft thofe Exorbitances, 
 which aredeftrudiveof all human Society. 
 
 We may conclude, from what hath been 
 faid, that the fame Being who fram'd the 
 World, and conftituted Things in fuch a 
 Manner, that certain Rules of Fitnefs refult 
 from them, muft enforce Obedience to thefe 
 Rules. On Uny other Foot thefe will rather 
 appear to us as Counfels and Advices, than 
 Matters of ftrid and proper Duty. It hath 
 been fhewn above, that, whilft Human Na- 
 ture fubfifts as it doth at prefent, Virtue can 
 neither enforce itfelf, nor can it be fafficiently 
 bound on us in a human Way: Something 
 therefore muft be found out, to ballance the 
 AfFedions and Paflions of Men ; and this 
 cannot be done, but by Sandions eftablilh'd 
 by God himfclf. 
 
 Yet our Author thinks this is needlefs, and, 
 which is more, impollible. Rewards or 
 Punifliments to be received hereafter, unlels 
 they be the natural Confequences of Mens 
 Adions, he explodes: And, tho* he fpeaks 
 fometimes of future Happin^fs 5 and inti- 
 C c 2 mates 
 
3^8 J DEFENCE of 
 
 mates fomewhat (when he thinks it will fervc 
 his Turn) of Rewards and Punilhments; yet, 
 as I do not remember he hath any where ex- 
 prcilly afferted them in the general Senlc 
 which they carry, fo in one Place he hath 
 ufed his Endeavours to overthrow them. 
 His Words are thefe ; " Tho' human Law- 
 *' givers are forc'd to have Recourfe to 
 *' Punifhments, which are not connected with 
 " the Things they forbid, yet a Being of 
 '' infinite Pov/er is not thus ftreighten'd, but 
 " may make one the neceflary Confequence 
 *' of the other. And, indeed, how can it 
 " be otherwife, fince Good and Evil have 
 " their Foundation in the Eflential Dif- 
 '' ference of Things, and their Nature is 
 '' fix'd and immoveable, and, coniequently, 
 " our Happinefs depends on the intrinfick 
 " Nature of the one, and our Mifery on 
 " the intriniick Nature of the other, " p. 16. 
 
 It is from hence certain, and will be far- 
 ther confirm'd by our Author's Way of 
 Reafbning in the former Page, that he ad- 
 mits none other Rew^ards or Punifhments than 
 thofe which are the neceflary and infeparable 
 Confequences of Mens Aclions. In the 
 Words now cited he affirms, i. That God 
 may reward or punifh in this Way. And_, 
 2. That he muft do fo. 
 
 As to the former, I would beg to know 
 
 what Adveffary he is contending with : 
 
 What Perfon ever aflerted, that God cannot 
 
 3 make 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 389 
 
 make Happinefs orMifery the neceflary Con- 
 iequences of Mens Adions ? Doth not every 
 Man, capable of underftanding this Subjed, 
 maintain, not only that God may do this, 
 but that in many Inftances He adually hath 
 done it ? Nay, do we not maintain farther, 
 in as ftrong Terms as himfelf, that, when 
 Men come to reflect coolly, they miift receive 
 Comfort from the Confcioufnefs of having 
 afted well, and be griev'd under the Senfe of 
 having acted ill ? But, what of all this ! 
 Doth it follow that this is of itfelf fufficient, 
 in the prefent State of Things, to enforce the 
 uniform Practice of Virtue ? Is every Man 
 fenfible of thefe Confequences ? Or, doth 
 every Man fo nicely examine his own Adions, 
 as to produce that Comfort or Remorfe which 
 might arife from a proper View of them ? If 
 not, then fomething farther is expedient for 
 the purpofe. 
 
 He afTerts, in the next Place, That God 
 muil: reward or punilh Men in this Manner. 
 " How (fays he) can it be otherwife, fince 
 " Good and Evil have their Foundation in 
 " the eflential Difference of Things. " Tho' 
 it be plain enough what our Author intends 
 to prove in this Place, yet 'tis not fb clear 
 Where the Force of his Argument lies. 
 There are Two Kinds of Good or Evil, vl^. 
 Natural and Moral ; and his Bufinefs is to 
 fliew, that natural Good or Evil is neceffarily 
 tonneded with moral Good or Eyil, How 
 C c 3 this 
 
jpo J DEFENCE of 
 
 this is prov'd by the Argument here prodiic'd 
 I cannot fee, and our Author is concern^ to 
 fhew it. However, were there any Thing 
 in the Argument, it ftill remains to be ftievvn, 
 that this natural Good or Evil, which may 
 be the diftant Gonfequence of Mens A(Stions 
 muft neceffarily be greater than the prefent 
 Advantage, or Difadvantage, which miy 
 poffibly arife from them. Unlefs this be 
 fhewn, Virtue may need fome ftronger En- 
 forcements than any which arife from the 
 prefent Gonfideration j and confequently, we 
 fhall be led to enquire fomewhat farther into 
 this Point. 
 
 It hath been obferv'd by me heretofore, 
 p. ^4. that Wife and Good Men have argued 
 in the following Manner; As God muft have 
 an unalterable JLove of Righteoufneis, fo he 
 cannot be fuppos'd to leave its Interefts un- 
 fupported. And therefore, if this cannot be, 
 or in Fad is not fufficiently done in the pre- 
 fent Management of ^Ihings, Amends will 
 be made hereafter. This Conclufion they 
 farther iiipported by feveral other ufeful Gon- 
 liderations, Notwithftanding this, I have 
 noted, that they did not all of them ag^;ee 
 upon the Point; that thofe who affirmed it 
 with Gonfidence, on fome Occafions, inti- 
 mated their jDiftruft of it on others ; and that 
 the very Arguments by which they endea- 
 voured to evince- the Matter (whatever Fcrrce 
 they might really have) were too fubtle and 
 
 abftradedj 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. jpi 
 
 abflraded, and not fuited to the Apprehen- 
 fions of the Vulgar. To which was added, 
 that, notwithftanding the Generality of Man- 
 kind had a certain Perfuafion of a future 
 State, yet, as their Notions were indiftin^t, 
 and not built on a folid Foundation, fo they 
 muft prove infufficicnt to bear them out in 
 the conftant Pradice of Virtue. This Per- 
 fwafion could not enable thena to combat 
 thofe Temptations which were extraordinary 
 and preffing. 
 
 How then fliall the Caufe of Virtue be 
 maintained, and the proper Rule of Life 
 enforc'd ? But, can this be any longer a 
 Qiieftion with us ? Cannot God declare his 
 Intention in this refped ? If the Author of 
 our Being may make us happy or miferablc, 
 is it impollible for him to manifeft to us in an 
 extraordinary Way what he defigns to do ? 
 If a Revelation be poflible, as I have Ihewn 
 heretofore, then this ;7Wj/ be done ; and, if it 
 be of any Confequence to us to have a more 
 certain and diftind View of thefe Things than 
 our own Reafbn can give us, or the Oppor- 
 tunities we enjoy will admit of, then no one 
 can affirm that it is unfit or improper to be 
 done : And when we confider farther, that 
 the doing this is entirely fuitable to the 
 Righteoufnefs, Goodnefs, and Wifdom of 
 God, then we may conclude that the Thing 
 h expedient, and what might be hop*d for 
 C c 4 when 
 
'39i ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 when it Ihould be confiftent with the feveral 
 other Schemes of Providence. 
 
 I muft not quit this Head, Of the Expe- 
 diency of a Revelation, without confidering 
 Two Objedions alledg'd by this Gentleman. 
 
 I. If a Revelation be expedient to be made 
 to Any, it muft be equally expedient to be 
 made to All : And confequently, as it ought 
 to have commenc'd with the firft Beginning 
 of Human Kind, fo it ought to have been 
 communicated to all the World ; whereas it 
 is not pretended, on our Part, that the Chri- 
 ftian Revelation was made 'till Four Thou- 
 fand Years were pafs'd, nor that it is to this 
 very Day univerfally promulgated. 
 
 1. It is affirm'd. That this Revelation hath 
 not in Fad anfwer'd thofe Purpofes for which 
 we affirm it to have been expedient ; and 
 that Men are fo far from being the better for 
 it, that it hath adually prov'd the Caufe of 
 greater Wickednefs, Cruelty, and Perfecu- 
 tion, than were ever known before. Some 
 Notice muft be taken of thefe Two Objec-' 
 tions, before 1 proceed to evince and fupport 
 the Reality of a Revelation. 
 
 The Jirfl Objection is reprefented by our 
 Author in fhe following Words ; " If the 
 *' Defign of God, in communicating any 
 *' Thing of Himfelf to Men, was their Hap- 
 *' pinefs ; would not that Defign have 
 ** obliged him, who at all Times alike defires 
 ^* their Happinefs, to have at all Times alike 
 
 ^' cgpia 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. 39 j 
 
 <' communicated it to them ? If God always 
 <' ads for the Good of his Creatures, What 
 " Reafon can be aflign'd why he fhould not 
 *' from the Beginning have difcover'd fuchr 
 " Things as make for their Good, but de- 
 *' ferr'd' the doing it 'till the Time of T/'Z'^- 
 " rms ; fince the fconer this was done, the 
 " greater would his Goodnefs appear to be ? 
 " Nay, is it confiftent with infinite Benevo- 
 " lence to hide that for many Ages, which 
 " he knew was as ufeful at firft to prevent, 
 " as afterwards it could be to put a Stop to 
 " any Tiling he dillik'd ? " 
 
 " And indeed, without denying that God 
 " at all Times intended Mankind that Hap- 
 " pinefs their Nature is capable of, we muft 
 " allow that at all Times he has given them 
 " the Means of obtaining it by the Rules 
 *' he has prefcrib'd them for their Condud ; 
 " and confequently, thefe Rules muft have 
 " been difcoverable at all Times. For, if 
 ^' God ads upon rational Motives, muft not 
 " the fame Motives which obliged him to 
 " difcover any Thing that is for the Good 
 " of Mankind, have oblig'd him to difcover 
 *' every Thing that is fo ? and that too, 
 " after the fame plain manner ; and not do 
 " this, as it were, grudgingly, Little by 
 " Little ; here a Bit, and there a Bit ; and 
 *' that too to one favourite Nation only, 
 *' under the Vail of Types and Allegories ; 
 *^ and at laft, tho' he difcover'd fome Things 
 
 " more 
 
394 -^ DEFENCE of 
 
 " more plainly, yet it was but to a fmall 
 " Part of Mankind, the Bulk of them to 
 " this Day remaining in deplorable Igno- 
 *' ranee. ^' p. 3>>3? 35^4; 
 
 There are Three Things here afferted by 
 our Author. 
 
 1. If a Revelation be thought fo expe- 
 dient to be made, as we on our Part contend, 
 it ought to have been made to us in the 
 Beginning, and not deferred 'till the Time 
 of Tiberius ; fince the fooner this was done, 
 the greater would God's Goodnefs appear 
 to be. 
 
 2. That this Revelation, fo made to us 
 in the Beginning, ought to extend itfelf to 
 every Thing which is for the Good of Man- 
 kind ; and not be granted (as he exprelTes 
 himfelf) grudgingly, Little by Little. 
 
 3. That it ought to be granted, as at all 
 Times, and in the fuUeft Manner, fo like- 
 wife every-where, and to every Perfon alike : 
 Not to one favourite Nation only, or to a 
 fmall Part of Mankind, the Bulk of them 
 to this Day remaining in deplorable Ig- 
 norance. 
 
 Thefe Three AfTertions are diredly con- 
 tained in the Objection produc'd : In which, 
 if there be any Thing of Truth or Weight, 
 it will bear full as hard upon Natural Reli- 
 gion as Reveal'd. For, according to this 
 Way of Arguing, If God intended the Hap- 
 pinefs of Man, by communicating himfelf 
 
 to 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 395 
 
 to him in the Ufe of Reafon, Would not 
 that Defign have oblig'd Him, who at all 
 Times alike defires his Happinefs, to have 
 communicated himfelf alwavs alike this 
 Way ? and confequently, To have given 
 him the full Ufe of his Reaibn the jfirft 
 Moment of his Being ; and not have deferr'd 
 this for feveral Years of Infancy and Child- 
 hood ? Would He not have difcover'd every 
 Thing that was' fit and proper, and capable 
 of being known by him in Time, at once ^ 
 fo as that he Ihould not come to the Know- 
 ledge of it gradually and by flow Steps, 
 gaining it by Little and Little ; here a Bit, 
 and there a Bit ? Would he, after all, make 
 fo great a Difference between Men ; making 
 Some, a fmall Part of Mankind, his Fa- 
 vourites, by vouchfafing them a greater 
 Meafure of Natural Parts, and greater Op- 
 portunities of Learning and Improvement ? 
 If Arguings of this Kind are thought to 
 conclude againft the Ufefulnefs and Expe- 
 diency of Revelation, they muft conclude, 
 with as great Force, againft the Ufefulnefs 
 of thofe Truths which are difcover'd by 
 Reafon ; and confequently, they muft prove 
 that Men are not one whit better than Brutes 
 themfelves. Or, if this muft not be afferted, 
 then the leaft that our Author can conclude, 
 is, That the Supreme Being deals unequally 
 and hardly by his Creatures • whilft he 
 fuppofcs that the Goodnefs of God obliges 
 
 him 
 
396 J DEFENCE of 
 
 him to communicate all Advantages, in their 
 own Nature capable of being communicated ; 
 and this in all Degrees, and at all Times 
 equally : For, the fooner this is done, ( and 
 for the fame Reafon I may fay, the more 
 cxtenfively it is done ) the greater will God's 
 Goodnefs appear to be. Fad contradids 
 fuch fond and" extravagant Reafonings as 
 thefe ; and he cannot pofiibly fupport them 
 but by carrying Matters ftill farther, and 
 charging God with Iniquity. 
 
 I muft beg Leave to add fome farther 
 Reflexions on this Point ; by which 1 fhall 
 endeavour to fhew, that his own Natural 
 Religion is as much afFeded by this Method 
 of Reafoning, as Revelation itfelf can ' be. 
 The Principle on which he proceeds, is This; 
 Since God always defires, and ads for the 
 Good of his Creatures, he mull: always dif- 
 cover thofe Things which make for their 
 Good. Thefe are his own Words, and 
 muft be refolv'd into this farther Principle, 
 viz. That he muft be oblig'd to beftow all 
 that Good he is capable of beftowing : From 
 whence thefe Confequences will follow j 
 
 I. That He ought to beftow on every 
 Man all that Happinefs, whether prefent or 
 future, whether Animal, or Intellectual, of 
 which his Nature is in itfelf capable, and 
 which the Faculties He hath beftow'd upon 
 him make him capable of enjoying. 
 
 $. That 
 
Rev£al'd Religion, &c. 397 
 
 2. That he ought to have beftowM upon 
 him fuch a Nature, and fuch Faculties, as 
 would qualify him for all that Happinefs 
 which is in itielf capable of being beftow'd 
 on any Being whatfoevcr. 
 
 3. That he ought not to have made any 
 Difference or Diftindlon between the feveral 
 Beings he created ; but to have given them 
 the lame Nature, the fame Perfedions, and 
 by this Means to have qualify'd them for 
 the very fame Degrees of Happinefs. To 
 which we may add, 
 
 4. That forafmuch as the fooner all this 
 is done, the greater God's Goodnefs muft 
 appear, He ought therefore to have pro- 
 duced all his Creatures from all Eternity : 
 Or, if this might not be, all new Produclion 
 fuppofing fome antecedent Duration, then 
 He ought not to have produc'd any Crea^ 
 tures at all. Thefe Conlequences follow 
 manifeftly from our Author's Principles ; 
 And therefore, if thefe are extravagant, the 
 Principles, from which they follow, muft be 
 falfe. 
 
 From thefe Remarks on the Objedion in 
 general, I fball pafs on to the diftind Con- 
 (ideration of its feveral Branches. 
 
