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FROM THE LIBRARY OF
ROBERT ELLIOTT SPEER
BR 128 .G8 .H37 1897
Hatch, Edwin, 1835-1889.
The influence of Greek ideas
and usages upon the "
\
ΤΣ (578
THE HIBBERT LECTURES,
1888.
Tue Hibbert Trustees cannot add this volume to their
series without a few lines of grateful acknowledgment.
It is impossible to forget either the courteous readiness
with which the accomplished author undertook the task
originally, or the admirable qualities he brought to it.
When he died without completing the MS. for the press,
the anxiety of the Trustees was at once relieved by the
kind effort of his family to obtain adequate assistance.
The public will learn from the Preface how much had to
be done, and will join the Trustees in grateful apprecia-
tion of the services of the gentlemen who responded to
the occasion. That Dr. Hatch’s friend, Dr. Fairbairn,
consented to edit the volume, with the valuable aid of
Mr. Bartlet and Professor Sanday, was an ample pledge
that the want would be most efficiently met. To those
gentlemen the Trustees are greatly indebted for the
learned and earnest care with which the laborious
revision was made,
AUG S1 1959
S88, S
ΣΟ ΟΝ πὴ»
THE AIBBERT LECTUR
INFLUENCE OF GREEK IDEAS
AND USAGES
UPON THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH.
BY THE LATE
EDWIN HATCH, DD.
READER IN ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.
EDITED BY
A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D.
PRINCIPAL OF MANSFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD.
SIXTH EDITION.
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;
20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH ;
AND 7, BROAD STREET, OXFORD.
1897.
(All Rights reserved]
LONDON?
PRINTED BY C. GREEN AND SON,
178, sTRAND,
PREFACE.
Tue fittest introduction to these Lectures will be a
few words of explanation.
Before his death, Dr. Hatch had written out and sent
to press the first eight Lectures. Of these he had cor-
rected six, while the proofs of the seventh and eighth,
with some corrections in his own hand, were found among
his papers. As regards these two, the duties of the editor
were simple: he had only to correct them for the press.
But as regards the remaining four Lectures, the work
was much more arduous and responsible. A continuous
MS., or even a connected outline of any one of the
Lectures, could not be said to exist. The Lectures had
indeed been delivered a year and a half before, but the
delivery had been as it were of selected passages, with
the connections orally supplied, while the Lecturer did
not always follow the order of his notes, or, as we know
from the Lectures he himself prepared for the press, the
one into which he meant to work his finished material.
What came into the editor’s hands was a series of note-
vi PREFACE.
books, which seemed at first sight but an amorphous mass
or collection of hurried and disconnected jottings, now in
ink, now in pencil; with a multitude of cross references
made by symbols and abbreviations whose very significance
had to be laboriously learned; with abrupt beginnings
and still more abrupt endings; with pages crowded with
successive strata, as it were, of reflections and references,
followed by pages almost or entirely blank, speaking of
sections or fields meant to be further explored; with an
equal multitude of erasures, now complete, now incom-
plete, now cancelled; with passages marked as trans-
posed or as to be transposed, or with a sign of interroga-
tion which indicated, now a suspicion as to the validity
or accuracy of a statement, now a simple suspense of
judgment, now a doubt as to position or relevance, now
a simple query as of one asking, Have I not said this, or
. something like this, before? In a word, what we had
were the note-books of the scholar and the literary work-
man, well ordered, perhaps, as a garden to him who
made it and had the clue to it, but at once a wilderness
and a labyrinth to him who had no hand in its making,
and who had to discover the way through it and out of
it by research and experiment. But patient, and, I will
add, loving and sympathetic work, rewarded the editor
and his kind helpers. The clue was found, the work
proved more connected and continuous than under the
PREFACE. Vii
conditions could have been thought to be possible, and
the result is now presented to the world.
A considerable proportion of the material for the ninth
Lecture had been carefully elaborated; but some of it,
and the whole of the material for the other three, was in
the state just described. This of course added even more
to the responsibilities than to the labours of the editor.
In the body of the Lectures most scrupulous care has
been taken to preserve the author’s zpsissima verba, and,
wherever possible, the structure and form of his sen-
tences. But from the very necessities of the case, the
hand had now and then to be allowed a little more free-
dom; connecting words, headings, and even here and
there a transitional sentence or explanatory clause, had
to be added; but in no single instance has a word,
phrase or sentence been inserted in the text without
warrant from some one part or another of these crowded
note-books. With the foot-notes it has been different.
One of our earliest and most serious difficulties was to
find whence many of the quotations, especially in the
ninth Lecture, came. The author’s name was given, but
often no clue to the book or chapter. We have been, I
think, in every case successful in tracing the quotation
to its source. Another difficulty was to connect the
various references with the paragraph, sentence or state-
ment, each was meant to prove. This involved a new
Vili PREFACE.
labour; the sources had to be consulted alike for the
purposes of verification and determination of relevance
and place. The references, too, in the note-books were
often of the briefest, given, as it were, in algebraics, and
they had frequently to be expanded and corrected ;
while the search into the originals led now to the making
of excerpts, and now to the discovery of new authorities
which it seemed a pity not to use. As a result, the
notes to Lecture IX. are mainly the author’s, though all
as verified by other hands; but the notes to Lecture X.,
and in part also XI., are largely the editor’s. This is
stated in order that all responsibility for errors and
inaccuracies may be laid at the proper door. It seemed
to the editor that, while he could do little to make the
text what the author would have made it if it had been
by his own hand prepared for the press, he was bound,
in the region where the state of the MSS. made a discreet
use of freedom not only possible but compulsory, to
make the book as little unworthy of the scholarship and
scrupulous accuracy of the author as it was in his power
to do.
The pleasant duty remains of thanking two friends
who have greatly lightened my labours. The first is
Vernon Bartlet, M.A.; the second, Professor Sanday.
Mr. Bartlet’s part has been the heaviest; without him
the work could never have been done. He laboured at
PREFACE. ix
the MSS. till the broken sentences became whole, and
the disconnected paragraphs wove themselves together ;
and then he transcribed the black and bewildering pages
into clear and legible copy for the printer. He had
heard the Lectures, and had happily taken a few notes,
which, supplemented from other sources, proved most
helpful, especially in the way of determining the order
to be followed. He has indeed been in every way a
most unwearied and diligent co-worker. To him we also
owe the Synopsis of Contents and the Index. Professor
Sanday has kindly read over all the Lectures that have
passed under the hands of the editor, and has furnished
him with most helpful criticisms, suggestions, and emen-
dations.
The work is sent out with a sad gratitude. I am
grateful that it has been possible so far to fulfil the
author’s design, but sad because he no longer lives to
serve the cause he loved so well. This is not the place
to say a word either in criticism or in praise of him or
his work. Those of us who knew him know how little
a book like this expresses his whole mind, or represents
all that in this field he had it in him to do.
The book is an admirable illustration of his method ;
in order to be judged aright, it ought to be judged
within the limits he himself has drawn. It is a study
in historical development, an analysis of some of the
x PREFACE.
formal factors that conditioned a given process and de-
termined a given result; but it deals throughout solely
with these formal factors and the historical conditions
under which they operated. He never intended to dis-
cover or discuss the transcendental causes of the process
on the one hand, or to pronounce on the value or validity
of the result on the other. His purpose, like his method,
was scientific; and as an attempt at the scientific treatment
of the growth and formulation of ideas, of the evolution
and establishment of usages within the Christian Church,
it ought to be studied and criticised. Behind and be-
neath his analytical method was a constructive intellect,
and beyond his conclusions was a positive and co-ordi-
nating conception of the largest and noblest order. To
his mind every species of mechanical Deism was alien ;
and if his method bears hardly upon the traditions
and assumptions by which such a Deism still lives in
the region of early ecclesiastical history, it was only
that he might prepare the way for the coming of a faith
and a society that should be worthier of the Master he
loved and the Church he served.
A. M. FarrBairn.
OxrorpD, July, 1890,
SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS.
Lecture I.
INTRODUCTORY.
The Problem : PAGE
How the Church passed from the Sermon on the Mount to
the Nicene Creed; the change in spirit coincident with
a change in soil δεν ae ΤΕ Beis mr aaa) te
The need of caution : two preliminary considerations δὸς 2
1. A religion relative to the whole mental attitude of an age:
hence need to estimate the general attitude of the Greek
mind during the first three centuries a.D. oe cue Dr Ome
2. Every permanent change in religious belief and usage
rooted in historical conditions: roots of the Gospel in
Judaism, but of fourth century Christianity—the key
to historical—in Hellenism ... aoe m me .45 Ὁ
The Method :
Evidence as to process of change scanty, but ample and
representative as to ante-Nicene Greek thought and
post-Nicene Christian thought. Respects in which evi-
dence defective [αι iS ae ἐπε ... ὅπ-ὶ0
Two resulting tendencies:
1. To overrate the value of the surviving evidence.
2. To under-estimate opinions no longer accessible or known
only through opponents Shs τὰν ais ee 10
Hence method, the correlation of antecedents and consequents 11—13
Antecedents : sketch of the phenomena of Hellenism ... 13, 14
Consequents: changes in original Christian ideas and usages 14
xil SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
Attitude of mind required ae ΣῈ ae aoe oes 15
1. Demand upon attention and imagination ae eg 10,10
2. Personal prepossessions to be allowed for... as i i el Fo
3. Need to observe under-currents, e.g.
(a) The dualistic τορος εν its bearing on se
and exorcism... ; ve Pere Be
(Ὁ) The nature of religion, e.g. its Stan to conscience 21
History as a scientific study: the true apologia in religion 21—24
Lecture II.
GREEK EDUCATION,
The first step a study of environment, particularly as literary.
The contemporary Greek world an educated world in a special
literary sense... Es Si he ae τς 25—27
I. Its forms varied, but all ΩΣ Α
Grammar ΕΣ οἶδα : ean eee 28—30
Rhetoric Ets ὅδ ae 30—32
A “‘lecture-room” PRE τὴ ote eee 32—35
II. Its influence shown by :
1. Direct literary evidence ... ant eee 35—37
2. Recognized and lucrative position of the teaching
profession ae ies re oer 37—40
3. Social position of its professors ... οἷς: 40---42
4, Its persistent survival up to to-day in general
education, in special terms and usages ... 42—48
Into such an artificial habit of mind Christianity came ... 48, 49
Lecture III.
GREEK AND CHRISTIAN EXEGESIS.
To the Greek the mystery of writing, the reverence for antiquity,
the belief in inspiration, gave the ancient poets a unique
value ... “a 4 οὖν dies ‘ie 50, 51
SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS. xiii
PAGE
Homer, his place in moral education ; used by the Sophists Σ
ethics, physics, metaphysics, ὅθ. .... oe de 52—57
Apologies for this use culminate in allegory, especially
among the Stoics a = ae Se 57—64
The Allegoric temper widespread, particularly in things religious.
Adopted by Hellenistic Jews, ree at Alexandria ;
Pinlow.. oe oe wh 65—69
Continued by early Christian exegesis in varied schools,
chiefly as regards the Prophets, in harmony with Greek
thought, and as a main line of apologetic ἊΣ 69—74
Application to the New Testament writings ἢ the Gnostics
and the Alexandrines ee a) . 75, 76
Its aid as solution of the Old ΕΝΕῊΝ cesta ΤΠ in
Origen ane Sas ae καὶ sale τὰ 71---19
Reactions both Hellenic and Christian: viz. in
1. The Apologists’ polemic against Greek mythology ... 79, 80
2. The Philosophers’ polemic against Christianity τις 80
3. Certain Christian Schools, especially the Antiochene 81], 82
Here hampered by dogmatic complications... oes A 82
Use and abuse of allegory—the poetry of life ... coe ... 82, 83
Alien to certain drifts of the modern spirit, viz.
1. Historic handling of literature ... ve se oo 84
2. Recognition of the living voice of God age ... 84, 85
Lecture IV.
GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.
The period one of widely diffused literary culture.
The Rhetorical Schools, old and new... ae 86—88
Sophistic largely pursued the old lines of Rhetoric, but also
philosophized and preached professionally ... ἘΠ 88—94
Its manner of discourse; its rewards .... ue 94—99
Objections of earnest men; reaction led by Stoics like Epic-
tetus ... Loe ae εἰς oot $3: ai 99—105
xiv SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
Significance for Christianity ... ak ot oe oes) ΠΙΘΕΘ Ὁ
Primitive Christian “ prophesying” w. later “ preaching.”
Preaching of composite origin: its essence and form, e.g. in
fourth century, a.D.: preachers sometimes itinerant 105—113
Summary and conclusions ee “τῷ ΕΞ soe 1138—115
Lecture V.
CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
Abstract ideas among the Greeks, who were hardly aware of the
different degrees of precision possible in mathematies and
philosophy ... apie δι as ae ads 116—118
Tendency to define strong with them, apart from any
criterion ; hence dogmas oh ΑΝ τὰς 118—120
Dogmatism, amid decay of originality: reaction towards doubt;
yet Dogmatism regnant ie τὸν Se so 120—123
“ Palestinian Philosophy,” a complete contrast ἘΠ 128, 124
Fusion of these in the Old Catholic Church achieved through
an underlying kinship of ideas τὸς eae ome 125, 126
Explanations of this from both sides aoe oe 126—128
Philosophical Judaism as a bridge, e.g., in allegorism and
cosmology aad ; = te ὍΣ 128, 129
Christian philosophy partly ΤῊΣ ὡς partly speculative.
Alarm of Conservatives: the second century one of tran-
sition and conflict cae τὰς εν ἐδὲ 130—133
The issue, compromise, and a certain habit of mind ... 133, 134
Summary answer to the main question oes eee Pe 1:
The Greek mind seen in:
1. The tendency to define co “és cos picnic
2. The tendency to speculate... εἶς seu ide 86
3. The point of emphasis, i.e. ἐν οὐ να $6 pail 157
Further development in the West. But Greece the source of
the true damnosa hereditas ... ae be on 137, 138
SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS. ΧΥ͂
Lecture VI.
GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
PAGE
The average morality of the age: its moral philosophy 139, 140
An age of moral reformation... oa 140—142
1. Relation of ethics to shilosbihy old life See ww. 142
Revived practical bent of Stoicism ; Epictetus 143—147
A moral gymnastic cultivated . dee cod LA
(1) Askesis (ἄσκησις): Philo, Epictetus, Dio
Chrysostom ΕΣ 148—150
(2) The “ philosopher” or ioral fefornier ide 150—152
2. The contents of ethical teaching, marked by a religious
reference. Epictetus’ two maxims, “ Follow Nature,”
“Follow God” ΒΒ ae aes Ἢ 152—155
Christian ethics show agreement amid difference ; based upon
the Divine command ; idea of sin: agreement most empha-
sized at first, ie. the importance of conduct ἢ 158, 159
1. Tone of earliest Christian writings: the ““Two Ways :”
Apostolical Constitutions, Bk. 1. ... ne 159—162
2. Place of discipline in Christian life: Puritan ideal v.
later corpus permixtum Σ ame τον 162—164
Further developments due to Greece :
1. A Church within the Church: askesis, Monas-
ticism ... ate ἘΣ "Εἰ nen mae 164—168
2. Resulting deterioration of average ethics: Ambrose of
Milan soz Hens aft “οι ee 168, 169
Complete victory of Greek ethics seen in the basis of modern
society » a ' a Me Ὶ ᾿ ἐκ} ν > ἢ fut
cee HOE gure - ἐὰν ΠΤ ΚΗ ἀν ἔν Ϊ 1 itt i εὐ δὴ π᾿
ἐπὶ μον Ove ee vere ak
οὐ a5 ἂν Ἄ ΠΗ iy τ ὌΝ ERY 9: ἡ MP 9 tans, δὶ ae a
δ £s ν᾽ is “ 4 ‘ © Pe τω a ἣ»
"τ IRR Wee SE ΠΕΣ tall theo bat: ἡ αὐ δε σΥ Ὁ
ΤΣ ‘ > ὶ ve a ,
he es 3 ¥} Ἂ ἵ nt divaces ἔν f old ccroods sda
τι si er τ ΓΟ a vee
δ " + fi; . ty ‘Peeeal πα" on ὃ vi “41 ὃ sa πὰς
"δὲ δ) ay? »*? ΠῚ ft wee of a the ᾿ aay avi iar το tt
᾿ ΠῚ ὐῷῳ .. ae ve gee ~ ete
τὰ Σ © ms τ ΄
ῃ Pe hantiatty νὴ sterorel ori ἔπη οἷν “ἢ διχῇ wi
la eee ate i ΧΩ
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Lecrure I.
TN ERO ClO iY.
Iv is impossible for any one, wl.ether he be a student
of history or no, to fail to notice a difference of both
form and content between the Sermon on the Mount and
the Nicene Creed. The Sermon on the Mount is the
promulgation of a new law of conduct; it assumes beliefs
rather than formulates them; the theological conceptions
which underlie it belong to the ethical rather than the
speculative side of theology; metaphysics are wholly
absent. The Nicene Creed is a statement partly of his-
torical facts and partly of dogmatic inferences; the meta-
physical terms which it contains would probably have
been unintelligible to the first disciples; ethics have no
place in it. The one belongs to a world of Syrian
peasants, the other to a world of Greek philosophers.
The contrast is patent. If any one thinks that it is
sufficiently explained by saying that the one is a sermon
and the other a creed, it must be pointed out in reply
that the question why an ethical sermon stood in the
forefront of the teaching of Jesus Christ, and a meta-
physical creed in the forefront of the Christianity of the
fourth century, is a problem which claims investigation.
It claims investigation, but it has not yet been inves-
B
2 I. INTRODUCTORY.
tigated. There have been inquiries, which in some cases
have arrived at positive results, as to the causes of par-
ticular changes or developments in Christianity—the
development, for example, of the doctrine of the Trinity,
or of the theory of a Catholic Church. But the main
question to which I invite your attention is antecedent
to all such inquiries. It asks, not how did the Christian
societies come to believe one proposition rather than
another, but how did they come to the frame of mind
which attached importance to either the one or the other,
and made the assent to the one rather than the other a
condition of membership.
In investigating this problem, the first point that is
obvious to an inquirer is, that the change in the centre
of gravity from conduct to belief is coincident with the
transference of Christianity from a Semitic to a Greek
soil. The presumption is that it was the result of Greek
influence. It will appear from the Lectures which follow
that this presumption is true. Their general subject is,
consequently, The Influence of Greece upon Christianity.
The difficulty, the interest, and the importance of the
subject make it incumbent upon us to approach it with
caution. It is necessary to bear many points in mind
as we enter upon it; and I will begin by asking your
attention to two considerations, which, being true of
all analogous phenomena of religious development and
change, may be presumed to be true of the particular
phenomena before us.
1. The first is, that the religion of a given race at a
given time is relative to the whole mental attitude of
I. INTRODUCTORY. 3
that time. It is impossible to separate the religious
phenomena from the other phenomena, in the same way
that you can separate a vein of silver from the rock in
which it is embedded. They are as much determined by
the general characteristics of the race as the fauna and
flora of a geographical area are determined by its soil,
its climate, and its cultivation; and they vary with the
changing characteristics of the race as the fauna and
flora of the tertiary system differ from those of the chalk.
They are separable from the whole mass of phenomena,
not in fact, but only in thought. We may concentrate
our attention chiefly upon them, but they still remain
part of the whole complex life of the time, and they
cannot be understood except in relation to that life. If
any one hesitates to accept this historical induction, I
will ask him to take the instance that lies nearest to him,
and to consider how he could understand the religious
phenomena of our own country in our own time—its
doubts, its hopes, its varied enterprises, its shifting
enthusiasms, its noise, its learning, its eestheticism, and
its philanthropies—unless he took account of the growth
of the inductive sciences and the mechanical arts, of the
expansion of literature, of the social stress, of the com-
mercial activity, of the general drift of society towards
its own improvement.
In dealing, therefore, with the problem before us, we
must endeavour to realize to ourselves the whole mental
attitude of the Greek world in the first three centuries
of our era. We must take account of the breadth and
depth of its education, of the many currents of its philo-
sophy, of its love of literature, of its scepticism and its
B 2
4 I, INTRODUCTORY.
mysticism. We must gather together whatever evidence
we can find, not determining the existence or measuring
the extent of drifts of thought by their literary expres-
sion, but taking note also of the testimony of the monu-
ments of art and history, of paintings and sculptures, of
inscriptions and laws. In doing so, we must be content,
at any rate for the present and until the problem has
been more fully elaborated, with the broader features
both of the Greek world and of the early centuries. The
distinctions which the precise study of history requires
us to draw between the state of thought of Greece proper
and that of Asia Minor, and between the age of the
Antonines and that of the Severi, are not necessary for
our immediate purpose, and may be left to the minuter
research which has hardly yet begun.
2. The second consideration is, that no permanent
change takes place in the religious beliefs or usages of
a race which is not rooted in the existing beliefs and
usages of that race. The truth which Aristotle enun-
ciated, that all intellectual teaching is based upon what
is previously known to the person taught,! is applicable
to a race as well as to an in lividual, and to beliefs even
more than to knowledge. A religious change is, like a
physiological change, of the nature of assimilation by,
and absorption into, existing elements. The religion
which our Lord preached was rooted in Judaism. It
came ‘not to destroy, but to fulfil.’ It took the Jewish
1 πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προὐπαρχούσης
γίνεται γνώσεως (Arist. Anal. post. 1. 1, p. 71). John Philoponus, in
his note on the passage, points out that emphasis is laid upon the word
διανοητική, in antithesis to sensible knowledge, ἡ yap αἰσθητικὴ γνῶσις
οὐκ ἔχει προὐποκειμένην γνῶσιν (Schol. ed. Brandis, p. 196 ὁ).
-
I. INTRODUCTORY. 9
conception of a Father in heaven, and gave it a new
meaning. It took existing moral precepts, and gave
them a new application. The meaning and the applica-
tion had already been anticipated in some degree by the
Jewish prophets. There were Jewish minds which had γι Per:
been ripening for them; and so far as they were ripe for Frets ἢ
them, they received them. In a similar way we shall
find that the Greek Christianity of the fourth century
was rooted in Hellenism. The Greek minds which had
been ripening for Christianity had absorbed new ideas
and new motives; but there was a continuity between
their present and their past; the new ideas and new
motives mingled with the waters of existing currents ;
and it is only by examining the sources and the volume
of the previous flow that we shall understand how it is
that the Nicene Creed rather than the Sermon on the
Mount has formed the dominant clement in Aryan ἢ
Christianity.
The method of the investigation, like that of all inves-
tigations, must be determined by the nature of the evi-
dence. The special feature of the evidence which affects
the method is, that it is ample in regard to the causes,
and ample also in regard to the effects, but scanty in
regard to the process of change.
We have ample evidence in regard to the state of
Greek thought during the ante-Nicene period. The
writers shine with a dim and pallid light when put side
by side with the master-spirits of the Attic age; but
their lesser importance in the scale of genius rather adds
to than diminishes from their importance as representa-
6 I. INTRODUCTORY.
tives. They were more the children of their time. They
are consequently better evidence as to the currents of its
thought than men who supremely transcended it. I will
mention those from whom we shall derive most informa-
tion, in the hope that you will in course of time become
familiar, not only with their names, but also with their
works. Dio of Prusa, commonly known as Dio Chry-
sostom, ‘¢ Dio of the golden mouth,” who was raised above
the class of travelling orators to which he belonged, not
only by his singular literary skill, but also by the nobility
of his character and the vigour of his protests against
political unrighteousness. Epictetus, the lame slave, the
Socrates of his time, in whom the morality and the reli-
gion of the Greek world find their sublimest expression,
and whose conversations and lectures at Nicopolis, taken
down, probably in short-hand, by a faithful pupil, reflect
exactly, as in a photograph, the interior life of a great
moralist’s school. Plutarch, the prolific essayist and
diligent encyclopzedist, whose materials are far more
valuable to us than the edifices which he erects with
them. Maximus of Tyre, the eloquent preacher, in whom
the cold metaphysics of the Academy are transmuted into
a glowing mysticism. Marcus Aurelius, the imperial
philosopher, in whose mind the fragments of many phi-
losophies are lit by hope or darkened by despair, as the
clouds float and drift in uncertain sunlight or in gathered
gloom before the clearing rain. Lucian, the satirist and
wit, the prose Aristophanes of later Greece. Sextus
Empiricus, whose writings—or the collection of writings
are the richest of all mines
for the investigation of later Greek philosophy. Philo-
gathered under his name
I. INTRODUCTORY. 7
stratus, the author of a great religious romance, and of
many sketches of the lives of contemporary teachers. It
will hardly be an anachronism if we add to these the
great syncretist philosopher, Philo of Alexandria ; for, on
the one hand, he was more Greek than Jew, and, on the
other, several of the works which are gathered together
under his name seem to belong to a generation subse-
quent to his own, and to be the only survivors of the
Judeo-Greek schools which lasted on in the great cities
of the empire until the verge of Christian times.
We have ample evidence also as to the state of Chris-
tian thought in the post-Nicene period. The Fathers
Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of
Nyssa, and Cyril of Jerusalem, the decrees of general
and local Councils, the apocryphal and pseudonymous
literature, enable us to form a clear conception of the
change which Greek influences had wrought.
But the evidence as to the mode in which the causes
operated within the Christian sphere before the final
effects were produced is singularly imperfect. If we
look at the literature of the schools of thought which
ultimately became dominant, we find that it consists for
the most part of some accidental survivals.1 It tells us
about some parts of the Christian world, but not about
others. It represents a few phases of thought with
1 Tertullian (adv. Valentin. c. 5) singles out four writers of the
previous generation whom he regards as standing on an equal footing :
Justin, Miltiades, Irenzus, Proculus. Of these, Proculus has entirely
perished ; of Miltiades, only a few fragments remain ; Justin survives
in only asingle MS. (see A. Harnack, Texte und Untersuchungen, Bd. 1.1,
die Ueberlieferung der griechischen Apologeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts) ;
and the greater part of Irenzeus remains only in a Latin translation,
5 I, INTRODUCTORY.
adequate fulness, and of others it presents only a few
fossils. In regard to Palestine, which in the third and
fourth centuries was a great centre of culture, we have
only the evidence of Justin Martyr. In regard to Asia
Minor, which seems to have been the chief crucible for
the alchemy of transmutation, we have but such scanty
fragments as those of Melito and Gregory of Neoceesarea.
The largest and most important monuments are those of
Alexandria, the works of Clement and Origen, which
represent a stage of singular interest in the process of
philosophical development. Of the Italian writers, we
have little that is genuine besides Hippolytus. Of Gal-
lican writers, we have chiefly [renzeus, whose results are
important as being the earliest formulating of the opinions
which ultimately became dominant, but whose method is
mainly interesting as an example of the dreary polemics
of the rhetorical schools. Of African writers, we have
Tertullian, a skilled lawyer, who would in modern times
have taken high rank as a pleader at the bar or as a
leader of Parliamentary debate; and Cyprian, who sur-
vives chiefly as a champion of the sacerdotal hypothesis,
and whose vigorous personality gave him a moral influ-
ence which was far beyond the measure of his intellectual
powers. The evidence is not only imperfect, but also
insufficient in relation to the effects that were produced.
Writers of the stamp of Justin and Irenzeus are wholly
inadequate to account for either the conversion of the
educated world to Christianity, or for the forms which
Christianity assumed when the educated world had —
moulded it.
And if we look for the literature of the schools of
I. INTRODUCTORY. 9
thought which were ultimately branded as heretical, we
look almost wholly in vain. What the earliest Christian
philosophers thought, we know, with comparatively in-
significant exceptions, only from the writings of their
opponents. ‘They were subject to a double hate—that
of the heathen schools which they had left, and that of
the Christians who were saying ‘‘ Non possumus” to
philosophy.t' The little trust that we can place in the
accounts which their opponents give of them is shown
by the wide differences in those accounts. Each oppo-
nent, with the dialectical skill which was common at the
time, selected, paraphrased, distorted, and re-combined
the points which seemed to him to be weakest. The
result is, naturally, that the accounts which the several
opponents give are so different in form and feature as
to be irreconcilable with one another.? It was so also
with the heathen opponents of Christianity. With one
1 Marcion, in the sad tone of one who bitterly felt that every man’s
hand was against him, addresses one of his disciples as “ my partner
in hate and wretchedness” (συμμισούμενον καὶ συνταλαίπωρον, Tert.
adv. Mare. 4. 9).
2 Examples are the accounts of Basilides in Clement of Alexandria
and Hippolytus, compared with those in Irenzeus and Epiphanius ; and
the accounts of the Ophites in Hippolytus, compared with those of
Irveneus and Epiphanius. The literature of the subject is considerable:
see especially A. Hilgenfeld, die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenthums
(e.g. p. 202); R. A. Lipsius, zur Quellenkritik des Epiphanios ; and
A. Harnack, zur Quellenkritik der Geschichte des Gnosticismus.
° The very names of most of the heathen opponents are lost : Lac-
tantius (5. 4) speaks of “plurimos et multis in locis et non modo
Grecis sed etiam Latinis litteris.” But for the ordinary student, Keim’s
remarkable restoration of the work of Celsus from the quotations of
Origen, with its wealth of illustrative notes, compensates for many
losses (Th. Keim, Celsus’ Wahres Wort, Ziirich, 1873).
10 I. INTRODUCTORY.
important exception, we cannot tell how the new religion
struck a dispassionate outside observer, or why it was
that it left so many philosophers outside its fold. Then,
as now, the forces of human nature were at work. The
tendency to disparage and suppress an opponent is not
peculiar to the early ages of Christianity. When the
associated Christian communities won at length their
hard-fought battle, they burned the enemy’s camp.
This fact of the scantiness and inadequacy of the
evidence as to the process of transformation has led to
two results which constitute difficulties and dangers in
our path.
1. The one is the tendency to overrate the value of
the evidence that has survived. When only two or three
monuments of a great movement remain, it is difficult to
appreciate the degree in which those monuments are
representative. We tend at almost all times to attach
an exaggerated importance to individual writers; the
writers who have moulded the thoughts of their contem-
poraries, instead of being moulded by them, are always
few in number and exceptional. We tend also to attach
an undue importance to phrases which occur in such
writers; few, if any, writers write with the precision of
a legal document, and the inverted pyramids which have
been built upon chance phrases of Clement or Justin are
monuments of caution which we shall do well to keep
before our eyes.
2. The other is the tendency to under-estimate the
importance of the opinions that have disappeared from
sight, or which we know only in the form and to the
extent of their quotation by their opponents. If we were
I. INTRODUCTORY. 11
to trust the histories that are commonly current, we
should believe that there was from the first a body of
doctrine of which certain writers were the recognized
exponents; and that outside this body of doctrine there
was only the play of more or less insignificant opinions,
like a fitful guerilla warfare on the flanks of a great
army. Whereas what we really find on examining the
evidence is, that out of a mass of opinions which for a
long time fought as equals upon equal ground, there was
formed a vast alliance which was strong enough to shake
off the extremes at once of conservatism and of specu-
lation, but in which the speculation whose monuments
have perished had no less a share than the conservatism
of which some monuments have survived.
This survey of the nature of the evidence enables us
to determine the method which we should follow. We can
trace the causes and we can see the effects; but we have
only scanty information as to the intermediate processes.
If the evidence as to those processes existed in greater
mass, if the writings of those who made the first tenta-
tive efforts to give to Christianity a Greek form had been
preserved to us, it might have been possible to follow in
order of time and country the influence of the several
groups of ideas upon the several groups of Christians.
This method hasbeen attempted, with questionable success,
by some of those who have investigated the history of
particular doctrines. But it is impossible to deprecate
too strongly the habit of erecting theories upon historical
quicksands; and I propose to pursue the surer path to
which the nature of the evidence points, by stating the
12 I. INTRODUCTORY.
eauses, by viewing them in relation to the effects, and
by considering how far they were adequate in respect of
both mass and complexity to produce those effects.
There is a consideration in favour of this method which
is in entire harmony with that which arises from the
nature of the evidence. It is, that the changes that took
place were gradual and at first hardly perceptible. It
would probably be impossible, even if we were in posses-
sion of ampler evidence, to assign a definite cause and a
definite date for the introduction of each separate idea.
For the early years of Christianity were in some respects
like the early years of our lives. It has sometimes been
thought that those early years are the most important
years in the education of all of us. We learn then, we
hardly know how, through effort and struggle and inno-
cent mistakes, to use our eyes and our ears, to measure
distance and direction, by a process which ascends by
unconscious steps tothe certainty which we feel in our
maturity. We are helped in doing so, to an incalculable
degree, by the accumulated experience of mankind which
is stored up in language; but the growth is our own, the
unconscious development of our own powers. It was in
some such unconscious way that the Christian thought
of the earlier centuries gradually acquired the form which
we find when it emerges, as it were, into the developed
manhood of the fourth century. Greek philosophy helped
its development, as language helps a child; but the assi-
milation of it can no more be traced from year to year
than the growth of the body can be traced from day to
day.
We shall begin, therefore, by looking at the several
I. INTRODUCTORY. 13
groups of facts of the age in which Christianity grew,
and endeavour, when we have looked at them, to estimate
their influence upon it.
We shall look at the facts which indicate the state of
education: we shall find that it was an age that was
penetrated with culture, and that necessarily gave to all
ideas which it absorbed a cultured and, so to speak,
scholastic form.
We shall look at the facts which indicate the state of
literature: we shall find that it was an age of great lite-
rary activity, which was proud of its ancient monuments,
and which spent a large part of its industry in endea-
vouring to interpret and to imitate them.
We shall look at the facts which indicate the state of
philosophy: we shall find that it was an age in which
metaphysical conceptions had come to occupy relatively
the same place which the conceptions of natural science
occupy among ourselves; and that just as we tend to
look upon external things in their chemical and physical
relations, so there was then, as it were, a chemistry and
physics of ideas.
We shall look at the facts which indicate the state of
moral ideas: we shall find that it was an age in which
the ethical forces of human nature were struggling with
an altogether unprecedented force against the degradation
of contemporary society and contemporary religion, and
in which the ethical instincts were creating the new
ideal of ‘‘following God,” and were solving the old
question whether there was or was not an art of life by
practising self-discipline.
We shall look at the facts which indicate the state of
14 I. INTRODUCTORY.
theological ideas: we shall find that it was an age in
which men were feeling after God and not feeling in
vain, and that from the domains of ethics, physics, meta-
physics alike, from the depths of the moral consciousness,
and from the cloud-lands of poets’ dreams, the ideas of
men were trooping in one vast host to proclaim with a
united voice that there are not many gods, but only One,
one First Cause by whom all things were made, one
Moral Governor whose providence was over all His
works, one Supreme Being “of infinite power, wisdom,
and goodness.”
We shall look at the facts which indicate the state of
religion: we shall find that it was an age in which the
beliefs that had for centuries been evolving themselves
from the old religions were showing themselves in new
forms of worship and new conceptions of what God
needed in the worshipper; in which also the older ani-
malism was passing into mysticism, and mysticism was
the preparation of the soul for the spiritual religion of
the time to come.
We shall then, in the case of each great group of ideas,
endeavour to ascertain from the earliest Christian docu-
ments the original Christian ideas upon which they acted;
and then compare the later with the earlier form of those
Christian ideas; and finally examine the combined result
of all the influences that were at work upon the mental
attitude of the Christian world and upon the basis of
Christian association.
I should be glad if I could at once proceed to examine
some of these groups of facts. But since the object
I. INTRODUCTORY. 15
which I have in view is not so much to lead you to any
conclusions of my own, as to invite you to walk with me
in comparatively untrodden paths, and to urge those of
you who have leisure for historical investigations to
explore them for yourselves more fully than I have been
able to do—and since the main difficulties of the investi-
gation lie less in the facts themselves than in the attitude
of mind in which they are approached—I feel that I
should fail of my purpose if I did not linger still upon
the threshold to say something of the “personal equa- ἡ
tion’? that we must make before we can become either
accurate observers or impartial judges. There is the
more reason for doing so, because the study of Christian
history is no doubt discredited by the dissonance in the
voices of its exponents. An ill-informed writer may
state almost any propositions he pleases, with the certainty
of finding listeners; a well-informed writer may state
propositions which are as demonstrably true as any his-
torical proposition can be, with the certainty of being
contradicted. There is no court of appeal, nor will there
be until more than one generation has been engaged
upon the task to which I am inviting you.
1. In the first place, it is necessary to take account of
the demand which the study makes upon the attention
and the imagination of the student. The scientific, that
is the accurate, study of history is comparatively new.
The minute care which is required in the examination
of the evidence for the facts, and the painful caution
which is required in the forming of inferences, are but
inadequately appreciated. The study requires not only
attention, but also imagination. A student must have
10 I. INTRODUCTORY.
something analogous to the power of a dramatist before
he can realize the scenery of a vanished age, or watch,
as in a moving panorama, the series and sequence of its
events. He must have that power in a still greater
degree before he can so throw himself into a bygone
time as to be able to enter into the motives of the actors,
and to imagine how, having such and such a character,
and surrounded by such and such circumstances, he
would himself have thought and felt and acted. But
the greatest demand that can be made upon either the
attention or the imagination of a student is that which is
made by such a problem as the present, which requires
us to realize the attitude of mind, not of one man, but of
a generation of men, to move with their movements, to
float upon the current of their thoughts, and to pass with
them from one attitude of mind into another.
2. In the second place, it is necessary to take account
of our own personal prepossessions. Most of us come to
the study of the subject already knowing something
about it. Itis a comparatively easy task for a lecturer
to present, and for a hearer to realize, an accurate picture
of, for example, the religion of Mexico or of Peru,
because the mind of the student when he begins the
study is a comparatively blank sheet. But most of us
bring to the study of Christian history a number of con-
clusions already formed. We tend to beg the question
before we examine it.
We have before us, on the one hand, the ideas and
usages of early Christianity; on the other hand, the
ideas and usages of imperial Greece.
We bring to the former the thoughts, the associations,
I. INTRODUCTORY. 17
the sacred memories, the happy dreams, which have been
rising up round us, one by one, since our childhood.
Even if there be some among us who in the maturity of
their years have broken away from their earlier moorings,
these associations still tend to remaim. They are not
confined to those of us who not only consciously retain
them, but also hold their basis to be true. They linger
unconsciously in the minds of those who scem most reso-
lutely to have abandoned them.
We bring to the latter, most of us, a similar wealth of
associations which have come to us through our educa-
tion. The ideas with which we have to deal are mostly
expressed in terms which are common to the early cen-
turies of Christianity, and to the Greek literature of five
centuries before. The terms are the same, but their
meaning is different. Those of us who have studied
Greek literature tend to attach to them the connotation
which they had at Athens when Greck literature was in
its most perfect flower. We ignore the long interval of
time, and the new connotation which, by an inevitable
law of language, had in the course of centuries clustered
round the old nucleus of meaning. The terms have in
some cases come down by direct transmission into our
own language. They have in such cases gathered to
themselves wholly new meanings, which, until we con-
sciously hold them up to the light, seem to us to form
part of the original meaning, and are with difficulty
disentangled.
We bring to both the Christian and the Greek world
the inductions respecting them which have been already
made by ourselves and by others. We have in those
C
18 I. INTRODUCTORY.
inductions so many moulds, so to speak, into which we
press the plastic statements of early writers. We assume
the primitiveness of distinctions which for the most part
represent only the provisional conclusions of earlier gene-
rations of scholars, and stages in our own historical edu-
cation; and we arrange facts in the categories which we
find ready to hand, as Jewish or Gentile, orthodox or
heretical, Catholic or Gnostic, while the question of the
reality of such distinctions and such categories is one of
the main points which our inquiries have to solve.
3. In the third place, it is necessary to take account
of the under-currents, not only of our own age, but of
the past ages with which we have to deal. Every age
has such under-currents, and every age tends to be un-
conscious of them. We ourselves have succeeded to a
splendid heritage. Behind us are the thoughts, the
beliefs, the habits of mind, which have been in process
of formation since the first beginning of our race. They
are inwrought, for the most part, into the texture of our
nature. We cannot transcend them. To them the mass
of our thoughts are relative, and by them the thoughts
of other generations tend to be judged. The importance
of recognizing them as an element in our judgments of
other generations increases in proportion as those genera-
tions recede from our own. In dealing with a country
or a period not very remote, we may not go far wrong in
assuming that its inheritance of ideas is cognate to our
own. But in dealing with a remote country, or a remote
period of time, it becomes of extreme importance to allow
for the difference, so to speak, of mental longitude. The
men of earlier days had other mental scenery round them,
I. INTRODUCTORY. 19
Fewer streams of thought had converged upon them.
Jonsequently, many ideas which were in entire harmony
vith the mental fabric of their time, are unintelligible
vhen referred to the standard of our own; nor can we
mderstand them until we have been at the pains to find
mut the underlying ideas to which they were actually
-elative.
I will briefly illustrate this point by two instances:
(a) We tend to take with us, as we travel into bygone
‘imes, the dualistic hypothesis—which to most of us is no
1ypothesis, but an axiomatic truth—of the existence of
in unbridged chasm between body and soul, matter and
spirit. The relation in our minds of the idea of matter
Ὁ the idea of spirit is such, that though we readily con-
eive matter to act upon matter, and spirit upon spirit,
ve find it difficult or impossible to conceive a direct
ction either of matter upon spirit or of spirit upon
natter. When, therefore, in studying, for example, the
incient rites of baptism, we find expressions which seem
Ὁ attribute a virtue to the material element, we measure
such expressions by a modern standard, and regard them
is containing only an analogy orasymbol. They belong,
n reality, to another phase of thought than our own.
They are an outflow of the earlier conception of matter
md spirit as varying forms of a single substance.}
1 This was the common view of the Stoics, probably following
Anaxagoras or his school; cf. Plutarch [Aetius], de Plac. Philos. 4. 3
Diels, Doxographi Greci, p. 387). It was stated by Chrysippus,
γὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σῶμα
σώματι συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι... . σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή
‘Chrysipp. Fragm. ap. Nemes. de Nat. Hom. 33); by Zeno, in Cie.
C2
20 I. INTRODUCTORY.
“Whatever acts, is body,” it was said. Mind is the
subtlest form of body, but it is body nevertheless. The
conception of a direct action of the one upon the other
presented no difficulty. It was imagined, for instance,
that demons might be the direct causes of diseases,
because the extreme tenuity of their substance enabled
them to enter, and to exercise a malignant influence
upon, the bodies of men. So water, when exorcized from
all the evil influences which might reside in it, actually
cleansed the soul.!| The conception of the process as
symbolical came with the growth of later ideas of the
relation of matter to spirit. It is, so to speak, a ration-
alizing explanation of a conception which the world was
tending to outgrow.
Academ. 1.11. 39; by their followers, Plutarch [ Aetius], de Plac. Philos.
1.11. 4 (Diels, p. 310), οἱ Στωικοὺὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά" πνεύματα
γάρ; so by Seneca, Hpist. 117. 2, ‘“quicquid facit corpus est ;” so
among some Christian writers, 6.5. Tertullian, de Anima, 5.
1 The conception underlies the whole of Tertullian’s treatise, de Bap-
tismo: it accounts for the rites of exorcism and benediction of both
the oil and the water which are found in the older Latin service-books,
e.g. in what is known as the Gelasian Sacramentary, 1. 73 (in Muratori,
Liturgia Romana vetus, vol. i. p. 594), “ exaudi nos omnipotens Deus
et in hujus aque substantiam immitte virtutem ut abluendus per eam
et sanitatem simul et vitam mereatur eternam.” ‘This prayer is imme-
diately followed by an address to the water, “‘ exorcizo te creatura aquae
per Deum vivum...adjuro te per Jesum Christum filium ejus unicum
dominum nostrum ut efficiaris in eo qui in te baptizandus erit fons
aque salientis in vitam eternam, regenerans eum Deo Patri et Filio et
Spiritui Sancto...” So in the Gallican Sacramentary published by
Mabillon (de Liturgia Gallicana libri tres, p. 362), ‘exorcizo te fons
aque perennis per Deum sanctum et Deum verum qui te in principio
ab arida separavit et in quatuor fluminibus terram rigore precepit: sis
aqua sancta, aqua benedicta, abluens sordes et dimittens peccata. .. .”
I. INTRODUCTORY. 21
(Ὁ) We take with us in our travels into the past the
underlying conception of religion as a personal bond
between God and the individual soul. We cannot believe
that there is any virtue in an act of worship in which
the conscience has no place. We can understand, how-
ever much we may deplore, such persecutions as those of
the sixteenth century, because they ultimately rest upon
the same conception: men were so profoundly convinced
of the truth of their own personal beliefs as to deem it
of supreme importance that other men should hold those
beliefs also. But we find it difficult to understand why,
in the second century of our era, a great emperor who
was also a great philosopher should have deliberately per-
secuted Christianity. The difficulty arises from our over-
looking the entirely different aspect under which religion
presented itself to a Roman mind. It was a matter which
lay, not between the soul and God, but between the indi-
vidual and the State. Conscience had no place in it.
Worship was an ancestral usage which the State sanc-
tioned and enforced. It was one of the ordinary duties
of life! The neglect of it, and still more the disavowal
1 These conceptions are found in Xenophon’s account of Socrates,
who quotes more than once the Delphic oracle, 7 τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ
πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Xen. Mem. 1. 3.1, and
again 4. 3. 16: in Epictet. Ench. 31, σπένδειν δὲ καὶ θύειν καὶ ἀπάρ-
χέσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια ἑκάστοις προσήκει : repeatedly in Plutarch, e.g.
de Defect. Orac. 12, p. 416, de Comm. Notit. 51. 1, p. 1074: in the
Aureum Carmen of the later Pythagoreans, ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς
νόμῳ ὡς διάκεινται, τίμα (Frag. Philos. Gree. i. p. 193): and in the
Neoplatonist Porphyry (ad Marcell. 18, p. 286, ed. Nauck), οὗτος γὰρ
μέγιστος καρπὸς εὐσεβείας τιμᾶν τὸ θεῖον κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. The intcl-
lectual opponents of Christianity laid stress upon its desertion of the
ancestral religion ; e.g. Ceecilius in Minucius Felix, Octav. 5, ‘quanto
22 I. INTRODUCTORY.
of it, was a crime. An emperor might pity the offender
for his obstinacy, but he must necessarily either compel
him to obey or punish him for disobedience.
It is not until we have thus realized the fact that the
study of history requires as diligent and as constant an
exercise of the mental powers as any of the physical
sciences, and until we have made what may be called the
‘personal equation,” disentangling ourselves as far as
we can from the theories which we have inherited or
formed, and recognizing the existence of under-currents
of thought in past ages widely different from those which
flow in our own, that we shall be likely to investigate
with success the great problem that hes before us. I
lay stress upon these points, because the interest of the
subject tends to obscure its difficulties. Literature is
full of fancy sketches of early Christianity; they are
written, for the most part, by enthusiasts whose imagi-
nation soars by an easy flight to the mountain-tops which
the historian can only reach by a long and rugged road ;
they are read, for the most part, by those who give them
only the attention which they would give to a shilling
hand-book or to an article in a review. I have no desire,
and I am sure that you have no desire, to add one more
to such fancy sketches. The time has come for a precise
study. The materials for such a study are available.
The method of such a study is determined by canons
which have been established in analogous fields of re-
search. The difficulties of such a study come almost
venerabilius ac melius.... majorum excipere disciplinam, religiones
traditas colere ;” and Celsus in Origen, 6. Cels. 5, 25, 35; ὃ. 57.
I. INTRODUCTORY, (2,35
entirely from ourselves, and it is a duty to begin by
recognizing them.
For the study is one not only of living interest, but
also of supreme importance. Other history may be more
or less antiquarian. Its ultimate result may be only to
gratify our curiosity and to add to the stores of our’
knowledge. But Christianity claims to be a present
guide of our lives. It has been so large a factor in the
moral development of our race, that we cannot set aside
its claim unheard. Neither can we admit it until we
know what Christianity is. A thousand dissonant voices
are each of them professing to speak in its name. The
appeal lies from them to its documents and to its history.
In order to know what it is, we must first know both
what it professed to be and what it has been. The study
of the one is the complement of the other; but it is with
the latter only that we have at present to do. We may
enter upon the study with confidence, because it is a scien-
tific inquiry. We may hear, if we will, the solemn tramp
of the science of history marching slowly, but marching
always to conquest. It is marching in our day, almost
for the first time, into the domain of Christian history.
Upon its flanks, as upon the flanks of the physical
sciences, there are scouts and skirmishers, who venture
sometimes into morasses where there is no foothold, and
into ravines from which there is no issue. But the
science is marching on. ‘Vestigia nulla retrorsum.”
It marches, as the physical sciences have marched, with
the firm tread of certainty. It meets, as the physical
sciences have met, with opposition, and even with con-
tumely. In front of it, as in front of the physical
24 I, INTRODUCTORY.
sciences, is chaos; behind it is order. We may march
in its progress, not only with the confidence of scientific
certainty, but also with the confidence of Christian faith.
It may show some things to be derived which we thought
to be original; and some things to be compound which
we thought to be incapable of analysis; and some things
to be phantoms which we thought to be realities. But
it will add a new chapter to Christian apologetics; it
will confirm the divinity of Christianity by showing it to
be in harmony with all else that we believe to be divine ;
its results will take their place among those truths which
burn in the souls of men with a fire that cannot be
quenched, and light up the darkness of this stormy sca
with a light that is never dim. f
Lecrore II.
GREEK EDUCATION.
Tue gencral result of the considerations to which I
have already invited your attention is, that a study of
the growth and modifications of the early forms of Chris-
tianity must begin with a study of their environment.
For a complete study, it would be necessary to examine
that environment asa whole. In some respects all life
hangs together, and no single element of it is in absolute
isolation. The political and economical features of a
given time affect more or less remotely its literary and
philosophical features, and a complete investigation would
take them all into account. But since life is short, and
human powers are limited, it is necessary in this, as in
many other studies, to be content with something less
than ideal completeness. It will be found sufficient in
practice to deal only with the proximate causes of the
phenomena into which we inquire; and in dealing, as we
shall mainly do, with literary effects, to deal also mainly
with those features of the age which were literary also.
