s>/->.X ^7i. 7^ 6?, O) "-^'i V^^i^^t lO/^^ri^ t-^^f^^ p \ ^ . \ Ip (fja.lk0 % A careful and ftridl ENQUIRY INTO The 77todern prevailing Notions OF THAT FREEDOM of WILL, Which is fuppofed to be eflential T O Moral Agency^ T^ertue and VicCj Reward "^xi^ Punijhment^ Praife .and Blame. ByJONATHANEDWARDSjA.M. Pallor of the Church in Stsckbridge, Rom* ix. 16. // is not cf him that willeth — — B CIS TO N, N. E. Printed axid Sold hj S. Kt/Teland, m Qiieen-flreety, Mdccliv, THE PREFACE. ???|gANY find much Fault with the callinp: S!2P 'i^Pp profeffing Chriftians, that differ one from W^^^^^ another in ibme Matters of Opinion, by ItmiSIM^ ^^^'^nd: Names-, efpecially calling them by m^i^illMI ^^^- Names of particular Men, who have didinguifhed themfelves as Maintainers and Promoters of thofe Opinions : as the calling fome pro- telling Chriilians Jrminians, from ArminiUs ; others Ari- ans, trom Arius ; others Socinians, from SocinuSy and the like. They think it unjufl in it felf -, as it feems to fdp- pofe and fuggeft, that the Perfons mark'd out by thefe Names, received thofe Do6trines which they entertain, out of Regard to, and Reliance on thofe Men after whom they are named ; as tho' they made them their Rule : in the fame Manner, as the Followers of Christ are called Chriftians \ after his Name, whom they regard & depend upon,^ as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjud and groundlefs Imputation on thofe that go un- der the foremention'd Denominations, Thus (fay they) there is not the lead Ground to fuppofe, that the chief Divines, who embrace' the Scheme of Dodrine which is by many called Arminianifm, believe it the more becaufe Anninius believed it : and that there is no Reafon to think any other, than that they fincerely and impartially ftudy the holy Scriptures, and enquire after the Mind of Chrift, with as much Judgment and Sincerity, as any ol thole that call them by thcfe Names j that they feek after Truth, and are not careful whether they think ex- aaiy ^sArminius^id ; yea, that in fome Things they adualiy differ from him. This Pradice is alfo elteemed A 2 actually n The P R E F ^ C E. adlnally injurious on this Account, that it is fuppofed na- turally ro lead the Multitude to imagine theDifference be- tween Perfons thus named & others,to be greater than it is •, ^a, as tho' it were lb great, that they muft be as it were, another Species of Beings. And they objedl againflic' as arifing from an uncharitable, narrow,conTradled Spirit ; which, they fay, qommonly inclines Perfons to confine all thax is good to themfelves and their own Party, and to make a wide Diftinction between themfelves and \ others, and ftigmatize thofe that differ from them with ' odious Names. They fay moreover, thac the keeping up fuch a Diitindlion of Najnes has a diredt Tendency to uphold Diliance 3c Difaffedion, and keep alive mutual Hatred among Chriftians, who ought all to be united in \ Friendfhip and Charity, however they can't in allThings j think alike. i I confefs, thefe Things are very plaufible. And I will ' not deny, that there are fome unhappy Confcquences of j this Diftinvflion of Narnes^ and that Men's Infirmities and i evil Difpofitions oFten make an ill In-iprovement of it. ^ But yet I humbly conceive, thefe Objections are carried < far beyond Reafon.- The Generality of Mankind are J difpofed enough, and a great Deal too much, to Uncha- ; ritablenefs, and to be cenforious and binter towards thefe i thac differ from them in religious Opinions : which evil \ Temper of Mind will take Occafion to exerc it felf, from • many Things in themfelves innocent, ufeful & necelfiry. \ hut yet there is no NeceiTuy to fuppofe, that the thus j didingulfhing Perfons of different Opinions by different j Names, arifes mainly from an uncharitable Spirit. Ic i niay arife from the Difpofition there is in Mankind ^ (whom God has dillinguifhed with an Ability and In- § clination for S})eech) to improve the Benefit of Language, .' in the proper Ufe and Defign of Nanies, given to I'hings \ which they have often Occafion to fpeak of, or fignify i their Minds about ; v-'hich is to enable them to exprefs ^ their Ideas with Eafe and Expedition, v^ithout being in- j cumber'd v/ith an ohfcure and diiiicuk Circumlocution. ' j\nd the thus di(l:inr^uin"iint^ Pcrf-^^ns ofdifi-crenc Opinions ! ^ '• " " hi] i:\ic P R E F A C E. Ill in religious Matters, may not imply, nor infer any more than that there is a Difference, and that the Difference is fuch as we find we have often Occafion to take Notice of, and make Mention of. That which we have frequent Occafion to fpeak of ('whatever it be„ that gives the Oc- cafion) this wants a Name : and 'tis always a. Defe<5t in Language, in fuch Cafes, to be obliged to make ufe of a Defcription, inftead of a Name. Thus we have often Occafion to fpeak of thofe who are the Defcendants of rhe ancient Inhabitants of France^ who were Subjeds or Heads of the Government of that Land, and fpake the Language peculiar to it ; in Diftindion from the Dc- fce^ndants of the Inhabitants of Spaifj, V;ho belonged to that Community, and fpake the Language ot that Coun- try. And therefore we find the great Need of diftinifb Names to fignify thcfe different Sorrs of People, and the great Convenience of thofe dillinguifhing Words, French^ and Spaniards •, by which the Signification of our Minds is quick and eafy, and our Speech is delivered from the Burden of a continual Reireration of diffufe Defcrip- tions, with which if mud otherwife be embarafs'd. I'hat the Difference of the Opinions of thofe, who in their general Scheme of Divinity agree with thefe two noted Men, Calvin^ and Jrmbnus^\s a'l^hing there is often Occafion ro fpeak of, is what the Pradice of the latter, in felf confeffes ; who are often, in their Difcourfes and Writings, taking Notice of the fup^)ofed abfurd and pernicious Opinions of the former Sort. And therefore the making Ufe of different Names in this Cafe can't rea- fonably beobjededagainff,or condemned, as aXhing which mufi: come from fo bad a Caufe as they alTign. It is eafy to be accounted for, without fuppofing it to arife from any other Source, than the Exigence and natural Tendency of the State of Things ; considering theFaculty and Difpofition God has given Mankind, to expsefs Things which they have frequent Occafion to mention, by certain diftingiiifning Names. It is an Effed that is fimilar to what we fee arife, in innumerable Cales -which •are parallel, where cheCaufe is not ai all blame-wonhy. Neverwhelefs, iv The PREFACE. Neveithelefs, at firft I had Thoughts of carefully a- void.ng the Ufe of the Appellation, JrmMa^, in this i reatile. But I foon found 1 Ihould be put to greacDiffi- culty by It ; and that myDifcoiiife would be fo incumber'd with an otren repeated Circumlocution, inftead of a ' JName. -which would exprefs the Thing intended, as well-: r!^L l"V^^' ^ altered niy Purpofe. And therefore I ' muftafttheExcufeot fuch as are apt to be offended wi£h Things of this Nature, that I have fo freely ufed the i erm JrmmiM in the following Difcourfe. 1 profcfs it to be without any Defign, to ftigmatize Perfons of any Sort with a Name of Reproach, pr at all to make theti appear more odious. If when I had Occafion to fneak ' of tnofc Divines who are commonly called by this nLc,. - Ihad ..nfteadof fty ling them ^n;;i;;/.«, called :h,m thee Ma,, as Dr. Whitby does Cahtniftic Divines ; it nrc^ bably would not have been taken any better, ^r tho'c lfj.7 ^ t'"" "^.TP""' ""' ™°''^ g"'''^ Manners. I bave,done as I would be done by, in thisMatter. How- ever the Perm Cahinift is in thefe Days, among moft, a vef iV ,f "'"■ i^'P™'''' ^''^" the Term °m/«4 ; ^ I r r"L"°i "''^ " ^' ^" «"^''"«'to be called a Cahi. ^¥, for Dirtinaion's Sake : tho' I utterly difclain, a Dcpenaance on C,hi„, or believing the Dodrines which I k,K]Decauua>is : And I would by no Cleans charge ^r«;M/^w in general with all tlie corruprDoitnne, which thefe maintain'd. Thus for In- stance. V. would be very injurious, it I ihould rank Jr. %. mtmart The PRE F A C E. v minian Divines in general, with fuch Auihors as. Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have fome of his Dodrines in Abhorrence •, tho' he agrees, for the mod Part, v;ich /Irminiam^ in hisi Notion of the Freedom of the Will. And on the other Hand, tho' I fuppofe this Notion to be a leading Article in the Aiininian Scheme, that which, if pUrfued in it's Confequences, will t:ru]y infer, or naturally lead to all the reft -, yet 1 don't charge all that h^ve. held this Dodrine, with being Arm fiians. For whatever may be the Confequences of the Doftrine really, yet fome that hold this Dodrine, may not own nor fee thefe Confequences -, and it ^would be unjuft, ia many Inftances, to charge every Author v/ith believing and maintaining all the real Confequences of his avowed Dodrines. And I defire it may be particularly noted, that tho' I have Occafion in the following Difcourfe, often to mention theAuthor of the Book cninkdyJpi EJTay en tbeFreedom of the tVill^ in God & the Creature^z.^ holding that Notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppofe \ yec I don't mean to call him an Arminian : however in that Dodrine he agrees with Jrminians, and departs from the current and general Opinion of Calvimjls, If the Author of that Eflay be the fame as it is commonly afcribed to, he doubtlefs was not one that ought to bear that Name. But however good aDivine he was in many RefpedSjyeC that-particular Arminian Dodrine which he maintain'd, is never the better for being held by fuch an One : nor is there lefs Need of oppofing it on that Account ; but rather is there the more Need of it j as it v^^ill be likely to have the more pernicious Influence, for being taught by a Divine of his Name and Charader ; fuppofing the Dodrine to be wrong, and in it lelf to be of an ill Ten- dency. I have Nothing further to fay by Way of Preface; but only to befpeak the Reader's Candour, and calm At- tention to what I have written. The Subjcd is of fuch Importance, as to demand Attention, and the mod tho- rough Confideration. Of all Kinds of Knowlege that we can ever obtain, the Knowledge of God, and the Knowlege VI The PREFACE: Knowlege of our felves, are the molt importanr. As Religion is the great Bufinefs, Tor which we are created, and on which our Happinefs depends -, and as Religion confids in an Intercourfe between our felves and our Maker •, and fo has it's Foundation in God's Nacure and -our's, and in the Relation that God and we iiand in to each other ; therefore a true Knowledge of both mull be needful in Order to true Religion. But the Know- ledge of our felves confilts chiefly in right Apprehen- fions concerning thofe two chief Faculties ot our Na- ture, the Under/} anding and fFilL Both are very impor- tant : yet the Science of the latter mull be confefs'd to be of greateft Moment •, in as much as all A^ertue and Religion have their Seat more immediately in the Will, confiding more efpecially in right Ads and Habits of this Faculty. And the grand Queftion about the Free- dom of the Will, is the main Point that belongs to the Science of the Will, l^herefore I fay, the Impor- tance of this Subjed greatly demands the Attention ofj Chriftiafks, and efpecially of Divines. But as to myi Manner of handling the Subjed, I will be far from pre- S fiuning to fay, that it is fuch as demands the Attention \ of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to : own, that in this Matter I depend on the Reader'sC(j«r/ut that the A6t: of Volition it {t\i is always determin'd by that in or about the Mind's View of the Object, which caufes it to appear moft agreable. I fay, in or about the Mi?-id's View of the Obje6t, becaufe what has Influence to render an Objedt in View agreable, is not only what appears in the Objedl | view'd» h\i\. ^\{o the Manner oi the View, and the State and ' Circumftances of the Mind that views.— Particularly to enume- ' rate all Things pertaining to theMind'sView of theObjecSts of Volition, which have Influence in their appearing agreable to the Mind, would be a Matter of no fmall Difficulty, and ! might require a Treatife by it felf, and is not neceflary to my prefent Purpofe. I ftiall therefore only mentioa fome Things ., ijfi general, L Oni' Seft.II. What determines the Will. . 9 I, One Thing that makes an Obje6t propofed to Choice agreable, is the apparent Nature and Circumjiayices of the Ohje^^ And there are various Things of this Sort, that have an Hand in rendring the Obje<5l more or lefs agreable ; as, I. That which appears in the Objed, which renders it 'lieautiful and pleafant, or deformed and irkfom to the Mind^; viewing it as it is in it felf I 2. The apparent Degree of Pleafure or Trouble attending the Objedt, or the Confequence of it. Such Concomitants and Confequents being view'd as Circumftances of the Obje6t, are to be confidered as belonging to it, and as it were Parts of it; as it ftands in the Mind's View, as a propofed Obje6t of Choice. 3. The apparent State of the Pleafure or Trouble that ap- pears, with Refpe6t to Dijlance of Time ; being either nearer or farther off. 'Tis a Thing in it felf agreable to the Mind, to have Pleafure fpeedily ; and difagreable, to liave it delayed : So that if there be two equal Degrees of Pleafure fet in the Mind's View, and all other Things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far off ; the nearer will ap- pear moft agreable, and fo will be chofen. Becaufe, tho' the Agreablenefs of the Objedls be exa6tly equal, as view'd in Themfelves, yet not as view'd in their Circumftances ; one of them having the additional Agreablenefs of the Circum- ilance of Nearnefs. II. Another Thing that contributes to the Agreablenefs of an Object of Choice, as it ftands in the Mind's View, is the Manner of the View, If the Obje6l be fomething which ap- pears connecfted with future Pleafure, not only will the Degree of apparent Pleafure have Influence, but alfo the Manner of the View, efpecially in two Refpecfts. 1 . With refpe6l to the Degree of Judgment^ or Firmnefs of Affent^ v^ith which the Mind judges the Pleafure to be fu- ture. Becaufe it is more agreable to have a certain Happinefs, than an uncertain one ; and a Pleafure view'd as more proba- ble, all other Things being equal, is more agreable to the Mind, than that which is view'd as lefs probable. 2. With refpe6l to the Degree of the Idea of the future Pleafure. With Regard to Things which are the SubjeA of our Thoughts, either paft, prefent or future, we have much more of an Idea or Apprehenfion of fomeThings than others ; that is, our Idea is much more clear, lively and ftrong.- Thus, the Ideas we have of fenfible Things by immediate Senfation, are ufually much more lively than thofe we have by meer Imagination, or by Contemplation of them when ab- fent. lo What determines ty^^ Will. Part I. fent. My Idea of the Sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid, than when I-only think of it. Our Idea of the fweet Rehfh of a dehcious Fruit is ufually ftronger when we tafte it, than when we only imagine it. And fometimes,the Ideas we haveof Things byContempIation,are much ftronger & clearer, than at other Times. Thus, a Man at one Time has a muchftronger Idea of the Pleafure which is to be enjoyed in mating fome Sort of Food that he loves,than at another. Now the Degree, or Strength of the Idea or Senfe that Men have of future Good or Evil, is one Thing that has great Influ- ence on their Minds to excite Choice or Volition. When of two Kinds of future Pleafure, which the Mind confiders of, and are prefented for Choice, both are fuppofed exa6tly equal ^ the Judgment, and both equally certain, and all other Things are equal, but only one of them is what the Mind has a far more lively Senfe of, than of the other ; this has the greateft Advantage by far to aiFect and attradl: tlie Mind, and move theV/ill. HTis now more agreable to the Mi»d, to take the Pleafure it has a ftrong and lively Senfe of, than that which it has only a faint Idea of. The View of the former is attended with the ftrongeft Appetite, and the greateft Unea- finefs attends the Want of it ; and 'tis agreable to the Mind, to have Uneafuiefs removed, and it's Appetite gratified. And if feveral future Enjoyments are prefented together, as Com- petitors for the Choice of the Mind, fome of them judged to be greater, and others lefs ; the Mind alfo having a greater Senfe and more lively Idea of the Good of fome of them, and of others a lefs ; and fome are viewM as of greater Certainty or Probability than others ; and thofe Enjoyments that appear moft agreable in one of thefe Refpeds, appears leaft fo in others : In this Cafe, all other Things being equal, the A- greablenefs of a propofed Objedlof Choice will be in a De- gree fome Way compounded of the Degree of Good fuppofed by the Judgment, the Degree of apparent Probability or Cer- tainty of that Good, and the Degree of the View or Senfe, or Livelinefs of the Idea the Mind has, of that Good ; becaufe all together concur to conftitute the Degree in which the Ob- je(5l appears at prefent agreable ; and accordingly Volition will be determined. ^ I might further obferv^e, the State of the Mind that views a propofed Objeift of Choice, is another Thing that contributes to the Agreablenefs or Difagreablenefs of that Object ; the particular Temper which the Mind has by Na- ture, or that has been introduced and eftablilhed by Educa- idon, Example, Cuftom, or fome other Means 3 or theFrame or Sed. li. What determines the WilL 1 1 or State that the Mind is in on a particular Occafion. That Object which appears agreable to one, does not fo to another. And the fame Object don't always appear alike agre* able to the fame Perfon, at different Times. It is moft a- greable to fome Men, to follow their Reafon ; and to others, to follow their Appetites : To fome Men, it is more agreable to deny a vicious Inclination, than to gratify it ; Others it fuits bcft to gratify the vileft Appetites. 'Tis more difagrea- bJe to fome Men than others, to counter-a6t a former Refo- Jution. In thefe Refpe<5ts, and many others which might be mention'd, different Things will be moft agreable to different Perfons ; and not only fo, but to the fame Perfons at diffe- rent Times. But pofTibly 'tis needlefs and improper, to mention the Frame and State of the Mind, as a diftin^ Ground of the Agreablenefs of Objeds from the other two mentioned be- fore ; 'z;/z. The apparent Nature and Circumftances of the Objeds view'd, 'and the .Manner of the View : Perhaps if we ftri6tly confider the Matter, the different Temper and State of the Mind makes no Alteration as to the Agreable- nefs of Objects, any other Way, than as it makes the Ob- jedts themfelves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent Pleafure or Pain attending them ; And as it occalions the Manner of the View to be different, caufes the Idea of Beauty or Deformity, Pleafure or Uneafmefs to be more or lefs lively. However, I think fo much is certain, that Volition, In no one Inftance that can be mentioned, is otherwife than the greateft apparent Good is, in the Manner which has been explained. The Choice of the Mind never departs from that which, at that Time, and with Refpedl to the dired: and immediate Objeds of that Decifion of the Mind, appears moft agreable and pleafmg, all Things confidered. If the im- mediate Objedts of the Will are a Man's own A6lions, then thofe Anions which appear moft agreable to him he wills. If it be now moft agreable to him, all Things conridered,to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at prefent appears to him,moft agreable to fpeak, then he choofes to fpeak : If it fuits him beft to keep Silence, then he choofes to keep Silence. There is fcarcely a plainer and more univerfal Didate of the Senfe and Experience of Mankind, than that, when Men acSl voluntarily, and do what they pleafe, then they do what fuits them beft, or what is Cjoft agrmhk to them. To fay, that they do what they pleafe, or 1 2 What determines the Will Part I. or what pleafes them, , but yet don't do what is agreahh to them, is the fame Thing as to fay, they do what they pleafej but don't adl their Pleafure ; and that is to fay, that they, do what they pleafe, and yet don't do. what they pleafe. It appears from thefe Things, that in fome Senfe, the WtU> always follows the loft Diclate ef th^ Under/landing. But then the; Underjianding muftbe taken in a large Senfe, as including the whole Faculty of Perception or Apprehenfion, and not meerly what is called Re af on ox Judgment. If by the Dictate of the; Underftanding is meant what Rcafon declares to be beft or moft for the Perfon^'s Happinefs, taking in the whole of his Duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the laft Di(5late of the Underftanding. Such a Dictate of Reafon is quite a different Matter from Things appearing now moft agreahle ; all Things being put together which pertain to the Mind's prefent Perceptions, Apprehenfions or Ideas, in any Refpect. Altho' that Didate of Reafon, when it takes Place, is one Thing that is put into the Scales, and is to be confidered as a Thing that has Concern in the compound In- fluence which moves & induces the Will ; and is one Thing that is to be confidered in eftimating the Degree of that Ap- pearance of Good which the Will always follows ; either as having its Influence added to other Things, or fubduded from them. When it concurs with other Things, then its Weight is added to them, as put into the fame Scale j but when it is againft them, it is as a Weight in the oppofite Scale, where it refifts the Influence of other Things : yet it's Refiftance is often overcome by their greater Weight,and fo the Ad of the Will is determined in Oppofition to it. The Things which I have faid may, I hope, ferve, in fome Meafure, to illuftrate and confirm the Pofition I laid down in the Beginning of this Sedion, viz. That the IVill is always determined by thejlrongeji Motive^ or by that View of the Mind which has the greateft Degree of previous Tendency to ex- cite Volition. But whether I have been fo happy as rightly to explain theThing wherein conlifts the Strength of Motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the Pofition it felf 5 which carries much of its own Evidence with it, and is the Thing of chief Importance to the Purpofe of the en- fuing Difcourfe : And the Truth of it, I hope, will appear •with greater Clearnefs, before I have flnifhed what I have to fay on the Subjed of human Liberty. ^ # SECT. Sed. III. The Nature of Neceffity. 1 3 Section III. Concer?ting the Meaning of the Tenns Ne- ceffity, Impoffibility^ Inability, &c ; and ^Contingence. . ^ ^^ - -^ THE Words iy^-f^ry, Lnpoffihle he. arc abundantly ufed in Controverfies about Free-will and moral Agency ; and therefore the Senfe in which they are ufed, Ihould be clearly underftood. Here I might fay, that a Thing is then faid to, be necejjaryy when it mull be, and cannot be otherwife. . But this would not properly be a Deiinition of NeceiTit)', or an Explana- tion of the Word, any more than if I explain'd the Word nmji^ by there being a Neceffity. The Words mujiy can^ and cannot^ need Explication as m.uch as the Words neceffary^ and unpojfihle -, excepting that the former are Words that Children commonly ufe, and know fomething of the Mean- ing; of earlier than the latter. '& The Word yieceffary^ as ufed in common Speech, is a rela- tive Term ; and relates to fome fuppofed Oppofition made to the Exiftence of the Thing fpoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to, hinder or alter it. That is neceffary, ia the original and proper Senfe of the Word, which is, or will be, notwithftanding all fuppofable Oppofition. To fay, that a Thing is neceffary, is the fame Thing as to fay, that it is impoITible ihould not be : But the Word impojfible is mani- feftly a relative Term, and has Reference to fuppofed Power exerted to bring a Thing to pais, which is infufficient for the Effea ; As the Word utiable is relative, and has Relation to Ability or Endeavour which is infufficient ; and as the Word Irrefifiahle is relative, and has always Reference to Refiftance which is made, or may be made to fome Force or Power tending to an Eflfe6t, and is infufficient to withftand the Power, or hinder the EfFecl. The common Notion oi^ Neceffity and Impoffibility implies fomething that fruftrates Endeavour or Deiirc, Here 14 7^^ Nature Part L Here feveral Things are to be noted. 1. Things arefaid to be neceflary in general^ which are or will be notwithftanding any fuppofable Oppofition from us or othersy or from whatever Quarter. But Things are faid to be neceflaiy to us, which are or will be notwithftanding all Op- pofition fuppofable in the Cafe from us. The fame may be obferved of the Word impofftble^ and other fuch like Terms. 2. Thefe Terms necejfary, impojfible, irrefijiihle Sec, do efpeci- ally belong to the Controverfy about Liberty and moral A- gency, as ufed in the latter of the two Senfes now mention'd, viz. as neceffary or impoffible to us, and with Relation to any fuppofable Oppofition or Endeavour of ours. 3. As the Word Necejftty, in it's vulgar and common Ufe, is relative, and has always Reference to fome fuppofable in- fufficient Oppofition ; fo when we fpeak of any Thing as ne- ceffary to us, it is with Relation to fome fuppofable Oppofition of our TVills, or fome voluntary Exertion or Effort of ours to the contrary. For we don't properly make Oppofition to an Event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily oppofe it. Things are faid to be what mujl be, or necejfarily are, as to us, ^htn they are, or will be, tho' we defire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their Exiftence : But fuch Oppofition of ours always either confifts in, or implies Oppofition of our Wills. ^Tis manifeft that all fuchlike Words & Phrafes, as vulgarly ufed, are ufed and accepted in this Manner. A Thing is faid to be neceffary, when we can't help it, let us do what we will. So any Thing is faid to be impoffible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pafs, and endea- vour it ; or at leaft may be fuppofed to defire and feek it ; but all our Defires and Endeavours are, or would be vain. And that is faid to be irrefiflibk, which overcomes all our Oppofition, Refiftance, and Endeavour to the contrary. And we are to be faid Unable to do a Thing, when our fuppofable Defires and Endeavours to do it are infufficient. We are accuftomed, in the common Ufe of Language, to apply & underftand thefe Phrafes in this Senfe : We grow up t^ith fuch a Habit j which by the daily Ufe of thefe Terms, in fuch a Senfe, from our Childhood, becomes fix'd and fettled } fo that the Idea of a Relation to a fuppofed W^iil, Defire and Endeavour of ours, is ftrongly conne<5ted with thefe SedJII. r/'Neceflity. 15 thefe Terms, and naturally excited in our Minds, whenever we hear the Words ufed. Such Ideas, and thefe Words> are fo united and aflbciated, that they unavoidably go together ; one fuggefts the other, and carries the other with it, and ne-- ver can be feparated as long as we live. And if we ufe the Words, as Terms of Art, in another Senfe, yet, unlefs we are exceeding circumfpe6t and wary, we fhall infenfibly flide into the vulgar Ufe of them, and fo apply the Words in a very inconfiftent Manner : this habitual Connexion of Ideas will deceive & confound us in ourReafonings & DifcourfeSjwhere- in we pretend to ufe thefe Terms in that Manner, as Terms of Art. 4. It follows from what has been obferved, that when thefe Terms neceffary^ impojfible^ irreJi/Uhle^ imahle kc. are ufed in Cafes wherein no Oppofition, or infufficient Will or Endea- vour, is fuppofed, or can be fuppofed, but the very Nature of the fuppofed Cafe it felf excludes and denies any fuch Oppofi- tion,Will orEndeavour ; thefeTerms are then not ufed in their proper Signification, but quite befide their Ufe in common Speech. The Heafon is m.anifeft ; namely, that in fuch Cafes, we can't ufe the Words with Reference to a fuppofa- ble Oppofition, Will or Endeavour. And therefore if any Man ufes thefe Terms in fuch Cafes, he either ufes them nonfenfically, or in fome new Senfe, diverfe from their ori- ginal and proper Meaning. As for Inftance ; If a Man fhould affirm after this Manner, That it is neceffary for a Man, and what muft be, that a Man fliould chufe Virtue rather than Vice, during the Time that he prefers Virtue to Vice 5 and that it is a Thing impoffible and irrefiftablc, that it fliouid be otherwife than that he fhould have this Choice, fo long as this Choice continues ; fuch a Man would ufe thefe Terms mu/^p irrejijiible Sec. v/ith perfe<5t Infignificence and Nonfenfe, or in fome new Senfe, diverfe from their common Ufe ; which is with Reference, as has been obferved, to fuppofable Oppo- fition, Unwiilingnefs and Refiftance ; whereas, here, the very Suppofition excludes and denies any fuch Thing ; for the Cafe fuppofed is that of being willing, and chufmg. 5. It appears from what has been faid, that thefe Terms necejfary^ hnpoffihk &c. are often ufed by Philofophers^ and Me- taphyficians in a Senfe quite diverfe from their common Ufe and original Signification : For they apply them to many Cafes in which no Oppofition is fuppofed or fuppofable. Thus they ufe them with Refpedl to God's Exiftence before tha Creation of the World, when there was- no pther Being but He; '1 6 The Nature ■ Part L He : fo with regard to many of the Difpofitlons and A<5ls oif -the divine Being, fuch as his loving Himfelf, his loving •Righteoufners, hating Sin &c. So they apply thefe Terms to many Calcs ot the Inclinations and Adions of created intel- ligent Beings, Angels and Men \ wherein all Oppofition of the Will is fliut out and denied, in the very Suppofition of the Caie. • MefapJjyfical or Philofophkal NecefTity is nothing different from their Certainty. I fpeak not now of the Certainty of Knowledge, but the Certainty that is in Things themfelves, which is the Foundation of the Certainty of the Knowledge of them ; or that wherein lies the Ground of the Infallibility of the Proportion which affirms them. What is fometimes given as the Definition of Philofophical NecelTity, namely. That by which a Thing cannot but be, or whereby it cajinot be otherwifey fails of being a proper Explanation of it, on two Accounts : i^fV/?, the Words Ca?2, or Cannot, need Explanation as much as the Word Necejjity ; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one afked us what we mean, when we fay, a Thing cannot but be, we might explain our felves by fay- ing, we mean, it muft neceffarily be fo ; as well as explain Neceirity,by faying,it is that by which aThing cannot but be. And Secondly, this Definition is liable to the fore-mention'd great Inconvenience : The Words cannot, or unable, are pro- perly relative, and have Relation to Power exerted, or that may be exerted,in order to the Thing Ipoken of; to which,as I have now obferved, the Word Necejjity, as ufed by Philofo- phers, has no Reference. Philofophical Neceffity is really Nothing elfe than the full and fix'd Connexion between the Things iignified "hy the ^ubje(^ ^TPredicate of a Propofi tion» which affirms Something jo he true. TVlien there" is luch a Connediou,then theThing affirmed in the Propofition is neceiTary, in a Philofophical Senfe ; whether any Oppofition, or contrary Effort be fup- pofed, or fuppofable in the Cafe, or no. When the Subject and Predicate of the Propofition, which affirms the Exiftence of any Thing, either SublIance,Quality, A(5t or Circumftance, have a full and certain Connexion, then the Exiftence ot Being of that Thing is faid to be neceffary in a metaphyfical Senfe. And in this Senfe I ufe the Word Necejjity, in the fol- lowing Difcourfe, when I endeavour to prove that Neceffity is not iiiconjj/ifnt with Liberty, The Sea.IJI. of Neceffity. 17 The Subje6t and Predicate of a Pfopofitioa, which affirms Exiftence of Something, may have a full, iixd, and certain Connection fever al Ways. (i.) They may have a full and perfe^ CdnnecStidn m and sfthemfehjes j becaufe it may imply a Contradiaion, or grofs Abfurdity, to fuppofe them not conneded. Thus many Things are neceffary in their owti Nature. So the eternal Exiftence of Being generally confidered, is necefTary In itfilf: becaufe it would be in it felf the gfeareft Abfurdity, to deny the Exiftence of Being in general, or to fay there was abfo- lute and univerfal Nothing ; and is, as it were the Sum of all Contradiaions ; as might be ftieWn, if this were a proper Place for it. So God's Infinity, and other Attributes are riecefiary. So it is necefiary in its otvn Nature, that two and two fliould be four ; and it is neceffary, that all fight Linej drawn from the Center of a . Circle" to the Circumference ft-.ould be equal. It isneceffaryj fit andfuitable, that Meri, (hould do to others, as they would 'thlt they iliouid do to them. So innumerable Metaphyfical and Mathematical Truths are neceffary in Themfdves j'The Subj eft and Predicate of the Propofition w hich affirms theiii, are perfqdly conneacd cfthe?nj elves, ' " ' ' ': (2.) The Connedion of the Subje(5l and Predicate of ai Proportion, which affirms the Exiftence of Something, may be tix'd and made certain, becaufe the Exiftence of that Thing is already come to pafs ; and either now^ is, or has been ; and To has as it were made fure of Exiftence. And therefore, the Propofition which affirms prefent and paft Ex- iftence of it, may by this Meaiis be mlde certain, and ne- ceffirily and unalterably true ; the paft Event 'has fix'd and decided the Matter, as to it's Exiftence ; and has made it impoflible but that Exiftence (hould be. truly predicated of if. Thus the Exiftence of whatever is already come to pafs, i| liow become neceffary ; 'tis become impoffible it fhould bet othcrwife thaii. true, that fudh a Thing has been* (3.) The"^^t^^'^a-?(d ffedicate of at Propofition which affirms Something to be,, may have a real and certain Con- fieaioh confequeniially ; and fo the Exiftence of the Thing may be confequentially neceffary ; as it may b^ furely and lirmly; cdnneded with fomething ehe, that is neceffar}^ in one of the former Refpcds! As it is either fully and thoroughly conuedcd with that which is abfdlutely neceffai^ in. its owrt C ' Nature, i8 The Nature Part L Njitufe,'6r with fomething which has already received and made furc of Exiftence: This Neceffity hes /«, or may be explained by the Connexion of two or more Propofitions one with another, lliings which are perfedly conneded with other Things that are neceilary, are neceflaryThemfelves, by a NecefTity of Confequence. And here it may be obferved, that all Things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be faid to be neceirary,are neceiTary only in this laft Way. Their Exiftence is not neceflary in it felf ; for if fo, they always would have exifted. Nor is their Exiftence become ne- ceiiarv by being made fure, by being already come to pafs. Therefore, the only Way that any Thing that is to come to pafs hereafter, is or can be neceffary, is by a, Conne6Hon with fomething that is neceffary in it's own Nature, or fome- thing that already is, or has been ; fa that the one being fuppofed, the other certainly follows. And this alfo is the only Way that all Things paft, excepting thofe which were from Eternity, could be neceffary before they came to pafs^ or could ccme to pafs neceffarily j and therefore the only Way in which any Effefl or Event, or any Thing whatfoever that ever has had, or will have a Beginning, has come into Being neceffarily, or will hereafter neceffarily exift. And therefore this is the Neceffity which efpecially belongs to Contraverfies about the Ads of the Will, It may be of fome Ufe in thefe Controverftes, further to obferye concerning ?Nefaphy/ical'NcceiT\ty^ that (agreable to the Diftinftion before obferved of Neceffity, as vulgarly under- fcood) Things that exift may be faid to be neceffary, either Vi\th 2. general or particular Neceffity. The Exiftence of a Idling may be faid to be neceftary witli a general Neceftlty, when all Things whatfoever being conlidered, there is a f^oundation for Certainty of their Exiftence ; or when ii> the moft general and univerfal View of Things, the Subjecfl and Predicate of the Propolition, which affirms its Exift- ence, would appear with an infallible Conne6lion. , An Event, or the Exiftence of a Thing, may be faid to be neceffary with a particular Neceffity, or with Regard to a par- ticular Perfon, Thing or Time, when Nothing that can be taken into Confideration, in or about" that Perfon, Thing or. Time, alters the Cafe at all, as to the Certainty of that Eyent> or the Exiftence of that Thing j or can be of any * " AccouiU ScdJII. c/NeccfTity. 19 Account at all, in determining the Infallibility of the Con- rkec!:lion of the Subjed and Predicate in the Propofition which affirms the Exiftence of the Thing ; fo that it is all one, as to that Perfon, or Thing, at leaft, at that Time, as if the Exiftence were necefTary with a NeceiTity that is moft urn- verfal and <^hfolute. Thus there are many Things that H ap- peal to particular Peribns, which they have no Hand in, and in ihe Exiftence of which noWiil of theirs has any Concern, at leaft, at that Time ; which, whether they are ne- ceflar)^ or not, with Regard to Things in general, yet are ne- ceflary to them, and with Regard to any Volition of theirs at that Time ; as they prevent all A(5ls of the Will about: the Affair. — I fliall have Occafion to apply this Obferva- tion to particular Infrances in the following Difcourfe.— Whe- ther the fame Things that are neceflary with 3. particular Ne- ccfiity, be not alfo necclTary with a ^ That it confifts in a Self-detenmning Power in the Will, or a certain Sovereignty the Will has over it felf, and it's own A6ls, whereby it determines it's own Volitions ; fo as not to be dependent in it's Determinations, on any Caufe without it felf, nor determined by any Thing prior to it's own A6ls. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their Notion of it, or that the Mind, pre\'ious to the A6t of Volition be, in iquilibriG, 3. Contifigence is another Thing that belongs and is effential to it ; not in the common Acceptation of the Word, as that has been already explained, but as oppofed to all Neceffity, or any fixed Sz certain Connecflion with fome previous Ground or Reafon of it's Exiftence. They fuppofe the EfTence of Li- berty fo much to confift in thefe Things, that unlefs the Will of Man be free in this Senfe, he has no real Free- dom, how much foever he may be at Liberty to a<5l ac- cording to his Will. A moral Jgent is a Being that Is capable of thofe Adlions that have a moral Quality, and which can properly be de- nominated good or evil in a moral Senfe, vertuous or vici- ous, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral Faculty^ or Senfe of moral Good & Evil, or of fuch a Thing as Defert or Worthinefs of Praife or Blame, Re- ward or Punifl-.ment ; and a Capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his A6lions by moral Inducements or Motives, exhibited to the View of Underftanding & Rea- fon, to engage to a Condu6t agreable to the moral Faculty. The Sun is very excellent & beneficial in it*s A<51:Ion and Influence on the Earth, in warming it, and caufmg it to bring forth it's Fruits ; but it is not a moral Agent : It's A(5tion, tho' good, is not vertuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a City, and confumes great Part of it, is very mifchievous in its Operation ; but is not a moral A- gent : what it does is not faulty or finful, or deferving of any Punifliment. The brute Creatures are not moral Agents : the A6lions of fome of 'em are very profitable & pleafant ; others are veiy hurtful : yet, feeing they have no moral Fa- culty, or Senfe of Defert, and don't a6l from Choice guided by Underftanding, or with a Capacity of reafoning and re- fleding, but only from Inftincft, and are not capable of be- ing influenced by moral Inducements, their Actions are not properly finful or vertuous ; nor are they properly the Sub- jeds of any fuch moral Treatment for what they do, as mo- ral Agents are for their Faults or good Deeds. Here 3© 0/ Moral Agency. Part I. Here it may be noted, that there Is a circumftantial Diffe- rence between the moral Agency of a Ruler and a Subje^, I call it drcumftantial^ becaufe it lies only in the Difference of moral Inducements they are capabk of being influen- ced by, arifing from the Difference of Circumflances. A Ruler ailing in that Capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral Law, and it's Sanations of Threat- nings and Promifes, Rewards and Punifliments, as the SubjeSf is ; tho' both may be influenced by a Knowledge of moral Good and Evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who a6ts only in the Capacity of a Ruler to- wards his Creatures, and never as a Subje^^ differs in that Refpedl: from the moral Agency of created intelligent Be- ings. God's A6iions, and particularly thofe which he ex- erts as a moral Governour, have moral Qualifications, are morally good in the higheft Degree. They are moft per- fectly holy & righteous ; and we muft conceive of Him as influenced in the higheft Degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral Inducement ; vix, the moral Good which He fees in fuch and fuch Things : And therefore He is, in the moft proper Senfe, a moral Agent, the Source of all moral Ability & Agency, the Fountain and Rule of ail Ver- t\ie and moral Good ; tho' by Reafon of his being Supreme over all, 'tis not poffible He ihould be under the Influerx^ of Law or Command, Promifes or Threatnings, Rewards or Pu- nifhments, Counfels orWarnings. The effential Qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greateft polfible Perfedlion ; fuch as Underftanding,to perceive the Difference-between mo- ral Good & Evil ; a Capacity of difcerning that moral Wor- thinefs and Demerit, by which fome Things are Praife-wor- thy, others defcrving of Blame and Puni{hment ; and alfo a Capacity of Choice, and Choice guided by Underftanding, and a Power of ading according to his Choice or Pleafure,and being capable of doing thofe Things which are in the highefi: Senfe Praife-worthy. And herein does very much conflft that Image of God wherein he made Man, (which we read of Gen, I. 26,27. & Chap. IX. 6.) by which God diftinguiflied Man from the Beafts, viz. in thofe Faculties & Principles of Na- ture, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much confifts the natural Image of God ; as his fpiritual and moral Image, wherein Man was made at firft, confifted in that moral Excellency, that he was endowed with. PART ( %t ) PART 11. Wherein it is confidered whether there is or can be any fuch Sort of Freedom of Will, as that wherein Arminiam place the Eflence of the Liberty of all moral Agents ; and whether any fuch Thing ever was or ca7^ be conceived of. Section L Shewing the manifejl Inconjtjience of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, confifting in the JVilFs felf-determining Power. H Aving taken Notice of thofe Things which may be neceffary to be obferved, concerning the Meaning of the principal Terms and Phrafes made ufe of in Con- troverfies concerning human Liberty, and particularly ob- ferved what Liberty is, according to the common Language, and general Apprehenfion of Mankind, and what it is as underftood & maintained by Arminians ; I proceed to confider the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of the Will^ and the fup- pofcd NecejQity of it in Order to moral Agency, or in Order to any One's being capable of Vertue or Viee, aad properly the 3 2 ^e Inconfifience Part II. the Subjea of Command or Counfel, Praife or Blame, Pro- mifes or Threatnings, Rewards or Punifhments ; or whether that which has been defcribed, as the Thing meant by Li- berty in common Speech, be not fufficient, and the only Li- berty, which makes, or can make any one a moral Agent, and fo properly the Subjedt of thefe Things. In thh Part^ I ihall confider whether any fuch Thing be poffible or concei- vable,as that Freedom of Will which Jrminians infift on ; and Ihall enquire whether any fuch Sort of Liberty be neceffary to moral Agency ^c. in the next Part. And Firft of all, I (hall confider the Notion of a Self^ determining Power in the Will : wherein, according to the Jrminians^ does moft efientially confift the Will's Freedom ; and fliall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly ab- furd, and a manifeft Inconliftence, to fuppofe that the Will it felf determines all the free A£fs of the Will. Here I fhall not infift on the great Impropriety of fuch Phrafes, and Ways of fpeaking, as the Wilts determini?ig it felf ; becaufe Actions are to be afcribed , to Agents, and not properly to the Powers of Agents j which improper W^ay of ipeaking leads to many Miftakes, and much Confufion, as Mr. Locke obferves. But I fhall fuppofe that the Jrminians^ when they fpeak of the Will's determining it felf, do by the JVill mean the Soul willing, I fhall take it for granted, that ■when they fpeak of the Will, as the Determiner, they mean the Soul in the Exercife of a Power of Willing^ or acSting volun- tarily. I fhall fuppofe this to be their Meaning, becaufe No- thing elfe can be meant, without the groffeft and plaineft Ab- furdity. In all Cafes, when we fpeak of the Powers or Prin- ciples of Ading, as doing fuch Things, we mean that the A- fents which have thefe Powers of ading, do them, in the ixercife of thofe Powers. So when we fay. Valour fights courageoufly, we mean, the Man who is under the Influ- ence of Valour fights courageoufly. When we fay. Love feeks the Objcdt loved, we mean, the Perfon loving feeks that Objedt. When we fay, the Underftanding difcerns, we mean the Soul in the Exercife of that Faculty. So when it is faid, . the Will decides or determines, the Meaning muft be, thae the Perfon in the Exercife of a Power of Willing & Chufing, or the Soul acting^ voluntarily, determines. Therefore Se(S.I. Of Self-determining Yovjtu 33 Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free A6ls, the Soul determines all the free Ads of the Will in the Ex- ercife of a Power of Willing and Chuiing ; or^ which is the fame Thing, it determines them of Choice ; it determines it's own AxSs by chuiing it's own Ads. If the Will deter- mines the Will, then Choice orders and determines the Choice : and Ads of Choice are fubjed to the Decifion, and follow the Conduct of other Ads of Choice. And therefore if the Will determines all it's own free Ads, then every free Ad of Choice is determined by a preceeding Ad of Choice, chuHng that Ad. And if that preceeding Ad of the Will or Choice be alfo a free Ad, then by thefe Princi- ples, in this Ad too, the Will is Self-determined ; that is, this, in like Manner, is an Ad that the Soul voluntarily chu- fes ; or which is the fame Thing, it is an Ad determined ftill by a preceeding Ad of the Will, chufing that. And the like may again be obferved of the laft mentioned Ad. Which brings us diredly to a Contradidion : for it fuppofes an Ad of the Will preceeding the firft Ad in the whole Train, direding and determining the reft ; or a free Ad of the Will, before the firft free Ad of the Will. Or elfe we muft come at laft to anAd of theWill, determining the confequent Ads,wherein the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is not a free Ad, in this Notion of Freedom : But if the firft Ad in the Train,de- termining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all can be free ; as is manifeft at firft View, but fhall be demon- ftrated prefently. If the Will, which we find governs the Members of the Body, and determines and commands their Motions and Adions, does alfo govern it felf, and determine it's own Mo- tions and Ads, it doubtiefs determines them the fame Way, even by antecedent Volitions. The Will determines which Way the Hands and Feet fhall move, by an Ad of Volition or Choice : and there is no other Way of the Will's deter- mining, direding or commanding any Thing at all. Whatio- ever the Will commands, it commands by an Ad of the Will. And if it has it felf under it's Command^ and determines it felf in it's own Adions, it doubtiefs does it the fame Way that it determines other Things which are under it's Command. So that if the Freedom of the Will confifts in this, that it has it felf and it's own Adions under it's Command and Diredlon, and it's own Volitions are determined by it fcif, k will follow, that every free Volition ariles from another an- tecedent Volition, direding and commanding that ; And it £ that 34 Of Self-detenni7tingVovjtx. Part IL that dtreaing Volition be alfo free, in that alfo the Will is de- termined ; that is to fay, that directing! Volition is deter- mined by another going before that ; and fo on, 'till we come to the firft Volition in the whole Series : And if that firft Volition be free, and the Will f elf- determined in it, then that is determined by another Volition preceeding that Which is a Contradiction ; becaufe by the Suppofition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the firft in the Train. But if that firft Volition is not determined by any preceeding Ad of the Will, then that A6t is not determined by the Will, and fo is not free, in the Arm'mian Notion of Freedom, which confifts in the Will's Self-determination. And if that firft A6t of the Will, which determines and fixes the fubfequent A6ts, be not free, none of the following Acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we fuppofe there are five A6ts in the Train, the fifth and laft de- termined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the fecond, and the fecond by the firft ; If the firft is not determined by the Will, and fo not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will : that is, that each of them are as they are,and not otherwife,is not firft owing totheWill, but to the Determination of the firft in the Series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no Hand in the Determination of. And this being that which decides what the reft ftiall be, and determines their Exift- ence ; therefore the firft Determination of their Exiftence is not from the Will. The Cafe is juft the fame, if inftead of a Chain of five A6ts of the Will, we Ihould fuppofe a Succeffion of Ten, or an Hundred, or ten Thoufand. If the firft A6t be not free, being determined by fomething out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to it felf, and that the next, and fo on ; They are none of them free, but all orignally depend on, and are determined by fome Caufe out of the Will : and fo all Freedom in the Cafe is excluded, and no Ad of the Will can be free, according to this Notion of Freedom. If we ftiould fuppofe a long Chain, of ten Thoufand Links, fo conne6ted, that if the firft Link moves, it will move the next, and that the next ; and fp the whole Chain muft be determined to Motion, and in the Direction of it's Motion, by the Motion of the firft Link ; and that is moved by fomething elfe : In this Cafe, tho' all the Links, but one, are moved by other Parts of the fame Chain ; yet it appears that the Motion of no One, nor the Diredlion of it's Motion, is from any Self-moving or Self- determining Power in the Chain, any more than if every Link Seft. II. Some Evafions conjidered. 3 5 Link were immediately moved by fomething that did not be- long to the Chain. If the Will be not free in the firft Act, which caufes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caufed by that firft A6t : for tho' indeed the Will caufed it, yet it did not caufe it freely ; becaufe the preceeding Acft, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the Will ben't free in the fecond Ad:, fo neither can it be in the third, which is caufed by that ; becaufe, in like Manner, that third was determined by an Act of the Will that was not free. And fo we may go on to the next Adl, and from that to the next J And how long foever the Succeflion of A6ls is, it is all one ; if the firft on which the whole Chain depends, and which determines all the reft, ben't a free Ac5t, the Will is not free in caufing or determining any one of thofe A6ts ; becaufe the A(5t by which it determines them all, is not a free Ad ; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not caufe them at all. Thus, this Ar^ fninian Notion of Liberty of the Will, confifting in the Will's Self-Determination^ is repugnant to itfelfjand (huts it felf wholly out of the World. Section IL Several fufpofed Ways ^p/' evading the fore-- r4 K^^^S R^^foningj conjidered. IF to evade the Force of what has been obferved, it (hould be faid, that when the Arminiam fpeak of the Will's deter- niining it's own Ads, they don't mean that the Will de- termines it's A6ts by any preceeding Ad, or that one Ad of the Will determines another j but ^only that the Faculty or Power of Will, or the Soul in the 13 fe of that Power, de- termines it's own Volitions ; and that it does it without any Ad going before the Ad determined ; fuch an Evafion would be full of the moft grofs Abfurdity. 1 confefs, it is an Eva- fion of my own inventing ; and I don't know but I fnould wrong the Jrminians, in fuppofing that any of them would make ufe of it. But it being as good a one as I can in- vent, I would obferve upon it a few Things, E 2 Firji^ 36 Suppofed Evafions Part II. Firf, If the Faculty or Power of the Will determines aa A6t of Volition, or the Sonl in the Ufe or Exercije of that Pcu'cr, determines it, that is the lame Thing as for the Soul to determine V'^olltion by an Mf of Will. For an Exerdfe of the Power of "^ill, and an Acl of that Power, are the fame Thing. Therefore to fay, that the Power of Will, or the Soul in the Vfc or Exemfe of that Power, determines Voli- tion, without an y/^ of Will preceeding the Volition deter- mined, is a Contradi6lion. Strom^y If a Powder of Will determines the A(5l of theWill, then a Power of Chufmg determines it. For, as was before obfcrved, in every AS: of Will, there is Choice, and a Power of Willing is a Power of Chufmg. But if a Power of Chufmg determines the Ad of Volition, it determines it by chufmg it. For 'tis moil abfurd to fay, that a Power of Chufmg deter- mines one Thing rather than another, without chuling any Thing. But if a Power of Chufmg determines Volition by chufine it, then here is the A6t of Volition determined by an antecedent Choice, chufmg that Volition. 77;/7yA)', To fay, the Faculty, or the Soul, determines it's owm Volition, but not by any, A6t, is a Contradiction, Be- caufe for the Soul to dire<^, decide, or determine any Thing, is to ad ; and this is fuppofed ; for the Soul is here fpoken of as being a Caufe in this Affair, bringing fomething to pafs, or doing fomething ; or, which is the lame Thing, ex- erting It felt in order to an Effe6t, which Efied is the Deter- mination of Volition, or the particular Kind and Manner of an Ati of Will. But certamiy, this Exertion or Action is not the fame with the Effe6t, in order to the Production of which it IS exerted j but mud be fomething prior to it. J^ain, The Advocates for this Notion of the Freedom of the Wj]], ipeak of a certain Sovereignty in the Will, whereby it has Power to determine it's own Volitions. And there- jore the Determination of Volition muil itfeif be an Ad of the Will ; ibr otherwite it can l^e no Exercife of that fuppofed Power and Sovereignty. ^ J^alti, If the Will determines it felf, then either the Will is acYive in determining it's Volitions, or it is not. If it be adive in it, then the Determination is an Adl gf the Will ; ^\\d 10 there is one Ad of the Will determining another. But if the Will is not a^ii'ie in the Determination, then how - ^ does Sea. II. confidered. 37 does it exerdfe any Liberty in it ? Thefe Gentlemen fuppofe that the Thing wherein the Will exerdfes Liberty, is in it's determining it's own Ads. But how can this be if it ben't active in determining ? Certainly the Will, or the Soul, can't exerdfe any Liberty in that wherein it dont aa, or wherein it don't exerdfe it felf So that if either Part of this Dilemma be taken, this Scheme of Liberty, confift- inff in Self-determining Power, is overthrown. If there be an Aa of the Will in determining all it's own free htXsy then one free Aa of the Will is determined by another ; and fo we have the Abfurdity of every free Aa, even the very fir ft, determined by aforegoing tree Aa. But if there be no Aa or Exercife of the Will in determining it s own Aas, then no Liberty is exercifed in determining them. From whence it follows, that no Liberty confifts in the Will s Power to determine it's own Aas : Or, which is the fame Thing, that there is no fuch Thing as Liberty coniifting in a belt-de- termining Power of the Will. If it (hould be faid, That altho' it be true, if the Soul de- termines it's own Volitions, it muft be aaive in fo doing, and the Determination it felf muft be an Aa ; yet there is no Need of fuppofing this Aa to be prior to the Volition de- termined i But the Will or Soul determines the Acl of the Will in IVilling ; It determines it's own Volition, in the very Aa of Volition ; It direas and limits the A61 of the Will, caufing it to be fo and not otherwife, in exerting the Aa, without any preceeding Aa to exert that. . If any fhould fay after this Manner,they muft mean one of thefe three Things : Either, (i.j That the determining Aa, tho' it be before the Aa determined in the Order of Nature, yet is not before it in the Order of Time. Or (2) That the determining Aa is not before the Aa determined, either in the Order of Time or Nature, nor is truly diftina from it ; But that the Soul^s determining the Aa of Volition is the fame Thing with it s exerting the Aa of Volition : The Mind's exerting fuch a particular Aa, is it's caufing and determining the Aa. Or, (3.) That Volition has no Caufe, and is no Effea ; but comes into Exiftence, with fuch a particular Determination, without any Ground or Reafon of it's Exiftence and Deter- mination. I ftiall confider thefe diftinaiy. (i.j If all that is meant, be, that the determining Aa is not before the Aa determined in Order of Time, it will not help the Cafe at all, tho' it lliould be allowed. If it be be- 38 Suppo/ecl Evafions PartIL fore the <5etfermin'd A61 in the Order of Nature, being the Caufe or Ground of it's Exiftenee, this as much proves it to Be dil^in(5l from it, and independent on it, as if it were be- fore in the Order of Time. As the Caufe of the particular Motioh of a natural Body in a certain Direcftion, may have fto Diftance as to Time, yet can't be the fame with the Mo- tion effeded by it, but muft be as diftin6t from it, as any other Gaufe, that is before it's Effecfl in the Order of Time : as the Archited is diftindl from the Houfe which he builds, or the Father diftind from the Son which he begets. And if the Acfl of the Will determining be diftin<5l from the A61 de- termined, and before it in the Order of Nature, then we can go back from one to another, 'till we come to the firil in the Series, which has no Ad of the Will before it in the Order of Nature, determining it ; and confequently is an A61 not determined by the Will, and fo not a free Ad, in this Notion of Freedom. And this being the Acft which determines all the Reft, none of them are free Ads. As when there is a Chain of many Links, the firft of which only is taken hold of and drawn by Hand ; all the reft may follow and be mov- ed at the fame Inftant, without any Diftance of Time ; but yet the Motion of one Link is before that of another in the Order of Nature ; the laft is moved by the next, and that by the next, and fo 'till we come to the firft ; which not being moved by any other, but by fomething diftindt from the whole Chain, this as much proves that no Part is moved by any Self-moving Power in the Chain, as if the Motion of one Link followed that of another in the Order of Time. (2.) If any ftiould fay, that the determining Ad is not be- fore the determined Ad, either in the Order of Time, or of Nature, nor is diftinct from it ; but that the Exertion of the Ad is the Determination of the Ad ; That for the Soul to exert a particular Volition, is for it to caufe and determine that Act of Volition : I would on this obferve, that the Thing in Queftion feems to be forgotten, or kept out of Sight, in a Darknefs and Unintelligiblenefs of Speech 5 un- lefs fuch an Objedor would mean to contradid himfelf. The very Ad of Volition it felf is doubtlefs a Determination of Mind ; i. e. it is the Mind's drawing up a Conclufion, or coming to a Choice between two Things, or more, propofed to it. But determining among external ObjeSis of Choice, is not the fame with determining the JSf of Choice it felf,among various poffible Ads of Choice. The Queftion is, What infiuences, direds, or determines the Mind or Will to come to Se(3:.II. conjidered. 39 to fuch a Conclufion or Choice as it does ? or whajt is the Cauie, Ground or Reafon, why it concludes thus, and not Qtherwife ? Now it muft be anrwered,according to theyirminian Notion of Freedom, that the Will influences, orders ancl determines it felf thus to a6t. And if it does, I f^y, it muft be by fome antecedent A^. To fay, it is caufed, influencec| and determined by fomething, and yet not determined by any Thing antecedent, either in Order of Time or Nature, is a Contradi6tion. For that is what is meant by a Thing's be- ing prior in the Order of Nature, that it is fome Way the Caufe or Reafon of the Thing, with Refped to which it is faid to be prior. If the particular A(5t or Exertion of Will, which comes into Exiftence,be anyThing properly determined at all,then ij has fome Caufe of it's exifting, and of it's exifting in fuch ^ particular determinate Manner, and not another ; fome Caufe, whofe Influence decides the Matter : which Caufe i$ diftindt from the EfFe6l, and prior to it. But to fay, that the Will or Mind orders, influences and determines it felf to ex- ert fuch an A6t as it does, by the very Exertion it felf, is to make the Exertion both Cauie & EfFed: j or the exerting fuch an A(5t, to be a Caufe of the Exertion of fuch an A6t. Fo]^ the Queftion is. What is the Caufe and Reafon of the Soul'^ exerting fuch an h&i ? To which the Anfwer is, the Soul ex- erts fuch an A(5t,and that is the Caufe of it. And fo, by this, the Exertion muft be prior in the Order of Nature to it felf, and diftind from it felf. (3.J If the Meaning be, that the Soul's Exertion of fuch a particular Adt of Will, is a Thing that comes to pafs of it felf without any Caufe ; and that there is abfolutely no Ground or Reafon of the Soul's being determined to exert fuch a Volition, and make fuch a Choice, rather than ano- ther ; I fay, if this be the Meaning of Jrmimans^ when they contend fo earneftly for the Will's determining it's own Acts, and for Liberty of Will confifting in Self-determming Power ; they do nothing but confound Themfelves and others with Words without a Meaning. In the Queftion, fP^hat determines the JVill f and in their Anfwer, that the Will determines it felf^ and in all the Difpute about it, it feems to be taken for grant- ed, that fomething determines the W^ill ; and the Controverfy on this Head is not, whether any Thing at all determmes it, or whether it's Determination has any Caufe or Foundation at all ; But where the Foundation of it is, whether in the WiU 40 Evafions conjidered. Part IL Will it felf, or fomewhere elfe. But if the Thing intended be what is above-mention'd, then all comes to this, that No- thing at all determines the Will ; Volitio i having abiblutely no Caufe orFoundation of it'sExiflence,either within, or with- out. There is a great Noife made about Self-determining Power, as the Source of all free A6ts of the Will : But when the Matter comes to be explained, the Meaning is, that no Power at all is the Source of thefe Ads, neither Self-deter- mining Power, nor any other, but they arife from Nothing ; no Caufe, no Power, no Influence, being at all concern'd in the Matter. However, this very Thing, even that the free Ads of the Will are Events which come to pafs without a Caufe, is cer- tainly implied in the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will ; tho' it be very inconfiftent with many other Things in their Scheme, and repugnant to fome Things implied in their No- tion of Liberty. Their Opinion implies, that the particular Determination of Volition is without any Caufe ; becaufe they hold the free Ads of the Will to be Contingent Events ; and Contingence is effential to Freedom in their Notion of it. But certainly, thofe Things which have a prior Ground and Reafoa of their particular Exiftence, a Caufe which antece- dently determines them to be, and determines them to be juft as they are, don't happen contingently. If fomething foregoing, by a caufal Influence and Connedion, determines and fixes precifely their coming to pafs, and the Manner of it, then it don't remain a contingent Thing whether They ihali come to pafs or no. And becaufe it is a Quefl:ion, in many Refpeds, very im- portant in this Controverfy about the Freedom of Will, Whether the free A6ls of the Will are Events which come to pafs without a Caufe ? I (hall be particular in examining this Point in the two following Sedions. SlCTJON Sfea^.ill. No Event without a Caufe. 41 Section III. Whether any Event whatfoeve?\andV oWtxon in particular^ can co77ie to pajs without a Caufe of it's Exijience. i'r . ■ ■■ , ; BEfore I enter on any Argument on this Subje^, I would explain how I would be underftood, when I ufe the Word Caufe in this Difcourfe : fince, for want of a better Word, 1 fliall have Occafion to ufe it in a Senfe which is more extenfive, than that in which it is fometimes ufed* The Word is often ufed in fo retrained a Senfe as to fignify only that which has a pofitive Efficiency or Influence to produce a Thing, or bring it to pafs. But there are many Things tvhich have no fuch pofitive productive Influence ; which yet are Caufes in that Refpe6t, that they have truly the Nature of a Ground or Reafon why fome Things are, rather than others ; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwife. Thus the Abfence of the Sun in the Night, is not the Caufe of the falling of the Dew at that Time, in the fame Manner as it's Beams are the Caufe of the Afcending of the Vapours in the Da) -Time ; And it's Withdrawment in the Winter, is not in the fame Manner the Caufe of the Freezing of the Waters, as it's Approach in the Spring is the Caufe of their Thawing. But yet the Withdrawment or Abfence of the Sun is an Antecedent, with which thefe EfFe(ffs in the Night and Winter are connected, and on which they depend ; and is one Thing that belongs to the Ground and Reafon why they come to pafs at that Time, rather than at other Times ; , tho' the Abfence of the Sun is Nothing pofitive, nor has atiy pojGitive Influence. It may be further obferved, that when I fpeak of ConneSiion ■ef Caufes and Effeds^ I have Refpect to moral Caufes, as well as thofe that are called natural in Diftindion from 'em. Moral Caufes may be Caufes in as proper a Senfe, as any Caufes whatfoever ; may have as real an Influence, and may as truly be the Ground and Reafon of an Event's coming to pafs. Therefore I fometimes ufe theV/ord Caife^ in this Enquiry^ to fignify any AntHidm>i either natural or moral, pofitive or F negative, 42 No Event without a Caufe. Part IL negative, on which an Event, either a Thing, or the Manner and Circumftance of a Thing, fo depends, that it is the Ground and Reafon, either in Whole, or in Part, why it is, rather than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwife j Or, in other Words, any Antecedent with which a confeqiient Event is fo connected, that it truly belongs to the Reafoa why the Proportion which affirms that Event, is true ; whe- ther it has any pofitive Influence, or not. And in an Agrea- blenefs to this, I fometimes ufe the Word Effe^^ for the Confequence of another Thing, which is perhaps rather an Occafion than a Caufe, moft properly fpeaking. I am the more careful thus to explain my Meaning, that I may cut off Occafion, from any that might feek Occafion to cavil and object againft fome Things which I may fay con* cerning the 'Dependance of all Things which come to pafs, on fome Caufe, and their Connection with their Caufe, Having thus explained what I mean by Cauje^ I afTert, that Nothing ever comes to pafs without a Caufe. What is Self- exigent muft be from Eternity, and mull be unchangeable : But as to all lliings that begin to hc^ they are not belf-ex- iftent, and therefore muft have fome Foundation of their Ex- tftence without themfelves. — That whatfoever begins to be, which before was not,muft have a Caufe why it then begins to cxift, fccms to be the firfi: Dictate of the common and natural Senfe which God hath implanted in the Minds of all Mankind, and the main Foundation of all our Reafonings about the Exiftence of Things, paft, prefent, or to come. And this Didate of common Senfe equally refpects Sub- fiances and Modes, or Things and the Manner and Circum- flances of Things. Thus, if we fee a Body which has hither- to been at Reft, ftart out of a State of Reft, and begin to move, we do as naturally and neceffarily fuppofe there is fome Caufe or Reafon of this new Mode of Exiftence, as of the Exiftence of a Body it itM which had hitherto not exifted. And fo if a Body, which had hitherto moved in a certain Direction, fhould fuddenly change the Direction of its Motion ; or if it ftiould put off it's old Figure, and take a new one ; or change it's Colour : the Beginning of thefe new Modes is a new Event, and the Mind of Mankind neceffiarily fuppofes tiiat there \% fome Caufe or Reafon of them» If Seil.III. No Eve?tt without a Caufe. 43 ■ If this grand Principle of common Senfe be taken away, all Arguing tromEffects to Caufes ceafethjand fo all Knowlege of any £x;itence, befides what we have by the moft direct and immediate Intuition. Particularly all our Proof of the Being of God ceafes : We argue his Being from our own Being, ana the Being of othtr Things, which we are fenfibie once were not, but have begun to be ; and from the Being of the World, with all it*s conftituent Parts, and the Manner ot their Kxirtcnce 5 all which we fee plainly are not neceffary in their own Nature, and fo not Self-exiftent, and therefore muil have a Caufe. But if Things, not in themfelves ne- celTary, may begin to be without a Caufe, all this arguing is vain. Indeed, I will not afErm, that there is in the Nature of Th ngs no Foundation for the Knowledge of the Being of God Without any Evidence of it from his Works. I do fup- pofe there is a great Abfurdity, in the Nature of Things fun- p!y confidered, in fuppofing that there fhould be no God, or in denying Being m general, and fuppofmg an eternal, abfolute, univerfal Nothing : And therefore that here would be Foundation of intuitive Evidence that it cannot be, and that eternal infinite moft perfect Being muft be ; if we had Strength and Compreheniion of Mind fafficient, to have a clear Idea of general and univerfal Being, or, which is the fame Thing, of the infinite, eternal, moft perfed di- vine Nature and Eftence. But then we fhould not properly come to the Knowledge of the Being of God by arguing ; but our Evidence would be intuitive : We Ihould fee it, as we fee other Things that are necelTary in themfelves, the Contraries of which are in their own Nature abfurd and con- tradiilory ; as we fee that twice two is four ; and as we fee that a Circle has no Angles. If we had as clear an Idea of univerfal ini'nite Entity, as we have of thefe other Things, I fuppoie we ihould moft intuitively fee the Abfurdity of fuppo- fing fuch Being not to be ; fhould immediately fee there is no Room tor the Queftion, whether it is pofTible that Being, in the moft general abftraded Notion of it, fliould not be. But we have not that Strength and Extent of Mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive independent Man- ner : But the Way that Mankind come to the Knowledge of the Being of God, is that which the Apoftle fpeaks of, Rom. ,\. 20. 77?^ ifjvifihle Things of Him, from the Creation of the IVcrld^ are clearly fe en ; being under fiood by the Things that are made ; even his eternal Power and Godhead, VVe firjl afcend^ and prove a F 2 Pojleriorip 44 J^o 'Event without a Caufe. Part 11. Pofteriorly or from Effedls, that there muft be an eternal Caufe ; and then fecondly^ prove by Argumentation, not In- tuition, that this Being muft be necefTarily ejciftent ; and then thirdly^ from the proved NeceiTity of hisExiftencejWe may defccnd^ and prove ^any of his Perfedlions a Priori, But if once this grand Principle of common Senfe be given up, that what is not necejfary in it felf^ mufl have a Caufe ; an(J •we begin to maintain, that Things may come into Exiftence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of them- felves, without any Caufe \ all our Means of afcending in our arguing from the Creature to the Creator, and all our Evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one Blow. In this Cafe, we can't prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the World, and the Creatures in it, or from the Manner of their Being, their Order, Beauty and Ufe. For if Things may come intp Exiftence without any Caufe at all, then they doubtlefs may without any Caufe anfwerable to the Effed. Our Minds do alike naturally fuppofe and determine both thefe Things j namely, that what begins to be has a Caufe, and alfo that it has a Caufe proportionable and agreable to the EfFea. The fame Principle which leads us to determine, that there cannot be any Thing coming to pafs without a Caufe, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the Effea than in the Caufe. Yea, if once it fhould be allowed, that Things may come to pals without a Caufe, we Ihould not only have no Proof of the Being of _ God, but we (hould be without Evidence of the Exiil:cnce of any Thing whatfoever, but our own imme- diately prefent Ideas and Confcioufnefs. For we have no Wa^ to prove any Thing elfe, but by arguing from Effeas to Caules : from the Ideas now immediately in View, we ar- gue other Things not immediateiy in View : from Senfations now excited in us, we infer the Exiftence of Things without us, as theCaufes of thefe Senfations : And from the :£x- iftence of thefe Things, we argue other Thiigs, which they depend on, as Eflfeas on Caufes. We infer the paft Exift- ence of our Selves, or any Thing elfe, by Memory ; only as we argue, that the Ideas, which are now in our Minds, 5ire the Confequences of paft Ideas and Senfations. We im- piediately perceive nothing elfe but the Ideas which are this Moment extant in our Minds. W^e perceive or know other Things only hy Meam qf thefe, as neceflarily conneaed with othersj Seft.in. No Event without a Caufe. 45 others, and dependent on them. But if Things may b^ without Caufes, all this neceflary Connecftion and Depen- iience is dilTolved, and fo all Means of our Knowledge is gone. ' If there be no Abrurdity or Difficulty in fuppofing one Thing to Hart out of Non-Exiftence, into Being, of ^t felf without a Caufe ; then there is no Abfurdity or Difficulty in fuppofing the fame of Millions of Millions. For Nothing, or no Difficulty multiplied, ftill is Nothing, or no Difficulty : Nothing multiplied by Nothing don't increafe the Sum. And indeed, according to the Hypothefis I am opppfin^, of the A6ts of the Will coming to pafs without a Caufe, it is the Cafe in Fad, that Millions of Millions of Events are continually coming into Exiftence Contingently^ without any Caufe or Reafon v/hy they do fo, all over the World, every Day and Hour, thro' all Ages. So it is in a conftant Suc- ceffion, in every moral Agent. This Contingency, this efficient Nothing, this effectual No-Caufe, is always ready at Hand, to produce this Sort of EfFeds, as long as the Agent exifts, and as often as he has Occalion. If it were fo, that Things only of one Kind, wz. AcSVs of the Will, feem'd to come to pafs of Themfelves'j but thofe of this Sort in general came hito Being thus 5 and it were an Event that was continual, and that happen'd in a Courfe, wherever were capable Subjeds of fuch Events ; this very Thing would demonflrate that there was fome Caufe of theni, which made fuch a Difference between this Event and others, ^nd that they did not really happen contingently. For Con- tingence is blind, and do^s not pick and choofe for a particu- lar Sort of Events. Nothing has no Choice. ThisNo-Caufe, which caufes no Exiftence, can't caufe the Exiftence which comes to pafs, to be of one particular Sort only, diftmguifli'd from all others. Thus, that only one Sort of Matter drops out of the Heavens, even Water, and that this comes fo often, fo conflantly and plentifully, all over the World, in all Ages, Ihows that there is fome Caufe or Reafon of the falling of Water out of the Heavens ; and that fomething beiides meer Contingence has a Hand in the Matter. If we fliould fuppofe Non-entity to be about to bring forth ; and Things were coming into Exiftence, without any Caufe or Antecedent, on which the Exiftence, or Kind or Manner of Exiftence depends ; or which could at all determine whe- ther the Things (hould be 5 Stones, or Stars, or Beafts, or Angels, 46 Volition arifes not Part 11. Angels, or human Bodies, or Souls, or only fome new Mo- tion or Figure in natural Bodies, or fome new Senfations in Animals, or new Ideas in the human Uoderftanding, or new Volitions in the Will J or any Thing elfe of all the infinite Number of Poflibles ; then certainly it would not be expect- ed, altho' many Millions of Millions of Things are coming into Exiftence in this Manner, all over the Face of the Earth, that they fhould all be only of one particular Kind, and that it fliould be thus in all Ages, and that this Sort of Exiftences fliould never fail to come to pafs where there is Room for them, or a Subjecft capable of them, and that conftantly, whenever there is Occafion for them. If any fhould imagine, there is fomething in the Sort of Event that renders it poffible for it to come into Exiftence without a Caufe ; and fhould fay, that the free Acfts of the Will are Exiftences of an exceeding different Nature from other Things ; by Reafon of which they may come into Ex- iftence without any previous Ground or Reafon of it, tho* other Things cannot ; If they make this Objedion in good Earneft, it would be an Evidence of their ftrangely forget- ing themfelves : For they would be giving an Account of fome Ground of the Exiftence of a Thing, when at the fame Time they would maintain there is no Ground of it's Exift- ence. Therefore I would obferve, that the particular Nature of Exiftence, be it never fo diverfe from others, can lay no Foundation for that Thing's coming into Exiftence without a Caufe ; becaufe to fuppofe this, would be to fuppofe the particular Nature of Exiftence to be a Thing prior to the Exiftence ; and fo a Thing which makes Way for Exift- ence, with fuch a Circumftance, namely without a Caufe or Reafon of Exiftence. But that which m any Refpe6t makes Way for a Thing's coming into Being, or tor any Manner or Circumftance of iv's firft Exiftence, muft be prior to the Exiftence. The diftinguiftiM Nature of the EfFea, which is fomething belonging to the Effe6t, can't have Influence backward, to ad before it is. The peculiar Nature of that Thing called Volition, can do Nothing, can have no Influ- ence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for it's Influence : for then the Thing has made fure of Exiftence already, without it's Help. So that it is indeed as repugnant to Reafon, to fuppofe that an Adl of the Will ftiouid come into Exiftence without a Caufe, as to fuppofe the human Soul, or an Angel, or the §e6l.IV. withmt a Caufe. 