OF THE 
 
 AT 
 
 PRINCETON, N. J. 
 
 x> cj K _-vt i t» .X- t» !•- 
 
 SAMUEL AONEW, 
 
 (IF PHILADELPHIA, PA. 
 
 J^£ettez. 
 
 foutswcJO /<J~?£f§5'r, 
 
 ( 'ase 9 
 
 Shelf. 
 Hook, 
 
 
 
 SCO i 
 
- ! - mtmrnm iimwi . i 
 
 NATURAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF 
 
 RECTITUDE 
 
NATURAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF 
 
 ECTITUDE, 
 
 FOR THE 
 
 CONDUCT OF MAN 
 
 IN ALL 
 
 STATES AND SITUATIONS OF LIFE; 
 
 DEMONSTRATED AND EXPLAINED 
 IN A 
 
 SYSTEMATIC TREATISE 
 
 ON 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 COMPREHENDING 
 
 The Law of Nature— Ethics — Natural Jurifprudence — General 
 CEconomy— Politics — and the Law of Nations. 
 
 By JOHAN. DANIEL UROS, D.T>, 
 
 ?4;r.ifter of the German Reformed Church in the City of New- York, 
 
 and Profeffor of Moral Philofophy, Geography, and 
 
 Chronology in Columbia College. 
 
 Omnes lndice opes fuperat mens confcia retti. 
 
 NEW-YORK: 
 
 PRINTED BY T. AND J. SWORDS, 
 
 Printers to the Faculty of Phyfic of Columbia College, 
 
 — 1795.— 
 
Difintt of New-Fork, fs. 
 
 /""""N Ti^ * l remembered, that on the 27th day of Auguit, 
 ^L.S.J JL# i n the nineteenth year of the independence of 
 the United States of America, the Reverend Johan. 
 Daniel Gros, of the faid diftricl:, hath depofited in this office 
 the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as author, in 
 the words following, to wit! 
 
 " Natural Principles of Reclitude, for the Conduft of Man in all 
 tl States and Situations of Life ; dcmonjlrated and explained in a 
 4C Syjlematic Treat if e on Moral Philofophy : comprehending the Law 
 tl of Nature — Ethics — Natural fur if prudence — General (Economy — 
 *' Politics — and the Law of Nations. By Johan. Daniel Gros, D.D, 
 * c Minijhr of the German Reformed Church in the City of New- Yor£ t 
 14 and Profejfjr of Moral Philofophy , Geography and Chrohology in 
 " Columbia College." 
 
 In conformity to the act of the Gongrefs of the United States,, 
 entitled, " An Aft for the Encouragement of Learning, by 
 ** fecuring the Copies of Maps, Charts and Books to the Authors 
 " and Proprietors of fuch Copies during the Times therein 
 ** mentioned. " 
 
 ROBERT TROUP, Clerk of the Difricl* 
 
 
TO THE 
 
 Regents of the Univerfity of the State of New- York, 
 To the Truftees of Columbia College, 
 
 This Treatife is humbly dedicated, 
 By their devoted, 
 
 And moll obedient humble fervantj 
 
 The AUTHOR, 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 JL HERE mould indeed be weighty caufes, which* 
 in themfelves, could juftify a pretention to the attention 
 of the public, on the part of a perfon who cannot but 
 be very imperfect, with regard to ftile and diction, in 
 the language of a country which has given him the 
 title of an adopted citizen. New and important truths, 
 or a new and happy arrangement of thole which are 
 eftabliihed by the reafonings of philofophers and con- 
 firmed by the experience of the prefent as well as for- 
 mer ages, might perhaps compenfate for a defedt of 
 elegance of ftile, fo juftly efteemed by the public, and 
 fo eagerly fought on the part of authors, who, treating 
 on fubjecls iuterefting to all ftates and conditions of men, 
 fet up for public teachers. The author of this treatife 
 dares not arrogate to himfelf merit on either of thefe 
 points. He contents himfelf with furniming the Stu- 
 dents of Columbia College, his former and prefent 
 difciples, with the general traits of a fyflem which he 
 has taught for a number of years in that feminary of 
 learning, under the aufpices and patronage of the 
 worthy Truflees thereof. He wifhes to fubmit to the 
 
 Regents 
 
Vili PREFACE. 
 
 Regents of the Univerfity of the flate of New- York, 
 and, in them, to the fathers of our country, to whofe 
 care is intrufted the greater!; object of public concern 
 on the part of rulers of ftates and nations, the educa- 
 tion of youth, the cultivation and advancement of the 
 arts and fciences, both fo beneficial and ornamental to 
 civil fociety,— the method and fubject-matter of his 
 labours as Teacher, and afterwards Profeflbr of Moral 
 Fhilofophy in the firft feat of learning in this ftate. 
 
 Very fenfible of his inability to fatisfy the great truft 
 repofed in him to that degree of perfection fo defirable 
 in perfons whofe province it is to inftil into the minds 
 of our youth thofe principles of morality and rectitude 
 which give them a true and happy direction in the 
 purfuit of all public and private virtues, and by the 
 indefatigable exercife of which they may become emi- 
 nently ufeful to themfelves, good members of fociety, 
 and ornaments to their country, — he is confident his 
 zeal to do all in his power for the attainment of thefe 
 important ends has not been in vain*, and as he is per- 
 fuaded this will be kindly taken into confideration, fo 
 he trufts it will entitle him to that liberal and generous 
 indulgence which laudable and arduous attempts have 
 never yet failed to meet with from the free citizens of 
 thefe happy ftates. — The highert of his ambition is, 
 that an imputation of partiality may be removed from 
 thofe generous patrons, who have honoured a German 
 preacher with an appointment to the Profeflbrfhip of 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 Moral Philofophy. — He has confulted, but not in a 
 fervile manner followed authors of fame and great au- 
 thority — he has even taken the liberty to differ from 
 them in many points of no fmall importance — he lias 
 endeavoured to eftablifh the rights in perfons on their 
 proper foundation, the eternal principles of natural 
 juftice and equity — he has laboured to enter the fane- 
 tuary of focial rights of every defcription, holding up 
 the high detonation and dignity of man, following him 
 through a variety of natural and adventitious ftates— 
 he afferts man's unalienable rights, under ail manner of 
 circumftances, in the various fituations of private and 
 public life — he has endeavoured to prove the great ad- 
 vantages of civil government, together with its necef- 
 fity for the general happinefs of mankind, pointing 
 out the grand natural rights and important public duties 
 of rulers on earth — he has explained and fupported, by 
 arguments founded in nature, the no lefs important 
 rights of the ruled, and the abfolute neceflity of a faith- 
 ful performance of all the public obligations which they 
 owe to their country and their magiftrates, in order to 
 be good citizens and a happy people. 
 
 His aim has even been fo extenfive as to lay before 
 the public, general, uniform and (table principles for 
 guiding, in fome meafure, their fentiments with refpect 
 to univerfal benevolence, the neceflity of a faithful at- 
 tention to duty, and the high excellency of religion and 
 piety. Infulated with regard to party or connections, 
 
 A 2 his 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 his whole attention has been fixed upon his fubject, 
 and the beft poffible manner to do it juftice. Under 
 thefe circumftances, he thought the liberty to take 
 up the tone of a cenfor no crime, but looked upon 
 candour as a right, as an indifpenfible duty in an author 
 who has undertaken to teach the facred principles of 
 morality. Following reafon as his guide, he could not 
 but fee its amicable and infeparable connection with 
 the facred caufe of religion. He thinks himfelf justi- 
 fiable in laying down as an incontrovertible truth, that 
 reafon is religion, becaufe rekgion is the greateft perfection 
 of reafon, and gives it the happieft direction. If this be 
 fo, which is evident from the nature of man and from 
 his natural relation to the Deity and to the univerfal 
 fociety of mankind, how mall we anfwer for the eager- 
 nefs with which certain publications are cried up, and 
 the great avidity with which they are bought — publica- 
 tions v/hich furely are not the falutary effects of the age, 
 but, on the contrary, the bitter and execrable fruits of 
 the rage of reafon, flnce their aim feems^to be, were 
 it poffible, to fap the very foundation of -religion? 
 
 The impartial public will judge, whether thefe great 
 objects are in fome meafure happily purfued— whether 
 the well-meant labours of the author merit their atten- 
 tion and patronage — whether freedom of thought and 
 impartiality of judgment have been theconftant guide 
 of his refearches after truth — whether the caufe of hu- 
 manity or finifter motives have been his object — and, 
 
 whether 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 whether the happinefs of mankind has been the prin- 
 cipal end of his labours. 
 
 Were it, that productions could gain credit from 
 the characters who have given encouragement for their 
 appearance before the public, the following treatife 
 would not be deftitute on this fcore. Forbearing to 
 mention the names of fome very refpectable perfons 
 who will doubtlefs fee this work, the author cannot 
 poflibly omit that of the late patriotic BARON DE 
 STEUBEN, his great patron and friend. However, 
 from the author's own confcioufnefs of his infufficiency 
 with refpect to diction, the thought was laid afide; and, 
 had it not been for the friendly importunities and pref- 
 fmg arguments of one * of my worthy colleagues, the 
 ProfefTors of Columbia College — had I not had fuffi- 
 cient reafons for depending on the afliduous fupport of 
 my worthy pupil -f m the theological and philofophicai 
 fciences, whofe heart and talents bid fair foon to give 
 him a place among thofe who will tranfmit the truths 
 of found morality to pofterity not impaired, but im- 
 proved, the publication of this treatife would probably 
 have been left in the world of pofTibilities. 
 
 Happy 
 
 * Dr. Samuel L. Mitciiill, Profeflor of Chemiftry in 
 Columbia College. 
 
 f The Reverend Philip Milledoler, Minifterof the Go(- 
 pel, alurrmu-3 of Columbia College, and a native of the city of 
 -Vew-York, 
 
Xll PREFACE, 
 
 Happy would the author be, if he mould find that 
 his production meets the indulgence of the public, and 
 is not thought unworthy the approbation of the good 
 and upright amongir. his fellow citizens; but frill hap- 
 pier, if he finds his wimes accomplifhed — if he can 
 confide, that it contributes to the advancement of the 
 caufe of virtue and religion — that it becomes a mean 
 to inflame the American youth with a true love for 
 their country, with a fpirit of patriotifm worthy their 
 great rights and privileges, as the free-born fons of the 
 free and independent ftates of North- America. May 
 they know, efleem, and always make a virtuous ufe of 
 thofe rights — May they be foremoft amongft thofe who 
 ftrictly adhere to all their private and public obliga- 
 tions — May they become good men, good citizens; 
 the fupporters of the government of laws, the defen- 
 ders of their country -, refpeclers of religion, and true 
 lovers of God, their benign and univerfal father 1 
 
 New -York y April 10, 1795. 
 
 NO T E. 
 
 A few errors have been obferved, but as the author has been 
 prevented by indifpofition from attending to them, it is expected 
 the reader will excufe their not being particularly noticed. 
 
 The tenn fecial obligee is made ufe of in a fenfe different from 
 the fignification it commonlv bears in law. Let it be remem- 
 bered, that thereby is underftood that party of the focial con- 
 nection upon whom the focial obligation is binding, 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 General introdufiion, » 
 
 The various Jiates of Man which modify his moral 
 character, Hid 
 
 Moral Philofophy defined and dijlinguijhed into three 
 parts, , 10 and n 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Of Moral Philofophy, comprehending the Law of Nature. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Of the aclions of Alan, and their morality or immorality, n 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of moral obligations, 26 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Of moral law, ^5 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the different degrees of morality and immorality in 
 human conducl, 69 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Of moral imputation, 02 
 
 PART II. 
 
 SECTION I. Comprehending Ethics. 
 Introduction, 109 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Of cur duties to God, . , 1 1 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of duties to our f elves, . . 1 26 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the duties of humanity in general, I rr 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the duties of humanity which we owe to others, . . 16 r 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
suit" CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the duties of nccejfity, 178 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the rights of defence and war, 188 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Of the duties of fpeceh, * 205 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Of pads and paditious rights, 234 
 
 SECTION II. Comprehending Natural Jurifprudence. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of rights in things, 253 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the original mode of acquiring rights in things, efpe- 
 
 cially the right of property , 260 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Of thofe modes of acquifition which may take effetT; during 
 
 the life of the owner, . . . 27 1 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 77ie derivative modes of acquifition of rights in things by 
 will and tefament, atid by adminijlration or inheritance 
 ab inteilato, 277 
 
 SECTION III. Comprehending General QEconomy. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Of rights in perfons, 283 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the general laws of focicty, 289 
 
 CHAPTER IK. 
 
 Introduction to the relative duties of Alan v:hich flow from 
 the conjlitutlon of the fexes, 303 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the matrimonial or connubial fociety, . . . . 315 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the more fpecific rights and duties between hujband 
 and wife, 318 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Of 'the parental focicty , ....;• 324 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
CONTENTS. xv 
 
 Page. 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Of the herile fociety, 331 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Of the domefic fociety, 34.Q 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Of communities , ,, 344, 
 
 SECTION IV. Comprehending Politics. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the nature and difference of civil focieties or fates, . 347 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Of the origin of civil fociety, org 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the different laws, rights and obligations which take 
 place in civil fociety, and the different capacities and 
 
 characters of -the citizens, 362 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Of the invariable fcope of all public and municipal laws in 
 a fate, the effential public rights, and the correlative 
 public obligations between the government and the people, 364 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Of the fuprcmc power or fovcreignty in a fate, and the 
 principal rights of fovercignty, . ► . . . . -371 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the rcfourccs of a fate, 376 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Of revenue and the a dm'mif ration thereof, .... 378 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Of the public obligations and rights of citizens hi regard 
 
 to their fovereign, 382 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Of the different forms of government, 386 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Of the pcivers of government, and the difributicn cf them 
 in mixed governments, .......... 391 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Of the fundamental law of the fate, and the public meet- 
 ings of the people, together with the modes of deliberation, 39? 
 
 PART 
 
xvi CONTENTS. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Of the Univerfal Law of Nations. 
 
 Page. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the univerfal principles of the law of 'nations ', a)id the 
 general rights of national independence , .... 402 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the duties of nations in general, 407 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the duties of the rulers of fates and nations with re- 
 fpeft to religion and public w or/hip, 409 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the duties which fates or nations owe themj elves , . 418 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the duties which nations owe one another, . • . 423 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the natural rights of nations, 425 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Of the natural rights of public fecurity and peace, . .426 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Of the natural rights of defence, 428 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Of public waj", ......«, 439 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Of the rights of the viclor, ......... 446 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Of national inter courfe, i 448 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Of the hypothetical natural rights of nations with refpetl 
 
 to treaties, 451 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 Of the territory and jurifdiffion of nations, . . . . 45 ^ 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
INTRODUCTION, 
 
 IVJlAN may be considered in a variety of ftatcs* 
 which modify his moral character, and exhibit general 
 rules for his conduct in the purfuit after happinefs. 
 
 By a ft ate of man, we understand an asTemblage of 
 certain determinations or affections inherent in, or re- 
 ferable to his nature, and to various relations in which 
 he may ftand v/ith refpect to other things. 
 
 There are fome affections in man which flow from 
 his eflence, and therefore are always inherent; thefe 
 constitute his ejfential ftate, which is conftant and un- 
 alienable. 
 
 Scholion.— His dependence upon God, the rationality of his na- 
 ture, &c. 
 
 There is a variety of other determinations which 
 exhibit human nature under certain confiderations, re- 
 lations and circumftances •, thefe, not being always in- 
 herent in man, constitute his accidental ft 'at es 9 which 
 are mutable. 
 
 Sch. — That man is a citizen, a ftranger, a magiftrate, a fa- 
 ther, &c. 
 
 Some of thefe determinations are in man, others re- 
 fult from a relation to other objects - 7 the former con- 
 stitute the internal, the latter the external ft ate of man. 
 Sch. — A man may be virtuous, though he be not rich; he may- 
 be admirably qualified for the fervice oi his country, and 
 B ' ItiU 
 
1 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ft ill be unnoticed, and vice verfa. The nobleft mind 
 may be obfcurcd under the garb of poverty — innocence 
 bear the bill of perfecution. Vice and fervility may 
 for a while ride in triumph. Man, according to his in- 
 ternal ftate, may be happy; in refpecT: of the external, he 
 may appear to be miferable and wretched. 
 
 If man be confidered under determinations which 
 remit from the natural conflitution of his body and the 
 natural frame of his mind, he is faid to be confidered 
 Si his phyfical ftate. 
 
 Scli. — A man may be ftrong and vigorous, briik and gay, or 
 weak, (low, fullen, &c. 
 
 Phyfical ftates are in many refpects mutable ; for we 
 experience, that the conftitution of the body and the 
 difpofition of the mind admit of great improvements, 
 or, by mifmanagement and by various accidents, may 
 be rendered worfe. 
 
 Sch. — To endeavour to know and do all that is conducive to 
 the well-being of foul and body, ought to be the moll 
 principal concern of every man who feels a delire to be 
 feappy. To affift our fellow men in this great work is 
 the province both of the phyfician and the moralift, with 
 this difference, that the latter refers all that he finds in 
 and about man to his free agency. 
 
 Man, reprefonted as a free agent, is confidered in 
 
 his moral ftate. 
 
 The moral ftate of man is either natural and con- 
 flant) or accidental and mutable. 
 
 S:'i, — Man, as a rational creature, is refponfible for his con- 
 duct to him that made him, where and whenever it is in 
 his power to exercife free agency, and in that refpect he 
 is beyond all controul of human authority : but in the 
 exercife of free agency, he may follow the dictates of 
 reafon, acquire habits of virtue, be fenfible of his duty; 
 or, on the contrary, may conduct himfelf in an irrational 
 manner, become more or lefs carelefs and abandoned. 
 
 Ill 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, J 
 
 In refpect of moral agency, we muft well diftinguim 
 the different actions of which human nature is capable, 
 the nature of moral actions, and their con/iftency with 
 moral rectitude. 
 
 We aft, if we are the caufe of an effect, or of the 
 contrary. 
 
 Actions, therefore, are dirtinguifhed into commiffive 
 or omijjive. 
 
 Sck. — We may do our duty or neglect it. 
 
 Whether we act by commiffion or by omiffion, an 
 effect will be produced in a two-fold way ; either that 
 we determine ourfelves, or that we are determined. 
 
 When we determine ourfelves, an action is faid to 
 be fpontaneous -, if we are determined, it is non-fponta- 
 neous. 
 
 Non-fpontaneous actions are either compulfory or 
 natural. 
 
 In compulfory actions we are determined by externa! 
 
 force % natural actions refult from the conftitution of 
 
 body and foul. 
 
 ^.—Hunger, thirft, fleep, reprefentations caufed by ob- 
 jects, &c. 
 
 Natural actions, in themfelves neceflary, may be 
 
 fpontaneous in refpect of time, place, and manner to 
 
 do them. 
 
 Sch. — We may eat and drink, at an improper time and place, 
 to excefs, in a decent or indecent manner. 
 
 We aft freely, when we act fpontaneoufly upon pre- 
 vious confederation. 
 
 We confider-i when, by an act of our underftanding, 
 
MORAL FHILOSOFHV. 
 
 we enquire whether an action ought to be done or 
 
 emitted. 
 
 Sck. — Irrational creature? acl: fpontaneoufly, and often with 
 an admirable fagacity ; but, being deftitute of underftand- 
 ino thev cannot act freelv. 
 
 O 7 •* J 
 
 An action is faid to be moral, when it is founded 
 in a free action. 
 
 All free actions are moral, but not all moral actions 
 
 free. 
 
 Sck. — Intoxication, freely indulged, with all its concomitants 
 and confequences, is criminal, horrid and difguftful : if 
 it be intruded by deception, or forced upon a fellow 
 creature by compulfion, it moves our pity and meets 
 compaffion. 
 
 In confequence of our actions, things which w r ere 
 merely poffible are brought into exiftence. 
 
 If it be our defire to enquire into the nature of mo- 
 ral actions, we muft carefully attend to the ideas of 
 poffibility, of neceffity and contingency, in order to 
 have a diftinct idea of liberty, upon which all that is 
 moral or immoral in human conduct ultimately de- 
 pends. 
 
 In general, that is faid to be poffible^ which involves 
 no contradiction. 
 
 What involves no contradiction in itfelf, is abfolutcly 
 
 pojjible. 
 
 Sch. — The whole fyftem of the heavens may be removed or 
 changed; the poor oppreiTed and injured. 
 
 What involves no contradiction under certain cir- 
 cumstances, is hypotheticdly pojjible. 
 
 The circumftances under which a thing, poffible in 
 .]fj may involve a contradiction, are our power or 
 
 duty ; 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. g 
 
 duty, therefore, hypothetical poffibility is diftinguifhed 
 
 into pbyfical and moral. 
 
 A thing is phyfically poffible, if it does not involve 
 
 a contradiction with our power. 
 
 Sck. — Upon the question, Whether the power of man, or of 
 the whole human race, or of all created beings taken to- 
 gether, can remove heavenly bodies, or change their or- 
 der? we cannot heiitate to declare fuch things utterly 
 impoffible. 
 
 Things are morally poffible, if they involve no con- 
 tradiction with a law, with our obligation and duty : 
 they are faid to be rights and the oppofite to be wrong. 
 
 Sch. — It is not morally poffible and right to opprefs and to in- 
 jure the poor ; on the contrary, it is morally impoffible 
 and wrong. 
 
 We call things necejfary^ when the oppofite thereof 
 is impoffible. 
 
 If the oppofite of a thing be impoffible in itfelf, it 
 
 |s abfolutely neceffary. 
 
 Sch. — Thus the exiftence of God, as the firft caufe of all 
 things, is neceffary; it is alfo neceflary that the love of 
 fin be an enmity againft God. 
 
 If the oppofite of a thing be impoffible under cir- 
 cumftances, it is hypothetically necejj'ary. 
 
 If the oppofite of a thing be impoffible in refpecl; of 
 our power, it is faid to be phyfically necejfafy ; as, meat 
 and drink for the fupport of life. 
 
 If the oppofite of a thing be inconfiftent with a 
 law, with our obligation and duty, it is morally neceffary. 
 Sch. — Of tins nature are all virtuous actions. The f?ar of 
 God, the love of our neighbour, modefty, juiiice, fo- 
 briety, are not optional in this fenfe, that we may omit 
 them, or do the contrary, confidently with the dignity 
 of human nature and our dependence upon God. 
 
 The 
 
6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The oppofite of neceffity is contingency. 
 
 A thing, therefore, is contingent, if the oppofite 
 thereof be pofiible, which may be either in itfelf or 
 under circumftances. 
 
 Hence contingency is likewife diftinguifhed into ab- 
 folute and hypothetical, and the latter into phyjical and 
 moral. 
 
 Sch. i. — What is abfolutely neceflary, cannot be contingent 
 under anv circumftances whatever. 
 
 Sch. i. — What is hypothetically neceflary, may be abfolutely 
 contingent. 
 
 Sch. 3. — What is phyfically contingent, may be morally ne- 
 ceflary. 
 
 Sch. 4. — The queftion, therefore, is, Whether a&ions are right 
 or wrong? Not whether we can, but whether we ought 
 to do, or to omit them. 
 
 If by a right we underftand a quality in a perfon, we 
 
 may define it to be a moral pombility of doing or 
 
 omitting certain actions. 
 
 Sch. — To order the confinement of perfons is the right of ma- 
 giftrates and officers of government, exclufi vely of citizens 
 of any other defcription; it extends to diforderly perfons, 
 the violators, not the peaceable obfervers of the law. 
 
 As free agency ought to be conducted according to 
 principles of right, we may infer, that the rights of 
 men are the principal features in their moral ftate \ 
 for different perfons enjoying the fame rights, are in 
 the fame moral ftate -, and, on the contrary, perfons 
 identically the fame, enjoying different rights, muft 
 be confidered in different moral ftates. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Men, by their nature equal, differ among one another j 
 the one is a father, the other a fon, a magiftrate, &c. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Nay, an individual perfon may be father, fon, ma- 
 gi ilrate. &c. 
 
 A perfon 
 
Moral philosophy. 7 
 
 A perfon veiled with rights is filled a moral per/on. 
 
 Many individuals veiled with identical rights, consti- 
 tute one moral perfon ; as corporations, legislatures, &c. 
 
 By the term nature^ which in different fciences is 
 taken in various fignifications, we, in the fequel of this 
 treatife, underftand the efTence of things, and call that 
 natural, which flows immediately from that efTence. 
 
 The nature of things is either confldered in iffelf, 
 or under circumflances. 
 
 Things flowing from nature confldered in itfelf, are 
 abfolutely natural \ thofe which flow from nature con- 
 fldered under circumflances, are hypotbetically natural. 
 
 Sch. 1. — It is the natural absolute right of man not to be fub- 
 je6l to human contronl againft his will, or independent 
 of an act: that is founded therein; likewife, to have his 
 fupport from the produce of the earth — to enjoy the fruit 
 of his own labour: JIavery, therefore, is a ftate abfolutely 
 unnatural. 
 
 Sch. 2. — But under the hypothefis, that we have made choice 
 of laws and men, or committed injury and damage, it is 
 naturally right that we be controuled by thofe laws and 
 men, or make reparation by our labour and property: 
 fubjec"tion, fervitude and compulfion are therefore hypo- 
 thetically natural. 
 
 What is abfolutely natural, is necejjary% what is hy- 
 pothetically fuch, is contingent, 
 
 Sch. 1. — Things of a phyfical nature, which are naturally ne- 
 ceffary, cannot, and thofe of a moral nature ought not to be 
 otherwife. Twice two neceflarilv make four. What is 
 right to one man, is neceffarily right to another who is 
 in the fame ftate and condition. 
 
 Sch. 2. — But fuppofe a continued addition of two, the fum 
 naturally will increafe to fix, eight, &c. As naturally 
 merit or demerit muft make a difference between the 
 characters of perfons, in other refpects of the fame ftate 
 
 and 
 
8 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and condition. The one has a juft claim to our appro- 
 bation, the other deferves difapprobation and cenfure. 
 
 Rights of man may be diftinguifhed in refpect of 
 the ft. 'frees from which they flow : thofe which flow 
 from his nature, are his natural rights \ thofe which 
 flow from other things, are adventitious. 
 
 The natural rights of man are abfolute or hypothetical. 
 
 All men, having the fame nature, have the fame ab- 
 folute natural rights •, and, when they are in the fame 
 circumilances, their hypothetical natural rights cannot 
 differ. 
 
 ScJi. — AH men have the fame abfolute natural right to have- 
 their fubfiilence from the produce of the earth : but as it 
 is impolfible that all occupy the fame fpot, and fubfiftence 
 cannot be had if one fhould defcroy the work of another, 
 it is natural that each be entitled to make ufe of the foil 
 firft occupied, and having bellowed his labour upon it, 
 exclufively to enjoy the fruits thereof. 
 
 Men, therefore, are in the fame natural ftate -, for 
 they are veiled with the fame natural rights. 
 
 Rights the fame, are equal. 
 
 Men naturally, therefore, are in a ft ate of equality. 
 
 Men, in a ftate of equality, are alfo faid to be in a 
 ft ate of natural liberty. 
 
 If man, in his abfolute natural ftate, be confidered 
 in himfelf, he is reprefented in a ftate of folitude; if 
 refpect is had to other men or creatures, he is confi- 
 dered in the abfolute focial ftate. 
 
 Sch. i. — In this flate, independent of his will, man is brought 
 into life a fellow creature of the whole human race, a 
 member of the univerfal family of the eternal father of 
 
 beir;gs. 
 
 Sch* 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 9 
 
 Sti, 2. — In treatifes of morality little is laid of this abfolutc fa- 
 cial ftate, though it ought to be deemed a fabject of the 
 greateft importance and of unlimited extent : for what 
 can more become the dignity of human nature, than that 
 men, flates, and nations fpread over the face of the earth, 
 ihould coniider themfelves and one another as children of 
 the fame gracious father, being not only the work of his 
 hand, but alfo the objects ol[ his benign love and con- 
 tinual care? 
 
 Sch. 3. — How far will this fubject extend, if it be confidered 
 that even brutes and other things have an abiolute focial 
 daim upon the human race? 
 
 Befides this necejfary fociety, of which man cannot, 
 and of the duties of which he ought not diveft himfelf, 
 there is a variety of others, where perfons voluntarily 
 unite for obtaining a common end. 
 
 Man, thus united with others, is in a foci at ftate— 
 acquires adventitious focial rights, and comes under 
 fbcial obligations. 
 
 Societies are as various as there may be ends for 
 
 r which perfons unite. 
 If an union be formed for propagating the fpecies, 
 perfons live in the connubial or matrimonial ftate. 
 
 Sch. 1. — If that union is, as it ought to be, for the end of edu- 
 cating children, the matrimonial ftate is lawful, and be* 
 comes parental. 
 
 Sch. 2. — In this ftate, parents, guardians, &c. are veiled with 
 parental rights ; children and wards, &c. are bound by 
 filial duties. 
 
 For the maintenance and education of children, fer~ 
 vices are required-, perfons uniting for that purpofe, 
 are in the berile ftate, where matters and fervants have 
 their refpective rights, and come under reciprocal 
 obligations. 
 
 The connubial, parental and herile ftates, taken to- 
 gether, or any tv/o of them, conftitute the domeftic ftate. 
 
 C From 
 
IO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 From thefe focieties, which are filled the lefs, may 
 be conceived an union of families affociating for mutual 
 convenience and fecurity. This is a ftep to the greater 
 ibcieties, and may be called a community. 
 
 If a community increafes to a confiderable extent, 
 the common concerns cannot well be managed by the 
 perfonal deliberation of all the heads of families. 
 Convenience, nay* nccefiity will of courfe dictate a 
 delegation of will and power of the members to a cer- 
 tain perfon, or number of perfons, for directing 
 things to the common good of all. 
 
 That focietv, the members of which have tranf- 
 ferred their will and power to a moral perfon for the 
 attainment of the felicity of all, is called civil. 
 
 Sch. — Civil focieties, in refpect to one another, are ftiledjlates. 
 
 Having given an idea of the moft principal ftates 
 in which man may be considered, and by which his 
 natural rights tand duties are varioufly modified, we 
 now proceed to the definition of moral philolbphy, 
 and will confider the moft general contents of that 
 fcience. 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 I S that fcience which gives rules for the direction 
 of the will of man in his moral ftate, or in his purfuic 
 after happinefs. 
 
 This fcience is generally divided into three parts : 
 The firft contains the law of nature, that is, the na- 
 tural and invariable principles of juftice and equity, by 
 which human conduct ought to be regulated. 
 
 The 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I i 
 
 The fecond mows how thofe principles are to be 
 applied to the various ftates of man. 
 
 The third exhibits the application of thefe natural 
 principles to the ftates of the nations of the earth. 
 
 The LAW of NATURE 
 
 IS that fcience which treats of the natural and in- 
 variable principles of juflice and equity, by which 
 human conduct ought to be regulated. 
 
 It contains five chapters : 
 
 The flrft treats of human actions in general, and 
 particularly their morality or immorality. 
 The fecond, of moral obligation. 
 The third, of natural law. 
 
 The fourth, of the different degrees of morality 
 pr immorality. 
 
 The fifth, of moral imputation. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the anions of man, and their morality or immorality 
 
 M 
 
 AN is a living creature, endowed with an organic 
 body and a rational foul. 
 
 Sch. i. — Living creatures, endowed with an organic body and 
 a foul, are called animals. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Man differs from other animals principally in this, 
 that his foul is rational; according to his animal nature, 
 he has numberlefs determinations in common with brutes. 
 
 Soul 
 
12 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Soul is defined to be a power fufceptible and capable 
 of reprefentations. 
 
 The different modes in which that power exerts it- 
 felf are termed faculties. 
 
 The faculties of the human foul diftinguifh them- 
 
 felves into the cognofcitive and appetitive^ both of which 
 
 mud be furthermore diftinguifhed into the inferior 
 
 and fup trior. 
 
 Sch. — The inferior we have in common with brutes ; by the; 
 fuperior we are elevated to the rank of fpirits. 
 
 The inferior cognofcitive faculty is that power of the 
 human foul by which we have reprefentations of ma- 
 terial objects. It comprehends fenfation, imagination 
 and fancy. 
 
 Smfation is that faculty by which we have reprefen- 
 tations of material objects prefent. 
 
 Sch. — Prefent here fignines any object that ftrikes our fenfory 
 organs; thus a fixed ftar, and a diitant found which is 
 heard, are prefent. 
 
 Imagination is that faculty by which we have repre- 
 fentations of material objects abfent, but which have 
 once been wholly prefent. 
 
 Sch. — We fee a friend, and remember the city, with other cir* 
 cumftances, where and under which we faw him. 
 
 Fancy is that faculty by which we form reprefenta- 
 tions of fuch abfent material objects as have once been 
 prefent in part. 
 
 Sch. — We fancy a golden mountain, having had partial ideas 
 of gold arid of mountains. Hence the fictions of cen- 
 taurs, nymphs, &c. 
 
 There are laws of fenfation, imagination, and of 
 fancy, by which may be determined what is necefTary 
 
 in 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ?3 
 
 \n our reprefentations, and how far they may be fpon- 
 taneous, referable to our will, finful or harmlefs. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — The law of fenfation: As foon as an object has flruck 
 our fenfory organ, the representation, or fpecres imprefTa, 
 is neceflary: fenfible reprefentations are therefore in our 
 power and imputable, a6 far as it was in our pov/er to 
 prevent objects affecting our organs. 
 
 ScL 2. — The law of imagination and fancy : If of two or more 
 objects formerly perceived, aflbciated with or bearing a 
 fimilitude the one to the other, one occurs to the mind* 
 the other or the reft will of neceffity alfo recur : imagina- 
 tions and phantoms, therefore, will be fo far in our power 
 and imputable, as it has been in our power to hinder the 
 recurrence of ideas formerly perceived. 
 
 Sc/i. 3. — As far as actions of the mind flow from thefe laws, 
 fo far they muft be conftrued to be natural actions of the 
 human foul. 
 
 There are alfo natural anions of our body, which 
 are fo far neceffary and non-fpontaneous as they flow 
 from its niechanifm and the natural (late of its fluids. 
 
 The perceptions of the mind hitherto explained, 
 
 have their ultimate caufe in fenfation. Senfible ideas 
 
 arife from mutations, which objects excite in the kn~ 
 
 fory organs. There is, therefore, the ftrictefl: harmony 
 
 between the fenfations of our mind and the mutations 
 
 excited in our organs. 
 
 Sch. 1. — By this indiflbluble union and harmony, foul and bo- 
 dy conftitute owtfuppofitum^ tha^ is, a complete incom- 
 municable fubflance. 
 
 Cch. 2. — If fuch a fuppolitum is intelligent, it conftitutes a 
 fhyfical per Jon. 
 
 All mutations flowing; from the mechanifm of the 
 body and the natural frame of the mind, in certain 
 refpecls, are hypothetically natural; for in divers pei- 
 fons they are different, nay, vary often in the fame in- 
 dividual. This difference is mod probably in con- 
 
 fequence 
 
*4 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fequence of their originating from different fources, 
 fome arifing in the foul, others refulting from the body. 
 
 Sch. i. — The mind is not always equally vigilant, the body 
 may be deranged; the ftate of childhood differs from that 
 of manhood, that of ficknefs from a ftate of health. 
 
 Sch. 2.— Whatever may be the origin or the qualifying caufes 
 of thofe different mutations, fo much is certain, that 
 they affect the whole man, and modify his phyfical date, 
 that he becomes an individual perfon, difiincl from all 
 others in conftitution, complexion, difpofition, &c. 
 
 Sch, 3. — Natural mutations do not intereft the moralift any 
 farther than as they affect or are affected by fpontaneity, 
 inclination and will; as they co-operate or are contrary 
 to the ultimate end and fcope of the efTence of man. His 
 enquiry is, What influence things have upon human hap- 
 pinefs, whether they be good, bad or indifferent? 
 
 Things are conjiftent^ if their junction can be ex- 
 plained from a principle common to all. 
 
 As far as things are confident, they axtperfecJ. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Every thing has its efTence if the various things in- 
 herent therein are confident with the fcope of that ef« 
 fence, there is a degree of perfection in it commen- 
 furate with that confiftency. 
 
 Sch. 2. — A clock is fo far perfect as the various fprings and 
 movements, and all parts, confpire to point out time in a 
 precife manner; for this is the fcope of its efTence. 
 
 Men cannot act but certain mutations will be pro- 
 duced; they either confpire with the fcope of their 
 eflence, or are inconfiftent with it. 
 
 By actions, therefore, man will render his ftate per- 
 fect or imperfect. 
 
 What renders our ftate perfect is good, that which 
 renders it imperfect is bad. 
 
 Sch. — What is not referable to our ftate is indifferent. 
 
 If our mind be actuated by rcprefentations of things 
 in reference to our ftate, we feel inclination or aver/ion 
 m conformity to fuch reprefentations. 
 
 The 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The appetitive faculty of the human foul in general 
 
 maybe defined that faculty by which we feel an appetite 
 
 for things reprefented as good, and are averfe to thofe 
 
 which are reprefented as bad. 
 
 Sch. — Appetite and averfion caufed by fenfation, imagination 
 or fancy, conftitute the inferior appetitive faculty ; but 
 if they take rife in confequence of acts of our nnder- 
 flanding, they muft be confidered as exertions of the fu- 
 perior ; they are acts of the will. 
 
 Appetite and averfion follow certain laws •, for they 
 are indifTolubly connected with the reprefentations of 
 good or evil; in our power, and imputable, if the re- 
 prefentations be in our power or fpontaneous. 
 
 Sch. — Appetites and averfions change with our reprefentations ; 
 the boy ceafes to diilike the fchool if he be made to fee 
 the evil of idlenefs. 
 
 The reprefentations by fenfation, imagination and 
 fancy being for the moil- part confufed, it follows, that 
 appetite and averfion refulting from them, may be 
 mifplaced and improperly exercifed. 
 
 Sensitive appetite and averfion have degrees m pro- 
 portion as things are reprefented to be good or bad 
 upon various grounds and confiderations. 
 
 Sch. — In confequence of this, appetite and averfion may chili 
 in refpect of one and the fame object, or the competition 
 may lie between different objects. In each of thefe cafes 
 the event will be, that one or the other preponderates. 
 Or they may refpectively coincide, and caufe the affec- 
 tions of the mind to become ftrong, turbulent and pre- 
 dominant. 
 
 Strong and predominant appetites or averfions are 
 known by the name of paffions. 
 
 Paffions are therefore produced by flrong and lively 
 fenfitive reprefentations of good or evil. 
 
l6 AlORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 Sci, — They are diftinguifhed into the agreeable and dij'agret°- 
 abk, as they have either good or evil for their object. 
 
 All pailions ultimately reft upon thefe four : pleafure y 
 defire, pain, and fear. 
 
 Pleafure and defire are the foundation of all agreeable 
 pafilons ; the former arifes from a ftrong reprefentation 
 of a good in our pojjeffion, the latter takes place when 
 there is a great probability of obtaining a good yet in 
 expectation. 
 
 Pain and fear, on the contrary, are thefources of all 
 difagreeable paflions; the former is caufed by the re- 
 prefentation that we labour under the preffure of a; 
 prefent evil, the latter arifes from the thought that an 
 evil hangs over our head. 
 
 ScL — All other paffions, diftinguifhed in languages by diffe- 
 rent names, are not affections different in their nature, 
 but only degrees either of pleafure or defire, of pain or 
 fear; as, joy, anxiety, defpair, terror, mortification, &c. 
 
 An habitual indulgence of fenfe and paflion plunges 
 us into. fenfuatity, and caufes propenfity. 
 
 A kind of appetite and averfion, not founded upon 
 reprefentations of the mind, is called inftinB \ as, hun- 
 ger, thirft, &c. 
 
 Experience evinces, that brute9, in conformity to 
 their fenfitive reprefentations, alfo have their fenfitive 
 appetite and averflon, exercife indifference, are actuated 
 by propenfities and by inftinct. It is likewife evident 
 from common obfervation, that their appetites and 
 averfions are generally more confined and infinitely 
 better directed than thofe of man : their paffions and 
 propenfities are but of the one or the other kind, and 
 their vehemency keeps pace with an irritating caufe, 
 or correfponds with the deftiny, defence, or fupport of 
 
 their 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 7 
 
 their exiilence. Every thing indicates that fenfe and 
 inftinct are given them for their guide*, every thing 
 manifefts infinite power, wifdom and gOodnefs in him 
 who made them. 
 
 But it i9 not fo with man •, he is prone to fenfuality ; 
 various paMlons obfcure and difturb his mind, plunge 
 him into error, fin and mifery : fenfe^ paffions, in- 
 ftinct, therefore, cannot have been defigned by the 
 wife Creator to be the directors of the ways of man. 
 
 . What great caufe is there to blefs God that he has 
 given him another, a better guide •, that he hath clothed 
 human nature with a dignity fuperior to all creatures 
 here on earth ; that he has created his foul a fpirit ? 
 Man is not to follow {qi\{q^ but as it is directed by un- 
 derftanding and reafon; thefe are to direct the fteps of 
 his feet, the defires of his heart — not to obey but to 
 regulate (mCt and paffion. 
 
 This leads us to treat of the fuperior faculties of the 
 human foul. Thefe, as has been faid, are diftinguifhed 
 into the cognofcitive and appetitive. 
 
 By the fuperior cognofcitive faculty we are enabled to 
 
 form reprefentations of immaterial objects. 
 
 Sck. i. — In order to have an idea of immaterial objects, we 
 may only think of the Jimilitudes and differences which we 
 perceive when we conlider feveral objects with any de- 
 gree of attention. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Thefe fimilitudes and differences are not in one or 
 the other of thofe objecls, but fomething between them, 
 therefore fomething immaterial. 
 
 The fuperior cognofcitive faculty more particularly 
 
 comprehends attention, reflection, undentanding, rea- 
 
 fon, and judgment. 
 
 Sch. — The terms, under/landing and reafon are often ufed the 
 one for the other, each expreffing in general the fuperior 
 cognofcitive faculty. 
 
 D We 
 
1% MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 We have not only a faculty to think, but it Is in our 
 power to dwell upon a thought or to difmifs it. The 
 faculty of continuing our thoughts we call attention. 
 
 We may attend to thoughts, view them as it were 
 on different fides, enter into their ingredient parts ; 
 that is, we may continue our attention. The faculty 
 of continuing attention is reflection. 
 
 By attending and reflecting upon objects, we will 
 difcover fimilitudes and differences •, that is, we will 
 be enabled to form diftinft ideas of things. The fa- 
 culty of forming diflinct ideas we call underftanding 
 in the reftricted {^n(c of the term. 
 
 If we form diftinct Ideas of things, we mall dif- 
 cover a connection of the one with the other. The 
 faculty of feeing the connection of things is in parti- 
 cular called reafon. 
 
 Sen. i.— -By connexion, we underftand that conftitution of 
 things, whereby the one cannot be without the other. 
 
 Sen. 2. — Thus caufes and effects, means and ends are things 
 connected. 
 
 We cannot fee fimilitudes and differences, or con- 
 nection in things, if we do not compare them. The 
 faculty of comparing ideas is called judgment. 
 
 If our mind be actuated by reprefentations of our 
 underftanding, we exercife the fuperior appetitive fa- 
 culty i that is, cur appetite and averfon will be ra- 
 tioned. 
 
 Rational appetite and averfion constitute what, in 
 the pbilofophicd fenfe of the word, is termed will. 
 Sch.— t-Will comprehends both will and refufal. 
 
 The acts of the will are volition or nolition. 
 
 In 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. It; 
 
 In the exercife of volition or nolition, we may dif- 
 tinguifh the following operations of the mind: 
 
 i. A diftinct idea of an object is formed. 
 
 2. Confequences mud be attended to, which may 
 flow from the propofed object, and mew its perfec- 
 tion or imperfection. 
 
 3. The object with thofe confequences is referred 
 to our ftate, and a concluiion formed, whether the 
 object is good or bad. 
 
 Hence it is evident, that the acts of will cannot be 
 exercifed without the exercife of attention, reflection, 
 underftanding, reafon, and judgment. 
 
 Sch. — It ought to be obferved, that, notwithstanding this, 
 anions are referred to the will, and become moral, when 
 we ought to have exercifed thofe acls of the underftand- 
 ing; that is, when they wera in our power, and we guilty 
 of inattention. 
 
 Whenever we exercife acts of the will, there is 
 fomething from which may be under flood why we 
 rather will than refufe. 
 
 That, which thus determines our will, is called 
 motive. 
 
 As from difiinEl reprefentations of good or evil may 
 be underftood why an intelligent being mould chufe 
 the one and refufe the other, it follows, that dirtinci 
 reprefentations afford the matter of motives, both for 
 volition and nolition. 
 
 Hence it follows, that we cannot exercife any act 
 of the will without motive. 
 
 ScL 1. — Thofe who think otherwife, do not fufficiently dif- 
 tinguifh fenfitive appetite from that which is rational. 
 
 Sell. 2. — No wonder, that we often appear to will without ex- 
 ercifing the fuperior faculty, as we often forego confult- 
 
20 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nig our imderilanding, and only follow our fenfitive and 
 vain inclinations. 
 
 Sc/i. 3. — Nay, actions which have been performed upon mo- 
 tives may become fo habitual, that we repeat them with- 
 out thinking of the motive which at flrft excited us to 
 a&ion. 
 
 We may reprefent good and evil as more or lefs 
 deferable and excellent, or hurtful and pernicious. One 
 motive is therefore more weighty and forcible than 
 another •, and acts of the will in confequence are dif- 
 ferently affected, and admit of various degrees of re- 
 folution. 
 
 Sch. 1. — The more motives confpire, the dronger our refo- 
 lution will be. 
 
 Sch. 2. — If motives lead to that which is flattering to our fen- 
 fitive inclinations, our refolutions will not only be drong, 
 but prompt, eafy, and delightful. 
 
 Sch. 3. — But good and evil fuggefted by our fenfes and ima- 
 gination do not always meet the approbation of our un- 
 derftanding; the confequence is, that the will comes 
 often into collifim with our fenfitive appetite, and itsrefq- 
 lutions become faint, or are entirely fubverted. 
 
 Sch. 4. — In fuch cafes, motives ought to prevail over flatter- 
 ing deceitful appearances ; our will ought to maintain its 
 fuperiority ; man ought to make a facrifice of fhort-lived 
 fenfual pleafures for lading, nay, everlading felicity. 
 
 Strong and perfevering refolutions of the will are 
 acts of virtue or vice. They bear the names of paf- 
 fions in a perfect analogy to thofe produced by ftrong 
 and lively fenfitive reprefentations, but they are really 
 different from them-, a material diftinction, therefore, 
 in our mind is neceffary, if we will not confound vir- 
 tues with good difpofitions, and place black and hei- 
 nous vices upon a par with evil inclinations and pro- 
 penfities. 
 
 Sch. — As rejoicing in the Lord, hoping in God, fearing his 
 name, are excellent virtues, fo, on the contrary, there 
 
 are 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 
 
 are not more pernicious vices than rejoicing in fin, def- 
 pairing of God, blafpheming his name, &c. 
 
 By fenfes, pafTions, habits, cufloms and examples, 
 many are tempted to judge that to be good which is 
 bad, and that bad which really is good. Good and 
 evil is therefore to be diftinguifhed into real and ap- 
 parent. 
 
 Apparent good is an evil reprefented as a good •, and 
 apparent evil is a real good under the falfe appearance 
 of an evil. 
 
 Sck i. — In the judgment of an idle boy going to fchool is an 
 
 evil, but play a defirable good. 
 Sch. 2. — It requires the greateft. care and diligence to guard 
 
 againft falfe appearances. 
 
 There are frequent occurrences in life, when feve- 
 ral goods offer themfelves, which cannot be attained 
 
 o ... 
 
 at the fame time, but where in chufing the one, we 
 mull deprive ourfelves of the other. In the fame man- 
 ner evils may threaten us, which are of that nature, 
 that in endeavouring to avoid the one, we muft meet 
 the other. 
 
 All we can do in fuch cafes is to make a true efli- 
 mate of the degrees of good and of evil, in order to 
 diftinguifh the greater from the lefs. 
 
 This leads to the idea of relative good and evil-, 
 
 where a lefs good chofen in preference to a greater, af- 
 
 fumes the quality of an evil, and a lefs evil preferred 
 
 to a greater has the effect of a good. 
 
 Sch. — Hence the rule, of two goods chufe the greateft, and 
 of two evils admit the leaft . 
 
 From the nature of our foul it may be proved, and 
 by daily experience we are indubitably convinced, that 
 
 our 
 
2 2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 our will is im perfect, ftands in need and is capable of 
 improvement. 
 
 Our will becomes more perfect and determined 
 the more we attain to a diflinct knowledge of things, 
 particularly in refpect of the good and evil that may- 
 proceed from them. For the more folid our know- 
 ledge, the more powerful is the dominion of our will 
 over the appearances of fenfe, and the allurements of 
 pafiion. 
 
 Our will is not fubject to coaction or compulfion, for 
 it refta upon reprefentations of our understanding, 
 which no human power can controul. 
 
 Sch. i. — Conviction and perfuafion will lead the will. 
 
 Sch. i. — By violent means the will may be affected; they may 
 obtrude to the intellect a companion between things to 
 which it has been averfe, and prefent painful experiences, 
 and canfe the former to appear the leafl of the two evils ; 
 then it is that thofe means afTume a moral complexion, 
 ceafe to be coactions, and become in a manner motives. 
 
 Sch. 3. — However that may be, no great dependence ought to 
 be placed in means, which, for the moil part only produce 
 fenfitive inclinations that lafl as long as fear and dread 
 excite the mind, caufe involuntary deceitful changes, 
 and leave the hardened flubborn heart untouched. 
 
 Sen. 4. — Thofe who have the care of education, of families, 
 &c. ought to confider that love begets love, that tender- 
 nefs creates attachment. Government is eafy and plea- 
 fant when we bear rule in the hearts of men. 
 
 Sch. 5. — Brutes, capable only of fenfitive inclinations, may, 
 and often muft be directed by force. 
 
 Sch 6. — If men a<t a brutal part, they have no caufe to com- 
 plain of feverity and violence. 
 
 From what has been laid, it clearly appears, that 
 ads of will are fpontaneous, confequently acls of choice. 
 
 The faculty to determine ourfelves to action upon 
 
 previous 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1% 
 
 previous consideration, is called liberty \ and actions 
 thus done or omitted, vlxz free. 
 
 In a free action there muft be fpontaneity in the 
 
 agent, contingency or room for choice in refpect of 
 
 the action, and a poffibility of our diftinctly knowing 
 
 its nature and effect before the commiilion or omiffion 
 
 thereof. 
 
 Sc/i. — Aftions, to which no intrinfic principle determines us, 
 are free from necefjity\ not to be determined by the autho- 
 rity of another, is to act free from fubjettion; when no 
 force compels us, we are faid to be, free from coadicn. 
 
 Moral actions are not always free in themfelves, but 
 
 muft ultimately depend upon or originate in free action. 
 
 Sc/i. — A drunkard, in a fit of intoxication, is not able to ex- 
 ercife his under/landing; the folly, rudenefs, &c. of his 
 conduct, are not free, being neceflary effects of a disor- 
 dered brain; but they are moral, if his will was thecaufe 
 of inebriation. 
 
 Moral actions, whether considered in themfelves or 
 under circumftances, have their conferences -, thefe 
 referred to the moral ftate of man will either confift or 
 not confift with the fcope of his effence, and confe- 
 quently render them either good or bad. 
 
 If we attend to the confequences of moral actions, 
 we confider them as materially good or bad. 
 
 Confequences flowing from actions confidered in 
 themfelves cannot change-, that is, an action, as fuch, 
 produces always the fame effect*, in this cafe, actions 
 materially good or evil are neceffarilyfuch. 
 
 Confequences, that flow from actions confidered un- 
 der circumftances, render them contingently good or bad; 
 that is, their effects, differ as the nature of thofe cir- 
 cumftances are different, 
 
 Sch. 
 
2 4- MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 Sch. — Confinement of an innocent, or of a wicked dangerous 
 perfon, mult be confidered in a very different light. 
 
 Hence, actions and their confequences being things 
 connected by nature, may, in that point of view, be 
 faid to be naturally good or bad. 
 
 Actions naturally good or bad may be known by 
 
 reafon and experience. 
 
 Scfr, — The natural confequences are objects of experience; 
 their dependence upon the nature of actions and of cir- 
 cumftances, comes under the cognizance of reafon. He 
 who knows the deleterious nature of poifon, will certainly 
 condemn the wickednefs of a perfon taking or adminifrer- 
 ing it for the horrid purpofe of deftroying life or health. 
 
 Material good or evil is infeparable from our ac- 
 tions, becaufe effects are infeparably connected with 
 their caufes. 
 
 Hitherto we have confined ourfelves to the confede- 
 ration of what is called the matter of actions ; but it is 
 time we mould now confider what it is that gives to 
 moral action its peculiar form, and diftinguifhes it from 
 all other aftions. Here the enquiry is not fo much 
 whether an action has produced a certain effect, but 
 whether that effect was intended by the agent. 
 
 Actions done with a good intention are faid to be 
 formally good-, thofe proceeding from a contrary in- 
 tention, are formally bad. 
 
 Actions may be formally good, though they be ma- 
 terially bad ^ and vice verfa. 
 
 Sch. — For inftance : a well intended though unlucky ampu- 
 tation, ending in the lofs of life. 
 
 The confequences of moral actions, by which they 
 are formally good or bad, conftitute their morality or 
 immorality, 
 
 Sch. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ^5 
 
 u. — If it be our part to determine what degree of morality 
 or immorality be in a certain action, we have to attend 
 to the confequences of the action, and fee whether they 
 be or be not intended. According to the intention of the 
 agent we pronounce acftions attended by good confe- 
 quences moral, thole attended by bad conferences we 
 call immoral. 
 Sck. 1. — Thus we fee, that the term moral, when applied to 
 human conduct, is taken both in a general and in a re- 
 ftrieted nullification : according; to the former, all intend- 
 ed actions are moral; in the reftrifted fenfe, thofe only 
 which are done or omitted with a good intention. 
 
 Kence we conclude, that all moral actions are either 
 moral or immoral ; for they prefuppofe intention, and 
 are attended by confequences. 
 
 Morality and immorality, flowing from the nature of 
 
 acftions, and the nature of circumftances, in reference 
 
 to the nature of the intention by which they are done or 
 
 omitted, are intrivfic; the confequence is, that they are 
 
 inf sparable from moral actions, and, as they are naturally 
 
 connected, may be known by rea (on and experience. 
 
 S<:h. — To flab an innocent man, with a malicious intention to 
 deftrcy his life, cannot but be an action in the highell 
 degree immoral, though it were fanctioned by the appro- 
 bation of high authority. 
 
 Good or bad confequences, flowing from moral ac- 
 tions, may depend alfo upon the will of another-, we 
 may therefore conceive morality or immorality, which 
 is extrhtfic, not natural, but pqfitive. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Extrinfic morality or immorality may depend upon 
 cuftoms, or upon particular injunctions or prohibitions. 
 
 Sen. 1. — Morality and immorality that zttmerefy extrinfic, may 
 be fe para ted from acftions; for cuftoms may change, irt- 
 jundtions and prohibitions ceafe, &c. For inftance, we 
 may do work in a week day, whicii is improper or for- 
 bidden on the Sabbath. 
 
 ar& 3. — As all morality or immorality has a necefTary con- 
 nection with the will and intention of the agent; it fol- 
 E lows, 
 
 / 
 
.6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lows, that no action that is not fpontaneous carl be mo- 
 ral or immoral. 
 ScL 4. — A part of a houfe broke down by a ftorm, or a per- 
 fon falling from a fcaffold, caufi ng the death of a man, are 
 anions equally difaflerous, and equally innocent, if the 
 latter has not been guilty of neglect. 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 Of Moral Obligation. 
 
 T 
 
 JL HERE are innumerable actions in our power, for- 
 mally contingent, affording unlimited fcope for choice, 
 \n refpect of actions as well as mode, place, manner, 
 and time for their performance : yet we find, that our 
 mind does not remain in fufpence, but refolves upon 
 one individual action, mode, place, manner, and time, 
 in preference to all others. 
 
 This particular refolution is found always to be in 
 confequence of, and in conformity to motives •, for it 
 is the nature of motives to controul our fpontaneity, 
 giving the mind a particular impulfe and direction, 
 and thus caufing a moral neceffity for doing or omitting 
 t'lich particular actions rather than others. 
 
 Whenever we are thus actuated by motives, we are 
 
 laid to be under a moral obligation ; fo that moral 
 
 obligation may be laid to confift in a connexion of 
 
 motrces with our anions. 
 
 Sch. — Writers, who contend that moral obligation is only con- 
 ftituted by the will of 'the fuperior ', rejecting all other defini- 
 tions thereof as vague and chimerical, feem to have ab- 
 ftra<ted their ideas from the effect of laws and govern- 
 ments in civil life, where all obligations ultimately de- 
 rive their force from the will of a fuperior. Under the 
 fuppofitiori) that all who claim the right ot a fuperior, be 
 
 [awfully 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 5 7 
 
 lawfully vefted therewith, and that lawful authority be 
 always juftly exerciled, their definition might be adopt- 
 ed with fafety. - But who can feel fo great a degree of 
 predilection, as to venture a truth of the greateft im- 
 portance upon a iuppofition, the fallacy of which may 
 be proved from the frequent records of hiflory, from the 
 imbecility of the human mind, and the imperfection of 
 all human affairs. Here we have not to take things ac- 
 cording to the notions and practices of men ; we have not 
 to copy the ideas of right and wrong from human laws 
 and inftitutions; on the contrary, we ought to look for 
 the eternal and unchangeable principles of juftice and 
 equity, which now from nature, and which alone can 
 be the infallible guide and foundation of civil law, 
 and all that can be right and excellent in governments. 
 How many monfters has the world produced who have 
 ufurped authority? How often do folly and caprice 
 aflame its facred name and appearance? Suppofe both 
 fuperior and authority lawful, can the wifdom of men 
 always warrant a wife, juft and proper exercife of that 
 authority? What therefore is moral obligation, that has 
 no other foundation than the will of an human fuperior, 
 but an expedient in moll cafes unfafe, and at beft as 
 fickle and unftable as the various fentiments and devices 
 of men. 
 
 The definition, which we have laid down, is not liable to 
 fuch exceptions, as it fufficiently guards againft all that 
 is unlawful in the exercife of authority and oppreflive in 
 obligation, and, on the contrary, enjoins, upon a foun- 
 dation that cannot be fliaken, a rational and fincere 
 refpect, deference and obedience to all lawful fuperioii 
 in all that they juftly require. 
 
 For a lawful fuperior on the one hand derives his authority 
 from a jult caufe, and on the other, is under the moll 
 facred obligation to exercife it in conformity to juftice. 
 But both caufe and direction of juft authority muft have 
 for their obje£t the felicity of all who are under that 
 authority. Public felicity is therefore the motive why 
 authority fhould be lawfully exercifed, and why the 
 will of a fuperior thus exercifing his authority ought 
 to be refpected and obeyed. Here then we find a con- 
 nection of motives, and of confecuence obligation. 
 
 A]} 
 
2 8 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 All that can be feid in refpect of moral obligation, 
 r r us upon the confederation of the caufes of that. 
 connection, upon the motives connected, and upon 
 the quality of perfons, actions and things to which it 
 
 extends. 
 
 Connection is an effect that muft have its originat- 
 ing caufe or caufes. 
 
 Obligation in this refpecl is either natural or pofitive, 
 or qualified-, as the connection of motives remits ei- 
 ther from the nature of actions and of circumftances, 
 or from the will of another, or from both. 
 
 Sch. — That we ought not to commit murder is a qualified ob- 
 atiou, enjoined both by nature and by the fanction of 
 civil laws. 
 
 Poiitive obligations are divine or human, as mo- 
 tives are connected either by the will of God or of 
 man. 
 
 All natural obligations are divine-, for nature, and all 
 
 that flows from it, is by the will of God. 
 
 Sck. i. — If we wifh to fatisfy natural obligation, we muft look 
 up to and be actuated by the will of God. For inftance, 
 
 noe mufc jludy Jobriety, net only from a confederation that it 
 has the greaieji influence en our happinefs, by invigorating our 
 health, preserving- our life, and affording our foul that ferenity 
 of mind, that tranquillity and peace, which rife fuperior to all 
 change: and vicifjitudes of time and chance ; but, ive ought 
 alfo to refiefl, that this virtue is commanded hy God, that a 
 faithful performance of it is pleafng to him, that a contrary 
 conduct is a grievous Jin, and J'ubj efts us to his awful dif plea- 
 fur e, £fXV. 
 Sch. 2. — Divine obligations may be merely pofitive ; as, circumci- 
 flon and other ceremonial infitutions of the Old Tefiament. 
 
 If connection of motives ceafes, we are liberated 
 from obligation-, if new motives be connected, new 
 obligations arife. 
 
 From 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 29 
 
 From pofitive obligations, whether divine or hu- 
 man, we may be liberated; for the connection of 
 motives may ceafe. But this cannot be with refpect 
 to natural obligations, they are unalterable and lafting 
 as nature itfelf. 
 
 Sch. — Qualified obligations confequently admit of liberation 
 as far as they are pofitive. 
 
 Ablions may reft upon many motives, and in this 
 refpectmay be diftinguifhed into Jimple and compound. 
 A fimple action refts upon one motive ; a compound 
 upon many. 
 
 A compound action may be confidered as an aggre- 
 gate of as many fimple as there are motives. 
 
 Obligations therefore admit of quantity ', which is to 
 be eftimated by the nature and number of motives. 
 
 Sch. — In refpect of the nature of motives, it mnft be obferved, 
 that the intrinfic are always more important than the 
 extrinfic. 
 
 Obligations confequently may be diftinguifhed into 
 greater and lefs. 
 
 When obligations come into colli/ion, we muft make 
 an exception in favour of the greateft. 
 
 Such is the imbecility of the human mind, that 
 perfons may conceive a connection of motives where 
 it is not, or where, if they were better informed, 
 they would do the contrary. In this cafe motives are 
 miftaken and wrong, and the conceited obligation er- 
 roneous. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Many of the perfections in chinch and Mate have ta- 
 ken their rife and progrefs from erroneous obligations. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The error of fuch conceited obligations may be feen 
 by others, but the perfon labouring under the mifbke 
 fincerely thinks he is in the right, and all wrong who are 
 
 of 
 
;c MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of- a contrary fentiment. Oppofition commonly increafes 
 enthuliaftic pride and obftinacy. 
 
 ScL 3. — Perfons of that clafs are rather objects of pity than 
 ridicule or perfecution. 
 
 Sck. 4. — If a remedy is to be applied, let it be conviction. 
 Conftraint is only allowable in cafes where the effect has, 
 in a direct manner, a fatal tendency to difturb the feli- 
 city of fociety ; and even, in fuch cafes, coercive meafures 
 Ihould be ufed with all poffible humanity, prudence and 
 moderation, and principally levelled againft the effect. 
 
 ScL 5. — Upon the queftion, Whether it would not be better to 
 make ufe of coercive meafures, than to leave our fellow 
 creature under an error that may be fatal to him and to 
 others? we anfwer, that human authority is not compe- 
 tent to judge the confciences of men; that fuch an au- 
 thority affumed may be abufed to opprefs a confcience 
 that is right, and actuated by a juft obligation. To judge 
 the confciences of men is thefole right of God* 
 
 No rule for action that is contrary to natural obli- 
 gation can be right ; it mud be falfe and erroneous. 
 
 Sch. — This proportion is very important, as it is an infallible 
 ftandaui for a wife and faithful difcharge of legiflative au- 
 thority; where errors and defects, which human wifdom 
 cannot always prevent, ought to be corrected and reme^ 
 died 3s foon as experience brings them to light. 
 
 As men often fubftitute habit, 'prejudice, cuftom, pro- 
 penjity and paffion for motives, there is no wonder that, 
 in the moft important occurrences of life, they loofe 
 fight of true obligation, and give way to error and 
 fanaticifm. 
 
 As motives prefizppofe diflinct reprefentation of 
 good or evil, it follows, that no perfon can be put 
 under moral obligation who cannot exercife under- 
 {landing, reafon, and judgment. 
 
 Actions which are free or moral, admit of motives, 
 and therefore come under obligation. 
 
 Sch. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. £f 
 
 Sc/i. i. — Hence it follows, that neither brutes, nor children be- 
 fore their years of discretion, can be put under obligation. 
 
 ScL 2. — In directing brutes, we muft work upon their Senii- 
 tive appetite and averfion, and connect conSequence^ 
 with their actions, whereby they obtain a fenfe of good 
 or evil in them, and are prompted to feel inclinations in 
 conformity to that (enfe. 
 
 Sc/i. 3 — Humanity requires, that means for directing the ac- 
 tions of brutes be as gentle as poilible. 
 
 Sc/i. 4. — Great prudence and care is requifite in the manage- 
 ment of children; like brutes thcv mav be driven into a 
 compliance with our wifhes, but, unlike to them, by too 
 great feverity, and too frequent violent coercions, they 
 may be hardened, rendered brutal and cbftinate. Never 
 give place to anger, at leafl never mow it in chaftiSe- 
 ments, for it has a monftrous form, and is alone Suffici- 
 ent to defeat the end for which this part of difcipline is 
 made our neceflary duty. The power of fir ft impreffi- 
 ons and the force of examples have great influence upon 
 the tender mind; they may effect great changes and 
 fixed habits in the inclinations of youth, both for the 
 better and for the worfe. 
 
 Sch. £. — We have gained a great deal if we have gained their 
 affection; the young mind fhould therefore be cultivated 
 at a very early date; we ought to work upon their Supe- 
 rior faculties by reproof, and advice holding forth mo- 
 tives ; for children generally have Sufficient discretion in 
 all things neceflary for or Suitable to their State and con- 
 dition, and by proper management may be cauSed to 
 exerciSe it in other things Sooner than they would be able 
 to do if left to themfelves, or consigned to the contagion 
 of vulgar company and bad examples. 
 
 No action which is not contingent in itfelf, and in 
 the power of the agent, can admit of moral obligation. 
 impoffibilium nulla eft obligatio. 
 
 Befides fpontaneity in the agent and contingency in 
 refpect of action, it is particularly necefTary for render- 
 ing actions truly obligatory, that they have a good ten- 
 dency j for that obligation alone is true and real, which 
 
 enjoins 
 
32 • MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 enjoins what is good and prohibits all that is evii % 
 becaufe for that end only a connection of motives 
 can take place. 
 
 Sch. i.— Obligations that enjoin to do what is bad, or pro- 
 hibit what is good, are abfurdand void. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Obligations contrary to our private good, are Hill 
 binding, if they have for their object public felicity; in 
 this cafe there would be an obligation, not to do what is 
 evil, but to chufe from two goods the greateft. 
 
 Sd. 3. — Obligations which have neither private nor public 
 good for their object, are nugatory and invalid, let the 
 authority by which they are eftablifhed be ever fo re- 
 fpectable. 
 
 Sch* 4. — As the wifeft lawgivers cannot always forefee the 
 effect which laws may produce, or may be miftaken in 
 their well-meant intentions, it is poflible that they form 
 obligations, burthenfome in their nature, and grievous in 
 their effects, militating againft both public and private 
 good. A queftion arifes, whether citizens, in fuch cafes, 
 may immediately throw them aflde, withhold their obe- 
 dience, and take the liberty of chufing for themfelves. 
 
 This queftion, as it is of great moment and importance, ap- 
 pears at firft fight to be extremely difficult; much, how- 
 ever, of that difficulty will vanifh, if we reflect upon other 
 weighty civil obligations, which enjoin to every citizen 
 all poflible care and perfeverance for the maintenance and 
 prefervation of peace and good order in fociety, fo eflen- 
 fcial to the promotion of public good. Thefe obligations, 
 which particular acts cannot fuperfede, dictate in all cafes 
 of a grievous nature, moderation, forbearance and pa- 
 tience, joined to a magnanimous folicitude, conducted 
 with prudence, to try all poffible means for redrefs, ra- 
 ther than to break in upon the tranquillity of our fellow 
 citizens. What is a temporary fubmiilion to grievances, 
 compared to the horrid confequences of anarchy and con- 
 fufion? Is not a lefs evil, in collifion with a greater, to 
 be confidered as a good? Public commotions are ge- 
 nerally attended with evils and calamities, which in- 
 volve prefent and future generations in the raoft ruinous 
 :onfe-]uences; they are therefore to be placed among 
 
 thofe 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 33 
 
 thofe expedients which cannot be juftified but by ex- 
 treme neceflity, where grievances are wickedly and in- 
 tentionally multiplied and ftudioufly continued, where 
 all lawful means in the power of men have proved abor- 
 tive and fruitlefs. 
 ScL $. — The effects of human laws are for the molt part things 
 eventual: as we are pleafed with thofe which happen 
 to be beneficial, we ought to exercife patience under 
 fuch as are of an adverfe nature. 
 
 Since the fcope of moral obligation is to enjoin thafi 
 
 which is good and to prohibit evil, it follows, that a 
 
 faithful performance of our obligations renders our 
 
 uate perfect, and procures to the mind pleafure and 
 
 fatisfaction. 
 
 Sch. — Moral obligation is therefore the friendly direclrix of 
 liberty. 
 
 Exercife of liberty, contrary to obligation, is licm- 
 tioufnefs. 
 
 Moral obligation is for certain ends, and extends to 
 all the means necejfary for their attainment : for ends 
 and means are things naturally connected ; the one is 
 therefore infeparable from the other. 
 
 Se/i. 1. — The consideration of the extent of moral obligation 
 in this refpeft, is of infinite importance to all human af- 
 fairs, particularly in the weighty concerns of government, 
 where inconceivable mifchiefs may arife from not care- 
 fully obferving a due diftinction between ends abfolutely 
 necefTary, and fuch as recommend themfelves by plaufi- 
 bility, or reft upon temporary expediency. 
 
 Sci. 2. — The intolerable hardfliips under which nations ftrug- 
 gle are weighty and incontrovertible arguments why 
 the fplendor of their governments mould not dazzle our 
 eyes, or tempt us eagerly to adopt their maxims. 
 
 ScL 3. — Citizens, murmuring againft contributions which 
 have a necefTary and falutary influence upon public good, 
 betray a want of difcretion and of public fpirit; they 
 wifn, in fuch cafes, to feparate protection and allegiance 
 
 F from 
 
j-f MORAL PHILOSOPHY'. 
 
 from that fupport without which the one cannot be af- 
 forded, and the other becomes void and nominal. 
 
 Obligations and rights are of a reciprdcdl nature* 
 
 ana always dependent upon one another, as caufes and 
 
 effects. As there cannot be an effect without a caufe, 
 
 i'o no right can be juftly claimed or exercifed except it 
 
 accord with a previous obligation. 
 
 Sch. i. — Could, for inftance, the highefl public authority 
 claim and exercife the rights of ordering military fervices 
 cr impofing taxes, if citizens were not previously under 
 obligations to defend the (late and to fupport its govern- 
 ment? or, can government extend the exercife of thofe 
 rights in an arbitrary manner to the deflruction of the 
 date ? We mull anfwer in the negative; for things pny- 
 iically connected cannot, and thofe of a moral nature 
 ought not to be feparated. To pretend that rights might 
 be claimed without, and exercifed beyond or contrary to- 
 obligations, would be afferting that effects can take place 
 without a caufe. 
 
 Sch. 2. — This natural and indiflbluble dependence of rights 
 upon obligations deferves our particular attention, be- 
 caufe rights are generally more obvious to our appre- 
 henfion and more pleating to our feelings than obliga- 
 tions: thefe always lay us under a kind of refrraint, while 
 it is the property of rights to impofe no reftraint upon 
 ourfelves, but to lay the burden of obligation upon others. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Hence we difcover a principal caufe why we generally 
 feel a reluctance in performing our obligations-, and why, 
 on the other hand, we are fo apt to boail of our rights. 
 Hence it is, that men, actuated by fenfe and paffion, often 
 claim rights where none really ex ill, and are prone fo 
 extend thofe which they pollefs beyond their jull and 
 proper limits. 
 Hence it is likiwife, that the bell eftablifhed governments, 
 conducted with all pollible moderation, prudence and 
 juftice, cannot be entirely free from jealoufy and diffe- 
 rence in fentiment between rulers and the ruled. 
 
 From this natural connection of obligation and right 
 it evidently follows, that even poiitive obligations can- 
 not 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 35 
 
 not be arbitrary, but muft be conformable to the na- 
 ture of man, of things, and of circumftances. Poiitive 
 obligations depend upon the will of others-, but that 
 wilfought to be directed by motives, and, if properly 
 exerciied, cannot be contrary to, but muft be in uriifon 
 with natural obligation. 
 
 Sch. — Government can in no inftance be juftifiable in com- 
 manding citizens to aft contrary to public good ; nor can. 
 anv aft of government make the commihion of a fin juft 
 and lawful. 
 
 There is a diftinction between human obligations 
 and their correlative rights : fome are of fuch a nature 
 that their performance is liable to compullion, whilft 
 others leave the performance to our difcretion and 
 good will. In the former cafe, obligations and rights 
 are p erf eft ; in the latter, imp erf eft. 
 
 Sch. i. — All acts of equity and humanity are of imperfeft right, 
 and reft upon imperfeft obligation. To attend to the 
 neceflities of the poor, to clothe the naked, to feed the 
 hungry, to direft into the right way thofe who are gone 
 aftrav, &c. are important obligations upon all who are 
 blefled with the means of afliftance ; and on the part of 
 thofe who are in want, there is a facred right to apply for 
 comfort and relief. But from want and mifery no right 
 can refult that may juftlfy force and compulfion: the 
 right of the poor and the diftrefTed in this cafe is imper- 
 feft, and fo is the obligation on the part of the rich and 
 wealthy ; it refts with them to judge whether affiftance is 
 in their power necefl'ary or proper. 
 
 £ e l, 2 . — But all afts of ftrift juftice are of perfect right, and 
 refult from perfeft obligation. To oppofe juft, laudable 
 and falutary purfuits, by hindering our neighbour in the 
 ufe of juft means in his own power, is an aft contrary to 
 his right and our obligation. If he defift upon our in- 
 terference, he cannot fatisfy an important obligation; on 
 the contrary, he countenances a bad action, teeming with 
 confequences fatal to himfelf and to mankind in general. 
 In vain are his rights, and to no purpofe are means in his 
 
 power, 
 
3 6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 power, if in fuch cafes he cannot compel us to act con- 
 formably to our obligation and to abftain from unjuft in- 
 terference. His natural obligation to make a proper ufe 
 of thofe means with which he is bieiTed for good ends, 
 gives him in this cafe the right of compwlfion, and our 
 obligation not to interrupt him in his juft purfuits is 
 perfect. 
 
 We call that our own, in which we have a perfect 
 
 right, and whereof we can difpofe as we pleafe. 
 
 Sch. — Withrefpect. to God we cannot call any thing our own; 
 our perfect and exclufive right can only have reference 
 to our fellow creatures, as all that we have is of him, and 
 we ourfelves the work of his hand. This confideration 
 alone is fufficient to prove that nothing can be indifferent 
 m all that we do or think, and that abufe is unjuftifiable 
 above all things. Let the fons of luxury and pride look 
 upon the hand that fcatters abroad his bleflings upon 
 men and beafts, and all that has breath ; is it not for 
 wife and good pnrpofes that their lot fell into lovely pla- 
 ces? Is it not that they mould abound in virtue, in grati- 
 tude to God and benevolence to men ? Let thofe whofe 
 hearts are too obdurate to feel the weight of thele reflec- 
 tions, confider, that even the nature of their right con- 
 demns all indifference of conduct with refpeft to God 
 and men. It is true, in our perfect right no man may 
 interfere; but can we have or exercife it juftly, if we act 
 contrarv to our obligation ? But what is more inconfiflent 
 with, more repugnant to our facred invariable obligation, 
 than ingratitude, inhumanity, luxury, with its natural 
 offspring, pride, oppremon, injuftice, impiety, &c? 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of Moral Law. 
 
 -ORAL obligations obtain particular energy and 
 binding force, if declared, prefcribed, enjoined, and 
 fanctioned by juft authority -, thus qualified, they be- 
 come 
 
 *» 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 37 
 
 come imperial rules for human conclude in all circum- 
 stances and fituations of life, and aflume the appella- 
 tion and nature of moral laws. 
 
 Sch. i. — Logicians call thoie definitions real, which {hew the 
 geneiis, origin, and nature of the object defined. Of this 
 defcription is the definition juft given. Upon due ex- 
 amination it will be found not to difagree in any necefFary 
 point from the nominal definition generally adopted, ac- 
 cording to which moral laiu is a general rule, given by afu- 
 perior to an inferior, for regulating human conduct, declaring 
 ivhat is right cr ivrong, or in what mariner ?na?i ouvlit to conduct? 
 his actions and nfe his powers and faculties : on the contrary, 
 it has that particular merit above the latter, that at fir ft 
 fight it more precifely determines the idea of a true fupe- 
 rior upon the principles of juft authority, with refpeft to 
 the right of giving rules for human conduct, and the juft 
 mode in which it muft beexercifed. It alfo guards againft 
 a poliible abufe of power in the adminiftration of juftice, 
 by excluding all arbitrary rules of right and wrong from 
 the facred character of moral laws. Laftly, it maintains 
 that our moral obligation in its nature is to be left invio- 
 late by the commanding rule of authority: this gives to 
 the former force and fanction, but can in no inftance 
 change its nature — No authority can caufe true obliga- 
 tion to ceafe to be fuch, nor render that right which is 
 repugnant thereto, under any circumftances whatever. 
 
 .Sv//. 2. — It muft be deemed a high recommendation to our de- 
 finition, that it is in perfect anifon with the invariable 
 and facred laws of God, both the natural and the revealed. 
 His authority, founded in his infinite power and godhead, 
 fo manifeftly declared in the works of creation and pre- 
 servation of the univerfe, gives infinite luftre and incom- 
 prehenfible majefty to the divine laws ; but is it not the 
 * peculiar glory, excellency, and beauty of thofe laws, that 
 they likewife have their eternal and unchangeable foun- 
 dation in the infinite wifdom and goodnefs of God, en- 
 joining nothing but what is profitable and good ? He, 
 tiie Lord of the univerfe, is clothed with abfolute autho- 
 rity, and can do all that he pleafes ; the world is his, and 
 all that is therein ; but he is pleafed to govern man by 
 thofe holy laws which his infinite underftanding from 
 
 eternity 
 

 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 eternity has feen fit and ncceflary for his glory and the 
 happinefs of men; laws which are necefTarily holy, per- 
 fect and immutable, for infinite wifdom has laid their 
 foundation, infinite power carries them into execution, 
 and infinite goodnefs directs their effects. The will of 
 God is that we mould be happy. His laws enjoin and 
 command, by fanctions the moil powerful, benign and 
 majeftic, our true, our real obligation to endeavour to be happy 
 indeed. Here rules for our conduct and our moral obli- 
 gation perfectly agree : the language of the laws of God 
 
 1S, THIS DO, ANJ) THOU SHALT LIVE. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Behold the glorious pattern, the infallible criterion of all 
 that is excellent, jufl and deflrable in human laws! But 
 is fuch a perfection attainable Dy frail mortals, and in af- 
 fairs of which men are to have the management ? We 
 anfwer, and in its place fhall prove, that it is the obliga- 
 tion of each particular individual £0 ufe his beff. endea- 
 vour to come as near it as pofiible: is it not the divine 
 command which lays this obligation upon all men — be ye 
 -perfect even as your father which is in heaven is perfefl? Can 
 there be, therefore, an exception with refpect to thofe 
 who are inverted with the risfht to direct the actions of 
 
 O 
 
 men? Mud it not be their indifpenfible duty to make ufe 
 of their authority for the happinefs-of fociety, flates and 
 nations? Is it not the nature and defign of the great 
 power intrulied to them, that dictate the neceffity of co- 
 pying after the great and glorious lawgiver in difpenfing 
 benignity, philanthropy, and difintereited juftice ? How 
 other wife mould they maintain the high character of 
 
 GODS ON EARTH? 
 
 Sch. 4. — How happy for the good of fociety would it be, if 
 thefe principles were always realized in human legiflation ! 
 Opprefiions and tyranny would ceafe; arbitrary meafures 
 would never appear or have any duration under the form 
 and facred character of laws: envy, detraction and Edi- 
 tion, with a train of black vices and calamities on the 
 part of the governed, if ever they ihould make their ap- 
 pearance, would rind not even a pretext, much lefs coun- 
 tenance. Societies, flates and nations would be bands of 
 brothers, and enjoy happiuefs indeed. 
 But alas! it is to this day a matter of doubt, whether fuch 
 principles can be put in practice; the idea is generally 
 
 ridiculed 
 
AJORAL PHILOSOPHY. jtt 
 
 ridiculed and fpurned at by thofe who, being in authority, 
 have the power to bring about reformation in points 
 where arbitrary meafures have aflumed the form of laws: 
 the notion has become familiar, that human authority 
 has unlimited fcope: even authors who profefledly have 
 treated of the nature of moral laws, favour an exception 
 from the great rule, that the laws of Cod maintain general 
 fuprcmacy over human iufuthtions and laws; thus° they 
 countenance the notion, that human laws have a pecu- 
 liar chat-after for themfelves, entirely diftinft from the 
 law of nature and revelation, diitinft, consequently 
 from the nature of moral law* For, to give but one 
 inftance among the many, what does it avail, that we 
 adopt the great truth which the celebrated Biackilone lavs 
 down in words very expreffive, upon tkefe two foundations, 
 the law of nature and of revelation, depend all human laws; 
 when we find that almoft in the fame breath he affirms as 
 a truth, that there are a great numher of indifferent points in 
 which both the divine laws and the natural leave a man at his 
 own liherty ; with the additional obfervation, that in re- 
 fpeft ot them human laws have tlieir greateft force and efficacy ? 
 He proceeds, and fpeaks of points not indifferent, for 
 mftancc, murder, and allows human laws declaratory- 
 force only, thence inferring their fubordination to the 
 laws of nature and of revelation. Laws, therefore, ac- 
 cording to his tacit confeflion, which act upon things in- 
 different, do not aft in fubordination to them. The con- 
 fluence then is, that all human laws depend upon thofe 
 divine laws, the natural and the revealed; and that 
 fome human laws, particularly thofe which have great 
 force and efficacy, do not depend thereon ! If thofe un- 
 changeable divine laws leave points indifferent, how can 
 human laws, acting upon fuch points, depend upon them ) 
 No, according to this reafoning they depend upon the 
 will of the legislature; they have no folid permanent 
 foundation, but are arbitrary. Should God thus leave 
 his rational creatures to arbitrary difpofal ? It cannot be. 
 His laws leave not one point indifferent : actions as ne- 
 ceflarily have their conferences as caufes their effects: 
 theie confeqnences have influence upon human nature, 
 individuals, lbcieties, &c. they are confequently far from 
 being indifferent in the light o*f God's natural law, which 
 extends to all aftions admitting of morality or immorali- 
 ty.— 
 
40 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ty. — Suppofe that actions were indifferent, or their influ- 
 ence to human obfervation imperceptible, which certainly 
 cannot be the cafe with God, could the exercifeof liberty, 
 could our choice be indifferent, when it is evident from 
 the nature of tilings, that acts of choice are acts of the 
 will ? Where there is room for choice, there is a connection 
 of motives, moral obligation, and cognizance of moral 
 law, and of courfe controul of the laws of God. Does it 
 follow, that an action is indifferent becaufe it does not 
 •amount to murder? The diftinction into malum infe, an 
 aclion loicked in itfelf^ and malum prohibitum^ an aft Ion wick- 
 ed becaufe it is forbidden by lazv, cannot prove that the latter 
 is more indifferent than the former.; all that it intimates 
 is, that actions have various degrees of deformity and 
 guilt, and varioufly influence human happinefs. The 
 forum confcientise extends to all actions; and human 
 laws prohibiting actions which are repugnant to natural 
 and revealed law, add indeed more guilt to difobedience, 
 make actions more immoral, as new motives added natu- 
 rally increafe obligation, and leave lefs culpablenefs and 
 excufe. They are fubordinate to the divine laws, but 
 have, notwithflanding this, as full force and efficacy as 
 if they acted upon any other point. Thefe things will 
 be placed in a clearer light in the fourth chapter of this 
 treatife, where we propofe to fpeak of the various degrees 
 of morality or immorality in human actions. 
 
 A fmail degree of attention will enable us to defeat the force 
 of the examples by which the author illuftrates his rea- 
 foning. In the cafe of murder, human laws, fays he, 
 have but a declaratory force, and act in fubordination to 
 the divine laws: in points indifferent, for inftance, ex- 
 portation of wool, they have their greatefl force and ener- 
 gy; they enjoin and fanction obedience, and, as muft be 
 fuppofed by the author's reafoning, change the nature of 
 action, make what is innocent or indifferent guilt. 
 
 But why may human authority prohibit the exportation of 
 wool? Is it becaufe the action is indifferent? Upon this 
 fuppofition, how mall we account for the jufHce and 
 wifdom of the legiflature? Is it becaufe it would be 
 contrary to public good? In this cafe we can both ac- 
 count for the wifdom and neceffity and juitice of the law : 
 it is tjien not an arbitrary proceeding acting upon a point 
 
 which 
 

 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 4 1 
 
 which is indifferent, but very important indeed to the 
 happinefs of fo< iety : it is giving a rule for the conduct 
 
 of citizens, which perfectly agrees with their moral obli- 
 gation, under which they are naturally and neceiTarm 
 members of fociety, to ahfiainfrou! oil $4? is contrary ^ ami 
 to do all things -which are beneficial to public rood. Behold 
 here a moral obligation prefcribed, enjoined, and fane- 
 tioned, in perfect conformity with the facred character 
 cf moral law, in lubordination to the laws of God, both 
 the natural and the revealed ! Why mould citizens obey 
 that law? becaufe it is their indifpenfible obligation; an 
 obligation prefcribed and {'auctioned by authority upon 
 1 : e principles cf right and eternal juftice. If all citizens 
 were faithful to, if they but knew their obligation, they 
 all would abibiu from au exportation prejudicial to pub- 
 lic good, although there were no reftraint or prohibition 
 to the contrary : even were there a law enacted to com- 
 .mand that exportation, they would, ceteris paribus, as 
 facredly be bound to tranfgrefs that law, as they are bound 
 to tranfgrefs that which mould command and enjoin the 
 perpetration of murder: becaufe, in both cafes the com- 
 mand would be inconfiffent with their true and real obli- 
 gation : and there is only this difference, that murder is of 
 direct, tranfgrefiion in the other cafe of indirect malici- 
 oufnefs, and that the former has an immediate pernicious 
 effect, the other a very remote one. 
 
 If the prohibition is juft and neceffary for the fupport of 
 the poor and the encouragement of honeft induftry, and 
 for the benefit of the whole community, a tranfgreffion 
 of that prohibition may become in its confequences very 
 fatal ; as citizens, for want of employ, may habituate 
 themfeives to Health, and perifh by the hand of juftice 
 — others drag out their days in a comfortiefs and fbarved 
 condition. Such a point mould be indifferent! 
 
 We admit the principle, that upon the law of nature and 
 the law of revelation, all human laws depend, and main- 
 tain, that there is not room for any exception, in refpect 
 ol any of them, fo that no rules for human conduct 
 
 GIVEN BY ANY AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER, CAN BB 
 LAWS OF A BINDING FORCE, UNLESS THEY AGREE WITH 
 THE LAWS OF NATURE AND OF REVELATION ENJOIN- 
 ING OUR TRUE AND REAL OBLIGATION, AND CONSE- 
 G QUENTLY 
 
4' 2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 QUENTLY BEARING THE STAMP AND CHARACTER OF 
 MORAL LAW. 
 
 Hard as this conclufion may bear againft proceedings of a 
 long Handing, which have taken their origin in times of 
 ignoranfce or con fu (ion, or have fprUng up from the vio- 
 lence of party fpirit, gaining frrength from habits and 
 mtereftednefs; little as it can boaft the fupport of learned 
 authority; unfriendly as it may be to men, who have ac- 
 cu Homed themfelves to rule independent of natural jus- 
 tice; ftill it is true. Founded in the nature of things, and 
 having for its fupport the internal evidence of truth itfelf, 
 it ought to be regarded as the palladium of ajuftadmi- 
 niitration of government, and a guide at all times and in 
 all places for the difpenfation of juftice. 
 
 Neither do we fubicribc to the idea, that human laws, in 
 points, according to the author, not indifferent, have but 
 fole declaratory power. Has the perpetration of a crime, 
 as murder, no influence upon the felicity of focietv? 
 Should not, therefore, human laws exercifethe fame right 
 to prevent, and to punilli fuch as are guilty thereof, as 
 they have the right to punifh all who act contrary to the 
 juit and falutary laws of the land? By all means — go- 
 vernments may and do exercife that right. 
 
 'v,'\ :. — It remains to account for the innumerable indiffe- 
 rent things and actions known by the appellation of per- 
 miJfions, becaufe human laws take no cognizance of them. 
 Thefe are facts which cannot be denied, but afford no 
 folid objection agaimt the preceding animadversions; as 
 that indifference is not in confequence of the natural and 
 revealed law of God, or of moral law, but a neceflary 
 effect of the imoerfections of human legiflators. Be their 
 ftations ever fo high, their power and wifdom ever fo 
 great, they do not ceafe to be men; they are neither om- 
 nipotent nor omnifcient. Hence fome things, in refpecr. 
 of human laws, muff remain indifferent in their nature ; 
 others will be fo under a variety of circumftances. 
 
 Of the former kind arc all concerns of confeience in things 
 in which men are only accountable to their God, as cer- 
 tain modes of worfliip : how may men dictate here, where 
 they cannot fee nor controul the hidden thoughts and 
 windings of the human heart? or how can they controul 
 what is not controulable by violence and forcer Finally, 
 
 how 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHV 
 
 43 
 
 now dare they nfurp the prerogative of the Molt High? 
 All they can and ought to do, in cafes where the felii it) 
 of foeiety is really endangered, is to put a check upon 
 the fatal effects of errors, innovations, &.c. with all poflible 
 prudence and moderation, left they incur the jufi ii 
 tation of being guilty of acts oi opprefiion, nerfecution 
 and tyranny. 
 
 Thefe are things which, in their nature, ought, before 
 human tribunals, to remain indifferent. Kcw happy 
 would it have been for the caufe both of humanity and 
 chriftianity, if thefe truths had guided the counfcls of 
 church and (late ! 
 
 But there are alfo many things, many anions indifferent, 
 upon which human laws might act, if it were not for 
 want of power and wifdom. It wouid be endlefs work, 
 far furpaffing human power, to direct each individual 
 man by name in each individual action, under each par- 
 ticular circumftance of mode, time and place, and in 
 each fituation and relation of life. Only God can and 
 really governs thus: each man partakes of human nature, 
 enjoys the powers of confeience, is placed in particular 
 circumftances by prqvidence, is gifted with particular 
 talents, for all which he is accountable to his God, who 
 has written his law into the heart of every man, and 
 knows and judges his thoughts. In the revealed law 
 of God, wherein he declares and commands what men 
 mil ft do to be faved, the rules are general, becaufe 
 the means afforded to each perfon are the fame, and 
 confequently things in themfelves of a general nature. 
 'But it is quite othenvife in refpect of the natural law oi 
 God; here all obligations are of an individual nature. 
 It is left to human wifdom and a proper ufe of reafon to 
 bring them under general rules and forms; for 1 actions 
 have a fimibrity; many, therefore, may be confidered of 
 a kin, and come under certain fpecies or kinds. 
 
 For inftance: Injury comprehends murder, theft, bearing falfe- 
 witnefs, Sec. 
 
 But human legiflators, ignorant of individual perfons, not 
 able to watch and to controul each ftep of the conduct of 
 men, equally unqualified to forefce effects, confequeoc 
 and relations, muit content themfelves with general rules 
 comprehending often certain defcri t) n of citizens only, 
 
44 MORAL PIIIL050PHV; 
 
 or actions of a certain clafs, complexion and tendency; 
 
 human laws can and do, therefore, give only general cha- 
 racters and marks, whereby we are to fee our obligation in 
 fpecial cafes. It is on this account always a difficult talk to 
 know their extent and their proper fenfe and meaning. 
 
 We could add, that with refpect to human laws, perfons 
 aiiume the general character of citizens, and as fuch are 
 alike with others under general moral obligations. 
 
 Thefe obligations mult be performed by individual actions, 
 Which are determined as well in refpect of our relation 
 with other citizens, as the particular mode, place, circum- 
 ihmce, or any other quality whatlbever. Behold then 
 the neceliity of general rules, pointing out our parti- 
 cular moral obligation ! But let it be remembered, that 
 rule is for the fake of obligation, and not obligation for 
 the fake of rule. 
 
 We may only adduce one or the other inftance from human 
 laws, in order to be convinced of the propriety of thefe 
 remarks. 
 
 The moral obligation of citizens is to defend the ftate; go- 
 vernment has a right to enjoin that obligation ; each citi- 
 zen is bound to obey a law fo falutary, fo neceiTary, fo 
 perfectly confident with their indifpenfible obligation. 
 But what would become of the ftate, if all muft take 
 arms? Is public good confalted, if manufactures cf a 
 necefiary nature, if agriculture, &c. are at a ftand? Muft 
 not wifdom direct, that a certain clafs of citizens, of a 
 certain age and occupation, perhaps a certain number 
 only, mould oppofe the enemy, the reft remain for culti- 
 vating the earth, adminiftering juftice, &c? 
 
 One obfervation remains, that things, indifferent in the. 
 eye of human laws, muft ceafe to be fuch as foon as 
 their influence upon public good becomes known: 
 ]ikewife, precepts or prohibitions that have a danger- 
 ous effect, muft either be changed into permiflions, 
 or turned into their oppofites. So there will be no end 
 to the obligations, to learn wifdom, that we may fee the 
 right wav, and endeavour to abound more and more in 
 uprightnefs, that we may walk therein. 
 
 Thus we have endeavoured to fhow, that all laws 
 ought to have thefe two erTential characters of morai 
 
 law -, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 45 
 
 law, true moral obligation, and its fan ct ion by juft au- 
 thority. From thefe fources flow all the general dif- 
 t motions and properties of laws. 
 
 Laws are preceptive or prohibitory, as thev 'import 
 affirmative or negative obligations : thefe enjoin the 
 omifTion, the former the performance of certain actions : 
 thus the firft law of the ten commandments is prohi- 
 bitory, for it enjoins omifiion ; thou /halt have no other 
 gods before me. The fourth and the fifth, on the con- 
 trary, are preceptive, &c. 
 
 Sch. — However proper this diftinttion may be with refpect to 
 the general obligations which form the principal character 
 of laws, yet it by no means extends to all their particular 
 injunctions. There cannot be fuch a thing as a preceptive 
 law entirely clivefted of prohibitions; neither can there be 
 prohibitory laws which comprehend not precepts; for 
 precepts and prohibitions are correlate ideas; the one can- 
 not exift without the other. How, for inftance, can our 
 conduct be conformable to any precept, if we do not omit 
 things which are repugnant thereto? Is it poflible for men 
 to be juft who wallow in acts of unrighteoufnefs? The 
 fame is the cafe with prohibitions and prohibitory laws. 
 How can we act conformably to the law which com- 
 mands, " thou malt have no other gods before me," if 
 we do not endeavour to feek after the true God, to defire 
 to know, to reverence, and to put our truft in him? 
 
 No laws can be given to perfons who are not capable 
 to exercife undemanding, reafon and judgment-, for 
 they are incapable of moral obligation. 
 
 Sch". — Hence it is, that infant children, lunatics ami madmen 
 are not under the cognizance of laws. 
 
 Laws zrzumv 'erj hi or particular: thefe import obli- 
 gations which bind a limited number of perfons, but 
 the former enjoin univerfal obligations, binding to all. 
 
 Sch. 1 . — The terms univerfal and particular being what is called 
 
 correlate ideas, are taken in a greater or I it. The 
 
Jt& MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 idea of univerfality with reipe& to men, in its greater! la- 
 titude comprehends the whole human race, and leaves 
 whole nations, Hates and focieties under the character of 
 particular ideas; but univerfality is often reitrictcd to the 
 idea of nations, ftates and focieties, and leaves under par- 
 ticular confideration certain claffes, descriptions, or a 
 plurality of their refpective members : thefe again may be 
 formed into univerfal ideas, comprehending a greater or 
 lefs number of individuals. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The laws of the ten commandments, and all natural 
 laws, are, in the mod extenfive fignirication, univerfal ; 
 for they bind all' mankind. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Human univerfal laws bind whole nations and ftates; 
 all citizens, for infeance, are bound to defend the Hate. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Human laws are for the greater! part particular ; for 
 though all members of fociety are bound to promote the 
 common good, and all citizens to defend the ftate, yet 
 there are many occupations and many ways in which 
 common good is to be purfued, and there are alfo many 
 things neceflary for a vigorous defence of the ftate befides 
 military fervice; agriculture is not to be neglected, necef- 
 fary manufactures muft be attended to, &c. Many ex- 
 ceptions and modifications muft therefore enter into laws 
 providing for common or public good; many difpenfa- 
 tions will be found neceflary and expedient. 
 
 As human laws ad upon a vad variety of interefts, 
 under an inconceivable multiplicity of circumftances, 
 we need not wonder that we often meet with intricacies 
 and difficulties in determining their extent with refpect 
 to the perfons and actions which come under their 
 cognizance. Laws are conceived in words, and thefe 
 have not always a precife meaning-, or their fenfe may , 
 be variously affected by the connection of fentences in 
 t\hj various expreffions neceflary to fhew the particular 
 modifications of the obligations which laws intend to 
 f motion. The (en(c and extent of the precepts and 
 prohibitions muft therefore often remain fluctuating, 
 are fubjeel: to different conitructions, and 
 
 fometimes 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 47 
 
 fometimes admit of difpute. It is therefore neccflary 
 to have a foundation for the conftruclion of laws, lefs 
 liable to change and more uniform than words. This 
 muft be the very caufe that gave rife to them*, the end 
 and fcope for which they were enacted; The caufe 
 and fcope of laws muft therefore lead our inquiries into 
 their extent, and finally determine our decifiqn: on 
 this account they have obtained the appellation of the 
 fpirit of taws. 
 
 But how {hall we always difcover the true caufe and 
 fcope of laws ? may it not be often a fubjec c t of con- 
 troversy ? It may be: but we mall rind our inquiry in 
 that refpccl greatly facilitated by confidering the occa- 
 fion of lav/s •, that is, by attending to a concurrence of 
 circumftances which have given rife to them. 
 
 ScL i. — He therefore who would determine the extent and 
 meaning of laws, muft not lofe fight of their fpirit — muft 
 not be inattentive to the occafion of their origin. 
 
 Sell, 2. — For inftance: in times of a public commotion, laws 
 may pafs which lay great reftriclions upon perfonsin the 
 purfuit of necefihry and innocent occupations. Should 
 that renramt continue when the affairs of the ftate or city 
 arc fettled, and all things bear the afpeel of peace and 
 good order? Attend to the pecafion of thofe laws, and 
 you will find that thefe reitriclions have loft their efficacy. 
 Suppofe farther, that the law forbids any peribn to be 
 feen in the ftreet after a certain hour; can that extend to 
 a meflenger lent for a phyfician in a defperate cafe? can 
 it extend to the phyfician? Here certainly is an excep- 
 tion, if the fpirit of the law be confulted. 
 
