^ PRINCETON, N. J. '^' 
 
 BL 181 .S5513 1857 
 Simon, Jules, 1814-1896. 
 Natural religion 
 
 Shelf. 
 
NATURAL RELIGIOK 
 
 BY M. JULES SIMON. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY J. W. COLE. 
 
 EDITED, WITH PREFACE AND NOTES, 
 
 BY THE REV. J. B. MARSDEN, M.A., 
 
 AUTHOU OF "history OF CHRISTIAN CHURCHES," "THE EARLY AND LATER 
 PURITANS," ETC. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 EICHAED BENTLEY, NEW BUELINGTON STREET, 
 
 pubIisf)Er in ©rtiinatg to p?er ifflajcstg. 
 
 M.D.CCC.LVII. 
 
LONDON : 
 BRADBURV AND KVANS, PKINTERS, WHITEFRIAR3. 
 
PEEFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 "It is an immense conclusion," says Dr. Paley, " that 
 tliere is a God : a perceiving, intelligent, designing being, 
 at the head of creation, and from whose will it proceeded." 
 At this conclusion we arrive either by accepting the state- 
 ments contained in the Bible, or by mere reason without 
 the assistance of revelation. But the conclusion, however 
 gained, involves mighty consequences ; namely, the duties 
 we owe to the Creator while here, and our destiny here- 
 after. Thus we have the two systems of natural and 
 REVEALED RELIGION. The oue derived from reason, the 
 other from the holy Scriptures. The volume now before 
 us treats only of the former of these two, and of that 
 only in one of its several branches, as we shall explain 
 hereafter. 
 
 To introduce the subject to the reader it may be con- 
 venient to remind him that a distinction has been drawn 
 between natural theology and natural religion ; regarding 
 the one as the science, and the other as the subject of 
 which it treats.* Thus, natural theology has respect to 
 the being and attributes of God ; natural religion, to his 
 
 * By Lord Brougham, for example, in his Discourse on Natural Theology. 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 designs respecting our existence in a future state, and 
 our principles and conduct in the present. Tlie distinc- 
 tion, however, does not seem to have been observed by 
 our own great writers, who use the terms indifferently, 
 nor by M. Jules Simon, who though he dwells more fully 
 on the being and attributes of God, does not overlook 
 the moral obligations of his creatures resulting from 
 them. Perhaps it is to be regretted that the distinction 
 has been so generally disregarded; for it seems to us 
 both real and of some importance. For it may be at 
 least conceived that natural theology should be true, and 
 yet natural religion false ; or that, (which is certainly the 
 case,) the discoveries of the one should be comparatively 
 full and satisfactory, those of the other meagre and incon- 
 clusive. Or, in other words, we might by the exercise of 
 reason without any assistance from revelation have arrived 
 at the discovery that a God exists, without being able to 
 prosecute our researches with success into another question 
 of equal moment ; namely, the duties which belong to us 
 in consequence, and the kind of worship which the Deity 
 will accept. However, in deference to the example of our 
 greatest writers, Paley, Bishop Butler, Dr. Samuel Clarke 
 and others, we shall not insist upon a point which they 
 have overlooked or disregarded. 
 
 Natural theology, then, or natural religion, regarding 
 them as one and the same, constitute a real science, the 
 truth of which is recognised in the Scriptures, both of 
 the old and new Testament. " The heavens," says the 
 Psalmist, " declare the glory of God; and the firmament 
 showeth his handy-work— day unto day uttereth speech, 
 and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no 
 speech or language where their voice is not heard. Their 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. V 
 
 line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to 
 the end of the world." Here the wisdom and power of 
 God, and therefore his existence, are argued from his 
 visible creation. The order and structure of the universe 
 declares its divine author. St. Paul makes use of a 
 similar argument where he asserts that the heathen are 
 left without excuse, though without a revelation, "because 
 that which may be known of God," by the light of nature, 
 " is manifest in them ; for God hath showed it unto them. 
 For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the 
 world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things 
 which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." 
 Here the great principles of natural religion are clearly 
 stated: the visible world is a sufficient proof of the 
 existence of a Creator ; it gives at least some insight 
 into his character, so far as to show his eternal power 
 and Godhead. It leaves the heathen, much more the 
 atheist, without excuse ; the one because the visible 
 universe contradicts his gross conceptions, the other 
 because it belies his irrational denial, of a God. 
 
 Still natural religion lies under a certain degree of 
 prejudice ; and it is singular enough that it should have 
 been assailed from time to time by men of the most 
 opposite principles ; by those Avho scarcely acknowledged 
 the inspiration of Holy Scripture in any sense, and by 
 those who carried their views of inspiration to the most 
 fastidious height, maintaining that all knowledge and 
 science, as well as all true religion, are to be found within 
 the sacred volume. Faustus Socinus, the founder of 
 modern Unitarianism, denied the power of man to discover 
 the being of God by the light of nature : he denied that 
 it could be proved from the creature or from creation, 
 
VI PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 that there is a God. In order to establish this position 
 he proposed to explain away the force of the passage we 
 have quoted from St. Paul, "in an explication in which," 
 says Bishop Pearson, who criticises it with his usual acute- 
 ness, " there is nothing which is not forced and distorted. 
 By this way of interpretation," he adds, "no sentence of 
 Scripture can have any certain sense." * This opinion of 
 Socinus, though by no means the creed of all modern 
 Unitarians, has yet from time to time reappeared among 
 his followers. Gilbert Wakefield avowed it in the last 
 century. The Hutchinsonians on the other hand, zealous 
 friends of revelation, aimed, about the same time, to prove 
 that there is no such thing as natural religion at all. 
 Hutchinson " looked upon natural rehgion as deism in 
 disguise, an engine of the devil in these latter days for the 
 overthrow of the gospel." f In his opinions, philosophical 
 and religious, he had several followers of great respecta- 
 bility, such as bishop Home of Norwich, Parkhurst the 
 lexicographer, Jones of Nayland, and the pious Eomaine. 
 Dr. Ellis published, in 1743, a Treatise entitled " The 
 knowledge of divine things from revelation, not from 
 Keason or Nature," in which he undertook to prove that 
 " neither the being of a God nor any other principle of 
 religion could possibly be deduced from the study of the 
 phenomena of the universe." Dr. Magee, the late arch- 
 bishop of Dublin, is said to have been a follower of 
 Dr. Ellis in his sentiments respecting natural religion. 
 The argument on which they chiefly rest amounts to this ; 
 that the mind having no knowledge but of sensible things 
 can abstract no ideas from matter but such as are material. 
 
 * Pearson on the Creed ; Note to Article I. 
 t Jones's Life of Bisliop Home. 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. VU 
 
 *' Without an instructor to open his eyes, it would he 
 impossihle, therefore, for man to conceive of an angelic 
 heing; for he can have no idea of a substance purely 
 spiritual, still less could he form a notion of God who is 
 yet more remote from matter." 
 
 It will be seen from M.Jules Simon's Preface to the Third 
 Edition of his work, that this fundamental objection to 
 the whole science of Natural Religion is now powerful in 
 France. In England, amongst our wisest and most thought- 
 ful men, no such prejudice exists. Lord Brougham, in his 
 Discourse of Natural Theology, pubHshed about twenty 
 years ago, aUuded to it as prevailing to some extent. This 
 led Dr. Turton, now Bishop of Ely, to examine the facts of 
 the question, in his ''Natural Theology considered; with 
 reference to Lord Brougham's Discourse on that subject." 
 And the result of his enquiries was, that during the last 
 thirty years there had not been more than one learned 
 man in the University of Cambridge, who avowedly pro- 
 fessed the leading doctrines of Dr. EUis's Treatise. 
 Milner, Dean of Carlisle, condemned in the strongest 
 terms Ellis's scheme of rejecting the operations of the 
 human mind as one of the primary sources of our know- 
 ledge of God. His brother, Joseph Milner, the ecclesias- 
 tical historian, spoke thus :— " St. Paul bemg judge, God 
 has not left himself without witness even in the natural 
 world. The works of creation speak to us from without ; 
 and the moral nature, which he has given us, speaks to 
 us from within. In conjunction, they declare his being 
 and sovereign authority, his power, wisdom and goodness, 
 his equitable government, and the accountableness of the 
 human race for all their moral conduct before him. And 
 this," he adds, " is the utmost stretch of natural religion, 
 
"^"^ PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 an intuitive feeling rather than the result of a laborious 
 investigation."* 
 
 These may be taken, as almost without exception, the 
 sentiments of our best divines. Still, in many i^ious 
 minds, there exists, unquestionably, to some extent, a 
 certain distaste for the whole subject of Natural Theology. 
 They feel as if the two systems were rivals, and that what- 
 ever credit the one gained was so much loss to the other ; 
 and they are alarmed lest the progress of natural 
 religion should prove at length dangerous to revelation. 
 They seem to think tliat if any discovery be thus made of 
 a first cause and another world, it would be no longer 
 true that life and immortality were brought to light by 
 the gospel. These scruples are certainly entitled to 
 respect; and it must be allowed that instances have not 
 been wanting, in which the enemies of revelation have 
 made use of natural theology for this very purpose. 
 Appealing to the light of nature and the voice of reason 
 as their guide, they have treated the religion of the Bible 
 with contempt, as being certainly superfluous and there- 
 fore of little authority, or of none at all ; and earnest, 
 simple-minded Christians have shrunk from a study which 
 they saw thus mischievously used. Again, it is true that 
 several writers of eminence on the side of natural religion, 
 have allowed themselves to speak of the Supreme Being' 
 if not with presumption, yet without that " reverence and 
 godly fear," with which every devout Christian wishes to 
 approach the subject. There is something hard and 
 offensive in the freedom of their manner, when no ex- 
 ception can be taken against their statements ;— a rude 
 familiarity with sacred things, which strongly conti'asts 
 
 * Letter to Gibbon on his Decline and Fall, &c. 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. IX 
 
 with the subdued and reverential style of holy writ. 
 There is scarcely a treatise on the Attributes to which 
 these objections do not, in our opinion, in some degree 
 apply ; and to a certain extent they are perhaps insepa- 
 rable from such discussions ; the effect, however, is not 
 the less painful to devout minds. 
 
 As to the argument that natural religion supersedes 
 revealed religion, it scarcely deserves a serious refutation. 
 Indeed it has never been advanced by any writer of reputa- 
 tion on either side. It is the idle jargon of infidelity on the 
 one hand, or of a too feeble and timid Christianity on the 
 other. Indeed, natural theology should be studied if for no 
 higher purpose, with this aim in view, namely, that the 
 student may ascertain for himself with certainty the 
 meagre limits of that knowledge of divine things which 
 may be had from nature and from reason only. The 
 three sources of natural religion are the works of nature, 
 the a priori reasoning, and the voice of conscience and 
 the whole internal economy of man. But how few, 
 after all, are the conclusions which they can be said 
 to place be3^ond the reach of doubt ! Paley's mag- 
 nificent argument from final causes, proves a unity 
 of design in the works of nature, but it scarcely 
 proves the unity of God. The a priori argument, if 
 its soundness be admitted, proves indeed the unity, 
 but leaves us sorely at fault with regard to the attri- 
 butes, of God. What natural theology does is this : it 
 prepares man to expect a revelation; it shows his need of 
 one ; and therefore it should teach him to receive it meekly 
 and with unbounded gratitude. For it assures him that 
 there is a great unseen Creator ; it suggests to him the 
 high degree of probability, at least, that to this unseen 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 Creator lie is held accountable ; and it conveys to him a few 
 dim intimations of a life to come. But here it forsakes 
 him, and leaves him still a prey to anxiety and doubt. 
 " When the utmost has been made," says Bishop Turton, 
 " of natural religion, it can give no intimation on subjects 
 on which revelation is the most copious ; the various dis- 
 pensations of God towards man, our redemption from the 
 effects of transgression, and in the language of the creed, 
 ' the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and 
 the life everlasting; " Nothing can be more instructive, 
 or, we wiU add, to a devout Christian more satisfactory^ 
 than the profound silence of the one compared with 
 the authoritative declarations of the other, on questions 
 which involve the present and eternal happiness of man. 
 Of the volume now in the reader's hand, the most unsatis- 
 factory parts are those in which the author attempts to 
 show the natm^e, and prove the necessity of prayer and of 
 public worship from natural religion, and to show that 
 from that source we are supplied with a rule of life. His 
 guide has forsaken him, and he wanders in the dark ; and, 
 after all, he is obliged to confess that "we can only 
 speak with fear and hesitation of the nature of God " 
 (p. 217). Natural religion then has no clear and well- 
 defined instructions for us on those points upon which it 
 is all important that we should be instructed well. 
 
 The Treatise of M. Jules Simon, which is now offered 
 to the reader in an English translation, has obtained a 
 popularity abroad, which is seldom granted to works of 
 abstruse philosophical discussion. Making every aUowance 
 for the fermentation of the public mind in France upon 
 several of the topics on which he speaks, a metaphysical 
 treatise on the existence of God and the Divine attributes 
 
PKEFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 would scarcely have passed in a short time through three 
 editions, in Paris, had not its ability heen of a high order ; 
 nor, it may be added, if the opinions against which it is 
 directed were not widely diffused upon the continent. 
 
 These opinions are represented by the word Pantheism. 
 They have obtained a footing in our own country, and are 
 not without their advocates in our seats of learning. A 
 strange and fearful portent, when the dreams of a heathen 
 philosophy are once more revived, and publicly taught, not 
 only by men who profess and call themselves Christians, 
 but by those who are the teachers of Christian morals ! 
 
 It is very difficult to explain in a few words tlie modern 
 doctrine of Pantheism. Its advocates write in an obscure 
 style, and seem to us to conceal under the shelter of 
 a new and difficult verbiage great confusion of ideas. 
 In general, however, it may be thus described : — it denies 
 the personality of the deity, and confounds the Creator 
 with the universe. It presents us as the great first cause 
 with a simple indivisible element or power, which pervades 
 all things, but without any personaUty implied or under- 
 stood. Creation is either denied, or else considered not 
 as a possible but a necessary act ; so that the deity was 
 compelled to produce the universe, with which he is in 
 fact identified. Thus the divine nature has neither inde- 
 pendence of existence, nor spontaneity of action. It lies 
 under a necessary influence ; and the created thing, which 
 we call a universe, is really a part of the Creator himself; 
 it is nothing more than a manifestation of his existence. 
 Thus, in effect, Pantheism is but a disguised Atheism ; 
 for a divine being, acting under the force of an external 
 law, or necessary influence, is not, and cannot be, supreme. 
 A God who cannot but pass into activity, and thus identify 
 
-^^^ PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 his nature with his own creation, has no longer a per- 
 sonality, nor in truth a real existence. Yet such are the 
 dogmas of Pantheism. In fact they represent the supreme 
 being as at once God, Nature, and Humanity. 
 
 Against the writers of this school, the argument from 
 final causes makes no impression. They speak with 
 undisguised contempt of Paley. Design, it is true, may 
 prove a designer and a designing mind ; but that mind 
 may be the universe itself, or the anma muncli of the 
 philosophers of old. 
 
 To speak of the impiety of these sentiments would be 
 a waste of words ; their folly and absurdity ought however 
 to be exposed, and this is the work which M.Jules Simon 
 has undertaken. 
 
 Up to the present time no vigorous attempt has been 
 made in England to resist the rising flood. Pantheism, 
 or as we should prefer to call it. Atheism, is not yet, it is 
 true, fully developed amongst us. It is known in England 
 rather by what it denies than by its assertions ; it works 
 insidiously, teaching the student to disbeheve and doubt 
 rather than to embrace any fixed creed. Yet it is haughty 
 and supercihous ; aifects profoundness ; and disdains the 
 manly simplicity of such writers as Butler and Paley; 
 whilst it buries its own shallowness beneath an exterior 
 of philosophical acuteness and depth. It has in short 
 just those qualities which are calculated to entice the half 
 educated, and to dazzle and mislead the joxmo^. 
 
 No apology then is needed for the translation of the 
 work in the reader's hand. M. Jules Simon attacks 
 Pantheism with its own weapons, pure reason and meta- 
 physical argument. The treatise is divided into four 
 distinct sections. 1. On the Nature of God. 2. On 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. Xlii 
 
 Providence, or the Interference of Deit}^ in the Affairs of 
 Man. 3. On the Immortality of the SouL 4. On 
 Worship. He begins by examining closely, and yet fairly, 
 the different arguments by which natural theology has 
 endeavoured to demonstrate the being and attributes of 
 God, and in language clear, vigorous, and simj^le, shows 
 the mistakes of the various schools of philosophy, while 
 he does justice to their triumphs. Thus, he places before 
 us the argument from conscience and innate ideas ; that of 
 Samuel Clarke and Leibnitz from the natm-e of infinite 
 space, and from axioms or self-evident truths ; and above 
 all the most popular and easy one from the phenonoma of 
 the visible universe. Of the latter he says, and we think 
 with truth: — "But the misfortune of this argument is, 
 that, while it proves invincibly what it undertakes to 
 prove, it does not establish all that is necessary. The 
 God who has made the world is unquestionably powerful 
 and intelligent, but does he possess infinity of power and 
 intelligence ? Between a God simply capable of making 
 the world, and a perfect God, there is still an infinite 
 abyss. We perceive here below, beauties and perfections 
 in vast numbers, but we find also plenty of disorder. 
 The induction which concludes the perfection of the 
 Creator from the greatness of his work, does not supply 
 any explanation of the evil that exists in the world." * 
 
 He then proceeds to establish the great truths of 
 natural religion on a basis which he considers at once 
 more broad and solid ; and, discarding metaphysical 
 theories, proves from the nature and constitution of man 
 himself that God exists, and then modestly concludes 
 thus : " Assuredly, there is here no new demonstration ; 
 
 * Page 12. 
 
XIV PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 who could dream of producing a new demonstration of 
 the existence of God ? Still less is there any attempt at 
 a new form of demonstration : on the contrary, we have 
 gone hack to the most ancient, the simplest, the most 
 familiar, and (for that reason) the best of all forms — medi- 
 tation in place of reasoning." The argument which 
 follows is presented to the reader in a form so clear and 
 beautiful by M. Jules Simon that anj^ analysis of his 
 work would be quite superfluous. The chapters on the 
 incomprehensibility of God, on creation, and j^antheism, 
 and that on providence, will be read with admiration, even 
 though we should except against some inferences, or some 
 opinions in them. And if the disquisitions on the exist- 
 ence of evil, and the divine immutability, seem to be less 
 conclusive, let it be borne in mind that our author has but 
 failed in a task which no man has yet accomplished. Yet 
 even here his passing remarks are often of great value. 
 Take, for instance, the clearly-drawn and eloquent dis- 
 tinction between what is incomprehensible and what we 
 call a mystery. " These two words, mystery and incom- 
 prehensibility, are often used synonymously. It is clear 
 that all mystery is incomprehensible, but everything that 
 is incomprehensible is not of necessity a mystery. To 
 admit an incomprehensibility, is to acknowledge that 
 reason has limits ; to admit a mj^stery, is to have recourse 
 to some other authority than reason. AVhen we maintain 
 that God is incomprehensible, we express nothing more 
 than an acknowledgment of our own insignificance. But 
 when it is said that he is one in three hypostases, a gra- 
 tuitous opinion is expressed upon the nature of an incom- 
 prehensible being; an hypothesis is constructed which 
 rests neither on reason nor experience. There can be no 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. XV 
 
 possible confusion between two assertions of such op- 
 posite natures." * 
 
 The brevity and force of the reasoning, and the sin- 
 gular felicity of the illustrations frequently remind us of 
 Pascal's most striking passages. For instance, — " If man 
 had no existence, the world would resemble one of the 
 palaces which have been restored and refurnished after a 
 revolution, that they may be preserved to history and art. 
 All has resumed its place, the council table, the crown, 
 the sceptre — nothing is absent hut the Kmg" t 
 
 M. Jules Simon writes as a Koman Catholic, and in a 
 country of Koman Catholics ; and, fearless in his inves- 
 tigations on all other subjects, he seems to evade rather 
 than to meet the difficulties with which the Church of 
 Kome embarrasses her more inquiring and thoughtful 
 children. He is constantly embarrassed with the appre- 
 hension that the dogmas of Christianity, as he terms 
 them, may be found inconsistent with reason. This 
 apprehension cannot arise, as the admirable passage we 
 have just quoted shows, from that confusion of thought 
 which confounds the mysterious with the incomprehen- 
 sible, or either of them with the irrational. It is not 
 difficult to point out its source : it evidently proceeds 
 from the fact that he sees no difference between the 
 teaching of the Scriptures and the teaching of the Church. 
 Both have with him equal authority, and in consequence 
 his clear intellect is grievously disturbed. We have 
 omitted a few passages, chiefly in the concluding chapter, 
 in which he enters into details which have no bearing 
 upon the general tenor of the argument ; and which are 
 more applicable to the state of religious feeling and 
 
 * Page 139. t Page 108. 
 
XVI PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 opinion in France than in England. Tliey seem brought 
 in per force, and the omission is due both to ourselves 
 and to our readers. 
 
 Nor will the Protestant reader expect to find in these 
 pages those acciu'ate statements of Christian doctrine 
 which are the glory of Protestant churches, reposing only 
 on the strong foundations of the written Word of God. 
 On the contrar}^ the merit of good works is frequently 
 implied ; the corruption of human reason in consequence 
 of the Fall is too often overlooked ; and in the chapter on 
 prayer there are crude statements which, how^ever con- 
 sistent with a sentimental piety, are not in simple unison 
 with the statements of Scripture. On two important 
 questions of theology, the Editor has added notes which 
 will be found at the end of the volume. 
 
 The volume of M. Jules Simon is a great work. 
 It shows by fresh arguments the eternal truth of the 
 leading principles common both to natural and revealed 
 religion. It silences the folly of atheism, and repels 
 the assaults of the modern pantheist. The author 
 has thrown a charm around discussions, which even the 
 learned have thought dry and difficult ; and if, after 
 all, many important questions remain unsettled, not- 
 withstanding the force of reasoning wiiich has been 
 brought to bear upon them, the disappointment will 
 serve to show the comparatively narrow range within 
 which human reason or natural theology can act ; and to 
 dispose the reader to return once more with deeper 
 reverence and gratitude to the inspired word of God. 
 And this, we must repeat, is one of the legitimate uses, 
 and that by no means the least important, of Natural 
 Theology. 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 If there was ever an un-aggressive book, it is this. Neverthe- 
 less it has excited, in very opposite camps, some animated 
 polemics. This arises from the great number of questions 
 touched upon, and perhaps from the sincerity of the author. 
 When I have thought my friends and masters were going 
 astray I have not hesitated to say so. In consequence of this 
 I have been asked, to which side do you belong ? I am, thank 
 heaven, of no side in philosophy. I write on such grave matters 
 that I cannot suffer myself to be guided by anything but truth. 
 
 The greater part of the objections urged, apply less to the par- 
 ticular form of my book, than to spiritual philosophy in general. 
 This philosophy, more popular than ever with those who are little 
 accustomed to reflect or write, is not in favour at present with 
 certain ardent spirits, who, engaged in a war of principles, think 
 of nothing but what their theory requires, and are desirous of 
 bringing back everything to a simplicity which science does not 
 allow. I shall endeavour to point out in what their error con- 
 sists, and also to show, by ascending a little higher, through what 
 a series of misunderstanding, spiritual philosophy is, at this day, 
 treated as an enemy by the most divided of the belligerent 
 parties. 
 
 If I use the phrase of the quarrel between reason and faith, no 
 one will suppose that I intend to give a history of this contest 
 
 h 
 
XVlll PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 in a short preface. The quarrel is nearly as old as the world, and 
 dates from a period much anterior to the birth of Christianity. 
 We can scarcely hope to see it ever terminated, for there will 
 always be, according to the expression of Malebranche, minds who 
 are anxious to see clearly, and others determined to believe 
 blindly ; for, as long as human nature lasts, men will incessantly 
 strive to impose on men their own particular belief or scepticism. 
 
 This quarrel between reason and faith is looked upon, accord- 
 in f^ to the construction of minds, under three different aspects. 
 Christian philosophers maintain that philosophy and religion 
 are equally sound and true ; that they ought to agree on all 
 points when both are well understood, and that there is in fact 
 no contest except between false religion and false philosophy. 
 
 This opinion entails a consequence which must not be lost sight 
 of. To be a Christian is not only to accept to-day the funda- 
 mental truths of Christianity, but to accept and practise them 
 always. Now philosophy rests upon free inquiry ; it is therefore, 
 at the least, susceptible of change, for it advances by gradual and 
 slow progress towards truth, and never completely discovers it 
 at the first glance. Orthodox to-day, it may cease to be so to- 
 morrow. A philosopher who desires to be truly a Christian, must 
 hold himself ready to renounce reason as soon as reason appears 
 to him to separate itself from orthodoxy. This declaration of con- 
 formity has therefore for an indispensable corollary, the subordi- 
 nation of reason to faith : in other words, a Christian may be a 
 philosopher, provided that, according to the consecrated formula, 
 he considers philosophy as the servant of theology. 
 
 Let me now speak of the philosophers who acknowledge no 
 authority but that of reason. They may be divided into two 
 classes. The first, amongst which I enrol myself, believe that the 
 religious and philosophical forms are destined to be ever separated 
 and to subsist entirely independent of each other, because they 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. xix 
 
 apply to two very different, but real necessities of human nature:* 
 and the other class, regarding the principle of authority and the 
 principle of liberty, not as being distinct, but as positive enemies, 
 admit neither reconciliation nor co-existence between them, and 
 rest all the hopes of man upon the absolute suppression and 
 extinction of the principles that they reject. 
 
 Of the three contrary opinions I have here recapitulated, the 
 first represents peace, and the third war. The second implies, 
 at the most, only controversy. Now, it is neither of peace, nor 
 of simple controversy that I propose to speak, but of war. This is 
 actively carried on at the present moment. We may remember 
 the origin of the last campaign. The revolution of July had pro- 
 duced a truce : the principle of state religion was abolished, and 
 universal liberty of worship recognised. Eeason felt satisfied. The 
 churches, on their part, finding themselves not only tolerated, but 
 respected and favoured, remained in peace ; on both sides the 
 question was confined to argument without passion or bitterness. 
 
 The quarrel broke out anew upon the subject of instruction. 
 
 The State, under the Kestoration and the government of July, 
 had preserved, from the imperial institutions, the privileges of 
 the University. It is with the University as with all the other 
 machinery of centralisation ; it forms an excellent auxiliary to 
 those who use it, and a terrible obstacle to others who suffer from 
 its use. A portion of the clergy began by claiming the exclusive 
 liberty of instruction; but, instead of confining themselves to 
 asking this as a civil right, and as a natural consequence of the 
 liberal institutions by which the country was then governed, they 
 adopted perhaps a more adroit, but certainly a less honourable 
 course ; they assailed the university with calumny. 
 
 The University, at first, defended itself weakly. Its heads 
 
 "There will always be Pelagians and Catholics, and war between 
 thetn." —Pascal, Thoughts, Art. xxiv, 12, ed. Havet. p. 301. 
 
 h 2 
 
XX PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 declared, with haughtiness, that they saw no reason why they 
 should speak in their own cause. Their merits were discussed in 
 the journals and in the tribune, but merely in a political point of 
 view, and by men generally unacquainted with the spirit of their 
 teaching, and the character of the establishment. 
 
 There sprang up besides, from this question, a very unfortunate 
 equivocation, which could not be imputed to the clergy. The 
 clergy, by the nature of their institution, represent the principle of 
 authority ; the State, represents the authority for the time consti- 
 tuted and consequently the University ; and the philosophers who 
 defended the University, ought to have represented the principle 
 of liberty. The exact contrary took place. We saw the ultra- 
 montanists demand the privileges of liberty, and the philosophers 
 demonstrate that these privileges were dangerous. The public 
 did not trouble themselves to enquire whether the clergy were 
 right in declaring themselves liberal, nor whether they had cared 
 for liberty of instruction, when under the Eestoration the 
 University had belonged to them. No one listened to the 
 philosophers who declared that the clergy only wanted this liberty 
 for themselves, and that with their immense resources they would 
 easily compel the concurrence of the laity, or extinguish their 
 influence altogether. This grand word liberty, which was then in 
 its full ascendant, obtained numerous partisans for all who invoked 
 it, and it soon became evident that the University, supported by 
 the government, had fallen in general opinion. 
 
 The solution, to speak of it incidentally, was very simple. It 
 became necessary to accord liberty because it was a right, and to 
 maintain the University by its side, to prevent liberty from 
 becoming a monopoly in the hands of the only great association 
 that subsists in France. But all this is an old history to-day; 
 to-morrow it may become interesting again. Under the restriction 
 of the Constituent Assembly, the privileges of the University 
 
PEE FACE TO THE THIED FEENCH EDITION. XXI 
 
 were re-established and strengthened some years afterwards, 
 without exciting the least attention on the part of any of the 
 warmest advocates of liberty of instruction. After more than 
 ten years of bitter contest, the question of the schools on both 
 sides amounted to little more than a pretext. The ultra-montanists 
 were fighting against reason, the right of free inquiry, and liberty 
 of conscience ; their adversaries, after having assaulted the 
 Jesuits, and taken up, by degrees, the views of the encyclopedia, 
 were dying with a desire to attack Christianity. 
 
 But who are these adversaries ? No longer the universitarians, 
 who (very contrary to their own wish) had completely disappeared 
 before the University itself; but the Voltairians, the materialists, 
 and the atheists ; or, as they call themselves, a little jesuitically 
 perhaps, the sceptics. In like manner, as by the side of the 
 clergy there are the ultra-montanists who speak the loudest, so 
 on the opposite side are the Voltairians, who make the greatest 
 clamour, but are the soonest consumed. These are they, who 
 from the origin of the dispute, effected a diversion so favourable 
 to the interests of the clergy by attacking in concert with them the 
 philosophy of the university, which they qualified by the title of 
 official philosophy. At that time, (for we lose nothing by being 
 just), they were influenced by a sentiment, honourable in itself, a 
 sort of highly legitimate horror of equivocation, half-measures, 
 and perplexed or doubtful predicaments. Escaping from thence, 
 they elevated their radicalism more and more, and this became 
 the easier to them, as scarcely belonging to philosophy, except 
 through this polemic, they were unrestrained by any scientific 
 scruple. Their fault and misfortune have been to confound 
 moderation wdtli weakness, the sincere expression of an honest 
 faith with interested concessions, and to exclaim against want of 
 candour as often as opinions are uttered by their partisans, con- 
 trary to those which they have adopted and patronise. Because . 
 
XXU PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 they are pantheists, or materialists, or sceptics, they persuade them- 
 selves that a philosopher, who differs from some pomts of their 
 system, is either inconsistent, or inclined to pass over to the camp 
 of the enemy. If through this erroneous interpretation they only 
 sacrificed impartiality, the evil would be but half consummated, 
 and they would remain the sole sufferers. But they disturb the 
 consciences of others by giving themselves up to unjust and 
 intemperate discussions, and by attacking liberty in the name 
 of liberty itself. When we, and other spiritualists, desire to 
 preserve the independence of thought, and at the same time, to 
 acknowledge all the great truths of religion which form the noble 
 and imperishable conquests of our school, we find ourselves 
 exposed to the cross fire of two contending parties. The ultra- 
 montanists exclaim, " You have no right, being recognisers of 
 religion, to remain rationalists, for reason is condemned to 
 scepticism." Their enemies retort, "You have no right, being free 
 thinkers, to declare yourselves religious ; for nothing is true but 
 positive science, and all your theories respecting God, Creation, 
 and Futurity, ought to be referred back to revealed religion." 
 
 This attempt of extreme theologians to reduce all dissenters 
 from their creed to the condition of sceptics, under the pretence 
 that reason can establish nothing, has been often combated. 
 There would be little use in recommencing against them a 
 discussion constantly renewed and invariably unavailing. In their 
 anxiety to demonstrate the necessity of revelation, they go to the 
 length of asserting that all our ideas, principles, and powers, are 
 derived from that source alone; that without an established 
 church we could neither believe in God, nor conceive the idea 
 of his divine nature ; that if, in remote antiquity, there were 
 pagans who worshipped the true God, these great convictions of 
 the origin of the earth, the destiny of man, and the immortality 
 of the soul, have come to them from the Jewish nation, at that 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. XXlll 
 
 time unknown to and despised by the rest of the world, and who 
 alone had received the word of God as its faithful depositories. 
 Thej are not dismayed by the difficulty of thus explaining by 
 tradition all that recorded history and sound sense compel us to 
 attribute to the spontaneous effort of human thought. They care 
 little to encumber themselves with this unnecessary, burden, for 
 they have more boldness than judgment. When they are told by 
 Bayle and all the great controversialists, that before we submit to 
 authority, it is first requisite to decide that it is legitimate and 
 necessary ; that we are then to argue, to believe in principles 
 and the deductions drawn from them ; and that consequently, the 
 very abdication of reason implies an act of faith in the authority 
 of reason ; they either turn a deaf ear, or according to the usual 
 custom of unintelligent and obstinate temperaments, reply by 
 scurrility and insult. No one will ever convince them, for they 
 themselves only submit in trembling to an authority which they 
 proclaim irrefragable, and which would leave them a prey to tlie 
 most complete and terrifying scepticism if they abandoned it. 
 The universal Church has frequently condemned this absolute 
 proscription of reason. Let us draw attention here to the terms 
 of the last formula of the congregation of the Index. It begins 
 with these words : " Although faith is above reason." .... We 
 are not surprised, for we have ourselves explained that it is 
 impossible to be an orthodox Christian without admitting this 
 proposition ; but let us hear the rest. " Art. 1. Though faith is 
 above reason, there can be no true disagreement between them, 
 and they lend, on the contrary, mutual support to each other, for 
 they both proceed from the same source, and rest equally upon 
 the word of God."* "Art. II. We can prove with certainty, by 
 
 * "I, Etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen vera dissensio, nullum dlssi- 
 dium inter ipsas inveniri potest, cum ambo ab uno eodemque imrautabili 
 veritatis fonte, Deo optimo maximo, oriuutur, atque sibi mutuam opemferant." 
 
Xxiv PEEFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 reason, the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the 
 free will of man. Faith comes after reason, and consequently it 
 cannot be effectually employed to prove the existence of God 
 to atheists, the spirituality of the soul to materialists, or liberty 
 to fatalists."* ''Art. III. The use of reason precedes faith, 
 lleason leads man to faith, with the aid of revelation and grace. "f 
 
 Reason is therefore something, oh ye enemies of reason, accord- 
 ing to an authority which you have no right to question. Submit 
 then on the strength of your own principles. Tell us no longer 
 that without revelation we can neither believe in God, nor prove 
 the immortality of the soul, for we have against you an auxiliary 
 before whom you must bow in silence. We have no occasion to 
 appeal to ecclesiastical authority to establish our belief in reason ; 
 but this authority delivers us from you and your arguments. You 
 are in reality the dissenters and rebels from the universal Church, 
 and if we desired to seek for what your eternal disputes prove, 
 and to draw advantage from them, we would say that they supply 
 an argument against the unity of faith and profession which you 
 attribute with so much power and display to your particular 
 communion. You dispute with us incessantly, you insult and calum- 
 niate us ; nevertheless, history will record, that you assist our 
 views, while you obstruct your own. 
 
 In revenge, the atheists, the materialists, the sceptics, and the 
 apostles of positive science who reply to you in the journals, and 
 who agree with you in anathematising spiritualistic philosophy, 
 inflict without intending it, more injury on reason and freedom of 
 thought than you will ever be able to accomplish. Iq listening 
 
 « (( 
 
 11. Eatiocmatio Dei existentiam, animte spiritualitatem, hominis 
 hbertatem, cum certitudine probare potest. Fides posterior est revelatione, 
 proiiideque ad probandum Dei existentiam contra Atheum, ad probandum 
 aniiDie rationalem spiritualitatem ac libertatem contra naturalismi et fatalismi 
 sectatorem, allegari conveuienter nequit." 
 
 t "III. Ratiouis usus fidem precedit, et ad earn hominem ope revelatiouis 
 et gratia? conducit." Ef. c. v., 8, 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIHD FRENCH EDITION. XXV 
 
 to their invectives against those amongst us who represent the 
 school of Descartes, we might fancy ourselves present at one of 
 the nocturnal battles, in which the soldiers of the same army- 
 decimate each other, while they believe that they are firing on 
 the enemy. Are they then so blinded by pride that they are not 
 shaken by the shouts of exultation which burst from the opposing 
 camp when they have insulted spiritual philosophy. Does their 
 doctrine of annihilation so obstruct their sight that they no longer 
 recognise the flag of liberty when carried by other hands ? Alas ! 
 if fanaticism can ever be excused, it is when its pretext is faith ; 
 but these insults, sarcasms, and treasons become incomprehensible 
 when we see them employed on the side of empty reason and 
 intolerant freedom. How ! You believe in nothing, and are you 
 not humbled '? Do you pretend to speak of philosophy without 
 either knowing its history or comprehending its terms ? Or 
 perhaps, if you do know something of the history of philosophy, 
 you have not acquired your knowledge from Plato, Zeno, Descartes, 
 or Leibnitz. You have issued from the schools of these great 
 masters with cold hearts and unenlightened minds, replying to 
 enthusiasm with raillery, and mistaking your impotence for 
 strength. In this absence of sound ideas and doctrines, to what 
 would you reduce human nature if it were committed to your 
 charge ? 
 
 The spiritualists have long been accused of feeding on chimeras : 
 this accusation was launched against them at the outset of their 
 schools. Positive minds imagine that nothing is serious or real 
 unless proved by experience ; and while they admit, without dis- 
 cussion, the data of the senses, and reduce all things to a few 
 generalisations, with no other value than that of a method, they 
 include in the same negative the innate principles of human reason, 
 and the invisible world which these principles discover to us. 
 But, to confine ourselves here to the foundations of spiritualistic 
 
XXvi PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 doctrine, plain sense suffices, in the absence of science, to show 
 that there are first truths, anterior and superior to all experience. 
 Experience produces neither the principle of contradiction nor 
 that of causality; not even that of justice. Every principle 
 founded on experience must necessarily possess the characteristics 
 of experience itself, and can only have the value of an induction. 
 Every day we might be in apprehension lest some new advance 
 of science should transform or annihilate justice. Is this the 
 general opinion of men? Is there one by whom the truth 
 of the principle of causality is considered doubtful or dependent 
 on the amount of experience? What can be looked upon as 
 proved, what is there solid in philosophy, in the experimental 
 sciences, or in the transactions of life, if the principle of causality is 
 not established beyond a doubt ? Of all realities the most real, 
 of all evidences the most evident, those which men universally 
 believe in without restriction or rescue, are the principle of 
 causality, the principle of contradiction, and the principle of 
 justice,— and these they irresistibly acknowledge, by an absolute 
 necessity of their nature. Not only do they believe these, but 
 they could not believe any thing else without this foundation of 
 faith. They could neither reason, speak, nor think. They think : 
 there is, therefore, something fixed and immovable in their 
 minds.. They speak: consequently, there mast be in every 
 human imagination principles anterior to all comrnunication by 
 words. They reason : they must, therefore, possess a fulcrum 
 inaccessible to the powers of reasoning, upon which all reasoning 
 rests. This doctrine is as evidently clear to a child as to a 
 Descartes, and those who affect to dispute it, to add more 
 weight to revelation, or to reduce human intelligence entirely to 
 the data of the senses and practical experience, do not themselves 
 see to the full depth of their own doctrine. Their doubt is either 
 levity or despair. They argue against us, they prove their doubts 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. XXVii 
 
 by demonstrative reasoning; and what is it to prove, if not to believe 
 in a principle, and to admit also that this principle being bestowed 
 by nature, another may be derived from it through science ? Oh, 
 ye collectors of clouds and obscurities ! absolute doubt is even 
 more difficult than faith. You employ dogmatism to combat 
 dogmatism. You deny movement, yet you walk. You dispute with 
 us the right of having principles, while you make use of the very 
 principle we acknowledge. You reproach us with deceiving our- 
 selves with vain words, and with not being sufficiently confident ; 
 but the first of your assumptions is to say that the absolute is a 
 combination of contingents. In your intemperate desire to 
 destroy metaphysics, you shake the most unrefutable and indis- 
 pensable of all mathematical axioms. 
 
 If your doctrine could be proved to be true, it would supply a 
 formidable argument against reason and liberty. After struggling 
 for so many ages to win the privilege of free thought, it would 
 leave us nothing after this life, nothing beyond the passing world ! 
 A noble triumph, to acquire the right of universal disbelief! 
 A legitimate object for so many efforts, so much genius, and so 
 much blood ! A great additional strength, a valuable remedy, 
 and a wonderful consolation for human nature ! 
 
