BT 15 .F7 v.6 
 Foster, Randolph S. 1820- 
 1903 . 
 
 Studies in theology 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2019 with funding from 
 Princeton Theological Seminary Library 
 
 https://archive.org/details/studiesintheolog06fost 
 

WORKS OF 
 
 RANDOLPH S. FOSTER, LL.D. 
 
 PRICE 
 
 BEYOND THE GRAVE,.$1 20 
 
 CENTENARY THOUGHTS FOR THE PEW AND PULPIT, . 1 50 
 
 CHRISTIAN PURITY,.1 35 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO CALVINISM,.75 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE, . . . 1 00 
 
 STUDIES IN THEOLOGY: 
 
 VOL. I. PROLEGOMENA.3 00 
 
 “ II. THEISM.3 00 
 
 “ III. THE SUPERNATURAL BOOK, . . . 3 00 
 
 “ IV. CREATION,.3 00 
 
 “ V. GOD—NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES, . . 3 00 
 
 “ VI. SIN.3 00 
 
 UNION OF EPISCOPAL METHODISM.75 
 
Studies in Theology—VI 
 
 BY 
 
 ^ ' 
 
 RANDOLPH S. FOSTER, D.D., LL.D. 
 
 A Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
 
 iipos to <t>nz 
 
 NEW YORK: EATON & MAINS 
 CINCINNATI : CURTS & JENNINGS 
 1899 
 
Copyright by 
 EATON & MAINS, 
 
 J899. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A prime object of the discussions conducted in this series of 
 volumes, of which this is the sixth, is to furnish the reader, in 
 a condensed form, the best thought of the most learned and 
 able thinkers in the departments of philosophy and theology, 
 and the results of personal investigation carried forward for 
 half a century with honest effort to reach the truth and relieve 
 points of obscurity and difficulty to the ordinary reader and 
 even to the most careful student 
 
 "We do not entertain the idea that all difficulties have been 
 relieved or obscurities made plain, but it is our hope that on 
 most points substantial help is rendered, while no subject has 
 been omitted or treated either with unchristian or unscientific 
 carelessness. Some views will be found not in harmony with 
 popular thought or common teaching, the study of which may 
 render help where it is greatly needed. 
 
 Of one thing we are entirely certain, that we have aimed 
 simply to correct some glaring errors and to aid in the right 
 understanding of obscure truth, and to lead other minds to 
 continued effort in the right direction. 
 
 It is not in our thought to free the reader from the duty of 
 personal effort, or to do his thinking for him, but rather to en¬ 
 courage and help him in his work. 
 
 6 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Adam. 3 
 
 Inclusions of the Creative Act. 14 
 
 What is Sin ?. 24 
 
 Guilt. 117 
 
 Punishment. 119 
 
SIN. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 fit 
 
SIN. 
 
 ADAM. 
 
 There is no subject upon which theologians have drawn 
 more largely, not to say exclusively, on the imagination than 
 that of the original state of man. The wild dream of Milton 
 has not simply furnished almost the entire staple of the popular 
 superstition, but also the substance of the grave teachings of 
 the most eminent theologians. They have put forward the 
 merest fables with assurance as well-established verities. A 
 hint, or mere suspicion, has dominated a doctrine. Disregard¬ 
 ful of all known or even probable facts, they have enforced a 
 theory woven by fancy. Painters have exhausted their art in 
 painting paradisaical landscapes of the rarest beauty and richest 
 luxuriance—lawns, groves, vistas, long-drawn avenues, lakelets, 
 meandering streams, arranged in the most artistic perspective, 
 flowers, tinted atmospheres suggestive of fragrance, all blending 
 in the picture-—and it has been insisted that the reality far tran¬ 
 scends the power of description. The happy pair have been rep¬ 
 resented as gliding about amid these bowers of beauty, them¬ 
 selves the most beautiful objects of all, having a perfect ecstasy 
 of life, without care or trouble. And this dream has been prop¬ 
 agated as if there were some real foundation for it. It is as 
 pure a fiction as was ever invented. There is not a sentence in 
 the Bible to warrant it. It is false to all reality as seen in the 
 light of natural laws and to all historic tracings in the works 
 and ways of Grod. A moment’s reflection divests us of the fool¬ 
 ish and injurious fancy. 
 
 The world where Adam was made and where he commenced 
 
 6 
 
4 
 
 Studies m Theolog-y. 
 
 his life was this world as we find it to-day, except not beauti¬ 
 fied by the touch of cultivation. The paradise where Adam 
 lived was probably somewhere in Central Asia, the land where 
 Bedouins pitch their tents to-day, and in essential respects un¬ 
 changed. The proof of this is found in the unchanged surface 
 of the land, in the atmosphere, in the climatic conditions, and in 
 the vegetable and animal life which geology shows has pre¬ 
 vailed there for ages. There were hailstorms and snowdrifts, 
 floods and earthquakes, plenty and famine, before and after 
 our first parents came. 
 
 They were made for this world; for work and toil and care; 
 for an everyday existence, and not for parade. The fiber of 
 their flesh was the same as ours. They needed forethought as 
 we do; had to collect and cook their three-times-a-day meal or 
 go hungry. Why shall we delude ourselves with fancies? 
 That which the history warrants is just this and no more: A 
 man and woman, one to be father and one to be mother, were 
 put upon their feet in a place called a garden, where the means 
 of subsistence were abundant, and were commanded to dress it, 
 and keep it, and get their living out of it. That is the record; 
 nothing more. It is a simple and perfectly natural story. It 
 was in a region long and abundantly inhabited by living crea¬ 
 tures. It was a good central point for a race to be planted that 
 was soon to spread over the whole earth. The whole earth, as 
 much as that particular spot, was to be their home. That spot 
 had no special sunshine, no peculiar enchantment. It was 
 simply the earth, for earthly beings; it was not heaven, or a 
 place midway. It will be well to begin the correction of our 
 fabulous fancies right here. So far as we are able to find there 
 is not a hint in revelation that Eden was more beautiful than, 
 or in any respect different from, a thousand places found in pure 
 nature now, and there is no indication in geological phenomena 
 
 to denote a radical change of the conditions then existing. Man 
 6 
 
Adam. 
 
 5 
 
 was there, sin and evil left out for a brief interval—perhaps 
 not more than a day, or possibly only a few hours—just what 
 he is now; had the same wants and needs, and had to be sup¬ 
 plied in the same way. Let us not delude ourselves or load 
 revelation with a fancy which is groundless and to which it 
 gives no support. 
 
 This being the place, what are we to think of the being? 
 Here, again, imagination has performed the same fantastic 
 tricks, and with as slender materials. Sober common sense 
 brought to the investigation of the history cannot fail to dissi¬ 
 pate the glamour thrown around it by mere fancy, but it is diffi¬ 
 cult to permit common sense to have fair play in competition 
 with sentiments which, however groundless, cling to us, hal¬ 
 lowed with a sort of religious sacredness, and which we suppose 
 come to us from the Bible. But if we would preserve those 
 ideas which are true and worthy of respect the attempt at 
 defending and perpetuating mere fables must be abandoned. 
 
 There is a truth with respect to that first man. What is it ? 
 As to his being, nothing could be more brief and simple than 
 the Bible statement. First, there was a body made out of com¬ 
 mon earth; second, there was a soul infused or shrined in it. 
 These terms describe humanity as we possess it—that, and 
 nothing more. If we would think justly of the case we bring 
 ourselves to the simple idea of a man like any of us, fitted to 
 live such a life as we live, environed with our wants, under the 
 same laws which apply to us in every particular. He was new, 
 but the world was old and just as we find it. To make his 
 way through it what is necessary for us was necessary for him. 
 He was as like us substantially, sin excepted, as our father 
 whom we laid away yesterday. He did not become so in time, 
 he began so. Hunger and want struck him the first day he 
 lived on earth. He needed clothes and home as much as we do. 
 The same law of labor bound him that binds us. 
 
6 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 Now, let ns come somewhat nearer to this great stranger who 
 has just been made to be the heir of the world, and study him 
 a little. 
 
 As it is with every other man, he stands before us a physical 
 structure—a body. We know what it was made of and what 
 it was like, for it was precisely like ours in every essential par¬ 
 ticular. It is reasonable to believe that it was as perfect as a 
 body can be, for we do not forget that it was not an accident. 
 God made it. There is every reason to believe that it was well 
 made. It was a good body—healthy, well-proportioned, com¬ 
 plete, and perfect in all its members. To suppose otherwise 
 would be to impeach its Maker. Any reason there was for 
 making a body at all was a reason for making it well. But it 
 was a body of earth. This implies a great deal. It was made 
 to dwell on the earth, to encounter its variable and destructive 
 climatic conditions. It was sensitive to the atmospheric changes; 
 hunger would pinch it, a bruise would hurt it, an accidental 
 fall might kill it; it was open to attacks of disease from the 
 subtle poisons which freighted the air; vital processes wasted it. 
 It needed constant care. It is so now, it was so then. 
 
 We inherit less healthy bodies; diseases have been contracted 
 and have been transmitted to us. We are degenerate physi¬ 
 cally, as a rule. But the possibility of this was in his constitu¬ 
 tion and is incidental to an earthly body, as such, in a world 
 such as the earth is, and as it has been all along the periods of 
 its existence. The common fortunes of humanity were his, its 
 imminent liabilities and necessities. He would grow old, his 
 hair would become gray and his eyes dim, and he would need 
 a staff. 
 
 He was to be a father and have offspring. This means the 
 pain of child-bearing to Eve and the increase of care to the 
 provident father. There would have been growing home wants 
 
 in Eden, and when the children came of age and wandered off 
 
 6 
 
Adam. 
 
 7 
 
 to new countries, as they must, there would have been tearful 
 partings. Life in a body means all this, and more, of toil and 
 weariness. 
 
 Now, what shall we say of his soul ? That the new creature 
 was endowed with adequate mental power we think there is no 
 just reason to doubt. The end for which he was called into 
 existence, the circumstances in which he was placed, the great 
 responsibility attaching to his actions, the character of the Cre¬ 
 ator and the manner of all his working, guarantee this. The 
 perfect body was the shrine of a mind of rich and ample endow¬ 
 ments. But the endowments were those of faculty—mental 
 powers. There is a relation between body and mind—-the rela¬ 
 tion of instrument and agent. The instrument was good, the 
 agent had complete use of it. His power was adequate and 
 unembarrassed. Before him were the ages. He was to grow 
 in stature and in all the elements of greatness. His mind, equal 
 in endowments to the task, would need to grow and to have 
 time for growth. 
 
 If, now, it be asked, What was the degree of knowledge with 
 which he was endowed ? we should incline to say, None what¬ 
 ever. Knowledge is acquired, not concreated; an attainment, 
 not a gift. He was able to know. His perfect sensorium was 
 a complex of avenues through which knowledge would pour in 
 upon his perceptive and receptive consciousness. The raw 
 material of sensations was immediately transmuted into ideas 
 and cognitions. 
 
 The imagination that he was created with knowledge, or that 
 he knew things in any other way than we know them, is with¬ 
 out warrant. He had the faculty of observation, understand¬ 
 ing, reason, intuition, imagination, memory, speech, and God 
 was near to inspire and guide him as his need required. So 
 gifted, his duties, as they arose, would become plain to his 
 apprehension, and nature as it passed in detail under his obser- 
 
8 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 vation would become subject to his use and convenience. He 
 had everything to learn, but the ravishing lesson would be 
 easily mastered, so far as present need required, by his vigorous 
 and industrious faculties. He was here for discipline and de¬ 
 velopment, and his great lifework was to learn, interpret, and 
 obey his Maker’s will, and possess and enjoy the wondrous 
 stores of wealth and blessing spread about him. Each hour 
 and day were to bring him on his journey of discovery and in¬ 
 creasing development; to thrill him with new attainments, and 
 refine and exalt his powers of love and knowledge by the con¬ 
 tact of fresh beauties and benignities of the earth and sky over¬ 
 arching and spreading around his home, and by the direct 
 influences of the ever-present Holy Spirit. Thus, ever learning 
 and ever enjoying what he learned, his life was to answer the 
 end for which it was bestowed. 
 
 Was he subject to mistakes and errors? We see no reason 
 to doubt that he was. Accurate knowledge is of slow growth. 
 There is no reason for supposing that it is not so with angels as 
 well as with men. He was not an exception. But, if careful 
 and dutiful, he would be saved from fatal mistakes. On moral 
 subjects he had an ever-present Guide, whose voice he would 
 not fail to hear whenever necessary. But by this we do not 
 mean that he was able to solve great moral problems, or knew 
 intuitively ethical laws and principles. The history shows that 
 in these respects he was a child. The code over him consisted 
 of a single command. That means something. He had no knowl¬ 
 edge proper of the world: had to find out the time to look for 
 the sun and when to expect its setting; the moon’s coming and 
 going; the seasons to plant and to harvest; the means of protec¬ 
 tion from rigor of weather, heat and cold; the ores and metals, 
 how to make tools and how to use them; what was good for 
 food, and how to capture it and prepare it,—everything. He 
 would doubtless make mistakes; not such as greatly to mar his 
 
Adam. 
 
 9 
 
 happiness or sully his purity, but such as to require his atten¬ 
 tion and study, put him under the need of exercising careful 
 judgment, and lay him under tribute to the healthful and vig¬ 
 orous use of all his faculties. He was at school, and school 
 means mental training. God, we must believe, was wonderfully 
 near to this inexperienced child of his to help him in matters of 
 real need. It is not given to us to know in what ways and 
 manners—there is an intimation of a visible presence on occa¬ 
 sions. There were lessons to be taught for all time that possi¬ 
 bly could not otherwise be learned or communicated. The 
 new-made Adam was simply a human soul in a human body, 
 placed on earth to begin a career of eternal improvement with 
 faculty sufficient to commence his journey and pursue it safely to 
 the end. His knowledge to begin with was a point; it would 
 become an ever-lengthening line, a rapidly growing volume, a 
 library. Knowledge would increase from age to age; would 
 become more accurate; would open new fields of discovery; 
 would multiply means of welfare. Paradise would improve. 
 
 In matters of duty he had, as we have now, an ever-present 
 inward and infallible monitor to guide him—a divine voice, we 
 may believe—but this implies, not completeness of knowledge, 
 but continuous growth. 
 
 Dr. Raymond in his excellent work on Systematic Theology , a 
 work throughout distinguished for sound common sense and 
 clear thought, says:* “It is not necessary to indulge a poetic 
 fancy or imagine a superhuman body of gigantic proportions 
 and of angelic beauty. It is sufficient to conceive that man, 
 such as we now find him, enjoyed perfect health and possessed 
 sufficient vigor and strength for all his duties, such as probably 
 many enjoy at some portions of their lives even now. It is not 
 necessary to conceive that hunger and weariness were impossi¬ 
 ble, nor that wounds would not produce pain, nor that poison 
 2 *Vol. ii, p. 40. 
 
 6 
 
10 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 would not produce disease, but that for all such exigencies some 
 preventive or antidote was ever at band. It is not necessary to 
 conceive that the body was naturally immortal; on the contrary, 
 it may be readily admitted that dissolution is an organic law of 
 animal life, and that therefore man, being an animal, was subject 
 to that law. Being of the dust of the ground, there was a nat¬ 
 ural, perhaps a necessary, tendency in his body to return to the 
 dust as it was. But perfection in a being destined to immor¬ 
 tality forbids the fact of death as man now experiences it.* But 
 for sin death, as a fact in history, would not have entered into 
 the world of human experience. Sin entered the world, and 
 death by sin. How the historical fact of death would have been 
 prevented we are not told, but many infer that the power and 
 providence which preserve man always would have secured 
 perfect health till probation terminated. Providence would 
 have preserved man till the purposes of his earthly life were 
 accomplished, and then, like Enoch and Elijah, he would have 
 been translated—changed in the twinkling of an eye, as it will 
 be with the quick at the last day; he would have put on im¬ 
 mortality, and mortality had been swallowed up of life.” 
 
 What do the terms “image” and “likeness” signify? The 
 words are synonymous. We see no reason for supposing that 
 they have different shades of meaning or that they refer to 
 different things. They indicate simple conformableness or re¬ 
 semblance—things of like nature or characteristics. The terms 
 are sometimes employed to represent only a similarity of appear¬ 
 ance, at other times an actual correspondence. There can be no 
 question that they are employed here in the more radical sense. 
 
 * In the main this is a fair statement, but not without some fanciful elements. It 
 is impossible to know whether or not, if man had not sinned, he would have been 
 subject to physical death. It is entirely certain that he was not to remain forever 
 in the organism given him at the time of his creation, or in an organism fashioned 
 as it was. It was made for an earthly life and conditioned by environments that 
 were not designed to be permanent. Nothing is more rationally certain than this. 
 What the change would have been could only be matter of conjecture if not revealed. 
 
Adam. 
 
 11 
 
 The creature was made in the actual likeness of the Creator, 
 and the image was in the thing made, not in its accidents. 
 This fact discountenances the idea that it was, as some have 
 vainly imagined, official resemblance. The dominion assigned 
 to man was an emolument of his nature because he was made 
 in the image of God, but it was not itself the image. The 
 image was invested in that which was made, dominion was con¬ 
 ferred upon that which was made. The image was before the 
 dominion and was the ground of the dominion. The preroga¬ 
 tives of dominion inhere in the created image of God. This 
 will serve to point out in what part of the nature of man the 
 image was. It was in that wherein the powers or qualifications 
 for dominion are found. It was certainly not in the physical 
 or animal nature. The fashion of the body was, indeed, noble, 
 not improbably the highest typical and ideal form—the very 
 form which is impressed upon the finite spirit itself; but, how¬ 
 ever this may be, it is certain that the predicate was not of the 
 form or the essence of the organism, but of the very essence 
 and substance of the spirit. There was nothing in the animal 
 to resemble him to his Maker, neither form, nor essence, nor 
 attribute. There was total want of resemblance. We search 
 in vain here for anything of which the predication can be made. 
 We find but a form of dust, which is not resemblance of the 
 Infinite. The predicate is of the spirit, which is the true man. 
 Here the image is complete. It is the image, not the identity. 
 Image implies neither sameness nor equality. The infant is 
 the image of the man, not his equal. The finite cannot resem¬ 
 ble the Infinite in measure; still, there may be likeness. God is 
 a Spirit Man is a spirit. The essences are identical in nature. 
 The attributes of spirit are power of intellection, volition, emo¬ 
 tion. They exist in the divine and in the human. Spirit is 
 free and responsible. It has power of ideality, of reflection, of 
 self-consciousness. It discerns beauty, and truth, and right, 
 
12 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 and obligation. It knows and loves with, discrimination. It is 
 cause, and detects cause. It has spontaneity of energy and de¬ 
 termines its own activity. It is capable of exquisite happiness 
 —happiness from supersensible sources. It formulates thought 
 as history, poetry, science. It has power to express its concepts 
 in words and deeds. It arranges and combines in infinite vari¬ 
 ety. It creates instruments and ends for itself. It is capable 
 of interminable progress. It is imperishable. These are its 
 characteristics, and in all these respects it differs from all other 
 created things. The gulf of separation is impassable. Herein, 
 in essence and powers, is found the image of God. 
 
 There can be no doubt, we think, that the intellectual and 
 ethical nature of man, as invested in a spirit, is that wherein is 
 the divine likeness; that which makes him a child and not a 
 mere creature of God. The child inherits the nature of the 
 Father. The mere creature does not necessarily possess the 
 nature of the Creator. Derivation is not kinship. Man is child 
 and heir. The nature and inheritance both descend to him. 
 As child and heir he was made to be immortal. 
 
 He is but a finite image. His nature discovers to us the 
 nature of his Father, but his perfections are not equal in measure. 
 His attributes image those of his Father, but in him they are 
 germs; in his Father they are perfect. Though like God he is 
 not God, nor a part of God, as some have vainly imagined. His 
 spirit was not an emanation or an inflow of the Infinite Spirit, 
 as a drop from a fountain, to return again to the infinite ocean 
 when the vessel which contains it is shattered. It was a created 
 spirit, new and self-contained; destined to continue individual, 
 separate from all other spirits, in its personal essence and inde¬ 
 pendent consciousness, to all eternity. It was forever to know 
 itself as differentiable, and to put forth its own attributes, and 
 accomplish its own history, and come to its own end under its 
 own law and spontaneities. 
 
Adam. 
 
 13 
 
 It was, and knew itself to be, amenable. It was to have a 
 history of its own in which no other could participate, which 
 would forever denote it as a separate and discrete existence; a 
 life and consciousness w T hich could neither be divided nor trans¬ 
 ferred, nor merged, nor extinguished; a golden thread of con¬ 
 tinuous and unbroken personal experience that should forever 
 be known by itself as its own, and not another’s. 
 
 God is a pure, unpicturable Spirit. It is impossible to con¬ 
 ceive that he has a form. The Bible declares that he has 
 neither form nor shape. Any likeness to him must be in form¬ 
 less qualities. In these respects it is easy to point out the 
 resemblances between him and his creature, man, and between 
 them alone. The qualities which they possess in common are 
 spiritual qualities. If God be a pure, unpicturable Spirit, so 
 also is man. Man dwells in a body, but he is not a body, but 
 a spirit. They are alike invisible. They manifest themselves, 
 or come to manifestation in the same way, by some external 
 act. They reveal the same qualities, of thought, feeling, will. 
 In each intelligence discerns an end, feeling impels to it, will 
 realizes it. The resemblance is that of parent and child. It is 
 minute and complete in every feature, touching every element 
 of consciousness. There is in each a like sense of the true, the 
 beautiful, the good; like aptitudes for adapting means to ends, 
 like ideas of right and wrong, like moral impulses and feelings 
 of obligation to the good, like pleasures and displeasures, like 
 freedom and self-determining power, like sense of justice and 
 mercy, like grounds of happiness, and like antagonisms. One 
 is infinite, the other is finite and imperfect. Their unlikenesses 
 are simply in the degrees of their qualities or perfections, not in 
 essence or radical. The one is the infinitely perfect Pattern in 
 whom is all fullness. The other is the infant germ which may 
 forever expand toward its infinite Exemplar. 
 
14 
 
 Studies ix Theology. 
 
 INCLUSIONS OF THE CREATIVE ACT. 
 
 Several questions of importance immediately arise concern¬ 
 ing this wonderful being. So far we have seen what he was in 
 the elements of his nature—a spirit created in the image of 
 Grod, shrined in a body formed of dust of the earth; a com¬ 
 pound, or, rather, a union of two differentiable lives. Further 
 on we shall see how those constituent parts were related to each 
 other and the diverse laws governing them, together with the 
 actual results flowing from them. For the present we consider 
 the just-made creature prior to all personal history or action. 
 
 What were the inclusions of the creative act? To this we 
 are constrained to answer: Creation imparted being with the 
 attributes inhering, and nothing more; an organized body (sen¬ 
 sory system) with its life, and a spirit with its faculties, and 
 nothing more. 
 
 The spirit contained in it attributes of personality—power to 
 begin to know and act in all forms of intellections, power to 
 exercise volitional freedom and capacity to feel sense of obliga¬ 
 tion—and so all the requisite powers to begin a moral history 
 and work out a moral character and destiny. The gift bestowed 
 by the creative act was that of a complete and perfect organism 
 and ethical nature completely endowed for use and develop¬ 
 ment—just that and nothing more. Two sets of laws were cor¬ 
 porate in the being: one set, laws necessitating his outgo, so far 
 as he was a thing; the other, laws addressed to his conscious¬ 
 ness as a person, to which he was free. 
 
 Was he holy? Everything in the answer depends on the 
 meaning we attach to the word “ holy.” For want of precision, 
 perhaps, as to the significance of the term, the point has given 
 rise to much confusing disputation. 
 
Inclusions of the Creative Act. 
 
 15 
 
 If by the term we mean innocent, without guilt, Yes. The 
 new-made creature had only what was given him of God; he 
 could not, therefore, have taint of sin. If by the term we mean 
 yet more than freedom from taint of guilt—capacity to know 
 and love God, capacity to know and feel obligation to the right, 
 direct and spontaneous movement of the affections toward God 
 —then still, Yes. We cannot doubt that the double nature of 
 the new-made creature was so adjusted as to make it natural 
 to it to move freely along the course of joyful obedience and 
 worshipful love. As such God approved the work of his own 
 hand—pronounced him good. All that is implied in good, as 
 descriptive of a perfect work, of a most noble nature, he was. 
 But it must be obvious that in all this we are predicating of a 
 creature endowed with power of responsible action, and of his 
 perfect fitness to act aright; that is, we are predicating of a 
 work of God. 
 
 If we mean by the word “ holy” a quality of a moral being 
 which results from free conformity to the law of right which he 
 perceives to be obligatory, then holiness cannot be concreated, 
 but is a quality of character which results from the free forth- 
 putting of personality. As we view it, a moral nature, how¬ 
 ever perfect, is different from a moral character, and is the an¬ 
 tecedent and indispensable condition of it. It is not the nature 
 which makes the being holy, but the free action of the being 
 toward the law which governs him. By free action we mean, 
 not external action alone, or chiefly, but the free, spontaneous, 
 personal action of the moral affections and of the will, and 
 external acts of conformity to a law either directly and inspira¬ 
 tionally revealed, or a law voiced by a perfect and uncorrupted 
 reason and conscience. Holiness is quality of a person, result¬ 
 ing from and determinable by a free conformity to a righteous 
 law. It resides in will as volitionating, or results therefrom. 
 It implies a nature, but it cannot attach to a nature as such, but 
 
16 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 only to a personality after, or concurrently with and conse¬ 
 quent upon, action, or forthputting of agency. Even in God, 
 who is the thrice holy One, that which makes him such is his 
 free determination of himself to the good. He is holy, yea, the 
 11 Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts,” because he wills 
 holily. Did he will otherwise he would cease to be the Holy 
 One. There is no holiness without this primitive act of the 
 will determining the person to that which is good. The act 
 must be a free and purely personal act. A moral nature can 
 be created, that is, a being who is intelligent, so as to be able 
 to discern between the good and the bad, or right and wrong; 
 a being who can feel the obligation to the good and right, and 
 who has power to determine himself thereto with perfect free¬ 
 dom. Such a being may be created, but the quality of holiness 
 cannot be concreated with his being but must arise from the 
 free determination of himself to the right The possession of 
 moral attributes by a being constitutes him a moral nature or 
 being, but it does not alone impart to him any moral quality. 
 The preeminence of man over other creatures consists in attri¬ 
 butes such that by their use he may acquire moral quality. 
 The nature in the one case is of higher quality than in the 
 other, and its possibilities in kind and degree of excellence are 
 incomparably superior. The one bears the image of God; the 
 other is a mere thing. The attempt to find in the personal 
 moral quality of holy character the image of God, in which man 
 was created, is as inconsistent with the principles and teachings 
 of the Bible as it is impossible of success. There is a close 
 resemblance in the holiness of God and the holiness of man. 
 Holiness or righteousness in both is identical in principle, and 
 the principle shows that it cannot be a concreated quality. It 
 is simply the free self-determination of a being toward that 
 which is cognized as right from the moral conviction that he 
 
 ought so to determine himself. When a sinful creature is 
 6 
 
Inclusions of the Creative Act. 
 
 17 
 
 renewed, or restored, or brought up to a state of righteousness 
 by the Holy Ghost he becomes in character like his holy Lord 
 and Maker, and it is proper to speak of him as renewed in the 
 image of God. Had he forever obeyed the law of God he 
 would forever have stood in the moral image of his Maker; but 
 the image in which he was created is one of nature and attri¬ 
 butes, and one which never was and never can be lost. 
 
 The possibility of a created holiness has in it many implicates 
 which it is quite important to notice. 
 
 There is no evidence that Adam ever became righteous, or 
 that he ever did one virtuous or holy act; that he resisted a 
 single solicitation to evil is nowhere apparent The utmost that 
 can be said of him from the record is that he passed from the 
 hands of his Creator a good moral creature, and was approved 
 as such. It is unwarrantable to attach to this account any other 
 meaning than that he was well and properly made. He was 
 good as a moral being, that is, fitted to the ends of moral exist¬ 
 ence, in the same sense in which other things were good, as 
 adapted to the ends for which they were made. Thus complete 
 Adam was set up for the moral struggle upon which he was 
 immediately to enter, and in which he was to acquire a charac¬ 
 ter of holiness or unholiness as he should observe or violate 
 the law of righteousness imposed upon him. That he obeyed 
 for a single moment a single requirement is not in the history. 
 He soon fell into evil There was no strong, manly resistance. 
 The great angels may have won their crowns after long and 
 perilous struggles. We employ the word “struggle,” not to 
 imply that to an unsinning being the conflict of good and evil 
 has in it all the elements of difficulty that ensue upon a fallen 
 and degenerate condition, but that the winning and mainte¬ 
 nance of holy character—which consists in choosing the right 
 against the wrong until holy habit is formed—always implies ef¬ 
 fort, need of watchfulness, and resistance of alluring temptations. 
 
18 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 Creation imposes a nature; that is, it is an act of Omnipo¬ 
 tence by which a being or thing of a particular kind is called 
 into existence. All that it is or can be as a creature the Crea¬ 
 tor makes it to be, or capable of being, and the terms which 
 adequately describe what it is describe the nature imposed upon 
 it by its Maker, and nothing else. It can neither abrogate it¬ 
 self, nor improve itself, nor in any way change itself, except by 
 use or abuse of powers vested in it. The creative fiat fixes 
 its nature forever, and God only is forever its author and he 
 alone is responsible for it. The only way in which moral 
 quality can be involved with respect to a nature is the moral 
 quality of the act which originates it. The law of any and 
 every nature is nothing but the fixed and unchangeable will of 
 God, which forever determines what it shall be. If the law 
 were changed the change must be in the will of God. He who 
 makes nature is above it, but he only can reverse, alter, sus¬ 
 pend, or change any one of his own laws. The nature of a 
 moral creature is no exception. In this respect it does not 
 differ from other beings. Its nature is imposed and can never 
 become anything else. It has no more to do with its nature 
 than a tree, or an animal, or a stone has to do with its nature. 
 It is no more a subject of praise or blame for its nature than 
 these other creatures are, and it never can be. It has no power 
 to become responsible for its nature. Thus it appears that a 
 moral being, while free as to his acts—to the whole matter of 
 determining himself to certain ends in obedience to certain 
 known laws—is, as to his being, under the common law of 
 necessity which dominates all created existence. As to its 
 nature it has no power to renounce itself and become anything 
 else than it is. It is held in the omnipotent grasp of natural 
 law; that is, of a necessitating omnipotent will. So, then, here 
 is a being under two laws: one, as to one part of him, coercive, 
 inviolable, universal, self-executed; another, as to another part 
 
Inclusions of the Creative Act. 
 
 19 
 
 of him, commanded, required, but to the obedience of which he 
 is free and unconstrained, which he may renounce, disobey, 
 transgress: the first the law of things, the second the law for 
 persons; the first natural, the second moral; the first enforced 
 by power, the second commanded; the first the necessity of the 
 being under it, the second the conscious ought of the person 
 commanded, but which, however, may be disregarded, and the 
 obedience or disobedience to which, because it must be rendered 
 in freedom, constitutes the righteousness or unrighteousness of 
 the person obliged by it. 
 
 It is obvious, from the principles here laid down, that man 
 was a unique creature, and by the constitution he received was 
 ordained to be the artisan of his own destiny—he alone of all 
 earthly creatures having intrusted to him the power to break or 
 kee]3 his law, and so to reap the benefits of obedience or incur 
 the penalties of transgression: in the former case to become 
 good and holy in character, and raise himself to holy happiness; 
 in the latter to constitute himself sinful or evil, and guilty, and 
 come to the miseries of remorse and reprobation. 
 
 Two courses were open to him. To one he was commanded, 
 from the other prohibited; to either and alike free. Which, 
 he must determine for himself. The one was enforced by an 
 inward sense of obligation as well as external command. To it 
 his nature was attuned. He was made for it. He spontane- 
 ouslv felt its attraction and obligation. To the other he was 
 allured by temptation. Being ethical in his constitution, he 
 could not but be plied with the sense of the ought and the ought 
 not He must act in the presence and under the pressure of 
 this sense. His decision, freely rendered but not without influ¬ 
 ence, determines his character and destiny. 
 
 Such was man as he came from the hand of his Maker. It 
 was a great venture, and its future must vindicate its wisdom 
 
 and justice, not to say its benevolence. The outcome is known 
 
 6 
 
20 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 —not fully, but in part. Eternity must be added to time to 
 make the revelation complete. When its fuller light comes 
 much that is for the present in shadow will be cleared up. The 
 result of the hazard was that man broke his law and opened 
 the floodgate of sin, whose dreadful history has darkened the 
 universe. Before we enter upon that sad chapter and attempt 
 to find its meaning let us for a brief space inquire what prob¬ 
 ably might have been had the free choice been otherwise; that 
 is, had the primal man obeyed the law and made for himself a 
 holy character. 
 
 In raising the inquiry we do not forget that the answer must 
 be largely conjectural, but it need not be entirely so. There 
 are grounds for rational inductions, if not for absolute knowl¬ 
 edge, both as to what might have been and as to what certainly 
 would not have been. In treating of the actual case there are 
 so many false or unwarranted assumptions frequently intro¬ 
 duced, as to what would have been had the case been the reverse, 
 that the question becomes not merely interesting as a matter of 
 speculation, but to some degree important as a practical inquiry. 
 
 1. It is often assumed that had the Adam kept his law he 
 would, after a sufficient interval, have been confirmed in holy 
 character, and by reason of his relation to his posterity there 
 would have been born to him a holy seed, who likewise, having 
 had their probation in him, would have inherited his holy char¬ 
 acter and would have been confirmed in holiness, and so sin 
 would never have become a fact in human history. This is a 
 pure figment of imagination, and not merely without warrant 
 of the word of God but in violent contradiction of its ethical 
 principles, which will admit of no proxies. Under the divine 
 government every soul must account for itself, and its ethical 
 character must be determined by itself. The discussion of this 
 point will emerge when we come to consider, further on, the doc¬ 
 trine of hereditary guilt. 
 
Inclusions of the Creative Act. 
 
 21 
 
 The utmost that is warranted is this: Had the Adam by 
 obedience won a holy character he would, in due process, have 
 acquired permanence of holiness, through him sin would not 
 have blighted the world, and had children been born to him 
 they would have inherited an unblighted nature with which 
 to commence their probation. That any one of these would 
 have acted better than he did act there is no warrant for assum¬ 
 ing ; nothing in the nature of the case, nothing in the teachings 
 and intimations or implications of revelation. If they were 
 born into the inheritance of a moral nature they must meet its 
 conditions and be subject to its perils. That the holy influence 
 of holy parentage and undepraved natures would have modified 
 the conditions of their probation there is no room to doubt, but 
 that it would have prevented them from sinning is what no one 
 can, upon either scriptural or rational grounds, assert. The 
 probabilities are all the other way. The fact that the first of 
 the race sinned under the most favorable circumstances cer¬ 
 tainly is no assurance that among the millions of his descend¬ 
 ants some one might not have fallen, and so have introduced 
 the evil of which he became the first frightful example and 
 source. We will not undertake to conjecture what might have 
 been the possible outcome. 
 
 2. It is often assumed that had the Adam won and main¬ 
 tained a holy character he would have remained free from all 
 sufferings of every kind, and his race would have been born 
 into a heritage of complete and perfect happiness not possible 
 henceforth to be forfeited by any. 
 
 This, like the figment already noticed, is pure imagination, 
 and, like it, wholly unwarranted either by reason or revelation, 
 and is in violent contradiction of all the probabilities in the 
 case, and, in fact, subversive of all ethical laws. It is even in 
 proof that had the Adam and all the long line of his descend¬ 
 ants acquired each for himself a perfectly holy character, and 
 
22 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 maintained it permanently, it would not have secured to them 
 unsufferingness or complete happiness during their earthly ex¬ 
 istence or probationary life. 
 
 This imagination—and it is nothing else—rests on the gratui¬ 
 tous assumption that all suffering implies some sin, is penal in¬ 
 fliction ; that where there is no sin there can be no suffering. 
 Of this there is not a particle of proof. Against it is the solid 
 testimony of all the ages of life and consciousness in the moral 
 and unmoral races. There is a hind of suffering that is the off¬ 
 spring of sin , hut it is a peculiar hind and not inclusive of most 
 forms , though inclusive of the most terrible forms. This par¬ 
 ticular subject will be discussed at length in a future chapter. 
 
 For the present we dismiss it with the general remark that a 
 life of trial and conflict with temptation, involving self-denial, 
 and a life under the conditions of the animal economy, must 
 necessarily involve the possibility, and actuality, of more or less 
 suffering, both of the affectional and sensational nature. The 
 whole economy must be reversed, or conducted by constant 
 miracle, to suppose it otherwise. We do not, therefore, suppose 
 that innocence included unsufferingness, but only precluded 
 that suffering which is penal or retributive, sufferings inflicted 
 for willful violations of law. Unsufferingness, if it may be 
 reached, which is not certain, belongs to a state following trial, 
 and beyond the realm of animal being. 
 
 Would man have been perfectly happy had he not sinned? 
 Suffering is not happiness; it is certainly an abatement of 
 happiness; but it does not necessarily overthrow happiness. It 
 is possible to be happy and at the same time suffer. The un¬ 
 sinning could not suffer any unhappiness that has sin for its 
 cause. That all forms of mental trial or sufferings of the sym¬ 
 pathetic nature, as grief or sorrow, would have been unknown 
 to unsinning beings we have not found reason to believe. Some 
 degree of suffering may be not only beneficial as discipline, 
 
Inclusions of the Creative Act. 
 
 23 
 
 even to the innocent, but be inevitable to finite nature in a 
 period of probation. No one is able to affirm that limitations 
 are not always a form of suffering. It is enough for innocence 
 to claim and possess freedom from the woes of sin, and such 
 bliss as will sweeten whatever of sorrow or trial it may experi¬ 
 ence, without demanding a happiness which might hardly be 
 consistent with love. Who knows that even angels or God are 
 free from sorrow ? Who knows that a condition of the highest 
 possible happiness is not the possession of a nature that may 
 sorrow? Jesus, the Immaculate, wept. All the instincts and 
 sympathies of humanity must be obliterated to extinguish all 
 forms of suffering resulting from his nature in a universe where 
 suffering and sorrow are known to exist. There are forms of 
 suffering of which the sin of the sufferer is not the cause. Sup¬ 
 pose a translation, say, of Eve, leaving Adam and her children 
 still in the body. Would it heighten our idea of their nature 
 and character to suppose them insensate to the loss, their affec¬ 
 tions unpained by the bereavement? This only is reasonable: 
 penal suffering would be unknown in an unsinning universe. 
 
24 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 WHAT IS SIN? 
 
 What is sin? that is, what is its essence? There is no term 
 with which we are more familiar. It is not only one of the 
 earliest with which we become acquainted, but it is also one of 
 the most constant in use, even long before we can form any 
 definite idea of it; but while, like most abstract terms, we do 
 not early, or even ever, have a clear and full conception of its 
 full contents, there is no term, perhaps, which conveys a more 
 explicit idea. The common mind has no trouble with it. 
 Theologians and ethical writers in the interests of metaphysical 
 and theological theories have imported into it distracting and 
 confusing elements. Left to the scriptural and common sense 
 use, it is simple and never misleading. The common people 
 understand perfectly what it means; but it has come into such 
 relations to controverted and disputed points, and is otherwise 
 of such importance, that it becomes necessary to the general 
 interests of right thinking, and right action as well, that it should 
 be thoroughly searched, and, if possible, rescued from its present 
 perverted meanings. Perhaps no theological term is in greater 
 need of reexamination. No thoughtful person doubts that it 
 imports something that is real. It is not an idle term, a mere 
 sound, a mythos. It designates a reality of the profoundest sig¬ 
 nificance. We feel sure that it will not be even difficult to 
 point out its exact meaning and at the same time to establish 
 its reality and its universality as a fact and a conscious experi¬ 
 ence of man. It will aid to a clear understanding if we state 
 somewhat carefully what it is not; since it has been applied 
 falsely, and that has been called sin which is not sin and it has 
 been predicated of that which its name does not describe. 
 
 Dr. Shedd says: “The intrinsic and innermost characteristic 
 
What is Sin ? 
 
 of sin is its culpability or guilt. Guilt is desert of punishment. 
 Sin is damnable and punishable before the moral law. Conse¬ 
 quently sin must be the product of free agency. Necessitated sin is 
 a contradiction. The primary source of sin, therefore, is the 
 will, because this is the causative and originating faculty of the 
 soul. ‘Our first parents, being left to the freedom of their will, 
 fell.’ From this inmost center of the soul it passes into the 
 understanding, and through the entire man. The inclinations 
 and affections having become contrary to what they were by 
 creation, the understanding is darkened and the conscience is 
 benumbed.’' * 
 
 This statement could hardly be improved. The last clause 
 points to the depravity which ensues as eff ect of sin which origi¬ 
 nates it, and is as to guilt complete, in the act of the will. This 
 is precisely the view herein advocated. He correctly denies 
 that sin is predicable off the understanding or of the sensuous 
 nature. Through the sensuous nature temptation may arise, 
 but sin must emanate from the will. In a very elaborate dis¬ 
 cussion extending over many pages f Dr. Shedd attempts to 
 show that the first sin consisted in the self-determined inclina¬ 
 tion to sin; that this act was “ voluntary,” but not “ volitionary.” 
 The fall, or sin, had, then, really taken place before the sinful 
 act of transgression had taken place. This subject will be more 
 fully treated when we come to consider so-called original sin, 
 but we call attention to it here. “Voluntary,” but not “voli¬ 
 tionary,” he explains: “It was will as desire, not will as volition; 
 will as inclining, not will as choosing. The fall was the transi¬ 
 tion from one form of self-motion to another form of self-motion, 
 and not the beginning of self-motion for the first time. ... It 
 was inclining away from one ultimate end to another, not choos¬ 
 ing between two ultimate ends to neither of which was there 
 any existing inclination. Adam, before he fell, was self-deter- 
 
 * Dogmatic Theology , toI. ii, p. 162. f Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 169-189. 
 
 3 6 
 
26 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 mined to God and goodness. Consequently in the garden of 
 Eden he had not to choose either good or evil, as two contraries 
 to both of which his will was indifferent By creation he was 
 positively inclined to good. The question put before him in 
 < the probation and temptation was whether he would remain 
 holy, as he was, or begin a new inclination to evil; not whether, 
 having no inclination at all, he would choose either good or evil. 
 His act of apostasy, if it occurred, was to be an act of new and 
 wrong desire in place of the existing holy desire; of new and 
 wrong self-determination in place of the existing and right self- 
 determination. The fall was a change of inclination, not the 
 exertion of a volition.”* 
 
 He makes a distinction between the desire or inclination—the 
 terms are used interchangeably—to partake of the fruit and the 
 desire to become wise, and excludes sin from the former and 
 predicates it of the latter. This is his language: “The innocent 
 physical desire of man’s unfallen nature for the tree of knowl¬ 
 edge ; the rising of sinful moral desire for it. 1 The woman saw 
 that the tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to the 
 eyes.’ This denotes merely the correlation between the created 
 qualities of man’s physical constitution and this particular 
 product of God’s creation. It was not wrong, but perfectly in¬ 
 nocent, to perceive that the tree was good for food , and to desire 
 it as such, and to be pleasantly affected by the beauty of it. 
 This divinely established relation between man’s physical nature 
 and the tree of knowledge constituted the subjective basis for 
 the temptation. Had the tree been repulsive to the sight and 
 taste its fruit would not have been employed by Satan as a 
 means of solicitation. ... But the account in Gen. iii, 6, fur¬ 
 ther adds that the tree of knowledge came to be for Eve a tree 
 £ to be desired, to make one wise .’ The sinful moral desire here 
 mentioned is different from the innocent physical desire spoken 
 
 * Dogmatic Theology, vol. ii, pp. 172, 173. 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 27 
 
 of in the preceding part of the verse. It was a mental hanker¬ 
 ing after the fruit as imparting to the eater a hind of knowledge 
 which God had forbidden to man . This is something new, and 
 different from the innocent craving belonging to man’s sensuous 
 nature. To desire the fruit simply as food, and as a beautiful 
 object, was innocent. But to desire a knowledge of good and 
 evil such as the ‘ gods ’ had, which the eating of it would com¬ 
 municate, was rebellious and wicked, because this kind of 
 knowledge had been prohibited. . . . The self-willed origination 
 and rising of this desire for a knowledge that God had forbidden 
 was the fall of Eve.” * 
 
 According to this theory desire is a voluntary act, that is, 
 an act of the will; and sin is predicable of this act. It does not 
 escape, nor does the author desire to escape, from the position 
 that sin originates in the act of the will. But we must dissent 
 from his position that desire is an act of the will, but not a 
 choice of the will. Desire is, indeed, not a choice, and there¬ 
 fore not an act of the will. Desire is a feeling which arises in 
 the soul wholly irrespective of the will; a feeling which is 
 wholly involuntary when an object is presented which for any 
 reason is agreeable. It is simply a feeling awakened by the 
 object. The feeling inclines the person to the object wholly 
 without the will. It moves, or is motive to the will to act, but 
 is not a form of will action; It is an action on the will, but not 
 of the will It can have no moral quality until it is taken up 
 by the will and results in a free choice or rejection. It draws; 
 the soul feels the drawing because it is its nature to do so. If 
 the discovery be made that the drawing is to an object that is 
 wrong the feeling of the drawing is not itself wrong, for it is 
 involuntary; but if the soul yield to the drawing when it per¬ 
 ceives that it is wrong, that is, that the thing proposed is wrong, 
 then sin is committed. It is the free yielding that is sin. The 
 
 * Dogmatic Theology, pp. 176-178. 
 
28 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 desire or inclination is not an act of the will, but the yielding 
 is. The will does not create the desire or inclination to the 
 object. That arises from the constitution of the soul itself—is 
 natural and inevitable. It is the necessary antecedent of moral 
 decision. The soul could not act volitionally without it. The 
 voluntary and the moral actions begin after the desire is awak¬ 
 ened, and not until then. The will acts on the desire, accept¬ 
 ing it or rejecting it. 
 
 This idea runs through all Calvinistic theology from Augus¬ 
 tine down, and comes to great prominence in Edwards on Origi¬ 
 nal Sin, and also in his treatment of the Will. It is designed 
 to locate sin in the disposition, or inclination, or desire, back of 
 every volitionary act, but to connect it with the will by identi¬ 
 fying these states with the will. It is invented for the purpose 
 of making an inherited sinful inclination or disposition to sin 
 sin, and so prove the guilt of all who by nature are sinfully in¬ 
 clined. Edwards makes the inherited sinful disposition the 
 essence of sin. To the view he presents we have the following 
 objections: 
 
 First. It teaches that the holy Adam, as he asserts he was, 
 fell into sin by creating in himself an inclination to sin before 
 he committed any sinful act. What does this mean ? Can it 
 mean any other thing than this, that he simply determined to 
 do what he was forbidden to do ? If so, what was that other 
 thing ? Is it that he determined to be inclined or to desire to 
 break the law, created in himself the inclination to disobey? 
 How did he do this—by an act of will, or without an act of will ? 
 If by an act of will, was then the act of will his sin, or was the 
 effect of it his sin? He declares that the inclination is volun- 
 tary, but is not a choice. What, then, was it ? Does the will 
 act without choosing to act? and is such an act sin? 
 
 My second objection is to his statement that his sin consisted 
 in the desire to become wise, which desire was forbidden. 
 
 6' - J. V 
 
 I 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 29 
 
 I deny that the desire to become wise was the thing forbid¬ 
 den. There is not a hint of that in the account or anywhere in 
 the word of God. The thing forbidden, and the only thing, 
 was the taking of the fruit of the tree of knowledge and the 
 eating it. The desire for it was not the thing forbidden. On 
 that subject the law made no deliverance. It was calculated to 
 create desire. It is admitted by Dr. Shedd himself that the 
 desire was innocent and natural, but he brings forward as 
 ground of guilt, not the disobedience to the command, nor the 
 desire of the palate, but the desire for forbidden wisdom. But 
 forbidden wisdom is neither mentioned nor implied in the case. 
 If the desire created by adaptation of the fruit to gratify the 
 palate was innocent, because natural, the desire for knowledge 
 was no less natural. If the physical organism was created 
 with tastes which the fruit would awaken and solicit, the mind 
 was also created with faculties and desires for knowledge. 
 
 My third objection is that sin is not predicable of desires 
 simply as such, either before or since the fall, but desires be¬ 
 come provocative of sin when they are indulged. “ Man is 
 tempted when he is drawn away of his lusts [desires] and en¬ 
 ticed, and lust [desire] when it hath conceived [when it has 
 induced consent of the will] bringeth forth sin.” 
 
 Desire for the forbidden fruit, whether viewed as palatable or 
 as source of knowledge, was natural to Adam, sprang from his 
 physical and mental constitution, and was not forbidden; was 
 innocent. The prohibition was of the indulgence of the desire. 
 The restraint was on taking and eating. The sin was voluntary 
 violation of that law, and that only was sin; and the same is 
 true in every case. 
 
 Where there is a law forbidding anv act, to refrain from the 
 act is duty, however strong the temptation. The temptation 
 involves no sin, however strong the inducement. If the induce¬ 
 ment is absolutely irresistible, compliance involves no sin, since 
 
 s- 6 
 
 i 
 
 
30 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 impossibilities can never be required. When the will begins 
 to dally with, forbidden things, then is the beginning of consent 
 Any yielding tends to compliance. When sin has been com¬ 
 mitted the moral nature is depraved, and inclination, or desire, 
 or disposition to continue in sin is born, and tends to perma- - 
 nence. These are the fruits of sin. 
 
 Adam’s sin was the sin of disobedience to the divine com¬ 
 mand. It did not consist in his first creating an inclination to 
 it, but it did consist in yielding to solicitation addressed to his 
 physical and moral nature, which moved him with desire; 
 which desire was innocent and natural, but compliance with 
 which was forbidden. The sin was possible, but not necessary. 
 It was a free act, immoral, but not unnatural. By nature and 
 constitution he was temptable, and by power of self-determina¬ 
 tion he was able either to yield or resist. He yielded and fell. 
 The yielding was his sin. The yielding preceded the external 
 act, and was the determination of the will to commit the exter¬ 
 nal act. 
 
 The whole history of the case is as follows: Adam was cre¬ 
 ated with a nature such that, in certain conditions, it would be 
 moved with involuntary feelings of desire and inclination; that 
 is, on occasions objects and courses of possible action would 
 present themselves to him which for one cause or another would 
 awaken inclination or desire in him. These states would arise 
 spontaneously and inevitably by a law of his nature, and with¬ 
 out any antecedent or concurrent voluntary action on his part. 
 When such purely involuntary desires or inclinations arose in 
 him he would be moved by them to act, as a will, either favor¬ 
 ably or unfavorably with respect to them, freely determining 
 which. The awakened desire, while not subject to his will as 
 to its origin, but arising from his constitution, would not act on 
 him as a necessitating force, constraining his will, but would 
 act on him as a motive to induce a will action on his part, and 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 31 
 
 would necessitate him to act either for or against, but would 
 leave him free as to which. Suppose Adam had felt the desire 
 but had resisted it because the thing desired was forbidden; 
 would he have been guilty? If not, then the desire was not sin. 
 
 But, then, it is said, Is not man born in sin? If by the 
 question is meant, Is not man a sinner as soon as born, or 
 before he was born? we answer unhesitatingly, No. The thing 
 is impossible. No being can be a sinner until he has personally 
 made himself such by a free personal transgression of law. 
 
 The discussion upon which we immediately enter will bring 
 under examination all the theories with respect to the state in 
 which man is born. 
 
 We sum up the conclusions already reached, and which we 
 hold on the subject of sin: 
 
 First. Sin is in. every case an act of transgression, and there 
 is no sin possible without an act of transgression. 
 
 Second. The transgression which constitutes the person a 
 sinner must be his own personal act. 
 
 Third. A person cannot sin except as he is free in his act; 
 that is, able to the opposite. 
 
 Fourth. The person cannot sin if the law which he trans¬ 
 gresses be not known to him in such measure that he is con¬ 
 scious of wrong in the act committed, or in the determination 
 of himself thereto. 
 
 Fifth. The sinful act is completed when the person wills its 
 performance. 
 
 Sin is not an entity or substance of any kind, material or 
 immaterial, which is conveyed from one being to another by 
 generation, or in any other way. It has no existence as a thing 
 in itself, as a lump or atom of matter, or as a spirit has. 
 There are substances that are harmful, poisonous, destructive 
 of life, whose touch is death; but sin is not predicable of any 
 such substance, simple or compound, natural or artificial. It is 
 
32 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 not a quality or attribute of any substance, as being bom with, 
 it, or concrete in it by a creative act; is not a product of the 
 power which gives existence to things or posited in things.* 
 No collocation of substance, as such, can produce it. It is not 
 an effect of any natural agent or force inherent in any substance 
 or exerted by any natural agent. Nor is it the quality of any 
 force, or the effect of any force exerted by a natural agent, 
 however deadly or destructive that force may be. It is not a 
 nature or state conferred, or imposed, either by the original 
 act of creation or by propagation. The universe is stored with 
 forces potential of ruin and mischief to life: deadly vapors, 
 noxious poisons, elemental disturbances inherent in the system, 
 storms, earthquakes, and innumerable potencies posited and 
 exerted by the agency which built it. Of none of these can sin 
 be predicated, nor can they be ascribed as effects of sin. Sin is 
 not an inherent of creation, that is, of the universe as created. 
 It has no place in, and can be predicated of nothing of, the 
 original system. It is not a necessitated effect of any force 
 of mind or matter, or the product of any efficient purpose 
 or decree of Grod. Much is said of inherited sin, of transmitted 
 sin, of sin of nature, of a nature that is sin. The phrases are 
 misleading and incongruous. The world is full of sin, but it 
 consists in none of the things described above. 
 
 Sin is predicable of only one being on the earth, and that is 
 man. It is universally predicable of man. There is no man 
 of whom it is not predicable. But, even of man, it is no part 
 of the essence of his being. It is not a quality born in him, or 
 imparted to him by creation. It is an acquisition not by the 
 addition of some foreign substance or infusion. It is not of 
 man by any necessitation of his nature. It is an intruder, and 
 might not have been. There is a long-time popular theologiz¬ 
 ing and carefully prepared teaching that will not accept some 
 * See Shedd, Dogmatic Theology , vol. ii, p. 165. 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 33 
 
 of these negative statements, but their vindication will appear 
 as the discussion progresses. 
 
 If sin be not any of the things above described—not a sub¬ 
 stance, or quality of any substance, or force exerted by any 
 substance, or potency of some kind in any substance; not a 
 nature of some thing, or effect which flows from some natural 
 force of some thing—and if it be something which has reality, 
 and which is predicable of man only, and which is not predi¬ 
 cable of something in man as a part of his substance or in¬ 
 herence of his nature, what, then, is it ? 
 
 We answer to this question : Sin is something which the indi¬ 
 vidual man does ; it is an act. There is no sin where there is not a 
 sinner ; and there is no sinner where there is not an act com¬ 
 mitted hy him which constitutes him a sinner. 
 
 By an act we do not mean merely or chiefly an external or 
 physical act, but an internal, personal act, an act of the soul 
 itself, in determining itself by free choice to that which it knows 
 to be in violation of law. The sin consists in this primary act 
 of the will. Any external act of disobedience represents the 
 primary soul act, and derives its heinousness from that. The 
 sin has its essence and complete vileness even before the exter¬ 
 nal act exists, and even, possibly, when it does not exist at all 
 —from want of opportunity or because of physical hindrance. 
 Thus the sin is in every case an act of a free being in deter¬ 
 mining himself to evil. There is, and can be, no sin when 
 these conditions do not exist. 
 
 Webster gives a logical definition which could scarcely be 
 improved. He says: “Sin is the transgression of the law of 
 God; disobedience of the divine command; any violation of 
 God's will, either in purpose or conduct.” Even those who, 
 driven by the exigencies of false theologizing, seek to find sin in 
 nature, constantly show and assert that actual sin is willful dis¬ 
 obedience. This will appear in further stages of the discussion. 
 
34 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 “ Whosoever committetli sin transgressed also the law; for 
 sin is the transgression of the law.” * 
 
 “ All unrighteousness is sin.” f 
 
 “ Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, any 
 law of Grod given as a rule to the reasonable creature.” J 
 
 By a reference to Cruden's Concordance , in his preliminary 
 remarks on the word sin, and in Knapp’s Theology , under the 
 heading u Scriptural Terms for Sin,” the reader may find in 
 the most condensed form the various senses in which the word 
 sin occurs in the Scriptures. 
 
 We have introduced here three definitions of the term sin: 
 two of them inspired ; the other uninspired, but of the highest 
 human authority. Out of these we proceed to raise a more 
 extended discussion of the nature of sin. 
 
 According to each of the above definitions, and every con¬ 
 ceivable modification of them, sin has essential relations to law. 
 To know what sin is, and when and where to predicate it, it is 
 indispensable that we should know what that law is to which it 
 is related ; for how can we find the breach of the law without 
 perceiving the requirement that is broken, the law itself? It 
 is by the comparison of that which is alleged as transgression 
 with the exact law, requirement, transgressed, that the fact of 
 transgression is ascertained. As when there is no law. there is 
 no transgression, so when the law is unknown it is impossible 
 to predicate the fact of transgression—the fact of sin. 
 
 What, then, is that law of which sin is the transgression? 
 
 There is a realm of things, comprising inanimate being and 
 creatures that have life. Pervasive of this realm is an estab¬ 
 lished and necessary order, called the law of nature. Within 
 this domain transgression is impossible. Each creature, under 
 stress of irresistible force, fulfills the law of its existence. Sin 
 cannot, therefore, be transgression of this law. Speaking of 
 * 1 John iii, 4. f 1 John v, 1*7. \ Assembly's Larger Catechism. 
 
What is Sm ? 
 
 35 
 
 this law, Ullmann tersely says: “ This law of nature is not, 
 however, a power acting from without; but it is the nature and 
 constitution of the things themselves making itself irresisti¬ 
 bly felt. Therefore here the law is immediately one with its 
 fulfillment; nor can there ever be a contradiction between the 
 two. Hence, also, when apparent deviations from the ordinary 
 course occur, when dangerous and destructive agencies enter in, 
 ice cannot speak of imputation or of guilt in this province, because 
 nature does only what she cannot help doing.” * 
 
 We search in vain in the domain of nature for factual or 
 possible sin, since there is no transgressing power within the 
 sphere of nature. 
 
 There is projected upon, and among, things, or the system of 
 nature, a realm of spirits—beings possessed of intelligence and 
 will. Here, as there, law reigns, but it is not the law of force; 
 there is order, but it is not the order of necessity. 
 
 Bushnell, in his masterly work, Nature and the Supernatural, 
 in the second chapter, with great clearness and marvelous 
 beautv, draws this distinction. In nature the order is that of 
 causation; in the supernatural, or among powers, minds, the 
 order is that of freedom. 
 
 Ullmann expresses it so clearly that it could scarcely be im¬ 
 proved: “On the basis of the life of nature,” he says, “there 
 rises up a moral life—an ethical kingdom within the kingdom 
 of nature. Of necessity an order must reign within this king¬ 
 dom too. It were folly, indeed, to suppose that that most 
 wonderful cosmical arrangement existed for no other purpose 
 than to serve as a scene over which caprice might bear sway; 
 that preparations so pregnant with design should issue in results 
 void of reason and purpose. But the order to be established 
 here will undoubtedly differ radically from the order of nature. 
 Thus, moral personality (even although situated in the midst 
 
 * Sinlessness of Jesus, p. 16. 
 
 6 
 
36 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 of the course of nature) still possesses a full consciousness that 
 it is not ruled thereby, nor can be, but that it has in it a prin¬ 
 ciple which is determined by a power beyond and above nature. 
 And this principle is free will. The order which rules in this 
 domain is free, like that will itself; it is not established by 
 force.”* 
 
 The law here, as there, is the expression of the will of the 
 infinite Sovereign and is obligatory, but as duty, and the crea¬ 
 ture, lifted out of the plane of nature, is endowed with a power 
 of recusancy and disobedience. The ought is upon him, but it 
 is without coercive force. He may transgress this law, and his 
 transgression will be sin. At this point, and this only, sin is 
 possible. 
 
 “ He is not independent of nature in the sense of being sepa¬ 
 rated from it in his action, but he is in it, environed by it, act¬ 
 ing through it, partially sovereign over it, always sovereign as 
 regards his self-determination, and only not completely sovereign 
 as regards executing all that he wills in it In certain parts or 
 departments of the soul itself, such as memory, appetite, passion, 
 attention, imagination, association, disposition, the will-power 
 in him is held in contact, so to speak, with conditions and quali¬ 
 ties that are determined partly by laws of cause and effect; for 
 these faculties are partly governed by their own laws, and 
 partly submitted to his governing will by their own laws; so 
 that when he will exercise any control over them, or turn them 
 about to serve his purpose, he can do it, in a qualified sense 
 and degree, by operating through their laws. As far as they 
 are concerned he is pure nature, and he is only a power supe¬ 
 rior to cause and effect at the particular point of volition where 
 his liberty culminates, and where the administration he is to 
 maintain over his whole nature centers. ”f 
 
 * Sinlessness of Jesus, pp. 16, 17. 
 
 f Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, p. 61. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 37 
 
 Now, it is not only an interesting but also an important fact 
 that the two realms, of nature and the supernatural, in which 
 the opposite laws of causation and freedom obtain, do not 
 simply lie in immediate neighborhood of each other, but are 
 blended and interwoven; the one interpenetrating the other so 
 that the same creature is partly in the one and partly in the 
 other; in one paid of him under the common law of nature - 
 necessity , in the other absolutely free and self-determining. Pre¬ 
 cisely where the line is drawn which defines the domain of the 
 natural and of the supernatural is obviously.a most important 
 question, as fixing precisely the sphere of moral law, and so 
 determining the limits within which sin may possibly occur. 
 
 Man is a creature possessed of soul and body; or, more prop¬ 
 erly, man is a soul subsisting in a body and acting in and 
 through it as an instrument. These are separable in idea, and 
 may be conceived of as existing apart. If we suppose the soul 
 absent we have a creature left, a physical organism. In form 
 only it would differ from other mere animals. If it were possi¬ 
 ble for that part of man to survive in the absence of the soul it 
 would be an animal, pure and simple. Morality could no more 
 be predicated of it than of any other brute. Existing in the 
 plane of natural law, or sheer causation, it becomes wholly irre¬ 
 sponsible. So much of our nature, then, must be excluded 
 from the moral sphere; of so much neither sin nor its opposite 
 can be predicated. If we suppose, now, the soul added, at the 
 same moment that we have the real man in the added quantity 
 we have also a new and different kind of being, who, by the 
 possession of certain qualities—intelligence, conscience, and 
 will—passes out from the dominion of causation into the plane 
 of the supernatural, or freedom. We have a creature that rises 
 above the condition of a thing that is under the law of neces¬ 
 sity into the dignity of a person that acts from freedom, keep¬ 
 ing or breaking law as he wills. The first, or animal part, 
 
 ^ 6 
 
38 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 being under the law of necessity, cannot transgress; the second 
 part, under the law of freedom, may. Here, then, is the sole 
 sphere of the moral—in the soul. Sin or its opposite, if they 
 exist at all, must be predicated of this part of man—which is, 
 indeed, man; here it must have its seat and throne; and its 
 existence must, also, be found in that which is a result of this 
 being exercising its powers in a free way. That in the soul, 
 even, which exists as a nature, determined by causation, will be 
 as much out of the sphere of moral law as any other nature, 
 since moral law is the law which obtains over a free being in 
 that wherein he is free, and not in that wherein he is under the 
 sway of the law of necessity. 
 
 Let us dwell for a little in the consideration of this important 
 point: Precisely what in the soul is to be accounted as under 
 the sway of moral law ? 
 
 It will aid us here if we keep in mind the radical distinction 
 between natural and moral law; or, at least, precisely what we 
 mean by moral law. 
 
 The phrase “moral law” has a well-defined sense. It signi¬ 
 fies simply the law of Grod for the government of free beings in 
 the matters in which they are free. Natural law is that system 
 of order which is ordained for the government of things, and 
 which is enforced by a power ab extra. Moral law is that sys¬ 
 tem of order which is ordained for the government of wills, and 
 which is not enforced by power but by moral considerations, 
 and which the free being ought to obey, but may or may not. 
 We are not predicating of the contents of moral law, but of that 
 which makes it moral law—in the absence of which it is not 
 moral law. The source of the two laws in the diverse realms is 
 the same; they differ but in kind. “ The plant, the animal, or 
 the star did not choose for itself its law, but received it from 
 that creative Power which gave it being; and it is because that 
 Power is Omnipotence that the laws it has implanted work with 
 
 l 
 
What is Sm? 
 
 39 
 
 undeviating certainty. The same holds true of man and his 
 order of life, only with this difference, that in his case that 
 order is one of liberty, because it is a moral order.”* 
 
 “We could not distinguish the moral law from the law of 
 nature, not even in its most general fundamental outlines, with¬ 
 out fixing its exclusive relation to self-determining existences. 
 Accordingly, no one thinks of applying the notion of the trans¬ 
 gression of law to animals; and even to children we cannot 
 apply the notion so long as the will and, therewith, the moral 
 law exist in them only jootentic t, at any rate only in a potential 
 sense. Just as little is one able to violate the moral law if, 
 after the exercise of his conscious self-determination, its constant 
 connection be again entirely broken, though by some physical 
 cause. We say by some physical cause, for if it be only the 
 unrestrained power of the lower impulses which have for a 
 moment broken loose the validity of the requirement of the law 
 would not in the least be lessened. For the will ought to be 
 master in its own house, and the vehemence of the lower im¬ 
 pulses is just that which ought not to be. But in the presence 
 of the power of natural necessity the imperative of the law has 
 no significance. It severs that connection in insanity, as well 
 as also in cases of fever, although only in its highest stages, 
 when delirium is present. In such conditions the concealed 
 evil of the heart may be revealed, but sin cannot be com¬ 
 mitted.” f 
 
 The point raised here is one of very great moment If moral 
 law relate alone to the conduct of free beings, and if sin consist 
 in its transgression, and that alone, then all sin must consist 
 simply in action. If the idea of moral law be wider, as com¬ 
 prehending states of the soul existing antecedent to action, sin 
 may be predicated when no action is supposed. This is the 
 
 * Sinlessness of Jesus, p. 24. 
 
 f Muller, Christian Doctrine of Sin , vol. i, pp. 39, 40. 
 
40 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 precise point around, which, a most exasperated controversy has 
 raged for ages. It is the point to which, more than any other, 
 attention should be given in attempting to solve the most diffi¬ 
 cult problem in theology. It has never been overlooked by 
 great writers in theology, but alone in the invaluable treatises 
 of Ullmann and Muller has it been allowed its real moment. 
 In the discussion of the several theories of original sin it 
 will recur, but a distinct examination of the point here may 
 aid us. 
 