47 the Globe of the Earth, or the whole Univerfe, (hould come into Exigence without a Caufe. And if once we allow, that fuch a Sort of Effed as a Volition may come to pafs without a Caufe, how do we know but that many other Sorts of Effe<5ls may do fo too ? 'Tis not the particular Kind of EfFedt that makes the Abfurdity of fuppofmg it has being without a Caufe, but fomething which is common to all Things that ever begin to be, viz, that they are not Self- exiftent, or ncceflary in the Nature of Things. Section IV. , Whether Volition can arife without a Caujhy through the Activity of the Nature of the SouL THE Author of the Efay on the Freedom of the TFilI in God and the Creatures^ in Anfwer to that ObjecStion againft his Dodrine of a Self-determining Power in the Will, (P. 68,69.) ThatNothlng is,or cvmes to fafs^without afuffident Reafon why it is, and why it is in this Manner rather than another ^ allows that it is thus in corporeal Things, which are -properly ond philofophically fp caking pajjive Beings ; but denies that it is thus in Spirits^ which are Beings of an aSfive Nature^ who have the Spring of ASiion within thejnfelveSy and can determine them-- felves. By which it is plainly fuppofed, that fuch an Event as an Ad of the Will, may come to pafs in a Spirit, without ^ fufficicnt Reafon why it comes to pafs, or why it is after this Manner, rather than another ; by Reafon of the Acti- vity of the Nature of a Spirit.—— But certainly this Author, in this Matter, mull be very unwary and inadvertent. For, I. The Objedion or DifRculty propofed by this Author, feems to be forgotten in his Anfwer or Solution. The very Difficulty, as he himfelf propofes it, is this ; How an Event can come to pafs witiwut a fufpcient Reafcn why it is, or why it is in this Manner rather than another f Inftead of folving this Difficulty, or aniwenng this Queflion with Regard to Voli- tion, as he propofes, he forgets himfelf, and anfwers ano- ther Queftjon quite divcrfe, and wholly inconfiftent with this, vis:.. What is a fufficient Reafon why it is, and why it is in 48 Volition not without a Caufe Part II. in this Manner rather than another ? And he afTigns the Active Being's own Determination as the Caufe, and a Caufe fufficient for the EfFe6t ; and leaves all the Difficulty ilrirefolved, and the Queftion unanfwered, which yet returns, ^ven, How the Soul's own Determination, which he fpeaks of, came to exift, and to be what it was without a Caufe ? The Adivity of the Soul may enable it to be the Caufe of Efffedts' ; but it doA't at all enable or help it to be the Sub- je<5t of Effedts which have no Caufe ; which is the Thing this Author fuppof^s concerning A6ls of the Will. Activity of Nature will no more enable a Being to produce Effeds, and determine the Manner of their Exiftence, within it felf, without a Caufe, than out of it felf, in fome other Being. But if an adive Being (hould, through it's Adivity, produce and determine an Effedl in fome external Objecl, how abfurd would it be to fay, that theEffedt was produced without a Caufe ! 2. The Queftion is not fo much. How a Spirit endowed with Adivity comes to acSt, as why it exerts fuch an A61, \ and not another ; or why it ads with fuch a particular De- ;; termination ? If Adivity of Nature be theCaufe why a Spirit '' (the Soul of Man for Inltance) ads, and don't lie ftill ; yet j that alone is not the Caufe why it's Adion is thus and thus ( limited, directed and determined. Adlive Nature is a general \ Thing ; 'tis an Ability or Tendency of Nature to Adion, generally taken ; which may be a Caufe why the Soul ,j ads as Occafion or Reafon is given ; but this alone ■■. can't be a fufficient Caufe why the Soul exerts fuch ' a particular Ad, at fuch a Time, rather than others. ' In order to this, there muft be fomething befides a general \ Tendency to Adion ; there muft alfo be a particular Ten- ] dency to that individual Adion. If it ftiould be afked, I why the Soul of Man ufes it's Adivity in fuch a Manner as 1 it does ; and it ftiould be anfwered, that the Soul ufes it's ■; Adivity thus, rather than otherwife, becaufe it has Adivity ; \ would fuch an Anfwer fatisfy a rational Man ? Would it ] not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one I 'i 3. An adive Being can bring no Effeds to pafs by his ' Adivity, but what are confequent upon his ading : He pro- I duces Nothing by his Adivity, any other Way than by the \ Exercife of his Adivity, and fo Nothing but the Fruits of i it's Exercife : He brings Nothing to pafs by a dormant I Adivity. But the Exercife of his Adivity is Adion ; and fo ' his Adion, or Exercife of his Adivity, roufi; be prior to the , Sedl-IV. thro the SouTs Adlivity. 49 EfFe(5ts of his Acclivity. If an a6live Being produces an EfFe6l in another Beings about which IiiSJ*' Activity is convcr- fant, the EfFe6l being the Fruit of his Ailivity, his A6ti- vity muft be firft exercifed or exerted, and the Effect of it muft follow. So it murt: be, with equal Reafon, if the a6live Being is his own Objev5t, and his Acflivity is conver- fant about Himfelf, to produce and determine fome Eifedl in himfelf ; ftill the Exercife of his AvStivity muft go before the Effect, which he brings to pafs and determines by it. And therefore his A6tivity can't be the Caufe of the Deter- mination of the firft A6lion, or Exerciie of Adivity it feJf, whence the Effeds of A6livity arife \ for that would imply aContradi6tion ; It would be to fay,the firft Exercife of Adivity is before the firft Exercife of A6tivity, and is the Caufe of it. 4. That the Soul, tho' an a6live Subftance, can't dherjify it's own Ads, but by firft a6ting ; or be a determinmg Caufe of different Ads, or any different Effeds, fometimes of one Kind, and fometmies of another, any other Way than in Confequence 6f it's own diverfe Ads, is manifeft by this ; That if fo, then the faine Caufe, the fame caufal Power, Force or Influence, ivkhout Variation in any Refpe£fy would produce different Effeds at different Time's. For the fame Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and the fame adive Nature of the Soul before it is exerted (i, e. before in the Order of Naturej would be the Caufe of different Effeds, "uiz, different Volitions at diff'erent Times. But the Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and it's adive Nature before it is exerted, are the fame without Variation. For 'tis fome Ad that makes the firft Variation in the Caufe, as to any caufal Exertion, Force or Influence. But if it be fo, that the Soul has no different Caufality, or diverfe caufal Force or Influence, in producing thefe diverfe Effeds , then 'tis evident, that the Soul has no Influence, no Hand in the d'iverfity of the Effed ; and that the Difference of the Effed can't be owing to any Thing in the Soul ; or which is the fame Thing, the Soul don't determine the Diverfity of the Effed ; which is contrary to the Supp9fition. 'Tis true, the Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and before there is any Difference in that Refped, may be in a different State and Circumftances : But thofe whom I oppofe, v/ill not: allov/ the diff"erent Circumftances of the Soul to be the de- termining Caufes of the i\ds of the Vv^'ill • as being con- trary to tiieir Notion of Self-detenninatiou and Self-motiou, 50 Volition not without a Caufe &c. Part IL 5. Let us fuppofe, as thefe Divines do, that there are no Aas of the Soul, ftriaiy fpeaking, but free Volitions ; Then it will follow, that the Soul is an a^ive Being in Nothing further than it is a voluntary or ele6tive Being ; and whepever it produces EfFeds aaively, it produces Effeds voluntarily and eledively. But to produce Effeds thus, is the fame Thing as to produce Effects in Confequence of^ and according to it's own Choice. And if fo, then furely the Soul don't by it's Adtivity produce all it's own Ads of Will or Choice themfeives : For this, by the Suppofition, is to produce all it's free A6ls of Choice voluntarily and eledive- ly, or in Confequence of it's own free Ads of Choice, which brings the Matter diredly to the fore-mentioned Contra- diction, of a free A6t of Choice before the tirft free Ad of Choice. According to thefe Gentlemen's own Notion of Adion, if there arifes in the Mind a Volition without a free Ad of the Will or Choice to determine and produce it, the Mind is not the adive voluntary Caufe of that Voli- tion ; becaufe it don't arife from, nor is regulated by Choice or Defign» And therefore it can't be, that the Mind fliould be the adive, voluntary, determining Caufe of the lirft and leadmg Volition that relates to the Affair. The Mind's htv!\% 2i dcfigning Q-^wit^ only enables it to produce Effeds in Confequence of it's Defign ; it will not enable jit to be the defigning Caufe of all it's own Defigns. The Mind's being an ele^live Caufe, will only enable it to produce Effeds in Confequence of it's Ele£iions^ and according to them ; but can't enable it to be the eledive Caufe of all it's own Elec- tions ; becaufe that fuppofes an Eiedion before the firft E- ledion. So tli£ Mind's being an .ja^ive Caufe enables it to produce Effeds in Confequence of it's own ASfs^ but can't enable it to be the determining Caufe of all it's own Ads ; for that is ftill in the fame Manner a Contradidion ; as it fuppoles a determining Act converfant about the firft Act, and prior to it, having a caufal Influence on it's Exiftence, and Manner of Exiftence. I can conceive of Nothing elfe that can be meant by the Soul's having Power to caufe and determine it's own Voli- tions, as a Being to whom God has given a Power of Adion, but this j that God has given Power to the Soul, fometimes at leaft, to excite Volitions at it's Pleafure, or according as it chufes. And this certainly fuppofes,- in all fuch Caics, a Choice preceeding all Volitions which are thus Sedt. V. Thefe Evaftons imdertinent. 5 1 thus caufed, even the very firft of them. Which runs into the fore-mentioned great Abfurdity. Therefore the Activity of the Nature of the Soul affords no Rehef from the Difficulties which the Notion of a Self- determining Power in the Will is attended with, nor will it help, in the leaii, it's Abfurdities and Inconfiftences. I . Section V, Shewing^ that if the Things ajferted in thefc -Eva/tons JJjould be fuppofed to be true ^ they are altogether imperti7unty and can t \ help the Caufe ^Arminian Liberty ; And how f this being the State of the Cafe ) Arminian Writers are obliged to talk in- confjiently. WHAT was lad obferved in the preceeding Se(5Vion may {hew, not only that the adive Nature of the Soul can't be a Reafon why any AcSt of the Will is, or why it is in this Manner, rather than another ; but alio that if it could be fo, and it could be proved that Volitions are contingent Events, in that Senfe, that their Being and Manner of Being is not fix'd or determined by any Caufe, or any Thing antecedent -, it would not at all ferve the Pur- pofe of Armimans^ to eftablifh the Freedom of the Will, ac- cording to their Notion of it's Freedom, as confilting in the Will's Determination ofit'i felf; which fuppofes every free Aa of the Will to be determined by fome Ad of the W^ill going before to determine it ; in as much as for the Will to determine a Thing, is the fame as for the Soul to determine a Thing by Willing ; and there is no ^Vay that the Will can determine an A<51 of the Will, than by xc77/;;z^ that A6t of the Will, or, which is the fame Thing, chufing it. So that here muft be two Ads of the Will in the Cafe, one goin^ before another, one converfant about the other, and the lat- ter the Objedt of the former, and chofen by the former. G % If 52 Thefe EvaJ^om impertinent. Pattll. If the Will don't c^ufe and determine the Act by Choice, it don't caufe or determine it at all ; for that which is hot. determined by Choice, is not determined voluntarily or' nx-iIUngly : And to fay, that the Will determines fomething. >^/hich the Soul don't determine willingly, is as much as to fiy, that fomething is done by the Will, which the Soul don't do with it's Will. So that if Armiman Liberty of Will, confifting in the Will's determining it's own Ads, be maintained, the old Abfurdity and Contradiction muft be maintained, that every free A61 of Will is caufed and determined by a foregoing free Aa of Will. Which don't confift with the free Aa's anfing 'yvithout any Caufe, and being fo contingent, as not be fix'd by any Thing fore-going. So that this Evafion muft be given i/p, as not at ail relieving, and as that which, inftead of fup- porting this Sort of Liberty, diredly deflroys it. And if it {hould be fuppofed, that the Soul determines it's own Acfts of Will fome other Way, than by a foregoing A6t of Will ; ftill it will not help the Caufe of their Liberty of Will. \{ it determines them by an Act of the Under- flanding, or fome other Power, then the IVtll don't deter- mine it J elf ', and fo the S:lf-deter?nming Power of the Will is given up. And what Liberty is there exercifed, according to their own Opinion of Liberty, by the Soul's being deter- mined by fomething befides ifs own Choice P The Acts pf the WilJ, it is true, may be directed, and effe(5laally deter- mined and lix'd ; but it is not done by the Soul's own Will and Pleafiire : There is no Exercife at all of Choice or Will in producing the Effect ; And if If^i/l and Choice are not exercifed in it, how is the Liberty of the Will exercifed in it ? So th at \ct Jnnimans turn which Way they pleafe with their Notion of Liberty, confuting in the Will's determining it's own ASsy their Kotion deftroys it felf. If they hold every free Act of Will to be determined by the Soul's own free Choice, or foregqing free A6t of Will 5 foregoing^ either in the Order of Time, or Nature ; It implies that grofs Contra- diction, that the tirft free A^<:? of the Soul, and not an ACt of Will or Choice, Tl is aifodefcroys their Notion of Liberty, confining in the A6ts of the Wiil being determined by the fVill it felf \ Or . • ■ if ^ci:.V. Arminians talk inconfiftently. 53 if they hold that the A6ls of the Will are determined by Nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contin- fent in that Senfe, that they are determined and fixed by no 'aufe at all ; this alfo deftroys their Notion of Liberty, con- fifting in the Will's determining it's own Ads. This being the true State of the Jr?nwia7i Notion of Li- berty, it hence coines to pafs, that the Writers that defend it are forced into grofs Liconfidences, in what they fay upon this Subje61:. To inftance in Dr. JVhitby ; he in hisDifcourfe on the Freedom of the Will, * oppofes the Opinion of the Cahinifis^ who place Man's Liberty only in a Poiuer of doing what He w'lll^ as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hohbes. And yet he himfelf mentions the very fame Notion of Liberty, as the Didate of the Senfe and coinmon Reafon of Mankind^ and a Rule laid down by the Light of Nature ; viz. That Liberty is a Power of aofing from our Selves^ or DOING WHAT WE IflLL. t This is indeed, as he fays, a Thing agreable to the ^enfe and comrnon R:afcn of Mank'.nd ; 'and therefore 'tis not To much to be v^7ondered at, that he unawares acknow- ledges it agaiaft himielf : For if Liberty don't confift in this, what ejfe can be deviled that it fliould confift in ? If it be faid, as Dr. Whitby elfewhere iniifts, That it don't only con- fiil in Liberty of doing zvhat we will^ but alfo a Liberty of Willing without Neceflity ; dill the Queftien returns. What does that Liberty of willing without Necefuty coniift in, but in a Fovver of willing as we pleafe^ without being impeded by a contrary Neceillty ? or in other Words, A Liberty for the Soul in it's wiliing to acft according to it's own Choice P Yea, this very Thing the fame Author feems to allow, and fup- pcfi again and again, in the Ufe he makes of Sayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his Vouchers. Thus he cites thefe Words of Origen, which he produces as a Teftimony on his Side ; j| The Soul aSfs By HER OJl^ CHOICE, and it is free for her to incline to zvhat ever Part SHE WILL. ,And thofe Words of fujiin Martyr ; % ^'^^ Do^rine of the ChrijVians is this. That Nothing is dons or ftijfered according to Fate, but that eim-y Man doth Good or Evil ACCORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE. And from Eufebius, thefe Words ; 4- If Fate be ejlablifh'd, Philofophy and Piety are overthrown. — Ail thefe Things depending upon the NeceJJity introduced by the Stars^ and * In his Book on the five Points, 2d Edit. P. 350, 35i,3>-- + Ibid. p. 325, 326. jl Ibid, P. 342. % Ibid. P.3 6o. \Itid. ^' 363- 54 Arminians talk inconfiftently. Part II. md not upon Meditation and Exertife PROCEEDING FROM OUR Om^ FREE CHOICE. And again, the Words- of Macaritis^ || God^ to preferve the Liberty of Mali's TVill^ Juffered their Bodies to die^ that it might he IN THEIR CHOICE to turn to Good or Evil. — They who are aSied by the Holy Spirit^ are not held under any Nccejjity^ hut have Liberty to turn themfelves^ ^md DO WHAT THEY WILL in this Life. Thus, the Do<5lor in EfFe6l comes into that very No- tion of Liberty, which the Calvinijis have ; which he at the fame Time condemns, as agreeing with the Opinion of Wx. HohbeSy namely, the Soul's Aciing by it's oivn Choice, Aden's doing Good or Evil according to their own free Choice^ Their being in that Exertife which proceeds from their own free Choice, Having it in their Choice to turn to Good or Evil, and doing what they zvilL So that if Men exercife this Liberty in the Acts of the Will themfelves, it muft be in exerting A6ts of Will as they will, or according to their own free Choice ; or exerting Acts of Will that proceed frcin their Choice. And if it be fo, then let every one judge whether this don't fuppofe a free Choice going be- fore the free kdi of Will, or whether an Acl: of Choice don't go before that A6t of the Will which proceeds from it. And if it be thus with all free Ads of the Will, then let eveiy one judge, vv'hether it won't follow^ that there is a free Choice or Will going before the firft free A61 of the Will exerted in the Cafe. And then let every one judge, whetlier this be not a Contradicftion. And finally, let every one uidge whether in the Scheme of thefe Writers tliere be any rolfibility of avoiding thefe Abfurdities. If Liberty confifts, as Dr. Whiiby hinifelf fays, in a Man's doing what He will ; and a Man exercifes this Liberty, not only in external A(5lions, but in the Ads of the Will 'them- felves ; then fo far as Liberty is exercifed in the latter, it confifts in willing what he wills : And if any fay fo, one of thefe two Things muft be meant, either i. That a Man has Power to Will, as he docs will ; becaufe w^hat he wills, he wills ; and therefore has Power to will what he has Power to will. If this be their Meaning, then all this mighty Con- troverfy about Freedom of the Will and Self-determining Power, comes wholly to Nothing ; all that is contended for being no more than this, That the Mind of Man does >ijvhat it does, and is the Subjed of w^hat it is the Subjed of, or X Ibid. 369, 370. . ^QiN\. Of chujing in Things indifferent, 55 ©r that what is, is ; wherein None has any Controverfy v/ith them. Or, 2. The Meaning muft be, that a Man has Power to will as he J)leafes or chufcs to will : That is, he has Power by one A61 of Choice, to chufe another ; by an antecedent Ad of Will to chufe a confequent A(5t ; and therein to execute his own Choice. And if this be their Meaning, it is Nothing but Shuffling with thofe they difputc with, and baffling their own Reafon. For ftill the Queftion returns, wherein lies Man's Liberty in that antecedent Adi of Will which chofe the confequent A61. The Anfwer ac- cording to the fame Principles muft be, that his Liberty in this alio lies in his willing as he would, or as he chofe, or agreable to another A(5t of Choice preceeding that. And fo the Queftion returns in infinitu?n^ and the like Anfwer muft be made in infinitum : In order to fupport their Opinion, there muft be no Beginning, but free Ads of Will muft have • been chofen by foregoing free Ads of Will, in the Soul of every Man, without Beginning ; and fo before he had a ' Being, from all Eternity. Section VI. Concerning theWilPs determining inT'hings which are perfeBly indifferent, in the V , J^iew of the Mind. A Great Argument for Self-determining Power, is the fuppofed Experience we univerfally have of an Ability to determine our Wills, in Cafes wherein no prevail- ing Motive is prefented : The Will (as is fuppofed) has It's Choice to make between two or more Things, that are perfedly equal in the View of the Mind ; and the Will is apparently altogether indifferent ; and yet we find no Diffi- culty in coming to a Choice ; the Will can inftantly deter- mine it felf to one, by a fovereign Power which it has over it felf, without being moved by any preponderating Induce- ment. Thus 56 Of chujing in Things mdi&xQnt. PartIL Thus the forementioned Author of an Effay on the Freedom cfthe Will &c. P. 25, 26, 27, fuppofes, ^' That there are *' many Inftances, wherein the Wiil is determined neither " by prefcnt Uneafinefs, nor by the greatefi: apparent Good, '' nor by the laft Didate of the Underfiand ng, nor by '' any Thing elfe, but meerly by it feif, as a Sovereign Self- *' determining. Power of the Soui ; and that the Soul does " not will this or that A(5tion, in fome Cafes, by any other ^' Influence, but becaufe it will. Thus (fays he) I can turn *' my Face to the South, or the North ; I can point with my '' Finger -upward, or downward. And thus, in fome Ca- *' fes, the Will determines it felf in a very fovereign Man- >* ner, becaufe it will, without a Reafon borrowed from the *' Underftanding : and hereby it diicovers. it's own perfe6t *' Power of Choice, riling from within it felf, and free from '' all Influence or Reftraint of any Kmd." And in Pages 66, 70, ^73, 74. This Author very exprcfly fuppofes the Will in many Cafes to be determined by no Motive at all^ and aSls altogether without Motive, or Ground oj Preference, — Here I would obferve, I. The very Suppofltion which is here made, dire^lly con- tradicSts and overthrows it felf. For the Thing fuppofed, wherein this grand Argument confifl:s,is. That among feveral Things the Will a6hial]y chufes one before another, at the fame Time that it is perfectly indiflferent ; which is the very fame Thing as to fay, the Mind has a Preference, at the fame Time that it has no Preference. What is meant can't be, that the Mind is indifferent before it comes to have a Choice, or 'till it has a Preference ; or, which is the fame Thing, that the Mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent. For certainly this Author did not fuppofe he had a Controverfy with any Perfon in fuppofing this. And then it is Nothing to his Purpofe, that the Mind which chufes, was indifferent once ; unlefs it chufes, remaining in- different ; for otherv^^ife, it don't chufe at all in that Cafe of Indifference, concerning which is all the Qiief^ion. Befides, it appears in Fa6f, that the Thing which this Author fup- pofes, is not that the Will chufes one Thing before ano- ther, concerniiig which it is indifferent before it chufes ; but alfo is indifferent when it chufes \ and that it's being otherwife than indifferent is not 'till afterwards, in Confequence of 'it's Choice ; that the chofen Thing's appearing preferable and more agrcable than anotherj arifes from it's Choice His Words are fP. 30.J *' Where the Ob- Sed.VI. Ofchujing inThings indifferent. 57 *« je(5ts which are propofed, appear equally fit or good, the " Will is left without a Guide or Diredor ; and therefore " mull make it's own Choice, by it's own Determination ; it " being properly a Self-determining Power. And in fuch *< Cafes theWill does as it were make a Good to it felf by it's *'~ own Choice, /. e. creates it's own Pleafure or Delight ** in this Self-chofen Good. Even as a Man by feizing *' upon a Spot of unoccupied Land, in an uninhabited *' Country, makes it his own Poffeffion and Property, and *l as fuch rejoyces in it. Where Things were indifferent " before, the Will finds Nothing to make them more agrea- ** ble, confidered meerly in themfelves ; but the Pleafure it « feels ARISING FROM IT'S OWN CHOICE, and it's " Perfeverance therein. We love many Things which we « have chofen, AND PURELY BECAUSE W^E CHOSE « THEM." This is as much as to fay, that we firft begin to prefer many Things, now ceafmg any longer to be indifferent with Refpe6l to them, purely becaufe we have prefer'd and chofen them before. Thefe Things muil needs be fpoken incon- fiderately by this Author. Choice or Preference can't be before it felf, in the fame Inftance, either in the Order of Time or Nature : It can't be the Foundation of it {^iiy or the Fruit or Confequence of it felf. The veryAdl of chufing one Thing rather than another^ is preferring that Thing, and that is fetting a higher Value on that Thing. But that the 'Mind fets an higher Value on oneThing than another,is not, in the firil Place, the Fruit of it's fetting a higher Value on that Thing. This Author fays, P. 36. " The Will may be perfectly In- f** different, and yet the Will may determine it felf to chufe *' one or the other." And again in the fame Page, " I am *' entirely indifferent to either ; and yet my Will may de- *' termine it felf to chufe." And again, ''Which I fhall chufe *' muft be determined by the meer A6t of my Will." If the Choice is determined by a meer A€t of V/ili, then the Choice is determined by a meer A(fl of Choice. And concerning this Matter, vi%. that the Ad of the Will it felf is determined by an A6t of Choice, this Writer is exprefs, in P.72. Speaking of the Cafe, where there is no fuperiour Fit- nefs in Objedls prefented, he has thefe Words : " There it « muft aa by it's own CHOICE, and determine it k\i as it PLEASES." Where it is fuppofed that the very Deter- II jmnation^ 38 Of the Will's determinhig Part II. mination^ which is the Ground and Spring of the WilFs Ad, \% Tin KQi oi Choice 2iW^ Plea jure ^ wherein one A(5t ,is more agreable, and the Mmd better pleafed in it than another ; and this Preference^ and fuperiour Pleafednefs is the Ground of " all it does in the Cafe. And if fo, the Mind is not indiffe- rent when it determines it k\^, but had rather do one Thing than another, had rather determine it felf one Way than another. And therefore the Will don't ad at ail in In- difference ; not fo much as in th^ firft Step it takes, or the " firft Rife and Beginning of it's ading. If it be poffible foi* the Underftanding to a6l in Indifference, yet to be fure the Will never does ; becaufe the Will's beginning to ad is the very fame Thing as it's beginning to chufe or pr fer. And if in the very iirlt Ad of the Will, the Mind prefers fome- thing, then the Idea of that Thing prefer'd, does at that Time preponderate, or prevail in the Mind ; or, which is the fame Thing, the Idea of it has a prevailing Influence on the Will. So that this wholly deftroys the Thing fuppofed, 'vix. That the Mind can by a fovereign Power chufe one of two or more Things, which in the View of the Mind are, in every Reiped, pcrfedly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing Influence on the Mind above another. So that this Author, in his grand Argument for the Abi- lity of the Will to chufe one of two, or more Things, concerning which it is perfedly indifferent, does at the fame Time, in Effed, deny the Thing he fuppofes, and allows «nd aflerts the Point he endeavours to overtlirow ; even that the Will, in chufing, is fubjed to no prevailing Influence of the Idea, or View of the Thing chofen. And indeed it is im;:)offibl& to offer this Argument without overthrowing it ; the Thing fuppofod in it being inconfiftent with it felf, and that which denies it felf. To fuppofe the Will to ad at all in a State of perfcd Indifference, either to determine it felf, or to do any 'I^hing elfej is to affert that the Mind chufe s without chufing. To fay that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleafes, is to fay that it can follow it's Plea- fure, when it has no Pleafure to follow. And therefore if there be any Difficulty in the Inftances of two Cakes, or two Eggs kc. which are exactly alike, one as good as another ; concerning which this Author iuppofes the Mind in Fad has a Choice^ and fo in Puffed fuppofes that it has a Preference ; it as much concern'd Himfeif to folve the Difliculty, as it "does thofe whom he oppofes. For if thefe Inftances prove Sed.VI. in Things indifferent. 59 any Thing to his Purpofe, they prove that a Man chufes without Choice. And yet this is not to his Purpoie ; be- caufe if this is what he allerts, his own Words are as much ^gainft him, and do as much contradidl him, as the"* Words of thofe he difputes againft can do. 2. There is no great Difiicuhy in (liewing, in fuch Inftan- ces as are ailedged, not only that it mhfi needs he fo^ that tlie Mind muft be influenced m it's Choice, by fomething that has a preponderating Influence upon it, but aUb how it is Jo. A little Attention to our own Experieace, and a diftincft Confideration of the Ads of our own Minds in fuch Cafes, will be fuflicient to clear up the Matter. Thus, fuppoling T have a Chefs-board before me ; and becaufe I am required by a Superiour, or defired by a Friend, ■or to make fome Experiment concerning my own Ability and Jyiberty, or on fome other Coniideration, I am determined -to touch fome one of the Spots or Squares on the 2oard with ,my Finger ; not being limited or directed in the firit Propo- fal, or my own firfl: Purpofe, which is general, to any one Jn particular ; and there being nothing in the Squares in themfelves confidered, that recommends any one of all the fixty four, more than another : In this Cafe, my Mind de- termines to give it felf up to what is vulgarly called Accident^ f ;by determining to touch that Square which happens to be ^mofl: in View, which my Eye is efpecially upon at that Mo- .ment, or which happens to be then moll in my Mind, or .which I fliali be directed to by fome other fuch-like Accident. :Here are feveral Steps of the Mind's proceeding (tho' all jmay be done as it were in a Moment) the firji Step is it's .^^;z^^ or /^z^^/' one rather than another; but not becaufe it chufes the Thing taken^ cv touch' dy but from foreign Confiderations. The Cafe may be fo, that of two Things offered, a Man may, for certain Reafons, chufe and prefer the taking of that which he undervcdues^ and chufe to negle6t to take that which his Mind prefers, Ii> fuch a Cafe, chufmg the Thing taken, and chufing to take, are diverfe : and fo they are in a Cafe where the Things prefented are equal in the Mind's Eileem, and neither of them preferred. All that Fad and Experience makes evi- dent, is, that the Mind chufes one Adion rather than ano- ther. And therefore the Arguments which they bring, in order to be to their Purpofe, ought to be to prove that the Mind chufes the A6lion in perfedt Indifference, with Refpecl to that Action \ and not to prove that the Mind chufes the A6tion in perfed Indifference with Refpe6t to the 0hje5f 5 which is very poffible, and yet the Will not ad at all with- out prevalent Inducement, and proper Preponderation. 2. Another Reafon of Confufion and Diihcuity in this Matter, feems to be, not diflinguilhing between a general Indifference, or an Indifference with Refped to what is to be done in a more diilant and general View of it, and a par- ticular Indifference, or an Indifference with Refped to the next immediate Ad, view'd with it's particular and prefent Circumftances. A Man may be perfectly indiffer-ent with Refped to his own Aciions^ in the former Refped ; and yet not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing Inftance of touch- ing one of the Squares of a Chefs-board ; when 'tis firfl. propofed that I fhould touch one of them, I may be per- fedly indifferent which I touch ; becaufe as yet I view the Matter remotely and generally, being but in the firfl Step of the Mind's Progrefs in the Affair. But yet, when, I am adually come to the lafl Step, and the very next Thing to be determined is, which is to be touch'd, having already determined that I will touch that which happens to be. mofl: in my Eye or Mind, and my Mind .being now fix'd on \ a particular one, the Ad of touching that, confidered thus ^ immediately, and in thefe particular prefent Circumflances^ is not what my Mind is abfolutely indifferent about. Section Sedl.VII. Of Liberty ^t/" Indifference. 63" Section VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will confft'ing in Indifference. X Tt 7 HAT has been faid in the foregoing Section, has a \/ 1/ Tendency in feme Meafure to evince theAbfurdity » ^ of the Opinion bf fuch as place Liberty in Indiffe- rence, .or in that Equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent Determination or Bias, and left hitherto free from any prepoffeffing Inclination to one Side or the other ; that the Determination of the Will to either Side may be entirely from it felf, and that it may be owing only to it's own Power, and that Sovereignty which it has over it felf, that it goes this Way rather than that. || But in as much as this has been of fuch long ftanding, and ,has been fo generally received, and fo much infilled on by Pelagians^ Semi-Pelagians^ Jefuits^ Socin'ianSy Jrminians^ and others, it may delerve a more full Confideration* And therefore I ihall now proceed to a more particular and tho- rough Enquiry into thjs Notion. But I Dr. Whithy, and fome other Arminiam^ make a Diftinftion of dif- ferent Kinds of Freedom ; one of God, and perfeft Spirits above; another of Perfons in a State of Trial. The former Dr. Whlthy allows to confill with Necefliiy ; the latter he holds to be without Neceffity : And this latter he fuppofes to be requifite to our being the Subje^ls of Praife or Difpraife, Rewards or Punifhments, Pre- cepts and Prohibitions, Promifes and Threats, Exhortations and Dehortations, and a Covenant-Treaty. And to this Freedom he fuppofes Indifference to be requifite. In Kis Difcourfe on the iivc Points, P. 299, 300, he fays ; *' It is a Freedom (fpeaking of a Free- ** dom not only from Co-a61ion,but from NeceiTity) requifite,as we " conceive, to render us capable of Trial or Probation, and to " render our Anions worthy of Praife or Difpraife, and our Per- " fons of Rewards or Punifhments." And in the next Page,fpeak- 5ng of the fame Matter, He fays, " Excellent to this Purpofe, •* are the Words of Mr. l^horndike : We fay noty that Indifference is *' requifite to a' I Freedom y but to the Freedom of Man alone in this ** State of Trwvail and Froficience : theGround of to be the free i A<51. ] And 3 Seft.VL in IndiiFerence. 