 The i/i was this ; l( a Revelation be 
 thought lb expedient to be made, as we 
 on our Part contend, then it ought to have 
 been made to us in the Beginning, and not 
 deferr'd 'till the Time of Tibmus. But, do 
 
 wc 
 
J5)8 A DEFENCE of 
 
 •we really affert, as this Gentleman feems to 
 intimate we do, that there was no Revela- 
 tion made 'till the Timt o^ Tiber lus ^ He 
 knows the contrary : And a little after, in 
 the Paffage above cited, he alludes as well 
 to the Jevvifh Revelation as the Chriftian. 
 
 Well : But the Objedion, he will tell us, 
 ftill holds good ; becaufe many Ages were 
 pafs'd before the Delivery oi Mofes's Law. 
 Very true : But then. Can he prove, that 
 no Revelation was ever made *till Mo/es*s 
 Time ? Or, Is he perfuaded that we Chri- 
 ftians think there was none ? How came he 
 then to talk of God's difcovering Things as 
 it wxre grudgingly, by Little and Little ? 
 This, I luppofe, muft allude to the feveral 
 Manifeftations which we afnrm God made 
 of himfelf aP fundry ^imes^ and in divers 
 Mcmners, 
 
 After all, He will tell us, however this 
 Matter Ihall ftand, the Objedion is in full 
 Force. The Revelation which we affirm to 
 have been expedient, is a Revelation of a 
 proper Rule of Life ? And Nothing of this 
 Kind was ever offered 'till the Times of 
 Mojes. Yet, how will he prove this, if he 
 fliould be calld on to prove it ? How 
 ■will he prove that the whole Scheme of 
 what he calls Natural Religion, was not 
 originally difcover'd to our iirft Parent by 
 immediate Revelatio?i ? By him it might 
 be taught his immediate SuccelTors ; from 
 
 whence 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &g. 39^ 
 
 whence it may have defcended down in 
 many Succeflions from one to another, 
 'till at laft it might be forgot from what 
 Original it fprung : and then being alter'd, 
 as the Iniquities or Follies of Mankind 
 increased, thofe feveral monftrous Schemes 
 might arife which were taught in the feveral 
 Parts of the World. Our Author, I fay, 
 cannot prove that this was not the Cafe, 
 But if it were fo, then what he alledges from 
 the bare Novelty of a Revelation is vaia 
 and ground lefs. 
 
 However, not to infift on this, I do 
 affirm, That upon Suppofition a Revelation 
 had not been vouchfaf'd fo early, the State 
 and Condition of the World might be fuch, 
 as not to need it in that Degree, in which 
 they afterwards came to need it. It is cer- 
 tain, that in every Age of the World all 
 Men have not needed this Favour equally. 
 Thofe who have enjoy'd an happy Confti- 
 tution, had quick Parts, been rightly edu- 
 cated, and gain'd fufficient Opportunities for 
 carrying on their Enquiries, have certainly 
 had lefs Occafion for fupernatural Inftruc- 
 tion, than others who have laboured under 
 the contrary Difadvantages. Thus likewife, 
 in the more fimple Ages of the World, before 
 Men had degenerated to fo prodigious a 
 Degree, whilft Men were as yet few, and 
 the Temptations to aft amifs, fmall ; good 
 Inftrudion might be eafily propagated, and 
 
 the 
 
40O A DEFENCE oj 
 
 the World kept in fome Order. But as 
 human Race increased, fo the Inter eft of 
 Vice got Ground. Each ill Man endeavour'd 
 to feduce his Neighbour ; lemptations 
 offer'd themfelves on every Hand ; Many- 
 Vices were become falhionable ; and, in 
 fome Inftances, fupported on Principle, and 
 pradis'd even as i)uties. Who doth not 
 dilcern, that fuch a Condition as this, was 
 more unfriendly to the Caufe of Virtue, than 
 the Simplicity of the iirft Ages ? That fome 
 extraordinary Methods were now more need- 
 ful than ■ they had been before ? and con- 
 fequently, a Reafon may be aifign'd, in this 
 Way of Thinking, why a Revelation Ihould 
 be vouchfafsd Men in one Age, which had 
 been withheld formerly. 
 
 Yet, our Author thinks this will not ferve 
 our Purpofe ; For he demands, " How it is 
 *' confiftent with infinite Benevolence, to 
 " hide that for many Ages, which God knew 
 " was as ufeful at firft to prevent, as after- 
 " wards it could be to put a Stop to any 
 " Thing he diilik'd. " Thefe are the very 
 Words of our Author : Upon which I might 
 obferve. That there is either great Impro- 
 priety in his Expreffions ; or, if he is willing 
 to be underftood in the more favourable 
 Senfe of them, there is fbmcthing infinuated, 
 which is abfolutely falle and groundiefs. 
 " How (fays he) is it confiftent with infinite 
 ** Benevolence, to hide, for many Ages, 
 
 " what 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 401 
 
 " what God knew was nfeful ? " &c. The 
 Thing affirm'd to be ufeful, &c, and con- 
 cerning which he is here fpeaking, is, a 
 Divine Revelation ; or, what he terms, a 
 few Lines before, " God's communicating 
 " any Thing of himfelf to Men. '* But to 
 " hide a Revelation, " is Something fo very- 
 much out of the Way, that I cannot under- 
 Itand it. However, Let us interpret the Gen- 
 tleman in a more favourable manner ; Let us 
 fuppofe he means by it. The " Hiding from 
 " Men, for many Ages, the Knowledge and 
 " Senfeof Duty. " If this be what he means, 
 then I muft obferve, That this is a very 
 unfair Reprefentation of the Cafe. Do we 
 aflert, that the Want of that Knowledge 
 which is neceflary, in order to the right 
 Apprehenfion of Moral and Religious Mat- 
 ters, is owing to God's hiding it from us ? 
 Don't we affirm, That originally Man had 
 a full View of all he was concerned to know ? 
 That afterward, having a£led difagreeably 
 to this Knowledge, he corrupted his Nature, 
 impair'd his Reafon, and heightenM his Paf- 
 fions ? Don't we fuppofe farther, That 
 during the more fimple Ages, Man might 
 in general know fo much as was fufficient 
 to keep him within fome tolerable Bounds ? 
 But that afterwards, when human Race in- 
 creas'd, and Men, abufing their Liberty, had 
 corrupted themfelves farther, Vice might get 
 Ground fo far, as not to be ftopp'd l?ut by 
 
 D d an 
 
401 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 an extraordinary Manifeftation ? Upon this 
 State of the Matter, are not the Corruptions 
 of Men owing rather to their own Perverfe- 
 nefs, than to God's hiding from them the 
 Knowledge of their Duty ? Why then is 
 God here charged with Cruelty ? 
 
 The main Thing however defign'd in 
 the Objedion, is This ; If a Revelation be 
 now expedient in order to put a Stop to 
 the Corruptions of Mankind, it muft have 
 been as expedient in order to prevent them 
 in the Beginning ; and infinite Benevolence 
 is concern'd as well to do the one as the 
 other. In Anfwer to which, Let it be con- 
 fider'd. That Divine Revelation, (as the 
 Point hath been ftated by us), is a Remedy 
 gracioufly intended for the Cure of thofe 
 Corruptions which had overfpread human 
 Nature ^ and that Remedies are not pro- 
 perly to be adminifter'd, 'till the Difeafe 
 makes them neceffary. In the ne-xt Place, 
 Thefe Corruptions did not arife from the 
 Want of Revelation, but from Something 
 elfc. Originally Man is fuppos'd to have 
 known what was lit and proper for him to 
 do, and to have been acquainted with the 
 leveral Motives to enforce his Duty : 
 Yet he fell ; and, by his Fall, brought a 
 Taint and Corruption on his Nature. After- 
 ward it is fuppos'd that Men had fuch a View 
 of Things, as might, had they been duely 
 careful, have kept them within fome Bounds. 
 
 Whence 
 
Revealed Religion, &c. 403 
 
 Whence then came it to pafs that Men de- 
 generated fo exceedingly ? Why, from, 
 hence ; they are free, and enjoy a natural 
 Freedom of ading Wrong as well as Right : 
 By abufing this, they made that neceifary, 
 which in the original Conftitution was not 
 fo. Tliis charges the Fault not on God, but 
 Man ; and confequently, Man only can be 
 accountable for the Confequence. 
 
 If there be any thing in the Difficulty be- 
 fore fuggefted ftill remaining, it will, I con- 
 ceive, be removed by oblerving what I fhall 
 propofe in the next Place, viz. When we 
 affirm a Revelation to he expedient^ the Term 
 hath a Double Acceptation, and may be 
 referr'd either to Perfbns or Things. When 
 referr'd to Perfons, it imports a Want of 
 Something, which upon that Account we 
 affirm to be expedient ; But when referr'd 
 to Things, it not only imports fome Want, 
 but likewife a Fitnefs and Propriety in 
 beftowing the Thing needed. The Ufe I 
 would make of the Diftindion is This ; 
 However the State of the World might make 
 a Revelation needful for Mankind, and there- 
 fore expedient, as the Word is referr'd to 
 Perfbns ; yet feveral Circumftances may 
 intervene, which fhall render it unlit and 
 improper to be made ; and confequently, in 
 the more general Senfe of the Word, inex- 
 pedient. This may account, in fome mea- 
 fure, for the Queftion before us, vtz. " If 
 
 D d 2 "a 
 
404 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 *' a Revelation be expedient, Why was it 
 '' not fooner made ? '* 
 
 The Revelation I am fpeaking of being 
 a Divine Manifeftaiion and Enforcement of 
 fome general Rule of Life intended for the 
 general Ufe of the World, could not pro- 
 perly be made, whilft Mankind were inca- 
 pable of applying it to this Purpofc ; whilft 
 they wanted fufficient Means either to pre- 
 ferve it in its Purity, or to tranfmit it fafely 
 to future Ages. 
 
 We know how difficult it muft be to pre- 
 ferve any Syftem incorrupt in the Way of 
 Oral Tradition. Rules may eafily be for- 
 gotten, or mifapprehended ; Errors will 
 creep in infenfibly, and fometimes be intro- 
 duced by Fraud. It was proper therefore 
 that the Fate of fuch a Revelation Hiould 
 not be trufted to this uncertain Way ; and 
 confequently, that it fiiould not be made, 
 'till Men had difcover'd fome furer Method 
 of recording it . From whence it follows, 
 that the Invention of Letters muft reafonably 
 come before fuch a Revelation, as being the 
 beft, and indeed the only Expedient, we 
 know of, to preferve a Truth inviolate. 
 
 And here I have the Pleafure of obferving. 
 That the Reafbnings offer'd, are confirm'd 
 by ftrong Appearances of Fad:. In all Pro- 
 bability, a Revelation was adually made 
 within fome Ihort Time after the Difcovery 
 / of Letters j as loon as the Ufe of them was 
 
 well 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 405 
 
 well known, and they were capable of being 
 apply'd to general and common Service. 
 Thus much is certain, that fome of the Sacred 
 Writings are the Oldefl: Books now extant 
 in the World : And polfibly, the very firffc 
 that were ever wrote, contain in them fuch 
 a Revelation as I am now defending. If this 
 prove true, then the Difficulty before us 
 vanilhes. Upon this Suppofition, a Revela- 
 tion there was as loon as it could be made 
 for the Service of Mankind ; and confe- 
 quently, as foon as it was lit and proper to 
 make it. 
 
 I mull allow indeed, that this Revelation 
 made to Mofes^ was intended for the more 
 efpecial Service of the Jews. It contained, 
 over-and-above the general Rules of Life, 
 their national Law^; and of Confequence, 
 mull, in a great Part of it, be peculiar to that 
 People. Yet ftill, it was not fo entirely re- 
 llrain'd to them, as to be unknown to others. 
 It was the publick Profelfion of a People 
 which made no inconliderable Figure ^ 
 which had, for feveral Ages, a great Weight 
 with their neighbouring Nations : And after- 
 wards, when their State was ruin'd, they 
 had greater Opportunities than ever of 
 fpreading the Knowledge of the True God, 
 The Captives, who were difpers'd, carry'd 
 their Religion with them : They rctain'd it 
 in fome meafure, no doubt ; and therefore, 
 may be fuppos'd to have given the ignorant 
 Dd 3 WorlcJ 
 
40^ A DEFENCE of 
 
 World ibme better Notions of Things than 
 they had before. Or, if it ihould be thought 
 that thefe Perfons were too little acquainted 
 with their Religion, to make any great Dil^ 
 coveries of it, ( as a great many of them 
 perhaps were) ; yet after their Reftoration, 
 Things were put on a better Foot. The 
 Law was better known and underftood after 
 the Ereftion of Synagogues ; and the People 
 had a more free Intercourfe with remote Na- 
 tions than formerly. There were few Coun- 
 tries of any confiderable Figure in which 
 there was not a competent Number of Jews 
 refiding, by whom the fevcral Particulars 
 of their Religion might be, and probably 
 were communicated to the World. From 
 this View of Matters, we may conclude, 
 that the Jewifh Law, tlio' made originally to 
 a particular People, and in feveral Branches 
 of it proper to that People, was not confined 
 to them alone. It might be, and probably 
 was known in a good Degree almoft every- 
 where. Thofe,amongft whom the Jews liv*d, 
 might profit much by their Inftrudions : Many 
 Parts of what hath been reckon'd the moft 
 excellent Philofophy, might be deriv'd from 
 them, or corrected by them ; and the Reli- 
 gion, which is now call'd Natural Religion, 
 in its laft Refort, be built on ReveaFd. At 
 leaft thus much may be prefum'd, that as 
 the moft eminent of thePhilofophers travelPd 
 in Queft of Wifdom, and embrac'd all Op- 
 portunities 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 407 
 
 portunities of improving themfelves, fo they 
 did not entirely overlook the Religion of a 
 People fo numerou3 as the Jews were, and fo 
 ftrongly recommended by the Appearances 
 of a Divine Original. Or, if this ihould not 
 really prove the Cafe, yet one Thing muft 
 be allow'd me. That the feveral Parts of the 
 World in which the Jews were difpers'd, 
 were not fo much Strangers to their Books, 
 as to know Nothing of what was contained 
 in them : They muft be apprizM of this, 
 That they expecfled a MeJJias ; and fo lin- 
 gular an Expedation would naturally lead 
 them to enquire fomewhat into the Grounds 
 of it. If therefore there were none other 
 Advantages arifing to the reft of Mankind 
 from the Manifeftations formerly made to 
 the Jews, yet this at leaft is confiderable, 
 That they prepared the Way to another 
 Difpenfation, of a more extenfive Nature, 
 the Chriftian. 
 
 This indeed was not given 'till the Reign 
 of Ttberlus : But no Prejudice will arife from 
 hence, if it be confider'd. That the Time 
 of giving it was, upon feveral Accounts, 
 more fit and proper than any which had 
 gone before it. I ftiall mention only Two : 
 VIZ. That the State of the World was fuch, 
 as made a Revelation at that Time, i. More 
 likely to be attended to, and embrac'd ; and, 
 a. More eafily fpread thro' the feveral Parts 
 of the World. 
 
 D d 4 I have 
 
^o8 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 I have mentioned above, That the World 
 had been gradually prepar'd for the Coming 
 of a Great Law-giver, by the Intercourfe 
 which the Jews had with other Nations, and 
 their feveral Settlements amongft them. And 
 in this we are confirmed by fome Teftimonies 
 "which remain even in Heathen Writers. At 
 prefent I am to note. That as Politenefs, 
 Civility, and Learning were now at their 
 Height, ib there was excited in Mankind 
 a greater Curiofity than had been ever 
 known before. Their Capacity of being 
 wrought upon was greater, and their Incli- 
 nation to learn more vigorous. They had 
 now feen what Philofophy could do : They 
 were more fenfible of its Defects, in Propor- 
 tion to the Improvements they had made 
 in it J and confequently, muft be prefum'd 
 more ready to hearken to fome furer Guide. 
 Agreeably we find that the Philofophers, 
 with whom St. P;?^// debated 2.i./ithens, gave 
 him a patient Hearing, fome of them being 
 curious enough to promife a fecond ; [ See 
 ^cfs xvii. 32.] And tho' the mere Novelty 
 of a Refurreclion iiartled them at firft, yet, 
 upon farther Thought, it might appear, that 
 ordinary Meafures are not to be obferv'd 
 upon extraordinary Occafions. Difficulties 
 enough there were in gaining a thorough 
 Admillion of this Religion ; But yet, in 
 any other Seafon it would, probably, have 
 been more difficult j in any other Seafon, 
 
 when 
 
Reveal'd Reiigion, &C' ^09 
 
 when Men had not beemfufficiently prepar'd 
 for ibmewhat of this Nature ; or were fo 
 exceedingly indolent and incurious as to 
 afford no Attention to it. 
 