 No actions come under the controul of laws which 
 are not in our power, or which depend not upon our 
 will •, for in fuch cafes no obligation can take place. 
 
 $ck. — It was not a law, but an act of tyranny, that commanded 
 the Ifraelites to make bricks without llraw. 
 
 ry-1 
 
48 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The fpirit and fcope of all laws ought to be, that we 
 do what is good and avoid all that is evil ; for this 
 alone can be the lcope of our true obligation. 
 
 Sc/j. 1. — Laws which command what is bad, and prohibit 
 what is good, are grievous oppreflions, and void in them- 
 felves. 
 
 ScL 2. — Laws which have no good for their object, are nuga- 
 tory and invalid. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Laws are falutary and have binding force, which have 
 public good for their object, though they bear hard oil 
 private intereft. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Should laws prove to be contrary both to private in- 
 tereft and public good, they would ceafe to bear the (acred 
 character of laws, and have no validity in themfelves. 
 
 ScL 5. — Upon the queftion, Whether we are at liberty to fet 
 thofe laws afide? we anfwer, that public authority, for 
 the fake of peace and order, is entitled to great reipect 
 and deference; that one improvident act cannot difannul 
 the powerful obligations which are kept inviolate under 
 the protection of the laws of the land. Public felicity, 
 fo inseparably connected with the obfervance of order, 
 renders it advifeable, nay neceflary, that the ruled bear 
 patiently a temporary inconvenience, and purfue the 
 moft gentle means for redrefs of grievances. Thofe who 
 are fo very apt to find fault with government, and mag- 
 nify ant-hills into mountains, fhould confider, that their 
 rulers are but men; that a government watching for the 
 wellfare of a ftate or a nation, is a momentous and ardu- 
 ous tafk; that laws have to take a profpect of things which 
 are yet in the womb of futurity; that effects of the befr. 
 intended means are often problematical ; that it is not in 
 the wifdorn or power of men to forefee or to controul 
 events. There is fuch a thing as a laudable jealoufy on 
 the part of the governed, which keeps pace with the fitua- 
 tion and concerns of the public good, and aims at an in- 
 violate enjovment of our natural and political rights. 
 The character of a good citizen, of a patriot, is not to 
 court popularity, by catching at every opportunity to 
 render government odious in the eyes of his fellow citi- 
 zens; public good is his primum mobile; he will be in- 
 
 ceflant, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 49 
 
 ced'ant, but prudent and moderate in his endeavours to 
 feek a happy change in all that has not a benign influence 
 on public happinefs. 
 And who fliould be more ready or willing for fuch a change 
 than men in authority, who have power to rectify all that 
 is improper? Should they not be vigilant, even antici- 
 pating applications for redrefs, by timely adminiftering 
 falutary and necerTary remedies, when any public mea- 
 fure has taken place which anfwers not public good? Is 
 it not tor this end that the very power they poflefs is in- 
 truded to them? Men of true wifdom will always be 
 confcious of their own fallibility — the guardians of the 
 laws mould firft fee their effects. It is no difgrace to any 
 government to rectify abufes : it is, on the contrary, a 
 circumftance not altogether honourable to the under- 
 Handings or the hearts of rulers, if grievances are con- 
 tinued: I know of no epithet ftrong enough to convey 
 the idea of deteftation and abhorrence which a govern- 
 ment deferves, if it mould perfiit to defend or fupport 
 them. 
 
 Upon the preceding proportion, which proves the 
 good and falutary tendency which all laws ought to 
 have, depend the ideas of legal morality or immorality : 
 where actions conformable to law are considered as 
 good, thofe which are repugnant to its precepts or pro- 
 hibitions are bad : actions, concerning which laws do 
 not determine, are permijfions , that is, actions legally 
 indifferent. 
 
 Sch. 1. — As it is poffible that unjufl laws exift, it is alfo poffi- 
 ble that actions be legally bad which are really good, and 
 vice verfa. 
 
 ■SeL 2. — How often have unjufl: and tyrannic laws condemned 
 as treafon and herefy, actions the mofl heroic and bene- 
 ficial to the caufe cf God and man? 
 
 Sch. 3. — In one forum an action may be permitted, which in 
 another is not fo. In the forum of nature and of nature's 
 God no a6tion is indifferent; no permillion takes place. 
 
 Sch. 4. — All actionj which concern the confeiences of men 
 pught to remain indifferent in fcro civili: civil laws 
 
 II may 
 
<^Q MORAL PHILOSOFHV. 
 
 may only reltrain tlie effects of fuch actions when they 
 have a fatal tendency with refpect to public good. 
 
 Sri. c. — All actions indifferent in foro civili, becaufe their 
 good or bad influence upon public felicity is not imme- 
 diately discernible, cannot be fuch when experience points 
 out their influence. 
 
 We are faid to obey a law, if our conduct is con- 
 formable to its precepts and prohibitions upon the 
 flrength of motives taken from that law : a contrary 
 conduct is called difobedience. 
 
 Sch. 1 . — Hence every action conformable or contrary to law 
 cannot immediately be confidered as an act of obedience 
 or difobedience: for inftance; ftrangers not knowing our 
 laws may conduct themfelves in conformity to them from 
 a fenfe of propriety; they cannot take motives from laws 
 of which they are ignorant. Likewife, foreign minifters 
 are not amenable to our laws; they are not bound to obey 
 them; ftill, from a principle of good fenfe, decorum and 
 politenefs, they will not act contrary to them. 
 
 Sch. 2. — As laws have for their object to command what is 
 good and to prohibit what is evil, it follows, that by obe- 
 dience we obtain a good, and fubject ourfelves to evil by 
 difobedience. Obedience to juft laws will therefore ren- 
 der our ftate more perfect ; difobedience, on the contrary, 
 will render it more imperfect both in the eye of law and 
 in reality. 
 
 Before laws are given, they cannot be obeyed or 
 difobeyed -, for no legal motive is afforded for regulat- 
 ing our conduct. 
 
 Sch. — Ignorance of a law, with refpect to an individual, is to 
 him as if it were not in exiftence; for our mind can be 
 as little affected by what is unknown as by that which 
 does not exiit. 
 
 Laws can only direct with refpect to things which 
 may take place, not of fuch as have already happened. 
 
 Laws which have retrofpect on things paft, are filled. 
 ex foftfaffo laws. Such contradict every principle of 
 
 reafon ; 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 5 I 
 
 reafon ; are acts of unpardonable injuftice, and oppofed 
 to the very idea of law. 
 
 It is impofnble that a perfon can obey a law, or be 
 guilty of difobedience, if the knowledge thereof is not 
 in his power. 
 
 To caufe laws to be known that they may become 
 obligatory and binding, is called the promulgo.iion of 
 laws. 
 
 Before promulgation no law can be known; confe- 
 
 quently neither obedience nor difobedience is poflible. 
 
 Sch. — It is therefore a confideration wefl worthy the attention 
 of government, and of great importance to the commu- 
 nity, that laws be properly promulgated : a quefHon 
 arifes, whether publication in a newfpaperis fuificient to 
 caufe all the inhabitants of an extenfive country to know 
 the laws by which they are governed ? To put laws not 
 fufficiently promulgated into execution, is more to lay 
 fnares for the governed than to take proper care of their 
 conduct and to benefit fociety. 
 
 Laws cannot properly bt faid to be known if they 
 are not underftood •, hence it is evident, that laws muft 
 not be contradictory to themfelves, that they be intel- 
 ligible, that they be declared and prefcribed in words 
 the plaineft and the moil unequivocal, that every (tn- 
 tence be well determined and exprefTed, to prevent 
 mifconftruction and miflake. 
 
 ScL — If it be unavoidable entirely to abfiain from technical 
 terms, it follows from what has been faid, that they ought 
 to be ufed as feldom as poflible. They may ferve to dif- 
 play learning and fkill, but muft remain unintelligible to 
 a great part of the community. 
 
 Whatever care is taken to render laws clear and in- 
 telligible, yetfuch is the condition of the human mind, 
 fuch the nature of language, that it is impoMible to 
 convey ideas with fuch precifion as to leave no room 
 
 for 
 
52 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 for a poflible mifapprehenfion. It is therefore necef- 
 fary to explain the true fenfe, meaning and extent of 
 laws j that is, laws muft be often interpreted. 
 
 Interpretation is diitinguifned into the authentic, the 
 
 cufiomary, and the dotlrinal. 
 
 Sch. i. — Authentic interpretation proceeds from the lawgiver; 
 the cultomarv is inferred from the cuftoms of a country, 
 or a particular diftrict thereof, nay, even from particular 
 lifages of towns; the doctrinal depends upon the appli- 
 cation of the rules of grammar and logic, and upon in- 
 ferences drawn from the fpirit and occalion of laws. 
 
 Sc/i. 2. — Some adduce precedents as helps for interpretation ;, 
 but as thefe mav be pood or bad. it is to be feared that 
 dependence upon them is often very unfafe. 
 
 Ignorance of laws is faid to be lincible, if it has been 
 in our power to know them; if otherwife, it is invin- 
 cible. 
 
 Sdi. — One who labours under invincible ignorance may violate 
 a law, but cannot be guilty of difobedience. 
 
 Since it is the fcope and nature of falutary laws, that 
 in all their precepts and prohibitions they contemplate 
 the happinefs of thofe who are under their cognizance 
 and controul, it neceflarily follows, that nothing is of 
 greater confequence to the general felicity of mankind 
 than obedience, nothing more hurtful and pernicious 
 than difobedience ; for as fuch laws, duly obferved, 
 neceflarily produce falutary effects, affording protection 
 of life and property, and fecuring that peace, harmony 
 and concord which render fecial intercourfe defirable, 
 and diffufe cafe, comfort and happinefs into every ftate 
 s.nd condition of life ; Co acts of difobedience, en the 
 contrary, defeat thefe falutary ends, fruftrate the good 
 intentions of the lawgiver, deprive mankind of the 
 choiceft pleafures of which this life is capable, and fpread 
 
 abroad 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. £$ 
 
 abroad difTention and confufion to the annoyance of all 
 that is agreeable and delightful inhuman converfation. 
 
 Hercewefee, that the nature of laws, the intention 
 of the lawgiver and the very happinefs of mankind re- 
 quire that the due obfervance of laws fhculd be made 
 as important as poflible, by affording to all who are 
 under their controul the ftrongeft motives, fufficient to 
 excite every well-wifher to mankind, every friend to 
 human happinefs, to acts of faithful obedience, and to 
 deter from wanton difobedience thofe whofe hearts are 
 either ftrangers to the tender feelings of duty and hu- 
 manity, or who are too weak to withfland the tempta- 
 tions and allurements of vice. 
 
 Laws are faid to be [anflioned, when ftrong and 
 powerful motives are connected with acts of obedience 
 and difobedience, calculated to enfure their faithful 
 obfervance : this will be the cafe, if confequences highlv 
 beneficial and irttereftirig are connected with acts of 
 obedience, while the contrary will refult from difobe- 
 dience ; for in this manner obedience will become a 
 great, a deferable good, difobedience adeteftable evil. 
 
 As good or bad confequences, refulting from acts of 
 obedience or difobedience, have reflectively obtained 
 the name of rewards and punifhments^ it follows, that 
 laws mult be fenctioned by rewards and punifhments. 
 
 Laws thus (auctioned place obedience, which is the 
 ba/is of all virtue and all that is excellent in human 
 conduct, in its true light, and . hold up to public 
 view difobedience, that defiling fcurce of fin and vice, 
 in its deteftable turpitude and deformity, for rewards 
 and punifhments, in their nature and effects, arc of great 
 extent, and have the greateft influence on the deareft 
 interefls of mankind. Leaving to an abler pen the tafk 
 
54 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of making researches into the various caufes that may 
 have co-operated and ftill co-operate to render the 
 fanctions of divine and human laws of fo little import- 
 ance to the generality of the children of men, as to 
 leave room for doubt whether there is fuch a thing that 
 deferves the name of fanction, and in its nature can 
 ihield the inviolability of laws from unhallowed infrac- 
 tions, we content ourfelves for the prefent to fhow, 
 that the great unconcernednefs obferved in human con- 
 duct, the neglect of the laws of God and of men, does 
 not proceed from the nature of moral law, nor from 
 the nature of any laws which bear its facred character, 
 nor from a defect in the fanctions thereof. Thefe in 
 their nature are powerful, and will not fail to be fo 
 m their effects, where they act upon a fober mind, 
 unbiarTed by prejudice, parTion or evil propenfities •, a 
 mind immaculate, not blinded or debauched by the 
 contagion of bad examples and practices. Are there 
 motives more powerful than the principles of felf-in- 
 tereft, the defire after honour and a good character, or 
 the inward (&n(t of happinefs and contentment ? Be- 
 hold, all thefe principles are embraced by the fanctions 
 of laws ! 
 
 What can be more truly interesting than obedience, 
 fmce it is the only fure, neceflary and efficacious mean 
 whereby all the beneficial intentions and effects of laws, 
 enfured and enhanced by the additional advantages of 
 their fanctions, are realifed and appropriated to our- 
 felves ? Protected by the law, we are free from fear and 
 danger of the punimment which follows tranfgreflion, 
 both by the nature and tendency of the violated prohi- 
 bitions and fanctions thereof. Is it not, on the contra- 
 ry, the natural effect of difobedience to fubject the vio- 
 lator 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, $$ 
 
 iator to all evils which flow from fcranfgreflkms and 
 the fanctions of laws, and to deprive him of all their 
 beneficial intentions and ends ? 
 
 Do we not feel a defire after honour and praife ? do 
 we not efteem highly the good opinion and approba- 
 tion of others? and who does not feel himfelf deeply 
 affected without them? What a powerful incentive 
 to obedience is that innate (a\ih of honour of which 
 the moil wicked and profligate cannot entirely divert 
 themfelves ! We have only carefully to diftinguifh 
 true honour from adulation, flattery, pride and folly, 
 and we fhall find that faithful obedience to law is the 
 only road which leads to true honour and praife : as an 
 action of a benign influence on fociety, it mull have 
 merit in the fight of God, of the human lawgiver, and 
 of all who value virtue and human felicity^ and in its 
 effect muff be reckoned a public benefit. Muff not 
 the agent, the upright man, the good citizen, by fuch 
 conduct naturally attract the attention of the lawgiver 
 and of all good men, have their good opinion, and 
 meet their approbation ? Is it not in this that true ho- 
 nour and praife confift ? 
 
 What demerit* on the contrary, ought difobedience 
 to have in the fight of the virtuous part of mankind 
 As it is an action oppofed to the general good of (o - 
 ciety, muff it not be abhorred and deteffed by all who 
 feel for the caufe of humanity and juftice ? mult not 
 the agent be confidered by them as an enemy to pence, 
 good order and public happinefs, and meet their cen- 
 fure and blame ? 
 
 But what far exceeds all external honour and praife, is 
 above all worldly fplendor and greatnefs, even where it 
 is merited and juftly bellowed, and is, at the fame time, 
 
 our 
 
5# MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 our fuppbrt under all manner of adverfity— our confo- 
 lation in death, is the internal fen fe of the rectitude of 
 our intentions and actions, which faithful obedience and 
 virtue doth not fail to initill. How great is the reward 
 of virtue ! inward fatisfaction and peace ! the appro- 
 bation of a good confeience ! the approbation of our 
 God ! the enlivening {qu(q of his favour, and a glori- 
 ous profpeci of eternity ! 
 
 Reverie this delightful picture ; you will fee what 
 bleflings the difobedient fervants of fin and vice lofe 
 in flighting the rewards of virtue. The punifhment 
 they draw upon themfelves, by their wanton tranfgref- 
 iions, exceeds the power of exprefiion— exceeds hu- 
 man compreheniion ! 
 
 Sch. 1. — If that be true which in the beginning of this chapter 
 we have endeavoured to prove, that all human laws 
 ought to bear the benign, majemc and immaculate cha- 
 racter of moral law, as far as is attainable, we may with 
 confidence ailert that their fa net ions are of equal extent. 
 It is true, human laws, with refpect to the authority of men, 
 have but an external effect ; their power cannot reach the 
 internal feelings of the heart: if laws are obeyed, that is/ 
 all human authority requires, and that is neceffary for the 
 maintenance of the peace of fociety : before an human 
 tribunal, no- enquiry is made concerning the principle of 
 obedience, whether it is love of virtue, or fervile fear of 
 punifhment. 
 But it is alfo true, that more is required for fecuring obe- 
 dience and the happinefs of mankind, than human laws 
 can effect. That which they cannot reach is under the 
 control! 1 of the laws of God, and under the power of 
 confeience. Before the tribunal of God, and at the bar 
 of our own confeience, we are accountable for all our 
 actions, whether they be done or omitted in the private 
 walks of life, or in our focial and public relations. 
 
 Sck. 2. — Hence the neceffity and great ufefulnefs of religion in 
 every ftate and condition of life, as it engages the con- 
 fciehces of men, and requires in all our actions fincefity 
 
 and 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and inward rectitude, and imprefles the foul with a moil 
 lively fenfe of our refponfibility for all we do or think, 
 frefore the tribunal of him who judges in rkjhteoufnefsj 
 and will render to every man according to his deeds. 
 
 Permijjions, as has been already obferved, are actions 
 
 of which certain laws take no cognisance. 
 
 ScL — In one forum an action nlay be a perrhiffioh which in 
 another comes under cognizance of laws, and perhaps is 
 a high tranfgreffion. With refpect to the jurifdiction of 
 the United States, there are a number of actions permit- 
 ted, which, by the laws of the refpectfve ftatefe, are highly 
 criminal, and vice verfa. All that is ftrictly a matter of 
 confci^nce human laws wifely consider as perraiffions ; 
 but all actions of that nature are accountable before the 
 tribunal of God. 
 
 Abrogation, derogation and difpenfatlon are terms 
 which have reference to human laws acting upon even- 
 tual objects, which are for the mod part problematical 
 and uncertain \ it may, therefore, be, that all or only 
 fome precepts or prohibitions of laws fail to produce 
 the intended effect, or in their operation happen to 
 have an oppofite tendency. If all precepts and pro- 
 hibitions have fuch an operation, they all ought to be 
 changed into permifrlons, or even into their oppoiites, 
 fhould there be cafes to require it; that is, the whole 
 law ought to be repealed or abrogated. 
 
 But if there are but fome precepts or prohibitions 
 obnoxious in their tendency, thefe ought to be changed ; 
 that is, the law ought to undergo a partial repeal, 
 known by the name of derogation. 
 
 Difpenfatlon does not introduce any change into the 
 precepts or prohibitions of a law, but only reftricts its 
 effects in favour of fome perfons or circumftances. 
 
 There is a poffibility, that of feveral laws certain 
 precepts and prohibitions come into collifion -, in which 
 
 I cafe 
 
5^ MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 cafe it is 2 queftfonable matter which we are to obey., 
 and which, under that cireumftance, may be fet afide. 
 This queilioii is generally folved by the maxim, Laws 
 fubfequent derogate from tbofe which are of a prior date, 
 becaufe it is the lateft declaration of the will of the Ie- 
 giflator; and what difference appears in the lateft and 
 former laws muft be fuppofed to be produced from a 
 change of his fentiments and will. It muft be con- 
 U d, that this maxim has much plaufibility, and 
 might be fafely, followed, if we could be certain that 
 changes introduced are always for the better. But it 
 preiuppofes that laws have for their foundation only the 
 will of a fuperior, independent of the previous moral 
 obligation, and therefore little good may be derived 
 from it -, for the will of the lawgiver may change for 
 the worfe. 
 
 We mould rather think, that the moral obligation 
 imported by fuch laws, and principally affected by 
 their feveral precepts and prohibitions, is the true cri- 
 terion to direct our choice where laws and duties clam. 
 
 Laws are greater or lefs, as the obligations which 
 thty import confift of more or lefs motives* 
 
 If, therefore, whole laws mould come into colliiion, 
 
 fo that in order to obey the one we muft fet afide the 
 
 other, it is manifeft that the greateft has binding force. 
 
 Sck.~— Thh rule was very well applied by the Apoflles again/! 
 the prefurnptuous command of human authority, forbid- 
 ding them to publifli faving truth: IVe ought, faid they, 
 to obey God rather than ?nun. A6ls v. 29. 
 
 TheYe is aliq a notable diftinction of laws into natu- 
 ral, pojitive and qualified, as they import obligations 
 which flow from nature, from the will of another, or 
 from both alike. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHV. 
 
 cui. — For inftance; the law, Thou ///alt have no otk Wfore 
 
 me, is natural, becaufe it flows from the nature of God 
 and the natural dependence of man upon him in all that 
 concerns his happinefs; but it is a pofitivclaw, depending 
 folely upon the will of God, which is recorded, Exo I. 
 xxiii. 1 7. in thefe words: three times in the year ail t) 
 fiill appear before the Lord God. The fourth command:!: 1 
 contains a qualified law : it is natural that man fliould 
 apart a certain time for attending, in an immediate rnj 
 ner, to the concerns of his immortal fpirit: public ac- 
 knowledgments of the bleffings received from God, acts 
 of humility and devotion before his throne, public ado- 
 ration and thanksgivings, are obligations refulting from 
 the nature of Qod, of man, and of that relation in which 
 he ftands with refpect to his maker and to mankind in 
 general. Cut the time appointed for this refr depends 
 upon the will of God, and in no wife hows from nature. 
 
 The law denouncing death againft murder is another in- 
 ftance of qualified laws: this flows from nature, bears the 
 fanction of the will of God declared in his revelation, and 
 has a place among the penal laws of the land. 
 
 We diftinguifh natural laws into neceffary and contin- 
 gent \ for natural obligations may flow from the nature 
 of actions or things considered in themfelvcs, or from 
 their nature confidered under circum fiances. In the 
 firft cafe, natural obligations cannot undergo any change 
 or modification but are neceflary ♦, in this cafe, they 
 admit of modifications, and on that account are faid 
 to be contingent. 
 
 Sck. 1. — It is a neceflary natural law, " thou malt have no 
 other gods before me;" and of this kind are all law$ 
 which have actions for their object eitherof internal rec- 
 titude or internal malignity, or what is otherwife called 
 a good or an evil in themfelves. 
 
 Seh. 2. — But all natural laws which have forge in actions that 
 are good or bad under circumilances, are contingent : the 
 nature and complexion of thefe actions change accord::);. 
 to circumftances; for inftance, the law, thou Jhalt not i 
 Is a natural law ■ it flow^ from the nature of man and of 
 
6q MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his relation to God, that he mould enjoy that Ufe which 
 :j given him as well as another; it alfo flows from nature, 
 that men mould rather protect than take it away. But 
 Juppofe the cafe, that a perfon is attempting to take your 
 life, or the life of your parent, your child — iuppofe your 
 country in imminent danger, and many valuable lives in 
 jeopardy ; will not killing fuch an enemy to manki-nd be 
 a permimon, pr in fome cafes even an obligation? 
 
 Rewards and punifhments are alfo diftinguifhed into 
 
 natural^ pofitive ^ or qualified-, as confequences connected 
 
 with acts of obedience or difobedience either flow from 
 
 the nature of the law, or the will of the lawgiver, or 
 
 from both alike. 
 
 Sch. — Peace and contentment, the natural rewards of virtue, 
 may be augmented by pofitive rewards, by honour and 
 praife, or by advantageous (ituations in fociety. 
 
 Want, obfeurity and regret, the natural confequences 
 of idlenefs and prodigality, draw after them contempt, 
 blame, difgrace, fufferings, expulfion from fociety, &c. 
 as pofitive puniihments inflicted by a wife legiflator. 
 
 Men need only be attentive to the internal feelings 
 of their hearts, and they will find the effects of qualified 
 rewards and punifliments united. 
 
 Should it happen, by a ftrange unconcernednefs, 
 both on the part of the legiflator and on that of the 
 community, that virtuous obedience of law be dis- 
 regarded, and tranfgrefTors thereof, the enemies of the 
 peace and liappinefs of fociety, efcape pofitive puniih- 
 ments, cenfure and blame, and be fuffered to enjoy the 
 i ftiraation of their fellow citizens, be honoured and 
 preferred, becaufe they are learned, rich, and praclile 
 upon their eafinefs and credulity, we can only pity fo- 
 ciety, and affert, that their indifcretion is and muft be 
 •dr.ir higheft punifhment 3 becaufe they are guilty of a 
 
 conduct 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 6f 
 
 conduct highly repugnant to their own felicity. Ho- 
 nours thus bellowed may have the name, but are des- 
 titute of reality, and cannot compenfate for the want 
 of internal peace and excellency. 
 
 It is true, there are punifhments which have, what 
 all punifhments in a certain degree ought to have, 
 ihame and difgrace annexed to them, as, for initance, 
 our corporal and capital punifhments : but mould not 
 he alfo be blamed, who, by fraud, by breach of pro- 
 mife, or in any other unjuft manner, opprefTes his fellow 
 citizens, and deprives them of their character and 
 property ? 
 
 Let us conclude this fubjecl with this obfervation : 
 as long as a community does not entertain the fanclions 
 of laws as they ought, it cannot be expected that laws 
 will produce their falutary effects, or fociety enjoy that 
 peace, concord and unanimity of which it is capable, 
 and upon which its greater]; ornament and happinefs 
 depend. 
 
 There are natural laws, for there are obligations 
 which flow from the nature of God, of man, of actions 
 and of circumilances ; for inftance, the law, thou Jl •all 
 have no other gods before me. 
 
 Natural laws are immutable^ for the obligations which 
 they import flow from nature,. 
 
 Immutability may be abfoluie or hypothetical; things 
 abfolutely immutable are unchangeable in themfelves; 
 thofe which are hypothetically immutable are un- 
 changeable under circiimflances. 
 
 Laws necerTarily natural are abfolutely immutable ; 
 they can admit of no modification whatever \ for in- 
 llance, biafphemy, idolatry, aflaffination, murder, can- 
 not 
 
6 1 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not be permitted, much lefs commanded, under any 
 circumftancc whatever ; thefe are what is called actions 
 wicked in ihemfelyes, 
 
 Likewife, actions of internal rectitude, as feeking 
 after God, adoring his goodncfs, purfuing virtue, gra- 
 titude to a benefactor, no laws can forbid : though they 
 are beyond the controul of human laws, they cannot 
 be indifferent, or things only permitted in the forum 
 of nature and of nature's God; they cannot but be 
 pleafing to him; they mull have the fanction of his 
 will ; and the contrary thereof muft always be heinous 
 fins. 
 
 Laws contingently natural are hypothetical!}/ immu- 
 table : the nature of the action is affected by the nature 
 of circumftanc.es ; as thefe change, the nature of the 
 action obtains a different modification. Though you 
 cannot expect abfolute immutability in this kind of ac- 
 tions, ftill there is, with refpecfc to the modifications 
 
 reof, this unchangeablenefs : that the nature of the 
 action has always the fame complexion under the fame 
 eircum fiances ; for ihftance, the law, " thou malt not 
 kill," is natural ; for it equally flows from the nature 
 of another perfon and his natural relation to God, in 
 whom he moves, is, and has being, that life is as pre- 
 cious to him as it can be to us ; we may as little take 
 away his life as he has a right to take away ours. The 
 railing away his life in a wilful, malicious manner, 
 mud therefore be a fin againft the abfolute immutable 
 natural laws of nature, and cannot be permitted, much 
 lefs can it be right under any circumflances whatever. 
 But take away malignity, that internal character of 
 murder, and you will find, that there may be circum- 
 ftances where the life of a perfon may be taken away 
 
 innocently. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1 . $4 
 
 innocently. Suppofe a pel-fern (lie draft of another's 
 death accidentally, is he a man of feeling who has not 
 pity for the unfortunate agent ? If a j is killed 
 
 in the a<ft of committing murder on a parent, a child, 
 a neighbour, or in waging trnjuft war ncrainft our coun- 
 try, who can blame, who will not highly enVem the 
 hemic protedlor of the innocent, the patriotic defender 
 or his country ? 
 
 &■//.— From this hypothetical immutability flow mod of the 
 maxims of morality, the refpedtive 'rights and duties of 
 individuals, focieties and nations smoiig one another If 
 one perion has a right td repel an injury bv force, another, 
 it inch injury is committed agaihft him, has the fame 
 Claim; If one nation may make war juitiy upon amrther 
 on account of a certain public proceeding/ another na- 
 tion, let it be ever fo weak, has, under the lame circum- 
 Itances, the fame right, &c. 
 
 Natural laws may be known by reafon ; for all that 
 flows from the mature of things and circumftances may ' 
 be known by thartioble faculty of the human foul. 
 
 God has promulgated human laws, by endowiro- 
 man with undemanding, reafon and judgment, & 
 
 As far as reafon extends, fo far extends the promul- 
 gation of natural laws: it may, therefore, be well faid 
 to be written into every man's heart. 
 
 Hence it follows, that ignorance of the laws of na> 
 ture is vincible, and leaves no excufe. 
 
 All natural laws are divine; that is to fay, 
 mpendupon the will of Cod, for nature and all that 
 flows from it is by the will of God. 
 
 He, therefore, who withes to obey natural laws, 
 muft connaer them as the laws of God; that is, he 
 mutt not only aft conformably to them, becaufe they 
 have a mod filutaty influence upon his own happinefs 
 
(W MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 gnd the felicity of others, but principally becaufe it is 
 
 thp will of God— it is required by his perfections— it 
 procures us his favour, and makes us conformable to 
 his image : motives taken from the will and perrcdhbns 
 of God° will elevate our minds— will render us con- 
 ftant and fmcere in our purfuits, and fet us above every 
 other confideration, fo that no envy or oppoiition can 
 make or change our refolution to obey our God and to 
 
 do his will. . 
 
 Natural laws are in the greater!: latitude umverral, 
 for the obligations they import are binding upon the 
 whole human race. 
 
 ScJi —All men, focieties, dates, nations and governments are 
 therefore under the controul of the laws of nature. 
 
 Natural laws have alfo an univerfal extent to all ac- 
 tions of a moral nature-, for natural obligations have 
 
 that extent. 
 
 ^..—Another proof that no atfion can be indifferent. 
 
 F-om the immutability and univerfality of the laws 
 of nature, it follows, that no law can be juft that is 
 contradictory to the laws of nature-, that With refpeft 
 to them, no abrogation, derogation or difpenfation can 
 take place •, that they leave no room for advice or per- 
 miflions. 
 
 Positive and qualified laws, as far as they are pofitive, 
 admit of abrogation, derogation and difpenfation. 
 
 Natural laws may be deduced from a firft principle, 
 that being generally the cafe with things which have 
 their foundation in nature. < m 
 
 Authors on morality ftudioufly differ in determining 
 which this firft principle is. From a laudable defign 
 to introduce into all deductions the original purity ot 
 the principle frym which they are inferred, fome 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 6$ 
 
 will hear of no other firft principle than the will of 
 God. Conduct yourself in all your, actions 
 
 CONFORMABLY TO THE WILL OF God I this, theV fav, 
 
 is the firft law of nature, the foundation whereon all 
 others ftand, the fource from which all duties muft be 
 deduced : this affords motives of the higheft nature, 
 of the greatert power, that have a purifying influence 
 on the human heart, render it /incere and upright, and 
 elevate the mind far above the temptations of mtereft 
 and the praife or obloquy of men. Here we have not 
 to look to ourfelves or to the world : we are to look 
 up to our God, and place our happinefs in a conformity 
 to his will. Thofe who differ from them fully fub- 
 fcribe to this excellent principle, and maintain, with 
 equal zeal, that our obedience ought to be principally 
 actuated by the consideration that it is the will and 
 majeftic command of God. 
 
 But, excellent and infinitely exalted and pure as this 
 principle may be, ftill they object, Whereby fhall 
 we know what the will of God enjoins in each par- 
 ticular cafe ? muft not that will be declared ? ana is 
 not that which declares it prior in refpect of our 
 knowledge ? But the will of God is declared by the 
 natural aptitude and tendency of the nature of things 
 to the great end of his glory and of human happi- 
 nefs. What, therefore, is found by reafon and ex- 
 perience to render us happy, is commanded by God; 
 all actions of an oppofite tendency are forbidden. 
 The firft law of nature, then, is, " do those things 
 
 WHICH RENDER THY STATE HAPPY, AND AVOID ALL 
 THAT CAN RENDER THYSELF UNHAPPY AND MISER- 
 ABLE," and muft be confidered as the firft principle 
 from which all duties, all that is ricdit or wron£ anion?* 
 
 K men. 
 
66 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 men, is to be deduced, whatever their ftate or condi- 
 tion may be. 
 
 Before we determine which of thefe principles ought 
 to be considered as the firft, it will be necefiary that we 
 confider principles in their different relations ; for there 
 are principles which have reference to the eflence or 
 exiftcnee of things, and principles different from them, 
 which have refpect to our knowledge of thofe things. 
 
 All pofiible things have their foundation in the in- 
 finite underit-anding of God. 
 
 All things exifient depend upon his omnipotent will. 
 
 All our knowledge of things poiiible and exiftent is 
 founcled in their nature and efrecis, difcovered by rea- 
 fon and experience. 
 
 Thus, with refpect to moral law, it is the divine un- 
 derftanding that has ordered the natural influence and 
 tendency of things, and particularly of human actions, 
 in fuch a manner as to manifeft the glory of God and 
 render mankind happy. His omnipotent will has 
 called into exiftence whatever his infinite undemanding 
 faw fit for the happinefs of his creatures -, and by giving 
 man reafon he has nianifefled and declared his divine 
 Will, according to which man mult conduct himfelf in 
 order to be happy. 
 
 It is therefore our firft and indifpenfible obligation 
 to endeavour to know what God in his infinite under- 
 standing has ordered for our happinefs, and what his 
 clivine will commands us to do or to omit, that thereby 
 we may be enabled to act in conformity to his laws and 
 obtain their end, our own happinefs. 
 
 We cannot, therefore, but adopt the propofition, do 
 thofe things which render thy ft ate happy, and avoid all 
 
 that 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 6'v 
 
 that can render thyfelf unhappy and miferabk% as the firft 
 law of nature, and the firft principle from which every 
 duty and all that is right or wrong in human conduct 
 is to be deduced. 
 
 But let it be obferved, that although this prlncrpfe 
 
 has the firft place in directing our inquiries concerning 
 
 the commands of the will of God, yet it is the divine 
 
 will itfelf which mould be our firft confederation and 
 
 our principal motive in practice; fo that we conduct 
 
 eurfelves conformably to the laws of nature, not folely 
 
 from this confederation, that thereby we render our- 
 
 felves happy, but principally becaufe it is the will of 
 
 our God. Thus we (hall, in all we do, be actuated by 
 
 fincerity and humility of heart, and walk as in the fighr 
 
 of God. Our conduct then will not give occaiion to 
 
 objections againft our firft principle, that it favours toe* 
 
 much of felf-intereft, and is liable to be perverted to 
 
 many abufes: on the contrary, it will be an animating 
 
 thought, that we do the will of God if we endeavour 
 
 to be really happy, and that our true intereft, our real 
 
 happinefs requires that we do his will. 
 
 Sch. — Behold the indiiToluble connection between our duty 
 and our intereft ! Are there any who, from motives of 
 intereft, tranfgrefs the laws of nature? It is not the prin- 
 ciple of law that mifguides them ; it is the perverfenefs 
 of their heart that blinds them ; it is, that they know cr 
 mind not their true, their real intereft. 
 
 Since, then, the principle of natural laws commands 
 our own happinefs, it necefTarily follows, that all of 
 them have the fame fcope and tendency, and that by 
 obeying them in fincerity and uprightnefs we fhall be 
 happy. Difobedience, on the contrary, muft be en- 
 tirely repugnant to our intereft, as it cannot fail to 
 render us unhappy. 
 
68_ MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 What an important confederation this ! what a pow- 
 erful motive for exciting us to habitual obedience, and 
 for deterring from acts of difobedience ! 
 
 Habitual obedience to the laws of nature, or a habit 
 of acting conformably to their injunctions, is called 
 virtue. The oppofite of virtue is vice. 
 
 An action to be done conformably to law is ftiled 
 
 duty. 
 
 Faithfulnefs in the performance of our duties, and 
 the practice of virtue, are confequently the road to 
 happinefs. Remifmefs in duty, and a vicious conduct 
 of life, lead to deftruction. 
 
 Actions referred to natural laws conftitute the natu- 
 ral forum. 
 
 Before the forum of nature all actions are cogniza- 
 ble-, they confequently will be either conformable or 
 unconformable to the injunctions of natural laws, 
 which, as has been mown, leave no action indifferent 
 or permitted. All actions, therefore, are good or bad, 
 and as fuch will be rewarded or punilhed. But as all 
 natural laws are divine laws, it follows, that the natural 
 forum is the divine forum; and we may draw this con- 
 clulicn, that in the forum of nature and of na- 
 ture's GOD, THERE IS NO ACTION WHICH WILL NOT 
 BE EITHER REWARDED OR PUNISHED. 
 
 If, therefore, there are actions which are not reward- 
 ed or punimed in this life according to their merit or 
 demerit, it is evident, that a day muft come when jh all 
 he rendered to every one according to his deeds. 
 
 Laws are -perfect or imperfect, as the obligations 
 which they respectively import are either the one or 
 the other. 
 
 It 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 69 
 
 It is the nature of perfect laws to give remedial rules 
 againfr. wrongs received •, rules which warrant coercive 
 and compulfory means for obtaining redrefs and inflict- 
 ing punifhments. 
 
 But imperfect laws afford no remedies of a compul- 
 fory nature, but leave the tranfgrefTor refponfible for 
 his conduct before the tribunal of God and before his 
 own confeience. 
 
 Sch. — Little as thefe laws mav be regarded by the generality of 
 mankind, as in the human forum they bear the afpecl: of 
 advice rather than of law, ftill they are of the greatefl 
 importance. They are the unalterable and eternal laws 
 of God, of the higheft and moft awful refponfibility. 
 Here the opprefled and their oppreffors muft meet; kings, 
 emperors, princes, nobles, the exalted, the rich, the great, 
 the poor, the moft diftrefled muft appear as men ; an ac- 
 count muft be rendered for all that human laws either did 
 or could not reach, and every man receive according to 
 his works ! 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the different degrees of morality or immorality in 
 hitman conduff. 
 
 E 
 
 iXPERIENCE evinces, that there are various de- 
 grees of rectitude or malignity in the actions of men. 
 Thefe, referred to the intention of agents, become fo 
 many traits in the moral character of man, defcriptive 
 of the degrees of probity or reprehenfibility of his 
 conduct. It is on this account that the languages of 
 civilized nations apply various epithets both to actions 
 and agents, as they are refpectively found more or Ids 
 conformable or contrary to their ideas of right and 
 wrong. 
 
 h Set. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 8c/;. i. — We may not, however, reft our eftimation of human 
 conduct upon terms; as in their nature they are but arbi- 
 trary figns of ideas, they may and indeed do often change 
 their fignifications. This is particularly the cafe with re- 
 fpect to fubjects of morality, as words denoting the diffe- 
 rent degrees and qualities of merit or demerit in actions, 
 and the proper {hare of commendation or reprehenfibility 
 which agents ought to have in our eftimation, are fome- 
 times prornifcuoufly and frequently very variouily ap- 
 plied. Are not the terms juft and unjufl, honeft and dif- 
 lioneft, &c. often ufed to denote actions of the fame qua- 
 lity and perfons of the fame character? And how often 
 does vice, with its offspring, affume the appearance and 
 the names of virtues ? Even thefe are often branded with 
 epithets originally defigned to fliew vice in its various 
 windings and native deformity. 
 
 Sc/l 2. — It is therefore necefiary that we define thofe terms, in 
 order to introduce into this fubject that precifion which 
 its importance demands. With us, then, the terms, c a 
 juft, an unjuft, a reafonable, an unreafonable, an honeft 
 and diflioneft man,' denote not one, but very different 
 characters : we make a material diftinction between un- 
 juft, unreafonable, and diflioneft actions and men. 
 
 Since, as has been proved, both perfect and imper- 
 fect obligations are indifTorubly connected with corre- 
 late rights •, and fince it is the nature of laws, as they 
 import moral obligations, to define our rights in con- 
 fequence thereof; we may, on the one hand, form our 
 ideas of right and wrong; immediately from the nature 
 and extent of our moral obligation, or derive them in 
 a mediate manner from the determinations of laws. 
 If, therefore, we wifh to form an eftimate of the de- 
 grees of morality or immorality in actions, we may 
 refer them to perfect or imperfect laws, or to perfect 
 or imperfect obligations. 
 
 Thofe actions which are referred to perfect or im- 
 perfect laws, are refpectively juft or unjufl \ reafonable 
 or unreafonable. 
 
 Actions, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, J I 
 
 A&ions, on the other hand, referred to perfect or 
 imperfect, obligations, are refpeclively either externally 
 or internally hmeft, or the contrary. 
 
 Sch. i. — A juft action is done conformably to perfect law, the 
 u nj uft is contrary thereto; for inftance, difcharging a 
 bond, a mortgage, a note; or making over property to 
 children or others, in order to defeat thofe perfect de- 
 mands. 
 
 ■Sch. 2.— A reafonable action is confident with imperfect laws* 
 the unreafonable is inconfiftent therewith; as giving time 
 or remitting our perfect demands, if the debtor has been 
 unfortunate; or, notwithstanding this, to infill: upon 
 punctual payment, and to diflrefs the unfortunate. 
 
 Sch. 3. — An aftion done or omitted conformably or contrary 
 to our perfe<5t obligation, is honeft or difhoneft; for in- 
 ftance, to fatisfy our bonds or notes before another makes 
 demands, in as full a manner as we ought; or to take ad- 
 vantage of his ignorance or eafmefs; or to try to make 
 fatisfaction in a manner inadequate to our obligation, 
 taking advantages of the infufficiency of laws, of terms, 
 and other circumftances. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Actions done or omitted in conformity with our im- 
 perfect obligations may be called /we, or aft. ions done in 
 upri?htnefs ; for here we onlv confider the internal beauty 
 or deformity of actions, confult the feelings of humanity, 
 nay, take pattern from the ways and perfections of God. 
 
 This reference of actions to the different laws and 
 obligations, and the diftinction of the different qualities 
 of actions in ccnfequcnce thereof, are by no means 
 things of an arbitrary nature, but founded in the erTen- 
 tial properties of thofe laws and obligations refpeclive- 
 ly. For when our ideas of right and wrong are taken 
 immediately from the nature and extent of our moral 
 obligations, they muft be purer and more certain, as 
 they are nearer to the point, than thefe which we form 
 from the determinations of human laws, the greateft 
 merit of which confifts in giving rules which come as 
 near our moral obligation as poiiible. 
 
 In 
 
72 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In vain do we look for confummate purity and per- 
 fection in human affairs. It is true, we may err even 
 if we pay attention to our obligations •, but the chance 
 is much greater in refpe6t of the directions of laws *, 
 for as it is the nature of human laws to contemplate 
 only the general character of men, fo the obligations 
 they import are alio of a general nature, and cannot 
 be defined with exactnefs and precifion in their indivi- 
 dual qualities, with refpect to manner, mode, time, ex- 
 tent, and other circumftances of the particular actions, 
 as well as the fituation, ftate and capacity of the agents. 
 Actions confequently referred to human laws, muft be 
 deemed right or wrong in confequence of their general 
 directions, which would have quite another afpect when 
 referred to our moral obligation. 
 
 Sch. i. — Laws, for inftance, impofing taxes, contemplate that 
 each member of the ftate contribute in proportion to his 
 circumftances. But there is fome property in a ftate 
 which can be known, whilft there is a pcflibility that a 
 vaft deal is out of the reach of knowledge. If the rich 
 man who has his property in funds, in bonds, mortgages, 
 or cafh lying by, follows the directions of law, he will 
 contribute far lefs than he ought to do in proportion to 
 his income. Would he confult his obligation, he would 
 not fiiifer men in low circumftances to groan under pub- 
 lic burdens, but would voluntarily come forward and 
 contribute his (hare. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The honeft man is ftudiOUS to fatisfy his perfect obli- 
 gation, though others may not know or not chufe to ex- 
 ercile their perfect right; he wifhes to live without fear 
 and trouble, content that no man has a perfect demand 
 upon him; whilit the difhoneit takes advantage of the 
 ignorance or eafinefs of his neighbour, or looks abroad 
 whether he has not a legal excufe for rejecting his perfect 
 obligation, or not fulfilling it in its full extent. Give 
 this man the opportunity which laws have provided in 
 cafe of public calamity as a remedy for reduced and dif- 
 trefled fufYerers, he. perhaps a gainer on that very ac- 
 count. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. J* 
 
 count, at leaft not a lofer, and fully able to fatisfy his per- 
 fect obligations, will neverthelefs evade the perfect rights 
 of others, by deducting intereft, paying in paper, &c. 
 Behold the difhoneft man! Let this character, deformed 
 as it is, and made up of fraud, hypocrify and dillimula- 
 tion, be joined to the unjuft man, and you have a cha- 
 racter ftill more deformed than evafion and diflimulation 
 Gan make it — a man of the mod depraved and debafed 
 character. The difhoneft man is dangerous; he preferves 
 appearances, pretends honefty, is loud in profellions of 
 friendfhip and gratitude; he makes life of various wind- 
 ings, attempting, by all manner of plaufible means, to 
 impofe upon good nature and credulity, and grouty dii- 
 appoints your confidence. But the unjuft man does alt 
 this, and he goes much farther; he breaks through all 
 bars of human rectitude; he cares as little for appearances 
 and the opinions of mankind, as he minds the internal 
 excellency of virtue or the hideous deformity of vice. 
 Mifchief and violence are his element; to fpread abroad 
 oppreffion, confufion and mifery is his delight : in fhort, 
 he is to human fociety what beafts of prey are in the brute 
 creation. Perfect rights, perfect laws, with all their fanc- 
 tions, have no effect upon him. Mark tho character of 
 an unjuft man as a monfter, as a hydra of human fociety, 
 and obferve, that fuch characters are often above and 
 beyond the reach of human laws ! 
 The man merely juft is made up of law; but you muft re- 
 fort to it to oblige him to fatisfy his perfect obligations ; 
 public opinion has little or no weight with him. If law 
 is on his fide, you find him inhuman and unmerciful ; he 
 pu flies his perfect right as far as the law gives him fcope, 
 is callous to the intreaties of the unfortunate, the induf- 
 trious and foberhufbandman, the honeft trader — unaffected 
 by the tears of widows, and deaf to the cries of orphans. 
 Shielded by law, he is contented that his unreafonable- 
 nefs and inhumanity are not contrary, but in the proper 
 form and according to the due courfe of legal proceed- 
 ings. Remember, therefore, when hereafter we fhnll fpeak 
 of the various degrees of deformity and immorality in bad 
 actions, that thofe who break through the reftraints of law 
 are fartheft from the loweft degree of commendation or 
 morality, and therefore in a high degree immoral and re- 
 prehensible. There may be a difference with refpect to 
 
 L the 
 
74 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the object of a tranfgrefiion ; but tranfgreilion, whatever 
 its object may be, counteracts public good and defeats the 
 falutary ends of Jaws in fpite of all their reftraints. The 
 man who can export wool in oppotition to the laws of the 
 1. ;:id, would as foorf export powder to the enemy, if he 
 could do it as eafily. Set it down as an aft of injuitice. 
 It is true, we have delineated thefe characters, perhaps, in 
 Hr greaTSft defor mirv ; but drop one or the other hideous 
 u ;>;:. end vou have itill a multitude of actions, iinjuft, nn- 
 real'onableand difhonefr, degrading to- the dignity of man ! 
 But the i menially h on eft and reafonable man, what a glo- 
 rious character ! man indeed, a rational creature — ra- 
 tional in all his intentions, actions and piirfuits ! He is 
 riot contented with taking things as men, as human laws 
 determine them ; penetrating into the very nature of his 
 moral obligations, he forgets fervile fear, fordid intereft, 
 legal excufe; he fees no beauty in an action that is barely 
 juit or honeil; wiming to be humane and reafonable to 
 the utmoft of his power, he contemplates the imperfect 
 laws which do not command this or that action iri this and 
 that manner, and to fuch an extent, but enjoin to do all 
 the good We can in the beft and fincereft polfible manner, 
 at all times and in all fituations of life. Yes, it is the man 
 of probity and internal honefly who penetrates into the 
 fpirit and feepe of his imperfect obligations, delights in 
 the fight of its beauty, tafles the fweetnefs of a virtuous 
 action, is above all low confiderations, and principally 
 concerned to do all the good he can in truth and fincerity. 
 lie penetrates into the receives of the difconfolate, of po- 
 verty, want and human miferv ; anticipates application, 
 and fpreads abroad the balm of comfort and relief. This 
 is the good man of the ancients; this character, if en- 
 lightened by the heavenly precepts of chriftianity and 
 actuated by thofe animating motives which flow from the 
 infinite love of a reconciled God, is the ?nan without guile ! 
 
 External deportment, where it is enquired, whether 
 conduct ourfelves with decency or in an indecent 
 i, inner. 5 whether our actions are proper or improper; 
 is another fbtrree from which the degrees of rectitude 
 and reprehenfibility of human conduct may be deter- 
 mined. 
 
 Sch. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY', J $ 
 
 Spfj, — The rules of decency and propriety have a vail influence 
 upon our actions, as a conformity to them adds much 
 external beauty and ornament to our behaviour in the 
 fight of others, and brings, as it were, to light the' i.tcr- 
 nal frame and qualities of the mind. It is true, ail 
 anions have native beauty in themfelves; but thev are 
 infinitely more beautiful and commendable, when per- 
 formed with the greated.poilible decency and propriety. 
 We mav anticipate the importance of decency and pro- 
 priety in human conduct from this confidcration, that 
 we expect neither of them in brutes or in infant children, 
 they being confined only to perfons who can exercife un- 
 derdanding, reafon and judgment. Is it therefore a won- 
 der, that we form ideas of the internal ftate of the mind 
 according to the degrees of decency or indecency dif- 
 covered in actions? 
 
 Men differ very much in their ideas of decency and 
 propriety, or the contrary ; and it is a queftion, whether 
 any fixed rule and ftandard can be given to enable us to 
 diftinguifh truth from error ? ( ( . 
 
 To folve this queftion, let. us define the ideas, and 
 fee whether they are founded or not founded in nature -, 
 if the latter is the cafe, we mall not only find rules, but 
 rules as unalterable and unchangeable in the moral 
 fenfe, as nature itfelf. 
 
 What is confident with the nature of an intelligent 
 being, and with its internal and external ftate, is natu- 
 rally decent and proper \ the contrary is naturally inde- 
 cent and improper. 
 
 Sch. i.— All juft, honed, reafonable actions are naturally de- 
 cent; the contrary naturally indecent: the former are 
 confident with the nature of a rational being, the latter 
 are inconlident therewith. 
 . Sch. 2. — All actions confident with the internal date of \ lie 
 mind, are naturally decent and proper; the contrary arc- 
 naturally indecent and improper. 
 "VVe expect another deportment in the learned than that of a 
 man who is illiterate and rude. If a religious man fiioulcj 
 
7& MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ufe the language of the prophane, it would be fhockirig; 
 if the latter mould fpeak religious fentiments, it would 
 caufe furprife, perhaps difguft. What would be mocking 
 in a Chriftian, caufes no furprife in a Jew. If Chriftians 
 and Jews fhould bow before Hone and wood, or adore the 
 works of the hands of men, who could bear the fight? in 
 a heathen it has fo much of propriety, that we revere that 
 fenfe of religion which the former perhaps have laid afide. 
 Sch, 3. — What agrees with the nature of our external flate is 
 naturally decent and proper; the contrary indecent and 
 improper. 
 
 What a glory is added to an exalted flate by affability, con- 
 defcenfion and modefly, that virtue which becomes every 
 ftate and condition of life ! How amiable is the character 
 of citizens paying refpect to perfons in public ftations, 
 loving and honouring them ! How truly excellent thefe, 
 if their perfonal virtues juftify that diflinction ! What a 
 beautiful fight to dif cover among fellow citizens, brethren, 
 fellow fludents, an affiduity to pleafe, to fhew friendfhip, 
 to be polite and civil to one another ! — The rich man is 
 only decent in a rich drefs ; the poor would make in it a 
 moll: ridiculous figure. : The ftrong, the robuft looks befl 
 employed in hard labour, and carrying along with him the 
 emblems thereof; a tarry veftment adorns the failor, &c. 
 The decrepid,the fick,the cripple may with decency apply 
 for relief and fupport; a thing that would be a difgrace 
 to human nature in a young man of ftrong conftitution 
 and in the vigour of health. 
 
 Sch. 4. — The fenfe of decency and propriety is an internal in- 
 gredient to many an excellent virtue. What is humility? 
 I anfwer, a decent fenfe and opinion of our merits; for 
 one who errs in defect is not the man of humility, but 
 abject ; he who has too great an opinion of his merits is 
 arrogant and proud. A decent, a proper management of 
 our affairs, with refpect to expence, is ceconomy, fruga- 
 lity; the excefs, luxury, prodigality; the defect, ftingi- 
 nefs, avarice, &c. 
 
 Sch. 5. — The juft man exercifes little decency, the honefl 
 more; the difhonefl flrives to have the appearance : the 
 reafonable man and the upright give, what they give, 
 with the befl grace, reprove with fympathetic gentle- 
 nefs, &c. 
 
 There 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 77 
 
 There are alfo ideas of decency and indecency, of 
 propriety and impropriety, which, retting only upon 
 the general opinions of mankind, are not only various 
 and very different, but alfo of a moft fluctuating and 
 changeable nature. Here is not the queftion, whether 
 an action is decent and proper, or the contrary, but 
 whether, in human converfation, it is deemed fuch. 
 If thefe ideas can conftitute any thing, it is fajkion, a 
 thing moft multifarious and arbitrary. 
 
 Ideas of propriety and decency, or the contrary, are 
 the criterion by which we may judge of the tafte and 
 manners of nations, ftates, cities, claffes and circles of 
 fociety. l As long as they lead to things not contradic- 
 tory to natural decency, &c. fo long we may follow 
 them, and gently glide down the ftream of public opi- 
 nion. But if it be fafhion to ftigmatize good actions, 
 or if they meet not with due commendation ; if, on the 
 contrary, bad actions, difobedience to law, &c. become 
 fafhionable, that is, if they are countenanced by a fa- 
 vourable opinion, farewell to good tafte, to good man- 
 ners. The manners of a people, a city, a fociety, are 
 debauched : were it not that they carry their punifh- 
 ment already, we fhould fay they are ripe for it. So 
 much is certain, that many a one will end his career in 
 ruin and in fhame ! 
 
 Another criterion of the different degrees of morality 
 or immorality of actions depends on their effect and the 
 intention of the agents. With refpect to effects, which 
 conftitute what may be called the material morality or 
 immorality of actions, little need be faid, as they are 
 very obvious to an attentive obferver, and produce efti- 
 mation rather as an effect, than the refult of a judgment 
 formed thereon. All, therefore, that we (hall fey, will 
 
 be 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 he to call the attention of the reader not only to the 
 proximate, but alio to the remote effects of our actions. 
 This will enable us to fee the great excellency and ufe- 
 juinefs of good, and the keinoufnefs of bad actions. 
 
 Sc/h :. — Behold the happy influence which the good education 
 of children has upon a parent ! joy, contentment for the 
 torefent, hope and confidence in approaching days of age 
 and of infirmity; confolation in the hour of death ! Be- 
 hold the children happy, profpering, blefled by their pa- 
 rents, and bltiled by God) They know the value of good 
 education; they reap the fruits thereof in their children, 
 perhaps more abundantly than their parents did; they 
 conftitute good education the chief inheritance of their 
 offspring, to be conveyed unimpaired, rather improved, 
 to the lateft pofterity ! Reverfe this portrait, and you 
 form an idea of the high reprehenfibility in parents, who, 
 though it was in their power, have neglected this great 
 . dutv. How exceedingly heinous in children, if they 
 frustrate the fond endeavours, the fweet expectations of 
 their parents, who do all in their power to promote their 
 happinefs! 
 
 Sc/r. 2. : — Conftder, that acts of fraud, of injuitice and oppref- 
 fioh, are felt by a fellow citizen through the remainder of 
 his days; that widows, that orphans, that pofterity are 
 affected by them. The murderer kills a pofTibie pofterity ; 
 liFiiuft wars produce calamities which involve the inno- 
 cent with the guilty, and bring poverty and ruin upon 
 tnofe who are yet unborn. Slaughter and bloodfhed pre- 
 vent thoufands from feeing the light. We may be dead 
 and gone, but our good or bad examples ftill live, being 
 copied by children and children's children. Is it there - 
 fore ftrange to read, that the Lord will vifit the fins of 
 parents in their children to the third and fourth genera- 
 tion ? 
 
 But our principal object here is an enquiry into the 
 nal morality or immorality •, whether an action pro- 
 ceeds from intention, and with what degree of liberty 
 that intention is purfued : for the greater our liberty is, 
 the greater is the morality or immorality of our actions. 
 
 As 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, /9 
 
 As liberty comprehends fpontaneity hi the argent, 
 contingency in the action, and a certain degree of dif- 
 rinct knowledge of the action previous to the commif- 
 fion or omiflion thereof, it follows, that we have three 
 rules for determining the degrees of morality or im- 
 morality in human conduct : 
 
 i. The greater the fpontaneity by which an ag-. 
 acts, the greater is the morality or immorality of thv, 
 action. * 
 
 2. The greater the contingency of the action, the 
 greater is its morality or immorality. 
 
 3. The. greater the knowledge which an agent had 
 of the nature and confequences of an aclion before the 
 comm'ifTion or omiflion thereof, the greater is the mo- 
 rality or immorality. 
 
 In confequence of thefe rules, we may form the fol- 
 lowing efrimate of a variety of actions, with refpect to 
 their different degrees of morality or immorality. 
 
 In actions done or omitted in confequence of compul- 
 
 fion, there can be neither morality nor immorality, as 
 
 there is no room for fpontaneity m the agent, nor any 
 
 contingency in the action. 
 
 Sen. — If a perfon is forced to do what is good,- he can claim 
 no merit; if he be compelled to do evil, he cannot be 
 blamed. As neceility has no law, fo it leaves no room 
 for merit or demerit in actions. 
 
 Actions done or omitted under conftrctiw^ that is, 
 where the agent is in fuch a fituation that he has but 
 to chufe between two or more actions prcpofed, where 
 confequently but one or the other alternative is left, 
 have morality or immorality in greater or lefs degrees, 
 as there are more or lefs alternatives for choice. Here 
 fpontaneity and contingency arc forcibly limited. 
 
 Sch. 
 
SO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. — A perfon intrufted with money, for inftance, may be 
 attacked by a robber, who propofes the alternative, de«= 
 liver or die ! 
 
 Actions done or omitted under reftraint, that is, 
 actions determined, commanded or forbidden by laws, 
 admit of a high degree of morality or immorality. 
 Here fpontaneity and contingency are limited in con- 
 formity to the rules of right \ liberty, confequently, is 
 not impaired, but directed. There is as much room 
 for fpontaneity and contingency as a rational man can 
 vvifh \ his will is not hindered, but led to that which is 
 good -, the action is entirely voluntary. 
 
 The more voluntary actions are, the higher is the 
 morality •, for the reftraint is lefs, and confequently 
 fpontaneity and contingency greater. 
 
 But it holds not good, that bad actions are more 
 immoral in confequence of their being more voluntary 
 and under lefs reftraint. On the contrary, they are 
 more obftinately wicked, as no confideration, not even 
 reftraint, can refifl them. 
 
 Sch. i. — Remember the character of the unjuft man already 
 defcribed. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Let it be obferved, that where the immorality of ac- 
 tions is affected by reftraint, either of law, advice, exam- 
 ple, or external motive afforded to the agent, it is always 
 greater than where no reftraint takes place, and that the 
 degrees of immorality are in proportion to thofe of re- 
 ftraint. In thefe cafes, therefore, the degrees of morality 
 and immorality do not keep pace in direct proportion ; 
 that is, from the higheft morality of good actions, we 
 may not immediately infer the higheft immorality in thofe 
 actions which are oppofite to them. In fome actions, 
 therefore, there will be occafion only to determine the 
 degrees of morality, and leave the reader to judge of thofe 
 of immorality. 
 
 Actions 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 8*t 
 
 Actions not affected by rcftraint, have a higher de- 
 gree of morality than thofe which are done or omitted 
 in confequence thereof. 
 
 Sch. i. — A perfon may do a good action b^caufe the lav/ coir, 
 mands or a friend adviies its performance : the example 
 of others may excite us, or motives afforded make it eli- 
 gible. In all thefe cafes the agent may have merit, but 
 the law, the friend, the example, the perfons affording 
 the motives have their refpective mare in it. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Suppofe a perfon does a good aftion from an inward 
 defire to do what is right, independent of any other con- 
 fideration, will he not be entitled to all the merit? 
 
 The more internal motives we have for doing or 
 omitting a certain action, the higher is the degree of 
 its morality •, for the agent has a greater mare of dif- 
 tinct knowledge than if he were actuated only by ex- 
 ternal motives. 
 
 The more external motives an agent has before he 
 does or omits an action, the lefs are the degrees of mo- 
 rality, and the greater the immorality ; the former is 
 in confequence of lefs knowledge, the latter of more 
 obftinacy in the agent. 
 
 Sch. — It will therefore not be difficult to fee the far greater ex- 
 cellency of honeft actions before thofe which are merely 
 juft, that of the reafonable before the honeft, &c. 
 
 Actions done or omitted upon motives taken from 
 the divine perfections, have the higheit degree of mo- 
 rality. 
 
 A habit of acting upon motives taken from the 
 perfections of God, is called piety, the higheft deoree 
 of morality, the greateft excellency of virtue within 
 the compafs of natural principles. 
 
 Sch. — Chriftian piety is ftill of greater excellency and purity, 
 
 becaufe the motives, taken from the Infinite love of God 
 
 declared in the ivork of redemption, are not only the pureft 
 
 M ' and 
 
b2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and moii exalted, but proceed from the pureft fincerity 
 of the heart, from the principle of faith. 
 
 Actions complicated or compound contain as many 
 
 motives as there axejtinple actions contained in them^ 
 
 they are therefore of a higher degree of morality or 
 
 immorality than a fimple action confifting but of one 
 
 or a few motives, becaufe the knowledge and the fpon- 
 
 taneity in the agent are greater. 
 
 Sc/u: — There is certainly more merit in an agent who procures 
 and preferves an eltate by afiiduous application to the toil- 
 ibme duties of his calling, than in him who has gained a 
 high prize in a lottery, or is become heir of an eftate. 
 There is alfo a higher degree of criminality in the act of 
 taking away a perlbn's life, when preparations have been 
 made for its perpetration by way-laying him, by reforting 
 to a particular place, by {electing the time moft fuitable 
 for producing that effect, than there is when that act takes 
 place on a fudden, unexpectedly, unpremeditated, in the 
 heat of paflion, &c. 
 
 Deliberate aclions have a higher degree of morality 
 or immorality than the inconfiderate\ for, as the former 
 are done or omitted in confequence of previous conii- 
 deration, the agent acts with a higher degree of know- 
 ledge and fpontaneity than can take place in the latter, 
 which are done without previous confederation. 
 
 Sch. i. — Actions mav be deliberate or inconfiderate with re- 
 fpect both to hijikutioii and execution^ or only with refpect 
 to the one or the other. 
 
 StL i. — We may erect works for public defence upon a pre- 
 meditated plan, and in cafe of neceflity make the moft 
 vigorous reliftance; or we may abandon them, or give 
 them up without any exertion at all, or be guilty of im- 
 prudence and indifcretion in conducting that defence. 
 
 Sch. 3. — A pod: may be taken in an improper place, or may 
 not be fufficientty fecured; ftiU, upon an attack, the be ft 
 exertions may be made to refift an invading enemy. 
 
 Sc/i. 4. — To act with deliberation, we muft inftitute our ac- 
 tions in the belt pofftble manner, penetrate into their na- 
 ture 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. §3 
 
 ture and tendency, and fpare no pains to carry our wcll- 
 digefted plan into execution. 
 
 Sch. jj.-rHow requisite is deliberation in the whole tenor of 
 our conduct ! How much fhould we attend to the confe- 
 quences of our actions! How careful ought we to be in 
 conducting them in conformity to our moral obligation, 
 as they have the greateit influence on our character, our 
 repofe, our happinefs, and the felicity of mankind 1 
 
 Remember that one inconfulerate act can ruin your happi- 
 nds, the peace of your mind and your character: con- 
 sider how deeply your parents and relatives are intereiled; 
 how deeply afflicted if their fond hopes and expectations 
 are blalted by an inconfiderate conduct, to which youth 
 is found to be particularly inclined. 
 
 We are faid^to be the author of an action, when its 
 exigence or non -existence may be referred to our fpon- 
 taneity: as this may be the cafe in various ways, it 
 follows, that we may be authors of actions in different 
 refpects. We may be the immediate caufe of an ac- 
 tion, or be it in a mediate manner, by means, contri- 
 vances, or the afliftance of others. Hence it is, that 
 actions may be diflinguifhed into immediate and me- 
 diate : of the former we are the immediate author, or the 
 immediate caufe \ that which ferves as a mean to pro- 
 duce the latter, is called the niftrumental caufe thereof, 
 in contradiftinetion to him who has given occasion for 
 it, and thereby mud be considered as the principal 
 caufe. So that in all mediate actions there is a princi- 
 pal and an inftrumental caufe. 
 
 But, as inanimate things, or brutes, or moral agents 
 may be ufed as means, we think it proper that the ap- 
 pellation of inflrumental caufe fhould be confined to 
 means not enjoying free agency, and that moral agents, 
 inftrumental in a6nons defigned by others, fhould be 
 called the proximate, the latter the moral caufe of (hem, M 
 
 Thus, 
 
84 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Thus, in mediate actions effected by the afliftance 
 of moral agents, we diftinguifh the moral and the 
 proximate caufe thereof. And it becomes a queftion, 
 what fhare of commendation or repreheniibility per- 
 tains to the one and the other ? for if things of an in- 
 animate nature or brutes ferve as means to effect per- 
 nicious defigns of others, no refponfibility can be ex- 
 pected on their part ; the whole blame muft fail upon 
 l the principal or moral caufe of the action produced. 
 But it is a very different cafe, where a moral agent, 
 refponfible for his conduct, prefents himfelf, or fufFers 
 himfelf to be made an inftrument for doing actions 
 deiigned by another : in a good action he muft have 
 merit, in a bad one he is reprehensible, as in both cafes 
 the actions are referrable to his will. He, therefore, 
 except under compulfion y will be anfwerable for the con- 
 fequences, and the action, with refpect to him, will 
 have certain degrees of morality or immorality. 
 
 Mediate actions have a lefs degree of morality or im- 
 morality than the immediate. Thefe are done without 
 any reftraint, from internal motives, confequently with 
 a greater degree of fpontaneity and contingency *, the 
 former are done by external motives, which caufe a 
 certain degree of reftraint, therefore with lefs fponta- 
 neity and contingency. 
 
 The moral caufe acts with a higher degree of mora- 
 lity or immorality than the proximate -, for, with re- 
 fpect to him, mediate actions muft be confidered as 
 
 immediate. 
 
 Sch, i. — Here the axiom holds good, what one caufes to be 
 done by another he does himfelf. 
 
 Sch. 2. — We may bcome a moral caufe in actions done or 
 omitted by others, in different refpects and degrees ; for 
 inftance, by command, advice, confent, approbation, 
 
 connivance., 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. $$ 
 
 connivance, participation, by concealing, not hindering, 
 not revealing, &c. 
 
 i*ch. 3. — Thus we may become the moral caufe in actions ef- 
 fected by things of an inanimate nature, not only when 
 we deiign the effect, as by laying traps, fixing guns, &c. 
 but likewife when we leave them in a condition that is 
 obvioufly dangerous; for indance, leaving fire-arms care- 
 lefsly in the reach of children, letting a ruined wall itand, 
 &c. The fame is the cafe with brutes ; we mav drefs 
 them, or fet them on to do harm, or let them run loofe, 
 though we know that they are mifchievous. 
 
 Sch. 4. — A perfon may be confidered as the moral caufe of an 
 a<ftion in general, but not of every particular thereof: for 
 inftance, one ordered or ad'vifed to beat another, may 
 proceed too far, break limbs, or deftroy life. In fuch 
 cafes the moral caufe of the a&ion cannot be refponfible 
 for outrages committed by the proximate; it is the latter 
 that muff, be confidered as the moral caufe of ail that is 
 done by excefs. 
 
 Sch. 5. — There are cafes which require undefined, unlimited 
 power; as, the conducting fleets and armies. Here the 
 principal caufe of a war mud be confidered as the moral 
 caufe of all that is done in confequence thereof. The in- 
 human mariner or foldier is far from being excufable in 
 any act of oppreffion and injudice: commanders deferve 
 the highelt punifhment, and the execration of mankind, 
 for having made an improper ufe of the powers intruded 
 to them. But, as all the glory of what fleets and armies 
 have accompliflied is humbly attributed to the wifdom, 
 the unconquerable power and greatnefs of the govern- 
 ment, which has laid their foundation by indituting and 
 planning the operations of a war; fo certainly all outra- 
 ges, all acts of cruelty, oppreffion and injudice, done on 
 the watery element or in the different quarters of the 
 globe, mud and will be brought to the account of the 
 principal author of that war; he is the principal, the 
 moral caufe of all ! Is the glory of a conqueror, there- 
 fore, an object of envy ? or can acts of injuflice condi- 
 tute true glory ? 
 
 Actions done or omitted under colliMon, are not as 
 high in morality or immorality as thofe in which no 
 
 collifion 
 
S6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 coilifion has taken place; for in the former there is lefs 
 fpontaneity and contingency. 
 
 An act of the will, referred to a contemplated effect, 
 is called irtfffition ; the effect contemplated is ftiledan 
 end. 
 
 Ends are diftinguimed into primary and fecondary : 
 for the former an agent would have acted independent 
 of any other effect •, for the latter he would not have 
 acted at all, if it had not been blended with another 
 more deiirable object. In this cafe, our intention with 
 refpect to the chief end is called indirett^ in the former 
 it is direct. 
 
 Sch. i. — The primary end of war is to enjoy peace, to be free 
 from the infults and vexations of a reftlefs nation: repre- 
 fentations and negociations, conducted with moderation, 
 prudence and juftice, witnefs the direct intention of thefe 
 proceedings; their end is to prevent war and to eftablifh 
 peace: but fuppofe armies to be raifed, magazines to be 
 laid up, &c. for the fame end, the intention may be the 
 fame, but it is indirect: even war may be declared, bat- 
 tles fought, towns facked, blood fpilt, for obtaining an 
 end which by gentle means was not attainable. Should 
 we fuppofe a nation fo cruel as to make deltruction, 
 plunder and bloodihed their principal object? fhould we 
 derive all thefe calamities from direct intention? No, if 
 there is yet a fenfe of honefty, juitice or humanity, thefe 
 things would not take place had they been avoidable: in 
 all thefe proceedings the intention is indirect; it is to 
 compel an enemy to terms of a lafting peace. 
 
 ■Sch. 2. — Confequences not intended, which may flow from 
 our intentional actions, as well as thofe which were in- 
 tended, are faid to be admitted. Thus the deltruction of 
 lives, of property, and the dreadful catalogue of the moll 
 horrid tranfactions during a long and bloody war, are faid 
 not to be intended, but admitted. 
 
 All intentional actions, both direct and indirect, are 
 of a very high morality or immorality ; for they are 
 
 acts 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. $J 
 
 acts of the will — actions complicated, which prefuppole 
 a high degree of fpontaneity and knowledge in the 
 agent. 
 
 From this very caufe it is evident, that actions done 
 or omitted by direct intention are very confidcrably 
 higher in morality or immorality than thofe which 
 proceed from indirect intention. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — The deftru&ion of a city or buildings confequent 
 upon direct intention, is the height of cruelty and inhu- 
 manity, caufing our deteftation ; if the ftrength of a 
 place, the vigorous refinance of a garrifon, renders it 
 unavoidable, it caufes pity and regret. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — Admiflions have generally reference to the unfavour- 
 able confequences of intentional actions: according to 
 the definition given of them, we have followed the au- 
 thority of fome authors rather than our own judgment. 
 Names and terms may ferve to palliate the outrages and 
 horrid calamities infeparable from the complicated opera- 
 tions of war; but the natural and infeparable connection 
 which they have with the intention of the author or au- 
 thors of war, and their horrid effecls, will eafily difcover 
 to the unprejudiced mind their high immorality. Let 
 the man who fets ftates and nations at variance, feel the 
 whole weight of his guilt ; let him have no excufe before 
 his confcience and the world, that inhumanity, blood- 
 fhed, conflagration, &c. are things admitted only, things 
 not intended, confequently not imputable. No, if un- 
 intended confequences may as well flow from onr actions 
 as thofe which are intended, they certainly ought to be 
 taken into confideration before we determine upon an 
 end ; they confequently, confidered or not confide red, 
 come within the compafs of at lealt indirect intention, 
 and as intentional acts, actions of the moft direful effects, 
 muit have a hi^h degree of immorality. 
 
 Sc/i. 3. — We might retain the term admiilion, to denote un- 
 forefeen confequences happening by accident; for in-, 
 fiance, the accidental blowing up of a powder-magazine, 
 and the death of many perfons occafioned thereby. 
 
 There 
 
88 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 There is an inconceivable variety of aclions by 
 which ends may be attained -, fuch are called means. 
 Affiduity in performing aclions, by which a mean may 
 be obtained, is called diligence ', a mod excellent and 
 neceflary virtue •, the contrary is negligence, a moft def- 
 picable and pernicious vice. 
 
 Sch. i. — If affiduity in anions intended and calculated for the 
 attainment cf ends, which are objects of laws and our 
 moral obligations, conftitutes diligence; we may fee the 
 dangerous and deformed nature of idlenefs, which keeps 
 mankind bufied in things which anfwer no beneficial or 
 falutary end. 
 
 Sch. z. — Idlenefs ought to be well diftinguifhed from amufe- 
 ments, which are indulged with an intention to afford a 
 certain relaxation to the mind, that it may be thereby re- 
 frefhed and invigorated to purfue the ends of our calling 
 with more readinefs and with greater effect. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Amufements which fpring from another intention, 
 and are not calculated or ufed for that purpofe, are temp- 
 tations to idlenefs, nurferies of vice, the enemies of vir- 
 tue; they rob us of the molt precious gift of nature, they 
 rob us of our time. 
 
 That act of the will by which we determine the ex- 
 ecution of an action, is called purpofe-, purpofe re- 
 ferred to the end propofed is ftiled defign, 
 
 Sch. — Actions, with refpect to purpofe, may have a moft 
 amiable afpe<ft; but referred to the defign, they may be 
 of the greateft criminality and deformity. We may be 
 affiduous in profeffions and external acts of friehdfhip, 
 give entertainments, &c. the defign may be fordid felf- 
 intereft; or all thefe endeavours may be ufed in order to 
 make us an accomplice in an act of treafon, to prevail 
 with us to betray the fecrets of our cabinet; or the defign 
 may be againft the virtue of a perfon. 
 
 Actions of purpofe and defign muft be of high 
 morality or immorality •, they are complicated actions, 
 which prefuppofc a high degree of knowledge and of 
 
 fpontaniety, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 89 
 
 fpontaniety, and have a place among the moft ftudied 
 
 and refined intentional actions. 
 
 Sch. — As we are bound to obey the law of nature, it follows 
 that we are alfo bound to make ufe of all the means in 
 our power in order to qualify oiirfelves for that obedi- 
 ence; in all our .anions, therefore, it ought to be our 
 invariable purpofe and defign to obey the natural laws, 
 to obey our God.. This will be a fhield againft the in- 
 numerable temptations of flattery, fycophancy, hypo- 
 crify, &c. fo prevalent among the children of men. 
 
 Moral Rectitude is the agreement of our actions 
 
 with the laws of truth and morality ; for our moral 
 
 actions depend upon the understanding and will ; they 
 
 confequently are right, if the acts of both under- 
 
 ftanding and v/ill are right. This will be the cafe if 
 
 the former agree with the laws of truth, the latter 
 
 with the laws of morality. 
 
 Sch. — We have not then in vain beftowed our attention upon 
 the principles hitherto explained; for, as they are the 
 eternal and unchangeable laws of truth and morality, 
 they muft be confidered as the bails and the infallible cri- 
 terion of rectitude in the conduct of men. 
 
 Fault is the general term whereby we defignate a 
 defect of rectitude. Such a defect may proceed from 
 an act of the underftanding or the will. 
 
 A fault that takes rife from a defect of the under - 
 {landing renders the agent culpable -, that which pro- 
 ceeds from a defect in the will is an act of malice. 
 
 A knowledge of the nature, effects, and other con- 
 fequences of actions, may or may not be in our power : 
 in the former cafe ignorance is vincible^ in the latter 
 invincible. 
 
 Faulty actions proceeding from invincible ignorance 
 c:«.r not be culpable,, much lefs malicious. 
 
 N Culpable 
 
§0 MOP.AL PHILOSOPH#. 
 
 Culpable actions proceed from vincible ignorance, 
 where either no idea is formed of the action, or where 
 the ideas are wrong. 
 
 We may act culpably from inattention, improviden- 
 cy, precipitancy, or carelelTnefs ; actions, therefore, 
 may be more or lefs culpable. 
 
 SJi. i. — We are guilty pf inattention, if we do not Sufficiently 
 corifider the action in general ; we act improvzdently, if wi 
 proceed to action without confidering the confequences; 
 we are charged with precipitancy, when we take no time 
 for reflecting on the proper mode and manner of con-' 
 dueling actions or for confidering their confequences. 
 The carehfs act without any consideration at all. 
 
 Sch. i. — In culpable actions, therefore, the agent omits what 
 is necellary for obtaining a Salutary end : hence we may 
 draw the conclufion, that all culpable actions proceed 
 from negligence. 
 
 Malicious actions are wilful, for they proceed from 
 defect in acts of the will. 
 
 In malicious actions the agent acts both wittingly 
 and willingly, as the phrafe is ; for the faults of the 
 will have their origin in the understanding. 
 
 M-ilicious actions are therefore of higher immorality 
 than the culpable, for they are acts of purpofe and 
 defign j their effect is bad by intention, and their ma- 
 lignity is internal. 
 
 Whenever actions are fo conducted that their out- 
 ward complexion is contradictory to the internal acts of 
 the mind, we are laid to dijfemble. 
 
 Acts of dirTembling may be intended for good and 
 allowable ends, and are in fome cafes necefiary ; as^ 
 feints 2.vAftraiagems. But as many acts of malice are 
 perpetrated under the cloak of honefty, of friendship, 
 &c. it follows, that nothing fhort of abfolute necemty 
 
 ean 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 91 
 
 can juftify difTembling even for juftifiable purpofes: 
 we betray in a manner the facred caufe of virtue, if we 
 are the means of putting it under any kind of fufpicion : 
 the man truly virtuous will avoid even the appearance 
 of evil. 
 
 SeL- — -Allowing that feints and ftratagems of particular kinds, 
 and to certain extent, may confift with the principlec of 
 rectitude, we mult obferve, that there are feldom filia- 
 tions in life which can equally juftify acts of awembling. 
 From an enemy we expect nothing but acts and defigns 
 of hoftility ; as we may place no confidence in him, he 
 cannot betray it. We may therefore draw this conclu- 
 fion, that acts of difTembling are not of an innocent, but 
 of a malignant nature, whereby confidence, for which 
 we have given occafton, is difappointed and betrayed. 
 
 An act of difiimulation, with defign to betray confi- 
 dence, ftill heightens the wickednefs of a malicious 
 action -, for there is a new* determination of the will, 
 confequently more motives, more knowledge, befides 
 the more pernicious effect and the greater danger to 
 which it expofes. An act fo conducted may be called 
 an act of clandeftine malice. 
 
 Sell. — There is a great difference between murder and a flaffi na- 
 tion ; between the taking away one's life by a weapon or 
 by poifon, &c. 
 
 There is alfo a difference between the open attack upon a 
 perfon's reputation, and the clandeftine aljaffin'ation oi 
 his character. 
 
 The action wittingly and willingly done contrary to 
 law and to obligation, is of dire '£t malt 'cioufnefs: there 
 is a poflibility for an action which has been done cul- 
 pably to become malicious, by approving and juftify- 
 \\\<g it, and glorying in its effects. Such actions we 
 .call acts of indireel malice. 
 
 Sch. — We may inadvertently hurt a perfon, and fignify our 
 regret; or we mav rejoice and fhew deirghfc in the eff< . 
 
 Hi 
 
£2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In the former cafe the action at raofl renders the agent 
 culpable; but in the latter he ftamps his will and appro- 
 bation upon it, after which the action becomes wilful and 
 malicious. 
 
 By fortune and. misfortune we underftand an unfore- 
 ictn concurrence of caufes, which have a favourable or 
 an unfavourable influence on our happinefs. 
 
 By accidents we underftand the effects of unforefeen 
 
 cauies. 
 
 Fortune and misfortune, and accidents, do not admit 
 
 of any degree of morality or immorality, for ignorance 
 
 in fuch cafes is invincible. 
 
 Sen. — What a great abufe is made of the terms misfortune and 
 accidents? How often mult, they unmerited ftand for the 
 natural effects of want of rectitude? The natural confe- 
 quences of folly, inattention, improvidency, precipitancy, 
 careleflhefs and wickednefs make up the greatefl part of 
 accidents and misfortunes ! Comparatively few houfes are 
 deftroyed by lightning; and is it not the cafe with refpeft 
 to other things, as poverty, captivity, &c. ? 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of moral imputation. 
 
 c 
 
 OlNCE actions admit of various degrees of morality 
 and immorality, according to the mode and manner in 
 which they are done or omitted, as well as in confe- 
 quence of their effects and the intention of the agent, 
 it follows, that it is impoflible for us to form a judge- 
 ment of the proper fhare of merit or demerit of parti- 
 cular actions, unlefs they are reprefented or con/idered 
 tinder their individual circumftanccs, 
 
 Actions 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 93 
 
 Actions coniidered under individual circunjfianees 
 are called faffs or cafes. 
 
 The moft principal circumftances of facts are their 
 ciFecls and the intention of the agent, for to them all 
 others have reference. 
 
 Sch. i. — The firft cafe of fratricide is thus recorded: Cain rofe 
 tip againji Abel his brother, and flew him. If we attend to 
 the effect, we fliall fee that it was an aft of violence; he 
 rofe and Jlezo him , not accidentally, not in a fudden phrenzy 
 of the mind, but deliberately, intentionally and maliciouf- 
 ly. Cain ivas wroth, and his countenance fell; not that Abel 
 gave him caufe, or provoked his anger; no, Abel's inno- 
 cence, his virtue was the caufe; it was, that the Lord 
 had rather refpect to his than to the murderer's facrifice. 
 What an aggravating circumftance! they were brethren, 
 the firft of brethren ! 
 
 Sch. 2. — Seeing an indifcriminate concourfe of people, our 
 firft enquiry is concerning what has happened. Being 
 told that a man has drowned, we not only enquire who 
 he is, when the event took place, when and where the 
 body was found; but principally whether the fact has 
 taken place from his or another's intention, or whether it 
 is an accident. 
 
 If we give a detail of the circumftances of a fact, 
 
 we are faid to give a fiats thereof. 
 
 Sch. i. — In ftating a cafe, every circumftance, great or final!, 
 even the pofture, countenance, and expreilions of the 
 agent, if any were made, the occasion, origin, progrefs, 
 manner, mode and time, &c. of the action, ought to be 
 moft carefully particularifed, that thereby the intention 
 of the agent may be made fully to appear: for the leaft of 
 thefe circumftances omitted or mifreprefented may give 
 the fact, particularly the intention of the agent, a different, 
 perhaps a moft unmerited complexion; and our judgment 
 formed upon fuch an imperfect or mifreprefented ftate 
 of the fact, may be erroneous and highly unjuft. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Such imperfect and miftaken ftatement of a fact: has 
 obtained the name of error of fad ; and when a declaration 
 is made that fuch an error has taken place, it is called an 
 exception to the f aft. 
 
 Sch, 
 
94- MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sfk, 3. — Witnefles in judicial proceedings ought to be ex- 
 tremely careful to teftify concerning all circumftances of 
 which they have any knowledge, jufl in fuch a manner 
 as they know them, left they render themfelves refponii- 
 b!e lor acts of opprefiion and injufiice, as moral or prox- 
 imate caufes of them. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Falfe reprefentations of facts mult be confidered as 
 the principal fources of the innumerable acts of detrac- 
 tion, calumny and (lander, fodeftructive to the peace and 
 harmony of focial intercourfe. How careful fhould we 
 be neither to originate nor to propagate rnifreprefentations 
 of this kind, or to form a judgment thereon to the injury 
 and detriment of our neighbour! 
 
 A fact is faid to be imputed^ if a declaration is made 
 that it is referable to the Spontaneity or will of a certain 
 agent. As referring actions to the will of a perfon is 
 declaring him the author thereof, we may define impu- 
 tation of f aft to be the declaration that a certain perfon 
 is its author. 
 
 Not only actions, but alfo their confequences, that 
 is, their merit or demerit, may be referred to the will 
 of their author. A declaration that certain merits be- 
 long to a fact, is imputation of law ; becaufe it is the 
 peculiar province of laws to determine the merits or 
 demerits, the rewards or punifhments due to actions 
 which come under their cognizance. 
 
 Sch. — Imputation of law, whether in judicial proceedings or 
 in common converfation, fhould therefore be according 
 to the directions of laws and confident with the degrees 
 of morality or immorality of facts, other wife an error of 
 law will be committed. A declaration that fuch an error 
 has taken place is filled exception to the law. 
 
 Moral imputation comprehends both imputation of 
 fact and of law, and may be defined a declaration that 
 a certain fact and its confequences are referable to a 
 certain perfon as the author thereof. 
 
 J6A. 
 
Moral philosophy, 95 
 
 Sch. 1. — In moral imputation, therefore, it is not fo much the 
 quefrion, whether actions have been done or omitted, but 
 principally whether they proceed from the intention of a 
 certain agent. 
 
 5V//. 2. — Hence it appears, that no facts can be imputed to 
 perfons who cannot exercife underftanding, reafon and 
 judgment; for they cannot exercife will, nor act from 
 intention. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Neither can any other but moral actions be imputed, 
 for they only depend upon the will or intention of agents'. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Natural actions cannot be imputed farther than they 
 admit of fpontarieity ; that is, only with refpect to time, 
 place, mode and manner. 
 
 Actions referable to the will of an agent will be 
 
 imputable as far as that will is free. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Actions done or omitted under compulsion cannot be 
 imputed to the immediate agent thereof, but mult be 
 wholly charged to the moral caufe of that compulsion. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Actions done "by inftruirrental caufes, are imputable 
 to thofe who are the principal caufes thereof. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Actions done by a proximate caufe are imputable both 
 to the proximate and to the moral caufe. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Actions done by brutes, by infant children, by luna- 
 tics and madmen, may be imputable to moral caufes, as 
 far as they are referable to their will ; for inftance, if we 
 know their milchievous nature, and do not our belt to 
 keep them from doing harm. 
 
 As actions, with refpect to the degrees of liberty, 
 
 have likewife their degrees of morality or immorality, 
 
 We may conclude, that imputability of actions will be in 
 
 proportion to their degrees of morality and immorality ; 
 
 for both have their foundation in certain degrees of will 
 
 and intention. 
 
 Sch. — If we value a good confeience, and wifh the happinefs 
 of preferving it pure and undented, we mufr. in all our 
 conduct pay the ftri<tefr attention to the laws of morality, 
 as they are the rule and ftandard of imputation. 
 
 From 
 
96 MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 
 
 From the preceding proportion it follows, that we 
 may diftinguifh fads in perfect fimilarity to the diftinc- 
 tions obferved in moral adions, and aflign their pro- 
 portionate degrees of imputability in the following 
 manner: — 
 
 Voluntary fads will be mofe imputable than the 
 involuntary, the immediate more than the mediate, the 
 intentional more than the unintentional, the deliberate 
 more than the inconfiderate : there is more heinoufnefs 
 and guilt in an unjuft than in a diihoneft fad-, and a 
 malicious fad is more criminal than a culpable one, &c. 
 Sck. 1. — As fads are a fpecies of moral adions, it is eafy to con- 
 ceive, that to determine the imputability of the former, 
 we have only to attend to the morality or immorality of 
 the latter; fubftituting imputability for morality or im- 
 morality, and fad for adion. 
 
 All imputation, whether moral, or that of fad or 
 of law, is conduded in the way of fyllogiftic argu- 
 mentation. 
 
 Sch. 1.— For inflance: imputation of fad may be conceived to 
 proceed in this form: 
 To whofe will the exigence or He who malicioufly has killed 
 
 non-exillence of the fad B is Clodius, has committed mur- 
 
 referable, he is the author der. 
 
 thereof. 
 It is to the will of A that the Milo has malicioufly killed Clo- 
 
 fad B is referable; therefore dins; therefore Milo is guilty 
 
 A is the author of fad B. of murder. 
 
 $ c ± 2 . — Imputation of law is by this fyllogifm : 
 Whatever fad is of fuch a par- Murder deferves capital punifh- 
 
 ticular nature, to it belongs meat; 
 
 fuch rewards or punifhments. 
 But the fad B is of that particu- The death of Clodius is murder; 
 
 lar nature; 
 Therefore to the fad B belongs Therefore the death of Clodius 
 
 fuch rewards or punifhments. calls for capital punifhment. 
 
 Sck. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 97 
 
 ScL 3. — Moral imputation comprehends both imputation of 
 fact and law, and is in this form: 
 Whoever is the author of foci Whoever has committed the 
 M, to him belongs the pu- murder of Clodius, he is to 
 nifhment D 1 be punifhed with death. 
 
 Milo is the author of faft M; Milo has committed the mur- 
 der of Ciodius; 
 
 Therefore Milo deferves the Therefore Milo rnuft be du- 
 
 i. 
 
 punilliment D. mlhed with death. 
 
 Imputation may be true, falfe or dubious : for fyllo- 
 giftic argumentation may be one or the other, or it 
 may depend upon premifes, from which only a pro- 
 bable conclufion may flow. 
 
 If the fact be not true or certain, imputation cannot 
 be the one or the other -, for if one of the premifes be 
 destitute of the criterions of truth and certainty, the 
 conclufion muft be defective accordingly. 
 
 ScL 1. — -Suppofe a trinket be miffing, and no perfon known 
 to have been in the room in which it was kept but a fer- 
 vant of the houfe, is it not probable that the fervant has 
 taken it away? An imputation upon thefe probable cir- 
 cumftances is dubious, for the trinket may be miflaid or 
 taken away by another. 
 
 ScL 2. — Imputation may be in a high degree probable, and 
 come near to certainty itlelf, itill it is dubious and may 
 be falfe, for the greatest, probability may be fo. Add to 
 the former inftance, that the fervant is wavering in hi'j 
 apology, that the article is found in a pocket of his coat 
 in the room allotted to him ; ftill another perfon may have 
 put it there; or if not thus found among his things, the 
 mailer of the houfe, who never concerned himfelf with 
 things of this kind, may have lent it to a neighbour. 
 
 ScL 3. — Suppofe the fervant ConfefTes the fact, tells where the 
 trinket is; or if witnefies have feen him take, or fell, or 
 hide it away; the imputation will be certain. 
 
 ScL 4. — Sufpicicm, in a certain fenfe of the term, has reference 
 to probable imputation of facts;, when it becomes a pro- 
 
 O penfity 
 
£$ MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 penfity or a paflion of the mind, it is a moft difagreeable 
 fouree of lafting inquietude to the heart in which it 
 dwells; befides, it is a mortal enemy to peace and harmo- 
 ny, the greateft bleffings of families, of human, inter- 
 courfe, and all focial connections; it deftroys character, 
 wounds reputation: actions the moft innocent are con- 
 ftrued into evil defigns: it traduces the caufe of truth, of 
 virtue, of God and man. 
 
 Neither is imputation true, if merits or demerits are 
 
 imputed which do not belong or are difproportionate 
 
 to facts. 
 
 «SV//. i.— Human legislators, therefore, ought to eftablifh in the 
 fanctions of their laws proper gradations of rewards and 
 punifhments, adapted to the refpective degrees of morality 
 or immorality in actions ; for how can imputation be 
 true, if its foundation is defective or falfe? 
 
 Sch. 2. — In forming our judgments concerning the conduct of 
 men, whether they are our fuperiors, equals or inferiors, 
 we fhould never lofe fight of this necefTary criterion of 
 true imputation; for how can we avoid fcandalous flat- 
 tery, envy, detraction, infolence and feverity, if we pay 
 not attention to the rules of rectitude, to the degrees of 
 morality or immorality in actions ? We muft make a 
 difference between riches, power, connections, and be- 
 tween true greatnefs and real goodnefs. We muft efteem 
 men by their virtue, humanity, prudence and induftry : 
 not by appearances nor paflion, not by the prevalent opi- 
 nions of mankind; but truth muft be our guide, where 
 juftice and a good conscience are the object. 
 
 Sck. 3. — If an innocent man fhould fuffer public punifhment, 
 and the guilty be rewarded, would it not be deemed an 
 act of moft horrid cruelty and injuftice? Can we there- 
 fore be innocent, if we defpife or difefteem a good man 
 becaufe he is poor, has no connections, no great expecta- 
 tions; and applaud the noify, turbulent, extravagant and 
 wicked man, becaufe he is rich, tec.} 
 
 As partiality and refpect of perfon find no place 
 before God, fo they mould find none in courts of juftice. 
 It wouid be a great happmefs to mankind if they were 
 entirelv banifhed from fociety. 
 
 He 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. *9J 
 
 He upon whom imputation of fact depends is the 
 accufer\ and the perfon who imputes law exercifes the 
 office of a judge. 
 
 No accufation can be juft and unexceptionable, ex- 
 cept the fact be cognizable, true and certain. 
 
 *>V//.~ Information is a kind of accufation. 
 
 Falfe accufation may be culpable or malicious. 
 
 Moral imputation cannot be juft where imputation 
 of fad is unfair or unjuft; for the author of the fact 
 not being afcertained, the merits or demerits of actions 
 cannot be referred to the intention of an agent. 
 
 Neither can mora) imputation be juft, if the proper 
 merits and dements which belong to facts, and their 
 authors, are not aflignefi. 
 
 Sch. i. — As laws are to determine the merits and demerits of 
 actions, it is evident, that no juft imputations can be 
 founded thereon, except they be juft and wifely inftituted. 
 
 Sch. 2. — No people can be happy without a wife and juft ad- 
 miniftration of laws. 
 
 Hence it appears, that the judge muft underftand 
 and be able to interpret laws; that he muft have full 
 and fufficient information of facts - 9 that he be careful 
 that evidences be examined, their teftimonies compared 
 and fcrutinized according to the necefTary criteria of 
 truth, otherwife he may become culpable: if any 
 rhing is omitted with defign, he is guilty of malicious 
 partiality and injuftice. 
 
 By relative equity we underftand a ftrict obfervance 
 of the various circumftances of facts, which may ferve 
 ro mitigate or aggravate their guilt, or to determine the 
 degrees of commendation in actions done conformably 
 ro laws •, for human laws cannot provide for all poflible 
 cafes, and facts of the fame kind may afTume different 
 
 complexions 
 
100 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 complexions under different circum fiances, and be 
 
 more or lefs referable to the • rention of the agent. 
 
 But as this ought to be the principal confideration in 
 
 imputation* it follows, that in juft imputation relative 
 
 equity is to be obferved. 
 
 Sch. — On this account the laws of the land very wifely leave 
 power in the executive part of the government, to fuf- 
 pend, remit, or to mitigate punifhments in certain cafes. 
 
 Jufiice is another requifite in imputation *, for, as by 
 
 its general definition it is a habit of doing juft actions, 
 
 there cannot be a better place for its exercife than where 
 
 we have to determine merits or demerits according to 
 
 the eternal laws of juftice and of equity. The idea of 
 
 juftice being more fpecifically confined to perfect laws 
 
 defining the perfect rights of men, which require that 
 
 we give every one his due, is more generally known 
 
 by the definition, that it is that virtue by which tvegive 
 
 every one bis due. Thus juftice commands, that good 
 
 men be rewarded and evil doers punifhed. 
 
 Sch. i. — Though both thefe definitions be true, and the latter 
 molt generally adopted, (till it muft be confefTed, that our 
 ideas of that virtue are fucli that we cannot fee its Ioveli- 
 nefs and the benignity of its nature fo eafily as we do of 
 other virtues, which in God are infinite and unfpotted at- 
 tributes of his efTence, and in man the higheft degree of 
 excellency and perfection. Juftice, with refpect to our 
 fenfibility, has the appearance of feverity, nay, is often 
 taken by mankind for feverity itfelf. Hence it is, that 
 tender minds cannot reconcile infinite inflexible juftice in 
 God with his infinite love and mercy. But there is no 
 fuch unfriendly ingredient in divine juftice, nor in juftice: 
 that is to be adminiftered by men. The confeioufnefs of 
 our guilt before God muft be aftigneu as one of the caufes 
 of our mifapprehenfions with refpeet to this his unfpotted 
 and infinite attribute; and the frequent examples of feve- 
 rity which we fee in the exercife of juftice by human au- 
 thority, are another caufe why wc are very apt to form 
 unfriendly conceptions of its nature. 
 
 9c&. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 10 I 
 
 Sr/;. 2. — It is on this Account that we feel a predilection for 
 the definition which feme writers have given of juilice, 
 calling it kindnefs admini/Iard according to the laiv of wifdom. 
 This definition fully anfwers the idea of juflice, and is 
 very well calculated to remove fa He imprdiions from our 
 minds, and to obviate every unfavourable conftruclion. 
 It leads us immediately into a fenfe, as it were, of the be- 
 nign nature of divine juflice, and the necefTary and bene- 
 ficial influence of this virtue on the general happinefs of 
 mankind. It is fo far from feverity, that it is kindnefs 
 itfelf. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Kindnefs, a promptitude to render others happy, being 
 in God the natural effecf of his infinite love to his crea- 
 tures, is the eflential and invariable fcope of all that comes 
 under the direction of human laws; for they have for 
 their end the general felicity of fociety. To whom 
 fliould we look for benignity, for kindnefs, but to God, 
 who is love itfelf, and to thofe, fathers of their country 
 who fnould in all their purfuits have for their principal 
 aim the happinefs of mankind ? Is it a wonder, there- 
 fore, that juflice is a property, an attribute of the divine 
 eflence, and its adminiftration a particular prerogative of 
 governments among men? 
 
 Sch. 4. — But have we not to look for that benignity in perfecf. 
 agreement with wifdom? As by zeifdem we underftand 
 that fcience which teaches tne beft ends, by the proper 
 nfe of the heft means for the attainment thereof, the law 
 of wifdom will direcf that kindnefs be not difpenfed 
 ' indiscriminately to offenders as well as to faithful ob- 
 fervers of law, but in fuch a manner that thereby the 
 general happinefs of mankind may be obtained. This 
 cannot take place where the laws are not duly obeyed ; 
 but obedience is to be incited by rewards, and by punifh- 
 ments inflicted upon the difobedient. Therefore, true 
 wifdom in God and in all governments requires that 
 kindnefs mould be extended to all who conduct: them- 
 felves conformably to law, and be withdrawn from thofe 
 who act contrary thereto. 
 