65 And here I would obferve in Xhtfrji Place, that to make out this Scheme of Liberty, the Indifference mull be per-* fe£l and abfolute ; there muft be a perfect Freedom from all antecedent Prepondcration or Inclination. Becaufe if the Will be already inchned, before it exerts it's own fovereign Power on it felf, then it's Inclination is not wholly owing to it felf : If when two Oppofites are propofed to the Soul for it's Choice, the Propofal don't find the Soul wholly in a State of Indifference, then it is not found in a State of Li-^ berty for meer Self-determination. The leaft Degree of antecedent Bias muft be inconfiftent with their Notion of Liberty. For fo long as prior Inclination poffeffes the Will, and is not removed, it binds the Will, fo that it is utterly impoffible that the Will ffould a6l otherwife than agreably to ft. Surely the Will can't a6t or chufe contrary to a re- maining prevailing Inclination of the Will. To fuppofs otherwife, would be the fame Thing as to fuppofe, that the Will is inclined contrary to it's prefent prevailing inclination^ or contrary to what it is inclmed to. That which the Will chufes and prefers, that, all Things confidered, it prepon- derates and inchnes to. It is equally impoffible for the Vv^iil to chufe contrary to it's own remaining and prefent preponderating Inclination, as 'tis to prefer contrary to it's own prefent Preference^ or chufe contrary to it's own prefent Choice. The Will therefore, fo long as it is under the Influence of an old preponderating Inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free x^ct, or any Act that (hall now be an A61 of Self-determination. The A<5t which is a Self- determin'd free A6t, muft be an A61 v/hich the Will de- termines in the Poffeffion and Uib of fuch a Liberty, as con- fifts in a Freedom from every Thing, which, if it were there, would make it impoffible that the Will, at that Time, Ihould be othervvife than that Way to which it tends. If any one fhould fay, there Is no Need "that the In- difference ftiould be perfect ; but altho' a former Inclina- tion and Preference ftill remains, yet, if it ben't very ftron^ and violent, poffibly the Strength of the Will may oppofc and overcome it : This is grofty abfur'd ; for the Strength of the WilU let it be never (o great, does not at all enable it to ad one Way, and not the contrary Way, both at the fame Time. It. gives it no fuch Sovereignty and Commaad, aS' to eaufe it 66 OfUhcxiyofWill Part II. felf to prefer and not to prefer at the fame Time, or to chufe contrary to it's own prefent Choice. Therefore, if there be the lead Degree of antecedent Pre- ponderation of the Will, it mufl be perfedly abolilhed, before the Will can be at Liberty to determine it k\i the contrary Way. And if the Will determines it 4clf the fame Way, it was not a free Determination^ becaufe the Will is not wholly at Liberty in fo doing : It's Deter- mination is not altogether /r^w it felf but ,it was partly de- termined before, in it's prior Inclination : And all the Free- dom the Will exercifes in the Cafe, is in an Increafe of In- clination, which it gives it felf, over and above what it had by foregoing Bias ; fp much is from it felf, and fo much is from perfed Indifference. For tho' the Will had a pre- vious Tendency that Way, yet as to that additional Degree of Inclination, it had no Tendency. Therefore the previ- ous Tendency is of no Confideration, with Refpe<5l to the A61: wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the fame Thing which was faid at firft, that as to the A6f of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there muft be perfect Indifferencey or EquiUhriu7n. To illudrate this ; If w^e fhould fuppofe a fovereign Self- moving Power in a natural Body : But that the Body is in Motion already, by an antecedent Bias ; for Inilance, Gra- vitation towards the Center of the Earth ; and has one De- gree of Motion already, by Vertue of that previous Ten- dency ; but by it's feif-moving Power it adds one Degree more to it's Motion, and moves fo much more fwiftly to- wards the Center of the Earth than it would do by it's Gra- vity only : It is evident, that all that is owing to a felf-mov- jng Power in this Cafe, is the additional Degree of Motion ; and that the other Degree of Motion which it had from Gravity, is of no Coniideratien in the Cafe, don't help the Effe^ft ot the free felf-moving Power in the leaft ; the EiTecl is juH: the fame, as if the Body had received from it itli one Degree of Motion from a State of perfe6t Reft. So if we Ihouid fuppofe a felf-moving Power given to the Scale of a Balance, which has a Weight of one Degree beyond the oppofite Scale ; and Vv'e afcribe to it an Ability to add to it it\i another Degree of Force the fame Way, by it's felf- moving Power ; This is juft the fame Thing as to afvribe to it a Power to give it felf one Degree of Preponderation Irom a pcrfed Equilibrium ^ and fo much Power as the *' Scale Sed.VII. conjtjling in IndifFerence. 67 Scale has to give it felf an Over-balance from a perfed E- quipoife, fo much felf-movlng felf-preponderatina; Power it has, and no more. So that it's free Power this Way is al- ways to be meafured from perfe6t Equilibrium. I need fay no m.ore to prove, that, if Indifference be effen lal to Liberty, it mull: be perfe6l Indifference ; and that fo far as the Will is deftitute of this, fo far it is defti- tute of that Freedom by which it is it's own M after, and in a Capacity of being it's ov/n Determiner, without being at all pafiive, or fubjed to the Power and Sway of fomething elfe, in it's Motions and Determinations. Having obferved thefe Things, let us now tr^^ whether this Notion of the Liberty of Will conliiling in Indiffe- rence and Equilibrium, and the Will's Self-determination in fuch a State, be not abfurd and inconfiftent. And here I would lay down this as an Axiom of undoubt- ed Truth ; That every free Ad is do7ie i:i a State of Freedom^ and not only after fuch a State. If an A6t of the Will be an A6t wherein the Soul is free, it mull be exerted in a State of Freedom^ and in the Fime of Freedom. It Vs^ill not fuflice, that the Acl immediately follows a State of Liberty ; but Li- berty muft yet contmue, and co-exift with the Acl: ; the Soul remaining in Poifeffion of Liberty. Becaufe that is the No- tion of a free Act of the Soul, even an A6t wherein the Soul ufes or exercfes Liberty. But if the Soul is not, in the very I'ime of the A61:, in the Foffeffion of Liberty, it can't at that Time be in the Vfc of it. Now the Quedion is, whether ever the Soul of Man puts forih any Act of Will, while it yet remains in a State of Li- berty, in that Notion of a State of Liberty, vi%. as implying a State of Indifference ; or whether the Soul ever exerts an Act of Choice or Preference, while at that very Time the Will is in a perfe6t Equilibrium, not inclining one Way more than another. The very putting of the Queftion is fufficient to ftiew the Abfurdity of the affirmative Anfwer : For how ridiculous would it be for any Body to infift, that the Soul chufe? one Thing before another, when at the very fame Inftant it is perfectly indifferent with Refpect to each. ! This is the fame Thing as to fay^ the Soul prefers one Thing to another, at the very fame I'ime that it has no Preference. Choice and Preference can no more be in a I 2 S^'^^^ 65 Of Liberty of Will Part 11. \ State of Indifference, than Motion can be in a State of Red, or than the Preponderation cf the Scale of a Balance can be j in a State of Equilibriunn, Motion may be the next Moment | afterRell ; but can't co-exift with it,in a7iy,^vtn the %^Part of ' it. So Choice may be immediately after aState of Inditference, | but has no Co-exiftence with it : Even the very Beginning of • it is not in a State of Indifference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no Acl of the Will, in any Degree, is ever per- formed in a State of Liberty, or in the Time of Liberty. . Volition and Liberty are fo far from agreeing together, and being effential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and deftroy? the other, as much as Motion and Reft, Light and Darknefs, or Life h Death. $0 that tlie Will ads not at all, does not fo much a^ begin to ad in the Time of fuch Liberty : Freedom is perfectly fit an End, and has ceafed to be, at the lirft Moment of Adion ; and therefore Liberty can't reach the Action, to I affecl, or qualify it, or give it a Denomination, or any Part of | i|:, any more than if it had ceafed to be twenty Years before | the Adion began. The Moment that Liberty ceafes to be, | it ceafes to be a Qualihcation of any Thing. If Light and ^ Darknefs fucceed one another inftantaneouily. Light qualifies ; Nothing after it is gone out, to make any^ thing lightfome : or bright, any more- gt the firft Moment of perfect Darknefs, J than Months or Years after. Life denominates Nothing | vital at the lirft Moment of perfect Death. So Freedom, if it ^| confifts in, or implies Indifference, can denominate Nothing '\ free, at the firft Moment of Preference or Preponderation. i Therefore 'tis manifeft, that no Liberty which the Soul is pof- ; feffed of, or ever ufes, in any of it's Acts of Volition, con- - fifts in Indifference ; and that the Opinion of fuch as lup- ' pofe, that Indifference belongs to the very Effence of Liberty, is to the higheft Degree abfurd and contradictory. If any one ftiould imagine, that this Manner of arguing ing is Nothing but Trick and Delufion ; and 'to evade the Reafoning, fliould fay, that the Thing wherein the Will ex- ercifes it's Liberty, is not in the Act of Choice or Prepon- deraticn it felf, but in determining it felf t9 a certain Choice or Preference ; That the Act of the Will wherein it is free, iand ufes it's own Sovereignty, conlifts in it's caufing or de^ ter mining the Change ox Tranjnion from a State of Indifference to a ccriain Preference, or determining to give a certain^ Turn to the Balance, which has hitherto been even ; ancH t'lat this Ad the Will exerts in a State of Liberty, or while '^ the Will yet remains in Equilibrium, and perfect Mafter o' 3 Scd.VII. conjifltng in Indifference. 69 it felf : I fay, if any One chufes to exprefs his Notion of Liberty after this, or fome fuch Mjfnner, let us fee if he can make out his Matters any better than before. What is afferted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect Equilibrium, without Preference, determines to change it felf from that State, and excite in it felf a certain Choice or Preference. Now let us fee whether this don't come to the fame Abfurdity we had before. If it be fo, that 4he Will, while it yet remains perfedly Indifferent, deter- mines to put it felf out of that State, and give it felf a cer- tain Preponderation ; Then I would enquire, whether the Soul don't determine this of Choice ; or whether the Will's coming to a Determination to do fo, be not the fame Thing as the Soul's coming to a Choice to do fo. If the Soul don't determine this of Choice, or in the Exercife of Choice, then it don't determine it voluntarily. And if the Soul don't determine it voluntarily, or of it's own Will^ then in what Senfe does it's Will determine it ? And if the Will don't determine it, then hovs^ is the Liberty of the Will exercifed in the Determination ? What Sort of Liberty is exercifed by the Soul in thofe Determinations, wherein there is no exercife of Choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the Will is not concerned ?— - But if it be allowed, that this Determination is an Act of Choice, and it be infilled on, that the Soul, while it yet remains in a State of perfect Indiffe- rence, chufes to put it felf out of that State, and to turn it felf oneWay ; then the Soul is already come to a Choice,and chufes that Way. And fo we have the very fame Abfurdity which we had before. Here is the Soul in a State of Choice, and in a State of Equilibrium, both at the fame Time : the Soul already chufing one Way, while it remains in a State of perfe6t Indifference, and has no Choice of one Way more than the other.—- And indeed this Manner of talking, tho' it may a little hide the Abfurdity, in the Obfcurity of Exprelhon, is more nonfenfical, and increafes the Inconfift- cnce. To fay, the free A61 of the Will, or the A6t which the Will exerts in a State of Freedom and Indifference, does not imply Preference in it, but is what the Will does in Order to caufing or producing a Preference, is as much as to fay, the Soul chufes (for to Will and to Chufe are the fame 1^^ Thing) without Choice, and prefers without Preference, in border to caufe or produce the Beginning of a Preference, or the firfl: Choice. And that is, that the firft Choice is ex- pened without Choice, in order to produce it i^\L 70 OflAh^xty'slyinginaPower Part II. If any, to evade thefe Things, fhould own, that a State of Liberty, and a State di Indifference are not the fame, and that the former may be without the latter ; But fliould fay, that Indifference is fcill ejfential to the Freedom of an Act of Will, in fome Sort, namely, as 'tis neceffary to go imme- diately before it ; It being efiential to the Freedom of an A6t of Will that it fhould directly and nnmediately 'arife out of a State of Indifference : ftill this Vvrili not help the Caufe of JrmimanUihtviy^ or make it confiftent with it felf. For if the AS. fpnngs immediately out of a State of Indifference, then it do's not arife from antecedent Choice or Preference. But if the A6t arifes directly out of a State of Indifi^rence, with- out any intervening Choice to chufe and determine it, then the Act not being determined by Choice, is not determined ty the Will ; the Mind exercife^ no free Choice in the Affair, and free Choice and free Will have no Hand in the Determination of the Act. Which is entirely inconfiilent with their Notion of the Freedom of Volition. If any fnould fuppofe, that thefe Difficulties and Abfurdi- ties may be avoidec^, by faying, that the Liberty of the Mind confifts in a Power X.o fufpend the A6t of the Will, and fo to keep it in a State of Indifference^ 'till there has been Oppor- tunity for Confideration ; and fo Ihall fay, that however Indifference is not effential to Liberty in fuch a Manner, that the Mind mufr make it's Choice in a State of Indifference, which is. an Inconfiftency, or that the A6t of Will mull fpring immediately out of Indifference ; yet Indifference may be effential to the Liberty of Acts of the Will in thisRefpect \ viz. That Liberty confifts in a Power of the Mind to for- bear or fufpend the A6t of Volition, and keep the Mind in a State of Indifference for the prefent, 'till there has been Opportunity for proper Deliberation : I fay, if any one imagines that this helps the Matter, it is a great Miftake : It reconciles no Inconfiftency, and reiieves no Difficulty which the Affair is attended with. For here the following Things muil be obferved, I. That \\\\s fufpcnding of Volition, if there be properly any fuch Thing, is it lelf an AS. px Volition. If the A/Iind de- termines to fufpend it's A] Time to condder of it. And no Account is pretended to be; )i given wherein the Mind is free with Refpedi to that A6t, \ wherein this Anfwer fuppofes the Liberty ef the Mind in- 1 deed confifts, w'z. the Ad of Sufpenfion, or of determining, ^ the Sufpenfion. / On the whole, 'tis exceeding manifefl:, that the Liberty of i the Mind docs not confjft in Indifference, and that Indiffe- ^ rence is not effential or neceffary to it, or at all belonging to »1 it, as the Arjninians fuppofe ; that Opinion being full of No- C thing but Abfurdity and Seif-Contradidion. t S E C T 1^1 T 5e(3:.VlIL Of Liberty without ^CQt{^ity . 73 Section VIIL Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will^ as oppofite to all Neceffity. ilS a Thing chiefly infifted on by Arminians^ In this Controverfy, as a Thing moft important and effen- tial in human Liberty, that Volitions, or the A<:^ts of the Will, are contingent Events ; underftanding Contingence as oppofite, not only to Conilraint, but to all Neceffity. There- fore I would particularly confider this Matter. And 1. I would enquire, w^hether there is, or can be any fuch Thing, as a Volition which is contingent in fuch a Senfc, as not only to come to pafs without any Neceffity of Con- ftraint or Co-adion, but alfo without a Necejfity of Confequence^ or an infallible Conne6tion with any Thing foregoing. 2. Whether, if it were fo, this would at all help the Caufe of Liberty. L I would coniider whether Volition is a Thing that ever does, or can come to pafs, in this Manner, contingently. And here it muft be remembred, that it has been already (hewn, that Nothing can ever come to pafs without a Caufe, or Reafon why it exiils in this Manner rather than another 5 and the Evidence of this has been particularly applied to the A(5ts of the Will. Now if this be fo, it wuU demon- ftrably follow, that the Atfls of the Will are never contingent, or without Neceffity, in the Senfe fpoken of j in as much as thofe Things which have a Caufe, or Reafon of their Exift- ence, muft be connected with their Caufe. This appears by the following Confiderations. I. For an Event to have a Caufe and Ground of it's Ex- iftence, and yet not to be conneded with it's Caufe, is art Inconfiftence. For if the Event ben't connected With the Caufe, it is not dependent on t'e Caufe ; it's Exift- ence is a« it were ioofe from it's Influence, and may at- tend it, or may not ; it being a meer Contingence, whe- ther it follows or attends the Influence of the Caufe, Qr not : And that is the fame Thing as not to be depen- K dent 74 0/ thefuppofed Liberty Part II. dent on it. And to fay, the Event is not dependent on it's Caufe, is abfurd : 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, it is not it's Caufe, nor the Event the Effe6t of it : For Dependence on the Influence of a Caufe, is the very Notion of an Eftea. If there be no fuch Relation between one Thinj^ and another, confiding in the Connecftion and Dependence of one Thing on the Influence of another, thea it is certain there is no fuch Relation between them as is fignified by the Terms Caufe and Effed. So far as an Event is dependent on a Caufe, 2nd conne6ted with it, fo much Caufahty is there in the Cafe, and no more. The Caufe does, or brings to pafs no more in any Event, than is dependent on it. If we fay, the Con- necftion and Dependence is not total, but partial, and that the EfFe(5l, tho' it has fome Connection and Dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it ; That is the fame Thing as to fay, that not all that is in theEvent is an EfFe6t of that Caufe, but that only Part of it arifes from thence, and Part fome other Way. 2. If there are fome Events which are not necefl^arily con- nected with their Caufes, then it will follow, that there are fome Things which come to pafs without any Caufe, contra- ry to the Suppofition. For if there be any Event which was not necefl^arily conneded with the Influence of the Caufe un- der fuchCircumftances,then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow thelnfluence of theCaufe,orno ; It might have followed, and it might not, when the Caufe was the fame, it's Influence the fame, and under the fame Circumftances. And if fo, why did it follow, rather than not follow ? There, is no Caufe or Reafon of this. Therefore here is fome- thing without any Caufe or Reafon why it is, viz. the follow- ing of the Effe<5l on the Influence of the Caufe, with which it was not necefliurily conneded. If there be a necefl^ary ConnecSiion of the Effed on any Thing antecedent, then we may fuppofe that fom^times the Event will follow the Caufe, and fomctimes not, when the Caufe is the fame, and in every RefpeCl: in tlie fame State h Circumftances. And what can be tiie Caufe and Reafon of this flrange Phenomenon, even this Diveriity, that in one Inftance, the ElTecl ftiould follow, in another not ? 'Tis evident by the Suppofition, that this is wholly without any Caufe or Ground. Hare is. fometiiing in the prefent Manner of the Exiflence of Things, and State of the World, that is abfolutely without a Caufe. Which is contrary to the Suppofition, and contrary to what has beea before demonfcrated. P To Seil.VIIL without all Neceffity. 75 3. To fuppofe there are fome Events which have a Caufe and Ground of their Exiftence, that yet are not ne- cefTarily connected with their Caufe, is to fuppofe that they have a Caufe which #not their Caufe. Thus ; If the EiFeA be not necellarily connected with the Caufe, with it's Influ- ence, and influential Circumftances ; then, as I obferved before, 'tis a Thing poflible and fuppofable, that the Caufe may fometimes exert the fame Influence, under the fame Circumrtances, and yet the Eff;:6l not follow. And if this aduaily happens in any Inftance, this Inflance is a Proof, in Fad, that the Influence of the Caufe is not fuflicient to pro- duce the Effe6l. For if it had been fuilicient, it would have done it. And yet, by the Suppofition, in another Inflance, the fame Caufe, with perfecStly the fame Influence, and when all Circumflances which have any Influence, are the fame, it Wc^i /J//^wiji Evil threatned^ when equally believed and rcfie5led on, is fufficient tj engage the Will to chufe the Good, and refiife the Evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to chufe or to refufe ; and that it is. contradiSfory to it felf, to fuppofe otherwife ; and therefore nmft of NeceJJity he falfe ; and then ivhat ive do really believe to be our chief- ejl Good willjTill he chofen, and what we apprehend to he the worfl 9 f Evils, will, whilj} we continue under that Conviclion, be refufed by us. Nothing could have been faid more to the Purpofe, fully to fignify and declare, that the Determinations of the Will muft evermore /ollow the Illumination, Convi6lion and Notice of the Underftanding, with Regard to the greateft Good and Evil propofed, reckoning both the Degree of Good and Evil underftood, and the Degree of Underftand- ing, Notice and Conviction of that propofed Good and Evil ; and that it is thus neceffarily, and can be otherwife in no In- ftance : becauie it is afferted, that it implies a Contradidion, to fuppofe it ever to be otherwife. I am fenfible,the Do6lor's Aim in thefe Aftertions is againlr the CalviniJIs ; to ftiew, in Oppofition to them, that there is no Need of any phyfical Operation of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good Choice, but that God's Operation and Afliftance is only moral, fuggefting Ideas to the Underftanding ; which he fuppofes to |r be enough, if thofe Ideas are attended to, infallibly to ob- tain the End. But whatever his Defign was. Nothing can more dire6tly and fully prove, that every Determination of the Will, in chufing and refufing, is neceffary ; directly con- trary to his own Notion of the Liberty of the Will. For if tlie Determination of the Will, evermore, in this Manner, follows the Light, Convidion and View of the Underftand- ing, concerning the greateft Good and Evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a ContradicSlion to fuppofe otherwife ; then it is neceffarily fo, the Will neceffarily follows this Light or View of the Underftanding, not only in fome of it's Ads, but in every A6t of chufing and refu- fing. So that the Will don't determine it felf in any one of it's own A6ls ; but all it's A6ls, every A61 of Choice and Re- fufal, depends on, and is neceffarily conneded with fome an- tecedent Caufe ; which Caufe is not the Will it felf, nor any A6t of it's own, nor any Thing pertaining to that Faculty, but fomething belonging to another Faculty, whofe Ads go before the Will, in all it's Ads, and govern and determine them every one. Here, So Of the Connexion of the Will Part II, Here, if it (hould be replied, that altho' it be true, that according to the Dodor, the final Determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly conneded with the Ijnderftanding's Convi(5lion, and Notice of the greateft Good ; yet the Ads of the Will are not neceffary ; becaufe that Convidion and Notice of the Underftanding is firft de- pendent on a preceeding A61 of the Will, in determining to attend to, and take Notice of the Evidence exhibited ; by which Means the Mind obtains that Degree of Convi6tioa which is fufficient and tffedual to determine the confequent and ultimate Choice of the Will ; and that the Will with Regard to that preceeding A6t, whereby it determines whe- ther to attend or no, is not neceffary ; and that in this, the Liberty of the Will confifis, that when God holds forth fufficient objedive Light, the Will is at Liberty whether to^ command the Attention of the Mind to it. Nothing can be more weak and inconfiderate than fuch a Reply as this. For that preceeding Ad of the Will, in de-y termining to attend and confider, ftill is an A£i of the Will, (it is fo to be fure, if the Liberty of the Will confifts in it, as is fuppofed) and if it be an Ad of the Will, it is an Ad of Choice or Refufal. And therefore, if what the Dodor afferts be true, it is determined by fome antecedent Light iri the Underftanding concerning the greateft apparent Good or Evil. For he afferts, it is that Light which alone doth ?tiove the Will to chufe or refufe. And therefore the Will muft be moved by that in chufing to attend to the objedive Light offered, in order to another confequent Ad of Choice : fo that this Ad is no lefs neceffary than the other. And if we fuppofe ano- ther Ad of the Will, ftill preceeding both thefe mentioned, to determine both,ftill that alfo muft be an Ad of the Will,& an Ad of Choice ; and fo muft,by the famePrinciples,be infallibly determin'd by fome certain Degree of Light intheUnderftanding concerning the greateft Good. And let us fuppofe as many Ads of the Will, one preceeding another, as we pleafe, yet they are every one of them neceffarily determined by a cer- tain Degree of Light in the Underftanding, concerning the^ greateft and moft eligible Good in that Cafe ; and fo, not one of them free according to Dr. Whith/s Notion of Free- dom. And if it be faid, the Reafon why Men don't attend to Light held forth, is becaufe of ill Habits contracted by evil Ads committed before, whereby their Minds are in- difpofed to attend to, and confider of the Truth held forth tg j Sed.IX. with the Underftandlng. 8i to them by God, the Difficulty is not at all r.voided : fiili : the Queftion returns, What determined the - Will in thofe ^ preceeding evil A6ts ? It mufl, by Dr. IVhitbys Principles, ftill be the View of the Underftandlng concerning the greateft Good and Evil. If this View of the Underllanding be that alone which doth move the Will to chufc or refufe^ as the i Do6lor aflerts, then every Acl of Choice or Refit fal^ from a i Man's tirft Exiftence, is moved and determined by thisView j and this View of the Underftandlng exciting and governing the Ad, muft be before the A6t : And therefore the Will is neceftarily determined, in every one of it'sAcls, from a Man's firftExiftence,by a Caufe befide theWill, & a Caufethat don't proceed from,or depend on any A6t of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abohfties the Dodor's whole Scheme of Li- berty of Will ; and he, at one Stroke, has cut the Sinews of all his Arguments from the Goodnefs, Righteoufnefs, Faithfulnefs and Sincerity of God, in his Commands, Pro- mifes, Threatnings, Calls, Invitations, Expoftulations ; \ which he makes Ufe of, under the Heads of Reprobation, Eledion, Univerfal Redemption, fufficient and effedual Grace, and the Freedom of the Will of Man ; and has enervated aad made vain all thofe Exclamations againft: the Dodrine of the Calvinijls^ as charging God with mani- feft Unrighteoufnefs, Unfaithfulnefs, Hypocrify, Fallaci- oufnefs, and Cruelt}' ; which he has over, and over, and over again, numberlefs Times in his Book. Dr. Samuel Clark^ in his Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God, f to evade the Argument to- prove the NeceiTity of Volition, from it's necelTary Connexion with the laft Di6tate of the Underftandlng, fuppofes the latter not to be diverfe from the Act of the Will it feif. But if it be fo, it will not alter the Cafe as to the Evidence of the Ne- ceffity of the Ad: of the Will. If the Didate of the Under- ftandlng be the very fame with the Determination of the Will or Choice, as Dr. Clark fuppofes, then this Determi- nation is no Fruit or Effe6i of Choice : And if fo, no Liberty of Choice has any Hand in it : As to ^Volition or Choice, it is neceftary ; That is. Choice can't prevent it. If the iaft Dictate of the Underftandlng be the fame with the Deter- mination of Volition it felf, then the Exiftence of that De- termination muft be neceffary as to Volition ; in as much as Volition can have no Opportunity to determine whether it ihall exift or no, it having Exiftence already before VoJi- L tioa ^ Mt. 6. P. 93. 82 Of the Conn&daon of the TFill Part II. tion has Opportunity to determine any Thing. It is it felf the very Rile and Exiftence of Volition. But a Thing, af- ter it exilfs, has no Opportunity to determine as to it's own Exiftence -, it is too late for that. If Liberty confifts in that which Armmiam fuppofe, wz. in the Will's determining it's own A6ts, having free Oppor- tunity, and being without all NecefTity ; This is the lame as to fay, that Liberty confifts in the Soul's having Power and Opportunity to have what Determmations of the Will it pleales or chufes. And if the Determinations of the Will, and the laft Di6tates of the Underftanding be the fame Thing, then Liberty confifts in the Mind's having Power to have what Di6tates of the Underflanding it pleafes, having Opportunity to chufe it's own Dictates of Underflanding. But this is abfurd j for it is to make the Determination of Choice prior to the Di6late of Underftanding, and the Ground of it ; which can't confifl with the Di&ate of Un- derftanding's being the Determination of Choice it felf. Here is no Way to do in this Cafe, but only to recur to the old Abfurdity, of one Determination before another, and the Caufe of it ; and another before that, determining that ; and fo on in infinitum. If the laft Dictate of the Un- derftanding be the Determination of the Will it felf, and the Soul be free with Regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian Notion of Freedom ; then the Soul, before that Di6tate of it's Underftanding exifts, voluntarily and according "to it's own Choice determines, in every Cafe, what that Didate of the Underftanding ftiall be ; otherwife that Di6late, as to the Will, is neceiTary \ and the Ads determined by it, muft ahb be neceflary. So that here is a Determination of the Mind prior to that Dictate of the Underftanding, an A(5l of Choice going before it, chufing and determining what that Di6tate of the Underftanding (hall be : and this preceeding Aa of Choice, being a free Aa of Will, muft alio be the fame with another laft Didtate of the Underftanding : And if the Mind alfo be free in that Di6tate of Underftanding, that muft be determined ftill by another ^ and fo on forever. Befides, if the Dictate of the Underftanding, and De- termination of the Will be the fame, this confounds the Un- derftanding and Will, and makes them the fame. Whether they be the fame or no, I will not now difpute ; but only would obferve, that if it be io^ and the Arminian Notion of Liberty J Sed.IX. with the Underftanding. 83 Liberty confifts in a Self-determining Power in the Under- ftanding, free of all Neceflity ; being independent, unde- termined by any Thing prior to it's own Acfts and Determi- nations ; and the more the Underftanding is thus indepen- dent, and fovereign over it's own Determinations, the more free. By this therefore the Freedom of the Sou', as a moral Agent, muft confift in the Independence of the Underftand- ing on any Evidence or Appearance of Things, or any Thing whatfoever that ftands forth to the View of the Mind, prior to the Underftanding's Determination. And what a Sort of Liberty is this ! conlifting in an Ability, Freedom and Eafmefs of judging, either according to Evidence, or a- gainft it ; having a fovereign Command over it felf at all Times, to judge, either agreably or difagreably to what is plainly exhibited to it's own View. Certainly, 'tis no Li- berty that renders Perfons the proper Subjeds of perfwafive Reafoning, Arguments, Expoftulatlons, and fuch i.ke moral Means and Inducements. The Ufe of which with A4ankind, is a main Argument of the Armimans^ to defend their Notion of Liberty without all NecelTity. For according to this, the more free Men are, the lefs they are under the Govern- ment of fuch Means, lefs fubjedt to the Power of Evidence and Reafon, and more independent on their Influence, in their Determinations. And whether the Underftanding and Will are the fame or no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe, yet in order to maintain ^he Arminian Notion of Liberty without Necelfity, the free Will is not determined by the Ln'-'erftandin^^-, nor neceftarily connected w th the Underftanding ; and the further from iuch Connection, the greater the Freedom. And when the Liberty is full and compleat, the Determinations of the Will have no Connexion at all with the Dictates of the Underftanding. And if fo, in vain are all Applications to the Underftanding, in order to induce to any free vertuous Ad ; and fo in vain are all Inftrudions, Counfels, Invitati- ons, Expoftulations, and all Arguments & Perfwafives what- soever : For thefe are but Applications to the Underftanding, and a clear and lively Exhibition of the Objects of Choice to the Mind's View. But if, after all, the" Will muft be ifelf-d^termined, and independent on the Underftanding, to what Purpofe are Things thus reprefented to the Underftand- ing, in order to determine the Choice ? Section 84 ABs of the Will PartIL Section X. Volitio7t neceffarily conneEiedwith the Influ-- ence porite Motives, can ufe them as it pleafes, and chufe it's own Influence from them, and negledl the ftrongefl:, and follow the weakeft, fuppofes it to be wholly independent on Motives. It further appears, on Mr. Chubvs Suppofition, that Vo- lition muft be without any previous Ground in any Motive, thus : If it be as he fuppofes, that the Will is not deter- mined by any previous fuperiour Strength of the Motive, but determines and chufes it's cwn Motive, then, when the rival Motives are exactly equal in Strength and Tendency to induce, in all Refpedfs, it may follow either ; and may in fuch a Cafe, fom.etimes follow one, fometimes the other. And if fo, this Diverfity which appears between the A6l« of the Will, is piaiply without previous Ground in either of the Motives ; for all that is previoully in the Motives, is fuppofed precifely and perfe6f ly the fame, without any Di- verfity whatfoever. Now perfed Identity, as to all that is previous in the Antecedent, can't be the Ground and Rea- fon of Diverfity in the Confequent. Perfect Identity in the pround can't bp a Reafon why it is not followed with the fame Confequence. And therefore the Source of this Diver- fity of Confequen<;e muft be fought for eifewhere. And laftly, it may be obferved, that however Mr. Chubb ^oes much infift that no Volition can tgke Fiace without fome I Sed.X. Scheme of Liberty y 8cc. 93 fome Motive to induce it, which previoufly difpofes the Mind to it ; yet, as he alfo iniifts that the Mind without Reference to any previous fuperiour Strength of Motives, picks and chufes for it's Motive to follow ; He himfelf here* in plainly fuppofes, that with Regard to the Mind's Prefe- rence of one Motive before another, it is not the Motive that difpofes the Will, but the Will difpofes it felf to fol- low the Motive. IV. Mr. Chubb fuppofes NecelTity to be utterly inconfill- cnt with Jgtncy ; and that to fuppofe a Being to be an Agent in that which is neceiTary, is a plain Contradiction. P. 311. And throughout his Difcourfes on the Subjed of Liberty, he fuppofes, that NecelTity cannot confift with Agency or Free- dom ; and that to fuppofe otherwife, is to make Liberty and NepelTity, A6tion and Paffion, the fame Thing. And fo he feems to fuppofe, that there is no A6tion ftriclly fpeaking, but Volition ; and that as to the Effects of Volition in Body or Mind, m themfelves confidered, being neceiTary, they are faid to be free, only as they are the Etfe6ts of an A61 that is not neceiTary. And yet, according to him. Volition it felf is the Eff^ if Volition ; yea, every A(5t of free Volition : and therefore every Adl of free Volition muft, by what has now been ob • ferved from Him, be neceflary. That every A(5t of free Volition is it felf the Effect of Volition, is abundantly fup- pofed by Him. In P. 341, he fays, " If a Man is fuch a *' Creature as I have above proved him to be, that is, if he " has in him a Power or Liberty of doing either Good or " Evil, and either of thefe is the Subject of his own free " Choice, fo that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, . *^ have CHOSEN and done the contrary." Here He fup- pofes, all that is Good or Evil in Man is the EfFecft of his Choice ; and fo that his good or evil Choice it felf is the Effect of his Pleafure or Choice, in thefe Words, He might if he had PLEASED^ have CHOSEN the contrary. So in P.356. " Tho' it be highly reafonable, that a Man fhould always " chufe the greater Good, —yet he may, if he PLEASE, " CHUSE oltherviife." Which is the fame Thing as if he had faid, He may^ if he chufes^ chufe otherwife. And then he goes on, "— that is, he may, if he pieafes^ chufe what is good for himfelf &c." And again in the fame Page, " The ^ Will is not confined by the Underftanding to any parti- ., " cular Sort of Ggod, whether greater or lefs -, but is at " Liberty 94 Inconftjlence of Mr. Chubb's Part IL ** Liberty to chufe what Kind of Good it pleafes."—!^ there be any Meaning in thele laft Words," the Meaning mull be this', that the Will is at Liberty to chufe what Kind of Good it chujes to chufe ; fuppofing the A61 of Choice it felf deter- mined by an antecedent Choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb fpeaks of, is not only a Man's having Power to move his Body agreably to an antecedent Ad of Choice, but to ufe or exert the Faculties of his Soul. Thus, in P. 379.fpeaking of the Faculties of his Mind, he fays, " Man has Power,and *' is at Liberty to neglect thefe Faculties, to ufe them aright, *' or to abufe them, as he pkafesy And that he fuppofes an Adi of Choice^ or Exercife of Pleafure, properly dijflincl fromy and antecedent to thofe Ads thus chofen, directing, commanding and producing thii chofen Ads, and even the Ads of Choice themfelves, is very plain in P. 283. " He " can command his JSfions ; and herein confifts his Liberty ; " He can give or deny himfelf that Pleafure as he plcafesS* And P. 377. " It the Adions of Men — are not the Pror- *' dzice of a free Choice^ or Eledion, but fpring from a Neceffity " of Nature, he cannot in Reafon be the Objed of Re- " ward or Punifhment on their Apcount. Whereas, if *' Adion in Man, whether Good or Evil, is the Produce of *' Will or f-ee Choice ; fo that a Man in either Cafe, had it «' in his Power, and was at Liberty to have CFIOSEN the " contrary, he is the proper Objed of Reward or Punifli- *' ment, according: as he CHUSES to behave Himfelf." Here in thefe laft Words, be fpeaks of Liberty ofCHUSING, according as he CHUSES, So that the Behaviour which he fpeaks of as fubjed to his Choice, is his chuftng it iQ\{^ as "well as his external Condud confequent upon it. And therefore 'tis evident, he means not only external AdionSjbut the Ads of Choice themfelves, when he fpeaks of all f-ee Jaions^ as the PRODUCE of free Choice, And this is abun- dantly evident in what he fays in P. 372^ & 373. Now thefe Things imply a twofold great Abfurdity and Inconfiftence. I. To fuppofe, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free Ad of Choice is commanded by^ and is the Produce of free Choice^ is to fuppofe the firft free Ad of Choice belong- ing to the Cafe, yea, the firft free Ad of Choice that ever Man exerted, tohtthe Produce of an antecedent Ad of Choice. But I hope I need not labourat all to convince my Readers, that 'tis an Abfurdity to fay, the very firji Ad is the Produce of another Ad that went befon it. 2. If I Sed.X. Scheme of Liberty ^ &c. 95 I i 2. If it were both pofTible and real, as Mr. Chicbh infifts, T ^ that every free A<51 of Choice were the Produce or the EfFe(5t of ' a free A(5t of Choice ; yet even then, according to his Principles, no one A61 of Choice would be free, but every one neceriary ; becaufe, every Ad of Choice being the Effect of a foregoing Ad, every Ad would be necelTarily con- 'j neded with that foregoing Caufe. For Mr. Chubb himfelf I fays? P- 3^9- " When the Self-moving Power is exerted, it " becomes the neceilary Caufe of it's Effeds." — So that his \ Notion of a free Ad, that is rewardable or punifhable, is a y Heap of Contradictions. It is a free Act, and yet, by his I own Notion of Freedom, is neceflary ; and therefore by him |j it is a Contradidion, to fuppofe it to be free. According to jit him, every free Ad i$^he Produce of a free Act ; fo that there mull be an infinite Number of free Ads in Succeffion, without any Beginning, in an Agent that has a Beginning. And therefore here is an infinite Number of free Ads, every one of them free ; and yet not any one of them free, i but every Ad in the whole infinite Chain a neceflary EfFed. I'! All the Ads are rewardable or punifliable, and yet the Agent I cannot, in Reafon^be the Objed of Reward or Punilhment,on I Account of any one of thefe Adions. He is adivc in them all, and paffive in none ; yet adive in none, but pafTive in t| all, b'r. M; V. Mr. Chubb does moft flrenuoufly deny, that Motives are Caufes of the Ads of the Will ; or that the moving Principle in Man is moved^ or caufed to be exerted by Motives.. His Words P. 388 & 389. are, " If the moving Principle in « Man is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE EXERTED, '' by Ibmething external to Man, zvh'ich all Motives are^ then, " it would not be a Self-moving Principle, feeing it would be " moved by a Principle external to it felf. And to fay, that a " Self-moving Principle is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE " EXERTED, by a Caufe external to it felf, is abfurd and *' a Contradidion &c."