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the 
 
 PROBLEM OF EVIL. 
 
 ^ranslaieft from tfi* jFnntl) of 
 
 M. ERNEST NAVILLE, 
 
 Author of “La Tie Eternelle,” “Le Pere Celeste,” “Maine de Biran, sa Vie et sea 
 
 Pensees,” etc., 
 
 * 
 
 By JOHN P. LACROIX, 
 
 PROFESSOR IN THE OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, AND TRANSLATOR OF FRESSENSE’S 
 
 “REIGN OF TERROR.” 
 
 [THE ONLY AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION.] 
 
 jlEW yOFfJC : 
 
 CARLTON & LAN AH AN. 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO: E. THOMAS. 
 CINCINNATI: HITCHCOCK & WALDEN, 
 
 1872 . 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1871, by 
 CARLTON & LANAHAN, 
 in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 
 
 “ c 
 
NOTE OE THE TRANSLATOR. 
 
 
 The author of these Lectures, Mr. Ernest Naville, is 
 becoming well known to the Christian world as one 
 of the most wide-awake and eloquent defenders of 
 evangelical religion. His writings on the Jife and 
 doctrines of Maine de Biran have procured for him 
 honorable recognition in contemporary philosophy : 
 while his brilliant and charming books, La Vie 
 Eterrielle and -Le Pere Celeste , have made him a 
 popular favorite throughout French Protestantism. 
 
 Of the character and worth of the present volume, 
 I will -attempt no analysis, but will simply adopt the 
 words of M. de Pressense in the Revue Chretienne of 
 August, 1869. b After remarking that the book forms 
 one branch of a “ vast monument of apologetics, or, 
 more properly speaking, a citadel of solid granite, 
 well able to resist the assaults of contemporary infi¬ 
 delity,” M. de Pressense thus proceeds: “ These 
 lectures are none the less profound for being thrown 
 into an animated popular form. The questions are 
 looked squarely in the face, and the admirable clear- 
 
4 
 
 Note of the Translator. 
 
 ness of the expression is but a fit counterpart to the 
 
 author’s keen and comprehensive insight into the 
 
 abstrusities of philosophy. Nothing is more false 
 
 than to confound obscurity with profundity ; that 
 
 which is obscure is often vague and inexact. The 
 
 haze which hovers over the landscape, though but an 
 
 aerial vapor, is yet sufficient to disenchant the whole 
 
 outlook. This discussion of the Problem of Evil 
 
 grapples boldly with the central difficulty of religion 
 
 and of theodicy in general. The eloquent orator 
 
 frankly admits the difficulty ; he places us face to 
 
 face with that knot of our destiny which, as Pascal 
 
 expresses it, was tied in the abyss of the Fall. He 
 
 does not solve it with a sword-stroke by resorting 
 
 to a dogmatic system ; such a procedure has no 
 
 validity save for those who are convinced already. 
 
 His method is purely philosophical; he presents the 
 
 Christian solution as he would present any other, 
 
 asking only that it be examined with honesty and 
 
 candor—without preconceived prejudice. The most 
 
 interesting portion of this excellent book is that 
 
 which treats of solidarity , that mysterious and real 
 
 • 
 
 bond which unites all the children of humanity, and 
 attaches them to a common source, as branches of 
 the same trunk. But it is not possible to give an 
 adequate idea of such a work in a brief notice.” 
 
 With this high appreciation of the book I think 
 
Note of the Translator. 
 
 5 
 
 most readers will heartily coincide. It certainly has 
 two very happy tendencies : to acquaint us more 
 fully with the inmost depths of our own hearts, and 
 to enable us better to understand and appreciate the 
 great moral crises of history. Though dealing with 
 the subject of Evil in its most naked and terrible 
 manifestations, the impression produced by the book 
 is the. very opposite of sad and dispiriting. It so 
 uniformly confronts the dusky and hideous figure of 
 
 Evil that is with the auroral beauty of the Good that 
 
 • 
 
 ought to be, that we are hardly conscious of gazing 
 into a pandemonium of darkness and crime—we 
 rather seem to be beholding in prophetic vision the 
 transfigured forms of Truth and Virtue and Joy 
 triumphing over the despairing and yielding hosts of 
 Night. 
 
 On laying the book aside we are enabled to look 
 upon humanity with more confidence and hope, and 
 ive are pretty sure to go to our daily toil with a more 
 cheerful contentment, realizing, in a higher sense 
 than Fichte meant it, that our existence is not vain 
 and purposeless, but that we are each a real link in 
 the endless chain of being, and that if we but faith¬ 
 fully fulfill the humble duty that falls to us individu¬ 
 ally, we are then actual co-workers with God, work¬ 
 ing for the good of all, as, in his plan, all should be 
 working for the good of us. 
 
6 
 
 Note of the Translator. 
 
 As to the style of the work I need say but a 
 word. As it was written expressly for the “ people ” 
 it discards all metaphysical jargon, and presents the 
 profoundest thoughts of philosophy in language so 
 familiar and objective as to be within the easy grasp 
 of the humblest reader, 
 
 I hope to have preserved in the translation some 
 degree of the directness and transparency of the 
 original. J. P. L. 
 
 Delaware, Ohio, June, 1S70. 
 
AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THIS TRANSLATION. 
 
 The volume which Mr. Lacroix here presents to the 
 American public forms one part of a series of works, 
 the general nature and object of which can be readily 
 stated in a few words. 
 
 Toward the close of the last century a large number 
 of minds, yielding to the spirit of the times, adopted 
 the opinion that there exists between Christian faith 
 and reason—between the Gospel and philosophy—a 
 radical antagonism. This was especially the case 
 with certain gifted French authors whose works 
 exerted a great influence throughout the reading 
 world. This same manner of thinking reappears in 
 our own day under the name of Free Thought, a title 
 that is often assumed by the enemies of the Gospel, 
 as if to imply that he who makes a free use of his 
 understanding must necessarily reject Christianity. 
 Study and meditation have led me to a view the very 
 opposite of this. Passing over the minor details, and • 
 fixing our attention upon the great essential features 
 of religion, I am convinced that the demands of rea- 
 
8 Author's Preface to this Translation. 
 
 son when seriously weighed, and the solutions which 
 Christianity gives to the great problems of life, will 
 be found to be in perfect harmony. This belief is 
 necessarily included in the faith of the Christian 
 who thinks himself in possession of -the truth, for it 
 is impossible to admit that there can be a disagree¬ 
 ment between truth, which is the light of the intelli¬ 
 gence, and reason, which is the eye designed for per¬ 
 ceiving that light. If we ever speak of reason as 
 opposed to the truth it is only of a perverted reason, 
 or, more properly, of a mind which has allowed its 
 reason to become obscured. 
 
 But it is one thing to have faith in the harmony 
 of reason and the Christian doctrines, and quite an¬ 
 other thing scientifically to demonstrate this harmony. 
 It is toward this demonstration that I wish to .contrib¬ 
 ute the weight of my labors, taking advantage for 
 this purpose of those philosophical studies in which 
 I have been engaged for the past thirty years, and 
 of which I have, from time to time, expounded the 
 results to the auditors of the Faculty of Letters in 
 Geneva. To determine with precision the problems 
 raised by philosophy as they present themselves in 
 the history of human thought; to state the various 
 solutions that have been proposed ; to examine these 
 solutions with that perfect liberty without which there 
 can be no true science ; to show that the solutions 
 
Author's Preface to this Translation. 9 
 
 contained in the Gospel are the most satisfactory of 
 all those which have been proposed to science; 
 finally, to conclude that the Christian faith contains, 
 on the one hand, the germ of the best of philoso¬ 
 phies, as, in the order of social life, it contains the 
 germ of the best of civilizations—such is the object 
 which I have set before me in a series of works in¬ 
 tended for a wider public than that of the schools 
 and universities. 
 
 I began by a series of lectures entitled La Vie 
 Eternelle . This was followed by a series entitled Le 
 Pore Celeste. The next fruit of my studies is the 
 volume in the hands of the reader. It will be fol¬ 
 lowed, should God grant me the necessary time 
 and strength, by a series of discourses on Jesus of 
 Nazareth. 
 
 These lectures on the Problem of Evil were de¬ 
 livered to the public, first of Geneva and afterward 
 of Lausanne, during the winter of 1867-68, under 
 the title of a philosophical discussion. As the audi¬ 
 ences were large and of all classes, it became neces¬ 
 sary to discard the terms and formulas of the schools, 
 and to clothe the results of my studies in a style 
 intelligible to all. But it was equally necessary, in 
 order to preserve the philosophical -character of the 
 discussion, to grapple with the most obscure phases 
 of the problem, and to avoid none of the difficulties. 
 
io Author's Preface to this Translation. 
 
 I have, therefore, striven to throw my thoughts into a 
 pleasing literary form, without, however, sacrificing 
 the requirements of a rigorous discussion. 
 
 At my express request the auditors proposed to 
 me, during the process of the delivery of the lectures, 
 various questions and objections. At the close of 
 the series I devoted a special hour to the discussion 
 of the points thus proposed. In preparing my lec¬ 
 tures for the press I have taken advantage of these 
 queries and objections to recast and improve as far 
 as possible the work which I am now enabled, thanks 
 to the esteemed labor of Mr. Lacroix, to commend to 
 the favor of the public of America and England. 
 
 Ernest Naville. 
 
 Geneva, March i, 1S70. 
 
Page 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE I.. 
 
 The Good. 13 
 
 1. Definition of the Good. 16 
 
 2. Characterization of the Good... 34 
 
 3. Guarantee of the Good.;. 59 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 Evil. 6S 
 
 1. Evil in Nature..... 69 
 
 2. Evil in Humanity. Si 
 
 3. The Negation of Evil. 96 
 
 LECTURE III, 
 
 The Problem. 118 
 
 1. Deceptive Solutions. 121 
 
 2. An Incomplete Solution. 129 
 
 3. Characteristics of Evil. *..... .. 135 
 
 (a) Its General Prevalence. 135 
 
 (< 5 ) Its Essentiality. e .... 14S 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 The Solution. 159 
 
 1. The Solution Proposed. 161 
 
 2. Historical Sources of this Solution.... 165 
 
 3. Primitive Condition of Humanity. 174 
 
 4. Origin of the Present Condition of Humanity. 183 
 
12 
 
 Contents . 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 The Proof. 193 
 
 1. Nature of the Proof.. 193 
 
 2. Presentation of the Proof. 200 
 
 3. Solution of Difficulties. 212 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 The Conflict of Life. 241 
 
 1. Point of Departure..,. 244 
 
 2. Scope of our Efforts. 251 
 
 3. Shoals. 255 
 
 4. Plan of the Conflict. 262 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 
 The Source of Strength. 275 
 
 1. Food of the Soul. 277 
 
 2. Prayer. 285 
 
 3. The Question of Faith. 302 
 
 Index. 325 
 
THE 
 
 PROBLEM OF EVIL. 
 
 - <+*•*. -- 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 THE GOOD. 
 
 There is need neither of much art nor of many words 
 
 to impress you with the importance of the General in¬ 
 terest of the 
 
 subject which has called us together. The subject. 
 Problem of Evil! Who of you has not, time and 
 again, proposed it to himself. Looking abroad 
 over the face of society, how much discontent is ob¬ 
 servable—how many complaints of political oppres¬ 
 sion and cruel revolutions ! of excessive luxury on the 
 one hand, and squalid poverty on the other ! The 
 history of nations is but too often a tissue of crimes 
 and a web of misfortunes. And to the conflicts of 
 society are to be added the convulsions of nature : 
 tempests engulfing navies ; earthquakes swallowing 
 up cities ; famine decimating populations. Thus, on 
 looking without, we meet the problem of evil in 
 history and in nature. And when we turn our eye 
 within, we find it reappearing under the form of 
 sorrow and suffering. Is it not, in fact, our almost 
 
14 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 unvarying lot either to suffer, or, what is worse still 
 for many hearts, to see suffer ? Finally, whoever will 
 descend into the sphere of conscience and duty will 
 there hear a voice ceaselessly upbraiding him for 
 having himself perverted his moral liberty;* and the 
 problem of evil will reappear in the agonies of re¬ 
 pentance and the bitterness of moral impotency. 
 
 In approaching this problem we are not influenced 
 
 Motives to its by mere intellectual curiosity: higher inter¬ 
 discussion. es {- s are a j- s t a k e< There is danger lest, by the 
 
 contemplation of so much evil without us and within, 
 our judgment hesitate to believe in the good ; lest our 
 heart, growing discouraged,-dare no longer hope for 
 happiness ; lest the soul finally come even to doubt of 
 God. And it is natural enough that the poet, in 
 shaping this thought into musical words,f should 
 awaken in our souls a lively response. In grappling 
 with the problem of evil I do not hope to raise all the 
 
 * Une voix sera la pour crier a toute heure : 
 
 Qu’as-tu fait de ta vie at de ta liberte ? 
 
 Alfred de Musset. 
 
 t Pourquoi done, 6 Maitre supreme ! 
 
 As-tu cree le mal si grand, 
 
 Que la raison, la vertu merne, 
 
 S’e’pouvantent en le voyant ? 
 
 Comment, sous la sainte lumiere, 
 
 Voit-on des actes si liideux ; 
 
 Qu’ils font expirer la.priere, 
 
 Sur les levres du malheureux ? 
 
 Alfred de Musset. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 15 
 
 vails, to dissipate all mysteries, to answer all questions. 
 Excuse me from such presumption. 
 
 What I wish and hope to do is this. The study of 
 this sad subject has been profitable tome g iritofthe 
 personally. During a protracted survey of ,Uscusslon - 
 the shadowy domain of evil, I have successively risen 
 to brighter visions of the light of good. This expe¬ 
 rience has given me courage to undertake to confront 
 the great difficulties of the discussion which we com¬ 
 mence to-day. My hope is to associate you with 
 my thoughts ; to conduct you along the path which, 
 though arduous, was yet so salutary to myself. I am 
 not an artist seeking to captivate by beauties of speech, 
 nor a master teaching with authority; I am simply a 
 fellow-traveler who, thinking that he has made, in 
 the obscure valley which we are all traversing, a few 
 steps in the direction of the light, would gladly show 
 you the way. 
 
 Our aim to-day will be to define the idea of the 
 good, then to characterize more fully its nature, and, 
 lastly, to seek what guarantee, what assurance, we 
 can have of the reality of this idea. The General 
 
 heads of the 
 
 order of our lecture will therefore be, Defini- first lecture, 
 tion of the Good, Characterization of the Good, Guar¬ 
 antee of the Good. 
 
16 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 I. Definition of the Good. 
 
 If light did not exist we would have no idea of 
 darkness. We cannot clearly comprehend the nature 
 of evil, save as we have an exact idea of the good. 
 But this word, which plays so large a part in the 
 Three uses speech of men, is of diverse application. 
 
 of the word 
 
 ‘•good.” These varieties of application of the word 
 “ good,” however, may all be reduced to three. 
 
 When man is on the point of acting, he hears an 
 interior voice speaking with authority and saying to 
 him, Do this, and avoid that ! It is the voice of 
 conscience. That which constitutes conscience is 
 1. As reiat- simply this primitive feeling of obligation 
 
 ing to flie 
 
 oon science. binding our will to do this and to avoid 
 that. This obligation is not desire, for it often op¬ 
 poses the most ardent desires of our hearts ; it is not 
 constraint, for it appeals to our liberty; but it is a 
 primitive part of our nature, distinct from every other, 
 and constituting the basis of obligation ; that is, it is 
 a commanding power which we feel and admit to be 
 legitimate. We are free, but we are not the arbiters 
 of our liberty. “ We should not, like voluntary com¬ 
 batants, have the presumption to place ourselves 
 above the idea of duty, and pretend to act only of our 
 own prompting, without need of orders from a supe¬ 
 rior. . . . Duty and obligation ! these are the only 
 words suitable for expressing our relation to the moral 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 17 
 
 law.” Thus speaks Kant in his Critique of the Prac¬ 
 tical Reason . He says, “ our relation to the law,” and 
 he is right. Conscience does, in fact, command us 
 in the name of a law—a law which is universal, and 
 which, under like circumstances, prescribes absolutely 
 like duties to all. There exists a law proposing duty 
 to the free will, and we say that the will is good when 
 it fulfills the duty or obligation. 
 
 I know that this obligation and this law have been 
 denied. There is a certain class of thinkers and of 
 men of the world who say that the words “obligation,” 
 “virtue,” “moral law,” are but deceptive words involv¬ 
 ing at bottom only motives of self-interest and vanity. 
 We will not undertake here a general examination of 
 this theory ; we submit but one remark. The idea 
 of the good is that alone which gives dignity to life. 
 Those who deny the moral law and obligation have 
 no other alternative than either to be inconsistent 
 and to be better than their theory, (which in fact is 
 often the case,) or to call down upon themselves the 
 contempt both of others and of themselves. To do 
 the good is to accomplish obligation or duty. And 
 the good, in the first sense of the word, constitutes the 
 law of our will. 
 
 But we employ the word in a second sense when 
 we speak of th e goods of life : health, fortune, pleasure, 
 reputation, power. But what is it that we seek in 
 riches, or power, or reputation ? what, alas ] in the 
 
18 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 gratification of envy, and revenge ? It is always one 
 and the same thing. In the objects of all our passions, 
 2. As rent- bad as well as good, we seek but this one thing: 
 
 ing to the 
 
 heart. pleasure, delight. Whatever we desire, we 
 desire it as a means of enjoyment. If the miser 
 sacrifices every other pleasure for the possession of 
 gold, it is because the possession of gold is to him a 
 pleasure surpassing all others, and for no other reason. 
 Enjoyment is the food of the soul; deprived of this 
 aliment it languishes and pines away. Our hearts 
 are so skilled in its pursuit that they succeed in find¬ 
 ing it even in suffering itself; so that the poets can 
 without the least absurdity sing of the delights of 
 melancholy and the charms of sadness. The desire 
 of happiness is like the sentiment of obligation, a 
 primitive indestructible part of our nature. You could 
 as easily persuade the water to abandon its natural 
 channel, as man to abandon the pursuit of happiness. 
 
 Here, again, we meet with a certain philosophy op¬ 
 posing itself in the paths of truth—a false wisdom, 
 whose erroneousness we must detect. True wisdom 
 The creed of teaches that there are false goods which must 
 
 Epicurean¬ 
 ism. be renounced if we would find the true good, 
 
 false happiness which must be sacrificed to the true ; 
 
 inasmuch as tfue happiness, that for which aur nature 
 
 is intended, can be found only in a life regulated by 
 
 the law of conscience. True wisdom teaches that 
 
 the soul, even when called to sacrifice to duty all ex- 
 
The Problem of Evil , 
 
 19 
 
 ternal enjoyments, can find in the simple accomplish¬ 
 ment of duty a joy transcending all other joys. And 
 experience confirms these teachings of wisdom; in 
 meeting with but satiety and disgust in evil pleasures, 
 man is, to some degree, driven back by the very na¬ 
 ture of things to the true pleasures which form a part 
 of his destination. Such is the general result of sage 
 reflection and common experience. 
 
 But a different view has been held. It has been 
 held that we can eradicate from our soul the desire 
 for happiness, and* reduce ourselves to a state of abso¬ 
 lute disinterestedness. So thought some of the 
 ancients ; so some of the mystics in all ages ; 0f 4sceti . 
 and so a few of our modern moralists. This C!Sn1, 
 view is the basis of the celebrated Buddhist system, 
 which proposes to obtain from man a sweeping re¬ 
 nunciation of all desire. However, when you come 
 carefully to examine the expounders of this theory 
 you will find that they invariably speak thus : “ In the 
 paths which we commend you will find repose, you 
 will find peace.” In other words they say, “ Re¬ 
 nounce happiness and you will be happy!” To en¬ 
 courage us to the sacrifice of all joys they promise us 
 joy itself as our recompense. Thus nature finds her 
 triumph in the very contradiction in which she in¬ 
 volves her contradictors. The soul seeks joy, happi¬ 
 ness, as its good; and the second sense of the word 
 M good ” is happiness. 
 
20 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 But it has a third sense. And we use it in this 
 3. As relating sense when we apply the idea of good in 
 
 to the rea¬ 
 son. cases where there is neither volition nor 
 
 feeling, and where consequently there can be neither 
 happiness nor obligation. In this third sense we call 
 an object good when it answers its purpose. A lamp 
 is good when it gives light well, because a lamp is 
 designed to give light. A road being a means of in¬ 
 tercommunication, we call it good when it admits of 
 prompt and easy passage. In saying that an object 
 answers its purpose, we have reference to a certain 
 correlative fitness to a certain order; and we affirm 
 that this order is realized. In this third and most 
 general sense, the word good means simply order , 
 fitness. 
 
 There are, therefore, three varieties of good: obliga¬ 
 tion, duty, which is the good of the conscience ; hap¬ 
 piness, joy, which is the good of the heart ; and order, 
 fitness, which is the good of the reason. Thus we 
 have three senses for the same word ; but for this 
 single and unique word can we not succeed in finding 
 one single and all-embracing sense ? The applica¬ 
 tion of a common term implies generally a likeness 
 of ideas ; for languages—the expression of human 
 thought—are not formed by hazard. The one general 
 
 Oood and definition which I venture to propose is this : 
 eva defined. ^j ie j s fj l(l f w hich ought to be ; and the 
 
 evil is consequently that which ought not to be. Con- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 21 
 
 sider well these two statements, for they are the sum 
 and substance of my whole theory of evil. Practically, 
 we are to do the good and avoid the evil, as you 
 already know ; and I have no notion of teaching 
 any thing else. And theoretically, my rule shall be 
 this : to reject all doctrines which deny that the good 
 ought to be, or tend to justify the existence of evil, 
 and to accept the doctrine, whatever it may be, which 
 shall leave intact our two fundamental definitions. 
 As these definitions are of so great importance in the 
 investigation which we are undertaking, it is essential 
 that we accurately determine their force and scope. 
 
 In order to determine what ought to be, it is neces¬ 
 sary, as we have already remarked, to have * The . d<r _ 
 in mind a plan expressive of what is legiti- ment "s° 0<r 
 
 ° implies a 
 
 mate order, what is the purpose of things, and plan - 
 * which enables us to pronounce that the condition of 
 things is or is not in harmony with that plan. Sup¬ 
 pose an object of whose purpose or final cause we are 
 entirely ignorant: we cannot say that it is good or 
 that it is bad. Take, for example, some machine, and 
 ask, Is it a good one? You cannot answer before 
 learning for what it was intended. Is it a sewing- 
 machine ? a thrashing-machine ? Until you determine 
 this you can pass no judgment upon it; being ignorant 
 of its purpose, you cannot say whether it is or is not 
 adapted to that purpose. 
 
 Now, if the good is always that which ought to be, 
 
22 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 in the sense which we have just indicated, it would 
 seem that it is the good of the reason which is the 
 one and all-comprehensive sense of the good. Yes, 
 as the good is always the realization of an order, a 
 purpose, a plan, all forms of the good are goods of the 
 reason, or rational goods, and we see at once that the 
 The third plea of cinswevin? to its purpose embraces 
 
 sense of a> s j: 
 
 “good” in- also the two other senses of the word good, 
 
 eludes the 
 
 two others, provided only that we admit that the will is 
 made for duty, and the heart for happiness ; that is, 
 that the purpose of the will is obligation, and that of 
 the heart, happiness. But it is essential to observe 
 that the “ ought to be ” of the reason would not exist 
 in our thoughts if we did not derive from conscience 
 the primitive and unique idea of moral obligation. 
 While the idea of obligation is wanting there are 
 also wanting the ideas of good and evil, right and 
 wrong. If we suppose a being capable of thought 
 and feeling but without moral consciousness, we can 
 comprehend that he should have notions of the agree¬ 
 able, the useful, the true, the beautiful, but not of the 
 good, in our sense of the word ; for that idea, such as 
 we have it, springs from the conscience. We pass 
 from the law of our will to the conception of a gen¬ 
 eral law of things ; from the idea of what we ought to 
 do, to the idea of what ought to be done. The judg¬ 
 ment “ good,” in its widest scope, always includes 
 the thought of an obligation for a will ; the judg- 
 
The Problem of Evil 23 
 
 ment “ evil ” includes likewise the thought of the fault 
 of some will. The idea of the good is consequently 
 conceived by the reason, but under condition of the 
 co-operation or active presence of the conscience. 
 There is a moral element in every judgment relating 
 to the good. 
 
 That which has often deceived philosophers on this 
 point, and led them to make an entire separation be¬ 
 tween moral good and what they have called meta¬ 
 physical good, is the fact that the word good is 
 applied to objects without volition, and which conse¬ 
 quently cannot be the subjects of obligation. But 
 these volitionless things may, however, be objects of 
 obligation for the volitions of free beings. A house, 
 for example, is under no obligation ; but the predicate 
 bad, as applied to a house, includes at bottom a com¬ 
 plaint against the architect, who ought to have made 
 it good. In the “ ought to be ” of the reason there is 
 always an element of conscience, since without the 
 conscience the word ought would have no meaning. 
 In the idea of the good there is realized thus The word 
 
 good always 
 
 an intimate union between reason, which implies uiti- 
 
 . , rnately an 
 
 conceives a plan, and conscience, which at- “ ought.” 
 taches thereto the idea of obligation. When reason 
 conceives the good it becomes in some sort the organ 
 of the absolute conscience, and pronounces an “ ought 
 to be ” which is valid throughout the universe. 
 
 These-statements can be justified, I think, by a 
 
24 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 detailed review of all the cases in which we use the 
 predicate “ good.” It can be shown that in every in¬ 
 stance where the word is not perverted from its prim¬ 
 itive and natural signification its employment presup¬ 
 poses, together with the idea of a plan, also that of a 
 power which ought to realize it, and which does 
 wrong if it does not realize it. But this demonstra¬ 
 tion would necessarily be very long, and perhaps 
 superfluous. I therefore confine myself here, in gen¬ 
 eral terms, to showing the unity of the three above- 
 mentioned forms of the good ; that is, to showing 
 the harmony of happiness, which is the good of the 
 heart, and order, which is the good of the reason, 
 with duty or obligation, which is the good of the con¬ 
 science. Let us begin with happiness or pleasure. 
 
 It may seem harshly paradoxical to pretend that 
 there is in pleasure, happiness, a moral obligation, 
 and that the conscience and heart may.be reduced 
 to harmony. From the tragic agonies of the Cid of 
 Corneille, wavering* between his honor and his mis¬ 
 tress, to the prosaic case of a student, hesitating in 
 the morning between his place in school which awaits 
 him and the charms of his bed which retain him, is 
 not our whole life one continual conflict between 
 those two elements of which I affirm the concord, 
 namely, the conscience and the heart ? It is true 
 there are bad pleasures ; it is true the law of the 
 heart is not fully coincident with the lavy of the will; 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 25 
 
 and when we affirm that pleasure is obligatory, we 
 do not mean that we are under obligation to seek all 
 kinds of pleasure, “ Do what you should, come what 
 may,” * is the universal law of conscience. But from 
 the facts that there are bad pleasures, and that our 
 exclusively personal happiness is not the law of our 
 will, it does not follow that pleasure is not obligatory 
 in some sense, and for some forms of volition. We 
 can readily see that the happiness of one may be the 
 duty of another. Is not, for example, the happiness 
 of the father the duty of the son ? the happiness of 
 the wife the duty of the husband ? 
 
 But take the question in its most general form. Is 
 it not true that when the law of the will is obeyed 
 the law of the heart ought also to be fulfilled, and 
 that happiness ought to follow the accomplishment 
 of duty, so that happiness, without being the object 
 of our will, is in fact the result of a good volition ? 
 To some degree we realize, in what we call the appro¬ 
 bations of conscience, that it is a fact that happiness 
 attends the practice of duty. But I do not speak 
 of the fact, which often realizes itself only very im¬ 
 perfectly; I speak of what ought to be. Wherever 
 every duty is accomplished, there, all admit, nappiness 
 happiness ought to result; and this connec- 
 tion of happiness with duty is conceived by duty - 
 reason as one of the laws of universal order. Plato 
 
 * Fais ce que dois, advienne que pourra. 
 
26 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 lias depicted an imaginary just man who, while 
 worthy of all the rewards of virtue, was yet covered 
 with all the opprobrium of vice.* Place yourselves 
 now in the suffering presence of this just man. Can 
 you possibly avoid coming at once to the thought 
 that the world in which this just man suffers is an ab¬ 
 normal world ? Whenever a being suffers, it must 
 be that there is some volition to blame for the dis¬ 
 order ; it must be that his suffering is the result either 
 of his own fault or of the fault of others ; otherwise 
 we would have to say that there is injustice, and that 
 the nature of things is evil. But the nature of things 
 is but a mere phrase expressive of facts, but ac¬ 
 counting for nothing. Consequently, in the presence 
 of a world in which every duty should be accom¬ 
 plished, and where, notwithstanding, we should still 
 find sorrow and suffering, the being who should be 
 the victim of this injustice would feel himself better 
 than the nature of the universe ; he would rise up 
 against its Creator and, “ agonizing, cry out, Thou 
 hast mocked me ! ” f A world of creatures continuing 
 in moral order and yet enduring suffering would be 
 inconsistent with divine wisdom. Hence, happiness 
 ought to follow the accomplishment of duty; it forms 
 a part of our destination in the plan of the universe ; 
 it ought to be , and enters therefore into our definition 
 of the good. 
 
 ° “Republic ,’ 1 Book II. f Rousseau. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 -7 
 
 Let us now try to reduce and embrace under the 
 same definition the good of the reason. Let us 
 show that order, fitness, as conceived by the reason, 
 is good only because the conscience attaches thereto 
 the notion of obligation. Wherever we see Eyerv form 
 order accomplished we invariably approbate ot ^ odcalls 
 
 1 j j. i forth appro- 
 
 the agents who realized it. We judge thus Nation, 
 of the works of men ; and, when we stand in the 
 presence of the spectacle of nature, our mind and 
 heart, if not paralyzed in their natural functions, 
 are constrained to approve and adore the Archi¬ 
 tect of Worlds, the Supreme Artist. On the con¬ 
 trary, wherever we meet with disorder we in- 
 stinctively search for a responsible and guilty will. 
 Whenever any thing conflicts with our desires we 
 are inclined to complain of somebody. When 
 the waters of Lake Leman rise a little too high 
 on the Vaudois shores, our neighbors of Lausanne 
 find fault with the authorities of Geneva, who, say 
 they, have obstructed the course of the Rhone at its 
 exit from the lake ; and when the Rhone suddenly 
 rises and overflows the streets of Lyons, the Lyonese 
 complain of their neighbors above for having swept 
 the forests from their hills and valleys. Wherever 
 we see evil we are inclined to blame some Every form 
 
 of evil calls 
 
 free will, and this instinct does not mislead forth blame, 
 us. What does mislead us is our over-readiness in 
 most cases to blame others when we ought to blame 
 
28 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 ourselves, whether for our own active faults or for 
 our presuming temerity of judgment. If it is a case . 
 of disorder observed in a sphere where neither our 
 wills nor those of our fellows have any evident part, 
 what is too often our course of conduct ? We rise 
 up with objections against Providence, and it is the 
 prevalence of this perverse tendency which has mainly 
 Purpose of occasioned me to undertake these lectures. 
 
 these lec¬ 
 tures. It is to answer to objections to the exist¬ 
 ence and attributes of God, that I undertake to dis¬ 
 cuss the Problem of Evil. 
 
 If we find in evil an objection to the existence of 
 God, it is because we believe that the good ought to 
 be , and that it would be if there existed a Being 
 capable of realizing that order which we conceive as 
 legitimate.* The objection cannot be understood 
 otherwise. The thought at bottom is this : Where- 
 ever we discover an evil which us beyond all human 
 
 power, there we are ready to think God fails to do 
 as he ought. But the statement in this naked form 
 
 God is primi- soim ds shocking. Let us explain it. Crea¬ 
 tively under tures suc h as we owing OU1' all tO the Al¬ 
 ii o obliga- 0 
 
 lion. mighty, can primitively have no claims 
 whatever on God ; and, God being originally the sole 
 
 * If God is under no obligation primitively, he can never asmme 
 any obligation, h'or, under what obligation is he to maintain that 
 assumption ? He has a perfect right to falsify. Or, rather, right has 
 no meaning. One thing is as right and as wrong as another.-D.D.w. 
 
The Problem of Evil. • 29 
 
 and absolute existence, there could not possibly be 
 any duties or obligations on his part, since there can 
 be no obligation without an object. “If God had 
 limited our life to two days, this would still have 
 been a favor, and we would have been bound to spend 
 these two days in pleasing and loving him.” * It is 
 no saint who says this ; it is Voltaire. But on the 
 other hand, as Rousseau has justly remarked, God 
 has, so to speak, obligated himself by the manner in 
 which he has constituted our soul. That which he 
 himself has caused us to judge good, this, his own 
 nature, or, as we say, his own glory, obligates him 
 to do. Is it not in this sense that the Hebrews 
 sang, “ Xot unto us, O Lord,' not unto us, but 
 unto thy name give glory, for thy mercy and for 
 thy truth's sake?” Thus we conceive for But he has 
 
 obligated. 
 
 the Absolute Being, not an obligation sub- himself 
 
 . . 1 • • , - , . relatively 
 
 jecting him to an objective law—for this to us. 
 would be absolutely inconsistent with his nature—• 
 no, but an obligation of which he himself is the 
 author. 
 
 Let us sum up these observations. There is a 
 good of the conscience, a good of the heart, and a 
 good of the reason ; but these three forms of good 
 
 * “ Si du Dieu qui nous fit, l’eternelle puissance 
 Eut. a deux jours au plus, borne notre existence, 
 II nous aurait fait grace ; il faudrait consumer 
 Ces deux jours de la vie a lui plaire, a l^aimer.” 
 
30 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 are reducible * to one. The good is that which ought 
 to be. It includes always an obligation for ourselves, 
 for others, or for God, in the sense which we have 
 just indicated. The good is not an entity, a thing ; 
 it is an order determining the relations of beings, 
 relations which ought to be realized by free wills. 
 When the order, the relations, are fulfilled, when the 
 law prescribed for the will is executed, happiness 
 ought to ensue. Thus, the good is the resume and 
 the goal of all the tendencies of our nature. It is 
 the common object of the reason, the conscience, 
 and the heart: of the reason as order, of the con¬ 
 science as duty, of the heart as happiness. 
 
 By the help of til is view we can now more worthily 
 appreciate one of the most beautiful conceptions of 
 ancient wisdom, the comparison in which Plato rep¬ 
 resents the good as the sun of spirits.! We all know 
 the role of the sun in nature. Melchthal, in Schiller’s 
 William Tell , on learning that a ferocious tyrant had 
 put out the eyes of his aged father, thus exclaims of 
 light: “ O noble and celestial gift! all creatures live 
 of light; every happy thing, the plant itself, turns 
 joyfully to the light. But he must sit, groping in 
 night, in eternal gloom ! ” The sun of nature holds 
 
 * Not, I think, reducible to the ought, but coverable by it. It is 
 not reduction to a simple, but bringing under a more generic, predi¬ 
 cate. The ought is a threefold ought. —D. D. W. 
 
 f “ Republic,” Book VII. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 31 
 
 intimately associated in its rays warmth and light, 
 and for this reason the plant turns toward it. The 
 good, the sun of spirits, the true light of reason, 
 holds inseparably associated in its rays, duty, The soul 
 and happiness, and for this reason our souls 
 turn to it. Yes, our souls, when not per- g00<L 
 verted from their natural orbit, gravitate toward the 
 good and love it. This statement, perhaps, surprises 
 some of you. To see us act, one would hardly sus¬ 
 pect our natural love of the good, and on looking into 
 our hearts we hardly perceive it ourselves. As¬ 
 suredly we do not often enough love the good with 
 that effectual virile love which issues in works. Our 
 exact condition is this : we do not welcome the good 
 when it comes under the form of duty, for then it 
 commands and condemns us ; but in and of itself we 
 love it, for it is the supreme beauty, and whenever 
 we are personally out of the question, this natural 
 love makes itself felt. O, if we could only be good 
 without effort, without sacrifice, what numberless dev¬ 
 otees virtue would have! This is readily seen in 
 circumstances where we are personally disinterested. 
 Cicero narrates that “ an aged man of Athens having 
 come to the theater, not one of his fellow-citizens 
 offered to help him to a place ; but, having approached 
 the embassadors of Lacedemon, who occupied re¬ 
 served places, these rose up all of them and received 
 him among themselves. The entire assembly broke 
 
32 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 out in applause. This gave occasion to the remark, 
 that the Athenians knew the good, but were unwill¬ 
 ing to do it.”* How many of such Athenians are 
 to be found elsewhere than at Athens ! Observe 
 Homage of what transpires in our public spectacles. 
 
 vice to vir¬ 
 tue. Represent a young woman in prey to the 
 
 most terrible of temptations, to the seductions of 
 flattery and gold, to the most diabolical of treacheries, 
 so that she shall see on the one hand vice and 
 fortune, and on the other conscience and poverty. 
 Cause her to maintain her purity, to pass through 
 corruption untouched, and to prefer poverty and a 
 good conscience. Do this, and you will be sure to 
 excite applause ; you will make even hardened liber¬ 
 tines weep with sympathy. 
 
 This throws light upon one of the mysteries of 
 Providence in the government of the world. How 
 is it that the moral law has succeeded in maintaining 
 itself? Many centuries ago Sophocles did honor, in 
 Greek tragedy, to this sublime law which oblivion 
 can never abolish. This law, in fact, has always 
 survived. Time has swept away many thrones and 
 republics, many charters and constitutions, but the 
 moral law still stands fast. And yet what law has 
 been more violated, more denied, more assailed, than 
 it ? And it still exists in all its vigor, with its two 
 terrible sanctions: remorse , the punisher of accom- 
 
 * Dc Seiiectute, xviii. 
 
33 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 plished crime, and ennui , the scourge of wasted lives. 
 Our very manner of assailing the moral law betrays 
 our conviction that it is unassailable. Though sue- 
 ceeding but too often in accrediting false maxims to 
 justify our bad conduct, still it is not so Bad men do 
 much the moral law that we deny, as, rather, } 
 
 that we plead, in excuse for violating it, the morallaw - 
 force of exceptional circumstances in our own case. 
 We will the good, the right; we even approve and 
 love them—in others. 
 
 Take the case of that statesman, for example, who 
 meditates the duping of his confreres , acting out the 
 maxim that speech was given to man to disguise his 
 thoughts ; who supposes that, even in the sphere of 
 politics, this man pretends to believe in the propriety 
 of deception as a general maxim ? Let one of his 
 clerks prepare for him a false political report, and he 
 is as ready as any one else to insist on the duty of 
 truthfulness. That banker who enriches himself by 
 criminal abuse of the confidence of his creditors, and 
 who is preparing bankruptcy for others and infamy 
 for himself, does he think of dignifying theft into a 
 universal moral law ? Let one of his subordinates 
 appropriate a few dollars from his safe, and he will 
 very soon recall the chapter of the catechism which 
 enjoins respect for the rights of property. His sub¬ 
 ordinate is a thief, but for himself there is some ex¬ 
 ceptional circumstance to plead. It is thus that 
 
34 
 
 The Problem of Evil, 
 
 we are prone to seek excuses for violating duty in 
 special cases, while at the same time we admit the 
 validity of the moral law in general. We approve 
 of the law ; we apply it to others ; we practice it in 
 the world—save where we find selfish pretexts for 
 violating it. And all the sophisms to which we then 
 resort in self-justification are but so much homage 
 rendered by vice to virtue. We are made for the 
 good, and-, when it does not come into conflict with 
 our evil proclivities, we choose it and love it. 
 
 The good is. an order, a state of relations, which 
 ought to be. This definition embraces the reason 
 which conceives the order, and the conscience which 
 pronounces it obligatory ; and as the good commends 
 itself to the heart by its own peculiar attraction, so 
 all the powers of the soul, provided they are not per¬ 
 verted from their normal direction, are turned toward 
 the good. We must now more specifically character¬ 
 ize the nature of the good, answering the question, 
 What is this order which ought to be ? 
 
 II. Characterization of the Good. 
 
 That which ought to be, among intelligent moral 
 agents, is the accomplishment of the moral law. But 
 what is this law ? Cannot its manifold prescriptions 
 be reduced to one all-embracing expression ? I think 
 so, and propose for your acceptance this formula: 
 That the duty which comprehends in itself all duties 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 35 
 
 is the consecration of each member of society the 
 
 moral law 
 
 to the general good of the whole, (his own is, 
 good included), that is, to the happiness of man¬ 
 kind-meaning by happiness, not transient pleasures 
 which may be in conflict with, but a state of happi¬ 
 ness which cannot be realized save in that condition 
 of order whose expression is, the moral law. 
 
 All duties may be reduced to three classes : Threeclass . 
 duties of dignity , which forbid us to abase esolduties - 
 ourselves to the rank of brutes by enslaving the mind 
 to the body, and by prostituting speech, the organ of 
 reason, to the service of falsehood ; duties of justice , 
 which require us to respect in our fellows the rights 
 of personality, property, reputation ; duties of benevo¬ 
 lence , which enjoin upon us to solace our fellows in 
 their spiritual and temporal necessities. Such is the 
 classification of our duties which, after careful study* 
 of the matter, has seemed to me best. Now the for¬ 
 mula which I have above proposed embraces these 
 three classes of duties. For, in fact, it is essential 
 to the realization of the good of rational, spiritual so¬ 
 ciety that each of its members should, so to speak, 
 spiritualize himself by rising above an animal life, 
 (dignity) ; it is essential that each, by respecting the 
 rights of others, should contribute to render society 
 truly spiritual, that is, free, (justice) ; and it is essen- 
 
 * In a course of lectures on Ethics delivered at Geneva in 1865 
 
 a.id 1006. 
 
36 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 tial that each will should be prompted to the realiza¬ 
 tion of the general good, (benevolence). Imagine a 
 society of moral agents in a condition of progressive 
 development, and in which, on the basis of justice, 
 there should flourish more and more, mutual love ; 
 would not that society be good ? 
 
 What word shall we now find for designating this 
 devotion of each to the common good of the commu- 
 nity ? this supreme virtue which embraces all others ? 
 Comte, the founder of Positivism, has tried to answer 
 the question by inventing a new term, altruisme , 
 “ othersomeness,” interest in others. Moral progress, 
 thinks he, consists in the progressive giving place of 
 egotism to altruisme, or concern for others. But there 
 is a better word. Charity, a term which in common 
 usage has come to be almost synonymous with alms¬ 
 giving, signifies primitively, not only in the language 
 of the Gospels, but also in that of Cicero, unselfish 
 love—the consecration -of each to the good of the 
 others. Prestige being therefore in favor of this word, 
 • we will retain it. We hold that charity is a suitable 
 general expression for the relations which ought to 
 subsist between moral agents as members of society. 
 This being the case, the good, as far as concerns the 
 Charity the relations of men with each other, is the reali- 
 
 sum of all 
 
 moral duty, zation of charity, or the direction of the will 
 of each toward the happiness *of all. 
 
 IIow now shall we conceive of the good, as involved 
 
The Problem of Evil, 
 
 37 
 
 in the relations of'physical nature to humanity ? The 
 body evidently ought to be the instrument of the 
 spirit. External nature ought to be the condi- The minist 
 tion of the life of the body; ought to give im- ot nature * 
 pulse to the investigations which culminate in science; 
 to the works of industry which establish the dominion 
 of man over matter; to the instinct of art which, taking 
 physical beauty as a starting-point, soars aloft in 
 search of the ineffable, the ideal. Nature in submis¬ 
 sion to spirits, spirits submitting to the law of 
 charity—would not that be a good state of things ? 
 It is to you, the great public, that I appeal for an 
 answer. I have not come here to teach you any thing 
 new, but rather to remind you of what you already 
 know; to aid you, perhaps, to brush away the dust 
 from the depths" of your souls that you may read the 
 characters that are there engraved. I ask you, Do 
 you not perceive—I do not mean in your practice, but 
 in your conscience and your reason—the image of the 
 good which I have just described ? Do you not 
 admit as a certain truth one that forces itself upon 
 your judgment, that, in the order of fitness, in a le¬ 
 gitimate and good condition of the universe, material 
 bodies are made for spirits, and spirits for charity ? 
 Does this conception bear any traces of the arbitrary, 
 the individual, the national ? Is it I merely* or you, 
 or a Russian, or an American, who conceives of the 
 good under the form in which I present it ? or is it 
 
38 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 not all and each of us, or, rather, humanity itself as it 
 exists in each of us, free from all individual and na¬ 
 tional peculiarities ? Is there one of you who fails 
 still to distinguish this deep primitive voice of human 
 nature from the discords of the surface ? In fact, this 
 voice is too often drowned by the clangor of the pas¬ 
 sions, the tumult of disorderly tendencies ; but it 
 finally succeeds in making itself heard by every soul 
 that is earnest and calm. The destination of the soul 
 is to rule our nature. To will the general good is 
 the supreme law of moral agents. These thoughts 
 find an echo in the depths of every conscience. 
 
 And here we come in conflict with a doctrine as 
 ancient as human letters, but which, ridiculously 
 enough, certain writers of the day are attempting to 
 rejuvenate under the title of modern science. We are 
 told that there is no good per se, no real and absolute 
 good ; that there are customs, and that these vary ; 
 but that, aside from these customs and their history, 
 some deny there is no permanent law of the good—no 
 unvanin'/ mora l principles. We are told that many 
 moral law. things judged bad in Europe, are judged 
 
 good in Asia ; that, for example, a young American 
 Indian obtains the praise of his father and the smile 
 of his mother for returning home with the scalp of 
 his foe, an act with which European parents would 
 hardly be pleased. And from a large number of facts 
 such as these, it has been inferred that the conscience 
 
The Problem of Evil ’ 
 
 39 
 
 has no invariable character; that it is like soft wax, 
 shaping itself indifferently to whatever pressure is 
 applied. This view is aptly presented in these words 
 of Montaigne, as stated by Pascal in his Pmsecs: 
 “ One sees scarcely any thing just or unjust, which 
 does not change character in changing climate. Three 
 degrees of polar elevation reverse the whole system 
 of jurisprudence. One meridian, more or less, over¬ 
 throws a truth. . . . Admirable justice which is limited 
 by a river ! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error 
 on the other ; . . . the mockery is so great, the caprice 
 of men is so fertile, that there is not a single law that 
 is universal. Theft, incest, the murder of infants and 
 of parents, every thing has had its place among virtu¬ 
 ous actions.” Resting on considerations of this na¬ 
 ture, it has been declared that the good is only an 
 idea of relative, variable, local, temporary character, 
 so that it is impossible to determine it in a general 
 absolute manner. These declarations are so grave 
 that their admission would undermine the very pillars 
 of our moral system. Let us, therefore, examine them 
 briefly, but seriously and in good faith. 
 
 Moral views vary. To understand well the nature 
 and scope of this incontestable fact, it is necessary to 
 examine more closely than we have yet done the na¬ 
 ture of moral phenomena. 
 
 That which we call conscience is the sentiment of 
 obligation which enjoins upon us certain modes of 
 
40 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 action, and forbids others. Without this unique senti- 
 Diversity of ment there would exist for us neither good 
 
 practical 
 
 moraljud- nor evil, esteem nor contempt. Now, the 
 
 merits ac- 
 
 counted for. idea oi good and evil, and the sentiments 
 therewith associated, constitute an essential element 
 of human nature ; the individual who should be de¬ 
 void of them would be what naturalists call a monster; 
 but the existence of monsters does not disestablish a 
 species. The idea of the good exists wherever man 
 exists in the integrity of his nature ; to this there are 
 no exceptions. But What is good? or, in other words, 
 What ought man to do? It is at this point that di¬ 
 versity begins. We cherish our aged parents, and 
 think we do well. Certain savages kill them to save 
 them from the ills of old age, and think likewise that 
 they do well. Now whence this diversity of rules of 
 conduct ? It arises from difference of belief. We 
 hold that man has no right over the life of man ; 
 savages who kill their aged parents hold a different 
 view. It is from diversity of views as to the nature 
 and destination of creatures that diversities of moral 
 Conscience practice arise. Conscience is not a faculty 
 
 not product¬ 
 ive of ideas, productive of new ideas ; it applies the senti¬ 
 ment of obligation to the realization of certain intel¬ 
 lectually perceived relations ; it conforms itself to the 
 truth, but it does not derive the truth from itself. 
 Truth is, however, the aliment of the conscience. 
 There is not one form of ethics for the conscience, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 4i 
 
 and another for the reason. Reason, alone and of 
 itself, has no moral law ; and conscience, alone and of 
 itself, contains only the sentypent of obligation, the 
 object of which, however, cannot be determined, save 
 by the intervention of the reason. Hence all rules of 
 practical morality are necessarily subject to the influ¬ 
 ence of speculative beliefs. Hence it is very evident 
 that that new theory of the day, la morale independante , 
 which pretends to sever the dependence of morality on 
 speculative beliefs, requires of its devotees to ignore 
 or forget the most incontestable results of anthropo¬ 
 logical science. 
 
 But the views of practical morality do vary con¬ 
 siderably. We admit it. It is easy to refute such 
 theorists as deny it. But I propose to submit three 
 observations which will prevent, as I think, the de¬ 
 duction, from this incontestable fact, of the inferences 
 which skepticism too hastily draws. First observa¬ 
 tion : The diversities in moral views, though real, 
 are not so extensive as a superficial examination might 
 lead to suppose. There exist every-where in the sphere 
 of morals two quite distinct currents. The one is 
 formed by usages and institutions, and by the maxims 
 
 which look to the justification of the usages The morali¬ 
 ty of public 
 
 and institutions. This is the morality of the me. 
 world, and it varies very extensively ; but the cause 
 of these variations is easily discoverable. Formerly, 
 for example, certain publicists of the Southern States 
 
42 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 of America constructed theories in justification of 
 slavery. The pressure that was exerted on the social 
 conscience by institutions and interest is in this 
 case very evident. We see analagous facts very fre¬ 
 quently in the works of writers on politics, who indeed 
 seem to have a large assortment of moral theories by 
 which to explain and justify the events they narrate, 
 and in which they have often shared. 
 
 But alongside of this zigzag and broken current, 
 The moraii- there is another. There is a morality which 
 
 ty of the 
 
 conscience, we call the morality of the conscience, with¬ 
 out forgetting that it is participated in by the reason, 
 and influenced by speculative views. This current 
 of morality varies less than the former, and varies 
 only in developing itself in a uniform direction. We 
 are not justified in attributing to the morality of the 
 conscience the variations which belong only to the 
 morality of society. Institutions and usages do not 
 always give a correct idea of the true thoughts of a 
 people. Our foundling hospitals do not prove that 
 family duties have no sanction in our theories of mo¬ 
 rality. Now, we often judge half-civilized and illiter¬ 
 ate nations by their usages and institutions ; and yet, 
 perhaps, among these same nations, conscience finds 
 true champions, but whose protests against certain 
 immoral usages remain unknown to us. But in cases 
 of nations which have a written history it is easy to 
 show, that the morality of the conscience varies less 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 43 . 
 
 extensively than is usually supposed. The ancient 
 books of India, of China, and of Persia contain some 
 very pure rays of truth, some very high conceptions 
 of the good. To cite but a single example, the an¬ 
 cient Sanscrit poem of Valmiki, Ramayana , contains, 
 among many fantastic fancies, some traits of virtue 
 from which we might derive instruction. The heroine 
 of the poem, Sita, is a woman of admirable purity ; 
 and the author addresses, more than once, to the per¬ 
 sonages whom he would present to us as worthy of 
 praise, the encomium, that they find their pleasure in 
 the pleasure of all creatures. 
 
 Notwithstanding, therefore, the considerable varia¬ 
 tions in usages and institutions, and in the maxims 
 which justify them, we find nevertheless among man¬ 
 kind a substratum of convictions which gives to the 
 idea of duty a greater degree of fixity. As civiliza¬ 
 tion begins and advances, these fundamental bases of 
 morality are recognized and brought out into stca(J 
 increasing light; and this process takes place gl ^^ al of 
 wherever culture finds footing. Christian knowledge, 
 morality alone, in my opinion, has placed in its true 
 light the fundamental law of moral order, and thus, 
 by enlightening the conscience, has enabled it fully to 
 accomplish its normal functions. Nevertheless we 
 find among the sages of Greece and Rome, and 
 among those of the far Orient, the enfeebled and scat¬ 
 tered, but real, rays of that light which illuminates 
 
44 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 us to-day. It is only a superficial examination of 
 facts that can lead to the notion that there is no 
 limitation to the discordancy of moral beliefs ; a 
 deeper study corrects this impression. 
 
 Second observation : When truth is presented to 
 the conscience it recognizes it, adheres to it, and, 
 Conscience save in exceptional cases, (jvhich,constantly 
 
 retains the 
 
 light which recur in the sphere of morals, for the reason 
 
 it once re- . . . 
 
 ceives. that it is the domain of liberty,) never again 
 separates from it. When man, carried away by pas¬ 
 sion, forsakes the good which he has known, it is 
 generally the case that his conscience continues faith¬ 
 fully to remind him of the laws which his conduct 
 is violating. This is one of the reasons of the indis¬ 
 pensableness of distraction to those whose lives .are 
 guilty; they flee from themselves, so to speak, only 
 in order to avoid the sight of an unwelcome light 
 which beams forth in the soul as soon as it is in re¬ 
 pose, and sheds too bright a glare upon the darkness 
 of an external life of disorder. 
 
 The general history of humanity already illustrates 
 the same truth. When it is asserted that every 
 nation has its peculiar ethics as well as its religion, 
 and that we have no good reason for supposing our¬ 
 selves in the right rather than the Hindoos, the 
 The potency Chinese, or the Greenlanders, it is forgotten 
 
 of a civili¬ 
 zation the that diverse forms of civilization do not 
 
 Normalcy, enter as equal factors in the development 
 
The Problem of Evil. 45 
 
 of mankind. When two forms of civilization come 
 into contact, and, after a long conflict, finally shape 
 themselves into a new civilization, what is the result ? 
 Morally, the more corrupt form usually corrupts the 
 other; intellectually, the more enlightened brings the 
 other to its light. Without turning over widely the 
 pages of history, look simply at what is transpiring 
 under our own eyes. European civilization—-or, to 
 call it by the name which indicates its source, 
 Christian civilization-— 4 s visibly accomplishing the 
 conquest of the world. Its triumph is but a question 
 of time, as all admit. It advances, it attacks, but 
 has no need of self-defense. Christians are busy in 
 
 putting down the immoral and cruel practices of 
 
 % 
 
 Asia and Africa; but the Indians make no attempts 
 to introduce among us the system of caste or of 
 human sacrifice, and the blacks of the equator send 
 no missionaries to convert to the barbarism of their 
 customs the people of France and England. The 
 principles of dignity, of justice, and of benevolence, 
 which form the basis of our ethical views, are the 
 sole principles in which the conscience recognizes its 
 true nature. 
 
 It is vain to object, that this is only our opinion, 
 and that contrary opinions have exactly the same 
 value for those who adopt them. We have in favor 
 of our view the weight of an immense and incon¬ 
 testable fact. Our opinions are taking possession of 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 the whole globe; Asiatics and Africans will affirm 
 The future it as well as we. The future of the world 
 woridbe- b e i° n & s to our moral ideas ; our free-thinkers 
 
 Christian even > do n °t doubt it. Do you wish a proof 
 civilization. 0 f this ? Hear what they say, and read what 
 
 they write, when, not engaged in defending their 
 skeptical views, they betray their real thoughts. We 
 repeat it, the history of the race, and an examination 
 of its actual condition, refute the notion that the con¬ 
 science yields equally to all forms of moral doctrine. 
 That moral doctrine which has vital power to destroy 
 all others, and to possess itself progressively of the 
 human race, is manifestly the doctrine which is 
 adapted to man, and which man does not renounce 
 when once he has received it. This fact is of im¬ 
 mense significance. 
 