The most general summary of those features is, that
the Greck world of the second and third centuries was,
in a sense which, though not without some just demur,
has tended to prevail ever since, an educated world. It
ν
26 1. GREEK EDUCATION,
was reaping the harvest which many generations had
sown. Five centuries before, the new elements of know-
ledge and cultured speech had begun to enter largely
into the simpler elements of early Greek life. It had
become no longer enough for men to till the ground, or
to pursue their several handicrafts, or to be practised in
the use of arms. The word codes, which in earlier
times had been applied to one who was skilled in any of
the arts of life, who could string a bow or tune a lyre or
even trim a hedge, had come to be applied, if not exclu-
sively, yet at least chiefly, to one who was shrewd with
practical wisdom, or who knew the thoughts and sayings
of the ancients. The original reasons, which lay deep
in the Greek character, for the element of knowledge
assuming this special form, had been accentuated by the
circumstances of later Greek history. There seems to be
little reason in the nature of things why Greece should
not have anticipated modern Europe in the study of
nature, and why knowledge should not have had for its
chief meaning in earlier times that which it is tending to
mean now, the knowledge of the phenomena and laws of
the physical world. The tendency to collect and colligate
and compare the facts of nature appears to be no less
instinctive than the tendency to become acquainted with
the thoughts of those who have gone before us. But
Greece on the one hand had lost political power, and on
the other hand possessed in her splendid literature an
inalienable heritage. She could acquiesce with the greater
equanimity in political subjection, because in the domain
of letters she was still supreme with an indisputable
supremacy. It was natural that she should turn to letters.
II. GREEK EDUCATION. BT
It was natural also that the study of letters should be
reflected upon speech. For the love of speech had become
to a large proportion of Greeks a second nature. They
were a nation of talkers. They were almost the slaves
of cultivated expression. Though the public life out of
which orators had grown had passed away with political
freedom, it had left behind it a habit which in the second
century of our era was blossoming into a new spring.
Like children playing at “make-believe,” when real
speeches in real assemblies became impossible, the Greeks
revived the old practice of public speaking by addressing
fictitious assemblies and arguing in fictitious courts. In
the absence of the distractions of either keen political
struggles at home or wars abroad, these tendencies had
spread themselves over the large surface of general Greek
society. A kind of literary instinct had come to exist.
The mass of men in the Greek world tended to lay stress
on that acquaintance with the literature of bygone gene-
rations, and that habit of cultivated speech, which has
ever since been commonly spoken of as education.
Two points have to be considered in regard to that
education before it can be regarded as a cause in relation
to the main subject which we are examining: we must
look first at its forms, and secondly at its mass. It is
not enough that it should have corresponded in kind to
certain effects; it must be shown to have been adequate
in amount to account for them.
I. The education was almost as complex as our own.
If we except only the inductive physical sciences, it
covered the same field. It was, indeed, not so much
analogous to our own as the cause of it. Our own comes
28 II, GREEK EDUCATION.
by direct tradition from it. It set a fashion which until
recently has uniformly prevailed over the whole civilized
world. We study literature rather than nature because
the Greeks did so, and because when the Romans and
the Roman provincials resolved to educate their sons,
they employed Greek teachers and followed in Greek
paths.
The two main elements were those which have been
already indicated, Grammar and Rhetoric.1
1. By Grammar was meant the study of literature.?
In its original sense of the art of reading and writing,
it began as early as that art begins among ourselves.
“We are given over to Grammar,” says Sextus Empiri-
cus,® “ from childhood, and almost from our baby-clothes.”
But this elementary part of it was usually designated by
another name,* and Grammar itself had come to include
1 The following is designed to be a short account, not of all the
elements of later Greek education, but only of its more prominent and
important features: nothing has been said of those elements of the
ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία Which constituted the medieval guadrivium. The
works bearing on the subject will be found enumerated in K. F. Her-
mann, Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitdten, Bd. iv. p. 302, 3te aufl.
ed. Blumner: the most important of them is Grasberger, Erziehung
und Unterricht im classischen Alterthum, Bd. i. and ii. Wiirzburg, 1864:
the shortest and most useful for an ordinary reader is Ussing, Erziehung
und Jugendunterricht bei den Griechen und Rémern, Berlin, 1885.
2 Litteratura is the Latin for γραμματική : Quintil. 2. 1. 4.
8 Adv. Gramm. 1. 44.
* γρἀμματιστική, Which was taught by the γραμματιστής, whereas
γραμματικὴ was taught by the γραμματικός. The relation between the
two arts is indicated by the fact that in the Edict of Diocletian the fee
of the former is limited to fifty denarii, while that of the latter rises to
two hundred: Hdict. Dioclet. ap. Haenel, Corpus Legum, No. 1054,
p- 178.
lI. GREEK EDUCATION. 29
all that in later times has been designated Belles Lettres.
This comprehensive view of it was of slow growth; con-
sequently, the art is variously defined and divided. The
division which Sextus Empiricus! speaks of as most free
from objection, and which will sufficiently indicate the
general limits of the subject, 15 mto the technical, the
historical, and the exegetical elements. The first of these
was the study of diction, the laying down of canons of
correctness, the distinction between Hellenisms and Bar-
barisms. Upon this as much stress was laid as was laid
upon academic French in the age of Boileau. ‘I owe
to Alexander,” says Marcus Aurelius,” ‘my habit of not
finding fault, and of not using abusive language to those
who utter a barbarous or awkward or unmusical phrase.”
((1 must apologize for the style of this letter,” says the
Christian Father Basil two centuries afterwards, in writing
to his old teacher Libanius; ‘the truth is, I have been in
the company of Moses and Elias, and men of that kind,
who tell us no doubt what is true, but in a barbarous
dialect, so that your instructions have quite gone out of
my head.”? The second element of Grammar was the
study of the antiquities of an author: the explanation of
the names of the gods and heroes, the legends and his-
tories, which were mentioned. It is continued to this
day in most notes upon classical authors. The third
1 Adv. Gramm. 1. 91 sqq., ef. 2b. 250. This is quoted as being most
representative of the period with which these Lectures have mainly to
do. With it may be compared the elaborate account given by Quin-
tilian, 1. 4 sqq.
aap ἢ ΤΣ
3 The substance of Basil’s letter, Hp. 339 (146), tom. iii. p. 455.
There is a charming irony in Libanius’s answer, Ep. 340 (147), zbid.
90 II. GREEK EDUCATION.
element was partly critical, the distinguishing between
true and spurious treatises, or between true and false
readings; but chiefly exegetical, the explanation of an
author’s meaning. It is spoken of as the prophetess of
the poets,! standing to them in the same relation as the
Delphian priestess to her inspiring god.
The main subject-matter of this literary education was
the poets. ‘They were read, not only for their literary,
but also for their moral value.2 They were read as we
read the Bible. They were committed to memory. The
minds of men were saturated with them. A quotation
from Homer or from a tragic poet was apposite on all
occasions and in every kind of society. Dio Chrysostom,
in an account of his travels, tells how he came to the
Greek colony of the Borysthenite, on the farthest borders
of the empire, and found that even in those remote settle-
ments almost all the inhabitants knew the Iliad by heart,
and that they did not care to hear about anything else.?
2. Grammar was succeeded by Rhetoric—the study
of literature by the study of literary expression and quasi-
forensic argument. ‘The two were not sharply distin-
guished in practice, and had some elements in common.
The conception of the one no less than of the other had
widened with time, and Rhetoric, ike Grammar, was
variously defined and divided. It was taught partly by
precept, partly by example, and partly by practice. The
professor either dictated rules and gave lists of selected
1 προφῆτις, Sext. Emp. adv. Gramm. 1. 279.
2 Strabo, 1. 2. 3, od ψυχαγωγίας χάριν δήπουθεν ψιλῆς ἀλλὰ σωφ-
povic pov.
8 Dio Chrys. Orat. xxxvi. vol. ii, p. 51, ed. Dind,
II. GREEK EDUCATION. St
passages of ancient authors, or he read such passages
with comments upon the style, or he delivered model
speeches of his own. The first of these methods has its
literary monument in the hand-books which remain.! The
second survives as an institution in modern times, and
on a large scale, in the University ‘lecture,’ and it has
also left important literary monuments in the Scholia
upon Homer and other great writers. The third method
gave birth to an institution which also survives in modern
times. Hach of these methods was followed by the stu-
dent. He began by committing to memory both the
professor’s rules and also selected passages of good
authors: the latter he recited, with appropriate modula-
tions and gestures, in the presence of the professor. In
the next stage, he made his comments upon them. Here
is a short example which is embedded in Epictetus :? the
student reads the first sentence of Xenophon’s Memora-
bitia, and makes his criticism upon it:
“«T have often wondered what in the world were the grounds
on which...”
Rather ....‘the ground on which....’ It is neater.”
From this, or concurrently with this, the student pro-
ceeded to compositions of his own. Beginning with mere
imitation of style, he was gradually led to invent the
1 These are printed in Walz, Rhetores Greci, vol. i.: the account
here followed is mainly that of the Progymnasmata of Theo of Smyrna
({cire. A.D, 130). There is a letter of Dio Chrysostom, printed among
his speeches, Orat. xvii. περὶ λόγου ἀσκήσεως, ed. Dind. i. 279, con-
sisting of advice to a man who was beginning the study of Rhetoric
late in life, which, without being a formal treatise, gives as good a view
as could be found of the general course of training,
2 Diss. 3. 23. 2U,
82 II, GREEK EDUCATION.
structure as well as the style of what he wrote, and to
vary both the style and the subject-matter. Sometimes he
had the use of the professor’s library;+ and though writ-
ing in his native language, he had to construct his periods
according to rules of art, and to avoid all words for which
an authority could not be quoted, just as if he were an
English undergraduate writing his Greek prose. The
crown of all was the acquisition of the art of speaking
extempore. A student’s education in Rhetoric was finished
_ when he had the power to talk off-hand on any subject
that might be proposed. But whether he recited a pre-
pared speech or spoke off-hand, he was expected to show
the same artificiality of structure and the same pedantry
of diction. ‘‘ You must strip off all that boundless length
of sentences that is wrapped round you,” says Charon to
the rhetorician who is just stepping into his boat, ‘and
those antitheses of yours, and balancings of clauses, and
strange expressions, and all the other heavy weights of
speech (or you will make my boat too heavy).’’?
To a considerable extent there prevailed, in addition
to Belles Lettres and Rhetoric, a teaching of Philoso-
phy. It was the highest element in the education of
the average Greek of the period. Logic, in the form
of Dialectic, was common to Philosophy and Rhetoric.
Every one learnt to argue: a large number learnt, in
addition, the technical terms of Philosophy and the out-
lines of its history. Lucian?® tells a tale of a country
gentleman of the old school, whose nephew went home
from lecture night after night, and regaled his mother
1 Philostr. V. S. 2. 21. 3, of Proclus.
2 Lucian, Dial. Mort. 10. 10. 8 JIermotim. 81.
II, GREEK EDUCATION. 33
and himself with fallacies and dilemmas, talking about
“relations” and ‘‘ comprehensions” and ‘‘ mental presen-
tations,” and jargon of that sort; nay, worse than that,
saying, “that God does not live in heaven, but goes
about among stocks and stones and such-like.” As far
as Logic was concerned, it was almost natural to a Greek
mind: Dialectic was but the conversation of a sharp-
witted people conducted under recognized rules. But
it was a comparatively new phase of Philosophy that it
should have a literary side. It had shared in the common
degeneracy. It had come to take wisdom at second-hand.
It was not the evolution of a man’s own thoughts, but
an acquaintance with the recorded thoughts of others.
It was divorced from practice. It was degraded to a
system of lectures and disputations. It was taught in
the same general way as the studies which preceded it.
But lectures had a more important place. Sometimes
the professor read a passage from a philosopher, and gave
his interpretation of it; sometimes he gave a discourse
of his own. Sometimes a student read an essay of his
own, or interpreted a passage of a philosopher, in the
presence of the professor, and the professor afterwards
pronounced his opinion upon the correctness of the rea-
soning or the interpretation.! The Discourses of Epictetus
have a singular interest in this respect, apart from their
contents; for they are in great measure notes of such
1 There is a good example of the former of these methods in
Maximus of Tyre, Dissert. 33, where § 1 is part of a student’s essay,
and the following sections are the professor’s comments ; and of the
latter in Epictetus, Diss. 1. 10. 8, where the student is said ἀναγνῶναι;
legere, the professor ἐπαναγνῶναι, preclegere.
D
34 II. GREEK EDUCATION.
lectures, and form, as it were, a photograph of a philo-
sopher’s lecture-room.
Against this degradation of Philosophy, not only the
Cynics, but almost all the more serious philosophers pro- .
tested. Though Epictetus himself was a professor, and
though he followed the current usages of professorial
teaching, his life and teaching alike were in rebellion
against it. “If I study Philosophy,” he says, “with a
view only to its literature, I am not a philosopher, but
a littérateur ; the only difference is, that I interpret
Chrysippus instead of Homer.”? They sometimes pro-
tested not only against the degradation of Philosophy,
but also against the whole conception of literary educa-
tion. ‘‘There are two kinds of education,” says Dio
Chrysostom,” “the one divine, the other human; the
divine is great and powerful and easy; the human is
mean and weak, and has many dangers and no small
deceitfulness. The mass of people call it education
(παιδείαν), as being, I suppose, an amusement {παιδίαν),
and think that a man who knows most literature —
Persian and Greek and Syrian and Pheenician—is
the wisest and best-educated man; and then, on the
other hand, when they find a man of this sort to be
vicious and cowardly and fond of money, they think the
education to be as worthless as the man himself. The
other kind they call sometimes education, and sometimes
manliness and high-mindedness. It was thus that the
men of old used to call those who had this good kind
of education—men with manly souls, and educated as
1 Enchir. 49: see also Diss. 3. 21, quoted below, p. 102.
2 Ογαί. iv. vol. i. p. 69, ed. Dind.
II. GREEK EDUCATION. 35
Herakles was—sons of God.” And not less significant
as an indication not only of the reaction against this kind
of education but also of its prevalence, is the deprecation
of it by Marcus Aurelius: ‘I owe it to Rusticus,”’ he
says,! “that I formed the idea of the need of moral refor-
mation, and that I was not diverted to literary ambition,
or to write treatises on philosophical subjects, or to make
rhetorical exhortations... . and that I kept away from
rhetoric and poetry and foppery of speech.”
IJ. I pass from the forms of education to its extent.
The general diffusion of it, and the hold which it had
upon the mass of men, are shown by many kinds of
evidence.
1. They are shown by the large amount of literary
evidence as to scholars and the modes of obtaining edu-
cation. The exclusiveness of the old aristocracy had
broken down. Education was no longer in the hands of
‘private tutors” in the houses of the great families. It
entered public life, and in doing so left a record behind
it. It may be inferred from the extant evidence that
there were grammar-schools in almost every town. At
these all youths received the first part of their education.
But it became a common practice for youths to supple-
ment this by attending the lectures of an eminent pro-
fessor elsewhere. They went, as we might say, from
school to a University. The students who so went away
ie at
2 This higher education was not confined to Rome or Athens, but
was found in many parts of the empire: Marseilles in the time of
Strabo was even more frequented than Athens. There were other
great schools at Antioch and Alexandria, at Rhodes and Smyrna, at
Ephesus and Byzantium, at Naples and Nicopolis, at Bordesux and
D2
50 II. GREEK EDUCATION.
from home were drawn from all classes of the community.
Some of them were very poor, and, like the ‘bettel-
studenten” of the medieval Universities, had sometimes
to beg their bread.! ‘‘ You are a miserable race,” says
Epictetus? to some students of this kind; ‘‘when you
have eaten your fill to-day, you sit down whining about
to-morrow, where to-morrow’s dinner will come from.”
Some of them went because it was the fashion. The
young sybarites of Rome or Athens complained bitterly
that at Nicopolis, where they had gone to listen to Epic-
tetus, lodgings were bad, and the baths were bad, and
the gymnasium was bad, and “society” hardly existed.®
Then, as now, there were home-sick students, and mo-
thers weeping over their absence, and letters that were
looked for but never came, and letters that brought bad
news; and young men of promise who were expected to
return home as living encyclopeedias, but who only raised
doubts when they did return home whether their educa-
tion had done them any good. Then, as now, they went
Autun. The practice of resorting to such schools lasted long. In the
fourth century and among the Christian Fathers, Basil and Gregory
Nazianzen, Augustine and Jerome, are recorded to have followed ii:
the general recognition of Christianity did not seriously affect the cur-
rent educational system: “Through the whole world,” says Augustine
(de utilitate credendi, 7, vol. viii. 76, ed. Migne), “the schools of the
rhetoricians are alive with the din of crowds of students.”
1 There is an interesting instance, at a rather later time, of the
poverty of two students, one of whom afterwards became famous,
Proheresius and Hephestion: they had only one ragged gown between
them, so that while one went to lecture, the other had to stay at home
in bed (Eunap. Prohwres, p. 78).
ἐν Jian, Al. £9., 1.9, 8 Jt. 2.21. 12; 3. 24. 54.
4 7b, 2. 21. 12,13, 15; 3. 24, 22, 24,
II. GREEK EDUCATION. a
from the lecture-room to athletic sports or the theatre;
‘Cand the consequence is,” says Epictetus,! “that you
don’t get out of your old habits or make moral progress.”
Then, as now, some students went, not for the sake of
learning, but in order to be able to show off. Epictetus
draws a picture of one who looked forward to airing his
logic at a city dinner, astonishing the “alderman” who sat
next to him with the puzzles of hypothetical syllogisms.?
And then, as now, those who had followed the fashion
by attending lectures showed by their manner that they
were there against their will. ‘“‘ You should sit upright,”
says Plutarch,’ in his advice to hearers in general, ‘‘ not
lolling, or whispering, or smiling, or yawning as if you
were asleep, or fixing your eyes on the ground instead
’ In a similar way Philo,* also speak-
of on the speaker.’
ing of hearers in general, says: ‘‘Many persons who
come to a lecture do not bring their minds inside with
them, but go wandering about outside, thinking ten
thousand things about ten thousand different subjects—
family affairs, other people’s affairs, private affairs,....
and the professor talks to an audience, as it were, not of
men but of statues, which have ears but hear not.”
2. A second indication of the hold which education
had upon the age is the fact that teaching had come to
be a recognized and lucrative profession. This is shown
not so much by the instances of individual teachers,° who
Mites 16, 14,15. 2G, 26, 9:
3 De audiendo, 13, vol. ii. p. 45. The passage is abridged above.
4 Quis rer. div. heres. 3, vol. i. p. 474.
5 For example, Verrius Flaccus, the father of the system of “ prize
wssays,” who received an annual salary of 100,000 sesterces from
38 Il. GREEK EDUCATION.
might be regarded as exceptional, as by the fact of the
recognition of teachers by the State and by municipalities.
The recognition by the State took the double form of
endowment and of immunities from public burdens.
(a) Endowments probably began with Vespasian, who
endowed teachers of Rhetoric at Rome with an annual
grant of 100,000 sesterces from the imperial treasury.
Hadrian founded an Athenseum or University at Rome,
like the Museum or University at Alexandria, with an
adequate income, and with a building of sufficient im-
portance to be sometimes used as a Senate-house. He
also gave large sums to the professors at Athens: in this
he was followed by Antoninus Pius: but the first per-
manent endowment at Athens seems to have been that of
Marcus Aurelius, who founded two chairs in each of the
four great philosophical schools of Athens, the Academic,
the Peripatetic, the Epicurean, and the Stoic, and added
one of the new or literary Rhetoric, and one of the old
or forensic Rhetoric.!
Augustus (Suet. de dlustr. Gramm. 17). The inscriptions of Asia
Minor furnish several instances of teachers who had left their homes
to teach in other provinces of the Empire, and had returned rich
enough to make presents to their native cities.
1 The evidence for the above paragraph, with ample accounts of
additional facts relative to the same subject, but unnecessary for the
present purpose, will be found in F. H. L. Ahrens, de Athenarum
statu politico et literario inde ab Achaici feederis interitu usque ad
Antoninorum tempora, Gottingen, 1829; K. O. Miiller, Quam curam
respublica apud Gracos et Romanos literis doctrinisque colendis et
promovendis impenderit, Gottingen (Programm zur Sacularfeier), 1837 ;
P. Seidel, de scholarum que florente Romanorum imperio Athenis
eaxstiterunt conditione, Glogau, 1838; C. ἃ. Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand
der philosophischen Schulen in Athen und die Succession der Scholar-
chen, Berlin (Abhandl. der Akademie der Wissenschaften), 1843; L.
II. GREEK EDUCATION. 99
(2) The immunities of the teaching classes began with
Julius Cesar, and appear to have been so amply recog-
nized in the early empire that Antoninus Pius placed
them upon a footing which at once established and limited
them. He enacted that small cities might place upon
the free list five physicians, three teachers of rhetoric,
and three of literature; that assize towns might so place
seven physicians, three teachers of rhetoric, and three of
literature; and that metropolitan cities might so place
ten physicians, five teachers of rhetoric, and five of lite-
rature; but that these numbers should not be exceeded.
These immunities were a form of indirect endowment.!
They exempted those whom they affected from all the
Weber, Commentatio de academia literaria Athenienstum, Marburg,
1858. There is an interesting Roman inscription of the end of the
second century 4.D. which almost seems to show that the endowments
were sometimes diverted for the benefit of others besides philosophers :
it is to an athlete, who was at once ‘canon of Serapis,” and entitled to
free commons at the museum, vewkdpov τοῦ μεγάλου Σαράπιδ]ος καὶ
τῶν ἐν τῷ Μουσείῳ [σειτουἱμένων ἀτελῶν φιλοσόφων, Corpus Inscr.
Grec. 5914.
1 The edict of Antoninus Pius is contained in L. 6, § 2, 1). de ex-
cusat. 27. 1: the number of philosophers is not prescribed, “quia rari
sunt qui philosophantur:” and if they make stipulations about pay,
“inde iam manifesti fient non philosophantes.” The nature of the
immunities is described, ibid. § 8: ‘a ludorum publicorum regimine,
ab edilitate, a sacerdotio, a receptione militum, ab emtione frumenti,
olei, et neque judicare neque legatos esse neque in militia numerari
nolentes neque ad alium famulatum cogi.” The immunities were some-
times further extended to the lower classes of teachers, e.g. the dud
magistré at Vipascum in Portugal: cf. Hiibner and Mommsen in the
Ephemeris Epigraphica, vol. iii. pp. 185, 188. For the regulations of
the later empire, see Cod. Theodos. 14. 9, de studiis liberalibus urbis
Rome et Constantinopolitane ; and for a good popular account of the
whole subject, see G. Boissier, L’instruction publique dans l’empira
Romain, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, mars 15, 1884.
q
40 II, GREEK EDUCATION.
burdens which tended in the later empire to impoverish
the middle and upper classes. They were consequently
equivalent to the gift from the municipality of a consi-
derable annual income.
3. A third indication of the hold of education upon
contemporary society is the place which its professors
held in social intercourse. They were not only a recog-
nized class; they also mingled largely, by virtue of their
profession, with ordinary life. If a dinner of any pre-
tensions were given, the professor of Belles Lettres must
be there to recite and expound passages of poetry, the
professor of Rhetoric to speak upon any theme which
might be proposed to him, and the professor of Philoso-
phy to read a discourse upon morals. 4 3 > A > “a > 7 Ν a , « /
μὲν αὐτὸν ἀπέφηνεν οὐκ ἀφανῶν ἐθνῶν ἐγκατέλεξε δὲ τοῖς δημοσίᾳ ἱππεύ-
ovat καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ Μουσείῳ σιτουμένοις : so οὗ Polemo, 7d. 1. 25. 3.
2 The inscription of one of the statues which are mentioned by
Philostratus, V. S. 1. 23. 2, as having been erected to Lollianus at
Athens, was found a few years ago near the Propylea: Dittenberger,
C. 1. A. vol. iii. No. 625: see also Welcker, Rhein. Mus. N. Ἐς i. 210,
and a monograph by Kayser, P. Hordeontus Lollianus, Heidelberg,
1841. It is followed by the epigram :
ἀμφότερον ῥητῆρα δικῶν μελέτησί τ᾽ ἄριστον
Λολλιανὸν πληθὺς εὐγενέων ἑτάρων.
εἰ δ᾽ ἐθέλεις τίνες εἰσὶ δαήμεναι οὔνομα πατρὸς
καὶ πάτρης, αὐτῶν T οὔνομα δίσκος ἔχει.
Philostratus, V.S. 1. 25. 26, discredits the story that Polemo died at
Smyrna, because there was no monument to him there ; whereas if he
had died there, “not one of the wonderful temples of that city would
have been thought too great for his burial.”
8. ἡ βασιλεύουσα Ῥωμὴ τὸν βασιλεύοντα τῶν λόγων, Eunap. Vit.
Proheres. p. 90.
4 ΜΝόδεστος σοφιστὴς εἷς μετὰ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν μὴ γεμίσας εἴκοσι
πέντε ἔτη, Bulletin de correspondence Hellénique, 1886, p. 157.
Ι1Υ. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. 99
crowning, the words, ‘“‘He subjects all things to elo-
quence,” are found on a similar base at Parion.?
They naturally sometimes gave themselves great airs.
There are many stories about them. Philostratus tells
one of the Emperor Antoninus Pius on arriving at Smyrna
going, in accordance with imperial custom, to spend the
night at the house which was at once the best house
in the city and the house of the most distinguished
man. It was that of the sophist Polemo, who happened
on the Emperovr’s arrival to be away from home; but he
returned from his journey at night, and with loud excla-
mations against being kept out of his own, turned the
Emperor out of doors.2, The common epithet for them is
aaCév—a word with no precise English equivalent, de-
noting a cross between a braggart and a mountebank.
But the real grounds on which the more earnest men
objected to them were those upon which Plato had ob-
jected to their predecessors: their making a trade of
knowledge, and their unreality.
1. The making of discourses, whether literary or moral,
was a thriving trade.? The fees given to a leading sophist
were on the scale of those given to a prima donna in our
1 ὃς πάντα λόγοις ὑποτάσσει, Mittheilungen des deutsches archeol.
Institut, 1884, p. 61.
* Philostratus, V. S. 1. 25. 3, p. 228, narrates the incident with
graphic humour, and adds two anecdotes which show that the Emperor
was rather amused than annoyed by it. It was said of the same sophist
that “he used to talk to cities as a superior, to kings as not inferior,
and to gods as an equal,” ibid. 4.
8. Dio Cassius, 71. 35. 2, παμπληθεῖς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπλάττοντο iv’ ὑπ᾽
αὐτοῦ πλουτίζωνται.
H 2
[00 IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.
own day.! But the objection to it was not so much the
fact of its thriving, as the fact of its being a trade at all.
“Tf they do what they do,” says Dio Chrysostom,? “as
poets and rhetoricians, there is no harm perhaps; but
if they do it as philosophers, for the sake of their own
personal gain and glory, and not for the sake of benefiting
you, there is harm.” The defence which Themistius?
makes for himself is more candid than effective: ‘I do
make money,” he says; ‘‘people give me sometimes one
mina, sometimes two, sometimes as much as a talent:
but, since I must speak about myself, let me ask you
this—Did any one ever come away the worse for having
heard me? Mark, I charge nothing: it is a voluntary
contribution.”
2. The stronger ground of objection to them was their
unreality. They had lost touch with life. They had
made philosophy itself seem unreal. ‘‘They are not
philosophers, but fiddlers,” said the sturdy old Stoic
Musonius.4 It is not necessary to suppose that they
were all charlatans. There was then, as now, the irre-
pressible young man of good morals who wished to air
his opinions. But the tendency to moralize had become
divorced from practice. They preached, not because
1 For example, the father of Herodes Atticus gave Scopelianus a fee
of twenty-five talents, to which Atticus himself added another twenty-
five: Philostr. V.S. 1. 21. 7, p. 222.
2 Dio Chrysost. Orat. xxxii. p. 403: so Seneca, Epist. 29, says of
them, ‘ philosophiam honestius neglexissent quam vendunt:” Maximus
of Tyre, Diss. 33. 8, ἀγορὰ πρόκειται ἀρετῆς, ὦνιον τὸ πρᾶγμα.
3 Orat. xxiii. p. 861, The whole speech is a plea against the dis-
repute into which the profession had fallen.
4 ap. Aul. Gell. 5. 1. 1.
Iv. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. 101
they were in grim earnest about the reformation of the
world, but because preaching was a respectable profes-
sion, and the listening to sermons a fashionable diver-
sion. ‘The mass of men,” says Plutarch,! ‘enjoy
and admire a philosopher when he is discoursing about
their neighbours; but if the philosopher, leaving their
neighbours alone, speaks his mind about things that are
of importance to the men themselves, they take offence
and vote him a bore; for they think that they ought to
listen to a philosopher in his lecture-room in the same
bland way that they listen to tragedians in the theatre.
This, as might be expected, is what happens to them in
regard to the sophists; for when a sophist gets down
from his pulpit and puts aside his MSS., in the real busi-
ness of life he seems but a small man, and under the
thumb of the majority. They do not understand about real
philosophers that both seriousness and play, grim looks
and smiles, and above all the direct personal application
of what they say to each individual, have a useful result
for those who are in the habit of giving a patient atten-
tion to them.”
Against this whole system of veneering rhetoric with
philosophy, there was a strong reaction. Apart from the
early Christian writers, with whom “‘sophist”’ is always
a word of scorn, there were men, especially among the
new school of Stoics, who were at open war with its
unreality.2 I will ask you to listen to the expostulation
1 De audiendo, 12, p. 43.
Ἃ Tt is clear that the word “ sophist” had under the Early Empire,
as in both earlier and later times, two separate streams of meaning. It
102 IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.
which the great moral reformer Epictetus addresses to a
rhetorician who came to him:
“First of all, tell yourself what you want to be, and then act
accordingly. For this is what we see done in almost all other
cases. Men who are practising for the games first of all decide
what they mean to be, and then proceed to do the things
that follow from their decision. .... So then when you say,
Come and listen to my lecture, first of all consider whether
your action be not thrown away for want of an end, and then
consider whether it be not a mistake, on account of your real
end being a wrong one. Suppose I ask a man, ‘Do you wish
to do good by your expounding, or to gain applause?’ There-
upon straightway you hear him saying, ‘ What do I care for the
applause of the multitude?’ And his sentiment is right: for in
the same way, applause is nothing to the musician φι musician,
or to the geometrician gud geometrician.
“You wish to do good, then,” I continue; “in what particular
respect ? tell me, that I too may hasten to your lecture-room.
was used as a title of honour, e.g. Lucian, Rhet. Prec. 1, τὸ σεμνότατον
τοῦτο Kal πάντιμον ὄνομα σοφιστής ; Philostr. V.S. 2. 31. 1, when
/Elian was addressed as σοφιστής, he was not elated ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος
οὕτω μεγάλου ὄντος ; Eunap. Vit. Liban. p. 100, when emperors offered
Libanius great titles and dignities, he refused them, φήσας τὸν σοφιστὴν
εἶναι μείζονα. But the disparagement of the class to whom the word
was applied runs through a large number of writers, e.g. Dio Chrys.
Orat. iv. vol. i. 70, ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ ἀλαζόνι σοφιστῇ ; 7b. vill. vol. i. 151,
they croak like frogs in a marsh; 7b. x. vol. i. 166, they are the
wretchedest of men, because, though ignorant, they think themselves
wise ; ib. xii. vol. i, 214, they are like peacocks, showing off their
reputation and the number of their disciples as peacocks do their tails.
Epict. Diss. 2. 20, 23; M. Aurel. 1.16; 6. 30. Lucian, Fugitiv. 10,
compares them to hippocentaurs, σύνθετόν τι καὶ μικτὸν ἐν μέσῳ ἀλα-
ζονείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας πλαζόμενον. Maximus Tyr. Diss. 33. 8, τὸ τῶν
σοφιστῶν γένος, τὸ πολυμαθὲς τοῦτο καὶ πολυλόγον καὶ πολλῶν μεστὸν
μαθημάτων, καπηλεῦον ταῦτα καὶ ἀπεμπολοῦν τοῖς δεομένοις. Among
the Christian Fathers, especial reference may be made to Clem. Alex.
Strom. 1, chapters 3 and 8, pp. 328, 343.
Iv. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. 103
But can a man impart good to others without having previously
received good himself ?
“No: just as a man is of no use to us in the way of carpen-
tering unless he is himself a carpenter.
“Would you like to know, then, whether you have received
good yourself? Bring me your convictions, philosopher. (Let
us take an example.) Did you not the other day praise so-and-
so more than you really thought he deserved? Did you not
flatter that senator’s son ?—and yet you would not like your
own sons to be like him, would you ?
“God forbid!
“Then why did you flatter him and toady to him ?
“He is a clever young fellow, and a good student.
“How do you know that ?
“He admires my lectures.
“Yes; that is the real reason. But don’t you think that these
very people despise you in their secret hearts? I mean that
when a man who is conscious that he has neither done nor
thought any single good thing, finds a philosopher who tells him
that he is a man of great ability, sincerity, and genuineness, of
course he says to himself, ‘This man wants to get something out
of me!’ Or (if this is not the case with vou), tell me what
proof he has given of great ability. No doubt he has attended
you for a considerable time: he has heard you discoursing and
expounding: but has he become more modest in his estimate of
himself—or is he still looking for some one to teach him ?
“Yes, he is looking for some one to teach him.
“To teach him how to live? No, fool; not how to live, but
how to talk: which also is the reason why he admires you.
* * Ἂς *
“[The truth is, you like applause: you care more for that than
for doing good, and so you invite people to come and hear you.]
“But does a philosopher invite people to come and hear him?
Is it not that as the sun, or as food, is its own sufficient attrac-
tion, so the philosopher also is his own sufficient attraction to
those who are to be benefited by him? Does a physician invite
people to come and let him heal them?.... (Imagine what a
104 IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.
genuine philosopher’s invitation would be)—‘I invite you to
come and be told that you are in a bad way—that you care for
everything except what you should care for—that you do not
know what things are good and what evil—and that you are
unhappy and unfortunate.” A nice invitation! and yet if that is
not the result of what a philosopher says, he and his words alike
are dead. (Musonius) Rufus used to say, ‘If you have leisure
to praise me, my teaching has been in vain.’ Accordingly he
used to talk in such a way that each individual one of us who
sat there thought that some one had been telling Rufus about
him: he so put his finger upon what we had done, he so set
the individual faults of each one of us clearly before our eyes.
“The philosopher’s lecture-room, gentlemen, is a surgery:
when you go away you ought to have felt not pleasure but pain.
For when you come in, something is wrong with you: one man
has put his shoulder out, another has an abscess, another a
headache. Am I—the surgeon—then, to sit down and give you
a string of fine sentences, that you may praise me—and then
go away—the man with the dislocated arm, the man with the
abscess, the man with the headache—just as you came? [5 it
for this that young men come away from home, and leave their
parents and their kinsmen and their property, to say ‘ Bravo!’
to you for your fine moral conclusions? Is this what Socrates
did—or Zeno—or Cleanthes ?
“Well, but is there no such class of speeches as exhortations ?
“Who denies it? But in what do exhortations consist? In
being able to show, whether to one man or to many men, the
contradiction in which they are involved, and that their thoughts
are given to anything but what they really mean. For they
mean to give them to the things that really tend to happiness ,
but they look for those things elsewhere than where they really
are. (That is the true aim of exhortation): but to show this, is
it necessary to place a thousand chairs, and invite people to
come and listen, and dress yourself up in a fine gown, and ascend
the pulpit—and describe the death of Achilles? Cease, I implore
you, from bringing dishonour, as far as you can, upon noble
words and deeds. There can be no stronger exhortation to duty,
70. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. 195
I suppose, than for a speaker to make it clear to his audience
that he wants to get something out of them! Tell me who,
after hearing you lecture or discourse, became anxious about or
reflected upon himself? or who, as he went out of the room,
said, ‘The philosopher put his finger upon my faults: I must not
behave in that way again’ ?
“You cannot: the utmest praise you get is when a man says
to another, ‘ That was a beautiful passage about Xerxes, and the
other says, ‘No, I liked best that about the battle of Thermo-
pyle.’
“This is a philosopher’s sermon !”?
I have dwelt on this feature of the Greek life of the
early Christian centuries, not with the view of giving a
complete picture of it, which would be impossible within
the compass of a lecture, but rather with the view of
establishing a presumption, which you will find amply
justified by further researches, that it was sufficient, not
only in its quality and complexity, but also in its mass,
to account for certain features of early Christianity.
In passing from Greek life to Christianity, I will ask
you, in the first instance, to note the broad distinction
which exists betaveen what in the primitive churches was
known as “‘ prophesying,” and that which in subsequent
times came to be known as ‘ preaching.” I lay the more
stress upon the distinction for the accidental reason that,
in the first reaction against the idea that ‘“ prophecy”
necessarily meant. ‘‘ prediction,” it was maintained—and.
with a certain reservation the contention was true—that
a “prophet” meant a ‘‘preacher.”? The reservation is,
that the prophet was not merely a preacher but a spon-
1 Epict. Diss, 3, 23.
100 IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC,
taneous preacher. He preached because he could not
help it, because there was a divine breath breathing
within him which must needs find an utterance. It is
in this sense that the prophets of the early churches were
preachers. They were not church officers appointed to
discharge certain functions. They were the possessors
of a charisma, a divine gift which was not official but
personal. ‘‘No prophecy ever came by the will of man;
but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy
Ghost.” They did not practise beforehand how or what
they should say; for ‘‘the Holy Ghost taught them in
that very hour what they should say.” Their language
was often, from the point of view of the rhetorical schools,
a barbarous patois. They were ignorant of the rules
both of style and of dialectic. They paid no heed to
refinements of expression. The greatest preacher of them
all claimed to have come among his converts, in a city
in which Rhetoric flourished, not with the persuasiveness
of human logic, but with the demonstration which was
afforded by spiritual power.
Of that ‘‘ prophesying” of the primitive churches it is
not certain that we possess any monument. The Second
Epistle of Peter and the Epistle of Jude are perhaps
representatives of it among the canonical books of the
New Testament. The work known as the Second Epistle
of Clement is perhaps a representative of the form which
it took in the middle of the second century ; but though
it is inspired by a genuine enthusiasm, it is rather more
artistic in its form than a purely prophetic utterance is
likely to have been.
In the course of the second century, this original spon-
IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. 107
tancity of utterance died almost entirely away. It may
almost be said to have died a violent death. The domi-
nant parties in the Church set their faces against it. The
survivals of it in Asia Minor were formally condemned.
The Montanists, as they were called, who tried to fan
the lingering sparks of it into a flame, are ranked among
heretics. And Tertullian is not even now admitted into
the calendar of the Saints, because be believed the Mon-
tanists to be in the right.
It was inevitable that it should be so. The growth
of a confederation of Christian communities necessitated
the definition of a basis of confederation. Such a defi-
nition, and the further necessity of guarding it, were
inconsistent with that free utterance of the Spirit which
had existed before the confederation began. Prophesy-
ing died when the Catholic Church was formed.
In place of prophesying came preaching. And preach-
ing is the result of the gradual combination of different
elements. In the formation of a great institution it
is inevitable that, as time goes on, different elements
should tend to unite. To the original functions of a
bishop, for example, were added by degrees the func-
tions—which had originally been separate—of teacher.}
In a similar way were fused together, on the one hand,
teaching—that is, the tradition and exposition of the
ὁ The functions are clearly separable in the Teaching of the Apostles,
15, αὐτοὶ [se. ἐπίσκοποι καὶ διάκονοι] γάρ εἰσιν οἱ τετιμημένοι ὑμῶν
μετὰ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ διδασκάλων ; but they are combined in the
second book of the Apostolical Constitutions, pp. 16, 49, 51, 58, 84,
ed. Lagarde,
108 Iv. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC,
sacred books and of the received doctrine; and, on the
other hand, exhortation—that is, the endeavour to raise
men to a higher level of moral and spiritual life. Each
of these was a function which, assuming a certain natural
aptitude, could be learned by practice. Each of them
was consequently a function which might be discharged
by the permanent officers of the community, and dis-
charged habitually at regular intervals without waiting
for the fitful flashes of the prophetic fire. We conse-
quently find that with the growth of organization there
grew up also, not only a fusion of teaching and exhor-
tation, but also the gradual restriction of the liberty of
addressing the community to the official class.
It was this fusion of teaching and exhortation that
constituted the essence of the homily: its form came
from the sophists. For it was natural that when addresses,
whether expository or hortatory, came to prevail in the
Christian communities, they should be affected by the
similar addresses which filled a large place in contempo-
rary Greek life. It was not only natural but inevitable
that when men who had been trained in rhetorical methods
came to make such addresses, they should follow the
methods to which they were accustomed. It is probable
that Origen is not only the earliest example whose writ-
ings have come down to us, but also one of the earliest
who took into the Christian communities these methods
of the schools. He lectured, as the contemporary teachers
seem to have lectured, every day: his subject-matter
was the text of the Scriptures, as that of the rhetoricians
and sophists by his side was Homer or Chrysippus: his
IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. 109
addresses, like those of the best professors, were carefully
prepared: he was sixty years of age, we are told, befure
he preached an extempore sermon.!
When the Christian communities emerge into the
clearer light of the fourth century, the influence of the
rhetorical schools upon them begins to be visible on a
large scale and with permanent effects. The voice of the
prophet had ceased, and the voice of the preacher had
begun. ‘The greatest Christian preachers of the fourth
century had been trained to rhetorical methods, and had
themselves taught rhetoric. Basil and Gregory Nazi-
anzen studied at Athens under the famous professors
Himerius and Proheresius: Chrysostom studied under
the still more famous Libanius, who on his death-bed
said of him that he would have been his worthiest suc-
cessor ‘“‘if the Christians had not stolen him.”? The
discourses came to be called by the same names as those
of the Greek professors. They had originally been called
homilies—-a ~word which was unknown in this sense in
pre-Christiaa times, and which denoted the familiar in-
tercourse and direct personal addresses of common life.
They came to be called by the technical terms of the
schools—discourses, disputations, or speeches.? The dis-
tinction between the two kinds of terms is clearly shown
by a later writer, who, speaking of a particular volume of
1 Euseb. H. Z. 6. 36. 1. 2 Sozom. ἢ. E. 8. 2.
3 Eusebius, 17. Ε΄. 6. 36. 1, speaks of Origen’s sermons as διαλέξεις,
whereas the original designation was ὁμιλίαι. So in Latin, Augustine
uses the term disputationes of Ambrose’s sermons, Confess. 5, 13, vol. i.
118, and of his own Tract. lxxxix. in Johann, Evang. c. 5, vol. iii.
pars 2, p. 719,
110 Iv. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.
Chrysostom’s addresses, says, ‘¢ They are called ‘speeches’
(λόγοι), but they are more like homilies, for this reason,
above others, that he again and again addresses his hearers
as actually present before his eyes.”! The form of the
discourses tended to be the same: if you examine side by
side a discourse of Himerius or Themistius or Libanius,
and one of Basil or Chrysostom or Ambrose, you will
find a similar artificiality of structure, and a similar
elaboration of phraseology. ‘They were delivered under
analogous circumstances. The preacher sat in his official
chair: it was an exceptional thing for him to ascend
the reader’s ambo, the modern “ pulpit:”? the audience
crowded in front of him, and frequently interrupted him
with shouts of acclamation.. The greater preachers tried
to stem the tide of applause which surged round them :
again and again Chrysostom begs his hearers to be silent:
what he wants is, not their acclamations, but the fruits of
his preaching in their lives.? There is one passage which
not only illustrates this point, but also affords a singular
analogy to the remonstrance of Epictetus which was
quoted just now:
1 Phot. Biblioth. 172.
2 Sozomen. H.#. 8.5, Augustine makes a fine point of the analogy
between the church and the lecture-room (schola): ‘tanquam vobis
pastores sumus, sed sub illo Pastore vobiscum oves sumus. Tanquam
vobis ex hoc loco doctores sumus sed sub illo Magistro in hac schola
vobiscum condiscipuli sumus:” Hnarrat. in Psalm. exxvi. vol. iv. 1429,
ed. Ben.
8 Adv. Jud. 7. 6, vol. i. 671; Cone. vii. adv. eos qui ad lud. cire.
prof. vol. i. 790; Hom. ii. ad pop. Antioch. ο. 4, vol. ii, 25; adv. eos
qui ad Collect. non occur. vol. 11, 157; Hom. liv. in cap. xxvil. Genes.
vol. iv. 523; Hom. lvi. in cap, xxix. Genes. vol. iv. 541.
IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. ELE
“There are many preachers who make long sermons: if they
are well applauded, they are as glad as if they had obtained a
kingdom: if they bring their sermon to an end in silence, their
despondency is worse, I may almost say, than hell. It is this
that ruins churches, that you do not seek to hear sermons that
touch the heart, but sermons that will delight your ears with
their intonation and the structure of their phrases, just as if you
were listening to singers and lute-players. And we preachers
humour your fancies, instead of trying to crush them. We act
like a father who gives a sick child a cake or an ice, or some-
thing else that is merely nice to eat—just because he asks for
it; and takes no pains to give him what is good for him; and
then when the doctors blame him says, ‘I could not bear to hear
my child cry.’.... That is what we do when we elaborate beautiful
sentences, fine combinations and harmonies, to please and not to
profit, to be admired and not to instruct, to delight and not to
touch you, to go away with your applause in our ears, and not to
better your conduct. Believe me, I am not speaking at random :
when you applaud me as I speak, I feel at the moment as it is
natural for a man to feel. I will make a clean breast of it. Why
should I not? Iam delighted and overjoyed. And then when
I go home and reflect that the people who have been applauding
me have received no benefit, and indeed that whatever benefit
they might have had has been killed by the applause and praises,
Τ am sore at heart, and I lament and fall to tears, and I feel as
though I had spoken altogether in vain, and I say to myself,
What is the good of all your labours, seeing that your hearers
don’t want to reap any fruit out ofall that you say? And I have
often thought of laying down a rule absolutely prohibiting all
applause, and urging you to listen in silence.”?
And there is a passage near the end of Gregory Nazi-
anzen’s greatest sermon, in which the human nature of
which Chrysostom speaks bursts forth with striking
force: after the famous peroration in which after bid-
1 §. Chrys. Hom, xxx. in Act, Apost. ο. 3, vol. ix, 238.
ΤΠ IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.
ding farewell one by one to the church and congregation
which he loved, to the several companies of his fellow-
workers, and to the multitudes who had thronged to hear
him preach, he turns to the court and his opponents the
Arian courtiers—
“Farewell, princes and palaces, the royal court and household
—whether ye be faithful to the king I know not, ye are nearly
all of you unfaithful to God.” (There was evidently a burst of
applause, and he interrupts his peroration with an impromptu
address.) “Yes—clap your hands, shout aloud, exalt your orator
to heaven: your malicious and chattering tongue has ceased: it
will not cease for long: it will fight (though I am absent) with
writing and ink: but just for the moment we are silent.” (Then
the peroration is resumed.) “Farewell, O great and Christian
city... 74
{ will add only one more instance of the way in which
the habits of the sophists flowed into the Christian
churches. Christian preachers, like the sophists, were
sometimes peripatetic; they went from place to place,
delivering their orations and making money by delivering
them. ‘The historians Socrates and Sozomen? tell an in-
structive story of two Syrian bishops, Severianus of Gabala
and Antiochus of Ptolemais (St. Jean d’Acre). They were
both famous for their rhetoric, though Severianus could
not quite get rid of his Syrian accent. Antiochus went
to Constantinople, and stayed there a long time, preach-
ing frequently in the churches, and making a good deal
of money thereby. On his return to Syria, Severianus,
hearing about the money, resolved to follow his example:
he waited for some time, exercised his rhetoric, got toge-
ther a large stock of sermons, and then went to Constan-
“1 Greg. Naz. Orat. xlii.
3 Socrates, H. EH. 6. 11; Sozomen, H. £. 8, 10,
Iv. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC, 113
tinople. He was kindly received by the bishop, and soon
became both a great popular preacher and a favourite at
court. ‘The fate of many preachers and court favourites
overtook him: he excited great jealousy, was accused
of heresy and banished from the city; and only by the
personal intercession of the Empress Eudoxia was he
received back again into ecclesiastical favour.
Such are some of the indications of the influence of
Greek Rhetoric upon the early churches. It created the
Christian sermon. It added to the functions of church
officers a function which is neither that of the exercise
of discipline, nor of administration of the funds, nor
of taking the lead in public worship, nor of the simple
tradition of received truths, but that of either such an
exegesis of the sacred books as the Sophists gave of
Homer, or such elaborated discourses as they also gave
upon the speculative and ethical aspects of religion. The|
result was more far-reaching than the creation of either
an institution or a function. If you look more closely
into history, you will find that Rhetoric killed Philosophy. ,
Philosophy died, because for all but a small minority it
ceased to be real. It passed from the sphere of thought
and conduct to that of exposition and literature. Its
preachers preached, not because they were bursting with
truths which could not help finding expression, but
because they were masters of fine phrases and lived in an
age in which fine phrases had a value. It died, in short,
because it had become sophistry. But sophistry is of no
special age or country. It is indigenous to all soils upon
I
114 IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC.
which literature grows. No sooner is any special form of
literature created by the genius of a great writer than there
arises a class of men who cultivate the style of it for the
style’s sake. No sooner is any new impulse given either
to philosophy or to religion than there arises a class of
men who copy the form without the substance, and try
to make the echo of the past sound like the voice of the
present. So it has been with Christianity. It came into
the educated world in the simple dress of a Prophet of
Righteousness. It won that world by the stern reality of
its life, by the subtle bonds of its brotherhood, by its
divine message of consolation and of hope. Around it
thronged the race of eloquent talkers who persuaded it
to change its dress and to assimilate its language to their
own. It seemed thereby to win a speedier and completer
victory. But it purchased conquest at the price of reality.