— And in the next Page, 'tis particu- larly and largely infifted, that Motives are Caufes in no Cafe, that they are meerly pajfftve in the ProduSlion of Aciion^ arid havd no Caitjality in the ProduSiion of it, — no Caufality, to be the Caufe $fthe Exertion of the Will. Now I defire it may be confidered, how this can pollibly confifis with what he fays in other Places. Let it be noted here, I.Mr. 96 Inconfiftence of Mr. Chubb's Part II. 1. Mr. Chuhh abundantly fpeaks of Motives as Ex- mtements of the J^'s of the Will ; and fays, that Motives d» excite Volition, and induce it, and that they are necelTary to this End ; that in the Reafo?i and Nature of Things, Folition can- not take Place without Motives to excite it. But nov/ if Motives excite theWill, they move it ; and yet he fays, 'tis abiurd to fay, the Will is moved by Motives. And again (if Language is of any Significancy at all) If Motives excite Vohtion, then they are the Cauje of it's being excited ; and to caufe Voh- tion to be excited, is to cauie it to be j>ut forth or exerted^ - Yea, Mr. Chubb fays himfelf, P. 317. Motive is neceffary to the Exertion of the adive Faculty. To excite, is pofitively to do fomething ; and certainly that which does fomtthing, is the Caufe of the Thing done by it. To create, is to caufe to be created ; to make, is to caufe to be made ; to kill, is to caufe to be killed ; to quicken, is to caufe to be quickened ; and to excite, is to caufe to be excited. To excite, is to be a Caufe, in the moft proper Senfe, not meerly a negative Occafion, but a Ground of Exiftence by pofitive Influence. The Notion of exciting, is exerting Influence to caufe the Effe6t to arife or corne forth into Exifl:ence. 2. Mr. Chubb himfelf, P. 317, fpeaks of Motives as the Ground and Reafon of Adion BY INFLUENCE, and BY PREVAILING INFLUENCE. Now, what can be meant by a Caufe, but fomething that is the Ground and Reafon of a Thing by it's Influence, an Influence that is prevalent and .fo efFedual ? 3. This Author not only fpeaks of Motives as the Ground and Reafon of A6tion, by prevailing Influence ; but exprefly oUhQir Influence as prevailing FOR THE PRODUCTION of an A6tion, in the fame P. 317 : which makes the Incon- fiflency fliill more palpable and notorious. The Produ^iow of an Eifect is certainly the Caufmg of an EfFedf ; and pro- du^ive Influence is cnufal Influence, if any Thing is ; And that which has this Influence prevalently, fo as thereby to become the Ground of another Thing, is a Caufe of that Thing, if there be any fuch Thing as a Caufe. This In- fluence, Mr, Chubb fays, Motives have to produce an Action ; and yet he fays, 'tis abfurd i.nd a Contradidion, to fay they are Caufes. 4. In the fame Page, He once and again fpeaks of Mo- tives as difpofmg the Agent to Adtion, by their 'influence. His Words ,jSed.X. Scheme of Liberty^ he. 97 Words are thefe : " As Motive, which takes Place in ther *' Underftandmg, and is the Produ6l of IntelHgence, is « NECESSARY to Adion, that is, to the EXERTION of *« the adive Faculty, becaufe that Faculty would not be ex- <« erted without Ibme PREVIOUS REASON to DISPOSE *' the Mind to A6tion ; fo from hence it plainly appears, *' that when a Man is faid to be difpojed to one A6lion ra- <' ther than another, this properly fignifies the PREVAIL- « ING INFLUENCE that one Motive has upon a Man « FOR THE PRODUCTION of an Aaion, or for the *' being at Reft, before all other Motives, for the Prodw^ion ** of the contrary. For as Motive is the Ground and Rea- *« fon of any Adion, fo the Motive that prevails, DISPOSES *' the Agent to the Performance of that Adion." Now, if Motives difpofe the Mind to Adion, then they caufe the Mind to be ctfpofed ; and to caufe the Mind to be difpofed, is to caufe it to be willing ; and to caufe it to be willing, is to caufe it to will ; and that is the fame Thing as to be the Caufe of an A61 of the Will. And yet this fame Mr. Chubb holds it to be abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be a Caufe of the Ad of the Will. And if we compare thefe Things together, we have here again a whole Heap of Inconfiftences. Motives are the previous Ground and Rcafon of the A(5ts of the Will ; yea, the necejfary Ground & Reafon of their Exertion, tvithout which they zuiil 'not be exerted, and cannot in the Nature of Things take Place ; and they do excite thefe A6ts of the Will, and do this by a pre^ vailing Influence ; yea, an Influence which prevails for the Pro-' duSiion of the A5t of the Will, and for the difpoftng of the Mind to it : And yet 'tis abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be a Caufe of an A6t of the Will, or that a Principle of Will is moved or caufed to be exerted by it, or that it has any Caufality in the Pro- du£tion of it, or any Caufality to be the Caufe of the Exertion of the Will A due Confideration of thefe Things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the ftrange Inconfiftences which the Notion of Li- berty confifting in the Will's Power of Self-determination void of all Ncceffity, united with that Dictate of common Senfe, that there can be no Volition without a Motive, drove him into,may be fufficient to convince us,that it is utterly im- poffible ever to make that Notion of Liberty confiftent with the Influence of Motives in Volition. And as it is iU a man- N t^-^T 98 GOD certamly foreknows Part II • ner felf-evldent, that there can be no A6t of Will, Choice or Preference of the Mind, without fome Motive or Induce- ment, fomething in the Mind's View, which it aims at, feeks, inclines to, and goes after ; fo 'tis moll manifeft, there is no fuch Liberty in the Univerfe as Arrninlatis inlift on ; nor any fuch Thing poliibie, or conceivable. Section XL 77je Evidence of GOD' s certain Foreknow- ledge of the Volitions of moral Agents. THAT the A(5ls of the Wills of moral Agents are not contingent Events, in that Senfe, as to be without all Necellity, appears by God's certain Foreknowledge of fuch Events. In handhng this Argument,! would in the/?;/? Place prove, that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the voluntary A(5ts of moral Agents ; and fecondly^ Ihew the Confequence, or how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral A- gents are not contingent, fo as to be without NecelTity of Connedtion and Confequence. First, I am to prove, that God has an abfolute and cer* tain Foreknowledge of the free Acftions of moral Agents. One would think, it fhould be wholly needlefs to enter on fuch anArgument with any that profefs themfelves Chriilians : But fo it is ; God's certain Foreknowledge of the free A6ts of moral Agents, is denied by fome that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God ; and efpecially of late. I therefore Ihall confider the Evidence of fuch a Pre- fcience in the moit High, as fully as the defigned Limits of this EiTay will admit of ; [fuppo mg my felf herein to have lo do with fuch as own the Truta of the Bible. Arg. I. Myfi'/? Argument fliall be taken from God's Prediclicn of fuch Events Here I would in the firft Place iay down thefe tv/o Things as Axioms. (I.) If kii Se5:.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 99 (i.) If God don't foreknow. He can't foretell fuch Events ; that is, He can't peremptorily and certainly foretell thtm. If God has no more than an uncertain Guefs concernixng Events of this Kind, then He can declare no more than an uncertain Guefs. Politively to foretell, is to profefs to fore- know, or to declare pofitive Foreknowlege. (2.) If God don't certainly foreknow the future Volitions of moral Agents, then neither can He certainly foreknow thofe Events which are confequent and dependent on thefe Volitions. The Exiiience of the one depending on the Exii^ence of the other, the Knowledge of tlie Exiilence of the one depends on the Knowledge of the Exigence of the other i and the one can't be more certain than the other. Therefore, how many, how great, and how extenfive fo- cver the Confcquences of the Volitions of moral Agents may be ; tho' they Ihould extend to an Alterat'on of the State of Things through the Univerfe, and ih.cJ.d be continued in a Series of fucceffive Events to all Eternity, and fliould in the Progrefs of Things branch forth into an infinite Num- ber of Series, each of tnem going on in an endlefs Line or Chain of Events ; God muft be as ignorant of all thefe Con- fcquences, as He is of the Volition w^hence they firft take their Rife : All thefe Events, and the whole State of Things depending on them, how important, extenfive and vaft fo-^ ever, mult be hid from him. Thefe Pofitions being fuch as I fuppofe none will deny, I now proceed to obfer\^e the following Things. I. Men's moral Condu6l and Qualities, their Vertues ■ and Vices, their Wickednefs and good Pra6tice, Things re- wardable and punifhable, have often been foretold by God. — Pharaoh's moral Conduct, in refufing to obr.y G: ci s Com- mand, in letting his People go, was foretold. God fays to Mofesy Exod. iii. 19. / am fur e^ that the King ^ Egypt zvill not let you go. Here God profelTes not only to guefs at, but to know Pharaoh's future Difobedience. In Chap. vii. 4. God fays, But Pharaoh JJjall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay mine Hand upon Egypt, &c. And Chap. ix. 30. Mofcs fays to Pharaoh, As for thee^ and thy Servant Sy I KNOW that ye zviil not fear the Lord. See alfo Chap. xi. 9. — The moral Con- duct of Joftahy by Name, in his zealoufly exerting himfelf iri Oppofition to Idolatr)', in particular Awts oi his, was ffiretold N 2 above I CO GOD certainly foreknows Part II. li above three Hundred Years before he was born, and the Prophecy feal'd by a Miracle, and renewed and confirm- ■\ ed by the Words of a fecond Prophet, as what furely would i not fail, I K^ngs xiii. i,— -6, 32. This Prophecy was alfo 1 in EfFe6t a Predidion of the moral Condud of the People, 1 in upholding their Schifmatical and Idolatrous Worfhip 'till i that Time, and the Idolatry of thofe Priefts of the high ! Places, which it is foretold Jofiah fhould offer upon that ti Altar oi Bethel.— Micaiah foretold the foclifh and fmful Con- J ^as brought about by the WickedneCs of Jofeph's Brethren in felling him, and the Wickednefs of Jo- Jeph's Miflrefs, and his own fignal Vertue in reiifting her Temptation. The Accomplifhment of the Thing preiigur'd in Jofeph\ Dream, depended on the fame moral Condu6t^ fothmris Parable and Prophecy, y/^^^^i ix. €5, 20. was accompiifhed by the wicked Condud of Ahimekch^ and the Men of Sheche7n. The Prophecies againft the Houfe of El'iy 1 Sam. Chap. ii. & iii. were accompiifhed by the Wickednefs of Doeg the Edomite^ in accufmg the Priefts ; and the great Impiety, and extreme Cruelty of Saul in deftroying the Priefts atA^^!^. i Sa?n.xKU.- — Natha7i''s Prophecy 2ig2im{i David, 2 Sam. xii. 11,12. was fulhl'd by the horrible Wickednefs of Jbfalom^ in rebelling againft his P'ather, feeking his Life, and lying with his Concubines in the Sight of the Sun. , The Prophecy againft iS.?/^;7z^«, i Kings xi. 11,— 13. was fulfil'd by JerQboa7ns Rebellion and Ufurpation, which are fpoken of as his Wickednefs, 2 C/;r(?w.xiii.5,6. compare ver.18. The Prophecy againft Jeroboam's Family, i Kings xiv. was fulfil'd ' by the Confpiracy, Treafon, and cruel Murders of Baajha,, 2 Kings XV. 27, &c. The Predications of the Prophet Jehu againft the Houfe of Baa/ha^ i Kings xvi. at the Beginning, were fulfil'd by the Treafon and Parricide of Zimri^ i Kings xvi. 9, 13, 20. 3. How often has God foretold the future moral Condudl of Nations and Peoples, of Numbers, Bodies, and Suc- ceffions of Men ; with God's judicial Proceedings, and many other Events confequent and dependent on their Vertues and Vices ; which could not be foreknown, if the Volitions of Men, wherein they a6ted as moral Jgefits^ had not been forefeen I The future Cruelty of the Egyptians in ^n 102 GOD certainly foreknows Part II. in opprefTing Ifrael^ and God's judging and punching them for it, was foretold long before it came to pafs. Gen, xv. 13, 14. The Continuance of the Iniquity of the Amorites^ and the Increafe of it until it Jhould be fully and they ripe, for Deftrudion, was foretold above four Hundred Years be^ fore-hand, Gen. xv. 16. J^, vii. 6, 7. The Prophecies of the Deftru(5lion of Jerufalem^ and the Land of Judah^ were abfolute ; 2 Kingi xx. 17,-19. Chap, xxii. 15, to the End. It was foretold in Hezekiah's Time, and was abundantly in- fifted on in the Book of the Prophet Ifaiah^ who wTote No- thing after Hezekiah's Days. It was foretold in Jofiah' sTimCy in the Beginnir^ of a great Reformation, 2 Kings xxii. And it is manifeft by innumerable Things in the Predidions of the Prophets, relating to this Event, it's Time, it's Cir- cumftances, it's Continuance and End ; the Rtturn from the Captivity, the Reftoration of the Temple, City & Land, and many Circumftances, and Confequences of That ; I fay, thefe fliew plainly, that the Prophecies of this great Event were abfolute. And yet this Event was connected with, and dependent on two Things in Men's moral Conduct : firft, the injurious Rapine and Violence of the King of Babylon and his People, as the efficient Caufe ; which God often fpe^ks of as what he highly refented, and would feverely punifli ; and 2dly, The final Obftinacy of the Jews, That great E- vent is often fpoken of as fufpended on this. Jer. iv. i.& v. i, vii. I5— 7. xi. I,— 6. xvii. 24, to the End. xxv. 1,-7, xxvi. I,— 8. 13. & xxxviii. 17,18. Therefore this Deftruc- tion and Captivity could not be foreknown, unlefs fuch a moral Conduct of the Chaldeans and Jews had been fore- known. And then it was foretold, that the People Jhould be finally ohflinate^ to the Deftruction and utter Defolation of the City and Land. Ifai^ vi. 9, 11. Jer, i, 18, 19. vii. 27, — 29. Ezek. in, 7. & xxiv. 13, 14. The final Obftinacy of thofe Jews who were left in the Land of Ifrael^ and who afterwards went down into Egypt^^ in their Idolatry and Rejection of the true God, was foretold by God, and the Prediaion confirmed with an Oath. Jer, xliv. 26,27. And God tells the People, Ifai, xlviii.3.4, — 8. that he had predided thofe Things which Ihould be confequent on their Treachery and Obftinacy, becaufe he knew they would be obftinate ; and that he had declared thefe Things before- hand, for their Convi^^ion of his being the only trueGod, Gft. The Sed*XI. the Volitions 6f moral Agents, ic^ The Deftru6lion of Babylon^ with many of the Circumftan* ces of it, was fore-told, as the Judgment of God for the ex- ceeding Pride and Haughtinefs of the Heads of that Monar- chy, Nebuchadnezzar, and his Succeflbrs, and their wickedly dellroying other Nations, and particularly for their exalting themfelves againft the true God and his People, before any of thefe Monarchs had a Being ; Ifai. Chap, xiii, xiv, xlvii : Compare Habbak. ii. 5, to the End, and Jer. Chap, I. and ii. That Babylon's Deftrudion was to be a Reco?npencey according to the Works of their own Hands, appears by "Jer, xxv. 14.-— The Immorality which the People of Babylon, and particularly her Princes and great Men, were guilty of, that very Night that the City was deftroyed, their Revelling and Drunkennefs at Beljhaz-zar's Idolatrous Feaft, was foretold, Jer, Ii. 39, 57. The Return of the Jews from tlie Babyhnijh Captivity is often very particularly foretold, with many Circumftances, and the Promifes of it are very peremptory ; Jer, xxxi. 35, — 40. and xxxii. 6, — 15, 41,-44. and xxxiii. 24,-26. And the very Time of their Return was prefixed ; Jer, xxv. II, 12. andxxix. 10,11. 2 Lhron. xxxvi. 21. Ezek. iv. 6. and Dan, ix. 2. And yet the Prophecies reprefent their Return as confequent on their Repentance. And their Repentance it felf is very exprefly and particularly foretold, Jer. xxix. 12, 13,14. xxxi.8,9,18,— 31. xxxiii. 8. 1.4,5. ^2;^>^.vi.8,9,io.vii. 16. xiv. 22, 23. and xx. 43, 44. It was foretold under the old Teftament, that the Meffiah (hould fufFer greatly through the Malice and Cruelty of Men j as is largely and fully fet forth, Pfal. xxii. applied to Chrift in the New Teftament, Matt, xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34. Joh. xix. 24. Heb. ii. iiz. And likewife in Pfal. Ixix. which, I it is alfo evident by the New Teftament, is fpoken of Chrift ; John XV. 25. vii. 5, &c. and li. 17. Rofn. xv. 3. Matt, xxvii. i 34, 48. Mark XV. 23. John xix. 29. The fame Thing is alfo foretold, Ifai. liii. & 1. 6. & Mic. v. i. This Cruelty of Men was their Sin, and what they a6ted as moral Agents. It was foretold, that there ftiould be an Union of Heathen and Jezvijh Rulers againft Chrift, Pfal. ii. i, 2. compar'd with J^s iv. 25, 28. It was foretold, that the Jews ftiould ge- ;Snerally rejed and defpife the Mefliah, Ifai. xlix. 5, 6, 7. and • Jiii. 1—3. Pfalm, xxii. 6, 7. and Ixix. 4, 8, 19, 20. And it. ■was foretold, that the Body of that Nation ftiould be reje<5led in the Mefliah's Days, from .being God's People, for their Obftinacy in Sin ; Ifai, xlix. 4 — 7. and viii. 14, I5> i6. com- pare4 I ©4 GOD certainly iorthiiow^ PartIL J pared with Rom.x.ig. and//^/.lxv. at the beginning, compared {) with Rom. x. 20, 21. . I: was foretold, that Chrift fhould be j' rejedted by the chief Priefts and Rubers among thtjeivs, Pfalm \ cxviii. 22. compared with Matth. xxi. 42. Atls iv. 11. i Fet» ii. 4, 7. ,! Chrift himfelf foretold his being delivered into the Hands ' ia{ of the Elders, chief Priefts and Scribes, and his being cruel- j J) treated by them, and condemned to Death ; and that he d by them fhould be delivered to the Gentiles \ and that He fhould jj) be Wi7fi2 Foreknowledge PartIL I 1. I obferved before, in explaining the Nature of Neceflity, ^ that in Things which are paft, their paft Exiftence is now \ necelTary : having already made fure. of Exiftence, 'tis too \ late for any PolTibility of Alteration in that Refpedl : 'Tis ; now impomble, that it Ihould be otherwife than true, that i that Thing has exifted. ,: 2. If there be any fuch Thing as a divine Foreknowledge ; of the Volitions of free Agents, that Foreknowledge, by the Suppofition, is a Thing which already has, and long ago had Exiftence ; and fo, now it's Exiftence is neceffary ; it is now utterly impoffible to be otherwife, than that this Fore • knowledge fhould be, or ftiould have been. 3. 'Tis alfo very manifeft, that thofe Things which are indiftblubly conne<5led with other Things that are neceftary, are Themfelves neceftary. As that Propofition whofe Truth is neceftarily connedcd with another Propofition, which is neceflarily true, is itfelf neceftarily true. To fay other- wife, would be a Contradiction ; it would be in Effe6l to fay, that the CoJine(5tion was indiftbluble, and yet was not fo, but might be broken. If That, whofe Exiftence is in- diflblubly conneded with fomething whofe Exiftence is now neceftary, is it felf not neceftar)^, then it may pojjjbly mi exifl, notwithftanding that indiftbluble Connexion of it's Exift- ence.— Whether the Abfurdity ben't glaring, let the Rea- der judge. 4. 'Tis no lefs evident, that if there be a full, certain and infallible Foreknowledge of the future Exiftence of the Volitions of moral Agents, then there is a certain infallible and indiftbluble Conneaion between thofe Events and that Foreknowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceeding Ob- fervations, thofe Events are neceftary Events ; being infal- libly and indiffolubly conneded with that whofe Exiftence already is, and fo is now neceftary, and can't but have been. To fay, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible,and yet ■ the Connexion of the Event with that Foreknowledge is not indiftbluble, but diffoluble and fallible, is very abfurd. To affirm it, would be the fame Thing as to affirm, that there is no neceftary Conne(5tion between a Propofition's- being infallibly known to be true, and it's being true in*- deed. So that it is perfedly demonftrable, that if there be any infallible Knowledge of future Volitions, the Event is mcejlary j Sedt.XII. infers /ome Ncccnity. 119 necejary •/ or, in other Words, that it is impojjthle but the Event Ihould come to pafs. For if it ben't impoflible but that it may be otherwife, then it is not impoflible but that the Propofition which affirms it's future coming to pafs, may not now be true. But how abfurd is that, on the Suppofition that there is now an intalUble Knowledge ( i. c. Knowledge which it is impoflible ihould fail) that it is true. There is this Abfurdity in it, that it is not impoflible but that there now ihould be no Truth in that Propofition, which is now infalUbly known to be true. II. That no future Event can be certainly foreknown, whofe Exifl:ence is contingent, and without all NeceiTity, may be proved thus ; 'Tis impoflible for a Thing to be certainly known to any Intellecfl without Evidence. To fuppofe otherwife, implies a Contradi6lion : Becaufe for a Thing to be certainly known to any Underftanding, is for it to be evident to that Underftanding : And for a Thing to be evident to any Underftanding, is the fame Thing, as for that Underftanding to fee Evidence of it : But no Un- derftanding, created or increated, can fee Evidence where there is none : For that is the fame Thing,as to fee that to be, which is not. And therefore, if there be any Truth which is abfolutely without Evidence, that Truth is abfo- lutely unknowable, infomuch that it implies a Contradidtion to fuppofe that it is known. But if there be any future Event, whofe Exiftence is contingent, without all Neceflity, the future Exiftence of that Event is abfolutely without Evidence, li there be any Evidence of it, it muft be one of thefe two Sorts, either Self- Evidence^ or Proof ; for there can be no other Sort of Evidence but one of thefe two ; an evident Thing muft be fither evident r« ;V y^^, or evident in fomething elfe \ that is, evident by Connexion with fomething elfe. But a future Thing, whofe Exiftence is without all NeceiTity, can have neither of thefe Sorts of Evidence. It can't be Self-evident : For if it be, it may be now known by what is now to be feen in the Thing it felf ; either it's prefent Exiftence, or the NeceiTity of it's Nature : But both thefe are con- trary to the Suppofition. It is fuppofed, both that the Thing has no prefent Exiftence to be feen ; and alfo that it is not of fuch a Nature as to be neceiTa- rily exiftent for the future : So that it's future Ex- iftence is not Self-evident. And fecondly^ neither is there V any I20 CenaJn Fovdknowhdgt Part IL j any Prdof, or Evidetice in any Thing elfe, or Evidence of ! Connexion with fomething tMt that is evident \ For this j alfo is contrary to the Suppolition. 'Tis fuppofed, that J there is now Nothing exiftent, with which the future Ex- | iftence of the contingent Event is conne(5ted. For fuch a j Connexion defiroys its Contingence^ and fuppofes Neceflity. i Thus 'tis dernonftratedjthat there is in the Natvwe of Things | abfoltitely n6 Evidence at all of the future Exiftence of ; that Event, v>fhich is contingent, without all Neceflity (if | any fuch Event there be) neither Self-Evidence nor Proof, j And therefore the Thing in Reality is not evident ; and 1 fo can't be fefcn to be evident^ or, which is the fame \ Thing, can't be known. Let us confider this in an Example. Suppofe that fivfe Thoufand feven Hundred and fixty Years ago, there w^ag j Sio other Being but the divine Being ; and then this 3 World, or fome particular Body or Spirit, all at once S flarts out of Nothing into Being, and takes on it felf a \ particular Nature and Form ; all in abfolute Conti?igence, \ without any Concern of God, or any other Caufe, in the I Matter ; without any Manner of Ground or Reafon of | it's Exiftence ; or any Dependence upon, or Connection j at all with any Thing foregoing i I fay, that if this be ^ fuppofed, there was no Evidence of that Event before- x hand. There was no Evidence of it to be feen in the fi Thing it felf ; for the Thing it felf, as yet, was not. And \ there w^as no Evidence of it to be feen in any Thing elfe ; ; for Evidence in fomething elfe, is Connexion with fomethingr | elfe : But fuch Connexion is contrary to the Suppofition. I There was no Evidence before, that this Thing would hap- -i pen-, for by the Suppofition, there was no Reafon why zV'i fhoidd happen, rather than fomething elfe, or rather than ii Nothing. And if fo, then all Things before were exactly .1 equal, and the 'fame, with Refpe6t to that and other pofli- 'il ble Things ; there was no Preponderation, no fuperiour Weight or Value 5 and therefore Nothing that could be i of any Weight or Value to determine- any Underftanding. | The Thing was abfolutely without Evidence, and abfo- 1 lutely unknowable. An Increafe of Underftanding, or of I the Capacity of Difcerning, has no Tendency, and mak6s % no Advance, to a difcerning any Signs or Evidences of it, 1 let it be increafed never fo much ; yea, if it be increafed jI infinitely. The Increafe of the Strength of Sight may have i a Tendency to enable to difcera the Evidence which is| farP Sed. XIL i7ifers fom^ Neceflity. 121 far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in Clouds and Darknefs ; but it has no Tendency to enable to difcerri Evidence where there is none; If the Sight be infinitely ftrong, and the Capacity of Difcerning infinitely great, it will enable to fee all that there is, and to. fee it perfe(5lly, and with Eafe ; yet it has no Tendency at all to enable a Being to difcern that Evidence which is not ; But on the contrary, it has a Tendency to enable to difcern with great Certainty that there is none. III. To fuppofe the future Volitions of moral Agents not to be necelTary Events ; or, which is the fame Thing, Events which it is not impoflible but that they may not com« to pafs ; and yet to fuppofe that God certainly foreknows them, and .knows all Things ; is to fuppofe God's Know- f ledge to be inconfiftent with it felf. For to fay, that God certainly, and without all Conjedure, knows that a Thing will infallibly be, which at the fame Time he knows to be fo contingent^ that it may polTibly not be, is to fuppofe his Knowledge inconfiftent with it felf 5 or that one Thing that he knows is utterly inconfiftent with another Thing that he knows. 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, He now knows a Propofition to be of certain infallible Truths which he knows to be of contingent uncertain Truth,,, If a future Volition is fo without all Neceflity, 'that there is no- thing hinders but that it may not be, then the Propofitioni which afferts it's future Exiftence, is fo uncertain, that there is Nothing hinders but that the Truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all Things, He knows this Pro- pofition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconfiftent v/ith his knowing that it is infallibly true 5 and fo incon-* fiftent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the Thing be indeed contingent, God views it fo, and judges it to be contingent, if he views Things as they are. If the Event be not neceftary, then it is poffible it may never be : And if it be pofllble it may never be, God knows it may poifibly never be ; and that is to knov/ that the Propofition which affirms it's Exiftence, may poflibly not be true ; and that is to know that the Truth of it is uncertain ; which furely^ is inconfiftent with his knowing it as a certain Truth. If Volitions are in Themfelves contingent Events, without all Neceffity, then 'tis no Argument of Perfection of Knowledge in any Being to determine peremptoril)r that they will be ; but on the contrary, an Argument of Jgnorance and Miftake : Becaufe it would argue, that Q^ he 12 2 Foreknowledge infersNeceJftty^zxX, 11, he fuppofes that Propofition to be ccT-tain, which in it's own Nature, and ail Things conf.dered, is uncertain and contingent. To fay in fuch a Cafe, that God may hav« Ways of knowing contingent Events which we can't con- ceive of, • is ridi;:ulous ; as much fo, as to fay, that God; may know Contradictions to be true, for ought we know,, or that he may know a Thing to be certain, and at thei fame Time know it not to be certain, tho' we can't con- ceive how ; becaufe he has Ways of knowing, which we^ can't comprehend. Coroh I. From what has been obferved it is evident, that tlie abfolute Decrees of God are no more inconfiftent with human Liberty, on Account of any Neceffity of the Event which follows from fuch Decrees, than the abfolute Foreknozvledge of God. Becaufe the ConnecSlion between the Event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indlflbluble, as between the Event and an abfolute Decree. That is, 'tis no more impollible that the Event and Decree fhould not agree together, than that the Event and abfolute Knowledge fhould difagree. The Conne6lion between thcl Event &Foreknowledge is abfolutelyperfe6l,by theSuppofition:] becaufe it it is fuppofed, that the Certainty and Infallibility of the Knowledge is abfolutely perfed. And it being fo, the Certainty can't be increafed ; and therefore the Con- ne<5tion between the Knowledge and Thing known, can't be mcreafed ; fo that if a Decree be added to the Foreknow- ledge, it don't at ail increafe the Connection, or make it more infallible and indiffoluble. If it were not fo, the Certainty of Knowledge might be increafed by the Ad-' dition of a Decree ; which is contrary to the Suppofition, v/hich is, that the Knovv^ledge is abfolutely perfed, or per- fect to the higheft polTible Degree. There is as much of an ImpoflibiHty but that the Things (1 which are infallibly foreknown, ihould be, or (which is the i fame Thin'<) as great a NecelTity of their future Exiftence, .^ as if the Event were already written down, and was known,', and read by all Mankind, thro' all preceeding Ages, and j there were the mod indiffoluble and perfeA Conne<5tion i poffible, between the Writing, and the Thing vmtten.i In fuch a Cafe, it would be as impoflible the Event ihould i fail of Exigence, as if it had exifted already ; and a ;; Decree cau't make aa Event furer or more neceffary than ^ this. And.i i Seca.XII. as much as a Decree. 123 And therefore, if there be any fuch Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Neceffity of Conneaion land Confequence, is not at all inconfiftent with any Li- berty which Man, or any other Creature enjoys. And from hence it may be infer'd, that abfolute Decrees of God, which don't at all increafe the Neceffity, are not at all •inconfiftent with the Liberty which Man enjoys, on any Ifuch Account, as that they make the Event decreed neceffary, •fand render it utterly impoffible but that it (hould come to pafs. Therefore if abfolute Decrees are inconfiftent with Man's Liberty as a moral Agent, or his Liberty in a Statas of Probation, or any Liberty v.^hatfoever that he enjoys, it is not on Account of any Neceffity which abfolute De- crees infer. Dr. Wh'ithy fuppofes, there is a great Difference between God's Foreknowledge, and his Decrees, with Regard to Neceffity of future Events. In his Difcourfe on the five Points, P. 474, 5ct. He lays, '^ God's Prefcience has no '' Influence at all on our Adions. Should God (fays be) *' by immediate Revelation, give me the Knowledge of the " Event of any Man's State ^or Actions, would my Know- " ledge of them have any Infmence upon his Acflifins ? *' Surely none at all.- — Our Knowledge doth not affecl " the Things w^e know, to make them more certain, or " more future, than they would be without it. Now Fore- " knowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Know- *' ledge has no Influence on Things that are, fo neither has *' Foreknowledge on Things that ihall be. And confe- *' quently, the Foreknowledge of any Action that would be " otherwife free, cannot alter or diminlfti that Freedom. *' Whereas God's Decree of Ele6lion is powerful & adive, *' and comprehends the Preparation and Exhibition of fuch *' Means, as ftiall unfruft.rably produce the End. Hence " God's Prefcience renders no Actions neceflary." And to this Purpofe, P. 473. he cites Origen^ where he fays, GocVs Prefcience is not the Cauje of Thhigs future^ hut their being fu- ture is the Caufe of God's Prefcience that they will be : And Le B/anCy where he fays. This is the truejf RefoJutiGn of this Difficulty y that Prefcience is not the Caufe that Things are future \ hut their being future is the Caufe they are forcfeen. In like Manner Dr. Clark^ in his Demonftration of the Being and^ Attributes of God, P. 95, — 99. And the Author of the Freedom of IVilU in God and the Creature^ fpeaking to the like Purpofe with Dr. IVhitby^ reprefents Foreknowledge as Q 2 having I 124 Foreknowledge infer sNeceJftty Part 11. j having no mor^ hifluence on Things known^ to make them mcejjar^^ \ than Jfter-Knouikedge^f or to that Purpqfe. . To all which I would fay ; That what is faid about Knowledge, it's not having Influence on the Thing knowii- to make it necefiary, is Nothing to the Purpofe, nor does It in the leaft ^fFecfl the foregoing Reafoning. Whether ^refcience be the Thing that ?nakes the Event neceflary or no, It alters not the Cafe. Infallible Foreknowledge may prov^ the Neceflity of the Event foreknown, and yet not be the Thing which caufes the Neceflity. If the Foreknowledge be abfolute, this proves the Event known to be neceflary, or proves that 'tis impoffible but that the Event fliould be, by fome Means or other, either by a Decree, or fome other Way, if there be any other Way : Becaufe, as was faid before, 'tis abfurd to fay, that a Proportion is known to t)e certainly and infallibly true, which yet may poflibly prove not true. The whole of thp feqming Force of this Evafion lies in this ; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge don't caufe an Event to be neceflary, as a Decree does ; therefor^ it don\ prove it to be neceflary, as a Decree does. But there is n» Force in this arguing : For it is built wholly on this Suppofltion, that Nothing can prove^ ox he an Evidence of a Thing's being neceflary, but that which has a coufal In- fluence to make it fo. But this can never be 'maintained. li certain Foreknowledge of the future exifl:ing of an E- yent, be not the Thing which firft makes it impoflij^le that it fhould fail of Ej^illence ; yet it may, and certainly does demonjh-ate^ that it is impoflible it fliould fail of it, how- ever ^'that Impollibility comes. If Foreknowledge .be not the Caufe, but the Effe6t of this Impofllbility, it may prove that there is fuch an Impoflibility, as much as if it were the Caufe. It is as fl:rong arguing from the Effec5l to the Caufe, as from the Caufe to the Eff'edt. 'Tis enough, that "j an Exiftence which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whe- ther that I;npoflibility arifes from the Foreknowledge, or is J prior to it. 'Tis as evident, as 'tis pofllble any Thing fliould/j be, that it is impoffible a Thing which is infallibly:; known to be true, fliould prove not to be true ; therefore^ there is a Nccejjiiy that it fliould be otherwife ; whether the ,' Knowledge be the C^ufe of this Neceflity, or the NeceffityS the Caufe of the Knowledge. All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or^ After-Knowledge, or concomitant Knov/ledge, proves the Thing Sed.XII. as much as a Decree. 125 vThing known now to be necefTary, by fome Means or other ; or proves that it is impoffible it fliould now be other- wife than true. — I freejy allow, that Foreknowledge don't prove a Thing to be necefTary any more than After-Know- ledge : But then After-knowledge which is certain & infalli- ble, proves that 'tis now become impoffible but that the Propofition known (hould be true. Certain After- Knowledge proves that it is now, in the Time of the Knowledge, by fome Means or other, become im-pofllble but that the Propo- fition which predicates paft Exiflence on the Event, fiiould be true. And fo does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the Time of the Knowledge, it is by fome Means or other, become impoffible but that the Propofition which predicates future Exiftence on the Event, fhould be true. The Neceffity of thie Truth of the Propofitions, confiding in the prefent Impoffibility of the Non-exiflence of the Event affirmed, in both Cafes, is the immediate Ground of the certainty of the Knowledge ; there can be no Certainty of Knowledge without it. There mufl be a Certainty in Things themfelves, before they are certainly known, or (which is the fame Thing j known to be certain. For Certainty of Knowledge is no- thing elfe but knowing or difcerning the Certainty there is in the Things themfelves which are known. Therefore there mufl be a Certainty in Things to be a Ground of Cer- tainty of Knowledge, and to render Things capable of be- ing known to be certain. And this is Nothing but the Ne- celfity of the Truth known, or it's being impoffible but that it fhould be true ; or, in other Words, the firm and infalli- ble Connexion between the Subjed and Predicate of the Propofition that contains that Truth. All Certainty of Knowledge confifts in the View of the Firmnefs of that Connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the fu- ture Exiflence of any Event, is his Vfcw of the firm and in- difToluble Connection of the Subject and Predicate of the iPropofition that afHrn;s it's future Exiflence. The Subject is . ^hat poffible Event ; the Predicate is it's future exifling : But if future Exiflence be firmly and indifTolubly connected with that Event, then the future Exiflence of that Event . is necefTary. If God certainly knows the future Exiflence of an Event which is wholly contingent, and may poffibiy never be, then He fees a firm Connection between a Sub- ject and Predicate that are not firmly connected ; which is . a Contradiction, r ] J 26 FoTcknowhdgcmfersNeceJ^fj, Pai-tll, I allow what Dr. Whlthy fays to be true. That meer ^ Knowledge don^t affe5i the Thing knowriy to make it more certain i mr more future. But yet, I fay, it fuppofes and proves the | Thing to be already^ both future, and certain ; i. e. necefla- 1 rily future. Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes Futurity ; and I 2 certain Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes certain Futurity, an- j tecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other \ certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of j Knowledge, than a prior Impoflibility but that the Thing j Ihould prove true ; or (which is the fame Thing^ the I Neceffity of the Event. I I would obferve one Thing further concerning this Mat- |J ter, and it is this; That if it be as thofe foremention'd | Writers fuppofe, that God's Foreknowledge is not the | Caufe, but the EfFe6t of the Exiftence of the Event fore- I known ; this is fo far from (hewing that this Foreknowledge 'i don't infer the Neceffity of the Exiftence of that Event, that .j It rather fhews the contrary the more plainly. Becaufe it t Ihews the Exiftence of the Event to be fo fettled U firm, that ;': it is as if it had already been ; in as much as in Effect it 'i adtualiy exifts already ; it's future Exiftence has already *i had a<5hial Influence and Efficiency, and has produced an Effect, \ viz. Prefcience : The Effedt exifts already ; and as the j^ EfFe(5l fuppofes the Caufe, is connc6ted with the ^aufe, and - ! depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future E- .( vent, which is the Caufe, had exifted already. The Effedt '^ is firm as poffible, it having already the Pofteffion of Ex- j iftence, and has made fure of it. But the Effed can't be \ more firm and ftable than it's Caufe, Ground and Reafon. I The Building can't be firmer than the Foundation. r To illuftrate this Matter, let us fuppofe the Appearances } and Images of Things in a Glafs ; for Inftance, a refledling "\ Telefcope to be the* real Effects of heavenly Bodies (at J a Diftance, and out of SightJ which they referable : |J If it be fo, then, as thefe Images in the Telefcope have A had a paft a6tual Exiftence, and it is become utterly \ impoffible now that it fhould be otherwife than that ^ they have exifted ; fo they being the true Effe<5ls of the 3 heavenly Bodies they referable, this proves the exifting of ? thofe heavenly Bodies to be as real, infallible, firm and I neceffary, as the exifting of thefe Eff*e(5ls ; the one being ^ connected with, and wholly depending on the other. ' Now let us fuppofe future Exiitences fome Way or other >;< Scd.XII. as much as a Decree. 127 to have Influence back, to produce Efre<5ls before-hand, and caufe exadl and perfefl Images of themfelves in a Glafs, a Thoufand Years before they exift, yea, in all preceed- ing. Ages ; But yet that thefe Images are real Effe6ls of thefe future Exiftences, perfectly dependent on, and con- necSted with their Caufe ; thefe Effects and Images, having already had adual Exiftence, rendring that Matter of their Exifting perfedly firm and ftable, and utterly impoffiblc to be otherwife ; this proves in like Manner as in the other Inftance, that the Exiftence of the Things which are their Caufes, is alfo equally fure, firm and neceffary ; and that it is alike impoffible but that they fhould be, as if they had been already, as their Effeds have. And if inftead of Images in a Glafs, we fuppofe the antecedent EfFedts to be perfedl Ideas of them in the divine Mind, which have exifted there from all Eternity, which are as properly EfFe6ls, as truly and properly conne<5led with their Caufe, the Cafe is not altered. Another Thing which has been faid by fome Armlmans^ to take ofiT the Force of what is urged from God's Pre- fcience, againft the Contingence of the Volitions of moral Agents, is to this Purpofe ; " That when we talk .of *' Foreknowledge in God, there is no ftri6i: Propriety in " our fo Speaking ; and that altho' it be true, that there is " in God the moft perfed Knowledge of all Events from *' Eternity to Eternity, yet there is no fuch Thing as " before and after in God, but He fees all Things by " one perfed unchangeable View, without any SuccelTion." To this I anfwer, 1. It has been already fhewn, that all certain Knowledge proves the Necefllty of the Truth known ; whether it be before^ after^ or at the fame Time, Tho' it be true, that there is no Succeffion in God's Knowledge, and the Manner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no Event, pad, prefent, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of ; He never is, never was, and never will be without *infallible Knowledge of it ; He always fees the Exiftence of it 'to be certain and infallible. And as he always kts Things ft as they are in Truth ; hence there never is in Reality . ; ^) Thing contingent in fuch a Senfe, as that pofTibly it may happen never to exift. If, ftridly fpeaking, there is no Foreknowledge in God, 'tis becaufe thofe Things which are 128 CVr/^/» Foreknowledge Part II. I i are future to us, are as prefent to God, as if they already ; had Exiftence : and that is as much as to fay, that future j Events are always in God's View as evident, clear, fure i and neceflary, as if they already were. If there never is 3 a Time wherein the Exigence of the Event is not prefent I with God, then there never is a Time wherein it is not j as much impoffible for it to fail of Exiftence, as if it's \ Exiftence were prefent, and were already come to pafs. ] I God's viewing Things fo perfedlly and unchangeably as u that there is no Succeflion in his Ideas or Judgment, don't • \ hinder but that there is properly now, in the Mind of God, \ a certain and perfe<5l Knowledge of the moral Actions of ' Men, which to us are an Hundred Years hence : yea the 1 Obje6lion fuppoles this ; and therefore it certainly don't 1 hinder but that, by the foregoing Arguments, it is now ; impoffible thefe moral A<5lions fliould not come to pafs. \ We know, that God knows the future voluntar}' Anions j of Men in fuch a Senfe before-hand, as that he is able par- * ticularly to declare, and foretell them, and write them,- :; or caufe them to be written down in a Book, as He often 1 has done j and that therefore the neceffary Connedlion | which there is between God's Knowledge and the Event*) known, does as much prove the Event to be neceffary \ before-hand, as if the divine Knowledge were in the fame ^ Senfe before the Event, as the Prediction or Writing is. i If the Knowledge be infallible, then the Expreffion of it in i the written Prediction is infallible 5 that is, there is an i infallible Connedion between that written Predidion and i the Event. And if fo, then it is impoffible it iliould i ever be otherwife, than that that Prediction and the Event i IhouW agree : And this is the fame Thing as to fay, ^ 'tis impoffible but that the Event fhould come to pafs : | and this is the fame as to fay, that it's commg to pafs i is neceffary. So that it is manifeft, that there being no ' > proper Succeffion in God's Mind, makes no Alteration "4 as to the Neceffit)^ of the Exiftence of the Events which | God knows. Yea, < 2, This is io far from weakening the Proof, which has been given of the Impoffibility of the not coming to pafs i of future Events known, as that it eftablifties that whereia 'li the Strength of the foregoing Arguments confifts, and. « fhQVt's the Clearnefs of the Evidence. For, J (I.) The I Sedl.XII. infers fome NecdTity. 129 I (ij The very Reafon why God's Knowledge is with- i out SuccelTlon, is, becaufe it is ablblutely perfecl, to the I higheft pofTible Degree of Clearnefs and Certainty : all i Things, whether paft, prefent or to come, being view'd I with equal Evidence and Fulnefs ; future Things being \ htn with as much Clearnefs, as if they were prefent ; the View is always in abfolute Perfedion ; and abfolute ! conftant Perfedion admits of no Alteration, and fo no I SuccefTion ; the adual Exiftence of the Thing known, don't at all increafe, or add to the Clearnefs or Certainty of lithe Thing known : God calls the Things that are not, as tho' they were ; they are all one to Him as if they [had already exifled. But herein coniifts the Strength of the Demonftration before given, of the ImpoiTibility of the I not exifting of thofe Things whofe Exiftence God knows ; ('That it is as impolTible they fhould fail of Exiftence, as if itheyexifted already. This Objedion, inftead of weakening jthis Argument, fets it in the cleareft and ftrongeft Light ; for it fuppofes it to be fo indeed, that the Exiftence of future Events is in God's View fo much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exift, it makes not the leaft Alteration or Variation in his View or Knowledge of them. (2.) The Objedlon is founded on the Immutability oi Go6!^ Knowledge : For 'tis the Immutability of Knowledge makes his Knowledge to be without SucceiTion. But this moft diredly and plainly demonftrates the Thing I infift on, ^vz.that 'tis utterly impoffible the known Events fhould fail of Exiftence. For if that were pollible, then it would be poliible for there to be a Change in God's Knowledge and View of Things. For If the knov/n Event ftiouid fail of Exiftence, and not come into Being, as God expefted, then God would fee it, and fo would change his Mind^ and fee his former Miftake ; and thus there would be Change and SuccefTion in his Knowledge. But as God is immutable, and fo it is utterly and infinitely impoffible that his View fhould be changed ; fo 'tis, for ,the fame' Reafon, juft fo impoffible that the fore-known Event fhould not exift : And that is to be impoffible in the higheit iDegree : and therefore the contrary is neceflary. Nothing [is more impoffible than that the immutable God fhould [be changed, by the SuccefTion of Time ; ^who compre- Ikends aU Things, from Eternity to Eternityj in one, moft: R. perfect 130 Forcknowlege/jrw^j NeceJJtty. Part II, perfed, and unalterable View ; fo that his whole eternal Duration is Vitoe interminabilis^ tota^fimul^ & perfe£ia Pojpjfto, . On the whole, I need not fear to fa}S that there is no Geometrical Theorem or Propolition whatfoever, more capa-. ble of ftri(5t Demonftration, than that God's certain Pre- fcience of the Volitions of moral Agents is inconfiftent with fuch a Contingence of thefe Events, as is without all Neceflity ; and fo is inconfiftent with the Arminian Notion of Liberty. Cord. 2. Hence the Dodrine of the Calvinifis^ concerning the abfoliite Decrees of God, does not at all infer any more Fatality in Things, than will demonftrably follow froii\ the Doclrine of moft Arminian Divines, who acknowledge God's Omnifcience, and univerlal Prefcience. Therefore all ObjecStions they make againft the Doclrine of the Calvijiijlsy as implying Hobbes's Do6lrine of Neceflity, or the Stoicd. Dodrine of Fate, lie no more againft the Dodlrine of Cahinijis, than their own Do6lrine : And therefore it ^on't become thofe Divines, to raife luch an Out-cry againft the Cakinijis, on this Account. CoroL 3. Hence^ all arguing from Neceflity, againft the Do6tnne of the Inability of unregenerate Men to perform the Conditions of Salvation, and the Commands of God; requiring fpiritual Duties, and againft the Calviniftic Dodrine of efficacious Grace ; I fay, all Arguings of Arminiam (fuch of 'em as own God's Omnifcience) againft thefe Things, on this Ground, that thefe Doarines, tho' they don't fuppofe Men to be under any Conftraint orCoadion, yet fuppofe 'em under NecefiTity, with Refpeft to their moral Aclions,and thofe Things which are required of 'em in Order to their Acceptance with God j and their arguing againft t^ie Neceflity of Men's Volitions, taken from the Reafo- iiablenefs of God's Commands, Promifes, and Threatnings,, and the Sincerity of his Counfels and Invitations ; and all Objedions againft any Doctrines of the Cahiynjh as being inconfiftent with human Liberty, becaufe they infer NecelFity ; I fay, all thefe Arguments and Objections muft fall to the Ground, and be juftly efteem'd vain and frivolous, as coming from them -, being maintain'd in an Inconflftence with themfelves, and in like Manner levelled againft their own Doahne, as againft the Doctrine of the Qalvmifls, Section Section XIIL Whether weftippofe the Folitions of moral Agents to be conneEied with any Xhing antecede7tty or not ^ yet they mujl be ne- ceffary in fuch a Senfe as to overthrow Arminian Liberty. EVERY Aa of the Will has a Caufe, or it has not. If it has a Caufe, then, according to what has already been demonftrated, it is not contingent, but neceflary \ the EfFe<5t: being neceffarily dependent and con- fequent on it's Caufe ; and that, let the Caufe be what it will. If the Caufe is the Will itfelf, by antecedv^nt A6ts •chufmg and determining ; ftill the determined and canfed Ad muft be a neceflary Effea. The Aa that is the determined Effea of tl\e foregoing Aa which is it's Caufe, can't prevent the Efficiency of it's Caufe ; but mull be wholly fubjea to it's Determination and Command, as much as the Motions of the Hands and Feet : The confequent commanded Aas of the Will are as paflive and as neceffary, with Refpea to the .antecedent determining Aas, as the Parts of the Body are to the Vohtions "Which determine and command them. And therefore, if all the free Aas of the Will are thus, if they are all -determined Effeas, determined by the Will it felf, that is, determined by antecedent Choice, then they are all • neceflary ; they are all fubjec^ to, and decifively fixed by the foregoing Aa, which is their Caufe : Yea, even the determining Aa it felf ; for that muft be determined and fixed by another Aa, preceding that, if it be a free and voluntary Aa ; and fo muft be neceflary. So that by this all the free Ads of the Will are neceflfary, and can't be free unlefs they are neceflary : Becaufe they can't be free, according to the Arminian Notion of Freedom, unlefs they are determined by the Will ; which is to be determined by antecedent Choice ; which being their Caufe, proves ■ 'em nebeflTary, And yet they fay, NeceflTity is utterly incon- R 2 iiftent 132 Both NeceJJlty &^ Conttngence Part II. ] fiflent with Liberty. So that, by their Scheme, the A6ls \ oi the Will can't be free unlefs they 2X^ neceflary, and ; yet cannot be free if they be ^ssm- neceflary ! I But if the other Part of the Dilemma be taken, and j it be affirm'd that the free A6ts of the Will have no 1 Caufe, and are connected with nothing whatfoever that \ go^s before them and determines them, in order to maintain \ ; their proper and abfolute Contingence, and this fliould b« I allowed to be poffible ; ftill it will not ferve their Turn. I For if the VoUtion comes to pafs by perfect Contingence, ] and without any Caufe at all, then it is certain, no A(5t of the Will, no prior Ad of the Soul was the Caufe, no" I Determination or Choice of the Soul, had any Hand in \ it. The Will, or the Soul, was indeed the Subject of what \ happened to it accidentally, but was not the Caufe. The i Will is not active in caufmg or determining, but purely ;■ the palTive Subject ^ at leaft according to their Notion of \ A6lion and Paflion. In this Cafe, Contingence does as 1 much prevent the Determination of the Will, as a proper ' Caufe ; and as to the Wil], it was neceflary, and could be .| po otherwife. For to fuppofe that it could have^ been i ©therwife, if the Will or Soul had pleafed, is to fuppofe \ that the Ad is dependent Qn fome pnor A6t of Choice or \\ Pleafure ; contrary to what now is fuppofed : Jt is to fup- 1 pofe that it might have been otherwife^ if it's Caufe had \ made it or ordered it otherwife. Eut this dpn't agree to \ it's having no Caufe or Orderer at all. That muft be -' neceflary as to the Soul, which is dependent on no free ij A6t of the Soul ; But that which is without a Caufe, is de- > pendent on no free A6t of the Soul : bccaufe, by the Sup- • pofition, it is dependent on Nothing, and is conneded with 1 Nothing. In fuch a Cafe, the Soul is neceflarily fubjeded" J to what Accident: brings to pafs, from Time to Time, as . much as the Earth, that is inadive, is neceflarily fub- j jected to what falls upon it. But this don't confift with ! the Armnicin Notion of Liberty, which is the Will's Power ' of determming it fclf in it's own Ads, and being wholly j adive in it, without Pafllvenefs, and without being fubjed '\ to Neccirity.--— Thus, Contingence belongs to the Armini^n ' Notion of Liberty, and yet is inconfiftent with it. \ I would here obferve, that the Author of the EJfay on \ the Freedc?n of Will^ in God and the Creature^ Page 76, 77. \ ^iivs as follows;, " The Word Chance always means forrie- j ' ' '*' thins: ' Seft.XIII. inco?tJiJI^ wi^^hxmm. Liberty . 133 *' thing done without Defign. Chance and Defign ftand " in dire6t Oppofition to each other : and Chance can *« never be properly applied to the Ads of the ^yiil, « which is the Spring of all Defign, and which defigns *« to chufe whatfoever it doth chufe, whether there be any <*= fuperiour Fitnefs in the Thing which it chufes, or no -, ** and it defigns to determine it felf to one Thing, where . *' two Things perfedlly equal are propofed, meerly becaufe it *' will." But herein appears a very great Inadvertence in this Author. For if the IVill be the Spring of all Defign^ as he fays, then certainly it is not always the EffeSl of Defign -, and the A61s of the Will themfelves muft fometimes come to pafs when they don't fprmg from Defign \ and confe- quently come to pafs by Chance, according to his own Definition of Chance. And if the Will defigns to chiije what- foever it does chufe y 2.n6. defigns to determine it felf as he fays, then it defigns to determine all its Defigns. Which carries us back from one Defign to a foregoing Defign determining that, and to another determining that ; and fo on in infinitum. The very firft Defign muft be the J£fFe6l of foregoing Defign, or elfe it muft be by Chance, in his Notion of it. Here another Alternative may be propofed, relating to the Conne(5\ion of the Acts of the Will with fomething foregoing that is their Caufe, not much unlike to the other ; which is this : Either human Liberty is fuch that it may iwell ftand with Volitions being neceffarily connected with the Views of the Underftanding, and fo is confiftent with Necelfity ; or it is inconfiftent with, and contrary to fuch a Connection and Neceflity. The former is diredly fub- that Men are worthy of I that Efteem, Refpe6l, and Honour for their Vertue, fmali land imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of^ for his [infinite Righteoufnefs, Holinefs, and Goodnefs ? If fo, it I muft be becaufe of fome Sort of peculiar Excellency in the jvi^rtuous Man, which is his Prerogative, wherein he really has the Preference ; fome Dignity, that is entirely diftin- iguifti'd from any Excellency, Amiablenefs or Honourablenefs in God ; not in Imperfe6tion and Dependance, but in Pre-eminence ; which therefore he don't receive from God, inor is God the Fountain or Pattern of it ; nor can God, in that Refpe6t, ftand in Competition with him, as the Obje<£t of Honour and Regard ; but Man may claim a peculiar Efteem, Commendation and Glory, that God can have no Pretenfion^ !to. Yea, God has no Right, by vertue of his necelTary Ho- linefs, to intermeddle with that grateful Refpe(5l and Praife, idue to the vertuous Man, who chufes Vertue, in the Exercife of a Freedom ad utruinque ; any more than a precious Stone, which can't avoid being hard and beautiful. And if it be fo, let it be explained what that peculiar I Refped is, that is due to the vertuous Man^ which differs I in Nature and Kind, in fome Way of Pre-eminence, from \ all that is due to God. What is the Name or I>efcription I of that peculiar Affedlion ? Is it Efteem, Love, Admiration^, Honour, Praife, or Gratitude ? The Scripture every where : reprefents God as the higheft Objea of all thefe : there we j read of the $quI' s imgnfying the Lord^ of hv'wg Hhn mth all the i . ■ " S Hearty 138 Concerning GOXy^ Vertue. Part III. Hearty with all the Soul^wlth all theMind^ ^ with all the Strength ; admiring him, and his righteous A^s^ or greatly regarding them, as marvellous ^ wonderful ; honouring^ glorifying^ exalting^ extolling^ blefpng^ thanking^ and praifing Him ; giving unto Him all the Glory of the Good which is done or received, rather than unto Men ; that no Flejh Jhould glory in his Prefence j but that He fl-iould be regarded as the Being to whom all Glory is due. What then is that Refpea ? What Pairion,AfFeaion, or Ex- ercife is it, that Arminians call Praife^ diverfe from all thefe Things, which Men are worthy of for their Vertue, and which God is not worthy of, in any Degree ? ';t If that Neceflity which attends God's moral Perfedions and Actions, be as inconfiftent with a Being worthy of Praife, as a Necefllty of CoacStion ; as is plainly implied in or inferred from Dr. Ulnthys Difcourfe ; then why fhould. we thank God for his Goodnefs, any more than if He were forced to be good, or any more than we ftiould thank one of our Fellow-Creatures who did us Good, not freely, and of good Will, or from any Kindnefs of Heart, but from meer Compulfion, or extrinfecal Neceflity ? Arminians fuppofe, that God is neceflarily a good and gracious Being : for this they make the Ground of fome of their main Arguments againft many Dodrines maintain'd by Calvinijls : They fay, thefe are certainly falfe, and it is i?npaffible they fhould be true,: becaufe they are not confident wqth the Goodnefs of God.l This fuppofes, that it is impoffible but that God fhould be good : for if it be fpofuble that He fhould be otherwife, then that ImpofTibihty of the Truth of thefe Dodrines ceafes, according to their own Argument. \ That Vertue in God is not, in the moft ;^roper Senfe^tft rewardcible^ is not for Want of Merit in his moral Perfedi- J ons and Actions, fufncient to deferve Rewards from hisli Creatures ; but becaufe He is infinitely above all Capacity ;)ii of receiving any Reward or Benefit from the Creature : HeH is already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and we can'tn be profitable unto Him. But flill he is worthy of our fupreamj4 Benevolence for his Vertue ; and would be worthy of ontk Beneficence, which is the Fruit and ExprefTion of Benevo-^^ lence, if our Goodnefs could extend to Him. If God de- 1| fervcs to be thanked and praifed for his Goodnefs, He wouldrt' for the fame Reafon, deferve that we fhould alfo requite his|i Kindnefs, if that were poffible. TVhat Jhall I render to thtV Lord for all his Benefits f is the natural Language of Thank-| fulnefs Seft.II. Chn{\' s Oh^dicncG mcejfarj. 139 fulnefs : and (o far as in us lies, it is our Duty to recompenfc God's Goodnefs, and render again according to Benefits received. And that we might have Opportunity for fo natural an Ex- preflion of our Gratitude to God, as Beneficence, notwith- ftanding his being infinitely above our Reach j He has ap- pointed others tobe his Receivers, and to ftand in his Stead, as the Objeas of our Beneficence ; fuch are efpecially our indigent Brethren. Section II. Ths AEis of the Will of the human Soul of Jesus Christ neceflarily holy,jj^^/ ^r^/^ vertuGus^ praife-worthyy rewardable^ 6cc. ir Have already confidered how Dr. Whithy infifis upon it, I that a Freedom, not only from Coadion, but Necefiity, # is requifde to either Vertue or Vice^ Praife or Dijpraife^ Reward or Funijlmient. He alfo infifis on the fame Freedom as abfo- h^tely requifite to a Perfon's being the Subject of a Lav;^ ot Precepts or Prohibitions \ in the Book before mentioned (P. 301, !^3i4, 328, 339, 940, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373,410.; And of ' Pro7ni/es znd Threatnings (P. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 34G, 363.) And as requifite to a State of Trial, (P. 297, &c.) Now therefore, with an Eye to thefe Things, I would en- quire into the moral Condud and Pra<5lice of our Lord Jei'us Chrift, which he exhibited in his human Nature here, in his State of Humiliation, And Firj}^ I would (hew, that his ■ hoJy Behaviour was necejfary ; or that it was impcfftble it ! (liculd be otherwife, than that He iliould behave himfelf holily, and that he fliould be perfectly holy in each indivi- dualAdt of his Life. And Secondly^ t\\2it his holy Behaviour' was properly of the Nature of Vertue^ and was zvorthy of Praife ; and that He was the Subject of Lawy Pi'ecepis o>- Commands^ Projnifes and Rewards \ and that he was in a State of Trial i- S 2 I. It 140 TieJS?so/t&eWi[\o(Chna, P.III. J I. It was impojftbk^ that the A(5ls of the Will of the human Soul of Chrift Ihould, in any Inftance, Degree or Circum- 1 fiance, be otherwife than holy, and agreable to God's Na- ture and Will. The following Things make this evident, I. God had promifed fo effedually to preferve and uphold j Him by his Spirit, under all his Temptations, that he ihould 1 | not fail of reaching the End for which He came into the \ World ; —which he would have fail'd of, had he fallen intg A Sin. We have fuch a Promife, Ifai. xlii. 1,2,3,4. Behold my ^\ Servant^ wham I uphold ; mine EleSi^ in whom my Soul dellghteth ,\ \ I have put my Spirit uponHim : He Jhall bring forth Judgment to the Gentiles : He Jhall not cry^nor lift up^nor caufe hisVoice to be heard in the Street. He Jhall bring forth Judgment unto Truth. He Jhall not fail ^ nor be difcouragedy till he have fet Judgment in the Earth ; end the Ifles Jhall wait for his Lqiv. This Promife of Chrift's having God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up his Voice &c. relates to the Time of ChrilVs Ap- pearance on Earth ; as is manifeft from the Nature of the Promife, and alfo the Application of it in the New Tefta- ment, Matth. 12, 18. And the Words imply a Promife of his being fo upheld by God's Spirit, that he (hpuld be pre- ferved from Sin ; particularly from Pride and Vain-glory, and from being overcome by any of the Temptations he ihould be under to affe6t the Glory of this World ; the Pomp ) of an earthly Prince, or the Applaufe and Praife of Men : and I that he Ihould be fo upheld, that he fhould by no Means 1 fail of obtaining the End of his coming into the World, of ( bringing forth Judgment unto Victory, and eftalplilhing his Kingdom of Grace in the Earth.— And in the following Verfes, this Promife is conf rmed, with the greateft imagina- ble Solemnity. Thus faith the LORD^ HE that created the Heavens^ andjlretched them out ; Tie that fpread forth the Earthy arid that which ccmeth out of it ; He that giveth Breath unto the ■■. People upon it^ and Spirit to them that tualk therein : I the Lord ^ have called Thee in Righteoufnefs^ and will hold thine Hand ; and • will keep Thee^ and give Thee for a Covenant of the People, for a . Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind Eyes, to briyig out the Pri' ■ f oners from the Prijon, and thein that Jit in Darknefs out of the } 'Prijm-Eloufe. 1 am JEHOVAH, that is my Name, kc. Very parallel with thefe Promifes is that, Tfai. xlix. 7, 8,9. which alio has an apparent Refpect to the Time of Chrift's Humiliation on Earth. Thus faith the Lord, the Redeemer of liraelj and his hdy Oncy to Him whom Man defpifeth^ to Hirti Se<9:.II. neceflarily ^^/^'. X41 whom the Nation akhorreth^ to a Servant of Riders j Kings fljalt fie and arifi^ F rimes alfo jfimll luorjhip ; becaifi of the Lord 'that is i faithful, and the holy One of Ifrael, and He jhall choofe Thee. ! Thus faith the Lord^ In an acceptable Time have I heard Thee ; in I a Day of Salvation have I helped Thee ; and I will preferve \ Thee, and give thee for a Covenant of the Peopky to ejlablijh fhe Earthy &c. And in Ifai. I. 5 9. w^ have the Meffiah expre fling his Aflurance, that God would help Him, by fo opening his Ear, or inclining his Heart to &c. Gird thy Sivord on thy Thigh, O mojl Mighty, with thy \ Glory and thy Majejly ; and in thy Majejiy ride profperonjly. And 1 fo every Thing that is faid from thence to the End .of the Pfalm. And thofe Promifes, Ifai, lii. 13, 14, 15. & Hii. ! 10, II, 12. And all thofe Promifes which God makes to the 1 Mefliah, of Succefs, Dominion and Glory in the Charader of Redeemer, in Ifai. Chap. xhx. 3. It was often promifed to the Church of God of old, . , for their Comfort, that God would give them a righteous^ finlefs Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5,6. Behold, the Days come, faith the Lord, that I tvill raife up unto David a righteous Branch ; and a King Jloall reign and profper, andfiall execute ^Judgment and Jujlict in tlye Earth, In his Days jliall Judah he faved, aJid Ifraei Jhall dwell fafely. And this is the Narne whereby He Jhall be called. The h Lord ourRighteoifnefs, So,Jer.xxxiii.— / will c^ufe the Branch of \\ Righteoufnefs to grow i^p unto David ; a^id He Jhall execute fudg- y ment and Righteoufnejs in the Land. Ifai. ix, 6, 7. For unto us a Child is born ; JJpon the Throne of David and of his King- dom, to order it, and to eftablijh it with f:! dement andfuJliceT, from h^nceforth^ even fcre^ier : The Zeal of the Lord of Ho/Is will do this. Chap. xi. at the Beginning. There JJ^all come forth a ^ Rod out of the Stem of Jeffe, and a Branch Jhall grow out of his " Roots -y and the Spirit of the Lord Jhall reft upon Him,~-T- The Spirit of Knowledge, and of the Fear of the Lord : — IVith Righ- teoifnej's Jhall He judge the Poor, and reprove with Equity ;-—- 1 Righteoufnefs pall be the Girdle of his Loins, ajid Faithfuhiefs. the Girdle of his Reins. Chap. lii. 13. My Servant Jliall deal prudently. Chap. iiii. 9. Becaufe He had done no Fiolcnce, neither h was Grille found in his Mouth. If it be impoffible, that thefe li Promifes fhould fail, and it be eafier for Heaven and Earth to pi pafs aw^ay, than for one Jot or Tittle -of thefe Promifes of |d God to pafs away, then it was impoflible that Chrift fhould commit any Sin. Chrift himfelf fignified, that it was im- poflible but that the Things which were fpoken concerning Him fliould be fulfilled. Luk. xxiv. 44. That all Things mufi be fulfilled, which were written in the Law of Mofes, and in the Prophets, and in the Pjalnis concerning Me. Mat. xxvi. 53, 54. Bui how then Jhall the Scripture be fulfJlcd, that thus it muji be ? Mark xiv. 49. But the Scriptures muji be fulfilled. And fo the Apoftle, ht\. i. 163 17, This Scripture mufi nmls have been fulfillecL 4- A^i Sed.II. neceflai-ily holy. 14.3 4. All the Promifes which were made to the Church of old, of the Meffiah as' a future Saviour, from that made to our firft Parents in Paradife, to that which was delivered by the Prophet Malachl^ {hew it to be impoffible that Chrift fhould not have perfevered in perfecSt Holinefs. The antient Predictions given to God's Church, of the Meffiah as a Saviour, were of the Nature of Promifes ; as is evident by the Predictions themfelves, and the Manner of delivering them. But they are exprefly, and very often called Prbmifcs in the New-Teftament ; as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Ads I xiii. 32, 33. Rom, i. i, 2, 3. & Chap. xv. 8. Heh. vi. i-^^ &c« Thefe Promifes were often made with great Solemnity, and confirmed with an Oath ; as in Gen. xxii. 16. 17. By my f elf have I Jworriy faith the Lord^ that in hleffing^ I will hlefs thee^ and in multiplying^ I will multiply thy Seed, ai the Stars of Heaven, mid as the Sand which is upon the Sea-Shore :— — And in thy Seed JhaU i all the Nations of the Earth be hleffed. Compare Luke i. 72,73, land Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16. The Apoftle in Heh. vi. 17, 18. fpeaking of this Promife to Abraham, fays^ IVherein God wil- ! ling more abundantly to foew to the Heirs of Promife the Imniuta-' bility of his Couifel, confirmed it by an Oath ; that by tW9 IMMUTABLE Things, in which it was IMPOSSIBLE fir God to lie, he might have Jlrong Conflation, — In which Words, the Neceffity of the Accompiilbment, or (which is the fame Thing) the Impojfihility of the contrary, is fully de- clared. So God confirmed the Promife of the great Salva- I tion of the MelTiah, made to David, by an Oath ; Pfal.Ixxxix* j 3? 4' I have made a Covenant with my Chofen, I have fwom I Unto David my Servant ; Thy Seed will I ejiablijh for ever, a7id \ build up thylhrone to all' Generations. There is Nothing that is fo abundantly fet forth jin Scripture, as fure and irrefra- ! gable, as this Promife and Oath to David, See PfaLlxxxix^ 34> 355 36. 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. Ifai. Iv. 3. ASf, ii. 29, 30, J ,and xiii. 34. The Scripture exprefly fpeaks of it as utterly 1 impojjible th^t this Promife and Oath to David, concerning \ the everlafting Dominion of the Meffiah of his Seed, fhould I fail. Jer. xxxiii. 15, &c. In thofe Days, and at that Time, I f will caufe the Branch of Righteoujhefs to gj'oiu up unto David. For thus faith the Lord, David fiall never want a Man to fit upon the Throne of the Houfe o/Ifrael. ver. 20, 21. If you can break my Covenant of the Day, and my Covenant of the Nighty and that thert f/mdd not he Day and Niglt in their Seafon ; then may alfo my Covenant be broken with David my Servant, that He JJjoul'l not have a Sen to reign upon his Throne, So in ver. 25^ 26. Thus abundant is the Scripture in reprefenting how i?npolftbU 144- 1ley4£isoftheWi\\o^C\in9iy P.III. impojfible it was, that the Promifes made of Old concerning the great Salvation and Kingdom of the MefTiah ftiould fail : Which implies, that it was impoffible that this Meffiah, the fecond Jdam^ the promifed Seed of Ahrahamf and o{ David^ ffcould fall from his Integrity, as the firft Jdam did. 5. All the Promifes that were made to the Church of God under the Old Teftament, of the great Enlargement of the Church, and Advancement of her Glory, in the Days of the Gofpel, after the Coming of the Meffiah ; the Increafe- of her Light, Liberty, Holinefs, Joy, Triumph over her Enemi2s,c5V. of which fo great a Part of the Old Tefta- ment ccnfifts ; which are repeated fo often, are fo varioufly exhibited, fo frequently introduced with great Pomp and So- lemnity, and are fo abundantly fealed with typical and fym- bolical P^eprefcntations j I fay, all thefe Promites imply, that the Meffiah (hould perfed the Work of Redemption j and this implies, that he fhould perfevere in the Work "which the Father had appointed Him, being in all Things conformed to his Will. Thefe Promifes were often confirm- ed by an Oath. (See Ifat. liv. 9. with the Context; Chap. Ixii. 18.) And it is reprefented as utterly impoffible that thefe Promifes (hould fail. {Ifai. xlix. 15. with the Con- text, Chap. liv. 10. with the Context ; Chap. li. 4, — 8. Chap. xl. 8. with the Context.) And therefore it was impojfible, that the Meffiah (liould fail, or commit Sin. 6. It was impGjJlhky that the Meffiah fhould fail of perfe- vering in Integrity and Holinefs, as the firft Adam did, becaiife this would have been inconfiftent with the Pro- mifes which God made to the bleffed Virgin, his Mother, and to her Hufband ; implying, that He Jhould Jave his People from their Sins^ that God would give Him the Throne of his Fa- ther David, that He jhould reign over the Houfe of Jacob for^ ever \ and that of Ins Kingdom there fmdd he no End. Thefe Promifes were fure, and it was impoff.ble they fliould fail. And therefore the Virgin Mary., in trufting fully to them, adted reafonably, having an immovable Foundation of her Faith ; as Elifaheth obferves, ver. 45. And hlejjed is fhe that heiieveth ; for there J]:>all be a Performance of ihofe Things which were told her from the Lord. 7. That it fliould have been poffible that Chrift (hould fin, and fo fail in the Work of our Redemption, does not confilt with the eternal Piurpofe and Decree of God,' reveal'd Sed.II. neceffarily holy. 145 i in the Scriptures, that He would provide Salvation for fallen I Man in and by Jefus Chrift, and that Salvation fhould be i offered to Sinners through the Preaching of the Gofpel. Such an abfolute Decree as this Armlniam don't deny. Thus much at lead fout of all Controverfy) is implied in fuch , Scriptures, as i Cor. ii. 7. £/,f. i. 4, 5. and Ch. iii. 9, 10, 11. I Fet. i. 19, 20. Such an abfolute Decree as this, Armlniam allow to be fignified in thefe Texts. And the Armlnmn Ele6tion of Nations and Societies, and general Ele6tion of the Chriftian Church, and conditional Ele6tiGn of parti- cular Perfons, imply this. God could not decree before the Foundation of the World, to fave all that fhould believe in, and obey Chrift, unlefs he had abfolutely decreed that Salvation fhould be provided, and effedually wrought out by Chrift. And fmce (as the Armlniam themfelves ftrenu- oufly maintain) a Decree of God infers Necejftty ; hence it became necejfary that Chrift ftiould perfevere, and actually work out Salvation for us, and that He fhould not fail by the Commiffion of Sin. ■ 8. That it fnould have been pofTible for Chrift's Ho- linefs to fail, is not confiftent with what God pro- mifed to his Son before all Ages. For, that Salvation fhould be offered to Men thro* Chrift, and beftowed on all his faithful Followers, is what is at leaft implied in 1; that certain and infallible Promife fpoken of by the Apoftle, Tit. i. 2. In hope of eternal Life ; which God^ that cannot Ile^ f promlfed before the TVorld be'ga?i. This don't feem to be con- I troveitei by Armlniam. * 9, That it ftiould be pofTible for Chrift to fail of doing his Father's Will, is inconftftent with the Promife made t to the Father by the Son, by the Logos that was with the Father from the Beginning, before he took the human Nature : as may be feen in Pfal. xl. 6,7, 8. (compar'd with 'the Apoftle's Interpretation, Heb, x. 5,-9. ) Sacrifice and Offering thou did ft not defer e : mine Ears hajl thou opened., (or tored ;) Burnt-Offering a7id Sln-Offerlng Thou hafe not required., Then f aid /, X^, I come : In the Volume of the Book It Is written •f me^ I delight to do thy IFill., O my God., and thy Law Is with- in my Heart. Where is a manifeft Allufion to the Cove- nant which the willing Servant, who ioved his Mafter's Ser- vice, made with his Mafter, to be his Servant for ever, on T UiQ * See Dr. ffhl/hy on the five Points, P. 48, 49, ;c^ 14-6 TheASisoftheWi\\oiC\in9i, Partlll. the Day wherein he had his Ear bored ; which Covenant was probably inferted in the publick. Records, called the Volume of the Book^ by the Judges, who were called to take -I Cognizance of the Tranfadtion i Exod, xxi. If the Logosy \ who. was with the Father, before the World, and who made ': the World, thus engaged in Covenant to do the Will of the :' Father in the human Nature, and the Promife, was as it were 4 recorded, that it might be made fure, doubtlefs it was im-,^v pofftble that it (hould fail j and fo it was impojftble that Chrift ^ fhould fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human u Nature. ^ ro. If it was poflible for Chrift to have failed of doing the Will of his Father, and fo to have failed of effedually working out Red(?inption for Sinners, then \^\t Salvation of all the Saints, who were faved from the Beginning of the World, to the Death of Chrift, was not built on a firm Foundation. The Mefliah, and the Redemption which He was to work out by^ his Obedience unto Death, was the. Foundation of the Salvation of all the Pofterity of fallen Man, that ever were faved. Therefore, if when the Old- Teftament Saints had the Pardon of their Sins, and the Fa- vour of God promifed them, and Salvation beftawed upon them, ftiil it was poflible that the Mefliah, when he came, might commit Sin, then all this was on a Foundation that was not firm and ftable, but liable to fail j fomething which it was poflible might never be. God did as it Vv'ere truft to what his Son had engaged and promifed to do in future . Time ; and depended fo much upon it, that He proceeded actually to fave Men on the Account of it, as tho' it had been already done. But this Truft and Dependance of God, on the Suppofltion of Chrift's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was leaning on a Staff that was weak, and might- pollibly break. The Saints of old trufted on the Promifes" of a future Redemption to be wrought out and compieated by the Melfiah, and built their Comfort upon it : Abraham ^aw Chrift's Day and rejoyccd j and he and the other Pa- triarchs died in the Faith of the Promife of it. ( Hcb.x\.ii^,) But on this Suppofltion, their Faith and their* Comfort, and their Salvation, was built on a moveable fallible P'oundation ; Chrift was not to them a tried Stone, a fure Foundation ; as. in 7/?