 Third observation : When a man has ascended a 
 degree in the scale of moral conceptions, he can see 
 well enough how false notions of virtue should be 
 formed in the inferior regions. But the inverse is not 
 the case ; the mind that is blinded by a belief in false 
 virtues cannot understand, and, in fact, absolutely 
 Higher vir- misconceives, the nature of true virtue. He, 
 derptoodTy f° r example, who, like Zamore in A hire, be- 
 lower, but p eves that vengeance is a virtue, sees only 
 
 not vice a ’ J 
 
 verm. weakness and cowardice in the man who 
 forgives. But when, after a violent inward struggle, 
 the Emperor Augustus brings himself to pardon 
 
The Problem of Evil. 47 
 
 Cinna, who, though overwhelmed with benefits, had 
 yet conspired to assassinate him, we can readily im¬ 
 agine the exalted emotions which this triumph over 
 self called forth in his soul.* And while in this state 
 of mind he understood well enough the false virtue 
 of vengeance, and saw with all clearness the error of 
 the violent and passionate man, who sees only weak¬ 
 ness in the spiritual triumph of him who forgives. 
 
 I hope, by the light of these three observations, to 
 put you on your guard against the approaches of 
 moral skepticism, which is, in fact, one of the most 
 dangerous forms of the spirit of doubt. Doubtless 
 we are as yet very far from possessing moral truth 
 in its most perfect developments and applications, 
 for we are far from having fully profited by the light 
 which we have already had. But our Christian mo¬ 
 rality has an all-conquering vital power, and it en¬ 
 ables us to understand all the lower degrees of moral 
 development; it gives a perfect explanation of the 
 origin and nature of the false maxims which passion 
 has generated, and of which we discover the germs 
 in ourselves. 
 
 * Je suis maitre de moi coniine de l’univers. 
 
 Je le suis, je veux l’etre. O siecles, 6 memoire ! 
 
 Conservez a jamais ma derniere victoire. 
 
 Je triomphe aujourd’hui du plus juste courroux 
 
 De qui le souvenir puisse aller jusqu’a vous. 
 
 Soyons amis, Cinna, c’est moi qui t’en convie. 
 
 Cinna. act v, scene 3. 
 
48 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Conscience is not like soft wax, taking indifferently 
 every shape. Let me suggest a better comparison. 
 Those of you who have climbed our Alps have per¬ 
 haps noticed near the limits of woody vegetation 
 certain trees clinging desperately to a rocky surface. 
 The uncongenial soil has tortured their roots ; snows 
 and ice-slides have disfigured their trunks ; the cold 
 has dwarfed the growth of the branches, and the teeth 
 of the chamois have put the climax to their deformity. 
 Conscience These wretched trees adapt themselves, it is 
 
 com para ole, 1 ’ 
 
 not to wax, true, to these deforming influences. But 
 
 but to the 
 
 vital princi- they have within themselves a vital principle 
 
 pie in vege¬ 
 tation. — the principle of a far different growth and 
 
 development. This development they can only attain 
 under the conditions of fertility of soil and abundance 
 of sunlight. But even here it is not the soil and the 
 sun which determine their superior forms ; it is only 
 when they find congenial nutriment, soil, light, moist¬ 
 ure, that their genuine germinal nature is enabled 
 to realize itself. Now it is thus of the human con¬ 
 science. Conscience is primitively adapted to recog¬ 
 nize true moral principles, but it has not the power of 
 producing them unaided. Error, passion, interest, 
 deform it. But give it only the soil of truth, and it 
 will spring up to a far different development. Until 
 you have accepted this thought, you cannot under¬ 
 stand the history of humanity. You will be unable 
 to account for certain great facts so long as you 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 49 
 
 refuse to admit that the will has a law which it seeks, 
 
 # 
 
 and that the conscience can find satisfaction only in 
 a definite conception of the good. 
 
 There is a positive principle of good and evil, and 
 in the diversities of our theories and usages we more 
 or less approximate this existing law, I hope to in¬ 
 duce you to admit, that, despite the doubts that may 
 have passed over the surface of your minds, you have 
 never seriously thought otherwise—never can think 
 otherwise. 
 
 Consider, that if in the sphere of morality there 
 was nothing but fluctuations, but no permanent law, 
 the very words better and worse , which pre- Th0 words 
 
 J r ‘“better” and 
 
 suppose the good as a standard of compari- “worse”pre¬ 
 suppose an 
 
 son, would be utterly without sense. Some unvarying 
 
 , _ < standard of 
 
 modern writers have wished to substitute for comparison, 
 the idea of good the idea of progress. But this was 
 surely thought run mad. Progress being simply an 
 approaching of the good, we cquld not conceive of 
 progress save in view of some—obscure, it may be, 
 but yet positive and real—idea of the good. Without 
 the idea of the good in our thoughts we could know- 
 nothing either of progress or decadence, but only of 
 mere changes. Attempt, if possible, to think in this 
 manner. Attempt to think that a generous and de¬ 
 voted man is different from an egotist, who basely 
 sacrifices the interests of his fellows to his own per¬ 
 sonal desires, but that he is not better. Try to think 
 
 L 
 
50 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 that the moral condition of the lowest savages, who 
 pass from murder to debauch, and from debauch to 
 murder, is different from the moral condition of the 
 most upright people of Europe, but that it is not worse. 
 You may attempt, but you cannot succeed in so 
 thinking. Doubtless you may say so ; but if, on seri¬ 
 ously examining your inmost thoughts, you still per¬ 
 sist in saying so, then you would evidently present a 
 case to which the remark of Spinosa would apply— 
 that, in order to cure a doubt which exists only in 
 words, there is need not for arguments, but for a 
 specific against obstinacy. 
 
 In the variations of morals and ethical ideas there 
 are progresses and decadences, as no one seriously 
 denies. There are changes which are generally ad¬ 
 mitted as true progress ; there are others which are 
 universally considered as steps backward. Let us 
 examine some of these changes, and we will encounter 
 again the true idea of the good. 
 
 The practical application of steam and electricity 
 are improvements of which our century is justly 
 proud. We do not sympathize with those narrow 
 spiritualists who speak with disdain of what they 
 rhe signifi- call “ mere material conquests.” But what 
 
 material do we see here ■ We see the human mind 
 conquests. mas t e ring more and more the agents of 
 
 nature, and succeeding, to some extent, in triumph¬ 
 ing over space and time. These are surely noble 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Si 
 
 conquests. But if these victories over nature were 
 employed only in satisfying the body, in multiplying 
 the delights of the flesh—-if telegraphs and railroads, 
 instead of contributing to spread over the globe intelli¬ 
 gence and spiritual light, contributed only to increase 
 the luxury and practical materialism of life-—who then 
 would hesitate to call them steps backward? You 
 will not dispute these two statements : mind pro¬ 
 gresses in conquering nature ; it declines in becom¬ 
 ing subservient thereto. 
 
 Let us now pass to the social sphere. When we see 
 justice prevailing more and more in institutions, the 
 poor and the rich equally favored in the sanctuary 
 of the law ; when we see benevolence increasing in 
 our customs, the different classes of society laying 
 aside their feuds and mutually aiding each The good 
 other in ameliorating the evils inseparable *,j e oi 
 from our earthly condition—that we call pro ® 1,ess - 
 progress. No one can think otherwise. Can you 
 possibly think that it would be well that force should 
 supplant right, and trample justice under foot ? that 
 hatred and war should take the place of mutual good¬ 
 will ? Can you admit that barbarism is not worse 
 than civilization? You cannot. 
 
 There are, therefore, degrees of progress, incontest¬ 
 able progress. In our relations to nature, progress is 
 the increase of the domination of mind over matter. 
 In the relations of men to each other, progress is the 
 
52 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 development of that charity which crowns justice 
 with benevolence. Now, progress is simply advance¬ 
 ment toward the good. In admitting the forms of 
 progress which we have just passed in review, we 
 declare that it is good that nature be subject to mind, 
 and that mind be subject to the law of charity. Our 
 formula is therefore justified ; the good is known to 
 us. That nature be subject to mind, that mind be 
 subject to the law of charity, is the legitimate order 
 of the universe, as conceived by reason, and as de¬ 
 clared obligatory by the conscience. 
 
 We are able now to construct, above and outside of 
 our widely variant national and individual usages and 
 tastes, the great outlines of the edifice of the good as 
 it is conceived by man as man. Let us do so. Let 
 society as us suppose a society which is good. Let us 
 
 conscience - . .. 1 i r 
 
 calls for it take trom it all war, tyranny, revolt, theft, 
 prostitution, murder—in fact, all the shameful and 
 bloody plagues of humanity. Let the men be tem¬ 
 perate and strong, and let them be successively gain¬ 
 ing the mastery of nature by the light of science and 
 the labor of industry. Let the women be chaste and 
 dutiful, transmitting to the rising generation the 
 heritage of their virtues. Suppose the families and 
 the state to abound in that peace which springs of 
 mutual love. Such a society would be happy indeed, 
 for the treasures of joy of which the human heart is 
 capable are almost infinite. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 53 
 
 Have you ever gone over in thought the long cata¬ 
 logue of joys which we lose by our own fault ? I was 
 returning into Geneva, not long since, on a radiant 
 
 autumnal evening. The air was tranquil, the a reminis¬ 
 cence of the 
 
 sun had just sunk behind the chain of the author, 
 jura, a calm transfiguring glory crowned the mount¬ 
 ain peaks. It was a joy to respire and gaze, and I 
 thought of the many for whom this joy was lost by 
 their own faults. Above all I thought of myself, and 
 of the occasions when, absorbed with profitless cares', 
 I had neglected pure joys that are always at hand. 
 How numberless are the joys offered to us in the 
 contemplation of nature, in the relations of family and 
 friendship, and in honest and successful labor ! How 
 happy the world if we could .eliminate from it all evil! 
 But would that be enough ? would that fully satisfy 
 our aspirations for the good ? No! And why? Be¬ 
 cause of death. So long as the thought of death, of 
 real death, is before us—of that death which is not a 
 transformation of life, the passage from one stage of 
 existence to another, but an end of life, an annihila¬ 
 tion—so long as the thought of death is before us we 
 may enjoy some elements of good, but not the full 
 good to which our soul aspires, the supreme good. 
 
 In youth we are full of confidence in life; and death 
 itself, appearing only at the distant horizon, and 
 shrouded in the mists of the future, has even some¬ 
 thing of the poetic and melancholic. But let age 
 
54 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 advance, and the limit of life begin to be felt; let the 
 The fearful- somber fingers of death begin to assume 
 Death. more definite lineaments, and we wake up to 
 the thought that each hour is bringing us nearer to 
 our coffin, and is hollowing out the grave for the loved 
 ones about us ; we feel that the river of life is flow¬ 
 ing without rest, and that the river leads to the abyss. 
 And then a profound sadness takes hold on the soul; 
 for it is horrible to feel that all that we have and are 
 is passing from us. This is one reason why so many 
 men fear to look into their own hearts when alone. 
 Some, as we have said, fear this because solitude 
 renders audible the voice of remorse; but others 
 dread it lest, in the silence of the hum of the world, 
 they hear in their souls the terrifying voice, “ Mortal, 
 thou art to die ! ” Death contradicts our nature. It 
 is vain to speak of the leaves which fade and fall, 
 of the seasons which come and pass ; it is vain to try 
 to impress upon us that death is a natural function 
 of life ; we refuse to admit the force of such analo¬ 
 gies—the soul protests. 
 
 I know that certain materialists, who assume to be 
 sages, mock at the pretentiousness of insignificant 
 man in his wish to live forever; but mock as they 
 may, they also in their sober moments think and feel 
 just as we. Their laugh is the hollow laugh which 
 disguises tears ; and if at times it is coarse and bois¬ 
 terous, it is, perhaps unconsciously to themselves, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 55 
 
 because they wish to stifle the voice of their own 
 hearts. For, in fact, death, in the sense of ceasing to 
 exist, would be a disorder contrary to our whole 
 spiritual constitution :• to the conscience, be- Death P r °- 
 
 tested against 
 
 cause conscience calls for an unlimited by conscience, 
 
 heart, and 
 
 growth in perfection, which, as we know too reason, 
 well, is not attainable in this life ; to the heart, be¬ 
 cause the heart is made for perpetual affections, and 
 is rudely broken by severance from the objects of its 
 love ; and to reason, because our nature is so mani¬ 
 festly constituted for life that, on the supposition 
 that we are actually destined to death, we can dis¬ 
 cover no sort of correspondence between its constitu¬ 
 tion and its destination. 
 
 We clearly see the grand outlines of the good—that 
 is, of the order of things—which would fulfill our aspi¬ 
 rations. These aspirations claim not merely the pro¬ 
 longation of life such as it here is ; for so great is the 
 disproportion between the wants of the soul and the 
 actual realities of this life, that sometimes we become 
 satiate of life and ripe for death. We aspire The goul as _ 
 "to a life other than this—a kingdom of the £ res *° a 
 good, of whose brightness we catch some than this - 
 positive, though confused, glimpses even from the 
 midst of our present darkness. And if this visidh 
 were really but a will-o’-the-wisp, if we open our eyes 
 on the marvelous light of this world but to close them 
 finally forever, then our life, were it prolonged even 
 
5 6 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 to patriarchal age, and under conditions otherwise 
 absolutely good, would not only be sad because of the 
 prospect of its end, it would be absurd in itself. 
 Either our conception of the good is chimerical, or 
 we are constituted for life, for life immortal. 
 
 But we are asked for proofs of immortality. Let 
 us state the question properly. Ib is impossible to 
 study the tendencies, the aspirations, the needs of the 
 soul, without being forced to admit that life is the 
 affirmation of, the thesis guaranteed by, our spiritual 
 constitution. To whoever, therefore, demands proofs 
 of immortality, I answer that it is for him to speak 
 first, and I ask that he furnish me proofs of death. 
 But how is one going to demonstrate death, in the 
 sense of a cessation of personal being ? Let us see. 
 
 A man falls sick. His heart finally ceases to beat; 
 his limbs become motionless ; his body begins to de¬ 
 compose ; it is carried to the grave-yard. The grass 
 springs and grows green on his grave; the overhang¬ 
 ing willow renews its foliage ; but the dead comes not 
 again. Let us state this in the language of science. 
 Within the limits of our present experience, the soul- 
 manifests itself only by the means of our present 
 body. But is that all the proof we have of death ? 
 ft is. I do not think that the most subtile of the ma¬ 
 terialistic philosophers, were he at the same time the 
 best of modern physiologists, could produce, in favor 
 of his cause, a proof, which would amount to 'more 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 57 
 
 than this simple statement: Within the limits of our 
 present experience spirits manifest them- present ex- 
 
 r . ,. , . r perience not 
 
 selves to us no more alter the dissolution ot the measure 
 their present bodies. But who can assure 
 them that there is no other experience than ence ‘ 
 the present, no other body than that which we know, 
 and no other life than that which now is ? But this 
 very assumption is their starting-point and the sole 
 basis of their argument. What, I ask, have they in 
 favor of their assumption ? Nothing; absolutely noth¬ 
 ing. Whatever be their display of science, their 
 thought at bottom never contains more than this 
 
 trivial commonplace of the rabble : When people 
 die we see them no more, and nobody ever came back 
 to bring us news from the other world. 
 
 Nobody has come back with news ! But who, then, 
 has returned with this frightful news, that death 
 swallows up life forever ? Who, then, has traversed 
 the universe from point to point, and that, too, with 
 senses to perceive the many things which doubtless 
 lie beyond the reach of ours, and has finally returned 
 to tell us : “ I have seen every thing, even to the limits 
 of space, and nowhere have I found the dead alive ! ” 
 Who, then, has risen from the dark womb of Naught 
 to inform us that the abyss has actually swallowed up 
 all who have lived ? Our dead are no longer with us 
 in the present life ; we know it—our hearts suffer so 
 deeply therefor that we know it only too well. If 
 
58 
 
 The Pioblem of Evil. 
 
 you say, there are no proofs of a future life in the eyes 
 of science as you understand it—namely, that science 
 which admits no other realities than those which fall 
 under our five senses — very well; but when you 
 affirm the annihilation of beings and things simply 
 because they fall no more under the observation of 
 our actual senses, surely you reason very poorly. 
 How will you answer the heart ? the conscience ? the 
 reason ? I insist on this latter word reason; how 
 will you answer the conviction reached by reason, 
 when weighing the spiritual facts of our nature, and 
 attempting to account for them ? To the cry of human 
 nature in its totality, and aspiring toward life, you 
 oppose the objection that our knowledge is the meas¬ 
 ure of all that exists—that beyond our present sensible 
 experience there is nothing. Surely that is a very 
 Cicero's in- narrow style of thought. And I can well 
 
 donation at 
 
 the presump- comprehend the slightly haughty disdain 
 tks. 01 with which Cicero treats the petty philoso¬ 
 phers,* as he cajls them, who, in the presence of a 
 being so manifestly formed for life, dare affirm that 
 the soul perishes when the body dissolves. 
 
 No one, in fact, really denies the fact of the aspira¬ 
 tions of the human soul, which we have just affirmed. 
 In all time and in all countries man has desired—I 
 do not say has invariably believed in—an immortal 
 future. He desires it because he is conscious of the 
 
 * “ Minuti philosophi .’’—De Scnectate , xxiii. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 59 
 
 good, and because, even should he aspire after it with 
 all the powers of his soul, he yet feels that its com¬ 
 plete realization is unattainable in this present state. 
 
 The good presupposes immortality, and the heart 
 is athirst for immortal life. This is not denied ; but 
 still it is asked, What does all that prove ? The 
 answer to this depends on how we answer this other 
 question : Does there exist in the universe so great 
 a disorder as that beings manifestly organized for 
 life are in fact destined to death ? This problem 
 was the ultimate source of the doubts as to future 
 life in all ancient philosophy, whether Greek or Indian. 
 Now, honest doubt is but one of the phases of dis¬ 
 couragement ; the shadows which darken the future 
 are cast from the clouds which vail, from us, the good, 
 the sun of souls. When the soul has once a firm 
 faith in the good, in order, reason will infer, immedi¬ 
 ately and without a shadow of hesitation, from man’s 
 spiritual constitution to his eternal destiny. If the 
 good is to be realized, then life does not cease at 
 what we call death. The good guarantees—presup¬ 
 poses—life ; but what is it that guarantees the good ? 
 This is the last question which our subject raises. 
 
 III. Guarantee of the Good. 
 
 What is it that guarantees the good ? I Godtheonly 
 answer, God. I will not enter here upon sufficient 
 
 1 guarantee 
 
 the general question of the existence of God. °f the good. 
 
6o 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 I have treated that elsewhere.* Nature and humanity, 
 heart, reason, and conscience, presuppose, imply, God. 
 This sacred name is at the base and cap-stone of 
 every thing—at the beginning and termination of all 
 processes of healthy thought. The existence of God 
 is not demonstrated like other truths, for it is the 
 primitive truth on which all other truths are sus¬ 
 pended ; so that we have no other alternative than to 
 decide either for faith in God, or for doubt, absolute, 
 irremediable, all-embracing. I limit myself here to a 
 single observation : The good presupposes God, and 
 a circle, but God guarantees the good. This is a circle, 
 
 not a vicious 
 
 one. but a circle that will not appear vicious to 
 those who have deeply enough examined the laws of 
 thought to know, that all truth terminates ultimately 
 in a circle of light, whereas the characteristic of error 
 is inevitably to end in contradiction. 
 
 The good implies God. To understand this, let 
 us remember that the idea of the good, as held by 
 the reason, originates in the conscience. Conscience 
 gives orders. Have you ever reflected on the two 
 senses of this word, order. An order is a plan, and 
 an order is a command. Conscience in its intimate 
 union with reason is a light indicating to the will 
 what it should do—it reveals an order; and con¬ 
 science is a power enjoining the performance of what 
 ought to take place—it issues an order for the real- 
 
 * Le P're celeste. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 61 
 
 ization of the order which itself has revealed. It is a 
 real power, making itself painfully felt by those who 
 brave it. 
 
 Now, the good, being a universal idea and appli¬ 
 cable to every thing, what is its ultimate origin ? 
 Where exists that world-plan of which we assuredly 
 know but a few outlines ? whence springs that uni¬ 
 versal light, of which a few of the rays fall upon us ? 
 The good, being obligatory on all, what is that which 
 makes itself felt bv us in and through the commands 
 of conscience, and which we conceive as a universal 
 power bearing on all volitions ? Assuredly the good 
 is not a mere personal conception ; it is not we who, 
 in the conscience, issue orders to ourselves ; for 
 these orders are constantly conflicting with our per¬ 
 sonal preferences. It must be, however, that the 
 plan and the power which are felt through the con¬ 
 science do actually exist somewhere and somehow, 
 for they are, in their kind, just as positive realities as 
 are the phenomena of matter. But a plan can exist 
 only in intelligence ; a power exists only in a volition ; 
 therefore, the plan of the good, whose existence is uni¬ 
 versal, can exist only in a universal spirit. 
 
 God per se is not the good, for the good is not a 
 being. God, in his essence, is the absolute The ^ ood is 
 Being ; in his relation to the universe he is * Goa^ipxe- 
 the Absolute Cause ; but the good being the cutton - 
 order established by God for all creatures, God is its 
 
62 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 personal principle or origin, and it is the direct mani¬ 
 festation of his eternal will. 
 
 Abandon thiif position, and you will fall into the 
 darkness of speculations which may seem profound 
 because they are obscure, but which will be obscure 
 only because they are false. You may, no doubt, 
 busy yourself in the practice of the good without 
 making it the object of philosophical speculation ; but 
 so soon as you propound the question, Where and 
 how can the good per se exist ? you will be forced to 
 conclude either that the good is the plan of God, and 
 the conscience the manifestation of his will—which 
 will give you firm footing for your thoughts—or that 
 the good and the conscience are absolutely inexpli¬ 
 cable enigmas. As soon as you reject God, con¬ 
 science and the good, losing all support, fall away 
 and vanish ; and, as the skepticism which then enters 
 the soul strikes at the validity of reason no less than 
 of conscience, the only-course for an honest person 
 in such circumstances is, silence. The choice which 
 must be made is between God, on the one hand, and 
 an absolute irremediable skepticism on the other. I 
 choose God, and for reasons which, I repeat, I have 
 elsewhere given at large. 
 
 The good is, as we have shown, the plan of God, 
 revealing to our conscience that which we ought to 
 do, and to our reason—through the mediation of the 
 idea of duty which it derives from the conscience— 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 63 
 
 that which ought to be done. Our will is good when 
 it accomplishes faithfully the individual task proposed 
 to it, and thus realizes, for its part, the plan of the 
 universe ; from which we may see that Plato did not 
 unaptly sum up all goodness in the single expression, 
 Likeness to God—which may well be translated thus : 
 Harmony of the created will with the creative will. 
 
 In God himself, the good cannot be the conforming 
 to a rule which is external to himself, inasmuch as 
 nothing exists independently of him, neither matter, 
 nor spirits, nor, consequently, the good itself. The 
 good, being in fact not an entity, but the expression 
 of the relations which ought to exist between beings, 
 the existence of the good independently of the matter 
 and the spirits whose relations it regulates, is a mere 
 abstraction void of all reality. The good Thea . ood 
 manifests the creative will in the relations an 1 ^ G 1 od ® 
 of creatures, as the creatures themselves caL 
 manifest the created will by their lives. The good 
 is therefore identical with the supreme will. To 
 speak of the good, and to speak of the will of God, is 
 to speak twice of the same thing. 
 
 The identity of the good with the will of God is a 
 truth of immense practical importance. To make a 
 distinction between the will of God and the good, 
 and to hold that these two ideas have a separate 
 validity, is a dangerous and hurtful error. It pro¬ 
 duces, on the one hand, in many devout persons, an 
 
64 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 •me contra- indifference for those forms of charity which 
 tends 1 !!™ are not exclusively ecclesiastical, (as if there 
 
 nesTmd 5 " cou ^ an y f° rms of good which the Gos- 
 fanaticism. p e | j oes no t commend,) and, on the other, 
 
 it leads to the fatal delusions of fanaticism. I 
 know how words are misused ; I know that a certain 
 class of persons stigmatize as fanaticism all sincere 
 and whole-hearted devotion to one cause ; I know, 
 that to. bring it into reproach, they brand with this 
 term the purest, the noblest of enthusiasms ; but the 
 word, nevertheless, has its proper use, and designates 
 a real and dangerous perversion of the human soul. 
 Fanaticism proper—that which is intolerant and pro¬ 
 scriptive—consists in believing that the will of God 
 may be separated from the good, and that evil may 
 be done to promote the cause of God. This notion 
 has brought great scourges upon humanity and great 
 reproaches to religion. Fortunately it is an error 
 that is essentially repugnant to the general voice of 
 conscience in all ages, as well as to true philosophy. 
 The most ancient odes of humanity celebrate the 
 pure, the holy, the incorruptible; and they* never 
 separate the thought of the Author of the world 
 Conscience from that of moral perfection. The religious 
 
 p ro tested 
 
 againstpoi- sentiment has been sadly perverted by the 
 
 ytlieistie . . ..... 
 
 Vice. worship of the immoral divinities of pagan¬ 
 ism ; but the perversion was perceived, and con¬ 
 science entered its protests. The great poets, those 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 65 
 
 reflectors of popular sentiment, joined with Euripides 
 in his protest against the worship of vice: “ It the 
 gods do wrong, they are no longer gods.” * 
 
 Despite numerous and sad aberrations, it may safely 
 be said, that the natural direction of the religious 
 sentiment leads it to recognize the indissoluble union 
 of the good and the divine will. The Lucifer of 
 Lord Byron can alone reason otherwise; but the 
 human race thinks, with the Adah of the poet, that 
 “ Omnipotence must be all goodness.” But if the 
 race in general thinks so, how of the atheists ? The 
 atheists think so also, as I think I can convince you. 
 Wl®t is their chief argument, the one which, over¬ 
 passing the limits of the schools, has made some 
 noise in the world ? It is this : "If there were a 
 God, there would not be so much evil.” What now 
 
 is the basis of this argument ? It is the idea Atheists as¬ 
 sume the 
 
 that God is essentially goodness, so that to inseparable- 
 
 . ness of the 
 
 show that the world is not good is to dem- ideas of 
 onstrate that it is not the workmanship of goodness. 
 God. Thus the chief argument raised against the 
 existence of God is based on the idea of his good¬ 
 ness. Surprising as it is, we see here, even at the 
 foundation of this saddest of intellectual aberrations, a 
 lingering glimmer of truth, namely, in that, as a final 
 
 * Justin. Martyr has collected, at the close of his treatise On 
 Monarchy , this passage of Euripides, and several other analogous cita¬ 
 tions from the-poets of paganism. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 • t56 
 
 homage to supreme holiness, man prefers the mad¬ 
 ness of atheism to the crime of blasphemy. 
 
 The conscience is the voice of God. So are our 
 children taught in school and family, and so teach I 
 here before an assembled people. Loyalty to the 
 truth would admit of no other teaching, even in the 
 select audience of a learned society, for there are not 
 two systems of truth. There are different degrees 
 of knowledge of the truth. But as it is the same sun 
 which illuminates all bodies, so there is but one and 
 the same sphere of truth for the enlightenment of all 
 spirits. 
 
 Some have thought otherwise in all ages. In our 
 own day some writers of reputation declare that 
 there is one form of truth for the masses—the false ; 
 There is no and another for the aristocracy of thought— 
 
 esoteric 
 
 truth. the true. But the strangest feature of the 
 matter is, that this very form of truth, which, by its 
 lofty and peculiar nature, is destined to remain the 
 peculiar secret of the initiated few, is the form of 
 truth which those writers are most zealous in sowing 
 
 broadcast among the populace. Thus their own 
 practice contradicts their haughty assumption. They 
 have no pretended pearls which they do not eagerly 
 parade before the great public. Now it is to the 
 public at large, to the common conscience, that we 
 address ourselves also. We say here, as we would 
 say every-where, The conscience is the voice of God ; 
 
The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 6 ; 
 
 or, to lay aside all figures, The moral law is the ex¬ 
 pression of the Divine plan, and the binding authority 
 of conscience is the immediate perception of the 
 Supreme Power. 
 
 We have asked, What is the guarantee of the good ? 
 We now know the answer. The good is the thought 
 or plan of the Eternal, the will of the Almighty. 
 He said to matter, Let there be order! and the 
 celestial spheres began their harmonious revolutions 
 in the depths of space. He has said to his free 
 creatures, Let the good be done ! be just, and ye 
 shall be happy. And in this, the promise is insepa¬ 
 rable from the command. All that conscience pre¬ 
 scribes, all that the pure heart desires, all that sound 
 reason conceives, is the good ; and all that is good is 
 God's will. The good is not immediately realized by 
 God, because, in the spiritual sphere, the good must 
 be accomplished by liberty ; the creature, made in 
 the image of God, must become a worker with God. 
 This is the end, the goal to be attained, the ideal to 
 be realized ; it can fully exist at first only in the plan 
 revealed to the conscience, and the free being, who is 
 charged with the accomplishing of the law, is capa¬ 
 ble of turning aside from his mission. But to doubt 
 the ultimate triumph of the good is as bad season for 
 
 hopeful- 
 
 as practical atheism. Let us, therefore, be ness, 
 of good courage and good hope ; the good is guaran¬ 
 teed by the Almighty ; that which oright to be, will be. 
 
68 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 EVIL. 
 
 In defining the good we have at the same time 
 defined evil, which is its contrary. Evil is not the 
 
 absence of the good; the absence of a thing is noth- 
 
 < 
 
 ing, and evil is not a nothing ; it is a reality, un- 
 Evuthecen- fortunately very real—the contrary of the 
 
 trary of 
 
 good. good. Just as the good is not an entity, a 
 thing, but an order in the relation of beings ; so evil 
 is not an entity, a thing ; it is a disorder in the rela¬ 
 tion of beings ; it is a disturbance in the harmony of 
 the universe. There exist neither beings nor things, 
 nor elements thereof, which are evil per se. Nothing 
 exists, in fact, but by act of the Creator, and this 
 act—a manifestation of the Supreme Good—has con¬ 
 stituted each creature in a manner appropriate to its 
 destination. In a world without free creatures, where 
 every thing would continue to be a direct manifesta¬ 
 tion of the Supreme Will, all would be well. But 
 wherever there is liberty all may be perverted. The 
 reason, the heart, the will of spiritual beings may 
 turn aside from their legitimate functions, and thus 
 disturb the normal relations of such beings to nature ; 
 but when, aside from the derangement of functions, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 69 
 
 we consider the being in himself, then all is good. 
 Evil is that which ought not to be. God wills it 
 not—wills that it should not be ; and this Supreme 
 Will constitutes for every created will the duty of 
 destroying it. We propose to examine the General 
 manifestations of evil, first in nature, and g^iKmec- 
 then in humanity ; and, finally, to notice some ture ' 
 theories which deny its existence. The subdivision 
 of this lecture will, therefore, be Evil in Nature, 
 Evil in Humanity, and the Negation of Evil. 
 
 I. Evil in Nature. 
 
 Let us direct our attention, first, to the domain of 
 matter in its simple and inert form. As there is here 
 neither heart nor will, neither can there be suffering 
 nor sin ; evil, therefore, can present itself In what 
 only under the form of disorder, of a false senseeyi1 
 relation between objects and their destina- nature - 
 tion. Now, so far as matter falls under our observa¬ 
 tion, in the fields of physics, astronomy, and geology, 
 can we find such a form of disorder ? The question 
 requires to its answering that another one be first 
 answered. To be able to pass a judgment as to the 
 good or the evil in a given case, it is necessary, as we 
 have seen, to know the plan which determines what 
 ought to be, and to ascertain whether or not the ob¬ 
 jects in question are, or are not, in harmony with that 
 plan. 
 
;o 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 But do we know the general plan of nature ? No. 
 It would seem, therefore, that judgments as to good 
 and evil could not be made in this realm. However, 
 incomplete as science yet is, it has succeeded by the 
 labor of centuries in determining certain principles 
 which throw much light on this subject. 
 
 The phenomena of nature are regulated according 
 to a definite order. The result of the long series of 
 Two ascer- evolutions which our globe has undergone 
 
 tained facts 
 
 as to the has been, to produce the conditions which 
 
 plan of na¬ 
 ture. (i) permitted life to appear thereon, and 
 
 which (2) continue to sustain it. These are certainly 
 two ideas relative to the plan of the universe which 
 are definitively ascertained. And we are constantly 
 finding new confirmations of them as science pro¬ 
 gresses. Phenomena which seemed to form excep¬ 
 tions are falling under the rule. What appeared as 
 
 fortuitous and irregular is traced back to constant 
 
 * 
 
 laws. 
 
 As to our own globe, we can pretty surely retrace 
 the marvelous changes which have wrought out its 
 present habitable condition. When we affirm that 
 there is evil in the facts which produced this condi¬ 
 tion, we pronounce a hasty judgment. Science as it 
 advances shows that every thing in the physical uni¬ 
 verse is order, proportion, harmony. The glaciers 
 of our mountains, for example, might be thought to 
 encumber uselessly vast tracts of land, but closer 
 
The Pi obi cm of Evil. 
 
 
 examination shows, that to them is largely due the 
 fertility and the irrigation of our valleys and plains. 
 The avalanche, which at first sight seems so destruc¬ 
 tive, denudes our mountain slopes only that spring 
 may there reappear all the sooner. The earthquake, 
 which is usually regarded as such a frightful evil, is 
 now known to be one of the normal incidents of the 
 internal constitution of the globe. In fine, our ac¬ 
 quaintance with nature, though as yet not very inti¬ 
 mate, enables us with every new advancement to hold 
 her in better opinion. 
 
 But do you find that this, my answer to the objection 
 that there is evil in nature, is entirely satisfactory ? 
 If you do, you are too easily contented. The order 
 of nature is admirable ; but why is it often so merci¬ 
 less toward man ? The storm, though it may purify 
 the atmosphere, is yet the cause of my ruined house 
 and my overturned orchards. The earthquake may be 
 a normal incident in the production of hill and valley 
 and lake, but it swallowed up Lisbon and Pompeii. 
 And the avalanche, whatever may be said in its 
 favor, yet sweeps away and buries in its ruins the 
 cabin and the vineyard, the shepherd and his flock. 
 These are facts about which we venture to complain. 
 We do not complain that there are disorders Evil in na- 
 in nature perse ; we complain of her relations s ^ s J^her 
 to us. Why is beauteous and harmonious ruations'to 
 nature so severe against man ? While gaz- raan ‘ 
 
72 
 
 The Problem of Evil, 
 
 ing on the glories of sky and cloud, of mountain and 
 plain, of river and lake, why must our ear invariably 
 be greeted by the sighs and wails of suffering hu¬ 
 manity ? 
 
 And here the question assumes a new phase. 
 What we complain of is not that there is disorder in 
 nature, but that nature inflicts sufferings on us. 
 What we term evil in the physical world is only a 
 relation between nature and us, a relation that inter¬ 
 feres with our interests and shocks our sensibilities. 
 
 The question presents new conditions when we 
 enter the realm of animated nature. In fact this is 
 Evil in the for us, as yet, a realm of mystery. Is there 
 
 world a among animals any thing corresponding to 
 
 mystery. w p a ^- we ca |] g j n ? Jf we d ei \y to them the 
 
 moral sentiment, have they not, at least, instincts, 
 proclivities, which become in us sources of moral 
 evil ? Do we not observe among them sensuality, 
 jealousy ? Certainly we find among them, war. 
 How many of the organs whose structure and adapt¬ 
 ation the naturalist so justly admires, are simply 
 defensive and offensive arms, instruments of resist¬ 
 ance and means of assault! As far back as we can 
 retrace the history of our globe, living creatures have 
 pursued and devoured each other. Fossil bones of 
 animals which appear to have preceded the advent 
 of man on earth bear the traces of the teeth of their 
 enemies, and reveal to us, after so many centuries, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 73 
 
 the gigantic and bloody combats of which the primi¬ 
 tive earth was the theater. Life is kept up only by 
 death, and most frequently by a violent and painful 
 death. 
 
 Let us cite here a few words from Joseph de 
 Maistre : “ In the vast domain of animated nature 
 there reigns a visible violence, a species of Words of 
 rage, arming all creatures in mutua funercip DeMaistre - 
 Even in the vegetable world we perceive the begin¬ 
 nings of this law; from the immense catalpa to the 
 most humble grass-blade, how many plants die! how 
 many are killed! But the moment we enter the 
 animal kingdom the proofs of the law are fearfully 
 multiplied. In each of the great classes of animals 
 there are a number of species whose destination 
 seems to be to devour the others ; there are insects 
 of prey, reptiles of prey, fishes of prey, and quadru¬ 
 peds of prey. There is no instant in duration 
 wherein living beings are not devoured by others. 
 And pre-eminent above these races of animals stands 
 man, whose destructive hand spares nothing that has 
 life—he kills in order to feed himself, kills to clothe 
 himself, kills to ornament himself; he kills in at¬ 
 tack, kills in defense, kills to instruct himself, kills 
 to amuse himself, kills for the sake of killing. A 
 king, haughty and terrible, he has need of every 
 thing and is resisted by nothing. But will this law of 
 
 * For mutual destruction, 
 
7 4 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 destruction stop at man ? No, assuredly. But who 
 is it, then, who is to exterminate him ? He himself. 
 It is man who seems commissioned to slaughter 
 man. But how can he accomplish this law ? he, who 
 is of a moral and merciful nature ? he, who is born to 
 love ? he, who weeps over others as over himself? It 
 is war that will accomplish the decree. Do you not 
 hear the earth crying and clamoring for blood ? And 
 it does not cry in vain ; war breaks out. Man, pos¬ 
 sessed of a madness which has in it no element of 
 hatred or wrath, rushes into the field of battle with¬ 
 out knowing what he wants, or even what he does. 
 Nothing is more contrarv to his nature, and vet he 
 does nothing with an equal eagerness ; he is enthusi¬ 
 astic in doing that of which his own soul has horror. 
 
 “ Thus is ceaselessly fulfilled in the whole scale of 
 being, from the worm up to man, the great law of the 
 violent destruction of living creatures. The entire 
 earth, continually drenched in blood, seems little else 
 than an immense altar, on which is to be immolated, 
 without end, or measure, or rest, every thing that 
 has life.”* 
 
 To come into being, to suffer, to die, and to cause 
 others to suffer and die—such is the destinv of ani- 
 mals ! The law which weighs upon us is only an ex¬ 
 tension of the general law of all earthly life. If we 
 do denv to animals the moral sentiment, and there- 
 
 * Abridged from the Soirees de Sai nt- Petersbovrg. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 75 
 
 with the possibility of sin, it is at least difficult not to 
 discover evil among them under the form of suffer¬ 
 ing. But this subject is involved in great perplexity. 
 Before reasoning on the destiny of animals we ought 
 to understand what it is ; but our knowledge has not 
 yet reached that point. 
 
 The state of the question is tiffs : We possess two 
 very distinct conceptions : that of the mechanism of 
 bodies, where there exists only form and motion ; and 
 that of the functions of spirit, whose essential condi¬ 
 tion is consciousness of self. From these two con¬ 
 ceptions there have arisen, as to the nature of ani¬ 
 mals, two rival theories, that of the machine-animal, 
 and that of the man-animal. Let us examine them 
 briefly. 
 
 The theory of the machine-animal is that Theory of 
 of the disciples of Descartes, as also that of ^ ma ‘. 
 a small number of consistent materialists, who maL 
 affirm, without faltering at any of the consequences 
 of their theory, that every thing in the world is sim¬ 
 ply mechanism. According to these, animals are 
 only very fine automatons ; they neither feel nor 
 think ; they move, and nothing more. In support of 
 this view some plausible considerations are urged. 
 It is said that in the infancy of the race man uni¬ 
 formly imagined a soul like his own wherever he saw 
 motion. Thus, for example, the ancients attributed 
 souls to the stars, which revolve, and to amber, which 
 
76 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 attracts light objects. Gradually science has done 
 away with these fancied souls, to the profit of pure 
 mechanism. To deny souls, minds, to animals, is 
 but the legitimate advance of the slow process by 
 which humanity overthrows the idols of its infancy. 
 But this theory finds earnest opponents ; in hunters, 
 for example, who live long and familiarly with their 
 dogs. In fact, none who sustain close and frequent 
 relations with the higher orders of animals will con¬ 
 sent to see nothing but mechanism in creatures whose 
 looks and tones they have learned perfectly to under¬ 
 stand. The thought that all beasts are but autom¬ 
 atons clashes so abruptly with our natural convic¬ 
 tions, that it reacts in favor of the theory of the man- 
 animal. 
 
 The second theory is largely represented in modern 
 Theory of literature ; for example, by La Fontaine, and 
 
 the man- 
 
 animal. especially by Buffon. Read the celebrated 
 descriptions of the latter author—the tiger, the lion, 
 the horse—and you will be surprised to notice to what 
 degree he attributes to these animals the sentiments, 
 the passions, the spiritual qualities of man. This 
 method, though contributing much to the literary 
 beauty of his works, detracts from their technically 
 scientific value. This doctrine of the animal-man is 
 also that of those inconsistent materialists—a large 
 class—who succeed very readily in proving that man is 
 only an animal by taking for granted, as a starting-point, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 77 
 
 without waiting for very overpowering proof, that the 
 animal is a man. It has, moreover, in its favor num¬ 
 berless facts which seem to indicate the presence of 
 sensibility and intelligence in brutes. 
 
 The main objection to this theory is the fact of 
 civilization, which the animal races entirely lack. It 
 is true these races have a history, but their fate seems 
 entirely dependent on external nature. The lack of 
 speech, the absence of progress, seem to Have ani _ 
 suo-o-est that the animal has not full pos- m f! s true 
 session of himself; that, consequently, he per- sciousness ? 
 haps lacks strict self-consciousness, and that the signs 
 of suffering which he betrays do not respond, in the 
 same sense as 'with us, to a really felt suffering. 
 
 Is there, between these two theories as to the nature 
 of animals, place for a third ? Can science conceive 
 of a mode of existence which is neither that of an au¬ 
 tomaton nor that of a free self-conscious spirit ? Per- 
 
 it 
 
 haps. It may be that we possess already some lines 
 of thought and observation that may issue in such a 
 result. In any case, however, the question is far 
 from being solved ; and I think true science will have 
 frankly to admit that, as yet", it does not un- Examination 
 derstand the nature of animals. In the ab- theories !™ 0 
 sence of a solution of the question, I will examine, in 
 their bearings on the problem before us, the two 
 above-mentioned theories. 
 
 If we regard animals as simply a manifestation of 
 
78 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 mechanism, as instruments of universal motion, de¬ 
 void of all thought and sentiment, then assuredly 
 there is no evil among them ; all is well. They en¬ 
 rich the soil, transport grains, contribute to spread 
 vegetation ; in a word, they are admirable channels for 
 the circulation of matter. All is order and harmony, 
 as they perfectly answer their destination. Nor can 
 we say any thing against those animals which dis¬ 
 commode and injure us, any more than we can against 
 poisonous plants; for all these facts, like inundations 
 and earthquakes, appear to us as evil only because of 
 their relations to humanity. 
 
 Now let us examine the other opinion : Animals 
 have souls like, or at least analogous to, ours ; they 
 feel the same disharmony as we between their aspira¬ 
 tions and their actual lot. What shall we say ? Does 
 the butterfly, which escapes from its dark chrysalis 
 only to die a few moments later, weep over the brevity 
 of its life ? The mare of the desert who sees her foal 
 succumb under the heat of the sun, and perish in the 
 parched sands—does she also, like Rachel, weep and 
 refuse consolation ? The sheep which is ruthlessly 
 taken from the flock and butchered—do its compan¬ 
 ions weep and mourn its bloody fate ? 
 
 Grant for a moment that such is the case. Sup¬ 
 pose that these deaths of animals, which rise to mill¬ 
 ions every hour of duration, do call forth the same 
 kind of tears, the same anguish, as the numberless 
 
The Problem of Evil, 
 
 79 
 
 hecatombs of men sacrificed on the altar of war. And 
 what shall we have to say? We shalfsay simply that 
 the realm of evil extends beyond humanity. But will 
 this supposition affect the question before us ? The 
 problem presents itself, in man, in clear and definite 
 terms. Our destination, as expressed in and by the 
 constitution of the soul, is contradicted by our actual 
 destiny. Formed for the good, we perceive Whetheran - 
 
 J o j. imalsareim- 
 
 evil within us ; organized for life, we are the P licated 111 
 
 the problem 
 
 prey of death. And the problem is simply of evil, does 
 
 not affect its 
 
 enlarged in proportion as we attribute to solutions, 
 animals a nature like or analogous to ours. But as 
 we do not, as yet, really know the nature of animals ;• 
 and as, even in case the problem of evil should extend 
 to them, it would still be not a new problem, but 
 simply the old one under a new phase ; so the course 
 of wisdom would seem to be, to study this problem 
 first in ourselves, where it presents itself in a positive 
 and definite shape. And if we succeed here in find¬ 
 ing a satisfactory solution, we may well anticipate 
 that this solution will apply to the animal races in the 
 measure that science may hereafter ascertain that 
 their nature is analogous to ours. 
 
 This is the sole safe method. To study the problem 
 of evil in animals without understanding their nature, 
 and then to apply the results of this study to man, 
 would be very unnatural, and would expose ourselves 
 to great confusion of ideas. To seek a solution in a 
 
8o 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 sphere which is full of mysteries, and not in the well- 
 ascertained facts of our own nature, would be the 
 reverse of a rational procedure. 
 
 But though we are forced to confess our ignorance 
 Two fain- character of evil as found among 
 
 cies- animals, there are two errors in connection 
 with this ignorance which it is important to indicate 
 and correct. 
 
 The first consists in imagining that we have ex¬ 
 plained the presence of evil in humanity by affirming 
 that we spring from the animal, so that our passions 
 and sufferings would also be due to that source. 
 JEven if we should admit, what is in no wise proved, 
 that man has direct kinship with the animal, this con¬ 
 sideration would be far from solving the question 
 before us. The inquiry would still remain: Why is 
 man clothed in this animal nature, and why does evil 
 exist among animals ? 
 
 The second error, which is only the first under a 
 new form, consists in reasoning thus: Passions and 
 suffering are but incidents of a general law ; what we 
 call evil is, therefore, simply a part of the order of 
 nature; we find it from the lowest grades of animal 
 life up to man. Now all that which is incidental to, 
 or included in, the' general order of nature ought to 
 be accepted as good. The utter fallacy of such reason¬ 
 ing is so evident, so unworthy of the human mind, 
 that I scarcely need beg those who have not yet 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 8r 
 
 practiced it, never to be guilty of saying, “ Evil is a 
 general law ; therefore every thing is good,” 
 
 The study of evil in physical nature directs us in¬ 
 evitably to humanity, inasmuch as we find evil here 
 only in the relations of matter to mankind, and not 
 in matter per se. The study of evil in animated na¬ 
 ture also directs us to humanity, inasmuch as we 
 discover evil in animals only in so far as we attribute 
 to them a nature analogous to ours. Let us, there¬ 
 fore, pass to humanity. 
 
 II. Evil in Humanity. 
 
 Evil presents itself among mankind under three 
 
 forms : envy, which is the evil or faultiness of the 
 
 reason ; sin, which is the evil of the con- Threefold 
 
 science; and suffering, which is the evil of formofevlL 
 
 the heart. To show that error, sin, and suffering are 
 
 evils, it is only necessary to show, in the light of our 
 
 definitions, that they are facts which reveal a disorder, 
 
 that is, a want of harmony between the condition of 
 
 the human soul and its destination, as indicated by 
 . * . 
 
 its constitution. 
 
 First, then, error is not ignorance. To prove that all 
 ignorance is an evil would require us to demonstrate 
 that the mind is destined to know all things I)ifference 
 at once and immediately, so that if we could bctwecn 1? ; 
 not tell the number of stars in the skies, or error - 
 
 of sands on the sea-shore, our soul would be in disorder. 
 
 6 
 
82 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 But this is not evident, and would' be difficult to 
 prove. Let us suppose a spirit clearly conscious of 
 what it knows and what it does not know, affirming 
 where it should, denying where it should, and sus¬ 
 pending judgment where it has not sufficient reasons 
 for either affirming or denying ; and suppose that 
 this spirit is continually growing in knowledge, con¬ 
 tinually widening in every direction the horizon of 
 
 • 
 
 its vision : in such a case, will there be any evil ? 
 will not all be good ? This spirit will not of course 
 possess all truth, but it will be full of truth ; all its 
 judgments will be true. Ignorance is an evil only 
 when it conflicts with our immediate destination, so 
 that our will, deprived of light, feels the need of acting, 
 and yet has not the means of acting understandingly. 
 Error ai- Error consists in passing false judgments ; 
 
 ways an 
 
 evil. it is an evil per se, and in all cases. It cannot 
 be denied that the mind is destined to possess the 
 truth ; hence error is in conflict with order, is a dis¬ 
 order, and often a very serious one. Our errors, for 
 example, as to the source of true happiness, throw us 
 into an insensate pursuit of a happiness tvhich ever 
 eludes us ; and our errors as to duty give rise to the 
 mysterious and deplorable- phenomenon of perverted 
 consciences. The most perplexing facts in the whole 
 sphere of ethics are these very cases where, deter¬ 
 mined to do our duty, we yet deceive ourselves as to 
 what it is. Evil seems to result here from the very 
 
The Problem of EviL 
 
 uprightness of the intention ; for, as Pascal has re¬ 
 marked, “ we never do evil so thoroughly and enthu¬ 
 siastically as when we do it from conscience.” 
 
 Error constitutes one element in our wrong actions ; 
 but error, even moral error, is not sin. Socrates held 
 very erroneous views on this point He held that 
 error is the sole origin of our evil actions, that men 
 deceive themselves as to what is duty, but that, with¬ 
 out exception, “ they do what they regard as duty.”* 
 The poet Euripides, his contemporary, could have given 
 him on this point a lesson in true philoso- Difference 
 
 between er- 
 
 phy ; for he wrote, “ We know what is right, ror and sin. 
 we are familiar with it, but we do it not.” f Error 
 and sin are closely allied, but they are perfectly dis¬ 
 tinct facts. Error is seated in the intelligence, and 
 sin is the act of the will 
 
 I will define sin by this familiar citation : “To him 
 that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is 
 sin.” Sin is the violation of known law, the revolt of 
 the will against the power and authority of conscience. 
 But it is important to observe, that when the law is 
 not known to us it may be because of our own fault. 
 If our ignorance is owing to our own neglect, .we are 
 responsible for it. He who violates a law, of which at 
 the moment he is ignorant, sins nevertheless, in case 
 it is himself who has shut out the light from his con¬ 
 science. 
 
 * Xenophon's Memorabilia. f Ilippolytus. 
 
8 4 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Such is our characterization of sin. As to the thing 
 itself, we know it only too well. There is perhaps no 
 one who, without thinking back very far over the past, 
 will not recall cases when, in the full light of conscience, 
 he was conscious of a perversity of will. To have 
 defined sin is to have shown that it is an evil, since 
 it is a revolt against law, and therefore ought abso¬ 
 lutely not to be. 
 
 As we know the essential nature of the moral law, 
 we know also the essential nature of sin. This su~ 
 I preme law is that of charity, the consecration of each 
 to the good of all. The essence of sin is the contrary 
 of this law, that is, the disposition to live only for self. 
 Egotism, in the full and etymological sense of the 
 The root of word, is the root of all,sin. Instead of re- 
 
 all sin is 
 
 egotism, maining at his place in the general order of 
 things, in his true relation to the rest of the universe, 
 the individual makes himself the center of all, sub¬ 
 ordinates every thing, as far as in him lies, to him¬ 
 self—like a little planet or mere fragment of a planet 
 that should try to be the sun. 
 
 This excessive seeking of self, the common ground 
 of all moral disorder, is manifested under two princi¬ 
 pal forms. On abandoning his true place, man either 
 descends, animalizes himself, falls into sensuality, and 
 thus forfeits his claim to membership in truly spiritual, 
 I elevated society ; or, on the other hand, he attempts 
 to rise above the place which his relative dignity 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 85 
 
 assigns to him ; in a vain hope to rise, he precipitates 
 himself into the abysses of pride. Sensuality and 
 pride are the two chief forms of egotism. The two 
 And as it has two forms, so has egotism [°™ 1 d s ee .j .^ 9 
 also two degrees. The first is that of the ofego * 1STn ' 
 indifferent, who, turning aside, is ever ready to ask, 
 “Am I my brother’s keeper?” The second is that 
 of him who is wicked positively, and who crushes 
 others for the gratification of self. 
 
 To define sin is, I repeat, to prove that it is an 
 evil, since it is the violation of law, the contrary of 
 what ought to be. But it will not be so easy to prove 
 as much of suffering. 
 
 Though it is easy enough to excite the human 
 heart to protest against suffering, it is quite an¬ 
 other task to demonstrate to reason that suffering 
 ought not to be. For it has in fact numerous and 
 powerful apologists. Let us examine this line of 
 thought. 
 
 What is it that develops manhood ? Energy. What 
 generates energy ? Active resistance. What calls 
 forth this resistance ? Suffering. Eliminate from 
 human life all suffering, and you suppress 4po]o „ i8ts 
 all contest, all development of energy— of suffering, 
 you have a creature devoid of all moral vigor. How 
 salutary an influence in calling forth character has 
 often resulted from the most dreaded scourges ! Some 
 time since a friend wrote to me from Zurich at the 
 
86 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 time the cholera was there raging. He said that 
 while the scourge had given occasion to many exhi¬ 
 bitions of selfishness, yet, on the other hand, it had 
 called forth so much moral courage, so much devotion, 
 so much disinterested sacrifice for the good of others, 
 so much forgetfulness of the distinctions of social 
 rank under the impulse of the noblest and purest of 
 sentiments, that for no consideration could he think 
 of wishing that the ravages of the disease had not 
 fallen upon his native city. And this was the head 
 of a family ; and he wrote to me at a time when the 
 scourge was yet menacing himself and his friends. 
 It is, therefore, possible to pronounce a eulogy on 
 epidemics. 
 
 And war ! What has not been said in its 
 favor ? Does not war give fortitude to char- 
 
 A pologists 
 of war. 
 
 acter ? The comforts of peace—do they not lead to 
 effeminacy ? And in general, do not public calami¬ 
 ties have a manifestly salutary effect ? Though some 
 may be driven from tender thoughts and from God 
 by experiencing and seeing suffering, is it not more 
 frequently the case that bereavement and sorrow lead 
 to God and to holy thoughts ? Is it not the fury of 
 the tempest that brings the otherwise godless sailor 
 to his knees and to prayer ? And are not the most 
 terrible convulsions of society often fruitful of great 
 moral ameliorations ? These thoughts are, in fact, .so 
 widely prevalent in, society that there is scarcely a 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 87 
 
 modern poet* who has not strung his lyre, and mani¬ 
 foldly sung of the blessed effects of trial and suffer¬ 
 ing—of the baptism of tears, of the sweet that springs 
 of the bitter. * 
 
 And suffering has not only its apologists, it has its 
 devotees. - I will not enlarge on the incredi- r)evotees of 
 ble macerations with which the ancient sutfermg ‘ 
 Brahmins tortured their bodies. In our own day, and 
 in our own frivolous and pleasure-seeking society of 
 Europe, there are still men who voluntarily, and often 
 after having thrown aside wealth and power, are sub¬ 
 mitting themselves to the law of toil under conditions 
 of the most extreme poverty. 
 
 Have you ever heard of the Trappists ? Last year 
 I visited a convent of this order, near Mulhouse in 
 Alsace ; and never perhaps did I experience a more 
 lively sense of contrast. On the one hand there was 
 the noisy, bustling, manufacturing Mulhouse, with its 
 prosperous, philanthropic and, consequently, happy 
 
 * Take as an example this : 
 
 L’homme est un apprenti, la douleur est son maitre, 
 
 Et nul ne se connait tant qu’il n’a pas souffert. 
 
 C’est une dure loi, mais une loi supreme, 
 
 Vieille coniine le monde et la fatalite, 
 
 Qu'il nous faut du malheur recevoir le bapteme, 
 
 Et qu’a ce triste prix tout doit etre achete. 
 
 Les moissons pour murir ont besoin de rosee ; 
 
 Pour vivre et pour sentir, l’homme a besoin de pleurs. 
 
 Alfred df. Musset. 
 
