. 1 829.] Review of Taylor and Hartley on human depravity. 343 Art. XL — Revikw of Taylor and Harvey ox Human De- r"T?ev, Jfb(PthyU%-vU. Concio ad THerum. A Sermon delivered in the Chapel of Yale Collegf. Sept. 10, 1828. By Nathamkl W. Taylor. A Review of a Sermon delivered in the Chapel of Yale College, Sept. 10. 1828; by Nathaniel W. Taylor, D. D. By Rev. Joseph Harvey,- Pastor of a church in Westchester, Conn. pp. 40. Hartford : 1828. The illustrious Edwards, early in life, recorded in his diary the remark, that " old men seldom have any advantage of new discoveries, because these are beside a way of thinking they have been so long used to :" and, to this remark, he subjoined the resolution, " if ever I live to years, I will be impartial to hear reasons of all pretended discoveries and receive them, if rational, how long soever I have been used to another way of thinking." The importance of the habit contemplated in this resolution, must be obvious to all men, who would not say " we are the people, and wisdom shall die with us." Nor is there less occasion for it in theological inquiries, than in other investigations. There are, indeed, truths in theology, as in physical science, which no person, who has once under- stood them, and in view of their proper evidence has beconie convinced of their certainty, can be supposed afterwards to doubt. The perfection and universal government of God,^ the spiritual and immutable obligation of his law, the entire sinfulness of unrenewed man, the deity and atonement of Christ, with other doctrines connected with these, are so clearly wrought into the christian system, are so powerfully" commended to the conscience, and are so essentially invol- ved in each other, that when they are once received as they are exhibited in the scriptures, they may be expected to- remain, with no hesitation or doubt, forever established in the mind. We accordingly find abundant historical evidence, that in respect to these, real christians from the first have had but one faith. But these doctrines have in all ages been accompanied with philosophical speculations, many of which have been clothed with the authority of first principles ; have been admitted without examination ; and have had na inconsiderable influence in corrupting the simplicity of the gospel. It is more especially in respect to these, that the Ijver of truth, after the example of Edwards, will hold him- self bound impartially to examine whatever doubts may be suggested as to their validity and correctness. Whatever we plainly see to come to us with the authority of " thus saith 344 Review of Taylor and Harvey [Junet, the Lord," we are to receive without a question of its truth. But whatever rests only on the basis of human reasoning, whether it professes to be an illustration of inspired declara- tions, or an inference from them, that, (however long and con- fidently we have been used to the adoption of it,) we may safely subject to rigid examination. It has been extensively asserted by able theological wri- ters that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity ; that atonement is made for none but the elect; and that mankind, previous to regeneration, have not sufficient power to exer- cise true repentance. These modifications of christian doc- trine are now extensively rejected ; and the testimony of the bible, concerning the peculiar relation of Adam to his pos- terity, the nature of the atonement, and the ability of men to obey the will of God, when stripped of the appendages which had veiled it, shines out with new splendor and power. That there are not still remaining in our system speculations as re- ally erroneous ; that a future generation will not detect, in the preaching which we call orthodox, a mixture of " phi- losophy falsely so called ;" that the river of the water of life flows perfectly pure from the sanctuaries of our God, and has all that restoring influence which it would have were it in no degree adulterated, is certainly not proved by the confidence which any one may have that it is so. We may incautiously have received, as we find that others greater and better than ourselves have received, human theories for divine revelation ; and whoever comes to us with any appearance of reason, to show in what particular we have done this, deserves our thanks, and is entitled to our careful and impartial attention. In regard to the main topic of the sermon now before us, however, the author, so far from pretending to inculcate any "new doctrine," insists that it is no other than the doc- trine of standard Calvinistic divines as maintained for centu- ries. Nor does he lay claim to a new discovery on any other point; although he does incidentally in the sermon, and more fully in a note, suggest reasons for questioning the truth of certain commonly received principles respecting the Divine government. Yet that busy rumor with her thousand tongues had gone abroad, spreading insinuations unfavorable to the or- thodoxy of Dr. Taylor in regard to the main doctrine of the ser- mon,the complection of it,in some of its parts,most clearly shows. And placed as he is at the head of one of our most important theological schools, and identifying his own character, in a considerable degree, with that of an Institution on which so many inestimable hopes depend, we do not wonder that he should have had deep sensibilities on this point. Still, if any 1829.] on Human Depravity. 345 representations which have been made, could have furnished a reasonable cause for suspicion respecting his real senti- ments on this doctrine, we are as little disposed to blame the sensibilities of others on that account, as we are to wonder at his own. We cannot imagine the guardians of our churches to be too scrupulous respecting a doctrine of this moment. Whether the sinfulness of our race is natural, or the result of circumstances merely, is a question of vital importance. It has a direct bearing upon the remedial system : and hence the decision of it which different men adopt, is found to give a distinctive character to their whole scheme of faith. Still we do think, that a public teacher under the responsibilities of Dr. Taylor, has no ordinary claim to christian candor; that floating rumors ought not to be taken up as the founda- tion of a serious charge ; that he may fairly ask to be heard before he is judged. We, therefore, heartily rejoice, that he has embraced the favorable opportunity given him of coming before the public on this subject; and we are equally gratifi- ed to find that Mr. Harvey, who remains unconvinced by the statements of Dr. Taylor, has brought forward his objections in a distinct and palpable form. Mutual explanations, we apprehend, will remove most of the difliculties which exist in Mr. Harvey's mind. At all events, a temperate and can- did discussion of the points at issue, will be productive of great good. Nothing can be more important to Calvinists at the present day, than to settle with entire precision the import of their statements respecting the nature of sin, and the ground of its certainty as a characteristic of our whole race. The use of ambiguous language on this subject, has been a prolific source of obloquy and error. There are thousands among us, who have the most monstrous and per- verted notions respecting the real faith of Calvinists, on these points. Prejudice has been hardened into animosity, and the soul has been steeled, in a multitude of instances, against conviction of sin and the pursuit of eternal life, by a fatal misconception of statements which were designed to lead it to God. The doctrine of man's entire depravity by nature, is so humbling to the human heart — so apt in itself io awaken opposition, and turn back the mind from the only path of safe- ty, that no unguarded statements should ever be interposed, to weaken the force with which this doctrine comes down on the consciences of men. Dr. Taylor has therefore, in our view, rendered an important service to the cause of evangel- ical truth, by pointing out some of these unguarded state- ments. And we cannot but think that Mr. Harvey, in re- peating those statements, and insisting that they constitute 14 346 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, an essential part of the doctrine in question, has completed the work which Dr. Taylor had begun, by holding them forth to the world in their naked character and inevitable re- sults. The text of Dr. Taylor's sermon is Ephesians ii. 3, '■^And were by nature children of wrath even as others." To be children of wrath, according to the author's explanation of the phrase, is " to possess the character which deserves pun- ishment; or, in other words, it is to be sinners, or to be en- tirely depraved in respect to moral character." From the text thus explained, Dr. Taylor derives the leading doctrine of his discourse, " that the entire moral depravity of mankind is by NATURE." In illustrating this position, he shows "first, in what the moral depravity of man consists, and secondly, that this is by nature." Under the first head he states, that " this moral depravity, for which man deserves the wrath of God, is man's own act, consisting in a free choice of some other ob- ject rather than God, as his chief good." Here Mr. Harvey joins issue with the preacher; and maintains that there is sin in the human heart which is not man's own act. " And here let it be kept in mind," he says, " that the question is not whether voluntary transgression is sin, or whether those who are capable of knowing the law of God, sin voluntarily, but whether there is no sin except such as consists in a man's own act."* In passing to consider this question, three things should be kept distinctly in view. First, that both parties mean by "sin," real guilt, or that which deserves punishment ; and not some c\Vi^\\Xy figuratively called sin, from its uniform- ly resulting in actual transgression. Dr. Taylor expressly con- fined his proposition to a " moral depravity which deserves the wrath of God." Mr. Harvey in controverting the state- ment, that this depravity " is man's own act," must of course be speaking of real guilt, or that which strictly deserves punishment. Secondly, both parties mean by the " sin" in question, not merely a negation — but something positive — an actually existing state of the human mnd. Such, throughout his whole discourse, is Dr. Taylor's meaning of the term ; and such too is Mr. Harvey's, for he represents the sin for which he contends, to be " the efficient and criminal cause of actual sin."f Nothing but a positive and existing cause, can be ei- ther efficjpnt or criminal. Thirdly, both parties agree that " guilt," " sin," " desert of punishment," belong strictly to a permanent agent alone. Mr. Harvey seems to imagine, in- deed, that Dr. Taylor considers a simple act of the will as * Page 7. t Page 28. 1 829.] on Human Depravity. 347 sinful, distinct from the agent who performs it. " This," he remarks, " would make every sinful act a separate accounta- ble agent, existing only for the moment when the action is passing." But Dr. Taylor is chargeable with no such ab- surdity as this. On the contrary, in laying down the propo- sition condemned by Mr. Harvey, he expressly says, " the question then still recurs, what is this moral depravity for which MAN deserves the wrath of God ? I answer, it is man's own act, etc." Such is the uniform tenor of his discourse — the AGENT is guilty for acting contrary to the demands of known duty. Such is the ordinary language of mankind on subjects of this nature. We say " the act is sinful," meaning that the agent who performs it, is guilty for doing the act ; and in the ordinary concerns of life, we should never expect a man to misunderstand language of this kind. With these explanations, we are brought at once to the point at issue as stated by Mr. Harvey himself, viz. " whether there is no sin except such as consists in a man's own act." If then a man is guilty of that which is not his own act, it is natural to inquire, o^ what is he thus guilty? Of the act of Adam in eating the forbidden fruit? This, we presume, Mr. Harvey will not say. Of the act of God in making him what he is, antecedent to, and independent of, his own actions ? This no one will venture to affirm. What then remains? He cannot be charged with guilt for what others have done, nor for the bare fact of being that which God has directly or indirectly made him. It must then be for acting, and for his "own act," too, that any moral being can possibly be considered as guilty. Such a b^ing can be regarded only in two points of view — the substance of the soul with its es- sential attributes on the one hand, and its actions on the other. If there is sin in the human mind previous to, and independent of those actions, the substance of the soul must itself be sinful. If sin can belong to any thing which has ne- ver acted, how can we be sure tliat inert matter may not be sinful too ? So clear is it that action of some kind is involved in the very idea of sin, that when we read the statement of Mr. Har- vey for the first time, we instantly concluded that some impor- tant word of the sentence had been omitted by an error of the press — that he intended to state the question thus, " whether there is no sin except such as consists in a man's own voluntary act." But we found, in the progress of his remarks, that the un- qualified statement which he had actually made, was demanded by the principles he maintains. Dr. Taylor's position that man's " nature is not itself smin\. and yet will certainly produce 348 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, sin and sin only," is rejected by Mr. Harvey as downright heresy. His fundamental principle is that nature is itself sinful — " the efficient and criminal cause of actual sin." But all agree that the nature of the human mind is distinct from, and antece- dent to, any of its acts. It is the nature of the human soul, for example, to perceive, to compare, and to judge. Take then, the first act of perception as it rises in the mind, and we have something totally distinct from the nature or constitution of the mind, which thus perceives. Mr. Harvey was correct therefore, in his statement of the point at issue ; for he men- tions unequivocally that "nature is sinful without the act or previous to it."