 In the exercife of juftice, therefore, we mav not confine 
 our confideration to the punifhment of the wicked, who 
 have forfeited all claim to kindnefs, but mould princi- 
 pally attend to its benign inttueuce on xht happinefs of 
 
 fociety 
 
102 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 focicty in general. Juftice requires that the diforderiy 
 and wicked experience the rigour of law; and that the 
 good and the upright may enjoy its protection. 
 Sch. 5. — Heft there ftill remain fomething in our conceptions 
 concerning the nature of juftice, leaving it liable to un- 
 favourable conftructions, it ought to be confidered, that 
 this is a necefTary confequence of the natural imbecility 
 of human adminiftrations thereof; for from this our ideas 
 of juftice are commonly formed, and mult be imperfect, 
 as they furnifh but feldom examples of rewards, whilft, 
 on the contrary, they frequently exhibit puniftiments to 
 public view. Hence it is, that we fee juftice but qp its 
 dark lide; not in the full difplay of its beauty and loveli- 
 nefs, but in its pitiable and dreadfuKeffects upon the dif- 
 obedient and wicked tranfgreffors of laws. 
 
 We may add, that the human heart, fo very apt to difregard 
 bleffings which we enjoy every day, is very feldom pro- 
 perly affected by the rewards which are confequent upon 
 obedience and ftrict obfervance of laws. God is juft; 
 and the day will come when no labour, no pain, no fuf- 
 fering, no endeavour to do our duty, will remain unre- 
 warded ; and even now his bleffings are innumerable upon 
 his children; and in the difpenfntions of his providence 
 we often fee thofe bleffings withdrawn from nations, nay, 
 from individual perfons, as the juft confequences of their 
 difobedience and vices, and the particular tokens of his 
 difpleafure. How necefTary, then, that we form our ideas 
 from the adminiftration of juftice by divine providence, 
 and the declarations which God has made by revelation, 
 of its full and glorious difplay that fliall take place when 
 he will judge the world in righteoufhefs ! 
 
 And are we not guilty of inconfideration, if even in human, 
 adminiftration we do not fee the rewards which are a na- 
 tural confequence of obedience and a faithful obfervance 
 of laws ? Is not the fccurity of our life, property and 
 rights, which' laws afford to faithful obfervers, a great, 
 nay, the beft, the moft valuable of all rewards? Is not 
 a good character, and the favour of the virtuous and up- 
 right, a great and delirable good ? Add inward peace; 
 and tranquillity of mind, the effects of a good confcience, 
 what more can be expected that the world can give? 
 The reward of virtue exceeds the wifdom and power of 
 
 men : 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. IO^ 
 
 men: it is the prerogative of God. Men, as they cannot 
 fee what is in man, cannot give virtue its due reward. 
 Since they cannot with precition djfcern the virtuous and 
 upright man from the deceitful and the hypocrite, would 
 not falfe pretenders run away with the rewards of virtue, 
 and virtuous modefty remain neglected ? Suppofc even 
 that the inward principles and fprings of actions could 
 be known; fuppofe that the ftock of a ftate be niexhaufti- 
 ble for rewarding every aft of obedience to law ; what has 
 the world befides riches, honours and preferments? Can 
 thefe tilings be rewards for virtue, which may be acquired 
 without an aft of our own, or by afts of fraud and mj-uf- 
 tice, and pofTefTed by fools, monfters and oppreflbrs ? 
 The virtuous man, if he poffefies them, can add luftre to 
 them; they receive defirablenefs and luftre by the virtu- 
 ous poffeflbr, and the ufe he makes of them. 
 
 As long as men of doubtful character enjoy riches, fill offi- 
 ces, or are elevated to high flat ions, fo long no riches, no 
 honours, no preferments can in themfelves be conudered 
 as rewards; they cannot add any thing to the internal 
 beauty and excellency of virtue. Virtue is its own re- 
 ward in this life — an inexhauftible fource of bleffings in- 
 deed ! If the world prefents you with inftances which 
 feem to render this axiom doubtful, take them for incon- 
 trovertible arguments, that there will be another (late of 
 exiftence, where juftice will be manifefted in its full glo- 
 ry, and every virtuous aft of this life will receive its due 
 reward. God isjuft, infinitely righteous ! 
 
 The fcope of the exercife of juftice is, that the laws 
 be obeyed, and the happinefs of mankind promoted 
 and preferved. Hence it is that it is faid to be diftri- 
 butive; becaufe it diftributes rewards to the obedient 
 and punifhments to the difobedient. 
 
 Diftributive juftice is therefore diftinguilhed into 
 remunerative and punitive. 
 
 Sch. — Some call punitive juftice vindiftive, but this term ap- 
 pears to us to be rather inconfiltent with the general na- 
 ture of the juftice of God, and that which ought to be 
 excrcifed by men. How can revenge be confifttnt with 
 kindnefs ? 
 
 By 
 
104 MORAL rHILOSQPHY. 
 
 By fentencc we underftand the refult of moral impu- 
 tation, declared by him who performs the office of 
 judge, concerning the quantum of imputability in ac- 
 tions, according to the dc frees of morality or immo- 
 rality, and the lhare of reward or pummment due to 
 a certain fact and its author. 
 
 Sentence includes a favouiable or unfavourable efti- 
 mate of the conduct of the agent; fuch an eftimate 
 conftituting honour and approbation, or blame and 
 difapprobation,it follows, that honour and blame muft 
 beconfidered in fome refpect as reward or punimment. 
 Sentence is juft when it refults from juft imputation * 
 no fentence, therefore, will be juft, where the obfervers 
 of law meet not due honour, and the difobedient 
 marked blame : where the reverfe takes place, it is 
 certainly faife and highly criminal. 
 
 ScL i. — How careful, therefore, fnould we be to fet up for 
 judges over the conduct of our brethren, whether they 
 be ourfuperiors, equals or inferiors? How important a 
 talk is laid upon uf, when the caufe of truth and huma- 
 nity calls us to the performance of this office, as there is 
 <*reat danger that we may injure both that very caufe and 
 our fellow creature ? . Nothing is of a more delicate na- 
 ture than character. How often, like him Who travelled 
 from Jerufalem to Jericho, is our character wounded and 
 laid proftrate ? Flow general is the cafe, that not only 
 the prieft and levite, but the generality of mankind pafs 
 by a wounded character? and how ieldpm is a Samaritan 
 found to heal or to relieve it ? 
 Sc/i. 2. — But how much more important is this confederation 
 to all who are concerned in judicial proceedings, the 
 accufer, judge, witneffes, jurors, &c. where there is dan- 
 ger even from the imbecility of human nature, that the 
 fa cred caufe of juftice may be betrayed or perverted! 
 Beware of partiality, whether of a culpable or a mali- 
 cious nature. May fuch proceedings never find place in 
 courts where the fword of juftice is uniheathed to exe- 
 cute wrath upon evil doers! 
 
 W here 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 10$ 
 
 Where fentence is cr'iven according to certain laws, 
 there is a forum, a tribunal. Laws may be human, na- 
 tural arid divine : the former conftitute the human, 
 thefe the natural and divine forum, which likewife is 
 called the forum of confciencc. 
 
 Sch. — To the human forum belong only thofe actions which, 
 come under the cognizance of the laws of the land; the 
 natural, the divine, and the forum of confeience extend 
 to all manner of actions which are of a moral nature. 
 Imputation before the tribunal of God will be in perfect 
 truth, according to unerring ju (lice, and fentence accord- 
 ing to deferts. 
 
 Iii natural imputation, all the natural confequences 
 of moral actions will be imputed to the authors of 
 them. No good action will be unrewarded, no evil 
 impunifhed. 
 
 There is fuch a thing as internal imputation, where 
 the author of a fact imputes to himfelf both actions 
 and their confequences. 
 
 
 The faculty of the human foul, by which we impute 
 
 to ourfelves actions and their confequences, is known 
 
 by the name of moral confeience: confeience, therefore, 
 
 perforins both the part of an accufer and the office of 
 
 a judge. 
 
 Sch. i. — In order more fully to underftand the nature and great 
 importance of moral confeience, and the various diftinc- 
 tions thereof, intimated by various epithets applied to its 
 a&s, it will be neceflary that we attend to the very foun- 
 dation from which thole acts proceed. This is undoubt- 
 edly the perfonality of the human foul, by which it cannot 
 but be confeious of itfelf, of all its thoughts and actions: 
 with perfonaiity is intimately connected the infernal fenje 9 
 that, as a rational being, it is under obligations to do what 
 is good and to avoid evil : upon perfonality and this in- 
 ternal fenfe refts the act of 'judgment concerning the con- 
 formity or contrariety of our actions to our moral obliga- 
 
 P tion : 
 
1O0 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion ; reajhn thence infers the merits or demerits, the re- 
 wards or punifhments which are due to us on account of 
 our obedience or difobedienee, according to the degrees 
 of their morality or immorality. 
 
 S'ck. 2. — From this analyfis feveral general inferences may be 
 drawn : — 
 i. That no man can lofe confeience altogether; for, how- 
 ever much he may defire it, he cannot lofe the perfonality 
 of his foul. Hence it is that we read, f the ungodly have 
 no peace;' and it is inconteftibly true, that confidence 
 will exert its power after life. 
 
 2. That, as the internal fenfe of obligation is in connection 
 with the knowledge we have of good or evil, there mull 
 be a vaft difference between an uninformed^ and an informed 
 confeience. An uninformed confeience is milled by ex- 
 amples, by fenfe and paiiion, and judges of things and 
 actions according to appearances: an informed confeience 
 confiders the reality of things, and judges of actions ac- 
 cording to their confequences. 
 
 Confeience may be more or lefs informed, and therefore 
 capable of improvements and liable to neglect and abufes, 
 By improving confeience we preferve it undefikd; by fol- 
 lowing bad examples, fenfe and paflion, it becomes de- 
 filed. 
 
 The enlightened confeience is the effect of the fpirit and word 
 of God : an enlightened confeience duly exercifed is pure, 
 
 Sch. \\ — Whatever our information may be, there is ftill dan- 
 ger, that by inconfideration and inattention to our actions 
 and their confequences, confeience may be neglected ; 
 that we either form no judgment of our actions and their 
 effects, of" that fuch judgment is partial and falfe. How 
 unaccountable is fuch a conduct in perfons endowed with 
 underftanding, reafon and judgment, hot to exercife thefe 
 powers, not to make a proper ufe of thefe heavenly gifts? 
 Certainly the inconfiderate Heathen, the diforderly Jew 
 and Chriflian, all are equally inexcufable; not becaufe 
 they» have equal advantages, God in his infinite wifdom 
 has not feen fit to grant it; but they are equally guilty of 
 neglecting, abufing or perverting thofe gifts which are 
 heilowed upon them, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 10/ 
 
 «SV^. 4 — When confcience does not exerciie its power as accu- 
 ser and judge, the caufe may be inattention, a fettled neg T 
 left, or evil and vicious habits. In the former cafe con- 
 fcience is faid to be afleep, in the fecond it is callous, in the 
 third feared. When the contrary is the cafe, confcience 
 is awake, tender, and vigilant. Confcience, with refpect 
 to imputation of fact, is faid to accufe or to excufe; with 
 refpect to imputation of fact -and law, it is right or erroneous, 
 certain or doubtful, approving or dif approving, condimnin? or 
 abfolv'mg, or wavering. If confcience judges in reference 
 to the degrees of morality or immorality, it is good, quiet, 
 ferene, full of peace and joy ; or bad, gnazoing^ gloomy, df~ 
 ponding, tormenting, full of defpair. 
 
 Sch. $. — In the moral as well as in the phyfical world, nothing 
 happens without previous caufes; confcience, therefore, 
 can never become callous or feared except it be fuf ered 
 to deep: neither mall we eafily run the riik of being mif- 
 led by an erroneous confcience, if we exercife our judg- 
 ment and reafon, together with the internal fenfe of our 
 obligations, and do not depend upon examples or confult 
 fenfe and paffions. We fhall be fecure againft defpon- 
 dency and defpair, if we guard againft a bad confcience. 
 We may enjoy great peace and joy, if we take care to 
 have a good confcience before God and before men. 
 Finally, obferve that happinefs and mifery in this life do 
 not confift in things external: nor riches, nor honours, 
 nor the pofTeffion of the earth can make a man happy who 
 has not a good confcience: no poverty, no perfecution, 
 even death cannot render the man unhappy who does his 
 belt endeavours to preferve a confcience pure and unde- 
 nted. 
 
 Sc/i. 6. — It is in our power to awaken confcience when it falls 
 afleep; it is therefore in our power to keep it undebauch- 
 ed, tender and vigilant; for attention and reflection are 
 in our power, and we ought to keep them in exerciie, as 
 rational creatures accountable to God for all we think, 
 fpeak or do. The day comes, and mult come, when even 
 the feared confcience will become fenfible, when it will 
 find no excufe, no hiding place, but muft feel unutter- 
 able pangs of defpair, anticipating God's righteoufnefs 
 in judgment. 
 
 As 
 
IC8 MCT.AL PHILOSOPHY - . 
 
 As the conuieniious man is invariably determined to 
 conduct him/elf conformably to his internal fenfe of 
 obligation, it fellows, that, as fuch, he maintains in 
 general the character of the internally honefl: and up- 
 right man. 
 
 However commendable thefe characters may be, 
 frill it is necefTary that in our conduct we attend alfo to 
 other things befides the internal principle of our mind. 
 For infrance, may not the upright, the confeientious 
 man be inattentive to the rules of decency and pro- 
 priety ? may he not form an erroneous idea of the 
 confequences of actions, or the intention of the agent ? 
 may he not, therefore, make a miflake with refpect to 
 the particular laws of morality or immorality ? In one 
 word, cannot a confeientious man be miftaken, or act 
 from an erroneous confeience ? 
 
 The confeientious man, who acts from a right and 
 well informed confeience, is, therefore, the mofr. ex- 
 cellent character, worthy our imitation. 
 
 Sen. — What (hall a man dp under a miftaken or erroneous 
 confeience ? We anfwer, Let him caft it off as foon as 
 he is convinced of that error, but follow it as long as he 
 conceives himfelf right. Suppofe he fhould not obferve 
 the latter, would he not fin againft his confeience? and 
 would he not be apt to do fo in cafes where his confeience 
 might be right? Who would trull that man? A man 
 without confeience is a monfter! 
 
 PART 
 
P A R T II. 
 
 Se£k. I. Comprehending Ethics. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 B 
 
 } Y ethics we underftand that part of moral philoso- 
 phy which treats of the duties of man. 
 
 Duties are actions to be done or omitted conformably 
 to the directions of moral obligations and Jaws. 
 
 Duties may be distinguished into commiffive and omif- 
 five, into perfecl and imperfe£l\ into duties to God, to 
 our/elves, and to others. The two former distinctions 
 have reference to the obligations and laws which enjoin 
 them, the latter has refpect to their immediate objects. 
 
 Commiilive duties are enjoined by perceptive, the 
 
 omiilive by prohibitory laws •, as, love God with all thy 
 
 heart — do not love fin. 
 
 Sch. i. — What has been obferved with refpect to the distinction 
 of preceptive and prohibitory laws, may in fome meafure 
 be applied to this ditt.inct.ion of duties : for the commiffive 
 duties imply omiffion of all acts inconfn'lent with the 
 performance thereof; and there are commiffive acts like- 
 wife necefTary in omiffive duties, fo that both muft be 
 considered as correlate ideas, infeparable from one ano- 
 ther. It is, therefore, only the general and principal cha- 
 racter of duties that juftifies this diftinction, and the pro- 
 per ufe we are to make of it is, that we learn at once the 
 great extent of our duties in all the particulars which a 
 faithful performance of them requires. For inftance, the 
 love of God requires, befides the commiflion of many 
 things which conftitute that affirmative duty, that we ab- 
 
 flain 
 
flQ t MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ftain from ill that is inconfiftent with its performances 
 not only our whole heart, foul, mind and flrength is to be 
 engaged in doing what is pleating to our God, but we muft 
 alfo avoid all things which are fin fill and difpleafing to 
 him, if we fincerely defire to love him. The fame is the 
 cafe with refpeil to the negative duty, Jo no injury : here 
 we have not only to omit many things which are of an 
 injurious nature, but we have alfo to do all actions con- 
 fident" with and necefiary for its performance: we mull 
 pay our debts, requite fervices and labour done in our 
 behalf, Sec. 
 
 Sch. 1. — -Vv T e may therefore lay down this general maxim re- 
 flecting the performance of duties, that all commiffive 
 duties imply thofe omiifive acts without which their per- 
 formance cannot take place, and vice verfa. 
 
 Perfect duties are enjoined by perfect laws, and re- 
 fult from perfect obligations. As the performance of 
 them may be compelled, they are denominated duties 
 of necejjiiy. 
 
 Imperfect duties have reference to imperfect obliga- 
 tions and laws. As no compuliion can take place, 
 they are filled, duties of humanity, for in performing 
 them we act up to the dignity of human nature. 
 
 Sc/i. — The divifion of duties in refpect of laws may be carried 
 to a great length, as laws are of various complexions and 
 denominations: thus civil, religious, family, public and 
 private duties, &c. have reference to civil, religious, fa- 
 mily, public and private laws, &c. 
 
 Duties to God have for their immediate objects the 
 infinite perfections and will of God. 
 
 Duties to ourfelves have for their immediate objects 
 the properties and qualities of our nature, and all that 
 is interefting to our own ftate. 
 
 Duties to others have for their immediate objects 
 the concerns and interefts of our fellow creatures. 
 
 It 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, III 
 
 Ji ought to be obferved, that all duties to ourfelveS 
 and to our fellow creatures are in a mediate manner 
 duties to God, for ultimately they have reference to 
 his will and divine perfections. We do his will in 
 rendering ourfelves and others happy -, and we ought 
 to be attentive in performing all obligations to ourfelves 
 and others, in order faithfully to dilcharge our duty 
 towards God, All laws ultimately depend upon his 
 will, and our obedience ought to be prompted by mo- 
 tives taken from the divine perfections. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of our duties to God. 
 
 i 
 
 T is a principal, nay, the firft duty we owe to God, 
 that we fincerely defire to know him, for we ought to 
 render our ftate happy by faithfully obeying the natural 
 laws : this will be the cafe if we confider them as the 
 laws of God, by taking our motives of obedience prin- 
 cipally from the divine perfections : hence it is necef- 
 fary that we know thole perfections. By knowing the 
 divine perfections we know God : the firft principle of 
 nature, therefore, enjoins the duty that we defire to 
 know God. 
 
 ScL — This duty might be proved from the nature of the foul, 
 which can be as little affected by things unknown as by 
 thofe which do not exift : but Laving eftablifhed a firft 
 principle of morality, it is proper that all duty and right 
 mould be deduced therefrom. 
 
 Things which may be known of God have either 
 reference to his exiftence, or to his eftence, or to his 
 relation to man and other creatures : hence we ought to 
 
 know, 
 
I I 2 MORAL philosophy. 
 
 know, with con virion of foul, both that he is, and 
 what he is in and to himfelf and to his rational crea- 
 ture?. 
 
 There is a God! God exifts ! This truth, deeply im- 
 planted into the human mind, and universally acknow- 
 ledged by all nations, admits of demonstrative proof in 
 the llricleft fenfe of the word, and refts upon principles 
 which cannot be ihaken; fo that no manner of room 
 is left for a reafonable pretext of doubt. 
 
 Amongfl the various arguments from which the ex- 
 iftence of God may be demonftrated, we confine cur- 
 sives but to one, which is as irrefragable as it is uni- 
 verfally obvious : for a rational man will be furTiciently 
 convinced of the exiftence of a God, if he can be as 
 certain of that exigence as he is of his own. 
 
 We are confeious of ourfelves and of other things 
 without us, confequently we think. Thoughts of our 
 mind, like other affections or modes, can only be pre- 
 dicated of things which have exigence. Our own con- 
 fcioufnefs, our own thoughts, therefore, proclaim our 
 exigence. Since our confeioufnefs of other things, 
 which are objects of fenfe and thought, likewife evinces 
 their exigence, we draw this general conclufion: We 
 and other things, i. e. the world, exifu 
 
 However, every thing has its caufe why it is fo and 
 not otherwife •, our exiflence and that of the world mud 
 confequently be the effect of a fufficient caufe. This 
 caufe of our own exigence and that of the world is ei- 
 ther in ourfelves or in the world, or in a being diitincl 
 from both. Were the former the cafe, We or the world 
 would exhr. necefTarily •, that exiftence would be eternal 
 and immutable-, for what is necelTarv cannot be other- 
 wife, and confequently can undergo no change, cannot 
 
 begin, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, II^ 
 
 begin, cannot ceafe to be. Therefore, as we are 
 changeable, beginning and cearjng to exift, and as the 
 whole world, in all things of which we have knowledge, 
 is contingent and variable, it evidently follows, that our 
 existence and that of the world are the effect of a caufe 
 without ourfelves and without the World-, the effect 
 of a caufe which exifts of itfelf, eternally, immutably, 
 and invariably, and is the firft caufe of all things that 
 exift. This rlrft caufe is called God: our own exig- 
 ence, therefore, and that of the world, proclaim the 
 truth, there is a God. 
 
 A God of eternal and immutable exigence, and the 
 firft caufe of all things, muft in himfelf poffefs all porTi- 
 ble perfections; for his immutability admits of no 
 augmentation, nor of any diminution. A being pof- 
 fefted of all poftible perfections is called infinite i God, 
 therefore, is infinite. 
 
 God is a being of ajzmple, mvifible^ incomprehenjible 
 nature ; for composition of parts, which implies both 
 limitation and mutation, cannot take place in a being 
 which is infinite* neceftary, and immutable. 
 
 God, the great firft caufe, who has ordered all things 
 in wifdom, muft be poftefted of understanding and will ; 
 but as thefe are properties and attributes of fpirits, it 
 follows, that God is a fpirit. 
 
 God is not only a fpirit fimilar to the foul of man 
 and other celeftial, invisible, intelligent beings, but he 
 is eflentially different from all fpirits, whatever their 
 exalted perfections may be: thefe, like our fouls, are 
 finite beings, creatures of his power : he, the creator, 
 is the only infinite fpirit ; becaufe his underftanding and 
 will, like all the glorious perfections of his effence, are 
 infinite. 
 
 Q^ Hence 
 
i 14 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hence it follows, that in refpect of the divine eifence 
 there is but one God^ for there can be but one infinite 
 being. 
 
 Sch. i. — If we fuppofe two or more infinite beings, they mufl 
 either be equal or unequal in perfections. But beings of 
 equal perfections and power could oppofe and refill each 
 other; neither of them, therefore, would poflefs all poili- 
 ble perfections, that is, neither of them would be infinite. 
 If they poflefs unequal perfections, certainly that being 
 which is inferior to the other cannot be infinite. 
 
 Sch. 2.— Nature, therefore, perfectly agrees with divine revela- 
 tion, which mo ft ftrenuoufly inculcates the unity of the 
 divine eflence: but no argument can be drawn from this 
 unity of effende. againit a plurality of perfcns. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Among the infinite perfections in God, which flow 
 from his necefury exiftence and from his fpiritual nature, 
 the following may be principally noted: his necefTary ex- 
 iftence, eternity, immutability, independence, fpirituality, 
 infinity, all-fufficiency, omnifcience, omniprefence, wif- 
 dom, omnipotence, faithfulnefs, goodnefs, juftice, holi- 
 nefs. 
 
 Superftition and atheifm are high offences, militat- 
 ing a^ainit this our firft duty, by which we are bound 
 to endeavour to know the exigence, the infinity and 
 fpiritual nature of God. 
 
 By fiiperfiition we underftand that fatal error where- 
 by falfe conceptions are formed of the pure and infinite 
 perfections of the deity, or falfe inferences drawn from 
 his true perfections, fo that they are made motives for 
 and principles of actions. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Superftition likewife attributes to creatures things 
 which only infinite power can effect; but this and other 
 kinds of fuperftition come under our definition; for all 
 of them imply a denial of his omnifcient care, ail-funi- 
 cierrt power and infinitely wife government. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Were fuperftition a lefs active principle than it really 
 is, there would be rather caufe to pity than to deteft per- 
 
 fons 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. W£ 
 
 fons tainted with it. But who does not feel horror in re- 
 volving in his mind the fcenes of bloodfhed, of devalua- 
 tion and human mifery which persecuting fuperftition has 
 fpread over the world? Who does not know that every 
 kind of fuperftition is of that perfecuting nature in one 
 degree or another? 
 
 Falfe conceptions of the infinite perfections of God 
 may lead into a wanton denial of his exiitence. This 
 unnatural offence is known by the name of atheifm. 
 
 Sch. i. — That perfon would be guilty of theoretical atheifm, who 
 in exprefs terms mould fay, there is no God. It may be 
 queftioned, whether man has ever advanced fo far in in- 
 fanitv and folly. 
 
 Sch. 2. — But it is not fo with refpect to praclical atheifm, of 
 which thofe are guiltv who live as if there were no God, 
 or, to fpeak in terms which have already been defined, 
 who do not take motives from the divine perfections. 
 Men who are deaf to the call of reafon, callous and infen- 
 fible to the voice of confeience, and commonly given to 
 every evil, may acknowledge the exiftence of a God, but 
 in works will reject and deny him. 
 
 What fhall we fay ofdeifm, which is fplit into various 
 fects ? Thofe who believe not divine revelation and 
 the myfteries of falvation, becaufe they never enjoyed 
 the great privilege of living under the gofpel, we con- 
 fider as objects of our fympathy and humanity: thofe 
 who reject thefe advantages we leave refponfible for 
 inconfiftent conduct and itch after novelty before the 
 tribunal of God. But that feet which holds to th<t ex- 
 igence of a God, and denies his providence, we here 
 defignatc by that name, and charge its adherents with 
 the moil foolifn fuperftition that has ever degraded 
 human nature. God ihouid have created, his power 
 fhould fupport all things, and fhould not care for them ? 
 he, the father of the univerfe, the father of mankind, 
 mould be too great, too high to regard the world and 
 
 the 
 
llS MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the conduct of the children of men ? Defpotic error ! 
 God mould be too great, too high to be wife and good ! 
 Nature recoils at the thought ; and that man mull cer- 
 tainly have gone far in wickednefs who can fay in his 
 heart, there is no God, or, which is the fame, God 
 does not fuperintend and govern the univerfe. Can 
 there be any perfection wanting in him who is infinite ? 
 Could he be infinite, could he be God, if he were 
 wanting in goodnefs and care ? To him nothing is too 
 little, becaufe nothing is too great. 
 
 How nearly, then, are the offences allied, which are 
 levelled againft the true knowledge of God ? How dif- 
 ficult is it to determine which is the greater! folly, whe- 
 ther to fay there is no God, to live without God, or 
 to affert that he who has formed the ear does not hear^ 
 he who has made the eye does not fee ? 
 
 All thefe abfurd errors, with other ftrange notions 
 attending them, are high offences ; for they militate 
 againft. the laws of nature and nature's God. All, 
 therefore, who give way to or continue in any of them 
 muit render themfelves unhappy and miferable. 
 
 What a great value, therefore, ought we to fet upon 
 that wifdom which is after God ? and how thankful 
 mould we be for the means fo abundantly given us to 
 attain to a true knowledge of his exiftence and infinite 
 perfections ? 
 
 As an affemhlage of perfections conftitutes glory, 
 and as by tnajefty is intimated the fupreme power of 
 government-, and as thefe in God are infinite, it fol- 
 lows, that he is in and to himfelf a fpirit of infinite 
 glory and majerty. 
 
 It is our duty to God to glorify him, by taking mo- 
 rives for our conduct from his infinite oerfections. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I I? 
 
 Sc/i. — God's glory being infinite, it follows, that by glorifying 
 him we cannot add to it; neither can it be diminifhed by 
 a contrary conduct. He does not ftand in need of any 
 thing his creatures can do. How, then, can it be faid, 
 that we glorify God? We anivver, in manifeiiing his 
 glory to our fellow creatures; for, by acting from motives 
 taken from the divine perfections, others may be led to 
 trace thefe motives, and thus feel an incitement to endea- 
 vour to know God, to ferve him in fpirit and in truth, 
 and to be fenfible of his infinite glory and majefry. 
 
 Blafphemy is the unnatural and horrid crime of ufing 
 words which attribute imperfections to God. 
 
 Sch. — Prophane fwearing, fpeaking of God in a loofe and ir- 
 reverent manner, taking his name in vain, &c. if they do 
 not amount to blafphemy, are ftili a kind of that horrid 
 offence. 
 
 God of infinite glory and majefty is, with reipect to 
 us and all creatures, a being of infinite fuperiority in 
 right of government and controul. As the inward 
 fenfe of another's fuperiority is failed reverence, it fol- 
 lows, that we muft think of God with the greateft hu- 
 mility and reverence. 
 
 As by the worjhip of God is underftood a proclivity 
 of the mind to mow our reverence to his infinite glory 
 and majeiry, it is evidently our duty to worfhip him. 
 
 In the worfhip of God two things may be diftin- 
 guifhed \ the internal fenfe of the divine glory and ma- 
 jefty, and the actions by which that fenfe is manifefted: 
 in the firft cafe our worfhip is theoretical^ in the laft 
 
 practical. 
 
 Practical worfhip is internal, when the fenfe of re- 
 verence actuates the internal acts of the mind; and 'it 
 becomes external, if thefc are outwardly exprefled by 
 words and actions. 
 
 Worfhip 
 
I I 8 MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 
 
 Worfhip may be true or falfe ; for things of the 
 holieft nature may be perverted by abufe. 
 
 If our worfhip is true, our theory of the existence, 
 perfections, infinite glory and majefty 0^ God, muft be 
 true; that is, we muft have a true, and, as far as 
 pofiible, a diftinct knowledge thereof: for only diftinct 
 knowledge convinces the heart; and if conviction is 
 rooted in the foul, we cannot but be ftruck with awe 
 and reverence for that God in whom we live, move, 
 and have our being. We muft feel delight in holy 
 meditation on his bountiful goodnefs- — feel pure defire 
 for his favour and communion; outward actions, 
 words of our lips, prayers, Amplications, praifes and 
 thankfgivings will be the willing, the natural effects of 
 the fulnefs of our heart. Our whole conduct in life 
 mould be a kind of divine worfhip; ail our actions 
 mould mow that our heart is inwardly fenfible how 
 exalted, how glorious, how bleffed is the Lord of 
 hofts ; how worthy to be reverenced and praifed ! 
 
 Worhhip founded on a falfe theory cannot be true in 
 practice. 
 
 Divine worfhip paid to what is not the true God, is 
 idolatry. 
 
 If the theory is founded in erroneous conceptions 
 of the perfedtions and glory of God, worfhip cannot 
 but be fuperftitious. 
 
 Worfnip may be true in theory, and full falfe in 
 practice. 
 
 Internal and external worfhip may be feparated; for 
 the mind can and ought to be fenfible of the prefence 
 of God and his infinite perfections, whilft we are occu- 
 pied in the external duties of our calling. 
 
 Sch. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. II9 
 
 Sch. 1. — If reparation of internal and external worfhip is car- 
 ried farther, we become guilty of perverfion, and a<5t 
 contrary to a great, a glorious and neceflary duty. What 
 is, for inftance, external worfhip without the internal; 
 what are the praifes of the lips with a heart eftranged 
 from God, but Lvpocrify, fhameful in the eyes of men 
 and abominable in the fight of God ? 
 
 Sch. 2. — Neither can internal worfhip, always feparatfd from 
 external, maintain the character of true worfhip ; for 
 in the firft place it is our duty to glorify God, that is, to 
 fhow by our external actions the inward acts of the mind, 
 and thereby incite our fellow creatures to praife, to glorify 
 and to fear the Lord their God. There is between the 
 body and the foul an indiffoluble connection, by which 
 the fulnefs of the heart muft actuate our body as necefla- 
 rily as the external experiences by our fenfes muft actuate 
 the mind. 
 
 Sch. 3. — A certain portion of time ought, therefore, to be fet 
 apart for the exercife of external worfhip, when the whole 
 man, all that is within us, all our powers of foul and 
 body, ought to be engaged in contemplating the infinite 
 glory of God, meditating on his love and goodnefs, and 
 fhowing forth his praifes. 
 
 Sch. 4.-— If we thus exercife the duties of internal and external 
 worfhip jointly, we are faid to ivorj/iip God infant and in 
 truth. 
 
 Worfhip of God is public or private*, in the former 
 we join a number of our fellow creatures j in the latter 
 only our houfhold is engaged. 
 
 Neglecting or treating flightly the worfhip of God 
 are offences unpardonable in themfelves and of a per- 
 nicious tendency -, for in the firft cafe one of the moil 
 excellent and heavenly duties is neglected, and in the 
 latter things of the moil glorious nature are prophaned 
 and abufed. 
 
 Sck. — Divine worfhip, therefore, whether public or private, 
 ought to be conducted with fincere and humble devotion, 
 equally remote from cold and indifferent formality, and 
 from exctntrical and unnatural epthufiafm. 
 
 The 
 
120 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 The more we learn to know God and meditate upori 
 his infinite perfections, the more fenfible we become of 
 the great imperfection of our theory. Our worfhip, 
 therefore, in this life, is at beft but imperfect. 
 
 Worfhip is confequently fufceptible of various de- 
 grees of purity and perfection. 
 
 Hence it is, that from imperfections obferved in va- 
 rious modes of worfhip, we ought not immediately to 
 judge them falfe. 
 
 God, confidered in his ways towards the children of 
 men, is an object of the purert love, of filial fear, of 
 our cordial gratitude, of the fincereft and moil humble 
 invocation and adoration, of the molt faithful obedience 
 and the mod rengncd acquiefcence in his will. 
 
 There is not a duty more comprehenflve than love, 
 whether its object be God, or we ourfelves, or our 
 fellow creature: it involves all other poffible duties, 
 and thence is very juftly ftiled the fulfilling of the law. 
 This is the caufe why its general definition is difficult, 
 and its diftinguifhing characters many and various. We 
 venture to afiert, that its general idea is animating affec- 
 tion concerning happincfs, caufing delight wherever excel- 
 lency and happinefs are found ', and defire for them where 
 they are wanting. 
 
 Love is generally diflinguifhed into love of affeftion, 
 love of complacency, and love of communion. 
 
 Sch. t. — Love of affection confifts in a folicitude for the hap- 
 pinefs of ourfelves or others. This love God manifefls 
 in his providence towards the world, and particularly to- 
 wards the children of men ; the good and the bad, the 
 righteous and the unrighteous, things animate and inani- 
 mate, being equally its objects. This love we mould alfo 
 feel and exerciie towards all men, and extend it to all 
 creatures endued with animal life : nothing mould blunt 
 
 its 
 
MORAL PHIL030PHV. tit 
 
 its fenfibiliry and effe&s: all men. the jnft and the up- 
 right, the friend, the obedient child, the faithful fervant 
 and the weil-difpofed neighbour, as well as the uttjuft ami 
 the difhoneir, the enemy, the refractory {on, the fini 
 ful fervant and the ill-natured neighbour, have a claim to 
 it. It is true, we have it not always in our power to ren- 
 der others happy; fome refute our cood offices, others 
 abufethem: we mu ft often fee peribns unhappv; but we 
 may ufe our endeavours to bring them to a ienfe of their 
 duty ; we may pity the ftate of the diforderly and refrac^ 
 tory, and fmcerely wifh for their reform and happinef*. 
 Why is it that the father cannot Sear the fight of a pro- 
 fligate fori? Why is the fenfe of refentment in a brother 
 fo keen againft a diforderly brother? Why is difguft 
 among relatives fo deeply rooted ? Why do we feel our 
 hearts troubled at the fight o( improper behaviour in youth 
 entrufted to our care ? It is love in the father; his' heart 
 could not feel fo forely wounded if he could caft off pa- 
 rental affe&ipri, if he could look upon his fob as a ftran- 
 «;er. ^ So it is with brethren, relatives, neighbours, &c. 
 So it is with faithful teachers; could they cai? off the' fenfe 
 of their duty, could they diveft themfelves of that affeaiori 
 for their truft which duty imppfes and humanity and re- 
 ligion improve, they could render their fituation very 
 ealy, they would not feel fo many of their laborious hours 
 embittered with the reflexion that their endeavours are 
 not crowned with the wifaed-for fuccefJ. 
 
 Sck 2.—fr is not thus with the love Qficmpfacencyi this, if it is 
 true, has for its objecl all that is lovely and excellent, every 
 thing wherein there is perfection, or that is influential on 
 our happinels. As- real good is only an objecl of delight 
 we feel true love of complacency only in what is good. 
 Thus God loves his children, being pleafed with their 
 ways; thus the father delights in his obedient fon, the 
 brother m his virtuous relation; thus we feel fatisfa&ion 
 m the diligent, the manly, the virtuous and regular ftu- 
 dent; thus we ate pleafed with excellent and 'beautiful 
 objecls, with what is decent and right, Perfohs of a con- 
 trary character, things of dangerous and pernicious qua . 
 lities, difpleafe, difguft, and often diftrefs us. 
 
 Sci. 3---The We of complacency begets, as far as is attain* 
 
 able, the love of communion. God, who delights' in his 
 
 R children, 
 
122 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 children, dwells in their hearts: the father feels happy in 
 - the converfation of his dutifui fon, and fixes his favour 
 upon him: brethren live in harmony and communion, 
 endeavouring to prevent one another's wifhes: we rejoice 
 in opportunities to mow our efteem to the diligent, the 
 virtuous ftudent, &c. 
 
 What we cannot attain to is an object of efteem, contem- 
 plation, &c. 
 Sch. 4. — We ought to diftinguifh this heavenly virtue jufl 
 now explained, whic^ has for its object real good, real 
 excellency and happinefs, from that paffion of the mind 
 which is likewife ftiled love, and is in confequence of 
 objects reprefented by the inferior faculties of the hu- 
 man foul as excellent, defirable and lovely. This love, 
 though not in itfeif a virtue, if it is well directed and 
 under the controul of reafon, paves the way to a more 
 exalted and virtuous love. Innocent fenfitive love has 
 for its object innocent fenfitive pleafures, in a degree 
 becoming rational creatures deftined for lafting felicity. 
 If our habits are thus directed, will they not more eagerly 
 purfue real, lafting pleafures and true felicity, and lead 
 to all that is good and virtuous? But not all fenfitive 
 love is innocent; it often leads to vanities and finful ob- 
 jects: if the love of the world and its lufts occupies the 
 heart, there is no room for virtuous love; love fixed upon 
 fuch things is perverted. You may innocently prefer one 
 ti i ill before another; fo you may without guilt prefer the 
 innocent converfation of one perfon to that of another, 
 &c. But you cannot be innocent in loving idlenefs, mif- 
 chief, empty and tempting amufements, bad company, 
 exceffes, &cc\ The tendency and effects of fuch love are 
 unhappinefs and ruin. Such a love is degrading to hu- 
 man nature, and inconfiflent with the love of God. 
 
 God is the moft excellent, and therefore above all 
 things the mod worthy objecl: of cur love; he is the 
 fource of all beatitude, the caufe of cur exiftence -, he 
 is our preferver, our benefactor, and benign father* his 
 perfections, infinitely glorious, fhine with unfpotted 
 purity and holTriefs. But how /hall, how can we love 
 him who is fo infinitely exalted above all things his 
 
 creatures 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 23 
 
 creatures can do ? We anfvver, by a folicitude to do 
 nothing that is inconfiftent with his glory and infinite per- 
 fections. 
 
 Sch. — We prefer this definition to others, beeaufe it gives us a 
 moft particular and infallible criterion of our love to God. 
 It is true, the love of God comprehends the ftim of all that 
 can be a duty to him; he who loves him fincerely will 
 contemplate his perfections with delight, and defire his 
 favour and communion above all things: but can I per- 
 fuade myfelf that divine love dwells in me, if I am not 
 defirous and highly felicitous fo to order my conduct that 
 it may be pleafing to him and confident with his glory? 
 In vain, then, do perfons flatter themfelves that they love 
 God, if they love fin, the world, with its vanities and 
 lufts, and if their deeds counteract the divine will. This 
 is love to God, fays an apoftle, that zve keep Lis command- 
 ?nents y and his commandments are not grievous. 
 
 It is a duty that we love God-, for it is our duty to 
 know him, to know that he is, and what he is in and to 
 himfelf and to his rational creatures : a God of infinite 
 glory and majefty, worthy to be wormipped in fpirit 
 and in truth; the creator, the preferver, the fupreme 
 ruler of the univerfe ! Can it be faid that we know 
 him, if his infinite glory does not ftrike our fouls with 
 admiration and awe ? Can the foul be filled with true 
 admiration, if it be not enraptured and drawn towards 
 him with delight ? And muft not delight in God im- 
 prefs us with a longing defire for his favour and holy 
 communion ? Can our defires after God be fincere, if 
 we are not actuated by an anxious folicitude to pleafe 
 him ? Can we pleafe him, if we act inconfiftent 
 with his glory and perfections ? As love to God is our 
 indifpenfible duty, fo it is our glorious privilege, and 
 conftitutes our greater! happmefs. 
 
 Among the divine perfections is his will : a folici- 
 tude of the mind not to act contrary to the will of ano- 
 ther has obtained the name of fear. 
 
 ScL 
 
1 I;- MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. i. — Fear is diftinguifhed into filial and fervife; the former 
 is a folicitude not to aft contrary to rhe will of another, 
 becaufe we love, eftee'm and reverence him ; the latter 
 takes place when that folicitude arifes from a dread of evil 
 confequences. 
 
 Sch. 2. — A perfon actuated by fervile fear loves himfelf and 
 hates the one he fears ; for looking to the bad confequen- 
 ces he feels an averlion, and a ftron;* decree of averfion 
 is hatred. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Only filial fear can, therefore, be a virtue; fervile fear 
 is, on the contrary, of a vicious quality, and carefully to 
 be avoided in our conduct towards God and man. ' 
 
 Sch. 4. — Hence the faying, fewilefear is better than none at all^ 
 cannot be conftrued as attributing to it any degree of ex- 
 cellency or rectitude ; but mult be taken in reference to its 
 unmerited effects upon the peace and tranquillity of fo- 
 ciety. As lions and tygers are reilrained from evil, fa 
 men of vicious difpofitions and habits muft be kept in 
 awe by compulfive" means, often by confinement and cor- 
 poral nunifhment, that public good may fuftain no harm. 
 
 Sch. 5.— From thefe obfervations we may draw another argu- 
 ment for proving the imbecility of human laws and the 
 ufefulnefs and necefnty of religion. 
 
 It is a duty that we fear God in a filial manner; 
 for he is worthy of our love, and without fearing we 
 cannot love hirm 
 
 It is alfo a duty that we endeavour in our conduct: 
 
 towards Gpd to cad away fervile fear ; becaufe love to 
 
 God and fervile fear cannot exift together. 
 
 Sch. — Hence the neceffity of the utmoft care in the manage- 
 ment of families, to inftill into the minds of children and 
 of fervants the principles of filial fear, in order to feciire 
 their obedience and faithfulnefs. 
 
 As love to a benefactor is (tiled gratitude, it follows, 
 that it is our duty to be grateful to God; for he is not 
 only the object of our fincereft love, but his benefits 
 and bleflinp-s are innumerable. Every bleflinp; is a 
 new, an additional motive for us to love him, and to 
 
 pay 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 125 
 
 pay him the duty of gratitude. Praiies and thanks- 
 givings being the efFuflons of a grateful heart, let 
 them be the tribute which our hearts rejoice to bring 
 before the footftool of cur God. 
 
 Can there be a more monftrous, heinous and unna- 
 tural vice, than ingratitude to God ? 
 
 Sch. — All are guilty of that vice who do not love God, who 
 do not reflect upon his merciful bleffings, and who care 
 not to ufe them to his glory and the end for which they 
 are given. Thofe who envy others, and murmur again ft 
 the ways of providence; thofe who look down with a. 
 proud and unfeeling heart upon human diftrefs, and fuffer 
 it on their part to continue unrelieved, &c. are guilty of 
 ingratitude. But unnatural as this vice is, ftill it is pre- 
 valent among the children of men, not only with refpect 
 to their conduct to one another, but alfo to that God in 
 whom they live, move and have being. 
 
 As a proclivity of the mind to do what another com- 
 mands is called obedience, It follows, that we muft obey 
 God v for we are bound to obey the natural laws, 
 which are the commands of his will ; we ought to 
 fear and love him. No human authority can free us 
 from this duty, and in cafes of real colliiion, we muft 
 pbey God rather than man. 
 
 When we are actuated in our obedience by no other 
 confederation than the will of. the commander, we are 
 faid to acquiefce in that will, or to be refigned to it. Since 
 God is a being of infinite glory, majefty, wifdom, power 
 and goodnefs, it is our duty to feel ourfelves happy in 
 doing his will, and to be fully refigned to all the ways 
 of his government and providence. He is omnipotent, 
 therefore our relu6f ance would be vain ; and as his will 
 is our happinefs, difcontent and murmuring cannot but 
 be foolifh and finful. 
 
126 MORAL PHILOSOPHY^ 
 
 ScL — Resignation arms the mind with fortitude under adversi- 
 ty, poverty, ficknefs and perfecution; inward peace and 
 cor. folation are its faithful attendants; it triumphs over 
 death. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of duties to our/elves. 
 
 J\ 
 
 S the duties we owe to ourfelves refult from 
 the fame" principles of natural law from which our 
 duties to God are inferred, it follows, that the former 
 muM: be in perfect confiftency with the latter •, for 
 both ultimately flow from one fource, to wit, the will 
 of God, and have one and the fame end for their object, 
 the happinefs of mankind. They confequently are of 
 the fame authority and importance, excepting the dif- 
 ference of their immediate objects. Duties to our- 
 felves are therefore in a mediate manner duties which 
 we owe to God. 
 
 Hence we may infer thefe infallible axioms : Nothing 
 can be a duty to ourfelves that is repugnant to the duties 
 we owe to God: What is repugnant to a duty we owe to 
 ourfelves cannot be a duty to God. 
 
 Natural laws, commanding us to render our flate 
 perfect as poffible, require that we principally endea- 
 vour to promote our own happinefs. But as fuch an 
 endeavour is called love, it follows, that it is a princi- 
 pal, nay, our ntft duty to love ourfelves. 
 
 If we are bound to love ourfelves, we mud conduct 
 ourfelves in all our purfuits conformably to the injunc- 
 tions and prohibitions of the law of nature*, for a con- 
 trary conduct is repugnant to our real happinefs. 
 
 ScJu 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. l±J 
 
 Sch. — How groflly miftaken, therefore, are thofe perfons who, 
 from a vain and erroneous perfuafion that they love the'm- 
 felves, run into all manner of excefTes, feeking pleafure 
 and fatisfaction in vanities and wicked purfuits? Stran- 
 gers to virtuous love, they take fenfe and paflion for their 
 guide, never confulting their true intereft and happinefs. 
 Such perfons are their own enemies, as in reality they 
 hate themfelves. 
 
 As a ftate of perfection and real happinefs caufes 
 true pleafure^ it follows, that true love only leads to 
 real pleafure and fatisfaction. 
 
 As real pleafure depends upon many things as means 
 neceffary for its acquisition and prefervation, it will he 
 our duty to endeavour to obtain and to make a proper 
 ufe of all thofe things which contribute to our real 
 happinefs. 
 
 There can be no real pleafure and happinefs where 
 there is not inward peace, tranquillity of mind and a 
 good conference; he, therefore, who truly loves him- 
 felf, muft endeavour, by an irreproachable conduct be- 
 fore God and men, to poiTefs and to prefer ve this de- 
 firable treafure. 
 
 Thus our true intereft is our principal duty, and as 
 thefe in their nature and tendency are things infepara- 
 bly connected, it is one of our molt important duties 
 to learn our real intereft, 
 
 Sch. i. — To fee'k our intereft in things which gratify the {enfe 9 
 pleafe the fancy, and flatter our pailions, which inflame 
 pride, invite ambition, avarice and lufts, is and has at all 
 times been the fatal fource of folly, extravagance and mi* 
 fery among the children of men. 
 
 Sch. i. — It is from want of attention and reflection that fuch 
 empty things have fo forcible and fo general an influence 
 on the human heart. Evil habits are contracted before 
 we exercife reafon: bad examples, with which the world 
 abounds, fteel the foul againft the voice of underftanding. 
 
 Itfence 
 
4 * 
 
 128 -TORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 Hence it is that the road to virtue is dirlicult, and t'ir-.,'. 
 thoutands run headlong to deftruction: not becaufe they 
 wifn not, but becaiiie they neglecl to know their happi- 
 nefs. 
 
 True love to ourfelves is therefore an arduous, com-, 
 prehenfive arid complicated duty ; for, independent of 
 all our duties to God and to our fellow creatures, with 
 which it is indhiblubly connected, it comprehends the 
 perfections of the foul and body, together with their 
 internal ftates, befides innumerable other things influ- 
 ential on their happinefs and neceffary for the perfection 
 of our nature. 
 
 In loving ourfelves, our first care mould be to render 
 our immortal foul as perfect as poiUble, by duly exer- 
 cising and improving its faculties, particularly the fu- 
 perior, our understanding and will : by thefe we rank 
 with fpirits, and refemble God the father of {pints. 
 
 We are therefore in duty bound to render our un- 
 derstanding as perfect as poflible, by endeavouring to 
 obtain knowledge of all things influential on our hap- 
 pinefs ; in particular to know God, his infinite perfec- 
 tions, and our ditties to this glorious being ; to know 
 ourfelves, and the end of our being; to know the hu- 
 man heart*, to know mankind; to know our duties to 
 others, together with the right and beft mode of per- 
 forming them ; to investigate the nature, the qualities 
 and destination of as many things of this world as pof- 
 fible; to know what is good or bad, risht or wrorp-j 
 what is neceflary and ufeful in life, &c. 
 
 But whatever we know or can know, let it remain 
 a particular care that our knowledge be as distinct as 
 poflible, that it be free from confusion and error, that 
 we may diftinguifh good from bad, right from wrong, 
 
 thiwj?. 
 
iMORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 29" 
 
 things of great ufefulnefs from thofe which have an in- 
 fluence lefs beneficial, and from fuch as are dangerous, 
 (inful, improper or wicked. Flow earned:!)', tljen, 
 fhould we attend, how inderatigably reflect upon all 
 things which prefent themfelves as objects of know- 
 ledge ? And how eager fnould we be to find out, to fee 
 by the eye of under flan ding the more exalted and glo- 
 rious things to which fenfe cannot afpire? It is pro- 
 per that a fpirit immortal, cleftined for eternity, mould 
 make itfelf acquainted with the things of eternity, in- 
 visible and full of glory. 
 
 The duty, therefore, which we owe to our under- 
 standing, may be comprehended in thefe few words : 
 Endeavour to acquire knowledge of all things which 
 may have influence on your duties and happincfs, and 
 do all in your power that your knowledge be as diitincl: 
 as poflible-, for wemaybe-faid only to know that 
 which we know without error and confuflon. 
 
 Sch.— Obferve, that we feldom find men wicked and abandon- 
 ed for want of knowledge, but generally for want of at- 
 tention and reflexion, for want of exercifinp reafon and 
 judgment. 
 
 We mult alfo endeavour to render our will as perfect 
 as poflible ; for what does all knowledge avail us, if 
 we do not thereby become better men ? The principal 
 aim, therefore, in improving our understanding and 
 reafon, mould be, that the inclinations of our will be 
 thereby directed to purfue that which is really good 
 and excellent. Reafon is given us that we fhould walk 
 by its light. He who does not realife his knowledge 
 in the purfuit of virtue may perhaps boaft of the name 
 of a learned, but can never claim the character of a 
 wife and good man. 
 
 S Our 
 
IjO MORAL PHILOSOPHV. 
 
 Our will is perfect, as far as it is actuated by diftinct 
 ideas of good and evil, of right and wrong; and has 
 controul over fenlitive appetite, paflions, propenfities 
 and inftinct, by fupprefling, retraining or directing 
 them in conformity to the dictates of natural laws, our 
 own happinefs, and the felicity of others. 
 
 Our will is endowed with liberty, and we muft di- 
 rect it in chufing always what is really good, what in 
 every circumftance of life is beft. If this be our inva- 
 riable purpofe and defign, our will obtains a firmnefs 
 and excellency worthy the dignity of our rational na- 
 ture j the purfuit of virtue will become more and more 
 pleafant ; we mail triumph over {cn(^ paffion, and the 
 vanities of the world — be happy, and refemble the in- 
 finitely perfect pattern of holinefs, as far as perfection 
 is attainable in this life. 
 
 Great and comprehenfive, therefore, is the duty we 
 owe to our immortal fouls. We muft make many a 
 lacrince to our underftanding and will, in order to con- 
 duct ourfelves conformably to the will of God. We 
 muft endeavour to diftinguifh truth from error, good 
 from evil, realities from appearances, principally for 
 this end, that we may invariably purfue the one and 
 reject and avoid the other. We muft ftudy nature in 
 all its beauty, ufefulnefs, harmony and order, that the 
 heart may be convinced of the exiftence, the infinite 
 Wifdbm, goodnefs and rnajefty of God, and fenfibly 
 feel the neceftity and importance of our indifpenfible 
 obligation to glorify, love and obey him. We muft 
 be indefatigable in our refearches after truth, that we 
 may have all pofhble motives to examine our own 
 hearts, to invigorate our inclinations, and to render 
 them ftedfaft in the purfuit of holinefs. The road to 
 
 virtue 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 13I 
 
 virtue oftea becomes arduous and difficult; many 
 temptations muft be overcome, paflions muft be fub- 
 dued, lively pictures of fenfe and imagination muft be 
 fupprefTed, our judgments fufpended, our inclinations 
 traverfed, and the whole compafs of our duties attended 
 to; not one is to be done by halves, much lefs to be 
 neglected. 
 
 Hence it is not a lefs important duty that we be ex- 
 tremely affiduous in the ufe of all the means by which 
 the understanding may be improved, the will melio- 
 rated, and the mind invariably determined not to de- 
 viate in the leaf! from the line of rectitude. We muft, 
 on the contrary, moft carefully avoid all things which 
 might miflead the underftanding and give the will a 
 contrary direction. 
 
 Among the means which may afiift the improvement 
 of the mind, good books and good company are prin- 
 cipally to be efteemed; for, as the former fet forth the 
 caufe of religion and virtue in their true excellency and 
 falutary tendency, fo the latter is calculated to infpire 
 the mind with a noble zeal of emulation, and as a for- 
 cible ftream to carry with it our inclinations to prcfecute 
 virtuous purfuits with ftedfaftnefs and delight. 
 
 But care and circumfpection are neceftary, as there 
 are great numbers of bad and dangerous books, and as 
 the world abounds with bad examples and company. 
 
 Among bad books we rank thofe principally which 
 advocate the caufe of irreligion, fpeak {lightly of virtue 
 and its rewards, and reprefent vice as harmlefs or in- 
 different, or exhibit it under the captivating appear- 
 ances and names of virtue. 
 
 Novels and romances of a lafcivious nature and ten- 
 dency, as they have done and ftill do a great deal of 
 
 mifchief, 
 
Ij2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mifchief, are juftly brought into the catalogue of dan- 
 gerous books ; for the purpofe of them is to intoxicate 
 the mind with faJfe and fictitious reprefentations, cal- 
 culated to excite and inflame the paftlons, pervert the 
 judgment of youth, and to give a loofe to all the boif- 
 tercus inclinations of an unfettled difpofiticn. Such 
 books in the hands of youth muft be particularly dan- 
 gerous; for, as their underftandings, not yet mature, 
 want the aid of experience to diftinguifh realities from 
 appearances and juft reafoning from fallacy, not only a 
 considerable part of precious time will be wafted and 
 loft, but their morals will be corrupted, and the temp- 
 tations thrown in their way, like hidden poifon, will 
 have a pernicious effect. 
 
 We cannot fpeak highly in favour of the beft books 
 of this kind, though their exprefs deflgn is to recom- 
 mend virtue and perfeverance in goodnefs under a va- 
 riety of trials •, for, as all is fiction, which feldom or 
 never can be realifed in life, curiofity may thereby be 
 entertained, but no melioration of the. heart effected. 
 
 We mould rather feel inclined to advife thofe who 
 have leifure hours to fpend them both agreeably and 
 profitably in reading hiftory : facts realifed in life are 
 in themfelves interefting, and, befides, exhibit leflbns 
 of prudence with refpect both to public and private life. 
 Hiftory gives us a lively reprefentation of the ways of 
 divine providence in the world. Contemplating the 
 rife and fall of empires, we learn to revere God's righ- 
 teous judgments. 
 
 Much alio will depend upon our choice of company •> 
 for, as converfation with good and righteous perfons 
 is one of the moft lively incitements to virtue, and cal- 
 culated to ihield us againft many temptations, fo the 
 
 company 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY'. I 33 
 
 company of the wicked is a peft to good manners, the 
 fchool of vice, and an alrnoft infallible criterion of a bafe 
 mind and depraved heart. 
 
 What can be a greater incitement to a faithful dis- 
 charge of our duty than the consideration of the im- 
 mortality of the foul ? The care we take of it fhall 
 never caufe regret ; the good done in this life fhall be 
 enjoyed forever. 
 
 Sch. — The immortality of the foul is doubtlefs one of the moft 
 important truths that ever can engage the human under- 
 ftanding; for we are thereby enabled to know the great 
 and glorious deftiny of our nature; and it is from a due 
 confideration thereof that our fouls feel inexpreffible ani- 
 mation in the arduous performance of all the duties of 
 ' life. It fets divine wifdom, power, goodnef6 and juflice 
 in the cleareft light, and caufes us to triumph over all 
 manner of adverfity, even over death itfelf. Convinced 
 of the immortality of the foul, we may look for a glorious 
 reftoration of that frail part of our nature, the deftiny 
 of which is to return to the duft from whence it is taken, 
 until God fhall judge every man according to his deeds. 
 Our labour, then, in the purfuit of virtue, our denials in 
 the faithful difcharge of our duties, (hall not be in vain, 
 but ultimately crowned with fuccefs and rewarded with 
 everlafting glory. 
 
 The immortality of the foul comprehends two 
 things, to wit, a continual duration of its exiftence, and 
 the never-ceafing confcioufnefs of itfelf and of thofe 
 actions which have been done in conjunction with the 
 body in this life. 
 
 All beings of a /imple nature have perpetual exig- 
 ence in common with the fouls of men. Though 
 we are not able to give a fatisfactory account of the 
 future deftiny of the fouls of animals, or the firft ele- 
 ments of compound beings, yet we may take it for 
 granted, that they will anfwer the great ends which in- 
 finite 
 
IJ4 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 finite wifdom and goodnefs hath defigned in decreeing 
 and giVirig them exigence, particularly as the power of 
 God is all-fufficient. So much is certain, that things 
 of a fimple nature cannot ceafe to exift as thofe which 
 are compounded : where parts may be tranfpofed or 
 difiblved, there only changes or diflblution can take 
 place. If the former mould ceafe to exift, nothing in 
 themielves nor any thing from without could be a fuf- 
 ficient caufe of fuch an effect except the will of God. 
 That power alone can caufe things to return to their 
 priftine ft ate that called them from mere poflibility to 
 a ftate of exigence. 
 
 An act of the divine will, by which God mould 
 caufe things that exift to return to the ftate of mere 
 poffibility in which they were before creation, is known 
 by the term annihilation. Beings of a fimple nature 
 cannot, therefore, ceafe to exift but by annihilation. 
 
 But it is a aueftion* Will God annihilate ? We an- 
 j. * 
 
 liver in the negative •, for, with refpect to the fouls of 
 brutes and the fir ft elements of compofition, no fhadow 
 of proof can be afforded that their annihilation would 
 be confident with the wifdom of God. "With regard 
 to th^ human foul, we have convincing arguments that 
 its annihilation would contradict the infinite wifdom, 
 goodnefs and juftice of God. He mould have en- 
 dowed it with faculties fuperior to the limits of time 
 and fpace, and given that power itfelf but, as it were, 
 a momentary exiftence ? Can infinite wifdom and 
 goodnefs do any thing in vain ? And muft we not af- 
 iert fuch an abfurdity, if v/e hold that the foul fhall in 
 a fhort fpace of time ceafe to exift ? Certainly a perfon 
 who knows any thing of the power that is in man muft 
 be fenfible that its thoughts connect things paft with 
 
 the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1 ■ J 
 
 the prefent, and from thefe look forward through in- 
 conceivable eternity. Limited now to the body, it 
 takes its range into the heavens, pervades the dark re- 
 gions, the habitations of endlefs mifery, pierces through 
 the veil of time, and beholds the blefied abodes where 
 peace and joy for ever reign. That fpirit mould ceafe 
 to exift that has capacities fo vaft and divine? What 
 mail we fay of the defires of our fouls, which nothing 
 of a frail or temporary nature can fatisfy, and which 
 finds contentment only in the hope that it fhall enjoy 
 God and his communion from eternity to eternity? 
 
 And for fuch an enjoyment the foul is qualified by 
 its perfonality. It is confcious of its exiftence and ac- 
 tions in the prefent moment ; it has power to recollect 
 time which is pan 1 , and that power fhall continue unto 
 eternity. For, though the fou! obtains primitive ideas 
 by the organs of fenfe, yet it forms thofe which are dis- 
 tinct by its own application and powers, in a manner fc 
 far independent of the body, that this is not feldom an 
 obftacle and incumbrance to the exercife of thofe fpiri- 
 tual and fublime reprefentations, which, once imprefied 
 on the foul, can never be erafed from its recollection. 
 The foul, therefore, after feparation from the body, will 
 certainly know that it once exiiled in conjunction with 
 it, and committed or omitted fuch actions as render it 
 acceptable to God, or an object of his difpleafure. 
 Thus the human foul will not only continue to exift, 
 but be confcious of its prefent and pair, ftates, and capa- 
 ble of everlafting rewards or punimments -, that is, the 
 human foul has not only perpetual duration., but is 
 deftined for immortality. 
 
 This truth, together with a future ftate of exiftencc 
 of our bodies, is (till more firmly efiablifhed upon the 
 
 unerring 
 
l%6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY," 
 
 unerring juftice of God. Shall the judge of the world 
 not do right ? Shall not every good action meet its re- 
 ward, and all acts of unrighteoufnefs be ultimately pu- 
 nifhed according to their deferts ? We anfwer in the 
 affirmative; for that God is righteous is as certain as 
 that he exifts ; and as the heavens and the earth declare 
 his exigence, fo the day will come when they mall 
 witnefs and approve his righteous judgment. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Though we hold to the continued duration of all be- 
 ings of a fimple nature, yet we deny that any other than 
 thofe which are intelligent are poifefled of an immortal 
 nature. Immortality is the prerogative of fpirits. 
 
 Sch. 2. — But mail not cur bodies be alfo raifed to immortality? 
 We anfwer, that the glorious immortality with which our 
 bodies mall be endued does not flow from the natural 
 powers of them, but from the power, wifdom and juftice 
 of God. 
 
 Since the foul and body are the efTential parts of our 
 nature, and exifl: in the clofeft union and harmony 
 whilft we are in this life, it follows, that we cannot 
 perform our duty to the foul if we do not at the fame 
 time endeavour to render the body as perfect as poffible. 
 
 As the body is capable of an infinite variety of modes, 
 influential on human happinefs, among the various per- 
 fections of which it is fufceptible we may diftinguifh 
 thofe which are born with us from others which are 
 acquired. 
 
 The perfections of the body born with us may be 
 called its conftitution-, thofe which are acquired conMit 
 of various habits and accomplijkmenls^ and have reference 
 either to the necefTaries, the conveniences or the luxuries 
 of life : as they may be conformable or contrary to the 
 dictates of natural laws and the fcope of our prefent 
 exiftence, they become particular objects of commiffive 
 
 and omiillve duties. 
 
 The 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 137 
 
 The foundation of conftitution, health, and all ether 
 accompJifhments, is life itfelf, the greatest of earthly 
 ble/Tings. The oppofite of life is deatl\ the greateft 
 evil that can befal the body. 
 
 Love to life and the fear of death are ihmnclts which 
 
 we have in common with other beings endowed with 
 
 animal life, fave this difference, that the fenfe thereof 
 
 is heightened by the profpect of futuritv, which brutes 
 
 are incapable of, or rjoilefs in a very fmall degree. But 
 
 as rational creatures enjoy life for far more glorious 
 
 purpofes than brutes, it becomes us to love life, not 
 
 for the fake of its enjoyment folely, but principally for 
 
 the purpofe of being active in the performance of all 
 
 the duries which the Creator has affirmed us for the 
 
 great ends of his glorification, for our own felicity and 
 
 that of others. Thus animal life, which confifls in the 
 
 activity of anirrial powers, becomes rational in man, if 
 
 not only the powers of the body, but principally thofe 
 
 of the foul are employed and conftantly active for the 
 
 attainment of the end of his exiftence, for a felicity that 
 
 lafts for ever. 
 
 Scli. — How important is life, if it is confidered as a ftate of 
 preparation for that of a more glorious and everialting 
 exiflence! How inglorious, when thefe great ends are 
 neglected, when men, endowed with rationality, live to 
 no better purpofe than to go through the rotine of eating, 
 drinking and fleeping, until death finifhes their career! 
 If the brute lives fo, it lives innocently, and accomplishes 
 the end for which its exiftence is given : but can man be 
 innocent, if his foul is not active In the purfuit of virtue, 
 perhaps active in fm and vice? Dees he live up to the 
 dignity of his nature by fpending his days idly and nn- 
 profitably to himfelf and others? 
 
 It is, therefore, an important duty that we learn to 
 
 know the value and deftination of life, that we may 
 
 improve it by an indefatigable purfuit after virtue. 
 
 ~T Upon 
 
itt MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 3 
 
 Upon this confederation it cannot but be one of our 
 firft duties that we endeavour to preferve life. 
 
 This duty is generally known by the term felf-prc- 
 fervation^ and writers on morality juftly lay it down as 
 the greateft and firft of duties •, for if life ceafes, all 
 poftlbility to do our duty m this world is at an end. 
 
 The horrid crime oppofed to this duty is filicide^ 
 where a perfon deprives himfelf of life. 
 
 Sch. i. — ^Since we have not given life to ourfelves, and fince 
 it is given by God for greater and more glorious purpofes 
 than fenfual enjoyment, it follows, that no perfon, under 
 anv circumftances whatever, is at libertv to take awav his 
 own life. 
 
 Sen. 2. — : It is to be hoped, that a crime fo unnatural will find 
 no advocates among the rational part of mankind; and 
 there is caufe to fuppofe, that perfons who have made 
 themfeives fad examples of its perpetration have laboured 
 under mental infirmities, or were furprifed by moft vio- 
 lent pa&ons. 
 
 Sen. 3. — Suicide may betray daftardly cowardice, but can ne- 
 ver be a fign of magnanimity and true courage. The 
 example of Cato is not an exception, and his harangue 
 is floic bombaft and phrenzy. 
 
 All actions where life is expofed to unnecefiary dan- 
 ger, amount to a kind of fuicide, and. are therefore to 
 be avoided. 
 
 But life may be expofed to imminent danger in a 
 very jufc manner, nay, even loft with glory, when the 
 glory cf Gcd or public good in an immediate manner 
 require that facrifice •„ for the chief end of life is the 
 glory of God-, and with the prefervation of our coun- 
 try, our own life and the prefervation of other valuable 
 lives is connected. By thus fupporting the caufe of 
 God and of cur country, we cannot be charged with 
 
 flighting 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 39 
 
 flighting a blefling, bat we are to chufe, in a eojliftoa 
 
 of important duties, the performance of the greateit. 
 
 The prefervation of life is immediately connected 
 with another important duty, which enjoins all pofiible 
 care and the obfervance of all neceffary means to pre- 
 ferve our health. A fickly life is but a lingering death •, 
 for what are things of the mod: exquiiite tafte and 
 beauty to a conftitution dead to enjoyment and plea- 
 fure ? Sicknefs not only renders the body unable to 
 perform the duties of our calling, but alio damps the 
 powers of the foul, and thus unfits it for any great and 
 yfeful undertaking : in fliort, it renders life difagreeable 
 to ourfelves and unprofitable to others. 
 
 Thofe, therefore, who, by the ill management of 
 Jife, by excefTes, luxury, idlenefs, and intemperance, 
 ruin their conftitution, fin againft their own life and 
 render themfelves in fome meafure guilty of fuicide. 
 
 Our conftitution being the quality of the body born 
 with us, confifts in a harmonious ftructure and a moft 
 wonderful mechanifm of its feveral parts : thefe depend 
 for their operations upon things which fuppcrt that 
 harmony. There is a proper mixture of fluids requi- 
 site to prevent its derangement. Too great a wafte of 
 powers, or other extraneous caufes or accidents, may 
 debilitate, nay, deftroy it. 
 
 Many things, therefore, are neccflary for the prefer- 
 vation of our health, which of courfe become import- 
 ant duties :— We muft procure fuftlcient meat and 
 drink, afford the body moderate reft and relaxation, 
 provide it with cloathing and convenient fhelter againft 
 the inclemency of the feafons, ftudy cleanlinefs, &c. 
 
 As all thefe duties require the application of mental 
 faculties and bodily ftrength, there is fuilicient caufe 
 
 on 
 
14° MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 on that account why labour and diligent application 
 fnould be claffed amongit the mcft indifpenfible duties 
 for the prefer vation of life and health. 
 
 But there is another confederation which, if poffible, 
 enhances the obligation, and fhould particularly endear 
 to us a ufeful occupation in life : this is, that exercife 
 and health, labour, and the enjoyment of the good 
 things of this life, are infeparably connected. Labour 
 invigorates, idlenefs and luxury weaken our conftitu- 
 tion : a laborious perfon finds exquifite fweetnefs in the 
 coarfeft and moil common nourifhment, whilft the 
 luxurious idler is condemned to chew, not to eat, fince 
 he finds relifh in nothing. 
 
 Another neceflary mean and duty for the preferva- 
 tion of our health is temperance, that excellent virtue 
 which commands moderation in all our enjoyments : — 
 intemperance, with its fcandalous offspring, gluttony, 
 drunkennefs, lafcivioufnefs, incontinence, pride and 
 orientation, independent of their horrid effects upon 
 the peace of families and fociety, may be looked upon 
 as more deftructive to the life cf mankind than war, 
 hunger and the plague together. 
 
 Serenity and tranquillity of mind, the natural con- 
 
 fequences of a prudent and virtuous conduct:, form an 
 
 invaluable ingredient in the promotion of health. A 
 
 taithful performance of our duties, therefore, becomes 
 
 necefTary, not only for the perfection of the foul, but 
 
 alfo tor the perfection of the body. 
 
 Sch. i. — From the comprehenfive duty which commands the 
 prefervaiion of life and health, many inferences may be 
 draVh, which might ferve as maxims for the regulation 
 of our conduct in the multifarious fituations and circum- 
 fiances of life. We ought, for inftance, to be truly {en- 
 fible of the necefTity of government, and the great advanr 
 
 tag;e? 
 
 J? 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I4I 
 
 tages we derive from its protection, iince, among many- 
 other valuable benefits, it affords fecurity to both life and 
 property. 
 
 Se/i. 2. — We ought to avoid every thing bv which others may 
 obtain the right to confine our perfon or deprive us of life. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Tt will often become our indifpenfible duty to feek the 
 affiffance, and faithfully to follow the directions of thofe 
 who have fuccefsfuliy applied their time and talents to the 
 fludy and practice of the healing art. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Life above all things is precious; but nothing is more 
 valuable in life than health and a good conference. 
 
 There may be fituations of life in which it will be- 
 come impofhble for us to obey all the laws which have 
 controul over us, on account of their collifion : in fuch 
 cafes we cannot perform all our duties ; but by acting 
 conformably to one we muft act contrary to another ; 
 that is, our duties clajh, and it becomes our obligation 
 to perform the greateft in preference to the leaf!:. 
 
 Whenever a duty dailies with the great law of felf- 
 preiervation, we are faid to be in ?l ftate ofnecejjity. 
 
 The ftate of necefTity may be abfolute, extreme, or 
 refpective. 
 
 A ftate of abfolute necefTity is, where life is in im- 
 minent danger •, as, where a perfon with a drawn fword 
 or a charged gun runs againft another threatening to 
 fake away his life. 
 
 A ftate of extreme necefTity is, where our ow r n life is 
 not immediately in imminent danger, but that of per- 
 fons who are next to life dear to us •, or, where things 
 abfoluteiy neceftary for the prefervation of life are for- 
 cibly taken away \ as, for inftance, if a perfon runs up 
 with fword or piftol in a threatening pofture againft 
 another's wife, child, brother, father or neighbour \ or, 
 if he is taking away our provifion in a defert far diftant 
 from a pofiibility of obtaining a fupply, &c. 
 
 A ftate 
 
*42 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 A ftate ofrefpeffive necefiity has reference to cafes 
 where life has not really been in imminent danger, but 
 where the agent has considered himfelf in fuch a fitua- 
 tion : foT inftance; a perfon may have a gun uncharged, 
 a circumftance well known to himfelf and to others, 
 but unknown to him whole courage he intended to put 
 to a trial, by aiTuming a threatening pofiure with the 
 weapon in his hand. 
 
 In a ftate of abfolute necefFity, the duty of felf-pre- 
 fervation juftifies and commands to take aw ay the life 
 of an aggrefibr, if it is not in our power to defend our- 
 felves by any other means. But to take away life when 
 we can preferve our own by maiming or otherwife 
 clifabling or confining the aggreflor, would be naturally 
 unlawful. 
 
 The fame duties will refult from a ftate of extreme 
 necefTity. If we cannot defend the life of a wife, child, 
 &c: &c. without taking the life of the aggreftbr, felf- 
 prefervation juftifles that dreadful alternative. The 
 fame would be the cafe if thofe things are taken away 
 whereon the prefervation of life immediately depends -, 
 as, provinon in a wildernefs. 
 
 In a ftate of refpective neceftity, we cannot account 
 for the feelings of another. If he who paffes an im- 
 prudent and unmanly joke upon another fuffers, we 
 have caufe to pity his indifcretion, but judge the de- 
 fendant innocent. 
 
 Injudicial proceedings, confideration for the feelings 
 of a perfon who has conceived himfelf in a ftate of ne- 
 cefTity, is Wiled favdyr of nccejjity. 
 
 Ech. i. — Extreme neceffity may be greater or lefs ; perfons 
 likewifl* differ v/irh refpeft to temper; circum (lances have 
 alfo a confide: hience upon the human mind; fa 
 
 that 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1 43 
 
 that it is vcrv difficult to judge what a perfon ought to 
 have done or omitted. We fhould not be forward, there- 
 fore, to enter upon a peremptory judgment with rcfpect 
 to the conduct of others, who have been more or lefs in 
 a ii.ite of necefiity, or had caufes to conceive themfelves 
 in fuch a fituation. 
 «SV//. 2. — The barbarous cuftom of duelling being founded up- 
 on a chimerical law of honour, in direct contradiction to 
 the facred precepts of moral law, is fo far t from ccrming 
 under a ftate of necefhty, that it is in every tnftance a 
 premeditated act of wilful tranfgrellion againft the laws 
 of God and the municipal laws of the land — a crime 
 equally participating of filicide and of murder. 
 
 ScL 3. — A wife and good man will never fufler himfelf to be 
 milled by fnch miftaken notions of honour; nor will he 
 ever find himfelf deftitute of the moft efficacious means 
 of defending his character; for, wifely purfuing the path 
 of virtue, he cannot fail of having the good opinion of 
 the upright in his favour; and he fets not fo great a value 
 upon the eflimation of perfons of a contrary character as 
 that he mould wilfully violate the laws of God and his 
 country. 
 
 There are innumerable things neceilary as means for 
 a. prudent and faithful performance of the duties we 
 owe to the foul and body.* — Things neceilary and con- 
 venient for the prefervation of life, and calculated to 
 affift us in the performance of our duties, may be com- 
 prehended under the term eflate. 
 
 It therefore becomes a weighty duty which we owe 
 to ourfelves, that we endeavour, by all lawful means 
 in our power, to procure and to preferve an eftate. 
 
 Actions by which an eflate may be procured and 
 preferved in a lawful manner, are denoted by the term 
 labour-, and a certain mode of conducting labour is 
 
 called an occupation. 
 
 j. 
 
 We are confeo^iently bound to labour, and to follow 
 a certain lawful occupation. 
 
144 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sc&. i. — It is from the furprifing variety of occupations that 
 each perfon may be ufeful'y employed and may lawfully 
 obtain a portion of the general flock of thofe things 
 which are neceffary and convenient for life : it is from the 
 fame fource fhat countries draw their riches, and acquire 
 importance and ftrcngth; that commerce flourilhes, and 
 the produce of the earth, the fruits of induftrv, fupply 
 and conn eel: the molt diftant regions of the globe. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The oppolite of labour is idlenefs, a pernicious, un- 
 natural and moil injurious vice, in itfelf difgracefui to 
 human nature, and the fatal fource of innumerable evils, 
 deftrucVive both to the morals of the idler and others, and 
 hurtful in a high degree to families and fociety. 
 
 It is consequently our duty to make the beft ufe of 
 our own for rendering life as ufeful and comfortable as 
 poffible ; and, as our own means and application may 
 not always prove fufficient for thefe purpofes, vc muft 
 endeavour to conciliate the pjocd will and afTiilance 
 of others. . 
 
 This leads to another important duty which we owe 
 to ourfelves •, that we remain in all our actions and 
 purfuits folicitous to maintain a good name and cha- 
 racter-, fot nothing more conciliates the good will and 
 benevolence of others, or renders us more extenfively 
 ufeful in life. 
 
 It is true, that a good name and character reft upon 
 the good opinions of others concerning the rectitude of 
 our conduct, and that nothing feems to be lefs at our 
 command than that opinion : but we may not thence 
 infer that a good name and character are things entirely 
 of a precarious nature or unattainable. A faithful 
 performance of all our duties will attract the notice 
 and influence the good opinion of all the virtuous and 
 upright who know us *, to have a good name with them 
 is true honour -, nay, virtue has a certain charming 
 
 power 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 145 
 
 power even in the fip-ht of thofe who are votaries fo 
 vice, that they cannot hut efteem it m others. How- 
 ever that may be, we have caufe, for our own fatisf ac- 
 tion and contentment in life, to maintain that character-, 
 for if the world proves uirjuft, we ought to do ourfelves 
 juftice, and defeat, by a ftedfaft conduct In the line of 
 rectitude, all attacks which envy, calumny or malice 
 may invent. 
 
 Among the means given us for the great duties 
 which we are bound to. perform to ourfelves, is princi- 
 pally time : we ought to be careful to improve it by a 
 wife, prudent and diligent management of every thing 
 that is comprehended in our duty to God, to ourfelves 
 and to others. Time unprofitably fpent is wafted, loir. 
 Our duties in life are great ; the time allotted for the 
 faithful performance of them is limited to an uncertain 
 and fhort fpace. . 
 
 It is evident from what has htzn hitherto explained, 
 that our duties are not only extremely comprehenfive, 
 but likewife fo varioufty modified, fo intimately con- 
 nected and interwoven with one another, that ail our 
 exertions, ail poffible care, prudence and circumfpection 
 ought to be joined to our pureft intention, left we -be 
 wanting to ourfelves, and eventually mifs thathappi- 
 nefs which is, next to the glory of God, the great and 
 ultimate end of our exiflence. 
 
 It is for this end that we mould beware of feparating 
 our duties ', which will be the cafe if we perform fomc 
 and neglect others, if we are careful in one refpect and. 
 negligent in others. 
 
 Let us not prepofteroufly imagine, that we can be 
 faithful to ourfelves without being fo to God and to our 
 
 U fellow 
 
J 46 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fellow creatures ; or that we can pleafe the Almighty, 
 if we neglect the duties to ourfelves and others. 
 
 Sch. i. — Hence it appears, that impofing upon ourfelves par- 
 ticular hardfhips and feverities under the idea of felf-de- 
 nial, is unjuft cruelty committed againft ourfelves, and 
 by no means a fervice rational or plealing to God. 
 
 Sch. 2. — It is likewife evident, that we cannot be truly religious 
 if we do not endeavour to be as ufefu! to others as poflible, 
 or if we neglect duties which we owe to ourfelves and our 
 own houfhold. 
 
 Sch. 3. — It is therefore a falfe notion, if people place religion 
 only in immediate acts of worfliip, confined to houfes of 
 public aflemblies, meetings, or the clofet; as if thole things 
 had a peculiar merit in themfelves, and were not ordained 
 or neceflary to qualify us for the faithful performance of 
 all our duties in all circumitances, fituations and relations 
 in life. It is a high authority that commands us, whether 
 ivis cat cr drink, or whatfoever zee do, to do it to the glory of God. 
 
 Even in that clafs of duties which has immediate 
 reference to ourfelves, particular care and circum- 
 fpeflion is neceflary to beware of a fatal feparation of 
 duties : for it is pofiible, 
 
 1 ft. That perfons may fuppofe themfelves well en- 
 gaged in their duties towards foul and body, even whilft 
 they neglect things neceflary, convenient and ufeful for 
 life, bv fquandering away or being unconcerned for an 
 effete, not carefully attending to an ufeful occupation 
 in lite, or flighting the good opinion of others. 
 
 2d. That man may confine his care and attention 
 entirely to the foul, neglecting the body and all concern 
 for the means of fubfiftence and fupport. 
 
 3d. That he may pay all attention to the body, 
 whilit the weighty concerns of an immortal foul are 
 neglected, and whjlft he is unmindful of neceflary la- 
 bour and the prefervation of an eftate. 
 
 4. That 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 4 
 
 •• 
 
 4. That perfons may engage with io much avidity 
 in the purfuks of honour, preferment and an eftate, as 
 to forget their important obligations to foul and body. 
 
 Sch. 1. — If we except the fuperftitiojis modes r.; m maftic life, 
 there are perhaps but few inftances of fuch as confume 
 their health and Subftance by too lev. re application for 
 the improvement of their mental faculties : fo mich is 
 certain, that a Studious and Sedentary life require 
 tion of the mind and fome bodily exercifefor kcepihi, the 
 conftitution ftrong and vigorous. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The number of fuch as wim to mine in literary or 
 great circles, who feel an ambition for drefs and a Sump- 
 tuous way of living, fet an example 01 high life before 
 their children, or bring them up in a higher ftate than 
 their circumftancts permit, may be more confiderable. 
 However that be, they are more dangerous tofociety than 
 the former, as the effects of their extravagance are fre- 
 quently felt by the indufrrious part of the community, 
 who have afforded the means thereto without receiving 
 juft compensation. Such characters may fhine in fa- 
 fhionable life, but they are in reality unjuir. to themfelves, 
 to their houfhold, and to others. 
 
 Sch. 3. — The glutton, the drunkard, the Spendthrift, &c. Serv- 
 ing their bellies, confume the patrimony of their children, 
 lead a beaftly life, and are drones to Society. 
 
 Sch. 4. — The mifer, callous to every feeling of humanity, is 
 oppreffive and cruel to all who are under his authority, 
 and uncharitable both to himfelf and to others; his only 
 aim is to gather for his children, who are brought up in 
 ignorance and Stupidity, and, like him, remain Grangers 
 to both mental and corporeal accomplishments. 
 
 Sch. y — As thefe are but a few inftances of the evil consequen- 
 ces flowing from a Separation of duties which men owe 
 themfelves, we may eafily conceive how dreadful is the 
 evil if, befides reprehenlibiiity in this particular, a fepa- 
 ration takes place in the duties we owe to God and to our 
 fellow creatures. 
 
 In each of thefe cafes, nay, in every inftance where 
 duties are Separated, we act contrary to the dictates of 
 
 natural 
 
I 4 S' MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 natural laws; for we do not render ourfelves as happy 
 ss poiTible. Jnllead of performing our duties, we 
 pervert them, and render ourfelves guilty of neglect 
 and difobedience. 
 
 It, then, the great extent and high importance of 
 our duties be weii considered \ if cur natural infirmity 
 be brought into contraft with the high degree of purity 
 and rectitude which is required in all our intentions and 
 the whole conduct of life, through innumerable temp- 
 tations which befet us from within and without ; we 
 may well conclude, that more is required for our ulti- 
 mate happinefs than human nature in its prefent ftate 
 is able to perform. 
 
 
 Muft not this lead to another inference, equally ra- 
 tional, of the greateft importance, and perhaps not 
 improper to be introduced here, that our nature is fallen. 
 frpm its original purity, and muft be renewed and power- 
 affifted if we are to be happy ? Alas ! there are in- 
 numerable part offences which, were it even in cur 
 power, the mdft. perfect performance of our duties for 
 t\\z future could not erafe : and as our beft endeavours 
 ftiU fall fhort of v/hat we know to be our indifpenfible 
 duty, the profpect of an atonement on our part is as 
 gloomy as the retrGfpect on our former accumulated 
 guilt. " 
 
 Reafon, however, leaves us not without hope: jut 
 tice and mercy in God may meet together. Afuper- 
 natural remedy is poffible with him who is infinite in 
 power and wii'aom, and from his infinite goodnefs it 
 may be expected. 
 
 Hence, in a itriking manner, flow both the proba- 
 bility and the necefiity, on our part, of a iupernatur^l 
 
 • : crht, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 149 
 
 light, by divine revelation, fhewing the way of our re- 
 conciliation with the offended majefty of heaven. 
 
 If fuch a revelation be. given by God, it mud: have 
 finking and infallible criteria, by which it may be in- 
 conteftibly afcertained as fuch, and thereby diftinguifhed 
 from the falfe and pretended. 
 
 Among the criteria of a divine revelation, the fol- 
 lowing particularly deferve our notice : that it muft re- 
 veal a mode of reconciliation which is beyond the reach 
 and power of reafon, yet by no means contradictory 
 thereto -, that the way of happinefs which it points out 
 is perfectly confident with the glory and perfections of 
 God, and fully adequate to the natural infirmity and 
 fpiritual wants of man •, that it refts upon an extraor- 
 dinary and the beft eftablifhed teftimony. 
 
 Sch. 1. — The firft criterion refts upon this plain proof: If there 
 were a way of reconciliation within the reach of reafon, 
 an exprefs divine revelation would not have been necef- 
 fary, confequently not given ; for God does nothing in 
 vain. 
 
 Sch. 2. — As reafon is given by God, and a? revelation is necef- 
 fary for the purpofe of affording it more light and eleva- 
 tion with refpecl to thofe things which are requisite for 
 our eternal happinefs, it is evident, that what is contra- 
 dictory to reafon cannot be a revelation proceeding from 
 Go* 
 
 We ought, therefore, well to diflinguifh things beyond the 
 compafs of reafon, from fuch as are contradictory thereto. 
 
 Sch. 3. — If a revelation fhould point out a mode of reconcilia- 
 tion contradictory to the divine perfections, it would carry 
 with it the inconteftible proof of its fallacy. 
 
 Sch. 4. — A mode of falvation which is incompetent for reliev- 
 ing the infirmities and fpiritual wants of men, cannot 
 have God for its author; nor is the revelation pointing it 
 out from God. 
 
 Sck. 
 
I^O MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Stft. ;. — Men pretending to a miflion from God, mull be en- 
 dowed with fuch gifts as will enable them to prove that 
 million by extraordinary figns and wonders. 
 
 It is therefore a mod important duty to ourfelves, 
 th.it we carefully examine into what is offered as a di- 
 vine revelation, and embrace and follow that which has 
 thefe incontrovertible criteria of divine truth •, for, by 
 a contrary conduct we neglect tho, ufe of means requisite 
 for our happinefs, are guilty of feparating our duty, 
 act contrary to the dictates of the laws of God, both the 
 natural and revealed, and render ourfelves miferable. 
 
 There is not, nor has there ever been a book in which 
 thefe and other criteria of divine truth were to be found, 
 befides the bible containing the Old and New Tefta- 
 ments: thefe exhibit a revelation of the will of God 
 concerning- our eternal falvation, worthy a divine ori- 
 gin, and worthy the adoration both of angels and men: 
 here we find doctrines furpaffing indeed what finite be- 
 ings fully comprehend, yet perfectly confident with 
 reafon; doctrines fo far from being repugnant to the 
 perfections of the Deity, that they reprefent them in 
 their full glory. Infinite juftice and mercy are fhewn 
 in their intimate connection, in perfect harmony, 
 as they meet in a Redeemer's rightecufnefs : God, the 
 holy one of Ifrae!> juftmes the ungodly: divine power 
 converts the foul and renews the mind: the fpirit of 
 God infpires tho: heart with the principle of faith and 
 holinefs : God works to will and to do according to his 
 good pleafure; man is by grace enabled to work out 
 his falvation. 
 
 For this end we alfo find in thefe books all duties to 
 God, to ourfelves and ethers, defcribed in their greatefl 
 1 puritj : here all is functioned with the ma- 
 
 jeftic 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. i 
 
 
 
 jeftic command of God; death and life are laid before 
 man, and the moft cogent motives given for exciting 
 his obedience. The divine perfections, the eternal love 
 of our heavenly Father, the philanthropy, the fuffer- 
 ings, the death, the refurreclion, the future judgment, 
 &c. of the Son of God, mould ftrengtheh our fmcerity, 
 and quicken our diligence In the purfuit of virtue and 
 holmefs. The great truths which reafon faintly com- 
 prehends are here laid open; the immortality 'of the 
 foul, the refurreclion of the body, the final righteous 
 judgment of the Lord of heaven and earth, is brought 
 to full light. There is an eternal and infinitely glorious 
 reward referred for thofe who love him. God is all- 
 fufHcient, unchangeably faithful. 
 
 Thefe fcriptures ought, therefore, to be received as 
 the exprefs divine revelation of God for our prefent 
 and future- happinefs. They exhibit the moft perfect 
 rule of faith and life, given by the higher!: pcflible 
 authority, for conducting us in the bed manner as men 
 and chnftians 3 the moft perfect fubjectioii, therefore, 
 is due to its directions. 
 
 ' Hence it follows,, that if we neglect the reading, 
 neanng and obeying the word of God, we commitTk 
 moft heinous offence againft heaven and our own hap- 
 pinefs. L 
 
 ScLi.—Utus therefore not vainly imagine, that we know- 
 enough of our duties when we are able to trace them from 
 natural principles. Let us- not reft contented with the 
 glimmering light of reafon, but refort daily to the divine 
 revelation. Let us draw from the fountain head, enjoy 
 the full light of the gofpel for concluding ourfeives 
 conformably to the will pf heaven. Let us be fenfible 
 or our fpintual wants, and among other things which 
 S a L- t du ? eS , of location and adoration before the 
 iUoit High, aft from the Father of Light that xvifdorn 
 
 which 
 
-*5 2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Which is from above, and the guidance of his lpirit in ail 
 the ways of holinefs and truth. 
 
 Sck. 2.- — There is nothing better calculated to give us both 
 light and ftrength in the performance of the duties of 
 cnriftialrity, than the folemn opportunities which the 
 public exercifes of religion fo frequently afford : thefe are 
 not only adapted to imprefs the mind with a inoft lively 
 fenfe of the omniprcfence of God, and give it that ele- 
 vation above all things of a tranfitory nature which ena- 
 bles us to worfhip him in fpirit and in truth; but they 
 likewife remind us continually of our infirmity, fet before 
 us the mercies of our God, and engage us in the concerns 
 of an everlafting life and happinefs. 
 
 Sen. 3. — Let us therefore fet a proper value upon thefe folemn 
 opportunities; let us efteem them as our greateff. privi- 
 leges; let us ufe and improve them for the great and 
 falutary purpofes for which they are given. 
 
 Would it not be the height both of indifcretion and ingra- 
 titude, if we mould refufe or reject the light which is 
 given us for purfuiug and obtaining everlafting happinefs? 
 
 The fcriptures fet the higheft poflible pattern of 
 virtue before us •, we are not to reft contented with any 
 thing Abort of the will and perfections of God : Be ye 
 perfecl^ it is fa id, as your Father which is in heaven is 
 perfeB. It is true, we mall never be able to attain to 
 that purity and perfection which, as an attribute of the 
 Mo ft High, is unattainable by any finite being •, ftill, 
 by prefTing forward we fhall, with divine aftiftance, 
 come nearer and nearer to his image, and may humbly 
 hope, that our fincere endeavours will be acceptable to 
 him, and ultimately rewarded with an exceeding great 
 reward. 
 
 The road of virtue is difficult; extremes muft be 
 avoided in all our actions •, the whole fum of our duties 
 muft be attended to, left we deviate from the path of 
 rectitude, and render ourfelves miferable. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1$$ 
 
 Sett, i. — No iction, not even the befl intended, can be virtu- 
 ous, if it contradicts any of our duties : we ought to be ;;s 
 careful not to fin by excefs, as we fhould to guard againft 
 deficiency in any of our efforts. Let it beobferved, that 
 virtue is a mean between two oppoiite extremes, which 
 deferve the name of vices, becaufe they are wilful and 
 habitual tranfgreflions againft moral reftitude, and againff. 
 the law and will of God; and that, befides vicious and 
 wilful habits of vice, there are innumerable interme- 
 diate deviations from virtue, which confritute greater or 
 lefs faults, as the will of the a°;ent is more or lefs engaged, 
 and his conduct more or lefs conformable to the line of 
 duty. 
 
 Sc/i. 2. — Thefe obfervations feemed necefTary in this placa; 
 for, as our obedience cannot but be imperfect in this 
 life, there is danger that we fall into extremes with refpect 
 even to our judgment, by being too ftrict or too lax, by- 
 harrowing as it were the path of virtue, that none feels an 
 inclination or difcovers a pofiibility to walk therein ; or, 
 on the other hand, by throwing open the bars of recti- 
 tude, to flatter vice and render miners fecure. 
 
 Sck. 3. — Let us confider that our perfection admits of degrees, 
 and that we are faid to be virtuous not becaufe there is no 
 imperfection, no manner of fault in us ; this is the ftate 
 we look for in another life; but we may flatter ourfelves 
 to be in the way of virtue, when we grow daily in fin- 
 cerity, goodnefs, uprightnefs and piety — when we hate fin 
 and vice, deny ourfelves and the world, and love God in 
 fincerity and truth. 
 
 Sch. 4. — We have obferved, that each virtue is a mean which 
 has two oppofite extremes, befides a number of interme- 
 diate deviations; ideas which perhaps will not be general- 
 ly underftood without fome kind of illuftration. — Sup- 
 pofe the known figure of a circle, with its diamelLr: if 
 lines be drawn through the points of the circumference 
 which are cut by the diameter, fo that they do not equally 
 touch the centre, they cannot be perfectly ftraight; how- 
 ever, they are far from being as crooked as the circumfe- 
 rence or linesnear it : compared with thefe they may rather 
 pafs for ftraight. Thus, as perfection is not expected in 
 human conduct, actions, where the deviation is very fmall, 
 muft not be confounded with eccentricity of conduct: 
 
 X . faults 
 
1$4 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 faults may be greater or lefs, and fo numerous as at Iaff to 
 contract the guilt and eccentricity of vice. Take, for 
 other inftances, the highly commendable virtues of cou- 
 rage, frugality and piety ; are not the extremes thereof, 
 known by the terms temerity, profufenfs^fuperjiithn, as re- 
 mote from them as the extremity of defect, as coioardice, 
 avarice and impiety? — May there not alfo be defects with 
 refpect to thofe virtues which do not amount to temerity, 
 profufenefs and fuperftition, nor render an agent guilty 
 of cowardice, avarice and impiety? 
 
 As duties are anions done conformably to laws, they 
 mult be confident with our moral obligations •, nothing, 
 therefore, can be our duty that is repugnant to our 
 obligations. But as obligations and rights are things 
 infeparably connected, it likewife follows, that we muft 
 have particular refpect to our own rights and thofe of 
 others, and that nothing can be our duty which is in- 
 confiftent with them. 
 
 Sc/i. — Let us then, in all the purfuits and purpofes of life, ftill 
 remember the important queftion, Is it right? As virtue 
 is generally a habit to conduct ourfelves conformably to 
 law, we may conclude, that it is of infinite importance 
 early to form inch habits as are conformable to the will 
 and law of God, both the natural and revealed, and to 
 guard againfl: any deviation from our duty, left a contrary 
 habit be contracted, which will eltrange the mind from 
 the love of virtue, and render the attainment of it difficulty 
 perhaps impoffibie. — As we cannot too foon begin the 
 practice of virtue, fo there is no maxim, perhaps, better 
 calculated to fecureus againfl vice than this: Principiis 
 objia ! Beware of begimiings ! 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I $$ 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the duties of humanity in general . 
 
 w, 
 
 ITH refpect to the duties which we owe to our 
 neighbour, reference may be had to imperfect obliga- 
 tions and laws, which, as they warrant no right of 
 compuliion in any perfon to enforce performance on our 
 part, leave a compliance with his wimes or applications 
 entirely to our own good will and free choice, without 
 the fear of coercion: or refpecl may be had to perfect 
 obligations and laws, which, in cafes of non-perform- 
 ance on our part, give our neighbour a perfect right 
 to enforce it by coercion or violence. Duties thus 
 confidered are of two kinds : the former are called im- 
 perfett duties, or duties of humanity •, the latter are known 
 by the appellation of perf eft duties, or duties of neceffity. 
 
 Sch. i. — Inftances of the firft kind we find in the duties of /cW 
 friendfiip, affifance, gratitude, fympathy, forbearance, &c 
 Thefe, as we faall (hew in the next chapter, we owe our 
 neighbour, and of them, in one or the other refpeft, he 
 may ftand greatly in need; but, as he has no right to en- 
 force their performance, his only reliance is on our good 
 will: if this mould fail, nothing remains but patiently to 
 bear the difappointment, or repeat his application in hopes 
 of better fuccefs. 
 
 Sch. 2. — But it is quite a different thing with refpe# to the du- 
 ties of neceffity : for inftance; the payment of taxes by a ci- 
 tizen, in confequence of the directions of the laws of the 
 land; the obedience due from an officer to his general, from a 
 foldier to his officer ; the labour zvhich ajcrvant is to perform for 
 his wafer; the payment which a debtor muft make to his creditor. 
 Here government may compel the citizen, the general the 
 
 officer, 
 
I56 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 officer, the officer the foldier, the mafter the fervant, the 
 creditor the debtor; as the laws give each reflectively the 
 right, in cafe of non-compliance, to enforce it by coer- 
 cion and violence. 
 
 Treating in this chapter of the duties of humanity 
 jn general, it may not be amifs, perhaps, to apprife 
 the reader, that there are writers who have exprened a 
 wifh for terms to denote duties of the firft kind more 
 fui table than the expreflions imperfeB duties, or duties 
 of humanity \ terms which, they fay, are very apt to 
 convey the erroneous ideas, either that there is fome- 
 thing of a defective nature in thofe duties, with refpect 
 to their internal beauty and excellency, or that the per- 
 formance of them is lefs cogent and necefTary than that 
 of perfect duties; whereas thofe duties which eftablifh- 
 ed ufe defignates by thefe improper terms, are the mod 
 exalted in their nature, the moft excellent of all our 
 duties y and the faithful performance of them confti- 
 tutes the greater!: ornament of the human character. 
 
 However, as in all fciences attention is necefTary to 
 the definitions of fubjects on which they treat, in order 
 to avoid mifapprehenfions and miftakes, let it be ob- 
 ferved, that this is more particularly requifite in inftan- 
 ces like the prefent, where language furnifhes only fuch 
 terms as at firft fight feem to favour ideas repugnant or 
 derogatory to the objects v/hich they are intended to 
 deflgnate. 
 
