BT 75 .L72 Lindberg, > Conrad Emil, 1852- 1930. Christian dogmatics an id notes on the history of CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS AND NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF DOGMA BY CONRAD EMIL LINDBERG, D. D., LL. D. PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TRANSLATION FROM THE SWEDISH BY REV. C. E. HOFFSTEN, B.D. REVISED AND AUGMENTED BY THE AUTHOR Rock Island, III. AUGUSTANA BOOK CONCERN 1922 Copyright, 1922, BY AuGUSTAXA Book Co>ceun'. TO MY STUDENTS THIS WORK IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED, IN TOKEN OF UNCHANGING FRIENDSHIP, BY THE AUTHOR. ORA ET LABORA! PREFACE. THIS Textbook of Christian Dogmatics and Notes on History of Dogma was published in Swedish in i8g8, with the excep- tion of additions made by the author for this edition. The work was amply commended by theologians here and in Sweden, Bishop Von Schéele in his review of the book in Teologisk Tidskrift, Uppsala, expressing high appreciation of its scientific value and prac- tical utility as a handbook. Time and again the author has been urged by theological scholars and his own students to have this work published in English, and lately a translation became a necessity in the Seminary work. The translation of the Swedish edition is the result of intimate collaboration with my former pupil, Rev. C. E. Hof^sten, B.D., who for three years heard my lectures on Systematic Theology and whose capable rendition into English of the original work has been minutely compared by myself. My grateful appreciation of his work as trans- lator is herewith expressed. This English edition I have augmented with some 125 pages of new material. Acknowledgments are also due to Mr. E. W. Olson, A.M., editor with the Augustana Book Concern, for aid in revising the manuscript and conducting the book through the press. The Notes on the History of Dogma have been prepared as a guide especially to the understanding of the development of doctrines. While most histories of dogma take up the doctrines by periods, here each important doctrine is treated in its entirety at its proper place in the dogmatic system, with the manifest advantage of an unbroken and completed exposition. The primary aim of this work is to serve as a textbook in theo- logical seminaries or as collateral reading where other textbooks are used. The Swedish edition having been used extensively by ministers as a review course and a book of reference, it is hoped that the English edition will be found equally serviceable. Hie main or doji;matic part includes only three sections belonj2;ing to Introduction, Prolegomena being usually treated in special text- books or monographs. As to terminology, the old dogmatic terms have been retained, though also rendered in English, this for the reason that Latin and Greek terms are part of the universal language of theological science, and as such they ought to be known by every student. In many instances the old dogmatic definitions are given in both English and Latin. The English version is frequently taken from Hay and Jacobs' edition of the Dogmatik of Heinrich Schmid. In quoting the Latin definitions and terms from Gerhard, Baier and Hollazius the following editions have been used : Gerhardi Loci Theologici (i6iO — 1621), Lipsiae, 1885, with Preface by Frank; Baieri Couipendiiun (1694), Berolini, 1864, edited by Preuss, and also Walther's Edition, 1879; Hollazii Examen Theologicum Acroa- rnaticum (1707), Editio Quinta, Stockholmia? et Lipsiae, 1734. Where we had no access to original sources, Schmid's Dogmatik, Luthardt's Compendium and others were used. Bible quotations are from the American Revised Version, and passages from the Con- cordia Pia are rendered from Die symboliche Biicher, by IMiiller, The Book of Concord, by Jacobs, and from Fjellstedt's edition. In regard to other Confessions, citations have been made from The Creeds of Christendom, by Schaff, or from sundry monographs. Space forbids mention of the leading books in general Theology, Dogmatics and History of Dogma studied during more than half a century of reading in four languages. In the preparation of this handbook original sources have been used as far as available, but it has not been found desirable to encumber the text with a great mass of notes and references. The book is not based upon another, but with the exception of terms and quoted definitions it is an attempt at presenting the result of assimilation and investigation with the object previously stated. It is my earnest hope that this manual of Christian Dogmatics may serve as a guide for devoted students of Scripture and of our Lutheran Confessions, and an aid in the faithful exposition of both. Conrad Emil Lindberg. Augustana Theological Seminary, Rock Island, 111. Season of La."tare ct Palmarum, 1922. COiNfTENTS. PAGE Definition of Dogmatics and History of Dogma 17 Tlie Principal Periods of the History of Dogma 18 I. THEOLOGY. § 1. Concerning the Existence of God 19 1. The Psychological Philosophical Proof 21 a. The Budaimonistic Proof 21 b. The Ontological Proof 21 c. The Ethico-Theological Proof 24 2. The Historical Proof or Argumentum e Consensu Gentium 24 3. The Cosmological Proof or Argumentum a Contingentia Mundi 25 4. The Teleological Proof 26 § 2. Natural Rev-elation 28 Revelatio Generalis 28 a. Cognitio Insita or Innata 28 b. Cognitio Acquisita 30 § 3. The Supernatitral Revelation 30 Revelatio Specialis 30 1. The Possibility of a Supernatural Revelation 31 2. The Necessity of a Supernatural Revelation 32 3. The Reality of Revelation 32 4. The Relation between Reason and Revelation 32 § 4. Concerning the Being of God 34 1. The Definition or Conception of God 34 2. The Divine Being Defined and the Conception of the Abso- lute Personality 35 3. Anti -Theistic Theories 39 a. Pantheism 39 1) Acosmism 39 2 ) Atheism 40 b. Materialism 41 c. Positivism 41 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 42 A. Concerning the Comprehensibility and Nature of God 42 B. Concerning the Unity of God and the Primitive Char- acteristics of His Being 43 8 CONTKXTS. PAGE § 5. COXCKRMNc; TIIK DiVI.NK A'lTKIIUJTKS 44 1. The Conception of the Attributes 44 2. How We Gain Knowledge of the Divine Attributes 46 Via Negationis 46 Via Causalitatis 46 Via Eminentiae 47 3. Division of the Attributes 47 4. Essential Characteristics 48 a. Vita or Life 48 b. Lux or Light 48 c. Amor or Love 49 5. The Special Attributes 50 A. In Relation to the Natural World 50 a. Immanent Attributes, Distinct from the Natural World 50 ^ternitas 50 Immensitas 51 Immutabilitas 51 b. Relative Attributes or Attributes of Contact 53 Omniprsesentia 53 Omnipotentia 55 Omniscientia 57 Omnisapientia 58 B. In Relation to the Moral World 59 a. Immanent Attributes, Distinct from the Moral World 59 Sanctitas, Justitia Interna 59 Justitia Externa 59 Veracitas 60 b. Attributes of Contact or Relative Attributes 61 Amor or Love 61 Fidelitas or Fidelity 62 § 6. TiiK Tkimty 62 1. The Ordinary Methods of Explanation 63 a. Through the Conception of the Absolute Personality. . 63 b. Through the Conception of Love 64 c. Through the Conception of Atonement 65 d. By the Use of Analogy 65 e. Through the Teaching of the Word of God 65 2. Remarks on Terminology 67 3. Divisions 72 I. The Ontological Trinity 72 A. Actus Personales 72 CONTENTS. 9 PAGE B. Proprietates Personales 75 C. Notiones Personales 75 II. The Economical Trinity 76 A. Opera Oeconomica 76 B. Opera Attributiva 76 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 77 § 7. The Eternal Purpose of God 85 1. The General Benevolence of God 85 2. The Special Will or Benevolence of God 86 3. Concerning Reprobation 95 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 96 § 8. The Creation 103 1. The Modus of Creation 105 2. The Effectus of Creation 110 3. The Objects of Creation 110 4. Notes on the History of Dogma Ill § 9. Providence 113 I. Providentia Ordinaria or Mediata 114 1. The Definition of Providence 114 2. The Object of Providence 115 3. The Special Acts of Providence 116 A. Conservatio or Preservation 116 B. Concursus or Concurrence 117 C. Gubernatio or Government 119 a. Permissio 120 b. Impeditio 121 c. Directio 121 d. Determinatio 121 4. The Objects of Providence 122 II. Providentia Extraordinaria or Immediata 122 1. The Conception of Miracles 122 2. The Possibility of Miracles 123 3. The Truth of Miracles.— Their Division 124 4. The Object of the Miracles 124 5. Notes on the History of Dogma 125 § 10. The Angels 126 I. The Good Angels 128 1. Their Attributes 128 2. Their Abode and Degrees 129 3. The Occupation of the Angels and Their Relation to Men 131 4. The Objects of the Activities of the Angels 133 5. Notes on the History of Dogma 133 10 COXTEXTS. PAGE II. The Evil Angels 135 1. The Existence of Satan and the Evil Angels 135 2. The Original and Present Condition of the Evil Angels 136 3. Their Attributes 137 4. Their Habitation and Gradation 138 5. Their Occupation 138 6. The Punishment of the Fallen Angels 141 7. Notes on the History of Dogma 141 II. ANTHROPOLOGY. •§ 11. Max 144 1. The Creation of Man 144 2. The Unity of the Human Race and Divergent Theories of Creation 145 3. The Component Parts of Man's Being or Nature 147 4. The Propagation of the Soul 149 5. Notes on the History of Dogma 152 § 12. TiiK Okigixal State 154 Status Integritatis vel Innocentiae 154 1. Divisions and Attributes 156 A. The Formal Image 156 B. The Material Image 156 2. The Attributes of the Image of God 157 3. The Purpose or the Object of the Image of God 158 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 158 § 13. The Fall axu Origixal Six 161 1. The Origin of Sin 161 2. Concerning Original Sin and its Definition 163 3. Characteristics or Affectiones 165 4. Imputatio or Imputation 166 5. The Effects of Original Sin or Effectus 167 6. Notes on the History of Dogma 168 §14. Actual Six 173 1. The Characterization of Actual Sin 173 2. Classification of Actual Sins 175 3. The Effects of Actual Sin 179 § 15. TiiK Freedom of the Will and Moral Boxdage 179 1. Definition of the Subject 179 2. The Loss of Free Will in Spiritual Things 180 3. The Two Hemispheres 180 4. Human Freedom and the Grace of God 181 5. Notes on the History of Dogma 184 CONTENTS. 11 III. CHRISTOLOGY. page § 16. The Necessity and the Reality of the God-Man 190 1. The Necessity of the God-Man 191 2. The Possibility of the God-Man 192 3. Concerning the Incarnation - 192 4. Concerning the Divinity of Jesus 195 5. Concerning the Humanity of Jesus Christ 196 6. Notes on the History of Dogma 199 § 17. Unio Personalis and its Immediate Resuxts 209 1. The Personal Union 210 2. The Communion of the Natures 211 3. The Personal Propositions 213 § 18. Communicatio Idiomatum 215 I. Genus Idiomaticum 216 II. Genus Majestaticum 217 1. Concerning Modus Communicandi 219 2. Division and Communication of the Attributes 219 1) Immanent 220 2) Relative 220 a) Omnipotence 220 b) Omniscience 220 c) Omnipresence 221 III. Genus Apotelesmaticum 225 § 19. The Two States of Christ 227 I. The State of Exinanition or Humiliation 227 1. The Definition of Humiliation 227 2. The Grades of Exinanition or the State of Humiliation 235 3. The New Development of the Kenosis Doctrine 236 II. The State of Exaltation 238 1. The Definition of Exaltation 238 2. The Grades of Exaltation ». 239 1) Descensus ad Inferos 240 2 ) Resurrectio Externa 242 3) Ascensus in Ccelum 243 4) Sessio ad Dextram Dei 244 Notes on the History of Dogma 245 IV. SOTERIOLOGY. § 20. The Prophetic Office of Christ 252 1. Christ as Teacher 253 2. The Prophecies of Christ 254 3. Christ as a Worker of Miracles 254 4. The Object of the Prophetic Office of Christ 255 12 CONTENTS. PAGE § 21. TiiK Sackudotai, Oi kick ok Chkist 256 I. The Reconciliation or the Atonement in the General Sense 257 1. The Necessity of the Atonement 257 2. The Subject of the Reconciliation or Atonement... 259 3. The Concept of the Reconciliation or Atonement... 260 1 ) Satisfactio 261 2 ) Expiatio 262 4. The Attributes of the Reconciliation or Atonement. . 267 5. The Object of the Reconciliation 263 6. The Effects of the Reconciliation or Atonement.... 271 II. Concerning the High-Priestly Intercessory Prayer of Christ 273 Notes on the History of Dogma 274 § 22. The Regal Office of Chiust 285 1. Christ as King 283 2. The Kingdom of Christ or the Kingdom of God 287 1 ) Regnum Potential 288 2 ) Regnum Gratia? 288 3) Regnum Justitiae 291 4) Regnum Glorise 292 V. PNEUMATOLOGY. § 23. The Grace of the Holy Ghost and the Okuek ok Salvation 295 1. The Definition of the Grace of God and its Division 296 2. The Attributive Terms Applied to Grace 237 3. Ordo Salutis or the Order of Salvation 298 § 24. Vocation 301 1. The Division of the Call 302 2. The Means and Mode of the Call 303 3. The Attributes of Vocation 304 4. The Object of the Call 305 § 25. Ilhimination 306 1. The Division of Illumination 307 2. The Means and the Mode of Illumination 308 3. The Activity and Object of Illumination 310 § 26. CONVEUSION 311 I. The General Characteristics of Conversion 311 1. The Division of Conversion 311 2. The Starting Point of Conversion 312 3. The Factors in Conversion 312 4. The Object of Conversion 314 CONTENTS. 13 PAGE II. Contrition 314 1. The Requisites and Marks of Contrition 315 2. The Object of Contrition 317 5. The Effects of Contrition 317 III. Faith 318 1. The Elements of Faith 319 2. The Attributes of Faith 320 3. The Effect and Object of Faith 321 Notes on the History of Dogma 322 § 27. Justification 325 1. The Definition of Justification 326 2. The Acts or Parts of Justification 329 3. The Means of Justification 331 4. The Attributes of Justification 333 5. The Purpose and Effect of Justification 334 6. Notes on the History of Dogma 335 § 28. Regeneration 342 1. The Definition of Regeneration 343 2. The Causes of Regeneration 348 3. The Starting Point and End of Regeneration 349 § 29. The Mystical Union 349 1. The Definition of the Mystical Union 350 2. Negative and Positive Characteristics 351 3. Testimonium Spiritus Sancti Internum 352 § 30. Renovation 355 1. The Definition of Renovation 356 2. The Degrees of Renovation and Sanctification 357 3. The Proof of Renovation in Good Works 358 4. The Object of Renovation 361 § 31. Conservation •. 362 1. The Definition of Conservation 362 2. The Means and Manner of Conservation 364 3. The Goal of Conservation 365 VI. ECCLESIOLOGY. § 32. The Church 366 1. Definition 367 2. The Founder and Head of the Church 370 3. Materia et Forma Ecclesiae 371 4. The Attributes of the Church 372 A. Attributa Ecclesise Vulgo 372 B. Attributa Ecclesiae Particularia 373 14 CONTENTS. PAG K 5. Status Ecclesise 376 6. The Aim and Purpose of the Church 377 7. Notes on the History of Dogma 377 § 33. TiiK Means of Gkace in General 384 1. The Necessity of the Means of Grace 384 2. God's Relation to the Means of Grace 385 3. The Effect of the Means of Grace in General 386 § 34. The Inspiration and Authority of Holy Scriptire 387 1. The Definition of Inspiration 388 2. The Constituent Parts of Inspiration 394 3. The Attributes of Holy Scripture 398 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 400 § 35. The Word of God as a Means of Grace 404 1. The Power of the Word of God as a Means of Grace. . . . 405 2. Negative and Positive Terms 406 3. The Contents of the Word, or the Law and the Gospel. . . 407 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 409 § 36. The Sacraments 414 1. Definition of Sacrament 414 2. The Forma et Materia of the Sacraments 415 3. The Effects of the Sacraments 416 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 417 § 37. Baptism 420 1. The Definition of Baptism 421 2. The Necessity of Baptism 422 3. The Elements of Baptism 424 4. The Formale or Modus of Baptism 425 5. The Subjects of Baptism 428 6. The Effect and Purpose of Baptism 432 7. Notes on the History of Dogma 435 § 38. The Lord's Supper 441 1. Definition of the Lord's Supper 442 2. The Form of the Lord's Supper 442 3. The Elements of the Lord's Supper 443 4. Further Definition and Explanation of the Doctrine.... 444 1) The Lord's Supper Is a Sacrament 447 2) The Lord's Supper is a Real Supper 448 3) The Lord's Supper Constitutes a Covenant Action... 448 4) The Body and Blood of Christ Are the Sacramental Objects 449 5) The Sacramental Objects Are Really Present in the Lord's Supper 452 CONTENTS. 15 PAGE 6) The Bread and Wine Are Vehicles of the Heavenly Elements 456 7) The Heavenly Elements Are Received by All the Com- municants 458 8) Manducatio Oralis 459 ' 5. The Effect and Object of the Lord's Supper 459 6. Notes on the History of Dogma 462 39. The Office of the Ministry 469 1. Definition of the Ministry 470 2. The Call to the Ministry 470 1) Necessitas Vocationis 470 2) Attributa Vocationis 471 3) Partes Vocationis 471 3. More Precise Definition of Ordination 472 1) Ordinatio 472 2 ) Necessitas Ordinationis 472 3) The Different Parts of the Act of Ordination 473 4) The ^^dpiCTfjia of Ordination 473 4. Potestas Ministerii Ecclesiastici 474 5. The Object of the Ministry 474 6. Notes on the History of Dogma 475 VII. ESCHATOLOGY. 40. Death and the Intermediate State 484 1. Death 484 2. Immortality 486 3) The Nature of the Intermediate State 489 1) Hades 487 2) Paradise 489 3) The Nature of hte Intermediate State. 489 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 496 41. The Last TutEs 500 1. The General Spread of Christianity 501 2. Antichristianity 503 3. The Signs of the Last Times 510 1) Remota 510 2) Propinqua 512 3) Propinquiora 512 4) Proxinja 515 i 42. The Second Coming of Christ 521 1. Definition of the Second Advent 52? 2. The Attributes of the Second Advent 523 16 CO.NTKNTS. PAGE 3. The Effects of the Second Advent 528 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 533 § 43. TiiK Ressurectiox 540 1. The Definition of the Resurrection 541 2. Further Definition of the Resurrection 542 3. The Object of the Resurrection 548 4. Notes on the History of Dogma 548 § 44. Till-, Jl-DOMENT 552 1. Judgment Defined 552 2. The Factors of the Judgment 556 1) The Subject of the Judgment 556 2 ) The Object of the Judgment 556 3) The Modus of the Judgment 557 4) The Day of Judgment 558 3. The Object of the Judgment 561 § 45. TiiK End of the World 561 1. The Destruction of the World 561 2. The Restoration of All Things 563 3. Notes on the History of Dogma 564 § 46. Eternal Damnatio.x 566 1. Eternal Death 566 2. The Character of the Eternal Punishments 569 3. Notes on the History of Dogma 570 § 47. Eternal Salvation 572 1. Eternal Life 573 2. The Blessings of Everlasting Salvation 574 Index 581 CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS A N IJ NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF DOGMA. The Science of Theologij is generally divided into four main divisions : Exegetical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical Theology. Exegetical Theology constitutes the foundation; Historical Theology gathers and supplies the material for the doctrinal edifice; Systematic Theology is the edifice itself; while Practical Theology constitutes the adornment of the building and indicates the purposes for which it is to be used. Among the disciplines of Systematic Theology Dogmatics occupies the chief place. Dogmatics is that science which systematically develops and defines the Christian dogmas mediated bij faith in co7i- formity unth the teaching of the Bible and the Church. This science includes the following seven divisions: 1) Theology; 2) Anthropology; 3) Christology; 4) Soteriolo- gy; 5) Pneumatology ; 6) Ecclesiology ; 7) Eschatology. The study of Dogmatics should include also the most im- portant parts of the history of dogma. The History of Dogma is that part of historical theology ivhich sets fo7'th the gradual development and for^mulation of the Christian doctrines as to their genesis, groivth, more precise definition and. final form during the various periods of Church History. Doijmatics. 2. 18 The principal periods are the following: I. The Apologetical Period from 70 to 254 A. D. (Death of Origen). II. The Polemical Period from Origen to John of Da- mascus (254—754 A. D.). III. The Catholic Scholastic Period from John of Damascus to the Reformation (754 — 1517). IV. The Reformation or Protestant Scholastic Pe- riod from the beginning of the Reformation to Leibnitz and Wolff (1517—1716 or 1754). V. The Speculative and Modern Critical Period. I. THEOLOGY. Theology constitutes that part of Dogmatics which treats of the doctrine of God and includes the following main sub- jects: The Existence of God, Natural Revelation, Super- natural Revelation, God as the Absolute Personality, the Divine Attributes, the Doctrine of the Trinity, Election, Creation, Providence, the Good Angels and the Evil Angels. Opinions differ as to whether the proofs for the existence of God together with the doctrines of natural and super- natural revelation should be included in Dogmatics. Strictly speaking, these should be treated in Prolegomena or Apolo- getics. Different opinions have also been expressed con- cerning the place of Angelology in the dogmatic system. §1. CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. Christian Dogmatics presupposes God's existence. If God did not exist, no theology could be written. Every man is certain of his own existence and is likewise convinced that other men exist. Whatever certain philosophical systems may present concerning the reality of the world, but few doubt its existence. Inasmuch as it cannot be proved that man and the world are eternal, they must have had a begin- ning and in such case necessarily a cause. The concept of causality has therefore great weight in proving God's ex- istence. This concept is also of the greatest importance in relation to the proof of God's existence which is based on our idea concerning a higher being. It may likewise be stated as a generally acknowledged fact that religion is the basic element in human personality. The existence of God belongs to the content of religion and is therefore as certain 20 TIIKOI.OCiY. as the existence of man himself. In accordance with the concept of causality as a proof of God's existence we con- sider God as a cause by reason of the fact that we know ourselves as causes. We know ourselves as causes because we are conscious of our will. To will is to cause. Further- more, by virtue of the exercise of the powers of our under- standing we reach the conclusion that God is not only the first cause but that He is likewise the greatest intellect. The clearly revealed purpose in the world in things great and small has also great weight in the proof of God's ex- istence. We may also state that our knowledge of God is acquired in the same manner as the knowledge of our fellow men. This latter knowledge is no more a priori and intu- itive than our knowledge of God. Our heavenly Father be- comes known in very much the same way as an earthly father and mother. Real character cannot be discerned with the physical eye nor comprehended by the senses. The child, however, soon learns to know its parents and the spirit that dwells in them. The children of men are likewise so constituted that they may know the Father of spirits through His works. There are some who consider that the existence of God cannot be proved. JACOBI said : "A God that can be proved is no God." Kant denies that we can know anything of God through theoretical reasoning. Fichte made light of the proofs and stated that the Supreme Being was equiva- lent to the moral government of the world. Hegel, who proclaimed the identity of thought and being, simply stated that man's knowledge of God was the same as God's knowl- edge of Himself. Others have expressed opinions along the same or similar lines. Even if objections may be raised against the common proofs for the existence of God, they nevertheless possess relative value, particularly from the viewpoint of Apolo- getics. Generally speaking, a Christian needs no such proofs, but in the hour of doubt and spiritual assault they become of great value and help. In presenting arguments to prove the existence of God THE EXISTEXC'K OF GOD. 21 the following methods must be rejected: 1) When men essay to prove God's existence as they would that of a ma- terial object; 2) when proofs are asserted to be based on direct or intuitive experience; 3) argumentum a ticto, which implies that it is doubtful whether or not God exists, but that it is safer to assume His existence and does no harm, while it may be dangerous to deny His existence, if He does exist; 4) argume^itum ab utili, which sets forth the great benefit of faith in a personal God. The ordinary proofs of God's existence are the following : 1. The Psychological Philosophical Proof. Human personality is made up of a union of receptivity, which finds expression in the emotions, and spontaneity, expressed in thought and will. From these three viewpoints the proof is divided as follows : a. The Eudaimonistic Proof. The human emotions find no rest in themselves nor in man. The world with all that is finitely good in it cannot satisfy the soul. Man feels that there must be something higher, something absolutely good, yea, an absolutely good personality. This absolute personality is God. Augustine in his Confessiones, I. 1, says : "Fecisti nos ad Te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donee requiescat in Te." Kant presents a eudaimonistic proof, but confuses it with the moral proof. He says that harmony between the internal and external is not found on earth, for which reason there must be an absolute being who at least in another world must abolish discord between the desire for happi- ness and the requirements of the moral law. b. The Ontological Proof. The expression is derived from ck twv oi/rwv=from the es- sence of things. This is an a priori argument, but not in the sense that we should find in it a cause of God's existence. The argument proves His existence to us, but His existence is not dependent on the argument. Man is so constituted that in all his reasoning he con- 22 THEOLOGY. eludes that there must be an absolute being. He possesses an innate idea of an absolute personality or a supreme being. When through education he learns to know of God, his un- derstanding apprehends the reality of this truth and his heart says yea and amen thereto. Man thinks of himself as real, and since God constitutes his highest thought, he con- ceives of God as the most real and the most perfect being (ens realissimum et perfectissimum) , The most real and the most perfect being must exist not only in our thought but in reality. The proof has been presented in many ways. There are certain indications of it in Plato and Kleanthes. Some even assert that Plato suggested the proof, while Anselm merely perfected the syllogistic form. Augustine presents a proof that is analogous to the ontological proof. He said : "Nothing higher than truth can be thought, because it embraces all true being." He also declared that God a? the highest truth must exist, because truth is sought at all times and by all men as something that is certain and un- changeable. Anselm's Proof sets forth that man has an idea of a most perfect being, but perfection implies real existence. All men have an idea concerning God, even those who deny it, because it is impossible to deny something concerning which men have no idea. The thought of God is the idea of a being who is absolutely perfect, a personality than whom there is none higher. When we realize that we are imper- fect and yet exist, it is self-evident that the most perfect being must exist; otherwise the most perfect being would be less perfect than we are. The idea of a most perfect being proves the existence of such a being. Existence is thus proven, otherwise we might imagine that a still higher being existed. . Descartes presents the second main form of the proof. He considered that all other ideas except the idea of God contain only the characteristics of possibility and contin- gency (contingentia), but the idea of God implies necessaria et aeterna existentia. Because we have ideas that possess no corresponding reality, therefore we are uncertain as to THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 23 whether or not the idea of God may not be simply a product of our thought. But he endeavors to prove that the idea of God is innate, that this idea is not adventicia, because it could not pcFsibly come w^holly from without, nor yet facticia by abs..-.„..^n, since it is only by abstraction from the finite that we reach the infinite. He considered that ex- istence was inherent in the essence of God. Existence as a mark of perfection could not be thought of as an attribute. He taught that inasmuch as the idea of God was innate, therefore the cause could not be less real than the effect. The Cartesian Proof is twofold: 1) We have an idea con- cerning an absolutely perfect being and in this idea itself lies the proof of the existence of such a being. 2) We are imperfect, but nevertheless have an innate idea concerning a perfect being. Only a perfect being could give us this idea. The saying of Descartes : "I think, therefore I am," also proves the existence of God, as all human beings have not only self -consciousness, but also God-consciousness. We think God and cannot get rid of this thought; therefore, God exists just as surely as we exist. Of course, the ontological proof has been criticised. The monk Gaunilo says that thinking a thing does not neces- sarily make it real. He uses the following figure : K some- one in speaking of an island declared it to be more perfect than all other known islands, intending thereby to draw the conclusion that it existed, that it would not be the best and most perfect if it did not exist, then one would not know who was the more foolish, the one who presented the proof or the one who believed it. The existence of the island must be proved first. Anselm defended himself against Gaunilo.* It is evident that Gaunilo and Anselm argue from difi'erent viewpoints. Anselm said, if the island was necessary, he would find it. God is a necessary thought, Kant enters an objection and declares that existence is not perfection and that an idea is just as perfect whether the corresponding reality exists or not. It is only through * Hagenbach's History of Dogma, §163. 24 TIIEOLOOY. the processes of reason that man can know how he under- stands God. Hegel confuses human thought with the di- vine essence and denies a personal God. In accordance with the Hegelian philosophy the ontological proof is a true, speculative proof when the assertion : God is thought, there- fore He exists, is changed to : God thinks, that is. He exists. The ontological proof is, however, not a mixture of thought and being, nor yet the result of a subjective thought. Rather man possesses an innate idea of God and in all his thinking proceeds from and returns to God, whose existence is just as certain as his own self-consciousness. c. The Et/iico-Theological Proof. The will of man cannot be ethically determined by any human will, nor in the last instance can it be determined by impersonal nature. The human will points to a personal God by whom it is materially determined so that the formal freedom receives its proper content. This proof has two forms or names: 1) Argumentiim a conscientia recti or the proof of conscience, which implies that conscience is aware of the moral law and that man perceives an inner voice which convinces him of the existence of a higher being. 2) Argumentum 7norale or the moral proof by which man, conscious of the union of virtue and blessedness, draws the conclusion that a higher being must exist who shall reward the virtuous and punish the unrighteous. This proof was presented by Cicero and Seneca. Later also by Abelard and Raimund of Sabunde. It was further developed by Kant. 2. The Historical Proof or ArgUxMentum e Consensu Gentium. This proof stands in close relationship with the preceding one. It may, however, be counted one of the chief proofs, inasmuch as it sets forth the thought, not of individuals, but of whole peoples. The idea of God is found among all peoples. Every people has some form of worship. Objec- tions have also been made against this proof, but the his- THE EXISTEXCK OF GOD. 25 torical truth of the universality of the idea of God cannot be gainsaid. This proof was set forth by Cicero and was often used by the Church Fathers, such as Clement of Alexandria. Cyprian and others. 3. The Cosmological Proof or Argumentum a Contin- GENTiA Mundi. The world is not self-caused. An absolute personality must exist who has caused it. We cannot go back inter- minably from cause to cause without finally reaching the first, from which all things proceed and which in itself is uncaused by anyone or anything. The first cause could not have been a primitive cell, since the first organism could not have been self -produced. The world must therefore be an ens contingens and created by God. This proof was suggested by Plato and Aristotle. Augus- tine says in his Confessiones, X, Chapter VI, 9 : "And what is this? I asked the earth and it answered, I am not he, and all that is therein gave the same answer. I asked the sea and the deep and all creeping things, and they answered, We are not thy God ; look higher than us. I asked the sun, the moon and the stars. Neither are we the God whom thou seekest. And then I made answer to all these things round about me : Ye have told me concerning my God that ye are not He. Tell me something about Him ! and with a loud voice they answered : He made us." Thomas Aquinas presented the proof in three forms: a) According to Aristotle, from the motion in the world to a primary cause which is not moved by anything, causa eflSciens prima; b) according to DiODORUS of Tarsus and John of Damascus, from the unchangeableness of the world to the unchangeable being who is the cause of all change: c) according to Richard of St. Victor, from the accidental nature of the world to a necessary being who is per se necessarium. Among the objections that have been raised against this proof we mention those of Kant. He says that man sees 26 THEOLOGY, the world as it appears and not as it really is. The acci- dental nature of the world cannot be proved. Against this it may be urged that Kant misunderstood the relationship between spirit and nature. He should have proved first that the world appears different from what it is. Hume states that there is no analogy to the assertion that all things are caused by a cause outside the world. Hegel, who changes the causal relationship between God and the world into a state of substantiality, says that that which is tem- poral is mere appearance, simply external changing forms, but the substance of the world is unchangeable in all change. This pantheistic objection is contradicted by the con- sciousness of man, which declares that the world is not determined by a world soul or by impersonal substance. 4. The Teleological Proof. Design or purpose in the world points to an absolutely wise personality. This is an a posteriori argument. Purpose is causa finalis. Compare Janet's splendid work on Final Causes. Every effect must have an adequate cause, and where purpose is evident this cause must likewise be intel- ligent. We cannot describe or comprehend a piece of ma- chinery save as we know its use and purpose. The teleo- logical proof is one of the oldest, best and most convincing proofs of the existence of God. The argument is presented in two forms : a) The physico- theological, when design in nature is considered; b) the historical theological, when plan and purpose in the history of the world are considered. Among those who have presented this proof in one form or another the following may be mentioned. Anaxagoras stated that the guiding hand in the world was I'or?. SOC- RATES asked if this world could be kept in order by some- thing which lacked understanding. Aristotle said that neither the Divine Being nor nature did anything in vain. Theophilus of Antioch set forth the figure of a ship and a helmsman. When we see the ship sailing along we con- clude that there is a helmsman aboard. MiNUClUS Felix THE EXIf^TENCK OF GO». 