//. xxviii. i6. Da-vid cniixoXy refted on the Covenant of God with him, concerning the future glorious Dominion aiVd Salvationof theiVIefflah,of his Seed ; fays, it was all hisSahationy and all his D£ fin ; and comfort;; himfclf that this Covenant was an Seca.II. neceffarily ic?^. 147 an everlafting Covenant^ ordered in all Things and fure^ 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. But if Chrift's Vertue might fail, he was miftaken :. his great Comfort was not built fo fure, as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the Determinations of the Free-Wiil of Chrift's human Soul ; which was fubje6l to no NeceiFity, and might be determined either one Way or the other. Alfo the Dependance of thofe who looked for Re- demption in Jerufalcm^ and waited for the Confolation of Ifrael^ [Luh ii. 25. & 38.) and the Confidence of the Difci- pies of Jefus, who forfook all and followed Him, that they might enjoy the Benefits of his future Kingdom, was built on a fandy Foundation. .11. The Man Chrift Jefus, before he had finifhed his Courfe of Obedience, and while in the midil of Tempta- tions and Trials, was abundant in pofitively predicting his own future Glory in his Kingdom, and the Enlargement of his Church, the Salvation of the Gentiles through Him &c. and in Promifes of Bleffings he would beftow on his true Difciples in his future Kirip;dom ; on which Promifes he re- quired the full Dependence of his Difciples. (Jjh. xiv.). But tlie Difciples would have had no Ground for fuch De- pendance, if Chrift had been liable to fail in his Work : And Chrift Himfelf would have been guilty of Prefumption, in fo abounding in peremptory Promifes of great Things, which depended on a nieer Contingence ; nji-z. the Determi- nations of his free Will, confifting in a Freedom ad iitrnm- ^ue^ to either Sin or Holinefs,. ftanding in Indifference, and incident, in Thoufands of future Inilances, to go either one I Way or the other. Thus it is evident, that it was impofflble that the Ac5\s cf the Will of the human Soul of Chrift Ihould be otherwife than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father ; or, u\ ibther Words, they were neceflarily fo conformed. I have been the longer in the Proof of this Matter, it being a Tiling denied by feme of the greateft Arminhuis^ hy EpJfcopius in particular ; and becaufe I look upon It as a Point ck-ariyand abfolutely determining the Controverfy between Caivi?ii/h and Jrjnimans^ concerning the Nccefftty of fuch a Freedom ot Will as is infifted on by the latter, in order to moral Agen- cy, Vertue, Command or Prohibition, Promife or Thi ear- ning, Reward or Punilhment, Praife or Difpraife, Ment or Demerit. I now therefore proceed, T 2 • ][, To 148 Christ's Righteoufnefs II. To confider whether Christ, in his holy Behaviour on Earth, was not thus a moral Agent ^ fubjeing the Work which God had ap- pointed Him ; Ifai, hii. 10, 11, 12. Pfal. ii. & ex. Ifai^ xlix. 7, 8, 9.— In Luke xxii. 28, 29. Chrift fays to his Dif- ciples, Te are They which have continued with me in my Tempta^ tions y and I appoint unto you a Kingdom^ as my Father hath ap-* poirited unto ?ne. The Word moft properly fignifies to ap- point by Covenant,orPromife. The plainMeaning of Chrift's V/ords is this : " As you have partook of my Temptations ^^ andTrials,and have been ftedfaft, & have overcome ; I pro- ^' mife to make youPartakers of my Rewardjand to give you a "^^ Kingdom ; as the Father has promifed me a Kingdom *< for continuing ftedfaft, and overcoming in thofe Trials/* And the Words are well explained by thofe in Rev. iii. 21^ To hi?n. that overomicth^ will I grant to fit with me in my Throne\ ^ven as I alfo overcame^ and am jet down with my Father in his Throne, And Chrift had not only Promifes of glorious Suc- ct:is and Rewards made to his Obedience and Sufferings, tut the Scriptures plainly reprefent Fiim as ufing thefe Pro- luilcs ioi' Motives and Inducements to obey and fuffer ; and particulajcly Sed.II. Pratfe-worthy^rewardable^t^c. 149 particularly that Promife of a Kingdom which the Father had appointed Him,or fitting with theFather on his Throne ; as in Heb. xii. i,2- Let us lay afide every Weighty and the Sin which doth eafly befet us^ and let us run with Patience the Race that is Jet before uSy looking unto Jefus^ the Author and Finijher of our Faith ; who for the Joy that was fet before Him^ endured the Crofs^ defpifing the Shame, and is fet down on the right Hand 1 of the Throne of God. And how ftrange would it be to hear any Chriftian aflert, that the holy and excellent Temper and Behaviour of Je- fus Chrifl, and that Obedience which he performed under fuch great Trials, was not vertuous or P7-aife-worthy ; becaufe his Will was not free ad utrumque, to either Holinefs or Sin, but was unalterably determin'd to one ; that upon this Ac- count, there is no Vertue at all, in all Chrift's Humility, Meeknefs, Patience, Charity, Forgivenefs of Enemies, Con- tempt of the World, Heavenly-mindednefs, Submiffion to the Will of God, perfed Obedience to his Commands, (tho' He was obedient unto Death, even the Death of the Crofs) his great Compaifion to the AfHicSted, his unparai- lel'd Love to Mankind, his Faithful nefs to God and Man, under fuch great Trials •, his praying for his Enemies, even when nailing Him to the Crofs ; That Vertue^ when applied to thefe Things, is but an empty Name ; That there was no Merit in any of thefe Things ; that is, that Chrift was wor^ I thy of Nothing at all on the Account of them, worthy of no I Reward, no Praife, no Honour or Refpe6t from God or Man ; Becaufe his Will was not indifferent, and free either to thefe Things, or the Contrary ; but under fuch a ftrong Inclination or Bias to the Things that were excellent, as made it impojfihle that he fliould chufe the contrary ; That upon this Account (to ufe Dr. Whitby s Language) // would he fenfibly umeafonable that the human Nature fhould be re- warded for any of thefe Things. According to this Doctrine, That Creature who is evi- dently fet forth in Scripture as the Firji-born of every Crea^ ture, as having iyi all Things the Pre-eminence, and as the high- eft of all Creatures in Vertue, Honour, and Worthinefs of Efteem, Praife and Glory, on the Account of his Vertue, is lefs worthy of Reward or Praife, than the very leaft of Saints ; yea, no more worthy than a Clock or meer Machine, that is purely palfr/e, and moved by natural Neceflity. 1 50 Christ's Rightcoufncfs Part III. l! If we judge by fcriptural Reprefentatlpns of Things, wc j have Reafon to fuppofc, that Chrift took on him our Na- ^ ture, and dwelt witji us in this World, in a fuffering t State, not only to fatisfy for our Sins ; but that He, being i in. our Nature and Circumilances, and under our Trials, ' < might be our moft fit and proper Example, Leader and ' u Captain, in the Exercife of glorious and vidorious Ver-' p tue, and might be a vifible Inftancc of the glorious End ;,c and Reward of it -, That we might fee in Him the ui Beauty, Amiablenefs, and true Honour and Glory, and |j exceeding Benefit of that Virtue, which it is proper for us | human Beings to pra6life ; and might thereby learn, and la be animated, to feck the like Glory and Honour, and to [i obtain the like glorious Reward. See Heb. ii. 9, 14, m •with V. 8,9. and xii, i, 2, 5. Joh. xv. 10. Rom.xin. 17. j| 2 Tim, ii. II. 12. I Pet. ii. 19,20. & iv. 13. But if there \l was Nothing of any Vertue or Merit, or Worthinefs of any :j Reward, Glory, Praife or Commendation at all, in all that !>; He did, becaufe it was all necefiary, and He could not ^1 help it ; then how is here any Thing fo proper to animate i and incite us, free Creatures, by patient Continuance in it well-doing, to feck for Honour, Glory, and Vertue ? ^ God fpcaks of Himfelf as peculiarly well-pleafed with ;i the Righteoufnefs of this Servant of his. Ifai. xlii. 21. Thg ■•i Lord is well pleafed foj- his Righteoufnefs fake. The Sacrifices of ]\ old are fpoken of as a fweet Savour to God, but the Obe- [3 dience of Chriil: as far more acceptable than they. Pfal. fi xl. 6, 7. Sacrifice and Offering Thou iiidjl not defire : Aline |.j Ear haji Thou opened [as thy Servant performing willing Obedience j] Burnt -Off'ering and Sin-Offering hnji thou not re- quired : Then f aid /, Lo^ I co?ne [as a Sei-vant that chearfully anfwers the Calls of his Mafter :] I delight to do thy Will,, O my God, and thy Law is ivithin mine Heart, Matth. xvii. 5. p This is my lelo'ved Son, in whom I am well-pleafed.' And' > Chrift tells us exprefly, that the Father loves Him for tl that wonderful Inftance of his Obedience, his voluntarily |' yielding himfelf to Death, in Compliance with the P'ather's P Command. Joh. x. 17, 18. Therefore doth my Father love me^ i lecaufe I lay down my Life : No Man taketh it from me ; J hut 1 lay it down of my felf This Command7nent received I of iny Father, And if there was no Merit in Chrift's Obedience unto Death, if u was not worthy of Piaife, and of the moft glorious Sc(3:.II. Praife-worthy^rewardaMe^^c.^ i 5I' glorious Rewards, the heavenly Hods were exceedingly miftaken, by the Account that is given of them, in Rev. v. %,— 12.— The four Beafls and the four and twenty Elders fell, dozun before the Lamb^ . having every one of them Harps^ mid golden Fials full of Odours ; Jnd they Jiing a new Song^ fay- ing, . Thou art JFORTHT to take the Btok^ and to open the Seals thereof ', for Thou waji Jlain^ And I beheld, and 1 heard ike Voice of many Jngels round about the Throne^ and the ■ Beafls^ and the Riders, and the Number of the?n was ten Ihoufand- Times ten Thoufand, and Thoufands of Tlmfands, faying with a loud Voice, WORTHY is the Lamb that was Jlain, to receive Power^, and Riches, and IVifdom, . and Strength, and Honour, and Glory^ md Blejfmg, , Chrifl fpeaks of the eternal Life which He was to re* ceive, as the Reward of his Obedience to the Father's Com-i mandments. Joh. xii. 49, 50. / have not fpoken of my f elf ; but the Father which fent me. He gave me a Conwiandmcnt what _ / foould fay, and what I Jhould fpeak : And I know that his Com- manchnent is Life everlafling : IVJ^atfoever I fpeak therefore, even as the Father Jaid unto me, fo 1 fpeaL---God promifes to di- vide Flim a Portion with the great Sec. for his being his righteous Servant, for his glorious Vertue under fuch great Trials & Sufferings. Ifai. liii. 11,12.^ He Jhall fee of the Travel of his Soul and be fatisfied : By his Knowledge jhall my righteous' \ Servant juflify many -, for he Jhall bear their Iniquities, Therefore will I divide him a Portion tvith the Great, and he flmll divide the Spoil -with the Strong, becaufe He hath poured out his Soul unto Death. The Scriptures reprefent God as rewarding Him far above all his other Servants. Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9. He took on Him the Form of a Servant, and was made in the Likenefs of Men : arid being found in Fajhion ai a Man, He humbled himfelf, : and became obedient unU^ Death, even the. Death of the Crofs : Wherefore GOD alfo hath highly .exalted Him, and given Him a Name above every Name.—'jPM. xiv. 7. Thou lovefl Righieoifnejs, and hatefl JVickednefs ; Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed Thee With the Oil of Gladnefs above thy Fellows, There is no Room to pretend, that the glorious Benefits beilowed in Confequence of Chrift's Obedience, are not pro- perly of the Nature of a Rev/ard. What is a Reward, in the moil proper Senfe, but a Benefit bellowed in Confe- quence of lomething ^morally exceiient in Quality or Beha- ^'iour, in Teftimony of weii-pieafednefs in that moral Ex- :cjjency> and Rcfpe<5l and Favour on that Account ? If we 152 Christ's Righteoufnefsj^c*. Partlll, We confider the Nature of a Reward moft ftn(5lly, and make the utmoft of it, and add to the Things contained in this Defcription, proper Merit or Worthinefs, and the Beftow- ment of the Benefit in Confequence of a Promife ; ftill it will be found, there is Nothing belonging to it, but that the Scripture is moft exprefs as to it's belonging to the Glory beftowed on Chrift, after his Sufferings ; as appears from what has been already obferved : There was a glo- rious Benefit beflowed in Confequence of fomething mo- rally excellent, being called Righteoufnefs and Obedience ; There was great Favour, Love and Well-pleafednefs, for this Righteoufnefs and Obedience, in the Beftower ; There was proper Merit, or Worthinefs of the Benefit, in the O- bedience ; It was beftowed in Fulfilment of Promifes,made to that Obedience ; and was beftowed therefor, or becaufi he had performed that Obedience. I may add to all thefe Things, that Jefus Chrifl, while here in the Flefh, was manifellly in a State of Trial. The laft Adam^ as Chnfl is called, i Cor, xv. 45. Rom.v. 14. taking on Hun the human Nature, and fo the Form of a Servant, and being under the Law, to fland and a6t for us, was put into a State of Trial, as the firit Adam was. Dr. Whitby mentions thefe three Things as Evidences of Perfons being in a State of Trial (on the live Points, P. 298, 299.) namely. Their Afflidions being fpoken of as their Triafs or Temptations, their being the Subjeds of Promifes, and their being expofed to Satan's Temptations. But Chrift was apparently the Subjed of each of thefe. Concerning Promifes made to Him, I have fpoken already. The Difficulties and AffiiBionz He met v^ith in the Courfe of his Obedience, are called his Temptations or l^riaU^ Luke xxii. 28. Ye are they which have continued with me in my Temptations, or Trials. Heb. ii. 18. For in that he Himfelf hath fuffered, being tempted [or tried] He is able to fuccour them that are tempted* And Chap. iv. 15. We have not an High-Prieji, which cannot bt touched with the Feeling of our Infirmities ; but was in all Points tempted, like as we are^ yet without Sin. And as to his being tempted by Satan, it is what none will difpute. S E c T J Oif ( ^53 ) Section III. The Cafe offuch as are given up of God to Sin, and (t/' fallen Man in general^ proves moral Necejfity and Inability to be con-* fijient with Blame-worthinefs. R. fFhiiby aflerts Freedom, not only from Coac^ion, but Neceffity, to be eflential to any Thing deferving the Name of Sin, and to an Adion's being cuipa^ hie: in thefe Words (Difcourfe on five Points, Edit. 3.P.348.) *' If they be thus neceflitated, then neither their Sins of O^ *' mifTion or Commiffion could deferve that Name ; it be- *' ing efTential to the Nature of Sin, according to St. AufitrC^ *' Definition, that it be an Action, a quo liberum efl ahfi'mere^ *' Three Things feem plainly neceffary to make an Adion •' or Omiffion culpable ; i. That it be in our Power to ** perform or forbear it : For, as OrigeUy and all the Fa* *' thers fay, no Man is blame-worthy for not doing what " He could not do." — And clfewhere the Doctor infills, that *' when any do Evil of Neceffity, what they do is no Vice^ " that they are guilty of no Fault, || are worthy of no " Blame, Difpraife, % or Diftionour, \ but are unblamea- " ble. * If thefe Things are true, in Dr. lVJMy\ Senfe of Neceffity, they will prove all fuch to be blamelefs, who are given up of God to Sin, in what they commit after they are thus given up. That there is fuch a Thing as Men's being judici- ally given up to Sin, is certain, if the Scripture rightly in- forms us ; fuch a Thing being often there fpoken of : as m Pfal. Ixxxi. 12. So I gave them up to their oivn Hearts Lujly . and they ivalked in their ownCounfeh. A61. vii. 42. TJyenGod twned^ and gave them up ta worjhip toe Hoji of Heaven, Rom. i. 24, Wherefore, God alfo gave them up to UncleannefSy through the Lu/ls of their own Hearts, to dijhonour their own Bodies between Themfelves, Ver. 26. For this Cauje God gave them up to vile Af* feSiions. Ver. 28. And even as they did not like to retain God in their Knowledge, God gave them over to a reprubati Mind, t9 do thofe Things that are not convenient, V Tis 5 Difc. oh £vePoins. P. 347. 360, 361. 377. % 303^ 325. 329. and many other Places, f 371. * 304. 361, 154 Of the Inability-^ Sin offuch PartllL 'Tis needlefs to iland particularly to inquire, what God's giving Men up to their own Heart* s Liifls fignities : . It is fuffi- cient to obferve, that hereby is certainly meant God's fo or- dering or difpjpfing Things, in fome Refpedt or other, either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the Confequence (hould be Men's continuing in their Sins. So much as Men >are given up to^ fo much is the Confequence of their being given up ; whether that be lei5 or more. If God don't 6rder Things fo, by Adtion or Permiffion, that Sin will be the Confequence, then the Event proves that they are not given up to that Confequence. If Good be the Confequence, in- Head of Evil, then God's Mercy is to be acknowledged in that Good ; which Mercy muft be contrary to God^s Judgment in giving up to Evil. If the Event muft prove that they are given up to Evil as the Confequence, then the Perfons who are the Subjects of this Judgment, muft be the Subjeds of fuch an Event, and fo the Event is neceifary. If not only CoaS^lon^ but all NeceJJity^ will prove Men blamelefs, then Judas was blamelefs, after Chrift had given kim ov^er, and had already declared his certain Damnation, and that he Ihould verily betray Him. He was guilty of no Siu in betraying his Mafter, on this Suppofition ; tho his fo doing is fpoicen of by Chrift as the moft aggravated Sin, more heinous than the Sin of Filate in crucifying Him. And the Jews in Egypt ^ in Jereimah's Time, were guilty of no Sin, in their not worfhipping the true God, after God had Sworn by his great Name^ that his Name Jl^ould he no more named in the Alouth of any Man omx^2iVidi% confiflent Part III. and that it has Power better to govern and regulate it's jirjl governing and regulating Aa^ v/hich is abfurd ; For it is to flip- pofe a prior Ad of the Wi]l, determining it's firft determining A6t ; that is,an A6t prior to the firft, and leading and govern- ^ ing the original and governing K6X of all \ which is a . Contradiction. 1 Here if it fhould be faid, that attho* the Mind has not ; any Ability to will contrary to what it does will, in the - original and leading A(5l of the Will, becaufe there is fup- « pofed to be no prior A61 to determine and order it otherwife, :;j and the Will can't immediately change it felf, becaufe it »3 can't at prefent incline to a Change ; yet the Mind has an li Ability for the prefent to forbear to proceed to Adion, and y take Time for Deliberation ; which may be an Occafion of h the Chanp;e of the Inclination. |' I anfwer, (i.) In this Objection that feems to be for- t gotten which was obferved before, viz. that the determin- | ing to take the Matter into Confideration, is it felf an K€t of the Will : And if this be all the Ad wherein the Mind exercifes Ability and Freedom, then this, by the Suppofition, muft be all that can be commanded or re» quired by Precept. And if this Acl be the commanded Ad, then all that has been obferved concerning the commanded Acft of the Will remains true, that the very Want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are fpeaking con- cerning the firft and leading A6t of the Will in the Cafe, or about the Affair ; And if a Determining to deliberate, or on the contrary', to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the nrft and leading A6t ; or whether it be or no,if there be another A6t before it, which determines that ; or what- ever be the- original and leading Ad j ftill the foregoing Proof ftands good, that the Non-compliance of the leading Ad implies moral Inability to comply. If it ftiould be objeded, that thefe Things make all moral Inability equal, and fuppofe Men morally unable to will | otherwife than they aduaily do will, m all Cafes, and equally ' fo, in every Inftance. .1 In anfvrer to this Objedion, I defire two Things maybe ' obrervcd. Firji^ That if by being equally unable, be meant "j 5ts really un^blt) then fo far as the Inability is meerly mo-;| r^ilj 'tis true, th^ Will, in every Inftance, ads by moral Ne- | cefTity, i Se6l:. IV. "^tth moral Inability i 165 ceflity, and is morally unable to a6l otherwife, as truly ancjl properly in one Cafe as another ; as, I humbly conceive, has been perfedly and abundantly demonftrated by what has been faid in the preceeding Part of this ElTay. But yet, in forne Refpe6l, the Inability may be faid to be greater in fome Inftances than others : Tho' the Man may be truly un^ able, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet '. he may be further from being able to do fome Things than others. As it is in Things which Men are naturally unable to do. A FV^rfon whofe Strength is no more than fufficient to lift the Weight of one Hundred Pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one Hundred and one Pounds, as ten Thoufand Pounds ; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter Weight than the former j and fo, according to common Ufe of Speech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A Man is truly morally unable to chufe contrary to a prefent Inclination, which in the leaft [ Degree prevails ; or contrary to that Motive, which, all I Things confidered, has Strength and Advantage now to move the Will, in the leaft. Degree, fuperiour to all other Motives in View : But yet he is further from Ability to refill a very ilrong Habit, and a violent and deeply rooted Incli- nation, or a Motive vaftly exceeding all others in Strength. And again, the Inability may in fome Refpe6ts be called greater, in fome Inilances than others, as it may be more general and extenpve to all JMs of that Kind. So Men may be faid to be unable in a different Senfe, and to be further from moral Ability, who have that moral Inability which is gene- I ral and habitual^ than they who have only that Inability which is occafional 2n\A particular. \ Thus in Cafes of natural Inability ; he that is born blind may be faid to be unable to fee, in a difterent Manner, and is in fome Refpe6fs further from being I able to fee, than He whofe Sight is hinder'd by a tranfient : Cloud or Mift. And befides, that which was obferved in the firft Part of this Difcourfe concerning the Inability which attends a ftrong and fettled Hablt^ fhould be here remember'd ; viz. That fix'd Habit is attended v»^ith this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is diflinguiihed from occafional Volition^ namely, that En- deavours to avoid future Volitions of that Kind, which arc agreabie to luch a Habit, much more frequently and com- monly prove vain and infufficient. For tho* it is impofTible there •}• See thisDilliD(5lion of moral Inability explain'd in Part I. Secl,lY> 1 66 Covcivci^xi6% confijient Part III. ! I there ihould be any true fincere Defires and Endeavours a- ! gainft a prefent Volition or Choice, yet there may be againft ;j Vohtions of that Kind, when view'd at a Diftance. A Perfon i may defire and ufe Means to prevent future Exercifes of a :J certain Inclination ; and in order to it, may wifh the Habit h might be removed ; but his Defires and Endeavours may be 'i inefFedual. The Man may be faid in fome Senfe to be ■': unable ; yea, even as the Word unable is a relative Terniy and j: has Relation to ineffectual Endeavours ; yet not with Regard ^ | to prefent, but remote Endeavours. Secondly^ It muft be borne in Mind, according' to what was, ' obferv'd before, that indeed no Inability whatfoever which is meerly moral, is properly called by the Name of Inability j and that in the ftrkSteft Propriety of Speech, a Man may be" faid to have a Thing in his Power,if he has it at his Election ; »; and He can't be faid to be unable to do a Thing, when He \ can if He now pleafes, or whenever he has a proper, direct, \ and immediate Defire for it. As to thofe Defires and Endea- [« vours that may be againft the Exercifes of a ftrong Habit, | with Regard to which Men may be faid to be unable to j avoid thofe Exercifes, they are remote Defires and Endea- ^ vours in two Refpe6ls. Firji^ as to Ti?ne \ they are never: fi againft prefent Volitions, but only againft Volitions of fuch a \ Kind, when view'd at a Diftance. Seeondfyy^s to their Nature ; | thefe oppofite Defires are not directly and properly againft the | Habit and Inclination itfelf, or the Volitions in which it is J exercifed ; for thefe, in themfelves conndered, are agreable ; but againft fomething elfe, that attends them, or is their Con- fequence ; the Oppofition of the Mind is levelled entirely againft this ; the Inclination or Volitions themfelves are not at all oppofed dire6lly, and for their own fake ; but only indiredly, and remotely on the Account of fomething aliene and foreign. III. Tho' the Oppofition of the Will it kl^^ or the very want of Will to a Thing commanded, implies a moral Ina- bility to that Thing ; yet, if it be as has been already fhewn, that the Being of a good State or Ad of Will, is a Thing moft properly required by Command ; then, in fome Cafes fuch a State or Ad of Will may properly be required, which *t prefent is not, and which may alfo be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore thofe Things may properly be commanded, which Men have a moral Iiiability for. Such Sed. I V. with tioral Inability. 167 Such a State or A(fl of the Wil], may be required by Com- mand, as does not already exifc. For if that Volition only may be commanded to be which already is, there could be no ufe of Precept ; Commands in all Cafes would be per- fedly vain and impertinent. And not only may fuch a Will be required as is wanting before the Command is given, but alfo fuch as may poflibly l3e wanting afterwards ; fuch as the Exhibition of the Command may not be effe<5hial to produce or excite. Otherwife, no fuch Thing as Difobedience to a proper and rightful Command is poffible in. any Cafe ; and there is no Cafe fuppofable or polTible, wherein there can be an inexcufable or faulty Difobedience. Which Armimam cannot affirm, confiftcntly with their Principles : for this makes Obedience to jull and proper Commands always neceffary^ and Difobedience impoffible. And fo the Arminian would over- throw Himfelf, yielding the very Point we are upon, which He fo fti'enuoufly denies, vi%. that Law and Command are I confident with Neceffity. If meerly that Inability will excufe Difobedience, which is implied in the Oppofition or Defe(5t of Inclination, remaining after the Command is exhibited, then Wickednefs always carries that in it which excufes it. 'Tis evermore fo, that by ihow much the more Wickednefs there is in a Man*s Heart, I by fo much is his Inclination to Evil the Wronger, and by fo much the more therefore has he of moral Inability to the iGood required. His moral Inability, confifting in the IjStrength of his evil Inclination, is the very Thing wherein jhis Wickednefs conlifts ; and yet according to Annmian Prin- ciples, it muft be a Thing inconfiflent with Wickednefs ; and (by how much the more he has of it, by fb much is he the [further from Wickednefs. I Therefore, on the whole,it is manifeft, that moral Inability jalone (which confifts in Difmclination) never renders any Thing improperly the fubje6t-matter of Precept or Command, land never can excufe any Perfon in Difobedience, or Want fjof Conformity to a- Command. \\ Natural Inability, arifing trom the Want of natural Capa-^ Icity, or external Hindrance (which alone is properly called Inability) without doubt wholly excufes, or makes a Thing improperly the Matter of Command. If Men are excufed I trom doing or adting any good Thing, fuppofed to be com- I Imanded, it mull be through fome Defed or OblUcle that is y not 1 68 Commands and Invitations Part III. \ not In the Will itfelf, but extrinfic to it ; either in the Capa- '] city of Underilanding, or Body, or outward Circumftances. | Here two or three Things may be obferved, y 1. As to fpiritual Duties or Ad^s, or any good Thing in the \ State or immanent A6ts of the Will it felf, or of the Affections i (which are only certain Modes of the Exercife of the Will ) | if Perfons are juifly excufed, it muft be thro' want of Capacity j in the natural Faculty of Underftanding. Thus the fame fpi- \\ ritual Duties, or holy Affedions and Exercifes of Heart, can't \ be required of Men, as may be of Angels ; the Capacity of Un- j derftanding being fo much inferiour. So Men can't be Id required to love thofe amiable Perfons w^hom they have '? had no Opportunity to fee, or hear of, or come to the Know- \\ ledge of, in any Way agreable to the natural State and Capacity 'J of the human Underftandmg. But the Infufficiency of Mo- j lives wiii not excufe ; uniefs their being infufficient arifes not -v from the moral State of the Will or Inclination it feif, but j- from the State of the natural Underftanding. The great ^, Kindnefs andGenerofity of another may be a Motive infuf^- 1 cient to excite Gratitude in the Perfon that receives the J Kindnefs, thro' his vile and ungrateful Temper : In this Cafe, I the Infufficiency of the Motive arifes from the State of the 'y Will or Inclination of Heart, and don't at all excufe. But if '.; this Generofity is not fufficient to excite Gratitude, being un- -A known, there being no Means of Information adequate to the '..\\ State and Meafure of the Perfon's Faculties, this Infufriciency '{^^ is attended with a natucal Inability, which entirely excufes. !• 2. As to fuch Motions of Body, orExerciles and Alterations ' 1 of Mind, which don't confift in the immanent Acts or State ;• i of the Vv^iil it felf, but are fuppofed to be required as Effe6ts 'i^ of the W'ill^ I fay, in fuch fuppofed EffecSts of the VyfiW^ in |t Cafes wherein there is no Want of a Capacity of Underftand- % ing ; that Inability, and that only excules, which confifts in \ V/ant of Connexion between them and theWill. If the Will %, fullv complies, and the propofed Effect don't prove, according \ to the Laws of Nature, to be cr>ane6fed with his Volition, ^ the Man is perfectly excufed ; he has a natural Inability to the \ Thing required. 'For the Will Itfelf, as has been obferved, is i all that can be direcSily and immediately required byCommand; \ and other Tilings only indirectiy, as connected with the Will. i» If therefore there be a full Compliance of Will, the Perfon \ haf ;i Sec^^.lV. conjijient with morallnability. 169 has done his Duty ; and if other Things don*t prove to be connected with his VoUtion,; that is not owing to him. 3. Both thefe Kinds of natural Inability that have been mentioned, and fo all Inability that excufes, may be refolved. into one Thing ; namely. Want of natural Capacity or Strength ; either Capacity of Underflanding, or external Strength. For when there are external Defeats and Obftacles, they would be no Obftaeles, were it not for the Imperfedtion and Limitations of Underftanding and Strength. Carol. If Things for which Men have a moral Inability, may properly be the Matter of Precept or Command, then they may alio of Invitation and Couniel. Commands, and Invitations come very much to the fame Thing ; the Differ- . ence is only circumftantial : Commands are as much a Mani- feilation of the Will of him that Ipeaks, as Invitations, and as . much Tedimonies of ExpeClation of Compliance. The Dif- ference between them Hes in nothing that touches the Affair in Hand. The main Difference betv/een Command and Invitation confiiis in the Enforcement of the Will of Him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his Klndncfs^ the Goodnefs which his Will arifes from t in the former it is iiis Authority. But whatever be the Ground of the Will of him that fpeaks, or the Enforcement of what he fays, yet feeing neither his Will nor Expedation is any more teltifkd in the one Cafe than the other ; therefore a Perfon's being known to be morally unable to do the Thing to which he is ■ directed hy Invitation^ is no more an Evidence of InfmcerJty in. him that directs, in manifeliing either a Will, or Expc6tation: which he has not, than his bemg known to be morally unable to do what he is diredted to hy Cotmnand, So that all this grand Objection of Arniiniam againil the Inability oi fallen Men to exert Faith in Chrift, or to perform other fpiritual- Gofpel-Duties, from the Sincerity of God's Counfels and In^ vitations, muft he without Force. #' i>i ■* Section 1 70 What Willingnefs and Part IIL Section V. H^at Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours, ivhich is Juppofed to tXQ\x{Q, in the Non- performance of Things in themf elves goody particularly conjidered. ^ *^--|-'^IS what is much Infifted on by many, that fome Men, I thp' they are not able to perform fpiritual Duties, iuch as Repentance of Sin, Love to God, a cordiaj /Acceptance of Chrift as exhibited and offer'd in the Gofpe!,&c. yet they may fmcerely defire and endeavour thefe Things ; and therefore muft be excufed ; it being unreafonable to blame 'em for the Omiflion of thofe Things which they fm- cerely deiire and endeavour to do, but can't do. Concerning this Matter, the following Things may be obferved. I. What is here fuppofed, is a great Miftake, and grofs Abfurdity ; even that Men may iincerely chufe and deftre thofe fpiritual Duties of Love, Acceptance, Choice, Rejec^lion &c. confifting in the Exercife of the Will it felf, or in the Dif- pofition and Inclination of the Heart ; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is abfurd, becaufe 'tis abfurd tq fuppofe that a Man fhould directly, properly aod fmcerely in- cline to have an Inclination, which at the fame Time is con- trary to his Inclination : for that is to fuppofe him not to be inclined to that which he is inclined to. If a Man, in the State and Ads of his Will and Inclination, does properly and dire6ily fall in with thofe Duties, he therein performs 'em : For the Duties themfeives conlift in that very Thing ; they coniift in the State and hdis of the Will being fo formed and directed. If the Soul properly and fmcerely falls* in with a certain propofed A61 of Will or Choice, the Soul therein makes that Choice it's own. Even as when a moving Body falls in with a propofcd Direction of its MotioHj that is the fame Thing as to move in that Direflion« 2. That SeA.V. Sincerity is no Excufe. 17 1 2* That which is called a Deftre and IVUlingnefs for thofe inward Duties, in fuch as don't perform them, has refpe6t to thefe Duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly reprefented as a Willingnefs for them -, not only becaufe (as was obferved before) it refpeds thole good Volitions only in a diftant View, and with refped to future Time ; but alfo be- caufe evermore, not thefe Things themfelves, but fomething t\k^ that is aliene and foreign, is the Objed that terminates thefe Volitions and Defires, A Drunkard, who continues in his Druhkeiinefs, being un- der the Power of a Love, and violent Appetite to ftrong Drink, and without any Love to Vertue ; but bemg alfo extreamly •covetous and clofe, and very much exercifed and grieved at the Diminution of his Eftate, and Profpe6t of Poverty, may ia a Sort defij-e the Vertue of Temperance : and tho' his prefent Will is to gratify his extravagant Appetite, yet he may wifh he had a Heart to forbear future Ads of Intemperance, and forfake his Exceffes, thro' an Unwillingnefs to part with his Money : But ftill he goes on with his Drunkennefs ; his V/ifhes and Endeavours are infufficient and ineffectual : Such a Man has no proper, direct, lincere Willingnefs to forfake this Vice, and the vicious Deeds which belong to it : for He .adls voluntarily in continuing to drink to excefs : His Defire is very improperly called a Willingnefs to be temperate ; it is no true Defire of that Vertue ; for it is not that Vertue that terminates his Wiihes ; nor have they any dire(5t Refpedt at all to it. 