 Upon this confederation, as our definition is well 
 calculated to imprefs the mind of the reader with the 
 internal beauty of thefe moh 1 , nay only, excellent duties, 
 we may expect, that a due attention thereto will fecure 
 him againft any improper idea which the common ufe 
 of thefe terms might be fuppofed to fuggeft. 
 
 And 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 57 
 
 And will not this fuppofed impropriety vanifii, if 
 thefe expreflions are taken in a true reference to their 
 fpeciflc objects ? 
 
 What impropriety is there in calling duties imperfect, 
 to the performance of which our neighbour has but an 
 imperfect right ? 
 
 And may not thofe duties be called duties of huma- 
 nity, which are done from an inward fenCt of obligation, 
 without any controul or fear of compulfion ? Certainly, 
 if free agency is, what it really is, the glory of human 
 nature, then the entirely voluntary exercife of this 
 heavenly gift, in the purfuit of actions of the higheft 
 excellency and rectitude, cannot fail to be highly or- 
 namental to the character of man, and becoming the 
 dignity of human nature. 
 
 What ferves ftill more particularly to imprefs the 
 mind with a due fenfe of the great importance of thefe 
 duties, and mould quicken our diligence in faithfully 
 obeying the gentle precepts of the laws of nature and 
 of nature's God, inviting us to the moft cordial per- 
 formance of our obligations, is the confederation that 
 all our duties, whatever their immediate objects may 
 be, are either duties of humanity in themfelves, or may 
 and ought to be made fuch by all who fet a value upon 
 virtue and the approbation of a good confeience ; for no 
 moral action is conceivable but where room is left for 
 choice, and where, in fome degree or other, it depends 
 upon our fpontaneity, whether we will do or omit it in 
 a manner confident with our internal obligations, or in 
 conlequence of the degrading principle of fervile fear, 
 or dread of violence. 
 
 It is on this account that a faithful obfervance of the 
 duties to God and to ourfelves fo much heighten the 
 
 excellency 
 
l<% MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 D 
 
 excellency of the human character -, they are in- them- 
 felves duties of humanity, depend upon our free 
 choice, and give free agency the moft ample fcope •, in- 
 ternal motives actuate the mind. We act worthy of 
 ourfelves if we conduct ourfelves as rational beings, 
 by glorifying our Creator and Preferyer, and by ad- 
 vancing our own felicity. 
 
 If we ever love God, we mud: love him freely, no 
 forced fervice is acceptable to the Deity : he requires 
 the heart in all, and this we ought to offer him freely. 
 
 No action that is done or omitted with refpect to 
 ourfelves, can be a virtue, or in any degree ornamental 
 to human nature, which does not proceed from an inter- 
 nal fenk of duty, and is not done in fincerity and truth. 
 An human agent forced to do a profitable action, is in 
 that inirance as little above the level of brutes as his 
 action has internal merit. Thefe cannot act freely, but 
 muft be forced into a compliance with our wiiTies. 
 
 In all acts of impiety, impropriety, indecency, in- 
 juftice and oppreftion, man abufes free agency, fins 
 againft the dignity of his nature, and degrades himfelf 
 far below the order of beads. 
 
 Behold both the excellency and neceffity of a moft 
 careful performance of the duties of humanity, with 
 refpect to God and to ourfelves ! 
 
 Of the fame nature are our duties with refpect to 
 the brute creation and to other things of an inanimate 
 nature: he who fhould think that we might conduct 
 the management and ufe of them in quite an arbitrary 
 and capricious manner, would give us but indifferent 
 proofs of his underftanding and heart: both reafon and 
 revelation point to the wife and benign defign for 
 
 which 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I $q 
 
 which they are given : by abuMng them we render our- 
 felves ungrateful to God, and act in a manner unbe- 
 coming the rationality of our nature. 
 
 Though the dumb creature cannot fet up a claim of 
 perfect right; though things inanimate have no fenfe 
 of pain or fatisfaction, like the former; and though 
 neither of them can apply force to avert tyranny or 
 abufe-, ftill there are duties on our part, duties of hu- 
 manity : we ought to conduct ourfelves in that refpect, 
 as indeed in all other occurrences of life, conformably 
 to the will of God. 
 
 Sc/i. — Shew me a man who is cruel and inhuman to brutes, 
 who wantonly deftroys or abufes other things; thoufand 
 to one but you point outaperfon who cares little for God 
 and his own confcience. 
 
 We have already feen, that fome of the duties to our 
 neighbour, that is to fay, to our fellow creatures, arc 
 in themfelves perfect, and liable, in refpect of perform- 
 ance, to violence and compulfion. However, it may 
 be eafily difcovered, that we can make them on our 
 part imperfect duties, by preventing the exercife of our 
 neighbour's perfect right, that is to fay, by doing 
 freely, from a fenfe of our duty, what another has a 
 right to enforce. Perfect laws warrant force only in 
 cafes of reluctance, delay or oppofition ; there is, conse- 
 quently, no caufe to fear violence where it may not be 
 exercifed. The ftri6left duty of neceflity may therefore, 
 without any fhadow of doubt, be made with us duties 
 of humanity. 
 
 Whatever our focial connections may be, we 
 mould feel an ambition to perform our duties from 
 choice rather than from fear. Prudence and a tender 
 regard for our repofe and character require, that we 
 
 lhould 
 
l6o MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mould lay more ftrefs upon the will of God and the 
 
 internal kn.fe of our duty, than upon the confideration 
 
 that others are porTeffed of perfect rights, or that there 
 
 are compulfory remedial rules provided by perfect 
 
 laws : thefe are againft the unruly, the diforderly, the 
 
 difhonert, the unjuft part of fociety, for the purpofes 
 
 of protecting the upright and confcientious man, who 
 
 is actuated by the impulfe of his internal obligation, 
 
 and does freely what is right. 
 
 Sch. — Mere we may advert to what fcripture declareth, the law 
 is not maddfor a righteous man. I Tim. i. 9. 
 
 Would it not be, as it were, a new heaven and a new 
 earth, if the practice of the duties of humanity mould 
 become co-extenfive with the human race, comparing 
 all that is or can be an object of human thought and 
 defire ? Behold man, the obedient fervant of God, the 
 beloved object of his complacency, the friend of his 
 Creator ! Strenuous and indefatigable in the purfuit of 
 virtue, behold him an ornament to himfelf and to hu- 
 man nature ! Behold all men, united in virtuous fenti- 
 ments and in mutual love, confpiring in their endea- 
 vours to glorify' their Maker, zealous to befriend one 
 another and to be benefactors of brutes, all of one ac- 
 cord endeavouring to make the wifeft and beft ufe of 
 the gifts of Providence ! all caufes of ftrife, animofity, 
 hatred, envy and litigation done away among the chil- 
 dren of men ! Behold a faint picture of human happi- 
 nefs, which virtue, were it univerfal, would produce a 
 happinefs where nothing is wanting but greater perfec- 
 tion in our nature, and a more lading, nay, an ever- 
 lading duration ! 
 
 But alas, the world has at all times, even to this day, 
 exhibited human conduct in direct oppofition to this 
 
 pleafing 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY; Ibl 
 
 pleaung and definable . representation. We have not 
 lived to fee virtue's gentle, reign; the earth groans un- 
 der opprefTion, and its inhabitants for the greater!: part 
 wear the chains of bondage. 
 
 Courts of juilice are frequently fcenes of heinous 
 intrigues and other fecret vices, and often become en- 
 gines of crying injufHce. There we behold brethren 
 in difcord, litigation and ftrife! « Little of humanity 
 is difcovered in human intercourfe, and mankind have 
 learned to make up for the lofs thereof by the empty 
 ceremonial of etiquette, by the madow of good breed- 
 ing, and by unmeaning compliments. Where liberty 
 yet upholds her ilandard, where humanity mould ihine 
 in an amiable difplay of focial happinefs, we find fre- 
 quent inftances of illiberality and licentioufnefs. But 
 w hy mould we enlarge on things which daily offend an 
 obferver's eye ? There is rather caufe to look to our- 
 felves, reform what is faulty in our conduct, and take 
 an animated refolution to do our part, by fincerely and 
 flrenuoudy purfuing virtue, and performing all our 
 duties in the bert pofiible manner. By fuch a conduct 
 we may expect the bleflings and favour of God, advance 
 our own happinefs, and fpread felicity abroad. Let us 
 thus prepare for that kingdom of peace where unity, 
 joy and happinefs for ever lair. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the duties of humanity which we owe to others, 
 
 OlNCE it is the obvious courfe of nature, and of 
 confequence the wife plan of the government of God 
 over the concerns of the human race, that no man can 
 
 Y be 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fee happy in a itate of foiitude, but by that kind provi- 
 dence which determined his exigence is made imme- 
 diately dependent upon others, not only for life and the 
 enjoyment of its comforts, but alfo for fuch acquire- 
 ments and qualifications as enable him to perform du- 
 ties to his creator and prefer ver, as well as to himfelf, 
 in order to be pleafmg to God and to render his own 
 frate happy : it is manifeft, that it is the will of God 
 that men alfo perform duties to thofe who are endowed 
 with the fame rational nature, and inhabit the fame 
 earth as fellow members of the univerfal fociety of 
 mankind, of which God himfelf is both the author and 
 the fupreme ruler and governor. 
 
 To this end his laws extend to ail men, taking cog- 
 nizance of all their moral actions : the rules which they 
 prefcribe are defigned for directing human conduct, and 
 of courfe the actions of each individual of the human 
 race -, the precepts and prohibitions thereof are equally 
 intereiling to all who defire to glorify God and to be 
 happy. It cannot, therefore, be a matter of indiffer- 
 ence, how" men conduct themfelves with refpect to one 
 another, whether they make ufe of their talents and 
 gifts, and the opportunities allotted them, for the bene- 
 fit, or apply them to the hurt and detriment of others. 
 
 God is fo far from giving his gifts in vain, that, on 
 the contrary, he commands all the good we can do to 
 others, and enjoins us by his laws to take motives from 
 his perfections and ways towards the children of men; 
 It is not only by internal a6ts of piety, but by an up- 
 right and irreproachable conduct before men, that we 
 rnuit glorify him, and thus excite our fellow creatures 
 to that reverence, love and obedience, which they owe 
 to their cteator, prefer ver, and fupreme governor. 
 
 As 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 6$ 
 
 As rational creatures, daily experiencing and partak- 
 ing of the difpenfations of the love, mercy and benefi- 
 cence of God towards man^ we ought to copy from the 
 divine original, by delighting in the happinefs of ethers, 
 and by ufing all our powers for prompting the welfare 
 of thofe around us. 
 
 Hence it appears, that we have not only duties to 
 be obferved towards our fellow creatures, but that thefe 
 duties are of the higher!: importance, as facred and ne- 
 4 cefTary as thofe which are due to God. How is it pof- 
 iible that our religious profefTions can be fincere, if we 
 do not endeavour to refemble the deity, if we feel not 
 affection and love for thofe who, as well as ourfelves, 
 are the objects of his tender love and regard. 
 
 Nay, thefe duties are fo interefting and necefiary, 
 that without a faithful obfervance of them we cannot 
 perform thofe duties which appertain to ourfelves-, 
 for daily experience fo inconteftibly evinces the necef- 
 fity of the agency, participation, aid and affiftance of 
 others for the attainment of our own happinefs, that 
 without the one and the other we could have never ob- 
 tained life or continued therein, much lefs have enjoyed 
 or been partakers of any of its comforts. Any action, 
 therefore, towards others, which may incline them to 
 afford us their necefTary aid and afTiitance, becomes a 
 duty to ourfelves j that, on the contrary, which might 
 induce them to withhold their good offices or obferuct 
 our happinefs, is injurious to our own true intereft and 
 repugnant to the firrt principle of natural laws, which 
 commands us, by every jurt and lawful endeavour, to 
 render our rtate happy. 
 
 It is, therefore, mort evidently manifeft, that God 
 the creator and preferver of mankind, has connected 
 
 the 
 
164 A1QE.AL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the individuals of the human race by the natural ties of 
 mutual duties and reciprocal good oflices, as well as by 
 identity of nature, wants and inclinations, His govern- 
 ment over mankind, which mufi neccfTarily be the moft 
 perfect, is at the fame time exceedingly gracious and 
 benign. Human happinefs, in which God will be 
 glorified, is moft wifely provided for by laws, which 
 enjoin one common intereft to all, founded upon the 
 invariable nature of things, whereby each p erf on be ft 
 promotes his own real inter efts and happinefs^ by endeavour- 
 ing as much as pojjible to promote the felicity of all men. 
 
 Upon this plan all natural relations among mortals 
 are founded. Men, by the defign of their creator and 
 the^ precepts of natural laws, are veiled with equal 
 rights in cafes where it may be requifite to expect the 
 help and affiftance of thofe who are in a fituation to 
 afford it, for without this human happinefs cannot 
 exifr. Thofe who are endowed with faculties, talents 
 and gifts, are, on the other hand, equally under obliga- 
 tions to apply them for the benefit of others, where an 
 opportunity offers for promoting their felicity. Force 
 and compulfion find place only where one hinders ano- 
 ther in the ufe and pofleffiqn of his own faculties and 
 gifts, and thus obrtructs his felicity, but not at all 
 where we have to ufe our own powers for our intereft 
 and the benefit of others : for thefe we are accountable 
 only to God and our own consciences. We are not 
 here to be directed, In the ufe of our own powers, by 
 the claims or defires of others, much lefs by force and 
 coercion ; but the will of God and cur own happinefs 
 are motives fufficiently ftrong to incite us to ufe them 
 tor the great end for which they are given us, and for 
 which we are placed in the world. 
 
 Hence 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1 65 
 
 Hence it appears, that all our duties to others which 
 flow from natural relations, are duties of humanity, 
 which call for the exertion of the nobler faculties of the 
 human foul, for a conduct conformable to the will of 
 the Almighty, and becoming the dignity of our nature. 
 
 As their immediate object is all that may contribute 
 to the well-being and happinefs of mankind, fo are all 
 their injunctions uniformly calculated to excite the hu- 
 man heart to the practice of love and philanthropy. 
 Duties of humanity to others are therefore duties of 
 love: nay, this virtue is both their liim and bafis. Love 
 thy neighbour as thyfelf fays the heavenly precept ; 
 which is one of thofe principles of natural laws which, 
 among others, has obtained the particular finction of 
 the will of God, declared in his word, in order to im- 
 prefs our fouls both with the great importance and the 
 necerlity of a faithful performance, in all pofTible rela- 
 tions, where it is in our power, and where opportuni- 
 ties offer for exercifmg this great duty. In this extent 
 the term neighbour is taken in the revelation ; and the 
 divine word is juft in other terms enjoining what the 
 duties of humanity require, to wit, that we fhould 
 love all men; for how can we love God if we do not 
 love thofe who are the objects of his affection and 
 care ? 
 
 We muft, therefore, fed an interesting concern for 
 the happinefs of all men, delight therein, and fincerely 
 endeavour to promote it as much as pofTible -, for this 
 is the nature of true love, and one or the other of 
 thefe acts may take place in our conduct towards cur 
 fellow creatures, whofe fituations and relations are 
 fuch as render the performance of all of 'them im- 
 poflible or impracticable. It is here in particular 
 
 that 
 
l66 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that the diftincticn into love of affection, of coin- 
 placency and of communion fhould arreft our at- 
 tention-, for from our own abilities, which in many 
 refpects are limited to a very imall extent, as well as 
 from the various relations and fituations of others with 
 refpect to us, it would be impoflible to love all men, 
 if it were rcquifite that we mould lo?e them equally 
 and with the fame degree of concern and affection. To 
 take equal delight in perfons, to conform to their de- 
 iires and ways, our duties to God , and to ourfelves 
 ftrictly forbid. There are perfons, relations and fitua- 
 tions more immediately interefting to us than others : 
 we meet w r ith fentiments among our fellow creatures 
 more frequently contrary to than congenial with our 
 own : men differ vaflly in their conduct, and cafes fre- 
 quently occur, which create in us difguft. and merit our 
 difapprobation : there are fome who favour our defigns, 
 whilft others are unconcerned about our interefts, or 
 even opoofe them : both our acquaintance with perfons 
 and our general knowledge of individuals are very 
 much limited, whiht the greater part of our fellow 
 creatures remain to us utterly unknown. There is in- 
 deed no calculation to be made of the various modifi- 
 cations of the extenfive object of love-, and the con fe- 
 culence is, that love in every refpect muft be varioufly 
 modified. 
 
 Neither can' it be the defign of God that we mould 
 love all men with the fame degree of ardor and affec- 
 tion, or in the fame manner and to the fame extent, fince 
 he himfelf obferves a difference in the difpenfations of 
 his providence, and varioufly qualifies the children of 
 men for the refpective duties of life. All men have 
 the fame nature, but not the fame talents and gifts -, 
 
 all 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, l&f 
 
 ail are inhabitants of the earth, but not of the fame 
 climate and foil; all are liable to wants and infirmities, 
 but thefe are vailly diversified, as well with refpect to 
 their nature and extent as to their duration; all may 
 contribute to the happinefs of others, but not in the 
 fame way, degree and extent. 
 
 In fhort, talents and gifts, v/ants and fuperfluities, 
 Situations, opportunities, and other circumftances in life 
 are fo distributed among the individuals of the human 
 race, and all things fo ordered, that men may fupply 
 the wants, alleviate the fufTerings, and in a certain 
 fphere prove inlfrumental in promoting the felicity of 
 others. What our Situation and power cannot reach, 
 we may reach by our good wifhes; where no other 
 power by immediate good offices is left us befides this, 
 others may have both ability and opportunity to afTift 
 more effectually. We have to act our part and per- 
 form our duties faithfully as far as we are able; and 
 there is no doubt but our example will prove instru- 
 mental in exciting others to emulate our conduct :-*- 
 Thus, if every one is afTiduous in the exertion of his- 
 powers for the promotion of the intereft and happinefs 
 of others, love will be effectually extended to all, and 
 univerfal harmony will prevail. 
 
 How infeparably and how nearly has divine provi- 
 dence connected the interests of parents and children ! 
 How neceflary is dependence for mutual offices between 
 relatives, between the {cxts^ and thofe who, in the 
 Strict fenfe of the word, are neighbours ! for without 
 fuch provision made for life, its preservation and necef- 
 fary Support, human happinefs could not exirf. Love 
 and affection, attachments and intimacy there remit 
 from initinct, or are pamons of the human mind which 
 
 naturally 
 
I 68 MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 
 
 naturally arife from the nccefTary and unavoidable in- 
 tercourfe with one another, and dictate an affiduity to 
 pleafe, and produce mutual afllftance and reciprocal 
 offices To neceflary for the being and welfare of man- 
 kind. But let it be remembered, that they are frill 
 effects of natural inftinct or acquired habits, and only 
 fo far confident with human happinefs as their direction 
 and extent are Confident with that noble virtue which 
 the natural laws enjoin as the flrrt duty of humanity. 
 If parents truly love their children, their natural fond- 
 nefs mud often s;ive way to the exercife of parental au- 
 thority, wounding their tendernefs as much as it bears 
 hard upon the humours and caprices of children. In 
 one word, the duty of love is to be the directrix of all 
 the intimate ties of blood and affections,' as well as 
 every relation of life, however didant and rem6te : we 
 are not to accommodate ourfelves to the fentiments, 1 
 defires and expectations of others, except it be in cafes 
 where they agree with the dictates of natural laws, 
 where consequently compliance is in our power and 
 confident with our duties to God and to ourfelves : if 
 the contrary mould be the cafe, our love to others 
 enjoins, that we conduct ourfelves quite otherwise than 
 they may expect, that we even cuofs their deiigns and 
 incur their difpleafure. 
 
 Whatever, therefore, the relations of life and the 
 difpofitions and defires of our fellow creatures may bej 
 the duties of humanity enjoin true love towards them, 
 and require that we endeavour as much as poffible to 
 promote their true interefts, and thereby advance their 
 real felicity. 
 
 Little as inftinctive love, or habitual attachments 
 ariiing from familiarity or an -unavoidable intercourse 
 
 with 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 69 
 
 with others, ought to be taken for the excellent duty 
 of love, fo little does this virtue confift in that natural 
 tendernefs and fenfibility of heart, which, as it is 
 effected by a certain fhite of the nervous fyftem, pro- 
 ceeds from the conftitution of our body, and is known 
 by the term good nature. All that can be faid of either 
 of them, and more particularly of the Jail, is, that they 
 are only fo far innocent and falutary, as they are under 
 the- guidance of reafon, and directed by that fincere 
 defire to promote the happinefs of others wherein true 
 love confute. — Good nature may be particularly con- 
 sidered as a natural difpofition, exciting us to the exer- 
 cife of the duty of love to others, but is far from being 
 love in itfelf; for, independent of a poffibility that this 
 eafy difpofition is liable to impositions and miitakes, 
 and has frequently proved ruinous to its pofleflbrs and 
 others, it is very evident, from the principles of natural 
 law, that we have neither to depend upon the fenti- 
 ments and defires of others, nor upon our own feelings* 
 where our duty requires obedience to the laws of God 
 and a folicitude to take our motives from his holy per- 
 fections and ways towards the children of men. 
 
 Sch.i. — We ought to guard againfr. the childifh opinion fo 
 much in vogue in human intercourfe, by which all that 
 is agreeable to our notions and defires is taken for love, 
 and the oppofite thereof for difaffection or hatred. Thus 
 ftiameful neglect of duty, ruinous indulgence, flattery, 
 hypocrify, &c. meet with approbation and a welcome re- 
 ception ; whilft the reproofs, admonitions, Counfels, ex- 
 hortations and expoflulations of parents and friends pafs 
 for auflerity, ill-nature, difefteem, and want of affection. 
 ' Sc/i. 2. — Want of complaifance is a great fault in the human 
 character; but complaifance may be carried too far, and 
 prove to be the ruin both of 011 ndves and others. 
 
 If our own feelings have no controul over theexer- 
 cife of the duty pf love, it is evident that we muft even 
 
 Z love 
 
i'jO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 love our enemies; for, from the Jaw of nature and the 
 precepts of the gofpel as well as from the very nature of 
 love, it can be proved, that every thing which is good, 
 excellent and defi rable in itfelf, or wherein there is any 
 thing of this kind, is an object of our concern, defire 
 and aftection. Let us fuppofe perfons to be our 
 enemies, favages, barbarians, drunkards, profligate 
 meters; we cor.fefs there is no pofiibility to feel 
 complacency in their conduct; but frill we can and 
 ought to love their perfons; they are men, rational 
 creatures endowed with human nature, our fellow citi- 
 zens on earth, fellow fubjects of the fupreme govern- 
 ment of the Molt High: the fame laws which enjoin 
 unto us obedience to the will of God, in order to ob- 
 tain his favour and our own happinefs, impofe on them 
 the fame duties towards us that are required at our 
 hands towards them. 
 
 There are indeed many weighty caufes why we en- 
 tertain a greater affection for our nearer! relatives and 
 neighbours, for friends, and perfons of a virtuous con- 
 duct in life, for acquaintances, townfmen, countrymen, 
 &c. than we commonly feel, or can feel for ftrangers, 
 enemies, profligate or wicked characters: but there is 
 nctonejurt caufe why we mould hate or entirely with- 
 hold our love from the latter. If we are duly impref- 
 fed with an efteem for, the dignity of human nature, 
 we will regard it in others •, if we think it neceflary to 
 conduce ourfelves conformably to the will of God, we 
 will efTeem it as a duty to love all men. 
 
 From what has been hitherto explained, it is mani- 
 fest:, that love undergoes innumerable modifications, 
 keeping pace with the various relations, fituations, 
 cfifpofitions, tempers, qualities and modes of conduct 
 amonffft men. 
 
 In 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 17£ 
 
 In confequencc of thefe modifications, love is diftin- 
 guiflied into many virtues, the mod principal of which 
 are denoted by particular terms : love, When it embraces 
 the concerns of the whole human race, is called 
 lanthropy: a heart animated by this virtue wiihes well 
 to and thinks well of all men, and is amicably interefled 
 both in their profperity and adverfity. Philanthropy 
 has therefore for its concomitants the amiable virtues of 
 univerfal benevolence, charity and fympatby. 
 
 Acts of univerfal benevolence, exercifed to foreigners 
 and Grangers, who happen to come within the fphere 
 of our knowledge or agency, conftitutc hofpitaliiy* 
 
 Love to our country, that is, the virtue of 'pairiotifm y 
 not only enjoins, that we mould feel the'utmoft foii- 
 citude for the profperity, M^iy and prefervation of 
 the rights of our country againfc all external and in- 
 ternal violence and machinations, but alfo requires a 
 particular regard for the perfons and concerns of our 
 fellow citizens. How becoming are acts of friendship 
 to thofe who are our fellow citizens, connected with us 
 in one common intereir. ! Love here enjoins tlit duties 
 of civilitv. 
 
 Love, in thediftant relations of citizenfhip, enjoins, 
 according to different flates and circumiiances of life, 
 the various acts of friendmip and civility expreMcd by 
 the terms refpecl, eft cent, affability, regard, genercfily, 
 politenefs, meeknefs, lenity, complaifance> ccc. 
 
 In the nearer relations of acquaintance, the lair, men- 
 tioned duties ought to be performed with a frill higher 
 degree of affection and complacency, becaufe they 
 more nearly concern our intereft, and are highly necef- 
 fary for ilveetening and endearing that daily intercourie 
 which our relative fituation renders unavoidable. 
 
 Among 
 
iyz MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Among relatives and thofe who are the constituent 
 members of families, there ought to reign the highcfi 
 pofhhle affection, exercifed by the mod {metre fait bful- 
 nefs, an unalterable attachment, a particular iendernefs 
 and rational friendjbip. 
 
 Sen. — How fincere, prudent, faithful, &c. mould be the love of 
 parents to their children! How affectionate, grateful and 
 obedient fliould be children towards their parents ! What 
 ornaments are gentlenefs, moderation and reafonablenefs 
 to heads of families! How defirable are faithfulnefs and obe- 
 dience in thole who are under their command and care! 
 
 Human mifery calls for love of compaffwnm various 
 degrees, which is to be exercifed by acts of charity, 
 benevolence, humanity and philanthropy. 
 
 That profperity may attend the ways of our fellow 
 creatures* is the wifh of a heart filled with benevolence 
 and love-, we mould therefore feel fatisf action, and even 
 exult in the welfare and happinefs of another. 
 
 The virtuous and upright man ought to poilefs our 
 heart, be high in our efteem, meet with our countenance 
 and applaufe; whilft a friend deferves our confidence \ 
 a benefactor our fincereft gratitude. 
 
 The diforderly, the profligate, the wicked leave 
 room for pity and companion •, the enemy forforgivenefs, 
 forbearance, moderation: where there is no merit we 
 may exercise genercfity: perfons who have contracted 
 demerit and guilt, have yet a claim to our humanity, to 
 magnanimity, grace and mercy. 
 
 Nay, there is no ftate, no fituation, no relation in 
 life, where we mav not cxercife the duties of love and 
 humanity. 
 
 It is therefore criminal in us not to love our fellow- 
 creatures : it is an act of the greatest inhumanity to 
 hate them. 
 
 Hatred 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 7 J 
 
 Hatred is the oppofite of love, and confifls in envy- 
 ing our neighbour's happinefs, or endeavouring to 
 render his (late miferable. 
 
 As we fhould endeavour to love all men, Co it is our 
 duty to beware of envying or hating any perfon, or 
 of giving any occafion why they fhould envy or hate 
 us -, for, in either of thefe cafes we tranfgrefs the laws 
 of nature, and render our ftate unhappy. 
 
 Thofe who hate us are called our enemies: the crite- 
 rion of friendfhip is love. 
 
 It is a duty that we entertain friendfhip for all, and 
 be at enmity with none. 
 
 Friendfhip^ a proclivity to love others, is diflin- 
 guimed into internal and external. Internal friendfhip 
 confifts in an inward and fincere defire to render the 
 ftate of others happy ; external friendfhip comprehends 
 acts declarative of that intention. 
 
 Since it is our duty to love all men, it follows, that 
 we are under a mod facred obligation to exercife inter- 
 nal friendfhip to all, even to enemies and the moft 
 wicked and profligate perfons \ for they are men, and 
 therefore objects of our love. 
 
 But external friendfhip may often become both 
 phyfically and morally impofiible ; that is, acts decla- 
 rative of the friendly difpofition of our heart may not 
 be in our power, or may be contrary to our duty. 
 
 True and lafting friendfhip is one of the greateft 
 comforts of life, and is only to be expected among; 
 perfons of virtuous conduct and intentions. Powers 
 may fail to give fufficient vent to the tender fentiments 
 of the heart; but it never can be contrary to duty to 
 make z true friend a perfect confident, a partaker of 
 
 ail 
 
174 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 all our concerns, and to exercife towards him every act 
 of friend/hip in our power. 
 
 Among the various duties which are due to an ene- 
 my, remember this as particularly requisite, to endea- 
 vour, by all juft and lawful means, to fof ten his refent- 
 fnerifi that is, to caufe a high degree of his hatred to 
 become lefs ; for the greater his hatred and animofity 
 towards you, the more he will be determined to do all 
 he can to your detriment, the greater confequently is 
 your danger -, but by weakening his refentment the 
 danger will be diminished, and your ftate in. that refpect 
 rendered lefs imperfect. The fame argument likewife 
 proves the duty of making him your friend, as far as 
 It is in your power and confident with your duty. 
 
 External proofs of friendfhip confift principally m 
 hnding to others our aid and afiiftance : we aid and 
 afBft if, by our agency, another is caufed to obtain 
 his end. As it is our duty to befriend others, it 
 follows, that it is alfo a principal duty to aid and afliffc 
 them in ali cafes where our afiiftance is wanting and 
 where the end is lawful. Where afiiftance is not in 
 our power, we are jtiftificd in making excufes: where 
 thQ end propofed is unlawful, or where it may be at- 
 tained without our aid, there duty warrants a refufal ; 
 for it can never be our obligation to do a thing that is 
 unjuft or unneceffiry. 
 
 Sch. i. — He, therefore, who has it in his power to help himfelf, 
 has no reafonable claim to our aid and afliflance. 
 
 Sen. 2. — We may aid and a (lift in as many different ways as we 
 may become the moral caufe of the actions of others; for 
 in all anions whichtake place in confequence of our afiift- 
 ance, the effect is to be attributed to our will : by aiding 
 and atnfting, therefore, we claim merit in all good actions 
 done by others, and contract demerit in all that are of a 
 contrary nature. 
 
 A pro- 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 /'J 
 
 A proclivity of the mind to aid and aflift. others is 
 called benevolence in the rcUrielxd fenfe: actions decla- 
 rative of benevolence conftitute beneficence : the author 
 of fiich actions is filled benefatlor. 
 
 As benevolence is the foul of internal friendship, 
 fo beneficence is the effect of that which is external: 
 benevolence confequently is unlimited in its nature and 
 extent-, but with refpect to beneficence, it is requisite 
 that it be in cur power, and regulated by cur duty and 
 other circumftarxes. 
 
 To be the benefactor of mankind, is to be in a man- 
 ner to our fellow creatures what God is to the human 
 race. 
 
 Love to a benefactor is gratitude \ all motives for 
 love are therefore motives for gratitude, and each be- 
 nefit received mould imprefs the foul with grateful 
 fentiments, and engage us to exprefs them by fuitable 
 actions towards our benefactors. Ingratitude, want 
 of love, or hatred towards a benefactor, is beyond 
 expreffion horrid', inhuman and unnatural. 
 
 Sch. — It is therefore, a very humiliating fpectacle, manifesting 
 the great corruption of the human heart, when we fee men 
 ungrateful to their maker and preferver; children to their 
 parents; citizens ungratefully abufing the bleliings of 
 peace and of liberty, Sec. 
 
 Before we conclude this chapter, we think it necef- 
 fary to remind the reader, that what has been obferved 
 of friendfhip and benevolence, with refpect to the dif- 
 tinction of the internal fentiments of the mind from 
 the external acts declarative of them, holds good in 
 all other duties of love and humanity. A concern 
 for and an endeavour to promote the happinefs and 
 mitigate the fufferings and mifcry of others, we 
 
 can 
 
tj6 Moral philosophy/ 
 
 cm and ought always to feel; but it may not be in 
 our power, or it may be inconfiftent with our duty, 
 both in reflect of our fituation, and the particular cir- 
 cumftances wherein our neighbour is placed, or often 
 places himfelf by indifcreet and improper conduct, to 
 participate with him, and to aid and aliift him as we 
 might otherwife wifh. We cannot, for inftance, for- 
 give an injurer at the coft of a neighbour, or of our 
 country : we may not fhcw lenity where its effects 
 countenance vice. Parents, who truly love their chil- 
 dren, muft often wound their own feelings, and refort 
 to means of a difagreeable nature. God himfelf chaf- 
 teneth thofe whom heloveth. 
 
 It remains for us to fpeak of the means by which the 
 knowledge and practice of thefe duties maybe greatly 
 facilitated. With refpect to the former, it will not be 
 amifs to liilen to the voice of nature, to ftudy carefully 
 the natural principles of morality, to read thofe books 
 which treat of our duties in life ; but, as there is 
 not, and indeed cannot be a more pure and perfect 
 fyftem of morality than the go/pel, and as the duties 
 of chriilianity exhibited therein are thofe of huma- 
 nity, ftrengthened by the pureft and mod; powerful 
 motives, and fanctioned by the exprefs will and com- 
 mand of our divine Redeemer, we mould be highly 
 culpable if we were not folicitous to confult daily this 
 heavenly monitor, in order to learn with the greateft 
 pofftble conviction, what is cur duty in every circum- 
 ilance of life. There is not a more pure and perfect 
 pattern to copy after than the author of that gofpel, 
 the author and nnifher of our faith, who forgave his 
 moll: cruel enemies, and has (o loved mankind that 
 he has given himfelf for them. 
 
 He 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I yj 
 
 He has loved men more than himfelf, and com- 
 mands that we love our neighbour as ourfelves; that 
 we mould be ready and willing to do unto others as we 
 wifh they mould do unto us. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — We ought confequently to flunk well of our neigh- 
 bour, not to give an eafy ear to backbiters, nor counte- 
 nance the tongue of the flanderer : when truth and a con- 
 viction thereof forbid the exercife of univerfal benevo- 
 lence towards him, charity and fympathy command, that 
 our hearts feel forrow and regret. To delight in the faults 
 and in the wretchedncft of others, is a lure iign that true 
 love is yet a ftranger to the heart. 
 
 ScL 2. — We Ihould /peak well of our neighbour, acknowledge 
 his merits, honour his virtues: is his condufl fufch that 
 we muft ceafe to commend his actions, we ought to con- 
 fider the faireft fide of his character, and feel heartily Fprry 
 when we can no longer praife him. To commend and dif- 
 commend are things very different: a lovino- heart throws 
 a cloak over all faults, which no higher duty commands 
 to reveal; that which is deftitute of love fports' with the foi- 
 bles and faults of another. There is ho vice more inhuman 
 than Spreading the tale of actions, which, if done by our- 
 felves, we would wim buried in eternal oblivion; becaufe 
 truth is here frequently mingled with untruth: other in- 
 tentions are often fuggefted than were entertained by the 
 unfortunate author; foibles are made faults, and thefe are 
 again transformed into vices. Suppofe all were true 
 who is edified thereby? certainly no perfon : but fuch a 
 .Conduct is always attended with bad confequences: the 
 voice of calumny fteels the heart of the calumniator as 
 well as thofe who give him countenance againft that love 
 which we fhould have for all. Many temptations are 
 avoided by our thinking well of others; and thoufands 
 would not be thought or heard of, were it not for idlers, 
 who bufy themfelves abroad whilft they neglect their du- 
 ties at home: pretending an acquaintance with every per- 
 fon's ways, they remain Grangers, entire Grangers to their 
 own folly and their own hearts. 
 
 Sc/i. 3. — We fhould finally do all the good we can to advance 
 
 the comforts, the interefts and felicity of others, to fpread 
 
 the balm of confolation and extend relief as far as pcffible, 
 
 A a Thus 
 
178 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Thus our life will be a general blefling on earth, our con- 
 duct ornamental to fociety, whilft our nature attains to 
 the higheft excellency, a conformity to the will and ways 
 ©f God. 
 
 c 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the duties of necejfity. 
 
 E may neglect duties which we owe to others 
 ithei by not directing our powers, faculties, talents 
 and gifts for the advancement of their happinefs, 
 or by applying them to their detriment, hindering and 
 difturbing; them in the ufe and poflefTion of their 
 powers and faculties, by which they might promote 
 their own interefts. In either of thefe cafes we act 
 contrary to our duty, with this difference, that in the 
 former we fin againft the dictates of the imperfect laws 
 of nature, act inconfiftent with the imperfect rights of 
 our neighbour, and omit thofe acts by which we mould 
 endeavour to render his ftate more happy : in the latter, 
 we render his ftate more unhappy, tranfgrefs laws, 
 and act contrary to rights which are perfect. 
 
 An action done or omitted contrary to the imperfect 
 laws of nature, and repugnant to the imperfect rights 
 of our neighbour, we call a breach of duty ; that which 
 is contrary to perfect laws and rights, is an injury. 
 
 Sck 1. — The criterion of a perfon internally honeft and up- 
 right, humane and conscientious in his conduct, is, that 
 he guards as much againft a breach of duty as he is averfe 
 to Siting ah injury; for he acts principally from a fenfe 
 of his internal obligations, regulates his conduct conform- 
 ably 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. Ijg 
 
 ably to the dilates of perfect laws, and carefully regards 
 the precepts of thofe which are imperfect. 
 
 £ch. 2. — Not every omiffion of what is deemed a duty of hu- 
 manity is immediately to be conftrued into a breach of 
 duty; for innumerable cafes may occur, where a collilion 
 of duties fuperfedes the performance of thofe which are 
 not as highly obligatory as others with which they hap- 
 pen to clam. We may deny the poor charitable affifl:- 
 ance, when our houfnold ftands in need of thofe things 
 which are required for that afilitance. 
 
 $ch. 3. — In all cafes where duties of humanity to others clafli 
 with perfect duties, the latter fuperfede the former; for 
 perfect: duties proceed both from internal and external 
 motives; the obligation is therefore ftronger. Bv toegle&- 
 ing a duty of humanity, we tranfgrefs imperfect, but by 
 neglecting a duty of neceflilv, we fin both againfi: imper- 
 fect and perfect laws. 
 
 Add to thefe confiderations, that by neglecting a duty of 
 neceflity, we render ourfelves liable to force and violence, 
 which our neighbour has a perfect right to ufe; the con- 
 fequence is, that we render our Hate imperfect. 
 We may not lend money which is due to others : when it is 
 our duty to adminifter juftice, we may not take confider- 
 ations from the principles of humanity which might 
 counteract impartiality: we may not, in any refpect, do 
 evil that good may refu.lt therefrom. 
 Sch. 4. — As a (trict adherence to the duties of humanity on 
 our part may prevent the exercife of the perfect right of 
 which our neighbour is pofTefTed, fo a careful obfervance 
 of them is neceffary for exercifing perfect rights and per- 
 forming the duties of neceflity in the beft poffible manner. 
 We may claim our due in a rough or in a gentle manner. 
 We may exercife juftice impartially, though it be admi- 
 niflered with as little rigour as poffible. Where we can- 
 not lpare, we may feel and fhew pity and compaffion, &c. 
 
 If an action done or omitted contrary to perfect laws 
 and rights .is an injury, it is plain, that no perfon can 
 be injured except he be hindered and difturbed in 
 the ufe and poflefiion of his own; for it is only in this 
 that he can have a perfect right. .. 
 
 To 
 
I So MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 To prove that we have fuflained an injury by ano- 
 ther, we mult confirm two truths: fitft, that the 
 thing in which we pretend an injury to be fuflained 
 is our own \ fecondly, that we have been hindered in 
 the ufe and pofTefTion thereof by the agency of another. 
 
 Sch. — Every evil we fuffer from others cannot, therefore, be 
 confidered as an injury. 
 
 It is a perfect duty, that we do no injury to any per- 
 forty for perfect laws enjoin that we fhould not invade 
 the perfect rights of another. 
 
 Since we do not invade another's perfect rights if we 
 give him his own, it follows, that the duty which en- 
 joins us to do no injury to another, requires that we 
 give every one his own. . 
 
 We prevent an injury, if we make ufe of all lawful 
 means in oup power, fhort of violence and compulsion, 
 to difiuade others from hindering or disturbing us in the 
 ufe of our own : we are faid to repel an injury, if We re- 
 fort to force and violence for the purpofe of averting it. 
 
 Since it is a duty not to fufTer ourfelves to be hin- 
 dered or disturbed in what we have a perfect right to 
 direct for the promotion of our own felicity, it follows, 
 that it is a duty which we owe to ourfelves and others, 
 if pofiible to prevent, or, mould this fail, to repel an 
 injury. 
 
 Sch. i. — As the duties of humanity, of love and benevolence 
 dictate all poffible care for the prevention of injuries, fo a 
 itrict adherence to them, in all our conduct, will be the 
 belt mean to fecure us againil the fhafts of calumny and 
 other injurious attempts prejudicial to our life, property, 
 character, and good name. 
 
 Sch. i. — However proper thefe means may be, when we have 
 to do with perfons who are not deaf to the voice of reafon, 
 they ceafe to be means with thofe who are carried away 
 bv paflion, and are obdurate and infenfible to their duty; 
 
 for 
 
MORAL PHILGSOi'KY. 1 S' I 
 
 for they v.' ill not produce the propofcd end: force and 
 compulfion muft be retorted to, and exemfed to inch a 
 degree as will caufe the aggreflbr to delift from his inju- 
 rious intentions and conduct. 
 
 Sch. i. — The right of repelling an injury extends to fuch 
 means as are fufficient for fcVfcrtirtgitj thofe which are 
 more violent than is requifitc for that end, are improper 
 and unlawful. 
 
 The two proportions, do no injury, — give every one 
 bis ozvn^ may he confidered as the firft principles of all 
 perfect laws which regulate the conduct of men. 
 
 Things are cur own, either by nature, as life, foul, 
 body, our members, health and abfolute natural 
 tights* or by acquifition, as accomplishments of the 
 body and foul, honour, character, eftate, and all ac- 
 quired rights both in things and in perfons. There 
 are therefore various ways in which we may do or 
 fufFer an injury. 
 
 Hence it is, why civil laws diftinguifn them into va- 
 rious clafies, each of thefe into many kinds, and each 
 kind into different fpecies. Thefe clafles, kinds and 
 fpecies are formed into general and fpeciflc laws, under 
 which each injurious aftion is refpectively brought, in 
 order to determine the degree of its demerit, and the 
 manner in which remedies are to be applied, that the 
 injured may obtain juftice. 
 
 ScL — We need not therefore be furprifed at the multiplicity 
 of civil laws; nor ought we to give an ear to thofe who 
 difclaim either the practicability cr neccliity of reducing 
 laws to firft and invariable principles, and the ltudy of 
 them to fcientific rules. 
 
 There can be no injury conceivable, or it mull: ul- 
 timately proceed from a violation of both the afore- 
 mentioned principles of perfect laws. The following 
 
 two 
 
I 82 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 two infbtnces, which we fhall give of general laws de- 
 duced from them, will mew the eafy mode of deduc- 
 tion, and ferve to lead us to the knowledge of the Spi- 
 rituality of laws. 
 
 The law, " thou malt not kill," reduced to the 
 principle, " do no injury," is this general rule, do not 
 injure thy yieighboafs life. Whatever therefore is inju- 
 rious to the life or health of our neighbour, or endan- 
 gers either one or the other, is repugnant to the law, 
 " thou (halt not kill." 
 
 If we refer it to the principle, " give every one his 
 own," we find that it enjoins upon us a care for our 
 neighbour's life and health, and requires our protec- 
 tion and affiftance, if one or the other is in danger. 
 
 The lav/, " thou malt not fleal," referred to thofe 
 general principles, prohibits, on the one hand, all man- 
 ner of violence, hurt, damage, fraud, ccc. by which 
 our neighbour may fuffer injury in his property ; and, 
 on the other, enjoins, that we afford afllflance if it is 
 in danger, and make difcovery when we know it is 
 purloined, &c. 
 
 Sch. — There are, befides thefe confiderations, innumerable 
 modes in which injuries may be committed and fuftained: 
 in fome, an agent may act culpably, in others malicioudy. 
 Laws juftly make diftinftions not only with refpeft to 
 the nature and effects of injuries, but likewife to their 
 immorality, refulting from the intention of the injurer. 
 There is on this account a vaft difference made between 
 the punifliment of man-Oaughter and that of murder, &c. 
 
 By damages we underftand evils arifing from injuries. 
 
 Damages are diftinguifhed into immediate and medi- 
 ate \ the former are the immediate, thefe the more 
 diftant and remote effects of injuries. 
 
 Immediate 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I 83 
 
 Immediate damages are eafily perceived by the na- 
 tural effects which injuries produce at the time when, 
 they happen or are difcovered: for inftance, the forg- 
 ing or palling a falfe note, at the value of ten pounds, 
 caufes the receiver a lofs of ten pounds. 
 
 Mediate damages are the remote and general 
 confequences of an injury : for inftance, the ftealing a 
 horfe, feed, or plough, or an cflential part thereof, 
 particularly in a place or under circumftances where 
 the lofs cannot be immediately fupplied, is in its im- 
 mediate confequences not fo considerable as in thole 
 which are remote: confider, that the owner of the 
 horfe, of the feed, &c. cannot fow ; the confequences 
 will be, that he cannot reap, cannot fupport his family, 
 or ftand to other weighty engagements. 
 
 In civil fociety, great flrefs is to be laid upon the 
 confequences, to which actions lead, and which they 
 would produce mould they become general ; if forging 
 becomes common, no note will pafs ; if ftealing or de- 
 fertion become general, there is no fecurity for pro- 
 perty, no poflibility of defending the country. 
 
 ScL — Civil laws are therefore juftly fevere in punifhing ac- 
 tions which are dangerous in their remote and general 
 confequences. 
 
 To prove a damage, it is not fufficient to make it 
 evident -that another has been the author of an ac- 
 tion which has caufed us inconveniency or lofs ; but 
 we muft alfo make it appear, that the action com- 
 plained of is an injury. 
 
 The fame duty which enjoins us not to do injury 
 to any perfon, forbids doing damages. 
 
 We 
 
184 MORAL philosophy'. 
 
 We make reparation for injury or damage, if we 
 caufe the evil arifen therefrom to ceafe. 
 
 It is a perfect duty that we make reparation for in- 
 juries and damages-, for it is our duty to commit nei- 
 ther the one nor the other •, but as long as evils ariferi 
 and arifing from injuries are fujrered to remain, fo 
 long injuries continue, and .fo long we iin againft the 
 laws, " do no injury, — give every one his own." The 
 dictates therefore of natural law forbidding injury, and 
 enjoining us to give every one his own, likev/ife com- 
 mand the reparation of Injuries and damages. 
 
 Hence it follows, that reparation is to be made 
 according to the law, " give every one his own." 
 
 It is in two ways that this law may be fatisned ; ei- 
 ther by returning anothers own in kind, or, where 
 that is impofTible, by an equivalent. 
 
 If we give to the injured perfon his own in kind, 
 we are faid to make reftitution-, if we give him an 
 equivalent, we make fatisfaclion. 
 
 In all cafes where reititutiort is poflibie, fatisfacliorl 
 cannot pafs for full reparation, except it meet the con- 
 {cnt of the party aggrieved; for fatisfaclion is only a 
 fubftitute for reltitu tion, where, in the nature of things, 
 the latter is impoiTible. 
 
 Damages, for which no restitution or fatisfacliort 
 can be made, are faid to be irreparable-, thofe for 
 which either the one or the other can be made, are re- 
 parable. 
 
 Sch. 1. — To kill a parent is an irreparable damage to children; 
 fo the taking away theiife of a child is an irreparable lolk 
 to parents. To betray the virtue and innocence of per- 
 fons is a high crime, and the damages irreparable 1 
 
 Sch. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, I S§ 
 
 t 
 
 Sd. 2. — In the ftri&eft fignification of the term, and in eon? 
 
 fequence of the nature of things confidcred in themfelves, 
 nothing fliort of reftitution can be a reparation. Human, 
 laws may be fatisfied by lines and coniiderations of in- 
 tereit, but certainly not the laws of God : it cannot be 
 right that the wealthy mould fport with the rights of others^ 
 becaufe they poflefs advantages which others have not. 
 
 It is then a perfect duty, that we make reftitution 
 for injuries and damages if poilible ♦, if otherwife, we 
 muft make fatisfaction ; for we are bound to caufe the 
 evil arifen from injuries to ceafe. 
 
 The greater the damages are, the greater are the in- 
 juries from which they refult; for the degrees of the 
 material morality or immorality refult from the confe- 
 quences of moral actions. 
 
 Sch. — A thief who fteals a hundred pounds does a greater in- 
 jury than one who fteals a hundred cents, &c. 
 
 But there are alfo various degrees of heinoufnefs iri 
 injuries, where reference is had to the will and inten- 
 tion of the agent. 
 
 Sch.— One may injure inadvertently, culpably, or malicioiiny. 
 
 Damages, therefore, with refpect to the intention of 
 the agent, are diftinguifhed into cdfuah indireft^ and 
 direff. 
 
 Cafual damages are confequences not proceeding 
 from amoral caufe-, as, from lunatics, infant children^ 
 brutes, and inanimate things. 
 
 Indireti damages proceed from injuries which are_ 
 done culpably, by inattention, improvidency, precipi- 
 tancy, or careleflhefs : thus, damages done by lunatics* 
 madmen, children, brutes, and inanimate things, may- 
 become indirect with refpect to him who had the care 
 of either the one or the other of them, and who knew 
 
 B b their 
 
I 86 MORAL PHILOSOPHY." 
 
 their mifchievous difpofition or dangerous condition* 
 and did not ail in his power to prevent the evil confe- 
 quences. 
 
 Dzrefl damages are done deliberately, intentionally 
 and malicioufly, and are therefore peculiarly heinous, 
 according to the various degrees of malice. 
 
 As, therefore, cafual damages excufe from repara- 
 tion, and as indirect injuries, on the contrary, bind 
 thereto, it is plain, that in the cafe of direct injuries 
 and damages, befides reparation and fecurity, the laws 
 may order punimments according to the degrees of ma- 
 lignity in the conduct and intention of the injurer. 
 
 We have a perfect right to compel reparation, for 
 we have fuch a right to avert and repel injuries : but 
 injuries continue until reparation is made; the fame 
 right, therefore, which juftifies us in repelling an inju- 
 ry, warrants all neceflary means for forcing the injurer 
 to make reparation. 
 
 We are faid to remit our right, if we declare that 
 we will not exercife it. 
 
 Remittance of injury among private perfons is for- 
 givenefs' 9 forgivenefs proceeding from authority, with 
 refpect to private perfons, is pardon. Remiiiion of 
 right to demand and compel damages declared by go- 
 vernment, is known by the term amnefty. 
 
 As our rights are our own, we cannot injure a third 
 perfon by remitting or by lawfully exerciiing them. 
 
 If a third perfon fuffer damages in the lawful exercife 
 of our right, the injury and damage muft be charged 
 to him who has provoked the exercife of that right, 
 r.hat is to fay, to the injurer. 
 
 Sck, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. iS/ 
 
 $J lt I# — By caufing the imprifonment of a debtor, or compel- 
 ling payment, an innocent wife may lofe her patrimony, 
 innocent children their fupport, &c. 
 
 Sc/i. 2. — It is to be obferved, that he is not always the injurer 
 who firft makes ule of violence ; but he undoubtedly is, 
 who is the caufe and has unjuftly provoked the exercife 
 thereof. 
 
 That reparation is proportionate, in which no more is 
 demanded and exacted than is fufficient to caufe the 
 evil confequences of an injury to ccafe. 
 
 By exacting lefs, we fhow favour and generofity. 
 
 By ufing more violence than is neceflary for repara- 
 tion, we difturb another in the ufeand pofl'eflion of his 
 own without a jiift caufe-, the confequence is, that in 
 fuch cafes we commit injury and damage as far as our 
 exaction exceeds the damages fuftained. 
 
 ScL — In all acts of violence, however, allowances are to be 
 made, in favour of the profecutor, for accidental wafte 
 and warmth of refentment; becaufe both the natural and 
 unavoidable confequences of injuries muft be charged to 
 the author of them, not to him who is under the neceffity 
 of exercifing a difagreeable right. 
 
 Damages may be done by a number of perfons col- 
 lected together : in fuch cafes, how fhall reparation be 
 made ? The principles of nature dictate, that each 
 perfon is to pay his quota of damage, if he is able and 
 it can be ascertained. Where the quota of damage 
 done by each perfon cannot be afcertained, the whole 
 company, at lean; thofe who are able, are to make repa- 
 ration for the whole : if all are not known or unable, 
 thofe who are known and able muft ftand for the reft : 
 for, in thefe cafes, thofe who affociated in mifchief had 
 the choice of their company, at leaft all who had a hand 
 in it ought to have informed themfelves both with re- 
 
 fpect to perfons and circumftances. 
 
 Scfft 
 
X SB _ MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 Sch, — To take one for all, in cafes where all or a number of 
 them are both known and able to make full reparation for 
 injury, is a way of procedure not altogether confident 
 with the principles of natural equity. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the rights of defence and war. 
 
 ASIDES attual injuries and damages treated of 
 in the preceding chapter, there may be fuch as are 
 impending •, for in many cafes it would be both impru- 
 dent and unfafe to delay our right of repelling injuries 
 until they mould have actually taken place. We have 
 a right to enjoy our own in fecurity : a ftate of fear 
 and appreheniion of danger is fo far from being happy, 
 that it frequently renders us uneafy and miferable : we 
 may therefore be juftly faid to be injured, if another 
 fhews an inclination to difturb us in the ufe and pofTef- 
 iion of our own. Such an inclination fhewn, we call 
 an impending injury, and the evils arifing from it are 
 impending damages. 
 
 The greater the damages of an impending injury, 
 
 the greater is the injury. 
 
 Sch. — There is a vafi difference between the cafes, where one 
 meets us in a threatening pofture with a clenched fift, or 
 with fword or piftol in hand. 
 
 Pie who actually difcurbs us in the ufe of our own, 
 or fhews an inclination to do fo, is called an aggreffor ; 
 the act itfelf is ftiled an aggreffion ; and he againft whom 
 the injury is levelled or intended, is the party aggrieved 
 qt aggrejjed* 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 189 
 
 If we bring evils upon an aggreflbr with an intent 
 
 to flop the further progrefs of an actual, or to avert 
 
 an intended injury, we are faid to defend ourfelves. 
 
 Sch. — Here we underftand violent defence, where recourfe is 
 had to force and compulfory means ; not that where we 
 make life of arguments with tin intention to ward oft the 
 imputation of a fact laid to our charge. 
 
 Defence cannot be juft where there is not a juft 
 caufe-, for by doing violence to another without a juft 
 caufe, we unjuftly difturb him in the ufe and porTeffion. 
 of his own, and commit an injury, becaufe we act 
 contrary to the dictates of natural law. 
 
 Where there is neither actual nor impending injury, 
 there cannot be a juft caufe for defence. 
 
 We are faid to prevent an cggreffion, when we ufe 
 officious means, lawful in themfelves, but not violent 
 in their nature and confequences, for the purpofe of 
 inducing another not to entertain a defire or mew an 
 inclination to injure us or to become an aggreflbr. 
 
 Well founded arguments, proving thejuftice of our 
 conduct and intentions towards another, or fettino- in 
 a proper light the injuftice of the meafures purfued by 
 him, together with their fatal tendency to difturb our 
 peace and fecurity, may have great weight with thofe 
 who, open to conviction, are not intoxicated by paftion, 
 or carried away with haughtinefs and felfiih views of 
 ambition : but where juftice and truth are difregarded, 
 the beft mean for preventing aggrefnons is doubtlefs to 
 put ourfelves in a proper ftate of defence, and fhew 
 both vigilance and vigour in afTerting and maintaining 
 our jult rights. 
 
 It is more confident with the principles of humani- 
 ty, more fafe, and confoquently more politic, that we 
 
 endeavour 
 
I9O MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 endeavour to prevent an aggreflion, than purfue a 
 contrary conduct, by which we might be precipitated 
 into violent meafures. 
 
 The party aggrieved has a juft right of defence; 
 for he either fuflains an aggreflion or is under the fear 
 of one, and confequently in a ftate where he may law- 
 fully make ufe of forcible means either to ftop the pro- 
 grefs of an actual or to avert an impending injury. 
 
 We may not refort to the right of defence if no ag- 
 greffion has taken place-, that is, where there is no 
 actual or impending injury. 
 
 As certainty is very difficult to be attained in matters 
 of fad, particularly in cafes where the motives and in- 
 tentions of the agent are to be proved, it follows, that 
 the eftablifhment of an aggreflion with refpect to an 
 impending injury, muft necefTarily give occafion to 
 doubts and controversies •, for it is poflible, that an 
 impending injury may be certain or probable, or may 
 only be pretended. 
 
 With refpect to aggreffion, we have therefore to atr 
 tend to certain particulars, which, either in their nature 
 or by the cuftom and confent of mankind, carry with 
 them the criteria or the prognoftics of the intentions of 
 another perfon. If fuch particulars take place, there 
 is a poffibility of coming to as much certainty as the 
 nature of the thing admits of, and we may in that re- 
 fpect pofitively know whether an injury is intended 
 or not. 
 
 An open avowal of an inclination or deflgn to injure 
 or difturb us, leaves no doubt but that aggreflion has 
 already taken place •, and a difavowal does not in every 
 cafe amount to a proof that no injury is intended. 
 
 There 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ICjl 
 
 There may be circumftances particularly notable 
 with refpect to matters of fact, from which probable 
 conclufions can be drawn of the intention of the agent. 
 We may therefore form an idea of a probable right of 
 defence, which takes place when there is a concurrence 
 of notable circumftances, from which collectively wc 
 fee fufficient caufe to apprehend an aggreftion. 
 
 Sch. — Suppofe rival nations, of which the one is difcovered to 
 be bufy in exploring the coafts and harbours of the other, 
 being at the fame time deeply engaged in refitting its navy, 
 recruiting its army, building or repairing fortifications, 
 and making alliances; would not the other have caufe to 
 apprehend an aggreflion, and be juftifiable in taking mea- 
 fures for defence? 
 
 It ought, however, to be well obferved, that the 
 greateft probability may be falfe; many aggrefllons, 
 therefore, are only pretended, and defence is often 
 nothing but clandeftine injury and aggreflion, under 
 the mafk of a neceflary and lawful exercife of ajuft 
 right. 
 
 Sch. — Jealoufies, ambitious fchemes, fubterfuges, fo common . 
 in national governments, may blind the eyes of indivi- 
 duals or other nations, but cannot take away the injuftice 
 of their bloody meafures, nor their refponfibility to God. 
 
 He who juftly defends himfelf, exercifes his own 
 right-, he may caufe hurt to a third perfon, but cannot 
 be charged with damages, nor held to make reparation, 
 for this plain caufe, that in exercifing his own right he 
 does not commit an injury. 
 
 If, therefore, a third perfon fuffer hurt, it muft be 
 charged as a damage to the aggreflbr; for he is the 
 moral caufe of all the natural and unavoidable confe- 
 quences flowing from the juft exercife of the right of 
 defence. 
 
 The 
 
1 02 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The aggrefibr, therefore, is bound to make good all 
 damages fuftained by a third perfon from the juft ex- 
 ercife of the right of defence, for which he has given 
 caufe and provocation. 
 
 Sc/i. — We mull, however, well confider, that only fuch lofTes 
 and inconveniencies are chargeable to the aggrefibr, as 
 cannot be avoided in juftly exercifing the right of defence. 
 Making allowances, as we have already mentioned, for 
 unavoidable wafte, we muft charge the defender with all 
 that is done wantonly or unnecefiarily : in thefe cafes he 
 may have a juft right of defence, but he is far from ex- 
 ercifing it juftly. 
 
 Ke who hinders us in the juft exercife of the right 
 of defence, difturbs us in the ufe and pofleffion of our 
 own, commits an injury, and is bound to make repa- 
 ration. 
 
 The right of defence involves the right of prevent- 
 in g aggrelTion. We prevent aggreffion .by the fame 
 ■conduct and means by which injuries are prevented. 
 
 §ch. — Remember, that putting ourfelves into a proper ftate of 
 defence, is found to be one of the moft powerful argu- 
 ments for preventing infults and aggreffion. 
 
 Defence may be juft with refpect to its caufe, and 
 ftifl unjuft with regard to the mode in which it is con- 
 ducted. On the other hand, defence may be conducted 
 in a proper mode, &c. and ftill be unjuft with refpect 
 to its caufe. 
 
 $ c ) tt — Defence which has not a juft caufe, can never be ren- 
 dered juft, though it be conducted in the beft poffibfe 
 manner; for it is in itfelf an injury and an unlawful ag- 
 greffion. 
 
 With refpect to the juft mode of conducting defence, 
 we diftinguifh both means and the ufe of them into 
 lawful and unlawful. 
 
 Defence 
 
MOR.AL PHILOSOPHY. tt>3 
 
 Defence is juflly conducted, if the means are lawful 
 and lawfully ufed; for nothing can be juffc that is re- 
 pugnant to the dictates of natural law.. 
 
 Thofe means are lawful which are not unnatural m 
 themfelves, nor difproportionate to the purpofes of a 
 juft defence. 
 
 We call thofe means unnatural which are ihconfiflent 
 with the ends of jufl defence. 
 
 The ends of juft defence being feCurity and peace in 
 
 the ufe and pofierTion of our own, it follows, that fuch 
 
 means as render, among other things, life in the higheft, 
 
 degree infecure, are contradictory to the very nature of 
 
 defence, and are juflly called unnatural. 
 
 Sch. — Among the unnatural means of defence is afTaffinafiori, 
 poifoning and perjury; for, independent of the horrid in- 
 ternal malignity of fiich actions, there would be an end 
 to all fecurity and truft, as well as to a poffibility of mak- 
 ing ufe of the right of defence, if fuch practices Should 
 become general. As this moil certainly will be the cafe^ 
 if any one who has the right of defence, or pretends la 
 have it, might ufe fuch means, there would be no poffibi- 
 lity of preventing others from following the fatal example* 
 Indeed, no man's life would be fafe. 
 
 Means unlawful, becaufe they are difproporiionaie^ 
 are fuch as are calculated in themfelves to bring more 
 evils upon the aggreflbr than are neeefiary for averting 
 the aggreflion. 
 
 The proportion of means, or the contrary thereof, 
 
 mud be eftimated by the nature and circumftances 
 
 of the aggreflion; for inftance, a fword is a proper 
 
 mean of defence, if the ap-areffor invades us with a 
 
 weapon of that kind, but is far from being fo" againfl. 
 
 one who attacks us with his lift. 
 
 Sen. — It would be murder, not cfefencej if a perfon, thou 
 
 C c rrjuttly* 
 
194 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 unjuftly beaten, fliould rip up the entrails of the aggrefTor^ 
 as there is an evident difproportion between the aggreflion 
 and defence; the former caufes only hurt and pain, the 
 latter death. 
 
 Befides proportionate and lawful means, defence 
 mud: not be carried to excefs ; which is the cafe when 
 we bring more evils upon an injurer than are neceflary 
 for reparation and fecurity ; for as thefe are the ends 
 for which defence may be juftly exercifed, it follows, 
 that an extended profecution of that right is deftitute 
 of a juft caufe, and therefore ceafes to be a right. All 
 acts of violence thus extended beyond their juft limits, 
 become kwlefs aggreiilons. 
 
 It is therefore an important duty, that we undertake 
 no defence without a jure caufe. 
 
 It is likewife a duty, in exercifing the right of juft 
 defence, that we do not exceed its limits, by making 
 ufe of unlawful means, or carrying the ufe of fuch as 
 are lawful to excefs^ 
 
 Sch. i. — The principles of juftice, humanity and prudence re- 
 quire, in making ufe of the right of defence, that we d® 
 not dived ourfelves of internal friendfhip. 
 
 ScJi.2. — In forming an eftimate of our own conduct, we can- 
 not be too ftri6t, whilft that of a neighbour, even that of an 
 enemy, has a claim to our charity. In all cafes of defence 
 proceeding from a juft caufe, we ought to make allow- 
 ances, and confider, not fo much what the real danger of 
 the defender has been, as what he himfelf conceived it to 
 be. There may be inftances where paffion has had the 
 better of judgment, and confequently defence is carried 
 too far; but is it not in fome meafure owing to the aggrcf- 
 for, that the defender has been put into fuch a Hate? 
 
 A defender tranfgreffing the limits of juft defence, 
 becomes an aggreflbr as far as he brings unneceilary 
 evils upon his adverfary, or more than are fufneient for 
 
 his 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 J 9: 
 
 his own reparation and fecurity. In this cafe, there- 
 fore, he is bound to make amends for fuch an excefs 
 of unlawful violence. 
 
 A perfon may remit his right of defence, for it is 
 his own. 
 
 On that very account he cannot be compelled to de- 
 fend himfelf. 
 
 Sch. i. — It is to be obferved, that we treat here of thofe rights 
 and duties which individuals might exercife, and would 
 be held to obferve amongft, one another in the abfolute 
 focial flate, where they are confidered as fellow men, and 
 where each is in the pofTeffion of all his natural rights, and 
 entitled to their full exercife. 
 
 Sch. 2 — When, on the contrary, men are confidered in a ftate 
 of civil fqciety, where natural rights, and amongft them 
 the rights of defence and war, and more efpecially the ex- 
 ercife of them, is in a greater or lefs degree lodged with 
 the government of that fociety; it is evident, that thefe 
 natural rights mull: undergo many modifications. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Citizens may remit or exercife all thofe natural rights 
 which are not delegated, and as far as the exercife of thpm 
 is not lodged in the hands of government. 
 
 Sch. 4.— Government, on the other hand, has the difpofal of 
 the exercife of the delegated rights of citizens, as far as 
 that exercife is delegated ; it may remit and pardon, where 
 civil duty points out to citizens the way of interceffion. 
 
 Sch. 5. — As individuals muft exercife the right of remiffion, 
 or of profecution of defence in conformity to dutv, fo 
 government may not exercife arbitrary power in that re- 
 fpe£t, iince it is a duty incumbent upon it to ufe all dele- 
 gated rights for the welfare and fecurity of civil focietv 
 in general. 
 
 A remiflion of the right of defence becomes our duty 
 when it produces greater and more univerfal felicity 
 than would refult from a ftridl profecution thereof. 
 
 But it cannot be lawful, at leaft in the forum of con- 
 fcience, if fuch remiffion has a bad tendency, or pro- 
 duces- 
 
1£,6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 duces bad effects, or if it proceeds from finifler mo* 
 rives, or endangers the fecurity of others. 
 
 Sch. i. — As the general confequences of the exercife of the 
 rights of defence and war among; individuals would render 
 a ftate of fociety either impoffible, or at leaft extremely 
 unhappy, we fee the great canfe why thofe rights are to a 
 certain extent very wiiely lodged in the hands of govern- 
 ment, and the exercife of them intrufted to its care. 
 
 Sfh. 2. — It is for the fame reafon, that a remiffion of the right 
 of defence, in cafes where the good of fociety is at (lake, 
 cannot remain at the difpofal of individuals. If each man 
 has a right to withdraw himfelf from the defence of his 
 country when he pleafes, fociety cannot fubfift. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Whilft we conclude, from thefe and other weighty 
 principles, that no member of civil fociety can have a 
 folid objection to an exercife of the right of repelling 
 force by force, particularly when that exercife is necelTary 
 for the affiftance of our fellow citizens and the preferva- 
 tion of the public good of our country; we think it 
 commendable in government to mitigate its public right 
 with refpeel to perfous who pretend fcruples of con- 
 icience, io far as is confident with public good. 
 
 pfk. 4.— Should lenity clafh with public good, there is no 
 doubt but that the latter fhould fuperfede all other confide- 
 rations. Upon the whole, if perfons have a claim upon 
 the humanity of government, it is very obvious that the 
 latter can in no wife condpfcend to any thing lefs than a 
 reasonable equivalent. 
 
 Violent defence is fo near akin to war, that nothing 
 more is required for conitituting the latter, than that 
 the former become reciprocal. 
 
 War may be defined to be that {late, where men 
 reciprocally refort to the right of defence, committing 
 violence again ft one another, determined to repel force 
 <by force. 
 
 The oppofite of war is peace. Peace, therefore, 
 rnay be defined to be that deferable ftate where no re- 
 ciprocal 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. l$f 
 
 ciprocal injury has taken place*, where men do not look 
 
 upon one another as aggreiTors, and confequently ab- 
 
 ifoiin froin acts of reciprocal violence. 
 
 Sth. i.-— According to thefe feveral definitions of peace, it is 
 manifeft, that thofe have the beft profpect of enjoying its 
 bleffmgs, who carefully refrain from acts of injury, and 
 are confcientioufly fcrupulous of giving every one his 
 due • for fuch conduct leaves not even a pretence for 
 committing an act of violence. 
 
 Sch. z. — As perfection in human affairs cannot be expected, 
 and as the beft difpofed neighbour may commit an act 
 injurious to another, ftill, even in this cafe, a perfon fet- 
 ting a proper value upon peace will rather fubmit to the 
 juft right of the injured, than refill, and thus render vio- 
 lence reciprocal. 
 
 §:h. 3. — Confidering the imperfections of human nature, and 
 the various temptations furrounding men in their inter- 
 courfe with one another, it is not to be wondered at that 
 injuries take place; but, as men are prone to aggreflion, 
 is it not a matter of furprife that they are unwilling to 
 make conceffions, or even reparation? JNfotwithftanding 
 the frailties of nature and the great variety of interefts 
 and fentiments in fociety, peace and harmony might ftill 
 prevail, and human intercourfe more frequently prefent 
 us with the pleafant fight of beholding brethren in unity, 
 if a folicitude to prevent or immediately to repair injuries 
 fhould become general among the children of men : all 
 caufe for war would thus be done away. 
 
 ScL 4.- — War amongft brethren is a thing in itfelf fo horrid, 
 and its confequences fo dreadful, that even a remiflion of 
 our right, when confident with higher duties, is not too 
 great a facrifice, if peace may thereby be cultivated and 
 prefer ved, 
 
 Scfi. 5. — This being the cafe, how careful mould we be, when 
 higher obligations make the exercife of our right of de- 
 fence neceffary, to ufe it with all poffible prudence and 
 moderation, and to guard againft the bias of pafiion, left 
 we become guilty of carrying defence beyond its juft li- 
 mits, and thereby give caufe for refiftance, and provoke 
 war, which both duty and intereft require us to avoid as- 
 much and as long as pciSble. 
 
 " F Set. 
 
%Q% 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. 6. — We need only fubftitute, in the definitions of peace 
 and of war, the term nations for that of men, in order to 
 have an adequate idea of public peace, the greater! na- 
 tional bleffing on earth, and of public war, the greateft 
 calamity that can befai a nation. Public peace may be 
 defined to be that ftate among nations, where there is 
 neither actual aggreffion nor real danger of an intended 
 one: public war, on. the contrary, takes place when na- 
 tions diftrefs and reciprocally commit violence againft 
 one another. 
 
 $ch. 7. — Although we may not here enlarge on the public rights 
 of peace and of war amongft ftjtes and nations, a fubject 
 which is referved for another part of this treatife, yet it 
 ought to be obferved, that all that has been or may be faid 
 with refpect to the juft exercife of perfect rights, of re- 
 paration, defence and war, between individuals, is the 
 very bafis and foundation of what is right or wrong in the 
 conduct of focieties, ftates and nations, in their inter- 
 courfe with one another. We allow that there is a great 
 and very material difference between public and private 
 concerns, with refpect to confequences, effects and ex- 
 tent; but there cannot be any formal or internal difference 
 with regard either to juftifving the caufe for beginning, 
 or the juft mode of conducting acts of violence and com- 
 pulilon; becaufe nations are men, and as fuch are in the 
 fame natural relation in which individuals are placed, to 
 wit, fellow-citizens of the earth, fubject to the fame go- 
 vernment of the Moft High, and equally bound to obey 
 his majeftic commands. The fame rights may therefore 
 be exercifed by nations in a ftate of aggreffion and hofti- 
 htv, which the principles of nature point out as the pro- 
 per line of conduct for individuals; and the fame duties 
 are to be obferved by nations, which individuals have to 
 perform in confiftency with the laws of nature, jufticc 
 and equity. 
 In order, therefore, to learn with precision what conduct 
 public bodies of men mould obferve towards one another, 
 in cafe of injury, aggreffion and iniecurity, we muft care- 
 fully examine the rights of individuals in fuch ftates. 
 
 jjkfc; 8. — It is true, in the prefent ftate of things men may very 
 feldom be conn'dered in their abfolute focial ftate, as they 
 are generally members of fociety, and as fuch have tranfr 
 
 ferreg 1 , 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, I99 
 
 ferred, in fome degree or other, their rights of reparation, 
 defence and war, particularly the exercife of them, to the 
 direction of government. But if thefe rights are to be 
 exercifed, they muft be known ; for without this, both 
 citizens are ignorant of what they have to expect from 
 government, and government is unable juftly to conduct 
 the exercife of rights which are unknown and undeter- 
 mined. 
 
 Sch. 9.— As citizens have now to exercife their natural rights' 
 of reparation, defence and war, by the laws and directions 
 of government, it is evident, that fuits and actions are 
 fubftituted for the natural mode of exercifing thofe rights. 
 Hence the neceffity of good, falutary and energetic laws; 
 and of a faithful and impartial adminiftration of them, 
 in order to afford citizens that protection and fecurity to 
 which they have a natural right. 
 
 , Sch. 10. — -Laws which have that tendency and effect, are 
 worthy of the higheft efteem, and a juft adminiftration of 
 them is a public bleffing. An obiequious compliance 
 with their precepts and prohibitions, as it conftitutes one 
 of the moft excellent traits in the character of a good 
 citizen, fo it is the bell poffible mode for the exercife of 
 thofe perfect rights with which citizens are invefted. 
 
 There is fuch a thing as the right of making war; 
 for we have a right to repel an unjuft aggrerTion, in or- 
 der to live in peace and fecurity. This right cannot be 
 defeated by the lawlefs reiifcance of an aggrefTor: if this 
 were the cafe, there would be no moral poflibility of 
 directing things which are our own for the attainment 
 of our felicity : but fince it has been proved, that this 
 would be contrary to the firil principle of natural laws, 
 it follows, that we have not only a right to make a 
 juft war, but that it is even our duty in every cafe 
 where avoiding it would interrupt our felicity or be 
 contradictory to our happinefs. 
 
 Between the right of peace and that of war there is 
 this difference, that the former is abibhitely natural, 
 
 the 
 
200 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the other, on the contrary, hypothetically fo. It is 
 evident from our own nature and the natural order of 
 things, that we mould enjoy our own undifturbed by 
 any other mortal. But the right of war prefuppofes a 
 Fad, to wit, interference and disturbance by another in 
 thofc things which are at our free difpofal for the end 
 of our exigence, our own happinefs and that of others, 
 and for the glory of our Maker. 
 
 The ftate of nature, confidered in itfelf, is therefore 
 not a ftate of war, but of peace. 
 
 Sck,— Rights of peace and war are taken in different fignifica- 
 tions : fomelimes, as is the cafe here, they are taken for 
 qualities in perfons ; when, on the other hand, they fre- 
 quently denote thofe rules for conducing the affairs of 
 peace or war which refult from the precepts and prohibi- 
 tions of the law of nature, or reft upon ufages which have 
 obtained the force of laws. 
 
 From the nature of the rights of peace and war it is 
 evident, that no right of war can take place without 
 previous diflurbance in what is our own; for there 
 cannot be a right to commit violence where there is no 
 injury. 
 
 That war hjuft which has a juft. caufe and is juftly 
 conducted : war, on the contrary, is unjuft, when it is 
 deltitute of a juft caufe and conducted in an unjuft 
 manner, or protracted to an unlawful extent. 
 
 A juft war, which really proceeds from a difturbance, 
 may become unjuft with refpect to the mode, manner 
 and extent of its being; conducted. 
 
 An unjuft war may be juftly conducted, but being 
 founded on an unjuft caufe, can never become juft. 
 
 Scfit i. — Wars without a juft caufe are, in the fight of natural 
 jaws, nothing but methodical robberies. 
 
 Sck. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 201 
 
 Sch. 2. — Suafory caufes, dilated by ambition, felf-intereft, a 
 defire of fame, for the purpofe^of conqueft, &c. are far 
 from juftifiable. 
 
 Sch. 3. — The pretence of placing nations in a better ftate with 
 refpe£t to religion or civil liberty, is i'o far from being a 
 juft caufe for war, that it is barefaced tyranny under the 
 garb of fcandalous hypocrrfy. 
 
 Since aggreflion only can be a juft caufe for war, it 
 follows, that perfons or nations, before they undertake 
 war, ought to be convinced of this point, left they fport 
 with the rights of man, tranfgrefs the natural laws, and 
 become the difturbers of fociety, — hateful to their fel- 
 low creatures, and abominable in the fight of God. 
 
 Thofe who are at war being called hoftile enemies* 
 it follows, that this term is applicable to the aggrefted 
 as well as the aggreftbr, as foon as acts of hoftility are 
 committed. 
 
 Sch. 1. — In the fequel we underfland by the term enemy fuch 
 an one as is hoftile. 
 
 Sch. 2.— Hence it follows, that from another's not committing 
 acts of hoftility againft us, we cannot fafely conclude that 
 he is our friend or well-wiiher. 
 
 Sch. 3. — With refpect to local fituation, there is no fuch thing 
 as natural enemies : if nations or men are fo placed that 
 they may eafily interfere with each other, a good under- 
 ftanding ought to be earneftly and affiduoufly cultivated 
 between them. 
 
 The diftinction of war into defenfive and offensive, 
 may be referred to the caufe as well as to the operations 
 of a war: with refpect to the former, he who is the 
 aggreflbr, that is to fay, who is the moral caufe of the 
 injury, whether he begins or provokes hoftility, carries 
 on an offenfive war : the party aggrieved, on the con- 
 trary, is on the defenfive, whether acts of hoftility be- 
 gin with him or with the adverfary. But, when refe- 
 
 D d rence 
 
202 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 rence is had to operations, he who invades is faid to 
 carry on an ofFenfive war, and the invaded is faid to be 
 pn the defenfive. 
 
 Sch. i.*— In the nrft fignincation of the terms, offenfive war is 
 unjuft, whether the operations be offenfive or defenfive. 
 
 Sch. i. — According to the fecond acceptation of the terms, an 
 offenfive war may be juft and a defenfive unjuft, and 
 vice verfa. 
 
 Sch. 3. — With refpecl to the general conduct of a war, the 
 operations are liable to change: he who invades to-day 
 may be invaded to-morrow ; an offenfive war may there- 
 fore become defenfive, and vice verfa. 
 
 It is our duty to cultivate peace as long as poffible ; 
 for it is our duty to injure no perfon. By avoiding the 
 commiffion of injury and acts of aggreflion, we avoid 
 giving caufe for war: by avoiding caufes we avoid 
 their effects. If, therefore, we are careful to do no 
 injury, and to give others their due, we do all that is 
 requifite for avoiding war. But as by this care and fo- 
 licitude we are faid to cultivate peace, it follows, not 
 only that this is a great duty incumbent upon all, but 
 alfo, that cultivating peace as long as pofiible is the 
 fureft means to avoid being involved in ruinous war. 
 
 Suppofe, which may be the cafe, that fuch a peace- 
 able conduct: cannot fecure us againft ambition, male- 
 volence, and acts of injuftice •, what is then to be done ? 
 The duties of humanity dictate forbearance as long as 
 It is morally pofiible ; but when fubmiffion to acts of 
 inhumanity and injuftice dailies with higher duties, 
 which we owe to God, to ourfelves, to our houfhold 
 and to others •, if it becomes injurious to the peace and 
 fecurity of fociety *, if the caufe of juftice mould there- 
 by fuffer, whilft the caufe of injuftice is fupported*, 
 then indeed it is not optional with us, whether we will 
 
 defend 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 203 
 
 defend our rights, or bafely furrender them. It is our 
 duty to refill. 
 
 He who wifhes us ill, that is, one who is an enemy 
 in the general fenfe of the term, if not prevented, will 
 naturally become hoftile. If we cannot, therefore, 
 foften him by our beft endeavours to cultivate peace, 
 our own fafety makes it a duty for us to endeavour, by 
 all lawful means, to prevent him from commencing 
 acts of hoflility, by laying fuch obftacles in his way 
 as will deter him from fuch a refolution. 
 
 As fear is found to have a powerful influence on the 
 human mind, ' even affecting thofe who are deaf to the 
 voice of reafon and humanity, and too obdurate to be 
 fenfibly affected by the noble principle of love, it fol- 
 lows, that we muft think of means calculated to ftrike 
 him with fear, or keep him under apprehenfion of the 
 dangerous confequences which may refult from his at- 
 tempting acts of violence. 
 
 There is no doubt but his apprehenfions will be fuch, 
 if he fees that our power is equal or fuperior to his own : 
 we ought therefore to put ourfelves into a proper ftate 
 of defence. 
 
 If it becomes a duty, under certain circumftances, to 
 endeavour to gain over to our intereft many and power- 
 ful friends, it will be particularly requifite, that we 
 proceed with the greater!: pofTible circumfpection, mo- 
 deration and delicacy, left we give provocation, and 
 by fuch conduct excite our enemy to acts of hoftility, 
 which might be warranted by his right of defence ; for 
 by going too great lengths, we juftify fufpicion con- 
 cerning our difpofition, and thus give a juft caufe for 
 defence and war. 
 
 ScL 
 
204 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. i. — We need only make the enemy's cafe our own, in 
 order to be convinced of the juftice and propriety of the 
 foregoing obfervations. 
 
 Sch. 2. — As thefe things have a particular reference to national 
 affairs, they may ferve to throw light upon many political 
 maxims obferved among the nations of the earth. 
 
 Since injury is the fole caufe of war, it follows, that 
 no war may be profecuted to an improper length, 
 though it is even founded on juft principles; for if 
 actual injury ceafes, if the impending aggrelTion is 
 averted, if there is no invaiion to be dreaded, there is 
 not one justifying caufe for the commilTion of an act of 
 violence or hoftility : but where there is no caufe for 
 ads of hoftility and violence, there a ftate of peace and 
 fecurity exifts : confequently no war can be carried on 
 juftly, if the aggrefTed can obtain fuch terms of peace as 
 will fecure reparation and fafety. 
 
 Sck. i. — The right of war, where the aggrefTed has to propofe 
 the terms of peace, is therefore naturally limited. But 
 fuppofe theaggrefTor is victorious, fo that the injured can- 
 not obtain terms calculated to make reparation, but muft 
 rifk his fafety and fecurity to the highefl degree, if he does 
 not fubmit to the terms propofed by the victor: in this 
 cafe, is the right of war on the defender's fide alfo limited? 
 We anfwer in the affirmative; for what is phvfically im- 
 pofiible leaves us under an unavoidable alternative, and 
 impofes the duty to chufe of two evils the leaft. 
 
 Sch. z. — In cafe the party who has juftice on his fide confents 
 to the terms of pacification propofed, he is held ftrictly 
 to obferve them as long as the other party faithfully keeps 
 within the bounds of that pacification. 
 No infidious ambiguities, but candour and honefty fhould 
 dictate the terms of peace, and a ftrict adherence to juftice 
 infure the obfervance thereof. Where reparation and 
 reftiiurion cannot take place, there is room for amnefty ; 
 and an act of amnefty is to be held facred, as we ourfelves 
 have thereby gained fecurity and peace. 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 205 
 
 CHAPTER VI i 
 
 Of the duties of fpeech. 
 
 JL RUTH, the principal object of the duties of 
 fpeech, is in its nature harmony and confirrency, which 
 are co-eternal with the internal pofTibility of the ef- 
 fences of things : its effects are order, beauty, con- 
 nedtion, and mutual dependence, in all that exifls : its 
 tendency is moral excellency, and its object the com- 
 pafs of all that can render life happy, fupport us under 
 the vicifTitudes of time and chance, and bear up the 
 foul with the fure hope of immortality. 
 
 It is diftinguifhed into metaphyseal, logical, and 
 
 moral \ or, in other terms, into the truth of things, 
 
 of words, and of thoughts. 
 
 Sc/i. — Metaphyseal truth may alfo be called ejjentlal; that 
 which is here itiled logical, is more generally known by 
 the appellation of real. 
 
 All evidence of truth, of whatever kind it may be, 
 ultimately depends upon thefe two infallible criteria, 
 or felf-evident principles : 
 
 i . It is impojjible that a thing be and be not at the 
 fame time and under the fame circumftances. 
 
 2. Whatever is either poffible, exiftent, or conceivable 
 in the mind, mufi have a f efficient caufe for being fo and 
 not otherwife. 
 
 Sch. — It is true, the fecond of thefe principles bears not im- 
 mediately that incontrovertible evidence which the former 
 cannot fail to produce; but it may be deemed felf-evident, 
 becaufe it is, as it were, the immediate confequence of 
 
 that 
 
2C6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that firft principle of all human knowledge. Suppofe 
 but for a moment a thing of any description whatever to 
 be without a Sufficient caufe; would it not follow, that it 
 might be and not be at the fame time? The perfon, there- 
 fore, who, from the circumftance that we cannot plainly 
 perceive the caufes of lb me things, mould conclude that 
 they are deflitute of a fuificient caufe or caufes, would 
 fall into the fame abfurdity with him who afTerts that a 
 thing is and is not what it really is, that black is ivhite, or 
 that day is night y &c. 
 
 Hence we lay down thefe proportions as infallible 
 maxims, and as lure criteria for diflinguiihing truth 
 from fal/hood: — That which is contrary to thefe and 
 other felf-evident principles of human knowledge, is 
 falfe, impoflible and abfurd ; that, on the contrary, 
 which evidently flows from them, is poffible and true. 
 
 Things are faid to be ejjentially or met aphyfiic ally true, 
 if their predicates are confident with their efTences: 
 thus, it is efientially true that God exifts, that he has 
 created the world, that he is almighty, omniprefent, 
 omnifcient, infinite in power, wifdom, juftice, goodnefs, 
 &c- for theie predicates are confident with the erTence 
 cf an infinite being. But it is metaphysically falfe, 
 that the world exiiis of itfelf, that fin is a thing indif- 
 ferent, that the ungodly can be happy ; for thefe pre- 
 dicates are contradictory to the eflence of the v/orld, to 
 the nature of fin and ungodlinefs, and to the perfec- 
 tions of the Deity. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — Metaphyfical truth is unchangeable, and co-eternal 
 with the efTences of things. The eflence of the infinite 
 being includes necefiary exigence; but the efTences of all 
 finite beings have been metaphyfically true before they 
 have exifted; nay, fuch efTences are true as never lhall 
 exift. Eut let not this be an objection to the necefiity of 
 a careful invefcigation of metaphyfical truth: we have 
 gained a great deal if we have an adequate idea thereof: 
 it is a fhield againfl innumerable errors, deceptions and 
 
 dclufions. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 20J 
 
 tkiuiibns. There are things which are true, though we 
 are unable to attain a diirinct knowledge of them: foul 
 and body co-operate with one another; the loadftone at- 
 tracts iron ; there is a ftate of future blifs and glory, &c. 
 though the nature of that co-operation, attraction, hap- 
 pinefs, &c. cannot be fully comprehended. What our 
 faculties cannot reach, other beings may fee clearly ; what 
 is now hidden from our appreheniion, we may hereafter 
 comprehend with full perfpicuity. 
 
 If metaphyseal truth had been properly attended to, we 
 (hould net have a continual war againft feeptjeifm and 
 unbelief: a thoufand tales and ftories would never have 
 found credit: the itcries of fpirits appearing, of ftatucs 
 or ftone, of wood, &c. performing human or fupernatural 
 actions, &c. would never have met with patronage among 
 the children of men. 
 
 We have onlv to bring things to the teft of the afore-rnen- 
 tioned principles, in order to fee whether they are beyond 
 the reach of reafon, or contradictory to it. Whiift thip£? 
 of the former kind are objects of faith, truth commands 
 us to reject the latter as incredible, impoffible and abfurd, 
 though the higheft authority of men mould join in 
 patronage and fupport. Where we cannot clearly difco- 
 ver the nature of the relation of things to the above prin- 
 ciples, there is caufe why we fnould fufpend our judg- 
 ment rather than imprudently precipitate ourfelves into 
 errors and miftakes. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — All works of fancy, epic poetry, the drama, romance?, 
 fables, ~"&c. are to reft upon metaphyseal truth, in order 
 to preferve that probability and propriety which are ef- 
 fentially neceflary for pieaiing the fancy and entertaining 
 the imagination, in which the principal merit of the^a 
 kinds of performances con lifts. Thus Homer, fufferiuor 
 his heroes to come into difficulties too arduous and intri- 
 cate to be removed by human wifdom and ftremnh, in- 
 troduces his fabulous deities, in order to reconcile the 
 mind of the reader to his fictitious narrations. 
 
 Truth of words, or real truth, has reference to things 
 WhicK exit!', and is the confiftcncy of our ideas, or words, 
 with the tilings themfelves, their qualities, properties, 
 
 relations, 
 
208 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 relations, and the particular modes of their exigence; 
 for jnftance, if we judge or call that gold which is really 
 fo; if we reprefent that as good and excellent which in 
 its nature and tendency has a beneficial influence on 
 human happinefs. The contrary of real or logical 
 truth is logical falfijood; for inflance, if brafs be taken 
 for gold, things of pernicious tendency for good and 
 excellent, &c. 
 
 Nothing is of higher importance to mankind, nor 
 any object more worthy the diligent refearches of the 
 human mind, than logical truth. We fcan heaven, 
 analyfe the component parts of bodies, of matter, 
 air, &c. in order to inveftigate things as they are, and 
 to acquaint ourfelves with the falutary or pernicious 
 effects of their properties. Without knowing the 
 real truth of things, uncertainty would hold its difmal 
 reign, mutual truft and confidence would find no 
 place, juftice could not be adminiftered ; the voice of 
 inftruction, of animation, of confolation, could not be 
 heard; morality would remain flothful indifference, 
 hope would be impofiible, and there would be no prof- 
 peel: of felicity •, nay, there would be no fecurity for our 
 life and health, as wholefome food could not be difcerned 
 from that which is pernicious and poifonous. In fhort, 
 without the knowledge of the real nature and properties 
 of things, human intercourfe would be, like the earth 
 without the enlightening beams of the fun and the re- 
 flected light of the heavenly luminaries, chaos and 
 confufion ! 
 
 Sch. — He who difcovers a new truth, beneficial to fociety, 
 merits well of mankind, and deferves to be held in high 
 eftimation, more lb, perhaps, than a difcoverer of new 
 couritrii 
 
 The 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 20£ 
 
 The real truth, like hidden treafure, is often diffi- 
 cult to be come at ; but, notwithftanding this, it is 
 attainable in many things which are necefTary for the 
 comforts of this life, and for a well eftablifhed hope 
 of a better. 
 
 We can form diftincT: ideas of various objects, which 
 involve no contradiction: by this way we come at the 
 knowledge of the very efTences of things, though ever 
 fo remote from our apprehenfion : thus we have diftincT: 
 ideas of God, of his exiftence, attributes and works — * 
 of the contingency of the world — of our own nature, 
 faculties, deftination, &c. 
 
 Sch. — We can clearly delineate in the mind a complicated ma- 
 chine before it exifts: we have diftinct ideas of the ma- 
 thematical figures and their efiential properties, though 
 they never exifl by themfelves in nature, being, only the 
 efiential properties inherent in things which really exift. 
 
 Our ideas are ftill more palpable and finking in fuch 
 things as have exiftence : we may become as certain of 
 their properties and ufes as we are of our own exift- 
 ence, v/ants and inclinations. 
 
 It is not only in idea, but alfo in the connection of 
 various reprefentations, that is, in judgments, in pro- 
 portions and reafoning, that logical truth can be di£ 
 covered; for all reafoning conftfts of judgments, and 
 muft be true if thefe are fo, and if there is confiftency 
 in the mode of drawing inferences or conclufions. 
 
 Thofe proportions are true the predicates of which 
 are confiftent with their fubjecTs •, as, for inftancc, God 
 is a fpirit -, men are liable to miftakes. 
 
 The truth of proportions refts fometimes upon an 
 internal criterion^ but often upon an external only ; and 
 
 E c there 
 
)2lO MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 there are many proportions which are fupported by 
 both. 
 
 Thofe proportions have the internal criterion of truth 
 where the confiftency of the predicates with their fub- 
 jects can be diftinctly feen ; that is, where we plainly dis- 
 cover that the oppofite of them implies impoflibility or 
 abfurdity ; as, God is almighty •, men are liable to error. 
 
 In other proportions we muft reft contented with 
 the evidence of {cpSc and the well eftabliflied experience 
 of others ; that is, we can only have the external crite- 
 rion of truth: according to this, that proportion is true 
 the predicate of which is conMent with the nature 
 and properties of the Subject, as difcovered by well 
 eftablifhed experiments, 
 
 Sck. i. — For inftance: the loadftone attracts iron, the needle 
 points to the north pole, the human body and foul have 
 a reciprocal influence upon each other, &c. We cannot 
 fo diftinctly perceive the confiftency of predicates with 
 their refpective fubjects as to be able to fliew, from the 
 nature of either the one or the other, that the oppofite of 
 them is impoflible. 
 
 Sck. 2. — But notwithstanding this, we have a very finking and 
 fufficient evidence of the truth of fuch-like proportions; 
 becaufe it is evident, that the oppofite of them would be 
 contradictory to fenfe and experience, which are far more 
 obvious and familiar to our apprehenfion than the nature 
 of things. 
 
 ScJu 3. — The truth of propofitions which reft upon internal 
 evidence, may be brighter than that which depends upon 
 the external : the latter, however, is more ftriking and 
 forcible, and more eafily attained. 
 
 There are many proportions the truth of which refts 
 
 both upon the internal and external criterion •, that is, 
 
 reafon, fenfe and experience confpire in convincing the 
 
 mind of the conrftency of their predicates with the 
 
 fubject* 
 
 - Sck* 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 211 
 
 $cJt.—~ This is the higheft poflible degree of evidence in nature: 
 thus it is true, that men are liable to miftakes. The con- 
 fiftency of the terms of this propofition flows from the 
 nature of things. Our eyes have often witnefled the errors 
 and miftakes of all forts of characters; and the report of 
 hi (lory perfectly coincides with our own experiences. 
 This degree of evidence attended the wonders of Chrifh, 
 with refpect to thofe who faw them and had the discretion, 
 to compare their experiences with the fcriptures : there 
 facts took place which mofl evidently befpoke almighty 
 power in the agent; the eyes o,f friends and enemies be- 
 held the agency; and the nature both of the agent and of 
 thofe acts had been predicted and attefted by many wit- 
 nefles, who derived their teftimony from divine infpira- 
 tion. 
 
 Truth, with refpect to the ways by which it become* 
 evident, is diftinguifhed into experimental, rational 
 snd hiftorical. 
 
 We are faid to experience^ or perceive things, when 
 we obtain reprefentations of them by means of our 
 fenfes : thus we have experimental truth in things that. 
 we fee, hear, tafte, fmell or feel. 
 
 Rational truth is that evidence which is derived by 
 a proper mode of argumentation from firft principles. 
 
 Hiftorical truth depends on the teftimony, that is y 
 on the experiences of others : thofe who declare their 
 experiences to others are called witnejfes, and the decla- 
 ration itfelf has obtained the name of teftimony. 
 
 We diftinguifh ocular from hear/ay witneifes: the 
 former declare their own experiences, the latter thofe 
 of others. 
 
 The receiving another's teftimony as true is called 
 affent: affent to a well eftablifhed teftimony \% faith. 
 
 Whether a teftimony is well eftablifhed, and con(e- 
 (juently deferves full credit and faith, is an enquiry of 
 
 great 
 
21-2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY*. 
 
 great importance, as it is often attended with many in* 
 tricacies and difficulties. Here two extremes are to be 
 avoided : we may contract the guilt of incredulity, or 
 incur the imputation of credulity, by denying our afTent 
 to teftimonies fufficiently well eftablifhed, or giving it 
 to any report, however badly fupported. 
 
 All the merit of teftimonies depends upon thefe par- 
 ticulars : i . that the things terrified be not metaphyfi- 
 cally falfe: 2. that thofe who teftify have the character 
 of good witneffes. 
 
 A good witnefs is one who is both capable and willing 
 
 to teftify the truth as it is. 
 
 Sch. — All that is matter of fact refts upon experimental or hif- 
 torical truth ; but all that can be inferred from indubitable 
 principles is an object, of rational truth. 
 
 From what has been explained it follows, that there 
 are truths which are only objects of reafon •, as, the 
 exiftence of a God, the foul, &c. others again which 
 are objects of reafon and fenfe -, as, the mortality of the 
 i>ody : and others which are experimental or hiftorical, 
 or perhaps both •, as, that there was fuch a thing as the 
 city of Jerufalem, that the cities of Rome, Paris, New- 
 York, &c. exift. 
 
 Hence it follows, that there are different criteria by 
 which each clafs of truths muft be examined; for to 
 deny the exiftence of fpirits, becaufe we cannot fee 
 them, would be as imprudent as to deny our eye-fight 
 becaufe we cannot demonftrate it. 
 
 The criterion of rational truth is this propofition : 
 that is indubitably true which is juftly inferred from 
 indubitable principles, or when the oppofite thereof is 
 metaphyiically falfe, abfurd, or impofTible. 
 
 The criterion of experimental truth is this maxim : if 
 
 the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2I£ 
 
 the mind is attentive and vigilant, the fenfory organ 
 found, the mean and mode ordinary, that is, fuch as 
 they ought to be for the purpofe of making experi- 
 ments of the kind, the object of fenfation within a pro- 
 per diftance, and its appearances to our fenfes always 
 the fame •, then things really are what they appear to 
 be, or in other words, then our fenfations are true. 
 
 The criterion of hiftorical truth is, as has been faid, 
 this proportion: if a fact is not metaphyfcally falfe, 
 and is fupported by a well eftablifhed teftimony, it is 
 then true, and deferves our faith. 
 
 Since a well eftablifhed teftimony requires capability 
 and fincerity in the witnefs, it is necefiary to fix upon 
 fuch criteria as may render it certain that a witnefs is 
 able and willing to teftify the truth, 
 
 The criterion for the capability of a witnefs is, that he 
 has been an eye-witnefs^ that he himfelf has experienced 
 the things of which he teftifies, and that his experience 
 has been attended by all or fuch of the criteria of ex- 
 perimental truth as the objeel: of the teftimony would 
 admit of. 
 
 The criterion for the fincerity of a witnefs, that is> 
 his readinefs to fpeak the truth as he knows it, is, that 
 he has not or cannot have from his teftimony any ex- 
 pectation of honour, riches or preferment, either for 
 himfelf or his friends, tils fincerity is ftjll more evi- 
 dent when the objeel: of his teftimony is oppofed to his 
 own prejudices and interefts, when it involves him in 
 difficulties, caufing him reproach, contempt, perfecu- 
 tion and even death. 
 