88 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 *% 
 
 population—Mulhouse, with its riches and luxury, its 
 culture and general comfort; and, on the other, there 
 stood close by, the vast, chilly, silent barracks, we 
 may say, of the Trappists, where, even in the rigors 
 of winter, fire is never kindled, save in the lamp of the 
 altar and in the hurried, preparation of their scanty 
 food. And the oppressive silence of the sepul¬ 
 chral place is broken only by the hum of toil or the 
 songs of worship! At this very hour of the evening 
 they lie there stretched upon boards, and seeking 
 sleep after the hard toil of the day. At two o’clock 
 in the morning they are awakened by the bell, and 
 called to prayer. On the morrow, they will labor in 
 the fields and workshops till ten o’clock before tasting 
 of food. To refreshen their forces they will then be 
 served with a glass of beer, and a ration of bread and 
 of vegetables gathered from their own fields. And 
 the repast of the evening will be but a repetition of 
 this. On festive days they receive in addition a piece 
 of cheese. 
 
 In comparison with these men, the most pinched 
 of our day-laborers leads the life of a capitalist. I 
 express no, opinion as to the value of these monastic 
 institutions ; I cite them merely as an example of a 
 class of men who seem as zealous in seeking privation, 
 as we in the pursuit of pleasure; who seem, in fact, 
 to ask nothing at the hands of the world but the 
 austere delights of suffering. Voluntarily they 
 
The Problem of Evil ’ 
 
 8 9 
 
 deprive their bodies of nourishment to the last possible 
 limits ; they deprive their minds of aliment by si¬ 
 lence ; and, what appears almost terrifying, they cut 
 oft' their heart from its natural source of life by the 
 absolute rupture of all bonds of family and of all 
 social affections. 
 
 This will suffice to illustrate our remark, that suf¬ 
 fering has not only its apologists, but also its devo¬ 
 tees. Now, in the face of the arguments of its apolo¬ 
 gists, and of the practice of its devotees, does not our 
 thesis, that suffering is an evil and ought not to be, 
 
 m 
 
 seem to be very far from established ? Let us first 
 understand each other. 
 
 It is easy to prove that, under the conditions of 
 our actual experience—note these words : of o?ir 
 actual experience —suffering is inevitable, and even 
 that it is good. But how is this proved ? Three favor- 
 
 « 1, , . r , . able phases 
 
 Ah the arguments used for tms purpose may 0 fsuffermg. 
 be reduced to three. 
 
 First : Suffering is a warning of the presence of 
 disorder. If you were sick without knowing it, with¬ 
 out having an idea of the evil, you would not seek for 
 a remedy. So also when the body politic ex- lt . ga 
 periences-troubles or sufferings, more intense inff- 
 than ordinarily, it is admonished to search out the 
 locality of the disorder, and to correct it by one of 
 those remedies which, in politics, are called reforms. 
 To be admonished of a disorder in order that it 
 
90 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 may be repaired, is useful and good. Who can 
 deny it ? 
 
 Second : Suffering is a remedy. From 
 the amputation of a limb, which will perhaps 
 
 It is a reme¬ 
 dy. 
 
 save your life, to some misfortune that may befall you 
 while under the influence of a culpable passion, and 
 thus awaken you to serious thoughts, suffering is of 
 most wholesome effects ; and no one can refuse to 
 say with Fenelon : “Who can call evil those pains 
 which God sends us to purify us and to render us 
 worthy of him ? That which does us so much good 
 cannot be an evil.” Suffering purifies us, is very 
 necessary to us ; hence, it is good. 
 
 Third : Suffering is a punishment. Pun¬ 
 ishment is an incident of justice, and justice 
 
 It is a pun¬ 
 ishment. 
 
 is good. Have you never, while in the presence of 
 some odious crime, felt rise within your heart a 
 voice calling for justice ? And criminals also some- 
 times hear that voice. There have been among such 
 as were condemned to death those who would have 
 refused a pardon, for the reason that, their con¬ 
 sciences having been made tender, they felt that they 
 ought publicly to expiate their crime. Justice is good, 
 and, despite the mysteries of the subject, we can con¬ 
 ceive that justice in the full sense of the word is per¬ 
 fectly consistent with goodness ; that it is, in fact, 
 only one of the forms of love. The moral law ex¬ 
 presses and exacts only that order which is essential 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 91 
 
 to all spiritual society. To permit the violation of 
 the moral law without vindicating its rights by pun¬ 
 ishment, is to sacrifice the interests of all to an indul¬ 
 gence toward the few, which is nothing else than a 
 weakness. To maintain the law by punishment is to 
 protect the interest of all against the disorder of a 
 few ; it is the work of goodness directed by wisdom. 
 In the form of punishment, therefore, suffering is 
 necessary; in this respect also it is good. 
 
 All candid apologies for suffering seem to fall under 
 one of these three arguments. Certain obscure state- 
 ments, however, have also been used for this purpose. 
 We will notice them in passing. 
 
 A free being, with an object to attain, must neces¬ 
 sarily desire it, and make efforts to realize it. It is 
 affirmed that all desire is the result of privation, and 
 presupposes, consequently, a suffering ; and that all 
 effort is painful. Suffering appears, therefore, to be 
 the necessary condition of liberty, inasmuch as, if 
 suffering were suppressed, there would exist neither 
 desire, nor effort, nor, consequently, any exertion of 
 free activity. 
 
 The bases of this reasoning are not solid. Desire and 
 A desire conjoined to the hope of its realiza- t ' xertl " n are 
 tion may, in fact, be a most pleasant feeling ; sutferiDg - 
 as, for example, all who have a good appetite and the 
 means of gratifying it, very well know. For those 
 who are physically and morally healthy, effort, far 
 
92 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 from being painful, is one of the purest joys of existence. 
 A young man, with the health and the will for it, is 
 far from suffering while playing his muscles in ascend¬ 
 ing a mountain. Desire becomes suffering when it is 
 deprived of satisfaction and hope ; effort becomes 
 pain when the means of action no longer respond to 
 the will; but all desire is not suffering, and all effort 
 is not pain. The action of a free being does not in¬ 
 variably presuppose pain. It is important to avoid 
 such confusions of thought as would imply that suffer¬ 
 ing is necessary. 
 
 As to the arguments in favor of the usefulness of 
 suffering, they are sound, and I accept them all. In 
 affirming that suffering is an evil and ought not to be, 
 I would not be understood to counsel parents to take 
 from the path in which their children tread all the 
 thorns, or to deprive them too largely of the*benefits 
 
 of the rod. I do not counsel generous hearts 
 to alleviate inconsiderately all suffering, and 
 
 Suffering' not 
 always to be 
 prevented to 
 
 the utmost, never to allow free course to the penal con¬ 
 sequences of idleness and sensuality. I do not coun¬ 
 sel judges to set free without punishment the thief 
 and the assassin. On the contrary, it seems to me 
 that the judge who absolves the malefactor who has 
 forfeited his rights to the liberty of society renders 
 himself in some degree an accomplice in the new 
 crimes which he commits. Such a judge forgets that 
 justice on the part of the civil power (the chief ob- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 93 
 
 jeet of which is to further the public good by re¬ 
 pressing the disorders of the few) is a mercy, and 
 feebleness a cruelty. And above all, would I not be 
 understood as counseling any one to attempt to 
 quench, in souls tormented with a sense of their sins, 
 the pains of repentance and the salutary bitterness of 
 remorse. In the world, in its actual state, pain has a 
 great mission, as it has a large place. It is some¬ 
 times our duty to let it run its course, and the highest 
 charity often requires that we become the rigorous 
 ministers of justice. 
 
 Suffering is, therefore, of healthful influence. It 
 may be good ; and if, for all that, it ought not to 
 be, still this is not true in an absolute sense, as 
 it is of sin. It may be the means to an excellent 
 end; and the maxim that the end justifies the 
 means, though severely to be excluded in regard to 
 moral duty, may nevertheless find here a legitimate 
 application. 
 
 Having said this, let us now examine the basis of 
 
 * 
 
 the argument offered by the apologists of suffering. 
 Warning, remedy, punishment, all these words pre¬ 
 suppose disorder; they place the necessity 
 
 I _ _ Suffering 
 
 of suffering in a bad condition of things, good only 
 
 . . , _ inanabnor- 
 
 All the arguments in justification of suffer- maistate of 
 ing are based on our actual abnormal con¬ 
 dition. In the midst of such a condition, where the 
 natural order of things is broken, it is easy to prove 
 
94 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 that warning is desirable, that punishment is good, 
 and that a remedy is beneficent. But suppose once 
 that all things are in a state of order, and you can 
 find no place for suffering. Pain is not nutriment, it 
 is a medicine ; and in a condition of health, remedies 
 are not good. Now, as pain would have to vanish 
 as soon as things should be as they ought to be, 
 it is very clear that, in an absolute sense, it ought 
 not to be, and, hence, that it is an evil. And if it is 
 inevitable that in this world we must suffer, it is quite 
 evident that the world is not in a condition of order ; 
 for God, who created our heart, did not create it for 
 suffering. 
 
 If we could be convinced that pain is good in itself, 
 
 The heart an d an absolute sense, the most disinter- 
 not made es t e d 0 f the functions of our hearts would 
 
 for Stoi- 
 
 tism. be materially paralyzed; pity would be 
 quenched. A philosopher of antiquity, while tor¬ 
 mented with the gout, is said to have cried out, 
 “ Pain, thy efforts are useless ; thou wilt never force 
 me to confess that thou art an evil! ” This 'is a 
 proud declaration, and when made of one’s self, of 
 one’s own actual sufferings, it is sublime. But in 
 the presence of the sufferings of others the heart 
 will ever exclaim, “ Philosopher, thy words are 
 in vain ; thou wilt never induce me to admit that 
 pain is not an evil.” 
 
 Do you need another argument to prove that suf- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 95 
 
 fering ought not to be ? Here is one which seems to 
 me unanswerable. What is the supreme Bedllctioad 
 law of practical life ? The law of charity. (,l) * urdum - 
 But charity, if it would not do more harm than good, 
 if it would not counteract the salutary working of 
 pain, must be of masculine temper. Now charity is 
 essentially gentle and mild ; its mission is to produce 
 ultimate happiness, and, until that point is gained, to 
 alleviate as far as possible all suffering. Its end is 
 to produce a state of society where all shall be order, 
 where there shall be no more tears, nor mourning, 
 nor lamentation. This being unquestionably the end 
 of charity, it would follow, on the assumption that 
 suffering is good, that the supreme law of duty 
 would tend to work the diminution and destruction of 
 the good, which is absurd. If charity, therefore, is the 
 law of the good, then suffering ought to be destroyed, 
 ought not to be, and consequently it is an evil. 
 
 I conclude : error, sin, and suffering are disturb¬ 
 ances of the true order of things, are evils, and our 
 mission is to remedy them. This seems almost as 
 clear to me as a theorem in geometry. 
 
 III. The Negation of Evil. 
 
 Human society presents a very strange spectacle. 
 
 How many of the faces we meet on our streets are 
 
 haggard and sad ! how many of the heads, Practical ad¬ 
 mission of 
 
 bowed with care and trouble ! As soon as evil. 
 
96 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 the early ardor of youth is dampened, and age has 
 begun to destroy the illusions once indulged, it is 
 exceedingly difficult to keep alive in men a hopeful 
 faith in the good. There is too generally prevalent 
 a deplorable lack of courage and hope, of confidence 
 in the future. It is often difficult to induce men to 
 believe that the passing clouds do not blot out the 
 sun, and that none of our hazes have yet succeeded 
 in destroying the eternal azure above them. Of all 
 the wants of the human heart, none is felt more uni¬ 
 versally than the want of consolation. Such is the 
 general condition of practical life. 
 
 But if we leave the beaten paths of real life, and 
 enter the select circle of scholars and philosophers, 
 every thing is wonderfully changed ; the task which 
 then is most difficult is, to demonstrate the existence 
 speculative of evil as against the affirmation that every 
 
 tendency to 
 
 deny it. thing is good. This may seem a strange 
 statement, but a slight examination of the subject 
 will show, that one of the chief currents of meta¬ 
 physical thought in the past has^constantly included 
 the denial of evil. It has been so up to the present 
 day. On several points of the intellectual globe there 
 are signs, it is true, that a better future is beginning 
 to dawn, but up to the present the results’of philoso¬ 
 phy have too often justly deserved the malediction 
 of Isaiah : “ Woe unto them that call evil good, and 
 good evil! ” I am not here to pronounce woes upon 
 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 97 
 
 any one, though I am convinced that, of all possible 
 theories, that which denies the reality of evil is cer¬ 
 tainly the most pernicious in its consequences. My 
 special task is to appeal to your reason, and show 
 that this theory is false. 
 
 The negation of evil, or the affirmation that all is 
 good, is in harsh contradiction to our natural senti¬ 
 ments. In its direct and unequivocal expression 
 this doctrine, as I have said, prevails only in certain 
 learned circles. An effort, however, becomes more 
 and more apparent to popularize it, and circulate it 
 among the masses, through journals and reviews ; I 
 have even discovered it in romances. Many of the 
 inferior writers who retail it on their pages have little 
 suspicion of its origin and true significance, mst as, 
 of the many who drink of a river, only a few know its 
 fountains and meandering course. 
 
 The substance of the argument urged against the 
 common views of evil is this ; “ In the eyes of the 
 true savant all is good.” But what does he say of 
 what we call evil? He says, “ It is a neces- The form of 
 
 the denial 
 
 sary incident of all existence. It is neces- ofevu. 
 sary, not merely in reference to the actual state of the 
 world, not merely as a result of an abnormal condi¬ 
 tion of Jiumanity; it is necessary primitively and ab¬ 
 solutely, thus constituting a part of the nature of 
 things and of the plan of the universe. Now, as evil 
 
 is necessary, so it ought to be ; and, as it ought to be, 
 
 7 
 
93 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 so is it good. There is, therefore, no evil; what we 
 call evil is only one of the forms of the good. The 
 existence of evil is an intellectual chimera, a mental 
 disease, from which philosophy cures us.” 
 
 Such is the kind of conversion to which we are 
 recommended by a certain so-called science. The 
 common sense of mankind, it holds, is in disorder ; 
 man must be converted, not by the destruction .of 
 evil, which does not exist, but by banishing from 
 him the idea of evil. The argument is logical: if 
 evil is necessary, it ought to be ; if it ought to be, it 
 is good. This is, in fact, our definition of the good. 
 The reasoning, I.say, is irresistible if we admit the 
 assumption upon which it rests, but this is what we 
 must now examine. 
 
 Let us observe at once that the question is,*as to 
 the positive denial of the reality of evil. In certain 
 speculative writings you will find the arguments 
 above stated under this heading, Explanation of 
 Evil. But the word explanation is out of place ; 
 those who deny a fact do not explain it. Toward 
 the close of the seventeenth century, if I mistake not, 
 there arose a great discussion about a child which 
 \ -oiden was born with a golden tooth. There was 
 tooth. a g rea t commotion among the physiologists. 
 How was one to explain, from the known constitu¬ 
 tion of the human body, the production of a golden 
 tooth ? Some one finally settled the question by 
 
The Problem of Evil , 
 
 99 
 
 examining the extraordinary child, and convincing 
 himself that the golden tooth did not exist. But was 
 this an explanation of the phenomenon ? No ; it was 
 the suppression of it. The question now is, Can we 
 as easily get rid of evil as of this fabulous tooth ? is 
 the true solution of the problem the denial of its 
 object ? 
 
 To come now to the heart of the matter: How is 
 it attempted to prove that evil is necessary ? It is 
 proved first by a fallacious method. It is T 1 i e fallacy 
 
 of applying 
 
 assumed that the processes of mathematics the method 
 
 of physical 
 science to 
 the sphere 
 of liberty. 
 
 and physics are applicable to universal sci¬ 
 ence. Thus are applied to the sphere of 
 
 liberty those methods which are legitimately appli¬ 
 cable only where no element of liberty exists. An 
 axiom in physics is, that in matter there is no prin¬ 
 ciple of spontaneity, so that the facts are always in 
 conformity to laws, and there is never a difference 
 between what is, and what ought to be. If this 
 process is applicable to the moral world, it is only so 
 applicable on the assumption that all that is ought 
 to be, evil included. The necessity of evil is thus 
 proved, by a method that takes that necessity for 
 granted. 
 
 But the argument returns. If evil exists, as con¬ 
 science affirms that it does, then there is in the 
 moral sphere a difference between what ought to 
 be, and what actually is ; the method peculiar to 
 
i oo The Problem of Evil . 
 
 physical science is, therefore, not the method of all 
 science. 
 
 Again, the necessity of evil is proved by assuming 
 the world under its actual conditions to be the meas¬ 
 ure of all that might be. In the present condition 
 of our world, good and evil are so intermingled that 
 to suppress the one would, it seems, amount to the 
 suppression of the other. Thus, a world exempt 
 from evil appears as little better than a purely Utopian 
 imagination. 
 
 This reasoning is based on experience, but it is a 
 very limited experience. In conceiving of a world 
 free from disorder, and fully realizing the good, it is 
 not true that we rush into the sphere of chimeras. 
 Common ex- To the experience of what actually is w r e 
 
 perience -op¬ 
 posed by a oppose another experience, not less real, not 
 
 higher ex- . . 
 
 perience. less certain—-the experience oi the reason and 
 of the conscience, which proclaim that which ought to 
 be, and assure us that evil ought not to be. To estab¬ 
 lish the necessity of evil in the name of experience, 
 is to forget the better and nobler part of experience. 
 
 Finally, the necessity of evil is proved by a con¬ 
 founding of ideas, and it is to this point that I desire 
 to direct your apecial attention. We must enter here 
 into the darkest labyrinths of philosophy ; but one 
 sees clearly every-where if one is only provided with a 
 good lamp, and the only lamp which you will need 
 Is, a close attention. 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 IOI 
 
 The human mind possesses, two perfectly distinct 
 ideas : the idea of more and less, and the idea of good 
 and evil. By confounding the more with the The feiiacy 
 
 of confound- 
 
 good, and the dess with evil, it is made to mg themore 
 
 with the 
 
 appear that evil is necessary. But by care- good, 
 fully distinguishing these ideas we will restore to evil 
 its true character. 
 
 Represent to yourself, if you please, the whole 
 series of created existences, from the very lowest to 
 the highest of all; or, to speak mathematically, con¬ 
 ceive of the vast multitude of beings which occupy 
 the space between zero, on the one hand, and infinity, 
 on the other. Begin now at the lowest and gradually 
 
 ascend the scale. As to matter, you will see a con- 
 
 0 
 
 stant increase, both as to the space occupied, and as 
 
 to the density and the richness of the forms. As to 
 
 spirits, you will see gradually rising to higher degrees 
 
 the power of the heart, of thought, and of volition. 
 
 Thus you will have before you a conception The hierar¬ 
 chy of be- 
 
 of the hierarchy, or scale of dignity, of the mg. 
 universe. When you say the sun is more than the 
 earth, life is more than matter, the being which 
 thinks is more than the being which thinks not, 
 you lorm judgments which we shall term judgments 
 of hierarchy , or of dignity. Pascal has used this 
 thought with telling effect on the page where he con¬ 
 trasts the being who thinks with the universe which 
 would crush him, and on that in which he exalts 
 
102 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 above the totality of all worlds and of all intelligence, 
 the pre-eminent worth of charity. 
 
 Every being in its place in the hierarchy, or scale 
 of existence, has a purpose, a destination, and it is 
 good or evil according as it does or does not answer 
 that destination. The judgment which we pronounce 
 in this regard is a moral judgment. I call it moral 
 even when it relates directly to inanimate objects, 
 taking as granted what I have said in my first lec¬ 
 ture, namely, that every phase of the good includes 
 directly, or indirectly, the participation of a will. 
 When you say a watch is out of order, or runs poorly 
 because its different parts do not all fulfill their func¬ 
 tions, (which implies at bottom a blame against the 
 watch-maker,) you pronounce a moral judgment, and 
 you do it as really and positively as when you say, 
 envy is a wrong feeling, or theft is a culpable action. 
 Hierarchic Now, the hierarchic judgment and the moral 
 different. judgment are radically distinct. This truth 
 
 from moral Jo J 
 
 judgments. j s so we ighty that I will adduce three con¬ 
 siderations in its support. 
 
 First. The good may exist, and may exist equally, 
 at all the degrees in the scale of being, for that which 
 Perfect determines the degree of good is not the 
 poSbieat pl ace which the being occupies in the scale, 
 any point p ut q- s conformity to its destination. A 
 
 in the scale J 
 
 of being, village clock whose single rude hand marks 
 only the hours, may be as perfect in its kind as the most 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 103 
 
 complicated repeater. The most humble duty faith¬ 
 fully performed is equal in the order of conscience 
 to the most brilliant virtue. The child who, while 
 under the hands of the dentist, represses the cry of 
 nature in order not to call forth the frowns of its 
 mother, may have a heroism equal to that of Winckel- 
 ried when receiving to his breast the lances of 
 
 Austria. Should we ignore this truth, should we 
 
 • 
 
 confound the degree of the good with the brilliancy 
 of the good, (which latter can exist only in excep¬ 
 tional conjunctures,) we would open the door to a 
 glory-seeking vanity, and shut it to humble duty- 
 fulfilling conscientiousness. 
 
 Second. Evil may exist at any and every e vil possi¬ 
 ble in the 
 
 stage of the scale of being. An archangel highest as 
 
 , ... 1 . , ~ n well as in 
 
 may be evil; a worm may be sick, li natter- the lowest, 
 ers are a detestable and fatal environment for mon- 
 archs, it is simply because they encourage in them the 
 sentiment that their elevation exonerates them, in 
 some sort, from the obligations of moral law, and that 
 they are limited only by their own good pleasure.* 
 Doubtless Louis XIV. believed, unconsciously, it may 
 be, that what would be culpable in the simple citizen 
 was right enough when it was the Great King who 
 
 did it; and the lesson which Racine gave him in some 
 of the fine verses of Athalie was, very likely, in place. 
 Third. There may be more good in the inferior de- 
 
 * Qu’un roi n’a d’autre frein que sa volonte meme.—A thai.ie. 
 
104 
 
 The Problem of Evil , 
 
 grees of the scale of being than m the superior degrees, 
 
 H -her (r ocxi The widow's mite was less in the scale of in- 
 possible at a £ r t ns i c W orth than the alms of the rich ; but 
 
 lower stage 
 
 in the scale, it was declared greater in the moral scale. 
 Epictetus, if he was as good as his books, was one of 
 the best men under the sun ; but he was a slave, and 
 stood quite at the bottom of the social hierarchy ; 
 while Nero, wh© was master of the world, has left an 
 accursed name. 
 
 The hierarchic judgment and the moral judgment 
 are, therefore, profoundly distinct. And yet they 
 may be harmonized. In separating them we attain 
 to a part of the truth ; but it is only in bringing to¬ 
 gether that which at first we distinguished that we 
 reach the whole truth. The hierarchic and the moral 
 judgments approach each other in the idea of 
 progress. 
 
 That progress is a good, is one of the most gener¬ 
 ally and readily accepted truths of this epoch : in fact, 
 in progress it is on ty too readily accepted, inasmuch as 
 
 nizedhTerar'- man y incautious minds are thereby led to 
 chic and welcome every novelty as an improvement, 
 
 moral judg- J J 1 7 
 
 meins. and every change as a progress. Progress, in 
 the sense of development, is the law, the final cause 
 of whatever exists. In that an object develops itself 
 it realizes more and more its destination ; it rises 
 from less to more ; it rises from zero and approaches 
 the plenitude of being. In the idea of progress, there- 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 fore, are intimately harmonized the law of the hie¬ 
 rarchy, which expresses the passage from the less to 
 the more, and the moral law, which requires that 
 the passage from the less to the more be effected. 
 
 But the two ideas, though harmonizing*, are none 
 the less distinct, inasmuch as progress does not con¬ 
 sist in the fact that a being passes out of its Progress is 
 
 not meta- 
 
 OWn order and nature to become a different morpliosis, 
 nature, but in the fact that it realizes fully its own 
 peculiar nature. The gardener who wishes to im¬ 
 prove a rose does not try to make a camellia of it ; 
 the shepherd who wishes to improve his sheep does 
 not aim to make goats of them ; and it is quite con¬ 
 ceivable that a young woman might be perfectly de¬ 
 veloped and accomplished without, for all that, being 
 made into a man—or even into a political elector. 
 
 The good may, therefore, exist at every degree in 
 the scale of being, if only each being fulfills its own 
 special function. A limited power may be as good as 
 a greater power, for the good does not consist in the 
 quantity but in the direction of the power. Every 
 thing may be good, perfectly good, in its place, with¬ 
 out in the least leaving its natural sphere; There is 
 only one thing which can never be good, and that is, 
 evil; for evil is disorder, and disorder has no legiti¬ 
 mate place. 
 
 In the sphere of progress every thing may be good, 
 perfectly good, if only at each moment of duration it 
 
io 6 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 develops itself in such a manner as to realize the 
 capabilities of its own nature. True progress con- 
 Simpie non- sists in rising from zero and tending toward 
 is^never^an the plenitude of existence ; and the evil 
 never lies in the distance which separates a 
 being from its ultimate end, but in the fact that it 
 has not advanced as it should have done, or that it 
 has taken a false direction. 
 
 Let us now return more directly to the subject in 
 hand. In order to establish the necessity of evil, the 
 more is confounded with the good, the less with the 
 evil, the hierarchic judgment with the moral judg¬ 
 ment ; and then it is argued : Without the less and 
 the more there would be no hierarchy (scale of being); 
 without the hierarchy, no diversity ; and without di¬ 
 versity the world would be impossible. The less, 
 which is the evil, is, therefore, the condition of the 
 existence of the world ; hence it is necessary. 
 
 This metaphysical reasoning is generally presented 
 in the following form : There is but one infinite being, 
 
 God ; whatever is not God is limited ; this limitation 
 
 statement of * s the evil ; what we call evil is simply the 
 argument m distance w hi c h separates us from the Infinite, 
 
 eviL that is, it is the portion of nonentity which 
 yet clings to us. If there were nothing but God, 
 there would be no world ; it is an essential condition 
 of the existence of the world that it cannot be in¬ 
 finite ; therefore, it must contain evil. To demand 
 
The Problem of Evil. i o7 
 
 0 
 
 that there should be no evil is to demand that noth¬ 
 ing should exist but God. Evil is only the imperfec¬ 
 tion inherent in all finite being ; and as all that is 
 not God is finite, imperfect, therefore evil is neces¬ 
 sary. With these arguments a fraction of the skeptic¬ 
 al world seems to triumph ; and they triumph all 
 the more as they exclaim : How could there be prog¬ 
 ress if there were no evil ? Progress consists in the 
 fact that an object develops itself, passes from imper¬ 
 fection to an imperfection that is less, that is, from 
 evil to good. To suppress evil would therefore be to 
 suppress progress, which all admit to be a good. 
 Evil is, therefore, a condition of the good—constitutes, 
 in fact, a part of the good. 
 
 I trust you already fully see the confusions of 
 thought on which all this scaffolding is based. To be 
 good it is not necessary to be God ; it suf- it rests on a 
 
 confusion of 
 
 fices that we be at the place in the hie- ideas, 
 rarchic scale which God has assigned to us, and that we 
 fulfill the duties which he has prescribed for us. That 
 progress which removes us from evil is not progress 
 proper; it is a restoration; and restoration presup¬ 
 poses disorder. Where there was no disorder progress 
 would not consist in getting rid of evil, but in getting 
 rid of non-development, of nonentity, and in realizing 
 ever more and more the plenitude of our being. 
 
 This confusion of thought, by which the hierarchic 
 idea is confounded with the moral idea, evil with im- 
 
io8 
 
 The Problem of Evil . 
 
 perfection, and progress with getting rid of evil, leads 
 to deplorable consequences. If all finite being is evil, 
 and evil in the proportion of its distance from the in¬ 
 finite, then all created beings are predestined to evil, 
 and to evil more or less great according to their 
 relative place in the scale of being ; such a doctrine 
 is horrible. 
 
 its absurd Note, now, some of the inferences in which 
 
 practical con - 
 
 sequences, you involve yourselves by holding that the 
 development of a being, its progress, consists in 
 passing from the evil to the less evil, to the good. 
 Have you never, of a fine June day, plucked from the 
 hedge, or on the hill-side, a branch of eglantine ? 
 Perhaps the flower that was as yet closed attracted 
 you more than the fully opened one. A bud is a 
 flower in process of development, an imperfect flower. 
 But has it ever occurred to you to regard a bud as 
 only a poor flower ? Behold that pretty child, whose 
 mere presence is the joy of a whole family, whose 
 least resemblance of a half-articulated word calls a 
 smile of bliss from its mother, and whose first attempts 
 at stepping are rich entertainment for a whole com¬ 
 pany. That child is a man in process of develop¬ 
 ment ; it is an imperfect man, in the sense of incom¬ 
 plete; but has it ever occurred to you to regard a child 
 as a poor, a bad, man ? The thought is absurd. 
 
 But we cannot dismiss it as a mere trivial absurdity 
 that needs but to be mentioned to be rejected ; it is 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 109 
 
 gravely propounded and defended in pretentious 
 tomes of metaphysics. We, therefore, will examine 
 it a little more closely. 
 
 Some of our contemporaries have claimed as a tri- 
 umph of what-they call modern science, the doctrine 
 that all is good. To obviate this anachronism I ex¬ 
 tract this formula from a Greek writer of the Alex¬ 
 andrian school. “ Without the existence of It is of an _ 
 evil,” says Plotinus, “ the world would be cient date ' 
 
 less perfect.” * And that we may have no doubt as 
 
 • 
 
 to his meaning he expressly mentions “ wickedness ” 
 as one of the elements that contribute to the perfec¬ 
 tion of the universe. The sense of the doctrine is, 
 that what we call evil is only a phase of the good, a 
 primitively and eternally necessary element of the 
 universe. All the errors that have obscured and still 
 obscure the human mind ; all the sorrows that have 
 rent the human heart, and still drape it in mourn¬ 
 ing ; all the crimes which cause us to shudder; all 
 the meannesses which disgust us with society; all this, 
 
 * “ Must we, then, regard as necessary the evils which are found 
 in the universe, and for the reason that they are the consequences of 
 higher principles? Yes: for without them the 'universe would he 
 imperfect. The majority of evils, or rather all evils, are useful to the 
 universe : such are venomous creatures ; but often we do not know 
 what purpose they serve. Wickedness is useful in many respects, and 
 may conduct to many good results : for example, it leads to happy 
 expedients; it obliges men to the practice of prudence .”—Second 
 Etimad , Book III, chap, xviii. 
 
I 10 
 
 The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 according to this theory, is good ; all this is but a 
 condition of the general harmony. It is only our 
 ignorance that finds any thing to object to in the 
 march of the universe. 
 
 Without the existence of evil the world would be 
 less perfect! Let us develop this formula. If the 
 what the Mexicans had not annually immolated thou- 
 
 theory im¬ 
 plies. sands of human victims on the altars of 
 
 their gods, the world would be less perfect. If the 
 Spaniards had not possessed themselves of Mexico 
 by means of abominable artifices and unheard-of 
 cruelties, the world would be less perfect. If so 
 large a portion of mankind did not brutalize them¬ 
 selves with intemperance, the world would be less 
 perfect. If Roman gladiators had not been accus- 
 tomed (as discoveries at Pompeii show that they 
 were) to satiate themselves with the infamous pleas¬ 
 ures of debauch before butchering each other for the 
 amusement of the populace, and if kindred practices 
 in the higher walks of life had not been so largely 
 prevalent, and if prostitutes did not swarm the streets 
 of our cities, spreading disease and infamy, and tempt¬ 
 ing the innocent into the snare from which they 
 themselves cannot escape, the world would be less 
 perfect. 
 
 Let us continue to develop it. It was necessary, 
 eternally necessary, that the negroes of America 
 should not be enfranchised save by the drenching 
 
The Problem of Evil. 111 
 
 of the soil of a continent with blood and tears. It 
 was eternally necessary—in fact, it was a part of the 
 divine plan of the universe—that Germans should 
 strew the plains of Sadowa with the bleeding and 
 mangled bodies of their brother Germans. It was 
 necessary that there should be seen at the great 
 Exposition of Paris so many new inventions in the 
 art of slaughtering men, and that they should be 
 universally admired as so many signs of modern 
 progress. All these, and innumerable analogous facts, 
 were necessary, and therefore good. Drunkenness 
 and debauch are but incidental graces of society! 
 The massacres of war are among the finest employ¬ 
 ments of human genius and power! If we could 
 suppress the bagnio and the guillotine, together with 
 the criminality which establishes and justifies them, 
 there would be something lacking to the harmony 
 of the world ! 
 
 Let us pursue the development a step further. It 
 is necessary that there should be falsehood and per¬ 
 jury, cruelty and assassination—necessary that there 
 should be rich sensualists and rich misers, indolent 
 lazzaroni and envious poor. And, worse still, when 
 we turn aside from others and look into our own 
 hearts, this theory requires us to believe that but for 
 that sin that burdens our conscience, that fault which 
 makes us blush when we are alone, that iniquity of 
 darkness, the world would be. ... I will not finish 
 
112 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 the monstrous sentence. To prolong this develop¬ 
 ment would be to insult the public conscience. 
 
 Against the conclusions of an erroneous philosophy 
 
 % 
 
 I appeal with confidence to the public heart, to the 
 public conscience, and to common sense. 
 
 But how is it possible, it may naturally be asked, 
 that men with heads and hearts, intelligent and honest 
 
 How possi- men > can maintain doctrines so monstrous 
 tietomajn-i n p lie j r conclusions ? It is thus i These 
 
 tam suci. a 
 
 uieorr. theorists dwell continually in the lofty 
 region of metaphysical abstraction ; they see things 
 in grand outline and from afar, and never deign to 
 descend to the commonplace sphere of experience 
 and facts ; they do feel, in fact, and seem sometimes 
 to confess it, that the realities of life are not in har¬ 
 mony with their theories. And these speculations, 
 which do not explain the ordinary facts of existence, 
 are not applied even by their own authors to their 
 own practical conduct In their contact with the 
 world and men, these philosophers, while maintain¬ 
 ing theoretically that all is good, yet practically act 
 and feel just as others. They blame whatever 
 itisnev«r wounds their conscience, grow irritated at 
 SSfbvi-s what opposes them, and, after having pub- 
 champiens, a demonstration that whatever is is 
 
 right, complain bitterly of those journalists who 
 speak evil of their works, and still more so of those 
 who do not speak of them at all. In spite of their 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 *13 
 
 theories, therefore, they also form the moral judg¬ 
 ments, bad, worse, worse still. For them, life and 
 science are two very distinct things* 
 
 But this distinction cannot be admitted. We do 
 not hold that algebraic formula for true which cannot 
 be applied to real quantities, and which an engineer 
 could not apply without committing a prac- True theory 
 
 not absurd 
 
 tical blunder. Nor is it any more safe to in practice, 
 entertain a philosophical theory which can neither 
 explain, nor be applied to, actual life. 
 
 The interest at stake here is of grave import; it is 
 that of the human conscience. Two years ago a 
 celebrated writer* declared in our city that the con¬ 
 science is dead. But it is not dead ; nor will it 
 die soon, for its guardian is the Eternal. But, with¬ 
 out dying, the conscience may become sick, and the 
 theories I here combat are calculated to produce this 
 sad result. When persons believe theoretically that 
 evil is necessary, it is unavoidable that in practice they 
 should not, more or less, tolerate evil, both in others 
 and in themselves. The founders of speculative 
 schools do not generally suffer the consequences of 
 their own errors ; for, as Leibnitz has observed, they 
 are preserved by their very habits of study and 
 thought from many of the temptations of life. Epi¬ 
 curus, the patron of voluptuaries, was a man of an 
 almost austere sobriety. The Emperor Marcus Au- 
 
 * Edgar Quinet. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 114 
 
 9 
 
 relius, though admitting, theoretically, the necessity 
 of evil, does not seem to have experienced much in¬ 
 convenience from a doctrine which was contradicted 
 by his life, and often by his writings. 
 
 But the havoc is felt in the ranks of the disciples. 
 The belief that evil is necessary acts on the will and 
 
 immoral conscience as a sort of fatal chloroform ; and 
 tendency of s cleleterious action makes itself widely 
 
 explaining 
 
 away evfl. f e p i n the broad level of practical ethics. 
 A minister of the Gospel, while exhorting a criminal 
 whom he wished to lead to repentance, received this 
 reply: “But what do you expect, sir? You know 
 very well that none of us are perfect.” This man 
 confounded what we have called the hierarchic judg¬ 
 ment with the moral judgment, and placed his acts 
 to the credit of the imperfection inherent in every 
 creature. And he was a double parricide, having 
 murdered both his father and his mother! The ex¬ 
 ample is extreme I know, but it is historical. But 
 if this extreme culprit excused himself thus, we may 
 well imagine what the less guilty may frequently do. 
 
 I believe in a profound harmony between con¬ 
 science and reason ; if, however, we must immolate 
 % 
 
 conscience, let us, at least, not immolate it on the 
 altars of sophistry. Let us look at the matter a little. 
 You hold the doctrine that every thing is good. You 
 cannot, however, deny that humanity possesses the 
 idea of evil, and judges that there is evil in the world. 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 115 
 
 % 
 
 Thi$ judgment brings about many imprisonments, 
 many executions, many complaints "about the condi¬ 
 tion of societyv You say, now, that this judgment is 
 an error, that our complaints are poorly founded, and 
 that you will set us to rights by teaching us the 
 truth that every thing is good. In your opinion, then, 
 we, the human race, are in error, since you undertake 
 to correct our thoughts. Is not, however, this error 
 itself an evil ? It is an evil, even in your opinion, 
 since you undertake to cure us of it. In proposing 
 to us a remedy, you admit that we are sick. An argu- 
 
 rnentum ad 
 
 Now, if all were good, as you affirm, we hominem. 
 would not be sick, the error of believing in the evil 
 would not exist, and you would not have the trouble of 
 destroying it. If your doctrine were true there would 
 be no need of proving it so. The mere fact that you 
 are obliged to undertake its defense refutes it. 
 
 Surely this is a strange and violent contrast, 
 namely, that of humanity on the one hand, groaning 
 under its miseries, and this of philosophy on the other, 
 which proclaims that every thing is good. And to 
 place the matter in its true light will be no easy task. 
 On the one hand, it is necessary to prove the reality 
 of the good in the face of the practical experience of 
 so much evil; and, on the other, to demonstrate to 
 men of reason the actuality of evil as opposed to its 
 speculative denial. The fact is, that reason, even in 
 its error, seems here to contain a partial expression 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 116 
 
 of the universal conscience ; its verdict is in the dlrec- 
 tion of what ought to be, while experience reveals to 
 us simply that which unfortunately is. But how is 
 it that that which is, is not in harmony with that 
 which ought to be ? This is, in fact, the very problem 
 we are discussing ; it cannot be solved, however, by 
 denying one of its terms. The world is what it is ; 
 ideal speculations cannot change the nature of things. 
 You may place the crown of orange on the brow of 
 a guilty woman ; you may write on the back of a 
 justly condemned culprit, honor and virtue; but you 
 will restore, neither to the one her purity, nor to the 
 other his innocence. The evil is there ; and you may 
 vainly say, It is good ; you cannot believe it, and your 
 faltering accent will not unfrequently betray your in¬ 
 ward conviction.* 
 
 Evil is in the world. Let us not merely confess 
 it; let us proclaim it aloud. The denial of evil is 
 fraught with terrible consequences. The affirmation 
 that every thing is good is absurd and blasphemous. 
 And, whatever certain philosophers may say to the 
 contrary, the world in its history, and in its actuality, 
 is full of errors, of sins, and of sufferings. If we say 
 the good is already realized, we thereby forbid our- 
 
 * Vous criez : tout est bien, d’une voix lamentable. 
 
 L’univers vous clement, et votre propre coeur 
 
 Cent fois de votre esprit a refute Terreur. 
 
 II le faut avouer, le mal est sur la terre.— Voltaire. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 117 
 
 selves to conceive of any thing better than that which 
 is ; we incapacitate ourselves for forming any ideal 
 higher than the prosy reality about us. To say that 
 there is nothing to look for higher than an order of 
 things similar to that which we know, is to deprive 
 ourselves of ail hope, and to quench the instinctive 
 aspirations of our heart. To affirm that the world is 
 not in disorder is to blindfold reason, for reason con¬ 
 ceives of a better order of things than that of this 
 world. To maintain, even by remote implication, 
 that sin is not evil, is to outrage the conscience, and 
 to do all that is possible to extinguish it. 
 
 With what have we to do here, then ? With sys¬ 
 tems, with theories, that conflict with—what ? With 
 the voice of God speaking from the depths of our 
 nature ; for it is the Author himself of our constitu¬ 
 tion, who prompts us to call evil, evil; who en¬ 
 joins us to combat it, and who causes to dawn in the 
 orient of the soul a blissful confidence in the good. 
 It is consequently a contest of pseudo-sages against 
 God and humanity. Voltaire, therefore, though so 
 often in the wrong, was grandly in the right when he 
 said, “ Our hope is that one day all will be right; to 
 say that all is now right is a delusion ; theorists may 
 blind us, but truth is truth.”* 
 
 * “ Un jour tout sera bien , voila notre esperance ; 
 
 Tout est bien aujourcTkui, voila 1’ illusion. 
 
 Les sages me trompaient, et Dieu seul a raison.” 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 118 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 THE PROBLEM. 
 
 The good, being the fundamental plan or order of the 
 universe, evil is a disturbance of this plan, a disorder. 
 Whence springs this disorder ? How has it come to 
 pass that that which ought not to be, is ? How is it 
 that that order which expresses the will of the Al¬ 
 mighty is not realized ? Such is the problem that 
 we have to solve. But first it is necessary to define 
 distinctly the spirit, the scope, and the limits of this 
 discussion. 
 
 It is not my intention to investigate the history of 
 
 The precise evil, the manner in which it transmits, repro¬ 
 aim of these , . , r T 
 
 lectures* duces, and perpetuates itseli; 1 am searching 
 for its origin, its cause. When one of your neighbors 
 gives you bad advice, and you follow the advice, this 
 is an occasion for evil to manifest and increase itself, 
 but it is not its cause, its point of departure. The 
 accepting of the evil advice presupposes a principle 
 of evil in him who gives it, and a capacity for evil in 
 him who receives it. A temptation from without is 
 a temptation only because it awakens an echo within 
 the soul. And for this reason, the question as to 
 primitive man’s having been tempted by a fallen 
 
The Problem of Evil. 119 
 
 angel—certainly a very grave and solemn question— 
 does not enter into the scope of our lectures ; it be¬ 
 longs to the history of evil, but does not bear on our 
 search for its origin. Suppose that a naturalist should 
 succeed in proving that the germs of life were de¬ 
 posited in our planet by its coming in contact with 
 another celestial body ; this fact would be important 
 as bearing on the history of life, but it would throw 
 no light on its origin. So is it also with the question 
 which occupies us. 
 
 We ask, Whence originates evil ? The tempter 
 offered man an occasion for committing it; this pre¬ 
 supposes that the tempter was evil. Man yielded 
 to the appeal of the tempter ; this presupposes that 
 the germ of a temptation existed in him. How came 
 it that there was a germ of temptation in man ? 
 Whence is it that the tempter was evil ? The question 
 is driven back, but it is not solved. Nor does it 
 remedy the matter to assume that the tempter was 
 evil by nature, for this would be to admit the ancient 
 doctrine of dualism , namely, that there exists along 
 with the good principle an eternal evil one. This 
 doctrine under its religious form prevailed among the 
 Persians ; in its metaphysical form it prevailed among 
 the Greeks, and is yet found in a few modern works. 
 But th£ history of religion and philosophy shows that 
 reason has ever striven to free itself from dualism as 
 well as from polytheism, and to arrive at the concep- 
 
120 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 tion of a single principle of the universe. Religious 
 dualism prevails no longer, save in a few relatively 
 obscure sects. And it is owing to the too predomi¬ 
 nant influence of Greek philosophy that there are yet 
 traces of philosophical dualism in modern meta¬ 
 physics. Since the establishment of the Christian 
 Dualism system, the idea of the existence of two 
 
 needs no ... 
 
 refutation. eternal principles has fallen outside of the 
 great current of human thought. And the study of 
 logic abundantly accounts for the fact; for a close 
 observation of the process of thought shows that it is 
 a fundamental tendency of reflection to seek for unity 
 as the basis of the multiple. We cannot, strictly 
 speaking, demonstrate the unity of the essence of the 
 universe, for this unity is the basis itself of reason, 
 and the common ground of all demonstration. The 
 assumption that there is an eternal principle of evil 
 will, therefore, be passed by in these- lectures, as al¬ 
 ready condemned, both historically and logically, by 
 the simple fact of the development of the human 
 mind in self-acquaintance. 
 
 We will examine, to-day, some deceptive solutions, 
 which sedm to resolve the question of evil, but do not 
 d : o so in fact; after which we will state an incomplete 
 General solution, which, while partly true, does not 
 
 heads of tlie 
 
 third lecture, account for all the facts. We will then de¬ 
 termine what are the general characteristics of evil, 
 so as to state, in closing, the true position of the 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 121 
 
 question. The points in our lecture will, therefore, 
 be: Deceptive Solutions, Incomplete Solution, Char¬ 
 acteristics of Evil. 
 
 i. Deceptive Solutions. 
 
 The solutions which I call deceptive have all of 
 them the same general character. They stop at the 
 occasions which permit evil to manifest itself, and 
 at the agents which propagate it ; and they lead 
 into error those who think to have found its real 
 source, its true origin. 
 
 Some, for example, think to have resolved the prob¬ 
 lem by saying that the body is the source of evil; 
 that the spirit, though good in itself, is vitiated by its 
 union with matter. It is very true that the body is 
 the occasion of many evils ; it is the recognized seat 
 of the sexual passions ; and a careful study of the re¬ 
 lations of the physical and the moral may even lead 
 us to admit that the bodily organs are the seat of all 
 our passions, even those that have not physical en¬ 
 joyment for their object. 
 
 These considerations have an important bearing on 
 the history of the manifestations of evil; ' they are 
 useful for practical life, indicating the means of 
 ameliorating our moral condition by a wholesome 
 discipline of the body. But they furnish no answer 
 to the question as to the origin of evil. The body 
 per sc is not evil; we can readily conceive of a body 
 
122 
 
 The Problem of Evil . 
 
 free from disorder, a spiritual body, that is, one serv- 
 The body is ing as an instrument to the spirit, instead 
 the cause of of debasing it to depraved appetites. After 
 determining the physical seat of our propen¬ 
 sions, it remains to be determined why the relations 
 between our soul and body are such that the body 
 uniformly oppresses the mind. The essence of the 
 problem is, therefore, untouched. 
 
 We will now examine, in more detail, another de- 
 Bad institu- ceptive solution, namely, the theory which 
 
 tions do not 
 
 clear up the places the origin of evil in social institutions. 
 evil. 111 ° This doctrine exists in germ, and more or 
 less obscurely, in a great number of minds. It is re¬ 
 duced to systematic form in the notorious system of 
 Charles Fourier. Establish phalansteries, say the 
 Fourierites, allow social harmony to realize itself, 
 and paradise will return to earth. The source of 
 evil lies in existing institutions ; good institutions 
 will banish all the evils of which we complain ; earth 
 will form nuptials with heaven, and the laws which 
 rule the stars will give peace to man.* So think 
 these men. 
 
 Without wishing to throw any ridicule on the 
 Fourierite system, I will show, simply, to what ab- 
 
 * La terre, apres tant de desastres, 
 
 Forme avec le ciel un hymen, 
 
 Et la loi qui regit les astres 
 
 Donne la paix au genre humain. 1 —Bera*s t ger. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 123 
 
 surdity it leads. Parents complain much of the diso¬ 
 bedience of children. A Fourierite, Victor Conside- 
 rant, if I mistake not, has given an infallible prescrip¬ 
 tion for drying up the source of these complaints. 
 Never command children to do any thing but what 
 pleases them, and they will always obey ; that is to 
 say, Give no commands, and you will suppress diso¬ 
 bedience ; abolish all forms of civil power, and there 
 will be no more place for the evil of revolt. The 
 solution is simple ; but is it good ? Let us examine 
 it in its general bearing. What is the purpose of in¬ 
 stitutions in respect to evil ? The question is im¬ 
 portant, and the truth will be found in the middle 
 point between two errors, which it will be well to 
 note. 
 
 A certain class of moralists say: “ Men are every 
 
 thing, institutions are nothing. Let the men be 
 
 » 
 
 good, and all the institutions will be good; but if the 
 men are bad, they will corrupt the best institutions.” 
 But this opinion is not strictly true. Institutions do 
 good, and institutions do evil. In the family, for ex¬ 
 ample, polygamy, or Roman divorce, (which finally 
 reduced marriages to a mere transient concubinage,) 
 are not matters of indifference. In society the insti¬ 
 tution of slavery is not of trivial import. It is But institu¬ 
 tions are po- 
 
 true, if all slaves and all masters were perfect, tent occa- 
 
 .... -it sions of good 
 
 a society might be happy even with slavery; or evil, 
 but as slaves are not perfect, nor masters any more 
 
124 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 so, slavery is consequently far from being without in¬ 
 fluence on humanity in its present condition. Some 
 time since a man sat with pen in hand, and about to 
 sign his name to a public document. That single 
 signature was going to transform into freemen twenty 
 millions of serfs of the soil. Suppose some one had 
 approached the Emperor of Russia at that moment, 
 and said to him, “ Sire! you are going to create 
 great embarrassments ; you will introduce very per¬ 
 plexing complications into the administration of your 
 empire; you will have a fearful crisis to pass; and to 
 what purpose, after all ? What signify institutions ? 
 Let the masters only be good, and the serfs will be 
 happy.” And I doubt not that this reasoning was 
 urged upon the Emperor Alexander more or less ex¬ 
 plicitly. But he did not heed it, and you will all 
 agree with me that he did well. Liberal institutions 
 develop in a people the sentiment of personal dignity; 
 tyrannical institutions tend to degrade and brutalize 
 men. Equitable institutions cultivate and develop 
 the sentiment of justice ; unjust institutions give rise 
 to discontent and revolt. There are pacific in¬ 
 stitutions which foster mutual good-will; there are 
 military institutions which provoke hostility, hatred, 
 and all the evil passions. It is never wise to 
 oppose salutary reforms under pretext that men 
 are every thing and institutions nothing. The er¬ 
 rors of these theorists have unfortunate practical 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 125 
 
 consequences. In times of social conflict, conserva- 
 tists make use of them in opposing desirable political 
 ameliorations. 
 
 Institutions continually promote either good or 
 evil; but they are evidently neither the root of the 
 good nor of the evil. To attribute to them an abso¬ 
 lute moral power, is an error into which politicians 
 are apt to fall. 
 
 This error of politicians is taken advantage of by 
 revolutionary passions ; but it produces, together with 
 the revolutions, also those bitter disappointments 
 which nearly always follow them. It was thought to 
 reach the source itself of the evil by changing the 
 institutions ; but it is seen finally, and with grief, that 
 the evil re-appears under the new institutions, what¬ 
 ever they may be. Flatterers surround and degrade 
 the throne of a monarch, and the enraged people 
 overthrow the throne; but flattery reappears and 
 addresses herself to the victorious people, and is some¬ 
 times as base, as perfidious, as fatal, as when she ad¬ 
 dressed a crowned head. Unprincipled revolutionists, 
 who wish to get themselves into public employment, 
 may reach their purpose through a political commo¬ 
 tion ; but disinterested patriots, who look to political 
 changes for the destruction of all abuses, are always 
 doomed to bitter disappointment, as some of the 
 recent French revolutions have abundantly illus¬ 
 trated. A change of institutions may be advantage- 
 
126 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 • ous, or it may be the opposite; but the ultimate 
 
 Back of in- soll]ice °f the evil is not in them. Back of 
 stitutions is institutions lies human nature; and Tor 
 
 tive action this reason, those who sav that man is every 
 
 of human J J 
 
 nature. thing, are nearer the truth than those who 
 look too exclusively to political institutions. 
 
 Let us illustrate by an example. We hear much 
 said recently of co-operative societies and associations. 
 Though hardly capable of an opinion on the subject, 
 I venture, however, to regard them as the aurora of 
 a better future for our over-worked population. But 
 it is very certain that if you establish co-operative 
 idleness and prodigal associations, you will not obtain 
 very brilliant results, either in regard to labor or 
 economy. It is necessary, therefore, to labor for the 
 reformation of men, and, above all, that each should 
 strive to reform himself. One can never more plausi¬ 
 bly work for public reforms than after having consci¬ 
 entiously wrought his own individual reform. Despite 
 the fact that sometimes the best opinions come from 
 those who have acted the worst, and thus discovered 
 by contrast the advantages of the good, there exists, 
 for example, a very natural prejudice against taking 
 the opinion of bankrupts in financial reforms, and 
 against following the advice of idlers in the organiza¬ 
 tion of labor. 
 
 Human nature lurks behind institutions, and the 
 best social organization will be paralyzed in its effect- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 1 2J 
 
 iveness when applied to bad men. Moreover, these 
 institutions which are based on human nature, whence 
 come they ? They did not fall from the Institutions 
 heavens like the leaves of the Koran ; they growth of 
 spring from the life of humanity, and partake t ure. 
 uniformly of the sentiments and desires of those who 
 
 J 
 
 organize them. Their origin, however, is usually 
 vailed in the clouds of the past. But there are some 
 cases where we can clearly see it. For example, 
 America has recently been drenched in blood for the 
 
 j 
 
 destruction of slavery. But whence came this Ameri¬ 
 can slavery? We all know’its origin, the perverse 
 and covetous motives that led thereto, and its dis¬ 
 astrous consequences and bloody end. And if we 
 cannot say so much of every evil institution, it is 
 simply because of the imperfection of recorded 
 history. 
 
 J 
 
 Institutions do not actually create evil: in* this re¬ 
 gard.politicians are prone to error ; but institutions 
 transmit and augment either good or evil. They are 
 not, therefore, without influence, as some moralists 
 erroneously assume. The error of both these classes 
 of men may be readily illustrated. Suppose a man 
 engaged in raising a stone with an excellent lever. 
 
 o o o 
 
 The property of a lever is to transmit and augment 
 force. Two passers-by stop and notice the man at 
 work. The first says : “ If one has arms Two errone- 
 
 nn . . . i r 0118 v i ews 
 
 sufficiently strong, there is no need ot a illustrated. 
 
128 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 lever; strictly speaking, the arm is every thing and 
 the lever is nothing.” This is the moralist. The 
 other exclaims : “ How great the improvements in 
 modern mechanics ! we will ultimately have such fine 
 machines that there will be no more need of arms/’ 
 So speaks the politician. But both are in error. 
 Let us-improve the machines, and also strengthen 
 our arms, and then all will in fact gg well; or, to 
 translate this figure, let us sow and cultivate the germs 
 of good, both in our own souls and in those of our 
 neighbors, so as to produce men of intelligence and 
 good-will. These men will, in turn, ameliorate the 
 institutions; and these ameliorated institutions, 
 putting into play more and more the principles 
 of true liberty, justness, and charity, will in turn con¬ 
 tribute to augment general intelligence and good 
 will; and this enlightened public opinion will again 
 give birth to still better institutions. Such is the 
 practical consequence to which the above ..con¬ 
 siderations lead. Let us now come more directly to 
 our subject. 
 
 Bad institutions are agents for transmitting and 
 increasing evil; but to make them the origin of evil 
 is manifestly erroneous. And it will be easy to see 
 that such is the case with various other analogous 
 solutions of the problem of evil, which are met with 
 in conversation and in books. They seize on the 
 occasions which transmit and aggravate evil, and treat 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 129 
 
 them as If they were its ultimate source. Let us pass, 
 now, to the incomplete solution. 
 
 IL An Incomplete Solution. 
 