* The question then returns upon him with redoubled force, how came that nature in the mind of man ? Ask the same question as to that nature which determines us to perceive, to compare, or to judge, and every one replies, " it was placed there by God himself." In fashioning the sub- stance of the soul. He framed it to be a thinking being, and thus stamped upon it an intellectual nature. Mr. Harvey must, therefore, permit us to say, that the statement, " nature is itself sin(u\,^^ is only a statement in other terms, that God, the author of nature, is the author of sin. We are far, indeed, from imagining that his mind ever assented, for a moment, to so dreadful a conclusion. But we are constrained to say, that he must either abandon his fundamental principle, or that he must not shrink from its "unavoidable consequences." But Mr. Harvey may retort the question upon us, and ask whence, upon our principles, does man derive his moral na- ture 1 We answer, without hesitation, from the hand of God who made him. By a moral nature we mean the power of choosing or refusing, in the view of motives, and with a knowledge of right and wrong. Such a nature every account- able being receives from the hand of his Creator. Angels use it aright in His service ; men uniformly abuse it to the purposes of rebellion. But in accounting for the certainty of this abuse, we are not to say that man's moral nature is itself sinful ; for no man, we think, can say this at the present day, without charging his sinful nature directly upon God, as its author. No one now believes that the soul of the child is propagated by the parent ; or that the human mind receives a taint from its connection with matter. Every soul, as it en- ters on existence, is a production of creative power. He who forms it, gives it from the first, that nature or constitution which prepares it for action, when placed in the appropriate circumstances of its being. And as well might we affirm that it is the nature of a stone to fall, and yet that God is not the * Page 25. 1829.] on Human Depravity. 349 author of gravitation, as that " nature is itself sinful," and yet that God is not the author of sin.* Whence then does it arise that Calvinistic writers, even at the present day, are occasionally betrayed into unguarded statements of this kind? Several reasons occur to us ; and the consideration of them, we think, may serve to disembar- rass the subject of much perplexity. The first is, the technical language of a theology which is now generally exploded. The statement of Mr. Harvey, that human nature is itself sinful, was, with few exceptions, the general statement of Calvinistic divines, until within the last sixty or seventy years. Such statements were founded entire- ly upon one principle, viz. ; that our whole race were in the view of God, one with Adam; and that his sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was the sin of each one of his descendants. This utter confusion of personal identity — this monstrous no- tion of sinning in the act of another, has now passed away; but the traces which it has left on the current phraseology of Calvinism, are yet too apparent. Educated in the use of lan- guage framed upon this hypothesis, there are many who still cling to it with a natural fondness, while they reject the doc- trine of imputation from which such language was derived. The old Calvinists were perfectly aware that the doctrine of a nature which is itself sinful, rendered them justly liable to the charge of making God the author of sin ; unless that sin- ful nature could be traced to Adam as its author, by consid- ering the whole race as one being with him, and as sinning in his first act of rebellion. It was to save them from this charge that the doctrine of imputation was devised ; and they never, we believe, would have dreamt that any of their followers could reject that doctrine, and yet retain their statement, in its literal import, that " nature is itself sinful." We cannot but think, therefore, that Mr. Harvey will find, on reviewing the subject, that he has been led, (not unnaturally, we acknow- ledge,) into the use of language which cannot be justified at the present day — that he will see there is no alternative, but either to go back to the doctrine of imputation ; or forward to the principle of Dr. Taylor, 'that human nature is not itself *If Mr. Harvey chooses to maintain that minds are propagated, and that sin is transmitted in general iim, it will only remove the difficulty one step farther back. For, we ask, who establislied the latcs of this propagation ? Can a be- ing come into existence, of which God is not the author ? Every soul, then,which becomes united to a human body, has either existed from eternity, or has been brought into existence by God. And every thing pertaining to such a soul, which is not its "own act," must of necessity result from the act of the v^'reator. 350 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, sinful, while yet there exists in that nature the ground of an entire certainty, that every moral act previous to regenera- tion, will be an act of sin.'* It would not indeed, be surprising, if some men should be found so wedded to the language of an obsolete philosophy, and so eager to justify their attacks on those who are more guarded in their statements, as even to revive, for a time, the doctrine of imputation, with all its absurdity and revolting consequences. We are very far, however, from imagining that Mr. Harvey believes that doctrine. It is a doctrine, in- deed, which no man, we are convinced, ever did, or ever can believe, in the real and practical sense of that term. The deceptions which a false philosophy sometimes practices on the strongest minds, are a striking exhibition of the weakness of human nature. Hume, for example, published to the world, and maintained by the most subtle reasoning, that there is no connection whatever between cause and effect. And yet Hume ate, drank, wrote, and carried on all the intercourse of life like other men ; on the constant presumption that causes would be followed by their appropriate effects. Berkley de- nied the existence of matter, and maintained his argument with an acuteness as Dugald Stewart remarks, which has made al- most every able metaphysician, at some period of his life, a convert to the doctrine. Yet Berkley always acted like other men ; and was indeed, rather distinguished for his care in guar- ding his own person against too rough a contact with the ideas around him. It is thus that a man's common sense sometimes overpowers his philosophy, and furnishes a standing evidence that he has never truly and practically believed in the specu- lations which deluded his judgment. The subject of person- al identity is attended with pecuLar difficulties of this kind. We may speculate upon it until all onr ideas of permanent and individual existence, fade from our view. In such ab- stractions, we may, as Edwards did, fancy that we be- lieve ourselves to have been one with Adam, — to have acted in his act, — to have united in his voluntary choice of rebell- ion against God — and thus to have corrupted our own nature in the act that corrupted his. Or we may reason ourselves into the notion, that there is some magic in the words " federal head," " representative," etc., which can make one moral be- * It is astonishing to what shifts men will resort to support the doctrine of imputation. A distinguished writer in the nineteenth century has taught as "the safest and most rational theory," that allsoulswere created at tlie begin- ning of the world, and that they remain in a quiescent state until the bodies which they are to inhabit arc formed ! ! 1829.] on Human Depravity. 351 ing truly guilty of the sin of another ; and render it not only right but necessary, that God should regard with indignation and punish with eternal wrath, beings who have never sinned in their own person. Yet, neither Edwards nor any other man, has ever truly felt, that he was guilty of Adam's sin. We may bewilder our minds with metaphysical speculations, but we cannot change the laws of our spiritual existence. He who made us distinct moral beings, with an intellect to under- stand, a will to choose, and a conscience to feel the sense of right and wrong, has made it impossible for that intellect, or will, or conscience to lose their individuality, or become blended with the being of another. We should, therefore, do great injustice to Mr. Harvey, in saying that he believes the doctrine of imputation. Yet he has been led by his prin- ciples, perhaps unconsciously to himself, to lay down that doc- trine in the broadest terms. "All actual sin," he says, " is vol- untary in him who commits it, and all native depravity was voluntary in the transgression o^ Adam, who acted as the repre- sentative of his race."* Our " native depravity" which is else- where pronounced by Mr. Harvey to be " criminal," is here ex- pressly madea part of" the transgression of Adam, "an act which took place nearly six thousand years before we came into exist- ence ! We are assured moreover, that this " native depravity was voluntary !" Whether Mr. Harvey, in saying this, adopts the the- ory of Edwards, that our personal identity was so blended with that of Adam, that we were voluntary in his act, as constituting one 6em^ with him, we cannot say. He may have adopted the other theory, which was rejected by Edwards, that moral charac- ter is transferable — that the criminality of a representative be- comes the criminality of his constituents, and that while Adam alone acted, and of course, was alone voluntary, all his race are literally deserving of punishment for what he did. We are inclined to believe, however, that Mr. Harvey, like thousands who have gone before him, used the language quoted above, without any very definite conceptions of its import. That profound theologian, the late President Dwight, was accus- tomed to caution his students in theology, against unguarded language as to the representative character of Adam. His views of this subject, as stated in his System of Theology, are expressed in these positions, " that by one man sin entered the world, and that in consequence of this event all men have sinned." These are plain scriptural statements, in which Dr. Taylor fully concurs. But when Mr. Harvey goes still farther, and in order to account for this " consequence," talks of a " na- tive depravity," which " was voluntary in the transgression of * Page 6.. 352 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, Adam, who acted as the representative of his race," he carries us back, at once, to the most revolting statement of the doctrine of imputation. Tt is surely worth while for him to inquire, whe- ther he has ever truly repented of this " depravity" which was not his " own act," but constituted part of " the transgression of Adam." And it is certainly time that modern Calvinists should free their statements on this subject, from a technical phraseology, which belies their real sentiments, and subjects them to the charge either of gross absurdity, or of making God the author of sin. The second reason for these unguarded statements, is the gratuitous assumption that the cause of a given effect, must have the same properties or attributes as the effect itself. A sinful act, it is said, can spring only from a smful cause or nature ; or, in the language of Mr. Harvey, " actual sin, then, if it be a certain and exclusive effect, must result from a cause which is sinful."* If this be so, it is an obvious inquiry, whence does this sinful cause or nature itself arise ? That too is an effect : it has not come into existence without a cause, and this cause, on the principle now stated, must like- wise be sinful. Thus, then, we have a sinful cause or na- ture in the heart of man, and a. preceding sinful cause of that sinful nature. What is this preceding cause ? The old Cal- vinists could reply, ' it was the first sin of Adam, reaching in its guilt to the extremities of the race, and corrupting the na- ture of each individual, in the act which corrupted our " federal head.' This, we presume, Mr. Harvey will hardly maintain, notwithstanding his unguarded language as cited above. We are sure, at least, that he can never truly believe repre- sentations of this kind. Whence, then, the question recurs, do we derive this sinful nature ? In all our inquiries on this subject, we must at last come back to God. Each soul as it enters on existence, receives its nature from Him ; and to affirm that this " nature is itself sinful," and that every cause partakes of the character of its effect, is not only to make God the author of sin, but to make Him sinful too ! ! We are aware, that Mr. Harvey has limited his remark to such effects as are " certain and exclusive." But a sin- ful nature is, in his view, " certain," for it constitutes a part of every human being. Whether he would pronounce it " exclusive," we can hardly say ; for we are not sure that we understand his meaning in the use of that term. But certain we are, that his limitation, whatever it may be, can avail him nothing. Here are two things which are connected together as cause and effect ; and the first, we will suppose, has the * Page 29. 1829.] on Human Depravity. 353 same qualities or properties as the second. Whence then, we ask, does this similarity arise? Two objects thus brought together, may be accidentally alike. But Mr. Harvey's prin- ciple, if it means any thing, means more than this. Are they alike, then, as cause and as effect ? Obviously they are so on the principle of Mr. Harvey. It is on this very relation and no- thing else, that he founds the resemblance in question. The consequent has the same properties with the antece- dent, because the one is an effect proceeding from the other as a cause. Take away this relation, and the similarity in question ceases to exist. It is on that relation alone that the resemblance is founded. If, then, a given cause uniformly produces only one effect, (which, we suppose, is what Mr. Harvey means by an "exclusive effect,") then that cause will have only one class of properties or qualities, residing within itself, and imparting a character to the effect produced. But if the cause in question produces two, three, or four different effects, then it must contain within itself, two, three, or four distinct kinds of properties, corresponding to the properties developed in those effects. This is intuitively certain, if the similarity in question results from the relation of cause and effect; and we have already seen that there is nothing else on which it can be founded. Mr. Harvey's limitation, there- fore, avails him nothing. If the principle assumed is true at all, every cause must contain within itself the properties of every effect which it produces. God the author of all things, must sum up within himself not only all the properties of the material universe, but likewise of man's sinful nature. For that nature not being " man's own act," must certainly be the result of creative power, unless a part of the human mind comes into existence without any cause at all. The only aP ternative is that God is sinful, or that effects may exist without a cause — a principle which lands us at once in atheism. It is, indeed, a striking proof of Mr. Harvey's loose mode of thinking on this subject, that he asserts, in direct terms, that " matter, animals and reptiles," " are not properly ef- fects ! .'"