 As the criterion of the capability of witnefles is a teft 
 oi logical truth, fo that of their fincerity is a fufficient 
 
 evidence 
 
214 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 evidence for the moral truth of what they teftify *, and 
 both taken together leave no rational doubt with refpect 
 to the real or hiftorical truth of their teftimony : for it 
 is a maxim as infallible as a demonftration, that he cer- 
 tainly fpeaks the truth who is both able and willing te 
 /peak it. 
 
 Sch. — When we have the criterion of the fincerkv of a witnefi^ 
 then we become certain that he fpeaks the moral truth. 
 
 Moral truth is the confiflency of our words with our 
 Inward thoughts, fentiments and defires. 
 
 Speech, in the ftridfc {en{& of the term, confifts of 
 
 words fpoken or written ; but, as words are the moil 
 
 common figns by which we exprefs our thoughts, we 
 
 may take fpeech for the exhibition of any figns by 
 
 which others are to underftand our thoughts. Not to 
 
 exhibit figns by which our thoughts may be under- 
 
 fl:ood, is called Jilence. 
 
 Sch. — There are circumftances in which filence may ferve as a 
 general fign for interpreting our thoughts; nay, common 
 converfation prefents us with many inftances where filence 
 fpeaks louder than words. For inftance; if a perfon, hav- 
 ing o^cafioned an accidental damage, would declare the 
 circumftances and confefs the faft, we fhould feel our- 
 f elves more reconciled to the lofs fuftained, than if we 
 muft take the author upon a conftruction, which perhaps 
 warrants the fufpicion that he has done the mifchief wil- 
 fully, with a bad intention, or from finifter motives, &c. 
 
 Signs by which our thoughts may be communicated 
 and interpreted, are either original or arbitrary: the 
 former, men are led by inftinct to employ and to inter- 
 pret •, for inftance, the various tones of the voice, the 
 different changes of features and geftures, naturally 
 calculated to exprefs the internal affections of tender- 
 ness, forrow, fympathy, joy, pleafure, grief, furprife, 
 terror, hope, anger, refentment, contempt, &c. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2 15 
 
 Scti. — The abfence of fuch figns is an indication of an even, 
 placid temper of mind. 
 
 Arbitrary figns are called conventional, becaufe they 
 reft either upon a tacit or explicit convention among the 
 parties converfing with one another by means of them. 
 
 Converfation by way of tacit convention is, when we 
 make ufe of common language, or fuch mute figns as 
 are generally underftood to denote affirmation, appro- 
 bation, information, accufation, &c. or the contrary; 
 as, looks, pointing with the finger or hand, nodding, 
 making the head, &c. 
 
 Parties by explicit convention may converfe by a par- 
 ticular ufe of words, mute figns, or hieroglyphic cha- 
 racters, agreed upon for the purpofeof communicating 
 their thoughts to one another in fuch a manner as to 
 render it impracticable for other perfons to underitand 
 the fubject of their converfation. 
 
 In whichever of thefe ways we fpeak, it is clear that 
 we give figns whereby others may apprehend our 
 thoughts : fpeech is therefore an action in which others 
 are more or lefs interested, and is under the cognizance 
 of the fame laws which form the rules for cofcdu&ing 
 our actions. 
 
 Hence it follows, that we muft obferve duties in 
 fpeaking as well as in filence; arid that the fame laws 
 which regulate our duties to God, to ourfelves and to 
 others, prefcribe alfo the rules according to which thofe 
 duties ought to be conducted. 
 
 We may therefore, for the direction of our conduct 
 in fpeech, lay down as an infallible maxim this proposi- 
 tion : dire it fpeech or filence to the glory of God, to t, 
 evjn bappinefs and that of others-, and carefully avoid 
 > v he contrary. 
 
2i6 moral philosophy^ 
 
 Sch. — Wc treat here of fpeech under the idea of moral actions^ 
 for there is fuch a thing as fpeaking which is not moral, 
 and therefore comes not under the cognizance of laws 
 and of duty: for inftance, that of madmen, infant chil- 
 dren, expreflions of perfons in a paroxyfm of ficknefs,&c> 
 
 From this principle it immediately follows, that as 
 it is on one hand an indifpenfible duty for us to fpeak 
 the truth and the whole truth, or in other words, to 
 exhibit fuch figns as are fully confident with our 
 thoughts, where the glory of God can thereby be ma- 
 nifefled, and our own happinefs and that of others 
 promoted; fo it is on the other hand abfolutely requi- 
 iite, that the truth be keptfecret in all thofe cafes where 
 the djfclofing of our thoughts would be in any wife 
 repugnant to thefe great and defirable ends. 
 
 As a proclivity of the mind to fpeak the truth, in all 
 cafes where the glory of God and the good of mankind 
 require it, is called veracity, and as a ftedfaft refolu- 
 tion to keep it fecret, when thofe ends render it necefla- 
 ry, is known by the name taciturnity, it follows, that 
 it is a high duty for us mod faithfully to exercife thofe 
 virtues, in everv inftance and occurrence of life where 
 the glory of God and the good of fociety render either 
 the one or the other neceffary. 
 
 Sch. i. — Since veracity can be exercifed only in thofe cafes 
 where the glory of God, the duties we owe to ourfelves, 
 and the good of fociety require that we mould fincerely 
 difclofe our thoughts, it is evident, that thofe have no 
 pretence to this amiable virtue who divulge every thing 
 they know, though it be oppofed to the duties of religion, 
 difgraceful to their own character, incompatible with the 
 principles of equity and humanity, contrary to decency, 
 detrimental to the perfons whom they addrefs. and inju- 
 rious to thofe whole actions are the fubjeft of fuch im- 
 prudent and indifcreet converfation. 
 
 Sch 2. — Suppofe it poflible, which can hardly ever be the cafe, 
 that the bufy hoft of tale-bearers confine themfelves ta 
 
 what 
 
:.;oral PHILOSOPHY. 2i;/ 
 
 -vlut is true, without adding to or taking from their frock 
 of knowledge, and without going fo far as pretending to 
 know the defigr.s and intentions of the victims of their 
 loquacity: fuppofe their tales ftrie'Uy true and innocent in 
 that refpecl; what good end is thereby obtained? you 
 divulge what the glory of God, your own character and 
 the good of mankind require to be kept to yourfelves, or 
 what perhaps you yourfelf mould communicate directly 
 to the agent, or impart only to fome particular perfons. 
 Confider the confequences of indifcreet loquacity : von 
 trifle away your time: by being bufied with others, you 
 forget yourfelf: you might have had opportunities to 
 fpeak things more innocent, more edifying: you intrude 
 upon your neighbour's patience and time : you degrade 
 your character by betraying the otneioufnefs of a tale- 
 bearer: you become guilty of (lander: you create mif- 
 chief in families, diftruff. in fociety: you fpeak to fpread 
 abroad mifery: you delight in the frailties and faults of 
 others: you fport with charity, fympathy and humanity 2 
 you lay fnares and temptations for your fellow creatures, 
 who would have retained their innocence had they been 
 fuffered to think well of perfons of an indifferent charac- 
 ter, &c. You fpeak the truth, but can your conduct be 
 innocent? can it even be indifferent? I\o: you become 
 either an indirect or a malicious flanderer; the former, if 
 you have not the intention to render your neighbour mi- 
 ferable; the latter, when your tongue is employed for the 
 purpofe of creating mifchief. The end being unjuil, the 
 mean you make ufe of cannot be rendered innocent. If 
 the truth is told for the purpofe of warning and cautioning 
 your neighbour, then it is confident with the good of 
 mankind as well as with the glory of God and the duty 
 of veracity. 
 
 Sch* 3. — Suppofe you deviate from the truth, you attribute to 
 your neighbour intentions and dengns which he had not, 
 or you do not know all the particular circumftances of the 
 action, or culpably or malicioufly conceal them; you 
 mingle untruth with truth: who is able to calculate the 
 mifchief which is caufed by that officious loquacity fo 
 prevalent in human converfation ? 
 
 Sch. 4. — There are therefore innumerable occurrences in life, 
 
 where a man of candor, fincerity and veracity muft keep 
 
 Ff the 
 
21 8 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the truth fecret, in order to be faithful to God and to 
 himfclf, juil and humane towards his fellow-creatures. 
 Sc/j. 5. — Not every inftance of a referred conduct in conver- 
 fation is therefore commendable: there is a time to fpeak, 
 and there are circumftances which require filence and re- 
 fervednefs: there are a variety of objects which may be 
 proper fubjects for converfation, whilft many others are 
 highly improper and hurtful. Thofe, however, who 
 carry referve to excefi?, and thereby become unfociable, 
 are not liable to half the mifchiefs which loquacity pro- 
 duces. 
 
 Thofe who hold that moral truth is of a character 
 peculiarly facred and inviolable, (o that it may not, un- 
 der any circumftances whatever, undergo any modifica- 
 tions, have not fufriciently considered, that on the one 
 hand they derogate from the facred character of other 
 moral actions, which are under the controul of the fame 
 laws according to which our converfation with refpect 
 to fpeech and filence muft be regulated, and on the 
 , other aflert what is impollible in the nature of things. 
 Why mould I not fpeak as I ought to act? or what 
 greater degree of morality or immorality is fpeech ca- 
 pable of than any other kind of moral actions ? Is there 
 a greater end to be purfued in fpeech or filence than that 
 which mould be the ultimate fcope of all our actions ? 
 Is there a greater end pofTible than the glory of God, 
 our own felicity and that of others ? Certainly not. 
 The confequence then is, that, if we will have it in our 
 power to do our duty at all, fpeech and filence, in cafes 
 of colliiion, muft undergo modifications and exceptions 
 as well as other actions, and that thefe modifications and 
 exceptions muft be made according to a juft eftimation 
 of our obligations, laws and duties, and in fuch a man- 
 ner as that the greater will always fuperfede the lefs. 
 
 Sch. i. — From thefe confiderations we may judge of the juftice 
 and propriety of thofe inftances and rules which authors 
 
 have 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2IQ, 
 
 have laid down as juftlfiable exceptions to the exercife of 
 the virtues of veracity and taciturnity under particular 
 circumftances. 
 Si,/;. 2. — Before we proceed to quote fomc of thofe Ipftances, 
 it is necefTary to obferve, that, in our opinion, deviations 
 from moral truth are not fufficiently diftinguifhed-; hence 
 it is, that what one author calls a falfhood, another ftiles a 
 lie; hence itlikewife is, that we meet not, in any fubjeet 
 of morality, with more difficulties, intricacies and confu- 
 fion, than in that of the duties of fpeech. In authors, as 
 well as in common cenverfation, no other diflinction is 
 oblerved than truth or a lie, the latter palling for a term 
 perfectly fynonimous with a moral falfhood. It is true, 
 we cannot pretend to teach the proper ufe of a language 
 in which we candidly acknowledge our deficiency: how- 
 ever, it ought to be remembered, that things different in 
 their nature and tendency mull be materially different; 
 that fpeech and filence, as moral actions, muft admit of 
 various degrees of morality or immorality, from the effects 
 which they produce and the difference of intention from 
 which they proceed. It is well known, that perfons com- 
 mit faults by a culpable conduct, and run into crimes 
 through malicious purpofe and defign. 
 
 Why is it,. then, that the lead deviation from truth is a falfe- 
 hood or a lie? Are there in fpeaking no intermediate de- 
 grees of defect of moral rectitude? Is it the peculiar na- 
 ture of this kind of actions that they admit only of ex- 
 tremes? If a breach of promife is a lie, what name is 
 left to fignify the moll injurious falfhood? 
 
 Are there particular laws that prohibit innocent recreations, 
 neceffary diverfiens in converfation, that is, in fpeech r— 
 Nay, the nature of things requires, that fpeech or filence 
 be referred to imperfect obligations and laws as well as to 
 thofe which are perfect. . And is not that reference necef- 
 fary for obtaining a true and liable criterion of what is juft 
 or unjuft, honeft or diihoneft, fincere or infincere, human 
 or inhuman, decent and proper or indecent and improper 
 in fpeech or filence? Is there not both a material and 
 formal difference beween a breach of duty and an injury ? 
 
 Would it not, 'therefore, be more confident with logical 
 truth, that deviations from moral truth which do not 
 amount to a breach of duty, where others either do not 
 
 or- 
 
2 20 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or have no right to expect that we {hould fpeak the truth, 
 be denominated untruths; whilft thofe untruths which are 
 repugnant to imperfect obligations and laws fhould be 
 Called faljitoodsi and that falfhoods committed contrary to 
 perfect obligations and laws mould be branded with the 
 appellation of lies of different degrees of heinoufnefs, ac- 
 cording as the author has ailed with greater or lefs culpa- 
 blenefs or malice ? 
 Sch. 3. — All thofe authors on morality whom we have had an 
 opportunity to confult agree in this particular, that the 
 duty of taciturnity requires our thoughts to be kept fecret 
 where the great ends before mentioned render that fecrecy 
 neceflary ; but they differ with refpect to the ufe of means. 
 Some will admit of no other than bare filence, making no 
 allowance for occurrences where filence fpeaks louder 
 than words, even ferving to heighten the deception, and 
 where it is apt, as in cafes of fufpicion, to conitrue inno- 
 cence into guilt, a culpable action into the greateft malice. 
 Others juftly allow the ufe of pretexts, or the exhibition 
 of figns whereby the truth may be concealed, when we 
 are intruded with fecrets on which the welfare of our 
 country or of our neighbour and perhaps the fafety of our 
 lives depend, and where bare fufpicion would have a fatal 
 or a pernicious effect: but thefe alfo differ with refpect to 
 the particular cafes and circumftances as well as with re- 
 gard to the means and manner by and in which the inward 
 thoughts and fentiments of our hearts may be concealed 
 from others confidently with the dictates of the law of 
 nature. There are fome who admit a falfhood to be made 
 ufe of for that purpofe; others again forbid it, and advife 
 a careful fearch after equivocations. 
 
 Sch. 4. — But it is time that we mould give their particular opi- 
 nions on this fubject: — u There are falfhoods which are 
 not lies, that is, which are not criminal; as, 
 
 *' 1. Where no one is deceived, which is the cafe in para- 
 bles, fables, novels, jefts, tales to create mirth, ludicrous 
 embellifhments of a ftory, where the declared defign of 
 the fpeaker is not to inform but to divert; compliments 
 in the fubfeription of a letter, a fervant's denying his 
 mafter, a prifoner pleading not guilty, an advocate afTert- 
 ing the juflice, or his belief of the juftice of his client's 
 caufe. In fuch inftances no confidence is deftroyed, be- 
 E ■ caufe 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 22 % 
 
 caufe none was repofed; no promife to fpenk the truth is 
 violated, becaufe none was given, or underftood to be 
 given. 
 
 " 2. Where the perfon to whom you fpeafc has no ri^ht to 
 know the truth, or more properly, where little or no in- 
 conveniency refults from the want of confidence in fuch 
 cafes; as, where you tell a falfhood to a madman for his 
 own advantage, to a robber to conceal your property, to 
 anauaffin to defeat or to divert him from his pnrpofe", &c. 
 It is upon this principle that, by the laws of war, it is al- 
 lowed to deceive an enemy by feints, falfe colours, fpies, 
 falfe intelligence, and the like; but by no means in trea- 
 ties, truces, fignals of diftrefs at fea, or fignals of capitu- 
 lation." Vide Paley's Principles of Moral and Political 
 Philofophy, chap. 5. Vide alfo for further information, 
 Hutchefon's Moral Philofophy, Part II. ch. 10. § 7, &c. 
 Sc/i. 5. — The reader will obferve, that according to our diftinc^ 
 tion all the cafes which have been laid down by thofe au- 
 thors come under the predicament of moral untruths; 
 we may therefore lay down the following maxims as 
 guides to diretf: our fteps through the irkfome difficulties 
 with which converfation is befet : — 
 
 1. It is a duty to fpeak the truth as it is, when it muft ne- 
 cefTarily be known for promoting the glory of God, our 
 own happinefs and that of others. 
 
 2. We ought to keep the truth fecret, when a declaration 
 thereof would be repugnant to thefe great ends. 
 
 3. Great care is neceflary, that both fpeech and filence, re- 
 fpe&ively warranted by thefe ends, be feafonable with 
 refpect to time, place and other circumftances. 
 
 4. Where taciturnity is neceiTary, we are allowed to make 
 ufe of thofe means which areneceffarv for concealing the 
 truth. " & 
 
 5. It can never be neceflary for us to fpeak what we have 
 defined to be a falfhood, 'much Iefs a lie, in order to con- 
 ceal a truth. If the duties of taciturnity have for their 
 object the glory of God, how can an action contrary to 
 the natural laws, which we have proved to be divine, be 
 confident with that glory? 
 
 6. No deviation from truth, contrary to imperfect obliga- 
 tions and laws, or even thofe which are perfect, provided 
 
 the 
 
222 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the agent in the latter cafe has not a&ed malicioufiv, is or 
 ran with propriety be called a falfhood or a lie, when 
 higher laws or duties fuperfede them ; that is to fay, if the 
 one or the other is either phyfically or morally impcffible. 
 Should we accufe a man of a falfhood or a lie who has 
 difappointed us in a meeting, or in lending money, or 
 making a payment, which he had prom i fed; when the 
 difappointment, the trouble, expence, or lofs we have 
 fuftained, is caufed by his ficknefs, by a robbery com- 
 mitted upon him, or by his forcible detention in capti- 
 vity ? 
 
 4 
 
 j. In cafes where it is doubtful whether it is for the glory 
 of God or for our own happinefs and that of others, that 
 we fpeak or conceal the truth, it will be well to examine 
 the object of fpeech or filence, the time, place, &c. by 
 the various rules of human rectitude. Isitjufr, honeft, 
 confident with uprightnefs, with humanity, and with a 
 good confcience? Is it confident with decency and pro- 
 priety? What will be the proximate, what the remote 
 confequences, &c. 
 
 8. No man who fets a value upon a good confcience will 
 indulge himfelf with unneceflary, much lefs with wanton 
 deviations from truth. 
 
 9. It ought to be obferved, that the duties of fpeech deferve 
 our mod careful vigilance; for deviations from a ftrict 
 obfervance of them are peculiarly hurtful and dangerous, 
 flnce the evil effects of them are not fo eafily perceived or 
 avoided as the confequences of other actions. Falfhoods 
 and lies, like the peftilence, walk in darknefs, and invade 
 when no danger is expected; like the father of lies they 
 aflume various forms — the form of truth, of friendship, 
 &c. they wound and kill at a diftance ; they are weapons 
 eafily concealed, foon unfheathed, always at hand, and in 
 every one's poffeffion. 
 
 We have defined moral falfhood to be that deviation 
 from truth by which we act contrary to our neighbour's 
 imperfect right. 
 
 It is our duty % to abhor and to avoid moral falfhood, 
 becaufe it is our duty to avoid all manner of deceit, 
 
 impro- 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2 2J 
 
 impropriety, infincerity, diffimulation and inhumanity; 
 in a word, it is our duty fmcerely to obey impericcl 
 obligations and laws, carefully to refped the imperfect 
 rights of others, and confcientiouily to avcid a breach 
 of duty. 
 
 Sch. — If an indifcreet declaration of the truth is fo unbecoming 
 the human character, what idea fliall we form of the au- 
 thors of falfhood, of thofe who countenance calumny,, 
 and of thofe who propagate it? Ail that can be faid is 
 this, that falfhoods have their different degrees of turpi- 
 tude, according to their etfects and various other circum- 
 itauces, with reference to the intention of the agent, the 
 abettor, the propagator, &c. 
 Let it be remembered, that a wilful falfhood has in it fo 
 much of the malignity of a lie, that it can hardly be dif- 
 tinfniifhed therefrom, except that it was not in the power 
 of the calumniator to perpetrate the injury. Characters 
 who deal in falfhood invite, the contempt of the difcreet 
 part of mankind; envy and malice are therefore as impo- 
 tentas they are reftlefs. The character of the honefr and 
 upright man is invulnerable. 
 
 A moral falfhood, whereby another furTers injury 
 and damap-e, is a lie. 
 
 As by fpeaking we underhand the exhibiting any 
 figns of our thoughts, it is plain, that we can both act 
 and fpeak lies. 
 
 By exhibiting figns whereby others are deceived or 
 .injured, we are faid to become guilty of the crime of 
 falfifying. 
 
 Falfifying by other actions than words fpoken or 
 written, as the term is taken in its moft common ac- 
 ceptation, is called real, and comprehends forging, 
 coining, counterfeiting, and other injurious adultera- 
 tions. Falfifying by words fpoken or written is filled 
 verbal, and extends to lies, libels, and other kinds of 
 injurious defamations, 
 
 Sch* 
 
2?4 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ScL i. — A well written fatire is fo far from being of a defama- 
 tory nature, that it is, on the contrary, necelfary veracity, 
 exercifed not againft perfons, but againft vice, inhu- 
 manity, &c. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The appellation lie is fo very offensive and fo general- 
 ly abhorred, that it would juftify a prefumption that this 
 vice has no abiding place on earth. We really might 
 wifh, both for the honour and for the good of mankind, 
 that fraud, calumny, traduction, &c. would never dare to 
 rear their heads. What a forrowful afpect do electioneer- 
 ing cabals commonly prefent us ! 
 
 Sch. 3. — It is juftly obferved, that lies may be acted : for iri- 
 ftance ; the man deeply in debt is flrutting along in the 
 finefl drefs at the coft of his creditors : the man poflefled 
 of a competency, or perhaps blefTed with great abun- 
 dance, is always complaining of want, or lives in a pe- 
 nurious manner, and is not free to impart of his fuper- 
 fluities to his indigent neighbour. 
 
 Since it is poflible that figns foreign or even oppoflte 
 to the thoughts of the fpeaker may be exhibited, it 
 follows, that we cannot always with certainty infer the 
 moral truth from what is fpoken or written; for as 
 little as figns are naturally calculated to mew with in- 
 dubitable precision the inward fentiments of the heart, 
 fo little are we able to penetrate into the thoughts of 
 him who exhibits fuch figns. We may be deceived. 
 
 However, as it is abfolutely necerTary, in many oc- 
 currences of life, that, for the glory of God and for 
 our own felicity and that of others, we fhould know 
 whether our neighbour fpeaks the truth or deviates 
 from it, and as thefe are the very cafes in which our 
 neighbour is bound ftrictly to exercife the duty of ve- 
 racity, it follows, that we have not only a right to 
 require, but that he alfo is under particular obligations 
 to give us a convincing proof or teft of his fincerity 
 and veracity. 
 
 Actions 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 22£ 
 
 A&ions or declarations ufed as a teft of our fincerity 
 and veracity in {peaking the moral truth, are called 
 ajfeverations. 
 
 AfTeverations are diftinguifhed into the improper? 
 the unnecejjary, and the necejfary. 
 
 Sch. i. — To make ufe of improper afTeverations, by curling, 
 f wearing, &c. is a folly, and a ltriking mark of a mind 
 as indifcreet and rude as it is impious. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The ufing unneceflary afleverations not only betrays 
 meannefs in the fpeaker, but may be taken for a pretty 
 fure fign of his want of fincerity. 
 
 Sch. 3, — The neceflary afleverations are again diftinguifhed 
 into the ordinary and the foltmn; the former ought to be 
 conducted with prudence and propriety, and mould ferve 
 for the purpofe of private transactions; as the expreffions, 
 it is certain, you may depend upon it, it is true, upon 
 my honour, &c. 
 
 Sch. 4. — The folemn are principally ufed in tranfactions of a 
 public nature. 
 
 No affeveration is better calculated for a teft of our 
 fincerity, or more folemn and awful, than when the 
 fpeaker calls upon God as witnefs of his thoughts, and 
 as avenger in cafe he fwerves from moral truth. This 
 folemn and awful affeveration is called an oath. 
 
 By the external folemnities of an oath we underftand 
 certain external acts, whereby the mind of the juror 
 may be deeply imprefTed with a fenfe of the omni- 
 fcience, omnipotence and juftice of the Deity, and 
 whereby he mews to others that he confiders himfelf 
 in a moft particular manner in the prefence of him who 
 is the fearcher of hearts, the righteous judge of the 
 earth, who can and will punifh the wicked and thofe 
 who are guilty of falfifying. 
 
 Sch. 1. — There are different folemnities in vogue, concerning 
 
 the propriety, neceffity and lawfnlnefs of which much 
 
 G g controv erfy 
 
2 lb -MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 controverfy has taken place. There is, however, a pretty 
 general agreement with refpect to the necefiity of external 
 lclemnities, as there are cafes where we ought, by fome 
 act or another, to be convinced of a perfon's veracity and 
 iincerity, before it can be expected that we mould give 
 aflent to his teftimony. But the fubject of the controverfy 
 is, which are thofe particular acts? for it does not follow 
 from that general necefiity, that thofe adopted by one 
 clafs of people are more necefTary than thofe advocated by 
 another. With refpect to the propriety, it ought generally 
 to be obferved, that fuch are molt eligible as are heft cal- 
 culated both for convincing us of the juror's veracity, and 
 for imprefiing his mind with a lively fenfe of the omni- 
 fcience, omnipotence and juftice of God. However, as 
 a variety of external acts may produce fuch effects, and 
 as thefe may in a great meafure depend upon different 
 cuftoms, habits and fentiments, it follows, that the pro- 
 priety of folemnities muff be left optional and undeter- 
 mined, with this provifo, that they be not naturally un- 
 lawful, that is to fay, not indecent, not contradictory to 
 the ends for which folemnities have been proved to* be 
 necefTary; thev muft confequentlv not be trifling, divert- 
 in^ the mind of the juror from a ferious consideration of 
 the awful iituation in which he is making his appeal to 
 the omnifcieuce of God and the righteous judgment of 
 him who is infinitely powerful, juft and holy. 
 
 &•/,, 2. — There are likewife folemnities necefTary in tendering 
 the oath. It is highly reprehenfible when the folemnities 
 prefcribed by the refpective laws of countries are exhibit- 
 ed or performed in a carelefs or flight manner, as if fwear- 
 \w? were but an indifferent and ordinary tranfaetion. 
 How can we expect that the mind of the juror is properly 
 impreffed with a fenfe of his awful iituation, when he 
 who tenders the oath fhews hardly any fymptom of feri- 
 oufnefs? 
 
 Sc/i. 3. — Since the greater or left propriety of the different kinds 
 of folemnities in vogue do not eflentially conftitute the 
 oath, but are only necefTary concomitants thereof, it fol- 
 lows, that indulgence from the party who tenders the oath 
 is as commendable as accommodation and moderation 
 on the part of the juror. Things of this kind indeed come 
 with the beft grace from thofe who fill the ftations of fa- 
 thers 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 22^ 
 
 thers of the people: the perlliring, however, In a parti- 
 cular mode on the part of thofe who are under the con- 
 troul of the law of the land, mows that prejudice pre- 
 ponderates. 
 
 Sch. 4. — The internal Jolemnity of an oath, or its efTence, con- 
 lifting in an appeal to the omnifcient, omnipotent and 
 righteous God as witnefs and avenger, it follows, that, if 
 that appeal is finccre and our testimony morally true, ano\ 
 as it is exprefTed, the whole truth, it is lawful, however it 
 may have been modified with refpecl to outward folemni- 
 ties: if that appeal is infincere, and the juror does not 
 fpeak t-he truth and the whole truth as far as he knows it, 
 it is unlawful under whatfoever folemnities it may have 
 been taken. The folemnities do not change the nature 
 of truth; they cannot render that right which is wron^.; 
 and vice verfa. 
 
 There is another folemn afTeveration, known with 
 us under the appellation of affirmation, where the 
 ipeaker makes only a bare declaration, fanctioned by 
 the folemnity of the act itfelf, that what he fpeaks 
 proceeds from the itneerity of his heart, and is the 
 moral truth, and the whole truth as it is known to him. 
 
 Our laws, for particular reafons, admit of fuch an 
 affirmation inftead of an oath, and attribute to it all 
 the juridical effects which an oath produces. They 
 very juflly contemplate it as an expedient well calcu- 
 lated to accommodate the fcruples of confeience which 
 fome perfons have contracted from m interpretations of 
 feveral pafTages of fcripture, where mention is made 
 of feveral improper modes of fwearing; which panages, 
 however, can be as little againfb the taking a necefTary 
 and lawful oath, as the facred writings can contradict 
 themfelves. We call the accommodation on the part 
 of government juft, becaufe nothing is more becoming 
 its dignity than lenity, wherever it can be exercifed 
 in a manner confident with juftice and (he public good. 
 
 ° No 
 
228 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 No perfon, we truft, can entertain a doubt but that the 
 admiifion of affirmation in thefe and many other cafes 
 is eligible, as it Kas all the internal folemnities of an 
 oath. Though no exprefs appeal is made to God, 
 ftill the very act fully amounts to it ; for it is a decla- 
 ration made before an omnifcient, omnipotent and juft 
 God, who punifhes faliifiers : no formal appeal can 
 give him a new or an additional right. 
 
 Affirmation may therefore be confidered as an oath 
 made without the external folemnities thereof : nay, 
 where it is directed or permitted by law, the very act 
 and the very expreflions whereby it is made muft be 
 confidered as the external folemnities. 
 
 Sck. i. — A celebrated author has juftly obferved, that the ob- 
 fcure and elliptical forms of oaths, together with the 
 levity and frequency with which they are fometimes ad- 
 miniftered, have been the caufe of a general inadvertency 
 to their obligations. He willies, that in many cafes fome- 
 thing which might anfwer the purpofes of a convincing 
 afleveration fhould be fubftituted for the formal oath in 
 all its folemnities. We fhall not determine which of the 
 modes is molt eligible, whether the expedients that author 
 advifes, or the affirmation, or the practice obferved in 
 ibme countries, where, for inftance, the judge afking, 
 Can you te/iify this upon your good faith, by giving me your hand 
 in lieu of an oath? the deponent, by anfwering yes and 
 giving him his hand, has given a full teftimony as to ju- 
 ridical effects, in all cafes which are not of great moment 
 or ferious confequences. Vide Paley's Moral Philofo- 
 phy, chap. 1 6. 
 
 Sell. 2. — However much it is to be wifhed that oaths might 
 become lefs frequent, ftill it ought to be obferved, that 
 what can be juftly affirmed may be juftly corroborated by 
 an oath; the one is confequently as facred as the other. 
 Let him, therefore, who fwears or affirms, always remem- 
 ber that he calls God to witnefs, and that he is bound to 
 fpeak the moral truth as far as he knows it. 
 
 ScL 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2 2Q 
 
 ScL 3. — There is a general complaint againft the taking of 
 oaths for eftablifhing the truth in cafes of little conie- 
 quence; as, for inftance, where the object of controverfy 
 is the lofs of one, two, &c. (hillings. Many an honeft 
 man chufes rather to loie five times the fnm than to take 
 an oath. But in this there is more fpecinufnefs than jus- 
 tice and truth. Is it the value of money, or the caufe of 
 juftice and truth that renders an oath neceflary? Is not 
 the greateft opprefiion, injuftice and falfnood very fre- 
 quently committed in tranfactions where confidence has 
 been placed in the honefty of perfons, becaufe they have 
 been confidered as able and willing to fulfil engagements 
 which are not of great moment? Should we be delicate 
 in cafes where the caufe of injury and injuftice can boaft 
 of triumph over virtue and honefty? 
 
 Befides the criteria heretofore explained of the wil- 
 lingnefs of perfons to fpeak the moral truth, the mak- 
 ing oath or affirmation mull be taken for particular 
 tells of the deponent's fincerity and of the moral truth 
 of his depofition. No immediate inference, however, 
 can be drawn either from the one or the other, that 
 what is fpoken is logically or really true ; for the 
 fincerefl and bell difpofed perfons may be midaken in 
 their ideas, and, notwithstanding their veracity, may 
 happen to tellify a logical fallhood. 
 
 Sch. 1. — It cannot, therefore, be immediately inferred from an 
 arTertion morally true, that it is logically fo. It is poffible, 
 too, for a perfon to fpeak logically true and morally falfe. 
 
 Sch. 2. — For inftance: a perfon over-hearing the converfation 
 of others, where mention is made of a ten pound bill, 
 cannot fay, confiftently with moral truth, that a ten 
 pound bill has been given in payment: the denomination 
 of dollars might have been miftaken by the party for that 
 of pounds: but he fwears morally true, if he teftifies that 
 he heard mention made of a ten pound bill. 
 
 Sch. 3. — But from the moral truth we may in many inftances 
 collect the real circumftances of particular fads; for, 
 being thereby convinced of the fpeaker's fincerity, no- 
 thing remains but to afcertain his capability to fpeak the 
 
 real 
 
23O MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 real truth, in order to be convinced of the reality of the 
 particulars of his testimony. 
 Sc/i. 4. — Hence the propriety of examining as many witnefles 
 as we can have; for the circumftance of many perfons 
 agreeing in their depofitions leaves lefs doubt with re- 
 fpeft to the veracity of the witnefles as well as the reality 
 of the object of their teftimony. 
 
 Sch. 5. — As it is poiftble for witnefles in thefe cafes to difagree, 
 fome not having been in a fituation to acquire that expe- 
 rience which others have obtained; fome again not hav- 
 ing paid that ftriCt. attention to every circumftance, or 
 not retaining the full recollection thereof, which others 
 have; we mav not from this difaereement infer inlinceri- 
 ty, or charge perfons, from contradictory teftimonies, 
 with moral untruth: for we are not fworn, in all aflertory 
 teftimonies, to fpeak the real truth; no authority can 
 bind us to a phylical impoflibility ; but we are fworn to 
 fpeak the moral truth, all that we know, and as it is 
 known. 
 
 Sch. 6. — It is an important duty that we teftify the moral truth, 
 even when we are not called to witnefs, if for want of our 
 evidence the innocent mould be wronged or opprefTed. 
 Our neighbour may often not know that we have any 
 knowledge of certain tranfaCtions; in fuch cafe we ought 
 to offer our teftimony. 
 
 Sch. 7. — It is therefore highly criminal, and the agent certainly 
 cannot efcape the imputation which is confequent upon 
 the commifiion of wrong, if he prevaricates or endea- 
 vours to evade giving his teftimony. 
 
 Sch. 8. — A moft facred regard for the caufe of truth becomes 
 us as men and as chriftians : we fhould have no refpeCt of 
 perfons, neither confult our own eafe or popularity, when 
 the caufe of juftice and truth calls for the exercife of the 
 duty of veracity. 
 
 The validity of oaths is diftinguifhed into natural 
 and legal. 
 
 The natural validity of oaths confifls in their internal 
 Solemnities, that is to fay, in the juror's or affirmant's 
 acknowledgment of an omnifcient, omnipotent and juft 
 
 God, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2^1 
 
 God, who will by no means hold guiltlefs, but will 
 punifh thofe who take his name in vain. 
 
 Idolaters and fuperftitious perfons, who attribute to 
 their fictitious deities thofe perfections, can fwear an 
 oath which is morally and naturally valid, though it is, 
 in a theological point of view, improper and falfe. 
 
 Theoretical atheifts, and fuch of the tribe of deifts 
 as deny the providence of God, cannot fwear an oath 
 which is naturally valid. 
 
 An oath is faid to be legally valid when it produces 
 a juridical effect, and when tendered and taken under 
 the external folemnities eftablifhed by the laws of the 
 country. 
 
 Hence it follows, that no immediate inference holds 
 good from the natural validity of oaths upon that 
 which is legal, and vice verfa. 
 
 Atheifts, and the afore- mentioned deifts, complying 
 with the external forms of oaths or affirmations, fwear 
 legally valid ; for they exhibit figns which induce others 
 to believe that they acknowledge the omnifcience, om- 
 nipotence, juftice and providence of God. 
 
 Oaths are diftinguifhed into promiffory, affertory, 
 neceffary, judicial, voluntary, and purgatorv. 
 
 By the promiffory oath we confirm our unalterable 
 refolution to ftand to our engagements. 
 
 By that which is called affertory, a fact is certified. 
 
 If a party before a court refers the caufe to the oath 
 of another, it is called judicial. 
 
 An oath is faid to be voluntary, if one of the parties 
 by private deed refers his came to the oath of the 
 other.- 
 
 An 
 
232 MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 
 
 An afTertory oath required by a magiflrate is faid to 
 be necejpiry. 
 
 An oath is faid to be purgatory, when we thereby 
 refute fufpicion or imperfect proof. 
 
 Perjury is that horrid crime where a perfon wilfully 
 and knowingly, under the qualification of an oath or 
 affirmation, declares an untruth to be true. 
 
 ScL 1. — A wilful perjurer is a blafphemer; for calling God to . 
 witnefs what he knows to be falfe is virtually attributing 
 to him imperfections. 
 
 ScL 2. — The perjurer is likewife the moral caufe of all the con- 
 fequencesrefulting from his infincerity and falfifkation. 
 
 ScL 3. — If we reflect upon the general confequences of this- 
 horrid fpecies of perfidy, that it tends to deftroy all con- 
 fidence among mankind, we (hall find there is no crime 
 more horrid or deteftable. 
 
 ScL 4. — All authors of afieverations which have a judicial ef- 
 fect are guilty of this crime, though they have not for- 
 mally fworn or affirmed. 
 
 ScL 5. — From which it follows, that perfons who offer their 
 oath are juftly deemed as perjured, if they have thereby 
 raifed an expectation in others to which they intentionally 
 remain unfaithful, or were determined at the time they 
 made that offer to deceive the confidence placed therein. 
 
 No oath can he lawful that is extorted, particularly 
 where a man is put into a ftate of neceflity, that is to 
 fay, forced to fwear upon pain of death. 
 
 ScL 1. — In this cafe feveral queflions arife : 
 
 1. Whether, under fuch circumftances, a perfon ought to 
 have taken an oath, or rather ritked his life? 
 
 2. Whether an oath taken under fuch circumftances ought 
 to be kept ? 
 
 3. Whether the breaking fuch an oath amounts to perjury? 
 Sch. 2. — The determination of thefe queftions principally de- 
 pends upon the confideration whether the juror was really 
 in an unjuft manner put into a ftate of abfolute, extreme 
 
 or 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 233 
 
 cr refpeftive neceffity, and whether in either cafe his own 
 agency has not led to his being placed therein. 
 Referring the reader, therefore, to the explanations which 
 we have given of thefe ftates, we willingly leave the de- 
 cifion with the unfortunate perfon, rather than with the 
 dry philofopher and difputant, who fits at his fire-fide rea- 
 foning on what he never has experienced and parhaps 
 never (hall. — It is eaiy faid, rather lofe your life than take 
 fuch an oath. 
 
 With refpecl: to the fecond particular, it is to be obferved, 
 that an oath may confirm, but can never confritute an 
 obligation. An oath, therefore, cannot bind us to do 
 what is wrong and contrary to all manner of obligations. 
 
 As for the third particular, it is plain, that what is unlawful 
 to be taken and unjufi to be kept, ceafes to be a crime 
 when difmified as foon as poilible. 
 
 Sch. 3. — It is a wrong idea to fuppofe that an oath is a promife 
 to God. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Extorted oaths, where a perfon has been put into a 
 ftate of unjufi fear, or threatened with unjufi violence, 
 have nothing left with refpecl to moral agency in the op- 
 prefled, but the name without the lean; fhadow of validity. 
 
 There may be cafes wherein an oath lawfully ten- 
 dered and taken becomes morally impoftible with re- 
 fpect to a literal performance thereof: for inftance, the 
 oath of allegiance binds virtually to fincerity and faith- 
 fulnefs towards the ftate or nation of which we are 
 members : this oath, however, may be literally worded 
 in fentences which refer to the perfon or perfons a.dmi- 
 niftering the public affairs of that ftate or nation. Sup- 
 pofe fuch perfons become ufurpers, and fubvert public 
 good; are we bound to fupport them in their iniquitous 
 deflgns ? No rational man will fay fo. No oath can bind 
 us to deftroy the rights or liberties of our country. 
 
 H h CHAPTER 
 
234 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Of pa£Is and patlitious rights. 
 
 JljLS long as we depend upon the help and afiiftance 
 of others, on the tenure of imperfect right, fo long 
 our felicity in that refpect is uncertain and precarious ; 
 for others may withhold or withdraw it at a time when 
 it may be mort wanting : our happinefs, therefore, 
 would be better confulted, and we might with greater 
 fecurity and eafe enter upon purfuits more extenfively 
 ufeful, if we could place ourfelves in fuch a ftate as to 
 obtain a perfect right to demand, and in cafe of refufal, 
 to compel that alliftance. 
 
 It is therefore a duty, that we think of lawful means 
 by which the expectation of that afliftance may become 
 of perfect right on our part, and of perfect obligation 
 on the part of our neighbour. 
 
 Both reafon and experience know of no other lawful 
 ways of obtaining fuch a perfect right in what is natu- 
 rally our neighbour's own, than by the law of repara- 
 tion, which we mail in future call the law of forfeiture y 
 or by his formal and determined will and confent; that 
 is to fay, there is no mode, beiides forfeiture, to obtain 
 a perfect right in our neighbour's property or perfon, 
 but by way of 'pafit. 
 
 Before we can well underftand the nature of a pact, 
 we muft have a diftinct knowledge of all its ingredients. 
 
 The ingredients of a patl are thefe four : promife, 
 confent, acceptance, and transfer. 
 
 By 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 235 
 
 By promife^ we underftanoV that declaration of the 
 will by which we fignify to another our intention of 
 performing fomething beneficial to him: if the pro- 
 mifee offer to the promifer fomething advantageous in 
 return, the promife is faid to be mutual or reciprocal. 
 Sch. 1. — No mutual promife, or claim founded upon it, can 
 take place without a previous jimple promife, or the per- 
 formance thereof. 
 
 Sch. 2. — It is to be obferved, that fome authors take promife 
 in a fenfe quite different from that which our definition 
 determines; fome even defignate pa£ts by that name. 
 
 Since both fimple and mutual promifes are declara- 
 tions of the will, it follows, that fuch as cannot exercife 
 their will cannot make lawful and binding promifes. 
 
 The exercife of the will depends either upon a phy- 
 fical or a moral poflibility. 
 
 Thofe are deftitute of the phyfical poflibility who 
 cannot exercife their underftanding, or have not the 
 liberty to exercife fpontaneity; as, children of a certain 
 age, with refpecl to a.great variety of things; lunatics 
 and madmen, with refpecl to all manner of objects ; 
 perfons in a delirious paroxyfm of ficknefs: likewife, 
 thofe who are under co-action, or particularly in a ftate 
 of neceflity. 
 
 A moral poflibility to exercife underfTanding and 
 will has reference to the lawfulnefs of the object, of 
 promifes. If we promife a thing that belongs to ano- 
 ther, or is repugnant to law, the promife is ipfo fatta 
 void-, that is to fay, it is wrong to make it and unjuh: 
 to keep it. A lawful promife may likewife become 
 unlawful with refpect to the eventual performance 
 thereof. 
 
 There is alfo a phyfical impoflibility conceivable 
 
 in 
 
2?6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 o 
 
 m promifes with refpect to their objects, if fuch objects 
 are not in our power. 
 
 ScL — In this cafe we may diftinguifh three particular circum- 
 fiances: i. either that the promifer knew the impoffibility 
 at the time he made the promife ; 2. that the impoffibility 
 not then forefeen happened by the wilful act of the pro- 
 mifer; or, 3. that the impoffibility arofe by accident. 
 
 In the firft and fecond cafes the promifer is guilty of intend- 
 ed fraud; in the third he is free from guilt. 
 
 Since it is the nature of promifes to be for the ad- 
 vantage of others, that is, for aiding and aflifting them 
 by the ufe of our powers; and fince our powers are 
 various, either thofe of the foul or of the body, or fuch 
 as may be derived from our eftate or influence ; nay, 
 iince by each of them our neighbour may be aided and 
 aflifted in an innumerable variety of ways, and in va- 
 rious degrees ; it follows, that promifes, with refpect to 
 their objects, muft be inconceivably multifarious. 
 
 In whatever manner we aflift others, the confequence 
 will be, that they poifefs our powers as far as that af- 
 fiftance extends. But fince promife implies an intended 
 ailiflance, it follows, that by promifing we declare our 
 will that fome of our powers mould become another's 
 own, that is to fay, that what is our own mould be- 
 come another's. \ 
 
 But as from the will of any finite being no imme- 
 diate inference can be drawn of the existence of things, 
 it follows, that by the promife of any finite being the 
 object thereof does not become our own ; the bare 
 promife, therefore, gives the promifee no perfect right 
 in the thing which has been promifed : the promifer, 
 for inftance, may change his mind, or the promife, with 
 refpect to performance, may become phyfically or mo- 
 rally 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 237 
 
 rally impoflible : it is likewife pofiible for the promifee 
 not to be willing to have the object of the protnife. So 
 much is certain, that promifes are among thofe things 
 which are not and indeed cannot be obtruded. 
 
 The lead that is required on the part of the promifee 
 is his confent, for without this the performance would 
 be deftitute of an object. We might promife to the 
 man of the moon as well as to a perfon who rejects our 
 offer, with this difference, that in the latter cafe we 
 mew more difcretion, and act from principles of phi- 
 lanthropy. 
 
 Moral confent confifts in an identity of will declared, 
 or fuppofed to be declared, by free agents, with refpect 
 to the enuring or rejecting of particular objects. 
 
 Perfons not having the phyrlcal faculty to will, can- 
 not confent; as, children, with refpect to many things ; 
 lunatics and madmen, in all cafes •, perfons in a delirious 
 ftate, caufed by a natural derangement of their faculties ; 
 and all who are under co-action, particularly in a Rate 
 of necerTity : for in thefe cafes agents have not the ex- 
 ercife of underftanding, or no room left for exercifing 
 fpontaneity: they may utter words, or do actions, 
 which, by a grammatical contraction, denote what may 
 be called phyjical confent •, but as no moral agency takes 
 place, the confent is not moral, and consequently void. 
 
 Sell.- — There is a vaft diilin&ion between the promife or con- 
 feat of a perfon in a delirium occafioned by ficknefs, and 
 that of perfons who have placed themfelves in fuch a itate 
 by intoxication and drunkennefs : it is true, in both cafes 
 the agents know not what they do or ought to do; but in 
 the rirft the actions are not moral, and in the laft they may 
 have different degrees of immorality and guilt. 
 
 Perfons have not the moral poilibility to will, when 
 the object of their intention is unlawful : we may not 
 
 confent, 
 
238 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 confent, that what belongs to others fhould be made 
 ufe of or be taken away ♦, neither may we confent to 
 things which are repugnant to the dictates of the natu- 
 ral laws : fuppofe things which are lawful mould be- 
 come, in courfe of time or under circumftances, of a 
 contrary nature or tendency, it cannot be juft that we 
 continue our confent. 
 
 Unlawful confent, with refpect both to its origin and 
 continuance, is not only void, but alfo criminal and 
 wicked, with reference to the moral caufe as well as to 
 the proximate. 
 
 Perfons who do not under ftand one another's mean- 
 ing, cannot exercife an identity of will -, confent, there- 
 fore, in fuch circumftances, is void : if it proceed from 
 the fpontaneity of one or the other party, it becomes 
 more or lefs criminal, according to the various degrees 
 of immorality flowing from the intention of the agent 
 and effect of the deception. 
 
 Since an identity of will implies a purpofe that fomc 
 effect mould take place, that is to fay, that fomething 
 .mould be brought into exiftence ; and flnce nothing 
 exifts but what is of an individual nature; it follows, 
 that the object of confent muft be particularly deter- 
 mined, and that moral confent is and in its nature mufl 
 be particular. 
 
 Univerfal confent is therefore only ideal, and may be 
 
 faid to find place where a latitude is left with refpect to 
 
 the particular actions, as well as the modes and manner, 
 
 by and in which a purpofe may be obtained or effected. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Still the purpofe is always fomething of an individual 
 nature: if the end is juft, we may be fuppofed to confent 
 to all juft means leading to that end, but not to thofe 
 which are of a contrary nature: for inftance; I confent 
 
 to 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 239 
 
 to let a perfon have a certain part of my property, pro- 
 vided he fatisfies my creditors; he may do that by paying 
 cafh, or giving other fecurity, &c. But fuppofe he robs 
 another perfon, and fatisfies my creditors with the money 
 he has thus unjuftly taken away; can any part of this 
 wicked deed be charged to my account upon that general 
 or univerfal confent? 
 Sch. 2. — If we reflect on the legiflative and executive powers 
 of government, there feems to be an univerfal or general 
 confent of the people neceflary for the exercife of thofe 
 powers in enacting and putting into execution public 
 laws and ordonnances, which are things eventual, and of 
 fuch a nature that they cannot be determined: however 
 that may be, it ought to be obferved, that, in free govern- 
 ments, neither the perfons adminiftering thofe powers, 
 nor the effects of the exercife of them, with refpect to the 
 purpofe and ultimate end of the confent of the people, are 
 things of a general nature. The purpofe of my vote at 
 an election, with refpect to the reprefentative body of the 
 people, is eventually for that individual perfon who has 
 obtained the majority of votes. The confent, likewife, 
 of citizens, with refpect to laws, becomes fpecific if re- 
 ferred to each particular claufe which they contain, or 
 rather is fpecific, becaufe it concentrates in every thing 
 that is found by the majority to be moll conducive to the 
 public good. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Gentlemen who confer the title my cmfiituents folely 
 upon the county, diftri<5t or ftate from which they derive 
 their political exiftence, or who confult its interefts 
 feparate from the intereft of the whole, have not fuifi- 
 ciently confidered that they hold their ftaticn by the con- 
 fent of the country in general, and that they mult confult 
 the public happinefs of all if they do juftice to their con- 
 ftituents. 
 
 Sch. 4. — The regulations and fpecific laws, therefore, in all 
 their particular claufes, bind every citizen, as they have 
 taken place by his confent, and muft remain his laws as 
 long as they are judged by the majority to promote the 
 public good. 
 
 Where there is no identity of will, there cannot be 
 a confent : if, therefore, it fliould be an object of enqui- 
 ry 
 
240 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ry, whether a perfon has or has not confented, it muft 
 be made to appear that he is or has been willing, or 
 /nuft be fuppofed to be either the one or the other, with 
 refpect to fome particular effect or confequence. 
 
 There are various ways, therefore, by which the 
 confent of perfons may be inferred : it is either declared 
 by words, that is, by figns which are in common ufe for 
 exhibiting our thoughts, or is collected from actions 
 and figns different from words ; or it follows from the 
 nature of things, and of other particular circumftances. 
 In the fii-ft. cafe, confent is called explicit, in the fecond 
 tacit, in the laft it is laid to be conftruffive. 
 
 Sch. i. — Both explicit and tacit confent is diftinguifhed into 
 certain or probable: to form a judgment of the one or the 
 other, it is neceifary that words be interpreted in their 
 moft ordinary fenfe, or in the fenfe in which it appears 
 from other figns that they were intended to be nfed. 
 With refpect to tacit confent, we muft judge whether an 
 action has been performed with a view to raife a belief in 
 others of our confent, or is known naturally to excite 
 fuch a belief. The cuftoms of places and countries and 
 the complexion of other circumftances will be a great 
 help for determining whether tacit confent is ^certain, 
 fuppofed, or only pretended. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Conftru£tive confent is of the utmoft importance, 
 and therefore particularly worthy our attention : it is by 
 this that conftitutions and laws are binding upon pofteri- 
 ty — a fubje£t which a late writer feems to have ferioufly 
 difputed, denying that there ever has been any binding 
 force upon pofterity in any thing which their progenitors 
 might have done. Suppofe but for a moment, that there 
 is truth or propriety in this aflertion ; the confequence 
 will be, that no country can have conftitutions or laws 
 binding any perfons at all. The framers of a conftitu- 
 tion are perhaps all called from the ftage of human affairs: 
 laws exift, the authors of which now lie in the duft; a 
 new generation has taken the room of their progenitors: 
 if they .are not fubject to the regulations which their fa- 
 thers 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ?4I 
 
 thers made by conflruclive confent, how can it be proved 
 that they are fubject at all? The miilake feems to pro- 
 ceed from the erroneous idea, that men enter life in an 
 abfolute natural ftate, having no connection with nor re- 
 lation to others; which is as abfolutely contradielorv to 
 experience, as it would be impoflible for new generations 
 to be happy without provisions of this kind being made 
 by their ancefiors: for it is known, that men come upon 
 and withdraw from the (rage of life fo imperceptibly and 
 fo gradually, that it would be very difficult to pitch upon 
 a, time when the public acts of the prefent day would not: 
 have as profpective an influence on poflerity, as thofe of 
 our forefathers had on the prefent generation. 
 
 As long, therefore, as pofterity abide under that conftitutiori 
 and thole laws, as long as they refide under their govern- 
 ment, fo Ion? they mull be deemed to have given their 
 confent. We allow that a diflenter may withdraw him- 
 felf from the country which is under the jurifdiction of 
 thofe laws, but we do not deem it jufi that he mould have 
 a right to attempt fo hazardous an enterprife as to change 
 them to his liking. Let the majority of the people at any 
 time make ufe of that better eftabiimed right of nature, 
 by which a community may govern itfelf, as it is founcj. 
 bed for the advancement of 'general happinefs. 
 
 ScL 3. — It is upon tacit and conftru&ive confent that the laws 
 and conftitutions are binding upon each individual of the 
 flate: a ftranger taking up his refidence in a country is 
 prefumed to be willing to comport with its laws: he 
 who gives free accefs to his houfe, is fuppofed to confenf 
 to a free departure : he who afks in a tavern for victuals, 
 drink, &c. is fuppofed to haye given his confent to pay. 
 
 §ch. 4.— -It is upon conftru6live confent that we claim a right, 
 given to our firft parents, to the creatures of the earth t 
 it is upon this confent that we have been parties in the 
 covenant of works concluded with them, 
 
 Sf/i. 5. — Thefe distinctions of confent are likewife applicable 
 
 ■ to promifes: we may expreiTiy promife by words which 
 
 render the promife certain, or only probable. The fame 
 
 may be the cafe with refpect to tacit promife: nay, there; 
 
 is likewife fuch a thing as conftructive promifes. 
 
 As fpon as the promifee gives his confent to th§ 
 
 I j proniifo 
 
242 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 promife, he declares that he will have the thing pro- 
 mifed for his own ; for in this cafe both his will and 
 that of the promifer meet, and without it no confent 
 could take place, as there would not be an identity of 
 will. 
 
 But as nothing refults from confent but will, it i*s 
 evident, that from confent to promifes a perfect right 
 can with no more propriety take place, than a promife 
 made can put the promifer under a perfect obligation 
 to keep it. 
 
 It is no more than imperfect right and obligation, 
 and therefore reds upon the perfon's own difcretion and 
 choice, whether he will or will not perform it ; that is, 
 there is no force or compulsion. 
 
 We ft and to our promife if we actually and finally do 
 for another's advantage what we have declared to be 
 our intention. 
 
 We are mofl facredly bound to beware of all man- 
 ner of improper or unlawful engagements, and faith- 
 fully to perform all our lawful promifes; for it is a 
 facred duty, that we act conformably to the precepts 
 and prohibitions of imperfect obligations and laws, and 
 make it an invariable rule to fpeak the moral truth. 
 
 He who is ftrict in obferving his promifes is a man 
 of probity, a contrary character is juftly reckoned des- 
 picable: a man who forfeits his word is either guilty 
 of great indifcretion, or is a difhoneft impoftor-, he 
 defervedly lofes his character and credit : thefe being 
 gone, there remains nothing worthy the efteem of an 
 honefl: man. 
 
 From what has hitherto been explained it follows, 
 that if promife and confent refpectively produce perfect 
 
 right 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 243 
 
 right and obligation, both the one and the other hiuft 
 be fupported by certain adfcs from which thefe effects 
 refpectively rcfult. 
 
 That act which the promifee performs in confequence 
 of his confent, in order to have a perfect right in the 
 thing promifed, is called acceptance. 
 
 An act that produces fuch a right mufr. be lawful ; 
 but no acl, whatever its other qualities may be, can be 
 lawful, that is to fay, can be a mean by which we law- 
 fully acquire a perfect right in what is another's own, 
 except he confents to it, and confequently fupports his 
 promife by an additional act, declarative of his acquie- 
 scence in the acceptance of the promife. Such an act 
 on the part of the promifer is called transfer, hccaufe 
 his will, fupported by an act of his own, is a fufHcient 
 caufe why the other mould have compenfation for the 
 trouble he has taken in performing acts which the pro- 
 mifer has encouraged, and by fubfequent confent has 
 directed and appointed : for the powers by which he 
 thus acted were his own, and non-performance on the 
 part of the promifer would naturally amount to a dif- 
 turbance in what would be the property of the promifee, 
 for as fuch the fruit of his labour rauft be conhdered. 
 
 The promife, on the part of the promifer, with re- 
 fpect to the acceptance, is conditional ; as if he were! 
 faying, if any perfon does fuch a thing, I will give him 
 fuch a thing for his own. If the promife is addrefled 
 to a particular perfon, it may be called perfonai, becaufe 
 the promifer confents to a certain act under this exprefs 
 condition, that the promifee be the particular agent 
 thereof: but if it be addreiTed in general to the per- 
 former of a fpecifled act, the promife is real, becauie an\ 
 author of that act is the promifee, or rather the acceptor. 
 
&44 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the act fpecified in that condi- 
 tion is performed, the performer, according to the tenor 
 of that condition, is to look upon the thing promifed 
 as Ins own, as the fruit of his labour; that is, he has 
 obtained a perfect right in it, and the promifer is under 
 a perfect obligation to make good his promife. 
 
 Where, therefore, there is acceptance with the con- 
 fent of the promifer, there acceptance is effectual, and 
 transfer has taken place. 
 
 Sck. — It ought to be particularly obferved, that confent on the 
 promifer's part is moft elTentially necefiary for rendering 
 acceptance effectual ; for, as the owner, he has a right to 
 direct the things promifed as he pleafes, and to fpecify 
 the conditions upon which he will part with his property; 
 if the promife is perfonal, no other but the perfon de- 
 fcribed has a right to acceptance; if it be real, no one has 
 a claim as acceptor except he who has done that particu- 
 larly fpecified act which the promifer has engaged to take 
 as an acceptance: for inftance; if a father tells his 
 Vourigel! fon that he will give him a watch if he learns 
 his catechifm within fuch a time, can the fervant in the 
 houfe or any of his other fons claim the promife, if the 
 requihtion has been complied with by either of them r or 
 if you engage that any perfon who mould be able to give 
 vou notice of a certain ftrayed horfe mail have fuch a furri 
 of money, are you bound to pay one who comes and gives 
 notice of another of your horfes which had not ftrayed ? 
 Certainly not. 
 
 By ftipulations are underftood particular actions or 
 forms, which the laws or cuftoms of a country or 
 place have introduced for the purpofe of taking the 
 place of thofe acts by which acceptance and transfer 
 are performed. 
 
 Qcfc i. — Stipulation is a word of Pvoman origin, and is derived 
 from their particular cuftom of accompliihing pa6ts and 
 contracts: it was thus: two perfons toOka piece of flraw^ 
 broke it in two, and then exchanged pieces. Thus ac- 
 ceptance was made, confent to it given, and the requilire 
 
 a£ts 
 
JtfORAL PHILOSOPHY. 245 
 
 afts performed, both on tlie part of the prornifer and of 
 the promifee, for transferring perfect: right. 
 
 &•//. 2. — In dead of the ftipulations of the Romans, the modern 
 Ki.ropeans havte introduced, for the moil common tranf- 
 aciions of life, certain words, expreflions, orfigns; as, 
 
 'tis a tvor J— done — may 1 depend upon it T — you may — -jhaking 
 hands — nodding^ftrikrng ivith a hammer at vendue — -giving 
 an earnejt — ajking the price at markets or in flores, and con- 
 fent ing to this price, &c. 
 
 Sch. 3. — -Since the art of writing has become general, the fti- 
 pulations requiiite in the more important occurrences of 
 life muff be done in writing; fome are confined to this 
 alone, others require hand and feal, and others again $ 
 befides thefe, a certain number of witneffes. 
 
 From what has hitherto been explained it appears, 
 that effectual acceptance includes promife, confent, ac- 
 ceptance and transfer ; that is to fay, all the requisites 
 neceffary for constituting a pact : a pa£l may therefore 
 be defined to be a promife effectually accepted. 
 
 There are various denominations or fpecies of pacts*, 
 as, treaties, compacts, contracts, covenants, agrees 
 ments, bargains, fales, &c. 
 
 That pact is faid to be formal, which comprehends" 
 promile, acceptance thereof, and the promifer's con- 
 fen t to the acceptance. 
 
 That pact is informal^ where a conftructive promife 
 or confent takes place. 
 
 Explicit pacts are fuch as contain explicit promife 
 and confent •, but thofe in which tacit promife or con- 
 fent takes place, are called tacit pacts. 
 
 Perfons who cannot promife or confent cannot be 
 parties to a formal pact, whether tacit or explicit. 
 
 A pact is void when either promife or confent is not 
 in the power of either party. 
 
 Sck. 
 
24-6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 SlL — If the impoflibility of performance has been known by 
 the promifer, or if it has been wilfully caufed by him af- 
 ter the pact has been concluded, he is guilty of perfidy, 
 fraud and injury. 
 
 A pad wherein either the promife or confent is un- 
 lawful, is invalid and unlawful. 
 
 If the terms of a pact admit of different conftruc- 
 tions, the performance is to be made in the fenfe which 
 the promifer apprehended at the time the acceptor re- 
 ceived it. 
 
 Sch. — Having laid down the three requisites for a formal pact, 
 to wit, promife, acceptance, and confent to this accept- 
 ance, or what is called transfer, it ought to be obferved, 
 that we do not in all tranfaetions find them always dif- 
 tinctly exhibited, fo that it requires fome deliberation to 
 determine who is the promifer or acceptor; as, for in- 
 ifcmce, in ftores and markets: the goods or provifions ex- 
 hibited are doubtlefs promifed on condition of acceptance, 
 that is, a certain price flipulated: the buyer confents by 
 afking the price, and fupporting it by paying what is re- 
 quired, the bargain is concluded. 
 
 In all cafes,, except that of forfeiture, where we 
 make ufe of another's property without his confent to 
 our acceptance, we are chargeable with ufurpation. 
 
 A p'otefi is an explicit declaration of our difient to 
 certain proceedings, and a fuitable and neceffarv expe- 
 dient for the prefervation of our rights, particularly in 
 thole cafes where filence might be conrtrued into tacit 
 confent. 
 
 Since by the rtipulations of a pact the promifer has 
 transferred his own to another, inverting him with a 
 perfect right to difpofe thereof as he fnall pleafe, it 
 ibllows, that the former is under perfect obligation to 
 perform what he has thus promifed and aliened. 
 
 Hence 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 247 
 
 Hence ft likewife follows, that the acceptor has a 
 perfect right to demand, and in cafe of refufal, to com* 
 pel performance. 
 
 Pacts extorted by unjuft fear, or by the violence of 
 one of the parties, are void for want of moral confent ; 
 but if that fear has been occafioned by perfons who are 
 not a party, or who are not in collufion with one of the 
 parties, both parties have acted freely, and the pact is 
 valid and binding; for a fault committed by a third 
 perfon cannot be prejudicial to one who is guiltlefs. 
 
 The duty of performing pacts has reference folely to 
 fuch as are lawful ; for illicit plots, or unlawful agree* 
 ments or combinations, deferve not that honourable 
 name. 
 
 Sen. — To form an eftimate of the lawfulnefs or validity of a 
 pacTr, we muft particularly attend to the nature of the pro- 
 mife and confent, both with refpec! to the parties and 
 their objecls. 
 
 The perfect rights and obligations refulting from 
 
 pacts, are called paclitious. Partitions rights are 
 
 reckoned among the perfonal rights of men. 
 
 If the promifer makes a declaration that he has 
 changed his will, be is faid to revoke; but as fuch a 
 revocation cannot juftly take place when the promife is 
 effectually accepted of, except by the confent of the 
 acceptor, it follows, that pacts are irrevocable. 
 
 Pacts are dirtinguifhed into obligatory ', libcratory, and 
 mixt: by the firft an obligation is constituted; by the 
 fecond a fubiifting obligation is done away ; by the laft 
 a new obligation is fubftituted in the place of one for- 
 merly fubfifting between the parties. 
 
 There is likewife a distinction of pacts into pure and 
 conditional; thofe pacts are conditional, where the pro- 
 mife 
 
2A.S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mife is made with the exprefs provifo of its becoming 
 
 binding upon a future event, the exiftence of which is 
 
 uncertain. The obligation of performance in a coiirr 
 
 ditional pa<5fc depends upon the exiftence of an uncer-? 
 
 tain event; as, for inftance, ten years hence if I live, 
 
 ©r when I fhall enter upon a certain inheritance of 
 
 which I have fome expectation, &c. 
 
 Sch. — A certain event does not make a pa£t conditional tiiougfy 
 it be ever fo diftant. 
 
 Pacts made upon an impoflible condition are void : 
 if the promifer knew the impofTibility, or if he is the 
 caufe thereof, he is guilty of fraud. 
 
 A pact to which no exprefs condition is annexed, 
 Is pure. 
 
 PuYe pacts are binding immediately upon being 
 concluded-, the conditional only when the condition 
 takes place. 
 
 The moft notable of conditional pacts are thofe 
 which come under one of thefe forms : do ut des, io 
 ut facias, facto ut des, facio ut facias ; that is, where 
 the parties ftipulate value for value, value for work, 
 work for value, work for work-, as, money for goods 
 or for victuals ; money, goods or provifions for labour 
 or fervices; work, labour or fervices for money or 
 goods -, work, labour or fervice for another kind of 
 work, labour or lervice, or perhaps for the fame a£ 
 another time. 
 
 Rights are temporary or perpetual : the former are. 
 redacted with refpect to time, which is not the cafe 
 with the latter. 
 
 A pact by which temporary rights arc transferred, 
 ceafes when thole rights expire, though no exprefs 
 
 conditio!! 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. £49 
 
 condition be annexed. Parents, for inftance, have no 
 right to bind their children beyond the term of their 
 minority: an indenture, whether conditioned or un- 
 conditioned, has no binding force when the term of 
 minority expires. 
 
 He who is obligated by a pact to expedite the affairs 
 of another, is called a mandatary •, whilfr. the latter is 
 filled his principal. 
 
 No one can claim the right or trufl of a mandatary 
 who cannot make it appear that certain affairs are fpe- 
 cifically committed to his care; becaufe the principal's 
 confent muft be fuppofed, and there is no fuch thing as 
 univerfal confent. 
 
 As the mandatary, by undertaking the commifTion 
 of the affairs of another, is under a perfect obligation 
 to fulfil his charge; (o the principal has a perfect ri^ht 
 to compel fuch commifTion, and in cafe of non-per- 
 formance or mal-practice, to recover damages. 
 
 A commijjioner is mandatary in all that is fpecificaJly 
 cntrufted to his care, and the principal is refponfible for 
 whatever he does in purfuance of this truft, but is clear 
 of all whereby it is exceeded. 
 
 Sch. — The fpecific powers are either explicitly determined bv 
 credentials, instructions, &c. or are deduced from tacit or 
 conftruftive confent, as they reft upon the cufiom or 
 general practice of tranfactions of that kind, or flow from 
 the nature of the truft itfelf. 
 
 A principal may conclude valid pacts with others 
 by the agency of his mandatary; for the moral and 
 principal caufe can produce effects by others. 
 
 Pacts concluded with a mandatary, in the name of 
 his principal, are binding upon the latter in all that the 
 
 K k former 
 
25O MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 former has done in virtue of fpecific powers for that 
 purpofe. 
 
 There are fome rights transferred, which, in their 
 nature or under particular circumftances, involve the 
 right of a mandatary •, that is to fay, imply fpecific 
 truft: what, therefore, a perfon does in purfuance of 
 fuch rights, is as binding on his principal as if he had 
 given a fpecial commirTion for the purpofe ; as, a ge- 
 neral in procuring fupplies, furrendering fortifications, 
 confenting to a temporary armiftice, &c. a fervant fent 
 abroad with a waggon, coach, &c. in having neceffary 
 repairs made, &c. 
 
 Pads are diftinguifhed into unilateral and bilateral. 
 In the former there is but one promifer, and acceptance 
 is juftly fuppofed, becaufe no reciprocal engagement is 
 required. Of this kind of pads are laft will and tefta- 
 ment, legacies and donations, which for this reaibn 
 have obtained the name of gratuitous paffs. To this 
 kind of pads likewife moral ifts refer commirTions un- 
 dertaken gratuitoufly, gratuitous loans for ufe, gratui- 
 tous keeping of the goods of others, &c. 
 
 In bilateral pads there is reciprocal promife, confent, 
 acceptance and transfer. Acceptance and transfer can- 
 not here be fuppofed, but are required by virtue of 
 perfed right in both parties. Of this kind of pads 
 are treaties, compadts, contrads, &c. which for this 
 reafon are called onerous^ becaufe fomething is required 
 on both fides. 
 
 There may be pads of more than two parties ; for 
 inftance, the triple and quadruple alliances recorded in 
 hiitory ; the combination of the powers of Europe, fo 
 much the topic of converfation at this time, &c. 
 
 Faditious 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 25I 
 
 Factitious rights and obligations may ceafe in various 
 ways. 
 
 In a conditional pact the obligation ceafes when the 
 condition becomes impoflibLe. 
 
 In any other pad, when the paditious right is re- 
 mitted. 
 
 Pads are dijfolved when both parties remit their re- 
 ciprocal paditious rights: the diffolution then pro- 
 ceeds from mutual confcnt. 
 
 Perfidy in one of the parties to a bilateral pad frees 
 the other from obligation, if he chufes to avail himfelf 
 of that expedient ; if he is otherwife inclined, the pad 
 is ftill binding on the perfidious party, who is liable to 
 profecution and bound to make reparation. 
 
 In a matrimonial contrad there are various caufes, 
 both with refped to its nature and tendency, which 
 render it indiflbluble even by the mutual confent of 
 the parties* 
 
 k AxvJ* 
 
PART II. 
 
 Sect. II. Comprehending natural jurifprudence. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of rights in things. 
 
 w. 
 
 E are faid to difpofe of things, if we determine, 
 by an act of our will, the mode and manner in which 
 they are to be ufed by others. 
 
 Sck. — Thus we difpofe of lands, of houfes, provifions, ap- 
 parel, &c. if we fell, leafe, exchange, or make a prefent 
 of them, &c. 
 
 Thole who have not the exercife of understanding, 
 cannot fignify their will in the moral fenfe of the term, 
 and are confequently incapable to difpofe of things. 
 
 Sch. i. — In the forum of nature, children cannot difpofe of 
 things of importance before they arrive to years of dif- 
 cretion ; and as this may take place fooner or later with 
 refpect to different individuals, the civil laws, which ex- 
 hibit general rules for human conduct, have affigned a 
 determinate number of years, antecedent to which no 
 difpofitions of youth are binding or valid: no male per- 
 fon, for inftance, can convey landed property before a 
 certain age, though he may lawfully make a prefent of 
 fomething belonging to his perfonal eftate, &c. 
 
 Sch. i. — Lunatics, madmen, perfons not compos mentis, or de- 
 ranged in their minds by a frantic fit of ficknefs, cannot 
 make any valid difpofitions as long as they are in that 
 ftate of natural imbecility. 
 
 Sch. 
 
Z'ji MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Neither can fuch difpofitions be lawful where the 
 things difpofed of are in themfelves unlawful, or not 
 our own. 
 
 Sck. 4. — Things our own and lawful in themfelves, cannot 
 render a difpofition of them lawful when it is made for a 
 bad end ; for in this, as well as in the two preceding cafes, 
 we have not a moral poflibiiity to wilL 
 
 If we may lawfully difpofe of things, we are faid to 
 have a right in them. 
 
 The things of which we may difpofe are either the 
 actions of men, or the necefTaries and conveniencies of 
 life, and what contributes thereto : in the former cafe 
 our right is ftiled a right in perfons -, in the latter, a 
 right in things. 
 
 Sch. — Rights in things are diftinguifned into real and perform I: 
 the former have refpect to things which cannot be carried 
 out of their places, as lands and tenements ; the latter take 
 place in fuch things as may attend the owner's peribn 
 wherever he thinks proper to go; as, money, goods, 
 horfes, waggon, utenfils, furniture, &c. 
 
 Of whatever defcription things may be, there are 
 various ways in which they may be difpofed of j for 
 things have their fubitauces, and from thefe fubftances 
 various emoluments may be drawn, and each of them 
 may be difpofed of for various ends, and under a va- 
 riety of reftrictions ; fo that it would be an endlefs 
 work to enter upon all the particulars which laws and 
 cuftoms have introduced concerning the nature and 
 modifications of the rights in things, and in confe- 
 quence of them have been and for the moft part are 
 jftill in vog-ue. 
 
 We mail here principally confine ourfelves to the 
 consideration of the right of property, of ufe, and of 
 ufufruet, and the right of coniuming the fubftanceof 
 things. 
 
 We 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 255 
 
 , We have the right of property in a thing, when we 
 
 may difpofe of its fubftance and all other uies. 
 
 Sch. — Thus a perfon has a right of property in an orchard, 
 when he may difpofe of the trees and of their produce, 
 and when he can extend his right of difpofal to the de- 
 struction of the trees or of their produce. 
 
 In the right of property we may diftinguifh the 
 moral pofhbility of acting, from the act itfelf ; a perfon 
 may have a right, and not exercife it of his own accord, 
 or be debarred from that exercife by a reftriction in 
 his right. This is what moralifts denote when fpeak- 
 ing of a right in afttiprimo and a right in aftu fecundo. 
 Both thefe acts together constitute perfect: dominion, 
 jiri ft property 1 where one may difpofe of it as he pleafes* 
 in a manner ccnfiftent with the law of nature. Im- 
 perfect dominion, on the contrary, is reftricted with 
 refpect to the exercife of fuch an unlimited difpofal ; 
 as is the cafe with minors, who by law or devife arc 
 proprietors of an eftate, which is under the manage- 
 ment of others until they become of age. 
 
 Where the right of property and the exercife thereof 
 are in different perfons, there a right of commonry 
 refults, extending to the exclufion of all others from 
 difpofing both of fubftance and emoluments. 
 
 When the right of property and the exercife thereof 
 are in feveral hands, each party thus interefted mav 
 exclude all thofe who have no intereft in it from dif- 
 pofing of the iubftance and emoluments : but copart- 
 ners may exclude one another only from the difpofal of 
 the fubftance and from hindrance in their actual ufes: 
 a tree, for inftance, may be common property, and 
 each may take the benefit of its fhade ; but a partner 
 occupying a particular fpot, has the exclusive right to 
 it as long as it is occupied by him. 
 
 erions 
 
7$6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PeiTons having a ftricl: right of property in a thing 
 may retain its fubftance, if it is inconfumable property, 
 and difpofe of the emoluments under various reftric- 
 tions: if the emoluments are for the own and proper 
 ufe of the party to whom the proprietor has conveyed 
 the property, his right is called ufufruti, and he him- 
 felf the ufufruffuary ; if it is conveyed for the benefit 
 of another, he has the right of ufe, and is {tiled the 
 ufuary. However, as we do not intend to enter upon 
 particulars, we mall hereafter call all rights in the 
 emoluments of things, rights of ufe. 
 
 In cafes where the ufe or ufufrucl: cannot be drawn 
 from the property without the deftruction or con-* 
 fumption of the fubftance, the right of ufe and ufufrucl 
 implies the right of confuming the fubftance. 
 
 Sch. — We cannot make ufe of fait, flour, &c. without con- 
 fuming the fubftances of thofe things: we fhould draw 
 but indifferent profits from a rented farm, if we might 
 nor cut the limber rieceflary for fences, houfes, fire- 
 wood, &c. 
 
 As tht rights of ufe, ufufrucl and confumption flow 
 from the ftricl: right of property, it follows, that things 
 which admit not of an exclufive right of u{e, ufufrucl: 
 or confumption, are not fubjects of the right of pro- 
 perty; that is, no property can be had in them; as, 
 the open fea to a certain diftance from fhore, inexhauf- 
 tible fisheries which fuch fea affords, the air, &c. 
 
 Ke who has the ftricl: right of property may difpofe 
 of the fabftance and its emoluments as he pleafes, be- 
 caufe all are his own. What is commonly laid, that a 
 proprietor in difpofing of his property is refponfible 
 only to God and his own conference, is fo far true as 
 that difpofition is confident with the general good of 
 
 mankind, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2.57 
 
 mankind, but not further; for, though a proprietor 
 has a right to difpofe of his property as he pleafes, (lilt 
 he ought not to be pleafed with any thing that is con- 
 trary to natural laws : the right of property is limited 
 as well as all other rights of men, and in cafes of colli* 
 fion, mud give way to weightier obligations and rights. 
 It is the eftablifhed order of nature, that all men have 
 their fubfiftence from the contents and produce of the 
 earth 5 there cannot, therefore, be a natural right to fe$ 
 up an ownership, or to difpofe of the things of the 
 earth in a manner contradictory to the general good of 
 mankind : nay, a right of property, a right to difpofe 
 of things as we pleafe, ceafes to be natural as foon as it 
 is inconiiftent with the general rights of mankind, 
 
 ScL 1. — Hence it may be feen, that perfons may, confidently 
 with the principles of natural law, make difpefidons or* 
 their property and other rights, which take effect after 
 their deatn. in behalf of their children and neareft rela* 
 tives and friends; becaufe fuch difjpofitions are perfectly 
 confident with the general rights and obligations o£ man- 
 kind, and are required by that dutv of love which nature 
 has enjoined to men in that intimate relation, 
 Cch. 2. — -A difpofition, on the contrary, by entailment, is un» 
 natural, becaufe it is inconfiftent with that love, fince tha 
 difpofer fuiFers himfelf to be fwayed by unnatural par-* 
 tiaiity, and lays the foundation of fervitude and domina- 
 tion, of ft rife and difcord, among his own houflio'.d, 
 among the children of one father, among natural bre-> 
 thren. In order to render one independent, he makes 
 the reft of his children dependent, and throws them upon 
 the public: he is not prompted by love to his children or 
 country, but by an ambition that proves injujjous to 
 both. 
 Sch. 3.— -It ought to be obferved, that unlimited andsxclufiva 
 right in things, mentioned in the fequel, is always to 
 be underftood under this limitation, that it muft be con-* 
 fiftent with the order of nature, and of confequence witl; 
 the eternal principles of natural law.. 
 
 L 1 As 
 
2 § 3 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 As the proprietor is vefted with a perfect and ex- 
 clusive right, with refpect to the fubftance and emolu- 
 ments of his property, lb all the rights which he con- 
 veys are of a perfect and exclufive nature. 
 
 If, therefore, he has once conveyed any right con- 
 nected with his property, thofe perfons who are vefted 
 therewith have not only a right to exclude others, but 
 even the proprietor himfelf, from interfering in their 
 refpective rights. It is on this account that not only 
 common converfation, but even treatifes on the fubject 
 of rights in things, attribute to the rights of ufufruct, 
 of ufe, and of many other kinds of tenures, the name 
 of property. 
 
 At this rate, the ufufructuary has a right of property 
 ill the ufufrucl:, the ufuary in the ufe, &c. 
 
 As the proprietor is injured if the ufuary or ufu- 
 fructuary wafte his fubftance in an unneceflary manner, 
 fo the latter may be injured by the proprietor, when 
 hindered from the fubftance abfolutely necefTary for 
 the exercife of their refpective rights: befides this, 
 they have a peremptory right to exclude the proprietor 
 and all others from interference in the emoluments to 
 which their rights entitle them. 
 
 As the right of property is immediately connected 
 with the right of pojfeffion, the right of reclaiming pof- 
 fejjion^ when others unjuftly retain propery for their 
 own ufe, and the right of alienation \ fo are the one 
 or the other, or both of the former, connected per 
 fe with the rights of ufe and ufufruct, when the 
 emoluments cannot be drawn without poffeftion, but 
 not otherwife: the right of alienation cannot extend 
 farther than their rights extend, and it is poflible that 
 
 the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 2$$ 
 
 the proprietor has granted thofe rights under the ex- 
 
 prefs reftriction that they fhould not be transferred. 
 
 Sch. — If a farm is rented to a perfon and his affigns, he can 
 alienate the ufufruct as far as it is given him and for the 
 term of his leafe: but if affigns are not expreflly men- 
 tioned, the civil laws will not permit the right of aliena- 
 tion, becaufe fuch things ought to be expreflly ftipulated 
 for the prefervation of peace in the community ; while, 
 on the contrary, natural law would permit fuch alie- 
 nations as far as they are not prejudicial or injurious to 
 the proprietor. 
 
 With refpeet to the various tenures of rights in 
 things, thofe authors may be confulted who have ex- 
 prefsly treated of them. So much feems necefiary to 
 be here obferved, that all thofe rights which are in 
 vogue amongft Europeans, are of a feudal complexion, 
 with this difference, that the fmaller parcels of landed 
 property are held for the confederations of rent, or part 
 of the produce, when the more extenfive poflefnons are 
 in the ancient form of fer vices. 
 
 By the feudal fyftem, the conqueror, in whofe place 
 modern times have fubftituted the higheft authority in 
 a ftate, conveyed property under a certain refervation 
 of right. He obtained the appellation of Lord Para- 
 mount: the latter was (tiled fimply Lord, or VaJJal. 
 
 Sch. i. — When the King of Great-Britain had jurifdictioa over 
 the country now the United States of America, he gave 
 whole provinces to certain proprietors, referving to him- 
 felf and his fucceflbrs a pepper corn, a beaver (kin, &c. 
 as an acknowledgment of his foyereignly and their de- 
 pendence: the dependent lords parted in a fimilar mannei- 
 with their property, for a certain confideration and for an 
 annual quit-rent. Our flate referves all mines and pre- 
 cious metals, &c. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The feveral manors which are extant in the United 
 States, and the thoufand lordfhips which are in embryo 
 and threaten this wsftern world of freemen with tenantry 
 
 an<4 
 
.CO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and dependence, make it worthy the attention of fotfttf 
 able pen, a friend of mankind, to bring to public view 
 the fatal confluences of feudal laws and cufforos. Of 
 freeholders it may be faid what Virgil extends to the ufe* 
 ful clafs of hufoandmen in generai: 
 
 " 0! nimium fortunaios, fua fi bona ncrint, 
 il Agricolas 
 
 Sch. 3. — Thofe who cannot be freeholders, and of corfe- 
 quence are tenants, might live free and independent as 
 well as the former in this country, where all citizens are 
 on an equal footing, if, as the poet fays, they knew 
 their advantages; if they would fer a proper value upon 
 their rights of citizenfhip, and not, like Efau, fell them 
 for a fmile of their landlord. Is it not fu indent that 
 you pay your rent and make good what the proprietor of 
 the foil has a right to demand? Should you deliver up 
 to him your rights of thinking and of enuring for your- 
 selves? Indignant boaft! that men peremptorily pro- 
 claim that they can procure fo many hundred votes at an 
 election; that another fpeaks of his great influence, &c. 
 Let every freeman learn to know his own importance j 
 let him learn to know his rights; let free Americans learn 
 to fcorn the man who pretends to influence at the price 
 of their own character: for what is the man who fuffers 
 himfeif to be fwayed and led as others think proper? 
 T anfwer, fo little a freeman, that, in fnch iniiances, he 
 renders it doubtful whether he is a free or a moral agent* 
 
 CHAPTER IL 
 
 Of the originary mode of acquiring rights in things 
 efpecially the right of property. 
 
 JL HERS cannot indeed be fitch a thing as ftrift 
 property by a right derived from nature considered in 
 itfelf; for prefuppofing here what may be clearly (ten 
 hy reafon, and is exprefsly declared by fcripture, that 
 
 the 
 
".•ORAL PHILOSOPHY, l6l 
 
 the earth and the various kinds of the produce there- 
 of are proximately deftined by the creator and preferver 
 of the whole univerfe for the ufe of man-, frill there 
 is nothing, either in the nature of men or in that of 
 things, which warrants that fole and perfect dominion 
 which one man claims and exercifes over the things of 
 this world exclttfive of the right of others. 
 
 All that can be inferred from both thefe fources is, 
 that the individuals of the human race, as thev have 
 the fame nature, labour under the fame neceflities and 
 wants, and feel the fame defires, have an equal right 
 in the fubflance and ufes of all thofe things which are 
 provided by the Moft High for the necefiary fupport 
 of their exiitence on earth, or which are calculated to 
 afford them the conveniences of life. 
 
 Men, therefore, confidered in their abfolute focial 
 ftate, as fellow citizens of the earth, have a natural 
 right of commonry, where no man may exclude others 
 in a defpotic manner from occupying the fubflance of 
 things, or from ufing their emoluments, except it be 
 in confequence of fuch reftrictions as flow from the 
 invariable order of nature, eflahlimed by the infinite 
 wifdorri and power of God, whofe will is the fupreire 
 law for the regulation of the conduct of men, in the ufe 
 they make of thofe things which the heavenly Father 
 hath been pleafed to place under their dominion and 
 direction. 
 
 As according to that order of nature men fuccefiively 
 fee the light of the world, fo the laws of nature re~ 
 fulting from that wife efiabii lament of the fovereign 
 Lord of the univerfe, do not permit a fucceeding gene- 
 ration to occupy what is already occupied, to deffroy 
 
 the 
 
262 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the labour and work of their predecefTors, or to inter- 
 rupt the peaceable ufe and pofTeflion of thofe things 
 upon which they have beflowed their diligence and 
 care ; for fuch a conduct would be palpably wrong and 
 injurious. 
 
 Hence it evidently appears, that there is an exclufive 
 Tight, which refults from the order and nature of things, 
 by which the firft occupant may exclude others from 
 oppofing him in the ufe and pofTeffion of thofe things 
 which he has occupied, as long as this ufe and occu- 
 pancy laft. 
 
 Sc/i. — The hiftory of the world informs us, that there has been 
 property in things moveable, when the earth was yet 
 confidered as a common, and all men equally entitled to 
 its produce. Thus Abraham claimed property in a well, 
 becaufe he had digged it. 
 
 But, when objects of occupancy became fcarce, fuch 
 tranfient property could not fecure the peace of man- 
 kind : when the wants of the children of men became 
 multiplied, it was found neceflary to make the foil it- 
 felf fixed and permanent property •, by means of which 
 one peribn mip;ht convey to another the fruits of his 
 labour and induftry, or a father transfer his right to his 
 children, &c. 
 
 Thus, from the natural right which each man has 
 in the fruits of his labour and induftry, flows his ex- 
 clufive right in the very fubftance improved by his 
 labour and particular care, and hence it fufficiently 
 appears why he rather mould difpofe thereof than 
 another. 
 
 The right of ftrict property is therefore hypotheti- 
 cally natural -, that is to fay, depends upon fome par- 
 ticular act cr deed of the firft occupiers and things 
 
 thus 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 363 
 
 thus appropriated to his own ufe are exelufively his 
 own, till fuch time as he does Tome other act by which 
 he mews his intention to abandon itj that is, leaves 
 property in the ftate in which it was before occupation, 
 or till it counteracts the general good cf mankind. 
 
 Sch. 1. — There is no doubt but the method of one man's 
 abandoning his property, and another feizing the vacant 
 pofleffion, if ever it had place, did not long fubfift in 
 fact, not only becaufe a pofTeflbr of property would find 
 it more eligible to exchange his improvements for an 
 equivalent, and, in coniequence thereof, would chufe 
 to transfer them by grant, fale and conveyance, rather 
 than to relinquifh them; but more principally becaufe 
 the powerful motives of that particular affection which 
 is the natural effect of the ties of blood between parents 
 and children forbid a conduct fo incongruous to that 
 tender relation. 
 To affert that the occupant abandons his property by death, 
 is to allow to that king of terrors rather too much power: 
 it is true, death feparates the owner from his pofisfiions, 
 but cannot feparate the effects of tendernefs and love 
 which a parent feels for his children, or defeat the rights 
 naturally refulting from the tender ties of that intimate 
 connection. Who fhould have a greater claim to the 
 fruits of the labour of parents, than thofe for whofe ad- 
 vantage they find both the greateft incitement and plea- 
 sure to undergo any fatigue and arduous undertaking? 
 Death cannot take away the intention of moral agents ; 
 and that father who dies without an intention that his 
 chilcrren fhould be veffed with rights in his things, does 
 not die as a father, or his children have forfeited that 
 amiable name by enormous a£ts of difobedience and 
 ingratitude. 
 
 The objection, that if a father, cr any perfcn, ha a 1 a right to 
 difpofe of Jus acquiftions one moment heynvd his life, he alfo 
 would have a right to direfl their difpojalfor a million of ages 
 after him, and the abfurdiiy and inconfjlency dreaded from 
 fuch a right, appear to us to have more fpecioufnels than 
 force ; for there is a great rationality in that difpofition. 
 As it is the prerogative of our nature to have a profpeel: 
 
 into 
 
fcd^ Moral philosophy. 
 
 into futurity, fo mod of ov.r deareft interefts He that 
 way. Suppofe a man had engaged, by pact, to conlent 
 to a transfer at a certain n\ed term, fay fix, twelve, £rc, 
 months to come; fuppofe death to have terminated that 
 man's exigence, does the right of the other therebv 
 ceafe ? can death difTblve the eternal laws of juftice? If 
 a perfon makes a wife and rational difpofition for the be- 
 nefit of his neareft and deareft friends, he follows the 
 dictates of -natural laws, and does what every man feels 
 an inclination to do; he provides for thofe whom he by 
 nature is bound to love before all other perfons; he does 
 not fta.no upon a level with the indifcreet and foolifh 
 man who builds difpofitions in the air, makes and does 
 not make difpofition; for inch would be difpofitions, if 
 they fhould compafs even a term far lefs than a million 
 of ages. Difpofitions, it mould be thought, muft have 
 a fpecific object ; and can a perfon know whether at fuch a 
 diftance of time any of his pofterity will exift? So much 
 is certain, that by the difpofition of a deceafed no perfon 
 is injured, if that difpofition was lawfully made in his life-, 
 time; if . otherwife, it ceafed before death clofed the 
 career of the difpofer. 
 
 v, is it not generally the cafe, as parents provide for 
 their children, that thefe again provide for them in the 
 davs of their infirmity ? Do not children befrow their 
 labour and care upon things in which their parents have 
 their rights, and thus mingle that which is naturally their 
 own with the property of their parents? Can it be, 
 that they fhould have no other natural right than that 
 of being the firfi occupants? At this rate, death would 
 not only rob the dead, but the living alfo o£ their natu- 
 ral right. 
 Cch. i. — The affertion, that ail property mujl ceafe upon the death 
 of a perfon, cannot hold good with refpect to uifpofitions 
 which are made in his life-time, for this very reafon, that 
 men cannot be conlidered as abfolute individuals, but are 
 fellow citizens of the world, naturally dependent upon 
 one another for mutual duties and happinefs, though, in 
 the flrict fenfe of the term, unconnected with civil fpciety. 
 We need not curtail men of their deareft natural rights in 
 order to fhew the unnatural tendency of entailments and 
 feudal tenures; for the injuftic© of fuch inftitutions is 
 
 Efficiently 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 2% 
 
 fufficiently manifeft from this particular, that they are 
 repugnant to the general rights of mankind. 
 Thofe civil inftitutions, therefore, come neareft to the duties 
 of natural law, which order the property of parents to 
 devolve upon their children in equal proportions, be- 
 caufe they are equally entitled to parental care and affec- 
 tion ; they alfo very wifely leave room for exprefs difpo- 
 fitions, which proprietors may make in their life-time 
 concerning the ufe which fhall be made of their property- 
 after their deceafe. 
 
 Sck. 3.— -Whilft we allow that civil inftitutions and municipal 
 laws have reduced the rights in things to general, fixed 
 and permanent rules, for the wife purpofes of prefervino- 
 the peace of fociety, an object highly neceffary and de- 
 firable; we maintain, that fuch rules ought not to be ar- 
 bitrary, but mould be the refult of a juft and wife mo- 
 dification of the natural rights of men, as thefe confti- 
 tute the only true bafis of the very right to pr'efcribe and 
 enforce fuch rules 5 for here is the enquiry, not what the 
 municipal laws have introduced, but whether the deter- 
 minations thereof are founded in nature. 
 
 Sch. 4.— We need only to attend to the ufe of the inftitution 
 of property, as laid down by a certain author on morality, 
 in order to be convinced that even the natural law, which 
 commands both the individual and the public happinefs 
 of mankind, furnifhes a foundation for all the wife and 
 beneficial regulations which civil laws have adopted for 
 the conduct of fociety. According to him 
 
 1. Property increafes the produce of the earth; 
 
 2. It preferves the produce of the earth to maturity,, 
 
 3. It prevents contefts. 
 
 4. It improves the conveniency of living, add encourage:. 
 induftry, the arts, agriculture and commerce; it melio- 
 rates the condition of mankind in general. 
 
 Fide Pakfs Mm: Phil Book iii. Part 1. ch, 2, 
 
 Things in general may be diftinguifhed either into 
 property or commonry, or things which belono- to 
 no perfon. In the two former kinds, certain perfons* 
 have an exclunVe right of difpofal) but fuch a rio-hc 
 
 M m finds 
 
l6S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 finds no place with refpect to the laft, unlefs forhe aft 
 or deed take place, from which an exclusive right 
 may refult; that is to fay, from which may be under- 
 flood why the agent mould have a right to difpofe of 
 fuch a thing rather than another. 
 
 In order, therefore, to prove that we have acquired 
 a right in any thing, we mull in the firfl place make it 
 appear, that we have performed a certain lawful action 
 towards appropriating it to our own ufe, and, fecondly, 
 mew, that the action thus performed contains a fufri- 
 cient caufe why we mould have it for our own, exclu- 
 sive of others. 
 
 Actions thus performed are filled modes of acquijt- 
 tion \ and if fuch an action contains a fufficient caufe 
 of an appropriation thereby made, it is faid to reft 
 upon a good title. 
 
 Hence it follows, that without a lawful mode of 
 
 acquisition and a jufl title, no right in things can be 
 
 lawfully acquired. 
 
 Sch. i. — A robber forcibly againft my will and with my know- 
 ledge appropriates my money; but he has no right of 
 property or of ufe in it, becaufe the mode of acquisition 
 is unlawful — his title is unjuft. 
 
 Sch. 2. — I buy an eftate, which is encumbered by a mortgage 
 or a judgment, give my money for it, have regular con- 
 veyances made; the mode of acquisition is lawful, but 
 the title is unjuft, for my purchafe and payment contain 
 not a fufficient caufe why I fhould rather difpofe of the 
 eftate than thofe who had an intereft in it before my pur- 
 chafe. 
 
 Sch. 3. — The proof of our right in things refts upon fyllogiftic 
 
 argumentation; as, 
 He who has performed fiieh an action has acquired a right 
 
 in fuch a particular thing. 
 The perfon N. N. has performed that action; 
 Therefore N. N. has a right in that thing. 
 
 The 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 26? 
 
 The firft and only originary mode of acquiring 
 rights in things is by way of occupancy, by which we 
 underftand the feizing a thing belonging to no body., 
 with an intention to appropriate it for our own ufe. 
 Three things, therefore, are requisite for constituting 
 a title by occupancy : Firft, that the thing which is 
 the object thereof belong to no body; fecondly, that 
 the occupier have the intention of appropriating it to 
 his own ufe-, thirdly, that in confequence of fuch in- 
 tention he actually takes it into poSTeSTion. 
 
 If one occupies a thing belonging to no perfon, he 
 thereby commits no injury; the action is confequently 
 lawful : and as it is conceivable from that very action 
 why the occupier mould difpoSe of the object of his 
 occupancy rather than others, who either were igno- 
 rant of or unconcerned about it, the occupier has a 
 juft title for his appropriation. 
 
 Occupancy, therefore, is at once a juft mode of 
 acquisition, and a juft title. 
 
 Sch. — Since God, by creation and prefervation, is the Sove- 
 reign Lord of the whole Univerfe, it is evident, that the 
 originary right of occupancy has only reference to out* 
 fellow-creatures; but if refpect be had to God, he has 
 the originary right, and occupancy, by certain acts of 
 men, is of a derivative nature.. 
 
 Things are (aid to be reHnqyiJbed, when the occu- 
 pier gives up his intention of having property there- 
 in, and, in confequence thereof, quits the pofieflicn ; 
 property, thus relinquished, returns to the original 
 Stock of tilings belonging to no body, and of confe- 
 quence becomes the property of the firft occupant. 
 
 But it is not fo in things which lie wafte* that is, 
 fuch as are not preferved or kept as things of that 
 
 nature 
 
$6% moral philosophy. 
 
 mature require ; for here is a defecl; with refpect to 
 pofTeiTion, but the owner has not given up his inten- 
 tion. Things lying wafle continue, therefore, to be 
 property, and may not be occupied. 
 
 Sch. — A plough in the field, a waggon in a wood, where the 
 owner is accuftomed to fetch his fuel, a bee-hive in a 
 yard, &c. do not lie wafle ; for things of that nature 
 mult be k#pt in fuch a manner: but the owner's coat lies 
 wafle when it is in the field, his axe when that lies in the 
 woods, the bee- hive when it is placed in the midfl of a 
 high-way, &c. 
 
 Neither can occupancy take place in things found 
 which were loft ; that is, whereof the owner has acci- 
 dentally and againft his will ceafed to preferve his 
 pofTeilion, for he retains the intention. Things found 
 mufl:, therefore, be reftored to the owner if he can 
 be known : confequently, no finder has a right to ufe 
 any thing that is found, except it be of fuch a nature 
 as to become worfe by not ufing, or as the owner 
 would fufFer detriment thereby ; for inftance, provifion 
 liable to fpoil, a horfe that mould have ftrayed, and 
 the keeping of which would incur the owner a high 
 expence : even in cafes like thefe the finder is held to 
 make reafonable compenfation for his ufe. 
 
 Sch. 1.— r-Things, of which no owner is or can be found, are 
 deemed to belong to no perfon ; the finder confequently 
 becomes the occupant until the owner prove and reclaim 
 property. 
 
 Sch. 2. — It is therefore necefTary that a finder of property en- 
 deavour to invefligate its owner, by giving fufFicient 
 public notice that fuch property is. in his pofTeilion. 
 
 $$. 3. — In fome cafes it is very difficult for the lawful owner 
 to diflinguifh his property ; as, coins of the fame value 
 and impreffion. Here the time when and the place where 
 things are loft, with other concomitant circumflances, 
 snav ferve to afcertaio the owner» 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 269 
 
 Sch. 4. — If things found and kept in life by the finder fliould 
 have an increafe whilit they are in his pofleflion, a quef- 
 tion arifes, whether the owner or the finder has a right to 
 that increafe; for inftance, a colt or a calf of a (frayed 
 mare or cow. 
 The decifion of this queflion depends upon the care and 
 trouble which the finder has had in the raifing of that 
 increafe, as well as upon an enquiry whether he has 
 done what he ought to have done in #rder to difcover 
 the owner. 
 
 Things admit of an increafe : an increafe attending 
 our property is called an acceffion : as acceflion may re- 
 mit from the nature of our property, or from our 
 induftry, or from both alike, it may be diftinguifhed 
 into natural, into that which is acquired by our induftry, 
 or into that which partakes of both, and may be called 
 mixt. 
 
 Sch. 1. — To natural acceflion may be referred the increafe of 
 cattle, of land gradually produced by the overflowing of 
 a river, a fea or a bay, conftituting the limits thereof. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The fecond kind of acceflion comprehends improve^ 
 ments of land, clearing, fencing, manuring, building, 
 hunting, fifhing, &c. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Under the head of mixt acceflion mav be brought 
 planting, fowing, engrafting, &c. 
 