 No : sceptical philosophy is not philosophy. There is much to 
 do in studying and cultivating the world; let these positive minds 
 confine their energies to this complicated task, and they will 
 render nothing but service to humanity. But when they proceed to 
 the length of denying all reality except what they can touch with 
 their instruments ; when they propose for sole and universal truth, 
 the narrow corner of truth that they are able to explore ; they 
 become, not our benefactors, but our enemies. Every step they 
 move in advance, is marked by a disaster. They take from us 
 our imagination of the ideal, which supplies a foretaste of future 
 reality, to enclose us within an actual reality, equally poor and 
 
XXVlll 
 
 PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 miserable; they forbid us to hope, by limiting our destiny to the 
 career of the body, the end of which is foreseen and inevitable. 
 If they leave us the name of God, it is only by an illogical con- 
 fusion which consists in identifying the cause with the effect. 
 The word duty is, in their definition, synonymous with contract, 
 and consequently with calculation : whence it follows that abso- 
 lute devotion becomes folly. Their science is a negation in 
 theory, a dissolvent in practice. On the other hand, spiritual 
 philosophy opens a new world to man ; bestows on him a father ; 
 teaches him to endure life with its casualties; and to love his 
 fellow-creatures. The moral lesson to which it gives birth is that 
 of duty and sacrifice. It consecrates law, but ennobles law by love. 
 It establishes liberty, but gives fraternity as its companion. 
 Positive science reduces man to the individual, and spiritual phi- 
 losophy tends to make all human nature a single family. 
 
 There is an exclusive class of sceptics, founded, not 
 upon philosophical, but upon political conviction. They have 
 witnessed the revival of superstition and intolerance, and have, 
 with good reason, thought that it was necessary to oppose a strong 
 barrier against these double enemies of civilisation and liberty. 
 But they have not contented themselves with attacking super- 
 stition and intolerance : they have made war upon a doctrine which 
 had degenerated into superstition, upon a Church which had 
 become intolerant; and not only upon this Church and doctrine, 
 but upon spiritualistic philosophy, the metaphysics of which are' 
 entirely impregnated with Christianity. 
 
 Let us not feel surprised that those who use philosophy as a 
 weapon of war, lose the true sense of the philosophical method. 
 It is to the truth of a proposition that we ought to look, and not 
 to its origin. If spiritualism is true, we ought to be spiritualists, 
 no matter what may be the errors of its disciples ; and if Christi- 
 anity is true, we ought to be Christians, whatever may be the 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. XXIX 
 
 mistakes which fanaticism shelters under the name of Christianity. 
 Can it be that truth shall cease to be truth, because it happens to 
 be taught by our adversaries? Is it possible that a doctrine 
 could no longer be salutary in itself because it happens to be 
 abused and perverted by some of its professors ? We have seen, 
 in politics, the m.elancholy example of parties alternately shifting 
 from side to side, solely for the sake of opposition. What can 
 philosophy have in common with such dishonest and puerile 
 diplomacy ? 
 
 I confess, there is not a single friend of philosophy, who does 
 not feel himself wounded and grieved by the crusade which, 
 during the few last years, has been carried on against liberty and 
 civilisation. But they must have little faith who are disturbed 
 for the consequences of this outbreak. For myself, if I may be 
 permitted to make this declaration of my personal feelings, 
 justified perhaps by the virulence of certain controversialists, I 
 hold, without difficulty or doubt, to the point I had marked out 
 for myself before these attacks commenced. I remain firm in my 
 convictions of rationalist philosophy, steadfast also in my profound 
 reverence for the Cliristian religion, immoveable in my resolution 
 to contend on all occasions and at any sacrifice, against intoler- 
 ance. I examine conscientiously what there can be contradictory 
 in this profession of faith, and I can discover nothing. Without 
 offence to the sceptics and Voltairians, whom I have no desire to 
 misrepresent, to oppose intolerance is not to question Christianity. 
 
 There are two kinds of intolerance, — ecclesiastical, and civil 
 intolerance. Ecclesiastical intolerance is that which compels all 
 the followers of a Church to believe what that Church teaches ; 
 civil intolerance obliges all dissenters to make an external 
 profession of a faith which they repudiate in the depth of their 
 souls. The first is merely a moral act, and only addresses itself 
 to conviction ; the second employs violence, and has recourse 
 
XXX PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 to the secular arm.* Ecclesiastical intolerance, in a church, results 
 from belief in revelation; civil intolerance, in a clergy, proceeds 
 from their pretensions to universal authority. The one is purely 
 religious, the other exclusively political. To resist civil intoler- 
 ance is to defend liberty of conscience, and to perform the most 
 rigid duty of all who assume the name of philosophers. But 
 ecclesiastical intolerance does not of necessity produce civil intoler- 
 ance. They are derived neither from the same cause nor the same 
 principle. Illustrious examples have often demonstrated to the 
 world that a jealous solicitude for orthodoxy may be perfectly 
 compatible with Christian charity; and we should despair of 
 human nature if persecution were the necessary and inevitable 
 companion of faith. My horror of theocracy and intellectual 
 thraldom, my opinions upon the independence and authority of 
 human reason, leave me therefore entirely free to express my 
 admiration and respect for the Christian doctrine, I teach in 
 the name of reason, and I endeavour to propagate the truths 
 that Christianity inculcates in the name of revelation. If it 
 becomes necessary to defend liberty of conscience, I shall 
 be ambitious of combating in the foremost ranks; if war is 
 declared against Christianity, neither the insults of my enemies, 
 nor the anger (perhaps more difficult to bear) of my friends, shall 
 induce me to question a doctrine that proclaims the unity of God, 
 Providence, spiritual existence, liberty, and the immortality of 
 the soul ; and the moral perfection of which is summed up in 
 these words ; " Do unto others as you would they should do unto 
 you ; " and " Children, love each other." 
 
 I can understand perfectly that the enemies of free thought 
 
 .\r "^^^ Proceeding of God who disposes all things with gentleness, is to 
 establish religion in the mind by reason, aud in the heart by grace. But to 
 seek to place It in the mind and heart by violence and menaces, is not to 
 establish religion hnt terror :^^-terrorem potius quam religionem. Pascal, 
 Thoughts, Art. xxiv. 3, ed. Havet. p. 205. ' 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. XXXI 
 
 and the partisans of theocracy, give me no credit for my reve- 
 rence for the Gospel. Do I not know this by experience ? We 
 may pity to the bottom of our souls, those who raise objections of 
 this nature. They, are unacquainted with liberty. They are 
 incapable of judging the heart of a philosopher. I much suspect 
 that a great number of the Voltairians of to-day are the same 
 who, in 1848, compelled the Catholic clergy to bless the trees of 
 liberty, and spoke of nothing but the alliance between democracy 
 and the Gospel. It would be sad for philosophy to depend on 
 these shifting currents of opinion, when its task, on the contrary, 
 is to restrain and regulate them. 
 
 I acknowledge humbly that I felt a scruple before publishing 
 " Natural Religion ; " but it was a scruple of a totally opposite 
 character. This work, which some regard as an ambitious 
 attempt, is, under a very well known name, often employed 
 even by illustrious writers, a kind of popular summary of the 
 most universally adopted tenets of the spiritualists. In col- 
 lecting together within such a limited compass, the doctrines 
 which I believe to be profoundly true, do I not run the risk of 
 weakening the respect they inspire ? And is there not danger in 
 taking this decided step of renouncing hypotheses, to confine 
 myself exclusively to what is received and undisputed? in insisting 
 as strongly on the limits of reason as on its authority ? and in 
 recalling, finally, with perfect sincerity of attention, the great 
 problems which reason leaves unanswered by the side of those 
 which she has so gloriously solved ? After mature reflection, I 
 have satisfied myself that the truth ought always to be told, that 
 nothing is gained by surrounding it with false greatness, and that 
 there can be no risk of paralysing the efforts of those who still 
 seek after knowledge, by placing before them in a more accessible 
 and popular form, the doctrines already established. 
 
 A positive religion, whatever may be its source, divine or 
 
XXXU PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 human, is called upon to solve all problems which concern the 
 future of the human race. Such is not the province of philosophy. 
 Its first duty is to rest upon substantial evidences, and to know 
 and confess its proper limits. On these conditions only can it 
 assume the character of a science. It is not, and never can be, 
 what is called a perfect science, for it will always have something 
 to search for and discuss. Progress, and indefinite progress is its 
 law. There are problems which, in all probability, philosophy 
 will never clear up; there are others, of the solution of which it 
 has already caught a glimpse ; and there are still more of which 
 at present it can only lay down the terms with exactitude. 
 Philosophy ought neither to dissemble the wants of society nor 
 the boundaries of reason. To pretend to knowledge that it does 
 not possess, to conceal or deny the hopes that it cannot realise, 
 is equally fatal to its dignity and influence. 
 
 If we look with attention around us, we may convince our- 
 selves, in spite of assertions to the contrary, that the human soul 
 finds within itself a strong necessity of being united again to God. 
 Nature urges us to dream of, to enquire after, and to long for, the 
 invisible world. As long as man continues to be man, he will 
 desire to be a spiritualist. This is, in some measure, his vocation. 
 Scepticism satisfied with itself, and erected into a system, consti- 
 tutes an actual rebellion against common sense.* But if spirit- 
 ualism is so much in the ascendant, that which prevails most in 
 our present profoundly agitated social system, is a vague, ill- 
 defined spiritualism, uncertain of itself, without fixed principles 
 or established faith. Perhaps the fault lies with the philosophers 
 
 * "There are only three diflferent kinds of persons : the first, who serve 
 God, having found him ; the next, who are occupied in seeking for but have 
 not yet found him ; and the last, wlio live without either seeking or finding 
 him. The first are rational and happy ; the last irrational and miserable ; 
 those of the intermediate class are wretched and rational." — Pascal, Thoughts, 
 Art. xxiv., Ed. Havet. p. 330. 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. XXXlll 
 
 of the doctrme themselves. It is the vice of reason to exalt 
 itself in the consciousness of its own strength. When once we give 
 ourselves up to our own guidance, we find it difficult to acknowledge 
 that there are spaces into which the light of reason cannot pene- 
 trate. We wish to attain the knowledge of all that it is desirable 
 to know. Alas ! it is not by our insatiable desires, but by the 
 weakness of our practical faculties and instruments that human 
 acquirements ought to be measured. These aspirations towards 
 problems which are beyond our range, gratify some minds as 
 tokens of strength. They love the dizziness and confusion in 
 which they become involved. After all, what do they prove, 
 beyond our impotence to restrain our own intelligence and our 
 own desires ? In proportion as the first truths we are enabled to 
 discover, are clearly and conclusively demonstrated, so in the 
 same degree we are unwilling to confess that other truths can 
 only be suspected or imperfectly perceived. To sound dogmas we 
 add conjectures. We wish to impose with equal authority 
 scientific tenets, and systems inevitably obscure, because they are 
 based only upon dreams. We envelop ourselves in clouds to 
 obtain credit for hypotheses, which, presented in barren naked- 
 ness, would excite only astonishment and compassion.. We take 
 circuitous routes to beguile ourselves with the illusion of having 
 made decided advances. We replace ideas by formulas. We 
 forget the celebrated saying of Socrates, that the first knowledge 
 is to feel convinced that we know nothing ; or rather, scarcely more 
 than nothing. We wish to be, at all costs, profound and original, 
 when we ought to think only of being true and useful. 
 
 Another serious mistake of the spiritualists is contempt for the 
 mass of mankind. They wish to reason and philosophise amongst 
 themselves. Why do they not converse in Latin, as in the fifteenth 
 century ? Let them beware lest they experience the lot of all 
 aristocracies, which dissolve and shiver to pieces in their own 
 
XXXIV PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 isolation. If we wish to serve or elevate humanity above its 
 present condition, we ought to live in communion with our fellow 
 men. Plato exhibits to us vulgar minds enchained in a cavern, 
 and mistaking for realities the indistinct shadows which a pale 
 glimmer occasions to appear at the end of their dungeon; while 
 by an effort of love and thought, the philosopher escapes from this 
 confinement, and breathes again the light of life and liberty. But 
 when his philosopher has lived for a time in this superior world, 
 Plato takes him again by the hand and leads him back to the 
 cavern, to instruct, to cure, and to console the captives. It is 
 thus that he acknowledges and practises the double mission of 
 philosophy ; to discover and to disseminate truth. 
 
 If I could venture, after having shown that the disciples of 
 what they call practical philosophy deceive themselves as to the 
 very foundation of the science they profess, as to its privileges, 
 interests, and future ; that they persevere in a war without utility, 
 and in many respects without justice ; that they amount, in fact, 
 to a mere negation, which is, if possible, less than nothing ; — I 
 should then address myself to my friends and masters, the philo- 
 sophers of spirituality, and conjure them to come into close 
 contact with the necessities of the weakest minds amongst our 
 fellow creatures, to reduce their own standard so as to be under- 
 stood, to become humble, to be true, to speak to the hearts of the 
 multitude, not, unhappily, to charm, but to awaken them. There 
 is no longer a pretext for illusion. The scene which we have 
 immediately before our eyes is too real and too melancholy. 
 There has ever been in our land an overwhelming number of 
 indifferent and lukewarm spirits ; but not long since,the sacred fire 
 was still burning. Our youth crowded the halls of the Sorbonne. 
 In proportion as the course of instruction was more severe, the 
 more directly it reached the heart. A new doctrine was hailed 
 with enthusiasm. The great labours of history had their exclusive 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. XXXV 
 
 world, who listened with ardour and wrapt attention. Political 
 opinions were divided; but the struggle was preferable to 
 extinction. Even art itself operated as a sermon. AVhat has 
 become of the time, so near and yet so remote, when people rushed 
 to the first representation of a new play, as to a battle ? Now, 
 we are all sunk in one universal apathy and degeneration. No 
 one is active except in the pursuit of self-interest. Everywhere 
 we see luxury without riches ; minds incessantly devoted to 
 play ; all France speculating on the rise or fall of the funds ; the 
 telegraph employed to carry on stock-jobbing ; money taken from 
 agriculture and thrown into the gambling-houses. The most 
 productive enterprises discredited, ruined, and utterly put a stop 
 to by strokes on the exchange, even before the works have had time 
 to commence. In the midst of all this, no zeal for studies that 
 bring no pecuniary profit, for letters, for theoretical sciences ; no 
 great school to excite and elevate inquiring minds ; no traces of 
 moral instruction; the fine arts depreciated, and without influence ; 
 characters efiticed, taste degraded, manners corrupted, and 
 hypocrisy esteemed. Does not this state of things move us to 
 tears? Must we stagnate and rot in the mire? Is there no 
 remedy to be found ? Let us hope and firmly trust that the 
 wound by wliich we are stricken is not mortal. History shows us 
 many examples of these decays followed by a brilliant resuscita- 
 tion. It is only necessary that those who fully understand and 
 groan under the evil, should also comprehend the vast extent of 
 their duty. It is the heart that is gangrened, and the heart 
 that calls for cure. Let us bring back the hopes of life to the 
 disinherited ; virtue and faith to the dead ; rouse up on all sides 
 the sentiments of right and duty ; and establish a new system of 
 stoic virtue to act as a rampart against another fall. For myself, 
 if any reflection encourages and animates me, it is that I have 
 not been silent in this general degradation. If, as I fear, ray 
 
 c 2 
 
XXXVl PREFACE TO THE THIRD FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 efforts are barren in themselves, may I at least excite a more 
 efficacious philosophy ! The standard of spiritualism would be 
 better held by another hand, but it is under that standard that 
 we are all called upon to rally. 
 
PEEFACE TO THE FIEST FEENCH EDITION. 
 
 Nature, society, and conscience, speak to us of God at every 
 instant. What is this God the thought of whom incessantly 
 recurs to us ? Is he a soKtary deity, indifferent to, and estranged 
 from the world he has created? Does he require our reve- 
 rence and our prayers ? Has he given us a law and subjected us 
 to a trial ? Does he reserve for us another existence after the 
 present? As we advance along the road of life, our relatives, 
 our friends fall on every side of us. We consign their bodies to 
 the earth, but whither do their souls depart ? Are we for ever 
 separated from the dead ? Is there nothing beyond the grave ? 
 
 Christianity supplies an answer for all these questions. It 
 teaches man his origin, his rule of conduct, and his end ; in a 
 word, it tells him all that is necessary for the guidance and 
 consolation of life. 
 
 Many minds repose with happiness in this secure light of 
 revealed faith. But there are others that hesitate to admit the 
 principle of revelation ; or being unable to believe all the truths 
 taught by the Church, (while they fully comprehend that we 
 cannot separate portions of the divine word, but must accept or 
 reject the whole,) imagine themselves called upon to give up 
 positive religion, and fly without reserve to philosophy. Those 
 who seek to reduce religion to the authority of reason, will they 
 find in reason all that they require ? Have the human faculties 
 no intermediate resource between revelation and scepticism? 
 
XXXVIU PKEFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 Is there nothing bej-ond the circle of revealed truth which can 
 reconcile earth with heaven ? 
 
 I know that natural religion is often treated as a chimera, and 
 that the impotence of philosophy is exaggerated when we read 
 the accounts of so many idle disputes, of so many systems 
 alternately flourishing and overthrown; but important truths 
 spring up from this mass of errors, as a vigorous tree flourishes 
 in the midst of ruins. We are ill-studied in the history of 
 thought, if we conclude that Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and 
 Leibnitz, when dying, left philosophy at the point where they 
 took it up. Natural religion is not a system attached to any 
 particular school ; it consists in two or three simple but sublime 
 dogmas, bequeathed to common sense by the science of all ages. 
 
 Much has been written in demonstration of the existence of 
 God. Such arguments are for the most part irrefutable ; but are 
 they necessary ? This may be questioned. In point of fact, 
 there are very few atheists, even if there are any at all. We 
 may forget God, we may adopt false ideas of his attributes, but 
 we cannot deny him. It is sufficient to open our eyes, the visible 
 world speaks ; or, better still, we have only to think, for our 
 reason, while in progress of development, elevates itself towards 
 God by an invincible attraction. If reason fails, my heart is 
 filled with him. I can neither suffer nor enjoy, without recog- 
 nising in myself the consciousness of his presence. He is my 
 support and my hope, the foundation of my intelligence, the star of 
 my love and my desire. But if I acknowledge him in his benefits 
 and promises, I am unable to understand him in his peculiar 
 essence. The nature of infinity is beyond the grasp of my imper- 
 fect powers. God has made me to incline towards him with all 
 the force of my intellect, my affection, and my will, but he has 
 also decreed that I am to remain for ever in immeasurable infe- 
 riority. The first word of philosophy should be to proclaim that 
 
PREFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION. XXXIX 
 
 God exists ; the second, to avow that he is incomprehensible. 
 What we know of him is all that is required to teach us how to 
 love and adore. 
 
 The human mind reluctantly acknowledges a limited range. It 
 aspires to comprehend God, and verges on a depreciation of his 
 omnipotence, while setting up a self-delusion. It ascribes to him 
 our feelings, passions, and necessities ; and, to complete the incon- 
 sistency, invests him with a power resembling the faculties of 
 man — a simple power of transformation. This human creator 
 can no longer create ; he has passed into the substance of the 
 world : such is the origin of Pantheism. Sound sense equally 
 rejects the conclusion and the principle : it acknowledges neither 
 a God analogous to man, nor identical with the world. Pantheism 
 is nothing beyond a mere scholastic term for atheism : the deified 
 world is a world without a deity. An ideal humanity cannot be 
 the unknown source whence springs at the same time, by a blind 
 concurrence, every thing that is good and all that is evil. It is 
 against reason to pretend that evil is the necessary expression of 
 perfection. 
 
 Pantheism takes God from us by confounding him with the 
 world ; another doctrine removes him by pretending that he has 
 no sympathy with his work. It is undoubtedly difficult to under- 
 stand that what is perfect in its essence, and all sufficient in itself, 
 should condescend so far as to think of us : but we know that God 
 has bestowed thought on us, seeing that we are made by him, and 
 creation assures us of Providence. Why should God detach him- 
 self entirely from his own work ? He neither renounces his plans, 
 nor checks himself in their accomplishment, like an unskilful 
 artificer. This attempt to impose a separation between the action 
 of creating and that of governing the world, forms a part of the 
 constant illusion by which we seek to reduce omnipotence to the 
 conditions of our own being. God is eternal ; he does not last for 
 
xl PREFACE TO THE FIRST FEENCH EDITION. 
 
 a given time; he forms no unconnected series of designs; be 
 embraces with the same momentary and extended will, the esta- 
 blishment and administration of the universe. We are compelled 
 to separate what in him is blended, because our weak intelligence, 
 of which the horizon is limited and the ideas consecutive, can 
 neither think nor speak but by the help of analysis. 
 
 Thus, there is above us, a God by whom we are made and con- 
 trolled. What place has he assigned to man in the great scheme 
 of creation ? To ascertain this, we have only to examine ourselves ; 
 for God has formed nothing without an express purpose, and 
 proportions the means exactly to the object he has in view. All 
 other beings are merely parts of a whole ; man alone is a centre ; 
 he knows himself and his relative position, he is aware of his 
 strength, and uses it freely. This of itself is a guarantee of 
 immortality, for the life which God has bestowed on man has 
 nothing in common with that of inferior creatures ignorant of 
 their own nature, without responsibility, and who have nothing 
 to expect after they have completed their task of a day, or have 
 given place to other individuals of the same species. For my own 
 part, I feel convinced that my immortality cannot be indifferent 
 to God, since it is not indifferent to myself. My mind is evidently 
 constructed to reflect on what is durable, permanent, eternal ; 
 and my heart is, as it were, intoxicated and possessed with 
 admiration of the infinite. I am free under a prescribed law ; 
 that law when I examine it has all the characteristics of infalli- 
 bility and eternity. It belongs to another world, with which it 
 connects me. It imposes on me continual sacrifices, which proves 
 that it has not been ordained with a view to this life only, and 
 that my present existence is but a state of probation. When 
 I am once impressed with the conviction that we are placed here 
 below for a struggle, and that we are expected elsewhere for the 
 reward, I despise suffering, and endure injustice without a murmur, 
 
PREFACE TO THE FTRST FRENCH EDITION. xU 
 
 because I believe in a future state as devoutly as in duty and 
 providence. Tbere is between these three leading tenets such 
 an inseparable and connected responsibility, that I cannot accept 
 one to the exclusion of the others. I believe, therefore, from the 
 sole light of reason, that God is my creator ; I believe that during 
 this life, I must fulfil the task he has allotted to me, and I hold 
 that after death I shall be rewarded or punished accordingly. 
 Such is my faith. 
 
 Filled with this conviction, I am insensible to solitude or 
 despair. God watches and expects me. I behold the invisible 
 world through the eyes of my understanding. In this state of 
 transition I may be crushed ; it is but the suffering of a day, for 
 which I shall be repaid a hundredfold. I know that the career of 
 virtue is painful, and that vice and sometimes crime contain the 
 elements of success. I demand nothing from the world but the 
 opportunity of contending and deserving. My repose, my country, 
 my God, belong to another sphere. 
 
 But how can I deserve? By obeying the law and doing good. 
 My law is to preserve and develop my faculties, to bear good will 
 towards, and lend assistance to my companions under the same 
 trial, to love and adore the author of my being ? I shall be asked, 
 how can I worship God? Have I not a prescribed duty ? To do 
 good is to adore. To love, to work, to practise self-negation, is 
 to worship, to pray." I can thus raise my thoughts and my heart 
 towards God, and thank him for his mercies. 
 
 Such are natural religion and natural worship. They lie in this 
 small compass, but they embrace all for those who can penetrate it. 
 My object is to expound this doctrine, in the present work, with 
 simplicity, but at the same time with force; to recapitulate the most 
 solid arguments which establish Providence and the immortality 
 
 * See Note on Prayer, at tke end of the volume. — Editor. 
 
xlii PREFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION. 
 
 of the soul, and to show how we can become the masters of our 
 own future, by a proper exercise of the liberty with which we 
 are intrusted ; to reply to serious objections, and to cast aside 
 sophisms ; to render, by force of perspicuity, science itself acces- 
 sible to the most homely understanding, from which it often differs 
 in nothing but in a more abstruse form. I also wish to distinguish 
 with a firm hand, that which we can understand, from what is 
 beyond our comprehension ; for it often happens that pride carries 
 us beyond the reach of human intelligence, and we become lost in 
 problems which defy solution. But, above all, I am anxious to 
 inspire a certain class of saddened and despairing minds with a 
 true sentiment of religion, without which there can be no agree- 
 able or binding obligation, no fraternal society, no really solid 
 virtue. If I can reanimate a fainting hope, revive a failing courage, 
 reassure a trembling conscience, console or pacify a suffering 
 heart, I shall believe that these humble pages have not been 
 entirely written in vain. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface by the Editor ^ 
 
 Preface to the Third French Edition xvii 
 
 Preface to the First French Edition zxxvii 
 
 FIRST PART. 
 
 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 Chap. I. — Reflections on the Proofs of the Existence of God 
 ,, 11. — On the Incomprehensibility of God 
 ,, III. — Creation and Pantheism 
 
 1 
 
 22 
 56 
 
 SECOND PART. 
 
 • PROVIDENCE. 
 
 Chap. I. — The Demonstration of Providence 85 
 
 ,, 11. — Examination of the objections drawn from the existence 
 
 of Evil 121 
 
 j> III. — Examination of the objections drawn from Divine 
 
 Immutability I34 
 
 )> IV. — God governs the world by General Laws . . . .150 
 
Xliv TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 THIRD PART. 
 
 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Chap. I. — Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul . . . . 173 
 „ II.— Of the Destiny of the Soul after Death . . . .196 
 
 FOURTH PART. 
 
 WORSHIP. 
 
 Chap. L— Of Prayer , . 214 
 
 ,, II. — On the Influence of Religious Philosophy in Modern 
 
 Society 230 
 
 Notes 261 
 
PART THE FIllST. 
 
 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 CIIAPTEE, I. 
 
 REFLECTIONS ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 
 
 " Every tliiug whicli is born must necesscirily proceed from something else ; 
 but it is difficult to liud the author and father of the universe, and impossible, 
 when he is found, to render him intelligible to all the world." — Plato's 
 Timceus, translated by V. Cousin, t. xii. p. 117. 
 
 There are beyond doubt, in the present lamentably unsettled 
 state of society, men who live without thinking of God. They 
 neither deny nor question that he exists ; they simply forget liim. 
 Exclusively devoted to their own worldly interests and passions, 
 they are occupied in the enjoyment of life, and in banishing the 
 idea of death. To whatever length the tragedy may be prolonged, 
 the catastrophe always comes upon them by surprise ; and the last 
 hour finds them filled with the thoughts and love of those sterile 
 possessions which are about to be snatched away for ever. These 
 indifferent sensualists do not comprise the majority; a great pro- 
 portion of mankind believe firmly in the existence of God. Too 
 often their faith is neither active nor fortified by reflection ; they 
 do not examine tliem selves on their tenets, and could scarcely 
 explain them if called upon ; in the practice of life they proceed 
 as if they were void of faith, but they recover themselves, if we 
 may so express it, under solemn circumstances. They may be 
 seen to pray upon a tomb or over a cradle. Although they do 
 not, with the philosophers, explore and inhabit the invisible world, 
 they know and feel that such a world awaits them, and is their 
 true inheritance. The name of God rises naturally to their lips 
 in necessity and suffering. They have a confused perception that 
 
3 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 God is the originating principle of all morality and knowledge, 
 and that to give up this fundamental truth is to plunge into 
 scepticism and deliver the soul over to annihilation. 
 
 In seeking for the causes which give predominance to this 
 salutary belief, we may assuredly enumerate the influence of 
 rehgion, education, and philosophy; but we must at the same time 
 admit that there are implanted in the mind and heart of man a 
 secret instinct, and a natural impulse which draw him towards 
 God. The spectacle of the world instructs us ; the afflictions of 
 life, while they demonstrate our helplessness, compel us to look 
 for a comforter; and enjoyment itself, in a generous, noble nature, 
 gives rise to sentiments of gratitude and piety. The longer we 
 live, the more deeply are we impressed with the impossibility of 
 admitting annihilation; and with the necessity of believing that 
 there is a God above who regulates everything. 
 
 Fortified, without our own consciousness, by the events which 
 have left their traces upon our souls, this belief in the existence 
 of God becomes at last an imperceptible portion of our nature. 
 We feel it to be so essential and irresistible, that without reflect- 
 ing or comprehending, we repose upon it with confidence and 
 security, as a child relies on the love and protection of a fother. 
 
 It is satisfactory to reflect that this conviction and confidence 
 are to be met with, in equal force, through every class of society; 
 that all nations, divided as they may be upon other points, are 
 in accordance upon this ; that religious faith precedes civilisation, 
 and is assuredly its original institutor ; that travellers never dis- 
 cover a new tribe without finding amongst them at least the 
 elements of some rude worship ; and that history, ascending to 
 the earliest periods, always presents to us God associated witli 
 the first thoughts and feelings of man. The inherent faith which 
 we acknowledge within ourselves, and which develops and in- 
 creases with the intercourse of life, encounters an analogous faith 
 on every side, in the external world. This community of belief 
 and sentiment renders human nature a single family. 
 
 Since the age of Plato, who has reasoned on the existence of 
 God in his Timaiis and Laicsr and that of iVristotle, who has 
 demonstrated the divine essence in the twelfth book of his Meta- 
 jjhysici, the schools have handed down a certain number of formal 
 
 * *' How can we, without indignation, beliokl ourselves reduced to prove the 
 existence of God ? We are compelled to regard with anger, and even with 
 hatred, those who have been, and are still, the causes that have forced us to 
 thin.''— Plato's Lav-s, book x. (translated by Y. Cousin.) 
 
ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 3 
 
 arguments, which have been successively amended, and which, 
 renewed, as we may say, by Descartes and Leibnitz, comprise, at 
 this day, the basis of instruction. These arguments are full of 
 force, if we consider above all other points the principle on which 
 they chiefly rest, and which embraces incontestable truth ; but in 
 arrangement they are neither solid nor efficacious. The propo- 
 sitions are sound, but the reasonings are feeble. They will never 
 convert the soul of an atheist, and are insufficient to fix hesitating 
 and unsettled minds. Let us pass them summarily in review, on 
 account of their historical importance, without deceivinf^ ourselves 
 as to any advantageous result. Their inutility will console us for 
 their weakness. We know that certain dispositions feel the 
 necessity of reasoning on their faith, of verifying it by ar^rument, 
 of sifting its tenor, of examining its consequences, of separating 
 it from all that appears obscure, incomplete or paradoxical ; but 
 to arrive thus at the power of transforming an instinctive and 
 impulsive belief in the existence of God into a philosophical 
 dogma, requires a long series of study and persevering meditation. 
 The habit of finding God everywhere, as the inseparable founda- 
 tion of all truth and reality, renders our foith equally specific and 
 animated. Such an effect cannot be expected from two or three 
 syllogisms. Arguments rapidly run over to arrive at a logical 
 conclusion, are insufficient to reassure and convince. We strive 
 in vain to admit their solidity ; the mind is startled and checked 
 by the greatness of the result. We require a longer road, and 
 more time to collect our powers of reflection, until we become 
 accustomed to the splendour of divine majesty. We believe, by 
 an invincible instinct, in the existence of God ; but to establish 
 our faith upon fixed rules, demands the fullest extent of human 
 science."-'- 
 
 When Descartes undertook to demonstrate the existence of 
 God through a regular formula, he was driven to the task by the 
 predicament in which he had voluntarily plunged. In order to 
 divest himself of all contradictory prejudices derived from edu- 
 cation, and to abandon every opinion of which he could not dis- 
 tinctly estimate the origin and value, he made a plain tablet of 
 his mind, and swept from it every point of faith which he had 
 previously adopted. This extended scepticism, the object of 
 
 * ' The metaphysical proofs of God are so far removed from tlie reasonings 
 of men, and so involved, that they strike little, and wlien they impress some, it 
 is only on the first instant of demonstration ; an hour after, they fear they have 
 deceived themselves."— Pascal, Thouf/hts, art. 10, edit. Havet., p. 156. 
 
4 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 uliich was not to cease to believe, but to re-commence belief upon 
 superior reason and authorit}', is what lias been denominated 
 " Doubting according to method." Descartes escaped from it by 
 this remark, — that he could doubt of everything, except only of 
 his doubt, and consequently of his thought and being. Saint 
 Augustine, before him, had uttered precisely the same opinion. 
 " I am certain of my existence," says he, in his treatise Be 
 Civitate Dei ; " in this I cannot be accused of deceiving myself, 
 for even to deceive myself, I must exist."* Being convinced of 
 his existence, Descartes demands of himself what he is, and 
 answers, that he is a living being endowed with thought. This 
 reflection leads him to examine the different ideas which present 
 themselves to his mind, and the first that arrests his attention is 
 that of perfection. What is this idea ? Is it a pure chimera ? 
 Or does it apply to some object actually existing ? It is thus 
 that Descartes finds himself led on from the first step of his 
 philosophy to demonstrate the existence of God. 
 
 " I conceive," says he.f " the idea of a perfect being : now, I 
 am not myself a perfect being, because I doubt. I possess many 
 other ideas, such as those of heaven, earth, and animals ; but I 
 may have formed these myself, for there is nothing in them 
 which I cannot draw from ray own nature by means of analysis 
 or composition. But perfection is something so far beyond myself 
 that I am unable to form any notion of it from the imperfections 
 with which I am acquainted. God, therefore, exists." 
 
 We may develop, or, to speak with more exactness, we may 
 detail this demonstration, as follows : — 
 
 I possess within myself the idea of God ; that is to say, the 
 idea of the infinite : how is this ? 
 
 It can only be from one of these two reasons : — 
 
 Either because infinity exists, and it thus becomes perfectly 
 natural that I should possess the idea ; or that infinity does not 
 exist, and I have myself formed the idea I conceive. 
 
 Now, is it possible that I could myself have originated the idea 
 of infinity which T feel within me ? 
 
 * ' ' Prius aLs te quffii'O iitrum tu ipse sis : an tu fortasse ruetuis ne in liac 
 interrogatione fallaris, cum \itique si non esses, folli omnino non possis ?— 
 Mihi esse me, idque nosse et amare, certissimum est. Nulla in his vero 
 acaderaicorum argumentorum formido, dicentium ; Quid si falleris ? _ Si enim 
 fallor, sum ; nam qui non est, utique nee falli potest ; ac per hoc, sum, si fallor." 
 Lib. ii. De Libera Arbitrio, cap. iii., et lib. ii. l)e Civ. Dei, cap. xxvi. 
 
 t Discourse upon Method, part iv. Third Meditation. Prinaples of 
 Philosophy, part i. 
 
ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF COD. 5 
 
 I have only two ways of forming an idea of an object which 
 does not exist ; either by attenuation, in suppressing through 
 power of thought some of the quahties of an actual object ; or by 
 amplification, in uniting under the same idea the qualities of 
 many objects. 
 
 The infinite cannot be an attenuation of the finite ; neither can 
 it be an accumulation of finite quahties ; for a great number of 
 finite things can make no more than a great number of finite 
 things; they cannot expand into a single infinite. The difficulty 
 i3 not removed by supposing that if I conceive a finite being, 
 setting aside all that limits it, I ascend thus to the notion of 
 infinity. This is to fall back into the hypothesis we have just 
 rejected ; for if we cannot produce infinity by combining together 
 an indeterminate number of finites, neither can we do so by 
 multiplying for an indeterminate number of times any given 
 thing which is finite in itself. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that I cannot conceive the idea of infinity 
 except upon the sole condition that infinity exists. 
 
 This demonstration is equally solid and simple. But, unfor- 
 tunately, it only addresses itself to those minds who are convinced 
 that the idea of infinity is inherent in their nature, and has not 
 been produced by a combination of several other ideas. Now, it 
 necessarily follows, that all those who reason from the senses 
 must agree on the first point, and that their theory consists 
 precisely in denying the second. Thus, the proof of Descartes 
 lias no value except for philosophers, who least of all require that 
 the existence of God should be proved. 
 
 After the foregoing demonstration, he laid down another much 
 more complicated, which we may sum up in the following 
 manner: — 
 
 I exist, and I possess within me the notion of a God ;'" I am, 
 therefore, not the author of my own being; for if I were, I should 
 have given myself all the perfections of which I have any idea, 
 having already assumed the most difiicult of all acquired things — 
 substance. But if I conclude that I have always been what I am 
 now, still that does not enable me to dispense with an originating 
 cause ; for the duration of defined substance is only the uninter- 
 rupted repetition of the act by which it has been produced. To 
 have recourse to my parents, or to any other cause less perfect 
 
 * Discourse upon Method, part iv. TliirJ Meditation. Principles of 
 Philosophy, part iii. sects. 20, 22. 
 
b THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 than God, explains nothing, as I must define such a cause as I 
 define myself, I cannot imagine an infinite series of successive 
 causes, for I must find not onl}^ a cause which produces, hut 
 one which preserves, — consequently, an actual, identical cause. 
 Several distinct causes, therefore, have not contributed to my 
 formation, each adding a specific perfection to the idea I enter- 
 tain of the general perfection of God ; for unity and simplicity 
 form the leading characteristics which I attribute to him. Thus, 
 by my existence and the idea of God implanted within me, the 
 existence of God can alone be proved. 
 
 We recognise in this demonstration the intellectual vigour with 
 which Descartes preserves the chain of a proposition, and the 
 exact enumeration of every point of an hypothesis. Nevertheless 
 it does not entirely satisfy the mind, and all who read it will be 
 arrested by some assertions which at least are open to contest. 
 
 Thus, for example, when Descartes says, " If I had been my 
 own creator, I should have given myself all the perfections of 
 which I can conceive the idea, because it is less difficult to have 
 given these perfections than to have given substance," this mode 
 of expression is, to say the least of it, inconsistent, since the 
 mind cannot implicitly adopt the conclusion that it is more difficult 
 to give substance than perfection. As we are unable to compre- 
 hend clearly what it is to bestow on ourselves substance, or to 
 give perfection, we can scarcely decide between these two incom- 
 prehensible difficulties, which is the most incomprehensible. 
 Descartes might have said in a more simple form, that the being 
 who exists by his own will, if such a being does exist, must of 
 necessity be perfect. The proposition thus laid down, would 
 seem to be beyond dispute. 
 
 The same result applies to the conclusion that the duration of 
 substance is merely continued creation ; whence Descartes decides 
 that, being imperfect, we not only require a cause which has made, 
 but also a cause which preserves us, and, consequently, a per- 
 petually acting cause. After all, it is most true, that having no 
 other reason to be, beyond the will of the Creator, we require no 
 other reason for continued being ; but, on the one hand, Descartes 
 has awkwardly complicated this simple idea of a theory of con- 
 tinued creation ; and, on the other, if we admit the necessity of 
 a preserving cause to continue our being, such an admission 
 includes an acknowledgment of the existence of God, and the 
 demonstration becomes superfluous. 
 
 Finally, the last assertion of Descartes, that unitv and sim- 
 
ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. < 
 
 plicity form the leading cliaracteristics which the human mind 
 attributes to perfection, will uudouhtedly he admitted hy the 
 rationalists, but warmly contested by other philosophers. Whence 
 it follows, that the greater part of the propositions, of which this 
 argument consists, possess the fault of rendering the rest of the 
 demonstration useless, if once they are admitted ; and the still 
 greater fault of being only admissible by philosophers of the 
 rationalist school. 
 
 We find again, in the " Discourse upon Method," and the 
 '' Meditations/' a third demonstration of the existence of God, 
 which is no other than the celebrated proof known under the 
 uame of The argument of Saint Ansehii, and which consists in 
 concluding directly the existence of God from the idea of God.--^ 
 This argument may be thus laid down, according to Saint Anselm, 
 Descartes, and Leibnitz : — 
 
 I have within myself the idea of God, that is to say, of a 
 perfect being, of a being endowed with all perfections.! Now, 
 existence being a perfection, I cannot without absurdity suppose 
 that a perfect being does not exist. 
 
 It requires a great effort to understand this argument in its 
 extreme brevity. We shall give in succession the formula of Saint 
 Anselm, that of Descartes, and the improved one of Leibnitz. 
 
 "It is impossible," says Saint Anselm,; "to think that God 
 does not exist; for God is, when defined, such a being that we 
 cannot conceive one superior. Now, I can conceive a being 
 whose existence it is impossible to disbelieve, and this being is 
 evidently superior to one whose non-existence I am capable of 
 imagining. Therefore, if we admit the possibility of supposing 
 that^God^'does not exist, there must be a being superior to God ; 
 that is to say, a being superior to one, than which we cannot 
 conceive a greater — which is absurd." 
 