With that its progress stopped. There has been an ele-
ment of sophistry in it ever since; and so far as in any
age that element has been dominant, so far has the
progress of Christianity been arrested. Its progress 1s
arrested now, because many of its preachers live in an
unreal world. The truths they set forth are truths of
utterance rather than truths of their lives. But if Chris-
tianity is to be again the power that it was in its earliest
ages, it must renounce its costly purchase. A class of
rhetorical chemists would be thought of only to be ridi-
euled: a class of rhetorical religionists is only less ano~
malous because we are accustomed to it. The hope of
Christianity is, that the class which was artificially
created may ultimately disappear; and that the sophis-
IV. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC. 115
tical element in Christian preaching will melt, as a
transient mist, before the preaching of the prophets of
the ages to come, who, like the prophets of the ages that
are long gone by, will speak only ‘“‘as the Spirit gives
them utterance.”
Lecture V.
CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
THE power of generalizing and of forming abstract
ideas exists, or at least is exercised, in varying degrees
among different races and at different times. The
peculiar feature of the intellectual history of the Greeks
is the rapidity with which the power was developed,
and the strength of the grasp which it had upon them.
The elaboration of one class of such ideas, those of
form and quantity, led to the formation of a group of
sciences, the mathematical sciences, which hold a per- -
manent place. The earliest and most typical of these
sciences is geometry. In it, the attention is drawn away
from all the other characteristics of material things, and
fixed upon the single characteristic of their form. The
forms are regarded in themselves. The process of abstrac-
tion or analysis reaches its limit in the point, and from
that limit the mind, making a new departure, begins the
process of construction or synthesis. Complex ideas are
formed by the addition of one simple idea to another,
and having been so formed can be precisely defined.
Their constituent elements can be distinctly stated, and a
clear boundary drawn round the whole. They can be
so marked off from other ideas that the idea which one
γ. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 117
man has formed can be communicated to and represented
in another man’s mind. The inferences which, assuming
certain “axioms” to be true and certain “ postulates”
to be granted, are made by one man, are accepted by
another man or at once disproved. There is no ques-
tion of mere probability, nor any halting between two
opinions. The inferences are not only true but certain.
The result is, that there are not two sciences of geo-
metry, but one: all who study it are agreed as to both
its definitions and its inferences.
The elaboration of another class of abstract ideas,
those of quality, marched at first by a parallel road. To
a limited extent such a parallel march is possible. The
words which are used to express sensible qualities sug-
gest the same ideas to different minds. They are applied
by different minds to the same objects. But the limits
of such an agreement are narrow. When we pass from
the abstract ideas of qualities, or generalizations as to
substances, which can be tested by the senses, to such
ideas as those, for example, of courage or justice, law
or duty, though the words suggest, on the whole, the
same ideas to one man as to another, not all men would
uniformly apply the same words to the same actions.
The phenomena which suggest such ideas assume a dif-
ferent form and colour as they are regarded from different
points of view. They enter into different combinations.
They are not sharply marked out by lines which would
be universally recognized. The attention of different
men is arrested by different features. There is conse-
quently no universally recognized definition of them.
Nor is such a definition possible. The idess themselves
118 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
tend to shade off into their contraries. There is a fringe
of haze round each of them. The result is that assertions
about them vary. There is not one system of philosophy
only; there are many.
Between these two classes of generalizations and
abstractions, those of quantity and those of quality or
substance, many Greek thinkers do not appear to have
made any clear distinction. Ideas of each class were
regarded as equally capable of being defined; the canons
of inference which were applicable to the one were con-
ceived to be equally applicable to the other: and the
certainty of inference and exactness of demonstration
which were possible in regard to the ideal forms of
geometry, were supposed to be also possible in regard
to the conceptions of metaphysics and ethics.!
The habit of making definitions, and of drawing deduc-
tions from them, was fostered by the habit of discussion.
Discussion under the name of dialectic, which implies
1 An indication of this may be seen in the fact that words which
have come down to modern times as technical terms of geometry were
used indifferently in the physical and moral sciences, e.g. theorem
(θεώρημα), Philo, Leg. alleg. ὃ. 27 (i. 104), θεωρήμασι τοῖς περὶ κόσμου
καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ : Epict. Diss. 2.17.3; 3.9.2; 4. 8. 12, &e., of
the doctrines of moral philosophy: sometimes co-ordinated or inter-
changed with δόγμα, e.g. Philo, de fort. 3 (ii. 377), διὰ λογικῶν καὶ
ἠθικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν δογμάτων Kat θεωρημάτων : Epictet. Diss. 4. 1.
137, 139, and as a variant Hnch. 52.1. So definition (ὁρισμός) is
itself properly applicable to the marking out of the boundaries of
enclosed land. So also ἀπόδειξις was not limited to ideal or “ neces-
sary” matter, but was used of all explanations of the less by the more
evident ; e.g. Musonius, Frag. ap. excerpt. e Joann. Damasc., in Stob.
Ecl. ii. 751, ed. Gaisf., after defining it, gives as an example a proof
that pleasure is not a good,
Vv. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 119
that it was but a regulated conversation, had a large
place, not only in the rhetorical and philosophical schools,
but also in ordinary Greek life. It was like a game of
cards. The game, so to speak, was conducted under
strict and recognized rules; but it could not proceed
unless each card had a determined and admitted value.
The definition of terms was its necessary preliminary ;
and dialectic helped to spread the habit of requiring defi-
nitions over a wider area and to give it a deeper root.
There was less divergence in the definitions themselves
than there was in the propositions that were deduced from
them. That is to say, there was a verbal agreement as to
definitions which was not a real agreement of ideas: the
same words were found on examination to cover different
areas of thought. But whether the difference lay in the
definitions themselves or in the deductions made from
them, there was nothing to determine which of two con-
trary or contradictory propositions was true. There was
no universally recognized standard of appeal, or criterion,
as it was termed. Indeed, the question of the nature of
the criterion was one of the chief questions at issue.
Consequently, assertions about abstract ideas and wide
generalizations could only be regarded as the affirmations
of a personal conviction. The making of such an affirm-
ation was expressed by the same phrase which was used.
for a resolution of the will—‘It seems to me,” or “It
seems (good) to me”’ (δοκεῖ wor): the affirmation itself, by
the corresponding substantive, dogma (δόγμα). But just
as the resolutions of the will of a monarch were obeyed
by his subjects, that is, were adopted as resolutions of
the will of other persons, so the affirmations of a thinker
190 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
might be assented to by those who listened to him, that
is, might become affirmations of other persons. In the
one case as in the other, the same word dogma was
employed.1 It thus came to express (1) a decree, (2) a
doctrine. The latter use tended to predominate. The
word came ordinarily to express an affirmation made by
a philosopher which was accepted as true by those who,
from the fact of so accepting it, became his followers and
formed his school. The acquiescence of a large number
of men in the same affirmation gave to such an affirma-
tion a high degree of probability; but it did not cause
it to lose its original character of a personal conviction,
nor did it afford any guarantee that the coincidence of
expression was also a coincidence of ideas either between
the original thinker and his disciples, or between the
disciples themselves.”
1 ὁ δὲ νόμος βασιλέως δόγμα, Dio Chrys. vol. i. p. 46, ed. Dind.
2 The use of the word in Epictetus is especially instructive : δόγματα
fill a large place in his philosophy. They are the inner judgments of
the mind (κρίματα ψυχῆς, Diss. 4. 11. 7) in regard to both intellectual
and moral phenomena. They are especially relative to the latter. They
are the convictions upon which men act, the moral maxims which form
the ultimate motives of action and the resolution to act or not act in
a particular case. They are the most personal and inalienable part of
us. See especially, Diss. 1. 11. 33, 35, 38; 17. 26; 29. 11,12; 2.1.
21, 32; 3.2.12; 9.2; ποῖ. 45. Hence ἀπὸ δογμάτων λαλεῖν, “to
speak from conviction,” is opposed tu ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν λαλεῖν, “ to speak
with the lip only,” Diss. 3.16.7. If a man adopts the δόγμα of
another person, e.g. of a philosopher, so as to make it his own, he is
said, δόγματι συμπαθῆσαι, “to feel in unison with the conviction,”
Diss. 1, 3.1. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hypot. 1. 13, distinguishes
two philosophical senses of δόγμα, (1) assent to facts of sensation, τὸ
εὐδοκεῖν τινι πράγματι, (2) assent to the inferences of the several
sciences: in either sense it is (a) a strictly personal feeling, and (0) a
VY. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1791
Within these limits of its original and proper use, and
as expressing a fact of mind, the word has an indis-
putable value. But the fact of the personal character
of a dogma soon became lost to sight. Two tendencies
which grew with a parallel growth dominated the world
in place of the recognition of it. It came to be assumed
that certain convictions of certain philosophers were not
simply.true in relation to the philosophers themselves,
and to the state of knowledge in their time, but had a
universal validity: subjective and temporary convictions
were thus elevated to the rank of objective and eternal
truths. It came also to be assumed that the processes
of reason so closely followed the order of nature, that a
system of ideas constructed in strict accordance with the
laws of reasoning corresponded exactly with the realities
of things. The unity of such a system reflected, it was
thought, the unity of the world of objective fact. It
followed that the truth or untruth of a given proposition
was thought to be determined by its logical consistency
or inconsistency with the sum of previous inferences.
These tendencies were strongly accentuated by the
decay of original thinking. Philosophy in later Greece
was less thought than literature. It was the exegesis
of received doctrines. Philosophers had become pro-
fessors. The question of what was in itself true had
become entangled with the question of what the Master
firm conviction, not a mere vague impression: it was in the latter of
the two senses that the philosophers of research laid it down as their
maxim, μὴ δογματίζειν : they did away, not with τὰ φαινόμενα, but
with assertions about them, ἰδία. 1. 19, 22: their attitude in reference
to τὰ ἄδηλα was simply ody ὁρίζω, “I abstain from giving a definition
of them,” idid. 1. 197, 198,
ΤΩ V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
had said. The moral duty of adherence to the traditions
of a school was stronger than the moral duty of finding
the truth at all hazards. The literary expression of a
doctrine came to be more important than the doctrine
itself. The differences of expression between one thinker
and another were exaggerated. Words became fetishes.
Outside the schools were those who were litt¢rateurs
rather than philosophers, and who fused different ele-
ments together into systems which had a greater unity
of literary form than of logical coherence. But these
very facts of the literary character of philosophy, and
of the contradictions in the expositions of it, served to
spread it over a wider area. ‘They tended on the one
hand to bring a literary acquaintance with philosophy
into the sphere of general education, and on the other
hand to produce a propaganda. Sect rivalled sect in
trying to win scholars for its school. The result was
that the ordinary life of later Greece was saturated with
philosophical ideas, and that the discordant theories of
rival schools were blended together in the average mind
into a syncretistic dogmatism.
Against this whole group of tendencies there was
more than one reaction. The tendency to dogmatize
was met by the tendency to doubt; and the tendency to
doubt flowed in many streams, which can with difficulty
be traced in minute detail, but whose general course
is sufficiently described for the ordinary student in the
Academics of Cicero. In the second and third centuries
of our era there had come to be three main groups of
schools. ‘‘Some men,” writes Sextus Empiricus,! “ say
1 Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypot. 1. 3.
V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 123
that they have found the truth ; some say that it is impos-
sible for truth to be apprehended; some still search for
it. The first class consists of those who are specially
designated Dogmatics, the followers of Aristotle and
Epicurus, the Stoics, and some others: the second class
consists of the followers of Clitomachus and Carneades,
and other” Academics: the third class consists of the
Sceptics.” They may be distinguished as the philosophy
of assertion, the philosophy of denial, and the philosophy
of research.! But the first of these was in an overwhelming
majority. The Dogmatics, especially in the form either
of pure Stoicism or of Stoicism largely infused with
Platonism, were in possession of the field of educated
thought. It is a convincing proof of the completeness
with which that thought was saturated with their methods
and their fundamental conceptions, that those methods
and conceptions are found even among the philosophers
of research who claimed to have wholly disentangled
themselves from them.?
The philosophy of assertion, the philosophy of denial,
and the philosophy of research, were all alike outside the
earliest forms of Christianity. In those forms the moral
and spiritual elements were not only supreme but exclu-
sive. They reflected the philosophy, not of Greece, but
1 Ibid. 4, δογματική, ἀκαδημαϊκή, σκεπτική.
2 For example, Sextus Empiricus, in spite of his constant formula,
οὐχ ὁρίζω, maintains the necessity of having definable conceptions,
TOV ἐννοουμένων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τὰς οὐσίας ἐπινοεῖν ὀφείλομεν, and
he argues that it is impossible for a man to have an ἔννοια of God
because He has to admitted οὐσία, Pyrrh. Hypot. 3. 2, 3.
124 VY. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
of Palestine. That philosophy was almost entirely ethical.
It dealt with the problems, not of being in the abstract,
but of human life. It was stated for the most part in
short antithetical sentences, with a symbol or parable to
enforce them. It was a philosophy of proverbs. It had
no eye for the minute anatomy of thought. It had no
system, for the sense of system was not yet awakened.
It had no taste for verbal distinctions. It was content
with the symmetry of balanced sentences, without attempt-
ing to construct a perfect whole. It reflected as in a
mirror, and not unconsciously, the difficulties, the con-
tradictions, the unsolved enigmas of the world of fact.
When this Palestinian philosophy became more self-
conscious than it had been, it remained still within its
own sphere, the enigmas of the moral world were still
its subject-matter, and it became in the Fathers of the
Talmud on the one hand fatalism, and on the other
casuistry.
The earliest forms of Christianity were not only out-
side the sphere of Greek philosophy, but they also
appealed, on the one hand, mainly to the classes which
philosophy did not reach, and, on the other hand, to a
standard which philosophy did not recognize. ‘Not
many wise men after the flesh” were called in St. Paul’s
time: and more than a century afterwards, Celsus sar-
castically declared the law of admission to the Christian
communities to be—‘‘ Let no educated man enter, no
Wise man, no prudent man, for such things we deem
evil; but whoever is ignorant, whoever is unintelligent,
whoever is uneducated, whoever is simple, let him come
Υ. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 125
and be welcome.’”! It proclaimed, moreover, that ‘the
philosophy of the world was foolishness with God.” It
appealed to prophecy and to testimony. ‘Instead of
logical demonstration, it produced living witnesses of the
words and wonderful doings of Jesus Christ.” The
philosophers from the point of view of ‘worldly educa-
tion” made sport of it: Celsus? declared that the Chris-
tian teachers were no better than the priests of Mithra
or of Hekaté, leading men wherever they willed with the
maxims of a blind belief.
It is therefore the more remarkable that within a cen-
tury and a half after Christianity and philosophy first
came into close contact, the ideas and methods of philo-
sophy had flowed in such mass into Christianity, and
filled so large a place in it, as to have made it no less a
philosophy than a religion.
The question which arises, and which should properly
be discussed before the influences of particular ideas are
traced in particular doctrines, is, how this result is to be
accounted for as a whole. The answer must explain
both how Christianity and philosophy came into contact,
and how when in contact the one exercised upon the
other the influence of a moulding force.
The explanation is to be found in the fact that, in
spite of the apparent and superficial antagonism, between
certain leading ideas of current philosophy and the lead-
ing ideas of Christianity there was a special and real
1 Origen, 6. Cels. 3. 44: see also the references given in Keim,
Celsus’ wahres Wort, pp. 11, 40,
2 Origen, 6. Cels. 1. 9.
120 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
kinship. Christianity gave to the problems of philosophy
a new solution which was cognate to the old, and to its
doubts the certainty of a revelation. The kinship of
ideas is admitted, and explanations of it are offered by
both Christian writers and their opponents. ‘‘ We teach
the same as the Greeks,” says Justin Martyr,! ‘though
we alone are hated for what we teach.” ‘Some of our
number,” says Tertullian,” “‘who are versed in ancient
literature, have composed books by means of which it
may be clearly seen that we have embraced nothing new
or monstrous, nothing in which we have not the support
of common and public literature.” Elsewhere? the same
writer founds an argument for the toleration of Chris-
tianity on the fact that its opponents maintained it to be
but a kind of philosophy, teaching the very same doc-
trines as the philosophers—innocence, justice, endurance,
soberness, and chastity: he claims on that ground the
same liberty for Christians which was enjoyed by philo-
sophers.
The general recognition of this kinship of ideas is
even more conclusively shown by the fact that explana-
tions of it were offered on both the one side and the
other.
(a) It was argued by some Christian apologists that
the best doctrines of philosophy were due to the inwork-
ing in the world of the same Divine Word who had
become incarnate in Jesus Christ. “The teachings of
Plato,” says Justin Martyr,* ‘are not alien to those of
Christ, though not in all respects similar. . . . For all
1 Apol. 1. 20. 2 De testim. anime, 1.
8 Apol. 40. 4 Apol. 2. 13.
V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 17
the writers (of antiquity) were able to have a dim vision
of realities by means of the indwelling seed of the im-
planted Word.” It was argued by others that philo-
sophers had borrowed or “stolen” their doctrines from
the Scriptures. ‘‘From the divine preachings of the
prophets,” says Minucius Felix,' “they imitated the
shadow of half-truths.” ‘What poet or sophist,” says
Tertullian,? ‘has not drunk at the fountain of the pro-
phets? From thence it is, therefore, that philosophers
have quenched the thirst of their minds, so that it is the
very things which they have of ours which bring us into
comparison with them.” ‘‘They have borrowed from
our books,” says Clement of Alexandria,? “the chief
doctrines they hold, both on faith and knowledge and
science, on hope and love, on repentance and temperance
and the fear of God:’ and he goes in detail through
many doctrines, speculative as well as ethical, either to
show that they were borrowed from revelation, or to
uphold the truer thesis that philosophy was no less the
schoolmaster of the Greeks than the Law was of the
Jews to bring them to Christ.
(2) It was argued, on the other hand, by the opponents
of Christianity that it was a mere mimicry of philosophy
or a blurred copy of it. ‘‘ They weave a web of mis-
understandings of the old doctrine,” says Celsus,* ‘and
sound them forth with a loud trumpet before men, like
hierophants booming round those who are being initiated
in mysteries.” Christianity was but a misunderstood
Platonism. Whatever in it was true had been better
1 Octav. 34, 2 Apol. 47.
8 Strom. 2. 1. # Origen, c. Cels. 3. 16.
128 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
expressed before! Even the striking and distinctive
saying of the Sermon on the Mount, ‘“‘ Whosoever shall
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other
also,’ was but a coarser and more homely way of saying
what had been extremely well said by Plato’s Socrates.”
It was through this kinship of ideas that Christianity
was readily absorbed by some of the higher natures in
the Greek world. The two classes of ideas probably
came into contact in philosophical Judaism. For it is
clear on the one hand that the Jews of the dispersion
had a literature, and on the other hand that that ltera-
ture was clothing itself in Greek forms and attracting
the attention of the Greek world. Some of that literature
was philosophical. In the Sibylline verses, the poem of
Phocylides, and the letters of Heraclitus, there is a
blending of theology and ethics: in some of the writings
which are ascribed to Philo, but which in reality bridge
the interval between Philo and the Christian Fathers,
there is a blending of theology and metaphysics. None
of them are “very far from the kingdom of God.” The
hypothesis that they paved the way for Christian philo-
sophy is confirmed by the fact that in the first articulate
expressions of that philosophy precisely those elements
are dominant which were dominant in Jewish philosophy.
Two such elements may specially be mentioned: (1) the
allegorical method of interpretation which was common to
both Jews and Greeks, and by means of which both the
1 Origen, c. Cels. 5. 65; 6. 1, 7, 15, 19: see also the references in
Keim, p. 77.
2 Ibid. 7. 58. So Minucius Felix, in Keim, p. 157.
Υ͂. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 129
Gnostics who were without, and the Alexandrians who
were within, the pale of the associated communities, were
able to find their philosophy in the Old Testament as
well as in the New; (2) the cosmological speculations,
which occupied only a small space in the thoughts of
earlier Greek thinkers, but which were already widening
to a larger circle on the surface of Greek philosophy,
and which became so prominent in the first Christian
philosophies as to have thrust aside almost all other
elements in the current representations of them.
The Christian philosophy which thus rose out of
philosophical Judaism was partly apologetic and partly
speculative. The apologetic part of it arose from the
necessity of defence. The educated world tended to
scout Christianity when it was first presented to them, as
an immoral and barbarous atheism. It was necessary to
show that it was neither the one nor the other. The
defence naturally fell into the hands of those Christians
who were versed in Greek methods; and they not less
naturally sought for points of agreement rather than of
difference, and presented Christian truths in a Greek
form. The speculative part of it arose from some of its
elements having found an especial affinity with some of
the new developments of Pythagoreanism and Platonism.
Inside the original communities were men who began to
build great edifices of speculation upon the narrow basis
of one or other of the pinnacles of the Christian temple ;
and outside those communities were men who began to
coalesce into communities which had the same moral
aims as the original communities, and which appealed
K
130 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
in the main to the same authorities, but in which the
simpler forms of worship were elaborated into a thauma-
turgic ritual, and the solid facts of Scripture history
evaporated into mist. They were linked on the one
hand with the cults of the Greek mysteries, and on the
other with philosophical idealism. The tendency to
conceive of abstract ideas as substances, with form and
real existence, received in them its extreme development.
Wisdom and vice, silence and desire, were real beings:
they were not, as they had been to earlier thinkers, mere
thin vapours which had floated upwards from the world
of sensible existences, and hung like clouds in an uncer-
tain twilight. The real world was indeed not the world
of sensible existences, of thoughts and utterances about
sensible things, but a world in which sensible existences
were the shadows and not the substance, the waves and
not the sea.
It was natural that those who held to the earlier
forms of Christianity should take alarm. ‘I am not
unaware,” says Clement of Alexandria, in setting forth
the design of his Stromatevs,? “‘ of what is dinned in our
ears by the ignorant timidity of those who tell us that
1 The above slight sketch of some of the leading tendencies which
have been loosely grouped together under the name of Gnosticism has
been left unelaborated, because a fuller account, with the distinctions
which must necessarily be noted, would lead us too far from the main
track of the Lecture: some of the tendencies will re-appear in detail
in subsequent Lectures, and students will no doubt refer to the brilliant
exposition of Gnosticism in Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, i. pp. 186—
226, ed. 2.
2 Strom. 1. 1: almost the whole of the first book is valuable as a
vindication of the place of culture in Christianity.
V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. ΠῚ
we ought to occupy ourselves with the most necessary
matters, those in which the Faith consists: and that we
should pass by the superfluous matters that le outside
them, which vex and detain us in vain over points that
contribute nothing to the end in view. There are others
who think that philosophy will prove to have been intro-
duced into life from an evil source, at the hands of a
mischievous inventor, for the ruin of men.” ‘The
simpler-minded,” says Tertullian,! “‘not to say ignorant
and unlearned men, who always form the majority of
believers, are frightened at the Economy” [the philo-
sophical explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity ].
‘These men,” says a contemporary writer,” of some of
the early philosophical schools at Rome, ‘have fearlessly
perverted the divine Scriptures, and set aside the rule of
the ancient faith, and have not known Christ, seeking
as they do, not what the divine Scriptures say, but what
form of syllogism may be found to support their godless-
ness; and if one advances any express statement of the
divine Scripture, they try to find out whether it can form
a conjunctive or a disjunctive hypothetical. And having
deserted the holy Scriptures of God, they study geometry,
being of the earth and speaking of the earth, and ignor-
ing Him who comes from above. Some of them, at
any rate, give their minds to Euclid: some of them are
admiring disciples of Aristotle and Theophrastus: as for
Galen, some of them go so far as actually to worship
him.”
The history of the second century is the history of
the clash and conflict between these new mystical and
1 Adv. Prax. 3. 2 Quoted by Euseb. H. £. 5, 28. 13.
k 2
192 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
philosophical elements of Christianity and its earlier
forms. On the one hand were the majority of the
original communities, holding in the main the conception
of Christianity which probably finds its best contem-
porary exposition in the first two books of the Apos-
tolical Constitutions, a religion of stern moral practice
and of strict moral discipline, of the simple love of God
and the unelaborated faith in Jesus Christ. On the
other hand were the new communities, and the new
members of the older communities, with their conception
of knowledge side by side with faith, and with their
tendency to speculate side by side with their acceptance
of tradition. The conflict was inevitable. In the current
state of educated opinion it would have been as impos-
sible for the original communities to ignore the existence
of philosophical elements either in their own body, or in
the new communities which were growing up around
them, as it would be for the Christian churches of our
own day to ignore physical science. The result of the
conflict was, that the extreme wing of each of the con-
tending parties dropped off from the main body. The
old-fashioned Christians, who would admit of no com-
promise, and maintained the old usages unchanged, were
| gradually detached as Ebionites, or Nazarzeans. The old
orthodoxy became a new heresy. In the lists of the
early hand-books they are ranked as the first heretics.
The more philosophical Gnostics also passed one by one
outside the Christian lines. Their ideas gradually lost
their Christian colour. They lived in another, but non-
Christian, form. The true Gnostic, though he repudiates
the name, is Plotinus. The logical development of the
V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 133
thoughts of Basilides and Justin, of Valentinus and the
Naassenes, is to be found in Neo-Platonism—that splendid
vision of incomparable and irrecoverable cloudland in
which the sun of Greek philosophy set.
The struggle really ended, as almost all great conflicts
end, in a compromise. There was apparently so com-
plete a victory of the original communities and of the
principles which they embodied, that their opponents
seem to vanish from Christian literature and Christian
history. It was in reality a victory in which the victors
were the vanquished. There was so large an absorption
by the original communities of the principles of their
opponents as to destroy the main reason for a separate
existence. The absorption was less of speculations than
of the tendency to speculate. The residuum of per-
manent effect was mainly a certain habit of mind. This
is at once a consequence and a proof of the general argu-
ment which has been advanced above, that certain ele-
ments of education in philosophy had been so widely
diffused, and in the course of centuries had become so
strongly rooted, as to have caused an instinctive tendency
to throw ideas into a philosophical form, and to test
assertions by philosophical canons. The existence of
such a tendency is-shown in the first instance by the
mode in which the earliest “‘ defenders of the faith” met
their opponents; and the supposition that it was instinc-
tive is a legitimate inference from the fact that it was
unconscious. For Tatian,! though he ridicules Greek
philosophy and professes to have abandoncd it, yet builds
1 Orat. ad Gree. 2.
184 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
up theories of the Logos, of free-will, and of the nature
of spirit, out of the elements of current philosophical
conceptions. Tertullian, though he asks,! ‘What re-
semblance is there between a philosopher and a Chris-
tian, between a disciple of Greece and a disciple of
heaven ?”? expresses Christian truths in philosophical
terms, and argues against his opponents-—for example,
against Marcion—by methods which might serve as
typical examples of the current methods of controversy
between philosophical schools. And Hippolytus,? though
he reproves another Christian writer for listening to
Gentile teaching, and so disobeying the injunction, ‘‘ Go
not into the way of the Gentiles,” is himself saturated
with philosophical conceptions and philosophical litera-
ture.
The answer, in short, to the main question which has
been before us is that Christianity came into a ground
which was already prepared for it. Education was widely
diffused over the Greek world, and among all classes of
the community. It had not merely aroused the habit
of inquiry which is the foundation of philosophy, but
had also taught certain philosophical methods. Certain
elements of the philosophical temper had come into exist-
ence on a large scale, penetrating all classes of society
and inwrought into the general intellectual fibre of the
time. They had produced a certain habit of mind.
~ When, through the kinship of ideas, Christianity had
been absorbed by the educated classes, the habit of mind
1 Apol. 46. 2 Refut. omn. heres. 5. 18,
J
V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 13d
which had preceded it remained and dominated. It
showed itself mainly in three ways:
1. The first of these was the tendency to define. The
earliest Christians had been content to believe in God
and to worship Him, without endeavouring to define
precisely the conception of Him which lay beneath their
faith and their worship. They looked up to Him as their
Father in heaven, They thought of Him as one, as
beneficent, and as supreme. But they drew no fence of
words round their idea of Him, and still less did they
attempt to demonstrate by processes of reason that their
idea of Him was true. But there is an anecdote quoted
with approval by Eusebius! from Rhodon, a controver-
sialist of the latter part of the second century, which
furnishes a striking proof of the growing strength at
that time of the philosophical temper. It relates the
main points of a short controversy between Rhodon and
Apelles. Apelles was in some respects in sympathy
with Marcion, and in some respects followed the older
Christian tradition. He refused to be drawn into the
new philosophizing current; and Rhodon attacked him
for his conservatism. ‘‘He was often refuted for his
errors, which indeed made him say that we ought not to
inquire too closely into doctrine; but that as every one
had believed, so he should remain. For he declared that
those who set their hopes on the Crucified One would be
saved, if only they were found in good works. But the
most uncertain thing of all that he said was what he said
about God. He held no doubt that there is One Prin-
ciple, just as we hold too: but when I said to him, ‘Tell
LTE: 5:13.
186 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
us how you demonstrate that, or on what grounds you
are able to assert that there is One Principle,’.... he
said that he did not know, but that that was his convic-
tion. When I thereupon adjured him to tell the truth, he
swore that he was telling the truth, that he did not know
how there is one unbegotten God, but that nevertheless
so he believed. Then I laughed at him and denounced
him, for that, giving himself out to be a teacher, he did
not know how to prove what he taught.”
2. The second manifestation of the philosophical habit
of mind was the tendency to speculate, that is, to draw
inferences from definitions, to weave the inferences into
systems, and to test assertions by their logical consistency
or inconsistency with those systems. The earliest Chris-
tians had but little conception of a system. The incon-
sistency of one apparently true statement with another did
not vex their souls. Their beliefs reflected the variety
of the world and of men’s thoughts about the world.
It was one of the secrets of the first great successes of
Christianity. There were different and apparently irre-
concilable elements in it. It appealed to men of various
mould. It furnished a basis for the construction of
strangely diverse edifices. But the result of the ascen-
dency of philosophy was, that in the fourth and fifth
centuries the majinty of churches insisted not only
tianity, but also upon a a “uniformity of ΕΞ: in
regard to those facts. The premises of those speculations
were e assumed ; the conclusions logically followed: the
propositions w ΠῚ were contrary or contradictory to
them were measured, not by the greater or less pro-
V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 137
bability of the premises, but by the logical certainty of
the conclusions; and symmetry became a test of truth.
3. The new habit of mind manifested itself not less
in the importance which came to be attached to it. The
holding of approved opinions was elevated to a position
at first co-ordinate with, and at last superior to, trust in
God and the effort to live a holy life. There had been |
indeed from the first an element of knowledge in the >
conception of the means of salvation. The knowledge ,
of the facts of the life of Jesus Christ necessarily precedes
faith in him. But under the touch of Greek philosophy,
knowledge had become speculation: whatever obligation
attached to faith in its original sense was conceived to
attach to it in its new sense: the new form of knowledge
was held to be not less necessary than the old.
The Western communities not only took over the
greater part of the inheritance, but also proceeded to
assume in a still greater degree the correspondence of
ideas with realities, and of inferences about ideas with |
truths about realities. It added such large groups to
the sum of them, that in the dogmatic theology of Latin
and Teutonic Christendom the content is more Western
than Eastern. But the conception of such a theology
and its underlying assumptions are Greek. They come
from the Greek tendency to attach the same certainty
to metaphysical as to physical ideas. They are in reality
built upon a quicksand. There is no more reason to
suppose that God has revealed metaphysics than that
He has revealed chemistry. The Christian revelation is,
138 V. CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
does not in itself afford a guarantee of the certainty of
the speculations which are built upon those facts. All
such speculations are dogmas in the original sense of the
word. They are simply personal convictions. To the
statement of one man’s convictions other men may assent:
but they can never be quite sure that they understand
its terms in the precise sense in which the original framer
of the statement understood them.
The belief that metaphysical theology is more than
this, is the chief bequest of Greece to religious thought,
}and it has been a damnosa hereditas. It has given to
later Christianity that part of it which is doomed to
perish, and which yet, while it pice holds the key of
the prison-house of many souls.
Lecture VI. !
GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
Ir has been common to construct pictures of the state
of morals in the first centuries of the Christian era from
the statements of satirists who, like all satirists, had a
large element of caricature, and from the denunciations
of the Christian apologists, which, like all denunciations,
have a large element of exaggeration. The pictures so
constructed are mosaics of singular vices, and they have
led to the not unnatural impression that those centuries
constituted an era of exceptional wickedness. It is no
doubt difficult to gauge the average morality of any age.
It is questionable whether the average morality of civi-
lized ages has largely varied: it is possible that if the
satirists of our own time were equally outspoken, the
vices of ancient Rome might be found to have a parallel
in modern London; and it is probable, not on merely
ἃ priort grounds, but from the nature of the evidence
which remains, that there was in ancient Rome, as there
is in modern London, a preponderating mass of those
who loved their children and their homes, who were
good neighbours and faithful friends, who conscientiously
140 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
discharged their civil duties, and were in all the current
senses of the word ‘ moral’ men.!
It has also been common to frame statements of the
moral philosophy which dominated in those centuries,
entirely from the data afforded by earlier writers, and
to account for the existence of nobler elements in con-
temporary writers by the hypothesis that Seneca, Epic-
tetus, and Marcus Aurelius, had come into contact with
Christian teachers. In the case of Seneca, the belief in
such contact went so far as to induce a writer in an imi-
tative age to produce a series of letters which are still
commonly printed at the end of his works, and which
purport to be a correspondence between him and St. Paul.
It is difficult, no doubt, to prove the negative proposition
that such writers did not come into contact with Chris-
tianity ; but a strong presumption against the idea that
such contact, if it existed, influenced to any considerable
extent their ethical principles, is established by the de-
monstrable fact that those principles form an integral part
of their whole philosophical system, and that their system
is in close logical and historical connection with that of
their philosophical predecessors.”
It will be found on a closer examination that the age
in which Christianity grew was in reality an age of moral
1 The evidence for the above statements has not yet been fully
gathered together, and is too long to be given even in outline here :
the statements are in full harmony with the view of the chief modern
writer on the subject, Friedlander, Darstellungen aus der Sitten-
geschichte Roms, see especially Bd. iii. p. 676, 5te διῇ,
* This is sufficiently shown by the fact, which is in other respects
to be regretted, that in most accounts of Stoicism the earlier and later
elements are viewed as constituting a homogeneous whole.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 141
reformation. There was the growth of a higher religious
morality, which believed that God was pleased by moral
action rather than by sacrifice. There was the growth
of a belief that life requires amendment.? There was a
reaction in the popular mind against the vices of the
great centres of population. ‘This is especially seen in
the large multiplication of religious guilds, in which
purity of life was a condition of membership: it pre-
pared the minds of men to receive Christian teaching,
and forms not the least important among the causes which
led to the rapid dissemination of that teaching: it affected
the development of Christianity in that the members of
the religious guilds who did so accept Christian teaching,
brought over with them into the Christian communities
many of the practices of their guilds and of the conceptions
which lay beneath them. The philosophical phase of the
reformation began on the confines of Stoicism and Cynic-
ism. For Cynicism had revived. It had almost faded into
insignificance after Zeno and Chrysippus had formed its
nobler elements into a new system, and left only its
“‘dog-bark’’? and its squalor. But when the philosophical
descendants of Zeno and Chrysippus had become fashion-
able littérateurs, and had sunk independence of thought
and practice in a respectability and ‘‘worldly conformity”
1 “How am I to eat?” said a man to Epictetus: ‘So as to please
God,” was the reply (Diss. 1. 13). The idea is further developed in
Porphyry, who says: “God wants nothing (281.15): the God who is
ἐπὶ πᾶσὶν is ἄῦλος ; hence all ἔνυλον is to Him ἀκάθαρτον, and should
therefore not be offered to Him, not even the spoken word (163. 15).
2 M. Aurelius owed to Rusticus the idea that life required διόρθωσις
and θεραπεία (i. 7 and ii. 13).
ὃ τὸ ὑλακτεῖν, Philostr. 587.
149 _ VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
which the more earnest men felt to be intolerable, Cynic-
ism revived, or rather the earlier and better Stoicism
revived, to re-assert the paramount importance of moral
conduct, and to protest against the unnatural alliance
between philosophy and the fashionable world.
It is to this moral reformation within the philosophical
sphere that I wish especially to draw your attention. Its
chief preacher was Epictetus. He was ranked among
the Stoics; but his portrait of an ideal philosopher is the
portrait of a Cynic. In him, whether he be called Stoic
or Cynic, the ethics of the ancient world find at once
their loftiest expression and their most complete realiza-
tion: and it will be an advantage, instead of endeavouring
to construct a composite and comprehensive picture from
all the available materials, to limit our view mainly to
what Epictetus says, and, as far as possible, to let his
sermons speak for themselves.
The reformation affected chiefly two points: (1) the
place of ethics in relation to philosophy and life; (2) the
contents of ethical teaching.
1. The Stoics of the later Republic and of the age
of the Caesars had come to give their chief attention to
logic and literature. The study of ethics was no longer
supreme; and it had changed its character. Logic, which
in the systems of Zeno and Chrysippus had been only its
servant, was becoming its master: it was both usurping
its place and turning it into casuistry. The study of
literature, of what the great masters of philosophy had
taught, was superseding the moral practice which such
1 The title of Diss, 3. 22, in which the ideal philosopher is described,
is περὶ Κυνισμοῦ.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 143
study was intended to help and foster. The Stoics of
the time could construct ingenious fallacies and compose
elegant mocal discourses ; but they were ceasing to regard
the actual “living according to nature” as the main object
of their lives. The revival of Cynicism was a re-assertion
of the supremacy of ethics over logic, and of conduct
over literary knowledge. It was at first crude and
repulsive. If the Stoics were ‘‘the preachers of the
salon,” the Cynics were ‘the preachers of the street.’’}
They were the mendicant friars of imperial times. They
were earnest, but they were squalid. The earnestness
was of the essence, the squalor was accidental. The
former was absorbed by Stoicism and gave it a new
impulse: the latter dropped off as an excrescence when
Cynicism was tested by time. Epictetus was not carried
as far as the Cynics were in the reaction against Logic.
The Cynics would have postponed the study of it inde-
finitely. Moral reformation is more pressing, they said.?
Epictetus holds to the necessity of the study of Logic
as a prophylactic against the deceitfulness of arguments
and the plausibility of language. But he deprecates the |
exaggerated importance which had come to be attached
to it. The students of his day were giving an altogether
disproportionate attention to the weaving of fallacious
arguments and the mere setting of traps to catch men
in their speech. He would restore Logic to its original
subordination. Neither it nor the whole dogmatic phi-
1 H. Schiller, Geschichte der romischen Kaiserzeit, Bd. i. 452.
* Diss. 1. 17. 4, ἐπείγει μᾶλλον θεραπεύειν, the interpolated remark
of a student when Epictetus has begun a lecture upon Logic: the addi-
tion, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, seems to show that the phrase was a customary one.
———
144 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
losophy of which it was the instrument was of value in
itself. And moreover, whatever might be the place of
such knowledge in an abstract system and in an ideal
world, it was impossible to disregard the actual condi-
tions of the world as it is. The state of human nature
is such, that to linger upon the threshold of philosophy
is to induce a moral torpor. The student who aims at
shaping his reason into harmony with nature has to
_ begin, not with unformed and plastic material, which he
/can fashion to his will by systematic rules of art, but
with his nature as it is shaped already, almost beyond
possibility of unshaping, by pernicious habits, and beguil-
ing associations of ideas, and false opinions about good
and evil. While you are teaching him logic and physics,
the very evils which it is his object to remedy will be
gathering fresh strength. The old familiar names of
‘“‘oood” and ‘ evil,” with all the false ideas which they
suggest, will be giving birth at every moment to mistaken
judgments and wrong actions, to all the false pleasures
and false pains which it is the very purpose of philosophy
to destroy. He must begin, as he must end, with practice.
He must accept precepts and act upon them before he
learns the theory of them. His progress in philosophy
must be measured by his progress, not in knowledge,
but in moral conduct.
This view, which Epictetus preaches again and again
with passionate fervour, will be best stated in his own
words :!
“A man who is making progress, having learnt from the phi-
losophers that desire has good things for its object and undesire
Ai UDiga! Vos
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 145
evil things,—having learnt moreover that in no other way can
contentment and dispassionateness come to a man than by his
never failing of the object of his desire and never encountering the
object of undesire,—banishes the one altogether, or at least post-
pones it, while he allows the other to act only in regard to those
things which are within the province of the will. For he knows
that if he strives not to have things that are without the province
of the will, he will some time or other encounter some such
things and so be unhappy. But if what moral perfection pro-
fesses is to cause happiness and dispassionateness and peace of
mind, then of course progress towards moral perfectiov is pro-
gress towards each one of the things which moral perfection
professes to secure. For in all cases progress is the approaching
to that to which perfection finally brings us.
“ How is it, then, that while we admit this to be the definition
of moral perfection, we seek and show off progress in other
things? What is the effect of moral perfection ?
“* Peace of mind 7᾽
“Who then is making progress towards it? He who has read
many treatises of Chrysippus? Surely moral perfection does
not consist in this—in understanding Chrysippus: if it does,
then confessedly progress towards moral perfection is nothing
else than understanding a good deal of Chrysippus. But as it
is, while we admit that moral perfection effects one thing, we
make progress—the approximation to perfection—effect another.
“<«This man, some one tells us, ‘can now read Chrysippus even
by himself.’
““You are most assuredly making splendid progress, my
friend,’ he tells him. .
“ Progress indeed! why do you make game of him? Why do
you lead him astray from the consciousness of his misfortunes ?
Will you not show him what the effect of moral perfection is,
that he may learn where to look for progress towards it ?
“Look for progress, my poor friend, in the direction of the
effect which you have to produce. And what is the effect which
you have to produce? Never to be disappointed of the object
of your desire, and never to encounter the object of your unde-
L
140 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS,
sire: never to miss the mark in your endeavours to do and not
to do: never to be deceived in your assent and suspension of
assent. The first of these is the primary and most necessary
point: for if it is with trembling and reluctance that you seek
to avoid falling into evil, how can you be said to be making
progress ?
“Tt is in these respects, then, that I ask you to show me your
progress. If I were to say to an athlete, ‘Show me your muscles,
and he were to say, ‘See here are my dumb-bells, I should reply,
‘Begone with your dumb-bells! What I want to see is, not them,
but their effect.’ (And yet that is just what you do:) ‘Take the
treatise On Effort’ (you say), ‘and examine mein it.’ Slave! that
is not what I want to know; but rather how you endeavour to
do or not to do—how you desire to have and not to have—
how you form your plans and purposes and preparations for
action—whether you do all this in harmony with nature or not.
Τῇ you do so in accordance with nature, show me that you do so,
and I will say that you are making progress; but if not, begone,
and do not merely interpret books, but write similar ones your-
self besides. And what will you gain by it? Don’t you know
that the whole book costs five shillings, and do you think the man
who interprets the book is worth more than the book itself costs ?
“Never, then, look for the effect (of philosophy) in one place,
and progress towards that effect in another.
“Where, then, is progress to be looked for? If any one of you,
giving up his allegiance to things outside him, has devoted him-
self entirely to his will—to cultivating and elaborating it so as
to make it at last in harmony with nature, lofty, free, unthwarted,
unhindered, conscientious, self-respectful : if he has learned that
one who longs for or shuns what is not in his power can neither
be conscientious nor free, but must be carried along with the
changes and gusts of things—must be at the mercy of those
who can produce or prevent them: if, moreover, from the moment
when he rises in the morning he keeps watch and guard over
these qualities of his soul—bathes like a man of honour, eats
like a man who respects himself—through all the varying inci-
dents of each successive hour working out his one great purpose,
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 147
as arunner makes all things help his running, and a singing-
master his teaching:—this man is making progress in very
truth—this man is one who has not left home in vain.
“ But if, on the other hand, he is wholly bent upon and labours
at what is found in books, and has left home with a view to
acquiring that, I tell him to go home again at once, and not
neglect whatever business he may have there: for the object
which has brought him away from home is a worthless one.
This only (is worth anything), to study to banish from one’s life
sorrows and lamentations and ‘Alas! and ‘Wretched me! and
misfortune and failure—and to learn what death really is, and
exile and imprisonment and the hemlock-draught, so as to be
able to say in the prison, ‘ My dear Crito, if so it please the gods,
so let it be.’”
This new or revived conception of philosophy as the
science of human conduct, as having for its purpose the
actual reformation of mankind, had already led to the
view that in the presert state of human nature the study
and practice of it required special kinds of effort. It
was not only the science but also the art of life? It
formed, as such, no exception to the rule that all arts
require systematic and habitual training. Just as the
training of the muscles which is necessary to perfect
bodily development is effected by giving them one by
one an artificial and for the time an exaggerated exercise,
so the training of the moral powers was effected, not by
reading the rules and committing them to memory, but
by giving them a similarly artificial and exaggerated
exercise. A kind of moral gymnastic was necessary. The
aim of it was to bring the passions under the control of
reason, and to bring the will into harmony with the will
of God.
1 Sext. Emp. iii. 239.
L 2
=
148 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
(1) This special discipline of life was designated by
the term which was in use for bodily training, askesis
(ἄσκησις).1 It is frequently used in this relation in Philo.
He distingvishes three elements in the process of attain-
ing goodness—nature, learning, discipline.* He distin-
guishes those who discipline themselves in wisdom by
means of actual works, from those who have only a
literary and intellectual knowledge of it. He holds
that the greatest and most numerous blessings that a
man can have come from the gymnastic of moral efforts.*
Its elements are ‘‘reading, meditation, reformation, the
memory of noble ideals, self-restraint, the active practice
of duties:”® in another passage he adds to these prayer,
and the recognition of the indifference of things that are
indifferent.® In the second century, when the idea of
moral reformation had taken a stronger hold, this moral
discipline was evidently carried out under systematic
rules. It was not left to a student’s option. He must
undergo hardships, drinking water rather than wine,
sleeping on the ground rather than on a bed; and
1 The Stoics defined wisdom as θείων τε kal ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην,
and philosophy as ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, Plutarch (Aetius), plac.
phil. 1.2; Galen, Hist. Phil. 5; Diels, Doxogr. Gr. pp. 273, 602.
2 De Abraham. 11 (ii. 9); de Joseph. 1 (ii. 41) ; de praem. et poen.
8, 11 (ii. 416, 418). Philo is quoted because his writings are in some
respects as faithful a photograph of current scholastic methods as those
of Epictetus. It is also possible that some of the writings that stand
under Philo’s name belong to the same period.
3 Quod det. potior. 12 (i. 198, 199): so de congr. erud. caus. 13
(i. 529); de mut. nom. 13 (1, 591).
4 De congr. erud. caus. 28 (i. 542),
5 Leg. alleg. 3. 6 (i. 91).
6. Quis rer. div. heres. 51 (1, 509)
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 149
sometimes even subjecting himself to austerities, being
scourged and bound with chains. There was sometimes
n ostentation of endurance. Marcus Aurelius says that
he owed it to Rusticus that he did not show off with a
striking display either his acts of benevolence or his
moral exercises. ‘If you drink water,” says Epictetus
in his Student’s Manual,? “don’t take every opportunity
of saying, I drink water. .... And if you resolve to
exercise yourself in toil and hardship, do it for yourself
alone, and not for the world outside. Don’t embrace
statues (in public, to cool yourself); but if ever your
thirst become extreme, fill your mouth with cold water
and put it out again—and fell no one.” Epictetus him-
self preferred that men should be disciplined, not by
bodily hardships, but by the voluntary repression of
desire. The true “ascetic” is he who disciplines himself
against all the suggestions of evil desire:? ‘an object of
desire comes into sight: wait, poor soul; do not straight-
way be carried off your feet by it: consider, the contest
is great, the task is divine; it is for kingship, for free-
dom, for calm, for undisturbedness. Think of God: call
Him to be your helper and to stand by your side, as
sailors call upon Castor and Pollux ina storm: for yours
is a storm, the greatest of all storms, the storm of strong
suggestions that sweep reason away.”’ In a similar way
Lucian’s friend Nigrinus condemns those who endeavour
to fashion young men to virtue by great bodily hardships
1M. Aurel. 1. 7.
2 Enchir, 47: cf. Diss. 3.14.4. In Diss, 3. 12.17, part of the
above is given as a quotation from Apollonius of Tyana.
8. Digi. 2¢ oath hela 9. Sal) SLOG 45315 81:
150 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
rather than by a mingled discipline of body and mind:
and Lucian himself says that he knew of some who had
died under the excessive strain.!
This moral gymnastic, it was thought, was often best
practised away from a man’s old associations. Conse-
quently some philosophers advised their students to leave
home and study elsewhere. They went into “retreat,”
either in another city or in solitude. Against this also
there wasa reaction. Ina forcible oration on the subject,
Dio Chrysostom argues, as a modern Protestant might
argue, against the monastic system.2 ‘Colum non
animum mutant,” he says, in effect, when they go from
city to city. Everywhere a man will find the same
hindrances both within and without: he will be only lke
a sick man changing from one bed to another. The true
discipline is to live in a crowd and not heed its noise, to
train the soul to follow reason without swerving, and not
to ‘retreat’ from that which seems to be the immediate
duty before us.
The extent to which moral discipline and the system
of ‘‘retreats”” went on is uncertain, because they soon
blended, as we shall see, with Christianity, and flowed
with it in a single stream.
(2) But out of the ideas which they expressed, and the
ideals which they held forth, there grew up a class of men
which has never since died out, who devoted themselves
‘both by their preaching and living” to the moral re-
formation of mankind. Individual philosophers had had
imitators, and Pythagoras had founded an ascetic school,
1 Nigrin. 27.
2 Orat. xx. vol. i. pp. 288 sqq. (Dind.), περὶ ᾿Αναχωρήσεως.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 151
but neither the one nor the other had filled a large place
in contemporary society. With the revived conception
of philosophy as necessarily involving practice, it was
necessary that those who professed philosophy should be
marked out from the perverted and degenerate world
around them, in their outer as well as in their inner life. °
“The life of one who practises philosophy,” says Dio
Chrysostom, ‘‘is different from that of the mass of men:
the very dress of such a one is different from that of
ordinary men, and his bed and exercise and baths and all
the rest of his living. A man who in none of these
respects differs from the rest must be put down as one of
them, though he declare and profess that he is a philo-
sopher before all Athens or Megara or in the presence of
the Lacedeemonian kings.” !