 Order being the basis of the universe, how is it 
 
 that disorder has come to exist? In order to create 
 
 a true commencement there is need of a cause, a 
 
 producing power—in a word, of liberty; for Liberty pos¬ 
 tulated by 
 
 where no free cause intervenes, there there <mi. 
 can only be a combination of that which already ex¬ 
 isted—strictly speaking, nothing can begin. Liberty! 
 this is the watch-word, of modern society, but it is not 
 that of modern science, nor of science in its general 
 form. Science has always found it very difficult to 
 admit the reality of liberty, and for this reason : 
 Science seeks to rise from one idea to another by a 
 series of reasons, each of which is the necessary result 
 of the preceding. The scientific spirit has, The scientific 
 in fact, from of old down to our own day, i^h^tuTto 
 been formed chiefly by the study of mathe- hherty ' 
 matics and physics. Now, in the objects with which 
 physics juxdr mathematics busy themselves there is 
 not the least element of liberty. This is the source 
 from which the most prevalent idea of general science 
 has been derived. 
 
 Now, if science, as thus conceived, is the sole and 
 
 universal science, then every thing in the universe 
 
 is fatalistic, inasmuch as where logical necessity pre- 
 
 9 
 
130 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 vails, there there is no place whatever for liberty. 
 An atheistical savant said one day, “ If God existed 
 the chain of science would be forever broken.” That 
 is to say, when we come into the presence of the 
 Supreme Will, and when, to the question, why such 
 a thing is : it is answered, Because God has willed it, 
 there, reasoning must stop in the presence of this 
 free cause. This is why science has so much diffi¬ 
 culty in admitting the divine freedom. God appears 
 to it as a stumbling-block, severing the logical con¬ 
 catenation of its reasonings ; but if God is embarrass¬ 
 ing to science, man is none the less so. If there exists 
 in man the least element of liberty, it must inevitably 
 occur that, in some measure, the reason of his acts 
 and conduct will lie in the decision of his free will. 
 For, if all the actions of man could be explained by a 
 chain of necessary reasons, there would be in him 
 no element of liberty. If there is the least free ele¬ 
 ment in man, then there is in human actions an ele¬ 
 ment to which formulas, like those of mathematics, 
 are inapplicable. 
 
 Scientists, therefore, who deny the divine liberty 
 at the behests of science, such as they conceive it, 
 are obliged to deny human liberty likewise, and to 
 affirm that all the facts of human life are simply a 
 Theory eon- pure mechanism. Thus they teach ; but 
 
 tradicted by _ # 
 
 practice, their teaching involves them in strange con¬ 
 tradictions. Many men who hold this doctrine take 
 
The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 i ji 
 
 active part in politics, and figure in the ranks of the 
 liberals. In their books of science they affirm that 
 human liberty is a chimera, but in journals and in 
 deliberative assemblies they are the champions of 
 liberty. The consciousness of this contradiction, 
 which they themselves cannot always suppress, will, 
 doubtless, finally turn to the advantage of the truth. 
 
 It is surely an evidence of a fallacy somewhere, 
 that the prevalent idea of science denies, that there is 
 liberty in this universe, whether in God or man. 
 Man forgets himself in the contemplation of 0ccasion of 
 matter, and extends its mechanism to the thelallacy ' 
 spiritual world. As it may be said that exclusive 
 pre-occupation with self is the essence of moral evil, 
 so we may say that forgetfulness of self is the essence 
 of great philosophical errors. It is only necessary to 
 take into consideration the nature of moral and social 
 phenomena, and to introduce into science the verdicts 
 of consciousness, to be enabled to perceive Tr 
 at once that the act of volition is in itself an 
 explanation, a sufficient cause of facts, and 
 to be induced to admit that there are other elements 
 of science than those of mathematicians and physi¬ 
 cists ; that is to say, to admit the reality of liberty. 
 The denial of liberty would not permit the proposing 
 of the question which we are now discussing, inas¬ 
 much as, if every thing were necessary there would 
 be no possibility of a difference between that which 
 
 ue science 
 must admit 
 the fact of 
 liberty. 
 
132 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 is and that which ought to be. But as soon as the 
 idea of liberty is admitted, the problem of evil exists, 
 and a way lies open for its solution. I shall now 
 state and explain what I shall call an incomplete 
 solution ; I will then distinguish that part of it which 
 I regard as true from that which I cannot accept. 
 
 Liberty implies the possibility of evil. That being 
 Liberty a which, in the presence of law, would not be 
 Risible able t0 execute it or violate it, to obey or 
 disobey, would not be a free being. A free 
 being is, by nature, capable of evil. To *ask that a 
 creature be incapable of doing evil is to ask that it 
 be not free. Capability is the essence of a free 
 being; power is, in it, the seal and image of the 
 Almighty. Capability of evil is the seal of the 
 creature ; as, in fact, there exists only one will which 
 is so identical with the good that to suppose it evil 
 would be an absurdity for the philosopher and a 
 blasphemy for the believer. 
 
 If the creature revolts against moral law, this 
 Mere voir revolt has no other real cause than the mere 
 volition which produces it. The possibility 
 of revolt, which is implied in the idea of lib¬ 
 erty, is in no wise the germ of actual evil. 
 The cause of actual evil is, the free decision of a will 
 to violate its law. To seek for any other cause is to 
 deny liberty, and to misunderstand the very essence 
 of moral phenomena. 
 
 tion the sole 
 and suffi¬ 
 cient first 
 cause of 
 evil. 
 
133 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 The revolt of the will against its law is sin, the 
 primitive form of evil. Sin, in its turn, produces 
 error. If you deceive yourself it is always Binthecause 
 your own fault. Never affirm until you have oferror - 
 clear evidence ; in the absence of evidence suspend 
 your decision, and you will never be deceived. In¬ 
 tellectual error results from the fault of the will, in 
 leading the understanding to form hasty and rash 
 judgments. Moral error is also uniformly the fault 
 of him who commits it. If we do not take the trouble 
 to read the law inscribed in our conscience we are 
 guilty of negligence. If to justify our evil inclina¬ 
 tions we invent sophisms to obscure the light we 
 already have, we become finally incapable of discern¬ 
 ing the law; but our ignorance of the law, if thus 
 voluntary in its origin, cannot excuse us. 
 
 Sin having once produced error, suffering follows 
 both the error and the sin. To this place belong the 
 apologies of suffering which we have already dis¬ 
 cussed, and to which we now simply refer. As soon 
 as the world is invaded by sin and error, suffering 
 makes its appearance as warning, as remedy, and as 
 punishment; it is then just and beneficent in its 
 workings. 
 
 Let us sum up these arguments. The universe is 
 based on order—an order which is the ex- Summarv 
 pression of the Divine Will. Evil originates 
 in a misuse of liberty. The possibility of solutlun - 
 
* 34 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 evil is included in the idea of liberty, it being im¬ 
 possible to conceive a free being, save God, who is 
 not capable of evil. But liberty itself, what shall we 
 say of it ? Is it an evil ? It is not only good, it is 
 more than good ; it is the necessary condition of all • 
 
 good, as it is the condition of the existence of a 
 spirit. Shall we reproach God for having created 
 spirits, that is to say, free personalities ? “ What ! ” 
 
 exclaims Rousseau, “ to render man incapable of evil, 
 would we have him lowered to mere brutal instinct ? 
 
 No ! God of my soul, I will never reproach thee for 
 having made me in thine own image, so that I might 
 be good, free, and happy, like thyself.” Such is the 
 solution which I call incomplete. Let us now make 
 some distinctions. 
 
 The origin of evil must be looked for in the acts 
 
 of created wills ; this is the doctrine of all self-con- 
 
 * 
 
 sistent spiritualistic philosophy. I accept and main¬ 
 tain this part of the solution. But the solution, more¬ 
 over, supposes that the sole origin of evil lies in the 
 individual exercise of volitions, and that all sin, all 
 suffering, all disorder, are to be explained by the 
 misuse which all and each of us have made of our 
 personal freedom. This part of the solution I reject. 
 
 It is the characteristic of that doctrine which I shall 
 designate as individualism , and which I hold to be 
 incomplete. We will discover its incompleteness on 
 examining: further the characteristics of evil. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 135 
 
 III. Characteristics Of Evil. 
 
 Evil, as presented to our observation, has two chief 
 characteristics, its generalness and its essentiality. 
 To these two phases of the matter let us successively 
 devote our attention. 
 
 (1.) General Prevalence of Evil. 
 
 No one will deny the general prevalence of error. 
 None of the sciences, save perhaps the pure Generalness 
 mathematics, are developed simply by ac- oterror * 
 cessions to the truth already known, which would be 
 their normal condition ; but they are developed by 
 refuting and overthrowing the errors, prejudices, false 
 theories, and fallacious maxims which, from of old, 
 have largely formed the general fund and current of 
 human thought. This fact is so manifest that some 
 philosophers, taking the general expression of that 
 which is for the formula of that which ought to be, 
 have assumed that it is a normal characteristic of in¬ 
 telligence to pass through error in order to arrive at 
 the truth. 
 
 Nor will the general prevalence of suffering be 
 denied. In this respect our every-day life Generalness 
 is full enough of complaints. And if we otsulfenn s- 
 consult that great oracle in which humanity testifies 
 to itself of its own condition, I mean literature, we 
 will recognize at once that its general background 
 
136 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 is sadness, I do not forget that, from Anacreon 
 down, there have occasionally been gay and merry 
 songsters ; these are, however, but rare and except 
 tional sounds mingling themselves faintly in the 
 mighty and doleful chorus of human woe. The gen¬ 
 eral verdict as to life is that it is sad ; and, for those 
 who lack a firm faith in the good, a faith which 
 implies confidence -in God and in immortality, this 
 verdict is almost despairing. For example, take this 
 unique citation, to which, however, it would be easy 
 to add similar ones from the literature of all ages and 
 countries. It is Cicero who says: “After the su¬ 
 preme happiness of not being born, and of avoiding 
 the shoals of life, the most happy lot for every one 
 who has come into the world would be to die on the 
 spot, and escape from life as one escapes from a con¬ 
 flagration.” But why shall I add more ? my cause is 
 already more than gained. It is less important to 
 rehearse the sorrows of life, than to call to mind the 
 blessings with which it abounds, and which we lose 
 by our faults. Instead of complaining, it were well 
 to resort more freely to the sources of happiness 
 which are liberally opened to us. So, at least, we 
 are abundantly taught; but when, after having been 
 brought to reflection by age and experience, we 
 finally give attention to' this teaching, it too often 
 only awakens in us a regret for joys which are no 
 longer within our grasp, and thus adds another drop 
 
The Problem of Evil. * 13 f 
 
 to the ocean of human sorrow. Let us now notice' 
 the general prevalence of sin. 
 
 But first we must come to an understanding as to 
 the sense of the word law , which we shall wrat law is. 
 have frequently to use. What we call law, as to 
 natural phenomena, is simply a general expression 
 of facts. The law of gravitation, for ex- Inthem3te _ 
 ample, expresses the general fact that bodies nal worI<L 
 are attracted toward each other. In this order of 
 things the facts are always in harmony with the 
 law, as there exists in matter no principle of action, 
 no caprice, no rebellion. But in the spiritual world 
 law is a command, an expression of what In the spirit- 
 ought to be ; and, as a command, it ad- ual " orl(L 
 dresses itself to free beings. The facts may be, or 
 may not be, in accordance with the command. There 
 are, therefore, laws which are a general expression 
 of that which is, and others which are the expression 
 of that which ought to be. The first are realized in 
 nature: the second are proposed to free wills in the 
 moral world. There may, however, be in the moral 
 world laws expressive of the general character of 
 facts ; but these laws will not be absolute like those 
 of nature ; there will be, or may be, exceptions. For 
 example, there are men who fast; but this does not 
 annul the general law that man eats when he is 
 hungry. There are mothers who murder their chil¬ 
 dren ; but this does not annul the general law of fact 
 
135 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 that mothers nurture their children. Having made 
 these explanations as to the nature of law, we must 
 now ascertain what is the law of duty, or the com¬ 
 mand, then determine the law of fact, or the general 
 usage, and thereupon compare the two classes of 
 laws. If the law of facts is, with slight exceptions, in 
 accord with the law of duty, we will say that the 
 state of things is good. But if, in the large majority 
 of cases, the law of facts contradicts the law of duty, 
 then we will say that the state of things is bad. 
 How is it now, in this respect, with mankind ? 
 
 Let us begin at the beginning. A child is born. 
 Let us pause at this phenomenon of birth. The re- 
 The sexes in production of the race has been confided to 
 an instinct which we have in common with 
 animals. This instinct is associated with 
 another, which is designed to safeguard the dignity 
 of the person—shame ; and it is placed under the 
 protection of a law—the law of chastity. The law of 
 reproduction leads normally to the union of the sexes 
 under well-known moral conditions, and in view of 
 certain ends and consequences. The condition is 
 that the union of the bodies should be preceded and 
 justified by the union of the souls, leading to a free and 
 real consent: this is the part of the heart in the law 
 of chastity. The end is the transmission of life, and 
 the relation of the means to the end is readily seen ; 
 this is the part of reason in the law of chastity. The 
 
 their nor¬ 
 mal rela¬ 
 tions. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 139 
 
 consequence is the concurrence of the father and 
 mother, which presupposes a lasting union in order 
 that maternal tenderness and the sterner duties of 
 fatherhood may co-operate in the physical, intellect¬ 
 ual, and moral education of the child ; this is the part 
 of conscience in the law of chastity. 
 
 Now, is not this the moral law in the matter? I 
 do not ask whether the law, in all the extent of its 
 consequences, is difficult or easy of fulfillment in the 
 present condition of our nature. The question is, 
 Is this the law ? is it possible for us to think other¬ 
 wise ? To settle this question soundly it were better 
 not to regard it as a mere matter of practical morals, 
 for morals imply a barrier to custom, and the passions 
 are ever ready to invent sophisms to evade the ap¬ 
 plication of moral rules. Let us examine, therefore, 
 how mankind invariably reason on this subject when 
 considering it otherwise than from a moralizing 
 stand-point. 
 
 That free consent is the legitimate condition of the 
 
 union of the sexes, no one doubts. The These rela¬ 
 tions are 
 
 idea of violence excites horror; the penal generally 
 
 . . . and well 
 
 code provides against it; and all constraint, understood, 
 whether material or moral, awakens reprobation -and 
 disgust. Free consent in the matter now before us 
 is the most common of maxims, and lies at the basis 
 of nearly all of our romances and poetry. As to the 
 end, consult any treatise on physiology, and you will 
 

 140 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 see maintained without the least hesitation the dis¬ 
 tinctions of the functions which relate to the produc¬ 
 tion of the species and the preservation of the indi¬ 
 vidual. And as to the consequences, all economists 
 assume that the bringing of children into the world 
 implies the duty of providing for them, and civil law, 
 as far as within its scope, becomes the partial organ 
 of the conscience, and imposes on parents the obli¬ 
 gation of nourishing and raising their children. On 
 this subject Christian ethics has not so much intro¬ 
 duced new ideas, as collected into a focus, and sealed 
 with divine authority, that which, in the eye of reason, 
 is the law of nature. This law, though often violated 
 by practice, by institutions, and by maxims framed 
 to justify them, has revealed itself more than is gen¬ 
 erally supposed to all those who have essayed to de¬ 
 cipher the characters inscribed on the conscience 
 and reason of humanity. Even in the darkest days 
 Duties of of Roman decadence, at an epoch when 
 
 chastity 
 
 known and morals were truly frightful, certain pagan 
 
 defended at . ....... 
 
 times of authors explained, almost m their whole ex- 
 corruption. tent and rigor, the duties of chastity. 
 
 The law of duty is, therefore, known. But what is 
 the* law of facts ? We repeat it, in the sphere of lib¬ 
 erty there are no fatalistic laws. There are persons 
 who resist the temptations of the flesh and remain 
 pure. To doubt this is to inflict self-chastisement, 
 self-contempt. In one of the most striking pages of 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 141 
 
 modern literature, Alfred de Musset, a sad victim of 
 earthly passion, has depicted the tortures of the liber¬ 
 tine, who, a prey to terrible doubts, confesses with 
 anguish that he has culpably rendered himself in¬ 
 capable of believing in purity. 
 
 The law is not fatalistic. The steps to its viola¬ 
 tion are easily traced. A man under the influence 
 of passion finds himself in the presence of the seduc¬ 
 tions of life ; his conscience warns him, but he has 
 not courage to obey it. A morbid curiosity leads 
 him to attend spectacles which awaken his senses, 
 leads him to entertain corrupt communications, or 
 prompts him to read books which fill his imagination 
 with impure images. A defiled imagination perverts 
 his senses, vice is contracted, and the guilty one 
 writes his sins to the score of nature ; he, perhaps, 
 even calls science to his aid to prove the necessity of 
 the disorders of which he has rendered himself the 
 victim. # Lacordaire, a man who may rightly speak 
 on this subject, as one who had struggled and con¬ 
 quered, says : “ When we have not taken the pains 
 to overcome our passions we console ourselves in 
 our vices by declaring them necessary, and clothe 
 in the mantle of science the testimony of a corrupted 
 heart.” 
 
 There is no fatal law consigning us to impurity ; 
 but what is the. general fact in this respect, as ex¬ 
 hibited in human life ? Is it a general fact that 
 
 o 
 
142 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Prevalence infancy is perfectly pure, that youth is truly 
 
 of impuri¬ 
 ty. chaste, and that children brought up by irre¬ 
 
 proachable parents uniformly make exemplary hus¬ 
 bands and wives ? Examine your own life, and what 
 you know of the life of others, and listen to the voice 
 of history. Sin is very prevalent; nations violate 
 the law of chastity without restraint, and the rulers 
 of nations seem sometimes to employ their excep¬ 
 tional position and power only to hand down to re¬ 
 motest posterity the reputation of adulterers and de¬ 
 bauchees. 
 
 The law is violated ; but how it avenges itself! 
 How many are the tombs prematurely opened by 
 vice ! how many constitutions undermined and de¬ 
 stroyed ! how many withered bodies ! how many 
 blighted intellects ! You turn toward the fountains 
 of life, and you see rise from them only the vapors 
 of death. On this point we cannot have exact statis¬ 
 tical data ; but I do not think those in error who 
 Eavatres of estimate that debauchery alone robs human- 
 unchastity. -j.y more vital forces than the combined 
 
 ravages of war, pestilence, and famine. Such is one 
 illustration of the prevalence of evil. It relates to 
 the origin of life ; let us now turn to another. 
 
 When man is born he needs nourishment. Is the 
 practice of mankind faultless in regard to this ? The 
 Food and law of alimentation is well known. Food 
 
 drink nor¬ 
 mally. and drink look to the maintenance 01 the 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 H3 
 
 forces of body and mind. I have no sympathy with 
 asceticism ; there is here a means of sociality which 
 should not be neglected. The family table is the 
 place of reunion of father, mother, and children. 
 When a friend joins himself to the circle, a few addi¬ 
 tions to the attractions of the repast is only a mark 
 of cordiality, a sign of welcome, which cannot be 
 blamed. And if on some natal or festive anniversary 
 a moderate use were made of a generous liquid which 
 cheers the spirit and contributes to the innocent joy 
 of friends, there would be nothing to condemn. But 
 it is evident that when excessive food fatigues and 
 destroys the forces instead of repairing them, and 
 when drink paralyzes the intelligence instead of pro¬ 
 moting its normal exercise, then there is disorder, 
 there is evil. 
 
 Now, what is the general fact in this respect ? We 
 do not speak of that open intemperance, of those 
 habits of drunkenness which so ravage society. We 
 ask, What is the general usage in regard to eating and 
 drinking? The general fact is that there The abuse 
 
 of food and 
 
 is excess ; the truly temperate are the ex- drink, 
 ceptions. In the majority of cases little daily excesses 
 fatigue the organism, waste, the forces, and gradually 
 sap the sources of life. It is only too often that we 
 see the animal kill the man, and finish by killing 
 itself. 
 
 But shall we continue our comparison of facts with 
 
144 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 the law ? Shall we pass to the laws of truth, of justice, 
 and of charity ? I need not enter into details ; you all 
 sin waiver- know only too many of them already. In 
 the presence of law, the perfect law, how 
 many are ji*st ? There are none, no, not one ; an 
 honest examination of the facts will prove not only 
 that sin is general, but that it is universal All, it is 
 true, do not sin equally; crime, as well as virtue, has 
 its degrees.* All do not sin against all the phases 
 of moral law ; but who does not transgress many of 
 the precepts which constitute it in its totality ? 
 None ; sin is all-prevalent This is one of the truths 
 which is least contested, especially when others are 
 concerned. 
 
 But we must here make an important distinction. 
 
 o 
 
 There is a morality of the conscience which places 
 Distinction us ' m ike presence of God, the author of the 
 from ethical ^ aw - But there is another morality, that of 
 morality. soc iety. I do not speak of the corrupt mo¬ 
 rality of the world ; I speak of a social morality which 
 is good and legitimate, and which ought to be care¬ 
 fully encouraged. Society judges each of its mem¬ 
 bers according to his acts, because it does not know 
 his motives, and it judges the acts of each in their 
 bearing on the rights of others. From this stand¬ 
 point there are men who are honest; there are others 
 who are less so, or not so at all; and these distinc- 
 
 * Ainsi que la vertu, le crime a ses degres.—R acine. 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 *45 
 
 tions ought to be kept up. There are men who, 
 when in society, may well move with downcast eyes, 
 and who had even better not show themselves abroad 
 at all; for some of their public acts have outraged 
 the public conscience. But there are others who 
 may well move among their fellows with upright 
 countenance, and who have the right, and sometimes 
 the duty, to rise up against outrage, and repulse -with 
 just indignation the assaults of calumny. If we ignore 
 •this distinction between the morality of conscience 
 and that of society, we involve ourselves in contra¬ 
 diction and foster a morbid humility. 
 
 There are persons who may rightly claim from 
 their fellows the title of honest men ; but he who 
 looks into his own conscience and compares himself 
 with the absolute law, that which looks at the inten¬ 
 tion as well as the act, and which is not limited to mere 
 social relations, will perceive in his heart all the germs 
 of evil, and will be convinced that it was, e .., 
 perhaps, only the occasion that was wanting rallty Wlth * 
 to have made of him an actual malefactor. root - 
 While standing in the presence of a criminal and 
 thinking over his history, have you never asked your¬ 
 self whether, if you had been placed in the same cir¬ 
 cumstance, you would not also have become what he 
 is, or perhaps worse still ? Have you never con¬ 
 ceived of yourself as in the presence of some great 
 
 temptation, and, on asking what would have become 
 
 10 
 
146 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 of you, felt the blood curdle in your veins ? In this 
 consultation of conscience, even those who pass for 
 just among men will learn three things : thankfulness 
 to God for having preserved them from the greater 
 temptations of life, indulgence for their fellows, and 
 severity for themselves. 
 
 We are all more or less involved in sin ; but what 
 shall we say of certain ones who imagine themselves 
 without reproach ? Shall we admit that they are 
 exceptions to the common rule ? If a man should 
 Plenty of declare himself without reproach, not only 
 
 Pharisees, 
 
 but no real from a social stand-point, in that he has 
 
 exceptions 
 
 to the gen- neither robbed, nor murdered, nor sworn 
 
 eral sinful- ri11 ....... . r 
 
 ness. lalsely, but also m the deep moral sense oi 
 the word, then I should be tempted to go and con¬ 
 sult his wife, his children, and his neighbors ; and I 
 would feel confident of learning many things to his 
 disfavor, and, above all, that he was intolerably pre¬ 
 sumptuous and arrogant. When Jesus of Nazareth 
 pronounced the parable commending the humble 
 publican who smote his breast, and condemning the 
 Pharisee who thanked God for his many virtues, he 
 did so, not so much in the character of the Son of 
 God, teaching us unknown truths, as in that of the 
 Son of man, making himself the organ of humanity, 
 
 and uttering the verdict of the universal conscience 
 against these self-righteous hypocrites, who, from 
 the sublime height of their imagined virtues, look 
 
The Problem of Evil, 147 
 
 down with disdain on the corrupt masses about 
 them* 
 
 The general prevalence of suffering and sin is only 
 too evident; we may laugh at it or weep at it, accord¬ 
 ing to the spirit that we are of, but it is certain that 
 the world goes wrong. Now, whence is this uni¬ 
 versality of evil ? The individualistic solution of the 
 problem of evil doubtless appears to you already as 
 very insufficient That a free being should not al¬ 
 ways choose the good may seem natural; but that 
 among the thousands and millions of human beings 
 who have appeared in the world, every one, without 
 exception, should have chosen evil and brought upon 
 himself suffering, and that none should have uni¬ 
 formly chosen the good, this may not be absolutely 
 and logically impossible, but it is assuredly very 
 strange. Our most honest and profound conviction 
 is this : Not only do we believe that no man Humanity 
 
 believes in 
 
 has always chosen the good, but we believe the univer 
 that in the present condition of humanity an ° f 
 absolutely good man is impossible. No one thinks 
 otherwise ; and of this, I could ask no better proof 
 than that given by the endless controversies which 
 are raised and perpetuated by the question of the 
 person of Jesus. Those who hold that he was abso¬ 
 lutely good, argue without hesitation from his absolute 
 goodness to his divine nature ; while those who deny 
 his divinity do not hesitate to deny, in consequence, 
 
148 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 the historical reality of his absolute goodness. We 
 believe, also, not only that every human creature is 
 affected by suffering, but that in the present condition 
 of humanity the existence of a man entirely free from 
 suffering is impossible. Finally, we treat as chimer¬ 
 ical the idea of a man entirely exempt from error. 
 We believe, therefore, that evil is inherent in human 
 nature under the threefold form of sin, of error, and 
 Essentiality °* suffering. This is what I call the essen- 
 
 ofevi1, tiality of evil . I11 view of this phase of the 
 
 * 
 
 question the individualistic solution will appear as 
 manifestly false—I mean, incomplete. 
 
 (2.) Essentiality of Evil 
 
 Evil is essential in humanity as it now exists ; that 
 is, independently of our personal faults, and of the 
 sufferings which arise therefrom or from the faults of 
 those about us, there is in all men, from the simple 
 fact that they are men, an element or germ of suffer¬ 
 ing and of sin. Mark well that I say an element of 
 sin, not necessarily implying actual sin. 
 
 It is easy to show that suffering does not arise 
 simply from the individual abuse of volition, though 
 this produces, in fact, a large part of it. Let us revert 
 to the facts attendant upon the transmission of life, 
 inevitable- Before rejoicing from the fact that she has 
 
 ness of suf- . 
 
 ferine. brought a man into the world, woman must 
 
 n O 
 
 suffer the pains of childbirth. And when the child 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 149 
 
 is born, what is the uniform herald of the fact ? It is 
 the cry of the infant. The groans of the mother 
 cease only to give place to the wails of the new-born. 
 
 And how many infants are swept away almost at 
 their birth ! how many of their epitaphs might be, 
 f ‘It cried and then died!" Pitiable infant! what 
 fault had it committed ? And the mother—were the 
 birth-pains the result of her own faults ? Are they 
 spared to the pure woman, and suffered only by the 
 guilty ? All suffer alike. In fact, so far as we can 
 see, suffering seems to strike at hazard, and, with 
 supreme indifference to individuals, to impose a tax 
 on humanity at large. A portion of our sufferings 
 does not belong to us as mere individuals, but as 
 members of the race. The proverb is * not without 
 justification, that “to live is to suffer.” 
 
 Let us pass to what we call the essentiality of sin. 
 There exists in human nature an element of v .. ... 
 sin independently of the fault of individual 01 sin- 
 volitions : such is our affirmation. But we must be 
 well understood, for, sin being a quality of our acts, 
 and every act being, as it seems, absolutely individual, 
 it does not appear easy, at first thought, to under¬ 
 stand that sin may belong not to our volition, but to 
 our nature itself. It is for this reason that we use 
 the expression element of sin, and we shall soon see 
 for what reason. Volition, reason, and conscience do 
 not constitute our entire spiritual nature. Volition 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 150 
 
 is not the sole origin of our acts. We are impelled 
 “Heart” in and solicited by the tendencies of the heart. 
 
 its moral 
 
 sense. In a general sense, we designate as heart 
 the spiritual organ of all our desires and inclinations, 
 of every thing that leads us to action, from the most 
 disinterested love down to the taste we may have for 
 this or that article of food. When man suspends the 
 action of his will-power, he acts under the mere im¬ 
 pulsion of his propensions, and, as we say familiarly, 
 he goes as his heart leads him. The heart consti¬ 
 tutes, in a moral point of view, what we call a nature, a 
 nature which lies at the base of the soul, and back of 
 our liberty. In the presence of this nature the free 
 will consents or resists ; it can consent to the evil, it 
 can resist the good. A large share of our responsi¬ 
 bility consists in our consenting to, or resisting, the 
 impulses of the heart. This moral nature which 
 weighs upon our will forever, and tempts it to abdicate 
 in favor of the heart—are we personally responsible for 
 its peculiarities ? Not entirely, as we shall soon see ; 
 though we are so partially, as must not be forgotten. 
 
 The consequence of a wrong act is, that we are in¬ 
 clined to commit it anew, if some bitter experience 
 Nature and or the power of repentance do not counteract 
 
 significance 
 
 of habit, the law of nature. This law is, that the 
 repetition of an act increases our inclination to persist 
 in doing it. Such is the mysterious effect of habit: 
 the employment of our liberty confines itself, so to 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 I 5 i 
 
 speak, in grooves which originally proceed from our¬ 
 selves. This is very evident, for example, in cases 
 of intemperance. The man who began to indulge in 
 drink in defiance of his conscience, and with a con¬ 
 sciousness that he could and should resist it, becomes 
 step by step the slave of the very, misuse which he 
 makes of his own will-power. Finally, after having 
 devoted himself to evil for ten, twenty, or thirty years, 
 so that his will has become incrusted in the prepon¬ 
 derance of his appetites, he will openly declare that 
 nature is stronger than he. And perhaps he will 
 speak truly ; but who, other than himself, has created 
 this nature ? Thus the past of liberty re-appears in 
 the present of nature ; though devoting ourselves 
 voluntarily to evil at first, we finally become its un¬ 
 willing slaves ; we ourselves fabricate and rivet the 
 chains of our own servitude. But this power of habit 
 is equally effectual in regard to the good. v help to 
 To-day you accomplish a good action with J lc f an<1 . a 
 
 J J 1 0 help to Yir- 
 
 efiort—perhaps with heroic effort; to-morrow tue - 
 you will do it with less effort; finally you will do it with¬ 
 out any effort. The practice of the good will have be¬ 
 come easy to you ; the employment of your liberty will 
 have inclined your heart to the good, and the past of 
 your liberty will re-appear in the present of your na¬ 
 ture ; that is, by the good employment of your will you 
 will have built upon your primitive nature a new nature. 
 
 There is, therefore, in our actual dispositions a por- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 K2 
 
 tion which has resulted from the previous use of our 
 liberty. But is that all ? is there in our nature noth¬ 
 ing other, and more, than what we ourselves, or others 
 by their influence on us, have put there ? Assuredly 
 a personal there is more; there is' in us a primitive na- 
 
 and an i m - 
 
 personaleie- ture, dispositions which are born with us, as 
 
 ment in our 
 
 heart. the etymology of the word 7 tat 7 tre itself im¬ 
 plies. The personal nature of each individual is 
 largely determined before the action of his will and 
 the influence of his fellows by inclinations inherent 
 in his organization, and which are transmitted to him 
 by his family, bis nation, his race. Nor is this all : 
 below these special, hereditary transmissions lie the 
 elements of human nature in general. In the har¬ 
 monious growth of body and soul, the elements of this 
 nature are developed and gradually disclosed to the 
 eye of consciousness, until finally they constitute that 
 totality of inclinations which we call the heart. 
 
 Now' the heart awakens to life before the conscience. 
 
 At the period when man, taking possession of himself, 
 becomes a moral being—a point of time which varies 
 Heart much with individuals, and which in some 
 awakes, bo- cases seem s almost never to arrive—the 
 
 fore cor*- 
 
 will finds itself in the presence of propensi- 
 
 science. 
 
 ties of the heart. Now, it is in this sense that the 
 w nature ” of our soul may be said to be good or bad ; 
 it is in this sense that there can be an element of 
 
 good or an element of evil essentialIv inhering in 
 
 o C- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 153 
 
 human nature under its present conditions. Though 
 sin, properly so called, presupposes a necessarily indi¬ 
 vidual act of the will, still predispositions to evil con¬ 
 stitute an element or germ of sin. Now, what is 
 the condition of humanity in this respect ? When a 
 person comes into moral possession of himself, does 
 he find himself, like the Hercules of the fable, called 
 on to choose between the good and the evil, which 
 stand before him under strictly equal conditions, the 
 one at his right, the other at his left ? Are the scales 
 of the balance equally charged ? This is the heart of 
 the question. Very certainly the scales of Heart over- 
 
 . balances 
 
 the balance are not equally charged : the conscience, 
 heart is inclined toward evil. It is true, we are not 
 naturally inclined to grime : an inclination to assassin¬ 
 ation and to acts of a like nature is, happily, but a 
 terrible exception. Crime is the accident of evil, the 
 paroxysm of the malady, as heroism is the exceptional 
 form of the good. The real question is : Which is the 
 easier for us, in view of the whole extent of the law, 
 vice or virtue ? If our language is well formed, we 
 need but propose the question to resolve it; for the 
 word virtue signifies primitively force, and general 
 usage stigmatizes vices as weaknesses. Let us prove 
 that language is in the right. 
 
 In the development of human nature the lusts of 
 the flesh have a manifestly abnormal Influence. 
 Every man, when desiring to fulfill the law of the spirit, 
 
154 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 finds himself, in one respect or another, subject to the 
 law of his members, without, however, being able to 
 attribute to his own will—which is responsible only 
 when it yields to the evil—the origin itself of the bad 
 passions which tempt him. In his relations with 
 others he may have a tender heart, and be affected 
 at their sorrows, without, however, having a good 
 heart. In general, therefore, can the human heart 
 
 be called good in the deep sense of the word ? Are 
 
 • 
 
 we naturally inclined rather to the fulfillment of the 
 law of charity? or to that indifference which takes no 
 thought of others ? or, in fine, to the spirit of arrogance 
 which occupies itself with others only to dominate 
 them ? In order to recognize what are the facts in 
 this respect, suspend for awhile the activity of your 
 will, and give free course to your thoughts as associa¬ 
 tion may call them up ; this will be what we call a 
 state of revery. In this state we lay aside the reins 
 _ , , of self-control, and give ourselves over to the 
 
 cy in revery. f ree current of human nature, as it exists 
 within us. What is the general tenor of our thoughts 
 and feelings in such a state ? Heaven preserve me 
 from denying that there is much of the pure and 
 noble in the reveries of many young women and 
 young men ! Yes, our souls are visited by brilliant 
 flashes and splendid gleams, but, alas ! these gleams 
 and flashes serve but too often to render the shadows 
 more visible. What is the testimony of literature 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 155 
 
 and popular proverbs—mirrors in which humanity 
 sees reflected its own inmost thoughts—in regard 
 to the purity of our thoughts when unoccupied ? Is 
 it not that idleness is the mother of all the vices ? 
 Now, if idleness, which is simply a suspension of 
 effort, generally occasions the undisciplined imagina¬ 
 tion to wander into impure scenes of vice and crime, 
 it is quite evident that our nature is not good, and 
 that we inherit from humanity in general, if not sin 
 properly so-called, yet certainly a condition of heart 
 which inclines us to wrong acts ; that is, we inherit 
 an element, or germ, of sin. “ I am con- x. 
 
 —* XtOUSSGclll b 
 
 vinced," wrote Rousseau, “ that there is no opmion ' 
 man, however honest he may be, who, should he 
 always follow the dictates of his heart, would not soon 
 become the worst of wretches.” 
 
 There remains yet a final question to propose. Is 
 this evil nature which is within us, and which each 
 can contribute to augment by his own volun- Our evil na- 
 
 , 1 • i i r , . ,. ture notac- 
 
 tary acts, but which exists before the inch- counted for 
 vidual, simply the result of the accumulated b> here,llta ' 
 faults of generations? The hereditary trans- unsslon - 
 mission of evil tendencies is an incontestable fact 
 which of itself proves the insufficiency of the indi¬ 
 vidualistic solution; but the mere fact of hereditary 
 transmission, as observed in history, does not solve 
 the problem. In fact, if our nature, such as it is, 
 were simply the result of the accumulated acts of 
 
156 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 generations, we would naturally expect to find history 
 presenting humanity as pure at its beginning, and 
 as corrupting itself continually more and more by the 
 faults of its members. It would be like a stream rising- 
 pure among the rocks of the Alps, and losing its lim¬ 
 pidity as it gradually approaches the plains. But is it 
 so ? Does history show us a greater degree of good 
 the further back it leads us ? I do not speak here of 
 religious traditions as to a pre-historic state, a Golden 
 Age, but of history proper. The annals of all nations 
 uniformly represent the earlier civilization as very 
 defective ; so much so that many have rashly inferred 
 that the savage state is the primitive state of the 
 race. And when we pass beyond the period of history 
 into the period of legend, does the matter assume a 
 more favorable phase ? What is the state of morals 
 as presented in the heroic age of Greece ? How 
 many sad parallels might we find to the stories of 
 Clvtemnestra and Agamemnon ! Let us turn now to 
 the sacred books of the Hebrews. Almost on the 
 first page, we find the earth crying for vengeance for 
 the blood of Abel. Turn over a few pages, and you 
 have the fearful history of the cities of the plain. 
 Lot escapes from the corruptions of Sodom only to 
 become a victim of the disorders of his own family, 
 and the incestuous father of the accursed races of 
 Moab and Ammon. No, no; we do not find history 
 presenting humanity as proceeding from a pure 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 157 
 
 source) and then degenerating little by little from 
 the mere influence of individual volitions. 
 
 The individualistic doctrine is, therefore, insuffi¬ 
 cient. It does not account for the hereditary Insufficiency 
 transmission of tendencies from one genera- 
 tion to another, and it is absolutely dis- solutlolu 
 proved by the presence of evil at the very outset of 
 history. And, in fact, those who maintain this doc¬ 
 trine come finally to admit its insufficiency in spite 
 of themselves. After having shown, and shown 
 properly enough, the share of evil which results from 
 the action of individual wills, they are forced to 
 attribute the rest either to the influence of society, 
 which is Rousseau's theory, or to a certain necessity 
 of things, which is the theory of a large number of 
 metaphysicians. To attribute the evil to so'ciety is 
 manifestly fallacious, for whence came the evil into 
 society? To place a portion of existing evil to the 
 charge of a primitive and absolute necessity of things 
 is not to solve the problem, but to deny it, inasmuch 
 as the very fact of proclaiming evil necessary is to 
 proclaim it good. 
 
 How far, now, have we advanced in the solution of 
 our problem ? Shadows surround us on every side, 
 and we seem lost in labyrinths without issue. We 
 have, however, ascertained some facts : Evil, for ex¬ 
 ample, cannot proceed from God, for the good and the 
 will of God are one and the same thing. To make 
 
158 
 
 The Problem of Evil ’ 
 
 God the author of evil is a logical contradiction ;*nor 
 can evil proceed from an eternal principle other than 
 God, for God is himself the universal principle, out¬ 
 side of which there exists, primitively, none other ; 
 he, and he alone, is eternal. We are therefore forced 
 to look for the origin of evil to created wills. On 
 studying the individual action of created wills we 
 find therein an explanation of a considerable portion 
 of existing evil. There is, however, another and a 
 large portion which escapes this explanation. An 
 evil influence seems to weigh down upon humanity 
 throughout all the pages of its history, and from the 
 very beginning ; or, to use a more appropriate figure, 
 an evil principle seems to have infected humanity as 
 a whole, and to exist in each one of us in the very 
 heart of our being. But what is this principle ? 
 whence can it spring ? To answer this will be the 
 purpose of our next lecture. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 159 
 
 LECTURE IV, 
 
 THE SOLUTION. 
 
 We are seeking for the origin of evil, that is, of a 
 disorder which manifests itself in humanity under 
 the three forms of error, suffering, and sin. We 
 have encountered one solution of the problem—that 
 which attributes sin exclusively to individual volition, 
 and regards the other elements of evil as simply the 
 natural consequences of individual sins. In regarding 
 error and suffering as sequences of sin, this theory 
 satisfies both conscience and reason. But in that it 
 attributes the origin of sin exclusively to individual 
 volitions, we have found it insufficient. It cannot 
 account for the general prevalence of suffering, nor 
 for the existence in humanity of an all-prevalent 
 element or germ of sin antecedent to all volition. 
 There exists, as we have said, an infectious principle 
 which vitiates all hearts. Whence comes it ? It is 
 of great importance for our practical life to recognize 
 the essential character of evil. If we ignore the fact 
 that humanity is in a state of fundamental disorder, 
 we are only too ready to regard the general state of 
 things, the common usage, as the proper rule for 
 that which ought to be, and from this results a great 
 
160 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 enfeebling of the conscience. The question as to the 
 origin of this wrong state of humanity appears at 
 first glance to be a question purely speculative. 
 And, in fact, it is not directly practical. As soon as 
 we admit that evil ought not to be, it follows that, in 
 case our heart is evil, it is our duty to resist it. The 
 whole bearing of our investigations on the conduct 
 of life is contained in this simple maxim, “ Abhor 
 that which is evil; cleave to that which is good.” 
 As far as practice is concerned, therefore, it would 
 seem that we might here pass immediately to the 
 subject of our sixth lecture, which is, to treat of the 
 in bow far con fli c t of life. „We cannot, however, con- 
 
 spocula- 
 
 tionson the cede in an absolute sense the moral indif- 
 
 origin of 
 
 evil are of ference of the question now before us. If 
 
 practical 
 
 bearing. we have no definite opinion as to the origin 
 of evil, we are very apt either to regard it as neces¬ 
 sary, which enfeebles the conscience, or to derive it 
 from God, which seriously violates the religious senti¬ 
 ment, Without being directly practical, therefore, 
 the question as to the origin of evil has yet a real 
 influence in the sphere of morals. Moreover, as the 
 method of our lectures is philosophical, and as the 
 peculiarity of philosophy is to seek for a solution 
 wherever a problem is encountered, we must here 
 tarry longer. We may remark in passing, however, 
 that, provided only you fully admit the obligation of 
 combating error, the doubts which some of you may 
 
The Problem of Evil. 161 
 
 entertain as to the solution which I propose will in 
 nowise neutralize, for such, the value of the subse¬ 
 quent lectures. After dissenting for awhile on the 
 field of theory, we will agree again when coming to the 
 practical applications, I propose now to submit to you 
 what seems to me the best solution of the problem 
 of evil, then to indicate its historical sources, and 
 finally, in developing it, to signalize the inferences to 
 which it leads us, as to the primitive condition of 
 humanity and the origin of its actual con- GeneBa] 
 dition. The order of our thoughts will, ^fourth 
 therefore, be: The Solution Proposed, the lecture ’ 
 Historical Sources of the Solution, the Primitive 
 Condition of Humanity, and the Origin of its Present 
 Condition. 
 
 I. The Solution Proposed. 
 
 We are studying the problem of evil in a general 
 manner, as bearing on all created spirits ; but as hu¬ 
 manity alone, of all the families of spirits whose ex¬ 
 istence we may suppose, lies within the sphere of our 
 observation, we will apply our theory as to all spirits, 
 to mankind in particular. 
 
 The solution I have to propose is this : Humanity 
 is corrupted because it has corrupted itself. A 
 primitive act of humanity has, by an abuse of free¬ 
 will, by a revolt against law, created the evil heart of 
 
 humanity. From this it follows that in each indi¬ 
 ll 
 
162 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 vidual two things are to be distinguished: first, his 
 
 The two eie- P ersona l will, which is responsible for his 
 mentsmhu- ac j- s anc [ f or his consent to the inclinations 
 
 man respon¬ 
 sibility. 0 f nature; secondly, the human nature which 
 
 is in him, and for which he is responsible on his part, 
 not as an individual, but in his quality of human being. 
 There are here two affirmations which must be main¬ 
 tained with equal force : the collective responsibility 
 of humanity, and the individual responsibility of each 
 of its members. These affirmations do not contra¬ 
 dict, but simply limit and complement, each other. 
 While the nature of the problem will require me to 
 insist on the collective Responsibility of the race, it is 
 essential to guard intact the responsibility of the indi¬ 
 vidual. We will be careful not to imitate Luther’s 
 drunken peasant, who, in his effort to ride upright, no 
 sooner righted himself up from one side than he 
 found himself veering to the other, without ever 
 finding his proper equilibrium. 
 
 In order to the acceptance, or even comprehension, 
 of the solution I propose, it is necessary to consider 
 humanity as not simply a collection of individuals, 
 a numerical mass, but as a real existence, distinct from 
 the individuals, without, however, being separate 
 from them, and which may be the object of moral im¬ 
 putation. We have something analogous to this con¬ 
 ception when we speak of the human conscience and 
 consciousness as in contrast to those of individuals, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 163 
 
 and when we attribute certain sentiments and acts 
 to humanity as a whole. But when we look at the 
 matter more closely we are apt to regard this as mere 
 figurative speech, and to conclude that it is only the 
 individuals who have a real existence, and that the 
 word humanity is a mere abstract term designating 
 no other reality than a collection of units. This 
 manner of thinking has in its favor both an apparent 
 plausibleness, and a form of philosophy which readily 
 obtains credit, from the fact that it is in harmony 
 with first impressions in this regard. The theory 
 which I present conflicts sharply with the first con¬ 
 clusions of common sense. And, in view of the diffi¬ 
 culty of the subject, I shall here propose a compro¬ 
 mise. I pledge myself not to terminate this discussion 
 with a triumphant assumption that I have refuted 
 every objection and dissipated every shade of dark¬ 
 ness. On the other hand, I ask of you not to reject 
 at once the view I present, for the simple reason that 
 it may seem new. To reject every new thought 
 would be to close the way against progress. Though 
 my view may seem strange, do not, therefore, imme¬ 
 diately pronounce it absurd, but take ample time to 
 reflect upon it. An idea is a life-germ. Treat my 
 view as a thought-germ ; let it grow ; nurture it by 
 meditation, and pass a definitive judgment upon it 
 only after seeing the nature and quality of the fruit 
 which it may produce.^ Moreover, my thoughts are 
 
164 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 not so chained together but that those who may not 
 accept their whole import, will, nevertheless, be able 
 to derive some profit from the details of the discussion. 
 
 I-might allege with strict truthfulness that con¬ 
 temporary science, especially during the last half 
 century, has been rapidly leading the human mind to 
 the very solution which I have proposed. I might, 
 therefore, appeal to your taste for novelty. I might 
 Modem sci- say that I present you with a conquest of 
 
 once favors 
 
 the view of science which is not only modern, but which 
 
 an imper- . ’ . 
 
 sonai eie- is more than modern, and whose role, in fact, 
 
 man. m belongs to the future. But while in one 
 sense it is new in science and philosophy—so new 
 that it is as yet only in the birth-stage —- still in 
 another sense it is ancient, very ancient: it is one of 
 the old truths of humanity, which science is now 
 seriously beginning to spell out, and will finally suc¬ 
 ceed, I am convinced, in fully reading. As my solu¬ 
 tion is, therefore, not only new but also old, it is proper 
 briefly to refer to its origin: this propriety, however, 
 is only historical, but not essential. 
 
 A scientific doctrine is a supposition, an hypothesis, 
 designed to explain certain facts, and which is versi¬ 
 fied in proportion as it explains the facts. Its historical 
 origin has no important bearing on its truth. For ex¬ 
 ample, the law of gravitation was at first simply a 
 supposition. This supposition has finally become a 
 law, from the fact of its rationally accounting for the 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 165 
 
 movements of celestial and other bodies—from this 
 and no other reason. The discovery of this great 
 lav/ has been attributed to Newton ; some have also 
 attributed it to Pascal. This dispute, though of some 
 historical interest, is of no bearing on the law itself, 
 as its truth is demonstrated by astronomical observa¬ 
 tions and by calculations quite independently of the 
 name of its founder. The question of origin is, there¬ 
 fore, of no influence on the proof of a doctrine. It is 
 usual, however, to associate laws with the persons or 
 sources from which they were first derived. In the 
 case now before us, it is quite important briefly to 
 glance at the sources of the solution I propose. 
 
 II. Historical Sources of this Solution. 
 
 Our solution has various antecedents in the history 
 of religious doctrine. It has always been in- Historical 
 
 . sources of 
 
 eluded by implication in any real and serious tMssoiution. 
 faith in God. It has been uttered and proposed to 
 the world in a positive, though not scientific, form, in 
 the Christian system. The sum of what I have to say in 
 solution of the problem of evil may be thus expressed : 
 
 The Christian dogma of the fall of man contains 
 the philosophical doctrine which best accounts to 
 reason for the facts of experience involved in the 
 problem of evil. 
 
 The importance of this proposition requires that it 
 be carefully explained. We will, therefore, explain 
 
166 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 each of its terms : Fall of humanity , dogma, philosoph¬ 
 ical doctrine. 
 
 The idea of -^ n d fi rs C what is the Christian idea of the 
 fall of man ? I shall explain it in the sense 
 in which it seems to me as common to all the great 
 manifestations of Christian thought. The affirmation, 
 that there is a radical disorder in human nature, is 
 of central importance in the organism of Christian 
 doctrine ; it is, in fact, the corner-stone of the edifice. 
 This doctrine contains three chief thoughts: the 
 creation of the race, its redemption, and its moral 
 restoration or sanctification. The object of redemp¬ 
 tion and sanctification is, to re-establish the primitive 
 plan of the creative will in the midst of a world in 
 disorder. If we deny that the world is in a state of 
 radical disorder there remains no place for redemp¬ 
 tion ; there is no occasion for a restoration; there re¬ 
 mains simply the doctrine of creation, that is to say, 
 deism. In this case, those who still claim to be 
 Christians are utterly unable to answer the deist 
 when he exclaims, “ What an idea yoti have of your 
 God !• You think he needed to intervene in the world 
 by a supernatural act; surely, therefore, he is a very 
 unskillful workman, since he did not do his work well 
 at the first attempt, but had to return to it.” By this 
 objection those who ignore the radical disorder of the 
 world are either reduced to silence or involved in a • 
 series of contradictions. Notwithstanding this these 
 
The'Problem of Evil. 
 
 16 / 
 
 Christians will continue to call Christ their Saviour, 
 and to use the words salvation and restoration, for¬ 
 getting that only that which is lost needs to be saved, 
 and that a work of restoration presupposes a pre¬ 
 cedent disorder. But, on the other hand, the moment 
 we admit that human nature has been corrupted, we 
 understand the reason of the intervention of God for 
 the re-establishment of order ; an intervention which 
 is supernatural, as bearing upon our fallen nature, 
 but which contemplates only the re-establishment of 
 our primitive nature. 
 
 A radical disturbance introduced into the plan of 
 creation, being the corner-stone of the Christian sys¬ 
 tem, and also of our own theory, the question Vrt<li( . al(]i ,_ 
 arises, From whence came this disturbance. oraerinthe 
 
 plan of ere • 
 
 If it were required to believe that a being ation - 
 like one of us had sinned, and that this sin was im¬ 
 puted to other beings, others in the absolute sense of 
 the word ; if it were required to admit that reinforce¬ 
 ments to a garrison should be held as guilty of an act 
 of sedition which took place before their arrival, such 
 a view would so directly shock the sentiment of justice 
 that the human conscience would not even give it a 
 hearing. But the Christian system does not teach 
 this. Its teaching may be expressed thus : The act 
 which disturbed the order of creation was not the act 
 of an individual, in the sense which we now give this 
 term,‘but of a primitive individual, who participated 
 
i6S 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 not only in human nature as one of us, but in whom, 
 because of his primitiveness, this whole nature was 
 concentrated. His acts involve two characteristics 
 which ever since then have been distinct: they were 
 at once individual and human, in the full scope of this 
 latter term. Entire humanity was really present in him 
 who fell, and who was its head, its germ, and its source. 
 
 Now, is this the sense of the Christian system ? 
 It is a cpaestion of fact. Open whatever authorities 
 you please : turn to the Catechism of the Council of 
 Trent,* the Catechism of the Orthodox Church of 
 
 Corrobora- the East,f the Institutes of Calvin, :t and 
 
 tive author- ..... 
 
 ities cited, you wilt see every-where the same care taken 
 to prevent the thought that sin should be regarded 
 as passing from one individual to others who did not 
 stand in an essential connection with the first. You 
 will every-where notice the employment of the images 
 of a fountain, a germ, a source. “God,” says Bossuet, 
 contemplates all men as a single person in him 
 from whom he causes them all to spring.” I heard 
 
 * “ Adam was, as it were, a fountain, a principle.”—Chap, iii, i. 
 t “ The stream which issues from an impure spring is very naturally 
 corrupt likewise .”—Third Article. 
 
 X “ On ne trouvera nul commencement de ceste pollution, sinon 
 qu’on monte pusques au premier pere de tous, comme a la fontaine. 
 
 G 
 
 Certainement il nous faut avoir cela pour resolu, qu’ Adam n’a pas 
 seulement este pere de l’humaine nature, mais comme source ou 
 racine : et pourtant qu’en la corruption d’iceluy, le genre humain par 
 raison a este corrompu .”—Institution de la religion chrestienne, par 
 Jehan Calvin, Livre II, chap, i. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 '69 
 
 M. Charles Secretan once observe, while beautifully 
 commenting on this thought of the Bishop of Meaux, 
 that to affirm that God contemplates any thing is to 
 say that that thing is a fact in the highest and most 
 real sense of the word. Let us now cite the authority 
 of a contemporary, one who is now most successfully 
 defending the Christian cause in Germany, “ The 
 condition of all of us,” says Professor Luthardt, “ has 
 been determined by the act of the first of our race ; 
 for this was not simply the act of an individual, but 
 the act of the representative of all men. . . . We form 
 collectively a great unity. Each one is mysteriously 
 involved in the whole ; no one can isolate himself and 
 say, What does that concern me ? ” Such is the 
 sense which we attribute to the words, Fall of Man, 
 
 But what is a dogma ? A dogma is an affirmation 
 which is not based directly on reason, or on The nature 
 
 , r . 1 • . 1 1 • r of a dogma. 
 
 experience, but on laith m the authority 01 
 testimony. If we take the term in its widest sense, 
 we would have to say that our ordinary thoughts are 
 full of dogmas. For example, how do those who 
 have never been in England know that there is such 
 a city as London ? They know it only by faith in 
 testimony. Nevertheless, their belief that there is 
 such a city is perfect and absolute. 
 
 But the word dogma is generally limited Eeligic 
 to the religious sphere. What then is a 
 
 !OUS 
 dogmas. 
 
 religious dogma ? It is an affirmation which is 
 
I/O 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 accepted on the authority of supernatural testimony, 
 that is to say, a testimony based on facts which lie 
 outside of human power. The witness of the facts 
 may be a mere intermediary agent; he may also 
 know directly, and by virtue of his own nature, the 
 divine world, as was the case with Christ in the belief 
 of Christians. A Christian dogma is an affirmation 
 based on the authority of the testimony of Christ, 
 who is himself the dogma of dogmas. By its very 
 nature, a dogma is authority. As it is a testimony 
 rendered in the sphere of history, it remains un¬ 
 changeable in its character of historical fact. For 
 such as accept this testimony as a revelation of abso¬ 
 lute truth, the dogma becomes an unchangeable truth; 
 a truth which may be understood more or less per¬ 
 fectly, and whose fuller comprehension may be attained 
 to only progressively, but which in itself remains fixed 
 and immovable. This phase of the matter alienates 
 many minds from the dogma, because the authority 
 which is inseparable from it appears to them as a chain. 
 But believers, finding their strength where others seem 
 
 to see shackles, do not think it best that all bonds 
 
 • 
 
 should be broken. They take courage from various 
 analogies, and say, for example, that a ship bereft of its 
 mast and helm would not do well to sever the cable 
 which attaches it to the succoring steamer, andjffiat 
 the steamer would not do well to throw overboard the 
 chain by which it might anchor itself in time of storm. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 iyi 
 
 The authority of a dogma, as it rests solely on 
 
 faith, is manifestly void for any but believers. Dogmas val¬ 
 id only for 
 
 To impose the authority of a dogma on those believers, 
 who disbelieve it is irrational and immoral. Men 
 cannot be forced to believe ; at furthest, they can 
 only be induced to an empty outward conformity. 
 The*ignoring of this has brought great scandal upon 
 nominal Christianity. The lingering vision of the 
 smoke of Inquisition fires obscures still, to-day, the 
 skies of many a soul; and, to pass from the great ex¬ 
 ample to *a little one, the flames which devoured a 
 Servetus have not attracted many hearts to the 
 Protestant Gospel. The confounding of the authority 
 which the dogma has for a believer, with the au¬ 
 thority of the dogma as imposed on those who do 
 not believe it, was the scourge of the Middle Ages. 
 