* If we supposed him actually to mean what he says, we should no longer doubt whether he could believe in the doctrine of imputation. But the truth is, that in penning this statement, he was thinking of God's " ultimate end" in creation, as an effect; when in fact it is simply an object aimed at — a result to be produced — and not properly an ef- fect at all, in the specific sense of that term. Misled by this Page 30, 45 354 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, erroneous phraseology, he denies that " matter, animals, and reptiles," are properly effects. "They are means," he says, " by which an effect is produced." But if these means are not, in Mr. Harvey's view, an effect of creative power, what evi- dence can he find, in the whole material universe, that there is a God ? But let us look for a moment longer at this principle, that "a certain and exclusive effect" must always have a cause, which contains the same properties as its own. Thinking is "a certain and exclusive effect" of man's intellectual nature. But is there any resemblance between an ad of thought, and that constitution of mind by which God enables us to think.? Pain is " a certain and exclusive effect" of applying fire to our bodily organs. But is there any siiffering in the ele- ment of fire ? The very examples adduced by Mr. Harvey, refute his principle. A certain plant or drug uniformly de- stroys life. Death, then, — a cessation of existence is the effect produced. But is there any property like death, or a cessation of existence, in the drug itself? No. But the death which follows, proves that the drug was poisonous. Exactly so. But poison is one thing, and a cessation of ex- istence is totally another. How, then, has Mr. Harvey, in common with many who have gone before him, been betrayed into the assertion of so strange a principle ? The solution is found in a passage which incidentally occurs on the twenty third page of his Review. "The word cause," he says, "may be used in much the same sense as origin or source; and in this sense it is used by those who speak of nature, or the heart, as the cause of sin." Now this is never the true or specific meaning of the term cause. A fountain is not the cause of the water which flows from it; nor is the light which fills the universe an effect of the sun, but simply a consequence of the diffusion of its beams. Neither the fountain nor the sun have produ- ced water or light, but have simply jwured them forth whea already brought into existence. In loose and popular dis- course, however, this confusion of terms does sometimes take place. Nor is it productive of any evil, when confined to subjects which demand no great precision of language. But the misfortune is, that Mr. Harvey should bring such loose- ness of statement into a subject of this kind ; and especially that he should derive from it a principle which proves so ut- terly erroneous, when applied to cause and effect in the pro- per sense of those terms. We go to a fountain and take from it a quantity of water; and we say that the properties of that fountain are the same with those of the water which has 1829.] on Human Depravity. ^355. thus been taken. The principle on which we pay so, is, that in a fluid of this kind, the whole is similar to its parts; not that a cause, whether " exclusive" or otherwise, has any re- semblance to its efTects. And we see from this example, why Mr. Harvey was compelled to limit his statement by the word " exclusive." In relation to a whole and hs parts, such a limi- tation is necessary. For if the fountain in question had, by some mechanical contrivance, poured forth wine at one open- ing and water at another, we could not infer its properties from those of the water alone. In other words, the "e^ec?," as Mr. Harvey erroneously terms it, must be "exclusive," or the principle does not apply. But we have already seen that no such limitation is necessary, or can exist in the case of a real cause and a real eft'ect. If there is any permanent ground of a similarity of properties between them, it is as cause and as effect that they are thus similar. Every cause would, on that supposition, contain within itself the properties of all its sev- eral effects ; and God, the cause of all things, would concen- trate in his own person the discordant properties of the whole universe. We see then how Mr. Harvey has been led into this error, A homogeneous whole has, indeed, the same properties with any one of its parts, and therefore the charac- ter of a fountain is known from its streams. But no such community of properties exists, between a cause and its effect : and the existence of a sinful act of choice does not, therefore, prove that the nature by which man is enabled thus to sin, is " if seZ/" sinful." This leads us to mention a third reason of the unguarded statements in question, viz. the ambiguous use of the words source, fountain, disposition, etc. when applied to moral action. By the term fountain, for example, we sometimes mean a body of water ; and sometimes a cavity of earth, mar- ble, or other substance in which that water is found. In other words, it denotes sometimes the thing contained, and some- times the container. It is only in the former sense that the qualities of a fountain are known from its streams: and there- fore it is in this sense only, that we speak, with propri- ety, of "a fountain of evil" in man, which imparts its charac- ter to his actions. This fountain, then, is not the soul itself, or its essential properties, because these are the container, and correspond to the marble or the earth. It is, therefore, the thing contained, and corresponds to the water. In other words, it is the desires and affections which fill the human soul ; or more exactly, it is that one leading desire, or govern- ing affection, which pervades them all, to which all are sub- servient, and from which all derive their character. This 350 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, governing affection corresponds to the water which consti- tutes the literal fountain ; and it is this governing affection, according to Dr. Taylor's sermon, which constitutes the moral man. This, he maintains, is entirely sinful from the commencement of moral agency, until God interposes by his immediate power to change this state of the affections, and to place them supremely on Himself. From this foun- tain all our external actions spring. This, on the one hand, is that " good treasure of a good heart" out of which a man " bringeth forth good things ;" and on the other, that " evil treasure of an evil heart" out of which a man " bringeth forth evil things." It is of this that our Savior says, " the tree is known by its fruit ;" and that St. James inquires, "doth a fountain send forth at the same place sweet water and bit- ter ?" And not only is this controlling affection or disposi- tion the source of external actions, but likewise, in general, of all those individual acts of choice, which are continually directed to the objects around us. The avaricious man, for example, chooses those objects which gratify his love of wealth ; the votary of ambition selects those pursuits which minister to his lust of power; the devotee of pleasure indulges his preference for low and debasing objects. While the forms in which this governing affection shows itself, are thus various, they all, previous to regeneration, amount to this, that selfish indulgence is the master principle of the soul — that the world in some shape, is the supreme object of affection and pursuit. This one principle leads the miser to toil for wealth, the ambitious man to struggle for distinction, the sensualist to grovel in lust, and each individual of our race, previous to regeneration, to live in one form or another, " without God in the world." And in all our estimates of moral character, we go back of the external action, and even of the immedi- ate volitions, to this comprehensive and controlling disposi- tion of the mind, from which they all spring. This is the fountain of good or evil. Now this governing affection of the soul, this predominant inclination to right or wrong, is a voluntary state of mind. We feel it to be so in every act of sin and of holiness. We know that we acted freely ; that we chose for ourselves at ev- ery step; and that no compulsion, no fatal necessity, over- ruled that choice. If our governing disposition were not thus voluntary, it could not have a moral character. It would be merely an instinct, like the blind propensities of the brute creation. "The temper of the mind," as Dr. Bellamy truly states, *' is nothing but the habitual inclination of the heart, but an 1829.] on Human Depravity. 357 involuntary inclination of the heart is a contradiction."* That this governing affection or disposition of the soul is sim- ply a settled choice or preference, is shown by an appeal to facts. What is revenge for instance? Not the mere instinc- tive sense of injury, which results from a consciousness that we are wronged. It is only when the ivill comes in and de- cides on retaliation, that the mind is in that state which we denominate revenge. What is pride ? Not the mere estima- tion of ourselves, but an undue preference of our own claims, when brought in competition with those of others. We might thus analyze all the evil dispositions which belong to the human heart, and show by an appeal to facts, that they are me >-eIy fixed states of choice or preference. No man, in the concerns of common life, ever supposed them to be any thing else , and it is only when he enters the region of metaphysics, that the mind of any one is bewildered on this subject. But let us hear Dr. Taylor on this point. And here we come to what I regard as the turning point of the whole controversy. So far as I know, the only argument in support of the opin- ion that sin pertains to something which is not preference, is based in a supposed decision of common sense. The decision claimed, is that all par- ticular or specific sins, as fraud, falsehood, injustice, unbelief, envy, pride, revenge, result from a wicked heart, — from a sinful disposition, as the cause or source of such sinful acts. To this fact, I yield unqualified as- sent, as " the dictate of the universal sense and reason of mankind," and by this universal judgment, I wish the present question to be decided. Let us then look at the fact in its full force and just application. There is a man then, whose course of life is wholly that of a worlding, his heart and hand sliut against human woe, living witiiout prayer, without grati- tude, unmindful of God, and rejecting the Saviour of men, devising all, purposing all, doing all, for the sake of this world. Why is it ? You say, and all say, and say right, it is owing to his love of the world — to his worldly disposition — to a heart set on the world. Now while all say this, and are right in saying it, we have one simple question to decide, viz. what do all mectn by it? Every child can answer. Every child knows that the meaning is, that this man does freely and voluntarily ^.r his affections on worldly good, in preference to God ; that the man has chosen the world as his chiif good, his portion, his God. He knows that tliis is what is meant by a worldly heart, a worldly disposition, which leads to all other sins. So when we ascribe the sins of the miser to his avarcious disposition, we mean his supreme love of money; or the crimes of the hero or conqueror to his ambitious disposition, we mean his supreme love of fame, a ^itate of mind which involves jjre/ercnce for its object, p. 12. We might ask too in this connection, what is it that sin- ners are called upon to do, when God addresses them, " make ye a clean heart?" Is any thing required but a voluntary * Works, Vol. I. p. 155. 358 Review of Taylor and Harvey [Jun'e, renunciation of the world, and a settled choice of God, as their supreme good ? If this does not constitute the change of dis- position enjoined, then that change is not dependc nt on the sinner's will, and is not, therefore, within his power. Dr. Bellamy, therefore, says correctly, that " this voluntary and stubborn aversion to God, and love to themselves, the world, and sin, is all that renders the immediate influences of the Holy Spirit so absolutely necessary, or indeed at all need- ful."* President Edwards in his Treatise on Religious Affec- tions, lays down the doctrine for which Dr. Taylor contends, as the basis of his whole system. " The affections," he says, " are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise."f In de- fining the nature of the will, he states it to be " the faculty by which the soul does not behold things as an indifferent unaf- fected spectator, but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This faculty is called by various names ; it is sometimes called the inclination. And as it has respect to the actions that are determined and govern- ed by it, it is called the will. And the mind with regard to the exercises of this faculty is often called the heart. ''^'!(. This is the fundamental principle of Edwards in his Treatise on the Will, and in all his reasonings upon sin and holiness. Ad- ditional authorities can hardly be necessary, but we shall in- troduce one passage from Dr. Woods of Andover, because it is remarkably explicit on this point. Speaking of man, he says, "The power of choosing right or wrong, makes him a moral agent. His actually choosing wrong, makes him a sinner."§ No language can affirm more strongly, that sin is entirely the result of choice; and of course that there is no- thing sinful in any disposition, except so far as that disposi- tion depends on choice or preference. Accordingly, he elsewhere says concerning " the natural appetites, affections, and passions," — " now I am as ready as Dr. Ware to affirm that these, considered as original properties of human nature, are not sinful, and imply no guilt." He then proceeds, after expanding these remarks, to say, " But if a man, in such a case, has a propensity or disposition to disregard the divine command, and to pursue the gratification of his own passions as his highest object, he has what I mean by a propensity or disposition to sin."|| " The passions" thus gratified, are plain- ly " the original properties of human nature" which Dr. * Works 1. 161. t Vol. IV. 13 American Edition, J Ibidem. 5 Remarks on Dr. Ware's Answer, p. 44. || Do. 47. 1829.] on Human Depravity. 