The distinction was marked in two chief ways:
(1) A philosopher let his beard grow, like the old
Spartans. It was a protest against the elaborate atten-
tion to the person which marked the fashionable society
of the time.
(2) A philosopher wore a coarse blanket, usually as his
only dress. It was at once a protest against the preva-
lent luxury in dress and the badge of his profession.
“Whenever,” says Dio Chrysostom, ‘people see one
in a philosopher’s dress, they consider that he is thus
equipped not as a sailor or a shepherd, but with a view
to men, to warn them and rebuke them, and to give not
one of them any whit of flattery nor to spare any one of
them, but, on the contrary, to reform them as far as he
1 Vol. ii. p. 240.
152 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
possibly can by talking to them and to show them who
they are.” !
The frequency with which this new class of moral
reformers is mentioned in the literature of the time shows
the large place which it filled.
2. The moral reformation affected the contents of
ethical teaching chiefly by raising them from the sphere
of moral philosophy to that of religion. In Epictetus there
are two planes of ethical teaching. The one is that of
orthodox and traditional Stoicism: in the other, Stoicism
is transformed by the help of religious conceptions, and
the forces which led to the practice of it receive the
enormous impulse which comes from the religious emo-
tions. The one is summed up in the maxim, Follow
Nature; the other in the maxim, Follow God.
On the lower plane the purpose of philosophy is stated
in various ways, each of which expresses the same fact.
It is the bringing of the will into harmony with nature.
It consists in making the “dealing with ideas” what it
should be, that is, in dealing with them according to
nature.2 It is the thorough study of the conceptions of
good and evil, and the right application of them to par-
ticular objects.? It is the endeavour to make the will
1 Vol. ii. p. 246. 2 Ench. 4, 13, 30.
3 The χρῆσις φαντασιῶν is an important element in the philosophy
of Epictetus. Every object that is presented to the mind by either the
senses or imagination tends to range itself in the ranks of either good
pr evil, and thereby to call forth desire or undesire: in most men this
association of particular objects with the ideas of good or evil, and the
consequent stirring of desire, is unconscious, being the result of educa-
tion and habit: it is the task of the philosopher to learn to attach the
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS, 153
unthwarted in its action,! to take sorrow and disappoint-
ment out of a man’s life,? and to change its disturbed
torrent into a calm and steady stream. The result of the
practice of philosophy is happiness. The means of
attaining that result are marked out by the constitution
of human nature itself and the circumstances which
surround it. That nature manifests itself in two forms,
desires to have or not to have, efforts to do or not to do.
The one is stimulated by the presentation to the mind of
an object which is judged to be ‘ good,” the other by
that of one which is judged to be “ fitting.” The one
mainly concerns the individual man in himself, the other
concerns him in his relations with other men. The
‘state according to nature”’ of desire is that in which it
never fails of gratification, the corresponding state of
effort is that in which it never fails of its mark. Both the
one and the other are determined by landmarks which
nature itself has set in the circumstances that surround
us. The natural limits of desire are those things that
idea of good to what is really good, so that desire shall never go forth
to what is either undesirable or unattainable: this is the “right dealing
with ideas.” Diss. 1. 28. 11; 1. 30.4; 2.1.4; 2.8. 4; 2.19. 32;
5.21. 2a so. 22,20: 103;
1 ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν προλήψεων τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους, Diss. 1. 2. 6; 1. 22. 2, 7;
2.11. 4,7; 2.17. 9, 12,16; 4.1. 41, 44: προλήψεις are the ideas
formed in the mind by association and blending.
* Diss. 1.1. 31; 1. 4.18; 1.17. 21; and elsewhere.
3 Diss. 1. 4. 23.
* The distinction between (1) ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις, the desire to have or
not to have, and (2) ὁρμή, ἀφορμή, the effort to do or not to do, is of
some importance in the history of psychology. It probably runs back
to the Platonic distinction between τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος and τὸ
Auuoedés μέρος.
184 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
are in our power: the direction of effort is determined by
our natural relations.
For example :4
“ Bear in mind that you areason. What is involved in being
ason? To consider all that he has to be his father’s property,
to obey him in all things, never to disparage him to any one,
never to say or do anything to harm him, to stand out of his way
and give place to him in all things, to help him by all means in
his power.
“Next remember that you are also a brother: the doing of
what is fitting in this capacity involves giving way to him,
yielding to his persuasion, speaking well of him, never setting
up a rival claim to him in those things that are beyond the
control of the will, but gladly letting them go that you may have
the advantage in those things which the will controls.
“ Next, if you are a senator of any city, remember that you are
a senator: if a youth, that you are a youth: if an old man, that
you are an old man: if a father, that you are a father. For in
each of these cases the consideration of the name you bear will
suggest to you what is fitting to be done in relation to it.”
This view of right moral conduct as being determined
by the natural relations in which one man stands to
another, and as constituting what is Fitting in regard
to those relations, had overspread the Roman world.
But in that world the philosophical theory which lay
behind the conception of the Fitting was less prominent
than the conception itself, and two other terms, both of
which were natural and familiar to the Roman mind,
came into use to express it. The one was borrowed from
the idea of the functions which men have to discharge in
the organization of civil government, the other from the
idea of a debt. The former of these, “‘ officiwm,” has not
2 Pres. 5. 10,
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 155
passed in this sense outside the Latin language: the
latter, “‘debctum,” is familiar to us under its English form
66 duty. 2)
On the higher aa of his teaching Epictetus expresses
moral philosophy in terms of theology. Human life begins
and ends in God. Moral conduct is a sublime religion.
I will ask you to listen to a short cento of passages, strung
loosely together, in which his teaching is expressed :—
“«We also are His offspring. Every one of us may call him-
self a son of God Just as our bodies are linked to the material
universe,” subject while we live to the same forces, resolved when
we die into the same elements,’ so by virtue of reason our souls
are linked to and continuous with Him, being in reality parts
and offshoots of Him. There is no movement of which He is
not conscious, because we and He are part of one birth and
erowth ;> to Him ‘all hearts are open, all desires known;® as we
walk or talk or eat, He Himself is within us, so that we are His
shrines, living temples and incarnations of Him.’ By virtue of
this communion with Him we are in the first rank of created
things :§ we and He together form the greatest and chiefest and
most comprehensive of all organizations.?
“If we once realize this kinship, no mean or unworthy
thought of ourselves can enter our souls.° The sense of it forms
a rule and standard for our lives. If God be faithful, we also
must be faithful: if God be beneficent, we also must be benefi-
cent. If God be highminded, we also must be highminded, doing
and saying whatever we do and say in imitation of and union
with Him.4
“Why did He make us?
“He made us, first of all, to complete His conception of the
universe: He had need for such completion of some beings who
ie Fo ola, Ms th 8. 3.13. 15.
41. 14.6; BAT 27; 2:8..1}. 5 1. 14. 6.
6 214811, 7 2. ὃ, 12—14. 81.9.5; 2.8.11.
81. Oa a ioe be 11 2, 14. 19,
156 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
should be intelligent.1 He made us, secondly, to behold and
understand and interpret His administration of the universe: to
be His witnesses and ministers.2 He made us, thirdly, to be
happy in ourselves: like a true Father and Guardian, he has
placed good and evil in those things which are within our own
power. What He says to each one of us is, ‘If thou wilt have
any good, take it from within thyself.* To this end He has given
us freedom of will; there is no power in heaven or earth that can
bar our freedom. We cry out in our sorrow, ‘O Lord God,
grant that I may not feel sorrow; and all the time He has given
us the means of not feeling it® He has given us the power of
bearing and turning to account whatever happens, the spirit of
manliness and fortitude and highmindedness, so that the greater
the difficulty, the greater the opportunity of adorning our
character by meeting it. If, for example, fever comes, it brings
from Him this message, ‘Give me a proof that your moral train-
ing has been real.’ There is a time for learning, and a time for
practising what we have learnt: in the lecture-room we learn:
and then God brings us to the difficulties of real life and says to
us, ‘It is time now for the real contest.’ Life is in reality an
Olympic festival: we are God’s athletes, to whom He has given
an opportunity of showing of what stuff we are made.’
“What is our duty to Him ?
“Tt is simply to follow Him: to be of one mind with Him :‘
to acquiesce in His administration :!° to accept what His bounty
gives, to resign ourselves to the absence of what He withholds.”
The only thought of a good man is, remembering who he is, and
19 1: 29229:
6.
9.4; 1.17.15; 1. 29. 46, 56; 2. 16:95; 4.7. 7
24, 2,
]
2
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. 82, 90, 100. 2. 16. 13.
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10 εὐαρεστεῖν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει, 1. 12. 8; 2. 23, 29, 42,
31 £1,100, 08:
Ι 4
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 157
whence he came, and to Whom he owes his being, to fill the place
which God has assigned to him,’ to will things to be as they are,
and to say what Socrates used to say, ‘If this be God’s will, so be
it.2 Submission must be thy law: thou must dare to lift up
your eyes to God and say, ‘Employ me henceforth for what
service Thou wilt: I am of one mind with Thee: I am Thine: 1
ask not that Thou shouldest keep from me one thing of all that
Thou hast decreed for me.’*
‘Lead Thou me, God, and Thou, O Fate,
Thy appointment I await :
Only lead me, I shall go
With no flagging steps nor slow:
Even though I degenerate be,
And consent reluctantly,
None the less I follow Thee.’4
“ We can only do this when we keep our eyes fixed on Him,
joined in close communion with Him, absolutely consecrated to
His commandments. If we will not do it, we suffer loss. There
are penalties imposed, not by a vindictive tyranny, but by a self-
acting law. If we will not take what He gives under the
conditions under which He gives it, we reap the fruit of wretched-
ness and sorrow, of jealousy and fear, of thwarted effort and
unsatisfied desire.®
“ Above all, we must bide His time. He has given to every
one of us a post to keep in the battle of life, and we must not
leave it until He bids us.® His bidding is indicated by circum-
stances. When He does not give us what our bodies need, when
He sends us where life according to nature is impossible, He, the
Supreme Captain, is sounding the bugle for retreat,’ He, the
Master of the Great Household, is opening the door and saying
to us, ‘Come.’ And when He does so, instead of bewailing your
misfortunes, obey and follow: come forth, not murmuring, but
1 3. 24. 95. 21, 205 185 4.4. 21; 8 2.16. 42.
4 Enchir. 52: Diss, 4. 1.131; 4. 4. 34: a quotation from Cleanthes,
52216) 465 9. 11:01... 3.124,)42 5 ἀξ 2.232.
ai 9. 10᾽ 7 1. 29. 29. $ 2, 13. 14.
158 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
as God’s servant who has finished His work, conscious that He
has no more present need of you.?
“This, therefore, should take the place of every cther pleasure,
the consciousness of obeying God. Think what it is to be able
to say, ‘What others preach, I am doing: their praise of virtue isa
praise of me: God has sent me into the world to be His soldier and
witness, to tell men that their sorrows and fears are vain, that to
a good man no evil can happen whether he live or die. He
sends me at one time here, at another time there: He disciplines
me by poverty and by prison, that I may be the better witness
to mankind. With such a ministry committed to me, can I any
longer care in what place I am, or who my companions are, or
what they say about me: nay, rather, does not my whole nature
strain after God, His laws and His commandments 2’ ”?
Between the current ethics of the Greek world and the
ethics of the earliest forms of Christianity were many
points both of difference and of contact. ᾿ :
The main point of difference was that Christianity
rested morality on a divine command. It took over the
fundamental idea of the Jewish theocracy.’ Its ultimate
appeal was not to the reasonableness of the moral law in
itself, but to the fact that God had enacted it. Greek
morality, on the contrary, was ‘‘ independent.” The idea
that the moral laws are laws of God is, no doubt, found
in the Stoics; but they are so in another than either the
Jewish or the Christian sense: they are laws of God, not
as being expressions of His personal will, but as being
laws of nature, part of the whole constitution of the
world.
1 3. 24.97; cf. 3. 5. 8—10; 4. 10. 14 sqq. 2 3. 24. 110—114.
3 ἹΚαινὸς νόμος, Barn. 2, 6, and note, in Gebhardt and Harnaci’s
edition.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 159
Consequent upon the conception of the moral law
as a positive enactment of God, the breach of meral
law was conceived as sin. Into the early Christian
conception of sin several elements entered. It was
probably not in the popular mind what it was in the
mind of St. Paul, still less what it became in the mind
of St. Augustine. But one element was constant. It
was a trespass against God. As such, it was on the one
hand something for which God must be appeased, and
on the other hand something which He could forgive. To
the Stoics it was shortcoming, failure, and loss: the chief
sufferer was the man himself: amendment was possible
for the future, but there was no forgiveness for the past.
Beyond these and other points of difference there was
a wide area of agreement. The former became accen-
tuated as time went on: it was by virtue of the latter
that in the earliest ages the minds of many persons had
been predisposed to accept Christianity, and that, having
accepted it, they tended to fuse some elements of the new
teaching with some elements of the old. The agreement
15 most conspicuous in those respects which were the chief
aims of the contemporary moral reformation; and above
all in the importance which was attached to moral con-
duct. This importance was overshadowed in the later
Christian communities by the importance which came to
be attached to doctrine: its existence in the earliest
communities is shown by two classes of proofs.
1. The first of these proofs is the place which moral
conduct holds in the earliest Christian writers. The docu-
ments which deal with the Christian life are almost wholly
moral. They enforce the ancient code of the Ten Words.
100 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
They raise those Ten Words from being the lowest and
most necessary level of a legal code, to being the expres-
sion of the highest moral ideal, expanding and amplifying
them so as to make them embrace thoughts and desires
as well as words and actions. ‘The most interesting of
such documents is that which is known as the ‘Two
Ways.”! It has recently acquired a fresh significance
by having been found as part of the Teaching of the
Apostles. It is there prefixed to the regulations for
ceremonial and discipline which constitute the new part
of that work. It proves to be a manual of instruction to
be taught to those who were to be admitted as members
of a Christian community. It may thus be considered to
express the current ideal of Christian practice. In the
‘Way of Life” which it sets forth, doctrine has no place.
Itis summed up in the two commandments: ‘ First, thou
shalt love God who made thee; secondly, thy neighbour
as thyself: whatsoever things thou wouldest not have
done to thyself, do not thou to another.”* These com-
mandments are amplified in the spirit of the Sermon on
the Mount. ‘Thou shalt not forswear thyself: thou
shalt not bear false witness: thou shalt not speak evil:
thou shalt not bear malice: thou shalt not be double-
minded nor double-tongued, for double-tonguedness is ἃ
snare of death. Thy speech shall not be false or hollow,
but filled to the full with deed. Thou shalt not be covet-
ous, nor rapacious, nor a hypocrite, nor evilly disposed,
nor haughty: thou shalt not take mischievous counsel
1 See especially Harnack, die Apostellehre und die Jiidischen Beiden
Wege, Leipzig, 1886.
2 Teaching of the Apostles, 1. 1.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 161
against thy neighbour. Thou shalt not hate any man,
but some thou shalt rebuke, and for some thou shalt pray,
and some thou shalt love more than thine own soul.!...
My child, be not a murmurer, for murmuring is on the
path to blasphemy: nor self-willed nor evil-minded, for
from all these things blasphemies are born. But be thou
meek, for the meek shall inherit the earth: be long-suffer-
ing, and pitiful, and guileless, and quiet, and kind, and
trembling continually at the words which thou hast heard.?
.... Thou shalt not hesitate to give, nor in giving shalt
thou murmur; for thou shalt know who is the good pay-
master of what thou hast earned. Thou shalt not turn
away him that needeth, but thou shalt share all things
with thy brother and shalt not say that they are thine
own ; for if ye be fellow-sharers in that which is immortal,
how much more in mortal things.”
Another such document is the first book of the collec-
tion known as the Apostolical Constitutions: it begins at
once with an exhortation to morality.
‘Listen to holy teaching, ye who lay hold on His
promise, in accordance with the command of the Saviour,
in harmony with his glorious utterances. Take heed,
ye sons of God, to do all things so as to be obedient
to God and to be well-pleasing in all things to the Lord
our God. For if any one follow after wickedness and
do things contrary to the will of God, such a one will
be counted as a nation that transgresses against God.
1 Teaching of the Apustles, 2. 2—T. 2 Ibid. 8. 6—8.
3 Ibid. “ἃ, G 8.
M
102 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
Abstain then from all covetousness and unrighteous-
ness,”?!
2. The second proof is afforded by the place which
discipline held in contemporary Christian life. The
Christians were drawn together into communities. Iso-
lation was discouraged and soon passed away. ΤῸ bea
Christian was to be a member of a community. The
basis of the community was not only a common belief,
but also a common practice. It was the task of the
community as an organization to keep itself pure. The
offences against which it had to guard were not only the
open crimes which fell within the cognizance of public
law, but also and more especially sins of moral conduct
and of the inner life. The qualifications which in later
times were the ideal standard for church officers, were
also in the earliest times the ideal standard for ordi-
nary members. ‘If any man who has sinned sees the
bishop and the deacons free from fault, and the flock
abiding pure, first of all he will not venture to enter
into the assembly of God, being smitten by his own
conscience: but if, secondly, setting lightly by his sin
he should venture to enter, he will forthwith be taken to
task .... and either be punished, or being admonished
by the pastor will be drawn to repentance. For looking
round upon the assembly one by one, and finding no
blemish either in the bishop or in the ranks of the people
1 Const. Apost. 1. 1, p. 1, ed. Lagarde. This may be supplemented
by the conception of Christianity as a new law in Barnabas ii. 6,
Justin passim, Clem. Alex. E. 7. i. 97, 120, 470: see Thomasius,
Dogmengesch. 1. 110 sqq.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 163
under him, with shame and many tears he will go out
in peace, pricked in heart, and the flock will have been
cleansed, and he will cry with tears to God and will
repent of his sin, and will have hope: and the whole
flock beholding his tears will be admonished that he who
has sinned and repented is not lost.”! In other cases
expulsion was a solemn and formal act: the sinful
member was cast into outer darkness: re-admission was
accompanied with the same rites as the original admis-
sion. In other words, the earliest communities endea-
voured, both in the theory which they embodied in their
manuals of Christian life, and in the practice which they
enforced by discipline, to realize what has since been
known as the Puritan ideal. Each one of them was a
community of saints. ‘‘ Passing their days upon earth,
they were in reality citizens of heaven.’’?. The earthly
community reflected in all but its glory and its ever-
lastingness the life of the ‘‘new Jerusalem.” Its bishop
was the visible representative of Jesus Christ himself
sitting on the throne of heaven, with the white-robed
elders round him: its members were the “elect,” the
“holy ones,” the “saved.” ‘Without were the dogs,
and the sorcerers, and the murderers, and the idolators,
and every one that loveth and maketh a lie:” within
were ‘‘they which were written in the Lamb’s book of
life.’ To be a member of the community was to be in
reality, and not merely in conception, a child of God and
heir of everlasting salvation: to be excluded from the
community was to pass again into the outer darkness,
the realm of Satan and eternal death.
1 Const. Apost. 2. 11, p. 22. 2 Ep. ad Diogn. 5.
M 2
104 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
Over these earliest communities and the theory which
they embodied there passed, in the last half of the second
century and the first half of the third, an enormous
change. The processes of the change and its immediate
causes are obscure. The interests of contemporary writers
are so absorbed with the struggles for soundness of doc-
trine, as to leave but little room for a record of the
struggles for purity of life. In the last stages of those
struggles, the party which endeavoured to preserve the
ancient ideal was treated as schismatical. The aggregate
of visible communities was no longer identical with the
number of those who should be saved. The dominant
party framed a new theory of the Church as a corpus
permiztum, and found support for it in the Gospels them-
selves. Morality became subordinated to belief in Chris-
tianity by the same inevitable drift by which practice
had been superseded by theory in Stoicism.
In both the production of this change and its further
developments Greece played an important part. The
net result of the active forces which it brought to bear
upon Christianity was, that the attention of a majority
of Christian men was turned to the intellectual as dis-
tinguished from the moral element in Christian life. And
when the change was effected, it operated in two further
ways, which have survived in large and varied forms to
the present day.
1. The idea of moral reformation had from the first
seized different men with a varying tenacity of grasp.!
There were some men who had a higher moral ideal than
1 Side by side with the average ethics were the Pauline ethics, which
had found a certain lodgment in some.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 165
others: there were some whose natures were stronger :
there were some to whom moral life was not the perfec-
tion of human citizenship, but the struggle of the spirit
to disentangle itself from its material environment, and
to rise by contemplation to fellowship with God. There
are proofs of the existence in the very earliest Christian
communities of those who endeavoured to live on a
higher plane than their fellows. Abstinence from mar-
riage and from animal food were urged and practised as
“counsels of perfection.””’ In some communities there
was an attempt to make such counsels of perfection obli-
gatory. In the majority of communities, though they
were part of ‘the whole yoke of the Lord,’’! and were
specially enjoined at certain times upon all church mem-
bers, they were not of universal or constant obligation.
Those who habitually practised them were recognized as
a church within the Church. The practice of them was
known by a name which we have seen to be common in
the Greek philosophical schools. It was relative to the
conception of life as an athletic contest. It was that of
bodily training or gymnastic exercise (daoKyas).”
The secession of the Puritan party left much of this
element still within the great body of confederated com-
munities. At the end of the third century it became
important both within them and without. It was in-
creased, partly by the growing influence of the ideas
which found their highest expression outside Christianity
in Neo-Platonism; partly by the growing complexity
of society itself, the strain and the despair of an age
1 Teaching of the Apostles, 6. 2.
2 Of a type of Gnosticism, Harnack, Dogmengesch. 202.
100 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
of decadence; partly also by the necessity of finding a
new outlet, when Christianity became a legal religion,
for the passionate love of God which had led men to a
sometimes ecstatic martyrdom. It was joined by the
parallel tendency among professors of philosophy. It
soon took a new form. Hitherto those who followed
counsels of perfection lived in ordinary society, undis-
tinguished except by their conduct from their fellow-
men. The ideal “Gnostic” of Clement of Alexandria
takes his part in ordinary human affairs, “acting the
drama of life which God has given him to play, knowing
both what is to be done and what is to be endured.” ?!
But early in the fourth century the practice of the ascetic
life in Christianity came to be shown in the same out-
ward way, but with a more marked emphasis, as the
similar practice in philosophy. It was indeed known as
philosophy.?, It was most akin to Cynicism, with which
it had sometimes already been confused, and its badges
were the badges of Cynicism, the rough blanket and the
unshorn hair. To wear the blanket and to let the hair
grow was to profess divine philosophy, the higher life of
self-discipline and sanctity. It was to claim to stand on
1 Strom. 7.11.
2 eg. Euseb. Dem. Ev. 3.6: “ Not only old men under Jesus Christ
practise this mode of philosophy, but it would be hard to say how
many thousands of women throughout the whole world, priestesses, as
it were, of the God of the universe, having embraced the highest
wisdom, rapt with a passion for heavenly knowledge, have renounced
the desire of children according to the flesh, and giving their whole
care to their soul, have given themselves up wholly to the Supreme
King and God of the universe, to practise (ἀσκήσασθαι) perfect purity
and virginity.” So also id. de Vit. Constant. 4. 26, 29; Sozom. 6, 33,
of the Syrian monks,
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 167
a higher level and to be working out a nobler ideal than
average Christians. The practice soon received a further
development. Just as ordinary philosophers had some-
times found life in society to be intolerable and had gone
into “retreat,” so the Christian philosophers began to
withdraw altogether from the world, and to live their
lives of self-discipline and contemplation in solitude.
The retention of the old names shows the continuity of
the practice. They were still practising discipline, ἄσκησις,
or philosophy, φιλοσοφία. So far as they retired from
society, they were still said ‘to go into retreat,” ἀναχωρεῖν,
whence the current appellation of avaywpyrat, “anchorets.”
The place of their retreat was a ‘school of discipline,”’
ἀσκητήριον, or a ‘place for reflection,” φροντιστήριον. To
these were soon added the new names which were rela-
tive to the fact that moral discipline was usually practised
in solitude. Those who retired from the world were
“¢solitaries,’”? μοναχοί, and the place of their retirement
was a “‘place for solitude,” μοναστήριον. When the prac-
tice was once firmly rooted in Christian soil, it was
largely developed in independent ways for which Greece
was not primarily responsible, and which therefore cannot
properly be described here; but the independence and
enormous overgrowth of these later forms cannot wipe
away the memory of the fact that to Greece, more than
to any other factor, was due the place and earliest con-
ception of that sublime individualism which centred all
a man’s efforts on the development of his spiritual life,
1 ἀσκητήριον, Socrat, i. 11; distinguished from μοναστήριον, bid.
4, 23, as the smaller from the larger: φροντιστήριον, Evagr. i. 21.
168 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS,
and withdrew him from his fellow-men in order to bring
him near to God.
2. It was inevitable that when the Puritan party had
left the main body, and when the most spiritually-minded
of those who remained detached themselves from the
common life of their brethren, there should be a de-
terioration in the average moral conceptions of the
Christian Churches. It was also inevitable that those
conceptions should be largely shaped by Greek influences.
The Pauline ethics vanished from the Christian world.
For the average members of the churches were now the
average citizens of the empire, educated by Greek
methods, impregnated with the dominant ethical ideas.
They accepted Christian ideas, but without the enthusiasm
which made them a transforming force. As in regard to
metaphysics, so also in regard to ethics, the frame of mind
which had been formed by education was stronger than
the new ideas which it absorbed. The current ideals re-
mained, slightly raised: the current rules of conduct
continued, with modifications. Instead of the concep-
tions of righteousness and holiness, there was the old
conception of virtue: instead of the code of morals which
was ‘briefly comprehended in this saying, namely,
Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” there was
the old enumeration of duties. At the end of the fourth
century the new state of things was formally recognized
by ecclesiastical writers. Love was no more ‘“ the hand-
book of divine philosophy:”?! the chief contemporary
theologian of the West, Ambrose of Milan, formulated
the current theory in a book which is the more important
1 Clem. Alex. Pedag. 3. 11.
VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 169
because it not merely expresses the ideas of his time and
seals the proof of their prevalence, but also became the
basis of the moral philosophy of the Middle Ages. But
the book is less Christian than Stoical.! It is a rechauffée
of the book which Cicero had compiled more than three
centuries before, chiefly from Panetius. It is Stoical,
not only in conception, but also in detail. It makes
virtue the highest good. It makes the hope of the life
to come a subsidiary and not a primary motive. Its ideal
of life is happiness: it holds that a happy life is a life
according to nature, that it is realized by virtue, and that
it is capable of being realized here on earth. Its virtues
are the ancient virtues of wisdom and justice, courage
and temperance. It tinges each of them with a Christian,
or at least with a Theistic colouring; but the conception
of each of them remains what it had been to the Greek
moralists. Wisdom, for example, is Greek wisdom, with
the addition that no man can be wise who is ignorant of
God: justice is Greek justice, with the addition that
its subsidiary form of beneficence is helped by the
Christian society.
The victory of Greek ethics was complete. While
Christianity was being transformed into a system of doc-
trines, the Stoical jurists at the imperial court were slowly
elaborating a system of personal rights. The ethics of
the Sermon on the Mount, which the earliest Christian
communities endeavoured to carry into practice, have been
transmuted by the slow alchemy of history into the ethics
ΤΡ, Ewald, der Einfluss der stoisch-ciceronianischen Moral auf...
Ambrosius, Leipzig, 1881; Draseke in the Rivista di filologia, Aun. v.
1875-6. ἶ
170 VI. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
of Roman law. The basis of Christian society is not
Christian, but Roman and Stoical. A fusion of the Roman
conception of rights with the Stoical conception of rela-
tions involving reciprocal actions, is in possession of
practically the whole field of civilized society. The trans-
mutation is so complete that the modern question is not
so much whether the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount
are practicable, as whether, if practicable, they would be
desirable. The socialistic theories which formulate in
modern language and justify by modern conceptions such
an exhortation as “Sell that thou hast and give to the
poor,” meet with no less opposition within than without
the Christian societies. The conversion of the Church
to Christian theory must precede the conversion of the
world to Christian practice. But meanwhile there is
working in Christianity the same higher morality which
worked in the ancient world, and the maxim, Follow
God, belongs to a plane on which Epictetus and Thomas
a Kempis meet.
Lecture VII.
GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
I. THe CREATOR.
Stowty there loomed through the mists of earlier
Greek thought the consciousness of one God.
It came with the sense of the unity of the world.
That sense had not always been awakened. The varied
phenomena of earth and sea and sky had not always
been brought under a single expression. The groups
into which the mind tended to arrange them were con-
ceived as separate, belonging to different kingdoms and
controlled by independent divinities. It was by the
unconscious alchemy of thought, working through suc-
cessive generations, that the separate groups came to be
combined into a whole and conceived as forming a uni-
verse.
It came also with the sense of the order of the world.
The sun which day by day rose and set, the moon which
month by month waxed and waned, the stars which
year by year came back to the same stations in the sky,
were like a marshalled army moving in obedience to a
fixed command. There was order, not only above, but
also beneath. The sea, which for all its storms and
Vic VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
murmurings, could not pass its bounds, the earth upon
which seed-time and harvest never failed, but spring
after spring the buds burst into blossom, and summer
after summer the blossom ripened into fruit, were part
of the same great system. The conception was that not
merely of a universe, but of a universe moving in obe-
dience to a law. ‘The earliest form of the conception is
probably that of Anaxagoras, which was formulated by
a later writer in the expression, ‘‘ The origins of matter
are infinite, the origin of movement and birth is one.’’!
This conception of an ordered whole was intertwined,
as it slowly elaborated itself, with one or other of two
kindred conceptions, of which one had preceded it and
the other grew with it.
The one was the sense of personality. By a transfer-
ence of ideas which has been so universal that it may
be called natural, all things that move have been invested
with personality. The stars and rivers were persons.
Movement meant life, and life meant everywhere some-
thing analogous to human life. It was by an inevitable
application of the conception that when the sum of
movements was conceived as a whole, it should be also
conceived that behind the totality of the phenomena
and the unity of their movements there was a single
Person.
The other was the conception of mind. It was a con-
ception which had but slowly disentangled itself from
that of bodily powers. It was like the preaching of a
revelation, and almost as fruitful, when Epicharmus
1 Theophrastus ap. Simplic. in phys. ἴ. 6 (Diels, Doxographi Graeci,
p. 479).
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 115
proclaimed :1 “It is not the eye that sees, but the mind:
it is not the ear that hears, but the mind: all things
except mind are blind and deaf.” It was the mind that
not only saw but thought, and that not only thought
but willed. It alone was the real self: and the Person
who is behind nature or within it was like the personality
which is behind the bodily activities of each one of us:
His essence was mind.
There was one God. The gods of the old mythology
were passing away, like a splendid pageantry of clouds
moving across the horizon to be absorbed in the clear
and infinite heaven. ‘But though God is one,” it was
said,? ‘‘ He has many names, deriving a name from each
of the spheres of His government. .... He is called the
Son of Kronos, that is of Time, because He continues
from eternity to eternity; and Lightning-God, and
Thunder-God, and Rain-God, from the lightnings and
thunders and rains; and Fruit-God, from the fruits (which
he sends); and City-God, from the cities (which he pro-
tects); and the God of births, and homesteads, and
kinsmen, and families, of companions, and friends, and
armies. .... God, in short, of heaven and earth, named
after all forms of nature and events as being Himself
the cause of 811.) ‘There are not different gods among
different peoples,” says Plutarch,? ‘nor foreign gods
and Greek gods, nor gods of the south and gods of the
1 νόος ὁρῃ καὶ νόος ἀκούει᾽ τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά, quoted in Plut.
de fort. 3, p. 98, de Alex. magn. fort. 3, p. 336, and elsewhere: cf
Lucret. 3. 36; Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 20.
2 Pseudo-Arist. de mundo, 7, p. 401 a.
8 De Isid. et Osir. 67, p. 378,
174. VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
north; but just as sun and moon and sky and earth and
sea are common to all mankind, but have different names
among different races, so, though there be one Reason
who orders these things and one Providence who ad-
ministers them ... . there are different honours and
appellations among different races; and men use con-
secrated symbols, some of them obscure and some more
clear, so leading their thoughts on the path to the
Divine: but it is not without risk ; for some men, wholly
missing their foothold, have slipped into superstition,
and others, avoiding the slough of superstition, have
in their turn fallen over the precipice of atheism.”
In the conception of God as it thus uncoiled itself in
Greek history, three strands of thought are constantly
intertwined—the thought of a Creator, the thought of
a Moral Governor, and the thought of a Supreme or
Absolute Being. It is desirable to trace the history of
each of these thoughts, as far as possible, separately,
and to consider their separate effects upon the develop-
ment of Christian theology. The present Lecture will
deal mainly with the first: the two following Lectures
with the other two.
It was at a comparatively late stage in its history
that Greek thought came to the conception of a begin-
ning of all things. The conception was first formulated
by Anaximander, in the sixth century 8.0.Ϊ The
earlier conception was that of a chaos, out of which gods
and all things alike proceeded. The first remove from
1 Theophrast. ap. Simplic. im phys. f. 6 (Diels, p. 476), πρῶτος
τοῦτο τοὔνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς : so Hippol. Philosoph. 1. 6.
VII. GREEK AND.‘CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 175
that earlier conception was hylozoism, the belief that life
and matter were the same. ‘The conception of mind
was not yet evolved. When it was evolved, two lines
of thought began to diverge. The one, following the
conception of human personality as absolutely single,
conceived of both reason and force as inherent in matter :
it is the theory which is known as Monism. The other,
following the conception of human personality as a
separable compound, body and soul, conceived of reason
and force as external to matter: it is the theory which
is known as Dualism. These two theories run through
all subsequent Greek philosophy.
1. The chief philosophical expression of Monism was
Stoicism. The Stoics followed the Ionians in believing
that the world consists of a single substance. They
followed Heraclitus in believing that the movements and
modifications of that substance are due neither to a blind
impulse from within nor to an arbitrary impact from
without. It moved, he had thought, with a kind of
rhythmic motion, a fire that was kindling and being
quenched with regulated limits of degree and time.!
The substance is one, but immanent and inherent in it
is a force that acts with intelligence. The antithesis
between the two was expressed by the Stoics in various
forms. It was sometimes the bare and neutral contrast
of the Active and the Passive. For the Passive was
sometimes substituted Matter, a term which, signifying,
as it originally does, the timber which a carpenter uses
1 Heraclit. ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.14, κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων
” -“ ᾿
οὔτε τις θεῶν οὐτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν" ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον,
ε ’ὔ’ 4 Se! , ΄
ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.
176 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
for the purposes of his craft, properly belongs to another
order of ideas; and for the Active was frequently sub-
stituted the term Logos, which, signifying as it does, on
the one hand, partly thought and partly will, and, on
the other hand, also the expression of thought in a sen-
tence and the expression of will in a law, has no single
equivalent in modern language. But the majority of
Stoics used neither the colourless term the Active, nor
the impersonal term the Logos. The Logos was vested
with personality: the antithesis was between matter
and God. This latter term was used to cover a wide
range of conceptions. The two terms of the antithesis
being regarded as expressing modes of a single substance,
separable in thought and name but not in reality, there
was a natural drift of some minds towards regarding
God as a mode of matter, and of others towards regarding
matter as a mode of God. The former conceived of Him
as the natura naturata: ‘Jupiter est quodcunque vides
quodcunque moveris.”! The latter conceived of Him as
the natura naturans. This became the governing con-
ception. He is the sum of an infinite number of rational
forces which are continually striving to express them-
selves through the matter with which they are in union.
He is through them and in them working to realize an
end. The teleological idea controls the whole conception.
He is always moving with purpose and system, and
always thereby producing the world. The products are
all divine, but not all equally divine. In His purest
essence, He is the highest form of mind in union with
the most attenuated form of matter. In the lowest form
1 Lucan, Phars. 9, 579.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 177
of His essence, He is the cohesive force which holds
together the atoms of a stone. Between these two poles
are infinite gradations of being. Nearest of all to the
purest essence of God is the human soul. It is in an
especial sense His offspring: it is described by the meta-
phors of an emanation or outflow from Him, of a sapling
which is separate from and yet continues the life of its
parent tree, of a colony in which some members of the
mother state have settled.
If all this were expressed in modern terms, and by
the help of later conceptions, it would probably be most
suitably gathered into the proposition that the world is
the self-evolution of God. Into such a conception the
idea of a beginning does not necessarily enter: it is con-
sistent with the idea of an eternal process of differentia-
tion: that which is, always has been, under changed and
changing forms: the theory is cosmological rather than
cosmogonical: it rather explains the world as it is thar
gives an account of its origin.
2. The chief philosophical expression of Dualism was
1 ἀπόῤῥοια, M. Anton. 2. 4: ἀπόσπασμα, Epict. Diss. 1. 14. G <2)
8.11; M. Anton. 5. 27: ἀποικία, Philo, de mund. opif. 46 (i. 32).
The co-ordination of these and cognate terms in Philo is especially
important in view of their use in Christian theology: de mund. opif.
51 (i. 35), πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν φκείωται θείῳ λόγῳ,
τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς:
he considers the term ἐκμαγεῖον to be more appropriate to theology,
τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ὅπερ ὁσιώτερον εἰπεῖν τοῖς κατὰ
Μωυσῆν φιλοσοφοῦσιν, εἰκόνος θείας ἐκμαγεῖον ἐμφερές, de mutat. nom.
39 (i. 612): and he is careful to guard against an inference that
ἀπόσπασμα implies a breach of continuity between the divine and the
human soul, ἀπόσπασμα ἣν od διαιρετόν᾽ τέμνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τοῦ θείου
κατ ἀπάρτησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνεται, quod det, pot. insid, 24 (i. 209).
N
178 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Platonism. Plato followed Anaxagcias in believing that
mind is separate from matter and acts upon it: he went
beyond him in founding upon this separation a universal
distinction between the real and the phenomenal, and
between God and the world. God was regarded as being
outside the world. The world was in its origin only
potential being (τὸ μὴ dv), The action of God upon it
was that of a craftsman upon his material, shaping it as
a carpenter shapes wood, or moulding it as a statuary
moulds clay. In so acting, He acted with reason, follow-
ing out thoughts in His mind. Sometimes His reason,
or His mind, is spoken of as being itself the fashioner of
the world.1 Each thought shows itself in a group of
material objects. Such objects, so far as they admit of
being grouped, may be viewed as imitations or embodi-
ments of a form or pattern, existing either as a thought
in the mind of the Divine Workman, or as a force pro-
ceeding from His mind and acting outside it. As the
conception of these forms was developed more and more,
they tended to be regarded in the latter light rather
than in the former. They were cosmic forces which
had the power of impressing themselves upon matter.
They were less types than causes. They came midway
between God and the rude material of the universe, so
that its changing phenomena were united with an un-
changing element. They were themselves grouped in a
vast gradation, reaching its highest point in the Form of
Perfection, which was higher than the Form of Being.
The highest and most perfect of types is conceived as the
1 Phileb. 16, p. 28e, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστήν : in the
post-Platonie Lpinomis, p. 986 ¢, λόγος ὁ πάντων θειότατος.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 179
most powerful and most active of forces. In the elabo-
rate cosmology of the Zimcus, it is further conceived as
a person. The creative energy of God is spoken of as
the Demiurgus, who himself made an ideal world, and
employed subordinate agents in the construction of the
actual world. The matter upon which the Demiurgus
or his agents work is sometimes conceived as potential
‘being,! the bare capacity of receiving qualities and
forms, and sometimes as chaotic substance which was
reduced to order.? The agents were gods who, having
been themselves created, were bidden to create living
‘beings, capable of growth and decay.® The distinction
between the two spheres of creation, that of a world in
which nothing was imperfect since it was the work of a
1 The best account of Plato’s complex, because progressive, theory
of matter is that of Siebeck, Plato’s Lehre von der Materie, in his
Untersuchungen der Philosophie der Griechen, Freiburg im Breisg. 1888.
The conception of it which was current in the Platonist schools, and
which is therefore important in relation to Christian philosophy, is
given in the Placita of Aetius, ap. Stob. Eel. 1. 11 (Diels, p. 308), and
Hippol. Philosoph. 1. 19.
2 Plat. Tim. p. 30, πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον
ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς
ἀταξίας.
3 Τὴ Tim. p. 41, the θεοὶ θεῶν are addressed at length by 6 τόδε τὸ
πᾶν γεννήσας (=6 δημιουργός) : the most pertinent words are, ἵν᾽ οὖν
θνητά τε ἢ τό τε πᾶν ὄντως ἅπαν ἢ, τρέπεσθε κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν
ἡ τῶν ζώων δημιουργίαν, μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμῶν γένεσιν.
The whole theory is summed up by Professor Jowett in the Introduc-
tion to his translation of the Timaus (Plato, vol. ii. p. 470): “The
Creator is like a human artist who frames in his mind a plan which he
executes by means of his servants. Thus the language of philosophy,
which speaks of first and second causes, is crossed by another sort of
phraseology, ‘God made the world because he was good, and the demons
ministered to him.’”
N 2
180 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOI OGY.
Perfect Being, and that of a world which was full of
imperfections as being the work of created beings, came,
as we shall see, to be of importance in some phases of
Christian thought.
It was inevitable, in the syncretism which results
when an age of philosophical reflection succeeds an age
of philosophical origination, that these two great drifts
of thought should tend in some points to approach each
other. The elements in them which were most readily
fused together were the theories of the processes by
which the actual world came into being, and of the
nature of the forces which lay behind those processes.
In Stoicism, there was the theory of the one Law or
Logos expressing itself in an infinite variety of material
forms: in Platonism, there was the theory of the one
God, shaping matter according to an infinite variety of
patterns. In the one, the processes of nature were the
operations of active forces, containing in themselves the
law of the forms in which they exhibit themselves,
self-developing seeds, each of them a portion of the
one Logos which runs through the whole.’ In the
other, they were the operations of the infinitely various
and eternally active energy of God, moving always in
the direction of His thoughts, so that those thoughts
1 λόγοι σπερματικοί, frequently in Stoical writings, e.g. in the defi-
nition of the πῦρ τεχνικὸν, which is the base of all things, as given in
the Placita of Aetius, reproduced by Plutarch, Eusebius, and Stobzeus,
Diels, p. 306, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ᾽ ovs
ἕκαστα καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην γίνεται. The best account of this important
element in later Stoicism is in Heinze, die Lehre vam Logos in der
griechischen Philosophie, 1872, pp. 110 sqq.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 181
might themselves be conceived as the causes of the
operations.! In both the one theory and the other, the
processes were sometimes regarded in their apparent
multiplicity, and sometimes in their underlying unity:
and in both also the unity was expressed sometimes by
the impersonal term Logos, and sometimes by the per-
sonal term God.
But while the monism of the Stoics, by laying stress
upon the antithesis between the two phases of the one
substance, was tending to dualism, the dualism of the
Platonists, by laying stress upon the distinction between
the creative energy of God and the form in the mind of
God which His energy embodied in the material universe,
was tending to introduce a third factor into the concep-
tion of creation. It became common to speak, not of
two principles, but of three—God, Matter, and the Form,
or Pattern.2 Hence came a new fusion of conceptions.
The Platonic Forms in the mind of God, conceived, as
they sometimes were, as causes operating outside Him,
1 Hence the definition which Aetius gives: ἰδέα ἐστὲν οὐσία ἀσώμα-
TOS, αὐτὴ μὲν ὑφεστῶσα καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰκονίζουσα δὲ Tas ἀμόρφους
ὕλας καὶ αἰτία γινομένη τῆς τούτων δείξεως, ap. Plut. de plac. philos.
1.10; Euseb. ργώρ. evang. 15. 48 ; with additions and ditferences in
Stob. Ecl. 1. 12 (Diels, p. 308).
* The three ἀρχαί are expressed by varying but identical terms:
God, Matter, and the Form (ἰδέα), or the By Whom, From What,
In view of What (ὑφ᾽ οὗ, ἐξ ov, πρὸς 6), in the Placita of Aetius,
1. 3. 21, ap. Plut. de placit. phil. 1. 3, Stob. Ecl. 1. 10 (Diels, p. 288),
and in Timezus Locrus, de an. mundi 2 (Mullach FPG 2. 38): God,
Matter, and the Pattern (παράδειγμα), Hippol. Philosoph. 1.19, Herm.
Trris. Gent. Phil. 11: the Active (τὸ ποιοῦν), Matter, and the Pattern,
Alexand. Aphrod. ap. Simplic. in phys. f. 6 (Diels, p. 485), where
Simplicius contrasts this with Plato’s own strict dualism.
182 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY,
were more or less identified with the Stoical Logoz, and,
being viewed as the manifold expressions of a single
Logos, were expressed by a singular rather than a plural
term, the Logos rather than the Logoi of God.
It is at this point that the writings of Philo become
of special importance. They gather together, without
fusing into a symmetrical system, the two dominant
theories of the past, and they contain the seeds of
nearly all that afterwards grew up on Christian soil.
It is possible that those writings cover a much larger
period of time than is commonly supposed, and that if
we could find a key to their chronological arrangement,
we should find in them a perfect bridge from philoso-
phical Judaism to Christian theology. And even without
such a key we are able to see in them a large representa-
tion of the processes of thought that were going on, and
can better understand by the analogies which they offer
both the tentative theories and those that ultimately
became dominant in the sphere of Christianity. It is
consequently desirable to give a brief account of the
view which they present.
The ultimate cause of the world is to be found in the
nature of God. As in Plato, though perhaps in a dif-
ferent sense, God is regarded as good. By His goodness
He was impelled to make the world: He was able to
make it by virtue of His power. ‘If any one wished
to search out the reason why the universe was made, I
think that he would not be far from the mark if he were:
to say, what, in fact, one of the ancients said, that the
Father and Maker is good, and that being good He did
not grudge the best kind of nature to matter (οὐσίᾳ
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 183
which of itself had nothing excellent, though it was
capable of becoming all things.”! And again: “My
soul once told me a more serious story (than that of the
Greek mythology), when seized, as it often was, with a
divine ecstasy.....It told me that in the one really
existing God there are two chief and primary faculties,
Goodness and Power, and that by Goodness He begat
the universe, and by Power He governs it.”? God is
thus the Creator, the Fashioner and Maker of the world,
its Builder and Artificer.2 But when the conception of
His relation to the world is more precisely examined, it
is found to be based upon a recognition of a sharp dis-
tinction between the world of thought and that of sense ;
and to be monistic in regard to the one, dualistic in
regard to the other. God is mind. From Him, as from
a fountain, proceed all forms of mind and reason. Reason,
whether unconscious in the form of natural law, or con-
scious in the form of human thought, is like a river that
1 De mundi opif. 5 (i. 5): ef. Plat. Tim. p. 30 (of God), ἀγαθὸς ἦν
ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος" τούτου δ᾽
ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὁτιμάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὑτῷ.
2 De cherub. 9 (i. 144): ef. ἐδ. 35 (i. 162).
3 The most frequent word is δημιουργός, but several others are used,
e.g. πλάστης, de confus. ling. 38 (i. 434); τεχνίτης, ibid. ; κοσμοπλάσ-
της; de plant Noe, 1 (i. 329); κοσμοποιός, ibid. 31 (i. 348), οὐ τεχνίτης
μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πατὴρ τῶν γιγνομένων, Leg. alleg. 1. 8 (i. 47). The
distinctions which became important in later controversies do not
appear in the writings which are probably Philo’s own, but are found
in those which probably belong to his school: the most explicit
recognition of them is de somn. 1. 13 (i. 632), 6 θεὸς τὰ πάντα
γεννήσας οὐ μόνον εἰς TS ἐμφανὲς ἤγαγεν ἀλλὰ Kal ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν
ἐποίησεν, οὐ δημιουργὸς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίστης αὐτὸς ὧν : cf. also de
monarch. 3 (ii. 210), θεὸς εἷς ἐστι καὶ κτίστης καὶ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων.
184 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
flows forth from Him and fills the universe! In man
the two worlds meet. The body is fashioned by the
Artificer from the dust of the earth: “The soul came
from nothing that is created, but from the Father and
Leader of all things. For what He breathed into Adam
was nothing else than a divine breath, a colony from
that blissful and happy nature, placed here below for
the benefit of our race; so that granting man to be
mortal in respect of his visible part, yet in respect of
that which is invisible he is the heir of immortality.’’2
And again: ‘The mind is an offshoot from the divine
and happy soul (of God), an offshoot not separated from
Him, for nothing divine is cut off and disjoined, but
only extended.”? And again, in expounding the words,
‘They have forsaken me, the fountain of life” (Jeremiah
il. 13), he says: ‘Only God is the cause of soul and
life, especially of rational soul and reasonable life; but
He Himself is more than life, being the ever-flowing
fountain of life.’’4
This is monistic. But the theory of the origin of the
sensible world is dualistic. The matter upon which He
acted was outside Him. ‘It was in itself without order,
without quality, without soul, full of difference, dispro-
portion, and discord: it received a change and trans-
formation into what was opposite and best, order, quality,
animation, identity, proportion, harmony, all that is
1 De somn., 2. 37 (i. 691).
2 De mandi opif. 46 (i. 32): ef. ἐδ. 51 (i 35): quod deus immut. 10
(i. 279), and elsewhere.
8 Quod det. ot. ins. 24 (i. 208, 209).
* De profug. 36 (i. 575).