 Those who hold that the moral law is limited to the simple 
 matter of the conduct of free beings in the cases wherein they 
 are free, and is nothing other than an ordination of the divine 
 will prescribing authoritatively what they ought to do or not do, 
 do not understand it to be a rule touching only outward action, or 
 concrete action. They believe, rather, that the law claim pene¬ 
 trates to the innermost sanctuary of personality; that it lays its 
 imperative upon the central power of the soul, the will, and 
 requires that its most primary movements should be according 
 to its commands; that obedience or transgression is complete in 
 the will act, without external expression. 
 
 But here they stop, holding it to be impossible to pursue 
 the idea of transgression to a deeper genesis than that of the 
 primary will movement; to find it back in an antecedent nature , 
 more primitive than moral action. They do not deny the exist¬ 
 ence of a back-lying moral nature—even a fallen and degen¬ 
 erate nature—but they deny that a nature, as such, can be a 
 transgressor, or morally culpable, or that a person can be held 
 for the nature in which, without personal agency, he finds him¬ 
 self swathed. They hold that moral law relates wholly to per¬ 
 sons, and is exhausted in defining what they must do, or be as 
 the result of their doing, and deny that so far as it is their law 
 or imperative it can have any relation to the nature which they 
 receive, logically before, but really together with, personality. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 41 
 
 The person, they hold, cannot be amenable to law until he 
 exists as a person, and so cannot be a transgressor prior to that 
 time, or in the nature which he receives, or any condition of 
 that nature, of which he is in no sense cause; but a nature or 
 being must be supposed as antecedent to personality or contem¬ 
 poraneous with it; and as it is wholly given, without any act 
 of the creature who receives it, it cannot bring with it sin to the 
 passive recipient Once more, they hold that, as moral law is 
 a law to free beings in the matters in which they are free, it 
 cannot relate to what is given in their nature, as in that they 
 are not free ; it supposes them to be free, and under law, before 
 thev can be transgressors. 
 
 TVe have seen already by extracts from Ullmann and Muller 
 that this is their view; and yet, as will be seen directly, they 
 seem to contradict this. 
 
 The same remark is true of Professor Shedd and the great 
 Edwards, as will appear further on when we come to examine 
 their theories of original sin. 
 
 In the following extract it will appear that Ullmann sought a 
 
 deeper seat of sin than separate acts of the will. He says: 
 
 “Everything depends on the relation of man to the law and its 
 
 principle, on the one hand in his inmost affections, and on the 
 
 other in the sum total of those outward actions which result 
 
 therefrom. And the relation can, in reality, be only one of two 
 
 kinds; either it is a relation of self-renunciation and obedience 
 
 or it is a relation of resistance and disobedience. All good 
 
 springs from the former, all evil from the latter. But the one 
 
 as well as the other is a fundamental fact of the moral life, which 
 
 must exist before the separate acts of will and separate deeds of 
 
 good can in either case take place. In this connection sin is 
 
 defined as disobedience. The disobedience is not, however, 
 
 merely in the external action and against the external precept; 
 
 it is disobedience in the heart and against the whole law, and 
 4 6 
 
f 
 
 42 Studies in Theology. 
 
 it is a spirit of disobedience by virtue of an internal opposi¬ 
 tion to the principle expressed by the moral law.” * 
 
 The reader, by referring to the pages immediately following 
 those from which we quote in the above work, will find the 
 * author’s views more fully drawn out. It is obvious that he con¬ 
 ceives a sin existing anterior to every separate act of will, 
 in what he calls a more fundamental act of the soul, in its resist¬ 
 ance of God—withdrawal from him, and acceptance of selfish¬ 
 ness as the law of life. 
 
 But it is not less obvious, and is what he by necessity con¬ 
 stantly admits, that the sin which antedates each separate act of 
 will was itself an act of the jDerson—the act of renouncing God 
 and enthroning self; an act so fundamental as to be the parent 
 of all after action. He does not escape from his own many-times- 
 repeated position—that sin is an act of recusancy of the will 
 against law, and not a quality of a nature prior to action. 
 
 Muller treats this subject exhaustively, and must be read to 
 get any just idea of the vast learning and masterly ability with 
 which he conducts the discussion. He is many times obscure, 
 and by as sluggish minds as the writer of these reflections needs 
 to be read many times and with great patience. If—as he does 
 —Miiller finds a sinfulness infecting humanity prior to action, 
 and lying back in the nature itself, it is not, as it seems to be, 
 a contradiction of the teachings already quoted, that all sin is a 
 transgression of law by a will action, since he holds that the 
 sin which attaches to souls when born, and anterior to any act 
 as human persons, is not properly a sin of nature, but a sin 
 which transpired in a former state of existence. Upon this 
 ground alone (that of the prior existence of souls) does he allow 
 of sin in the just-bom being. 
 
 Indeed, if we correctly understand this great author, his la¬ 
 bored discussion is intended to set forth the following points: 
 
 * Sinlessness of Jesus, pp. 22, 23. 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 43 
 
 First, that moral law is law for the government of moral beings 
 in matters of action—action including in it the idea of primary 
 decisions of the will, all subsequent separate choices, and that 
 state of the soul called disposition, or habitual tendence, which 
 arises from a prior fundamental act of the will. His idea of 
 will is thus expressed: “In the degree in which our spirit is 
 able by conscious self-determination to determine its own con¬ 
 dition and its influence over other beings, in so far it is will. 
 The mere moment of self-determination does not suffice for the 
 notion of will, for this in a certain sense we must ascribe to 
 unintelligent creatures, to the organic life of nature, by virtue 
 of its development from its own principle. Self-determination 
 only thereby becomes will, by its being a conscious determina¬ 
 tion ; that its subject (the subject of \ self-determination or the 
 self-determining subject) is able previously to present to its 
 mind that which it brings to reality by its self-determination. 
 Accordingly, there is not immediately expressed in that deeper 
 truth of our nature being (Sein), that which is, but the obligation 
 of being (Seinsollen), that which ought to be, more strictly 
 speaking, an obligation (sollen) which is determined to pass 
 into being, but which, so long as it is in the shape of transition 
 into being, consequently not yet being, does not cease to appear 
 in our consciousness as obligation, as the rule of life, as a neces¬ 
 sity [imperative] determining our will.”* 
 
 “This practical truth, absolutely regulating, and yet not 
 coercing the will, is the moral law .' 1 f 
 
 These are designed to be strictly scientific statements, and are 
 of value as laying down these fundamental positions: first, that 
 the will is the self-conscious, self-determining power; second, 
 that it presents to the mind beforehand that which it deter¬ 
 mines to bring into actuality, and so is self-conscious of what 
 it is going to do; third, that the moral law is present with it as 
 * Christian Doctrine of Sin , vol. i, p. 28. f Ibid., p. 29. 
 
 6 
 
44 
 
 Studies in Theolog-y. 
 
 ' an imperative, imparting the sense of obligation before and 
 during the process of its action. So that, in case of transgres¬ 
 sion, sin arises as a premeditated violation of the moral law. 
 
 I subjoin here a number of definitions intended to be as 
 nearly scientific as possible, and from authors of the most or¬ 
 thodox type, on the particular subject set forth in their defini¬ 
 tions : 
 
 “ 1. As to its formal aspect, sin is any want of conformity 
 with or transgression of the law of God. It is anomic unlaw¬ 
 fulness. 
 
 “ 2. As to its essential nature, it is moral unlikeness to God— 
 or, rather, the reverse of his likeness. 
 
 “ 3. Its origin is, in every instance, traceable to the criminal 
 apostasy of a nature made in God's image, and clothed with 
 freedom to continue in that likeness or depart from it. 
 
 “4. As to its habitual form, it is a depraved principle in the 
 nature; hostile to all good, and prone to all evil; enmity to 
 God and his law; and delighting in whatever is hateful to 
 him. 
 
 “5. In action it is transgression, actively assailing alike the 
 authority of God and the rights of fellow-creatures.' 5 * 
 
 “We regard the will as the seat of all virtue and wee, . t . 
 The morality in the will begins at the place at which conscience 
 interposes. ... In short, human virtue consists in the will 
 obeying the conscience as its law appointed by God, and vice 
 consists in the will setting the law of conscience aside and pre¬ 
 ferring some other good to what conscience declares to be the 
 morally good.”f 
 
 “We would now affirm the all-important principle that noth¬ 
 ing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary. We have 
 often been struck with writers upon moral science, in that, even 
 
 * Elohim Revealed , p. 259. 
 f McCosh, Divine Government , pp. 309, 310. 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 45 
 
 though professing a view or an argument altogether elemen¬ 
 tary, they seldom come formally or ostensibly forth with this 
 principle.” “We think it for the advantage of our own sub¬ 
 ject that it should receive a different treatment; that it should 
 be announced, and with somewhat of the pomp and circum¬ 
 stance, too, of a first principle, and have the distinction given 
 to it, not of a tacit, but of a proclaimed, axiom in moral sci¬ 
 ence.” This passage from Chalmers is quoted by McCosh as 
 his own view.* 
 
 “Bv sin either that condition of the nature of a man, from 
 which, as from a constant source, the actual opposition of his 
 life to the divine law proceeds; or, we understand by it, this 
 opposition to the divine law itself. The former of these is 
 habitual sinfulness, the latter actual sin. In life the two are 
 inseparably connected; habitual sinfulness expresses itself in 
 actual sin; actual sin springs from habitual sinfulness, conse¬ 
 quently for both state and act we use a common expres¬ 
 sion.” f 
 
 “ This subjective moment is immediately given in the very 
 nature of sin. But it characterizes as sin whatever in the life 
 of a self-determining being is found contradictory to the moral 
 law, without troubling itself as to the origin of such an element 
 in the individual, or about its particular relation to the moral 
 consciousness of its subject, or the stage of its development 
 and degree of its momentary activity. . . . 
 
 “ In order, however, to determine more fully the relation of evil 
 to the moral law we have still a threefold question to answer. 
 First of all, is everything which is evil really a violation of the 
 moral law ? or, strictly speaking, does the moral law merely 
 regulate the conduct , and not the disposition, the abiding state of 
 the inner life in general ? In the second place, is evil only that 
 which opposes the law, or also that which does not yet perfectly 
 * Divine Government , p. 310. f Sinlessness of Jesics, p. 45. 
 
46 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 correspond to the requirement of the law? And, lastly, is not 
 perhaps the law, and the consciousness of law, mucli rather the 
 consequence of evil than, according to the above determination 
 of its notion, its presupposition ? ” * 
 
 This putting brings the subject before us in complete full¬ 
 ness. Quoting approvingly from Schleiermacher, the author 
 sums his views on the first question in these words: “If the 
 law as moral contains a requirement, the imperative form is 
 essentially proper to it, in so far as it addresses itself to the 
 will, in order to its being carried out in the life, and it only 
 becomes a resolution of the will, primarily, of course, by the 
 automatism of the will. According to this, while the act, which 
 of course cannot here be regarded in a limited external manner, 
 is the primary object of the requirement of law, it follows that 
 everything in the life of man, which essentially springs out of 
 his act, must be its secondary object . . . The law regulates 
 not merely the conduct of man, but also his being , as it proceeds 
 from the inward act , the disposition of his mind, which is always 
 regarded, when rightly conceived of, as essentially possessing a 
 fixed habitual tendency of the will; indeed, the very move¬ 
 ments and conditions of the mind, the inclinations and disin¬ 
 clinations of the soul, are regulated by the law, in so far as 
 these are redetermined by the established tendency of the will. 
 And it also, without contradiction, essentially belongs to moral 
 perfection that these inward and abiding elements of life should 
 be harmoniously arranged, which surely no one will wish to find 
 in the mere legality of the individual act as such. If now there 
 is nothing in the notion of law to prevent its being directed to 
 the abiding moral condition, we may quite generally denote it, 
 when regarded according to the purity of its notion, as the rep¬ 
 resentation of the moral idea in the imperative form.”f 
 
 * Muller, The Christian Doctrine of Sin , vol. i, pp. 40, 42, 43. 
 
 f Ibid., vol. i, pp. 44, 45. See also the footnotes of those pages. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 47 
 
 The second point raised is, if possible, more important; con¬ 
 ducts us to a still deeper deep: Does evil denote that only 
 which positively contradicts the law, or that also which fails to 
 satisfy the full claims of the law ? 
 
 u The moral law, regarded in its true light, requires of us 
 nothing less than perfection. Is, then, everything which is less 
 than this perfection required by the law to be regarded as 
 moral evil? If we look at the question generally it is mani¬ 
 festly the same as when we ask, Are the notions purity from 
 evil (moral integrity) and moral perfection identical ? In this 
 we, of course, presuppose that we can only speak of moral in¬ 
 tegrity in relation to creatures possessing a moral nature. To 
 the mere creatures of nature, as possessed of no moral being, 
 one can just as little ascribe virtue as vice.” * 
 
 The essence of moral action is that it is an act in the pres¬ 
 ence of a law known. Hence intelligent beings only are sub¬ 
 jects of moral law, and intelligent beings who are able to dis¬ 
 cern obligation, oughtness. Moral action cannot be predicated 
 of an idiot, certainly not more of an infant. Then the condi¬ 
 tions of acting against its law ethically do not exist in infancy. 
 That free and fundamental act of responsible choice of its end 
 cannot, during this period of irresponsible life, take place; 
 then it cannot sin. To pretend that an infant can sin in the 
 early stages of infancy is a monstrosity of conception only 
 transcended by the other supposition that it can inherit sin. 
 
 A peculiarity of man was, he was put on trial. It was not so 
 with any other terrestrial creature. What precisely do we mean 
 by this? Every creature save man was so constituted and 
 posited that its welfare was not made dependent on itself, on 
 any law which it might obey or disobey. Its nature dominated 
 its end. Man was the solitary exception to this rule. It was 
 possible to him to miss his end. It is an interesting fact that 
 
 * Muller, The Christian Doctrine of Shi, vol. i, p. 58. 
 
 6 
 
48 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 the deepest and truest moment of sin is “missing the mark.” 
 Whether he should reach it was made absolutely to depend 
 upon himself. The event was suspended upon his own free 
 act. He was put on trial under a definite test. Weal or woe, 
 in the deepest and highest significance, was put in his power. 
 Which should be, in the event, an act of his was to determine. 
 The period of the trial is denoted probation, a time in which 
 and by which the eternal issue was to be determined. The is¬ 
 sue of destiny was suspended on personal character. Man was 
 thus alone the maker of his own fate. It was a trial determi¬ 
 native of character and consequent destiny—perhaps nothing 
 more. Failure would deprive him of innocence, separate him 
 from the communion of God, subject him to utter and remedi¬ 
 less death, would drive him from the bliss and happiness of 
 Eden, and send him forth, an outcast from God, to a gloomy 
 immortality. Fidelity would ennoble innocence into holiness, 
 and make him an immortal heir of riches of glory immeasur¬ 
 able and inconceivable. It was a vast issue, and himself was, 
 by a free act, to determine it. It is appalling to think of the 
 responsibility. 
 
 Fundamental to man as a moral being is that great peculiarity 
 of his nature that he is, so far forth as he is moral, endowed 
 with absolute freedom. This freedom resides alone in his will. 
 Morality, therefore, can be predicated only of his will, and of 
 other things in him so far as they are under the government of 
 will. This point is fully elucidated in the portion of this work 
 which treats, of sin. 
 
 As will is so important a factor, in fact the very center and 
 pivotal point in the moral being, it becomes us to examine it 
 more fully here. What is it precisely that we mean by will, 
 and by absolute freedom of will ? 
 
 The spirit of man is essentially man; when we predicate of 
 
 it we predicate of him. Its functions are intellection, sensi- 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 49 
 
 tivity, will. It knows, it feels, it wills. These are names for 
 discriminated forms of its activity. Under the first form are 
 grouped the powers of knowing, as perception, self-conscious¬ 
 ness, intuition, understanding, reason, memory, imagination. 
 Under the second are grouped all forms of feeling, as affections, 
 passions, emotions. The classifications need not be further ex¬ 
 tended here. This second group of activities depends on the 
 first for the conditions of their existence and expression. The 
 intellect must present an object before feeling can awaken in 
 any form except the purely animal forms. The third group of 
 activities takes the generic name will. As the second awaits 
 the action of the first and springs forth unbidden, so the third 
 requires the antecedence of both the first and second as con¬ 
 dition of its exercise. 
 
 It is of the third that we now treat. What do we mean by 
 will? We have a tolerably definite idea of what we mean by 
 knowing and feeling. Have we as definite an idea of what we 
 mean by will, or willing ? It would seem that we should have. 
 There should be no more obscurity in the one case than in the 
 others. The terms describe equally common forms of activity. 
 “I know,” “I feel,” “I will,” are modes of speech employed 
 with equal frequency, and with equal consciousness that we 
 employ them understandingly. There is no more sense of ob¬ 
 scurity in the one case than in either of the others. 
 
 What we mean by will is the power we find ourselves 
 endowed with of self-determination. The power applies in 
 everv case in which we are able to decide what we would do if 
 
 t/ 
 
 not restrained bv external forces, and its act is the act of decid- 
 ing. It is a purely subjective power, and its act is always a 
 subjective act. The external effect is not the will act, but 
 result of it. Every intelligent external act is sequent of the 
 previous subjective act, and could not be without it. The pri¬ 
 mary will act is election, or choice, or decision to an end, the 
 
 6 
 
50 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 determination of the self to an object. The second form of mil 
 action is the executive volition, or putting forth of power to 
 effectuate the choice; to possess or do what is decided on. First 
 there is presented an object or end, and it is accepted by the 
 will, that is, determined on; second, the effort, or executive 
 volition, is made to accomplish it. The two acts are differen¬ 
 tiable in fact and ordinarily in time, and always logically as an¬ 
 tecedent and sequent—never in the reverse order. The moral 
 quality is complete in the first act. 
 
 It must not be imagined that there is moral quality in every 
 will act, but only in those which relate to ends which are right 
 or wrong. A man chooses to sit or stand; to eat or abstain; to 
 converse or be silent. These may be right or wrong, or they 
 may be indifferent. 
 
 Rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the existence 
 or nonexistence of law concerning it. If commanded by right¬ 
 eous authority it is right, and the opposite is wrong. If not 
 commanded—that is, not required or forbidden—it is indif¬ 
 ferent. By law or command is not meant merely verbal rules 
 of action communicated, but all ethical imperatives emanating 
 from the reason and conscience; divine laws revealed in the 
 mind itself and enforced directly by the ethical reason, or sense 
 of oughtness or ought-notness. 
 
 In all cases in which there is a law or command, whether 
 directly and supernaturally given or emanating from the ethical 
 reason, the requirement is primarily on the will; and it requires 
 that the subject should choose to obey the command and should 
 in the resulting act obey it, or do what it requires; and obedi¬ 
 ence or nonobedience renders the subject righteous or sinful. 
 
 In order that he may acquire the quality of righteousness or 
 sinfulness he must act as a will under law; and he must be ab¬ 
 solutely free in his act—that is, it must be properly his act, 
 What do we mean by free ? There is no point in theology 
 
What is Sin ? 
 
 51 
 
 and metaphysical philosophy about which there has been more 
 debate than this—none of greater practical moment; and yet, 
 we may venture to assert, none of which consciousness more 
 explicitly affirms. There are things with respect to which we 
 know we are not free, and things with respect to which we 
 know we are free. When we so predicate we understand per¬ 
 fectly what we mean. The atom is not free when it moves by 
 attraction. Water is not free when it rises to its level or flows 
 in its channel. The eye is not free when objects are painted 
 on its retina. The nerve of sensation is not free when it feels a 
 blow. The appetite is not free when it covets its object. The 
 mind is not free when it perceives a difference between the 
 beautiful and deformity-—when it affirms opposition between 
 right and wrong—when its consciousness asserts that the right 
 ought to be and the wrong not—-when it perceives what im¬ 
 pinges on its sensory organ, or is conscious of its present 
 thought or feeling. Why, in all these and ten thousand other 
 cases, do we assert the absence of freedom ? What is it that 
 we mean ? Simply this, that such is the order of nature that 
 these things are necessary; that is, cannot be avoided by the 
 things themselves; they have no power to the opposite; they 
 are under domination of force or power, external or internal; 
 they have no choice or power of choice in the premises. 
 
 When we affirm that man is free we mean that in the matters 
 in which he is free, and so far as he is free, he has what these 
 things have not—power over, or election of his end; that is, 
 whenever he acts as a free will, or in freedom, he possesses the 
 power to act, not only as he does, but differently; that there is 
 nothing in his constitution, or the circumstances of the case, or 
 any external power, which dominates his act, but it is freely 
 determined by himself, with the full consciousness that at the 
 instant the determination might have been different. 
 
 It is not meant that he is not susceptible of influence or 
 
52 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 motive to act. He cannot, indeed, act rationally without mo¬ 
 tives addressed both to his intellect and affections. This is one 
 characteristic differencing him from other things. They do not 
 feel or perceive motives which influence their decisions, but 
 are acted on as machines. He is addressed, and is conscious of 
 influence, both of reasons and desires, but he is conscious also 
 that when he yields to them he exercises a free and sovereign 
 power, and is, therefore, responsible. It is precisely this fact 
 which makes him a moral being, and which makes it impossible 
 that beings wanting this power should be moral. 
 
 It is not implied that every act of will, either as choice or 
 executive volition, is free, but that any act of will that is unfree 
 lacks ethical quality. 
 
 The Adam, a moral being, was, as such, placed under law. 
 There can be no doubt that his law was the common law per¬ 
 vasive of all moral being; inclusive of all duty that might arise 
 in the history of his immortal existence. 
 
 For his immediate trial, however, it was reduced to a single 
 command, obedience to which would have contained the prin¬ 
 ciple of all obedience, that of implicit submission to righteous 
 authority; disobedience to which, on the other hand, would 
 have contained the germ of all sin, self-will. We accept as 
 literal history the account given by Moses. The case is cer¬ 
 tainly not clear, but the preponderance of the argument, to our 
 thinking, favors that view. To those who may be curious to 
 extend research on the subject an endless number of writers 
 will be found accessible in any extensive theological library. 
 As the discussion we have to offer will not be affected in either 
 event, whether it is literal or allegorical, we do not deem it 
 useful to pursue the examination. Whether an allegory or a 
 literal statement, it asserts the same fact, that he was law-bound, 
 or under law. Of that there can be no dispute. The nature 
 which he has transmitted to us declares it. In addition to the 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 53 
 
 natural law, which, held him in common with all other beings in 
 its grip of inexorable necessity, he found himself under another 
 law, dictating forms of activity but not forcing them ; saying, 
 “Thou shall” This law held out rewards and penalties to 
 induce obedience, but had no compulsory force. It was so 
 then ; it is so now ; it has never been otherwise. 
 
 It is sometimes asked, Why was the Adam made so as to be 
 subject to temptation and liable to fall? It is equivalent to 
 asking, Why was he made a moral being ? since to be a moral 
 being is to be under a law which the subject knows by com¬ 
 mand internally or externally imparted ; a law, therefore, which 
 is consciously freely kept, and may be broken, and to the 
 breach of which he is, or may be, conscious of an inducement 
 or temptation. This point will be fully elaborated when we 
 come to consider specifically the origin of evil. 
 
 Whence arose temptation? In the actual case of man it 
 arose through a foreign agency, the devil; he using an inno¬ 
 cent creature as the unconscious instrument of his act, if the 
 history is to be interpreted literally. Whether he might have 
 exerted a direct influence upon the soul of the unfallen, or 
 whether he now does on the souls of men, we are not informed. 
 It is probably true that his wiles are always exerted through 
 intermediates. We do not doubt the personality of the tempter 
 in this case, or that there is a spirit of evil in the universe 
 —the devil; a person who, by reason of his bad preeminence, 
 is chief and prince of the powers of darkness. The empire of 
 sin is composed of persons, represented in the Scriptures as a 
 host of evil beings, consolidated under one head of matchless 
 malice—or, if not of greater malice, primus inter pares. 
 
 There are those who doubt. They are not always unchris¬ 
 tian. They understand the many scriptural allusions to be, 
 under the various names, devil, serpent, Satan, etc., to a spirit of 
 
54 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 evil, or principle of evil, existing—in or among things—in 
 nature. Sin is a personal thing, and cannot be predicated apart 
 from a personal being. We see no reason whj a person, oldest 
 in sin and chiefest in power of mischief, may not be alluded to 
 rather than an abstract principle, and especially since the attri¬ 
 butes of personality are constantly ascribed. There are many 
 devils—there is one chief. 
 
 But, while we accept the account as literal, we do not for a 
 moment doubt that temptation would have arisen inevitably 
 without a personal tempter, as must have been the case in the 
 first instance of sin. We accept the presence and agency of a 
 personal devil in Eden as a fact, but not at all as a necessary 
 condition to temptation. His presence here, as everywhere, 
 complicates and disturbs; is an impertinence and obtrusion. 
 He was not necessary to the trial progressing in Eden, nor 
 must we regard his presence and the malicious part he acted as 
 determining the sad catastrophe. Man is a social being, and 
 thus one becomes a tempter of another; and, as his trial 
 is to determine that he will not sin under any temptation, from 
 any quarter, it was proper that he should be subject to tempta¬ 
 tion. This is a sufficient reason for the presence of the tempter 
 in Eden; but the Adam finds no palliation for his act in the 
 presence of Satanic influence. He would have been tempted, 
 and, and we doubt not, have sinned, had no devil slimed the 
 beautiful paradise with his impure presence and speech. The 
 elements of temptation were in the circumstances and nature of 
 the Adam, as of every other being who is on moral trial. The 
 law which lays its command on a free being suggests its own 
 violation, in the conscious power of the subject to disobey. 
 This is especially the case when the matter of the command 
 crosses any inclination of the subject—prohibits what, but for 
 the command, would be for any reason agreeable. 
 
 The command laid on the Adam was of this kind, and con- 
 
"What is Sin? 
 
 55 
 
 tainecl a germ which, of necessity, would breed struggle in his 
 soul. It prohibited the enjoyment of a fruit that was agreeable 
 to his palate, which he could not behold and not covet. He 
 was required to deny himself of that which his nature craved. 
 His desires and his sense of obligation necessarily collided. 
 To feel desire was to be tempted. He could not avoid see¬ 
 ing in the fruit a seeming good, for he was so made that it 
 must appear as a good; it suited his nature—it was an invol¬ 
 untary action—he must desire it. There was no impropriety 
 in the desire, as there is no impropriety in anything that is 
 natural until it comes into collision with law. The law super¬ 
 venes before there can be sin, and determines what shall be sin. 
 
 "Where there is no law there is no transgression.” 
 
 But, it is said, how could the holy Adam have a desire in 
 contravention of the command or of duty ? We answer, The 
 desire was not in contravention of duty. It was not his duty 
 not to desire. Duty has no place as regards an involuntary 
 feeling. The imperative was not, Thou shalt not desire, but, 
 Thou shalt not eat. Duty requires the control of the impulses, 
 not their nonaction or their extinction. The ought of moral 
 law and moral consciousness regards the use of a nature, not 
 its extinction or abrogation; imperates the exercise or restraint 
 of powers, not their being or nonbeing. 
 
 But, yet further, it is said, How could the holy Adam yield 
 to desire and act against his conviction of duty ? How could 
 the holy become unholy ? How could the good tree produce 
 evil fruit? It is the ages-old question, How could sin find 
 entrance into the universe? It is here, and in some way it did 
 arise; otherwise it is eternal. Holding the view that it is not 
 eternal, and not a product of divine creation, but an effect or 
 fact having its origin from previously sinless creatures, we will 
 try to answer the inquiry, How ? 
 
 The power requisite to constitute a moral being is power of 
 
56 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 free action in the presence of its law—command; power to act 
 with or against the command. The subject must be absolutely 
 free in the matter of his will action. If constrained from with¬ 
 out it is not he that acts, but the constraining force. If con¬ 
 strained from within, by a necessity of nature, the nature being 
 created by another, the included constraint is imposed by 
 another; it is not he that acts, but the constraining force. The 
 idea of freedom is excluded; we have a necessary agent, and 
 the testimony of all consciousness is that there can be no respon¬ 
 sibility—we have not a moral being. Freedom does not imply 
 absence of law, or absence of influence, but power to act either 
 against or with any law or any influence that may exist. 
 
 As the law imposed upon moral beings is, by supposition, 
 the most reasonable possible law, and the most righteous possi¬ 
 ble law, and a law the obeying of which will conduct to the 
 highest possible good—a law, therefore, which, if known as to 
 its working, must make the strongest appeal to the reason, the 
 conscience, and self-interest—if the subject be free he must be 
 able to resist; that is, to act in unreason—against conscience, 
 and against the highest form of self-love. 
 
 Now, if, when it is asked, How can or could a holy being act 
 so irrationally, criminally, and ruinously? be meant, What good 
 reason can be assigned for his so acting? we answer, No good 
 reason can be assigned; all the good reasons are against it. 
 This is the case in every sin. There is no good reason for any 
 sin. All the good reasons are against every sin. Sin is the 
 sum and essence of unreason. The meaning of which is, a free 
 moral being may act against the best reason when he ought to 
 act with it; he has the power to do this, and the use of that 
 power is his sin; it is the very essence of his sin that he degrades 
 himself thus; that he turns away from his royal guides to follow 
 and obey mean and base lusts. 
 
 Up to a given moment the being is guiltless of sin; he hears 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 57 
 
 and follows tlie behests of right reason and conscience. But 
 now another voice clamors to be heard; it is the voice of pas¬ 
 sion, or self-will; it points to a somewhat which awakens desire, 
 blow there is a conflict. How will it terminate? Will reason 
 decide? Will conscience? Will the right, and highest good? 
 So one would think it ought to be, but it will not. A person 
 will determine as he listeth, and will render no reason but that 
 so he determines. If we attribute his determination to a back- 
 lying nature or disposition which is stronger than reason or 
 conscience, and make it the source of the sin, it is at the same 
 time to deny freedom to the subject and assign sin to a nature, 
 and find its origin thus in God, the Creator of the nature; by 
 implication to give it the most holy origin. 
 
 Our conclusion is that sin enters the universe by that act of a 
 sinless or innocent being in which he renounces his allegiance 
 to God. Up to the initiation of the act he is innocent; in the 
 moment of it, and by it, he passes from the unfallen Adam to 
 the guilty and fallen apostate. 
 
 Then sin is an act The view we have taken is certainly in 
 complete harmony with the account given by Moses of the 
 manner in which, as a fact, sin did enter this world. It was an 
 outgrowth of human spontaneity, a product of human will. 
 The tempted Adam yielded when he ought to have resisted; 
 sin was the finished fact 
 
 The conclusion at which we have arrived is of such manifold 
 importance that we must extend the examination still further, 
 and with yet greater care fortify the position. 
 
 I judge that, so far as the primary sin is in question, there is 
 perfect agreement that it consisted wholly in an act of the 
 creature, and not at all in a nature. It is, indeed, by those 
 with whom we now reason, insisted that the creature with 
 whom it originated was, until the guilty act, really holy. They 
 admit that out of a holy nature emanated an unholy act, which 
 
58 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 act constituted the sin—the whole of the offending—of the 
 creature. 
 
 What we aim to show now is that what was true in the 
 primal case is true in every case; that the essence of the primal 
 sin is the essence of every sin; that it is fundamental to it that 
 it should pertain to the free act of a responsible being; that 
 there is no case in which it can be predicated of something 
 which antedates a movement of will, and the will of a person 
 who knows obligation. How it affects nature will appear in 
 future discussions. 
 
 It having been shown that the moral law lays its imperative 
 only on the will of man, and indirectly on that which results 
 from the action or guilty nonaction of his will, and not on any 
 part of his person or conduct, which exists independently of his 
 evil act and beyond its control, we are better prepared for the 
 discussion of the point in hand, and we shall soon find that it 
 comes to essential unity with the question disposed of. 
 
 Does evil (sin) denote only that which contradicts the law, 
 or that also which fails to satisfy the full claim of the law ? 
 Muller discusses the question as if it were this: Does the moral 
 law require the moral perfection of its subject ?—giving to the 
 phrase moral perfection the significance of the utmost degree of 
 moral excellence as to nature and capacity of the subject—and 
 in this aspect of it answers in substance: If there be no distinc¬ 
 tion between moral perfection and moral blamelessness, between 
 imperfection and sin, then progress in goodness must involve 
 the gradual casting away of the evil still clinging to the life. 
 Progress from imperfection toward perfection cannot be sepa¬ 
 rated from normal development; and thus it is plain that evil 
 (sin) cannot be predicated of the mere difference between perfec¬ 
 tion and imperfection, nor of the necessary difference between the 
 ideal and the empirical reality. To the question, From what 
 can any minus, any deficiency, in relation to the perfection 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 59 
 
 demanded by law, arise, save the power of an opposing princi¬ 
 ple somehow associated with, it? he answers: “The necessity 
 for such a minus , in the beginning of man’s course, arises sim¬ 
 ply from the fact that realization of moral perfection is a task 
 assigned him, the full performance of which, in virtue of his 
 nature, he can only accomplish in successive moments of time. 
 It follows, therefore, as a matter of course, and not on ac¬ 
 count of sin, that it must be beyond man’s power at the outset 
 absolutely to fulfill the demands of the moral law in its entire 
 range, and that this following on after the law is moral imper¬ 
 fection , but not sin. If it were sin, sin would be the necessary 
 outgo of finite human nature in the state in which it is created. 
 . . . But if there be a moral development which advances, not 
 from evil to good, but from good to better, it is clear that there 
 is a moral integrity or blamelessness distinct from moral per¬ 
 fection, a state which does not perfectly correspond to the ideal 
 and yet does not contradict it, and that the true conception of 
 evil (sin) is not that of something which does not wholly come 
 up to the perfection which the law demands, but must be de¬ 
 fined as contradiction of the law.”* 
 
 To this lucid statement he adds, tending to the same objec¬ 
 tive point, some luminous reflections on the correlative terms 
 law and duty , in which he shows that moral law is the sum of 
 all requirements upon moral beings along the whole line of their 
 existence, while duty is a determinative moral claim which ad¬ 
 dresses itself to any person at any given moment. 
 
 The sum of which is that the law claims, of each moral be¬ 
 ing, that he should do, each moment of his existence, the things 
 he ought to do at the moment 
 
 TVe add, there never can be a moment in the history of any 
 moral being when he ought to do or be anything which he 
 has not the power to do or be unless some former guilty act 
 * Muller, The Christian Doctrine of Sin, yoI. i, pp. 65-67. 
 
 6 
 
60 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 deprived him of the power. The moral law lays no claim upon 
 nonexistent power except when power has been criminally 
 destroyed. 
 
 The law is the rule of action for a will; duty obliges con¬ 
 formity. Disconformity is sin, whenever and wherever the 
 obligation exists; and that only is sin. The equivalent of 
 this statement is that which was taught by Aquinas and Bel- 
 larmine loDg ago: that though the law sets forth the ideal of 
 perfection, yet, when a moral subject endeavors with all his 
 power to fulfill its claims, shortcoming arising from natural 
 weakness or incompetence, not personally superinduced, is not 
 accounted sin—is not sin; failure to reach the ideal of the 
 moral law is sin only, even in the act, when the failure is vol¬ 
 untary ; or such that the subject had power to avoid it, or 
 power to achieve perfect conformity. 
 
 It is a noteworthy fact that among all authors who have 
 treated of this subject, however they may have differed, there 
 is substantial agreement on these several points, which I will 
 venture to characterize as embodying all that is fundamental : 
 
 First, that sin can only be predicated of a person. Second, 
 that it can only be predicated of that pertaining to a person 
 which is in violation of moral law. Third, that specific acts of 
 violation of moral law are sins only when the law is known, 
 or might have been known, and when the person was free in 
 the act. Fourth, that in every case sin involves a volitional 
 act—an act of the will. Fifth, that the moral law imperates 
 duty in such form that it can only be kept or broken by some 
 movement of will. All of which indicates a universal convic¬ 
 tion that, however a nature may be involved in sin, it must be 
 in some way in connection with a movement of the will and 
 cannot antedate it; must be a something in which the person 
 sins or is a sinner. The terms are active. Did no act trans¬ 
 pire there could be neither sinner nor sin in the universe. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 61 
 
 The Assembly’s Catechism, in adding to the revealed defi¬ 
 nition of sin, if it means to add to it any idea not included in 
 it, is unauthorized. If by “ any want of conformity to ” it 
 means any transgression of it is sound, but confusing; if it 
 means something different from , it is misleading and impertinent. 
 This particular phase of the subject will be considered more at 
 length when we’come to discuss the doctrine of so-called origi¬ 
 nal sin. In this connection we will add a few reflections only. 
 
 If by disconformity to law be meant a disconformity of the 
 act to the law requirement it is precisely the equivalent of 
 transgression of the law, and is useless. If it means, as most 
 of interpreters insist it does, something in the nature itself, a 
 state or quality of the being himself, given in existence and by 
 no fault of the recipient, we are plunged at once into confusion. 
 What do we mean by disconformity of a nature or being to 
 law? Does it mean that the being or nature in question is 
 abnormal, distorted, perverted, not according to the ideal? 
 that it has lost some primitive quality, or taken on some alien 
 condition? that it fails to meet the end originally purposed 
 for it, and goes, by some inherent fault, to an opposite end ? 
 All this is conceivable. And it is conceivable that any such 
 distortion would be displeasing to him whose ideal was thus 
 distorted. But the question is, Would its existence constitute 
 the subject of it a sinner, provided it were a fact that he had 
 nothing to do with its existence ? Would the displeasure felt 
 against it, or on account of it, if any displeasure might exist, 
 be the same in kind as that which is felt against a transgression 
 of law in a matter of duty ? Could guilt—desert of punish¬ 
 ment—be predicated of the one case as of the other? We are 
 quite sure the cases are so extremely dissimilar that their dif¬ 
 ference in kind must be at once discerned; and that difference 
 marks the one as sin, the other as misfortune. 
 
 Each disconformity, it may be, is displeasing. May it not 
 
62 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 be further admitted that each stands in the way of the perfect 
 good of its subject, but on entirely different grounds: the one 
 as sin demanding punishment, the other as disorder demanding 
 cure; the one coming home to the subject as guilty cause, the 
 other finding in him a passive recipient of a disabling injury? 
 
 Disconformity to law, then, is not the essential idea or ele¬ 
 ment of sin, but disconformity of a specific hind; disconformity 
 not of inherited nature, but of voluntary act; disconformity 
 originating with and emanating from the subject of it; discon¬ 
 formity in a matter of duty and obligation; disconformity for 
 the existence of which the subject is responsible, and which 
 may be charged upon him as guilty cause; which cannot, there¬ 
 fore, lie back of a forth-putting of his agency. Did no forth- 
 putting of agency transpire there could neither be sin nor 
 sinner in the universe; nothing of which sin could be predi¬ 
 cated, and no person who could be held as a sinner. And the 
 sin in every case is predicable only of the individual agent who 
 acts. Sin is a person’s sin, and the person who sins is a sinner; 
 and sin could be predicated of him in no other way, and on no 
 other account, but that he has sinned. Personal agency is ab¬ 
 solutely requisite to the existence of sin, and it resides in that 
 agency, in the manner of its exercise, and cannot come into 
 being in any other way. 
 
 Is it said, Yes, sin is personal, but it lies in the person an¬ 
 terior to action; in a state of the person out of which his act 
 itself emanates ? This point is more strongly put by Professor 
 Shedd than by any other on the side he represents. We shall 
 reach his view in a moment. 
 
 Assuming, for the present, that we have made good the posi¬ 
 tion that sin is the product of a person, by the free exercise of 
 his personal agency, let us now endeavor to find the precise 
 point of agency at which it arises, the most primitive point to 
 which it may be traced. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 63 
 
 The moral law, of which sin is the transgression, lays its 
 imperative on the subject as to external conduct; that is, it 
 requires him to do or forbear certain external acts; and the 
 command is so broad in this respect as to cover almost all the 
 activities of his life. 
 
 Does sin consist in the disconformity of the external act to 
 the command? Is that disconformity the moral transgression 
 of the law ? We cannot better answer this question than in the 
 language of Dr. Shedd : 
 
 “ Suppose we arrest the sinner in the outward act, and fix 
 our attention upon sin in this form, we are immediately com¬ 
 pelled, by the operation of our own minds, to let go of this 
 outward act, and to seek for the reality of his sin within him. 
 The outward act, we see in an instant, is but an effect of a 
 cause; and we instinctively turn our eye inward and fasten it 
 upon the cause. The outward act of transgression drives us by 
 the very laws of thought to the person that produced it-—to the 
 particular volition that originated it. No mind that thinks at 
 all upon sin can possibly stop with the outward act. Its own 
 rational reflection hurries it away, almost instantaneously, from 
 the blow of the murderer—from the momentary gleam of the 
 knife—to the volition within that strung the muscle and nerved 
 the blow.” 
 
 If upon examination it were found that the blow was not in¬ 
 tended, even though death was the result of it, we should not 
 find the guilt of murder. We rest not until we find a will 
 directing it with murderous intent. He proceeds: 
 
 “But the mind cannot stop here in its search for the essential 
 
 reality of sin. When we have reached the sphere—the inward 
 
 sphere—of volitions we have by no means reached the ultimate 
 
 ground and form of sin. We may suppose that because we 
 
 have gone beyond the outward act—because we are now within 
 
 the man—we have found sin in its last form. But we are 
 
 6 
 
64 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 mistaken. Closer tliinking and, what is still better, a deeper 
 experience will disclose to ns a depth in our souls lower than 
 that in which volition occurs, and a form of sin in that depth, 
 and to the very bottom of it, very different from the sin of 
 single volitions.” 
 
 What that deeper depth is, Dr. Shedd assures us, is a nature 
 underlying volitions. The discussion is exceedingly able, and 
 as it contains much with which we agree, and also much from 
 which we dissent, we must examine it with particularity and 
 in detail, giving him the benefit of his own statements. 
 
 Nothing can be more obvious, we think, than that sin finds 
 its germ in the innermost, and most central, act of the will— 
 the very shrine of personality. It consists in the determina¬ 
 tion of the will to evil, and, though expressed inconcrete acts 
 specifically forbidden, it transpires before any concrete act—it 
 may be before any separate volition to a concrete act—in a yet 
 more primitive and all-embracing determination to self, as 
 against God; but behind the ivill and its movement we cannot go. 
 The most primitive moral act possible to a person, it may be, 
 is choice of an end; if it be self he becomes by the choice a sin¬ 
 ner ; separate will-acts, to definite sins, are but the outgrowth 
 of the more radical primitive choice. If any choose to denom¬ 
 inate this more general determination a nature, as Dr. Shedd 
 does, we do not object, except that it confuses. 
 
 Dr. Hopkins, in his Law of Love , has written luminously on 
 this subject, as he does upon all subjects of which he treats. 
 He is inquiring for the seat of responsibility. A person, he 
 says, is something more than reason and will. We get misty 
 and lose ourselves by always using abstract terms and the 
 names of attributes. A person is a substance, a being , that has 
 reason and will. Here we reach an agent, and the true point 
 of responsibility—the man himself. It is the man himself, the 
 person, the self, the ego—the man, whatever you please to 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 65 
 
 term it—that we hold responsible, and praise or blame. It is 
 this mysterious—mysterious as all things are that are simple 
 —this mysterious and inscrutable person—this self-conscious, 
 thinking, comprehending, electing being—it is the man himself 
 that we approve or disapprove. Constitutional tendencies, de¬ 
 sires, affections, have no moral character till he adopts them 
 and consents, or elects, that they shall move in a particular 
 direction. After other wise remarks he continues, in sub¬ 
 stance : “ From what has been said we shall readily see what 
 that form of activity is to which responsibility ultimately 
 attaches. It is not volition, regarded simply as an executive 
 act; it is preference. It is that immanent act of preference by 
 which we dispose of ourselves, and on which character de¬ 
 pends. It is this that gives set to the current of the soul and 
 determines the character of subsequent specific acts of prefer¬ 
 ence and volition under it. It is an act of will as distinguished 
 from the feelings.”* 
 
 Nothing is plainer than that here the doctrine is what we 
 have affirmed: that sin is found in the act of a person, in the 
 choice or election of an end, conceived, in the presence of a 
 sense of obligation, or law, to be wrong. The preference is 
 declared to be an act of will, and not an impulse. 
 
 Even Dr. Shedd does not get away from this ground. “In 
 regard to the first point,” he says, “the position taken is that 
 this sinful nature is in the will, and is the product of the will.” 
 This statement is hardly satisfactory to him, so, after much dis¬ 
 cussion, he returns to it, to explain further: 
 
 “ In saying, therefore, that the sinful nature of man is a 
 product of his will, we do not mean to teach that it has its 
 origin in the will considered as the faculty of choices, or par¬ 
 ticular volitions. . . . But it seems to us that we can have a 
 fuller and more adequate idea of the voluntary power in man 
 
 * Pp. 66-68, et al. 
 
66 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 than this comes to. It seems to us that our idea of the human 
 will is by no means exhausted of its contents when we have 
 taken into view merely that ability which a man has to regu¬ 
 late his conduct in a particular instance. It seems to us that 
 we do believe in the existence of a controlling power in the 
 soul that is far more central and profound than the quite super¬ 
 ficial faculty by which we regulate the movement of our limbs 
 outwardly, or inwardly summon our energies to the perform¬ 
 ance of particular acts. It seems to us that by the will is 
 meant a voluntary power that lies at the very center of the 
 soul, and whose movements consist, not so much in choosing 
 or refusing, in reference to particular circumstances, as in deter¬ 
 mining the whole man with reference to some great and ultimate 
 end of being. The characteristic of the will proper, as distin¬ 
 guished from the voluntary faculty, is determination of the whole 
 being to an ultimate end , rather than selection of means for at¬ 
 taining that end in a particular case. The difference between 
 the voluntary and volitionary powers—between the will proper 
 and the faculty of choices—may be seen by considering a par¬ 
 ticular instance of the exercise of the latter. Suppose that a 
 man chooses to indulge one of his appetites in a particular in¬ 
 stance—the appetite for alcoholic stimulants, for example—and 
 that he actually does gratify it. In this instance he puts forth 
 one single volition, and performs one particular act. By an act 
 of the faculty of choices, of which he is distinctly conscious, 
 and over which he has arbitrary power, he drinks, and gratifies 
 his appetite. But why does he thus choose in this particular 
 instance? In other words, is there not a deeper ground for 
 this single volition ? Is not this particular act of the choice 
 determined by a far deeper and preexisting determination of 
 his whole inward being to self as an ultimate end of living ? 
 And now, if the will should be widened out and deepened so 
 as to contain this whole inward state of the man—this entire 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 67 
 
 tendency of the soul to self and sin—is it not plain that it 
 would be a very different mode of power from that which put 
 forth the particular volition? Would not the will as thus con¬ 
 ceived cover a far wider surface of the soul, and reach down to 
 a far deeper depth in it, than the faculty of single choices, 
 which covers but a single point on the surface, and never goes 
 below the surface? Would not a faculty comprehensive 
 enough to include the whole man, and sufficiently deep and 
 central to be the origin and basis of a nature, a character, a per¬ 
 manent moral state, be a very different faculty from that voli¬ 
 tionary power whose activity is merely on the surface, and 
 whose products are single resolutions and transient volitions ? 
 . . . The will as thus defined we affirm to be the guilty author 
 of the sinful nature. Indeed , this sinful nature is nothing more nor 
 less than the state of the will; nothing more nor less than its con¬ 
 stant and total determination to self as the ultimate end of being. 
 This voluntary power, lying at the bottom of the soul as its 
 elementary base, and carrying all the faculties and powers of 
 the man along with it, whenever it moves and wherever it goes, 
 has turned away from God as an ultimate end; and this self- 
 direction—this permanent and entire determination of itself— 
 this state of the will, is the sinful nature of man. 
 
 “ Here, then, we have a depraved nature, and a depraved 
 nature that is guilt because it is a self-originated nature. 
 Here, then, is the child of wrath. Were this nature created 
 and put into a man, as an intellectual nature or as a particular 
 temperament is put into him, by the Creator of all things, it 
 would not be a responsible and guilty nature nor would man 
 be a child of wrath. ... It has its origin in the free and 
 responsible use of that voluntary power which God has created 
 and placed in the human soul as its most central, most myste¬ 
 rious, and most hazardous endowment. It is a self-determined 
 nature; that is, a nature originated in a will and by a will. ” 
 
68 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 These are weighty words, and deserve great consideration. 
 They trace the genesis of sin to precisely the point at which 
 we locate it, the will, and to an action of the will. That this 
 most primitive action is called a nature does not at all change 
 the fact that it is the free act of a free will, and this is all that 
 we contend for. When this most primitive act takes place in 
 the history of individual men or human beings is a point which 
 for the present is not raised. That subject will be fully treated 
 when we come to consider the subject of original sin, so 
 phrased. But it is manifest in this extensive extract that, with 
 all his effort, Shedd himself does not, even when he imputes 
 sin to a nature and calls it a nature, get clear of the admission 
 that it always centers in the will, and consists of an act of the 
 will. We desire here to give great emphasis to the single 
 point that sin, whenever and wherever and however it exists, 
 consists in that movement of will which arrays itself against its 
 law—which determines it to an end other than that to which its 
 law obliges it—which carries the whole personality. Until this 
 act has transpired sin cannot be predicated. 
 
 In order to any movement of a will or person, it must be ad¬ 
 mitted, the person or will must be supposed to exist. Existence 
 is necessarily antecedent to action. It must appear, therefore, 
 that if sin located in a movement of will, a great fundamental 
 act, the person, who necessarily existed antecedently to the act, 
 was then free from sin. 
 
 In the case of the Adam before the fall there is no dispute 
 upon this point. In him whatever existed antecedently to that 
 act of his will which constituted him a sinner was normal—those 
 with whom we controvert now say it was holy. Then from a 
 holy nature originated the unholy act. Then, in order to ac¬ 
 count for the unholy act of apostasy, we do not have to seek a 
 cause lying back of will in an unholy nature. This is a 
 most important concession, since it is precisely what we have 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 69 
 
 contended for, namely, that sin is not predicable of a nature, 
 but of an act of a specific kind. 
 
 It accords with universal consciousness that we impute to 
 ourselves and to our fellow-men, except idiots and insane 
 persons and infants, blame, in view of certain of their acts or 
 nonacts. We reproach them, condemn them, account them 
 deserving of punishment—reproach ourselves, condemn our¬ 
 selves, and account ourselves worthy of punishment. It ac¬ 
 cords with the same universal consciousness that we do not and 
 cannot experience the same, or similar, feeling toward any 
 other being or thing, animate or inanimate, or even toward 
 ourselves or our fellows, with respect to other of our acts, or 
 with respect to anything in our nature which is born with us. 
 There must be a reason for this, and the universality of the 
 fact must be attributed to a universal and identical cause. No 
 such phenomena could appear in consciousness, invariably and 
 universally, without a common ground. Experimental science, 
 when it discovers invariable sequence, predicates identity of 
 causation or antecedents; identical effect proclaims identical 
 causation. The effect here is an awakened feeling of condem¬ 
 nation of a man because of certain of his acts. Now, what is it 
 in the act, or because of the act, which gives rise to this invari¬ 
 able feeling? Is it that it is harmful, injurious, destructive of 
 good? That this is a part of the ground there can be no ques¬ 
 tion ; it must possess this character in order that the feeling of 
 condemnation may be awakened; but, alone, is it a full and 
 adequate explanation ? Take a case—murder. Does the im¬ 
 putation of blame depend wholly on the ground that the de¬ 
 struction of human life is injurious ? Certainly not, or it must 
 follow in every case in which life is destroyed. But this we 
 find is not the fact. The tiger kills ; the earthquake swallows 
 up a city; the storm whelms a fleet; contagion decimates a 
 province. We do not impute blame to any of these, though 
 
70 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 the effect of the destruction of human life is common to them 
 all. It is not, then, solely the fact of a killing, and injury re¬ 
 sulting therefrom, which awakens the feeling of blame. We 
 must find some other and additional ground. And what is true 
 in this case is true in every case in which the feeling arises. 
 There is something additional, as cause of the feeling, to the 
 mere harmful effect of the act. The harmful effect may, in¬ 
 deed, be almost wholly obscured in the consciousness; we 
 may not at all know how it injuriously affects any good of 
 being, but for some reason we may suppose that it does before 
 we can condemn it; but this supposition or discovery is not 
 the adequate ground of condemnation. Upon more careful anal¬ 
 ysis we discover that the feeling of blame is awakened by the 
 knowledge we have of certain unique qualities existing in the 
 perpetrator of the act which give heinousness to it, and draw 
 down blame upon him. What are these conditioning factors ? 
 
 1. We allege, as a part of the ground of our feeling, he knew 
 better. By which we mean to affirm two things: he knew that 
 the act which he did would do harm, and that there was an 
 alternative possible nonact or other act that would not be pro¬ 
 ductive of any or of equal harm. 
 
 2. We allege that at the time when he perpetrated the act 
 he knew that it was wrong, that he ought not to do it—or might 
 so have known. 
 
 3. We allege that when he did the act he had the conscious¬ 
 ness, not only that it was wrong, but that he had the power to 
 refrain from it. The act after it is performed is followed by 
 the corresponding conviction that it was not unavoidable. 
 
 4. We allege that in the light of all these knowings, and 
 against all these feelings, prompting to another and better act, 
 he intended to do precisely what he did do, believing it to be 
 wrong, when he was not under constraint of any kind neces¬ 
 sitating him, and when he had full liberty to the opposite. 
 
"What is Sin? 
 
 71 
 
 These several factors are essential to intelligent feeling or 
 imputation of blame in any and every case, and as predicable 
 of man, and of man alone , constitute the reason why we do, in¬ 
 variably, consciously impute blame to him for some of bis acts 
 and not for others; and why we impute blame to him, and not 
 to other things or beings, when they are cause of similar 
 effects. Any one of them wanting, we are consciously inca¬ 
 pable of the feeling that he ought to be blamed. 
 
 If these presumed grounds are true we cannot repress the feel¬ 
 ing that the blame we impute is just ; but if we should discover 
 that any one of them is false we should be compelled to revise 
 the feeling. If it should be discovered that the act which we 
 supposed was injurious was, in fact, beneficent; or if we should 
 find that he did not know it to be harmful, supposed it not to 
 be, when, in fact, it was; or if we should ascertain that he did 
 not know the difference between right and wrong, or was in¬ 
 capable of feeling obligation to the right and to refrain from 
 the wrong; or if we should come to know that he really had 
 no power to avoid the act; or if we should be compelled to 
 conclude that he did not intend it as mischievous, or that it 
 was involuntary or forced, we could no more impute blame to 
 him than we can to an earthquake. These are antecedent and 
 conditioning postulates of ethics. The corresponding condi¬ 
 tions of praiseworthy action will suggest themselves. The 
 facts of desert and ill desert are conditioned in precisely 
 the same manner, and the same conditions apply to God 
 and the whole retinue of moral existences. Any one of 
 them, from the highest down, would incur blame or deserve 
 praise on precisely the same, and on no other possible, grounds. 
 And not to impute it on these grounds, or to be able to impute 
 it on any other grounds, we should have to be reconstructed. 
 
 In this analysis we do not raise the question as to the 
 origin or grounds of right and wrong—the reasons why some 
 
72 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 things are right, others wrong; why some things ought and 
 others ought not to be. Doubtless the examination would show 
 that it is a distinction which is grounded in the nature of God, 
 and is, therefore, unchangeable and eternal. We should find 
 that his will is the standard, and that his will is unchangeable 
 as the supreme good; and that right therefore is right because 
 it is that which is in conformity to his will, and the exact 
 measure of the supreme good, and that wrong is wrong be¬ 
 cause it is disconformity to his will and therefore to the 
 supreme good. That herein is that which makes the eternal 
 distinction of right and wrong. The distinction is made known 
 to us, and the standard in some measure is revealed in our con¬ 
 sciousness, either directly or indirectly, so that we are able to 
 try our acts by it, and to say this is right and this is wrong, 
 and so to feel the imperative of the ought and ought not before 
 an act is performed, and condemnation or approval afterward. 
 We find that there is a standard, which applies to the entire 
 circle of our volitional acting, which affects the supreme good 
 whether of thoughts, affections, intentions, or external actions; 
 reaching inward to our hidden motives and choices, and regu¬ 
 lating our duties toward God, toward our fellows, and toward 
 ourselves, so that there is no moment of waking conscious¬ 
 ness when its imperative is not touching us in some form. 
 There is no man, equipped with a small amount of intelligence, 
 who does not detect the presence of such a standard in him, and 
 who is not in some measure affected by its authority; it is for¬ 
 ever trying and condemning or approving us. As a standard 
 of action it reaches inward to the deepest springs of action, and 
 lays its imperative on the will, both as to motives and most 
 primary choices. But, as stated, our aim is not now to ascer¬ 
 tain the sources of the distinction of right and wrong, nor yet 
 the extent or authority of the standard, but rather to point out 
 
 the grounds or conditioning facts which make us impute blame 
 6 
 
What is Sin ? 
 
 73 
 
 to ourselves when a wrong act is performed or a right act 
 omitted: in other words, the conditioning grounds of amena¬ 
 bility ; presuppositions without which we cannot be subjects of 
 the law, and can neither break nor keep it; neither be con¬ 
 demned nor approved by it. 
 
 It is a law for the government of wills directly, and of all ex¬ 
 ternal acts which emanate from the will or are volitional. The 
 conditions of its possible violation, as we have found, are that 
 we should know the right which it enjoins, that we should 
 discern the obligation, that we should be able to keep it, that 
 any act which seems to violate it should be intentional—an act 
 of choice—and free. Nothing that we can be or do, which 
 does not presuppose these conditions, can make us deserving of 
 its condemnation nor exposed to its penalties, or vice versa. 
 
 If we are right in these predications blame can only be 
 imputed for a certain kind of volitional activity, under certain 
 conditions, and for effects which emanate therefrom, or for the 
 want of them. In every possible case the imputation of either 
 merit or demerit must respect the will ultimately, as does the 
 law by which the fact of merit or demerit is determined. In 
 no case can we go behind a will-act, as above predicated. This 
 excludes mere nature, and all automatic, instinctive, necessi¬ 
 tated, or unintentional actions. For any of these it is impossible 
 to impute blame, except in ignorance or malice. But, it is said, 
 in fact we do affirm blame of depravity, of evil disposition, of 
 impure imagination, of lustful feelings, which are purely invol¬ 
 untary. This is not true, and what it asserts is impossible. 
 "We impute blame for the nonrepression, noncorrection, and non¬ 
 restraint of evil tendencies which we find in our nature, but 
 not for their existence, unless their existence can be traced 
 directly to our volitional activity—to some wrong use of will, 
 or failure to will. The blame in these cases, as in every other, 
 
 ultimately comes back to some misuse or nonuse of power. 
 
 6 " 6 
 
74 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 We may dread an evil distemper, or be disgusted with an in¬ 
 curable natural mischievousness, as we do when it appears in 
 brutes, and may for self-protection destroy them as dangerous. 
 A malicious lunatic or evil-disposed idiot awakens alarm, and 
 we shut him up. But in such cases we do not pretend that 
 they are amenable to the ought; and this not simply because 
 they lack intelligence, but because, lacking the intelligence to 
 know the right, they lack the conditions to responsible action 
 —that is, the power to choose right ends. 
 
 Thus it appears that universal consciousness attests both the 
 fact and grounds of our responsibility. The fact is substan¬ 
 tially uniform, and is as wide as the race, the only exceptions 
 being instances of idiocy or cases of undeveloped intelligence 
 among adults, and all infants, none of which classes are proper 
 subjects of moral law. This enunciation of universal con¬ 
 science cannot be unimportant. We cannot feel it to be so. 
 It disturbs us; it breaks in on the quiet of our lives; it points 
 ominously to the future—we find ourselves unable to escape 
 from it or to lay it. It is inexorable; will be appeased only 
 by being regarded. It pushes on past all external actions into 
 the very citadel of the soul, and arraigns our motives and pri¬ 
 mary determinations. It will have nothing short of an un¬ 
 broken intention to keep inviolate its demands. It asserts our 
 ability to keep all its requirements, and compels us to blame 
 ourselves for every infraction, on the charge that we know the 
 right, and might have done it. If the charge be true we can¬ 
 not escape. That it is true will further appear in discussing 
 the doctrine of the will. 
 
 A vicious habit obtains in treating of the will, as if it were 
 something apart from the man—something that stood alone, 
 and had a kind of personality of its own. This tends greatly 
 to confusion. As it is the man who knows and feels, so it is 
 the man who wills. The three words simply describe forms of 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 io 
 
 activity which the man exhibits and exerts. When an object 
 passes before him, or when in some way it is brought into cer¬ 
 tain relations to him, he cognizes it—takes note of its exist¬ 
 ence. When it becomes an object of cognition it impresses him 
 with some sort of feeling, pleasurable or the reverse ; awakens 
 in him admiration, desire, a sense of duty, or the opposite. In 
 the presence of the object some one of these feelings arises. It 
 is the man who cognizes and feels. If the object be one of ad¬ 
 miration, he simply admires; if it be one which simply excites 
 disgust, he is disgusted; but if it awaken desire to possess it, or 
 a sense of duty—if it be something which he thinks he ought 
 to have, or which he would like to have, or something which 
 he feels he ought not to have or ought not to do; or if he feel 
 that he would like to have it but ought not, or would like to 
 do it but ought not to—immediately he is brought into new re¬ 
 lations to the subject, and commences a new form of action 
 with regard to it, discrete from both the antecedent knowing 
 and feeling. He chooses it, he determines to have or do it, or 
 he refuses it and determines that he will not have or do it. 
 This is called an act of will, or willing—the power exerted in 
 the act is called the will—but it is the man who acts, and the 
 word will only describes the unique power he exerts. Ho form 
 of activity is more frequent or better understood. It comes into 
 play almost every waking moment. He is weary of standing— 
 he chooses to sit; he is tired of the house—he chooses to go 
 forth ; he wants a book—he chooses to take it; it is the time 
 for church or the theater—he chooses to go; he thinks of a 
 journey—he chooses to make it; he chooses what he will eat, 
 what wear, what business he will pursue, whom he will wed, 
 where he will take up his abode, the color of his coat, the style 
 of his garment, his reading, whether it shall be light or grave, 
 his politics, whether he will support this or that party—in a 
 word, everything he does or does not, his entire life of waking 
 
76 
 
 Studies en t Theology. 
 
 consciousness, whatever liis business or pursuit, is made up of 
 a continued series of volitions. There is no jDOwer in our pos¬ 
 session, or exerted by us, which we know better than this—the 
 power to will, to form volitions. Whatever is presented to us, 
 as something to be done, we immediately act with regard to it 
 affirmatively or negatively, or by holding in abeyance for a 
 future decision, and in either case we make a choice. This is 
 the invariable first form of our action, after knowing and feel- 
 ingr, and we denominate it a will action, or willing:. But in 
 itself it is incomplete. Following there must be an action exe¬ 
 cuting the determination, or a putting forth of power to do that 
 which we have chosen or decided to do. To this we give the 
 name of an executive volition—and it is always a further pro¬ 
 jection of the same power that we exerted in forming the de¬ 
 termination or choice. The two forms often stand in juxta¬ 
 position—the choice to do and the executive act run so close 
 together that they seem to be one; but in fact they are not, 
 since the determination may change before the executive act 
 follows. Many times they are separated by days. The deter¬ 
 mination is that an act shall be done to-morrow, or next year. 
 When the time comes, if we still adhere to the previous choice, 
 we complete it by the executive volition. This double facet 
 of the will is a generic choice and all the consecutive forth- 
 puttings of power to achieve it. The determination to go on 
 a journey is followed by the executive volitions included in its 
 prosecution to the end, which may be many successive discrete 
 acts. The act may thus be a ruling permanent purpose formed, 
 in conformity to which his life is to be fashioned, which is con¬ 
 sidered by him final (it may be amended), but while it holds 
 the voluntas follows in all the consecutive executive acts which 
 realize it. In both the original purpose and the subsequent 
 forth-puttings it is the man that acts, and the power used is the 
 will. Everyone is conscious of the accordance of this statement 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 77 
 
 with, his own experience. By will, then, we mean a power 
 which we possess to originate choices and to execute them—or 
 in general, as defined by Dr. Whedon: “ It is that power of the 
 soul (the man) hy which it intentionally originates an act or state 
 of being. Or, more precisely, will is the power of the soul by 
 which it is the conscious author of an intentional act” That we 
 possess such a power, and constantly use it, it is impossible any 
 man should doubt, unless he has acquired the power to doubt 
 his most pronounced consciousness. To doubt the existence of 
 the power is to doubt the existence of a power which he con¬ 
 sciously exercises every time he acts as an intelligent being. 
 
 We do not yet raise the question of freedom, but seek simply 
 to define a power. The question of freedom in its use will come 
 directly. Whenever the mind, or, rather, the man, is called to 
 act as a will, or volitionally, either in the first form, choosing, 
 or in the second form, executing, he finds himself beleaguered 
 by a variety of feelings which stand in such proximity to his 
 subsequent will-act, and in some sort so resemble it, that they 
 are not always distinguished, though upon careful analysis they 
 are distinct Want of careful analysis has led to much confu¬ 
 sion here. No better illustration of this can be given than is 
 found in the definition of the will by the elder Edwards: 
 “ Whatever names we may call the act of the will by—choos¬ 
 ing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, em¬ 
 bracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbid¬ 
 ding, inclining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased 
 with—all may be reduced to this of choosing.” 
 
 Nothing is more plain than that in this passage there is a group¬ 
 ing together of things utterly dissimilar, some of which belong to 
 the will properly but most of which do not. Some describe 
 purely acts of the discriminating faculty, others mere feelings; 
 others state external acts. The analysis is thus made by Dr. 
 Whedon: “ Now, of the above terms, in order to a greater 
 
78 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 precision, we may say, 1. Approving, disapproving, coming to a 
 conclusion and deciding [deciding may refer to a will action in 
 the sense of determining to do, but it is properly a concluding 
 of the intellect on the merits of a case, and in such case is 
 not a will-act], belong more properly to the intellective or 
 moral faculty; 2. Liking, disliking, inclining, being averse, 
 being pleased with or displeased with, to the sensitive nature; 
 8. Choosing, refusing, rejecting, determining, sometimes decid¬ 
 ing, to the will; 4. Embracing, directing, commanding, and 
 forbidding, to external acts.” Evidently among all these terms 
 the only ones that are properly predicable of the will are those 
 indicated: choosing ; refusing—which is simple choice against; 
 rejecting—which is an active determination not to choose in 
 favor ; determining—which is a final choice to do or not to do; 
 deciding—when it is a decision to do or not. They severally 
 import the same kind of action in some form, and are the same 
 use of the same power. The executive volition results in em¬ 
 bracing, directing, commanding, and forbidding, but the will-act 
 is causal and discrete and lies back of this—in the soul itself. 
 