'Tis only the faving his Adoney^ and avoiding Poverty, that terminates, and exhaufts the whole Strength of his Defire, The Vertue of Temperance is regarded only very indire6lly and improperly, even as a neceffary Means of gratifying tholition, He continues ftill in his fettled Hatred of his Father. Now if fuch a Son's indirect Wiliing- nefs to have Love and Honour towards his Father, at all ac- quits or excufes before God, for his failing of a6luaily exer- citing thefe Difpofitions tov»'ards Him which God requires, it muft be ou one of thcf's, there is Nothing that appears in theRealbn and Nature of Things,which can juftly lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the neceffary Means of Salvation, or fome Way or other beftow true Holinefs and tternal Life on thofe Heathen^ who are fincere (in the Senfc above explained) in their Endeavours to find out the Will of the Deity, and to pleafc Him, according to their Light, that they may efcape his future Difpleafure and Wrath, and obtain Happinefs in their future State, through his Favour, Z Section 178 IndifFerence inconftjlent Part III. Section VI. Liberty of IndifFerence, not only not ne-: cejfary to Vertue, but utterly mconj7jie?pt{\\ with it ; And ally either vertuous or vi-r cious Habits or Inclinations, inconjifient with Arminian Notions of Liberty an moral Agency. lO fuppofc fuch a Freedom of Will, as Armin'ians talk of, \ to be requilite to Vertue and Vice, is many Ways con- I trary to common Senfe. J If Indifference belongs to Liberty of Will, as Arminlam fup- |i pofe, and it be effential to a vertuous A6lion that it be perfor- m med in a State of Liberty, as they alfo fuppofe ; it will follow, fl that it is ellential to a veituous A6lion that it be performed in | a State of Indifference : And if it be performed in a State of \ Indifference, then doubtlefs it muft be performed in the 77W ,1 of Indifference. And fo it will follow, that in order to th^ % Vertuoufnefs of &n A61, the Heart mull be indifferent in the j Time of the Performance of that Adi, and the more indiffer- \ cnt and cold the Heart is with Relation to the A(5t which is f p-crformed, fo much the better ; becaufe the A(5l is performecj -i with fo much the greater Liberty. But is this agreable to the \ Light of Nature ? Is it agreable to the Notions which Man- i kind, in all Ages, have of Vertue, that it lies in that which \ is contrary to Indifference, even in the Tendency and Inclination i of theHeart to vertuous Action ; and that the ftronger the In- I clmation, and fo the further from Indifference, the more ver- ' tucus the Heart, and fo much the more praife-worthy the J^ ] which proceeds from it r \ If we (hould fuppofe (contrary to what has been before de— j monftrated) that there may be an A61 of V/iIl in a State of j indifference ; for Inflance, this A6t, vi-z. The Will's deter-' | mining to put it felf out of a State of Indifference, and give it 1 iclf a Preponderatiou one Vv^ay, then it would follow, on Jrm^ nian Sed:. VL wii^/j Ycrtwc. 179 man Principles, that this A61 or Determination of the Will is that alone wherein Vertue confifts, becaufe this only is per- formed while the Mind remains in a State of Indifference, and fo in a State of Liberty : For when once the Mind is put out of it's Equilibrium, it is no longer in fuch a State ; and there- fore all the A(5ts which follow afterwards, proceeding from Bias, can have the Nature neither of Vertue nor Vice. Or if the Thing which the Will can do, while yet in a State of Indifference, and fo of Liberty, be only to fufpend ailing, and determine to take the Matter into Confideration, then this Determination is that alone wherein Vertue confifts, and not proceeding to Action after the Scale is turned by Confideration, So that it will follow from thefe Principles, all that is done after the Mind, by any Means, is once out of it's Equilibrium and already pollelfed by an Inclination, and ariling from that Inclination, has nothing of the Nature of Vertue or Vice, and is worthy of neither Blame nor Praife. But how plainly con- trary is tills to the univerfal Senfe of Mankind, and to the No.- tion they have of fmcerely vertuous A6lions ? Which is, that they are Actions which proceed from a Heart well difpofed and ind'med ; and Xh^Jironger^ and the vaox^t fix'd and determined xht good Difpofition of the Heart, the greater the Sincerity of Vertue, and fo the more of the Truth and Reality of it. But if there be any Ads which are done in a State of Equihbrium, or fpring immediately from perfe61: Indifference and Coldnefs ; of Heart, they cannot .arife from any good Principle or Djf- J3ofition in theHesrt ; and confequentlyj according to common Senfe, have no nncere Goodnefs in 'em, having no Vertue of Heart in 'em. To have a vertuous Heart, is to have a Heart that favours Vertue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfcd\- 1 ly cold and indifferent about it. And befides the Anions that are done in a State of Indiffer- ence, or that arife immediately out of fuch a State, can't be vertuous, becaufe, by the Suppofition, they are not determined by any preceeding Choice. For if there be preceedingChoice, then Choice intervenes between the A61 and the State of In- difference ; which is contrary to the Suppofition of the Ad's " arifing immediately out of Indifference. But thofe Ads which are not determined by preceeding Choice, can't be vertuous or vicious hy Arminian Principles, becaufe they are not determined ^by theWill. So that neither oneWay, nor the other, can any Adions be vertuous or vicious according toy/rwrn/^wPrinciples. If theAdion be determined by a preceedingAd oif Choice it can't be vertuous ; becaufe the Adion is not done in a State of In- i Z 2 d-ifFerence,^ i8o \nd\Stv. inconft/i^ withV^vtuQ. Part III, difference, nor does immediately arife from, fuch a State ; and, fo is not done in a State of Liberty. If the A6tion be not d^-. . \ Urmined by a preceeding Act of Choice, then it can't be ver-^ ^ tuous J becaufe then the Will is not Self-determin'd in it, \ So that 'tis made certain, that neither Vertue nor Vice caa '\ ever find any Place in the Univerfe. ; \ Moreover, that it is neceffary to a vertuous A^ion that \% i be performed in a State of Indifference, under a Notion of \ that's being a State of Liberty, is contrary to common Senfe ; a as 'tis a Di6tate of common Senfe, that Indifference it felf, in - Tnany Cafes, is vicious, and fo to a high Degree. As if when % I fee my Neighbour or near Friend, and one who has in \ the higheft Degree merited of me, in extreme Diflrefs, and \ ready to penlh, I find an Indifference in my Heart with Re-» l^ fpc6t to any Thing propofed to be done, which I can eafily do, f for his Relief. S^ if it Ihpuld be propofed to me, to blafpheme ^ God, or kill my Father, or to do numberlefs other Things j "which might be mentioned ; the being indifferent, for a Mo- i nient, would be highly vicious and vile. j And it may be further obferved, that to fuppofe this Liberty \ of Indifference is effential to Vertue and Vice, deilroys the .1 great Difference of Degrees of the Guilt of different Crimes, k and takes away the Heinoufnefs of the moft fiagitious horrid ' Iniquities ; fuch as Adultery Beftiality, Murder, Perjur)', Blaf- \ phe'Tiy, &c. For according to thefe Principles, there is no 1 Harm at all in having the Mind in a State of perfect Indiffer- i ence withRefpe' more muft be confidered than what arifes from felf-determin- ing Pov^/er, without any Influence of that Bias, becaufe Liberty i is exercifed in no more : So that all that is the Exercife of | habitual Inclination, is thrown away, a^ not belonging to thcj '■ Morality of the Adlion. By which it appears, that no Exer- j cife of t'hefe Habits, let 'em be ftronger or weaker, can ever i'l have any Thing of the Nature of either Vertue or Vice. I Here if any one ffeould fay, that notwithftanding all thefd ' Things, there may be the Nature of Vertue and Vice in Habits \ of the Mind j becaufe thefe Habits may be the .Effe6ls of | thofe h&.i, wherein the Mind exercifed Liberty ; that how- ;| ever t^ie foremention'd Reafons will prove that no Habits '{ vv]-)ich Sed. VI. and ^/r/^^j\Habits, ,, ^ 183 which are natural^ or that any are born or created with us, can be either vertuous or vicious ; yet they will not prove this of Habits, which have been acquired ' and eftablifh'd by repeated free Ads. To fuch an Objector I would fay, that this Evifion will not at all help the Matter. For if Freedom of Will be eflential to the very Nature of Vertue and Vice, then there is no Vertiie or Vice but only in that very Thing, wherein this Liberty is exerclfed. If a Man in one or more Thing that he does, ex- ercifes Liberty, and then by thofe A6ts is brought into fuch' Circumftances, that his Liberty ceafes, and there follows a ■.long Series of A6ls or Events that come to pafs neceflarily ; thofe confequent Ads are not vertuous or vicious, rewardable or punhhable ; but only the free Adts that eftablifli'd this Ne- cedlty J for in them alone v^as the Man free. The following Effects that are neceffary, have no more of the Nature of Ver- tue or Vice, than Health or Sicknefs of Body have properly the Nature of Vertue or Vice, being the EfFe61:s of a Courfe of free Acts of Temperance or Intemperance ; or than the good Qiialities of a Clock are of theNature of Vertue,which are the Eifiects of free A6ls of theArtificer ; or theGoodnefs and Sweet- nefs of the Fruits of a Garden are moral Vertues, being the Efre6ls of the free and faithful Adts of the Gardener. If Li- berty be abfolutely requifite to the Morality of Actions, and Neceflity wholly inconfiftent with it, as Annmians greatly infift ; then no necejfary EffeSls whatfoever, let the Caufe be never fo good or bad, can be vertuous or vicious ; but the Vertue or Vice muft be only in \Sx^ free Caufe. Agreably to this, Dr. Whtihy fuppofes, the Neceffity that attends the good anti evil Habits of the Saints in Heaven, and Damned in Hell, which are the Confequence of their free Acts in tlieir State of Probation, are not rewardable or puniQiable. On the whole,- it appears, that if the Notions o^ Ar?n'm}nns concerning Liberty and moral Agency be true, itjv/ill fol]ov»r that there is no Vertue in any fuch Habits or Qualities as Humility, Meeknefs, Patience, Mercy, Gratitude, Generofity, Heavenly-mindednefs ; Nothing at ail Praife -worthy in loving Chrid: above Father and Mother, Wife and Children, or our own Lives ; or in Delight in Holinefs, hungring and thirfting after Rightebufnefs, Love to Enemies, univerfal Benevolence to Mankind : And on the other Hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of Difpraife, in the moft fordid, beaflly, Rlgljg^cant, dcviiiinDifpofition^ ;. in being ungrateful, profane, habitually 184 Armimamfm intonfiftent Partlll. habitually hating God, and Thihgs facred and holy ; or in being mofi: treacherous^ ehvibUs and cruel toVvards Men. For all thefe Things are Difpojitions i.'ix^ Inclmations of the Heart. And in fliort, there is no iuch Thing as any vertuous or vici- ous ^ality of Mind ; no Iuch Thing as inherent Vertue and Holinels, or Vice and Sin : And the ftronger thofe Habits or Difpofitions are, which ufed to be called vertuous and vicious, the further they are from being fo indeed ; the more violent Men's Lufls are, the more tix'd their Pride, Envy, Ingratitude and Malicioufnefs, ftill the further are they from being blame- worthy. If there be a Man that by his own repeated Acts, or by any other Means, is come to be of the moft hellifh Diipofition, defperately inclined to treat his Neighbours with Injurioufnefs, Contempt and Malignity ; the further they fliould be from any Diipofition to be angry with Him, or in the leafi to blame Him. So on the other Hand, if there be a Perfon, who is of a moft excellent Spirit, ftrongly inclining him to the moft amiable Actions, admirably meek, benevolent &:c. fo much is he further from anyThing rewardable or com- mendable. On which Principles, the Man Jefus Chrift was very far from being Praife-worthy for thofe Acts of Holinefs and Kindnefs which He performed, thefe Propenfities being fo ftrong in his Heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God, is infinitely remote from any Thing commen- dable, his good Inclinations being infinitely ftrong, and He therefore at the utmoft poflible Diftance from being at Liberty. And in all Cafes, the ftronger the Inclinations of any are to Vertue, and the more they love it, the lefs vertuous they are ; and the more they love Wickednefs, the lefs vicious.— ^ Whether' thefe Things are agreable to Scripture, let every Chriftian, and every Man who has read theBible, judge : and whether they are agreable to common Senfe, let every one judge, that have human Underftanding in Exercife. And if we purfue thefe Principles, we (hall find that Ver- tue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the World -, and that there never was, nor ever c^an be any fuch Thing as one or the other ; either in God, Angels or Men. No Propenfity, Difpofition or Habit can be vertuous or vicious, as has been (liewn i becaufe they, ki far as they take Place, deftroy the Freedom of the Will, the Foundation of all moral Agency, and exclude all Capacity of either Vertue or Vice. And if Habits and Difpofitions themfelves be not vertuous nor vicious, neither can the Exercife of thefe Difpofitions be ig ; For the Exercife of Bias is not the Exercife of free fTf- dctermtning Seel. VII. with moral Habits ^Motives. 185 determining TVtll^ and fo there is no Exercife of Liberty in it. Confequently noMan is vertuous or vicious, either in being well or ill difpofed, nor in acting from a good or bid Difpolition. And whether this Bias or Difpofition be habitual or not, if it exifts but a Moment before the Act of Will, which is the Effect of it, it alters not the Cafe, as to the Neceflity of .the Effect. Or if there be no previous Difpofition at all, either habitual or occafional, that determines the Act^ then it is not Choice that determines it : it is therefore a Contingence, that happens to the Man, arifing from Nothing in him ; and is neeeffary, as to any Inclination or Choice of his ; and there- I fore can't make Him either the better or worfe, any more than a Tree is better than other Trees, becaufe it oftener happens to be lit upon by a Swan or Nightingal ; or a Rock more vicious than other Rocks, becaufe Rattle-Snakes have happen'd I oftner to crawl over it. So that there is no Vertue nor Vice I in good or bad Difpofitions, either fix'd or tranfient ; nor any ! Vertue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous In- i clination ; nor yet any Vertue or Vice in acting wholly with- j out any previous Inclination. Where then fhali we find 1 Room for Vertue or Vice ? Section VII. Arminlan Notions of moral Agency incojt- Jiftent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either vertuous or vicious AElions. As Armtnian Notions of that Liberty, which is efTentlal to Vertue or Vice, are inconfiftent with common Senfe^ in their being inconfiftent with all vertuous or vicious Habits and Difpofitions ; fo they are no lefs fo in their Incon- ^{lency with all Influence of Motives in moral Actions. A a 'Ti3 1 86 Motive &^ Inducem^ incoiifif^ Y'^xX III. 'Tis equally againft thofe Notions of Liberty of Will, whe- ther there be, previous to the Act of Choice, a Preponde- rancy of the Inchnation, or a Preponderancy of thofe Circum- ftances, which have a Tendency to move the Inchnation. And indeed it comes to juft the fameThing : To fay, the Cir- cumftances of the Mind are fuch as tend to fway and turn it*s Incliaation one Way, is th^ faine Thing as to fay, the IntU- nation of the Mind, as under fuch Circumftances, tends th^t Way. Or if any think it moft proper to fay, that Motives do alter the Inclination, and give a new Bias to the Mind ; it will not alter the Cafe, as to the prefent Argument. For if Motives operate by giving the Mind an Inclination, the^ they operate by deftroying the Mind's Indifference, and laying it under a Bias. But to do this, is to deftroy the Anninian Freedom : B: is not to leave the Will to it's own Self-determination, but to bring it into Subjection to the Power of fomething extrinficfc, which operates upon it, fways and det-ermines it, previous to it's own Determination. So that what is done from Motive, can't be either vertuous or vicious. And befides, if the Acts of the Will are excited by Motives, thofe Motives are the Caufes of thofe Acts of the Will : which makes the Acts of the Will neceffary ; as Effects neceffarily follow the. Efficieticy of the Caufe. And if the Influence and Power of the Mo- tive caufes the Volition, then the Influence of the Motive determines Volition, and Volition don't determine it felf ; and fo is not free, in the Senfe of Arviinimis (as has been largely (liewn already) and confequently can be neither ver- tuous nor vicious. The Suppofition, v/hich has already been taken Notice of as an infufficient Evafion in other Cafes, would be in like Manner impertinently alledged in this Cafe ; namely, the* huppofition that Liberty coniifl:s in a Power of fuipending Adlion for the prefent, in order to Deliberation. If it (hould be faid, Tho' it be true, that the V/Ul is under a Neceffity of finally following the firongeft Motive, yet it may for the pre- fent forbear to ad upon the Motive prefented, till there has- been Opportunity thoroughly to confider it, and compare it's real Weight with the Merit of other Motives. I anfwef, as follow^. Here ?gain it mufl: be remember'd, that if determining thust to fufpeud and confider,be that A61 of the Will wherein alone Liberty is exercifed„ then in this all Vertue and Vice muft conflU i Sedl.Vll. mthXtmim^nFertue^Fict. 1S7 confift 5 and the A<5ls that follow this Confidcration, and are #ie Effe6ts of it, being neceflary, are no more vertuous or vicious than fome good or bad Events which happen when they are fail alleep, and are the Confequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore I would here obierve two Things. I. To fuppofe that all Vertue andVice, in every Cafe, con- fifts in determining whether to take Time for Confideration, or not, is not agreable to common Senfe. For according to fuch a Suppofition, the moft horrid Crimes, Adultery, Murder, Buggery, Blafphemy, &c. do not at all confift in the horrid Nature of the Things themfelves, but only in the Negle6t of thorough Confideration before they were perpetrated : which brings their Vicioufnefs to a fmall Matter, and makes all Grimes equal. If it be faid, that Negled of Confideration, when fuch heinous Evils are propofed to Choice, is worfe than in other Cafes : I anfwer, this is inconfiftent, as it fuppofes the very Thing to be, which at the fame Time is fuppofed ftot to be ; it fuppofes all moral Evil, all Vicioufnefs and Hei- noufnefs, dees not confift meerly in the want of Confideration, It fuppofes fome Crimes in themfelves^ in their oivn Nature, to be inore heinous than others, antecedent to Confideration or In- confideration, which lays the Perlbn under a previous Obliga- tion to coafider in fome Cafes more than others. 2. If it were fo, that all Vertue and Vice,' in every Cafe, confifted only in the Ael of the Will, whereby it determines 'ii^hether to coniider or no, it would not alter the Cafe in the leaft, as to the prefent Argument. For ftill in this A6t of the Will on this Determination, it is induced by fome Motive, and neceffarily follows the ftrongeft Motive ; and fo is necelTary, vcven in that Ad wherein alone it is either vertuous or vicious. Gne Thing more I would obfefve, concerning the In con - fiftence of Jrmiman Notions of moral Agency with the Influ- ence of Motives. I fuppofe none will deny,that 'tis pof^ibie for Motives to be fet before theMind fo powerful, and exhibit- 6^ Sincerity Partlll. Hundred take it half away. If one Degree of the Influence^ of Motive don't at all infringe or diminifn Liberty, then no more do two Degrees \ for Nothing doubled, is ftill Nothing. And if two D'Cgrees don't diminifli the Will's Liberty, no more do four, eight, fixteen, or fix Thoufand. For Nothing multiplied never fo much, comes to butNothing. If there be iicthing in the Nature of Motive or moral Suafion, that is at all oppolite to Liberty, then the greateft Degree of it can't hurt Liberty. But if there be any Thing in the Nature of the Thing, that is againft Liberty, then the leaft Degree of it hurts it in fome Degree ; and confequently hurts and dimi- nifhes Vertue. If invincible Motives to that A6tion which is good, take av/ay all the Freedom of the Ad, and fo all the v''ertue of it ; then the more forceable the Motives are, fo much the worfe, fo much the lefs Vertue i and the weaker the Motives are, the better for the Caufe of Vertue j and none is befl of all. Now let it be confidered,v^hether thefe Things are agreable to common Senfe. If it Ihould be allowed, that there are fome Infcances wherein the Soul chufes without any Motive, what Vertue can there be in fach a Choice ? I am fure, there is no Prudence or Wifdom in it, Such a Choice is made for no good End ; for it is for no End at all. If it were for any End, the View of the End would be the Motive exciting to the Acft ; and if the A61 be for no good End, and fo from no good Aim, then there is no good Intention in it ; And there- fore, according to all our natural Notions of Vertue, no more Vertue in it than in the Motion of the Smoke,which is driven to arid fro by the V/ind, without any Aim or End in the Thing moved, and which knows not whither, i)or why and wherefore, it is moved. Corol. I. By thefe Things it appears, that the Argument againft the Cahinijls^ taken from the Ufe of Counfels, Exhor- tations, Invitations, Expoftulations, &c. fo much infifted on by Armhnans^ is truly again [t themfeives. For thefe Things can operate no other Way to any good EfFed, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite p.nd determine the Acls of the V/ill. But it follows on their Principles, that the A6ts of Will excited by fuch Caufes, can't t-e vertuous j becaufe fo far as they are from thefe, they 3re not from the Will's felf-determining Power. Hence it ivill follovv/, th:it it :s not worth the while to offer any Argu- iy\mp to peruvade I'ltxx to any vertuous Volition or voluntary '' '" '•■'•••■• Aetion 5 Se.VII. of Invit2LWc. again/! thcmklvcs. 189 I A<5tion ; 'tis in vain to fet before them the Wifdom and Amiablenefs of Ways of Vertue, or the Odioufnefs and Folly of Ways of Vice. This Notion of Liberty and moral Agency fruftrates all Endeavours to draw Men to Yertuc by Inftrudion, or Perfwafion, Precept, or Example : For tho* I thefe Things may induce Men to what is materially vertuous, yet at the fame Time they take away the Form of Vertue, ; becaufe they deftroy Liberty ; as they, by their own Power, put the Will out of it's Equilibrium, determine and turn the Scale, and take the Work of felf-dctermining Power out of \ it's Hands. And the clearer the Inftru(5lions are that are given, , the more powerful the Arguments that are ufed, and the more moving the Perfwafions or Examples, the more likely they are to fruftrate their own Defign ; Becaufe they have fo much the i greater Tendency to put the Will out of it's Balance, to hinder it's Freedom of felf-determination •, and fo to exclude the very Form of Vertue, and the EiTence of whatfoever is Praife- worthy. So it clearly follows from thefe Principles, that God has no Hand in any Man's Vertue, nor does at all promote it, either by a phyfical or moral Influence ; that none of the moral Methods He ufes with Men to promote Vertue in the World, have Tendency to the Attainment of that End ; that all the Inilrudlions which He has given to Men, from the Beginning of the World to this Day, by Prophets, or Apoftles, or by his Son Jefus Chrift ; that all his Counfels, Invitations, Promifes, Threatnings, Warnings and Expoftulations ; that all Means He has ufed with Men, in Ordinances, or Providences ; yea, all Influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no Tendency at all to excite any one vertuous Adl of the Mind, or to promote any Thing morally good and commen- dable, in any Refpe6t. For there is no Way that thefe or any other Means can promote Vertue, but one of thefe three. Either ( I.) By a phyfical Operation on the Heart. But all Effe6ls that are wrought in Men in this Way, have no Vertue in them, by the concurring Voice of all Jr?mmans. Or (2.) Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the Underftanding,to excite good Acls in the Will. But it has been demonftrated, that Volitions which are excited by Motives, are neceflary, and not excited by a felf-moving Power ; and therefore, by their Prin- ciples, there is no Vertue in them. Or (3.) By meerly giving the Will an Opportunity to determine it felf concerning the Objects propofed, either to chufe or reject, by it's own Jjncaufed, unmoved, uninfluenced felf-determinatiou. And if this igo Arminianifhl excludes ^// Vertuey P.llL this be all, then all thofe Means do ho more to promote Ver-^ ttic, than Vice: For they do Nothing but give the Will Opportunity to determine it felf either Way\ either to Good or Bad, without laying it under any Bias to either : And fo thtrc is really as much of an Opportunity given to determine in Favour of Evil, as of Gefod. Thus that horrid blafphemous Confequence will certainly- follow from the Armiman Dodrine, which .they charge on Others \ namely, that God a6ls an inconfiftent Part in ufing fo many Counfels, Warnings, Invitations, Intreaties, &c. with Sinners, to induce 'em to forfake Sin, and turn to the Ways of Vertue ; and that all are infincere and fallacious. It will fol- \m^ from their Dodrine, that God does thefe Things whert He knows at the fame Time, that they have no Manner of Tendency to promote the Effedt He feems to aim at ; yea^ knows that if they have any Influence, this very Influence will be inconfiftent with fuch an Eifecl:, and will prevent it. But what an Imputation of Infincerity would this tix on Him who is infinitely holy and true !~So that their's is theDo6lrJn5 which if purfued in it's Confequences, does horribly reflect on the moft High, and fix on Him theCharge of Hypocrify ; arid not the Dodlrine of the Cahhiijl ; according to their frequentj and vehement Exclamations and Invedives. Corol. 2. From what has been obferved in this S€<51:ion, ft- again appears, that Armhuayi Principles and Notions, when fairly examined, and purfued in their demonftrable Confe- quences, do evidently Ihut all Vertue out of the World, and make it impoflible that there fhould ever be any fuch Thing, in any Cafe \ or that any fuch Thing fhould ever be conceiv'd of. For by thefe Principles, the very Notion of Vertue oi^ Vice implies Abfurdity and Contradidion. For it is abfurd irt it felf, and contrary to common Senfe, to fuppofe a vertuous A<51 of Mind without any good Intention or Aim ; and by their Prin^eiples, it is abfurd to fuppofe a vertuous A(5l with a good Intention or Aim \ for to att for an End, is to a6t froih- a Motive. So that if we rely on thefe Principles, there cart be no vertuous A61 with a good Defign and End ; and 'tiS felf-evident, there can be none without : confequently there can be no vertuous A61 at all. Corol, 3. Tis manifeft, that Armmian Notions of moral Agency, and the Being of a Faculty of V/ill, cannot confift to- gether i and that if there be apy fuch Thixig as, either a ver- tuous> Sea.VIL and Victy out of the World. 191 tuous, or vicious A<5t, it can't be an A(5l of Will ; no Will can bye at all concerned in it. For that A6t which is performed without Inclination, without Motive, without End, muft be performed without any Concern of the Will. To fuppofe an A51 of the Will without thefe, implies a Contradiction. If the Soul in it's Act ha? no Motive or End ; then in that Ad (as was obferv^d before) it feeks Nothing, goes after Nothing, exerts no Inclination'to any Thing ; and this implies, that in that A61 it defires Nothing, and chufesNothing ; fo that there is noA<5t of Choice in theCafe : And that is as much as to fay, there: is no Adt of Will in the^ Cafe. Which very effedtualiy fhuts out all vicious and vertuous A6ts put of the Univerfe ; in as much as, according to this, there can be no vicious or vertvious A(5t wherein the Will is concerned ; arid according \.o the plaineft Didates of Reafon, and the Li^ht of Nature, and alfo the Principles of Armin'mm themfelyes, there can be no vertuous or vicipus K6k wherein the Will is not concerned. And therefore there is no Room for any vertuous or vicious A«ts at all. Corok 4. If none of the moral A(ftions of intelligent Beings^ are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, ano- ther ftrange Thing will follow ; and this is, that God not only can't foreknow any of the fijiture moral Acftions of his Creatures, but He can make no Conjedure, can give no pro- bable Guefs concerning them. For, all Conjedure in Things of this Nature, muft depend on fome Difcerning or Apprcr. li^nfion of thefe two Things, previous Difpcfition^ and Motive ; which, as has been obferved, Arminian Notions pf moral ' Agency, in their real Confequ.ence, altogether exclude. PART { 192 ) PART IV. Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafon- ings o{ Arminians^m Support andDefence of the foremention'd Notions o{ Liberty^ I moral Ageitcy^^c. and againft the oppo- I file Doctrine, are confidered. ■% Section I. !r>5^ Eflence of the Vertue and Vice of Dif \ pofttions of the Hearty a?td A8is of the \ JVilly lies not in their Caufe, hut their \ Nature. \ NE main Foundation of the Reafons, which are brought to eftablifh the foremention'd Notions of Liberty, Vertue, Vice, &c. is a Suppofition, that the Vertuoufnefs of the -Difpofitions or A^s of the Will confifts not in the Nature of thefe Difpofitions or A6ls, but wholly in the Origin or Caufe of them : fo that if the Difpofition of the Mind or hdi of the Will be never io £Ood, yet if the Caufe of the Difpofition or Adt be not our Vertue, there is nothing vertuous or praife-worthy in it ; and •a the contraiy, if the Will in it's Inclination or Ads bene- vei^ Sea.I. OftkeMcnctofFertue &> Fice,i^^ I vcr fo bad, yet unlefs it arifes from fomething that is our Vice or Fault, there is Nothing vicious or bIame-^\^orthy in I it. Hence their grand Objedlion and pretended Demonftra- tion, or Self-Evidence, againft any Vertue and Cofrtmenda- bJenefs, or Vice and Blame-worthinefs, of thofe Habits or A(5ls of the Will 3 which are not from fome vertuous or Vici* I; ous Determination of the Will it felf. Now, if this Matter be well confidered, it will appear to be altogether a Miftake, yea, a grofs Abfurdity ; and that it is r moft certain, that if there be any fuch Things, as a vertuous, or vicious Difpofition-, or Volition of Mind, the Vertu5ufnefs or Vicioufnefs of them confifts not in the Origin or Caufe of thefe Things, but in the Nature of them. If the EiTence of Vertuoufnefs or Commendablenefs, and of Vicioufnefs or Fault, don't lie in the Nature of the Difpo- fitions Or A6ls of Mind, which are faid to be our Vertue or our Fault, but in their Caufe, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus^ for Inflance, if the Vice of a vicioi^s Aa of Will, lies not in the Nature of the Aa, but the Caufe ; fo that it's being of a bad Nature will not make it at all our Fault, unlefs it afifes from fome faulty Determination of our's as it*s Caufe, or fomething in us that is our Fault; then for the fame Reafon, neither can the Vicioufnefs of that Caufe lie in the Nature of the Things it felf, but in it^s Caufe : that evil Determination of our's is not our Fault, meerly becaufe it is of a bad Nature, unlefs it arifes from fome Caufe in us that is our Fault; And when v/e are come to this higher Caufe, fl:ill the Reafon of the Thing holds good ; tho* this Caufe be of a bad Nature, ye^L V, e are not at all to blame on that Account, unlefs it arifes from fomething faulty in us. Nor yet can Blame-worthinefs lie in the Nature of ibis Canje^ but in the Caufe of that. And thus we muft drive Faultinefs back from Step to Step, from a lower Caufe to a higher, in infinitum : and that is thoroughly to banilh it from the World, and to allow it no polfibility of Exigence any where in the Univerfality of Things. On thefe Principles, Vice or moral Evil can't confift in any Thing I that is an EffeSf ; becaufe Fault don't confift in the Nature ; of Things, but in their Caufe ; as well as becaufe Effefls : are neceiuiry, being unavoidably conne(5led with their Caufe : ' \ therefore the Caufe only is to blame. And fo it follows, that Faultinefs can lie only in that Caufi^ which is a Caufe only^ zn6. no Effecft of any Thing. Nor yet can it lie in this ; for then it muft lie in the Mature of the Thinir it felf ; cct in it's be- k B b ^ ia^ K^^T^e Effcnct of Fertue & J^ke^ Part IV* ing from any Determination of o]jr*s, nor any Thing faulty m us which is the Caufe, nor indeed from any Caufe at all, for by the iiuppofition, it is no EfFed, and hai no Caufe. And thus, He that will maintahi, it is n'ot the Nature of Habits or Ads of Will that makes them vertuous or faulty, but the Caufe, muft immediately run Hnnfelf out of his ovm AfTertion ; and in maintaining it, will infenfibly con- tradid and deny it. This is certain, tha.t if EfFe6ls are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature, or from any Thing inherent in them, but bccaufe they are from a bad Caufe, it muft be on Ac- count of the Badnefs of the Caufe ; and fo on Account of the Nature of the Caufe : A bad EfFea in the Will muf^ be bad, becaufe the Caufe is bad^ or of an evil Nature^ or has Badnefs as a Quality inherent in it : and tl good Eflfed in the Will muft be good^ by Reafon of the Goodnefs of the Caufe, or it's being of a geod Kind and Nature, And if this be what is meant, the very Suppofition of Fault and Praife iving not in the«» Nature of the Thing, but the Caufe, con- tradicts it {€ii^ and does at leaft refolve the Eftence of Vertue and Vice into theNature of Things, and fuppofes it originally to confift in that. And if a Caviller has a Mind to run from the Abfurdity, by faying, '' No, the Fault of the «"^ Thing which is the Caufe, lies not in this, that the Caufe, >' it {^ii is of an evil Nature^ but that the Caufe is evil in *^' that Senfe, that it is from another bad Caufe". Still the Abfurdity will follow him ; for if fo, then the Caufe before, ch"arged is at once acquitted, and all the Blame muft be laid, to the higher Caufe, and muft confift in that's being Evil^ or of an evil Nature. So now we are come again to lay theBlamC' of the Thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the Thing, and not to the Caufe. And if any is fo foolifti as to go higher ftill, and afcend from Step to Step, till he is come to that which is the lirftCaufe concerned in the whole Affair, and will fay, all the Blame lies in that ; then at laft he muft be forced to ov/n, that the Faultinefs of the Thing which he fuppofes alone blame-worthy, lies wholly m the Nature of the Thing, and not in the Original or Caufe of it ; for the Suppofition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by noAct of our's, is caufcd by nothing faulty in us, being abfolutely w///>tf«f ans; Qaufl. And fo the Race is at an End, but the Evader is taken In his Flight. 'Tis agreable to x\\'^ natural Notions of Mankind, that moral Evil, v.'ith it's Defert of Diilike and Abhorrence, and ali it's other Jll-defcrvings, confifts in a certain DAtw/Zv in . the Se.I. in the^^t^ of Volition ^not in theC^LVik. 1 9 5 the Nature of certain Difpofitions of the Heart, and A€is of the Will ; and not in the Deformity of fcrmihing elfe^ diverfe. from the very Thing it felf, which deferves Abhorrence, fuppofed to be the Catife of it. Which would be abfurd, becaufe that would be to fuppofe, a Thing that is in- nocent and not Evil, is truly evil and faulty, becaufe another Thing is Evil. It implies a Contradidion ; for it would be to fuppofe, the very Thing which is morally evil and blame- worthy, is innocent and not blame-worthy j but that fomething elfe, which is it's Cauie, is pnly to blame. To fay, that Vice don't confift in the Thing which is vicious, but in it's Caufe, is the fame as to fay, that Vice don't confiil: in Vice, but in that which, produces it. 'Tis true, a Caufe may be to blame, for being the Caufe of Vice : It may be Wicicednefs in the Caufe, that it pro- duces Wickednefs. But it would imply a Contradidion, to fuppofe that thefe two are the fame individual Wickednefs. The wicked A61 of the Caufe in producing Wickednefs, is one Wickednefs ; and the Vf ickednefs produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore the Wickednefs of the latter don't lie in the form.er, but is diftind from it ; and the Wickednefs of both lies in the evil Nature of the Things which are wicked. The Thing' which makes Sin hateful, is that by which it deferves P'uniSiment ; which is but the Expreffion of Hatred. And that which renders Vertue lovely, is the fame with that, on the Account of which, it is fit to receive Praife and Re- ward ; which are but the Expreflions of Efteem and Love. But that which makesVice hateful, is it's hateful Nature ; and that which rendersVertue lovely, is it's amiable Nature. 'Tis a certain Beauty or Deformity that are inherent in that good 'or evil Will, whieh is the Soul of Vertue and Vice (and not in the Occafion of it) which is their Worthinefs of Eileem or Difefteem, Praife or Difpraife, according to the common Senfe of Mankind. If the Caufe or Occaficn of the Rife of an hateful Difpofition or Ad of Will, be alfo hateful ; ^ fuppofe another antecedent evil Will 5 that is entirely an^ig. Sin, and defer\^es Punidiment by it felf, under a diilincrv^onf de- ration. There is Worthinefs of Difpraife in the Nature of an evil Volition, and not wholly in fome foregoing A<5t which is it's Caufe ; otherwife the evil Volition wl»ich is the Eifeit* is no moral Evil, any more than Sicknefs, or fome other na- tural Calamity, which arifes from a Caufe moraUy evil. B b 2 Thus IL «96 The Effence ofFerm ^Vice, PartlV. Thi;s for Inftance, Ingratitude is hateful and worthy of Difpraife,ajccording to common Senfe ; not becaufe fomethjng as bad, or worfe than Ingratitude, was the Caufe that produced ^t ; but becaufe it is hateful in it i€ii^ by it's own inherent Deformity. So the Love of Vertue is amiable, and worthy of Praife, not meerly becaufe fomething elfe went before thi^ Love of Vertue in our Minds, which caufed it to take Place there ; forlnflance our own Choice ; we chofe to love Vertue, and by fome Method or other wrought our felves into th$ Love of it ; but becaufe of the Amiablenefs and Condecei\cy of fuch a Difpofition and Inclination of Heart. If that was the Cafe, that we did chufe to love Vertue, and {o produced that Love in our \thts^ this Choice it felf could be no other-! wife amiable or praife- worthy, than as Love to Vertue, or fom,e other amiable Inclination, was exercifed and impjied in it. If that Choice was amiable at all, it muft be fo on Act count of fome amiable Qiiality in the Nature of the Choice, If we chofe to love Vertue, not in Love to Vertue, or any Thing that was good, and exercifed no fort of good Difpofi* tion in the Choice, the Choice it felf was not vertuous, no!" worthy of any Praife, according to commpn Senfe, becaufe^ the Choice vvas not of a good Nature. ^ It may not be improper here to take Notice of fomething faid by anAuthor, that has lately made a mighty Noife in Ame- rica, <« A neceffary Holinefs (fays He *) is no Holinefs.- — " Adam could not be originally created in Righteoufnefs and *' true Holinefs, becaufe He muft chufe to be righteous, before *^ He could be righteous, And therefore He muft exift. He '* muft be created, yea He muft exercife Thought and Re^^ " fledtion, before he v