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 185
characteristic of a better form.”! He himself did not
touch it. ‘Out of it God begat all things, Himself not
touching it: for it was not right that the all-knowing
and blessed One should touch unlimited and confused
matter: but He used the unbodied Forces whose true ἡ
name is the Forms (ἰδέαι), that each class of things should
receive its fitting shape.’* These unbodied Forces,
which are here called by the Platonic name of Forms,
are elsewhere spoken of in Stoical language as Reasons
(λόγοι), sometimes in Pythagorean language as Numbers
or Limits, sometimes in the language of the Old Testa-
ment as Angels, and sometimes in the language of
popular mythology as Demons. The use of the two
1 De mundi opif. 5 (i. 5): this is the most explicit expression of
his theory of the nature of matter. It may be supplemented by de
plant Noe, 1 (i. 329), τὴν οὐσίαν ἄτακτον καὶ συγκεχυμένην οὖσαν ἐξ
αὑτῆς εἰς τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας καὶ ἐκ συγχύσεως εἰς διάκρισιν ἄγων ὃ
κοσμοπλάστης μορφοῦν ἤρξατο : quis rer. div. her. 27 (i. 492): de
somn. 2. 6 (i. 665): οὐσία is the more usual word, but ὕλῃ is sometimes
found, e.g. de plant Noe, 2 (i. 330): the conception underlying either
word is more Stoical than Platonic, ie. it is rather that of matter
having the property of resistance than that of potential matter or
empty space: hence in de profug. 2 (i. 547), τὴν ἄποιον καὶ ἀνείδεον
καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον οὐσίαν is contrasted, in strictly Stoical phraseology,
with τὸ κινοῦν αἴτιον.
2 De sacrif. 18 (ii. 261).
8 The terms λόγοι and ἰδέαι are common. Instances of the other
terms are the following: angels, de confus. ling. 8 (i. 408), τῶν θείων
ἔργων καὶ λόγων ovs καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους : de somn. i. 19 (i. 638),
ἀθανάτοις λόγοις οὖς καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους : Leg. alley. 3. 62 (i. 122),
τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ λόγους αὐτοῦ : δαίμονες, de gigant. 2. 2 (i. 263),
ovs ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι δαίμονας, ἀγγέλους Μωῦσῆς εἴωθεν ὀνομάζειν :
so, in identical words, de somn. 1. 22 (i. 642): ἀριθμοὶ and μέτρα,
quis rer. div. heres. 31 (i. 495), πᾶσιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πάσαις ταῖς πρὸς
τελειότητα ἰδέαις καταχρησαμένου τοῦ πεποιηκότος : de mund. opif. 9
186 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
names Force and Form, with the synonyms which are
interchanged with each of them, expresses the two sides
of the conception of them. They are at once the agents
or instruments by means of which God fashioned the
world, and also the types or patterns after which He
fashioned it.} |
In both respects they are frequently viewed, not in
the plurality of their manifestations, but in the unity of
their essence. On the one hand, they collectively form
the world which the Divine Architect of the great City
of the Universe fashioned in His mind before His thought
went outside Him to stamp with its impress the chaotic
and unformed mass. The place of this world is the
Logos, the Reason or Will or Word of God: more pre-
‘cisely, it constitutes that Logos in a special form of its
activity :* for in the building of an ordinary city the
ideal which precedes it ‘‘is no other than the mind of
the architect, planning to realize in a visible city the
(i. 7), ἰδέαι καὶ μέτρα καὶ τύποι καὶ σφραγῖδες : οἵ, de monarch. 6
(ii, 219), τὰ ἄπειρα καὶ ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσχημάτιστα περατοῦσαι καὶ
περιορίζουσαι καὶ σχηματίζουσαι.
1 The clearest instance of the identification is probably in de monarch.
6 (11. 218, 219), where God tells Moses that so far from Himself being
cognizable, not even the powers that minister to Him are cognizable in
their essence; but that as seals are known from their impressions,
τοιαύτας ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὰς περὶ ἐμὲ δυνάμεις ἀποίοις ποιότητας καὶ
μορφὰς ἀμόρφοις καὶ μηδὲν τῆς ἀϊδίου φύσεως μεταλλομένας μήτε
μειουμένας.
2 De mund. opif. 6 (i. 5), οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναε
κόσμον ἢ θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος : vit. Mos, 8. 13 (ii. 154),
τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ παραδειγματικῶν ἰδεῶν ἐξ ὧν ὁ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος:
so de confuse, ling. 34 (i. 431): cf. the Stoical definition of λόγος in
Epictet. Diss. 1, 20, 5, as σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 187
city of his thought..... The archetypal seal, which we
call the ideal world, is itself the archetypal pattern, the
Form of Forms, the Reason of God.’”’! On the other hand,
the Reason of God is sometimes viewed not as a Form
but as a Force. It is His creative energy.? It is the
instrument by which He made all things.2 It is the
‘“‘river of God” that is “full of waters,” and that flows
forth to ‘make glad the city of God,” the universe.*
From it, as from a fountain, all lower Forms and Forces
flow. By another and even sublimer figure, it, the
eldest born of the “1 am,” robes itself with the world
as with a vesture, the high-priest’s robe, embroidered by
all the Forces of the seen and unseen worlds.®
But in all this, Philo never loses sight of the primary
truth that the world was made not by inferior or opposing
beings, but by God. It is the expression of His Thought.
His Thought went forth from Him, impressing itself in
infinite Forms and by means of infinite Forces: but
though His Thought was the charioteer, it is God
1 De mund. opif. 4 (i. 4): the same conception is expressed in less
figurative language in Leg. alleg. 1. 9 (i. 47), πρὶν ἀνατεῖλαι κατὰ μέρος
αἰσθητὰ ἣν τὸ γενικὸν αἰσθητὸν προμηθείᾳ τοῦ πεποιηκότος.
2 δύναμις κοσμοποιητική, de mund. opif. 5 (i. 5); δύναμις ποιητική"
de profug. 18 (i. 560).
$ Leg. alleg. 1. 9 (1. 47), τῷ γὰρ περιφανεστάτῳ καὶ τηλαυγεστάτῳ
λόγῳ, ῥήματι, 6 θεὸς ἀμφότερα (i.e. both heaven and earth) ποιεῖ :
quod deus immut. 12 (i. 281), λόγῳ χρώμενος ὑπηρέτῃ δωρεῶν ᾧ καὶ
τὸν κόσμον εἰργάζετο : more expressly, it is the instrument, ὄργανον,
Leg. alleg. 3. 31 (i. 106), de cherub. 35 (i. 163).
* De somn. 2. 37 (i. 691).
5 De profug. 20 (1, 562), de migrat. Abr. 18 (1, 452): cf, Wisdom,
18, 24.
188 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Himself who gives the orders.1_ By a different concep-
tion of the genesis of the world, and one that is of
singular interest in view of the similar conceptions which
we shall find in some Gnostic schools, God is the Father
of the world:* and the metaphor of Fatherhood is
expanded into that of a marriage: God is conceived as
the Father, His Wisdom as the Mother: “and she,
receiving the seed of God, with fruitful birth-pangs
brought forth this world, His visible son, only and well-
beloved.”
We have now the main elements of the current
conceptions out of which the philosophers of early Chris-
tianity constructed new fabrics.
Christianity had no need to borrow from Greek philo-
sophy either the idea of the unity of God, or the belief
that He made the world. Its ultimate basis was the
belief in one God. It rode in upon the wave of the
reaction against polytheism. The Scriptures to which
it appealed began with the sublime declaration, “ In the
beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” It
accepted that declaration as being both final and com-
plete. It saw therein the picture of a single supreme
Artificer: and it elaborated the picture by the aid of
anthropomorphic conceptions: “ΒΥ His almighty power
He fixed firm the heavens, and by His incomprehensible
1 De profug. 19 (i. 561).
2 ὃ τῶν ὅλων πατήρ, de migrat. Abrah. 9 (i. 443); ὁ θεὺς τὰ πάντα
γεννήσας, de somn. 1. 13 (i, 632), and elsewhere,
8 De ebriet. 8 (i. 361).
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 189
wisdom He set them in order: He separated the earth
from the water that encompassed it... . and last of all
He formed man with His sacred and spots Pads the
impress of His own image.”
The belief that the one God was the Creator of heaven
and earth came, though not without a struggle, to be a
foremost and permanent element in the Christian creed.
The various forms of ditheism which grew up with it
and around it, finding their roots in its unsolved pro-
blems and their nutriment in the very love of God which
it fostered, gradually withered away. But in proportion
as the belief spread widely over the Greek world, the
simple Semitic cosmogony became insufficient. The
questions of the mode of creation, and of the precise
relation of God to the material world, which had grown
with the growth of monotheism as a philosophical doc-
trine, were asked not less instinctively, and with an even
keener-sighted enthusiasm, when monotheism became a
religious conviction. They came not from curiosity, but
as the necessary outgrowth among an educated people
of that which, not less now than then, is the crucial
question of all theistic philosophy: How, if a good and
almighty God made the world, can we account for imper-
fection and failure and pain ?
These questions of the mode of creation and of the
relation of God to the material world, and the underlying
1 1 Clem. Rom. 33. 3,4: but it is a noteworthy instance of the con-
trast between this simple early belief and the developed theology which
had grown up in less than a century later, that Irenzus, /ib. 4, pref.
ὁ. 4, explains the ‘hands’ to mean the Son and Spirit: ‘homo... per
manus ejus plasmatus est, hoc est per Filium et Spiritum quibus et
dixit Faciamus hominem.”
190 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
question which any answer to them must at the same time
solve, fill a large place in the history of the first three
centuries. The compromise which ultimately resulted
has formed the basis of Christian theology to the present
day.
The first answers were necessarily tentative. Thinkers
of all schools, within the original communities and out-
side them, introduced conceptions which were afterwards
discarded. One group of philosophers, treating the facts
of Christianity as symbols, like the tableaux of the
mysteries, framed cosmogonies which were symbolical
also, and fantastic in propor‘ion as they were symbolical.
Another group of philosophers, dealing rather with the
ideal than with the actual, framed cosmogonies in which
abstract ideas were invested with substance and per-
sonality. The philosophers of all schools were met, not
only by the common sense of the Christian communities,
but also by caricature. Their opponents, after the man-
ner of controversialists, accentuated their weak points,
and handed on to later times only those parts of the
theories which were most exposed to attack, and which
were also least intelligible except in relation to the
whole system. But so far as the underlying conceptions
can be disentangled from the details, they may be clearly
seen to have drifted in the direction of the main drifts
of Greek philosophy.
1. There was a large tendency to account for the
world by the hypothesis of evolution. In some way it
had come forth from God. The belief expressed itself
in many forms. It was in all cases syneretist. The
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 191
same writers frequently made use of different metaphors ;
but all the metaphors assumed vast grades and distances
between God in Himself and the sensible world. One
metaphor was that of an outflow, as of a stream from its
source! Other metaphors were taken from the pheno-
mena of vegetable growth, the evolution of a plant from
a seed, or the putting forth of leaves by a tree.2 The
metaphors of other writers were taken from the pheno-
mena of human generation:? they were an elaboration
of the conception of God as the Father of the world.
They were sometimes pressed: there was not only a
Father, but also a Mother of the world, Wisdom or Silence
or some other abstraction. In one elaborate system it
was held that, though God Himself was unwedded, all
the powers that came forth from Him came forth in
pairs, and all existing things were the offspring of their
union.* That which came forth was also conceived in
1 Derivatio: Iren. 1, 24. 3, of Basilides (or rather one of the schools
of Basilidians).
2 This is probably the metaphor involved in the common word
mpoBorn, e.g. Hippol. 6. 38, of Epiphanes.
3 The conception of the double nature of God, male and female, is
found as early as Xenocrates, Aetius ap. Stob. Hcl. 1. 2. 29 (Diels,
p. 304); and commonly among the Stoics, e.g. in the verses of Valerius
Soranus, which are quoted by Varro, and after him by S, Augustine,
de civit. Det, 7.9:
Jupiter omnipotens regum rex ipse deusque
Progenitor genitrixque deum, deus unus et omnis,
So Philodemus, de piet. 16, ed. Gomp. p. 83 (Diels, p. 549), quotes
Ζεὺς ἄρρην, Ζεὺς θῆλυς ; and Eusebius, prep. Evang. 3.9, p. 1004,
quotes the Orphic verse :
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη.
4 The Valentinians in, e.g., Hippol. 6. 29; 10, 13: so of Simon Magus,
t2 6, 12, γεγονέναι δὲ τὰς ῥίζας φησὶ κατὰ συζυγίας ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὺς.
192 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
various ways. The common expression in one group of
philosophers is won (αἰών), a term which is of uncertain
origin in this application. In other groups of philo-
sophers the expressions are relative to the metaphor of
growth and development, and repeat the Stoical term
seed. In the syncretism of Marcus the several expres-
sions are gathered together, and made more intelligible
by the use of the synonym Jlogoz ;1 the thoughts of God
were conceived as active forces, embodying themselves in
material forms. In the conception of one schoolof thinkers,
the invisible forces of the world acted in the same way
that the art of a craftsman acts upon his materials.2_ In
the conception of another school, the distinction between
intellectual and material existence tended to vanish.
The powers which flowed forth from God were at once
intellectual and material, corresponding to the monistic
conception of God Himself. They were subtler and
more active forms of matter acting upon its grosser
but plastic forms. In the conception of another school,
God is the unbegotten seed of which the Tree of Being
is the leaves and fruit,? and the fruit again contains
1 Hippol. 6. 48 (of Marcus), τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τῶν στοιχείων τὰ κοινὰ
καὶ ῥητὰ αἰῶνας καὶ λόγους καὶ ῥίζας καὶ σπέρματα καὶ πλη-
, ἢ pean a
ρώματα καὶ καρποὺς ὠνόμασε.
2 Hippol. 5.19 (of the Sethiani), πᾶν 6 τι νοήσει ἐπινοεῖς ἢ καὶ
παραλείπεις μὴ νοηθέν, τοῦτο ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν πέφυκε γενέσθαι ὡς ἐν
ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ πᾶσα ἡτισοῦν διδασκομένη τέχνη.
8 Hippol. 8. 8 (of the Docete), θεὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον oiovel σπέρμα
συκῆς μεγέθει μὲν ἐλάχιστον παντελῶς δυνάμει δὲ ἄπειρον : wid. ο. 9,
τὸ δὲ πρῶτον σπέρμα ἐκεῖνο, ὅθεν γέγονεν ἡ συκῆ, ἐστὶν ἀγέννητον. Α
similar metaphor was used by the Simonians, Hippol. 6. 9 sqq., but it
is complicated with the metaphor of invisible and visible fire (heat and
flame). It is adopted by Peter in the Clementines, Hom. 2. 4, where
God is the ῥίζα, man the καρπός.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 193
in itself infinite possibilities of renewing the original
seed.!
The obvious difficulty which the actual world, with
its failures and imperfections, presents to all theories of
evolution which assume the existence of a good and
perfect God, was bridged over by the hypothesis of a
lapse. The ‘fall from original righteousness” was
earried back from the earthly Paradise to the sphere of
divinity itself. The theory was shaped in various ways,
some of which are expressed by almost unintelligible
symbols. That of the widely-spread school of Valentinus
was, that the Divine Wisdom herself had become subject
to passion, and that, having both ambition and desire, she
had produced from herself a shapeless mass, in ignorance
that the Unbegotten One alone can, without the aid of
another, produce what is perfect. Out of this shapeless
mass, and the passions that came forth from her, arose
the material world and the Demiurgus who fashioned it.?
Another theory was that of revolt and insurrection among
the supernal powers.? Both theories simply pushed the
difficulty farther back: they gave no solution of it:
they were opposed as strongly by philosophers outside
Christianity as they were by polemical theologians within
it:* they helped to pave the way for the Augustinian
1 Tbid. 8. 8, ....6 καρπὸς ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀνεξαρίθμητον
θησαυριζόμενον φυλάσσεται σπέρμα συκῆς.
_? The chief authorities for this theory, which was expressed in lan-
guage that readily lent itself to caricature, are the first seven chapters
of the first book of Irenzeus, and Hippolytus 6. 32 sqq.
8. This was especially the view of the Perate, Hippol. 5. 13.
4 Notably by Plotinus, nn. 11. 9. 2—5.
ο
194 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
theology of succeeding centuries, but they did not them-
selves win permanent acceptance either in philosophy or
in theology, in either the Eastern or the Western world.
2. Side by side with these hypotheses of evolution
was a tendency, which ultimately became supreme, to
account for the world by the hypothesis of creation. It
was the result of the action of God upon already existing
matter. It was not evolved, but ordered or shaped.
God was the Builder or Framer: the universe was a
work of art.
But this, no less than the monistic hypothesis, con-
tained grave difficulties, arising partly from the meta-
physical conception of God, and partly from the conception
of moral evil. Three main questions were discussed in
connection with it: (i.) What was the ultimate relation
of matter to God? (11.) How did God come into contact
with it so as to shape it? (11.) How did a God who was
almighty as well as beneficent come to create what is
imperfect and evil ?
(i.) The dualistic hypothesis assumed a co-existence of
matter and God. The assumption was more frequently
tacit than explicit. The difficulty of the assumption
varied according to the degree to which matter was
regarded as having positive qualities. There was a
universal belief that beneath the qualities of all existing
things lay a substratum or substance on which they
1 The conception appears in Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 10, πάντα τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα δημιουργῆσ αι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης : id. ο. 59,
ὕλην ἄμορφον οὖσαν στρέψαντα τὸν θεὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι : but Justin,
though he avowedly adopts the conception from Plato, claims that
Plato adopted it from Moses,
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 194
were grafted, and which gave to each thing its unity.
But the conception of the nature of this substance varied
from that of gross and tangible material to that of empty
and formless space. The metaphysical conception of
substance tended to be confused with the physical con-
ception of matter. Matter was sometimes conceived as
a mass of atoms not coalescing according to any principle
or order of arrangement:! the action of the Creator
upon them was that of a general changing a rabble of
individuals into an organized army. It was sometimes
conceived as a vast shapeless but plastic mass, to which
the Creator gave form, partly by moulding it as a potter
moulds clay, partly by combining various elements as a
builder combines his materials in the construction of a
house. Both these conceptions of matter tended to
regard it as more or less gross. It was plastic in the
hands of the Divine Workman, but still possessed the
quality of resistance. With Basilides, the conception of
matter was raised to a higher plane. The distinction of
subject and object was preserved, so that the action of
the Transcendent God was still that of creation and not
of evolution; but it was “ out of that which was not” that
He made things to be. That which He made was
expressed by the metaphor of a seed which contained in
1 Plutarch, de anim. procreat. 5. 3, οὐ yap ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις
GAN ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μηδ᾽ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος : ibid. ἀκοσμία γὰρ nv τὰ
πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως : cf. Moller, Kosmologie, p. 39.
* Wisdom, 11. 18, κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης : Justin M.
Apol. 1. 10. 59 (quoted in note, p. 194): Athenag. Legat. 15, ὡς γὰρ
ὁ κεραμεὺς καὶ ὁ πηλός, ὕλη μὲν ὁ πηλός, τεχνίτης δὲ 6 κεραμεύς, καὶ ὁ
θεὸς δημιουργός, ὑπακούουσα δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν τεχνην.
0 2
196 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
itself possibilities, not only of growth, but of different
kinds of growth. Three worlds were involved in it:
the world of spirit, and the world of matter, and between
the two the world of life. The metaphor is sometimes
explained by the help of the Aristotelian conception of
gencra and species. The original seed which God made
is the ultimate swmmum genus. The process by which
all things came into being followed in inverse order the
process of our knowledge. The steps by which our
ideas ascend, by an almost infinite stairway of subor-
dinated groups, from the visible objects of sense to the
highest of all abstractions, the Absolute Being and the
Absolute Unity, are the steps by which that Absolute
Being and Absolute Unity, who is God, evolved or made
the world from that which was not. The basis of the
theory was Platonic, though some of the terms were
borrowed from both Aristotle and the Stoics. It became
itself the basis of the theory which ultimately prevailed
in the Church. The transition appears in Tatian. In
him, God is the author, not only of the form or qualities,
but also of the substance or underlying ground of all
things.2. “The Lord of the universe being Himself the
substance of the whole, not yet having brought any
creature into being, was alone: and since all power over
both visible and invisible things was with Him, He
Himself by the power of His word gave substance to all
τὶ . 99 “1" AB tS Ν , am” a > «ε Ὁ
Hippol. 7. 22 (of Basilides), τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σπέρμα ὃ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ
vas \ ΄ « > >
πᾶσαν τὴν πανσπερμίαν ὅ φησιν Αριστοτέλης γένος εἶναι εἰς ἀπείρους
, fal , a ° " εἰ
τεμνόμενον ἰδέας ὡς τέμνομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῴου βοῦν, ἵππον, ἄνθρωπον ὅπε
ΜῈΝ t , » avlp p
ἐστὶν οὐκ ov. Cf. 7b. 10. 14,
2 Orat. ad Graec. 5 (following the text of Schwartz).
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 197
things with Himself.” This theory is found in another
form in Athenagoras:! he makes a point in defence of
Christianity that, so far from denying the existence of
God, it made Him the Author of all existence, He alone
being unborn and imperishable. It is found also in
Theophilus,? who, however, does not lay stress upon it.
But its importance was soon seen. It had probably
been for a long time the unreasoned belief of Hebrew
monotheism: the development of the Platonic conception
within the Christian sphere gave it a philosophical form :
and early in the third century it had become the prevail-
ing theory in the Christian Church. God had created
matter. He was not merely the Architect of the universe,
but its Source.®
1 Suppl. pro Christ. 4.
2 Ad Autol. 2.5 and 10; butin the former of these passages he
adds, τί δὲ μέγα εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἐποίει τὸν κόσμον.
3 The most important passage is Hermas, Mand. 1, which is expressed
in strictly philosophical language, ὁ θεὸς ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ KaTap-
τίσας καὶ ποιήσας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα (the pas-
sage is quoted as Scripture by Ireneus, 4. 20, 2 = Eusebius, 17. 1.
5. 8. 7: Origen, de princip. 1. 3. 3, vol. i. p. 61, 2. 1. 5, p. 79, and
elsewhere): this must be read by the light of the distinctions which
are clearly expressed by Athenagoras, Legat. 4 and 19, where τὸ ὃν =
τὸ νοητόν, Which is ἀγένητον : τὸ οὐκ ὃν = τὸ αἰσθητόν, which is
γενητόν, ἀρχόμενον εἶναι καὶ παυόμενον : the meaning of τὸ μὴ ὃν
appears from the expression, τὸ ὃν οὐ γίνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν, Whence
it is clear that τὸ μὴ ὃν Ξ- τὸ δυνάμει ὄν, or potential being (see Moller,
Kosmologie, p. 123). In some of the other passages in which similar
phrases occur, it is not clear whether the conception is more than that
of an artist who, by impressing form on matter, causes things to exist
which did not exist before: 2 Maccab. 7. 28, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν
αὐτὰ ὁ θεός : 2 Clem. i. 8, ἐκάλεσεν γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ὄντας καὶ ἠθέλησεν
ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι ἡμᾶς : Clementin. Hom. 3. 32, τῷ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς τὸ
108 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
But the theory did not immediately win its way to
acceptance. It rather set aside the moral difficulties
than solved them. It was attacked by those who felt
those difficulties strongly. There are two chief lite-
rary records of the controversy: one is the treatise of
Tertullian against Hermogenes, the other is a dialogue
of about the same date which is ascribed to an otherwise
unknown Maximus.! Both treatises are interesting as
examples not only of contemporary polemics, but of the
insoluble difficulties which beset any attempt to explain
the origin of f moral evil on metaphysical grounds. The
attempt was soon afterwards practically abandoned. The
solution of the moral difficulties was found in the doctrine
of Free-will: the solution of the metaphysical difficulties
was found in the general acceptance of the belief that
God created all things out of nothing.
(ii.) How, under any conception of matter, short of its
having been created by God, did God come into contact
with it so as to give it qualities and form? The difficulty
of the question became greater as the tide of thought
receded from anthropomorphism. The dominant idea
εἶναι συστησαμένῳ, οὐρανὸν δημιουργήσαντι, γῆν πιλώσαντι, θάλασσαν
περιορίσαντι, τὰ ἐν Gon ταμιεύσαντι καὶ τὰ πάντα ἀέρι πληρώσαντι:
Hippolyt. in Genes. 1, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ὅσα ἐποίησεν
ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ταῖς δὲ ἄλλαις οὐκ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων. In Theophilus, these
expressions are interchanged with that af ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη in such a
ges to suggest their oy 1.4; 2. 10, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ πάντα
« , “ > , Ν᾽,
ἐποίησεν : 2.4, τί δὲ μέγα εἰ ὁ Oeds ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἐποίει τὸν
᾽ὔ “ > > ” Ἂν ΄ > ’
κόσμον .. .. ἵνα ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν. In the later books
of the Clementine Homilies, τὸ μὴ ὃν Ξε void space: the whole passage,
17. 8, gives a clear und interesting exposition.
1 In Euseb. Praep. Kvang. 7. 22, and elsewhere: reprinted in Routh,
Reliquiae Sacrae, ii. 87.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 199
was that of mediation. Sometimes, as in Philo, the
mediation was regarded from the point of view of the
plurality and variety of the effects, and the agents were
conceived as being more than one in number. They
were the angels of the Hebrews, the demons of the
Greeks. Those who appealed to Scripture saw an indica-
tion of this in the use of the plural in the first chapter
of Genesis, “ Let ws make man.”! Another current of
speculation flowed in the channel, which had been first
formed by the Zimeus of Plato, of supposing a single
Creator and Ruler of the world who, in subordination to
the transcendent God, fashioned the things that exist.
In some schools of thought this theory was combined
with the theory of creation by the Son.? The uncon-
trolled play of imagination in the region of the unknown
constructed more than one strange speculation which it
is not necessary to revive.
The view into which the Christian consciousness ulti-
mately settled down had meanwhile been building itself
up out of elements which were partly Jewish and partly
Greek. On the one hand, there had long been among
the Jews a belief in the power of the word of God:
and the belief in His wisdom had shaped itself into a
conception of that wisdom as a substantive force. On
the other hand, the original conception of Greek philo-
1 Justin M. Tryph. 62; Iren. 1. 24, 25; Hippol. 7. 16, 20: so
Philo, de profug. 13 (i. 556), where, after quoting the passage of
Genesis, he proceeds, following the Platonic theory, διαλέγεται μὲν οὖν
6 τῶν ὅλων πατὴρ ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεσιν αἷς τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς
μέρος ἔδωκε διαπλάττειν, μιμουμέναις τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην.
2 The Perate in Hippol. 5. 17.
9200 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
sophy that Mind or Reason had marshalled into order
the confused and warring elements of the primeval
chaos, had passed into the conception of the Logos as a
mode of the activity of God. These several elements,
which had a natural affinity for each other, had already
been combined by Philo, as we have seen, into a com-
prehensive system: and in the second century they were
entering into new combinations both outside and inside
the Christian communities.!1_ The vagueness of conception
which we have found in Philo is found also in the earliest
expressions of these combinations. It is not always
clear whether the Zogos is regarded as a mode of God’s
activity, or as having a substantive existence. In either
view, God was regarded as the Creator; His supremacy
was as absolute as His unity: there was no rival, because
in either view the Logos was God.
(iii.) How could a God who was at once beneficent
and almighty create a world which contained imperfection
and moral evil? The question was answered, as we
have seen, on the monistic theory of creation by the
hypothesis of a lapse. It was answered on the dualistic
theory, sometimes by the hypothesis of evil inherent in
inatter, and sometimes by the hypothesis of creation by
subordinate and imperfect agents.
The former of these hypotheses came rather from the
Kast than from Greece; but it harmonized with and
was supported by the Greek conception of matter as the
seat of formlessness and disorder.
1 The Jew through whom Celsus sometimes speaks says, “If your
Logos iy the Son of God, we also assent to the same.” Origen, 6. Cels.
2. 31.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 201
The latter hypothesis is an extension of the Platonic
distinction between the perfect world which God created
directiy through the operation of His own powers, and
the world of mortal and imperfect existences the crea-
tion of which He entrusted to inferior agents. In the
Platonic conception, God Himself, in a certain mode of
His activity, was the Creator (Demiurgus), and the
inferior agents were beings whom He had created.!
In the conception which grew up early in the second
century, and which was first formulated by Marcion, the
Creator was detached from the Supreme God, and con-
ceived as doing the work of the inferior agents. He
was subordinate to the Supreme God and ultimately
derived from Him :? but looming large in the horizon of
finite thought, He seemed to be a rival and an adversary.
The contradictions, the imperfections, the inequalities of
both condition and ability, which meet us in both the
material and the moral world, were solved by the
hypothesis of two worlds in conflict, each of them moving
under the impulse of a separate Power. The same solu-
tion applied also to the contrast of the Old and New
Testaments. It had been already thought that the God
of the Jews was different from the Father of Jesus
Christ; but, with an exaggerated Paulinism, Marcion
made so deep a chasm between the Law and the Gospel,
the Flesh and the Spirit, that the two were regarded as
inherently hostile, and the work of the Saviour was
1 Cf. Origen, c. Cels. 4. 54.
2 Hippol. 6. Noet. 11.
202 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
regarded as bringing back into the world from which
he had been shut out the God of love and grace.!
The objection to all this was that, in spite of its
reservations and safeguards, it tended to ditheism. The
philosophical difficulties of monotheism were enormous,
but the knot was not to be cut by the hypothesis of
either a co-existent and resisting matter or an indepen-
dent and rival God. The enormous wave of belief in
the Divine Unity, which had gathered its strength from
the whole sea of contemporary thought, swept away the
barriers in its path. The moral difficulty was solved, as
we shall see in the next Lecture, by the conception of
free-will: the metaphysical difficulties of the contact of
God with matter were solved, partly by the conception
that God created matter, and partly by the conception
that He moulded it into form by His Logos, who is also
His Son, eternally co-existent with Him.
The first patristic statement of this view is in Irenzeus ;
it stands in the forefront of his theology: and it seems
to have been so generally accepted in the communities
of which he was cognizant, that he states it as part of
the recognized “rule of truth:” the following is only
one of several passages in which he so states 10:3
“There is one Almighty God who created all things by His
Word and fashioned them, and caused that out of what was not
1 Tt is not the leasi of the many contributions of Professor Harnack
to early Christian history that he has vindicated Marcion from the
excessive disparagement which has resulted from the blind adoption of
the vituperations of Tertullian: see especially his Dogmengeschichte,
Bd. i. pp. 226 sqq., 2te aufl,
21, 22: cf. 4. 20,
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 208
all things should be: as saith the Scripture, By the Word of
the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by
the Breath of His mouth: and again, All things were made by
Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made.
There is no exception: the Father made all things by Him,
whether visible or invisible, objects of sense or objects of intel-
ligence, things temporal or things eternal. He made them not
by angels or by any powers separated from His Thought: for
God needs none of all these beings: but it is by His Word and
His Spirit that He makes and disposes and governs and presides
over all things. This God who made the world, this God who
fashioned man, this God of Abraham, and God of Isaac, and
God of Jacob, above whom there is no other God, nor Beginning
nor Power nor Fulness: this God, as we shall show, is the
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.”
The same view is expressed with equal prominence
and emphasis by a disciple of Irenzus, who shows an
even stronger impress of the philosophical speculations
of his time :4
“The one God, the first and sole and universal Maker and
Lord, had nothing coeval with him, not infinite chaos, not
measureless water, or solid earth, or dense air, or warm fire, or
subtle breath, nor the azure cope of the vast heaven: but He
was one, alone by Himself, and by His will He made the things
that are, that before were not, except so far as they existed in
His foreknowledge... .. This supreme and only God begets
Reason first, having formed the thought of him, not reason as a
spoken word, but as an internal mental process of the universe.
Him alone did He beget from existing things: for the Father
himself constituted existence, and from it came that which was
begotten. The cause of the things that came into being was the
Reason, bearing in himself the active will of Him who begat
him, and not heing without knowledge of the Father’s thought ....
so that when the Yather bade the world come into being, the
1 Hippol. 10. 32, 33.
204 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Reason brought each thing to perfection one by one, thus pleasing
God.”
This creed of Irenzeus and his school became the
basis of the theology of later Christendom. It appealed,
as time went on, to a widening sphere, and summed up
the judgment of average Christians on the main philo-
sophical questions of the second century. The questions
were not seriously re-opened. The idealists of Alexandria,
no less than the rhetoricians of Gaul, accepted, with all
its difficulties, the belief that there was one God who
revealed Himself to mankind by the Word by whom He
had created them, and that this Word was manifested in
Jesus Christ. But the Alexandrians were concerned
less with the metaphysical than with the moral diffi-
culties; and their view of those difficulties modified also
their view of creation. The cosmogony of Origen was a
theodicy. His aim was less to show in detail how the
world came into existence, than to ‘justify the ways of
God to man.” He proceeded strictly on the lines of the
older philosophies, justifying in this part of his theology
even more than in other respects the criticism of Porphyry,?
that though in his manner of life he was a Christian, in
his opinions about God he was a Greek. He followed
the school of Philo in believing that the original creation
was of a world of ideal or “intelligible” existences,
and that the cause of creation was the goodness of God.?
He differed from, or expanded, the teaching of that
school in believing that the Word or Wisdom of God,
by whom He made the world, was not impersonal, but
His Son, and that both the existence of the Son and the
1 ap. Euseb. ἢ. Δ. 6. 19. 2 De princip. 2. 9. 1, 6.
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 205
creation of the ideal world had been from all eternity.!
For it is impious to think that God ever existed without
His Wisdom, possessing the power to create but not the
will; and it is inconceivable either that Wisdom should
ever have been without the conception of the world that
was to be, or that there should ever have been a time at
which God was not omnipotent from having no world to
govern.” The relation of each to the world is stated in
varying ways: one mode of statement is, that from the
Father and the Son, thus eternally co-existent, came the
actual world; the Father caused it to be, the Son caused
it to be rational:? another is, that the whole world,
visible and invisible, was made by the agency of the
only begotten Son, who conveyed a share in himself to
certain parts of the things so created and caused them
thereby to become rational creatures.* This visible world,
which, as also Philo and the Platonists had taught, is a
copy of the ideal world, took its beginning in time: but
it is not the first, nor will it be the last, of such worlds.®
The matter of it as well as the form was created by
God.° It was made by Him, and to Him it will return.
The Stoical theory had cenceived of the universe as
analogous to a seed which expands to flower and fruit
and withers away, but leaves behind it a similar seed
which has a similar life and a similar succession: so did
one universal order spring from its beginning and pass
through its appointed period to the end which was like
the beginning in that after it all things began anew.
1 De princip. 1. 2. 2. 2 Ibid. 1. 2. 2, 10.
8. Ibid. 1. 8. 5, 6, 8. 4 [bid. 2. 6. 8.
5 Iiid. 3. 5. 3. 6 Ibid. 2. 9. 4.
906 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Origen’s theory was a modification of this: it recognized
an absolute beginning and an absolute end: both the
beginning and the end were God: poised as it were
between these two divine eternities were the worlds of
which we are part. In them, all rational creatures were
originally equal and free: they are equal no longer
because they have variously used their freedom: and
the hypothesis of more worlds than one is a complement,
on the one hand of the hypothesis of human freedom,
on the other hand of the hypothesis of the divine justice,
because it accounts for the infinite diversities of condition,
and gives scope for the discipline of reformation.
Large elements of this theory dominated in the theo-
logy of the Eastern Churches during the fourth century.
But ultimately those parts of it which distinguished it
from the theory of Ireneeus faded away. The mass of
Christians were content with a simpler creed. More
than one question remained unsolved ; and the hypothesis
of creation by a rival God was part of the creed of a
Church which flourished for several centuries before it
faded away, and it also left its traces in many inconsis-
tent usages within the circle of the communities which
rejected it. But the belief in the unity of God, and in
the identity of the one God with the Creator of the
world, was never again seriously disturbed. The close
of the controversy was marked by its transference to a
different, though allied, area. It was no longer Theolo-
gical but Christological. The expression ‘‘ Monarchy,”
which had been used of the sole government of the one
God, in distinction from the divided government of many
gods, came to be applied to the sole government of the
VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 207
Father, in distinction from the “‘ economy” of the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Spirit. In this new area of con-
troversy the old conceptions re-appear. The monistic
and dualistic theories of the origin of the world lie
beneath the two schools of Monarchianism, in one of
which Christ was conceived as a mode of God, and in
the other as His exalted creature. In the determination
of these Christological controversies Greek philosophy
had a no less important influence than it had upon the
controversies which preceded them: and with some ele-
ments of that determination we shall be concerned in a
future Lecture.
We may sum up the result of the influence of Greece
on the conception of God in His relation to the material
universe, by saying that it found a reasoned basis for
Hebrew monotheism. It helped the Christian commu-
nities to believe as an intellectual conviction that which
they had first accepted as a spiritual revelation. The
moral difficulties of human life, and the Oriental influ-
ences which were flowing in large mass over some parts
of the Christian world, tended towards ditheism. But
the average opinion of thinking men, which is the
ultimate solvent of all philosophical theories, had for
centuries past been settling down into the belief in the
unity of God. With a conviction which has been as
permanent as it was of slow growth, it believed that the
difficulties in the hypothesis of the existence of a Power
limited by the existence of a rival Power, are greater
even than the great difficulties in the belief in a God
who allows evil tobe. The dominant Theistic philosophy: ‘-
208 VII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
of Greece became the dominant philosophy of Chris-
tianity. It prevailed in form as well as in substance.
It laid emphasis on the conception of God as the Artificer
and Architect of the universe rather than as its immanent
Cause. But though the substance will remain, the form
may change. Platonism is not the only theory that is
consistent with the fundamental thesis that “of Him,
and through Him, and to Him, are all things:” and it
is not impossible that, even after this long lapse of cen-
turies, the Christian world may come back to that con-
ception of Him which was shadowed in the far-off ages,
and which has never been wholly without a witness,
that He is ‘‘not far off but very nigh;” that ‘ He is in
us and we in Him;” that He is changeless and yet
changing in and with His creatures; and that He who
‘Crested from His creation,” yet so “‘ worketh hitherto”
that the moving universe itself is the eternal and unfold-
ing manifestation of Him,
Lecture VIII.
GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
11. Toe Moran Governor.
A. Tue Greek IpEa.
1. THe idea of the unity of God had grown, as we
have already seen, in a common growth with the idea of
the unity of the world. But it did not absorb that idea.
The dominant element in the idea of God was personality:
in the idea of the world it was order. But personality
implied will, and will seemed to imply the capacity to
change; whereas in the world, wherever order could be
traced, it was fixed and unvarying.
The order was most conspicuous in the movements of
the heavenly bodies. It could be expressed by numbers.
The philosopher of numbers was the first to give to the
world the name Cosmos, the ‘order’ as of a marshalled
army. The order being capable of being expressed by
numbers, partook of the nature of numerical relations.
Those relations are not only fixed, but absolutely unalter-
able. Thata certain ratio should be otherwise than what
it 1s, is inconceivable. Hence the same philosopher of
1 Aetius ap. Plut. de plac. phil. 2. 1. 1 (Diels, p. 327), Πυθαγόρας
πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν κόσμον ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως.
P
210 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
numbers who had first conceived of the Cosmos, conceived
of it also as being “invested with necessity,” and the
metaphysicians who followed him framed the formula,
‘¢ All things are by necessity.”’}
This conception linked itself with an older idea of Greek
religion. The length of a man’s life and his measure of
endowments had been spoken of as his “‘ share”’ or ‘‘ por-
tion.”” Sometimes the assigning of this portion to a man
was conceived as the work of Zeus or the other gods:
sometimes the gods themselves had their portions like
men; and very commonly the portion itself was viewed
actively, as though it were the activity of a special being.
It was sometimes personal, sometimes impersonal : it was,
in any case, inevitable.2 Through its character of inevi-
tableness, it fused with the conception of the unalterable-
ness of physical order. Hence the proposition, ‘‘ All
things are by necessity,” soon came to be otherwise ex-
pressed, ‘‘ All things are by destiny.’’®
1 Actius, ibid. 1. 25 (Diels, p. 321), Πυθαγόρας ἀνάγκην ἔφη περι-
κεῖσθαι τῷ Koop’ Tlappevidns καὶ Δημόκριτος πάντα κατὰ ἀνάγκην.
2 For the numerous passages which prove these statements, reference
may be made to Nagelsbach, Homerische Theologie, 2. 2. 3; Nach-
homerische Theologie, 3. 2. 2.
3 Aetius, ut supra, 1. 27 (Diels, p. 322), Ἡράκλειτος πάντα καθ᾽
εἱμαρμένην, τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀνάγκην : the identification of
ἀνάγκη and εἱμαρμένη is also made by Parmenides and Democritus in
a continuation of the passage quoted above. But in much later times
a distinction was sometimes drawn between the two words, ἀνάγκη
being used of the subjective necessity of a proposition of which the
contradictory is unthinkable: Alea. Aphrodis. Quest. Nat. 2. 5 (p. 96,
ed. Spengel), τέσσαρα γοῦν τὰ Sis δύο ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ μὴν καθ᾽ εἷμαρ-
μένην εἴ γε ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις τὸ Ka εἱμαρμένην ; but, on the other
hand, οἷς καθ᾽ εἱρμὸν αἰτιῶν γινομένοις τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀδύνατον, πάντα
εἴη ἂν καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 211
Over against the personal might of Zeus there thus
came to stand the dark and formless fixity of an imper-
sonal Destiny.! The conception was especially elaborated.
by the Stoics. In the older mythology from which it
had sprung, its personifications had been spoken of some-
times as the daughters of Zeus and Themis, and some-
times as the daughters of Night. The former expressed
its certainty and perfect order ; the other, the darkness of
its working. The former element became more promi-
nent. It was an “eternal, continuous and ordered move-
ment.”3 It was ‘‘the linked chain of causes.’’?* The
idea of necessity passed into that of intelligent and in-
herent force: the idea of destiny was transmuted into
that of law.
This sublime conception, which has become a perma-
nent possession of the human race, was further elaborated
into the picture of the world as a great city. The Greek
πόλις, the state, whose equivalent in modern times is not
civil but ecclesiastical, was an ideal society, the embodied
type of a perfect constitution or organization (σύστημα).
Its parts were all interdependent and relative to the
1 Nagelsbach, Nachhomerische Theologie, p. 142.
2 Hesiod, Theog. 218, 904.
* Chrysippus, ap. Theodoret. Gr. affect. curat. 6.14, evar δὲ τὴν
εἱμαρμένην κίνησιν ἀΐδιον συνεχῆ καὶ τεταγμένην : 80, in other words,
ap. Aul. Gell. 6. 2. ὃ.
* Aetius ap. Plut. de placit. philos. 1. 28, of Στωικοὶ εἱρμὸν αἰτιῶν:
Philo, de mut. nom. 23 (i. 598), ἀκολουθία καὶ ἀναλογία τῶν συμπάν-
των, εἱρμὸν ἔχουσα ἀδιάλυτον : ( ic. de divin. 1. 55, ‘ordinem seriemque
causarum cum causa caus nexa em ex se gignat.’
5 The Stoical definition of a a Aus was σύστημα καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθμώ-
πων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον, ΟΙ n. Alex. Strom. 4. 26; cf. Arius
Didymus, ap. Diels, p. 464, \
P2
9212 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
whole; the whole was flawless and supreme, working
out without friction the divine conception which was
expressed in its laws. The world was such an ideal
society.1 It consisted of gods and men: the former were
its rulers; the latter, its citizens. The moral law was
a reason inherent in human nature, prescribing what
men shoufd do, and forbidding what they should not do:
human laws were but appendages of it. In this sense
man was a ‘citizen of the world.”® To each individual
man, as to every other created being, the administrators
had assigned a special task. ‘‘ Zhou be Sun: thou hast
the power to go on thy circuit and make the year and
the seasons, to make fruits grow and ripen, to stir and
lull the winds, to warm the bodies of men: go thy way,
make thy circuit, and so fulfil thy ministry alike in small
things and in great. .... Zhou hast the power to lead
the army to Ilium: be Agamemnon. Thou hast the
power to fight in combat with Hector: be Achilles.” To
this function of administration the gods were limited.
The constitution of the great city was unchangeable.
1 The idea is found in almost all Stoical writers : Plutarch, de Ales.
Magn. virt. 6, speaks of ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωικῶν
αἵρεσιν καταβαλομένου Ζήνωνος : Chrysippus ap. Phedr. Epicur. de
nat. Deorum, ed, Petersen, p. 19: Muson. Frag. 5, ed. Peerlk. p. 164
(from Stob. Flor. 40), τοῦ Διὸς πόλεως ἢ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ
θεῶν : Epict. Diss. 1.9.4; 2.13.6; 3, 22.4; 3. 24. 10: most fully
in Arius Didymus ap. Euseb. Prep. Evang. 15. 15. 4, οὕτω καὶ 6
κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν Kal ἀνθρώπων συνεστῶσα, τῶν μὲν
θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων.
2 Philo, de Josepho, 6 (ii. 46), λόγος δέ ἐστι φύσεως προστακτικὸς
μὲν ὧν πρακτέον ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ πρακτέον .... προσθῆκαι μὲν
γὰρ οἱ κατὰ πόλεις νόμοι τοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθοῦ λόγου.
8 Epict. Diss. 3. 22..ὅ
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 213
The gods, like men, were, in the Stoical conception,
bound by the conditions of things.
“ That which is best of all things and supreme,” says Epictetus,
“have the gods placed in our power—the faculty of rightly deal-
ing with ideas: all other things are out of our power. Is it that
they would not? I for my part think that if they had been able
they would have placed the other things also in our power ; but
they absolutely could not.... For what says Zeus? ‘Epictetus,
if it had been possible, I would have made thy body and thy
possessions free and unhindered. But as it is, forget not that
thy body is not thine, but only clay deftly kneaded. And since
I could not do this, I gave thee a part of myself, the power of
making or not making effort, the power of indulging or not in-
dulging desire ; in short, the power of dealing with all the ideas
of thy mind.’ ἢ
2. Side by side with this conception of destiny were
growing up new conceptions of the nature of the gods.
The gods of wrath were passing away. The awe of the
forces of nature, of night and thunder, of the whirlwind
and the earthquake, which had underlain the primitive
religions, was fading into mist. The meaner conceptions
which had resulted from a vividly realized anthropomor-
phism, the malice and spite and intrigue which make
some parts of the earlier mythology read like the chronique
scandaleuse of a European court, were passing into the
region of ridicule and finding their expression only in
burlesque. Two great conceptions, the elements of which
had existed in the earliest religion, gradually asserted
their supremacy. The gods were just, and they were
also good. They punished wicked deeds, not by an arbi-
trary vengeance, but by the operation of unfailing laws.
1 Epict. Diss. 1. 1. 10; cf. Seneca, de Provid. 5.7, ‘non potest
artifex mutare materiam.’ But Epictetus sometimes makes it a ques-
tion, not of possibility, but of will, e.g. Diss. 4. 3. 10.
214 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
The laws were the expression of the highest conceivable
morality. Their penalties were personal to the offender,
and the sinner who did not pay them in this life paid
them after death. The gods were also good. The idea
of their kindness, which in the earlier religion had been
a kindness only for favoured individuals, widened out to
a conception of their general benevolence! The con-
ception of their forethought, which at first had only been
that of wise provision in particular cases, linked itself
with the Stoical teleology.2 The God who was the Reason
of the world, and immanent in it, was working to an end.
That end was the perfection of the whole, which was also
the perfection of each member of the whole. In the
sphere of human life, happiness and perfection, misery
and imperfection, are linked together. The forethought
or ‘ Providence” of God was thus beneficent in regard
both to the universe itself and to the individual. It
worked by self-acting laws. ‘There are,” says Epic-
tetus,? ‘punishments appointed as it were by law to
those who disobey the divine administration. "Whoever
thinks anything to be good that is outside the range of
his will, let that man feel envy and unsatisfied longing ;
let him be flattered, let him be unquiet; whoever thinks
anything to be evil that is outside the range of his will,
let him feel pain and sorrow, let him bemoan himself and
be unhappy.” And again: “This is the law—divine
1 The data for the long history of the moral conceptions of Greek
religion which are briefly indicated above are far too numerous to be
given in a note: the student is referred to Niagelsbach, Die Nach-
homerische Theologie, i. 17—58, One may note the list of titles applied
to God, e.g. in Dio Chrysostom, and the diminishing use of ἱλάσκεσθαι.
2 Epict. Diss. 1. 6. » Der Set, A
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 215
and strong and beyond escape—which exacts the greatest
punishments from those who have sinned the greatest
sins. For what says it? The man who lays claim to
the things that do not concern him, let him be a braggart,
let him be vainglorious: the man who disobeys the divine
administration, let him be mean-spirited, let him be a
slave, let him feel grief, and jealousy, and pity ; in short,
let him bemoan himself and be unhappy.’’!
There were thus at the beginning of the Christian era
two concurrent conceptions of the nature of the super-
human forces which determine the existence and control
the activity of all created things, the conceptions of
Destiny and of Providence. The two conceptions, though
apparently antagonistic, had tended, like all conceptions
which have a strong hold upon masses of men, to approach
each other. The meeting-point had been found in the |
conception of the fixed order of the world as being at
once rational and beneficent. It was rational because it
was the embodiment of the highest reason; and it was
beneficent because happiness is incident to perfection,
and the highest reason, which is the law of the perfec-
tion of the whole, is also the law of the perfection of the
parts. There were two stages in this blending of the
two conceptions into one: the identification, first of Des-
tiny with Reason ;? and, secondly, of Destiny or Reason
1 Diss. 3, 24, 42, 43.
2 Destiny is Reason: Heraclitus ap. Act. Placit. in Plut. de placit.
philos. 1. 28.1; Stob. Eel. 1. 5. 15 (Diels, p. 323), οὐσίαν εἱμαρμένης
λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ παντὸς διήκοντα : Chrysippus, ébid.
εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ
Ἂ Ἃ >
δισικουμένων ἢ λόγος καθ᾽ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε τὰ δὲ γινόμενα
216 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
with Providence.! The former of these is found in He-
raclitus, but is absent from Plato, who distinguishes
what comes into being by necessity, from what is wrought
by mind: the elaboration of both the former and the
latter is due to the Stoics, growing logically out of their
conception of the universe as a single substance moved
by an inherent law. It was probably in many cases a
change rather of language than of idea when Destiny or
Reason or Providence was spoken of as God;? and yet
sometimes, whether by the lingering of an ancient belief
or by an intuition which transcended logic, the sense of
personality mingles with the idea of physical sequence,
and all things that happen in the infinite chain of immu-
γίνεται τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται : Zeno ap. Ar. Did. Epit. phys. 20,
in Stob. Hel. 1. 11. 5 (Diels, p. 458), τὸν tod παντὸς λόγον ὃν ἔνιοι
ἑιμαρμένην καλοῦσιν.
1 Destiny, or Reason, is Providence: Chrysippus, in the quotation
given in the preceding note: Zeno ap. Aet. Placit. in Stob. Eel. 1. 5.
15 (Diels, p. 322).
2 Destiny, Reason, Providence, is God, or the Will of God: Chry-
sippus in Plut. de Stoic. repug. 34. 5, ὅτι δ᾽ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ 6 κοινὸς
τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη Kat πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντί-
ποδας λέληθε" πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν᾽ καὶ “Ads δ᾽
ἐτελείετο βουλὴ τὸν “Ὅμηρον εἰρηκέναι φησὶν [sc. ὁ Χρύσιππος] ὀρθῶς
ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν καθ᾽ ἣν πάντα
διοικεῦται : id. de commun. not. 34.5, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν
ἔχειν ἄλλως GAN ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς βούλησιν : Arius Didymus,
Epit. ap. Euseb. Prep. Ev. 1ὅ. 16 (Diels, p. 464): Philodemus, de
piet. frag. ed. Gompertz, p. 83 (Diels, p. 549). The more exact state-
ment is in the summary of Aetius ap. Plut. de placit. philos. 1. 7. 17,
Stob. Hel. 1. 2. 29 (Diels, p. 306), where God is said to comprehend
within Himself τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ᾽ ovs ἅπαντα καθ᾽ εἷμαρ-
μένην γίνεται. The loftiest form of the conception is expressed by
Lucan, Pharsal. 2. 10, ‘se quoque lege tenens:’ God is not the slave
of Fate or Law, but voluntarily binds Himself by it,
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 217
table causation are conceived as happening by the will of
God.
3. But over against the conception of a perfect Reason
or Providence administering the world, was the fact of
the existence of physical pain and social inequality and
moral failure. The problems which the fact suggested
filled a large place in later Greek philosophy, and were
solved in many ways.
The solution was sometimes found in the denial of the
universality of Providence. God is the Author only of
good: evil is due to other causes.1 This view, which
found its first philosophical expression in the Timeus of
Plato, was transmitted, through some of the Platonic
schools, to the later syncretist writers who incorporated
Platonic elements. In its Platonic form it assumed the
existence of inferior agents who ultimately owed their
existence to God, but whose existence as authors of evil
He permitted or overlooked. In some later forms the
view linked itself with Oriental conceptions of matter as
inherently evil.
The solution was more commonly found in a denial
1 Plat. Rep. 2, pp. 379, 380; Tim. p. 41. Philo, de mund. opif.
24 (i. 17), de confus. ling. 35 (i. 432), θεῷ γὰρ τῷ πανηγεμόνι ἐμπρεπὲς
οὐκ ἔδοξεν εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ κακίαν ὁδὸν ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ Sev ἑαυτοῦ δημιουρ-
γνῆσαι" οὗ χάριν τοῖς per αὐτὸν ἐπέτρεψε τὴν τούτου τοῦ μέρους κατασ-
κευήν : de profug. 13 (i. 556), ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἡγήσατο τὴν κακῶν γένεσιν
ἑτέροις ἀπονεῖμαι δημιουργοῖς τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτῷ μόνῳ: so also
in the (probably) post-Philonean de Abraham. 28 (ii. 22). The other
phase of the conception is stated by Celsus, not as a philosophical solu-
tion of the difficulty, but as one which might be taught to the vulgar,
ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ εἰς πλῆθος εἰρῆσθαι ds ἐκ θεοῦ μὲν otk ἔστι κακὰ ὕλῃ δὲ
πρόσκειται.
218 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
of the reality of apparent evils. They were all either
forms of good, or incidental to its operation or essential
to its production. This was the common solution of the
Stoics. It had many phases. One view was based upon
the teleological conception of nature. The world is march-
ing on to its end: it realizes its purpose not directly but
by degrees: there are necessary sequences of its march
which seem to us to be evil.1 Another view, akin to the
preceding, was based upon the conception of the world
as a whole. In its vast economy there are subordina-
tions and individual inconveniences. Such subordina-
tions and inconveniences are necessary parts of the plan.
The pain of the individual is not an evil, but his contri-
bution to the good of the whole. ‘‘ What about my leg
being lamed, then ?” says Epictetus,? addressing himself
in the character of an imaginary objector. ‘Slave! do
you really find fault with the world on account of one
bit of a leg? will you not give that up to the universe ?
will you not let it go? will you not gladly surrender it
to the Giver?” The world, in other words, was regarded
as an economy (οἰκονομία), like that of a city, in which
there are apparent inequalities of condition, but in which
1 This is one of the solutions offered by Chrysippus: the concrete
form of the difficulty, with which he dealt, was εἰ ai τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι
κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται, and his answer was that diseases come κατὰ παρ-
ακολούθησιν, ‘non per naturam sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias,’
Δα]. Gell. 7 (6). 1. 9. So also in the long fragment of Philo in Euset.
Prep. Ev. 8. 13 (Philo, 11. 643, 644), θεὸς yap οὐδενὸς αἴτιος κακοῦ τὸ
παράπαν ἀλλ᾽ ai τῶν στοιχείων μεταβολαὶ ταῦτα γεννῶσιν, οὐ προηγού-
μενα ἔργα φύσεως ἀλλ᾽ ἑπόμενα τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καὶ τοῖς προηγουμένοις
ἐπακολουθοῦντα.
2 Diss, 1. 12. 24,
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 219
such inequalities are necessary to the constitution of the
whole.?
“What is meant, then,” asks Epictetus, “by distinguishing
the things that happen to us as ‘according to nature’ and ‘con-
trary to nature’? The phrases are used as if we were isolated.
For example, to a foot to be ‘according to nature’ is to be clean;
but if you consider it as a foot, a member of the body, and not
as isolated, it will be its duty both to walk in mud, and to tread
on thorns—nay, sometimes even to be cut off for the benefit of
the whole body ; if it refuse, it is no longer a foot. We have to
form a similar conception about ourselves. What are you? A
man. If you regard yourself as isolated, it is ‘according to
nature’ to live until old age, to be rich, to be in good health;
but if you regard yourself as a man, a part of a certain whole, it
is your duty, on account of that whole, sometimes to be ill,
sometimes to take a voyage, sometimes to run into danger, some-
times to be in want, and, it may be, to die before your time.
Why then are you discontented? Do you not know that, as in
the example a discontented foot is no longer a foot, so neither
are youaman. For what isaman? A member of a city, first
the city which consists of gods and men, and next of the city
which is so called in the more proximate sense, the earthly city,
which is a small model of the whole. ‘Am 1, then, now,’ you
say, ‘to be brought before a court: is so-and-so to fall into a
fever: so-and-so to go on a voyage: so-and-so to die: so-and-so
to be condemned?’ Yes; for it is impossible, considering the
sort of body we have, with this atmosphere round us, and with
these companions of our life, that different things of this kind
should not befall different men.?
“Jt is on this account that the philosophers rightly tell us
that if a perfectly good man had foreknown what was going to
happen to him, he would co-operate with nature in both falling
1 Chrysippus, de Diis, 2, ap. Plut. de Stoic. repug. 35, ποτὲ μὲν τὰ
, ΄, a > A 3 a ° , ,
δύσχρηστα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὡσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως
χάριν ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.
2 Diss. 2. 5. 24.
520 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY,
sick and dying and being maimed, being conscious that this is
the particular portion that is assigned to him in the arrangement
of the universe, and that the whole is supreme over.the part,
and the city over the citizen.”}
This Stoical solution, if the teleological conception which
underlies it be assumed, may have been adequate as an
_ explanation both of physical pain and of social inequality.
But it was clearly inadequate as an explanation of misery
and moral evil. And the sense of misery and moral evil
was growing. The increased complexity of social life
revealed the distress which it helped to create, and the
intensified consciousness of individual life quickened also
the sense of disappointment and moral shortcoming. The
solution of the difficulties which these facts of life pre-
sented, was found in a belief which was correlative to
the growing belief in the goodness of God, though logi-
cally inconsistent with the belief in the universality of
His Providence. It was, that men were the authors of
their own misery. Their sorrows, so far as they were
not punitive or remedial, came from their own folly or
perversity. They belonged to a margin of life which
was outside the will of the gods or the ordinances of fate.
The belief was repeatedly expressed by Homer, but does
not appear in philosophy until the time of the Stoics: it
is found in both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and the latter
also quotes it as a belief of the Pythagoreans.? Out of
it came the solution of a problem not less important than
that from which it had itself sprung. The conception
that men were free to bring ruin upon themselves, led
to the wider conception that they were altogether free.
1 Diss, 2. 10. 5. 2 Δ]. Gell. 7 (0). 2. 12—15.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. pA |
There emerged for the first time into prominence the
idea which has filled a large place in all later theology
and ethics, that of the freedom of the will. The freedom
which was denied to external nature was asserted of
human nature. It was within a man’s own power to do
right or wrong, to be happy or miserable.
“ Of all things that are,” says Epictetus,! “one part is in our |
control, the other out of it; in our control are opinion, impulse
to do, effort to obtain, effort to avoid—in a word, our own proper
activities ; out of our control are our bodies, property, reputation,|
office—in a word, all things except our proper activities. Things |
in our control are in their nature free, not liable to hindrance in
the doing or to frustration of the attainment ; things out of our
control are weak, dependent, liable to hindrance, belonging to
others. Bear in mind, then, that if you mistake what is depen-
dent for what is free, and what belongs to others for what is
your own, you will meet with obstacles in your way, you will
be regretful and disquieted, you will find fault ‘with both gods
and men. If, on the contrary, you think that only to be your
own which is really your own, and that which is another’s to be,
as it really is, another’s, no one will thwart you, you will find
fault with no one, you will reproach no one, you will do no single
thing against your will, no one will harm you, you will not have
an enemy.”
_ The incompatibility of this doctrine with that of the
universality of Destiny or Reason or Providence—the |
‘‘antinomy of the practical understanding” —was not
always observed.” The two doctrines marched on parallel
lines, and each of them was sometimes stated as though
it had no limitations. The harmony of them, which is
indicated by both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and which
underlies a large part of both the theology and the ethics
1 Ench. 1s 3 Eg. Sext. Empir. Pyrr. 3. 9.
229 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
of Epictetus, is in effect this: The world marches on to
its end, realizing its own perfection, with absolute cer-
tainty. The majority of its parts move in that march
unconsciously, with no sense of pleasure or pain, no idea
of good or evil. To man is given the consciousness of
action, the sense of pleasure and pain, the idea of good
and evil, and freedom of choice between them. If he
chooses that which is against the movement of nature,
he chooses for himself misery; if he chooses that which
is in accordance with that movement, he finds happiness.
In either case the movement of nature goes on, and the
man fulfils his destiny: “‘ Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem
trahunt.’! Itisa man’s true function and high privilege
so to educate his mind and discipline his will, as to think
that to be best which is really best, and that to be avoided
which nature has not willed: in other words, to acqui-
esce in the will of God, not as submitting in passive
resignation to the power of one who is stronger, but as
haying made that will his own.?
If a man realizes this, instead of bemoaning the diffi-
culties of life, he will not only ask God to send them,
but thank Him for them. This is the Stoical theodicy.
The life and teaching of Epictetus are for the most part
a commentary upon it.
1 Seneca, Hp. 107. 11: a free Latin rendering of one of the verses
of Cleanthes quoted from Epictetus in Lecture VI. p. 157.
* Seneca, Dial. 1.5.8: quid est boni viri? praebere se fato. grande
solatium est cum universo rapi. quicquid est quod nos sic vivere, sic
mori jussit, eadem necessitate et deos adligat. inrevocsbilis humana
pariter ac divina cursus vehit. 1116 ipse omnium conditor et rector
scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur, semper paret, semel jussit.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 228
“Took at the powers you have ; and when you have looked at |
have the equipment which Thou hast given me, and the means
for making all things that happen contribute to my adornment.’
Nay, but that is not what you do: you sit sometimes shuddering
at the thought of what may happen, sometimes bewailing and
grieving and groaning over what does happen. Then you find
fault with the gods! For what but impiety is the consequence
of such degeneracy? And yet God has not merely given you
these powers by which we may bear whatever happens without <=—
being lowered or crushed by it, but also, like the good King and
true Father that He is, has given to this part of you the capacity.
of not being thwarted, or forced, or hindered, and has made it
absolutely your own, not even reserving to Himself the power
of thwarting or hindering it.”!
“What words are sufficient to praise or worthily describe the
gifts of Providence to us? If we were really wise, what should
we have been doing in public or in private but sing hymns to
God, and bless Him and recount His gifts (ras χάριτας) 2? Digging
or ploughing or eating, ought we not to be singing this hymn to
God, ‘Great is God for having given us these tools for tilling the
ground ; great is God for having given us hands to work with
and throat to swallow with, for that we grow unconsciously and
breathe while we sleep’? This ought to be our hymn for every-
thing: but the chiefest and divinest hymn should be for His
having given us the power of understanding and of dealing’
rationally with ideas. Nay—since most of you are utterly blind
to this—ought there not to be some one to make this his special
function, and to sing the hymn to God for all the rest 2 What
else can a lame old man like me do but sing hymns to God? If
I were a nightingale, I should do the work of a nightingale ; if
a swan, the work of a swan; but being as I am a rational being,
I must sing hymns to God. This is my work: this I do: this
rank—as far as I can—I will not leave ; and I invite you to join
with me in this same song.”
1 Epict. Diss. 1. 6. 37—40.
2 7014. 1. 16. 15—21,
224 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
B. Tue Curist1an IpEA.
In primitive Christianity we find ourselves in another
sphere of ideas: we seem to be breathing the air of Syria,
with Syrian forms moving round us, and speaking a lan-
guage which is not familiar to us. For the Greek city,
with its orderly government, we have to substitute the
picture of an Kastern sheyk, at once the paymaster of
his dependents and their judge. Two conceptions are
dominant, that of wages for work done, and that of posi-
tive law.
1. The idea of moral conduct as work done for a
master who will in due time pay wages for it, was a
natural growth on Semitic soil. It grew up among the
fellahin, to whom the day’s work brought the day’s wages,
and whose work was scrutinized before the wages were
paid. It is found in many passages of the New Testa-
ment, and not least of all in the discourses of our Lord.
The ethical problems which had vexed the souls of the
writers of Job and the Psalms, are solved by the teaching
that the wages are not all paid now, but that some of
them are in the keeping of the Father in heaven. The
persecuted are consoled by the thought, “ Great are your
wages in heaven.”! Those who do their alms before men
receive tkeir wages in present reputation, and have no
wages stored up for them in heaven. The smallest act
of casual charity, the giving of a cup of cold water, will
not go without its wages.? The payment will be made
at the return of the Son of Man, whose ‘‘ wages are with
1 §. Matthew, 5. 12; S. Luke, 6. 23, 2 Ibid. 6, 1.
8 Ibid. 10. 42; S. Mark, 9, 41.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 225
him to give to every man according as his work is.”
So fundamental is the conception that ‘‘he that cometh
to God must believe,” not only “that He is,” but also
that He “pays their due to them that seek after Him.’’?
So also in the early Christian literature which moved
still within the sphere of Syrian ideas. In the “‘ Two
Ways,” what is given in charity should be given without
murmuring, for God will repay 10:3 in the Epistle of
Barnabas, the conception of the paymaster is blended
with that of the judge.* ‘The Lord judges without
respect of persons: every one shall receive according as
he has done: if he be good, his righteousness shall go
before him: if he be wicked, the wages of his wicked-
ness are before his face.”
2. God is at once the Lawgiver and the Judge. The
underlying conception is that of an Oriental sovereign +
who issues definite commands, who is gratified by obe-
dience and made angry by disobedience, who gives pre-
sents to those who please him and punishes those with
whom he is angry. The punishments which he inflicts ,
are vindictive and not remedial. They are the mani-|
festation of his vengeance against unrighteousness. They |
are external to the offender. They follow on the offence
by the sentence of the judge, and not by a self-acting
law. He sends men zzéo punishment.
The introduction into this primitive Christianity of
1 Revelation, 22.12: so Barnab. 21.3: ἐγγὺς ὁ κύριος καὶ ὁ μισθὸς
αὐτου.
2 Hebrews, 11. 6.
8 Didaché, 4.7, yrary γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ μισθοῦ Kadds ἀνταποδότης.
4 Barnab. 4. 12,
Q
220 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
the ethical conceptions of Greek philosophy, raised diffi-
culties which were long in being solved, if indeed they
can be said to have been solved even now. The chief of
these difficulties were, (i.) the relation of the idea of
᾿ forgiveness to that of law; (11.} the relation of the con-
ception of a Moral Governor to that of free-will.
(i.) The Christian conception of God on its ethical side
was dominated by the idea of the forgiveness of sins.
God was a Sovereign who had issued commands: He
was a Householder who had entrusted His servants with
powers to be used in His service. As Sovereign, He
could, at His pleasure, forgive a breach of His orders:
as Householder, He could remit a debt which was due
to Him from His servants. The special message of the
Gospel was, that God was willing to forgive men their
\ transgressions, and to remit their debts, for the sake of
Jesus Christ. The corresponding Greek conception had
~ \come to be dominated by the idea of order. The order
lwas rational and beneficent, but it was universal. It
, could not be violated with impunity. The punishment
of its violation came by a self-acting law. There was a
possibility of amendment, but there was none of remis-
sion. Hach of these conceptions is consistent with itself:
each by itself furnishes the basis of a rational theology.
But the two conceptions are apparently irreconcilable
with each other; and the history of a large part of early
Christian theology is the history of endeavours to recon-
cile them. The one conception belonged to a moral ~ |
world, controlled by a Personality who set forces in
motion; the other to a physical world, controlled by a
force which was also conceived as a Personality. Stated
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 227
in Christian terms, the one resolved itself into the pro-
position, God is good; the other into the proposition,
God is just. The two propositions seemed at first to be
inconsistent with each other: on the one hand, the infi-
nite love of God excluding the idea of punishment; on
the other hand, His immutable righteousness excluding
the idea of forgiveness.! The difficulty seemed insoluble,
except upon the hypothesis of the existence of two Gods.
The ditheism was sometimes veiled by the conception
that the second God had been created by the first, and
was ultimately subordinate to Him. In the theology of
Marcion, which filled a large place in the Christianity of
both the second and the third centuries, ditheism was
presented as the only solution of this and all the other
contrasts of which the world is full, and of which that of
Law and Grace is the most typical example. The New
1 These conceptions of the earliest Christian philosophers are stated,
in order to be modified, by Origen, de prince. 2. 5.1: existimant igitur
bonitatem affectum talem quemdam esse quod bene fieri omnibus debeat
etiam si indignus sit is cui beneficium datur nec bene consequi merea-
tur.... Justitiam vero putarunt affectum esse talem qui unicuique
prout meretur retribuat .... ut secundum sensum ipsorum justus
malis non videatur bene velle sed velut odio quodam ferri adversus eos.
2 The title of Marcion’s chief work was ᾿Αντιθέσεις, ‘ Contrasts’: the
extent to which his opinions prevailed is shown both by contemporary
testimony, e.g. Justin M. Apol. 1. 26, ὃς κατὰ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων διὰ
τῆς τῶν δαιμόνων συλλήψεως πολλοὺς πεποίηκε βλασφημίας λέγειν,
Tren, 3. 3. 4,. and also by the fact that the Churches into which his
adherents were organized flourished side by side with the Catholic
Churches for many centuries (there is an inscription of one of them,
dated a.D, 318, in Le Bas et Waddington, vol. iii. No. 2558, and they
had not died out at the time of the Trullan Council in a.p. 692, Cone.
Quinisext. c. 95): the importance which was attached to him is shown
by the large place which he occupies in early controversies, Justin
Martyr, Ireneus, the Clementines, Origen, Tertullian, being at pains
to refute him. ᾳ 2
228 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Testament was the revelation of the good God, the God
of love; the Old Testament was that of the just God,
the God of wrath. Redemption was the victory of for-
giveness over punishment, of the God who was revealed
by Jesus Christ over the God who was manifested in the
Law.
The ditheistic hypothesis was itself more difficult than
the difficulties which it explained. The writers who
opposed it were helped, not only by the whole current
of evangelical tradition, but also by the dominant ten-
dencies of both philosophy and popular religion. They
insisted that justice and goodness were not only com-
patible but necessarily co-existent in the Divine nature.
Goodness meant not indiscriminating beneficence ; justice
meant not inexorable wrath: goodness and justice were
combined in the power of God to deal with every man
according to his deserts, including in the idea of deserts
that of repentance.
The solution is found in Ireneeus, who argues that in
the absence of either of the two attributes, God would
cease to be God:
“If the God who judges be not also good, so as to bestow
favours on those on whom He ought, and to reprove those whom
He should, He will be as a Judge neither wise nor just. On the
other hand, if the good God be only good, and not also able to
test those on whom He shall bestow His goodness, He will be
outside goodness as well as outside justice, and His goodness
will seem imperfect, inasmuch as it does not save all, as it should
do if it be not accompanied with judgment. Marcion, therefore,
by dividing God into two, the one a God who judges, and the
other a God who is good, on both sides puts an end to God.”?
3 Tren. 3. 25. 2.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 225
It is found in Tertullian, who, after arguing on ἃ prior?
grounds that the one attribute implies the other, passes
by an almost unconscious transition from physical ta
moral law: just as the ‘‘justice” of God in its physical
operation controlled His goodness in the making of an
orderly world, so in its moral operation it has, since the
Fall, regulated His dealings with mankind.
“Nothing is good which is unjust; all that is just is good.....
The good is where the just is. From the beginning of the world
the Creator has been at once good and just. The two qualities
came forth together. His goodness formed the world, His justice
harmonized it. It is the work of justice that there is a separa-
tion between light and darkness, between day and night, between
heaven and earth, between the greater and the lesser lights... . .
As goodness brought all things into being, so did justice distin-
guish them. The whole universe has been disposed and ordered
by the decision of His justice. Every position and mode of the
elements, the movement and the rest, the rising and the setting
of each one of them, are judicial decisions of the Creator.....
When evil broke out, and the goodness of God came hence-
forward to have an opponent to contend with, the justice also of
God acquired another function, that of regulating the operation
of His goodness according to the opposition to it: the result is
that His goodness, instead of being absolutely free, is dispensed
according to men’s deserts; it is offered to the worthy, it is
denied to the unworthy, it is taken away from the unthankful,
it is avenged on all its adversaries. In this way this whole
function of justice is an agency for goodness: in condemning, in
punishing, in raging with wrath, as you Marcionites express it,
it does good and not evil.”
It is found in the Clementines,? the ‘‘ Recognitions”’
going so far as to make the acceptance of it an element
1 Tert. c. Mare. 2. 11, 12.
5. Homil. 4.13; 9. 19;-18. 2, 3.
230 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
in “saving knowledge:” “it is not enough for salvation
to know that God is good; we must know also that He
is just.”! It is elaborated by both Clement of Alex-
andria? and Origen; but in the latter it is linked closely
with other problems, and his view will be best considered
in relation to them.? The Christian world in his time
was settling down into a general acceptance of the belief
that goodness and justice co-existed, each limiting the
other in the mind of God: the general effect of the con-
troversy was to emphasize in Christianity the conception
of God as a Moral Governor, administering the world by
laws which were at once beneficent and just.
(11.) But this problem of the relation of goodness to
justice passed, as the corresponding problem in Greek
philosophy passed, into the problem of the relation of a
good God to moral evil. The difficulties of the problem
‘were increased in its Christian form by the conception
of moral evil as guilt rather than as misery, and by the
emphasis which was laid on the idea of the Divine fore-
knowledge.
The preblem was stated in its plainest form by Marcion:
“Tf God is good, and prescient of the future, and able to avert
evil, why did He allow man, that is to say His own image and
likeness, nay more, His own substance, to be tricked by the
devil and fall from obedience to the law into death? For if He
had been good, and thereby unwilling that such an event should
happen, and prescient, and thereby not ignorant that it would
happen, and powerful, and thereby able to prevent its happening, |
it would certainly not have happened, being impossible under
these three condi‘ions of divine greatness. But since it did
1 Recogn. 3. 37. 2 Especially Pedag. 1. 8, 9.
3 See below, p. 233,
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 231
happen, the inference is certain that God must be believed to be
neither good nor prescient nor powerful.”
The hypothesis of the existence of two Gods, by which
Marcion solved this and other problems of theology, was
consistently opposed by the great mass of the Christian
communities. ‘The solution which they found was almost
uniformly that of the Stoics: evil is necessary for the
production of moral virtue: there is no virtue where
there is no choice: and man was created free to choose.
It was found, in short, in the doctrine of free-will.
This solution is found in Justin Martyr:
“The nature of every created being is to be capable of vice
and virtue: for no one of them would be an object of praise if it
had not also the power of turning in the one direction or the
other.”?
It is found in Tatian :
“Each of the two classes of created things (men and angels)
is born with a power of self-determination, not absolutely good
by nature, for that is an attribute of God alone, but brought to
perfection through freedom of voluntary choice, in order that the
bad man may be justly punished, being himself the cause of his
being wicked, and that the righteous man may be worthily
praised for his good actions, not having in his exercise of moral
freedom transgressed the will of God.”
It is found in Ireneus:
“In man as in angels, for angels also are rational beings, God _
has placed the power of choosing, so that those who have obeyed
might justly be in possession of what is good; and that those
who have not obeyed may justly not be in possession of what is
good, and may receive the punishment which they deserve.....
But if it had been by nature that some were bad and others
1 ap. Tert. c. Mare. 2. 5. 2 Apol. 2. 7.
3 Tatian, Orat. ad Grac. 7.
232 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
good, neither would the latter be deserving of praise for being
good, inasmuch as they were so constituted; nor the others of
blame for being bad, inasmuch as they were born so. But since
in fact all men are of the same nature, able on the one hand to
hold fast and to do what is good, and again on the other hand
to reject it and not do it, it is right for them to be in the one
case praised for their choice of the good and their adherence to
it, and in the other case blamed and punished for their rejection
of it, both among well-governed men and much more in the sight
of God.”?
It is found in Theophilus? and Athenagoras,? and, asa
more elaborate theory, in Tertullian and the philosophers
of Alexandria. Just as Epictetus and the later Stoics
had made freedom of will to be the specially divine part
of human nature, so Tertullian* answers Marcion’s objec-
tion, that if God foreknew that Adam would fall He
should not have made him free, by the argument that
the goodness of God in making man necessarily gave him
the highest form of existence, that such highest form
was “the image and likeness of God,” and that such
image and likeness was freedom of will. And just as
/Epictetus and the later Stoics had conceived of life as a
moral discipline, and of its apparent evils as necessary
means of testing character, so the Christian philosophers
of Alexandria conceive of God as the Teacher and Trainer
and Physician of men, of the pains of life as being dis-
ciplinary, and of the punishments of sin as being not
vindictive but remedial.®
1 Tren. 4. 37, 2 Ad Auitol. 2. 27.
8 Legat. 51. =e, Mare, 2. Ὁ
5 E.g. Clem. Alex. Pedag. 1.1; Origen, de prince. 2. 10. 6; σα. Cele
6. 56: so alyo Tert. Scorp. 5.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY, 233
There was still a large margin of unsolved difficulties. |
The hypothesis of the freedom of the will, as it had
hitherto been stated, assumed that all beings who pose
sessed it were equal in both their circumstances and their
natural aptitudes. It took no account of the enormous’
difference between one man and another in respect of |
either the external advantages or disadvantages of their
lives, or the strength and weakness of their characters.
The difficulty was strongly felt by more than one school
of Christian philosophers, the more so because it applied,
not only to the diversities among mankind, but also to
the larger differences between mankind as a whole and
the celestial beings who rose in their sublime gradations
above it. 7
“Very many persons, especially those who come from the
school of Marcion and Valentinus and Basilides, object to us that
it is inconsistent with the justice of God in making the world to
assign to some creatures an abode in the heavens, and not merely
a better abode, but also a loftier and more honourable position ;
to grant to some principality, to others powers, to others domi-
nations ; to confer upon some the noblest seats of the heavenly
tribunals, to cause others to shine out with brighter rays, and to
flash forth the brilliance of a star ; to give to some the glory of
the sun, and to others the glory of the moon, and to others the
glory of the stars; to make one star differ from another star in
glory..... In the second place, they object to us about terrestrial
beings that a happier lot of birth has come to some men than to
others ; one man, for example, is begotten by Abraham and born
according to promise ; another is the son of Isaac and Rebekah,
and, supplanting his brother even in the womb, is said even before
he is born to be beloved of God. One man is born among the
Hebrews, among whom he finds the learning of the divine law;
another among the Greeks, themselves also wise and men of no
small learning; another among the Ethiopians, who are canni-
294 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
bals ; another among the Scythians, with whom parricide is legal;
another among the Taurians, who offer their guests in sacrifice.
“They consequently argue thus: If this great diversity of
circumstances, this varied and different condition of birth—a
matter in which free-will has no place—is not caused by a
diversity in the nature of the souls themselves, a soul of an evil
nature being destined for an evil nation, and a soul of a good
nature for a good one, what other conclusion can be drawn than
that all this is the result of chance and accident? And if that
conclusion be admitted, it will no longer be credible either that
the world was made by God or that it is governed by His pro-
vidence: and consequently neither will the judgment of God
upon every man’s doings seem a thing to be looked for.”
It is to this phase of the controversy that the ethical
theology of Origen is relative. In that theology, Stoicism
and Neo-Platonism are blended into a complete theodicy:
nor has a more logical superstructure ever been reared
on the basis of philosophical theism.
It is necessary to show the coherence of his view as a
whole, and it is advisable, in doing so, to use chiefly his
own words : 2
“There was but one beginning of all things, as: there will be
but a single end. The diversities of existence which have sprung
from a single beginning will be absorbed in a single end.* The
causes of those diversities lie in the diverse things themselves.*
They were created absolutely equal; for, on the one hand, God
had no reason in Himself for causing inequalities ;° and, on the
other hand, being absolutely impartial, He could not give to one
being an advantage which He did not give to another. They
1 Origen, de prince. 2. 9. 5.
° The passage which follows is, with the exception of one extract
from the contra Celsum, a catexa of extracts from the de principiiz.
8 De princ. 1. 6. 2. $59. .B, ΔΝ 29, we
59 9. 6. 61.8.4.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 235
were also, by a similar necessity, created with the capacity of
being diverse; for spotless purity is of the essence of none save
God; in all created beings it must be accidental, and conse-
quently liable to lapse’ The lapse, when it takes place, is
voluntary ; for every being endowed with reason has the power
of exercising it, and this power is free ;” it is excited by external
causes, but not coerced by them.’ For to lay the fault on external
causes and put it away from ourselves by declaring that we are
like logs or stones, dragged by forces that act upon them from
without, is neither true nor reasonable. Every created rational
being is thus capable of both good and evil; consequently of
praise and blame ; consequently also of happiness and misery ; of
the former if it chooses holiness and clings to it, of the latter if
by sloth and negligence it swerves into wickedness and ruin.*
The lapse, when it has taken place, is not only voluntary but
also various in degree. Some beings, though possessed of free-
will, never lapsed: they form the order of angels. Some lapsed
but slightly, and form in their varying degrees the orders of
‘thrones, dominations, princedoms, virtues, powers. Some lapsed
lower, but not irrecoverably, and form the race of men.’ Some
lapsed to such a depth of unworthiness and wickedness as to be
opposing powers ; they are the devil and his angels.° In the
temporal world which is seen, as well as in the eternal worlds
which are unseen, all beings are arranged according to their
merits ; their place has been determined by their own conduct.’
“The present inequalities of circumstance and character are
thus not wholly explicable within the sphere of the present life.
But this world is not the only world. Every soul has existed
from the beginning; it has therefore passed through some worlds
already, and will pass through others before it reaches the final
consummation. It comes into this world strengthened by the
victories or weakened by the defeats of its previous life. Its
place in this world as a vessel appointed to honour or to dis-
honour is determijed by its previous merits or demerits. Its
1.5.5; 1.6.2. 23. 4
1
. Ets pea) τῶν 5.1: 6: 2:
4 3.5:
Sie
280 VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
work in this world determines its place in the world which is to
follow this.
“ All this takes place with the knowledge and under the over-
sight of God. It is an indication of His ineffable wisdom that
the diversities of natures for which created beings are them-
selves responsible are wrought together into the harmony of the
world? It is an indication not only of Fis wisdom but of His
goodness that, while no creature is coerced into acting rightly,
yet when it lapses it meets with evils and punishments. All
punishments are remedial. God calls what are termed evils into
existence to convert and purify those whom reason and admo-
nition fail to change. He is thus the great Physician of souls.*
The process of cure, acting as it does simply through free-will,
takes in some cases an almost illimitable time. For God is long-
suffering, and to some souls, as to some bodies, a rapid cure is
not beneficial. But in the end all souls will be thoroughly
purged* All that any reasonable soul, cleansed of the dregs of
all vices, and with every cloud of wickedness completely wiped
away, can either feel or understand or think, will be wholly God:
it will no longer either see or contain anything else but God:
God will be the mode and measure of its every movement: and
so God will be ‘all’ Nor will there be any longer any distinc-
tion between good and evil, because evil will nowhere exist; for
God is all things, and in Him no evil inheres. So, then, when
the end has been brought back to the beginning, that state of
things will be restored which the rational creation had when it
had no need to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil; all sense of wickedness will have been taken away; He
who alone is the one good God becomes to the soul ‘all, and
that not in some souls but ‘in all.’ There will be no longer
1 3. 1. 20, 21: but sometimes beings of higher merit are assigned
to a lower grade, that they may benefit those who properly belong to
that grade, and that they themselves may be partakers of the patience
of the Creator, 2. ὃ. 7.
iat ee 8 ¢. Cels. 6. 56; de prince, ἃ. 10.
4 De prince. ὃ. 1. 14,17.
VIII. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 95
death, nor the sting of death, nor any evil anywhere, but God
will be ‘all in all’ ”?
Of this great theodicy, only part has been generally
accepted. The Greek conceptions which underlie it,
and which preceded it, have survived, but in other
forms. Free-will, final causes, probation, have had a
later history in which Greece has had no share. The |
doctrine of free-will has remained in name, but it has
been so mingled on the one hand with theories of human |
depravity, and on the other with theories of divine grace,
that the original current of thought 15 lost in the marshes
into which it has descended. The doctrine of final causes
has been pressed to an almost excessive degree as proving
the existence and the providence of God; but His govern-
ment of the human race has been often viewed rather as
the blundering towards an ultimate failure than as a
complete vindication of His purpose of creation. The
Christian world has acquiesced in the conception of life
as a probation; but while some of its sections have con-
ceived of this life as the only probation, and others have |
admitted a probation in a life to come, none have admitted |
into the recognized body of their teaching Origen’s sub-
lime conception of an infinite stairway of worlds, with
its perpetual ascent and descent of souls, ending at last
in the union of all souls with God.
1 3. 6. 3.
Lecture IX.
GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
III. Gop as ΤῊΝ Supreme Berna.
Ir was in the Gentile rather than in the Jewish world
that the theology of Christianity was shaped. It was
built upon a Jewish basis. The Jewish communities of
the great cities and along the commercial routes of the
empire had paved the way for Christianity by their
active propaganda of monotheism. Christianity won its
way among the educated classes by virtue 8 of its satisfy-
ing not only their ir moral ideals, but also their highest_
intellectual conceptions. On its ethical side it had, as
we have seen, large elements in common with reformed
Stoicism; on its theological side it moved in harmony
with the new movements of Platonism.t And those
movements reacted upon it. They gave a philosophical
form to the simpler Jewish faith, and especially to those
elements of it in which the teaching of St. Paul had
already given a foothold for speculation. The earlier
conceptions remained; but blending readily with the
philosophical conceptions that were akin to them, they
were expanded into large theories in which metaphysics
1 Cf. Justin, Dial. 6. Tryph. 2.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 239
and dialectics had an ample field. The conception, for
example, of the one God whose kingdom was a universal
kingdom and endured throughout all ages, blended with,
and passed into, the philosophical conception of a Being
who was beyond time and space. The conception that
‘clouds and darkness were round about Him,” blended
with, and passed into, the philosophical conception of a
Being who was beyond not only human sight but human
thought. The conception of His transcendence obtained
the stronger hold because it confirmed the prior concep-
tion of His unity; and that of His incommunicability,
and of the consequent need of a mediator, gave a philo-
sophical explanation of the truth that Jesus Christ was
His Son.
A. Tue IDEA AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
But the theories which in the fourth century came to
prevail, and which have formed the main part of specu-
lative theology ever since, were the result of at least two
centuries of conflict. At every stage of the conflict the
conceptions of one or other of the forms of Greek philo-
sophy played a decisive part; and the changing phases
of the conflict find a remarkable parallel in some of the
philosophical schools.
The conflict may be said to have had three leading
stages, which are marked respectively by the dominance
of speculations as to (1) the transcendence of God, (2)
His revelation of Himself, (3) the distinctions in His
nature,
(1) Zhe Transcendence of God.—Nearly seven hun-
240 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
dred years before the time when Christianity first
came into large contact with Greck philosophy, the
mind of a Greek thinker, outstripping the slow infer-
ences of popular thought, had leapt to the conception
of God as the Absolute Unity. He was the ultimate
generalization of all things, expressed as the ultimate
abstraction of number:! He was not limited by parts
or by bodily form: ‘all of Him is sight, all of Him
is understanding, all of Him is hearing.” But it is
probable that the conception in its first form was rather
of a material than of an ideal unity :? the basis of later
metaphysics was first securely laid by a second form of
the conception which succeeded the first half-a-century
afterwards. The conception was that-of Absolute Being.
Only the One really zs: it was not nor will be: it “8
now, and is everywhere entire, a continuous unity, a
perfect sphere which fills all space, undying and immov-
able. Over against it are the Many, the innumerable
objects of sense: they are not, but only seem to be: the
knowledge that we seem to have of them is not truth,
but illusion. But the conception, even in this second
form, was more consistent with Pantheism than with
Theism. It was lifted to the higher plane on which it
has ever since rested by the Platonic distinction between
the world of sense and the world of thought. God be-
longed to the latter, and not to the former. Absolute
1 The more common conception of the earliest Greek philosophy
was that of ras ἐνδιηκούσας τοῖς στοιχείοις ἢ τοῖς σώμασι δυνάμεις,
Aetius ap. Stob. Eel. Phys. 2. 29.
2 The form in which it is given by Sextus Empiricus, in whose time
the distinction was clearly understood, implies this: ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν
καὶ τὸν θεόν συμφιῇ πᾶσι, Pyrrh. Hypotyp. 228,
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 241
Unity, Absolute Being, and all the other terms which
expressed His unique supremacy, were gathered up in
the conception of Mind; for mind in the highest phase
of its existence is self-contemplative: the modes of its
expression are numerous, and perhaps infinite: but it
can itself go behind its modes, and so retire, as it were,
a step farther back from the material objects about which
its modes employ themselves. In this sense God is
transcendent (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), beyond the world of |
sense and matter. ‘God therefore is Mind, a form sepa-
rate from all matter, that is to say, out of contact with it,
and not involved with anything that is capable of being
acted on.””4
This great conception of the transcendence of God
filled a large place in later Greek philosophy, even out-
side the Platonic schools.2 The history of it is beyond
our present purpose; but we shall better understand the
relation of Christian theology to current thought if we
take three expressions of the conception at the time when
that theology was being formed—in Plutarch, in Maxi-
mus of Tyre, and in Plotinus.
1 This is a post-Platonic summary of Plato’s conception ; into the
inner development, and consequently varying expressions, of it in
Plato’s own writings it is not necessary to enter here. It is more
important in relation to the history of later Greek thought to know
what he was supposed to mean than what he meant. ‘The above is
taken from the summary of Aetius in Plut. de plac. philos. 1.7, Euseb.
Prep. evang. 14. 16 (Diels, Doxographt Greci, p. 304), The briefest
and most expressive statement of the transcendence of God (τὸ ἀγαθόν)
in Plato’s own writings is probably Republic, p. 509, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑτερ-
έχοντος.
2 It was a struggle between this and Stoicism.
R
29 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Plutarch says:
“What, then, is that which really exists? It is the Eternal,
the Uncreated, the Undying, to whom time brings no change.
For time is always flowing and never stays: it is a vessel charged
with birth and death: it has a before and after, a ‘ will be’ and
a ‘has been:’ it belongs to the ‘is not’ rather than to the ‘is.
But God is: and that not in time but in eternity, motionless,
timeless, changeless eternity, that has no before or after: and
being One, He fills eternity with one Now, and so really ‘is,’
not ‘has been,’ or ‘will be, without beginning and without
ceasing.”
Maximus of Tyre says:
“God, the Father and Fashioner of all things that are, He
who is older than the sun, older than the sky, greater than time
and lapse of time and the whole stream-of nature, is unnamed
by legislators, and unspoken by the voice and unseen by the
eyes: and since we cannot apprehend His essence, we lean upon
words and names and animals, and forms of gold and ivory and
silver, and plants and rivers and mountain-peaks and springs of
waters, longing for an intuition of Him, and in our inability
naming by His name all things that are beautiful in this world
οἵ οὔτ."
And again:
“Tt is of this Father and Begetter of the universe that Plato
tells us: His name he does not tell us, for he knew it not: nor
does he tell us His colour, for he saw Him not; nor His size, for
he touched Him not. Colour and size are felt by the touch and
1 Plutarch, de Hi ap. Delph. 18; cf. Ocellus Lucanus in the Augustan
Age, ap. Diels, 187, Mullach, i. p. 383 sq. The universe has no begin-
ning and no end: it always was and always will be (1. 1. p. 388). It
comprises, however, τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον, the former above the
moon, the latter below, so that the course of the moon marks the limit
between the changing and changeless, the det θέοντος θείου and the
ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γενητοῦ (2. 1, p. 394, 2. 23, p. 400).
2 Max. Tyr. Diss. 89:
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 243
seen by the sight: but the Deity Himself is unseen by the sicht,
unspoken by the voice, untouched by fleshly touch, unheard by
the hearing, seen only—through its likeness to Him, and heard
only—through its kinship with Him, by the noblest and purest
and clearest-sighted and swiftest and oldest element of the soul.”?
Plotinus similarly, in answer to the old problem, “‘ how
from the One, being such as we have described Him,
anything whatever has substance, instead of the One
abiding by Himself,” replies:
“Tet us call upon God Himself before we thus answer—not
with uttered words, but stretching forth our souls in prayer to
Him, for this is the only way in which we can pray, alone to Him
who is alone. We must, then, gaze upon Him in the inner part
of us, as in a temple, being as He is by Himself, abiding still
and beyond all things (ἐπέκεινα ἁπάντων). Everything that moves
must have an object towards which it moves. But the One has
no such object; consequently we must not assert movement of
Him... ... Let us not think of production in time, when we
speak of things eternal. ... What then was produced was pro-
duced without His moving: ... . it had its being without His
assenting or willing or being moved in anywise. It was like the
light that surrounds the sun and shines forth from it, though the
sun is itself at rest: it is reflected like an image. So with what
is greatest. That which is next greatest comes forth from Him,
and the next greatest 15 νοῦς ; for νοῦς sees Him and needs Him
alone.”?
1 Max. Tyr. 17. 9.
2 Plotinus, Enneades, 5.1.6; cf. 1 1. 8, where νοῦς is ἀμέριστος,
distinguished from ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστὴ (οὐσία). We are between
the two, having a share of both. The κάθαρσις of the soul consists in
ὁμοίωσις πρὸς θεόν, 1. 2.3; the love of beauty should ascend from that
of the body to that of character and laws, of arts and sciences, ἀπὸ δὲ
τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡδὴ ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ νοῦν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὃν, κἀκεῖ βαδιστέον τὴν ἄνω
πορείαν, 1. ἃ 2.
R2
944 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
But the conception of transcendence is capable of
taking two forms. It may be that of a God who passes
beyond all the classes into which sensible phenomena are
divisible, by virtue of His being pure Mind, cognizable
only by mind; or it may be that of a God who exists
extra flammantia moenia mundi, filling the infinite space
-which surrounds and contains all the spheres of material
existence. The one God is transcendent in the proper
sense of the term; the other is supra-cosmic. In either
case He is said to be unborn, undying, wncontained; and
since the same terms are thus used to express the ele-
_ ments of both forms of the conception, it is natural that
these forms should readily pass into each other, and
that the distinction between them should not always be
present to a writer’s mind or perceptible in his writings.
But the conception in one or other of its forms fills ἃ
large place in later Greek philosophy. It blended ina
common stream with the new currents of religious feel-
ing. [The process is well illustrated by Philo. |
The words “I am thy God” are used not in a proper but in a
secondary sense. For Being, gua Being, is out of relation: itself
is full of itself and sufficient for itself, both before the birth of
the world and equally so after 101 He transcends all quality,
being better than virtue, better than knowledge, and better even
than the good itself and the beautiful itself* He is not in space,
but beyond it; for He contains it. He is not in time, for He
is the Father of the universe, which is itself the father of time,
since from its movement time proceeds.* He is “without body,
1 De mut. nom. 4; i. 582, ed. Mangey.
3 De mund. op. 2; i. 2.
De post. Cain, 5; 1, 228, 229.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 245
arts or passions”: without feet, for whither should He walk
who fills all things: without hands, for from whom should He
receive anything who possesses all things: without eyes, for how
should He need eyes who made the light He is invisible, for
how can eyes that are too weak to gaze upon the sun be strong
enough to gaze upon its Maker.? He is incomprehensible: not
even the whole universe, much less the human mind, can contain
the conception of Him :* we know that He is, we cannot know
what He is:+ we may see the manifestations of Him in His
works, but it were monstrous folly to go behind His works and
inquire into His essence.® He is hence unnamed: for names
are the symbols of created things, whereas His only attribute is
to be.
(2) The Revelation of the Transcendent.—Side by side
with this conception of the transcendence of God, and
intimately connected with it, was the idea of beings or
forces coming between God and men. A transcendent
God was in Himself incommunicable: the more the con-
ception of His transcendence was developed, the stronger
was the necessity for conceiving of the existence of inter-
mediate links.’
1 Quod deus immut. 12; i, 281. 2 De Abrah. 16; ii. 12.
3 j, 224, 281, 566; ii. 12, 654; Frag. ap Joan. Dam. ii. 654.
* De prem. et pen. 7; iu. 415. 5 De post. Cain, 48 ; i. 258.
6 De mut. nom. 2; 1. 580; cf. 630, 648, 655; ii. 8-9, 19, 92-93,
597. Cf. in general Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen
Philosophie, Oldenburg, 1872, pp. 206, 207, n. 6.
7 The necessity for such intermediate links is not affected by the
question how far, outside the Platonic schools, there was a belief in a
veal transcendence of God, or only in His existence outside the solar
system. In this connection, note the allegory in the Phadrus. The
Epicureans coarsely expressed the transcendence of God by the express-
sion, διήρηται ἡ οὐσία, Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. p. 114, ὃ 5; cf. Ocellus
Lucanus, cited above, p. 242. Hippolytus describes Aristotle’s Meta-
physics as dealing with things beyond the moon, 7. 19, p. 354; cf.
940 IX. GREEK AND CHRISIIAN THEOLOGY.
i, A basis for such a conception was afforded in the
popular mythology by the belief in demons—spirits
inferior to the gods, but superior to men. The belief
was probably “(ἃ survival of the primitive psychism
which peopled the whole universe with life and anima-
tion.”! There was an enormous contemporary develop-
ment of the idea of demons or genii. They are found
in Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, Maximus, and Celsus.
In the latter some are good, some bad, most of them of
mixed nature; to them is due the creation of all things
except the human soul; they are the rulers of day and
night, of the sunlight and the cold.?
ii. A philosophical basis for the theory was afforded
by the Platonic Jdeai or Forms, and the Stoical Logot
or Reasons. We have already seen the place which those
Forms, viewed also as Forces, and those Reasons, viewed
also as productive Seeds, filled in the later Greek cosmo-
logies and cosmogonies. ‘They were not less important
in relation to the theory of the transcendence of God.
The Forms according to which He shaped the world, the
Forces by which He made and sustains it, the Reasons
which inhere in it and, like laws, control its movements,
Origen’s idea of the heavens in de prince. ii. 3, 7, and Celsus’ objection
that Christians misunderstand Plato by confusing his heaven with the
Jewish heavens. Origen, 6. Cels. vi. 19; cf. Keim, p. 84.
1 Benn, Greek Philosophers, 2. 252.
2 Cf. Hesiod in Sext. Emp. ix. 86. Similarly, Thales, τὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον
ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλῆρες (Diels, 301); Pythagoras, Empedocles in
Hippolytus, διοικοῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὴν γῆν (Diels, 558); Plato and the
Stoics (Diels, 307), e.g. Plutarch, Epictetus, 1. 14. 12; 3.13. 15 (Diels,
1307); Athenagoras, 23 ; Philo, ii. 635; Frag. ap. Eus. Prep. Evan,
8. 13; see references in Keim’s Celsus, p. 120; cf. Wachsmuth, Die
Ansichten der Stoiker tiber Mantik u. Démonen, Berlin, 1860.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. DAN
are outflows from and reflexions of His nature, and
communicate a knowledge of it to His intelligent crea-
tures. In the philosophy of Philo, these philosophical
conceptions are combined with both the Greek conception
of Demons and the Hebrew conception of Angels. The
four conceptions, Forms, Zogod, Demons, and Angels,
pass into one another, and the expressions which are
relative to them are interchangeable. The most common
expression for them is Zogoz, and it is more commonly
found in the singular, Logos.