27 pointed to the heavens and said that a being with the highest understanding must have set all in order. Athanasius remarks concerning the statues of Phidias that by viewing their form one could recognize the sculptor, and adds, "How much more certain must one not be, in viewing the heavens, that all these wonders have not arranged themselves, but are the work of a Creator." This proof occurs in one form or another in many other writers down to the time of Melanchthon, after which it was abandoned for a con- siderable period until the representatives of the Wolffian philosophy and the advocates of natural theology exerted their influence. Many objections have been raised against this proof. Bacon of Verulam rejected causa finalis and set forth in- stead causae efficientes or the genetic method, Hume and Kant say that we know the world in very small part. We cannot have faith in an absolutely perfect being because the creator cannot be more perfect than his work. It is not certain that there is design in the world, however much it may so appear. Hegel says that this proof leads to the idea of a world soul. The Materialists say that the world is not a finished piece of work, but a workshop which pro- duces its own tools. MOLESCHOTT says that the will is con- ditioned by external influences and that the thinking man is the sum of his sensual experience, or the sum of parents, time, space, atmosphere, sound, light, food and clothes. However, the Materialists have not proved their assertions. They have not proved that the principle of life is a modi- fication of matter and as such the formative principle. Neither have they proved that the soul is a product of mat- ter, nor that ideas are inductively derived from the same source. Even if the Darwinians could prove their doctrine of the original cell, this would still not be a proof that God does not exist. Rightly considered, evolution implies a won- derful teleology that points to an intelligent cause. The teleological proof is incontestably one of the best natural proofs of the existence of God. 28 TirEoi.ooY. ^2. NATURAL REVELATION. The question of revelation and therefore also natural revelation is closely connected with the proofs of God's ex- istence. If a God exists, He must reveal Himself in some way. Revelation means to be revealed and to reveal. God has actively revealed Himself in a general and special sense. In that way His existence has been proved. This reasoning may indeed be in a circle, but it is nevertheless true. Tholuck says: "Reasoning in a circle is not forbidden in the realm of truth. Is not every logical proof to a certain extent based on this reasoning? If the final conclusions were not found in the premises, how could it ever be de- rived therefrom?" Revelatio generalis, or General Revelation, is that nat- ural revelation of God through ivhich He reveals Himself in the conscience of man, in the kingdom of nature, and in history. The invisible God reveals Himself in His works which reflect His attributes. But we could not know this, did He not reveal Himself in us. But God is also a living God who rules and therefore reveals Himself in the events of history. Someone has said that creation and history both conceal and reveal God. Creation and history are books written with consonants as the Hebrew Bible, while man in hearkening to the voice of conscience and reason supplies the vowel signs. There is therefore a natural knowledge of God, cognitio Dei naturalis, which is partly insita, partly acquisita. a. Cognitio insita or innata, which is also called con- stitutional or subjective, is the general conception of God which is found in the heart of every man as a remyiant of the divine image. To this so-called scintillula notitise belongs the conscience, which in the first place is the voice of God in man, but also the voice of our deepest nature. The concept of conscience is expressed in the very name. Compare the expressions for conscience used in different languages. From the legis- NATURAL REVELATION. 29 lative point of view conscience is called conscientia antece- dens; as a witness of special acts, conscientia concomitans; from the critical viewpoint, conscientia subsequens. QUENSTEDT presents the following proofs of the existence of this cognitio insita : 1) The inherited distinction between good and evil; 2) the fear of the Supreme Divinity whicn is natural to all men; 3) terror of an evil conscience ana the securitj^ of a good conscience; 4) the anguish of con- science when a crime has been committed; 5) the common testimony of all peoples; 6) the natural inclination to some form of religion; 7) moral laws produced by natural re- ligion. In the early days of the Church natural religion and the knowledge of God derived therefrom were also set forth. Compare the doctrine of Adyo? o-Tre/j/xaTtKo?. Justin Martyr says in Apol., II : "Every man spoke in accordance with the measure of the Aoyo? o-Trep/xariKo's (the word planted among men), which he had received. Clement of Alexandria expresses himself as follows in Stromata, I, Chapter vii : 'The husbandman among men is only one, viz., He who causes the rain to fall at all times, the Lord, the Word. The times and the places, which were the recipients, brought about the differences that occur." Tertullian in his XVII Apol. says : "Although burdened under the slavery of the body, although led astray by harmful habits, although weak- ened by passion, although under the dominion of false gods, yet whenever the soul comes to itself out of a condition of debauchery, or of sleep, or of sickness, and regains some- thing of its natural health, it speaks of God, using no other expression, because this is the name of the only true God. 'God is great and good; may God grant it,' are expressions upon every tongue. It also bears witness that God is the judge. God sees ! O beautiful testimony of the soul, which is naturally Christian! And when it makes use of these words it looks not up to the Capitoline Hill, but to heaven." Arnobius, C. Gent. 33: "Is there a human being that has not begun the first day of his life with the thought (as idea) of the great head? In whom has it not been implanted ;U) TnEOLOGV. by nature, imprinted and impressed almost from the moth- er's womb, in whom is it not an inherited instinct, that He is King-, Lord and Regent of all that exists?" b. CoGNiTio ACQUisiTA, which is also called objective, is gained by considering the ivorks and activity of God in the kingdom of nature and in history. Gerhard sets forth the following points among others: 1) The variety, beauty and order of nature; 2) the main- tenance and government of creation; 3) the rich gifts that satisfy the wants of all creatures; 4) the divine retribu- tion; 5) the miracles; 6) the prophecies ; 7) the periodical destruction of earthly kingdoms; S) the series of causae efficientes and causae finales. This cognition, although imperfect and weak, is never- theless true, since Paul calls it truth. Cf . Rom. 1 : 18ff. However, we must distinguish between this knowledge be- fore and after the Fall. After the Fall it has been falsified and made imperfect, containing only a partial knowledge of God, His power, wisdom and providence. This knowledge is insufficient for salvation. The natural revelation of God has, however, a threefold usefulness, as pointed out by Calovius: 1) Utilitas pxdw- gogica, so that man seeks true knowledge; 2) utilitas pse- deutica, which leads to moral and general education both within and without the Church; 3) utilitas didactica, be- cause natural revelation can shed light upon the supernat- ural revelation. §3. THE SUPERNATURAL REVELATION. Revelatio specialis, or the Special Revelation, is that external act of God by which He re reals Himself to man through the Logos, the personal Word, and through the Holy Scriptures, so that all men may receive saving knoivl- edge of Him. This revelation is divided as follows: a. immediata or direct, b. mediata or indirect. HOLLAZIUS presents the following modi for the direct SUPERNATURAL REVELATION. 31 revelation: 1) By the hearing of an articulated voice, 2) through sleep, 3) through ecstasy, 4) through urim and thummim, 5) through an inspiration, 6) through the Son. 1. The Possibility of a Supernatural Revelation. Although it is evident since God exists that He can also reveal Himself, still the following points may be considered : 1) On the divine side there can be no obstacles, since God is able to do what He wills; 2) there is nothing to hinder such a revelation in the laws of nature, since God is the ruler of these laws; 3) on the human side there are no obstacles, because man is able to receive, know and examine such a revelation; 4) it cannot be proved that the truths of reason are violated by the special revelation. The objections to the possibility of the supernatural reve- lation come principally from the Deists and the Pantheists. The Deists object: a. That God after creation has with- drawn Himself from the world and left it to develop accord- ing to the laws of nature. A special revelation would disturb this order. While the Deists have not proved their contention, still it may be said that God never ceases to work. All nature is permeated by spiritual power and God is ever active in sustaining the universe in never-ceasing creational activity. The laws of nature do not develop from blind necessity, but are God's way of working. b. The special revelation, if actual, would be a post fac- tum activity and designed to improve the perfect creation of God, which would be unworthy of Him. In dealing with these and other objections we must consider the freedom of man and the disturbing influence of sin. The Pantheists object: a. That a special revelation would militate against the immutability of God. But this immu- tability must not be considered as a cold and petrified im- mobility. b. God and the world are one. Therefore if anything intervenes in nature that would militate against the laws of nature there arises a conflict with the divine essence. 32 TIIKOI.OCY. Clearly a world substance of this sort is no God. Pantheism cannot accept any other revelation than the manifestation of the absolute substance in nature and man. 2. The Necessity of a Supernatural Revelation. The necessity of a special revelation was recognized even by the heathens, such as Plato. The history of religion clearly demonstrates this necessity. The founder of every religion has claimed a special revelation. The history of philosophy itself reveals the need of a special revelation when we consider the contradictions and conflicts that have arisen on all the most important subjects. The necessity of a special revelation is grounded in the need of salvation, the occasion for it being the Fall into sin. This revelation was accidental on the ground of sin as a presupposition, but it was not accidental in the sense that it could have been inhibited after sin had entered the world. Revelation was necessary from the divine viewpoint in order that the design and purpose of creation and salvation might be realized. Revelation was necessary for man be- cause he was powerless to save himself from the power and condemnation of sin. 3. The Reality of Revelation. The Christian Church is now in the world and Christi- anity is the dominating religion. The historical reality of Christ, His words and deeds, the testimony of the Apostles, the miracles, the fulfilment of prophecy, the content of the Holy Scriptures and the fruits of Christianity prove incon- trovertibly the reality of revelation. 4. The Relation between Reason and Revelation. Reason has been defined in many ways, but we may say that reason consists in our power to comprehend necessary truths, while understanding is the ability to judge and draw conclusions. We may also say that reason sets forth the principles that are revealed by the light of nature and the conclusions that are based on these principles. They are SUPEKNATX'RAL KEVEI.ATION. 33 divided as follows: 1) Organic, which belong to the medi- ating disciplines, such as grammar, logic, etc.; 2) philo- sophical: a, absolutely and unrestrictedly universal, which cannot be controverted by any argument, not even by Scrip- ture, e. g., it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time ; b. restrictedlij universal, which are true to a certain extent, i. e., as far as human knowledge goes, but they are limited and may be invalidated through proof, e. g,, the number of essences is the same as the number of persons. This assertion does not hold in the doctrine of the Trinity, Concerning the use of the reason Hollazius says : "Rea- son is not the leader but the follower of theology. Hagar acts as the handmaid of her mistress, but does not com- mand; when she seeks to command, she is driven from the sanctuary of the home." In theology reason is acknowl- edged as possessing organic and instrumental power, iisus organicus et instrumentalis , but not a normal or material influence, non nsus principiorum philosophicorum normalis. Concerning the function of reason in theology the follow- ing division may be observed: 1) usus organicus, which sets forth the assistance rendered by grammar, logic, etc. in the work of exegesis; 2) usus catascevasticus or edifica- tivus, which is the power of the sanctified reason to set forth the content of faith for edification. There is a natural knowledge of God, but it must always be subordinated to the revealed knowledge. When these two forms of knowl- edge do not appear to agree, the former must yield to the latter; when, however, they do agree, the latter strengthens the former; 3) usus anascevasticus or destructivus is the power of the reason to defeat error. In the first place Holy Scripture must supply the arguments, but in the second place philosophical arguments may be employed. Of course we must distinguish between reason per se before the Fall and reason such as it is now, as well as between unregenerated and regenerated reason. The doc- trines of faith are supra rationem and in reality contra rationem corruptam. We must likewise distinguish be- 34 THEOLOGY. tween the diverse character of the fields of the natural and the supernatural. In this manner an apparent con- tradiction will be avoided. For example, Gerhard and with him others set forth the following: When the philoso- pher says ex nihilo nihil fieri, sc. per modum generationis, he does not contradict the theologian who teaches per modum creationis aliquid fieri ex nihilo. In the same manner when the philosopher says that the virgin Mary could not give birth to a child and still remain a virgin, he does not contra- dict the theologian who says that it took place in a super- natural manner. A Christian and true philosophy does not conflict with theology, because their fields are different. § 4. CONCERNING THE BEING OF GOD. 1. The Definition or Conception of God. A true theological knowledge cannot be obtained except through special revelation. Theology must be studied in the light of Christology. For this reason our Lord says in His high-priestly intercessory prayer : "This is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." In Matth. 11: 27 He says: "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." God cannot be defined in an adequate manner. We can only obtain an aliqua descriptio, a definitio Dei yioyninalis. In Isa. 40 : 18 we read : "To whom then will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him?" Gerhard says : "We are certainly able to know God, but not to comprehend Him, i. e., we cannot know Him com- pletely, for He is infinite." Quenstedt defines God as essentia spiritvalis infinita and Hollazius as spirit us inde- pendens. Some of the modern theologians define God as the ahsolutclu harmonious life. Granfelt says, God is per- sonal, holy love. The more recent orthodox theologians in Germany and BjÖrling in Sweden emphasize the concep- tion of absolute personality. There is no doubt that the THE BEING OF GOD. 35 best definition is to be obtained by considering God as the absolute personality. God is not an absolute undetermined substance, according- to Spinoza, rather He is a personality who in Himself lives the life of everlasting love. 2. The Divine Being Defined and the Conception of THE Absolute Personality. We may say that the being of God consists of two parts : a) the formal, or that God is self-conscious and self-deter- mining; b) the material, or that God is love. The parts are therefore being, self-consciousness or thought, and self- determination or will, united in love, which is the qualita- tive factor. These parts abide in and through each other and are therefore equally primitive. The being cannot pre- cede the knowing and the willing, for that would result in substance that is without consciousness or will. The know- ing could not precede the being and the willing, for then God would become an empty form or idea without any cor- responding reality. The willing could not precede the being and the knowing, for this would result in blind power. As an absolute personality God is therefore a unity, a union in love of being, thought and will. God is therefore one, for which reason we can say that true Theism is Monotheism. But Monotheism in no wise conflicts with the doctrine of the Trinity, but is rather explained by it, because as triune God is absolute personality both from the formal and the material point of view. The unity of God comprises two parts: a) the inteyisive, by which God in His position of eternal independence is the union of all attributes of His being, which is called the qualitative unity; b) the exclusive, in accordance with which God is all that He is only by and through Himself, which is called the numerical unity. In accordance with the first part God is perfect by reason of the harmony be- tween the being, the knowing and the willing. The will agrees with the being so that God is power; the thought agrees with the being so that God is truth; the will agrees with the absolute good so that God is the Holy One ; the 36 TIIKOI.OCiV. thought agrees with the absolute good so that God is wis- dom. By reason of the second part God is self-sufficient, which constitutes His autarchy. The harmony of the divine attributes in the unity of love from the internal point of view constitutes His blessedness and from the external point of view His majesty. The conception of the absolute personality which ex- presses His being is set forth bj^ Dogmaticians in the fol- lowing manner : God is a unity in love of being, knowing and tvilling, ayid by reason of this unity He is the perfect, self- sufficient ayid blessed majesty. In the Holy Scriptures the names of God express His being. The word "countenance" is also used to express God's being, as in the following passage : "I shall behold thy face in righteousness ; I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with beholding thy form." The attributes of God's essence are set forth in their relation to the world, but in this connection the following passages may be quoted: "God is one" (Romans 3: 30) ; "There is no God but one" (1 Cor. 8:4); "One God and Father of all" (Eph. 4:6); "For there is one God" (1 Tim. 2:5); "Your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matt. 5: 48); "Neither is he served by men's hands, as though he needed anything" (Acts 17 : 25) ; "For as the Father hath life in himself, even so gave he to the Son also to have life in himself" (John 5: 26). In 1 Tim. 6: 15 God is called the blessed and only Potentate. In addition many passages could be quoted that describe the being, knowing and willing of God, and also that He is love. John 4: 24 'Vver/xu 6 öeds" is a most wonderful and re- markable definition of God. The omission of the article does not make the expression indefinite, but is the most definite and emphatic way of saying that God is the Spirit in the absolute sense. Spirit stands first in the original, and, therefore, occupies the most emphatic place, literally translated: "Spirit is God." He is not a spirit, but spirit in the fullest and highest sense. The only corresponding dogmatic expression is, God is the Absolute Personality. THE RRING OF GOD. 37 We human beings, although created in the image of God, cannot comprehend the infinite Spirit, Man knows partly his own spirit through his self -consciousness, but the Spirit of God man knows only by analogy. A divine self -conscious- ness is necessary to know the essence of God. Compare Matt. 11: 27, where it is stated that only the Father knows the Son and the Son the Father. And when the Son re- vealeth the Father to the believers, the knowledge imparted is only relative. When God is defined as absolute spirit and incorporeal, we should not look upon the divine Spirit as unreal. The spiritual essence of God is the most real substance. God as Spirit is more real than any phenomenon. The Spirit of God is more real than the soul or spirit of man, and the soul of man is more real than his body. The soul is not exposed to changes like the body, and at death the soul remains a spiritual entity just as real as before death. It is easier to think of the soul as intact after death than the body, because we know how the body dissolves. The reason, will and feeling occupy no space, but are nevertheless real. The soul, although naturally penetrating every part of the body, as an entity occupies no space. The forces or laws of nature, such as gravity, are invisible. The fact that a thing is invisible does not make it unreal. We do not see the soul, but we feel that the spiritual in us is our real being. God is just as real without a body as if He had one. God has no eyes and ears as we have, but it is self-evident that He sees and hears. Compare Ps. 94 : 9. God makes an impres- sion on the human soul as really as matter does upon the human body. Compare Ps. 77 : 3 : ''I remember God and am disquieted." Although God has no body nor bodily organs, He still can manifest Himself. And the Son of God as incarnated has a body and will appear as the God-man with a glorified body in all eternity. Philip wanted to see the Father. He said to the Lord Jesus Christ : "Lord, show us the Father, and it sufiiceth us. Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long time with you, and dost thou not know me, Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father." 38 TIIKOLOGY. Philip desired to see a bodily manifestation just as he saw the Lord Jesus. The disciples did not understand that in knowing- the character of Jesus Christ they also knew the character of the Father, They did not then realize that the divine essence is one that exists in three relative persons. Christ did not at that time explain that the hypostasis of the Father, as it is in reality, could not be seen with bodily eyes. We do not even see one another except in the picture form. The outward appearance is not the most important ; the soul and character are essential. The Father has re- vealed Himself by means of many manifestations. Some of the disciples had heard His voice, as on the mount of trans- figuration. The Holy Spirit also had revealed Himself. God as absolute Spirit in the highest sense is also the absolute Personality. Personality implies self-conscious- ness and self-determination. Self-consciousness is the power which a rational being possesses of making itself the object of its own thought and of knowing that it has done so, and, therefore, it also knows the identity of subject and object. We must clearly discriminate between conscious- ness and self-consciousness. In consciousness the object is something different from the subject. An animal is con- scious of another object, but never duplicates its own unity and contemplates itself. The animal has many experiences, but cannot refer them back to itself as a person can. There is no self-knowledge in an animal. Man is both conscious and self-conscious. But God is not first conscious and then self-conscious. God is eternally self-conscious. In the doc- trine of the Trinity it is self-evident that the divine self- consciousness is trinal. But there are not three independent self-conscious persons. God is one, and there can be but one divine essence. Three separate and independent divine essences would be an axiomatic contradiction, because none of them would be absolute, and as a consequence none could be God or Absolute Personality. The doctrine of the divine unity was as important to the Israelites and Jews of old as the doctrines of the resurrection of Christ and justification by faith to the Christians. When the Old Testament people THK HEIAG OF GOD. 39 emigrated from Egypt their motto was : "Hear, O Israel : Jehovah our God is one Jehovah." If they did not fully understand the trinal unity, they were ready to die for the doctrine that God is one. God is one God and the only God. The unity of God is unique. God is not a unit, but a unity implying distinctions. God is blessed forever independently of the universe. His majesty is manifested to the rational beings. God was blessed before creation, being eternally blessed. As the material element of the conception of God as the absolute personality is His love within Himself inde- pendent of creation, it is plain that His blessedness belongs to His very nature, but on account of His love He created rational angels and man and also created for them a uni- verse suitable to their condition. But God is not a part of the universe and the universe is not a part of God. The All is not the infinite God. The Infinite and the universe are wholly diverse. God as infinite cannot be finite, and He is not limited by the finite world which He created according to His wisdom. The simplicity, spirituality and immutability of God also preclude the thought that God in His immanence is extended. When we say that God is the Absolute as a real person, we also reject such views as the following: God is an absolute idea, a universal mind, a world-soul, a moral order of the universe, etc. 3. Anti-Theistic Theories. a. Pantheism. By this is meant the view that God and nature or that God and the entire universe are one and the same substance. All things temporal are considered as modifications or parts of the one substance. Pantheism therefore implies Monism and cannot be separated from Determinism. In considering the question of God's rela- tion to the world, Pantheism is the opposite of Deism. Pantheism is said to be twofold: 1) Acosmism, or the Oriental Pantheism, according to which the world has been entirely merged in God. In this class are counted the Eleatics, such as Xenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno. Par- 40 TIIKOI.OOY. MENIDES taught that being is not an abstract unity, but the only reality, an absolute unity and the only one. Being is likewise indivisible and unchangeable with neither begin- ning nor end. He also stated that being is identical with thought, for thought must be being; non-being is nothing. According to Parmenides the world has entirely entered into God or what he calls being. The world of phenomena is non-being and exists only in the thought of man; 2) Athe- ism, or the Occidental Pantheism, by which God is merged in the world. According to this view becoming is set forth, but not being. Modern Pantheism began with Bruno, who was a fore- runner of the most noted of all Pantheists, Spinoza. His system contained the ideas substance, attribute and mode. There exists only one substance. This substance he calls God. All separate existences are merely modifications of the substance. He considers the world as an accident of the divine substance. The substance has attributes, each of which gives expression in its way to the essence of the substance. These are thought and extension. God is think- ing substance when considered from that point of view ; He is extended substance when so considered. But the exten- sion of the divine substance does not imply length or depth or shape. The attributes do not belong to the substance, for the substance excludes all determination. Res cogitans and res extensa are the same thing. The infinite substance appears in finite forms or modi Avhich are like the waves of the sea. Therefore all that we see, yea, the entire uni- verse, is nothing more than the modes of the attributes or of the substance. Among idealistic Pantheists may be mentioned Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Fichte represents Subjective Ideal- ism, the identity of thought and being, of the subjective and the objective in the ego. Things as to their substance are not found outside the ego. Schelling represents the Objective Idealism, the identity of thought and being even independent of the ego. What Fichte calls the highest prin- ciple or the ego, Schelling calls the world soul. While Fichte THE BEING OF GOD. 41 sets forth the subjective ego as the principle of all being and knowing, Schelling endeavors to show that the ob- jective non-ego or nature could just as well be set forth as the principle of being and knowing. Hegel is the repre- sentative of the Absolute Idealism ; thought is the source of the indwelling concept and is the only reality and truth. The absolute ego realizes itself fn the non-ego. Hegel's Pantheism is logical. He said that reason is the organ of philosophy. The absolute is the result which the reason reaches through the exercise of dialectical thinking from undetermined being. According to Hegel all that exists is simply the revelation of God in the exercise of thought. God is everything and nothing. He is all because He is the only substance that sustains all consciousness and every existing thing. He is nothing because He is conscious of Himself only through man. Clearly such systems conflict with Christianity. b. Materialism. Materialism says that matter is the only substance, from which everything is derived. There is therefore no spiritual essence either in the universe or in man. The anti-theistic theory appears in so many varia- tions that it is difficult to give a precise definition. Materi- alism may be divided into two main divisions: 1) The an- cient, which is represented by Democritus and Epicurus; 2) the modern, which is represented by Hobbes, whose ma- terialism, however, was not complete, La Mettrie, von Hol- bach, Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Huxley and others. The last named do not desire to. be classed as Materialists, but they are clearly materialistic philosophers and their posi- tions are anti-theistic. c. Positivism. This designation was originated by AUGUSTE COMTE who may be said to be the foremost cham- pion of Positivism. The main principles of Positivism are not new, for they were set forth in ancient times by Prota- goras and in modern times by Hume and Kant. Comte has, however, formulated into a system the ideas that are char- acteristic of Positivism. It is not easy to define Positivism, for skeptical, materialistic and general atheistic tendencies 42 THEOLOGY. bear the name of Positivism. Positivism forms a link be- tween Skepticism and Materialism. Comte says that we know nothing- but physical phenomena and their laws. He rejects both causa efficiens and causa finalis. The world phenomena has not been produced by any supernatural cause. Religion in the ordinary sense was not needed and is considered as a weakness. The religion of Positivism presented as objects of worship the earth, the universe and humanity. This is enough to show the anti-Theism of Positivism. 4. Notes on the History of Dogma. A. Concerning the Comprehensihility ayid Nature of God. When we consider the development of the dogma during the different periods we find that most thinkers take the position that God cannot be understood or defined in an adequate manner. Among those who took another view were Arius and especially Eunomius. Duns Scotus held the view that man could attain essential knowledge. Dionysius the Areopagite and John Scotus Erigena were both influ- enced by Pantheism, as were also Böhme, Servetus and others later on. There were some that held anthropomor- phic views. The Alexandrian school and Origen fought against them. Tertullian laid emphasis upon the substan- tiality of God without ascribing to Him a material body. JusTi.v Martyr says that there is no name for the Father of all, who is unborn. For by what name He might be called, the person who gave Him the name would be the »older. The words Father, God, Creator, Lord and Master are not names but designations derived from His good works. CKKMp:N'r ok Alkx.\xdria says that we can tell, not what God is, but what He is not, and he removes from God all finite characteristics. God is neither genus nor species, substance nor accident. Even after giving ourselves to Christ our consciousness of Him is more negative than positive. His views were not anthropomorphic. Tkr- TULLiAN ascribed to God a body, not an ordinary human body, but a form of existence. He maintained that nothing could be without bodily form except that which did not exist. However, w'e cannot count him among the anthropomorphists. OuuiKX said that God was incom- prehensible and past finding out. As the brilliance of the sun exceeds the light of a lantern, so the glory of God exceeds our conception of Him. the' beixg of god. 43 The Audians, so-called from their founder, Audius of Mesopotamia, held anthropomorphic views of God. Atiiaxa-sisus holds that only a pure and sinless being can see God. God cannot be seen nor compre- hended. His essence cannot be discovered by man and He is above all substance. Gregory of Nazianzus calls God the sea of being. EuxoMius declared that God did not know^ more of His own being than we do, and that we can comprehend Him. Augustine would not call God a substance, for that would imply the conception of accident. Our language cannot deffne the essence of God. John of Damascits said that God is above all knowledge. Joiix ScoTus Erigexa held the view that God did not know Himself. He is nothing, and therefore knows not what He is. He divides nature, which includes God, as follows: 1) That which creates and is not created (God); 2) that which is created and creates (Logos); 3) that which is created, but does not create (the world) ; 4) that which is neither created nor creates (God as the goal). Axselm taught that God indeed knows' Himself, but we cannot obtain adequate knowledge of Him. THOiiAS Aqhixa.s declared that man cannot have a quid- ditative (essential) knowledge of God, but may know Him in His relation to the created world. Albert the Great distinguishes between Deum intellectu attingere et comprehendere and ascribes the first- named to man. Duxs Scotus maintained that man could have a quid- ditative knowledge of God. The controversy was settled as follows: That man can obtain knowledge of God's being, cognitio quidditatis Dei, but not a knowledge complete in every detail, cognitio quidditativa. The fathers of the Reformation and the old Dogmaticians in general consider that the human conceptions of God are inadequate. Tiiomasius considered that our knowledge of God contains elements that objec- tively represent the nature of God. Piiilltppi said that our knowledge of God, while true and well-founded, does not objectively express the essence of God. B. Concerning the Unity of God and the Primitive Char- acte7'istics of His Being. Because Christianity acknowledged Monotheism, as ex- plained in the doctrine of the Trinity, it became necessary to combat Polytheism, Dualism and Gnosticism. A variety of natural and mathematical figures of speech were used to prove the oneness of God. Through the subsequent con- troversies within the Church itself the doctrine of Christian Monotheism was established. Different opinions concern- ing that which is primitive in the essence of God have been 44 THEOLOGY. set forth during- the different periods and in our own church there has likewise been a diversity of views. JusTix Martyk said that the unity of God is an innate idea, and that God is the perfect intellect. Mixrcius Fki.ix and Cyi'hiax say that as there is one ruler in a kingdom, one queen in a bee-hive, and one leader in a flock, so there can be only one God. Julius Afkicaxvs said the will was the primitive characteristic of God's essence. Okigex said that God is intelligence and intellect. , Gkkcory ok Nyssa sets forth the unity of God from the concept of God's perfection. If there were many gods, then all must be perfect; still in such case they must either be alike or unlike; in the latter case they would each lack the perfection of the others, in the former case there would be only one God. At'ci'.stixk set forth the divine self- consciousness as the primitive characteristic of Gods' essence. Jonx of Damascus endeavored to conceive of the unity of God by considering His immensity, for if there were many gods, the one could find no room because the other filled all space. Axselm says that self-consciousness is the primitive characteristic of God's essence. Tho.mas Aqiixas sets forth being, while Duxs Scotus sets forth the will as the primitive characteristic of the essence of God. Li^THER lays stress on love as the primitive characteristic, and in his work De Servo Arbitrio he makes mention of the absolute power. Gerhard emphasizes essence, but he also says: in Deo idem est esse et intelligere et velle. Calovius also emphasizes essence, but speaks of God as the absolute Spirit and mentions intellectus and voluntas. TiioxrAsius. Jul. Miiller and DELiTZfstii set forth the will as the primi- tive chararacteristic. Piiillippi presents God in the first place as the absolute substance, but then also as the absolute subject and as love. He also mentions, 1) self-consciousness and 2) self-determination. B.JciRLiXG and Gkanfelt set forth being, intellect and will as equally primitive. The latter says that in every part and at all points they must come in contact with, measure up to and determine one another. §5. CONCERNING THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 1. The Conception of the Attributes. In the theological terminology the attributes are called attribnta. Proprictates set forth the trinitarian relation- ship and prxdicata special acts, such as creation, etc. But in speaking of the attributes and the predicates we must not consider the former as inactive, for God is an actus purissimus. The attributes are based upon the essential characteristics THE mVIXE ATTRIBUTES. 