 This Reflexion fhall be feconded by obferv- 
 ing, that the Circumftances of the World 
 favour'd tliis Religion in another Refped, 
 viz. That they made the Promulgation of it 
 more eafy and extenfive. The Roman Arms 
 had prevaird over a great Part of the known 
 World. They had fubdu'd many large Pro- 
 vinces, both in Eur ope J JJta^ and Afr'icky 
 and erected an Empire of prodigious Extent. 
 The Government was now pretty well fettled : 
 And, as their Empire was vaftly large, and 
 the Affairs of it compos'd, fo there muft 
 have been a more free Intercourfe between 
 the feveral Nations than had been ever 
 known before. W^ho doth not difcern, that 
 this was a fitter Time to fpread the Know- 
 ledge of a Revelation, than whilft the Jealou- 
 fies which fublifted between different Nations 
 prevented a Gorrefpondence, or Givil Diilrac- 
 tions v/ould allow no Room for Religious 
 Enquiries ? This, I think, is plain and cer- 
 tain ; and therefore muft infift on it, that no 
 fufficient Objection can be alledg'd againfl 
 making the Revelation at this Time, unlefs 
 it be fhewn, that fome former Times were 
 more proper. Men might indeed want- it 
 fooner ; But, in relieving Wants, it ought to 
 be remember'd, that there is a Suitablenefs 
 
 of 
 
410 A DEFENCE of 
 
 of the Time as weH as a Ufefulnefs of the 
 Thing ; and that the Kindnefs in doing a 
 Favour is then moft eminent, when the Effeds 
 of it will be moft general and certain. 
 
 The Second Branch of our Author's Ob- 
 jection, is This ; A Revelation, if ex- 
 pedient, ought to extend itfelf to every thing 
 which is for the Good of Mankind ; and be 
 given not as it were grudgingly, by little and 
 little. This Branch muft refped, not the 
 Chriftian Revelation, which was given at 
 once, and contains one perfed Scheme, but 
 the feveral Occafional Revelations which 
 were granted in former Times; and feems 
 to allude to a PalTage in the Epiftle to the 
 Hebrews J where it is afTerted, that God who 
 at fun dry I'imes^ and In divers Manners^ fpake 
 hi ^inies faft unto our Fathers by the Pro- 
 phets, hath In thefe laji Days fpoken unto us 
 by his Son. 
 
 Upon this I muft obferve, that, if the 
 Latenefs of a Revelation may be defended, 
 and no fufficient Objection can arife from 
 hence, that God did not manifeft himfelf in 
 an extraordinary Manner fooner ; then we 
 may equally account for the Point before us, 
 viz. That every Revelation vouch fafcd to 
 Man hath not been compleat : For this is 
 certain. In all Cafes where God may, if He 
 pleafes, vouchfafe no Revelation at all, or 
 defer the Time of giving it, there he may 
 vouchfafe it, if granted, in any aflignable 
 
 Meafure ; 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 41 1 
 
 Meafure ; and the Reaibns which will fup- 
 port the one, muft, a fortiori^ fiipport the 
 other likewife. A Revelation, we affirm, is 
 expedient : But how? Not at all Times 
 equally ; nor yet to all Perfbns equally ; If 
 this be true of a Revelation in the general, 
 then the Revelation of a compleat and per- 
 fed Scheme was not equally expedient at all 
 Times. Or, if we Ihould fuppofe, that the 
 Knowledge of it would be equally ufefal at 
 all Times, yet a great many other Circum- 
 ftances mufl come into Gonfideration, which 
 may ferve to determine as well the Meafure 
 of Light proper to be vouchfafed, as the 
 Time and Seafon of giving it. 
 
 I. Then, I affirm, that feveral Revela- 
 tions in different Ages of the World, may be 
 fuited to the Condition and Exigences of the 
 feveral Times. Thus, after the Flood, when 
 one Family only was preferv'd, fome general 
 Rules, to be obferv'd univerfally in future 
 Times, might properly be given : For, as all 
 the future Race of Men defcended from this 
 Family, fuch Rules, if few and fimple, 
 might be eafily taught and retained. Agree- 
 ably, the Scripture teaches, that God deli- 
 vered thefe Diredions to Noah and his Sons; 
 [See Gen. 5).] i. That they might eat Flefb, 
 as well as Vegetables. a. That they Ihould 
 abftain from Blood. 3. That Murthcr jfhould 
 be punilh'd with Death. To which was added 
 a Promife, that the World ftiould no more 
 3 be 
 
412 A DEFENCE of 
 
 be deftroy'd by Water. Thefe Things are 
 diftinftly mentioned : But who doth not fee 
 the Fitnefs of declaring thefe Particulars at 
 fuch a Time as this ? And, if Nothing elfe 
 was Matter of Revelation at that Time, I may 
 be allow'd to prefume, Eitiier that the Cir- 
 cumftances of Mankind did not make it need- 
 ful; or elfe, that, in fome refpecl or other, 
 to us unknown, they would not admit of it. 
 
 Afterwards we lind God was pleafed to 
 favour Abraham with fome fpecial Commu- 
 nications. Thefe were in a good Meafure 
 perfonal, and intended topreferve one Family 
 at leaft trom the general Corruption. To this 
 Purpofe He was order'd to withdraw himfelf 
 from his native Country, and fettle at a Di- 
 ftance ; to encourage him in which, he had 
 the Promife of efpecial Favour from God. 
 Here indeed we do not fee any Points of 
 Dodrine, or general Precepts delivered, for 
 which there might be none Occafion. The 
 Intent of Providence in this Cafe was, to pre- 
 ferve a good Man from Danger. This extra- 
 ordinary Care might be built, not only on 
 the great Virtue and Merit of the Man, but 
 likewife on This, that perhaps the Family 
 i^i Abraham might be the only one which re- 
 main'd untainted. This, at leaft, is certain, 
 That, according to the Determinations of 
 Providence, this Family was defign'd to pre- 
 ferve the Knowledge of God, and to be in 
 future Time the Inftrumcnts of a general Re-r 
 
 vclation* 
 
Revealed Religiok, &c, 413 
 
 relation. This God afterwards declar'd, when 
 he made him this Promife, In thy Seed (hall 
 all the Niit'tons of the Earth be hlejpd. [Gen. 
 xxii. 18.] 
 
 Let us pafs on to the Revelation made by- 
 God to Mojls. Here was a Body of Laws 
 deliver'd \ A Syftem of moral Precepts, of 
 religious Ceremonies, and of political Rules. 
 Whether thefe were not highly proper, and 
 agreeable to the Wants and Temper of the 
 People concern'd in them, may appear, in a 
 good meafure, from conlidering their Cir- 
 cumftances : And, it every Thing may not 
 be clear'd up this Way, we may conclude 
 the Wifdom of each particular Branch from 
 the appearing Wifdom of the Whole. 
 
 Notwithftanding this, our Author will, 
 perhaps, infift, that, however fuitable thefe 
 feveral Revelations might be to the Times in 
 which they were made, yet the Difcovery of 
 feveral other Matters might be equally fuit- 
 able: And, if a Revelation be expedient, in 
 the Senfe we are contending for, then fuch a 
 Revelation muft be equally fuitable to all 
 Perfons, and at all Times. 
 
 If this be alledg'd, it will be fufficient to 
 reply, that fome Things, which if deliver'd 
 at one Time would not be received, may 
 yet be admitted at another Time, after due 
 Preparation made for»them. This, I think, 
 is fo evident in other Cafes, that it cannot, 
 with any 6hew, be difputed. It is daily fccn 
 
 in 
 
4!4 A DEFENCE of 
 
 in the Study of the Arts and Sciences, and 
 indeed in the Eftablifhment of political Infti- 
 tutions : Why then may not the fame be pre- 
 fum'd in the prefent Cafe ? Do we know the 
 real State of Mankind in all Ages of the 
 World i^o well as to determine peremptorily 
 that This was not the Cafe ? Is not the Su- 
 preme Judge and Governor of the World 
 fitter to fettle this Matter than we are ? If 
 this be fo, then the Objedion before us is not 
 drawn from the Nature of Things, but our 
 own Ignorance. 
 
 I am farther confirmed in the prefent Ac- 
 count from hence, That moft of the Revela- 
 tions formerly made were, in Truth prepa- 
 ratory to the Ghriftian. They were either dired 
 Promifes that Something of this Kind Ihould 
 be hereafter given, or elfe they were in fome 
 other refpeds very proper Introdudions of it : 
 And therefore St. Paul afferts of the Jewilh 
 Religion, ^hat the Law was our School-majier 
 to bring us unto Chrift, [Gal. iii. 24.] 
 
 I Ihall pafs from hence to the Third Branch 
 of our Author's Objeftion j If a Revelation 
 be expedient, then, as it ought to be granted 
 at all Times, and in the fuUeft Manner, fo 
 likewife to every Perfon alike. Not to one 
 favourite Nation only, or to a fmall Part of 
 Mankind, the Bulk of them to this Day re- 
 maining in deplorable Ignorance. 
 
 As to the Part which the Jews have in the 
 prefent Objedion, I have noted Something 
 
 concerning 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 4 1 j 
 
 concerning it before, when I obferv'd, that, 
 notwithftanding the Law deliver'd by Mojes 
 refpecled the Jews more immediately, yet it 
 was not confin'd to them alone; and that pro- 
 bably a great Part of the World might re- 
 ceive no fmall Profit from it. There will be 
 none Occafion that I fhould offer any Thing 
 farther on that particular Cafe. The Ob- 
 jedion, if there be any thing in it, bears full 
 as hard on the Ghriftian Revelation, which, 
 'tis own'd, hath not yet been received uni- 
 verfally ; and perhaps the far greater Part of 
 the World are Strangers to it to this very Day. 
 This deferves to be confider'd, and 1 fliall 
 make my Reply by the following Steps. 
 
 I. No Objedion can be made againft the 
 Ghriftian Revelation, from the mere Confi- 
 deration of its not being receh'd univerfally. 
 No Force of Proof, no not Demonftration 
 itfelf can prevail with every one. Men may 
 Ihut their Eyes, and refufe to confider ; and 
 they will be difpos'd to do fo, where irre- 
 gular Paffions fhall render the Truths to be 
 prov'd unacceptable. A Revelation therefore, 
 however ftrong the Evidence of it may be, 
 may be rejeded. This cannot be otherwifc, 
 fo long as human Freedom remains ; fo long 
 as God deals with Men as rational Creatures, 
 and does not force Proof upon them, whether 
 they are willing to admit it or no. The Diffi- 
 culty therefore arifing from this Objedioii 
 nuilt reft, not on the imperfed Recep- 
 tion, 
 
4i6 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 tion, but the imperfed Promulgation of the 
 Gci\)e\. 
 
 1. Let us obferve, Secondly, That not- 
 withftanding the Gofpel hath not yet been 
 promulgated uni serially, yet it fhall one 
 Time or other be ofFer'd to every one. Some- 
 thing of this Nature is intimated to us by our 
 BkfTed Lord himfelf, who declared, ^eni- 
 falempjallhe trodden down of the Gentiles^ im- 
 t'll the Time of the Gentiles be fulfilled. [Luke 
 xxi, 24. ] And more clearly by St, Pauly 
 I would noty Brethren^ that ye fljould be ignorant 
 of this Myftery^ that^ Bl'mdnefs in part is hap- 
 fened to Ifrad^ until the Fnlnefs of the Gen- 
 tiles be come in. [Rom, i r. 25.] Upon this 
 Foot we affirm, that the Gofpel fhall fome 
 Time or other be univerfally promulgated : 
 And, confequently, no Objedion can be 
 drawn from this Circumftance, but what 
 arifes from the Novelty of the Revelation 
 itfelf ; which, if it be inluliicientin the former 
 Refped, it muft equally be fo in this. 
 
 3. If the Gofpel fhall hereafter be promul- 
 gated univerfdly ; then, as we know not how 
 long this World lliall laft, we cannot fiy but 
 this gradual Promulgation of the Gofpel may 
 bear a due Proportion to the Age and Con- 
 tinuance of the World. About Seventeen 
 Hundred Years are already pafs'd fince the 
 firrt: Delivery of our Religion ; and how 
 many Ages more may be required for its full 
 Promulgation we know not. This Extenu 
 
 of 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 417 
 
 of Time looks great iii our Accounts of 
 Things. But yet, if the World fliould con- 
 tinue for Millions of Ages, (as no. Man can 
 prove it fhall not) Two or Three Thoufand 
 Years might be confider'd as Nothing. There 
 is an Expreffion in Scripture, which contains 
 deep Truth in it as well as Beauty. One 
 Day is wtth the Lord Cis a I'hotifcwd Tear?^ 
 mid a Thoufand Tears as one Day, It is built 
 on this, that Qreat and Small are relative 
 Terms, and depend on the Proportion which 
 one Thing bears to another with which it is 
 compar'd. The few Years of our Infancy 
 might be thought a very conliderable Time, 
 were the ordinary Term of human Life much 
 fhorter ; whereas, upon the prefent State of 
 Things, it appears otherwife. Let the Sea^ 
 fon of the prefent imperfed Promulgation of 
 the Gofpel be confider'd as the Infancy of 
 the Chriftian State: In that View, no fuffi- 
 cient Objections can be rais'd, upon Suppo*- 
 lition that it fhall flourifh for Millions of 
 Ages in full Maturity \ none, but what may 
 equally be urg'd againfl: the State of Infancy 
 in theConfideration of human Life. 
 
 4. Let us confider, Fourthly, that, at the 
 firil Publication of the Gofpel, the Preachers 
 of it were endued with feveral miraculous 
 Powers, which ferv'd them as well to fpread 
 and propagate this Religion, as to prove and 
 fupport it. This was neceffary at lirft, in 
 order to give it a firm Footing, and to gain 
 E e a fuf- 
 
41 8 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 a fufficient Settlement. When this was donCy, 
 as ail was elFecled which neceiTarily requir'd 
 a miraculous Power, fo thefe extraordinary 
 Powers ccafed. When abundant Evidence 
 had been given of this Religion, and it was 
 embraced by a competent Number of Perfons, 
 it was left to make its Way by human Means. 
 In thcfe Circumftances, it is the Bufinels of 
 thofe who enjoy this Light, to impart it to 
 others. Somewhat to this Purpofe is at- 
 tempted daily ; and more would be, if that 
 Spirit prevail'd with Us, which animated the 
 firft Propagators of Chriftianity. Yet, if all 
 be not done which might and ought to be fo, 
 we alone are to blame j and the Objedion 
 rather lies againft the Conduct of Men, than 
 the Adm-iniftrations of Providence. But, 
 
 5. The Circumftances of the World are 
 fuch, that 'tis impoilible to promulgate this 
 Religion univerfally but by Length of Time, 
 and flow Degrees. The Intercourfe we have 
 with many Heathen People is fmall ; their 
 Languages to us unknown j and, perhaps, 
 fo barren, many of them, as to want Improve- 
 ment for the Conveyance of religious Notions. 
 As the Ignorance of Heathens is great, fo 
 their Prejudices are great likewife ; and, as 
 they are utterly unacquainted with the Credit 
 of thofe Hiftories on which the Evidence of 
 the Chriftian Faith is built, fo it cannot be 
 any cafy Matter to make a Progrefs in this 
 Affair. The Converfion of Heathens therefore 
 
 muft 
 
Reve.al'd Religion, &c, 419 
 
 muft be the Work of Time. A more free In- 
 tercourfe with them muft be open'd ; Arts and 
 Sciences cultivated ; their Languages known 
 and improv'd ; And, as thefe Means are gra- 
 dually carry'd on, we may hope foraSuccefs 
 proportionable. 
 