 AVhile examining this proof in the fifth "Meditation," Descartes 
 has explained and strengthened it. " I cannot," says he, " con- 
 ceive a mountain without a valley, nor a right-angled triangle of 
 which the sum of the three angles is not equal to two right 
 
 * <' The most beautiful, tlie most exalted, the soundest aud best proof of the 
 existence of God, that which supposes the least, is the natural idea we have of 
 the infinite. For it is certain that the human mind recognises infinity though 
 it cannot comprehend [tr—3lalehranchc, Research into Truth, book iii. part u. 
 
 ^ '^^' Discourse upon Method, part iv. Fifth Meditation. Principles of 
 Philosophy, part i. 
 
 X Prosloyiuni, cap. iii. 
 
THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 angles ; in like manner, I am unable to imagine God without 
 existence, for existence is a perfection, and God is the sum of all 
 periections." " It might be objected," he continues, " that if I 
 c.mnot conceive a mountain without a valley, this does not prove 
 that there is either a mountain or a valley, but simply that one 
 cannot exist without the other; and, in like manner, if I cannot 
 conceive God without existence, because God is perfect this do-s 
 not prove that God exists, but merely that he could not be 
 perfect^ without existence. Now, this objection is specious, not 
 solid since it is existence itself, and not any other specific quality, 
 which IS mseparable from our idea of God. I am as incapable of 
 conceiving a God without existence, that is to say, a hemcr 
 supremely perfect, yet wanting a supreme perfection, a's I am free 
 to imagine a horse with or without wings."-:- Enlightened minds 
 have judged that this reasoning cannot be attacked. Leibnitz 
 endeavoured to improve it by anticipating a possible objection.f 
 According to him it is thus peremptorily demonstrated that if 
 God ispossibe,he is necessary. Everything consists in esta- 
 b isning that tlie simple definition of God implies the existence 
 ot God; above all, that it is indispensable that God should be 
 aefined, that he should be proved to be possible, or, in plainer 
 terms, that tjie idea of a perfect being should not embrace a con- 
 tnidiction. i^eibnitz, therefore, imagined lie Iiad given to the 
 argument of Saint Anselm the utmost degree of severe perspi. 
 cuity, when he expressed it under the following formula-—" The 
 benig whose essence implies existence, exists, if it is possible • 
 tiiat IS to say, if it has an essence. (This is an axiom of identity' 
 winch requires no demonstration.) 
 
 ^Ti"^^°T' ?f-^'' "" ^''^"^ ''^'^^^ ^^''^"^^ ^'^^P^ies existence. 
 Tlirough definition.) Therefore, if God is possible, he exists 
 [by the sole force of the idea we conceive of him ) "^ 
 
 Must it be confessed? This argument appears more subtle 
 
 attribute 13 00.^^^^^^^^^ 
 
 exactly that this attribute is a true component of that particuh^^'hL and 
 tuat we are convmced of its being so. It is also to sav, necessary exttence is 
 compnsec lu the nature and conception of God. Therefore, it is St to 
 cunclude that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists " ° 
 
 T .\ew L,scujs on the Human Undcrstandhuj, book iv. chap. x. 
 
 - J^'is ex cujus essentia sequitur existentia, si est possibile id est si 
 
 ''"^\ZTt"''T'''- (E«t<'^^i««^-<^-ticumdenn.nstraLnenonindiit. 
 ^ ^ Atqui Deus est ens ex cujus essentia sequitur existentia. (Est definitio 
 hr^o Deus, si est possibiiis, existit. (Per ipsius conceptus necessitatem) '' 
 
ON THE rr.OOlS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 9 
 
 than sound ; and without the respect inspired by such names as 
 those of Descartes, Bossuet, Fenelon, and Leibnitz, we should 
 venture to say that it resembles a sophism. This last word 
 naturally suggested itself to the pen of Descartes while he was 
 writing." The improvements added by Leibnitz are not very 
 encouraging. He is undoubtedly right in declaring that if by 
 some contradiction or impossibility, the idea of perfection should 
 prove to be in itself a chimera, we could not conclude from the 
 presence of such an idea in our own minds, that the object of it 
 actually existed ; but, on the other hand, it seems difficult not to 
 admit that if the presence in our own minds of the idea of per- 
 fection does not prevent us from supposing the impossibility of 
 perfection, still less does it prevent us from conceiving its non- 
 existence. The error of this argument lies in its having a reality 
 for conclusion, and an abstraction for principle. It is true that 
 we conceive God to be perfect; it is true that existence is a 
 perfection ; it is, therefore, equally true that we conceive God to 
 be existing at the same time and in the same manner that we 
 conceive him to be perfect. Now, in what manner do we con- 
 ceive God as perfect? When I say, "I conceive a perfect 
 being," that means, " I conceive that there is, or that there may 
 be, a perfect being." In like manner, when I say, " I conceive that 
 a perfect being exists," I mean to imply, " I conceive that there 
 is or may be a perfect being, and that such a being could not be 
 perfect without the condition of existence." 
 
 Descartes, who foresaw this objection, maintains that we do not 
 conceive the existence of God as simply possible, but as absolutely 
 necessary, "considering that God exists through himself alone, and 
 that that which exists by its own power must exist for ever."t This 
 conclusion may be classed with nearly all the preceding arguments. 
 It is true, but the reasoning applies to the conclusion alone ; 
 which means, that here again there is no reasoning, and Descartes 
 has only once more affirmed the philosophy of the rationalists. 
 
 * "Although in truth this does not appear at first entirely manifest, hut 
 seems to hear some semblance of sophism." — Fifth Meditation. 
 
 t "If Ave carefully enquire whether existence accords -with an omnipotent 
 being, and what sort of existence, we shall he able clearly and distinctly to 
 ascertain, in the first place, that, at least, possible existence may be one of 
 his suitable attributes ; and secondly, because we cannot thii)k that his 
 existence is possible without at the same time knovN'ing that, as his power is 
 infinite, he exists through his own will, we must therefore conclude from thence 
 that he actually does exist." See Anm-er to thejirst objections, Ansurr to the 
 second ohjections, and, above all, at the end of these A7isu'ers, The Demands 
 of Descartes. (Fifth Demand.) 
 
10 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 If now, including in a single glance all the different arguments 
 we have gone through, and disengaging them from their syllogistic 
 form, we endeavour to explain what gives them, in spite of their 
 logical weakness, a real value which the most sceptical mind is 
 compelled to bow to and acknowledge, we shall find it is the con- 
 stant presence of the following affirmation so incessantly repeated 
 under every possible form. " It is evident that the infinite exists ; 
 it is absurd to suppose its non-existence ; nothing opposes the 
 existence of the infinite; if the infinite is not, nothing is possible ; 
 while, on the contrary, everything is possible on the condition 
 that the infinite exists." This is not an argument ; it is a prin- 
 ciple, an intuitive conviction, if so it maybe called, a self-evident 
 truth. Remove this from our perception and we shall be no 
 longer capable of thought. It is precisely because this principle 
 is the foundation of thought, that it cannot be reduced to a 
 logical demonstration. To demonstrate is to rest a truth upon 
 an antecedent principle : therefore, all principles may be de- 
 monstrated -with the exception of those first principles which 
 serve for the demonstration of others. What we have to deal 
 with here, is not to introduce into our minds a belief in the 
 existence of the infinite, but simply to establish that the belief is 
 already there. The authors of the arguments we have reca- 
 pitulated have onl}^ erred upon a question of method. 
 
 If instead of having had recourse to the scholastic form, which 
 seems more in its place in the Proslogium than in the " Medita- 
 tions," Descartes had confined himself to saying that the human 
 mind in considering perfection, comprehends that it must 
 exist by the necessity of its nature, while, on the contrary, it 
 acknowledges that an imperfect being can only exist upon the 
 condition of having been produced by some extraneous cause, 
 this principle, which forms the whole point of the argument, must 
 have been received with conviction. Bossuet has adopted it in 
 his " Elevations." " Why," says he, " should imperfection exist, 
 and not perfection? Or rather, why should that be which 
 contains the elements of nonentity, and that not be which has 
 no particle of annihilation? . . . My soul, who art endowed 
 with the fticulty of reason, but whose reason is so limited, why 
 dost thou desire to endure, and how canst thou believe that God 
 does not? Alas! art thou superior to God? Weak, ignorant, 
 and misguided soul, full of doubt and error in thine intelligence, 
 overflowing with ignorance, wandering, corruption, and evil 
 desires, in thine own will, can it be that thou shouldst exist, and 
 
ox THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 11 
 
 that certainty, comprehension, the boundless knowledge of truth, 
 and the immutable law of justice and rectitude should not exist ?'•' 
 . . . Tell me, my soul, how dost thou understand nothingness, 
 except by being? How dost thou feel privation except by the 
 distinct something which is taken away ? How dost thou conceive 
 imperfection, except by the idea of the perfection from which it 
 has fallen ? . . . There must be perfection before there can be 
 a fault ; before irregularity there must be something essentially 
 regular, and which being inseparable from its own nature, can 
 neither fail nor err."t- 
 
 Spinoza reasons after the same manner : " Nothing," he says, 
 " either in God or out of God can establish any obstacle to the 
 -existence of God. There cannot be a square circle, because the 
 nature of such a figure is contradictory, and a circle cannot exist 
 without a cause, because its nature is not essentially necessary ; 
 but God, on the contrary, cannot be without existence, because 
 he is self-sufficient, and there is nothing in his nature which can 
 render him impossible. ".; 
 
 In speaking thus, Bossuet and Spinoza merely repeat the 
 argument of Descartes, of which they neglect, or, as we may 
 almost venture to say, of which they disdain the form. 
 
 Descartes, whose genius was essentially metaphysical, has 
 intentionally omitted the demonstration drawn from the visihle 
 universe, and from the necessity of a perfect cause which explains 
 its existence and harmony. 
 
 '' First Week, first Elevation. + Second Week, second Elevation. 
 
 Z "We oxiglit to be able to assign a cause or reason for everything, to ex- 
 l^lain why it does or does not exist. For instance, if there is a triangle, there 
 must be a reason or cause why it is there. If the triangle does not exist, still 
 it is necessary to show a reason or cause which either opposes or destroys its 
 existence. Now this cause or reason must be found either in or out of the 
 nature of any given thing. For instance, the reason why there cannot be a 
 square circle is comprised in the very nature of the thing, which implies^ con- 
 tradiction. ... On the other hand, the reason why there should be either a 
 triangle or a circle does not lie in the nature of these figures, but in the order of 
 bodily nature taken entirely ; for it must result from this order, either that 
 the triangle already existed of necessity, or that it is impossible that it should 
 continue to exist. These principles are self-evident, and from these we con- 
 clude, that a given thing necessarily exists when there is no cause or reason 
 which prevents its existence. But we cannot find, out of the divine nature, 
 any cause or reason which prevents its existence, and it is therefore absurd to 
 imagine a contradiction in a being absolutely infinite and endowed with 
 sovereign perfection. Let us conclude, therefore, that neither in God nor out 
 of God is there any cause or reason which destroys his existence, and con- 
 sequently that God necessarily exists."— /S'?r/«o~«'s L'thics, part i., second pro- 
 position. Translation of M. Eniile Saisset, vol. i. pp. 13 and 14. 
 
10 
 
 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 Jiilo tluee distinct clemonstratious. 
 
 Fii-st — It establishes that the matter of the world requires a 
 cause; for how could it subsist of itself, seeing that it is the 
 most imperfect, and in some respects the least real of all 
 ex,sences? Therefore, the existence of matter proves the 
 existence of a Creator. 1 ^^e^ me 
 
 Secondly,— It proves that matter left to itself is inert It 
 undergoes, receives, and transmits motion, but cannot produce it 
 llierefore, everytlnng i„ matter that has power and organisation 
 comes from an exterior cause ; consequently there must be an 
 origmatmg mover of matter. "c mu.t be an 
 
 of mnl^on'~'VV•'"™'^-' "' '''■^™ f™™ the universal harmonv 
 of motion and bemg. Ivot only is it impossible for matter t"o 
 exist or move of itself, but its movements, if they were, as has 
 been supposed, the consequences of a blind necessity, would be 
 capricious and disorderly, instead of being replete /i h beautv 
 ..•oportiou, and regulated force. There must, tfierefore, be Tct 
 trolling intelligence which has conceived and carried into 
 execution the plan of the universe. There is a Providence 
 strl on ?i!!'!l°''';^ *•'''''":''' '^ preferred, this single demon- 
 
 s, b ct n e '. T"^' ''/''' ™"'' P''P"'=^^ ^■■S""^"' 0" ">^ 
 ■.emitted. It embraces all the resources of oratorical art, and 
 addresses itself, perhaps, quite as powerfully to the imaciuation 
 and feelings, as to the reasoning faculties, "it has the medt o 
 ZlZT^^r^V'' ^^P-'^'b-.iu the study of phenomena, 
 
 the different formulae of a single and undivided principle 
 
 But tlie misfortune of this argument is, that if it proves invin- 
 
 ecesst ZTf] 'T'"- 1 ''°" '"" ^^'^^'' '' «» "-' - 
 ece^saij. The God who has made the world is unquestiouablv 
 
 powerful and intelligent, but does he possess infinL of power 
 
 and intelligence ? Between a God simply capable of mal i,f. 1 
 
 world, and a perfect God, there is still an infinite abvss We 
 
 burwr'r T', 'T' "T"''' *""' P"*^''''"^ "> vast'numbei' 
 but we find also abundance of disorder. The induction which 
 0^ eludes the perfect on of the Creator from the greatness of hi 
 
 the woild. One point alone of the argument could give us a 
 glimpse of the divine perfection-that which touclfes i^on 
 
ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 13 
 
 creation. But the world is a bad road through which to arrive 
 at creation, for creation has no analogue. 
 
 This proof, or one exactly similar, has been elaborately dis- 
 cussed by Samuel Clarke, in his *' Treatise on the Existence of 
 God," which excited the somewhat excessive admiration of 
 Voltaire. Clarke handles the same materials, and writes with 
 the abrupt inelegance of Spinoza, but without his genius. He 
 arranges an interminable series of axioms and syllogisms, some- 
 times to prove that the world is contingent ; at others, to establish 
 that it exists necessarily as an infinite and eternal essence. The 
 whole winds up with a conclusion that perfection cannot be pro- 
 duced by a combination of all imperfections ; so that, by a diffe- 
 rent path, Clarke falls into the error of Descartes, and merely 
 repeats over and over again, under a syllogistic form, the funda- 
 mental proposition of the rationalist schools. 
 
 We merely mention, for the sake of record, another argument 
 peculiarly belonging to Samuel Clarke, and which Leibnitz has 
 considered worthy of a reputation. This is it ; " Infinite time 
 and infinite space are not substances ; they are therefore attri- 
 butes ; consequently there must exist an infinite cause and 
 subject to which infinite time and space belong." -''- 
 
 This conclusion is not only denied by the sensualists, but by 
 the rationalists, who equally agree in rejecting these two chimeras 
 of time and space, which Clarke endeavours to establish ps the 
 attributes of God. 
 
 Finally, a very beautiful and simple proof of the existence of 
 God (beautiful on account of its simplicity), has been drawn from 
 the existence of axioms, or self-evident truths. The reasoning 
 may be thus conveyed : Since there are certain self-evident and 
 eternal truths, and that the distinctive mark and object of any 
 truth is to be understood, it follows that there must be an eternal 
 intelligence, by which these truths are eternally comprehended. 
 Consequently, God exists, f 
 
 * The origin of this demonstration of Chirke is to be found in the cele- 
 brated phrase of Newton : ' ' Durat semper, adest ubique, et existendo semper 
 et ubique, durationem et spatium, teternitatem et infinitatem constituit." — 
 Grod endures for ever and is present everywhere ; by this continued being and 
 omnipresence he constitutes time and space, eternity and infinity. — Phllosophun 
 Naturalis Principia Mathemafica, lib. iii. schoL gen. 
 
 t "All these truths, and all others that I deduce from them by a sure 
 process of reasoning, subsist independently of time. If I inquire now, where 
 and in what object they exist, eternal and immutable as they are, I am com- 
 pelled to admit a being iu which truth is eternally subsisting, and by whom it 
 
14 - THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 AVe shall not inquire ^Y]]ethe^ it is possible to suppose an 
 indefinite series of finite intelligences, bj means of Nvhich, axioms 
 could be understood throughout interminable ages. The argu- 
 ment which concludes from the existence of eternal ideas, the 
 existence of an eternal intelligence, and consequently of an eternal 
 being, seems perfectly solid and convincing for all who, with us, 
 admit the necessity and eternit}^ of axioms. As a general ques- 
 tion, it appears extremely easy to demonstrate the existence of 
 God to the rationalists, because they cannot set him aside for a 
 single moment ; or rather, it is unnecessary to enter into the 
 demonstration with them, for his existence is implicitly contained 
 in all their doctrines. The rationalists never go beyond the 
 major of these propositions, because that suffices to convince 
 them ; and the other philosophers stop there equally, because 
 they reject it. 
 
 Such are the formal proofs of the existence of God, which are 
 of sufficient importance to be pointed out, and which, under 
 various forms, fill the treatises of philosophy wherein it has 
 been endeavoured to reduce to the authority of a syllogism this 
 fundamental truth, without which nothing can be true. Fenelon 
 has summed them all up with much force and eloquence, in his 
 Essay on the Existence of God. Thus collected together, in a 
 hody of doctrine, they impress the mind as something serious 
 and weighty. We readily discover certain objections ; we hesitate 
 a little on particular details; but we comprehend, on the whole, 
 that any thesis contrary to that of the author must be inad- 
 missible. The priest and preacher are visible behind the philo- 
 sopher. Fenelon is one of the first writers in our language, who 
 possesses the rare gift of passing from a familiar simplicity of 
 style to the most florid oratory, and from the scholastic severity 
 of logic to the most touching effiisions of tenderness. His. 
 book, which is exclusively a reflection of his heart, is a grand and 
 beautiful work, where ignorance may find method and perspicuity, 
 and whence the whole world, learned and unlettered, may extract 
 noble emotions. Such a lecture, considered with attention, is 
 equivalent to a prayer. Our conclusion may be easily foreseen. 
 Fenelon will be read with delight ; but we shall derive from his 
 volume edification rather than incentives to faith. 
 
 is eternally understood : and this being must he truth itself, and eutirel}'" 
 composed of truth." — Bossuet, On the Knowledge of God and Ourselves, 
 chap. iv. sect. 5. 
 
ON THE PEOOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 15 
 
 We admire in Descartes, in Leibnitz, and, in a lesser degree, 
 in Clarke, a strong and solid train of thought ; hut their proofs 
 are insufficient for unbelievers, as they all rest on the impossibility 
 under which we find ourselves of conceiving the idea of God, 
 without an inspiration from God; an impossibility, which the 
 rationalists alone confess : " and for the rationalists they are 
 useless, because if the idea of God is in us, as they believe, 
 without our having formed it ourselves, it is clear, before all 
 demonstration, that God exists. 
 
 We incline to think, that instead of adopting any particular 
 formula, which must be ever open to discussion ; and which, 
 argued as it may, will never appear a sufficient base for such an 
 important point of faith, it would be wiser to " approach philo- 
 sophy with this salutary reflection, that we are entering into the 
 temple of truth, which only manifests itself to sincere inquirers ; " 
 and to examine successively every section of which science is , 
 composed, without dwelling too much on first results, and without 
 expecting to arrive, all at once, at the solution of the most im- 
 portant and intricate problems. When w^e seek God thus, we 
 may be sure to find traces of him at every step. We compre- 
 hend, from the outset, that he exists, without forming a distinct 
 conception of his attributes : but, in proportion as during the 
 gradual development of science, we find him always as a neces- 
 sary conclusion to every new theory, we gather from this study 
 unexpected light upon the nature of him who is the cause of all 
 substance and all law. We accustom ourselves to contemplate 
 God while first studying him in his works ; like children, who 
 being unable to look on the sun, seek for its reflection in a 
 stream. 
 
 Do you desire to know if there is a God ? Study the world ; 
 or, if the world is too extended, study man. Every thing 
 within us bears testimony to the existence and omnipotence of 
 the Deity. 
 
 Human form is single in principle, but triple in its mani- 
 festations. To live, is to think, to feel, and to desire. 
 
 What is to feel? Is it merely to experience sensations of 
 pleasure and of pain ? We have here but the first indications 
 of sensibility. To these ephemeral phenomena something is 
 
 * Descartes was well aware that he reasoned exclusively for the rationalists. 
 " I have several times protested," he says, "that I decline argviing with those 
 who appeal to the imagination and not to the understanding." — Ansiver to the 
 Five Objections. 
 
16 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 attached more grand and enduring — our affections. In ^vhat do 
 they originate? Does the external world bring them, or do they 
 spring from the heart, as from a burning centre, to expand them- 
 selves upon all that surrounds us ? If love came from without, 
 why is not the same cause equally attractive to every one ? 
 Whence could proceed the varieties of feeling between cold and 
 impassioned temperaments ? How could we then comprehend 
 so many lofty sentiments excited by unworthy objects ? Or that 
 magic of affection which creates in the subject of its worship the 
 beauties it admires ? Or those souls born for love, who, finding 
 nothing on which to concentrate an exclusive attachment, perish 
 of an unknown disease, victims of their own richness and of the 
 poverty of the world ? The same hand which, in the seed of a 
 plant, has disposed the mysterious power which draws the roots 
 towards the earth, and elevates the stem above the soil, to expand 
 itself in fruits and flowers, has fixed in the depths of the human 
 heart a love of eternal beauty, which inclines us to all that is 
 good and perfect, by a secret and controlling analogy. What is 
 this sentiment, this innate perception of the beautiful and the 
 good, without which we should be incapable of love '? What is 
 this beauty towards which the entire heart springs, and which we 
 adore, by reflection, in the glorious creatures in whom it is 
 manifested ? Is it not infinite, eternal, and perfect beauty ? 
 And this boundless love, is it not one of the ties that connect us 
 with God ? 
 
 The faculty of intelligence soars, perhaps, even above that of 
 feeling. To think, with ordinary minds, is to distinguish the 
 form, the size, and the weight of bodies ; to calculate the degree 
 of muscular force required to displace a mass ; to foresee that a 
 necessity will arise at a particular part of the globe for con- 
 veying thither, at a precise moment, the merchandise which has 
 been called for ; to buy and sell with relative convenience ; to 
 balance expense and profit; in a word, to concentrate human 
 understanding upon this one point — the preservation and nourisli- 
 ment of the body. We have no occasion to go further or 
 ascend higher ; for even to accomplish such a restricted end, 
 how great is the mechanism of human understanding ? Must it 
 not conceive laws and necessary affinities between different 
 things ? Does it discover those nffinities in the things them- 
 selves, the inevitable in the contingent, the right in the act, the 
 law in that whicli submits to the law? If it be true that the 
 visible world does not contain the law, here is in itself the first 
 
ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 17 
 
 intuition of the invisible world. But let us approach the latter 
 by another road. Let us examine the objects which surround us, 
 this narrow horizon, by which we are compressed. We only 
 touch what is close to us, or literally within reach ; we only see 
 distinctly for a few paces: at a given distance everything dis- 
 appears and escapes. Let us fly from this prison, since we can 
 remove ourselves, painfully and slowly, by natural means, but with 
 extreme rapidity by the aid of mechanism. To enjoy expansion, 
 let us travel one thousand or two thousand leagues, or make a 
 tour of the globe. We shall thus introduce into our minds the 
 idea of extended spaces, which we can only look upon in sue 
 cession, but which we are able to conceive by a single notion. 
 In fact, we do not even require movement to comprehend space; 
 imagination suffices; and, by its aid, we can figure to ourselves, as 
 in a dream, the dimensions of the entire world. But the world 
 comprises little, although it would take a man's life to visit it all: 
 we know that it is merely an atom in the immensity of the 
 universe. Let us travel in thought from star to star; let us 
 figure to ourselves those vast bodies, more extensive than the 
 earth, separated by boundless intervals, and more numerous than 
 the sands of the sea. When we have accumulated together all 
 these wonderfal and multiplied existences; and when, to describe 
 them, we have exhausted the resources of langUMge, and the 
 powers of calculation, we still feel within us a propelling force 
 which urges us onward, beyond the real, the possible, and the 
 imaginary. W^hat must we conclude from this ? That we cannot 
 conceive a space which is not contained within another. And 
 whence arises this impossibility? Is it the limited extent we are 
 capable of conceiving which impresses it on our minds? Is it 
 this bounded atom which brings with itself immensity ? Is 
 there not in the idea something originating in ourselves, which, 
 instead of resulting from the senses, is directly opposed to them ? 
 If we quit space for durability, we find at the end of our double 
 analysis an identical conclusion. If from time and space we pass 
 to motion, or multiplication, we still recognise the same progress 
 towards the infinite, the same necessity of conceiving something 
 which goes beyond what we can derive from the senses and the 
 power of imagination. We call this indescribable something by 
 different names, according to the path by which we have been led 
 towards it — immensity, if we were following space ; eternity, if we 
 were on the track of time ; immutability, if we were pursuing 
 .motion; and unity, if we recurred to multiplication. But this 
 
 
 
18 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 immensity, eternity, or immutability, is merely one identical idea 
 under various names— the idea of the infinite. If we examine 
 this idea in itself, and demand what it includes, we shall find it 
 always necessary, entire, and indivisible, while the world is ever 
 contingent, changing, moveable, and shut up on every side within 
 narrow limits. We are forced to acknowledge the perpetual 
 opposition of these two ideas. We are compelled to conclude 
 that we have within us an idea which neither the world, nor 
 the faculties with which we analyse it, can explain, and that 
 this idea is the idea of infinity, which the Infinite can alone 
 produce.'"' 
 
 Human liberty studied in its true depth, carries us directly to 
 a conception of the infinite, AVhat is liberty? The power of 
 making or of not making. By this endowment, instead of being 
 subjugated, like the rest of creation, we become masters, and are 
 responsible for our own destinies : a mighty privilege, which 
 gives us the present, and assures us of the future. But can this 
 liberty subsist without rule ? Liberty without restraint would 
 fail to elevate, but must degrade the possessor. If we were alone 
 in the world, without law, we should be vain and futile beings, 
 indifferent to the order and system of the universe. Liberty is 
 not bestowed to raise us above the law, but that we may obey the 
 law in full knowledge of the cause. In this consists the power 
 of human freedom and the strength we derive from it. Given 
 up to itself, it would destroy us ; subjected to an immutable law, 
 it becomes the instrument and distinctive mark of our superiority. 
 What is this law ? Whence does it proceed ? From the world, 
 which has no liberty, and is in itself changeable, and controlled 
 by necessary regulations? No — the law of moral government 
 comes neither from man, nor society, nor the world. It existed 
 before man and will endure after him. Man may outrage but 
 cannot abrogate it. Human society may forget, deny, despise 
 this law; if the present world were destroyed, the next creation 
 would still obey it. Liberty is changeable, but justice is absolute. 
 Our sentiments, our actions, our thoughts are transitory, but 
 beauty, goodness, and truth are eternal. 
 
 Thus, psychology, logic, and morals combine in producing a con- 
 viction of infinity. They tend towards it incessantly by every 
 analysis and by all theories. They assist each other in this 
 
 * " Insinuavit nobis Christus animain hniuanam et inentem ratioualem non 
 vegetari, non beatificari, non illuminari, nisi ab ipsa substantia Dei." — D. 
 Aiogu^tinus, In Joann. tract. 23. 
 
ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 19 
 
 common work, which produces their unity hy a unity of object 
 and end. We may almost define philosophy in all its branches, 
 a method of arriving at the infinite by the study of the finite. 
 
 All philosophy is full of God, and all the sciences are full of 
 philosophy. Are you studying mathematics ? What is size ? 
 Eeflect a little deeply on this question ; size will lead you by con- 
 trast to the idea of simple, single substance. Everything in the 
 world is commensurable; but measure is nothing. You must 
 seek the being, the reality, the truth, and consequently the cause, 
 in that which cannot be measured — in the immoveable. Are you 
 engaged in writing history ? Why are certain nations alternately 
 raised and subdued, and wherefore are these revolutions and 
 catastrophes ? Do we find in any given series of events, merely 
 an empty spectacle, or the progressive realisation of a thought ? 
 Perhaps you are deeply immersed in jurisprudence. Law, on the 
 surface, appears nothing more than a compilation proceeding 
 from human will ; but pause a little before you adopt this con- 
 clusion ; behind these forms of man's invention, strange and 
 ephemeral as they often are, you will perceive the image of a 
 necessary and inevitable law. You will see and feel that if tlie 
 written law is subject to change, there exists beyond it an immuta- 
 ble, independent, and eternal law, constituting at the same time the 
 condition and sanction of human liberty. Are you a physician ? 
 Search for the first voluntary movement in your body, and tell us 
 whence it comes. It is in vain that you are encompassed by 
 matter: your bones, your fibres, your anatomical texture are 
 inert : they are subject, in common with all bodies, to physical 
 laws, and equally so, with all living bodies, to physiological con- 
 ditions. Where then is the spring which gives them spontaneous 
 motion ? It escapes from all your efforts and instruments ; yet, 
 nevertheless, there it is in positive existence, the impenetrable 
 mystery of life, the final secret which laughs at science, the initial 
 force which attests the presence of creative Deity. Physician, 
 when you study the law of motion,— chemists, while you are 
 decomposing bodies, explain to us, if you can, what are causes, 
 movement, extension, and particles — the primary and irreducible 
 qualities of matter. You hesitate between a dynamical and a 
 mechanical theory ; but whether it be force or law, whence comes 
 the originating impulse ? from what does the first regulated plan 
 emanate ? The study of nature throughout every department of 
 her extended kingdom brings us back to God by the infinitely 
 little and the infinitely great. He stands forth as a cause at the 
 
20 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 beginning of all, and as a foundation of universal harmony at the 
 end of all. Human life itself, with its joys and sorrows, is one 
 prolonged demonstration of the existence of God. We recognise 
 him at every instant in our thoughts and feelings. What wo 
 comprehend of ourselves teaches us to know him, and "what we 
 cannot understand still enhances that knowledge. 
 
 We have thus given a brief indication of the manner in wdiicli 
 philosophical enquiry should be conducted, so that collective science 
 may concur in rendering irrefragable the dogma of the divine 
 being. Assuredly, there is here no new demonstration ; who 
 could dream of producing a new demonstration of the existence 
 of God ? Still less is there any attempt at a new form of demon- 
 stration : on the contrary, we have gone back to the most ancient, 
 the simplest, the most familiar, and (for that reason) the best of 
 all forms — meditation in place of reasoning. A syllogism is 
 good as a summary, or in an argument, when it becomes neces- 
 sary to cut short an opponent ; but let us not undertake to prove 
 the existence of God by such a rapid process. Let us take 
 time to think over and penetrate his nature ; and for this express 
 purpose, let us select the most circuitous roads. After all, we 
 cannot conclude that he exists from any one specific evidence, but 
 we perceive him in the evidence of all things. We have only to 
 learn how to look about us. Well regulated reflection will give 
 us so much light, that the presence of God will shine forth in all 
 our actions, thoughts, and sentiments. 
 
 AVe must, therefore, take up knowledge at its source, and from 
 the first word, without intermission, in every principle, and in every 
 observation, we must show the infinite as he develops himself ; 
 sometimes in producing the love of that love with which he has 
 inspired us; at others, in supplying a rule for our judgments, 
 an ideal for our thoughts, and a star for our desires. God is the 
 corner-stone which cannot be shaken without overthrowing the 
 entire building, and of which, by a necessary consequence, the 
 firmness of the edifice establishes and proves the immutable and 
 eternal solidity. Let us not complain that we have to travel on 
 a lengthened path, for we shall not lose our time, even though it 
 should be necessary to consume life in the journey. This is our 
 appointed course ; the rest is merely an episode. Happy is he who 
 believes in God, through natural grace, without so many subtle 
 disquisitions, and who only seeks in science a confirmation of his 
 faith! But for the sceptic, it will not suffice to refer him to 
 two or three syllogisms. 
 
ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 21 
 
 It is related of Diderot, that bearing, on a particular occasion, 
 the ordinary scholastic proofs of the existence of God expounded, 
 he became a sudden believer ; and, in the warmth of his enthu- 
 siasm, ran to seek a philosopher, one of his intimate friends, that 
 he might induce him to participate in his own recent conversion. 
 He met him in a printing-office; opened the subject, detailed his 
 arguments with the intemperate fervour by which he w'as ever 
 characterised, but encountered a mind utterly closed against 
 conviction. Diderot persevered, appealed to the heart of liis 
 listener, and urged him with the most impassioned expostula- 
 tions ; he considered his friend lost by his atheism, depicted his 
 miserable condition in glowing colours, and implored him with 
 tears to become a convert. The other remained unshaken, 
 replied to all the arguments, refuted and turned them into 
 ridicule, restored the equanimity of the zealot, and concluded by 
 extinguishing his fire and new-born faith. The apostleship of 
 Diderot lasted only for an hour. His belief was destro3'ed as 
 rapidly as it had been conceived, and he came out of the enquiry 
 a more obstinate unbeliever than ever. If this anecdote be true, 
 it does not prove that the demonstrations of the schools are bad 
 in themselves, but it teaches us not to attach much value to such 
 sudden revolutions of opinion, and to judge how little can be 
 expected from an isolated faith which has only a few logical 
 arguments to oppose to the obscurities and deficiencies of thought, 
 the thousand objections of the incredulous, the difficulties of life, 
 and the fears of deatli. He alone has a true faith who accustoms 
 himself to live with God in heart and meditation, to find him at 
 the end of all his researches, to include him in all his hopes. Let 
 us accept no demonstration of the eternal existence of a supreme 
 being, except one so overpowering, and so completely interwoven 
 with our convictions, that it cannot disappear from the mind 
 without leaving behind it solitude and despair. 
 
22 THE NATUEE OF GOD. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ON THE INCOMPEEHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 
 
 "It belongs to the nature of the infinite, that I who am limited, cannot 
 comprehend it." — Descartes, Fifth Meditation. 
 
 **It is contradictory to suppose that lean comprehend a given thing, and 
 that what I can thus comprehend should he infinite ; for to have a correct idea 
 of infinity implies that it cannot be understood, and the more so, since incom- 
 prehensibility is included in the explicit definition of infinity." — Descartes, 
 Answer to the Five Objections. On the Third Meditation, sect. 3. 
 
 ' ' The intellectual world, without excepting geometry, is full of truths, at 
 the same time incomprehensible and indisputable ; because the reason which 
 shows that they exist, cannot actually touch them, as we may say, across the 
 boundaries within which they are restrained, although it perceives that they 
 are there. Such is the dogma of the existence of Grod." — /. /. Rousseau, 
 Letter to D''Alcmhert on the article Geneva. 
 
 The first requirement of thought after having satisfied itself 
 that God exists, is to demand what are his attributes ? 
 
 God is the cause of the world ; he is, therefore, an eternal and 
 necessary being. He has produced the world ; he has therefore 
 known and willed it, and comprises within himself, enlightened 
 will. As his own substance contains the reason of his existence, 
 his understanding depends on no other being, and his will can 
 neither be impeded nor limited in its exercise. From the same 
 cause, the power directed by this will is absolute. This power 
 leads to creation ; the reason or intelligence, to truth ; and the 
 will, to good.- 
 
 God is infinite in his being, in his understanding, in his 
 goodness, in his power ; for if he were not infinitely infinite, or, 
 in other words, perfect, he would cease to be necessary, and con- 
 sequently could not exist at all. Further, there is but one God, 
 for a single God being necessary, a single one only is possible. 
 Finally, God possesses perfect happiness, for he has in himself 
 his own cause and intent. To these attributes which our reason 
 can discover, we join others in unlimited number, which having 
 
 * Leibnitz, Essays on the Goodness of God, part i. sect. 7. 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. S3 
 
 not even a remote analogy to \Yhat we are able to comprehend, 
 remain, of necessity, beyond the reach of our thoughts. When 
 we consider God in his relations with the world, we call him the 
 Creator ; by which we mean that his will suffices to explain the 
 existence of the matter and phenomena of which the world is 
 composed ; we speak of him as the King, implyhig that he disposes 
 all things for the best with unlimited power ; and we denominate 
 him the Father, for being all sufficient in himself, he can only 
 be influenced by love in producing and governing the creatures 
 he has made." 
 
 There have been in all ages, and especially in our own time, 
 philosophers who believe that they advance science by concealing 
 its limits ; and who after having demonstrated God with the 
 certainty of a proposition in geometry, undertake to enumerate 
 and describe his attributes, as if man were capable of possessing 
 a clear and complete knowledge of the divine nature. 
 
 Oar individual philosophy is less ambitious. Humiliated by 
 the magnitude of what we cannot discover, rather than intoxicated 
 by the little of which we are permitted to acquire an imperfect 
 glimpse, the first word we utter in speaking of God is that of 
 incomprehensibility. 
 
 This word is offensive to human pride, and, if it m.ust be con- 
 fessed, equally so to philosophical pride. It is readily accorded 
 that any particular religion may speak of the incomprehensibility 
 of God, and the whole world knows that the Catholic faith 
 proclaims a deity both hidden and incomprehensible ; yet it 
 seems that the direct aim of philosophy is to explain all mys- 
 teries, to render all our ideas distinct and defined, to carry into 
 all things the light of reason, and to accustom the mind to 
 believe nothing that it cannot prove and thoroughly understand. 
 Tt might be said that the well-known dictum of Bayle, " Com- 
 prehension is the measure of faith," has become the adopted 
 motto of philosophy. To believe without proof, or to believe 
 Avithout comprehending, appears merely to express, under two 
 different forms, the abdication of reason. 
 
 Such common-place conclusions break down under examina- 
 tion. The very essence of philosophy undoubtedly consists in 
 
 * 'AyaOhs rjV, ayaOui Se ovheXs Trtpl oCSevb? ouZ^-nore iyyiyverai ^Oouos. 
 TovTou 5' (KThs &v, rrduTa oriixdXKTra i^ovXriOt] yevcaQai irapairK'ncna avra. 
 " He was good, and he who is good, has no particle of envy. Free from envy, 
 he has willed that all things should as closely as possible resemble himself. 
 Plato, Timteus (translated by V. Cousin), t. xii. p. 119. 
 
24 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 believing nothing without proof; but wlien once the existence of 
 a being is proved, are we to renounce our belief in that existence 
 under the pretext that the nature of the being is incomprehen- 
 sible to us ? If after having demonstrated that God exists, we 
 could arrive at a thorough comprehension of his nature, we 
 should then say, not only that we know that God is, but that 
 we know what he is. If, on the contrary, after having de- 
 monstrated, we find that we cannot comprehend him, we ought 
 equally to say that we know he exists, but that we are ignorant 
 of his nature." 
 
 These data are so simple and natural, that while we reflect 
 on them we feel a difficulty in explaining to ourselves the 
 pretensions to omniscience assumed by certain schools.f We 
 agree with Locke and Leibnitz, that to estimate what God can 
 do by what we are able to comprehend, is either to give an 
 unlimited extent to human understanding, or to limit the 
 attributes of Divine power. | 
 
 It is necessary, moreover, to render very distinct what is 
 intetided to be conveyed by the words, " divine incomprehen- 
 sibility." We do not mean to say, that there is anything in the 
 nature of God contrary to reason; neither is it implied that 
 there is absolutely nothing in the divine essence which reason 
 cannot understand. § " I can touch a mountain," says Descartes, 
 " although I am unable to embrace it." God is not contrary, but 
 superior, to reason. He is incomprehensible, but not entirely 
 inaccessible to human understanding. 
 
 Tg comprehend that anything is contrary to reason, and at 
 the same time to admit its existence, is to renounce both reason 
 and philosophy ; to comprehend that anything is above reason, 
 is only to acknowledge that there are limits to reason and pliilo- 
 sophy.jl If we were to say that God is entirely inaccessible to 
 reason, or, in other words, that we know nothing of him whatever, 
 
 * *'We can readily understand the existence of any given thing, without 
 understanding its nature."— P««co7, Tkouyhts, edit. Ha vet. p. 145. 
 
 t "It seems strange that they should have desired to understand the 
 principles of all things, and thence to arrive at universal knowledge by a 
 presumption as infinite as their object."— PasmZ, Thoucjkts, edit. Ha vet. p. 8. 
 
 X Leibnitz, Neio Essai/s, book. iv. chap. x. 
 
 § "When God is pronounced an incomprehensible being, this applies to a 
 full and entire conception of his nature, which embraces and includes all that 
 is in him ; and to that indifferent and imperfect conception which is in us, but 
 Avhich, nevertheless, suffices to satisfy us that he exists."— Descartes, Ansiccr 
 to the Second Objections. 
 