 Misuse has especially been made of the words desire, prefer¬ 
 ence, disposition, inclination, pleasure, which invariably come 
 to view in a certain class of authors when they treat of lib¬ 
 erty. It is only necessary to remember that these are predi¬ 
 cates of feeling, and not of will. They may be supposed to 
 explain the grounds of an act of will, but can never be identi¬ 
 cal with it. Dr. Whedon, with his usual discrimination, says: 
 
 “ Desire, be it ever so intense, never becomes volition but by a 
 distinct movement known to consciousness; and no action can 
 follow until volition arises. Desire is uneasy and stimulant; 
 will is decisive, and brings all the mind to acquiescence. Yet 
 volition, like desire, is appetency and preference; it is a con¬ 
 scious free act of fixing a settlement upon its object, to which 
 it brings the unity of the man. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 79 
 
 “Will may be distinguished from desire by the following 
 points: 1. Volition is consciously distinct in nature from even 
 the culminating desire. It is felt to be an act —a decisive 
 movement — a putting forth of energy. It is a conscious pro¬ 
 jection, from interior power, of action upon its object. Desire 
 is the flowing forth of appetency for an object; volition is the 
 putting forth of action upon it. 2. Volition and desire differ 
 in their objects. Desire is an appetency for some perceived 
 agreeable quality or agreeable thing in its object. The object 
 of the volition is the post-volitional act which it effectuates. 
 3. We can conceive a being full of coexisting and contending 
 desires and emotions, but without any power of volition, and so 
 hemmed forever into a circle of passivities. 4. To volition, 
 and not to any other mental operation, belong, as before said, 
 intention and motive. This peculiarity alone would be sufficient 
 to distinguish volition as a unique operation and will as a 
 special faculty. 5. There is no mental faculty which our con¬ 
 sciousness so identifies with the self as the will. When the will 
 governs the appetites or passions we naturally say that the 
 man governs them; when they govern the will we say the man 
 is governed by them. 6. The will is alone that power by 
 which man becomes properly an agent in the world. It is the 
 bridge over which he passes in his active power to produce 
 effects, according to design, on objects around him. No mat¬ 
 ter how intense or powerful may be his other feelings or facul¬ 
 ties, he could never execute any projects, shape any objects, 
 or make any history which he could call intentionally his own, 
 without the faculty of will. 7. Upon will alone primarily rests 
 from above the iveight of moral obligation. And surely if, of all 
 possible events, volition alone can be the primary object of 
 obligation, it ceases to be an arrogant or wonderful claim that in 
 volition alone should exist the element of freedom. The necessi¬ 
 tarian allows that in one respect at any rate the event volition 
 
 6 
 
80 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 is absolutely UNIQUE ; it is sole and singular among things; the 
 freedomist, consequently, only claims for that unique super¬ 
 structure, responsibility , an equivalently unique basis, freedom . 
 8. It is a fact that, while among all thinkers there is a perfect 
 unanimity in attributing necessity to all the other mental opera¬ 
 tions, there is, to say the least, a very extensive and perpetu¬ 
 ated denial of necessity in the volition. The necessitarian is 
 bound to account for both this unanimity and this dissent. Here, 
 then, is a distinction, permanent and extensive, between desire 
 and volition. The desire is a mental operation to which all 
 thinkers with perfect unanimity ascribe necessity; the volitions 
 are a mental operation in which all deniers of necessity affirm 
 with an equal unanimity that freedom resides. 
 
 “Inclination belongs to the feelings, and not so properly 
 either to the intellect or the will. From his perception of an 
 object a man feels inclined to choose it It is the feelings that 
 incline , and the will remains quiescent until the initiation of 
 the choice. ‘A mere inclination to a thing,’ says Dr. South, 
 ‘is not properly a willing of that thing.’ 
 
 “ The dispositions are the feelings viewed in relation to any 
 particular object or volition. A man is said to be disposed to 
 an object or act when his feelings are favorable to it; indis¬ 
 posed when they are the reverse. 
 
 “A choice is always a volition, but of a particular kind. It 
 is, namely, a volition by which the agent appropriates to him¬ 
 self one of a class of objects or courses of action on account of 
 some perceived comparative preferability in it. I choose, that 
 is, appropriate to myself, one of a lot of apples, because I see it 
 comparatively most eligible or preferable. I choose one of 
 two roads at a fork because I see it comparably the preferable. 
 I choose from among professions that which seems compara¬ 
 tively most eligible. I choose Grod, not I will Grod. I choose 
 
 virtue, not I will virtue. Choice, then, is an appropriative, com- 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 81 
 
 parative volition; usually, however, including also the exter¬ 
 nal act By it I will one of several things to be mine. To say 
 that I will as I choose is simply to say that one volition is as 
 another volition. Definitions which make a choice not to be a 
 volition are incorrect. In this treatise choice and volition are 
 used interchangeably. 
 
 u To please, as an intransitive, expresses a volition, and 
 ■usually signifies to ivill authoritatively. So a deity or an auto¬ 
 crat pleases that a thing be thus or so, or he does as )iq pleases. 
 That is, he does as he authoritatively wills, chooses, or deter¬ 
 mines. 
 
 “To purpose is to will, to determine, predetermine, or 
 resolve that something shall be willed or done at a future time. 
 I now will or purpose to go to the city to-morrow. A pur¬ 
 pose wills or predetermines now that perhaps an immense 
 number of volitions shall take place. A volition thus com¬ 
 prehensive of many volitions, to which they more or less con¬ 
 form, may be called a standard purpose. This comprehensive 
 purpose resolves the mind into a state of permanent determina¬ 
 tion. A man may act in view of one great life purpose. 
 
 “ The preference is a recognition by the intellect that a given 
 object or course is, on some account, or upon the whole, rather 
 to be chosen than, or held in some way superior to, another 
 with which it is compared. When a man on some account 
 intellectually prefers an object he generally has a feeling of 
 inclination to choose it Nevertheless there mav be coexistent 
 
 t / 
 
 with this preference an opposing inclination on some other 
 account, in favor of which the will may decide. Opposite dis¬ 
 positions and desires may, and often do, coexist in the same 
 mind. Different affections, operations, and forces may exist 
 within the soul and at the same instant fluctuate and struggle 
 for mastery. This agitation might last forever had man, as 
 previously said, no faculty of will. He would be like the 
 
82 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 troubled sea that cannot rest. It is by volition that the facul¬ 
 ties are brought to unity and settlement. 
 
 u Nevertheless to the will also belongs a preferential state. 
 When a volition has resolved the will into a settled purpose 
 that at the proper time it will give a particular volition, or 
 adopt a certain cause or object, then so long the will perma¬ 
 nently prefers that volition course or object to a diverse. 
 
 “ The term indifference was often used by the old writers on 
 the freedom of the will in a technical sense. In ordinary 
 language it now refers to the feelings as being wholly without 
 inclination for or against an object But as in the feelings 
 there may be no inclination, so in the will there may be no 
 volition; and until the will chooses, or differentiates, there is 
 an indifference, nondifferentiation, or quiescence. Whatever 
 may be the coexisting and struggling or fluctuating inclina¬ 
 tions and preferences, the will does not differentiate until it 
 volitionates, chooses, or wills. 
 
 “ Consequent upon the interior volitional act performed by 
 the will is the external voluntary act performed by the body, 
 obeying and executing the imperative volition. Yet it is not 
 the body and the limbs alone which obediently execute the 
 determinations of the interior self through the will. The mind 
 also in its operations, intellective and emotional, is more or 
 less under the will’s control. To trace how complete this par¬ 
 tial volitional control over the body or mind is, is not our pres¬ 
 ent purpose. 
 
 “The intention of an act, volitional or voluntary, objectively, 
 is the result had in view to be produced by the act. This 
 result may be immediate, or more or less remote. Of the 
 same act the intentions may be stated with a great variety. 
 Thus an archer draws his bow. His intention is the discharge 
 of an arrow. That is, such is the immediate result imaged 
 and intended in his mind. But, more remotely, his purpose is 
 
W hat is Sin ? 
 
 83 
 
 that the arrow pierce the body of a stag. Still further remote, 
 there are other and other successive intentions; and it is diffi¬ 
 cult to ascertain, often, the ultimate intention of an act or voli¬ 
 tion. For the intention, near, remote, and ultimate, whether 
 accomplished or not, the agent is responsible. For all the 
 legitimately calculable consequences the agent is responsible. 
 How far even for any consequence of a deliberately wicked act 
 an agent may be responsible is debatable, since he who 
 breaks law is fairly warned by his own reason that he indorses 
 disorder, and so makes any disastrous consequence legitimate 
 and responsible. 
 
 “ Suppose, however, that, without any culpable want of care, 
 the arrow of the archer, missing its aim, is so deflected by 
 some object as to hit and slay his prince. At once it is seen 
 no responsibility for the result accrues. He is irresponsible 
 just because this result was not intended; that is, framed in 
 his conception as that which he, as a volitional agent, exerted 
 his power to bring into existence. Though partially an effect 
 by him caused, that result comes upon him as unconceivedly 
 as a lightning flash darting across his path. For the concep¬ 
 tion unsanctioned by the volition, and for the result uncon¬ 
 ceived and unintended , yet accomplished, there is really no 
 responsibility. 
 
 “ As the intellect, the emotions, and desires conditionally 
 precede the volition, so we may call these th q prevolitional con¬ 
 ditions. The act of body or mind which follows as a conse¬ 
 quent of the volition obeying its power and executing its 
 requirements may therefore be called joostvolitional; so that 
 the position of the act of will is with great precision identified. 
 The willing act is adjectively called volitional; the consequent 
 act of body or mind is called voluntary. When an athlete 
 strikes a blow his willing the blow is a volitional , and the 
 
 sical motion of the arm which obeys and executes his voli- 
 
 6 
 
84 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 tion is a voluntary act. So that we have the prevolitional , the 
 volitional , and postvolitional or voluntary operations as the sum 
 total of all human affections and activities. 
 
 “The occasional confounding of the terms volitional and vol¬ 
 untary, and the transfer of the latter from the postvolitional 
 act to the volition itself, is the source of some error and 
 some unintentional sophisms. Thus Dr. Pond, in the Biblio¬ 
 theca Sacra , says: ‘ If we originate our own voluntary exer¬ 
 cises we must do it voluntarily or involuntarily. If we do it 
 involuntarily there is nothing gained certainly on the score of 
 freedom. There can be no freedom or voluntariness in an 
 involuntary act of origination more than there is in the beating 
 of the heart. But if we originate our own voluntary exercises 
 voluntarily, this is the same as saying that we originate one 
 voluntary exercise by another, which runs into the same ab¬ 
 surdity as before.’ To this we may for the present reply that, 
 as the terms voluntary and involuntary are predicable only 
 of the external actions in reference to the will, the volitions 
 are neither voluntary nor involuntary, but volitional. They 
 are not intrinsically, as free, the product of a previous volition; 
 nor in that does their freedom consist. What their freedom 
 does imply appears in the proper place by our definition. 
 
 “ The younger Edwards, in his remarks on his father’s Im¬ 
 provements in Theology , has the expression, L such volitions 
 being, by the very signification of the term itself, voluntary.’ 
 A voluntary volition is impossible. So on the same page he 
 uses the term spontaneity , not, evidently, as Webster defines it, 
 to signify voluntariness , but as the abstract of volition, volition- 
 ality. 
 
 “ WTien we say that the will wills we really mean that the 
 entire soul, or self, wills. It is the man who wills, and his 
 will is simply his power, or being able, to will. And the free 
 will is really the man free in willing. So it is the man, the 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 85 
 
 soul, the self, that perceives, feels, and thinks. The faculties 
 are not so many divisions of the soul itself, but rather so many 
 classes of the soul’s operations, and the soul viewed as capable 
 of being the subject of them. And as in volition the whole 
 soul is the will, and in thinking the whole soul is the intellect, 
 so it follows that the will is intelligent, and the intelligence is 
 volitional. When, therefore, we speak of will, we speak not 
 of a separate, blind, unintelligent agent, but of the whole intel¬ 
 ligent soul engaged in and capable of volitional actions. It is 
 in no way a separate substance or agent.” 
 
 From all which it appears that of the word will, or in answer 
 to the question, What is will? it must be said that in one 
 facet it is that power which a man possesses by which he origi¬ 
 nates acts of choice, or by the use of which he chooses, deter¬ 
 mines, decides, elects the equivalent of choice or choices ; and in 
 the other facet it is that by which man originates actions de¬ 
 signed to realize the ends of choice—the fountain of efficiency for 
 making real the thing chosen. In the cardinal and most funda¬ 
 mental sense willing is choosing; and, as declared at the outset, 
 it is that which we do, showing that we both possess and use 
 power almost every moment of waking consciousness, and the 
 which is the antecedent subjective act of every objective act, 
 of all the things we do, in the external activity of life, except 
 such as are purely automatic or instinctive. Thus having 
 found what we mean by will, and also willing, w r e come now to 
 inquire for the conditions of the use or exercise of this power. 
 
 A will-act is never originated or executed without something 
 as an end or occasion, existing in the apprehension of the intel¬ 
 lect or in the sensibility moving thereto. These states must 
 exist as grounds or conditions of volitional activity, but not 
 as causes. Nothing can be presented to the mind to elicit its 
 will action that has not its possible alternative suggested by it. 
 The emotions of whatever kind which objects awaken in us 
 
86 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 are neither originated by the will nor subject directly to it. 
 They are natural and necessitated effects. Objects addressing 
 our reason either through sensation, or reflection, or intuition, 
 necessitate belief or cognition of some kind, as, for example, 
 that they are real or unreal, true or false, or indeterminable, or 
 proper objects of inquiry. These effects are independent of 
 volitional activity. Objects addressing our sensibility excite 
 desire and occasion admiration, wonder, astonishment, or 
 awaken emotions of joy or sorrow, pain or pleasure, hope or 
 fear. Objects addressing the conscience or moral reason origi¬ 
 nate the sense of duty, of the ought or ought not. These 
 effects are independent of any direct power of will we possess, 
 and do not suppose any volitional activity. We are passive 
 in them, and they are to be attributed to our peculiar consti¬ 
 tution. These necessitated effects, however, so soon as they 
 are produced solicit an action of the will, and may make some 
 form of volitional activity inevitable. They suggest ends— 
 something to be chosen, or something to be done—which in 
 either case demands an exercise of the will. Thus they are 
 motives or a motive to volitional activity. 
 
 Do they necessitate the precise volition which ensues ? To 
 this there are two utterly opposing answers. Necessitarians 
 insist that there is a clear and causal connection between the 
 excitant and the precise volition which follows. Freedomists 
 deny this, and assert that an action of the will may be necessi¬ 
 tated, but not some particular act; that is, when an object is 
 presented which excites desire, or awakens a sense of duty, 
 it may be inevitable that some will-act should take place, 
 either choosing or refusing, obeying or disobeying; but they 
 insist that it may be either this or that, and the determination 
 which of the possible it shall be is in the power of the actor, 
 and not a mere effect of the excitant. In the realm of the 
 will it asserts man is a free cause. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 87 
 
 It is so severe a strain on any system to deny freedom tliat 
 necessitarians are generally solicitous to escape the charge, and 
 every dialectic art is resorted to for that purpose. They claim 
 to be freedomists, and are loud in complaints when the logic of 
 their system is forced upon them. They invent definitions of 
 freedom and fate or necessity, and show that they hold to the 
 one and deny the other, and then declare it a slander and mis¬ 
 representation to expose the fallacy and refuse them the benefit 
 of their dexterous use of words. It hence becomes important 
 that the words should be clearly defined. Each word, as 
 applied to different objects, has different shades of meaning, 
 and words require to be expressed in different terms ; but each 
 also has a fundamental sense which will be found in every 
 possible case in which it can be employed. Necessitarianism 
 is used interchangeably with fatalism and determinism. In 
 the ultimate result they mean precisely the same thing-—they 
 differ in the method of accounting for events, but in every 
 form the doctrine is that every event that ever has occurred 
 had not only an antecedent cause which made it inevitable, 
 but also the cause was powerless to any other result. Thus 
 inevitability reigns and must forever reign throughout the 
 whole realm of being and events; nothing is, has been, or will 
 be, that might have been otherwise, or that might not have 
 been, and nothing is possible that has not been or will not be. 
 Each immediate antecedent is potent cause of the effect it 
 produces, itself being an effect of a like potent cause, and so 
 on back along an infinite chain, or up to some reigning origi¬ 
 nal fate which locks all in the chain of inevitable sequence; or 
 if not some blind fate, then Grod, who by the mystery of an 
 eternal decree accomplished the same end. We have said 
 that there are diverse methods of explaining the result, but 
 the result is the same. 
 
 The various schemes may be classed as, first, the doctrine of 
 
 6 
 
88 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 fatalism, which teaches that all events are determined by a 
 blind necessity. This necessity does not arise from the will 
 of a person, but from a law of sequence dominating Grod as 
 well as men. Things are as they are, and could not be other¬ 
 wise. 
 
 The second form of the doctrine is the mechanical theory. 
 This is thus defined by Dr. Hodge: “This denies that man is 
 the efficient cause of his own acts. It represents him as pas¬ 
 sive, or as endowed with no higher form of activity than spon¬ 
 taneity. It avowedly precludes the idea of responsibility. It 
 assumes that the inward state of man, and consequently his 
 acts, are determined by his outward circumstances. This doc¬ 
 trine as connected with the materialism of Hobbes, Hartley, 
 Priestley, Belsham, and especially as fully developed by the 
 French encyclopedists, supposes that from the constitution of 
 our nature some things give us pain, others pleasure; some 
 excite desire, and others aversion; and that this susceptibility 
 of being acted upon is all the activity which belongs to man, 
 who is as purely a piece of living mechanism as the irrational 
 animals. A certain external object produces a corresponding 
 impression on the nerves that is transmitted to the brain, and 
 an answering impulse is sent back to the muscles, or the effect 
 is spent in the brain itself in the form of thought or feeling 
 thereby excited or evolved. The general features of this 
 theory are the same so far as its adherents ignore any distinc¬ 
 tion between physical and moral necessity, and reject the doc¬ 
 trine of free agency and responsibility, however much they 
 may differ on other points.”* 
 
 The materialistic fatalist finds absolute necessity reigning in 
 matter—a flow of inevitable sequences. He denies the exist¬ 
 ence of spirit, and volitional phenomena is only more obscure 
 but in no respect different from the rest. A volition differs 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, p. 281. 
 
 a 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 89 
 
 nothing from a crystallization or secretion—each is a result of 
 the only possible material law, or interaction of physical 
 forces. One effect, the only possible, follows another in end¬ 
 less series. Necessity thus being universal and eternal, no man 
 in a lifetime can take one step less or more than actually is 
 taken, or vary in word or thought or deed any more than 
 a planet or atom could release itself from gravitation. In a 
 word, since the universe began there has not been a single stir 
 of any kind, nor an atom of movement or change, that might 
 not have been, or that might have been in any way different. 
 
 We quote further from Dr. Hodge: “A third form of neces¬ 
 sity includes all those theories which supersede the efficiency 
 of second causes, by referring all events to the immediate 
 agency of the first cause. This, of course, is done by panthe¬ 
 ism in all its forms, whether it merely makes God the soul of 
 the world, and refers all the operations of nature and all the 
 actions of men to his immediate agency, or whether it regards 
 the world itself as God, or w T hether it makes God the only sub¬ 
 stance of which nature and mind are the phenomena. Accord¬ 
 ing to all these views God is the only agent; all activity is but 
 different modes in which the activity of God manifests itself. 
 
 “ The theory of occasional causes leads to the same result. 
 According to this doctrine all efficiency is in God. Second 
 causes are only the occasions on which that efficiency is ex¬ 
 erted. Although this system allows a real existence to matter 
 and mind, and admits that they are endowed with certain qual¬ 
 ities and attributes, yet these are nothing more than suscepti¬ 
 bilities or receptivities for the manifestation of divine efficiency. 
 They furnish the occasions for the exercise of the all-pervading 
 power of God. Matter and mind are alike passive; all the 
 changes in the one, and all the appearances of activity in the 
 other, are due to God’s immediate operation. 
 
90 
 
 Studies ix Theology. 
 
 of God in tlie preservation of the world is a continuous creation. 
 This mode of representation is, indeed, often adopted as a figure 
 of speech by orthodox theologians; but if taken literally it im¬ 
 plies the absolute inefficiency of second causes. If God creates 
 the outward world at every successive moment he must be the 
 immediate author of all its changes. There is no connection 
 between what precedes and what follows, between antecedent 
 and consequent, cause and effect, but succession in time; and 
 when applied to the inward world the same consequence, of 
 necessity, follows. The soul, at any given moment, exists only 
 in a certain state; if in that state it is created, then the cre¬ 
 ative energy is the immediate cause of all its feelings, cogni¬ 
 tions, and acts. The soul is not an agent; it is only something 
 which God creates in a given form. All continuity of being, 
 all identity, all efficiency, are lost; and the universe of matter 
 and mind become nothing more than the continuous pulsations 
 of the life of God.” 
 
 To this class belong the so-called advanced scientists of the 
 day. “ They are agreed that there is no freedom. A man is 
 what the environment has made him, and his action is a neces¬ 
 sary resultant of the forces which play upon him. A man’s 
 goodness or badness is entirely beyond his control. The 
 former depends on happy antecedents and on moral physiolog¬ 
 ical action ; the latter depends on unhappy antecedents and on 
 abnormal physiological action. There is as much guilt in hav¬ 
 ing a clubfoot as a disposition to murder. 
 
 “ Nearly allied with the doctrine of continued causation is 
 
 the ‘ exercise scheme.’ According to this theory the soul is a 
 
 series of exercises created by God. There is no such thing as 
 
 the soul, no self, but only certain perceptions which succeed 
 
 each other with amazing rapidity. Hume denies any real 
 
 cause. All we know is that these perceptions exist, and exist 
 
 in succession. Emmons says God creates them. It is, of 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 91 
 
 course, in vain to speak of the liberty in producing the creative 
 acts of God. If he create our volitions in view of motives 
 they are his acts, and not ours. The difference between this 
 system and pantheism is little more than nominal.”* 
 
 Now, all these systems are necessitarian; why ? Is it not 
 simply because they, alike and equally, but in diverse methods, 
 make it impossible that any event should be introduced into 
 the series, or any event left out, by any power of man, or any 
 other agent below the primal cause ? The possibility of some¬ 
 thing other is precluded ; the occurrence of the series is fixed 
 in inevitability. This is necessity, and any theory which 
 insures the same result is of the same essence, however it may 
 differ from these in method ; and whatever invalidation comes 
 to these on the ground of necessity or fatalism must invalidate 
 every other which includes the principle. Any system, to 
 escape, must provide for an agency which is able to break in 
 on the series and from itself originate free acts; that is, acts 
 which no causations out of themselves render inevitable. The 
 advocates of the theories named, themselves, admit that they 
 do away with freedom, that the acts of man are absolutely 
 necessitated; and they accept the sequence that man is an irre¬ 
 sponsible being. They are so manifestly in violent contraven¬ 
 tion of all right thinking, of consciousness itself, that their 
 following has been limited to a few speculative minds, and the 
 reasonings and conclusions are so weak and inconsequent that 
 they are innocuous, and may be safely left to perish of their 
 intrinsic impotence. But there is another theory which, de¬ 
 spite the brave and persistent denial of its advocates and their 
 resolute and dexterous efforts to rescue it from the odium, 
 we shall be compelled to place in the same category, and 
 which will require a more extended examination. It scarcely 
 need be said we refer to the system known as Augustinian or 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, p. 281. 
 
92 
 
 Studies in Tp;eology. 
 
 Calvinian theology. The peculiar exigencies of that system 
 involve the question of freedom directly, and, as we shall be 
 able to show, abolish the possibility of it. Dr. Hodge, from 
 whom we have given such extended extracts, is its latest and 
 most admired and ingenious expounder. If it had been pos¬ 
 sible to evade the charge his great ability and distinguished 
 polemical skill would have accomplished the task ; but, despite 
 all, and notwithstanding the nervous and sensitive aversion to 
 necessitarian schemes and earnest espousal of freedomistic 
 nomenclature everywhere pervading his discussion, it will be 
 found that he has signally failed, and must be written down, 
 from the theology he has devoted his life to teaching, a de¬ 
 fender of the odious doctrine of necessity, or a doctrine of 
 freedom which differs from necessity only in name. In sum¬ 
 ming up, at the close of his very able discussion, he says: 
 “The doctrine of free agency, therefore, which underlies the 
 Bible, which is involved in the consciousness of every rational 
 being, and which is assumed and acted on by all men, is at an 
 equal remove on the one hand from physical or mechanical 
 necessity, which precludes the possibility of liberty and respon¬ 
 sibility, and, on the other, from the doctrine of contingency, 
 which assumes that an act in order to be free must be uncer¬ 
 tain, or that the will is self-determined, acting independently 
 of the reason, conscience, inclination, and feelings. It teaches 
 that a man is a free and responsible agent because he is author 
 of his own acts, and because he is determined to act by noth¬ 
 ing out of himself [it will be hard to reconcile this state¬ 
 ment with words which we shall soon quote from this author], 
 but by his own views, convictions, inclinations, feelings, and 
 disposition, so that his acts are the true products of the man 
 and really represent or reveal what he is.” The profoundest of 
 modern authors admit that this is the true theory of liberty, 
 
 but some of them, as, for instance, Muller, in his elaborate 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 93 
 
 ■work on “Sin,” maintain that, in order to render men justly 
 responsible for the acts which, are thus determined by their 
 internal state or character, that state must itself be self-pro¬ 
 duced. “ This doctrine has been sufficiently discussed when 
 treating of original sin. It may, however, be remarked, in 
 conclusion of the present discussion, that the principle assumed 
 is contrary to the common judgment of men. That judgment 
 is that the dispositions and feelings which constitute character 
 derive their morality or immorality from their nature, and not 
 from their origin. Malignity is evil and love is good, whether 
 concreated, innate, acquired, or infused. A malignant being is 
 an evil being, if endowed with reason, whether he was so 
 made or so born. And a benevolent rational being is good, 
 in the universal judgment of men, whether he was so created 
 or so born."* This statement recurs again and again in Dr. 
 Hodge and all other Calvinistic authors. If it mean anything 
 it means that a man may be guilty without his action—that it 
 may come to him by inheritance. We deny. The thing is 
 impossible, and is shown so to be in the discussion of the sub¬ 
 ject of original sin. 
 
 “It is better to abide by the general statement, the will is 
 not determined by any law of necessity; it is not independent, 
 indifferent, or self-determined, but is always determined by the 
 preceding state of mind; so that a man is free so long as his 
 volitions are the conscious expression of his own mind, or so 
 long as his activity is determined and controlled by his reason 
 and feeling."! In another place, defining his own position, 
 he says: “ The third general theory on this subject is sepa¬ 
 rated by an equal distance from the doctrine of necessity on 
 the one hand, and from that of contingency on the other. It 
 teaches that a man is free, not only when his outward acts are 
 determined by his will, but when his volitions are truly and 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, pp. 307, 308. f Ibid., p. 288. 
 
 6 
 
94 
 
 Studies is Theology. 
 
 properly his own, determined by nothing out of himself, but 
 proceeding from his own views, feelings, and innermost dis¬ 
 positions, so that they are the real, intelligent, and conscious 
 expression of his character, or of what is in his mind.” 
 Again: “ When we say that an agent is self-determined we 
 say two things: 1. That he is the author or efficient cause of 
 his own acts. 2. That the grounds or reasons of his determi¬ 
 nation are within himself. He is determined by what consti¬ 
 tutes him at the moment a particular individual, his feelings, 
 principles, character, dispositions; and not by an ab-extra or 
 coercive influence.” Again : “It may, however, be remarked 
 that there is no difficulty attending the doctrine of foreordina¬ 
 tion which does not attach to foreknowledge. The latter sup¬ 
 poses the certainty of the acts, and the former secures the cer¬ 
 tainty. If, then, being certain be consistent with liberty, being 
 rendered certain cannot be incompatible with it. All that fore¬ 
 ordination does is to render it certain that free acts shall occur. 
 . . . Foreknowledge supposes certainty; foreordination de¬ 
 termines it, and Providence effects it.” * 
 
 These definitions are carefully drawn to make the offensive 
 doctrine as little objectionable as possible. They might, with 
 slight modification, be adopted by freedomists; but they dex¬ 
 terously hide as pure necessitarianism, as if they had said, in so 
 many words, “Man wills as he wills, and is as powerless to will 
 otherwise as the piston is powerless to resist the steam.” In 
 this statement w T e see the doctrine; in the other it is disguised. 
 This is the thing the system contains, and wffiieh its advocates 
 must defend or abandon, and it is neither ingenuous nor loyal 
 to truth to attempt to obscure it and retain it. If it be true, 
 the plainer the statement the better; if it be false, let it not be 
 smuggled into the teaching under false or misleading names. 
 
 Several things are noticeable throughout the discussion of 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, pp. 2S1, 295, SOI. 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 95 
 
 this subject by Dr. Hodge: be has profited by former contro¬ 
 versies, and -with great adroitness seeks to escape the errors of 
 former advocates; bis definitions are more cautious; be finds a 
 function for self-determination; be evinces a slightly improved 
 idea of freedom, but after all finds it impossible to escape tbe 
 maelstrom which has engulfed all bis predecessors. His most 
 dexterous feat is tbe adroit change of tbe issue between tbe 
 parties in tbe controversy. He wages war against several 
 forms of necessitarianism, and by adopting tbe nomenclature 
 of freedomists, and their general postulates, be seems to be a 
 champion of liberty against necessity; thus at tbe same time 
 lulling suspicion and winning favor. Tbe real trend of tbe 
 difficulties of bis theological position is smoothed over or 
 avoided. He makes tbe question in dispute between him and 
 genuine freedomists to be a question about certainty; and 
 then, with spread of learning, proceeds to show that certainty 
 does not. interfere with liberty, that certainty is not necessity, 
 that things may be certain and yet free—as if this were tbe 
 question in dispute. Tbe word contingency, as conspicuously 
 used in tbe old discussion, gives him bis cue. Tbe idea of a 
 possible something different be adroitly makes to mean a total 
 uncertainty of events, and gives that as tbe fundamental issue. 
 But this is not at all tbe view held on tbe subject by tbe class 
 of freedomists to which it was important be should give atten¬ 
 tion. They, no less than be, bold that whatever will be was 
 certain from eternity, certain in fact and certain in tbe divine 
 knowledge, but tbe ground of tbe certainty was not tbe impos¬ 
 sibility of tbe opposite. They bold that in every case in which 
 tbe action of a free will is concerned the precise opposite 
 might have been, and then tbe certainty would have been dif¬ 
 ferent That it is as it is is simply because wills are as they 
 are, but not because it was impossible they should be other¬ 
 wise. Tbe theory is as far from contingency, in tbe sense of 
 
96 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 may not be, as it is from necessity. The fact that an event 
 will certainly occur, or the fact that it is foreknown, neither 
 necessitates its occurrence nor proves that it was so fixed 
 beforehand, nor so inevitable at the time, that it might not 
 have been different. This the freedomist has a right to hold, 
 and in the absence of it there can be no true freedom; but it 
 is what no Augustinian can hold, and it is what Dr. Hodge 
 does not hold, and for the want of which he finds himself inex¬ 
 tricably in the coils of necessity. In answer to the question : 
 “Can a man in the exact environments put forth a volition 
 different from the one he does put forth ? ” he must and does 
 answer, Ho ; and yet he declares the will is free. The ground 
 of the answer is that it is his volition, that it springs from him¬ 
 self alone, that no external causation is involved, that it repre¬ 
 sents correctly his feeling, reason, and disposition; that there¬ 
 fore he is justly responsible for it; that if it were not precisely 
 what it is it would not represent him, but something else. 
 To this, allowing it to be true, we answer, If the fact remain 
 that he was shut up to the volition, so as not to be able to 
 withhold it or vary it, however it may spring from him alone, 
 and truly represent his innermost nature, and be free from 
 external compulsion, it nevertheless reduces him to a mere 
 machine, and leaves him no more free than a lump of matter. 
 In fact, in the last analysis, his so-called personal act, so far 
 from being free from external compulsory causation, is directly 
 attributable to it. What is external compulsion ? If a man 
 were seized by some person and forced to do what he would 
 choose not to do, the case is clear; but is it less clear if the 
 power that creates him so constitutes him that he cannot avoid 
 the choice? Why does he choose as he does? Because he 
 cannot choose otherwise. Why can he not choose other¬ 
 wise ? Because his nature is as it is. Why is his 
 nature as it is? Because his Maker so constituted him. 
 
What is Sin ? 
 
 97 
 
 Then the reason that he does as he does is that his 
 Maker incorporated in the nature he gave him a necessity that 
 he should so act. The compulsion is real, and is external. It 
 invests him with intelligence, and feeling, and spontaneity, 
 but it divests him of freedom, since what he does he cannot 
 avoid doing. The only possible responsibility that can exist 
 in the case must lie back of him, in the creative power which 
 so made him that he is incapable of responsibility; so made 
 him that his volitions must inevitably be precisely as they 
 are. It is nothing that they are his, or represent him, if they 
 represent an automaton. A reasoning, living, feeling autom¬ 
 aton, if such a thing were possible, is no more free than a 
 senseless dead thing; and without gross injustice is no more 
 susceptible of blame. Neither reason, nor feeling, nor sponta¬ 
 neity implies freedom—nor all combined. The reason is not 
 free, nor is the feeling, nor is the disposition, nor that state of 
 the mind—the whole complex—which immediately precedes a 
 volition and which Dr. Hodge says determines the volition, so 
 that it must inevitably be as it is. Dr. Hodge admits and 
 teaches this. But if these necessitated states in turn necessi¬ 
 tate volition, and the exact volition, and make any other voli¬ 
 tion impossible, how is it possible to conceive of a closer chain 
 of necessitation ? He may dilate as much as he pleases on the 
 peculiarities of an intelligent, sensitive, and volitionating being, 
 but these only diversify the kind of being without breaking 
 the reign of necessity. The theological system defended by 
 this illustrious divine shuts him up to his theory of the will, 
 and is a system which in some of its dogmas expels freedom 
 from the universe. Its theory of foreknowledge, not less than 
 its theory of foreordination, works this result. It makes fore¬ 
 knowledge a result of decree, which not only fixes events in 
 certainty, but in certainty because of necessity. Events are 
 foreknown, not simply as foreseen, but as fixed in causational 
 
93 
 
 Studies ix Theology. 
 
 inevitability. The subterfuge of a permissive decree brings no 
 relief to the doctrine. The decree determines what they must 
 be, and an arrangement is made which secures the result. It 
 matters nothing that the result is according to the laws of 
 mind. These laws are instituted to insure the sole possible 
 event. Before the scheme is perfected all its inclusions are 
 fixed in inevitability, and it is alleged that for this reason the 
 utmost minutia is foreknown; and it is assumed that in this 
 way alone are foreknowledge and certainty possible. There 
 is, according to this theory, precisely the same possibility, and 
 no more, of altemativity in the realm of spirit as in the realm 
 of matter, and freedom is as predicable of one as of the other. 
 A volition is as much determined by its antecedents as any 
 effect in the physical universe. If it be said the mind is the 
 
 author of its own volition bv its constitution, while the atom 
 
 «/ • 
 
 is not author of its motion, the answer is, It can no more avoid 
 its volition than an atom can resist gravitation. Herein they 
 are alike; that is, however they may differ in other respects, 
 as to a possible altemativity of action they are precisely alike. 
 
 It is vain to say that the decree is not the efficient cause, 
 since the theory determines that the so-called efficient cause, 
 the man himself, is bound to the sole act which is decreed, and 
 since, also, the decree so environs the agent that his antecedent 
 state of mind, which the will represents, is one over which he 
 has no control. He is what he is by no act or choice of his, 
 and the necessity which makes him drags the volition. Thus, 
 give the theory the benefit of its last and most cautious utter¬ 
 ance, it is still a scheme of necessity. Nothing ever has been 
 which might have been otherwise. Whatever the spontaneity 
 of the human action, and however free from external compul¬ 
 sion, he is fettered. His so-called liberty is a mockery. To 
 predicate responsibility of him is an outrage on reason and con¬ 
 science. When taken in connection with the assumed fact that 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 99 
 
 his every volition is in accordance with an eternal decree which 
 cannot be resisted, and that he is providentially so environed 
 that his acts are determined to the one possible end of its ful¬ 
 fillment, to pretend that he is responsible, or is held to ac¬ 
 count for them, and blamed and punished for them, is to do 
 violence to the idea of justice, and to whelm the government 
 of God in unutterable dishonor and disgrace. If it were true it 
 would obliterate the last traces of moral distinctions and con¬ 
 vict reason and conscience of fraud. If there were a God who 
 could enact such a scheme, and who could execute it, it would 
 be impossible that men should reverence and worship him 
 until they had first reversed their intuitions of justice and 
 righteousness. But the atrocious supposition is false. It is a 
 misrepresentation of the laws of mind. Its assumption that 
 volition is determined by anything internal or external to the 
 mind is without foundation. The self is a rational being, in¬ 
 telligent, sensitive, moral. It can never divest itself of these 
 characteristics. When it acts it must act with these qualities; 
 but it may and does ignore right reason, right feeling, and con¬ 
 science. Nor does this divest it of its nature. It is still a rea¬ 
 soning, feeling, and conscience-endowed being, whether it act in 
 accordance with its best promptings or against them. Dr. Hodge 
 seems to imagine that he makes a point w T hen he says: “All 
 the desires, affections, or feelings which determine the will to act 
 must have an object, and that object by which the feeling is ex¬ 
 cited and toward which it tends must be discerned by the un¬ 
 derstanding. It is this that gives them their rational character, 
 and renders the determination of the will rational. Any voli¬ 
 tion which does not follow the best dictates of the understand¬ 
 ing in this sense of the word is the act of an idiot. It may be 
 spontaneous, just as the acts of brutes are, but it cannot be free 
 in the sense of being the act of an accountable person.’' * 
 
 * Systematic Thelogy , vol. ii, p. 287. 
 
100 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 What a strange mixture of truth and error! Certainly a 
 rational being must apprehend the object toward which he 
 acts; there is no dispute about that; but is that the same as to 
 say that his act must be the last dictate of his reason ? May 
 he not be a reasoning being and yet act as a fool ? Is not that 
 the exact fact in all cases of wrongdoing ? When a man acts 
 against his reason it does not prove that he is an idiot or that 
 he acts upon mere spontaneity as a brute does. If it were so 
 it would free him from responsibility. But it proves this, 
 rather, that, being a reasonable being, he acts like an idiot. 
 He acts against what from his nature he knows to be right. 
 That is his sin. For that reason he becomes subject of blame. 
 The last state of his understanding, before his act, was to see 
 the right, and know it, and feel its obligation; his act was to 
 reject it, and debase himself by playing the part of a fool. We 
 repeat, therefore, that freedom is the absolute mastery the mind 
 has over its own acts, be they right or wrong. It can do as 
 it ought or as it ought not. Which it will do it determines. It 
 is not shut up to do, as the greatest good or as what seems to 
 it the greatest good, as the strongest motive or as any particu¬ 
 lar motive, but determines for itself what it will do. It is 
 sovereign of its own acts. It says, It is unreasonable, it is ab¬ 
 horrent, it is essentially wrong, but I will do it and take the 
 consequences; or, It is right, it is what ought to be, it is good 
 —I know all this—but I will not do it. If you ask why, it 
 answers, Because I choose to. If you ask why it chooses to, 
 it might assign many reasons, as, I feel like it; I am disposed 
 to ; I take the risk. But, whatever the reason of the action, it 
 cannot be assigned as the efficient cause, or as the determining 
 cause. It is one among many of the possible incitants to act, 
 and the one which is selected. Any other might have been, 
 this one is that in view of which the actor determines himself. 
 
 To say that he could not therefore have determined differently 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 101 
 
 is what he consciously knows is not true. One need only test 
 by the little, common events of each passing moment to assure 
 him of the truth in every case. Alternatives are always pres¬ 
 ent with him. He is exercising the power of selection every 
 instant, choosing this instead of that; and to pretend that he 
 is shut up to the de facto accepted form of action is to say that 
 he cannot but close his eye, move his head, shift his position, 
 or pronounce the word, if he intentionally perform any one of 
 these acts. Its absurdity and utter falsity are so plain that we 
 cannot suppose that those who propound it are grave and sincere. 
 
 Dr. Hodge is persistently shy of the point which has so con¬ 
 fused his compeers, the influence of motives, but he does not 
 escape. He says: “Most of the arguments against the state¬ 
 ment that motives are the cause of volition are founded on 
 the assumption that they are affirmed to be producing causes, 
 and that it is intended to deny that the agent is the efficient 
 cause of his own acts; whereas the meaning simply is that 
 motives are the reasons that determine the agent to assert his 
 efficiency in one way rather than another. They are , however , 
 truly causes , in so far as they determine the effect to he thus , and 
 not otherwise How, nobody ever taught that the motives 
 did the deed of the agent; that they were in that sense effi¬ 
 cient cause. The man does the act; he is efficient cause. But 
 how does this relieve Dr. Hodge ? He says the motives cause 
 him to do it; determine it to be as it is. The man puts forth 
 the power, but the motive makes him do it; it determines him. 
 If the motive determines him he is as unfree to the opposite 
 as if a muscular force compelled him. The act is his, in the 
 same sense in which the river current is the act of the river, so 
 far as ability not to act, or to act differently, is concerned. If 
 you could make the river understand that it flows, and impart 
 to it a desire to flow, and leave it under the same necessity 
 
 * Systematic Theology, vol. ii, p. 290. 
 
 6 
 
102 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 that now makes it flow, yon would have an exact analogy to 
 the case of the man impelled by motive. He perceives an 
 object toward which to act; it excites him in a certain manner; 
 he is moved thereby to act, and has no power to resist it. Is 
 it not a misnomer to call this freedom ? Is it not impossible to 
 make it the ground of responsibility ? 
 
 When he comes to speak of liberty and ability he evinces the 
 same confusion and embarrassment. It is obvious in every 
 line that he is forced to put evasive meaning on the words 
 with which the problem requires him to deal. 
 
 We set over against these definitions this one: 11 Freedom of 
 will consists in the absence of all insuperable impediments, 
 internal or external, to the use of the power of choice and 
 executive volitions, whenever an occasion for its exercise ex¬ 
 ists.” This definition recognizes the fact that the power is a 
 power which belongs to a person; that the power and use of it 
 are discrete; that the freedom is predicable, not of the power, 
 but of him who uses it; that the freedom consists in the ab¬ 
 sence of insuperable impediments in the way of its use; that in 
 order to be used there must be an occasion or end. 
 
 We have seen that the power he has is two-faceted—power 
 to choose an end, and power to effectuate the end chosen. But 
 this makes it necessary that in order to the use of the power 
 there should be an object, and that to be an object it must be 
 known, and must awaken sensibility, and must be possible. 
 For the power to choose is not power to choose when there is 
 nothing to be chosen. There is nothing to be chosen when 
 there is nothing known or felt; and nothing can be chosen if 
 the objects known and felt are known to be impossible. A 
 person must possess the power of will that he may be a person, 
 but there are indispensable external conditions of its exercise 
 without which it would lie fallow forever; in the absence of 
 which the nonuse and nonpossibility of use are no limitation 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 103 
 
 of personal freedom; for how can there be freedom to choose 
 when there is nothing to be chosen ? and what limitation of 
 freedom is it to make it impossible to choose an object which it 
 is known cannot be possessed, or not to be able to put forth 
 power to accomplish what it is known cannot be accomplished? 
 
 In order that choice may be exercised there must be plurality of 
 objects. The term itself means selection, or determination to 
 one rather than another, and all equivalent terms imply this. 
 If the object be single it always presents the alternative of 
 choice or rejection, to do or not do. This is the most re¬ 
 stricted alternativity possible. From this it may widen into 
 any number of alternatives, out of which one only may be 
 chosen. In most cases there are reasons for and against, with 
 a like division of feeling ; the reasons and feelings take oppo¬ 
 site sides, and the conflict is sharp and earnest. In a few cases 
 the intelligence and sensibilities agree. In the former case 
 choice is difficult, in the latter it is frictionless and easy, but in 
 all cases the person is master of the power and determines what 
 the choice shall be. It is never made without the conscious¬ 
 ness that it might be other than it is—unless it may be in some 
 gust of passion, when the deed is rather an impulse than a 
 rational act, or when by long course of habit the person is 
 reduced to mere automatism and freedom is substantially de¬ 
 stroyed, and the power runs away with the master. That 
 there are cases of this kind there can be no doubt. Freedom 
 may be obscured, weakened, overslaughed, possibly destroyed, 
 but during probationary existence it remains intact, and mani¬ 
 festation of it is constant and the consciousness of it complete. 
 When destroyed the subject ceases to be a proper object of 
 command, and probation ends; but he may continue to be a 
 proper object of punishment forever for bringing himself by a 
 criminal abuse of freedom into this abject and guilty condition. 
 When we heed reason against desire or yield to desire against 
 
104 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 reason, when we curb passion or indulge it, it is with the per¬ 
 fect knowledge that we bad, at the moment, power to the oppo¬ 
 site, and that there was no impediment to its exercise which 
 necessitated us to the sole and single act. And it is on this 
 ground alone that we predicate of our act desert of praise or 
 blame. If we could once persuade ourselves that the deed 
 was unavoidable—that in the exact circumstances in which 
 the choice was made and act performed we had no power to 
 the contrary, or could not use it—it would forever be im¬ 
 possible to create in us any feeling of responsibility, and we 
 should be as incapable of remorse as a piston or a water¬ 
 wheel driven by absolute forces. It serves nothing toward 
 restoring the idea of responsibility to say that the act was 
 chosen, that it was spontaneous, that it was our act, that there 
 was no external force, that we did as we pleased, or that we 
 were free, if it be once established that we could not avoid 
 it—that it was not in our power to refrain from it or do some¬ 
 thing else. This is so manifestly true, so accordant with the 
 common everyday experience, with the universal conscious¬ 
 ness ; so absolutely essential to all ideas of morality; so in¬ 
 eradicable as long as any sense of responsibility remains on 
 earth; so the basis of all law, human and divine ; so corporate 
 in the structure of language and institutions—so a law of 
 thought itself—that it never could have been called in ques¬ 
 tion but by a system which abolishes God from the universe, 
 or one which traduces his character and throne. Either, the 
 one no more than the other, reduces man to a mere piece of 
 mechanism, and all his acts—great and small, whether of in¬ 
 tellect, or affection, or will, or external deed—to the same cate¬ 
 gory as secretions, differing only in kind ; both, the one no 
 more than the other, make conscience a brazen fraud, a false 
 accuser, a usurper ; and either converts its reproofs into abuses 
 and its warnings into a mere brutum fulmen , or convicts the 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 105 
 
 Author of the universe of a character more frightful than 
 human imagination has as yet been able to portray. 
 
 The proofs of freedom, as here defined, are, first, conscious¬ 
 ness. If there be any deliverance in consciousness on the sub¬ 
 ject of our powers it is this. We are no more conscious of a 
 power to know or feel than we are of the power to choose and 
 put forth executive acts. We are no more conscious of the 
 power to choose than we are of the power to choose the oppo¬ 
 site of any choice we make. It never occurs to us, when the 
 power is exerted, that it is a power to that sole act. When we 
 make it a subject of thought we intuitively know that it is not. 
 From the conviction of the intuitive reason, posited in con¬ 
 sciousness, however we may be confused by sophistry, we 
 never escape. The conviction is not simply that we have power 
 to choose, and do spontaneously choose as we do, but that we 
 could choose otherwise. The structure of every language on 
 earth demonstrates that this accords with the universal thought 
 —-that it is a spontaneous utterance of mind as mind. Such 
 agreement can only arise from an inevitable deliverance of 
 consciousness, or absolute intuition. It makes nothing against 
 this that theories repudiate it. 
 
 It is objected that consciousness does not reach a latent, 
 
 unused power, but only the power which is actually exerted; 
 
 that we are conscious, not of what we could do, but of what 
 
 we do. This is not true. Before we act we are conscious of 
 
 the power to act, and if we were not we could not act at all. 
 
 An object is placed before the mind, an object of perception. 
 
 It awakes consciousness by exciting perception. We come to 
 
 know self and what the self does. The object awakens desire 
 
 or some state of feeling. We become immediately conscious, 
 
 not only of desire, but of a power to act toward it, to choose it 
 
 or refuse it. This consciousness of power to choose or refuse 
 
 is not subsequent to the act, but antecedent and requisite con- 
 8 6 
 
106 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 dition of it. Thus consciousness of power precedes the use of 
 power, and it is consciousness of power to or from—to choose 
 or reject. 
 
 The second proof is that we are responsible for our acts. This, 
 like the one just named, is an intuitive and uneradicable con¬ 
 viction of mind as mind. All institutions of government and 
 discipline repose on it; all languages express it; all personal 
 remorse and self-approval imply it; all condemnation or com¬ 
 mendation of others for their acts or nonacts proclaim it. 
 There is no escape from it, except by a process of self-abuse 
 which obliterates all traces of mind. But we likewise intui¬ 
 tively know that, if responsible, we must have powers over 
 our acts: to will or not to will; power to the opposite, power to 
 and from. We know that, in every case where we discover 
 necessity, immediately we become unable to predicate respon¬ 
 sibility absolutely. Freedom, as power to the opposite, and 
 responsibility stand or fall together. The one can no more 
 stand without the other than consciousness can without a liv¬ 
 ing, intelligent subject. The idea of responsibility is not 
 empirical, not something that comes after experience. Experi¬ 
 ence does, indeed, establish it; we see by it that we are respon¬ 
 sible ; but, before the act and the resulting effects, we feel the 
 responsibility; we anticipate the effect; we discern what it 
 will and must be. Consciousness of responsibility is the pre¬ 
 cursor of every moral act; and this consciousness is that the 
 proposed act is right or wrong, and that if done we shall be 
 required to answer; and that we can only be required to 
 answer as it is our free and unnecessitated act; that when we 
 perform it we possess the power to the opposite. On these 
 grounds alone are we able to think responsibility. 
 
 Third: the Scriptures affirm freedom as power to the opposite; 
 its accusations and persuasions are meaningless without it. 
 To this view of freedom several objections are made; not on 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 107 
 
 the ground that it is irrational, nor jet that it is unscriptural, 
 but that it is irreconcilable with other doctrines which are 
 held to be true. It is safe to say that if it were considered 
 apart, bj itself, it would never be challenged. The exigencies 
 of systems create the debate; the proof of which is that those 
 who reject it nevertheless in all practical matters accept it, 
 and in their theorizings avoid and confuse the real issue in 
 every way possible. Materialists reject it because it presup¬ 
 poses a moral realm, which they deny. They do not deny 
 the phenomena of consciousness and conscience, on which it 
 rests, but they set them down as a delusion and a snare, and 
 therefore as proving nothing, and as deserving only such con¬ 
 sideration as hallucinations are entitled to. Their one answer 
 is, Freedom implies a class of powers which do not exist; 
 therefore it is false: there is no effect without a cause, and 
 every cause is potent to the effect. If materialism were true 
 the argument would be unanswerable and the moral universe 
 would be abolished. Augustinians—Calvinists—-reject it, for 
 the reasons following: 
 
 1. It is inconsistent with the sovereignty of God. See 
 answer in the discussion of Sovereignty. 
 
 2. It is inconsistent with the divine plans and decrees. 
 
 3. It is irreconcilable with the foreknowledge of God. 
 
 4. It is a kind of freedom not necessary to meet the de¬ 
 mands of the moral problem. 
 
 The freedom necessary to constitute us moral beings, it is 
 alleged, is simply the freedom to do as we choose, or to act 
 out what is in us. If by this is meant freedom to do external 
 acts it is not freedom of will at all, since the will-act must pre¬ 
 cede the external act. If acting out what is in us means act¬ 
 ing according to nature, this is the freedom of natural forces to 
 produce their effects. In either case it leaves us wholly pow¬ 
 erless as to effects by leaving us wholly necessitated as to our 
 
103 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 causality. The will is the fountain of all efficiency; if we do 
 not have power over its decisions or activity we have no 
 power. That which the moral problem demands is that we 
 should have freedom as to our own causality; that we should 
 be causes in the true and proper sense; that is, that we should 
 originate the beginning of our responsible activity. If the 
 choices are caused in us, and not by us, and the acts flow from 
 the necessitated choices, the acts are not ours, but must be 
 ascribed to the necessitating agent which puts our power of 
 choice in action. 
 
 5. It is alleged that we are conscious of being influenced by 
 motives, and if influenced in some measure there can be no 
 adequate ground for assuming that the influence may not be 
 irresistible. 
 
 Influence of motives prepares us for action by furnishing an 
 end attractive to the reason and feeling, or otherwise; but here 
 its function ceases. If it also determined our act, in what re¬ 
 spect would we differ from the needle when it is drawn to the 
 magnet, and how could responsibility be any more predicated of 
 the one than the other ? It matters nothing that it is our char¬ 
 acter which gives power to the motive, since our character is 
 simply a product of causes outside our freedom. The theory 
 takes freedom from us as really as if the resulting act were 
 forced directly. Allow that by a course of free acts we make 
 ourselves what we are, and so give power to internal and ex¬ 
 ternal motives, and the case is clear. We may by a process 
 of freedom make ourselves impure; may bind chains about us 
 that we cannot break ; but then it is we that do it—and we are 
 responsible for the enslavement and whatever evil ensues. In 
 such a case we are not responsible for that to which we had no 
 power, but for the destruction of a power which we did possess. 
 
 6. It is alleged that our depravity is such that, without 
 grace, we are disabled to good. 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 109 
 
 This is admitted; but we are not without grace, and not re¬ 
 sponsible for the depravity except as, by the refusal of grace, 
 we permit it to dominate us. 
 
 7. It is said that after probation—by the admission of all 
 parties—the good are unchangeably fixed in good and the evil 
 in evil, and this without affecting their merit or demerit. 
 
 The confirmation of saints in a state of unchanging holiness 
 does not destroy their freedom to the opposite, but simply de¬ 
 notes that they have entered a condition in which they will 
 resist evil and choose good forever. It is not a growth out of 
 freedom into necessity, or a change from responsible to non- 
 responsible existence, but it is advancement to a state where 
 temptation will practically cease, and the spontaneity will be 
 frictionless toward the good, but not under the laws of neces¬ 
 sity. The reverse is true of the evil. The holiness of the one 
 and the evil of the other will have arisen from freedom, and 
 will continue to be the expression of freedom. But it is said 
 they will never change. Admitted. This does not prove that 
 they are not free. There may be a sufficient reason for their 
 remaining as they become without binding them in the chains 
 of necessity—without reducing them to mere automata. 
 
 The Scriptures do, indeed, teach the permanence of the good 
 in goodness and of the evil in evil—the certainty that they 
 will never change—but this is not the affirmation that they are 
 not free; to assume it is to be wise above what is written; but 
 even if this were affirmed it would not imply that their being 
 in this fixed condition is not because of acts which were per¬ 
 formed in freedom. If it should appear that a human spirit 
 may come to fixedness in evil by a long course of evil habit, 
 or by separation from gracious influences as a just punishment 
 for sin, it would not change the fact of its responsibility for its 
 condition, since it is the result of abuse of free will. The 
 ground of blame for present acts would be that the authors of 
 
110 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 them brought themselves into the condition of fixedness by 
 former free courses of self-abuse. They might not, indeed, be 
 responsible for what they now do, or fail to do, if it be impos¬ 
 sible to do otherwise, but they would be answerable for making 
 it impossible. The good, on the other hand, are but reaping 
 the just reward of a holy life, which has developed in them, 
 not a necessary continuance in holiness, but a free and change¬ 
 less volition to it. But it is said that even now the wicked 
 cannot turn themselves to God, and especially that they cannot 
 make themselves good. They must be able to do both of these 
 if they are required. No being can be commanded to do what 
 is impossible and the command be just. If of mere nature the 
 thing is impossible it will be found the requirement does not 
 rest on mere nature. If grace be needed to supplement weak¬ 
 ness it will be found the grace is always given. Freedom does 
 not apply to all things. A man is not free to fly, or subsist 
 without food, or to do anything for which he has no faculty; 
 but this does not imply that he is not free in his proper sphere. 
 A man cannot annihilate the fact that he has sinned, cannot 
 purge his depravity, cannot by a volition make himself holy; 
 but this does not imply that he cannot do anything he is re¬ 
 quired to do, and for the not doing of which he is blamewor¬ 
 thy. The fact is admonitory that the growing influence of 
 habit may make it irresistible, but it does not prove nonfree¬ 
 dom, but rather the opposite, during a period of probation. It 
 makes the possible loss of freedom a possible element of pun¬ 
 ishment. A soul reaching this state cannot be said, henceforth, 
 to be so much blamable for its habitual sinfulness and help¬ 
 lessness as for those free acts which brought it into such a 
 forlorn state. It rests under eternal blame for being as it is 
 and doing as it does, since it was the free cause of its own evil 
 state. It once might have been avoided, and it is now a just 
 
 recompense. The truth remains that there must be ability 
 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 Ill 
 
 where there is responsibility, and a condition of blamableness 
 and punishment must be the outcome of acts which were free, 
 and so which might have been avoided. No being can 
 ever be blamed that could not have done other than that for 
 which he is blamed, and no being can be entitled to praise for 
 doing or being anything which is the result of necessity, be it 
 internal or external. These axioms are, like all other axioms, 
 eternal and necessary truths. 
 
 It may indeed be a question whether a soul once enthralled 
 by sin can ever work out its own deliverance or have power 
 of self-restoration to holiness. It may even be certain that it 
 cannot; but it must be certain that it cannot be placed in this 
 condition by actions necessitated in it, and that it cannot be 
 blamed for not doing what is impossible. All ground of con¬ 
 demnation must rest on the freedom it once possessed, and by 
 the abuse of which it is reduced to its hopeless state of help¬ 
 lessness and ruin. 
 
 There may, indeed, come a time when efforts at reclama¬ 
 tion may cease ; but so long as invitation is extended, and the 
 duty of reformation is urged upon or by the conscience, there 
 must be either personal power to comply or some external 
 help available. The offers of salvation and the demands 
 made for obedience in the Gospel are a mockery if the sinner 
 has no power of his own, and none in his reach, by which he 
 may comply with the one and obey the other. When possible 
 action to the right ceases the exhortation and command must 
 cease. If it is said, If this be so, then, w T hen a sinner, by 
 reason of his sin, incurs disability to be holy, which was his 
 duty, holiness ceases to be a duty, and his continued unholi¬ 
 ness is no violation of his obligation, and it can no more be 
 said of him that he ought to be holy—we answer, This cer¬ 
 tainly does not follow. He ought to be holy; he has made 
 himself unable to be so; the obligation is not abolished, and 
 
112 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 for the disability, self-superinduced, he may be justly pun¬ 
 ished. The measure of his guilt is precisely the measure 
 of the ought which was possible to him, and for which he 
 was responsible. That he cannot now render it is his own 
 fault, and while he cannot be required to do the impossible 
 thing he may be justly punishable for the not doing of it, or to 
 the full extent of the measure of guilt for not doing it, since 
 by disabling himself he failed in the service justly required of 
 him. Nor would this be punishing for acts to which the guilty 
 party was not able. He was able. He made himself unable. 
 His guilt was incurred under the conditions which make guilt 
 possible; it remains now under conditions in which it would 
 be impossible if the present state were not self-superinduced. 
 But, it is said, still the blame is imputed for a state or acts 
 which are now inevitable, and this breaks down the rule that 
 no blame can be imputed when acts are inevitable. We an¬ 
 swer, This is not true. All the life of sin was evitable once, 
 and we blame the culprit because he has lived it, and con¬ 
 tinues to live it, when he might have avoided it. 
 
 To the doctrine of freedom it is further objected that it is in 
 contradiction of the established doctrine of a sufficient cause; 
 that it releases the will from the operation of the universal 
 law. The law is, “ For each effect there must be a cause, and 
 the cause produces the effect.” Volitions are effects; a suffi¬ 
 cient cause must be assignable ; but these volitions come under 
 the general law of causation, and freedom can no more be 
 predicable of them than of other effects. Each volition must 
 have a sufficient cause, and the sufficient cause must produce 
 the exact and only effect of which it is the sufficient cause; it 
 cannot be a cause and not a cause at the same time, and it may 
 not be a cause of nothing in particular; since, then, the exist¬ 
 ence of the cause necessitates the existence of the effect, voli¬ 
 tional effects cannot be free. Let us do justice to this objec- 
 6 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 113 
 
 tion. What do we mean by cause? “The word cause,” Dr. 
 Hodge says, “is ambiguous. Sometimes it means the mere 
 occasion; sometimes the instrument by which something is ac¬ 
 complished ; sometimes the efficiency to which the effect is due; 
 sometimes the end for which a thing is done, as when we 
 speak of final causes; sometimes the ground or reason why the 
 effect or action of the efficient cause is so rather than other¬ 
 wise. To say that motives are the occasional causes of voli¬ 
 tions is consistent with any theory of agency, whether of neces¬ 
 sity or indifference. To say that they are efficient causes is to 
 transfer the efficiency of the agent to the motives ; but to say 
 that they are the ground or reason why the volitions are what 
 they are is to say that every rational being, in every rational 
 act, must have a reason, good or bad, for acting as he does.”* 
 
 When, then, it is said that an event must have an adequate 
 cause, we mean one of these several things: a person which 
 produces it, or the reason why the person acts, or an end to 
 which it is exerted. Ultimate cause must be spontaneous; that 
 is, must be uncaused, must have the grounds of action in itself. 
 This, in the last analysis, is the only proper idea of cause; and 
 the action of such a cause must be free. 
 
 In what way is freedom inconsistent with the doctrine that 
 every effect must have a sufficient cause ? Suppose a being 
 exist such as man is, an effect-producing being, is there any 
 impropriety in calling him a cause ? If not, what would we 
 mean by ascribing to him that character ? He walks or rides. 
 If we inquire for the cause of the walking or riding are we not 
 satisfied with the answer that the man is the cause? Do we ever 
 think it necessary to look further to find the cause—some other 
 cause that sets the cause agoing? We do not doubt there is 
 an end or reason for the action which he perceives or feels; 
 and we often say he does the act, whatever it may be, because 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, pp. 289, 290. 
 
 6 
 
Studies in Theology. 
 
 114 
 
 of the reason; but we do not mean that the reason is the force 
 expressed in the act, but only the end for which he employs a 
 self-contained power. He exerts the power, and so is the 
 cause. For a free volition, then, there is a cause, and the 
 cause is the person who exerts it. He is adequate to it. Prior 
 to the volition he exists, and has latent power which, under 
 suitable conditions, he can spontaneously convert into active 
 power, of which volition will be the expression. The suitable 
 condition is the perception of an end which seems reasonable, 
 or desirable and possible, to him. This perception puts him 
 into the condition for action, or for becoming a de facto 
 cause. The requisite power is in him to make him cause. He 
 needs but use it. When he does use it for the end which he 
 perceives to be reasonable or desirable we say he does it, and 
 do not think it necessary to seek something else to explain it. 
 The effect is a choice; the power he is is the cause of the choice. 
 There were several alternatives before him, or reasons for this or 
 that or the other; the power was that of choice between them. 
 When he chooses one we say he had the power to choose, and 
 that explains the choice; but then the power to choose was 
 power to choose the others as well as the one chosen. He is 
 sufficient cause for any of the alternatives—he is equal to 
 any of them—-but he becomes real cause to the end which is 
 actualty effected by his use of power. What the use is he 
 determines. 
 
 Thus we see that there are no valid objections against the 
 doctrine of freedom as alternativity, or power of self-determi¬ 
 nation to either of alternative ends; and also we see that the 
 sophistical objections urged against it are inventions in the in¬ 
 terests of other false doctrines of a false theory but for the 
 necessities of which they would never have been invented; 
 that they do violence to intuitive convictions and conscious¬ 
 ness itself; that they spring either from atheism, pantheism, 
 
What is Sin? 
 
 115 
 
 fatalism, or a form of natural theism, or perverted scriptural 
 theism, ail of which are schemes of necessity, and which do 
 away with the existence and possibility of a moral universe, and 
 ideas of right and wrong, ought and ought not, rewards and 
 punishments, fundamental thereto. The exclusion of freedom 
 excludes the possibility of anything different from what has 
 been, is, or will be, and renders absurd and meaningless all 
 idea of attempt at bringing about improvement of any kind, 
 or of concern or regret for anything that may be; and all that 
 can be said in explanation of such feelings as ought and ought 
 not, remorse, shame, regret, and desire for the better, is that 
 they are meaningless products of necessity, doing no good and 
 serving no purpose, or at best that they are an artifice by 
 which to deceive men with false imaginations of a part which 
 they suppose themselves to act. Since the facts are as they 
 are, and never could have been otherwise, it is an entirely in¬ 
 different question what the fountain head of the necessity is. 
 A universe constructed on this theory can only be as it is, and 
 if it could be different—but it cannot—might swing through 
 its meaningless round of changes with utter indifference, and, 
 having detected the fraud of all ideas of responsibility, ought to 
 exterminate all remorse, all sense of obligation—all ethical lum¬ 
 ber—and submit to fate cheerfully and extort from it whatever 
 it can of gratification. But why do we say ought? There is 
 no ought. It must and will be just as it turns out to be. 
 
 The idea is so repugnant to laws of thought that language 
 and thought itself would have to be revolutionized before it 
 can be conceived or expressed. The necessity that presses us 
 renders all our established modes of thinking false, and cum¬ 
 bers our language with words which represent only lies. 
 
 The theory of freedom, on the other hand, fits to all the facts 
 of existence, furnishes the indispensable conditions to responsi¬ 
 bility, lays the foundations of moral government, accords with 
 
116 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 intuitive convictions, is in harmony with consciousness, gives 
 function and authority to conscience, makes the restraints and 
 demands of law just, satisfies the dictates of reason, agrees with 
 experience, harmonizes with revelation—its promises, invita¬ 
 tions, commands, reproofs, and warnings—gives dignity to 
 virtue and heinousness to vice; in a word, ennobles man as a 
 free and responsible agent and enthrones God as a just and 
 honorable sovereign of the universe. It makes sin sin, and 
 holiness holiness. It lifts being from the dead sea of necessity, 
 and glorifies it with the powers and possibilities of freedom. It 
 creates a heaven for goodness and justifies a hell for evil. It 
 makes the difference between matter and spirit, angels and 
 devils. Take it away, and nothing remains but brute neces¬ 
 sity and a dark and dismal outlook of dread and despair full of 
 possible inevitable evil. Against it no fact of experience, no 
 suggestion of reason, no teaching of revelation properly inter¬ 
 preted, no utterance of conscience, no deliverance of conscious¬ 
 ness, can be alleged. For these reasons we accept it, and find 
 it the key to the problem of being and to the justification of 
 the ways of God with man. It is not simply a truth, but it is a 
 master truth; not a factor simply, but a prime factor in the 
 structure of moral being; a determiner of all right thought; 
 there is no moral universe without it; it is the foundation of 
 ethics. As well surrender God as give it up; nay, give it up, 
 and any concept of God that may remain is one which is so dis¬ 
 creditable that it is no longer God but fate, or worse, that is left 
 We conclude that man is a responsible being, made so by be¬ 
 ing endowed with power to originate his own intentional acts, 
 determine his own volitions, choose his own destiny; so that, 
 whatever the result, he is the author of it; and so that, what¬ 
 ever it is, he might have made it otherwise. God is just and 
 good in so making and endowing him, and in rendering to him 
 according to his deserts. 
 
Guilt. 
 
 117 
 
 GUILT. 
 