 Yet, however this be, I conceive, Laftly, 
 the Conducl of the Supreme Being will be 
 lufRciently juftifyM from hence, That God 
 will deal with Men in Proportion to the Ad- 
 vantages they enjoy. They who are with- 
 out this Law fhall be judg'd without it, and 
 they who enjoy this Law fhall be judg'd by 
 it. As therefore Men are not made account- 
 able to God merely for not having it, fo nei- 
 ther can God be accountable for not granting 
 it. His Proceedings in this refpect are en- 
 tirely in his own Power ; And therefore, as 
 he may beftow or not beftow a Revelation, 
 as he pleafes, fo He is the moft proper Judge 
 When and to Whom to grant it. This Con- 
 lideration is fufficient of itfelf, unlefs our 
 Adverfaries will undertake to prove. That 
 the grand Scheme of Things, from the Be- 
 ginning to the End, is entirely inconfiftent 
 with the making any Revelation at all ; 
 or the making it lb late; or the making it 
 gradually ; or the promulgating it imper- 
 fectly. For, if the doing all thefe be con- 
 fiftent with this great and wife Scheme, then 
 a Revelation, under all the Gircumftances 
 objeded againft, there may be ; and, if the 
 E e a Scheme 
 
420 A DEFENCE of 
 
 Scheme itfelf fhall require it, then ther^ 
 mil ft be. 
 
 The fecond Objeclion againft the Expe-* 
 diency of a Revelation, which I proposed to 
 examine, was This ; The Revelaton we arc 
 Ipeaking of, hath not anfwerM thofe Purpofes 
 far which we affirm it to have been expe- 
 dient. It occurs, p. 404. " What impartial 
 " Man, who hath compared the former and 
 " prelent Condition of Mankind, can think 
 " the World much mended fince the Times 
 *' oil'tberiHs ; or, tho*^ ever {o well vers'd 
 *' in Church-Hiftory, can, from the Conduct 
 " ofChriftians, find that they are arriv'd to 
 ^' any higher State of Perfedion than the 
 " reft of Mankind, who are fuppos'd to 
 ^' continue in their Degeneracy and Corrup- 
 «' tion ? " And afterwards ; " What in moft 
 " Places pafTes for the Ghriftian Religion, 
 " if not the chiefeft Part of it, has tranf- 
 " form'd this focial and benign Creature 
 " into one fierce and cruel ; and made him 
 '' acl with fuch Rage and Fury againft thofe 
 *' who never did, nor defign'd him any 
 *' Injury, as could not have enter 'd into the 
 '' Hearts of Men to conceive, even though 
 *' they were in the unavoidable State of 
 " Degeneracy and Corruption ? '* p. 405. 
 
 Our Author here afTerts, i. In general, 
 That Chriilians are not at all better than 
 Heathens. And, a. That they are in fomc 
 relpeds worfe* 
 
Revealed Religion, &c. 421 
 
 As to what he aflerts under the former 
 Head, whether it relate to Heathens before 
 the Times oi Tiberius^ or in the prefcnt Age, 
 ■it might be fufficient to deny, as roundly as 
 he affirms ^ and to refer the Thing, without 
 more Ado, to any impartial Confiderer. Only 
 this fhould be remembered, That when we 
 •compare the Lives of Chriftians with the Lives 
 of Heathens ; by Chriftian, we ought to under- 
 hand, not thofe who are merely Nominal, 
 without having any real Knowledge, orjuft 
 Apprehenfions of our Religion : And there- 
 fore we ought to ftrike out of the Account, 
 I. Thofe who have nothing elfe to fhew for 
 their Religion but their being baptiz'd. 
 And, 2. Thofe who have corrupted our 
 Religion in any notorious Degree. So far 
 as Men alter Ghriftianity, fo far they ceafe 
 to be Chriftians ; and confequently, thofe 
 . Faults which arife from Corruptions of this 
 Kind, are not chargeable to the Account of 
 our Religion. To which I may add farther, 
 That in making the Comparifon, we ought 
 to confider Men as plac'd on an equal Foot 
 in every other rcfpcd. A wife and learned 
 Heathen may carry feveral Points farther 
 ^han an illiterate, tho' well-meaning Chriftian. 
 To come at the Truth, and to learn whether 
 any Advantages have arifcn from the Chri- 
 ftian Inftitution, Let us fee how Men behave 
 in the general, under the feveral Perfuafions 
 pf Jieathenifm ^nd Chriftianity j or, if par-r 
 
 iK e 3 ticular 
 
421 A DEFENCE of 
 
 ticiilar Perfons are to be compar'd, then let 
 them be chofen fairly. 
 
 On thefe Conditions, I may truft the Caufe 
 to the Judgment of any impartial Man. Let 
 him examine Hiftory, and determine upon 
 the Point. This I may do, notwithftanding 
 feveral worthy Perfons have, in a Heat of 
 Zeal, and to prefs Chriftians to a greater 
 Circumfpeclion, fometimes exprefs'd them- 
 felves incautiouflv. Let our Author cite as 
 many PaiTages of this Kind as he pleafes, I 
 fliall yet maintain what I have aflerted, as 
 knowing from the Nature of Things, that 
 the Point which he infifts on is impollible. 
 
 For, let us confider ; Have not Chriftians 
 the fame common P.eafon with Heathens ? 
 or. Does this Gentleman think that Infidels 
 are the only Men of Senfe? If this be the 
 Cafe, then, as Chriftianity doth not impair 
 their Reafbn, and as all the moral Conclufions 
 of Reafon are Pans of Chriftianity, and con- 
 iirm'd by it, Both are fo ^r as this upon 
 the Level. But, when <ve confider, that 
 many Things which are remotely concluded 
 by Reafon, are plainly laid down in the 
 Scriptures ; that others are there delivered, 
 which cannot be concluded by our Realbn 
 at all ; and that there are feveral Motives to 
 a virtuous Life peculiar to Chriftianity ; it 
 will appear, that all other Things being 
 equal, the Chriftian muft as far exceed the 
 Heathen, as Chriftian Light exceeds Heathen 
 
 Ligh t: 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 42} 
 
 Light : And to affirm the contrary, will 
 imply the fame as to affirm, that Uneqiials 
 being added to Equals, the Produce will 
 be Equal. 
 
 The Gentleman advances farther, and 
 affirms, idly^ That Chriftians are in fome 
 refpeds worfe than Heathens. But How 
 doth he fupport this ? Why, by obferving, 
 *^ That what in moft Places palTcs for the 
 " Chriftian Religion, if not the chiefeft 
 ** Part of it, has transform'd the focial and 
 *^ benign Creature into one fierce and 
 " cruel, *' and, in Ihort, made him a£l with 
 fuch Rage and Fury as could not have 
 enter'd into the Heart of an Heathen. 
 But, is this aflerted of pure, and genuine 
 Chriftianity ? Are there any Precepts of 
 Cruelty to be found in the Gofpel ? On the 
 contrary ; Are not Matters of Charity car- 
 ry'd fo far by it, that this very Gentleman 
 complains of it on that very Account ? How 
 then comes this Imputation to be infinuated 
 againft Real Chriftianity, which can only 
 belong to Nominal ? His Words are ; 
 " What paffes for the Chriftian Religion, &c. 
 " makes Men fierce. " Be it fo ; Chri- 
 ftianity doth not efFed this : But Chriftia- 
 nity corrupted, or that which is not real 
 Chriftianity, may do fo. Pray, What Con- 
 
 clufion can be drawn from hence ? That 
 
 Chriftianity is mifchievous ? No, certainly ; 
 ynlefs this Gentleman will charge all the 
 
 E e 4 Abfurdities 
 
424 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 Abfurdities of abiis'd and diftorted Reafon 
 to the Account of genuine, and well-con-, 
 duded Reafon. 
 
 Still our Gentleman will tell us, What 
 Good hath real Chriftianity done all this 
 while, if it could not prevent fuch Cruelties 
 as mere uninftruded Reafon muft condemn ; 
 if it could not hinder its ProfelTors from ad- 
 ing worfe than Heathens themfelves have 
 ever done ? But will this Gentleman fay. 
 That no Cruelties were ever praclis'd among 
 the Heathens ? Or will he affirm, Tha£ 
 they were not fo generally pradis'd ; or, 
 not to fuch a Degree ? Surely, he can- 
 not be fo much a Stranger to the Ten Per- 
 lecutions ; in which the Heathen Governors 
 rag'd againft their Chriftian Subjeds, who 
 had never done them any Injury, and upon 
 no Score whatfoever but their profeiling 
 a Religion different from the eftablifh'd. 
 No Periecutions of Chridians which have 
 happened fince can over-match thefe ; And 
 therefore it cannot be affirm'd, that thofe 
 who are call'd Chriflians, have in this refpect 
 outdone thofe who were real Heathens. 
 
 After all. It is too true, and muft not be 
 deny'd, that molt horrid Cruelties have 
 fometimes been pradis'd by Perlbns pro^ 
 felling Chriftianity, and perhaps under Pre- 
 tence of Zeal for their Religion. But, can it 
 be concluded from hence, that Chriftianity 
 hath done no Good ? If it cannoj: fully 
 
 worl^ 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 425 
 
 work its proper EfFeds upon all Men, muft 
 it therefore be entirely fruitlefs ? No, cer- 
 tainly : All that can be juftly inferr'd, is 
 This ; Some Perfons may corrupt themfelves 
 to fuch a Degree, as to make their Cure 
 defperate : Such may receive little Benefit 
 from the Religion they profefs. But let me 
 ask. Would thefe Men be lefs degenerate in 
 a State of Hcathenifm ? Would an ill- 
 natur'd and cruel Man find none Occafions 
 of Mifchief, unlefs the Confiderations of Re- 
 ligion fupply'd them ? This cannot be faid : 
 Why then muft our Religion be accusM, for 
 not doing that, which cannot be effected by 
 any Caule whatfoever, which doth not dcr- 
 ftroy Mens Liberty ? 
 
 Upon the Whole, Let the Faults of Chri- 
 ftians be aggravated as much as this Gentle- 
 man pleales j yet ftill I am perfwaded, where 
 Chriftianity hath any tolerable Footing, Men 
 will be found not only to think more juftly, 
 but to a6l more virtuoufly, than an equal 
 Number of Men have been found to do in 
 the Heathen World. His Accufations arc 
 founded on a Falfity in Fad ; and confe- 
 quently, cannot affecl the Caufe of Chri- 
 liianity at all. 
 
 C H A P 
 
426 A DEFENCE of 
 
 CHAP, IX. 
 
 Whether there he fufficient Evidence of 
 the Reality of a Revelatiofiy and 
 efpecially of the Chrijtian. 
 
 SHALL introduce what may- 
 be proper to be ofFer'd on this 
 Qiieftion, with oblerving, That 
 §) if the feveral Points already in- 
 * " fifted on are made good ; and 
 efpecially, if, confidering the Condition of 
 Human Nature, an extraordinary Revelation 
 of the Divine Will be expedient ; then one 
 or other of the following Conclufions may- 
 be drawn ; Either, i. That fuch a Revela- 
 tion hath already been granted us in Fad: 
 Or elfe, i. If Nothing of this Kind hath 
 been granted hitherto, yet we may reafbn- 
 ably hope and exped it in fome future 
 Time. 
 
 I do by no means determine abfolutely for 
 the former ; nor argue, that becaufe a Re- 
 velation may have been highly ufeful and 
 
 defirable. 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 427 
 
 defirable, therefore the Reality of a paft Re- 
 velation may certainly be concluded. I am 
 fenfible this would run me on Difficulties, 
 and oblige me to maintain the abfolute Ne- 
 ceflity of a Revelation on God's Part. On 
 this Suppofition it will be impoffible to avoid 
 the Conlequence which our Author alledges, 
 that a Revelation mull be univerfal. 
 
 I contend therefore, from the Confidera- 
 tion before us, for no more than This ; That 
 probably a Divine Revelation either hath 
 been already, or will be hereafter granted 
 us : And therefore, as this is, in a reafbn- 
 able Account of Things, probable, it be- 
 comes every Man to examine the Pretences 
 to it impartially. Were the Thing in itfelf 
 impoffible ; or, tho' not abfolutely impof- 
 fible, yet highly improbable ; it might be 
 thought there would be none Occafion to 
 examine fuch Pretences at all : Then every 
 Thing of this Kind might be rejed:ed at 
 once, as offering a manifeft Affront to our 
 Reafon. But fince the Cafe is otherwife ; 
 Since Probability lies on the other Side of 
 the Qiicftion ; To be entirely carelels, is 
 inexcufable : For it cxprefles a Contempt of 
 that Being, whofe Will we are concerned as 
 well to learn, as to obey. 
 
 Over and above what hath been juft now 
 obferv'd, I might go on, and alledge feme 
 prefumptive Proofs, that God hath not left 
 Men entirely to thcmfelyes 5 that he hath 
 
 given 
 
4i8 A DEFENCE of 
 
 given them fbme Prefcriptlons in an extra* 
 ordinary Way ; or, in other Words, thac 
 fome Divine Revelation hath been granted 
 Men already : Which if it fhall appear to 
 be extremely probable, then the Way will 
 be olear'd to thofe Arguments by which ws 
 fupport our Religion ; For, if a Revelation 
 be allow'd in fome Inftances, What Preju?- 
 dices can arife againft granting it in others ? 
 
 It will be needlefs to alledge every Thing 
 which might be pertinently ofFer'd to this 
 Purpofe. However, not to let this Matter 
 pafs entirely, I fhall take the Liberty to 
 demand, How we can account for the Origine 
 of Sacrifices ? Of thefe there have indeed 
 been different Sorts, and attended with dif- 
 ferent Ceremonies, agreeable to the Humour 
 of the feveral Perfons who have offer'd them. 
 Yet it is remarkable, that 'till 'Jefns Chnfi 
 appear'd, (who, m our Account of Things, 
 anfvver'd the Intent of all Sacrifices by the 
 iSacrifice of himfelf), I fay, 'till this Time, 
 fcarce any Place or Age can be aflign'd, in 
 which fome Sacrifices, of one Kind or other, 
 have not been offer'd. 
 
 But Vv'hcnce, I defire to know, could this 
 arife ? Was it from the Nature and Reafon 
 of the Thing ? This will not be affirm'd 
 by the Gentleman I am contending with, 
 who would reprefent the Pradice as ridi-; 
 culous. Here indeed I mufi: differ from him 
 widely : For I cannot fee that there is any 
 
 Abfurdity 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 42^ 
 
 Abfurdity in the Matter ; any Thing con- 
 trary to the Principles of Reafon. But ftill. 
 Would mere Reafon have led Men to it ? 
 Would it have taught them that This was 
 the only, or the beft Method of Propitiating 
 the Deity ; and confequently, that the 
 making thefe Offerings was a necelfary and 
 indifpenfible Duty ? If not, then How- 
 came it pafs that this Inftitution fhould pre-*- 
 vail univerfally ? 
 
 We fliall be told perhapSj It was the 
 Invention of Priefts, who made great Advan- 
 tages to themfelves from Sacrifices. Yet 
 ftill the Difficulty will return. How came it 
 to pafs that all Priefts, in almoft all Parts 
 and Ages of the World, have enter'd into 
 this Method ? Could Nothing elfe be in- 
 vented of as gainful a Nature ? Or was this 
 Method more plain and obvious than any 
 other ? 
 