45 of God's essence. The attributes set forth the relationship of God's essence to the world. His essential characteristics are therefore both transcendent and immanent. They have two sides, one inward toward God Himself, the other out- ward toward the world. In the latter case the essential characteristics become the same as the attributes. The attributes are not supplements to the essence of God which can be laid aside without detriment to the divine being. The attributes are therefore unchangeable and permanent. Gerhard says that the attributes, considered per se, are really one with the divine essence. God is not, therefore, a combination of essence and attributes. With regard to the subjectivity of the attributes it may be remarked that they are not the subjective products of our thought, but are grounded in the essence of God and are objectively true, although they are not to be considered as disintegrated parts. Their relation is such that they subsist in and through each other. Each attribute expresses the whole of the divine essence, otherwise the essence would be divided. However, this does not nullify the distinction above mentioned. Each attribute gives expression to the divine essence in a special manner. Various opinions have appeared from time to time con- cerning the objectivity and the subjectivity of the divine at- tributes. According to Augustine they are distinguished subjectively only in our own thought. In De trin., VI, 7, he says : "His greatness is the same as His wisdom, for He is not great by bulk but by power ; His goodness is the same as His wisdom and His greatness, and His truth is the same as all these things, and in Him it is not one thing to be blessed and another thing to be great or wise, true, good, or in a word, to be Himself." Thomas Aquinas said that the conceptual distinctions on the part of man were well grounded objectively (fundamentum aliquid in re) , and distinguished between dwtinctio rationis ratiocinantis, a subjective distinction, and distinctio rationis ratiociifiatse , which is grounded in the object. QUENSTEDT follows Thomas Aquinas and uses his terms, but says, nevertheless, 46 THEOLOGY. that strictly and correctly speaking, God has no attributes, but is the most simple essence, which cannot be resolved into parts and is without all composition. By reason of the fact that we cannot comprehend the divine essence in an adequate manner, therefore we endeavor to apprehend it by means of distinct and inadequate conceptions which im- perfectly represent the divine essence, and these concep- tions are called attributes. HOLLAZius says: "The divine attributes are distinguished from the divine essence and from each other not nominally, nor really, but formally, ac- cording to our mode of conceiving, not without a certain foundation of distinction." Schleiermacher says that the attributes do not represent anything in the essence of God, nor in His relation to the world, but are the relationships inherent in the idea of God as found in the Christian con- sciousness. Thomasius considers that the attributes are found not only in our reason, but also in God Himself. Phillippi takes the view that they are not objective and distinct attributes in the essence of God, but that they are nevertheless true and grounded in the revelation of God. 2. How We Gain Knowledge of the Divine Attributes. The Church Fathers in general taught that we gain knowl- edge of the attributes in three ways. Dogmaticians, such as Gerhard and Hollazius, used the same method and like- wise taught that we gain knowledge of the attributes via negationis, via causalitatis and via eminentiae. Via negationis sets out from the principle : quod summe perfectum est, ei nullus inest defectus, or that there is no imperfection in that which in the highest sense is perfect. We remove from God whatever implies imperfection in creatures, and ascribe to Him an opposite perfection, so that we say that He is perfect, independent, immeasurable, immortal, etc. Via cnuftalitatis is based upon the following principle: effectus testatur de causa ej usque perfectione, or that an effect testifies of the cause and its perfection. We ascribe THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 47 to God as the cause the good attributes which are revealed in His works. Via eminentise is derived from the principle : quidquid exstat in effectu praeexistit in causa, or whatever exists in the effect, pre-exists in the cause ; so that we ascribe to God in the highest degree those attributes which we find in a lower degree in ourselves. Through via negationis we learn of God's transcendence and through the other methods we learn of His immanence. It is necessary to unite these three ways and not to separate them, in order to derive a perfect idea of God's attributes. 3. Division of the Attributes. Dogmaticians have divided the attributes in many ways. Baier, Schmid and others have divided them into negative attributes, such as unity, simplicity, eternity, immensity and immutability; and jjositive, such as life, wisdom, justice, truth, power, goodness and perfection. Others, such as Björling, divide them into the attributes of being, knowing and willing. The attributes of absolute being are, eternity, omnipresence, immutability, and immensity; the attributes of the absolute intellect are, omniscience, omnisapience ; the attributes of the absolute will are, power, holiness, right- eousness, truthfulness and love. Phillippi : The attributes of the absolute substance are eternity and omnipresence ; of the absolute subject, power and omniscience ; of the abso- lute love, wisdom, righteousness and goodness. Thomasius divides the attributes into immanent and relative. Among the former are eternity, immensity, etc., and among the latter power, omniscience, omnipresence, etc. It is our pur- pose to follow this division in the section of Christology. Luthardt in his dogmatics makes use of a combination of SCHLEIERMACHER and NiTZSCH : 1) Essential character- istics according to the conception of the absolute personality or according to the Scriptures : Life, light and love. 2) Those attributes that express the relationship of the absolute per- sonality to the world: A. God's relationship to the natural world: a) Distinct from the world (eternity, infinity and 48 THEOLOGY. immutability) ; b) Contact with the world (omnipresence, power, omniscience and wisdom) ; B. God's relationship to the moral world: a) Separated from but active in the moral world (holiness, righteousness and truthfulness; b) Contact (love as expressed in goodness, mercy, longsuffer- ing, patience, meekness, faithfulness, etc.)." 4. Essential Characteristics. * In accordance with the conception of the absolute per- sonality we might say that the essential characteristics or the transcendental attributes are the following: Perfection or the harmony between being, intellect and will, self- sufficiency and love. In this connection, however, we wish to consider the essential characteristics according to Bib- lical expressions, as life, light and love. a. Vita or life. God is the absolute life, the absolutely harmonious life. He possesses the principle of His own existence in Himself. QUENSTEDT says: "The life of God is that attribute by which His essence ever manifests its activity," Cf. Ezekiel, chap 1, concerning the living crea- tures and the wheels, etc.; "A living God" (Acts 14: 15) ; "The Father hath life in himself" (John 5: 26) ; "Neither is he served by men's hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he himself giveth to all life, and breath, and all things" (Acts 17: 25); "Who only hath immortality" (1 Tim. 6: 16). b. Lux or light. God is the absolute light. Of all things light is the purest. God is therefore the absolute truth, wisdom and holiness. Compare how the divine majesty is described in Ezekiel 1 and in Daniel 7. "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights" (James 1 : 17) ; "And this is the mes- sage which we have heard from Him an announce to you, that God is the light, and in him is no darkness at all" (1 John 1:5), etc. * Luthardt's Conipendiuni. S29, p. 99. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 49 c. Amor or love. God lives within Himself the life of everlasting love. In God are found both the subject and object of love and also the union between them. "He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love" (1 John 4:8); "The Father loveth the Son" (John 3: 35) ; "Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world" (John 17: 24). Compare vv. 23, 26. In regard to these three essential characteristics or at- tributes of the divine essence we add to what is above stated : Vita is the essential attribute which corresponds to His per- fection as an expression of the divine intensive or qualita- tive unity. No one can define life, and God is the essence of life. All life depends on God, spiritual, physical, angelic, human, animal and vegetable. In regard to Logos John says : "In him was life." The incarnated Logos, or Christ, says : "I am the life." Christ defines eternal life as knowl- edge of God and Himself. Cf. John 17:3: "And this is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." Lux, the second great essential attribute, corresponds to the self- sufficiency of God as expressed by the exclusive or numerical unity of the divine essence. According to the numerical unity God is unicus and none is like Him, and He is the only one who is self-sufficient. He is, therefore, the absolute light and has all light within Himself. And all light in the world has its source in Him. The incarnated Logos is the light of the world. In John 1 : 9 we read: "There was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world." In James 1 : 17 God is called the Father of lights. Amor is the third attribute which. is character- istic of the divine essence. God is love, which is the material element of the Absolute Personality. The diversification of external attributes was not necessary for God Himself. He lived eternally and lives eternally in love. When God cre- ated angels and man the love of God flowed out in the uni- verse. What would the world be without the life, light and love of God ! Dngmatics. 3. 5. The Special Attributes. A. In Relation to the Natural Woiid. a. Immanent Attributes, Distinct from the Natural World. ^ternitas, or eternity, is that attribute of God which expresses His possession of the fulness of infinite life and that in an absolute sense He is independent of time by ivhich all finite existences are conditioried. We cannot comprehend the idea of eternity because we view it from the standpoint of time and because we lack suitable analogies. Someone has compared eternity to a circle and time to a line passing off from the periphery of the circle. It might still better be said that the line is within the periphery. In the nature of the case God must be eternal also from the point of view that He is without beginning, for who or what could have existed if God had not been? We cannot conceive of anything existing before God. And if there was nothing, neither could there be the concept "nothing." We cannot comprehend the eternity of God because of the limitations of our thought, but it would be just as incomprehensible that God should not be eternal. Among Scripture passages the following may be here noted : "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from ever- lasting to everlasting, thou art God" (Ps. 90: 2); "Thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end" (Ps. 102: 27) ; "With thee is the fountain of life" (Ps. 36: 9) ; "His everlasting power and divinity" (Rom. 1: 20) ; "And he is before all things" (Col. 1: 17) ; "And sware by him that liveth for ever and ever" (Rev. 10: 6), etc. Augustine understood eternity to be never-ceasing being, BOETiiius defines eternity thus: Quod sit interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio. Anselm declares that concerning God it can only be said that He is. Thomas Aquinas said that eternity is the same as tota simul. Ger- hard* says that the Scholastics define eternity as follows: * Gerh. Loci Theologici, Tomus I, Cap. VIII, Sectio IV, pp. 307, 137. THE DIVINE ATTKIBUTES. 51 Quod sit duratio interminabilis, indivisibilis et independens. Interminabilis, quia excludit terminum a quo et ad quern ; indivisibilis, quia excludit omnem successionem temporis; independens, quia excludit omnem imperfectionem ac muta- tionem. Hase defines : "That attribute by which God, Him- self independent of all time, is the creator of time, by which all finite existences are conditioned." Martensen : "God is eternal as that esserice which possesses life and fulness in itself, a living eternity which ever blossoms forth in un- fadirig youth." LUTHARDT* : "Supertime, which is not quantitatively but qualitatively separated from that which exists in time, that which is purely present, and which therefore comprises the background which sustains time and which at every moment can dwell within the same." Immensitas, immensity, BAiERf defines : "The immensity of God consists in this, that the divine essence cannot be measured by, or included within, any local limits." Im- mensity is the infinity of God or His absolute transcendence above spatial relations. We must understand God's im- mensity not extensively but intensively. "Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith Jehovah" (Jer. 23: 24) ; "But will God in very deed dwell on earth? behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee ; how much less this house that I have builded!" (1 Kings 8: 27), Immutabilitas or immutability, according to Björling, is that attribute by which God, independent of time, is also independent of all those changes that continually take place in time. BAiERt : "Immutabilitas consistit in eo, quod Deus nulli mutationi, neque secundum esse, neque secundum ac- cidentia, neque secundum locum, neque secundum volunta- tem aut propositum est obnoxius." According to this definition the immutability of God consists in this, that God cannot be subject to any change: 1) in regard to essence, because He is eternal, 2) in regard to accidental attributes, because all in God is essential, 3) in regard to space, be- 1 — * Kompendium, Fifth Ed., Trans, by Neander, p. 100. t Baieri Comp. Pars I, Cap. 1, §XII. t Baieri Comp. Theol. Pos., Caput. I, §X. 52 TIIKOI.OliV. cause He is omnipresent, 4) in regard to will, because He can do what He wills, 5) in regard to purpose or resolution, because He is omniscient and all-wise. But the immuta- bility of God ad extra and ad intra does not imply a mo- notonous sameness, a barren, petrified existence, or such like. When, therefore, we read of God's repentance, and that He does not punish men when they repent, as in Nine- veh, although He had threatened to punish, this does not militate against His immutability, but rather emphasize-j: it, because God thereby corresponds to His own nature. God's seeming change is in fact a change of relation on the part of man. When sinners, like the people of Nineveh, are wicked and do not repent, they are exposed to the justice of God, but when they repent, they enter into a new relation and receive God's grace and mercy. As an analogy we may use the sun and our relation to it. We may place ourselves in such a relation to the sun that we are healed and live, but we may also expose ourselves in such a way that we are hurt and killed by sunstroke. God is not only love, but also a consuming fire. Each attribute of God works im- mutably according to its nature. , How God's love and justice work immutably and do not conflict is evident in the great work of reconciliation. In love God sends His Son and in justice He sacrifices Him for the expiation of the sins of the world. The immutability of God is an earnest that in a living way He answers to all His attributes. Prayer, for instance, would be worthless, if God were mutable ad intra or ad extra. But because He is immutable, therefore prayer has a sure foundation. God appears in history and enters into the life of individuals and of nations and follows the history of mankind with great sympathy. The following Scripture passages may be quoted: "I, Jehovah, change not" (Mai. 3 : 6) ; "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning" (James 1: 17). THE DIVIXE ATTRIBUTES. 53 b. Relative Attributes or Attributes of Contact. Omnipr^sentia, or omnipresence, Hase defines as fol- lows: "That attribute by tvhich God, Himself independent of all space, is the creator of space, by luhich all material substayices are conditioned." God's transcendence as well as His immanence are united in His omnipresence. Of course we are unable to understand completely how God can be omnipresent, but we can understand it in part by pre- senting certain qualifying characteristics. Negative characteristics are such as the following: 1) non circumscriptive, because God is not limited as to space ; 2) non definitive, as pneumatic bodies and angels are present somewhere; 3) non extensive, by extension as the ether or the universe; 4) non per rar ef actionem, because God is not present through rarefaction or diminution; 5) non per multiplicationem or ihrovighrauMi^McSiiion', 6) non per divisionem or through the division of His essence. Positive characteristics of His prsesentia are the following: 1) illocalis, because, although His throne is in heaven. He is intensively present everywhere but not limited to any certain place; 2) intensiva,^ or that His essence is of such a nature that He can be present everywhere without exten- sion; 3) repletiva, or that God, Himself contained within no bounds, contains or enfolds all things as in a little point (Gerhard: omnia instar minutissimi puncti continens) ; 4) Indivisibilis, because ubicunque est, totus est, for God cannot be divided, so that a part of His essence should be * When we say that God is everywhere present in an intensive sense, this implies in the first place the opposite of an extensive omnipresence. The theological expression implies more than intensity in the ordinary sense. Although God cannot be or rather is not extended everywhere in a local sense, yet He is everywhere by reason of the inward power and nature of His essence. There is no analogy. Our thought can be present at many places without extension. In a real sense God can be everywhere. Our spirit or soul can without extension be present throughout the body, and still the soul has its seat somewhere. God is everywhere present throughout the universe, but He reveals Himself specially in heaven, from whence He is intensively and repletively present everywhere. It is not unthinkable, although it is inexplicable, that an absolute essence can be so constituted that it can be present everywhere in an illocal sense, and yet reveal itself somewhere. If we think of Christ, the matter becomes clearer. 54 TIIKOI.OGY. at one place and a part at another; 5) incomprehensihilis or incomprehensible, for there is no analogy that can represent the substantial presence, but we can understand that a being can be constituted in such a manner when that being is an absolute personality or God. The thought of man can be at many places. While this is not an analogy, still we may learn from it that God who is an absolute spirit can in- tensively be present everywhere; 6) operativa, so that God is actively present everywhere. Our soul is operatively present in the body. A speaker in an auditorium is opera- tively present everywhere in the whole room, although not locally through extension. A king is present in an opera- tive sense throughout his whole kingdom. There is, how- ever, this difference with God, that He is both substantially and operatively present everywhere. The Scriptures clearly teach the omnipresence of God : "Know therefore this day, and lay it to thy heart, that Je- hovah he is God in heaven above and upon earth beneath" (Deut. 4: 39) ; "Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith Je- hovah" (Jer. 23: 24) ; "Thou hast beset me behind and be- fore, and laid thy hand upon me. If I ascend up into heaven thou art there : if I make my bed in Sheol, behold, thou art there" (Ps. 139: 5, 8) ; "Jehovah is nigh unto all them that call upon him" (Ps. 145: 18) ; "Christ says: "I am with you always, even unto the end of the world" (Matt. 28: 20) : Paul says concerning God : "In him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17: 28), etc. Hermes Trismegistus said that God is an intellectual sphere whose center is everywhere and whose periphery is nowhere. Augustine said that it would be more suitable to say that all things are in God than that God is in all things. Thomas Aquinas said that the essential presence of God gives reality to space and its affections. Gerhard says among many other things on this subject: "Deus est totus in omnibus, totus in singulis, totus in se ipso." The old Dogmaticians call God's substantial presence in things immediatio sujjpositi, and His activity they call immediatio virtutis. The former term implies that there is no inter- THE DIVINE ATTRIRTTTES. 55 mediary subject, the second that there is no intermediary power beside God's own. God's presence has also been con- sidered as revealing His power, grace and glory. The Gies- sen and Sa^on theologians taught a specialis approximatio essential; ^av.nse ad substantiam credentium. The Tilbingen theologians, however, and especially Gerhard and Mus^us in Jena, spoke of a gratiosa operatio. In general it is taught that the presence of God is both siibstantialis and operativa. Some have taught a modified omnipresence which implies merely an operative presence, while others have taught a relative presence, i. e., God is present wherever He wills to be. But the Scriptures set forth an omnipresence that is more general than those implied in omniprsesentia modifi- cata and relativa, so that we may say that it is an omniprse- sentia absoluta which also implies the operativa. The omni- presence of God is absolute, both substantial and operative. Just as the soul in its entirety is everywhere in the body, God as the absolute spirit is totally in every place of the universe. But His presence may not be recognized. As a figure or analogy we may use electricity. There must be an induction. Think of the induction of electricity by Franklin's kite and how it led to the great electrical inven- tions ! God has given us the means of grace, and we should use those means. And there may be so-called spiritual in- duction by prayer, when we realize the presence of God, A Christian feels daily the presence of the Lord in the mystical union. There are many promises as to the pres- ence of the Lord. But God is present independent of our feeling. Omnipotentia or power. On the basis of the intensive unity, God is the perfect essence. He is also the absolute power because His will harmonizes with His essence. Om- nipotence is therefore that attribute of God by tvhich He can do all things that are not contrary to His ivilL Om- nipotentia is called absoluta when we consider the divine power as active at the creation and in the miracles ; relativa or ordinata, when we consider it as mediated through the laws of nature. 56 THEOLOGY. The divine will is named and divided as follows : Voluntas necestnaria or vat ii rails, by which God wills and determines Himself, and voluntas libera, by which God determines the whole universe and all definite things. Voluntas libera is divided as follows: 1) with regard to the relation of tho will to outside objects, a) prima, absoluta or antecedens, and b) secunda, conditionata or consequens. The former refers to a disposition of God without reference to any con- ditions; the latter to one in which conditions and circum- stances are considered; 2) with regard to the imparting of the content of the divine will, a) beneplaciti or abscondita, the secret will, and b) signi (on account of certain signs) or revelata, the revealed will. These divisions have mostly arisen through the controversy on election. The Scriptures present the power or omnipotence of God in the form of figures or in direct statements : "The arm of thy strength" (Ps. 89: 10) ; "The right hand of the Lord doeth valiantly" (Ps. 118: 16) ; "or he spake, and it was done: he commanded, and it stood fast" (Ps. 33: 9) ; "With God all things are possible" (Matt. 19: 26) ; "The Lord al- mighty" (2 Cor. 6: 18; Rev. 1:8), etc. Chrysostom and John of Damascus spoke of an ante- cedent and subsequent will. Prosper Aquitanus distin- guished between a secret and a revealed will of God. The former was seria or efficax and the latter was non seria, for the secret will had reference to those chosen for salva- tion, but the revealed will had reference to the universal call which was not serious. Clearly the secret and the re- vealed will cannot conflict with each other, for then the veracity of God would be annulled. Abelard said that God cannot do anything except what He does. We may say that God can do all that He wills, but He does not do all that He can. Duns Scotus declared that God could determine what is good, and therefore conceived God's will to be arbitrary. Luther sanctioned the division of the will as secret and revealed. Calvin misinterpreted the division in the same manner as Prosper Aquitanus. But the misinterpretation does not hinder the use of terms which, when correctly em- THE DIVIXE ATTRIIiUTES. 57 ployed, serve to explain this attribute, as in the relation be- tween the determined order of God and His daily providence. Omniscientia or omniscience. By this attribute is meant that God in an immediate and perfect manner knows all that which under certain conditions can happen and be. To God are ascribed memory, vision and foreknowledge. There is, however, no distinction as to the formal part of God's knowledge, but only as to the objects. With regard to praescientia it may be remarked that there is no deter- minism implied in it, inasmuch as the acts do not take place by reason of God's foreknowledge, but God foresees that they shall occur. With regard to the character of God's knowledge it may be pointed out that it is called intuitiva, in contradistinction to demonstrative and (iiscursive knowl- edge, for in the thought of God all things are immediately present; simultmiea, to distinguish it from that which is successive, for God knows and sees all things simultaneous- ly; distinctissima, or perfectly clear, and verissima, or per- fectly true. Scientia is divided as follows: 1) Scientia necessaria or naturalis, by which is meant that God knows His own abso- lute essence and all possible things. This knowledge- is called scientia simplicis iyitelligeyitise, when the knowledge • embraces those possible things that are the objects of thought only. As examples we call attention to the fact that God knows evil ideally or theoretically, but not by per- sonal experience. There are many things we know ideally and are able to present concretely in our minds. The Su-, preme Mind can understand fully everything and picture it correctly in His own thought. If man had not fallen, evil would have been known to him according to the method of scientia simplicis intelligentiae. 2) Scientia libera or God's knowledge of all that exists. This knowledge is also called scientia visionis or God's penetrating vision or perception of real beings and things, coram intuendo. 3) Scientia media or conditionata^ by which is meant God's knowledge of those things that could have happened or can now happen under certain conditions. 58 tup:oi.ogy. There are many Scripture passages that set forth the omniscience of God, among which the following may be quoted: "Known unto God are all his works from the be- ginning of the world" (Acts 15: 18) ; "And there is no creature that is not manifest in his sight : but all things are naked and laid open before his eyes" (Heb. 4: 13) ; "God knoweth all things" (1 John 3: 20) ; "Thou knowest the hearts of all the children of men" (1 Kings 8: 39) ; "Thou understandest my thought afar off ; There is not a word in my tongue, but, lo, 0 Jehovah, thou knowest it altogether" (Ps. 139: 2—4), etc. Origen said that God's foreknowledge is not the same as His predetermination, for the free acts do not happen by reason of God's foreknowledge, but God foresees that they shall happen. However, Origen limited the knowledge of God when he endeavored to prove the finiteness of the world by the argument that God could not understand the world if it were infinite. The term scientia media originated with the Jesuits FONSECA and Molina in the sixteenth century during the controversy concerning election. The Socinians declared that the acts of man could not be free by reason of God's foresight. Rothe and Martensen both sought to defend the Socinian view asserting that God arranged a schedule of the world plan and that the free acts of man as they occur constitute the filling in of this schedule. How- ever, this view militates against the perfection of God and is not a satisfactory explanation. We must distinguish be- tween the foreknowledge and the predetermination of God. The knowledge of God and His will do not always agree, in- asmuch as God knows much that He does not will. Omnisapientia or wisdom. God's wisdom is the perfect correspondence of His thought with the absolute good. God is all-wise because He infalliblij knows the best means to be used to accomplish purposed ends. God's omnisapience im- plies, therefore, teleology or causa finalis. The Word of God teaches the omnisapience of God, as in the following passages: "Whence then cometh wisdom? And where is the place of understanding? God understandeth THE DIVINE ATTRIIU'TES. 59 the way thereof, and knoweth the place thereof. He made a weight for the wind: yea, He meteth out the waters by measure. When He made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder; then did he see it, and declare it" (Job 28: 20, 23, 25—27) ; "0 the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God" (Rom. 11: 33) ; "The only wise God" (Rom. 16: 26) ; "Christ, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hid- den" (Col. 2: 3), etc. B. In Relatio7i to the Moral World. a. Immanent Attributes, Distinct from the Moral World. Sanctitas, justitia interna, or God's holiness is the correpondence of the will of God luith the absolute good or perfectio7i. God's holiness contains a negative element, in- asmuch as God is separated from all that is unclean and sinful, and also a positive element, because God as the abso- lutely Holy One wills that all creatures should be holy. Baier defines God's holiness as the rectitude of His will, wherefore He wills all things that are right and good in accordance with His eternal law.* But Baier adds that God is Himself the law. Jus'rtTiA EXTERNA is the term that is used to express the righteousness of God in its narrow and specific sense. Righteousness in a broader sense is understood to include all the moral perfections of God. In the narrow sense the righteousness of God is the same as His holiness in an ex- ternal sense, which makes laws. Justitia externa is divided in the following way: 1) Legislativa or antecedent, by which is meant God's legislative righteousness, 2) judicialis, consequens or distributiva, i. e.. His retributive righteous- ness. This latter is divided as follows: a) remuneratoria, or the remunerative righteousness, b) punitiva, or the puni- tive righteousness, for which reason God is said to become angry, which implies the righteous reaction of God's holi- ness against sin. * Part. I, Cap. I, §XXIII. 60 TIIKOI.OOY. The following Scripture passages may be quoted : "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy" (Lev. 11: 45) ; "The Holy One in Israel" (Ezek. 39: 7) ; "And provoked the Holy One of Israel" (Ps. 78: 41) ; "As your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5: 48) ; "Each shall receive his ov^n reward accord- ing to his labor" (1 Cor. 3:8); "After thy hardness and impenitent heart thou treasurest up for thyself wrath in the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every man according to his works" (Rom. 2: 5, 6). Other passages could be cited. Many objections have been raised against the righteous- ness of God, against His righteous government, against His righteous judgment, and some have desired to deny the wrath of God towards sinners. For this reason they have also attacked the doctrine of substitutional atonement. They emphasize the love of God at the cost of His holiness and righteousness and forget that God is holy love, that He loves Himself as the Holy One. God has been compared to a sinful father, who forgives His children. The argument is that God must be more merciful than an earthly father. Indeed, He is more merciful, but He is not sinful, for which reason He is more just. The love of God does not encroach upon His righteousness, nor does His righteousness limit His love. Both attributes function according to their own nature and characteristics. We must remember that when God is forced to manifest His wrath He is not cruel. Even the punishments of hell conform to an infallible justice, and men shall some day acknowledge the righteousness of God as they now acknowledge His love and mercy. Veracitas or truthfulness. Baier defines veracity as that attribute by which God is ever constant in the telling of the truth and in the keeping of His promises.