 The significance of this word becomes of great importance. 
 Some define it “liability to punishment.'’ Prefix the words 
 “that which constitutes/’ and we accept the definition. It im¬ 
 ports a quality of a person, arising from his relations to moral 
 law, which renders him deserving of its condemnation, and of 
 a punishment inflicted by its author. It is a state or quality 
 of ill desert which arises from an act of the will, or the non- 
 act of the will, in conscious violation of law, which act is sin. 
 The guilt is not the same thing as the sin, but it cannot exist 
 without sin, and no sin can be without it. It goes with sin as 
 form with substance; and is that of sin which denotes its evil 
 and is the measure of it—or rather denotes the demerit of the 
 sinner himself and is the measure of his personal ill desert. It 
 always attaches to a person, but only for an act or a state which 
 results from an act It is not the act alone that is displeasing 
 to law, but the person who commits it—on account of it. 
 The act is harmful, and bad, but the actor is guilty. The law 
 prohibits the act, condemns the actor. There are two closely 
 related ideas in an inseparable unity; wrong describes the 
 one, guilt describes the other. If we are right in this defini¬ 
 tion of guilt, then whatever of evils may exist in a nature, how¬ 
 ever the nature may be disconformed to its law, guilt may not 
 be predicated of it unless the disconformity be the result of a 
 free act; and as sin always implies guilt, so sin may not be 
 predicated of it. In order to the existence of sin and guilt, two 
 factors which cannot exist apart, as there can never be sinless 
 guilt or guiltless sin, there must be a person, a law, and an act: 
 a person that is free; a law that commands; and voluntary 
 disobedience of the command. Since the law only commands 
 
118 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 what is good the act which caused its breach must necessarily 
 be evil, or bad; since the person had power to obey, and was 
 obliged by the command, the person for his evil act is guilty. 
 Guilt to him is inherent in the act. One contains the other. 
 Whatever else may be predicated of a free being, as to his nature, 
 or the relations of his powers, or his activities—whatever of 
 disorder, or disharmony, or unloveliness, or folly, or harmful¬ 
 ness, or degradation, or absolute ruin and overthrow—sin and 
 guilt are facts which can only be predicated of him when he 
 originated as a will a transgression of a law whose requirements 
 he knew, and whose obligation he voluntarily disregarded. 
 Other breaches of law by him—of law unknown, or law to the 
 obedience of which he had no power—were not breaches of his 
 law, for under such conditions law there could not be; and of 
 such breaches, whatever calamity may result to himself or the 
 universe, neither sin nor guilt can be predicated without a mis¬ 
 use of language and gross perversion of thought. Laws broken 
 by unmoral beings, or by moral beings without knowledge, or 
 under necessity, are not moral breaches, or breaches of moral 
 law, for in such cases there is no subject of moral law; and there 
 can be no law binding where there is not a subject, or in a 
 
 matter in relation to which a person is not a subject. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 119 
 
 PUNISHMENT. 
 
 We have now seen that sin is the moral act of a moral be¬ 
 ing in violation of moral law; that guilt is the desert of punish¬ 
 ment which accrues to him consequent thereupon. It remains 
 that we consider the import of the word punishment. It is 
 considered by some to be any kind of suffering endured by a 
 moral being; so that all sufferings are pronounced punishments. 
 This is by no means clear. Punishment is that suffering which 
 is inflicted upon a person because of some ill desert which is 
 supposed to attach to him in view of a transgression of moral 
 law perpetrated by him , and expresses the displeasure of the 
 lawgiver against him on account of his act. Thus it is plain 
 that by punishment we do not mean pain, misery, suffering, 
 or distress indifferently, and without respect to their causes; 
 but we do mean sufferings inflicted on a person for the pur¬ 
 pose of expressing displeasure against him on account of some 
 personal act in relation to law. When the party inflicting the 
 punishment is God it expresses the displeasure of God against 
 him for some breach of law which God commanded him to 
 obey. 
 
 Here are two distinct concepts : one that of a person suffer¬ 
 ing ; the other that of a person inflicting suffering for a definite 
 purpose. The question is, Does the first concept always in¬ 
 clude the second ? This is often assumed. We deny. It is 
 an important question. If those are right whose position we 
 antagonize, then suffering, in all cases, shows sin in the sufferer. 
 If, on the other hand, we are right, then there may be suffering 
 where there is no sin. The position we assume is so important, 
 and yet has been so overlooked, or, what is worse, denied, that 
 we will illustrate it at a greater length. 
 
 6 
 
120 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 There are clearly discernible three classes or kinds of suffer¬ 
 ing, haying distinct sources, and expressive of different pur¬ 
 poses : 
 
 1. Sufferings that are penal: punishments, in which the 
 sufferer suffers because of guilt; that is, because of some breach 
 of law which he ought not to have committed but which he did 
 freely commit; in view of which act the displeasure of the law¬ 
 maker is excited against him and his power exerted upon him. 
 Such a case is that in human law in which a person is executed 
 for murder, or imprisoned for crime; or, under divine law, that 
 in which God exerts the penalty of his law—which is ex¬ 
 clusion from his favor, and consequent remorse—against the 
 transgressor. 
 
 2. The case of suffering in consequence of another’s sin or 
 directly by means of it—by means of some natural or social re¬ 
 lation to the guilty party, or some wrong done to the sufferer. 
 Such a case is that where a child suffers by inheriting the con¬ 
 sequences of his father’s crime; or when he inherits disease; or 
 where innocence is destroyed by violence. The suffering does, 
 indeed, in such cases, result from crime, but it were a great 
 abuse of language, and a much greater abuse of justice, to call 
 it punishment. If punishment, by what law, and for what of¬ 
 fense ? Then there is a suffering that is not punishment; that, 
 indeed, so far from implying guilt in the sufferer, shows him to 
 be the victim, in the matter of his suffering, of an atrocious 
 wrong. 
 
 3. Suffering which exists wholly irrespective of guilt or pun¬ 
 ishment either in the subject of it or anywhere else; which is 
 neither punishment of a guilty person, nor is superinduced by 
 natural or social relations to a guilty person, nor yet is caused 
 directly by a guilty person. This class of cases, if they exist, 
 proves that there is no necessary connection whatever between 
 suffering and the idea, or rather fact, of guilt; so that a uni- 
 
Punishment. 
 
 121 
 
 verse in which no guilt is, and consequently no punishment, 
 might nevertheless be a suffering universe. Such we conceive 
 not only might be the case, but certainly has been and is the 
 case. On no other principle can we explain the suffering of 
 pre-Adamite races; the suffering now, and all along the ages, 
 of unmoral races. The former suffered when as yet there w r as 
 no sin. The latter do yet suffer when it is impossible there 
 should be sin. It has never yet been shown, and we venture 
 to assert that it cannot be shown, that sufferings, and even great 
 sufferings, might not be beneficially and beneficently included 
 in a universe in which sin did not exist at all: sufferings con¬ 
 ditional to and compensated by a higher good not otherwise 
 attainable; sufferings expressive of no displeasure at violated 
 law, but bom of love, the offspring of benignity-—working to 
 the greatest good of the sufferer—or sufferings incident to a 
 nature capable of enjoyments of some kind. 
 
 Here, then, is the generic difference between mere suffering 
 and punishment; a distinction so broad as to be universally 
 recognized except by a class of theologians, and by them in all 
 cases except when the necessities of a theory confuse their per¬ 
 ceptions. 
 
 The value of this discussion consists in this, that it rules out 
 suffering as a proof of sin, and so destroys an argument which 
 has often been employed to establish the sin of infants and, 
 what is still more wonderful, the sin of our Saviour himself! 
 
 Having found the origin of sin, and wherein it consists, we 
 are now prepared to examine the questions, How did the primal 
 sin affect the Adam himself; and how did, and how does, it 
 affect his posterity ? 
 
 These have long been most important questions in theology— 
 
 not more important than difficult. They have given rise to 
 
 protracted and earnest and, it is sad to add, many times most 
 
 exasperated discussions. The most candid and able men have 
 9 6 
 
122 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 occupied extremely oppugnant positions. But the questions are 
 so intrinsically important that it is impossible they should rest 
 until a nearer approach to harmony is reached. The discussion 
 must progress. It ought to be conducted with patience and 
 candor. 
 
 We take the questions up in their order: What was the 
 effect of the Adam sin upon himself? To this question divers 
 answers have been returned, but in the main there has been 
 substantial agreement. On the following points there is abso¬ 
 lute harmony: (a) His act of disobedience began, not with the 
 temptation or solicitation, whether internal or external, but with 
 the free consent of his will to the act; it was completed by the 
 overt act of disobedience; and the completed act rendered him 
 guilty in the sight of God. ( b ) The immediate result of the act 
 was that from the enjoyment of the divine favor and fellowship 
 h.e became an object of displacence, and became at once subject 
 to the death threatened. There is not perfect agreement as to 
 the import of the term death in the threatened punishment. 
 There can be no doubt that it was utter death—immediate 
 and perpetual severance from his true end; the overthrow 
 of the good of his being; death temporal, or the cessation of his 
 natural life ; death spiritual, or the destruction of his spiritual 
 life of communion with God. In both forms the effect was 
 necessarily perpetual under course of mere law. Some have 
 imagined that death, the threatened penalty, included—had, 
 indeed, for its very substance—extinction, or utter annihilation. 
 For this idea we think there is no scriptural warrant; but the 
 revelation on the subject is exceedingly brief, and it is perhaps 
 quite impossible to know what, under course of law, would have 
 happened to the Adam. It is not agreed that, on the supposi¬ 
 tion that immediate physical death was included in the sentence 
 threatened, it must necessarily be inferred that temporal death 
 
 would not have taken place had he not sinned. For its imme- 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 123 
 
 diate infliction there might be in his act of disobedience a legal 
 reason, as we shall find there was. But this is not conclusive 
 of the point that, had he not sinned, he would not ultimately 
 have died in course of nature. This assumption is often made, 
 but it is without warrant, either of reason or revelation, (c) An 
 immediate effect of his sin was the introduction into his nature 
 of abnormalcy; a depraved condition and tendency such that, 
 in himself, there was no power to restore himself to righteous¬ 
 ness and the forfeited favor of God. Sin, working moral sev¬ 
 erance from God, became enthroned and dominant over him. 
 Guilt, and consequent liability to the threatened punishment, 
 left him helpless under the law, utterly wfithout means or 
 power of purging himself. Had the case been closed with his 
 act of disobedience the penalty must immediately have super¬ 
 vened, for reasons which will appear, and as a consequence the 
 race would have perished in its root. Under law the race did 
 so perish. 
 
 Such was the effect of the Adam sin upon himself under law. 
 It made him guilty, left him abnormal, and slew him. The law 
 result was death, utter and perpetual. 
 
 But the race did not perish ; the sentence was not executed, 
 if so be this result was included in it. What is the explana¬ 
 tion ? Why did not the law take its course ? 
 
 What did happen was an interposed redemption; the law 
 course was estopped. The veil of oblivion is forever thrown 
 over what would have been, and we see only the course of 
 events under redemption. 
 
 The Adam did not immediately die a physical death for his 
 sin, but lived; but he was not the same Adam he was at first. 
 He was Adam the fallen: a sinner—out of favor—under sentence 
 —bowed with the consciousness of guilt—driven from Eden— 
 his heritage and his heart clouded with sin and curse—the 
 moral glory and strength of his life departed—self-centered 
 
m 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 and, under the frown of his Maker, exposed to endless wrath; 
 jet he was Adam reprieved: provisionally redeemed; offered 
 pardon; placed under circumstances of mercy; encouraged 
 and helped to regain his lost position of favor; the sentence 
 still over him, but possible to be lifted; restoration, not to his 
 old position, but to a better, offered on practicable conditions. 
 The law left to its own course would have cut the tree of 
 .humanity down before it branched; blasted the potentialities 
 in the uprooted stock. This point will be further discussed 
 after we shall have presented another and extremely different 
 theory—the theory of original sin, as popularly held. 
 
 There are three theories of the effect of Adam’s sin upon his 
 posterity, or, more properly, upon his nature and that of his 
 descendants. 
 
 The first, in the order in which we shall notice them, is com¬ 
 monly called the Pelagian view, from the name of its most 
 illustrious expounder. 
 
 The effects that have resulted from Adam's sin are effects 
 confessed by all; effects modified and limited by supervening 
 redemption, and which as to his posterity could not have been 
 possible without redemption. AYe have already said that 
 precisely what might have been the course of events under- 
 law, as to Adam, we do not know, but can only imperfectly 
 conjecture. 
 
 But, whilst we do not know precisely what might in fact 
 have occurred, we do know intuitively and absolutelv some 
 things that could not have occurred under the government of 
 an infinitely wise and just, much more under the government 
 of an infinitely good and loving, God. And among the 
 things thus known this is most conspicuous: he could not have 
 been permitted to live and propagate a race the individuals of 
 which race should, because of any actual or hypothetical rela¬ 
 tion they sustained to him—any imputation of his act, or 
 
Punishment. 
 
 derivation of his nature—be accounted guilty and come under 
 sentence of curse; which is only saying that he could not have be¬ 
 come father to a race already damned. 
 
 The corollary of this postulate is, either under course of law 
 he would have had no posterity, or children born to him would 
 not have inherited his curse but would have had a fair in¬ 
 dividual trial. Since the latter could scarcely be, with the 
 effects of his sin upon his nature and theirs, and his sinful 
 example and unholy influence upon them during infancy and 
 youth, the periods of inexperience, the former would have been 
 the alternative; he would have had no posterity. 
 
 The law cut Adam down ; he was legally dead , but redemption 
 interposed and restored him. 
 
 The question now before us is, "What was the status of 
 the redeemed Adam and of his posterity? To this we 
 answer: 
 
 1. He was permitted, under the redemption, to live for a time 
 on the earth instead of being precipitated at once into utter 
 death. 
 
 2. He was granted a new probation, with such gracious helps 
 as placed pardon for his sin and restoration to the divine favor 
 in his reach. 
 
 3. His nature was corrupted by his sin, and so remains until 
 it is regenerated by the divine Spirit. 
 
 4. Under the redemption he was restored to the forfeited 
 privilege of the headship of a race, but with the consequence 
 to the race—and to himself—that it should inherit the evils of 
 his depravity and the conditions of the new probation under 
 redemption. His life upon earth should be one of manifold 
 sorrows and struggles, and should inevitably end in physical 
 death. 
 
 5. If he should repent, and avail himself of the proffered 
 pardon and regeneration procured by and offered in redemp- 
 
126 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 tion, winch though powerless in himself he should be enabled 
 to do by a divine empowering that would come to him, he 
 should, after a life of trial, warfare, and suffering on the 
 earth, finally attain to the everlasting life of bliss and holi¬ 
 ness which he would have attained by obedience had he never 
 sinned. 
 
 6. He was permitted to beget children in the likeness of his 
 fallen nature, but under provisions of redemption. 
 
 This we conceive is a fair and sufficiently full statement in 
 this connection of the condition into which the redemption 
 brought the Adam and his posterity. It placed him on a 
 new platform of probation, but he commenced his new proba¬ 
 tion not as he commenced the old. Then he was pure and 
 innocent, and his probation was to test whether he would 
 remain so and by obedience attain to a holy character. Now 
 he was fallen, and his probation was to test whether he would 
 penitently accept help. His guilt then was to arise from diso¬ 
 bedience. His guilt now was a fact to arise from his rejection 
 of proffered mercy. Eden closed against him, under the law, 
 because he had sinned. Heaven closes against him, under re¬ 
 demption, because he will not repent. 
 
 To this answer I know of no objection except upon the single 
 point of the effect of the Adam sin upon his nature, and by 
 consequence upon his posterity. 
 
 From this the Pelagian view dissents. As we understand 
 them they hold, from Pelagius to Bellows, the so-called liberal 
 Christians of to-day, that the sin of Adam, which consisted in 
 an act, did not at all affect his nature, but only his personal re¬ 
 lations to law; his nature remained the same after as before the 
 act. There was no subjective change wrought, but only a new 
 relation of the subject to violated law. If any change in the 
 subject, it was only the presence of the power of habit—a tend¬ 
 ency to repeat a once-performed act. James Freeman Clarke, 
 
Punishment. 
 
 127 
 
 a candid critic generally, and certainly fair wlien lie represents 
 liberal Christianity , so called, thus states the view as now held: 
 
 “Liberal Christianity regards man, not as in a state of disease 
 and needing medicine, but as in a state of health, needing diet, 
 exercise, and favorable circumstances, in order that he may 
 grow up a well-developed individual. It regards sin, not as a 
 radical disease with which all men are born, but as a tem¬ 
 porary malady to which all are liable. It does not, therefore, 
 necessarily dwell on sin and salvation, but on duty and im¬ 
 provement. Man’s nature it regards as radically good, and 
 even divine, because made by God.” * 
 
 Dr. Bellows f holds this language: “ Who, for instance, will 
 wish to conceal or deny the hereditary descent of dangerous 
 propensities any more than of good and beautiful dispositions ? 
 We do not deny that goiter, consumption, gout, are hereditary, 
 but we do not allow that this shows the human body to be de¬ 
 praved in its origin or constitution. When we take away the 
 subjects of these diseases from the circumstances that produced 
 them they recover, and in a generation or two their diseases 
 are extinguished. There is a resistance to them in the body, 
 which, assisted, may overcome them. Obedient to this anal¬ 
 ogy, I would not deny hereditary tendencies to rage, to jealousy, 
 to insanity. The mind may be diseased, and through its con¬ 
 nection with the body may be propagated in a diseased con¬ 
 dition. But this proves nothing against the truth, or rectitude, 
 or wholesomeness of human nature, more than a murrain 
 among sheep establishes the general defect of that creature’s 
 final cause, to produce wool and food for man. We recognize 
 the hereditary defects as diseases, excrescences, perversions of 
 human nature, and treat them as such; not as its normal he¬ 
 reditary and wholesome condition. The real question is, How 
 
 * Orthodoxy: its Truth , etc., p. 134. 
 
 f Restatement of Christian Doctrine , p. 219. 
 
128 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 deep and how common is this alleged discord ? Is it total, or 
 vast, or general? Has it not been immensely exaggerated? 
 Has not the disposition to treat the sonl as sick been at least as 
 common an error as to treat the body as sick—and have not 
 both of them been overdosed and overwatched ? It is the want 
 of food, and not of medicine, which has impoverished whole 
 races and tribes. Hereditary diseases, prevalent as they are, 
 are not the common causes of physical degeneracy, but bad 
 habits, self-indulgence, poor diet, or hardship and toil. And 
 so of the soul. Its hereditary disorders, not to be denied, are 
 not its chief difficulties, but its present want of light, educa¬ 
 tion, encouragement, confidence, sympathy, and help.” On 
 page 260 he continues: “ There is, then, doubtless in accord¬ 
 ance with this showing, a real and grand truth in the cath¬ 
 olic doctrine of the fall of man in Adam. Adam stood for and 
 represents his race. Any other man in his circumstances 
 would have acted as he acted. It was not Adam’s nature that 
 fell, but merely he himself; that is to say, his nature was no 
 other after his fall than before. It was no more weak than be¬ 
 fore. For, if stronger before he fell than since, how did he 
 yield so easily to temptation ? No ! Adam’s nature was illus¬ 
 trated, not changed, by his fall. He was created liable to and 
 certain of his fall. And his fall was simply an exhibition and 
 evidence of his total inability to keep the commandment of 
 God in his own independent strength; that is to say, his in¬ 
 tellect and conscience were made so much more powerful than 
 his will that he was constituted to see and feel the obligative- 
 ness of duties which he had no adequate resolution and power 
 of character to observe and perform.” 
 
 This, we must think, is a superficial view, and one which 
 fails entirely to account for well-known facts of human con¬ 
 sciousness, not less than it fails to accord with direct teachings 
 of revelation. The universality of a depraved disposition in 
 
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 129 
 
 man is indisputable and, as discoverable in the earliest infancy, 
 can have no other solution than that of transmission—an hered¬ 
 itary virus, or weakness, or tendency to yield to proffered sin, 
 which did not exist until after the fall. It may not be possi¬ 
 ble to determine precisely in what the depravity consists, or 
 how the effect is propagated, but the fact is among the most 
 pronounced and indisputable of the facts of human nature. It 
 is not more apparent that it is of the nature of an acorn to pro¬ 
 duce an oak, or a tiger to be ferocious, than it is for man born 
 of Adam to be depraved. The invariability of the actual effect 
 in each case proclaims the nature cause, and in one no more 
 than the other. The fact that each • man sins might be ac¬ 
 counted for, it is true, without a depraved nature, even as Adam 
 sinned at first without depravity; possibly even more easily 
 as the case of every successor of the first transgressor—we have 
 the influence of his example, and of the examples, indeed, of all 
 of his successors ; but it is not the mere fact of sin that is to be 
 accounted for, but the fact of the invariable and deeji-seated im¬ 
 pulse to it of which we are conscious, and which is ever bear¬ 
 ing us, like a resistless tide, even against our protests and 
 struggles; whose power we constantly feel and are impotent in 
 ourselves to subdue. That we sin is our fault, and we never 
 sin that we do not feel this ; but that we are inclined to sin, feel 
 ourselves almost forcibly impelled, we can no more doubt or 
 prevent than we can exist without breathing. Neither habit 
 nor example will account for this. It belongs to our nature. 
 Did it belong to the Adam before the fall? That before the 
 fall he was susceptible to the attractions of evil, that he could 
 feel temptation, that there was that in his nature which might 
 be enticed, cannot be disputed. Otherwise he would have been 
 an unmoral being, and could not have sinned. But is there 
 not reason to believe that the impulses and tendencies of his 
 nature were characteristically to the good, that his spontaneity 
 
130 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 was toward the ought? That was nature , then. To sin was 
 possible, but we must believe not unavoidable. There was 
 harmony. The potentates in the new-made soul dwelt together 
 in peace. The lower and baser powers were peacefully sub¬ 
 missive to the behests of the higher and nobler. The drift and 
 boom of nature set toward righteousness. 
 
 It certainly is not so now. There is a tendency to evil inher¬ 
 ent in human nature. To Dr. Bellows’s question, “How deep 
 and how common is this alleged discord ? Is it total, or vast, or 
 general ? ” we are constrained to answer: It is so deep that it 
 defies the unaided skill or power of man to eradicate it; so 
 total that it slimes and pollutes every affection and faculty of 
 the human soul; so common and vast and general that not a 
 single child of Adam that ever lived on this planet has escaped 
 it, save the immaculate Son of God. He must, indeed, have 
 lived to little purpose on this globe who has not seen in every 
 life about him, and felt in every fiber of his own being, the 
 world-wide, ages-long, and death-dealing contagion. 
 
 Ho; it is not a murrain that has attacked, here and there, 
 and at intervals, exceptional flocks; not a peculiar fever that 
 has intermittently appeared along the ages in unique condi¬ 
 tions ; not a corruption of blood that has broken out in special 
 families. It is the disease of Adam’s race which has blasted 
 every heart of his long line of degenerate children. 
 
 We do not pretend that nothing good and beautiful remains in 
 humanity—no natural sweetnesses; no high and noble virtues; 
 no delicate and Godlike ethicalities and sensibilities; but this 
 only: that they are so rare and so hindered in their growth, 
 and so unique, that when we come upon their bloom they ex¬ 
 cite our wonder, and when we inquire into their history they 
 are found to be, after all, but instinctive and selfish forms of 
 affection, resembling moral virtues; or, if real, that they are the 
 product of struggle and tedious culture, which have con- 
 
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 131 
 
 sciously and graciously supplanted or transformed more primi¬ 
 tive evils and vices. We are ready to admit that in no case is 
 the depravity total; that there is no desert so bleak and barren 
 that no single flower relieves its waste and arid bosom; that no 
 heart is utterly and totally dead to all forms of goodness. 
 Nay, we are not only disposed to admit this, we rejoice to be¬ 
 lieve it Total evil is unknown upon earth, but we find the 
 reason for this not in the fact that our nature does not strongly 
 set toward evil—nay, in its own motions, exclusively—but in 
 the other fact that counter-currents of life and regeneration are 
 let into it from God, in the grace of redemption. Whilst ad¬ 
 mitting the existence of much that is beautiful and good in the 
 heart of nature, apparently blooming outside the garden of grace- 
 and seeming to contradict the idea of a moral fall, we ought not to 
 forget either that many most lovely graces are not virtues; that, 
 on the contrary, ethically they are vices—mere forms of selfish¬ 
 ness or, at best, instinctive affections; good, it may be, for their 
 end, but indicating no moral quality. Beneath the most profuse 
 bloom of these natural and instinctive graces, as they are called, 
 many times lies a subsoil of sinful proclivity: a nature estranged 
 from God, dead to all spiritual consciousness ; a grave in which 
 decay reigns—utter selfishness and earthiness and lust, the de¬ 
 cay of moral death; a sepulcher fair to look upon without, but 
 within full of dead men’s bones. Human nature, if ever dis¬ 
 posed to obedience unto righteousness, is fallen; for it certainly 
 is not so disposed now. Its spontaneity is to sin. 
 
 We must not be supposed, in predicating a fall of human 
 nature in Adam, to believe that some new element was added to 
 it, or some old essence subtracted from it, by which it became 
 a different nature, or man a different being. The fall was a fall 
 from righteousness into sin ; a personal fall; a fall in his rela¬ 
 tions to law: from favor to wrath; from innocence to guilt; 
 from obedience to disobedience; a fall by a rebellious act of 
 
132 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 will; a fall out of tlie normal and right nse of his powers into 
 a vile use; a going over of his entire personality from God to 
 self. The act transformed him, as sin must every nature that it 
 touches. God’s frown darkened his soul; a sense of guilt cor¬ 
 roded his conscience; his jewels were gone; he was in the mire. 
 Where God had been, and conscience and reason the revered 
 and honored sovereigns, self had come, and pride and lust, and 
 they reigned. One act of will had opened the floodgates, and 
 the currents were turned the other way. The fall was complete. 
 The Adam—made in the image of God; made to find his im¬ 
 mortal good in obedience; made to live in fellowship with God, 
 and to enjoy God forever—discrowned and debauched, with his 
 head and heart bowed downward to the earth, was driven from 
 his paradise, henceforth to know righteousness but to love sin; 
 to see the good but to pursue the evil; pursue it of preference, 
 but against the goadings of conscience, reproaches of reason, and 
 pains of punishment: an utter fall, into utter sin and utter death, 
 but for interposed redemption. 
 
 This was the effect of the Adam’s sin upon himself. We 
 come now to consider its effect upon his posterity. 
 
 We have already seen that, after he became a sinner, he 
 could have had neither continued life nor posterity. 
 
 Our question now is, How, being raised to the privilege of 
 a posterity by redemption, did his fallen condition affect his off¬ 
 spring ? Some aspects of this question will be discussed when 
 we come to consider redemption. For the present we assume 
 that the race exists through redemption of its head, and in re¬ 
 demption for itself; but its natural head, though redeemed, was, 
 as we have seen, fallen. Redemption did not affect either his 
 actual relations to law or his nature. It left him in both his guilt 
 and depravity, only providing pardon for him and the grace of 
 renewal on conditions. He was still the fallen Adam as much 
 after redemption as he was before, but help was extended to him. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 1 9 o 
 
 OO 
 
 His children inherited his fallen nature. TYe have already 
 seen that it is universal. We now say it is by transmission. In 
 whatever it consists it descends from its ancient root. It is not 
 a fall of each individual humanity for itself and by itself, but 
 a fall of all in or, as we prefer, through the head; a derived 
 fall; the polluted fountain uttered a degenerate stream; the 
 corruption and degeneracy flowed all along the lines and touched 
 all the atoms of the issue. From the maimed father came a 
 race of maimed children. The maim was abnormal, alien to 
 the original nature, not of it; but it was interwoven with it, 
 corporate and inseparable in all its parts; a superinduced 
 nature, taking the place of the old. If any choose to call it a 
 habit we do not object, if they have in mind that it is a habit 
 conveyed by generation and inoculating the very germ of the 
 beins;—an inborn tendencv. 
 
 TYe are now prepared for the question, Is the inherited fallen 
 nature guilt ? or, in any proper sense of the word, sin ? To the 
 question, Is human nature fallen ? we have been constrained to 
 answer, against the ancient Pelagian and recent liberal teaching, 
 in the affirmative. To the question now raised, Is inherited 
 degeneracy ground of guilt ? we are constrained to answer, 
 against Calvinism, in the negative. 
 
 There is, we think, abundant evidence that the two errors 
 have close relation to each other. Augustine was father to 
 Pelagius; Calvin sire of Channing. The extreme view, by a 
 necessary law, produced its opposite. Liberal Christianity, so 
 called, is the maimed offspring of illiberal Christianity. The 
 making that evil to be sin which is not sin, on the part of the 
 one, became the reason on the part of the other for calling the 
 evil good. Edwards pronounced inherited depravity damnable; 
 Bellows declares it divine! Beyond all dispute both are wrong. 
 The protest of the one does away with sinfulness of sin; the 
 dosrma of the other makes that to be sin which cannot be sin. 
 
 O 
 
 6 
 
134 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 The reaction is perfectly natural, but extreme. The denial of 
 guilt to a nature was just; but the assertion that human nature 
 is normal, as well as innocent, is wide of the mark. I scarcely 
 know of forty other pages in all print in which there is such an 
 admixture of truth and error—such brilliant inconsequence—as 
 in the pages between 218 and 260 of Bellows’s Restatement of 
 Christian Doctrine , unless the exception might be found in Dr. 
 Shedd's article on Original Sin, the very title of which, in its 
 first appearance, “ Sin a Nature; That Nature Guilt,” was a 
 contradiction. Of the two errors Calvinism is the more damag¬ 
 ing to the character of God, Pelagianism is more dangerous to 
 the morality of men; both harmful in the extreme, but both 
 having fundamental truth underlying the error. Pelagianism 
 is superficial, inconsequent, and flippant, its influence weaken¬ 
 ing to law and encouraging to sin, but in spirit and temper it is 
 humane and merciful; careless of the weightier matters, it is 
 most careful of the mint and cumin of external cultus. Cal¬ 
 vinism is profound, logical, and austere; its influence conserva¬ 
 tive of law and repressive of sin ; but in spirit it is severe, in¬ 
 human, and unjust, enthroning cruelty and power above equity 
 and love. If the former subverts sovereignty by justifying 
 lawlessness, the latter overthrows it by rendering rebellion more 
 righteous than loyalty. The God of the one is an amusing 
 toy ; the Jehovah of the other a frightful Moloch. 
 
 The doctrine that the fallen nature carries guilt to all who 
 possess it; that guilt is transmitted from Adam to all his de¬ 
 scendants ; that we are bom in sin and liable to all its penalties; 
 that each child of man brings into the world, as its sad inherit¬ 
 ance, the sufficient causes for its eternal damnation; that the sin 
 inherent in its nature is the greatest possible sin, and just 
 reason for its greatest possible condemnation, is so strange a 
 doctrine, so utterly repugnant to human reason—to a priori 
 judgment of our intelligence—that it can with difficulty be 
 
Punishment. 
 
 135 
 
 imagined that it has ever been entertained by sane men. Yet, 
 upon examination, it is found that it has for its sponsors many 
 among the wisest and best men that have lived along the ages. 
 
 Those who contend for the guilt of inherited depravity, or of 
 a nature which fatally tends to sin, which includes almost the 
 entire Church through all the centuries, differ widely among 
 themselves in methods of explaining and defending the doc¬ 
 trine, one class subverting the other. The different theories are 
 thus given by Dr. Hodge: 
 
 “ 1. That which is adopted by Protestants generally, as well 
 Lutherans as Reformed, and also by the great body of the 
 Latin (Roman Catholic) Church is, that in virtue of the union, 
 federal and natural, between Adam and his posterity, his sin, 
 although not their act, is so imputed to them that it is the judi¬ 
 cial ground of the penalty threatened against him also coming 
 upon them. This is the doctrine of immediate imputation. 
 
 “2. Others, while they admit that a corrupt nature is de¬ 
 rived from Adam by all his ordinary posterity, yet deny, first, 
 that this corruption or spiritual death is penal infliction for his 
 sin; and, second, that there is any imputation to Adam’s de¬ 
 scendants of the guilt of his first sin. All that is really imputed 
 to them is their own inherent hereditary depravity. This is 
 the doctrine of mediate imputation. 
 
 u 3. Others discard entirely the idea of imputation, so far as 
 Adam’s sin is concerned, and refer the hereditary corruption of 
 man to the general law of propagation. Throughout the vege¬ 
 table and animal kingdoms like begets like. Man is not an ex¬ 
 ception to that law. Adam, having lost his original righteous¬ 
 ness and corrupted his nature by his apostasy, transmits that 
 despoiled and deteriorated nature to all his descendants. To 
 what extent man’s nature is injured by the fall is left undeter¬ 
 mined by this theory. According to some it is so deteriorated 
 
 as tcC be, in the true scriptural sense of the term, spiritually 
 
 6 
 
136 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 dead, while according to others it is little, if anything, more than 
 physical infirmity and impaired constitution, which the first 
 parent had transmitted to his children. 
 
 u 4. Others again adopt the realistic theory, and teach that 
 as generic humanity existed whole and entire in the persons of 
 Adam and Eve their sin was the sin of the entire race. The 
 same numerical, rational, and voluntary substance which acted 
 in the first parents having been communicated to us, their act 
 was as truly and perfectly our act, being the act of our reason 
 and will, as it was their act. It is imputed to us, therefore, not 
 as his, but as our own. We literally sinned in Adam, and conse- 
 cpiently the guilt of that sin is our personal guilt, and the conse- 
 cpient corruption of nature is the effect of our own voluntary act. 
 
 u 5. Others, finally, deny any causal relation, whether logical 
 or natural, whether judicial or physical, between the sin of Adam 
 and the sinfulness of his race. Some who take this ground say 
 that it was a divine constitution, that if Adam sinned all men 
 should sin. The one event was connected with the other only 
 in the divine purpose. Others say that there is no necessity to 
 account for the fact that all men are sinners further than refer¬ 
 ring it to their liberty of will. Adam sinned, and other men sin. 
 That is all. The one fact is as easily accounted for as the other. ’’ * 
 The theories all make the sin of Adam, in some form, or for 
 some reason, imputatively the sin of the race descending from 
 him. His guilty act either directly or indirectly inculpates all 
 in a common guilt. To impute means to regard or account 
 something as personal which is not personal, but which is de¬ 
 rived by way of another. u The ground of the imputation of 
 Adam’s sin, or the reason why the penalty of his sin has come 
 upon all his posterity, according to the doctrine above stated, is 
 the union between us and Adam. There could, of course, have 
 been no propriety in imputing the sin of one man to another 
 * Hodge, Systematic Theology , vol. ii, pp. 192, 193. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 137 
 
 unless there were some connection between them to explain and 
 justify such imputation.” * 
 
 The theory of Augustine, as the most prominent, and as 
 involving in its discussion the discussion of all the rest, may 
 be properly introduced first. It justly takes his name because 
 it undoubtedly originated with him, as well as because through 
 his influence it obtained wide and lasting sway over the 
 Church. The prominence with which Calvin brought it for¬ 
 ward in the Reformation period, and its adoption by the family 
 of churches which sprang from him, has associated it with his 
 name, and it is now most generally designated Calvinism. 
 With unimportant variations as formulated in different creeds 
 it is substantially this, as given in the Westminster Confession, 
 under the article, “ Of the fall of man, of sin, and of the punish¬ 
 ment thereof,” and the Assembly Catechism: 
 
 “By this sin they fell from their original righteousness and 
 communion with God, and so became dead in sin and wholly 
 defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. 
 
 “ They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of their sin 
 was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature 
 conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordi¬ 
 nary generation. 
 
 “From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly in¬ 
 disposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly 
 inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions. 
 
 “ Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of 
 the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own 
 nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to 
 the wrath of God and curse of the law, and so made subject 
 to death, with all miseries spiritual, temporal, and eternal. ”f 
 
 “The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consisteth 
 
 10 
 
 * Hodge, Systematic Theology , vol. ii, p. 196. 
 f Confession of Faith , cbap. vi, secs. 2, 3, 4, 6. 
 
 6 
 
138 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of that righteousness 
 wherein he was created, and the corruption of his nature, 
 whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made oppo¬ 
 site to all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all 
 evil, and that continually; which is commonly called original 
 sin, and from which do proceed all actual transgressions. 
 
 “ Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their 
 posterity by natural generation, so as all that proceed from them 
 in that way are conceived and born in sin. 
 
 “ The fall brought upon mankind the loss of communion with 
 God, his displeasure and curse; so as we are by nature children 
 of wrath, bondslaves to Satan, and justly liable to all punish¬ 
 ment in this world and that which is to come.'’* 
 
 “ The punishments of sin in this world are either inward, as 
 blindness of mind, a reprobate sense, strong delusions, hardness 
 of heart, horror of conscience, and vile affections; or outward, 
 as the curse of God upon the creatures for our sake, and all 
 other evils that befall us in our bodies, names, estates, relations, 
 and employments, together with death itself. 
 
 “ The punishments of sin in the world to come are everlast¬ 
 ing separation from the comfortable presence of God, and most 
 grievous torments in soul and body, without intermission, in 
 hell fire forever.’' f 
 
 That we may see with what justice the doctrine is attributable 
 to Augustine a brief quotation only will be necessary: 
 
 “ As all men have sinned in Adam, they are justly exposed 
 to the vengeance of God, because of this hereditary sin and guilt 
 of sin.” % 
 
 Calvin’s view is expressed in these words: 
 
 “To remove all uncertainty and misunderstanding on the 
 
 * Larger Catechism, Answers to Questions 25-27- 
 f Answers to Questions 28, 29. 
 t Hagenbach, History of Doctrine , vol. i, p. 323. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 139 
 
 subject let us define original sin. It is not my intention to 
 discuss all the definitions given by writers; I shall only pro¬ 
 duce one, which I think perfectly consistent with the truth. 
 Original sin, therefore, appears to be an hereditary pravity 
 and corruption of our nature diffused through all the parts of 
 the soul, rendering us obnoxious to the divine wrath, and pro¬ 
 ducing in us those works which the Scripture calls ‘works of the 
 flesh.’ And this is, indeed, what Paul frequently denominates 
 sin. The works which proceed thence, such as adulteries, 
 fornications, thefts, hatreds, murders, revelings, he calls in the 
 same manner ‘ fruits of sin; ’ although they are also called 
 ‘ sins ’ in many passages of Scripture and even by himself. 
 These two things, therefore, should be distinctly observed : first, 
 that, our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we are 
 on account of this corruption considered as convicted and justly 
 condemned in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable 
 but righteousness, innocence, and purity. And this liableness 
 to punishment arises not from the delinquency of another; for 
 when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to 
 the divine judgment it is not to be understood as if we, though 
 innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin; 
 but because we are all subject to a curse, in consequence of his 
 transgression, he is said therefore to have involved us in guilt. 
 Nevertheless we derived from him not only the punishment, 
 but also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due. 
 Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of 
 another, the more clearly to indicate its transmission to us by 
 propagation, yet at the same time also asserts it properly to be¬ 
 long to every individual.” * 
 
 It is hardly necessary that we add further quotations. The 
 advocates of this doctrine are not ashamed of it, nor are they 
 wanting in boldness in its utterance and vindication. From 
 
 * Calvin’s Institutes, book ii, chap, i, sec. 8. 
 
 6 
 
140 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 Augustine to Hodge it is fortified by great learning and tran¬ 
 scendent genius. 
 
 To the first pail; of the doctrine, namely, that all men are 
 depraved by inheritance from Adam, and by means of his 
 first sin, we have already signified our unqualified assent. 
 To the second part, namely, that our inherited depravity in- 
 , volves us in personal guilt, we shall now proceed to file our 
 objections. 
 
 In the discussions of the nature of sin, occupying the earlier 
 pages of this treatise, we have already assigned conclusive rea¬ 
 sons for the rejection of the doctrine; reasons showing from the 
 nature of sin itself that it cannot, as involving guilt, be predi¬ 
 cated of a nature. We propose now more fully to examine the 
 reasonings of those who assert and defend the dogma. 
 
 The precise issue raised is, Does congenital depravity— 
 natural corruption, hereditary proclivity to sin—a fact fully 
 admitted by both parties, affirm guilt of the subject, irrespec¬ 
 tive of and antecedent to any personal will action, or along 
 with being itself—guilt inherited and transmitted? We deny. 
 
 The general ground of our dissent is that the affirmation is 
 in conflict with the clearest dictates of natural justice and 
 a priori intuitions of reason, and is alike dishonorable to God 
 and impossible in the nature of things, as it involves that men 
 are made guilty, blameworthy, on account of an event which 
 transpired when as yet they had no existence at all, of any 
 kind; that one man is made guilty on account of another man’s 
 act with which he could have no connection whatever, since the 
 act was committed before he existed; and that guilt is trans¬ 
 missible. 
 
 The grounds of the protest are so obvious, so accordant with 
 the spontaneous verdicts of all reason, and so apparently fatal 
 to the doctrine, that an explanation, at least, is felt, by even its 
 friends, to be an imperative demand. It is not, if a truth, like 
 
Punishment. 
 
 141 
 
 most truths, attractive of confidence. Its speech, and counte¬ 
 nance are against it. 
 
 It is not surprising that, with attempts to make it acceptable, 
 great disharmony should arise among its advocates—absolute 
 conflicts as to the grounds of defense. It could scarcely be 
 otherwise. 
 
 It is at once admitted that if there be injustice in fact, and 
 not simply in seeming, the doctrine must be abandoned. Not 
 even its most earnest defenders can continue their adherence in 
 the juesence of such a refutal. 
 
 Let us examine the several methods of explanation and rec¬ 
 onciliation attempted, together with the general supports of the 
 doctrine. 
 
 It has been said above that the chief embarrassment arises 
 from its seeming conflict with natural justice. In response to 
 this strong prima facie against it, it is argued that an equally 
 strong and obvious reason in its support meets the eye of the 
 reflecting observer as soon as he beholds human society, in the 
 sufferings which, as well as sinfulness, are universal; attacking 
 and destroying infancy as remorselessly as age, suggesting a 
 high displeasure against the species itself. If the injustice of 
 alleging guilt where there has been no crime bears against the 
 doctrine of inherited sin, the no less manifest injustice of pun¬ 
 ishment of the innocent seems to furnish it support. If it is a 
 maxim of justice that there can be no guilt without personal 
 sin, it is certainly no less a maxim that “there can be no just 
 punishment where there is not personal guilt.” The prima 
 facie is that all do suffer; it is insisted, therefore, all have 
 sinned. If we admit that all suffering is punishment of the 
 guilty, most certainly the argument is conclusive. Thus it ap¬ 
 pears that those who contend for and those who oppose the 
 doctrine of inherited sin have, if not precisely the same diffi¬ 
 culty to meet, very analogous objections to answer. We have 
 
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142 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 already shown that all sufferings are not punishments. The 
 reply from our side is complete; it remains that we attend to 
 the manner in which those meet the difficulty who contend for 
 the doctrine. 
 
 They rest their defense upon two grounds: first, that the 
 doctrine is expressly taught in the word of God, and that there¬ 
 fore it must be true, whatever seeming objections bear against 
 it; second, that, rightly understood, the apparent objection of 
 injustice does not bear. If they can succeed in making good 
 either of these positions they establish the point in question, or 
 at least remove the objection, and judgment must be in their 
 favor. If a Bible doctrine it is true; and if true it cannot 
 be in conflict with justice; and, reversely, if it collide with jus¬ 
 tice it cannot be true, and if not true it cannot be sanctioned by 
 the word of God. Let us examine the positions in the reverse 
 order, considering first the explanations of the doctrine which 
 have been adopted to do away with its seeming conflict with 
 justice. 
 
 As stated already, the advocates of the doctrine differ widely, 
 and we will add fundamentally, in their modes of defense; and 
 unfortunately for the point which they seek to establish their 
 diverse modes are mutually subversive—each class alternately 
 overthrowing the arguments and reasonings advanced by the 
 other. Dr. Shedd thus laments this fact: 11 What divisions 
 and controversies exist among those who all alike profess to be 
 Calvinists! How little unanimity exists upon the doctrine 
 among those who all alike repel the charge of Arminianism! 
 One portion or school teach that there is a corrupt nature in 
 man, but deny that it is really and strictly sinful. Another 
 portion or school teach that there is a nature in man to which 
 the epithet sinful is properly applied, who yet, when pressed 
 with the inquiry, Is it crime , and deserving the wrath of God ? 
 
 shrink from the right answer and return an uncertain sound, 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 143 
 
 of which the substance is that its contrariety to law, and not its 
 voluntariness, is the essence of sin. Again, there are those who 
 are prepared to fall back on the ground of the elder Calvinists, 
 up to a certain point, but who resolve the whole matter, when 
 pressed by their opponents, into the arbitrary will and sov¬ 
 ereignty of God, and deprecate all attempts to construct the 
 doctrine on grounds of reason and philosophy. And, finally, 
 there are some who are inclined not only to the doctrinal state¬ 
 ments of Augustine and Owen and the elder Edwards, but also 
 to their method of establishing and defending it, by means of 
 the doctrine of the real oneness of Adam and his posterity in 
 the fall of the human soul” * 
 
 We shall find in the progress of the discussion that this is a 
 very gentle putting of the disagreements existing. 
 
 The first method of explanation and defense we notice as the 
 most radical is that which is intimated in the citation just made, 
 “the doctrine of the real oneness of Adam and his posterity; ” 
 more commonly put as the real presence of the posterity in the 
 Adam when he committed the sin. This, Dr. Shedd asserts, was 
 the doctrine of the elder Calvinists—of Augustine, of Calvin, of 
 Owen, of Edwards, and of all the masters of this faith. With 
 him agree Baird, Landis, and others. 
 
 Dr. Hodge positively denies this, and asserts that not one of 
 them ever believed any such doctrine. Those interested to 
 look into the dispute may do so by referring to Shedd, in his 
 treatise, “Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt;” and Hodge, 
 in his examination of the essay in his Princeton Essays. 
 
 Among those who hold to the presence of the race with 
 Adam in the original sin, and hence their common guilt, there 
 is noticeable this difference: Some seem to hold that all human 
 souls were severally present in him, and as separate souls joint 
 in the act, concurring and consenting. This view has not 
 
 * Dogmatic Theology , vol. ii, p. 223. 
 
144 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 found favor, and needs no further notice. It has not the 
 merit of having received the support of a single respectable 
 writer. 
 
 The common view is, rather, that we were present in the 
 Adam impersonally, but really and substantially; so that, being 
 one with him, his act is our act. This, Dr. Shedd alleges, was 
 the view of Augustine. The passages which seem most clearly 
 to convict him are excerpta from his letter to Jerome: “Teach 
 me, therefore,” he says to this eminent prelate, “I entreat you, 
 what I shall teach, teach what I shall hold, and tell me, if souls 
 are created one by one for those who are born, when do they 
 sin in the little ones so that they need remission of sins in 
 baptism as sinning in Adam, from whom the sinful body is 
 propagated? Or, if they do not sin, by what justice of the 
 Creator are they so held responsible for the sin of another, 
 when they are introduced into bodies propagated from him, 
 that they are condemned, if the Church does not relieve them 
 by baptism, although they have no power to decide whether 
 they shall be baptized or not ? How can so many thousands 
 of souls, which leave bodies of unbaptized infants, be with any 
 equity condemned—introduced into these bodies for no pre¬ 
 vious sin of their own, but by the mere will of him who created 
 them to animate these bodies, and foreknew that each of them, 
 for no fault of his own, would die unbaptized ? Since, then, we 
 cannot say that God either makes souls sinful by compulsion 
 or punishes them when innocent, and yet are obliged to confess 
 that the souls of the little ones are condemned if they die 
 unbaptized, I beseech you tell me how can this opinion be de¬ 
 fended, by which it is believed that souls are not all derived 
 from that one first man, but are newly created for each particu¬ 
 lar body, as was his for his body.” * 
 
 “For we were all in that one man who fell into sin through 
 
 *Ep. 166, Ad Hieronymum. 
 
 G 
 
Punishment. 
 
 145 
 
 the woman, who was made of him before the sin when he, 
 one, corrupted all. The form in which we as individuals live 
 was not yet created and distributed to us severally, but the 
 seminal nature was created from whence we are propagated; 
 which nature itself being by sin vitiated, bound in the chains 
 of death, and justly condemned, man was begotten of man in 
 no different estate."* 
 
 Odo, or Oudardus, Archbishop of Cambray, thus states his 
 own as Augustine’s view: “Two hinds of sin are spoken of, 
 that of nature, and personal sin. The sin of nature is that with 
 which we are born, and which we derive from Adam, in whom 
 we all sinned. For my mind was in him as a part of the whole 
 species, but not as a person; not in my individual nature, but 
 in the common nature. For the common nature of all human 
 minds in Adam was involved in sin. And thus every human 
 mind is blamable with respect to its nature, although not with 
 respect to its person. Thus the sin by which we sinned in 
 Adam is to me a sin of nature—in Adam a personal sin. In 
 Adam it was more criminal; in me less so; for I, who am, did 
 not sin in him, but that which I am. I did not sin in him, but 
 this essence which I am. I sinned as the genus man, not as the 
 individual Odo. I sinned as a substance, not as a person; and 
 because my substance does not exist but in a person the sin of 
 my substance is the sin of one who is a person, but not a 
 personal sin. For a personal sin is one which I, who am, com¬ 
 mit, but this substance which I am does not commit—a sin 
 in which I sin as Odo, and not as the genus man; in which I 
 sin as a person, and not as a nature; but, because there is no 
 person without a nature, the sin of a person is also the sin of a 
 nature, but not a natural sin.”f 
 
 This is the doctrine of Professor Shedd, in his able essay on 
 
 * Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 13, 14. 
 
 f E. Beecher, Conflict of Ages, pp. 320, 321. 
 
146 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 “ Original Sin.” He contends, also, that it is the doctrine of 
 the Westminster Assembly, and of Augustine, Calvin, Owen, 
 and Edwards, from whom he adduces copious extracts in sup¬ 
 port of his position. 
 
 Having quoted from the Assembly’s Catechism, he proceeds: 
 
 “How, it is to be remembered that these men were making 
 distinct and scientific statements, and their language, conse¬ 
 quently, is not to be regarded as merely metaphorical. It 
 must, therefore, be understood in the same way that scientific 
 language is always to be understood—taken in its literal mean¬ 
 ing, unless a palpable contradiction or absurdity is involved in 
 so doing. In the doctrinal and scientific statement, then, it is 
 affirmed that all men sinned in Adam, and fell with Adam, in 
 his first transgression. This implies and teaches that all men 
 were, in some sense, coexistent in Adam; otherwise they 
 could not have sinned in him. It teaches that all men were in 
 some sense coagent in Adam; otherwise they could not have 
 fallen with him. The mode of this coexistence and coagency 
 of the whole human race in the first man, they do not, it is true, 
 attempt to set forth; but their language distinctly implies that 
 they believe there was such a coexistence and coagency, 
 whether it could be explained or not. They regarded Adam 
 not merely as an individual, but as a common person, and 
 having a generic as well as individual character. They taught 
 that he was substantially the race of mankind, and that his 
 whole posterity existed in him. Consequently, whatever be¬ 
 fell Adam befell the race. In Adam’s fall the race fell. And 
 what is to be particularly noted is that they did not regard the 
 fall of Adam, considered as an individual, any more guilty 
 than the fall of each and every one of his posterity, or that 
 original sin was any the less guilt in his posterity than it was in 
 him. So far as responsibility was concerned Adam and his pos¬ 
 terity were all alike guilty of apostasy. They were all involved 
 
Punishment. 
 
 147 
 
 in a common condemnation, because they were all alike con¬ 
 cerned in the fall. The race fell in Adam, and consequently 
 each individual of the race was in some mysterious yet real 
 manner existent in this common parent of all. 
 
 “ This phraseology is not to be understood as implying that 
 the individual is in the germ as a distinct individual. Adam, as 
 the generic man, was not a mere receptacle containing millions 
 of separate individuals. The germ is not an aggregation, but a 
 single, simple essence. As such it is not yet characterized by in¬ 
 dividuality. It, however, becomes varied and manifold, by being 
 individualized in its propagation, or development into a series. The 
 individual, consequently (with the exception of the first pair, who 
 are immediately created, and are both individual and generic), is 
 always the result of propagation, and not of creation. In the 
 instance of man the creation proper is the origination of the 
 generic species, which species is individualized in its propaga¬ 
 tion under the preserving and providential (but noncreating) 
 agency of the Creator. The individual, as such , is consequently 
 only a subsequent modus extendi; the first and antecedent mode 
 being the generic humanity, of which this subsequent serial 
 mode is only another aspect or manifestation. Had the mem¬ 
 bers of the series of human generations existed in their proper 
 individuality in the progenitor there would have been no need 
 of the subsequent process of individualization or propagation. 
 The doctrine of traducianism is unquestionably more accord¬ 
 ant with that of original sin than that of creationism, and the 
 only reason why Augustine, and others after him, hesitated 
 with regard to its formal adoption was its supposed incompati¬ 
 bility with the doctrine of the soul’s immateriality and immor¬ 
 tality. If, however, the distinction between creation and de¬ 
 velopment be clearly conceived and rigorously observed, it will 
 be seen that there is no danger of materialism in the doctrine of 
 the soul’s propagation. For development cannot change the 
 
US 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 essence of that which is being developed. It may unfold that, 
 and only that, which is given in creation. Now, granting the 
 creation of the generic man in his totality of soul and body , it is 
 plain that his mere individualization by propagation must leave 
 both his physical and spiritual nature as it found them, so far 
 as this distinction between mind and matter is concerned. For 
 matter cannot be converted into mind by mere expansion, and 
 neither can mind be changed into matter by it. Both parts of 
 man will, therefore, preserve their original created qualities 
 and characteristics in this process of propagation, or individual¬ 
 izing of the generic, which is conducted, moreover, beneath the 
 preserving and providential agency of the Creator. That which 
 is flesh will be propagated as flesh , and that which is spirit as 
 spirit , and this because mere propagation or development can¬ 
 not change the kind of essence. If, therefore, it is conceded that 
 the creation of man was complete, involving the origination 
 from nonentity of the entire humanity as a synthesis of matter 
 and mind, flesh and spirit, cannot change the essence upon 
 either side of the complex being, but can only individualize it. 
 
 “It is on this ground that they taught that original sin is 
 real sin, is guilt The sinful nature they held could be properly 
 charged upon every child of Adam as a nature for which he, 
 and not the Creator, was responsible, and which rendered him 
 obnoxious to the eternal displeasure of God, even though, as 
 in the case of infants dying before the dawn of self-conscious¬ 
 ness, this nature should never have manifested itself in con¬ 
 scious transgression. Every child of Adam fell from God in 
 Adam, and together with Adam, and therefore is justly charge¬ 
 able with all that Adam is justly chargeable with, and precisely 
 on the same ground, namely, on the ground that his fall was 
 not necessitated, but self-determined. For the will of Adam 
 was not the will of a single isolated individual merely; it was 
 
 also, and besides this, the will of the human species—the 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 149 
 
 human will generically. If he fell freely, so did his posterity, 
 yet not one after another and each for himself, as the series of 
 individuals in which the one seminal human nature manifested 
 itself were born into the world, but all together, and all at once, 
 in that first transgression, which stands a most awful and preg¬ 
 nant event at the beginning of human history.” 
 
 That we do not misinterpret this author in supposing him to 
 hold that the nature which was present in Adam was a real objec¬ 
 tive thing, as distinct from his person, is conclusive from a consul¬ 
 tation of chapter iv, in which, among other things, he treats 
 of species, and fully asserts the doctrine of realism. Treating 
 of the word nature, he says : “The word is not expressive of a 
 mere abstraction, but designates an actual thing, an objective 
 realitv. Thus the human nature consists of the whole sum of 
 forces which, original in Adam, are perpetuated and flow in 
 generation to his seed. And our oneness of nature does not 
 express the fact merely that we and Adam are alike, but that 
 we are thus alike because the forces that are in us, and make 
 us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same 
 which in him constituted his nature and gave him his like¬ 
 ness.” * 
 
 “By birth we acquire a distinct and separate personality, 
 having an identity of its own, of the same grade and degree as 
 was that of Adam's person. But with this distinct personality 
 there is associated a community in Adam’s moral nature, by 
 virtue of the continuity of forces flowing from him to us, em¬ 
 bracing us in an identity with his nature, and involving our 
 communion in his apostasy from God.”f 
 
 In the work of Dr. Baird, The Elohim Revealed , the doctrine 
 is most explicitly stated and elaborately argued. “ The nature 
 of the entire race was created originally in Adam, and is propa¬ 
 gated from him by generation, and so descends to all his seed. 
 
 * Dogmatic Theology, vol. ii, p. 150. f Ibid., p. 496. 
 
150 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 Hence arise two distinct forms of responsibility: tbe nature 
 being placed under a creative obligation of conformity to tbe 
 holiness of Gods nature, and each several person being in a 
 similar manner held under obligation of personal conformity of 
 affections, thoughts, words, and actions, to the holy require¬ 
 ments of God’s law. The apostasy of this nature was the im¬ 
 mediate efficient cause in Adam of the act of disobedience, the 
 plucking of the forbidden fruit. Thus there attached to him 
 the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal diso¬ 
 bedience. The guilt thus incurred attached not only to Adam's 
 person, but to the nature which, in his person, caused the act of 
 transgression. Thus, as the nature flows to all the posterity of 
 Adam, it comes bearing the burden of that initial crime, and 
 characterized by the depravity which was embraced therein."* 
 
 “We are not held accountable for Adam’s breach of the 
 covenant, in consequence of the transgression respecting the 
 tree; but because of the inscription of the covenant in Adam’s 
 nature, and our inbeing in him in whose nature it was 
 inscribed.” f 
 
 u He and they are one by virtue of a community in a nature 
 which, originally one, in Adam, is communicated to his pos¬ 
 terity by generation, and is possessed by them, not, as in the 
 other case, in common and undivided, but distributively and 
 in severalty.”:]: 
 
 “ The offense is ours immediately, and not by virtue of any 
 divine agency investing us with it. As the apostle has already 
 shown that, when Adam sinned, all his seed were in him, and 
 so sinned in the very act with him. ... It is only because 
 truly and immediately ours that a God of infinite truth and 
 justice charges it to us.” § 
 
 We cannot be doing an injustice to these several authors in 
 representing them as holding the real unity and identity of 
 
 P.248. t P.811. t P.322. § P.422. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 151 
 
 Aclam and his posterity as to nature—meaning thereby some¬ 
 thing which constituted objective and numerical unity—and 
 that because of this presence of us with Adam in the transgres¬ 
 sion, and partaking of it, we became guilty in the same way as 
 he did. 
 
 It is exceedingly difficult to understand precisely what is 
 meant by the statement of our real presence with Adam. It 
 does not mean that our bodies and souls were present in him 
 as they are now existing in us. And yet something that is now 
 of us, and the substratum of our personality, was there—that 
 something which makes us men—called human nature. The 
 idea would seem to be that at first there was created a great 
 mass of human nature out of which all human beings were 
 afterward to be made, as many garments are made out of one 
 web of cloth, and that this mass was invested in Adam; that 
 when an individual man is propagated from Adam he has trans¬ 
 ferred to him a molecule of the original mass, or so many 
 molecules as he is to transmit to future men that are to spring 
 from him, and thus the great mass originally created is to be 
 parceled out and divided up until each one of the posterity 
 shall have received his part; that while in Adam this entire 
 mass of human nature, the as yet impersonal aggregate of the 
 stuff future individual personalities were to be made of, apos¬ 
 tatized and became attaint and guilty—-the whole and every 
 part of it—so that each molecule as it descends carries the 
 taint and guilt of that first apostasy to the individual person¬ 
 alities of which the molecule becomes the center, nucleus, or 
 basis. 
 
 Dr. Hodge so interprets it: “According to this view, hu¬ 
 manity is one substance, in which inhere certain forces. This 
 substance was originally in Adam, and has been by propa¬ 
 gation communicated to all his descendants, so that the sub¬ 
 stance, with its forces, which constitutes them what they are, is 
 
 6 
 
152 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 numerically the same as that which was in him and made him 
 what he was. 
 
 “ If there be any other meaning it is so transcendental that 
 we acknowledge onr inability to perceive it.”* 
 
 We do not say that this is Calvinism. Dr. Shedd declares it 
 is, and Dr. Baird, and Dr. Landis, and Dr. Breckenridge, and 
 they quote from all the leading authors from Augustine down 
 to show that such was their doctrine, and that it is true and 
 sound doctrine, f Dr. Hodge declares it a perversion of all the 
 authorities, and quotes profusely to show itf 
 
 We cannot doubt that both are right. The authors, under 
 the embarrassments of their circumstances in attempting to 
 defend an indefensible point, have doubtless taken contradic¬ 
 tory and antagonistic positions. The authorities * are pretty 
 evenly balanced, and the same masters are about half the time 
 on one side and half the time on the other. 
 
 The question with us, however, is not whether the doctrine 
 above declared is Calvinism, but, Is it true ? The men whose 
 names are attached and the authorities cited are high authori¬ 
 ties. They at least undertake to sustain the Calvinistic posi¬ 
 tion that all Adam’s posterity are guilty of Adam’s sin, or 
 guilty by that one sin of Adam. Their explanation is that 
 the posterity were in the Adam, coexisting and coacting; 
 that, therefore, they are guilty; and they assert that in no 
 other way could they be guilty. They are extremely positive 
 upon this point. 
 
 Dr. Hodge and the Princeton school at his back assert the 
 doctrine of the guilt of the race, but pronounce the reason 
 assigned by these authors to be wholly without foundation and 
 
 * Biblical Repertory, April, 1861. 
 
 fSee Danville Review, 1861-62; Shedd’s Essays; Baird’s Elohim Revealed; 
 Beecher’s Conflict of Ages. 
 
 % See his essays, in volume of Princeton Essays , on Imputation and Original Sin ; 
 and still later articles in the Princeton Review. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 153 
 
 utterly false—the grossest kind of error ; and in this we think 
 they are right His exceptions are taken on several grounds, 
 and most earnestly on the ground that it deserts and surrenders 
 fundamental principles of the Calvinistic system ; but—in every 
 such case—because it is untrue. I quote from his review of Dr. 
 Baird's book in the Princeton Review , April, 1860. He is espe¬ 
 cially severe on Dr. Baird. On page 365 he says: “ If there 
 is any meaning in all this we confess ourselves too blind to see 
 it. We have no idea what is meant by 1 the law being addressed 
 to the very substance of the soul ’ [the reply here is to the pre¬ 
 posterous idea of Dr. Baird, about page 260 of his book, on the 
 subject of a nature sinning, a doctrine in the form in which he 
 expressed it I think never conceived by another mind; but his 
 remarks are of wide application, hence the extended quotation], 
 or by saying conformity of substance to the image of God is 
 holiness, and the reverse sin.” 
 
 11 It is,” Dr. Hodge goes on to say, 11 as unintelligible to us as 
 speaking of the moral character of a tree, or the correct de¬ 
 portment of a house. It has often happened to us in reading 
 German metaphysics not to comprehend at all the meaning of 
 the author; but we have always had the conviction that he 
 had a meaning. We do not feel thus on the present occasion. 
 The distinction which the author attempts to draw between 
 sinful acts of nature and personal sins is a distinction which 
 means nothing, and on this nothing his whole theory is 
 founded. There are actions, of course, of very different kinds 
 in a creature composed of soul and body; some of these may 
 properly enough be called natural, and others personal. But 
 this does not apply to moral acts, whether good or evil. . . . 
 There can, indeed, from the very idea of sin, be no actual sin 
 which is not personal, because that which acts rationally and 
 by self-determination, two elements essential to actual sin, is a 
 
 person. Actual sin can no more be predicated of a nature as 
 
 11 6 
 
154 : 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 distinguished from a person than of a house.” The criticism is 
 severe, but just. We shall find that his criticisms are no less 
 destructive of the common ground of a real unity of the race 
 in Adam, and their coaction in his sin—the ground so ably 
 defended and constantly assumed by Dr. Shedd and the many 
 great names quoted by him. “ This supposition,” he says, 
 “ that actual sins can be committed by persons before they 
 are persons, that we acted thousands of years before we ex¬ 
 isted, is as monstrous a proposition as ever was framed.”* 
 “ There is no definition of a personal act more precise and 
 generally adopted than an ‘ act of voluntary self-determina¬ 
 tion.’ Such was apostasy in Adam, and if we performed that 
 act, then we were in him, not by community of nature merely, 
 but personally. Apostasy being an act of self-determination, 
 it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of 
 Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed thousands of 
 years before we existed at all. If any says he believes this, 
 then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not under¬ 
 stand what he says.” How refreshingly the doctor utters 
 himself when he happens to have truth on his side! “It is 
 assumed that innate, hereditary depravity cannot have the 
 nature of sin in it unless it be self-originated [the very posi¬ 
 tion of Dr. Shedd] ; hence some assume that we existed in a 
 former state, when, by an act of self-determination, we de¬ 
 praved our own nature. Others assume that humanity is a 
 person, or that personality can be predicated of human nature 
 as a generic life, and that individuals are the forms in which its 
 comprehensive personality is revealed; a conception as incon¬ 
 gruous as the hundred-headed idol of the Hindus.” 
 
 In the following trenchant manner he knocks on the head the 
 whole theory of the unity of the race in Adam: 
 
 “ The principle here involved is asserted to be true in its 
 
 * P. 356. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 155 
 
 application to all the genera and species of plants and animals. 
 The lion of to-day is the same numerical substance with the lion 
 first created; the oak of to-day is the same numerically as the 
 original oak in Eden. What is meant by this ? We take up an 
 acorn in the forest—in what sense is it identical with the first 
 created oak? Not in the matter of which it is composed, for 
 that is derived from the earth and the atmosphere; not in its 
 chemical properties, for they inhere in the matter, or result 
 from its combinations. These properties are doubtless the same 
 in kind with those belonging to the first acorn, but they are 
 not numerically the same. . . . The realistic hypothesis of 
 
 the objective reality of genera and species is not only purely 
 gratuitous, but it overlooks the continued presence and agency 
 of God in nature. The development of a plant and the growth 
 of an animal body are not to be referred to blind forces inher¬ 
 ent in matter, or in any substance, material or immaterial, but to 
 the omnipresent Spirit of God.” 
 
 Thus the theologians of Princeton repudiate this theory 
 entirely as baseless, repugnant to sound philosophy, and as 
 furnishing no explanation of the doctrine of original sin. The 
 fact which serves as its foundation is no fact. Realism, which 
 held to the objective reality of what was indicated by universal 
 terms, is an exploded myth of the mediaeval ages; universal 
 terms, not things which have an objective existence, but simply 
 subjective conceptions of the mind employing them. There is 
 a conceptual, or ideal, human nature abstract of real man, and 
 it is not an objective thing, but only an idea, having no other 
 existence except the unsubstantial form of a subjective concep¬ 
 tion. Adam’s human nature was a subjective idea of the 
 divine mind until it became a reality in the real Adam. The 
 human nature of every other man, likewise, had no existence 
 until it existed with and in him. Millions of similar men, 
 with a similar nature, existed before him, but his own nature 
 
156 
 
 Studies ix Theology. 
 
 was not until he, by existing, caused it to exist, an ideal, and not 
 a real, thing. He was in Adam in this sense only as the effect is 
 in the cause ; as there was in Adam the power to produce him, 
 aot as something already existing; as the ocean steamer is in 
 the man who makes it. So that to charge human nature, 
 separate from personality, with being tainted and guilty is the 
 same as saying that something is tainted and guilty which has 
 no being at all in reality, but only in imagination; as pure a 
 nothing as a mountain of gold or a flying man—a myth! 
 