 When an acceffion to property is the natural effect 
 thereof, it is evident that the owner of the pro- 
 perty is entitled to the acceffion *, as, for inftance, the 
 young of animals, &c. 
 
 If, by an event in nature, another's property ac- 
 cedes to our's, fo that the former can be diitinguifhed 
 and precifely known, the acceffion, or as much there- 
 of as may be thus diftinguifhed, remains the property 
 of the firft proprietor ; as, when a river has fuddenly 
 formed a new channel, 
 
 But 
 
2/0 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 But if the accefTion be gradual, a bank of our pro- 
 perty enlarged, or an ifland formed fo that the parti- 
 cles cannot be known, and confequently not claimed 
 as the property of others •, fuch enlargement or ifland 
 mud be confidered as belonging to no perfon ♦, and 
 the owner of the bank to which <the accefTion is made, 
 or contiguous to which the ifland is formed, is deemed 
 to have the beft title to the accefTion, becaufe he has 
 the beft opportunity for occupancy. 
 
 Sch. — Things of this nature are under particular regulations, 
 provided for by civil and national laws, as thev now-a- 
 days chiefly intereft the claims of territory and the jurif- 
 diction of dates and nations. 
 
 With refpecl to acceffion by induftry, we diftin- 
 guifh thefe two cafes : the one, where the thing ac- 
 ceded to is the property another; the fecond, where no 
 other has a right in the acceffion. In the flrft of thefe 
 cafes there cannot be any room for making an acquisi- 
 tion of the accefTion, becaufe there is no room for 
 occupancy: in the laft, the perfon producing the in- 
 crease is by that very ad the occupant and the owner 
 thereof. 
 
 But an accefTion may take place by our induftry on 
 another's property. Here we muli diilinguifh two 
 cafes, for that accefTion may either exift by itfelf, 
 within or upon faid property, or is intermixed there- 
 with. In the firft of thefe cafes accefTion is faid to 
 be by adjunfition; in the latter it is either fpecification 
 or comtnixion % as we give another's property a new form 
 or fnape, or unite and intermix with it things of a 
 diftinci quality. 
 
 Sen. i. — Acceffion bv adjunction comprehends buildings and 
 all other improvements which may be taken away with- 
 out injuring the foil or property. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2*71 
 
 ScJi. 2.— That by fpecification has reference to orchards, in- 
 grafting, walling up banks, &c. Here improvements 
 cannot be taken away without injuring the property. 
 
 Sc/i. 3. — Commixion may be inftanced in manuring, &c 
 where the improvements are fo intermixed that they can- 
 not be taken away without injuring the property. 
 
 As by the natural laws the improver is entitled to 
 the acceflion produced by adjunclion, fo the proprietor 
 of the foil, according to thofe laws, becomes the 
 owner of it by fpecification and commixion. 
 
 Sch. — Prudence dictates on the one hand, that the improver 
 provide for indemnification before he beftows his induftry 
 upon another's property; juftice requires on the other, 
 that, if fuch improvements have been made, the proprie- 
 tor make a reafonable fatisfaction. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of thofe derivative modes of acquifition which may take 
 effecl during the life of the owner. 
 
 jLjlLL rights in things which are held in property 
 or commonry, muft be derived from particular acls 
 on the part of the owners, from which it may appear 
 why another fnould now difpofe of them rather than 
 they themfelves. 
 
 Since there cannot be another mode naturally law- 
 ful by which we may difpofe of what is another's 
 than by his will and confent, or where the law of re- 
 paration entitles us to fo much of our neighbour's 
 pofTefTions as is fufficient to make good damages fuf- 
 tained, or where the withholding of fuch things would 
 create a damage, and of confequence give us that 
 
 right, 
 
2J1 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 riorht; it follows, that there are different kinds of de~ 
 rivative modes of acquiring rights in the property of 
 others. 
 
 The mode of acqiiifitien by will and confent of the 
 owner, is by pacts of one kind or another. 
 
 With refpedt to the mode of acquifition by the law 
 of reparation, we diftinguifh damage which has ac- 
 tually taken place from that which would take place 
 in cafe of refufal : the former of thefe modes we 
 call the mode of acquifition by forfeiture 3 the latter, 
 that by law. 
 
 When pacts are confummated, that is to fay, when 
 In unilateral pacts the promife is performed on one 
 ilde, and when in the bilateral both parties have ful-. 
 filled their engagements, then, as has been fhewn in 
 its place, adfcual transfer is made by the promifer to 
 the promifee. The different pacts, therefore, by 
 which a transfer may be made of our own, are as 
 many modes of derivative acquisitions whereby ano- 
 ther may obtain a lawful right in our property. 
 
 But there are two general kinds of pacts ; the uni- 
 lateral, where the promifer acts without expectation 
 of receiving any thing in return, and the bilateral* 
 where each party is held to perform. As the former 
 comprehends all the fpecies of gratuitous pacts, fo the 
 latter implies all thofe which are reciprocal or onerous. 
 
 To the gratuitous modes of acquifition are reckon- 
 ed gifts, grants, laft will and teftament. Between the 
 two former there is this difference, that gift is a gra- 
 tuitous pact without even the mention of any expec- 
 tation or confideration being made in return; but 
 grant is a gift without the outward appearance thereof, 
 
 as 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY^ 273 
 
 as a confideration is expreffed, which, however, is 
 not taken or demanded -, for instance, a pepper-corn, 
 five millings, &c. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Of wills and teftaments, and other gratuitous de- 
 vices of a deceafed peribn, we mall treat in a particular 
 chapter. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Reciprocal or bnerous pacts are more generally 
 known under the appellation of contracts. 
 
 Sc/i. 3. — Gifts and grants, which latter have the outward form 
 of contra&s, are naturally as binding as any contract 
 may be; but civil laws, for the purpofe of preventing 
 frauds, by which others, creditors for inftance, may be 
 injured, do not allow to them that obligatory power in 
 the civil forum which contracts have, that is, where a 
 confideration is given. 
 
 Sc/i. 4. — Among thofe considerations which are efleemed as 
 valuable, the municipal laws admit that of blood or 
 natural affection between near relations, provided no 
 perfon is thereby injured. 
 
 Contracts, that is to fay, reciprocal pacts, become as 
 many modes of acquifition as there may be transfers of 
 rights in things made in the different forms of onerous 
 pads, of which we have treated under the head of 
 pads. 
 
 Thus the form do ut des comprehends all contracts 
 where money is given for money, property for pro- 
 perty, goods for goods ; as, money loaned upon bond 
 or promife of payment, barter or exchange either of 
 money, property or goods, and all fales of goods for 
 a price exprefsly ftipulated or implied, where the buyer 
 tacitly confents to give as much as they are worth. 
 
 The form facio ut des has reference to contracts 
 where work is performed for a certain price, either 
 fpecincally mentioned or left to the determination of 
 the law ; as, a fervant hiring himfelf to a mailer for 
 
 N a certain 
 
274 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 certain wages, or a labourer or tradefman engaging to 
 work for the current wages, or for a compenfation for 
 a piece of workmanfhip, &c. 
 
 The form do ut facias has refpedf. to contracts where 
 the matter hires his fervant, the landlord employs a 
 labourer, or engages a piece of workmanfhip with a 
 mechanic, &c. 
 
 The formfacio ut facias extends to contracts where 
 I engage with a man to do his work if he will do mine ; 
 or where two perfons agree to enter the matrimonial 
 flate, or to perform certain acts on both /ides; or it 
 may be that one forbear on one fide if fomething is 
 done on the other in confideration of that forbearance ; 
 as, a landlord giving up his rent upon condition that 
 the tenant inclofe a field with a good fence; or it may 
 be for mutual forbearance on both, fides ; as, one mer- 
 chant engages not to trade to Lifbon if the other will 
 not trade to Marfeilles. Vide Black. Comment. Book ii. 
 chap. 30. 
 
 Sch. 1.- — Befides thefe modes of acquiring property, there arc 
 others arifing from the fame principles, which have refe- 
 rence to a transfer of the rights of ufe and ufufruct ; as, 
 giving in truft, hiring, lending, borrowing, &c. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Authors who have treated thefe fubjeets in detail 
 diftinguifli contracts into thofe of fale, of hazard, and 
 of lending either inconfumable property or money, and of 
 labour by fervice, commiflions, partnership, or offices. 
 
 Sch, 3. — Indeed, all manner of trulls, fecurities, pledges, pawns, 
 mortgages, bonds, promiflbry notes, and the different 
 kinds of indentures, reft upon the principles of pact, and 
 import paclitious rights and obligations. 
 
 As we do not -intend to treat of thefe fubjects in de- 
 tail, it may fuffice to obferve, that the determination 
 of what is right or wrong in the transfer of property, 
 
 or 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ly 5 
 
 or of ufe and ufufruct, in the natural forum, refts upon 
 the erTential requisites of pacts, which have been ex- 
 plained in a preceding chapter. 
 
 It therefore deferves our particular attention, whe- 
 ther a pretended contract is founded in a lawful pro- 
 mife, confent, acceptance and transfer, or whether each 
 of them is accomplifhed in its proper meaning and in- 
 tention, without any ambiguity or prevarication : for 
 a contract defective with refpect to one or the other of 
 thofe requifites is void ; and the contracting parties of 
 a juft contract act perfidiously towards each other if 
 they do not fulfil every Stipulation in its true fenfe and 
 meaning. 
 
 Sch. — The municipal laws of different countries have intro- 
 duced into this fubject different and various modifica- 
 tions, which have refpect both to the publicity and the 
 neceffary evidence which muft attend the various tranfac- 
 tions of a pactitious nature, in order to give them legal 
 validity, and to obviate fraud, litigation and confufion : 
 for inftance; a bond muft be figned, fealed and delivered 
 in the prefence of two witneffes, a laft will and teflament 
 in the prefence of three, &c. 
 
 A right to compel an owner to transfer fo much of 
 his right in things as is necefTary to repair a damage 
 done by him, is called the right of forfeiture. 
 
 The right of forfeiture, if conducted according to 
 the dictates of natural law, is confequently a juft mode 
 of acquisition, and extends to the right of* making 
 feizures. 
 
 The right of forfeiture by feizure, where it is exer- 
 cifed by public authority for the benefit of a citizen 
 who has fuftained fuch damage, is called execution,, 
 which is always to be preceded by a judgment. But 
 when civil government has fuflained a damage, and 
 
 lazes 
 
2j6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 feizes for the ufe of the public, then the right of for- 
 feiture is {tiled that of confifcation. 
 
 There is another mode of acquifition derived from 
 law, by which we may claim as much right in another's 
 property or perfon, as is fufficient to compenfate for the 
 expence or trouble to which we have been put by his 
 neceflary fupport, or by other exigencies in his behalf, 
 This mode is diftinguifhed from that of forfeiture in 
 this particular, tPiat the latter prefuppofes injury and 
 damages a£r.ually committed, whereas the former leads 
 to fomething which is to be done, to wit, compenfation 
 to be made, left an injury and damage might enfue. 
 
 The mode by which we may lawfully demand, re- 
 tain or feize fo much of our neighbour's property, or, 
 an default thereof, of his perfonal fervices, is called 
 acquifition by law, as this fupplies us with forcible re- 
 medies in cafes where juft compenfation is refufed; for 
 inftance, where children are brought up by their pa- 
 rents, where minors depend for fupport and education 
 upon provifion made by their guardians, or where 
 poor and fatherlefs children are taken into families. 
 Parents are by law entitled to the fervices of their 
 children, independent of the duty of gratitude, which 
 jnould moft principally prompt them to all manner of 
 refpect and obedience: guardians have a claim upon 
 the property, and, in default thereof, upon the fervices 
 of their wards : thofe who have beftowed their fub- 
 illance to bring up the indigent and fatherlefs, have the 
 claim of natural parents. 
 
 Civil laws mention a mode of acquifition, which 
 refts folely on what is called immemorial porTeiTion, that 
 is, a fpecified number of years : thefe years laws take 
 for a time immemorial, beca^ufe it is deemed imprac- 
 ticable 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 277 
 
 ticable to prove a right in things, after fuch a number 
 of years, with that precision which laws, and indeed the 
 peace of fociety, require. This mode is called the right 
 of prefcription^ and is varioully determined in reference 
 to the different objects which may thereby be claimed ; 
 but in the forum of nature it might be considered as 
 the finder's right, in things found of which the owner 
 does not appear, or cannot prove his right, rather than 
 a distinct natural mode of acquisition. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The derivative modes of acquifition of rights in things 
 by will and teftament, and by adminiftration, or in- 
 heritance ab inteStato. 
 
 x\MONG the natural rights of making difpofition 
 of the fubftance and emoluments of things, we have 
 taken notice of the right of alienation, which vefts the 
 right of property, of pofleSTion and other ufes, in per- 
 sons after the owner's deceafe. 
 
 Such a difpofition, made by the owner in his life- 
 time, muft be considered as an unilateral and beneficent 
 pact, where confent and acceptance are constructive, and 
 where death Stamps the unalterable confent of the pro- 
 mifer upon that prefuppofed acceptance of the promi- 
 fee, and thus gives the pact its full validity. 
 
 He who makes fuch a difpofition of his property is 
 called a t eft at or \ the property itfelf is filled an inhe- 
 ritance \ the perfon who is designated as the new owner 
 thereof has obtained the appellation of an heir: the 
 
 whole 
 
278 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 whole tranfaClion taken together is called a teftator's 
 
 loft will and t eft anient. 
 
 Sch. — Thofe who treat on this fubjeft in detail make a diffe- 
 rence between will and tefiament, confining the former 
 to the difpefition of perfonal, and reitricting the latter to 
 that of real eftate. 
 
 Since will and teftament maft be confidered as an 
 unilateral and purely beneficent pact, where confent and 
 acceptance, though fuppofed, cannot take place before 
 the teftator's deceafe, it is evident, that wills and tefta- 
 ments may be altered or revoked as long as the teftator 
 lives, but obtain their confummation, and confequently 
 become irrevocable at the moment of his death. 
 
 It being the nature of love, that we wifh to render 
 thofe for whom we have a particular affection as happy 
 as poffible, it follows, that a teftator, designing the 
 inheritance to a particular perfon or perfons, declares 
 thereby that he loves fuch a perfon or perfons in a par- 
 ticular manner above others. 
 
 It is therefore as equitable as it is congruous to the 
 nature of things, that the laws of the land direct the 
 inheritance of one who dies inteftate, to fall to fuch 
 perfon or perfons whom he ought to have loved 
 before others. 
 
 Thofe who, by this conftruclion of natural and thofe 
 civil laws which take nature for their guide, become 
 vefted with the inheritance, are heirs ab inteftato, heirs 
 at law. The difpofition, as it proceeds from law, is 
 called legitimate^ tfhifft that which depends upon the 
 will of the teftator is ftiled t eft anient ary. 
 
 Since an heir fucceeds to the rights of the former 
 owner, it follows, that he comes under his obligations, 
 as far as he is heir -, an heir mull, therefore, fulfil the 
 
 engagements 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 279 
 
 engagements of the deceafed, as far as he is enabled 
 by the inheritance, and not farther. 
 
 SuccefTion, ab inteftato, conformably to the law of 
 nature, is to be confidered in this manner : if no de- 
 claration of the laft will of the deceafed can be produced? 
 or? which amounts to the fa?ne, is not authenticated, he or 
 they will be entitled to the inheritance whom the deceafed 
 was bound by nature to love particularly above others: 
 for it is a well eftabliihed maxim in morality, that 
 what is natural muft be prefumed until the contrary 
 is proved. 
 
 From thefe and other principles it is therefore evi- 
 dent, that wife and children, and after them the 
 nearer!: relations, and among thefe firft the lineal, and 
 then the collateral, and in default of each of them the 
 country of the deceafed, or rather the place wherein 
 the inheritance lies, have a legitimate claim to the in- 
 heritance. 
 
 Sch. — The laws of our ftate follow thefe principles with great 
 exaclnefs, and allow the widow in fome cafes the third 
 part, in others the half of an inheritance: the former 
 takes place where children are left by the deceafed; after 
 the portion allowed to the widow, the children are to di- 
 vide the remainder in equal lliares. 
 
 A laft will and teftament is then necefTary, if a per- 
 fon intends another divifion of his property than that 
 which the law directs, orwifhes others to be his heirs 
 than thofe which are heirs at law. 
 
 No laft will is therefore entitled to any notice, which 
 is not folemnly declared as fuch by the teftator, and 
 fufficiently proved by witnefTes; becaufe, nothing that 
 is vague or uncertain can have force to fet afide direc- 
 tions exprefsly preferred by law. 
 
28o MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 Sch. — This, perhaps, has been the caufe why the Juftinian law 
 requires, that, befides the (even, witnefTes neceflary for 
 the proof of a will, the teftator fhould expreffly mention 
 the heirs at law, and leave to each a certain proportion, 
 as what is called their legitimate, with this provifo, that 
 without a ftridt. attention to the latter, the will ihall not 
 be valid. 
 
 By the folemnities of a laft will and teftament, be- 
 fides thofe things which ferve exprefsly to declare the 
 teftator's intention with refpect to the difpofkion of 
 his property after his deceafe, are underftood fuch ex- 
 ternal acts as are fuflicient to prove that fuch a decla- 
 ration was really made. 
 
 Thofe folemnities which declare the teftator's inten- 
 tion, we call internal-, but fuch as ferve as proofs of 
 the declaration thereof, are external. 
 
 A laft will and teftament, if it be confident with it- 
 felf, that is, not contradictory or unintelligible, has the 
 internal folemnities requisite for an act of fo great im- 
 portance : the teftator, when he declared his will, rauft 
 have been of found mind and memory, and the difpo- 
 iition free and of his own accord. 
 
 There are alfo external folemnities requisite, to wit, 
 
 a fufftcient teftimony of witneffes, who can prove, in a 
 
 fatisfactory manner, that the teftator was in a ftate of 
 
 ability to make a valid difpoftion, and that the difpo- 
 
 lition made or proferred has been declared by him to 
 
 be his laft will and teftament. 
 
 Sch. — Thofe who think that, in the internal forum, the hand- 
 writing of a teftator would be a fufficient proof of his laft 
 will and teftament, do not conlider, that from a perfoirs 
 hand it cannot be proved that he acted freely and of his 
 own accord, that fear or force had no interference, &c. 
 
 The municipal laws of different countries have va- 
 
 rioufly determined, both with refpect to heirs at law, 
 
 and 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2%% 
 
 and to the number of witnefles neceflkry to give a laft 
 will and teftament fufficient authenticity. 
 
 Our laws require at leafi three witnefles prefent when 
 the teftator acknowledges the feal affixed to the inftru- 
 ment containing his will, and figns his name thereunto, 
 with the explicit declaration, that the contents of the 
 inftrument thus figned and fealed are his laft will an4 
 teftament : they alfo order, that the witnefles flgn their 
 names as witnefles prefent when thefe tranfaclions have 
 been performed by the teftator. 
 
 Sch. i. — The witnefles muft. all be prefent at the fame time 5 
 each muft fee not only the teftator, but alfo the other wit- 
 nefles fign their names or affix their marks. 
 
 Sch. 2. — If failure be made in any of thefe folemnities, the will 
 is fet afide, and the laws of the land order adminiflratioa 
 to take place. 
 
 Nuncupative wills, that is, fuch as are declared by 
 word and mouth, are not admitted by law, except in 
 very extraordinary cafes; for inftance, when perfons 
 are at fea, foldiers in the army, &c. 
 
 If a perfon who would have been heir at law is by 
 will excluded from a portion of the inheritance, he is 
 faid to be difinherited. 
 
 A perfon constituted heir may remit his right before 
 he enters upon the exercife thereof; but having once 
 afllimed that right, he is, as far as the inheritance ex- 
 tends, under all the obligations of the deceafed : he 
 muft, for inftance, pay all lawful debts, becaufe nothing 
 can be confldered as the inheritance but what remains 
 over and above all juft demands, 
 
 Q o PART 
 
PART II. 
 
 Sect. III. Comprehending general ceconomy. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of rights in perfens. 
 
 OINCE, as has already been fhewn, duties, obliga- 
 tions and rights are of a correlate nature, fo that the 
 latter depend upon the former as effects upon their 
 caufes, it evidently follows, that we cannot lawfully 
 have or claim any rights in perfons which are inconfift- 
 ent with our duties towards God, towards ourfelves 
 and fellow creatures : for any action whatever that is 
 contradictory to either of thefe duties, is repugnant to 
 our natural obligation, contrary to the dictates of natu- 
 ral law, and confequently wrong, impious, unnatural 
 and unjuft. 
 
 The following maxims, which may be confidered as 
 the infallible criteria of right or wrong in the focial in- 
 tercourfe of mankind, of whatever defcription or extent 
 it may be, flow from thefe undeniable principles : — 
 
 i. No perfon can have a frrict right of property in 
 another ; for no man can ceafe to be a moral agent, 
 but, as fuch, is under the dominion of God, and re- 
 fponfible to him for all his actions : being efientially 
 different from brutes and things inanimate, he cannot, 
 
 confidently 
 
.2§4 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 confidently with his nature, become an object of pro- 
 perty. 
 
 Sck.— rlt is unnatural and impious to deal in human flefh, to 
 treat man as a beafi: of burden, or to hold him in equal or 
 in lower eftimation than things of an inanimate nature; 
 for it is inconfiftent with the duties we owe to God, to 
 ourfelves and to others. 
 
 1. Rights in perfons can only amount to the right 
 of directing their actions ; for fuch a right only is con- 
 iiftent with the nature of a moral agent, and with that 
 natural relation by which mankind are dependent upon 
 each other for mutual happinefs. 
 
 Sch. — A right in perfons extended farther than to the direction 
 of the actions of others confident with the nature of a 
 moral agent, would amount to a ftrict right of property— 
 a right which has juft been proved to be as unnatural and 
 inhuman on the part of the claimant, as it would be de- 
 grading and difgraceful to the fubjecl of fuch unnatural 
 claim; with this difference, that, like the wolf and the 
 lamb, the latter moves our fympathy, whilft the lawlefs 
 ufurper excites our difguft and indignation. 
 
 3. No perfon has an unlimited perfedh right in ano- 
 ther, fo that he may arbitrarily direct his actions as he 
 pleafes ; becaufe, he who fubmits to fuch a right ceafes 
 to conduct himfelf confidently with the dignity of a 
 being endowed with a moral nature-, and the claimant 
 deprives him of his unalienable natural right, with 
 which he is vefted as a member of the univerfal ibciety 
 of mankind. 
 
 4. No perfon may lawfully claim even a limited per- 
 fect right in others, except for lawful purpofes ; for a 
 contrary conduct would be repugnant to the duties we 
 owe to God, to ourfelves and to others, and would 
 eonfequently be impious, unnatural and unjuft. 
 
 5. Na 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2$5 
 
 £. No perfon may lawfully have an abfolute natural 
 right, however limited, and however good the purpofes 
 may be ; for what is abfolutely natural, flows from na- 
 ture confidered in itfelf *, and men, considered in them- 
 felves, have the fame nature, and confequently can 
 poffefs no perfect rights in one another, but fuch rights 
 only and fuch claims as are in every refpect equal. 
 
 6. Rights in perfons muft confequently be hypo- 
 thetically natural, adventitious •, that is to fay, fome 
 ads are necefTary, by which it may appear why perfons 
 of the fame nature, members of the fociety of mankind, 
 mould have perfect rights in one another, and why 
 fome mould have the right to direct the actions of 
 others, whilft the latter are under perfect obligations to 
 follow and obey thofe directions. 
 
 7. Rights in perfons, therefore, which are pcrfeft 
 and affirmative, that is, by which we require, and in 
 cafe of refufai compel, others to follow our directions, 
 muft refult from a juft mode of acquisition, and reft 
 upon a juft title. 
 
 Sch, — By nature, and without any previous a<t either on our 
 part or on that of another, we have negative perfeft rights 
 in all perfons; for from our nature and from the nature 
 of things it follows, that others fhould do us no injury 
 or damage. 
 
 There is no originary mode of acquisition by oc- 
 cupancy; for, as man is not only endowed with moral 
 agency, but is likewife a fellow member of the uni- 
 verfal fociety of mankind, a fellow fubject of the go- 
 vernment of the Moft High, he is under the dominion 
 of God, and cannot be confidered as a thing, much 
 lefs a thing belonging to no perfon: he is naturally 
 vefted with a right in himfelf. 
 
 Since, 
 
2$6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Since, then, all derivative modes of acquiring rights 
 refult from certain acts, we may diftinguifh three gene- 
 ral modes by which rights in perfons may be acquired, 
 to wit, either by acts on the part of the claimant, or 
 on that of the obligee, or both alike. In the firft cafe, 
 we acquire rights in others by the title of law \ in the 
 fecond, by that of forfeiture \ in the laft, by the title 
 of paff. 
 
 Rights acquired in perfons by the title of law, take 
 place with parents in their children, with guardians 
 in their wards, and indeed with any perfon who un- 
 dertakes and is faithful in the performance of parental 
 duties; for here the eftablifhed order of nature, or 
 rather the law and will of God direct, that perfons 
 beftow much care and labour upon others, whofe very 
 exiftence and happinefs are made immediately depen- 
 dent upon their faithful exertions. But the laws which 
 impofe duties grant likewife a right to all things ne- 
 cefTary for the performance of thofe duties. The 
 confequence is, that parents, and thofe who are under 
 parental obligations, mud not only have rights in 
 children, but fuch rights muft alfo be perfectly con- 
 fident with their duties to God, to themfelves and to 
 others. Parents have confequently perfect rights, not 
 only to direct the actions of children in a manner 
 which will comport with the glory of God and their 
 own happinefs, but likewife to require them to make 
 compenfation for the care, trouble and expence be- 
 llowed upon them . 
 
 Sch. i. — Perfect rights, founded in ju'ftice, may be well exer- 
 cifed bv parents; for it is perfectly confident with the 
 ture of children, that they mould make, for benefits 
 received in the days of helplefs infancy, all poffible com- 
 pen fat ion of their own accord, left they heighten the in- 
 jury 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 287 
 
 jury they commit in refufing obedience, by the molt un- 
 natural vice, that of ingratitude. 
 
 Sck. 2.— Neither is it incompatible with the ftate of infancy, 
 that parents exercife perfeft rights in directing their ac- 
 tions: thefe rights, however, undergo natural modifica- 
 tions, keeping pace with the improvement of their moral 
 faculties. 
 
 Sch. 3. — A non-fubmiflion to the rights of parents, guardians, 
 &c. by the title of law, renders the recufant liable to the 
 right of forfeiture. 
 
 By the right in pcrfons, in virtue of the title of for- 
 feiture, acts which have caufed injury and damage on 
 the part of the obligee are prefuppofed. In defect: of 
 property by which reparation may be made, the injurer 
 is held to make it by his labour. 
 
 Sck. — Such a right is both compatible with the principles of 
 natural juftice and with the nature of a moral agent: as 
 the former requires that reparation be made, fo the jatter 
 fhould feel inclined to make it as far as is in his power. 
 
 By the title of pact, acts on both fides are required ; 
 that is to fay, as one intends to have a right in another, 
 'fo the confent of each is required for fuch a claim to 
 become lawful. The feveral fpecies of pads, there- 
 fore, whether explicit, tacit or conftructive, heretofore 
 explained, are modes of acquiring rights in perfons, 
 with this exception, that nothing can find place which 
 is incompatible with the nature of a moral agent and 
 the natural rights of man. 
 
 Having hitherto attended to the perfect: affirmative 
 rights in perfons, under the appellation of rights in 
 perfons, it is proper that we fpeak of thofe imperfect: 
 rights which men, as fellow creatures, as fellow citizens 
 of the government of the Mofl: High, have in one ano- 
 ther by virtue of their nature, and particularly by this 
 their natural relation. Thefe are not only negative, 
 
 but 
 
288 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but alfo affirmative, and may be claimed in all perfons 
 whatfoever ; for, as by that natural relation men are 
 bound by mutual obligations to promote the general 
 happinefs of mankind, fo they have likevvife mutual 
 rights to require all thofe things which are necefTary to 
 be done for the attainment of that happinefs. It 
 would be impoflible, on the one hand, to do our duties, 
 if we had not a right in perfons to expect and to re- 
 quire that they mould act conformably to them. How 
 mould we be able to perform the duty of hofpitality 
 to a ftranger, if we had not the right to recommend 
 him ? How mould we be able to cultivate true friend- 
 fhip, if we had not the right to rebuke, to exhort, or 
 to vifit a friend ? How could parents love their chil- 
 dren, if they had not rights to advife, to reprimand, 
 to chide, or to put them to fome ufeful employment ? 
 We have a right, on the other hand, to expect for 
 our friendly offices fincerity and gratitude from a 
 friend. Parents have a right to require love, reve- 
 rence, gratitude, obedience and afTiftance from their 
 children. 
 
 Since our imperfect rights refult from imperfect ob- 
 ligations, it is plain, that as thefe are ftronger, the 
 more intimate our natural relations are; fo, likewife, 
 our rights in perfons become more forcible tht nearer 
 the relation is in which we ftand towards them. Thus 
 parents have the ftricteft poifible right in the perfons 
 pf their children ; nothing, therefore, can be more 
 impious and horrid than difobedience and ingratitude 
 in children to their parents. 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 289 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the general laws of fociety, 
 
 JL3Y fociety, in the ftrict fenfe of the term, \re un- 
 derfland that ftate in which a perfon has a perfect affir- 
 mative right in others : the perfons living in this per- 
 feci: fecial ftate are members. 
 
 Sch. — As there are many focieties among the children of men 
 which reft upon imperfect rights and obligations, and 
 admit only of a directory government, fo that they are 
 <juite of another nature than thofe which refult from per- 
 fect affirmative rights; it is proper that the reader be 
 apprifed, that what is faid in the iequel with refpect to 
 focial rights and obligations, is only applicable to focieties 
 which reft upon perfect rights and refult from perfect 
 obligations. 
 
 Since there are not only a variety of actions, hut 
 alfo many and different ends to which they may be 
 directed-, fince, likewife, directions may be inftituted 
 and conducted by various means, and under different 
 modifications, with refpect to time, place, the imme- 
 diate object and individual circumstances ; it follows, 
 that there are a variety of focieties poffible, which ei- 
 ther differ in kind, or only in fome other qualities. 
 
 All focieties which have for their object the fame 
 end, are materially the fame, that is, focieties ef the fame 
 kind-, but fuch as have for their object different ends, 
 are materially different, or focieties of different kinds. 
 
 Societies of the fame kind may differ with reipedl 
 to other qualities •, as, for inftance, the different go- 
 vernments on earth — the various charitable and politi- 
 
 Pp cal 
 
%i^O MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cal focieties now in vogue — the different profeffions of 
 religion, &c. 
 
 As fpecies are contained in kinds, fo one general 
 fociety may contain many fpecific, and thefe again va- 
 rious individual focieties. There are, therefore, not 
 only many and various focial ftates poffible among 
 men, but individuals may alfo be members of feveral 
 and different focieties. 
 
 Since perfect affirmative rights muft neceffarily 
 ftand in a natural correlation with perfect affirmative 
 obligations, it follows, that two parties muft be dif- 
 tinguifhed in a fociety, to wit, one veiled with a right, 
 the other under a perfect obligation to act conformably 
 to that right. 
 
 Since rights in perfons cannot be lawfully claimed 
 without a proper mode of acquifition and a juft title, 
 it follows, that all reciprocal claims of a perfect nature 
 which perfons make upon one another, not founded 
 in the right of acquifition by law, forfeiture or pact, 
 are tyrannical and repugnant to natural law, under 
 whatever fpecious name fuch claims may be made. 
 
 AfTociations, likewife, which are formed for un- 
 lawful ends, deferve not the name of focieties, but 
 that of lawlefs combinations, of banditti, of nuifances 
 and pefts of fociety \ difgraceful as they are dangerous 
 and deteftable, 
 
 A fociety becomes defpotical, if the claimant of the 
 focial right extends it to all that the obligee pofleffes ; 
 but, if the latter has fomething left to himfelf, inde- 
 pendent of the focial right on the part of the claimant 
 or any other member, it is limited. 
 
 Sch. — In limited focieties there are reciprocal rights and obli- 
 gations on both Ikies, 
 
 .A defpotic 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2^t 
 
 A defpotic fociety, whether we confider it with re- 
 fpect to inftitution or execution, is as inhuman as it is 
 irrational and unnatural ♦, for here the obligee is confi- 
 dered not as a moral agent, but as a brute or thing of 
 an inanimate nature. 
 
 Sch. i. — Such fhameful defpotifm is to be met with in the go- 
 vernments of the eaftern parts of the globe, efpecially in 
 the treatment of the female fex. Of that nature was the 
 barbarous right allowed to parents to expofe or put to 
 death their children. The (late wherein perfons are de- 
 prived of all their rights, is a ftate of Jlavery. 
 
 Sch. 2. — In that abject miferable flate captives in War were 
 held by the Greeks and Romans of old, who looked upon 
 themfelves as exclufively entitled to the honour of civili- 
 zation and humanity, calling all others barbarians. 
 
 Sch. 3. — -Though among civilized nations the right over the 
 death and life of flaves is taken out of the hands of private 
 perfons, yet flavery itfelf, where perfons may be dealt 
 with in all other refpects as brutes, does not ceafe to be 
 inhuman, unnatural and difgraceful to mankind. 
 
 Sch. 4. — How far the right of forfeiture may reduce a moral 
 agent, is a queftion which, to the honour of humanity, 
 has of late been much agitated among the learned of dif- 
 ferent nations. That men who have, by an abandoned 
 conduct of life, voluntarily debafed themfelves, mould 
 be juftly conlidered as nuifances and pelts of focietv, and 
 confined or put to hard labour until they have expiated 
 their crimes and made reparation, is perfectly confonant 
 to reafon and the principles of natural law : but in juili- 
 fying the right of taking away their lives, reafon is as 
 much at a lofs as philanthropy and humanity, fince the 
 violent death of fuch wretches can neither be conlidered 
 as an atonement to the public, nor to thofe individuals 
 who have become the objects of their lawlefs excefTes. 
 
 Sat. 5.— Capital punifhments in many inftances prevent the 
 poffibility of reparation, and in this refpeet are far from 
 being naturally lawful. 
 
 3th. 6. — If the argument drawn from the force of the victims 
 becoming proper examples for deterring others from wan- 
 ton tranfgreffions of the hw, be brought into contraft 
 
 with 
 
2^2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with the experience of ages, it proves, that human im- 
 molations at the fhrine of juftice fhouid either ceafe or, 
 become lefs frequent. 
 
 ech. 7. — Be it remembered, that government can have no 
 l'ights but fuch as are delegated, and that the individuals 
 of a fociety cannot delegate more than they have : if, 
 therefore, a fociety is not in a ftate of abfolute or extreme 
 necellity, which can hardly be the cafe in a well regulated 
 government, there is no caufe for extending the right of 
 felf-prefervation to life and limb : nay,, fince even a ftate 
 of necellity, with refpect to individuals, does not juftify 
 the taking away of life, if the duty of felf-prefervation 
 may be otherwife fatisfied, it appears very plain, that ca- 
 pital punifhments in many inftances contradict the prin- 
 ciples of natural laws. 
 
 Seh. 8. — It is even queftionable, whether taking away the life 
 of a criminal in the cafe of murder is in itfelf conform- 
 able to natural law ; or whether it fhouid not rather be 
 ranked among thofe pofitive laws which derive their 
 force, with refpect to particular circumftances, from the 
 law of felf-prefervation, upon which all right of life and 
 death ultimately depends. It is upon the ftrength of this 
 law that we may account for the words, Whojoever Jlied- 
 dcth man's blood, by manjliall his blood be jlied, as well as for 
 other crimes made capital when Ifrael was in the wilder- 
 nefs ; whilft the death of AbeJ, of Uriah, &c. was fuffered 
 to go unrevenged, no capital punifhments having been 
 inflicted upon thofe who were guilty of taking away the 
 lives of thefe innocent perfons. It is on the fame account 
 that martial laws, in times of invafion and in the field, may 
 be put into execution with more rigour than would be 
 juftifiable in any other fituation of public affairs. 
 Let us therefore conclude, that murder and other enormous 
 crimes militating agamft the law of felf-prefervation, may 
 * lawfully be punifhed with death, when this great duty 
 cannot be fatisfied by punifhments lefs rigorous. Let it 
 be remembered, that we cannot have rights inconfiftent 
 with the duties which we owe to God, to ourfelves and 
 to ethers, and that cafes of colliiion call for prudent, jufl 
 and equitable exceptions. 
 
 In a defpotical fociety, the paradoxical maxim can 
 
 only 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 295 
 
 only be applied, that a human being can do no wrong \ 
 for that fociety leaves no right m the other party: but 
 as limited focieties alone are recognized by the infalli- 
 ble principles of nature, it is in them that either or 
 both parties may do wrong. The members of a fo- 
 ciety may injure one another, either when the claimant 
 of the focial right extends it farther than he ought to 
 do, or when the focial obligee falls jfhort in the per- 
 formance of his obligation. 
 
 To an attentive obferver of perfons and things it is 
 obvious, that from the intricacy of human concerns, 
 and from the various affections of the human heart, 
 arifing from the imperfection and imbecility of our na- 
 ture, innumerable feuds and animofities mud necefTa- 
 rily take place amongft members of fociety, if the juft 
 proportion of focial right and obligation mould reft 
 upon the aflertions and arbitrary claims of the parties — 
 claims often as whimfical as they are felflm and unjuft. 
 
 It is, therefore, for the happinefs of mankind, that 
 in this refpect we have nature for our guide ; that is to 
 fay, principles refulting from the nature of juft focie- 
 ties, as infallible as nature itfelf. The very effence of 
 fociety is the fcope and end for which it is inftituted: 
 this end, therefore, is the true criterion of what is right 
 or wrong in the conduct of members. 
 
 The end of focieties we call the common good; bc- 
 caufe, as no fociety is naturally lawful which has not a 
 good for its object, fo it is abfolutely reqnifite, that that 
 good be common •, that is, the members mud in fome 
 manner or other be interefted in it ; for, if the contrary 
 mould be the cafe, the fociety would be defpotical, un- 
 natural and unlawful. 
 
 Whenever 
 
;4 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Whenever the claimant of the focial right extends 
 
 his claim farther than is confident with the common 
 
 good, he injures the focial obligee : when, on the other 
 
 hand, the latter does not perform all his obligations to 
 
 fuch an extent and in fuch a manner as the common 
 
 good requires, he injures the former : in either cafe* 
 
 the end of the fociety is fruftrated, and the members 
 
 refpe&ively incur the guilt of perfidy. 
 
 ScL — The pofition, that all lawful focieties mud have a com- 
 mon good for their objeci", holds good even in cafes where 
 perfons, on account of injuries and damages committed 
 by them, are deprived of their liberty and put to hard 
 labour; becaufe they enjoy as much right as their ftate of 
 guilt admits of, and have this interefl in that ftate of fer- 
 vitude and conftraint, that they make that reparation 
 which the natural laws in fuch cafes require. 
 
 There is fuch a thing as focial morality or immorality ' y 
 for, in all manner of focieties, that isjuit, right and be- 
 neficial which comports with the common good : that, 
 on the other hand, which is repugnant thereto, is un- 
 jud:, wrong and evil. 
 
 This leads us to the univerfal focial law contained in 
 this proportion \ Direli your anions fo that the common 
 good of the fociety be attained^ preferved and promoted^ 
 and carefully avoid the contrary. 
 
 This law binds both the claimant of the focial right 
 and the focial obligee : all actions of the members of 
 fociety among one another, which comport with this 
 law, are juft, right and good-, all, on the other hand, 
 that is contradictory thereto, is unjuft, wrong and evil. 
 
 Since obligations for certain ends imply the per- 
 formance of all thofe duties which are necefTary for the 
 attainment of thofe ends, it follows, that the members 
 of a fociety are bound to perform all thofe focial duties 
 
 which 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 295 
 
 which are necefTary for the attainment of the common 
 good thereof. Hence it likewife follows, that the 
 claimant of the focial right may lawfully extend his 
 claim to all fuch actions as are abfolutely necefTary for 
 the attainment and prefervation of the common good 
 of the fociety. 
 
 Sch. — Of the importance of this natural connection between 
 ends and means we have already fpoken, and fhewn the 
 neceffity of a careful diftin£tion between necefTary ends 
 and fuch as may be ptherwife. Vide page 33. 
 
 Thofe actions, rights and things which members of 
 fociety enjoy independent of their focial character, and 
 which they may confequently direct to their own ad- 
 vantage, conftitute what is called their private good. 
 
 The private good of the members of fociety may 
 concern their temporal or their eternal felicity : fince 
 the latter is a good which man, as a rational creature, 
 cannot on any account facrirlce, fo no fociety can law- 
 fully require that facrince under any circumftances 
 whatever. But temporal private good may come intq 
 a collifion with the common good of the fociety; and 
 in cafe of fuch a collifion, it is a focial duty to prefer 
 the common intereft to our private eafe and conve- 
 nience. 
 
 Amongft the many things which require the molt 
 careful attention, and which murt be confidered as the 
 efTential ingredients of the common good of fociety, are 
 liberty and internal and external fecurity : for, without 
 them-ft, members have no intereit in the common good 
 of the fociety, at leait not as much as they ought to 
 have, and the fociety becomes more or lefs defpotical 
 and unjuit: without internal and external fecurity, in- 
 riividuals, nay, perhaps the whole focietv is in a ftate 
 
2g6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of fear, which is one of its moft unhappy fituations, 
 except that of inteftine war and invafion from without. 
 
 In fociety the natural liberty of members muft be 
 reftrained; for, without fuch a reftraint they may not 
 only injure one another, but alfo others not belonging 
 to their body -, and the confequence would be, that the 
 fociety could neither be internally nor externallyfecure. 
 
 It is therefore a focial duty, that no member injure 
 a fellow member or any other perfon, left the fecurity 
 of the fociety be thereby difturbed or endangered. 
 
 Societies, with refpect to the acquisition of rights, 
 may be diftinguifhed into necejfary or voluntary: the 
 former refult from the titles of law and of forfeiture -, 
 the latter from pact and mutual confent. 
 
 There is another important diftinction, which has 
 reference to the focial obligation ; for this may arife 
 from the nature of the fociety, or depend upon the 
 claim of the perfon vefted with the focial right. In 
 the former cafe, focieties are faid to be equal-, in the 
 latter they are unequal. 
 
 Unequal focieties are unnatural, and are therefore, 
 in the forum of nature, unlawful and defpotical. 
 
 In equal focieties, many and great inequalities may 
 take place in many refpects, becaufe the nature of fuch 
 focieties requires or admits of them. There muft be 
 members who exercife particular rights, whilft others 
 are under correfponding obligations; for without fuch 
 a fubordination the end of fociety cannot be obtained, 
 or that order and harmony preferved which are fo efTen- 
 tially neceftary for the prefervation of the fociety and 
 the happinefs of its members. As in this refpect a 
 difference muft take place, refulting from the nature of 
 
 the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. Q^J 
 
 the fociety, To members may be differently fituated 
 with refpect to their private interefts : with thefe, as 
 has been explained, the common good does not inter- 
 fere ; but, in cafes of collifion, requires the united ex- 
 ertions of the members, according to their feveral 
 abilities. 
 
 The principle of equality, therefore, fo much the 
 object of controverfy at this day, if well underftood, is 
 far from that levelling fyftem which faps the foundation 
 of all order and fubordination in fociety, and lays prof- 
 trate all right of lawful pre-eminence and property. 
 There muft be rulers in fociety, and there muft and 
 will be a difference among men, with refpect to talents, 
 induftry and poffeffions : but let the rulers derive their 
 right from the nature of the fociety, and let this right 
 be exercifed for the common good thereof-, let the wife 
 and the virtuous be preferred to the adminiftratjon of 
 the fociety, as they are both able and willing to ftudy 
 its advancement and profperity ; let the poor reft -con- 
 tented under the care and protection of the fociety, and 
 cheerfully contribute for the fupport of the common 
 good, whilft thofe who are more wealthy affift in pro- 
 portion to their poiTeffions. 
 
 A right to difpofe of the actions of the members of 
 fociety, for the attainment of the common good thereof, 
 is called government : perfons adminiftering govern- 
 ment are laid to be in authority : thofe members of fo- 
 ciety who are in authority are known by the name of 
 rulers, whilft fuch as are under that authority are called 
 the ruled. 
 
 Since the actions of moral agents are to be directed 
 by motives, and as a connection of motives conftitutes 
 moral obligations, it follows, that rulers have a right 
 
 Q.q to 
 
2^8 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to prefcribe to the members of a fociety fuch rules as 
 may import their focial obligations \ that is to fay, 
 each government is inverted with the natural right of 
 enacting, promulging and putting into execution laws 
 for the conduct of the members of fociety, and thefe 
 are bound to conduct themfelves conformably to thofe 
 laws. 
 
 Laws which are naturally entitled to the obedience 
 of the ruled, muft be confident with and have for their 
 ^end the common good of fociety, for it is for this 
 purpofe only that government is veiled with legislative 
 rights. If the contrary mould take place, obligations 
 would be conftituted which refult not from the nature 
 of fociety, but depend upon arbitrary difpofal \ — the 
 fociety would become unequal and defpotical. ■ 
 
 The determination, whether laws are confiftent with 
 the common good of the fociety, cannot reft upon the 
 opinion of the rulers, nor upon that of particular per- 
 sons' amongft the ruled •, for in the former cafe, the fo- 
 cial obligation would reft with the claimants of the fo- 
 cial right ♦, in the latter the focial right would be made 
 dependent upon the focial obligee, who might have a 
 private intereft to biafs his judgment to the prejudice of 
 the rulers as well as of the common good of the whole 
 fociety. In both thefe cafes obligations would be con- 
 ftituted which do not flow from the nature of the fo- 
 ciety, and the confequence would be, that the fociety 
 would ceafe to be equal and lawful. 
 
 The nature of equal and limited focieties is, that they 
 have for their end a common good. But a good is 
 common if all or the greater part of the members are 
 interefted in it. The determination, therefore, whe- 
 ther laws are for the benefit of the fociety or of a con- 
 trary 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 299 
 
 trary tendency, refts with all the members, or, where 
 the confent of all cannot be obtained, with the majority : 
 for in either of thefe cafes the focial duty is preferved 
 by which members are bound to prefer the common 
 good to their private intereft. 
 
 It is pofTible, and indeed frequently the cafe, that the 
 majority of a fociety commit errors and miftakes, by 
 approving and adopting what is detrimental thereto : 
 but as they have their mare in the evil confequences of 
 their errors, fo they have an opportunity of being foon 
 convinced of them, and the remedy to find relief is in 
 their own hands. 
 
 . Laws of a fociety have therefore a binding force 
 upon all its members, as long as a majority approve 
 or acquiefce in them. 
 
 As long as focieties are ruled by men, fo long there 
 
 is no fecurity againft a poflibility of being burthened 
 
 with unnecefTary and grievous laws : the members of 
 
 a fociety have therefore a natural right to watch the 
 
 conduct of their rulers, to ftate their grievances, and 
 
 to apply proper remedies for redrefs: the rulers are 
 
 under natural obligations to grant redrefs as often as 
 
 their meafures militate againft the common good. 
 
 Sc/i. — For further particulars on this fubje<5t fee pages 31 — 34, 
 and 48 — 50. 
 
 Societies become fubordinated, when the common 
 good of one is fo modified as to become a fuitable 
 mean for obtaining the common good of another. 
 
 Thofe focieties which arife from fuch a fubordination 
 are compound \ and thefe again more or lefs general, as 
 the fubordination comprehends a greater or lefs number 
 of individual focieties. 
 
 Members 
 
300 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Members of a compound fociety muft exercife their 
 focial rights, and perform their focial obligations in 
 fuch a manner and to fach an extent as the common good 
 of the more general fociety requires •, for in refpect 
 of the latter, the focial rights and obligations of the 
 members of fubordinated focieties mud be confidered 
 as their private good. 
 
 As, therefore, in each fociety private good muft be 
 difpenfed with where it is found to be inconfiftent with 
 the common good, fo the common good of fubordi- 
 nated focieties muft be difpenfed with, as far as it is 
 found to militate againft the common good of the ge- 
 neral fociety. 
 
 Sch. — The mod general fociety is the civil. Civil focieties 
 are known by the names of ftates, nations, &c. In a 
 ftate all focieties and interefts muft be fubordinate to 
 public good; where that is not the cafe, the political pa- 
 radox takes place, imperium in imperio, or flatus injlatu. 
 
 The rule that the common good, in cafes of colli- 
 fion, muft be facrificed to the more general, or what 
 is commonly called the public weal, cannot extend to 
 the fpiritual good of focieties ; that is, their religious 
 fentiments and modes of worfhip •, except where thefe 
 fhould actually endanger the welfare of fociety, and 
 members on this account oppofe the public good, fo 
 that no other remedy is left. In cafe therefore of ne- 
 cefllty only, the fociety has a right to check the effects 
 of fuch dangerous innovations. 
 
 Sch. — If a fociety holds it unlawful to make ufe of war or 
 violent defence, the general fociety has a right to check 
 the progrefs of fuch tenets, that they may not become 
 general, if there be caufe to fear that effect; but if fuch 
 perfons may otherwife contribute to the general defence, 
 and there be not an abfolute neceffity for their actual 
 fervice, it would be imprudent and improper to meddle 
 with their tenets at all. 
 
 In 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 3OI 
 
 In all other refpe&s well regulated focieties require 
 not a facrifice of the liberty of confeience-, for their 
 primary fcope is temporal felicity, that is, the higher!: 
 poflible degree of liberty, joined with both internal 
 and external fecurity: but for the enjoyment of the 
 firft, liberty of confeience is effentially neceffary •, and 
 in well regulated communities falutary laws provide 
 for the internal peace of fociety, which is generally 
 very fafe with refpecl to confeientious perfons. As 
 for the external fecurity of fociety, experience has 
 evinced that the number of thofe who have adopted 
 tenets unfriendly to its effectual fupport in times of 
 imminent danger, has been comparatively fmall at all 
 times, fo that its fafety is by no means injured by ex- 
 ercifing towards them all poflible moderation. 
 
 The oftenfible, or public characler of a fociety, con- 
 fids in the rulers thereof-, for as long as a majority 
 acquiefce in their proceedings, the approbation of the 
 fociety is {tamped on thefe proceedings, and the con- 
 fequence is, that the rulers are held up as perfons who 
 are vefted with the power of maintaining the rights of 
 the fociety at large. Things, therefore, done or fuf- 
 fered by rulers in their focial capacity, are deemed to 
 be done or fuffered by the fociety at large. 
 
 Hence it is that different focieties injure one ano- 
 ther, if the rulers of the one, either direcliy or indirectly , 
 impede the rulers of the other in the purfuit or in the 
 enjoyment of the common good of their own fociety : 
 the former will be the cafe if the injury arifes from the 
 proceedings of the rulers -, the latter when it is caufed 
 by a&s of the members, with the knowledge, con- 
 nivance or approbation of the government of their 
 fociety : for in both thefe cafes the rulers of the one 
 
 are 
 
302 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are the moral caufe of injuries committed againft the 
 i*uJers of the other fociety. 
 
 The government of a fociety may be injured in an 
 immediate or in a mediate manner; the former if the 
 direct or indirect injury is committed againft the rulers ; 
 the latter if the one or the other has befallen an indi- 
 vidual, fo that he has been impeded in purfuing or 
 enjoying the common good of his own fociety. 
 
 From thefe diftinctions the following maxims may 
 be inferred for determining what is injurious or other- 
 wife between focieties : 
 
 i. Injuries committed by the rulers of one fociety 
 againfl: the government of the other, are ipfo faclo 
 public ; that is to fay, they concern the whole fociety. 
 
 2. Injuries committed by any member of a fociety 
 againft the government of another, become only pub- 
 lic on the part of the former, if fatisfaction is denied 
 when required, the injurer countenanced or protected, 
 or the act approved of, &c. 
 
 3. Injuries which members of one fociety commit 
 againft the members of another, become public if the 
 injury concerns the public good, and if, reprefentations 
 being made by one government to the other, fatisfac- 
 tion is refufed, and the injury thus countenanced. 
 
 4. A member injuring the rulers of the fociety of 
 which he is a member, commits a public offence 
 againft the fociety at large. 
 
 Societies are bound by natural laws not to injure 
 others either directly or indirectly, whether in a me- 
 diate or in an immediate manner; for by doing an in- 
 jury, they give caufe for violent defence and war, and 
 endanger their own fecurity. 
 
 In 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 303 
 
 In times of common danger, the members of a fo- 
 ciety are perfectly bound to afford aid and afiiitaiice to 
 one another, and make defence a common caufe. 
 
 Social connections are deiiroyed when focial obliga- 
 tions and rights ceafe: we may diftinguifh various 
 ways in which either of thefe will be the cafe. 
 
 Death puts an end to focial connections •, mutual 
 confent dijfolves them •, they become extincl if prohi- 
 bited by law, or where their end is rendered impoflibie ; 
 they expire when the time is elapfed which was to de- 
 termine their duration. 
 
 We conclude this chapter by obferving, that focial 
 
 connections have no pretence to a longer continuance 
 
 than the caufe of their inftitution. 
 
 Sch. — Allegiance is a focial duty as long as protection is 
 afforded. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Introduction to the relative duties of man, which flow from 
 the confitution of the f exes. 
 
 JLXLL focieties of a fpecific nature, which may take 
 place among men, ultimately refult from the fame 
 fource and origin from which the various affociations 
 of all beings of an animate nature arife, to wit, from 
 the. natural constitution of the fexes, and that inftinc- 
 tive affection between them, which, accompanied by 
 an infuperable defire and love of offspring, are defin- 
 ed by the Moft High as means to preferve and con- 
 tinue in existence their refpective fpecies. 
 
 T!:e 
 
304 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The brute creation, feem to have accomplished the" 
 defign of Providence, when, following inftindt and 
 fenfe, by affociations, for the mofr. part periodical and 
 promifcuous, they procreate offspring, beftowing on 
 them that fhort-lived care and folicitude which the 
 protection and prefervation of their young require. 
 
 But, blefTed be God, there is a vaft difference with 
 refpect to human nature •, his providences towards 
 the children of men are not only more extenfive than 
 this tranfitory life, but likewife infinitely more glo- 
 rious. Man, befides the enjoyment of animal life, 
 and the innumerable bleffings it affords, is blefTed with 
 a moral, fpiritual and immortal nature ; his destina- 
 tion is not confined to time or tranfitory enjoyments, 
 but extends to permanent, lafting, nay, everlafting 
 happinefs. To be guided by inftinct, to follow fenfe, 
 to be fatisfied with fenfual gratifications, comports with 
 the nature and is the condition of brutes. To fub- 
 ject them to reafon, to ufe them in conformity to the 
 will of the glorious Creator, and in confiftency with the 
 defign for which they are given -, to feek real and 
 everlafting happinefs, by a conduct rational and con- 
 formable to the fupreme law and will of God, is the 
 duty of man — his glory — his prerogative. 
 
 The flave of paffion fins both againfr. God and 
 
 himfelf ; thofe who fubmit to the incitements of in- 
 
 ftinct only, forget the high deftination of nature, and 
 
 are infenfible of their awful refponfibility to their God 
 
 and Maker, for the ufe they make of all the faculties 
 
 and gifts beftowed upon them : the leaf! that can be 
 
 faid of fuch a conduct, is, that it degrades man to 
 
 the claffes of brutes, or perhaps finks him below their 
 
 condition. 
 
 Sch 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 305 
 
 ..//.— Here would be the place to fpeak of difaraqeful con- 
 nexions, and of* acts unnatural, which conltitute crimes 
 without a name ; becaufe too difgraceful to be fuppofed 
 
 to obtain :: place among the actions ol men. 
 
 Quid men be fatisfied, that aflbciations have the 
 function of natural inftinct ? Ought they not, as mo- 
 ral agents, to look forward to the will of their Crea- 
 tor, and consider the confequences of their actions ? 
 Moil certainly ; fo far from rendering himfelf a brute, 
 man ought, before all other considerations, to enquire, 
 Is it right ? is it confident with the dignity of a moral na- 
 ture and with the will of God ? is it lawful ? Thus con- 
 ducting himfelf he acts becoming the deftination of a 
 being, blefled with an immortal fpint, which cannot 
 be fatisfied by tranfitory gratifications and empty In (Is, 
 and ought therefore to feek for rational pleafures, lad- 
 ing and permanent, calculated to advance that happi- 
 nefs which is the ultimate defign of all the providences 
 of the Deity towards men. 
 
 Since, then, God has implanted powerful inftincts 
 in human nature, rendering thofe aflbciations eligible 
 which he has ordered for the prefervation of mankind, 
 it certainly follows, both from the nature of man and 
 his high deftination, that he is under the mo ft {acred 
 obligations, neither blindly to follow nor wantonly to 
 fupprefs, but rationally to controul the influence of 
 them, by determined refolutions, taken from the 
 weighty motives of piety, juftice, humanity and de- 
 cency, that they become not obftacles to the purfuit, 
 but means for the attainment and advancement of hu- 
 man happinefs. 
 
 Sch. — It is a juit obfervation, that man differs not fo much 
 from brutes by reafon as by religion. What avails it to 
 have the former, and not to exercife it, or to reject its 
 falutkrv counfc Is 
 
 R r The 
 
306 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The molt lively fenfe of duty mould therefore impel 
 man to improve thofe ftrong affections implanted in 
 his nature into habits of true love, and a lofting friend- 
 Jhip, founded in a fincere and indefatigable defire to 
 promote, as much as poffible, one another's happinefs. 
 Without fuch a moral union of will and affection, there 
 cannot be {lability in a common intereft*, happinefs 
 cannot fubfirt, and a connection of the fexes cannot be 
 confident with the general welfare of mankind or be- 
 coming the dignity of human nature; iince the condi- 
 tion of the parties muft be precarious and pitiful, and 
 that of their offspring miferable, forfaken and deftitute. 
 
 How long do children continue to be extremely 
 tender, helplefs and weak ! and what would be their 
 condition, if thofe who have been inftrumental in their 
 exiftence mould withdraw their affirtance for the pro- 
 tection and prefervation of their lives ? 
 
 How ftrong, on the other hand, is the affection, 
 how nearly is the happinefs of parents connected with 
 that of their children ! How great then the affliction, 
 and how grievous the injury to a fellow parent, if one 
 of the parties mould withdraw his affection, and de- 
 prive what is his own flefli and blood of fo neceffary 
 an affiftance! 
 
 Hence it is evident, that connections which are not 
 founded in true love, where perfons have not formed 
 one common interert with the deflgn of promoting one 
 another's happinefs, where they continue not in a 
 perpetual ftate of friendfhip neceffary for their mu- 
 tual comfort, as well as for the faithful performance 
 of parental duties to children, who are generally the 
 natural confequence of fuch affeciations, are unbe- 
 coming the rationality of human nature, contrary to 
 
 the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. %OJ 
 
 the happinefs of the parties as well as the children, 
 and therefore utterly repugnant to the dictates of na- 
 tural law, which requires of man that his principal 
 duty mould be to promote his own happinefs and that 
 of others, and carefully to avoid the contrary. 
 
 Sell. — Befides the powerful arguments, that God firft made one 
 man and one woman, and,(ince creation, has ordered things 
 fo, that the number of males and females mould continue 
 as nenrly equal as poffible, the neceflity of one common 
 intereft and perpetual friendfiiip between perfons con- 
 nected for their own happinefs and for that of their chil- 
 dren, is a ftrong argument againft polygamy : the former 
 mews the injuftice thereby committed againft the general 
 rights of mankind; the latter evinces the fins which per- 
 fons by fuch conduct commit againft God, againft t'hem- 
 felves and their offspring. 
 
 It is delightful indeed to contemplate the ways of 
 the wifdom of God in his government over the human 
 race, for they are wifely diftributed and full of mercy. 
 Children receive their exiflence by powers which, ac- 
 cording to the univerfal order of nature, are implanted 
 in the conftitutional frame of mankind : their fupport, 
 and more efpecially their education, that is, all that con- 
 cerns their felicity here and hereafter, is founded on 
 natural affection, and chiefly on thofe principles of jus- 
 tice and equity which the wifdom of the Moil High 
 lias planned, and which his finger has engraven on the 
 hearts of men for the direction of their conduct; and 
 the promotion of their happinefs. — Man is made de- 
 pendent on his fellow creatures for the firft dawn of 
 life : the human race is linked together by ties of blood 
 and ties of duties: all men labour under the fame 
 wants and infirmities, and, in conformity to the will of 
 their common Father, are fubjedfc to the fame laws for 
 promoting their happinefs and extending their benevo- 
 lence* 
 
308 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lence to one another, and efpecially to thofe who are 
 related to us by blood and more ftrictly intrufted to 
 our care. 
 
 Let thofe who have unluckily learned the art of con- 
 tracting a callous infenfibility to the dictates of reafon, 
 and who are even dead to the inftinctive calls of nature, 
 take example from the affectionate care and folicitude 
 which brutes never fail to exert towards their young, 
 as long as their condition requires protection and aflift- 
 ance: here they will fee the horror of lawlefs, loofe 
 and promifcuous connections. 
 
 But let us draw a veil over human converfation not 
 guided by religion, where a creature endowed with 
 reafon is deaf to the gentle voice of virtue, and turns 
 an enemy to the delights of innocence and its conco- 
 mitants, peace of mind and true happinefs, the appro- 
 bation of God and of men. — Let us behold the beau- 
 tiful fight of perfons who have given up all their 
 worldly intereits for their own mutual happinefs and 
 for that of their offspring, dwelling in unity, each en- 
 deavouring to prevent the other in ail things which are 
 confident with virtue and with their common good. 
 United by intereft, they are not only one body, but 
 one heart and one foul. Their affection refts upon 
 virtuous love, which increafes with every effort that is 
 made to advance their mutual happinefs. Behold 
 their joint, unceafing endeavours, not only to protect, 
 but to educate their children ! how affduous to tit them 
 for the duties of life! how ftrenuous and mediant to 
 do all in their power to qualify them for the promotion 
 of their own felicity and that of others ! It is both 
 their vvifh and delight to caufe their offspring to be- 
 come good fathers, good citizens, bleffed inftruments 
 
 for 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 309 
 
 for promoting the glory of their Maker and the felicity 
 
 of mankind. It is (aid, Nuptitf declare the father-, 
 
 but let it be obferved, that it is the good education 
 
 that realizes the declaration. What excellency is there 
 
 in the name of a father or mother, if parents have 
 
 been but inurumental 'in bringing children to light, 
 
 iince it is Weil known that the beafts of the foreft do 
 
 the fame after their kind ? Suppofe fuch parents give 
 
 \t children the needful fupport, by doing lb they 
 
 can only exceed the dumb creature in the neccilary 
 
 length of time. It is altogether inftinct with both, 
 
 with this difference, that the effect of that inftinct is 
 
 more lading on the part of man than on that of the 
 
 brute •, becaufe it is God who has ordered it fo, the 
 
 natural weaknefs of children requiring that provifion 
 
 for their protection and prefervation which even the 
 
 degeneracy and wickednefs of the human heart can 
 
 feldom impair. 
 
 Sch. 1. — How cruel and unnatural, then, niuft be the conduct 
 of thofe who can deny children their natural rights, and 
 leave them deftitute and unprovided for? 
 
 Sch. 2. — How detectable is fornication and adultery, if, befides 
 the internal turpitude and a thoufand other crimes con- 
 fequent to them, this one is confidered, that a parent de- 
 nies his own fiefli and blood, or leaves it to all the mife- 
 ries of want, difgrace and fiiame? 
 
 $ch. 3. — We juftly diftinguilh parental love from natural ten- 
 dernefs and fondnefs, fince the former is guided by rea- 
 fon and directed in conformity to the precepts and prohi- 
 bitions of natural law, whilft the lattdf degenerate into 
 reprehenfible neglect of duty, and caufe more harm than 
 defpotic rudenefs and feverity. Love is true, if the hap- 
 pinefs of children is its invariable object and purfuit. 
 Of true parental love it may be juftly faid, that it is fit- 
 as death, lafting as life. It rifes fuperior to all the pains, 
 troubles, vexations and fufferings . duration of 
 
 linidrer requires from parents^ 
 
 Parental 
 
3 10 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Parental duties are indeed exceedingly complicated, 
 arduous and difficulty but, behold the merciful provi- 
 dences of the Mod High ! they are not only made to- 
 lerable, but pleafant, fweet and delightful ! It is a great 
 gratification to parents, that they can render the ftate 
 of their children happy, aflift their wants, alleviate 
 their mifery, and fympathife in their fufferings ! It is 
 God who has thus placed the hearts of parents in uni- 
 fon with the concerns of their children ; nay, the power 
 of nature, as well as of religion and humanity, extends 
 that fympathy to others •, fo that children who are des- 
 titute of the affiftance of parents, either by death or the 
 omiiilon of parental duties, find relief and comfort, fa- 
 thers and mothers, in other perfons. God has con- 
 nected the happinefs of parents with that of their chil- 
 dren, fo that it is morally inftparable therefrom: no- 
 thing but death fhould be ftrong enough to difiblve 
 parental affection. 
 
 Sch. i. — Hence we fee how very confident it is with human 
 happinefs, and confequently with moral law, that parents 
 fhould have a right to devife their property to their chil- 
 dren. 
 
 Sch. 2. — What then is hard enough to ferve as a reproach for 
 the great neglect that is frequently fuffered to take place 
 in the education of children? How unaccountable is it 
 to confign them in their tender years to the company of 
 rude or wicked perfons — to truft them entirely to a mailer 
 or a madam — to fend them to a public institution, and to 
 be lefs concerned, with refpeel to their progrefs-and con- 
 dud, than one would be about a horfe or any other fa- 
 vourite creature? 
 
 Sch. %. — The very little concern men take in caufing their 
 children to have a proper fenfe of religion, and their neg- 
 lect of inculcating thofe fentiments of their dependence 
 on God for all they have or may expect, which are fo 
 \vell calculated to make ftrong impreffions on their ten- 
 der minds, and early habituate them to the practice of 
 
 virtue. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 3 I I 
 
 virtue, form another aftonifhing proof that the prefent 
 age has ftrange notions of education. We mail not ani- 
 madvert on the noify crowds of idle vagabond children, 
 who obftruft the flreets by day, and particularly bv night. 
 Still we are republicans, and boaft of republican man- 
 ners ! 
 
 The fupport and education of children, which re- 
 quire the joint efforts of parents, are therefore further 
 ftrong arguments to prove, that no other connection 
 of the fexes can be naturally lawful but that which is 
 founded upon a firm and permanent union of the parties 
 in one common intereft. This union is to be indijfohi- 
 hie \ nothing but the death of one of the parties ought 
 to caufe a reparation. 
 
 Unhappy are the parties connected for life, who have 
 given up all their individual interefts, and placed their 
 happinefs in mutual ailiftance, in reciprocal fidelity, and 
 in joint efforts to promote the end of their afTociation, 
 if love be not both the bafis and foul of that union, 
 and if there mould be caufe to refort to the perfect: af- 
 firmative rights in each other's perfon which are natu- 
 rally created by that union. — The moft grievous inju- 
 ries mult arife, if one of the parties fhould forfake tho 
 other, or be remifs in performing thofe duties which are 
 neceflary for the promotion of their joint happinefs and 
 that of their children. Nature never fails to give rights 
 adequate to the duties fhe impofes : perfons cannot 
 form a diftinct fociety, nor lawfully have afeparate in- 
 tereft from Others, but upon the ftrength of particular 
 rights required by the end of that fociety, and adequate 
 for the fecurity of that particular intereft. 
 
 There are likewife perfect affirmative rights re- 
 quired, that others may be excluded from lawlefs in- 
 terference. Injuries attempted or committed againft 
 
 the 
 
- y l2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the peace of the union or the attainment of all its oh 
 jects, muft be prevented, warded off or repelled. Per- 
 feci: affirmative rights are neceflary, on account of the 
 frailty of human nature, that fidelity be fecured, in- 
 ternal fecurity eflablifhed, and injuries corrected which 
 might unfortunately take place between the parties. 
 
 Hence it follows, that no connections can be lawful 
 which are not voluntary, refting upon and proceeding 
 from the mutual ccnfent of the parties : acts of vio- 
 lence are highly criminal, and, by the laws of civilized 
 countries, offences capital and felonious. 
 
 Sch. i. — The fame conclufion flows from the confederation, 
 that connections cannot be lawful which are not founded 
 on true love. 
 
 Sch. i. — Unwarrantable as it is in children to flight the advice 
 of their parents and friends, in concerns which have the 
 greateft influence on their happinefs, and as much as grati- 
 tude requires that they fhould afk their confent ; fo, little 
 can an interference be recommended which is dictated by 
 ambition, avarice, or other fordid views of parents, in 
 matters which concern the peace and happinefs of their 
 children. 
 
 Sch. 3. — But to difapprove and oppofe connections with wick- 
 ed or profligate characters, is the duty of parents; and 
 woe unto children who defpife advice fo truly parental! 
 
 From thefe feveral confiderations it follows, that a 
 connection between the fexes naturally lawful, may be 
 confidered in one refpect as a voluntary Jo ciety\ which, 
 as rights and obligations flow from the end and nature 
 of lawful connections hitherto explained, is at the fame 
 time equal. — In another point of view, this connection 
 has the form and comprehends all the ingredients ne- 
 ceffary to a lawful pact; for, where perions mutually 
 promife the moft facred fidelity in performing all that 
 is neceflary for the happinefs of their union and the 
 
 advancement 
 
ItfORAL PHILOSOPHY. gi* 
 
 advancement of its objects, and make a tender of per- 
 fect and affirmative rights in each other's perfon, there 
 is both acceptance and transfer, confequently a con- 
 tract. 
 
 Although lawful connections are juftly conftdered as 
 contracts in the forum of nature, as Well as in the civile 
 yet there is in them this Vaft difference from all other 
 pacts which have for their object rights in things, that 
 they mud: be confident with the natural rights in per- 
 fons, and that thefe rights muft be modified by the 
 nature and ends by and for which connections of the 
 fexes can only be lawful. There cannot be a claim to 
 arbitrary and defpotical fway or flavim fub'jection: it 
 cannot confift with natural law, that an union be formed 
 for a time, or difiblved by mutual confent. Concubinage^ 
 even where children are (upported and educated, can- 
 not be lawful, becaufe the bond of perpetual union* 
 eflential to common happinefs, is fet afide. 
 
 Whether lawful connections be confidered as con- 
 tracts or as voluntary equal focieties, they ought to be 
 attended with certain external folemnities, giving them 
 publicity to others, that no act may take place by which 
 the peace and happinefs of the union, or its objects, 
 may be diftufbed. 
 
 Befides this, juftice, decency and propriety dictate 
 that deference to the good opinion of others, which is 
 Que to our fellow creatures and ornamental to the con- 
 iiection. 
 
 In. both cafes, it is eafy to determine, in general* 
 the perfons who may or may not lawfully adociate :— * 
 Nature undoubtedly gives that right to fuch as can 
 make a lawful promife or give a valid confent; but it 
 
 Ss <■: nies 
 
314 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 denies it to children, to lunatics, and to all fuch as have 
 not the phyfical or moral faculty to will or to perform. 
 Neither can perfons form a lawful connection who are 
 pre-engaged, or where any moral impediment is in 
 
 the way. 
 
 We rather prefer, however, the conflderation of this 
 fuhject under the idea of a voluntary equal fociety, 
 where the refpective rights and obligations of the 
 members refult from the nature of the fociety, not from 
 the will or caprice of either or both parties : becaufe, 
 if an union is blefled with children, a fociety arifes, 
 which is altogether natural in its foundation, and con- 
 fequently neceffary •, for as fuch the relation of parents 
 and children muft be confidered. 
 
 Before we conclude thefe general principles and 
 proceed to the feveral ftates of men which reft upon 
 them, it will be neceflary, for the fake of perfpicuity, 
 to reduce them to two principal points •, the one de- 
 pending upon the qualifications of perfons, or the re- 
 quires of thofe who may lawfully afibciate ; the other 
 referring to the end or ends for which afTociations 
 made can only be lawful. 
 
 1 . No connections can be lawful unlefs they proceed 
 from the mutual confent of the parties, and are form- 
 ed upon the bafis of a perpetual union, eftablifhed 
 upon true love and affectionate friendship, and fup- 
 ported by perfect: and affirmative rights in each other's 
 perfon, for the more effectual attainment of its object. 
 
 2. The end of this perpetual union muft neceffarily 
 be the common and joint intereft, the promotion of 
 each other's happinefs, and the propagation and edu- 
 cation of the children who mould derive their origin 
 from it. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 315 
 
 Sfk, 1. — Since this end is not always attainable in its full ex- 
 tent, children being a bleffing of the Lord, not in the 
 power of the parties, nor the exclufive confequence of a 
 lawful connexion; it follows in this cafe, that a connec- 
 tion is lawful which extends no farther than a perpetual 
 union for promoting each other's happinefs. 
 
 ScL 2. — Connections which defeat that end are imputable to 
 the moral caufes, are extremely inhuman and criminal. 
 
 Sck. 3. — To make a fingle life a virtue in itfelf, or the obje<ft 
 of religious vows, is as unjuft and barbarous as it is (in- 
 fill and fuperftitious. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the matrimonial or connubial fociety. 
 
 X HE end for which a lawful connection may take 
 place is a perpetual union for promoting the happinefs 
 of the parties : it likewife extends to the natural con- 
 fequences of that union, the propagation and education 
 of children, in cafes where children derive their origin 
 from that connection. 
 
 We may therefore diftinguim a proximate and ulti- 
 mate end : the former is in the power of the parties 
 to obtain, and their indifpenfible duty to purfue, by 
 faithfully performing what is reciprocally neceflary for 
 their mutual happinefs, what may perpetuate their 
 friendfhip, and contribute to the attainment of the 
 objects of the union, as far as is pofiibie : the latter has 
 refpect to the propagation of children, for which the 
 Mofl: High has ordered fuch a lawful and perpetual 
 union to be formed and conducted in confiflency with 
 the deftination of human nature, and conformably to 
 his law. 
 
 If 
 
Jf6, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If perfons veft. one another with perfect affirmative 
 
 rights for the ends of mutual happinefs, the propaga- 
 tion and education of children, they are faid to enter 
 into the matrimonial ft ate. 
 
 The matrimonial ftate is diftinguifhed into the con- 
 niiblul and the 'parental. 
 
 In the connubial ftate the relation is considered be- 
 tween hujhand and wifey in the parental, that of pa- 
 rents and children. 
 
 Both the connubial and parental ftates are morally 
 connected where they are naturally fo-, that is to fay % 
 when hufband and wife are bleiTed with children, they 
 are bound to the performance of the parental duties, 
 to maintain, protect and educate them. 
 
 If one of the parents dies, the parental rights and 
 duties center in the other; if both fhould be called 
 from the ftage of life, thefe rights and duties naturally 
 devolve upon thofe of the nearefl relations who are beffc 
 calculated for the charge. 
 
 If parents become naturally fuch, by begetting chil- 
 dren without having entered into the connubial fociety, 
 they ought, if poifible, to become moral parents, by 
 forming that indiffoluble union upon perfect and affir- 
 mative rights, which vefts them with the rights of huA 
 band and wife, and qualifies them for the performance 
 of thofe duties which are requifitefor the fupport and 
 education of their children. 
 
 Sch. i .— Juftice to the parties, to the children, to relations^ 
 and to fociety at large, requires that this kind of reparation 
 be made in all cafes where it is phyfically and morally 
 poiiible. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Both thefe requifites meet in fingle perfons, and in 
 fuch cafes where the condition cf the parties is net fuch, 
 
 that 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. $lj 
 
 that a greater evil would arife from the connection; but 
 then certainly the poverty or "low condition of one of 
 the parties cannot be among the caufes that render the 
 con Sfcibhj ineligible. Vices, fraud, deception, and the 
 qneilion whether the feducer is thereby brought to a bet- 
 ter condition, are of more confequence. 
 
 ScJi. 3. — It may be fu ppofed there- is not a better mean by 
 which feduftion may be more powerfully di farmed, and 
 the iiuioce.'icf ot the honeft and induflrious poor more 
 e .'... protected, than to compel the feducer to con- 
 
 tra.: - I . connubial ftate with the object of his criminal 
 co. :on. 
 
 ScL 4. - De objected,' that this would be founding a con- 
 
 nee^, ) . ot upon true love and real friendfhip; weanfwer, 
 that in cafe of an injury and a heinous crime, the firft 
 queftion is the making reparation; and the feoond, which 
 is the mod fuitable punifhment for an offence by which 
 the laws of God, of men, of humanity, piety and decency 
 have been wantonly tranfgrefled ? 
 
 Sch. 5. — Have not the children a natural claim ? Is he a man 
 who can deny his own fiefh ? 
 
 .Sch, 6. — Reparations of this kind are impoflible, where cither 
 or both parties are under the obligations of a connubial 
 ftate; and this irnpoffibility muff, be coniidered as one of 
 the caufes why adultery is of infinitely greater turpitude 
 and malignancy than other lawlefs connections* 
 
 However, where children are not or cannot be the 
 confequence of the connubial ftate, all the duties of 
 hufband and wife center in the reciprocal rights and 
 obligations which have for their object mutual happi- 
 nefs and perpetual union -, and that date maintains the 
 fandkion of the matrimonial. 
 
 The firft cafe has reference to perfons who might 
 naturally have expected the blefling of children ; the 
 fecond relates to fuch as have fo far advanced in life 
 that fuch an expectation finds no place. There huf- 
 band and wife are bound to their perpetual union, be- 
 caufe they have purfued the ends o£ matrimony as far 
 
 as 
 
3fl MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as was in their power : here higher obligations may 
 Juftify and render a connection eligible which is necef- 
 iary for their mutual comfort and happinefs. 
 
 Sch. i. — But let it be obferved, that the latter cafe cannot be 
 extended fo far as to juftify marriages obvioufly improper, 
 between perfons of too great a difparity of years for even 
 happinefs to be thereby expected. 
 
 Sck. 2. — Thofe who have become parents by a former marriage 
 btfght to avoid fubfequent connections, which are inju- 
 rious to the fuppcrt and education of their children. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the more fpecific rights and duties between hufband 
 
 and wife. 
 
 INCE lawful connections, as has been lhewn, muft 
 have the nature of voluntary and equal focieties, it 
 follows, that the matrimonial or lawful connubial fo- 
 ciety muft be equal-, that is, no rights or obligations 
 can take place between hufband and wife which do 
 not flow from the nature and fcope of that intimate re- 
 lation. But as that fcope is mutual happinefs, and as 
 happinefs cannot fubfift without order, peace, regula- 
 rity, and an uniform direction of their joint will for the 
 attainment of the objects of their perpetual union, it 
 will be necefTary for one of the members to have the 
 general direction. 
 
 The queftion then is, whether the hufband or the 
 wife is lawfully vefted with that right? Among the 
 variety of caufes affigned for the appropriation of fa- 
 mily government to the male fex, we think this the mod 
 
 material, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. $1Q 
 
 material, that nature has formed that fex for thofe con- 
 cerns of the family which generally lie beyond the walls 
 of the houfe and furpafs the limits of the field •, whilir. 
 the wife has her place particularly at home, where her 
 infant children (land in need of her inceflant care and 
 afliftance. At this rate, the hufband, who has his bu- 
 finefs both abroad and at home, mull needs acquire a 
 more extenfive knowledge of what is conducive to the 
 promotion of the intereft of his family •, and it is na- 
 tural that the direction of affairs mould devolve upon 
 that perfon who is calculated to conduct it to the bed 
 advantage. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — Happy that marriage where true love and faithful 
 friendfhip bear fway — where hufband and wife, guided 
 by virtue and piety, vie with each other in the moil affi* 
 duous efforts of benevolence. 
 
 Sch, 2. — Family affairs and family government ought to be 
 conducted upon principles of humanity : defpotical con» 
 duel in a hufband is barbarity — moderation and gentleneis 
 his greateft ornament: modefty, fubordination and ra- 
 tional obedience in a wife are more excellent, more in- 
 valuable than all the jewels which India has or mall ever 
 produce: but flavifli -fubjeftion is a difgrace, not to the 
 poor fufferer, but to the rude barbarian who difhonours 
 humanity. 
 
 The rights and obligations between hufband and 
 wife are mutual or reciprocal -, for only fueh comport 
 with the nature and fcope of the connubial or matri- 
 monial fociety. 
 
 Hence it follows, that as the hufband has the chief 
 government, fo he is bound to conduct it only for the 
 promotion of the joint intereft: and the right of the 
 wife is to expect or to have maintenance; that is to fay, 
 fuch fupport as comports with the good of the family, 
 and is proportionate to its circumftances. 
 
 Sek. 
 
10 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Scfi. i. — Our laws have exceedingly well provided both for the 
 protection and fupport of a wife; but it is a pity that a. 
 profligate hufband can fruftrate thofe laws, by fquander • 
 ing away all during his life-time, except where the family 
 is poileiled of a real edate. 
 
 $c&. 2.-*-It is therefore a queftion, whether it Would not be 
 confident with good policy, as well as with the eternal 
 laws of judice, that drunkards, gamblers, &c. be redricted 
 fo as not to have it in their power to difgrace and ruin 
 their families; fince fuch perfons are unfit for family go- 
 vernment, and deferve, as in fome countries is the cafe, 
 to be put under the direction of trudees appointed by 
 law ? 
 
 ocL 3. — The right of ^maintenance is the only right left to a 
 wife that, according to the laws of fome countries, is 
 divorced a menfa et thoro* 
 
 The mutual rights and duties between hufband and 
 wife are principally of the imperfect kind, and on this 
 account are unlimited in extent, as much exceeding 
 thofe which are due to other perfons in* intenfify, as 
 their relation is the nearer! that is poflible among 
 mankind. Is love in general of an accommodating 
 nature? is it benevolence and friendship to a well- 
 wifher ? is it regard, efteem, affability, and afTiduity 
 to pleafe in near relations and equals ? is it fympathy, 
 patience, forbearance, pity, or mercy, w T here mediocri- 
 ty is its object, or where infirmities prefent themfelves, 
 errors and failings take place, or even injuries and 
 wrongs provoke ? What is it that conjugal love can- 
 not effect:, correct or endure ? 
 
 Even the perfect rights of man and wife, which ex- 
 tend to all that is necellary and in their power to pro- 
 mote the beii interefts of the union and the happy 
 attainment of its objects, mould be performed, not 
 from the low confederation that the partner has aright 
 to compel, but from principles of love, fympathy, 
 piety and humanity* 
 
 Much 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. $2\ 
 
 Much lefs mould room be left for correcting the 
 want of fidelity : appearances, even fufpicion, nay, 
 any thing that can be a pretext for it, ought to be 
 avoided. Actual breach of fidelity is a grievous in- 
 jury of the rnoft heinous nature, and acaufe of incon- 
 ceivable mifchief and unhappinefs. 
 
 There is no doubt but that there are injuries poiTible, 
 which in themfelves would be fufficient caufes for dif- 
 folving the connubial or matrimonial connection. 
 
 The legal declaration that the bond of matrimony 
 is dirTolved, is ftiled divorce. 
 
 The relation between hufband and wife may be en- 
 tirely annulled, or the laws of the land may leave to a 
 repudiated wife fome of the rights of matrimony, to 
 wit, the right of maintenance. In the former cafe the 
 divorce is total, in the latter it is divortium a men fa et 
 thoro. 
 
 The natural laws admit not of total divorces, where 
 innocent children are affected and perfons deprived of 
 all their dependence, as muft be the cafe with a repu- 
 diated wife -, for fuch an effect cannot be reconciled to 
 the nature of equal focieties, and can only comport 
 with defpotic fway on the part of a hufband. 
 
 Neither do the principles of eternal juftice require 
 a remedy, which, in its operation, produces more evil 
 than good, and applies not to an impartial adminiftra- 
 tion of juftice. What would become of the conjugal 
 fociety, the nurfery of church and ftate, if every or 
 even any injury could break the focial union ? What 
 a temptation to frail mortals for becoming remifs in the 
 exercife of the duties of humanity, if the moft power-* 
 ful motives for mutual compliance between the parties 
 
 T t be 
 
^22 MORAL PHILOSOPHY". 
 
 be taken away ! Whilft, on the other hand, the con- 
 fcioufnels of the indiflblubifity of the connection muft 
 be a conftant fpur to their afiiduity in performing, with 
 faithful fincerity, the mutual duties of benevolence, 
 Sympathy, and even forgivenefs. He that fears God, 
 and is faithful in his endeavours to promote the caufe 
 of vir.tue, will not wim to be freed from an injury at 
 the coft of humanity and to the detriment of human 
 happinefs, which muft be the confequence when a difTo- 
 lution of the connubial tie can be expected. 
 
 It is true, that adultery on the part of a wife is an 
 aggravated injury, as children are introduced in the 
 family to the injury and difgrace of the hufband. But 
 mould the punifhment of infidelity fall only on the 
 fide of the wife ? Should fhe not have an equal right 
 againft a faithlefs hufband? 
 
 Had not the parties their choice in forming the 
 connection ? Does it not very much depend upon the 
 difcretion, prudence and virtuous intention of this 
 choice, that the fociety be eftablifhed upon virtuous 
 love ? Does it not generally depend upon their vir- 
 tuous conduct to ftrengtfren the bond of union ? Are 
 there not perfect rights to check what is obnoxious to 
 the peace, confidence and happinefs of the parties ? 
 Are there not a thoufand remedies fhort of a total or 
 partial diflblution ? 
 
 So much is certain, that it is often the punifhment, 
 and for the moft part a jurt one too, that parties fhould 
 remain bound in a connection begun improperly, and 
 conducted imprudently and impioufly. 
 
 The feducer deferves indeed the higheft pnnifh- 
 ment, as he is the principal and moral caufe of inex- 
 prefTihle mifchief, and an irreparable injury. 
 
 Adultery 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 323 
 
 • Adultery is doubtlefs one of the greatefl injuries 
 that can happen to a family, if committed with a finglc 
 perfon •, for no fatisfaction can be made without adding 
 to the damages of a faithful partner : but when this 
 crime is committed by perfons on both fides bound by 
 the facred duties of a connubial fociety, it furpafies 
 eftimation — the damages are far beyond calculation. 
 
 If, notwithstanding thefe confiderations, experience 
 mould render legiflative interference eligible; if there 
 mould be cafes where a divorce is become expedient, 
 we think it mould not be extended, on the fide of the 
 woman, further than divortium a menja et thoro. No- 
 thing appears from the principles of nature, why the 
 wife mould not have the fame r^ght, together with a 
 generous maintenance from the efete of her hufband, 
 in cafe he mould be found unfaithful to his matrimonial 
 engagements. 
 
 What may be faid of another marriage, with refpect 
 to either party, is very difficult and precarious : and 
 even this intricacy and difficulty is in favour of our 
 principle, that a divorce, mould not be fanctioned by 
 the laws of the land. 
 
 There is another queftion with refpect to the con- 
 nubial fete of perfons who cannot form lawful connec- 
 tions •, but we have here no occafion to {peak of di- 
 vorce; the bond of lawful union is not diflblved, for 
 there was no fuch thing from the very origin or the 
 connection. The laws of the land mould rather en- 
 deavour to prevent than to annul them. 
 
 Connections are annulled^ when they are declared by 
 law invalid and void. 
 
 Thofe marriages are void, where the contract is made 
 
 by 
 
§24 MORAL FHILOSOPHV. 
 
 by perfons who have not the phyfical or moral faculty 
 to will and to perform : the former is the cafe with all 
 who have not the exercife, or have not arrived to the 
 maturity of their understanding -, likewife with fuch as 
 are bound by a former marriage : the latter refers to 
 natural infirmities, and to fuch perfons as cannot per- 
 form the parental duties •, alfo to cafes where the con- 
 nection is contrary to the fcope of the connubial and 
 parental ftates •, for inftance, confanguinity, &c. 
 
 There are no other prohibited degrees refulting from 
 principles of the natural law, than thofe which are ex- 
 £>refsly laid down in fcripture. 
 
 Marriages or connections within the prohibited de- 
 grees are highly criminal, and are juftly branded with 
 the appellation of inceft. 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Of the parental fociety* 
 
 X HERE is no doubt but the relation of parents 
 and children is one of the greater!: blefTmgs of this 
 life, if it takes place in confequence of a happy, firm 
 and eftablimed union of parents connected in a lawful 
 connubial fociety : their common intereft becomes 
 greatly enhanced by having thofe who are their flefh 
 and blood the particular objects of their care •, conjugal 
 felicity grows with their growth \ and there are innu- 
 merable endearments attending their education, which 
 is the moft important, and at the fame time the fweeteft 
 
 and 
 
Moral philosophy. 
 
 and moft delightful duty, requiring the joint efforts of 
 botli parents who are blerTed with offspring. 
 
 But if that reftltion takes place by means or lavvlefs 
 connection, children are fo far from being a bleftino- to 
 the guilty tranfgreftbrs of the law of nature and of 
 nature's God, that they publifh the difgrace and pro- 
 claim the criminality of their parents, who have thus 
 offended againft God and againft man, who have thus 
 injured both their own character and that of their 
 children. 
 
 Sch. i. — To difgrace is added imiferv and adeftitnte condition : 
 children often do not know their fathers, or if they know 
 them, they have no legal claim to their protection and 
 care. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Hence arifes the neceffity that parents mould, if pof- 
 fible, take upon themfelves the duties of man and wife, 
 by entering into the connubial ftate. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Behold the horrid effects of adultery, fornication, a 
 loofe and diforderly life ! Parents fin againft their own 
 flefh and blood; they become worfe than brutes! 
 
 With refpect to the parental fociety, we have firft to 
 enquire into the duties and rights of parents, and then 
 confider the obligations and rights of children. 
 
 Befldes the imperfect duties of humanity, which in- 
 deed have no limits aligned them butthefe, that they 
 muft be perfectly confiftent with thofe duties which 
 are due to God, to themfelves and to others, parents 
 owe perfect duties to their children •, for, next to God, 
 they are the authors of their exiftence, and by neglect- 
 ing them they would be guilty of injuries againft their 
 own flefh and blood, and againft the whole human race. 
 
 The perfect duties of patents comprehend the main- 
 tenance, protection and education of their children ; 
 for it is the defign of Providence, that parents fnould 
 
 promote 
 
%l6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 promote the happinefs of their children, by endeavour- 
 ing to render their fouls and bodies as perfect as pofli- 
 bJe, and by procuring them thofe means by which 
 thtCG ends may be attained. 
 
 Parents muft 'maintain their children, that is, give 
 
 them their neceflary fupport, until they are able to 
 
 iupport themfelves: without this their life and health 
 
 cannot be preferved, which however are amongft the 
 
 moil: eflentlal duties which parents owe to the bodies, 
 
 and are prefuppofed by the ftill more important duty 
 
 which they owe to the fouls of their children. 
 
 Sc/i. — Parents therefore have to maintain and to protect their 
 children, and to render their bodies and fouls as perfect 
 as poflible. 
 
 The education of children is very comprehenMve, 
 and naturally co-extenfive with the power of the pa- 
 rents, the capability of the children, and with other 
 iuitable circumftances. 
 
 The moft general traits of this great duty are, flrfr, 
 that children be fitted for the duties of life, and led to 
 an honeft and ufeful occupation, for which they feem 
 beft calculated by Providence, that they may fupport 
 themfelves : fecond, that parents do all in their power 
 that their children may become able to promote their 
 own felicity and that of others. Thus the defigns of 
 Providence are beft promoted, when children in their 
 time become good parents, good citizens, blefled in- 
 ftruments for fpreading abroad the effects of benevo- 
 lence, guarded by virtue and directed by piety. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Need parents be told, that idlenefs is the bane of de- 
 itruction to youth? Can there be occaflon to fhevv their 
 great obligation to fend their children to fchooi? 
 
 S:k 2. — It may be right that parents, in a collifion of obliga- 
 tions, or when better opportunities offer, transfer thefe 
 « duties 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 32.7 
 
 duties to others; but they ought to be fenfible, thnt the 
 delegated duties are their own; and it remains an import- 
 ant, though too much neglected, obligation with them to 
 fee that the truft is faithfully difcharged. 
 Sch. 3. — Parents who have no opportunities to have their chil- 
 dren inftructed, ought themfelves to undertake the tail; 
 of giving them all the inftruction in their power. 
 
 The duties of parents cannot extend beyond the 
 ends or caufes of them ; for* as all that parents have to 
 do refolves itfelf into the general duty of aftiftance, 
 which ceafes as foon as perfons can help themfelves, 
 we may conceive three different ftates with refpedt to 
 children, of which the 
 
 1 ft. Is, that in which children muh 1 have fupport 
 from their parents or from others, the ftate of child- 
 hood. 
 
 2d. That wherein children may fupport themfelves, 
 the ftate of their minority. 
 
 3d. That in which they are able to promote their 
 own happinefs and that of others, the ftate of major 
 
 The duty of maintenance ceafes with a ceffation of 
 
 the ftate of childhood •, that of education with the cef- 
 
 fation of the years of minority. 
 
 Sch. 1. — From the natural conftitution and particular frame of 
 the mind, which is very different in individuals, a vaft 
 difference mr.fr arife with refpecl to the number of years 
 to which each of the above mentioned ftates of children 
 is confined: much alio depends upon their diligence, ap- 
 plication, good conduct, and the opportunities they may 
 enjoy; fo that it is difficult to draw exactly the line when 
 and at what particular period the two lafl of thefe (tales 
 begin or end. 
 
 '. 2. — Among the various determinations concerning the 
 ftates of children, and their rights and duties in co 
 quence of them, adopted by the law of England, which 
 is generally followed bv the le^illatures of the United 
 
 Stat* , 
 
32S 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 States, we only mention thofe which feem to accord beft; 
 with the principles of nature, to wit, that children be 
 fuppofed to pofTefs dijcretwi, and to have the right to 
 chufe for themfelves their guardians, at the fourteenth 
 year; that they have their full age at twenty-one, and the 
 right to difpofe of themfelves and of real eftates. 
 
 Sell. 3. — According to the principles of nature, children can- 
 not have the direction of rights in things or in perfons 
 before they have the full exercife of underftanding — - 
 know what is good or bad, right or wrong: otherwife 
 they might make difpofitions contrary to the dictates of 
 natural law. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Hence refults the propriety of allowing children the 
 right of difpofal, with reipect to things of which they 
 may have obtained a fufricient knowledge, whilft they 
 " may not difpofe of others. 
 
 Sch. <j. — It is likewife necefTary for the happinefs of children, 
 that thev may difpofe of certain things, or of themfelves 
 in fame degree, before the term fixed by law for their full 
 age, or the ftate of their majority. 
 
 Sch. 6. — From this it appears, fhat children ought not to enter 
 into the matrimonial ftate without the confent of their 
 parents or guardians, under the fuppofition that they do 
 not refift higher obligations, which render fuch a confent 
 exceptionable. 
 
 Sch. 7. — But it is not at all confonant to reafon, that the con^ 
 fent of parents mould introduce children into that ftate 
 before they have the exercife of their underftanding. 
 
 The duties of maintenance, protection and education 
 undergo various modifications, keeping pace with the 
 condition of children, and refpectively ceafe at the pe- 
 riods of childhood, minority and majority, that is to 
 fay, parents have no occafion to maintain and protect 
 their children, if they can fupport and defend them- 
 felves •, thev are free from the duties of education, if 
 thev have done fo much that children can promote 
 their own happinefs and that of others. They may 
 then confent to their marriage, andentruft them with 
 
 the 
 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 329 
 
 the management of affairs, when they are calculated 
 to become good parents, good citizens, &c. 
 
 But parental love, the tendered affection, taking a 
 moft lively intereft in all that concerns the happinefs of 
 children, cannot ceafe but with life, and ought to be 
 vifible in its effects after death. We fet it down as a 
 parental duty, that parents leave fome of their effects 
 to their children after their deceafe. It is on this ac- 
 count chiefly, that nature has vetted perfons with the 
 right of property, that they may render their family 
 ufeful to fociety : and the greateft good the father of a 
 family can do is to take care of his own houfehold. 
 So far then is the right to difpofe of our property for 
 the benefit of our children from being an infringement 
 upon the general rights of mankind, that a contrary 
 conduct would be injurious to ourfelves, to our children^ 
 and to the community j more particularly fo when our 
 parents have rendered our condition comfortable, or 
 when our children have faithfully affifted us. 
 
 From the great fondnefs and provident care which 
 our parents feel for our children, it feems that we per- 
 form ads of gratitude to our parents for the particular 
 care received at their hands, if we endeavour to render 
 our children happy here and hereafter. 
 
 Sch. — Inftinct and duty confpire in dilating to parent* the 
 juftice to beftow benevolence upon their children with 
 as impartial a hand as poffible. 
 
 The rights and authority of parents flow from their 
 duties, and are, in every other refpect, co-exten/ive 
 with their obligations; from which it follows, that 
 fome will ceafe when the ©blioations ceafe, others will 
 fee cotemporary with the parental relation. 
 
 U u Thofc 
 
330 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Thofe rights which have reference to the duties of 
 maintenance, protection and education, in all their 
 ftages, undergo various modifications, according to the 
 advancement of children towards maturity, and ceafe 
 when they become of age. 
 
 Thefe rights constitute the parental power, and 
 extend to neceflary difcipline, to the fervices of their 
 children, to the chuiing for them occupations, to the 
 giving them advice, to binding them to an apprentice- 
 iliip, to placing them under the care of tutors or 
 guardians, to confenting to their adoption, &c. 
 
 They have a claim to the love, refpecl, gratitude and 
 arTiftance of their children •, for which caufe the muni- 
 cipal laws juftly command the latter to maintain their 
 parents, and even their grand-parents, if they fhould 
 have need of their fuppott. 
 
 The rights of children are nothing t\(e than the ob- 
 ject of the parental obligations hitherto explained, toge- 
 ther with thofe unalienable natural rights in perfons 
 upon which it is not lawful for parents to trefpafs. 
 
 The filial duties are love, refpect, gratitude in the 
 higheft porlible degree, with all thofe marks thereof 
 by which the fincerity of their beft endeavours may be 
 manifested. 
 
 During the time of their non-age, fubmifTion, ftrict 
 obedience and faithful arTiftance are perfect duties, 
 which oupht to flow, not from a dread of parental 
 power, but from a principle of love, refpect and gra- 
 titude. 
 
 Nothing but a collifion of higher duties can juftify 
 
 even the appearance of backwardnefs in receiving and 
 
 following the advice of parents, 
 
 Sck. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 331 
 
 Sch. — Virtuous parents will not advife children to do evil, nor 
 bind them to a confent which is inconliltent with their 
 happinefs. 
 
 The leaft that children can do by way of retribu- 
 tion, is to render the fituation of their parents as eafy 
 and pleafant as poflible. 
 
 Children are mod facredly bound to maintain their 
 parents : if fuch a mark of gratitude is neceflary^ they 
 mould give it with delight. 
 
 Teachers, guardians, &c. are under parental obliga- 
 tions and vetted with parental rights : they ought to 
 exercife them with that fincerity, gentlenefs, afliduity, 
 faithfulnefs, moderation and watchfulnefs, requiflte in 
 fathers who truly love their children. 
 
 Wards, and thofe who enjoy the advantages of edu- 
 cation by others, are naturally bound to pay their guar- 
 dians, &c. the refpect, obedience, love and gratitude 
 due from children to parents. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Of the herile fociely. 
 