* The veracity of God is the correspondeyice of His thought with His es- sence, so that God is the absolute truth, which is another acknowledged definition. The following passages may be quoted: "For Thy loving kindness is great unto the heavens, and thy truth unto the * Part. I, Cap. I, §XXIV. TTIF, DIVIXR ATTHinT'TKS. 61 skies" (Ps. 57: 10) ; "All thy commandments are faithful" (Ps. 119: 86) ; "Loving kindness and truth go before thy face" (Ps. 89: 15) ; "He that hath received his witness hath set his seal to this that God is true" (John 3 : 33) ; "In hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised before times eternal" (Titus 1:2), etc. b. Attributes of Coyitact or Relative Attributes. Amor or love. Hollazius defines love in the following manner: "Amare significat velle alicui bonum." Love may be understood in many ways. Granfelt* combines God's intra-essential love and His love manifested to the world and defines as follows: "That attribute by which God eter- nally imparts Himself ad intra and ad extra." The Scholastics divide love as follows: 1) complacentia, or that God loves all creatures, in other words, God's general good-will, 2) benevolentia or His love to man, 3) amicitia or His love for the faithful. Scripture passages : "God so loved the world" (John 3 : 16) . This is the cardinal passage by which to prove God's general love to men. "Jehovah loveth the righteous" (Ps. 146 : 8) ; of Jesus we read : "Having loved his own that were in the world, he loved them unto the end" (John 13 : ] ) ; "He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself unto him" (John 14 : 21) . The expressions which the Lord uses concerning the faith- ful manifest the special love (amicitia) which He has for them, such as betrothed, bride, flock, fold, a beautiful crown, a kingly diadem, etc. We might also speak of an amicitia specialis, such as was manifested in relation to such as Enoch, Abraham, Moses, Samuel, David, Peter, James, John, Lazarus, etc. Love manifests itself as bonitas or goodness toward all creatures ; gratia or grace toward sinners ; misericordia, or mercy towards sinners in their wretchedness; dementia, or meekness, mildness; lo7iganimitas , or long-suffering, in which love manifests itself in the deferring of punishment, * Kristlig dogmatik, Third Ed., p. 91. 62 TIIKOI.OC.Y. and patientia, or patience, which bears with many faults. We should always use the expressions correctly. Bonitas or goodness refers to the love of God as in providence, when the sun shines on all and the rain waters the fields of both good and wicked. Grace should be used in relation to sin- ners and criminals. Only sinners and criminals before the law of God need grace in the sense of pardon. Mercy is needed on account of the consequences of sins in suffering, sickness and all kinds of misery. God is long-suffering to- wards the wicked and delays punishment in order to give them an opportunity to repent and reform. God exercises patience towards the pious or His own children in education and correction of faults. Among the Scripture passages that set forth love from these various points of view are the following : "Jehovah is good to all" (Ps. 145: 9) ; "Where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly" (Rom. 5: 20) ; "Jehovah is mer- ciful and gracious" (Ps. 103: 8) ; "The Father of mercies" (2 Cor. 1: 3) "Endured with much longsuffering vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction" (Rom. 9: 22); "Slow to anger, and abundant in lovingkindness" (Ps. 103: 8); "For he is kind toward the unthankful and evil" (Luke 6: 35) ; "The riches of his goodness and forbearance and long- suffering" (Rom. 2:4). FiDELiTAS, or fidelity, is that attribute by which God con- tinues to manifest His love and grace until the object has been icon. This attribute constitutes the external side, an opus ad extra, of God's veracity. "He is faithful that prom- ised" (Heb. 10: 23). "But the Lord is faithful, who shall establish you" (2 Thess. 3:3). §6. THE TRINITY. By reason of the conception of the absolute personality, which also includes the qualitative characteristic that God is love, we must come to the conclusion that God is triune. Besides, we are led through the revelation of God's economy to the conception of His intra-essential trinity. The follow- THE TRINITY. 63 ing propositions have therefore generally been accepted in the Christian Church : Dens est triniis, h. e. i?i essentia unus, tres habet subsistendi modos, or God is triune, i. e., one in essence with three modes of subsistence; una divina essentia in tribus personis subsistis, or a divine essence subsists in three persons. There are therefore three in one and one in three or a trinity in the unity and a unity in the trinity. Apart from the clear presentation of the Trinity in the Bible, it lies in the intensive and exclusive nature of the matter that God cannot be one person in the ordinary sense, inasmuch as love demands an object. According to the two parts of the unity of God He is absolutely perfect and also self-sufficient. The world could not be the object of God's love, for this would conflict with His perfection and also with His self-sufficiency. These essential charac- teristics do not imply that there are only two persons in the divine essence, but that God, who is one, subsists in three persons or three persons in one essence or three persons in one absolute personality, otherwise there would be lacking the common object of love, which at the same time unites and distinguishes. The human reason cannot comprehend the mystery of the Trinity, and the inadequate terms of human language cannot express the content of this mystery, wherefore rea- son must give way to the obedience of faith, forasmuch as the doctrine of the Trinity hag a firm basis in the Word of God and finds an empirical response in the Christian con- sciousness. But faith contains knowledge, and the Church correctly maintains that it is her duty to set forth what can be learned concerning this important doctrine. 1. The Ordinary Methods of Explanation. a. Through the conceptioyi of the absolute perso7iality. Man is an ego which reaches self-consciousness and self- determination in opposition to a thou. Without this rela- tionship of duality we could not speak of personality. But the ego is not merely a relationship of duality, i. e., in op- 64 TIIKOI OCY. position to a thou, there is a unity likewise, a union of the ego and the non-ego. The union is not found, however, in a person, but in the human organizations of the family, state and church. We may also speak of a threefold ego: the substantial ego, which places itself before itself as an object, the ob- jective ego, in which we contemplate ourselves as an object, the subjective ego, which looks upon the other as identical with itself. Man is made in the image of God ; his personality is rela- tive and determined by something outside of himself. God is absolute and infinite, for which reason the dual relation- ship is found in His own essence, as well as the union which is mediated by the Spirit. b. Through the conception of love. Love implies self- impartation between persons. Since God is a unity and absolute love. He must therefore include within Himself three persons. God must be the subject and the object of love. Between the Father and the Son there arises a recip- rocal activity of divine love. The moving power or force in this reciprocal activity is common to both, the third person, contemplated and loved by both, who constitutes the uniting bond between both and saves them from losing each other, that is, each in Himself. The third person is the Spirit. As triune God is therefore an absolute personality, who in Himself lives the life of everlasting love, for which reason the characteristics of His essence are likewise trinitarian, and we may say that they are of the Father, through the Son, and in the Spirit. It follows that one of the persons does not possess the whole fulness of the divine essence in- dependent of the others, but only in relation to one another does each possess the divine essence. The whole essence is in each person undivided, and this essence is the one God or the absolute personality subsisting in three relative per- sons. Each one of them is the absolute personality only in a special relational form. This does not imply, however, that the absolute personality is a combination of three separate persons in the ordinary sense, for the persons in THE TRINITY. 65 the Trinity are not absolute per se, but relatively, and sub- sist in and through one another. From the conception of the absolute personality and also of love it is seen that the position of the Spirit in the Trinity implies an element of union and also one of separation or distinction. Emphasis must be laid on both sides of this relationship, for if the emphasis is laid on the former, then the Spirit becomes more than the Father and the Son, not to say the whole essence ; if the latter is emphasized, then the position of the Spirit becomes simply a relation between the Father and the Son. c. Through the conception of the atonement. In the ex- perience of the atonement there is a difference between God, who is atoned, God, who atones, and God, through whom the atonement is applied. d. By the use of ayialogy. Hereby are meant the general analogies that have been presented at different times. How- ever, they do not possess any scientific value as proofs of the Trinity, and many objections could be raised against them. Among analogies of this sort may be mentioned, the root, the tree and the fruit ; the sun, rays of light, and heat ; length, breadth and depth in space; the past, present and future of time ; the triangle with its three sides ; the per- sonal pronouns, I, thou and he; the subject, the predicate and the copula of a sentence ; the noun with its three gen- ders; the adjective with its three degrees of comparison. In the realm of man there are better analogies which still are inadequate : the family, consisting of man, wife and chil- dren ; the body, soul and spirit of man ; the intellect, will and emotions of the mind. These analogies simply prove that the ideas of unity and trinity are not foreign to our thought, but they cannot explain the Trinity. The analogy of man as a unit of intellect, will and emotion is probably the best, especially as we remember that we are created in the image of God, but the analogy does not explain a divine essence and the three persons. e. Through the teaching of the Word of God. The pres- entation of the Trinity in the Bible does not aim to solve the 66 THEOLOGY. problem for the human reason, but every one who believes that the Scriptures are the Word of God can become con- vinced that the doctrine of the Trinity is true. The declara- tions and words of the Bible are incontrovertible proofs of the divine Trinity, if it can be shown that the Scriptures clearly teach this doctrine. In the history of creation God appears as more than one person. Elohim created. When we compare this expression with John 1, where we learn that the Son of God created, then it is evident that Elohim includes both the Father and the Son. But when we also read the following passages : "By the word of Jehovah were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth" (Ps. 33: 6), and also, "The spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters" (Gen. 1:2), then the proof is clear that Elohim in Gen. 1 : 1 must imply the Father, Son and Spirit. In Gen. 1 : 26 we read : "And God said, Let us make man." This cannot be explained to mean that God spoke to angels, for this conflicts with the story of creation. It proves that the Father, Son and Spirit spoke together. The Messiah is represented as the Son of God, the servant of God : "Jehovah said unto me. Thou art my son ; this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. 2:7); "Behold, m.y servant" (Isa. 42: 1). In this connection servant is used in a higher sense, and the life-work of the Son of God is considered. In Isa. 9 : 6 He is called God ; also in Ps. 47 : 7. The three persons of the Godhead are mentioned in Isa. 63. In Isa. 48: 16 we read: "And now the Lord Jehovah hath sent me, and his spirit." The following passages may be cited from the New Testament: "Into the name of the Fa- ther and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 28 : 19) ; "And the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1:1); "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit, be with you all" (2 Cor. 13: 14). In addition there could be cited many passages that clearly contain the doctrine of the di- vinity of Christ. The personality of the Holy Spirit is set forth in many places. Among these we will limit ourselves to the quotation of only one passage, where the Holy Spirit THE TRINITY. 67 speaks and uses the first person of the pronoun : "And as they ministered to the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Spirit said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work where- unto I have called them" (Acts 13 : 2) . Besides many other passages, the above quotations show clearly that the Bible contains the doctrine of the Trinity. 2. Remarks on Terminology. Since the time of Athanasius and the Gregorians the ex- pression ovaia has meant the djAdne essence common to all three persons of the Godhead. Prior to that time the use of the word was uncertain and the definition of Aristotle was accepted that an essence or being was an individual thing or an ordinary person. But the Church does not un- derstand by essence either a general essence or substantia secunda according to Aristotle, for God is represented as an absolute personality and in the sense of a substantia prima. However, since the Church employs the expression ovata, or essence, it possesses a meaning, which, as John of Damascus says, is far above the ordinary conception of essence. The expression vTroaraa-i's, or person, was first used in the same sense as essence is now used, but when oia-^a came to be used to designate the divine essence, then wTroo-Tao-ts came into general use as designating the persons in the divine essence. The expression cannot be understood in the ordi- nary empirical sense, so that the Father, the Son and the Spirit should be like three distinct persons. The unity in the divine essence is numerical and not one of its kind, as in man. In man the essence in three persons is not one in number but in species. Concerning men it cannot be said that one is in the other, but Jesus says in John 14 : 10 : "I am in the Father.' Furthermore, it cannot be said concerning men that where one is, there the other is also, because they are locally distinct; but the Lord says in John 8: 29: "He that hath sent me is with me; he hath not left me alone." God is not divided into three persons, G8 TIIKOI.OCY. but the three persons share the divine essence indivisibly, so that each one possesses the divine essence without multi- plication or division. It is therefore not a plio'alitas essen- tialis, nor a phiralitas accidentcdis, for personality is not something that is temporarily added to the divine essence, but it is a plMvalitas hypostatica sen pei^sonarum. There is therefore a real distinction, but not in a human v^^ay. Philippi says that above all things it is necessary to un- derstand in w^hat sense the Church interprets the expres- sion person. He says in his Glaubenslehre II, pp. 145 — 147 : "Personali^ty is found only where self-consciousness and freedom are found, for where there is personality it mani- fests itself in self-consciousness and self-determination or freedom. But in itself we may say that personality is some- thing deeper, that forms the foundation of self-conscious- ness and self-determination, the real inner essence which is- reflected in the two forms in which it is revealed. In man, and especially when he has reached perfect spiritual devel- opment, the essence and manifestation of personality cannot be separated from each other. But what cannot be sepa- rated in reality can be distinguished in thought. The ecclesiastical terminology has been based upon the possi- bility of this conceptual distinction and has applied the one factor, the inner essence of the personality, the ego, or the independent form of subsistence, to mean the true, im- manent distinction in the Godhead, while, on the other hand, the second factor, the revealed form of the person- ality, the self-consciousness and the freedom are conceived of as the predicate of the one divine essence. Therefore the three persons in the Godhead are self-conscious and free subjects, by reason of their communion in the one, self- conscious, free divine essence, which reveals itself in the three persons in distinct and independent forms of sub- sistence." Therefore when on the one hand we emphasize the absolute personality, we express our antagonism in the first place to Pantheism, and in the second place to Sabel- lianism and Arianism together with other related theories. THE TIIINITY. 69 'Oiioova-ia constitutes the predicate of all three persons. Therefore the Son and the Spirit are of the same essence as the Father. Wherefore we confess in the Athanasian Creed : "The Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one : the glory equal, the majesty co- eternal. Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost. And in the Trinity none is afore, or after the other ; none is greater, or less than another. But the whole three persons are co-eternal together, and co- equal." Although we cannot apprehend God or attempt to do it, we have the right to present what the Bible teaches. To those who believe in the Biblical statements and meditate on them, the being of God becomes more concrete. It is plain that the Bible teaches the unity of the essence of God and yet speaks of three distinctions. It is Biblically evident, therefore, that essence and persons are differently under- stood. The oneness of God is not the same as the unity of man, and the different persons in the Godhead are not three separate persons like three human persons. And they are not confused or mixed, because each relative person has His own consciousness by which He knows that He is not the other relative person, but He is Himself. The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Father, neither of these two is the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is Himself and not the Father or the Son, but all three know that they are one, having the same undivided essence and consequently one self-consciousness and one self-determination. Notice again what we quoted from Philippi : ''The ego, or the inde- pendent form of subsistence, means the real, immanent dis- tinction in the Godhead, while on the other hand the second factor, the revealed form of the personality, the self-con- sciousness and freedom (self-determination) are conceived of as the predicate of the one divine essence." The three relative 'egos' or relative persons, who have a consciousness of their own, constitute one and are one self -consciousness and one self-determination, which is the same as one God or one Absolute Personality. Apparently or superficially 70 TiiEor.ocv. considered it looks as if man had an advantage in possessing his own self-consciousness, but a closer view reveals the plenitude of God as trinal unity. The unity of God eternally exists as trinality, three in one and one in three. But the three persons do not exist within the one essence as the fourth. Neither does the trinitarian person exist as a part of the one essence. The three persons possess simultane- ously the whole divine essence. The divine essence subsists eternally and permanently in three modes, but not succes- sively, as the Sabellians taught. Paul speaks of "the form of God" (ixopcfyrj). The divine essence subsists in, three forms, each form or relative person being the essence or substance of the others, both numerically and identically. But two or three human persons, like Peter, John and James, although having the same kind of nature, have not the same nature or substance numerically and identically, because each hu- man person is a fractional part of the human nature. The personality of God is therefore richer than an ordinary person. God was self-sufficient before other persons were created and blessed in Himself. There is no adequate analogy to make the Trinity concrete to our vision. If a triplex mirror would produce three images of one person- ality containing all in each and each having its own pecu- liarity, this would be a mental analogy. Or if three persons could be conceived of as having the same undivided soul, it would also give an idea. In His manifestation God does not appear as one person, as we can deduce from the mani- festations related in the Bible. At the Baptism of Christ there were three personal manifestations, although only the voice of the Father was heard and the Holy Ghost ap- peared in the form of a dove, but the Second Person of the Godhead in His incarnation was visible to all. In heaven we will see the incarnated Son of God in a glorified body. It is then evident that God the Father and God the Holy Spirit will also appear as persons in manifestation. The omnipresence of God is not affected by these manifesta- tions, as the omnipresence of the divine essence is not local or circumscribed. From revelation or the Bible we learn THE THINITY. 71 that the three divine persons are objective to each other. The manifestation of God is not like a mathematical unit. There are many actions of the relative divine persons v^hich prove their relative objectivity to each other. One divine person loves another, addresses another, is the way to an- other, suffers from another, sends another, glorifies another, etc. But on the other hand, on account of the unity, there are not three almighty, but one almighty, etc. If we pray to one, we pray to all the persons in the Trinity. In the Lord's Prayer our Father is not the first person only, but the triune God, our providential Father. We cannot speak to one of the persons to the exclusion of the others. They dwell in one another and work together according to the order stated in the Economical Trinity. Uepix(opr]aL<; implies a common and peculiar indwelling, so that the one is in the other, by which we can understand that the three persons do not subsist separately or by the side of each other. Also they are alike, so that the Father is not God in a higher sense than the Son and the Holy Ghost. As is already mentioned, the persons are absolute only in a relative sense and together constitute the absolute personality. The Son of God says: "I and the Father are one" (John 10: 30) ; ''Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me" (John 14: 11) ; "As thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee" (John 17: 21). But as the persons are relatively distinct, so there exists a certain order in their internal relationship and in their manifestation ; for which reason they have their distinct characteristics and work. The term mcommuyiicahilis is therefore used to explain that that by which the one divine person is distinguished from the others cannot be transferred from the one to the other. The common name given to the characteristics that separate one person from the other is character hypostaticiis. 72 TIIEOI.OCIY. 3. Divisions. I. The Ontological Tinnity. By this is meant the Trinity when considered from the intra-essential viewpoint. Here belong the inner charac- teristics or notae internae, which constitute the modus sub- sistendi or Tpö-n-o-; vTrdpéco)€w? of the persons, and by which they are distinguished from each other in their relation to the world, or in opera ad extra, which are indivisa or communia '(common). These opera ad extra belong to each person of the Godhead, but in the order that is peculiar to each. Although it may be said concerning God that ^1 things are of Him, and through Him, and unto Him, yet the following particulse discriticae are used, €k of the Father, 8ta of the Son, and ev of the Holy Spirit. Opera ad extra are divided as follows: A. Oper'a oeconomica or the economical acts. These are personalia and minus communia or minus indivisa. a. The Father determined upon the redemption, which therefore includes election, and He gave the Son. "And we have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world" (1 John 4: 14) ; "Fear not, little flock ; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom" (Luke 12: 32) ; "He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all" (Rom. 8: 32). b. The Son has performed the work of redemption, which therefore presupposes the incarnation. "Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Matt. 20: 28) ; "And the Word became flesh" (John 1: 14), etc. c. The Holy Spirit applies reconciliation or redemption. "No man can say, Jesus is Lord, but in the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12: 3) ; "God chose you from the beginning unto sal- vation in sanctification of the Spirit" (2 Thess. 2: 13), etc. B. Opera attribntira or the attributive acts. They are communia or indivisa, and yet different acts are ascribed to each person, by which they are distinguished. THE TBINITY. 77 a. To the Father are ascribed creation and providence. "Have we not all one father? hath not one God created us?" (Mai. 2: 10) ; "Yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things" (1 Cor. 8:6); "He careth for you" (1 Peter 5: 7). b. To the Son are ascribed the raising of the dead and the judgment. "The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God ; and they that hear shall live. And he gave him authority to execute judgment, because he is the son of man. Marvel not at this : for the hour cometh, in which all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice" (John 5 : 25 — 28) . c. To the Holy Spirit is ascribed inspiration : "For no prophecy ever came by the will of man : but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit" (2 Peter 1 : 21) . 4. Notes on the History of Dogma. The primitive Church accepted the doctrine of the Trin- ity, but the doctrine 'underwent development a little at a time and became more precisely defined by reason of the controversies that arose concerning it. During the Apolo- getical period the words rptas and trinitas were used for the first time, the former by Theophilus and the latter by Tertullian. Origen taught the eternal generation of the Son. The doctrine of the Trinity was given relatively final definition during the Polemical period through the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople on account of the Arian, Mace- donian and related controversies. During this time the expressions 6ixoova[a and Trepixw/Dr/o-i? came into permanent use. The expression filioque was added to the Constantinopolitan Creed. The speculative development of the doctrine of the Trinity began at this time and continued during the Scho- lastic period. The controversy concerning the Holy Spirit was also continued, without resulting, however, in any spe- cial dogmatic definition. At the time of the Reformation the Trinity was deduced from the religious experience of the atonement, and there was no tendency toward specula- tive treatment, at any rate not so much in the Lutheran 78 THKOI.OGY. Church. During the Reformation and Protestant Scholastic period the true doctrine was established through the con- troversies with the Anti-Trinitarians of the time. The dogmatic terms w^re increased in number and more care- fully defined. The modern critical period is not distin- guished by the production of any dogmas, although specula- tive and philosophical expositions have not been wanting. Orthodox dogmatics has been compelled to combat philo- sophical Anti-Trinitarianism and Unitarianism in various forms. We wish now to present some special quotations and notes, which set forth the history of the dogma during the various periods. Clement of Rome speaks of the Father, Christ and the Spirit and also sets forth the unity in tlie economical activity. He presents the divinity and pre-existence of Christ. Ignatius confesses the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and calls Christ God. The Ebionites did not ac- knowledge the Trinity and denied the supernatural birth of Christ. At His baptism He received divine powers. Some Ebionites also taught that God immediately brought forth the man, who received the Mes- sianic spirit. They likewise taught that this spirit had been present in others, such as Abraham and Moses. The Nazarenes did not deny the supernatural birth, but did not acknowledge the hypostatical pre- existence of Christ's divine nature, holding that at baptism God, the source of all holy spirit, united Himself with the human personality of Jesus. Justin Mautyk is the first to emphasize the word generation with regard to the relationship between the Father and Son. The genera- tion of the Son was an act of the will. It was to the Son, who was born before all creatures, that the Father said: Let us make man. He also speaks of the Spirit. Thkovhii.v.s of Antioch was the first to use the expression Tptas of the Trinity. He speaks of Aoyoq ei'Staoeros and Trpoo/jtAcd? i j the seventh power includes aU the others and constitutes the substanti- ality of the soul as the image of the spirit. All this expresses the internal relationship between the soul and the spirit, but the spirit through the medium of the soul must enter into relationship with the body. The soul possesses, therefore, a sevenfold 86$a and, as Luther says, constitutes the seven-armed candlestick in the sanctuary. When tho soul reveals its seven forms of life, it appears in the first place as an embryo; the second form is breathing; the third is the blood, for which reason it is said that the soul is in the blood; the fourth form is the heart, which is the drive-wheel of life; the fifth form is the nervous system, including the brain, through which medium thought becomes possible, and by which the soul, and through the soul tho spirit, may enter into relationship with the external world; the sixth form is the productive form or the power of speech, which reveals the inward man, while the seventh form is the outward form or the lJ.op(f)i] of the soul.* §12. THE ORIGINAL STATE. Status integritatis vel innocenti^ is the original con- dition of man as created in the image of God, which implied especially wisdom in understanding, holiness in will, and purity in feeling. In defining the image of God we confine ourselves espe- cially to the spiritual nature of man, although the corporeal nature must also be considered. Man is made up of soul or spirit and body, but inasmuch as he became a living soul through the spirit, we hold forth man as a unit of intellect, * Delitzsch, Biblical Psychology, IV, §VI. THE ORIGINAL STATE. 155 will and emotion. Inasmuch as religion was and in a cer- tain sense still remains basic in man's nature, so the formal aspect of religion will likewise appear as a unit of the three basic concepts that constitute human personality, for which reason we must conceive of the image of God, not only in a general sense, referring to man as a person, but take into consideration the qualitative distinction. The thought of man could not be content with derivative knowledge, but sought God directly and found rest in Him, who also be- came the light of his reason. Furthermore his will was determined by the will of God, while his emotional nature found peace alid happiness in God. God is absolutely free, while man possesses only relative freedom. However, man was not to render obedience by reason of any arbitrary law. In human freedom two fac- tors must be taken into consideration, viz., self-determina- tion and determination. If we consider the determining activity of God to the exclusion of human self-determina- tion, the result would be determinism; contrariwise, the result would be arbitrariness. Created freedom was to be realized by way of choice. For this reason man could either sin or refrain from sinning. He could not remain neutral. The will of God became a factor as the source or motive of his actions, but he was conscious of the fact that he could act contrary to this motive. Augustine said that man's original nature was posse non peccare, which was to become non posse peccare. In Gen. 1 : 27 the Hebrew expressions tzelem and demuth are used to set forth the image of God. The latter is an exegetical expression of the former. The Latin expressions are imago and similitudo. Hollazius says that imago is not the same as vestigium, inasmuch as imago clearly por- trays the original of which it is an image, while vestigium is only a dim portrayal. The image of God was clear and not dim. 156 ANTHROPOLOGY. 1. Divisions and Attributes. The image of God is divided into the formal and material images. A. The Formal Image. — By the formal image is meant the human personality as consisting of the faculties of in- tellect, will and emotion. The content of these faculties is not taken into consideration, the question concerns merely the concept of personality. If the formal image were lost, the essence of man would be destroyed. The formal image, therefore, cannot be lost, for which reason it is called essential. The old writers called it imago Dei. The formal image of God is imago Dei late dicta, generaliter et abusive spectata or dKv/jw?. In considering the formal image per se, or the image of God as both formal and material, we must bear in mind that the image of God is not man in the sense that he is a portrait of God, but that the image is in man. Man is a relative personality. B. The Material Image. — ^By this is meant the original endowment or the qualitative content of the formal image of God. This is the image of God in a special sense. For this reason it is also called imago Dei stricte dicta or Kvpiws. It is also called primaria or accidental. The old writers called it similitudo Dei. As embodying all these attributes it is called oAikw? ; as embodying only the essential it is called jat/utKws. The material image of God is divided as follows: a) per- fectiones principale's or the essential perfections, also ex- pressed by justitia originalis or the original righteousness, meaning enlightenment in the understanding, holiness in the will, and purity in the emotions. In his original state man was perfect, yet undeveloped. However, it was not the helpless condition of a child. Neither were the wisdom in the understanding, the holiness of will and the blessed- ness in feeling possessed only in nuce. Man was created in the mature state; b) perfectiones minus principales or the less essential perfections were: 1) impassibilitas or that man was not subject to suffering. Originally the body THE ORIGINAL STATE. 157 was a pure and faultless organ or instrument of a pure and holy spirit. There was perfect harmony between the sen- suous appetites and the higher life of man. This harmony the Apology calls sequale temperamenhim qualitaUmi cor- poris; 2) immortalitas or immortality. In case man had remained in status integritatis, he would have undergone a transformation without the intervention of death and would have been translated with a pneumatic body into the world of glory; 3) dominium in creatui'os, or that man was lord of creation. He stood in perfect harmony with nature and was the crown of creation. 2. The Attributes of the Image of God. The attributes (affectiones) that are ascribed to the image of God are: a) concreata or concreated, so that the image was in no sense increased after creation. The Roman Catholic Church teaches that man was created in a purely natural condition (status purorum naturalium). He possessed intellect and free will, but was without character. He was neither good nor bad. In addition God had bestowei upon him a donum superadditum, which was a gift of grace, and which did not belong to his nature, through which his development in the right direction would be rendered more easy. Hollazius has compared this gift with the bit that directs the horse. Some Catholic Dogmaticians have taught that this gift was bestowed after creation; b) natur alis or natural. According to Quenstedt this attribute has five specific significations: 1) constitutive, or that which con- stitutes nature itself or an essential part of it, such as soul and body, 2) consecutive, or that which is derived from nature, such as the faculties of the soul, 3) subjective, or that which adheres to nature as a natural property, 4) per- fective, or that which perfects and adorns it internally, 5) transitive, or that which is transplanted. We conceive of naturalis according to the last three significations; c) 2)ropagabilis ad posteros, or the propagation to posterity; d) accidentalis or accidental, inasmuch as it was not the 158 ' ANTIIKOI'OLOGY. essence of man, but a qualification in his essence. This was taught against Flacius, who maintainfd that the image of God was essential. This term has also been employed in order to distinguish between the image of God in man and the substantial image of God or the Son. In the Son the image is original, uncreated, and in relation to man, prototypical (Hollazius: ''He exhibits in Himself the en- tire essence of the Father, being distinguished from Him by the mode of His subsistence") ; e) amissibilis, or that the image can be lost. With regard to the image of God in general the following passages may be observed: "(lod created man in his own image" (Gen. 1: 27); "God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen. 1: 31) ; cf. Gen. 9:6; "And put on the new man, that after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth" (Eph. 4: 24) ; "And have put on the new man, that is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him" (Col. 3: 10) ; "Men, who are made after the likeness of God" (James 3:9). 