 But were the fact as alleged, that is, had there been co¬ 
 existence of substance, it would add nothing to that for which 
 it is introduced. It is relied on to explain the doctrine of orig¬ 
 inal sin; that is, to show how in Adam we all sinned and 
 became justly deserving of punishment. The difficulty* to be 
 overcome is that we had no participation whatever in Adam's 
 sin, and cannot have a participation in his guilt and punish¬ 
 ment; that we had no more connection with it than we had 
 with the sin of Satan, and can, therefore, be no more justly 
 amenable in the one case than we could in the other. 
 
 The ground of the objection is tacitly admitted: that to be¬ 
 come guilty it is requisite that we should have some real con¬ 
 nection with that which is the occasion of guilt. This enforces 
 conviction with all the authority of an intuition, as we shall see 
 throughout the discussion. 
 
 If by being present with Adam the propounder meant that 
 each of the human race was personally and consciously pres¬ 
 ent, giving his free consent to the act of transgression, acting as 
 a will and intelligently, then it would serve the purpose for 
 which it is introduced; that is, it would prove the act of trans¬ 
 gression to be the individual act of each and the common act of 
 all. One hand plucked the fruit, but all the souls said Amen ! 
 "Doubtless, in such a case, the sin, guilt, and punishment would 
 be common and individual; the moral act—which is the sin, 
 
Punishment. 
 
 157 
 
 lying back of the external act, which was performed by Adam 
 alone—being the common act of all and the individual act of 
 each. 
 
 But that is not what the theorist means; indeed, it is what 
 he expressly denies. TYe were present, but not in that man¬ 
 ner. We were present as parts of one substance, but not as 
 intelligences and wills; we were impersonally present; the stuff 
 out of which we were afterward to be manufactured into per¬ 
 sons was present There was but one will present. That was 
 Adam's, but that will wrought for all the substance; and 
 through it the substance all became guilty! Or, what is still 
 more occult, the substance itself acted ! The author who an¬ 
 nounces the theory most fully holds that human nature apos¬ 
 tatized before Adam personally sinned, and that this apostasy, 
 which was the apostasy of all, led to Adam’s sin, as it leads to 
 our sin; and that, indeed, no personal sin ever could have 
 occurred if the nature had not first apostatized. 
 
 u The sin was the apostasy of man’s nature from God; apos¬ 
 tasy by the force of which Adam was impelled into the act of 
 transgression as an inevitable consequence of the state of heart 
 constituted by the apostasy.” * 
 
 The principle that community in a propagated nature con¬ 
 stitutes such a unity or oneness as immediately involves the 
 possessors in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in 
 the progenitor whence it springs, which underlies this whole 
 theory, is thus dispatched by Dr. Hodge: u This is a principle 
 of wide application. It cannot be taken up and laid aside at 
 pleasure. If community of nature involves community in guilt, 
 and pollution for acts of nature, then it must be for all the acts 
 of that nature. It is purely arbitrary and contradictory to con¬ 
 fine it to one of these acts to the exclusion of all others. If in 
 virtue of community of nature we are agents in Adam’s first 
 
 *P. 97. 
 
 6 
 
158 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 sin of nature, and morally chargeable with its criminality, then 
 we are morally chargeable with all his moral acts. If the ground 
 of imputation of his guilt is the covenant then it is limited to 
 his first sin, but if that ground be community of nature it must 
 extend to all his sins. . . . Community of nature makes us 
 morally responsible for all the moral acts of our progenitor. 
 But what is to limit the application of the principle to our orig¬ 
 inal progenitor ? What is the specific difference between our 
 natural relation to Adam and our natural relation to Noah ? 
 Again, what difference as to community of nature is there be¬ 
 tween our relation to Adam and the relation of the Hebrews to 
 Abraham? If we, on the ground of that community, are 
 responsible for all Adam’s moral acts, why are not the Hebrews 
 responsible for all the acts of Abraham ? Nay, why are not we 
 responsible for the acts of our immediate progenitors, and of all 
 our progenitors back to Adam ? What is to hinder our being 
 morally chargeable with every act ever committed by all our 
 ancestors? ” 
 
 We quote from the reviewer precisely the objection we should 
 put ourselves. It is unquestionably well taken, and is by no 
 means put in the most objectionable form of which it is capable. 
 
 Were coexistence of the entire race in Adam, as mere sub¬ 
 stance, essence or matter, if the thing be conceivable, allowed, 
 it would be of no avail to establish guilt; and if it were further 
 allowed that by the sinful act of the Adam the entire mass was 
 in some mysterious manner addled, corrupted, polluted, or 
 whatsoever you may call it, it would still be of no avail to con¬ 
 vict the after personalities, invested with it by propagation, of 
 guilt Until it is made out that sin is a physical quality the 
 only possible ground of guilt must be in something else than a 
 nature or essence. No sane writer has ever attempted to find 
 it in the absence of will, or resident anywhere else but in will. 
 
 Allow, for the sake of the argument, the coexistence of the 
 
Punishment. 
 
 159 
 
 very essence of each human soul in and with Adam, and upon 
 this admission predicate of them the guilt of his sin. The 
 question at once arises, Upon what ground, and of what, are 
 they guilty? Is it said, Of Adam's act of sin? But how 
 comes it that Adam’s act is ground of guilt to them? Was 
 Adam’s act their act ? It is conceded that it was not, since it 
 is agreed that as persons they did not exist and therefore could 
 not act. But if, as appears, the matter of blame was some¬ 
 thing with which by reason of nonexistence they could have 
 no connection, it must be impossible that they should partici¬ 
 pate in the blame. To blame them is to blame them for an 
 act performed by another person, and which transpired thou¬ 
 sands of years before they had a personal and responsible ex¬ 
 istence, and the knowledge of which was first brought to them 
 in the form of an indictment. The supposition is that of a mad¬ 
 man; guilt could as reasonably, and on precisely the same 
 ground, be predicated of any and all misfortunes and injuries 
 which one being receives from another by virtue of coexist¬ 
 ence. It reverses all ideas of justice and subverts all moral 
 distinctions. It is an impossible conceit to a rational being 
 that blame should attach to a substance, or to a person, on ac¬ 
 count of a substance with which his connection is wholly in¬ 
 voluntary. The words may be strung together in propositional 
 forms, and men under stress of preconceived theories may 
 imagine that they conceive a meaning to them, and a truth in 
 them, but they do violence to the laws of thought, and when¬ 
 ever presented to minds free from disguises meet a prompt and 
 spontaneous resistance. 
 
 An examination of all the writers who have attempted to 
 identify the race with Adam’s sin on account of coexistence 
 will show that they are constantly assuming coaction as well, 
 and this because they know that coaction must be hypothecated 
 in order to guilt. 
 
 s 
 
160 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 Dr. Shedd expressly admits that in order to guilt there must 
 be personal will action. “ The doctrine of the divine anger is 
 tenable only on the supposition that the objects upon which it 
 expresses itself are really ill-deserving—are really criminal. It 
 becomes necessary, therefore, to show that the sinful nature of 
 man, on account of which he becomes a child of wrath, and 
 obnoxious to the divine anger, is a guilty nature.”* 
 
 Following this extract in his essay is an elaborate argument 
 to show that the sinful nature is in the will, and is originated 
 by the will, and hence its guilt; and that its guilt may be 
 predicated of each man he connects the action of each man’s 
 will with its origination; men are, therefore, individually guilty 
 in the matter of their sinful nature because, and only because, 
 they participated in the act of will which originated it. He 
 many times affirms there can be no other ground of guilt 
 More than presence of a common nature or substance is predi¬ 
 cated—common will action, in its deepest and most primitive 
 form. Of the Westminster Assembly he asserts this was their 
 view, and scientifically expressed in the Creed. “Every child 
 of Adam fell from God, in Adam, and together with Adam, 
 and therefore is justly chargeable with all that Adam is justly 
 chargeable with, and precisely on the same ground, namely, on 
 the ground that his fall was not necessitated, but self-determined. 
 For the will of Adam was not the will of a single, isolated 
 individual merely; it was also, and besides this, the will of the 
 human species—the human will generically. If he fell freely, 
 so did his posterity, yet not one after another, and each for 
 himself, as the series of individuals in which the one seminal 
 human nature manifested itself were bom into the world, but 
 all together and all at once, in that first transgression, wjiich 
 stands a most awful and awfully pregnant event in the begin¬ 
 ning of human history.” f 
 * P. 237. 
 
 fP. 260. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 161 
 
 “ The aim of the Westminster symbol, accordingly, and, it 
 may be added, of all the creeds on the Angustinian side of the 
 controversy, was to combine two elements, each having truth 
 in it: to teach the fall of the human race as a unity, and at the 
 same time recognize the existence, freedom, and guilt of the 
 individual in the fall. Accordingly they locate the individual 
 in Adam, and make him, in some mysterious, but real, manner, 
 a responsible partaker in Adam’s sin—a guilty sharer, and in 
 some solid sense of the word coagent in common apostasy.” * 
 
 He cpiotes from Augustine, Calvin, Owen, and others to 
 show that they held this view. He concludes the discussion 
 with these words: “We know of no other theory that does 
 not in the end either reduce sin to a minimum, by recognizing 
 no sin but that of sinful volition, or else, while asserting a 
 sinful nature, does it at the expense of human freedom and 
 responsibility." f 
 
 The theory of Professor Shedd is that all sin has its origin 
 in will. But he holds that will often acts unconsciously, and 
 therefore sin may be originated by an act of will entirely 
 beyond our consciousness—that this, indeed, was so with regard 
 to original sin. He holds that the will is in some sense double; 
 consisting first of a power, the very central power of our being, 
 to choose a nature, or what Nathaniel Taylor calls a ruling 
 purpose; and then a power to make separate individual choices ; 
 as, for instance, a man primarily by this first will determines 
 upon self as the law of his life; having so determined, all his 
 after separate volitions will take their rise from this first and 
 highest act of will, and will derive their moral character from 
 it. This primary act carries his moral nature with it; and 
 when once the primary determination has been taken it is 
 forever irrevocable, if wrong; the choice becomes a nature, 
 originated, it is true, by the will, but afterward unchangeable 
 *Pp. 260, 261. t P.2'70. 
 
162 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 by the same power! This primary determination to a wrong 
 end is original sin, and dates anterior to any conscious personal 
 act of separate individual choice. He supposes it to have tran¬ 
 spired with regard to every human being in Eden and in Adam! 
 That then your will and mine, in some mysterious manner, went 
 astray, in consequence of which all our subsequent acts of will 
 go astray also—the effect of that primary estrangement; and 
 for this primary estrangement we are guilty because it is 
 product of will. 
 
 The first thing noticeable here is the inconsistency of ranking 
 this as an Augustinian or Calvinistic view, with which it is in 
 direct and violent antagonism; they holding that we are guilty 
 for Adam's sin, this teaching that we are guilty for our own— 
 as opposite positions as possible; they teaching that our 
 depravity is our sin—contradicting themselves also, this 
 teaching that sin is our act, and not our depravity. The 
 resemblance in the theories is that they locate sin at the very 
 starting point of our being: one in our very generation, the 
 other in an act of will which unconsciously transpires immedi¬ 
 ately following our generation; the act of will superinduced by 
 what is given in our generation. This is called original sin, 
 not, as the older theorists teach, because it was Adam’s first, 
 and not because it is something given in generation, but be¬ 
 cause it begins, or rather takes its rise in us, at the very foun¬ 
 tain head of our being, and from a nature transmitted to us; 
 not the nature, but from the nature. 
 
 The plausibility of the theory arises from the real truth 
 which underlies it: in the proposition that sin is an act of will; 
 that our sin, therefore, begins when we begin to sinfully act. 
 This is truth, and it is fatal to the whole scheme which imputes 
 guilt to us for Adam’s sin. It is rank heresy to the system 
 it is invented to support, as we shall show in our strictures. 
 
 The fault of the theory is that it locates sin at an impossible 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 163 
 
 period; it supposes us to act sinfully when we could not act at 
 all. Its error is not that it imputes Adam’s sin to us—and 
 therefore it comes not under the general category which we are 
 here considering—but that it makes our sin to arise at the 
 fountain head of our being, where, as we shall see, the capacity 
 for it does not exist. It may be true, as it assumes, that acts 
 of will antedate consciousness, and transpire unnoticed by the 
 mind willing, but such acts of will cannot possess the quality 
 of sin. 
 
 "What is that act of will that includes or constitutes sin ? It 
 must be answered by all that it is that act of will which deter¬ 
 mines upon a wrong action or feeling with respect to law; a 
 transgression of law which ought to be obeyed. But does this 
 exhaust the whole idea? Or, in order that the act of will 
 may have the quality of sin, is it not presupposed that the party 
 held knew the law and perceived the obligation? Can we 
 predicate sin where there is no intelligence ? A tiger acts when 
 he devours a human being, but does he sin ? Why not ? The 
 answer is plain: because he lacks the intelligence which ren¬ 
 ders him capable of a moral act—capable of knowing law and 
 feeling obligation; conditions indispensable to moral quality. 
 But has the newborn human child any such intelligence? Does 
 it perceive the distinction between right and wrong? Does it 
 feel the force of moral obligation ? Does it intelligently will ? 
 Deprive a man of his intelligence, his moral power of discern¬ 
 ing between right and wrong; reduce him to the plane of a 
 nonrational creature: could he then be held by law ? Do me: 
 ever conceive of such as accountable? Can they so regard 
 him ? Was law ever made for such ? Is an infant rational ? 
 It will be ; is it the day it is placed in the mother’s arms ? To 
 propound these questions is to answer them. 
 
 We all know that in the child are the rudiments of a moral 
 nature, but, as yet, no capacity for moral action; the power, it 
 
164 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 may be, to will and to think and to feel, but not the power to 
 will, think, or feel morally. To impute moral quality to its 
 acts is as irrational as to impute it to the freaks of lightning or 
 caprices of the wind; there is really no more proper intelligence 
 in the one than in the other. 
 
 That an act of will is wrong, that is, contrary to law, is not 
 what alone constitutes the person a sinner, but that it is known 
 by the person who commits it to be wrong; that he commits it 
 with the feeling that it is wrong. This is a point which surely 
 need not be discussed here. The seat of the morality is the 
 will acting understanding^—the intention. “As a man 
 thinketh [purposeth] in his heart, so is he.” 
 
 Thus, if it were allowed that action of will commences long 
 before consciousness, with the very dawn of being, and wrong 
 action, as to the law governing wills; if it could be shown that 
 even thus early the infant will acts selfward and not Godward, it 
 proves nothing as to moral quality, furnishes no basis for the 
 charge of sin; since the wrong action is not moral action, be¬ 
 cause not rational, and the wrong quality not moral quality, 
 which can only attach to moral action! 
 
 The theory assumes that the great radical action of will tran¬ 
 spired in Adam. This has been shown to be absurd, inasmuch 
 as the will was not existing in Adam—that is, the will of non¬ 
 existing posterity. If it should be assumed that it acted in the 
 infant the moment it became an existence the difficulty remains, 
 in all its force, that in an infant there can be no moral will. 
 Allow its tendency to self, yet it is an irrational tendency—as 
 much so as in the case of any instinct—and can have no more 
 elements of morality in it than any other case of instinctive 
 action. The whole affectional nature moves indeed wrong, 
 but not morally so. The nature is depraved in its central 
 powers, but not guilty. 
 
 Standing in close proximity to this, but radically different 
 
Punishment. 
 
 165 
 
 from it, is the theory of Coleridge, substantially accepted by 
 Professor Shedd, and, as we shall see, by Dr. Taylor, of New 
 Haven. As we understand it, it is this—and we must bear 
 with us the recollection that in this case, as in those already 
 referred to, the design of the theory is to show how we are 
 justly held for original sin: that the proper seat of sin is the 
 will; in other words, that in all cases it is the action of a per¬ 
 sonal will—precisely the ground we have taken; that, there¬ 
 fore, our original sin consists in an action of our will, but that 
 our wills act as soon as we exist, and act wrong; that, there¬ 
 fore, our sin dates back to the very dawn of our being—even 
 before consciousness itself; we sin before we know it, or, in¬ 
 deed, before we know anything. The theory, it would seem 
 sometimes, rests upon realism, and supposes a coaction of our 
 wills with Adam. This is undoubtedly Professor Shedd’s view. 
 We doubt whether Coleridge went so far. His statement will 
 be found in volume i, pages 269 to 289, Aids to Reflection , con¬ 
 taining his strictures on Jeremy Taylor’s Doctrines of Original 
 Sin. We cannot quote him in full. Let the student refer to 
 him. Dr. Shedd says: 
 
 “ In regard to the first point, the position taken is that the 
 sinful nature is in the will, and is the product of the will. We 
 say that it is in the will, in contradistinction to the physical 
 nature of man. Our statement of the doctrine of original sin 
 makes it consist in the deprivation of man’s sensuous nature 
 merely. In this case the will is conceived to be extraneous to 
 this corrupted nature, and merely the executor of it. Original 
 sin, in this case, is not in the voluntary part of man, but in the 
 involuntary part of him; and guilt cleaves to him when the 
 voluntary part executes the promptings of the involuntary part; 
 and guilt does not cleave to him until this does take place. 
 The adherents of this view insist (and properly, too, if the 
 statement is correct) that the term ‘ sinful,’ in the sense of 
 
166 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 guilty or criminal, cannot be applied to this depraved physical 
 nature—to this (so-called) original sin. 
 
 “In opposition to this view we affirm that original sin does 
 not consist in the depravation of man’s sensuous or physical 
 nature, but in the depravation of the will itself The corruption 
 of the physical nature of man is one of the consequences of 
 original sin, but not original sin itself. This is depravation of 
 a far deeper and more central faculty than that of sense—a 
 corruption of the voluntary power itself. It is because the 
 human will —the governing power of the soul—first fell away 
 from God that the other faculties of man are in the condition 
 they are in, that the affections are carnal, that the understand¬ 
 ing is darkened, that the physical nature is depraved; and 
 these effects of apostasy should never be put in the place of 
 their cause—of that corruption of the will which is the origin 
 of them all. 
 
 “But the examination of a single instance of the gratifica¬ 
 tion of a sensuous propensity is enough to show that sin lies 
 elsewhere than in the physical nature. A man, we will sup¬ 
 pose, gratifies the sensuous craving for strong drink. The sin 
 in this case does not lie in the craving of the sensuous nature, 
 corrupt though it be. The sin in the case lies further back, in 
 the will; and, be it observed, not solely in that particular voli¬ 
 tion of the will by which the act of drinking was performed, 
 but ultimately in that abiding state of the will—that selfishness 
 or selfish motive in the will—which prompted and permitted 
 the volition. Here, as in every instance, we are led back to a 
 sinful nature as the essence of sin; and this nature we find in 
 the will itself; we find it to be a particular state of the will 
 itself. 
 
 “But, besides saying that this sinful nature is in the will, we 
 have said furthermore that it is the product of the will. By 
 this we mean that the efficient producing author of this sinful 
 
Punishment. 
 
 167 
 
 nature is the will itself; in other words, that this nature is self- 
 
 willed, a self-determined nature. 
 
 “Here, then, we have a depraved nature, and a depraved 
 nature that is guilt, because it is a self-originated nature. 
 Here, then, is the child of wrath. Were this nature created 
 and put in man, as an intellectual nature, or as a particular 
 temperament, or put in him by the Creator of all things, it 
 would not be a responsible and guilty nature, nor would man 
 be a child of wrath. But it does not thus originate. It has its 
 origin in the free and responsible use of that voluntary power 
 which God has created and planted in the human soul, as its 
 most central, most mysterious, and most hazardous endowment. 
 It is a self-determined nature— a nature originated in a will and 
 by a will." 
 
 Perhaps no writer has attempted to give the philosophy of 
 original sin so directly as this author. His theory is summed 
 up in these several positions: first, original sin (all sin) has 
 its location in the will; second, it is produced by the will as a 
 self-determined power. The correctness of these positions cannot 
 be questioned. They are precisely the positions we should 
 assume. He then proceeds to define what he means by the 
 will, having made it the seat and author of original sin: 
 “In saying, therefore, that the sinful nature of man is the 
 product of the will we do not mean to teach that it has its 
 origin in the will considered as a faculty of choices or particular 
 volitions. We no more believe that original sin was produced 
 by a volition than that it can be destroyed by one. And if we 
 can have no idea of the will except as a faculty of single 
 choices, and no idea of voluntary actions except such as we 
 are conscious of in our volitions and resolutions, then we grant 
 that the sinful nature must be referred to some other producing 
 cause than the human will, and that the epithets ‘self-deter¬ 
 mined ’ and ‘ self-originated 7 cannot be applied to it. 
 
 6 
 
168 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 “ But it seems to us that we have a fuller and more adequate 
 idea of the voluntary power in man than this comes to. It 
 seems to us that our idea of the human will is by no means 
 exhausted of its contents when we have taken into view merely 
 the ability which a man has to regulate his conduct in a par¬ 
 ticular instance. It seems to us that we do believe in the 
 existence of a controlling power in the soul that is far more 
 central and profound than the quite superficial faculty by 
 which we regulate the movements of our lives outwardly, or 
 inwardly summon up our energies to the performance of par¬ 
 ticular acts. It seems to us that by the will is meant a voluntary 
 power that lies at the very center of the soul, and whose move¬ 
 ments consist, not so much in choosing and refusing, in refer¬ 
 ence to particular circumstances, as in determining the whole 
 man with reference to some great and ultimate end of living. The 
 characteristic of the will proper, as distinguished from the 
 voluntary faculty, is determination of the whole being to an 
 ultimate end , rather than selection of means attaining that end 
 in a particular case. (This distinction between the will proper 
 and the faculty of choices is marked in Latin by the words 
 voluntas and arbitrium , and in that one of the modern tongues 
 whose vocabulary for philosophy is the richest of all by the 
 two words Wille and WilTkuhr.) The difference between the 
 voluntary and volitionary power—between the will proper and 
 the faculty of choices—may be seen by considering a particular 
 instance of the exercise of the latter. Suppose that a man 
 chooses to indulge one of his appetites in a particular instance 
 —the appetite for alcoholic stimulus, for example—and that 
 he actually does gratify it. In this instance he puts forth one 
 single volition and performs one particular act By an act of 
 the faculty of choices, of which he is distinctly conscious, and 
 over which he has arbitrary power, he drinks and gratifies his 
 appetite. But why does he thus choose this particular instance ? 
 
Punishment. 
 
 169 
 
 In other words, is there not deeper ground for this single 
 volition ? Is not this particular act of choice determined by a 
 far deeper and preexisting determination of his whole inward 
 being to self, as an ultimate end of being? And now, if the 
 will should be widened out and deepened so as to contain this 
 whole inward state of the man—the entire tendency of the soul 
 to self and sin—is it not plain that it would be a very different 
 power from that which puts forth the particular volition? 
 "Would not the will, as thus conceived, cover a wider surface 
 of the soul, and reach down to a far deeper depth in it, than 
 that faculty of single choices which covers but a single point 
 on the surface, and never goes below the surface? Would not 
 a faculty comprehensive enough to include the whole man, and 
 sufficiently deep and central to be the origin and basis of a 
 nature , a character , a permanent moral state , be a very different 
 faculty from that volitionary power whose activity is merely 
 on the surface, and whose products are single resolutions and 
 transient volitions ? 
 
 “Now, by the will we mean such a faculty. We mean by it 
 voluntary power that lies at the very foundation of the human 
 soul, constituting its central, active principle, containing the 
 whole moral state, and all the moral affections. We mean by 
 it a voluntary power that carries the whole inward being along 
 with it when it moves; a power, in short, which is the man 
 himself—the ego, the person. 
 
 u The will, as thus defined, we affirm to be the responsible 
 
 and guilty author of the sinful nature. Indeed , this sinful 
 
 nature is nothing more nor less than the state of the will; nothing 
 
 more nor less than its constant and total determination to self as 
 
 the ultimate end of living. This voluntary power lying at the 
 
 bottom of the soul, as its elementary base, and carrying all the 
 
 faculties and powers of the man along with it, whenever it moves 
 
 and wherever it goes, has turned away from God, as an ultimate 
 12 6 
 
170 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 end; and this self-direction—the permanent and entire determi¬ 
 nation of self—this state of the will—is the sinful nature of man.” 
 
 That the precise view of the author may be seen it may be 
 proper to add, before we proceed to examine his statements, 
 still other positions. That act of the will which he makes the 
 ground of original sin is the determination of the will to self as 
 the ultimate end of life. This he holds to be the movement of 
 the whole nature toward self, and away from Grod—apostasy. 
 This primary and most central movement revolutionizes the 
 moral nature and enthrones a second, a perverted nature, which 
 now becomes dominant and permanent, out of which all subse¬ 
 quent separate volitions flow. This is the sinful nature. It 
 involves guilt because it is produced by the primary self- 
 determined action of the will; self-superinduced; not entailed 
 —not inherited. Each soul is its author in itself—so that each 
 soul is guilty for itself and not for another. He most explicitly 
 objects to all transfer of guilt. After the primary movement 
 of the will toward self it moves freelv forever in that direction. 
 All after separate choices are free choices, but inevitably 
 toward self; inasmuch as the will has no power of self-regen¬ 
 eration or recovery from its fall, which would be to choose 
 against its permanent choice—to act virtuously when it has be¬ 
 come wholly sinful. 
 
 Having established that acts of will transpire often without 
 our being conscious of them, he holds that this great act of 
 apostasy transpired before we were conscious of it; and in 
 proof alleges that our first consciousness is of guilt, which 
 involves that we were sinners before we were conscious of our 
 act of sin. He then proceeds to show that the act of will by 
 which we apostatized transpired in the garden of Eden, so that 
 our guilt antedates our birth. The argument is very com¬ 
 pact, and contains so much of truth as renders it exceedingly 
 
 plausible, and to the unlearned quite forcible. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 171 
 
 Enough has been said already to show the utter untenability 
 of the final position, that the act of the apostasy of our wills 
 occurred in the garden of Eden. This is the weak point of 
 the theory, and is fatal to the whole argument of the learned 
 author. If it were all admitted but this one point it fails en¬ 
 tirely to answer the purpose for which it was produced, namely, 
 to prove that we are born guilty. If this point were allowed 
 it would favor rather the theory of Edward Beecher than the 
 common Calvinistic view. 
 
 But let us search into its general contents. It is undoubtedly 
 correct in locating sin in the individual will. But this is a 
 fatal admission to the doctrine of original sin, as we have 
 abundantly shown, since acts of will must transpire after wills 
 exist and become competent to action. What is denominated the 
 depraved state of the will, its disposition, is admitted by the 
 author to be the product of the will in its primary choice; a 
 self-chosen, self-determined nature—self-originated; but this is 
 the same as asserting that original sin is not innate, but pro¬ 
 duced by after action—unless, as has been shown to be impos¬ 
 sible, the will really existed and acted before the person 
 existed. 
 
 If we suppose original sin to commence with the first act of 
 the infant will which, from some cause, is selfish and wrong, 
 then the following difficulties are insuperable. 
 
 Dr. Shedd is careful to state that it was not mere presence of 
 substance but was also coaction of will—and yet he admits 
 that there was but one will that acted : 11 The will of the whole 
 species, including the will of every individual within it, fell in 
 the first man.” He admits that we were not conscious of the 
 act, and makes an extended and very able argument to show 
 that wills often act unconsciously. But his argument does not 
 touch the point of our difficulty. Dr. Hodge discards the 
 hypothesis on two grounds : that it is false in philosophy, and 
 
172 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 a betrayal of the doctrine it is invented to serve—the Calvinis- 
 tic theory. We discard it as false in fact, and of no service at 
 all to the point it is supposed to establish—namely, our guilt 
 in the matter of the Adam’s act 
 
 The same objection so trenchantly made by Dr. Hodge 
 against the realism of Dr. Baird bears with all its force against 
 Dr. Shedd. His theory of coaction of will rests upon the as¬ 
 sumption of coexistence of being. But this is utterly without 
 foundation. The superstructure built upon it stands upon 
 nothing—or falsehood, which is worse than nothing. He 
 predicates coaction of a factor which exists only in his imagina¬ 
 tion ; and upon the basis of the action of this shadowy nothing 
 he founds his accusation of guilt against the human race. The 
 cofactor whom he indicts has no existence and never did 
 exist. 
 
 But if it were true, as he assumes, that there was such a co¬ 
 existence, it was of such a kind as, according to his own show¬ 
 ing, precludes coaction in such a form as to become ground of 
 personal guilt. He predicates a generic coexistence and a 
 generic coaction. What does he mean? By generic coexist¬ 
 ence he must mean, in some sort, the coexistence of the essence 
 of human nature in the essence of Adam. That essence must 
 have existed as personal or impersonal. If impersonal it could 
 not act personally; and, since nothing but a person can act 
 responsibly, it could not be responsible or guilty. If personal, 
 then each person of the race was present personally in Adam; 
 and if they acted responsibly they personally acted—acted as 
 discrete wills and not as a generic will, and then they are guilty, 
 not for the Adam’s sin, but each person for his own sin. Adam’s 
 hand plucked the fruit, but it was the instrument, not of his 
 will alone, but of each several will of the entire race, each will 
 acting with the same freedom as Adam himself possessed, and 
 under the same conditions of moral obligation. It is but a 
 
 e 
 
Punishment. 
 
 173 
 
 modification of the doctrine of the preexistence of souls, in 
 which state they sinned, by consequence of which they enter 
 this life as guilty, and a much less plausible form of it than 
 that first held by Origen and of late defended by Edward 
 Beecher, in this country, and Muller, of Germany. 
 
 If Dr. Shedd imagines that he has any other meaning for the 
 words generic will—“the will of the whole species, generically 
 including the will of every individual within it ”—let him try 
 to construe his phrase; he will find that the words are mean¬ 
 ingless. 
 
 Let us see how this is : A will acted in Eden. Whose will ? 
 A generic will, it is answered. That is, everybody’s will. Can 
 you separate in your thought a will from a person, so as that 
 the will may be present and act when the person whose will it 
 is is not present and not even existing ? There was a person 
 present in Eden and acting in the transgression; the act was 
 a will act. Whose will act ? There was but one person there, 
 Dr. Shedd says, and yet he declares that that act of will was 
 the will of each individual of unborn generations acting—your 
 will and my will; that is, our wills acted when we did not exist. 
 For that act of will, which was not mine personally, since he 
 says I did not personally exist, he brings me in personally 
 guilty. I am condemned for what I never did, but another 
 person did, long before I had being—my will being present, 
 though I was not; and my will acting, though I had no exist¬ 
 ence, at the time of the transaction. 
 
 Life is permanent—lives perish. The life that was created 
 and shrined in Adam, and which by transmission or expansion 
 has appeared along the ages, and which now pulsates in all 
 human veins, is an indiscerptible unit—the same life. The 
 millions of organisms into which it has flowed, and in which 
 it has become individualized, have been utterly distinct from 
 each other, having no common elements, but only resembling 
 
174 
 
 Studies ih Theology. 
 
 substance and arrangement, but the life itself has been common 
 and perpetual. It has never intermitted. An unbroken stream 
 extends from the first to the last man; that mysterious some¬ 
 thing called life, which beats in my heart and yours to-day, 
 thrilled in Adam’s veins when he opened his eyes in the 
 unblighted Eden. The individuals die, and the atomic lives 
 expire, but the life remains. This, then, is one thing we have 
 in common with Adam. No one can tell what it is. We call 
 it, in our blindness, a force. It pertains to matter—is a cre¬ 
 ated quality. 
 
 In addition to natural life, or possibly having some occult 
 identity with it, is a spiritual entity in man. As to its origin 
 there are two theories. One is known as creationism, the 
 other as traducianism. The former supposes that each human 
 soul is a distinct creation; that when natural life is propagated, 
 at some moment the new life center, probably before birth, 
 when it has elaborated its organism and is about to become a 
 differentiated life, becomes the home of a new creation—a soul. 
 The latter holds that the soul entity, in some occult manner 
 propagated with the natural life, is the projection of the human 
 parent It is no objection to this view that we cannot under¬ 
 stand how this might be. The whole subject is too deep for 
 us—eludes our gross apprehension. The soul soon discovers 
 itself, but neither knows nor tells the mystery of its origin. 
 We incline to the hypothesis of its propagation, and so some 
 occult unity of human souls as of human life. 
 
 Supposing these wonderful unities, do they reflect any light 
 on the problem of human sin? It has been so supposed. 
 Identity of the soul essence of the man of to-day with the 
 man of Eden is conceived to connect the man of to-day with 
 the sin of Eden. If sin were attribute of an essence this might 
 be conceivable, but as it is the quality of an act of a personal 
 
 will, with relation to law, it does not appear how it might be. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 175 
 
 The fact of identity of life and soul essence, if established, 
 might explain effects in the nature: tendencies—abnormal 
 conditions—common phenomena in the physical, mental, and 
 moral nature. These would seem to be propagated. Like 
 would beget like. Universal depravity may be thus explained 
 as a fact of the life force or essence—disease in the whole 
 physical and spiritual nature—carried along from generation 
 to generation. We have no means of knowing how the fact 
 of sin does affect the being that sins, but it is conceivable that 
 it may attack his essence in some manner, producing perma¬ 
 nent effects of disorder in it. Metaphysical causes do affect 
 substances. But, even supposing such effects wrought in the 
 nature by sin, the effects are not the sin. 
 
 Of entity, substance, essence, of any kind, we know but lit¬ 
 tle, and can predicate but little. So far as we can know any¬ 
 thing, we know that form is form of a reality—being; we call it 
 substance. So of thought and will. We cannot see it as we do 
 form; but we know that it has a home; it is thought and will 
 of some real being; some causational center. We cannot see 
 its shape or form ; or touch or weigh it; or dissect it as we can 
 solids, and even gases or electricity; but we are certain that 
 thought, emotion, and will are facts which as clearly point to 
 a real being as do form and weight and hardness. We know 
 not how a sinful volition of such a spiritual being may leave 
 its mark on the very essence itself—how it may affect its 
 powers. There are effects which lie beyond our ken. But if 
 such effects are possible they might explain how degeneracy 
 could be propagated. We see the fact that it is, but do not 
 see the how—do not know exactly what it is, but only that it 
 is abnormal condition of the being; but whatever it is, and 
 however radical or superficial, we know that it is but the effect 
 of sin, not sin itself. 
 
 By sin Adam became subject to attainder; his life was 
 
176 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 forfeit, liis estate confiscate. Redemption supervened for liis 
 restoration; "but while it arrested process of law, and provided 
 pardon, it did not rehabilitate him. It left him under the cloud 
 of death and degeneracy during his earthly life, as the sad 
 memorial of his sin; stains which even pardon and restored 
 favor did not, and do never, remove; stains which reach over 
 to his children along all the lines of their generation, reminding 
 them of the disastrous sin of their primitive ancestor. The 
 race blood is attaint. But these effects of his sin, carried over 
 under redemption, are not its penalties. It is a perversion of 
 language to call them so. 
 
 The case is that of a worthy nobleman who by treason for¬ 
 feits his life and in madness burns up the titles to his estates 
 and houses; who at the time is without heirs, but is in wed¬ 
 lock, and his wife is partner of his crime. The law attaches 
 dishonor and death to their crime. But the king, for some con¬ 
 sideration—say respect to the family name, or the intercession 
 of the queen, or any of a thousand amiable reasons—is induced 
 or disposed to relax the law, or restrain its penalty, but he will 
 do so in such manner as not to weaken the force of law or 
 minify the culprit’s sense of his crime. He will be gracious, 
 but also just to his own rights; he will spare, but he will ef¬ 
 fectually admonish. He calls his subject before him, and sets 
 forth the law and its penalty, and makes this announcement: 
 Your crime has forfeited your life, and your madness has de¬ 
 stroyed your estate. They were yours; I gave them to you; 
 you have forfeited them; I am disposed to be merciful to you. 
 This I will do: I will suspend the penalty which you have in¬ 
 curred ; I will give you time to repent; and on certain condi¬ 
 tions I will pardon you and restore the privileges which you 
 have forfeited, or their equivalents; but your restoration will 
 be in such form as always to remind you of your crime and 
 
 of my clemency; the memorials of these shall always go with 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 177 
 
 you, and be perpetuated with all your descendants. Your es¬ 
 tates, that would have descended to them by inheritance, will 
 henceforth come to them by grace, and on conditions. Had 
 you been loyal they would have been born to honor and emol¬ 
 uments. They will now be born to shame and poverty. This 
 will he known as the effect of your crime; but the shame and 
 poverty and death to which your crime subjects them, while it 
 will be a perpetual memorial of your guilt, will denote nothing 
 of guilt in them; they shall know that you have ruined them; 
 I am their friend and saviour; the curse that you have entailed 
 as inheritance I will turn to blessing; the inheritance you have 
 wasted I will restore. They will suffer, but only that by way 
 of suffering I may restore them. The shame and poverty and 
 death to which they shall be born will answer to no claim of 
 law, but to the reverberation of the blow that falls upon your 
 guilty head. 
 
 Thus it seems that the evils of degeneracy are in the world 
 by sin, but are concomitants of an economy of mercy; memo¬ 
 rials of sin, but not less memorials of grace. 
 
 Unity of substance, or occult connection of being, in some 
 intimate manner, as to mere essence, whether of spirit or mat¬ 
 ter, while it might suffice to account for certain phenomena, 
 could not go beyond that Moral character differs from moral 
 nature. The latter may be propagated or inherited, the former 
 cannot; the nature may be common to two or to many, the 
 character must be personal and singular. The moral nature 
 may exist without character; may exist without either virtue 
 or vice, as in infants. The character requires the nature, but 
 does not issue until the person inheriting the nature has morally 
 acted, and is the result, or rather the substance, thereof. Na¬ 
 ture is what the being is in his tendencies and powers. Char¬ 
 acter is what the being is in relation to law touching his duty. 
 Duty cannot be predicated of nature, but only of a person as 
 
178 Studies in Theology. 
 
 to the right use of his nature; and character is as the right or 
 wrong use. 
 
 It is said that the suffering of death and all other forms of 
 suffering which came to Adam on account of his sin were tokens 
 of the divine wrath and judicial visitations for the maintenance 
 of law—punishments. Death is explicitly stated, in the law 
 itself, to be the penalty of sin. It is repeated in many forms 
 throughout revelation: “Because thou hast hearkened,” etc. 
 “ The wages of sin is death. ” “By one man sin entered into 
 the world, and death by sin.” 
 
 There is not perfect agreement as to the exact import of the 
 word death. It is used in a triple sense in the Scriptures, un¬ 
 doubtedly. In one case it signifies the dissolution of the body 
 and its concomitants; in another it signifies the state of a soul 
 in which sin reigns; in a third it signifies permanent sever¬ 
 ance from communion with God and endurance of his displeas¬ 
 ure. These are, all and severally, death. Are they all in¬ 
 cluded in the penalty of sin ? It is so generally understood by 
 evangelical theologians. 
 
 We think there can be no doubt of the fact that they are, 
 all and severally, the effects of sin—facts that never would 
 have existed but for sin—but whether the several forms con¬ 
 stitute the penalty of sin may possibly be questioned. Whether 
 the presence of the first form is declarative of the sin of the 
 subject, and whether the second form is an effect of penalty or 
 is simply the state of the subject, may be doubted. 
 
 Much in the answer must depend upon the exact meaning 
 we attach to the word punishment. If we mean suffering 
 directly inflicted on the sinner for his sin and for the main¬ 
 tenance of law—and that seems to be its meaning—in that 
 case the sinner’s suffering only, and that part which is judicially 
 inflicted, is punishment. Yet, further, it enters into the idea 
 of punishment that the reason of the suffering is in the fact 
 
Punishment. 
 
 179 
 
 of the sin; and as punishment it is a suffering which is confined 
 to the sinner, in whom the sin exists, as its sole reason. 
 
 But suppose the punishment inflicted on the sinner for his 
 sin be such as to carry over suffering to others who did not 
 sin, the question arises, Are these sufferings penal ?—-that is, ■ 
 Are they judicially inflicted on the sinner for the maintenance 
 of law ? A commits a murder. The law, for its support, 
 affixes death to that crime—the death of the murderer. This 
 is the penalty of the law ; that is punishment. Now, when A 
 is executed, a consequence is that his children suffer in many 
 forms. Are these sufferings penal? Are they judicially in¬ 
 flicted for the maintenance of law; are they for the sin of the 
 sufferer ? If any should so say would we not conclude that 
 his moral perceptions are dull and his understanding of language 
 defective ? 
 
 It would seem from these reflections that punishment justly 
 inflicted declares the sin of the subject in all cases, but it would 
 also seem that punishment inflicted on a sinning person to 
 declare his guilt, and to support the law which he has dis¬ 
 honored, may, in many ways, give rise to other forms of suffer¬ 
 ing, reaching out to other and perfectly innocent beings; 
 which sufferings may be even greater than the real and great 
 penal suffering endured by the guilty himself—may be greater 
 in a hundred different sufferers than that inflicted on the guilty 
 —and in no proper sense any part of the legal penalty, but 
 only accidents of its infliction ; the essential difference being, 
 not in the amount of the suffering, but in the subjects and 
 sources. In the one case the subject is guilty; in the other 
 case he is innocent. In the former case law inflicts suffering 
 for its support; in the latter the consequences of guilt affect 
 the innocent, but not as penalty. 
 
 Mr. Wesley and Mr. Watson held to imputation in a certain 
 sense, but by no means in the Calvinistic sense. They held to 
 
180 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 punishment and guilt on account of Adam’s sin, but not at all 
 in the Calvinistic sense. 
 
 These points are clearly set forth, especially in Mr. Watson: 
 That Adam’s sin was personal in such sense that he alone 
 became subject to its proper penalty of eternal death. But 
 they hold that it was imputed in a sense to the unborn poten¬ 
 tialities in him, in such a way that the punishment of death 
 reached them as the extinction of their seminal existence. 
 
 They hold that being born with depravity is in a sort sin, 
 but not sin that is punishable with eternal death; and yet that 
 it is punishable. They distinguish between punishments proper 
 and penal consequences; as, when a murderer is hanged for 
 his crime he is punished, but his children who suffer the con' 
 sequent disgrace may be said to be punished. The punishment 
 in the first case being on account of guilt as its desert; in the 
 second case being simply suffering consequent upon a relation 
 of some kind to the sufferer. 
 
 “ Nowhere is it said, or even hinted in the most distant 
 manner, that men will be sentenced to eternal death at that day, 
 either because of Adam’s sin or because their connection with 
 Adam made them inevitably corrupt in nature and unholy in 
 conduct; from which effects they could not escape, because 
 God from eternity had resolved to deny them the grace neces¬ 
 sary to this end.” * 
 
 “ What the race would have been had not the redeeming 
 plan been brought in the Scriptures nowhere tell us, except 
 that a sentence of death, to be executed ‘ in the day ’ in which 
 the first pair sinned, was the sanction of the law under which 
 they were placed; and it is great presumption to assume it as 
 a truth that they would have multiplied their species only for 
 eternal destruction. That the race would have been propa¬ 
 gated under an absolute necessity of sinning, and of being 
 
 * Theological Institutes , part ii, pp. 397, 398. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 181 
 
 made eternally miserable, we may boldly affirm to be impossible; 
 because it supposes an administration contradicted by every 
 attribute which the Scriptures ascribe to God.”* 
 
 Thus he explicitly denies the possibility of such a participa¬ 
 tion in Adam’s sin by his posterity as to expose to the penalty 
 of eternal death. Mr. Wesley holds the same view, and asserts, 
 as Mr. Watson does, as a maxim: “The Judge of the whole 
 earth will do right; ” “ He will judge the world in righteous¬ 
 ness,” and every man therein according to the strictest justice. 
 He will punish no man for doing anything which he could not 
 possibly avoid, neither for omitting anything which he could 
 not possibly do. Every punishment supposes the offender 
 might have avoided the offense for which he is punished. 
 Otherwise to punish him would be palpably unjust and incon¬ 
 sistent with the character of God, our Governor. 
 
 “ Taking these principles, let them be applied to the case be¬ 
 fore us. The scheme of predestination in question contem¬ 
 plates the human race as fallen in Adam. It must, therefore, 
 contemplate them either as seminally in Adam, not being yet 
 bom, or as to be actually born into the world. 
 
 “In the former case the only actual beings to be charged 
 with sin, ‘ the transgression of the law,’ were Adam and Eve; 
 for the rest of the human race not being actually existent were 
 not capable of transgressing, or if they were, in a vague sense, 
 capable of it by virtue of the federal character of Adam, yet 
 then only as potential , and not as actual , beings ; beings, as the 
 logicians say, in posse , not in esse. Our first parents rendered 
 themselves liable to eternal death. This is granted ; and had 
 they died fin the day’ they sinned, which but for the intro¬ 
 duction of a system of mercy and long-suffering, and the ap¬ 
 pointment of a new kind of probation, for anything that 
 appears, they must have done, the human race would have 
 
 *P. 398. 
 
 6 
 
182 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 perished with them, and the only conscious sinners would have 
 been the only conscious sufferers. But then this lays no foun¬ 
 dation for election and reprobation—the whole race would thus 
 have perished without the vouchsafement of mercy to any. 
 
 u This predestination must therefore respect the human race 
 fallen in Adam, as to be born actually, and to have a real, as 
 well as a potential, existence; and the doctrine will be that the 
 race so contemplated were made unconditionally liable to eternal 
 death. In this case the decree takes effect immediately upon 
 the fall, and determines the condition of every individual in 
 respect to his being elected from this common misery, or his 
 being left in it; and it rests its plea of justice upon the assumed 
 fact that every man is absolutely liable to eternal death wholly 
 and entirely for the sin of Adam, a sin to which he was not a 
 consenting party, because he was not in actual existence. But 
 if eternal death be ‘ the wages of sin,' and the sin which receives 
 such wages be the transgression of a law by a voluntary agent 
 (and this is the rule as laid down by God himself), then on no 
 scriptural principle is the human race to be considered abso¬ 
 lutely liable to personal and conscious eternal death for the sin 
 of Adam, and so the very ground assumed by the advocates of 
 this theory is unfounded.” * 
 
 The principle bodied in all these quotations, as maxims of 
 divine jurisprudence to which the divine administration must 
 conform, is that a sin must be personal, and hence that Adam's 
 sin cannot be imputed to his posterity as ground of punish¬ 
 ment and guilt. The same is positively affirmed in a passage 
 on page 342. It occurs in his discussion of election, in com¬ 
 menting on the case of the nonelect He says: “In whatever 
 light the subject be viewed, no fault, in any right construction, 
 can be chargeable on the persons so punished, or, as we may 
 rather say, destroyed, since punishment supposes a judicial pro- 
 
 *P. 395. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 183 
 
 ceeding which this act shuts out. For either the reprobates are 
 destroyed for a pure reason of sovereignty, without any refer¬ 
 ence to their sinfulness, and thus all criminality is left out of 
 the consideration, or they are destroyed for the sin of Adam, 
 to which they were not consenting; or for personal faults re¬ 
 sulting from a corruption of nature which they brought into 
 the world with them, and which God wills not to correct, and 
 they have no power to correct themselves. Every received 
 notion of justice is thus violated .” 
 
 It is not pretended that in no case can the sin of one occa¬ 
 sion suffering to another or others. Such may be the relations 
 of parties, either natural or social, that neither can suffer with¬ 
 out the other participating. The suffering resulting from pun¬ 
 ishment inflicted on one for crime may inevitably reach others, 
 even more acutely than the criminal himself. The evil conse¬ 
 quences in some cases may be more serious and lasting than the 
 punishment But in no proper sense of the word can they be 
 accounted punishment, or a part of the punishment The inci¬ 
 dental evils are accidents of relation. Punishments are judicial 
 pains which connect themselves with the crime in the person of 
 the criminal. He is the only person known to the law, and the 
 only person, therefore, that can be subject of judicial treatment. 
 When it is said, “By the sin of one man condemnation passed 
 upon all, ” it is not meant that the all were accounted guilty and 
 adjudged to punishment, which would, as we have seen, be a 
 violation of justice, but rather it is meant that as a consequence 
 of their relation they became affected with evil, which would 
 inevitably work to their ruin; and because this would be unjust 
 it is immediately added, “so by the righteousness of one the 
 free gift passed upon all unto justification of life”—the evils 
 that ensued from the natural relation of innocent seed to their 
 natural head were counterworked by their relation to their 
 
 gracious Head. If the passage is to be regarded as declaring a 
 
 6 
 
184 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 judicial act at all it was not, on the one part, the act of con¬ 
 demnation to punishment and on the other side the act of a 
 judicial pardon, for there was no possible guilt in the case; 
 which fact rendered such judicial acts impossible. The declara¬ 
 tion is of beings potential, and is equivalent to the statement 
 that the condemnation of Adam—which in effect was the con¬ 
 demnation of his unborn descendants to that forfeiture of life 
 which would result from his death—was reversed by redemp¬ 
 tion, by which they were permitted to live, and without impu¬ 
 tation of blame for the fallen nature which they inherited. 
 
 Calvinistic writers have a way of defining punishment which 
 is false and misleading, and which is made to serve a sophis¬ 
 tical purpose. There is but one true idea of punishment The 
 word is perfectly definite. All just use of the word must 
 recognize this exclusive and exhaustive meaning. It signifies 
 penalty, that suffering which law attaches to its violation, 
 and which is due and is adjudged to the transgressor and none 
 other. 
 
 The essential and only possible ground of liability is that the 
 person so liable be a transgressor, in the meaning of the law. 
 It can never arise without this, and never go beyond it. These 
 are its absolute and only conditions. The sufferings which are 
 accidents of the law’s infliction are not a part of it, are not 
 known to it When it is said, therefore, that punishment is 
 any suffering to which a person is liable because of sin the 
 definition is made to serve a misleading idea. If it meant any 
 suffering to which a 'person is judicially liable for his sin it 
 would be true. But it is used in a much broader sense, and a 
 meaning is adroitly incorporated which hides a dangerous fal¬ 
 lacy. The word liable is the equivocal factor. In law it means 
 amenable, or subject to, because of the relation of the party to 
 law. It is employed, however, in the loose sense of what we 
 
 are exposed to, or subjects of, without respect to our relations 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 185 
 
 to law; and so all the evils to which we are exposed, which 
 result from violation of law by another, is called punishment. 
 Adam sinned, and he was adjudged to death. This was pun¬ 
 ishment to which he was liable for his sin. We as his descend¬ 
 ants are subject to death, because we inherit his fallen fortunes. 
 Since this liability, in the sense of “ subjection to,” comes to us 
 by our relation to him, it is declared that we incur the penalty 
 even as he did, since it results from a judicial process. This is 
 clearly not true. Our death results to us as an accident of his 
 sin and our relation to him, and is not something to which we 
 are adjudged as violators of law. The only party known to the 
 law and punished by it is the transgressor. Others inherit 
 calamities through his sin, but they are not punishments, as the 
 law does not know them. 
 
 But am I asked, How, then, do I account for the death of 
 infants, as punishment ? I answer, I deny that to them it is 
 punishment But it is said that I have already admitted it to 
 be punishment, and how, then, can I now repudiate the admis¬ 
 sion? 
 
 The question is perfectly fair, and I am in duty bound to 
 furnish an answer. 
 
 My position is this: Adam, the first man, was placed under 
 specific law to God, inclusive of all moral duty; he was also 
 placed under a positive law, which was a test law. This posi¬ 
 tive law read, “ Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, 
 thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof 
 thou shalt surely die.” How, either that declaration was a mere 
 prophecy or it was the assertion of a penalty. I take the latter 
 view. It was penalty. But of which law ? The law concern¬ 
 ing the tree. It is specific—its terms are express. Do you wish 
 to widen it? Upon what authority? Do you answer, Upon 
 the authority of other interpretative passages ? What passages ? 
 
 “The soul that sinneth, it shall die.” “Wherefore, as by one 
 13 • 
 
186 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 man sin entered into tlie world, and . . . death passed upon all 
 men, for that all have sinned: for until the law,” etc. These 
 are certainly the crucial passages. We propose to examine 
 each and find its exact meaning. They are introduced to prove 
 that the temporal death of each human being is the punishment 
 of his sin. This we deny. 
 
 Before the examination it is proper we should state our 
 view, that the interpretation may be in the light of the two 
 theories. 
 
 We hold that Adam’s sin against his law involved him in the 
 threatened penalty, which certainly included temporal death. 
 It is therefore true that death was by sin —temporal death 
 by sin, as to the tree. That transaction terminated the first 
 covenant. It was the end of the economy. The law given to 
 the innocent Adam, whose violation was death, was broken, 
 and under that economy nothing more remained but the execu¬ 
 tion of the penalty. Observe, the terms are few and simple and 
 express: 11 Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou 
 shalt not eat of it ”—that is the command part and the whole 
 of it; “ for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely 
 die.” No more can be put into it. The disobedience having 
 transpired, the subject must die, and the covenant has reached 
 its end. The transaction fully accounts for the introduction of 
 sin and the introduction of death. But it accounts for nothing 
 beyond Adam. The fact of Adam’s posterity, and of their cir¬ 
 cumstances, does not enter into that transaction at all except 
 as rendered impossible by it. The completion of that covenant 
 in the execution of penalty on the transgressor was the extinc¬ 
 tion of the race. 
 
 Now, to account for the existence of the race, and any and all 
 the circumstances connected therewith, we shall come to another 
 covenant, or economy, or arrangement, or new departure, and all 
 subsequent events must be explained under the provisions of the 
 
Punishment. 
 
 187 
 
 new. The old is abolished—has no more force; is nothing; 
 explains nothing. Parts of it may be carried over and incor¬ 
 porated in the new, but the new must interpret everything. 
 Nothing remains by virtue of the former covenant, however it 
 may resemble it. It is analogous to a contract or form of gov¬ 
 ernment which is superseded by a later, which may or may 
 not continue parts of the old, but which alone, in its new con¬ 
 stitution, interprets and is responsible for what exists under it. 
 
 The new covenant had respect to an Adam already under 
 sentence of death. Now the question is: What did it propose 
 to do ? What did it do ? What has arisen under it ? What 
 will arise under it? As the old covenant vanished away 
 everything must be explained under the new. 
 
 As I understand it, the new departure was a covenant or 
 arrangement by which the death impending over the guilty 
 Adam was not removed, but suspended. The new economy 
 did not abolish it, but carried it up, so that the penalty of the 
 first covenant was incorporated into the second—as to the 
 Adam as penalty , as to his seed as inheritance. The new cove¬ 
 nant provided that the death-doomed Adam should be permitted 
 to beget children in his likeness, and that they should come 
 into the inheritance of his mortality as well as the inheritance 
 of his nature—his disordered affections. Thus the death which 
 was to him penalty of the law he had broken—and which de¬ 
 clared his sin, and which became possible to him because he 
 sinned—to his children became an inheritance; not a punish¬ 
 ment, not at all declarative of their sin. It was born of penalty 
 —just as shame to the children of a murderer is bom of his 
 crime but is not penalty. Their death comes not of the law 
 sentence as to themselves, but as an inheritance from a fallen, 
 but redeemed, ancestor, under a new and totally different 
 economy from that under which his death was incurred. 
 
 The children born to Adam thus die not because they are 
 
1S8 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 sinners, for they die often before they are sinners. The new 
 covenant, as the old, has its law and its penalty, but neither the 
 law nor the penalty reads as the old. What is the law of the 
 new covenant ? I answer, The law embraces the whole moral 
 law of God as in the former case. It imposes all moral duty, 
 all righteousness of motive, of affection, of action; perfect love 
 to God, and perfect love to man; unswerving obedience. 
 
 Is the subject, fallen and abnormal, able to keep this law in 
 all its requirements from its birth ? 
 
 We answer: It is not a law to infants, but to adults. Infants 
 are not suitable subjects of command; can neither know a law, 
 nor obey a law, nor be judged by a law. But can adults, from 
 the moment they become responsible, keep a perfect law? We 
 answer: We cannot tell what, under grace, a human being 
 might do; bat we hold that no moral law can be binding 
 which is absolutely beyond the power of the subject, unless his 
 inability has been guiltily superinduced. We deny that it is 
 possible to predicate oughtness of an absolute impossibility. 
 Hence, once more, we hold that the new covenant is not a mere 
 legal covenant, having commands and a penalty. It is a cove¬ 
 nant of mercy, in which provision is made for failure ; in which 
 faith is imputed for righteousness, or whose penalty may be 
 averted. 
 
 What are its penalties? To this I answer: It does not 
 reenact or carry up the penalty of the old, as penalty. That 
 is, the subjects of the new are not already under sentence from 
 the old. They do not begin with penalty incurred. It is not 
 natural death , therefore natural death is no part of it: natural 
 death will exist though its penalty should be averted. Natural 
 death is in the covenant itself, not in its breach. Its penalty is 
 banishment from God; just that, and no more, and no less. 
 When do we become liable ? When we sin, and do not repent. 
 When will it be executed ? 
 
Punishment. 
 
 189 
 
 The point we make, and hold to be of great importance, is 
 that the Adamic law, expressed in the command concerning 
 the tree, and the penalty attached thereto, are not the law and 
 penalty holding over his degenerate descendants. They take 
 their existence under a new law—one wholly moral—and their 
 liability to penalty arises upon wholly different ground facts. 
 
 We do not deny that, as to general contents, the law in the 
 two cases is identical; but there is a specific difference, arising 
 out of the difference in the circumstances and nature of the 
 subject Ideal moral law can never prescribe less than per¬ 
 fection to its subject. It is the standard. In this respect all 
 moral beings are under the same law. But law can never 
 oblige its subject beyond his power. Therefore ideal law of 
 perfection can only bind him when there is power of obedience. 
 Doubtless upon Adam the whole moral law laid its imperative, 
 but of this no mention is made. How far he would have been 
 able to realize the ideal we have no means of knowing. It is 
 revealed to us that he was obliged, under penal sanctions, but 
 the penalty was attached to a specific clause and a positive, and 
 not to the law demanding ideal perfection. This clause we 
 know he had the power to keep, and hence perceive the right¬ 
 eousness of the sentence. Ho man knows anything further. 
 The race is under the ideal law : moral perfection is the stand¬ 
 ard of requirement; it can be nothing else; but what is the 
 penalty of failure, and when does the penalty become due ? 
 
 To these questions I answer: First, while ideal perfection is 
 the standard of claim the divine law never imposes this as duty 
 on fallen beings, and never threatens penalty upon its failure. 
 It is confessedly a law addressed to fallen beings—beings 
 crippled in their nature. It requires obedience to the extent 
 of their ability, whatever that may be. It threatens penalty on 
 disobedience, but since disobedience may result from inability, 
 or other palliating cause, or even from criminal intent, it offers 
 
190 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 pardon, and executes its penalty on tlie sinner not until after 
 his refusal to repent. It is a law whose penalty is laid rather 
 against persistent impenitence than breaches of its requirements; 
 whose claim is met rather by repentance and faith, with evan¬ 
 gelical efforts to obey, than by perfect obedience. The penalty 
 of any just law is a suffering inflicted by justice for a fault 
 which was avoidable. The penalty, therefore, was avoidable. 
 That was so under the first law. It is so under the second. 
 Natural death is not avoidable. With what propriety can it 
 be a penalty ? The finally saved are saved from what ? Sin and 
 its penalty. But they die. Then death is not penalty. The 
 death which is the penalty of the new covenant is not natural 
 death, but soul death—the loss of the soul. All the warnings 
 are against that death. All the promises are of deliverance 
 from that death. 
 
 Pardon annuls punishment. The pardoned are not punished. 
 The terms are exclusive of each other. Believers are pardoned, 
 but they die. Then death is not punishment—the death which 
 they die. In a word, nothing is plainer than that evils which 
 result to the race in consequence of Adam’s sin are not, in any 
 proper sense of the word, punishments, but incidents of a re¬ 
 deemed life during the period of its probation, reaching it in 
 part by inheritance, or coming to it for correction and reproof— 
 admonitive of future wrath. The evils inherited are permitted 
 to reach the innocent by reason of their relation to a guilty an¬ 
 cestor, under an economy of salvation. The evils which reach 
 them for their own sins may be of the nature of penalty, but 
 even these are chiefly admonitory. Punishment properly 
 comes after trial, and ends the case. 
 
 The theory, then, which undertakes to explain our guilt for 
 
 Adam’s sin on the hypothesis of our coexistence in and coaction 
 
 with him fails—fails because its postulate is shown to be false. 
 
 Dr. Hodge agrees with us in sweeping it away as a figment of 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 191 
 
 imagination; as an impossible conception. The supposition of 
 the guilt of the race in Adam has no support in it. Dr. Shedd 
 declares it can have no other foundation. Between Union and 
 Princeton the truth of the doctrine is shown to be impossible. 
 We are constrained to agree with this conclusion. Dr. Shedd 
 affirms, what all rational men admit to be true, that sin and 
 guilt can only be predicated of will—and of will in action, or 
 as primitive originating cause; that it can only be predicated 
 of individuals because of the relation of their wills to its pro¬ 
 duction. Unquestionably he is right. Dr. Hodge declares 
 that w r e could not have personal connection with Adam’s sin 
 by coaction, since we did not exist at the time. Unquestiona¬ 
 bly he is right. The conclusion is inevitable: since we had 
 no connection with the act it cannot be ground of our guilt or 
 sin. 
 
 I have not deemed it pertinent to expose other dangerous 
 errors in Dr. Shedd’s able discussion; but cannot dismiss his 
 theory without adding that its ability is only surpassed by its 
 dangerous sophistries, and its want of candor in presenting the 
 doctrine it antagonizes is only equaled by the unsoundness 
 and manifold errors into which it has brought its learned and 
 adroit expounder. 
 
 The real theory, which we shall examine, we designate the 
 Princeton theory. We do not mean that it is peculiar to 
 Princeton, but that it finds its strong support in Dr. Hodge, the 
 theologian of Princeton, as against Hew England theologians, 
 on the one hand, and Danville on the other. He constantly 
 asserts that his view is that which has been held by the ortho¬ 
 dox Church from Augustine down. We have seen already 
 how stoutlv he denies and resists the theorv advanced by Dr. 
 Shedd—the theory that the race is guilty of original sin be¬ 
 cause of community of nature, or any kind of actual participa¬ 
 tion in the Adam’s sin. He rejects it on two grounds: first, 
 
192 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 that it is in direct conflict with the doctrine as held by the Church 
 from the beginning ; and, second, as impossible in fact, and as 
 involving many dangerous and damaging consequences. His 
 own view excludes it. Asserting more stoutly, if possible, the 
 doctrine of the sin and guilt of the race than they do, he has an 
 entirely different explanation of it. 
 
 It is this: The race sinned and became guilty in the Adam, 
 representatively, or imputatively; that is, the Adam was the 
 divinely constituted representative of the race. As such his 
 act was imputed to them as their act—accounted theirs. It 
 was not their act in any real sense, but it was made theirs by 
 imputation. They had no real participation in it, but he who 
 acted represented them and they became guilty as if they had 
 acted themselves. According to the theory already examined 
 the race had a real presence in Adam, and did really act with 
 him, and so were really guilty of the sin as their own sin. The 
 sin was theirs in fact, not by imputation. According to this 
 theory the sin was not their own in the fact, but by imputa¬ 
 tion. The theory is called the strict imputation theory. It is 
 just to say that Dr. Hodge and those who agree with him do 
 not rest the whole of the doctrine of original sin here. They 
 admit that it consists in part in the corruption of nature which 
 descends from the Adam to his posterity, and in this respect 
 is real and personal. Original sin comprises these two parts: 
 first, it is the guilt of Adam’s representative act charged to his 
 posterity; second, being thus found guilty of sin, by imputa¬ 
 tion, the posterity are punished by the withdrawment from 
 them of that original righteousness in which they would have 
 appeared, and in the stead thereof endued with the possession 
 of a corrupt and sinful nature; and this nature is their real 
 and positive sin. 
 
 That this is the theory will appear from the following ex¬ 
 tracts. Dr. Hodge thus defines it: “Adam, as the common 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 193 
 
 father of all men, was by divine appointment constituted not 
 only the natural, but the federal, bead or representative of bis 
 posterity. Tbe race stood its probation in bim. His sin was 
 tbe sin of tbe race, because tbe sin of its divinely and right¬ 
 eously constituted representative." * 
 
 Again: “Tbe main point in tbe analogy between Christ and 
 Adam, as presented in the theology of tbe Protestant Church, 
 and as exhibited by tbe apostles, is that as in tbe case of 
 Christ, bis righteousness, as something neither done by us nor 
 wrought in us, is the judicial ground of oar justification, with 
 which inward holiness is connected as an invariable conse¬ 
 quence, so in the case of Adam, his offense, something outside 
 of ourselves, a peccatum alienum , is the judicial ground of the 
 condemnation of our race, of which condemnation spiritual 
 death or inward corruption is the expression and the conse¬ 
 quence." f 
 
 Again: “ He has insisted that it was not our works or our 
 subjective character, but the blood of Christ, his propitiatory 
 death, his righteousness, the righteousness of God, something 
 therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our 
 justification. It is to illustrate the great fundamental doctrines 
 of the Gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and 
 shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any cor¬ 
 ruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed upon all 
 men for the offense of one. To denv this, and to assert that 
 our subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not 
 only to deny the very thing which the apostles asserts, but to 
 overturn the whole argument." £ 
 
 The elaborate articles in the Princeton Essays on Pelagian- 
 ism. Original Sin, and Imputation, as well as Dr. Hodge’s 
 reviews of Dr. Parks and Dr. Baird, in the years 1851-60, and 
 
 * Princeton Review, April, 1860, p. 340. 
 
 f Biblical Repertory, 1860, p. 341. \ P. 344. 
 
 6 
 
194 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 Dr. Nathaniel Taylor's on tlie Divine Government, contain in 
 many forms statements of precisely the import of the above 
 extracts. We may cite a few more brief paragraphs. 
 
 Dr. Thornwell, in the Southern Presbyterian Review* in his 
 review of Dr. Baird's book, holds the same positions: “ This is 
 the point upon which we differ—not whether a man can be 
 punished for what is not his own, but whether there is only one 
 way of a thing being his own. If there is a just moral sense 
 in which an action can be mine, without my having actually 
 committed it, then there is a ground upon which it may be 
 righteously imputed to me without my being the cause of it. 
 ... We contend that representation as really establishes the 
 relation of property in action as personal causation; that what 
 a man does by his agent he as truly does as if he did it in 
 his own proper person. The maxim expresses the common 
 sense of mankind, qui facit per alium facit per se. The whole 
 system of sponsorship in society is founded upon it, and no 
 commonwealth could hang together for a single generation if 
 the principle were discarded. This is the principle upon which 
 the imputation of Adam’s first sin, to us, proceeds. He was 
 oar representative; he was our head, our agent; on probation, 
 not for himself alone, but for all who should descend from 
 him by ordinary generation. There can be no question but, 
 if he sustained this relation to us, we are implicated in all that 
 he did in this relation. His acts are ours, and we are as re¬ 
 sponsible for them as if we had committed them ourselves. 
 We sinned in him, and fell with him in the first transgres- 
 sion. 
 