359 Woods justly says "are not sinful, and imply no guilt." If, then, "the propensity or disposition''' to gratify them is sinful, that disposition can be nothing else than an exercise of the will of man, because " his actually choosing wrong," as Dr. Woods remarks, '■'■makes him a sinner." The sinful propensi- ty or disposition, therefore, for which Dr. Woods so properly contends in his controversy with Dr. Ware, is thus shown to be that " wicked heart" — that " governing affection or pre- dominant inclination of the mind" spoken of by Dr. Taylor above, as that "which leads to all other sins." "It is the preference or choice of man alone," according to both these distinguished theologians, which "makes him a sinner." How different from the doctrine of Mr. Harvey, who main- tains that "nature is ifse//' sinful," " without the act or previ- ous to it" ! !* This voluntary, sinful disposition is uniformly considered, throughout Dr. Taylor's discourse, as a permanent state of mind. The whole tenor of his discourse indeed, carries with it the full and entire implication, that he regarded it as fixed and permanent beyond the hope of change, except by a di- rect intervention of almighty power. In the passage al- ready quoted, he represents man as having "a heart se? on the world" as his "chief good," "his portion," "his God." The solemn appeal to impenitent sinners, with which he con- cludes, charges upon them with overpowering force, the fixed- ness of their purpose in the ways of sin and death. He (the sinnev) yields himself by his own free act, by his own choice, to those propensities of his nature, which under the weight of God's authority \\e ought to govern. The gratification of these he makes his chief good, immortal as he is. For this he lives and acts — this he puts in the place of God — and for this, and for nothing better he tramples on God's authority and incurs his wrath. He is going on to a wretched eternity, the self-made victim of its woes. Amid Sabbaths and bibles, the intercessions of saints, the songs of angels, the intreaties of God's ambassadors, the accents of re- deeming love, and the blood that speaketh peace, he presses on to death. * Mr. Harvey objects to Dr. Taylor's use of the word preference, as synony- mous with choice. " Preference, lie says, is commonly understood to mean a preponderence of estimation in favor of one object, compared with another, when both ma}', in a degree, be objects of esteem and love." But do we not say, that a beggar would prefer even a poor meal to nothing ? The word pre- ference, then, does not imply that the thing refused is an object of " esteem or love." Dr. Taylor's use of the term is that of Edwards, and most other writers. It is the appropriate meaning of the word, in discussions of this kind. There is not in the whole sermon, a particle of doubt or obscurity on this point, un- less the reader makes it for himself; and we cannot but think the spirit a very unhappy one, which leads Mr Harvey, on such grounds, to charge Dr. Taylor with •' a defect in doctrine." 360 Review of Taylor and Haniey [June. God beseeching with tenderness and terror — Jesus telling him he died once and could die again to save him— mercy weeping over him day and night— heaven Hfting up its everlasting gates — hell, burning and sending up its smoke of torment, and the weeping and the wailing and the gnashing of teeth within his hearing, — and onward still he goes. — See the infatuated immortal ! Fellow sinner, — it is you. Bowels of divine compassion — length, breadth, height, depth, of Jesus' love — Spirit of all grace, save him, — Oh save him — or he dies forever. p. 38. Who would think it possible for any man to say, as Mr. Harvey has done, in reviewing a sermon, which closed in this manner, " the doctrine is that there is no such thing as a wicked heart, considered as a permanent source of depravi- ty."* Mr. Harvey could dwell upon this passage for the sake of exposing what he deems (we think incorrectly) a '' rhetor- ical" error. f While Dr. Taylor was expostulating with sin- ners on the inflexible obstinacy of that "wicked heart," that "sinful disposition," as he had already called it, "which leads to all other sin," Mr. Harvey could employ himself in matters of verbal criticism ! And in this employment, he could overlook the whole scope of the passage before him, and lose all recollection of the manner in which he was treating Dr. Taylor, in saying of his sermon, " the doctrine is, that there is no such thing as a wicked heart, considered as a perma- nent source of depravity ! !" We leave it to Mr. Harvey him- self, and to an impartial public, to apply such terms as they think proper to conduct of this kind. We are aware, however, that there are some persons, (and Mr. Harvey may be of that number,) who find a difficulty in understanding, how that which consists wholly in preference or choice, can still be permanent. Though such a difficulty could furnish no justification for stating the doctrine of the sermon diametrically contrary to the fact, yet it may be a suffi- cient reason for devoting a few moments to this part of the subject. We would appeal, then, to the experience of the ob- jector, whether there is any thing more inflexible and stub- born than the will or purpose of one, whose decision has been finally made. In the ordinary language of life, we say that a man is "wilful," or that "his will is up," as the most natural mode of describing a state of fixed and settled obstinacy. While this purpose remains, all individual acts of choice are made subordinate to it. Besides ; avarice, ambition, pride, etc. as we have already remarked, are voluntary states of mind. Tagel5. tPage40. 1829.] on Human Depravity. 361 We do not call the instinctive feelings from which they spring, by these names. It is only when the will comes in, when a preference is established, and the purpose of gratification is formed, that pride, ambition, or avarice exist. Yet what more permanent than these states of mind! What more hopeless than "the unconqerable will and study of revenge" ! The objec- tor's difficulty arises from this, that he has not sufficiently dis- tinguished between the governing purpose of the soul, and subordinate acts of choice. Avarice, for example, may be considered as n governing purpose, to those particular acts of choice, by which avarice selects the means of gratification. These specific acts are all subordinate ; and may change per- petually, as new objects are presented. But the pr^erence of wealth, and iha purpose to attain it, may remain fixed and unalterable. Now avarice is only one specific form whicii the comprehensive governing affection of the soul assumes. Pride is another, — sensuality, another. One is more common in age, another in manhood, and another still in youth. They may at times be brought into conflict with each other. A momentary fit of pride may make the miser generous; or the spendthrift may become frugal, from some unlooked for change of circumstances. But in all these conflicts between inferior principles, the one comprehensive, controlling affection which pervades them all, remains unchanged as " the ordinances of heaven." This consists in the supreme love of the world in some form — the settled preference of its "good things," to the exclusion of God, as the highest object of the soul — and a de- termined purpose to obtain this object, which never yields except to the intervention of almighty power. There was no occasion, therefore, for Mr. Harvey to sneer at Dr. Taylor, on the subject of a new translation of the scrip- tures; or to tell us that David, instead of praying 'create in me a clean heart,' should have said, " create in me a clean act." A permanent state of voluntary affection or choice, is totally distinct from particular acts of the will. It is a governing purpose or disposition of the soul ; and if the change for which David prayed, and which God enjoins on every sinner, when he says, " make you a new heart," is not a change in this governing state of the will, it is not, in any sense, within the power of man. If, then, Mr. Harvey does not renounce the distinction between natural and moral abili- ty and inability, it would be more consistent for him, perhaps, to spare his sneers on this subject. At all events, he should first answer President Edwards, who as we have already seen lays it down as the foundation of his work on the Affections, that the will and the heart are the same thing; and of course 46 362 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, that a change of heart consists in a permanent change of the governing state of the will. Nor does the permanency of this state consist in the standing and perpetual exercise of that single comprehensive volition. The simple fact is, and we see it in the daily concerns of life, that, in some cases, when a man has once formed his purpose, he adheres to if. All his other acts of choice are either subservient to this decision, or at least, not inconsistent with it. This, then, is his go- verning purpose; and this in the heart of man before regene- ration, is the choice of the world as the highest object of regard. This, according to Dr. Taylor's sermon, while sinful in itself, is the fountain of all other sin; and this consists wholly in "man's own act." But on Mr. Harvey's principles, there is another fountain of evil back of this, which does not consist in " a man's own act." This fountain, then, is not the thing contained, but the con- tainer. It corresponds, not to the water which supplies the streams, but to the cavity of earth or marble in which that wa- ter reposes. And here, we apprehend, is precisely the ground of Mr. Harvey's error. The source or fountain to which Dr. Taylor alludes, has the same qualities with the streams which issue from it. But the source or fountain contended for by Mr. Harvey, cannot, from the nature of the case, have the pro- perties of that which is contained within it. Who ever im- agined that a marble fountain, or a cavity of earth, had any of the properties of water? And who will maintain that the sub- stance of the soul, or its nature and constitution, are sinful, be- cause its free acts of choice have that character ? The former are necessary to lay the ground of moral action, and are the direct product of creative power; the latter are the man's own acts, and for these alone is he responsible. When the former are spoken of as the source of moral action, the word source is used in a totally different sense, from its acceptation when we speak of a fountain as partaking of the character of its streams. Yet Mr. Harvey, from confounding these two senses, insists that " nature is itself sinful," be- cause the voluntary actions of the human soul have this cha- racter. How obviously is he misled by his own ambiguous se langua There is a similar ambiguity, too, in the use of the words ten- dency, propensity, disposition, principle, etc. These words, as we have seen already, are used extensively to denote voluntary states of mind — a fixed purpose, orsettled p'c/"e/*enceof the soul. In this sense they are sinful or holy; and impart their own cha- racter to all those individual acts of choice, which are subordi- nate to them. But there are, likewise, in the constitution of the 1829.] on Human Depravity. 363 mind, certain other propensities, tendencies, or principles, which lie back of moral action, and belong to us simply as in- tellectual and sentient beings. Of this class are the natural ap- petites, as hunger, thirst, etc. the social affections, as love of children, sensibility to the opinions of others, a feeling of in- jury when wronged, sympathy with the suflerings of others, etc. and connected with them all, is the desire of happiness, which belongs to us in common with all sentient beings. Now these, from the nature of the case, are neither sinful nor holy. They result from the inevitable condition of our being; and we can no more cease to be subjects of them, than we can cease to exist. All that is demanded by the claims of duty, is to keep them in strict subjection to the rights of other beings — to our obligations to God and to our fellow creatures. Each of these constitutional propensities has some specific object to which it is directed ; and we have no way of describing such a propensity, but by directing the inquirer to that object. Thus, if we are asked, what is hunger, we can reply only by pointing to its appropriate object, and saying it is the desire of food. What is sympathy ? It is pain in the view of the sufferings of others. Thus it is that these constitutional pro- pensities, lie at the foundation of every thing that we call a motive. Any external object becomes a motive to us, by becoming an object towards which one of these constitutional propensities is directed.* * The voluntary propensities have likewise their appropriate external motives. Thus, to an ambitious man, an opportunity to injure a rival be- comes a motive to action. But if the inquiry is, how the voluntary state of mind called ambition, became predominant in the soul, we must go back to the constitutional dc-sire for the approbation of our fellow men. We here see the purpose formed to indulge this desire even at the expense of the happiness of others, and in defiance of God's commands. This purpose is ambition. And here we are led to notice a very common error of Unitarian writers on this subject. Mr. Walker of Charlestown, for example, says in the Liberal Preacher, Vol. I. No. II. when speaking of a " revengeful tem- per," •' an avaricious disposition," etc. " the vice does not consist in the feeling itself, but in its being permitted to become inordinate." This, we conceive, is a palpable and destructive error. " T\\e feeling itself" of re- venge or of avarice, is always sinful, even in its slightest exercise. To teach any thing diiferent from tliis, is, we apprehend, to annihilate the distinction between right and wrong. The feeling is not revenge or ava- rice, until the voluntary affection of the soul denoted by these terms, ex- ists in the mind. This voluntary affection differs not in degree merely, but in kind, from the preceding constitutional propensity out of which it sprung. The one is a fixed choice or preference^ the other a mere impulse of our nature. Mr. Walker's doctrine that " the vice does not consist in the feeling itself," must give some alarm., we think, tff every reflecting man of 364 Review of Taylar and Harvey [June, Now there are some, who, misled by the double sense of the terms propensity, tendency, etc. ima<2;ine that these constitu- tional feelings are sinful, because voluntary propensities are of this character. Hence Dr. Taylor was led to state so em- phatically, that these constitutional propensities, even in their highest state of excitement, are not in themselves sinful. The sin lies wholly in that act of will or choice, which decides on their gratification against the demands of known duty. Or, as Dr. Woods remarks of a moral agent : " His actually choosing wrong makes him a sinner" in such a case. The number is not great, however, we believe, of those who think these constitutional propensities to be in themselves sinful. But there are many who have a confused idea, that there must be in man some distinct and specific tendency to sin, previous to all acts of choice ; as there is a tendency to food, to drink, and to the pursuit of happiness. This they consider as a part of man's nature, like the constitutional propensities already spoken of; and they of course consider it as sinful, and de- serving of punishment. Such we should imagine to be Mr. Harvey's meaning, when he states that " nature is itself sinful." But, if this is his meaning, the question returns upon him, how came this tendency in the human soul ? The man has not pro- duced it ; for the tendency claimed, is previous to all acts of choice, and, according to ]VIr.Harvey,is previous even to any act of the man at all. Every other tendency of the soul, which is thus prior to choice, is acknowledged by all to have proceed- ed directly from the hand of God. This tendency, if it exists at all, is a positive existence, a real entity ; for Mr. Harvey de- scribes it as the "efficient and criminal cause of actual sin." How has it come into being ? The alternative is again before those who hold this doctrine, viz. it either has no cause, or God is its author, and is therefore the efficient author of sin. But is it really so? Ts there in man a specific craving for sin, as there is for food or drink ? Why then is it wrong to be the subject of it ? How is it possible not to be the subject of it at his party. Let tlie principle be acted upon in tlie streets of Cliarlestown or Boston, tliat "the feeling itself" of avarice or revenge is not a " vice," and Mr. Walker would soon see the tremendous consequences of his doc- trine. As the scriptures have not taught us how murk avarice or revenge we may properly exercise, men would differ greatly in their views of what is really " inordinate." The peculiar circumstances of the case,'would be thought by each individual to justify an indulgence of tliese i■ecliug^^,in the full extent to which he had carried "it. If tlie man was sincere in this opinion, could Mr. Walker condemn him or not? If not, then mankind are given up to promiscuous wickedness, provided they are only sincere m thinking that tliey do not carry it too far. 1829.] on Human depravity. 