 II Leibniiz, New Essays on the Human Understanding, book iv. chap. x. 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 25 
 
 beyond that lie exists, we sliould render all our reasonings useless 
 by making them end in a term which expresses nothing to 
 satisfy the thought ; but we can recognise certain attributes and 
 acts of God, without therefore assuming the right to assert that 
 we comprehend his nature. The Catholic creed, which admits 
 the incomprehensibility of God, declares at the same time that 
 lie is infinitely good, infinitely intelligent, and infinitely 
 powerful ; that he has created and governs the world ; and yet 
 no one has ever charged this against the Catholic creed as a 
 contradiction."'' Let us dwell a little on this point, so strongly 
 contested and so imperfectly understood. 
 
 Can human intelligence explain all things ? 
 
 It is manifest that it cannot. In principle, the mind of man 
 is limited; consequently its perceptions are also limited. We 
 see around us, on every side, realities which we are unable to 
 explain. We may quote them by hundreds, as they are ready at 
 hand, equally incomprehensible and familiar. 
 
 Can the human mind admit facts to be true which are incom- 
 prehensible ? It both can and must. If we see a given thing, 
 we are compelled to believe in its existence, whether we may be 
 able to explain it or not. It is the same with anything that we 
 prove without seeing it : for from the moment that it is proved 
 by clear and convincing reasons, we are no longer capable of 
 denying the force of these reasons. Nothing is more common 
 than the necessity of admitting a fact, while we renounce the 
 attempt to account for it. 
 
 Some affect to confound the incomprehensible and the contra- 
 dictory. The distinction is, however, topical, and leaves no room 
 for scepticism. We may not penetrate the possibility of the 
 incomprehensible, but we clearly comprehend the impossibility of 
 a contradiction. When it is demonstrated to us that an opinion 
 we have delivered is inexplicable, we reply, that it is because 
 reason is limited : when we have proved to our opponents that an 
 opinion adopted by them is contradictory, we have a right to say, 
 the opinion is false. 
 
 That which God has given us for our internal guide, is in truth 
 a portion of reason ; therefore, whatever reason denies or affirms, 
 
 * "We love God because we kuow him ; but we adore him, because he is 
 above our comprehension." — Gregory of Nazianzen, Discourse xxxvii. No. ii. 
 torn. i. p. 61G. "Qtt. Can we thoroughly know God ? Ans. No, he is incom- 
 prehensible in his nature, iu his perfection, in his designs, and in his works." 
 — Bossuet, Catcchisrii of Meaux. 
 
26 
 
 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 is well denied or affirmed. But lie lias not gifted us with con- 
 summate reason ; consequently there are things above our com- 
 prehension, and which divine intelligence alone can fathom.-- 
 
 Here is a first proposition : Paul left Paris at mid-day, and 
 arrived at Versailles five minutes later. I am unable to com- 
 prehend the possibility of such speed. Now, here is a second 
 proposition : Paul left Paris at mid- day, and arrived at Versailles 
 five minutes earlier. I at once understand and affirm the 
 impossibility of such a miracle. Human science is entirely 
 grounded on these subtle distinctions. At every instant we 
 exclaim with humility, " I do not comprehend," and with 
 assurance, '* That is impossible ! " 
 
 Is God the only being whose existence we affirm, ajtid whose 
 nature we are unable to comprehend ? Has it never happened, 
 for example, in the physical sciences, that a phenomenon has 
 been established long before the explanation is discovered ? Are 
 there not at this very moment universally admitted phenomena, 
 which no one has yet accounted for, and which appear likely to 
 remain for ever inexplicable? If then, in nature itself, which 
 means in what is necessarily limited and imperfect, we recognise 
 the existence of positive mysteries above the power of human 
 reason to solve, by what aberration can we suppose that absolute 
 perfection has not depths beyond the reach of human thought ? f 
 
 What is to comprehend ? We do not thoroughly weigh the 
 value of this word — it says much. I am almost the master of 
 what I comprehend ; I penetrate its hidden meaning. Anything 
 that I understand is no longer obscure. I can describe and 
 explain it; it is, at least, brought down to the level of my 
 faculties. 
 
 To comprehend an argument, is to seize the connecting link 
 which unites its different portions into one. But what is to 
 comprehend a being ? 
 
 Let us consider a watch : every one knows that a watch is a 
 machine intended to produce a regular movement. To know 
 this is merely to know^ that there are watches : but to understand 
 what watches are, we must follow the motion from the hand to 
 
 * Leihnitz, Discourse on the Oonform'dy of Reason and Faith. 
 
 + "lucomprehensibility does not prevent us from believing natural truths ; 
 for instance, we do not comprehend the nature of odours and tastes, never- 
 theless we are convinced by a species of faith, that these perceptible qualities 
 are inherent in the nature of things ; and that they are not illusions." — 
 Leihnitz, Discourse on the Conformity of Iteason and Faith, sect. 41. 
 
THE INCOMPrvEHENSIBILlTZ OF GOD. 27 
 
 the spring, we must investigate the action of all the wheels, and 
 we must convince ourselves that the multiplied movements 
 proceed from a single originating movement, as conclusions arise 
 out of their principles. 
 
 But do we comprehend this first movement which causes all 
 the others ? Do we also understand the transmission of move- 
 ment from one hody to another ? Without going so far, do we 
 comprehend the movement itself? I know that it is there ; I 
 am familiar with its operation, which excites no astonishment in 
 my mind; I am not accustomed to ask myself in what it consists. 
 Ail this is true, and it is equally so, that after having described 
 this movement (which is almost always easily done), I am unable 
 to explain, and still more unable to comprehend it. 
 
 With a certain class of men, to explain is precisely the same as 
 to describe ; with others, more instructed, it is to generalise ; 
 with another section, still more intelligent, it is to connect the 
 effect with the cause. But this does not amount to compre- 
 hending, and no one will ever comprehend why a particular cause 
 produces a particular effect. It is much to know that it does 
 produce the effect. 
 
 We may, if we are so disposed, contemplate the spectacle of 
 human ignorance in human science.- A physician who sees the 
 fall of substances, will with reason believe himself much better 
 informed than the ignorant multitude, because he is aware of the 
 affinity or connection between the swiftness of movement and the 
 mass that moves. What is this affinity ? A generalisation, and con- 
 sequently a fact, but not an explanation. To explain the fall of a 
 body, after having measured and described it, we must have recourse 
 to the hypothesis of gravitation and attraction. The discovery 
 of this hypothesis is an instance of genius, but after all» 
 attraction is still only a proved fact, with which other facts are 
 connected. Why does this attraction exist? What is it? 
 We cannot tell. We discover, we affirm, but we are unable to 
 comprehend it. 
 
 The same argument applies to chemistry. To find simple 
 bodies again in complex bodies, and to compound complex 
 
 * "Positive religions insist on the belief of mysteries. This means, m 
 fact, that the incomprehensibility of a tenet is not a sufficient reason for its 
 rejection : not to comprehend a tenet is simply not to perceive the possibility 
 of its object. No one comprehends the reproduction of organic matter, and 
 yet no one refuses to believe it." — Kant, On llelvjion within the Limits of 
 Reason, part iii. ad finem. 
 
28 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 bodies by ibe aid of simple bodies, — such is, under its 
 double form, the ^vonde^ful science of cliemistr}'. The 
 world believed formerly that there were only four elements ; 
 chemistry has discovered simple bodies under these pretended 
 elements. But what are simple bodies ? This is precisely 
 what chemistry cannot understand. It may describe and 
 define them, but it cannot comprehend their nature, for it 
 knows not the nature of a substance, a quality, or a movement. 
 When philosophers venture in their reasoning beyond the visible 
 phenomena of composition and decomposition, when they speak 
 of atoms, simple forces, first and secondary qualities, and inse- 
 parable attributes, they confound many ingenious ideas with a 
 host of extravagant conceptions, and merely succeed in showing 
 that they live in the midst of bodies without being able to com- 
 prehend what bodies are. An argument even more conclusive 
 is furnished, if we take man himself, to prove to man that he 
 does not comprehend any one of the beings of whose existence he is 
 thoroughly convinced, with whom he lives, and whose description 
 and history fall under his daily notice. -'•' When I wish to explain 
 the movement of my finger, 1 follow the motion of the muscle to 
 a certain material centre from whence that motion has com- 
 menced. Can I comprehend this transmission of movement ? 
 Not more than I can deny that it is there. Let us admit, to 
 obtain a solution, that there is an analogy between this succes- 
 siv.e motion and certain mechanical laws : we thus arrive at a 
 generalisation and a comparison, but nothing more. Is it not 
 strange to believe that we comprehend a particular thing, because 
 we have discovered that it is analogous to another given thing 
 which we do not comprehend ? The exclusively material pheno- 
 menon of the transmission of motion is therefore, as far as we 
 are concerned, an unexplained mystery. But what is this 
 mystery in comparison with what now follows ? Not only does 
 the movement extend throughout the entire length of the muscle, 
 but there is in this muscle, a first point, which moves itself, 
 without being set in motion by anything else ? This is not, iu 
 truth, an effect without a cause, but a material movement pro- 
 
 * "Assuredly the soul has no distinct idea of its own nature and compo- 
 sition. It cannot discover by examining itself whether it is capable of such 
 and such modifications, which it has never experienced. It is truly sensible to 
 pain, but knows not what it is ; neither can it determine how it has been 
 constructed to suffer pain, or to endure one particular pain more than another." 
 — Malebranche, Jlesearch into Truth, book iv. chap. ii. sect. ii. 
 
THE INCOMPEEHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 29 
 
 cluced l>y an immaterial will ; a power directly exercised by the 
 soul upon the body. Who comprehends this, or who can hope 
 that it ever will be comprehended ? ■' Profound philosophers 
 have wasted their time in trying to explain the action of the 
 mind upon the corporeal system, by the absurd theory of animal 
 intelhgences. Even Descartes has not recoiled from the extra- 
 vagance of this liypothesis. Such is the fate of human science 
 when it ventures beyond the limits which God has prescribed 
 for it. 
 
 It is quite as difficult to account for the action of the body 
 upon the mind. We can analyse the eye to perfection ; we can 
 dissect the optic nerve and the brain ; we can discover the laws 
 of perspective ; we can follow up an image presented to us, and 
 explain all its characteristics ; nothing can be more complete. 
 And yet, after all, what is To see ? What affinity is there 
 between the image presented and the faculty of vision ? What 
 is colour ? What is form ? The fire scorches rae. What is 
 there in the fire which resembles the burn I suffer from ? I am 
 equally unable to comprehend the beings that surround me, the 
 phenomena through which they manifest themselves, my own 
 substance, and my individual faculties. I see, but I know not 
 what seeing is. I touch, but I cannot tell what touching is. I 
 suffer pain without being able to understand the cause. I am 
 plunged in depths and encircled by mysteries. Unknown 
 creations are on every side of me, and I am myself for ever 
 inexplicable to my own intelligence. Yet, notwithstanding all 
 this ignorance, I live in perfect self-complacency, I prate of 
 science in pompous terms, and when I go so far as to 
 demonstrate the existence of God, and am told that he is 
 incomprehensible, I cry out and exclaim that I am insulted in 
 my dignity as a rational being and a philosopher. 
 
 It is true that divine incomprehensibility possesses a character 
 peculiar to itself : that of being an incomprehensibility more 
 incomprehensible than any other. But this is no reason for 
 denying the fact. The other existences which we are unable to 
 comprehend possess some relative analogies : they cease to be 
 strange to us, by appearing to be ordinary : we can estimate 
 thoroughly their power, what that power can effect, in how much 
 time, and according to what laws ; we compare and classify them, 
 
 * "Modus quo corporlbus adhjeret spiritus, comprehendi ab horainibus non 
 potest; et hoc taraea homo est." — D. Aiir/ustinus, de Civitate Dei, lib. xxi. 
 cap. X. 
 
30 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 which almost prevents us from thinking how they are to be com- 
 prehended. God, on the contrar}', stands by himself alone. He 
 has no analogies, he belongs to no class, he cannot be defined.''' 
 To speak of him would require a language composed of words 
 inapplicable to created things. Principles themselves seem to 
 change their nature when we trace them back to him, for he is 
 the foundation of principles, the cause from whence all existences, 
 external to himself, proceed. 
 
 Not only is there nothing repugnant to human reason in the 
 dogma of divine incomprehensibility, but there appears while we 
 reflect on it, a certain measure of folly in the contrary assump- 
 tion. In actual life, there are many things which we comprehend 
 at once, without difficulty ; there are many more which require 
 long and persevering study before we can master them ; and 
 there are others (as we have just shown), which we despair of 
 ever understanding. And yet we would aspire to the compre- 
 hension of God ! In science, as we advance by degrees, we find 
 depths which we are unable to reach : weak minds alone believe 
 that they can explain and comprehend everything. Is it 
 possible that there can be any thing in the world inexplicable and 
 incomprehensible, and that the Author of the world should not 
 possess these attributes '? We say of what we cannot comprehend 
 that it is beyond our intelligence : what then can surpass our 
 intelligence if not the nature of God. 
 
 It seems strange to hear the dogma of the divine incomprehen- 
 sibility disputed by philosophers of the school of Descartes and 
 Leibnitz. The ingenious and profound studies of the rationalists 
 on the origin of our ideas, ought to be sufficient to set aside all 
 attempts to fathom the nature of God. We shall endeavour to show 
 this. Locke had maintained that we draw our idea of causation 
 from notice of the external world. According to him, wlien a body 
 in motion encounters another body to which it communicates its 
 own motion, this simultaneousness, or succession of two move- 
 ments, is not sufficient to supply us with the idea of causation ; 
 but if one of these bodies is our own, we are then very distinctly 
 assured that our movement is the cause of the movement wliich 
 we afterwards observe in a diff'erent object. Leibnitz was the 
 first to demonstrate that this analysis is incomplete : for our 
 movement, taken in itself and separated from the will by which it 
 
 * "Summum Magnum, ex defectione a^miili, solitudinem quandam de 
 singularitate prgestantioe sut« possidens, imicum est." — Tcrtidllan, Adv. 
 Mar don. lib, i. no. 4. 
 
THE INCOMPKEHENSIBTLITY OF GOD. 31 
 
 has been produced, is nothing more in realty than an external 
 phenomenon, known to us only through our senses, and agreeing 
 exactly with the movement which follows it. The idea of a cause 
 does not spring from the junction of these two movements, but 
 rather from the coincidence between my own will and my 
 personal motion. It is in perceiving this coincidence that 1 form 
 the idea of a connection, which is no more than a simple link of 
 succession. I see and feel that the internal act is the cause of 
 my movement ; I feel it, as it were, by sudden impulse, without 
 experience or reflexion ; I wish to move, before I know that I 
 am capable of motion. I am so fully conscious of the power I 
 exercise, that I feel myself master of my will whether to move or 
 not ; I can alter the directioii or range of my movement at 
 pleasure, and I can either increase or restrain its energy. If 
 such is the origin of the idea of causation, it is clear that if I 
 were not a cause myself, I could never acquire the idea of a 
 cause. The world would present to me, in space, in co-existences, 
 and in time, nothing beyond a series of consecutive order. I 
 should see there co-ordination but not generation. I derive the 
 idea of cause from myself, and I subsequently apply it to all 
 other beings. 
 
 Now this idea, which I find in myself, is the simple idea of 
 causation, although the identical cause perceived may be free, 
 intelligent, and animated; and why should it not be so, since tlie 
 simple idea of cause is comprised in the complex idea of a 
 voluntary cause ? Assuredly, I do not at first conceive the idea 
 of a specific voluntary cause, and afterwards, by abstraction, tb.e 
 simple idea of causation ; my thought does not proceed thus in 
 the first act of consciousness; but we comprehend thoroughly 
 that our? intelligence can seize a simple idea in a complex 
 phenomenon, by virtue of the axiom which common-sense has 
 borrowed from philosophy, " He who can achieve the most can 
 accomplish the least." 
 
 But we are not in a condition to reverse the proverb, and say, 
 " He who can achieve the least can also accomplish the most." 
 Are the causes of God's existence and our own identical ? 
 Does the Divine cause differ from the human cause only in 
 degree ? If we &iy so, it amounts to the audacity of declaring that 
 God is useless. What signifies it that his power is greater, if he 
 can only exercise that powder after the same manner and in tlie 
 same order? Reduced to the condition of a human cause in its 
 highest exercise of power, God can move the world, but he is 
 
32 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 unable to create it. The human cause produces the movement, 
 and this is alL It modifies the being by the aid of the move- 
 ment, but can do nothing more. The Divine cause produces and 
 creates the being. This is a power of a nature entirely and 
 radically different. We include under the same name of cause, 
 the force which produces a being, and the power by which that 
 bein<^ is modified : but it is evident that we employ one word to 
 express two ideas ; for, in the second case, we comprehend the 
 term we employ, because it represents a human act; and, in the 
 first, we utter an incoherence, for we speak of what we neither 
 comprehend nor are capable of comprehending. It would be 
 as easy to find the originating cause in the external world as in 
 the created man. 
 
 It has been said by Voltaire, that " Ever since God created 
 man in his own image, man has liberally repaid him ; " and 
 there is truth in this. We, nearly all, begin with the Christian 
 idea of a God, the author of the world, and we end with the 
 pagan notion of a deity resembling ourselves. We do not desire 
 to comprehend that God has no analogy with us because he is 
 our creator. All beings, God alone excepted, are portions of a 
 system ; this is their nature and condition ; he only is beyond 
 and above all systems. What is there in common between them 
 and him ? 
 
 When we apply the principles of our own nature to God, we 
 run into contradictions ; these principles emanate from him, but 
 they constitute us entirely. When we attribute to God the 
 faculties of man we find impossibilities ; and the first of all, 
 according to this conclusion, is the existence of the world itself. 
 
 The utter absurdity of this anthropomorphism is proved by the 
 absurdity of its formulas. They require that God should be a 
 man and at the same time eternal. They attribute to God all 
 our human faculties, and add that they are infinite in him but 
 limited in man. Thus, having a full comprehension of a human 
 faculty which is terminable, they refuse to acknowledge the 
 incomprehensibility of an infinite faculty. What, then, is this 
 comprehensible infinity ? If infinity is merely used to express 
 immensity, God disa})pears ; if it really means infinity, we amuse 
 ourselves with vain words, and these human qualities, elevated to 
 infinitude without becoming incomprehensible, evaporate in a 
 confused phrase without any distinct idea. 
 
 Plato, Aristotle, the Alexandrians, and the great theologians 
 of the Christian church, have directed philosophy on a totally 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 33 
 
 different course. They are so far from considering God analogous 
 ^vith the world, that their chief difficulty has been, not to sepamte 
 him from, but to draw him nearer to, creation. In proportion as 
 they conceive him to be perfect and immutable, they know not 
 how to bring him down to the attributes of Providence. This 
 same feeling of incomprehensible perfection is very strikincrly 
 expressed by Malebranche.- Perhaps a similar motive has 
 induced Descartes to reject the doctrine of final causes. He 
 denies us, equally, the power of comprehending God, and that of 
 divining, in their ephemeral effect, the intentions of infinite 
 cause. If, since his time, there has been a tendency to fall back 
 into anthropomorphism, it proceeds from a certain decline in the 
 metaphysics of the eighteenth century. The eighteenth century 
 was signalised by daring, exact, practical, and experimental 
 philosophy, which, while it opposed the remnants of scholastic 
 theories, equally rejected the exalted metaphysics of Descartes 
 'and Leibnitz. From the former it has only adopted this leadincr 
 maxim : to believe nothing that is not clearly and distinctly 
 comprehended to be true. Opposed to established systems 
 governed entirely by clear sense, and dreading, above everything 
 subtle arguments and chimerical ideas, the philosophers of thfs 
 age fell into the error of exaggerating these excellent principles 
 until, by degrees, they confined themselves witliin the narrow 
 compass of admitting the existence of nothing, except what they 
 could see and touch. By far the greater number ended in 
 materialism. Those who did not carry the fanaticism of incre- 
 dulity to the extent of shrinking from spiritual essences altogether 
 desired at least that the spiritual and material world Should 
 resemble each other as closely as possible. They required a 
 comprehensible God, because, according to their principles, they 
 could conceive nothing superior to reason ; they were anxious not 
 to clash with popular customs, to reject all mysteries, to explain, 
 to define, and in some manner to measure everything. Now a 
 comprehensible God is of necessity a human God. ° This can 
 be illustrated by an example. What do we know of a body ? 
 That it is shaped, coloured, heavy, sapid, sonorous. Its shape we 
 
 * " We ought to know that, to estimate God worthily, we are not to ascribe 
 to him any but incomprehensible attributes. This is evident, since God is the 
 inhnite m every sense of the word ; therefore, nothing that is limited is con- 
 sistent with his nature, and all that is infinite in everv sense, is in every 
 possible manner incomprehensible to the human mindr -3Jalebra7iche, Einlah 
 UJiscourse upon Metaphysics, sect. 7. 
 
34 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 can ascertain by sight and touch, its sonorousness by the ear, and 
 so on. Can we affirm that it has no other quahties than those 
 with which we are acquainted ? How could we assert this ? Is 
 it utterly impossible that it should possess certain qualities 
 imperceptible to our senses? This is not impossible. If these 
 qualities exist, can we figure to ourselves an idea of them, or, in 
 other words, can we comprehend them ? It is clear that we can 
 only comprehend the ideas infused into our internal or external 
 experience, or the ideas which are formed through the aid of that 
 experience. As to qualities which do not fall under the test of our 
 senses, we abstain from affirming, because we can neither prove 
 nor comprehend them. Respecting these we are placed as the 
 blind and the deaf are with regard to colour and sound. If, then, 
 the attributes of God differ from those of man, not in degree, but 
 in nature, it is impossible that we can comprehend God. The 
 rationalists of the eighteenth century refused to admit this con- 
 clusion, and, consequently, they were driven to create a human- 
 God to render him comprehensible. They have thus supplied an 
 argument to the materialists, who are sounder logicians than they ni 
 their nenatives. From the moment when they reduced God to the 
 point of'becoming impotent and useless, they laid down their arms 
 before atheism. They have not comprehended that the infinite 
 could never be analogous to its opposite ; that is to say, to the 
 finite. They were unable to perceive that, if the scientihc formulas 
 were equally applicable to the finite and the infinite, it follows of 
 necessity that they must be false. 
 
 Philosophers required a principle upon which to establish the 
 analogv between God and man ; and this is what has been laid 
 down^by pre-eminence, and is still confidently repeated m the 
 most authentic schools. According to them, the cause must of 
 necessity contain all that is in the effect. This principle is 
 utterly false, and has led its supporters to lamentable conclusions. 
 They have been driven to maintain that matter is in God and 
 forms an essential portion of his being, because he is, in fact, the 
 author of matter. They have separated imperfection and evil 
 from the Divine nature, because, as they say, God permits evil 
 without creating it; and imperfection in created beings results 
 from their condition of being created, and not from the act by 
 which their cause has produced them. This is an extremely 
 subtle distinction for those theologians who make it their boast 
 to be governed by common sense. They have taken a bold step 
 iu thus distinguishing the faculties we derive from our Creator, 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 35 
 
 from those ^vllic]l belong to our quality of created beings. With- 
 out being conscious of it, they have invented a system of meta- 
 physics equally daring and obscure; and their own principles 
 have condemned them to this, or to take refuge in pantheism 
 And how, after all, could they escape pantheism, after having 
 degraded God until human intelHgence is capable of comnre° 
 hendmg him ? ^ 
 
 The fact is, that their principle is totally worthless. It is not 
 true that all that is in the effect must of necessity be in the cause • 
 It IS merely true that there is in the cause a power equal to or 
 superior to the effect; which is a very different conclusion, 
 (rod, being the cause of man, cannot be less perfect than man • 
 this is certain. God, being the cause of the world, cannot be 
 inferior to the world, in perfection: this is also indisputable. But 
 to conclude that God, therefore, resembles man or the world is 
 equally erroneous and absurd. Truly, we have made an important 
 advance, when we merely prove that God is superior to man ' 
 We must demonstrate that he is infinitely so, or remain silent. 
 Let us not hesitate here to insist on the distinction between the 
 finite and the infinite, which constitutes the principal foundation of 
 the dogma of incomprehensibility, as we shall presently find it 
 formmg the basis of the refutation of pantheism. These words, 
 nifinite and finite, which we are compelled to use, as our language 
 imposes them upon us, comprise a very fertile source of'^equi- 
 vocation. The Greek tongue is much more clearly constructed. 
 The word airetpos, which corresponds exactly with our injinite 
 (from a, privative or negative, and Tiepaj, limit), was not defined 
 by the Greek philosophers, injinite, but unfinished. They said 
 of God that he was finished, reAetoy, which means complete, 
 perfect; and of the world that it was injinite, air^ipos, whicli 
 implies incomplete, imperfect. These words, therefore, Jlnlte 
 and injinite, were not employed by them with any reference to 
 time and space. We, on the contrary, who understand by the 
 term finite, all that is limited, apply to God, by contrast, the 
 quality of infinite; and thus, at once, we give rise to two 
 serious objections. The first is, that we conceive the idea of 
 specific magnitude, although God is not a specific magnitude ; and 
 secondly, we give a negative construction to a word which is 
 synonymous with perfect, and to an idea which is the most 
 positive of all our ideas.-- This confusion has misled many minds 
 
 " It is not true that we can derive our idea of the infinite from a denial 
 
 D 2 
 
36 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 Upon the relative nature of infinity and finity ; and has induced 
 them to believe, that to be infinite is actually to fill or occupy 
 infinite time and infinite space. Now, there are no such things 
 as infinite time and infinite space. When we say that God is 
 infinite, we mean to express tliat he is beyond or without all 
 time and space. 
 
 God exists neither in time nor space ; for this reason, he is 
 eternal and infinite, and also incomprehensible. 
 
 A God, beyond all time and space, is incomprehensible. An 
 infinite God circumscribed within time and space, is a contra- 
 diction. 
 
 The doctrine we maintain admits a God superior to reason ; 
 that which we undertake to refute, asserts a God contradictory to 
 reason. If our doctrine is true, it follows that reason is limited; 
 if the doctrine of our adversaries is correct, it equally follows that 
 reason is impotent. 
 
 The whole difficulty lies in bringing our minds to the conviction, 
 that any being can exist beyond or separated from time and space. 
 We hope to show that this is possible, by establishing that 
 time and space have no substantial reality, and mean nothing 
 more than the order of connection between existences relatively 
 limited ; and we shall endeavour to prove that it is necessary, 
 by establishing that eternity of time and infinity of space are 
 contradictory expressions. 
 
 Let us first examine time and space, and convince ourselves of 
 their nature. I have near me a writing-table. In one of the 
 drawers there is a piece of pasteboard. I take this pasteboard 
 away, and replace it by another. The drawer then has undergone 
 three distinct conditions. First, it contained a certain piece of 
 pasteboard ; then, it was empty ; and finally, it enclosed another 
 piece of pasteboard. Thus the drawer, with relation to the 
 pieces of pasteboard, is a container. It may be either full or 
 empty ; it can receive any particular object, provided only that 
 the dimensions of that object are suitable. This drawer, which is 
 an actual object that I can see and touch, and the extent of which 
 I am able to measure, fills here exactly the part of space, with 
 this sole distinction, that I cannot see space, and am unacqainted 
 Avith its limits. Let us, then, suppose that, instead of being in a 
 drawer, the first piece of pasteboard was simply placed on a table 
 
 of the finite, since, on the contrary, limitation contains within itself a denial 
 of infinity."— i^escaWe^, Aiiswer to the Fifth Objection (against the Third 
 Meditation) y sect. 4. 
 
THE INCOMrEEHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 37 
 
 by my side. I take it from that place : the place which it occupied 
 appears to me to be in reality there ready to receive it again, or 
 any other object, whatever may be its nature. It was full, and 
 now it is empty ; but, full or empty, it still appears to be a positive 
 something. 
 
 It may be asserted that a particular place is never empty, at 
 least on this earth and what may be called its vicinity ; because no 
 sooner is the ohject removed by which it was occupied, than the 
 an- fills it : but it is equally true that this ordinary phenomenon 
 of the displacement of an object, conveys the idea of fullness and 
 vacuity, as also the idea of something that contains substances, 
 and, when it does not contain them, is qualified for that purpose. 
 This is what I understand by space. 
 
 Here, then, is space named, and almost defined ; and here also 
 is the idea I have formed of space. Let us admit that this idea 
 is very meagre, and that when I have said "it is the conception 
 of something which either contains, or is capable of containing, 
 substances," I have said all that I am able to say. If I attempt 
 to go further, I shall only plunge into negatives. This something 
 is not perceptible to any of my senses ; it has no defined shape or 
 dimension ; its component parts, if it has them, do not differ 
 from each other ; its capacity of containing, the only characteristic 
 with which I am acquainted, is perfectly indifferent to the nature 
 of the object contained. This is, assuredly, a reality which differs 
 much from all other realities. Now, in this world, there are only 
 three ways of being an actual something. It must be either a 
 substance, a quality, or an affinity. In other words, we can 
 conceive the idea of distinct individuals, of the different qualities of 
 individuals, and of the different affinities which these individuals 
 and their qualities bear to each other relatively. We should seek 
 in vain for any specific object of thought beyond these three terms. 
 Space, then, is either an individual, a quality, or an affinity. It 
 seems almost puerile to affirm that it cannot be an individual 
 and yet it is often spoken of as if it were. An individual must 
 either be a spirit or a body ; space is neither the one nor the 
 other. An individual has qualities ; space neither has nor can 
 have them, for our express idea of space is, that it can receive all 
 qualities. Thus, space cannot be an individual or a substance. Is 
 it a quality? Assuredly it is not a spiritual quality. And how 
 can it be a bodily quality, since we have seen that it does not fall 
 under the cognisance of any of our senses? Space cannot be 
 the substance of a quality ; still less can it be the quality of a 
 
38 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 substance ; for, in either case, there would be some quality or 
 some object which it could not contain, namely, a quality contrary 
 to its own, which is directly opposed to the definition. It remains, 
 therefore, that space must be either an affinity, or cannot be at 
 all. In fact, space is an affinity, and nothing more. 
 
 Leibnitz, who in his controversy with Clarke, victoriously dis- 
 proved the actual existence of time and space, has employed 
 against them the principle of adequate reason, and also the prin- 
 ciple of imperceptibility. Here follow his two arguments : — Let 
 us suppose, for a moment, that space exists, and that God has 
 placed the world in a corner of this space : this is opposed to the 
 doctrine of adequate reason ; for, space being everywhere alike, 
 God could have had no motive for placing the world in one par- 
 ticular locality rather than in another. 
 
 The very hypothesis of the existence of space is absurd in 
 virtue of the principle of imperceptibility ; for all parts of space 
 being by definition exactly like each other, we should be driven 
 to conclude that God had created two things precisely similar, 
 which is again an absurdity : God never works to produce nothing ; 
 agendo nihil agere.-^ 
 
 The conclusion at which Leibnitz arrives is, that space is tho 
 order of co-existences, as time is the order of successive existences, f 
 If there were no bodies, what would space be ? In reality nothing. 
 It might become possible, since bodies might become possible. 
 Space only assumes reality when bodies are produced, and has no 
 existence irrelative of bodies, being nothing more than an affinity 
 or connection between them. 
 
 It is said of a body that it is above or under another ; that it is 
 either before, behind, at one side, on the right, or on the left. 
 Empty space is not of itself sufficient to render these qualifications 
 intelligible : the space must be occupied, and even by two distinct 
 bodies; for all the different expressions merely designate the rela- 
 tion of one body to another. 
 
 It seems, at first, that there is at least one quality of which 
 space is susceptible in itself, and that we might say, even when 
 empty, it is either great or small ; but if we reflect a little, we 
 shall find that any estimate of the extent of a space, supposes an 
 actual or preceding comparison with the extent of a body. It is 
 because we have conceived the idea of a difference of dimension 
 
 * Controversy/ letween Clarice and Leibnitz.— Yovsi\x Treatise of Leibnitz, 
 sect. 5. 
 
 + Ibid. Third Treatise of Leibnitz, sect. 4. 
 
THE INCOMPKEHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 39 
 
 in bodies, that ^ve form, by abstraction, the idea of a difference of 
 dinK^nsion in space. Here is a sticlv three feet in length. We 
 are asked if it is long or short : the question is absurd. It is long 
 when compared with a stick of three inches in lengtli, and short 
 if contrasted with another of two yards. A size, or, which is the 
 same thing, a space, or, which is still the same thing, an affinity, 
 is not and can not be anytliing but the result of a comparison. 
 Change the terms of the comparison, the connection changes ; 
 suppress one of the terms, and the connection is nuUified. If the 
 w'orld contained but a single body, that body would be neither great 
 nor small. For this reason we know not what we say, when we ask 
 why did not God make the world larger? for there being but 
 a single world, it can neither be great nor small. But in 
 the composition of the world there are great and small parts, 
 because there are several parts, and these may bo compared with 
 each other. 
 
 No man is nine feet higli. Let us suppose that God, in his 
 supreme will, had given to an individual man three yards of 
 stature, and that all others had remained as they are ; such a man 
 would be considered a giant, a monster. Let us suppose, again, 
 that God had universally increased the size of men in a similar 
 ratio, without changing the rest of creation ; the harmony of 
 nature would be disturbed. But if at the same time, and by a 
 single act, he had augmented all existences in the same propor- 
 tion, what then would be changed ? Nothing, absolutely ; not 
 even the relative dimensions of beings. If no affinity is changed, 
 no specific size is changed. Thus, once more, size and space are 
 not abstract but relative qualities. 
 
 We estimate dimensions by two means — by sight and touch. 
 Experience teaches us to establish a relation between the dimen- 
 sion we see and that which we feel, and to judge one by the 
 other. If to-day, for the first time, God should please so to 
 change our power of vision that all dimensions appeared to 
 be doubled, we should be sensible of the change from recollec- 
 tion ; but if he had made this disposition of the eye from the 
 first moment when he gave us the faculty of sight, all our impres- 
 sions, notwithstanding the difference, would be the same as they 
 are at present. In a word, as regards size, the truth lies entirely 
 in relative proportion. The same reflections may be applied to 
 time. Time is the regulated order of succession, as space is the 
 regulated order of contiguity. 
 
 If there were no such thing as size, there would be no space. 
 
40 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 If there were but one size, still there would be no space. But if 
 a second size appears, comparison becomes possible, and imme- 
 diately the idea of space, and, as we may say, space itself, springs 
 up with it. 
 
 If every thing was immovable, there would be no time. If 
 every thing moved together, and in the same order, still there 
 would be no time. But as soon as one thing is in motion, and 
 another remains immovable, then time commences. We even 
 express ourselves badly in supposing a single size, or a single 
 uniform movement. Without comparison, and consequently 
 without quality, there can be neither size, movement, time, nor 
 
 The habit (more common than we are inclined to think) of 
 realising abstraction, leads to the supposition of a time and space 
 independent of duality. We say, " Before there could be either 
 extent or duality, there must have been a space capable of con- 
 taining them ; and before any change could be produced, there 
 must have been a time capable of containing the change." 
 Herein is included a double error. Empty time and space are 
 simple nonentities. Neither time nor space are actual con- 
 tainers. It is in our imagination only that we make them fill 
 this office, because we conceive fictitious spaces and durations of 
 time, measured by other extents and movements. If space is 
 wanting to the development of a body, or time to its history, it is 
 not, in fact, that time or space are deficient, for they have no 
 actual existence ; it is that some other body restrains the expan- 
 sion of the first. We express ourselves defectively, and we think 
 with similar incorrectness. We create two phantoms, by which 
 we are perpetually attended. Philosophy ought to teach us to 
 abhor a vacuum, as formerly was said of Nature. Time and 
 space, considered without reference to bodies, are merely two 
 forms of vacuity ; or, to speak more consistently, they are pure 
 nonentities. 
 
 Time and space are very closely related. The difference 
 between them resembles that between length and thickness, 
 which are but two dimensions of a single idea. Space is engen- 
 dered by extent, time by movement ; both by duality : for extent 
 and movement are comprised under this common term, which 
 constitutes the first and simplest form of multiplication. Thus, 
 there can be no idea of time and space without the idea of 
 duality ; and no actual time and space without actual duality. 
 Everything that falls within time and space, involves duality, 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILIT'^ OF GOD. 41 
 
 motion, clivisibilit3% difference. The metapbysical language of 
 the Greeks allowed no distinction between the words matter, 
 multiple, moveable, indefinite, and imperfect ; and in its preci- 
 sion, full of meaning, it especially denominated matter the other, 
 or the various. Plato and Aristotle said, the same and the other, 
 or, rather, the immutable and the moveable, as we should now 
 speak of God and the world. 
 
 Time and space being, as we have seen, nothing but affinities, 
 it is not surprising that thought should become lost and con- 
 founded when we reason upon their nature as if they were actual 
 existences. We find here three leading difficulties. One, in 
 dividing them, as they can diminish down to the infinitely small ; 
 a second, in multiplying them, as they can increase up to the 
 infinitely great; and a third, in isolating them, for when once 
 they are considered as abstractions from the world, we are 
 tempted to pronounce them infinite by the necessary absence of 
 boundaries. Let us examine, under this triple point of view, 
 this strange doctrine of the metaphysical reality of time and 
 space. 
 
 The hypothesis of infinite divisibility has filled the history 
 of philosophy with celebrated sophisms. If extent is infinitely 
 divisible, it has been asserted that all dimensions are equal, for 
 they have all the same number of parts ; or rather, the parts con- 
 tained in a great extent, and the parts contained in a small 
 extent, are equally incommensurable. 
 
 If a square is inscribed within a circle, there can be no reason 
 whatever for maintaining that the circle contains more parts than 
 the square. 
 
 The parts of divisible extension being themselves divisible to 
 infinity, it is impossible to say of what an extension is composed. 
 Nothing but the indivisible can constitute a specific size. 
 
 If to escape from the difficulty we fall back upon the hypo- 
 thesis of indivisibility, still we gain nothing. 
 
 In fact, what is an indivisible unit ? Let us call it by what 
 name we please, a unit, a monad, an atom, a point, we can say 
 no more than that it is in itself indivisible, and that it produces 
 extent, which means divisibility. This is the true definition, and 
 this definition contains a manifest absurdity, if extent is a real 
 existence. But if extent is only a relative affinity, the difficulty 
 disappears ; for there must be two terms or conditions before 
 there can be an affinity, and two points before there can be an 
 extent. Now, it does not result that the extent is composed of 
 
42 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 these two points, or that the affinity is composed of these two 
 conditions. 
 
 There is no occasion, therefore, to waste time in discussing 
 the scholastic arguments and sophistries of this class, already 
 familiar since the age of Gorgias, and which Bayle has taken the 
 trouble to repeat.- 
 
 All these reasonings, so productive of difficulty, are not only based 
 upon the point of a needle, but they are absolutely founded upon 
 nothing. The famous dilemma, — if the monad or point is ex- 
 tended, then there is indivisible extent; if the point is not 
 extended, two points not extended constitute an extent, — this 
 can only embarrass those who consider extent as an actual exist- 
 ence. But for those who question the being, and not the 
 vacuum, there is no more difficulty in comprehending this than 
 there is in understanding that two cannot be one, or that one 
 cannot be two, and that a relative affinity results from two terms 
 or conditions. 
 
 It is quite true that we do not recognise the monad in the 
 nature of things. Yfe have an abstract conception, but we can 
 neither perceive nor figure it. We cannot figure it, for all form 
 is an extent ; and we are unable to perceive it, for our senses are 
 extensions, the nature of which is to perceive nothing but 
 extension. Why can we only perceive extensions ? Or rather, 
 ^vhy are we made as we are ? This is precisely what we cannot 
 answer : such secrets are impenetrable to human reason. Let us 
 merely remark, that it is the monad, and not the extent, which it 
 is difficult to comprehend. But nevertheless, comprehended or 
 not, extent exists ; we establish and measure it, which is 
 sufficient, provided that after having abstracted it from sub- 
 stance, in thought, we do not arbitrarily erect it into a physical 
 reality. 
 
 As we raise difficulties out of all measure upon infinite divisi- 
 bility, others are created without more reason upon infinite 
 multiplication ; as thus ; Europe, it is said, is larger than France, 
 the terrestrial globe is larger than Europe, and all together 
 comprise but an atom in the universe. But what is the extent of 
 the universe ? If it is limited, a thousand objections present them- 
 selves : why is it not more extended ? What is there beyond it ? &c. 
 If it is not limited, it must be infinite ; and therefore infinity is 
 
 '•• "It is sad," says Pascal, "to pause over tliese absurdities ; but there are 
 times for trifling." — On the Nature of Geometry, edit. Havet., p. 445. 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 43 
 
 composed of a total amount of limited existences : and thus ^ve 
 create other difiBculties equally inextricable. 
 