 Dr. Thornwell declares that “ there is no reason to suppose 
 that, independently of the sovereign appointment of God, the 
 character and conduct of Adam would have had any legal 
 effects upon the destiny of his offspring." f 
 *For 1861, pp. 188, 189. 
 
 6 
 
 fP. 193. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 195 
 
 Pages 200 and 201 of the same article reiterate and expand 
 the same positions. Farther along he holds this remarkable 
 language: “By one man's disobedience many were made sin¬ 
 ners. Either we are guilty of that act or original corruption is 
 in us simply misfortune. In some way or other it is ours, 
 justly imputable to us, or we are not, and cannot be, born the 
 children of wrath. But we are guilty; conscience testifies that 
 we are guilty—that our native corruption is in us [change of 
 ground]. But as we did not sin personally, as we did not sin 
 naturally, we must have sinned vicariously. The only alter¬ 
 native is—in ourselves, or in another. Ourselves are out of 
 the question. Therefore we sinned in Adam, and our history 
 truly began before our birth. Our appearance in time was not 
 an absolute commencement, but moral relations preceded and 
 determined it In bringing us into the world sinners God did 
 nothing more than execute the decree of his justice; the 
 negative agency of withholding or not imparting the divine 
 image is sufficient to explain the effect. To be destitute of the 
 image of God is to be in an unholy state, and the want of 
 original righteousness necessitates positive corruption. But 
 still the agency of God, in the production of that corruption, is 
 purely punitive and judicial. The case is this: The being to 
 be produced is, under the curse, exposed to the penalty of the 
 law. . . . This is precisely the doctrine of our stardards. 
 There is first guilt; then the want of original righteousness; 
 and then corruption of the whole nature.” * 
 
 Xothing could be more explicit than these statements, and 
 we could add to them indefinitely from ancient and recent ex¬ 
 pounders of the doctrine of original sin. They directly con¬ 
 tradict the explanation we have already examined, and thus 
 divide the defenders of the doctrine into clans mutually destroy¬ 
 ing one another, each party declaring that what the other 
 
 *Pp. 206-208. 
 
 6 
 
196 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 holds cannot be true. And they are unquestionably severally 
 right! 
 
 To the view before us we have these objections to offer: 
 The theory is that we are guilty of Adam’s first sin because he 
 acted as our agent or representative; and it admits that we did 
 not have any personal connection of any kind with the act; is 
 even careful to state, and insist upon it, that we had no exist¬ 
 ence at the time it occurred. 
 
 The words imputation and representation are so important, in 
 this theory, that we do well to ponder them before we proceed 
 with our exceptions. 
 
 By representation, representative, federal head, and kindred 
 terms, whatever other meanings may be attached to them by 
 other minds, as used by Dr. Hodge and the school of which, 
 because of his eminence, I have chosen him as an exponent, is 
 meant that Adam was appointed to act for us; so that his act 
 should be ours as really as if we acted ourselves, and we should 
 be responsible in the same degree as if we had acted personally. 
 He became our representative by appointment and sovereign 
 constitution. 
 
 By imputation is meant the actual ascribing to us the act, 
 and the whole of its moral contents, which he did under this 
 constitution, so that we became morally related to it just as we 
 would have been if we had lived and been the actors ourselves, 
 just as the real actor himself was. 
 
 “ That which is adopted by Protestants generally, as well 
 Lutheran as Beformed, and also by the great body of the Latin 
 Church, is that in virtue of the union, natural and federal, 
 between Adam and his posterity, his sin, though not their 
 act, is so imputed to them that it is the judicial ground of 
 the penalty threatened against him coming also upon them. 
 This is the doctrine of immediate imputation.” * 
 
 * Hodge, Systematic Theology , vol. ii, p. 190. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 197 
 
 Now, to this theory I have to answer: Given a God of jus¬ 
 tice and truth, the supposition, in both its parts, is necessarily 
 false. It is impossible that there should have been any such 
 representation, or any such imputation. 
 
 The word representation is confusing here, because used in 
 an exceptional and impossible sense. There is a doctrine of 
 representation that is admissible, but this is not that doctrine. 
 When we object to this doctrine we do not object to the doc¬ 
 trine of representative responsibility, but only to a false and 
 impossible form, or rather perversion, of it. 
 
 There is a true case in which one person may morally repre¬ 
 sent another; so that the whole moral contents of the acts of 
 the representative may go over to the represented, just as if he 
 had himself committed the act; it is de facto his act. That case 
 is this: when the party represented agrees that the party repre¬ 
 senting shall be his agent; agrees to be bound and responsible 
 in whatever he does; but even in such a case it may be doubted 
 whether the moral contents of a specific act would reach the 
 party represented without a specific commission to its perform¬ 
 ance. 
 
 There is a modified form of representation when one party is 
 appointed to represent another—a minor or incompetent person. 
 Thus parents are the natural representatives of their children ; 
 guardians, appointed by the State, the legal representatives of 
 their wards. But in these cases the representation can only 
 affect the external interest of the represented. That is, the 
 represented party can only be bound, or made to suffer, in his 
 estate, or his temporal circumstances, by his representative. No 
 moral act of the agent can be imputed as guilt to the party 
 represented. The parent or guardian may by neglect of duty, 
 criminal misuse of his agency, or ignorance, or even with the 
 best possible motives, injure, in various ways, and very se¬ 
 riously, the child or ward, in reputation, in property, in cliarac- 
 
198 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 ter, in well-being ; but there is one thing he never can do: he 
 can never make the represented morally responsible for any of 
 his deeds; his sin can never become the sin of the child or 
 ward; his power to represent or act as agent stops short of 
 power to inculpate in deeds of guilt. 
 
 The doctrine of representation taught by Dr. Hodge and the 
 theologians, ancient and modern, who concur with him is 
 neither of these; it is a form of representation which never did 
 exist, and never can until intuitions of justice are expunged 
 from the universe. 
 
 The case supposed by him is this, as we have seen in numer¬ 
 ous excerpta from his own writings and the writings of eminent 
 exponents of the theory: that one person was created, and 
 placed on trial under law in such form that, if he should break 
 the law, he would become deserving of the endless wrath and 
 curse of his Maker; and he was appointed at the same time to 
 represent his unborn and nonexisting descendants, so that his 
 guilty act should be laid to their charge as if they had per¬ 
 formed it themselves, and they should become therefor subject 
 to the same wrath and curse which he deserved and suffered 
 even as they would be if they had personally committed the 
 act. 
 
 This, it is assumed, is a conceivable and real case, and not 
 at all inconsistent with justice and honor and truth. On the 
 ground of representation he says the sin of the one is, and 
 justly, the sin of the many—and therefore the curse is theirs: 
 the sin is imputed and the punishment is inflicted. The im¬ 
 puted sin becomes real sin, thus: “ To impute sin, in scriptural 
 and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And 
 by guilt is meant, not criminality, or moral ill desert, or demerit, 
 much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy 
 justice. Hence the evil consequent on the imputation is not an 
 arbitrary infliction; not merely a misfortune or calamity, not a 
 
Punishment. 
 
 199 
 
 chastisement, in the proper sense of that word, but a punishment; 
 that is, an evil inflicted in the execution of the penalty of law and 
 for the satisfaction of justice.”* “ The ground of the imputation 
 of Adam's sin, or the reason why the penalty of his sin has come 
 upon all his posterity, is the union between us and Adam. 
 There could, of course, be no propriety in imputing the sin of 
 one man unto another unless there were some connection be¬ 
 tween them to explain and justify such imputation. . . . The 
 union between Adam and his posterity, which is the ground of 
 the imputation of his sin to them, is both natural and federal. ”f 
 
 The theory of the elder Edwards has a general resemblance 
 to this but really differs from it, and in this is the leading rep¬ 
 resentative of a class. He holds to a real oneness of Adam's 
 posterity with him, not on the ground that the posterity were 
 substantially in him, but on this ground: they were divinely 
 constituted one; the one Adam was all other men, not sub¬ 
 stantially, but really, because so in the divine mind; that 
 therefore the sin and guilt of Adam were really and properly 
 the sin and guilt of each of his descendants; they were morally, 
 by a divine constitution, the same person. This seems to be the 
 view of several of the leading Hew England divines, and, as 
 they contend, was possibly the opinion of Augustine himself, 
 and many eminent divines of intermediate ages. 
 
 The point in which this differs from the Princeton school, if 
 we can understand them, is this : Edwards holds to the actual 
 sin and guilt of the posterity for Adam’s sin as one moral 
 person with him by divine constitution—which Hodge denies, 
 but holds that, while the posterity are not one moral person 
 with the Adam, they are by a divine constitution regarded and 
 treated as if they were one. They did not really sin in Adam, 
 but are regarded as having done so. The difference holds to 
 be fundamental. It is, perhaps, however, imaginary. The 
 *Vol. ii, p. 194. f P.196. 
 
200 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 objections to both are identical, and will be mainly offered in 
 connection with the Princeton theory. Still, before passing, 
 let ns briefly examine this opinion. 
 
 The object is to explain how we are guilty of Adam’s sin. 
 To do this it alleges that his sin was de facto our sin, inasmuch 
 as we were morally one person. This ground of condemnation 
 is identical to both. Allowing the premises, it must be ad¬ 
 mitted that the explanation is complete. If we were one with 
 Adam we sinned precisely as he did, and are justly held. 
 
 But how is our oneness made out? Edwards admits that 
 our substance did not exist in Adam, nor, until six thousand 
 years afterward, did our persons. 
 
 But how, then, were we one? He answers that we were 
 one by divine constitution; that is, that we were constituted 
 one. But what does this mean ? It can mean nothing other 
 than that God determined to regard us as one when, in fact, 
 we were not one. To say that we became one when I was 
 not in existence is to assume that I existed when it is ad¬ 
 mitted I did not exist To say that we were one in the divine 
 thought when we were not one in fact is nothing other than 
 to say that the divine idea was contrary to the fact; that God 
 assumed that to be which was not! The only other meaning 
 possible is that the divine Being determined to treat us 
 in the same way as if we were one; view the posterity as 
 like the head and treat us in the same manner—one in kind; 
 unless it is contended that because he determined to regard us 
 as one we really did become so. It was either a legal oneness or 
 an actual oneness. The latter it could not be, unless it can be 
 shown that to be and not to be are convertible terms. 
 
 Could it be the former ? That is, were we constituted one 
 
 legally, so that what Adam did in the eye of the law I did ? 
 
 The difficulties here are no less numerous than in the former 
 
 case. God determined to view Adam's act as my act when it 
 
 %/ 
 
Punishment. 
 
 201 
 
 was not my act; when it conld not be my act unless it can be 
 shown that I could act before I existed. It is nothing other 
 than to charge G-od with assuming that to be true which he 
 knew to be false—to regard me as one with Adam when I was 
 not one with Adam. 
 
 But it supposes that my sin, which is held to be real, is not 
 something which originates with me; that is, it is not my 
 sin. It makes me a sinner, not because I have sinned, but be¬ 
 cause another man sinned and by a divine fiction it is trans¬ 
 ferred to me! I am not a sinner in fact, but I am so in the 
 divine idea. I am held to punishment for a fiction in the 
 divine mind—or on no other ground than that God alleges, 
 against me what could not be true, namely, that I sinned be¬ 
 fore I existed. 
 
 This theory is introduced, like the one we have already ex¬ 
 amined, to show how it is that Adam's posterity are guilty of 
 his sin. The grand difficulty in the way of the doctrine, and 
 which it seeks to remove, is that it antagonizes justice. The 
 object is to relieve that difficulty; to show that it does not im¬ 
 plicate justice and possible truth; to show that it is not neces¬ 
 sarily contradictory and false. The method has the merit of 
 being simple—plain. It is relieved of all physiological en¬ 
 tanglements and mystical realistic notions, and announces itself 
 in a plain and perfectly intelligible proposition : We are guilty 
 of Adam's sin solely on the ground that God constituted him 
 by appointment our representative; determining to regard as 
 our act whatever he did and to treat us accordingly. In har¬ 
 mony with this divine arrangement when Adam sinned God 
 regarded us as sinning also, and views and treats us as guilty! 
 Our personal depravity is not a natural consequence of our re¬ 
 lation to Adam, but a penal infliction upon us regarded as 
 sinners. 
 
 Can this doctrine be true ? Does it harmonize the apparently 
 14 ‘ 6 
 
202 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 conflicting doctrines of our hereditary guilt and the infinite 
 justice of God? We have seen in former discussions what sin 
 and guilt are. Can they be accounted for in this way? 
 
 To our conception this theory is beset with precisely the 
 ' same embarrassments which those who embrace it allege against 
 the realistic theory, and many more. 
 
 Stripped of all disguises, if we can comprehend the import of 
 language, it is simply that we, who were not in the fact guilty 
 of Adam’s sin, are made so by the divine purpose so to regard 
 us. But this is an impossibility on two grounds: First, it is 
 impossible that God should regard us as guilty when we are 
 not, unless it can be shown that God can hold that to be true 
 which is not true. Second, if it were possible that he should 
 thus confound truth and falsehood it could not make the false¬ 
 hood true. He might, if he were capable of regarding a false¬ 
 hood as a truth, which is assumed, call us guilty when we are 
 not—and he might, if void of justice, determine to treat us as 
 guilty on the monstrous fiction—but this could never change 
 the facts in the case. They would remain as they were before. 
 We should still be guiltless, though charged with guilt; inno¬ 
 cent, though punished. Facts are facts, and do not change 
 their nature however they are viewed by any mind. If the 
 principle should be allowed that one person can be constituted 
 guilty because another is, simply by an arbitrary constitution, 
 then one might be constituted guilty when no one was so. Why 
 not ? If I may be constituted guilty when I am not really so, 
 simply because God determines to consider me so, then so might 
 Gabriel, or any angel—or all angels. The same principle would 
 render allowable that every being in the universe should be 
 considered and treated as guilty, and heaven be turned into 
 hell. When Adam sinned either I did sin or I did not. If I 
 did sin, then I was there and acted; or else I sinned when I 
 
 had no being and did not act; but if I did not sin, and God 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 203 
 
 assumes that I did sin, he assumes what is not true! And if 
 his assuming that I sinned, when I did not, makes it a fact that 
 I did sin, then that is made to be a fact which is not a fact!— 
 my sin is resolved to be no fact, but a fiction in the divine 
 mind! 
 
 It is a fact, admitted and contended for by this author, that 
 we who now live did not exist until six thousand years after 
 Adam’s sin; and yet it is contended that we are guilty of that 
 very sin as really as he is. We ask, How ? He answers, By 
 the purpose of God that we should be so. Then it is a deter¬ 
 mination of God, an act in the divine mind, by which we are 
 constituted sinners; not any act of our own. For six thousand 
 } r ears after the act for which we were thus made sinners we were 
 not sinners, for we were not at all; a certain guilt, then—that 
 is, our guilt—must have been borne along through all this 
 period, without anybody being guilty, which seized upon us as 
 soon as we came into being! So far as we are concerned it is 
 a created guilt: God alone is its immediate and sole author. 
 
 It is no answer to this to reply that a party may be guilty 
 for what his representative does; that is true when the repre¬ 
 sentative really represents the party; but here there was no 
 representation, for there was no party to be represented, and 
 the representative represented no will but his own; it is not 
 even pretended that he did, for it is conceded there was no 
 other will. If my will concur with another in act it is morally 
 my act as much as his; but if he represent not my will it is no 
 more my act than it is that of God himself. The principle that 
 would allow that Adam should be my representative, so that 
 I should be held by his act without my having any concur¬ 
 rence of will in the case, would allow that Satan himself should 
 be my representative. If it could be made just, simply by ap¬ 
 pointment, in the one case it could on the same ground in the 
 other. God could just as well seize upon any other sinner that 
 
204 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 ever lived and make my soul answerable for his crimes! Why 
 not ? But is not this shocking to think of ? This whole idea 
 of transferable sin and guilt by mere arbitrary will, or consti¬ 
 tution, is inadmissible in every form in which it can be stated. 
 In ordinary cases, in which it stands naked before the mind— 
 divested of the haze which is thrown around all theological 
 questions—common sense at once and inexorably rejects it. 
 A murder is committed of the most vile and atrocious kind. 
 A hundred years afterward a child is bom, a lineal descendant 
 of the murderer, it may be. Could that child be held guilty of 
 the murder ? Suppose God shoud determine so to regard and 
 treat him, would it make him so ?—or does the mind shrink 
 from the supposition with horror ? But in what one particular 
 does this case differ from the case before us ? Adam commits 
 a heinous sin. Six thousand years afterward a child is born, 
 and God lays the sin upon him for no other reason than that 
 he determines so to regard him! Truly this would be con¬ 
 verting the government of God into a system of cruelty 
 which might well cover the universe with terror and endless 
 dismay. 
 
 It is said that, should God so determine, it would become 
 just, since his will is the standard of right We answer, No ; 
 justice is not something which is subject to caprice, but is eter¬ 
 nal and immutable. The terms are incompatible, that a God 
 of infinite truth should assume that to be true which is not 
 true, namely, that there is guilt where there is no guilt; or that 
 a God of infinite justice should, upon a fiction, treat as guilty a 
 party who is not guilty. 
 
 This author denies the possibility of guilt because of hered¬ 
 itary depravity; that is, that our guilt arises from the fact 
 that we are corrupt by nature. This, he says, is not to be ad¬ 
 mitted, because it would make us guilty without having had a 
 
 probation, which would be a great injustice. Speaking of the 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 205 
 
 theory of Placaeus, he says: “The meaning of Placaeus was 
 not that Adam's sin is imputed to us, but that on account of 
 the inherent corruption derived from him we are regarded as 
 being as deserving of death as he was. Imputation, therefore, 
 is not the judicial ground of corruption, but corruption is the 
 ground of guilt.” This is the ground of Placaeus: that we are 
 accounted guilty because corrupt. To this Dr. Hodge objects 
 “ that it denies any probation to the race. They come into 
 the world under the burden of spiritual death, infected with a 
 deadly spiritual malady by a sovereign, arbitrary infliction. 
 To put a man to death on account of a righteous judicial sen¬ 
 tence is one thing. To put him to death without any offense 
 or sentence is another thing. According to Placaeus, men 
 being born in sin, and having no probation in Adam, are con¬ 
 demned without trial or offense.” * 
 
 This theory involves such consequences that it cannot be 
 admitted. What consequences? Why, that the individuals are 
 condemned to death without a fair trial or probation. This 
 cannot be admitted. God could never proceed in this way. 
 Before he condemns he must give a fair and equitable pro¬ 
 bation. 
 
 Certainly he is right in this. There is no maxim plainer 
 than what is here assumed: that a fair and equitable probation 
 must precede guilt; that is, before a party is treated as guilty 
 he must have furnished the proof that he is guilty. But how 
 does our author apply his principle ? Why, thus: Adam was 
 put upon probation, and it was determined that we should 
 have our probation in him. He sinned; therefore we have had 
 a fair trial, and, having sinned, deserve condemnation and are 
 condemned. This statement fails entirely to relieve my diffi¬ 
 culties. I am too obtuse to discover wherein it would be more 
 unjust to condemn me for inborn depravity, without having had 
 
 * Princeton Review , I860, p. 843. 
 
206 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 a probation, than to condemn me for a trial which occurred 
 six thousand years before I was born! I am too dull to per¬ 
 ceive how I could undergo a fair probation so long before I 
 had an existence. I cannot discover how Adam’s probation 
 was my probation, since I cannot but believe that we are two 
 persons. It gives no help to tell me that we are viewed as one, 
 since I know we are not one. So long as it appears to my 
 mind a dictate of common sense that a person cannot in fact 
 have a probation before he has existence it must be impossible 
 for me to conceive how I had a probation in the garden of 
 Eden. It is a direct contradiction. This whole idea of a pro¬ 
 bation in Adam is fallacious and deceptive. It resolves itself 
 into this: that Adam was put upon trial and sinned; God de¬ 
 termined to treat me as though I had also been put upon trial 
 and had sinned, when in fact I was as pure a nonentity as 
 possible—and this is a fair and equitable probation! Receive 
 this who can! 
 
 If there is a single doctrine clearly and explicitly stated in 
 the word of God, and, we may add, in the intuitive reason, it 
 is that each man stands as a distinct and separate personal¬ 
 ity in the eye of divine law, and is treated for what he is 
 and does himself, and for that alone. “The son shall not 
 bear the iniquity of the father.” That proverb shall be 
 done away. 
 
 There is, and there can be, no guilt without sin. Were 
 there no sin in the universe there would be no guilt; and there 
 can be no punishment without guilt. Were there no guilt in 
 the universe there would be no punishment. And as there can 
 be no guilt where there is no sin there can be no guilt in a per¬ 
 son who has not sinned, any more than there could be guilt in 
 a universe where there is no sin. Each person is as much 
 alone and isolated as if there were no other being in existence 
 
 and never could be; and so he must eternally be viewed by 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 207 
 
 the divine mind. Personality is a thing which admits of no 
 partnership—no transfer. And so one cannot morally act for 
 another—obey or disobey for him. 
 
 The testimony of God is most explicit upon this point: 
 “The soul that sinneth, it shall die.” “ What mean ye, that ye 
 use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, The 
 fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set 
 on edge ? As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have oc¬ 
 casion any more to use this proverb in Israel. Behold, all souls 
 are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son 
 is mine; the soul that sinneth, it shall die.” 
 
 If the sin of Adam be my sin how did it become mine ? The 
 answer is: By a purpose of God that it should so be, and in 
 no other way; it is ascribed to mere sovereignty. Then was 
 there ever a time when I had power to prevent my sin ? It is 
 admitted that there was not. Then my sin, as my sin, is of 
 necessity. By what necessity? By the necessity of God’s 
 appointment. That is, as my sin it has no cause but God— 
 he is its Author. Is he displeased with me on account of it? 
 Then he is displeased with me for being what I never had the 
 power to avoid being, and for being what he alone caused me 
 to be by his own sovereign appointment! Will he punish me 
 for being thus? Then he will punish me for being what he 
 determined I should be, and for being what I am only by 
 means of his purpose that I should so be. That is, he will 
 account me deserving to go to hell throughout eternity, not for 
 anything I ever did, or could have prevented, not for anything 
 I ever was in myself, but for no other reason than that he de¬ 
 termined I should be so accounted and so punished! If ever 
 there was a travesty of all ideas of justice to exceed this it 
 has not fallen in the range of my observation. If words could 
 be arranged to express the concept of utter malignity—mere 
 power and unmixed cruelty—I confess to a total inability to 
 
203 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 conceive the form of the sentences. Every instinct and intui¬ 
 tion of humanity stands aghast at the dreadful intimation, 
 and if it could be accepted revolt would be as universal as 
 reason and conscience. It gives sin its habitat in God, and 
 makes innocent and unoffending men its prey, and not its 
 author. 
 
 To avoid the absurdity of imputing ill desert it deprives sin 
 and guilt and punishment of their meaning; making sin, as 
 we have seen, a something which can attach to a man without 
 any action of his, and guilt to mean, not culpability, unworthi¬ 
 ness—desert of blame, and so of punishment—but liability to 
 be punished without respect to desert, and giving to punish¬ 
 ment, not the idea of suffering inflicted in the interests of jus¬ 
 tice, but suffering inflicted against justice upon the unoffending. 
 The persons charged with Adam’s sin are not charged to have 
 committed sin—not charged to be ill deserving on account of it 
 —but are held to be punished, made to suffer, without having 
 committed it and without any personal demerit! That is, to 
 suffer eternal wrath because God chooses to inflict it upon 
 them for the reason that Adam, whom they never knew, trans¬ 
 gressed. The words sin, guilt, and punishment mean nothing, 
 or mean precisely the opposite of their real meaning, in this 
 theory. 
 
 But, conscious that this dreadful theory cannot stand, Dr. 
 Hodge buttresses his position with another hypothesis still more 
 revolting: we are guilty of original sin because we are depraved 
 by it. He spends many pages to show that this mediate puta- 
 tion idea is unsound—un-Calvinistic; that it abandons the 
 ground of strict imputationism; but finally attempts to steal it 
 in unobserved and make it do service. He says the race were 
 charged with the guilt of Adam’s act—this is their real original 
 sin; and thus being guilty they are punished with depravity; 
 and thus being depraved they are made guilty on account of 
 
Punishment. 
 
 209 
 
 their depravity. That is, being unborn they are charged with 
 having sinned; God is displeased with them, and withdraws 
 from them as a punishment; the effect of God’s withdrawal is 
 that they are depraved: they ought not to have been so born; 
 their depravity is wrong and sin; and, since it is their depravity 
 and sin, they deserve to be punished for it and are liable to 
 eternal death. 
 
 What ingenuity of malignity is here! First, unborn souls 
 are guilty of what another man did. Second, they are pun¬ 
 ished with personal depravity on account of that guilt for 
 another man’s sin. Third, they are punished in hell forever— 
 first, for the sin of another before they were born, and then for 
 already having been punished with depravity. Damned for a 
 sin that was not theirs, and for having been unjustly punished 
 with depravity! 
 
 The nest method adopted is this: Denying the position that 
 we were present with Adam, and so parties to his sin and guilt, 
 and denying the theory that we are guilty by having his act 
 charged against us as our own, which in fact it was not, it still 
 asserts that we are by nature sinners, and guilty in Adam’s sin, 
 and deserving of death on that account—and for this reason : 
 that his sin corrupted his whole nature and brought it into a 
 state of disconformity to God’s law, and that we—descending 
 from him in the way of natural generation—have propagated in 
 us the same corrupted nature, which is guilty and deserving of 
 death. Thus it is that we are justly held. 
 
 The theory has two parts: First, that we are naturally de¬ 
 praved ; second, that this is to us sin, ground of guilt and pun¬ 
 ishment The first part has been already allowed and fully 
 discussed; the second part is that which now comes under our 
 notice. 
 
 Among those who hold this theory there are two methods of 
 accounting for what is held to be our guilty depravity. First, 
 
210 
 
 Studies is Theology. 
 
 it is alleged that our depravity is a penal infliction for Adam’s 
 personal sin, both upon himself and his posterity, on this wise: 
 Having sinned, God withdrew from him, as an indication of 
 displeasure, and this withdrawal left his nature wholly averse 
 to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil; and regarding his 
 posterity as also guilty God likewise withdrew from them, and 
 thus subjected them to the same utter ruin. And this depravity 
 is held to be the sin of all who suffer it. The second view is 
 that depravity is a natural effect of sin, which is propagated by 
 natural generation—on the principle that like begets like—and 
 yet that, inasmuch as it is disconformity to law, it is really sin, 
 and chargeable as such against those in whom it is found with¬ 
 out respect to the means by which it exists. 
 
 The former of these views is held by the Princeton divines, 
 but they are very careful to state that the sin of inherited cor¬ 
 ruption is not only not to be considered the sole ground of our 
 guilt, but secondary; the primary and immediate ground being 
 that we are guilty for Adam’s sin, and this is the penal effect 
 of it. 
 
 To this we especially object: That it assumes our depravity 
 to be a punishment—something that is inflicted upon us imme¬ 
 diately by God, and that, as we have already seen, without any 
 fault of our own, and upon an unrighteous legal fiction—and 
 then it charges upon us that punishment as our sin! God 
 originates our depravity, by punitively withdrawing from us, 
 for no other cause than the false assumption that we deserve 
 to be forsaken for what another man did thousands of years 
 before we were born; and then holds us to be guilty because he 
 has already inflicted upon us the greatest possible calamity, the 
 withdrawal of his own presence; inevitably plunging us into 
 all manner of evil. And this is the vindication of the divine 
 justice! Two wrongs of inconceivable magnitude make an im¬ 
 maculate and infinite right! Punishment for another man’s 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 211 
 
 sin, and then punishment for being punished, is the climax of 
 justice! Surely this is strange doctrine. It is, indeed, nothing 
 else but making God the author of sin, in the most objection¬ 
 able manner; for if the depravity is punitively inflicted it mat¬ 
 ters nothing in what it consists, whether the influence of a phys¬ 
 ical substance or the privation of a moral element; and, if the 
 depravity be sin, is not he who inflicts it its only and imme¬ 
 diate author ? If not, whence comes it ? And will it be pre¬ 
 tended that justice can allow that God, by a sovereign constitu¬ 
 tion or arbitrary action, can first inflict sin upon a creature of 
 his own formation and then punish him for being as he makes 
 him ? Allow this, and then conceive, if it be possible, anything 
 that would be injustice. If this might be, then what could not 
 be ? If this strikes not down the idea of justice entirely, I, for 
 one, know not what could. 
 
 The other view is that depravity is naturally engendered; 
 not a punishment but the result of a natural law; that, never¬ 
 theless, it is sin, and all to whom it comes are guilty and de¬ 
 serving of punishment on account of it. This view denies the 
 charge of Adam’s personal sin upon his posterity. That was 
 his own. Our depravity is our own, and it is our sin. This is 
 by far the nearest approach to a vindication of the natural 
 guiltiness of man. It has the semblance of truth. But even 
 this vanishes when analyzed and tested. 
 
 Admitted that we are depraved, that our depravity has its 
 root in Adam’s sin, that it is disconformity of our nature to 
 God’s law; does it therefore follow that it is sin-guilt? Our 
 sin? Our guilt? 
 
 How came we by this depravity? It was caused. Who 
 caused it ? Did God, by punitive infliction, or Adam, by nat¬ 
 ural generation ? It is admitted by all that we did not. We 
 suffer it; it is inexorably thrust upon us; as much born with 
 us as our bones and muscles—the color of our skin or the 
 
212 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 fashion of our members. Is there blame ? Where ? Where 
 does blame always attach? To effect or to cause? To him 
 who suffers or to him who causes misery? We have already 
 seen how impossible it is that God should hold one man guilty 
 ■ of another’s sin; but is it more possible that he should charge 
 guilt upon one man for the effect of another’s sin ? 
 
 It is, further, an insuperable objection to this theory that it 
 makes sin and guilt physical; an objective something commu¬ 
 nicated in generation—a corruption of blood or taint of essence 
 given either of God by immediate agency in the moment of 
 generation, a created substance, or given by the natural father 
 to what is begotten of him—or the absence of some property 
 not given. In either case a physical fact. But upon what 
 principle can a creature be held guilty either for what is given 
 •or for what is withheld in its generation ? It may be defect¬ 
 ive, but it cannot be blameworthy for a defectiveness thus en¬ 
 tailed. Is it possible to human reason to accept the proposition 
 that an infant just born can by any possibility have at that 
 moment a quality which would render it just in God to over¬ 
 whelm it with his wrath to all eternity? 
 
 The theory misconceives of the only possible ground of sin 
 and guilt as enunciated both in the intuitive reason and in rev¬ 
 elation. All sin has its root in will and in the wrong actions 
 of will. It can be predicated of nothing else. And this is 
 really and constantly admitted by those who formally deny it. 
 They insist that depravity is sin because it is the effect of sin, 
 tending to other sin. That is, they trace it back to an act of 
 will, without which they allow it could not exist, showing that 
 they hold finally that the root of sin is in the will. But the 
 root of sin is in the will which acts, and not in some other alien 
 will. But who can pretend that such act of will has transpired 
 in an infant just born ? The argument on this point has been 
 
 given in the examination of Professor Shedd’s theory. Sin 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 213 
 
 and its effects are radically different ideas, and tlie one can 
 never be put for the other. The effect may determine the 
 magnitude of the sin but is not the sin itself. For the elabora¬ 
 tion of this point refer to the discussion of the nature of sin. 
 It is conceivable how depravity may be engendered, but sin 
 never. Having its source in a person, a will, it cannot come to 
 him ab extra. No mind ever did, or ever can, conceive of sin 
 as a physical quality—a property of substance, whether mate¬ 
 rial or immaterial. Men think they so conceive of it, but they 
 do not. A closer scrutiny of their own ideas would show them 
 that finally they mean by sin a quality of the action of will. It 
 is something done. The person does it and he is guilty, but 
 the sin is the something he does—a thing properly his own! 
 
 This putting of the doctrine is called the mediate imputation 
 theory, and is thus stated by Hr. Hodge: 
 
 “About the middle of the seventeenth century Amyraut, 
 Cappel, and La Place (or Placasus), three distinguished profess¬ 
 ors in the French Theological School at Saumur, introduced 
 several modifications of the Augustinian or Eeformed doctrine 
 on the Decrees, Election, the Atonement, and the Imputation 
 of Adam’s sin. La Place taught that we derive a corrupt 
 nature from Adam, and that that corrupt nature, and not 
 Adam’s sin, is the ground of the condemnation which has come 
 upon all mankind. "When it was objected to this statement of 
 the case that it left out of view the guilt of Adam’s first sin, he 
 answered that he did not deny the imputation of that sin, but 
 simply made it dependent on our participation of his corrupted 
 nature. We are inherently depraved, and therefore we are in¬ 
 volved in the guilt of Adam’s sin. There is no direct or imme¬ 
 diate imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, but only an in¬ 
 direct or mediate imputation of it, founded on the fact that we 
 share his moral character. These views were first presented by 
 La Place in a disputation, ‘ De statu hominis lajosi ante gratiam ,’ 
 
214 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 ... and afterwards more elaborately in a treatise, ‘ Be Imputatione 
 primipeccati AdamV This doctrine was formally condemned 
 by the National Synod of France in 1644-45 by the Swiss 
 Chnrcbes in the ‘Formula Consensus,’ and by the theologians 
 of Holland. . . . 
 
 “It was to evade the force of this decision that Placaeus 
 proposed the distinction between mediate and immediate impu¬ 
 tation. He said he did not deny the imputation of Adam’s sin, 
 but only that it preceded the view of hereditary corruption. 
 
 . . . Although the doctrine of mediate imputation was thus 
 generally condemned, both by the Deformed and Lutheran 
 Churches, it found some distinguished advocates beyond the 
 pale of the French Church. The younger Vitringa, Yenema, 
 and Stapfer, in his Polemical Theology , gave it their sanction. 
 From the last-named author it was adopted by President 
 Edwards in one chapter of his work on Original Sin. It appears 
 there, however, merely as an excrescence. It was not adopted 
 into his system so as to qualify his theological views on other 
 doctrines. Although President Edwards does clearly commit 
 himself to the doctrine of Placaeus, as he says, ‘ that the evil 
 dispensation is first, and the charge of guilt consequent ,’ never¬ 
 theless he expressly teaches the doctrine of immediate imputa¬ 
 tion formally and at length in other portions of that work.” * 
 
 It is not so much the history of the doctrine which concerns 
 us as the doctrine itself. I think it would not be difficult to 
 show that it had a much earlier origin; but it is with the doc¬ 
 trine itself we are more particularly interested. Dr. Hodge 
 alleges against it several objections. These are interesting 
 as showing the conflict among the defenders of the doctrine of 
 original sin. 
 
 “1. It denies what the Scriptures assert. The Scriptures 
 assert that the sentence of condemnation has passed upon all 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, pp. 205-207. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 215 
 
 men for the sin of one man. This the doctrine of mediate 
 imputation denies, and affirms that the ground of that condem¬ 
 nation is inherited depravity. 
 
 “2. This doctrine denies the penal character of hereditary 
 corruption, in which all men are born. . . . 
 
 “3. It is a further objection to the doctrine of mediate im¬ 
 putation that it increases instead of relieving the difficulty of the 
 case. It denies that a covenant was made with Adam. It 
 denies that mankind ever had a probation. It assumes that, 
 in view of a natural law of propagation, when Adam lost the 
 image of God and became sinful his children inherit his char¬ 
 acter, and on the ground of that character are subject to the 
 wrath and curse of God. All the evils, therefore, which the 
 Scriptures and Church doctrine represent as coming upon the 
 posterity of Adam as the judicial punishment of his first sin, 
 the doctrine of mediate imputation represents as sovereign in¬ 
 flictions, or mere natural consequences. What the Scriptures 
 declare to be a righteous judgment Placseus makes to be an 
 arbitrary dispensation. 
 
 “4. It is a still more serious objection that this doctrine de¬ 
 stroys the parallel between Adam and Christ on which the 
 apostle lays so much stress in his Epistle to the Romans. . . . 
 
 u 5. Perhaps, however, the most serious objection against the 
 doctrine of mediate imputation is drawn from the principle on 
 which it rests and the arguments of its advocates in its support. 
 The great principle insisted upon in support of this doctrine is 
 that one man cannot justly be punished for the sin of another.” * 
 
 These are the objections which the strict imputationists bring 
 from their standpoint. Some of them are absurd enough, to 
 be sure, especially the last; but they suffice to show that, in 
 the judgment of eminent defenders of the doctrine of original 
 sin, it cannot stand upon this theory. Those who hold to this 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, pp. 210-213. 
 
216 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 theory assert that it cannot stand on the other, or any other. 
 We think both are right. 
 
 The doctrine of mediate imputation we understand to be 
 affirmed and defended by Chalmers in the following citation: 
 
 “ To determine the question, then, in how far the attaching 
 of demerit to a sinful nature that man has brought with him 
 into the world is agreeable to the moral sense of mankind, we 
 should inquire how much or how little man requires to have 
 within his view, ere his moral sense shall pronounce on the 
 character either of any act or of any disposition that is sub¬ 
 mitted to his notice. One may see a dagger projected from 
 behind a curtain, and in the firm grasp of a human hand, and 
 stretched with sure and deadly aim against the bosom of an 
 unconscious sleeper; and, seeing no more, he would infer of 
 the individual who held this mortal weapon that he was an 
 assassin, and that he deserved the death of an assassin. Had 
 he seen all he might have seen that this seeming agent of the 
 murder which had just been perpetrated was in fact a struggling 
 and overpowered victim in the hands of others; that he, the 
 friend of the deceased, was pitched upon, in the spirit of dia¬ 
 bolical cruelty, as the unwilling instrument of the deed which 
 he abhorred; that for this purpose the fatal knife was clasped 
 or fastened to his hand, and his voice was stifled by violence; 
 and he was borne in deepest silence to the spot by the strength 
 of others; and there was he, in most revolting agony of heart, 
 compelled to thrust forward his passive, or rather, his resisting 
 arm, and immediately to strike the exterminating blow into 
 the bosom of a much-loved companion. Who does not see 
 that the moral sense, when these new circumstances come into 
 view, would immediately amend, or rather reverse, and that 
 totally, the former decision which it had passed upon the sub¬ 
 ject—that he, whom he deemed the murderer, and chargeable 
 
 with all the guilt of so foul an atrocity, it would most readily 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 217 
 
 absolve from all the blame and all the condemnation—that it 
 would transfer the charge to those who were behind him, and 
 pronounce them to be the murderers—that he who held the 
 dagger and performed the deed was innocent of all its turpi¬ 
 tude, because the victim of a necessity which he could not 
 help, and against which he had wrought and wrestled in vain : 
 and thus, ere it passes such a sentence as it feels to be right¬ 
 eous, must it look not merely to the act but to the intention, 
 not merely to the work of the hand but to the will of the heart 
 which prompted it. 
 
 “ Now, if we have any right consciousness of our own moral 
 feelings, or any right observation of the moral feelings of others, 
 the mind of man, in order to be made up as to the moral char¬ 
 acter of an}" act that is submitted to its notice, needs to know 
 what the intention was that originated the act, but needs no 
 more. It makes no inquiry as to what that was which origi¬ 
 nated the intention.* Give it simply to understand that such 
 is the intention of a man who is not under derangement, and 
 therefore knows what he is purposing and what he is doing; 
 and then, without looking farther, the moral sense comes at 
 once to its summary estimate of the moral character of that 
 which is under contemplation. Let us see a man who has done 
 a murderous act, in the circumstances which we have just now 
 specified, and we do not look upon him as a criminal, because 
 we find that the act originated in the will of others and against 
 his own will. Let us see a man who has done a murderous act, 
 and was instigated thereto by a murderous disposition, and 
 we cannot help looking upon him as a criminal—finding 
 as we do that the act originated in his own will. An act 
 against the will indicates no demerit on the part of him who 
 
 * This entire line of argument locates culpability in the inherited disposition to 
 sin. There is no more effectual way to make us guilty for Adam’s sin than this. 
 The disposition was engendered of that act, and in no other way, and we are made 
 guilty on account of it. 
 
 15 
 
 6 
 
213 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 performed it. But an act with, the will gives us the full impres¬ 
 sion of demerit. The philosopher may amuse himself with the 
 ulterior query: What was it that originated the will ? But 
 the peasant has no metaphysics and no speculation for enter¬ 
 taining such a topic; and yet he has just as fresh and just as 
 enlightened a sense of the demerit of a bad action coming from 
 a bad intention as the most curious and contemplative inquirer 
 has, whose restless appetite is ever carrying him upward 
 among the remote and hidden principles of the phenomena 
 that are around him. To get a right moral estimate of any 
 given act we must carry our view up from the act of the hand 
 to the disposition of the heart; but we need to carry it up no 
 farther. The moment that the disposition is seen the moral 
 sense is correspondingly affected, and rests its whole estima¬ 
 tion, whether of merit or of demerit, not on the anterior cause 
 which gave origin to the disposition, but on the character 
 which it now bears, or the aspect under which it is now seen 
 and contemplated before you. 
 
 “ How the disposition got there is not the question which the 
 moral sense of man, when he is unvitiated by a taste for specu¬ 
 lation, takes any concern in. It is enough for the moral sense 
 that the disposition is there. One may conceive with the 
 Manichaeans of old two eternal beings—one of whom was es¬ 
 sentially wicked and malignant and impure, and the other of 
 whom was essentially good and upright and compassionate and 
 holy from everlasting. We could not tell how these opposite 
 dispositions got there, for there they behooved to be from the 
 unfathomable depths of the eternity that is behind us; yet 
 that would not hinder us from regarding the one as an object 
 of moral hatefulness and dislike, and the other as an object of 
 moral esteem and moral approbation. It is enough that the 
 dispositions exist, and it matters not how they originated, or if 
 
 ever they had an origin at all. And, in like manner, give us two 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 219 
 
 human individuals—one of whom is revengeful and dishonest 
 and profligate and sensual, and the other of whom is kind and 
 generous and honorable and godly—our moral sense, on the 
 simple exhibition of these two characters, leads us to regard the 
 one as blamable and the other as praiseworthy—the one as 
 rightly the object of condemnation and punishment, and the 
 other as rightly the object of approval and reward. And in so 
 doing it does not look so far back as to the primary or origi¬ 
 nating cause of the distinction that obtains between these two 
 characters. It looks so far back as to reach its contemplation 
 from the act of the outer man to the disposition of the inner 
 man ; but there it stops. Give to its view a wrong act origi¬ 
 nating in a wrong intention, and it asks no more to make up its 
 estimate of the criminality of what has been offered to its 
 notice. It troubles not itself with the metaphysics of prior and 
 originating causes ; and, however the deed in question may 
 have originated, let it simply have emanated from a concurring 
 disposition on the part of him who has performed it, and be a 
 deed of wickedness—then does it conclude that the man has 
 done wickedly and that he should be dealt with accordingly. 
 
 “We know very well what it is that stumbles so readily the 
 speculative inquirer into this mystery. He thinks that a man 
 born with a sinful disposition is bom with the necessity of sin¬ 
 ning, and that to be under such a necessity exempts him from 
 all blame and all imputation of guiltiness in having sinned. 
 But so long as he is under this feeling, though not very con¬ 
 scious of the delusion, he is in fact confounding two things 
 which are distinct the one from the other. He is confounding 
 the necessity that is against the will with the necessity that is 
 with the will. The man who struggled against the external 
 force that compelled him to thrust a dagger into the bosom of 
 his friend was operated upon by a necessity that was against 
 his will, and you exempt him from all charge of criminality in 
 
220 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 the matter. But the man who does the very same thing at the 
 spontaneous bidding of his own heart—whose will prompted 
 him to the act, and who gave his consent and his choice to this 
 deed of enormity—this is the man whom you irresistibly con¬ 
 demn and you irresistibly recoil from. With such a disposi¬ 
 tion as he had it was perhaps unavoidable; but the very having 
 of such a disposition makes him in your eye a monster of moral 
 deformity. If there was a kind of necessity here it was a ne¬ 
 cessity of an essentially different sort from the one we have 
 just now specified, and ought therefore not to be confounded 
 with it. It is necessity with the will, and not against it; and 
 by the law, both of God and man, the act he has committed is a 
 crime, and he is treated as a criminal. 
 
 11 The only necessity which excuses a man for doing what is 
 evil is a necessity that forces him by an external violence to do 
 it against the bent of his will struggling most honestly and de¬ 
 terminedly to resist it. But if it be with the bent of the will, 
 if the necessity he lies under of doing the evil thing consists in 
 this, that his will is strongly and determinedly bent upon the 
 doing of it—then such a necessity as this, so far from extenu¬ 
 ating the man’s guiltiness, just aggravates it the more, and 
 stamps upon it, in all plain moral estimation, a character of 
 fuller atrocity. For set before us two murderers, and the one 
 of them differing from the other in the keenness and intensity 
 of his thirst for blood. We have already evinced to you how 
 there is one species of necessity which extinguishes the crimi¬ 
 nality of the act altogether—even that necessity which operates 
 with violence upon the muscles of the body and overbears the 
 moral desires and tendency of the mind. But there is another 
 species of necessity which heightens the criminality of murder 
 —even that necessity which lies in the taste and tendency of 
 the mind toward this deed of unnatural violence. And if of 
 these two assassins of the cave or of the highway the one was 
 
Punishment. 
 
 221 
 
 pointed out to ns who felt the most uncontrollable impulse 
 toward so fell a perpetration, and to whom the fears and the 
 cries and the agonies of the trembling victim ministered the 
 most savage complacency—he of the two, even in spite of the 
 greater inward necessity that lay upon him, he, in the breast 
 of every plain and unsophisticated man, would raise the sensa¬ 
 tions of keenest indignancy, and be regarded by all as the one 
 whom the voice of justice most loudly demanded as a sacrifice 
 to the peace and the protection of society. 
 
 u It is enough then that a disposition to moral evil exists; and, 
 however it originated, the disposition in itself, with all the evil 
 acts which emanate therefrom, calls forth, by the law of our 
 moral nature, a sentiment of blame or reprobation. It may 
 have been acquired by education ; or it may have been infused 
 into us by the force of surrounding example; or it may be 
 the fruit, instead of the principle, of many willful iniquities of 
 conduct; or, finally, it may, agreeably to the doctrine of orig¬ 
 inal sin, have been as much transmitted in the shape of a con¬ 
 stitutional bias from father to son as is the ferocity of a tiger, 
 or the industry of an ant, or the acidity of an apple, or the odor 
 and loveliness of a rose. When we look to the beauty of a 
 flower we feel touched and attracted by the mere exhibition of 
 the object; nor is it necessary that we should know when this 
 property sprung into existence. When we taste the sourness 
 of a particular fruit it matters not to the sensation whether this 
 unpleasant quality is due to the training of the tree, or to some 
 accident of exposure it has met with, or finally to some inher¬ 
 ent universal tendency diffused over the whole species and 
 derived through seeds and acorns from the trees of former 
 generations. When assailed by the fury of some wild, vindic¬ 
 tive animal, we meet it with the same resentment and inflict 
 upon it the same chastisement or revenge, whether the ma¬ 
 lignant rage by which it is actuated be the sin of its nature 
 
222 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 derived to it from inheritance or the sin of its education derived 
 to it from the perverse influence of the circumstances by which 
 it has been surrounded. And lastly, when moral corruption 
 is offered to our notice in the character of man—when we see a 
 depraved will venting itself forth in deeds of depravity—when 
 in every individual we meet with we behold an ungodliness or 
 a selfishness or a deceit or an impurity, which altogether make 
 the moral scenery of earth so widely different from the moral 
 scenery of heaven, it positively makes no difference to our 
 feeling of loathsomeness and culpability wherewith we regard 
 it whether the vitiating taint rises anew on every single spec¬ 
 imen of humanity, or whether it has run in one descending 
 current from the progenitor of our race, and thence spread the 
 leprosy of moral evil over all succeeding generations. The doc¬ 
 trine of original sin leaves the distinction between virtue and vice 
 just where it found it; nor does it affect the sense of moral appro¬ 
 bation wherewith we regard the former, or the moral dislike 
 and feeling of demerit in which the latter ought to be regarded. 
 
 “ There is not a more effectual way of bringing this to the 
 test than by making one man the object of injustice and of 
 provocation from another man. Let a neighbor inflict upon 
 any of you some moral wrong or moral injury—will not the 
 quick and ready feeling of resentment rise immediately in your 
 hearts? Will you stop to inquire whence your enemy has de¬ 
 rived the malice or the selfishness under which you suffer ? 
 Is it not simply enough that he tramples upon your rights and 
 interests, and does so willfully—is not this of itself enough to 
 call out the sudden reaction of an angry judgment and a keen 
 retaliation upon your part? If it be under some necessity 
 which operates against his disposition this may soften your 
 resentment. But if it be under that kind of necessity which 
 arises from the strength of his disposition to do you harm— 
 
 this, so far from softening, would just whet and stimulate your 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 223 
 
 resentment against him. So far from taking it as an apology, 
 that he is forcibly constrained by the obstinate tendency of his 
 will to injure and oppress you—this would just add to the ex¬ 
 asperation of your feelings; and the more hearty a good will 
 you saw he had to hurt or to traduce or to defraud you, the 
 more in fact would you hold him to be the culpable subject of 
 your most just and righteous indignation. 
 
 “ These remarks may prepare the way for all that man by his 
 moral sense can understand or go along with in the doctrine 
 of the imputation of Adam’s sin to all his posterity. We con¬ 
 fess that we are not able to perceive how one man is at all 
 responsible for the personal doings of another whom he never 
 saw, and who departed this life many centuries before him. 
 But if the personal doings of a distant ancestor have, in point 
 of fact, corrupted his moral nature, and if this corruption has 
 been transmitted to his descendants—then we can see how 
 these become responsible, not for what their forefathers did, 
 but for what they themselves do under the corrupt disposition 
 that they have received from their forefathers.* And if there 
 be a guilt attachable to evil desires, as well as to evil doings, 
 and if the evil desire which prompted Adam to his first trans¬ 
 gression enter into the nature of all his posterity—then are his 
 posterity the objects of moral blame and moral aversion, not 
 on account of the transgression which Adam committed, but 
 on account of such a wrong principle in their hearts as would 
 lead every one of them to the very same transgression in the 
 very same circumstances, f It is thus that Adam has trans- 
 
 * Here it seems to dawn upon the mind of the illustrious author that the guilt is 
 not for the having the disposition which is entailed, but for the acts which are 
 performed under the instigation of the inherited disposition; but under the fear 
 that he has gone too far, and possibly put in peril his beloved Calvinism, he im¬ 
 mediately hedges. 
 
 f Here he falls into the slough of mediate imputation; our guilt is not guilt for his 
 act, but guilt for our own depravity, which comes to us as unavoidable consequence 
 of his act. 
 
 6 
 
224 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 mitted a guilt the same with his own, as well as a depravity 
 the same with his own, among all the individuals and families 
 of our species—if not that each of them is liable to a separate 
 reckoning on account of the offense committed in the garden 
 of Eden, at least that each of them is liable to a separate reck¬ 
 oning on account of his own separate and personal depravity 
 —a depravity which had its rise in the offense that was then 
 and there committed; and a depravity which would lead in 
 every one instance to the same offense in the same circuim 
 stances of temptation. According to this explanation every 
 man still reapeth not what another soweth, but what he 
 soweth himself. Every man eateth the fruit of his own do¬ 
 ings. Every man beareth the burden of his own tainted and 
 accursed nature. Every man suffereth for his own guilt, and 
 not for Adam’s guilt; and if he is said to suffer for Adam’s 
 guilt the meaning is that from Adam he inherits a corruption 
 which lands him in a guilt equal to that of Adam.* 
 
 “ Many, we are aware, carry the doctrine of imputation farther 
 than this, and make each of us liable to answer at the bar of 
 God’s judicature for Adam’s individual transgression. We 
 shall only say of this view at present that, whether it be scrip¬ 
 tural or not, we are very sure that we cannot follow it by any 
 sense of morality or rightfulness that is in our own heart.” f 
 In seeking the home of sin Dr. Chalmers goes back thus, as 
 we see, of any action of will, and finds it to consist of a disposi¬ 
 tion to wrong or sinful choices. To the objection that this 
 
 * This is an amazing statement, both for its contradictions and its heinous 
 principle. First, every man is guilty, not for what Adam did, but in consequence of 
 what Adam did. Second, his guilt is equal, for what Adam did, to the guilt of 
 Adam himself. Adam guilty for his act, every man equally guilty with him on 
 account of the corruption which flows to him from the act. 
 
 f He proceeds. He hesitates at this idea, as if it were more atrocious than 
 his own ; but in what respect is it more objectionable than his own ? Is there any 
 difference in ethical principle between imputing guilt to his posterity for his indi¬ 
 vidual act—making them guilty for it—and making them guilty for an inherited 
 consequence of it ? 
 
Punishment. 
 
 225 
 
 locates the cause or origin out of the subject he replies that the 
 origin of the disposition has nothing whatever to do with its 
 subject. It is simply the fact of it that makes the sin. It 
 makes no difference how the subject came by it; it is the fact 
 that he has it that constitutes him a sinner. This idea is put 
 forward with great boldness, and is repeated by all subsequent 
 authors, as if it were axiomatic: as it is the ferocity of the tiger 
 or the poison of a reptile that makes it worthy of death, and not 
 the manner of its coming to possess it, so it is the fact of sin, 
 and not the source or manner of its origin, that renders man 
 deserving of wrath. A more vicious fallacy could scarcely be 
 uttered—one more subversive of fundamental ethical ideas. 
 The true maxim is precisely the reverse; it is not a question 
 what a man is that determines whether he is a sinner or not, but 
 it is the question, How did he become what he is ?—a question 
 as to the origin of his state. It is not a question as to whether 
 he is evil or not, but a question as to how he became evil, as to 
 what responsibility he has in the premises. If the evil can be 
 traced to him as cause, he is sinner in the evil; if it cannot, he 
 is not the sinner but the sufferer simply. The sinner in every 
 possible case is the originator of the sin. To find the sinner, 
 therefore, the quest is for the cause, not for the fact merely. 
 
 We have been at the pains of this extended extract for two 
 reasons: First, that it puts the argument for a corrupt tendency 
 and inherited evil disposition in our human nature in a clear and 
 unanswerable form, and shows that it is not only universal—a 
 race fact—but also how deep and radical it is, tracing it, as we 
 are convinced, to its true origin in the primal sin, a state in 
 which we are not involved by creation but by defection; a 
 state originated by sin and transmitted as calamity, the just¬ 
 ice of which will be considered further on. Second, that we 
 might have the view of the author quoted as to the guilt it in¬ 
 volves, and his best reasons for asserting guilt. 
 
226 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 Dr. Chalmers’s position is: (a) that the evil disposition is by 
 inheritance. With this we find ourselves in hearty accord; 
 (b) that it is ground of guilt. From this we dissent. We con¬ 
 sider it a great evil, and one from which the soul must be de¬ 
 livered in order to its final holiness and happiness ; but we deny 
 that per se, separate and apart from the act of the individual 
 will, it involves sin, on the general ground that it is impos¬ 
 sible that anything inherited can involve guilt, and for many 
 reasons which will appear in the examination of the several 
 theories which hold on different grounds the same general 
 position. 
 
 His position is that of Edwards, and many other sympathiz¬ 
 ing writers, that the native disposition to evil is itself culpable. 
 At first view it has the appearance of almost an ethical maxim, 
 but it will not bear the test of examination. It seems to mean 
 the same as to say that sin and guilt reside in the intention, 
 which is a true maxim, if the intention be to do that which is 
 perceived or supposed to be wrong, but in fact it differs in toto 
 from it. Inherited disposition does not even involve intention; 
 in fact, it of necessity excludes it; it, from the nature of the case, 
 must be absolutely unintended. Intention, which is the essen¬ 
 tial element in determining an act or state to be culpable, is 
 wholly wanting. Ho man ever intended to be bom with a dis¬ 
 position to sin. He and those who sympathize with him assert 
 that we need not go behind the native disposition, and in¬ 
 quire whence it came, in order to find guilt—the disposition 
 itself involves that. We assert that, in order to make it ground 
 of culpability, that is the very thing we must do. If the dispo¬ 
 sition is, like that of the tiger, an inherited nature, it has no 
 more moral character than has the tiger. To find culpability 
 we must go deeper, and determine whether the person, as a free 
 willing being, chooses the disposition or the indulgence of its 
 promptings; then we may predicate guilt; but if it is simply an 
 
Punishment. 
 
 227 
 
 abnormalcy which exists wholly independent of him it can have 
 no more moral quality than the venom in a viper. Like any 
 other disposition, it may be detestable; we kill the rattlesnake 
 and the tiger, but we do not dream of imputing guilt or of pun¬ 
 ishing them. We incarcerate lunatics, but we do not accuse 
 them of crime. This the author quoted seems to recognize 
 when he attempts to show that an inherited disposition is not 
 necessitated, but free. A balder sophism cannot be conceived. 
 He makes disposition a product of the will. Doubtless he 
 means that what a man is disposed to do he chooses to do—as 
 if the terms were identical; the disposition would then be mat¬ 
 ter of choice. But that is precisely what is denied when it is 
 declared to be hereditary. What a man, in the full possession 
 of freedom to the opposite choice, chooses to do is the ground 
 of ethical quality, and nothing else is or can be. That for which 
 he is responsible is that of which he is free cause, and never is 
 or can be that of which he is not the cause; much less is it 
 something which he never had power to prevent, but which 
 descends to him as a fatal heirloom from a sinning ancestor. The 
 depravity which is inborn and universal is malady, but not sin. 
 It demands cure, but not punishment. It renders sin certain, 
 but not inevitable under redemption. It furnishes no excuse 
 for sin, but to treat it as sin would be the injustice of making 
 misfortune a crime. Personal depravity is not natal depravity. 
 Hor is natal depravity personal, though it be a depravity of the 
 person. 
 
 Our objection to the doctrine of mediate imputation is mani¬ 
 fold. The fact of depravity—congenital corruption—is not, 
 and cannot, with reason, be disputed; on the contrary, it is ac¬ 
 cepted as undoubtedly true, but it is not admitted that it is sin; 
 or if in any case it is called sin it is with such accommodation 
 as to deprive the word of its ordinary acceptation. 
 
 Sin as guilt it cannot be, for the following reasons: 
 
 6 
 
228 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 The matter of which the party is accused is hereditary. 
 This is admitted by the accusers; it is even a fundamentative 
 of their system. It is expressly laid in the charge. But that 
 which is hereditary cannot exist by fault of him who inherits, 
 since it has its origin along with his being, and necessarily, 
 therefore, before he could be at fault. Its cause is not in him, 
 but out of him. There may be guilt concerning it, but it can¬ 
 not be his guilt, since in him it is an effect descending from a 
 cause which operated in his production. There is a fault, it is 
 true, in his nature, since his nature ought not to be corrupt; but 
 the fault that is in him is not by his fault—is not of him, as 
 cause, or by him, as agent; it is a fault he suffers, not a fault he 
 originates. To call it sin, and his sin, is to pervert language. 
 To accuse him of sin on account of it is to abuse and misrepre¬ 
 sent him. To condemn and punish him for it is to add injury 
 to misfortune or injustice to calamity. The whole idea that 
 there can be sin without personal fault, without something in 
 the cause of which the person is implicated, is against plainest 
 dictates of common sense. 
 
 It is important, in the whole controversy, that it be kept in 
 mind what sin, guilt, and punishment import; and especially 
 since attempts are made to confuse the sense. Whatever mean¬ 
 ing be attached to the word sin, it is, confessedly by all the par¬ 
 ties in the controversy, that which renders the subject of it 
 liable to punishment. That is, it is something for which the 
 person is justly exposed to be banished from the presence of 
 God, and condemned to whatever is included in hell torments for 
 eternity. Thus the sin and guilt which are conveyed to an 
 unborn child by its father in the act of its generation are such 
 that it may justly be subjected to eternal punishment; are such 
 that it will be doing it no wrong, but just precisely what ought 
 to be done, when it is given over to endless wrath. To the 
 
 question, Why, on what principle, should it be so dealt with? 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 229 
 
 the answer, and the only answer, is, Because its father begat it. 
 Now, he who can believe this ceases to be a fit subject with 
 whom to reason. He is simply a lunatic; either he cannot com¬ 
 prehend the meaning of terms or his moral nature has become 
 deprived of primitive and a priori instincts, intuitions, judg¬ 
 ments. 
 
 It is true that Adam’s sin did bring much suffering upon his 
 innocent offspring, but the most serious of all the forms of suf¬ 
 fering it did not bring—the divine wrath and exclusion from 
 his kingdom. It brought calamity, but it did not bring punish¬ 
 ment. Dr. Hodge does not seem to be able to see the differ¬ 
 ence. I judge that this want of capacity is not common. That 
 a child should inherit gout or abnormal lusts from a father, I 
 judge most persons are able to perceive, is quite a different 
 thing from inheriting hell. That in the first case the child may 
 be an object of pity, not of wrath, most people will be able, I 
 must judge, to think quite possible—even probable. Is it said, 
 Yes; but he made the constitution under which such conse¬ 
 quences arise; and he made the consequences inevitable to the 
 sin; and the consequences show the evil of sin and his dis¬ 
 pleasure against sin, therefore they are penal inflictions? The 
 first part of the statement is true; the conclusion is false, and 
 does not follow from the premises. The truth is he established 
 a constitution under which he determined to inflict certain pen¬ 
 alties upon the transgressor for his sin, and under which sin 
 might appear by its injurious effects upon others—either as it 
 should consist in harmful acts against others or as it should be 
 occasion of harm to others. 
 
 But is it said, What is the difference, since they suffer in both 
 cases, whether it be called punishment or not ? I answer, All 
 the difference in the world; since, if it were punishment, it 
 would be criminal injustice, but, as it is injury, it shows the sin 
 of its criminal cause but not the injustice of the government. 
 
230 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 That it should be permitted, even, would be the grossest in¬ 
 justice if it were not incident to a plan which may bring good 
 to the unfortunate sufferer out of it; but that it should be penal 
 and final were at once atrocious and diabolical. 
 
 But it is insisted that our depravity is a bar against the favor 
 of God, and such as to shut us out from eternal life; and must 
 therefore justly expose us to eternal death and displeasure. 
 This is the most plausible of all the arguments we have noticed, 
 and we will examine it with the care it deserves. 
 
 Much ingenious writing has been expended on this point, 
 but, we must think, without success. Depravity is a bar to 
 communion with God, and so to his favor and the enjoyment 
 of eternal life. It is a thing with which he is displeased; he is 
 displeased with its cause and with the effect. It must be re¬ 
 moved. We admit all this, but does this imply that they who 
 suffer are guilty and punishable therefor? Nothing of the 
 kind. That they might be justly barred from the communion 
 of God therefor ? Nothing of the kind. On the contrary, it 
 implies this: that—seeing they suffer this evil without any 
 fault of their own—mercy and grace, not to say justice, will 
 provide a remedy for it; will see that the impediment of nature 
 shall be removed and these disabled souls shall be enabled; the 
 impediment which they had no part in creating shall be re¬ 
 moved out of the way. 
 
 As we understand it, it is thus: The children of Adam, 
 without any fault of their own, come into the world in an ab¬ 
 normal condition, with an inherent tendency to sin, a natural 
 estrangement from God, called native depravity, or inherited 
 corruption of nature. This fact hinders their communion with 
 God. It must be removed, or they cannot enjoy his fellowship. 
 God is displeased with the existence of this hindrance. But as 
 he knows it is not the fault of the subject of it; that, in fact, he 
 is an innocent victim in the case, injured by but not sinning in 
 
Punishment. 
 
 231 
 
 it, he is not displeased with him, not wrathful against him; 
 rather, he pities him, and provides a remedy for him, and un¬ 
 dertakes, like a merciful God as he is, to help him out of it. 
 Instead of cursing and sending him to perdition for it he offers 
 to cure him. But he won’t be cured. 
 
 The case now changes. A new fact develops which brings 
 the parties into entirely new relations. Now the person, before 
 innocent, becomes the guilty cause; he by consent perpetuates 
 his depravity in refusing a proffered cure. 
 
 The result is that the theory that we are bom in a state of 
 sin and guilt is without foundation and contradictive of the 
 plainest dictates of reason. Hence the utter confusion into 
 which its advocates have fallen, mutually subverting and de¬ 
 stroying each other. Every attempt to explain is unsatis¬ 
 factory, because it is an attempt to explain what intuitive reason 
 declares not only is not, but cannot be, true. The several solu¬ 
 tions not only antagonize each other, but each is discordant 
 with itself, and all with first beliefs. No possible evidence 
 could sustain the doctrine, any more than proof could sustain the 
 assumption that justice and injustice are identical. No amount 
 of explanation can show why or how that is true which is in¬ 
 tuitively known to be false. Each new attempt only adds to 
 absurdity and increases the confusion. It is the old folly re¬ 
 enacted of showing why it is that a fish placed in a given volume 
 of water adds neither to its bulk nor weight. The theory must 
 long ago have been abandoned, under the rebuke of insulted 
 reason, but for its essential importance to a system of which it 
 is a part—and by no means the most inadmissible part. 
 
 Its chief grounds of defense are two: First, that it is the doc¬ 
 trine of the divine word, and therefore must be true or the 
 word itself be rejected. This argument must have weight with 
 all Christians. 
 
 Our answer is in two parts: First, that the divine word can- 
 
232 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 not assert tliat to be true which the divine voice within us 
 declares to be false, since the divine utterance cannot be con* 
 tradictory. Should a passage be found, or a number of them, 
 which seems to teach the doctrine it could avail nothing if op¬ 
 posed to dicta of original reason; for the mind has no power to 
 believe against these. This is admitted by the advocates of the 
 doctrine itself, in their fruitless efforts to reconcile the difficulty, 
 and is made available by one party against the method of 
 another. The proper attitude of the mind in every such case is 
 this: Here is a passage which seems to teach a doctrine which 
 is contradictory of, first, self-evident truths, the original dicta 
 of reason; but these we cannot doubt, therefore the passage 
 cannot teach what it seems to teach. It matters nothing how 
 direct and plain the terms employed, the verdict must be the 
 same. Rational and sound interpretation demands that the pas¬ 
 sage either be held in abeyance or accommodated. Language 
 is too uncertain a medium to enforce a seeming sense against a 
 primary cognition. The idea may be something else than that 
 which it appears to be ; we may not be able to ascertain what, 
 it may elude our most diligent search, but it is certain that it 
 cannot be such as to oppose God to himself. That we know. 
 
 Is it said, This canon subjects revelation to reason, and strips 
 the word of its supreme authority in matters of faith? We 
 answer, No ! What the word teaches is final. It is only a 
 question, What does it teach ? Reason must determine this. 
 Some things reason declares it cannot teach because they are 
 known not to be true; therefore when, from the imperfection 
 of language, the Bible seems to teach them we know there is a 
 mistake, an improper apprehension of its utterance. This plain 
 canon has always been admitted, and must obtain until men re¬ 
 nounce their reason. The divin es have invariably availed them¬ 
 selves of it in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity: when 
 
 charged with holding the doctrine in a sense to contradict 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 233 
 
 reason they deny, ana admit that the thing is impracticable, bnt 
 they explain that there must be some sense in which it is true, 
 since it is revealed. What that sense is is a mystery, unknown 
 and inexplicable. They do not embrace contradictory ideas on 
 the authority of the text. They do not because they cannot. 
 It is a law of mind. What is enforced upon us as a belief 
 on intuitive grounds cannot be displaced on logical grounds; no 
 argument here can supplant the certainty there. This is what 
 we demand in the case under consideration : that we be allowed 
 to find such ideas in the word as can be received without the 
 rejection of what we know is true and therefore cannot reject! 
 