365 least to some extent? Is it not certain, then, that there is in our nature no such specific tendency to sin, corresponding to our natural and constitutional propensities ? Besides, each of those propensities is directed to its appropriate object as a good. But is mere sin regarded by the mind as a good, in itself considered^ Is there in the original constitution of the human soul, any such thing as a simple, disinterested love of sinning, for its own sake^ On the contrary, are we not always conscious of being in pur- suit of some worldly good, when we sin? Are we not seeking the gratification of our natural appetites and desires, or of that voluntary disposition already spoken of, to find our happiness in " the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life ?" But there is one remaining difficulty in the minds of ma- ny persons, respecting this voluntary propensity or disposi- tion to sin. How does it happen that all human beings, from the commencement of moral agency, uniformly acquire this propensity or disposition? This leads us to the fourth reason of the unguarded statement that human "nature is itself sin- ful ;" viz. a hasty assumption, that the certainty of man's en- tire sinfulness from the commencement of moral agency, can- not be accounted for without supposing a sinful nature. On this Mr. Harvey insists in various forms, and with great ear- nestness. But on what principle does this assumption rest? Obviously on this, that a cause must have the same proper- ties as its effect ; or in the words of Mr Harvey, "that actual sin, if it be a certain and exclusive effect, m.ust result from a cause which is sinful." But we have already shown, that this principle is totally erroneous. Acts of thought, for example, are the certain and exclusive effect of our intellectual nature. Yet that nature is one thing, and acts of thought are entirely another. The truth is, that the certainty of an effect is in no degree dependent on our being acquainted with the qualities of its cause. The nature of gravitation is wholly unknown, but the certainty of its eftects remains unimpaired by our ig- norance. The results in optics are the same, whether we con- sider light as a fluid or a vibration. The facts in electricity are unaltered, whether we adopt the theory of Franklin, or of Da- vy. In the case before us, we have only to inquire whether the fact is not certain, that mankind do uniformly sin, from the commencement of moral agency until their affections are renewed by the influence of divine grace. To us it appears most clear that they do, both from the testimony of experience and of the word of God. There must be, then, some perma- nent ground of this uniformly existing fact. But, if we never should discover what that ground is, the certainty of the fact 360 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, would remain unaltered. As to a great proportion of facts in the natural world, we are actually in this state of ignorance. Who can describe the process on which the growth of an ani- mal or vegetable depends ? We talk of vegetable or animal life as the cause ; but these words convey to us no idea of the pro- cess in question, or of the nature of the cause supposed. And when Lord Monboddo insists that these causes are distinct en- tities, and that there are in the universe four kinds of souls, the material, the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual — some of which have only orectic, while others are possessed of gnostic powers, we merely smile at his absurdity and set his theories aside. We look with a graver aspect on the theory of Mr. Harvey, because it brings reproach and misconcep- tion on one of the most important doctrines of our faith. And when Dr. Taylor puts down this theory by unanswera- ble reasoning, it is quite as ridiculous for Mr. Harvey to ex- claim, 'then all ground of the certainty of sin is annihilated,' as it would be for Lord Monboddo to insist, when his newly invented souls were brushed aside, that all certainty of coming events was destroyed, in the material universe. But let us look at facts. Angels sinned. Was the cause which led to their first act of rebellion, in itself sinful ? Eve was tempted, and fell. Was her natural appetite for food, or her desire for knowledge — to which the temptation was addressed — a sin- ful feeling? And why may not our constitutional propensi- ties now, lead to the same result at the commencement of moral agency, as was actually exhibited in fallen angels and our first parents, even when advanced in holiness? A child enters the world with a variety of appetites and desires, which are generally acknowledged to be neither sinful nor holy. Committed in a state of utter helplessness to the assiduity of parental fondness, it commences existence, the object of unceasing care, watchfulness, and concession, to those around it. Under such circumstances it is, that the natural appe- tites are first developed ; and each advancing month brings them new objects of gratification. The obvious conse- quence is, that self indulgence becomes the master principle in the soul of every child, long before it can understand that this self ndulgence will ever interfere with the rights, or entrench on the happiness of others. Thus by repetition is the force of constitutional propensities accumulating a bias towards self-gratification, which becomes incredi- bly strong before a knowledge of duty or a sense of right and wrong, can possibly have entered the mind. That moment — the commencement of moral agency, at length ar- rives. Does the child now come in a state of perfect neu- 1829.] on Human Depravity. 367 fralily, to the question, whether it will obey or disobey the command, which cuts it off from some favorite gratification? If the temptation presented to constitutional propensities, could be so strong in the case of Adam, as to overpower the force of established habits of virtue in the maturity of his reason, how absolute is the certainty that every child will yield to the urgency of those propensities, under the redoub- led impulse of long cherished self-gratification, and in the dawn of intellectual existence ! Could the uniform cer- tainty of this event be greater, if the hand of Omnipotence were laid upon the child to secure the result? Why, then, is he sinful ? Because, in every instance, where guilt is char- ged in the unerring record of God, the incipient moral agent had attained to a knowledge of duty, and possessed full power to resist the temptation, and to obey the command. At what moment this period of moral agency commences, it is not for us to say. We see no evidence, however, that a knowledge of the existence or moral government of God, is essential to such a state. The parent may for a time sus- tain the highest relations which the mind of the child is able to comprehend. And whenever, by looks or actions, a com- mand can be made to reach a sense of right and wrong awa- kened in the heart, at that moment the dawn of moral agency has commenced. Why, then, is it necessary to suppose some distinct evil propensity — some fountain of iniquity in the breast of the child previous to moral action ? It is a sound principle of philosophy never to presume the existence of more causes than are necessary to account for the effect. And in the present instance, we are forbidden to do it, by the imputation which it brings on the character of our Creator. In accordance with these views, President Edwards says of his opponent, " he supposes the doctrine of original sin to imply some positive influence — some quality or other not from the choice of owr minds, (how explicit is Edwards in say- ing that sin lies wholly in olr choice !) but like a taint, tinc- ture, or infection altering the natu7'al constitution, faculties, and dispositions of the soul. Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing."* How diflerent from the statements of Mr. Harvey! We think, too, that the account given by the apostle James of the process of temptation, is perfectly accordant with our explanation, as offered above. "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own (Ecrifiufjuiag) lust, and enticed." The word lust in this passage, as Mr. Harvey acknowledges.. ^;^ Vol, VI. p. 487, .368 Review of Taylor and Harvey [Junk- denotes merely "vehement desire," "and implies in itself no- thing necessarily criminal." It is applied to the feelings of our Savior himself, " with desire have 1 desired," etc. Now this vehement desire is all that the apostle mentions as existing in temptation. " Then," he adds, "when desire hath conceived. jT bringeth forth sin," etc. But Mr. Harvey takes the liberty to introduce one thing more into the process, which the apostle has not mentioned; viz. "the principle of depravity in the heart." "This," he says, " exerts an efficient influence even in the conception of sin." But the apostle says no such thing ; and on what authority does Mr. Harvey add to the words of inspiration? Solely on his own assertion, that vehe- ment desire " will never conceive sin by itself." But why not: Did not vehement desire produce sin in Adam's first act of trans- gression? Was there any previous "principle of depravity" in him? Why then, may not strong constitutional desires be fol- lowed noiv by a choice of their objects as well as in the case of Adam ? And when an apostle undertakes professedly to des- cribe the process of temptation, who shall dare to add to his words ? Besides, wc are told expressly, that Christ was " tempt- ed in ALL, points like as we are." Now we know, that nothing but the natural appetites and constitutional propensities could have been the source of temptation to Him. Is it not demon- strably certain then, from the apostle's words, that these pro- pensities are the original source of our temptations to all sin ? Mr. Harvey most strangely misrepresents Dr. Taylor on this subject. .He assumes it to be a part of the doctrine maintain- ed in the sermon, that the constitutional propensities become sinful in themselves, when they have risen to a certain degree of excitement. Hence he says, " there must be a gradual ap- proach towards a sinful state. And there must be a time when this desire is passing the line between the two moral states."* And this he says in the face of Dr. Taylor's declar- ation : " Nor does any degree of excitement in these pro- pensities or desires, not resulting in choice, constitute moral depravity." (page 6.) He says it too, knowing and stating the fundamental doctrine of the sermon to be, that sin consists wholly in acts of choice ! Nor has he stopped here. He has actually assumed that Dr.Taylor considers these propensities in their uncxcited state to be holy ! ! For thus he reasons. " And there must be a time when this desire is passing the line be- tween the two moral states, consequently when it is neither holy nor sinful, but partakes in exactly equal proportions of the two moral principles" ! ! It is amazing, it is humiliating Pao;e 12. 1829.] on Human Depravity. 