3. The Purpose or the Object of the Image of God. Finis is conceived of either specialiter or generaliter. In the first sense, or specialiter, the object is thought of as: 1) jyroximus, or the immediate object, which implies that man may live a godly life, well-pleasing unto the Lord; 2) remotior, or the more remote object, which consists in everlasting salvation. Generaliter. In this sense the object is the glory of the divine wisdom, power and goodness. 4. Notes on the History of Dogma. During the first period it was generally acknowledged that the Mosaical story of Paradise and man was real his- tory. Origen departed from this view. The image of God was thought to consist in intellect and freedom, while stress was also laid on the formal content. It was also argued that the material image could be lost. The same views were THE ORIGINAL STATE. 159 current during the period that followed. The Roman Cath- olic conception, developed during the Scholastic period, made a sharp distinction between imago Dei and similitude Dei, the latter being conceived of as implying an extra gift of grace. Both set forth a concreated and special gift of grace. The power to overcome the sensual in man's nature was not a natural gift, but was added by (iod as a special gift. liUTHER rejected this Scholastic teaching. Our con- fessional writings clearly set forth the formal and material concepts of the image of God. The old Dogmaticians taught as did Luther and said that justitia originalis was not a bonum superadditum, but a concreated perfection. The Socinians and the Arminians did not acknowledge the doc- trine of the Church on the original state. The Rationalists declare that the original state consisted simply in good traits. In general the philosophers reject the truth of the account in Genesis. Among theologians Schleiermacher and those most closely associated with him in thought took a position nearly akin to Rationalism in relation to the historical content of Genesis. They limited the original perfection to a consciousness of God. Many of the leading Dogmaticians in modern times, however, favor the old orthodox view. Justin Martyk and many of the older Church Fathers taught that the image of God consisted in intellect and freedom. Justin also stressed the ethical content. The similitude was also extended to the body. The Encratites and the Severians denied that women were made in the image of God. Iren.eus and Tertxtllian extended the likeness unto God even to the body. The former stated that Adam possessed the garment of righteousness, but that his state was not that of the matured man, but must be developed. Origen said that the story of Paradise was an allegory. Together with Clement of Alex- andria he taught that death was natural even in the original state of integrity. The Audians limited the image of God to the body. Augustine said that the prototype of the creation of man was the Trinity. It' had previously been taught that it was the Logos. He not only sets forth the image of God as memoria, intelligentia and voluntas, but also the positive inclination of the spirit to that which is good. In regard to death he used the same terms as with relation to sin. Before the Fall 160 ANTIlKOl'OI.OfiY. man possessed posse noii mori, which was to be transformed into non posse mori. Cykil of Alexandria taught that a positive inclination toward good was implanted in the first man. Man was righteous and good. He says, however, that man received the Spirit of God, basing his assertion on Gen. 2: 7. TiioMA.s AtH'i^As conceived of the image of God from three points of view. In the first place man possesses aptitudo moralis to know and love God; in the second place he knows and loves God, although imperfectly, which is imago per conformitatem gratiae; in the third place man loves God perfectly, and this is imago secundem simili- tudinem gratiae. In the first place the image is natural, in the other instances it is a supernatural gift of grace. He says that donum superadditum was bestowed upon man at his creation and designed to serve as a rein on nature. Alexander of Hales, Boxaventura. Duns Scotus and others maintained that donum superadditum was given after creation. Bellarmin also asserts that this gift did not belong to the nature of man, but was bestowed upon him later. Luther taught that the image of God consisted in a pure will, true knowledge and peace in God. He distinguished between imago Dei and similitudo Dei, but rejected the teaching of the Scholastics. The tree of life bestowed health and the strength of youth on Adam, who would be transformed without the intervention of death. Calovius, Quenstedt and Hollazius look upon immortality as a natural attribute. BuDDEUs derives it from the tree of life. The Socinians conceive of the image of God principally as dominion over nature and the animal creation. Woman is excluded from participation in this dominion. The Arminians also state that the image consisted in the dominion over the animal creation. Men were like good children and their goodness came from natural instinct. The Rationalists declared that the image of God consisted in in- clination toward good and that the difference between now and then is simply relative. Sciileieu.macher said that the original perfection consisted in the possibility of uninterrupted consciousness of God in the soul. He rejects the expression "image of God," because, he de- clared, there existed no perfect correspondence. Neither did he con- sider "justitia originalis" a proper expression, inasmuch as man has not reached independence through development. Thomasius and PiiiLiiTi advocated the orthodox view, but stressed the principle of development. THE FALL AJND ORIGINAL SIN. 161 §13. THE FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN. We begin herewith the study of hamartology or the doc- trine of sin. The existence of sin presupposes the Fall, inasmuch as man was originally in a state of relative per- fection or status integritatis. Now he finds himself in status corruptionis. By this is meant that state of corrup- tion into which man was plunged when of his own free will he became disobedient toward God and transgressed the law of Paradise. The possibility of the first sin becomes evi- dent when we consider the implications in the concept of freedom. No real reason has been presented to prove the historical recital of the Fall, as found in Gen. 3, an allegory. We may be sure that the story of the Fall is a literal recital of the actual historical truth. 1. The Origin of Sin. God is not the author of sin. Quenstedt says: "God is not the cause of sin: 1) in a physical sense, because in such a sense sin or evil has no cause; 2) in a moral sense, by commanding, persuading, or approving, because He does not desire sin, but hates it ; 3) by way of accident, inasmuch as nothing can happen to God by chance or fortuitously." The causes were as follows: a) causa externa et principalis remotior was Satan; b) causa insUnmientalis was the ser- pent, possessed by Satan ; c) causa interna, directa et pro- pinqua was man's abuse of the understanding and the free will. We can formulate a conception of the origin of sin by the consideration of the principle of freedom. There are many that have asked the question why God, who is omniscient, should have created man such that he could fall into sin. Those who propound such a question, how- ever, forget that man would not have been a man, but an irrational animal, if he had been created without self- consciousness, self-determination, or freedom. According to the principle of freedom a mechanical determinism could 1G2 ANTHROPOLOGY. not be brought into play. The freedom of man as to its content must needs be realized by way of choice. A test was therefore necessary. The will of God was therein revealed in a manner that cannot be considered too stern, inasmuch as the test that ensued is expressed in the fol- lowing words of the Lord: "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it." This was a reasonable demand, but a strong enough challenge to bring into play the principle of self-determination on the part of man, so that he could determine for himself what he would do. It may be considered at once a piece of good and evil fortune, if we may so express ourselves, that the temptation to sin came from Satan, i. e., from without, because if man had fallen into sin without an external temptation, then his fall would have been like unto that of the evil angels. To be sure, it was a great misfortune that Satan tempted men, but there is no excuse for man on that ground, inasmuch as man possessed power to overcome temptation. He had an enlightened understanding, so that the temptation should have been perfectly transparent. Of his own free will the egoism of man became dominant, so that his own will in- stead of the will of God became the decisive element of his self-determination. The essence of sin, therefore, is selfish- ness. Man would become like unto God. He was made in the image of (^od, but became perverted through the asser- tion of rebellious independence. Viewed from the stand- point of man, the Lord said after the Fall: ''Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil." There was holy irony or at least a terrifying truth expressed in this assertion of the Lord, inasmuch as man had gotten knowledge of evil in a wrong way that led to eternal death. If man in his self-determination had chosen the will of God he would have learned to know of evil in a detached way. while now by reason of the Fall he knew what was good only in a detached way as a reminiscence of the period when he stood in blessed communion with God. Various theories have been propounded to explain the origin of sin. The following must be rejected: 1) The THE FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN. 163 theory of privation or imperfection, according to which the source of sin is to be found in finiteness and sin is considered only an imperfection, just as a person loses a limb or suffers from some defect, physical or moral. The positive element of sin is ignored in this theory; 2) the Sensualistic theory, according to which the source of evil is to be found in the body. This theory is related to the Manichaean Dualism. In recent times a modification of this theory has been pre- sented to the eff'ect that inasmuch as the sensuous in man is first to be developed, therefore sin arises as the sensuous outbalances the influence of the spiritual; 3) the Pantheistic theory, which declares that the evil is necessary as a process in the development of the spirit. The good stands in need of the evil, since all life is developed through contraries ; 4) the Calvinistic theory, which asserts that God has pre- determined sin and therefore also decided' upon the Fall; 5) the Rationalistic theory, which denies the Fall. Man still possesses his original freedom, and sin arises through the exercise of his free. will. Sin is general by reason of bad example and habits; 6) the old and modern Negative theory, which teaches that sin does not exist and is only an imagination of the mind. The so-called "Christian Science" holds this view. 2. Concerning Original Sin and its Definition. HoLLAZius defines original sin as follows:* "Original (or hereditary) sin is that corruption of human nature by evil desire which deprived man of his original righteousness through the Fall of our first parents and tvhich is trans- planted in all men by natural generation, rendering them indisposed to spiritual good and inclined to evil and making them subject to the tvrath of flod and eternal damnation." Original sin may therefore be said to consist of two and * HoLLAZius : "Peccatum originale est privatio justitise originalis cum prava inclinatione conjuncta, totam humanam naturam corrum- pens, ex lapsu primorum parentum derivata et per carnalem genera- tionem in omnes homines propagata, ipsos ineptos ad bona spiritualia, ad mala vero propensos reddens reosque faciens irse divinae et aeternse damnationis." 164 ANTHROPOLOGY. to imply three elements: 1) the negative, or the loss of the material image of God, 2) the positive, or the evil desire, concupiscentia prava, which is real sin, 3) imputatio ad reatum et poenam, or, as it is also expressed, reatus culpse and reatus poenae. In the confessional writings the following metaphorical terms are used: 1) vitiiim, corresponding to the negative element, the word meaning fault or deformity, such as blindness or lameness, and therefore a permanent defect ; 2) morbus, corresponding to the positive element, meaning a sickness that extends throughout the whole body, a con- tagious disease, such as fever; or, changing the figure, sin is said to permeate man's nature as the heat penetrates the iron in the crucible; 3) seuche (Latin, lues), which is dif- ferent from both vitium and morbus. The relation between this word and sickness and pest is the same as the relation between genus and species. Original sin is also designated by the following terms: 1) peccatum originate originan^, or the first sin of our race; 2) peccatum originale originatum, or the depravity that is transplanted to the whole race in consequence of the first sin. Sin is called peccatum originale, in the first place, because it originated with Adam, in the second place, because every man is born with it, in the third, because it is the root of all sins. Concerning the sinfulness of original sin Dr. C. P. Krauth in The Conservative Reformation (pp. 398-406) argues that it is truly sin, because: 1) it has the relations and connections of sin; 2) it has the names and synonyms of sin; 3) it has the essence of sin; 4) it has the attributes of sin; 5) it does the acts of sin; 6) it incurs the penalties of sin; 7) it needs the remedies of sin. The following Scripture passages may be cited : "Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Ps. 51 : 5) ; "As through one man sin entered the world" (Rom. 5: 12) ; "That which is born of the flesh is flesh" (John 3:6); "He begat a son in his own likeness. THE FALL AND ORIGINAL. SIN. 165 after his image" (Gen. 5:3); "Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (Gen. 6:5); "By nature children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3). The selfishness of sin is set forth both directly and indirectly, as in the following passage: 'That they that live should no longer live unto themselves" (2 Cor. 5: 15) ; compare also Gal. 2: 20; Phil. 2:4; Luke 14: 26; John 12: 25. With regard to the attributes, the acts and the consequences of sin the fol- lowing passages may be observed: "What is man, that he should be righteous?" (Job 15: 14) ; "For out of the heart come forth evil thoughts," etc. (Matt. 15: 14) ; cf. (iai. 5: 19—21; "Sin which dwelleth in me" (Rom. 7: 20) ; "I see a different law in my members" (Rom. 7: 23) ; "The judg- ment came of one unto condemnation" (Rom. 5: 16) ; "Cre- ate in me a clean heart, 0 God" (Ps. 51: 12) ; "In the put- ting off of the body of the flesh, in the circumcision of Christ" (Col. 2: 11) ; "Who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" (Rom. 7: 24) ; "Except one be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John 3:5). 3. Characteristics or Affectiones. These are: 1) iiaturalis inhserentia, because original sin belongs to the depraved nature of man. In the original state of man sin was unnatural. Against Flacius, who declared that original sin constituted the essence of man, the following terms are used, non essentiale, sed accidentale, because original sin is a quality in the essence of 'man ; 2) naturalis projjagabilitas, because original sin is propa- gated through natural birth; 3) generale, or general, a term used against the Roman Catholic Church, which teaches the immaculate conception of Mary. Therefore all men are subjectum quod; 4) duratio per oynnem vitam, because original sin is never rooted out in this life. The reatus or the imputation of sin ceases in regeneration whose Sac- rament is Baptism, but the materiale remains. The domi- nation of sin is done away with through sanctification, and in death, finally, so far as the children of God are concerned, 166 ANTIIKOPOLOGY. sin itself is totally obliterated in a manner past finding out; 5) damnabile or damnable. This is true because peccatum originale originatum is vere peccatum. Original sin con- demns all that are not regenerated through Baptism and the Holy Ghost. 4. iMPUTATio OR Imputation. Imputation is presented in a threefold manner: 1) im- putatio immediata, or immediate imputation. Adam is re- garded as the representative and the moral head (caput morale) of the human race. Therefore all men sinned in him. The children of men, who constitute one race, cannot be separated from each other; 2) impiitatio mediata, or the mediate imputation, which is based upon the fact that Adam is the natural head of the race or caput naturale. Compare Traducianism, Section II, 4; 3) imputatio individ iicdis, or the individual imputation, because with the development of self-consciousness each person appropriates original sin as his own through actual sin. Original sin is something that is imputed, not only be- cause of the transgression of another, which view tends toward Pelagianism, but because original sin implies the corruption of our nature. The sinful state stands in rela- tion to the sin of Adam because he is the principium natu- rale et morale of the whole race. Original sin is therefore guilt or reatus propter inobedientiam Adse et Hevae. For this reason the confessional writings state that on account of this corruption and the disobedience of our first parents the nature of man is accused and judged by the law of God. Inasmuch, therefore, as not only grown persons, but also small children who have not committed actual sins, come under the judgment of the sin of our first parents, it would seem as though the small children, not to speak of grov^m persons, would thereby suffer unjustly and without cause. However, we must not forget that Adam was the repre- sentative of the race and as such must be tested for the race. Inasmuch as he failed in the test, therefore all must suffer by reason of the solidarity of the race. If men had THE FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN. 167 not constituted a racial solidarity, they would have been like unto the angels and each would have stood his own test, but in His wisdom (iod created man to form an organism. Despite the fact that sin has come into the world through one man, still men are not compelled to remain in the state of sin. The compensation which has been gained through the Second Adam is greater than the original loss sustained, and through another test man may become finally liberated from original sin, provided he make use of the means of salvation. Thus Paul writes in Romans 5 : 14, 15 : ''Never- theless death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's trans- gression, who is a figure of him that was to come. But not as the trespass, so also is the free gift. For if by the tres- pass of the one the many died, much more did the grace of God, and the gift by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, abound unto many." The act of the second Adam is meant for the whole race of men without merit and without dis- tinction. Therefore the way to Paradise is open to all, al- though a test is necessary for all, since God does not force anyone to return. 5. The Effects of Original Sin or Effectus. The effects of sin are the following: 1) The loss of the free will; 2) actual sins; 3) spiritual death; 4) sickness and suffering; 5) bodily death; 6) eternal or the second death. The loss of the free will is naturally included in the nega- tive element of sin, inasmuch as man lost perfectiones prin- cipales or justitia originalis. Spiritual death or separation from God is also included under this head. Although original sin in a special sense destroyed the spiritual powers of man, still the effects necessarily also were extended to his physical nature so that perfectiones minus principales were likewise lost. Bodily death became the necessary re- sult of spiritual death. Death did not belong to the nature of man and even now is something unnatural. Provided 168 ANTHKOl'OLOGY. man had remained in the state of integrity, he would have escaped death and when fully developed for the higher life would have been transformed in nature and translated to heaven. But by reason of sin, not only did physical death as a king of terror enter into the world, but what is still worse, eternal death or the second death also entered. The following Scripture passages may be cited to show the effects of original sin : "I am carnal, sold under sin" (Rom. 7: 14) ; "Then the lust, when it hath conceived, beareth sin : and the sin, when it is fullgrown, bringeth forth death" (James 1 : 15) ; "Dead through your trespasses and sins" (Eph. 2:1); "The wages of sin is death" (Rom. 6: 23) ; "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" (Gen. 2: 17) ; "This is the second death, even the lake of fire" (Rev. 20: 15). 6. Notes on the History of Dogma. The older teachers of the Church considered that the depravity of sin was general, but their opinions did not agree on the heredity of sin through natural propagation. This in turn was dependent on the distinctive opinions with regard to the propagation of the soul. The Oriental fathers seemed to identify the natural imperfections with sensu- ality. The Occidental theologians took a deeper view of sin. Stress was laid on imputatio immediata. Augustine re- garded sin as reatus, and the principal seat of sin he places in the sensual nature of man. The teaching of the Roman Catholic Church was developed during the Scholastic period. According to this doctrine original sin is something nega- tive, a loss of the original righteousness, which, however, was only a bonum superadditum, through the loss of which man merely fell back into the state of puris naturalibus. The golden rein was lost and to that extent man was weak- ened. Original sin was regarded indeed as lust, which had its seat in the flesh, but it was not real sin. Baptism does away with the reatus of the Fall and therefore also with the evil of hereditary sin. Luther and the Church that THE FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN. 169 bears his name teach clearly that all men are born in sin, without religion, without trust in God, and with evil desires. Original sin is real sin and condemns all that are not re- generated through Baptism and the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, ZwiNGLi leaned toward the Roman view, while the teaching of Calvin stood in alignment with his doc- trine of predestination. The Formula of Concord empha- sized the doctrine that had been expressed in the Augsburg Confession. During the modern critical period the theories of privation and sensualism have been advocated besides that of Rationalism. The idealistic philosophy naturally rejects the Church's doctrine of original sin. In accordance with the tenets of this philosophy sin was necessary and beneficial. Schleiermacher and Julius Miiller speak of an original sinfulness. But the orthodox Lutheran Theo- logians have firmly set forth the teachings of the Church. In recent times Ritschlianism has sought to undermine the orthodox doctrine of sin, but many voices have been raised against this destructive theology. Justin Martyk considered that the Fall consisted in disobedience and superstitious credulity, but he does not clearly present the doctrine of original sin. Every man deserves death t^iat chooses to do evil and walk in the footsteps of Adam. Tatian* said that before the Pall man possessed a material soul 'and a spirit, but that the spirit was lost in the Fall and in consequence man became mortal. Iren.eus taught that the human race had sinned in Adam and become guilty before God, while it fell into the power of Satan. Clement of Alexandria taught that sin is the free act of man and not an evil inherited from Adam. Tertullian said that the essence of sin was selfishness. The soul is transplanted with the body and sin through heredity. He was the first to set forth clearly the doctrine of original sin and used the expression vitium originis. In children sin is found as to its material content, but not in a formal sense, that is, there is no guilt. On the other hand, Cyprian said that children have inherited guilt from Adam. Origen did not believe in original sin, but said that all men were born in sin, basing his assertion on the supposition that a fall into sin had taken place in the ante-temporal state, for which reason every man brought sin with him into the world. Lactantius taught that sin had arisen through the infirmities of the body, but that we had inherited death from Adam. Athanasius ascribes sin to inertia or slothfulness. He did not consider the sin 170 ANTHROPOLOGY. of Adam as really being the cause of human corruption. Small chil dren are guiltless. There were sinless men before Christ. Cf. Oratio III, 26, 33. Basil taught that freedom was the root of sin. It was dependent on man himself as to whether he would sin or not. Cyril OF Jerusalem ascribed sin to the free will of man and said that Satan leads such men astray as would be led astray. Gregory of Nazianzu.s and Gregory of Nyssa conceived of sin negatively. Small children are guiltless. A.mhrose taught that we all sinned in Adam and that we are born in sin. Pkl.\gius maintained that man was indifferent. Adam brought injury only upon himself through the Fall and only through his example has he brought injury upon his descendants. There is no original sin. Lust is not sin, but can give rise to it. Augustine taught that in Adam all men sinned. He conceived of sin as implying a negation or privatio boni in contradistinction to the ManichcBans who set forth the substantiality of sin in man. He pre- sented the negative and positive elements in sin, but concupiscentia was not sin per se. According to his view original sin was reatus or the imputation of the sin of Adam, for which reason he did not con- sider it so much our sin as rather a punishment for sin. The real scat of sin is to be found in the sensuous nature of man. Gregory* THE Great set forth spiritual death as the punishment for sin, because Adam did not die the same day that he fell into sin. Joiix of Damascus viewed sin more from the negative than the positive standpoint. John Scotus Erigena rejected the doctrine of original sin and ac- cepted the teaching of ante-temporal sin. As a Pantheist he considered sin as a yu,^ 6v and necessary for development. Anselm considered that the essence of sin was selfishness. He expressed the relationship between Adam and his posterity in the following language: in Adamo fecit persona peccatricem naturam, in posteris facit natura personas peccatrices. Hugo of St. Victor taught that sin had arisen through a disparity between appetitus justi and commodi, both of which are concreated in man. Man passed beyond or exceeded moderation in the Fall, and as a consequence he also lost moderation in seeking the lower good. He lost appetitus justi and justitia. Original sin was principally privatio boni. Abelard detracted from the significance of the Fall, making sin dependent on intention. Strictly speaking, there- fore, small children have no sin. He laid stress on the punishment of sin. Peter Lo.mhard said that sin, fomes pcccati, was mediated through lust at the time of conception. The souls were then created immediately by God, but contaminated by contact with the body. He taught, however, that all men sinned in Adam, but viewed sin prin- cipally from the negative standpoint or the loss of the primitive good- ness. Thomas Aquinas declared that the bonum superadditum was lost in the Fall, by which there resulted a disorder in the powers of the soul, a vulneratio natura? Materialiter, sin consisted in concupi- THE FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN. 171 scentia, which in itself was not sinful. He viewed the human race as a living body and held that original sin brings guilt to all. The souls of men are created by God as included in the Fall of Adam. Duns ScoTUS did not consider that any great damage had been wrought through the Fall, because it was only the bonum superadditum that had been lost, which had been given after creation. Still, concupi- scentia, which in itself was no sin, thereby lost its rein. He advo- cated the doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary DuRANDUs OF St. Pourcain Said that guilt was inherited from Adam, but not sinful corruption. Bellarmin taught that there is no other difference between man before and after the Fall than that man has lost the supernatural gift of grace and now is in a state of purls naturalibus. The guilt of Adam, however, is imputed to all men. LvTHER experienced a deep sense of sin and laid stress on both th2 positive and negative elements in sin. He compares original sin to the leaven of Satan which has poisoned the whole of our nature. On the other hand, Zwingli had a superficial sense of sin, considering it simply as a sickness. The hereditary damage is neither sin nor guilt. He does not acknowledge the imputation expressed in the term im- putatio mediata. Flacius taught that original sin constitutes the nature and essence of man. Striegel, on the other hand, in his argu- ment against the term "substance," lays stress in an ambiguous way on the accidental element in sin. Flacius declared against him that if sin be accidental, original sin would simply be an external thing. At least, Striegel used a very peculiar expression, although neither he nor Flacius understood the effects of their terminology and explana- tions. Striegel made use of the figure of the juice of garlic, which, when spread on a magnet, nullifies the magnetism. According to this figure sin would become an external and accidental thing merely, a privatio or imperfection. The Formula of Concord uses still stronger expressions than the preceding Lutheran symbols. Original sin is set forth as peccatum and worthy of condemnation, even though no actual sin had followed. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the sinful state is man's very own. It is, however, connected with the sin of Adam, because he is principium naturale et morale. Imputatio me- diata is set forth. The formale of original sin is guilt. The materiale of sin in the negative sense is the loss of man's original righteousness, so that in a material sense he lacks the image of God; in a positive sense the materiale of sin is set forth as concupiscentia with its seat especially in the spiritual nature of man. In the antithetical portion Pelagianism and related theories are condemned. The Formula fur- ther condemns the theory that original sin is merely a spot or stain in human nature and not a corruption. The contention of Striegel is rejected, in which he declared that through original sin nature was deprived of the use of its powers as the magnet is demagnetized by 172 AXTHROrOLOGY. the application of garlic juice. The teachings of Flacius were also rejected. The Sovinians reject the doctrine of original sin and its imputation. The sin of Adam was the cause of physical- death. Man was, indeed, mortal by nature, but God had granted unto him im- mortality. Men are indeed weak, but this is to be ascribed to the influence, the evil habits and examples of their ancestors. The Arminians also reject original sin and call it merely a weakness. Justitia originalis was lost, so that the grace of God is necessary for salvation. They also teach that physical death came as a result of the sin of Adam. The lusts of men are not sinful, provided they are natural and have not arisen through some evil habit. Leibnitz says that sin is a lesser degree of good, as the cold is a lesser degree of heat. The Rationalists, such as Wegscheider. reject the doctrine of original sin, stating that it does not accord with the attributes of God that He should permit the whole of human nature to be corrupted through the si-n of one man. He says, furthermore, that the doctrine is inexplicable. Kant stated that the Fall consisted in man's liberation from the domination of instinct and transition to that of the intellect. Adam was man in general. The root of sin was to be found in the evil tendency which he called the radical evil. This arose in the ante-temporal period. He is the author of the rationalistic theory of sensualism. Man arranged the determining factors of the practical reason in accordance with the sensuous appetites. Hegel considered the paradisaical state the same as the animal state, but through the Pall man became true man. Evil is necessary for progress. The Hegelian theologians considered that sin was necessary. The Supranaturalists teach that man participates in the guilt and punish- ment of Adam, but no one is condemned because of original sin. Man is condemned, if, in self-determination, he sins as Adam sinned. Schleiermaciier acknowledges the universality of sin, but denies its heredity from Adam. Human nature was sinful from the beginning. Sin is an element in progress. In relation to God sin possesses no objective reality; it exists in our subjective consciousness. With his Pantheism he combines the theories of privation and the sensual. Julius Muller believes that every man has had an ante-temporal ex- istence, when his will was turned against the will of God. Martenskx considered original sin as an evil fate. Only on becoming personal does racial sin imply guilt. Ritschl denies that original sin is evil desire (concupiscence). He considers original sin simply as the fate- ful influence which evil continually exerts upon man ACTUAL SIN. 173 '§14. ACTUAL SIN. Original sin, peccatum originale or prava concupiscentia, is the ground and source of peccata actualia or actual sins. As man progresses morally there are to be found in his development two conditions, one called habitus, or the set- tled state, the other, actus, or the free-will action. Habitus is dependent on natural character and repeated acts of the will, while actus implies a distinct act of the will in each separate action. Both of these elements must be empha- sized, because if the former alone is emphasized, the result will be determinism, while if the latter is emphasized to the exclusion of the former, the result will be a rationalistic interpretation of the origin of sin. Man is therefore in a state of corruption to which he conforms more and more through sinful actions which are fostered in this state. Status corruptionis is characterized by various states, dependent on the moral development of man. These states are the following: 1) status securitatis, or the state of sinful security; 2) status ser'vitutis, or the state of bondage; 8) status hypocriseos et phariseismi, or the state of hypocrisy or Pharisaism ; 4) status indurationis, or the obdurate state. 