 Second, the passages which are adduced do not involve the 
 necessity of supposing them so to teach, but may without vio¬ 
 lence be construed in harmony with the utterance of reason, so 
 that there is no need to suppose a conflict or to resort to the 
 canon we have laid down. 
 
 What is the position with respect to original sin ? Not that 
 men are sinners. This is undisputed. Not that all men are 
 born depraved, with a tendency to sin, which depravity is 
 called sin by accommodation, as leading to sin. This, also, is 
 undisputed. Not that this depravity is derived from Adam, 
 having its root in his first sin. This is undisputed. Not that 
 we suffer in consequence of that sin and resulting depravity. 
 This, also, is admitted. Upon these points we make no de¬ 
 murrer ; but to these: 
 
 First, that we sinned in Adam’s sin, or that his sin is laid 
 to our charge as if we had sinned in him. This we deny, and 
 insist that not a single passage of God’s word so teaches. 
 
 Second, that we are accounted guilty, or ill deserving, either 
 for his sin or the depravity which results to us from his sin. 
 This we deny, and insist that no passage of the word of God 
 so teaches. 
 
 Third, that we do suffer, or ever could have suffered, any 
 16 6 
 
234 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 punishment for his sin or our resulting depravity. This we 
 deny, and insist that no passage of Scripture teaches it. We 
 admit suffering, but not punishment. 
 
 On the contrary, we hold that the word of God joins with rea¬ 
 son to repudiate all three of these ideas in the most explicit 
 manner. 
 
 The second ground is this: That we are in fact punished for 
 Adam’s sin or our resulting depravity; and since punishment 
 presupposes guilt we must be guilty. Our answer is: We 
 admit that punishment presupposes guilt, but deny the fact that 
 we are punished and infer the very opposite: since we are not 
 guilty we cannot be punished. 
 
 The ground upon which it is assumed that we are punished 
 dor Adam’s sin, and on account of native guilt, is that our whole 
 xace suffers, even from the earliest infancy ; and since it can¬ 
 not be a punishment of their personal sin it must be for their 
 sin in Adam. 
 
 The whole argument rests on the assumption that suffering 
 and punishment are identical. This we deny, and for the argu¬ 
 ment upon which our denial rests refer to the section which 
 treats of punishment. 
 
 Is it a fact that there is no distinction between calamities and 
 punishments ? Is suffering impossible except as punishment ? 
 When a government punishes a criminal does it punish his 
 family ? It must be obvious that there is a difference in the 
 two cases of suffering which renders them entirely dissimilar in 
 intent and kind. This is precisely the case, we find, under 
 the divine government. Criminals are punished. The crim¬ 
 inal deeds of criminals cause suffering to innocent persons; 
 many times consist in injuries of the innocent; but are the 
 injuries of the innocent their punishment? 
 
 There are yet two other schemes for accounting for the origin 
 and prevalence of sin and depravity among men which deserve 
 
Punishment. 
 
 235 
 
 brief mention. The first is that which supposes the souls of 
 men to have had a former existence and probation, during 
 which they sinned and fell. This theory has been broached 
 from time to time along the Christian ages, but without meet¬ 
 ing with sufficient favor to create a school of influence. Its most 
 recent advocates are Julius Muller, in his very able treatise on 
 Ttie Christian Doctrine of Sin, and Edward Beecher, in his Con¬ 
 flict of Ages. They find it impossible to account for all the facts of 
 the problem in any other way, and fancy that in this idea there 
 is relief. The idea is substantially that of a second probation 
 —sinners in a former life are born into this life, into a condition 
 of mitigated punishments, but under a provisional redemption 
 of which they may avail themselves and attain to salvation. 
 The fact of their former actual sin and guilt explains their he¬ 
 reditary sufferings and mitigated penalties. They are put on a 
 new probation, as sinners under disfavor and with condemna¬ 
 tion resting on them, but with helps to recovery, and with the 
 chance, if they will, of reprieve. In this way the advocates of 
 the scheme imagine they relieve the divine character and ad¬ 
 ministration of injustice, and clothe both with compassionate 
 beneficence. 
 
 The idea has its genesis in the horror of a system which 
 teaches hereditary sin and guilt. Revolting at this, they take 
 shelter in this scheme as a dernier resort. Reared in schools of 
 Calvinistic and modified Calvinistic thought, which they find to 
 be untenable and yet from the enslavement of which they are 
 not able to free themselves, they accept this as a possible refuge. 
 
 It is only necessary to say that the assumption is a pure 
 fancy, wholly unsupported by either reason or revelation. 
 Nothing is, or can be, alleged for it—no facts of experience. 
 The soul knows absolutely nothing of the assumed previous his¬ 
 tory. The Bible makes no sign of it Reason finds no ground 
 for it. It is a sheer imagination. The suggestion is so intrin- 
 
236 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 sically absurd that in all the eager search for a possible solution 
 of the problem it is unable to secure even a meager following. 
 As it offers nothing to be believed it shows nothing to be 
 refuted. 
 
 The remaining view is that which is held by Arminian 
 divines, and which we advocate. What, then, is our view? 
 
 We hold that Adam is the natural head of the human race, 
 and in a modified sense the covenant, or representative, head; 
 that is, that, as natural head, his action, so far as it might affect 
 his nature and condition, would also favorably or unfavorably 
 affect the nature and condition of his posterity. We hold that 
 morally he represented himself alone ; that is, that, whatsoever 
 he might do, the morality of his act would be exclusively his 
 own, and he alone would be held for it. If he should remain 
 innocent the nature and condition of nature in which he was 
 created would descend to his posterity. Coming into existence 
 thus with a normal nature, his children, as they became compe¬ 
 tent, would have been placed, each for himself, under obliga¬ 
 tions of law ; that is, would have entered necessarily, as moral 
 beings, upon a responsible course in which, by the same neces¬ 
 sity, each one would stand accountable for himself. Proxies 
 do not exist in morals. 
 
 He did not remain innocent. He sinned. We believe that 
 his sin produced two effects. First, that it made him guilty 
 and exposed him to the punishment written in the law—death, 
 whatever that might be. Second, that it became the occasion 
 : of the withdrawment of the divine favor from him, and by this 
 and other—to us unknown—causes he lost the balance and 
 equipoise of his nature, and became extremely averse to good 
 and inclined to evil. That such was the effect on his nature, 
 by which we mean the tendencies of his entire powers of heart 
 and mind and flesh, that, in himself, there remained no recov¬ 
 ering power—he was totally overthrown. We believe that 
 
Punishment. 
 
 237 
 
 under the operation of that mysterious law, which prevails 
 through all being, under which like begets like, children born 
 to him must have inevitably inherited his evil tendencies and 
 disabilities; that, so, existence to them could have been noth¬ 
 ing less than inevitable curse. We believe, therefore, that jus¬ 
 tice, not less than mercy, required either that the race should 
 be estopped, or that a redeeming economy should be introduced 
 by which the calamity might be turned to blessing. We be¬ 
 lieve, therefore, that in the sin of Adam the possibility of a seed 
 from him perished—we died in him as potentialities, possibili¬ 
 ties. The injunction against our existence was at the instance 
 of the attributes justice and mercy. 
 
 We believe that at this point in logical order, but really in 
 the eternal plan foreknown and arranged, the race took a new 
 departure. The Redeemer became the head, in the room of the 
 apostate Adam, so that, as we all died potentially in Adam the 
 first, we were all made alive potentially in Adam the second. 
 The existence of the race is a provision of redemption; each 
 life is a redeemed life—a life taking its rise in redemption. 
 Christ is the second head of the race, and in such sense its head 
 that, but for his relation to it, there would be no race. 
 
 Under redemption the first Adam, the original head, who 
 lost his headship by forfeit, was restored, and became the natu¬ 
 ral source of the race. Thus we exist by redemption through 
 Adam. 
 
 Coming through Adam, as our natural head, we partake of 
 his fall; inherit his degenerate and corrupt nature—his tendency 
 to evil; a tendency so deep and radical that it would, unhin¬ 
 dered, inevitably carry us to utter death; a state in which, as 
 before stated, justice and mercy alike inhibited that we should 
 be born, unless with or under a redemption, but in which we 
 are permitted to be born under redemption, both by the con¬ 
 sent of mercy and justice, for the reason that the inherited 
 
238 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 depravity in ns is guiltless, and for the reason that redemption 
 provides for it a cure; and for the further reason that actual 
 sins, springing from its hereditary weakness, under redemption 
 may be pardoned, and so the entire race, though fallen, and 
 actually sinning, may yet be saved, upon conditions and by 
 helps thus reaching them through redemption. An existence 
 that would have been an inevitable and unmixed curse—and, 
 therefore, an impossible thing under a just dispensation—thus 
 now, with redemption provided, becomes a gracious boon. 
 
 Thus we are found to agree with those who hold to congeni¬ 
 tal depravity, as to the fact and source of it, while we deny its 
 guilt as hereditary. 
 
 We believe that in Jesus Christ, now our restoring head, the 
 entire human race are born to a heritage of eternal life, which 
 with all needful qualifications is secured to them unless, and 
 until, by personal transgression it is forfeited; and that every 
 human being, rising out of infancy into a responsible existence, 
 is immediately placed upon a just and equitable probation for 
 eternal life, each for himself, even as the first Adam was for 
 himself. 
 
 We hold that, while inherited depravity is not itself ground 
 of guilt as inherited, it becomes ground of guilt when it is vol¬ 
 untarily perpetuated by the refusal of the subject, after he has 
 attained to responsibility, to have it overcome or removed by 
 availing himself of the helps of redemption placed within his 
 reach thereto. Innocently existing incipiently, the depravity 
 may not be perpetuated without involving the subject in guilt 
 —or only so far as it is impossible, by any use of responsible 
 agency, that it should be eradicated or corrected. But even in 
 such cases the guilt results from improper action as to the ap¬ 
 plication of remedies rather than from the continued existence 
 of the disorder. Guilt is in the will; either in its wrong action 
 or inaction. The subject, as depraved, is shut away from com- 
 
Punishment. 
 
 239 
 
 munion with God, and is held guiltily responsible, and an ob¬ 
 ject of displeasure for failing to have the offensive impediment 
 removed. He has now accepted it, and becomes guilty on 
 account of it, as making it his own voluntary state. Primarily 
 he had no responsibility in the premises, because it was a fact 
 with whose existence he had no connection. Now, he is solely 
 responsible because its continuance is by his consent or guilty 
 inaction. His guilt is precisely in the degree in which it 
 remains by his tolerance. So far as it is impossible to him to 
 have it removed he is guiltless. This depraved nature, we 
 allow, is sinful in these two senses: first, that it tends to sin 
 from the beginning—tends to courses of action which in a 
 responsible being would be sins; second, when tolerated, ac¬ 
 cepted, and followed by a responsible being, it is sin—or he 
 becomes a sinner on account of it. 
 
 Further, we hold that in consequence of our depravity, as 
 children of a fallen head, we inherit the fortunes of suffering 
 and death; which to him were penal but to us are permitted as 
 an inheritance of nature, and, far from being penal, are many 
 times the chastisements and corrections of love and included in 
 an economy of salvation. 
 
 Yet, further, we hold that our congenital depravity, while it 
 does not involve guilt, is an evil of nature which needs to be 
 removed; a root on which sin has a tendency to grow; an ab¬ 
 normal and ruinous condition which must be remedied in order 
 to real spiritual life—the communion of God; it is of the nature 
 of a malady from which the soul must be delivered in order to 
 its happy existence; redemption, by which it is possible to 
 exist, is remedial deliverance—that is, the soul is under agency 
 of cure, and in the case of such as are removed from life before 
 the period of personal accountability, such, therefore, as have 
 not worked personal forfeiture of eternal life, we hold that the 
 abnormal condition is unconditionally remedied, in a manner 
 
240 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 to us unexplained, so that they are fitted for eternal life. In 
 the case of those who attain to responsibility we hold that, by 
 an act of faith on their part, the Spirit of God becomes a regen¬ 
 erating agent, freeing them from the dominion of depravity and 
 renewing their fallen nature; restoring order and spiritual life; 
 making them new creatures. 
 
 Finally, we hold that no man or angel ever did, or ever can, 
 fail of the favor of God, or become subject to his displeasure, 
 except by personal sin; that guilt and punishment are facts 
 which require always and absolutely, as a necessary condition 
 to their existence, a personal act of transgression—a renuncia¬ 
 tion of life. The entire race exist in Jesus Christ as a redeem¬ 
 ing head; in no other way do or could they exist; and in him 
 they must remain as redeemed until they take themselves per¬ 
 sonally out of his hands at the point where law meets them 
 and personal disobedience severs them. 
 
 Still, it is said that our view does not relieve the case of the 
 apparent injustice charged against the theory we reject, since 
 we admit that great and manifold evils come to the race by in¬ 
 heritance, which is a manifest injustice if they are innocent. 
 
 To this we answer in two parts. If we were compelled 
 to allow the first part of the statement it would involve no 
 necessity of admitting the second part. It is conceivable that 
 we might incur even serious disadvantage, and real temporary 
 harm, under a perfectly just and equitable system. We have 
 no right to assume that a condition less favorable than Adam’s 
 would be an injustice to his children. There may be a necessity 
 in the nature of the case, which utmost goodness may not be 
 able to overcome, why the offspring of transgressing ancestors 
 should be less favorably circumstanced than if they had re¬ 
 mained unsinning, and yet compensation be introduced which 
 would make their condition not only not one of hardship but 
 one of real and abundant kindness. Sin may be a factor whose 
 
Punishment. 
 
 241 
 
 presence, on the whole, diminishes the good of every being in 
 the universe, relatively to what it would have been had no sin 
 been committed, and yet its presence may not impugn either 
 the goodness or the justice of God toward general being. 
 
 The disadvantage might be real, even great, and might in¬ 
 volve manifold perils and actual sufferings to the perfectly 
 innocent without injustice, since innocence, as we have seen, 
 does not imply exemption either from exposure or actual suf¬ 
 fering, but only exemption from needless and unjust hardships 
 and, especially, penal inflictions. It is conceivable that such 
 might be our relations to Adam, or such our relations to our 
 immediate ancestors, or to society around us, that the sin of 
 anyone would limit or lessen our probationary heritage, and 
 yet the damage imply no injustice to us in Him who so framed 
 the constitution of the universe as to make such injury possible. 
 The very fact which made the possibility of injury may be the 
 fact which contains in it the highest substance of good. A son 
 might so impair the father’s fortune as really to lessen the 
 estate and limit the income of all the other members of the 
 family, and no actual wrong be done on the part of the father, 
 who was thus hindered from doing by them as he would have 
 done but for this circumstance. It seems to be a law of social 
 life, inevitable to natures capable of sympathy and love, that 
 there should be liability of one member to suffer with and by 
 another; the wrong done by one or against one may painfully 
 vibrate through the whole. In fact, the whole idea of duty 
 with relation to another, the moral economy, involves the pos¬ 
 sibility that, either by neglect or malfeasance, one should be 
 subject of temporary harm; but this does not imply injustice 
 in the constitution. 
 
 The moral system is the crown and glory of all God’s great 
 and wonderful provisions; that without which the created uni¬ 
 verse would have been barren and incomplete, that without 
 
242 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 winch no note of rational joy or ecstasy of rational love or con¬ 
 sciousness of worth could have existed in any realm; and yet 
 that grandest and most significant work of all had to lay its 
 corner stone in possibilities of deepest evil. 
 
 The Infinite saw fit to start moral races on a platform of in¬ 
 nocence, and with natures attuned to right, and we do not see 
 how he could have done otherwise, either in wisdom, or love, 
 or justice; but this does not imply that a probation so projected 
 was either the only conceivable form that might arise, or that 
 it contained in it the greatest possible advantages. For aught 
 we know to the contrary a scheme of probation might be per¬ 
 fected, for a race which had failed under the first form, that 
 would redeem their failure and bring them to a most glorious 
 culmination under its provisions. Who dare say that redemp¬ 
 tion was not foreseen to be an absolute need to the moral uni¬ 
 verse, to repair foreseen lapses under the rigors of law—and 
 that, therefore, it was a primitive provision of the eternal plan, 
 complementing and completing, with its greater glory, the first, 
 or legal, scheme? 
 
 But now, having seen that hardships to the innocent might 
 possibly arise under a moral system, and that this is a very dif¬ 
 ferent thing from the supposition that they might be justly 
 punished for sins which they never committed, let us see 
 whether there is any ground for the assumption that our con¬ 
 dition has been greatly injured by Adam’s sin. 
 
 To form a just judgment in the case we must contrast our 
 case as it is under redemption with what it would have been 
 under the primeval economy; compare what we lost under law 
 with what we have gained under Gospel; what we had in our 
 first head with what we have in our second Head. It may turn 
 out, after all, that our loss is our gain; that, strange as it may 
 sound, it is better for us to come into being fallen, under re¬ 
 demption and the operation of its restorative forces, than it 
 
Punishment. 
 
 243 
 
 would have oeen to be born, unfallen, under the law; that what 
 at first view seems to be so great a disaster will in the outcome 
 prove to be to our advantage. This would be no utterly unique 
 thing in the government of the Almighty Father, who is able 
 to bring good out of evil and make the wrath and folly of men, 
 and even devils, to praise him. If any should be disposed to 
 say, The supposition is impossible, and even blasphemous, since 
 it would be making sin a good, we answer, No; it would be 
 nothing of the kind. It would leave the sin still the same; but 
 it would be only allowing that infinite wisdom and love may be 
 able in their boundless resources to overrule that which in itself 
 is really evil, not so as to make it good, but so as to make it 
 the occasion of a good not otherwise attainable. This seems to 
 be the apostle’s view in Rom. v, “Where sin abounded 
 grace did much more abound.’’ Observe, what we say is not 
 that our depravity is a good, or could ever become such, but 
 that the evil which has happened to us becomes the occasion of 
 an interposing mercy which makes our condition after it more 
 secure, as to our highest good, than before it. Let us see how 
 this might be. 
 
 Before the fall we were under law; since the fall, and by oc¬ 
 casion of it, we are under grace. 
 
 Flow, what was it to be under law ? As to the persons, to 
 be under law was to be in a state of innocence—to be as Adam 
 was. Had he not sinned it is safe to infer that we, his chil¬ 
 dren, would have inherited both his innocent nature and his 
 moral position of innocence. That looks well for safety and 
 happiness. But was he safe ? Was there no avenue by which 
 harm could reach him? The law read, “ In the day thou eatest 
 thereof, thou shalt surely die.” Secure and blessed as it is 
 death may come to this beautiful Eden. One trembles as he 
 reads that dreadful covenant which puts eternity on the hazard 
 of a single chance. Into that covenant the unfallen Adam 
 
Studies in Theology. 
 
 244 
 
 would have brought his unfallen children. I know it is as¬ 
 sumed that, had he not sinned, his children would have been 
 placed beyond the possibility of sinning; the hazard would 
 have been forever passed. But this assumption is without 
 shadow of foundation. The opposite fact is not only probable 
 but is absolutely certain. Each moral being must stand for 
 itself, and must for itself undergo the perils of probation. Is 
 it not frightful to think of existence under an economy which 
 provided no mercy for a single deviation, and with such sur¬ 
 roundings that the very first experiment proved a disastrous 
 failure ! We do not accuse that economy of injustice, but we 
 do say its possibilities were terrible. To a finite being, tempt- 
 able in his nature, probation under a covenant that will allow 
 of no extenuations, admit of no forgiveness, but will visit with 
 remediless death the first transgression, is not a condition to be 
 coveted, even though an unfallen being be the subject of it. 
 Who is able to say that less possibilities of evil would be con¬ 
 tained in the plan of individual probations under such a scheme 
 than are involved in the economy of redemption ? 
 
 What is the economy? In general it is the economy of 
 probation for fallen beings. As to the persons there is this 
 difference : Under the first economy they were unfallen, under 
 the second they are fallen; under that the nature of the sub¬ 
 ject tended to righteousness, but with a possibility of temptation 
 and sin ; under this the nature tends to sin, but with a possibility 
 of recovery; under that one failure was inevitable ruin, under 
 this a million failures may be repented of and pardoned, and so 
 the ruin be averted. 
 
 The contrast between a fallen and an unfallen world, it must 
 be admitted, is painfully striking; between a nature stricken 
 with the leprosy of depravity and a nature pure and innocent; 
 between bodies filled with pain and disease and death and 
 bodies thrilled with the vigors of diseaseless life ; between homes 
 
Punishment. 
 
 245 
 
 blighted and darkened with ignorance, malignity, and shame, 
 and homes sacred and beautiful and holy ; between the sorrows 
 and bereavements of a world full of anguish and graves and a 
 world without tears and death. At first look, and on the sur¬ 
 face, the advantage seems all one way; but maybe it is not so. 
 If we take a broader and deeper view we may find that birth 
 in the darker world is, after all, more desirable. 
 
 It may be heresy, but for myself, deeply conscious as I am 
 of the plague of a nature utterly sinful in its tendencies, I would 
 rather be in the second head than in the first; rather take my 
 chances with Christ than with the unfallen Adam ; rather be 
 born a fallen soul, in a fallen world, under the redemption of 
 Jesus, with all sorrow and suffering brimming my cup of earthly 
 life, than be born of Eve amid the bloom of paradise, with 
 angel brothers around me, under the inevitable exposures and 
 terrible dangers of an economy of unappeasable law ; rather take 
 the certainties of sin, with the possibilities of pardon and re¬ 
 covery with a Saviour such as Jesus, than the hopes of fallible 
 immaculateness without a redeemer. If others would choose 
 Adam I would choose Christ. I am content to enter a fallen 
 world through the gate of suffering if I may feel enfolding me 
 the arms of the pitying, omnipotent Son of Mary, rather than 
 an unfallen w T orld, with the exigencies and perils of fallibility 
 without a rescuer. If others would venture, of choice, on an 
 eternity whose doom hangs in the balance of a single chance 
 under the primeval law I would cling to the Seed of the 
 woman, who saves to the uttermost of a thousand sins and falls. 
 For, see: under the former, if there be innocence, it is innocence 
 under law, innocence temptable; innocence so frail that it per¬ 
 ishes at the first breath of trial; an innocence which, once for¬ 
 feited, is irrecoverable; one misstep, and all is lost; one blunder, 
 and a plunge into a hopeless eternity. Under the latter if 
 
 there is taint there is cure ; if there is sin there is pardon. That 
 
 6 
 
246 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 had its tree of life, it is true, but it had also its flaming sword 
 and its avenging angel; this also has its tree of life and its olive 
 branch of promise and invitation of mercy. That rewarded the 
 faithful, this opens its arms to the prodigal; that had no death, 
 this has a grave—but also a conquering Jesus and a transform¬ 
 ing resurrection ; that opened heaven, through the clouds, to the 
 unsinning; this opens heaven to the sinning, through Calvary 
 and by the way of the tomb, with songs and shouts of redeem¬ 
 ing victory. Again I say, if any would complain of the hard¬ 
 ships of the probation of Adam’s fallen seed, as compared with 
 the probation of the unfallen, I have no complaints. To my 
 thinking we gain more in the second than we lost in the first. 
 
 If we look on beyond probation we know not what was the 
 possibility of innocence ; what heights of glory were in reser¬ 
 vation for them—where amid the ascending eternities they 
 would have shone and sung. Doubtless their destiny would 
 have been inconceivably glorious. Their powers indicate 
 a progression in which culminations followed by still more 
 ineffable culminations would have filled the measure of immor¬ 
 tal existence. But will Jesus do less for his ransomed seed? 
 Shall they who came up out of great tribulation, scarred on the 
 battlefields of temptation and sin and bearing the marks of suf¬ 
 fering and death incurred in the dreadful struggle, shall they, 
 with robes washed in the blood of the Lamb, the purchase of 
 Calvary’s agony, have a less conspicuous glory ? We venture 
 to believe not “ Having suffered with him they shall also be 
 glorified together.” 
 
 With this view Chalmers seems to agree. He says: 
 
 “ In the three verses that follow we have such a parallel 
 drawn between the evil entailed upon us by the first Adam, 
 and the good purchased and procured for us by the second 
 Adam, as to evince that there is something more than compen¬ 
 sation, but such an overbalance of blessedness provided to us by 
 
Punishment. 
 
 247 
 
 the Gospel as may well serve to reconcile us to the whole of this 
 wondrous administration. Rom. v, 15-17: 4 But not as the 
 offense, so also is the free gift: for if through the offense of 
 one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift 
 by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded 
 unto many. And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the 
 gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the 
 free gift is of many offenses unto justification. For if by one 
 man’s offense death reigned by one; much more they which 
 receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness 
 shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ’ 
 
 “We do feel that there is a considerable difficulty in this 
 short passage; and the following is the only explanation that 
 we are able to give of it. You will observe that in the four¬ 
 teenth verse the effect of Adam’s sin in bringing death upon his 
 posterity is demonstrated by this circumstance that the sentence 
 had full execution, even upon those who had not in their own 
 persons sinned as he did. Death reigned even over them; and 
 it made Adam to be the figure of Christ, that what the one 
 brought upon mankind by his disobedience the other by his 
 obedience did away. 
 
 “But Christ did more than do away the sentence which lay 
 upon mankind because of the sin of Adam being imputed to 
 them. This and no other sentence was all that could be inflicted 
 on infants, or those who had not sinned actually. But in ad¬ 
 dition to the guilt that we have by inheritance there is also a 
 guilt which all who live a few years in the world incur by prac¬ 
 tice. The one offense of Adam landed us in guilt; but the 
 many offenses of the heart and life of us all have woefully ac¬ 
 cumulated that guilt. And we stand in need, not merely of as 
 much grace as might redeem us from the forfeiture that was 
 passed on the whole human family in consequence of the trans¬ 
 gression of their first parent, but also of as much new grace as 
 
 6 
 
248 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 might redeem us from the curse and the condemnation of our 
 own iniquities—as might redeem us, not merely from the debt 
 that has been entailed upon us, but from the additional debt 
 that has been incurred by us. 
 
 “And thus it is that not as the offense so also is the gift For 
 the gift by Christ compensates for more evil than the offense 
 by Adam has entailed. Through that one offense the penalty 
 of death passed upon many, even upon all whom Adam repre¬ 
 sented. But the grace of God, and the gift which emanated 
 therefrom and was won for us by the one man Jesus Christ, 
 greatly exceeds in its amount the recallmentof this penalty from 
 the many whom Christ represented. The condemnation we 
 derive from Adam was passed upon us because of his one 
 offense. The free gift of justification we receive from Christ 
 not merely reverses that condition of guilt in which Adam has 
 placed us, but that still more aggravated condition of guilt in 
 which we have been placed by the multitude of our own 
 offenses. We obtain, not only justification from the guilt of 
 Adam’s one offense, but justification from the guilt of our own 
 many offenses. Such was the virulent mischief even of the 
 one offense that through it, and it alone, even when separated 
 from all actual guilt, as in the case of infants, death reigned in 
 the world. There was more grace needed, however, than would 
 suffice merely to counteract this virulence, for greatly had it 
 been aggravated by the abundance of actual iniquity among 
 men; and for this there was an abundance, or, as it might have 
 been translated, a surplus of grace provided, so that, while the 
 effect of Adam's single offense was to make death reign, greatly 
 must the power of the restorative administered by the second 
 Adam exceed the malignity of the sin that has been transmitted 
 to us by the first Adam, inasmuch as it heals, not merely the 
 hereditary, but all the superinduced diseases of our spiritual 
 constitution, and causes those over whom death reigned, solely 
 
Punishment. 
 
 249 
 
 on account of Adam’s guilt, to reign in life, though for their 
 own guilt as well as Adam’s they had rightfully to die. 
 
 u This is all the length at which we can penetrate into this pas¬ 
 sage. We see affirmed in it the superiority of that good which 
 Christ has done for us over that evil which Adam has entailed 
 upon us. We see in it enough to stop the mouth of any gain¬ 
 say er who complains that he has been made chargeable for the 
 guilt which he never contracted; for we there see announced to 
 us, not merely release from this one charge, but from all the ad¬ 
 ditional charges which by our own willful disobedience we have 
 brought upon ourselves. The heir of a burdened property, who 
 curses the memory of his father and complains of the weight 
 and hardship of the mortgages he has left behind him, ought in 
 all justice to be appeased when his father’s friend, moved by 
 regard to his family, not only offers to liquidate the debts that 
 were transmitted to him by inheritance, but also the perhaps 
 heavier debts of his own extravagance and folly. From the 
 mouth of a willful and obstinate sinner may we often hear the 
 reproach of God for the imputation of Adam’s sin to his blame¬ 
 less and unoffending posterity; and were he indeed a blameless 
 individual who was so dealt with there might be reason for the 
 outcry of felt and fancied injustice. But, seeing that in har¬ 
 dened impiety, or at least in careless indifference, he spends his 
 days, living without God in the world and accumulating vol¬ 
 untarily upon his own head the very guilt against which he 
 protests so loudly when laid upon him by the misconduct of 
 another, this ought at least to mitigate a little the severity of his 
 invective ; and it ought wholly to disarm and to turn it when 
 a covering so ample is stretched forth, if he will only have it, 
 both for the guilt at which he murmurs and for the guilt of his 
 own misdoings. Nor has he any right to protest against the 
 share that has been assigned to him in the doom of Adam’s dis¬ 
 obedience, when, willfully as he has aggravated that doom upon 
 17 6 
 
250 
 
 Studies ln t Theology. 
 
 himself, there is a grace held out to him, and a gift by grace, 
 which so nobly overpasses all the misery of man's unregenerate 
 nature and all its condemnation. 
 
 “ Perhaps there is a great deal more in this passage than we 
 have been able to bring out of it. It is likely enough that the 
 apostle may have had in his mind the state of the redeemed 
 when they are made to reign in life by Jesus Christ, as con¬ 
 trasted with what the state of man would have been had Adam 
 persisted in innocency, and bequeathed all the privileges of in¬ 
 nocence to a pure and untainted posterity. In this latter case 
 our species would have kept their place in God's unfallen 
 creation and maintained that position in the scale of order 
 and dignity which was at first assigned to them; and, though 
 lower than the angels, would at least have shone with an unpol¬ 
 luted though a humbler glory, and have either remained upon 
 earth, or perhaps have been transplanted to heaven, with the 
 insignia of all those virtues which they had kept untainted and 
 entire upon their own characters. Now, certain it is that the 
 redeemed in heaven will be made to recover all that personal 
 worth and accomplishment which was lost by the fall, and in 
 point of moral luster will shine forth at least with all that orig¬ 
 inal brightness in which humanity was formed; and in the 
 songs of their joyful eternity will there be ingredients of trans¬ 
 port and of grateful emotion which, but for a Eedeemer to wash 
 them from their sins in his blood, could never have been felt ; 
 and, what perhaps is more than all, they are invested with an 
 order of merit which no prowess of archangel could ever win; 
 they are clothed with a righteousness purer than those heavens 
 which are not clean in the sight of infinite and unspotted holi¬ 
 ness ; they are seen in the face of Him who takes precedency 
 over all that is created; and, besides being admitted into the 
 honor of that more special and intimate relationship which sub¬ 
 sists between the divine Messiah and those who are the fruit and 
 
Punishment. 
 
 251 
 
 travail of his soul, it is indeed a wondrous distinction that the 
 Son of God, by descending to the fellowship of our nature, has 
 ennobled and brought up the nature of man to a preeminence 
 so singularly glorious. 
 
 “Verses 18,19: ‘ Therefore, as by the offense of one judgment 
 came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteous¬ 
 ness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification 
 of life. For as by one man’s disobedience many were made sin¬ 
 ners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.” 
 
 “ The three last verses state the disparity between the two 
 Adams in respect of the amount of good and evil conveyed 
 by them. The two before us state the similarity between them 
 in respect of the mode of conveyance of this good and this evil. 
 They contain, in fact, the strength of the argument for the im¬ 
 putation of Adam’s sin. As the condemnation of Adam comes 
 to us, even so does the justification by Christ come to us. 
 Now, we know that the merit of the Saviour is ascribed to us, 
 else no atonement for the past, and no renovation of heart or 
 of life that is ever exemplified in this world for the future, will 
 suffice for our acceptance with God. Even so then must the 
 demerit of Adam have been ascribed to us. The analogy 
 affirmed in these verses leads irresistably to this conclusion. 
 The judgment that we are guilty is transferred to us from the 
 actual guilt of the one representative, even as the judgment 
 that we are righteous is transferred to us from the actual 
 righteousness of the other representative. We are sinners in 
 virtue of one man's disobedience, independently of our own 
 personal sins; and we are rightous in virtue of another’s obedi¬ 
 ence, independently of our own personal qualifications. We 
 do not say but that through Adam we become personally sin¬ 
 ful, inheriting as we do his corrupt nature. Neither do we say 
 but that through Christ we become personally holy, deriving 
 out of his fullness the very graces which adorned his own char- 
 
252 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 acter. But, as it is at best a tainted holiness that we have on 
 this side of death, we must have something more than it in 
 which to appear before God; and the righteousness of Christ, 
 reckoned unto us and rewarded in us, is that something. The 
 something which corresponds to this in Adam is his guilt, 
 reckoned unto us and punished in us; so that, to complete the 
 analogy, as from him we get the infusion of the depravity, so 
 from him also do we get the imputation of his demerit 
 
 “ One may suppose from the eighteenth verse that the number 
 who are justified in Christ is equal to the number who are con¬ 
 demned in Adam, and that this comprehends the whole human 
 race. But by the term ‘ all,’ we are merely to understand, all, 
 on the one hand, who are in that relation to Adam, which infers 
 the descent of his guilt upon them; and that is certainly the 
 whole family of mankind; and thus 1 all,’ on the other hand, 
 who are in that relation to Christ which infers the descent of 
 his righteousness upon them ; and that is only the family of 
 believers. As in Adam, it is said, all die, even so in Christ 
 shall all be made alive. But the 1 all ’ does not refer to the same 
 body of people. The first, who die in Adam, evidently refer 
 to the whole human race. But the second, who live in Christ, 
 are restricted by the apostle to those who are Christ’s, and will 
 be made alive by him at his coming. All men have not faith, 
 and all men therefore will not reign in life by Christ Jesus. 
 
 “For anything we know the mediation of Christ may have 
 affected, in a most essential way, the general state of humanity; 
 and, by some mode unexplained and inexplicable, may it have 
 bettered the condition of those who die in infancy, or who die 
 in unreached heathenism, and aggravated the condition of none 
 but those who bring upon themselves the curse and the severity 
 of a rejected Gospel. But the matter which concerns you is 
 that, unless you receive Christ in time, you will never reign 
 with him in eternity. You will not be admitted into the num- 
 
Punishment. 
 
 253 
 
 ber of those all, who, though they comprehend the entire family 
 of believers, do not comprehend any that obey not the Gospel; 
 and it is at your peril if, when the offer of an interest in the 
 righteousness of Christ is placed within your reach, you turn in 
 indifference away from it 
 
 “ And it is of vital importance to you to know that the free gift, 
 though it comes not upon you all in the way of absolute con¬ 
 veyance, it at least comes upon you all in the way of offer. It 
 is yours if you will. The offer is unto all and upon all who 
 now hear us, though the thing offered is only unto all and 
 upon all who believe. We ask each individual among you to 
 isolate himself from the rest of the species—to conceive for a 
 moment that he is the only sinner upon the face of the earth, 
 that none but he stands in need of an atoning sacrifice, and none 
 but he of an everlasting righteousness brought in by another 
 and that might avail for his justification before God. Let him 
 imagine that for him, the one and solitary offender, Christ came 
 on the express errand to seek and to save; that for him he 
 poured out his soul unto the death ; that for him the costly ap¬ 
 paratus of redemption was raised ; that for him, and for him 
 alone, the Bible was written; and a messenger from heaven sent 
 to entreat that he will enter into reconciliation with God, through 
 that way of mediatorship which God in his love had devised, 
 for the express accommodation of this single wanderer, who 
 had strayed, an outcast and an alien, from the habitation of the 
 unfallen, and that it now turns upon his own choice whether 
 he will abide among the paths of destruction or be readmitted 
 to all the honors and felicities of the place from which he had 
 departed. There is nothing surely wanting to complete the 
 warrant of such an individual for entering into hope and hap¬ 
 piness ; and yet, ye hearers, it is positively not more complete 
 than the warrant which each and which all of you have at this 
 moment. To you, individually to you, God is holding out this 
 
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 Studies in Theology. 
 
 gift for your acceptance—you is lie beseeching to come again 
 into friendship with him. With you is he expostulating the 
 cause of your life and your death, and bidding you choose 
 between the welcome offer of the one and the sure alterna¬ 
 tive of the other if the offer is rejected. He is now parleying 
 the matter with every hearer, and just as effectually as if that 
 hearer were the only creature in the world to whom the 
 errand of redemption was at all applicable. There is nothing 
 in the multitude of hearers by whom you are surrounded 
 that should at all deaden the point of its sure and specific appli¬ 
 cation to yourself. 
 
 “ The message of the G-ospel does not suffer, in respect of its 
 appropriateness to you, by the ranging abroad of its calls and its 
 entreaties over the face of the wdiole congregation. The com¬ 
 mission is to preach the Gospel to every; and surely that is the 
 same with preaching the Gospel to each. It does not become less 
 pointedly personal in its invitation by its being made more 
 widely diffusive. The dispersion of the Gospel embassy over 
 the face of the whole world does not abate by one single iota 
 either the loudness or the urgency of the knock which it is mak¬ 
 ing at your door. This is a property which no extension of 
 the message can ever dissipate. It cannot be shipped off either 
 in whole or in part by the missionary vessel which carries the 
 news and the offers of salvation to other lands. Your minister 
 speaks with no less authority though thousands and thousands 
 more are preaching at the same moment along with him. Your 
 Bible carries no less emphatic intimation to you, though Bibles 
 are circulating by millions over the mighty amplitudes of pop¬ 
 ulation that are on every side of you. God, through the me¬ 
 dium of these conveyances, is holding out as distinct an overture 
 to you, and pledging himself to as distinct a fulfillment, as if you 
 were the only sinner he had to deal with ; and whether he be¬ 
 seeches you to be reconciled, or bids you come unto Christ on the 
 6 ^ 
 
Punishment. 
 
 255 
 
 faith, that you will not be cast out, or invites you, weary and heavy 
 laden, to cast your burden upon him and he will sustain it, or 
 sets forth to you a propitation and tells you that your reliance 
 upon its efficacy is all that is needed to make it effectual to you 
 —be very sure that all this is addressed as especially to yourself 
 as if you heard it face to face by the lips of a special messenger 
 from heaven—that God is bringing himself as near as if he 
 named you by a voice from the skies. So that if you, arrested 
 by all this power and closeness of application, shall venture 
 your case on the calls and the promises of the Gospel, there is 
 not one call that will not be followed up, nor one promise that 
 will not be fully and perfectly accomplished.’’ 
 
 Despite the virus of Calvinism in this citation—the strange 
 mixture of truth with error which greatly mars its consistency 
 and beauty—it nevertheless recognizes the fact that the race, 
 though depraved through Adam, its natural head, gains more 
 in Christ, the second Adam, than it lost in the first. It, though 
 in self-contradiction, affirms the very doctrine that inherited de¬ 
 pravity does not involve the guilt of those who suffer it—the 
 guilt being removed by redemption before they are born. Its 
 contradictory and inadmissible implications are manifold, but 
 in it all there is the presence of the great truth that in Christ, 
 by an act of grace, we are placed on an improved platform ; a 
 condition better than if the first Adam had maintained his alle¬ 
 giance. He affirms guilt of unsinning beings by imputation, 
 which we deny, but he relieves them of guilt, before it reaches 
 them, by the imputation of a righteousness which is another’s. 
 This, also, we cannot receive. But it aims at a truth, if it 
 reaches it illogically and unethically. Many Arminians have 
 followed the general trend of his position, simply interjecting a 
 universal redemption against a limited one, considering hered¬ 
 itary guilt by imputation and offsetting it by imputed jus¬ 
 tification; an idea wholly inconsistent with the fundamental 
 
 6 
 
25 G 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 principles of the Arminian system, and foisted upon it by the 
 prevailing theologizing of the times. 
 
 The great bane of writings and thinkings on the subject is 
 the attempt to preserve the mass of errors known as Calvinism. 
 Now this theory is broached, now that, each subversive of the 
 other, and all outraging rational and moral intuitions; and so 
 the truth, which is plain and simple, is sacrificed to the interests 
 of a system which is, and must forever be, indefensible. The 
 fact of inherited abnormalcy is patent, and cannot be rationally 
 disputed. Its guilt is unethical and impossible. A provisional 
 redemption, helpful to regeneration and rendering freedom pos¬ 
 sible—as broad as the hurt—alone renders the propagation of 
 a race so maimed possible under a just system. With such a 
 provision, of universal application, no injustice is done to any, 
 and the system may be the most beneficent possible. 
 
 Let no one say that this implies that the primal sin and the 
 consequent fall of the race in its head are a good. This is not 
 a legitimate inference from anything here affirmed or supposed. 
 Sin—in itself—is the greatest evil possible under a beneficent 
 and just administration. There is for it no possible excuse, 
 not a single redeeming circumstance. Had it not occurred there 
 could have been nothing to mar the harmony of the universe 
 or the happiness of beings callable of immortal blessedness; 
 nothing to grieve or offend a holy and beneficent God. There 
 would have been limitations, restrictions, discipline; these are 
 necessary incidents of any possible created system, and espe¬ 
 cially of the highest, in which moral beings exist. There might 
 have been forms of suffering, coincident with sensational ex¬ 
 istence. These, for aught that we know, are unavoidable con¬ 
 comitants of every universe in which any kind of enjoyment is 
 possible. But under the movements and government of infinite 
 love, save for sin, highest welfare would have been secured. 
 
 Sin alone darkens the universe and prevents the outcome of 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 257 
 
 complete and perfect happiness and highest holiness, which is 
 the aim of creation. It mars all beauty, ruins all loveliness 
 that it touches. The evil may be beyond the power of the In¬ 
 finite to prevent or completely to remedy in the best system. 
 We venture to affirm that it is. In itself it is unmixed evil. 
 It serves no end of goodness. But it is not unlimited evil, or 
 evil which may not be overruled for good, or a universe in 
 which it exists never would have been created. Despite it an 
 infinite glory of beneficence and goodness will yet crown the 
 great creative scheme; and its occurrence will be made the 
 occasion—and, so far as we can perceive, the only way—for 
 the complete revelation and exercise of the most glorious of 
 the divine attributes: holy, compassionating, and forgiving 
 love. What is implied in the statement above is this: That 
 under the government of mere law sin is utterly destructive. 
 The chances of any moral existence attaining its supreme wel¬ 
 fare are restricted to utter and unswerving obedience. This is 
 an ethical fact. Law provides no reprieves and gives no chance 
 for recovery. If obeyed it works life, with all possible bene¬ 
 fits ; but if disobeyed it kills inexorably. Lrnder redemption 
 there is a provision for pardons. It is thus that in Christ we 
 gain more than we lost in our natural head: a scheme of mercy 
 and helps. It is infinite love broadening the possibilities of 
 welfare where its perils are increased. 
 
 We close this discussion on the doctrine of original sin, so 
 called, with some general reflections and deductions. 
 
 By the doctrine as defined by its advocates is meant guilt 
 for a nature which by inheritance tends to sin. We have ad¬ 
 mitted such a nature, and have contended that, while in no 
 proper sense ground of guilt, yet it is an evil which must be 
 remedied in order to the soul's peace and moral purity. We 
 now add that impurities of nature become ground of actual 
 guilt whenever the soul freely tolerates their existence and 
 
258 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 volitionally acquiesces in them. The}- then become personal 
 acts, or states with respect to which the will either directly acts 
 or criminally fails to act. In either and both cases alike they 
 are chargeable to the will—as criminal defects or overt and 
 criminal causes. 
 
 Inherited dispositions or tendencies—in themselves innocent, 
 but working to sin when not repressed, and more when indulged 
 —not only add to their strength but become deepest sin. The 
 soul by its own consent becomes filled with all manner of moral 
 impurities; the whole inner nature is defiled and becomes a 
 fountain of all manner of unholiness—the hotbed of the very 
 essence of all sin. Men thus volitionally multiply and inten¬ 
 sify their own dejmavity. This condition is not to be attributed 
 to inherited tendencies, alone considered, but directly to the 
 willful wrongdoing of the person himself. This self-superin¬ 
 duced moral loathsomeness is spiritual death, a product of the 
 will itself. Depravity so superinduced is sin ; “ the whole head 
 is sick, and the whole heart faint,” and within there is naught 
 but “ wounds, and bruises, and putrefying sores.” This outcome 
 is a condition of depravity wrought by us, not born with us. 
 To natural tendency it adds active will concurrence. A soul so 
 defiled is not only morally abnormal, with evil tendencies such 
 as come with its nature, but it is a soul which has corrupted 
 itself and rendered itself guilty of all its added impurities. It 
 is dead in trespasses and sins. For its state it cannot refer to 
 the sin of its first parents, nor can it plead inability to have it 
 otherwise—the necessitation of an inborn nature. It is defiled 
 and corrupted and filled with all manner of unrighteousness 
 by its own free personal inaction or positive action. 
 
 There can be no doubt that many of those who plead for 
 original guilt identify it in their thought with this self-superin¬ 
 duced depravity; and knowing the guilt of such a state they 
 attribute it, under the general name of original sin, to the nature 
 
Punishment. 
 
 259 
 
 which we inherit A more radical and conspicuous error can 
 scarcely be conceived. The nature has a tendency. The will 
 creates the fruitage. 11 Lust when it is permitted to conceive 
 bringeth forth sin "—guilt. No child of man was ever born in 
 this state; every child of man is born with a tendency to it; it 
 is reached only by personal consent and coaction. 
 
 Can the tendency to sin be resisted ? If not, then abnormalcy 
 must issue in actual sin. But nothing that is a necessary result 
 can be sin. Sin is not only of the will, but it is of the will in 
 freedom. Indeed, there is no proper will act where freedom 
 does not exist. This point will be fully developed when we 
 come to consider redemptive helps. To suppose the native 
 tendencies to sin irresistible, and then to assume that they are 
 inherited, leaves all born in such a condition already damned 
 -—with their birth, and before their sin, and not on account 
 of it. 
 
 Does the fact of a fallen nature modify the guilt of those who 
 become actual transgressors under its inheritance? That the 
 fallen nature, and all the evil environment which encompasses 
 life in a fallen world, will be taken into account in determining 
 the measure of guilt of any and every fallen soul cannot be ques¬ 
 tioned. God will judge righteously. Any sin has in it the 
 essence of all sin, but there are degrees of turpitude. Nothing 
 is more certain than that under the government of God no soul 
 of man will have less than perfectly fair dealing. No soul will 
 be held as guilty that is not itself guilty; no disabilities, not 
 self-superinduced, will be laid to its charge. If there are miti¬ 
 gating circumstances they will not fail to be valued at their full 
 worth. Infinite love, which differs nothing from infinite justice 
 regulated by unerring wisdom, holds the balance. There will 
 be no mistake; nothing of mitigating circumstance left out, 
 nothing of overweening severity permitted. The hand that, 
 holds the scale is the Father’s hand, tempered by the added 
 
260 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 intercessions of a Redeemer's tenderness. But guilt is guilt, and 
 neither love nor mercy can change it. 
 
 On this subject—that of race depravity, inherited tendencies 
 to sin—before finally dismissing it, we have this one thing fur¬ 
 ther to say: 
 
 It is not an unforeseen accident. The plan which included 
 it was adopted with perfect foresight. It was fully provided for 
 by a prearranged scheme of redemption. The misfortunes that 
 have overtaken the race under it are more than compensated. 
 Evils have arisen, and evils will remain, but they are such as 
 are incident to any moral system, under any possible regula¬ 
 tions ; we may rest assured that they are the very least that 
 would have occurred under any possible moral system, and the 
 benefits are the greatest that could be secured by any system. 
 This we are constrained to believe if we retain the belief that 
 God is infinite in goodness. The two propositions stand or fall 
 together. 
 
 A question arises, Are there no circumstances in which pun¬ 
 ishment for sins may be remitted? Does divine justice inex¬ 
 orably require the forfeit in all cases ? Or may circumstances 
 exist in which justice will accept less than its claim, or be con¬ 
 tent with something else than punishment ? 
 
 There are two very dissimilar theories which answer these 
 questions in precisely the same manner, namely, that justice, in 
 all cases of sin, necessitates punishment—is inexorable, unap¬ 
 peasable. 
 
 The first we shall examine is put forth by a school of Uni- 
 versalists. It holds that pardon is an unknown and impossible 
 fact; that law and penalty are so reciprocal that the violation 
 contains the punishment, as cause contains effect—that they 
 are absolutely inseparable; that in the moral, precisely as in 
 the natural, the law carries its retributions with it, which can 
 no more be arrested or turned aside than the burn, when the 
 
Punishment. 
 
 261 
 
 hand is inserted in the blaze—strangulation, when the body is 
 submerged in water. They deny permanent or perpetual pen¬ 
 alty as cruel and unmeaning, but hold that it will always re¬ 
 main until it has exhausted itself; it will never be lifted or 
 remitted. Each sin has its exact retribution, which follows it 
 as the shadow the substance; but as the sin is limited so the 
 punishment is, and will end as a term of imprisonment does. 
 The sinner may emerge from punishment, but not until it has 
 had its last farthing. It is as when a man lacerates himself— 
 the act of laceration is the sin, the laceration is the punishment, 
 which terminates when the wound heals. Some who entertain 
 this theory of punishment suppose that all sin is punished dur¬ 
 ing this life. Others suppose that some punishments will extend 
 into the next world, and may indefinitely be extended by the 
 continuance of sin, but ultimately the spirit of disobedience 
 must be broken—sin cannot longer maintain the fruitless strug¬ 
 gle against law, and the last sin and punishment will expire 
 together, and so evil will disappear from the universe. Those 
 holding this theory do not necessarily ignore Christ as a Sav¬ 
 iour. They allow that in a certain sense he saves, not, indeed, 
 from the punishment due to sins already committed, by remis¬ 
 sion of the penalty, but nevertheless he does save by winning 
 the sinner from his sinful practices, and so stopping the river 
 of his sin stops the river of his possible punishment. 
 
 We cannot deny that this is a beautiful philosophy, or, 
 rather, speculation, but we are at a loss to ascertain how it is 
 called a Christian scheme. It certainlv is the furthest removed 
 
 t/ 
 
 from the teachings of Christ. Its faults are manifold. Claim¬ 
 ing to be beneficent, it expunges mercy from the nature of God ; 
 claiming to be Christian, it denies both the word and work of 
 Christ; as a philosophy, it is incognizant of some and contra- 
 dictive of other most important facts ; as a theology, it is pagan 
 
 rather than Christian; it has no place for a distinction between 
 
 6 
 
262 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 mistakes and sins, injuries and punishments. Boasting of its 
 salvation, it in fact has neither salvation nor Saviour. Its 
 God is not the God of revelation; its Christ is a travesty of 
 Jesus of Nazareth ; as for the Holy Ghost, “ it has not so much 
 as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost; ” the repentance 
 of which the Bible makes so much is vain, its promised pardon 
 impossible, its new birth a delusion and a snare. 
 
 The second is the view held by Calvinists; namely, that all 
 sins are either punished in the person of the transgressor or in 
 the person of Christ, the vicarious substitute of the elect. This 
 theory agrees with the one already examined only in the one 
 point of the inevitability of punishment. We will reserve its 
 examination until we come to discuss theories of the atonement. 
 
 Standing over against the idea that every sin must inevitably 
 be punished is the theory that no sin need be punished, that it is 
 matter of mere prerogative with God whether he will punish or 
 pardon, whether he will vindicate law or be indifferent to it. 
 It wholly denies the need of atonement on the one hand or 
 punishment on the other. It may or may not admit the justice 
 of penal sanction to the divine law, but asserts the right in God 
 to vacate such sanctions on mere prerogative; that there is 
 nothing either in his nature or relations to being that obliges 
 him to punish. In the ultimate the theory is equivalent of de¬ 
 nying the view that there should be any distinction in the treat¬ 
 ment of obedience and disobedience—any difference in the re¬ 
 sult between sin and holiness. The idea subverts the divine 
 government. Under it God has no law, only advice; maintains 
 no authority, manifests no moral character. If he punish occa¬ 
 sionally he becomes capricious, partial, and unjust; if not at 
 all he indicates indifference to ethical distinctions. 
 
 He not only surrenders right to obedience, but in the act of 
 abdication of authority declares that he has no ethical nature, 
 that he knows no difference between good and evil, and will 
 
Punishment. 
 
 263 
 
 treat them in no different manner; for if he forbear to punish 
 sin on prerogative what distinction is possible between it and 
 holiness? There is no distinction in the treatment, for that 
 were punishment, which is denied to exist; the disobedient and 
 obedient to all appearance are regarded alike. There can be no 
 difference in the feeling toward them, or the exact similarity of 
 the treatment is dissimulation, falsehood, hypocrisy, duplicity. 
 To suppose either the possibility that God should feel toward 
 wrong as he does toward right, toward sin as he does toward 
 holiness, or that he should treat one as he does the other in the 
 ultimate, is to asperse his nature, to debase his throne, and re¬ 
 move the only bulwarks from the universe. The idea finally 
 vacates all moral distinctions, reduces holiness and sin to unity, 
 practically if not theoretically, and abolishes the distinction be¬ 
 tween angels and fiends. By all the reasons we have for sup¬ 
 posing God to be holy and to love holiness we are compelled to 
 believe that he must feel, and express in his sovereign action, 
 an eternal hatred against sin, an eternal love of righteousness. 
 His love no less than his justice, his whole ethical nature, pro¬ 
 tests against the idea that he should be either indifferent or re¬ 
 miss in the punishment of sin; and the entire moral universe, 
 both from nature and interest, joins in the protest, since not to 
 punish the evildoer is a premium on crime; is to leave all being 
 unprotected and a prey. The caprice which gives up punish¬ 
 ment in order to vacate hell, while it looks like an amiable com¬ 
 passion, in fact is an atrocious cruelty, which turns the whole 
 universe into a hell and vacates heaven itself. The mercy 
 which lets the culprit go encourages his crime and opens a flood 
 of curse which whelms all beings. 
 
 There is a modification of this view which has much more 
 the semblance of truth. It recognizes the justice of punish¬ 
 ment and the absolute necessity that it should be exerted in 
 every case of obstinate sin, but supposes repentance a suf- 
 
204 
 
 Studies if Theology. 
 
 ficient reason for pardon. The sole office of punishment is 
 to work repentance, and when that is achieved its function 
 ceases, justice demands nothing more, love demands respite. 
 It must be admitted that most of the objections which bear 
 against the former view are obviated by this, but it may not 
 therefore be inferred that it is true. It may be admitted that 
 the whole system of chastisements—semipenal sufferings con¬ 
 sequent upon sin during probation—is designed to induce re¬ 
 pentance, but it does not follow that repentance is the sole suf¬ 
 ficient ground for pardon. It may be a necessary means to an 
 end, and at the same time not be the adequate means, and it does 
 not appear that it is always and under all circumstances effectual. 
 
 If by repentance is meant simply regret of an act because of 
 actual or prospective penal suffering on account of it, then 
 repentance must necessarily supervene in every case, since no 
 being likes to suffer, or fails to regret an act which superin¬ 
 duces suffering. The theory, with this definition of repentance, 
 would vacate punishment, not only in some instances, but in¬ 
 variably ; in effect it would abrogate or make void all penal 
 sanctions. Under it there would be but a feeble protest, and 
 no protection whatever against sin. 
 
 If repentance means something much more radical than this, 
 as a thorough sense of the guilt of sin, a hearty and sincere 
 renunciation of it, a recoil of the sinner’s heart against it, deep 
 and honest sorrow for its commission, a longing after pardon 
 and reconciliation to God—a radical reaction of the soul from 
 wrong to right, we are not prepared to say that such a repent¬ 
 ance would not secure pardon, nor are we certain that it would 
 under all circumstances; we think it could; but there are grave 
 difficulties in the way of either a positive or negative answer, 
 and the supposition that it would does not by any means show 
 that repentance is the chief ground of pardon, as will appear on 
 reflection. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 265 
 
 Those who assert that it would not, among whom are all our 
 standards, take the ground chiefly because the idea seems to 
 weaken, if not entirely do away with the need of atonement. In 
 this we think they are mistaken. They answer to it also that 
 the deepest and most thorough repentance does not do away with 
 the fact of the sin and with its desert of punishment; that a 
 life of the most perfect holiness and a heart of the purest love 
 do not obliterate the fact of a misdeed; that the justice which 
 claims perfect obedience cannot be defrauded of its claim by an 
 imperfect obedience, supplemented with sorrow, however deep, 
 and reformation, however thorough; that the one sin must be 
 answered for according to the letter of the law. Most of these 
 allegations are indubitable; but of some of them we confess 
 doubt. That the ends of justice would necessarily be defrauded 
 in such a case we are not clear, nor are we clear that they w'ould 
 not. The only ends of justice are the security of rights and the 
 good of being, and the manifestation of the divine nature toward 
 sin—the punishment of sin, or the remission of punishment, 
 must be subordinate to these ends. What might be possible is 
 known only to the Infinite. 
 
 There is a view of justice much more rigorous than this, 
 which holds that its demand is penalty, that it considers noth¬ 
 ing but its claim to suffering. We reject it. 
 
 Nothing is plainer than that he will forego suffering, will 
 pardon—remit punishment—and this without wrong to justice ; 
 and the condition is repentance and faith in an atonement, We 
 shall see what that atonement is by and by. 
 
 No man knows that sin can be forgiven without the atone¬ 
 ment. And no man knows that if a true repentance were pos¬ 
 sible without an atonement sin might not be pardoned. What 
 is recorded is that there is an atonement, without which there 
 is no forgiveness, but through which there is forgiveness to the 
 
 penitent and believing. Now the atonement satisfies the claim 
 18 6 
 
266 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 of justice otherwise than by working repentance in the hearts 
 of men has been a matter of much perplexing discussion ; but 
 that it does become effective by working repentance, and in a 
 way that is contentful to justice, will appear in the progress of 
 * the discussion. 
 
 The real answer, as we think, in the above case—the case 
 supposed—is one which neither exists nor can exist without the 
 intervention of help, and that help comes, in fact, only through 
 an atonement. Whether it might have come in another way 
 we are not informed. We are distinctly informed that sin 
 cuts off the soul from the fountain of all spiritual life and 
 leaves it dead, and so leaves it helpless in itself, and that 
 help comes to it only because of and through the atonement. 
 This is enough. We have neither right nor competency to 
 ■determine what might have been. It is revealed to us that 
 through the atonement we may repent, and if we repent we 
 shall be pardoned. This is God’s method of saving men from 
 the power and punishment of sin. 
 
 In attempting a solution of the problem of pardon under the 
 divine government a careful discrimination must be made 
 between the two departments of natural and moral government 
 —departments extremely distinct, but only intimately con¬ 
 nected and inseparably interblended. Examination will show 
 that while in the one there is possibility neither of sin nor par¬ 
 don, in the other there is room for both. The failure to make 
 the distinction has greatlv confused the thinking of manv wise 
 and generally sound investigators. 
 
 The department of nature is carried forward by the operation 
 of certain definite, invariable, and necessitating forces acting 
 in accordance with these laws. They are the appointment of 
 God; but, except in the case of providential intervention, are 
 never interfered with—they stand fast forever. If one of these 
 laws be transgressed an answering retributive blow immediately 
 
Punishment. 
 
 267 
 
 follows, and inevitably. These effects are called punishments; 
 but the least reflection will show that in many cases the word 
 implies nothing of the nature of moral retribution—has nothing 
 of the nature of punishment for moral fault, since the blow fol¬ 
 lows unintended and accidental transgression precisely in the 
 same manner as willful violation. The laws reigning: in and 
 
 o o 
 
 over nature know no moral distinctions—go forward to their 
 end wholly irrespective of moral causes. It is a government 
 administered wholly irrespective of moral exigencies. Under 
 it precisely the same thing happens to the evil and the good. 
 Its “ sun rises alike upon the just and the unjust; ” its earth¬ 
 quakes and storms and pestilences ravage alike the habitations 
 of the righteous and the wicked—except in extraordinary cases 
 which occasionally arise along the ages for great moral pur¬ 
 poses. It knows nothing of pardon. Its blow inexorably 
 falls alike upon the evil and the good, the penitent and the 
 obdurate. 
 
 It includes moral beings, but is not administered over them 
 as moral, but only so far as they exist in the plane of the 
 natural, and in that plane it considers no moral questions; for 
 there are none. Every moral being belongs also to the depart¬ 
 ment of nature, and exists within the sphere of natural law so 
 far forth as he is invested with a nature. If, as a nature, he 
 comes into collision with natural law, he comes under its 
 effects, and they are not suspended or modified because of bis 
 exalted moral worth. And when morally he violates a natural 
 law, as when he knowingly sins as to his nature Or any other 
 nature, the natural effect will inevitably follow, even after 
 tbe sin as to its proper punishment is forgiven; thus showing 
 that the effect which follows in the nature is not properly penal, 
 though a sin was committed. The same act against nature 
 which in one would be sin, because a known and willful viola¬ 
 tion of a natural law, would not be sin in another who did not 
 
268 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 know or feel the obligation of the law. The natural deed 
 would be the same in both cases, but the moral deed would not 
 be the same. But in both cases precisely the same natural 
 effects would follow, showing that the effect is not moral retri¬ 
 bution, but merely effect under natural law. 
 
 But there is a moral department in which retributive forces 
 operate wholly along moral lines, and whose movements are 
 determined wholly by moral causes, and never spring from nat¬ 
 ural causes. The retributive blow is evoked by the criminal 
 action of a will and emanates from the direct action of an aveng¬ 
 ing will, and not from a natural law. Here the retribution is 
 purely moral and penal in its cause and source. Let us see 
 how this is and that it is. 
 
 A moral being is one who knows his law, and in knowing it 
 knows himself to be free in regard to its obedience or disobedi¬ 
 ence, and who for some cause feels himself to be under obliga¬ 
 tion to keep it. 
 
 As natural and as moral two classes of effect may follow— 
 effects natural and moral. He exists under the two laws, and 
 often these are both operative in the same act, or resultant of 
 the same act. Let us illustrate: The law of his nature requires 
 that he should be temperate in his habits, the moral law makes 
 the same requisition. If he shall violate this law, ignorantly or 
 knowingly, one no more than the other, the effect in his nature 
 must inevitably follow—loss of health, impaired power, prema¬ 
 ture death. These are nature’s consequences, administered by 
 the inevitable operation of necessary forces. But suppose the 
 violation to have been knowingly perpetrated in resistance to 
 the demand of conscience and of God, now there arises another 
 and altogether different fact—a fact of guilt, ill desert, not 
 known to natural law, but wholly within the sphere of the 
 moral—a fact which calls forth, not simply impaired health, etc., 
 but the displeasure of God, and adds the sense of this as spe- 
 
Punishment. 
 
 2 GO 
 
 cific punishment for the fault of will or for the moral fault. 
 This fact of the displeasure of God with the act as criminal 
 transgression was not at all expressed in the effects produced 
 in the natural plane, since, as we have seen, those effects tran¬ 
 spire whether there has been moral fault or not; but this fact of 
 displeasure is possible only where there has been moral fault, 
 and has regard only to that The evil to the nature resulted 
 from the physical act of intemperance, and nature is the avenger 
 in her own realm. The deeper evil that is in the will trans¬ 
 gresses a higher law, and God is the avenger by direct punish¬ 
 ment—a punishment which is only possible when there is such 
 a fault of will, and which he declares consists in personal ban¬ 
 ishment of the transgressor from his presence, or consignment 
 to remorse and anguish. 
 
 The sin act consists in the willful disobedience of the moral 
 law, but as the moral law enjoins the observance voluntarily of 
 the natural law the sin act violates also the natural law. The 
 natural law was ordered for the good of being, and when ob¬ 
 served the good of being is subserved, and this is so whether 
 the observance be voluntary or involuntary, and vice versa , the 
 infraction harms the good of being, and so whether voluntary 
 or involuntary. 
 
 Its observance is enjoined, therefore, as moral duty. To 
 neglect the injunction is sin, and the effect is harm, and it was 
 to prevent the effect that the injunction was made; herein is 
 the reason of the law to prevent harm. Now, the evil which 
 the law prohibits is not the punishment which is enacted to 
 prevent its violation; for that there is another punishment 
 superadded by the lawgiver; let no one imagine, therefore, 
 that the natural effects of sin, which denote the evil it is in it¬ 
 self, are the same as its judicial punishment. 
 
 When a sin has been conceived in the mind it becomes sub¬ 
 ject to the treatment of law. The law, laying its imperative on 
 
 6 
 
270 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 the will in its inmost momenta is violated in the intent to vio¬ 
 late its commands. The intent is violation, is injury of the 
 rights of sovereignty, and is injury of the moral nature of the 
 subject—is sin against its law. It harms the person from within, 
 marring his purity, and it evokes harm from without, calling 
 forth retribution. When sin has been translated into action 
 against law it effects harm objectively, for, so far as it is external 
 act, it hurts the person or other beings; it is hurt and can 
 never cease to have been hurt; no power can annihilate that 
 fact; but that hurt, whether subjective or objective, whether 
 of the sinner himself or other being, is no part of the proper 
 punishment of sin; but it is that in part, if not in whole, for 
 which the punishment is due, is of the substance of the wrong 
 if not the entirety of it—that to prevent which punishment was 
 instituted. This will explain why it is that sufferings here in 
 this life are not punishment, and why it is that where sin is 
 pardoned the sufferings which they occasion do not cease. 
 The pardoned drunkard does not recover his health or avert 
 the death his dissipation has superinduced; they remain after 
 his punishment has been remitted. The evil effects of objec¬ 
 tive sin are in nature and inevitable—they are operated by nat¬ 
 ural law and cannot be averted; they are for reformatory uses: 
 showing sin to be an evil, but there is a much more serious evil 
 threatened, but delayed. 
 
 The physical evil and moral wretchedness which follow upon 
 our sinful conduct, but really as consequent to our constitution 
 and relations, are not strictly of the nature of punishment, 
 though such is a very common view. That sin brings misery 
 is in the order of the divine constitution of things. It is not 
 clear that there could be such a constitution of moral beings 
 that suffering would not follow upon sin. Indeed, the contrary 
 is manifest But what so follows as a natural result, though in 
 
 an order of things divinely constituted, is not strictly penal. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 271 
 
 Sucli naturally consequent evil may have in the divine plan an 
 important ministry in the economy of moral government. But 
 punishment strictly is a divine infliction of penalty upon sin in 
 the order of a judicial administration. 
 