 We think these questions may be answered thus : There is 
 nothing beyond the whole, for this sufficient reason, that any 
 thing beyond the whole is a contradiction in terms. If any one 
 is induced to state such an absurd proposition, it can only be in 
 consequence of having contracted a habit of speaking of vacuum 
 as if it were real. Now, it is not so ; for space is only an affitiiiy, 
 and has no actual existence. Moreover, the whole could not be 
 greater than it is ; neither could it be less, because it is neither 
 great nor small. In fact, being the whole, it stands alone in its 
 species, and cannot be comipared with any thing. Space being 
 only a relative affinity, the whole has nothing to do with space. 
 Space is in it, but it is not in space. We may, if we please, say 
 of the whole, that it is great, because it contains all quantities ; but 
 this is a defective mode of speaking. Language is not intended 
 to express what is solitary ; it applies to comparisons and classes. 
 That which stands alone belongs to no class, and can scarcely be 
 named. We may convince ourselves still more of the inanity of 
 size, by a few extremely simple propositions. A nutshell is 
 smaller than the world, because the world contains it. Let us 
 suppose that God, by an act of his supreme will, should destroy 
 the world, and then, by a second exercise of omnipotence, create a 
 new world with its luminaries, in the interior of this nutshell ; 
 possessing all the relative proportions of the former one. Would 
 this second world be smaller than the first? Certainly it Avould, 
 in the estimation of whoever knew the nature of a nutshell, 
 because it is a term of comparison ; but with those who were 
 unacquainted with a nutshell, the two worlds would possess 
 equal dimensions." The question is sometimes asked, " Is the 
 world infinite ? " This is evidently a mistaken use of the word in- 
 finity. Infinite means perfect, and not immense. Shall we rather 
 ask if the world is perfect ? Besides that this question is absurd, it 
 has no relation to the dimensions of the world, and to space. Again, 
 shall we demand if the world is incommensurable ? Assuredly it is ; 
 for there is nothing beyond, with which it can be compared. 
 
 This business of measurement is another of our delusions. We 
 do not perceive that measurement is merely a logical artifice 
 employed to give a certain sort of solidity and consistence to 
 bodies, necessary to the operations which our ideas associate with 
 
 ^' Malchranchc, Xinfh Dhcowsc on Mdaphijilcs, § 7. 
 
44 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 them. The measurement of time and duration are defniitions 
 without which there could he neither history nor gecgraphj^ ; hut 
 these definitions themselves sufficiently prove that time and space 
 possess only the value of a proportion, tlie terms of which may 
 be varied at pleasure. The proportion is fixed, and the value of 
 the terms arbitrary. We assume a particular extent as a type, 
 and we employ this to measure all extent and all duration ; extent, 
 by carrying the type over the entire surface of the object to be 
 measured, as often as that object will contain it ; duration, by 
 means of a needle mechanically moved, and which traverses 
 certain equal spaces in equal times. In consequence of these 
 processes, all our comparisons are made with mathematical pre- 
 cision. We ascertain whether a particular duration or extent is 
 longer or larger than another ; but if we wish to say absolutely 
 that it is either long or large without comparison, we feel our 
 impotence, and cease to speak intelligibly. 
 
 Thus, a league is undoubtedly a longer distance than a mile. 
 But is it long or short ? No one can tell ; for this depends on 
 the measure with which it is compared. It is a long passage on 
 foot, and a very short one on horseback ; by the railroad, it is 
 almost nothing. Distances, in regard to locomotion, have entirely 
 changed their signification within the last half century. One 
 hundred leagues, two hundred years ago, required eight days of 
 travel ; fifty years since, they could be accomplished in three 
 days ; at present, they will occupy ten hours. It is the same 
 with coins, which preserve their names and forms while the value 
 is changed. " Was the casket large ? " demands Harpagon. — 
 " Yes," replies Maitre Jaques. — " No, my casket was small." — 
 " Well, it is small too, if you go to that." And in fact every thing 
 depends on the manner in which it is received. The entire 
 existence of space and time is included in a comparison of great 
 or small; and great and small are nothing except by comparison. 
 
 The romance of Gulliver, intended pre-eminently to expose the 
 vanity of every thing human, is also highly profitable in teaching 
 us of how little value are our ideas of simple dimensions, and con- 
 sequently of dimensions altogether. According to the organs of 
 the spectator, and, what is even more significant, in proportion 
 to the power he exercises, the world increases or diminishes in 
 size. La Fontaine, in relating the thoughts of anim.als, conveys 
 this metaphysical instruction. The ant, by dint of labour, ac- 
 complishes the passage of an ocean two feet in breadth, on a 
 blade of grass. Wlio can tell us that the minute ant is not a 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 45 
 
 colossus in the eyes of some other animal who looks on this 
 voyage with wonder? As to duration, it is so little in itself, that 
 we should entirely lose the faculty of appreciating it, if nature 
 did not teach us how exactly periodical are certain phenomena con- 
 nected with, and separated from, our own bodies. When nothing 
 external forcibly attracts us, we are apt to fall into an inextricable 
 confusion, and to mistake a very short lapse of time for a very long 
 one, and vice versa, according to the state of our minds. Let us 
 here quote another work of imagination, " The Sleeper Awakened," 
 an Arabian tale, which all the world understand when they read 
 it, Arabs as well as Europeans. This is what we find there : — 
 
 A certain sultan had a great taste for curiosities ; a propensity 
 common to all the sultans of the " Thousand and one Nights." 
 One day, a dervise was brought before him, who boasted of pos- 
 sessing the most wonderful basin in the world. In appearance, 
 it was of a ver}^ ordinary description. The dervise half filled 
 it with water, and desired the sultan to immerse his head. The 
 sultan is in his palace, attended by his court, and surrounded by 
 guards. What has he to fear ? He ventures on the experiment. 
 Scarcely has he plunged his head into the basin, when he finds 
 himself swimming in the middle of a sea. This is no time to 
 indulge in rage against the dervise, nor to bewail his departed 
 grandeur. He thinks only of saving his life, and lands exhausted 
 on the shore. Strange people surround him, clothe, feed, and 
 make him a slave. He endures years of captivity until he effects 
 his escape. He traverses deserts, environed by innumerable 
 perils, and finally arrives at Cairo. Once there, he is rescued 
 from danger, but not from starvation. The former monarch 
 becomes a tailor, marries, has children, and leads the usual life 
 of the working classes, sometimes sad, sometimes merry, but 
 more frequently wretched than joyful. At length, he is accused 
 and condemned to death by a brother sultan. The executioner 
 is sent for, places him on his knees, seizes him by the hair, raises 
 his sabre, and — at that moment the sultan makes a violent effort, 
 which causes him to lift his head from the basin, when he finds 
 himself once more surrounded by his court and guard, the 
 motionless dervise standing before him, holding his basin, and 
 the grand vizier, who finishes the compliment he had com- 
 menced before the imaginary shipwreck. The sultan, in his glass 
 of water, had lived twenty years in a single minute. The story 
 is not a fable, for we all have our heads in the basin at this 
 very hour. 
 
46 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 We can comprehend how the mass of mankind, compelled to 
 struggle incessantly with the mysteries of time and space, deceive 
 themselves as to their nature, and instead of regarding them 
 only as the most general points of view under which we can 
 class the different relations of bodies, transform them into 
 distinct realities. The pagans personified time. Many modern 
 minds, without making time a person, are inclined, at least, to 
 consider it a substance. But it is more lamentable and sur- 
 prising to see learned men and philosophers fall into this 
 superstition ; and not content with having created time and 
 space, bestow on these two idols the characteristics of infinit}'. 
 Herein lies one of the leading vices of modern philosoph}-. 
 We shall endeavour to point out, in a few words, how it can be 
 explained, and how it ought to be cured. 
 
 The school of rationalism, which, in France, opposed and 
 overthrew the doctrine of Condillac, perfectly understood that its 
 principal mission was to ascertain the true character of the idea 
 of infinity. In fact, if we regard infinity as a precise and positive 
 reality, it can only be conceived by reason ; but if we imply by 
 this word nothing more than a vague and negative idea, expe- 
 rience, with the aid of generalisation and imagination, is sufficient 
 to establish it. Leibnitz laid down the question in these terms, 
 and it has become one of the boasts of the French rationalist 
 school, in the nineteenth century, to have continued, upon this 
 ground the polemics of the " New Essays;'' Siud to have rendered 
 the philosophy of Leibnitz, if not more profound, at least more 
 popular and accessible. Now, to establish his doctrine, Leibnitz 
 followed the psychology of Locke, step by step, showing always 
 that in Locke the infinite is confounded with the indefinite ; 
 that the system of the English philosopher explains the indefinite, 
 and leaves the infinite completely on one side ; that the idea of 
 infinity, instead of being negative, is the most positive, as well 
 as the most sensible, of all our notions ; that it cannot be formed 
 from the mode and amplification of our ideas of finite beings, but 
 that it necessarily results from a distinct conception of an infinite 
 being, endowed with the indivisible fullness of perfection. 
 
 In renewing this discussion after Leibnitz, an attempt was 
 made to prove that certain ideas and principles, which are 
 impressed on the mind, cannot result from experience ; and to 
 demonstrate this, it has been asserted that these ideas possess an 
 absolute value, independent of the mind which conceives them, 
 and the facts by which they are controlled. This method of 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 47 
 
 reasoning has been especially employed in discussing the ideas of 
 time and space ; and here Leibnitz is lust sight of, and his long 
 and victorious controversy ^vitll Clarke entirely forgotten. ^Ye 
 have not only, say these arguers, a distinct idea of time and space, 
 but we have necessarily the idea that every thing which exists is in 
 time and space, and, by natural consequence, the idea of an infinite 
 space, and an interminable time. 
 
 It must be conceded that if these propositions could be estab- 
 lished, they would utterly subvert the doctrine of the sensualists. 
 They embrace three points : — a fixed opinion upon the origin of 
 the idea of limited space and time, — an opinion of little import- 
 ance in the debate, and which we entirely cast aside ; an affirma- 
 tion of the necessary existence in the human mind of a principle 
 which compels us to localise every extent in space, and every 
 movement in time, — a principle which, not being derived from 
 experience, is inevitabl}^ originated by reason ; and finally, an 
 assertion of the existence in our minds of the two ideas of infinite 
 time and space, — positive, necessary, absolute ideas, and conse- 
 quently based on reason, and not empirical. 
 
 Is it true that there is a principle implanted in the mind, which 
 compels us to suppose invariably that all dimension and duration 
 is of necessity contained within a larger and longer dimension 
 and duration? This appears evident; we can satisfy ourselves 
 that it is so by the simplest experiment. Let us imagine any 
 extent that we please ; we shall find that we are, at the same time, 
 cotnpelled to imagine that tliis extent is contained within another.'"' 
 This compulsion is not (as the disciples of sensualism suppose) 
 caused by a generalisation. Neither is it from having established 
 that all the dimensions we perceive are contained within others, 
 that we express this fact in a general formula. The affirmation 
 of the necessity of a container for all conceived extent is spon- 
 taneous, immediate, and antecedent to experience. The ration- 
 alists demonstrated this against Locke, and up to this point the^^ 
 were in the right. But they had no occasion to go beyond. The 
 demonstration sufficed to confute their adversaries ; yet after 
 having overthrown, they were inspired with the ambition of 
 constructing; and here they went entirely astray. Being satisfied 
 
 * "Whatever may be tlie extent of a i^pacc, we can conceive a larger one, 
 and again a larger cue slill, and so on to infinity, without arriving at a space 
 which admits of no increase. The same argument applies to time. We can 
 always imagine a longer time, without reaching final duration." — Pascal^ on 
 the Nature of Geometry^ edit. Havet., p. 451, 
 
48 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 that any given dimension must be contained within another, they 
 concluded the existence of infinite space ; and feeling convinced 
 that any specific duration, no matter how long it might be sup- 
 posed, appears to be always preceded and followed by another 
 duration, they thence decided on the existence of infinite or eternal 
 time. 
 
 Now, if it be true, as Leibnitz has shown, and we have endea- 
 voured to demonstrate after him, that time and space are nothing 
 more than the successive or co-existent relations which belong to 
 different things, what meaning can we attach to these expressions 
 of infinite time and infinite space ? We can imagine the infinity 
 of a being ; but what is the infinity of a relation ? 
 
 Without proceeding furtlier, a relation or affinity without end, is 
 evidently an assemblage of incoherent terms, which conveys no 
 intelligible meaning to the mind ; but, strictly speaking, if it be 
 insisted upon that this infinite relation is an actual existence, it 
 will become equally necessary that the beings which it seems to 
 classify and measure, must be in themselves infinite, and also 
 infinite in number ; for the relative quality supposes two things 
 placed in connection with each other. Thus the chimerical notion 
 of infinite time and space necessarily implies the infinity of the 
 world in the sense of duration, and also in that of extent. 
 
 The infinity of the world in duration and extent is a doctrine 
 maintained by all those who deny the existence of a God distinct 
 and separate from material creation. This doctrine appears con- 
 tradictory to us who are not pantheists ; but, nevertheless, it 
 presents at first something accessible to reason — the image of 
 a reality without limit, while infinity of time and space is merely 
 a qualification of nonentity. 
 
 We are ready, if required, to concede to time and space a reality 
 which they do not possess ; our opponents will gain nothing by 
 this admission. Whether space be, as we believe, nothing more 
 than a co-ordinate affinity between existing beings, or, as our 
 adversaries maintain, an individual reality, still it is clear that the 
 mind cannot conceive the idea of space without at the same time 
 conceiving that it is divisible. All that has extent must be 
 divisible, and this applies equally, whether that extent be full or 
 empty. What, then, is an indivisible extent, or an indivisible 
 space ? From the moment when an extent ceases to be divisible, 
 it ceases to be an extent, and becomes either a point or an atom. 
 This is an axiom in geometry, and a self-evident truth. Let us 
 then determine that space, whatever else it may be, possesses 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 49 
 
 inevitably and of necessity the characteristic of being divisible. 
 And now, what is it to be infinite ? We have seen that it is to 
 possess actually, fullness or completeness of existence. We do 
 not force this definition on those against whom we are now arguing ; 
 it is common to both them and us ; we learned it in their school, 
 and in the school of all the rationalists. If infinity is not this, 
 they have done wrong to Locke, and their whole doctrine falls to 
 the ground. They cannot, therefore, dispute this definition ; and 
 what does it imply ? The indivisibility of the infinite, as the 
 doctrine of Locke, implies its divisibility. The infinite of Locke 
 is composed of an indefinite number of units joined to each other, 
 and for this reason he concludes that the world may be infinite.* 
 The infinite of the rationalists is a single unit, to which nothing 
 can be added, and from which nothing can be subtracted. Thus, 
 according to them, that which is infinite is of necessity indivisible. 
 If, on the one hand, that which is space is of necessity divisible, 
 and, on the other, that which is infinite is of equal necessity 
 indivisible, in pronouncing the words infinite space, we utter 
 something almost as rational as if we talked at random upon 
 divisible indivisibility. 
 
 The same reasoning may with equal facility be repeated as 
 regards time. Let us conclude, then, that infinite time and space 
 are not actual existences ; in the first place, because time and 
 space are merely relatives ; and secondly, because divisibility is 
 inherent in time and space, as indivisibility is equally inherent 
 in infinity. 
 
 But by what blindness can any school of rationalists place 
 their adversaries under the necessity of bringing such a demon- 
 stration against them? How is it that they treat with such 
 lightness this all-important word infinity? Can infinity be suit- 
 able to any being except to God ? Can any being be infinite in 
 one sense, and not in every sense ? What difi"erence is there 
 between the materialist who derives the infinite from an accumu- 
 lation of finite beings, and the rationalist, who composes infinity 
 from an accumulation of many infinites, which in reality are mere 
 abstractions and chimeras? If infinite space and time actually exist, 
 do they thus exist beyond God, or within him as his attributes? 
 
 If they are in God, he is necessarily extended and divisible, and 
 thus, like ourselves, neither perfect, nor absolute deity. If tliey 
 are out of or beyond him, there are then several ways of being 
 
 * See Note at the end of the volume. 
 
50 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 infinite: the idea of infinity, and the idea of perfection, are not 
 identical, from whence it follows that infinity is only a negative 
 conception. On whatever side we turn, we encounter nothing 
 but contradictions and impossibilities. We either fall into pan- 
 theism or a plurality of gods. Whoever is God is all God, and 
 cannot degenerate in any place or portion of his being. We 
 must either renounce God and the doctrines of the rationalists, 
 or chase away these absurd chimeras of absolute time and space — 
 fictitious existences, which for so many years have darkened the 
 clear light of philosophy. 
 
 At present, we obtain a glimpse of our general conclusion. 
 There is no such thing as infinite time, or infinite space. Time 
 and space begin with the world ; they are necessary conditions of 
 the world ; but God, who is infinite, is neither in time nor space. 
 He is beyond, without, and above both. God, therefore, to us, is 
 incomprehensible. 
 
 To convince ourselves of this, analytically, after having proved 
 that God is neither in time nor space, let us take some of his attri- 
 butes and examine whether they can possibly bear any analogy 
 to human faculties. For an example, w^e select intelligence. 
 
 Is God intelligent? We have seen that he is, and w^e have 
 permitted ourselves to say that he contains within himself a 
 certain perfection which we designate by that term. It cannot 
 be that he does not know the world, for he made and governs it ; 
 neither can he be without intelligence, for it is better to know 
 than not to know. As soon as he knows, he knows to perfection ; 
 and this is a sufficient reason why we, with our limited and 
 imperfect understandings, are not capable of comprehending 
 divine intelligence. But, besides, it follows from our imperfec- 
 tion that we are subject to change, or circumscribed by the 
 conditions of time and space. It also follows, from the perfec- 
 tion of God, that he is immutable or infinite, — which means, 
 above all time and space. Now, how can an intelligence, 
 necessarily changeable, comprehend an intelligence necessarily 
 immutable ? 
 
 Is it not true that the human mind passes incessantly from 
 one idea to another? " We sail on a vast medium, ever uncer- 
 tain and floating, driven from one side to the other. If we seek 
 to attach and fix ourselves to any particular end, it shakes and 
 leaves us.""^- 
 
 * Pascal, ThouglitSf edit. Havet., p. 13. 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 51 
 
 A brilliant imagination is one that flies rapidly to unexpected and 
 remote ideas ; a solid mind can recover, when they are required, 
 the ideas it has formerly conceived ; an expanded genius embraces 
 many ideas at the same time : but, whatever may be the propor- 
 tions of this triple affinity between human intelligences, there is no 
 single mind which can preserve all these ideas together, which can 
 embrace them simultaneously, and can take in at a single effort a 
 vast number of new ideas. We feel, as it were, our weakness in 
 our power ; for if we wish to acquire a fresh idea, we can only 
 accomplish it by giving up another. This we call concentrating 
 our strength. The operation is precisely the same as that 
 executed by the general of an array when he reduces the wings to 
 strengthen the centre of his line. He who does not possess this 
 power of concentration has a weak mind ; and yet to exercise it 
 is to prepare by sacrifices for an unequal contest. Every effort 
 to accelerate, strengthen, or extend the action of the thought 
 imposes fatigue ; redouble the effort, and the fatigue becomes 
 intolerable. At a certain point, we feel the necessity of pausing, 
 of proceeding more deliberately. It seems as if we struggled 
 less against the difficulty than against the time. With that, we 
 can reach the ideas we wish to attain. Let us then employ the 
 time required. The intelligence which travels quickly, traverses 
 a given space in a single day ; another, which moves with less 
 speed, requires two days, and perhaps a jear. There are not 
 only natural, but artificial distinctions. Because I have studied 
 and am acquainted with the latter, I shall arrive at the result 
 more rapidly than one who is ignorant of them. Is it not the 
 same in the physical world ? It was always practicable for a 
 man to go from Paris to St. Petersburg. Formerly this jour- 
 ney required several months ; now it can be accomplished in a 
 few days. Such is progress — a victory over time. 
 
 The reason why I am thus condemned to the attainment of 
 knowledge by degrees, is, that I myself belong to duration. Now, 
 duration being divisible, every reality has but an indivisible 
 instant, followed by an indefinite series of new indivisible instants. 
 This indivisible instant is called the present. While I am writing 
 this sentence I am no longer what I was when I commenced it, 
 I remember that I have been what I was ; but I am now changed. 
 In the heart of my conscience, something invincibly attests my 
 identity: but my whole is comprised in passing on, and remember- 
 ing. The moment which approaches, is not yet in existence ; 
 that which has been, exists no more. I am as if suspended 
 
 E 2 
 
52 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 between two nonentities, and every hour, every minute, every 
 second, carries me along with the rapidity of a torrent. I possess 
 memory, and some faculties of foresight : with the latter I compel 
 myself to follow the course of my life ; but my conscience only is 
 clear ; memory, imagination, and inductive knowledge, serve too 
 often but to throw me back into visible darkness. Thus, I feel 
 throughout my entire system, at the same time the exciting 
 impulse and the failing power. 
 
 Let us consider with some attention a very important attribute 
 of man, which we call the faculty of reasoning. This faculty gives 
 us the power of attaining, through the means of two ideas, a third 
 idea, which, unless by the aid of the preceding, would be beyond our 
 reach. As we well know, it seldom happens that an argument 
 springing from two common ideas arrives at a third idea at once 
 unexpected and extraordinary. Things do not proceed so rapidly. 
 From the humble state in which we are when we begin to reason, 
 we reach, by slow and successive degrees, the condition of learned 
 disputants ; that is to say, we establish not a single argument, 
 but a long series of arguments, one depending on the other. 
 But when several are thus connected, does not the whole appear 
 like a single argument, the principle of which is the principle of 
 the first, and the conclusion that of the last ? Now, who can decide 
 the number of intermediate arguments through which any given 
 mind must pass before it arrives from the first at the last point ? 
 This depends on the strength or weakness of the individual mind, 
 engaged in the discussion, and is a question of time. Is your 
 mind powerful ? If so, you will hurry at once from the principle 
 to the conclusion. Is it weak ? In tliat case you will pause and 
 divide your argument into distinct sections. There is no master 
 who has not proved the truth of this in the course of his practice. 
 I put forth a demonstration, and I perceive that I am not under- 
 stood : sometimes I confine myself to repetition as an appeal to con- 
 centrated or lengthened attention ; but nearly always I explain or 
 enter into minute points, and proceed slowly by minor arguments. 
 The same system prevails in the physical world, for the tortoise 
 at last reaches the end of its journey. To know, to judge, and 
 to measure our capacity, is to estimate correctly how much time 
 we require. Genius has been called a long patience. In other 
 ■words, genius is a mighty victory over time ; a victory which 
 prompt spirits may win by sudden assault, and slow ones by 
 perseverance. Montesquieu has profoundly observed, "The 
 success of most undertakings depends upon knowing exactly how 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 63 
 
 much time success requires." Descartes, at the conclusion of his 
 " Discourse on Method," does not complain of the weakness of 
 human intelligence, but of the brevity of human life. 
 
 It is not enough to acquire ideas ; it is quite as essential to 
 preserve them. Nature has provided for this, and, while imposing 
 limits to our power of acquiring and preserving, she has given us 
 resources by means of which we can combat with and pass beyond 
 these barriers. To extend our acquisitive faculties we have 
 argument ; and to widen the scope of the conservative quality we 
 can generalise and classify. The effect of generalisation is 
 marvellous, and enables us to multiply ideas a thousand fold, by 
 submitting to the labour of detail. To form abstract conclusions 
 is to give up details to gain the whole. He who cannot generalise 
 is unable to reflect, and he who is unable to abstract is equally 
 unfit to generalise. In life, we are placed, like the captain of a 
 ship, occasionally on the forecastle, looking out and struggling to 
 penetrate the mysteries of ocean ; and at other times, shut up in 
 the cabin, employed in arranging the objects we have disco 
 vered, and in casting superfluous ballast to the waves. Thus we 
 gain at the price of loss. We lessen the burden that we may be 
 able to bear it. 
 
 In general, analysis is a condition of all synthesis ; and all 
 analysis consists in diminishing the object under consideration to 
 adapt it to our own weakness. It has been asked, to what point 
 must we divide to complete an analysis ? Even to the minuteness 
 of our perceptions. There is no absolute rule, because there can 
 be no common measure. Every mind has its own range and 
 horizon. Language is the form which our thoughts take to com- 
 municate themselves to the other intelligences. It is also the 
 indispensable instrument of our studies; without language, we 
 can neither abstract nor generalise, and consequently it becomes 
 necessary to us that we may reason and remember. The instru- 
 ment of language is definition, which supposes a double com- 
 parison, one with a superior, and the other with a corresponding 
 species. Language is therefore essentially analytic ; to such 
 an extent that when we form a complex idea we are obliged to 
 unravel it that we may convey its meaning by words. Every 
 proposition includes or implies the affirmation and absolute reality 
 of our being ; so that besides the three grammatical members of 
 which it is composed, it involves a triple conclusion, of which 
 the one expressed supposes two understood ; and the same phe- 
 nomenon which we observe in language is reproduced in all our 
 
54 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 thoughts. The simple conception of an object by the mind con- 
 veyed through an organ, would be merely a vision, and in some 
 manner a dream, if our intelligence were not impressed with a 
 belief in its identical reality, which we call conscience ; and also 
 with a belief in the real existence of an absolute being, which we 
 denominate reason. By means of these two established con- 
 ditions, one of which permits me to pronounce and affirm, while 
 the other establishes a fixed point from whence I estimate the 
 value of the object perceived, I emerge from the chimerical to 
 the actual world. To decide that there is motion, three conditions 
 are necessary : an immutable being, a being that has moved, and 
 I myself who compare them. Thus thought is always manifold, 
 not only in its act, but in its constitution and foundation. Even 
 when I consider this faculty in an indivisible moment, and in its 
 application to a single object, it is still manifold ; for it places all 
 conception between the affirmation of the absolute and the 
 affirmation of myself. Such is the law of my imperfect and 
 limited mind, which everything condemns to motion, which is 
 nothing except by motion, and is only compelled to move on 
 account of its impotence. 
 
 After these reflections, it is not necessary to examine the nature 
 of God, in order to ascertain how much his intelligence differs 
 from ours. He never shifts from one idea to another, for he can 
 never differ from himself. To him, the past, the present, and the 
 future, are the same ; except as he distinguishes them in their 
 relations to us, and in the same manner as we ourselves are 
 distinguished. But, as his being is persistive and not progressive, 
 and the plenitude of his existence is included in a single act, 
 so all his components are ever and equally present to himself. 
 He neither remembers nor foresees. He cannot abstract or 
 generalise, for if he did, there would be some detail of which 
 he had no conception ; he never argues, for if he argued, he 
 would require an intermediate term to perceive the affinity of 
 a principle to its consequence. The chief duality which is 
 in us disappears in him, because, being himself reason, he 
 has a full consciousness of the truths of reason. All this 
 is as certain as it is incomprehensible. We understand, with 
 evidence, that God is a being immutable in all his attributes, 
 that he is above time and space, and consequently there is 
 nothing in his nature which resembles either extent or dura- 
 tion ; that he has no thoughts, sentiments, or inclinations which 
 gradually succeed each other and grow to maturity as in us, 
 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBrLITY OF GOD. 55 
 
 and we acknowledge in all humility that this constitution of 
 existence is too far beyond our intelligence for human explana- 
 tion.* 
 
 It is even by a palpable abuse that we use the words being, 
 thought, sensation, and will, indiscriminately, whether speaking 
 of God or of ourselves; for they cannot possibly have the same 
 sense in the two cases. We know what they mean when applied 
 to us ; when used with reference to God, they express only vague 
 and indeterminate ideas. St. Augustine, in writing of the Trinity, 
 says, " We speak of God as unity in three persons, less to say 
 something than not to remain altogether silent." From the same 
 motive, we have endeavoured to express the perfections of incom- 
 prehensible Deity. Plato was so thoroughly convinced of the 
 fundamental distinction between divine and human attributes, 
 that he did not say, " God is being," but " God is above being." 
 Christianity has taken another view, and after having declared 
 that God is, he icho is, subjoins by contrast that the world is 
 purely nothing. Compelled as we are to employ human language 
 in speaking of God, let us never forget that he is incompre- 
 hensible, and above all, when we say of him that he exists, 
 thinks, and determines, let us remember that these words merely 
 convey that he is the unknown and perfect cause of what we 
 denominate being, thought, love, and will. 
 
 * '' If there is a God, lie is totally incomprehensible ; for having neither 
 parts nor limits, he has no affinity with man." — Pascal, Thoughts, edit. Havet., 
 p. 145. 
 
56 THE NATUKE OF GOD. 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 
 
 "I had then lost sight of thee for a little space, oh my treasure, oh infinite 
 unity, that surpassest all multitudes ! I had lost thee, which was more than 
 if I had lost myself ! But I find thee again with more convincing evidence 
 than ever. A cloud had obscured my weak sight for a moment, but, thy 
 rays, oh eternal truth, have dissipated the gloom ! No, nothing but thee can 
 satisfy my thought, oh unity, who art all in thyself, and before whom all 
 accumulations of number are as nothing. I see thee again, and my soul is filled 
 with thee. All the fiilse infinites in thy place would leave me empty." 
 — Fenelon, On the Existence of God, part ii. chap, iii. 
 
 We know that God exists, and to what extent we can under- 
 stand him. The question now above every other, is to examine 
 whether he has made the world as a creation separated from 
 himself, or whether it is merely a modification of the divine 
 substance. 
 
 In our judgment the point is already decided; for we have 
 established that God is neither in time nor space : he is there- 
 fore beyond and outside the world. It is idle to speak of eternal 
 time and infinite space ; these are mistakes which lead directly 
 to pantheism. The mighty vacuum can only be occupied by 
 God, and his presence pervades it with mobility and divisibility. 
 For this reason the dogma of incomprehensibility is repugnant to 
 all rationalists who have allowed themselves to be deceived by 
 the pretended infinity of time and space. They require a com- 
 prehensible, a human deity, because they have no wish to 
 establish an abyss between God and the world. They are ready 
 with refutations of pantheism ; but these refutations evince 
 their good faith, joined to inconsistency, and recoil back upon 
 themselves. 
 
 The reason why we enter on the discussion of pantheism, 
 instead of proceeding at once to the proof of creation, is, that 
 creation cannot be proved : it is clearly demonstrated by the 
 demonstration of the existence of God, unless it can be shown 
 that it is impossible. The pantheists have no other argument 
 upon which to establish their system, than the impossibility of 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 57 
 
 creation. At one time they maintain that we are unable even to 
 form an idea of creation, and that the word is void of meaning ; 
 and at another, that the omnipotence of God could not produce 
 anything from nothing, because no terrestrial power is competent 
 to do this. Thus, they admit that there is a God, but pretend 
 that he is incapable of having created the world ; whence they 
 conclude that God and the world are distinct without being 
 separated. The question, then, is confined to the possibility of 
 creation. Creation is real if it be possible. 
 
 We shall commence by stating the objections of the pantheists. 
 First, What do we understand by this expression, — to create? 
 The Christian religion defines it thus : To create is to produce 
 something from nothing. This is, in plain fact, the meaning 
 given by all who admit the dogma of creation. Now, is it possi- 
 ble to produce something from nothing ? We may make one 
 thing into another, which is to transform ; but to make some- 
 thing from nothing, or to create, is not only impossible, but 
 absurd. Nothingness is not an element which can be employed 
 for any given purpose.''' We introduce the term in language 
 by an artifice which can be easily explained ; but we must not 
 carry the deception to the extent of assigning to nonentity the 
 functions of reality, for the two ideas confound each other. 
 
 God evidently can do what man is incapable of doing. But 
 when we afiirm that he makes a given thing which no one but 
 himself can make, it becomes necessary, at least, that we should 
 comprehend our own affirmation. To utter a word to which the 
 mind attaches no intelligible idea, is mere loss of time. What 
 idea can we form of creation, if the act of creating consists in 
 making something out of nothing? Whence could we derive 
 such a notion ? There is not a single object in creation which 
 does not proceed from another object ; we have nothing either 
 within or beyond ourselves which can give us the idea of original 
 creation. As regards this idea, we are in the same situation 
 with one born blind, in respect to his conception of colour. The 
 blind can speak of colours by hearsay ; but if all mankind were 
 without sight, could they speak of colours at all ? Could they 
 suspect the existence of colours ? Since, then, no man can create, 
 how can men acquire the idea of creation ? 
 
 A particular school of metaphysics considers it a leading point 
 
 * ** Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia suraet : 
 NuUam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam." 
 
 Lecrctiaa, De lierum Natura, lib. i. vers. 148, 149. 
 
58 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 to examine into the origin of ideas; and enters into minute 
 analysis to arrive at the conclusion, that our idea of cause is 
 produced by conscience, and not by external perceptions. 
 Although the world abounds in causes, we should live, according 
 to this school, in the midst of all these powers, witliout knowing 
 what powers are, if we were not one of them ourselves ; and the 
 same school attempts to maintain, that, although unable to 
 create, we possess the idea of creation. 
 
 No one dreams of disputing the axiom, that there can be no 
 effect without a cause. But of what value is this axiom ? To 
 comprehend it fully, we must first comprehend what is under- 
 stood by causes. The ancients divided them into four kinds : 
 the productive, the formative, the material, and the final. Let 
 us lay aside the formal cause, which applies more exclusively 
 to certain metaphysical doctrines. The three others are so com- 
 prised in the general idea of causation, that all schools agree 
 upon them ; hence it follows, by virtue of the axiom, ^' every 
 existing thing supposes a cause," — that a material cause is as 
 essentially requisite as an effective or a final cause. 
 
 The deists reason thus ; " If I see a watch, I say there is a 
 watchmaker : if I look on the world, I say there is a God." 
 But when I see a watch, I not only say there is a watchmaker, 
 but I say also that this watchmaker had copper and gold at his 
 disposal ; and these elements which he has employed are as 
 necessary as himself to the work he has produced. It becomes 
 then a mere waste of language, and an outrage against sense, to 
 speak of creation ; for the words that we assemble together, 
 when we say that nothing has become something, imply a 
 contradiction, and present no reality to the mind. Here is a 
 first objection against creation ; let us now consider a second. 
 Let God be a creator or not, what is he in himself, in his inmost 
 nature ? He is perfect ; for he must be so, or he could not be 
 at all. Do we know what perfection is ? Not absolutely ; but 
 we know something at least of the nature of a perfect being, as 
 this, for example, which is but a definition : that it must be 
 without defect, and consequently — one only. All deists, as well 
 as pantheists, insist on the unity of God ; and they prove it by 
 establishing, that not only is a single God necessary, and that the 
 harmony of the world supposes a single government, but that the 
 co-existence of two perfect beings involves a contradiction. In 
 fact, according to the deists, each of these perfect beings is want- 
 ing to the other, so that neither can be perfect. It is clear that 
 
CREATION AND rANTHEISM. 59 
 
 thought can conceive that the being of one might be increased by 
 the being of the other ; we thus imagine the absurd hypothesis of 
 a perfection more perfect than perfection. It follows, therefore, 
 that God is one, a conclusion with which all the rationalists agree. 
 But for the same reasons, he must be alone. In other words, it 
 is not enough that there is but one God ; there can be but one 
 divine being. 
 
 To prove this, or rather to prove pantheism, we have only to 
 take up the argument by which the partisans of creation demon- 
 strate continually that God is one. Since there can be nothing 
 beyond God which imagination can add to his being, what does it 
 signify whether we place beyond him a deity or a worm? It is 
 absurd to deny that he can be limited, and at the same time to 
 admit that he is limited. Whatever this limit may be, it ceases 
 to be infinity, if it exists. Do we say there are but God and a 
 worm ? If so, there can be no God, for the reality of this worm 
 can be added to the totality of God. Between this God, limited 
 by an atom, and the perfect and illimitable God, there is a fathom- 
 less abyss. This is the argument of the Eleatics.* They said, 
 " either God is all or nothing ; for if there is any reality beyond 
 him, that reality is wanting to his perfection." A third objection 
 has been drawn, not from the metaphysical nature of God, but 
 from his intellectual and moral composition. If God has made the 
 world, he has made it either on compulsion or of free will. It is 
 contrary to the hypothesis of creation to suppose that God should 
 have been constrained to create ; for this production necessary to 
 the producer appears not to be separated from him. And besides, 
 if the world is not only distinct but separated from God, whence 
 could proceed the necessity which forces God to produce the 
 world ? There is no power beyond, which can control him ; we 
 must, therefore, conclude that it belongs to his nature to produce 
 a work external and strange to his own being. This is to 
 fall into an evident absurdity. Therefore, God has created 
 of his own free will, or, in other words, he created because 
 he would create. Here arise innumerable difficulties, if not 
 impossibilities. 
 
 Let us first consider this act — to will ; the consequence of which 
 is a defined and limited world. Is it not, in itself, a determina- 
 
 * A sect founded by Xenophanes in the sixth century before the Christian 
 era, and named from the city of Elea. They maintained that God and the 
 world were the same. — Note by Translator, 
 
60 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 tion, and, consequently, a limit of the nature of God ? It seems 
 that no act of God can he otherwise than infinite, and can have 
 only infinity for its object. 
 
 This will of the eternal God, is it eternal like himself? It 
 must be, since there cannot be two Gods, or, which amounts to 
 the same thing, since there can be no difference in God. As he 
 is eternal, there is in him neither before nor after : he is above 
 time, and he is perfect, there cannot be in him first one state, and 
 then another ; he is eternally similar to and identical with himself. 
 If, therefore, he has willed, he has willed to all eternity; his will, 
 like his existence, can have neither beginning nor end. Now, is 
 this continual and eternal will, continually and eternally efficient? 
 Undoubtedly it is, for if its efficiency were not immediate, time, 
 which we have excluded from the divine attributes, would intrude 
 itself into divine power, and eternity w^ould disappear. Besides, it 
 is impossible that God should will uselessly. To will without an 
 object is the direct characteristic of impotence. What, therefore, 
 should render the will of God inefficient ? There is nothing 
 beyond him which could oppose an obstacle, since, according to 
 the hypothesis, all that is beyond him is his own work. Nothing- 
 ness cannot contend with God. Let us, therefore, conclude that 
 the world has had no beginning, and will have no end. But this 
 conclusion is as formidable to the dogma of creation as the hypo- 
 thesis of divine fatality. When once eternity is attributed to the 
 world, the idea of eternity becomes dark and confused. The 
 world is moveable, and, therefore, perishable. Is it not holding 
 logic in contempt to say, that we cannot suppose the world to 
 have been created without affirming that it is eternal ? 
 
 Why do we require the dogma of creation ? To place in 
 absolute separation from God the imperfections of the world. 
 But w^hat does it signify that this imperfection shall be separated 
 from God, if it is his necessary work, and co-eternal with him, 
 by virtue of his own nature ? Is it not to be imperfect, to be 
 condemned to produce eternal imperfection ? 
 
 What we have said of time, let us now repeat of space. The 
 same reasons which compel the world to be eternal, oblige it also 
 to be unlimited. The efficiency of divine power can 'neither be 
 limited by place nor moment. Thus, the world is infinite in time 
 and space. As soon as this consequence is made apparent, the 
 mind is compelled to avow that it has bewildered itself, for there 
 are neither infinite space, infinite extent, nor indivisible divisi- 
 bility. The advocates of creation prove against the atheists that 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 61 
 
 the world is neither infinite in time nor space. They must either 
 renounce this argument, or give up divine omnipotence. 
 
 Let us efface these difiicuUies, and suppose them resolved : 
 here are still others. If God has willed the world, he has desired 
 it. To will is to produce an act with knowledge of the cause, and 
 for a specific motive. Why has God desired the world ? It is 
 impossible that lie can have desired it ; being perfect, he wants 
 nothing. Not only he cannot desire, but if he desired, would his 
 wishes incline him to imperfection ? Every being who desires an 
 inferior being degrades himself. God can neither love nor desire 
 anything but perfection ; he cannot desire the world, he cannot 
 will the world, and he cannot have created the world. 
 
 This impossible desire, if it existed, would be eternal. Thus, 
 the desire of God would be as inefficient as his will, whilst the 
 world is eternal. The inefficacy of will is impotence ; the inefficacy 
 of desire a misfortune. We must either resign ourselves to these 
 impieties, or confess once more the eternity of the world. But 
 the arguments which prove the eternity and infinity of the world, 
 do they not also establish something else ? Are there no limits 
 but in space and duration, and are there none in the very essence 
 of our being ? The act which produces a finite series is finite ; 
 the act which produces an infinite series of finite beings, is it not 
 itself finite ? If the world is created by a perfect God, the world 
 is perfect. But if it is perfect, wherefore was it created ? and why 
 should there be a God ? 
 