1. The Characterization of Actual Sin. The essence of sin is selfishness or self-will. It must be borne in mind, however, that although sin is a matter of the will and therefore voluntarium subjective, still it cannot be said that sin is voluntarium effective, inasmuch as sin does not originate in the free assent of the will, as the Roman Catholics, the Socinians and others teach. We must always bear in mind the sinful nature of original sin or the state of man. The most general definition of sin is the following: Sin is every departure, in thought, ivord and deed, from the Law of God. But what distinction is there between actual and habitual sins? Some say that actual sin is an act of the will and stands under the domination of the will, while 174 ANTHROPOLOGY. habitual sin dominates the will. AgairTst this it may be urged that Christians may commit actual sins that are involuntaria. Actual sin is momentary, while habitual sin is dependent on the permanent bent of the will. The cause of sin is naturally the person who sins, tempted by his own flesh, the world and the devil. God is in no sense the cause of actual sin, just as He was not the cause of original sin. Some have declared that He is the cause of the sin of obduracy. This view is based on the following passage: "Whom he will he hardeneth" (Rom. 9: 18). This passage implies only an act of divine judgment upon an alreadj^ existent state of sin, God punishes sin with sin. HOLLAZius defines the sin of obduracy as follows: "God does not harden men causally or actively, by producing hardness of heart, but judicially (judicialiter) , permissively (permissive), and by forsaking them (desertive). For the act of hardening is a judicial act by which, on account of antecedent, voluntary, and inevitable wickedness, God justly permits a man, habitually wicked, to rush into greater crimes, and withdraws His grace from him, and finally delivers him up to the power of Satan, by whom he is after- wards driven into greater sins, until He finally cuts him off from the right of the heavenly inheritance." Concerning suhjectum quo it may be observed: 1) that primaria sedes is the spirit of man with his attributes, faculties or endowments, intellect, will and emotion; 2) secundaria sedes is the body or the physical nature of m.an. In the Word of God sin is regarded from different points of view. When sin is looked upon as a failing to hit the mark, or to reach the right goal, the word ufJupTLu is used. Concupiscence, or the positive side of sin, is called i-mOvfjiM. The difference between åfJuipTrjfj-a and aixaprU is that the latter term sets forth sin in both the abstract and concrete sense, while the former has reference to the specific deed as dis- obedience toward the Law of God. Compare Mark 3: 28; Rom. 3: 25; 1 Cor. 6: 18. Considered as ungodliness sin is called do-c/Saa. The expression TripiKorj means unwilling- ness to hear, with disobedience as a result. Lawlessness ACTITAI. SIN. 175 and transgression of the Law are expressed by åvofJML and 7rapa/3ao-t9 . When shi is considered as a fault, an insufficient abihty to judge, a deviation from truth or higher moral standpoint, then TrapäiTTOijxa is used. As implying ignorance sin is called ayvoT^/ta. When forgetfulness of duty or imper- fection is implied, rjTTTjfxa. is used. Cf. 1 Cor. 6 : 7. nAr//u,/A£Aeta is often used in the Old Testament to express discord. The word o-Api is used with a variety of meanings, but most generally with a strongly ethical significance. 2. Classification of Actual Sins. Actual sin has been classified in the following way: 1) ratione causae or culpx, or in respect of the defective cause: a) voluntaria or intentional; b) involuntaria or uninten- tional, to which are counted peccata ignorantise, prsecipi- tantias et infirmitatis, or sins committed through ignorance, rashness and infirmity. "And that servant, who knew his Lord's will, and made not ready, nor did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes" (Luke 12: 47, 48) ; the denial of Peter (Matt. 26: 70) ; "And there arose a sharp contention, so that they parted asunder" (Acts 15: 39) ; "The good which I would I do not" (Rom. 7: 19) ; "But when they came, he drew back and separated himself, fearing them that were of the circumcision" (Gal. 2: 12) ; 2) ratione siibjecti totalis, or in respect of the person sinning in general : a) mortalia et venalia, or mortal and remissible sins ; the former imply spiritual death, the latter may be found in Christians, i. e., unintentional sins that are repented of and forgiven. Con- cerning venalia compare 1 John 2: 1, 2; b) nostra et aliena, our own and others'. We may become partakers in the sins of others by internal or external assent. "Be not ye there- fore partakers with them" (Eph. 5: 7; 5: 11) ; compare the admonition in 1 Tim. 5: 22; "He that giveth him greeting partaketh in his evil works" (2 John 11) ; 3) ratioyie sub- jecti partialis or in respect of the individual mode of sin- 176 ANTHROPOLOGY. ning: a) peccata cordis sen interna or the sins of the heart; b) peccata oris et operis sen externa or the sins of the mouth and deeds. "For from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed," etc. (Mark 7: 21, 22) ; "The tongue is a fire : the world of iniquity among our members is the tongue" (James 3 : 6) ; 4) ratione actus or in respect of the deed itself against the Law of God: a) peccata com- missionis or sins of commission; b) peccata omissionis or the sins of omission. "To him therefore that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (James 4: 17) ; 5) ratione objecti or in respect of the object: a) peccata in Deum, sins against God; b) peccata in proximum, or sins against our neighbor; c) in ipsum peccantem, or sins against ourselves; 6) ratione effectus or in respect of the effect: a) clamantia, or sins which cry out for punishment; b) non clamantia, or sins which do not so cry out. With reference to the former compare the sin of Cain, the sins of the Sodomites, the oppression of the Israelites in Egypt and the hire of the laborers. With regard to the last named we quote the following: "Behold, the hire of the laborers who mowed your fields, which is of you kept by fraud, crieth out: and the cries of them that reaped have entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth" (James 5: 4) ; 7) ratione acljnnctorum or in respect of their adjuncts: a) graviora et leviora, sins more or less grievous (as to degree) , because a Christian in certain cases sins more grievously than a heathen. He that commits adultery with another man's wife sins more grievously than the man who steals whpn he is hungry. A person who kills his mother sins more than the man who kills an enemy, etc. "Therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath greater sin" (John 19: 11) ; b)' occulta et mariifesta, secret and manifest. A secret sin is one that may be little known to the sinner himself or that may be known only by him and others who endeavor to keep it secret. A manifest sin may grow into a great scandal which may not only cause public offense, but also become a snare to others "For the things which are done by them in secret it is a shame even to speak of" (Eph. 5: ACTUAL, SIN. 177 12) ; "I know how manifold are your transgressions, and how mighty are your sins — ye that afflict the just, that take a bribe, and that turn aside the needy in the gate from their right" (Amos 5 : 12) ; c) mortiia et viventia, dead and living sins. Dead sins are such as are not known as sins, or which are not considered as great as they really are, or else such as have been partially or wholly overcome. They are there- fore no longer dominant. "But sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all manner of coveting: for apart from the law sin is dead" (Rom. 7:8); "Wherein ye also once walked, when ye lived in these things" (Col. 3: 5 — 7); d) manentia, which still oppress by their guilt, and remissa or forgiven; e) conjuncta cum indi(ratio7ie et ab ea sejuncta, i. e., some sins that are con- nected with hardness of heart and others not. Compare 2 Cor. 4:4; Acts 5 : 3 ; 1 Sam. 6:6; "Hardened by the de- ceitfulness of sin" (Heb. 3: 13) ; f) remissibilia et irremis- sibilia or remissible and irremissible sins. To the latter belongs the sin against the Holy Ghost. HOLLAZius defines this sin as follows:* "Sin agaiJist the Holy Ghost consists in a malicious denial of, a hostile attack upon, a7id a horrid blasphemy of divine truth, clearly knoivn and approved by conscience, together loith an obstinate ayid finally perse- vering rejection of all the means of scdvation." All of these characteristics ought to be emphasized and combined. This sin can be committed by persons who in a Christian sense have not been converted, as well as by Christians who have fallen from grace. In the former sense this sin was com- mitted by the Pharisees. Compare Luke 11 : 15 and Mark 3 : 28 — 30. The last-named passage reads as follows : "All their sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and their blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme: but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin: because they said. He hath an unclean spirit," With regard to sin *HoLLAZius: "Peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum est veritatis divinse evidenter agnitse et in conscientia approbatae malitiosa abnegatio, hos- tilis impugnatio,horrenda blasphematio et omnium mediorum salutis obstinata et finaliter perseverans rejectio." Dogmatics. 7. 178 ANTHROPOLOGY. against the Holy Ghost in the latter sense we quote Heb. 6: 4 — 6 : "For as touching those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age to come, and then fell away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame." Cf . 1 John 5:16: "There is a sin unto death: not concerning this do I say that ye should make request." Sin against the Holy Ghost is a decided and absolute evil, an absolute hardness of heart which al- ready in this life has identified itself with satanic egoism and blasphemy. Therefore those that have committed this sin cannot be forgiven, because they will not repent. There is a relative hardness of heart from which men may be saved, but when a person has become definitely and abso- lutely hardened in heart, there is no longer any hope. It is an abysmal defection which merits the judgment of hell. Such persons are ripe for hell before they die, i. e., the time of their visitation is at an end before the period of grace is finished. The sin against the Holy (ihost in this sense is to be distinguished from sins against the Holy Ghost in ordinary cases where sinners withstand the Holy Spirit and where even Christians grieve the Holy Spirit of God. The irremissible sin must also be distinguished from a special form of sin against Christ. Men may blaspheme Christ and by means of true repentance receive the forgiveness of their sin. Such blasphemy is relatively superficial and is brought about by ignorance, infirmity and the fear of man. Compare Luke 12: 10 together with the context. "And every one who shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Spirit it shall not be forgiven." In Matt. 12: 31 we read: "Every sin and blasphemy shall be for- given unto men ; but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven." Cf. the following verse. FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MORAL BONDAGE. 179 3. The Effects of Actual Sin. The consequences of actual sin are: a) the confirmation of the will in sin; b) accumulated guilt; c) temporal pun- ishment, for sin often punishes itself; God punishes here and now; d) eternal punishment in hell. God shall measure the punishment in the judgment when He shall judge every man according to his deeds. §15. THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MORAL BONDAGE. As a person man possesses a will or the power of self- determination and cannot be influenced irresistibly from within or without by instinct. Human freedom consists of two elements: 1) the formal or self-determination; 2) the material or determination by which the will of God becomes the determining ground for the will of man. By reason of the Fall the will of God ceased to determine the will of man. Man's power of self-determination became dominated by selfishness. The form of freedom was filled with a false content. After the Fall man indeed possesses a will, but he has lost the free will as determined by God. He has therefore lost the freedom of the will in relation to that which is good and determines upon that which is evil, if not influenced from above. The Augsburg Confession de- clares that the natural man lacks all freedom and power in spiritual things, that he possesses freedom, although cur- tailed through sin, in the realm of the intellect, and that in some measure he is able to abstain from the commission of gross sins. 1. Definition of the Subject. The principal question is. What is the relation of the will to spiritual things after the Fall? The Formula of Con- cord states the subject as follows: What unregenerated man, by his own powers of intellect and will, can accom- plish toward his conversion and regeneration. The answer 180 ANTHKOPOLOGY. is summed up in the terms : defectus lihevi arhitrii in rebus spiritualibus, or the loss of free will in spiritual things. Ad- ditional points are comprised under two heads: 1) libenim arbitrium in malis, or free will in evil things; 2) liberum arbitrium in rebus exteriiis, or free will in external things. 2. The Loss ov the Free Will in Spiritual Things. This defectus or loss consists of two elements: 1) the negative, or the absolute want of all power; 2) the positive, or that the intellect and the will are hostile toward God, which is expressed in the formula liberum arbitrium in malis. By nature, therefore, man withstands the grace of God. The Formula of Concord says that even in the re- generate the natural man in himself is constituted in the same way as these points express. Strong expressions are used with regard to the unregenerate. In his natural state man is represented as a stock and a stone. This expression does not mean that man has become a stock and a stone, nor that in all things he resembles a stock and a stone. Man has not lost his own personal nature. But as the stock and the stone are unyielding and withstand external influences, so the natural man possesses no power in himself in spir- itual things save to obstruct and withstand the power of God. The question concerns the power that man possesses in himself and then he is like a stock and a stone. But he is not unimpressionable like a stock and a stone. 3. The Two Hemispheres. Some Dogmaticians, in defining the natural power and want of power in man, make use of the following terms: hemisphxrium inferius and hemisphserium snperius. HoLLAZius refers the following to hemisphaerium in- ferius:* "All things and actions, physical, ethical, political, domestic, artificial, pedagogic, and divine, as far as they can be known by the light of the intellect and can be pro- duced by the powers of nature, aided by the general con- * Hon. Exam. Theol. Acroam. Pars II, Cap. V, 623. FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MOUAL BONDAGE. 181 currence of God." To this belongs liberum arbitrium in externis. To this hemisphere belong the reading and hear- ing of the Word of God, civic righteousness, etc. Still the natural ability that belongs to this lower hemisphere of the powers of the will is weak and infirm. There are internal and external impediments. Among the internal impedi- ments may be mentioned blindness of the intellect, obstinacy of the will, vehemence of the affections and perverseness of the natural appetites of man. Among the external impedi- ments may be counted the influence of Satan, the fasci- nating blandishments of the world, the fear of men, un- foreseen happenings and misfortunes. In hemisTphxrium swperius man is totally helpless and possesses no power in purely spiritual conditions. In this sphere is also counted the reading and hearing of the Word of God in such manner as to be of profit and blessing. Man has indeed the natural ability to read and hear, but by his own power he cannot be influenced thereby to salvation. 4. Human Freedom and the Grace of God. The human will can be liberated through grace, but not by force and coercion. All determinism must be excluded in order that the responsibility of man may be maintained. Man is incapable of his own power to do anything toward his own spiritual welfare (indeed, in his natural state he counteracts that welfare) ; still he must be brought into a state or condition where his sense of responsibility can be aroused. He cannot bring himself into such a state, but the Lord has arranged a way of escape and made it possible for man to be influenced from above. The Holy Spirit ap- proaches man especially through the means of grace and through these alone exerts His saving influence and activ- ity. Through the means of grace man becomes the object of the work of grace. It is not the work of man, but from beginning to end all is by grace. In this incipient activity the grace of God is called prevenient grace or gratia prse- veniens. By this means man is put in a position where he can determine for himself whether he will cease or continue 182 ANTHKOl'OLOGY. to withstand the activity of the Holy Spirit. Left to himself, man would continue in a state of sin and hos- tility. It is possible for prevenient grace to operate in the heart of man, inasmuch as the im.age of God in a formal sense still remains, thereby providing a ground of religious life. Although man is permeated by sin and to- tally incapacitated in spiritual things, still the essence of man is not sinful. The image of God in the formal sense as found in man does not denote that man possesses ability in spiritual things, it simply provides a point of contact. In its activity prevenient grace comes in touch with this point of contact, the ground of the religious life in man. To illustrate by a figure what takes place, let us say that it is like a man listening to a familiar note from the homeland, the Paradise that is lost. In his original state in Paradise man was put to the test, but failed in that test. Through prevenient grace man is again put to the test, and the ques- tion is whether or not he will return to Paradise. In coming in contact with the means of grace man cannot escape the activity of prevenient grace. For this reason gratia prae- veniens has been called inevitabilis or inevitable, and irre- sistibilis or irresistible, in the sense that man cannot escape the distinctive influence of this activity. At this juncture the self-determination of man comes into play, otherwise man would not be responsible. The Holy Spirit exerts His activity, but He cannot force a man. Luther and the Formula of Concord state that man possesses Swa/ui? iraOrjTiKr] or capacitas, non activa, sed passiva, by which is meant that man can become, although he cannot make himself, a partaker of the grace of God. There is no activity through the freedom of the will toward that which is good, but by grace man may become passive. If he remain in quietness, then the redeeming power of grace will continue, and he will become active through the powers bestowed by the Holy Spirit in conversion. But if he withstands the work of the Spirit, then the result will not only be resistentia naturalis, but resistentia malitiosa or nolle positivum. In this way a higher state of corruption is reached. FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MORAL BONDAGE. 183 Some have thought that the Lutheran Church is not con- sistent in this doctrine, teaching as she does that man is incapable of doing anything toward his salvation and still is responsible, but when we understand the question as dealt with in the Augsburg Confession, and which the Formula of Concord emphasizes, then it is evident that there is no inconsistency. This subject has already been discussed ; we would merely add that man has power to use the Word of God, even if by his own power he cannot read and hear in such manner as to receive a blessing. In this way man first becomes responsible, inasmuch as God works through the means of grace. But as soon as a man reads and hears the Word of God, then the Holy Spirit is present with prevenient grace. In this connection attention ought to be called to the fact that there is a great difference be- tween the unbaptized heathen and a baptized Christian, even though the latter has fallen from the grace of Bap- tism. He that has been baptized has at one time possessed an arbitrium liberatum or liberated will and is therefore continuously an object of special grace. The strong expres- sions in the P^'ormula of Concord concern the natural man and tell what the unregenerated man is able to accomplish by his own power, and the answer is that he can do nothing of his own power, indeed, he only resists the work of the Holy Spirit. He that has been regenerated once in Baptism is therefore more responsible than the heathen, who has never, as has the Christian, possessed a liberated will. Therefore of his own natural power man can do nothing, but grace does all. Although there is no real co-operation before conversion, it is nevertheless taught that man co- operates after conversion. This co-operation is, however, not a natural product, but is the activity of the regenerated man through the powers and endowments which the Holy Spirit began to bestow in conversion.' The following passages of Scripture may be quoted as being of importance in the solution of this question : "For ye were once darkness" (Eph. 5: 8) ; ''The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God : for they are 184 ANTIIKOPOLOGY. foolishness unto him ; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged" (1 Cor. 2: 14) ; "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves, to account anything as from ourselves" (2 Cor. 3:5); "The mind of the flesh is enmity against God" (Rom. 8:7); "Every one that committeth sin is the bondservant of sin" (John 8: 34) ; "When Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law" (Rom. 2: 14) ; "As touching the righteousness which is in the law, found blameless" (Phil. 3:6); "But without thy mind I would "do nothing ; tha,t thy goodness should not be of necessity, but of free will" (Philemon 14) ; "But hath power as touching his own will" (1 Cor. 7 : 37) ; "Now when they heard this, they were pricked in their heart. . . .and Peter said unto them, Repent ye" (Acts 2: 37, 38) ; "Repent ye therefore, and turn again" (Acts 3: 19); "So belief Cometh of hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ" (Rom. 10: 17) ; "I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins : for except ye believe that I am he, ye shall die in your sins" (John 8: 24); "If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed" (John 8 : 36) ; "For by grace have ye been saved through faith ; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God" (Eph. 2:8); "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ made me free from the law of sin and death" (Rom. 8:2); "For as many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ" (Gal. 3: 27) ; "Look therefore carefully how ye walk, not as unwise, but as wise" (Eph. 5: 15) ; "Give the more diligence to make your calling and election sure" (2 Peter 1: 10) ; "I can do all things in him that strengtheneth me" (Phil. 4: 13) ; "If by the Spirit ye put to death the deeds of the body" (Rom. 8: 13). 5. Notes on the History of Dogma. The Greek Fathers laid stress in general on human free- dom and self-determination. Still they speak of the assist- ance of grace and the work of enlightenment. The Occi- dental or Latin Fathers, indeed, lay greater stress on grace, but they also set forth the ability of man. The real con- FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MORAL BONDAGE. 185 troversy on the relationship between grace and freedom began with Pelagianism and has continued ever since in one form or another. PELAGIUS teaches that man is practically sound and can do whatever he wills to do, for which reason grace is superfluous or else possesses little significance. Augustine said that man is bound and in a spiritual sense dead. He rejected the formal element in freedom and ended in Determinism, just as Pelagius, who went to the opposite extreme, ended in Indifferentism. Semi-Pelagianism set forth the spiritual sickness and weakness of man, who nevertheless possessed the power to begin his conversion. During the Middle Ages a synergistic tendency began to appear. The Thomists represented this tendency, although neither Semi-Pelagianism nor Synergism are found fully developed in Thomas Aquinas. The Scotists represented Semi-Pelagianism and Indifferentism. For this reason the Roman Catholic conception became synergistic in theory and Semi-Pelagian in practice. The Protestant Churches taught that man does not possess liberum arbitrium in spirituali- bus and Calvin was led into the doctrine of unconditional predestination. The Lutheran Church was fortunate in avoiding extremes in setting forth the grace of God and still maintaining and emphasizing the responsibility of man. However, during the period of the Reformation a contro- versy broke out concerning the freedom of the will. The Synergists declared that the will constituted a third factor in conversion, that man was indeed unable to begin his con- version, but that he had the power in himself to co-operate with the grace of God. The Socinians and Arminians adopted Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian views. The Kantian School, the Rationalists, the mediating theologians in gen- eral together with the Ritschlians advocate more or less strongly developed Pelagian and synergistic views. Justin Mar'tyr presented the power of self-determination on the part of man in the choice between good and evil. Clement of Alex- andria says that power for good is found in every man. Iren^us stresses human freedom, but says that man is like a withered tree that cannot bear fruit unless watered from above. Tertullian set forth the necessity of grace, not only as an aid in spiritual things, but also 186 ANTHROPOLOGY. as a creative principle. Man, however, can will to accept grace and thus begin repentance. Origkn says that man can decide for the good, although the co-operation of God is necessary. Cypkiax declared that our strength was lost, but that faith is ours and upon its quantum de- pends how much we receive. Cykil of Jekusalem teaches that God grants His grace to those that are worthy and that faith is our own possession. Gregory of Nazianzvs says that penitence depends both on us and God. Gregory of Nyssa says the human will and the grace of God must co-operate. Ciikysostom teaches that we must first begin, then God comes to our assistance. A.mrrose says that the grace of God is needed to begin repentance, and he speaks of a gratia praeparans interna. However, he makes a distinction between praecepta and con- cilia, stating that the latter have special merit. Pei-agius ascribes to man power to choose. There is a natural capability (posse) which is the gift of God, but to will and to do (velle et facere) belong to human freedom. There is special grace for the Christians, which con- fers the forgiveness of sins for actual sins and renders assistance in that which is good or enlightenment through the teaching and example of Christ. The conferring of this grace makes easy what man of him- self is otherwise able to accomplish. AuorsxixE says that the human will is incapable, that it tends toward sin. There is no real good out- side of grace. The grace of God is a creative principle and is bestowed without merit. He speaks of gratia irresistibilis, prseveniens, operans et cooperans and of donum perseverantiae. The Semi-Pelagians taught that nature had simply become infirm through sin. By his own power man is capable of co-operating in his own conversion when supported by grace. Man begins and then the grace of God enters in to assist. Pelagianism was rejected in 418 and 431, while Semi-Pelagianism was rejected in 529. Joiix of Damascus declared that the moral power of man was only weakened through the Fall. Man is now just as free as Adam. Reason and freedom have not been lost. John Scotus Erigena taught that man possesses freedom, but that it does not become active except through grace. Man is capable of seeing even in darkness, but the objects of vision do not become visible be- fore the light appears. A.nselm rejected the view of Augustine that man is free to choose only the evil and considered that the power of the will to choose and do the right was indispensable. We must dis- tinguish between the faculty and its use. Adam failed in its use, but the faculty remains. Higo of St. Victor has the following to say concerning human freedom: 1) In the state of integrity man possessed the power to sin or not to sin (posse peccare et posse non peccare) ; 2) after the Fall, before the restoration, freedom is infirm, so that man possesses the power to sin and is incapable of not sinning (posse peccare et non posse non peccare) ; 3) after the restoration, but prior to confirmation in that which is good, there is power to do the good FKEEDOai OF THE WILL A^s'D MORAL BONDAGE. 187 and infirmity in relation to evil, so that man is capable of sinning, but has the ability also of not sinning (posse peccare et posse non peccarej : 4) in the more perfect state there is the possibility of not sinning and the impossibility of sinning, the latter dependent on the confirming grace of God (posse non peccare et non posse peccare). Peter Lombard like Augustine speaks of gratia operans et cooperans. However, while Augustine says that the natural will is dead in relation to the good, Lombard considers that it is merely weak and infirm. He also makes use of the following classification of grace: gratia gratis dans, who is God Himself, gratia gratis data, which is the same as gratia prse- veniens et operans, and gratia gratum faciens, which is the same as gratia cooperans, which is meritorious. Alexander of Hales advocated the Semi-Pelagian view and says that after the Fall there is to be found a receptivity for grace. Thomas of Aquixas said that God works that which is good in us without our assistance, but not without our consent. Man is capable of inclining himself to receive the grace of God and thus win for himself meritum de congruo. This merit of fitness has, however, not come about except through the presence of the grace of God. Through meritum congrui gratia habitualis is re- ceived, by means of which man gains for himself the merit of worthi- ness or meritum ex condigno. Even in the converted soul he dis- tinguishes between meritum congrui and meritum condigni. In his doctrine of meritum congrui there is a Semi-Pelagian tendency and in the doctrine of meritum condigni a synergistic tendency, but in general Thomas Aquinas represents the synergistic view. Duns Scotus, who advocated Pelagianism, says that after the Fall man still possesses the use of his free will, which is arbitrary, and that he can incline himself to receive the grace of God. Gabriel Biel taught that even after the Fall man is capable of producing bonum morale and of his own power to love God above all things, but bonum morale becomes bonum meritorium through gratia gratum faciens, which man lost on account of original sin. The Council of Trent taught that liberum arbitrium was not extinct through the Fall, but only made infirm. The grace of God begins conversion, but man is afterwards capable of cooperating. In theory the Council supported the synergistic view. Bellarmin sets forth human freedom and the grace of God as co- ordinated and makes use of the following illustration: It is the same as when two persons are engaged in the act of carrying a huge stone which neither of the two was able to carry; neither increases the power of the other nor does he urge him on; each is perfectly at liberty to leave the burden, but if one of the two no longer desires to co- operate, then nothing will come of their labors. In the beginning Luther indeed advocated Determinism, but the reason for this is easily understood, and he afterwards abandoned this position. His explanation of the Third Article shows clerirl;/ v;lAi 188 ANTHROPOLOGY. he thought about the ability of man. Melanchthon departed from the position of Luther, which he first advocated. He taught that to a certain extent man possesses a free will in spiritual things. In his revision of the Loci which he published in 1535 he set forth that there are three factors that co-operate in conversion, viz., the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the human will. In the edition of 1548 he ascribes to the will of man facultas applicandi se ad gratiam. Man was at least capable of saying "yes" to the grace of God. His doctrine gave rise to the synergistic controversy. In 1555 Pfeffinger published a work on the free will in which he set forth the co-operation of the free will or Synergism. Stkiegel taught that the Holy Spirit must begin the work of conversion, showing in this respect the inability of man, but he nevertheless possesses modus agendi et aptitudo moralis. This contained a positive power toward the good. The human will is not dead, but infirm. Aroused by the Spirit, the will becomes syner- gistic. The power to do good is therefore not the work of the Spirit, but a natural capacity. The ability of man was therefore a factor in conversion. TJie Formula of Concord naturally rejected Synergism as well as Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism and recognized only two factors in conversion, viz., the Word and the Holy Spirit. Selxecker spoke of the natural man as possessing carnalis conatus in relation to the Word of God. ^gidius Hunnius ascribed to man a general longing for salvation. The Socinians taught that in his natural state man pos- sesses freedom both with regard to good and evil. The Ar7ninia7is said that man possesses power to incline himself to obey the will of God. HouNEjus declared that between actiones spirituales, which can be wrought only by special grace, and opera civilia, which can be done by natural man, there ought to be placed opera moralia. The latter can be produced by general divine grace. Mus.eus ascribes to man certain actus pedagogici in regard to knowledge and will which may develop into a high regard for salvation. Budd.eus taught that the grace of God was to be found in a general way even outside of the pale of salvation. Although Kaxt set forth the doctrine of radical evil, still he took the position that man could convert himself, basing it on the teaching of the so-called categorical imperative, thou shalt, because thou canst. Scm.EiERMACHKH, Hase, NiTZScii, J. MuLLER and others advocated to a greater or less extent synergistic views. Martensex speaks of grace that is inborn, of essential freedom, and that man has ability to open his heart to receive the grace of God. Such theologians as Thomasius and Frank, of course, reject Synergism, but require that emphasis be placed not only on the active relationship during conversion on the ground of the liberating activity of salvation, but also on the possi- bility of a state of preparation on the basis of the general divine activity through the conscience. III. CHRISTOLOGY. Christology is that part of Dogmatics which treats of the doctrine of Christ's person, under which the following main subjects are discussed: The Necessity of the God-man, the Incarnation, Jesus Christ as True God and True Man, the Personal Union and the Communion of Natures, Commu- nicatio Idiomatum, and the States of Christ. Christology, which stands in the closest union with So- teriology, constitutes the central theme in Dogmatics. The- ology cannot be properly understood except in the light of Christology. Moreover, so far as the remaining parts of Dogmatics are concerned, Christology is the sun that illu- mines them and about which they all revolve in harmony and order. The Christology of the Lutheran Church is the founda- tion of her doctrine of Justification, and therefore when we consider the importance of this doctrine as the material principle of our Church, we can readily appreciate why Christology should be accorded the important position it occupies. Faith justifies because it accepts Christ, who is the Saviour. The Saviour m^ust be true Gud and true man. Luther, for whom our Church was named, was certain of his justification, because in faith he had accepted Christ. The theology of Luther did not depend on scientific investi- gations and research, but was grounded in his religious experiences. The experience of faith is also the argument for the Christology of the Lutheran Church. The Lutheran Christology reaches its culmination in the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum. The doctrinal de- velopment concerning the communication of the attributes and the communion of the actions or concerning the idio- 190 CUKISTOLOGY. matic or personal propositions is characteristic of our Church. This doctrinal presentation in turn provides a sure foundation, according to the Word of God, for other important doctrines of our Church. Among these may be mentioned the atonement, justification and the Lord's Sup- per. In considering especially the Lord's Supper it is true that Luther did not in the final analysis base his conception of it on his doctrine of Christology, but upon the sure words of Christ at the institution of the Holy Supper; still com- municatio idiomatum throws a clear light on this subject and explains the Lutheran standpoint. From one point of view we may say that the doctrine of Christology is based on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, while from another we may say that the latter is grounded in the former. §16. THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. God-man is a word that expresses a heaven-born and eternal thought which was realized in the fulness of time. No man could have attained unto so exalted a thought. There must be a special reason why God became man. He who was eternally self-sufficient could not feel the need of as- suming manhood. We remember what the creative will of (iod implied. When this could not be realized because of sin, then there followed another divine decree. It is always in such connection that the Scriptures speak of the incarna- tion of the Son of God. The Word of God does not tell us whether or not the Son of God would have become man in case sin had not come into the world. But since the Scrip- tures always present the incarnation as a necessity for the salvation of man, this fact itself forms a sure basis for the opinion that the Son of God would not have assumed human flesh had not the decree of salvation required it. The pos- sibility of the incarnation cannot be denied, inasmuch as it is a fact that the Son of God has become man. In any other case Jesus Christ would be the riddle and unsolved problem of human history. THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 191 1. The Necessity of the God-man. The necessity for the Son of God to assume our human nature is therefore based on sin and the human need of salvation through a Saviour and Mediator that belonged to both sides, i. e., was both God and man. There are many theologians who declare that the incar- nation lay within the scope of creation itself. Such theo- logians consider the idea absurd that man should have come into closer relationship with God through sin than would have been the case had he remained in the state of integrity. If so, they argue, sin would have brought about such a great effect, that a foreign element, viz., human nature, would forever have entered into the Trinity. Their real argument for the incarnation independent of sin is that the Son of God is considered as the head and center of humanity. The head must be a part of the organism. With regard to these views the following answers may be given : It is impossible to prove that the incarnation was a part of the plan of creation. It may be said, indeed, that in a way man as saved through Jesus Christ has come nearer to (Jod by reason of the incarnation which took place on account of sin, and yet God was very near to man and man near to God in the state of innocence, Besides, man was created in the image of God, so that the race of men was the offspring of God. The question of a foreign ele- ment entering into the Trinity is not disconcerting, inas- much as this was foreseen and determined upon in eternity. The Son of God could have been the head of humanity with- out being a part of the organism. We must be careful not to lay too much stress on the relationship between the body and the head in the figure and thereby lose sight of the main idea, viz., that the Son of God was the eternal proto- type of humanity, indeed the ideal man. The doctrine of incarnation independent of sin has no clear support in Scripture. It is based on vague speculation and mere guess- work, having no sure foundation. 