 Following all the evils that sin inflicts, both upon the sinner 
 himself and upon the good of other beings, is the judgment, 
 when he must give account of these—when their evil will appear 
 and when his punishment proper will begin. The degradation 
 and shame and sorrows of sin accompanying its performance, so 
 far from having been its punishment proper, will be in part the 
 very things which will be to be punished. This is the uniform 
 teaching of the Scriptures, which locate punishment beyond the 
 judgment and in eternity-—it is banishment from God and the 
 misery of personal remorse. It is not a suffering included in 
 nature, inflicted by the operation of natural law; but is a suf¬ 
 fering emanating from eternal sovereignty for a fault of will—for 
 essential wickedness—committed during probation and never 
 repented of. Rebukes of conscience and the distresses which 
 flow into the consciousness sequent upon sin, like physical suf¬ 
 fering during probation, must be included among premonitory 
 chidings whose end is reform rather than judicial inflictions. 
 They hint what punishment will be ; a great element of their 
 poignancy is their keenness of warning, their apprehension of 
 certain and coming doom. Nothing is more conspicuous in 
 consciousness than the feeling that punishment is something 
 awaiting us in the future or beyond death. The ominous finger 
 keeps ever pointing to that mysterious realm, and the secret 
 voice is “ not now but forever.” We are kept constantly aware 
 that we must face our deeds, secret and public—that an inquest 
 will come—that justice will hold the balance, and that a dread¬ 
 ful blow will follow crime. Revelation joins conscience and 
 thunders the warning on every page—tells us of longsuffering 
 patience now, but of terrible retribution after a w T hile. One’s 
 
272 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 blood almost curdles when he reads the dreadful precursive 
 words, “Then shall the Son of man sit upon the throne of his 
 glory,” with the graphic delineation of a final judgment found 
 in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew’s gospel. It may be 
 ventured that there is no single fact more universally and unin- 
 termittingly characteristic of human consciousness than this 
 spontaneous feeling of accountability following this life. The 
 grave acquires its terrors almost wholly from this apprehension. 
 Few are restrained from deeds of evil from any fear of conse¬ 
 quences that are limited to this life, where the temptation is 
 strong and opportunities of concealment supposed to be good. 
 But all, unless utterly blinded and hardened, dread that inward 
 monitor, “Yet thou shalt answer.” Conscience reechoes and 
 gives emphasis to the appalling words. Through the open 
 grave the inward eye beholds approaching vengeance. It is in 
 vain that we attempt to lay the frightful apparition—we cannot. 
 Nor is it a horror of uncertainty as to what the retribution will 
 be. Much is hidden ; but one thing is plain—it looms upon us 
 like a pharos from some far-off dismal shore; we behold it, a 
 signal of warning; it tells of danger, of a storm of wrath which 
 awaits us, a punishment that will burst upon us in fury, dark¬ 
 ening and desolating our immortality. Such is the doctrine of 
 punishment disclosed in human consciousness when unper¬ 
 verted, and such is the doctrine found in the sacred page. 
 “The wages of sin is death”—separation from the loving pres¬ 
 ence and fellowship of Grod. The tribunal at which answer is 
 to be made, and from which sentence is to be pronounced, and 
 retributive penalties to be executed, we locate beyond mundane 
 time. There can be no reasonable doubt that this harmony of 
 the divine teachings in the book of his revelations and in the 
 constitution of his moral creature point to a fact. That fact is 
 that the present life is a probationary period, in which there 
 
 are premonitory reproofs designed to convert and cure our 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 2 73 
 
 tendencies to evil, and that final account awaits ns, when dne 
 punishment will be inflicted. 
 
 Now, the question is, May these penalties be averted, or will 
 moral law go to its mark even as natural law does? We have 
 seen that natural law is inexorable ; that it admits of no excuse; 
 that it never for any reason turns aside from its mark; that 
 the transgression and its evil effect are eternally united—the 
 one concomitant of the other; the flame must burn, the pon¬ 
 derous wheel grind to powder whatever comes in its way; that 
 here forgiveness is absolutely unknown. Is it so in the moral 
 as well ? Some so teach. Surely the Scriptures are filled with 
 the contrary idea. If there is anything made plain it is that, 
 while moral fault is the greatest of all, in fact, the only, and 
 while possible consequences here are the most grave and tre¬ 
 mendous, involving the entire being in curse and ruin for eter¬ 
 nity, yet that there is a possibility of pardon—not a pardon 
 that will annul the natural effects of sin, but a pardon that will 
 bring to an end the moral effects. God, in the administration 
 of the moral, will forgive; in the administration of nature he 
 will not. There is a reason for the difference—why nature will 
 not relent We do not forget that God is the author of nature— 
 that nature is but a mode of his operation. We mean, there¬ 
 fore, only this, that there is a reason why God in nature is 
 uniform; why he does not turn back upon himself to interfere 
 with the established order; to prevent evil resulting from it 
 would be to annul established order. To suspend gravitation 
 whenever it would hurt, or any other agency whenever it might 
 harm, would be to take away the quality of uniformity, or, in 
 effect, abolish an order of nature entirely. The benefits of an 
 established and permanent order are too obvious to need de¬ 
 fense. 
 
 It is essentially important to a morally responsible being 
 that he should be in a system whose order is permanent, that he 
 
274 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 may be able to know with certainty wbat will be tbe effects of 
 his conduct; that he may thus know the importance of obe¬ 
 dience to law; in no other way can he do this. He must learn 
 the good of obedience by feeling and seeing the evil of diso¬ 
 bedience. He must have assured data upon which to proceed. 
 If nature turned aside at every whim of his he could have no 
 certainty of moral distinctions. There would be no difference 
 between wisdom and folly, justice and injustice, truth and false¬ 
 hood. Nature gives emphasis to them. By thus being able to 
 know the effects of his conduct because of the permanence of 
 the laws that determine them he is enabled to know what is 
 good and what is evil, what will harm and what will benefit, 
 and, therefore, to feel the imperative of moral law when it com¬ 
 mands the good. Thus, too, he is enabled to see the good and 
 evil in himself—to feel the sense of approval when he chooses 
 the good, and the sense of guilt when he chooses the evil, and 
 to understand the justice of punishment when he transgresses 
 law. How else could he possess a moral character ? That is, a 
 character for which he is responsible, a personal character. 
 
 For these will acts, which make him an agent subordinating 
 known and uniform forces with freedom and with a knowledge 
 of the result, he is held to account. They visibly determine 
 whether he is good or evil, and determine how a just and benef¬ 
 icent sovereign shall regard and treat him. 
 
 Is there the same reason for invariability of result in the 
 moral department ? When guilt has accrued by breach of law 
 : must the effect follow here as there ? So we would conclude; 
 but we see in fact that there is a difference in several respects. 
 First, the effect does not, as in the former case, immediately fol¬ 
 low, and never obviously, in fact, follow during this life. This 
 difference is sufficient to give rise to the supposition that pos¬ 
 sibly the principle of the administration may be different; since 
 
 the penalty is not an inseparable concomitant of the offense 
 6 
 
Punishment. 275 
 
 gives rise to tlie idea that it may possibly not occur at all or be 
 in some way averted. "V\ T hat is thus suggested as possible we 
 find the Scriptures abundantly teach is actual, in that they show 
 that the moral penalty of sin may be remitted even when the 
 natural effect is not prevented; in other words, the sin itself 
 may be pardoned, its proper penalty restrained, though its tem¬ 
 porary evils may not be hindered. 
 
 Xor does this imply any more uncertainty or looseness in the 
 administration of moral than natural law. It supposes a differ¬ 
 ent principle, but not a less fixed and inexorable end. In 
 the natural realm, effects immediately and inevitably follow 
 their causes. In the moral realm the effect of the divine dis¬ 
 pleasure immediately and inevitably follows sin; but the final 
 penal blow that results from the displeasure is suspended until 
 judgment or until probation is ended; and it is a fixed prin¬ 
 ciple of the administration that during that interval, for reasons 
 which will appear further on, on certain defined conditions, the 
 suspended penalty may be averted—may never transpire; and 
 yet the validity and authority of moral law not be surrendered. 
 The principle demonstrates that moral law is not administered 
 mechanically, as natural law is, and the reason of the differ¬ 
 ence is found in the essential difference of the subjects; nor 
 does the difference imply anything of indeterminateness or 
 looseness or uncertainty in the law or administration. In the 
 first case the lawgiver finds no sufficient reason for variability 
 or delay—sees it best that effects should immediately and uni¬ 
 formly follow their causes without interference under most cir¬ 
 cumstances ; in the other case he sees that gravest interests 
 would be subserved by the enactment of laws the administra¬ 
 tion of whose penalties should not be mechanical or corporate 
 and immediate, but should be delayed, and on certain conditions 
 be relaxed or remitted entirely-—he determining what the con¬ 
 ditions shall be. They must be such, however, as will not dis- 
 
 6 
 
 
276 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 honor his character by connivance at disobedience; such as will 
 not imply indifference to the sanctity of law; such as will not 
 undermine the authority of his government; such as will not 
 peril the rights or interests of any of his creatures; such as will 
 be in consonance with highest wisdom, love, and jnstice, and 
 such as will subserve the best interests of his universe. If such 
 conditions may exist he may extend pardon. That such condi¬ 
 tions do exist is one proof, in that he publishes to his human 
 children that he will “forgive iniquity, transgression, and sin.” 
 What the principles of mercy are, and what the grounds, will 
 appear as we advance. 
 
 Growing out of the universal consciousness of sin and the in¬ 
 eradicable belief that sin deserves punishment, and the appre¬ 
 hension of danger which conscience keeps alive in every human 
 breast, and the feeling of need of pardon and reconciliation 
 with God—a feeling which is either permanent or occasional 
 with every human being, and the abiding sense of helplessness 
 which we find within us, the question is as old as man and as 
 widespread, “What must I do to be saved? ” It is impossible 
 to escape it. Only the most abandoned can make light of it. 
 Their levity is at once the fruit of their extreme moral debase¬ 
 ment and the proof of their imminent peril. That there should 
 be honest difference in the answer is not surprising. 
 
 The Scriptures undertake to answer the question. In them 
 Christ is set forth as the Saviour of men. Some on one ground 
 and some on another decline to accept the answer. Among those 
 who admit the authority of the revelation there emerges a dif¬ 
 ference of understanding as to what the teaching is. They do 
 not differ so much as to the fact that Christ is therein set forth 
 as a Saviour, or as to the fact that he is in some true sense a 
 Saviour, as upon the question in what sense he saves and how 
 he saves. 
 
 There are many theories if we make each slight difference de- 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 277 
 
 note a theory. If we group under one theory all these varieties 
 which have a fundamental unity, there are but three, one of 
 which takes the name of the moral influence theory; the other 
 two the common name of atonement theories, which are respect¬ 
 ively called the satisfaction and the governmental theories. Un¬ 
 der some one of these three all theories which in any way ascribe 
 salvation to Christ may be classed. 
 
 Dr. Miley says, after a very careful analysis, and we think he 
 is correct, “ In a strict and scientific sense there are but two the¬ 
 ories of atonement. We have seen how many in popular enu¬ 
 meration are reducible to the one theory of moral influence. 
 Others are so void of essential facts that they hold no rightful 
 place as theories. Nor is the scheme of moral influence in any 
 strict sense a theory of atonement, because it neither answers to 
 the real necessity in the case nor admits an objective ground of 
 forgiveness in the mediation of Christ. 
 
 “ Nor can there be more than two theories. This limita¬ 
 tion is determined by the law of necessary difference between 
 the necessity for an atonement and the nature of the atone¬ 
 ment for answering to that necessity. This fact we have, that 
 the vicarious sufferings of Christ are an objective ground of 
 the divine forgiveness. There is a necessity for such a ground. 
 His sufferings are an atonement only as they answer to this 
 necessity. Hence the nature of the atonement is determined 
 by the nature of its necessity. Now, this necessity must be 
 either (1) in the requirements of an absolute justice which must 
 punish sin, or (2) in the rectoral office of justice as an obliga¬ 
 tion to conserve the interests of moral government. There 
 can be no other necessity for an atonement as an objective 
 ground of forgiveness. Nor does any scheme of a real atone¬ 
 ment in Christ either represent or imply another. Thus there 
 is room for two theories, but only two. There is place for a 
 theory of absolute substitution, according to which the re- 
 
278 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 demptive sufferings of Christ were strictly penal, and the ful¬ 
 fillment of an absolute obligation of justice in the punishment 
 of sin. This is the theory of satisfaction, and answers to a 
 necessity in the first sense given. There is also place for a 
 theory of conditional substitution, according to which the re¬ 
 demptive sufferings of Christ were not the punishment of sin, 
 but such a substitute for the rectoral office of penalty as renders 
 forgiveness, on proper conditions, consistent with the require¬ 
 ments of moral government. This answers to a necessity in 
 the second sense given, and accords with the deeper principles 
 of the governmental theory. The truth of atonement must be 
 with the one or the other of these theories.”* 
 
 "We shall best systematize the discussion by first giving at¬ 
 tention to the moral influence theory. Strictly speaking this is 
 not a theory of atonement. It is rather an account of how men 
 become reconciled to God in a manner, through Christ, which 
 
 sets aside his atonement work. But because it is a theorv of 
 
 %/ 
 
 reconciliation and salvation by means of certain influences 
 which flow from Christ it has generally been ranked as a 
 theory of atonement. 
 
 The theory is held by theologians and semitheologians and 
 moralists of such views on correlated points that it will be 
 difficult to make a statement which would be acceptable to 
 the entire class. There is extreme difference among them as 
 to the nature of sin; how it affects the soul, the question of 
 regeneration, the person of Christ, the authority of revelation, 
 and, indeed, the entire circle of fundamental theological ideas 
 —some occupying the lowest plane of Socinianism and others 
 embracing many of the essentials of high orthodoxy. The 
 point of their agreement is thus put by Dr. Miley: “The me¬ 
 diation of Christ fulfills its redemptive offices in the economy 
 of human salvation through the influence of its own lessons 
 
 * Atonement in Christ, pp. 100, 101. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 279 
 
 and motives, as practically operative upon the soul and life 
 of men. Such is the office of his incarnation, if admitted; 
 of his example, teaching, miracles, suffering, death, resurrec¬ 
 tion, ascension. By the lessons of truth so given and en¬ 
 forced it is sought to enlighten men; to address to them 
 higher motives to a good life; to awaken love in grateful 
 response to the consecration of so worthy a life to their good; 
 to lead them to repentance and piety through the moral force 
 of such a manifestation of the love of God; to furnish them a 
 perfect example in the life of Christ, and through his personal 
 influence to transform them into his likeness.”* 
 
 Dr. A. A. Dodge thus puts it: “ The general view that the 
 great end of the death of Christ was to produce a moral im¬ 
 pression upon the hearts of sinners, and thus lead to their 
 moral and spiritual reformation, has been taught in various 
 forms by many successive teachers, and has been uniformly 
 rejected as a heresy by the Church.” Hagenbachf says that 
 “ Socinus defined the object of Christ’s death positively as fol¬ 
 lows : (1) The death of Christ was an example set before men 
 for their imitation. (2) It was designed to confirm the prom¬ 
 ises made by God, thus giving assurance of the forgiveness of 
 sins. (3) It was the necessary means, preparatory to his res¬ 
 urrection, by which he entered into glory. ‘ Christ died that 
 through death he might attain to resurrection, from which 
 arises the strongest confirmation of the divine will and the most 
 certain persuasion of our own resurrection and attainment to 
 eternal life.’ ” J Thus, according to Socinus, the designed 
 effect of Christ's death is wholly a subjective impression upon 
 the minds of sinners, to stimulate them to emulate his heroic 
 virtue; to prove and to illustrate the love of God and his will- 
 
 * Atonement in Christ, pp. 121-123 ; Professor Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ , 
 
 pp. 326-328. 
 f Vol. ii, p. 360. 
 
 t Cat. Racov., p. 265. 
 
 6 
 
230 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 ingness to forgive sin upon the repentance of the sinner; to 
 confirm the truth of all the doctrines he had taught and of the 
 promises which God had made through the prophets or through 
 himself; and by giving opportunity for his resurrection from 
 the dead to demonstrate the fact of a future life and to prove 
 and illustrate the future resurrection of his people. The mod¬ 
 ern theories of Jowett, Maurice, Bushnell, Young, etc., differ 
 from that of Socinus only in being rhetorical where his is logi¬ 
 cal, confused where his is clear, and narrow and partial where 
 his is comprehensive. The lines between truth and error with 
 regard to this central doctrine of the Gospel were already defi¬ 
 nitely drawn in the first half of the twelfth century, at the very 
 opening of the Scholastic era. As to the entire essence of the 
 doctrine, Anselm then stood precisely where the whole Church 
 of Christ in all its branches has ever since stood; and the famous 
 Abelard taught in every essential respect the doctrine main¬ 
 tained by Socinus, and by Maurice, Bushnell, and Young, in 
 our own day. Baur, as quoted by Hagenbach,* says : “ Thus 
 the two representatives of Scholasticism in its first period, when 
 it developed itself in all its youthful vigor, Anselm and Abelard, 
 were directly opposed to each other with respect to the doctrines 
 of redemption and atonement. The one considered the last 
 ground of it to be the divine justice, requiring an infinite 
 equivalent for the infinite guilt of sin ; that is, a necessity 
 founded in the nature of God. The other held it to be the 
 free grace of God, which, by kindling love in the breast of 
 man, blots out sin, and with sin its guilt.” 
 
 To the same effect Bushnell says: “The true and simple 
 account of his [Christ’s] sufferings is that he had such a heart 
 as would not suffer him to be turned away from us, and that 
 he suffered for us even as love must willingly suffer for its 
 enemy.”f “Vicarious sacrifice was in no way peculiar to 
 
 * Vol. ii, pp. 47, 48. f Vicarious Sacrifice , p. 108. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 281 
 
 Christ save in degree.”* “The Holy Spirit works in love, 
 as Christ did, and suffers all the incidents of love—compassion, 
 wounded feeling, sorrow, concern, burdened sympathy, violated 
 patience—taking men upon him, to bear them and their sins, 
 precisely as Christ himself did in his sacrifice.” f He “simply 
 came into the corporate state of evil [sum total of natural con¬ 
 sequences of sin], and bore it with us—faithful unto death for 
 our recovery.” ^ He “ came simply to be the manifested love of 
 God.” § “ Christ became incarnate to obtain moral power ” (that 
 which belongs to a developed character). “The understand¬ 
 ing is to obtain through him, and the facts and processes of 
 his life, a new kind of power, namely, moral power—the same 
 that is obtained by human conduct under human methods. It 
 will be divine power still, only it will not be attribute power. 
 That is the power of his idea [that is, original power, intrinsic 
 to the divine nature]. This new power is to be the power 
 culminative, gained by him among men as truly as they gain 
 it with each other. Only it will turn out in the end to be the 
 grandest, closest to feeling, most impressive, most soul-renovat¬ 
 ing, and spiritually sublime power that was ever obtained in 
 this or anv other world.” ;| 
 
 To the same effect, also, Young writes over and over again 
 in many passages exquisitely beautiful, and true also when 
 accepted as an expression of one side of the truth-—an ines¬ 
 timably precious side too: “ The infinite Father in boundless 
 pity looked down upon his undutifnl children, and yearned to 
 rescue them by regaining their hearts and drawing them back 
 to allegiance and to peace. With Godlike mercy he unveiled 
 all that was possible of divine purity, and truth, and beauty, 
 and sweetness, and lovingness, and compassion. He humbled 
 himself, descended to the level of his creatures, walked among 
 
 * Vicarious Sacrifice , p. 107. f Ibid., p. 74. % Ibid., p. 514. 
 
 %Ibid., p. 141. | Ibid., p. 18. 
 
 19 6 
 
282 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 them, spoke to them face to face, and appealed, as lie still 
 continues to appeal, to their hearts through the gentleness, the 
 tenderness, the wisdom, the meekness, the patience, the suffer¬ 
 ings, the tears, the blood, and the death of Jesus Christ. 
 
 “ The distinction here is radical and fundamental. The sac¬ 
 rifice was not offered up by men at all or by a substitute in 
 their room; and it was not required to appease God’s anger, 
 or to satisfy his justice, or to render him propitious. The sac¬ 
 rifice was not offered by men and for sin, in order that sin 
 might be forever put down and rooted out of human nature. 
 This stupendous act of divine sacrifice was God’s instrument 
 of reconciliation and redemption, God’s method of conquering 
 the human heart and of subduing a revolted world and attach¬ 
 ing it to his throne—pure love, self-sacrificing love, crucified, 
 dying love.” 
 
 This theory has much truth in it, and much greatly neglected 
 truth. It presents a view of the case which is both important 
 and greatly obscured in the generally prevailing expositions of 
 the subject. But it is certainly a defective view. It presents 
 only one class of the requirements of the case. It provides 
 for a part of the difficulties in the way of man’s deliverance 
 from sin, but wholly ignores another part. It shows how the 
 work of Christ is related to man, but utterly denies its relations 
 to God. It is a mode of saving from sinning, but not from 
 guilt of sins. It knows nothing of pardon. It denies that 
 there is any impediment in God’s nature or government to his 
 favorable treatment of the sinner if he will but cease sinning. 
 Christ’s only work is to reconcile the sinner to God, not God to 
 the sinner. The propitiation is of the sinner, not of resenting 
 holiness. Calvary pleads with man, not with God. 
 
 This defective view finds its great power in the highly ex¬ 
 aggerated and utterly impossible implications of the penal 
 atonement theory. It dwells on these, and makes them appear, 
 
Punishment. 
 
 283 
 
 as they really are, a revolting travesty of the divine character, 
 and by a natural law of mind as well as matter rebounds to 
 the opposite extreme. The theory it rejects locates the con¬ 
 spicuous if not all the impediments on God’s side, and so ren¬ 
 ders the atonement a method of placating God—a plan by 
 which to extinguish his wrath and render him willing to exert 
 his abundant power to save some or many or all. This it re¬ 
 gards, and justly so, as slanderous against his character, and in 
 direct contradiction of his word. The device by which the 
 placation is effected, the transfer of punishment which his 
 wrath demands to his own innocent Son, it sees to be mere 
 cruelty and high crime, and spurns it as atrocious. Stung with 
 resentment, it flies to the opposite extreme, and locates all the 
 impediments in the sinner himself, and sees in the atonement 
 no other function than to remove these, and so exhausts its 
 office in its subjective effects on the sinner’s mind. It is called 
 the moral influence theory. There is a bar to salvation which it 
 does not bring into the view, namely, the bar of public justice. 
 If the sinner is saved it must be on grounds which will make 
 his salvation not at the sacrifice of justice. A ground must 
 exist for it of sufficient merit to make it right, conservative of 
 public welfare to forgive. It is doubtful whether an agency 
 which will confine itself exclusively to reform will do that. If 
 it would be effectual in some cases it might weaken the impres¬ 
 sion of the evil of sin and impair the sacredness of law over 
 wide surfaces of mind. This the guardian of public welfare 
 could not do without injustice. It partakes of the same fault, 
 but in a much less degree, which was found to mar the theories 
 of optional forgiveness and forgiveness upon the assurance of 
 repentance; but it is much more supposable than the theory of 
 which it is a rebound. Mere reform under a just government 
 is not ground for pardon, however superinduced. There are 
 other parties interested and other rights to be considered be- 
 
284: 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 sides the administration and culprit subject, and righteousness 
 must respect those as much as these. It is not a mere question 
 what sympathy for the criminal will dictate or what love in 
 the sovereign will prompt. There is a question of justice which 
 cannot be set aside. Love in its deepest momenta includes it. 
 
 Arising in a system of theology so diverse from the orthodox 
 faith, and so antagonistic itself to the orthodox atonement, it 
 was inevitably polemic, and both defensively and offensively in 
 its methods. This naturally arose, in the first part, from the 
 fact that the Scriptures, in what seems their obvious sense, 
 positively affirm an objective atonement in Christ; and the 
 second part, from the fact that the doctrine of atonement then 
 most prevalent was open to serious valid objections, and espe¬ 
 cially to very plausible ones. 
 
 But little attempt was made to build up the new doctrine 
 on direct scriptural proofs. The main attempt was to set 
 aside the Scripture truth alleged in support of the Church doc¬ 
 trine. In its endeavor the new exegesis had little regard for 
 well-established laws of hermeneutics. It dealt freely in cap¬ 
 tious criticism, and in the most gratuitous and forced interpreta¬ 
 tions. The exigency of the case required such a method. 
 Scripture facts and utterances are so clear and emphatic in the 
 affirmation of an objective atonement in the mediation of Christ 
 as the only and necessary ground of forgiveness that the new 
 scheme found in such a method its only possible defense 
 against the crushing force. 
 
 Within the sphere of reason the new scheme was boldly of¬ 
 fensive in its method. Here it had more apparent strength, 
 and could be plausible even when not really potent. But any 
 real strength bore rather against a particular form of redemp¬ 
 tive doctrine than against the truth itself. The array of objec¬ 
 tions, wrought in all the vigor of rhetoric and passion, is nu¬ 
 gatory against the true doctrine. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 285 
 
 Beyond the ground of valid objection to the doctrine of sat¬ 
 isfaction Socinianism finds a sphere of plausible objection to 
 the atonement itself. A fluency of words, even with little 
 wealth or potency of thought, will easily declaim against its 
 unreason, its injustice, its aspersion of the divine goodness, its 
 implications of vindictiveness in God, its subversion of moral 
 distinctions and obligations. Yery gifted minds have given to 
 such declamation all possible force. It has the force of plausi¬ 
 bility in false assumptions and issues, but is impotent in the 
 light of truth.* 
 
 The ground of rejecting this theory is, not that it has no 
 truth in it, but that it is a fractional and distorted truth allied 
 with a fundamental and dangerous error. It is true that the 
 atonement is a scheme of love—that a large part of its effica¬ 
 ciousness in saving men is the influence of the teachings of 
 Jesus, and of his life of self-sacrifice drawing them away from 
 their sins. His doctrines, his pure and beautiful precepts, his 
 spotless example, his heroism, his moral elevation, his tran¬ 
 scendence in every respect, his unexampled love for humanity, 
 his brave defense of the truth, his courage even unto death, 
 the detestation kindled against his enemies, the indefinable 
 feeling that somehow he was superhuman, his gentleness, his 
 poverty, his identification with the lowly, his manger at the 
 beginning and his cross at the end of his earthly life—these 
 things have gone into the heart of the world, and have moved 
 and do move it with strange and mysterious power. It is true 
 that souls attracted solely by the charm of this wonderful life 
 to humble penitence and faith would be saved. It is true that 
 to this very end, to draw men unto him, Christ came into the 
 world ; that it is thus that he saves. It is no wonder that, 
 feeling the power of this great truth, and shocked at the trav¬ 
 esty of God contained in the prevailing creed, men were ready 
 
 * Atonement in Christ , pp. 123-125. 
 
286 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 to accept this as the true theory of atonement. It was and is 
 in these respects less objectionable than that which it rejected. 
 But, after all, it was but half a truth, and for that reason must 
 be rejected as a theory of the atonement. It utterly ignores 
 essential truths of the system. It is false in its negations to 
 the general tenor of revelation; false especially to all the piac- 
 ular terms, emptying them of their meaning; false generally to 
 the doctrine of sin; false, as a rule, in its Christology; false 
 in its entire view of the nature and necessity of the atonement 
 Specifically: (a) It gives no adequate view of justice in the 
 punishment of sin. (b) It fails to grasp the significance of the 
 death of Christ as an objective ground of atonement, doing 
 away with its necessity as a ground of forgiveness and reducing 
 it to simple martyrdom. ( c ) It robs him of his exclusive rank 
 as Saviour, and makes him but one of many saviours. ( d) It 
 necessarily retires a large part of revelation, or so explains it as 
 to do violence to all just rules of interpretation, (e) It is a philos¬ 
 ophy rather than a scriptural theology in a case in which reve¬ 
 lation alone is competent to speak. The result is that its tend¬ 
 ency is unfavorable to faith, and the truth that is in it, by 
 reason of negations and positive errors, is deprived of practi¬ 
 cal power. These are grave charges, but such as no one can 
 doubt who has studied the theory and noted its working. 
 
 It ought to be said, also, that the half truth that is in it, and 
 which it claims as peculiarly its own, is in no other sense pe¬ 
 culiar to it but in this, that in it the fragment is taken for the 
 whole. The true scriptural theory of atonement includes all 
 that is true and valuable in it, and adds those other rejected, 
 but essential truths, without which all virtue would go out of 
 the very truths which the imperfect theory contains. 
 
 But if, as we have seen, there are penalties against sin, and 
 
 if there is reason to believe that thev cannot be remitted on 
 
 %/ 
 
 mere prerogatives without impairing the integrity of the divine 
 
Punishment. 
 
 287 
 
 government, and, indeed, without a total abdication of bis 
 ethical nature, and all moral distinctions ; and, if for the same 
 and additional reasons they cannot be remitted on the ground 
 of any repentance or reformation the transgressor may effect 
 in himself; and, if any moral influences which may be exerted 
 on him helpful to his repentance and reformation must be in¬ 
 effectual to constitute an adequate ground of forgiveness; if, 
 in fact, there are hindrances, in either the nature of God or 
 his rectoral relations, which must be removed out of the way 
 before he can extend pardon to the guilty; and, if the Bible 
 makes constant reference to a redeeming scheme meeting these 
 needs, and setting forth the grounds and conditions of pardon 
 —if there is a Saviour and salvation, it becomes a most im¬ 
 portant question: What is that redeeming scheme, and what 
 are the conditions of that salvation? 
 
 It may not, indeed, be important to know the philosophy of 
 it; possibly there are mysteries in it we cannot fully compre¬ 
 hend ; but some things we need to know, and some things seem 
 to be plainly revealed. There is a scheme of salvation set up 
 in the Scriptures. No one can become acquainted with the 
 sacred writings without discovering this. It is also clear that 
 to become actual partakers of the benefits of that scheme we 
 need to know some of its cardinal facts and doctrines. 
 
 If it were an arrangement whereby salvation was procured 
 for us irrespective of any coaction of ours—salvation here or 
 hereafter; something which God has done, or is to do, which 
 will ultimately bring us out all right; if it had no relation to 
 our lives now, or relations of self-working processes; if we 
 were simply in some way to become recipients of it by some 
 kind of irresistible and sovereign grace, without reference to 
 our thinking or seeking, it might not then be important that 
 we should be concerned to know anything about it, or we 
 might be indifferent whether this or that theory is true; but 
 
288 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 if, on the contrary, it has been revealed because it is important 
 for us to have certain information about it; if there are certain 
 facts in it which are to have great practical influence on our 
 conduct as well as thinking; and if the salvation it brings is 
 conditional on our acceptance of it, then, indeed, it becomes 
 important that we should in some measure understand it. If 
 especially it is to be a practical power in the world, and the 
 measure of its power depends upon a right understanding of it 
 —if, as a truth, it is to influence and guide men—if it is to 
 build on the earth a divine kingdom by the force of its ideas, 
 then more than ever we need to know what it is. 
 
 It is not something that we are to excogitate from our inner 
 consciousness; it is not a human philosophy, it is a revelation. 
 It is God’s scheme for saving men. It is a divine plan for 
 bringing men back to himself. It is a way whereby pardon 
 may be offered to the guilty, whereby the depraved may be 
 restored to holiness, whereby the kingdom of God may be set 
 up in the earth, whereby sinners, even the whole race, may 
 attain to everlasting life—the atonement, the redemption, the 
 reconciliation—the salvation through Jesus Christ. 
 
 The fact that the Scriptures do constantly teach that men 
 may be saved from both the guilt and punishment of sin, and 
 that they as constantly represent that they are saved, if at all, 
 by the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, is accepted by all the 
 theories we are about to examine. 
 
 They differ, not as to the fact, but as to the theory—the 
 grounds and mode. If the matters in which they agree are 
 important, the matters in which they disagree are also of great 
 importance. 
 
 The first theory in the order in which we prepare to treat 
 these is known as the penal atonement or satisfaction theory. 
 
 It rests upon the assumption or postulate that the law 
 
 claims of punishment must be satisfied in atonement—that 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 289 
 
 punishment when due must be inflicted, and that, therefore, 
 Christ, in becoming the Redeemer of men from the pollution 
 and guilt of their sins, suffered the very penalty of the law 
 which was due them, and thus satisfied the penal demands of 
 justice. But as the law demands perpetual and perfect obedi¬ 
 ence the theory consistently holds yet further, not simply that 
 he suffered the identical penalty due the sins of his people, 
 but he also rendered a perfect obedience to the entire law 
 claim upon them, and thus completely satisfied or extinguished 
 the entire demands of justice in their case. The atonement 
 is thus a complete satisfaction to all the claims of justice. 
 
 That we may not seem to do injustice to the theory by 
 what might be considered a partisan statement or a forced 
 construction, we will give here a full and carefully prepared 
 statement of one of its most accredited and distinguished 
 expounders. This we do in preference to scrap quotations, 
 which, taken apart from their connections, often do injustice to 
 authors. 
 
 Dr. A. A. Hodge says: 
 
 “ The orthodox doctrine provides exhaustively for satisfying 
 all these conditions of redemption at once by the one act of the 
 Lord Jesus, in vicariously suffering the penalty of the broken 
 law as the substitute of his people. His motive was infinite 
 love. The precise thing he did was to suffer the penalty of 
 the law as the substitute of his people. His direct intention 
 was to satisfy justice in their behalf, and thus secure, on legal 
 terms, their salvation. In doing this he also necessarily satis¬ 
 fied the natural demand of the sinner’s conscience for expiation, 
 and subdued his sullen alienation, and removed his distrust of 
 God, by the supreme exhibition of divine love made on the 
 cross. At the same time, and by the same means, he gave to 
 the whole moral universe the highest conceivable demonstration 
 
 of God’s inexorable determination to punish all sin, just be- 
 
 6 
 
290 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 cause he did so punish it even in the person of his Son. 
 Prompted by the infinite love common to the Father and him¬ 
 self, he voluntarily assumed all of our legal responsibilities. 
 He obeyed and suffered as our substitute. His sufferings were 
 vicarious. It expiated the guilt of sin. It fulfilled the demands 
 of law. It propitiated justice. It reconciled us to God. It 
 actually secures our salvation , and does not simply put us in a 
 salvable state. According to the terms of the covenant of 
 grace the impetration of redemption by Christ is infallibly con¬ 
 nected with its application by the Holy Ghost. Not being the 
 payment of a pecuniary debt, which ipso facto liberates, but a 
 vicarious penal satisfaction, it remains, as far as we are con¬ 
 cerned, as a matter of right, in the hands of God to grant its 
 benefits to whom he pleases, when and on whatsoever terms 
 he pleases. His granting it in any case is an act of sovereign 
 grace. But since Christ acted by covenant, he has acquired by 
 his performance of the stipulated conditions a strictly legal title 
 to the salvation of all for whom he acted. As between God and 
 the Mediator, the claim in right is perfect. As between God 
 and the Mediator and sinful man, it is all free and amazing 
 grace. Being the actual execution in strict rigor of justice of 
 the unrelaxed penalty of the law in the person of the God-man, 
 it is the most impressive exhibition to the moral universe con¬ 
 ceivable of God’s inexorable determination to punish all sin. 
 
 11 The word 1 satisfaction ’ is neither ambiguous nor defective. 
 The Reformed Churches mean by its use that Christ fully satis¬ 
 fied all that the justice and law of God required on the part of 
 mankind as the condition of their being admitted to divine 
 favor and eternal happiness. As the demands of the law upon 
 sinful men are both preceptive and penal—the condition of life 
 being ‘ do this and live,’ while the penalty denounced upon dis¬ 
 obedience is, 1 the soul that sinneth, it shall die ’—it follows that 
 
 any work which shall fully satisfy the demands of the divine 
 6 
 
 
Punishment. 
 
 291 
 
 law in behalf of men must include that obedience which the law 
 demands as the condition of life, and that suffering which it de¬ 
 mands as the penalty of sin. 
 
 “ The difference between a penal and a pecuniary satisfaction. 
 These differ precisely as do crime and debt, things and persons, 
 and therefore the distinction is both obvious and important. 
 Many, who either are incapable of understanding the question, 
 are ignorant of its history, or who are unscrupulous as to the 
 manner in which they conduct controversy, are continually 
 charging our doctrine with the folly of representing the sacri¬ 
 fice of Christ as a purely commercial transaction, in which so 
 much was given for so much, and in which God was in such a 
 sense recompensed for his favors to us that, however much grat¬ 
 itude we may owe to Christ, we owe on this behalf none to God. 
 Long ago the doctrine of the Reformed Churches was unanswer¬ 
 ably vindicated from such puerile charges by all its most au¬ 
 thoritative expounders. 1 Here the twofold solution, concern¬ 
 ing which jurists treat, should be accurately distinguished. The 
 one which ipso facto liberates the debtor or criminal because 
 that very thing which was owed is paid, whether it was done by 
 the debtor or by another in his name. The other, which ipso 
 facto does not liberate, since not at all the very thing which was 
 owed, but an equivalent, is paid, which, although it does not 
 thoroughly and ipso facto discharge the obligation, yet having 
 been accepted—since it might have been refused-—is regarded 
 as a satisfaction. This distinction holds between a pecuniary 
 and a penal indebtedness. For in a pecuniary debt the payment 
 of the thing owed ipso facto liberates the debtor from all obli¬ 
 gations whatsoever, because here the point is not who pays , but 
 what is paid. Hence the creditor, the payment being accepted, 
 is never said to extend toward the debtor any indulgence or re¬ 
 mission, because he has received all that was owed him. But 
 the case is different with respect to a penal debt, because in 
 
292 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 this case the obligation respects the person as well as the thing; 
 the demand is upon th q person who pays as well as the thing 
 paid; that is, that the penalty should be suffered by the person 
 sinning; for as the law demands personal and proper obedience, 
 so it exacts personal enduring of the penalty. Therefore, in order 
 that a criminal should be absolved—a vicarious satisfaction be¬ 
 ing rendered by another hand—it is necessary that there should 
 intervene a sovereign act of the supreme lawgiver, which, with 
 respect to the law, is called relaxation, and with respect to the 
 debtor is called remission, because the personal endurance of 
 the penalty is remitted, and a vicarious endurance of it is ac¬ 
 cepted in its stead. Hence it clearly appears that in this work 
 [of redemption] remission and satisfaction are perfectly consist¬ 
 ent with each other, because there is satisfaction in the endur¬ 
 ance of the punishment which Christ bore, and there is remission 
 in the acceptance of a vicarious victim. The satisfaction respects 
 Christ, from whom God demanded the very same punishment, 
 as to kind of punishment, though not as to the degree nor as 
 to the nature of the sufferings which the law denounced upon 
 us. The remission respects believers, to whom God remits the 
 personal, while he admits the vicarious, punishment. And 
 thus appears the admirable reconciliation of justice and mercy 
 —justice which executes itself upon the sin, and mercy which is 
 exercised toward the sinner. Satisfaction is rendered to the 
 justice of God by the sponsor, and remission is granted to us by 
 God.’ * 
 
 “ Hence, pecuniary satisfaction differs from penal, thus: (a) 
 In debt, the demand terminates upon the thing due. In crime, 
 the legal demand for punishment is upon the person of the 
 criminal, (b) In debt, the demand is for the precise thing due— 
 the exact quid pro quo , and nothing else. In crime, the demand 
 is for that kind, degree, and duration of suffering which the 
 
 * Turretin, locus xiv, qugestio 10, §. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 293 
 
 law—that is, absolute and omniscient justice—demands in each 
 specific case, the person suffering and the sin to be expiated 
 both being considered, (c) In debt, the payment of the thing 
 due, by whomsoever it may be made, ipso facto liberates the 
 debtor, and instantly extinguishes all the claims of the creditor, 
 and his release of the debtor is no matter of grace. In crime, 
 a vicarious suffering of the penalty is admissible only at the ab¬ 
 solute discretion of the sovereign; remission is a matter of 
 grace; the rights acquired by the vicarious endurance of pen¬ 
 alty all accrue to the sponsor; and the claims of law upon the 
 sinner are not ipso facto dissolved by such a satisfaction, but re¬ 
 mission accrues to the designed beneficiaries only at such times 
 and on such conditions as have been determined by the will of 
 the sovereign or agreed upon between the sovereign and the 
 sponsor. 
 
 “ The significance of the term penalty , and the distinction between 
 calamities, chastisements, and penal evils. Calamities are suffer¬ 
 ings viewed without reference to any design or purpose in their 
 infliction, that is, suffering considered simply as suffering. Chas¬ 
 tisements are sufferings viewed as designed for the improvement 
 of those who experience them. When viewed as designed to 
 satisfy the claims of justice and law they are penal evils. The 
 sufferings of Christ were not mere objectless, characterless ca¬ 
 lamities. They could not have been chastisements designed for 
 his personal improvement. They must therefore have been 
 penal inflictions vicariously endured.* 
 
 “ Penalty is suffering exacted by the supreme lawmaking 
 power of the breakers of law. The penalty in case of any per¬ 
 son and in view of any crime is precisely that kind, degree, and 
 duration of suffering which the supreme lawmaking power de¬ 
 mands of that person under those conditions for that crime. Hu¬ 
 man law is necessarily generalized in an average adaptation to 
 
 * Dr. Charles Hodge. 
 
 6 
 
294 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 classes. But divine law, with infinite accuracy, adapts itself to 
 the absolute rights of each individual case of crime and punish¬ 
 ment, the penalty in each case fulfilling all righteousness, both 
 as respects the person punished and the crime for which it is 
 inflicted. We say that Christ suffered the very penalty of the 
 law, not because he suffered in the least the same kind, much 
 less the same degree of suffering as was penally due those for 
 whom he acted, because that is not at all necessary to the idea 
 of penalty. But we say that he suffered the very penalty of 
 the law, because he suffered in our stead; our sins were pun¬ 
 ished in strict rigor of justice in him ; the penal demands of the 
 law upon his people were extinguished, because his sufferings 
 sustained precisely the same legal relations that our sufferings 
 in person would have done; and because he suffered precisely 
 that kind, degree, and duration of suffering that absolute justice 
 demanded of his divine person, when found federally responsi¬ 
 ble for the guilt of all the sins of the elect. We believe that 
 while the sufferer is substituted the penalty, as penalty , though 
 never as suffering, is identical. We are willing to call it in 
 accommodation a 1 substituted penalty,’ though we believe the 
 phrase inaccurate. But the phrase insisted upon by the advo¬ 
 cates of the governmental atonement theory, namely, ‘a sub¬ 
 stitute for a penalty,’ we believe to be absurd. Sin is either 
 punished or not punished. The penalty is either executed or 
 remitted. Justice is either exercised or relaxed. There can 
 be no manifestation of penal righteousness without an exercise 
 of penal justice. 
 
 “ The meaning of the words substitution and vicarious. These 
 
 terms are admitted in a loose sense even by Socinians, and are 
 
 paraded by Young, Maurice, and Jowett, and very much in the 
 
 same loose, indifferent sense by Barnes and the advocates of the 
 
 governmental atonement theory generally. When these parties 
 
 say that Christ was substituted for us, and his sufferings are 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 295 
 
 vicarious, they mean nothing more than that he suffered in our 
 behalf for our benefit. We hold, on the other hand, that Christ 
 was in a strict and exact sense the substitute of his people; that 
 is, by divine appointment and of his own free will he assumed all 
 our legal responsibilities and thus assumed our law place, bind¬ 
 ing himself to do in our stead all that the law demanded of him 
 when he suffered the penalty due us and rendered the obedi¬ 
 ence upon which our well-being was made to depend. Vicari¬ 
 ous sufferings and obedience are penal inflictions, and acts of 
 obedience to law which are rendered in our place or stead [vice] 
 as well as in our behalf by our substitute. An alien goes to 
 the army in the place of a drafted subject. He is the substitute 
 of the man in whose place he goes. His labors, his dangers, his 
 wounds, and his death are vicarious. 
 
 “ The distinction between the terms expiation and propitiation. 
 Both these words represent the same Greek word, ikaoKsodai. 
 When construed, as it is constantly in the classics, with rov Qeov 
 or rovg Qeovg, it means to propitiate by sacrificial expiation. In 
 the Hew Testament it is construed with rag dfiapriag (Heb. ii, 17), 
 and is properly translated to expiate. Expiation removes the 
 reatus or guilt of sin. Reatus is that obligation to suffer the 
 penalty which is inherent in sin. Sanctification alone removes 
 the pollution of sin. Propitiation removes the judicial displeas¬ 
 ure of God. Expiation respects the bearing or effect which 
 satisfaction has upon sin or upon the sinner. Propitiation has 
 respect to the bearing or effect which satisfaction has upon 
 God. Sacrificial expiation among heathens, Jews, and Chris¬ 
 tians has always been regarded as a tru q poena vicaria ; it is of 
 the genus penalty ; its specific difference is vicariousness. Pro¬ 
 pitiation, as a theological term, means that peculiar method of 
 rendering placable which affects the heart of a Deity, who at 
 the same time hates the sin and is determined to punish it, yet 
 loves the sinner ; and which proceeds by means of expiation, 
 
296 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 or the vicarious suffering of the penalty by a substituted 
 victim. 
 
 u Impetration and Application. Arminians and the Calvinistic 
 advocates of a general atonement are constantly insisting upon 
 the distinction between the impetration and the application of 
 salvation by Christ. By impetration they mean the purchase, 
 or meritorious procurement by sacrifice, of all of those objec¬ 
 tive conditions of salvation which are offered to all men in the 
 Gospel; that is, salvation made available on the condition of 
 faith. By application they mean the actual application of that 
 salvation to individuals upon faith. The impetration they hold 
 to be general and indefinite; the application they believe to be 
 personal, definite, and limited to believers. The Reformed 
 Churches, on the other hand, teach that while the impetration 
 of salvation is both logically and chronologically distinguish¬ 
 able from its application, nevertheless in the eternal and im¬ 
 mutable design of God the impetration is personal and definite, 
 and includes certainly and meritoriously the subsequent appli¬ 
 cation to the persons intended ; for ‘ to all for whom Christ hath 
 purchased redemption he doth certainly and effectually apply and 
 communicate the same .’ 
 
 u Redemption and Atonement The modem advocates of a 
 general atonement distinguish between the words redemption 
 and atonement after this manner: Atonement they confine to 
 the impetration of the objective conditions of salvation, which 
 they maintain is general and indefinite. Redemption they use 
 in a wider sense as including the actual personal application in 
 addition to the general and all-sufficient impetration. Hence, 
 while they speak of a general atonement, they deny, of course, 
 that there is a general redemption. It must be carefully noted, 
 however, that this distinction was not marked by this usage of 
 the terms atonement and redemption by any of the controver¬ 
 sialists on either side of the question during the seventeenth cen- 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 297 
 
 tury, when the authoritative standards of the Reformed Churches 
 were written. Baxter used the word redemption as equivalent 
 to atonement in his work entitled Universal Redemption of 
 Mankind by the Lord Jesus Christ. So also the Arminian Dr. 
 Isaac Barrow, in his sermons entitled £ The Doctrine of Uni¬ 
 versal Redemption Asserted and Explained .’ In the West¬ 
 minster Confession, let it be remembered, the word redemption 
 is used in the sense of atonement, or the sacrificial purchase of 
 salvation for those for whom it was intended.* 
 
 “ There is, however, unquestionably a distinction to be care¬ 
 fully observed between these words in their biblical usage. 
 
 “ The precise biblical sense of atonement (D'HBS— Uaa\iof) is 
 the expiation of sin by means of a poena vicaria in order to 
 the propitiation of God. The biblical usage with respect to 
 redemption (anohvTpcooic;, etc.), is more comprehensive and less 
 definite. It signifies deliverance from loss or from ruin by the 
 payment for us of a ransom by our Substitute. Hence it may 
 signify the act of our Substitute in paying that ransom. Or it 
 may be used to express the completed deliverance itself, the 
 consummation of which is, of course, future. To say that 
 ‘ Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made 
 a curse for us ’ (Gal. iii, 13), is precisely equivalent to saying 
 that he has made atonement for us. But when we speak of 
 our £ redemption drawing nigh ’ (Luke xxi, 28), of 1 the redemp¬ 
 tion of the purchased possession ’ (Eph. i, 14), of £ the re¬ 
 demption of our body ’ (Rom. viii, 23), or of £ the day of re¬ 
 demption ’ (Eph. iv, 30), it is plain that the word signifies the 
 deliverance of our souls and bodies, and the attainment for us 
 of a heavenly inheritance by means of the payment of a ransom 
 for us by our Lord—a deliverance which, although commenced 
 now, will be consummated at a future day. Redemption being 
 
 * See Dr. Cunningham’s Historical Theology , vol. ii, p. 327, and Dr. Henry B. 
 
 Smith, in his edition of Hagenbach , vol. ii, pp. 356. 
 
 20 
 
 6 
 
298 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 deliverance by means of the substitution of a ransom, it follows 
 that, although the ransom can only be paid to God, and to him 
 only as the moral Governor of the universe, we may still be said 
 to be redeemed from all that we are delivered from by means 
 of the ransom paid in the sacrifice of Christ. Thus we are said 
 to be redeemed from our “ vain conversation ” (1 Pet. i, 18), 
 “from death” (Hos. xiii, 14), “from the devil” (Col. ii, 15; 
 Heb. ii, 14), from “ all iniquity ” (Tit. ii, 14), and “ from the 
 curse of the law ” (Gal. iii, 18, and iv, 5), while it is of course 
 not meant that the ransom is paid to the devil, or to sin, or to 
 death, or to the law. It is simply absurd to claim that these 
 different representations are inconsistent. A captive is re¬ 
 deemed by a i)rice paid only to him that holds him in bondage, 
 but by the same act may be redeemed from labor, from disease, 
 from death, from the persecution of his fellow-captives, and 
 irom a slavish disposition.* 
 
 Meritum and Satis/actio. Thomas Aquinas (1274) first signal¬ 
 ized the distinction between the terms meritum and satisfactio. 
 By satisfactio he intended the bearing of Christ’s work consid¬ 
 ered as penal suffering, which satisfies the penal claims of law 
 for the demerit of sin. By meritum he intended the bearing of 
 Christ’s work considered as a holy obedience, fulfilling all the 
 conditions of the original covenant of life upon which the 
 eternal well-being of his people were suspended. These are in 
 modern times both embraced under the one term satisfaction 
 (which see above), and the distinction intended by Aquinas is 
 now expressed by the terms active and passive obedience. The 
 whole earthly career of Christ, including his death, was obedi¬ 
 ence in one aspect and suffering in another. Inasmuch as it 
 was suffering, it expiated the sins of his people; inasmuch as 
 it was obedience, it merited for them the covenanted reward of 
 eternal life. 
 
 * See the closing paragraph of chap, xii, Governmental Theory. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 299 
 
 What is our doctrine of atonement? The answer to this 
 question is not so simple or unperplexed as many, at first 
 thought, would suppose. The Scripture terms of atonement 
 have, with all propriety, been in the freest use with us. Nor 
 have we been careful to shun the terminology of the strictest 
 doctrine of satisfaction. An inquiry for the ideas associated 
 with these terms in the popular thought of Methodism respect¬ 
 ing the nature of the atonement would probably bring no very 
 definite answer. In view of all the facts we are constrained to 
 think that the dominant idea has been that of a real and necessary 
 atonement in Christ, while the idea of its nature has been rather 
 indefinite. We are very sure that while the popular faith of 
 Methodism has utterly excluded the Socinian scheme it has not 
 been at one with the theory of satisfaction. 
 
 Our earlier written soteriology has, at least in part, a like 
 indefiniteness. It is always clear and pronounced on the fact 
 of an atonement, but not always exact or definite respecting its 
 nature. This, however, should be noted, that our written 
 soteriology contains comparatively but little directly on this 
 question. Indeed, we have not contributed much to the litera¬ 
 ture of the atonement; and most of the little contributed has 
 been given to the two questions of reality and extent, while 
 only the smaller part has been given to the nature or doctrine 
 of the atonement. 
 
 Mr. Watson has written more fully and formally on the 
 atonement than any other Methodist author.* We recognize 
 his superior ability as a theologian. This ability is not wanting 
 in his discussion of the atonement. But his strength is given 
 to the questions of its reality and extent. His discussion is 
 mainly a polemics with the Socinian scheme and with Calvin- 
 istic limitationists. With rare ability he maintains the fact of 
 an atonement against the one, and its universality against the 
 
 * Theological Institutes , vol. ii, chapters xix-xxix. 
 
300 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 others. But on the question of theories we cannot accord to 
 him any very fair discrimination. Grotius, as it appears, was 
 his chief authority, and next to him, Stillingfleet, who wrote 
 mainly in defense of Grotius.* But Grotius, while giving the 
 principles of a new theory, did not, as previously noted, give to 
 its construction scientific completeness. He wrote from the 
 standpoint of the reformed doctrine, but with such new princi¬ 
 ples as really constitute another doctrine. But, clear and deter¬ 
 mining as his principles are, he failed to give either theory in 
 scientific completeness. This is just what Mr. Watson has 
 failed to do. And he is less definite than Grotius himself. 
 
 He rejects the doctrine of satisfaction in its usual exposition, 
 and requires for its acceptance such modifications as it cannot 
 admit. He interprets satisfaction much in the manner of 
 Grotius, and hence in a sense which the reformed doctrine 
 must reject. And the doctrine which he arraigns and refutes 
 as the Antinomian atonement is the historic and current 
 Calvinian doctrine of satisfaction, with the formal rejection 
 of its Antinomian sequences. He is, therefore, not a satis¬ 
 faction^, f 
 
 The principles of moral government in which Mr. Watson 
 grounds the necessity for an atonement mainly determine for 
 him the governmental theory 4 The same is true of his dis¬ 
 cussion of the vinculum between the sufferings of Christ and 
 the forgiveness of sin.§ And when we add his broader views 
 in soteriology as including the universality of the atonement, 
 its strictly provisory character, and the real conditionality of its 
 saving grace—views necessarily belonging to all consistent 
 Arminian theology, and which Mr. Watson so fully maintained 
 —his principles require for him the governmental theory of 
 atonement And the more certainly is this so, as it is impos- 
 
 * Works, vol. iii, p. 227. f Theological Institutes , vol. ii, pp. 138-143. 
 
 | Ibid., pp. 87-102. § Ibid., pp. 143-145. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 301 
 
 sible to construct any new doctrine of a real atonement between 
 this and the satisfaction theory. 
 
 So far as we know Dr. Whedon has never given his theory 
 of atonement in the style of the governmental; yet it is in 
 principle the same. In his statement of the doctrines of Meth¬ 
 odism it is given thus: “Christ as truly died as a substitute 
 for the sinner as Damon could have died as a substitute for 
 Pythias. Yet to make the parallel complete Damon should so 
 die for Pythias as that, unless Pythias should accept the sub¬ 
 stitution of Damon in all its conditions, he should not receive 
 its benefits, and Damon’s death should be for him in vain; 
 Pythias may be as rightfully executed as if Damon had not 
 died. If the sinner accept not the atonement, but deny the 
 Lord that bought him, Christ has died for him in vain; he per¬ 
 ishes for whom Christ died. If the whole human race were to 
 reject the atonement, the atonement would be a demonstration 
 of the righteousness and goodness of God, but would be pro¬ 
 ductive of aggravation of human guilt rather than of salvation 
 from it. The imputation of the sin of man, or his punishment, 
 to Christ, is but a popular conception, justifiable, if understood 
 as only conceptual; just as we might say that Damon was pun¬ 
 ished instead of Pythias. In strictness of language and thought 
 neither crime, guilt, nor punishment is personally transferable.”* 
 
 Anyone at all familiar with theories of atonement will see 
 at a glance that the principles contained in this statement are 
 thoroughly exclusive of the satisfaction theory, and that they 
 have a true scientific position only with the rectoral theory. 
 The same is true of the doctrine, and with much fuller unfold¬ 
 ing, in the sermon to which reference is given. 
 
 On the theory of atonement we understand Dr. Raymond to 
 be with Dr. 'WTiedon, He gives the atonement thus: “The 
 
 * Bibliotheca Sacra , vol. xix, pp. 260, 261. Dr. Whedon gives the same views in 
 his very able sermon on “ Substitutional Atonement.” 
 
302 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 death of Christ is not a substituted penalty, but a substitute 
 for a penalty. The necessity of an atonement is not found in 
 the fact that the justice of God requires an invariable execution 
 of deserved penalty, but in the fact that the honor and glory 
 of God, and the welfare of his creatures, require that his essen¬ 
 tial and rectoral righteousness be adequately declared. The 
 death of Christ is exponential of divine justice, and is a satis¬ 
 faction in that sense, and not in the sense that it is, as of a 
 debt, the full and complete payment of all its demands.”* 
 
 The principles given in this passage exclude the satisfaction 
 atonement, and require as their only scientific position the 
 rectoral theory. All this is even more apparent when the 
 passage cited is interpreted in the light of the further refer¬ 
 ences given. 
 
 With this view Dr. Raymond’s doctrine of justification, as 
 that of every consistent Arminian, fully accords. It is not a 
 discharge of the sinner through the merited punishment of his 
 sin in his substitute, but an actual forgiveness, and such as can 
 issue only in the non execution of penalty, f 
 
 We would not place Dr. Raymond in any false light, nor 
 identify him with any theory which he discards. He does 
 discard the theory which represents the death of Christ simply 
 as a governmental display, and especially as implying that this 
 is only one of several possible expedients in atonement. While 
 fully maintaining the rectoral office of the atonement he re¬ 
 gards the death of Christ as also a manifestation of the right¬ 
 eousness of God4 But these two facts we think very closely, 
 indeed inseparably, united. Without the manifestation of the 
 divine righteousness the atonement in the death of Christ 
 could not fulfill its rectoral office. But it is not the govern¬ 
 mental theory, in any true statement of it, that is here criticised. 
 
 * Systematic Theology , vol. ii, pp. 257, 258. See also pp. 261, 264-268. 
 
 f Ibid., vol. ii, p. 258. $ Ibid ., vol. ii, p. 253. 
 
 6 
 
Punishment. 
 
 303 
 
 And on its own principles the theory requires the redemptive 
 mediation of Christ as the only adequate atonement. 
 
 The principles and office of the atonement in Christ, as 
 maintained by Dr. Bledsoe, agree with the governmental 
 theory. This will be clear to anyone who will read with 
 scientific discrimination his discussion of the question.* And 
 with Arminians he is, rightfully, a representative author on 
 questions of this kind. He had both the learning and the 
 ability for the discussion of Methodist doctrines. He gave to 
 them profound study, and had a deep insight into their philos¬ 
 ophy. The same is true respecting the atonement. He studied 
 it in the light of the Scriptures and in its scientific relations 
 to other cardinal doctrines of Wesleyan Arminianism. The 
 outcome is a doctrine intrinsically the same as we propound, 
 though not so styled. On the ground of such a doctrine it is 
 easy to answer the Socinian objections arrayed against the fact 
 of an atonement in the death of Christ; objections which the 
 theory of satisfaction never has answered, and never can. 
 
 The soteriology of Wesleyan Arminianism, taken as a 
 whole, excludes the satisfaction theory, and requires the gov¬ 
 ernmental as the only theory consistent with its doctrines. 
 The doctrines of soteriology, with the atonement included, 
 must admit of systemization, and be in scientific accord. If 
 not, there is error at some point, as no truth can be in discord 
 with any other truth.f How certain cardinal doctrines of the 
 Wesleyan soteriology are very conspicuous and entirely settled. 
 One is, that the atonement is only provisory in its character; 
 that it renders men salvable, but does not necessarily save them. 
 Another, and the consequence of the former, is the condition- 
 alitv of salvation. Hor is this such as Calvinism often asserts, 
 
 kJ 
 
 yet holds with the monergism of the system, but a real condi¬ 
 tionality in accord with the synergism of the truest Arminianism. 
 
 * Theodicy , pp. 276-293. f Governmental Theory , chap, i, 10. 
 
304 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 On these facts there is neither hesitation nor divergence in 
 Methodism. With these facts, the atonement of satisfaction 
 must be excluded from her svstem of doctrines, and the recto- 
 ral theory maintained as the only doctrine of a real atonement 
 agreeing with them. 
 
 Such has really been the position of Arminianism from the 
 beginning, though without exact or definite statement. It 
 never occupied the position of Lutheranism in maintaining a 
 doctrine of atonement which, with its universality, must save 
 all men, and which is disproved by the fact that many are not 
 saved. While the early Arminians never formally constructed 
 a doctrine of atonement in scientific accord with their system, 
 yet from the beginning they denied the leading facts of the 
 reformed soteriology so vitally connected with the atonement 
 of satisfaction. Thus they denied its limitation to an elect 
 part, that it is necessarily saving, that it includes its own appli¬ 
 cation, that saving faith is a resistless product of its sovereign 
 grace, that the application is in the full extent of the redemp¬ 
 tion.* Indeed, these questions were the chief issue in the 
 great polemics between the Arminians and the Calvinists. 
 Hence the former could not consistently hold the doctrine 
 maintained by the latter. 
 
 But if we object to the idea that justice will accept of noth¬ 
 ing but punishment—that the Infinite can in no case pardon— 
 much more do we object to substitutional punishment, as dis¬ 
 creditable to God, and impossible under a holy and just ad¬ 
 ministration. What is punishment ? Is it mere suffering in¬ 
 flicted, without respect to occasion or end? Certainly not 
 Just punishment, and it is of that alone that we speak, is suf¬ 
 fering inflicted upon a culprit for the willful violation of a 
 
 * Dr. Schaff, Creeds of Christendom , vol. i, pp. 516-518 ; Frederick Calder, 
 Memoirs of Episcopius, p. 474; Professor Smeaton, Apostles ’ Doctrine of Atone - 
 ment, pp. 537, 538. 
 
Punishment. 
 
 305 
 
 law which, he was obliged of right to obey. It has four in¬ 
 variable and essential conditions: First, that the law trans¬ 
 gressed be a righteous law; that is, that it be not oppressive and 
 that it enforce rights; second, that it has been knowingly and 
 freely transgressed ; third, that the party inflicting the punish¬ 
 ment has the right obligation to inflict it; fourth and finally, 
 that it be inflicted on the guilty. Any one of these wanting 
 there may be suffering, but there cannot be just punishment. 
 An innocent person may come into suffering either voluntarily, 
 as a consequence of the guilty act of another, or voluntarily 
 in the behalf of one who has committed crime. The innocent 
 cannot be punished by justice. The proposition that the in¬ 
 nocent may be justly punished contains as absolute a contra¬ 
 diction as can be uttered in language. It is impossible to 
 think of just punishment without crime; and it is impossible 
 to think of its being exerted upon any other than the culprit, 
 but most impossible of all to think of going away from the 
 culprit to find content in the infliction of its deadly blow 
 upon the most exalted worth or most immaculate holiness in 
 the universe. The case is not changed by alleging that it is 
 a device of love—that justice punishes the one innocent for 
 the sake of the many guilty. Both the love and the justice 
 become stained with foulest injustice. Not such is either the 
 love or justice of God. Those ineffable attributes, alike the 
 glory of the divine nature, and alike and forever the terror of 
 all sin, and the palladium of all innocence, were never more 
 vilely slandered than in the vain dream of substitutional pun¬ 
 ishment. 
 
 But it is said the supposition is not that punishment was 
 inflicted on the innocent. The substitute was punished be¬ 
 cause, in taking the law place of the guilty, he became guilty. 
 Some have been bold enough to assert that Christ was guilty 
 of all the sins of the whole world; others have been more 
 
306 
 
 Studies in Theology. 
 
 sparing, and have only indicted him for all the sins of the elect. 
 What does this mean? The divine declaration is positive, 
 that “ in him was no sin; ” that “ He was the brightness of the 
 Father’s glory, and the express image of his person; ” that in 
 heaven he is hailed and worshiped as the thrice holy; that 
 “he, the just, died for the unjust.” But it is said that he 
 consented to be accounted a sinner, and that God did so ac¬ 
 count him; but if in fact he was not a sinner on what princi¬ 
 ple could he so account himself ? How could God so account 
 him? Will he, the perfectly true and just, falsely accuse 
 himself? Will the Father falsely accuse him? Either sup¬ 
 position is to impute a sinful artifice to the Godhead, and so to 
 rob the whole Deity of the attribute of holiness. Either he is 
 a sinner or he is not. The Scriptures are plain, that he did no 
 sin—that he was the spotless lamb. To assume that he was 
 when God declares he was not is to make God a liar. To say 
 that God accuses him is to put God at war with himself. It 
 will not relieve the case to say that his sin was not his own, 
 for it is a contradiction to say it was his sin, but not his own 
 sin. It is no relief to say that it was so his sin, that he was 
 treated as if it had been his own sin, for this is but another 
 way of saying that infinite justice can treat an innocent per¬ 
 son just as if he was guilty; that is that infinite justice 
 might be infinite injustice at the same time that it made no 
 distinction between guilt and innocence. Human language is 
 incapable of a grosser absurdity. 
 
 There is but one way by which any being can be justly 
 accused of sin, and justly punished for sin, and that only way 
 is by sinning. To suppose that Christ in some way made 
 human sin his sin necessitates that he accepted it, and thus 
 made it, de facto , his own; but that supposition contradicts 
 the declaration that “ in him was no sin,” and also makes 
 it impossible that his punishment should be meritorious, 
 
Punishment. 
 
 307 
 
 since it would be punishment which he deserved for his 
 own sin. 
 
 But it is said, after all, the Scriptures declare that he was 
 punished, and this settles the question. This we deny, and 
 assert that they uniformly declare the very opposite. They 
 declare that he was guiltless, and they declare that the law— 
 justice—condemns only transgressors: that, therefore, the law 
 could not condemn him. They declare positively that in him 
 the Father was always well pleased; that when suffering his 
 greatest agonies it was not because of displeasure against him 
 that the Father loved him. We will go further, and say that 
 not only were his sufferings not because of any displeasure of 
 justice against him, but so neither were they because of the 
 displeasure of God against any transgressor or class of trans¬ 
 gressors ; they do not express displeasure. They were suffer¬ 
 ings of love and pity incurred, not as penal, but voluntarily 
 accepted from simple inspiration of love. 
 
 But these are not the only grounds for rejecting the idea 
 of substitutional punishment as a delusion and a snare; it must 
 be rejected as wholly inadmissible and false on other grounds 
 as well; on the general ground that it leads to a totally incor¬ 
 rect view of the nature and design of the atonement, and all 
 the doctrines cognate thereto. 
 
 Is it not the all-pervading doctrine of the Scriptures 
 that the atonement does not deliver us from exposedness to 
 punishment for our sins; that, notwithstanding it has been 
 made, we are still liable, and in case we do not repent will 
 actually suffer the penalty ? But how can this be if the pen¬ 
 alty has already been endured? Will justice demand the for¬ 
 feit the second time—have its pound of flesh of the surety and 
 debtor both ? The limited atonementist may and does answer 
 that all those on behalf of whom it was offered will infallibly 
 be saved, and the Universalist may consistently make the same 
 
308 
 
 Studies m Theology. 
 
 answer as of the whole, but how shall we escape? We hold 
 that those on behalf of whom the atonement was offered 
 may perish; that some of them certainly will. If the punish¬ 
 ment was visited on the surety, how can we explain the sec¬ 
 ond visitation ? Either the first met the demand or it did not 
 If it did justice can neither ask nor receive the second indem¬ 
 nity. There can be no escape from this. It will not answer 
 to reply that it was conditional A penal atonement cannot 
 be conditional. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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