 Let us turn the Matter which Way we 
 pleafe, it will be fcarce pofliblc to folve the 
 Difficulty but by fuppofing, that this Practice 
 arofe originally from fome Divine Appoint- 
 ment. Ihis will clear up all at once. In this 
 Cafe, what was made known by Revelation 
 to the firft Man, would be pradis'd by him 
 with Care : His Children would be taught to 
 vvorfhip God this Way : The Praclice, thus 
 taught, would be retain'd for Subftance, 
 into whatever diftant Parts of the World 
 they fhould remove : And, tho' in Tract of 
 
 Time 
 
4^0 J DEFENCE of 
 
 Time great Coruptions might happen, and 
 many Variations be made from the original 
 InftitLition, yet the more general Parts of the 
 Inftitution might remain : Sacrifices might 
 be offered every-where, and be reckon'd, 
 (as in Fa£t they have been), one of the 
 principal Farts of Worfhip. I cannot forbear 
 alledging this as a prefumptive Evidence of 
 a Revelation ; becaufe the Univerfality of 
 Sacrifices is much better accounted for this 
 Way, than by referring the Matter to the 
 Didates of Reafon, or the Artifice of Priefts. 
 
 Some Revelation then probably hath been : 
 But the Argument now produced concludes 
 for no other than a Revelation as to one 
 particular Inftance : This indeed falls vaftly 
 fhort of the Point I am contending for ; and 
 therefore m.uft be only confider'd as Prepa- 
 ratory to my main Defign. 
 
 The great Queftion which I have all along 
 had in View, and which is here to be con- 
 fider'd diftindly, is, Whether the Religion 
 we embrace be really founded on a Divine 
 Revelation : Whether Jeftis Chriji were a 
 Perfon fent from God, or not : and confe- 
 quently. Whether the Scheme of Doctrines 
 and Precepts deliver'd by him ought to be 
 received on the Foot of a a Divine Autho- 
 rity. 
 
 To determine This, Writers have fre- 
 quently taken the following Method, viz. 
 To confider, i. The Internal Evidence of 
 
 the 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 431 
 
 the Religion. And, 2. The External Proof 
 by which it is confirmed. 
 
 As to the former Head, I conceive, the 
 Terms in which it is exprefs'd are not quite 
 fo proper; and that for this Reafbn, becaufe, 
 ftrid:ly fpeaking, there can be no internal 
 Evidence of a Revelation at all. For, I 
 would defire to know. What can be con- 
 cluded from the Nature of any Doctrines or 
 Precepts delivered ? Why, This only, That 
 they are Either true or falfe ; and if true, 
 that it muft be the Will of God they Ihould 
 be received as fuch. Be it fo ; yet doth it 
 follow from hence, they muft therefore be 
 reveaPd ? No, certainly : Several of the 
 fame Points which are inculcated in the 
 Golpels, arc contained likewife in the Wri- 
 tings of the Philofophers. The internal Evi- 
 dence of their Truth muft be the fame in 
 both : But were they equally reveal'd to 
 both Kinds of Writers ? No ; The one 
 learn'd them from Divine Revelation ; the 
 other from Principles of human Reafon : 
 The One produce full Proof a Divine Com- 
 million ; the Other alled^e nothing of that 
 Kind at all. Upon this I muft affirm, that 
 external Proof is the only dired Evidence 
 of a Revelation ; and that all Conclulions 
 drawn from the Nature of the fcveral Doc- 
 trines or Precepts amount to nothing more 
 than a Condition, or Cauja Jjne qua noju as 
 
 being 
 
4ji A DEFEKCE of 
 
 ks being that without which no external 
 Evidence fhoiild be admitted. 
 
 To proceed ; There is nothing in the 
 Chriftian Scheme which makes it abfolutely 
 impoflible to be true 5 It contains nothing 
 inconfiftent with itfelf, or contradidory to 
 any fure Principle of Reafon. If it did, no 
 external Evidence would be fufficient. What 
 is falfe in itlelf, cannot be prov'd true by 
 any Arguments whatfbever : And therefore, 
 were any Things of this Kind produced, we 
 ftiould be forc'd to maintain, Either that the 
 Points alledg'd were Corruptions of Ghriftia- 
 
 nity ; or, if this might not be fuppos'd, 
 
 That the Religion itfelf was an Impofturc. 
 For, no Man can have greater Evidence 
 that any Miracles have been ever wrought, 
 than he hath already, that a Religion which 
 contains Contradiclions muft be falfe. 
 
 But Nothing of this Kind can be charg'd 
 on our Religion. It propofes to us the nobleft 
 End, and the moft fuitable Means. Its Doc- 
 trines have all of them an Influence upon our 
 Praftice. And the Precepts which it deli- 
 vers, are either founded on the Natures of 
 Things ; or, if fome few of them are pofi- 
 tive, they are far from being ufelefs. Thofe 
 points which are proveable from Principles 
 of Natural Light, can create no Difficulty ; 
 and Others, concerning which Nothing can 
 be determined from thence, may (for any 
 Thing we know) be true. To which may 
 
 be 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 43 j 
 
 be added, That as the fcveral Particulars of 
 our Religion, feparately taken, are unexcep- 
 tionable, fo there is luch an Harmony and 
 Correfpondency of its Parts, as makes the 
 whole Scheme beautiful. 
 
 If then the Matter of our Religion be 
 fuch, as makes it capable of external Proof, 
 we are concerned to Enquire What Proof of 
 that Kind it has. Now the Evidence to be 
 produced is that of Miracles ; From which 
 I do by no means exclude Prophecies, which 
 may be conlider'd as one Sort of Miracles : 
 They exceed any Powers of human Nature ; 
 and have juft the fame Force in Proof as 
 other Miracles have, viz. as being fuper- 
 natural Atteftations of a Divine Commiflion. 
 This therefore being the Foundation on 
 which I build, it will be proper that I ftiould 
 enquire, 
 
 I. Whether any Miracles have been really 
 wrought in Favour of our Religion. And, 
 
 1. What Force there is in the Argument 
 deduced from thence. 
 
 Before I proceed to the particular Dif- 
 cuifion of the firft Queftion, 1 muft clear 
 the Way, by removing fuch Prejudices zs 
 may be fuppos'd to lie againll this Kind 
 of Proof The Gentleman I am contend- 
 ing with laughs at Miracles, and would 
 repreient every Thing of that Nature as 
 ridiculous. To this Purpofe, he tells us, 
 " It was a proverbial Saying among the 
 
 Ff '' Philo- 
 
434 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 <' fophers of Greece^ QxviJLaflce. julmqoi^, Mi- 
 *' racks for Fools, and Reafons lor Wife 
 *' Men. The Boeotians were remarkable for 
 " their Stupidity, and the Number of their 
 *' Oracles : And if you look no farther than 
 *^ the Chriftian World, you will find that 
 *' Ignorance, and the Belief of daily Mi- 
 " racles, go hand in hand ; and that there 
 " is nothing too abfurd for the Peoples 
 " Belief." p. 1^2. 
 
 The Gentleman hath here exprefs'd a great 
 Contempt of Miracles : Miracles ( fays he ) 
 for Fools. Which Words, tho' cited from 
 fome of the Greek Philofophers, he makes 
 his own by the Application. And if we 
 demand what Reafon he alledges for this 
 Proceeding, the Anfwer is, Weak Men are 
 frequently impos'd on, and apt to take thofe 
 Things for Miracles, which are only Cheats. 
 But, what then ? Muft this pafs for a Reafon ; 
 and can there be no real Miracles, becaufe 
 fome Men will be apt to credit feign'd ones ? 
 No, certainly ; and therefore, if the Gentle- 
 man be really in earneft, he muft build on 
 one or other of thefe Principles ; Either, 
 I. That Miracles are abfolutely and in 
 themfelves impolTible ; or elfe, 2. That there 
 can be no fufficient Caufe or Reafon for 
 working them. 
 
 Miracles are fupernatural EfFeds ; /'. e. 
 fuch as being above the natural Powers of 
 any vifible Agents, or evidently not pro- 
 duced 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 455 
 
 duc*d by them, are contrary to the general 
 Laws of God*s ading upon Matter, or at 
 leaft cannot be accounted for by any Com- 
 pofition or Refult of thofe Laws. The 
 Queltion therefore at prefent, is This ; Whe- 
 ther Effedls of this Kind are abfolutely im- 
 poflible. If they are fo, they muft imply a 
 Contradidion ; and it concerns our Adver- 
 faries to fhew Where the Contradidion lies. 
 Is there any Inconfiftency in affirming, that 
 Effeds above the Powers of vifible iVgents 
 may yet be performed by invifible ; or, that 
 EfFeds may be produc'd without any vifible 
 Means at all ^ or, that the general Laws 
 of Nature may be fufpended or controuFd ; 
 or laflily, that Things may be done which 
 cannot be accounted for by any Compofition 
 or Refult of thofe Laws ? Can any one 
 prove that there are no invifible Beings ? or, 
 if there be, that they enjoy no Powers be- 
 yond human ? or, that they cannot exert 
 thefe Powers in the Affairs of the World ? 
 If any of thefe Pofitions could be provM, we 
 muft then yield our Point : But if the con- 
 trary may be true, then Miracles may be 
 wrought ; and of the Pofiibility of this we 
 have as clear an Idea, as we have of any 
 ordinary Effed whatfoever. 
 
 Miracles, I have faid, are fuch EfFeds, 
 as are either contrary to the general Laws 
 of God's ading upon Matter, or cannot 
 refult from them. If this Account be true, 
 
 Ff 2 the 
 
4?<5 A DEFENCE of 
 
 the PofTibility of Miracles mull be apparent : 
 For, if the Laws of Nature are none other 
 than the general Method of God's ading up- 
 on Matter, which Method is not in itfelf, and 
 abfolutely neceflary ; then 'tis certain God 
 may either fufpend his Adion entirely, or 
 a6l, upon particular Emergencies, in whatever 
 different Manner he pleafes. Upon this View, 
 it is clear, that the working of Miracles 
 may not require in the Supreme Being the 
 Exertion of any greater Power than what is 
 neceiTary in ordinary Operations ; and con- 
 fequently, we may conclude the Poflibility 
 of fupernatural Effeds, from the Certainty of 
 natural. 
 
 To this may be added. That forafmuch 
 as Miracles do not neceffarily imply infinite 
 Power ; and we know not what Degrees of 
 Power God may have beftow'd on feveral 
 created Beings, w^e cannot affirm that the 
 •working of Miracles is impoflible even to 
 them. Only we muft remember, that what- 
 ever Privileges they enjoy in this refpefb, 
 they arc ftill fubjed to The Supreme Being, 
 and limited in the Exercife of them by his 
 Will. From whence it follows, that no 
 Confufions will arife from hence : The Ad- 
 miniftration of Things may ftill be God's ; 
 and the Force of Miracles the fame, as tho' 
 they were produc'd by an immediate Divine 
 Power. 
 
 If 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 457 
 
 If therefore Miracles are not abfolutely 
 impoflible, we are concern'd to Enquire far- 
 ther, Whether any fufficient Reafon can be 
 affign'd for working them. This is the 
 more neceflary to be done, becaufe I am 
 apprehenfive our Adverfaries build more on 
 this Head than the former. They muft fup- 
 pofe that Miracles are Either prejudicial, or 
 ufelels j and therefore, inconfiftent with 
 Goodnefs in the one Cafe, and with Wifdom 
 in the other. 
 
 It cannot be aflerted that Miracles are 
 prejudicial, without maintaining that fuch 
 Effeds are mifchievous in themfelves or Con- 
 fequences. The former we deny 5 becaufe, 
 if Good may be produc'd in an ordinary- 
 Way, it may certainly be as well produc'd 
 in an extraordinary ; and the latter, be- 
 caufe, however true it be in fome Cafes, that 
 a prefent Advantage may be overballanc'd by- 
 future ill Confequences, yet this is not abfo- 
 lutely and univerfally necelTary. Tho' upon 
 the Whole, the prefent Scheme of Things 
 is beft, and any new Laws might be Icls 
 ufeful than thofe which obtain already ; yet 
 it cannot be affirm'd, that to fufpend or 
 counter-ad thefe Laws in any particular In- 
 ftances, muft be mifchievous. To do this, 
 may poflibly be of fingular Ufe on fome 
 Occafions ; and it hath been prefum'd, that 
 certain Irregularities which arife from the 
 prefent Conftitution, (no doubt, the wifeft 
 
 F f 5 upon 
 
438 A DEFENCE of 
 
 upon the whole) may be correded by occa- 
 fional Interpofitions. 
 
 The Natural Good of the World is, I con- 
 ceive, fecure from any Prejudice on Account 
 of Miracles: Let us fee therefore, whether 
 any Moral Advantages may be derived from 
 them. If there may, then Miracles may be 
 ufeful ; then Reafons may be affignM for work- 
 king them ; and confequently, To explode 
 them univerfally, and to make them the Sub- 
 ject of Ridicule, (as this Gentleman has done) 
 is, to fay the leaft, ralh and unwarrantable. 
 
 Common Appearances, and the ordinary 
 Courfe of Things, according to the prefent 
 Conftitution, are a ftrong Argument for a 
 Providence ; becaufe, without this Suppofi- 
 tion, we Ihail be unable to account for thofe 
 Things which we fee daily. This, to a 
 Thoughtful and Wife Man, may be fuffici- 
 ent* and, confequently, extraordinary Ad- 
 monitions unneceflary. But the Generality 
 of the World are lefs affected by them. 
 They are not apt to refled and confider, or 
 to give any Attention to Matters familiar. 
 Yet, when any Thing very unufual happens, 
 the Surprize which it occafions engages them. 
 Things out of the Way, and which cannot 
 be perform'd by Men, will be afcrib'd to God. 
 Thofe who overlooked his Power in the com- 
 mon Adminiftrations of Providence, will ac- 
 knowledge it here ; and, from hence be- 
 come more deeply fenfible of their Depen^ 
 
 dance 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 459 
 
 dance on him, and Obligations to him. 
 Still Miracles will carry a greater Weight, if 
 they Ihall prove either the Rewards of Vir- 
 tue, or the Punilhments of Vice ; if they 
 ihall bring any extraordinary Advantages to 
 the Good, or unufual Calamities on the 
 Wicked. This will alarm them to the Pur- 
 pole, and go much farther towards the Sup- 
 port of Virtue than any Methods merely- 
 human can do. I do not, by any Means, 
 affirm how far Miracles have been wrought 
 in Fad, for the End now alledg'd by me; 
 tho' perhaps more frequently than every one 
 is willing to allow. It is enough to aifert, 
 that the Cafe is in itfelf poillble ; For, if it 
 be, then Miracles are not abfolutely ridicu- 
 lous. 
 
 However, the principal Thing I am con- 
 cern'd to note is This; Miracles may be pro- 
 per to confirm the Authority of that Perfon 
 who is commiffion'd to declare God's Will. 
 That 'tis poflible for the Supreme Being to 
 reveal himfelf immediately, ihall be here 
 alTum'd, becaufe it hath been already ihewn 
 elfewhere; and, that the Knowledge attain- 
 able by this Means may be lerviceable, as well 
 to Mankind in general,as to any one fingle Per- 
 fon,will be readilyadmitted,and needs noProof. 
 Upon this Foot I demand, whether it be ne- 
 ceffary that this Revelation be immediately 
 made to every one ? This cannot be affirm'd, 
 if the Knowledge of it may be communicated 
 F f 4 to 
 
i,4o ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 to others, and fufficient Evidence of a Divine 
 Com million given. For, no one Kind of 
 Means can be affirmed to be neceflary, where 
 the End may be obtain'd by fome other 
 Means. Well then ; Immediate Revelation 
 is poffible ; This Revelation made to One 
 may be defign'd for the Benefit of Others ; 
 The Matter of it may be communicated ; and 
 fufficient Evidence of a Divine Commiffion 
 given : But how fhall it be given? Certainly 
 by fome fupernatural Operations, /. e, by 
 Miracles of one Kind or other ; For No- 
 thing can be Proof of a Divine Commiffion 
 but Divine Credentials. If therefore Miracles 
 are proper for this End ; and the End itfelf 
 be entirely worthy of God- it remains, that 
 there may be a realbnable Caufe of working 
 them; and that they may, (notwithftanding 
 this Gentleman's Greek Proverb) be applied 
 as convincing Arguments to wife Men. 
 