 No, the world is not perfect, according to the advocates of 
 creation; it is not eternal; it is not infinite: these are con- 
 clusions which they will never renounce; they would sooner 
 oppose their own principles. Let us see, then, whether, when 
 these contradictions are swallowed up, an imperfect and terminable 
 world does not prepare new ones. 
 
 God is all-good and all-powerful; he has made the world of 
 his own free will ; why, then, is there evil in the world ? The 
 advocates of creation are bad lawyers:— first, to prove that God 
 exists they show that the world is imperfect ; and then, to reply 
 to the objection which we have just set forward, they hesitatingly 
 attempt to deny the imperfectness of the world. These tergiver- 
 sations condemn them, and leave them nothing but half- reasonings 
 and contradictory views. If the world is perfect, let them say 
 so : if it is imperfect, let them explain how and why. 
 
 Even their explanations are contradictory. If we open their 
 books, we perceive that some maintain that what appears to us 
 
69 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 evil, is, on the contrary, good ; and that we are deceived by our 
 own ignorance alone. What does this answer mean ? That there 
 is no such thing as evil, or that there is less than we suppose ? 
 What imports the degree? It is sufficient, that evil should exist 
 to limit the goodness and power of God. Others assert that evil 
 was necessary that man might be tried. This is a mere subtlety. 
 Of what use is this trial to him who could at first have made us 
 better? Who succeed under it? The greater number? No; 
 by the avowal of all, a very small minority. Thus, for one family 
 of the elected, who buy their happiness by long and terrible 
 sufferings, the immense majority have nothing but the trial 
 without the happiness. And is it after giving utterance to this 
 despairing truth that they sing hymns in honour of divine good- 
 ness ? Let us leave evil thus considered, and take finitude under 
 its abstract form in time and space. The world is limited in 
 time. What was God doing before he produced the world ? Why 
 did he do without the world at one period, and why afterwards 
 did he will that the world should be ? What relation has the 
 durability of the world with the time that has preceded and will 
 follow it? The same questions may be applied to space. Why 
 has God filled one corner of space and left the rest empty? What 
 use does he make of this vacuum ? What is the relative dimension 
 of full and void ? Somewhere there must be an atom which is 
 the last component of the world ; on the side on which we are, 
 it verges towards another atom: to what does it approximate 
 on the opposite side ? Can it be, by chance, to nonentity ? The 
 doctrine of creation is now obliged to assign a part to nothing. 
 This looks like philosophy based upon nonsense, and expressed 
 in words without meaning. As soon as we have determined that 
 the world is limited in time and space, we may be asked why the 
 Creator has chosen a certain limit rather than another; why he 
 has not doubled the dimension and duration of the world ; why 
 he has placed it where it is and not in some other spot ; why he 
 has not created it one minute or a million of years sooner — for it 
 is all one ? No answer can be given to these questions, perhaps 
 on account of our ignorance : not so, but on account of the nature 
 of things. All space is equal to another space, and all time to 
 another time; therefore all time and all space could receive the 
 world as readily as the particular time and space which have 
 received it. If then God has selected this time and space in 
 preference to any other, he has chosen without a motive ; whence 
 it follows that he is governed by chance, and is neither good, nor 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 63 
 
 intelligent, nor free. It is to fall below the standard of rational beings 
 to determine without a motive, or upon insufficient motives. And 
 how could the nature of God submit to be guided by chance, if it 
 be true that the excellence of the end, in every thing, constitutes 
 the goodness of the act, and the superiority of the agent? 
 
 Such are, in a condensed form, the chief arguments of the pan- 
 theists against creation, which they pronounce impossible, contra- 
 dictory, and absurd: from whence they draw this conclusion, that if 
 God is the cause of the world he has not employed creation as 
 the means. Instead of using the word creation, which conveys no 
 distinct idea, why have we not sought in the examination of 
 nature to explain*^ the action of a power ? We are ourselves a 
 power ; what do we do under this signification ? We modif}^ 
 beyond ourselves, a pre-existing matter, and we modify within 
 ourselves our own proper substance. God cannot modify a pre- 
 existent matter beyond himself, for there is nothing, and there 
 can be nothing beyond himself. What then does he do ? He 
 modifies his own substance in himself, and these distinct modifica- 
 tions, inseparable from God, are the phenomena of the world. 
 Thus the abyss is filled-up which it has been attempted to hollow- 
 out between God and us, unintelligible metaphors disappear, and 
 all becomes simple, clear and comprehensible. Evil itself vanishes 
 in this unity in which the whole is responsible and can repair 
 itself. W^e are no longer compelled to make an effort to under- 
 stand that God is near us, since it is in him that we live and 
 have our being. 
 
 Having pointed out the objections ; we shall now endeavour to 
 reply to them. 
 
 But, first of all, let us throw aside an error which might 
 uselessly perplex the discussion. The pantheists demand, in 
 what originates the idea of cause ? We do not derive this notion 
 from external observation, but from conscience. Thus, the first 
 cause with which we are acquainted, is the cause that we are 
 ourselves. Now, we are not a creative, but merely a moving 
 cause. The idea therefore that conscience supplies us with is 
 that of a moving cause. If the act of creating were comprised in 
 the act of moving, we should then, by means of analysis, be able 
 to pass from the idea of a moving cause to that of a creative one : 
 but they are not so combined. Creation and motion are two acts of 
 a very different nature, and the idea of the second is so far from 
 being included in the idea of the first, that the power of creating 
 is evidently much superior to that of producing movement. The 
 
64 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 pantheists conclude from tlience that creation is a hybrid idea ; or 
 rather, according to them, a formula without idea, the incompre- 
 hensible definition of an act which has no existence. 
 
 This difficulty is not serious, being founded on an error in the 
 statement of fact. It is true that we derive the idea of cause from 
 our conscience ; it is also true that we are not ourselves a creative 
 cause ; but the idea that we acquire in the first act of conscience 
 is the simple idea of cause, and not the complex notion formed of 
 all the elements comprised in this primary act. In other words, 
 although the first cause of which we obtain perception is a moving 
 cause, free and voluntary, we do not commence with the complex 
 idea of a moving, free, and voluntary cause, to arrive afterwards at 
 the simple ideas of cause and freedom. It requires reflection to 
 comprehend that the power of causing which is in us, is nothing 
 more than the power of motion and transformation. The same 
 degree of attention which determines the kind of cause that we 
 are, settles also that which we are not. The complex ideas of 
 creative and moving cause both arise from the reflections we 
 make on the simple idea of causation supplied to us by 
 conscience. 
 
 Let us add that we ought not to confound the scientific formula 
 of an idea with the idea itself. It has been said that the formula 
 of creation was only discovered by Christianity. Even if this were 
 so, the result would be no more than that an extremely clear idea 
 has been slowly established. But the statement is erroneous, 
 and the proof lies in the sentence of Lucretius, ex nihilo nihil. 
 Lucretius denies creation ; he therefore must have had a conception 
 of what he denies. The truth is, that no school of philosophy ever 
 taught the dogma of creation before Christianity. 
 
 The facts regarding the origin of the idea of creation being thus 
 re-established, let us examine more closely the objections of the 
 pantheists. 
 
 They begin by reproaching us with using empty phrases when 
 we assert the doctrine of creation, because the word creation is 
 incomprehensible, and conveys no explicit idea to the mind. Is 
 it true that the word creation carries with it no distinct idea ? 
 The entire question is comprised in this. Now there are words 
 which represent a simple idea, and there are others whicli embody 
 a complex idea. The word creation belongs to the second 
 category, and we shall endeavour to show by a most minute analysis 
 what are the simple ideas that it includes. First, when we say 
 that God has created the world, we affirm that he is the cause of 
 
CKEA.TION AND PANTHEISM. 65 
 
 the world. This is a clear, positive idea, tlie scope of which we 
 thoroughly understand. 
 
 In the second place, the word creation evidently implies that 
 the cause of the world is exterior to the world. It is so certain that 
 this is comprised in the word creation, that the whole dispute 
 between the pantheists and us is confined to this point : for they 
 declare that the phenomena of the world are simple modifications 
 of the divine substance ; while we maintain, on the contrary, that 
 the phenomena of the world modify, not the substance of God, but 
 an extraneous substance which God has produced through his 
 omnipotent power and freedom of will. Is not this thoroughly 
 comprehended? 
 
 Here are then two ideas, one positive and the other negative, 
 implied by the word creation : and yet we are told that it has no 
 meaning. 
 
 When I say, " God created the world," I mean, " God pro- 
 duced the world, and has produced it as a separate existence 
 from himself." This affirmation and negation are both indis- 
 putably clear. 
 
 The word creation implies something more. It signifies, 
 that when God produced the world as a separate existence from 
 himself, there existed nothing previously separated from him, 
 either substance or phenomenon. Is not this third idea as 
 clear as the two others ? 
 
 Thus, there are included under the term creation three 
 perfectly intelligible ideas ; so intelligible, that they all three 
 provoke extremely explicit negations, in which there is not 
 the slightest obscurity. Why do they speak to us of a doctrine 
 that means nothing? There is none more full of meaning. 
 When I affirm the reality of creation, assuredly I know what I 
 assert 'and what I deny.* What is there then really incompre- 
 
 * *' What is the meaning of producing the world from nothing ? That whicli 
 never was, never can become anything else. This is true ; but to say tliat God 
 has made the world from nothing, does not imply that he used nothing as a 
 material with which to construct the world ; it means that the world did not 
 exist of necessity, and that it derives from God not only its form and movement, 
 but its being and substance. That it exists actually, separated from God, 
 although dependent on him ; that the will of God has produced the world 
 voluntarily, and by the sole virtue of its own ethcaey, without the concurrence 
 of any other i)rinciple ; because, beyond God and his works, there is nothing : 
 that the power of God not only ditters from the power of man by this unique 
 characteristic, that ours is limited, while his is iulinite, but also, that we can 
 only modify what already exists, while he can bestow existence. When we aliinu, 
 in this sense, that God could not extract the world from nothing, we limit the 
 
66 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 hensible in this ^vord creation? One point only, but a very 
 leading one. I comprehend that God is the cause of the world ; 
 that he has produced the world as a separate existence from 
 himself; and that before the world was made, nothing existed 
 separate from God. But I cannot comprehend how he has been 
 able to produce tlie world under these conditions. 
 
 Now, then, the object of the pantheists appears in all its 
 nakedness. They desire to know how God has produced the 
 world. It is in vain to tell them under what conditions he has 
 produced it : if we are unable to penetrate the absolute secret of 
 his creative power, they accuse us of not understanding ourselves, 
 and of substituting words for ideas. The truth is, that far from 
 knojving how creation has been produced, we do not know how 
 any thing has been produced, not even the cause of our own 
 being. What then is the cause either within or beyond ourselves 
 of which we can assign the reason? If we exhaust our faculties 
 in searching for examples, we shall find none. When we dis- 
 cover a resemblance between the mode of action of a new cause, 
 and that of one previously known, human pride gratifies itself by 
 calling this an explanation : it is in fact nothing more than a 
 comparison, and as we could not possibly discover how the earlier 
 cause acted, we are equally unable to lay open the mode of 
 action of the more recent one. Our ignorance, in this respect, is 
 invincible, even when the question relates to secondary causes, or 
 even to the cause that we are ourselves. What will this ignorance 
 amount to when the inquiry applies to God? 
 
 We conclude, therefore, that the objection founded on the 
 incomprehensibility of creation has no weight. Let us now con- 
 sider the next. If the world is an existence separated from 
 God, we may, by power of thought, add this existence to God, 
 and thus conceive the idea of a being more complete, and con- 
 sequently more perfect than perfection ; which is absurd. 
 
 This difficulty is a serious one ; so much so, that according to 
 our opinion it should be set aside rather than solved. We shall 
 show that the pantheists have no right to bring it in opposition, 
 and that it is more formidable to them than to us. It proves 
 nothing against our doctrine, but it establishes something against 
 human knowledge. 
 
 It is not necessary that any particular school when opposed to 
 
 Divine power, whicli has no limit except contradiction. Does tlie production 
 of a substance involve contradiction ? If so, let it be proved." — Jules Simon, 
 History of the School of Alexandria^ vol. i. p. 368. 
 
CHEATION A^'D PANTHEISM. 67 
 
 another should take advantage of arguments which bear against 
 all schools at once. Even between the pantheists and us there 
 is this difference, that we candidh^ admit the limits of philosophy, 
 while they acknowledge none. We maintain and prove that the 
 mind of man cannot explain every thing ; they, on the contrary, 
 are compelled to assert that all things are accessible to human 
 intelligence. Now, the existence of plurality will never be 
 explained or understood : neither by us, who regard plurality as 
 a production separated from God by his omnipotent will, nor by 
 the pantheists, who look upon it as composing an integral and 
 necessary portion of the divine nature. 
 
 It is abundantly evident that God suffices to himself. It is 
 equally so that he possesses entire plenitude of being. If he has 
 this perfect fulness of existence, if it is impossible that any reality 
 can be wanting to his nature, how can there be existence sepa- 
 rated from him ? Let it once be admitted that he is not single, 
 and we can then, in imagination, add something to his being, and 
 consequently augment divine perfection ; which is absurd. 
 
 This objection astonishes the mind ; but what are we to con- 
 clude from it? That reason cannot explain every thing, and 
 consequently that reason is limited. And what beyond this ? 
 Nothing, as we shall proceed to demonstrate. 
 
 On the question of the existence of God, and before entering 
 into details as to the government of the world, there are not, and 
 there never can be, more than four schools or doctrines : tliose 
 of the atheists, the eleatics, the pantheists, and the partisans of 
 creation. The atheists maintain that there is no God ; the 
 eleatics that there is no world ; the pantheists that the world and 
 God are one. 
 
 And the partisans of creation, that the world exists separated 
 from God, by virtue of his omnipotent will. 
 
 Those who oppose to us the objection we are now discussing, 
 will they conclude from thence that God does not exist? 
 Certainly not: they beheve themselves as far removed from 
 atheism as we are. Or, that the world has no existence ? No : 
 if such a doctrine could have been professed in remote ages, when 
 the audacity of thought acknowledged no restraint, it is entirely 
 inconsistent with modern practice, which, after all, attaches 
 some value to evidence. 
 
 This difficulty then is placed in our way, solely to establisli the 
 conclusion that the world and God are one. This being admitted, 
 the question may be rendered in the following terms : — 
 
 F 2 
 
68 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 The co-existence of unity and plurality, or if it must be so 
 expressed, of perfection and imperfection, is inexplicable ; but is it 
 more so in the hypotliesis of creation than in that of pantheism ? 
 
 Let unprejudiced minds weigh attentively the question as 
 here put, and they will convince themselves of the complete and 
 scrupulous accuracy of the formula. Now, the world, according 
 to pantheists, is a portion of God, and according to us, is 
 exterior to, and separated from, God. 
 
 So that the question may again be rendered thus : — 
 
 Unity and plurality co-exist. Is it more difficult to compre- 
 hend that plurality forms a portion of unity, than that plurality is 
 exterior to, and separated from, unity ? 
 
 Or, finally, in other terms : — 
 
 Is it more difficult to comprehend that imperfection should 
 form a part of perfection, than that imperfection should exist 
 exterior to, and separated from, perfection ? 
 
 This comprises the whole. The question thus laid down is 
 determined. 
 
 It has been timidly asserted that the world has more reality in 
 the system of creation, which gives it an individual substance, than 
 in the doctrine of pantheism, which reduces it to the condition of 
 an assemblage of phenomena ; but, besides that this hierarchy 
 in degrees of reality partakes somewhat of the arbitrary and subtle, 
 the degree signifies nothing. It is sufficient that imperfection 
 exists, and it imports not whether it is a substance or a quality, 
 a world, or an atom. 
 
 Neither must we believe, according to the pantheists, that unity 
 co-exists with plurality, without producing it, while according to 
 us, it does produce it. The trutli is, that it produces it in all 
 cases ; there, beyond itself ; and here, within its proper sub- 
 stance. If it is asserted that one of these operations is more 
 easy and intelligible than the other, the assertion amounts to 
 nothing beyond senseless words ; for we know not how any thing 
 is done, whether we consider our own works or those of God ; 
 we believe that we comprehend better the action of the forces 
 which are the most familiar to us, and this is all. Now the 
 action of producing within and beyond ourselves is equally 
 familiar. I produce within myself a thought ; I produce beyond 
 myself a movement. There can be no doubt that these two 
 problems, whatever the presumptuous philosophy of pantheists 
 may say to the contrary, are perfectly incomprehensible to me ; 
 but they are incomprehensible in the same degree. 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 69 
 
 We entreat our readers not to lose sight of tins douLle prin- 
 ciple, which ^Ye believe we have made sufficiently clear by what 
 has preceded. It is true that the existence of the world is as 
 inexplicable as it is indisputable. And it is also true that the 
 existence of the world is, at least, as inexplicable in the hypothesis 
 of pantheism as in the doctrine of creation. 
 
 Thus, pantheism remains (without any advantage) encumbered 
 with the difficulties that peculiarly belong to that system. 
 
 A third objection has been urged against us, in the fact that 
 the partisans of creation are compelled to maintain that God has 
 voluntarily produced the world.- We fully admit this. There 
 have been, undoubtedly, supporters of our doctrine who declare 
 that God was constrained to this act, that he could not do other- 
 wise ; but Ave ourselves accuse them of inconsistency, and adhere 
 to the perfect liberty of creation. Can any one believe that it is 
 possible to augment the perfections of the Deity, by taking from 
 him free-will, and subjecting him to inevitable laws? It must 
 follow as a direct consequence of this assumption that liberty 
 is evil in itself, and when uncontrolled, an inferior attribute. 
 Can such a conclusion be sustained for a moment ? On what 
 ground or authority is this attempt made to impose conditions on 
 God? Is it that the necessity of producing imperfection is 
 comprised in our idea of a perfect being? But, they reply, if 
 God willed the world, he has always willed it, and therefore the 
 world is eternal. This objection ought not to be used by the 
 pantheists. Do they mean to say that their God, inseparately 
 chained to the world, began to produce phenomena? Since 
 they admit eternity, let them not set it forward as an obstacle 
 to others. There is this difference, according to their doctrine, 
 that the world not being separated from God, divisibility forms 
 a portion of unity — and do they call this the clearness and com- 
 prehensibility of their hypothesis ? 
 
 But if our God has willed the world, he has desired it, and has 
 therefore desired imperfection : if he has desired the world, he 
 has known it, and, therefore, known imperfection. This, according 
 to the pantheists, is a declension ; and, in fact, logic supports 
 them. We shall not affirm that it is so, but that it appears to be 
 
 * Corollary to Proposition 22.—" It results from thence that God does not 
 act by virtue of a free will." 
 
 Proposition 23. — "The works that have proceeded from God could not 
 have been made in another manner, nor in another order." — Spinoza's Ethics, 
 part i. Translation of M. Emile Saisset, p. 33. 
 
70 
 
 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 SO. Philosophers, \vho were not pantheists, have been the first 
 to acknowledge, that, judging by the standard of man's faculties, 
 God could neither create, nor desire, nor know the world without 
 declension. Aristotle said, " God knows nothing except himself, 
 for there are things better unknown than known." And 
 Malebranche declares in his Christian Meditations, that " God 
 has chosen to take on himself the base and humiliating condition 
 of a creator." But let us remember that this is the standard 
 objection constantly recurring, the question of the co-existence of 
 the unit and the multiple ; and the point requires to be well 
 considered, for it embraces, under different forms, every difficulty 
 that can be raised on the question of creation. Now, as hereto- 
 fore, the problem is insolvible by human reason ; perhaps, in 
 some measure, more inaccessible to the pantheists than to all 
 others; they encounter special difficulties and impossibilities in 
 the common impossibility. How can they allege that to will, 
 desire, or meditate imperfection is a degradation, and that to 
 contain it is not equally one? Is not this mere trifling ? Does it 
 not require an effort to comprehend that the perfect can degrade 
 itself by producing the imperfect. But is it not extremely easy 
 to understand, without an effort, that the perfect must cease to 
 be perfect, if imperfection is included in its nature ? When the 
 pantheists triumph beyond measure in the imperfection of the 
 world, and oppose this as an obstacle to divine perfection, we 
 might say, and truly, that their object is either to render the 
 world perfect, or to destroy it altogether. But no ; their entire 
 design is to transport the world into God : and in this manner, 
 they do away with the antagonism which exists between the 
 creator and his work, the unit and the multiple, the immutable 
 and the moveable, the perfect and the imperfect. And this 
 perfection necessarily united to imperfection, is presented to us 
 as the ideal of perfection ! This all (Ylav), composed of two 
 parts, one of which contradicts the other, is offered as the 
 explanation of a nature supremely comprehensible ! 
 
 Even in bringing the question down to the conditions to which 
 they reduce it, and taking their own \ie\\, do they not admit that 
 God meditated the production of the world ? If they deny this, 
 they are little better than atheists ; if they allow it, why do they 
 oppose objections to us which apply so evidently to their own 
 principles ? 
 
 Undoubtedly, the eternity and infinity of the world are for- 
 midable difficulties ; its limits, if they exist, give rise to problems 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 71 
 
 which confuse human inteUigence. But, at least, we endea- 
 vour to account for and explain what appears unsettled. We 
 know that time and space are not actual existences, but merely 
 relative qualities ; that, consequently, totalities and units, wanting 
 the term of comparison, escape from time and space ; that the 
 human mind, condemned to analyse, and advancing only by the 
 aid of comparison and definition, becomes perplexed and con- 
 founded in presence of what it can neither compare, define, nor 
 measure. We have also learned that man is made for an inter- 
 mediate position, and to act accordingly; that he is neither infi- 
 nitely great nor infinitely small ; that his horizon, as far as it 
 extends, is clear, but that beyond it he sees only darkness : happy, 
 in having sufficient intelligence to distinguish his path, and to 
 enable him to perceive in the invisible world a star which directs 
 him ; a brilliant and a friendly star, and, in spite of its unknown 
 nature, an undecaying source of light and love. But all these 
 problems which we lay down without being able to solve them, 
 and which we pronounce to be beyond solution, are, as far as they 
 regard the pantheist, not problems, but contradictions. He can 
 no longer distinguish between time and eternity ; or if he does 
 distinguish, it is only under the condition of uniting them in the 
 same reality. He vainly pretends that God cannot move ; since, 
 according to his own doctrine, movement incessantly springs forth 
 from this immoveable source, and as necessarily falls back into it 
 again. God, at most, in his definition, will be the substance of 
 which motion and time are attributes; and thus it will become 
 necessary to oppose in contest the substance and the phenomenon, 
 the being and the life, the producing nature, and the nature 
 produced." 
 
 It seems as if we were present at the torture described in the 
 dream of Dante — two souls struggling in one body. 
 
 Finally, how is it possible to explain why the pantheists thrust 
 forward the moral and physical imperfection of the world as an 
 obstacle to the system of creation ? We freely confess the difii- 
 culty of explaining evil. It is true that evil exists to a great 
 extent. Not all the systems of philosophy, nor all the optimists, 
 
 * " By producing nature, ue ouglit to iinderstand tbat wliieli is in itself and 
 conceived by itself ; or rather, the attributes of substance, which express an 
 eternal, an infinite essence ; that is to say, God, inasmuch as we consider him 
 an unfettered cause." " I understand, on the other hand, by produced nature, 
 all that which follows from the necessity of the Divine nature, or of any of the 
 attributes of GodySplnoza's Ethics, part i. prop. 19, schol. Translation of 
 M. Emile Saisset, voh ii. p. 31. 
 
7:^ 
 
 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 can succeed in palliating or diminishing it. The triumph of 
 philosophy, and its true value, consist in teaching us resignation : 
 and thus we learn how bitter is the savour of life. But if calamity 
 were diminished, we should still reproach God in our weakness, 
 for our lives are passed in suffering, and not in learning how to 
 suffer. Nevertheless, we, who believe in creation, and who con- 
 sider man a being distinct, and separated from the creator of all 
 beings, although we cannot deliver ourselves from endurance, we 
 learn at least to comprehend it. We understand the unceasing, 
 severe, and obstinate contest of this thinking atom, against the 
 immense and insensible powers of nature, and also against the 
 human billows which our common destiny must encounter, but 
 which overbear individuals with the indifference of brute force. 
 We enjoy a bitter satisfaction in the struggle ; and, convinced 
 of our immortality, because we are equally certain of our dis- 
 tinct existence, we feel that being alone immortal in the midst of 
 the world, our victory is safe, although dearly purchased. Thus 
 we pass through the combat, bearing within ourselves what unites, 
 at the same time, resignation, consolation, and courage — an 
 undying hope. What do the pantheists offer in place of this 
 immortal identity ? They leave us the battle, but take away the 
 reward. They probe the wound, but tear away the dressing. 
 They expose our sores, and to alleviate them, teach us that we, 
 sick and deformed, constitute the lowest portion of a whole, filled 
 with health and harmony. Man may complain and suffer, pro- 
 vided that the universal serenity is not disturbed. He dies ; but 
 in dying, he knows that the mass of existence has suffered no 
 diminution. His dissolved being goes to unite itself with other 
 atoms, to produce fresh phenomena in the common bosom of 
 nature : a dull insignificant immortality, which the heart rejects, 
 the conscien(;e shrinks from with horror, and which implies anni- 
 hilation of the person, if not of the entire existence." According 
 to this system, when I am overtaken by death, what remains 
 of my individual being no longer concerns myself, but belongs to 
 a whole, imperceptible to my reason, and ignored by my con- 
 science. Thus my own immortality becomes a matter of indif- 
 ference to me ; my memory, my identity, and my person subsist 
 no longer. My soul is absorbed in the universal soul, as the 
 
 * "The present existence of the soul, and its poAver of imagination, are 
 destroyed as soon as the soul ceases to corroborate the present existence of the 
 body." — Spinoza's EthicK, part ii. scholium of the second prop. Cf. part v., 
 prop. 23, and scholium of prop. 24. 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 73 
 
 atoms which compose my body are swallowed up by the movement 
 which is perpetually dissolving and reforming all existing sub- 
 stances. Do I take any thought of these inert portions of my 
 corporeal nature, which, after my dissolution, go to fatten the 
 earth ? Can I draw either consolation or reliance from this 
 physical theory, that not a particle perishes in the material world ? 
 And what difference is there in the destiny of my body and that 
 \Yhich pantheism promises to my soul ? Thus I shall perish 
 totally, for the future of ray bodily substance is in fact no futurity. 
 Nothing remains to me but my trial and suffering, which 
 are individually mine without compensation. And yet, the sup- 
 porters of this doctrine speak of tlie justice of God ! They 
 reproach us with not sufficiently respecting it, when we maintain 
 the dogma of a future life, and when we proclaim human identity, 
 the continuance of the person, rewards and punishments I Is 
 it not, therefore evident that, if to account for the existence of 
 evil in the world is a difficulty for us, for them it becomes an 
 impossibility. 
 
 How would the question stand, if instead of suiTering, we were 
 to speak of sin? It is not easy to explain sin. We attribute it 
 to our freedom of action : but we know that passion acts powerfully 
 against freedom, that reason is unsteady, and that victories are 
 rare, difficult, and painful. We can scarcely suppress the 
 murmur on our lips when we remember that God, if he pleased, 
 might have increased our light, our strength, and our disposition 
 towards good. But at least, according to the system of creation, 
 the principle of our errors is in ourselves ; where is it according 
 to the doctrine of the pantheists ? In God I For why speak of 
 the human power as distinct from the divine nature, in a theory 
 which admits for God and man but one substance, one existence, 
 and one history ? ■■'• The pantheists may endeavour to reply, but 
 let them answer us as they please, their arguments must of 
 necessity prove more for us than for them. 
 
 We have now reached what may be called the common-place 
 argument for the refutation of pantheism. Pantheism, in its ordi- 
 nary acceptation, is entirely comprised in the identity of God and 
 the world. The refutation of pantheism equally consists in attri- 
 buting to God the imperfections of the world. The following 
 proposition is unquestionably simple, conclusive, and evident to 
 
 "All that I cau reply to those wlio believe that they can speak, remain 
 silent, or, in a word, act by virtue of a free decision of the soul, is, that they 
 dream with their eyes open." — Spinoza's Ufhics, part iii. prop. 2, and scholium. 
 
74 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 general conviction. Tlie doctrine of the pantheists consists in 
 maintaining that the world is in God : now the world is evil, or 
 at least contains evil ; therefore there is also evil in the nature of 
 God — which is direct blasphemy. 
 
 We perceive, in fact, that in all ages, pantheism has been held 
 impious by every contemporary school. Atheism itself has scarcely 
 excited more indignation. Three eminent names are distinguished 
 in the history of this doctrine — Parrnenides, Plotinus, and Spinoza. 
 They recal very different epochs of civilisation. Parmenides 
 carries us back to the pagan world, and the first dawn of philosophy 
 and learning ; Plotinus, to the last defenders of ancient institutions 
 engaged with the early founders of Christianity; and Spinoza to 
 the absolute triumph of the Christian faith, with its universal and 
 acknowledged authority. Nevertheless, Parmenides, Plotinus, 
 and Spinoza, have been encountered with the same weapons. 
 In the full strength of the seventeenth century, Bayle, Male- 
 branche, and Fenelon, those enlightened and acute minds, so 
 capable of thoroughly sifting the most abstruse questions, have 
 not disdained to borrow the commonest arguments in opposition 
 to Spinoza. They have shown absolute perfection enduring within 
 its own bosom every want, weakness, and deformity ; immensity 
 everywhere divisible ; sovereign goodness united, in the same 
 being, to utter perversity ; the same nature occupied incessantly 
 in creating and destroying, in building up and throwing down ; 
 inflicting punishment on itself, producing evil and its remedy, 
 establishing and violating the law, free in its most humble mani- 
 festations, and governed in its entire essence by a blind fatality; 
 God and the world amali^amated into one, and endinof, through 
 the struggle of opposing principles, in contradiction and chaos. 
 To this summary the pantheists reply that a confusion is imputed 
 to them which they have not created, — that they have never con- 
 founded God and the world, but only the substance of God, and 
 the substance of the world. Because God cannot be separated 
 from the world, nor the world from God, it does not follow that 
 the world is God, or God the world. There is only one sub- 
 stance, but there are two different modes. To conclude universal 
 identity from identity acknowledged in one particular point, is to 
 transform at pleasure the doctrine iri dispute, and to render it 
 absurd to obtain an easy triumph. Those who reason in this 
 manner against the pantheists might be caught in their own 
 arguments ; for, since they admit that every individual has a sub- 
 stance peculiar to himself, they are forced to allow that there 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEIS:^!. 75 
 
 is ill each individual a substance inseparable from attributes, 
 and attributes inseparable from substance. Do they, therefore, 
 conclude that all that is said of substance can be applied to 
 attributes, or that all that is said of attributes can be applied to 
 substance ? Not at all. Substance has the nature of substance, 
 and attributes have their nature of attributes : these are two natures 
 which no one can separate or confound. And since it is so, why not 
 allow the pantheists to distinguish between a perfect, active, act- 
 ing, and productive substance of the world, and attributes or phe- 
 nomena incessantly produced by this substance, and which differ 
 from it the more, that their nature is to be produced, while the 
 nature of substance is to produce. When the pantheists say that 
 the whole is God, they do not in the least mean to convey that 
 every separate part of the whole is God. The whole is complete, 
 because it is the whole, and consequently perfect : a part, on the 
 contrar}', b}^ reason that it is a part, is inevitably incomplete and 
 imperfect. Where, then, is the contradiction, and where the con- 
 fusion ? There is some truth in this answer ; nevertheless, the 
 objection of common sense remains. A substance which neces- 
 sarily produces evil, and is at the same time the necessary recep- 
 tacle of evil, cannot be absolute perfection. A whole, of which 
 evil constitutes a part, may be good ; but it cannot be the all-good. 
 It is not the ideal of perfection, for I can imagine another whole 
 from which evil shall be excluded. A body may be beautiful, 
 although it has a wound ; but it would be lending ourselves to 
 voluntary blindness to pretend that the beauty would not be 
 increased if the wound w'ere removed. Thus, distinctions are 
 futile, and evil in God is a degradation of the divhie nature. 
 The pantheists are justified in asserting that the existence of evil 
 is embarrassing, even for us ; but undoubtedly there is a great dif- 
 ference between producing an existence capable of good and evil, and 
 in being in oneself at the same time capable of good and evil. Our 
 God may be a perfection difficult to explain, but the God of the 
 pantheists is not a perfection.- Thus re-established in its true con- 
 ditions, this kind of objection, which is in every mouth, possesses 
 considerable importance. We might even carry the consequences 
 
 * "Is it a perfection to Le unjust in its parts, and iniquitous in its modi- 
 fications, ignorant, senseless, and impious ? There are more sinners than good 
 men, more idolaters than believers : what a confusion, Avhat a combat between 
 Diviuity and its components ! What a monster we here conjure up, Aristus ! 
 Wliat a fearful and absurd chimera ! A God, inevitably hated, blasphemed, 
 and despised!" — Malehranche, Ninth Discourse on Mctcqjhi/sics, sect. 2. 
 
76 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 of this doctrine further, as regards the moral effect. According 
 to the system of the pantheists, it seems that evil may legitimately 
 assume its place in us, since it exists also in God. I have weak- 
 nesses, but God has them too, I disturb order, I outrage nature, 
 I disobey the law, but God does the same. How, then, can I 
 say there is a law for good ? There can be no law, if all is in 
 God, unless, indeed, there is no evil in his nature. There is not 
 even a principle or an axiom of which the contrary is not true. 
 I cannot love God for the good he has done to me, without hating 
 him for the evil by which it is accompanied. He is good and bad, 
 beautiful and repulsive, intelligent and blind, worthy to be adored 
 and detested. Shall I, with this understanding of his attributes, 
 invoke or worship him ? I lose at once the law, the prayer, and 
 the hope. Pantheism wrests from me what constitutes the strength 
 of my thought, and sustains my heart. It is to be remarked that 
 pantheism, like all other false doctrines, turns its conclusions 
 against its premises. The same rule applies to mysticism, 
 and every system which, by the permanent or temporary 
 identification of opposite natures, involves the principle of contra- 
 diction, and entirely compromises logical reason. What do the 
 pantheists require at the commencement? The absolute per- 
 fection of God. What do they arrive at, at the end? They 
 accumulate all imperfections within the divine nature. This 
 alone suffices to condemn them : their own arguments supply 
 their own refutation. If we open Spinoza, but more especially 
 Plotinus, we shall find that no writers have ever declaimed in 
 more pompous terms of absolute perfection ; never has it been 
 more clearly demonstrated. It seems as if their God ceases to 
 be perfect, as soon as he begins to reflect, for he possesses two 
 conditions — the act of thinking, and that of being the object of 
 thought. Plotinus carries back his deity beyond the possible and 
 real, into the region of chimeras, by dint of taking from him all 
 that constitutes distinction and limit ; and when he has banished 
 him to this inaccessible solitude, and from these lofty dialectics 
 descends to explain the production of the world, what does he do ? 
 He pours into the bosom of God the streams of indefinite multi- 
 plicity. He employs the first part of his philosophy in excluding 
 all evil from the divine essence, and the second in restoring it. 
 
 With all its contradictions and mistakes, pantheism attracts 
 many minds : it assumes a fiilse appearance of mysticism ; it sub- 
 stitutes permanent identity for communion and ecstacy. It has 
 had the art of displacing the question and refuting the principle of 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 77 
 
 creation, instead of clearing up the principle of the confusion of 
 suhstances. While the pantheists employ themselves in esta- 
 blishing that creation is incomprehensible, we forget to ask them, 
 by what emanation they propose to replace it. But it is useless for 
 them to change the form of the argument, to substitute irradiation 
 for emanation, and to make God by turns a source and a centre. 
 These are mere images and metaphors, which it is almost puerile 
 to erect into a doctrine. That the world emanates from God, as 
 heat proceeds from flame, or as water runs off from an overfilled 
 vessel, — this is what they propose to us in place of direct creation: 
 a mighty discovery, and quite satisfactory to common sense ! The 
 vase, and the water issuing from it, produce a well-designed 
 image ; but it is not easy to apply it, or to comprehend that the 
 water was not in the vase before it left it, or that it did not cease 
 to be there as soon as it was poured out. 
 
 It was scarcely worth the trouble of insisting so strenuously on 
 the incomprehensibility of creation to arrive at an hypothesis 
 equally incomprehensible ; which doubles the importance of the 
 existing difficulties, and, in addition, embraces such palpable con- 
 tradictions. In fact, to render their doctrine plausible, the pan- 
 theists must combine with it the system of Bishop Berkeley. 
 Berkeley is a sceptic of a very peculiar class. He admits the 
 existence of reason and the laws of reason, and does not utterly 
 reject experience ; but, under the difficulty of comprehending the 
 reality of bodily matter, he supposes that God has created us to 
 believe that there are bodies, and laws by which bodies are regu- 
 lated, although nothing of the kind actually exists in nature. 
 Thus, for example, I believe that I see this table before me. I 
 believe that I touch it. I affirm that it is square in shape, brown 
 in colour, &c. Nothing of this is true. It is neither square nor 
 brown, nor a resisting object, since there are no bodies ; but we 
 dream that it exists, and by the will of God all men are the dupes 
 of their imagination. The pantheists are compelled to come to this 
 conclusion, and to say that we dream of bodies, and that God 
 dreams of us. This is rather more comprehensible than emana- 
 tion ; for a dream requires for its existence the dreamer only, and 
 the entire existence of the dream is in the dreamer. Let us 
 admit pantheism on these conditions, and figure to ourselves the 
 perfect being compelled to dream all these imperfections. Let 
 us ourselves resign our existence into the hands of the disciples 
 of Spinoza, and become, in consequence, less than an affinity, 
 less than a phenomenon : and let us place this world, with all its 
 
78 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 luminaries, below the importance of a bubble of soap, j^grl 
 sotmiia. After having shown themselves so haughty and exacting 
 at the outset, and having denied that human intelligence is con- 
 fined within certain limits, the pantheists conclude by bringing us 
 down to a very low estimate. But it is not only in a metaphysical 
 sense that they thus depreciate us. Having taken away our sub- 
 stance, they deprive us of liberty. The entire person of man 
 disappears, absorbed, carried away, and annihilated. 
 
 They may be permitted to think that it is a mere trifle to deprive 
 man of free ^ill : but we, in our turn, may be equally allowed to 
 say, that according to us, and the immense majority of all reflect- 
 ing persons, to compel a school to declare themselves fatalists, is 
 to force them to sign their own condemnation. We have no 
 occasion to press the point, for logic and practical experience 
 equally prove that liberty can have no place in the pantheistic 
 hypothesis : but it is ever profitable to meditate over and fathom 
 the depth of these conclusions. How can the pantheists allow 
 freedom of action to man, since they deny it to God ? 
 
 If the world is in God, it becomes inevitably necessary, and 
 everything that is in him becomes necessary also ; for if the world 
 had not been at all, or if it had been in any one of its parts dif- 
 ferent from what it is, the nature of God itself vs'ould be changed : 
 which is absurd. Tims there is neither free will in God nor in 
 the world. The word liberty, in the doctrine of the pantheists, 
 represents nothing but a negative, and corresponds with no reality. 
 To convince ourselves of this, we have only to read Plotinus and 
 Spinoza. 
 
 Plotinus says that God is a free agent, for not being able to 
 produce evil, he always produces good, without effort ; -:= and that 
 man can become free, because he can become analogous to God by 
 the annihilation of the evil passions. f According to Spinoza, 
 man is free when he directly desires good, and regulates his life 
 
 * 'AroTTwrepov av yiyuoiTO avTo to ayaOhv cLTvocnepeiu rov avre^ovaiov, on 
 ayaBov koI on i(p' cavTov /neuei, ov Sso/xevov icLveTadai rrphs &Wo, tCov aWoov 
 Kivovix4vwv TTphs avrh, ouSeu Siojufuou irphs ot'/Sevos. "It is the height of 
 .ibsxii'dity not to allow liberty to God, since he remains immoveable in himself, 
 and tliat all beings tend towards him, while he does not tend towards any 
 other being, and requires nothing from any one!" — Plotinus, Enncad. yi. 
 1. viii. sect. 7. 
 