 But, finally, what do we 'understand by a philo¬ 
 sophical doctrine? What is philosophy ? a philosoph¬ 
 ical doctrine, 
 
 Philosophy is a search after a* general ex- as distin- 
 
 •. . r . . , . . r guishedfrom 
 
 pianation oi the universe, under condition of a dogma, 
 freedom from all dogmatic assumption. No science 
 that rests on a dogmatic assumption, whether it be 
 the authority of Christ, or of Mohammed, or of any 
 one whomsoever who is believed to be an organ of the 
 Divinity, can be philosophy. But shall we, therefore, 
 say that philosophy is an employment of reason freed 
 from all authority whatever ? Certainly not. Such 
 an employment of reason would be only a free groping 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 in litter night. Philosophical speculations are sub¬ 
 ject to the authority of facts, to the authority of 
 logic, to the authority of natural testimony; but they 
 never appeal, in establishing a principle, to the au¬ 
 thority of a supernatural, divine testimony. 
 
 Having now explained the terms of our fundamental 
 affirmation, we reproduce it : 
 
 The Christian dogma of the fall of man contains the 
 philosophical doctrine which best accounts to reason for 
 the facts of experience involved in the problem of evil. 
 
 I presume, now, that some of you are thinking that 
 I have forgotten my purpose, of treating this question 
 from a philosophical stand-point. You afe saying 
 within yourselves, that, as faith is the domain of au¬ 
 thority, and philosophy the domain of liberty, there is 
 an incompatibility between the two. 
 
 The objection, if founded in fact, is weighty, and it 
 is important to understand ourselves. There is no 
 place for the authority of dogmas in a philosophical 
 discussion ; a dogma can be proposed as a dogma 
 only in a society which is based on the assent of its 
 members to a common faith, that is, in a Church. 
 Here, therefore, we cannot appeal to dogmas for 
 proof. Should we, however, find in the language of 
 dogmas a solution which seems to us plausible, and 
 if, after carefully subjecting it to the ordeal of a phil¬ 
 osophical examination, that is, testing it on its own 
 merits, and seeing how far it accounts for and 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 i/3 
 
 explains facts, it should thus commend itself to our 
 understanding, I see not why we might not adopt it, 
 without for that reason ceasing to discuss The dogma 
 philosophically. And this is what I propose ot \ the f ll j 
 to do. I am not going to introduce the au- to as dogma, 
 thoritp of a dogma into this discussion, but I invite 
 you to a free examination of a philosophical doctrine, 
 stating at the same time that this doctrine is actually 
 found among the Christian dogmas. 
 
 And who could object to such a procedure ? Chris¬ 
 tians ? But is it not plain that if, by means of a free 
 discussion, it can be shown that there is in the sphere 
 of dogmas a philosophical doctrine of the greatest 
 importance for science ; if it can be thus shown that 
 the simple words of Jesus contain a solution of the 
 great problem of humanity, which the wisdom of 
 Greece and of the Orient did not succeed in solving—• 
 is it not plain that this would be a strengthening of the 
 Christian cause ? a strengthening which could proceed 
 from nothing other than a free discussion of this kind ? 
 But is it perhaps the freethinkers who will object to 
 the course I propose ? Where, then, is their boast of 
 independence, if they may not examine and discuss a 
 doctrine simply because it happens to coincide with a 
 dogma ? This would be to show themselves guilty 
 of the same prejudice and intolerance which they are 
 so generally accustomed to attribute to those who 
 hold to the Church. 
 
174 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 With these remarks, I hope to have made my posi¬ 
 tion understood. The historical origin of the solution 
 I propose, and the fact that it coincides with a Chris¬ 
 tian dogma, are circumstances irrelevant*to, and with¬ 
 out bearing on, our discussion. I frankly mention its 
 historical origin just as, for example, in the discus¬ 
 sion of a doctrine of Plato, I would attribute it his- 
 0 . 
 
 torically to him. We will, therefore, proceed to ex¬ 
 amine this solution independently, and on its own 
 merits. And first, let us inquire what was probably 
 the primitive state of humanity ? 
 
 III. Primitive Condition of Humanity. 
 
 “ Every thing is good on coming from the hands 
 of the Creator.” This phrase, from Rousseau, shall 
 
 Ail is irood. be our Starting-point. Every thing is good; 
 primitively. according to our definition of the 
 
 good, it corresponds to its destination. * But from the 
 fact that a creature is good, does it follow that it must 
 
 Though not be Perfect, in the sense of a complete and 
 perfected. t 0l:a ]_ realization of its whole destination ? 
 
 No ; such a view is false even in regard to material 
 creation. In regard to matter, we might indeed con¬ 
 ceive of it as springing in a complete form and de¬ 
 finitive order from the hands of the Creator, but facts 
 show that this was not the case. Matter appears first 
 True even of under a crude form, and is constantly trans¬ 
 forming itself into higher forms. Therevolu- 
 
 inatter. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 tions of nature are not definitively fixed. Does the 
 earth in its motion around the sun uniformly trace the 
 same circle ? No ; for the sun itself, with its entire 
 train of planets, is also in motion. Probably in the 
 whole period of time, from the beginning of creation 
 to the end of the present order of things, the earth 
 will not have twice intersected the same line in space. 
 And this revolving earth is, within itself, a theater of 
 endless transformation. It is not now what it was at 
 its origin ; and after the lapse of centuries it will no 
 longer be what it is to-day. In the presence of this 
 general revolution- of all nature, as disclosed by mod¬ 
 ern science, modern poetry has taken many a daring 
 flight in search of an answer to the question, Whither 
 do we tend ? * - 
 
 * For example : 
 
 Seigneur ! Seigneur l ou va la terre dans le ciel ? 
 
 Le saurons-nous jamais ? Qui percera vos voiles, 
 
 Noirs firmaments semes de nuages d’etoiles ? 
 
 Victor Hugo. 
 
 Cependant la nuit marche, et sur 1’abime immense 
 Tous ces mondes flottants gravitent en silence, 
 
 Et nous-memes, avec eux emportes dans leurs cours. 
 
 Vers un port inconnu nous avaneons toujours. 
 
 Souvent, pendant la nuit, au souffle du zephyre, 
 
 On sent la terre aussi flotter conune un navire. 
 
 Soleils ! mondes flottants qui voguez avec nous, 
 
 Dites, s'il vous l’a dit, oil done allons-nous tous ? 
 
 Quel est le port celeste ou son souffle nous guide ? 
 
 Lamartine. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 1 76 
 
 And the longing of poetry is also the longing of 
 reason. For who, after contemplating the spectacle 
 of the universal revolution of worlds, could suppose 
 that to the question, Whither go they ? the proper 
 answer would be, Nowhere! Astronomers do not 
 think so ; they would be most happy to discover the 
 general law and the general direction of the move¬ 
 ment of the whole celestial system. 
 
 It is plain, therefore, that nature has a plan, and 
 that this plan is not at once realized, but that nature 
 is ever tending to its realization. Will the time ever 
 come when the plan of nature shall have reached its 
 ultimate accomplishment Will the celestial globes 
 finally fix themselves in a uniform motion, and 
 crystallize themselves in the immobility of perfection ? 
 Perhaps the question transcends the sphere of human 
 thought. It is certain, however, that nature was 
 made, and well made at first, but that it was not made 
 perfect. 
 
 On passing to the world of spirits this order is 
 more evident still; for it is impossible to conceive, 
 Spirits not even in theory, of a primitive perfection of 
 
 perfect at 
 
 once. the spiritual world. The destination of spirits 
 is the good, that is, an order of relations from which 
 happiness arises. Their very constitution indicates 
 this end; and we have, in this respect, the guarantee 
 of reason as applied to the idea of creation, for, as we 
 have elsewhere shown, love is the sole motive which 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 1 77 
 
 we can conceive of as having induced the Supreme 
 Being to the creation of the universe; and the good 
 of the creature is the sole object which we can assign 
 to creative love. 
 
 To correspond to its destination, a spirit must nec¬ 
 essarily have a free-will as its basis and essence, an 
 intelligent conscience, revealing the law to the will, 
 and, finally, a pure heart, free from any evil predisposi¬ 
 tion. A spirit so constituted is placed in the presence 
 of law, in the accomplishment of which it is to find its 
 happiness; but this state is not perfection. To think 
 of a spirit as originally perfect is a contradiction. A 
 spirit is a capacity, a potency, and its law is to realize 
 itself by its own acts, to make and perfect itself. As 
 we find in nature no perfection immediately realized, 
 so in the spiritual world is such a perfection not only 
 not discoverable,- it is moreover impossible ; for a 
 spirit which should be perfect from its very origin, 
 and should not have developed its own moral charac¬ 
 ter, would be no spirit at all-—would be an absurd 
 chimera. The primitive state of a spirit, The desti 
 therefore, is that of a being with a free-will, o! a spint ' 
 innocent but not perfect. The earthly paradise of 
 innocence is not only to be guarded, it is also to be 
 cultivated by the created will, so as to be transformed 
 into a celestial Eden, the plan of which is revealed to 
 the conscience of the free being as the true law of its 
 destiny. The golden age is the gilded dream of inno- 
 
178 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 cence, contemplating under a beautiful symbolism the 
 destiny set before it by eternal love. 
 
 The perfection of a spirit must be the product of its 
 own liberty ; to ask it of the Creator, is to ask him 
 to not create free beings. But can this liberty itself, 
 which is to conduct a spirit to its perfection, be per¬ 
 fect at first and at once? No. Liberty in its first 
 a lower and stage can only be conceived of as an imper- 
 
 higher stage 
 
 of liberty. feet liberty. It must pass, by its own action, 
 from an inferior to a superior stage. Let us give 
 special attention to this thought. 
 
 The word liberty has two senses. In the first 
 place, it is the faculty of choosing, and includes 
 necessarily*the possibility of evil. In another sense, 
 we call free that being who does all that he wishes. 
 Note carefully these two ideas ; they are very clearly 
 distinct. That liberty which consists in the possi¬ 
 bility of choosing between alternatives is a less high 
 form of liberty than that of’ a will which does what¬ 
 ever it chooses, without being shut up to a choice. 
 In the first sense, liberty supposes a law. A finite 
 power (we pass over the mystery of the liberty of the 
 Infinite One) that should not be under a law which 
 it could obey or violate, is inconceivable as a moral 
 power ; such a conception is only that of an intangi¬ 
 ble caprice, a blind farce, yielding to impulses from 
 without, and having within itself no principle of self- 
 determination. There must be a law, a command, to 
 
179 
 
 The Problem of EviL 
 
 awaken the will, and to reveal to it its liberty of 
 choice. The second form of liberty supposes the 
 absence of all law. These two notions of 
 
 The two sta* 
 
 liberty seem contradictory. They are not so, 
 however: they find their harmony in the mys- " heart; ’ 
 tery of the heart. The mystery of the heart has already 
 been discussed, but we must here revert to the subject. 
 
 In the phenomena of habit, repeated volitions trans¬ 
 form themselves into a nature. After having volun¬ 
 tarily nerformed an act a number oi times this act 
 becomes a habit, and habit begets a power, a propen¬ 
 sion ; it crystallizes itself in our heart, so to speak, 
 and becomes a love, in the most general sense of the 
 word. Now what is the working of love? It wills 
 what it loves ; and when the soul works by love, it 
 does all that it wills, inasmuch as it wills nothing out¬ 
 side of its love. For him who loves the good, there¬ 
 fore, the law requiring the good disappears as law, in 
 that it dissolves itself in love, and the command of 
 the conscience assumes the form of an impulse of the 
 heart. The liberty of choosing between good and 
 evil remains thenceforth simply what we call in 
 philosophy a metaphysical possibility; but the choos¬ 
 ing of evil has become morally impossible. To the 
 “Thou shalt not” of the conscience, corresponds the 
 non possumus of the heart. Beginning in the simple 
 liberty of choice, the will may thus, by the simple 
 fact of choosing, make a decision which will become 
 
i8o 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 definitive, and the struggle will cease in triumph. 
 The will may, by its own action, pass from the in¬ 
 ferior forrg of liberty (the power of choice) to the 
 higher form of liberty, (the state of a soul which does 
 all that it wills.) 
 
 We are able now to conceive of the plan which 
 humanity, manifesting itself in individual existences, 
 but maintaining itself in harmony and unity by the 
 common purpose of executing the divine plan, was 
 destined to realize. Beginning in the mere possi- 
 The normal bility of evil, that is to say, in a state of inno- 
 
 development 
 
 of virtue, cence, and, by the effort of free-will in re¬ 
 sistance to evil, annihilating even the possibility of 
 evil, and attaining to a state of perfection, or holiness, 
 characterized by the fact that liberty has definitively 
 given itself over to the good : such would be the 
 normal development of virtue. If the will does, at 
 each moment, what it ought to do, it obtains finally a 
 
 in what sense definitive triumph over the possibility of evil, 
 sm is impos- j7 y [\ p as no t appeared; it has become im- 
 
 ture spirit, possible without ever having been destroyed, 
 for it has never been realized. 
 
 All this is difficult to understand, because, involved 
 as we are in a world where evil weighs upon us, it re¬ 
 quires a vigorous effort to so far free ourselves from 
 the burden of a bitter experience as to conceive of 
 this passage from primitive liberty to perfect liberty, 
 without the intervention of disorder. However, even 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 18 r 
 
 in our actual experience there are some analogies 
 which will aid us to appreciate this conception. The 
 two senses of the word liberty are familiar to us, as 
 may be readily illustrated. Whom, for example, do 
 we esteem as more free ? that young merchant who, 
 for the first time entering upon business, debates 
 within himself whether he had better impose on his 
 customers or engage in honest dealing, and who, in 
 this simple hesitation of choice, has a conscious¬ 
 ness of his liberty ? or, is it not rather this same 
 merchant, who, after having grown gray in honorable 
 trade, and felt himself bound by the reiterated action 
 of his will to the law of integrity, feels himself now 
 henceforth incapable of deceiving, and has thus by 
 the free exercise of volition made himself the servant 
 of probity ? Surely we esteem as in a higher sense 
 free, not he who doubtfully balances between good 
 and evil, but he who, by a reiterated and definitive 
 choice of the good, has raised himself beyond the 
 temptation of evil. Obedience in the face of con¬ 
 quered temptation is the act of nascent liberty choos¬ 
 ing the good ; and when temptation is definitely 
 overcome by a love of the good, liberty becomes per¬ 
 fect in a full, joyous, and unhesitating obedience. 
 Thus, even in the midst of our present darkness, we 
 meet some luminous traits which help us to under¬ 
 stand the transition from primitive to perfect liberty, 
 without the intervention of evil. ^ 
 
182 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 But has this programme of spiritual development 
 been fully carried out anywhere ? Lift your eyes to 
 the heavens ; I speak of the heavens of astronomers. 
 Are there The universe is immense ; no one believes, 
 
 sinless 
 
 worlds ? I presume, that the whole family of God is 
 confined to our earth—that the Eternal Shepherd of 
 souls has, under his crook, only our little flock. We 
 sometimes smile at our ancestors for having made of 
 humanity the center of the universe. But it was an 
 incident of ignorance rather than a sin of pride ; it was 
 at an epoch when one could believe that the sun was 
 only a great torch, and the stars but lamps attached fo 
 the solid vault of the sky. But what shall we say of 
 certain learned men of our day, who, now that science 
 has opened the immeasurable depths of space and 
 peopled them with worlds, presume still to think and 
 say that there is in the whole universe no intelligence 
 superior to that of man ? Look then up to the skies, 
 fix your eye on whatever star you please—perhaps 
 that one which, shining out suddenly between the 
 clouds, awakens with its light a ray of hope in your 
 heart, and ask yourself: Is there not, then, somewhere 
 a happy world ? Is there not upon some one of those 
 
 globes which gem the sky a family of intelligent and 
 
 ' 
 
 free beings, who have used their liberty only in con¬ 
 firming themselves in the good, and who, growing 
 continually in the knowledge of the truth, grow, at 
 the same time, in happiness, and wonder each day 
 
The Problem of Evil. 183 
 
 anew at the increasing depths of bliss which the heart 
 can take in ? Is there not some family of free spirits, 
 who, when presenting themselves before God, can 
 commence their worship without the confession of 
 original sin, and can chant the hymn of pure thank¬ 
 fulness and love to Him from whom all proceeds, and 
 by whom all exists, and who has given them the un¬ 
 speakable gift of life, and the glorious privilege of that 
 liberty by which they have realized the happiness 
 for which his eternal love destined them ? If I should 
 affirm positively that such a world does exist, I would 
 provoke your smile. But if you should affirm that 
 such a world does not exist, I should indulge in a 
 smile, in my turn. At all events, that happy star is 
 not our planet; that family of sinless creatures is not 
 the human race. Let us return to humanity. 
 
 IV. Origin of the Present Condition of 
 
 Humanity. 
 
 What was the origin of evil, according to the solu¬ 
 tion which I indicate ? The end proposed to hu¬ 
 manity was to realize the harmony and happiness 
 of a spiritual community. But humanity in its very 
 source and origin revolts against its law; so we 
 assume. The created will desires to place itself, as 
 regards the law, in a state of complete independence ; 
 that is to say, it wishes to become its own law. What 
 employment, now, will it make of this independence ? 
 
134 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Its acts, whatever they may be, will be acts of dis¬ 
 order, since they will be acts accomplished in contra¬ 
 vention of the law of primitive and essential order. 
 Now, this order being the submission of matter to 
 spirit, and the submission of spirits to the law of 
 charity, the disorder will manifest itself in the domina¬ 
 tion of spirit by matter, and in a spirit of self-seeking 
 and of domination over others, which will give rise, 
 sensuality as society develops itself, to endless strife 
 twofol'mstf i nstea d of harmony. Fleshly-mindedness 
 sm - and pride will be the two principal forms of 
 
 the revolt. 
 
 The human heart being corrupted, liberty will be 
 compromised. A developed evil nature, bom primi¬ 
 tively of the will, will paralyze its exercise. Domi¬ 
 nated by his propensions, man will feel himself the 
 slave of his vices, while yet preserving in remorse, 
 the witness of his lost liberty. 
 
 From the perversion of the heart and from the en- 
 feeblement of the will, error will spring; and error, 
 beclouding the natural light, will deform the con¬ 
 science. 
 
 Suffering will then appear as a punishment in the 
 sphere of justice, and as a remedy in the sphere of 
 goodness ; and entire humanity havings in its source, 
 participated in the primitive revolt, every man will, 
 by the simple fact of his sharing in human nature, 
 be subjected to the consequences of this revolt. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 185 
 
 As soon as these views are admitted, the indi¬ 
 vidualistic solution, which we have had to reject as 
 incomplete, becomes so supplemented, as to llie indivi(1 _ 
 cover the whole ground. For what, in fact, uahstlc so ' 
 was the defectiveness of this solution ? It i |lementecL 
 did not account for that large portion of evil whose 
 origin cannot be found in the merely individual action 
 of historic volitions. But this phase of evil is now 
 explained. At the origin of our race, and before the 
 commencement of history, an act of humanity cor¬ 
 rupted the heart of the race ; it is humanity itself, 
 that, by its own revolt, has precipitated itself into 
 error and suffering. The all-prevalence of sin is ex¬ 
 plained by the existence of temptations inherent in 
 the human heart, and by the enfeeblement of the will 
 produced by the evil inclination of the heart. We 
 know well enough the all-prevalence of suffering. 
 Great mysteries still hover about the share of suffer¬ 
 ing and temptation which falls to the lot of individu¬ 
 als;* but we have made important steps in the di- 
 
 * It has been attempted to account for our individual lots by sup¬ 
 posing that we suffer here the consequences of our individual acts in 
 a previous existence. Cicero mentions this doctrine as in his day 
 already ancient. It has several times been reproduced in our day. 
 I cannot discuss here a theory of such importance. It concedes the 
 Universality of suffering and sin, and maintains intact the existence of 
 God and the authority of conscience. But in explaining our present 
 state by a primitive individualism, it does not account for the actual 
 solidarity of the race. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 186 
 
 rection of light, in that we have found an origin for 
 that portion of suffering, and that germ of sin*, which 
 observation proves to exist in every man, by virtue of 
 his being a man, and independently of his personal acts. 
 
 Evil is an essential part of our world, such as it is, 
 
 ‘ such as the revolt of the creature has made it; but 
 
 the evil is, in itself, accidental. It is, but it ought not 
 to be. Its possibility is the condition of liberty; but 
 its realization is directly contrary to the plan of the 
 universe, that is, to the divine will. Thus the cloud 
 which evil interposes between God and us vanishes 
 away, and the glory of the Creator shines forth in 
 immaculate purity. Henceforth, when the poet shall 
 ask why the Master created evil so great, we will 
 
 call him in question, and reply that God did not 
 
 create evil at all. 
 
 md the fail The idea °f a primitive fall enables us to 
 Nation °to an ticip a te the possibility that the conse- 
 natm-e ~t quences of the revolt of the created spirit 
 may have disturbed its relations with nature, and that 
 nature may not be for us, now, that which the plan 
 of the Creator designed it to be. This, it is true, is 
 but a single door opened upon the darkness; still, it 
 is an open door, whereas the individualistic solution 
 offers in this direction but a closed and impenetrable 
 wall. It is certain in fact that the historical action 
 of individual wills can offer no possible shadow of a 
 solution for this phase of our problem. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 1 87 
 
 To charge the creature with the whole origin of 
 evil is the only means of not charging it upon God ; 
 for, what we call the nature of things is Tlie whole 
 
 blame must 
 
 either God or it is nothing. And is it a hu- rest on man. 
 miliation for the creature to bear the whole burden 
 of evil ? or is it rather a glorification ! It is a glory 
 shining forth in humiliation ; it is a humiliation re¬ 
 vealing a primitive glory. In this respect our solu¬ 
 tion comes in contact with two contrary sentiments : 
 on the one hand, with that pride which rejects so 
 high a responsibility; and on the other, with a morbid 
 humility which shrinks from the idea of so great a 
 power. The solution is humiliating and exalting at 
 the same time ; it brings into relief that two-fold 
 character of human nature which Pascal has traced 
 in immortal words : its greatness and its misery. 
 
 God did not create evil. Between the Creator 
 
 and the world, as it now is, there is interposed a sad 
 
 creation of the creature. This doctrine is of great 
 
 shaping influence on the whole drift of our thinking. 
 
 The passing immediately from the world, such as it is, 
 
 to the perfect God, is the source of the gravest errors 
 
 in philosophy, as well as of many other misconceptions 
 
 of society at large. It is by this leaping from Afaisemeth¬ 
 od of philos- 
 
 this imperfect world to the perfect Creator ophy. 
 that philosophy is led to the negation of evil, starting 
 out, as it does, with this incontestable axiom, that 
 whatever proceeds from God is good. It is on the 
 
188 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 same erroneous method that are based many pre¬ 
 sumptuous and, sometimes, evil-working vindications 
 of Divine Providence. For example, if you impute to 
 
 inconsider- ^ ie divine will, not the essential and constitu- 
 atevmdica- ent } aws 0 f human society, which are truly 
 
 tions of J J 
 
 Providence. a p ar t 0 f the plan of creation, but our society 
 as it is—if you attempt to repress the complaints of 
 those who suffer from real social abuses by urging 
 them to bow under the hand of Providence—you vyPll 
 seek in vain to clothe the evil with a divine sanction; 
 you will not obtain submission ; you will only add to 
 revolt against society, revolt against God. It is by 
 assuming that certain general and permanent facts, 
 which do not depend on individual wills, form a part 
 of the original divine plan, that men have been led to 
 apologize for war, representing it, not as the bloody 
 sequel of sin, but as one of the primitive and, therefore, 
 good elements of the universe. 
 
 In another sphere of thought, if you do not admit, 
 despite of all the mysteries that surround this sub¬ 
 ject, the possibility that a perturbation has been 
 introduced into nature, your apologies for Providence 
 will frequently conflict with the science of the natural- 
 - ist, and sometimes even be nonplused by the simple 
 questions of childhood. 
 
 The world in all its constituent elements is the 
 work of God ; and, in humanity, all that normally 
 constitutes our nature is good in itself. The heart. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 189 
 
 as the power of loving, is good; reason, as the power 
 of comprehending, is good ; and volition, as Humanity 
 
 per se is 
 
 the power ot acting, is more than a good, it good, not- 
 Ls the basis and condition of all good. But the fail, 
 the world, as it is, is a disordered world ; and between 
 the world, as it is, and God, there lies the fall of hu¬ 
 manity, which has created an evil potency that weighs 
 heavily upon our destinies. A fact that is general, 
 and even universal may be evil, for it may be the 
 consequence of the primitive revolt of humanity 
 against its law. 
 
 Note well the practical importance of this thought. 
 If you ignore the fact that the world is in disorder, 
 you may aspire to the good in obedience to the 
 natural instinct of your heart; but on coming in con¬ 
 flict with real life your heart will be bitterly disap¬ 
 pointed. If you mingle in the life of society with the 
 thought that human nature is good, you will very soon 
 feel the approaches of dejection, and a misanthropic 
 gloom will most likely take possession of your soul. 
 But if, on the contrary, you act on the conviction that 
 human nature is fallen, you will meet without surprise 
 with sin, disorder and suffering ; and you will combat 
 them, as a soldier of the good, with a firm confidence 
 in the final triumph of your cause. 
 
 I will sum up these considerations at the same time 
 that I answer an erroneous notion that is quite preva¬ 
 lent in our day. You often hear said that the doc- 
 
1Q0 The Problem of Evil 
 
 trine of the fall is the religious and ancient doctrine; 
 a false do- whereas, the doctrine of progress is the new 
 
 tion of prog¬ 
 ress. and philosophical doctrine, and that we are 
 
 forced to make our choice between these two irrecon¬ 
 cilable conceptions. Progress, it is said, is the law 
 of the intellectual world, as gravitation is the law of 
 matter. Now, the law of progress excludes the idea 
 of a fall; for a fall of humanity would be the very 
 contrary of progress. This manner of reasoning rests 
 on a radical confusion of ideas in regard to the word 
 law. A physical law being, as we have said, the ex¬ 
 pression of constant facts in a sphere where liberty 
 does not exist, every such law excludes its contrary; 
 and the knowledge of the true law justifies the denial 
 of every fact which contradicts it, just as a certain 
 knowledge of a fact justifies the denial of the pre¬ 
 tended law which would deny that fact. But the 
 moral law, being proposed to free beings, may be 
 obeyed or violated according to the decisions of 
 liberty. The idea of progress is represented as con¬ 
 flicting with the idea of the fall. As well might we 
 say that the fact that Nero grew worse as he grew 
 older is a refutation of the idea of progress ; for if 
 progress in humanity is a law T which is always realized 
 with the strictness of physical laws, it would follow 
 that what is true of humanity must be true of each 
 of its members: if humanity could not fall, Nero could 
 not grow worse. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 191 
 
 But let us look at the matter in a more general 
 aspect. Does the idea of progress render superfluous 
 our solution ? Progress, it is thought by some, is in¬ 
 consistent with the existence of evil, because prog¬ 
 ress, a primitive law of. creation, can realize itself in 
 the exclusively good. True progress tends from im¬ 
 perfection to perfection, but imperfection is not evil. 
 If there exist disorder and evil, it must be because 
 volitions have gone astray. If progress in our world 
 appears under the form of a restoration from evil, 
 that fact itself is a striking proof of the doctrine oi the 
 fall. To admit that progress consists in overcoming 
 evil, and that it is a fundamental law of the universe, 
 is to admit that evil, the condition of progress, is a 
 primitive and necessary element of things; and to 
 make evil a primitive and necessary element of 
 things is, we repeat it, to proclaim that it is good, 
 or, in other words, to deny its existence. There is, in 
 fact, no need of choosing between these two ideas, 
 progress and a fall; they are both true ; they are 
 both necessary to account for the present state of hu¬ 
 manity. Man started out in a state of innocence in 
 which a spiritual heaven was present to his mind as 
 the goal at which he should aim, as the gift of the 
 Creator which he was to appropriate by the use of his 
 own liberty. But heaven became vailed from the eye 
 of his conscience by the consequences of the fall ; 
 and, nevertheless, it remains still the object of his 
 
The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 192 
 
 aspirations—the ideal after which every soul is, in 
 some degree, athirst. 
 
 In a normal state of things, progress would be the 
 rising from imperfection to perfection, or from a 
 
 The true idea lesser perfection to an ever greater; in the 
 ot progress. p resen t abnormal state of things, as intro¬ 
 duced by the fall, progress is the rising out of, and 
 triumphing over, evil, and the ever fuller appropriation 
 of the good. 
 
The Problem of Evil, 
 
 293 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 THE PROOF, 
 
 The proof—-such is the. title of our present lecture. 
 It will consist of three parts. I will first explain the 
 nature of the proof which l design to propose; I will 
 then offer my arguments; finally, I will try to solve 
 the chief difficulties which the subject presents. The 
 order of our thoughts will, therefore, be: Genera! 
 
 heads of th«s 
 
 Nature of the Proof, Presentation of the fifth i-ecture. 
 Proof, and Solution of Difficulties. 
 
 I. Nature of the Proof. 
 
 Let us first come to an understanding as Process of & 
 
 scientific 
 
 to the nature of a scientific demonstration ; fie; nous tra- 
 and to this purpose l will draw an analogy, t!-tte<L 1U& 
 What is the process by which the science of celes¬ 
 tial motion has come to its present stage ? The move¬ 
 ments of the heavens have attracted man’s attention 
 in all ages, and the science which seeks to account 
 for them is one of the most ancient For a long time 
 a system of astronomy prevailed which is known as 
 the Ptolemaic. It explained celestial phenomena by 
 assuming that the earth is motionless, and that the 
 
 heavenly bodies revolve around it in circles to tffhich 
 
 13 
 
194 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 various movements were assigned, according to the 
 distances of the lines traversed by these movements, 
 and according to the velocity itself of these move¬ 
 ments. Copernicus, a Polish priest, came to think 
 that this solution of the problem was too complicated 
 to be true, and he set himself about searching for a 
 simpler one. During his researches he found, in 
 certain ancient books, the notion, once sustained by 
 Pythagorean sages, that the sun remains motionless, 
 and that the earth revolves around it in space. Of 
 course, he did not find in these books his theory in 
 that completed form in which he afterward proposed 
 it to the world ; he found simply Its germ. Thus, he 
 did not, as is generally supposed, discover the true 
 system of the world by the simple inspiration of his 
 genius. He found aids in the past; he found hints 
 toward it in Cicero and Plutarch; and we have yet 
 extant from his own hand the testimony that he hon¬ 
 orably acknowledged his indebtedness.* The truth 
 which he brought to light, though new in science, 
 
 * In a letter to Pope Paul IIP, which serves as preface to his work 
 De Revolutionibus Orbium Ccelestium , Copernicus explains himself 
 thus : “ After having reflected a long while on the uncertainty of the 
 mathematical traditions relative to the movements of the heavenly 
 bodies, I began to be chagrined that philosophers who scrutinize so 
 carefully the most insignificant things in the universe had not been 
 able to fall upon a more certain explanation of the movements of the 
 mechanism of a world which was created for us by the most perfect 
 and systematic of workmen, ( ab optimo et regularissimo omnium 
 opifice f*) For this reason I undertook to reread all the works of 
 
The Problem of Evil* 195 
 
 was yet ancient in tradition*—in a tradition which had 
 almost disappeared. 
 
 When the discovery of Copernicus was made public 
 it excited lively opposition. Its adversaries were 
 numerous. They were, on the one hand, the learned 
 defenders of the old idea, who could not so readily 
 discard the results of all the labor they had given 
 themselves to understand and further perfect the 
 system generally admitted. On the other, they were 
 the men of common sense, that superficial common 
 sense which judges things by first appearances. And, 
 in fact, had we of this generation not been taught 
 from our earliest school-days that it is the earth that 
 daily revolves, we also would not be readily convinced 
 of the fact. We can, therefore, easily understand the 
 popular applause obtained by an aged doctor of the 
 Sorbonne while ridiculing this day-dreaming Coper¬ 
 nicus, who, as he said, taught that people did not carry 
 about their candles to light their houses, but that they 
 carried about their houses to be lighted by the candles. 
 
 And to all these obstacles which opposed the propa¬ 
 gation of the new theory, there was added also one 
 
 philosophers to which I could have access, in order to see whether 
 some of them, perhaps, had not thought that the movements of the 
 spheres are other than those assigned to them by our professors of 
 mathematics. I discovered, first, in Cicero, that Nicetas had believed 
 that it is the earth which moves. I found subsequently, from Plu¬ 
 tarch, that some others had had the same opinion. . . . Upon this I 
 began, myself also, to reflect on the mobility of the earth.” 
 
196 The Problem of Evil 
 
 of the most memorable pieces of folly in the whole 
 history of Catholicism. The theologians of the Index 
 condemned the new system. This fact had its im¬ 
 portance ; though it had far less of importance than 
 anti-religious passion has attributed to it. The com¬ 
 mon opinion is, that, when Copernicus published his 
 discovery, science came to his defense while theology 
 undertook his ruin. This is the romance of the 
 matter, but not its history. As confirmation of this 
 hear these words, which date from the second half of 
 the seventeenth century: “No decree of Rome as 
 to the movement of the earth will prove that the earth 
 remains in repose ; and if we only had constant ob¬ 
 servations to prove that it is it that revolves , all the 
 men in the world would not hinder it from revolving, 
 nor hinder themselves from revolving with it.” Cer¬ 
 tainly this independent spirit was little daunted by 
 the Roman Index; and he was, confessedly, an incom¬ 
 parable genius both in the physical sciences and in 
 the mathematics : it was Pascal At the time when 
 Pascal wrote, therefore, science was still hesitating in 
 regard to the Copernican system;* even the most 
 
 * ** Pascal ‘always hesitated to venture his opinion on the system 
 of Copernicus, not because he feared the Inquisition, as Condorcet 
 hastily says, but because his conviction was not yet formed.”— Note 
 of Fattger-e , in his edition of Pascal. 
 
 “ Pascal seems positively to admit (in the passage referred to by 
 the note of Faugere) that it is the heavens that revolve about the 
 earth,”— Note of Havet , in his edition of Pascal. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 197 
 
 free and enlightened minds were still doubting whether 
 the number of constantly verified facts was sufficient 
 to confirm the theory of the revolution of the earth. 
 It is only since the time of Newton that Copernicus 
 has definitively triumphed. Now the discovery of 
 Copernicus was published in 1543, and the great work 
 of Newton dates from 1687. It required, therefore, 
 one hundred and forty-four years of laborious observa¬ 
 tion and calculation, and also the aid of the discoveries 
 of two geniuses of the first order, Kepler and Newton, 
 to enable the doctrine of Copernicus to take place 
 among the uncontested theories of science. 
 
 And why all this time? To verify by calculation 
 the consequences of the new doctrine, to compare 
 these consequences with an ever-increasing mass of 
 facts, and thus to overcome by demonstration of the 
 truth both the prejudice which clung to the ancient 
 ideas, the imprudent decisions of the Catholic Church, 
 and, above all, the first impressions of a superficial 
 common sense. And what kept up the courage of 
 the partisans of Copernicus in all this memorable 
 contest ? Study its history in the original texts, and 
 you will see that what sustained their confidence was 
 a profound faith in the wisdom of the Architect of 
 the universe, a serious conviction that as God, accord¬ 
 ing to the expression of Copernicus, is the best of 
 workmen, so are his ways simple ones. The three great 
 founders of modern Astronomy, Copernicus, Kepler, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 198 
 
 and Newton, were each of them, in the highest ac¬ 
 ceptation of the term, adorers of God,—a fact forming 
 one of the most glorious pages of the history of 
 science, a page which many would gladly forget, but 
 which no hostile power can efface. 
 
 We have thus shown, by means of a notable illus¬ 
 tration, the nature of a scientific proof; let us now 
 return to our special subject. 
 
 We are in the presence of a great question. We 
 Application wish to explain, not the motion of the heav- 
 
 of the illus¬ 
 tration. enly bodies, but this fatal movement of the 
 
 human soul which carries it toward evil. We have 
 examined the solution most prevalent in the philoso¬ 
 phy of the day, the individualistic, and found it insuffi¬ 
 cient to account for all the facts. We have sought 
 tor another. Where did we find it ? fdke Coperni¬ 
 cus, in an ancient book ; but in a book which is pecul¬ 
 iar in this, that it has not ceased to be read, that it 
 is, in fact, continually read more and more in every 
 region of the globe, and that it has passed into a liv¬ 
 ing tradition, permeating and modifying the highest 
 civilization of the race. This solution is, as I think, 
 the solution of the future. Ancient in tradition, and 
 in that science which expresses and seeks to justify 
 the tradition, it is yet new in philosophy, properly so- 
 called. Now, if it should require as much as one 
 hundred and forty-four years fully to demonstrate 
 
 its truth, would there be any reason for astonishment? 
 
 - «. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 199 
 
 Would it be surprising if it required as many years 
 to explain scientifically the state of the human soul 
 as it did to explain the march of the stars ? To study 
 the proposed solution in its consequences, and in its 
 bearing on the best observed facts, may be a tedious 
 labor ; but it is a labor in which we all may take part. 
 For, after all, it is the common sense of mankind 
 which is to pronounce in the last instance on all scien¬ 
 tific theories relative to human nature,—not that super¬ 
 ficial common sense which judges by preju- Genuine 
 
 common 
 
 dices and first appearances ; but that deep, sense the 
 
 ultimate 
 
 serious common sense which discerns and test of psy- 
 constantly places in clearer light the funda- truth? 1Ca 
 mental laws of the human mind—I mean, in a word, 
 reason, as God made it. If a superficial and frivolous 
 common sense is the pest of science, on the other 
 hand, that true common sense in which humanity 
 utters its honest verdicts is the legitimate judge of 
 all philosophical attempts to account for the state of 
 society. 
 
 To accomplish the \vork to which the subject in¬ 
 vites you, the first thing to be done is to observe and 
 reflect. The observation of moral phenomena re¬ 
 quires neither a laboratory nor costly instruments ; 
 each one has always about him, both his soul, which 
 is the object of observation, and his reason, which is 
 its instrument. To facilitate your study you may de¬ 
 rive aid from writers who have touched upon this 
 
200 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 problem.. I will limit myself to a few suggestions. 
 The Thoughts of Pascal would greatly aid you. If 
 you strip this book of a few traces of jansenist ascet¬ 
 icism, and of a few hasty sallies which the author 
 would doubtless have modified had he lived to review 
 his manuscripts, you will find abundant proof of this 
 proposition. On subjecting the state of the human 
 heart to a careful study, we can find no satisfactory 
 explanation of this condition, save in the doctrine of 
 the fall. Among contemporaries, I will mention two, 
 from whose works I myself have greatly profited, 
 Julius Muller, and my friend Professor Secretan. 
 After these explanations relative to the nature of the 
 proof, I come to the proof itself 
 
 II. Presentation of the Proof. 
 
 The establishing of a scientific demonstration may, 
 as we have just said, require the lapse of much time. 
 But, as the partisans of every new doctrine might 
 equally appeal to the future, science can take no notice 
 of such an appeal To succeed in calling public at¬ 
 tention seriously to any new theory", it is necessary 
 to show at once that it accounts for certain great 
 facts ; as, for example, Copernicus showed immedi¬ 
 ately that his theory accounted for the succession 
 of day and night, and the changes of the seasons. 
 We will, therefore, now reproduce our solution, 
 and then present some arguments which, without 
 
The Problem of Evil. 201 
 
 demonstrating it completely, may yet render it quite 
 probable. 
 
 In the presence of the absolute moral law we dis¬ 
 cover a principle of evil in every' heart, that Epst atemeiit 
 is to say, in the heart of humanity. This t J ie av i' 
 principle of evil is essential in humanity. 
 
 We are not all, however, scoundrels and thieves ; there 
 are men whom the instinct of shame and the law of 
 chastity preserve from sensual indulgence; there are 
 men who remain sober ; there are generous and com¬ 
 passionate men ; but a principle of evil exists in all 
 of us, in that we are all naturally inclined to violate 
 moral law. Moral law requires that each individual 
 . shall have for his object the general good of all, in 
 which good each finds his legitimate share. From 
 the stand-point of social morality, we call honest 
 that man who uses his liberty without directly infring- 
 ing on the rights of others ; but a man may be honest 
 in the eyes of society without being good in the eyes 
 of the moral law; for the law requires not only to 
 refrain from wronging others, from stealing, from kill¬ 
 ing, from calumniating; it also exacts the consecra¬ 
 tion of each individual to the general good of the 
 whole. Now, in studying the human heart we recog¬ 
 nize in it a tendency that is constant in the present 
 state of things, to an excessive love of self, which 
 is the very root of evil. Pascal says: “ We are 
 born unjust, for each tends to himself. This is con- 
 
202 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 trary to all order; we ought to tend to the general; 
 the tendency to self is the commencement of all 
 disorder.” 
 
 Such is my affirmation. I say not that all are male¬ 
 factors ; but I affirm, that there is in every man a 
 principle of egotism which is the essence of sin. 
 Whence this evil principle ? From an act of human¬ 
 ity, of which we are all members, in consequence of 
 yvhich act we receive from nature a corrupted heart. 
 Each of us is, as an individual, simply responsible for 
 his personal acts, or, to speak more exactly, for the 
 • personal part of his acts. But each of us, in so far 
 as human, has a solidarity in the fall of the human 
 race. This doctrine, as we have admitted, conflicts . 
 directly with a certain kind of common sense ; but 
 the question is, whether it is with that superficial 
 common sense which judges from first appearances, 
 or with that common sense which is the expression 
 of human reason, and the judge of truth. The fol¬ 
 lowing considerations will aid us in deciding this. 
 
 Let us indicate some great fact which our theory 
 explains so well, as to show itself worthy, at least, of 
 serious examination. I choose for this purpose the 
 The twofold fact of the existence in man of a double 
 
 nature of 
 
 man. nature, a fact which is one of the chief feat¬ 
 ures of the problem which we are studying. 
 
 Observe the manner in which human nature devel¬ 
 ops itself. A child is born. How does the soul 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 203 
 
 first manifest itself in connection with the body ? 
 Before exercising the power of thought, -so far as we 
 can see, the child is brought into contact with the 
 spiritual world by the organs of sentiment, the look, 
 and the accent of its mother. Before understanding, 
 it feels ; it feels love, and it is by the heart that a 
 makes its entrance into the world of spirits. Subse¬ 
 quently, by teaching its lips to utter words, the mother 
 brings it into connection with universal tradition. It 
 accepts this tradition, which is for its intelligence 
 what the maternal milk is for its body, and it enters 
 thus into communion with the human race. The 
 child, therefore, begins its life by believing in the 
 good, and in the truth. Hence, the great Teacher 
 of men proposed as a model for the perfect man the 
 naive faith of the child, which doubts neither the love 
 nor the words of its mother. Infancy is pure. Then 
 comes adolescence ; and adolescence is the period of 
 noble impulses, high aspirations, and pure desii^s. 
 
 But how sad the change ! I appeal to those of you 
 whose soul has been touched by the sweet and melan¬ 
 choly spirit of poesy. If you feel like weeping, how¬ 
 ever, do not spend your tears on the too-soon-with¬ 
 ered rose, on the vanishing mists, on the fading 
 leaves, on the transient spring-time, on the zephyr 
 which passes and returns no more ; but shed them 
 for these beautiful flowers of humanity, so often, alas! 
 withered before unfolding,—for the purity of infancy, 
 
204 
 
 The Problem of Evil , 
 
 ms fallen and the sacred aspirations of youth. From 
 
 developed the very start the gnawing and blighting 
 worm is there. The good shows itself, it is 
 true, but it is only like a fruit immaturely plucked, 
 or blasted in its flower by a hostile breath.* This 
 subject has called forth from the poets many touch¬ 
 ingly sad strains.f But others of less noble nature 
 allude to it only with a bitter smile, and speak of the 
 baseless dreams of infancy and the illusions of youth. 
 All admit in some form that evil is in the child from 
 the start, and that in developing itself it triumphs 
 over the good. But some say that the purity of in¬ 
 fancy and the noble impulses of youth are thwarted 
 by their contact with our evil world, as if all evil 
 came from without. But whence, then, does this evil 
 world obtain its recruits ? How is it that these pure 
 children on coming into society with each other uni¬ 
 formly become such impure adults ? Strictly speak¬ 
 ing, infancy is not pure, and youth is not holy; but 
 there never was a human being, perhaps, who at the 
 threshold of life did not have day-dreams of purity, 
 
 * II est comme le fruit en naissant arrache, 
 
 Ou qu’un souffle ennemi dans sa fleur a seche.— -Racine. 
 
 f Oh ! quand ce doux passe, quand cet age sans tache, 
 
 Avec sa robe blanche ou notre amour s’attache, 
 
 Revient dans nos cheirfins, 
 
 On s’y suspend, et puis que de larmes ameres 
 Sur les lambeaux fletris de vos jeunes chimeres 
 
 Qui vous restent aux mains!— Victor Hugo. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 205 
 
 love, and holiness. Before doing the evil, we see 
 the good. 
 
 By the time the will is developed, therefore, and 
 comes to self-consciousness, that is, when man comes 
 to responsibility, he finds already within himself a 
 double nature. It is because of this fact that the 
 smile which attends the sight of a little child is al¬ 
 most always tinged with melancholy. We fear for 
 the little candidate of life not only the varied acci¬ 
 dents of existence, but we also have a presentiment 
 of the struggles and sufferings which the yet inno¬ 
 cent little creature will have to endure, in proportion 
 as the fallen nature within it comes to development. 
 It would be easy to multiply citations from literature 
 in support of these thoughts. I might cite Conflrma to- 
 the Apostle Paul, and, for such as would not rycitations - 
 prefer that authority, the Roman poet, Ovid. I might 
 quote from the Christian, Racine, and for those of 
 different tastes, from the Greek, Euripides, or even 
 from Voltaire. I would find every-where in human 
 letters the evidence of this double nature which 
 exists in each of us. We perceive on the one hand 
 an order in which our better nature delights ; on the 
 other, we groan under the heavy burden of a disor¬ 
 dered nature which weighs upon our will. 
 
 Our life is a false nature ; ’tis not in 
 
 The harmony of things—this hard decree, 
 
 This ineradicable taint of sin, 
 
 This boundless upas, this all-blasting tree, 
 
206 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 Whose root is earth, whose leaves and branches be 
 The shies which rain their plagues on men like dew— 
 Disease, death, bondage—all the woes we see— 
 
 And, worse, the woes we see not—which throb through 
 The immedicable souls with heartaches ever new.* 
 
 A single sentence of Pascal sums up all these 
 thoughts : “ There are two natures within us, the one 
 good, the other evil.” But without accumulating cita¬ 
 tions, I prefer to appeal to your daily experience. 
 That there are within us two natures, the conflicts 
 of which often rend our hearts, no one denies. 
 
 Our solution explains this great fact. Every time 
 that a new representative of our common humanity 
 appears as a candidate of life, the true use and pur¬ 
 pose of his liberty is clearly enough shown to him by 
 conscience. The golden dream is experienced ; the 
 celestial Eden is caught sight of. But this is the 
 work of that part of our nature which God made, of 
 that primitive constitution of the soul which makes 
 itself felt at the very outset of life. The other phase 
 of our nature, the evil, is the man as made by human¬ 
 ity ; it is the sad creation of the creature, the result 
 of the common fall. We have now the means of ex¬ 
 plaining the presence of these two natures. 
 
 We have also the means of explaining why 
 
 Why the fall- 1 & J 
 
 en nature the evil nature gains the upper hand in the de¬ 
 gains the 
 
 upper hand, velopment of life. In fact, it results directly 
 
 * Childe Harold. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 207 
 
 from the idea.of the fall, namely, that the human will 
 is not in its normal condition. Liberty, as we have 
 said, realizes and confirms itself in giving itself to the 
 good ; but it enfeebles and ruins itself in giving itself 
 to evil; and for the reason that the good is our law, 
 whereas evil is foreign and hostile to the constitution 
 of the soul. Though man possesses the inestimable 
 gift of liberty, which renders him capable of the good 
 and of happiness, yet in itself it is an empty gift, 
 and has no other alternative than either to become 
 the free servant of justice by the practice of the good, 
 or to become, by yielding to evil, the slave of sin. 
 The revolt of humanity has, therefore, resulted not 
 only in vitiating the human heart by making it 
 the seat of evil solicitations, but also in paralyzing 
 the will. 
 
 Our solution, therefore, accounts for the evil prin¬ 
 ciple which observation discovers in the heart. What 
 other solution does as much ? Evil is there ; it is 
 essential in humanity, and cannot be accounted for 
 by individual historic volitions. But whence comes 
 it ? Will you say that it is necessary ? But Eegtaternent 
 this is to deny it; it is not to solve the 01 posltion - 
 problem, it is to destroy one of its terms. Will you 
 refer it back to an eternal principle ? but this is dual¬ 
 ism, a system which the advance of human thought 
 has long since renounced. What alternative is then 
 left ? To seek the origin of evil in God ? But this 
 
203 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 we cannot We must, therefore, seek the origin of 
 evil in an act of humanity. Such is the substance 
 of my proof. I consider as worthy of serious exam¬ 
 ination every solution of the problem which will free 
 God from the responsibility of evil, without recurring 
 to the idea of a nature of things, which would be a 
 second principle co-eternal with God; but I know no 
 other than the one I propose which has this charac¬ 
 ter, and hence I shall cling to it until the discovery 
 of some new light, the probability of which, however, 
 I do not suppose. 
 
 We have settled at the outset the two principles, 
 that the good is that which ought to be, that is, that 
 it is identical with the Divine will; and that evil is 
 that which ought not to be, that is, that it is the con¬ 
 trary of the Divine will. To maintain these two defi¬ 
 nitions intact is for me the test of every theory of 
 evil that presents itself. To reject every theory 
 which conflicts with the moral law, or a faith in God's 
 holiness, is my uniform rule. Is there any other solu¬ 
 tion than the one I propose which does not violate 
 this rule, and which at the same time accounts for 
 the totality of facts which observation reveals ? Let 
 us see. 
 
 Do you say that the moral law and God are mere 
 speculative ideas ? and that the matter in hand is not 
 to discover a new doctrine in justification of precon¬ 
 ceived theories, but to explain facts ? Let us then 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 209 
 
 examine this thought; and, back of what you call 
 theories, let us go directly to the most positive of 
 facts. The conception pf the moral law is neither 
 more nor less than the expression of a fact, P^°i©gic- 
 namely, the fact of the sentiment of obliga- as rea? as 
 
 ' physical 
 
 tion, the consciousness of duty. Our faith fects, 
 in the holiness of God is also the expression of a fact, 
 namely, the fact of the profound heartfelt need of 
 worshiping. Try to suppress the feeling of moral 
 obligation, which is the basis of all moral and social 
 order ; undertake to suppress the instinct of worship, 
 which is the basis of all religions ; silence that voice 
 which, in the presence of the good, utters an appro¬ 
 bation, and in the presence of evil, a blame; silence 
 that voice which in the presence of some great in¬ 
 justice rises often, even in those who pretend to 
 disbelieve in God, and makes appeal to a Supreme 
 Justice; silence all these voices if you can, and we 
 will admit that the moral law, and God, are nothing 
 but theories. But this cannot be ; for the conscious¬ 
 ness of duty, and of a divine order, are fundamental 
 elements of our nature. To maintain the moral 
 law, and the holiness of God, is to maintain two 
 ideas which are the immediate and direct expression 
 of facts. 
 
 But we meet here a certain form of science which 
 treats this class of facts with disdain, stigmatizing 
 
 them as matters of sentiment. French Positivism de- 
 
 14 
 
210 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 dared the other day/by the mouth of its disciple, M. 
 Littre, that science recognizes nothing but matter 
 and the properties of matter. German Materialism 
 declares, through Professor Biichner, that “ it is im¬ 
 possible long to resist the force of facts,” Now, in 
 the opinion of these writers, the conscience, the in¬ 
 stinct of worship, and, in general, all spiritual phe¬ 
 nomena, are not facts; there are no other realities than 
 those which fall under our senses. If they had said, 
 the science of matter recognizes nothing but matter 
 and the properties of matter, they would only have 
 said a commonplace truism ; but their real purpose 
 is to force upon the public the notion that the science 
 of matter and its properties is the sole and universal 
 science. They hold that all that exists is either 
 matter or properties of matter. 
 
 Let us examine this. The properties of matter 
 „ ... . exist only under condition that matter exists, 
 criticised. an q ft exists only under the conditions of form 
 and weight. Please then tell me what is the form of 
 honor, and what is the exact weight of infamy. By 
 what instruments shall we determine the geometrical 
 dimensions of generosity, and measure, in all its de¬ 
 tails, the shape of selfishness ? What confusion of 
 ideas we are involved in, what thick darkness we must 
 call up, if we would so far succeed in quenching the 
 natural light which enlightens every man who comes 
 into the world, as to concede that vice and virtue, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 211 
 
 honor and probity, devotion and esteem, contempt 
 and censure, admiration and horror, are either matter 
 or the properties of matter, or—nothing! Let us 
 now return to the declaration of Buchner, for it con¬ 
 tains a direct condemnation of the very materialism 
 which has placed it in our hands, “ It is impossible 
 long to resist the force of facts !’ 5 It is for this very 
 reason that humanity will never consent to erase irom 
 their place in science those realities which are the 
 most direct manifestations of life, realities which man 
 knows more immediately than he knows matter; for 
 matter reveals itself to our senses only under the 
 condition of the presence and action of his spiritual 
 nature, * 
 
 But we hear it affirmed that the science of our age 
 is inclining more and more to materialism. I think, 
 on the contrary, that it is already on the point of 
 getting out of it, and that the darkness of which 
 men complain is only that final obscurity of the 
 night which usually seems more dense just before the 
 break of day.* I might mention, as a favorable sign 
 of the times, the general interest which the discussion 
 of moral questions now excites in every intelligent 
 community, an interest which does not indicate any 
 
 * M. Felix Ravaisson has just signalized, in contemporary philosophy, 
 “ a general movement of thought tending to get the mastery once 
 again, and from a higher stand-point than ever before, of the doctrines 
 of materialism.” 
 
'y T ^ 
 
 A *mf 
 
 The Problem of Evil, 
 
 great success of materialism in persuading the world 
 that the conscience and the heart, sin and holiness, 
 are objects unworthy of the serious attention of 
 reason. 
 
 III. Solution of Difficulties. 
 
 Let us now examine some difficulties connected 
 with the solution of the problem of evil which I have 
 proposed. Our object has been to find a system 
 which, while satisfying reason, shall maintain and 
 safeguard the conscience. Now, at first sight our 
 solution seems to conflict both with conscience and 
 with reason. Let us notice, first, the rational diffi¬ 
 culties. * 
 
 It is impossible, say some, to conceive of sin as 
 How can originating in a state of innocence. That we 
 eni ^nng ourse i ves d 0 e vil, however, is perfectly easy 
 
 from mno- 1 J J 
 
 cence 
 
 to understand, as we are a prey to the solici¬ 
 tations of our evil heart, and to the temptations of 
 sense and vanity under all their phases. Evil being 
 already in our heart, we naturally yield to its seduc¬ 
 tions ; but take evil out of the heart, and you can 
 never explain how the will should deviate from the 
 good. The good, in fact, exerts of itself an attraction. 
 To overbalance this attraction there must be a tempta- 
 tion resulting from the pre-existence of evil. Without 
 a temptation the fall cannot be explained ; and to admit 
 a primitive state of innocence is to exclude all tempta- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 213 
 
 tion, and, consequently, to exclude the possibility of 
 evil. Such is the first objection we meet. 
 