 I fhall now pafs on to the great Queftion 
 before proposed, v'lz^ Whether any Miracles 
 have been really wrought in Favour of our 
 Religion ; And this will farther refolve itfelf 
 into Two other Queflions ; i. Whether the 
 Hiftories from whence we draw our Fads are 
 credible; And 2. Whether the Fads there 
 recorded are Miraculous. 
 
 The Hiftories 1 have now in View are, 
 The Accounts given us of the Life and Adions 
 of 'J ejus Chr'iji contain'd in the Four Gofpels^ 
 and of theCondudofThe Apoftles delivered 
 
 in 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 441 
 
 in the J^s. In reference to which, it will 
 not be difputed by our Adverfaries, Whether 
 there was ever fuch a Perfon as J-efus Chri/i'^ 
 
 Whether He did not claim the Title of 
 
 Mefjias ; Whether He did not, under 
 
 that Charader, give out Laws, and inftitutc 
 a Religion ; Whether He did not ga- 
 ther a conliderable Number of Followers, 
 from whom He chofe fome, who were prin- 
 cipally employed by him to propagate his Re- 
 ligion. Thefe Points I fhall lay down as in- 
 difputable : So that if the Accounts given us 
 concerning the Lives and Adions of Chrtfi 
 and his Apoftles fhould be thought quefti- 
 onable for fome particular Reafbns, yet the 
 general Foundation of them is abfolutely un- 
 queflionable. To this may be added, That 
 the Hiftories before us are not the Forgeries 
 of later Ages, but of great Antiquity, and as 
 old as we Chriftians pretend they are, may 
 be prov'd in every Way which is allowed to 
 eftabliih the Antiquity of any other Books. 
 They have approved themfelvcs, in this re- 
 fped, to all critical Enquirers : And therefore, 
 if our Adverfaries will, notwithftanding this, 
 queftion the Point, They fhould tell us When, 
 and by whom thefe Books were forg'd ; or, 
 at leaft, produce Ibme Arguments, from the 
 Nature and Texture of the Books themfelvcs, 
 to prove the Forgery. Nothing of this Kind 
 hath yet been done by them, as I am per- 
 iiiaded Nothing can be done by them. 
 
 Wc 
 
41 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 We ftioald obferve, in the next Place, That 
 tlic Perfbns who wrote thele Hiftories were 
 fufficiently qualified for the Undertaking; I 
 mean, That they had all the Advantages 
 which any Hiftorians ever had, of knowing 
 whether the Matters they related had any 
 fufficient Foundation in Fad. For, they 
 wrote Accounts of what is faid to have hap- 
 pened in their own Times ; They were Na- 
 tives of, and refided in the very Country 
 where the Affairs they relate were tranfaded. 
 And, in many Particulars,they affirm what they 
 were themfelves Witneffes to. In fuch Cir- 
 cumftances as thefe, they muft either be fully 
 affur'd concerning what they wrote, or have 
 been guilty of fuch Negligence as cannot be 
 imputed to a ferious and confidering Man. 
 So far as this goes, few Writers have ever 
 equal'd them, and None exceeded them. 
 
 But, our Adverfaries will tell us, The 
 Queftion doth not reft here. They will ad- 
 mit perhaps, fome of them at leaft, that they 
 knew what they were about; and infift, that 
 they were crafty Impoftors, who defign'd to 
 fupport a falfe Religion by falle Relations. 
 This bears hard on their moral Charader, and 
 we are concerned to examine it. 
 
 But, is there any Evidence for this ? Hath 
 it been prov'd, that thefe Writers were in- 
 famous Perfons, and fuch as could not be 
 credited in common Affairs? Nothing of this 
 appears j Nothing to the Difadyantage of 
 
 any 
 
ReVeal'd Religion, &c. 445 
 
 any of the Apoftles but what they themfelvcs 
 have confelVd ingcnuoufly. Methinks This 
 Ihould be allow'd Ibme Weight, that, in 
 writing thefe Accounts, they did not {o much 
 as conceal their own Infirmities. 
 
 Yet our Adverfaries pretend to take Ad- 
 vantage from hence. The Gentleman I am 
 contending with demands, " Do we not find 
 " one of the Apoftles, tho' with the reft he 
 " had the Power of doing Miracles, even to 
 " the raifing of the Dead, betraying his 
 " Mafterforthe paltry Sum of Thirty Pieces 
 " of Silver ? and the other Apoftles not only 
 " fled and defertcd him, but the chief of 
 " them forfvvore him as often as he was ask'd 
 " about being one of his Followers : And 
 " He, as well as Barnabas^ was afterwards 
 " guilty of a mean Piece of Diflimulation ; 
 " And ^atil and Barnabas had fuch a fliarp 
 '' Contention, tho' about a very indifferent 
 " Matter, as to caufe a Separation. And 
 " even St. Paul fays, 'the Good that Iworddy 
 " I do not '^ but the EvH which I would net ^ that 
 " / do. But IJee another Law hi my Members 
 " warring again fl the Law of my Mind, and 
 <' bringing me into Captivity to the Law of 
 ••^ Sin which is in my Mejjibers. Do not thelc 
 ^^ Inllances, tho' many more might be added, 
 
 " plainly fliew that infpir'd Perfons are 
 
 <^ fubject to the fame Paffions, even to Dif^ 
 ^' fembhng and Lying, as other Men? *' 
 p. 245. This is alledg'd to difcredit the lirft 
 
 Propagators 
 
444 J DEFENCE o/ 
 
 Propagators of our Religion, who (as he in- 
 fifts) ought to have been both infallible and 
 impeccable. [See p. 243.] 
 
 Upon this Paflage I muft obferve, that it 
 doth not diredly afFed the Point I am upon. 
 I am here concerned to juftify the Charader 
 of the Gofpel Hiftorians, and to fhevv that 
 they were Perfons who related Matters fairly, 
 according to what they either knew or be- 
 lieved. Suppofing therefore, they had re- 
 corded much greater Faults in the Conducl of 
 thofe Perfons they wrote of, What, I defire, 
 could be concluded from thence ? That the 
 Hiftorians deferv'd no Credit ? I fhould be 
 tempted to think the contrary, from the F ree- 
 dom they us'd in the Inftances before us. 
 It is reckon'd in all other Writers a Sign of 
 Impartiality, that they record as well the 
 Errors as \ irtues of their Friends. 
 
 However, thus much I (hall acknowledge 
 readily, that, as the Credibility of our Reve- 
 lation depends on the Evidence of thofe 
 Fads by which it is fupported, fo 'tis neccfla- 
 ry, not only that the Hiftorians muft have 
 been faithful, but the Witnefles they cite 
 credible ;' and therefore, if they have really 
 given fiich Accounts of thefe Witnefles as 
 ftiall overthrow their Evidence, the Caufe of 
 our Religion muft fuffer by the very Credit 
 we allow to thefe Hiftorians. This makes it 
 neceflary that we examine carefully the Cha- 
 raders of thefe Witnefles. 
 
 And 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 445 
 
 And here I can by no means agree with 
 this Gentleman, that the firft Propagators of 
 our Religion ought to have been infallible 
 and impeccable. If we confider them only 
 as WitneiTes to Fa61:, (as that is the proper 
 Confideration at prefent) we may put them on 
 the fame Foot as any other Witneffes ; ia 
 whom we do not require an ablblute Infal- 
 libility, to gain them Credit. It is fufficient, 
 if, all Circumftances laid together, we may 
 fairly conclude they were not deceived in 
 Fad : And, if this be not allowed, then fare- 
 well to all human Teftimony whatfoever. 
 Nor is it any more neceflary they fliould 
 be impeccable. The Qiieftion arifing on this 
 Occafion muft be, not Whether the Witneffes 
 produc'd were abfolutely incapable of de- 
 ceiving ; (This cannot be prov'd demonftrably 
 of any mere Man) but whether they were 
 Perfons of a general good Charader ; and 
 Whether there be fufficient Appearances of 
 Fairnefs in what they teftify. Let us fee 
 therefore, Whether, from the Inftances pro- 
 duc'd by this Author, any Thing can be con- 
 cluded which will deftroy the general Credit 
 of thefe Witnelfes. 
 
 The Inflance of J-udas^ who betray'd his 
 Mafter, is of no Conlequence here : For, tho' 
 He, with the reft of the Apoftles, was en- 
 du'd with a Power of working Miracles, yet 
 it does not appear he was infpir'd, as this 
 Gentleman is pleas'd to intimate : He was 
 
 indeed 
 
44^ J DEFENCE of 
 
 indeed chofen originally, as the reft were, 
 to bear Witnefs to Chr/J^ ; But he forfeited 
 this Honour by his Perfidy : And it will be 
 Time enough for our Adverfaries to alledge 
 his Mifcarriages, when they find we build 
 any Thing on his Evidence. 
 
 The other Perfbns here accufed are, The 
 Difciples, who deferted our Saviotir in his 
 Extremities ; St. Peter, who deny'd him ; 
 Barfiahas, who is charg'd with Diffimulation 
 in one Inftance, and with Contention in an- 
 other ; and, laftly, St. ^aul, who is repre- 
 fented as drawing his own Charader in a very 
 difadvantageous Manner. 
 
 It is affirmed by St. Matthew, that the 
 D'tfciples forfook their Lord, and fled. But 
 doth this prove them to have been profligate 
 and infamous Perfons ? Is there any more in 
 the Cafe than This ; that, upon a very try- 
 ing Occafion, they were over-born by the 
 Senfe of Fear, as moft other Perfons would 
 probably have been in the fame Circum- 
 ftances ? Yet afterwards, when they recover'd 
 themfelves, and had received the laft AfiTur- 
 ances of Chriji's MeJfmhJJjip by his Refur- 
 redion from the Dead, thefe fame Perfons be- 
 hav'd themfelves with the greateft Refolu- 
 tion imaginable. Methinks This fhould be 
 allow'd to be a ftronger Argument in their 
 Favour, than the having once betray 'd a 
 Fear can be againft them. 
 
 As 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ &c. 447 
 
 As little Strefs can be laid on the Con- 
 dud of St. Peter and Barnabas in the Inftancc 
 which this Gentleman calls a Piece of mean 
 Diffimulation. The Cafe in fhort was This ; 
 The Apoftle had conversed freely with the 
 Gentiles ; But when certain came from James^ 
 he withdrew^ and Jeparated himfelf fearing 
 them which were of the Circumcijion^ [Gal. 
 ii. 1 2. J He was confcious of his Chriftian 
 Liberty, and had on former Occaiions fliewn 
 it ; But, being apprehenfive of giving the 
 Jews Offence, he chofe rather to throw up 
 his Liberty than to ufe it. This might have 
 been attended with difadvantageous Conle- 
 quences ; However, lince there appears no 
 Difhonefty in the Cafe, the Apoftle, whole 
 Gondud was juftifiable in the general, may 
 Hirely claim fome Excufe. 
 
 St. Barnabas ftands on much the fame Foot 
 with St. ^eter^ as to the foregoing Objedion : 
 But it feems there is another Charge brought 
 againft him, in which St. Paul likewife hath 
 a Share. It relates to a Difference between 
 thefe Two Perfbns, where the Contention was 
 fo Jharp that they parted. But, hath the 
 Gentleman never heard of a Mifunderftand- 
 ing between great and good Men ? or, doth 
 he think they muft immediately forfeit 
 their Charader on fuch Occafions > And what, 
 after all, was the Matter of this Difference ? 
 Why This j The One infifted to take Mark 
 with them, which the Other xefus'd ablb- 
 
 lutely. 
 
448 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 folutely. The Thing itfelf was Matter of 
 Difcretion : About which tho' they happened 
 to differ, yet it doth not appear that the 
 Contention was criminal. Let the Gentleman 
 make the moft of this, and fee whether it 
 will affed the moral Charader either of ^aul 
 or Barnabas. 
 
 The great Charge on St. Peter bears hard- 
 er: He was forewarn'd of his Danger, re- 
 peated his Denial, and confirmed it with 
 Oaths. The Crime itfelf muft not be ex- 
 cused. But, Ihall One great Fault, commit- 
 ted under the Influence of ftrong Tempta- 
 tions, render a Man infamous for ever ? Can 
 Nothing be done to repair the Mifcarriage, 
 and to recover the good Opinion of theWorld ? 
 If Something may, then let us remember 
 that this unhappy Perfon recolleded himfelf 
 immediately ; — lamented his Crime bitterly; 
 labour'd afterwards with fingular Zeal in 
 propagating the Gofpel • and at length laid 
 down his Life for it. What furer Signs of 
 Repentance can be given than thefe ? 
 
 As to what the Gentleman affirms St. Paul 
 declares, Rom. vii. i^. by which he would in- 
 timate that the Apoftle is there drawing his 
 own Gharader, I mull: obferve, that this is 
 fuch a monftrous Mifreprefentation of the 
 Apoftle as can admit of no Excufe whatfoever. 
 Doth not St. Paul^ in feveral other Parts of 
 his Writings, infift on the Stridnefs of his 
 paft Life, and call upon the Jews as Wit- 
 
 nefles 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 445^ 
 
 neflcs of what he affirm'd ? How then is it 
 credible, that this lame Perfon fhould after- 
 wards draw his own Charatter in a Manner 
 ib difadvantageous ? But the Gentleman will 
 demand, Are not thefe St. Paul's own Words, 
 I'/ye Good that I would^ I do not ; but the Evil 
 
 which I would not^ that I do. / fe^ ano" 
 
 ther Law in my Members warring again fi the 
 Law of my Mind, and bringing me into Cap-' 
 tivity to the Law of Sin, which is in my 
 Members ? They are fo ; But the Words are 
 clearly accounted for by Dr. Sam. Clark, in his 
 Eighth Volume of Sermons, p. i88. " This 
 ** whole Seventh Chapter to the Romans is 
 " plainly intended of a Perfon, in his Pro- 
 " felTion not yet Christian, and in his Life 
 <' vicious : Which, tho' poflibly it might 
 *' be equally the Cafe either of a Jew or a 
 '' Heathen ; yet, becaufe the Apoftle is here 
 " more particularly direding his Difcourfe 
 *' to thole of his own Nation, the Jews, for 
 " this Reafon, I fuppofe, it is, that, accord- 
 " ing to his ufual Method of giving them 
 " as little Offence as pollible, he intro- 
 " duces his Difcourfe in the firft Perfon, v. 5. 
 *' When we (We unconverted Jews) were 
 
 " in the Flejh, the Motions of Sin did 
 
 " work in our Members. " 
 
 Hitherto Nothing hath appear'd to difcre- 
 
 dit either the Witnefles or the Hiftorians of 
 
 thefe Fads. Yet this is not all we have to 
 
 fay for them* There are feyeral other Cir- 
 
 G g cumftances 
 
45© A DEFENCE of 
 
 cumftances of fingular Advantage in their 
 Favour. 
 
 We miift obferve then, that as Men, they 
 were govern'd by the common Principles of 
 human Nature ; and confequently, were 
 under the fame Influences of Hope and Fear, 
 as other Men are. Can it then be fuppos'd, 
 they would either contrive or concur in fuch 
 an Impofture, without any apparent Advan- 
 tage J Could they hope to better their Con- 
 dition this Way, whilft all Power was in the 
 Hands of their Adverfaries, and which they 
 knew would be employed againft them in full 
 Rigour ? Were they taught by their Mafter 
 to entertain any temporal Expectations ? On 
 the contrary, Did he not tell them plainly, 
 If they would follow him, they ma ft take up 
 
 the Cro/s ; T'hat in this pVorld they miifi 
 
 expect ^yibulation ; and that the Time was 
 comings zvhen zvhofoever lulled them fJjould 
 think he did God Service ? Had not their 
 Mafter himfelf been murthered ? and could 
 They exped better Treatment, whilft they 
 reproach'd the 'Jews with Injuftice and Cru- 
 elty in killing him ? Nay, were they not 
 in Fadt ferjecuted from City to City j and 
 were not Matters carried againft them to fuch 
 Extremities, that but one iingle Perfon of 
 all the Apoftles efcap'd a violent Death ? 
 But, Whence did all this Hatred and Per- 
 fecution arife ? Why, from hence, That they 
 cndeavour'd to fupport a new Religion by 
 
 the 
 
Reveal'd Religion^ &c> 451 
 
 the Fads they affirm'd. Could they have 
 been prevail'd with to deteft the Cheat, or 
 to have unfaid what they had preach'd, or 
 to have been filent on that Head, they 
 might have obtain'd any Advantages they 
 could defire. But had this any EfFed on 
 them ? No : They fliil went on courage- 
 oufly, ajid rejoyced that they were counted 
 worthy to Juffer for Chrifi' s j'ake. Upon this, 
 without alledging numberleis other Con- 
 fiderations to the fame Purpofe, I may 
 affirm, That no Writers in any Age, have 
 ever given equal Proofs of Sincerity. 
 