360 that a minister of the gospel who comes forward through the medium of the press, to guard the public against the errors of another, should himself fall into such flagrant misrepresen- tations ! We do not suppose that Mr. Harvey intended to *' bear false witness against his neighbor." But on this, as well as on other points, he has sent forth to the world a represen- tation of Dr. Taylor's sentiments, as opposite to the fact as light is to darkness. This representation will be read proba- bly by hundreds, who will never see the sermon. It will be taken as truth ; and may create in the minds of many, jealousy, suspicion, and alienation of feeling towards an In- stitution, which now stands, where it has ever stood, on the rock of New-England's early faith. For these consequen- ces he alone is answerable. An impartial public will judge whether such misrepresentations are the result of a mind too prejudiced to see facts, or too inaccurate to state them aright. We make these remarks without any unkindness of feeling. Towards Mr. Harvey personally, we have al- ways cherished sentiments of regard. As a firm supporter of public morals, and an energetic preacher of the gospel of Christ, he has long had our unmingled respect. What we have felt ourselves compelled to say on this subject, has given more pain to our own minds, than,we hope,it will ever give to his- A fifth reason of the unguarded statement in question, is the assumption that a particular mode of action, supposes a corresponding nature from which that action is derived. Thus, it is said, 'intellectual action presupposes an intellect- ual nature; moral action, a moral nature; and of course, sinful action implies a previously existing sinful nature.' The answer is direct and obvious. Intellectual action does indeed presuppose an intellectual nature. But does each specific /onn of intellectual action suppose a correspondent nature out of which that form arises? Is a distinct mathe- matical nature necessary to prepare the mind for the study of mathematics; a chimical nature, for the investigations of the chimist ; or a historical nature, for the pursuits of history? So in the case before us. Moral action does presuppose a moral nature. But the particular direction or form which that moral action takes, whether sinful or holy, does not presuppose a corresponding nature. The remark of Dr. Woods, which we have already quoted, happily illustrates this point. "The power of choosing right or wrong makes him (man) a moral agent. His actually choosing wrong" — and not a pre-existing sinful nature — " makes him a sinnek." We shall mention only one reason more for the unguarded statement alluded to; we mean an erroneous conception of the nature of moral agency. Why does the will yield to the 47 370 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, power of motives? Every external object which we term a motive, is addressed to some desire or propensity of our nature. Does nature, or in other words, does that desire act upon the will as an efficient cause, and thus produce the choice of these objects ? Mr. Harvey, as we suppose, affirms that it does, and condemns Dr. Taylor as opening the flood-gates of heresy, in maintaining a contrary opinion. An efficient cause is one which exerts a positive influence to produce its effect. This influence cannot be resisted. For, if it could be, in any instance, then, in that instance, it would cease to be an effi- cient cause, since the effect would not follow. Of course an ef- ficient cause is one, which no exertion of power, in the given case, can hinder from producing its effect. Thus fire applied to our bodies is an efficient cause of pain, and no exertion of power on our part, can prevent us from feeling this sensation or effect. Now, we ask, is there any propensity or nature within us, which thus acts by a direct efficiency on the will, and which the will has no power to resist? Are our acts of choice thus bound by a fatal necessity to the impulses of our nature ? Those impulses or propensities we did not create — we cannot prevent ourselves from feeling them — and if we have no power of the will to resist them, if nature is, in the words of Mr. Harvey, " the efficient cause of sin," then the worst kind of fatalism is established. We are objects of divine anger and liable to endless suffering, for acts of the will which come upon us from a cause of precisely the same kind, as that which actuates the material universe around us. Now Dr. Taylor does not believe this, and therefore he is a heretic ! He believes that nature, or our native propensities, are the ground, reason, or occasion why the will chooses — but not " the efficient cause." He believes that, from the commencement of moral agency, the choice will in fact be uniformly on the side of transgres- sion, and he accounts for the certainty and uniformity oY this fact as we have done, when speaking of constitutional pro- pensities as leading to sinful indulgence. And in these views of the will — yes, and in using the very term " occasion" which Mr. Harvey censures so severely — he has the sanction of no less an authority than Edwards himself. When that writer says there must be some cause of every event, he takes care to apprize us that he is not speaking oi' efficient causes alone. "I sometimes use the word cause in this inquiry to signify -—any antecedent with which a consequent event is so con- nected, thiit it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event is true ; whether it has any positive INFLUENCE Or uot. And in agreeableness to this [ sometimes use the word effect, for the consequence of another thing, which is, perhaps, rather an occasion than a cause, most pro- 1829.] on Human Depravity. 37 1 perly speaking.''''* Dr. Taylor, then, has the authority of Edwards for saying that a motive is not a cause, nor an act of the will an effect, in the strict sense of those terms. The man chooses in the view of motives. Those motives are ulti- mately founded on the constitutional propensities of our na- ture. Thus nature becomes a ground, reason, or occasioa of the choice, though not an efficient cause. This is the doctrine of the passage quoted above from Edwards. In our view it is the true foundation of the distinction between na- tural and moral ability and inability ; and Dr. Taylor stands on the solid foundation of Edwards, in calling nature the " rea- son" or " occasion" of sin. We have thus enumerated, at much greater length than we had originally designed, the principal reasons which have led to the unguarded statement that man's nature " is if se//" sinful," previous to and independent of any act of choice. In doing this we have examined the fundamental jarmcipZes of Mr. Har- vey's reasoning, and have shown, if we mistake not, that they are founded in error. We shall now pass to consider very briefly some of Dr. Taylor's arguments in proof that sin is man's own voluntary act, together with Mr. Harvey's objec- tions. Dr. Taylor first appeals to Calvin, the Wesminster Divines, Bellamy, and Edwards, and quotes passages which declare in express terms, or by necessary implication, that all sin is volun- tary. In reply to these quotations, Mr. Harvey asks, did not the authors of them "make a distinction between native sin and actual sin?" Unquestionably they did. He then asks re- specting President Edwards, (who may serve as a representa- tive of the others,) did he not believe in the native corruption of the heart ; and could he then believe that sin consists wholly in a man's own act ? We answer unequivocally that he did maintain both. He had speculated himself into the notion that "personal identity depends on an arbitrary divine consti- tution" — that lapse of time makes no difference — that Adam and his posterity were "one moral whole," with a virtual "co- existence of acts and affections. "f Hence he says expressly of man, " the sin of the apostacy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them; but is truly and properly Xhit'us, and on THAT ground God imputes it to them. "J Such too were the views of Bellamy, who was a disciple of Edwards. Mr. Harvey has endeavored to set aside his testimony that sinful propensities " are in themselves native choice,'''' by saying that Bellamy was endeavoring to guard against the idea, " that de- pravity was originally created in man as an essential property of his soul." Be it so. And how does he guard against it ? By . * Works, V. 54. Am. Ed. t Works. VI. 439—40—48. t Works, VI, 468. 372 Iteview of Taylor and Harvey [June, affirming, with Mr. Harvey, that this depravity was " not man's own act?" No; but by saying in direct terms, that our native evil propensities are " the free, voluntary, spontaneous bent of our hearts ;" though Mr. Harvey, in quoting his words, has unfortunately omitted the word voluntary, on which the whole force of the passage turns. Of the Westminster di- vines, too, Mr. Harvey remarks, that they made a distinction between original and actual sin. True. But did they not maintain, as Edwards did, that all our race were one moral person in Adam, and were thus associated with him in con- tracting original sin? They say expressly, that all mankind •' sinned in him," and they define original, as well as actual sin, to be a " transgression of the righteous law of God." Such too, appear to have been Calvin's views, as expressed in Book H. of ins Institutes ; and such Mr. Harvey apparently concedes them to have been. " Man," he says in this pas- saire, (one quoted from Calvin by Dr. Taylor,) " is used col- lectively, meaning Adam as the head, and all his race as re- presented by him" When therefore Calvin says that " sin is voluntary" — that " native depravity can be imputed to none but man himself," does he not clearly mean, that " man collectively — Adam and all his race," were voluntary as one complex " moral whole," in producing that "native de- pravity, which can be imputed to none but man himself ?" These notions of oneness with Adam are, indeed, truly ab- surd. But as the writers in question professed to hold them, we see how they were consistent in saying that sin is " man's own act," and yet that nature itself is sinful, previous to ac- tual sin. Now take away this oneness with Adam, and what remains ? Precisely the statement of Dr. Taylor, that sin is man's own act, and that " nature is not itself sinful." We pass next to consider what is meant by "spiritual death." According to Dr. Taylor it consists in confirmed and actual sin; according to Mr. Harvey it is that "native depravity," which is the cause of actual sin. Let the apostle decide. "You hath he quickened who were dead" — how? — "in trespasses and sins," i. e. actual sin, as Mr. Harvey conr- cedcs. Could language more plainly declare in what the death consists? We say, for example, "I am occupied in writing." Is the occupation the cause of the writing, or rath- er does it not constitute the occupation? The apostle' says in the second verse, " we all had our conversation in the lusts of the flesh." Was that conversation the cause of those lusts, or do tlie lusts describe the conversation, and show in what it consisted? "Ye are yet in your sins," "walk in love," "I was m the Spirit on the Lord's day." Are the "sins," the "love," and the "Spirit," effects, in these cases? It is too obvious to admit of argument, that such expressions 1829.] on Human Depravity. 373 do not point out an effect, but describe the condition or state of that with which they are connected; and of course that "dead in trespasses and sins," is a definition of spiritual death as consisting in confirmed actual sin. We come now to Mr. Harvey's direct arguments to prove that sin exists previous to moral agency. 1. Infants die. The answer has been giren a thousand times ; brutes die also. But Mr. Harvey replies, "animals are not subjects of the moral government of God." Neither are infants, previous to moral agency ; for what has moral gov- ernment to do with those who are not moral agents ? But Mr. Harvey instantly shifts his ground. " Before, then, the objection can have any weight, it must be shown that infants stand on precisely the same ground with animals, that is that they have no immortal part, and sustain no relation to the future."* It has been shown " that infants stand on precisely the same ground with animals" as far as the present question is con- cerned. For neither of them are moral agents nor subject to moral government. Whether in other respects they stand on the same ground, is aside from the present inquiry. That inquiry is, can there be guilt or desert of punishment previous to moral agency: but guilt belongs exclusively to a sub- ject of moral government. Immortality in itself considered, has .nothing to do with guilt or innocence. A brute or the soul of an idiot might live forever without being sinful. A man may be annihilated to-moiTow, but while he continues in existence he continues to be a sinner. Animals, and infants previous to moral agency, do therefore stand on precisely the same ground in reference to this subject. Suffering and death afford no more evidence of sin in the one case than in the other. Why either of them suffer, it is not for us to say. It is obvious, however, that the laws of nature were in many respects, altered in consequence of the fall of Adam. The ground has been cursed. The contact of man with the ma- terial universe is a perpetual source of danger or suffering. These are the consequences of sin. But are these laws to be suspended the moment they come in contact with one who is not a moral agent? Shall the blow which crushes the mo- ther be arrested by a miracle, when it reaches the child in her arms? If such a suspension would be proper in the case of any, we should expect it in relation to brutes rather than infants. The former have but a remote connection with the sinful moral agent. The latter are " bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh," and are themselves soon to rise into all the responsibilities of moral agency. 2. Why are infants baptized ? Because God has permit- ted believing parents to place upon their offspring " the seal and token of the covenant." This seal is the pledge and * Page 17, :374 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, assurance that of those to whom it is applied, God will raise up many " children unto Abraham." But is there no signifi- cancy in the use of the purifying element of water in this or- dinance ? Certainly. It indicates that the being to whom it is applied will need the purifying influences of the Holy Spi- rit, from the earliest moment that such influences in the na- ture of the case can take effect. But neither sin nor holiness, we apprehend, can be predicated of any but moral agents.* The affecting truth is brought home to every christian parent, in dedicating his offspring to God, that nothing but almighty power can save them from pollution and final ruin. His anxieties and prayers are thus called forth for the intervention of the Spirit of grace ; and he is at once urged and encou- raged to hold steadily before their minds, from the dawn of moral agency, that truth which the sacred Spirit uses as the means of making them wise unto eternal life. What greater significancy is there in the rite of baptism, on the scheme of Mr. Harvey ? 3. Are children saved through the death of Christ? In our view, and in the view of Dr. Taylor as expressed in his sermon, they are. By salvation, in reference to those who are not yet moral agents, is meant deliverance from the future existence and consequent punishment of sin, and a title to eter- nal life. That infants dying before moral agency, will need this deliverance, and this title, is our belief. And the only ground on which either can be hoped for, is that atonement of Christ by which the moral government of God has been sustained ; the influences of the Holy Spirit secured for the sanctification of God's elect ; and the unfading glories of heaven laid open to those who through grace are made heirs of eternal life. 4. We pass now to consider the scriptural evidence addu- ced by Mr. Harvey. Psalms ii. 5. "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Literally understood, this passage would teach that sin existed previ- ous to our birth. It is, therefore, figurative ; and expresses in strong terms the cardinal doctrine, that sin is not the re- sult of circumstances merely, but of principles which belong to the structure of the soul itself. But we are not, therefore, to infer that those principles are in themselves sinful. Psalm Iviii. 