 I have no intention of answering the objection by 
 proposing an abstract definition of liberty, in saying 
 that the will, being free, is able, from this very fact, 
 to determine itself for the evil without any solicita¬ 
 tion. I concede that, in the absence of all temptation, 
 sin is inexplicable. What course is then left for me ? 
 It must be shown that there exists, in a state of entire 
 
 purity of heart, a temptation that is inherent The tempta¬ 
 tion of lib- 
 
 in the will, and which cannot be suppressed erty. 
 save by suppressing the will itself; so that on the 
 admission of the freedom of the will, and of absolute 
 purity of heart, this temptation, but this alone, must 
 also be admitted. Now, this temptation does exist. 
 But what is it ? The temptation of liberty. 
 
 A free created power is, as a power, conscious of 
 originating actions ; byt as a creature, it cannot be 
 in a state of absolute independence ; it finds itself in 
 the presence of universal law, or rather of God, whose 
 will the law expresses. Now from this very situation, 
 there results for the created power the temptation to 
 ignore the consequences of its position as a creature, 
 and, rejecting the law which subordinates it to God, 
 to become a law unto itself. This is the temptation 
 to revolt, pure and simple. Is this incomprehensible ? 
 By no means. Is this temptation impossible ? Far 
 from it ; it is real, it exists in us now. This tempta- 
 
214 
 
 he Problem of Evil. 
 
 tion is, in its simple form, vailed and, as it were, 
 choked, beneath the enormous mass of other tempta¬ 
 tions in our fallen nature ; and when we do evil it is 
 more frequently because we yield to the impulses of a 
 vitiated nature. Still, we can yet recognize, feeble 
 though its influence may be in our present state, the 
 temptation of independence per se. 
 
 Take this illustration. You desire to do a certain 
 act. Some one, who has no legitimate authority over 
 you, comes and arrogantly commands you to do the 
 very thing you were intending to do. Now, what is 
 the result ? Almost certainly you will rebel against 
 this undue command ; and you will quite likely, if 
 not wisely, at least very naturally, renounce doing 
 what you intended to do, and do something which 
 you had no desire to do, simply to vindicate your 
 independence. Your resistance will be legitimate in 
 this case, as the command is illegitimate. But this 
 spirit of independence exists, likewise, in the presence 
 of the legitimate authority of conscience and God. 
 And this is so true that many young persons who 
 would disdainfully repel certain temptations if they 
 were directly, presented to them, yet become victims 
 to the diabolical cunning of those who awaken in them 
 the spirit of independence in order to lead them, little 
 by little, to do that for which they originally had a 
 horror. Forbidden fruit is of savory taste. 
 
 Discard this notion of the temptation of liberty. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 215 
 
 and evil is no longer possible. But where evil is not 
 possible, there liberty is not possible. The Isthistemp _ 
 elementary form of liberty, under which it of 
 
 must begin, and out of which it must rise to av0ldable? 
 its perfect form by overcoming the possibility of evil, 
 
 • presupposes the power of choice. Take away this 
 power of choosing between obedience and revolt, and 
 you have suppressed the freedom of the creature. It 
 has sometimes been asked why God did not create a 
 being which could not sin, that is to say, which should 
 be good necessarily. Those who so ask forget that 
 necessity excludes liberty, and that where there is no 
 liberty there can be neither good nor evil, so that the 
 notion of a being necessarily good involves an abso¬ 
 lute contradiction of terms. 
 
 We explain the primitive fall, therefore, by a tempta¬ 
 tion which is the sole one unavoidably inherent in a free 
 being, as, also, the sole one which can exist in a state 
 of innocence: that is to say, the sole one which can 
 find an echo in a will associated with a pure heart. 
 This temptation may be thus expressed : “ Thou shalt 
 be a God unto thyself.” No other temptation can 
 come until after this one, that is, until after the will 
 shall have already enfeebled itself by yielding to the 
 temptation which is inherent in liberty itself. It was 
 in view of this that Milton, when attempting to go 
 back to the first origin of evil, assigned, as the motive 
 of the archangel s rebellion, the aspiring to a position 
 
216 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 in which he should be a law unto himself r the wishing 
 to be free from the authority of the Creator. In this 
 he showed himself a good philosopher ?<s well as poet. 
 
 But I hear some one object: There, you have evil, 
 after all, at the very beginning of things ; you make evil 
 This liberty inherent in the creatine in its character of 
 
 is not a germ 
 
 ©f eviL creature l No, we do not have evil, but only 
 its possibility, a possibility which is, we repeat it, the 
 condition of created liberty. Liberty presupposes 
 possible evil, and. contains a temptation without which 
 liberty could not exist; but the sufficient cause of 
 realized evil exists nowhere—save in a will rebelling 
 against its law. All confusion on this.point may be 
 saved by recalling the saying of Shakspeare: 
 
 7 Tis one thing t.o be tempted. 
 
 Another thing to falL 5 * 1 
 
 There is, therefore, a temptation inherent in liberty 
 independently of any evil proclivity of the heart. 
 Our solution, in this respect, appears as perfectly 
 reasonable; and, on dose examination, it becomes 
 even quite evident. I would be glad if I could say 
 as much of the point which follows. 
 
 When we once have admitted that the fell of a free 
 being is possible in a state of innocence, a new diffi¬ 
 culty* more formidable than the first, rises in the face 
 of reason, and. seems to bar its way. We repeat, that 
 our solution does not affirm that a first man, or that a 
 
 * Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene I. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 217 
 
 first human pair, render themselves guilty of a purely 
 individual sin, and that then other individuals, others 
 in the true and absolute sense of the word, bear the 
 consequences of this sin, which is not their own. If 
 our solution meant this it would be false. It does 
 not affirm that we all participated individually in this 
 first sin, and yet it does affirm that we did In what 
 participate really in the common fall; human- sense al b 
 ity revolted, and is now bearing the conse- il)atedinthe 
 
 J primitive 
 
 quences of its revolt. In this sense only is faU - 
 our solution reconcilable with justice ; or, to speak 
 more correctly, our solution alone permits the recon¬ 
 ciliation of the idea of justice with the facts which 
 experience reveals. There are not two justices ; it is 
 one of the severest things that can be reproached to 
 Pascal, that he held (without mature reflection, doubt¬ 
 less) that there are two forms of justice, human and 
 divine. There is but one justice, that of God ; and 
 this justice we see in brighter light the more we 
 study it. We are accustomed to appeal from the 
 injustice of men to the justice of God ; but to wish 
 to separate the justice of God from the justice of the 
 conscience would be to precipitate ourselves inevita¬ 
 bly either into atheism or into fanaticism. Our 
 solution does not depend, therefore, on a particular 
 definition of justice ; there is but one justice, that 
 which Cicero has defined thus : “To concede to each 
 his rights.” But our solution turns on this point: 
 
2 l8 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Turning- namely, is each individual of the race other 
 
 point of the J • 
 
 solution, than his fellows in an exclusive and absolute 
 sense ? Or is it true that there is in each man both 
 a personal existence, and also the existence of hu¬ 
 manity ? We do not mean that humanity is to be 
 regarded as a being apart from the individuals ; but 
 we hold that each man unites in himself two realities, 
 which are distinct without being separate, and thus 
 presents a double aspect: namely, in so far as he is 
 himself in his personal existence, and in so far as he is 
 man by the presence of humanity in him. After these 
 explanations let us approach the difficulty. 
 
 The difficulty is, How are we to be made in any 
 sense responsible for the primitive fall of our race ? 
 You will now object that we have no recollection of 
 this primitive revolt; you object, even, that we had 
 no existence at the time when it occurred, and that, 
 if the race fell at all, it occurred surely before we ap¬ 
 peared on the stage of action ; and, hence, you are 
 tempted to say with the lamb of La Fontaine : c< *How 
 could I have done it if I was not yet born ? ” 
 
 You did not exist? in no sense ? is that beyond 
 dh we aii all question ? The difficulty being the same 
 SrltVuman f° r ever y object that lives, let us examine it 
 pan-? j n £} ie case 0 f a vegetable. I will take, for 
 example, one of our forest pines. Whence springs it ? 
 Its present substance came evidently from the soil 
 and the atmosphere, through a series of organic 
 
The Problem of Evil. 219 
 
 changes. Recently the people of Geneva heard Pro¬ 
 fessor Candolle explain, in the light of recent physics, 
 the entire development of a vegetable from the mo¬ 
 ment when germination commences. He explained 
 to us the growth of the plant; but under what con¬ 
 dition ? Under condition that the plant is already 
 there, living in its germ. Now, the germ of the plant 
 is not the result of movements in matter ; a living 
 germ is not an aggregate of particles, like a stone or 
 crystal. Before developing itself, therefore, our pine 
 existed in its germ. But whence came this germ ? 
 Did God create it directly ? Does God create direct¬ 
 ly, every year, the infinitude of germs which are scat¬ 
 tered abroad in the whole vegetable kingdom ? In 
 view of the uniformity with which the same plant pro¬ 
 duces unceasingly seed of its own kind, and of the 
 fact that God so uniformly works through second 
 causes, we cannot believe this. No one believes in this 
 infinite multiplication of new creative acts. The 
 germ of the pine, therefore, existed in the pine which 
 produced it, and this in another, and so on AMlogyofa 
 
 1 vegetable 
 
 from pine to pine, back to the origin of the pre-existing 
 
 in its spe- 
 
 species. But how, and in what sense did it cies. 
 exist ? Philosophers say that the germ exists poten¬ 
 tially in the life of the individual which reproduces 
 its kind. But what shall we understand by this word 
 potentially l Shall we attribute to the vegetable a 
 will, and suppose that it creates the germ ? No one 
 
220 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 thinks so. The germ exists before it appears ; and 
 what we call vital force in this case does not create, 
 but simply develops that which already was. But 
 how are we to conceive of this ? Shall we suppose 
 that the whole number of living individuals existed 
 infinitely small in the first germ ? Shall we assume 
 that the first pine-seed of all, the origin of all other 
 pines, past, present, and future, having been opened, 
 and placed under a microscope of infinite power, 
 would have revealed all the pines of the world shut 
 up as in a box? You smile; and, if we admit the 
 indefinite reproduction of individuals, metaphysics 
 justifies your smile. For, in fact, this would require 
 the presence in the first germ of an indefinite num¬ 
 ber of real entities ; now, every number being essen¬ 
 tially determinate, an indefinite number is no number 
 at all. It is certain, however, that our pine existed a 
 hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, no matter how 
 many, years ago, at the very origin of its species. 
 No matter how large the number of real species, our 
 reasoning remains unaffected. The pine existed in 
 its species before its individual manifestation, as we 
 have two reasons for believing. The first is, that as 
 it now exists, and that as it is not a simple aggregate 
 of material particles, and that as it was not created 
 individually, it must, hence, have existed at the origin 
 of its species. The second reason is based on the 
 acknowledged influence of soil and climate in modi- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 221 
 
 fying, under condition of the lapse of very long periods 
 of time, the peculiarities of natural species. To ac¬ 
 count for all the peculiarities of the pine in question, 
 we would have to go back to the influence of soil 
 and climate, and of astronomical and geological facts 
 which took place countless centuries in the past. 
 Our pine was being modified at that remote epoch ; 
 it must, therefore, have then existed, for it could be 
 modified only on condition of then existing. But 
 how did it exist ? How does a vegetable exist in its 
 species ? In form and substance ? No ; un- Itexists ’ but 
 
 in a manner 
 
 less it existed all formed and in miniature, a incompre¬ 
 hensible to 
 
 supposition which we have excluded. Nev- us. 
 ertheless, it is impossible for us to conceive of the 
 existence of a vegetable save under the double con¬ 
 dition of form and substance. The pine, therefore, 
 existed in a manner to us incomprehensible. This 
 is simply one of the mysteries of all life. 
 
 Let us come, now, to the application of our illus¬ 
 tration. Before it existed individually, the tree existed 
 in its species, but in a manner which we do not un¬ 
 derstand. Likewise, also, man before his personal 
 manifestation existed in humanity. But how ? In a 
 manner which we do not understand. We conceive 
 of the existence of a vegetable only as possessing 
 form and substance, and yet reason leads us to admit 
 that it exists in its species without form or substance. 
 We conceive of the existence of a man only as an 
 
222 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 individual, and yet we are forced to admit that there 
 is for him, in humanity, another mode of existence. 
 It is with him the same as with the pine. One of 
 you says he is twenty years old ; another, thirty, fifty, 
 sixty. This is your date as an individual; but, as to 
 your date as man, you have no other than that of 
 humanity itself—you are all of you much older than 
 you think. 
 
 The objection to our solution arising from the 
 thought that we did not exist at the time of the sup¬ 
 posed fall of the race, disappears as soon as we admit 
 the existence of each in humanity, not as an individ¬ 
 ual, but as man. But, in order to the admission of a 
 so is man’s more than merely ideal reality of the species, 
 the species it is necessary to overcome the whole weight 
 
 incompre - 11 °f appearances, as well as of an easily ac- 
 hensibie. ce pted popular philosophy, which has appear¬ 
 ances in its favor. And, then, it is necessary to be 
 satisfied with a conception of pu*e reason, which 
 affirms the reality of the species without being able 
 to call imagination to its support. Without entering 
 upon all the difficulties of the subject, let it suffice 
 here to cite the counterbalancing fact, that some of 
 the most illustrious representatives of reason have 
 found the difficulty to be the very opposite of that 
 which we here consider. Individuals pass away, but 
 the species remains. Where are the oaks which shad¬ 
 owed our fathers ? Where, in a few years, will be 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 223 
 
 the birds which sing in our forests ? the sheep, and 
 the cattle of our fields ? Every thing dies, and dis¬ 
 appears from the surface of the earth ; but the spe¬ 
 cies remain : the oak, the ox, the horse, still continue, 
 notwithstanding the incessant destruction of the indi¬ 
 viduals which represent them. Several philosophers 
 have been so vividly struck with this consideration, 
 that for them the reality of the species was the over¬ 
 shadowing fact, while the existence of individuals 
 seemed problematical. 
 
 But I think I hear some of you accusing me of 
 reasoning very poorly. “ Comparisons are not proofs,” • 
 say you. “ What has this pine to do here ? If you 
 mean that we have existed from the origin of humanity 
 in a metaphysical sense, as every living thing exists 
 in its species, very well ; but this metaphysical ex¬ 
 istence does not touch the question ; for what con¬ 
 cerns us is moral responsibility, which is not imputed 
 to the pines. Surely we did not exist before our birth 
 in a form which involves moral responsibility. A moral dif _ 
 The moral difficulty, therefore, still remains, llculty ‘ 
 that we suffer for a fault which is foreign to us ; and 
 that is unjust.” Here, therefore, after the difficulty 
 of the reason, we encounter an objection of conscience ; 
 it merits our most earnest attention. * 
 
 The basis of the objection is, that acts of volition 
 are-exclusively individual, and that the responsibility 
 which attends them is of the same character. Let 
 
224 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 us examine these two ideas, bearing in mind that the 
 individual character of volitions as well as of responsi¬ 
 bility is to remain absolutely intact, even should 
 it not be exclusive. While engaged in placing in 
 relief one of the phases of a double truth, we do not 
 desire in any degree to deny the other, or throw it 
 into the shade. But is it true that volition manifests 
 
 Are volitions itself only under a purely individual form ? 
 
 exclusively J 
 
 individual? There are some reasons for doubting it; I 
 shall indicate three. 
 
 If we are to believe the words of lovers, the senti¬ 
 ment which animates them has the effect to melt two 
 wills into one, to cause the will to cease in some de¬ 
 gree to be purely personal, the two concurrent souls 
 
 The working- f° rm i n g a sort of unity. Persons unaccus- 
 ot love. tomed to the vivacity of the passions might 
 
 be tempted to question the testimony of lovers ; but 
 serious writers, grave observers of human nature, 
 likewise affirm that deep feelings of love and friend¬ 
 ship diminish, so to speak, the separation of souls, 
 taking from their volitions, not, of course, their indi¬ 
 vidual nature, but the exclusive character of that 
 individuality. This is my first remark. 
 
 The second is this : When a man advances alone 
 in the presence of a hostile army, when he braves 
 certain death to secure an advantage for his fellows, 
 of en he is proclaimed a hero. In the assault'of a 
 redoubt, and in some other military move- 
 
 asm. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 225 
 
 merits, an entire corps is sometimes sent to certain 
 death, as bait for the cannon, and in many cases the 
 victims know where they are going. These poor 
 fellows are swept down by hundreds, and their bodies 
 are thrown into forgotten ditches. Their action is 
 none the less heroic because they were many, though 
 very few or none of them would have had the courage 
 to do alone that which, in a body, they did without 
 hesitation. This fact is well known and excites no 
 astonishment. It results, we are wont to say, from 
 the power of emulation, from example, from associa¬ 
 tion of action. It is doubtless all that; but what 
 does that mean ? It means that the concurrence of 
 volitions creates a power which would not exist if 
 these same volitions were isolated. In the accom¬ 
 plishment of a collective action, there is, therefore, a 
 power which manifests itself in each individual, but 
 whose source, however, is not purely individual ; 
 otherwise, the collection of individuals would not have 
 greater power, or courage, than the sum of their per¬ 
 sonal volitions. But all know that this is not the 
 case; all admit, without, perhaps, weighing the sig¬ 
 nificance of the fact, that concurrence of forces is 
 additional potency. • 
 
 And here is my third remark : In the phenomena 
 of habit, we see the will creating a new nature. It is, 
 in the first place, the person that produces of habit. 
 
 the nature, and then the nature that determines the 
 
 15 
 
226 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 acts of the person, (I borrow- expressions from St. 
 Augustine). Now, in this power of habit, we have an 
 instance of a will manifesting itself, no longer ex¬ 
 clusively under an individual form, for the individual 
 feels this power of habit as something foreign to him¬ 
 self, although proceeding primitively from him ; and 
 this new nature, formed by habit, transmits itself 
 hereditarily from one individual to others, and loses 
 thus the personal character of its origin. 
 
 I submit to you these observations, which it will be 
 easy to illustrate by other examples. There exist moral 
 phenomena, obscure and little studied, which enable 
 us to catch a glimpse, as through vails of mist, of an 
 element of volition whose form is not exclusively 
 individual. 
 
 The idea of responsibility calls forth similar re- 
 is responsi- flections. The notion that responsibility is 
 ciiisivei\ X ~ Purely and exclusively individual vanishes at 
 mdmduai? once on se rious reflection. You influence 
 
 one of your fellows by words, by example, by looks ; 
 and you lead him into evil. You know well enough 
 that you are responsible for those words, acts, and 
 looks. But you know also that you have likewise a 
 share of responsibility in the act itself of him whom 
 you influenced to turn aside from the line of duty. 
 Consider carefully that which, in judicial matters, are 
 called extenuating circumstances. These extenuat¬ 
 ing circumstances, which our jurymen sometimes mis- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 227 
 
 use, are, nevertheless, a serious reality. Can we 
 justly disregard them in our moral judgments ? A 
 poor girl, born in dens of vice, and raised in the midst 
 of infamy, is hardly to be regarded as so deeply guilty, 
 should she fall into a disorderly life, as a better raised 
 young woman would be held, for the same conduct. 
 Does not a part of her guilt belong to those who per¬ 
 verted her ? If a boy, raised in habits of begging 
 and theft, should afterward deviate from the la\fs of 
 strict probity, would he be in the same degree guilty 
 as a well-raised son, who, in order to yield to tempta¬ 
 tion, would have to trample under foot the maxims 
 of his father and the example of his mother ? Evil 
 influences are often an exculpation, as no one denies. 
 Now the exculpating of one is always the accusing of 
 another ; to extenuate the wrong of an act by the con¬ 
 sideration of evil counsels given and bad examples 
 followed, is to throw back upon the authors of the evil 
 counsels and bad examples, that share of the responsi¬ 
 bility which is thrown off from the agent. There are, 
 therefore, in the same act different concurrent respon¬ 
 sibilities ; responsibility is not exclusively individual. 
 This is a weighty thought; it addresses itself directly 
 to the conscience. Follow out the consequences of 
 one of your acts, or words. You exert a bad influence 
 in a certain place to-day, and to-morrow this influence 
 is extending itself; thus your responsibility is impli¬ 
 cated in actions which shall be committed afar off, 
 
228 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 and after a long lapse of time; in these actions your 
 share will be real. 
 
 Far from being exclusively personal, responsibility 
 presents on the contrary such connections with the 
 past and future as may well give occasion to earnest 
 meditation. Xavier de Maistre, an eye-witness of the 
 horrors of the retreat from Russia, exclaims, while re- 
 niustration cording the fearful destiny of the French : 
 
 fronffne dis¬ 
 asters of the “ I did not see a single one of them without 
 
 itussia. n ° thinking of that infernal man who had led 
 them into such extremes of misfortune.” I do not 
 wish to blunt the point of this sharpened arrow ; 
 Bonaparte was doubtless the first in responsibility 
 for the disasters of his army. But trace out the 
 origins of the great misfortune: ask yourselves who 
 had brought Napoleon to power, and thus tempted 
 him to seek military glory as a necessity of his posi¬ 
 tion ; and, without excusing his excessive ambition, 
 you will see that the responsibility distributes itself 
 back over long and multiplied cross-currents of 
 history. 
 
 Responsibility, and volitions which are its condi¬ 
 tion, are not, therefore, facts of an exclusively indi¬ 
 vidual nature. Every act is essentially personal in its 
 The obiec- accomplishment, but no act is exclusively 
 
 tions disap¬ 
 pear. personal in its origins. These considerations 
 
 open for our solution the door which seemed closed 
 
 against it. The imputation of the common fall will 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 229 
 
 assume a character of justice as soon as we admit 
 that, while preserving the personal part of our re¬ 
 sponsibility, which is undeniable,. w r e may also par¬ 
 ticipate in the collective responsibility of the race. 
 
 The idea of justice presented itself as an objection. 
 Now, if there w r ere any injustice, is it our doctrine 
 that is responsible for it ? By no means. The in¬ 
 justice would be in the facts, which our doctrine 
 simply seeks to explain. This is easily enough seen 
 from a glance at the great law of human The law of 
 solidarity. The one suffers from the faults S ° 
 of the other ; one enjoys the favorable results of the 
 good actions of another. The distribution of goods 
 and of evils is not of an exclusively individual charac¬ 
 ter. It is not our doctrine which speaks thus; it is 
 the voice of facts ; and none can dispute their number 
 and Importance. I will call to witness on this subject 
 a justly celebrated man, one occupied with an entirely 
 different order of thoughts from those which now en¬ 
 gage our attention. I open the works of Frederic 
 Bastiat. This economist discusses the laws of the 
 production and distribution of wealth. Here are some 
 of the thoughts which he pens. After remarking that 
 the idea of solidarity was rejected by the philosophy 
 of the eighteenth century, and made the object of the 
 raillery of Voltaire, he thus proceeds : “ But that at 
 which Voltaire mocked is a fact as incontestable as 
 it is mysterious. Why is this man rich ? Because 
 
230 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 his father was active, upright, laborious, economical; 
 the father practiced the virtues, his son gathers the 
 advantages. Why is that other man suffering, sick, 
 feeble, fearful, and unhappy ? Because his father, 
 gifted with a powerful constitution, misused it in de¬ 
 bauch and excess. There is not a man in the world 
 whose condition has not been affected by millions of 
 facts to which his own volitions are foreign. This 
 ill of which I complain to-day was caused, perhaps, 
 by a caprice of my great-grandfather, etc., etc. We 
 discover solidarity on a still grander scale, and at 
 distances more inexplicable, when we consider the 
 relations of different nations, or of different genera¬ 
 tions of the. same nation. Look at our public loans. 
 We declare war, we obey barbarous passions, we 
 destroy thereby precious resources, and we discover 
 the means of throwing the burden of this destruction 
 upon our sons, who, perhaps, will have a horror of war, 
 and be unable to understand our contentious passions. 
 Civil society entire is but a totality of interwoven 
 solidarities. There is, therefore, naturally and to a 
 certain positive degree, undeniable solidarity among 
 men. In other terms responsibility is not exclusively 
 personal 
 
 The moral Bastiat shows the law of solidarity in its 
 phase of mi- contributions to the progress of social har- 
 iiarity. rnony; we are here to consider, however, 
 its darker phase. There exists, then, a general law, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 231 
 
 which observation confirms more and more : the law 
 of solidarity. And while social science is continually 
 placing it in brighter light, our increasing civilization 
 is incessantly contributing to its far-reaching applica¬ 
 tions. The consequences of a war among savages 
 extend but little beyond the forests that witnessed it. 
 In the civilized world, however, war cannot break out 
 in one point without affecting the interests of the 
 whole society of nations. 
 
 Human justice has for its device, and properly so, 
 to render to each individual his dues, and to inflict 
 punishment on the head of the solely guilty one. It 
 aims to reach this point as far as possible, but it is 
 unable to reach it absolutely ; the nature of Human jus- 
 things forbids it. For what being, indeed, is sldi/Tm-" 
 so isolated that the sword of the law may perIect 
 strike him, or justice seal him with the stamp of in¬ 
 famy, without causing others by his side to suffer also ? 
 
 We seek in vain to touch but one individual; the 
 individuals are never isolated ; he who touches one 
 touches also another. 
 
 Solidarity is, therefore, a very general law. Shall 
 we consider it of an evil nature ? Let us examine 
 our conduct. Death enters a certain house. Visitors 
 repair thither. I dp not mean visits of cere- Beneficent 
 mony; friends repair to the house. But to morai"^^ 
 do w r hat ? To bear their share in the suffer- danty ' 
 ing of others ; for if sympathy solaces, it solaces only 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 232 
 
 by dividing the suffering. Alexandre Vinet well ex¬ 
 presses this thought when he says: “Two hearts, 
 when united, can brave misfortune; it y at least, is 
 common to both of them ; it falls on each with but 
 half its force/’* 
 
 The significance of compassion, therefore, is, that- 
 one offers on the score of another. Now, is compas¬ 
 sion a wrong activity-of the human heart? Is what 
 we call a tender heart, a bad heart ? The Stoic phi¬ 
 losophers thought so. They may have been person¬ 
 ally kind and compassionate men; their writings 
 command beneficence; but their doctrine affirms that 
 the true sage retires entirely within himself, and, to 
 use their own expression, that he becomes round and 
 polished like a ball of steel, experiencing no influence 
 from without. Can you thus think ? can you place 
 
 * The last three lines of these stanzas r 
 
 Vois ce vieux chene abattu par Forage 
 Et sur la terre etendu sans feuillage. 
 
 II etait seal; le voila sous nos pieds. 
 
 Vois ces ormeaux qui joignent letrr ombrage, 
 
 Des aquilons ils ont brave la rage ; 
 
 Ils etaient deux; ils se sent appuyes. 
 
 Dans le malheur ainsi courbant la tete s 
 Tu cederas aux coups de la tempete 
 Si pres de toi tu n’as pas un ami. 
 
 Deux coeurs unis affrontent Pinfortune ; 
 
 A tous les deux au moins elle est commune 
 Et sur chacun ne frappe qvda demi. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 233 
 
 compassion among the unhealthy qualities of the soul ? 
 You cannot. 
 
 And what of sacrifice ? Leonidas dies for Greece ; 
 Winkelried sacrifices himself for Switzerland. But let 
 us descend from the sphere of great men. This poor 
 laborer, who scarcely finds in his ordinary life suffi¬ 
 cient time for sleep, devotes a portion of his already 
 too short nights to advancing the work of his com¬ 
 panion enfeebled by disease. That poor mother toils 
 day and night to pay the debts of her son—debts con¬ 
 tracted, perhaps, in a life of disorder. All devoted 
 hearts, all those who practice the virtue of sacrifice, 
 bear the burdens of others : is this wrong ? Note 
 now that it is precisely this fact which is declared to 
 be unjust, namely, that one should suffer because of 
 another. 
 
 But I hear you saying within yourself, There is a 
 sophism in this. Devotion is beautiful and good be¬ 
 cause it is voluntary ; but it is manifestly unjust that 
 one should suffer on account of another without will¬ 
 ing it. My reasoning, however, is not so illogical as 
 you think. We must learn whether the fact To suffer for 
 
 others is not 
 
 that one suffers for another, taken in itself unjust, 
 and independently of our will, is good or evil. If it is 
 evil per se, then our intention may be pure, but the 
 object of our volition is evilj that which we intend 
 with an upright motive is yet the realization of in¬ 
 justice. Compassion and devotion would then be 
 
234 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 instances of perverted conscience. Now, while a 
 certain class of persons think, or at least say, that de¬ 
 votion is folly, yet to lay down as a scientific maxim 
 that the fulfillment of the law of charity is the expres¬ 
 sion of a perverted conscience, is what no sound mind 
 would consent to do. We, therefore, see, not only, 
 that solidarity exists in fact, and is revealed to obser¬ 
 vation as a fundamental law of society, but also that 
 we voluntarily practice this law as often as we enter 
 upon works of charity: and charity is good. My con¬ 
 clusion, therefore, is, that if the practice of this law is 
 good it must also be just, for there is no goodness 
 without justice. 
 
 Let us understand ourselves well. The question 
 here is as to that absolute morality which binds us 
 to the divine law, and not as to that judicial morality 
 which fixes the mutual rights of individuals. As 
 bearing on the mutual rights of individuals, the 
 characteristic of charity is to transcend justice, to do 
 voluntarily more than is required. If a beggar de¬ 
 mand your help as his right, you may, with all jus¬ 
 tice, show him the door and close your purse. But in 
 the presence of the absolute law of God, we never do, 
 in the accomplishment of duty, more than we are 
 bound to do, or than is required by absolute justice. 
 It is in God only that charity transcends justice ; or, 
 to speak more strictly, there is in God no distinction 
 between justice and charity, because he owes nothing 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 235 
 
 to his creatures other than the voluntary debt of his 
 free and eternal love. All that proceeds from God is, 
 as to us, grace, pure grace. All that proceeds from 
 us, as related to God and to the law which expresses 
 his will, is simply duty and justice. In the deep and 
 true sense of the word, therefore, that charitableness 
 which bears the burdens of others, is simply a mani¬ 
 festation of justice. But how can this be so, unless 
 it be -because we are not individually segregated from 
 each other in an absolute sense, and because The law of 
 there exists among us a bond, a fundamental 
 union—that is to say, because the human race “ or f til J n 
 
 J ’ ideal unity 
 
 forms a real though mysterious unity ? Aside ol ' mankin <r 
 from this thought there is no justice in the law of 
 solidarity 
 
 J 
 
 Should this reasoning appear too subtle, perhaps 
 the following may be more simple. The solidarity of 
 mankind is a fact. It is not only actual, in the sense 
 that we suffer or derive joy from the acts of our con¬ 
 temporaries ; but it is also hereditary: we experience 
 in good, as in evil, the consequences of actions com¬ 
 mitted by generations past; and future generations 
 will reap the heritage which our conduct is sowing 
 for them. These are facts of experience which no one 
 can contest. Now, no one undergoes justly the 
 moral consequences of acts which he did not accom¬ 
 plish : such is an axiom of conscience. We are forced, 
 therefore, to choose between these two alternatives: 
 
236 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 either, we suffer for the faults of beings from whom 
 we are totally and absolutely separated—and in this 
 case injustice would be at the foundation of the uni- 
 
 1 
 
 verse, sin cesolidarity is a general fact—or the human 
 
 1 
 
 race is, under the diversity of its individuals, so con¬ 
 nected in a real unity, that there springs justly there¬ 
 from, for us, a collective responsibility in addition to 
 our personal responsibility. Such is the alternative 
 from which we are forced to choose, unless w£ give 
 up all hope of solving the problem. But to admit that 
 injustice is at the foundation of the universe, is to 
 violate reason and to destroy conscience. We are, 
 therefore, forced to the admission of a human unity, 
 of a collective responsibility; and we accept it, not¬ 
 withstanding its obscurities, as the sole view which 
 reconciles experience and reason, the facts of life and 
 the utterances of conscience. 
 
 Human individuals are distinct, but they are not 
 separate. Isolation is the watch-word of Cain; and it 
 is also the cold word which once fell from Rousseau 
 when he wrote : “ What matters to me what becomes 
 of the wicked ! I take little interest in their fate.” 
 Solidarity in But the supreme law of the spiritual world, 
 
 conflict avith 
 
 selfishness, charity, does not speak as Cain and Rous¬ 
 seau. Charity practices two maxims. The first is this: 
 Render to each the consequences of his own acts ; 
 none can throw his own faults upon others. This is 
 a clear oracle of conscience. Charity conforms itself 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 23 7 
 
 thereto, for true charity is just, and it cannot be truly 
 good save in being just. The second maxim is this: 
 We are many, and .yet we are one. At this point 
 the heart outruns the reason; and to arrive at the 
 truth in the case, we only need to reduce to theory the 
 practice of the heart. Pascal has said : “ The heart 
 has its reasons which the reason understands not; ” 
 but it is the fault of the reason, for an essential part 
 of its duty is to fathom the reasons of the heart 
 
 Place yourself in front of an edifice in construction, 
 ✓ 
 
 and observe the manifold stones, designed for it, 
 lying about you. You will often notice on these 
 stones, certain marks intended to designate the place 
 of each of these fragments in the unity of the rising 
 edifice. Now, we are all stones for an edifice, and 
 the heart is the mark which fixes our destination. 
 Our diverse individualities are to conciliate them¬ 
 selves in the harmony of a whole, that is, in a unity. 
 God designs that we should be free and responsible 
 persons ; but he also designs us to form a spiritual 
 communion, which is as real as the individuals ; since 
 it also, as well as the individuals, is willed by God, 
 and since the will of God is the supreme expression 
 for that which is and for that which ought to be. 
 
 We have, therefore, to accept and to main- Two funda- 
 
 . , , . . mental pha- 
 
 tain two truths : first, our personal existence ses of hu _ 
 with all its consequences, the most important mau hte ‘ 
 of which being, ^at no one can throw off the responsi- 
 
238 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 bility of his voluntary acts ; and, secondly, our col¬ 
 lective existence with all its consequences, the most 
 important of which being, that we ought to bear each 
 other's burdens. The one of these truths, our per¬ 
 sonality, we see perfectly clearly, and, in many cases, 
 only too clearly. But the other is obscure to us : we 
 do not clearly discern the spiritual edifice in view of 
 which we exist, and which is to realize the funda¬ 
 mental unity of our nature, But why so ? I do not 
 presume to lift the vail entirely, but only, if possible, 
 to brush it aside a little. Why, then, do we not see 
 this second truth ? Is it not egotism, that primitive 
 form of sin, that is here also the essential cause of our 
 error ? And is it not the elevating influence of de¬ 
 votion and sacrifice—-that is, of those elements of 
 charity that we yet retain—"that dissipates, in some 
 degree, our darkness ? Do we not accept solidarity 
 in the limits and in the proportion of our love ? The 
 members of a united family accept and practice, with¬ 
 out thinking it strange, the solidarity which binds them 
 together. The citizen, when animated by warm patriot¬ 
 ism, raises not the least doubt as to the legitimacy of 
 the bond which attaches him to his nation. Is it not 
 safe to assume that in growing in charity we will grow 
 in the truth, and that we will succeed in understanding 
 our solidarity in the fall in proportion as we accept the 
 work, proposed to each of us, of being laborers in the 
 common work of the restoration of the human race ? 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 239 
 
 Our solution of the problem of evil rests on two 
 principal ideas, that of liberty, and that of 
 solidarity. Up to our own day, philosophy two ideas of 
 has too often ignored the rights of liberty, solidarity, 
 which alone constitute the reality and dignity of 
 spirits. But one of the chief currents of contem¬ 
 porary thought is now tending to lead men into the 
 opposite error, and to occasion the ignoring of the 
 law of solidarity, which expresses the essence of the 
 spiritual unity of mankind. Writers seem frequently 
 to confound man’s individual existence with a mere in¬ 
 dividualism which is contrary to the nature of things. 
 “ Individuality ,” says Vinet, “ is not individualism. 
 
 The latter refers every thing to self, sees in every 
 
 0 
 
 thing nothing but self; individuality consists simply 
 in wishing to be one’s self in order to be something. 
 Individualism and individuality are two sworn ene¬ 
 mies : the former is the obstacle and negation of all 
 society ; the latter is that to which society owes all 
 that it has of savor, of life, and of reality.” It is our 
 duty to separate ourselves from the evil current of 
 humanity, and to become personal and conscient 
 beings, not in order to remain isolated, but in order 
 to re-enter freely into communion with spiritualized 
 society. Each is to become a personal self, not in 
 order to keep himself for himself, but in order to con¬ 
 secrate himself to the common good of all, in har- 
 
 4 . 
 
 mony with the plan of the universal Father. 
 
240 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Socialists and Individualists, drawn up in opposite 
 The errors camps, contend, in the schools and in the 
 ists. world, with the disjointed fragments of truth. 
 The fact is, the normal development of society pro¬ 
 motes more and more the complete formation of true 
 individuals, for society is not an aggregate, a simple 
 collection, but a spiritual organism formed of wills 
 which control and unite themselves in a common 
 
 purpose. On the other hand, the individual cannot 
 
 » 
 
 . exist in isolation, but develops himself normally and 
 harmoniously only in realizing by his freedom the 
 law of solidarity. Harmbny, as Pythagoras held, is, 
 in fact, the solution of the enigma of the world. 
 
 The Swiss have a beautiful national motto, but it 
 is not to Swiss hearts alone that it speaks. In the 
 solemn moments of our existence it stirs the man 
 within us in his profoundest depths, for it is the ex¬ 
 pression of the supreme law of the universe : “ Each 
 for all; all for each.” 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 241 
 
 * 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 THE CONFLICT OF LIFE. 
 
 The title of this lecture will surprise no one. 
 Who, in fact, does not know that life is a conflict ? 
 The majority of men are engaged in a constant strug¬ 
 gle in order merely to live, to gain their daily bread, 
 and that of their family ; they struggle against ever- 
 menacing poverty. Others, free from these material 
 cares, strive for place, for office, in order to obtain 
 fortune or reputation ; they seek to triumph over their 
 competitors, to rise above their rivals. All of us seek 
 after happiness ; and in this seeking we have to strive 
 daily with cares and chagrins. Thus we succeed in 
 living; then we leave something behind for our chil¬ 
 dren, a fortune greater or less, a reputation more or 
 less good ; and then, we are carried to our graves. 
 
 But it is not of this conflict, the object of which is 
 comfort and success, that we are to-day The couflicC 
 to speak, and yet we will not speak of any lorthe s° od * 
 thing else than of our every-day life ; but we will 
 speak of it from a special point of view ; we will 
 speak of the good conflict, that which is to have for 
 result, not success in the world, but the realization 
 of the laws of the good. 
 
 10 
 
24 2 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 The conflict which we are to engage in against 
 evil is not a normal phase of the development of a 
 rjh - conrtict spiritual creature ; it is not directed against 
 
 is against ° 
 
 anabnor- the possibility of evil, for evil is already ex- 
 
 mal state of 
 
 things. tant, real and powerful; it has its armies 
 and fortresses, and, worst of all, it has a citadel in the 
 heart of each of us. Evil being already real, there 
 is in the struggle which we have to sustain some¬ 
 thing to be destroyed, something to be annihilated ; 
 and though man may, by the consciousness of per¬ 
 formed duty, attain to a feeling of peace, yet he can¬ 
 not find stable and permanent repose in a world ruled 
 over by disorder. This situation is both astonishing 
 and discouraging ; hence, we are sometimes led to 
 shut our eyes to the real condition of life, and to try 
 to persuade ourselves that there is not after all so 
 Lamennais much to do. “ Indifference, indolence, the 
 love of ease, and, above all, trembling cow¬ 
 ardice—such are the influences that blind and corrupt 
 the feeble consciences of so many men who go about 
 crying with feigned security, Peace, peace!' when 
 there is no peace. They are fearful of labor, of con¬ 
 flict, of every thing except that which they ought to 
 fear. But I tell you there is an Eye, whose glance 
 falls from on high as a malediction on these sluggards. 
 For what, then, can they believe themselves to have 
 been born ? God did not place man upon this earth 
 to repose as if in his native clime, nor to dose away a 
 
The Problem of EvlL 
 
 243 
 
 few days in indolent slumber. Time is not a gentle 
 breeze which caresses and fans his brow in passing, 
 but a wind that alternately burns and freezes him, a 
 tempest that drives his frail bark rapidly on, under a 
 beclouded sky, and across dangerous shoals, He 
 needs to watch, and row, and sweat; he needs to do 
 violence to his nature, and to bend his will to that 
 immutable order that harasses and hems it in, inces¬ 
 santly. Duty, stern duty, presides at his cradle, rises 
 with him when he leaves it, and accompanies him to 
 the tomb.” These words of Lamennais are a vivid 
 and striking picture of our actual condition. 
 
 It is not necessary to have accepted all the details 
 of our solution of the problem of evil in order to 
 sympathize with the considerations which I shall offer 
 in this lecture ; it is enough that you admit that evil 
 ought not to be, and that, consequently, its general 
 prevalence in no wise diminishes the obligation to 
 destroy it. To do away with evil is the purpose of 
 the good combat of life. 
 
 He who combats is a soldier; and every soldier 
 should know his colors and receive the word of order. 
 Our colors, the banner which we are to plant on the 
 citadels of the enemy, is the Good. The word of 
 order is Victory. The supreme commander is He 
 whose eternal volition is identical with, and the sub¬ 
 stance of, the good. 
 
 Let us inquire what should be, in our contest 
 
244 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 against evil, the point of our departure, what the 
 scope of our aim, what the shoals we should avoid, 
 chief heads and, finally, what is the true plan of the com- 
 
 of the sixth 
 
 lecture. bat. Our topics will, therefore, be: Point 
 of Departure, Scope of our Efforts, Shoals, and Plan 
 
 of the Conflict. 
 
 « 
 
 I. Point of Departure. 
 
 What is to be our point of departure ? how are we 
 to set out in our contest against evil ? What, if I 
 may so speak, is the condition of enrollment into the 
 army of the good ? Have you not sometimes started 
 from your home with the intention of repairing to 
 some definite point, and, after walking some time, 
 suddenly come to the consciousness that, because of 
 some mental preoccupation, you had taken the wrong 
 road ? At the moment of making this discovery you 
 see at once that, in order to accomplish your purpose, 
 you must turn about, and perform what is called in 
 military style, a movement of conversion. The start¬ 
 ing-point in the contest against evil is a movement 
 of this nature. As we are naturally in a state of 
 egotism, our volitions are naturally directed toward 
 ourselves, as if it were practicable for us to be our 
 own goal, and our own center. This way is evil 
 and deceptive, for egotism is not the way of happi¬ 
 ness. We have, therefore, to turn about by an act 
 of conversion. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 245 
 
 In detailed histories of the retreat which followed 
 the disastrous battle of Leipsic, you will read of the 
 formation, on the outskirts of the disband- 0ur natura i 
 ing French army, of a terrible swarm of iu” t rate(iby 
 fricotears . Thus were called those soldiers l hat 1 ot , dl y 
 
 J banded sol- 
 
 who, abandoning their colors and the orders diers - 
 of their officers, had dispersed themselves, some to 
 indulge in pillage and evil passions, others from sim¬ 
 ple indolence or cowardice, and who, leaving the melt¬ 
 ing army to save itself as best it could, had taken for 
 their device, “ Each for himself.” Now what had 
 this class of men to do in order to return to order ? 
 Simply to rejoin their colors, and place themselves 
 under legitimate command ; to abandon the evil de¬ 
 vice, “ Each for himself,” and assume this device, 
 which alone can save an army in a hostile country: 
 “ Each for all, and all for each.” 
 
 Now, we also, instead of being united for the strug¬ 
 gle against evil, are all of us by nature disbanded ; 
 we seek each his particular interest ; w& Method of 
 must rejoin our colors, and put ourselves ^2'“ 
 under the authority of the Chief. And what work ' 
 desires this Chief, the sovereign Father over ajl ? He 
 desires not the exclusive good of this one or that one, 
 of any select number of his children ; he desires the 
 good of all, and it is this that we also should likewise 
 desire. We should aim at the good of all, and in this 
 each finds his own share ; for he who forgets him- 
 
246 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 self is he who most truly cares for himself. Our 
 starting-point in the good struggle is, therefore, to 
 renounce egotism, which leaves us a prey to the 
 strokes of evil, or which is rather itself the essence 
 of evil, and to turn ourselves back toward the su¬ 
 preme law of charity. But this point of departure 
 *is the commencing point of a development in soul- 
 life which deserves our special attention. 
 
 Human life begins under the impulses of the heart, 
 apart from the action of conscience. At first, man 
 follows his instincts, then, he undergoes the influence 
 of those about him. The child is under the influence 
 of the family ; the adult, under that of society. One 
 may live thus without having in himself any princi¬ 
 ple of action, yielding only to external impressions, 
 without true exercise of will or of conscience. Such 
 a man, should he happen to be among the Puritans 
 of England or America, would be of grave demeanor, 
 serious words, and strictly exact conduct. But trans¬ 
 port him into a frivolous society, and the same man 
 will act quite otherwise. Those who live thus, sim¬ 
 ply following a current without reacting against it, 
 are not yet born to the moral life ; and from this point 
 of view one can say that there are multitudes of men 
 already old who are not yet born. In the majority 
 two phases 0 f cases, however, the conscience makes it- 
 
 of con¬ 
 science. self heard in the primitive life of the heart ; 
 
 and conscience presents itself under two forms. It 
 
The Problem of Evil . 247 
 
 forbids : Thou shalt not; and it commands : Thou 
 shalt. 
 
 The first manifestations of conscience are uni¬ 
 formly of the first form : Thou shalt not lie ; thou 
 shalt not steal. If a man has elevated instincts, and 
 a well-balanced temperament, and if he has grown 
 up in honest society, it may be that he will live with¬ 
 out seriously violating any of the restrictive precepts 
 of conscience. He may hence imagine that he is a 
 good man, or that, as he will express it, he does wrong 
 to no one. Nevertheless, in this observance of the 
 prohibitory rules of morality such a man may remain 
 supremely selfish, may be his own proper center. If 
 he is content with avoiding what society regards as 
 evil, and if he does not positively work for the good, 
 it is vain for him to say that he does wrong to no 
 one ; in reality he does wrong to every body, since he 
 does not employ for the common good a power of 
 which his fellows have need. His honest life is only 
 an honest egotism. Moreover, such a position can¬ 
 not strictly be maintained. If the power which is 
 given to us for the common good is not employed in 
 its legitimate direction, it becomes corrupt. One 
 does not triumph over evil by simply refusing to do 
 it, and by continuing to live for self. In strictness of 
 fact, we overcome evil only by good. The good is 
 not simply a rule of prohibition ; it is a positive com¬ 
 mand, assigning a direction for our powers, a goal 
 
248 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 for our volitions. This is the second form of the con¬ 
 science : Thou shalt. 
 
 But what shalt thou do ? Good. What good ? All 
 good, without exception ; it is the very nature of the 
 good to be obligator} 7 , and obligatory in its totality. 
 Now what is the good ? The good, in the full sense 
 of the word, is the plan of the Creator for the happi¬ 
 ness of his spiritual creatures. To accomplish the 
 The (roal of good is, therefore, to put harmony into 
 hfe * the universe, and work the happiness of 
 the w r orld. Such is the purpos’e proposed to our 
 efforts. 
 
 Let us pause here to contemplate the bright light 
 which this thought casts over life. Let us take, for 
 example, the duty of labor. Labor is a law of nature 
 which presents itself, in the first place, under the form 
 of necessity. To the one it says: Labor, to avoid 
 indigence, that scourge of the poor. To another: 
 Labor, to avoid ennui , that scourge of the rich. To 
 the one it says : If thou toil not, thou wilt lack 
 bread to feed the body, and thy children will starve. - 
 To the other : If thou toil not, thou wilt lack happi¬ 
 ness, which is the food of the soul, and at thy fire¬ 
 side, however well it may be warmed, the heart of 
 thy children will be cold. Thus, labor appears in 
 the first place as a necessity, as a law whose violation 
 entails harsh retributions. 
 
 Let us notice, now, how this law is transfigured by 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 249 
 
 the consideration of the idea of the good, The imm- 
 
 blest life 
 
 that' is, of the consecration of all volitions transfig¬ 
 ured by con- 
 
 to the general happiness. Labor is a uni- scientious- 
 versal and fundamental law of the spiritual 
 world ; since for spirits, whose very essence is free 
 power, to live is to act. Now, the co-operation of all 
 the forces, each acting in its legitimate place and 
 direction, would produce a harmony whose fruit would 
 be progress, or the increasing amelioration of society. 
 When this thought once enters the understanding, 
 then even the gardener, while reposing on his spade, 
 the artisan, while suspending for a moment his work, 
 in fact, all honest laborers, may say without presump¬ 
 tion that they are no less necessary agents in the 
 general march of society than the men whose posi¬ 
 tions are surrounded by the greatest pomp. The law 
 of labor, then, is transfigured. Under the form, 
 Thou shalt, it was a harsh necessity ; under the form, 
 Thou shouldst , it becomes a privilege, sublime in pro¬ 
 portion as we penetrate its significance, and attractive 
 as we come to see that its foundation is goodness. 
 Yes, yes, all of us—the one in guiding his plow in 
 the furrow, the other in handling the saw or plane, 
 the other in holding the square or file, the other in 
 settling disputes and rendering justice, the other in 
 administering public affairs, the other in instruction 
 and study—all of us, are contributing to shape the 
 destinies of the world ; and we will all do our task 
 
250 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 joyfully, as soon as we come fully to understand how 
 high a privilege it is, to fulfill the common law of-laffor 
 in fraternity of love. 
 
 Such is the good. The goal of each will should 
 not be the individual who wills, but the development 
 and harmony of the common brotherhood. When 
 this is once truly understood, the idea of self-seeking 
 gives place to the idea of charity. This is a moral 
 discovery, analogous to that of the astronomer 
 Copernicus. The earth had been saying: I am the 
 center of the universe ; the starry heavens revolve 
 around me, and exist for me only. But science came, 
 and said : Thou art not the center of the universe ; 
 it is thou that revolvest around the sun, and the sun 
 itself, with all its retinue of planets, revolves perhaps 
 also about some central sun in* the immense system 
 of creation. But is the earth humiliated by this ? 
 By no means ; it is simply assigned to its place ; and 
 every place is good so long as the proper circle is 
 traced, so long as the true orbit is not abandoned. 
 The three- To substitute the idea of charity for the idea 
 
 fold conver¬ 
 sion. of self-seeking—such is the conversion of the 
 
 intelligence ; to be seriously and thoroughly resolved 
 
 to do duty—such is the conversion of the will; to 
 
 love the duty which we have determined to do—such 
 
 is the conversion of the heart. 
 
 g/ 
 
 Such is our starting-point. What, now, should by 
 the scope of our efforts for the good ? 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 251 
 
 II. Scope of our Efforts. 
 
 Where do we find evil ? Every-where. Where 
 should we do good ? Every-where. In the presence 
 of all good whatever, we should repeat the cry*of the 
 ancient Crusaders : God wills it! Let us beware of 
 that narrow and empty religion which would admit a 
 distinction between the cause of God and the cause 
 of charity. To this perverted religion, which would 
 assign to God only a small share in public worship 
 and in external forms, true religion—-that which 
 should be the center of our existence, the inspiration 
 of the whole life—will always respond, in the lan¬ 
 guage of St. James, that, “Faith without works is 
 dead.” 
 
 Let us not permit the good to be limited in any 
 such manner. There is no sphere of human activity 
 into which it should not enter ; there are no u evil js 
 walls of tradition or prejudice which it should e T iy " 
 
 x J where, so 
 
 not break through. The contrary opinion is should it be 
 
 J combated 
 
 an error not less frequent than deplorable. evei x- 
 
 where. 
 
 Notice, for example, its workings in politics. 
 
 Injustice is quite revolting in the relations of private 
 life: none should be deprived of what belongs to 
 him ; nothing is more branded than theft. And yet 
 have we not seen it raised into a maxim of interna¬ 
 tional law that, in the sphere of politics, “ Might 
 makes right ? ” “ Those are but freaks of princes,” 
 
252 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 as says Andrieux ; “ they respect a trifle, but steal a 
 province.”* 
 
 But how many private citizens indulge in similar 
 freaks ! It is not less obligatory to respect our neigh¬ 
 bor's reputation than his material possessions. Now, 
 in politics, for the sake of illustration, what are the 
 usual concomitants of a democratic election ? In the 
 case of a candidate of the opposite party, see how 
 
 ready we are to credit every scandalous rumor with 
 
 « 
 
 regard to his life and motives ! how ready we are, 
 even, to spread them abroad, without the least certain 
 evidence of their truth ! And why all this ? Because 
 it is mere politics ; and morality, as we practically 
 say, should stay within its own sphere. 
 
 Almost every profession seeks thus to establish for 
 itself a closed field into which common morality is 
 not to enter. It is wrong to lie ; but what of a law¬ 
 yer ? Would it not be too great a restriction on an 
 advocate to require him always to tell the truth ? 
 And what of commerce ? Is it not a usage too prev¬ 
 alent in this business, to take for granted that exact 
 honesty and truthfulness are not to be expected ? 
 in art. And so is it also in the sphere of art and 
 literature. Here are paintings decidedly lascivious, 
 music that is enervating, poetry whose charm is mor¬ 
 bid, and prose which will leave-unfortunate associa- 
 
 * Ce sont la jeux de prince : 
 On re?pecte un moulin, on vole une province. 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 ^53 
 
 tions in the memory. But what of that! exclaim the 
 artists ; provided only that the laws of beauty are not 
 violated, there is nothing to complain of; let us have 
 art for its own sake, and leave morality in its own 
 domain! 
 
 It is thus that men attempt every-where to estab¬ 
 lish shadowy regions, to hollow out caverns from which 
 the entrance of sunlight is interdicted. And, in fact, 
 the light does retire ; but with what sad consequences ! 
 In politics men deviate from morality a little at first, 
 and then more and more, until finally they come to 
 the maxims of Machiavelli, maxims which are prac¬ 
 ticed by many men who are not princes. Politics, 
 the proper business of which is to promote the well¬ 
 being of nations, becomes then one of the greatest 
 scourges of mankind. And in commerce the effect 
 of an ever-increasing departure from the laws of 
 morality is, finally, to affect trade in its very sources, 
 namely, confidence and credit. In those great crises 
 which afflict society, and dry up the sources of labor, 
 a share of the embarrassment is doubtless to .be 
 attributed to political events, to the choking of mar¬ 
 kets, as well as to causes which do not belong so 
 evidently to the moral sphere. It is clear, however, 
 that if business men had perfect confidence Ha iw ef - 
 
 fects of a 
 
 that their agents and correspondents would wider appli¬ 
 cation of the 
 
 not take advantage of circumstances to vio- moral law. 
 late, to their disadvantage, the laws of strict probity, 
 
254 
 
 The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 trade would be much more prosperous, other circum¬ 
 stances remaining the same. And is it not evident 
 that public finances would not come to such a condi¬ 
 tion as they sometimes do, if the creditors had confi¬ 
 dence that they were doing business with perfectly 
 upright governments, with nations that would impose 
 upon themselves the last sacrifices rather than pay, 
 in a paper currency, sums which they received in 
 solid coin ? On careful reflection, you will see that 
 it is never safe to divorce commercial transactions 
 from ethical principles. And, finally, of art. I know 
 that artists are not moralists by profession ; I know that 
 they can attain to true beauty only under the impulse 
 of a truly free inspiration, and that, should they 
 directly aim at a moral effect, they would probably 
 fail in art; but I know that artistic inspiration passes 
 through the artist’s heart, and thence receives a par¬ 
 ticular direction. If the artist does not keep his 
 imagination pure, if he does not watch over himself 
 to prevent his passions from damagingly affecting his 
 feeling for the ideal, and if, thereby, he comes to 
 create immoral productions, it is surely not art that 
 is responsible therefor. The sad effects of exclud¬ 
 ing morality from art are only too evident in many 
 of the corrupting productions of the literature of 
 the day. 
 
 No, no ; neither politics nor the diverse professions 
 of private life, neither art nor literature, nor, in a word, 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 255 ' 
 
 any thing that man engages in, can isolate itself from 
 morality without bringing upon itself ruin. Let us 
 break down these unjustifiable walls. Let us throw 
 open all caverns ; let the light of the good reign every¬ 
 where, not under the form of a narrow and cramping 
 rule, but as a powerful inspiration, shedding every¬ 
 where the light and warmth of spiritual truth. 
 