 There is but One Way of evading this 
 Evidence, v'tz. by affirming, that thefe Wri- 
 ters were Enthufialls, i. e. Mad-men ; and, 
 as fuch, capable of believing any Thing 
 which favour'd the great Point they were 
 poflefs^d with. This may be affirm'd : But 
 is there any fufficient Ground to affirm it ? 
 Did thefe Perfons betray any Thing of this 
 Kind in their ordinary Life and Charader ? 
 Did they not fupport a rational Scheme of 
 Duty by the Fads they alledg'd ; a Scheme, 
 which the very Gentleman I am contend- 
 ing with, owns to be rational as to the Main ? 
 Did they not behave with fingular Difcre- 
 tion upon almoft every trying Occafion ? 
 And are thefe the Marks of Enthufiafm ? 
 If not, I may conclude, that this is a Sup- 
 pofition made purely becaufe Men have 
 Nothing elfe to fay. 
 
 Gg 2 The 
 
451 J DEFENCE of 
 
 The Point I am upon will be farther fup- 
 ported, by confidering fome collateral Evi- 
 dences. To this Purpofe it may be noted, 
 That as the Fads related are faid to have 
 been preach'd every-vvhere immediately after 
 the Afcenfion of Chr'tji, fo the Hiftories we 
 are fpeaking of were written and publifh'd in 
 the very fame Age ; To which may be added 
 another Circumftance of no i neon lid erablc 
 Moment, viz. That many of the Fads are 
 faid to have been done publickly, in the 
 Prefence of Numbers, as well Enemies as 
 Friends. But, would any Men have been 
 fo fenfelefs as to have affirmed Matters of 
 fuch a Nature, and under thefe Circum- 
 ftances, had there been nothing at all of 
 Truth in them ? Would they have pub- 
 lifh'd to the World fuoh Accounts of Things, 
 at a Time, and in a Place, where the Fallhood 
 might have been ealily deteded ? Or, if 
 they had been Fools enough to do this, would 
 they have affirmed that many of thefe Fads 
 were notorious, when it was in the Power 
 of numberlels People then alive to have 
 contradided them ? Or, if they had been 
 fo far infatuated as to run this Risk, Is it 
 pofiible that no One Perfon fhould ever dif- 
 cover the Impofture ? Were the Jews fo 
 very negligent in a Point which concern'd 
 their Religion fo nearly, and affeded the 
 Honour of their Nation fo much ? No doubt 
 but Guriofity muft have led fome, and Zeal 
 
 others, 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 452 
 
 others, to examine thefe Matters to the Bot- 
 tom. But did they, after all, difcover the 
 Cheat ? Nothing of this appears : The 
 yews have no Accounts which contradid: the 
 Gofpel Hiftory : There are no Records of 
 any Kind to oppoie it : So that whatever 
 is affirm'd by our Adverfaries in Oppofition 
 to this Hiftory, is affirm'd by them without 
 any manner of Ground, and purely the Effed 
 of their own unjuft Sufpicions. 
 
 It is farther worth while to confider, that 
 the very Narrations themfelves are fuch, as 
 are apt to give them Credit, and what we 
 Ihould allow a juft Weight in any other 
 Writers. There appears nothing of Artifice 
 in the Stories : They are plain and fimple, 
 and the Accounts fuch as might be expeded 
 to be given of real Fads by honeft and 
 well-meaning Men. There are Four dif- 
 ferent Writers of the Hiftory of Chriji, 
 Thefe have vary'd fomewhat from each 
 other, and given us Accounts which are not 
 exadly the fame. But are thefe Differences 
 fuch as Ihall impair their Credit ? Are thefe 
 Hiftorians found contradiding each other 
 plainly ? Do the main Fads related by 
 any one, diredly overthrow the Fads men- 
 tioned by any other ? Is there any other 
 Difference between them, than would be 
 found in the Accounts of any four honeft 
 Men who fhould be examin'd about the fame 
 Affairs ? Thefe very Differences, methinks, 
 G g 3 heighten 
 
454 ^DEFENCE of 
 
 heighten their Credit, and prove that they 
 did not write in Concert. After all, Have not 
 moll of thefe Differences been fairly accounted 
 for ? and if fome Differences ftill remain, 
 May it not be prefumM lather that we want 
 fome Helps towards clearing them up, than 
 that they are abfoliitely infiiperabje ? 
 
 I am the more ftrongly induc'd to pre- 
 fume fomething of this Kind, from con- 
 fiderine, that if there had been no fufficient 
 Foundation for what thefe Writers have 
 aiiirm'd, they could not poffibly have gained 
 fach Credit, and made fuch a vaft Number 
 of Profelytes. We read, that within a few 
 Days after the Afcenfion of Chrift, the 
 Apoftles being endued zmth ^owcr from on 
 Htgh^ preach'd Jejhs^ and coniirm'd what 
 they preach'd w'tth Signs and iVonders ; im- 
 mediately upon which Multitudes were con- 
 verted. It appears f^'om feveral following 
 Writers, as well Heathen as Chriftian, that 
 in a fhort Time the Chriftian Religion fpread 
 itfelf thro' mofc Parts of the Roman Empire : 
 Perfons of every Rank and Perfv/afion em- 
 brac'd it ; and this, notwithftanding it met 
 with all pollible Difcouragement from the 
 Civil Power. But whence could this arife ? 
 Certainly from the Evidence of the Things 
 ailedg'd : Can we think they never enquir'd 
 about thefe Matters ; or, that they gave in 
 to this Belief, without any fufficient AlTu- 
 rance about them ? This muil have been 
 
 more 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &e, 455 
 
 more extraordinary than the very Miracles 
 they believ'd. In fhort, bad this Coiinfel or 
 this JVorh been of Men ^ it mufl have come to 
 nought \ hut hecauje it was oj God^ therefore 
 no human Force could overthrow it» 
 
 This leads me to the next Queftion I pro- 
 pos'd to confider, viz. Whether the Fads 
 recorded in thefe Hiftorics were truly and 
 properly miraculous. 
 
 It would be endlefs to infill diftindlly on 
 each of thofe extraordinary Fads which are 
 reprelented in the Gofpels : I lliall only 
 note in general, That all manner of Difeafes, 
 even the moft inveterate, were cured inftantly, 
 by a Touch, by a Word fpeaking, and at 
 a Diflance ; That the Dead were raisM to 
 Life ; and that, on a fudden. Men who had 
 been bred in a low Way, and were known 
 to be illiterate, became perfectly acquainted 
 with ail Kinds of Languages. Fads of thefe 
 Kinds muft be allow'd to be miraculous, if 
 they are free from all Sufpicion of Cheat, 
 and fhewn to be unaccountable by any 
 natural Powers. 
 
 If there were any Thing of Cheat in the 
 Cafe, then, from the very Nature of the 
 Thing, there muft have been a great Num- 
 ber of Accomplices. The Difciples doubt- 
 lefs were concern'd ; The Perfons on whom 
 thefe Fads are faid to have been wrought, 
 muft likewife have been interefted ; And, 
 when w^e confider that many of the Pifealcs 
 
 Gg 4 faid 
 
45<5 ^ DEFENCE 0/ 
 
 faid to have been cured, were inveterate and 
 notorious, we mull farther fuppofe no fmall 
 Party among the Spectators. Had Things 
 of this Kind been done in one Place only, 
 they might have been accounted for more 
 cafily : But forafmuch as Jejus Chr'ift tra- 
 velPd about from Place to Place, keaJ'tng the 
 Skk^ and cafting out Devils^ there could be 
 no Deceit, without fuppofing that the Plot 
 was carryM on at once in almoft all Parts 
 of 'Judea. But is this credible ? Could a 
 Perlon of low Education form a Defign fo 
 vaft, or conduct it fo fuccefsfully ? Is it 
 conceivable, that a Man without Wealth, 
 Power, or Intereft, could feduce fo vaft a 
 Number in almoft every City ? Or if this 
 might have been, Is it credible that not one 
 of thefe Accomplices Ihould ever betray the 
 Cheat ? Did thofe who were employed in 
 gaining Accomplices fucceed in every Ap- 
 plication ? If not, whence was it that the 
 whole Defign was not blafted at once ? I 
 muft conclude therefore, there was no Deceit 
 in accomplifhing thefe Fa^ls, becaufe from 
 the Circumftances of Things there could be 
 none. 
 
 One Thing farther may be be obferv'd in 
 reference to the Spedators in general ; Thefe 
 muft know whether the Perfons pretended 
 to be heal'd of inveterate Difeafes, had really 
 labour'd under them, or not ) and if they 
 had, whether they were really cured, or not : 
 
 They 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 457 
 
 They muft know, feveral of them at leaft, 
 whether Perfons faid to have been rais'd had 
 been really dead, and whether after this they 
 were really alive : And, laftly, whether the 
 Apoftles were really illiterate Perfons ; and 
 if they were, whether they did (as 'tis affirmed 
 they did) on a fudden fpeak to every Man 
 in his proper Tongue. If Men cannot be 
 certain in fuch Cafes as thefe, they cannot 
 be fufficiently affiir'd of any Thing. This 
 refted on the Evidence of their Senfes, and 
 to this Evidence we appeal. 
 
 As little Difficulty will there be in proving 
 that thefe Works were llridly fupernatural. 
 1 think it is very plain that they could not 
 be wrought by any mere human Skill or 
 Power. If Difeafes may be heaFd this Way, 
 yet this cannot be done in. an Inftant ; It 
 cannot be done without the Ufe of fuitable 
 Means, much lefs without the Ufe of any 
 Means at all : No natural Agents can work 
 at a Diftance ; Nor can Effeds of this Kind 
 be produc'd merely by a Command. The 
 Dead cannot be rais'd to Life by thofe who 
 are unable to bellow Life ; Nor, can Men 
 of themfelves Ijpeak Languages they never 
 learn'd, and perhaps fcarce ever heard before. 
 Thefe Things are too evident to need En- 
 largements ; And therefore, if the Relations 
 given of thele Fads, with all their feveral 
 Circumftanccs, be juft, the Conclufion I 
 would draw is certain. Every EfFed requires 
 
 Ibme 
 
45^ J DEFENCE of 
 
 ibme Caufe proportionable to it ; and that 
 which cannot be produc'd in a natural way, 
 muft be fupernatural. 
 
 After all, if there be any Evafion remain- 
 ing, it muft be This ; That we are not per- 
 fedly acquainted with all the leveral Powers 
 of Nature ; That if we knew all the fimple 
 Powers, yet we might be Strangers to their 
 feveral Compofitions : And therefore, as we 
 cannot fay What their Refults may be, fo 
 we cannot determine What is ftridly and 
 properly fupernatural. 
 
 This Allegation muft be vain, if we con- 
 fider, That 'tis unreafonable to fuppofe 
 any Effects to be natural, which cannot be 
 accounted for in fome natural Way j at 
 leaf!:, where there are no Grounds to pre- 
 fume that they are really owing to ibme latent 
 Powers in Nature : Such are thofe, of which 
 we have never had any certain Inltances 
 either before or lince thefe Times ^ and efpe-r 
 cially, if they have directly contradided the 
 known and Handing Laws of Nature. Or, 
 if it Ihould be imagined that fome of the 
 Effeds might poffibly arife from unknowii 
 Powers ; yet fmce thefe very Powers are fup^ 
 posM to be unknown, the Facls, as they 
 ftand in thefe Hiftories, will be flill mira- 
 culous. Put the Cafe of Difeafes being 
 cured in an Inftant ; You will lay, This 
 might pofTibly happen by fome lucky Co- 
 incidence of natural Caufes of which we 
 
 know 
 
Reveal D Religion, &c. 459 
 
 know nothing. Very well : But if this were 
 really unknown, How came our Saviour and 
 his Apoftles to apply, with fuch Succeis, 
 this Coincidence of Caufes to their own 
 proper Purpofes ? How came they to repeat 
 this fo frequently, and to fucceed conftantly ? 
 To fay, Be tJoou heaVd^ and to have the 
 Effed fucceed immediately, where *tis fup- 
 pos'd that the feveral Circumftances really 
 conducing to the EfFed, are unknown, is 
 itfelf a Miracle of the higheft Nature. It 
 argues, that the Speaker was directed by a 
 Knowledge fupernatural, tho* the Effed 
 itfelf fhould be ftriclly natural. 
 
 It remains that I Enquire, What Fore© 
 there is in the Argument deduced from hence 
 in Favour of our Religion. This, one might 
 think, could be no Matter of Enquiry. If 
 the Fads themfelves are fupernatural, the 
 Religion confirmed by them muft be ^o like- 
 wife. The Conclulion is plain, and hardly 
 capable of being rendered plainer by any man- 
 ner of Reprefentation. This hath been allow'd 
 by fober Men in all former Ages ; who, tho* 
 they have queftion'd, and in many Cafes 
 juftly queftion'd the Reality of the Fads, 
 have thought, if this be once admitted, the 
 Confequence deduced from it muft be certain. 
 However, Difficulties have of late been pre- 
 tended ; and thefe muft be examin'd before 
 I clofe this Head, 
 
 V^'hat 
 
460 J DEFENCE of 
 
 What hath been alledg'd to this Purpofe 
 is, I. That Miracles being nothing more 
 than Fads, can prove nothing but the 
 Operation of fome fupernatural Power ca- 
 pable of producing them ; And that as there 
 is no neceifary Connexion between Miracles 
 and Truths, fo we cannot conclude the 
 Truth of a Religion from the Miracles 
 alledg'd for it. 1. That forafmuch as Mi- 
 racles may be wrought as well by fubordi- 
 nate Beings as the fupreme, as well by Evil 
 Spirits as by Good ; fo we cannot depend on 
 any Arguments drawn from thence, unlefs 
 "we have fome certain Way of difcovering 
 what are Divine Miracles, and what Ocher- 
 ■wife ; at leaft, what are the Effeds of a 
 Good Power, and what of an Evil one. 
 
 As to the former Objection, 1 muft allow, 
 that Miracles are indeed Fads, which of 
 themfelves prove Nothing more than the 
 Agency of lorne Caufe proportionable ^ and 
 that as there is no necelTary Connexion be- 
 tween Miracles and Truths, fo Miracles are 
 of themfelves no Evidence of Truths. But 
 then I muft affirm, That Things which are 
 not neceffarily, and in their own Nature 
 Signs, may yet become fuch by the Appli- 
 cation ; and confequently, That Things may 
 become the Proofs of Truth, which have no 
 neceifary Connexion with that Truth. 
 
 This will be plain, if we confider that 
 Words Ipoken, are in themfelves nothing 
 
 more 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. 461 
 
 more than Sounds modify 'd in a certaia 
 manner, between which and the Ideas they 
 Hand for in Speaking there is no Connexion 
 at all. How then comes it to pals, that 
 Men communicate their Thoughts to each 
 other this Way ? The Cafe is, Words which 
 are not elTentially Signs, are capable of being 
 us'd as fuch ; To this Purpofe they have 
 been and are apply M : And confequently, 
 where we are entirely fecure of the Speaker's 
 Honefty, we no more doubt his Sentiments 
 exprefs'd by Words, than we iliould the' 
 inwardly confcious to his Thoughts. The 
 fame may be obferv'd concerning an- 
 other Ufage, viz. That of Seals. There 
 is no neceffary Connexion between the 
 Ufe of thefe, and the Confirmation of a 
 Bargain: Yetftill, the ufual Import of thefe 
 being known, Men receive as full Satisfaftion 
 from them, as they would if thev had been 
 in their own Nature expreflivc of the Thing 
 they fignify. 
 