 X. HAT fociety where one member has perfect af- 
 firmative rights in the perfons of others, for directing 
 their actions to the promotion of his particular intereft, 
 is called the herile ft ate-, the perfon veiled with that 
 right is called mafter: the actions to be performed for 
 another's advantage in confequence of fuch rights are 
 comprehended under the appellation offer-vices, in the 
 ftrict fenfe of the word ; and the perfons under obliga- 
 tion to perform fuch actions are ftiled fervants. 
 
 ScL 
 
332 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. — As there is a great variety, both of modes and actions, 
 by which others may be affifted or their intereifs promot- 
 ed; and as innumerable modifications may take place 
 with refpeft to the affirmative rights which one perfon 
 may have in another for that purpofe; it is evident that 
 there is a great variety of fervices, and that the principles 
 of the herile ftate are applicable to a vait number of ipe- 
 cific focieties, where the relation of mailer and of fervant 
 takes place. 
 
 Since daily experience evinces, that fervices are re- 
 quired for the management of families in the mainte- 
 nance and education of children, it follows, that per- 
 fons under certain circumftances may have a natural 
 right to exert themfelves, confidently with the dictates 
 of natural law, to acquire perfect affirmative rights in 
 others, for the purpofe of promoting their particular 
 interefts : that is to fay, perfons under certain circum- 
 ftances have a right to become mafiers. 
 
 Hence it follows, that the fame modes by which 
 perfons may lawfully acquire rights in others, are the 
 modes by which perfons may lawfully become mafters 
 of their fellow creatures. 
 
 Likewife, perfons, notwithstanding their abfolute 
 natural rights, which are perfectly equal with thofe of 
 their fellow creatures, may happen to be in a ftate 
 where the unalterable principles of nature, juftice and 
 equity require that they ihould come under perfect 
 obligations to aftift others by their fervices — if, for in- 
 ftance, they can thereby render their ftate more perfect % 
 if, having been guilty of committing injury and da- 
 mage to their neighbour, they have no other or not a 
 more eligible mean left whereby reparation can be 
 made •, or, laftly, if injury and damages would accrue 
 from the non -performance of fuch fervices. 
 
 Perfons, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 233 
 
 Perfons, therefore, become fervants in a manner 
 confident with the principles of natural law, either by 
 pa5i, by the right of forfeiture^ or by law. In the nril 
 cafe, the herile fociety is voluntary, and reds upon the 
 mutual confent of the parties •, in the fecond and third 
 it is neceflary, refting upon the principles of natural 
 law. 
 
 The herile fociety, however it may be modified, 
 whether it be voluntary or neceffary, cannot be lawful 
 except it be equal •, that is to fay, except the focial ob- 
 ligations flow from the end, that is, from the nature of 
 the fociety : becaufe no fociety can be lawful if the end 
 thereof is contradictory to the dictates of natural laws, 
 which is raoft evidently the cafe with all manner of 
 unequal focieties : for, as the focial obligations, accord- 
 ing to the definition which has been given, depend 
 upon the will and caprice of the claimant of the focial 
 right, a fociety would take place, having for its end 
 the humouring and fatisfying the will of a mortal, 
 whatever he might direct or command, good or bad, 
 right or wrong. Is it not impiety to hold up fuch a 
 right on the part of a frail creature, liable to error, a 
 worm of the earth; when only the Moft High^ who 
 cannot err, who wills the happinefs of his children, — 
 when he only is entitled to fuch fubjeclion, to fuch 
 implicit fubmifTion ? And behold, he does not exer- 
 cife that right he condefcends to the indigent creature ! 
 he demands obedience to his laws, becaufe that obe- 
 dience renders his creatures happy. 
 
 Can a moral agent, refponfible to God for all his 
 powers and faculties, and bound by the mofl facred 
 duties to God, to himfelf and to his fellow creatures — 
 can he, confidently with the dignity and high dedina- 
 
 tion 
 
334 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 tion of his nature, confidently with the law of nature 
 and with the will of God — can he render himfelf abject 
 as a brute, give up his abfolute natural rights, and 
 idolize him who is but duft of the earth, make the will 
 of a man his fupreme and only law ? No : to confent 
 to fuch a ftate is the more horridly impious in a perfon, 
 as he fins not only againft God, but againft himfelf and 
 againft humanity. 
 
 If the law of reparation is nature's law and the will 
 of God, who delights in righteoufnefs, we may eafily 
 inter, that reparation cannot be exacted, or pretended 
 to be made, in a manner inconfiftent with the moral 
 nature of men and with their refponfibility to God. 
 
 Ail fervitude, therefore, is unnatural and unlawful, 
 whether founded in confent or on force and compulfion, 
 where the obligations do not flow from the nature or 
 the fcope of a herile fociety, where they are inconfiftent 
 with the dictates of natural law and repugnant both to 
 the rights in things and in perfons. The fowler and 
 the encaged bird, the ravenous wolf and the innocent 
 iamb, or the hawk with the harmlefs dove in his ta- 
 lons, might as well be faid to be members of a natural 
 fociety, as thofe inhuman monfters who take advantage 
 of the fimplicity or impotency of their fellow creatures, 
 and domineer over them with defpotic fway, have a 
 claim to the ftate of lawful matters. 
 
 Sck. i. — Tyranny is not to be looked for in defpotic govern- 
 ments alone; it often takes root and exerts its fury within 
 the walls of a family. Here we frequently find defpotic 
 fway under the mafk of parental power, and tyranny ex- 
 ercifed againft fervants bv the matter of a familv, and not 
 feldom by children. The nature of the herile fociety is, 
 however, ftill more generally forgot on the part of fer- 
 vants, and that fidelity, induftry, ceconomy, humility, 
 fobriety, refpecl and gratitude wanting, by which their 
 
 own 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 33$ 
 
 own happinefs and the particular interefts of their mailers 
 would be truly and effectually promoted. 
 
 Sd. 2.— If nature has provided rational mafterfhip, file has 
 like wife ordered rational obedience. 
 
 A voluntary fervitude lafts as long as the members 
 of the fociety have ftipulated by mutual confent, that 
 the relation of matter and fervant fhall fubttft, and of 
 confequence' may be temporary or perpetual. 
 
 Temporary fervitude, which is* voluntary, may be 
 determined with refpeel to a certain fixed term of time, 
 or with refpeel to a certain work to be done : the latter 
 cafe, however, rather refers to the fubjeel: of contracts 
 under the forms, do ut facias^ or facio ut facias. 
 
 The necefTary herile fociety, founded upon the right 
 of forfeiture, implies a fervitude which mull be equi- 
 valent to a necefTary reparation of damages, and may 
 be temporary or perpetual. 
 
 But it is generally otherwife in cafes where the fo- 
 ciety refults from law : the fervices of children to their 
 parents, or to thofe who have bettowed upon them the 
 parental duties of maintenance and education, ceafe 
 when they amount to a reafonable compenfation for 
 the trouble and expences which have been caufed 
 thereby. 
 
 Whatever the herile fociety in this refpeel may be, 
 whether temporary or perpetual, the matter has a right 
 to direct in what manner he is to be attifted, or his in- 
 tereft promoted: this right flows from the fcope and 
 nature of that fociety, if care is taken not to extend it 
 to a contravention of the exprefs ftipulations agreed 
 upon in voluntary focieties, or to what is unlawful both 
 with refpect to the rights in perfons and in things. 
 
 No 
 
2%6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 No fervant is therefore bound to obey the unlawful 
 commands of a m after ; for it is repugnant to his mo- 
 ral nature and refponfibility to God. 
 
 Sch. i. — A fervant, of whatever defcription he may be, lias 
 therefore no excufe in obeying his mafter's will to the in- 
 jury of another perfon. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Behold, then, the debafed ftateof a mercenary foldier! 
 
 A mafter mav not burden a fervant with more work 
 than is confident with the powers of fuch fervant to 
 perform. 
 
 A mafter is bound to give his fervant fufficient 
 meat, drink, apparel, time for refreftiing his body, and 
 for performing thofe duties to God and to himfelf 
 which are incumbent upon him as a moral agent, re- 
 fponfible to his creator: befides thefe and a thoufand 
 other duties of humanity, he is facredly bound to pro- 
 tect his fervant againft injuries from others, whether 
 intended, or committed by fuch as are a part of his 
 family, or by ftrangers. 
 
 A mafter is bound to reward his voluntary fervants, 
 by honeftly paying the ftipulated price for their fervice. 
 
 The fervants whom he holds by forfeiture, and 
 confequently has paid before hand, he ought to direct: 
 with humanity and command with gentlenefs: hemuft 
 likewife render their fituation as comfortable as cir- 
 cumftances will admit. 
 
 The mafter has a right, nay, it is his duty to re- 
 ftrain his fervants from doing evil, or from committing 
 injury, for all mifchief committed by them is imput- 
 able to the mafter's will, if he cannot make it appear 
 that he has done his part to prevent it. 
 
 That mafter can hardly fail of having good and 
 
 faithful 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 337 
 
 faithful fervants, who fets them an example of huma- 
 nity and virtue, and inftils into their minds the fear of 
 God, and the necefiity of preferving a good confcience. 
 
 Where the end of the focial connection is a particular 
 kind of fervice or truft, the matter has no right to di- 
 rect any thing contrary thereto ; for inftance, an ap- 
 prentice bound to a trade, &c. 
 
 Where no flipulations have been made with refpect 
 to the particular kind of labour, either in regard to 
 quality or quantity, the known cuftom of the country 
 determines what may be lawfully exacted. 
 
 The duties of fervants refolve themfelves into the 
 moft ready obedience, unabating induftry, and ftridb 
 faithfulnefs in performing all the lawful commands of 
 their mafter; his interert muft be ftudied in all their 
 conduct, and they muft demean themfelves in a peace- 
 able, orderly and grateful manner, and omit nothing 
 that may render them worthy his efteem and good 
 will, as well as that of his family. 
 
 Let fervants not forget their accountablenefs to God 
 for all they do, and particularly for their conduct, and 
 the performance of the duties of their ftation. That 
 noble refolution of Jofhua, As for me and my houJe\ we 
 willferve the Lord, (xxiv. 15.) is an example worthy 
 the imitation of mafters and fervants. 
 
 Servants are bound to protect their mailer's perfon, 
 
 family and goods. 
 
 Sc/i. 1. — The unnatural injuftice of flaverv, both with refpect 
 to mafter and fervant, has already been {efficiently fhewn; 
 we mould therefore have laid nothing of it, were it not 
 that the poor victims of avarice, kept ignorant with re- 
 fpect to their duties to God and to men, are to the utmoft 
 dangerous in debauching the manners of children, who 
 X x are 
 
33 8 MORAL PHILOSOPHV. 
 
 arc careleHly permitted to be in their company, where 
 their juvenile follies and caprices are humoured and obey- 
 ed with the fame abject fubmiflion which muft not fail to 
 be paid to the mailer or miftrefs of the family : the young 
 mafter and mifs foon forget that they have to do with the 
 human fpecies, and imbibe the love of tyranny and vice 
 aim-oft with their mother's milk. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The idea of flavery has already fo far advanced in our 
 free country, that even the children of the farmer refufe 
 the molt, neceflary work, fuch as is eflential to the ma- 
 nagement of a farm, under the foolifli notion, that it is 
 degrading to a freeman, and an occupation only fit for 
 (laves. 
 
 Since there are reciprocal rights and obligations in 
 equal focieties, flowing from their nature, it follows, 
 that it is poiTible for matters and fervants to injure one 
 another-, the former, if they exact more fervices than 
 are due, deny the payment of juft wages, neglect what 
 is neceflary for the fupport, protection and refrefhment 
 of the fervants, exceed the juft' bounds of difcipline 
 and correction, &c. : the latter commit injury if they 
 perform not faithfully all lawful fervices, if they neg- 
 lect to affift their mafter, idle away their time, fquan- 
 der away their mafter's fubftance; if they fubmit not 
 to his advice, or leave his fervice, or behave diforderly 
 .and difturb the peace of their mafter's family, &c. 
 
 A mafter is injured when others feduce his fervants, 
 or have any commerce or converfation with them, 
 whereby the end of the herile fociety is affected or 
 fruft rated. 
 
 A mafter may lend the fervice of his fervant for a 
 time, becaufe it is conftftent with humanity and juftice 
 that others be aftifted. 
 
 There may be circumftances where a mafter may 
 alienate the fervice due upon forfeiture, under condi- 
 tion 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 339 
 
 tion that the ftate of the fervant becomes not worfe : 
 all other alienations of right in this refpect ought to 
 arife from exprefs ftipulations of voluntary focieties, 
 or, where fuch stipulations cannot be made, from the 
 mutual confent of the parties. 
 
 No perfon can be born a Have, becaufe flavery is 
 utterly contradictory to natural law. 
 
 It is poflible, however, that one may become by 
 birth a temporary fervant:' for inttance, a child born 
 of a woman who is either a perpetual fervant, or bound 
 to fervice for a considerable length of time: the child 
 muft be fupported and maintained, and mould even 
 be educated by the matter of fuch fervant : whence it 
 will be necelTary, that the child in the firil cafe Should 
 be bound by the principles both of juftice and grati- 
 tude to indemnify the matter for his care, trouble and 
 expence ; and in the fecond, either the fervant or child 
 mutt do it. Here many caufes concur, which render 
 it confident with prudence and juttice, that the mo- 
 ther Should confent to the temporary fervitude of her 
 child, particularly when there is on this fide the bett 
 profpecl: for its maintenance and education. 
 
 Sch. i. — Such like cafes are inftances of the herile Society 
 founded in laiu. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The fervitude of children to their parent?, as found- 
 ed in law, cannot extend further than the ftate of their 
 minority, and ought not to exceed that irate with refpecl: 
 to the children of fervants, except the expences of their 
 maintenance and education have amounted to more than 
 the fervice of fuch a fpace of time can reafonably com- 
 penfate. 
 
 Sch. 3. — It is not to be reconciled with natural equity, that the 
 children of fervants fhould be bound for a longer term, 
 becaufe the mafter was at a trouble againft his will ; for, 
 if it be confidered that the children cannot, at leaft ought 
 
 not 
 
340 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not to expiate injuries committed by their parents, it will 
 be plain, that they cannot be held in fervitude when 
 compenfation is made for their maintenance and educa- 
 tion. 
 
 Sch. 4. — It is more confiftent with natural laws, that the mafler 
 fhould feel an inconveniency from that which in many 
 inftances may be attributed to his carelelfnefs in not fuf- 
 ficiently watching the morals or giving instruction to his 
 houfliold. 
 
 .•Both the rights of matters and the obligations of 
 fervants keep pace with the various circumftances of the 
 herile ftate: for inftance ; in the military fervice, com- 
 mand, in time of an invaflon, muft be extremely ftrict, 
 and obedience almoft implicit \ becaufe focial rights and 
 obligations flow from the nature of the fociety as well 
 as from that of the circumftances,, 
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 Of the domeftic fociety. 
 
 X HE fociety which comprehends the connubial, 
 parental and herile ftates, is called domeftic, and may 
 be defined to be that in which perfons have perfect af- 
 firmative rights in the perfons of children or fervants, 
 for directing their actions and fervices in fuch a manner 
 as that the peace and fecurity of the whole fociety may 
 be preferved, and its happinefs promoted. 
 
 Perfons vefted with that right are called the heads of 
 the family ; thofe who are under perfect obligations to 
 perform actions and fervices for thofe ends, are com- 
 prehended under the appellation of the houfhold. 
 
 ScL 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 34I 
 
 Sc/i. — The houfhold of a family may be the children or the 
 fervants, or both: in the firit cafe the houfhold is incom- 
 plete; in the laft it is complete. 
 
 Since the right of directing the actions of others to 
 a certain end is called government, it follows, that 
 thofe who are the heads of families are veiled with fa- 
 mily government. 
 
 The parents in a family are by nature its heads, and 
 have the right of family government ; for parents have 
 a right to direct the actions of children, as well as the 
 right lawfully to endeavour to obtain perfect affirma- 
 tive rights in fervants, for directing their actions fo that 
 they may be afllfted in the duties of maintaining and 
 educating their children, and for having their intereft, 
 with that of their connection and its objects, promoted. 
 But, either children or fervants, or both alike, confti- 
 tute the houfhold: they confequently are fubjected to 
 the heads and governors thereof. 
 
 The domeftic fociety is compound, for it confifts 
 of the connubial, the parental, and the herile. 
 
 It is likewife equals for thefe are equal. 
 
 The right of the heads of a family, or their power 
 and government, cannot be defpotical, but is limited. 
 
 A right to direct the actions of others implies au- 
 thority for enacting laws, and for publiming and put- 
 ting them into execution •, becaufe the nature of free 
 agents is fuch, that they ought to be fo directed as 
 that motives mould be connected with their actions. 
 From a connection of motives refult obligations, and 
 rules importing thefe are laws. 
 
 Family government, therefore, is not a government 
 of arbitrary will, but a government of laws. 
 
 Since 
 
342 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Since no laws can be juft which have not a good for 
 their object, it follows, that no family laws can be juft 
 except they have the good of the whole family in 
 view. 
 
 The common good of a whole family will be con- 
 fulted, if the ends of the herile, the parental and the 
 connubial hates are fo modified, that they be in the 
 greater!: poiTible harmony, and that each particular 
 fociety finds its greateft advantage in the union for a 
 common intereft. 
 
 Since the principal ends of the connubial and pa- 
 rental ftates are the mutual happinefs of the parents 
 in a perpetual union, and the propagation and educa- 
 tion of children •, and fince the fcope of the herile fo- 
 ciety, on the one hand, comprehends the fervices of 
 children or of fervants neceflary for the promotion of 
 thefe ends, and on the other, requires the necefTary fup- 
 port, refrefhments, protection and juft retribution, as 
 the cafe may be-, that is, requires the happinefs of the 
 parties; it follows, that the domeftic fociety muft have 
 for its end a common good, wherein all its members 
 are interefted, and the felicity of all the ftates of which 
 it is compofed fecured and augmented. 
 
 Since all the laws of a family muft center in the 
 common good of all the members thereof, it follows, 
 that we may lay down as the fundamental law of family 
 government, this propofition : Direct: you actions fo 
 that the common good of the whole family may be 
 obtained, preferved and promoted. 
 
 Sch. — What is repugnant to this law is unjuft and unreafon- 
 able, whether the aclion proceed from the head of the fa- 
 mily or from any member of the houfhold. 
 
 There 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 343 
 
 There are various things neceffary as means for the 
 fupport and convenience of a family : fome of thefe 
 have a direct, others an indirect influence on all its 
 members; but all ferve to promote the common good 
 of the whole fociety, if care is taken that they do not 
 interfere with one another; that is to fay, if that order 
 is obferved, with refpect to time, place and other cir- 
 cumftances, which the fcope of the fociety and the na- 
 ture of thefe circumflances require. 
 
 The head or heads of a family, therefore, may make 
 rules, nay, even transfer the direction to others, for 
 the regulation of the fervices ; and the fervants are 
 bound to follow thofe rules. 
 
 The laws of a family cannot bind to things unlaw- 
 ful, nor to fuch as are not in the power of fervants, or 
 are contradictory to their unalienable natural rights. 
 
 A family cannot be happy, where there is caufe to 
 dread evil within or injury from abroad. 
 
 The heads of a family muft therefore make rules 
 for the internal peace of the fociety, and for its protec- 
 tion agaimt injuries from abroad. 
 
 Servants are perfectly bound to obey fuch rules : 
 they muft not injure any of the family, or any other 
 perfon or fociety ; for by the former the peace of the 
 family is interrupted •, by the latter others may have 
 caufe to difturb its fecurity. 
 
 As the ftate of a houfhold becomes infecure and un- 
 happy when the heads of a family injure others, it 
 follows, that heads of families injure their houfhold 
 if they do not endeavour to prevent the enmity of then- 
 neighbours. 
 
 If 
 
344 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 If the heads of families be therefore the aggrefTors, 
 the houfhold are prohibited by higher obligations from 
 fupporting them in their injuftice. 
 
 On the contrary, if the houfhold are injured by per- 
 fons abroad, or by another houfhold, the heads of the 
 family are bound to protect them. 
 
 A family that avows an injury done by one of the 
 houfhold againft another perfon or houfhold, or a 
 member thereof, and refufes reparation, injures that 
 perfon or houfhold, and gives a juft caufe for war. 
 
 The heads of a family engaging in a jurt defence or 
 war, have a perfect right to be affifted by their houfe- 
 hold ; for without that affrftance the common good of 
 the family cannot be preferved. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Of communities. 
 
 i 
 
 T may be for the happinefs of feveral families to 
 enter into a fociety for common defence, and for pro- 
 moting their local interefts. Here the heads of families 
 may meet and confult, each ordering his own family fo 
 that harmony and amity be preferved, and fuch things 
 performed as may cement their union, and give it 
 ftrength and fecurity againfr. intruders or invaders. 
 
 Such a ftate we may call a community \ of which moft 
 of the Indian nations are inftances. 
 
 As the interefts of families affociated in a commu- 
 nity, without a general government and a uniform 
 
 conduct 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 345 
 
 conduct of all its members, cannot but frequently clafh ; 
 and as, in cafes of common danger, defence and war 
 muft be conducted with a certain degree of uniformity, 
 and under the direction of a leader; human prudence, 
 nay, neceflity, the mother of wifdom and invention, 
 muft foon point out the danger of a want of fyftem, 
 and the propriety of coming under one rule and under 
 one direction for the peace and fecurity of the whole 
 community, and the happinefs of each of the confli- 
 tuent families. 
 
 The fame caufes which flrft prompted a confedera- 
 tion of families, have no doubt given rife to commu- 
 nities aflbciated under one general law and government. 
 
 Communities united under one law and govern- 
 ment are the conftituent focieties of fiat es. 
 
 Sch. — Inftances of fuch focieties are the incorporated cities or 
 towns, the townfhips or difiricls of ftates — in fine, all 
 manner of civil focieties, the government of which is 
 local. 
 
 That general fociety which comprehends the interells 
 of individuals, of families, and of communities fpread 
 over an extenfive tract of country, is called the civil* 
 
 t r PART 
 
PART II. 
 
 Sect. IV. Comprehending politics. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 Of the nature and difference of civil focieties or ftates^ 
 
 t± AVING in the preceding fection briefly explained 
 the principles of natural juftice and equity, with re- 
 fpect to the conduct of perfons, who are members of 
 the moft intimate focieties among the children of men, 
 the object of which is confined to the particular in- 
 terests of families and neighbourhoods ; it is proper 
 that we fhould now proceed to the confideration of 
 that general fociety which comprehends both the indi- 
 vidual and focial concerns of a van: multitude of per- 
 fons, families and communities, having for its ulti- 
 mate end the public good; that is to fay, the felicity of 
 all. 
 
 This great and general fociety, comprehending the 
 interefts of all other aflbciations, and having for its 
 ultimate object the felicity of all its members, is, by 
 
 way of eminence, ft i led civil. 
 
 If civil focieties are confidered in their relation to 
 one another, they are called fiates : thus we find the 
 globe divided into various empires, kingdoms and 
 republics, all which agree in this their general cha- 
 racter, 
 
348 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 rafter, that they are dates under different forms, mo- 
 difications, laws and governments. 
 
 Civil fociety, or a ft ate, may be defined to be that 
 general fociety, the members of which have transfer- 
 red their will and power to a certain perfon, for the 
 attainment, prefervation and advancement of the pub- 
 lic good. The members of civil fociety are called 
 citizens. 
 
 Sck. 1. — The very neceffity of the cafe renders a transfer of 
 that nature neceflary, as foon as the extent of a fociety 
 is too great to admit of a perfonal attendance of all the 
 members for deliberating on thofe things which are ne- 
 ceflary for or conducive to the felicity of the whole 
 body. 
 
 Sc/i. 2. — All authors on morality agree, in general, with re- 
 fpect to the transfer of will and power, and all govern- 
 ments act upon it ; there is, however, this difference, 
 that whilft the former have much controverfy among 
 themfelves in determining the originating caufe of that 
 transfer, the latter are very apt to forget the fource and 
 foundation of their power and political exiftence, and 
 often fubititute their own will for that of the whole fo- 
 ciety over which they rule* 
 
 Whether fuch a transfer of the public will and 
 power is made, or fuppofed to be made, to one or to 
 a certain number of individuals, the confequence is, 
 that a moral perfon is thereby conftituted, fo that fuch 
 perfon, or perfons as the cafe may be, becomes a public 
 perfon, vetted with public rights, and is under public 
 obligations. 
 
 Sc/t. 1. — From the modifications of the moral or public perfon 
 in a ftate, refult, as we fhall fee hereafter, the different 
 forms of governments, the monarchical, the ariftocratical, 
 the democratical, &c. 
 $ c ], m 2. — The transfer itfelf may be varioufly modified and 
 limitted : from thefe modifications and limitations refult 
 the qualities of government; whether a ftate is defpotical 
 
 or 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 349 
 
 or limited, whether dependent or independent, whether 
 it is or is not vefted with national fovereignty. 
 Sch. 3. — Thofe who hold that certain forms and qualities of 
 ftates or governments are of divine institution, pre- 
 fuppofc that the will and power of a people h transferred 
 by God. 
 
 Sclt. 4. — Others, who fee the abfurdity of fuch a fuppofition, 
 hold that all authority in a ftate is and ought to be de- 
 rived from the people. 
 
 Sch. 5. — As defpots fubftitute their own will for that of the 
 people, they make ufe of the power of the members of 
 the itate to their own deltruction. 
 
 Sch. 6. — Wife and good governments, whatever their form 
 may be, will always refpect the people as the main object 
 of their care, and the iburce of their authority. 
 
 Sch. 7. — We meet the objection which has often been made 
 againft thefe obvious and generous ideas of good govern- 
 ment, from mifconftruction or rather mifapplication of 
 certain pallages of fcripture, with an open and candid 
 acknowledgment of the neceffity of civil government for 
 the general felicity of mankind, as this is the fum of all 
 that thofe paffages intimate. Thus far we hold govern- 
 ment to be an ordinance of God, that we believe a eood 
 government to be the greateft temporal blefling on earth, 
 and that there is nothing more conformable to his will, or 
 more conducive to the happinefs of mankind, nothing 
 at leaft more fuitable to the profeffion of religion and 
 chriftianity, than a faithful obedience to all that is law- 
 fully commanded by civil authority, and a patient for- 
 bearance with refpeft to thofe public proceedings which 
 have not that falutarv tendency to promote, as they fhould, 
 the felicity of mankind. 
 
 The public perfon in a ftate has a right to direct 
 the will and power for the attainment, prcfervation 
 and advancement of tht public good; for it is for that 
 purpofe that the public will and power have been 
 transferred. 
 
 Sch. — To pretend a right to rule without, or repugnant to the 
 will of man, is to pretend to a thing that is unlawful in 
 itfelf, and contradictory to ths nature of rights in per- 
 forms j 
 
J/J® MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Tons ; for members of the civil fociety cannot ceafe to 
 be men, and as fuch mud be ruled in a manner confiftent 
 with the nature of a moral agent. 
 
 A right to direct the moral actions of others is 
 
 called government. 
 
 Civil fociety, therefore, neceifarily requires govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Thofe who exercife civil government are faid to be 
 in authority -, and are ftiled the rulers of the ft ate \ the 
 perfons directed by civil government are faid to be 
 lubject to public authority, and are ftiled the people, 
 or the ruled. 
 
 Since the members of civil fociety are called citi- 
 zens, it follows, that thefe are diftinguifhed by the 
 rulers and ruled. 
 
 Since rulers are vefted with public authority to 
 direct the will and power of the people in all that is 
 neceflary for the attainment, prefervation and advance- 
 ment of the public good, it follows, that the ruled 
 are under perfect obligations to do all that is neceflary 
 to be done for this deflrable end. 
 
 From this it immediately follows, that both the 
 public rights of the rulers and the public obligations 
 of the ruled, flow from the very fcope and nature of 
 civil fociety, that is to fay, civil society is equal. 
 
 k. i. — We diflinguifh equality into abfolute, focial and 
 legal, 
 
 '.. z. — /ibfolutc ox natural equality finds place between man 
 and man, conlidered in their nature or under the fame 
 circumftances. This equality, as we flia.ll fee, is the na- 
 tural ftate of nations with reipect to one another. 
 v!. 3. — Social equality refults from the nature of focial connec- 
 tions; fome of which, as already explained, are neceflary ^ 
 others agaia voluntarv. 
 
 Ia 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 35 £ 
 
 In neceffary focieties, the directory or compulfory right is 
 unalterably vefted in one member, as is the cafe with pa- 
 rents and mafters; whilft perfect obligations, on the other 
 hand, are invariably confined to the ouher party of the 
 fociety, as long as the focial connection remains founded 
 in nature} as, obedience and fervices on the part of chil- 
 dren and fervants to their refpective parents and mafters. 
 
 In voluntary focieties the confent of the parties directs who 
 is to command, and who are bound to obey: the nature 
 of them confequently is, that whilft rulers have to direct 
 the affairs of the fociety, it is the duty of the ruled to 
 obey them, according to the ftipulations of the focial 
 compact, and in conformity to the fcope of the connec- 
 tion. 
 
 The equality of the refpective members of focieties is there- 
 fore by no means favourable to the idea, that there is no 
 difference between the ruler and the ruled, the father and 
 the child; or that the ruled can be at the fame time ruler* 
 or the mafter a fervant: no j fuch things cannot exift at 
 the fame time, and are not practicable by alternate rota- 
 tion, as long as the focial connection fubfifts upon the 
 foundation of nature or pact. Here children and parents* 
 fervants and mafters, foldiers and generals, the ruled and 
 the rulers of ftates or nations, are equals, becaufe their 
 refpective obligations and rights are not arbitrary imposi- 
 tions, but falutary rules, confiftent with nature, and ne- 
 ceffary for the general happinefs of mankind. 
 
 ScL 4. — By legal equality we do not underftand a levelling fyf- 
 tem, depriving men of their juft rights, but an equal ad- 
 miniftration of juftice, without refpect to perfon, rank* 
 dignity or calling, and an impartial taxation, according 
 to the property and abilities of citizens. 
 
 ScL 5. — It may, perhaps, not be amifs to obferve here, that it 
 is not abfolutely neceffary for reinftating citizens into 
 their natural rights of equality, to pull down the thrones 
 and the eftabliflied forms of government, and to level all 
 the conditions of citizens : for an overbearing fpirit takes 
 pofTeffion of men who have drawn their origin from hum- 
 ble cottages, as well as thofe who are born in courts and 
 princely palaces. A government unequal in its inftitu- 
 tion may be equally adminifrered j whilft, on the other 
 
 hand, 
 
35-2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hand, the moft equal may be abufed, and the powers iri<« 
 trufted by the people into the hands of men of theif 
 choice, perverted to the ruin of the ftate, to the vexation 
 and oppreffion of its citizens. 
 Sen. 6. — If fundamental laws have intruded the reins of go- 
 vernment into the hands of perfons who, like the heads 
 of the neceffary focieties, are invariably fixed as the rulers 
 of empires, kingdoms, &c. which is the cafe in hereditary 
 ftates; let fuch rulers exercife their rights in confiftency 
 with the fcope of the fociety ; let them exact no public 
 obligations, but fuch as are pointed out by the public 
 good of the ftate; nay, let no citizen claim immunities 
 to the prejudice of his fellows; let the neceflary burdens 
 fall upon all citizens, according to their abilities and cir- 
 cumfrances; let the laws be no refpecters of perfons, Sec. 
 
 $c/;. y. — Behold the neceffity and nature of the reforms requifite 
 in many governments now extant! which require, on the 
 part of the rulers and the privileged orders, facrifices well 
 worthy the wifdom, patriotiim, juftice, equity and hu- 
 manity, in which great minds find the higheft fatisfaction 
 and the greateft glory. 
 
 Sck. 8. — We cannot difmifs this important fubjecl without a 
 moft cordial congratulation, addrefled to the free and in- 
 dependent citizens and electors of thefe ftates, founded 
 upon the true principles of civil equality; with our hearty 
 wifhes, that thefe glorious inftitutions of civil govern- 
 ment may continue to be fo happily adminiftered, that the 
 rulers and the ruled may have but one common intereft 
 at heart, the general good of the neto-born nation — placing 
 the glory of North-America in the liberty and ha-ppinefs 
 of the people. 
 
 Public good) the general felicity of individuals, what- 
 ever their ftate or fituation may be, muft neceflariJy be 
 of a vaft extent, as it comprehends all manner of ob- 
 jects which influence human happinefs under every 
 circumftance of time, chance and place. To find out 
 the mode and manner how the particular and focial in- 
 terefts of the community may be heft attained, fecured 
 and advanced, under all circumftances, is the ftudy of 
 
 the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY*" 35$ 
 
 the ftatefman, and an object worthy the care and con* 
 federation of a government imprerTed with a defire of 
 promoting the public good. 
 
 Perfection, however, cannot be expected where frail 
 men have an agency. Great and complicated machines 
 caufe frictions, and carry in themfelves obftructions to 
 their power. To govern a ftate is a vaft undertaking : 
 colliiions and difficulties keep pace with its extent. It 
 will remain a matter of controverfy, both in public 
 confultations and in the comments which the ruled 
 make on them, whether things are or are not confiftent 
 with public good. 
 
 In order to facilitate our enquiries with refpect to 
 this important fubjeet, it will be neceflary to felect 
 fome eftential ingredients, without which public felicity 
 cannot fubfift, from other things which have but a 
 remote influence, and are not always attainable •, as, an 
 extenfive, well-fituated and populous territory, or ah 
 abundance of materials for manufactories and com- 
 merce. 
 
 We hold, that the public good of civil fociety ef- 
 
 fentially coniifts in the enjoyment of civil liberty ', of 
 internal and external fecurity. 
 
 Sch. i. — We here confider a ilate in the enjoyment of all the 
 rights of government and fovereignty; that is to fay, both, 
 in its political and national character. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The political character of a ftate comprehends all the 
 rights of government which are necefiary for the enjoy- 
 ment of civil liberty and internal fecurity: thefe right* 
 cenftitdte what we fhall hereafter call the internal fove- 
 reignty of a ftate. 
 
 Sch. 3. — There are flates which have veiled the rights of go- 
 vernment, with refpect to external fecurity, in a confede- 
 ration,, or in a confolidated general government; whiifr. 
 Z z thev 
 
354 MORAL PHILOSOPHY." 
 
 they enjoy feparately and in themfelves all the rights of 
 internal fovereignty ; that is, the rights which are neceflarv 
 for the direction of their internal concerns, their feparat'e 
 interefts, and their internal fecurity. Such ftates are in- 
 ternally independent; whilft the confederation, or the general 
 government, maintains external or national independence. 
 
 Note i. — Thus the feven united provinces of the Nether- 
 lands, and the cantons of Switzerland, are free, fovereign 
 and internally independent ftates : but their national cha- 
 racter, their external fovereignty is in the States General, 
 and in the Helvetic body. 
 
 Note 2. — Thus the individual ftates of the American union 
 are free, fovereign and naturally independent; whilft the 
 general government exercifes the national Jovereignty of 
 that union. 
 
 • Sch, 4. — There are ftates which are reftricted with refpect to 
 internal fovereignty; that is, fubject to the controul of 
 another ftate in the direction of their internal concerns; 
 as, the kingdom of Ireland, theBritifh and other colonies, 
 where the laws are liable to the controul, or even rever- 
 iion of the refpective courts, &c. 
 
 Sch. 5. — But there are alfo ftates which bear, at the fame time, 
 both the political and the national character of ftates; as, 
 Great-Britain, France, Prufiia, Ruffia, Poland, Sw.eden, 
 &c. 
 
 Sch. 6. — Thofe nations which are ftates bearing the national 
 character, may be confidered as ftates and as nations; 
 that is to fay, both in their political and national cha- 
 racter. 
 
 Sch. j. — Since we fhall treat of the law of nations hereafter, 
 let it be obferved, that what relates to their political cha- 
 racter will be the fubject of this fection ; whilft all thofe 
 things will be referved for the fubfequent part of this 
 treatke which refer to the public rights and obligations 
 of nations among one another. 
 
 Civil liberty necefTarily imports a reftraint upon that 
 natural liberty to which individuals are entitled by 
 nature and that natural relation which they bear to 
 one another \ for it would be impoflible that one com- 
 mon 
 
MOHAL PHILOSOPHY. 355 
 
 moil intereit. could fubfift, or the public felicity be ob- 
 tained, if every man might exercife his natural right as 
 he would wifh, fince, at this rate, each would purfue 
 his own interefts, whether they were or were not con- 
 fident with the felicity of all. Hence it follows, that 
 for the attainment and prefervation of civil liberty, all 
 thofe natural rights muft be furrendered which are in- 
 compatible with the public good of the whole fociety. 
 
 Citizens, as fuch, are therefore free, when they enjoy 
 all thofe natural rights which are not neceflarily furren- 
 dered for the attainment, prefervation and advance- 
 ment of the public good, and when they have in this 
 good their jurt and proportionate mare. 
 
 Civil liberty is therefore defined to be that ftate of 
 citizens, in which they enjoy, together with thofe ac- 
 quired rights belonging to them, as members of civil 
 fociety, all thofe natural rights which are confident 
 with the public good. 
 
 To make a furrender, in the hands of government, 
 of fuch natural rights as are not neceflary for the pro- 
 motion of the public good, would be both foolifh and 
 unjuft: foolijh, becaufe it would be acting without a 
 good caufe, without a rational deiign ; unjuft, becaufe 
 it would involve a contradiction with the firrt principle 
 of natural law, upon which all civil laws and obliga- 
 tions ultimately depend: for the very end of the mfti- 
 tution of civil fociety is this, that the ftate of all the 
 members may be thereby rendered as perfect as pof- 
 fible. 
 
 If, therefore, civil focieties are properly inftituted 
 and well adminiftered, the citizens will be gainers, 
 fince their acquired civil rights will make more than 
 
 fufKcient 
 
£$6 . MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fufficient amends for thofe of their particular natural 
 
 rights furrendered, which, in their hands, could have 
 
 been of very little ufe, if not altogether ufelefs. What, 
 
 for inftance, avails the natural right of compulfion or 
 
 defence, when your ftrength is not adequate or fuperior 
 
 to that of your adverfary •, or, if he finds afTociates in 
 
 committing injuries againft your perfon or property ? 
 
 In the civil ftate the ftrength of all is your protection, 
 
 your fhield, and the wifdom of the whole fociety your 
 
 guide. If the public good is promoted, your own 
 
 felicity is advanced. The public happinefs and ftrength 
 
 of the ftate difFufes comfort, happinefs, peace and fe- 
 
 curity over all its members. 
 
 £c/i. — Civil liberty is then to be well diftinguifhed from that 
 which is natural. A fpirit impatient of rational, falu- 
 tary and necefTary controul, is not liberty, but wan- 
 ton licentioufnefs. Public good, and not the acciden- 
 tal changes of time and circumftances that may befal 
 the ftate, is the true ftandard of civil liberty. The citi- 
 zen is not lefs free in the day of public danger, when the 
 public good renders his perfonai fervices, the ftricleft 
 difcipline and fubordination, nay, even the facriflce of 
 his life and property, neceflary, than he is when fur- 
 rounded by the funfhine of peace and external fecurity, 
 when he may live at eafe, and dwell under his own vine 
 and fig-tree. 
 
 There is indeed nothing in the public concerns of 
 ftates and nations which requires more care and cir- 
 cumfpeclioa on the part of the rulers as well as on 
 that of the ruled, than to draw and keep within the 
 precife line of their refpeclive public rights and obli- 
 gations, fo that each may faithfully perform their 
 public duties -, for every ftretch of power on the part 
 of government, is an incroachment on the civil liberty 
 of the ruled ; and every default, with refpect to the 
 performance of the civil duties, on the part of the lat- 
 ter, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ^^J 
 
 ter, is an injury committed againft the government, a 
 wanton abufe of civil liberty, and an aft of licentiouf- 
 nefs, ending with the fubverfion of the flate and the 
 deftruction of public happinefs. There would be 
 caufe to lament the incefTantcontroverfies on this point 
 between the governors of free ftates and the go- 
 verned, were it not that jealoufy, diftruft and difcon- 
 tent feem to be naturally interwoven in the conftitu- 
 tions of ftates, and as infeparable from free govern- 
 ments as debilities and ficknefTes from the frail confti- 
 tution of our bodies. 
 
 Befides thefe confiderations, it is internal fecurity^ 
 that is to fay, fuch provisions as are neceftary that there 
 be no caufe to dread an evil within, that citizens may 
 live peaceably and undifturbed in their perfons and 
 property, which naturally incroach upon the liberties 
 of the members. In the multifarious occurrences of 
 life, and among fo many and fuch various clamings of 
 private and focial interefts, it far furpaffes the wifdom 
 and fagacity of human legislators to draw the exact line 
 and to determine with precision where laws are to put 
 a reftraint upon the citizen, and where he may be left 
 to follow his own inclination and to be guided by his 
 own discretion, What the foul is with refpecr. to the 
 exercife of our faculties as men, fuch are laws with re- 
 flect to the body politic in regard to the conduct of 
 citizens. 
 
 To thefe mud be added the various provisions ne- 
 cefiary for the external fecurity of the ftate : citizens 
 muft be retrained from committing any injury againft 
 other ftates or their citizens, left the public repofe of 
 the ftate be thereby endangered. As a fociety cannot 
 enjoy public felicity if it muft be in a continual ftate 
 
 of 
 
%$% MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of fear and danger, the citizens muft learn the ufe of 
 arms, and ftand prepared to quell an infurrecTion and 
 defeat a rebellion, as well as to repel an invafion of the 
 ftate. At fuch times the citizen muft come under 
 military law — muft leave all other concerns, folely in- 
 tent on averting the public danger •, he mould even 
 make a facriiice of life, limbs and property at the facred 
 ihrine of his injured country. 
 
 Sch. i. — Behold the various and theneceflary modifications of 
 civil liberty, and the great importance of public good I 
 We fet down civil liberty firfl and foremoft; for what 
 will all laws avail, what is the power, the fplendor of na- 
 tional refpectability and grandeur, when the former are 
 the fhackles, the latter the bane of citizens? 
 
 But what is liberty without the controul of falutary and ne- 
 ceffary laws — laws which have public good for their ob- 
 ject, and are not the arbitrary edicts of unnatural defpot- 
 ifm? — What will liberty, guarded by the wifeft and bell 
 of laws, finally avail, when there is no care taken for the 
 promotion of public peace and fecurity ? 
 
 ■Sch. 2. — Where thefe three ingredients to the public good are 
 properly fubqrdinated, and fo poifed that they fupport one 
 another, the happinefs of a ftate or nation will ftand — 
 will be lafting and permanent. To apportion them as 
 times and circumftances require, is the greateft art, the 
 mod glorious object in which men can engage. To go- 
 vern well, to render ftates and nations happy, entitles 
 rulers to the auguft diftinction of being denominated Gods 
 on earth.. 
 
 Since civil fociety, whatever the form of its govern- 
 ment may be, is by nature equal, and fince the nature 
 and fcope of that fociety, that is to fay, public hap- 
 pinefs, is the ftandard by which the extent of the public 
 rights and obligations of all the members muft be efti- 
 mated •, it follows, that civil fociety naturally refts on 
 an univerfal fundamental law, whereby both the rulers 
 
 of 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 359 
 
 of ftates and nations, and the refpective citizens under 
 their authority, ought to regulate their conduct. 
 
 This fundamental civil law may be exprefTed in this 
 general proportion: Citizens must direct their 
 
 ACTIONS SO THAT THE PUBLIC GOOD, that IS to fay, 
 THAT CIVIL LIBERTY AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
 SECURITY MAY BE OBTAINED, PRESERVED AND PRO- 
 MOTED ; AND MUST CAREFULLY AVOID THE CON- 
 TRARY. 
 
 Sch. — What contradicts this fundamental law is civilly unjuft; 
 laws and ordinances contrary to it are public grievances, 
 &c. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the origin of civil foriety. 
 
 1HE origin of civil fociety, conlidered as a matter 
 of fact, has given rife to a variety of opinions : but 
 as opinions cannot affect, the nature of things, we may 
 lay afide an unprofitable difcuflion of them, and proceed 
 immediately to the principal point of the controverfy, 
 to wit, the enquiry, Whether philofophical deductions^ 
 like thofe of the preceding chapter, "reft upon fittion^ 
 or are founded in nature, are fomething real and co- 
 eval with the multiplication of the human race ? — We 
 think reafon is on the fide of thofe who affert the latter ; 
 for, if the relation of rulers and the ruled is not natu- 
 ral, how can we account for the general reception and 
 
 eftablifhment 
 
%6o MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 eftabli foment of one kind of government or another* 
 even among the mod barbarous nations of the earth ? 
 Have not the freed communities among the Indians 
 their leaders ? Have they not their head men, who 
 tranfact public bufinefs in the name of their tribes? 
 
 Men* are prone to counteract both perfect and imper- 
 fect obligations : in confequence of this barbarous dii- 
 pofition, life, as well as the undifturbed enjoyment o( 
 the things necenary for its prefervation, muft have be- 
 come extremely infecure and precarious, as foon as the 
 human race were multiplied to a considerable extent. 
 Neceliity, therefore, muft have foon fuggefted the 
 greater conveniences and fecurity which civil focieties 
 
 and governments afford, 
 
 <_> 
 
 Where is the reafon, we may afk, that men, in the 
 early ages of the world, have been fo itrangely fupine 
 with refpect to their true interefts, and fo much more 
 inattentive to their mod urgent neceflities than their 
 fellow creatures in fubfequent days ? , Experience 
 evinces, that the apprehenfion of an evil places us in a 
 ftate of infecurity, and renders our Situation unhappy. 
 Is it not the nature of fear to excite men to exert them- 
 felves in acquiring repofe, peace and fafety ? 
 
 Aflbciations have mod undoubtedly derived their 
 origin from the fear of danger. Natural focieties, the 
 connubial and parental, have led the way to the herile. 
 The deiire of peace and happinefs has cemented fami- 
 lies under the domeftic irate ; of which the civil is, as 
 it were, the counterpart, with this difference, that the 
 latter is more extenfive, and forms the fhield under 
 which not only individuals, but families and commu- 
 nities find their general fecurity. 
 
 We 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.. 36* 
 
 We fhould not feel that degree of anxiety for op- 
 posing thofe authors who affign, as the firfr. moving 
 caufes for civil focieties, the lint of power and dorni- 
 nion> or fuccefsful acts of violence and rapine, the 
 efTential traits of which the experience ,of ages has not 
 been able fully to take away even among the poliihed 
 nations of the earth, — were it not that it would feem 
 to leave them the boaft of victory, as it were, over the 
 fuperior power of reafon and found morality : for, de- 
 crying the principles flowing from the nature of God 
 and men, from the nature of things and real happinefs, 
 as a fiction, they fap the very foundation of political 
 morality, nay, of human happinefs. They place the 
 origin of civil fociety in lawlefs and unnatural acts ot 
 violence and injuftice, and thence draw the inconclufive 
 inference, that the rights and obligations of the mem- 
 bers of civil fociety cannot be reduced to ftable and 
 unalterable principles of natural law. 
 
 Hiftory, it is true, furnifnes us with frequent in- 
 fiances of ftates which have had their origin in lawlefs 
 ufurpation : but thefe inftances are fo far from proving 
 the infufficiency of rational principles for explaining the 
 true nature of civil focieties, that they exhibit powerful 
 arguments for eftablifhing both the right and power of 
 reafon in the public concerns' of ftates, as there are in- 
 numerable examples of governments founded in in- 
 juftice and fupported by Violence, which have either 4 
 vanifhed or undergone a feries of changes and revolu- 
 tions, vibrating, as it were, from one extreme to the 
 other, until they have been brought under modifica- 
 tions as near to the principles of nature as the circum- 
 fiances of the times, the improvements and the genius 
 of the people, or the particular fituation cf ftates, 
 would admit. 
 
 A a a Recent 
 
g62 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Recent inftances of this kind are exhibited by the 
 genera] government of the United States, and of the 
 particular ftates which compofe it — -inftances which 
 fufficiently mew that it is practicable to eftablifh go- 
 vernments upon/the bafis of natural juftice. 
 
 The druggies of the French nation have been con- 
 fidered in the ridiculous light of a vifionary dream ; but 
 in fpite of all oppofltion, they bid fair to afford us an 
 eflential proof, that there is fome reality in governments 
 founded on the principles of nature. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the different laws, rights and obligations which take 
 place in civil fociety, and the different capacities and 
 . char afters of the citizens. 
 
 J\ L L the rights and obligations of citizens have 
 either reference to civil government, or are confined to 
 the concerns which citizens have among one another, 
 in the former cafe the rights and obligations of citizens 
 are called public; in the latter, private. 
 
 Perfons who are vefted with the right of civil govern- 
 ment are public; thofe who are under the authority of 
 government are private perfons. 
 
 When private perfons are coniidered in their relation 
 to government, that is to fay, with refpeel to their 
 public rights and obligations, they are contemplated in 
 their public charafter; but when reference is had to the 
 relation which they bear to their fellow citizens, or 
 
 when 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 363 
 
 when their private concerns come into contemplation y 
 they fuftain a private char after. 
 
 Public perfons may have private rights and obliga- 
 tions, and of confequence, fuftain a private character; 
 for inftance, the prefident of the union, the feveral 
 governors of the United States, &sc. have private pro* 
 perty, hold real and perfonal eftates. 
 
 Thofe laws of a ftate or nation are public, which 
 have for their -object, the public rights and obligations 
 of the rulers as well as of the ruled ; but the municiv 
 pal lazvs are confined to the cognizance of the private 
 concerns of citizens among themfelves. 
 
 In.mort, all things in a ftate are Riled public, which 
 have reference to the government thereof : there are 
 fuch things as public property, public concerns, public 
 employ, public ftations,. affairs, offices, fervices, &c. 
 
 Public perfons, or citizens engaged in public fer- 
 vice, becaufe they alfo fuftain a private character, are 
 bound to regulate their conduct in perfect conformity 
 to the laws of the land, as far as that obedience does 
 not clafh with the weightier concerns of government : 
 for nothing except a higher obligation can excufe the 
 citizen from the performance of the duties- he owes to 
 his fellow citizens as men and as citizens. 
 
 Hence it appears perfectly confiftent with the law 
 of nature, that perfons whofe fervices are eftentiallv 
 necefTary for the prefervation of the public welfare, 
 .mould not be amenable to the municipal law as long 
 as that neceffity exifts : as, the general, the officer, the 
 foldier, &c. on an. expedition, fliould not be liable to 
 arreft for debt. 
 
 Public perfons, at the helm of government, are qt 
 
 all 
 
364 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 all times engaged in public affairs ; they ought, there- 
 fore, to he exempted from the power of the municipal, 
 laws, as long as their adminiftration lafts. This pri- 
 vilege ought likewife to be extended to the members 
 of the legiflature, during its feflion, and a reafonable 
 time before as well as after it. 
 
 A reafonable expectation may be formed, that per- 
 fons raifed to an exalted ftation will not fail to be as 
 faithful in their private as they ought to be in their 
 public characters, ' 
 
 Thofe who abufe fuch privileges to the prejudice of 
 
 their fellow citizens, carry the mark of public opprefibrs 
 
 of the worft kind -, becaufe, under the fhield of Jaw» 
 
 they facrilegiouily defeat its falutary ends, 
 
 Sch. — It is an additional argument to prove the propriety of 
 privileging public perfons, that it is poflible for defigning 
 men to throw an obflacle in the way of public proceed- 
 ings, by vexatious and unfounded actions commenced 
 againfl public perfons. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the invariable f cope of all public and municipal laws in a 
 ftate, the effential public rights, and the correlative public 
 obligations between the government and the people.. 
 
 I N C E the fundamental civil law requires citizens 
 to direct their actions fo that the public good of the 
 ftate or nation may be obtained, preferved and promot- 
 ed, it follows, that all public laws of a ftate, as well as 
 the municipal, muft invariably have this defirable end 
 for their object, and that all regulations in a ftate which 
 
 have 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 365 
 
 have a contrary tendency, are improper, grievous and 
 unjuft. 
 
 Hence it follows, that government cannot have any 
 public rights which are inconfiftent with the liberty of 
 the people. The people, therefore, owe no obligation 
 to fuch mandates as, in themfelves, have a manifeft ten- 
 dency to deftroy civil liberty, for fuch mandates flow 
 not from the public right, but are abufes of the power 
 of government. 
 
 Sc/i. — We fay mandates hi themfelves, becaufe it is poffible that 
 other and higher obligations bind citizens to forbear. 
 Vide p. 32—48, &c. 
 
 It is for the enjoyment of civil liberty that govern- 
 ment is necefTary and civil fociety inftituted : civil li~ 
 berty is therefore the right paramount of the citizen, 
 to which governments owe all their powers, their exig- 
 ence and authority, and on this account are bound, 
 under a public and moft facred obligation, to refpect 
 and protect that right. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Civil liberty is that facred public depofit which is not 
 to be touched with an unhallowed hand: it is the birth- 
 right of the citizen: he who is deprived thereof is not a 
 citizen, but a (lave. This great and indefeafible right 
 implies the rights to the necefTary means for preferving it 
 again ft encroachments and daagers. A free citizen has 
 the right to have arms, and is entitled to a free communi- 
 cation of his thoughts: hence the liberty of the prefs, and 
 hence the right to aflemble with fellow citizens in a peace- 
 able manner, for confutation with refpect to the concerns 
 of their country, 
 
 €eh. 2. — How careful ought citizens to be to preferve thefe 
 rights! how folicitous not to abufe them, fince abufes 
 whether they proceed from or take their rife among 
 citizens, provoke meafures of the moft dreadful effects 
 and the moll fatal confequences! 
 
 It is a public obligation in citizens to learn to know 
 
 their 
 
§66 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 fcheir rights : it is from ignorance that the people m 
 many countries have loft their liberty •, and it is from 
 that caufe why with fome it has only exiftence in imagi- 
 nation and prejudice, whilft fuch as enjoy it fetno value 
 thereon, or become guilty of abufing it to the mod 
 outrageous purpofes. 
 
 Liberty indeed comprehends avaft deal; but the 
 liberty of man is directed by the laws of nature and of 
 revelation; that of the citizen becomes modified and 
 determined by additional reftraints, neceiTary for the 
 internal and external fecurity of the ftate. To perpe- 
 trate injuries againft fellow citizens, to invade the juft 
 rights of the rulers or the ruled, is not liberty, but 
 the. height of ■ anarchy and licentioufnefs, the greatest 
 evil that can befal civil fociety, The liberty of the 
 citizen is restrained by neceiTary and directed by falu- 
 tary laws. 
 
 It is, therefore, a public right of government to« 
 
 enact falutarv laws, which are necefTarv tor the internal 
 
 order, peace and fecurity of the ftate; and citizens 
 
 are under the moft facred public obligations to obey 
 
 them. 
 
 Sch. — Behold a ftriking criterion of a good government and 
 of £ood and free citizens! 
 
 There are like wife public rights, veiling government 
 with a power to make laws directing the conduct of 
 citizens, that they do not injure other civil focieties by 
 any adls which are repugnant to the perfect rights of 
 their members, whether they be rulers or the ruled, 
 left the external fecurity of the ftate becomes involved 
 in the iflue of fuch a conduct. 
 
 Befides fuch neceiTary regulations and laws, obedi- 
 ence to which is an indifputable public obligation on 
 
 the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 36*7 
 
 "the part of the people, the government has the public 
 right to order that the citizens be prepared for public 
 defence and war, againft an intended or actual ag- 
 grerTion; likewife, to regulate and order the mode of 
 conducting the one or the other, to afTent to terms of 
 accommodation or pacification, &c. 
 
 The citizens are bound to fubmit to fuch regulations. 
 To fupport the ftate is the greater!: privilege, and the 
 principal trait in the character of a free citizen, fince 
 that fupport is the fureft mean to preferve the liberty 
 of our country. 
 
 Sc/i. i. — Almoft all nations have loft their liberty, becaufe 
 they have intruded their public right of defence to fo- 
 reigners, or to a mercenary foldiery. 
 
 'Sc&. i. — Patriotic citizens will not fuffer, in learning the mili- 
 tary art, that ftrange indolence or want of discretion, on 
 their part, fhould give a handle to thofe who are fond of 
 undervaluing the character of a militia-foldier. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Whillt, with heart-felt gratitude, we recollect the 
 patriotic and heroic perfeverance of the continental armv 
 during our glorious conteft with Great-Britain, it would 
 be criminal to forget the valour and affiduity of our mi- 
 litia: America has exhibited inftances that a citizen fol- 
 dier is invincible — to recount the noble exploits of in- 
 dividuals would certainly be worthy' the pen of hiftorians. 
 
 §ek. 4. — Let pofterity hear, that at the time of Herkemer's 
 battle, which happened the 6th of Auguft, 1777, the 
 valour of one hundred and nTtv militia-men. commanding 
 themfelves, becaufe their leaders had fallen, affifted by 
 the intrepid and mo ft feafonable fortie of a Colonel 
 Willett, maintained the field againft the mixt hoft 
 of regulars, refugees and Indians, exceeding four times 
 their number. Let it ftand recorded among other pa- 
 triotic deeds of that little army of militia, that a Jacob 
 Gardiner, with a few of his men, vanquiihed a whole 
 plattoon, killed the Captain thereof, after he had kept: 
 nim for a long time by his collar, as a mield againft the 
 Walls and the bayonets of the whole plattoon. This brave 
 
 rnalitia 
 
$6$ MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 militia Captain is ftill alive, and was cured of thirteen 
 wounds. Neither mult it be forgotten, that William 
 Wills and John Harper, who at that time of general 
 diftrefs on our weflern frontiers, when two hundred roy- 
 alifts and Indians had advanced into the heart of Scho- 
 hary, when treachery, affifted by the panic with which 
 the inhabitants had been ftruck, had almofl accomplish- 
 ed a total defection among the inhabitants, with forty 
 men, collected in a ftrong brick-houfe, braved the enemy, 
 hindred the defection from taking the intended effect, 
 and afforded time for fuccour, by which the whole defign 
 of the enemy was defeated, and a valuable part of the 
 frontier preferved. 
 It is a certain fact, that, after the above-mentioned bloody 
 day, when General Burgoyne's proclamation was fent 
 amongft the intimidated inhabitants of the then county 
 of Tryon, by a flag of truce, compofed of a mixed 
 group of run-aways from faid county, and of a number 
 of Indians yet reeking with the blood of their benefactors 
 and neighbours — only a few men defeated the treacherous 
 fcheme, and prevented the defection of that county, which 
 continued during the war one of our ftrongeft barriers 
 againit the weftern invafions of the enemy. A thoufand 
 inftances might be given of the valour of militia-foldiers 
 during that conteft, which might be adduced in refutation 
 of the reafonings lately communicated by the public pa- 
 pers, as having taken place in a great public affembly. 
 Certainly fuch men do not know our militia, or have for- 
 got their fellow citizens. 
 
 Since, then, civil liberty is, as it were, the refult of 
 neceflary and wife modifications of all the individual 
 and other focial rights of the citizens, by the public 
 obligations, both of civil rulers and the ruled, for the 
 prefervation of internal and external fecurity;- it fol- 
 lows, that government ought not to put the people 
 under greater reftraint than is necefTary for, nor 
 fhould the latter pretend to more freedom than is con- 
 fident with, the attainment of thefe defirable objects. 
 
 On the contrary, it eflentially interefts both the 
 
 public 
 
MORAL PHlLOSOP&W $6& 
 
 public and the private perfons in a flate, that they 
 join their beft efforts for conducting themfelves fo, that 
 no occafion may be furnifhed to any perfons, whether 
 citizens or ftrangers* why they mould entertain any de- 
 signs, or enter into any machinations prejudicial to 
 public peace and tranquillity. 
 
 The tranquillity of a ftate or nation may be fafe> 
 from evil defigns againft its internal fecurity, when 
 perfons either feel no inclination, or have it not in their 
 power to diflurb the ftate : the former may be rea- 
 sonably expected, when there is either no caufe for, of; 
 when there are ftronger motives againft the railing a 
 difturbance. 
 
 There is certainly no Caufe for dreading dangerous 
 innovations when the love of virtue and good order 
 prevails, when the citizens are feniible of their public 
 duties, as well as thofe which they owe as individuals 
 to God, to themfelves* and to their fellow creatures,, 
 more efpecially to their fellow citizens* — when citizens 
 are not only contented with their prefent condition, 
 but alfo when there is not any juftifying caufe fof 
 difcontent. In either of thefe cafes, thofe who would 
 be at all events difpofed to caufe diflurbances would 
 be left without even pretences under which difcontent 
 and a wanton breach of order might find plaufiblity 
 or excufe. 
 
 Should there ftill be among citizens fuch ignoble 
 minds as that confederations of public virtue, of pa- 
 triotifm and humanity do not operate, it will be necef- 
 fary that they be deterred from evil by laws, fanctioned 
 with ignonimous and public punifhment. Fear, it muffc 
 be confeffed, is not the moft laudable, but it is, not- 
 withftanding, a powerful principle, nay, perhaps the 
 
 B b b only 
 
^7<0 ItfORAL PHILOSOPHY". 
 
 only one left againfc brutal men, whofe minds have be- 
 come too callous and obdurate to yield to the tender 
 emotions of religion, patriotifm and humanity. 
 
 It is therefore a public obligation in government, 
 For eftabliming internal and external Security upon the 
 firmed bafts, that they make ufe of their authority to 
 order all things in a ftate in fuch a manner as to become 
 means for exciting the minds of the people to virtue 
 and patriotifm. Such a conduct on the part of the 
 rulers of ftates and nations cannot fail to imprefs them 
 with the higher! efteem for public virtue, and a due re- 
 fpect to thofe who eXercife it. Citizens who are well 
 informed and fenfible of their public obligations, will 
 view difturbances of the public tranquillity in their true 
 light, as evils of the moft heinous nature, and the cha- 
 racter of the authors and abettors of them as infamous 
 and deteftable. 
 
 It is a public obligation on the part of government, 
 to order that each clafs of citizens be ufefully employed* 
 and thereby enabled to live comfortably. 
 
 Government is under public obligation to ufe all pot 
 fible care, prudence, moderation and circumfpection* 
 that the private good of individuals, as well as the 
 common interefts of the lefs focieties within the limits 
 and jurifdiction of the date, be properly fubordinated 
 to the public good of civil fociety, from which they 
 derive their protection. 
 
 It is not only a public obligation of citizens in gene- 
 ral, but alfo of government in particular, that they be 
 extremely careful not to injure other ftates, left tlieex.-^ 
 temal fecuwty of the ftate be thereby endangered. 
 
 Since it is a moft important public and national obli- 
 gation 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 37 
 
 gation to place the ftateon the fureft foundation againffc 
 Foreign aggrefhon and internal infurrection, the govern- 
 ment is bound to order all things (o that population, 
 agriculture, commerce, arts and fciences may be en- 
 couraged and cultivated— that the citizens may be well 
 acquainted with and exercifed in all that pertains to the 
 means of public defence. 
 
 To crown all, the public rights and obligations,, 
 which form the bond of political and national union 
 between the rulers of dates and the people, mould be 
 fecured and determined by wife and falutary laws, 
 founded on the eternal principles of natural juiface and 
 equity •, and thefe laws ought to be adminiftered in 
 conformity to the duties which men owe to God, to 
 themfelves, and to their fellow creatures. 
 
 Let it be remembered, that, as civil fociety is equal, 
 the government thereof ought to be a government not 
 of men, but of laws •,-— that to be obedient and faithful 
 to fuch a government is the higher}, degree of liberty 
 $f which man is capable with refpec! to public life. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the fipreme power or fiver eignly in a ftaie^ and th& 
 principal rights- of fiver eigniy. 
 
 X H E fource of all public power in a irate is th& 
 people ; all authority to order and direct the actions of 
 the citizens for the attainment, prefervation and ad- 
 vancement of the public felicity, originates in the tranf- ■ 
 fer made by them. The fupreme power of thQ ftate 
 
 is 
 
3JZ MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is therefore eflentially inherent in the people -, but the 
 cxercife thereof is transferred to the moral, or public 
 perfon of the ftate, whether a king, a fenate, or a go- 
 vernment that reprefents the people. 
 
 Thofe rights which immediately flow from the right 
 of civil government, conftitute what is called the fo- 
 vereignty of a ftate or nation : the public perfon vefted 
 with the exercife of fuch rights is ftiled the fovereign. 
 
 Hence it follows, that^ though the fovereignty of a 
 ftate or nation is originally and eflentially in the people, 
 ftill, when civil government is once eftablifhed, the 
 exercife of it is the right of the public rulers, as long 
 as that eftabliftiment mbftfts. 
 
 The eftabliftiment of a government refts upon a 
 fundamental law, known under the title of the confti- 
 tution. 
 
 The fovereigns of ftates and nations are fubject to 
 the conftitutions of them, whether they actually exift 
 or are only fuppofed to exift. Such original compacts 
 between the rulers and the people remain the unalter- 
 able rule for the administration of government. 
 
 To alter or to change the conftitution of a ftate or 
 
 nation is, as we fhall fee, the right of the people. 
 
 Sch. — We have already obferved, that thofe ftates whofe go- 
 vernments are not vefted with all the neceflary powers of 
 fovereignty, are dependent. 
 
 We diftinguifti fovereignty into internal and external: 
 the former might be ftiled political •, the International. 
 
 Internal or political fovereignty comprehends all the 
 fights neceflary for the internal concerns of a ftate. 
 
 National fovereignty has reference to other ftates 
 $nd independent civil focieties. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 373 
 
 ScL i. — Since national fovereignty conftitute-s the character 
 of a nation, it will be the proper fubjeft of the law of 
 nations to inveftigate the nature and extent of thofe fpe- 
 ciMc rights which conftitute it. 
 
 Sch. 2. — But the internal concerns of nations belong to their 
 political character, which is the fubje£t of politics; though 
 authors who have treated of the law of nations, have 
 likewife taken notice of them, becaufe a treatife on that 
 lalt mentioned fubjecf, cannot be underfto'od without juit 
 ideas of the political character of nations. 
 
 Sck, 3. — Let it therefore be obferved, that what has been hi- 
 therto explained, together with all that will be faid in the 
 fequel on the fubject of the political concerns of ftates, 
 applies fully to nations. 
 
 ScL 4. — Thofe things, on the contrary, which have particu- 
 lar reference to external fecurity againft the machinations 
 and invasions of other ftates, belong folely to the national 
 character of dates. 
 
 Since government is inftituted for the attainment, 
 
 prefervation and advancement of the felicity of the 
 
 flate or nation, it follows, on the one hand, that the 
 
 fovereign is not vefted with any rights of fovereignty 
 
 which are contrary to public good; and, on the other, 
 
 that he is naturally and neceflarily porTefied of all thofe 
 
 without which that defirable end cannot be obtained, 
 
 fecured or promoted. 
 
 ScL — From thefe confiderations a judgment may be formed 
 whether canftitutions ftand in need of emendations or ad* 
 ditions, or whether they deferve the character of falutaiy 
 fundamental laws. 
 
 Perfons within the borders and jurifdiction of a ftate 
 are either citizens or Grangers : with refpect to the 
 former, the rights of the fovereign are both affirmative 
 and negative •, fince citizens are bound not only to omit 
 all that is contrary to public good, but muft likewife 
 perform thofe civil duties which are necelTarv for the 
 prefervation of the internal and external peace of the 
 
 fiate, 
 
574 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 &ate, and are effential to its public felicity : but Gran- 
 gers not having an intereft in the public good of the 
 ftate, are only bound by negative duties; that is to fay, 
 die fb vereign can only interdict fuch actions as are re- 
 pugnant to the public good of the ftate. This ri^ht 
 the iovereign pofTefTes from the neceffity of the cafe, 
 becaufe otherwife he could not exercife the rights of 
 sovereignty neceffary for the prefervation of the public 
 good. 
 
 Of the various rights of fovereignty, with refpect 
 to the citizens of the flate, the following may be con- 
 sidered as the principal, becaufe they are effentially 
 neceilary for promoting the public good of the fociety. 
 
 1. The right to make and promulge laws for regu- 
 lating the conduct of citizens. 
 
 2. The right to pafs imputation upon the conduct 
 of the citizens, according to the direction of thofe laws ; 
 to determine rewards and punifhments, and to put 
 thofe determinations into execution. 
 
 3. The right of fufpending, altering or repealing 
 municipal laws ; and of adapting and modifying natural 
 laws to the exigencies of the ftate. 
 
 4. The right to prohibit all things, and all conducl: 
 of individuals and focieties, which are contradictory to 
 tho. internal or external peace of the community. 
 
 5. The right to erect courts of juftice for the trial 
 and puniihment of crimes committed within the limits 
 and jurifdiction of the ftate. 
 
 6. The right of building fortifications and harbours 
 withm the territory of the itate, to regulate roads, to 
 exclude it-angers from accefs to or from paiTing through 
 the ftate, or to grant and modify fuch privileges. 
 
 7. The 
 
MO&AL PHILOSOPHY. 3^5 
 
 7. The rights to make war and peace ; to order the 
 mode in which the former is to be conducted, and to 
 affent to the terms upon which the latter may be con- 
 cluded. 
 
 8. The right to prohibit all things which have a 
 tendency to produce evil habits and pernicious confe^ 
 quences. 
 
 9. The right to fanction all that may incite the citi- 
 zens to virtue, and may have a falutary effect upon 
 the manners of the people. 
 
 10. The right to order things fo that the citizens 
 may be ufefully employed and enabled to live com- 
 fortably. 
 
 11. The fight to order that the citizens may learn 
 and be exercifed in the military art. 
 
 12. The right to prohibit whatever is unfriendly to 
 population. 
 
 Upon the whole, the right of fovereignty extends to 
 all that is neceffary as a mean for promoting and pre- 
 ferving public felicity* 
 
 The arTuming rights of fovereignty, which are not 
 abfolutely neceffary for public good, or, which ulti- 
 mately amounts to the fame thing, the extending the 
 lawful rights of fupreme controul farther than is ne- 
 ceffary for that end, lead to an abridgement of the civil- 
 liberty of the citizens, and muft be ranked among thofc. 
 claims which are not founded in natural law. 
 
 Rights of fovereignty which are incompatible with 
 public good, though warranted by certain constitutions 
 of ftates, are in the forum of nature nothing leis than 
 high-handed ufurpation. 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
37& MORAL PHILOSOPHY* 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the refources of a ftate. 
 
 B 
 
 >Y the refources of a ftate are generally underftood 
 all the means which the government may make ufe of 
 for attaining, advancing, and particularly for preferving 
 the public felicity. 
 
 Since there are innumerable things in a ftate which 
 may ferve for thefe purpofes, it follows, that its re- 
 fources are not only multifarious, but alfo, that, by a 
 proper adminiftration of public affairs, they may be 
 vaftly increafed, as, by a contrary conduct, they may 
 be neglected and diminifned. 
 
 All the refources of a ftate are reducible to thefe 
 two : the ftrengtb of the citizens and their wealth. 
 
 Thofe who place public ftrength in a vaft extent of 
 territory, forget that a country is ftrong at the rate of 
 its populoufnefs ; that a compact, thickly fettled terri- 
 tory can perform what may be expected in vain from 
 an equal number of inhabitants fpread over a territory 
 too extenfive for the public force to be concentrated 
 and brought to act with united efforts. It is union, 
 public virtue and patriotifm that fupply numbers: it 
 is the hardinefs, courage, difcipline, induftry, oeconomy, 
 fobriety,-^-the progrefs in arts and fciences, the united 
 zeal to improve the advantages which a country affords 
 into means of private and public happinefs, which ren- 
 der a comparatively fmall ftate ftrong and vigorous. 
 Indolence and corruption of manners, on the contrary? 
 weaken a people in proportion to numbers : the more 
 
 numerous, 
 
Moral philosophy. 37^ 
 
 numerous, the more extenfive will be the contagion, the 
 more incurable the difeafe. 
 
 That country is certainly deficient in the moft power- 
 ful refources, where luxury fupplies the place of fobriety 
 and induilry, and where numbers muft ftand in the 
 room of wifdom, courage, fortitude, patriotifm and 
 perfeverance. 
 
 The wealth of a date, like the ftrteherrh of its citi- 
 zens, is a comparative relation. GEconomy and in- 
 duftry may compenfate the want of rich mines, of £ 
 rich and fertile foil, and of advantageous fea-ports. 
 
 That ftate is wealthy, where the citizens have the 
 neceflaries requiflte for the fubfiftence of themfeives and 
 their families, and for the means of defending the ftate. 
 
 Money, particularly that of the paper kind, is the 
 representative of wealth •, but agriculture, manufaftures 
 and commerce are the real wealth of a ftate, and inex- 
 hauftible refources, which will not leave government at 
 a nonplus in the day of public danger; 
 
 A ftate, therefore, where the laws are properly ad- 
 ministered, where liberty and virtue reign, where agri- 
 culture, arts and commerce are encouraged, will not 
 be defective in men who are ready to ftand forth iri 
 defence of the ftate from a true principle of patriotifm, 
 and cannot remain deftitute of thofe means by which 
 they are enabled to fupport and maintain that defence. 
 
 Though countries differ in natural advantages, it is 
 the indilftry and genius of the people that can fuppjy 
 the deficiencies : there is confequentiv caufe why a ftate 
 mould contentedly purfue its own felicity, and banifh 
 the idea of conqueft. 
 
 G c c CHAPTER 
 
37? MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Of revenue and the adminiflration thereof. 
 
 OlNCE government cannot be adminiftered without 
 expence, it is neceiTary that a portion of the produce 
 of the wealth of a ttate be allowed for the purpofes of 
 government; for government is instituted for public 
 good, and the will and power of the members of a ftate 
 •are transferred to government for the promotion and 
 prefervation of that great end. A right to the end im- 
 plies the right to make ufe of the means abfolutely ne- 
 cefiary for that end. 
 
 A portion of the produce of the public wealth that 
 may be applied for the purpofes of government, is 
 comprehended under the term revenue. 
 
 The public good of a ftate therefore requires a re- 
 venue. 
 
 Since revenues are drawn from the wealth of a {late, 
 it follows, that either fome public property, for in- 
 ftance, demefne lands, or that a certain proportion of 
 the private property of the citizens, or of goods im-. 
 ported from abroad, be allotted for the purpofes of 
 government. 
 
 Hence it follows, that the revenues of a ftate pro- 
 ceed either from public property, or from private pro- 
 perty made public, that is to fay, allotted to the pur- 
 pofes of government. 
 
 It is a right of fovereignty to difpofe of the public 
 revenue; for it is public property belonging to the 
 
 whole 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 379 
 
 whole Hate-, and whatever belongs to the whole date- 
 is under the direction of government. 
 
 The difpofal of the revenue is not left optional to 
 the fovereign of a irate, but muft be in perfect confiit- 
 ency with the public good, otherwife a ftate is injured 
 by its government. 
 
 It is one of the moft momentous rights of (bve- 
 reignty, connected with the right of government, to 
 order, in cafe public property be not farBcient for the 
 exigencies of the ftate, that a certain quantum of the 
 produce of the property of private citizens, or of the 
 proceeds from imported goods, be appropriated to the 
 purpofes of government •, that is to fay, the fovereign 
 has a right to raife a revenue; for government is under 
 perfect obligation to do all that is necefTary for l\iq pro- 
 motion and prefervation of the public good : but obli- 
 gation to ends implies the right to the necefTary means. 
 
 Sc/i. 1. — The exercife of this important right is generally at- 
 tended with many and great difficulties, as it affects the 
 private property, and confequently the perfdhal liberty 
 of the citizen. 
 
 Sch. 1. — It ought to be considered, that nothing which is not 
 abfolutely necefTary for public good can juftify govern- 
 ment in interfering with the private interests of citizens. 
 
 " Sch. 3. — That great care and circumspection is necefTary that 
 the impositions mould be as light as poffible: they muft 
 not, therefore, be laid on the neceffaries of life, or on the 
 manu factories of the citizens, if any other refource is left. 
 
 Sch. 4. — That they be proportionate to the abilities of the citi- 
 zens; that is to fay, equally aiitlfed according to the re- 
 fpective circumftances of the citizens. 
 
 Sch. 5. — That they be laid on the luxuries of life, particularly 
 on fuch articles as are imported from abroad. 
 
 Sch. 6. — That the collection be the Jeaft burthenforrie and the 
 leaft expenfive poffible. 
 
 Sch. 
 
3 $0 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Set:. 7. — Since, from the principles of nature, it cannot in any 
 wife be made out that a public debt is a national bleffing, 
 it is a high and important duty not to anticipate the public 
 revenue, except in cafes of abfolute and extreme neceffity, 
 and then to reduce it as. faft as is confident with public 
 
 good. 
 
 The right to apply public property to the purpofes 
 of government is called the adminifiration of the revenue. 
 
 This right being in its nature a right of fovereignty, 
 it follows, that the fovereign is under perfedt obliga- 
 tion to direct the adminiftration of the revenue to the 
 advancement and prefervation of the public good \ for, 
 as public property is only to be ufed for thofe purpofes, 
 fo it is for public felicity only that private property 
 may be made public. 
 
 The right of adminiflration implies the right of 
 eftablifning the necefTary perfons and departments, both 
 with refpecl to the collection and the expenditure of 
 the public revenue. 
 
 By taxation is underftood the determining the pro-^ 
 portion of revenue arifing from the private property of 
 citizens, or from the proceeds of occupations, im- 
 portation and confumption of goods, &c. 
 
 The proceeds arifing from taxation are taxes, cuf- 
 toms and excife, 
 
 Faxes laid upon real or perfonal eftate are called 
 real or perfonal. 
 
 Taxes laid upon lucrative occupations have obtained 
 rhe name of It c ernes. 
 
 Taxes laid upon manufactories or articles of con- 
 fumption, are comprehended under the term excife. 
 
 Taxes laid upon goods imported or exported are 
 itiled duties. 
 
 The- 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 3 Si 
 
 The fovereign pofTefTes the right of ufe and ufufi uct 
 In the property of citizens as far as the neceflities of the 
 flate require, but no further. 
 
 In a flate of neceffity, the fovereign may difpofe of 
 the property of a citizen, provided he gives an equi- 
 valent •, for in fiance, when a certain fpotof land is requir- 
 ed for a fortification, for a harbour, for public roads, &c. 
 
 Since the fovereign has a right to order that the citi- 
 zens mav live comfortably, learn the arts and fciences, 
 Sec. it follows, that it is a right of fovereignty to order 
 orphan-houfes, fchools, colleges, and other inflitutions 
 to be fet on foot, and to draw for thefe purpofes the 
 necefTary revenue from the refources of the flate. 
 
 That flate wherein a perfon is under perfect obliga- 
 tion to execute bufinefs of a public nature, is called an 
 office ; and the perfons who are under that obligation 
 are public officers. 
 
 As fuch offices are necefTary for public good, it fol- 
 lows, that it is a right of fovereignty to inflitute the 
 offices necefTary for the adminiflration of government, 
 and to appoint proper perfons to fill fuch offices. 
 
 If the fovereign arrogates to himfelf other rights 
 
 than fuch as flow from the nature of the fovereignty, 
 
 he becomes guilty of injuring the flate. 
 
 Sch. — In different dates the eflablifhmcnt of the fundamental 
 laws of government may differ; the fovereign of one 
 itate may confequently lawfully do what with that of ano- 
 ther would be a public injury. 
 
 When the fovereign of a Hate, by abufi ng the rights 
 pf fovereignty, endeavours to opprefs the flate, he de- 
 generates into a tyrant. 
 
 Tyranny is therefore not every fault in government, 
 
 not 
 
3^2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not every defect in rectitude of which rulers are guilty, 
 but an intentional abufe of power. 
 
 From the oppremon of a few citizens that of the 
 whole ftate cannot be inferred. All the citizens of a 
 ftate, however, are deeply interefted in the fufFerings 
 and oppreflion of their fellow citizens, and juftifiable in 
 taking prudent and lawful meafures for bringing about 
 a reform and preventing a repetition. 
 
 The granting privileges caufes inequalities between 
 citizens, and mould never be reforted to but in cafes 
 where the public good is not attainable without it: 
 for inftance -, a company may very well have the privi- 
 lege of a canal, if there was no other mean to have it 
 cut but by their contribution. 
 
 Sc/i. — Privileges fhould be but of fhort duration. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Of the public obligations and rights of citizens in regard 
 
 to their fovereign. 
 
 I HE obligations of foreigners and Grangers are 
 of the negative kind, and are binding upon them as 
 foon as they arrive and as long as they live within the 
 territory and jurifdiction of the ftate. The fovereign 
 has the right to forbid all that is in any wife repugnant 
 to the public good •, and ftrangers are perfectly bound 
 to regulate their conduct fo that it be not contradictory 
 to the laws and ufages of the land. 
 
 But citizens are under the moit perfect obligations. 
 not only to abftain from all that is contrary to the laws 
 
 ' of 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 3S3 
 
 of the land or repugnant to public good, but alfo to 
 perform all things which the fovereign directs in con- 
 fiftency with that good. 
 
 As it would be endlefs to particularize all the public 
 obligations of citizens, and as it is impoflible to deter- 
 mine every particular inftance when a citizen is or is 
 not ftrictly bound to comply with all the regulations 
 and orders which the fovereign of the itate has made 
 the general rule for the conduct of citizens, let it be 
 obferved, that thofe public obligations of citizens are 
 in every refpect correlate to the j lift exercife of the rights 
 of fovereignty, and that they deferve the utmoft care 
 and attention of every citizen, fince the happinefs of 
 fociety depends as much on a faithful obedience to the 
 laws as on a juft administration of them. 
 
 There are, however, two important duties which 
 deferve to be particularly noticed, becaufe upon the 
 one the internal peace, and on the other the external 
 fecurity of the ftate is in a peculiar manner depending. 
 The nrft of thefe is this: Citizens mud exercife their 
 natural rights of defence, war and compulsion, by the 
 authority of the fovereign, and in the mode prefcribed 
 by him. The laws of the land forbid perfonal, but 
 grant ample public relief for all that might be done 
 wrong or injurioufly. 
 
 It is on this account that no action which has in- 
 fluence on public good mould be left indifferent, that 
 the laws of the land mould compafs all the individual 
 and focial concerns of the citizens. There is no danger 
 that natural liberty be curtailed, when falutary, intel- 
 ligible and beneficent laws and regulations direct the 
 conduct which citizens fhould obferve ^o one another. 
 
 -when 
 
3&4 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 — when family governments are well directed, and do 
 mefr.ic peace and happinefs promoted and preferved. 
 
 Ignorance is faid to be necefTary to keep citizens un- 
 der fubjection ; but we venture ro fay, that information 
 will be more beneficial to all the purpofes of a happy 
 fociety : let the citizens know that their obedience to 
 law is the mean of their internal peace and happinefs. 
 When a people is bleft with a happy conftitution, and 
 governed by wife and falutary laws, nothing is want- 
 ing but information and experience to convince them 
 of their happy fituation, arid to render them a virtuous., 
 faithful, peaceable and patriotic people. 
 
 The fecond public obligation of citizens is, that 
 they faithfully fupport, and courageoufly defend the 
 ftate. Let citizens confider that civil liberty is not to 
 be fported withj that it is dangerous to truft it in the 
 hands of mercenaries, and that an armed citizen is in- 
 vincible. 
 
 Rebellion is that ftate where citizens violently refift 
 the laws and authority of government, and malicioufly 
 endeavour to difturb the peace and fecurity of the 
 Hate, and meditate the overthrow of its eftablifhed 
 government. 
 
 Machinations of that kind are treafon, fedition or 
 infurretlion^ as individuals or aflbciations are involved 
 in defigns and actions which have a tendency to raiie 
 a rebellion. 
 
 Sch. i. — It is poflible that the government may rebel againfl 
 the people, bv endeavouring to overthrow the conihtu- 
 tion of the ftate. 
 
 Sch, 2. — However, in the legal fenfe of the term, rebellion 
 is violent refinance to the meafures of government, whe- 
 ther they be right or wrong: the coniequence is, that 
 men of the moll excellent character, of the greateft pub- 
 lic 
 
JMQR.AL PHILOSOPHY, ^ S 
 
 lie virtue and undaunted patriotifm, have been branded 
 with the name of rebels, and have fuffered capital punifli- 
 ment: we muft therefore make a wide difference between 
 crimes in the fight of iinjuft laws, and in that of fuch as 
 are j uft and confident with the eternal principles of natu- 
 ral juftice. , 
 
 As citizens are under the mod: facred obligations to 
 refpect government, and to fubmit to all falutary laws 
 and regulations i {Tiling from the higher!: authority of 
 the ftate and from its fubordinate officers ; fo they have 
 great and indefeafable rights, which are the palladium 
 of their civil liberty. Thefe are, 
 
 The right to make remonftrances : 
 
 The right to meet in a peaceable manner for the 
 purpofe of confutation : 
 
 The right to ftate their grievances to the govern- 
 ment, and to make them known to their fellow citizens : 
 
 The right to expect redrefs, if their grievances are 
 real : 
 
 The right to expect a prompt and equal adminiftra- 
 tion of juftice : 
 
 The right to claim and to enjoy the protection of 
 their perfons, property, rights and character : 
 
 The right to make appeals : 
 
 The right to enjoy all the rights and franchifes to 
 which citizens are entitled by the confutation of the 
 ftate. 
 
 ScL — Moft of thefe rights are infringed if the prefs is not left 
 free. 
 
 If the ftate is invaded by a foreign or domeftic ene- 
 my, every good citizen ought moft cordially to ailift in 
 relieving government and the ftate from imminent d.an- 
 
 D d d ger. 
 
$$6 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ger. Every one mould offer his life and fortune for 
 the prefervation of the ftate, its rights and liberties. 
 Bat it is very difficult to determine what line of conduct 
 citizens have to purfue, if the fovereign of a ftate ihould 
 invade and perfift in wicked machinations to deftroy 
 their liberty. 
 
 Let it be obferved, that a matter of fuch magnitude 
 and importance, teeming with confequences dreadful 
 in their nature and effects, involving the fate of the 
 prefent generation as well as that of thofe who are yet 
 unborn, ought to be coolly and thoroughly inveftigated ; 
 feafonable, proper and refpeclful reprefentations mould 
 be made, and all lawful means purfued in order to bring 
 about a reformation in government, before any ftep 
 be taken that has any fymptom of violent reiiftance. 
 
 Should it happen that all this is in vain,— mould 
 the protection of the laws be withdrawn, public juftice 
 denied, the abfolute natural rights invaded, the great 
 end of civil fociety wantonly fubverted by its own fo- 
 vereign •, what other remedy is left to citizens than that 
 which is pointed out by nature — the return to their 
 natural ftate, by forming themfelves into a new focie- 
 ty, under a new government, upon the bafis of a con- 
 ftitution calculated to enfure the permanent enjoyment 
 of public happinefs ? 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Of the different forms of government. 
 
 UY anarchy is underftood that ftate of civil fociety 
 wherein there is no government. But where there is 
 
 no 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 3.^ 
 
 no government, there can be no form of it. Anarchy- 
 is therefore juftly reckoned one of the greateft curfes 
 that can befall civil fociety, and is {tiled a monfter in 
 politics. 
 
 SJi, i. — This mortal enemy to public peace and happinefs 
 particularly invades free governments when the citizens 
 exchange the honeft manners of true republicans for fel- 
 "fifti purfuits and the arts of intrigue. Sometimes wor- 
 shipping as idols the work of their own hands, then im- 
 patient of the fupreme controul which their free confti- 
 tutions have placed in the hands of the men of their free 
 choice, they, like the cameleon, exhibit complexions fur- 
 palling the power of description. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Let it be remembered, that it is not the momentary 
 attachment to a party, the wild adherence to a particular 
 form, &c. purfued by adminiftration, but real goodnefs, a 
 difcreet, faithful, active performance of all public obliga- 
 tions, that conftitutes the good citizen. Names may be 
 bait for the ignorant and felfifh; but the good citizen will 
 look for reality, for merit, parts, honefty and public virtue, 
 and efteem any perfon who poffefles them, whether in or 
 out of office, whether a federalift or an antifederalift, &c. 
 
 Sch. 3. — It is therefore difficult to determine whether free en- 
 quiries into the conduct of public perfons proceed from 
 principles of anarchy, or from patriotifm. But fo much 
 is certain, that patriotifm ought to be guided by wifdom, 
 and (hew due deference to government, always obfervino- 
 a proper diftinction between men and meafures. 
 Sch. 4. — When I behold the electioneering mania, which be- 
 gins to grow into fafhion, and foon will be of the force of 
 precedent, (o that thofe who come hereafter will take 
 party zeal for liberty, I cannot but fee the defcription of 
 Virgil's monfter realized in the complexion of the felf- 
 conceited leader, who, like Polypheme, threatens to de- 
 vour what comes before hirn. " Monftrum horrendum, 
 informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum." — The horrid 
 monfter, of hideous form, too unwieldy for rational <*on- 
 troul, too much blindfolded to controul himfelf. 
 
 Ochlocracy is that ftate of civil fociety where it is 
 iplit into tribunal factions,, each claiming and aflum*. 
 
 ine 
 
388 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ingto itfelf the right of government, and ufurping the 
 exercife thereof by violence. Here we are prefented 
 with horrid feenes of confuflon and public calamity, 
 but with no form of government. 
 
 'tyranny and defpotifm are fuch ftates of civil fociety, 
 where the government is feized and continued by ufur- 
 pation, violence and unjuft oppreffion, — where obliga- 
 tions are laid down as the rule for the conduct of the 
 governed, which depend upon the will and pleafure of 
 the tyrant or defpot. Thefe however we dildain to call 
 forms of government, for fuch governments are con- 
 tradictory to the dignity of human nature and only fit 
 for brutes. Since there is fomethino- in them of uni- 
 formity, rule and method", let us call them methodical 
 injuftice, methodical rapine and opprellion! 
 
 Sch, 1. — It has been often obferved, that governments and 
 governmental men are very apt to lean to defpotifm. 
 Want of experience leaves us at a lofs whether this phae- 
 nomenon proceeds from the nature of government, or 
 irom the nature of man. We fuppofe, however, that 
 thofe come neareft the mark who attribute that effect to 
 both thofe caufes; for it is natural, in procefs of time, 
 for government to comprehend more and more ends: the 
 confequence will be, that more means, new refources 
 in u ft be found to enable the perfons adminiftering go- 
 vernment to accompli fh thofe ends. A fimilar caufe in- 
 cites men to advocate and proiecute the meafures which 
 have originated in their own advice. 
 
 Sch 2. — It is generally reckoned a political virtue in ftatefmen 
 to be confiftent with thernfelves: however ignorant of 
 court morality, we mould be apt to reckon it a great to- 
 ken of fortitude if great men would reject fyftems which 
 they find opprCiTive : for confiftcncy can only be a virtue 
 where we have been right, a circumftance which cannot 
 always take place in affairs managed by men. 
 
 Sch. 3- — Citizens, therefore, who have the choice of public 
 in .:, flvDuk! weigh the advantages and difrdvantagesof a 
 
 rotation, 
 
]VfORAL PHILOSOPHY. 389 
 
 rotation, and fee which way the complexion of the times 
 and the public good of the (late incline. 
 
 Government afiumes a form when its inrYitutions 
 aim at a public good, and when the will and power for 
 the attainment and prefervation of that end are under 
 public direction •, for then there is a fociety, from the 
 nature of which reciprocal rights and obligations flow, 
 and a political union is constituted. 
 
 The ejjential form of all governments we therefore 
 place in the transfer of the will and power of all the 
 members of a fociety : all governments either acknow- 
 ledge or prefuppofe fuch a transfer ; and the citizens 
 of all ftates either glory in this transfer as their birth- 
 right, or acquiefce in the fuppohtion of its having 
 taken place. 
 
 Sch. 1. — The doctrine of divine right ftill has its abettors in 
 feveral parts of Europe, among proteftants as well as 
 among others, and may be considered as a relic of politi- 
 cal fu perdition. 
 
 Sch. 2. — So much is certain, that government is neceffary for 
 human happinefs, and thus far dependent on the will of 
 God, as it is inftituted and adminiftered in confiftency 
 with the dictates of natural law, and is confequently con- 
 ducive to the advancement of human happinefs. 
 
 The different forms of government refult from the 
 different modifications of the moral perfon, veiled with 
 the will and power of the civil fociety. 
 
 We mufl beware not to confound with the forms 
 the different qualities of government, refulting from the 
 modifications of the will and power transferred, which 
 may be with various limitations, or without any at all. 
 
 Governments, according to their qualities, are either 
 defpotical, or limited. Limited governments admit of 
 a variety of degrees. 
 
 The 
 
>$qO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The qualities of governments are not eftentially con- 
 necled with their particular forms: defpotifm may- 
 reign in democracies as well as in ariftocracies and 
 monarchies : one government may be more energetic, 
 another more weak : in one may be exercifed the 
 greateft rigour, in another lenity and mildnefs. 
 
 The forms of government are either fimple or mixt. 
 
 The fimple forms are the monarchical^ ariftocratical 
 and democratical. 
 
 The monarchical, where an individual per [on is vett- 
 ed with the will and power of the ftate. 
 
 The ariftocratical, where a certain clafs of citizens 
 are vefted with the right of government. 
 
 The democratical, where the citizens exercife the 
 government by certain public officers appointed by 
 their fuffrages. Such were the ancient republics of 
 Greece, and fome of thefe are to be met with among 
 the cantons of Switzerland. 
 
 The mixt forms of government may refult from the 
 combination of all three, or of two of the fimple forms. 
 Tims the kingdom of Great-Britain conftfts of the 
 king, of the houfe of lords, and of the houfe of com- 
 mons. 
 
 Sch. — There are other ftates of Europe and of Afia which may 
 be adduced as examples of mixt monarchies of the two 
 forms, the monarchical and the ariftocratical ; as, Ger- 
 many, Poland, &c. 
 
 Reprefentative governments are, where the mo- 
 narchical, the ariftocratical and democratical powers are 
 diftributed. Inftances of thefe we have in the general 
 government of the United States, and alfo in almoft 
 ail the individual governments of thofe ftates. With 
 
 refpecl 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 39 1 
 
 refpedl: to the former, the office of prefident is fimilar 
 to that of the king ; the fenate correfpond with the 
 houfe of lords, and the houfe of reprefentatives has 
 the refemblance of the houfe of commons •, with this 
 difference, that as there is no hereditary prerogative in 
 either of the former branches of the American govern - 
 ment, but all their dignity proceeds from the fufTrages 
 of a free and independent people ; fo the third branch 
 is not the nominal, but the true reprefentative body 
 of the people ; becaufe, chofen by biennial general 
 elections, they immediately depend upon the ballots of 
 the freeholders. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Qf the powers of government , and the dtftribation of them 
 in mixt governments. 
 
 A 
 
 .LL the rights of fovereignty in a ftate have re- 
 ference either to the right to make laws for the pur- 
 pofes and exigencies of its government — to the right 
 to apply thofe laws to particular cafes and perfbns, or to 
 the right to put them and the decisions in confequence 
 of them into execution. 
 
 Thefe three diftincl: rights have obtained the name 
 of the three powers of government, the kgijlaiive y the 
 judicial^ and the executive. 
 
 In defpotical governments and in ftricT: monarchies, 
 as in RuMia, Pruffia, &c. thefe powers are infeparabiy 
 connecled with and refide in the individual perfon who 
 is at the head of the government. The monarch is 
 the lawgiver; he appoint- the judges, whofe decifion 
 
 ultimately 
 
392 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ultimately depends upon his ratification; and he is 
 iinally the fole moral caufe that puts the laws and thofe 
 decifions in confequence of them which meet his ap- 
 probation, into execution. 
 
 The confequence is, that his will and pleafure is the 
 fupreme law of the land, upon which the liberty, life 
 and property of the citizen depend. 
 
 Though in limited monarchies, or in ariftocratic 
 governments of the ftrict kind, thefe rights are gene- 
 rally limited and determined by exprefs or fuppofed 
 fundamental laws, yet there is little fecurity for the 
 liberty of the citizens, fince the interpretation of thofe 
 laws, the decifions in confequence thereof, and the ex- 
 ecution of fuch decifions, are in one perfon, or in a 
 particular fet of perfons, who might find it convenient 
 to have an intereft different from that of the people. 
 
 In mixt governments, thefe powers are not only de- 
 termined and defined by fundamental laws and confti- 
 tutions, but they are diftributed among feveral branches 
 of the government, and thus certain checks are pro- 
 vided upon one another, fo that thefe powers are 
 lodged, in diflincl bodies of men, as independent of one 
 another as the conftitution directs and ordains. 
 
 The distribution of the powers of government ad- 
 mits of various modifications, which are beft learnt 
 trom the conftitutions of different countries. 
 
 In the government of the United States, the legi- 
 flative power is lodged in a houfe of reprefentatives, 
 in a fenate, and in the executive, who has, under cer- 
 tain reiiriclions, a negative'upon all bills which he does 
 not approve, but, ex officio, gives fanction of law to 
 all approved bills by the great feal and his fignature. 
 
 The 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 393 
 
 The judiciary is an authority independent both of 
 the legislative and the executive, except that the per- 
 ions exercifing it derive their appointment from thofe 
 two branches. 
 
 The executive, befides giving fandfcion to all laws 
 which have their constitutional quality, appoints, with 
 the confent of the fenate, all officers of government, 
 and exercifes the interior rights of fovereignty, &c. 
 
 However, left the executive abufe this power of 
 eminent fovereignty which invefts him with the right 
 to fanction public laws and put a negative on bills pre- 
 fented, provifion is made, by which bills may become 
 laws without his confent, to wit, when two thirds of the 
 members perfift in their determination, &c. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Of the fundamental law of the ftate, and the public 
 meetings of the people, together with the modes of de- 
 liberation, 
 
 1HE fundamental law whereby the distribution 
 and exercife of the fovereign power of a ftate is regu- 
 lated, and its mode of government in all its parts or- 
 ganized, is ftiled the confiitution of the ftate. 
 
 Since the powers of a ftate are indifTolubly connected 
 with the will of its citizens, in regard of its flrft caufe 
 and origin, it is evident, that the civil fociety, in its 
 collective or reprefentative capacity, has the exclufive 
 right to make or to alter its conftitution. 
 
 E e e When 
 
394 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.. 
 
 When the members of civil fociety, in their collective 
 or reprefentative capacity, meet for extraordinary pub- 
 lic tranfa&ions, which relate to the fundamental law of 
 the. ftate, they are faid to meet in convention. 
 
 The civil fociety is in its collective capacity ', when, 
 on general notice being given, its members meet in 
 perfon. Of fuch as do not meet, a tacit confent is 
 prefumed to all that has been agreed upon by the ma- 
 jority met. 
 
 Sch. i. — In ancient republics, which were frequently confined 
 to cities, with a fmall territory circumjacent, the meetings 
 of the people were of the collective kind; at leaft fuch 
 cities took the lead, if they did not afTume the right of 
 being the fole conftituents of the popular aflemblies. 
 
 Sch. 2. — As iuch cities and the limited territories around them 
 had formed republican governments, a mi (taken notion 
 has taken place, that republican governments were only 
 calculated for fmall ftates, but entirely incompetent to 
 the exigencies of large empires. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Since the invention of the art of printing, the means 
 of information have been multiplied, and the communi- 
 cation of fentiments rendered ealy through an extent of 
 territory that would have been impracticable in former 
 times. 
 