 'I' To; Se 5ia vov rSiv iyepyeiuiu eXevOepca TraO-qfidrccu rov cruixaros, to 
 avT^^Qvaiov Scacro/xev. "We shall call him free, who, by strength of intelli- 
 gence, has delivered himself from the passions of the body," — Plotinus, 
 A'nnead. vi, 1. viii, sect 3, See Jules Simon''s History of the School of 
 Alexandria, vol. i, p, 468 et seq., and p, 574 et seq. 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 79 
 
 entirely by the dictates of reason.- According to both, liberty 
 does not suppose a struggle, but rather the impossibility of a 
 struggle, by the absence or destruction of the evil principle. 
 
 Let us suppose that Plotinus and Spinoza admit for a moment 
 the existence of liberty as ^Ye understand it; that is to say, that 
 they allow man the power of performing an act which depends 
 solely on human will : what will result from the dogma ? The 
 consequence must be, that man, by the sole possession of liberty, 
 becomes superior to God. 
 
 In fact, God, not being free, can neither modify his own sub- 
 stance, nor the laws, nor the phenomena of the world. What 
 God is unable to accomplish, man can perform : he introduces 
 into the whole an element which is not regulated by immutable 
 order, but depends on human caprice. 
 
 We say that two things are distinct when we can form in our 
 minds an exclusive idea of either, without however imagining 
 that they could exist in this isolation : and we say that two things 
 are separable, when we can conceive them as existing and sub- 
 sisting detached from each other. 
 
 Thus, for example, the idea of the statue is inseparable from 
 the mind of the sculptor, while the statue itself is at the same 
 time distinct and separated. Let us consider God as the sculptor. 
 Is the world then the idea or the statue ? 
 
 Not only, for all the reasons we have stated, is the world the 
 statue, but we, who form a portion of the world, are also statues. 
 W^e could not exist without God, who is our cause, but we exist 
 distinct from him, and the proof lies in the fact that we are 
 free. 
 
 The statue contains within itself all that is necessary to 
 existence, on the sole condition of having been made. It pro- 
 ceeds of necessity from an external cause, but, indisputably, it 
 has nothing to do with that cause. It has therefore an individual 
 being, a person that belongs to itself. 
 
 * Proposition 17. — " God acts by the sole laws of nature, and witliout 
 being constrained by any one. Demonstration. — It is from the sole necessity 
 of the Divine nature, or, in other words, from the sole laws of this same 
 nature, that an absolute infinity of things results, as we have shown in 
 proposition 16 ; and it has been further established, in proposition 15, that 
 nothing exists, or can be conceived, without God, but that all is in God ; 
 consequently, there can be nothing out of God which can induce or coin])el him 
 to act ; whence it follows that he acts by the sole laws of his own nature, and 
 without being constrained by any thing else : which was to be demonstrated.' 
 — Spinozas Ethics, part i. Translation of ]\I. Emile Saisset, vol. ii. p. 72. 
 
80 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 How then can this, which is true of unconscious marble, not 
 be equally applicable to a being endowed with the power of 
 modifying itself according to its own free will ? Not only do I 
 conceive that I have a separate existence, but I feel that I can 
 enter into a contest with other existences. How ! I contend with 
 them, and yet form but one with them ? Being acknowledged 
 free, I become, by definition, the sole author of the phenomena 
 which are passing within me, and nevertheless if we are to 
 believe the pantheists, I am neither an individual, a substance, 
 nor a power ? Such a conclusion is contrary to sound reason and 
 evidence. Being free, I am a power. Thus, there are two 
 powers, God and man. The pantheistic unity is destroyed. 
 
 Let its advocates increase to what extent they please, the 
 difference which separates absolute from relative power, or the 
 force that is all sufficient to itself, from tliat which is derived 
 and limited ; still they cannot say more, or even as much 
 as has been said by the supporters of the doctrine of creation. 
 We were the first to acknowledge that man cannot do without 
 God ; but he can struggle against God, and therefore he is a 
 separate being : as a single blade of straw suffices to overthrow 
 atheism so is a single free act enough to destroy the system of the 
 pantheists. What necessity is there then for all these arguments? 
 As long as I feel that I am a free agent, all the theories they can 
 urge will never induce me to forget that I am an individual per- 
 son, and consequently a substance. Let us conclude, then, that 
 pantheism and fatalism are the same thing. The doctrine is a 
 sentence of death. 
 
 The pantheists endeavour to turn the entire argument be- 
 tween them and us, on substance. How is it they do not 
 see that it is quite as difficult to reconcile the existence of 
 human liberty with the unity of God? There are not two 
 questions, but one. Since they are afraid to limit the divine 
 substance by the co-existence of another substance distinct from 
 it, they ought also to hesitate, from the same motives, before they 
 limit divine power by the co-existence of another power. It sig- 
 nifies little whether we suppose, separated from God, a substance 
 or a free power. Or rather, of these two ideas, a substance and 
 a free power, the second is the clearest, the most decided, and that 
 which bests conveys the notion of a separate reality, of an indi- 
 vidual existence. Strictly speaking, we may confound the rest ; 
 but it is quite impossible to thrust into one, two distinct liberties 
 struggling against each other. 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 81 
 
 Not content with depriving us of liberty, pantheism at the 
 same blow destroys the immortality of the soul.'' 
 
 Spinoza has said that the soul is immortal ; that he whose 
 body is suited to many functions, possesses a soul, the greater 
 portion of which endures for ever. But this eternity with which 
 he deceives us, is not the eternity of the individual person. 
 Every faculty that I feel within myself contradicts the doctrine of 
 Spinoza; conscience, liberty, and all that distinguishes and 
 separates me from the rest of creation. He saves nothing from 
 death but my material substance, and this he absorbs in universal 
 matter. I myself perish, or, rather, my living identity perishes. 
 Spinoza, in fine, notwithstanding the beautiful language in which 
 he writes, and the precise regularity of his exposition, accumulates 
 contradictions, because he is opposed to common opinion and the 
 ordinary interjDretation of words. We have seen him allow 
 liberty (while jesting with the word), at the same moment that 
 he denies it. By another equivocation he speaks of the immor- 
 tality of the soul: we admit that it is clear, that the destructive 
 and the creative powers are exactly of the same order ; and that 
 a system which denies the possibility of creation, must also deny 
 the possibility of annihilation. Thus, according to the doctrine 
 of Spinoza, the soul cannot perish ; nothing perislies, but all is 
 transformed. But it is this transformation which terrifies me. 
 Death, without destroying my substance, takes away my identity. 
 Is this to be immortal ? Spinoza might as reasonably say, that 
 my body is eternal. From the moment that my soul ceases to 
 remember itself, I am no more interested in its immortality, than 
 I am in the dust to which my body is resolved. We reduce the 
 pantheists to this dilemma: They pretend that God and the 
 world are distinct without being separated; which means, in 
 precise terms, that they are one by unity of substance. But in 
 this necessary connection of two opposite conditions, one of which 
 represents the perfect and immutable, the other the imperfect 
 and moveable, how do they distinguish the portion assigned to 
 God from that allotted to the world ? On whichever side they 
 
 * " Et quoniam mens est hominis pars una, locoque 
 Fixa manet certo, velut aures atque oculi sunt, 
 Atque alii sensus, qui vitam cuuque gubernant ; 
 Et veluti manus atque oculus naresve, seorsuin 
 Secreta a nobis nequeant sentire neque esse, 
 Sed tamen in parvo liquuntur tempore tabi : 
 Sic animus per se non quit, sine corpore, et ipso 
 Esse homiue." — Lucretiios, lib. iii. v. 547 et seq. 
 
82 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 turn, tliey are confounded; for, if they insist on the plenitude of 
 divine reality, the phantom of the world vanishes, and God 
 remains alone : if, on the other hand, the reality of the world 
 occupies their minds, God in their system is reduced to an 
 abstraction. The whole theory, sifted to the bottom, is nothing 
 but a compromise, without candour or clearness, between 
 Eleaticism and Atheism. 
 
 It is idle to say, in defence of the pantheists that they are 
 mystics ; that, in fact, they sacrifice the world to God. Truly, 
 we are under an obligation to them, if placed between the mystical 
 absurdity of Eleaticism, and the natural absurdity of Atheism, 
 they make the least odious selection. We admit willingly that 
 Plotinus and even Spinoza tend towards mysticism. This lends 
 a certain effect to their systems without adding to their truth 
 or solidity. But at the present day, atheism is at the bottom 
 of the greater part of pantheistic doctrines. We are no longer in 
 the age of Parmenides of Elea, who denied the world, nor even 
 in that of Plotinus, who considered it a phantom, and treated it 
 with contempt. Experience and sensation no longer suffer 
 themselves to be forgotten. The chimeras of idealism are 
 rejected. The world which conscience and the senses make 
 manifest, imposes itself on our conviction with undeniable 
 authority. Amongst those who would suffer themselves to be 
 seduced by pantheism, there are very few indeed who are disposed 
 to give up the dogma of human liberty : and there are none 
 content to be only a phenomenon, and to see in the world nothing 
 but unsubstantial appearances. Whether through choice or com- 
 pulsion they give the preference to reality, and in consequence 
 incline towards atheism. Here then is a system, which because 
 we are unable to comprehend creation, proposes to us to believe 
 that every thing emanates from God as water issues from a vase, or 
 a spark from the fire : which from a dread of sullying divine purity 
 by the supposition that God has created an imperfect world, 
 identifies the Creator with his work, and makes this very imper- 
 fection a portion of perfection ; which, first denies us the right of 
 supposing that God could have imagined, desired, or willed the 
 world without losing his own immutability ; and concludes by 
 placing this eternally changing world in his very thought and 
 existence : which refuses to admit that God has created evil or 
 unhappy beings, and yet at the same time considers all wickedness 
 and misfortune as phenomena of the divine substance — a system, 
 according to its partisans, alone capable of preserving the grandeur 
 
CREATION AND PANTHEISM. 83 
 
 of deity, the dignity of man, and the privileges of reason ; and 
 which ends in confounding God with an obscure and unintelligible 
 universal substance, in depriving man of his future, of his liberty, 
 and of his identity ; and in compelling reason to admit con- 
 tradictory doctrines. All this arises from denying, at the outset, 
 the superiority of God over man ; and so originates this host of 
 contradictions and failing arguments. 
 
 Alas ! In examining our own natures we find many reasons 
 for limiting human intelligence in order to preserve it. Supreme 
 and powerful within its proper sphere, when it endeavours to soar 
 beyond the prescribed boundaries, it loses itself in impossibilities 
 and paralogisms. The mind is formed to connect consequences 
 closely with a first principle, and to receive this originating cause 
 without demonstration : to explain by analogical reasoning all 
 the different parts of the world, and to explain the world itself by 
 the Creator, but on the condition of worshipping that Creator 
 without endeavouring to comprehend him. So impossible is 
 it to prove the first principle, or to understand the first being, 
 that the faculties of man can only demonstrate conclusions 
 on the preliminary admission of the incomprehensibility of God, 
 which forms at once the basis of all knowledge, and of the world 
 itself. 
 
 The pantheists desire to comprehend everything, including the 
 divine nature, and for this special reason they comprehend 
 nothing. We, on the contrary, believe that the divine nature is 
 incomprehensible, and this point admitted, we explain everything 
 else. 
 
 To maintain that everything can be proved is to be ignorant 
 of what proof is. All proof rests upon a principle, and every 
 principle upon another principle, of which it forms its base. There 
 is, therefore, a first or originating principle, which must be ad- 
 mitted without proof, or all logic is but a circle of error. In like 
 manner we can control our faculties one by the other ; but we 
 are compelled to say with Descartes, '* I think, therefore I am ; " 
 and consequently to acknowledge, without direct proof, the autho- 
 rity of conscience. This, it may be said, is humiliating to man. 
 Yes — if man has persuaded himself that he is God. 
 
 To pretend that the supreme being, from whom all existence 
 is derived, is comprehensible, and therefore analogous to the 
 beings he has created, is to feel the necessity of explaining 
 the world, and to refuse the means of explanation. Why do 
 we admit the existence of this sovereign power, whether we 
 
 G 2 
 
84 THE NATURE OF GOD. 
 
 denominate it God universal or substance ? Because there is nothing 
 in the world which sustains itself. Let us not, then, assign to 
 the solid base the fragility of the beings we desire to place there. 
 We may easily dispense with a deity analogous to his own work. 
 This human God is but the first link of a chain ; and the entire 
 world, with all human intelligence, are thus swept away into inde- 
 finite vacuum, until a fixed point is found, beyond creation, alone 
 and unconnected, which may be in itself the cause and foundation 
 of every thing else. 
 
PART THE SECOND. 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE DEMONSTRATION OF PROVIDENCE. 
 
 " The lieavens declare the glory of Grod, and the firmament sheweth his 
 Landywork. 
 
 " Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. 
 " There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard." 
 
 Psalm xix. verses 1, 2, 3. 
 
 The most important of all considerations to man, is that of 
 ascertaining whether God is actually interested in and occupied 
 with him. Unless this conclusion is borne in view, the problems 
 we have just gone through will lose a portion of their influence 
 upon the soul. It is not only as a basis upon which to found 
 metaphysical argument that we require a God, but to shed hope 
 and consolation over existence. 
 
 Providence is God's direct government over the world and 
 mankind; and to recognise this, it seems simply necessary to 
 look around and behold in all things the traces of wisdom and 
 goodness ; just as in judging of the laws of any particular country 
 it is sufficient that we see the inhabitants peaceable, industry 
 flourishing, and art encouraged. Since the beginning of phi- 
 losophy, systems have been erected on this foundation. ^Yhilo 
 metaphysicians multiply formulas, and exhaust their intellect in 
 an endeavour to discover the mj^stery of the creation in the 
 nature of God, (a bold undertaking for human weakness,) less 
 presumptuous philosophers content themselves with studying the 
 wonders of nature, with proving that the immense variety of its 
 
86 PROVJDE^'CE. 
 
 phenomena are regularly controlled by uniform laws, with 
 accounting for evil, while demonstrating that it does not proceed 
 from God, but from the ignorance and sinfulness of man, and 
 that its existence is necessary in order to produce an increase of 
 benefit. They hold that everything is for the best, from the 
 profoundest science to the most common-place and trivial ideas. 
 
 Each habit of daily life, each sentiment of the heart, each 
 vague impression, whether in the mind of an infant, or in the 
 enlightened comprehension of a man ; every discovery in science, 
 every achievement in art, serves in their estimation to raise them 
 towards God. They make the minute description of the creature 
 a hymn to the praise of the Creator. Far from sharing the deep 
 and gloomy enthusiasm of the mystics, who, in their desire for 
 ideal perfection, slight and despise the natural world, they, 
 through admiration and love of that world, teach themselves the 
 love of God. Their doctrine is neither exacting nor difficult; it 
 is easy, simple, benevolent, and suited to the ordinary condition 
 of humanity. Their language requires no effort to comprehend, 
 and they justly claim the merit of appealing to the heart 
 of the multitude. Philanthropic and beneficent philosophers, 
 exalted minds, whom to meet is to love, and the perusal of whose 
 ■works touches our best and most sacred feelings ! Well may it 
 be said, that as a special evidence of grace, those who consecrate 
 their lives to the task of conveying to us a knowledge of the love 
 of God, are themselves most worthy of love, and the most beloved 
 by their fellow men. God forbid that we should seek to turn a 
 single individual from the study of precepts combining evidence, 
 exhortation, and prayer. That which seeks to ameliorate evil, 
 exalt good, and convey to all mankind a knowledge of the Creator 
 and Father of the world, must be salutary and holy. There 
 cannot be a more beautiful subject of contemplation than these 
 souls, imbued with charity, and a fresh flowing fountain of ready 
 sympathy ; w^ho look on sin without taint, and feel an involuntary 
 impulsion towards all that is lofty and good. Sincere, com- 
 passionate, and generous minds, created to partake and impart 
 happiness; sometimes imprudent and often mistaken, yet proud 
 of errors which result from too exalted an opinion of others. 
 Let us permit these gentle beings, privileged by love, to paint 
 their enchanted world, where all is grand, beautiful, useful, and 
 well-ordered : where there is no terror, and where misfortune 
 never enters. Let us permit them, forgetful of all records of 
 historic injustice, to trace with a charmed vision the uninterrupted 
 
THE DEMONSTEATION OF PROVIDENCE. 8T 
 
 progress of arts, letters, civilisation, and public integrity. Let us 
 leave them in their belief that all mankind are born good and 
 virtuous, and that vice is only an exception and a misfortune. 
 Their illusion, if it be one, approaches nearer the truth than the 
 disenchantment of others. There is enough greatness and 
 harmony in the world, — enough justice in history, and above all 
 in ourselves a sufficient impulse towards good, to warrant and 
 justify their enthusiasm. They lose sight of evil in the world, in 
 history, and in man's heart, just as those, who, climbing a lofty 
 eminence, no longer behold the mire on the way-side. Thus, 
 instead of plunging into detail, they accustom themselves to view 
 the whole from an elevated distance. Hence we deduce that 
 beauty is found in greatness ; therefore, the abstract science of 
 metaphysics, when deeply studied and truly understood, has an 
 effect upon the mind similar to that produced by sublime poetry. 
 
 The objections raised against this method of demonstrating 
 Providence, bear more upon the extravagances of tlie optimists 
 than upon the foundation on which their theory is built. 
 
 It is demanded of them. Have you positively ascertained this 
 universal state of perfection ? The world is very vast compared 
 with our feeble powers : the number of beings it contains is so 
 immense, that the longest enumeration leaves their amount unde- 
 cided. How much bej'ond all that we know still remains to be 
 known ! Of the many different sciences of which collected science 
 is composed, who can boast of understanding more than one 
 or two, and even of comprehending these thoroughly ? Most of 
 the sciences are still in their infancy ; their study demands much 
 labour, and, when all that they teach is attained, we discover 
 beyond our farthest point of view an horizon which will supply 
 work to millions of future generations. Were it possible for a 
 single mind, during a single existence, to master all science, all 
 science would but explain one very small corner of the universe. 
 During the two thousand years that have elapsed since the age of 
 Thales and Pythagoras, much has been done, when the present 
 state of knowledge is compared with what it was then ; but how 
 little, when the secrets drawn from nature are placed in the 
 balance with those she still retains in her bosom ? * 
 
 This condition of human learning should not discourage us in 
 the pursuit, but should at least deter us from attempting a 
 
 * "Quota pars operis tauti nobis committitur ? " — Seneca, Quasi. Nat. 
 lib. vii. cap. 30. 
 
88 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 summary or drawing a conclusion. Alas ! wlien all we know is 
 proved to be good, we can but conjecture the goodness of what 
 remains unknown. 
 
 It is not only the extent of our knowledge that is limited, but 
 its nature also ; we know little, but do we even know that little 
 correctly ? This is not an argument of scepticism, far from it ; 
 but the necessity of knowledge, human pride, and its sister, 
 human frivolity, the custom of accepting as explained that which 
 is only familiar,— all these influences induce a habit of taking com- 
 parisons for definitions and conjectures for facts. Sometimes 
 resignation, but more frequently ambition, induces us to be easily 
 satisfied. It is difficult to persuade a chemist that he cannot 
 define matter, a physician that he knows not the nature of exten- 
 sion, or a philosopher that God is incomprehensible. The most 
 puerile doctrines have been gravely taught in the most celebrated 
 schools by men of genius. Let us speak respectfully of the past, 
 for history shows us that modern science is in many instances 
 equally open to contradiction. 
 
 When we read in Xenophon the enumeration of the miracles 
 by which Socrates sought to prove the existence of Providence, 
 we find that they are, for the most part, errors, which a more 
 advanced knowledge has rejected. But we need not go so far 
 back; let us take up a volume which has charmed us all in 
 infancy. Without becoming very learned, we can no longer read 
 the " View of Nature," by the Abbe Pluche. We feel at once 
 how unsettled are his views. We look with alarm at the task he 
 undertakes, of proving every thing in the world to be good. 
 Buckland himself, the latest and most scientific amongst these 
 opponents of the existence of evil, stumbles at every step. His 
 system is only thirty years old, but nearly exploded, and we often 
 feel inclined to smile at his fervour. His antagonists have argued 
 that the wolf devours the lamb. The objection is more grave 
 than it appears, and also a very general one, for throughout the 
 wld the strong prey upon the weak. Now, what is the reply 
 given by this excellent writer ? He says, ** Without doubt the 
 wolf eats the lamb, and it is thus that the goodness of Providence 
 is manifested ; " for the sheep are always devoured while they 
 are young, fat, and in good condition ; so that they escape sickness 
 and old age. If sheep were endowed with reason and could 
 penetrate the future, they would in death bless their carnivorous 
 benefactors. 
 
 While apologists turn to declamation and feed upon puerilities. 
 
THE DEMONSTEATION OF PROVIDENCE. 80 
 
 others, with very different alms, exhaust themselves in fruitless 
 endeavours to expel from the world all that is imperfect, incom- 
 plete, and contradictory. They are no less sincere in their 
 complaints than Buckland and Pluche in their excuses. These 
 opposite modes of reasoning form, so to speak, two opposing 
 currents in literature : on one side Gessner s " Idyls," on the 
 other Young's "Night Thoughts." The perusal of the former 
 conveys most satisAictiou ; but in the latter it is difficult to trace 
 anything but sophistry. We are confounded by the most flagrant 
 contradictions, sometimes the extremest optimism, and at others 
 universal disparagement. It seems strange that these two distinct 
 lines of argument should be equally familiar to us, and that, 
 according to the whim of the moment, we should adopt that 
 which it pleases us to believe, with power to abandon it as our 
 impressions may vary. This induces us to conclude, at the first 
 glance, that there is in all this mucli sentiment and poetry, but 
 nothing truly scientific. 
 
 These are weighty objections : nevertheless, whatever be their 
 force, no one will deny that the profound study of nature produces 
 a feeling of admiration for the Creator. This supplies the evi- 
 dence of a fact which supersedes reasoning. After all, so much 
 science is not necessary to bestow the capability of admira- 
 tion. God has ordained that the beauty of his work shall be 
 manifest, both to the simple and the ignorant. All we are required 
 to do, is to open our eyes. A higher degree of knowledge, by 
 rectifying and enlarging our ideas, discovers to us new analogies, 
 new splendours, and increases instead of diminishing our faith. 
 It is wrong to say, "Let us not be too prompt to admire while 
 science is so incomplete ; " but, rather, " Since we admire the 
 world of which we know so little, what would be our admiration 
 did we know it better ! " The entire fault of the optimists con- 
 sists in their extremes : because they seek to prove too much, 
 they generally prove nothing. Why take so much trouble ? 
 Instead of pretending to explain the existence of evil, and to 
 transform it into good, let us rest satisfied with the knowledge 
 that good, which means order (for in the world good and order 
 are one), overrules disorder and evil, and this not in a degree 
 open to dispute, but to an almost infinite preponderance : thus 
 proofs abound, the most ordinary and superficial observation 
 will discover very solid and very numerous arguments, and all 
 the sciences unite in comipleting the demonstration. And, in 
 fact, what is the highest aim of science ? Is it not explanation 
 
90 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 and arrangement? Is it not the substitution of the unity of 
 laws for variety of effects? Is it not the subduing of all obsta- 
 cles opposed to human intelligence, and compelling them to aid 
 instead of to impede ? The world explained by science, understood 
 in its profundity, as governed by general and controlling laws, 
 ameliorated, enriched, subdued, and disciplined, becomes the 
 kingdom of man instead of his prison; and there where the 
 ignorant think they have a right to groan and complain, the truly 
 wise see only cause for admiration and gratitude. The existence 
 of a stupendous plan, and the presence of an omnipotent artificer, 
 will become manifest to their comprehension. They will behold 
 evil without consternation, because they do not expect from the 
 creature a perfection which can only belong to the Creator. 
 
 Having thus approached the object of our inquiry, in order to 
 render it more accessible, we shall first demand the evidence of 
 Providence from inanimate nature. 
 
 The existence of science proves to itself alone, without entering 
 into details, that the world is well and regularly organised"! 
 What is science? The knowledge of general laws. If there is 
 no law, there can be no science. Thus we are compelled to 
 admit, from the moment when we establish the existence of 
 science, that everything is regulated by order. If we are 
 answered that these laws are inevitable, we at once reply, that 
 this is not a self-produced necessity, for infinite power only can 
 create necessity, in virtue of its definition ; and likewise that 
 there are law^s at the same time true, immutable, and unneces- 
 sary. That all which begins to exist must have a cause, is a 
 necessary law. That all bodies should gravitate towards the 
 centre of the earth is not a necessary law, but is not the less a 
 law: and this second law, which might not exist, has been 
 established by the will and intelligence of the Creator of the 
 world. Are there not laws, or rather order, api^licable only to a 
 certain number of cases and a certain number of individuals ? The 
 question itself is absurd. There are laws of which we are ignorant ; 
 but all things have a law. That which we denominate disorder, is 
 more properly a derogation from some known law, through the influ- 
 ence of some law unknown. At our first step in science we say, "I 
 am seeking the law of these phenomena ; " we do not say, " I am 
 seeking to discover if these phenomena have a law," for we know 
 that everything in nature depends upon law, all being regular : hence 
 it follows, undeniably, that there is more good than evil in nature. 
 We clearly perceive the good, but nothing proves to us the reality 
 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF PROVIDENCE. 91 
 
 of the evil. It may be, that what we cousider evil would appear 
 good, if our science were more enlightened. This is not only 
 possible, but probable. If we do not say that this is certain, it is 
 only because we cannot affirm it by immediate evidence. It 
 must also be observed, that all that has a law has also an aim : 
 for if a law were applicable to nothing, it would be a mere 
 generalisation without reality. Thus, for example, if I am 
 unacquainted with the law of the phenomena which I desire to 
 retain in mind, I can invent an arbitrary principle of classifica- 
 tion to aid my memory. This artificial method is a great relief 
 to me ; it is soraetliing for my mind to rest upon, since it is a 
 method. Yet it is nothing to the objects which I class; it forms 
 no part of them, neither does it modify them in any manner. 
 The laws of nature are not of this description. All that falls 
 under them is co-ordinately arranged for one actual aim. To say 
 that all is regular, and that all is useful, is to express the same 
 idea twice over. When we affirm that there is no place for 
 chance in the world, it is the same thing as saying that every 
 movement is influenced by one law, and ordained to one end. 
 
 All science has for its result the demonstration of this axiom ; 
 that everything is regulated, and useful ; but we might spare 
 the demonstration. It is an axiom which results from science, 
 and yet precedes, and, in fact, engenders it. It is because we 
 believe in the existence of intention and law that we labour 
 to discover them. We have an innate passion for tracing the 
 secret, or which amounts to the same, the principle of every 
 thing. Place in the hands of a child an automaton or a watch ; 
 when he first looks at it, the exterior movement or result satisfies 
 his curiosity ; but in a little while he seeks to know the cause, and 
 then he breaks it. The philosopher does the same thin^r His 
 plaything is the world. The secret he searches after is that of 
 creation. He generally confines his attention to one being or one 
 class of beings. He circumscribes his curiosity, lest, should he 
 attack the world as a whole, he might be overwhelmed by the 
 greatness of matter; but once penned within the speciality he has 
 selected, his ambition is to comprehend it in every branch, to 
 leave nothing unexplored. He begins by observing and describing, 
 then he classifies; this superficial knowledge soon ceases to 
 satisfy him, and he breaks his plaything to discover in its interior 
 the secret of its existence. The more he sees, the more he desires 
 to see. The learned are insatiable, for beneath each problem 
 solved, a new problem is presented : they resemble travellers 
 
92 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 climbing a liill in the hope of reaching the summit, and that 
 point attained they seek to conquer another. What they know, only 
 serves to make them desire further knowledge. When the logician 
 first rises beyond the earth, he has still possessed himself only of 
 certain laws which are most evidently connected with phenomena ; 
 he must operate upon these laws, as he has already operated upon 
 the phenomena they control; he must laboriously struggle on to 
 the attainment of higher and more universal laws, and so from 
 one degree to another, till he has mastered the supreme law which 
 explains all the rest, for it contains them all in one magnificent 
 synthesis. What can sustain liim in this undertaking ? an 
 anticipated vision of universal harmony : an hypothesis at the 
 commencement, a doctrine at the termination. 
 
 While our thoughts dwell upon this collective work, so varied, 
 yet unparalleled, commenced two thousand years ago, and since 
 then pursued with unrelaxing vigour, we seem to behold all the 
 artizans of human science at their labours. One gathers plants, 
 dries, and classifies them. Another penetrates the earth to draw 
 forth its minerals. Another decomposes bodies to arrive at the 
 simple elements which form the primary composition of all 
 substance. His whole existence consists in watching his furnace, 
 and his crucibles, for ever marvelling, for ever attracted. On his 
 journey he sometimes encounters fame and fortune, but the great 
 object of his search is science ; if he pauses for enjoyment, the true 
 aim of his existence ceases. To attain the conquest of this secret 
 of God, which he can write in a single page, or sum up in a single 
 line, he surrenders up his youth, his health, risks his life, and is 
 not even aware of his sacrifice. Tliere are those who resolutely 
 abandon their native country at the age when love is strongest ; 
 they leave all for desert lands ; they travel thousands of miles 
 without encountering a beaten track ; they swim through the 
 waves of the deep ; they escape as by miracle from ferocious 
 animals ; they live for years in solitude, or in the midst of savages ; 
 perhaps they die in the wilderness without leaving a name behind 
 them ; but sometimes more fortunate, they return to civilised 
 society bringing back with them an additional world. 
 
 When the Almighty sends a pestilence upon earth, two classes 
 of men repair to the hospital, the one to console and succour, 
 the other to learn ; heroes of humanity and heroes of science. 
 All these men, from Thales down to ourselves, and from us to our 
 latest posterity, these travellers in deserts, these physicians in 
 their amphitheatres, these chemists iu their laboratories, and these 
 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF PEOYIDENCE. 93 
 
 mariners In the midst of ice-bergs, are brethren by the unity of 
 the aim they follow. The world reveals itself through them. 
 Science conquers, and ignorance retires. Daily their hands 
 dispense something to enhghten, console, and sustain the mul- 
 titude. Body and soul, we depend upon and live through them. 
 What signifies it that they are slighted or oalumniated ? They are 
 in themselves the mind and progress of humanity. Socrates drinks 
 hemlock, Aristotle is forced to slay himself, Plato is sold, Zeno is 
 only a gardener, Epictetus a slave : such are the great philosophers 
 of Greece. We must seek those of a later age in dungeons and 
 at the stake ; Abelard, Savonarola, Christopher Columbus, and 
 Galileo. Even as late as the commencement of the seventeenth 
 century, Giordano Bruno and Vanini were condemned to be burnt, 
 Descartes died in Sweden, Spinoza was proscribed, and Rousseau 
 driven from one asylum to another. But dungeons, scaffolds, and 
 proscriptions, like crowns and triumphs, are only accidents. 
 Truth consists in conquering truth, in rectifying error, in the 
 revelation of method, the bursting of fetters, and the develop- 
 ment of strength. Tyrants and the mob may league together, 
 their victories are nothing. They crush man, but science remains. 
 When each has excavated his particular vein and discovered his 
 portion of golden ore, the philosopher arises, who is to collect 
 these scattered riches into one heap. He scans history entire, he 
 gathers from all the sciences, he discovers universal analogy, and 
 through analogy by unity he recognises many different la^vs, all 
 proceeding from one higher law, on which they are founded. He 
 comprehends that they vary according to the variety of objects, 
 but they ever bear the impress of one thought and one mighty 
 will. He hears, as we may say, the word that gives life to the 
 world, and which every movement and every form of creation 
 translate into their own language. 
 
 Thus nature is revealed to him complete and uniform under the 
 variety of her phenomena. With equal facility he mounts and 
 descends the ladder of dialectics, invisible to the vulgar eye, which 
 has the immense and diversified miracles of creation for its base, 
 and the power of God for its summit. In this universal co- 
 ordination all is evident, useful, and, consequently, beautiful. 
 The plan of nature presents itself before him in its perfect 
 grandeur and unity ; he beholds the mark of the divine workman 
 in each detail and in the stupendous whole. 
 
 If we quit nature for man, the scene becomes more compli- 
 cated. It is properly here that evil appears under its two-fold 
 
9i 
 
 PEOVIDENCE. 
 
 form — suffering and error. But we must begin by first tracing 
 the unity, and subsequently examine the disorder. 
 
 Man has a double nature ; he partakes both of heaven and 
 earth. Let us first study him in his humblest aspect, in his 
 analogy with creatures of an inferior order to himself. 
 
 This is nature's invariable process with all created things: 
 first she provides for their preservation, next for the continuation 
 of their species, finally she assigns them a function and a locality ; 
 thus she establishes duration, stability, and unity in the world. 
 
 In inorganic creation she directly charges herself, if we may so 
 term it, with the preservation of individuals and species by the 
 laws she imposes on them ; but in the higher class of beings she 
 accepts individuals themselves as auxiliaries, and forms within 
 them principles which tend to preserve and propagate. Thus, 
 a tree is not only obedient, like all other bodies, to the physical 
 laws of nature, but it is increased, developed, and preserved by 
 nutrition ; it reproduces itself by its seed, and this double power 
 at once makes it a living being. 
 
 The existence of animals is more complete, because they enter 
 with more spontaneity and efiicacy into this double function of 
 organised being. It is seen that brute nature submissively 
 yields to law, and that the plant develops a power, every phase 
 of which is unchangeably pre-ordained ; while the power of the 
 animal depends in a certain measure upon the mysterious faculty 
 which we denominate instinct. Thus, as often as we rise in the 
 scale of beings, we find individuals possess within themselves a 
 more extended power, or power of a higher order. 
 
 All laws applicable to the inferior class exist in the indi- 
 vidual in a more perfect degree, but in some manner combined 
 with a new law, which bestows upon the being that at once 
 contains and is governed by it, a greater degree of unity and 
 perfection. 
 
 The human body, equally with inorganic substances, is subject 
 to the physical laws which govern matter. It develops itself 
 like the plant, and possesses the motive power of the animal. 
 But, placed at the head of all created beings, man possesses a 
 quality essentially different from those of the plant or even of the 
 animal, and the innate characteristic of which is the uncon- 
 trolled exercise of itself. Tliis single foct enables us to under- 
 stand all human nature ; for nothing can voluntarily pursue an 
 aim without recognising and loving it. Even had we no mission 
 in the world beyond our individual safety, and the continuation of 
 
THE DEMONSTEATION OF PROVIDENCE. 95 
 
 our species, the uncontrolled accomplishment of this task requires 
 of necessity that man should be perfectly intelligent and sensitive. 
 
 We all know that food is necessary to preserve life, but how do 
 we know it ? Nature communicates the fact. In what language ? 
 In the language of pleasure and of pain. By pain she tells us that 
 we require to eat ; by pleasure she instructs us what food to select. 
 We soon learn that insufficient or excessive nourishment are 
 equally detrimental to our frail machine ; that certain dishes are 
 wholesome, others detrimental, and that our repasts should be at 
 regular intervals. Experience teaches us this without the aid of 
 physicians ; but nature does not confide in our experience, she does 
 not even trust to the interest we have in prolonging our existence, 
 and preserving ourselves from disease; she undertakes to settle the 
 hour of refreshment by the periodical return of appetite; and when 
 our wants are satisfied, she very intelligibly announces that it is 
 time to retire. It is true, we do not always listen to her voice, 
 but it is equally true, that she never fails in her warning. 
 
 It would be difficult not to perceive in this arrangement of 
 nature the traces of a provident wisdom. The indulgences which 
 compromise health are maladies of the mind before they become 
 diseases of the body ; and when the rule is applied to free 
 subjects, it must not be judged by the extravagances of liberty. 
 
 Liberty interferes more in the operations of a class than in 
 those of an individual. No matter how it may act upon hunger 
 and thirst, it can only rebel against law to a certain limited extent; 
 but in all that appertains to love, it shows itself most unbridled. 
 The human species would perish without the enjoyment of love ; 
 but this gratification is so vivid that it leads into excess all who 
 are not accustomed to restrain their inclinations. Nevertheless, 
 the rule is evident in spite of excess, even as regards those who 
 transgress ; and what proves the vigilance and clear-sightedness 
 of Providence is, that the wisest and most stringent laws which 
 the coldest reason has been able to establish, always accord with 
 those of nature, when nature is not vitiated by custom. It is 
 possible that this truth may not at once appear evident to minds 
 such as ours, long accustomed to give way to passion, and too far 
 removed from the healthy and sound inspirations of nature ; but 
 every just mind and well regulated heart will feel its full force 
 upon reflection. 
 
 If love is the great promoter of human error, let us acknow- 
 ledge in it a principle which gives evidence of our superiority, and 
 conveys our first glimpse of the true destiny of man. We are 
 
96 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 speaking here of love, considered merely as the sentiment pro- 
 vided by nature for the propagation of species. While we degrade 
 it to this definition, do we not feel that something great and holy 
 is wounded within us ? In man love is a complex feeling, and 
 this physical element to which we allude, forms so very small a 
 portion of the combined sensation, that in treating of love we almost 
 entirely lose sight of it, to dream exclusively of the ennobling 
 emotion, so pure, so radiant, so intoxicating, of which we do not 
 say that it is full of poetry, for it is poetry itself; by which 
 common minds are elevated to a knowledge of devotion, inspi- 
 ration, and heroism; which fills the coldest hearts with generosity 
 and purifies them as by fire ; which doubles and trebles existence, 
 and tears aside the dark veil which obscures tlie glory of heaven ; 
 which is so great, that it appears the source of all greatness in 
 the heart of man ; so powerful, that it triumphs alike over our 
 weakness and our strength ; so consistent, despite our failings, 
 that in the world it alone leads us to the conviction of the infinite ; 
 the only one, perhaps, amidst all our feelings which we can truly 
 acknowledge as an inspirer and a consolation. We encounter love 
 at every step ; for, though it has but one source and end, it reveals 
 itself under many names and in different forms ; it pervades all 
 human life ; it connects us with God, society, and the world ; it 
 forms the unity of existence, its charm, explanation, and blessing. 
 Here, even when we behold its birth in the humblest sphere of 
 human necessities, it comes surrounded by other affections, the 
 names of whicli are equally attractive. Such are all the tender 
 emotions which render the family tie so endearing; conjugal, 
 paternal, filial, and fraternal love. While we thus look into our 
 own hearts, let gratitude teach us to admire and adore God. Let 
 us truly learn that which is of such importance to the world, to 
 society, and to families ; the stern duties imposed upon the father, 
 and the heroic devotion peculiar to the mother. Let us try 
 thoroughly to understand the daily, hourly and momentary sacri- 
 fices, the sleepless nights, the incessant toil, the solicitude, the 
 tenderness, and the more difficult courage. All this is necessary 
 to form a true man, and all this is required by patriotism, 
 humanity, and morality. It is so ! but the heart also counsels, 
 and renders these duties easy : the heart transforms them into 
 delights, and delights which have no rivals under heaven : the 
 heart, which means nature, the good mother and gentle nurse of 
 humanity : the thousand-fold blessed strengtli which dwells in our 
 innermost being, like the voice and bounty of the Creator. He 
 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF PROVIDENCE. 97 
 
 who thinks of the family tie, who feels the sweetness and beauty • 
 of family relationship, needs no other proof than this that the 
 hand which has made us is truly a paternal one. God I 
 Parent of the world ! thy providence will for ever be adored 
 and comprehended by the heart of a father ! 
 
 After having contemplated man in the humblest position of his 
 task, which concerns only his individual protection and the pre- 
 servation of his species, we must now seek to discover his destiny 
 upon earth, and his future beyond the tomb. Correctly under- 
 stood, these two problems resolve themselves into one. God has 
 given us two lives, distinct, but depending one upon the other ; 
 the first is the struggle, the second the reward. It requires no 
 profound meditation to discover the destiny of man : conscience 
 demonstrates it with equal clearness to philosophic minds, and 
 to the humblest intellect. I am free, but I possess a law : this 
 law when I look at it in myself, bears the denomination of 
 justice : when I seek it at its source, its name is God. To obey 
 God with all my power, to love, to know, and to approach him; 
 in these few words is comprised the sum of my destiny. 
 
 What do I require for its fulfilment ? Knowledge of duty in its 
 principle and application, love which will attach itself to the 
 creature only to attain strength and rise more resolutely to the 
 Creator, and an unlimited free will. Are these my possessions? 
 Am I this unfettered being? intelligent, passionate, capable of 
 comprehending the end of existence, of advancing to it through 
 sacrifice, and of winning, by personal exertion, a reward that never 
 can be too dearly purchased ? I require no science to answer this 
 question : thought, feeling, and will, comprise my entire being. 
 What is the process of thought ? First to reflect upon myself, 
 for if I do not know myself, what can I know? I must be 
 satisfied of my own existence that I may be able to affirm other 
 existences. I know, see and feel, all that passes within me. I 
 am acquainted with something beyond these phenomena, for I am 
 aware that there must be a power that produces them ; I calculate 
 the range of this power ; I am sensible of its exhaustion or 
 renewal according to requirement; I can concentrate, impel, or 
 restrain it ; and each time I proportion my effort to the resistance 
 I anticipate. This intuitive knowledge is my first intellectual 
 faculty : I give it the name of conscience. Knowing myself, and 
 knowing also that I am a being of limited faculties, I see every- 
 where around me other beings contingent and ephemeral as I am. 
 My life is a perpetual struggle against external forces, in which 
 
98 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 I alternately conquer and yield. The faculty by which I dis- 
 tinguish these opposing powers is denominated perception. 
 