3. " The wicked are estranged from the womb ; they go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies." If the Psalmist had not expressly added " speaking lies," this passage would have been more to Mr. Harvey's purpose. But as chil- dren do not " speak lies" from the womb, or as soon as they are born, the conclusion is irresistible, that these expressions denote only, that sin commences at a very e arly period — the * The expression, "sanctified from the womb," applied to J^emiah, plainly denotes set apart or dedicated. 1829.] on Human Bepravity. oTS dawn of existence — and no account is taken, in such general statements, of the brief period which intervenes between birth and moral agency. The same is still more obviously the case with Gen. viii. 21. "For the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." Of all such passages, one general re- mark may be made. To the brief period before moral agen- cy, moral government does not extend. Declarations, there- fore, respecting things which belong to moral government, are not to be considered as embracing that period. All lan- guage is to be interpreted by a reference to the nature of the thing spoken of. And as the scriptures assure us that " where no law is there is no transgression," they forbid us to apply any of these declarations to a state of being, where a knovvledge of law cannot exist. General statements may, in some instances, seem to extend to such a state. In the pas- sage, " th(!y are all gone out of the way," no exception is made as to idiots or deranged persons. To make such exceptions, would be to trifle with the subject. If men will not learn to interpret language according to the obvious nature of the thing spoken of, it is in vain to hope that any language can be guarded against perversion. We speak of a lion's whelp as carnivorous, but no one ever suspects us of affirming that as yet it subsists on flesh. We could not call it carnivorous, however, if any doubt remained — if it depended on circum- stances alone — whether the animal before us would ever eat flesh. To justify this language, there must be, in the struc- ture of its frame, the ground of a certainty that it will sub- sist on flesh, whenever, from the nature of the case, this shall become possible. A ground of certainty, likewise, ex- ists, according to Dr. Taylor, in the mind of each individual of our race, that the first and all subsequent acts of moral agency will uniformly be sinful, previous to regeneration. This certainty, in the case of the lion, results from the action of " an efficient cause," which creates a natural and irresisti- ble necessity of the act in question. In the case of man, according to Dr. Taylor, no such necessity exists. In every instance he could have acted otherwise. The certainty of sinning, therefore, is merely a moral certainty, and is depen- dent entirely on moral causes. Now there are those who, oa the ground of this certainty alone, are accustomed to speak of human nature as itself sm- ful. By the term " sinful," they do not mean ''■ deserving of punishment,^'' but "certainly resulting in sin." And we be- lieve that multitudes who imagine themselves to mean more than this, will find on examining closely, that this is the whole amount of their real and practical faith. Neither Mr. Harvey nor any other man, we are confident, ever felt remorse of con- science for sin which was not his " own act." We can no more repent of such sin than of Adam's first transgression. 376 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, Those who fancy themselves to believe in its existence, are, in our opinion, either misled by ambiguous language, or de- luded precisely as Hume, Berkley, and Edwards were in their speculations. The testimony of their consciences, their habits of prayer, and their mode of striving against sin, will furnish a complete demonstration, we think, that they truly and prac- tically believe " there is no sin except such as consists in a man's own voluntary act.'''' As to the figurative use of the terms "sin," "sinful," "guilty," etc. to denote "certainty" of sin, and not "desert of pnisliment," we think it unhappy in a high degree. It is not the true and proper meaning of these words. Mankind at large do not so understand them. The use of them will bring a perpetual and unmerited reproach on the doctrines of Calvinism. We have examined at a greater length than we had origi- nally intended, the first position of Dr. Taylor's sermon, viz. that sin is man's own voluntary act. We pass, now to consider very briefly his second position, that "this depravity is by nature." The word nature, like many other terms of the same class, is used sometimes in a wider, and sometimes in a more restricted sense. We say, for example, that it is the nature of a stone to be heavy. By this we imply two things, first that the stone has a certain in- ternal constitution, and secondly that there is in existence some larger body like the earth, towards which, in consequence of that constitution the stone will fall. But if the earth, and all other solid bodies, were annihilated, the stone in question would have nothing towards which it could tend. It would, therefore, no longer have the tendency in question. It would not be heavy. The internal constitution wr>uld remain unal- tered, but it wouid not now be the nature of the stone to gravitate as it was before. Such is the statement of President Edwards, in very nearly the same terms which we have now used. " It is the nature of a stone," he says, "to be heavy, but yet if it were placed, as it might be, at a distance from this world, it would have no such property."! When- ever we say, therefore, that any thing is thus or thus by nature, the internal constitution of the thing, is (in the words of Ed- wards) "considered together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence." In other words the internal constitution of the stone is consid red in connection with some body towards which it may gravitate. But if we restrict the word nature by some qualifying term — if, for example, we speak of the nature of the stone itself, as distinguished from its "proper situation" in the system of existence, we now mean its internal structure or constitution alone. This dis- tinction Dr. Taylor has observed throughout his whole dis- course. When the word nature is not restricted by some tWorkB, VI. 150. 1829.] on Human Depravity. 37T qualifying word, or by the obvious scope of the passage, it is taken in its customary and widest sense, denoting the in- ternal constitution of the object in connection with its " pro- per situation in the universal system of existence," as Ed- wards terms it ; or as Dr. Taylor expresses it, " all the appro- priate circumstances of its being." Thus he says, " a certain tree by nature bears bad fruit ;" meaning that in all situa- tions where it can live and bear fruit at all, (in all the appro- priate circumstances of its being) it bears bad fruit. Thig is its nature in the broad acceptation of the term. But in many cases the word nature in the sermon is 'obviously restricted to the constitution of the being in question. Thus he says, " nature is not itself sinful," " such is their (men's) nature that they will sin and only sin, in all the ap- propriate circumstances of their being." Here it would be absurd to suppose that, after such qualificiations, he used the word nature in its widest sense. And in thus passing from a wider to a more restricted sense, as the case may require, he is justified by the universal practice of mankind. We are now prepared to judge of the correctness of Dr. Taylor's positions. "Nature, he says, is not itself sinful." Here the word nature is expressly restricted by the word *^ itself'' to the internal constitution of the mind, as distin- guished from the appropriate circumstances. The position then corresponds to that of Edwards, that the stone is not heavy when considered in itself, and when withdrawn from all con- nection with the earth. " Mankind are depraved by nature." Here the term nature is used without restriction ; and the meaning is, as in the case of the stone, that such is the inter- nal constitution of tiie human mind, that in all situations where man does or will exist and act as a moral being be- fore regeneration, he will sin. Although this was obvious from the term itself, Dr. Taylor thus defines his meaning. " What are we to understand when it is said that mankind are depraved by nature ? — I answer, that such is their nature (in the restricted sense, i. e. internal constitution) that they will sin and only sin in all the appropriate circumstances of their being." Thus explained the position " mankind are depraved by nature,'' and the position " a stone is heavy by nature," express a certainty equally unlimited and absolute. They differ only in this, that the certainty, in the former case, arises from moral causes and is consistent with entire freedom of will and power of acting to the contrary; while in the lat- ter it is produced by physical necessity. Dr. Taylor rests the certainty, as Edwards does in the case of the stone, on the connection of the internal constitution (nature in the restric- ted sense) with " the appropriate circumstances of its being," and not on either of them taken separatelv. Mr. Harvey 48 378 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, rests the certainty on the internal constitution alone, consi- dering it as an efficient cause and as sinful in itself. Armi- nianism rests the certainty on peculiar circumstances of an unfavorable kind, so that in other of the appropriate circum- stances of his being, man would not be sinful. Now which is most consistent with the scriptures and experience, the middle ground on which Dr. Taylor has placed himself, in accordance with Edwards' meaning of the term, or the ex- tremes of Mr. Harvey on the one hand, and of Arminians on the other ? Notwithstanding Mr. Harvey's cavils, this middle point is the true ground of Calvinism, when freed from the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin. We come lastly to consider the note to Dr. Taylor's ser- mon, on the question " for what reason has God permitted sifi to enter the universe." To this question three answers might be given. 1. God could not prevent its existence. 2. Moral beings must, from the nature of the case, have the power of sinning; and there is no evidence that God could have over-ruled that power and entirely withheld them from its exercise, by a direct interposition of his providence, and yet have sustained a moral system in existence. Thus sin, as to God's preventing — not our committing it, is a necessary inci- dent to a moral system. 3. God chose that sin should enter the universe as the ne- cessary means of the greatest possible good. Wherever it ex- ists, therefore, it is, on the whole, better than holiness would be in its place. Onthis ground God permits its existence. The first solution is attributed to Dr. Taylor by Mr. Har- vey ; but in direct contradiction to the whole tenor and rea- soning of the note. God could have prevented sin by leaving moral agents out of his creation. The third solution has been extensively adopted by philo- sophers, especially on the continent of Europe ; and its ulti- mate reaction on the public mind, had no small share, we believe, in creating that universal scepticii?m, which at last broke forth upon Europe, in all the horrors of the French revolution. While the profoundest minds were speculating themselves into the belief that sin was the necessary means of the greatest good — better on the whole in each instance, than holiness would have been in its place — common rnen were pressing the inquiry, "why then ought it to be punish- ed." Voltaire laid hold of this state of things, and assu- ming the principle in question to be true, carried round its application to the breast of millions. In his Candide, one of the most amusing tales that was ever written, he introdu- ces a young man of strong passions and weak understanding, who had been taught this doctrine by a metaphysical Tutor. They go out together into the world, to "promote the great- 1829.] tm Human Depravity. .379 est good" by the indulgence of their passions ; certain thiat, on the whole, each sin is better than holiness would have been in its place. But when Candide begins to sutler the natural consequences of his vices, he feels it to be but a poor consolation, that others are now reaping the benefit of his sin. Is it surprising that such a work induced thousands to disbe- lieve in the holy providence of God, and prepared multitudes to "do evil that good might come ?" It is a serious inquiry, then, is this solution the true one ? Ought we not to have stopped one step farther back ? Are we sure that God could have entirely withheld moral agents from sinning, and yet have had a moral system ? This is the question raised by Dr. Taylor ; and so far is he from opening a new career of rash and fruitless speculation, that his object is to recall past speculations to greater truth and soberness. Are we, then, who are of yesterday, able so to trace the re- sults in God's government which is from everlasting to ever- lasting, and which comprehends the destinies of all worlds, that we may hence establish, on a firm basis, the sentiment, that the greatest evil — the essential and only cause of evil, is itself the indispensable means of the greatest good ? Easy, indeed, it is to see that if there had not been sin, there would have been no redemption — no joy over repenting sinners — no display of the riches of the glory of God in the pardon of the guilty. But can we cast abroad our eyes over the do- minions of God and down the tract of ages, and thence know that there will be more glory to his name, and more happi- ness in the universe, than there would have been had the occasion for redemption never occurred, but a universal heaven had forever been enjoyed without it ? Surely we cannot. The subject is removed infinitely beyond our com- prehension. The moral government of God, in distinction from his providential dominion has been a subject of but little discus- sion. The views of men concerning it are apt to be loose and indefinite. Almost every thing pertaining to the govern- ment of God, has been referred to his physical agency. Hence it has been inferred from his omnipotence, as a kind of axiom, that God could, in a moral system, have prevented all sin. This has been supposed to result so directly from his power, that a doubt respecting it, has seemed to involve a question respecting his perfection. Yet it is not a limitation of his power to say that what in the nature of the case is impossible, could not have been done. And do we know that, in the na- ture of the case, all sin, or the present amount of sin, could have been prevented, and yet a moral government have ex- isted at all ? Plain it is that if sin be prevented, this must be done, not by force alone, but by a moral influence exerted upon created minds. Moral beings are voluntary beings. 