 Sch. 4. — It is on this account that, notwithftanding many 
 abufes, the liberty of the prefs muft be confidered a pub- 
 lic bleflins!'. 
 
 Befides thefe great advantages, we ought to confider 
 the reprefentative capacity of the people as a vaft im- 
 provement in the art of government •> as, by means 
 thereof, the moft extenfive countries may be wonder- 
 fully concentrated, and their public concerns fubmitted 
 to the collected wifdom of thofe who are confidered as 
 the wifeft and beft men of the flate, becaufe they arc 
 chofen by and from the general mafs of the citizens. 
 
 Sch. 1. — Happy that flate in which citizens have franchifes fo 
 
 eminently 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 395 
 
 eminently great, that the government is founded in their 
 own choice, and that frequent elections of their repre- 
 fentatives and officers of government put it in their power 
 to correal the evil effects of a miftaken choice: but only 
 happy and likely to continue fo, if they endeavour to 
 keep elections, the fountain of public power, pure and 
 nndefiled; fo that the queflion is, who is the man bell 
 qualified for the poft — not the man of party or connec- 
 tions ! 
 St//. 2. — Is it necefiary to invite free citizens to a careful ufe 
 of thefe great and ineflimable rights ? Is it pardonable to 
 neglect them? Should a free citizen, as long as he can 
 exercife this right, neglect any opportunity to do it freely, 
 impartially, unbiafled by party zeal, and firmly determin- 
 ed to take the fide of the virtuous and honeft candidate? 
 
 ScL 3. — If the fountain is not pure, what can we expect of the 
 rivulets proceeding from it? 
 
 When perfons, chofen by a majority of voters who 
 have duly met in their collective capacity, afiemble for 
 tht difpatch of the public concerns of the ftate, they 
 are called the reprefentatives of the people : what is 
 done by them, or by a majority of them, is reckoned 
 to be done by the whole people in their reprefentative 
 capacity, and is confequently binding on the whole 
 ftate. 
 
 If the constitution determines what particular num- 
 ber of perfons may proceed to public bufinefs, that 
 number is called a quorum. 
 
 When, upon due notification, a quorum has met, 
 they may proceed to bufinefs. 
 
 In reprefentative or republican governments, as well 
 as in ariftocracies, if any thing is determined, it will be 
 by unanimous confent or by a majority. 
 
 Where unanimous confent is necefiary, hardly any 
 thing can be concluded, at lcaft the felicity of the fo- 
 ci etv 
 
396 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ciety is to the utmofr. precarious : this is the cafe with 
 
 the government of Poland. 
 
 Sc/i. — Though necefTary unanimity in public proceedings ge- 
 nerally defeats all attempts to do what is advantageous for 
 the people, yet fuch unanimity is the moft eligible defi- 
 rleratum in all cafes where evil is to be dreaded from the 
 exercife of public powers intruded to the hands of frail 
 men. 
 
 The greateft excellence of the Britiih laws confifts in this 
 particular, that no accufed perfon can be condemned 
 except by the unanimous confent of his peers. The trial 
 by jury and the liberty of the prefs are therefore juftly 
 reckoned prerogatives of free citizens, worthy to be hand- 
 ed down unimpaired to the lateft pofterity. 
 
 It is therefore wifely provided in the conftitutions 
 of governments, that a majority determine. 
 
 In a monarchy, all depends upon the directions of 
 the monarch. 
 
 ScJl — It is to be obferred, that the titles king, empercr, 8cc. an 
 not perfeflly fynont7nous with the term monarch : there are 
 kings and emperors who are reftricled by conftitutions 
 and laws, and far from being monarchs; for inflance, 
 the king of Great-Britain, the emperor of Germany. — 
 Kuiiia and Pruffia are, what France formerly was, mo- 
 narchies of the ftrift kind. 
 
 Confederated flates are fuch as are 'united together, 
 by mutual confent, for the purpofe of mutual defence, 
 forming a common intereft in conducting fuch de- 
 fence, in cafe any of the confederation mould fuffer an 
 aggrelTion •, for inflance, the cantons of Switzerland, 
 and the United States of North-America before the 
 adoption of the new conftitution. 
 
 It is by this conftitution that the United States are 
 confolidated into one general government, fo that the 
 individual flates retain all thofe rights of fovcreignty 
 which relate to their internal government, whilft the 
 
 rights 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 397 
 
 rights of national fovereignty are transferred to the 
 government of the union. ♦ 
 
 Governments are varioufly limited, by compact, by 
 exprefs or fuppofed conftitutions. 
 
 Thofe which are not limited by fundamental laws 
 are limited by nature-, for fovereignty flows from the 
 right of government, and the public good is the ulti- 
 rnate end of this right -, therefore, any right aflumed and 
 exercifed contrary to public good, is inconftftent with 
 the law of nature, the dignity of man, and the majeftic 
 will of God. 
 
 Defpotifm is confequently repugnant to the principles 
 of natural law, a monftrous abufe of power in what- 
 ever government it may takie place. 
 
 We mall wave the queftion, Which form of govern- 
 ment is beft calculated for the advancement of public 
 happinefs ? becaufe it is obvious, that cuftoms beget 
 habits, and that what has become habitual feems moft 
 natural, and of confequence muft be moft pleafing. As 
 a father is fondeft of his own children, fo it is natural 
 that a perfon is beft pleafed with his own country and 
 its government-, and in either of thefe cafes arguments 
 have little weight. 
 
 But, that writers on morality continue to fancy a 
 difference of character naturally more fit for this or 
 that fort of government, is juftly matter of furprife; 
 for, human nature cannot change, and that needs muft 
 be belt, which beft advances man's improvement in 
 wifdom, goodnefs and happinefs. Let it be obferved, 
 that governments intended for the regulation of hu- 
 man conduct: muft be limited — that of the limited go- 
 vernments, the mixt are moft fuitable to the moral na- 
 ture 
 
|8 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hire of roaiij and more favourable to liberty than any 
 fimple form — that thofe citizens are free indeed, who 
 have both the direct and the indirect choice of their 
 rulers — that free citizens will continue to enjoy this 
 bleiiing, and will doubtlefs deliver it as an indefeafable 
 patrimony to their pofterity, who, it is to be hoped, 
 will be careful to make a wife and good ufe of their 
 ineftimable rights, in order to tranfmit them from ge- 
 neration to generation, inviolate and unimpaired. 
 
 Much depends upon a juft- and wife adminiftration : 
 a government well adminiftered may and ought to be 
 a public bleffing : but to fecure this effect, great care, 
 prudence, moderation, watchfulnefs, firmnefs, perfeve- 
 rance, &c. are required on the part of the rulers. 
 Things which have but a remote influence on public 
 happinefs muff not be neglected : the duties of huma- 
 nity ought to go hand in hand with the mofr. faithful 
 performance of the public duties of their refpeclive 
 ffations : what may tend to prevent or to relieve po- 
 verty and diffrefs — what may render domeftic life juft 
 and happy — what may ferve to diffufe a fpirit of indus- 
 try and ceconomy throughout all orders and conditions 
 of the citizens — what may lead to the promotion of the 
 caufe of virtue, and ferve as incentives to a faithful dis- 
 charge of the duties to God, to themfelves and to their 
 fellow citizens, — ought to be amOngft the firft concerns 
 of a government towards the people ; becaufe, for 
 thefa ends the Sovereign is veiled with Such ample, jfuch 
 important rights over the community. 
 
 The education of youth, that great and important 
 object of the lefs Societies, calls for the moii felicitous 
 care on the part of the fathers of countries, and ought 
 
 to 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2QQ 
 
 to engage their attention more than the difciplining of 
 citizens for the eventual defence of the country. 
 
 It is to government, whatever its form may be, that 
 citizens have a right to look up for relief and redrcfs, 
 for juftice, protection and public happinefs. 
 
 Whatever the form of government may be, fo much 
 is certain, that its power to do good is unlimited. Thofe 
 who exercife that right to this end deferve the name of 
 great and good men ;, fuch are fathers of their country, 
 and a public bleifing. 
 
 In conflltuting and eftablifhing the limits of govern- 
 ment and the fubfequent administration thereof, fcvo 
 extremes mull be avoided : — If too much power be 
 lodged in any particular branch of government, parti- 
 cularly in the executive, it may materially affect the 
 liberty of the people -, if too little, the internal peace 
 of the ftate, its fafety, external fecurity and refpectabi- 
 lity abroad, mult, become unliable and precarious. 
 
 Much, therefore, is requifite, indeed more than hu- 
 man wiidom can forefee, for fecuring permanent gooci- 
 nefs in a government, however well eftabliihed. — 
 Standing armies are fo far from being a mean for public 
 happinefs, even in the hands of the bell governors, 
 that in fome cafes they may be considered as the bane 
 of civil happinefs, and in other refpects bear the com- 
 plexion of a necefFary political evil, as, like all publi- 
 cans in a ftate, they muft fupply the want of public 
 virtue on the part of the citizens. 
 
 If citizens would be faithful to their public obliga- 
 tions, if they would not often place their private in- 
 tereft in the counteracting public good, if they would 
 ftudy public honefty more than is generally the Cafe, — • 
 
400 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the government would not have caufe to create an hoft 
 of dependents, and the public would not be peftered 
 with the irkfome attendance of inquifitorial vifitants, 
 who might be more ufefully employed. 
 
 We conclude with this obfervation, that the citizens 
 of the United States have caufe to glory in their free 
 constitutions : if they are fupine in making the beft, 
 that is to fay, a virtuous ufe of their rights, if they are 
 dilatory or neglectful in the performance of all thofe 
 duties which the public good requires, the leaft that 
 can be faid is^ that they fin againft themfelves — a fin 
 which, if not the moft unpardonable, is certainly the 
 mof!: unnatural. 
 
 PART 
 
PART III. 
 
 Of the univerfal Law of Nations. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the univerfal principles of the law of nations and the 
 general rights of national independence, 
 
 A HERE are ftates which have in themfelves that 
 fovereignty by which they provide for their refpecta- 
 bility and external fecurity, and correct or repel in- 
 croachments and injuries which might be meditated 
 or attempted againft their fafety by other civil focieties : 
 —There are others again, which make their external 
 fecurity a common intereft with fome other ftates, by- 
 way of confederation-, whilft there are alfo fuch as 
 aflbciate for that purpofe, under a common General 
 government. In the firft cafe, the national concerns 
 of the people are directed by the immediate govern- 
 ment of the ftate ; in the fecond, the rights of external, 
 fovereignty are exercifed by an afTembly of the confe- 
 derated bodies politic ; in the Iftft, the national fove- 
 reignty is lodged in a general government. 
 
 Sd. — In the firft cafe, the ftate itfelf is a nation; as, France 
 Ruffia, Sweden, Venice, Genoa, &c. In the fecond, the 
 confederation bears the character of the nation ; as the 
 States General of the Seven United Provinces of the Ne- 
 therlands, and the Helvetic body, or the afTembly of the 
 cantons of Switzerland, &c. In the laft, the general go- 
 vernment reprefents the nation and tranfacb the national 
 F f f affairs 
 
402 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 affairs of thofe ftates which have formed the political 
 union ; for inftance, the German, empire, Great-Britain, 
 and the general government of the United States of North- 
 America. 
 
 A (late, or a confederation or an anociation of ftates 
 vefted with the external fovereignty requisite for felf- 
 defence, have place among the nations of the earth. 
 
 A nation is therefore iimply defined to be a ftate 
 externally or abfolutely independent ; that is to fay, not 
 fubjccl to the authority, controul, or government of 
 any other body politic. 
 
 Sch. i. — It has been already obferved, that the external or ab- 
 folute independence of dates conftitutes their national 
 ,chara6ter. Nations may be different in many refpects, 
 for inftance, in that of the form or the quality of govern- 
 ment, of the extent and fituation of territory, and of 
 . various, other relations; but all fuch things relate to their 
 political character foiely, and do not in the leaf! affect 
 their national independence. 
 
 Sen. 2. — Hiftory furnifh.es us with inflances of nations which 
 have loft their national character. There are ftates which, 
 for the fake of finding greater fecurity in a confederation 
 or in an aifociation, have transferred their national right: 
 and we have recent inftances of ftates which havefhakert 
 off their former dependence and made themfelves abfo- 
 lutely independent. 
 
 Sc/i. 3.- — Nations, in fhort, have their changes and viciflitudes, 
 which are obvious evidences of the fupreme government 
 of Divine Providence over the affairs of the children of 
 men. They have their rife, progrefs, full growth, — -be- 
 come ftationarv, — decline and fall into ruin. Witnefs the 
 Affyrian, the Perfian and the Greek monarchies; witnefs 
 the mighty Roman empire, &c. 
 
 Since abfoiute or national independence excludes all 
 idea of fubjection or fubordination it follows, that no 
 inferiority orfuperiority can take place among nations. 
 
 From this it immediately follows, that nations have 
 
 no 
 
moral philosophy; 402 
 
 no perfect affirmative right in one another •, that is to 
 fay, they are not in a focial, but in a natural ftate. 
 
 The natural ftate of nations is abfolute when they 
 are confidered in themfelves, but becomes hypothetical 
 when they are confidered under certain circumftances. 
 
 Nations, contemplated in their abfolute natural ftate, 
 have equal rights, becaufe they have the fame nature, 
 and are equally independent of any authority on earth. 
 
 From this it follows, that when the circumftances 
 of nations differ, their rights may differ •, but when 
 they are under the fame circumftances, their hypo- 
 thetical natural rights will be the fame. 
 
 Hence it follows, that nations live ina ftate of abfo- 
 lute equality, or in a ftate of natural liberty. 
 
 Sch. — What is permitted in one is alfo permitted in another; 
 each nation may do what it pleafes, provided it commits 
 no injury to another, or breaks not through a public 
 engagement, or does not commit what among nations is 
 reckoned injurious. 
 
 No laws, therefore, will apply to the affairs of na- 
 tions but thofe which flow from the nature of abfolute 
 independence, or fuch as they confent to by conven- 
 tional agreement, or thofe which reft upon the cuftom^ 
 and ufages followed by civilized nations. Cuftoms 
 among nations may be confidered as rules for national 
 conduct, which have the force of conventions refult- 
 ing from tacit or conftructive confent. 
 
 Sch. i. — Hence we may fee the propriety of the diftinftion 
 of the law of nations into natural and cufotnary. It is 
 true, authors have added- a third kind of national law, 
 which they call conventional ; but that diftinction may be 
 confidered as unneceflary, fince both the natural and the 
 cuftomary laws confpire in regulating the conduct of 
 nations, with regard to the treaties or conventions which 
 £ubfift or are fuppofed to iubfift between them. 
 
 Scki . 
 
404 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. 2. — However, as it is not our defign to enter into the 
 irkfome and extenfive field of national affairs, as they 
 are de faflo conduced by the nations of the earth, and as 
 we confine ourfelves to thofe urtiverfal natural principles 
 which fliew what nations ought to do; we fhall wave an 
 explanation of the various conventions which have, or 
 are fuppofed to have taken place between them, and 
 attend folely to what is called the immutable and univerfal 
 natural law of nations. 
 
 Since nations are by their nature absolutely inde- 
 pendent of any controul, it follows, that they may 
 direct this their independence to their own perfection 
 as they think proper; that is to fay, they may claim 
 the right of equality as their own by nature* 
 
 A nation, therefore, that is difturbed in the exer- 
 cife of its natural right of equality, is injured. 
 
 We may confequently Jay down as the fundamental 
 laWy by which all national concerns are to be regulat- 
 ed, this proportion: nations must act so that 
 
 THEY COMMIT NOTHING WHEREBY THE RIGHT OF 
 THE NATIONAL EQUALITY OF OTHERS IS DISTURBED 
 OR INFRINGED. 
 
 Sch. i. — Actions by which the natural right of equality is 
 infringed, amount to national injuries, and are juft caufes 
 for national defence and war. 
 
 Sch. i. — Actions by which the natural equality is deftroyed, 
 deprive a ftate of its national character and dignity. 
 
 Sch. 3.— -Such actions may take place either from choice or 
 neceflity. The former is the cafe if ftates enter into a 
 national confederation with other ftates, or form a na- 
 tional union under a general government; the latter is 
 generally the effect of conqueft. 
 
 The right of natural equality to which a nation is 
 entitled by nature, implies all other rights with which 
 it is or may be vetted by lawful acquifition ; becaufe 
 the latter are lawful property, and it is a hypothetical 
 
 natural 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 405 
 
 natural right that the lawful acquirer or poiTeflbr 
 mould have the exclufive right of his acquisitions 
 and poflefilons. 
 
 Hence it follows, that the fundamental law of nations 
 refts immediately upon the two principles of perfect 
 laws, which, as has been heretofore explained, com- 
 mand men to give every one his own, and carefully to 
 abftain from doing an injury to any perfon whatever. 
 
 Sch. — Behold the two infallible criteria by which the conduct, 
 the conventions and cuftoms of nations are to be eftimat- 
 ed! The fame univerfal principles which direct the ac- 
 tions of individuals, are the bafis and foundation of politi- 
 cal and national reflitude, the greatejl glory to which flates 
 or nations can or ought to afpire. 
 
 As it is a fundamental law, according to which na- 
 tions muft regulate their conduct with refpect to one 
 another, that they mould give every one its own, and 
 abftain from committing injuries \ it is necefTary, that 
 nations mould know one another ; for without this 
 knowledge, thefe duties cannot be fatisfied. 
 
 The important queftion therefore obtrudes itfelf, 
 Who is the nation ? 
 
 In order to determine this queftion with precifion, 
 it is neceflary that we diftinguim certain fituations and 
 circumftances, which have reference to the political and 
 internal character of nations. 
 
 If refpect is had to their original and eflential na- 
 tional fovereignty, we anfwer, the people are the na- 
 tion, the fource and the fum of all national power and 
 fovereignty. 
 
 But if the people are under a regular national go- 
 vernment, we anfwer, the government, whatever 
 its form or quality may be, is the nation^ and exchtfively 
 
 vefted 
 
406 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1 eft ed with the national rights of fiver eignty, fo far thaf 
 ?w aft can be confidered as national, which cannot be con- 
 templated as an atlion of which the national governmetit 
 is in fome manner or other the moral caufe. Vide page 
 84 and 85. 
 
 Sch. — Let it be obferved, that in a treatife on the law of na- 
 tions, all public rights and obligations are taken as im- 
 mediately affecting the national rulers or governors: fo 
 that in this treatife ive take the rulers or the government for ike 
 71 at ion. 
 
 However, if the government and the people are fo 
 far at variance that a majority have declared againft the 
 former, an anfwer to the before mentioned queftion is 
 difficult. If other nations cannot fufpend a determi- 
 nation on this point, which they ought to do, if polTi- 
 ble, in order to keep themfelves fafe and to avoid all 
 interference with the internal affairs of a nation, then 
 thev ought to confider the ruling power as the na- 
 tion-, becaufe it mud be fuppofed that thofe who rule 
 are fupported by the majority of the people, in whom 
 the fupreme power is originally founded. 
 
 Sch. 1. — However juft this manner of reafoning may be, and 
 however much it would conduce to the happinefs of man- 
 kind, if nations would refpecl it fo far as to obferve that 
 forbearance which national duties as well as the duties of 
 humanity impofe upon them; ftill the fad experience of 
 all ages has evinced, that this important queftion con- 
 cerning national conduct towards a neighbouring nation 
 when fallen into a ftate of commotion, has never had a 
 fair difcuffion, or even a hearing, before the tribunal of 
 reafon, but always, like the Gordian knot, has been de- 
 cided by the fword, the ultima ratio regum. 
 
 Sch. 2. — If natural governments have their powers from the 
 people, it is a ilrange phenomenon indeed to fee this 
 power exercifed to their deftruction, by the very hand 
 that ought to protect their rights, their liberties, their lives 
 and their property ! To fee a nation at variance with 
 
 itfclf 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 407 
 
 itfelf is a pitiful afpect, and its concomitant circumflan- 
 ces and effects are horrid and dreadful. 
 
 Sch. 3. — It is therefore a matter of furpriie, that national go- 
 vernments fo far forget their rights and duties as to make 
 nfe of that power which is given them for the protection 
 of their refpectire nations, to augment the calamities of 
 another nation, by unjuft interference in what are its own 
 concerns. 
 
 Sch. 4. — Were it not a fact often eftablifhed by experience, we 
 fhould hardly think it poflible for a people, in fuch ca- 
 fes, to fuffer their rulers to abufe the delegated powers by 
 applying them to fuch horrid purpofes. Strange, that 2 
 people can be fo far intoxicated as to bring the treafure 
 of the nation and the blood of their fellow citizens fa- 
 crifices at the fhrine of inhuman ambition and unnatural 
 injuftice, for the deflruction of the deareft rights of hu- 
 manity ! 
 
 Sell. 5. — This queftion is important with refpect to the internal 
 good government of the ftate or nation, and deferves the 
 moft ferious confideration both of the rulers and ruled, 
 that each party be faithful in the performance of their 
 refpective public duties. Paffion indeed will not give a 
 rational decilion : the democrat and the ariftocrat of the 
 prefent day are pre-determined not to agree. But unpre- 
 judiced reafon willingly declares for government, as long 
 as the conftitution is the invariable rule for conducting 
 its adminiftration, and as long as the rights of the people 
 continue to be held facred and inviolate. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the duties of nations in general. 
 
 T, 
 
 HERE is no doubt but nations, that is, the ru- 
 lers of ftates and nations, are moft facred iv bound to 
 the performance of all thofe natural duties which re- 
 fult from the nature of civil focieties veiled with na- 
 tional 
 
408 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tional independence •, for they are bound to regulate 
 their conduct in perfect conformity to the precepts 
 and prohibitions of the natural law. 
 
 Since all natural duties may be diftinguilhed into 
 commiilive and omiffive, into perfect and imperfect, 
 and into duties to God, to ourfelves and to others, 
 it follows, that the duties incumbent upon the rulers 
 of ftates and nations are either commiflive or omif- 
 five, perfect or imperfect, duties they owe to God, to 
 themfelves, and to other nations. 
 
 Sch. i. — The duties which nations or ftates, that is, their go- 
 vernments, owe to God, concern the caufe of religion 
 and public worfhip. 
 
 Sch. 2. — The duties which they owe themfelves are either of 
 a political or national nature, or both alike. The firfl 
 have reference to thofe public obligations under which 
 rulers are to promote the internal happinefs of a nation; 
 the fecond relate to its external fecurity ; the laft com- 
 prehend all that concerns both internal and external fe- 
 curitv; for inftance, laws for promoting the internal 
 peace and preventing injuries again ft foreigners; like- 
 wife, the placing of citizens in a proper ftate of defence 
 for quelling an infurreclion, as well as for preventing or 
 repelling an invafion. Hence we difcover the propriety 
 of referving the fubje<5t of the political duties of the rulers 
 of ftates for the law of nations, becaufe a repetition of 
 the fame duties may be avoided thereby, and thofe which 
 are folely national are brought to their proper place. 
 
 Sch. 3. — The duties which nations owe one another folely 
 concern national governments, and conftitute what in the 
 fubftance of the term is called the laiv of nations. 
 
 The nature of things requires, that a material dif- 
 ference be obferved with refpect to the political and 
 national duties of the public rulers, as fuch, and thofe 
 which are incumbent on them as individuals, or as 
 members of any of the lefTer focieties. 
 
 This 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 4O9 
 
 This diftinction is more efpecially neceflary, becaufe 
 men in an elevated public ftation forget that they are 
 tinder the fame obligations to perform their duties to 
 God, to their families, <kc. as devoutly and fincerely as 
 the meaner! of their fubjects are held to perform theirs. 
 
 Before the tribunal of God, and in the forum of na- 
 ture, emperors, kings and nobles are but men •, there 
 is no diftinction but this, that they will be judged accord- 
 ing to the faithfulnefs with which they have performed 
 more extenfive duties than fall to the lot of other men. 
 Their Ration is high, but there is no real caufe to envy 
 it, becaufe their duty and their refponfibility are great. 
 To whom much is given, of him much will be required,. 
 
 This thought, and the incontrovertible experience 
 that kings die like other men, feem to be fufficient 
 caufes why they mould fortify their breafts againft the. 
 infmuating poifon of flattery. 
 
 Referring, therefore, the rulers of the earth, in their 
 perfonal capacity, to the beft fyftem of ethics — the fa- 
 cred precepts of the Bible, — we proceed to treat of their 
 public duties, or that line of public conduct: which they 
 ought to obferve in the adminiftration of the powers 
 entrufted to them for the good of mankind. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the duties of the rulers of ftates and nations with re- 
 fpeft to religion and public worfhip. 
 
 Q 
 
 OINv^E religion is the glory of human nature, and 
 the duty to glorify God incumbent on all men, it fol- 
 
 Goff lows. 
 
4IO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lows, that the rulers of ftates and nations ought to 
 direct the public powers entrufted to their care for the 
 promotion of all that has a beneficial and necerTary in- 
 fluence on the advancement of the caufe of vital reli- 
 gion, of piety and virtue, whereby the citizens may be 
 incited to take motives for their moral actions from the 
 holy ways and perfections of God, fo that the whole 
 nation may be united in a fincere defire to glorify their 
 Creator, the Supreme Ruler and Governor of the uni- 
 verfe. 
 
 As God cannot be glorified if we take not motives 
 for our conduct from the perfections of the Deity, it 
 follows, that the rulers of ftates and nations mud them- 
 felves be actuated with an indefatigable defire to conduct 
 their public administration of government in conformi- 
 ty to the ways and perfections of the Moft High. 
 
 Thus the nations of the earth will be led in the beft 
 
 and moft forcible manner to glorify God, if their rulers 
 
 ht them the auguft and confpicuous example. 
 
 Sck. i. — Directions which are not necefiary for promoting the 
 glory of God can feldom have a beneficial influence on the 
 caufe of piety and virtue, and are unbecoming a wife and 
 good government: the leaft that can be faid of them is, 
 
 too * 
 
 that they are an idle ftretch of public authority. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Such as militate againft the caufe of vital religion, 
 virtue and true piety, are oppofed to the manifestation of 
 the glory of God, and an abufe of fovereignty as wanton 
 as it is reprehenfible. 
 
 Sch. 3. — How careful, therefore, mould governments be, that 
 their public proceedings may be no obftacle to fo great 
 and good a caufe ! How folicitous, on the other hand, 
 to do all in their power for its protection and advance- 
 ment! 
 
 Governments act contrary to their public duties, 
 -when they apply violent means, or refort to other 
 
 unlawful 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 411 
 
 unlawful methods for hindering any of their citizens 
 in the free enjoyment of that religion which they think 
 belt, calculated for promoting the glory of God and 
 their own happinefs : for, that government certainly 
 does not glorify God which affumes a power to judge 
 the confciences of men, and thus impioufly ufurps what 
 is the fole right of God. He, the More. High, who 
 will not give his glory to another, cannot be glorified by 
 ads of public injuftice and violent opprerTion. Such 
 proceedings in rulers cannot be juftified on any account-, 
 for, befides the juft mentioned weighty arguments, 
 they openly revolt againft the very nature and fcope of 
 civil fociety : neither is any fociety naturally lawful, 
 if the members thereof are deprived of their indefeafa- 
 ble natural rights of conducting themfelves as free and 
 moral agents, refponfible in all their actions to their 
 Maker. No lawful fociety requires a facrince of that 
 nature; and any fociety which requires it, is unnatural 
 and more than tyrannical. 
 
 It is therefore an indifpenfible duty which the go- 
 vernors of ftates and nations owe to God, that they 
 protect the citizens in the undifiurbed, enjoyment of 
 their religion. 
 
 It is a queftion varioufly agitated among authors on 
 the law of nations, how far that protection extends, 
 with refpect to the free exercife of public worfhip — 
 whether one, two or three religious profeflions are ex- 
 clufively entitled to that privilege in preference and 
 perhaps to the prejudice of all others ? , 
 
 Here is pre-fuppofed, which eafily flows from the 
 nature of things, that a certain day ought to be fet apart 
 for public worfhip— a day of reft, where each citizen is 
 under public obligation to abftain from labour or *di- 
 
 verfions, 
 
412 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 verfions, whereby the public worftiip may be inter- 
 rupted or difturbed. 
 
 Sch. i. — The firft day of the week has continued to be this 
 public day among all the profeflbrs of Chriftianity from 
 the refurrection of* Chrifl to the prefent time. The 
 French only have of late broke through that general con- 
 formity, altering times and feafons with an enthufiafm 
 equal to that with which they changed their old form of 
 government. It is to be hoped, that, when that nation; 
 is left to think for themfelves, they will return from the; 
 extravagance of irreligion, and fee the vaft difference be- 
 tween true religion and ftupid fuperftition, which for % 
 long time has darkened their horizon, fo that it is no 
 wonder they cannot fee the light of real truth and tafte 
 the fweets of pure, heaven-born religion. 
 
 Sck. 2. — The Jews adhere to the feventh day of the week as a 
 day of reft, fet apart by the Creator, to be kept holy by 
 attending to the concerns of their fouls and eternity. 
 
 If, then, in a Chriitian country, that is, in a ftate or 
 nation where the majority of the citizens profefs Chrif- 
 tianity, the various feels and profefTions of that religion 
 refpeclively attend public worihip after that mode 
 which each of them think beft, they certainly will not 
 interfere with refpedi: to time, as this is the fame among 
 all denominations of Chriftians : neither can any inter- 
 ference take place in the exercife of public worfhip, 
 iince, in truth, this becomes the more public in pro- 
 portion to the numbers which participate thereof, and 
 then deferves to be called national, when no citizens are 
 excluded from the exercife of folemn worfhip who can 
 porTibly be partakers thereof. 
 
 To give any particular perfuafion the exclufive right 
 of public worfhip in preference and to the prejudice of 
 others who have adopted a different mode, in cafes 
 where no interference with public worfhip or public 
 good takes place, is fo far from being neceflary or na- 
 turally 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 413 
 
 turaily lawful, that, on the contrarv, it is a wanton 
 abufe of power, and an error the more fatal, as it has 
 the fanclion of the majority of the Rate or nation for 
 its fupport. 
 
 Sch. — Eftabliftiments, as they are to be met with in the Euro- 
 pean and Aiiatic countries, as they are generally managed, 
 muft be confidered as relics of political fuperftition, or 
 as meafures which the blind enthufiafm and party zeal of 
 fuperftitious ignorance and bigotted violence have pro- 
 voked as means neceftary to curb the power and influence 
 of a party inimical to public good, or to defend the na- 
 tion againft foreign machinations and intrigues fubver- 
 five of its government. 
 
 Whilft we lament that religious eftablifhments have 
 ever taken place, we cannot but rejoice that the United 
 States of North-America, and the happy concord 
 among the citizens thereof, exhibit a confpicuous ar- 
 gument againft all exclufive rights unfriendly to any 
 profefTor of religion whatever. — Yes, as a country 
 whereof the generality of the inhabitants are Chriftians 
 of fome denomination or other, the Chriftian fabbath is 
 the eftablifhed day for public reft and for public worfhip. 
 On this day, all denominations of Chriftians worfhip 
 publicly, refort to their houfes of worfhip, approach 
 the throne of the Eternal, each in that mode which 
 appears to them beft. Our ftreets on the public days 
 of worfhip reprefent (and may they ever continue fo to 
 do ! ) the beautiful fight of brethren dwelling in unity. 
 
 Sch. — The Jew celebrates his own fabbath, and labours under 
 no inconvenience except that which arifes from the nature 
 of the civil ftate-— he muft abftain from work out of doors 
 on the Chriftian fabbath, whilft his own is deftitute of the 
 fanction of the laws of the land as a day of reft. 
 
 Where eftablifhments have taken place, and an in- 
 equality has been introduced among citizens, unfriendly 
 
 to 
 
414 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to their civil liberty, it is the duty of rulers to do their 
 utmoft that unneceilary burdens may be done away, and 
 that laws of fuch a nature may be either abrogated, or 
 reftricted in their operation and effects : for of religion 
 it may be faid what Chrift anfvvered before Pilate — My 
 kingdom is not of this world. 
 
 As little as it is confident with the principles of na- 
 ture to opprefs, or unneceffarily to reftrict citizens with 
 refpect to the exercife of their religion, fo little can it 
 be right, that a nation may exile a number of citizens 
 who diflent from what abufe has introduced as the na- 
 tional religion of the land. It is a great queftion, whe- 
 ther any crime or mifdemeanor in a citizen can deferve 
 a punifh merit tantamount to the deprivation of his do- 
 mocile, of his country — to his being torn from his 
 dearer!: connections ? — However this queftion may be 
 ultimately determined, it certainly cannot be a crime to 
 follow the dictates of our own confcience in things which 
 are not repugnant to public good. 
 
 Soh. — Should the ftrange and felfifh ipfe dixit of enthufiafts or 
 hypocrites have fuch an effect with rulers of nations, as 
 that, to fatisfy their pride or intereft, the liberty of the 
 meek and peaceable citizen mufl be made a facrifice, the 
 mo ft ufeful and mod faithful members of fociely banilhed 
 their native country? 
 Glaring as the abfurdity of fuch conduct may be, (till it has 
 been purfued and applauded. The Hugeuots were not 
 Ion* iince a fatal in (lance of this tyrannical abufe of 
 power; and France has loft in them more than all her fo- 
 reign conquefts have been able to compenfate. 
 
 From what has been hitherto explained, it follows, 
 that the different profefTions of religions in a ftate are 
 naturally entitled to more than is exprefTed by the term 
 general toleration. As citizens, they are entitled to the 
 enjoyment of all rights which are confident with the 
 
 public 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 415 
 
 public good, and cannot without injury be confidered 
 
 as outcaits and nuifances, who are merely fufFered to 
 
 enjoy rights to which they have no lawful claim. 
 
 Sck. — There is no doubt but that thoufands would look upoa 
 toleration as a great bleflinor • whilft there are manv who 
 would fain facrifice every thing to efcape the fangs of fpi- 
 ritual tyranny and oppreflion, and to be fufFered to exile 
 themfelves in order to keep their confidences undeflled. 
 
 We return from irkfome political cafuiftry to the 
 general duties which the rulers of dates and nations 
 owe towards the Deity. Their authority is given them 
 for the fole purpofe of promoting the happinefs of the 
 people: they cannot, therefore, remain unconcerned, 
 whether the minds of the people are or are not duly 
 imprefled with reverence for the glory and majefty of 
 the Supreme Ruler of nations: they ought, as far as 
 it is phyfically and morally pofTible, to employ their 
 authority in the purfuit of all proper and juft means for 
 imprefTing the minds of all with a lively fenfe of the 
 necefTity of obeying the laws of God in truth and in 
 iincerity. 
 
 Thofe things which are phyfically pofTible in the 
 hands of government for rendering the performance 
 of duties due to the Deity general among the citizens 
 of ftates or nations, are, on the one hand, the en- 
 couragement of fcienc'e, and the extending the aid of 
 government to fuch inftitutions of learning as ferve as 
 general means for improving the minds of the people 
 in true knowledge, which leads to a conviction that it 
 is neceflary to fear and to obey God — a conviction 
 without which no fervice can be fincere, no worfhip 
 acceptable : on the other hand, a difpofition manifefted 
 in the public proceedings of government, to favour 
 and patronize the virtuous and upright of every per- 
 
 fuaiion, 
 
41 6 • MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fuafion, and an earned defire to recommend the caufe 
 of religion, of virtue, philanthropy and piety, by their 
 ownxonfpicuous examples. 
 
 The power of governments is very great — that of 
 doing good has no bounds : it will therefore be object- 
 ed, that more things are phyfically poffible for enforcing 
 the performance of duties due to the Lord of the 
 univerfe. It is true, compulfory means are phyfically 
 poffible, and in many countries have unfortunately 
 been employed: oppreflions and cruelties have taken 
 place, which are finking monuments of the unfltnefs 
 of men to rule confcience, of their aptnefs to pervert 
 the caufe of God and religion, and of their pronenefs 
 to be feduced by a fpirit of fanaticifm, fuperftition or 
 flubborn infidelity. 
 
 Let it fraud as an incontrovertible political maxim, 
 that God has never entrusted to men his caufe — that no 
 means, however well intended or qualified, are morally 
 poffible, or juft and lawful, which in themfelves are in- 
 confiftent with the idea of religion, repugnant to the 
 dictates of reafon, or contradictory to the firft princi- 
 ples of natural laws. 
 
 How mould government have an authority which 
 men cannot and which God will not grant ? Rulers 
 of ftates and nations, who know any thing concerning 
 their duty to God, do not arrogate, impiouily arrogate 
 to themfelves rights which are the only prerogative of 
 the great Judge of heaven and earth. 
 
 They mav employ their public authority for pre- 
 venting and forbidding notorious prophanenefs, blaf- 
 phemy, and other offences of a horrid and abominable 
 nature, by making them cognizable in the municipal 
 laws of the land. 
 
 Let 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 417 
 
 Let no perfon object to this as an encroachment 
 upon the confciences of men •, for, blafphemy and fome 
 other acts of prophanenefs are actions fo abominable 
 in their nature, fo deftructive in their tendency, that 
 the government, independent of its being a duty to 
 God, would not do jufticeto the nation, nor act con- 
 fidently with the public good, if it mould be remifs in 
 retraining the licentioumefs of the unruly and wicked, 
 by punifhments adequate to the enormity of their of- 
 fences. 
 
 Since perfons who can be guilty of blafphemy and 
 abominable prophanenefs ceafe to couduct themfelves 
 as men, no injuftice is committed when they are arrived 
 at that pitch of wickednefs and folly, if restrictions 
 are impofed upon them for fecuring the tranquility of 
 the date. 
 
 Upon the whole, actions of a wicked nature and 
 dedructive tendency cannot be treated as a matter of 
 confcience; nor have thofe who have diverted them- 
 felves of all fenfe of moral confcience, and bid defiance 
 to common decency, any claim to its facred rights. 
 
 Sch. — However juft and right it is that rulers fet their face 
 againft any thing which is unfavourable to the canfe of 
 religion, and punifh offences of a notorioufly heinous na- 
 ture, ftill great care is neceflary that juftice be not per- 
 verted and fuffered to degenerate into cruelty and perfe- 
 ction. Truth hath been more than once cried down as 
 blafphemy : virtue and innocence cannot always fee lire 
 us againft the ftiafts of flander and defamation. Govern- 
 ments have to take cognizance of overt-adts, which are 
 contradictory to public good : it does not become them, 
 to be partizans with refpeft to particular modes of wor- 
 ship, nor is it fuitable to their ftate to fet up inquifitorial 
 authority. 
 
 The rulers of dates or nations ought to be fenfible,' 
 
 that they are accountable to God for all they do in 
 
 Hhk their 
 
41 3 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 their public capacity — that righleoufnefs exalteth a na- 
 tion, and thatyfo is the reproach of any people. 
 
 As it is a public duty of the ruler* of ftates and na- 
 tions to hinder all that is incompatible with public 
 good, it is evident, that government has not only a 
 juft right, but is in duty bound to check the progrefs 
 of doctrines which are in a direct: manner oppofed to 
 the piefervation of that defirable object. 
 
 Set). — If, for inftance, perfons fbould preach the lawfulness 
 of, or practife promifcuous concubinage; if they ihould 
 teach, that it is not right to fubmit to government, either 
 becaufe it is faid that Chrift has made us free, or becaufe 
 the perfons adminiilering government differ with refpect 
 to religious fentiments and external mode of worfhip, &c, 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the duties which ftates or nations owe themf elves* 
 
 X HE duties which nations owe to themfelves flow- 
 in a manner fo immediately from the firft principle of 
 natural law, that for the idea of man we have only to 
 fubftitute that public infeparable relation which fubfifts 
 between public rulers and the ftates or nations over 
 which they prefide, and draw this general analogical 
 conclufion : c The rulers of nations owe thofe duties in 
 their kind towards the ftates or nations under their 
 controul, which individual men owe to themfelves.' 
 
 At this rate, the flrft duty of the rulers of ftates and 
 nations will be, that they truly love their people, by 
 doing all in their power to render their ftate as happy 
 
 as 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 4T9 
 
 f» poflible. So that the fum of all public duties is the 
 advancement of the intereft of the {late or nation. 
 
 It is therefore an important duty, that the rulers 
 icarn to know what is really interesting to the nation, 
 and carefully diftinguifh realities from the falfe appear- 
 ances of national greatnefs or fplendour. 
 
 The perfection of a nation is very extensive, com- 
 plicate and intricate : the care of the rulers of a nation 
 mult be extended to the perfection of the fouls, the 
 bodies, the external flate and the character of citizens, 
 and more efpecially to the prefervation of the national 
 Independence. 
 
 Befides the protection of the caufe and the encourage- 
 ment of a faithful performance of the duties of piety and 
 virtue on the part of ali orders and conditions of citizens, 
 the rulers ought to furnim them with opportunities and 
 means whereby their underftandings may be improved, 
 that they may obtain knowledge in all things which may 
 influence their domeftic or political happinefs — that 
 they may be relieved from and fortified againft confufion 
 and error, particularly with refpect to what is good or 
 bad, right or wrong — that they may be enabled to dif- 
 tinguifh things of great ufefuinefs from thofe which 
 are of lefs utility, and from fuch as are dangerous, fin- 
 fill, improper or wicked. 
 
 They mufr. endeavour to give the will of the citizens 
 the bert directions for the purfuit of what is really 
 good and virtuous : for this ctnd, the governors of 
 ttates and nations have the right to make and put in 
 execution wholeibme laws, that the good and faithful 
 citizens may be protected and rewarded on the one 
 hand, and on the other wicked perfons deterred from 
 doino: evil. 
 
 It 
 
4-20 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is a public duty of the rulers of ftates and nations, 
 that they ufe the authority given them for the great 
 purpofes of countenancing and promoting all that mav 
 render the people wife, difcreet and virtuous, and of 
 prohibiting whatever has a contrary effect or a perni- 
 cious tendency. 
 
 As inftitutions of learning have generally a falutary 
 efTecl in making men wife and good — behold the im- 
 portant public duties of national rulers to order that 
 fuch inftitutions may be fet on foot and well conducted ! 
 
 Since there is nothing which has a more powerful 
 influence upon the human mind than the hope of im- 
 mortality, the rewards and punimments of another 
 life; it is evident, that it is a very important duty of 
 rulers to hold forth, in all their public proceedings, 
 their fenfibility of their own accountablenefs before 
 God, fo that the citizens may be properly actuated by 
 the force of fo great and good an example. 
 
 The love which the rulers of nations ought to ex- 
 ercife towards their people, implies the mofl: tender 
 care for the prefervation of their lives and health, and 
 the attainment of all things necefTary and convenient 
 for promoting thefe great purpofes. 
 
 All things then necefTary for the fupport of life, for 
 the prefervation of health, and for augmenting natural 
 wealth, are national duties. Rulers are to encourage 
 the arts, agriculture and commerce — to reward the in- 
 duftrious — to provide for the poor and needy — to have 
 a care that the whole body politic may be cemented to- 
 gether by mutual affiftance, and to order things fo that 
 a harmonious co-operation may pervade all clafTes and 
 occupations of the people, that they give one another 
 
 that 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 42 I 
 
 that fupport and vigour which constitute the political 
 life and happinefs of a ftate. 
 
 The whole nation in particular calls for the ftricteft 
 attention on the part of their rulers, to the great duty 
 of political felf-prefervation. 
 
 The life of a body politic or a ftate conftfts in its 
 political union •, that of a nation comprehends, befides 
 that union, all the rights of abfolute independence. 
 
 As the rulers of dates are in duty bound to fecure 
 the community againft infurrections and diforder from 
 within, fo thofe of nations have moreover to be careful 
 that the independence of the nation or any part thereof 
 be not infringed, encroached upon or deftroyed. The 
 lofs of independence is the political annihilation of a 
 nation. 
 
 Whatever clafties with the independence of a nation 
 puts it in a ftate of neceftity, which may be abfolute, 
 extreme, or refpective. Vide page 141. 
 
 In either of thefe ftates, the rulers are in duty bound 
 to ufe all poiTible means to avert the danger and pre- 
 fer ve the independence of the nation. 
 
 Sck. — Hence the rights of defence and war with which rulers 
 are inverted by nature in cafes of neceflity. 
 
 Should rulers find no other remedy left to preferve 
 the independence of the nation than to confent to a 
 difmemberment of the body politic, by giving up a 
 fortification, a town, a province, &c. the ftate of ne- 
 ceftity not only juftifies, but alfo lays the indifpenfible 
 duty upon them to confent to fuch difmemberment. 
 But to alienate provinces or places on any other ac- 
 count is a ftretch of power and a mo ft unnatural and 
 flagrant act of injuftice. 
 
 As 
 
,%2l MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 As national felf-prefervation centers in national in- 
 dependence, it follows, that the rulers of a nation arc 
 in duty bound to be careful that the natural right of 
 abfolute equality be not infulted or infringed by any 
 other nation whatever. 
 
 Sch. i. — It is therefore of fome importance to know to what 
 length government has a right to go in moderation and 
 forbearance, with refpect to infolent treatment on the part 
 of other nations, — fince, by exceeding the juft meafure 
 which prudence and other circumftances dictate, the na- 
 tifc£ may be injured by its own government. 
 
 Sch. %.— x T here there is not perfect equality among nations, 
 independence is but nominal, or to the utmoft precarious. 
 
 This leads to a confederation of the duties of na- 
 tional rulers concerning the character and refpectability 
 of the nation. 
 
 By the character and refpeclability of a nation we 
 understand the favourable opinion of other nations 
 concerning the wifdom and energy of its government, 
 and the riches, ftrength, refources, means of defence, 
 &c. of the ftate, but more particularly the valour and 
 patriotifm of the citizens. 
 
 A nation governed by wifdom, where the public 
 rulers refpect the rights of other nations, and are tena- 
 cious in the maintenance of their own — where agricul- 
 ture and manufactures flourim — where arts and fciences 
 are cultivated — where love of virtue and order prevail 
 — where a fpirit of patriotifm pervades all orders and 
 conditions of men — where the means of defence are 
 provided, and the citizens are able and willing to make 
 life of them — where the public revenue is properly ap- 
 plied, — that people {lands fair to be beloved at home 
 and refpected abroad, and will doubtlefs conciliate the 
 good will of all other nations. 
 
 We 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 423 
 
 We only add, that, as the manners and tafte of a 
 nation have a vaft influence on its profperity, it will be 
 an important duty on the part of government to en- 
 deavour to give them the moft falutary direction, by 
 doing all in their power to inftil in the minds of the 
 people a lively {tnk of true honour. 
 
 Sch. — Since the mod eflentiai duties which nations owe them- 
 felves have been attended to under the head of politics, 
 it may be deemed unnecefiary to enlarge here on any fur- 
 ther explanation of them. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the duties which nations owe one another. 
 
 s 
 
 I N C E the duties which nations owe one another 
 flow from the law of nature, it follows, that they may 
 be diftinguifhed into duties of humanity and of necef- 
 
 fity. 
 
 By the duties of humanity nations are bound to con- 
 
 fider one another as focieties of fellow men — as fo many 
 
 communities of the univerfal fociety of the human 
 
 race, placed under the government of the Moft High, 
 
 and individually as well as collectively bound to obey 
 
 his holy will, in rendering one another as happy as 
 
 pofTible. National rulers, confidered in this light, are 
 
 bound to befriend other nations — to alleviate their dif- 
 
 trefTes— to cultivate peace as long as pofTible, and, in 
 
 cafes of necefiary defence or war, to exercife humanity, 
 
 forbearance and moderation. 
 
 Sch. — How defirable and happy would be the ftate of the hu- 
 man race, if the duties of humanity, friendship, good 
 
 neighbourhood 
 
424 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 neighbourhood and benevolence were generally and fin- 
 cerely exercifed amongft national governments ! — How 
 fatal is it for the happinefs of mankind, that jealoufy, dif- 
 truft, rivalfhip, ambition, luft of power and dominion, 
 take place of that general benevolence and brotherly 
 affection which would enfure more univerfal and perma- 
 nent happinefs than all treaties of commerce, amity or 
 alliance ever will afford ! 
 
 However, as this amiable union of intereft and af- 
 fection between national governments feems to remain 
 among the pi a defideria of the philofopher and philan- 
 thropic, — the time not being yet come for nations to 
 embrace one another as brethren, which they really are 
 as fellow inhabitants of the earth, fellow members of 
 the univerfal kingdom of the Moft High, who gra- 
 ciously difpenfes his providential mercies over all the 
 nations of the earth, — it remains for the law of nations 
 to take into consideration the perfect duties which they 
 owe towards one another. 
 
 The moft general duties of necefilty, under which 
 all others of a fpecific nature, arifing from particular 
 relations and circumftances incident to national affairs, 
 may be brought, are the following : — 
 
 No nation muft injure another, by either actually or 
 implicitly endangering its fecurity. 
 
 Nations muft give one another their own •, that is to 
 fav, they muft be careful not to interfere in the rights 
 of each other, efpecially the natural right of equality. 
 
 A nation that has become guilty o^ injuring another 
 muft make reparation, left it give juft caufe for defence 
 and war, and thereby endanger its own fecurity. 
 
 A nation muft never refort to defence or war without 
 a juft caufe: when either becomes necefiary, care 
 
 mould 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 425 
 
 mould be had that it be conducted with equity, and 
 not continued beyond the limits of natural juftice ; that 
 is to fay, hoftilities mull ceafe as foon as reparation can 
 be obtained and national fecurity re-eftablifhed. 
 
 Nations are bound to (land faithfully to their public 
 engagements, and Strictly to obferve the ftipulations of 
 the treaties which fubfift between them. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the natural rights of nations. 
 
 N. 
 
 ATIONS, as fuch, enjoy natural rights, which 
 are either abfolute or hypothetical. 
 
 The abfolute natural rights of nations flow from 
 their nature, considered in themfelves -, that is to fay, 
 from the idea of national independence. 
 
 Their hypothetical natural rights refult from that 
 national independence considered under certain circum- 
 stances \ for inStance, a nation has a right to prohibit 
 the exportation of raw materials out of the country-— 
 to permit the currency of foreign coin, &c. 
 
 The abfolute natural rights of nations might be dif- 
 tinguifhed into various claries, and thefe again fpecified 
 to a considerable extent, if it were our intention to 
 enter into a minute detail of them. 
 
 But the general ideas explanative of all the particu- 
 lars requifite for fpecific information on this fubject, 
 having been already explained, when we treated of 
 civil fociety, the nature, different forms and qualities 
 
 I i i of 
 
420 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of governments, the diftribution of the exercife of po- 
 Jitical and national fovereignty, — it may fuffice to ob- 
 serve here, that all the abfolute natural rights of nations 
 center in the free exercife of all the rights of fovereign- 
 ty neceffary for their own internal government, together 
 with the right of abfolute equality and national inde- 
 pendence, fo that no power on earth, no nation, nay, 
 no combination of nations, has any fhadow of right to 
 interfere with either the one or the other. 
 
 Ssh. i. — Nations have confequently the abfolute natural right 
 to change their government, conftitution and laws as they 
 pleafe; and other nations interfering, under any pretence 
 whatever, act contrary to the abfolute natural right of 
 nations. 
 
 ■Sch. 2. — The republic of France and the kingdom of Poland 
 exhibit fcenes of horror and injuflice, and fliow how 
 little the great ones of the earth refpedt the laws of nature 
 and of nature's God. 
 
 The hypothetical natural rights of nations are ftill 
 more multifarious, according to the great variety of 
 circumftances differently affecting national governments 
 and national affairs. 
 
 The moft notable circumftances which introduce 
 great and confequential modifications into national af- 
 fairs, are, on the one hand, a ftate of peace and public 
 fecurity •, and, on the other, a ftate of war and public 
 kifecurity. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Of the natural rights of public fecurity and peace. 
 
 A HE hypothetical natural rights of public fecurity 
 and peace reft upon the right of abfolute equality : for 
 
 one 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 4^7 
 
 one nation commits no injury againft another by 
 enjoying either of thofe rights •, consequently it cannot 
 meet with any disturbance by virtue of any right 
 founded in nature. Hence we conclude, that a nation 
 has a natural right to live in fecurity and peace, when 
 it fufters no disturbance from and keeps itfelf clear of 
 committing injury againSt others. 
 
 Since rights to the attainment of lawful ends imply 
 the right to make ufe of all thofe means which are ne- 
 ceSfery for thofe ends, it follows, that nations have a 
 natural right to make ufe of all lawful means for the 
 prefervation of fecurity and peace. 
 
 To determine the fpeciflc rights of fecurity and 
 peace, attention muft be had to the particular com- 
 plexion and fituation of national affairs: — The whole 
 of the enquiry turns upon thefe two considerations : 
 whether, at the prefent time and under the prefent cir- 
 cumstances, certain public proceedings of a nation are 
 means necefTary for its fecurity and peace ; and whe- 
 ther thofe public proceedings are lawfuL 
 
 Sck. — For inftance, if a nation erects fortifications, augments 
 its navy, recruits its array, and puts itfelf in a rcfpeft- 
 able State of defence, the queftion will be, Are thefe 
 proceedings meant for war; is a rupture to be dreaded; 
 or does that nation provide for its own fafety ? 
 
 No nation lawfully provides for its fafety that arro- 
 gates to itfelf a controul, right or power over another 
 independent State-, becaufe the right of equality is in- 
 fringed, a national injury takes place, and that nation 
 gives the other a juSt caufe for defence and war. 
 
 No nation can lawfully provide for its fafety by com- 
 pelling the afliStance of another ; for fuch a conduct 
 would be arrogating a right over an independent nation- 
 No 
 
42$ MORAL PHILOSOPHY".' 
 
 No nation may march through the territory of ano- 
 ther without its confent •, for fuch a conduct would be 
 ufurpation and arrogation of right over another nation. 
 Sch. i. — The territorial fo vereignty of a nation is co-extenfive 
 
 with its independence and dominions. 
 Sch. 2. — 'The republic of Genoa has bravely maintained that 
 independence, and thereby efcaped the greateft public 
 calamities, which have been brought on other Hates by 
 the lawlefs arrogation of right on the part of the formid- 
 able combination of the European powers that has been 
 occalioned by the prefent revolution in France. 
 
 Nations are all independent ftates, and poflefled of 
 equal rights ; no natural precedency can, therefore, 
 take place, except that which refults from the order 
 of nature: according to this, nations have their be- 
 ginning, arrive to the zenith of national glory, de- 
 cline and vanifh away. Some are as it were born 
 when others become extinct. If then nature mould 
 be the guide to determine rank, it would follow, that 
 that nation is entitled to precedency which is of the 
 jnoft ancient origin. 
 
 Sch. — As among individuals, fo amongft nations, it is not 
 venerable age always, nor even virtue and wifdom, but 
 power, riches and fplendour that determine rank and 
 precedency. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Of the natural rights of defence* 
 
 JTTL Nation is injured and in a ftate of infecurity when 
 another either mews an inclination to infringe its 
 rights, or actually diflurbs it in the enjoyment of its 
 
 national 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 4^9 
 
 national independence *, for abfolute independence, the 
 right of equality, and all other acquired rights, confti- 
 tute what nations may exclusively claim as their own. 
 
 Since a disturbance in what is a nation's own, by 
 the national interference of another, is a national injury, 
 it follows, that in fuch cafes a nation has the natural 
 right of compulsion, reparation, defence and war againft 
 any other that becomes guilty of committing a distur- 
 bance, 1, an injury, a damage, or any act of intended or 
 actual aggreSlion. 
 
 When nations make ufe of violent means to avert 
 a public injury, they exercife the natural right of the 
 aggreSTed againft the aggreflbr, and refort to what is 
 called national defence. 
 
 Since national defence is frequently attended with 
 great rifks and lories on the part of the lawful defender ; 
 and Since the happieft defence brings great calamities 
 on an inconceivable number of individuals, and often 
 on the mod innocent citizens of both the contending 
 nations ; it follows, that the rulers of nations mould 
 do all in their power to prevent an aggrejfion ; that is to 
 fay, to prevent a national injury^ by uflng efficacious 
 means, lawful in themfelves, but not violent in their 
 nature or confequences, for the purpofe of inducing 
 other nations not to entertain adefire or to manifest an 
 inclination to become an aggreflbr. Vide p. 1 89. 
 
 Nations have a right to prevent national injuries, by 
 obferving a juft conduct towards others, and by putting 
 themfelves in a proper State of defence. 
 
 National defence cannot be juft when it is not found- 
 ed in a juft caufe or conducted in a lawful manner. 
 
 Nothing 
 
430 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.* 
 
 Nothing can be a juft caufe for national defence, e^r* 
 cept a national injury, either actual or impending. 
 
 Nothing, with refpect to nations, can be confidered 
 public or national, except what has reference to the 
 national government. 
 
 We diftinguifh national injuries into direct and in- 
 direct, and into immediate and mediate. 
 
 Injuries which proceed from or are fanctioned by 
 government are dlreR, and ipfo fatto national, if they 
 are levelled againft the government of another : thofe 
 which depend upon the agency of private perfons are 
 indirefty and may become national when the govern- 
 ment ex poft fafto approves of them, or, upon repre- 
 fentations made and fatisfaction required by the injured 
 government, fuffers fuch reprefentations to remain un- 
 noticed, or withholds that fatisfaction which is due. 
 
 Thofe injuries which are committed againft the na- 
 tional government are faid to be immediate^ and are in 
 themfelves national, if, as has juft been remarked, thev 
 come from government, or have its fanction ; but fuch 
 as are done to the private citizens of a nation, whether 
 directly by government or indirectly by individual per- 
 fons, are called mediate ', and become national wheh re- 
 prefentations from the government of the injured citi- 
 zens are flighted, and fatisfaction, which is due, with-' 
 held on the part of the rulers of that nation from which 
 the injury has proceeded, whether it be by acts of their 
 own or by fuch as bear their fanction, or by the private 
 agency of citizens under their controul. 
 
 Thus, even injuries committed by Grangers become 
 national when they are countenanced by a national go- 
 vernment. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 43 l 
 
 Sch. i . — From this diftindtion flow the following maxims of 
 national rights : 
 The fovereign ought to'redrefs the injuries of the ftate and 
 
 protect its citizens. 
 He ought not to fuffer his people to offend other national 
 governments or their citizens f 
 
 The faults of individuals are not immediately imputable to 
 the rulers of nations. 
 
 Governments that approve or ratify the aetions of their ci- 
 tizens againft other nations, become the moral caufe of 
 fuch injuries, and confequently aggreflbrs. 
 
 An offended nation that has the private perfon who has 
 been guilty of national offence in its power, has a right 
 to compel reparation on the part of fuch offender. 
 
 National governments offend others if, upon reprefentation, 
 they refufe juftice, and make it a practice to connive at 
 the robberies and plunders committed by thofe under 
 their authority. 
 
 Vide Vatel, B. ii. chap. 6. 
 
 Sch. 2. — There are no principles flowing from nature which 
 warrant what in the proper fenfe of the term is called 
 revenge amongft nations. Natural juftice extends not 
 farther than fatisfaction and fecurity. Nations acknow- 
 ledge no fuperior tribunal on earth: the inflicting of 
 punifhment is, therefore, an unwarrantable ufurpation 
 of power, which may entitle a people to the exercife of 
 national ferocity, Gothic barbarity, but not to a national 
 right. 
 
 Among national rulers, the fame diftinction holds 
 good between a breach of duty and between injuries, 
 which takes place in the tranfactions of individuals : 
 want of refpecl to a prince is therefore very far from 
 being in itfelf a national injury. It may, in fome in- 
 ftances, juftify a fimilar behaviour, a certain indifference 
 and coldnefs; but cannot juftify violent meafures, war 
 and bloodfhed, wherein thoufands of innocent pcrfons 
 become involved. Vide p. 178, ttt. 
 
 There 
 
432 MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 There is a great variety of national injuries -, for na- ' 
 
 tions may have a variety of things and rights which 
 
 are their own-, and there are inconceivable actions, 
 
 modes and ways in which difturbances may take place. 
 
 Sck, — Perhaps all national injuries might be referred to thefe 
 three heads: injuries againft perfons, property and rights. 
 
 As nations are bound to abftain from all injuries, it 
 follows, that they are facredly bound to make repara- 
 tion, either by reftitution or fatisfaction. 
 
 The damages refulting from national injuries may 
 be cafual direct and indirect. Vide p. 185 and 186. 
 
 When a nation caufes direct damages againft another, 
 the latter has not the right of punifhment, but the 
 right of requiring particular fecurity againft future ma- 
 chinations of unnatural malevolence*, for, as has been 
 faid, puniihment is contradictory to national indepen- 
 dence. 
 
 Damages may be alfo diftinguifhed into great and 
 fmall, with refpect to the effects •, but in themfelves the 
 internal immorality of a national injury is to be efti- 
 mated by the ftandard of the important right of abfolute 
 independence, which by every injurious act is infringed. 
 
 The right of defence implies a right to compel 
 reparation ; for nations have a right to avert as well as 
 to repel injuries. l r idep. 186. 
 
 Nations, however, cannot be forced to exercife any 
 of thefe rights ; for, as independent bodies politic, they 
 may make fuch ufes of what is their own as they think 
 proper. 
 
 They may therefore forbear to exercife, or even 
 remit their right of defence, by a public declaration 
 of amneftv. 
 
 Sch, 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 4^j 
 
 ScL — It is a queftion of another nature, whether, in fome 
 cafes, fuch forbearance comports with prudence and the 
 duties which nations owe themfelves, or confifts with 
 that humanity which one nation iliould feel for the fuf- 
 ferings and fafety of another, 
 
 "Whether a nation chufes to remit or to exercife its 
 right of defence, no third nation is thereby injured. 
 
 In the profecution of the right of defence, a neutral 
 power may be hurt by acts of the profecutor-, but the 
 injury of that hurt muft be charged to the injurer. 
 
 Sc/i. — What has been obferved with refpect to the beginning 
 of acts of violence among individuals, perfectly holds 
 good with regard to national governments; that is to fav, 
 not the nation which commences acts of hoftility, bur. 
 that which has provoked them is the injurer, the aggref- 
 for. Vije p. 187. 
 
 Nations have but a limited right of reparation and 
 defence : no more violence is lawful than that which 
 is fufficient to afford fatisfaction and fecurity ; neither 
 are acts of hoftility entitled to any further continuance 5 
 for in either of thefe cafes compuliion and defence 
 would be deftitute of a juft caufe ; the defender would 
 confequently become guilty of an aggreflion, and give 
 the original aggreflbr a juft right for defence, as far as 
 the limits of a juft and lawful defence are exceeded. 
 Vide p. 187 — 192. 
 
 Since thefe important rights depend upon a juft 
 caufe for their exercife, it is evident, that national rulers 
 ought to be well convinced of this particular; for vio- 
 lent meafures among nations are fo dreadful and exten- 
 sive in their effedfcs, fo complicated in their nature, that 
 it exceeds the power of conception to form any idea of 
 the calamities which involve the lives, the rights, the 
 property, the domeftic and individual comforts of In- 
 
 K k k numerable 
 
434 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 numerable perfons of fuch contending nations. The 
 practice of engaging unjuftly, or for a flight offence, in 
 public meafures of national defence, cannot but be in- 
 finitely heinous and criminal, both in the fight of God 
 and of men. 
 
 Sch. i.— It is true, rulers of nations and their minifters may 
 do infinitely more good than other men, becaufe they en- 
 joy uncontroulable powers and innumerable opportuni- 
 ties for rendering nations happy : but it is alfo true, that 
 the temptations to make an improper ufe of thofe powers 
 are fo many and fo great, that the fituation of fuch men 
 calls more for pity than for envy. The human foul re- 
 volts at the fight of the facrifices which are daily making at 
 the fhrine of infatiable and boundlefs ambition: — The 
 hiftoric page exhibits more monfters and deftroyers of 
 mankind, than fathers of their country, gods on earth! 
 Let us draw a veil over the imperfections of men, and take 
 a leiTon for prudence and moderation, which beft fait 
 high ftations in life, and conftitute thegreateft fplendour. 
 and glory of national governments. 
 
 S c fr t 2. — When we examine the dreadful combination of pow- 
 ers in the eaftern hemifphere, unnaturally formed for what 
 they ftile mutual defence, we cannot help lamenting, that 
 among the reafons are mentioned, humanity, the caufe 
 of order, of good government, of morality, of religion, 
 &c. as if objects of this nature required fuch means of 
 violence, or could in any fhape juftify unlawful inter- 
 ference in what is an independent nation's own right. 
 
 .Sch. 3. — The unnatural contempt of religion on the part of 
 that devoted nation which has been the object of their 
 perfecution may, on the other hand, be confidered as a 
 temporary mean of defence againft the power of fuper- 
 ftition, and that ftrange mode of fupporting or preaching 
 up morality; but a profecution of fuch ftrange fenti- 
 ments muft and will be a caufe for endlefs feuds and ani- 
 mosities, which finally end in diflblution. A nation 
 without religion, what is it? What is a people, warlike 
 and great, that declares againft it? 
 
 -&7z. 4. — With refpect to fuafory, probable or pretended caufes 
 for defence, vide p. 190 and 191. 
 
 National 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 43£ 
 
 National defence may be juft with refpect to its 
 eaufe or caufes, and frill unjuft with regard to th^ 
 mode in which it is conducted. 
 
 Sch. i. — A defence deftitute of a juft caufe can never be juft» 
 though it be conducted in the bed poffible manner; fo r 
 in itfelf it is an injury, and a lawlefs aggreflion. 
 
 Sck* i. — The prefent conteft between the combined powers 
 and France exhibits, on the part of the former, with few 
 exceptions, infhnces of regularly conducted defence, 
 whilft the latter have frequently tranfgrefTed; witnefs the 
 mode in which they forced the fpeedy furrender of polls 
 and garrifons. 
 
 A juft defence muft be carried on, fo that the means 
 be lawful and lawfully ufed-, for nothing can be juft 
 that is contrary to the dictates of natural laws. 
 
 Nations may not make ufe of anamination, poifon- 
 ing or perjury \ means which in themfelves defeat all 
 poftibility of fecurity. Vide p. 193. 
 
 All other means for repelling an invaflon, compel- 
 ling reparation, or guarding againft aggreflion, are 
 lawful, if ufed with as much humanity as poffible, 
 and not further than the right of defence extends. 
 
 $ck. 1. — Among the lawful means of defence are reckoned fol- 
 diersand otScers; a regular, well difciplined militia: they 
 are inftruments in the hands of the national rulers to ex- 
 ecute the public will of the national fovereignty. This 
 ftate is lawful on the part of the ruled; nay, their duty, 
 their birth-right, and their greatefi; glory, when they are 
 employed for the defence of their country; but men who 
 are inftruments of ambition, who are fent upon conqueft, 
 or given to hire, who fight for no object but their pay, — 
 how degrading their condition! how little comporting 
 with the dignity of human nature! and how inconfiftent 
 with a lawful exercife of rights in perfons! 
 We wave entering into the minutiae of fubfidies, auxiliaries, 
 &c. becaufe nations have fuffered their affairs to become 
 preternatural; affairs which muft be fupported by reme- 
 dies of the fame (lamp and nature. 
 
436 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sch. 2. — There are other means for national defence of an 
 inanimate nature, which are always and in themfelves 
 means for defence and war; as, arms of all kinds; gun- 
 powder, with its ingredients, and tools and implements ne^- 
 cefTary for carrying on expeditions, for {landing a fiege, 
 or profecuting effectually the operation of defence. Add 
 to thefe, fhips of war and the materials for building and 
 equipping them, tents, foldiers' cloth, fortifications, &c. 
 
 Sch. 3. — Likewife, provifions of all kinds, live-flock, horfes, 
 &c. though they are reckoned innocent in peace, may, 
 ■under circumftanees, become means of defence and war: 
 when by the one an army is fupported, by the other it 
 ii enabled to take the field. When a place is blockaded 
 or beiieged, live-ftock and provifions enable the defen- 
 ders to hold out. Other things, as, waggons, horfes, &c. 
 ferve to facilitate the movements and various operations 
 of defence and war. 
 
 There are cafes where a nation comes under a ftate 
 of abfolute or extreme necefTity, — where the outrageous 
 behaviour of an aggreffor or invader renders neceffary 
 the ufe of means for defence, which in no other ftate 
 would be lawful. 
 
 This leads to a confederation of the nature of the 
 laws of retaliation, of retortion, and of reprifals, and 
 the objects of them. 
 
 By retaliation we underftand public proceedings, 
 
 whereby an unreafonable and outrageous aggreflbr is 
 
 made to fufFer exactly fo much evil as he has done. 
 
 Sch. 1. — If an ao-g-refTor burns towns, vvantonlv maltreats and 
 so > ' . r . 
 
 unjuflly detains the perfons, or deftroys the lives of ci- 
 tizens, facrifices their property, &c. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Thefe are cafes where the injurer tranfgrefTes the law 
 of nature, and a queition arifes, whether unlawful pro- 
 ceedings of one nation jultify another to proceed to 
 public acts of injuftice? 
 
 Sch. 3. — The principles of natural juftice declare againft this 
 mode of defence, except in cafes of abfolute neceffity, of 
 which the common faying holds good, mcejjityhas no law* 
 
 There 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY,. 437 
 
 There is a pollibiiity for a nation to do itfelf juftice, 
 by exerciftng the right of reparation, in feizing on the 
 things that belong to the injurious nation, and retain- 
 ing them until jure fatisfaction is made. 
 
 Likewife, the aggrefled nation may take from the 
 nation guilty of aggremon thofe privileges which it 
 enjoys in the dominions of the former. 
 
 The law of retortion entitles a national fovereign to 
 treat the fubjedts of another in the fame manner as the 
 latter treats the citizens of the former. 
 
 Reprifals are ufed between nation and nation to do 
 juftice to themfelves, when they cannot otherwife ob^ 
 tain it. If a nation takes pofTemon of what belongs to 
 another, or refufes to pay a debt, repair an injury, &c. 
 the other may feize and apply to its own ufe any thing 
 that belongs to the nation thus afrgreflihg, and may 
 proceed in this manner till it has obtained full com- 
 penfatlon for intercft and damage •, or it may retain the 
 property fo feized as a pledge till ample fatisfaclion has 
 been made. 
 
 Sch. i. — Effects feized mull be preferved while there is any 
 hope of obtaining fatisfaction or juftice. 
 As foon as that hope is loft, they are confifcated, and then 
 the reprifals are accomplished. This takes place upon a 
 rupture between nations and the commencement of hof- 
 tilities. 
 
 Sch. 2. — Reprifals are only allowed by the law of nations upon 
 a caufe that is evidently juft, or for a debt that is extreme- 
 ly clear. 
 No force can be lawfully applied by a nation, without 
 knowing whether the other is or is not difpofed to do it 
 juftice. 
 
 ScA. 3. — Room is likewife left for reprifals where an adverfary 
 refufes the means of bringing the right to proof, or art- 
 fully evades it, 
 
 The 
 
43* MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The objects of reprifals are either the public pro- 
 perty of the nation, or that which belongs to the pri- 
 vate citizens thereof. 
 
 An exception muft be made as to things which arc 
 a depofit trufted to the public faith -, for the confi- 
 dence placed in the public faith of a nation ought to 
 be refpecled even in cafe of an open war. 
 
 Government ought to indemnify its citizens who 
 fuffer by reprifals. 
 
 The fovereign alone can order reprifals. 
 
 Reprifals cannot be lawfully granted in favour of 
 foreigners *, for a nation has no right to fet itfelf up as 
 a judge between other nations. 
 
 If private perfons have given room for juft reprifals, 
 they ought to be compelled by their governments to 
 recompence thofe on whom fuch reprifals are made. 
 
 Juftice is denied by a refufal to hear complaints — by 
 not admitting fubjecls to eftablifh their rights before 
 the ordinary tribunals — by affecled delays — by a judg- 
 ment manifeftly partial and unjuft, 8rc. 
 
 Nations may detain the citizens of one another by 
 way of reprifals, and not releafe them until fatisfaclion 
 is received. Reprifals of this kind extend not to life or 
 corporal pain *, for fuch proceedings are the efFedls of 
 retaliation, and only allowable in a ftate of abfolute 
 neceflity. 
 
 When a nation makes juft reprifals, it profecutes its 
 own right, commits no national injury, and gives not 
 a juft caufe for war. Vide Vatel — Law of Nat. B. ii. 
 chap. 1 8. 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 439 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Of public war. 
 
 v, 
 
 IOLENT public defence is fo nearly allied to 
 public war, that nothing more is required to conftitute 
 the latter than for the former to become reciprocal. 
 
 Public war, therefore, may be defined to be that ftate 
 where national rulers reciprocally refort to the exercife 
 of what really is, or is deemed the right of public 
 defence : it is that ftate in which nations commit vio- 
 lence againft one another, determined to repel force by 
 force, in the name and by the order of the public 
 power. 
 
 Public peace, on the contrary, is that defirable ftate 
 of nations, where no reciprocal injuries have taken 
 place — where no nation is looked upon as an aggrefibr, 
 and where every one abftains from acts of violence. 
 
 $ch. — For further elucidations on this fubjecT:, vide p. 196 — 
 199, with this exception, that what there applies to the 
 conduct of individual perfons, is to be taken in reference 
 to nations and national rulers. 
 
 Nations have a natural right of making war, if there 
 is no other remedy left for repelling an unjuft aggref- 
 fion •, that is to fay, if they cannot without it enjoy peace 
 and fecurity ; for the natural rights of a nation cannot 
 be defeated by the lawlefs reflftance of an aggrerTor : if 
 this were the cafe, there would be no moral poftibility 
 for government to direel what is a nation's own to the 
 attainment and advancement of its public happinefs : a 
 tame fubmiftion on the part of rulers of nations would 
 
 confequentlv 
 
440 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 confequently be a conduct contradictory to the firfl 
 principle of the law of nature. Hence it follows, that 
 it is fo far from being naturally unlawful for nations, 
 under fuch circumftances, to make war, that, on the 
 contrary, it is their public duty fo to do, whenever ano- 
 ther nation unjuftly and malicioufiy difturbs the free 
 enjoyment and lawful exercife of their natural right of 
 abfolute eciuality. 
 
 It is evident from the nature of national indepen- 
 dence, and the natural relation of nations, by which 
 they are focieties of fellow men, fellow citizens of the 
 world, that each mould enjoy its own, undifturbed by 
 any power or authority on earth ; that is to fay, live 
 in peace and fecurity. The right, therefore, which a 
 nation has for the enjoyment of public peace and fecu- 
 rity, is abfolutely natural and infeparable from the 
 national fovereignty of ftates. 
 
 But it is otherwife with refpect to the rights of vio- 
 lent defence and war; they pre-fuppofe fome facts or 
 public acts on the part of other nations, to wit, inter- 
 ference or diiturbance in thofe things which are at the 
 free difpofa! of a nation for the ends of its political ex- 
 igence, profperity and independence. The natural fcate 
 of nations, therefore, is not a ftate of war, but a mate 
 of peace. Vide p. 199 and 200. 
 
 From the nature of the rights of peace and of war 
 it is evident, that no right of public war can take place 
 without previous difturbance, of which a national go- 
 vernment is in fome mode or other the moral caufe; 
 for, where there is not a national injury either actual or 
 impending, there can be no room for the public exercife 
 of the rights of compulfion, reparation or defence. 
 
 That 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 441 
 
 That war is juft which has a juft caufe and is juftly 
 conducted : public war, on the contrary, is unjuft ^ when, 
 it is deftitute of a juft caufe, conducted in an unjuft 
 manner, or protracted to an unlawful extent. 
 
 A war which really proceeds from a juft caufe, that 
 is, from a national injury and disturbance, may become 
 unjuft with rgfpect to the mode, manner and extent of 
 its being conducted. 
 
 An unjuft war may be juftly conducted; that is, the 
 
 proper mode and manner preferved which comport 
 
 with the limited and reftricted rights of compulfion 
 
 and violent defence, or are fanctioned by the cuftoms 
 
 and practices of the civilized nations of the earth •, but 
 
 being founded on an unjuft caufe, can never become 
 
 juft. 
 
 Sch. — What has juft been faid of the various caufes of defence, 
 and what is remarked of wars deftitute of juft or refting 
 upon fuafory caufes, in the feveral fcholia at the bottom, 
 of page 200 and in the beginning of page 201, is fully 
 applicable to the public wars of nations. 
 
 Acts of aggreftion ought to be very well afcertained, 
 
 left nations become guilty of inexpreftible mifchief — of 
 
 tranfgreffion againft the dictates of natural law — of re- 
 ts O 
 
 bellion againft God., 
 
 As foon as acts of mutual violence or hoftility are 
 begun, or war is declared, the nations at war, that is, 
 the aggrefTor as well as the aggreffed, are ftiled hojliis 
 enemies, 
 
 Sch. 1. — Hoflile enemies muft be diftinguifhed from thofethat 
 
 bear us ill will. 
 Sch. 2.— That nations are not hoftile enemies is not a fuffkient 
 
 proof that they are friends and well winters. 
 Sch. 3. — There is no fuch thing amongft nations as natural 
 
 enemies; for if their territories, their commerce, &t\ tH 
 J, 1 1 fa 
 
44^ MORAL PHILOSOPHY". 
 
 fo fituated that interference, or what is called rivalj/rip, 
 mav eafiiv take place, there is no caufe why they fhould 
 injure or hate one another; on tSe contrary, filch fitua- 
 tions are forcible reafons why they ihould cultivate a good 
 iiiulerfUnding, harmony and peace. 
 
 Acts of hoftility mould always be preceded by a 
 formal declaration of war ; becaufe, national wars teem 
 with innumerable calamities, in which private perfons, 
 even the citizens of neutral powers, are involved : — r 
 Befides, according to the principles of nature, violence 
 cannot be lawfully made ufe of, till other means have 
 been found ineffectual for preventing an open rupture. 
 
 The diflinction of war itato defennve and offenfivc, 
 has reference to the caufe as well as to the operations 
 of a war. — For further particulars concerning this 
 different relation — for fatisfying the enquiry, whether 
 an offenfive war may be jvtft? and for determining 
 concerning the changes of operations, vide p. 201 and 
 202, together with the fcholia I, 2 and 3 of the lad 
 mentioned page. 
 
 How nations are bound to cultivate peace as long 
 as poflible ; when and under what circumftances they 
 mould make refiftance •, how and by what means they 
 ought to endeavour to gain the good will of a nation that 
 is not favourably inclined; what care and prudence are 
 nece/Iarv, that preparations for putting themfelves into 
 a proper ftate of defence or that forming alliances pro- 
 voke not acts of aggrefiion, upon the principle of an 
 intended or impending injury, fo that no pretext may 
 be given for exercinng the right of defence, — may be 
 collected from what has been explained heretofore, un- 
 der the chapter of the rights of defence and of war, 
 particularly pages 202 and 203, with the two fubfe- 
 quent fcbolia, which begin page 204. 
 
 The 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 44J 
 
 The rights of war are naturally limited by the rights 
 of reparation and fecurity. 
 
 A nation at war with another has a right to make ufe of 
 all things which are natural, direct and necerTary means 
 for the fecurity of national felicity and independence. 
 That right extends to all manner of violence by which 
 the power of the enemy may be weakened, the adver- 
 sary rendered unable to make further refrftahce, and in- 
 duced to confent to equitable terms of peace-, except, 
 as has already been obferved, acts of violence unnatural 
 in themfelves, as, poifoning, aftafiinatiqn and perjury : 
 for it is a nation's natural right to enjoy its own, un- 
 diflurbed by another, and to live in a ftate of external 
 fecurity. As long as a hoftile enemy is able to carry 
 on thz war with vigour, he will continue his refinance, 
 and that fecurity cannot be expecled; but when de- 
 prived of the means, when weakened to that extreme 
 that he cannot profecute his views with vigour, he will 
 confent to terms ot pacification, and the nation which 
 has been the cbjccT; of profecution will enjoy that peace 
 and fecurity without which a community cannot be 
 happy. 
 
 All violent meafures, though they be naturally law- 
 ful in themfelves, become unlawful when they are not 
 necerTary for obtaining jute reparation and full fecurity. 
 
 With refpecl to the perfons and things which natu- 
 rally come under the right cf war, the cufiomary law of 
 nationsdeterrnir.es hi detail, and extends that right to 
 all perfons and to 1 all public and private property of the 
 enemy : but the principles of natural law determine ac- 
 cording to this maxim, thai it is neither wife nor lawful 
 to make ufe of means which are not abfolutely and dire 51 ly 
 necejfary for obtaining a lawful end y particularly in cafes 
 
 wl 
 
444 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 where fuch means are grievous in their operation, and. 
 where they affett the innocent as well as the guilty. 
 
 Upon the flrength of thefe principles we make a dis- 
 tinction between perfons and things which come under 
 the right of war in a direct and in an indirect manner. 
 
 Perfons and things which come under the right of 
 war in a direct manner are, — perfons in arms, belong- 
 ing to the army and public force of the enemy •, war- 
 like (lores, ammunition, magazines, fortifications, fhips 
 of war, &c. in a word, all things which are the principal 
 among thofe that the cuftom of nations has (lamped 
 with the appellation of contraband goods. 
 
 Things of an enemy thus coming directly under tliQ 
 
 right of war, are liable to feizure and appropriation, 
 
 and, if thefe expedients are impoffible or inconvenient, 
 
 even to defrruction. 
 
 Sck.—- Such as are the property of fubjects of neutrrJ powers 
 are liable to feizure, and, upon adjudication confonant to 
 the cuftomary laws of nations, may be appropriated. 
 
 How far the right of war affects the life of perfons 
 who bear arms or are part of the enemy's active force, 
 cannot be determined with preciiion, unlefs we diftiri- 
 guim the various ftages and other circumftances at- 
 tending the operations of War. 
 
 In an engagement, that is to fay, in that ftate where 
 enemies actually contend for victory, the right of war 
 extends to the life of perfons in arms, if there is no 
 other mean to obtain fecurity and to fatisfy the duty 
 of felf-prefervation ; for during that period the parties 
 are h\ a Mate of abfolute or extreme neceflity. 
 
 When victory is obtained, and perfons furrender 
 thcmfelves, the right of war dees net extend to life, 
 
 if 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 445 
 
 if fecurity can be obtained by confining the conquered 
 as prifoners. 
 
 Perfons who do no' bear arms, do not come directly 
 under the right of war; their lives ought to be (pared, 
 and their perfons protected : but they may be fecured, 
 either by imprifonment or by oath of temporary alle- 
 giance, as the fecurity of the aclverfary renders the one 
 or the other necefiary. To treat women and children, 
 aged perfons, &c. with fe verity, or unneceilarily to 
 moleft them, is confequentiy naturally unjuft and bar- 
 barous. 
 
 Private property, or public buildings and public 
 records, are entitled to protection, if a contrary pro- 
 cedure is not abfolutely neceilary for profecuting the 
 war or enjoying fecurity. 
 
 Nations who take no part in the war of belligerent 
 powers, and favour no party more than another, ab- 
 ftaining from all interference, except that they equally 
 tender their good offices for a reconciliation, are {tiled 
 neutral power s^ and as fuch are entitled to the right of 
 neutrality, which extends to the government as well as 
 to the people under its controul, and entitles them to 
 the free enjoyment of their independency and of their 
 lawful occupations, commerce, &c. 
 
 As long as a neutral nation and its citizens obferve 
 ftricl neutrality, fo long their perfons and property do 
 not come under the right of war. 
 
 Neutral powers have a right to protect their citizens 
 in the enjoyment of the right of neutrality: they are 
 in duty bound to enjoin on them a forbearance from 
 acts of partiality, whereby either of the belligerent 
 parties may be injured : they ought to prohibit the fup- 
 plying either party with contraband goods, &c. 
 
 Provifions 
 
44^ MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Provisions carried by the fubjedls of a neutral power 
 to a place befieged or blockaded, forfeit the right of 
 neutrality; and fuch goods, perhaps the vefiels alfo, 
 become juftly liable to feizure and confifcation by the 
 power that carries on the fiege or has inftituted the 
 blockade. 
 
 Neutral powers may involve themfeives in war when 
 their governments favour one party more than another, 
 without a juft and preponderating caufe. 
 
 Nations which are bound by alliances previous to a 
 rupture between belligerent powers, cannot be compel- 
 led to break through their public engagements : they 
 confequently remain neutral, if they do not exceed the 
 clear and pointed ftipulations of fuch previous treaties. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Of the rights of the victor. 
 
 Y viSiory we underftand that ftate between con- 
 tending forces, wherein one party is fo far reduced as to 
 be incapable of making farther refiftance. 
 
 When engagements are decifive, they will end in the 
 victory of the fortunate party, who, as victor, has cer- 
 tain rights over the vanquished in his power-, which 
 rights, though in themfeives the natural refult of war, 
 may with propriety, and for the fake of perfpicuity, be 
 called the rights of the viclor. 
 
 In order to determine the rights of the viclor, a dif- 
 tinction is to be obferved between temporary and final 
 vitlory : the former ends particular engagements, and 
 
 in 
 
moral philosophy:.' 447 
 
 in the courfe of a war is often changing fides-, but the 
 latter puts an end to the farther profecution of acts of 
 hoftility, and generally induces both parties to make 
 peace. 
 
 The rights of a victor during and after an engage- 
 ment do not extend to the lives of the vanquifhed in 
 his power, if in any poffible mode he can put himfelf 
 in a ftate of fecurity : for farther effufion of blood would 
 be deftitute of a juft caufe. 
 
 The victor may keep the vanquimed prifoners -, he 
 may confine, enlarge or parole them, as his own fafety 
 requires or admits. 
 
 Prifoners ought, therefore, to be protected againft 
 abufe and unneceflary rigour, and fupplied with provi- 
 fions : humanity requires their fituation to be made as 
 eafy as poftible, confident with the fafety of the victor. 
 
 The victor has the right to fecure himfelf againft all 
 thofe perfons of his adverfary who have not borne 
 arms ; as, infants, women, aged perfons, &C. 
 
 In cafe of final victory, the victor has all thofe rights 
 again ft his adverfary, both with refpect to perfons and 
 things, which flow from and are warranted by- the 
 rights of reparation, defence and fecurity. 
 
 If thefe rights are fatisfied, and the national injuries 
 ceafe — if the damages are repaired, and the victor en- 
 joys fecurity, — there is no longer a juft caufe for war: 
 farther hoftilities confequently become naturally unlaw- 
 ful, and the victor ought to confent to equitable terms 
 of peace: becaufe, it is the nature of a juft war to be 
 abfolutely neceflary for the enjoyment of fecurity and 
 peace-, and the fcope of lawful proceedings is, that 
 thereby thefe deferable ends may be obtained and fe- 
 cured. 
 
448 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 3d. — Other things concerning the facilitating meafures. for 
 moderating the calamities of war, and for propofing terms 
 of capitulations and pacifications — for concluding truces 
 and armiftices — fcr complaining againft outrages^ accord- 
 ing to the cuftoms of nations, &c. by trumpeters, flags of 
 truce, &c. come properly under the cuuomary law of na* 
 tions, and are not eflential to the i abject of this treatife. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Of national intercourfe. 
 
 
 1 ROM the natural rights and duties of nations to 
 one another hitherto explained, it is evident, that na- 
 tions are often under a neceflity to tranfacl: public affairs 
 with one another : there ought, therefore, to be perfect 
 liberty for each nation to lay before others its requefts, 
 complaints, and other public concerns for its own pros- 
 perity and fecurity. 
 
 This natural libertv, which is efTential to the ftate of 
 abfolute equality, is filled the right of national inter courfe. 
 
 As it is inconvenient for national governments to 
 meet together, and impoilible for the mafs of the peo- 
 ple to hold fuch an intercourfe, it appears, that the 
 only mean left is, that perfons be publicly delegated, 
 and fent to tranfacl: the public bufinefs of the nation 
 with the government of the other. 
 
 Since perfons (ti\t for managing the public affairs of 
 a nation with the government of another bear the ge- 
 neral name of legates , it follows, that the rights to 
 fend and to receive legates are exclufive rights of na- 
 tional fovereignty, which, in times of internal peace, is 
 always lodged in the national government, but often 
 
 becomes 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 44.9 
 
 becomes doubtful, when a revolution is taking place, 
 
 and the national controul afTumed by one part of the 
 
 people and contended by the other. 
 
 Sck. — In cafes of unavoidable neceflity, the ruling party may 
 be confidered as the perfons who exercife national fove- 
 reignty. 
 
 When a legate is fent by one nation, it becomes a 
 duty on the part of that to which he is fent to receive 
 him. 
 
 The perfon of a legate is facred and inviolable •, for 
 he tranfacts the concerns of an independent nation, is 
 its public minifter, and in fome way or other its repre- 
 fentative. 
 
 The inviolability of a legate chiefly imports liberty 
 of fpeech, fecurity of perfon, and the particular privi- 
 lege of not being amenable to the laws of the land. 
 
 Thefe public rights of a legate flow from the prin- 
 ciples of nature, and from the very nature of the public 
 bufinefs of nations, both with refpecl to the one which 
 fends him, and that to which he is fent: becaufe, the 
 public concerns of nations involve obligations fo high 
 and important, that in cafes of collifion inferior obliga- 
 tions muft give way. 
 
 If a legate behaves improperly or injurioufly to the 
 
 nation to which he is fent, fuch nation has no right to 
 
 puniih him, but can defire his recall and demand fatii- 
 
 faction from his principal. 
 
 ScL — In cafe of abfolute neceflity, the principles of nature 
 warrant the imprifonment or fafe-keeping of an injurious 
 legate; for in that ftate a nation has a right to fecure itfelf 
 even againft the nation which fent him. 
 
 If a nation refufes compliance with the juft demands 
 gf another concerning the infults or other injuries of 
 
 M m m its 
 
450 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 its public minifter, the latter has a right to confider 
 
 fuch refufal as an injury directly proceeding from the 
 
 government which fuch injurious delegate reprefents. 
 
 Sck. — The treatment of delegates and their behaviour may 
 consequently become means for involving nations in vio- 
 lent meafures of defence and war. 
 
 The privileges of a delegate being fo great, his mif- 
 fion and reception fo important, and the bufinefs itfelf 
 intruded to him of national confequence -, it is evident, 
 that no perfon can have a jufh claim to the character of 
 a legate, who is not furnifhed with and who does not 
 produce fufficient documents, which accredit and teftify 
 his public miflion. Such documents have obtained the 
 name of credentials. Legates mult therefore have fuf- 
 ficient credentials, and produce them, before they have 
 any right to the privileges which appertain to a public 
 minifter at the court of a fovereign nation. 
 
 The cuftomory law of nations has introduced various 
 and different characters, and applies different appella- 
 tions expreflive of them, to public minifters, who, as 
 fuch, have equal rights with refpect to the object of their 
 million, which is the management of the public concerns 
 of their principals ; but, according to thofe diftinctions, 
 they have a different rank among the public minifters 
 of other nations at courts where they refide. 
 
 St-L i. — Legates, according to thefediftin&ions, are filled am- 
 bajj'adors,. minifters, envoys, charges des affairs, re.Jidents, &c. 
 
 ScL 2. — Confuls have to attend to the commercial interefls of 
 the people : they are confequently public perfons ap- 
 pointed and fent by government ; but as they do not tranf- 
 act the affairs of national fovereignty, they, as public per- 
 fons, are entitled to certain rights and privileges, but not 
 to the inviolability of legates. 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 45 I 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Of the hypothetical natural rights of nations with refpett 
 
 to treaties. 
 
 N. 
 
 ATIONS enjoying abfolute independence have 
 naturally no other affirmative rights in one another, 
 than thofe which are of imperfect obligation. All their 
 natural perfect rights are negative -, they muft not injure 
 one another, and are bound to give every one its own. 
 If, therefore, they would obtain perfect affirmative 
 rights in one another, they muft do it by Lawful acqui- 
 fition, founded on a juft title and refulting from a lawful 
 mode, by which rights in things or in perfons may be 
 acquired. 
 
 There being three modes of lawful acquiiition, to 
 wit, by forfeiture, law, and pact ; it follows, that na- 
 tions have perfect affirmative rights in one another, ei- 
 ther when injuries and damages are committed, or when 
 their right of equality is infringed-, or they obtain fuch 
 rights by the dictates of natural law, if a contrary con- 
 duct would prove to be an injury and caufe damages: 
 for inftance; if a nation, fired by ambition, attacks 
 without caufe, folely from motives of aggrandifement 
 and conqueft, a neighbouring power, there is fofficient 
 caufe for a nation to confult its own fafety, and to in/iff. 
 on the treipafler's forbearance; and, in cafe fuch claim 
 of right is flighted, it has the further right to join and 
 aftift its neighbour, and to make a common caufe with 
 him again ft that nation, which muft beconfidered as a 
 common enemy, nay, as an enemy to mankind. 
 
45 2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 «SV//.— The rights of forfeiture and law are the foundation of 
 the rights of defence and war. 
 
 But a milder and more humane mode by which a 
 nation may acquire perfect affirmative rights in another, 
 is the mode of acquisition by pact. 
 
 Pads among nations are ftiled treaties. 
 
 Treaties are concluded by the national fovereigns, 
 or by means of public perfons, fpecifically veiled with 
 mandatary powers given for fuch a purpofe. 
 
 Treaties comprehend promife, confent, acceptance,, 
 transfer. 
 
 In treaties, the promife and confent muft be both 
 lav/ful and fair ; the acceptance and transfer explicit and 
 well ascertained: no ambiguities mould find place; no 
 ftrefs mould be laid upon certain modes of leaving room 
 for different interpretation and difputes concerning the 
 cafus foderis. Proceedings of this nature mould be far 
 from the rulers, and are derogatory to the dignity of 
 nations. 
 
 In all things where an actual collifion takes place, 
 prior treaties fuperiede thofe of fubfequent date. 
 
 Sen. i. — It is a great queftion, whether treaties are for the ad- 
 vancement of the happinefs of mankind, or for the good 
 of a nation? 
 
 Sen. i. — -To determine this queftion, we have to obferve two 
 things: firfi:, that nations, upon the ftrength of the duties 
 of humanity, owe one another friendship, afTiftance and 
 mutual good offices; and that felf-intereft will forcibly 
 prompt rulers to Sincerity as much as can be expected or 
 is commonly experienced from them : fecondly, that by 
 each treaty, nations part with feme rights of abfolute in- 
 dependence. 
 
 Sch. 3.— -Perhaps it may be objefted, that they gain more by 
 having; a perfect claim, founded on the Strength of treaties, 
 than if they were ftill vefled with thofe rights of abfolute 
 
 independence. 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 453 
 
 independence. In treating of politics, we afTerted, that 
 the citizen is in a far more eligible condition, than the in- 
 dividual who has not parted with any of his abfolute na- 
 tural rights; becaufe, the whole ftrength of the flate is 
 his protection, and the will of the community his guide; 
 his intereft is fecured in the participation of the public 
 good, fanftioned by the public laws of the land. But, 
 What can a weak nation expect, when it has to cope with 
 a powerful ftate with which it was on friendly terms, but 
 which proves to be infincere and perfidious? How often 
 have treaties been explained away, evaded, broke! How 
 often have they been the means of laying a foundation for 
 a new war! How liable are their operations to caufe 
 ruptures between the parties, or between either of them 
 with its neighbour ! 
 
 Sc/i. 4. — Let us therefore conclude, that nothing but neceffity 
 fhould induce nations to enter into treaties. Happy thofe 
 nations which, like the Chinefe, can keep themfelves un- 
 fhackled ! Happy thofe which, as they cannot avoid fol- 
 lowing the cuftoms generally adopted, confine themfelves 
 to treaties of amity and commerce! In times of com- 
 motion among the nations of the earth, they can maintain 
 the character of fathers of their people, fecnring to them 
 the rights of peace and neutrality: they bid fair for being 
 refpe£ted as neutral powers, as they are not bound to al- 
 low one party that which by folemn ftipulations they 
 mu ft refufe the other. 
 
 Sc/i. 5. — Inftances of the difficulties under which nations may 
 be placed upon the rupture of other ftates, we have ex- 
 perienced amongft ourfelves, in the prefent conteft be- 
 tween the powers of Europe and the firft ally and friend 
 of the United States of North-America. 
 
 When treaties are concluded, they ought faithfully 
 to be obferved: nothing is more pernicious to the 
 common good of mankind, nothing more diforaceful 
 to a nation, than the guilt and well- merited imputation 
 cf perfidy. 
 
 Perfidy amongft nations is a national injury, and is 
 a juft caufe for defence and war, 
 
 Ruptures 
 
454 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Ruptures between nations may be, on the part of the 
 injured defender, a jufl caufe to break through all for- 
 mer flipulations with the enemy, provided they are not 
 in their nature a kind of public truft, which, both with 
 refpedt to national governments and their citizens, mould 
 be kept inviolate : — Still, all engagements which nations 
 at war have entered into during the courfe of fuch war, 
 whether by themfelves or by perfons delegated for that 
 purpofe, or by certain officers, who, by virtue of their 
 trull and commiffion, have the power to flipulate in 
 name of the national fovereign, — ought to be perform- 
 ed moil faithfully, and with the flricTeft punctuality 
 and exactnefs : for, an enemy cannot forfeit a right that 
 was given him as fuch, by profecuting acts of hoflility 
 and violence ; and, as fuch engagements are necefTary 
 to mitigate the horrors and calamities of war, a party 
 that proves perfidious in fuch cafe muft be considered 
 as a monfler in human fhape, as an enemy to humanity. 
 
 Sch. — We may here advert to truces and armiftices necefTary 
 for acts of humanity; as, burying the dead, concerting 
 meafures for reconciliation and peace, &c. 
 
 Nations form treaties by mandataries, flrictly and 
 fpeciflcally qualified for pledging the faith of the fo- 
 vereign. 
 
 He who claims the right of a mandatary mufl mew 
 fpecific powers from the national government. 
 
 The fovereign is bound to all that is lawfully flipu- 
 lated by his mandatary. 
 
 Officers of government, particularly thofe of the ar- 
 my and navy, are veiled with powers which involve 
 the right of mandatary trufls : for inftance, a general 
 
 treating 
 
moral philosophy 455 
 
 treating for fupplies, officers entrufted with the com- 
 mand of fortifications, &c. Their engagements are 
 public, becaufe, without fuch a power they could not 
 ferve their country. 
 
 Treaties ceafe in a manner iimilar to that in which 
 pacts terminate. Vide the latter part of chap. viii. part 
 2, of this tread fe. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Of the territory and jurifdiclion of nations. 
 
 N. 
 
 ATIONS inhabit a part of the globe, they con- 
 fequently potfefs a territory. 
 
 Nations may acquire territory by occupancy, by 
 conqueft upon the principle of forfeiture and law, or 
 by treaties. 
 
 The territory of a nation may be enlarged by ac- 
 ceflion, according to the principles formerly laid down 
 with refpect to the various modes of acquiiition of 
 property, or right in things. 
 
 As far as a nation's territory extends, fo far extends 
 its jurifdiclion; for, not to have jurifdiclion in its own 
 territory would amount to a dependency inconfiftent 
 with the right of equality. 
 
 Upon the fame principles, national jurifdiclion ex- 
 tends to thofe things in which a nation has the right 
 of commonrv ; as, the open fea, &c. 
 
 The 
 
456 MORAL PHILOSOPHY^ 
 
 The cuftomary law of nations allows a maritime 
 ftate jurifdiclion to the diftance of three leagues from 
 fhore, and over bays, rivers and harbours, where a free 
 paffage can be hindered by the batteries erecled on 
 their refpective mores, or the exclufive right main- 
 tained by means' of neighbouring fortifications. 
 
 

/