192 C'll HISTOLOGY. 2. The Possibility of the God-man. The necessity of the God-man would seem to presuppose His possibility. To the superficial thinker it appears alto- gether impossible for the Son of God to assume human nature and become true man. Neither is there any analogy. We might refer to unio mystica in the experience of the Christian, but this is no adequate comparison. Although no analogy can be found to illustrate the possibility of the God-man, still no true Christian doubts this possibility, having experienced the reality of it through faith. Of course, there are always nominal Christians who raise objections. These objections are of the same character as those of the Deists and the Rationalists, They declare that He who is infinite, immeasurable and omnipresent could not possibly unite Himself with that which is finite and limited to time and space. Their misconception arises from the fact that they consider God as infinite and man as finite in an ex- tensive sense. But God is infinite and immeasurable in an intensive sense. True, man is finite, being only a relative personality, but from the religious aspect man realizes that he is created in the image of God and for this reason he is in a certain sense partaker in the infinity of God. The fact that man was created in the image of God and destined for eternal life explains the fact of the incarnation. This miracle could take place because God willed it. A king can assume the position of a servant. Why should not the Son of God be able to become man and still remain supra- mundane? There was no hindrance. The imperfection of the human intellect and our inability to explain the great miracle prove nothing, for many things are possible which we do not comprehend, while to God nothing is impossible save that which militates against His holy will. 3. Concerning the Incarnation. HOLLAZius gives the following definition: "Incarnatio 07' unitio is the divine act through which the Son of God THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 193 assumed in the unity of His person a human nature in the womb of the Virgin Mary." In this connection we quote the following from Bjorling's Dogmatics.:* "In the act of the incarnation the divine self-consciousness takes up the human into communion with itself, and the divine self- determination takes up the human into communion with itself. In this manner there arises a person who is con- scious of the fact that He is both God and man." When the Son actively assumed the nature of man, while at the same time the other persons were active in the in- carnation, it is important to define more closely in what the other persons participated. When the question con- cerns the cause of the act of incarnation, then it is an opus ad extra and is ascribed to the Trinity. On the other hand, when the question concerns the accomplishment of the act. then it is an opus ad intra and is ascribed to the Son. The activity of the three persons is divided in the following w^ay : 1) The Father sends the Son. The following passages may be cited: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son" (John 3: 16). "That spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all" (Rom. 8 : 32) . "When the fulness of time came, God sent forth his Son" (Gal. 4:4). 2) The Son assumed human nature and became man. In Luke 1 : 35 we read : "The power of the Most High shall overshadow thee." This refers to the Son. Hollazius** says: "Overshadowing denotes the mysterious and won- derful filling of the temple of the body, formed by the Holy Ghost, for the Son indeed overshadowed the Virgin Mary and by a peculiar assimilation filled and united to Himself a part of the Virgin's blood, influenced by the Holy Ghost, so that He dwelt in it bodily as in His own temple." 3) The work of the Holy Ghost is presented in a three- fold way: a) ^ixtovpyiKri or formativa, by which is meant that the Holy Ghost influenced Mary, so that without male seed she could conceive. The Holy Ghost formed in the * Björlings Dogmatik, Part II, sec. iir, p. 56. ** Exam. Theol. Acroam., Pars III, Qu. 14, p. 87. 194 CIIUISTOLOGY. womb of Mary the substance which became the human na- ture of Christ; b) dytufrriKT^' or sanctificativa, for the Holy Ghost cleansed from sin and sanctified the substance of which the body of the Son of (Jod was formed; c) TtAetom/cT^ or cotijunctiva, which denotes the mysterious union by which the eternal Logos was indissolubly united with the nature formed and sanctified by the Holy Ghost. And yet, although Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost, still we cannot say that the Holy Ghost is the Father of Christ. It was not an cTreAeno-is a-rrepixaTLKii , SO that the Holy Ghost was a spermatic cause. The cleansing of the natural substance from sin is furthermore explained through the activity of the divine nature.* The following passages may be quoted concerning the activity of the Spirit and the incarnation of the Son: "And the angel answered and said unto her, The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee: wherefore also the holy thing which is begotten shall be called the Son of God" (Luke 1 : 35) ; "When his mother Mary had been betrothed to Joseph, before they came together she was found with child of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 1: 18) ; "And without con- * In the Creeds of the Church we confess that Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost. This was not an ordinary, but an extraordinary and absolutely miraculous conception. We also confess Him "born of the Virgin Mary," which emphasizes the supernatural in the event. The correct translation of Luke 1: 35 in rendering it the Holy Spirit supports the Confession. Spirit (compare the original) has the em- phatic position which makes it more definite without the article. The indefinite translation 'Holy Spirit' only serves the exegesis of Nes- torians, Kenotics and Dorner. While it is impossible to explain the supernatural conception, it is evident that the Holy Spirit was active in a supernatural manner to segregate the cell, purify it from inherited sin in the physico-psychical propagation and at the very same instant conjoin the human and divine nature, the latter as Logos at the same moment assuming human nature actively and not passively. The Son of God did not assume human nature as entire, but a human nature as separated by the Holy Spirit and possessing all that belongs to human nature except sin. The personalization took place in the same act, the result being the God-man and not a man-God. Compare the following passages: "God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sin- ful flesh," Rom. 8: 3; "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee (concep- tion), and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee (Logos)," Luke 1: 35; "And the Word became flesh," John 1: 14. — The Roman Catholic Church attempted to establish the sinlessness of Christ by the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. Pope Pius THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 195 troversy great is the mystery of godliness; he who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit" (1 Tim. 3: 16) ; "Since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same" (Heb. 2: 14) ; ''Yet without sin" (Heb. 4: 15). 4. Concerning the Divinity of Jesus. The incarnation being necessary, the gracious will of God required that it also should be realized. All the proofs in- dicate and make clear that the incarnation of the Son of God or His assumption of human nature was carried into effect through the appearance of Jesus Christ. The incar- nation is therefore an historical fact. The ordinary proofs for the divinity of Jesus are the fol- lowing: 1) argumentuyn ovo/xao-rtKoV or that divine names are ascribed to Him; "This (Jesus Christ) is the true God and eternal life" (1 John 5: 20) ; 2) arguynentumlSLWfjiaTiKov or that divine attributes are ascribed to Him ; "Jesus came to them and spake unto them, saying. All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth" (Matt. 28 : 18) ; cf. John 17: 3; 17: 24, etc.; 3) argimientum évepyrjTiKov or that divine deeds are ascribed to Him; "All things have IX. (infallible ex cathedra, as officially decreed in 1870) declared at a Convention in 1854 that the Virgin Mary was, in the first instant of her conception, preserved free from every stain of original sin. — It is idle to discuss whether or not Jesus was born clauso utero Virginis, which would be a miracle. No Lutheran would deny the possibility, while a Calvinist, rejecting the Communicatio idiomatum, would be forced to teach aperto utero, but it is not based on Scripture passages. The Scriptures teach plainly that Jesus was born of a virgin, and her virginity was destroyed neither morally nor physically by the changes connected with pregnancy and the natural birth. — Another question, perhaps also idle, or at least curious, is discussed by theologians, namely, why the Second Person in the Trinity became man, and not the First or the Third. The following answers may be adequate: The First Person, being the Father, it was most fitting that the Father should send the Son and not the Son the Father; it was most suitable that in the incarnation the relation of the three should remain as be- fore; it was also proper that He by whom all things were made was to be the Mediator to bring the lost back to God; and it was also fitting that the Spirit was not incarnated, but that He, proceeding from the Father and the Son in the ontological relation, was sent by the Father and the Son to apply salvation. It was wonderful love that prompted the Son to become man to suffer and die for the salvation and redemp- tion of man. 196 CnRISTOLOGY. been created through him, and in him all things consist" (Col. 1: 16, 17) ; cf. John 1:3; John 5: 20, 21; Matt. 9: 6, etc.; 4) argumentum XarptvriKÖv or that divine worship is ascribed unto Him; "That all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father" (John 5: 23) ; cf. Phil. 2: 10, 11; 5) argumentum åvTo^iapTvpr^TiKÖv XpiaTov or the testimony of Jesus Christ Himself concerning His divinity. Note the following passages: "The P^ather loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand" (John 3: 35) ; "I that speak unto thee am he" (John 4 : 26) ; "Before Abraham was born I am" (John 8: 58) ; cf. John 17, etc.; "And they all said, Art thou then the Son of God? And he said unto them, Ye say that I am" (Luke 22: 70). Many other passages bear directly or indirectly upon the same subject. The testi- monies of Christ Himself possess great significance, inas- much as He was an intellectual, truthful, unselfish, meek and holy man, even when considered from the merely hu- man point of view. Even His enemies have acknowledged that His character was spotless, that He was the ideal man, and that He was elevated far above all selfish aspirations. A good man would not have borne such testimony of him- self, had it not been true. It is plainly evident that a sinful man never would have spoken as He did. He presented the truth boldly and uncompromisingly. He never sought popular favor and played no political role. His words and manner never indicate any mental aberration. His words always convey thoughts of profound wisdom. However critically considered, He was perfectly normal. In His ap- pearance and speech there was something supernatural, but nothing abnormal. Every unprejudiced thinker who loves the truth must therefore acknowledge the testimonies of Christ concerning His divinity as the best proofs of His divine origin. 5. Concerning the Humanity of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ was not only true God, but also true man. Proofs for the true humanity of Jesus have been presented against the advocates of Docetism and other related theo- THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 197 ries, definitions have been formulated in order to forestall misleading conceptions, while the special prerogatives of the human nature of Christ have been set forth in order to counteract Nestorian and rationalistic tendencies as well as for the purpose of making clear the pure and harmonious character of Christ as Mediator. We would herewith pre- sent more precisely the content of these considerations which have such great bearing on the development of the doctrine of the humanity of Jesus. 1) The ordinary proofs for the true humanity of Jesus are the following: a) argiimentum ex nommibiis humanis, or the proof on the ground of the human names of Jesus ; ''A man that hath told you the truth" (John 8: 40) ; "Man, Jesus Christ" (1 Tim. 2:5); "Is not this the carpenter's son? is not his mother called Mary? and his brethren, James, and Joseph, and Simon, and Judas?" (Matt. 13: 55) ; b) argumentum ex partihus hominis essentialibus, or proofs gathered from such passages as mention that He possessed body, soul, spirit, emotion, knowledge, will, etc. ; "The tem- ple of his body" (John 2: 21) ; "My soul is exceedingly sor- rowful" (Matt. 26: 38) ; "Yielded up his spirit" (Matt. 27: 50) ; cf. also Luke 2: 52; John 11: 35; Matt. 26: 39, etc.; c) argumentum ex operationihiis humanis, or proofs on the ground of His human deeds, such as that He taught, con- versed, journeyed, etc.; d) argiimentum ex attributis vero homini propriis, such as hunger, thirst, fatigue, sleep, etc. : e) argumentum ex genealogia Christi according to Matt. 1 and Luke 3. 2) Designations ascribed to the humanity of Jesus are: a) vera, or true, which term is used against Docetism and other related theories; b) completa, or perfect, which term is used against Apollinaris and others, and against Mono- teletism ; c) homousia, or of the same essence with us in accordance with His humanity, which is used against Gnosticism and against Schwenkfeld. 3) Concerning the natural and personal human infirmi- ties it is taught that Christ assumed infirmitas naturales, such as hunger, thirst, fatigue, trials, etc., but He did not 198 CIIKISTOLOGY. assume infirmitates persojiales, because these latter denote imperfection in formation, from which are derived de- formities and hereditary sicknesses. The assumption of these would not have served any purpose, and at the same time would have detracted from His human dignity. 4) Py-serogativa hiimanse Christi natur se, or the spe- cial prerogatives of the human nature of Christ, are: a) ävviro(jTaa-ia . By this is meant that the human nature did not exist per se as a special personality which was assumed in the act of incarnation, since in that case there would have been two persons and two mediators and not two natures in one person. The human nature, therefore, lacked per- sonality, but became personal by being made partaker in the personality of the Son of God, which is called IvvTroaTaa-ia. There M^as no separation in time so that the human nature of Christ should have lacked the elements of personality even for a moment. At exactly the same moment that the human nature through the divine activity came into ex- istence, it was made partaker in the most real and perfect way in the personality of the Son of God; b) ttm/xapr^o-ta, or that the assumed nature was sinless; c) singularis animse et corporis excellentia, denoting a singular measure of un- derstanding, will and emotion, Cf . Luke 2 : 47 ; John 7 : 46. His body constituted a harmonious organism. He was im- mortal and died therefore of His own free will, for which reason He did not see corruption. His form and appearance were perfect and beautiful. Cf . Ps. 45 : 3 : "Thou art fairer than the children of men." Isa. 53 refers to Christ in the garb of His suffering. Christ was normal in all things. Even in His appearance He was the ideal man. It is not necessary to think of Him as wearing a heavenly halo. His appearance was that of men in general, although His ex- ternal features undoubtedly expressed something of the inward purity of His spirit. Even Pilate was captivated by His personality. In regard to the second point touching upon the impec- cability and temptability of Christ we must consider that the divine nature by itself could not be tempted, but when THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOI>-MAN. 199 the divine and human natures are by the incarnation united in one theanthropic person, temptation' is possible. But His sinlessness does not lessen the reality of His temptation by Satan. The g:ood angels were tempted and our first parents were tempted in their state of innocence. But it was im- possible for Christ to fall a prey to Satan's wiles, and yet He could suffer the anguish of soul and the internal struggle of temptation to the utmost. This experience belonged to His suffering. We must consider that He was in the state of exinanition and, therefore, the experience of temptation was real. Being sinless. He was endowed with enlighten- ment in the understanding, purity in the feeling and holi- ness in the will and therefore felt the attack of Satan all the more keenly. If an enemy attacks a strong fortress, like Gibraltar, the bombardment will be corrsepondingly heavy. The temptation of Christ was evidently the severest that Satan was able to plan and execute. The reason that Christ could not fall depends upon the fact that the divine nature would not leave the human nature to itself in mo- ments of special danger. In the state of exinanition the divine nature ordinarily withdrew from the human nature the use of omniscience and other relative attributes and the (lOd-man was left to suffer desertion by God in His experi- ence of hell, but would never have been left to fall. He had been sent to suffer and die vicariously to save men. Ac- cording to Heb. 5: 8, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered, and He was the more able to help those who experience temptation. The fact that the Second Per- son in the Trinity has Himself passed through all kinds of trials and the hardest sufferings and death possesses great consolation for every Christian. 6. Notes on the History of Dogma. In the earliest period the doctrine of the Christian Church was in danger through influences both from Judaism and heathenism. There were two kinds of heresy that arose from Judaism. We refer to those of the Ebionites and the Nazareans. The former considered Christ only a man who 200 CHRISTOLOGY. had been consecrated as Messiah at His baptism. The lat- ter acknowledged the supernatural birth of Christ, but denied His hypostatical pre-existence. They considered that at the baptism of Christ God united Himself with the human personality as it had been fashioned by the Spirit of God. There was also a Greek Ebionitism which was pan- theistic in character. According to this theory the human nature of Christ was considered divine, which from the practical point of view simply meant that He was a great genius. Gnosticism arose through the influence of hea- thenism. Among its representatives we would mention Basilides, Valentinus and Marcion. Gnosticism also im- plied Docetism. The Church was also compelled to fight against the Monarchians, Apollinarism, and other tenden- cies. AVhile Origen was heretical in many things, he never- theless advocated the eternal generation of the Son. Among the many doctrinal controversies we would make mention of the struggle against Arius and the different forms of Arianism. During the second period there arose the con- troversy between the Nestorians and the School of Alex- andria, of which Cyril was the representative. The Alex- andrian School emphasized the union of the natures of Christ, while the Nestorians, on the other hand, separated them, resulting in two persons. Eutyches laid such em- phasis on the union of the natures as to result in only one nature. At the Council of Chalcedon in 451 it was decided that the two natures were united inconfusedly (do-vyxi'rws), unchangeably (dTpeVrws), indivisibly ( dSiaipcVws ) and insep- arably ( dxwpt'o-Tws ) . At the same Council the following was adopted: "We confess. that He is truly God and truly Man, of a reasonable soul and body ; consubstantial with the Fa- ther, according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us, according to the Manhood ; in all things like unto us, except sin." Several attempts were made to unite the Monophy- sites with the Church. Among such attempts may be men- tioned the one made by Emperor Heraclius together with the patriarchs Sergius in Constantinople and Cyrus in Alex- andria. Through this attempt there arose the heresy of THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 201 Monotheletism, which was condemned at Rome in 649 and at Constantinople in 680. In the West there arose a doc- trinal tendency known as Adoptionism, which set forth a double sonship. Peter Lombard developed a new doctrine which has become known as Nihilism. The Roman Catholic Church sought to effect a compromise between the different tendencies. The doctrines of this Church overshadow the humanity of Christ not only by laying special emphasis on the divine, but also through the worship of the saints, the mass and the exaltation of the Virgin Mary, who through her intercession represents the divine love in human form. During the following period, or the period of the Reforma- tion, the Lutheran Church devoted itself to the most thor- oughgoing study and treatment of the Christological ques- tion, which reached its culmination in the logical doctrine of communicatio idiomatum. The Reformed Church laid emphasis on the expression, "finitum non est capax infiniti," in accordance with which the union of the two natures is not real, except in the sense that it is the same person that is active at times through the one and at other times through the other nature. Such a position is related to Nestorianism. The Reformed view is often expressed in the same language as the Lutheran, but the content is not the same. The Re- formed doctrine of communicatio idiomatum makes this clear. During the Protestant Scholastic period there arose many Docetic tendencies, as in Schwenkfeld and Weigel, while other tendencies set forth only the human nature of Christ, such as Socinianism. Servetus rejected the doc- trine of the two natures of Christ as well as the eternal existence of a personal Son of God. This period was also characterized by a still more profound development of the Lutheran Christology. During the following period, which includes the modern critical development, there arose as a result of Deism and the philosophical schools of the day the modern development of Rationalism, which considers Jesus as simply a man. Kant laid stress on Christ from the prac- tical and moral point of view, while it became more and more customary to look upon Christ as the ideal man. 202 CHBISTOLOGY. Schleiermacher presents the doctrine of the ideal man and reallj' rejects the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, although in a pantheistic way he recognizes Christ as divine. Christ was the God-man as the highest development of humanity. And yet, although the school of Schleiermacher and Hegel have undermined the faith in the true divinity of Christ, still the orthodox doctrines have had many powerful de- fenders. The iconoclastic theology of Ritschl has won many adherents in our modern day. This theology robs Christ of essential union with the Father. The expression "Son of God" is used, but not in the sense that the Church teaches. In reality Ritschlianism denies the divinity of Christ. But while this destructive theology has exerted great influence, still it bears within its own heart the seeds of self-destruc- tion. The old truth shall conquer. We would herewith as before give a more detailed resumé of the ideas and concep- tions that have characterized different tendencies as well as the views of the leading men during the various periods of development. Clement of Rome calls Christ the effulgence of the Father, while he calls the suffering of Christ the suffering of God. Barnabas taught the pre-existence of Christ. Ignatius says that Christ is God who be- came man. He calls His blood the. blood of God. Cerintiii's, whom John, according to Polycarp, considered a heretic, taught the opposite, declaring that Jesus was a man who had received the aeon Christ at his baptism. This Christ left Jesus before His suffering. Justin Martyr taught that the Logos was a potency that had existed eternally in the Father, but appeared as a hypostasis at the creation of the world and was then born out of the essence of the Father. He therefore taught the birth of the Son. This Son of God assumed man- hood. Justin therefore did not teach that the Son was born of eternity, but that the birth of the Son was dependent upon the will of the Father. Atiienagoras partly followed the conception of Justin, but nevertheless considered that the Son was an eternal hypostasis in the Father. Among the Monarchians may be mentioned first the Alogians. who rejected the doctrine of the Logos as contained in John's Gospel and taught that the Logos was not a divine hypostasis as distinct from the Father. We would further mention the dynamic Monarchians, such as Theodotus the Tanner, Theodotus the Money-changer, and Artemon. who taught that it was only a divine power that was imparted to Jesus, who had been brought forth by the Holy Ghost and the Virgin THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 203 Mary. Later on Paul of Samosata further developed the teachings of the Monarchians. There were other Monarchians, the so-called Patripassians, who taught that the only person in the Godhead, or the Father Himself, had become man and suffered for the sins of the world. Among these may be mentioned Peaxeas, Noötus and Beryllus. The third form of Monarcliianism was the so-called Modalistic Monarch- ianism, which in developed form is called Sabellianism. Sabelltus taught that per se Ood was a unity that was impersonal and admitted of no distinctions. In the course of the world's development this unity appeared in three different modes or forms, each constituting, however, the whole monad. The Godhead, which is fixed and stable, reveals itself in three different phases of development, so that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit exist successively in the concrete, but it is the same God. — Gnosticism, flourished during the second century and was represented by Basilides, Valentinus and Marcion. The system of Basilides contained among other things the following: The nameless God through His creative word first produces a world embryo or chaos, from which the world develops. In this embryo there are found three sons, the pneumatic, the psychic and the hylic. The first of these liberates himself instantly from the embryo and arises with lightning rapidity to God and remains there as the blessed world of the spirit or TrXrjpoijxa, which constitutes the seven highest aeons, and together with the primitive being forms the first Ogdoad. The emanations continued and there arose 365 spiritual worlds. The second Son with the help of the Holy Spirit, whom He has produced, endeavors to follow the pneumatic son, but reaches no further than the border-line of the TrXrjpw/xa or the firmament. The third son is caught in the embryo and stands in need of redemption. Two apxovTe<; or SrjixLovpyoL are created which proceed from the world substance. The first ap)(^(Dv creates the firmament, the second creates and rules the planetary heavens. Both the archontes bear sons who arise and bring unto their father knowledge mediated through the Holy Spirit, leading him to repentance. This is the beginning of the process of redemption by which the children of God or the pneumatics are to be brought back to the supramundane God. Christianity is the means. Christ is threefold. He is the son of the first apxm', also of the second, as well as the son of Mary. It is the same principle. The body of Christ returned to formlessness at death. His soul arose and ascended, but stopped in the planetary heavens. His spirit ascended to the first son and the primitive being. The threefold pneumatic principle attracts all spiritual beings by which redemption is accom- plished. The system of Valentinus contains briefly the following main points: The primary substance is Bnöos which is inscrutable and throughout limitless ages lives in silent contemplation of his own perfection. This silence or rj o-Lyq is the spouse of Bythos and consti- 204 CHRISTOLOGY. tutes the feminine principle. After the silence begins the evolution. The first to be born are vov<; and aXy'/deiu, which in turn bear Aoyos and Coirj, and these in their turn bear ävOpwTro<; and eKKkrjaia. The first pair bring forth ten aeons and the second pair twelve. The last or the 28th aeon is called aocfyia. Thereafter the first pair also brought forth the heavenly Christ and the feminine Holy Spirit. 2oLa longs for the primitive being and at once plunges into the Bvdo^ and then chaos arises. "Opo? prevents her destruction, bringing her back and releasing from her Trä6oia is purified and as the bride of aoyr-qp is brought to TrXripMp.a and brings all the pneumatic spirits with her. Marcion accepted two principles, viz., the highest God and the Demiurge, the God of the Jews. The former was the good God, the latter was the angry God which was connected with the material. The Son of God without any preparation had suddenly come in a phantom body and without having come in contact with the body of Mary. He revealed the good God. Iren.^us taught that the Son had co-existed with the Father from eternity. He believed that there was an intimate union between the two natures. He further believed that Logos would have become man, even if sin had not come into the world. He said that Logos rested when Jesus suffered. Tkimulliax set forth a threefold sonship or filiatio. He wavered somewhat in his expressions con- cerning the humanity of Christ, but he was a powerful opponent of Docetism. Against Marcion he declared that Christ could not have appeared suddenly and without preparation. Origex taught the eternal generation of the Son. He called Christ the God-man or at least he conceived of Him as a divine-human person. He said that Christ had a human soul, but on the ground of his theory of the pre-existence of souls he declared that the Logos had united Himself to the soul of Jesus before time was. For this reason he believed that the Son of God had received from Mary a human body, but not a complete human nature. He also taught subordination. Concerning the body of Jesus after His resurrection Origen taught that the human nature of Christ was lost in the essence of God, so that Christ is not now a man. THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 205 Arxobius taught also that the human nature of Christ consisted only of His body. He calls Christ Deus sublimus. • Arius presented the same idea, viz., that at His incarnation the Son had assumed a human body without a soul. He taught that there was a time when the Son did not exist. It was not necessary for the Son to be born. God is an absolute causality. The Son was created out of nothing and is not of the same essence with the Father. The logical sequence of Arianism was developed by the Heterusians. The Semiarians were represented by Basil of Ancyra and George of Laodicea, who used the term o/xotouo-ios. EusEBius OF C.ESAREA Said that the Father was before the Son as to cause and that the generation did not take place in one act and therefore it was not from eternity. The Son was God in a sec- ondary sense. Marcellus denied the hypostatical pre-existence of the Son. Only through the incarnation did the Logos become personal and the Son of God. Hilary of Poitip:rs taught that the human soul of Christ was like ours, although it was created directly by God; also that His human nature, formed by the flesh of Mary, was like unto ours. He set forth three acts of generation, the first was the eternal generation of the Father, the second was the incarnation, and the third was the resurrection. The human nature of Christ was made divine after the resurrection. Athanasius laid emphasis on the in- timate relationship between the two 'natures of Christ. He not only fought Arianism, but also Apollinarism, stressing against the latter the true human nature of Christ. Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory OF Nyssa emphasized the union of the natures and used the term (Tuy/cpao-ts. The Alexandrian School set forth the union, but the Antiochian School distinguished between the natures of Christ. Apol- LiNARis did not accept the views of the latter, for he said that there was only one nature in Christ, which had a divine and a human side. He taught further that God and a complete man could not be united in one person, for which reason he declared that Christ lacked the human spirit. This was necessary, inasmuch as the seat of sin was in the spirit. Diodorus of Tarsus said that the union between the two natures was not substantial but moral. Toward the close of the fourth century the Priscillianists appeared in Spain. They declared that the devil was an independent ruler. The souls of men were brought forth by the good eternal being. They descended in order to conquer Satan. But he imprisoned them in the material body. When the Re- deemer came to deliver them, He came with a heavenly body. This sect advocated Docetism. Augustine rejected all Docetic tendencies and clearly set forth the teaching that Christ was God and man in one person. He makes use of the analogy of the union of the soul with the »body. The Christological controversy between the schools of Antioch and Alexandria reached its culmination when Nestorius pre- sented his doctrine which has become known as Nestorianism. He 206 CnUISTOLOGY. taught that the incarnation did not consist in the Son of God assuming manhood in the womb of the Virgin Mary, but through the mediation of the Holy Ghost Mary had given birth to a man as an organ for the divinity, in which man the Logos had taken His abode as in a temple. The union of the natures was therefore only moral. The union was considered as a (rwa<^aa. Mary was a ;i(pi(rTOTOKOs, but not a öeoroKos Cyril of Ai.exanduia rejected the doctrine of the communion of the natures and taught instead an cVwcris. He used the illustration of the union of the soul with the body. Logos united Himself with an im- personal human nature. He called Mary Öcotoko?. Cyril presented partly the doctrine of communicatio idioraatum. The doctrine of Nes- torius was rejected at the third Ecumenical Council in Ephesus in 431. EiTYCHEs was a spirited opponent of Nestorianism, but went to the opposite extreme, and his position has been termed Eutychianism. He stressed the union to such a degree that it resulted in only one nature. The human nature of Christ was not like ours, but was wholly merged in the divine. The doctrine of Eutyches was rejected in Ephesus in 448, but w-as acknowledged at the so-called Robber Council at Ephesus in 449. His doctrine was condemned at Chalcedon in 451. Nestorianism was rejected at this same Council. The letter of Leo the Great to Flavins exerted a great influence on the decisions of this meeting. The Council of Chalcedon confessed that Christ is truly God and truly man, of a reasonable soul and body; consubstantial with the Father, according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us, according to the manhood; in all things, except sin, like unto us. It was also stated that He was born of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God, according to the manhood; that He was one person with two natures which were united inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly and inseparably. Through the attempt to reconcile the Monophysites there arose a new doctrinal development known as Monotheletism, which declared that Christ was indeed possessed of two natures, but that there was only one will and one divine mode of activity. Monotheletism was con- demned at Constantinople in 680 when it was decided that in Christ there were two wills and modes of activity. The human will, however, must be thought of as being subject to the divine will. Docetism was revived in the East through the Paulicians, who taught that the Demiurge kept the souls imprisoned, but that the good God sent the Redeemer, who brought with Him from heaven a phantom body, which passed through Mary as though through a pipe without receiving any- thing. Joii.x OF D.vM.\scxs taught that the Logos did not assume a human nature that was an individual (individium), which would imply Nestorianism. Neither did he conceive of the human nature generic- ally, which would lead to Monophysitism. Through the incarnation the human nature of Christ was made the recipient of real subsistence. The human nature did not exist independently either before or after THE NECESSITY AND THE REALITY OF THE GOD-MAN. 207 the union; it was an avvTrocrj-acrca that became an ivvTroaTacrta. He also speaks of a Tre/oixw/ar/o-ts, which is active on the side of the divine nature. The basic lines of the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum are also to be found in this Church father. During the following period there arose a tendency that has been termed Adoptio^iism. in accordance with which there was a double sonship in Christ. In accordance with His divine nature He was, strictly speaking, the Son of God, but in accordance with His human nature He was adopted. In the former sense He was the Only Begot- ten, in the latter sense He was the First Born. Elipandus of Toledo and Felix of Urgellis were the leading representatives of this doc- trine. Felix of Urgellis also taught that Logos was united with an unsanctified human nature, but Christ never committed any actual sin. Adoptionism was rejected at Regensburg in 792, in Frankfort in 794, and in Aachen in 799. Johx Scotvs Erigexa taught that the Logos assumed human nature in general, so that the whole of humanity be- came deified. Anselm presented the Son as the prototype and in general taught the same as John of Damascus. The incarnation was effected because sin had come through one, and therefore salvation must come through one who could make satisfaction. Peter Lombard taught that the human nature of Christ did not possess personality and then drew the conclusion that the Son of God did not become any- thing when He became man, because God is unchangeable. He con- ceived of the incarnation as an indumentum or that the Son of God was invested with human nature without becoming man in a real sense. This view, denominated Nihilism, was condemned in 1179. Thomas Aquinas denied that the Logos had become united with the whole race or with all individuals, because it served no purpose to effect through many what could be accomplished through one. Christ was Mediator in accordance with His human nature. Duns Scotus taught that the Son of God would have become man irrespective of sin, because the will of God must be fulfilled. John Wessel likewise taught that the Son of God would have assumed manhood independent of the Fall in order to complete humanity as an organism. In such case Logos would have become King in the kingdom of God, which reaches its goal in the world of men. Litther clearly presented the true Christological position and em- phasized the true manhood and divinity of Christ as well as the union of the two natures in one person. He taught communicatio idiomatum. An important utterance in the Christology of Luther is the following: Where Christ is, there He is entire. Zwingli considered the communi- cation of the attributes in accordance with the doctrine of communi- catio idiomatum simply as a figure of speech. Each nature has its own attributes and functions in its own way. According to His human nature Christ is limited by space and is therefore not omnipresent; 208 CHRISTOLOGY. only the divine nature can be omnipresent. The Reformed Church adopted the saying: finitum non est capax infiniti. On the other hand, Luther declared that natura humana capax est divinse. Calvin stood closer to Luther than to Zwingli. He had a deeper conception of com- municatio idiomatum than Zwingli. Although he fought against the Christology of Servetus and also that of Osiander, still he did not show any great desire to delve too deeply into the mysteries of Chris- tology. However, he laid emphasis on the significance of genus apo- telesmaticum. Sciiwenkkelu asserted that the body of Christ was not taken from the material world, but that it came from the essence of God, for which reason Jesus was the natural Son of God. The body which He received from Mary was simply the external form. Weigel also spoke of an invisible and a visible body; the latter had been re- ceived from Mary. The Forniuln of Concord presents clearly the doc- trine of the person of Christ without swerving either to the right or to the left. The doctrine of communicatio idiomatum is given profound treatment in a religious sense in relation to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, while the doctrine of the union of the persons together with its effects is also included in the same discussion. The Socinians declared that Jesus was merely a man, but that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, and before He entered upon His office, He was taken up to heaven and instructed. As a reward for His obedience He was accorded divine attributes and worship. The Armi7iians taught sub- ordination and presented a view which approached Nestorianism. According to Reimarus and Lessing Christ was a wise and prudent man, indeed, they considered Him a demagogue, who endeavored to establish an earthly kingdom. This also to a certain extent expresses the attitude of the Deists, who at the most considered Jesus Christ as a moral teacher, comparing Him to Apollonius of Tyana. Kaxt as- serted that Christ possessed significance merely as the founder of a church in which the religion of the intellect finally would conquer. He considered Christ as an example and as the ideal of moral perfec- tion. The principal thing is faith in the ideal, not in the historical Christ. FiCHi-E said that Christ possessed the most highly developed knowledge possible to man, viz., the knowledge of the absolute union of being as revealed in the unity of man and the divine essence. Christ does not now possess any other historical significance than that He was the person who imparted the knowledge of this union. Hegel, together with the representatives of modern Pantheism in general, teaches that the incarnation is not to be considered empirically, in the sense that God should have assumed human nature at a certain time. Jesus was not, strictly speaking, the God-man. The question does not concern the union of God with a particular man, but with the whole of humanity. The self-consciousness of God is reached through the spirit of man. Some of Hegel's disciples have endeavored to har- XJNIO TKUSOXALIS AXD ITS IJr:\rEDIATR RKSrLTS. 209 monize Hegelianism with the Christian doctrine of an liistorical divine- human person, but Strauss has proved that this is impossible from tlie Hegelian point of view. Strauss said that ideas are not ordinarily realized in such manner that all the wealth of their content is poured out in one individual representative, but in the many. Humanity is the divine form of revelation. Schleiekmacher considered Christ as the greatest fruit of humanity. The consciousness of the divine ap- peared in Him as in no other. Christ was the ideal man, but He was not the real Son of God. Schleiermacher leaned toward Sabellianism. De Wette taught that we transfer our religious emotion to Christ and imagine that He forms the connecting link between the infinite and the finite. But divinity has not become united with humanity in an individual. Toward the close of his life, however, h3 gave stronger recognition to the historical realization of the religious ideas in the person of Christ. Ritsciie sought to eliminate from the Christological question all metaphysical consideration. He stated that knowledge was not the principal thing, but the will. Ethical considerations were of prime importance. He endeavored furthermore to forestall any collision with the natural sciences and the higher criticism. He there- fore attacked the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ, while avoiding all dogmatic considerations of the person of Christ. The work of Christ was of prime importance, considered from the ethical stand- point. It is evident that Ritschl denies the teachings of Christianity concerning Christ. The more recent confessional Dogmaticians combat Ritschlianism with all their power. The confessional Dogmaticians agree with the old Lutheran orthodoxy and lay all stress on the di- vinity as well as the humanity of Christ, although all are not agreed on the question of kenosis. Some of the most recent theologians set forth that Christ could have come into the world independent of sin. The Scandinavian Dogmaticians Martensen and Granfelt hold such views. §17. UNIO PERSONALIS AND ITS IMMEDIATE RESULTS. The result of the incarnation or imitio was the intimate union of the divine and the human nature, considered as a conditio, which union is called unio personalis seu hypo- statica. But this personal union must imply the communion of the natures or their real communion and communication. This communion of the natures is generally expressed in what are termed Personal Propositions. Dogmatics. 8. 210 riiiusToi.ofjY. 1. The Personal Union. HOLLAZius defines the personal union as follows:* "Unio PERSONALIS is the union of the tivo natures, the divine and the human, subsisting in the one hypostasis of the Son of God, implying a mutual, indissoluble communion of the two natures." Christ is therefore a personal (TvvOtTO'i. The hypostasis is called complex, because it is a hypostasis of two natures, while before the unitio it was an hypostasis of the divine nature only. Therefore the two natures are inseparable. Gerhard*'-' says in this connection that nei- ther has a part been united to a part, but the entire Logos to the entire flesh and the entire flesh to the entire Logos; wherefore it follows that because of the identity of the per- son and the pervasion of the natures by each other, the Logos is so present to the flesh and the flesh is so present to the Logos, that neither the Logos is without the flesh, nor the flesh without the Logos, but wherever the Logos is, there is the flesh, and wherever the flesh is, there is the Logos. The following negative and positive terms are em- ployed to define more closely the personal union: 1) nega- tiva: a) non verbalis, inasmuch as the God-man is not a title; h)non notionalis seu rationis, i. e., it is not a concep- tual union; c) no7i habitualis seu respectiva, such as a union between husband and wife or between friends; d) non acci- dentalis, inasmuch as it is not a union such as that of sub- stance and quality in a learned man or whiteness and sweet- ness in milk or like two beams joined together; e) no7i essentialis, so that the two natures become one, which term was used against the Eutychians; f) non naturalis, like the soul in the body. It is not that sort of a natural union. 2) Positiva: a) realis, or real; b) personalis, or personal, but not a union of two persons; c) perichorintica, inasmuch as the divine nature of the Logos entirely penetrates the * HoLLAZii'.s: "Unio personalis est duarum naturarum, divinse et humana;, in una filii Dei liypostasi subsistentium, conjunctio, mutuam eamque indissolubilem utriusque natura) coniniunionem inferens " ** Gerhard Loci Theol. Tomus I, Loc. 4, pp. 501, 502, or 3, 427, 428. UNIO PERSONALIS AXD ITS UIMEDIATE RESULTS. 211 human nature and imparts itself in the totality and perfec- tion of its essence; d) perpetuo duvans, because it is an eternal union. 2. The Communion of the Natures. COMMUNIO NATURARUM is a necessary consequence of the unio personalis. Hollazius defines as follows:* "Communio NATURARUM is the mutual participation of the divme and human natures of Christ, through which the divine nature of the Logos, having been made partaker of the human na- ture, permeates, perfects, inhabits and appropriates it unto Himself, while the human nature, having been made par- taker of the divine nature, is permeated, perfected and in- habited by it." The divine nature is therefore active in this permeation which is more clearly defined by the old Dogma- ticians, such as Hollazius, in the following terms: 1) in- tima et perfectissima, by which is meant that the union or the communion is not an external one, such as when angels have been revealed in human form, or like the clothes on a body; 2) mutua in the sense that the divine nature in actual essence or in the most absolute act (eVreA/xeta) per- meates and perfects the assumed human nature, which is permeated and perfected. This is therefore a 7rep(xwp7;crts, which, however, is neither local nor quantitative, but per- meates indivisibly and simultaneously every part of the human nature. In this connection we may quote Col. 2:9: "In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." The old Dogmaticians made use of various analogies, such as permeatio in the Trinity, the permeation and the in- dwelling of the soul in the -body and the permeation of the iron by the fire; 3) inseparabilis, i. e., after the incarnation the divine nature was never separated from the human nature, not even when the soul was separated from the body in the grave. The divine nature of the Logos was in * Hollazius: "Communio naturarum est mutua divinse et humanse Christi natura' participatio, per quam natura divina rov Aoyov, par- ticeps facta liumana? naturae, hanc permeat, perficit, inliabitat, sibique appropriat; humana vero, particeps facta divinae naturae ab hac per- meatur, perficitur et inhabitur." 212 CIIKISTOLOGY. the highest degree present in the assumed human nature; 4) sine confusione, mixtione et tranHmutatioiic ( ao-vyxuro?, a/AtJcros Kat ärpeTTTos) , i. e., without confusion, mixture or change, as the soul is not commingled or changed in the body; 5) dStao-raTov, or that both natures are so intimately united in a permanent sense and so present in and through each other that the one nature is never outside of nor apart from the other. We find analogies in the Trinity, and in more comprehensible form in the normal relationship be- tween the soul and the body. The third term, inseparahilU, means that the two natures could never be separated, not even at the death and burial of Christ. When Christ died His soul was separated from the body just as every person experiences death. The body of Christ was placed in the tomb and His spirit-soul was transferred to Paradise, where the spirit of Christ remained until vivification on the resurrection morning. The dead body of Christ was not exposed to decomposition, as He was sinless and had completed the reconciliation in its two ob- jective parts, namely, satisfaction and expiation or atone- ment. His state of exinanition ended with His burial. Cf. Acts 2: 31; 13: 35, 37. The brief separation of His soul and body made no break in the continued personal union of the two natures. The unsevered union of body and soul with the divine nature or Logos was necessary for the verity of the uninterrupted personal union and communion of natures. The personality of the God-man depends ac- tively upon the divine nature, as the Son of God or Logos was personal or a person before He assumed the human nature. A human soul is the active factor in the personality of man. In Paradise the divine nature or Logos was united with the soul of Christ and also with the body. This be- comes clearer, when we consider that the divine omni- presence is intensive and not extensive. Besides we should remember the communication of attributes according to genus majestaticum which concerns the entire nature and not a part of it as the soul. The old theologians spoke of prsesentia intima and praesentia extima, the former term UNIO PERSONALIS AXD ITS IMMEDIATE RESULTS. 213 meaning the presence of the natures to one another and the second term denoting the presence to created things. Even in the state of exinanition, when prsesentia extima was an extraordinary exception, the prsesentia intima, which is in- dependent of space and time, could not cease on account of the personal union. The fifth term under our heading, communio naturarnm, is connected with the preceding. One nature cannot be without or outside of the other. The divine nature cannot be locally encircling in space and the human nature circum- scribed in a place as in heaven. Where the God-man is, He is entire. There are two modes of presence, depending upon the natures. The God-man has one definite presence on account of the human nature and one omnipresent mode according to the divine nature. But in both modes He is entire and undivided. According to the mode of His mani- festation in heaven, He is entire, and according to His presence with us here on earth as He has promised. He is entire in both natures by a divine mode. This presence of Christ in both natures as one person is explained by the action of the divine nature upon the human in the com- munication of attributes. Cf. genus majestaticum. 3. The Personal Propositions. PROPOSITIONES PERSONALES. — hi these propositions or designations the co7icrete expressed concerning one nature is the predicate of the concrete of the other nature, and. still in a luay that is peculiar and unusual, in order to express the unio7i of the two natures and their communion in the one person. It is important to note that the question concerns the concrete of the natures ; the concrete of the divine nature when the designation is derived from the divine nature, and the concrete of the human nature when the designation is derived from the human nature. The question cannot con- cern the concrete of the person, the concrete being the designation of the person that consists of the two natures. The abstract designation of the natures is also excluded. 214 CHKISTOLOGY. inasmuch as we cannot say that divinitas est humanitas. Concrete designations for the divine nature are such as (;od, and the Son of God. The designations of the human nature are such as man, the Son of man, and Son of Mary. The concrete of the person is expressed in such designations as Messiah, Immanuel, and Christ. According to proposi- tiones personales with reference to the concrete names of the natures we can therefore say, God is man, Jesus is God, etc. These personal propositions are true because of the personal union. The following Bible passages may be quoted : "Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and his name shall be called Mighty God" (Isa. 9:6); "Who do men say that the Son of man is ? Simon Peter answered and said. Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matt. 16: 13—16); "The holy thing which is begotten shall be called the Son of God" (Luke 1: 35) ; "The second man is of heaven" (1 Cor. 15: 47) ; "The Son of God is come; we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life" (1 John 5: 20). The personal propositions are further defined by the fol- lowing terms: 1) negative: a) non mere verbales. The propositions are not to be understood as if only the name, but not the nature thereby designated, were predicated of the subject, as Nestorius does, when he says that the Son of Mary was the Son of God, ascribing to the subject merely a title, but positively refusing to acknowledge that He who was the Son of Mary was also true Son of God; b) neque improprue ant tropica, such as a painting or a statue, which may represent a person, so that we may say, this is such and such a person. Christ was not the Son of God in only an ideal sense or in any unreal or figurative sense; c) neque identic^, i. e., the predicates that are ascribed to the subject art not to be so explained as if they applied to it only in so far as the predicate precisely corresponds to that nature from which the designation of the subject is derived. For example, the proposition. The Son of (Jod is the Son of Mary, cannot be interpreted as follows, The man who is ÖOMMITNICATrO 11)10 JIATUM. 215 united with the Son of God is the son of Mary ; consequently the concrete of the predicate ascribed to the concrete of the subject should not be of the identical nature; we should not say: Jesus is the son of Mary; d) neqiie essentiales, as if the subject, in its essential nature, were that which the predicate ascribes to it. God is man, would then mean, The nature of God is this, that it is the nature of man ; 2) positive: a) reales, or in the real sense; b) imisitatée, or unusual; c) si7ie exemplo, or without any analogical or real examples. In accordance with these propositions therefore Nestorianism, Eutychianism and Adoptionism together with other related theories are rejected. §18. COMMUNICATIO IDIOMATUM. As a necessary result of unio personalis and communio naturarum the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum and communis operatio occupies a central and important place in the Lutheran Christology. The communication of the attributes is defined by Hollazius as follows:* ''Commu- nicatio IDIOMATUM is the true and real participation of the properties of the divine and human natures, restating from the personal unioyi in Christ, the God-man, designated by either nature or by both naturen." By idiomata we understand the properties and the dis- tinguishing characteristics of the natures, through which the two natures are distinguished, and by which they are known. Gerhard points out that the divine properties be- long to the essence of the Logos, while the human proper- ties do not belong to the essence of the human nature, but are derived from it. There is a communication of the idiomata between the natures and the person and also be- tween the natures reciprocally. Dogmaticians use the following terms more clearly to define communicatio idiomatum: 1) jiegative: a) non ver- * Hollazius: "Communicatio idiomatum est vera et realis propriorum divinae et humanse naturae in Christo OeavOpionto^ ab alterutra vel utraque natura denominato, participatio ex unione personali resultans." 216 CIIRISTOLOGY. balls et titidaris. This term is used against the Calvinists or the Reformed in general, who say that the communicatio idiomatum is real in regard to the person, designated either in accordance with the divine or human nature, but that in regard to the natures themselves communicatio is simply- verbal, so that it is a communicatio verborum and not idiomatum; b) iion intellectualis, because it is not a bare concept without concrete content; c) )ion exiBquativa, inas- much as the distinction of the natures remains; d) mm viidtiplicativa, so as to imply a multiplication and therefore different subjects; e) nan t)-a7isfusica, since the divine na- ture does not pour out over or impart to the human nature something which it would not afterwards possess; f) no7i accidentalis, or accidental; g) non commixtiva, not through commingling; h) 71011 esHeyitialis, inasmuch as the proper- ties of the one nature cannot become the essential pos- session of the other nature; 2) positive: a) i-ealis, or a real communication; b) personalis, i. e., a communication KttTtt crvvhvauLv ov such a communiou of the natures, through which the two natures are so intimately united with each other, that, their essence remaining distinct, the one nature without mixture really receives and participates in the pe- culiar power, work and property of the other on the ground of the communion of the natures in the one person; c) supe7'natnralis, because it takes place in a supernatural way. Communicatio idiomatum is divided into three classes : genus idiomaticum, genus majestaticum and genus apoteles- maticum. Some would also add rairuvoTLKov or kw>tlk6v, I. Genus Idiomaticum. Genus idiomaticum is that genus hij ichich the attiibutes that are peciiliai- or' belong to the divine oi' to the human nature are truly ayid really asci'ibed to the entire person of Christ, designated by either one of the natures or both. (ienus idiomaticum is divided into three species: 1) l6ioiTo[rjaL^ or appropriatio is the species in accordance with which human idiomata are predicated concerning Christ, designated by the concrete of the divine nature. The fol- I COMMUNICATIO IDIOMATUJr. 217 lowing may serve as examples : "Crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Cor. 2:8); "The Son of God gave himself up for me" (Gal. 2: 20) ; 2) kolvwvlu twv Oumv {participation of the divine) is that species by which divine idiomata are predicated concerning Christ, designated by the concrete names of the human nature. "The Son of man ascending where he was before" (John 6: 62) ; "Before Abraham was born, I am" (John 8: 58) ; 3) dirtSoo-ts, alteniatio or recipro- catio is that genus by which both the divine and the human idiomata are predicated concerning the concrete of the per- son, designated from both natures. The following may serve as examples : "Christ as concerning the flesh, who is over all, God blessed for ever" (Rom. 9: 5) ; "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and to-day, yea and for ever" (Heb. 13: 8) ; "Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous; being put to death in the flesh" (1 Peter 3: 18). It follows from this that the subject in genus idiomaticum may be either the concrete of the natures or the concrete name of the person, but neither the one nor the other nature in the abstract sense. We can say that God is dead or that the Son of God is dead. A^'e can also say that Jesus is dead or that Christ is dead, but we cannot say that the divine nature is dead. In order to show which nature is imme- diately concerned in the predicate, although both natures are included by reason of unio personalis, the following particulse discriticse are used, viz., iv, it, 8i.d and Kard. The use of these particles does not, however, mean that it is only the designated nature that is active. In the third genus on that account there is presented communicatio operationum, by which the concept of t8to7roi'7?o-i9 in genus idiomaticum is made complete. II. Genus Majestaticum. Genus majestaticum seu auchematicum is that genus bij which the Church declares that the Son of God really communicates the 2^^'operties of the divine nature to the human nature. 218 CHRISTOI.OCiY. This genus is like unto the second species in genus idio- maticum with this difference, which is principally formal, that in the latter the real subject is the entire person of Christ, while in genus majestaticum the real subject (sub- jectum cui) is the assumed human nature. The subject (subjectum cui) therefore is really the con- crete of the human nature, but the concrete names of the person may also be used and sometimes also the abstract designations of the human nature. The following examples may be quoted: "There was given him (Son of man) do- minion, and glory, and a kingdom" (Daniel 7: 14) ; "And he gave him authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man" (John 5: 27) ; "The Son of man hath authority on earth to forgive sins" (Matt. 9; 6); "And Jesus came to them and spake to them, saying. All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth" (Matt. 28: 18) ; "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. 18: 20) ; "Christ, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowl- edge hidden" (Col. 2:3); "My flesh is meat indeed" (John 6: 55). These Scripture passages prove clearly that genus maje- staticum possess a Biblical foundation. And still the Re- formed Church rejects this genus, saying that all expres- sions in this direction are figurative. When anything is ascribed to the divine nature of Christ which is a property of the human nature, as well as the reverse, this Zwingli calls alloeosis. Luther condemned the Zwinglian doctrine of alloeosis in the strongest terms. The opponents of this genus argue that the divine idiomata can not be imparted to the human nature except as the divine essence is also imparted, because the properties cannot be separated from the nature of God. However, the properties referred to, while founded in the divine essence, must nevertheless be considered as attributes ad extra. For this reason they can be imparted, although not in such manner as to become the essential possession of the human nature. Another objec- tion has been made to this genus which asserts that it is CÖMMUNICATIO IDIOMATUM. 219 one-sided and that consistency demands a reciprocity to be expressed by a genus TUTreivoTLKov or KevoriKov . In answer it may be said that only the divine nature is active. A genus raireLvoTLKov would militate against the unchangeableness of God, not to speak of the reflex action which such a genus would exercise on the doctrine of the human nature and in consequence also in relation to the validity of the atone- ment. In the discussion of the doctrine of genus majestaticum we must not confuse the imparted idiomata of the divine nature with the special prerogatives of the human nature. These prerogatives surpass the most excellent gifts of men and angels, and still they are created gifts, while, on the other hand, the divine majesty which is imparted is infinite and not to be counted among finite attributes. 1. CONCERNING MODUS COMMUNICANDI. Concerning the manner of communication the Dogmati- cians use the following terms: 1) Negative: a) 7ion per geminationem or through duplication, so that the divine nature should possess properties and in addition to this that the human nature should come into possession of the same or similar properties; b) noyi transiens, so that the one nature would pass over into the other; c) non trans- fusiens, so that the divine properties would be poured out over the human nature in such manner as to become the real possession of this nature; d) 7ion adsequativus, or that the nature became alike; e) 7ion destructivus, so that the human nature would be destroyed and only the divine na- ture remain thereafter. 2) Positive: a) entelechialis et perichoristicus, i. e., in an active permeating way; b) ad possessio7iem (with reference to possession) in regard to all the attributes, and c) ad usurpationem (with reference to use) in regard to the relative attributes. 2. DIVISION AND COMMUNICATION OF THE ATTRIBUTES. As we recall, the Dogmaticians divide the divine attri- butes in many ways. We here use the division into im- manent and relative attributes. 220 CIIUISTOI.OGY. 1) ' Avtvépyr]Ta or the immanent are such attributes as eter- nity and infinity. Tliese are imparted to the human nature of Christ mediatehj through the relative or operative attri- butes as to denomination (ad denominationem) , as to in- dwelling (ad inhabitationem) and as to pofisesnion (ad pos- sessionem), but not o.s to use (ad usurpationem) , or, briefly stated, as to kt^^^ 0£oD {-Trapxwv." The form of God does not refer to the essence of God itself, but to the con- dition of glory, inasmuch as fJiopcf>rj refers to the endowment or adornment of a nature. Still He was the Son of God, and when He took the form of a servant {p.op4>rf ^ovkov) , He did not lay aside the form of God, although it was only at times that He used divine attributes. He therefore con- tinued to remain divine and in the form of God. We read further: "Counted not the being on an equality with God a thing to be grasped," or "oi^ åpiru-ypov rj-yy/aaTO TO elvai icra 0£w." By this is meant that it would not have been robbery if Christ according to His human nature had made use of the divine attributes, but He voluntarily abstained from the full exercise of the attributes, as expressed in the words: "But emptied (eKeVwo-ci') himself, taking the form of a servant ixop(f)i]v Sou'Aov)." He took the conditio of a servant, for pop