(3) The Distinctions in the Nature of God.—The Logos
is able to reveal the nature of God because it is itself
the reflexion of that nature. It is able to reveal that
nature to intelligent creatures because the human intelli-
gence is itself an offshoot of the Divine. As the eye of
sense sees the sensible world, which also is a revelation
of God,! since it is His thought impressed upon matter,
so the reason sees the intelligible world, the world of
His thoughts conceived as intelligible realities, existing
separate from Him.
“The wise man, longing to apprehend God, and travelling
along the path of wisdom and knowledge, first of all meets with
the divine Reasons, and with them abides as a guest ; but when
he resolves to pursue the further journey, he is compelled to
abstain, for the eyes of his understanding being opened, he sees
that the object of his quest is afar off and always receding, an
infinite distance in advance of him.”* “Wisdom leads him first
into the antechamber of the Divine Reason, and when he is there
he does not at once enter into the Divine Presence; but sees
Him afar off, or rather not even afar off can he behold Him, but
1 Philo, de confus. ling. 20 (i. 419).
2 De post. Cain. 6 (i. 229).
248 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
only he sees that the place where he stands is still infinitely far
from the unnamed, unspeakable, and incomprehensible God.”?
What he sees is not God Himself but the lhkeness of
Him, “just as those who cannot gaze upon the sun may
yet gaze upon a reflexion of it.”? The Logos, reflecting
not only the Divine nature, but also the Divine will and
the Divine goodness, becomes to men a messenger of
help; like the angel to Hagar, it brings advice and
encouragement ;? like the angel who redeemed Jacob
(Gen. xlviii. 16), it rescues men from all kinds of evil ;*
like the angel who delivered Lot from Sodom, it succours
the kinsmen of virtue and provides for them a refuge.°
“Like a king, it announces by decree what men ought to do;
like a teacher, it instructs its disciples in what will benefit
them; like a counsellor, it suggests the wisest plans, and so
greatly benefits those who do not of themselves know what is
best ; like a friend, it tells many secrets which it is not lawful
for the uninitiated to hear.”®
And standing midway between God and man, it not only
reflects God downwards to man, but also reflects man
upwards to God.
“Tt stands on the border-line between the Creator and the
creation, not unbegotten like God, not begotten like ourselves,
and so becomes not only an ambassador from the Ruler to His
subjects, but also a supplant from mortal man yearning after
the immortal.”7
The relation of the Logos to God, as distinguished
from its functions, is expressed by several metaphors, all
1 De somn. 1. 11 (i. 630). 2 Ibid. 1. 41 (i. 656).
8 De profug. 1 (i. 547); so de Cherub. 1 (i. 139).
4 Leg. Alleg. 3. 62 (1. 122), 5 De somn. 1. 15 (i. 633).
6 Ibid. 1. 33 (i. 649). 7 Quis rer. div. her. 42 (i. 501).
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 249
of which are important in view of later theology. They
may be gathered into two classes, corresponding to the
two great conceptions of the relation of the universe to
God which were held respectively by the two great
sources of Philo’s philosophy, the Stoics and the Plato-
nists. The one class of metaphors belongs to the monistic,
the other to the dualistic, conception of the universe.
In the former, the Logos is evolved from God; in the
other, created by Him! The chief metaphors of the
former class are those of a phantom, or image, or outflow:
the Logos is projected by God as a man’s shadow or
phantom was sometimes conceived as thrown off by his
body,? expressing its every feature, and abiding as a
separate existence after the body was dead; it is a
reflexion cast by God upon the space which He contains,
as a parhelion is cast by the sun;? it is an outflow as
from a spring.* The chief metaphor of the second class
1 De sacrif. Abel. et Cain. 18 (1. 175), ὁ yap θεὸς λέγων ἅμα ἐποίει
μηδὲν μεταξὺ ἀμφοῖν τιθείς" εἰ δὲ χρὴ δόγμα κινεῖν ἀληθέστερον, 6 λόγος
ἔργον αὐτοῦ : de decem orac. 11 (ii. 188), commenting on the expression
of the LXX. in Exodus xx. 18, ὁ λαὸς ἑώρα τὴν φωνήν, he justifies it
on the ground ὅτι ὅσα ἂν λέγῃ ὁ θεὸς οὐ ῥήματά ἐστιν GAN ἔργα, ἅπερ
ὀφθαλμοὶ πρὸ ὠτων διορίζουσι: de mund. opif. 6 (i. 5), οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον
εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον ἢ θεοῦ λόγον non κοσμοποιοῦντος.
2 The word σκία seems to be used, in relation to the Logos, not of
the shadow cast by a solid object in the sunlight, but rather, as in
Homer, Odyss. 10. 495, and frequently in classical writers, of a ghost
or phantom: hence God is the παράδειγμα, the substance of which the
Log s is the unsubstantial form, Leg. Alleg. 3. 31 (i. 106): hence also
σκύχ is used as convertible with εἰκών (¢bid.), in its sense of either a
portrait-statue or a reflexion in a mirror: in de confus. ling. 28 (i. 427),
the Logos is the eternal εἰκών of God.
3 De somn. 1. 41 (i. 656). * Quod det. pot. ins, 23 (i. 207).
250 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
is that of a son; the Logos is the first-begotten of God 5}
and by an elaboration of the metaphor which reappears
in later theology, God is in one passage spoken of as its
Father, Wisdom as its Mother.? It hence tends some-
times to be viewed as separate from God, neither God
nor man, but ‘inferior to God though greater than man.”’?
The earlier conception had already passed through several
forms: it had begun with that which was itself the
greatest leap that any one thinker had yet made, the
conception that Reason made the world: the conception
of Reason led to the conception of God as Personal
Reason: out of that grew the thought of God as greater
than Reason and using it as His instrument: and at last
had come the conception of the Reason of God as in some
way detached from Him, working in the world as a sub-
ordinate but self-acting law. It was natural that this
should lead to the further conception of Reason as the
offspring of God and Wisdom, the metaphor of a human
birth being transferred to the highest sphere of heaven.
B. Lue IpEA AND ITs DEVELOPMENT IN CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY.
(1) The Transcendence of God.—All the conceptions
which we have seen to exist in the sphere of philosophy
were reproduced in the sphere of Christianity. They
1 De agric. 12 (i. 308): de confus. ling. 28 (i. 427): spoken of as
γεννηθείς, ibid. 14 (i. 414).
2 De profug. 20 (i. 562): so God is spoken of as the husband of
copia in de Cherub. 14 (i. 148). But in de ebriet. 8 (i. 361), God is
the Father, Knowledge the Mother, not of the Logos but of the
universe.
8 Quod a Deo mit. somn. i. 683,
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 251
are sometimes relative to God, in contrast to the world
of sensible phenomena: phenomena come into being,
God is unbegotten and without beginning: phenomena
are visible and tangible, God is unseen and untouched.
They are sometimes relative to the idea of perfection:
God is unchangeable, indivisible, unending. He has no
name: for a name implies the existence of something
prior to that to which a name is given, whereas He is
prior to all things. These conceptions are all negative:
the positive conceptions are that He is the infinite depth
(vos) which contains and embosoms all things, that He
is self-existent, and that He is light. ‘The Father of
all,” said one school of philosophers,* “is a primal light,
blessed, incorruptible, and infinite.” ‘fThe essence of
the unbegotten Father of the universe is incorruptibility
and self-existing light, simple and uniform.’’?
From the earliest Christian teaching, indeed, the con-
ception of the transcendence of God is absent. God is
near to men and speaks to them: He is angry with them
and punishes them: He is merciful to them and pardons
them. He does all this through His angels and prophets,
and last of all through His Son. But he needs such
mediators rather because a heavenly Being is invisible,
than because He is transcendent. The conception which
underlies the earliest expression of the belief of a Chris-
tian community is the simple conception of children :
“We give Thee thanks, Holy Father, for Thy holy name which
Thou hast caused to dwell in our hearts, and for the knowledge
and faith and immortality which Thou hast made known to us
through Jesus Christ, Thy servant. To Thee be glory for ever.
1 j,e, Sethiani ap. Iren. 1, 30. 1. ® Ptolemeus, ad Flor. 7.
252 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Thou, Almighty Master, hast created all things for Thy name’s
sake, hast given food and drink to men for their enjoyment, that
they may give thanks to Thee: and upon us hast Thou bestowed
spiritual food and drink and eternal life through Thy servant.
Before all things we give Thee thanks for that Thou art mighty :
to Thee be glory for ever.”?
In the original sphere of Christianity there does not
appear to have been any great advance upon these simple
conceptions. The doctrine upon which stress was laid
was, that God is, that He is one, that He is almighty
and everlasting, that He made the world, that His mercy
is over all His works.? There was no taste for meta-
physical discussion: there was possibly no appreciation
of metaphysical conceptions. It is quite possible that
some Christians laid themselves open to the accusation
which Celsus brings, of believing that God is only cog-
nizable through the senses.? They were influenced by
Stoicism, which denied all intellectual existences, and
regarded spirit itself as material. This tendency resulted
in Adoptian Christology.®
But most of the philosophical conceptions above de-
scribed were adopted by the Apologists, and through
such adoption found acceptance in the associated Chris-
tian communities. They are for the most part stated,
not as in a dogmatic system, but incidentally. For
example, Justin thus protests against a literal inter-
1 Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, 10. 2—4.
2 Cf. the Ebionites, Alogi, and the Clementines.
8 Origen, οὐ Cels. 7. 36; cf. de prince. 1. 1. 7.
4 Con. Cels. 7. 37, καὶ δογματίζειν παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι
vontas οὐσίας Στωϊκοῖς ; cf. Keim, p. 100. See also Orig. in Gen. vol. ii.
p. 25 (Delarue), and Eus. 7. E. iv. 26, for a view ascribed to Melito.
5 Harnack, Doqmengesch p. 160.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. yA
pretation of the anthropomorphic expressions of the Old
Testament :
“You are not to think that the unbegotten God ‘came down’
from anywhere or‘ went up. For the unutterable Father and
Lord of all things neither comes to any place nor walks nor sleeps
nor rises, but abides in His own place wherever that place may
be, seeing keenly and hearing keenly, not with eyes or ears, but
with His unspeakable power, so that He sees all things and
knows all things, nor is any one of us hid from Him: nor does
He move, He who is uncontained by space and by the whole
world, seeing that He was before the world was born.”?
And Athenagoras thus sums up his defence of Chris-
tianity against the charge of atheism :
“T have sufficiently demonstrated that they are not atheists
who believe in One who is unbegotten, eternal, unseen, impas-
sible, incomprehensible and uncontained : comprehended by mind
and reason only, invested with ineffable light and beauty and
spirit and power, by whom the universe is brought into being
and set in order and held firm, through the agency of his own
Logos.”*
Theophilus replies thus to his heathen interlocutor who
asked him to describe the form of the Christian God:
“Listen, my friend: the form of God is unutterable and in-
describable, nor can it be seen with fleshly eyes: for His glory
is uncontained, His size is incomprehensible, His loftiness is
inconceivable, His strength is incomparable, His wisdom is un-
rivalled, His goodness beyond imitation, His beneficence beyond
description. If I speak of Him as light, I mention His handi-
work: if I speak of Him as reason, I mention His government:
if I speak of Him as spirit, I mention His breath: if I speak of
Him as wisdom, I mention His offspring: if I speak of Him as
strength, I mention His might: if I speak of Him as providence,
1 Dial. c. Tryph. c 127. 2 Legatio, 10.
254 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Δ mention His goodness: if I speak of His kingdom, I mention
His glory.”4
It is not easy to determine in regard to many of these
expressions whether they are relative in the writer’s mind
to a supra-cosmic or to a transcendental conception of
God. The case of Tertullian clearly shows that they are
compatible with the former conception no less than with
the latter; for though he speaks of God as ‘the great
Supreme, existing in eternity, unborn, unmade, without
beginning, and without end,”? yet he argues that He is
material; for ‘how could one who is empty have made
things that are solid, and one who is void have made
things that are full, and one who is incorporeal have
made things that have body?”® But there were some
schools of philosophers in which the transcendental cha-
racter of the conception is clearly apparent. The earliest
of such schools, and the most remarkable, is that of Basi-
lides. It anticipated, and perhaps helped to form, the
later developments of Neo-Platonism. It conceived of
God as transcending being. He was absolutely beyond
all predication. Not even negative predicates are predi-
cable of Him. The language of the schoo! becomes para-
doxical and almost unmeaning in the extremity of its
effort to express the transcendence of God, and at the
same time to reconcile the belief in His transcendence
with the belief that He is the Creator of the world.
‘When there was nothing, neither material, nor essen-
tial, nor non-essential, nor simple, nor compound, nor
1 Ad Autolycum. 1.3; οἵ, Minuc. Felix, Octavius, 18, and Novatian,
de Trin. 1. 2.
2 Adv. Mare. 1. 3. δ Adv. Prax. 7.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 755
unthought, nor unperceived, nor man, nor angel, nor god,
nor absolutely any of the things that are named or per-
ceived or thought, .... God who was not (οὐκ ὧν θεός),
without thought, without perception, without will, with-
out purpose, without passion, without desire, willed to
make a world. In saying ‘willed,’ I use the word only
because some word is necessary, but I mean without
volition, without thought, and without perception; and
in saying ‘world,’ I do not mean the extended and divi-
sible world which afterwards came into being, with its
capacity of division, but the seed of the world.”! This
was said more briefly, but probably with the same mean-
ing, by Marcus: There is no conception and no essence
of God.”
These exalted ideas of His transcendence, which had
especially thriven on Alexandrian soil, were further ela-
borated at the end of the second century by the Christian
philosophers of the Alexandrian schools, who inherited
the wealth at once of regenerated Platonism, of Gnos-
ticism, and of theosophic Judaism. Clement anticipated
Plotinus in conceiving of God as being ‘‘beyond the
One and higher than the Monad itself,’’? which was the
highest abstraction of current philosophy.* ‘There is no
name that can properly be named of Him: ‘neither the
One, nor the Good, nor Mind, nor Absolute Being, nor
Father, nor Creator, nor Lord.” No science can attain
1 ap. Hippol. 7. 21, p. 358.
3 ἀνεννόητος καὶ ἀνούσιος, ibid. 6. 42, p. 302; ef. 12 ff, pp. 424 ff,
for Monoimus, and also Ptolemeus, ad Floram, 7.
3 Pedag. 1. 8.
ὁ Moller, Kosmologie, Ὁ. 26, cf. 124 129, 130.
256 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
unto Him; ‘for all science depends on antecedent prin-
ciples; but there is nothing antecedent to the Unbegot-
ten.”! Origen expressly protests against the conceptions
of God which regarded Him as supra-cosmic rather than
transcendent,” and as having a material substance though
not a human form.? His own conception is that of a
nature which is absolutely simple and intelligent, or
which transcends both intelligence and existence. Being
absolutely simple, He has no more or less, no before or
after, and consequently has no need of either spa*e or
time. Being absolutely intelligent, His only « trivute
is to know and to be known. But only “like knows
like.” He is to be apprehended through the intelligence
which is made in His image: the human mind is capable
of knowing the Divine by virtue of its participation in it.
But in the strict sense of the word He is beyond our
knowledge: our knowledge is like the vision of a spark
as compared with the splendour of the sun.*
(2) Revelation or Mediation of the Transcendent.—But
as in Greek philosophy, so also in Christian theology,
the doctrine whether of a supra-cosmic or of a tran-
scendent God necessitated the further question, How
could He pass into the sphere of the phenomenal? The
rougher sort of objectors ridiculed a God who was ‘soli-
tary and destitute” in his unapproachable uniqueness : ὃ
the more serious heathen philosophers asked, If like
knows like, how can your God know the world? and
1 Strom. 5. 12. 2 « Cels. 6. 19 sqq.
8 De prince 1. 1. 2, 5, 7.
4 Ibid. 1. 1, passim; cf. 4. 1. 36.
® eg, Min. Felix, ὁ. 10; cf. Keim, Celsus, 158.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 257
the mass of Christian philosophers,! both within and
without the associated communities, felt this question,
or one of the questions that are cognate to it, to be the
cardinal point of their theology.”
The tentative answers were innumerable. One early
group of them maintained the existence of a capacity in
the Supreme Being to manifest Himself in different forms.
The conception had some elements of Stoical and some of
popular Greek theology, in both of which anthropomor-
phism had been possible.? It came to an especial promi-
nence in the earlier stages of the Christological contro-
versies, as an explanation of the nature of Jesus Christ.
It lay beneath what is known as Modal Monarchianism,
the theory that Christ was a temporary mode of the
existence of the one God. It was simply His will to
exist in one mode rather than in another.*
“One and the same God,” said Noetus, “is the Creator and
Father of all things, and, because it was His good pleasure, He
1 The older sort, who clung to tradition pure and simple, were
dubious of the introduction of dialectic methods into Christianity : see
Eus. v. 28; cf. v. 13. “Expavescunt ad οἰκονομίαν," Tert. adv. Praz.
3. Cf. Weingarten, p. 25.
2 Pantenus, when asked by outside philosophers, “ How can God
know the world, if like knows like ?” replied (Routh, Rel. Sac. i. p. 379):
μήτε αἰσθητῶς τὰ αἰσθητὰ μήτε νοερῶς TA vonTa’ od yap εἶναι δυνατὸν
τὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα κατὰ τὰ ὄντα τῶν ὄντων λαμβάνεσθαι, GAN ὡς ἴδια
θελήματα γινώσκειν αὐτὸν τὰ ὄντα φαμέν... for if he made all things
by His will, no one can deny that He knows His own will, and hence
knows what His will has made. Cf. Julius Africanus (Routh, ii. 239),
λέγεται yap ὁμωνύμως ὁ θεὸς πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν.
3 γίνομαι ὃ θέλω καὶ εἰμὶ ὃ ἐιμί, as used by the Naassenes, ap. Hipp.
5. 7.
4 Cf. Harnack, art. in Encycl. Brit. ‘Sabellius,”
8
Φ
258 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
t
appeared to righteous men of old. For when He is not seen He
is invisible, and when He is seen He is visible: He is uncon-
tained when He wills not to be contained, and contained when
He is contained. .... When the Father had not been born, He
was rightly styled Father: when it was His good pleasure to
undergo birth, He became on being born His own son, not
another’s.’#
But the dominant conception was in a line with that
of both Greek philosophy and Greek religion. From
the Supreme God came forth, or in Him existed, special
forms and modifications by which He both made the
world and revealed Himself to it.
(i.) The speculations as to the nature of these forms
varied partly with the large underlying variations in the
conception of God as supra-cosmic or as transcendental,
and partly with the greater or less development of the
tendency to give a concrete shape to abstract ideas.
They varied also according as the forms were viewed
in relation to the universe, as its types and formative
forces; or in relation to the Supreme Being and His
rational creatures, as manifestations of the one and means
of knowledge to the other. The variations are found to
exist, not only between one school of philosophers and
another, but also in the same school. For example, Ter-
tullian distinguishes between two schools of Valentinians,
that of Valentinus himself and that of his great, though
independent, follower Ptolemy.2 The former regarded
the AZons as simply modes of God’s existence, abiding
within His essence: the latter, in common with the great
1 Hipp. 9. 10; Schmid, Dogmeng. 47, n.
2 Τοῦ, c. Valent. 4 ; cf. διαθέσεις of Ptol. ap, Iven. 1. 12. 3.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 259
majority of the school, looked upon them as “personal
substances”? which had come forth from God and re-
mained outside Him. And again, most philosophers of
the same school made a genealogy of AXons, and fur-
nished their opponents thereby with one of their chief
handles for ridicule: but Colorbasus regarded the pro-
duction of the Kons as a single momentary act.1 Some-
times, however, the expressions, which came from dif-
ferent sources, were blended.
Almost all these conceptions of the means by which
God communicated Himself to the world were relative
te the conception of Him as Mind. It is as inherent
a necessity for thought to reveal itself as it is for light
to shine. Following the tendency of current psychology
to regard the different manifestations of mind as relative
to different elements in mind itself, some schools of phi-
losophers gave a separate personality to each supposed
element in the mind of God. There came forth thought
and reflexion, voice and name, reasoning and intention :*
or from the original Will and Thought came forth Mind
and Truth (Reality) as visible forms and images of the
invisible qualities (διαθέσεων) of the Father.®
(ii.) But side by side with this tendency to indivi-
dualize and hypostatize the separate elements or modes
of the Divine Mind, there was a tendency to regard the
mind of God as a unity existing either as a distinct
element in His essence or objective to Him. On one
theory, mind is the only-begotten of God.* He alone
1 ap. Iren. 1. 12. 3. 2 Hipp. 6. 12.
3 Ptolemy ap. Iren. 1. 12. 1; ef. Hipp. c. Noet. 10, πολὺς ἦν.
4 ap. Iven. 1. 2. 1, 5 (Valentinians).
s 2
a
200 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
knows God and wishes to reveal Him. On another
theory, mind is born from the unborn Father, and from
Mind are born Logos and Prudence, Wisdom and Force,
and thence in their order all the long series of Powers
by whom the universe was formed.! Another theory,
that of Marcus, probably contains the key to some of the
others; the meaning of the conception of Mind as the
only-begotten of God, is that Mind is the revelation of
God to Himself: His self-consciousness is, so to speak,
projected out of Him. It is at once a revelation and a
creation—the only immediate revelation and the only
immediate creation. The Father, “resolving to bring
forth that which is ineffable in Him, and to endow with
form that which is invisible, opened His mouth and sent
forth the Zogos”’ which is the image of Him, and revealed
Him to Himself.2 The Logos, or Word, which was so
sent forth was made up of distinct utterances: each
utterance was an won, a logos, a root and seed of being:
in other words, each was a part and phase of God’s
nature which expressed and reflected itself in a part and
phase of the world, so that collectively the dogoz are
equivalent to the Logos, who is the image and reflection
of God.
The theory is not far distant from that which is found
in the earlier Apologists, and which passed through more
than one phase before it won its way to general accept-
ance. The leading point in both is the relation of the
individual Jogoz to the Logos. We have already become
1 ap. Iren. 1. 24. ὃ (Basilides): οὗ, Clem. Al. Protrep. 10, the Logcs
is the Son of νοῦς.
> Tren. 1. 14. 1, προήκατο λόγον ὅμοιον αὑτῷ,
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 261
acquainted with the syncretism which had blended the
Platonic zdeas with the Stoical Jogoz, the former being
regarded as forces as well as forms, and the latter being
not only productive forces, but also the laws of those
forces; and which had viewed them both in their unity,
rather than in their plurality, as expressions of a single
Logos. We have also seen that the solution of the
problem, How could God create? was found in the doc-
trine that He created by means of His Logos, who im-
pressed himself in the innumerable forms of created
things. The solution of the metaphysical difficulty, How
can a transcendent God know and be known? was found
to lie in the solution which had already been given to
the cosmogonical difficulty, How could God come into
contact with matter?! The Forces were also Reasons:
they were activities and also thoughts: in men they
woke to consciousness: and the mind of man knew the
mind of God, as like knows like, by virtue of containing
within it ‘‘a seed of the Logos,” a particle of the divine
Logos itself. That divine Logos “οὗ which the whole
human race is partaker,” ‘which had at one time ap-
peared in the form of fire, and at another in the form of
angels, now by the will of God, on behalf of the human
race, had become a man, and endured to suffer all that
the demons effected that he should suffer at the hands
of the foolish Jews.”? The difference between Christ
and other men was thought to be, that other men have
1 As compared with Philo, who emphasizes the Logos in relation to
the work of creation, Justin lays stress on the Logos as Revealer,
making known to us the will of God: cf. ἀπόστολος, Tryph. 61.
2 Justin, Apol. i. 63.
202 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
only a “seed of the Logos,” whereas in him the whole
Logos was manifest: and the difference between Chris-
tians and philosophers was, that the latter lived by the
light of a part only of the divine Logos, whereas the
former lived by the knowledge and contemplation of the
whole Logos.}
Within half a century after these tentative efforts,*
and largely helped by the dissemination of the Fourth
Gospel, which had probably at first only a local influence,
the mass of Christians were tending to acquiesce not only
in the belief of the transcendental nature of God, but
also in the belief that, in some way which was not yet
closely defined, Jesus Christ was the Logos by whom the
world had been made, and who revealed the unknown
Father to men.
The form in which the belief is stated by Irenceus is
the following :
“No one can know the Father except by the Word of God,
that is by the Son revealing Him: nor can any one know the
Son except by the good pleasure of the Father. But the Son
performs the good pleasure of the Father: for the Father sends,
and the Son is sent and comes. And His Word knows that the
Father is, as far as concerns us, invisible and unlimited: and
since He is ineffable, He himself declares Him to us: and, on
the other hand, it is the Father alone wko knows His own Word:
both these truths has the Lord made known to us. Wherefore
the Son reveals the knowledge of the Father by manifesting
Himself: for the manifestation of the Son is the knowledge of
1 Apol. ii. 8.
2 It would be beyond our present purpose to go into Christology.
It will be sufficient to indicate three theories: (1) Modal Monarchian-
ism ; (2) Dynamical Monarchianism ; (3) Logos theory. Cf. Harnack,
Dogmeng. 1. 161, 220, for Gnostic Christology.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 263
tle Father: for all things are manifested by the Word..... The
Father therefore has revealed Himself to all by making His
Word visible to all: and conversely the Word showed to all the
Father and the Son, since He was seen by all. And therefore
the righteous judgment of God comes upon all who, though they
have seen as others, have not believed as others. For by means
of the creation itself the Word reveals God the Creator ; by means
of the world, the Lord who is the Fashioner of the world; and
by means of His handiwork (man), the Workman who formed it;
and by the Son, that Father who begat the Son.”?
(3) The Distinctions in the Nature of God, or the Media-
tion and Mediator.—It was by a natural process of deve-
lopment that Christian philosophers, while acquiescing
in the general proposition that Jesus Christ was the Logos
in human form, should go on to frame large theories as
to the nature of the Logos. It was an age of definition ,
and dialectic. It was no more possible for the mass of
educated men to leave a metaphysical problem untouched,
than it is possible in our own days for chemists to
leave a natural product unanalyzed. Two main questions
engaged attention: (i.) what was the genesis, (il.) what
was the nature, of the Logos. In the speculations which
rose out of each of these questions, the influence of Greek
thought is even more conspicuous than before.
(i.) The question of the genesis of the Logos was
mainly answered by theories which were separated from
one another by the same broad line of distinction which
separated theories as to the genesis of the world.
The philosophers of the school of Basilides, who, as
we have seen, had been the first to formulate the doctrine
of an absolute creation, that is, of a creation of all things
1 Tren. 4, 6. 3, 5, 6; cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. 2.
264 IX, GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
out of nothing, conceived that whatever in their theory
corresponded to the Logos was equally included with all
other things in the original seed. Hence came the defi-
nite proposition, which played a large part in the contro-
versies of the fourth century, that the Logos was made
‘out of the things that were not.”?!
But the majority of theories expressed under various
metaphors the idea, which was relative to the other theory
of creation, that in some way the Logos had come forth
from God. ‘The rival hypotheses as to the nature of
creation were reconciled by the hypothesis that, though
the world was created out of nothing, it was so created
by the Logos, who was not created by God, but came
forth from Him. The metaphors were chiefly those of
the “putting forth” (προβολή, prolatio), as of the leaves
or fruit of a plant, and of the begetting of a son. They
were in use before the doctrine of the Logos had esta-
blished itself, and some of them were originally relative,
not to the Logos, but to other conceptions of mediation
between God and the world. They were supplemented
by the metaphors, which also were in earlier use, of the
flowing of water from a spring, and of the radiation of
light.2, That there was not originally any important
distinction between them, is shown both by the express
disclaimer of Irenzeus and by the fact of their use in
combination in the same passages of the same writers.
The combination was important. The metaphors supple-
mented each other. Each of them contained an element
1 Cf. Hipp. 7. 21, 22; Schmid, Dogm. 52,
3 Tert. Apol. 51; Hipp. c. Noet. p. 62.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 265
in the theory which ultimately expressed the settled
judgment of the Christian world.
The main difficulty which they presented was that of
an apparent inconsistency with the belief in the unity
of God. The doctrine of the ‘“‘sole monarchy” of God,
which had been strongly maintained against those who
explained the difficulties of the world by the hypothesis
of two Gods in conflict, seemed to be running another
kind of danger in the very ranks of its defenders. The
Logos who reflected God and revealed Him to rational
creatures, who also contained in himself the form and
forces of the material world, must be in some sense God.
In Athenagoras there is a pure monism: ‘‘God is Him-
self all things to Himself, unapproachable light, a perfect
universe, spirit, force, Jogos.”! But in other writers the
idea of development or generation, however lightly the
metaphor might be pressed, seemed to involve an exist-
ence of the Logos both outside God and posterior to
Him.? He was the “first-born,” the “ first offspring of
God,” the “‘ first force after the Father of all and the Lord
God;” for ‘“‘as the beginning, before all created things,
God begat from Himself a kind of rational Force, which
is called by the Holy Spirit (i.e. the Old Testament)
sometimes ‘the Glory of the Lord,’ sometimes ‘Son,’
1 Leg. 16; cf. Clem. Al. Strom. 5. 1; cf. Theophilus, 2. 22, for
distinction of λόγος προφορικός as well as ἐνδιάθετος, denied by Clement
(loc. cit.), but repeated in Tert. adv. Prax. 5; cf. Hipp. c. Noet. 10.
See Zahn’s note in Ign. ad Magn. 8. 2, on προελθὼν in relation to
eternal generation.
2 Philo applied the phrase “Son of God” to the world: cf. Keim,
Celsus, 95.
266 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
sometimes ‘Wisdom,’ sometimes ‘ Angel,’ sometimes
‘God,’ sometimes ‘ Lord and Logos,’ sometimes he speaks
of himself as ‘Captain of the Lord’s host:’ for he has
all these appellations, both from his ministering to the
Father’s purpose and from his having been begotten by
the Father’s pleasure.”! It follows that ‘there is, and
is spoken of, another God and Lord beneath the Maker
of the universe.”? The theory thus formulated tended
to ditheism and was openly accused of it. It was saved
from the charge by the gradual formulating of two dis-
tinctions, both of which came from external philosophy,
one of them being an inheritance from Stoicism, the other
from Neo-Platonism.* The one was that the generation
or development had taken place within the sphere of
Deity itself: the generation had not taken place by the
severing of a part from the whole, as though the Divine
nature admitted of a division,® but by distinction ὁ
function or by multiplication, as many torches may be
1 Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. 61 A, cf. 62 E, προβληθὲν γέννημα ; and
Hipp. c. Noet. 8, 10, 16; Tatian, c. 5; Irenzeus ap. Schmid, p. 31.
2 Justin, Dial. ὁ, Tryph. 56 Ὁ; p. 180.
3 Hipp. 9. 12; Callistus, while excommunicating the Sabellians
(cf. Schmid, 48 ; Weing. 31), also called Hippolytus and his party
ditheists. For Callistus’ own view, cf. ibid. 9.11. See Schmid, p. 50 ;
also p. 45 for Praxeas ap. Tert.
4 The Gnostic controversies in regard to the relation to God of the
Powers who were intermediate between Him and the world, had helped
to forge such intellectual instruments.
5 Justin, c. Zryph.128: δυνάμει καὶ βουλῇ αὐτοῦ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ Kat ἀπο-
τομὴν ws ἀπομεριζομένης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ; cf. Plotinus ap. Harn.
Dogm. 493: κατὰ μερισμὸν οὐ κατ᾽ ἀποτομὴν in Tatian, 5, is different ;
ef. Hipp. c. Noet. 10.
IX GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 267
lit from one without diminishing the light of that one.!
The other was that the generation had been eternal. In
an early statement of the theory it was held that it had
taken place in time: it was argued that ‘‘ God could not
have been a Father before there was a Son, but there
was a time when there was not a Son.”? But the influ-
ence of the other metaphors in which the relation was
expressed overpowered the influences which came from
pressing the conception of paternity. Light, it was
argued, could never have been without its capacity to
shine.2 The Supreme Mind could never have been with-
out His Thought. The Father Eternal was always a
Father, the Son was always a Son.+*
(ii.) The question of the nature of the eternally-be-
gotten Logos was answered variously, according as the
supra-cosmie or the transcendental idea of God was domi-
nant in a writer’s mind.® To Justin Martyr, God is con-
1 Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. 61C, where the metaphor of ‘‘speech”
is also employed.
2 ap. Tert. c. Hermog. 3.
3 For metaphor of light, cf. Monoimus ap. Hipp. 8. 12; also Tatian,
6, 5.
4 There is uncertainty as to eternal generation in Justin; see Engel-
hardt, p. 118. It is not in Hippolytus, c. Moet. 10. Though implied
in Irenzeus (Harn. p. 495), it is in Origen that this solution attains
clear expression, e.g. de princ. 1. 2 ff., though his view is not through-
out steady and uniform. Emanation seemed to him to imply division
into parts. But he hovers between the Logos as thought and as
substance. For Clement and Origen in this connection, see Harnack,
pp. 579, 581.
5 God unchangeable in Himself comes into contact with human
affairs: τῇ προνοίᾳ καῖ TH οἰκονομίᾳ, c. Cels. 4.14. His Word changes
according to the nature of the individuals into whom he comes, 6. Cels,
4. 18.
268 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
ceived as supra-cosmic. He abides ‘‘in the places that
are above the heavens:” the “ first-begotten,” the Logos,
is the ‘‘first force after the Father:” he is “ἃ second
God, second numerically but not in will,” doing only
the Father’s pleasure. It is uncertain how far the idea
of personality entered into this view. There is a similar
uncertainty in the view of Theophilus, who introduced
the Stoical distinction between the two aspects of the
Logos, thought and speech—‘“ ratio” and “ oratio 3’?
while Tertullian still speaks of ‘“virtus” side by side
with these.
It was only gradually that the subject was raised to
the higher plane, from which it never afterwards de-
scended, by the spread and dominance of the transcen-
dental as distinguished from the supra-cosmic conception
of God. It came, as we have already seen, mainly from
the schools of Alexandria. It is in Basilides, in whom
thought advanced to the belief that God transcended not
merely phenomena but being, that the conception of a
quasi-physical influence emanating from Him is seen to
be first expressly abandoned.? But the place of the later
doctrine in the Christian Church is mainly due to Origen.
He uses many of the same expressions as Tertullian, but
with another meaning. The Saviour is God, not by par-
taking, but by essence. He is begotten of the very
essence of the Father. The generation is an outflow as
of ight from light.
1 Justin, Apol. i. 22. 23. 32, ὁ. Try. 56. 2 ad Autolye. ii. 22.
3 He held that side by side with God existed, nct ἐξουσία, but
οὐσία, φύσις, ὑπόστασις : see Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. 1.
4 Cf. Harnack, Dogmeng. p. 580,
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 269
But the controversies did not so much end with Origen
as begin with him. From that time they were mostly
internal to Christianity. But their elements were Greek
in origin. The conceptions which were introduced into
the sphere of Christian thought were the current ones of
philosophy. In Christian theology that philosophy has
survived. —
But although it would be beyond our present purpose
to describe the Christological controversies which fol-
lowed the final dominance in the Church of the tran-
scendental idea of God, it is within that purpose to point
out the Greek elements, confining ourselves as far as
possible to the later Greek uses of the terms.
Ousia (οὐσία) is used in at least three distinct senses:
the distinction is clearly phrased by Aristotle.?
(a) It is used as a synonym of hylé, to designate the
material part of athing. The use is most common among
the Stoics. In their monistic conception of the universe,
the visible world was regarded as the ousia of God.2 In
the same way Philo speaks of the blood as the material
vehicle, τὸ οὐσιῶδες, of the vital force. Hence in both
philosophical and Christian cosmologies, owséa was some-
1 οὐσία ἥ τε ὕλη Kat τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, Metaph. 6. 10,
p. 1095 α, ““οτἰδία is matter, form, and the compound of matter and
form.”
2 οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον Kat τὸν οὐρανὸν,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος, Diog. L. 7. 148: so in
M. Anton. e.g. 4, 40, ἕν ζῶον τὸν κόσμον μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν μίαν
ἐπέχον, paraphrased in the well-known lines of Pope:
“ All are but parts of one stupendous Whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.”
3 τῆς ζωτικῆς δυνάμεως, Quod det. pot. insid, 25, i. 209.
270 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
times used as interchangeable with hylé, to denote the
matter out of which the world was made.
(Ὁ) It is used of matter embodied in a certain form:
this has since been distinguished as the substantia concreta.
In Aristotle, a sensible material thing, a particular man
or a particular horse, which in a predication must always
be the subject and cannot be a predicate, is an owséa in
the strictest sense.?
(c) It is used of the common element in the classes
into which sensible material things may be grouped:
this has since been distinguished as the substantia ab-
stracta: in the language of Aristotle, it was the form
(εἶδος), or ideal essence (τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι).2 This sense branched
out into other senses, according as the term was used
by a realist or a nominalist: to the former it was the
common essence which exists in the individual members
of a class (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν), 5 and not outside them {since
ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὗ ἡ οὐσία): or which
exists outside them, and by participation in which they
are what they are: this latter is Plato’s conception of
εἶδος, and of its equivalent οὐσία.
To a nominalist, on the other hand, owséa is only the
1 οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη 1)
μήτε καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν᾽ οἷον
ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ 6 τὶς ἵππος, Categ. ὅ, p. 2a: but in the Metaphysics
a different point of view is taken, and the term πρώτη οὐσία is used in
the following sense, i.e. of the form, e.g. 6, 11, p. 1037.
2 Frequently in the Metaphysics, e.g. 6.7, p. 1032 ὃ, 7. 1, p. 1042 a.
3 Arist. Metaph. 6. 11, p. 10374.
4 Ibid. 12. 5, p. 1079 Ὁ.
> eg. Parmen. p. 132e: ov δ᾽ ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια 7, οὐκ
5 - ” oN \ >
€KEL/O EDTAL αὐτὸ TO ELCOS.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 271
common name which is predicable in the same sense to a
number of individual existences.!
The Platonic form of realism grew out of a distinction
between the real and the phenomenal, which in its turn
it tended to accentuate. The visible world of concrete
individuals was regarded as phenomenal and transitory:
tke invisible world of intelligible essences was real and
permanent: the one was genesis, or ‘becoming ;” the
other, ousia, or ‘‘being.”* The distinction played a large
part in the later history of Platonism :* and whereas in
the view of Aristotle the species, or smaller class, as being
nearer to the concrete individuals, was more ousta than
the genus, or wider class, in the later philosophy, on the
contrary, that was ousia in its highest sense which was
at the farthest remove from the concrete, and filled the
widest sphere, and contained the largest number of other
classes in itself: it was the swmmum genus. Hence
Plotinus says that in respect of the body we are farthest
from ousia, but that we partake of it in respect of our
soul; and our soul is itself a compound, not pure ousia,
but οὐδέ with an added difference, and hence not abso-
lutely under our control.®
1 οὐσία ἐστὶν ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ἀόριστον κατὰ πασῶν τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὴν
ὑποστάσεων ὁμοτίμως φερόμενον, καὶ συνωνύμως κατηγορούμενον,
Suidas, 8. v.
2 νρητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη... τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι" τὰ δὲ
ἐκείνων σώματα .... γένεσιν ἀντ᾽ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσι,
Plat. Sophist. p. 246.
3 e.g. it is stated by Celsus and adopted by Origen: Origen, c. Cels.
7. 45 sq.
4. ἡ οὐσία ἀνωτάτω οὖσα, τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸ αὐτῆς, γένος ἣν τὸ
γενικώτατον, Porphyr. Eisag. 2. 24.
6 σ Ν ε lal \ \ . lal ld x” ” 3 eee 7 Ν δὲ
εκάστος μεν ἡμῶν κατα, μεν TO σωμα πορρω ἂν €li) ουσιύς, κατα, O€
2742 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Of these two meanings of ouwsia, namely ‘ species”
and ‘‘genus,’’ the former expressing the whole essence
of a class-name or concept, the latter part of the essence,
the former tended to prevail in earlier, the latter in later
Greek philosophy. In the one, the knowledge of the
ousia was completely unfolded in the definition, so that
a definition was itself defined as ‘‘a proposition which
expresses the owsia:”} in the latter, it was only in part
so unfolded, so that it 1s necessary for us to know not
only the ousta of objects of thought, for example, whether
they fall within or without the class “‘body,” but also
the species (εἴδη).2
But in the one meaning as in the other, the members
of the same class, or the sub-classes of the same wider
class, were spoken of as homoousioi: for example, there
was an argument that animals should not be killed for
food, on the ground that they belong to the same class
as men, their souls being homoousioi with our own:? so
men are homoousiot with one another, and Abraham
washed the feet of the three strangers who came to
him, thinking them to be men “of like substance” with
himself.*
τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὃ μάλιστα ἐσμὲν, μετέχομεν οὐσίας, Kal ἐσμέν τις οὐσία.
τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν οἷον σύνθετόν τι ἐκ διαφορᾶς καὶ οὐσίας, οὔκουν κυρίως
οὐσία οὐδ᾽ αὐτοουσία᾽ διὸ οὐδὲ κύριοι τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, Plotin. πη.
Ὁ: 8.;12,
1 Arist. Anal. post. 2.3, p. 90 ; Top. ὅ. 2, ». 190; Metaph. 6. 4,
p. 1030 ὁ.
? Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. 3. 1. 2.
3 εἴ ye ὁμοούσιοι at τῶν ζῴων ψυχαὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις, Porphyr. de
Abstin. 1. 19. ᾿
4 robs πόδας ὡς ὁμοουσίων ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωποι ἔνιψαν, Clement.
Hom, 20. 7, p. 192,
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 273
The difficulty of the whole conception in its application
to God was felt and expressed. Some philosophers, as
we have already seen, denied that such an application
was possible. The tide of which Neo-Platonism was the
most prominent wave placed God beyond ousta. Origen
meets Celsus’s statement of that view by a recognition of
the uncertainty which flowed from the uncertain meaning
of the term.t The Christological controversies of the
fourth century were complicated to no small extent |
from the existence of a neutral and conservative party, |
who met the dogmatists on both sides with the assertion —
that neither owsza nor hypostasis was predicable of God.”
And, in spite of the acceptance of the Nicene formula,
the great Christian mystic who most fully represents Neo-
Platonism within the Christian Church, ventured more
than a century later on to recur to the position that God
has no ousta, but is hyperousios.? Even those who main-
tained the applicability of the term to God, denied the
possibility of defining it when so applied to Him. In this
they followed Philo: ‘‘ Those who do not know the ouséa
of their own soul, how shall they give an accurate account
of the soul of the universe ?’* But in spite of these diffi-
culties, the conservative feeling against the introduction
1 ¢. Cels. 6. 64.
2 eg¢.in 5. Athanas. ad Afr. episc. 4, vol. i. 714.
3 Dionys. Areop. de div. num. 5.
# Philo, Leg. Alleg. 1. 30, vol. i. 62; cf. de post. Cain. 8, vol. i. 229:
there is a remarkable Christian application of this in a dialogue between
a Christian and a Jew who was curious as to the Trinity, Hieronymi
Theologi Greeci, Dialogus de sancta Trinitate, in Gallandi, Vet. Patr.
Bibl. vol. vii., reprinted in Migne, Patrol. Gr. vol. xl. 845.
T
Lo
74 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
of metaphysical terms into theology, and the philosophical
doctrine of absolute transcendence, were overborne by the
practical necessity of declaring that He 7s, and by the
corollary that since He is, there must be an ous¢a of Him.
But when the conception of the one God as transcend-
ing numerical unity became dominant in the Christian
Church, the term homooustos (ὁμοούσιος) was not unnatu-
rally adopted to express the relation of God the Father
to God the Son. It accentuated the doctrine that the
Son was not a creature (κτίσμα); and so of the term as
applied to the Holy Spirit. Those who maintained that
the Holy Spirit was a creature, thereby maintained that
He was severed from the essence of the Father.! The
term occurs first in the sphere of Gnosticism, and expresses
part of one of the two great conceptions as to the origin
of the world. It was rejected in its application to the
world, but accepted within the sphere of Deity as an
account of the origin of His plurality. But homoousios,
though true, was insufficient. It expressed the unity,
but did not give sufficient definition to the conception of
the plurality. It was capable of being used by those
1 διῃρημένον ἐκ τῆς ὀυσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, Athan. ad Antioch, 3, vol. i.
5 Cf. Harnack, i. 191, 219, 476 sqq., 580. In the Valentinian
system, the spiritual existence which Achamoth brought forth was of
the same essence as herself, Iren. 1. 5. 1. In that of Basilides, the
three-fold sonship which was in the seed which God made, was κατὰ
πάντα τῷ οὐκ ὄντι θεῷ ὁμοούσιος, Hippolytus, 7. 22: so as regards
τὸ ἕν in Epiphanes (Valentinian ?), ap. Iven. 1. 11. 3 (Hipp. 6. 38),
it συνυπάρχει TH μονότητι as δύναμις ὁμοούσιος ἀυτῇ. Cf. Clem. Hom.
20.7; Iren. ap. Harn. 481, “ejusdem substantie ;” Tert. Apol. 21,
“ex unitate substantie ;” Harn. 488, 491.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 275
who held the plurality to be merely modal or phenome-
nal.1 It thus led to the use of another term, of which it
is necessary to trace the history.
The term ousia in most of its senses had come to be
convertible with two other terms, hypostasis (ὑπόστασις)
and hyparzis (ὕπαρξις). The latter of these played but a
small part in Christian theology, and may be disregarded
here.* The term hypostasis is the conjugate of the verb
ὑφιστάναι, which had come into use as a more emphatic
form than εἶναι. It followed almost all the senses of ousza.
Thus it was contrasted with phenomenal existence not
merely in the Platonic but in the conventional sense;
e.g. of things that take place in the sky, some are appear-
ances, some have a substantial existence, καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν.
It also, like owsza, is used of that which has an actual as
compared with a potential existence ;* also of that which
has an objective existence in the world, and not merely
exists in the thinking subject. Hence when things
came into being, οὐσία was said ὑφιστάναιι6 Moreover, in
one of its chief uses, namely that in which it designated
the permanent element in objects of thought, the term
1 Tt was expressly rejected at the Council of Antioch in connection
with Paul of Samosata ; and Basil, Zp. 9, says that Dionysius of Alex-
andria gave it up because of its use by the Sabellians: cf. Hp. 52 (300).
5 It is found, 6.5.» in Athan. ad Afr. epise. 4, vol. i. 714, ἡ yap
ὑπόστασις καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὑπαρξίς ἐστι. The distinction is found in Stoical
writers, e.g. Chrysippus says that the present time ὑπάρχει, the past
and future ὑφίστανται. Diels, Doxogr. Greeci. 462. 1.
3. Diels, ibid. 372 ; cf. 363, where it is contrasted with φαντασία.
+ Sext. Empir. p. 192, ἃ 226.
5 Diels, 318.
© Ib. 469. 20: so κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν, p. 462, 26.
T 2
270 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
ὀυσία had sometimes been replaced by the term ὑπέστασις,
When, therefore, the use of ousia in its Neo-Platonic
sense prevailed, there arose a tendency to differentiate
the two terms, and to designate that which in Aristotle
had been πρώτη οὐσία by the term ὑπόστασις, This is
expressed by Athanasius when he says: ‘‘ Ousia signifies
community,” while ‘‘hypostasis has property which is
not common to the hypostases of the same ousia ;’’? and
even more clearly by Basil.?
There was the more reason for the growth of the dis-
tinction, because the term. homoousios lent itself more
readily to a Sabellian Christology. This was anticipated
by Irenzeus in his polemic against the Valentinian heresy
of the emission of ons. Ouszaz, in the sense of genera
and species, might be merely conceptions in the mind:
the alternative was that of their having an existence of
their own.t So that hypostasis came in certain schools
1 Epict. 1. 14. 2.
2 Ath. Dial. de Trin. 2: ἡ οὐσία τὴν κοινότητα onpaive, while
ὑπόστασις ἰδιότητα ἔχει ἥτις οὐκ ἐστι κοινὴ τῶν τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας
ὑποστάσεων. He elsewhere identifies it with πρόσωπον in Ath. et
Cyril. in Expos. orthod. fid.: ὑπόστασίς ἐστιν οὐσία μετά τινων ἰδιω-
μάτων ἀριθμῷ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν διαφέρουσα τουτέστι πρόσωπον ὁμοούσιον.
Still the identity of the two terms was allowed even after they were
tending to be differentiated: cf. Athan. ad Afr. Ep. 4, vol. i. 714, ἡ δὲ
ὑπόστασις οὐσία ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαινόμενον ἔχει 7} αὐτὸ TO ὄν.
So ad Antioch, 6. (i. 617), he tolerates the view that there was only
one ὑπόστασις in the Godhead, on the ground that ὑπόστασις might
be regarded as synonymous with οὐσία. Cf. objection at Council of
Sardica, against three ὑποστάσεις in the Godhead, instead of one
ὑπόστασις, of Father, Son and Spirit.
8 Cf. Harn. Dogm. 693.
4 ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν, Sext. Empir. de Pyrrh. 2, 219,
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. QTE
of thought to be the term for the substantia concreta, the”
individual, the οὐσία ἄτομος of Galen.’ The distinction,
however, was far from being universally recognized. The
clearest and most elaborate exposition of it is contained
in a letter of Basil to his brother Gregory, who was evi-
dently not quite clear upon the point. The result was,
that just as ὑπόστασις had been used to express one of the’
senses of οὐσία, so a new term came into use to define’
more precisely the sense of ὑπόστασις, Its origin is pro-.
bably to be traced to the interchange of documents be-
tween East and West, which leading to a difficulty in
regard to this use of ὑπόστασις, ended in the introduction |
of a third term.