 But where does duty cease ? Where the activity 
 of man ceases, and nowhere else. There exists in 
 human life no phase which should be unaffected by 
 the good. When may we cease to combat evil ? 
 When it shall be destroyed, and not sooner. All 
 good is obligatory; all good ought to be ; such is its 
 very nature. Either conscience deceives us, or we 
 are obligated to put order into the universe, and work 
 the happiness of the world. Such is the object that 
 is set before us, and toward which our efforts are to 
 aim. But here is a danger. 
 
 III. Shoals. 
 
 Our programme has become alarming ; and, if we 
 consider it in its entire scope, it is absurd. In fact, it 
 really seems as if it would make of us but so many 
 Don Quixotes on the highways of life, charged to 
 redress all wrongs, to repair all injuries, and to restore 
 order every-where ; and you know well enough how 
 the brave chevalier of La Mancha succeeded in put¬ 
 ting order into the world. Don Quixote was a fool. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 256 
 
 % 
 
 But he was a good fool; it is difficult not to love him ; 
 but after all he was a fool; and our programme seems 
 equally affected with folly. What, in fact, would be¬ 
 come of a ship which should set out from port with 
 the purpose of seeing every thing, without having any 
 prescribed plans? From the very fact that it is 
 destined to see every thing, it would have no reason 
 for going here rather than there. Opening, therefore, 
 its sails to the first wind that blew, and using neither 
 helm nor compass, what would become of it ? The 
 
 The danger shoal that would wreck it would of course 
 of dissipat- ^ p e f ar 0 f£ And such would also be 
 
 ing our lor- 
 
 ces - our moral destiny should we launch forth 
 vaguely in the pursuit of all good ; we would be seized 
 by the current of dispersion and sadly make shipwreck 
 011 the shoals of discouragement. 
 
 For, in fact, how boundless the work! To convert 
 one’s self and to convert the world ; to fulfill our du¬ 
 ties in the family, and in the exercise of our profes¬ 
 sion ; to lead the blind, to succor the poor, to visit 
 the sick ; to do our civic duties as elector, soldier, 
 juryman ; to busy ourselves in reforming institutions ; 
 to ameliorate that which already is, to create what 
 ought to be; to give ear, in fine, to the varied and 
 never-ending appeals for works of charity! calls for 
 
 charitable 
 
 Of these appeals, you know there is in fact works, 
 scarcely any limit. Here, for example, at the begin¬ 
 ning of cold weather, a society presents itself propos- 
 
The Problem of Evil", 
 
 257 
 
 ing to furnish food to the poor at the lowest possible 
 rates ; the thing is excellent, hesitate not to co-operate 
 with it. And here is another society, working to 
 spread popular instruction ; you will do well to take 
 part in it, for instruction is the food of the soul And 
 here is a club for circulating good books; what, in 
 fact, is more laudable than to counteract, as much as 
 possible, the circulation of bad books ? And here is 
 an institution aiming to repress the nuisance of beg¬ 
 gary ; and who is not interested in it ? who does not 
 see that it is an excellent work to check unworthy 
 beggars, and to provide for the really helpless ? And 
 here is an enterprise to furnish cheap, healthy lodg¬ 
 ings for the poor; surely it is praiseworthy to furnish, 
 as fully as possible, air and light and health to all; 
 we cannot refuse ourselves to such a good work. 
 Elsewhere there is an effort to obtain by persuasion 
 and free consent, the suspension of labor on Sunday. 
 Let us hasten to second this effort; for, as much as 
 industry is desirable and profitable, equally so is, like¬ 
 wise, that leisure for worship which is necessary to 
 raise mind and heart to the true dignity of manhood. 
 
 To all these enterprises we are required to devote 
 our time, our counsels, our money. We must give 
 an hour where we cannot give a day ; a dollar where 
 we cannot give ten. Nor must we allow these works 
 at home to make us forgetful of those abroad. A fire 
 consumes a village in Switzerland or on the French 
 
258 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 border ; we must subscribe. In this or that manu¬ 
 facturing city there are workmen without bread ; we 
 must help to save them from starving. The negroes 
 of America have great difficulty in passing the crisis 
 of their emancipation ; we must interest ourselves in 
 the negroes of America. Nor must we forget the 
 heathen to whom we should bear the benedictions 
 of our faith and civilization. What work! what 
 work ! 
 
 And yet there are some men who languish and 
 And yet complain, because, as they say, they have 
 
 there are 
 
 sluggards, nothing to do ! There are men who seem 
 to see in the improvements of modern civilization only 
 so many multiplied means and occasions for killing 
 time—for killing time, which is the coin by which we 
 should purchase the good of our fellows. In the 
 presence of the boundless proportions and ramifica¬ 
 tions of evil in the world, this misuse of time is as 
 
 » 
 
 bad as casting grain into a river in the midst of a 
 famishing city ; it is the throwing away of all the 
 brighter elements of life. 
 
 But let us return to our subject. We cannot too 
 earnestly remind those who fold their arms and waste 
 their lives, how many good works demand their help, 
 how many harvests are waiting for reapers ; but it is 
 a different phase of the subject that now calls our 
 attention. 
 
 Our perplexity now is that there is too much to do. 
 
The Problem of Evil, 
 
 259 
 
 The field for practical charity is immense; and prac¬ 
 tical works are not half our task. We have need not 
 only of boundless knowledge, but also of boundless 
 wisdom. We need to enlighten the conscience, that 
 our motives may be directed toward a really good 
 object, and that we may avoid the errors of misguided 
 zeal. ^Ve need to enlighten our practical understand¬ 
 ing ; for it is not enough that the intention be pure 
 and the goal good in itself ; we need wisdom to select 
 appropriate means to ends. The economist Bastiat 
 mentions certain philanthropic and social enterprises, 
 which, while springing from a pure intention and aim¬ 
 ing at an excellent object, yet produce, in fact, much 
 evil, because they proceed on a misconception of the 
 true plan of social harmony, which is the expression 
 of the will of the Creator, and tend to substitute in 
 its place an unnatural order of things whose conse¬ 
 quences would be disastrous. A like danger is in¬ 
 curred in every sphere of human activity; zeal without 
 knowledge works evil; to act effectually, we need to 
 know the object to be attained, the means to emplof, 
 and the obstacles to overcome. The work of con- 
 science, therefore, needs the aid of the reason; we 
 must unite all the light of the understanding to all 
 the ardors of the will, so as to keep upright our own 
 heart, to combat incessantly within and without, 
 to do all and to learn all, to have an opinion on all 
 subjects, to exert an influence in every sphere; but 
 
260 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 Our 
 
 ity. 
 
 at this rate, what will become of us ? We are already 
 perplex- drifting away on the current of dispersion. 
 We will do every thing but by halves; we 
 will abandon one good work for the next one that 
 comes offering itself. In the conflict against evil we 
 shall act like a soldier, who, raising his sword against # 
 one enemy, should turn it away without striking him 
 in order to assault another, and from the second in 
 order to pursue a third, and so on, without ever doing 
 effectual service. Thus we would be engaged in a 
 fruitless agitation for the good, which really, however, 
 would only further the evil; for a vague and undisci¬ 
 plined zeal becomes indiscreet, and introduces trouble 
 every-where, and order nowhere. It is, as Fenelon 
 has said, “ an anxious and unquiet ardor, more apt to 
 create perplexity than to enlighten us as to our duties.” 
 
 And it is noteworthy that the natural tendency of 
 civilization is to increase all these dangers. In pro- 
 And the portion as our relations are multiplied, and as 
 
 progress of _ • 
 
 civilization a general solidarity of cares, interests, and 
 
 increases 
 
 rather than works, is established, in this same proportion 
 diminishes ^ ve tend to lose that calmness so necessary 
 
 to the sound culture of the heart, in that, more and 
 more, we are interested in every thing and tempted 
 to participate in every thing. Every day a new call 
 for help comes from one end of the world or the other. 
 
 If we yield to this current we will be involved in an 
 ardent and unquiet agitation, and will not be long in 
 
The Problem of Evil, 
 
 261 
 
 exhausting our powers, our time, and resources ; na¬ 
 ture will interpose her veto, and, overcome as well by 
 exhaustion of body as by weariness of soul, we will 
 stagger and disastrously fall. We are glad to say, to 
 the honor of human nature, that over against the 
 millions of victims of sense, vanity, and ambition, 
 there are, in fact, some victims of an ardent and 
 disordered zeal for the good. 
 
 The prostration springing from this fatal disper¬ 
 sion of forces appears under two forms. Twoformsof 
 With some, it is a noble sadness springing <y nse( i uent 
 from a sentiment of powerlessness, but with- ment 
 out destroying a firm and persistent confidence in 
 the good. With others, however, it is a sort of half 
 persuasion that the good which they had sought with 
 such feverish ardor was, 'after all, only a delusion ; 
 they conclude with Philinte, in Moliere, that it is the 
 greatest of follies to undertake to put to rights the 
 world.* They adopt as device the favorite saying of 
 an Italian statesman at the beginning of this century: 
 The world goes of itself, f and hence there is no need 
 of meddling with it. Here we meet in fact with a 
 stumbling-block, with danger of discouragement. 
 But what is to be done? It is impossible to renounce 
 the fundamental truth that all good is obligatory; for 
 
 * “ Que c’est une folie a nulle autre seconde, 
 
 De vouloir se meter de corriger le monde.” 
 
 + “ II mondo va da se." 
 
2 62 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 this would be to deny the very essence of the good. 
 There must, therefore, be some other truth to com¬ 
 plement this one, and by the aid of which we may 
 form a rational scheme for the conflict of life. This 
 truth, doubtless, some of you have anticipated. Let 
 
 us try to place it in a clear light. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 IV. -Plan of the Conflict. 
 
 The obligation to do the good is absolute and uni¬ 
 versal ; but this universal obligation is distributed by 
 the Maker of all among all his creatures. We are 
 all called to contribute to the general good; but no 
 one of us is personally and exclusively charged with 
 restoring order to the universe, and giving happiness 
 a truth com- to the world. This is the fundamental truth 
 
 plemeutary 
 
 to the obii- which we have left out of consideration in 
 
 gation to do . ,. , . T ...... - 
 
 aii good. the preceding observations. It will help us 
 out of our perplexity. 
 
 Every creature has a definite, providentially-as¬ 
 signed place. Eliminate from the circumstances of 
 
 each of us all that may appear as disorder, all the 
 
 « 
 
 evils that proceed from our personal will, from the 
 Each has his actions of others, or from the influence of 
 
 provideutial 
 
 place. bad institutions, and it will still be true that, 
 while normally there is equality of duty and equality 
 of happiness, there will yet always remain diversity 
 of position. Absolute equality cannot exist even in 
 the material universe. Conceive a world composed 
 
The Problem of Evil. 263 
 
 of perfectly similar atoms : will you have realized 
 absolute equality ? By no means ; these atoms will 
 differ in the positions they occupy, as they will neces¬ 
 sarily be at unequal and different distances from the 
 common center. The same diversity must exist 
 among* spirits ; this diversity is the condition of the 
 existence of the world. Each occupies a place which 
 falls to him independently of his will. Our first duty 
 is to accept this place as an expression of general 
 Providence. Not to accept this place, but to cast a 
 covetous look upon the position of others, is to com¬ 
 mit the sin of envy. And envy, when indulged in 
 freely, finds no stopping-place in the vast universe ; 
 it comes finally to wish to usurp the place of God. 
 It is the primitive temptation which explains the 
 origin of evil. Envy, which brings so much trouble 
 into society, and so much bitterness into souls, is the 
 most immediate outgrowth of the primitive fall. 
 
 But do not fear lest this thought should have a re¬ 
 actionary tendency. Fear not lest acquiescence in 
 our providentially-assigned sphere should lead us to 
 sit like Turks, with arms and legs folded, and await 
 the decrees of fate. As we have already seen, the 
 law of every moral creature is continually to amelio¬ 
 rate its condition, and thus realize true progress. 
 Every place in the world of spirits has its special 
 duties, its peculiar works. If a being, called to de¬ 
 velop himself as a free power, should remain stationary, 
 
264 
 
 The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 this would not be to stay in his proper place, it would 
 be to desert his post 
 
 We have here, therefore, the light which we needed 
 in order to lay out a practical plan for the combat of 
 
 The scale of From the diversity of positions there 
 duties, results a graduated scale, a hierarchy, of 
 duties. No one person is the center of the world, 
 and no one should be the goal of his own volitions; 
 but each one is a center of personal activity. Con¬ 
 ceive of each will as a point from which power radi¬ 
 ates ; conceive this point as surrounded by a series 
 of concentric circles ; and conceive that the power in 
 developing itself is not to pass to any one of these 
 circles until after having filled those which are nearer 
 the point of departure : and this will be an apt image 
 of the normal exercise of our activity in the practice 
 of the good. 
 
 We mu£t begin .with ourselves. We are all keepers, 
 Our first the ones of the others ; nevertheless, in the 
 
 moral con- . r . . , . ... 
 
 cem is for order oi rrovidence, each is more especially 
 charged with keeping himself. We can give 
 an excellent interpretation to the common proverb : 
 “ Charity begins at home.” To labor for the good, the 
 first requisite is to be good. The question is, here, 
 not of an order of succession in time, but in causa¬ 
 tion. If one should wish to be good before doing 
 good, he would be like a boy unwilling to go into the 
 water before having first learned to swim ; for to be 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 265 
 
 good and to do good in the true sense of the word, 
 are one and the same thing. The question is not of 
 an order of succession, but of an order of importance. 
 In the accomplishment of duty, our first care should 
 always be directed to ourselves. We should not be 
 of those who preach the law to others without sin¬ 
 cerely trying to keep it ourselves, or bind burdens 
 for the shoulders of others without bearing them our¬ 
 selves. The first duty of each is to restore himself 
 to order; to govern his actions, feelings, and thoughts 
 in conformity with the moral law. 
 
 m 
 
 This duty includes this other one, namely, of pre¬ 
 serving ourselves in a condition to accomplish our 
 part. There are exceptional cases in which man 
 should be willing, without hesitation, to sacrifice his 
 health, or even his life ; but in ordinary cases We shoulrl 
 it is our duty to economize our forces in our forces, 
 order to be capable for our work. Repose is neces¬ 
 sary. Amusements, even, and pleasure have their 
 place in a well-regulated life ; for man needs recrea¬ 
 tion. The spirit which should regulate this order of 
 things, is suggested by the very word itself. Recrea¬ 
 tion should recreate , that is, renew our forces ; its 
 object determines its legitimate limits. It is very 
 evident that we violate the law of recreation when 
 the diversion which should renew our forces, con¬ 
 sumes them. If we waste body and soul in excessive 
 eating or drinking—if it is necessary to spend the 
 
2 66 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 day in recovering from the fatigues of a night spent 
 at a ball, or theater, or club—it is very evident that 
 the order of nature is disturbed. 
 
 But what is even more important than recreation, 
 we should for the health <3f the moral life, is the habit 
 " °f finding moments for mental repose, for 
 silence, for meditation. In a world where 
 disorder reigns so largely, the law of charity becomes 
 a law of combat. But in order to combat, one needs 
 to be strong ; and no one can build up his spiritual 
 forces if he does not manage to be often in solitude, 
 to isolate himself from the tumult of life, in order to 
 nurture his mind on those high thoughts which secure 
 against dissipation. We never act more effectually 
 in the service of others than when we frequently 
 withdraw from them, in order calmly to contemplate, 
 in the presence of the universal Father, the great 
 laws of spiritual order which bind us to all of our fel¬ 
 lows, and to *him, the common center of all. 
 
 After having been busied with ourselves, we must 
 We must re- then pass to others. In this passage from 
 liberty of self to others, there is one feature which 
 deserves careful consideration. To do good 
 to others is the law of our will; but these others are 
 our fellows, that is, they have wills also, and we are 
 not their masters. There is one common Master of 
 souls, but it is not we. Therefore, after having ex¬ 
 erted our legitimate influence on others—an influence 
 
The Problem of Evil ’' 
 
 267 
 
 that will be great in proportion as we love them—we 
 should stop, and respect their liberty; for indiscretion 
 is here fatal. An indiscreet zeal for good awakens 
 man’s instincts of independence, and thus turns to 
 evil. Under the general law of solidarity which 
 makes us to so large an extent one, each has yet his 
 proper responsibility and his personal affairs. 
 
 A good rule for the influence which we ought to 
 exert on others, is suggested by the above-mentioned 
 concentric circles. Our first care should be for our 
 own family, and for our closest natural com- Theprece- 
 panions in the journey of life. This rule is home da- 
 essential, but it is frequently violated. Here ties ‘ 
 is, for example, a very charitable lady. She visits the 
 poor very often, which is an excellent thing ; she is a 
 member of all the benevolent societies, which is per¬ 
 haps too much. For, in fact, my good lady, on the 
 supposition that your husband, returning fatigued 
 from the toil and cares of the day, has great need of 
 finding a glowing fireside, a repast ready, and a 
 cheering welcome, and that, instead of this, he learns, 
 on reaching his home, that Madam is gone to attend 
 her charity-meeting, will you not then be neglecting 
 your first duty, to attend to a work which, while excel¬ 
 lent in itself, yet becomes evil by taking a place 
 which does not belong to it ? And you, sir, also, if 
 you are needed at home for counsel, for making a de¬ 
 cision, for a necessary virile intervention, will you do 
 
268 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 right to remain from home, even though it be to at¬ 
 tend a meeting of public utility ? If the wife is at 
 her charity-meeting, and the husband at his club, 
 what is to become of the family ? the children ? Is 
 not that fire of wood, or coal, that is smoldering 
 when it ought to be brightly blazing, the symbol of 
 another fire whose flame also is lacking ? Are you 
 not depriving your children of those memories of the 
 parental fireside which ought to constitute a protec¬ 
 tion and strength in your sons and daughters against 
 the seductions of life ? 
 
 And our professional duties fall in the same class 
 And profes- with those of the family. A clerk has no 
 tie S nal dU right to engage in philanthropic works if he 
 thereby must slight his duties to his employers. *A 
 banker has no right to engage in the best of charities 
 if he thereby jeopardizes the interests of his credit¬ 
 ors. And we who fill the functions of citizens in a 
 free State, we have no right to help our neighbors in 
 the best of enterprises, if thereby we must neglect 
 our duties as electors. 
 
 We have no right to sacrifice a near duty to one that 
 is farther off, however good and great it may be. Such 
 is the general rule ; by it we can avoid the shoal of 
 dissipated forces. This, we say, is the ordinary rule 
 Exceptional for ordinary lives. There are, however, spe¬ 
 cial vocations which have special privileges ; 
 there are persons who are called by their very pro- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 269 
 
 fes^ion, to break, if need be, the bonds of family and 
 country, in view of a general interest which they 
 have accepted as their first duty. There are also 
 cases of urgency, when a duty which is usually remote 
 becomes an immediate duty for every body. When, 
 for example, a conflagration threatens a city with de¬ 
 struction, then our professional and domestic duties 
 yield to the general duty of preserving the city. But 
 these are exceptional cases ; as a general rule, we can 
 labor efficiently in the cause of the good, only by 
 observing the place providentially assigned to us in 
 society. 
 
 This truth is important, but it must not be misap¬ 
 plied. There is nothing more elastic than the forces 
 and opportunities of man : egotism restrains them, 
 charity augments them. However exactly you may 
 fill your immediate duties, if you are yet inclined to 
 disparage those who do more than you, if you are 
 always ready to throw your little vial of cold water 
 on every generous impulse, you will clearly prove that 
 the practice of your own duties is, at bottom, only an 
 intensified egotism. Let the immoderate pursuits of 
 ambition and vanity, the unworthy thirst for earthly 
 pleasure, and the temptations to idleness, be sup¬ 
 pressed, and there is nobody who will not find some 
 time to do good works outside of the circle of his 
 more immediate duties. But in this respect there is 
 a great inequality. Many persons are able, outside 
 
270 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 of their labor, and their indispensably necessary fb- 
 aii can find pose, to accomplish only acts of individual 
 somVforms beneficence, to lend a hand to a neighbor, to 
 of charm. a t rave i er ^ or address a kind word to 
 
 an afflicted one. And here presents itself a privilege 
 of the wealthy classes, which at first sight seems 
 immense, the privilege of being able largely to take 
 part in works of public charity. Take the instance 
 of a merchant who should at first have concentrated 
 his efforts upon his business in order to establish his 
 family, while yet also doing such charity as he could 
 without deviating from his purpose. Suppose that 
 this man, on arriving, by toil, at an affluence limited 
 within reasonable bounds, should retire from business, 
 and then consecrate his whole activity in aiding, suc¬ 
 coring, and consoling others, and in taking part in 
 enterprises of general utility: and you have before 
 you one of the noblest types of humanity—a type 
 which, thank God, is not rare in Switzerland. Also 
 in this liberty of action for the good, which results 
 from affluence, there is need to guard against disper¬ 
 sion : all forces are increased by concentration. Al¬ 
 most certainly, ten men will obtain a better result by 
 giving themselves each to a particular work, than if 
 these ten men should each take part in ten different 
 works. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave good 
 practical advice when he said, “ Do not meddle with 
 too many affairs.” 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 271 
 
 It seems, at first glance, that this liberty of devoting 
 one’s self to the public good is an immense The privi¬ 
 
 leges of all 
 are essen¬ 
 tially equal. 
 
 privilege for a generous heart. This privi¬ 
 
 lege is real, but it is not as great as it ap- ia * equa ' 
 pears ; for all and each of us contribute to the public 
 good by fulfilling faithfully our special individual 
 duties. In fact, the very first of public interests is 
 that individual duties should be properly fulfilled. 
 There exists in the rural districts a proverb that 
 might be applied also in cities : “ Let each mind his 
 own business, and the cows will be well cared for.” 
 The most majestic oak, in its multiform and vigorous 
 * growth, is but the result of an infinity of particular 
 movements of little currents of sap in very little 
 channels. From the moment that individual duties 
 should be well performed, there would be far less to 
 do in what we call public charities, a large share 
 of public beneficence having no other object than to 
 remedy the results of neglected individual duty. Do 
 away, for example, with indolence and drunkenness, as 
 well as inconsiderate almsgiving, and, although there 
 may yet remain poor persons, there will, however, be 
 nothing more to do in repressing the abuses of men¬ 
 dicity. Establish temperance and purity of morals, 
 and three fourths of the hospitals are at once emptied ; 
 and thus one of the branches of charitable activity is 
 greatly reduced. If governments and nations would 
 obey the laws of justice and reason, it would not be 
 
272 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 necessary to found associations for solacing the mis¬ 
 eries of the battle-field. And many similar illustra¬ 
 tions might be given. 
 
 Such is the plan which we propose for the combat 
 of life. We owe ourselves, our whole powers, to all 
 The practical f orms 0 f good, but only in the order of the 
 the plan, position assigned to each of us by Provi¬ 
 dence. Thus our efforts, being guided by law, will be 
 lasting, because they are guided, and they will be 
 fruitful because they are lasting. Harmonious effort 
 will realize the order of the spiritual world. In the 
 presence of the armies of evil, we are by nature in a* 
 disbanded state ; and this is our weakness. It is * 
 egotism, that is, it is the maxim, “ Each for himself,” 
 that disperses us. The order of battle for the good 
 is, for each to turn himself about, and march resolutely 
 against the enemy, following closely his colors, and 
 each preserving his own place in the ranks. It is 
 beautiful, this marching under the banner of the 
 good, and beholding the humblest duties irradiated 
 with divine light. It is beautiful to take part in the 
 great contest, and confidently to look forward, at the 
 close of the struggle, to repose and harmony, and to 
 the regular and increasing expansion of the inner 
 life. It is beautiful to contemplate yon side of the 
 anguishes, disorders, and torments of a world dis¬ 
 turbed by suffering and sin—“ a heaven of free, lov¬ 
 ing, and reasonable stars, an immutable sky filled full 
 
The Problem of Evil, 
 
 273 
 
 of serenity, light, and love, where all that we have 
 hoped for shall be real” * 
 
 Such is the work which is to be begun on earth, 
 and to be prosecuted in the endless future. Is there 
 any one who finds life heavy, existence dull The worth 
 and wearying, and the succession of days of llle ' 
 monotonous ? Let him but comprehend these things, 
 and he will feel that life is worth living. And if there 
 be any one who doubts the good and its definite 
 triumph, for the reason that he lacks a fixed faith in 
 God, I would say to him, in the words of Socrates : 
 
 The thing is worth the trouble of venturing to be¬ 
 lieve in it; it is a hazard worthy of running ; it is a 
 hope with which we should, as it were, enchant our¬ 
 selves.” f 
 
 Plato, the great disciple of Socrates, has depicted, 
 
 in pages which will be read as long as human letters 
 
 endure.t the progress of the soul while rising The aspira¬ 
 tion toward 
 
 from beauty to beauty, up to the contempla- the ideal, 
 tion of that supreme beauty which is infinite. And 
 who of us has not, at times, cast a longing desire 
 toward the Supreme ideal ? What libertine does not 
 feel that it is noble and beautiful to triumph over, 
 sense ? What untruthful man does not feel in his 
 conscience the worth of truthfulness ? What faint¬ 
 hearted one does not, from the depths of his heart, 
 admire courage ? What egotist has not had to stifle 
 
 * Pere Gratrv. f Phaedo. t In the Banquet. 
 
 18 
 
2 74 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 the voice of his own nature, and learn to despise him¬ 
 self, before he could turn generous-heartedness into 
 derision? Now, the good is the truth; for it is the 
 expression of the Supreme Mind who has determined 
 all that is, and all that ought to be; the good is beauty, 
 as our own hearts amply evince, in the simple fact of 
 their tending to it by all the purer aspirations which 
 inspire them. The good stands out before our soul 
 as a splendid vision, the attraction of which it is im¬ 
 possible not to feel. We go forth to meet it, but 
 come into conflict with evil; we then too often fall 
 back into our own darkness; the cloud re-forms before 
 us, and we ask ourselves whether the glorious vision 
 was not after all a deceptive illusion. No, no! the 
 vision is true; the good is the highest reality for it is 
 an outgoing of the Sovereign God. We behold it 
 
 The -rest c ^ ear b'; what hinders us from grasping it ? 
 
 ° • 
 
 Lack of strength. Is there a remedy? We 
 will try to suggest one in our closing lecture. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 275 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 
 THE SOURCE OF STRENGTH. 
 
 What we lack in the presence of the good, is the 
 strength, the ability, to accomplish it. Except in 
 cases where we are blinded by an overpowering pas¬ 
 sion, we feel and know well enough that the practice 
 of evil renders us unhappy ; but we have not the 
 courage to break off from this practice. Where can 
 we find the strength which we lack ? 
 
 In order to answer this question, let us seek for a 
 symbol in the power which we have of acting upon 
 our body, that is to say, in physical force. An analogy 
 
 in physical 
 
 And, in fact, we will find here more than a force, 
 symbol. The connection of our two natures is so 
 intimate, so profound, and so continued, that in our 
 whole life they are never separated. Our spiritual 
 life manifests itself only under condition of the ex¬ 
 istence of the organs, and by their instrumentality. 
 Nothing but a false idealism, the result of an erring 
 philosophy, could ignore the moral value of disciplin¬ 
 ing the body. On the other hand, we cannot deny 
 the influence of morality on the organic functions ; 
 hygiene, as has been said, is more a virtue than a 
 science. He who has a will firm enough to govern 
 
2j6 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 his body according to the true laws of nature, will 
 obtain a better sanitary result than he who, though 
 directed by the most skillful of physicians, yet yields 
 to disorderly proclivities. Physical force, therefore, 
 and moral force, are very closely related ; and if we 
 take into consideration the influence of the will on 
 the organs of thought, we will never find an absolute 
 separation between our corporeal and our physical 
 natures. But without following further this analogy, let 
 us simply seek in bodily force a symbol of moral force. 
 
 How is that power which we exert in muscular 
 movements kept up and increased ? By exercising 
 it; it is for this reason that manual labor, prome¬ 
 nading and gymnastics, contribute to good health. 
 But exercise keeps up strength only in expending it, 
 and would soon exhaust it, were it not nourished by 
 food. We partake of nourishment, sometimes solid, 
 sometimes liquid ; and the solid portions thereof have 
 to be liquefied before serving for alimentation. Nu¬ 
 trition takes place through a marvelous system of 
 digestive and circulatory functions ; and in the midst 
 of these functions there is one primitive phenomenon 
 which is the basis of all the rest. This phenomenon is 
 respiration. The necessary condition of the alimenta¬ 
 tion of the body is our contact with the vitalizing 
 principle of the atmosphere. At the moment when 
 the new-born infant is to begin its independent 
 physical life, the first requisite of all is that the air 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 277 
 
 shall enter its lungs ; it must respire; it'is only after 
 having respired that it can take nourishment. Such 
 are the facts in which we shall presently discover a 
 symbol of the alimentation of the powers of the soul. 
 The order of our thoughts in this lecture General 
 will be; Food of the soul, Prayer, and the seventhke- 
 Question of Faith, £ure ’ 
 
 I. Food of the Soul. 
 
 Spiritual strength is increased, normally, by its own 
 regular exercise. Many persons find themselves 
 feeble on important occasions simply because they 
 have disdained small efforts and minor virtues. But 
 this strength, which is kept and increased by its own 
 exercise, has also need of nourishment; and spiritual 
 nourishment consists of ideas and sentiments. Ideas 
 are, in some sort, the solid parts of the food of the 
 soul, and sentiments the liquid parts. Now, just as 
 the solids do not nourish the body save as they are 
 liquefied, so also ideas do not act upon the will until 
 after they are translated into sentiments. Ideas may 
 remain in the intelligence without any practical re¬ 
 sults ; but from sentiments we receive an active im¬ 
 pulse ; they influence the will. 
 
 What are the ideas which develop the power of the 
 soul for the accomplishment of good ? They The source 
 
 of helpful 
 
 are, mainly, those which are involved in the ideas, 
 contemplation and meditation of the moral law. 
 
2/8 
 
 The Problem of Evil, 
 
 Consider the different classes of our duties, their con¬ 
 catenation, almost as marvelous as that of natural phe* 
 nomenon, their relations among each other, and their 
 general dependence on the law of charity, from which 
 they all spring, as light-rays proceed from the sun. 
 Consider, above all, as a protection against the illu¬ 
 sions of life, the inseparable connection of duty and 
 happiness. Learn from the works of the sages—for 
 example, from the thoughts of Socrates, and from 
 some of the admirable pages of Cicero—that all search 
 for happiness outside of the laws of moral order is 
 delusory; that in the ordinary course of things, labor 
 procures comfort, veracity gains esteem ; and that in 
 certain cases when it is necessary to renounce all 
 these goods, there is in this very sacrifice to duty, in 
 the approbation of conscience, a joy superior to all 
 other joys : learn this and you will have attained to 
 thoughts which will give you real strength for the 
 struggles of life. 
 
 As to the sentiments which may aid us in the 
 
 of helpful combat against evil, they are first and mainly 
 
 sentiments, t } le attraction itself which the good inspires, 
 
 an attraction resulting from the thoughts which we 
 
 * 
 
 have just indicated. The contemplation of the moral 
 law, when engaged in in calmness and in the silence 
 o f the evil passions, which are ever ready to rebel 
 against order, tends naturally to awaken a love of the 
 good, which is a real power, as it inclines the heart 
 
The Problem of Evil 279 
 
 « 
 
 in the direction of conscience. The good has, in fact, 
 an altogether peculiar beauty, which, as soon as we 
 have learned to perceive it, transcends all others. 
 This we can illustrate by a comparison. On leaving 
 a church or a lecture-roem, raise your eyes, if the 
 night is serene, and contemplate for a moment the 
 firmament. You will perceive at once that the sky, 
 with its brilliant setting of stars, has a beauty that is 
 calm and profound, and of an entirely different nature 
 from the beauty of the fairest edifice lighted by the 
 flames of tapers and chandeliers. Now, the contempla-, 
 tion of the moral law produces a sentiment analogous 
 to that inspired by the firmament. It awakens the 
 sentiment of a beauty far above all those which are 
 met with in the spheres of passion and interest. 
 This accounts for why these words of Kant have been 
 so often cited and admired : “ There are two objects 
 which fill the soul with an admiration and reverence 
 which are ever fresh, and which increase in propor¬ 
 tion as the mind more frequently returns to and 
 meditates upon them : the starry heavens above us, 
 and the moral law within usd 
 
 The contemplation of the good awakens, therefore, 
 an admiration which attracts us toward it. If we 
 more frequently meditated on the wonders of the law, 
 we would be less feeble against evil. This resource 
 is real, but it is of an abstract character. We have a 
 means more usual and more efficacious for inclining 
 
280 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 our heart on the side of conscience. This means 
 of heipfai consists in the employment of personal affec- 
 affeetions. ^ ons> Nothing more fortifies the heart in 
 
 struggling against temptations than the influence of 
 personal affections which coincide with the love of the 
 good ; and this influence is very often felt. Suppose, 
 for example, a young man, raised by respectable 
 parents, (let us observe, in passing, that in obedience 
 to a profound instinct of nature many parents who, 
 in fact, are far from respectable, strive nevertheless to 
 . show themselves so in the eyes of their children ;) 
 suppose this young man remote from the parental 
 fireside and in prey to a terrible temptation. His 
 conscience is at stake, perhaps also his honor; and 
 he is on the point of falling. At this moment, the 
 thought of his home comes into his mind. He has the 
 power to turn aside from this salutary image, and yield 
 himself to the imaginations of a heart fascinated by evil. 
 But if he profits by the beneficent light which has 
 appeared to his vision—if he clings persistently to 
 the thought of his father, and of that mother whose 
 heart he is about to break—is it not clear that he shall 
 thus ffy an act of the will give himself a powerful im¬ 
 pulse toward the good ? Personal affections are hence 
 a great help in the combat of life. And for this 
 reason it is very important, so far as it depends on 
 our choice, to select with care those who are to have 
 a part in our affections, so that these affections may 
 
2? I 
 
 The Problem of Evil 
 
 be a help and not an obstacle in the work of the moral 
 culture of the heart. And for this reason also it is 
 important to preserve and cultivate, more even than 
 we cultivate the flowers over their graves, the memo- 
 ries of those who. after having* walked before us in 
 
 7 o 
 
 the good way, have departed from this life; so that 
 their association with our thoughts mav be for us a 
 salutary power, and that, though dead to this world, 
 they may yet speak to us, and come to our help in 
 the moral crises of life. And, finally, this is why the 
 moral life cannot attain the plenitude of its develop¬ 
 ment until after the heart has opened itself to the 
 sentiment of divine love, and thus fixed its affections 
 on the sole Being who is alwavs and in everv thin^ 
 identical with the good. The love of creatures, even 
 the best, is always liable, in one respect or another, 
 to find itself in conflict with the law. The sole love 
 which is in an unfailing harmony with the conscience, 
 is the love of. and for, that One who is the principal 
 of the conscience and the author of the law. 
 
 Ideas, sentiments: such are the aliments of the 
 soul. This spiritual food is offered to us }> not only in 
 the relations which we sustain to our contemporaries, 
 but also in the traditions which associate us with the 
 past of humanity. These traditions are all-prevalent. 
 They are found under the tent of the Arab, T .. . 
 and in the cabins of Alpine shepherds, under andreadiDg * 
 the lorm ot verbal and chanted recitals ; in cultured 
 
 * 
 
282 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 • 
 
 society they chiefly assume the form of reading. 
 Reading levels for us the barriers of space and time, 
 and places at our disposal the collective intellectual 
 treasures of the race. How great the variety of re¬ 
 sources which it offers us for nourishing the soul with 
 noble ideas and fortifying sentiments ! Study the 
 pages of history, and go below the mere surface of 
 dates and facts ; penetrate to the great laws which are 
 revealed in the march of human affairs, and you will 
 see that, on the whole, justice is vindicated. Open 
 books of biography, true biography, books which pre¬ 
 sent men as they really were, without disguising them 
 in false drapery, and you will see the heroes of the 
 good often a butt for persecution and outrage, for the 
 simple reason that the world is in disorder ; but you 
 will see them prefer their conscience to all the treas¬ 
 ures and pleasures of earth. You will also see great 
 egotists who have immolated every thing to the gratifi¬ 
 cations of their passions, and who, though possessing 
 wealth and power, and perhaps though seated on the 
 most illustrious thrones of the world, have yet died 
 in disgust with life, and in contempt of themselves. 
 
 We can thus derive from reading, (not to mention 
 the books which preserve for us the prescriptions of 
 wisdom, and the maxims of experience,) thoughts and 
 But reading- sentiments which will greatly help us. We 
 well se- must not forget, however, that nourishment 
 is transformed into strength, only under the 
 
28 3 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 double condition of being good in quality and suit¬ 
 able in quantity. If you read books which fall in 
 with your passions, and which will redouble their vio¬ 
 lence ; if you read “ those writings which are, so to 
 speak, the sewers of the human mind, and which, 
 despite their flowers, contain only a frightful cor¬ 
 ruption/’^ you cannot escape damage. As to the 
 quantity of intellectual nutriment, these sage cautions 
 were given by Alexander Vinet: “Our century is 
 sick from reading too much, and from reading poorly. 
 Reading, which has been called an occupied indolence , 
 and which might be called an indolent activity , is the 
 chief occupation of a large number of persons, whose 
 mind, incessantly, but feebly, solicited to a thousand 
 different points, droops like a plant to the surface of 
 the earth, and finally loses all vigor, spontaneity^and 
 independence. Unless there is a reaction of the will 
 of the reader upon the thoughts of the author, read¬ 
 ing is often an evil rather than a good. It And well di¬ 
 profits not to swallow unless we digest. Woe gested ' 
 to him who forgets this ! woe to him who is guilty of 
 this voracity, or of indulging this imprudent appe- 
 
 m 
 
 tite, which has caused our age to be compared to a 
 boa-constrictor gorged with stained paper, and whose 
 digestion has the look of an agony. Read, but think 
 also ; and do not read at all if you are unwilling to 
 think while reading, and after having read.” It is 
 
 * From Lacordaire. 
 
284 
 
 The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 not only the culture of the intellect that is here in 
 peril, but also the force of the will; for by as much 
 as healthy and well-directed thought is a power for 
 the good, by so much are also indecision, hesitation, 
 and debility of thought, causes of moral weakness. 
 
 True ideas and pure sentiments are, thus, abun¬ 
 dantly at our disposal for alimenting the soul: but we 
 often have the misfortune of fortifying evil passions 
 by erroneous ideas and guilty sentiments. Instead 
 of healthy nutriment we take poison ; or, at least, we 
 follow a very unfortunate moral regimen. This bad 
 regimen debilitates us, and we then complain of a lack 
 of force. But whose is the fault ? 
 
 These considerations are important, but they do not 
 go to the bottom of our subject. On the supposition 
 of ^will directed toward the good, we see well enough 
 how it may be strengthened ; but it is this will itself, 
 it is this power facing toward the good, which we 
 lack; our will is debilitated, It seems, therefore, 
 that in appealing to our will in order to strengthen 
 our will, we are revolving in a circle. But this circle 
 is not absolutely vicious, for every one has some de¬ 
 gree of will-force, and of sensibility for the good, so 
 that to know the means of augmenting the force 
 which we already have, by giving it a suitable direc- 
 is there any t i on ; s no little help. However, there re¬ 
 means of mains yet this important phase of the ques- 
 
 strengthen- ^ 
 
 ing the will? tion : Is there any direct means of augment- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 285 
 
 ing the power of the will ? Does there exist in the 
 life of the soul any primitive* phenomenon which is 
 analogous to respiration in the life of the body ? This 
 question brings us into the presence of the problem 
 of prayer ; a problem which is far-reaching as well as 
 of serious import. The reflections which I am about 
 to present have a general bearing ; I confine myself, 
 however, more directly to that which bears on the 
 subject in hand, the inquiry after strength of will. 
 May we demand of God the strength of which we 
 feel we have need ? Are we reduced, in the conflict 
 of life, to our own resources, and to the support of 
 our fellows, or may we call to our help the Almighty ? 
 
 II. Prayer. 
 
 Prayer is a universal fact. But in prayer, Prayer uni _ 
 as in every thing else, we see traces of the versaL 
 essential disorder of humanity. A brigand of Cala¬ 
 bria, it is said, will pray the Madonna to assist him in 
 making a lucky stroke ; the Chief of a State, when 
 on the point of undertaking a manifestly unjust war, 
 will institute public prayers to beseech God to help 
 in the iniquity: these are instances of the absolute 
 perversion of prayer, so that it becomes Perverted, 
 prayer for evil. There are persons who, like that 
 frank Greek, Ischomachus, of whom Xenophon has 
 given us a sketch, ask the Divine power for triumph 
 over their enemies, for good repute, for good health, 
 
286 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 and for all the pleasures of earth. Nevertheless we 
 find also every-where and always, in some degree, 
 true spiritual prayer, prayer which asks strength for 
 the good, of Him who is at once the source of all good 
 its true pur- aR d °f a ^ strength. This prayer you will 
 port ‘ find in its essential traits in one of the cele¬ 
 brated choruses of Sophocles ; it commences thus : 
 “ May it be given to me to observe strict purity in all 
 my actions and words ! ” * And our own prayer I 
 mean that prayer which we Christians have all been 
 taught in our infancy, what is its purport ? What 
 were we taught to pray for ? “ Our daily bread,” in 
 order to remind us who it is that causes the grain to 
 grow in the fields. And what else ? That.the name 
 of God be hallowed, that is to say, that all men be 
 penetrated more and more with the fundamental truth 
 that the will of God is identical with the good. What 
 else do we pray for ? That his will be done, that 
 the good be accomplished, and that we be delivered 
 from evil by pardon and assistance. Such is spiritual 
 prayer in its majestic simplicity ; it is prayer for good, 
 and it is of this that we are to speak. 
 
 I ought here to dissipate a fear which some of you 
 may entertain. Do not fear lest I should be about to 
 undertake to penetrate the most secret mysteries of 
 soul-life, and introduce into the delicate functions of 
 the soul the cold and relatively rude instrument of 
 
 * CEdipus Rex. 
 
The Problem of Evil 2 87 
 
 reasoning. But doubts are raised as to the value of 
 prayer; I wish to examine these objections, in the 
 hope of destroying them ; that is all. I do not pro¬ 
 pose to demonstrate prayer, but simply, if possible, 
 to give you satisfactory reasons for praying in peace 
 according to the dictates of your heart. 
 
 You will hear it said that prayer is a characteristic 
 of the infancy of humanity, and that it is vanishing, 
 little by little, before the light of philosophy, and the 
 results of modern culture. The question is one of 
 fact ; but I do not see that the fact alleged is a fact. 
 The instinct of prayer seems to me to be as The instinct 
 
 of OrBiV6r qs 
 
 intense in our day as in the past. Art is so intense now 
 well aware of this that it continually appeals aso1 ul<L 
 to this instinct. In order to eliminate from the pro¬ 
 ductions of art the idea and sentiment of prayer, it 
 would be necessary to destroy the most beautiful 
 pages, I will not say of Racine, but of Victor Hugo, 
 of Lamartine, of Musset; it would be necessary to 
 efface the finest canvasses in our galleries of paint¬ 
 ing ; it would be necessary to impose silence on the 
 sublimest expressions of music ; for it is only on 
 attaining the accents of prayer, that music rises to 
 the loftiest heights of art. Observe that I do not 
 refer here to the personal sentiments of the artists, 
 but to a general sentiment to which they would 
 assuredly not address themselves if this sentiment 
 had disappeared. 
 
288 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 But is science in contradiction with prayer ? If it 
 were so, Kepler, it seems to me, would have surmised 
 it, Newton would have suspected it, and Faraday 
 would not have died, leaving to the learned world the 
 example of a piety equal to his genius. 
 
 It does not appear, therefore, on consulting facts, 
 that prayer is disappearing before modern culture, as 
 some affirm.* But the chief objection to prayer is 
 urged in the name of philosophy. It is said that in 
 the eyes of philosophy prayer is irrational. This 
 statement is of serious import; for though we are 
 often obliged to do things contrary to the reasonings 
 of men, we ought never to do any thing contrary to 
 reason in its primitive and true form, such as God 
 Not incom- pi acec j fa { n U s. But is there, in fact, an 
 philosophy, incompatibility between philosophy and 
 prayer ? In the course of my studies I have made 
 acquaintance with a large number of philosophers, 
 both of the present time and of ages past. I find 
 quite a number of them, and among these the great¬ 
 est of all, who were pious men, and who prayed as 
 humbly as little children—for there are not two man¬ 
 ners of praying. This very day, while turning over a 
 new book, I fell upon an account of the death of a 
 
 * My own conclusion is affirmed in a recent work of M. Juventin, 
 entitled, Etats des croyances. The author says: “All sources of 
 information agree in indicating that, under different tendencies, the 
 number of men of prayer is sensibly increasing.” The cool philo¬ 
 sophical method of this author gives great weight to his words. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 289 
 
 celebrated philosopher and bold innovator, Peter Ram¬ 
 us, who fell a victim of the massacre of p e t e r iiam- 
 St. Bartholomew, When he found himself us ' 
 fronted by the assassins who had just broken in the 
 door of his work-chamber, he begged for a single 
 moment of delay, and pronounced aloud these words 
 of prayer, which have been preserved : “ O my God, 
 I have sinned against thee ; I have done evil in thy 
 sight. Thy judgments are justice and truth. Have 
 pity on me, and pardon these erring men ; they know 
 not what they do.” 
 
 Descartes, a free and mighty spirit if there ever was 
 one, when undergoing the fatal attacks of Descartes, 
 his last sickness fell into a sort of delirium, which 
 did not, however, disturb the regular connection of 
 his thoughts. Those who he^rd his last utterances 
 were astonished to hear the geometrician and meta¬ 
 physician discoursing, not of the sciences which had 
 so much occupied him, but of the greatness of God, 
 and of the misery of man. 
 
 I have no desire to multiply these examples, and 
 will give but a single one more. There is a philoso¬ 
 pher, to the life and works of whom I have devoted 
 long study : Maine de Biran. Maine de Bi- Mainede 
 ran arose, as an administrator and states- Blran ' 
 man, to high political functions ; but he was always 
 attracted by an irresistible instinct to the observation 
 
 of bis own mind and to the study of the great 
 
 19 
 
290 
 
 The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 problems of human destiny. His great merit m the 
 
 field of science is this : He observed and recognized, 
 
 better than any had done before him, the important 
 
 role of the will in alF the manifestations of human 
 
 life. He discerned the influence of the will, not only 
 
 over our acts, but also over our ideas, over our senti- 
 » 
 
 ments, and even over our bodily sensations. But 
 at the same time that he determined more and 
 more, by a profound analysis, the power of the will, 
 and what it ought to be in the life of man, he also 
 learned, by a prolonged and often painful experience, 
 the feebleness of the will, and frankly admitted it. 
 By a slow, continued, and long-protracted movement 
 of a mind which, in the midst of uncertainties and 
 waverings, had always been fundamentally directed 
 in one course, he finally turned himself to God, and 
 died a praying man. 
 
 There is, therefore, no incompatibility between phi¬ 
 losophy and prayer—no more in our own age than in 
 the century of Descartes or in the days of Ramus. 
 
 Now, however,,.when a skeptical doctrine as to 
 prayer has once taken hold upon a mind, does this 
 doctrine succeed in destroying, in the soul of him who 
 The instinct professes it, the natural instinct of prayer ? 
 
 ot“ prayer 1 
 
 ineradicable No • this also is a question of fact. Never 
 
 by skepti¬ 
 cism. did the philosophy which denies all personal 
 
 Je» 
 
 relations between man and God develop itself with 
 more fullness and brilliancy than at the close of the 
 
291 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 last century. But what was the result ? It is said 
 that sailors who profess to be impious enough, cast 
 themselves oil their knees as quick as other men 
 when storms threaten them with death. But there 
 are other storms in the world than those of the ocean. 
 At this same epoch, also, great men who had been 
 nurtured on atheism, and who had long professed it 
 openly, discovered anew in their heart, in the midst 
 of the sufferings and convulsions of revolution, the 
 
 c 
 
 instinct, the need, and the words of prayer. 
 
 And here is an analogous fact, which occurred un¬ 
 der less sad circumstances. An estimable writer of 
 the same epoch had been imbued with the philosophy 
 of his time and had learned to deny the power of 
 prayer. He had just terminated a work in favor of 
 a cause which he had greatly at heart; he had done 
 all that was in his power to do, and he wrote to one 
 of his correspondents these lines : “ It is for God to 
 do the rest; I have prayed him for it with fervor and 
 with tears; a thing which is very unusual for me, 
 and perhaps inconsistent, but my heart was full and 
 it was for me a necessity to pray.” 
 
 The instinct of prayer, therefore, subsists in spite 
 of the theories which deny it. It is not even necessary 
 in order to be able to pray, to have a positive faith in 
 God. W ho are those who can pray ? Every body, 
 save those atheists who are certain that God does not 
 exist. But are there any atheists ? Are there, I do 
 
292 The Problem of Evil 
 
 not say, theories of atheism, of which there are un¬ 
 fortunately many, but are there men who are perfectly 
 satisfied that God does not exist ? We may well 
 doubt this ; many fires seem extinct, where live coals 
 still smolder under the ashes. Aside from a sup¬ 
 posed real atheism, all can attempt to pray, and I see 
 nothing to object to in the reasoning of the poet who, 
 after having exclaimed, “ Believe me, prayer is a cry 
 of hope ! Let us address God that he may answer us! ” 
 seems to hesitate and question whether God exists, 
 and then continues : “ But if heaven is empty, we 
 shall offend no one ; and if some one hears us, may 
 he have pity upon us ! ” * 
 
 Philosophy in general is not incompatible with 
 prayer; those systems which deny the intercommun¬ 
 ion of God and man do not destroy the instinct of 
 prayer, even among their followers ; and no doctrine, 
 unless it be atheism properly so called, legitimately 
 interdicts him who feels the need of being Strength- 
 Logical ma- ened from seeking help fc of God. There ex- 
 
 teriahsm 
 
 must deny ists, however, in the science of the day, a 
 
 the proprie- 
 
 tyof prayer, considerable current which bears souls away 
 from God, a current which has been increased by the 
 
 * Croyez-moi, la priere est un cri d’esperance ! 
 
 Pour que Dieu nous reponde adressons-nous tl lui ! 
 
 Si le ciel est desert, nous n’offensons personne ; 
 
 Si quelqu’un nous entend, qu’il nous prenne en pitie ! 
 
 Alfred de Musset. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 293 
 
 writings of men who were personally pious, and whose 
 systems of thought did not harmonize with their lives. 
 There is a very extensive phase of philosophy which 
 teaches that prayer is not reasonable, or, in other 
 words, that it is forbidden to the creature who makes 
 use of his reason, to seek the assistance of God. But 
 what is this philosophy ? It is that which we have 
 already encountered and characterized ; that which 
 denies every element of liberty, and sees in the uni¬ 
 verse only a totality of phenomena governed by the 
 laws of absolute necessity. If, in fact, every thing is 
 determined necessarily—if there is no principle of 
 liberty in the world—there is, then, nothing to pray 
 for. The inference is just; but when I add, There is 
 nothing to be done, the inference is equally just. 
 The doctrine which denies the efficaciousness of 
 prayer, denies equally also the efficaciousness of the 
 efforts of man in labor. This is the sole argument 
 which I propose to develop. It is objected to the idea 
 of prayer that every thing is fatally determined ; I 
 shall try to show that, if the objection is valid, it is 
 also valid against labor. 
 
 Do you believe in the reality of human But it m 
 power in labor? What is the character of a Jf 0 d !“ y the 
 
 r emcacious- 
 
 the action of man on nature? We fertilize nessof Jabor - 
 the soil, shut in rivers by dikes, improve the species 
 of vegetables and animals ; or, acting in another di¬ 
 rection, we exhaust the soil by imprudent culture, 
 
2 Q 4 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 we strip the mountains of trees, so that the unre¬ 
 strained water inundate our valleys, and we deterio¬ 
 rate the animal and vegetable species. But our action 
 on nature is quite limited : most certainly we could 
 not cause our planet to deviate from its orbit; an 
 earthquake annihilates the work of entire generations ; 
 still, our power over nature, though limited, is real. 
 What are its precise limits ? No one can tell. It is 
 not likely, however, that, realizing the dream of a 
 modern Utopian, humanity will ever succeed-in chang¬ 
 ing the ocean into a basin of lemonade ; but while 
 good sense laughs at the dreams of fools, genius has 
 often surpassed, and will often yet surpass, the dreams 
 of lunatics. We exert, in fact, an undeniable influ¬ 
 ence on nature ; do we not also on society ? Do we 
 not act on our fellows by words and by looks ? 
 Could we arrest an engineer who purposes raising a 
 
 dam, or a gardener who is trying to amelio¬ 
 rate his products, or a mother who is trying 
 
 Common 
 sense never 
 accepts fa¬ 
 
 talism. to incline the heart of her child to be good, 
 or the politician who is attempting to bring about a 
 reform in society, by saying to them: What are you 
 about ? do you not know that every thing is absolutely 
 and fatally determined ? No ; in the matter of appre¬ 
 ciating human power, our age leans rather to the side 
 of presumption than to that of discouragement. But 
 what is the object of all those who labor, whether in 
 the domain of matter or of mind ? They are in the 
 
The Problem of Evil, 
 
 295 
 
 presence of an order of things which they are attempt¬ 
 ing to modify; they do not think, therefore, that 
 every thing in the universe is fatally determined. 
 
 You see the drift of my argument; and you think, 
 perhaps, that I am venturing upon a sophistical un¬ 
 dertaking. You admit that man can exert an influ¬ 
 ence on nature and on society; but you suppose that 
 the action of God is fixed and immutable, and that, con¬ 
 sequently, an argument based on the efficaciousness of 
 human action could not lead to the admission of the 
 efficaciousness of prayer, since prayer presumes to 
 modify the action of God. The objection is based on 
 the assumption of an absolute distinction and Divinpaction 
 
 co-operates 
 
 separation between the action of man and the Avith that of 
 
 man, not 
 
 action of God. But this assumption is erro- oniympray 
 
 er, but also 
 
 neous, as I think I can readily make clear. elsewhere. 
 
 What is it that man does when he acts on nature ? 
 This action consists, as Lord Bacon remarks, in 
 separating or in uniting portions of matter. But in 
 what more than this ? Nothing. In all his works, 
 from the fabrication of the most diminutive watch to 
 the construction of the grandest cathedral, man never 
 does any thing more than to bring together, or sepa¬ 
 rate, portions of matter ; whatever else is done takes 
 place independently of him, and almost always by 
 means which he does not understand. For example, 
 you elevate water in the tube of a pump, and you say 
 
 that your effort has raised the water. ’ This is true, 
 ✓ 7 
 
296 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 but under what condition ? Under condition of all 
 the natural laws of water; under condition of the 
 attraction of the earth and the weight of the atmos¬ 
 phere. When you elevate water in a pump, heaven 
 and earth co-operate with you ; all the powers of 
 nature consent to undergo, on a given point, and con¬ 
 trary to the natural'course of things, the influence of 
 your will. And even should you raise the water 
 simply with your hand, the fact would remain the 
 same ; for, in obedience to a decision of your will, all 
 the forces of nature have been active, in the interior 
 of your body, in transmitting this decision to your 
 hand, and from vour hand to the water which it has 
 raised. That philosophy which establishes an abso¬ 
 lute distinction between the work of man and the 
 
 work of God, is, therefore, a philosophy without depth. 
 
 % 
 
 It supposes, contrary to fact, that man can accom¬ 
 plish work without the concurrence of the forces of na¬ 
 ture, which are but an expression of the will of the Crea¬ 
 tor. The natural course of things which, in fact, is the 
 direct working of God, is, therefore, incessantly modi¬ 
 fied by the labor of man. But shall we say, now, that 
 by our work the designs of God are changed ? No; 
 for God, in creating us free, made us partakers of his 
 power, and designs us to be laborer together zvitfz 
 Him ; to laboris not, therefore, to change his designs, 
 but to accomplish them. Man is conscious within him- 
 self of the power of acting; he acts; he sees and 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 29 7 
 
 knows the results of his acts, and takes little account 
 of those theorists who affirm that every thing The results 
 
 J of labor are 
 
 is determined by necessity. manifest. 
 