380 Review of Taylor and Harvey [June, They act under the influence of motives. If they are kept from sinning it is not because they cannot sin, but because obedience is their choice. Do we know that there must not, in the nature of the case, be a display of the feelings and determinations of God in regard to sin, as actually committed, in order to the exertion of that moral influence, by which alone creatures who can sin, will, in all the circumstances of their being, remain obedient? We do know that the only wise God has taken occasion from sin to accumulate the in- fluences of his moral government upon the minds both of angels and men, ever since time began. The overthrow of Sodom ; the judgments inflicted upon Egypt, and upon the Israelites, in the wilderness; his dealings with his chosen people in Canaan and with the surrounding nations ; the whole history of his providence, as it is contained in the bi- ble, and more especially the incarnation, life, ministry, ato- ning death, and exalted reign of his own Son, are in fact, and will continue to be, the basis of those means by which the Holy Spirit convinces, converts, and sanctifies the heirs of salvation. The existence of this evil is pre-supposed in the system by which God is displaying himself in his bright- est glories, to the view both of angels and men, and bringing tlie whole weight of his character to bear upon their minds, to secure their obedience. And when the whole shall be fin- ished and revealed, as it will be, at the consummation of all things, it will afford such an exhibition of His glory, that, as we may reasonably suppose, all his obedient subjects, throughout the universe, will be held under its influence, in iioly and joyful allegiance, thenceforward even forever and ever. And do we know of any other way in which the apos- tacy of the subjects of a moral government, could have been prevented ? These thoughts are not new. President Dwight says, " how far the fall and punishment of some moral beings may, in the nature of the case, be indispensably necessary to the persevering obedience of the great body, cannot be deter- mined by us.''* Sentiments leading to this conclusion ap- pear also in the sermons of Dr. Strong. f These great men, though perhaps they never distinctly contemplated the sub- ject in the form presented by Dr. Taylor, or may have fallen in with the generally received notion respecting it, were yet led, in reasoning on other topics, to thoughts which seem to justify his conclusion. Whatever assumptions we have been accustomed to connect ■with our speculations on the scheme of christian doctrine, we, are apt to consider as essential to that scheme. The senti- ment that sin exists, not because the Ruler of the world could not have prevented it in a moral system, but because hepre- ~* * Theol. Vol. I. p. 136. t Sermons Vol. II. p. 37. 1829.] on Human Depravity. 381 ferred its existence as the necessary means of the greatest good, to holiness in its stead, has so long been adopted by Calvinists in their views of his government, that it may appear indispen- sable to their scheme of faith. Yet we apprehend that so far from being indispensable, it goes rather to embarrass it. In this bearing of the subject, although to some of our read- ers it will afford but little entertainment, and our remarks have already been too protracted, we wish to be in- dulged in suggesting a few thoughts. Both theories appear to us consistent with the supreme natural perfection, and with the sovereign, universal and unchangeable dominion of God. Both suppose that He might have prevented sin. On the the- ory of Dr. Taylor it might have been prevented, by not adopting a moral system; on that which he opposes by adopting another moral system than the present. Both theories suppose that in a moral system, perfect and unchanging holiness was pos- sible. The former supposes this, because God has endowed the subjects of his government with the capacity of obedi- ence ; and because His government embodies the most ef- fective influence that is possible for this purpose; — that it is in resistance of this influence that they rebel, and on them wholly rest the responsibilities of the amazing evil. The latter supposes that the agency of God alone might have been so directed as to prevent all sin. Both suppose that in a moral system, God could have prevented each sin individu- ally considered. The former does not deny that he might have done this by a different arrangement of the moral system;, while at the same time it supposes that this arrangement might have been connected with a greater amount of sin in the ge- neral result. If the mighty works which were done in Caper- naum, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have re- pented ; but what would have been the general consequence in the history of the world, cannot be known by us. Doubt- less the Creator might have prevented the access of the tempter to our first parents, or have unveiled his true charac- ter ; or by a divine influence have prevented their yielding to his insinuations. But can we be certain that, to have broken the force of the temptation in this manner, would not have begun a train of events, leading inevitably to a more hopeless rebellion ? That there could have been a system of moral government which would have prevented all sin, or the present amount of sin, the one theory does not assume, the other does. Yet both acknowledge the omnipotence of God, in the most unqualified sense of that glorious attribute. *' On either supposition there is what may be called a limi- tation of the power of God by the nature of things. In the one case, the limitation is supposed to result from the na- ture of sin; in the other from the nature of moral agency.*' In both casesj however, the limitation of his power consists 382 tteview of Taylor and Harvey [JuNfi, rather in terms than in reality. The difficulty, if there i^ one, results from the imperfection of language or some improper use of it. For, when we say on the one hand that God could not prevent all sin in a moral system, or, on the other that he could not accomplish the greatest good without its existence, we do not mean that He was prevented by a de- ficiency of power, but by the nature of the case. No suppo- sable increase of power, (could we imagine it to be increased) would alter the result. As far as the intervention of God is concerned, sin is necessary, according to both theories, to the greatest good ; necessary — not indeed in any such manner as infringes the moral agency of men — but on the theory of Dr. Taylor, because it is necessarily incidental, in respect to the power of God to prevent it in his moral government, so that there could have been no moral system without it. On the theory which he opposes, because it is the necessary means of the greatest good, so that were there less evil, the amount of good would also be less. Both suppositions also acknow- ledge that all events, sin not excepted, take place according to the eternal purpose of God. Dr. Taylor supposes Him to have designed the system in which sin reigns, and to govern the world according to his designs. But not, so far as we know, because there is aught in sin or its necessary consequences, on account of which He preferred it to the universal reign of righteousness, but because He foresaw that the subjects of a moral government would be liable to apostacy, and would in many instances, whatever might be done to prevent it, ac- tually rebel. Equally with the other supposition, it ascribes to Him the dominion ; asserts the immutability of His coun- sel; acknowledges the sovereignty of His universal providence ; encourages prayer; and invites us to repose our confidence in Him as governing all things for the attainment of the best ends, and for the complete security of all who love him : while it does not involve the embarrassing thoughts inseparable from the other supposition, that He has decreed all the sin that is committed and brings it to pass as that, which, all things considered, he prefers to obedience in its stead. Fi- nally both are consistent with the infinite blessedness of God. The assumption that He could have prevented sin in a moral government, but would not, supposes that sin itself is necessary to His happiness, because the necessary means of the greatest good in his kingdom. It supposes that were there less sin, were a single sinner whom he has not deter- mined to bring to repentance, to return to Him, as all may and ought to do, with relenting, saying, " Father I have sin- ned ;" and much more were all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, his purposes would be painfully crossed and his happiness proportionably disturbed. The supposition of Dr. T. does not involve this, while yet it contem- 1829.] on Human Bepravity. 383 plates Him as carrying into complete effect, a scheme of go- vernment calculated to produce the highest conceivable good, if creatures would unite their agency with that of God for this purpose ; — a scheme which actually will produce the great- est amount of good which infinite perfection can produce ; which will afford a visible illustration of the glories of the in- visible God; and in which therefore he rests infinitely and unchangeably blessed forever. The assumption then, that God could have prevented all sin by a different arrangement of the moral system, does not seem to be essential to our faith in any of the particulars, which had been mentioned, but involves it in serious difficult- ies. It presents too, we apprehend, a still greater embarrassment to our full reliance on the sincerity of God in the revelation of his feelings and conduct towards us, involved as we are under this dreadful evil, — His sincerity in His declarations, His pre- cepts, and His invitations. In llis declarations, " O that there were such a heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep my commandments always !" " O do not that abominable thing which I hate!" "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live !" "Who will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth." Which supposition, we ask, is the more evidently consistent with such declara- tions, and best lays open the heart to their proper influence, that which ascribes to God a pre/erewce of sin, in all the extent of its reign, to holiness in its stead, — so that His happiness and His glory are necessarily connected with it; — or that which con- templates it as being on no account whatever desired by him, or necessary to the accomplishment of his purposes, except as it is his will to maintain a moral government: which merely sup- poses the frailty incident to the subjects of that government, to be such, that until His feelings in regard to sin are exhi- bibited by answerable dispensations, they will to a fearful extent, be drawn to the commission of it? In his precepts. Law is an expression of the will of him who ordains it — his desire that the subject do as he is required — his preference of that to its opposite. This is the nature, the essential attri- bute, of law. It is only as an expression of the will of the sovereign, that law is designed to control the will of the sub- ject. If it is not this, it is an expression of nothing which the subject is bound to regard, or his regard to which would be obedience. What motive of obedience can we have to per- form an action required in terms, if we do not suppose that it is the will of the sovereign that we perform it ; and more es- pecially, if we suppose that, all things considered, he would be better pleased with our doing the opposite ? Or what can be the intention or moral influence of rewards and punishments, but to express his satisfaction with obedience and his displea- 384 Review of Taylor and Harvey on Human Depravity. sure at disobedience ? And how can this be reconciled with the assumption that God prefers the transgression of his own law, in an infinite multitude of instances, to obedience ? In his invitations, "Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters." " Whosoever will let him take the water of life freely." " Come, for all things are now ready." Such invitations coming from the throne of the Eternal King, to perishing men, are meant not for philosophers alone, but for the poor. They are meant to be taken according to their obvious import. But such invitations addressed by one man to another would express the desire of acceptance ; or cer- tainly would not include the desire of their being rejected. Were we fully apprized that a neighbor, who had invited us to an entertainment, although for form's sake, or his own credit's sake, or any other reason, he chose to address his in- vitation to us, and would admit us on our coming, yet to ac- complish other ends however laudable, secretly preferred our rejection of the invitation, could we regard him as sincere.^ Such language would mean, that he wished, or, at least, was willing, all things considered, that we should come ; but his heart would not mean so. How then is the sincerity of evan- gelical invitations to be reconciled with the assumption of God's preferring the rejection of them by a multitude of those to whom they are addressed, instead of their being universally received ? In conclusion, wo remark that we have no wish to establish the contrary assumption. We pretend not to assert, on this subject, what was, or was not possible with God. Our ob- ject has been to inquire whether men know as much respec- tin2 it, as some have assumed to know. Ought an assump- tior. which so clogs the system of revealed truth, which is not essentially connected with ^any part of it, nor is capable of proof by other considerations , to be retained? Does it give to the declarations of the Eternal King respecting sin, to the law of his throne, or to the invitations of his grace, that mea- ning — that subduing influence, with which, in their naked forms, they would come to the mind? Are we, whenever we ^•, go before him in confession of sins, to believe that he would "'"^jf^ rather that we had committed them than not ; and that, how- ever he may have remonstrated with us respecting them, and interposed his authority to prevent us, and then by the cross of his Son intieated us to desist, still he meant not so? Or are we not rather to yield ourselves to the unmingled impres- sion, that we have offended his holiness, counteracted his will, and outraged all his feelings of kindness towards us? Under this impression we may be subdued — we may be grieved — we may — we must be melted in contrition ; but under the other impression it is difficult to see that we can .review our sins even with a feeling of regret.