So long as οὐσία and ὑπόστασις had been convertible
terms, the one Latin word substantia, the etymological |
equivalent of ὑπόστασις, had sufficed for both. When the
two words became differentiated in Greek, it became
advisable to mark the difference. However, the word
essentia, the natural equivalent for οὐσία, jarred upon a
Latin ear.2 Consequently substantia was claimed for
οὐσία, While for ὑπόστασις a fresh equivalent had to be!
sought. This was found in persona, whose antecedents
may be those of ‘a character in a play,” or of “ person”
in the juristic sense, a possible party to a contract, in
which case Tertullian may have originated this usage.*
1 Ed. Kiihn, 5. 662. 2 Ep. 210; Harn. Dogm. 693.
3 Cf. Quintilian, who ascribes it in turn to Plautus and to Sergius
Flavius, 2. 14.2; 3. 6. 23; 8. 3. 33: Seneca, Hp. 58. 6, to Cicero,
and more recently Fabianus. For substantia, cf. Quint. 7. 2. 5, “nam
et substantia ejus sub oculos cadit.”
* Cf. Harnack, 489, 543 ; forits use by Sabellius, &., ib. 679 ; also
Orig. de prince. 1. 2, 8,
278 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
Such Western practice would tend to stimulate the em-
ployment of the corresponding Greek term πρόσωπον,
whose use hitherto seems to have been subordinate to
that of ὑπόστασις. And, finally, the philosophic terms
φύσις and natura came into use. In the second century
φύσις had been distinct from οὐσία and identical with
Reason.2 But in the fourth century it came to be iden-
tified with οὐσία,8 and afterwards again distinguished from
it, whereas the Monophysites identified it with ὑπόστασις.
To sum up, then. We have in Greek four terms, ὀυσία,
ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον, φύσις, and in Latin three, substantia,
persona, natura, the two series not being actually parallel
even to the extent to which they are so in appearance.
Times have changed since Tertullian’s* loose and vague
usage caused no remark; when Jerome, thinking as a
Latin, hesitates to speak of τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, by which he
understood tres substantias, and complains that he is
looked upon as a heretic in the East in consequence.
There is a remarkable saying of Athanasius which is
capable of a wider application than he gave it: it runs
1 Eg. Ath. et Cyr. in Expos. orth. fid., ὑπόστασις = πρόσωπον ὅμο-
οὐσιον. In Epictetus, 1. 2. 7, 14, 28, it denotes individuality of cha-
racter, that which distinguishes one man from another.
5. In Ath. ad. Ant. 7. 25, ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις is distinguished
from ὀυσία τῶν ὅλων : 50 7. 75, ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις ἐπὶ THY κοσμοποιΐαν
ὥρμησεν. For φύσις in Philo, see Leg. All. 3. 80 (i. 106).
8 Leontius of Byzantium says that both οὐσία and φύσις = εἶδος,
Pat. Grec. 1xxxvi. 1193.
4 E.g. adv. Prax. 2 (E.T. ii. 337), where he makes the distinctions
within the ceconomia of the Godhead to be gradu, forma, specie, with
a unity of substantia, status, potestas; ci. Bp. Kaye, in E. T. ii.
p- 407.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY, 279
as follows:! ‘“‘They seemed to be ignorant of the fact
that when we deal with words that require some training
to understand them, different people may take them in
senses not only differing but absolutely opposed to each
other.”2 Thus there was an indisposition to accept ovom.
The phrase was not understanded of the people.? A reac-
tion took place against the multiplicity of terms; but the
simple and unstudied language of the childhood of Chris-
tianity, with its awe-struck sense of the ineffable nature
of God, was but a fading memory, and on the other hand
the tendency to trust in and insist upon the results of
speculation was strong. Once indeed the Catholic doc-
trine was formulated, then, though not till then, the
majority began to deprecate investigations as to the
nature of God.
But I do not propose to dwell upon the sad and weary
history of the way in which for more than a century
these metaphysical distinctions formed the watechwords
of political as well as of ecclesiastical parties—of the
strife and murder, the devastation of fair fields, the flame
and sword, therewith connected. For all this, Greek
philosophy was not responsible. These evils mostly came
from that which has been a permanently disastrous fact
in Christian history, the interference of the State, which
gave the decrees of Councils that sanction which elevated
1 De Sententia Dionys. 18, quoted in Dict. of Christ. Biog. under
Homoousios,
* Thus the Roman Dionysius, in a fragment against the Sabellians
(Routh, Relig. 111. pp. 373, 374), objects to the division of the μοναρχία
into τρεῖς δυνάμεις τινὰς καὶ μεμερισμένας ὑποστάσεις Kal θειότητας
τρεῖς.
" ἀγνοούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν λαῶν, Athan. de Synod. 8 (i. 577).
280 IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
the resolutions of the majority upon the deepest subjects
of human speculation to the factitious rank of laws which
must be accepted on pain of forfeiture, banishment or
death.
Philosophy branched off from theology. It became
its handmaid and its rival. It postulated doctrines
instead of investigating them. It had to show their
reasonableness or to find reasons for them. And for
ages afterwards philosophy was dead. I feel as strongly
as you can feel the weariness of the discussions to which
I have tried to direct your attention. But it is only by
seeing how minute and how purely speculative they are,
that we can properly estimate their place in Christian
theology. Whether we do or do not accept the conclu-
sions in which the greater part of the Christian world
ultimately acquiesced, we must at least recognize that
they rest upon large assumptions. Three may be indi-
cated which are all due to the influence of Greek philo-
sophy.!
1 [As this summing up never underwent the author’s final revision,
and the notes which follow stand in his MS. parallel with the corre-
sponding portion of the Lecture as originally delivered, it has been
thought well to place them here.—Ep. |
(1) The tendency to abstract has combined with the tendency to
regard matter as evil or impure, in the production of a tendency to
form rather a negative than a positive conception of God. The majority
of formularies define God by negative terms, and yet they have claimed
for conceptions which are negative a positive value.
(2) We owe to Greek philosophy—to the hypothesis of the chasm
between spirit and matter—the tendency to interpose powers between
the Creator and His creation. It may be held that the attempt to
solve the insoluble problem, how God, who is pure spirit, made and
sustains us, has darkened the relations which it has attempted to
explain by introducing abstract metaphysical conceptions.
IX. GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 281
(1) It is assumed that metaphysical distinctions are
important.
I am far from saying that they are not: but it is not
less important to recognize that much of what we believe
rests upon this assumption that they are. There is other-
wise no justification whatever for drawing men’s thoughts
away from the positive knowledge which we may gain
both of ourselves and of the world around us, to contem-
plate, even at far distance, the conception of Essence.
(2) The second is the assumption that these metaphy-
sical distinctions which we make in our minds correspond
to realities in the world around us, or in God who is
beyond the world and within it.
Again, I am far from saying that they do not; but it
is at least important for us to recognize the fact that, in
speaking of the essence of either the world or God, we
are assuming the existence of something corresponding
to our conception of essence in the one or the other.1
(3) The third assumption is that the idea of perfection
which we transfer from ourselves to God, really corre-
sponds to the nature of His being.
It is assumed that rest is better than motion, that
passionlessness is better than feeling, that changelessness
is better than change. We know these things of our-
selves: we cannot know them of One who is unlike our-
selves, who has no body that can be tired, who has no
1 It may be noted that even in the later Greek philosophy there
was a view, apparently identical with that of Bishop Berkeley, that
matter or substance merely represented the sum of the qualities,
Origen, «de Princ. 4. 1. 84.
282 IX, GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
imperfection that can miss its aim, with whom unhindered
movement may conceivably be perfect life.
I have spoken of these assumptions because, although
it would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of
the conceptions by which Greek thought lifted men from
the conception of God as a Being with human form and
human passions, to the lofty height on which they can
feel around them an awful and infinite Presence, the time
may have come when—in face of the large knowledge of
His ways which has come to us through both thought
and research—we may be destined to transcend the as-
sumptions of Greek speculation by new assumptions,
which will lead us at once to a diviner knowledge and
the sense of a diviner life.
1 These Lectures are the history of a genesis: it would otherwise
have been interesting to show in how many points theories which have
been thought out in modern times revive theories of the remote past of
Christian antiquity.
LEcturE Χ.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES UPON
CHRISTIAN USAGES.
A. Tut Greek MyYsTERIES AND RELATED CULTS.
Srvz by side in Greece with the religion which was
openly professed and with the religious rites which were
practised in the temples, not in antagonism to them, but
intensifying their better elements and elaborating their
ritual, were the splendid rites which were known as the
Mysteries. Side by side also with the great political
communities, and sheltered within them by the common
law and drawn together by a stronger than political
brotherhood, were innumerable associations for the prac-
tice of the new forms of worship which came in with
foreign commerce, and for the expression in a common
worship of the religious feelings which the public religion
did not satisfy. These associations were known as θίασοι.
ἔρανοι OF ὀργεῶνες,
I will speak first of the mysteries, and then of the
associations for the practice of other cults.
1. The mysteries were probably the survival of the
oldest religions of the Greek races and of the races which
preceded them. They were the worship not of the gods
284 X. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
of the sky, Zeus and Apollo and Athene, but of the gods
of the earth and the under-world, the gods of the pro-
ductive forces of nature and of death.!
The most important of them were celebrated at Eleusis,
near Athens, and the scattered information which exists
about them has been made more impressive and more
| intelligible to us by excavations, which have brought to
light large remains of the great temple—the largest in
Greece—in which they were celebrated. It had been
a cult common to the Ionian tribes, probably borrowed
from the earlier races among whom they had settled.
It was originally the cult of the powers which produce
the harvest, conceived as a triad of divinities—a god
and two goddesses, Pluto, Demeter and Koré, of whom
the latter became so dominant in the worship, that the
god almost disappeared from view, and was replaced by
a divinity, Iacchus, who had no place in the original
myth.? Its chief elements were the initiation, the sacri-
fice, and the scenic representation of the great facts of
natural life and human life, of which the histories of
the gods were themselves symbols.®
1 For what follows, reference in general may be made to Keil,
Attische Culte aus Inschriften, Philologus, Bd. xxiii. 212—259, 592—
622: and Weingarten, Histcr. Zeitschrift, Bd. xlv. 1881, p. 441 sqq.,
as well as to the authorities cited in the notes.
2 Foucart, Le culte de Pluton dans la religion éleusinienne, Bulletin
de Correspondance Hellénique, 1883, pp. 401 sqq.
3 The successive stages or acts of initiation are variously described
and enumerated, but there were at least four: » 4@apo1s—the preparatory
purification ; ovcrac.s—the initiatory rites and sacrifices ; τελετὴ or
ponous—the prior initiation; and ἐποπτεία, the higher or greater
initiation, which admitted to the παράδοσις τῶν ἱερῶν, or holiest act of
the ritual. Cf. Lobeck, Aglaoph. pp. 39 tf.
UPON CIIRISTIAN USAGES. 255
(i.) The main underlying conception of initiation was,
that there were elements in human life from which the
candidate must purify himself before he could be fit to
approach God. There was a distinction between those
who were not purified, and those who, in consequence
of being purified, were admitted to a diviner life and
to the hope of a resurrection. The creation of this
distinction is itself remarkable. The race of mankind
was lifted on to a higher plane when it came to be
taught that only the pure in heart can see God. The
rites of Eleusis were originally confined to the inhabitants
of Attica: but they came in time to be open to all Greeks,
later to all Romans, and were open to women as well as
to men.! The bar at the entrance came to be only a
moral bar.
The whole ceremonial began with a solemn proclama-
tion: ‘Let no one enter whose hands are not clean and
whose tongue is not prudent.” In other mysteries it
was: “‘ He only may enter who ?s pure from all defile-
ment, and whose soul is conscious of no wrong, and who
has lived well and justly.’
The proclamation was probably accompanied by some
words or sights of terror. When Nero went to Eleusis
and thought at first of being initiated, he was deterred
by it. Here is another instance of exclusion, which is
not less important in its bearing upon Christian rites.
Apollonius of Tyana was excluded because he was a
1 An interesting inscription has recently come to light, which shows
that the public slaves of the city were initiated at the public expense. ~
Foucart, le. p. 394.
2 Cf. Origen, c. Cels. 3. 59,
286 X. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
magician (γόης) and not pure in respect of τὰ δαιμόνια----
he had intercourse with other divinities than those of
the mysteries, and practised magical rites.}
We learn something from the parody of the mysteries
in Lucian’s romance of the pseudo-prophet Alexander.
In it Alexander institutes a celebration of mysteries and
torchlights and sacred shows, which go on for three suc-
cessive days. On the first there is a proclamation of a
similar kind to that at Athens. ‘If any Atheist or
Christian or Epicurean has come as a spy upon the festi-
val, let him flee; let the initiation of those who believe
in the god go on successfully.”’ Then forthwith at the
very beginning a chasing away takes place. The prophet
himself sets the example, saying, “ Christians, away!”
and the whole crowd responds, ‘‘ Epicureans, away!”
Then the show begins—the birth of Apollo, the marriage
of Coronis, the coming of Adsculapius, are represented ;
the ceremonies proceed through several days in imitation
of the mysteries and in glorification of Alexander.?
The proclamation was thus intended to exclude notorious
sinners from the first or initial ceremonial. The rest was
1 Philostratus, Vita Apoll. 4. 18, p. 138. 2 Alex, 38.
3 Cf. Lobeck, Agkaoph. pp. 39 ff. and 89 ff.; Welcker, Griech. Gét-
terl. 11, 580—532. “The first and mogt important condition required
of those who would enter the temple at Lindus is that they be pure in
heart and not conscious of any crime.”—Professor W. M. Ramsay in
Ency. Brit. s.v. ‘ Mysteries.” For purification before admission to the
worship of a temple, see, in C.I.A. iii. Pt. i. 73. 74, instances of regu-
lation prescribed at the temple of Mén Tyrannus at Laurium in Attica,
6,5. μηθένα ἀκάθαρτον προσάγειν, various periods of purification being
specified. Cf. Reinach, Zraité d’Epigr. Grecque, p. 133, on the inser.
of Andania in Messenia, B.c. 91; the mysteries of the Cabiri in Le Bas
and Foucart, Inscr. du Peloponnese, ii. § 5, p. 161; and Sauppe, die
Mysterieninschr. von Andania.
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES. 287
thrown upon a man’s own conscience. He was asked
to confess his sins, or at least to confess the greatest
crime that he had ever committed. “ΤῸ whom am I to
confess it?” said Lysander to the mystagogoi who were
conducting him. ‘To the gods.” ‘Then if you will
go away,” said he, “1 will tell them.”
Confession was followed by a kind of baptism.1 The
candidates for initiation bathed in the pure waters of the
sea. The manner of bathing and the number of immersions
varied with the degree of guilt which they had confessed.
They came from the bath new men. It was a κάθαρσις,
a λουτρὸν, a laver of regeneration. They had to practise
certain forms of abstinence: they had to fast; and when
they ate they had to abstain from certain kinds of food.?
(11.) The purification was followed by a sacrifice—which
was known as σωτήρια----ὃι sacrifice of salvation: and in
addition to the great public sacrifice, each of the candi-
dates for initiation sacrificed a pig for himself. Then
1 Tertullian, de Baptismo, 5, “ Nam et sacris quibusdam per lava-
erum initiantur...ipsos etiam deos suos lavationibus efferunt;” Clem.
Alex. Strom. Bk. 5. 4: “The mysteries are not exhibited incontinently
to all, but only after certain purifications and previous instructions.”
Thid. 5.11: “Τὸ 15 not without reason that in the mysteries that obtain
among the Greeks, lustrations hold the first place, as also the laver among
the Barbarians. After these are the minor mysteries, which have some
foundation of instruction and of preliminary preparation for what is to
come after ; and the great mysteries, in which nothing remains to be
learned of the universe, but only to contemplate and comprehend nature
and things.” We have thus a sort of baptism and catechumenate.
2 The fast lasted nine days, and during it certain kinds of food were
wholly forbidden. Cf. Lobeck, Aglaoph. pp. 189—197.
8 There was a lesser and a greater initiation: “It is a regulation of
law that those who have been admitted to the lesser should again be
initiated into the greater mysteries.” Hippol. 5, 8: see the whole
chapter, as also cc. 9, 20.
288 X. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
there was an interval of two days before the more solemn
sacrifices and shows began. They began with a great
procession—each of those who were to be initiated
carrying a long lighted torch, and singing loud pans
in honour of the god.! It set out from Athens at sunrise
and reached Eleusis at night. The next day there was
another great sacrifice. Then followed three days and
nights in which the initiated shared the mourning of
Demeter for her daughter, and broke their fast only by
drinking the mystic κυκεὼν---ἃ drink of flour and water
and pounded mint, and by eating the sacred cakes.”
(iii.) And at night there were the mystic plays: the
scenic representation, the drama in symbol and for sight.
Their torches were extinguished: they stood outside
the temple in the silence and the darkness. The doors
opened—there was a blaze of light—and before them
was acted the drama of Demeter and Koré—-+he loss
of the daughter, the wanderings of the mother, the birth
of the child. It was a symbol of the earth passing
through its yearly periods. It was the poetry of Nature.
It was the drama which is acted every year, of summer
and winter and spring. Winter by winter the fruits
and flowers and grain die down into the darkness, and
spring after spring they come forth again to new life.
Winter after winter the sorrowing earth is seeking for
1 Cf. Clem. Alex. Protrept. 12: “Ὁ truly sacred mysteries! O
stainless light! My way is lighted with torches and I survey the
heavens and God: I am become holy whilst Iam initiated. The Lord
is the hierophant, and seals while illuminating him who is initiated,” &e.
Ib. 2: “Their (Demeter’s and Proserpine’s) wanderings, and seizure,
and grief, Eleusis celebrates by torchlight processions ;” and again p. 32.
So Aélius Aristid. i. p. 454 (ed. Canter), τὰς φωσφόρους νύκτας.
2 “T have fasted, I have drunk the cup,” &c. Clem, Alex. Protrept. 2.
UPON CERISTIAN USAGES. 289
her lost child; the hopes of men look forward to the new
blossoming of spring.
It was a drama also of human life. It was the poetry
of the hope of a world to come. Death gave place to
life. It was a purgatio anime, by which the soul
might be fit for the presence of God. Those who had
been baptized and initiated were lifted into a new life.
Death had no terrors for them. The blaze of light after
darkness, the symbolic scenery of the life of the gods,
were a foreshadowing of the life to come.1
There is a passage in Plutarch which so clearly shows
this, that I will quote it.?
“When a man dies, he is like those who are being initiated
into the mysteries. The one expression, reAevrav—the otzer,
τελεῖσθαι, correspond. ... Our whole life is but a succession of
wanderings, of painful courses, of long journeys by tortuous
ways without outlet. At the moment of quitting it, fears, terrors,
quiverings, mortal sweats, and a lethargic stupor, come over us
and overwhelm us; but as soon as we are out of it, pure spots
and meadows receive us, with voices and dances and the
solemnities of sacred words and holy sights. It is there thus
man, having become perfect and initiated—restored to liberty,
really master of himself—celebrates, crowned with myrtle, the
most august mysteries, holds converse with just and pure souls,
looking down upon the impure multitude of the profane or
uninitiated, sinking in the mire and mist beneath him—through
fear of death and through disbelief in the life to come, abiding
in its miseries.”
There was probably no dogmatic teaching—there
were possibly no words spoken—it was all an acted
1 Cf. Allius Aristid. 1, 454, on the burning of the temple at Eleusis.
The gain of the festival was not for this life only, but that hereafter
they would not lie in darkness and mire like the uninitiated.
2 Fragm. ap. Stob, Florileg. 120. Lenormant, Cont. Rev. Sept.
1880, p. 430.
U
290 X. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
parable. But it was all kept in silence. There was an
awful individuality about it. They saw the sight in com-
mon, but they saw it each man for himself. It was his
personal communion with the divine life. The glamour
and the glory of it were gone when it was published to
all the world.2, The effect of it was conceived to be a
change both of character and of relation to the gods.
The initiated were by virtue of their initiation made
partakers of a life to come. ‘Thrice happy they who
go to the world below having seen these mysteries: to
them alone is life there, to all others is misery.’’?
2. In time, however, new myths and new forms of
worship were added. It is not easy to draw a definite line
between the mysteries, strictly so called, and the forms of
worship which went on side by side with them. Not only
are they sometimes spoken of in common as mysteries, but
there is a remarkable syncretist painting in a non-Chris-
tian catacomb at Rome, in which the elements of the
Greek mysteries of Demeter are blended with those οὗ
Sabazius and Mithra, in a way which shows that the
worship was blended also.t These forms of worship
1 Synes. Orat. p. 48 (ed. Petav.), od μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ
διατεθῆναι γενομένους δηλονότι ἐπιτηδείους. But the μυσταγωγοὶ pos-
sibly gave some private instruction to the groups οὗ μύσται who were
committed to them.
2 Cf. Lenormant, Cont. Rev. Sept. 1880, p. 414 sq.
3 Soph. frag. 719, ed. Dind.: so in effect Pindar, frag. thren, 8 ;
Cic. Legg. 2.14. 36; Plato, Gorg. p. 493 B, Phedo. 69 C (the lot of the
uninitiated), They were bound to make their life on earth correspond
to their initiation ; see Lenormant, wt sup. p. 429 sqq. In later times
it was supposed actually to make them better; Sopatros in Walz,
Rhet. Gr. viii, 114.
4 See Garrucci, Les Mystéres du Syncretisme Phrygien dans les
Cutacombles Romaines de Pretextat, Paris, 1854.
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES. 291
also had an initiation: they also aimed at a pure religion.
. The condition of entrance was: ‘‘ Let no one enter the
most venerable assembly of the association unless he be
pure and pious and good.” Nor was it left to the
individual conscience: a man had to be tested and
examined by the officers.1 But the main element in
the association was not so much the initiation as the
sacrifice and the common meal which followed it. The
offerings were brought by individuals and offered in com-
mon: they were offered upon what is sometimes spoken
of as the “‘holy table.” They were distributed by the
servants (the deacons), and the offerer shared with the rest
in the distribution. In one association, at Xanthos in
Lycia, of which the rules remain on an inscription, the
offerer had the right to half of what he had brought.
The feast which followed was an effort after real fellow-
ship. There was in it, as there is in Christian times, a
sense of communion with one another in a communion
with God.
During the earliest centuries of Christianity, the
mysteries, and the religious societies which were akin
to the mysteries,’ existed on an enormous scale throughout
the eastern part of the Empire. There were elements
in some of them from which Christianity recoiled, and
against which the Christian Apologists use the language
1 There was a further and larger process before a man was τέλειος.
Tert. adv. Valent. c. 1, says that it took five years to become τέλειος.
2 'The most elaborate account is that of the Arval feast at Rome:
ci. Henzen, Acta fratrum Arvalium.
3 μύσται is used of members of a religious association at Teos
(Inser. in Bullet. de Corresp. Hellénique, 1880, p. 164), and of the
Roman Monarchians in Epiph. 55. 8; ef. Harnack, Dogm. 628.
uD
202 Χ, THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
of strong invective.! But, on the other hand, the majority
of them had the same aims as Christiani.y itselfi—the
aim of worshipping a pure God, the aim of living a pure
life, and the aim of cultivating the spirit of brotherhood.”
They were part of a great religious revival which distin-
guishes the age.®
B. Tur Mysteries AND THE CHURCH.
It was inevitable when a new group of associations
came to exist side by side with a large existing body
of associations, from which it was continually detaching
members, introducing them into its own midst with the
practices of their original societies impressed upon their
minds, that this new group should tend to assimilate,
with the assimilation of their members, some of the
elements of these existing groups.4 This is what we
1 Clem. Alex. Protrep. 2; Hippol. 1, prowm. Cf. Philo, de sacrif.
12 (ii. 260), τί yap εἰ καλὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὦ μύσται κ. τ. λ.
2 They also had the same sanction—the fear of fuéwre punishments,
cf. Celsus in Orig. 8. 48. Origen does not controvert this statement,
but appeals to the greater moral effect of Christianity as an argument
for its truth. They possibly also communicated divine knowledge.
There is an inscription of Dionysiac artists at Nysa, of the time of the
Antonines, in honour of one who was θεολόγος of the temples at
Pergamos, as θαυμαστὸν θεολόγον and τῶν ἀπορρήτων μύστην. Bull.
de Corr. Hellén. 1885, p. 124, 1. 4; ef. Porphyry in Eusebius, Prep.
Ev. 5. 14.
3 This revival had many forms, cf. Harnack, Dogm. p. 101.
4 Similar practices existed in the Church and in the new religions
which were growing up. Justin Martyr speaks of the way in which,
under the inspiration of demons, the supper had been imitated in the
Mithraic mysteries: ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Μίθρα μυστηρίοις παρεδωκαν
γίνεσθαι μιμησάμενοι οἱ πονηροὶ δαίμονες : Apol. 1. 66. Tertullian
points to the fact as an instance of the power of the devil (de presse.
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES. 293
find to have been in fact the case. It is possible that
they made the Christian associations more secret than
before. Up to a certain time there is no evidence that
Christianity had any secrets. It was preached openly
to the world. It guarded worship by imposing a moral
bar to admission. But its rites were simple and its
teaching was public. After a certain time all is changed:
mysteries have arisen in the once open and easily acces-
sible faith, and there are doctrines which must not be
declared in the hearing of the uninitiated.1_ But the in-
her. 40): “qui ipsas quoque res sacramentorum divinorum idolorum
mysteriis emulatur.” He specifies, inter alia, ‘‘ expositionem delictorum
de lavacro repromittit .... celebrat et panis oblationem.” Celsus, too,
speaks of the μυστήρια and the τελεταὶ of Mithras and others: Orig.
6. Cels. 6. 22.
1 The objection which Celsus makes (6. Cels. 1.1; Keim, p. 3) to the
secrecy of the Christian associations would hardly have held good in
the apostolic age. Origen admits (c. Cels. 1. 7) that there are exoteric
and esoteric doctrines in Christianity, and justifies it by (1) the philo-
sophies, (2) the mysteries. On the rise of this conception of Christian
teaching as something to be hidden from the mass, cf. the Valentinians
in Tert. c. Valent. 1, where there is a direct parallel drawn between
them and the mysteries: also the distinction of men into two classes—
πνευματικοὶ and ψυχικοὶ or tAvkoc—among the Guostics : Harn. Dogm.
222, cf. Hipp. 1, proewm, p. 4, who condemns τὰ ἀπόρρητα μυστήρια
of the heretics, adding, καὶ τότε δοκιμάσαντες δέσμιον εἶναι τῆς ἁμαρτίας
μυοῦσι τὸ τέλειον τῶν κακῶν παραδιδόντες, ὅρκοις δήσαντες μήτε ἐξειπεῖν
μήτε τῷ τυχόντι μεταδοῦναι κιτολ. Yet this very secrecy was naturalized
in the Church. Cf. Cyril Hier. Catech. vi. 30; Aug. in Psalm ciii., Hom.
xevi. in Joan. ; Theodoret, Quest. xv.in Num., and Dial. ii. Inconfusus) ;
Chry. Hom. xix. in Matt. Sozomen’s (1. 20. 3) reason for not giving
the Nicene Creed is significant alike as regards motive and language :
εὐσεβῶν δὲ φίλων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιστημόνων, ofa δὲ μύσταις καὶ
μυσταγωγοῖς μόνοις δέον τάδε λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν ὑφηγουμένων, ἐπήνεσα
τὴν βουλήν᾽ οὐ γὰρ ἀπεικὸς καὶ τῶν ἀμυήτων τινὰς τῇδε τῇ βίβλῳ
ἐντυχεῖν.
294 X. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
fluence of the mysteries, and of the religious cults which
were analogous to the mysteries, was not simply general ;
they modified in some important respects the Christian
sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist—the practice,
that is, of admission to the society by a symbolical puri-
fication, and the practice of expressing membership of
the society by a common meal. I will ask you to con-
sider first Baptism, and secondly the Lord’s Supper, each
in its simplest form, and then I will attempt to show
how the elements which are found in the later and not
in the earlier form, are elements which are found outside
Christianity in the institutions of which I have spoken.
1. Baptism. In the earliest times, (1) baptism followed
at once upon conversion; (2) the ritual was of the sim-
piest kind, nor does it appear that it needed any special
minister.
The first point is shown by the Acts of the Apostles ;
the men who repented at Pentecost, those who believed
when Philip preached in Samaria, the Ethiopian eunuch,
Cornelius, Lydia, the jailor at Philippi, the converts at
Corinth and Ephesus, were baptized as soon as they were
known to recognize Jesus Christ as the Messiah.1 The
second point is also shown by the Acts. It was a bap-
tism of water.
A later, though still very early stage, with significant
modifications, is seen in the ‘‘ Teaching of the Apostles:”’?
(1) no special minister of baptism is specified, the vague
‘Che that baptizeth” (ὁ βαπτίζων) seeming to exclude a
1 Acts ii. 38, 41; viii 12, 13, 36, 38; x. 47, 48; xvi 15, 33;
Xvill, 8; xix. 3,
=
2 ¢
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES. 295
limitation of it to an officer; (2) the only element that
is specified is water; (3) previous instruction is implied,
but there is no period of catechumenate defined; (4) a
fast is enjoined before baptism.
These were the simple elements of early Christian
baptism. When it emerges after a period of obscurity—
like a river which flows under the sand—the enormous
changes of later times have already begun.
(i.) The first point of change is the change of name.
(a) So early as the time of Justin Martyr we find a
name given to baptism which comes straight from the
Greek mysteries—the name “ enlightenment” (φωτισμός,
φωτίζεσθαι).1 It came to be the constant technical term.”
(Ὁ) The name “seal” (σφραγίς), which also came both
from the mysteries? and from some forms of foreign cult,
was used partly of those who had passed the tests and
who were “‘consignati,” as Tertullian calls them,* partly
of those who were actually sealed upon the forehead in
sign of a new ownership.®
1 Apol. 1. 61; cf. Otto, vol. 1. p. 146, n. 14; Engelhardt, p. 102.
2 Clem. Alex. Pedag. 1. 6; Can. Laod. 47, Bruns, p. 78; Greg.
Naz. Orat. xl. pp. 638, 639. Hence of φωτιζόμενοι -- those being pre-
pared for baptism, of φωτισθέντες = the baptized. Cf. Cyr. Hier.
‘Catech. 13. 21, p. 193 et passim.
8 Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 36, cf. 31 fff.
* Apol. 8: talia initiatus et consignatus = μεμυημένος καὶ eoppayis=
μένος. See Otto, vol. 1. p. 141; ef. ad Valent. 1.
5 For the seal in baptism, cf. Clem. Al. Strom. 2. 3; Quis dives,
42, ap. Euseb. Hist. 3. 23; Euseb. Vita Const. 1. 4. 62; Cyr. Hier.
Catech. 5; Greg. Naz. Orat. 40, p. 639; Orig. 6. Cels. 6.27. For the
use of imagery and the terms relating to sealing—illumination—initia-
tion—from the mysteries, Clem. Al. Protrep. 12. The effect of baptism
4s illumination, perfection, Pwdag. 1.6; hence sins before and after
300 Σ. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
(9) The term μυστήριον is applied to baptism,! and with
it comes a whole series of technical terms unknown to
the Apostolic Church, but well known to the mysteries,
and explicable only through ideas and usages peculiar to
them. Thus we have words expressive either of the rite
or act of initiation, like μύησις,2 τελετή, τελείωσις, μυστα-
ywyia :ὅ of the agent or minister, like μυσταγωγός : of the
subject, like pucraywyouvpevos,’ μεμυημένος, μυηθείς, or, with
reference to the unbaptized, ἀμύητος. δ In this terminology
we can more easily trace the influence of the mysteries
than of the New Testament.®
(11.) The second point is the change of time, which
involves a change of conception. (a) Instead of baptism
being given immediately upon conversion, it came to be
in all cases postponed by a long period of preparation,
baptism, i.e. enlightenment, are different, Strom. 2.13. Early instances
of σφραγὶς are collected in Gebhardt on 2 Clem. pp. 168, 169; cf. als»
Cyr. Hier. Catech. 18. 33, p. 301.
1 Greg. Naz. Orat. 39, p. 632; Chrys. Hom. 85 in Joan. xix. 84:
Sozomen, ii. 8, 6.
2 Sozomen, i. 3. 5. 3 Dion. Areop. Eccles, Hierar. 3, p. 242.
4 Clem. Alex. Pedag. 1. 6, p. 93; Athan. Cont. Ar. 3, p. 413C.;
Greg. Naz. Orat. 40, p. 648; Dion. Areop. Eccles. Hier. 3, 242,
5 Chrys. Hom. 99, vol. v.; Theod. in Cantic. 1.
6 Dion. Areop. Eccles. Hier. 1..1; Mys. Theol. 1. 1.
7 Chrys. Hom. 1 in Act. p. 615; Hom. 21 ad popul. Antioch;
Sozomen, ii. 17. 9.
8 Sozomen, i. 3.5; ii. 7.8; iv. 20.3; vi. 38.15; vii. 8. 7, et passim.
These examples do not by any means exhaust or even adequately repre-
sent the obligations in the sphere of language, and of the ideas it at
once denotes and connotes, which the ecclesiastical theory and practice
of baptism lies under to the mysteries; but they may help to indicate
the degree and nature of the obligation,
® For the sphere of the influence of the mysteries on the language
and imagery of the New Testament, see 1 Cor. ii. 6 ff.; ef. Heb. vi 4.
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES, 297
and in some cases deferred until the end of life.! (0) The
Christians were separated. into two classes, those who
had and those who had not been baptized. Tertullian
regards it as a mark of heretics that they have not this
distinction: who among them is a catechumen, who a
believer, is uncertain: they are no sooner hearers than
they “‘join in the prayers;” and ‘their catechumens
are perfect before they are fully instructed (edocti).”?
And Basil gives the custom of the mysteries as a reason
for the absence of the catechumens from the service.®
(c) As if to show conclusively that the change was due
to the influence of the mysteries, baptized persons were,
as we have seen, distinguished from unbaptized by the
very term which was in use for the similar distinction in
regard to the mysteries—initiated and uninitiated, and
the minister is μυσταγωγός, and the persons being baptized
are μυσταγωγούμενοι. I dwell upon these broad features,
and especially on the transference of names, because it
is necessary to show that the relation of the mysteries
to the sacrament was not merely a curious coincidence ;
and what I have said as to the change of name and the
change of conception, might be largely supplemented
by evidence of parallelism in the benefits which were con-
1 Apost. Const. 8. 32. Cf. passages quoted from Clem. Alex. and
others, supra, p. 287, note 1; p. 295, notes 2 and 5. See Bingham,
vol, iii. pp. 443—446.
2 De presc. her. 41. Cf. Epiphan. 41. 3; Apost. Const. ὃ. 12.
3 ἃ οὐδὲ ἐποπτεύειν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἀμυήτοις, de Spir. Sanct. 27; οἵ. Orig.
6. Cels. 3. 59 ad fin. and 60, e.g. ‘then and not before do we invite
them to participation in our mysteries,” and “initiating those already
purified into the sacred mysteries.” Cf. Dict. Christian Antiquities,
8.v. Disciplina Arcant.
298 xX. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
ceived to attach to the one and the other. There are
many slighter indications serving to supplement what has
been already adduced.
(a) As those who were admitted to the inner sights
of the mysteries had a formula or pass-word (σύμβολον
or σύνθημα), so the catechumens had a formula which
was only entrusted to them in the last days of their
catechumenate—the baptismal formula itself and the
Lord’s Prayer.! In the Western rites the traditio symboli
occupies an important place in the whole ceremony.
There was a special rite for it. It took place a week or
ten days before the great office of Baptism on Easter-eve.
Otherwise the Lord’s Prayer and the Creed were kept
secret and kept so as mysteries; and to the present day
the technical name for a creed is σύμβολον or pass-word.
(8) Sometimes the baptized received the communion
at once after baptism, just as those who had been initiated
at Eleusis proceeded at once—after a day’s fast—to
drink of the mystic κυκεὼν and to eat of the sacred cakes.
(y) The baptized were sometimes crowned with a
garland, as the initiated wore a mystic crown at Eleusis.
The usage was local, but lasted at Alexandria until
modern times. It is mentioned by Vansleb.?
(δ) Just as the divinities watched the initiation from
out of the blaze of light, so Chrysostom pictures Christian
baptism in the blaze of Easter-eve ;? and Cyril describes
1 See p. 293, note 1; also Dict. Christian Antiquities, s.vv. Baptism,
Catechumens, especially p. 318, and Creed.
2 Histoire de l’église d’ Alexandrie, p. 12: Paris, 1677.
3 De baptismo Christi, 4. ii. 374, τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρόντος, τῶν ἀγγέλων
παρεστώτων, τῆς φρικτῆς ταύτης τραπέζης προκειμένης, τῶν ἀδελφῶν gov
μυσταγωγουμένων ἔτι. Cyril, Prefatio ad Catech, 15,
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES. 299
the white-robed band of the baptized approaching the
doors of the church where the lights turned darkness
into day.
(ε) Baptism was administered, not at any place or
time, but only in the great churches, and only as a
rule once a year—on Easter-eve, though Pentecost was
also a recognized season. ‘The primitive ‘‘See here is
water, what doth hinder me to be baptized?” passed
into a ritual which at every turn recalls the ritual of the
mysteries. I will abridge the account which is given of
the practice at Rome so late as the ninth century.! Pre-
paration went on through the greater part of Lent. The
candidates were examined and tested: they fasted: they
received the secret symbols, the Creed and the Lord’s
Prayer. On Easter-eve, as the day declined towards
afternoon, they assembled in the church of St. John
Lateran. The rites of exorcism and renunciation were
gone through in solemn form, and the rituals survive.
The Pope and his priests come forth in their sacred vest-
ments, with lights carried in front of them, which the
Pope then blesses: there is a reading of lessons and a
singing of psalms. And then, while they chant a litany,
there is a procession to the great bath of baptism, and the
water is blessed. The baptized come forth from the water,
are signed with the cross, and are presented to the Pope
one by one, who vests them in a white robe and signs
their foreheads again with the cross. They are arranged
in a great circle, and each of them carries a light. Then
a vast array of lights is kindled; the blaze of them, says
a Greek Father, makes night continuous with dawn. It
1 Mabillon, Com. prev. ad. ord. Rom.; Museum Ital. 11. xcix,
800 X THE INFILUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
is the beginning of a new life. The mass is celebrated—
the mystic offering on the Cross is represented in figure;
but for the newly baptized the chalice is filled, not with
wine, but with milk and honey, that they may understand,
says an old writer, that they have entered already upon
the promised land. And there was one more symbolical
rite in that early Easter sacrament, the mention of which
is often suppressed—a lamb was offered on the altar—
afterwards cakes in the shape of a lamb.! It was simply
the ritual which we have seen already in the mysteries.
The purified crowd at Eleusis saw a blaze of light, and
in the light were represented in symbol life and death
and resurrection.
2. Baptism had felt the spell of the Greek ritual:
not less so had the Lord’s Supper. Its elements in the
earliest times may be gathered altogether apart from the
passages of the New Testament, upon which, however
clearly we may feel, no sensible man will found an argu-
ment, and which, taken by themselves, possibly admit of
more than one meaning.
The extra-biblical accounts are:
(1) ‘The Teaching of the Apostles ;”? which implies :
(a) Thanksgiving for the wine. ‘‘ We thank Thee, our
Father, for the holy vine of David Thy servant, which
Thou hast made known to us through Jesus Christ Thy
Servant. ΤῸ Thee be glory for ever.”
(0) Thanksgiving for the broken bread. ‘ We thank
Thee, our Father, for the life which Thou hast made
1 Tt was one of the points to which the Greeks objected in the dis-
russions of the ninth century,
5. Ὁ. 9,
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES. 301
known to us through Jesus Thy Servant. To Thee be
glory for ever.”
After the thanksgiving they ate and drank: none
could eat or drink until he had been baptized into the
name of the Lord. After the partaking there was
another thanksgiving and a prayer of supplication.
(2) There is a fragmentary account which has been
singularly overlooked, in the Apostolical Constitutions,!
which carries us one stage further. After the reading
and the teaching, the deacon made a proclamation which
vividly recalls the proclamation at the beginning of the
Mysteries. ‘Is there any one who has a quarrel with
any? Is there any one with bad feeling” (ἐν ὑποκρίσει) ?
(3) The next stage is found in the same book of the
Apostolical Constitutions.2_ The advance consists in the
fact that the catechumens and penitents go out, just as
those who were not yet initiated and those who were
impure were excluded from the Greek Mysteries.
This marked separation of the catechumens and the
baptized, which was possibly strengthened by the philo-
sophic distinction between of προκόπτοντες and of τελειοι,
lasted until, under influences which it would be beyond
our present purpose to discuss, the prevalence of infant
baptism caused the distinction no longer to exist.3
1 Bk. ii. 57, p. 87; cf. viii. 5, p. 239, lines 18, 19,
2 vill. 11. 12, p. 248.
° Origen, 6. Cels. 3.59. Persons who have partaken of the Eucha-
vist are of τελεσθέντες (Chrys. de compunct. ad Demet. 1. 6. i. p. 132),
and of μεμυημένοι (id. Hom. vi. de beat. Phil. c. ὃ. 1. p. 498, and in
Ep. ad Hebr. cap. x., Hom. xvii. 4, vol. xii. 169). Degrees and
distinctions came to be recognized within the circle of the very initiated
themselves, Aposé. Const. vii. 44, vili. 13.
802 X. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
(4) In a later stage there is a mention of the holy
table as an altar, and of the offerings placed upon the
table of which the faithful partook, as mysteries.1
(a) The conception of the table as an altar is later
than the middle of the second century.? It is used in
the Apostolic Fathers of the Jewish altar. It is used
by Ignatius in a Christian sense, but always meta-
phorically.* It may be noted that though the Apostolic
Constitutions (Bk. 11.) speak of a θυσία, they do not speak
of a θυσιαστήριον This use of θυσιαστήριον is probably
not earlier than Eusebius.®
(2) The conception of the elements as μυστήρια is even
later ;® but once established, it became permanent, like
the Latin term “ sacramentum.”
1 The earlier offerings were those of Ireneus, 4. 17. 5, where he
speaks of Christ ‘suis discipulis dans consilium, primitias Deo offerre
ex suis creaturis ;” and again the Church offers “ primitias suorum
munerum in Novo Testamento ei qui alimenta nobis prestat.” The
table in the heathen temple was important; upon it were placed the
offerings: Th. Homolle in Bulletin de Corresp. Hellén. 1881, p. 118.
For the Eucharist itself as a mystery, cf. φρικωδεστάτη τελετὴ, Chrys.
de sacerdot, 3, 4, vol. i. 382. He argues for silence on the ground
that they are mysteries, de bapt. Christ. 4. ii, 375. Cf. Greg. Naz.
Orat. 44, p. 713; Conc. Laod. 7, Bruns, p. 74.
2 Found in Chrys. e.g. Hom. in Ep. ii. ad Corinth. v. ο. 3, vol. x.
470: τοιαύτῃ τὸ θυσιαστήριον ἐκεῖνο φοινίσσεται σφαγῇ.
3 Ad Ephes. 5; see Lightfoot’s note. Cf. Ζγαῖϊ. 7; Philad. 4;
Mag. 7; Rom. 2.
4 Ap. Const. ii. 57, p. 88. But see for θυσιμστήριον in a highly
figurative sense, iii. 6, iv. 3.
5 H. E. x. 4, 44.
° Isid. Pelus, Hpist. 3. 340, p. 390, προσῆλθε μὲν τῷ σεπτῷ θυσιασ-
τηρίῳ τῶν θείων μυστηρίων μεταληψόμενος ; also 4. 181, p. 516, τὰ
θεῖα μὴ δι) σθαι μυστήρια. Cf. Chrys. de comp. ad Demet. 1. 6, vol. i.
UPON CHRISTIAN USAGES. 303
(5) The conception of a priest—into which I will not
now enter—was certainly strengthened by the mysteries
and associations.
The full development or translation of the idea is
found in the great mystical writer of the end of the fifth
century, In whom every Christian ordinance is expressed
in terms which are applicable only to the mysteries. The
extreme tendency which he shows is perhaps personal to
him; but he was in sympathy with his time, and his
influence on the Church of the after-time must count
for a large factor in the history of Christian thought.
There are few Catholic treatises on the Eucharist and few
Catholic manuals of devotion into which his conceptions
do not enter.!
1 will here quote his description of the Communion
itself: ‘All the other initiations are incomplete without
this. The consummation and crown of all the rest is
p. 131; Theodoret, dial. 2, vol. iv. 125. There was a sacred formula.
Basil says that no saint has written down the formula of consecration :
de Spir. Sancto, 66, vol. iv. pp. 54, 55. After saying that some doc-
trines and usages of the Church have come down in writing, ra δὲ ἐκ
τῆς τῶν ἀποστόλων παραδόσεως διαδοθέντα ἡμῖν ἐν μυστηρίῳ παρεδεξά-
μεθα, he instances the words of the Eucharistic invocation as among
the latter ; τὰ τῆς ἐπικλήσεως ῥήματα ἐπὶ τῇ ἀναδείξει τοῦ ἄρτου τῆς
ἐυχαριστίας καὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου τῆς ἐυλογίας τίς τῶν ἁγίων ἐγγράφως
ἡμῖν καταλέλοιπεν.
1 In Dionysius Areop. (5. ν. ἱεράρχης, ed. Corderius, i. 839), the
bishops are τελεσταί, ἱεροτελεσταί, τελεστάρχαι, μυσταγωγοί, τελεσ-
τουργοί, τελεστικοί; the priests are φωτιστικοί ; the deacons, καθαρ-
τικοί ; the Eucharist is ἱεροτελεστικωτάτη (c. 4). The deacon, ἀποκα-
θαίρει τοὺς ἀτελέστους (c. 5, ὃ ὃ, p. 233), ie. dips them in the water ;
the priest, φωταγωγεῖ τοὺς καθαρθέντας, i.e. leads the baptized by the
hand into the church; the bishop, ἀποτελειοῖ τοὺς τῷ θείῳ φωτὶ
κεκοινωνηκότας.
904 X. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERIES
the participation of him who is initiated in the thearchic
mysteries. For though it be the common characteristic
of all the hierarchic acts to make the initiated partakers
of the divine light, yet this alone imparted to me the
vision through whose mystic light, as it were, I am
guided to the contemplation (ἐποψίαν) of the other sacred
things.” The ritual is then described. The sacred bread
and the cup of blessing are placed upon the altar. ‘‘ Then
the sacred hierarch (.
Plutarch, 6; quoted for transcendence,
242; immortality through “initiation,”
289.
Poetry, its place in the Greek mind, 51 ff.
Political analogies in the Church, 331.
Preaching and ‘‘prophesying,” 105 ff.; of
composite origin, 107—109; the “ho-
mily,” 109—113.
Prophecy and divination, 72, 73; and
apologetic, 74; died with formation of
Catholic Church, 107.
πρόσωπον, how used, 278, especially n.?:
see hypostasis.
Ptolemzeus, on God’s transcendence, 251 ;
his idea of ‘‘ Mons,” 258 fin., 259.
Puritanism in early Church, 347, 348.
Pythagoreanism and Christianity, 81, 129.
Religion, its political aspect to the Roman,
21; connected with usage (νόμος), 21, n.
Revelation and metaphysics, 187, 138.
Rhetoric, Greek, 87, 88.
* Rule of Faith:” see Faith.
σοφός, its later usage, 26.
Sophistic, its genesis, 87, 88; mainly on
lines of the older Rhetoric, 88—90;
popularized in διαλέξεις, 91; and itine-
rant, 92—94; manner of discourse, 94—
97; its rewards, 97, 98; and airs, 99.
Objections, 99—101; reaction led by
Stoics like Epictetus, 101—105.
Speculation, its true place in Christianity,
332, 333.
State, its interference with doctrine, 279 f.
345—347,
Stoicism: its view of substance, 19, n.;
and the moral reformation, 141 ff.; its
ethies in Ambrose, 169; ethical affini-
ties with Christianity, 238; demons,
246.
Substantia at first = hypostasis, then
ousia, 277, cf. 218.
309
Supper, the Lord’s: extra-biblical deve-
lopments, 300 ff. ; in Didaché, 300, 301;
Apost. Const. Bks. ii. and viii., 301;
the “altar,” its “‘mysteries,” the sacred
formula, 302 and n.§; “priest,” 303;
culmination in Dionysius, 303, 304;
realism first among Gnostics, 808, 309.
Symbola traditio, 298: cf. contesseratio,
944,
σφραγίς, of baptism, 295,
Tatian: his view of creation, 196; free-
will, 231; on genesis of Logos, 266,
n. and n.5, 267, n.3.
Teaching profession, 37 ff.; endowed, 38 ;
excused public burdens, 39.
τελετή, τελεῖσθαι : see initiation, cf. 296.
Tertullian, 8; his Stoic view of substance,
19, n., 20, n., cf. 254; on Christianity
and philosophy, 126, 127; the Conser-
vatives, 191, 257, n.1; on creation,
197; on God as just and good, 229;
on free-will, 232; transcendence in him
supra-cosmic, 254 ; genesis of the Logos,
265, n.1; nature of the Logos, 268;
on ecclesiastical tradition and specula-
tion, 322.
Theodore of Mopsuestia as exegete, 82.
Theophilus on creation, 196; God’s tran-
scendence, 253; on genesis of Logos,
265, n.1, cf. 268.
Transcendence, as of absolute Unity, Being,
Mind, 240; in Plutarch and Maximus,
242; Plotinus, 243; its two forms, 244 ;
Philo, 244, 245. Absent from earliest
Christian teaching, 251 f.; appears in
Apologists, 252, 253 ; Gnostics, 254 f. ;
Alexandrines, 255 f.; mediation of,
256 ff., especially 257, n. 3,
Unction of (1) exorcism, (2) thanksgiving,
307, 308, especially n.4.
φύσις (=natura), later use = ousia, 278 ;
sometimes = hypostasis, 1b.
φωτισμός, of baptism, 295.
Writing as mysterious, 50.
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