 The question which here presents itself, now, is : 
 Is prayer a power? Have we the privilege of deriv¬ 
 ing strength from the source of strength, of seeking 
 it of God ? We have the instinct of prayer as well as 
 that of action, and God who made us actors made us 
 equally pray-ers. But there are so many men who do 
 not pray! you say. And I answer: There are so 
 many men who do not work ; or, what amounts to 
 the same thing, who work only under the iron rod of 
 necessity! As the fact that there are idlers is no 
 proof that man is not constituted for labor, so the fact 
 that there are some lips always closed before God, is 
 no proof that man is not constituted for prayer. 
 
 We have the instinct of prayer, but can we verify 
 
 its results ? Without doubt. Here is a man in prey 
 
 « 
 
 to some severe temptation. Feeling himself The insults 
 on the point of falling, he cries to God and areEwise 
 is sustained. -You say, perhaps, that he is a mr ‘ m * est ‘ 
 man of strong will, and that the result would have 
 been the same even had he not prayed. But are you 
 quite sure of this? Take another case: an epidemic 
 has broken out in a city. The physicians and civil 
 officers perform their duties, the special duties of their 
 profession. But here are men and women who, 
 without being obligated by any special office, without 
 
298 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 seeking renown, without having at heart the interests 
 of science, without hoping for crosses of honor, or 
 other reward, consecrate themselves with unfaltering 
 devotion to the alleviation of the public distress ; and 
 they are praying persons. Perhaps you will say: 
 They are generous natures, and, even had they not 
 prayed, their conduct would have been the same. 
 But are you quite sure of this ? These persons affirm 
 that they found strength in prayer; the fact transpired 
 within their souls. What right have you to deny it ? 
 
 To labor is not to change the plans of God : it is to 
 accomplish them, since God made us for labor. Prayer 
 does not presume to change the plans of God : it 
 
 simply accomplishes them, since God constituted us 
 
 % 
 
 with the need and instinct of prayer. 
 
 Prayer and labor are liable to the same objections ; 
 but these objections are based on the assumption that 
 The objec- there is liberty neither in man nor in God, 
 
 tionsto pray- J 
 
 er vanish as that the universe is a fixed and fatal mechan- 
 
 suon as we 
 
 admit the ism. From this point of view, which is that 
 
 liberty of t . 
 
 God. ‘ of open or disguised atheism, there is, in fact, 
 nothing to be prayed for; but, likewise, there is noth¬ 
 ing to be done. The doctrine of universal fatalism 
 is so contrary to our immediate sense of reality, and 
 to the common consciousness of the human race, that 
 we have a good right to ask of it proofs of its truth. 
 Now, these proofs have never been given, nor are 
 they ever likely to be. 
 
2Q9 
 
 The Problem of Evil. * 
 
 Labor and prayer have many points of resemblance ; 
 they coincide in presuming on the co-operation of 
 God with man. The contrast has been made in more 
 than one modern writer, that prayer was the practice 
 of ancient times, while labor is the virtue of the 
 modern world. I am not sure, however, that the 
 ancients prayed much more than we ; and I am of 
 opinion that we do not labor much more than they. 
 As to instituting a contrast between prayer and labor, 
 there is no just foundation for it, though it is often 
 suggested to the mind by the abuses of a morbid 
 piety. The prayer that would presume to Labor and 
 take the place of labor would be a mockery, prayerform 
 
 1 J ’ no proper 
 
 and almost a crime. You know very well antagonism- 
 the fable of La Fontaine : The Rat which has Retired 
 from the World. The big fat^rat, superabundantly 
 supplied with Dutch cheese, is applied to for help by 
 a delegation of his compatriots of Ratopolis, who were 
 blockaded by the cat-nation. “ They had been com¬ 
 pelled to start on their mission without money be¬ 
 cause of the needy condition of the assaulted city. 
 They asked very little, confident that succor would 
 soon be at hand. ‘ My friends,’ said the hermit, ‘ the 
 things of this world concern me no longer; wherewith 
 can a poor recluse be of help to you ? What can he 
 do but pray that heaven may come to your aid ? I 
 hope, in fact, that heaven may preserve you.’ Flaving 
 spoken thus, the new saint turned and shut his door.” 
 
300 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 This is a saint of the bad type. The invalid who 
 has neither gold, nor silver, nor strength, nor even 
 speech, may yet give his prayers, and woe to him who 
 would disdain the gift! But for him who is able to 
 act, to say to his fellows : “ Brothers, I prefer not to 
 trouble my repose in order to do you a service, but I 
 will pray that God may come to your help,” is mani¬ 
 festly to mock, at once, both man and God. Prayer, 
 true prayer, ought to be the source, the main-springy 
 of our action for the good. To those who say, Act, 
 instead of praying! we should always be able to an¬ 
 swer, I pray in order to have strength for acting. 
 
 These two harmonizing activities, labor and prayer, 
 have the same condition, and the same limitation. The 
 The condi- condition of both is perseverance. On this 
 
 tion of labor . ~ . 
 
 aud of point we often commit an error which occa- 
 Pia -' er ‘ sions many discouragements. We reason, 
 and we act, as if every prayer were to be immediately 
 and fully answered ; as if every thing should be Ac¬ 
 complished on our simply once asking it of God. 
 This is the error of an impatient child that should 
 want a work to be finished as soon as it is com¬ 
 menced. If prayer is a natural function of spiritual 
 life, it is from that very fact a perpetual function. If 
 prayer is the respiration of the soul, it ought to be 
 incessantly renewed. Without presuming to limit 
 the power of divine grace, we yet have no right, for 
 example, to expect, in the ordinary course of Provi- 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 301 
 
 dence, that a single prayer addressed to the Master 
 of life should emancipate the will from the fetters of 
 evil habits which have been strengthening themselves 
 for a period of ten, twenty, or, perhaps, thirty years. 
 Perseverance, therefore, is the common condition of 
 both labor and prayer. As to the limits of these two 
 powers, they are involved in the inscrutable designs 
 of Providence. How many prayers receive no ap- 
 parent and immediate answer ! How many The effects 
 
 ^ J of both la- 
 
 of our efforts seem to fail of their end ! Sov- tor and 
 
 prayer lim- 
 
 ereign wisdom reserves the privilege of fix- itfid by the 
 
 . . ^ . , . . , , r wisdom ol 
 
 mg definitively Doth the success 01 our ood. 
 efforts and the results of our prayers. 
 
 We have, therefore, found the direct source of 
 strength, of that strength which, when once obtained, 
 we are to nurture and increase by a good spiritual 
 regimen. But is that all? One of you has written 
 to me, and asked, what others of you have, doubtless, 
 also thought: Are we not going to speak directly of 
 that help which is to be found in Christian faith, in 
 faith properly so called ? Is there not a The qlles ' 
 
 r r J tion of faith 
 
 power in believing in God as revealed in ^ Christ. 
 Jesus Christ ? This question is grave ; shall we enter 
 upon it ? We shall enter upon it, and that, too, with¬ 
 out in the least transgressing the philosophical limits 
 which we have laid down for our inquiries. 
 
302 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 IIL The Question of Faith. 
 
 By the nature of this discussion, as defined from 
 the start, it was to be a philosophical examination of 
 the problem of evil. That is, we were to enter upon 
 it without any other condition than that of serious 
 and earnest minds in search of the truth. We are 
 not presumed, while here, to have any common bond 
 of faith, or to have consented to any one form of 
 dogmas. Under all the diversities, shades, and transi¬ 
 tions which real life offers, and which over-step our 
 abstract divisions, society forms, on the whole, two 
 distinct classes. The ones make profession of the 
 Christian faith ; that is to say, they accept the super¬ 
 natural testimony of Christ, and, if they are consist¬ 
 ent, submit to his authority wherever it may conduct 
 them. The others have not accepted this authority, 
 and can be addressed only in their quality of men, with 
 reason,“heart, and conscience. Thus far I have ad¬ 
 dressed all without discrimination. But now I must 
 distinguish. 
 
 . . ni . As to us' who are Christians, at least in' 
 tmns. profession, what is our position on the ques¬ 
 tion which we are investigating ? We affirm that it 
 is only by faith in the Crucified One of Golgotha, and 
 by participation in the grace which flows from this 
 source of mercy, that the soul can find, through 
 prayer, the strength necessary for working that 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 303 
 
 change, that conversion, which extricates it from the 
 pursuits of egotism, and causes it to enter into the 
 paths of charity. Those of you who are believers, 
 to whatever degree it may be, your faith is your treas¬ 
 ure. But this treasure is not like that of the miser ; 
 he who possesses it ought to spread it, for it grows 
 intense within us in proportion as it is propagated to 
 others by us. You have, therefore, to bear testimony 
 of your faith. You are to call the attention of men 
 to the source of the strength that is in you, by the 
 instrumentality of your works and your sentiments, 
 that is to say, by being virtuous and joyous ; for all 
 true faith is a fountain of goodness and joy. You 
 are, then, to add words to example, and propagate 
 your convictions by argument. Take care, however, 
 not to wound legitimate sentiments. Do not, by your 
 imprudence, increase the difficulties which the truth 
 otherwise meets with in conquering hearts. In ad¬ 
 dressing those who profess the same faith as your¬ 
 selves, remind them frankly of the rule of authority 
 to which you, as well as they, submit. But when you 
 are to give a reason for your faith to those who are 
 simply your fellows, without being believers, do not 
 forget that they are your fellows, that is to say, that 
 they, like you, have a will that belongs to God, but 
 which, in the presence of men, is master of itself. 
 Respect in all things the liberty of others ; and, to 
 say it all in one word, if you wish to serve efficiently 
 
304 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 the cause of Christian faith, propose it, but do not 
 impose it. 
 
 For those, however, who make no profession of 
 
 As to non- being Christians, and who are here simply 
 Christians. to investigate a philosophical question, the 
 
 testimony of believers is a fact which is evident be¬ 
 fore you, and of which you are called to estimate the 
 value. You could not neglect this without violating 
 the conditions of honest investigation. Philosophy, 
 in fact, is a pursuit which is entirely free, that is to 
 say, which is limited by no dogmatic assumption ; it 
 is an inquiry, whose object is universal; strictly 
 speaking, it differs from the special sciences simply 
 by the universality of its object. Liberty and univer¬ 
 sality : these are the two characteristics of philosophy. 
 In your search after a solution of the problems of 
 humanity, you encounter the testimony of Christians, 
 occupying a large place in history. What is to be 
 thought of the fact upon which their faith is based ? 
 This question cannot be evaded ; are you forbidden 
 to examine it ? If so, your inquiries are not free. 
 But is this question foreign to you ? No ; for by their 
 very nature, your inquiries are universal. In either 
 case, you would violate the conditions of philosophy. 
 It is necessary, therefore, in an honest and truly free 
 investigation, to propose directly the question of 
 faith ; that is to say, the question of the nature of 
 the testimony of Jesus Christ. To avoid proposing 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 305 
 
 it on the pretense that it is already solved in the neg¬ 
 ative, would be to act under the influence of a preju¬ 
 dice ; and this prejudice would constitute a dogmatic 
 pre-supposition, which, tor being contrary to that of 
 believers, would none the less be contrary to philo¬ 
 sophical procedure. 
 
 The question, when once proposed, is capable of 
 two solutions. Is the testimony of Christ a T 1 f twopos ' 
 divine testimony establishing a legitimate swers - 
 authority ? If, after examination, you answer nega¬ 
 tively, then you will seek some other basis than that 
 of faith upon which to construct your theory of life. 
 But if, after examination, you answer affirmatively, 
 then, by that very fact, you enter into the very sphere 
 of faith. * If you have said “No,” then either Thene?a . 
 your search will continue without coming to tlve * 
 any result, or you will come to be a Positivist, a 
 Hegelian, a Deist, a Pantheist, or you will construct 
 a theory of your own. You will have a philosophy 
 of some kind ; this philosophy may be even Christian 
 in a certain degree, in that you may accept a portion 
 of the Christian system ; but the doctrines which 
 you may thus accept will remain for you simply doc¬ 
 trines, resting on no basis of«faith. It is thus that 
 the majority of contemporary French philosophers 
 of the so-called Spiritualistic school, have introduced 
 into their system many elements, whose historical 
 
 source, is manifestly Christian. And it is thus that 
 
 20 
 
30 6 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 I have proposed to you a philosophical solution of the 
 problem of evil, taken from the sphere of theology, 
 but which we have separated therefrom, and which 
 may be accepted, if it is thought to answer well its 
 purpose, without accepting, as a whole, the Christian 
 system. However this may be, if you have given a 
 negative answer to the question of faith, you will still 
 remain in the common domain of philosophy, properly 
 so-called. 
 
 But if you have answered affirmatively, if 
 you have accepted the testimony of Christ 
 
 The affirma¬ 
 tive. 
 
 as divine, the faith which therefore ensues will be the 
 starting-point of a new process of thought, for, as St. 
 Anselm has said, faith seeks to justify itself. Taking 
 the Christian doctrines as a basis, you will proceed to 
 organize a speculative or practical theory of life. If 
 you are a theologian, you will construct a system of 
 theology. But if you are not, if you are simply 
 a member of society, desiring to be able to give a 
 reason for your faith, you will adopt what may be 
 called a Christian’s philosophy ; the word Christian 
 preventing all misunderstanding, and giving clearly 
 to understand that you stand no longer on the ground 
 of mere philosophy in general, but within the pale of 
 faith. Where once the divine testimony is accepted, 
 there the inquiry after the basis of truth ceases, 
 like a ship casting anchor on entering a harbor; and 
 the efforts of thought assume another phase. Though 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 30 7 
 
 philosophy proper ceases within the pale of faith, 
 but continues, if faith has been rejected after rational 
 examination, yet, strictly speaking, in all cases where 
 skepticism as to faith exists before such examination, 
 and hence can only be the result of prejudice, w r e 
 cannot admit that philosophy proper, which by nature 
 is impartial and absolutely free, has either ceased or 
 yet continues, for it, in fact, has never commenced. 
 
 Is it not perfectly evident that a mind truly honest 
 and free could not pass over a fact as important as 
 the power of Christianity in the world without sub¬ 
 jecting it to the most careful examination ? Manjrthink ' 
 
 J + ers of tlie 
 
 Many men, however, I mean men of science, day ignore 
 
 Christian - 
 
 have never made this examination—-have ity. 
 never thought of seriously proposing the question of 
 faith. But why is this ? The fact depends partly on 
 historical causes, into the details of which I cannot 
 here enter. I will, however, indicate one : the abuse 
 of authority, and the interference of civil And why? 
 powers in the domain of faith. At the time when 
 heresy, as detected by ecclesiastical authority, involved 
 severe temporal consequences, those men who wished 
 to enjoy independence of thought, and yet had no 
 taste for martyrdom, thought of no better stratagem 
 than to declare that, absorbed in the researches of 
 philosophy, they kept themselves entirely outside of 
 the religious sphere, and meddled themselves not in 
 the least with the verities of faith. It was under 
 
308 
 
 The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 these circumstances that sprang up the strange notion 
 that there could be two realms of truth, to the one 
 of which men might belong as philosophers, and to 
 the other as believers. It was under such a state of 
 things that the Italian Pomponazzi, while writing a 
 book against the immortality of the soul, neverthe¬ 
 less affirmed that, in his quality of Catholic, he fully 
 accepted the doctrine of a future life, as viewed from 
 the standpoint of faith. The abuse of authority 
 produced, as a natural consequence, an unwillingness 
 to examine the grounds of faith. And one of the 
 causes which still yet hinder the propagation of the 
 Christian religion is the fact, that many men are de¬ 
 terred from examining such questions by a vague and 
 unnatural trepidation which is a heritage of the servi¬ 
 tude of the past. But the epoch of liberty has now 
 fully arrived. And as it is contrary to all reason to 
 admit that one truth can conflict with another, it is 
 very evident that true liberty of mind, and independ¬ 
 ence of spirit, cannot exist in that man who does not 
 break through the cloud of prejudices, and honestly 
 contemplate, along with other problems, that pre¬ 
 eminently great problem which is involved in the 
 origin and revolutionizing power of Christianity. But 
 what is here my more immediate object? Simply to 
 show you how that the question of faith, that ques¬ 
 tion which is of such manifold and deep bearing, 
 rises naturally and inevitably from the discussion in 
 
The Problem df Evil 309 
 
 which we are engaged, and demands of us a positive 
 answer, one way or the other. 
 
 The good has a history. It has had its struggles, 
 its reverses, and its triumphs. Now, in the history of 
 the good, there is one name which, as no one really 
 denies, occupies an altogether exceptional pre-emi¬ 
 nence—Jesus of Nazareth. Moral truth, it is true, 
 had been largely developed in the ancient world, by 
 the patient labors of sages in studying the voice of 
 conscience, and in observing the laws of spiritual life. 
 But at the same time that moral light was c ' lmstiamty 
 
 savedtheeiv- 
 
 ’ dawning more clearly, public morals were ilized worl(1 
 
 from moral 
 
 degenerating : the civilization-of the Roman rum. 
 world was characterized by a frightful mingling of 
 debauchery and cruelty. There seemed to be a pro¬ 
 found divorce between the conscience and the life of 
 humanity; and the more clearly the sages discovered 
 the ideal of good, the more did they feel their inability 
 to realize it in the world. 
 
 It was then that the teachings of the Galilean were 
 heard, teachings which were the starting-point of re¬ 
 generation in a world which was sinking into the 
 abysses of corruption. If there were need of it, I 
 could refer you for confirmation of this remark to a 
 recent work which will not be suspected of partiality 
 to Christianity, the History of Moral Ideas in An¬ 
 tiquity, by M. Denis. M. Denis seems to design 
 positively to deny the reality of a supernatural mani- 
 
3io 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 festation in Jesus Christ. He collects a multitude 
 
 of texts, designed to show that moral light had con- 
 
 • 
 
 stantly increased through the researches of ancient 
 philosophy. And he proves it; but he is forced to 
 admit, at the same time, that the depravity of morals 
 increased in proportion as the sages saw more dis¬ 
 tinctly and clearly the true laws of human nature ; 
 it was not an q p e acknowledges that the power, the 
 wanting, but strength, which has begun to realize the 
 strength. moral law in society, did not spring directly 
 from the labors of philosophers, but, on the contrary, 
 from the preaching of Christianity. And we see not* 
 how any one who is acquainted with the facts can 
 think otherwise than M. Denis. We say, then, that it 
 was the teaching of Christ which gave birth to that 
 progress which characterizes and constitutes modern 
 civilization ; those even who do not admit the divinity 
 of the Gospel are often forced to admit this as a 
 historical fact. To accept this fact is equivalent to 
 admitting that the world is in progress. 
 
 Permit me here, as bearing on this point, to intro¬ 
 duce a piece of personal experience. I know that it 
 is a good rule to speak as little as possible of one’s 
 self; but you know also that when men are engaged 
 in an interchange of thought, the recital of an experi¬ 
 ence made by one of them is often of great interest. 
 Here, then, is what has occurred to me in regard to 
 the idea of progress. 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 311 
 
 Every man, perhaps, whether because of circum¬ 
 stances attending his advent into the world, Personal ex¬ 
 perience of 
 
 or because of his own peculiar temperament, the author, 
 is naturally inclined to look with especial preference, 
 either in the direction of the past, or in that of. the 
 future. Personally, I have always had a predominant 
 taste for the past, whether because of the general cir¬ 
 cumstances which I have just mentioned, or perhaps 
 because, not being insensible to poetry, I found more 
 pleasure in the rural scenes and landscapes as they 
 existed in the days of our fathers, in the roads wind¬ 
 ing along between hedges and following the meander- 
 ings of our native brooks, than in the best constructed 
 of our railroads, or in the straightest lines of tele¬ 
 graphic posts ; or, finally, perhaps because, in the 
 political changes which Europe has presented since* 
 the time of my youth, I have not been able to enter¬ 
 tain a sentiment of respect for those men who are 
 ever ready to welcome every thing that is novel, 
 taking care, at the same time, to secure for themselves 
 as good a place as possible in the new order of things— 
 for those men who turn the back to every setting sun, 
 and adore ever}' rising star, and who are ready to ap¬ 
 plaud to-day, after its success, that which they blamed 
 yesterday while uncertain of the result. By reason 
 of all these causes, I was disposed to look with sus- 
 picion upon all innovation, and to believe very little 
 in progress. But in the year 1854 I was called to 
 
312 
 
 The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 lecture, in Geneva, on the subject of the influence of 
 Christianity on the destiny of society. This required 
 me to embrace under one point of view the entire 
 development of the history of the last eighteen 
 centuries. I became convinced that every innovation 
 is not progress ; that in the march of civilization 
 there are halts, returns backward, darkenings of the 
 public conscience, and debilitated states of public 
 opinion ; but that, notwithstanding this, if we fix our 
 eye on the great movements and grand outlines, we 
 discover a uniform and progressive growth, both 
 legislatively and practically, of dignity, justice, and 
 benevolence. I saw that, even as the waters of all 
 streams flow into the abysses of the oc'ean, so the 
 current of humanity, though often eddying backward, 
 • yet, on the whole, constantly rises toward the heavens. 
 From that time forth, while unwilling to welcome 
 every innovation, or to renounce my inalienable right 
 of exposing hurtful innovations, and protesting against 
 unjust triumphs, I have believed, seriously believed, 
 in progress; and this impression has never been 
 shaken. I was conquered by the truth. 
 
 But whence springs true progress ? I have already 
 explained it. The soil of humanity was prepared by 
 the labor of the conscience^ and the reflec- Trne prog , 
 tions of sages ; but ancient wisdom found ^. 33 ( i l h b “ s th 
 the light without discovering the power. It tiaility - 
 did not succeed in furnishing the human race with a 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 3 n 
 
 lasting principle of life. The germ of effectual moral 
 power was deposited in the soil by the words of 
 Christ. From that time on, the tree of good has been 
 growing. It may at times become covered with moss, 
 with fungus, and with dead branches; but the sap of 
 eternal youth circulates in its members. To those 
 who have seen, in vision, the proportions to which it 
 is destined, the tree appears as yet scarcely started 
 in its career of expansion ; and those who despise its 
 shade resemble men who should disdain the secular 
 oak which shaded their fathers, and which might 
 generously overhang generations to come, and plant 
 for themselves shriveled acorns in arid sands. 
 
 We have in us two instincts : love of the past and 
 love of the future ; and these two instincts are equally 
 true. Without indulging in illusions, without ex¬ 
 pecting from earthly progress that which the earth 
 can never realize ; without losing sight of the shocks, 
 the tempests, the catastrophes, whiqji may fall upon 
 the champions of religion, and which, perhaps, are not 
 far distant, it must be admitted that human society 
 tends, constantly and progressively, to present a less 
 imperfect reflection of the kingdom of the good. But 
 the future grows out of the past; progress is but the 
 development of the pure germs deposited in the tra¬ 
 ditions of the race. Our love of that which Conserva- 
 
 was, and our desire of the new, are harmon¬ 
 ized by our fidelity to this tradition, as main- 
 
 tism and 
 radicalism 
 reconciled. 
 
314 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 tained and purified by trial, and as the more surely 
 maintained by being more perfectly purified. The 
 division of mankind into two camps, of which the one 
 aims to preserve all that is, and the other to destroy 
 all that thus far has been—the division, which is ob¬ 
 servable no less in the quarrels of a village than in 
 the diplomacy of empires, no less in the conversation 
 of two individuals than in the greatest conflicts in the 
 world of ideas—is entirely unnecessary and unjustifia¬ 
 ble. That there should be a contest between two 
 exclusive parties is perhaps natural to our evil hearts ; 
 for it is the contest of interest and passion. But have 
 you not caught sight of the day-dawn of better times, 
 as often as personal interest and passion were lost 
 sight of? Innovators, would you, then, destroy the 
 good of the past and renounce the heritage of centu¬ 
 ries ? Conservatists, would you, in your turn, arrest 
 the work of the present, and hinder the good from 
 growing for th« future ? There is a better course ; 
 between the banners of these two hostile factions 
 there exists a third, that of the men who, by the labor 
 of the present, are striving to prepare a better future 
 by the development of the good that was in the past, 
 and by the progressive elimination of the evil. This 
 is the party of peace, of justice, and of truth. In its 
 hands is the future, that future which we hail with 
 confident hope. Cast your eyes about you, now, and 
 say whether this progress toward the good is not an 
 
The Problem of Evil. 
 
 3 T 5 
 
 outgrowth of the past; say whether that which con¬ 
 stitutes the solidity and glory of our civilization is 
 not the development of Christian thought; say 
 whether the increasing harmony of individuals and 
 nations under just and beneficent law is not the work 
 of Him who manifested his glory on high by announc¬ 
 ing peace and good-will among men ? 
 
 Jesus of Nazareth appears in history as the source 
 of the greatest of all developments of social good 
 among mankind. This is assuredly a unique Theunpara1 ' 
 faCt, and worthy of the most serious con- ence of 
 
 Christ on 
 
 sideration. It seems surprising that the civilization, 
 germ of universal progress was deposited in the soil 
 of humanity, not by the schools of Greece,*nor by the 
 practical wisdom of Rome, but by a citizen of Nazareth 
 in Galilee. But let us not simply consider the social 
 influence of the Son of Mary ; look also at his influ¬ 
 ence on individuals. Alfred de Musset, a victim of 
 passions of which, even while yielding to 0n illustri _ 
 them, he never ceased to recognize the fatal ous men ‘ 
 character, stopped thoughtfully one day in the pres¬ 
 ence of the grand figure of St. Augustine, and seeing 
 how this ardent son of Africa rose to full triumph 
 over passions which were ruining him, he wrote this 
 line, which is not among the feebler tributes which 
 the world has rendered to the Bishop of Hippo: “The 
 most manly man that ever existed, St. Augustine! ” 
 But whence did St. Augustine obtain power to tri- 
 
3 J 6 
 
 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 umph over his passions ? He himself has told us so 
 clearly that all the world knows it. And shall we 
 again refer to Pascal ? Pascal was of such feeble 
 health that from the age of nineteen he never passed 
 a single day without suffering in his body. And in 
 this ailing body there was lodged a soul so bold, so 
 proud, so ready to descend into the deepest depths of 
 thought, that he was also acquainted with all the 
 torments of the understanding. But it was Pascal 
 who, while speaking of the condition of his own soul, 
 exclaimed : “Joy, joy, joy ! and weepings for joy ! ” 
 And whence came to him the power of triumphing 
 over suffering ? He himself has written it, in words 
 which will not be effaced. But why linger about 
 these illustrious names ? The Christian faith, it is 
 true, acts too little for the good; and this is the fault 
 and shame of those who profess it; but it neverthe¬ 
 less acts. Consider what is taking place in the world, 
 far and near. How many temptations conquered! 
 on the how many lives changed ! how much sacri- 
 
 hnmblest. r , . . . , , . 
 
 nee ! how many tears wiped away! how 
 many rays of hope, beaming even into the anguish and 
 darkness of death ! how much fortitude—fortitude 
 against suffering, against sadness, against disgust 
 and temptation ! in a word, how much strength for the 
 good has been produced and is yet every day pro¬ 
 duced by this single name Jesus ! 
 
 Suppress this name if you can ! If you could efface 
 
The Problem of Evil 
 
 317 
 
 it from the memories of men, what gloom would cover 
 the earth, what thick clouds would vail our sun ! 
 clouds more dark than those which brooded over the 
 chaos of the ancient world, because the shadows which 
 follow after light are more dense than the darkness 
 which precedes it. Every serious conviction has its 
 rights, and should be respected. If a man, after 
 having considered and reconsidered his thoughts, is 
 well convinced that the Christian faith in itself, and 
 independently of its abuses, is hurtful, he has the 
 right, and not only the right, but the duty, of working 
 for the destruction of what, in his eyes, is a baneful 
 superstition. But (and I say it not only in the name 
 of my personal convictions, but also in the name of 
 the most evident interests of humanity, in the name of 
 untold weaknesses sustained, and sufferings consoled), 
 how culpable would be overhaste in this matter ! how 
 criminal would it be to trifle ! how confirmed should 
 one be in his convictions,.and certain in his negations, 
 before being able with good conscience to devote his 
 words and pen to banishing faith from the earth ! 
 
 But, it may occur to some of you, are we only going 
 to consider one phase of the question ? are we not 
 going to supplement our survey of the benefits of the 
 Christian faith, by an examination of the evils with 
 which it has been accused ? We have no But has not 
 desire to leave in the background this phase caused*™ 1 ^ 
 of the subject. But what are the accusations much evU? 
 
318 
 
 The Problem of Evil . 
 
 made ? That under pretext of religion, men seek, 
 riches, power, and earthly interests. That in the name 
 of religion, constraint, oppression, and despotism have 
 been so much practiced as to throw the friends of 
 liberty almost inevitably into the party hostile to faith. 
 In a word, it is complained that religion is often only a 
 cloak to cover the base purposes of sensuality and 
 pride. But is this a fact ? It is a fact, and undenia¬ 
 bly so. But why is this ? ShalfVd impute it to the 
 Christian faith per se? Do you suppose that the 
 Brahmins of India and the priests of Mongolia never 
 seek, under pretext of religion, the satisfaction of un¬ 
 spiritual interests ? Or do you pretend that it is not 
 simply the Christian religion, but religion in general, 
 that produces these sad results ? If so, then I ask : 
 Do you suppose that all professions of patriotism are 
 perfectly pure, and that private interests never lurk 
 behind the broad mantle of the public good? You 
 cannot think so ; for there are few so little acquainted 
 with the world as not to know, that-if faith has its 
 hypocrites, politics and philanthropy have also their 
 quacks and Tartuffes. There have been dreadful per¬ 
 secutions ; but would you charge upon the Christian 
 faith the orders of the Roman emperors, in their efforts 
 to quench in blood the infant Church ? In India the 
 blood of the followers of Buddha has been freely shed ; 
 but is that the fault of the Christian faith? Nor, to 
 leave out of the account Christianity, can we fix upon 
 
The Problem of Evil 319 
 
 religion in general a blacker stigma than upon other 
 manifestations of social life ? The interest of mon- 
 archs, and the passions of nations, have created in the 
 past, and still yet create, untold suffering and un¬ 
 numbered martyrs. The proscriptions of Sylla were 
 not of a religious origin ; and the bloody excesses of 
 the French Revolution cannot be charged to religion. 
 Is it not clear that the world is full of passions which, 
 springing from man’s evil heart, defile every thing 
 with their contact ? To charge religion with the 
 evils which have resulted from its perversion, a s pretext 
 
 but not as 
 
 is to take the innocent pretext for the guilty cause, 
 cause. If passions have run especially high under 
 religious pretexts, it is simply because of the great 
 importance of the subject of religion in general. But 
 when social interests predominate, the passions of 
 men run to equal extremes in this respect. Hypocrisy 
 and persecution are not uncommon in the sphere of 
 politics, as all of you have already seen, and will 
 doubtless see again. But let us meet the question 
 squarely and directly. 
 
 Is Jesus of Nazareth responsible for the evil that 
 has been done in his name ? Did he, for example, 
 commend the seeking of the riches and power of 
 earth, under pretext of heaven ? You know very well 
 that fanaticism showed itself under his own eyes, and in 
 the person of his own disciples. What did he say to 
 those who wished to call down fire from heaven to 
 
320 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Christ the consume an inhospitable village? “Ye 
 
 first to pro- r & 
 
 test against know not what manner ol* spirit ye are of.” 
 
 tlie abuse, of 
 
 his truth. And what to him who wished to draw the 
 sword in his defense ? “ Put up again thy sword in 
 
 its place.” And what to those who supposed him 
 interested in earthly glory ? “ My kingdom is not of 
 
 this world.” Jesus has had his imitators, and he has 
 them still. For three centuries his Church saw no 
 other blood flow than that of its unjustly persecuted 
 members, and had no other connection with prisons 
 than to see its innocent members cruelly shut up 
 therein. P'or eighteen centuries there have been, 
 and there are yet, men who have sincerely sought the 
 good of their souls, and renounced the pursuits of 
 selfishness. Now, I ask you, you who complain of the 
 evils produced by religion: Are such persons the real 
 Christians, or is it the other class of merely professed 
 Christians ? Jesus himself foresaw, and condemned 
 in advance, all the abuses that have ever been made 
 of his word. No single protest of a noble heart, or 
 a generous conscience, against an unworthy use 
 which has been made of religion, fails to find in the 
 words of Christ direct approbation and sanction. 
 Earth has had its impure religions ; there have been 
 pious debauches and holy cruelties ; vice, armed with 
 divine sanction, descended to earth from Olympus, 
 and the conscience of Socrates was purer than the 
 sanctuary of the gods. But in the Christian world, 
 
The Problem of Evil . 
 
 321 
 
 that which is made an occasion for abuses, will al¬ 
 ways remain a living principle of protestation against 
 these very abuses. Whenever, in the Christian world, 
 deplorable instances of hypocrisy or fanaticism come 
 to light, as they constantly do come to light, we can 
 always appeal from the temple to the God who is 
 there adored, and from the priest to Him of whom 
 he claims to be the minister and servant. The Chris¬ 
 tian records are an ever-flowing spring, fertilizing the 
 soil of humanity. But the waters of this spring, in 
 flowing through the corrupt heart of humanity, be¬ 
 come mingled with impurity and uncleanness. But 
 what of this ? Turn your eyes to their primitive 
 fountain, and behold how it still flows, perennially 
 crystalline and pure. Impute not, therefore, to it the 
 slime and impurity which become mingled with it, 
 and which it sweeps away and purifies. Jesus, I re¬ 
 peat it, is the greatest of all actors, an actor with 
 whom no other can even be compared, in the contest 
 against evil. There presents itself, therefore, to 
 every earnest and impartial mind, this ques- The question 
 
 . . t initsessen- 
 
 tion : Who was this man, the position of tni form, 
 whom in the history of moral development is so 
 unique and exceptional? 
 
 I state this question, but do not discuss it; this 
 would lead us outside of our programme ; and it 
 merits to be treated apart. Moreover, we have 
 
 reached the close of this series of discourses. 
 
 21 
 
322 The Problem of Evil. 
 
 Before opening this discussion, I received from 
 abroad a letter dictated by an artist's taste, and occa¬ 
 sioned by the nature of the subject I had undertaken 
 to discuss. I was asked whether the contemplation 
 of the beautiful and the good would not be more 
 salutary, and whether it were not dangerous to con¬ 
 sider too attentively the evil. “I answer: It is not 
 well to look long at evil; and we should hasten to 
 turn away our eyes, if we feel ourselves feeble in its 
 presence, and have reason to fear that, instead of com¬ 
 bating it, we may yield to its solicitations. But evil 
 is so intimately inwoven with our life that we see it 
 without needing to look for it ; and I think with 
 Pascal, that “ It is well to accustom ourselves to 
 profit by evil, inasmuch as it is so generally prevalent, 
 whereas the good is so rare.” I trust that we, too, 
 will not separate without having derived some profit 
 from this review of the nature of evil. 
 
 Let us sum up the principal points involved in the 
 discussion which we are now closing: 
 
 Remmi. The good is that which ought to be ; it is 
 the will of God. The realizing of the good has been 
 committed to free creatures; where freedom should 
 be lacking there could be neither good nor evil. 
 PVom the existence of free creatures, results the pos¬ 
 sibility of revolt and its consequences. A revolt has 
 actually taken place ; the human race violated its 
 law bv a voluntary act, and we are subject to the con- 
 
The Problem of Evil\ 
 
 323 
 
 sequences of the common fall But the good is the 
 cause of Him who is almighty ; and time will not 
 fail the Almighty for accomplishing his purposes. 
 The source of our discouragements is often in our 
 impatience; we would measure by our short reed 
 the ways of Him who is patient because he is 
 eternal 
 
 The evil ought not to be; God wishes it not to be. 
 To name it is to proclaim at once the duty of com¬ 
 bating it, and the bright hope of triumphing over 
 it. For him who, admitting the authority of reason 
 and the validity of conscience, preserves an unshaken 
 faith in the goodness of the Author of the universe, 
 the good beams brightly forth, even from the con¬ 
 templation of evil, and all complaints and sighs of 
 discouragement are finally transformed into an an¬ 
 them of hope. 
 
INDEX 
 
 
 Alexandrian school, the, 109. 
 
 Altruisme, the, of Comte, 36. 
 
 Alzire. the play, alluded to, 46. 
 
 Animals, jealousy among, 72 ; have they true self-consciousness? 77 ; 
 
 souls ? 78 ; implicated in evil, 79. 
 
 Asceticism, 19. 
 
 Atheist, an, his declaration, 130. 
 
 Augustine, St., 226, 315. 
 
 Bastiat quoted, 229. 
 
 Beranger quoted, 122. 
 
 ‘‘‘Better” and “worse” imply an absolute standard, 49. 
 
 Body, the, not evil, 122. 
 
 Buchner on “facts,” 210. 
 
 Buffon, 76. 
 
 Calvin quoted, 168. 
 
 Carnivora before the fall, 72. 
 
 Catholicism, imprudence of, 196. 
 
 Charity the sum of moral duties, 36; “begins at home,” 264; nu¬ 
 merous calls to, 256; all have some time for, 270. 
 
 Chastity, 138 et seq. 
 
 Christianity, the only progressive religion, 46; not responsible for 
 its abuses, 317 et scq. 
 
 Cicero quoted, 31, 58, 136, 194, 217. 
 
 Cid, the, alluded to, 24. 
 
 “ Cinna” quoted, 47. 
 
 Civilization, its potency its test, 44. 
 
 Conscience, 40, 44; not comparable to wax, 4S ; never utterly silent, 
 64; two forms of, 246. 
 
 Conflict of life, the, 241 ; abnormal, 242. 
 
 Conservatism and radicalism reconciled, 313. 
 
 Conversion, a twofold, 250. 
 
 Copernicus quoted, 194 etseq. 
 
326 
 
 Index. 
 
 Death, significance of, 54. 
 
 Deceptive solutions, 121. 
 
 De Maistre quoted, 73. 
 
 Demonstration, process of a. 193. 
 
 Descartes, 75 ; a praying man, 289. 
 
 Dissipation of power, danger of, 236. 
 
 Divorce, Roman, 123. 
 
 Dogma, nature of a, 169 et seq. 
 
 Don Quixote, 255. 
 
 Dualism in Persia and Greece, 119. 
 
 Duties, three classes of, 35 ; scale of, 264; professional, 268. 
 
 Egotism, 23S, 269. 
 
 Ennui , 33, 248. 
 
 Epictetus, 104. 
 
 Epicureanism, 18. 
 
 Ethics, steady advance of, 43. 
 
 Euripides quoted, 65, 83. 
 
 Evil always calls forth blame, 27 ; defined, 68; in nature, in what 
 sense, 69; in the animal world a mystery, 72 ; to be studied in 
 man, 79; threefold form of, 81; negation of, 95; admitted prac¬ 
 tically-, 95; denied speculatively, 96; “explained,” 98; argument 
 in denial of, 106; absurdity of this denial, 10S et seq. ; essentiality 
 of, 14S ; not accounted for by hereditary transmission, 155. 
 
 Experience, present, not all-embracing, 57; a Higher form of, 100; 
 personal, of the author, 311. 
 
 Facts, psychological, as real as physical, 209. 
 
 Faith versus works, 251 ; the question of, 302 et seq. ; two possible 
 answers to, 305. 
 
 Fall, the, its philosophical significance, 166 et seq. ; in what sense all 
 participated in it, 217. 
 
 Fallacies, 80. 
 
 P'anaticism, 64. 
 
 Fatalism, never acted upon, 294. 
 
 Food and drink, abuse of, 143. 
 
 P'ourierism, 122. 
 
 Fricoteurs, 245. 
 
 Generalness of error and sin, 135. 
 
 God primitively under no obligation, 28; has obligated himself, 29 ; 
 the only guarantee of the good, 59; his will identical with the 
 good, 157. 
 
Tndcx 
 
 3 2 7 
 
 Good, the, senses of the word, 16 ; of the conscience, 16 ; of the 
 heart, iS; of the reason, 20; implies a plan, 21 ; of the reason, 
 the all inclusive form, 22 ; always implies an “ ought,” 23 ; always 
 calls forth praise, 27 ; normally loved, by the soul, 31 ; character¬ 
 ized, 34 ; the goal of all progress, 51 ; the plan of God, 61 ; iden¬ 
 tical with God’s will, 63 ; all good obligatory, 255. 
 
 Greece, morals of, in the heroic age, 156. 
 
 Habit, significance of, 150. 
 
 Happiness, an object of duty, 24; the normal fruit of duty, 25. 
 Havet quoted, 196. 
 
 “ Heart ” in its moral sense, 150 et seq.; impersonal element of, 151s 
 awakes before conscience, 152 ; overbalances conscience, 153. 
 Hierarchy of being, 101 ; judgments of, 101. 
 
 Hobbyists. 240. 
 
 Homage of vice to virtue, 32. 
 
 Home duties, precedence of, 267. 
 
 Hugo, Victor, quoted, 175, 204. 
 
 Humanity not a mere numerical mass, 162 ; good per se, 189. 
 Human nature back of all evil, 126. 
 
 Ideal, attraction of the, 273. 
 
 Impersonal element, an, in man, 164. 
 
 Individualism, 133 ; inadequacy of, 157. 
 
 Individuality of volition not exclusive, 224; as seen in love, 224; in 
 enthusiasm, 225 ; in habit, 226. 
 
 “ Incomplete,” not bad, 108. 
 
 Infancy, sad fate of, 149, 
 
 Institutions not a sufficient cause of evil, 122. 
 
 Jealousy in animals, 172. 
 
 Judgment, the “good” implies a plan, 22; “evil” always blame, 
 23 ; hierarchic and moral, 102 ; harmonized in progress, 104. 
 Justin Martyr, 65. 
 
 Kant cited, 16, 279. 
 
 Kepler, 197. 
 
 Lacordaire quoted, 141, 283. 
 
 La Fontaine, 76, 299. 
 
 Lamartine quoted, 175. 
 
 Lamennais quoted, 242. 
 
328 
 
 Itidex. 
 
 Law, natural ancl spiritual, 137. 
 
 Leibnitz, 113. 
 
 Lever, two ways of viewing a, 127. 
 
 Liberty as real a fact as combustion, 131; the basis of possible evil, 
 132; two stages of, 178; harmonized in the “heart,” 179; a 
 temptation, 213 ; to be respected in others, 266. 
 
 Luthardt quoted, 169. 
 
 Machiavelli, 253. 
 
 Maine de Biran, 2S9. 
 
 Man, his twofold nature, 202 ; why the lower gains the upper 
 hand, 206. 
 
 Method of physical science not applicable to liberty, 99; a falla¬ 
 cious one of philosophy, 187. 
 
 Milton, 215. 
 
 Minuti Philosophic the, 58. 
 
 Material conquest, significance of, 50. 
 
 Moliere cited, 261. 
 
 Montaigne alluded to, 39. 
 
 Moral law, the, Sophocles alludes to it, 32; not directly assailed, 33 ; 
 general formula of, 34; its invariablenesss denied, 38; its germ in 
 all souls, 43. 
 
 Moral sense in brutes, does it exist ? 74. 
 
 Moral views, how far they vary, 39; accounted for, 40. 
 
 Moralists, an error of, 123. 
 
 Morality, social, 41 ; ethical, 144, 
 
 Musset cited, 14, 87, 292. 
 
 Motto, a Swiss, 240; an Italian, 261. 
 
 Nature, the ministry of, 37 ; how far hostile to man, 71; how far 
 . affected by the fall, 186. 
 
 Newton, 197. 
 
 Non-development, the state of, not an evil, fo6. 
 
 Notes of Dr. Whedon, 28, 30. 
 
 Order of things, the true, 37. 
 
 Pascal cited, 39, 83, 101, 201, 206; his relation to the Copemican 
 system, 196; his “Thoughts,” 200; his indebtedness to religion, 
 316. 
 
 Phalansteries, 122. 
 
 Plan of nature, two facts as to it, 7c; of life, 262. 
 
Index. 
 
 329 
 
 Pharisaism, prevalence of, 146. 
 
 Plato, his “Just Man” alluded to, 25 ; quoted, 273. 
 
 Plotinus quoted in denial of evil, 109, 
 
 Plutarch, 194. 
 
 Politicians, an error of, 124. 
 
 Positivism criticized, 210. 
 
 Potential pre-existence, 219. 
 
 Prayer, universal, 285 ; its true purport, 2S6 ; an ineradicable in¬ 
 stinct, 2S7 ; not incompatible with philosophy, 288 ; of skeptics, 
 290 ; contrasted with labor, 293 ; conditions of, 300 ; effects of, 
 limited by the wisdom of God, 301. 
 
 Pre-existence of the soul, an ancient doctrine, 1S5 ; ours, in the 
 race, 217; illustrated by that of a tree in its species, 21S; the 
 “how” a mystery in both cases, 221 et seq. 
 
 Pressense’s estimate of this work, 3. 
 
 Privileges of all at bottom equal, 271. 
 
 Progress, 104; not metamorphosis, 105; a false notion of, 190; true 
 idea of, 192; real, owing to Christianity, 312. 
 
 Quinet, Edgar, 113, 
 
 Racine, 103, 204. 
 
 Radicalism and conservatism reconciled, 313. 
 
 Ramus, Peter, prayer of, 289. 
 
 Rank, blinding to the moral judgment, 103, 
 
 Ravaisson quoted, 211. 
 
 Reading, tendencies of, 281 et seq. 
 
 Recipe, Fourierite, to render all children good, 123. 
 
 Recreation, duty and significance of, 265. 
 
 Rejuvenation of an ancient objection, 38. 
 
 Reminiscence, a, of the author, 53. 
 
 Remojse, 32. 
 
 Responsibility, two elements of, 162 ; not purely individual, 228. 
 Revery, our tendency in, 134. 
 
 Rousseau quoted, 26, 134, 155, 174. 
 
 Sacred books of India and Persia, the, 43. 
 
 Scale of being, 102. 
 
 Schiller quoted, 30. 
 
 Science prone to hostility to religion, 129; and why, 307. 
 
 Secretan, 200. 
 
 Sexes, normal relation of, 138; well understood, 140. 
 
330 
 
 Index, 
 
 Shakspeare quoted, 216. 
 
 Shoals, 255. 
 
 Sin. essentiality of, 149; when impossible to a moral agent, 180; two 
 forms, 1S4. 
 
 Sinless-worlds, are there any? 182. 
 
 Society as called for by the conscience, 52. 
 
 Socrates, an error of, S3 ; an aspiration of, 273. 
 
 Solidarity, the law of, 229 et seq. ; happy effects of, 231. 
 
 Solitude, the need of, 266. 
 
 Solution, the one proposed, 161. 
 
 Sophocles cited, 2S6. 
 
 Soul, food of the, ideas, 277 ; sentiments, 278; affections, 280. 
 Spirits cannot be created in maturity, 176. 
 
 Stoicism, unnatural, 94. 
 
 Strength, moral source of, 275. 
 
 Suffering apologized for, 85 ; devotees of, 87 ; three favorable phases 
 of, 89 ; warning, 89 ; remedy, 90; punishment, 90; beneficial only 
 in an abnormal state of things, 93; inevitableness of, 148. 
 
 Theodicies, inconsiderate ones, 188. 
 
 Theory of the machine-animal, 75; of the man-animal, 76; true, 
 not-absurd, in practice, 113. 
 
 Tooth, a golden one, 9S. 
 
 Tradition, 281. 
 
 Trappists, self-denial of, 87. 
 
 Unchastity, prevalence of, 141 ; ravages of, 142. 
 
 Valmiki, the poet, cited, 43. 
 
 Vinet quoted, 232, 238, 283. 
 
 Volition the sole cause of evil, 132. 
 
 Voltaire quoted, 29, 116, 229. 
 
 War among animals, 72; apologized for, 86. 
 
 Womanhood does not imply manishness, 105. 
 
RELIGION AND THE REIGN OF TERROR 
 
 NOTICES OF THE PRESS. 
 
 A BOOK FOR THE GREAT WAR CRISIS! 
 
 Religion - and the Reign of Terror; or, The Church during 
 the French Revolution. Prepared from the French of Ue Pres- 
 sensA By John P. Lacroix, A. M. 121110., pp. 416. Price, 
 Si 75 ; for which it will be sent by mail. 
 
 What will become of the French? Can they sustain a Republic? 
 Why have all their attempts at self-government so disastrously failed ? 
 This latter question M. De Pressense has honestly and fearlessly 
 answered, and the light which he throws on the past of France illus¬ 
 trates her present, and is prophetic of the future. Pressense’s great 
 work has received the highest commendations from the secular and 
 religious press throughout the country. We present the following as 
 a few specimens : 
 
 This elegant volume, translated and modified from the French of 
 the eloquent Pressense, comes, by permission of the original author, 
 through the hands of the Western Professor with peculiar propriety, 
 being himself a descendant of a French Protestant ancestry. It is 
 full of monitory lessons.— Dr. Whedon , i)i the Quarterly Review. 
 
 The author is one of the ablest French historians, and both he and 
 the translator have done their work nobly.— Christian Era. 
 
 Professor Lacroix has succeeded admirably in preserving the fire 
 and force of style for which the eminent French divine is distin¬ 
 guished. It is really one of the most interesting books of the time. 
 The thrilling scenes and remarkable personages of the period come 
 under most careful revision, and are placed in lights and relations 
 where they are seldom seen. . . . The descriptions of the book are 
 graphic, and its lessons impressive. We know not where else so 
 many pages of so much historic interest can be found that will be 
 read by Americans with so much of profit.— North-western Chris¬ 
 tian Advocate. 
 
Religion and the Reign of Terror. 
 
 This new work is worthy of Pressense’s fame. A simple book 
 notice cannot do it justice. It must be read, studied, digested, to 
 be appreciated. It is a book for Americans, because it is a graphic 
 picture of the horrors consequent upon the struggle, first between 
 free thought and spiritual despotism, and last between Christianity 
 and absolute atheism, or a philosophy which attempts to shut out 
 God and the Gospel as living forces in the social structure. It 
 is an eloquent warning against the cruelties of tyranny and the cor¬ 
 ruptions of the Catholic Church, drifting inevitably at last into the 
 abominations of red republicanism and infidelity. . . . Every clergy¬ 
 man, every Christian, every radical and bigot, every American citizen, 
 should read this book.— Universalist Quarterly. 
 
 It is a resume, of the leading facts of that strangest of epochs in 
 human history, the first French Revolution, in their religious and 
 ecclesiastical relations. It is less a history than a dissertation on a 
 great historical theme, as viewed by a learned and philosophical 
 Christian Pastor of decidedly evangelical views and sentiments. The 
 story is, of course, a fearful one, and yet the troubles of the times 
 brought into view many rare excellences of life and character among 
 both priests and revolutionists ; and, whatever else it teaches, it shows 
 very clearly that civil order cannot be maintained in the absence of a 
 recognized religion, and also that civilized communities will not con¬ 
 sent to live without religious institutions. The experiment then 
 made was a costly one, but the world has profited by it. 
 
 This English version of De Pressense’s larger work, made by our 
 correspondent, Professor Lacroix, is less a translation than a sum¬ 
 mary, though, as far as was convenient, the author’s own language is 
 given in corresponding English. In matter and spirit the translation 
 is faithful to the original; but in style and the use of idioms it is 
 pure English and not Anglicised French, It is such a book as thought¬ 
 ful and intelligent readers must value, and the reading of which will 
 do good.— Dr. Curry , in Christian Advocate. 
 
 It contains a terrible illustration of what men may be^. me when 
 they banish God from their creed and their hearts.— Presbyterian. 
 
 De Pressense has filled one of the great wants of literature with 
 a book of moderate size, published by Carlton & Lanahan, and called 
 “Religion and the Reign of Terror.” We have all of us read in a 
 crude and half way about the religious principles which were brought 
 into vogue in France during the great Revolution, but we have not 
 had la ill before us, at least in America, till now, any clear, accurate, 
 
Religion and the Reign of Terror. 
 
 and readable account of those principles till Prof. Lacroix, of Ohio, 
 translated Pressense’s book, and spread it before us. We have 
 perused its pages with the deepest interest. Though the style has a 
 trace of that turgidity which runs through nearly all French authors, 
 the translator has been very happy in the process of simplification, 
 and in this respect the work improves from the first page to the last. 
 The author, De Pressense, is the most prominent Protestant clergy¬ 
 man in France, and his works on “The Life of Jesus,” “The Holy 
 Land,” etc., are largely known and admired. We commend without 
 reservation this, his latest work, to all who are interested in the great 
 fermentation and clashing of religious ideas which went on in France 
 during the French Revolution. The growth of infidelity, the tem¬ 
 porary triumph of a religion of reason, the decadence of Romanism, 
 are portrayed with great power and candor, and altogether the work 
 is one which should find its place in every thoroughly furnished 
 library.— Dr. Gage , in The Religions Herald, Hartford. 
 
 It is refreshing to read the author’s vigorous attack of the empire, 
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 Every young man especially ought to read it. It contains highest 
 lessons most pleasantly conveyed.— Dr. Warren , in Zion's Herald. 
 
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 Greek Philosophy in its Relations to Christianity, 
 
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 the University of Michigan. 12mo., pp. 531. Price, $2 75. 
 
 This work comprises a profound discussion of the leading philosoph¬ 
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 Rome and Italy at the Opening of the CEcumenical 
 Council. 
 
 Depicted in Twelve Letters written from Rome to a Gen¬ 
 tleman in America. By Edmond De Pressense, D.D., 
 Pastor of the Evangelical Church in Paris, Author of 
 “Early Years of the Christian Church,” and “Life and 
 Times of Jesus Christ.” Translated by Rev. George 
 Prentice, A.M. 12mo. Toned paper. Price, $1 50. 
 
 Of Pressense the North British Review says, “ His sentences are like 
 
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 He expatiates over the scenes of natural beauty which wonderful Italy 
 spreads before his eye. He lingers in delighted yet critical enthusiasm 
 among her multitudinous works of art. He walks the Roman streets, 
 and paints the monuments of the past and movements of the living 
 present. He descends into those wonders of subterranean Rome, the 
 Catacombs, where lie the nations of the dead in one vast monumental 
 city, cut by nine hundred miles of streets, and where the epitaphs of a 
 whole glorious army of martyrs reveal to us the wonders and glories 
 of the early faith. In the great pivotal questions of the age he is at 
 home. He understands their genesis from the history of Europe. Ills 
 penetrative eye reads Papal Rome through and through. His prescient 
 eye sees hope only in the far future ; a period of blessed sunshine after 
 Europe has tried the awful experiment of utter godlessness.— Methodist 
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 Hamilton was celebrated for his conversational powers, his wide 
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 in their build, there is a largeness in their component parts, that re¬ 
 minds you of an old cathedral. Of all American preachers, he reminds 
 us most of Henry B. Bascom. But what strikes one as a difference is, 
 that with Bascom the grand pulpit oration was the end ; when he had 
 finished, and received the assurance that his sermon was an oratorical 
 success, his entire object seemed gained. With the burning as well as 
 the lofty soul of Hamilton it was but a means, an instrument, upon 
 which, as a production, he set no high estimate, since he was looking 
 to. a further end—the success of the cause for which he wrought... . 
 His sermons cannot be recommended as a model. They serve as a 
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 Principles of a System of Philosophy . 
 
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 us that he should have touched prophecy. The' foundation principle 
 of the book 3 s necessary laws, a force that cannot be annihilated, and 
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 could not make a triangle with but two sides, nor can he so make a 
 triangle but that the three angles would be equal to two right angles. 
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 the possibility of his sinning. Certain evils are necessarily incidental 
 to doing the best tilings, or to doing any one of several things that 
 might be best. God, .therefore, not only does not do every thing, but 
 cannot do every thing, and so neither does he know every thing. We 
 are exceedingly thankful to our Editor and Agents at New York for a 
 work of this kind. It must stir up thought, and give clearer views of 
 God’s glorious economy. If it be not entirely satisfactory, it will con¬ 
 tribute something toward solving the most difficult problems of the 
 ages. We advise our ministers generally to purchase this work, aDd 
 read it with care from end to end.— Rorthwestern Advocate . 
 
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 Problem of Evil. 
 
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