 To apply this to our preient Purpofe. 
 Miracles are diredly no more than Evidences 
 of a fupernatural Power: But when .vrought 
 at the Inftance of Men, and apply'd by 
 them as Evidences of a fupcrnatural Com- 
 miflion, they carry with them the Nature of 
 Seals, and are properly the Confirmation of 
 that. Authority they are allcdg'd to fupport. 
 Let us then fuppofe a Pcrfon claiming fuch 
 an Authority as commifTion'd by a fupcr- 
 natural 
 
4^2 A DEFENCE of 
 
 natural Power : To fupport this Claim, Mi^ 
 racles are wrought, /. e. Works which argue 
 the Interpofition of fuch a Power ; What 
 can we conclude but the PvCality of a Com- 
 miffion ,deriv*d from him who wrought thefc 
 Miracles. The Confequcnce is plain ; If the 
 Perfon who wrought them had a Right to 
 our Submiffion, the Perfon on whofe Ac- 
 count they were wrought muft have it like- 
 wife. 
 
 But this Kind of Arguing, our Adverfa- 
 ries will tell us, muft be ufelefs, becaulc 
 fuch Miracles may be wrought as well by 
 Subordinate Beings as the Supreme, as well 
 by Evil Spirits as Good, See how the Gen- 
 tleman I am contending with reprefents the 
 Matter. " If Evil Beings can imprefs No- 
 tions on Mens Minds as ftrongly as Good 
 Beings, and caufe Miracles to be done in 
 Confirmation of them ; is there any way 
 to know to which of the two. Notions 
 thus imprefs'd are owing, but their Nature 
 and Tendency, or thofe internal Marks 
 of Wifdom and Goodnefs by which they 
 plainly fhew themfelves to be a Part of 
 natural Religion ? If fo, can external 
 Proofs carry us farther than internal Proofs 
 do ? " p. 243. 
 What dired Power Evil Beings may pof- 
 fibly have on the Minds of Men, I pretend 
 not to determine, nor, confequently, in how 
 ftrong a Manner they may be capable of 
 
 imprelling 
 
Revealed Religion, &c, 46^ 
 
 impreffing Notions on them. Only thus much 
 I mull: obfervc, That otir Author is very 
 bold, in fuppoling that the Scnfe of a Divine 
 Impulfe can be founded on Nothing elfe 
 than the Strength and Livelinefs of the Im- 
 preflion. This he can have no Authority 
 for affirming. I fhould think it much fafer 
 to leave this Matter in the dark, being con- 
 fident of this alone, That if God fhould 
 ever vouchfafe to make Impreflions on Mens 
 Minds, he would do it in fuch a Manner, 
 (whatever that be), as fhould leave no 
 Room to doubt the Author of the Impreffion. 
 And if this may be, then there will be fiif^ 
 ficient Difference between the Infpirations of 
 God, and the Infufions of the Devil. 
 
 But the Point I am moft concern'd with 
 here, is this j Miracles may be wrought as 
 well by Evil Beings as Good ; and confe- 
 quently alledg'd as well to confirm an Im- 
 pofiure, as a Truth : If fo. How ihall we 
 diflinguifh from what Caufe thefe Miracles 
 proceed ; and yet, without this, all Argu- 
 ments drawn from Miracles muft be pre- 
 carious. 
 
 In Reply, I muft obfervc, That there are 
 Two Methods lerviceable to this Purpofe, 
 in the proper Ufe of which Men cannot 
 cafily mifcarry. 
 
 I. The Nature of the Dodrines which 
 Miracles are alledg'd to confirm, muft be 
 confidei'd j becaufe, if thcle are incofiftent 
 
 with 
 
4^4 ^ DEFENCE o/ 
 
 ■with any certain and known Truths, they 
 are incapable of Proof : No Miracles can, in 
 fuch a Cafe, be of any Force ; and there- 
 fore, if fuch are really wrought, we muft 
 conclude that they did not proceed from the 
 God of Truth, but the Author of Lyes. 
 
 But if, upon fuch a Coniideration, every 
 Thing Ihall appear clear ; /. e. If there be 
 no Contradidion in the Dodrines themlelves, 
 nor Inconfiftency with any certain Truth, 
 then, ( for any Thing we know to the con- 
 trary ), they may be true ; and if fo, then 
 they may be capable of fufficient Evidence 
 from Proof external. There is no manner of 
 Occafion, ( as our Author contends there is ), 
 that thefe Matters fhould be provM by the 
 internal Evidence of the Thing, or that they 
 Ihould fhew thcmfelves to be Parts of natural 
 Religion by Marks of Wifdom and Goodnefs, 
 of which every one is not capable of judg- 
 ing. If this were neceflary, then external 
 Proofs could carry us no farther than internal 
 Proofs do ; Then Miracles could have no 
 Force, but where fuch Force is ufelefs ; 
 and confequently, the working them for this 
 Purpofe muft be unaccountable. But the 
 Defign of Miracles is, to fupply the Want of 
 internal Evidence, with regard to Matters 
 capable of being confirm'd ^ and this Force 
 they will have, if we can get fufficient far- 
 ther AlTurance that they are not wrought by 
 the Interpofition of malicious Beings. 
 
 To 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c, 46*^ 
 
 To this Purpofe, it fliould be enquired, 
 2. Whether the Miracles wrought, arc opposed 
 by any other Miracles alledg'd to prove the 
 contrary ; and if they are, then it flionld 
 be confider'd on which Side there is the 
 greateft Evidence of Power. The Cafe of 
 J^JoJes and the Magicians determines the Point 
 clearly : The Pretenlions on both Sides were 
 to be try'd by Miracles, /. e. by Inftances 
 of fupernatural Power : Thefe were alledg'd 
 by both as Evidence : It is plain therefore, 
 that the moft extraordinary Inftances were the 
 ftrongeft Evidence : The Magicians allowed 
 it, and confefs'd the Finger of God. 
 
 But if the Miracles in this Cafe wrought to 
 confirm a ConimifHon are unopposed by any- 
 other Miracles, then we may conclude fafely 
 that they are, and muft be in fome Senfe 
 from God j They muft be wrought, either 
 by his own immediate Power, or, (which 
 amounts to much the fame,) by his Appoint- 
 ment. This muft be concluded from the 
 elTential Perfections of the Divine Nature. 
 They are (as hath been ftiewn already) In- 
 ftances of fupernatural Power ; and therefore, 
 being urg'd to confirm a Divine Authority, 
 would never have been permitted by God, 
 had the Perfon who alledg'd them no fuch 
 Authority, and were there no other Means 
 whereby the Fraud might be deteded. No 
 Earthly Prince would permit his Name and 
 Authority to be ufurp'd, without taking fome 
 H h Methods 
 
4^6 ^ DEFENCE of 
 
 Methods to vindicate his Honour : Much lefs 
 would he lay his Subjeds under the unhappy 
 Necellity of acting contrary to his Will, even 
 whilft they are moft defirous of obeying it 
 entirely. We deny not but there may be 
 Powers in feveral created Beings of working 
 Miracles ; and in what Inftances God may 
 permit them to exercife thefe Powers we can- 
 not fay precifely : Yet, this we may be bold 
 to affirm, that He will not fufFer them to in- 
 terpofe to the Prejudice of his own Autho- 
 rity, becaufe it is inconfiftent with his Wif- 
 dom ; nor to delude Mankind unavoidably 
 in the moft important Affairs, becaufe it is 
 irreconcileable with his Goodnefs. 
 
 Upon the Whole then, If the Gofpel Hi- 
 ftories are faithful Records ; If the Fa6ls 
 there recorded were real Fatls, and not mere 
 lllufions ; If they were properly miraculous, 
 and alledg'd to fupport the Divine Authority 
 of our Religien ; If in this Religion there 
 are no Articles incapable of being prov'd, /. e. 
 inconfiftent with any of the certain Conclufi- 
 ons of Reafon \ And if, Laftly, the Miracles 
 wrought to confirm this Religion have never 
 been oppos'd by greater, nor indeed by any 
 other Miracles at all, then I muft conclude 
 that this Religion is really from God. 
 
 I have now gone through with what was 
 propos'd at firft. I have endeavoured to fup- 
 port the Caufe of Revelation againft the 
 Reafonings of this Gentleman, under the 
 
 feveral 
 
Reveal'd Religion, &c. ^67 
 
 feveral Articles heretofore produc'd, and am 
 not aware I have left any Thing unexamined, 
 which was proper to be confider'd, and fell 
 within the Compafs of my Defign. I muft 
 confeis indeed, I have not enter'd into a par- 
 ticular Defence of certain Dodri-nes, againft 
 which he hath rather infinuated Objedions 
 than iirg'd them : This I have omitted, not 
 only becaufe the Points themfelves have been 
 frequently confider*d by other Writers, but 
 like wife becaufe The Gentleman exprefles 
 himfelf in ib very loofe a Manner, that 'tis 
 difficult to fay in what Senfe he is willing to 
 be underftood. If he expeds to be confider'd 
 on thofe Heads, I muft defire him to explain 
 himfelf more diftindly ; and then, if he calls 
 on me, I fhall be ready to attend him. At 
 prefent I take my Leave, with this Obferva- 
 tion only, That a Debate concerning Natural 
 and Reveard Religion ought to be carried on 
 by Methods confiftcnt with N^/^^/r^^/ Religion 
 at leaft. I hope I have not offended this 
 Way : How far the Gentleman I have been 
 concerned with, can fay the fame, let the 
 World judge. 
 
 The £ N Z). 
 
BOOKS Tirkted for and Sold ly 
 Samuel Wi l m ot. 
 
 THE Nature, Poffibility, and Cer- 
 tainty of Miracles fet forth ; and the 
 Truth of the Chriftian Refigion provM from 
 thence. A Sermon preach'd before the Uni- 
 verfity of Oxford. 3d Edit. 
 
 The Myfteries of the Chriftian Religion 
 credible, &c. A Sermon Preach'd before 
 the Univerfity of Oxford, &c. id Edit. 
 
 The Cafe of Subfcription to Articles of 
 Religion conlider'd. A Sermon preach'd at 
 the Triennial Vifitation of the Right Re- 
 verend Father in God, jobfi Lord Biihop of 
 Oxford. 3d Edit. 
 
 The Penal Sanations of Laws confider'd. 
 •An Affize Sermon preach'd before the Uni- 
 verfity of Oxford, Q.d Edit. 
 
 The Expediency of a Divine Revelation 
 confider'd. A Sermon Preach'd before the 
 Right Honourable the Lord Mayor and 
 Aldermen of London, id li^dit. 
 
 Alltloefe by Dr. John Conibeare. 
 
 Lately 
 
Books Printed for S. Wilmot. 
 
 Lately '^uUtJh'd^ 
 
 OBSERVATIONS on Mr. C^»Z'Z'*s Dlfcourfc 
 concerning Realbn : wherein his At- 
 tempt to prove that Realbn is, or ought to 
 be, a fufficient Guide in Matters of Religion, 
 is confider'd ; and his Arguments are Ihewn 
 to be frivolous and inconclufive, 
 Nay^ htit^ O Man, who art thou that re- 
 fUeJi againp God r* Rom. ix. 20. 
 
 A Letter in Vindication of God's Prelcience 
 of Contingencies, upon the Principles of 
 Reafon, againft the Objedions of Mr. Fan- 
 court, in his late Eflay on Liberty, Grace, 
 and Prefcience. 
 Ntillo modo cogtmiir, ant retenta prcejcientia 
 Dei, toUere voluntatis arhitrtum, ant re~ 
 tento voluntatis arbltrlo, Deum, quod nefas 
 eji, negare prafclum futurorum : fed 
 utrumque ampleBlmur, utrumque fldeliter 
 & veraclter conjitemur. Iliad, ut bene 
 credamus ', hoc, ut bene vivamus. Aug. 
 de Civ. Dei, 1. 5. c. 10. 
 As for Soclnus's Refolution, That God fore- 
 fees only Things forefceable, and that 
 Contingents are not fuch, but only thofc 
 that come to pafs by his Decree, I con- 
 ceive it is as dangerous as Mr. Calvin's, 
 that he predetermines all things, and 
 
 it 
 3 
 
Books printed for S. Wilmot. 
 
 it is vifibly as falfe. Dr. Hammond'j 
 Jiiji Letter to Dr. Sanderfon. 
 Thefe two by Anthony BUfsy A. M. Vicar 
 of '^ or tf mouth. 
 
 ReformM Devotions : Being a Collection 
 of the belt Hymns, Prayers, and other 
 Spiritual Exerciies, for all Occafions, com- 
 pofed by Divines of the Church of Englandy 
 and Foreign Afceticks ; Bifhop Laud,, Featfy, 
 Duppa^ PVhichcotty Wettenhall., Cofms,, Ha- 
 mond,, T'aylor^ Bernard, Scott, I'tUotfon, Pa- 
 tricky Kettlewelly Bennet, Thomas a Kempis, 
 Stanhope^ Inett, Hicks, Neljon, Gothair. 
 The whole corrected and improved by Jof. 
 Waffe, Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of 
 Kent, and Redor of Aynhoe in ^Northampton- 
 /hire. 
 
 Three Sermons Preached before the Uni- 
 verfity of Oxford, on the Dodrine of the 
 Trinity. By William Stephens, M. A. Vicar 
 of St. Andrew in Plymouth, late Fellow of 
 Exeter College in Oxford. 
 
 The Several Heterodox Hypotbefes concer^i- 
 ing both the Perjons and the Attributes of 
 the Godhead, jujily chargeable with more In- 
 confijlencies and Abfurdities th-an thofe which 
 have been gronndlejly imputed to the CathoUck 
 Syjiem. A Vifitation Sermon Preached at St. 
 . Andrew'^ in Plymouth, by W. Stephens, M. A. 
 
 A Vin- 
 
'»w: 
 
 Books printed for S. Wilmot. 
 
 A vindication of the Writers of the Old 
 and New Tcftanient. By William Louth y 
 B. D. Prebendary of Winchejier, 
 
 Youthful Lufts inconfiftent with the Mi- 
 niftry. A Sermon preach'd before the Uni- 
 verfity of Oxford^ by I'homas Rohinfon^ M. A. 
 Fellow of Merton College. 
 
 Two Sermons preachM before the Univer- 
 j(ity oi Oxford, by Jofeph Stochwell, B. D. late 
 Fellow of trinity College. 
 
 A Sermon preach'd at the Annual Feaft 
 of the Gentlemen Educated at Ttverton 
 School. By John Jones^ A. M. Fellow of 
 Baliol College. 
 
 The Infufficiency of Human. Reaibn con- 
 fider'd, in a Sermon preached before the 
 Univerfity of Oxford. By Benjamin Bulkkvy 
 D. D. 
 
 The Perpetuity of Chriji's Church. A 
 Sermon Preached at the Vifitation of the 
 Right Reverend Father in God Richardy 
 Lord Bilhop of Lincoln. By Richard GreVy 
 D. D. 
 
 The Divine Inftitution of the Miniftry, 
 and the ablblute Necellity of Church Govern- 
 ment. 
 
Booh printed for S. Wilmot, 
 
 ment. A Sermon Preached before the Uni- 
 verlity of Oxford. By Jofeph Betty ^ A. M. 
 Fellow of Exeter College. The Third Edi- 
 tion. 
 
 Dr. Liiptons Sermon of the Eternity of 
 ^ .Future Punifhments. 
 
 — Temporal Advantages of 
 
 Religion. 
 
 An Eflay on the Ufefulnefs of Mathema- 
 tical Learning. 
 
 An Explanation and Vindication of the 
 Rubricks before the New Office for the 
 Eleventh of June, 
 
 An Eflay on Mr. Pope's Odyjfeyy in which 
 Ibmc particular Beauties and Blemiihes of 
 that Work are confider'd. In Two Parts. 
 By y. Spence^ M. A. Poetry Profeflbr in the 
 Univerfity of Oxford, 
 
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