 Have I no conception of anything but myself and the world ? If 
 there were nothing beyond the world, (for as regards myself I am 
 but a portion of it), it could neither be, nor be understood. For it 
 to exist, something more than itself is necessary, and for it to be 
 understood, something beyond the conviction of the senses. The 
 world and the impressions it produces are of a vague and transitory 
 description ; they doubtless belong to, but they do not comprise, 
 existence. There is within me a third faculty, which leads me 
 from dreams, brings me to precision and reality ; and if we may 
 be permitted to use the phrase, bestows substance upon every- 
 thing else. This is the faculty of Reason, supreme endowment, 
 aspiring to unravel all the immutable truths which form the 
 principles of being and knowledge, the object and end of love, 
 and the rule of liberty. 
 
 Imperfect ourselves, we comprehend all things imperfectly, but 
 in proportion to our necessities. We behold God without com 
 prehending him, and in main points we do not comprehend 
 ourselves. The insignificance of our organs, and in fact the feeble 
 extent of human faculties, contracts our horizon ; but nevertheless 
 there exists within us an intelligence which reaches beyond the 
 time and space that we actually occupy. Every moment of a 
 well-employed life is a victory over time and space, and con- 
 sequently an increase of being. We have memory to retain the 
 past, induction to lead to the future, deduction by which we 
 develop principles, abstraction which brings distinct objects to 
 one point of view, generalisation which raises us by degrees from 
 multiplied creation to unity, and imagination which consoles us 
 with hope for the necessarily narrow bounds within'which human 
 knowlege is circumscribed. Faculties so accordant, so closely 
 connected, so dependent one upon the other, so abundant in 
 discoveries and attractions, which place animals and natural forces 
 in subjection to man, which embrace the creation and rise even to 
 the contemplation of God, are they not the proof of one great plan 
 designed by the author of our being ? What name, except that of 
 Providence, will accord with the cause of this order and regularity, 
 this unvarying agreement between the means and the end ? 
 
 If I were merely a being of intelligence, — if I could only see 
 and understand, and did not possess the property of loving, I 
 should remain inactive, in a state of quiescence, which would look 
 upon the existence of facts, truths, and principles, with absolute 
 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF PROVIDENCE. 99 
 
 indifference. It is necessary that I should rejoice and suffer, love 
 and hate, in order to make me desire. Reason gives me a rule, but 
 passion bestows the impulse. 
 
 When we abandon the cold and severe world of reflection to 
 enter the tragic regions of passion, the first thing that strikes 
 us is, that here again, with the same affinities, we encounter the 
 same divisions and the same analogies. As our intellect applies 
 itself to three objects, — to God through reason, to ourselves 
 through conscience, and to the exterior world through perception, 
 thus collectively embracing all beings and all affinities, so is the 
 heart divided by three affections, — love of God, love of self, 
 and love of the world. Passion takes many shapes, but no 
 matter how clothed, or under what name disguised, every human 
 passion is but a changed condition of one of these three affections. 
 We differ much one from the other ; but there exists not a man 
 who cannot find this triple love at the bottom of his heart. The 
 moment arrives when even the selfish egotist feels its softening 
 influence. But he whose whole life is a sacrifice — who counts 
 hours by his good deeds — who has no occupation but that of 
 seeking and relieving the unfortunate — no happiness but phi- 
 lanthropy — no ambition but the amelioration of his brother's 
 condition : — God has ordained that this man shall find compen- 
 sation even in the fulfilment of his mission ; he feels that there 
 is gratification in self-denial, and his efforts to promote general 
 happiness unite him more closely with humanity, without 
 interfering with his importance. 
 
 In conclusion, the love of God is so necessary a sentiment, 
 that it may be found even in the bosom of the atheist. We may 
 slight, forget, or deny God, but not to love him is impossible.* 
 In vain do we seek not to think of him ; it is only through his 
 love for God that man is capable of feeling poetry and enthusiasm. 
 That which we call the ideal, is, though unknown to us, the 
 abandonment of earth and the aspiration towards Deity. What 
 man has ever been so buried that he has no dreams of any thing 
 beyond what he sees and touches ? What night was ever so 
 dark that no single flash of lightning has brightened it ? More 
 than one have gone to sleep atheists and woke up mystics. The 
 cold flint contains the internal spark. Thus, by a beautiful 
 dispensation, our minds and hearts are formed upon a similar 
 plan, and carefully suited to our wants and affinities.! This 
 
 * See Note at the end. 
 
 ■f "Thou thyself, miserable mortal, insignificant as thou art, formest a 
 
 H 2 
 
100 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 is not the only analogy. If it were possible for us in this 
 place to examine psychology, we should be able to prove how, in 
 the system of intelligence, individual and absolute existence form 
 the opposite and necessary poles of thought ; how thoughts 
 possess reality by their affinity with the idea of the absolute, 
 and precision by their affinity with the idea of individuality ; in 
 such manner that neither reason, which is the internal sense 
 through which we receive the impression of the absolute, nor 
 conscience, which is the inward faculty through which we derive 
 the impression of individuality, can ever be absent from any of 
 our intellectual operations : and we could afterwards show that 
 the same principle applies to our love for God and our love for 
 ourselves;* — first, to our love for God, since God is no less 
 the source of all that is amiable, than the cause of universal 
 existence ; and secondly, to our love for ourselves, as by virtue of 
 the law which enforces self-preservation, we cannot obliterate or 
 bury ourselves in love. 
 
 These three affections, which are in fact the components from 
 whence the heart is moulded, divide and change themselves 
 into a multitude of sentiments and passions, the study of which 
 would lead us at each step to bless and adore Providence. 
 The subject is so inexhaustible, that we cannot permit ourselves 
 to do more than indulge in a passing reference. 
 
 We have seen that man is instructed by his appetites to 
 provide for the preservation of himself and his species. Every 
 pleasure and every pain renders him an analogous service. 
 When not depraved by an evil indulgence of his liberty, or by 
 his individual vices, his pleasure is generally produced by that 
 which is salutary, and his pain by that which is injurious to him. 
 
 For example, exercise, the moderate exertion so essential to 
 the health of mind and body, is accompanied by a sensation of 
 pleasure ; while fatigue is a pain which warns us of the exhaustion 
 of our strength and the necessity of invigoration by repose. The 
 same rule would apply in all our relations with mankind, if we 
 only sought lo govern ourselves better ; and Nature incessantly 
 warns us, that for our punishment we shall become incapable of 
 consulting, and unable to comprehend her. 
 
 portion of the universal system, and hast with it an incessant affinity. The 
 universe does not exist for thee, but thou thyself existest for the universe." — 
 Plato, Laics, book x. 
 
 * '* I affirm that the heart naturally loves universal being, and as naturally 
 loves its own being." — Pascal, Thoughts, Art. 24, edit. Havet., p. 296. 
 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF PROVIDENCE. 101 
 
 If we wish to behold a dominion where Nature reigns all- 
 powerful, we must glance at the first and holiest instincts of 
 family affection. Let us suppose that the mother had no love 
 for her child ; this alone would sufiBce to destroy humanity, 
 The legislator might institute laws ; but no matter how sternly 
 they might be enforced, could he compel the devotion an infant 
 requires ? If we find in an asylum for orphans something of 
 the maternal sentiment, the objects towards which it is directed 
 enjoy the advantage, but have not created it. Maternal love 
 exists in the heart of every woman, and for this sole reason 
 the wife regards having no family as the greatest misfortune of 
 her life. If we dare utter words which, wrongly interpreted, 
 would seem to diminish the grandeur and beauty of the mission 
 of these adoptive parents, we might almost say that the 
 children who could not live without them are also necessary to 
 their lives; they bestow upon them the double privileges of 
 love and sacrifice. A woman should be seen by the cradle of an 
 infant, whether the offspring of her own bosom, or one that she 
 has adopted as her own, poor and naked, to bestow^ upon it all 
 her time and tenderness. 
 
 Women will be adored and deified as long as youth and passion 
 shall endure ; but all their grace and beauty, the charms of their 
 minds, and the attraction of their conversation, render them less 
 worthy of our respect and love, than that small cradle which they 
 prefer to all the rest of the world. 
 
 Family affection is not sufficient for man : we are one fraternity 
 and all need one another. Placed here below to fulfil a common 
 destiny, to endure the same ills, enjoy the same pleasures, and 
 journey to the same end, moral rectitude, or if the name is pre- 
 ferred, the will of God, ordains that we shall lean one upon the 
 other, fight shoulder to shoulder the battle of life, and give to our 
 fellow men a portion of the wealth which is most our own and least 
 factitious ; that which we inherit from God and ourselves, and not 
 from society or human institutions : our physical and intellectual 
 powers, our intelligence and our eloquence. If reason alone 
 inculcated this law, we could understand its wisdom and necessity, 
 but should be far from discovering its charm. Reason prescribes 
 sacrifice without allowing the smallest compromise of its severity, 
 sometimes to an extent almost unmerciful. Nature therefore has 
 placed within us, as a companion to every law, a sentiment which 
 inspires the inclination to do what necessity enforces, and renders 
 the performance at the same time agreeable. She cares for the 
 
10^ PROVIDENCE. 
 
 orphan, for those who are abandoned by their family, for the rare 
 natures whose hearts seek even beyond the precincts of the 
 domestic hearth, for other congenial souls that can sympathise 
 with theirs ; and she has endowed us with the important, manly 
 and controlling feeling, which forms a bond so much the more 
 powerful that its condition is esteem, and its principle virtue, — 
 friendship ; — which doubles our capacity both to act and to endure, 
 and gives us, in our chosen companion, a second heart and another 
 conscience. Thus nature by degrees widens the sphere of our love 
 in proportion to that of duty, and we learn progressively that our 
 relationship extends beyond our own immediate family to all 
 mankind.* Upon the same principle she attaches us to the 
 earliest associations of our lives, and clothing the recollections of 
 youth and childhood with an unfading charm, she creates many 
 invincible bonds, from community of habits, laws, and faith ; and 
 by a secret magic reveals to us all the beauty and sanctity con- 
 tained in the name of country. She renders us susceptible of 
 pity, which teaches us to tender the hand of kindliness to the 
 stranger, and measure the benefits we bestow only by the neces- 
 sities that demand them. She inspires us with gratitude that we 
 may find consolation even in excess of misery, for it is also one of 
 the greatest blessings of life, to feel that we are protected and 
 sustained, and to kiss the relieving hand with fervour and thank- 
 fulness. And, as by the strength of our intelligence, through 
 which the forces of Nature are submitted to our control, and we 
 become masters of the future, our sphere of action is infinitely 
 more extended than our horizon, Nature has not desired that our 
 feelings of benevolence should be confined to those with whom we 
 are acquainted, or to the calamities which fall under our actual 
 observation. She has kindled within us a fire which burns of 
 itself. In our love, we embrace all human nature, men whom we 
 may never meet or know but by their evil offices, and generations as 
 yet unborn. In truth, all these affections, which are our richest 
 treasures, are not lit up by the same flame in every heart. The 
 more their object becomes extended and remote, in the same pro- 
 portion the minds by which they are controlled, become more 
 restricted in number. But if the family tie is the most universal 
 and most powerful, because the most immediately necessary, there 
 
 * " Ut profectus ^ caritate domesticorum ac suorum, serpat longius, et se 
 implicit primum civium, deiude omuium mortalium societate." — Cicero, On 
 Good and Evil, book ii. chap. xiv. 
 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF PROVIDENCE. 103 
 
 is no heart destitute of a general love for human nature. Nothing 
 in the composition of one man can he wanting in another. Every- 
 thing within us speaks of the goodness of God, and denies the 
 melancholy and harsh hypothesis of a negligent or indifferent 
 deity. The desire of esteem, which is often degraded into vanity ; 
 the thirst for power, frequently condemned with justice, under the 
 title of ambition ; these propensities if we know how to limit and 
 discipline them under rule, assist in the construction of 
 society, by the introduction of honour and shame, and by 
 rendering power attractive, which in its nature, is merely a 
 burden. During the latter ages of Rome, public offices had 
 become so oppressive, that the citizens requested as a favour to be 
 excluded from municipal dignities. It is an infallible symptom 
 of decline, when instead of courting human feelings and render- 
 ing them generally useful, the legislature opposes, contradicts, 
 and offends them. We ought to live by turning Nature and its 
 resources to account, for Nature is wise and wisely organised. 
 Not only does she assist us through the aid of the passions, and 
 transform our duties into pleasures ; but these allurements by 
 which we are solicited to fulfil our mission, like a kind and 
 prudent mother, she proportions to our weakness. When she 
 foresees that an impulse of too refined and exalted a character is 
 not sufficiently active to rouse us from our lethargy, she adds 
 some moving power of a more personal description, and of more 
 immediate energy. What object can a man propose to himself 
 superior to that of bestowing upon humanity a new science, and 
 consequently an accession of strength ? But the mere love of 
 human nature is not always influential enough to command a 
 whole life of sacrifices which may produce no beneficial result. 
 If this impelling cause should prove insufficient, truth itself steps 
 in as an additional incitement. The philosopher perhaps forgets 
 the fruits of science, but he has still an internal impulse which 
 urges him on, at every hazard, to discover truth, although his 
 discovery may be useless. 
 
 A school was formed at the commencement of the present 
 century, which, starting upon the foundation that there is nothing 
 useless in nature, and consequently in man, denounced all -exist- 
 ing customs and rules, as replete with every description of 
 impediment and shackle ; and proposed to replace civilisation, 
 the spring of which is law, by a new organisation, the sole prin- 
 ciple of which should be jileasure. The school overflowed with 
 errors. The greatest of all was, an attempt to consider this life 
 
104 PEOYIDENCE. 
 
 as a definitive end, and to suppress the trial. It deceived itself 
 again bj supposing that the moving impulse could take the place 
 of the rule ; and this mistake led to the deplorable consequence 
 of denying moral obligation. It was wrong even in the analysis 
 of the passions, which it deified, and in the search after pleasure, 
 which it considered the sumniwn bonum ; so difficult is it to deal 
 with these sweeping innovations, which, amongst other disadvan- 
 tages, entirely cast aside experience. But in some respects the 
 school was right; for all sentiments inspired by Nature are sound 
 and profitable. It is equally the duty of the moralist and legis- 
 lator to respect and render them useful ; society and mankind 
 can only exist through them ; they are the instruments of good 
 and the auxiliaries of virtue ; and the suppression of a natural 
 feeling, be it what it may, invariably tends to reduce and degrade 
 the character of man. 
 
 For us, who cannot comprehend liberty without law, virtue 
 without sacrifice, or existence on earth without futurity, we 
 require that passion should be at the same time admitted and 
 regulated ; that the heart should be honoured and praised in its 
 character of servant to the moral will ; and that the exhibition of 
 the vices which man has given to himself should not annul the 
 strength and virtue which he has derived from God. 
 
 Before quitting the subject of meditation on the human pas- 
 sions, which can never be exhausted, we ought to endeavour to trace 
 them in their various transformations. Destiny, in this world, 
 carries us where no one can calculate. We are only masters of 
 ourselves, but serve as playthings to events. In the sudden 
 changes of fortune, to which we are all exposed, we seldom indeed 
 find wanting within our hearts a fresh and living strength to 
 assist us under new and unexpected trials. We do not here 
 refer to common feelings, the epoch and hour of which are 
 marked in ordinary life — such as paternal love : the peculiar 
 sentiments we are now speaking of have received no distinct 
 name in any language, because they require no generalisation, 
 and seem to take birth from accidents. A parvenu bears himself 
 with appropriate demeanour in an elevated position ; and the 
 crowd remarks, " Who would have suspected him of so much 
 dignity?" The fact is, he had it not, but God has bestowed it 
 upon him with his advancement. Let us make the same reflec- 
 tion in an opposite sense. In a romance, the description of a 
 dreadful calamity overwhelms the mind, and we wonder bow any 
 one could endure it; let it fall upon ourselves, and we are 
 
THE DEMONSTEATION OF PROVIDENCE. 105 
 
 enabled to bear the trial. We did not possess this courage ; but 
 the same God has sent us resignation with misfortune. He has 
 given us even more than resignation, — new sentiments suited to 
 our new necessities. It seems as if with change of position our 
 hearts were simultaneously altered. A traveller in Siberia has 
 remarked with what facility tlie condemned criminals transform 
 themselves, to assimilate their bodies, minds, and feelings to 
 their new situations. A nobleman of exalted rank, accustomed 
 to all the luxuries and refinements of wealth, issues some morning 
 from a fortress, without name, family, or money. He is marched 
 off, with a knapsack on his back, to serve for life as a private 
 soldier in the army of the Caucasus, or towards some district 
 in Siberia to labour as a colonist, or to fill a subordinate post 
 or public office. The state of existence is entirely new, and has 
 nothing in common with his former life, yet he finds the necessary 
 courage, aptitude, and strength. In this, great credit has 
 been assigned to the extraordinary flexibility of the Russian 
 character ; but we have all something of this within us ; our 
 nature changes, to a certain degree, with inevitable circumstances 
 and necessity. We resemble a ship well provided with stores of 
 every kind, which has spare tackle in all the magazines, ready to 
 be used when the machinery gets out of order ; which has the 
 materials to construct a jury-mast when disabled, and the deck of 
 which, at the last moment, can be converted into a raft. Will 
 the passenger who owes his life to this foresight, waste time in 
 questioning it, while profiting by its efficacy ? 
 
 But what proves even more than love and intelligence, the 
 greatness of the design of God in the creation of man, is liberty. 
 We need not ask what liberty would be without intelligence ; for, 
 to desire, we must know that we desire, and what we desire, and 
 consequently that we possess a mind capable of thought. But in 
 order to desire, it is not alone necessary to think ; it is equally 
 essential to love ; for reason points the road, but inclination 
 induces us to follow it. Thus intelligence and love are requisite 
 to liberty ; but liberty, in turn, is also indispensable to the heart 
 and the thought. The action is the object, and for this the thought 
 exercises itself, and the heart warms. Without resolution, our 
 thought and desire would be lost, as if they had never existed. 
 They assume, in some measure, a material substance, they occupy 
 a place and become a reality, by the spontaneous operation of 
 which they are the origin and determining cause. Such is the 
 necessary bond, which under these three exercises of human 
 
-^^^ PEOVIDENCE. 
 
 faculty, to think, to love, and to act, constitute a single unity. 
 Dissatisfied minds have sought to discover in liberty a diminution 
 of our bemg. It is true that liberty leads to error. But, in tlie 
 first place, error does not naturally belong to liberty. Love may 
 be deceived in its object, or change to hatred. It may become 
 absorbing, or excessive. It has, besides, inseparable fa^lincrg ; 
 like every other element of our being, it is subject to fatigue Tnd 
 exhaustion. Intelligence, made for the discovery of truth, can 
 never grasp it at once, but only by degrees, and through constant 
 ettort. The most concentrated attention is necessary to penetrate 
 truths of a high order, and by an inseparable re-action, weariness, 
 alter a certain period, dims the perspicuity of the mind. Let us 
 not therefore assert that liberty alone engenders evil. Evil is 
 everywhere found in man, by the side of good, in consequence of 
 the limited nature of his existence. If we were even to compare 
 our respective faculties to decide on the most pre-eminent, liberty 
 alone has no boundaries, for its entire essence consists in being 
 or not being, without any possible degree between the two terms! 
 It IS true that to constitute liberty, it is not merely sufficient to 
 will ; there must be the power of accomplishing the will ; and in 
 this power we are limited in various ways; externally by the 
 weakness of our means of execution, internally by the enervatinct 
 struggles of the passions, which divide and exhaust, on a thou° 
 sand occasions, our faculties of active exertion; and, finally, by 
 the lassitude which results from the frequent recurrence of' the 
 efi-ort. We become tired of acting, and of wishing to act. The 
 weariness of the master co-exists with that of the agent. My 
 arm is tired ; my will is not less so. There I find myself again, 
 in my weakness; but in the resolution itself, in the act of 
 willing, my liberty is, and remains, absolute. 
 
 It is, therefore, a mistake to impute to liberty an evil common 
 to and inherent in all created things. Everything that is made, 
 all that has proceeded from a cause, all that does not contain 
 within Itself the principle of its existence, has limits, which is 
 precisely to say, that it has imperfections. The true question is 
 to ascertain whether liberty is intended to produce good or ill. 
 Now, It is certainly intended for good, and whatever sophistry may 
 attempt to establish to the contrary, every individual conscience 
 whispers It, and the conscience of all human nature proclaims it 
 loudly. Liberty is, therefore, good in itself, and the greatest of 
 all goods. ° 
 
 Certain disciples of mysticism, without confounding, as do the 
 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF PEOVIDENCE. 107 
 
 sceptics we have alluded to, the abuse of anything with the thing 
 itself, and while admitting with us, that liberty in a sound and 
 well regulated mind, almost always produces good, and never evil 
 but as the exception, still condemn liberty, either through an 
 erroneous assimilation of human and divine nature, or through 
 ignorance of the destiny of man, and the laws of creation. They 
 fall into the first error in consequence of adopting the opinion of 
 Malebranche, and of nearly all the mystical schools, that God 
 lowered himself by the act of creation ; as if they did not perceive 
 that it is impossible to depart from absolute perfection without a 
 fall, while an imperfect being, who should condemn himself to 
 immobility, would at the same time be condemned to imperfection 
 without advance. Again, they fall into the second error, through 
 believing that the whole mission of man is comprised in not 
 transgressing. It is an offence against God to reduce human 
 nature to this condition. If all our efforts were confined to doing 
 no wrong, God would have produced a useless and pernicious 
 creation. There is not in the entire world an existence absolutely 
 passive. Everything is action, and for that reason everything is 
 great ; and we, whose action is free, are for that reason at the 
 head of all creation. To think and to pray, without action, is to 
 fail in the true vocation of man. The sort of meditation and 
 worship which God desires, is that which, by a discovery of the 
 divine perfection, learns to be useful and operative. He has never 
 bestowed power to be annihilated by inactivity. Every human 
 action may be considered under two different views : in its imme- 
 diate object, and in its relation to duty. Let us consider it first 
 in its ostensible end : all here is humble, apportioned to our 
 narrow wants, our passions, our daily avocations, by which we are 
 absorbed, and man is nothing more than man. Take the act in 
 its connection with duty, and the most unpretending, obscure, and 
 contemptible function partakes of something divine, and has the 
 attributes of meditation and prayer. It appears like an homage 
 rendered to him from whom we derive our liberty, and also our 
 sense of justice ; for the second gift is not inferior to the first, 
 and God is equally our benefactor in imposing duties and sup- 
 plying us with the means of performing them. 
 
 It is one of the finest reflections of Aristotle, that the dignity of 
 every being increases with his duties, and is to be measured 
 according to the extent of his task. " The senate," says Seneca, 
 " have been assembled since the morning, and employed without 
 interval in the public good, while the populace are drinking in 
 
108 PEOVIDENCE. 
 
 taverns, or amusing themselves in the field of Mars." * Action 
 and fulfilled duty can fdone elevate man above his brother men. 
 Even misfortune becomes dignity when endured with fortitude, 
 because it evinces courage. He whose life passes in unvarying 
 happiness, resembles a combatant traversing the arena without 
 encountering an adversary who will condescend to encounter him. 
 To endure and to act is to live and be a man. The head of a 
 nation, whose life is passed in responsibility and action, is the 
 greatest of men, while the despot who thinks only of himself is 
 the least, t 
 
 Thus, liberty, far from being the origin of disorder in the com- 
 position of man, is essentially a benefit. The inconveniences to 
 which it gives rise are amply repaid by the corresponding advan- 
 tages. Sometimes the part assigned to it on this earth is not 
 confined only to what concerns mankind and human society. The 
 presence of such an intelligent spectator in the world, such a 
 co-operator with the forces of nature, cannot be regarded as an 
 episode. The organic and inorganic phenomena of the world are 
 so disposed as to furnish food to our activity ; the absence of man 
 would render a vast number of them inexplicable. If man had 
 no existence, the world would resemble one of the palaces which 
 have been restored and refurnished after a revolution, that they 
 may be preserved to history and art. All has resumed its place, 
 the council-table, the crown, the sceptre ; nothing is absent but 
 the king. 
 
 We have as yet discoursed only of liberty in its worldly 
 character. There are doubtless solid reasons why even those 
 who have no belief in a future existence, regard free will as one 
 of the greatest benefits we have received ; but to others who, like 
 ourselves, entertain a steadfast faith in the life to come, of which 
 freedom is at once the property and the pledge, there is no 
 necessity to vindicate the sublimity of liberty, for in their esti- 
 mation it constitutes the entire greatness of man. The aspect 
 and character of life are completely changed when, instead of 
 regarding it as a definitive evil, we look upon it only as a state of 
 intermediate trial. It is recorded that during the reign of terror 
 there was a chamber of registration in every prison in Paris, 
 which the condemned were compelled to enter before they 
 
 * "Labor optimos citat. Senatus pei' totum diem ssepe consulitur, quum 
 illo tempore vilissimus quisque, aut in campo otium suum oblectet, aut ia 
 popina lateat, aut tempus in aliquo circulo terat." — Seneca, De Providentid, 
 
 t Plato, RexmUic, book ix. Translation of V. Cousin, vol x. p. 224. 
 
THE DEMOKSTRATION OF PROVIDENCE. 100 
 
 proceeded to assume the habiliments of execution. Each awaited 
 their turn while the relatives and advocates of other prisoners 
 were admitted into the same place. Despair was painted on 
 every countenance, and no exterior indication pointed out who 
 were pardoned or who condemned. It is thus that we differ in this 
 life, no matter how apparently similar ; and, according to our 
 individual faith, every hour brings us nearer to death or 
 immortality. 
 
 While we are thus endeavouring to point out the Providence 
 of God in his works, we are ever distressed by the consideration 
 that we are able to say so little upon a subject demanding so 
 much. But this little is sufficient to prove the indissoluble con- 
 nection of all great principles, and is amply satisfactory to the 
 religious soul. If we reduce everything in the world to mere 
 matter, and in man to the satisfying of his wants and egotistical 
 pleasures, such a process may possibly lead us to overlook and 
 forget God ; though the existence of the world without a cause to 
 produce and preserve it, should remain an unsolved problem : 
 but if we are capable of listening to the harmonies of nature ; if 
 we look upon the phenomena of physical order, as the regular 
 and powerful development of a system of analogous and connected 
 laws ; if we regard all the ideas of man, and all his affections as 
 emanating from the one idea, and love of the infinite ; if we feel 
 that liberty is but the power of rendering life glorious and 
 sanctified through sacrifice ; if we found the greatness of man 
 upon the austere fulfilment of duty, instead of the enjoyment of 
 pleasure ; if we have learned to regard man as one family, to 
 acknowledge, prefer, and practice the doctrine of universal frater- 
 nity ; if we have faith in the never ceasing progress of the human 
 mind, through liberty and labour, to new discoveries in science, to 
 greater civilisation and purity of manners, and laws more in con- 
 formity with the light of the divine ideal, which shines in the 
 consciences of the just; if we experience an internal conviction, 
 necessity, and promise of immortality ; — all our feelings, doctrines, 
 and instincts will satisfy us that there is a superintending 
 Providence. The conviction will impress itself upon us every- 
 where, and in every moment of our lives. We shall find 
 the great Worker alone and complete in the most insignificant of 
 his works. 
 
 We ought not to reject this line of argument, because since the 
 origin of philosophy, it has been looked upon as a sort of common- 
 place. The same applies to prayer ; nevertheless, we do not 
 
110 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 become weary of prayer. The truly religious man is a lover of 
 Providence, and can never be satiated by the study and exaltation 
 of the spirit that he adores. He worships infinite wisdom and 
 power in their smallest details ; but when he contemplates 
 the mighty whole, his reverence is unbounded ; it is then that he 
 compares one law with another to convince himself of their analogy, 
 and to discover that all classes of being, form, and motion, are but 
 different translations of the one word, and varied applications of 
 the one will. This simplicity mingled with profusion, this immo- 
 bility in motion, this eternity amidst the crowded and fleeting 
 waves of time, is God himself, who unveils his majestic nature, 
 and holds direct communication with the soul that seeks him. 
 As in the morning we behold a fog floating over the surface of one 
 vast horizon, when pierced by the sun's rays, disperse and reveal to 
 us the living and enchanted land which lies behind, bathed in light; 
 so philosophy drives away false appearances, unsound theories, 
 and vulgar, perishable attractions, to display to our sight the 
 eternal source whence flow unceasingly strength, beauty and 
 existence. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. Ill 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTIONS DRAWN FROM THE 
 EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 
 
 *'Tu non dubitas de Providently, sed quereris .... Inter honos viros ac 
 Deum amicitia est, conciliante virtute." — Seneca, De Providentid. 
 
 One of the calamities of human weakness is, that when we have 
 convinced ourselves that there is a superintending Providence, 
 and have only just begun to enjoy the consoling thought that 
 God watches over us with the tenderness of a father, instead of 
 feeling thankful for the benefits he has bestowed, we demand 
 the reason why he has seen fit to withhold others. 
 
 Even those who are believers in Providence murmur at the 
 existence of evil ; and this affords an argument to the irreligious, 
 who say, " None can desire evil unless they are wicked, nor in- 
 voluntarily commit evil unless they are powerless." This doctrine 
 obliges us either to account for the existence of evil, or to renounce 
 our belief in Providence. 
 
 To the question, *' How can evil exist ?" the stoics replied, " It 
 cannot exist." They treated evil and pain as the Eleatics did 
 multiplicity and motion — not being able to explain, they denied 
 them. On the other hand, a great number of religious sects have 
 in some measure bestowed a divine origin on evil in attributing 
 its existence to a living principle always at variance with the 
 principle of good. Their mistake lies in setting aside reason and 
 attaching themselves solely to fact — that of the stoics in sacri- 
 ficing fact to the rules of logic. 
 
 Besides these two doctrines, — which are not solutions, since the 
 first denies one of the terms which contradict themselves, and 
 the second accepts the contradiction and yields to it — there are 
 three celebrated theories which still divide the minds of men : the 
 theory of the fall, of progression, and of optimism. 
 
 We shall first say a few words upon the doctrine of the fall. 
 
 To understand this question, we must start from the precise 
 
11-2 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 point of the difficulty. What it becomes necessary to explain is 
 not the cause of physical ills or deformities, ^hich is easily 
 arrived at, but the origin of pain and moral evil ; and further, we 
 must understand that pain and moral evil are the necessary con- 
 sequences of human liberty. In fact, to be free is to possess the 
 power of choice, and of choosing between good and evil. This power 
 of choice supposes the interference of pleasure and of pain ; thus 
 there are but two alternatives : to do away, at once, with pain, 
 moral evil, and liberty ; or to preserve liberty with its origin and 
 consequences. 
 
 Which is best ? We reply with confidence, liberty. Then 
 there is no difficulty in ascribing a place to moral evil and pain ; 
 the only obstacles are that this place is too great, that the tendency 
 to evil is too strong, the charm and reward of virtue insignificant 
 and weak, pain intolerable, and unequally or unjustly distributed. 
 We have, therefore, to deal less with the actual thing itself, than 
 with the degree in which it exists. 
 
 We should consent to suffer evil, but not so much evil. God 
 has not dealt to us equitable measure : he has sold us our liberty 
 at too high a price. In this state of temptation and suffering 
 where he has placed us, we can no longer behold in him the ideal 
 perfection of goodness and power. It is to this difficulty thus 
 restricted that the doctrine of the fall replies, and which may be 
 explained as follows : — 
 
 God has made man imperfect, because there cannot be two 
 Gods. He has endowed him with ail the perfections that an 
 imperfect creature can possess. Free will is one of these per- 
 fections, and this is why man was created free ; but he made a 
 bad use of his liberty, and by a necessary consequence, pain and 
 temptation have increased in strength from generation to genera- 
 tion, in proportion as virtue has diminished. Man alone is re- 
 sponsible for his own misfortunes. God is innocent. This is a 
 summary of the doctrine of the fall, already ancient in the time 
 of Plato, and which he has explained in several of his dialogues, 
 and remarkably so in the Phcedo. 
 
 We must examine, then, whether this doctrine does not in 
 itself embrace many difficulties, whether it really destroys the 
 contradiction it proposes to solve, and whether it rests upon a 
 demonstrated fact or remains a simple hypothesis. 
 
 With regard to the first point, we cannot disguise from our- 
 selves that the doctrine of the fall is full of difficulties. As long 
 as it applies only to a single individual, we can easily understand, 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 113 
 
 that by making a bad use of his free-will, he increases the 
 strength of the evil passions within him, and renders a return to 
 a virtuous course more and more difficult. Experience and 
 reason place this beyond a doubt. But, in the first place, 
 between the increasing depravity of the individual, and the 
 transmission of the parent s weakness to the child, there exists an 
 abyss ; and should it even be proved that vice is transmitted, in 
 order that the hypothesis may be complete, it would also become 
 necessary that the transmission should be entire' and universal. 
 This is not what history teaches us. Some desponding reasoners 
 hold that vice increases with each succeeding generation of man. 
 Other philosophers maintain precisely an opposite theory: in 
 either case we are justified in saying that the first argument 
 carries nothing solid in its favour, and that the hypothesis of the 
 fall is destroyed when it is found necessary for its maintenance 
 to estabHsh that the Jews were better than the Christians, and 
 that the Goths and Vandals were superior to ourselves. 
 
 Let us now inquire if this hypothesis resolves the problem. 
 God, they say, has not originally made us either unfortunate or 
 unhappy : we have become so through the faults of our fore- 
 fathers. But God, who knows everything, was not ignorant that, 
 by abusing their liberty, the first men would change the nature 
 of his work. God, who can do all things, could guard us, if he 
 pleased, from the effects of the degradation of our first parents. 
 Thus the theory of the fall leaves all the objections against 
 Providence undisturbed. 
 
 Finally, it can only in any case deserve the title of an 
 hypothesis ; for the actual fact of the fall remains undemonstrated, 
 and is only admitted by those who think they are obliged to have 
 recourse to it for the sake of the argument.- It is certain that 
 we have aspirations within ourselves which the world cannot satisfy, 
 and faculties that, in some measure, raise us above it ; which satis- 
 factorily proves that this is not our home, and that there is reserved 
 for us a future beyond the grave. But, because we can and ought 
 to aspire to a more perfect state of existence, it does not follow- 
 that we have previously enjoyed that state and have fallen from it. 
 Logical reasoning absolutely disavows such an exaggerated concla- 
 
 It may be almost superfluous to remind the reader that the philosophical 
 dogma of the fall is, as M. Jules Simon exjilains on a future page, something 
 quite distinct from the Christian doctrine of the fall of man. The former supposes 
 a pre-existent state, for our misconduct in which mankind is now degraded, 
 and undergoing a course of corrective discipline.— ii'c?. 
 
114 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 sion. Let us also add, that by the side of these faculties, so lofty 
 and so remote in their aim, there are many others suited to our 
 actual condition, and exactly proportioned, if we may be per- 
 mitted to use the phrase, to our human stature. We are, there- 
 fore, made to inhabit and traverse this earth; but we neither 
 move by chance, nor undergo the punishment of a crime. 
 The hand which has placed us here has expressly created us for 
 the state of existence we are intended to fill, and has endowed us 
 with the power" of performing a prescribed duty, that we may live 
 again in a future state. 
 
 It is unnecessary to observe that we are here examining the 
 theory of the fall in a philosophical point of view, by the light of 
 reason alone, and not by that of Divine revelation. 
 
 The dogma of original sin is, in Christianity, indissolubly 
 linked with that of redemption. The same Divine decree has 
 pronounced the curse and its remission. From original sin on 
 the one hand, and from the pardon obtained through the sacrifice 
 accomplished by our Redeemer on the other, are derived the 
 entire worship of the Christian churches. God is an offended 
 Master whom we are bound to fear, but he is also a Father 
 whom we are taught to love. His decrees are immutable ; but 
 with the same breath he has pronounced the sentence of con- 
 demnation and that of redemption. He is immeasurably above 
 us, but we gain access to him through the merits of his Son,^' 
 who is infinite and consubstantial Deity with himself. Philosophy 
 can only contemplate this combination of tenets from without. 
 It rests upon a basis to which all science is a stranger— upon 
 revelation ; and contains, in accordance with its privilege of 
 revealed doctrine, afi&rmations beyond human comprehension. 
 We have so little ground for confounding the dogma of original 
 sin with the philosophical theory of the fall, that these two 
 doctrines, in the united association of ideas to which they re- 
 spectively belong, do not by any means lead to the same con- 
 clusions. The theory of the fall has been adopted to reconcile 
 the existence of evil with the idea of Providence ; and from the 
 doftma of original sin, according to the Christian code, are 
 derived the origin of redemption, and the conditions of punish- 
 ment and pardon. 
 
 * " "When his disciples heard it, they were exceedingly amazed, saying, Who 
 then can be saved ? . . -i i 
 
 '« But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible ; 
 but with God all things are possible."— /S^ Matthew, chap. xix. verses 25, 26. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 115 
 
 The doctrine of progression is, as we may say, exactly opposed 
 to the theory of the fall. But as this word ' progression ' does 
 not convey to the mind a sufficiently perspicuous idea, it may be 
 desirable to dwell briefly upon its true meaning. Nothing renders 
 this task more easy than the association here produced by the 
 train of ideas between the theory of the fall and that of progression. 
 The one carries the ideal of humanity back to the past, and the 
 other dreams of it exclusively in the future. The first belongs 
 entirely to regret, the second to hope. If the doctrine of progression 
 consists in believing that the labour of man is never unprofitable, 
 even on this earth, and that each generation witnesses the increase 
 of those resources which ameliorate material life under every form, 
 which facilitate the development of thought, and render the 
 manners of men more polished and gentle ;— this doctrine appears 
 as incontrovertible as it is consolatory: at least it cannot be 
 contradicted by any philosophical reasoning deiived from the 
 principle of free will. But the theory of progression, thus under- 
 stood and restricted, could avail but little in explaining the 
 co-existence of evil with divine Providence : it has, therefore, 
 been amplified in a singular manner. There are certain minds 
 more enthusiastic, perhaps, than reflective, which maintain the 
 necessity of unceasing advance in all created nature, and look 
 upon this opinion as one of those incontestable truths which can- 
 not be contradicted without impiety. In their eyes it would be as 
 extreme an absurdity to deny free will as to doubt for a moment 
 universal and continual progression. 
 
 ^ It becomes the peculiar characteristic of all these rash opi- 
 nions, adopted with ardour and professed with intolerance, that 
 in the mouths of their advocates they resemble a provocation. 
 Every point is the same ; what they cannot prove they violently 
 insist upon. 
 
 The doctrine of continual and universal progression assumes a 
 double form : it is either placed in God or in the world : — 
 
 In God, when we suppose that his mind, being infinite, con- 
 ceived an infinity of worlds, and that his power, being also un- 
 limited, created, one after the other, in the hierarchical order of 
 their perfection, all those worlds which his intelligence had 
 imagined ; — 
 
 In the world, when it is pretended that God created an imperfect 
 work, but one which corrects and ameliorates itself by its own 
 strength, so that without any renewed intervention of the Creator, 
 the actual advances towards the ideal, overcoming evil at every 
 
 I 2 
 
116 PROVIDEXCE. 
 
 step, and approaching nearer and nearer to that perfection which 
 it can never attain. 
 
 The error is equal on hoth sides, when these doctrines are set 
 forward to account for the existence of evil. 
 
 For, placed in God himself, it lowers his intelligence hy at- 
 tributing to it a progressive series, the first terms of which were 
 defective ; and degrades his power by condemning it to pass con- 
 tinually through imperfect creations, to arrive at last at a better 
 conceived and more skilfully executed work. 
 
 And, placed in the world, instead of palliating evil, it almost 
 renders evil necessary ; it supposes, gratuitously, that God was 
 unable to create at once what he either sought or wished to pro- 
 duce ; and it places an inequality between men from the hour of 
 their birth, which cannot be reconciled with divine justice. Not 
 only does it offer no remedy, under either of these two forms, but 
 it aggravates the evil it was intended to destroy. 
 
 It seems strange that there should be no philosophers more 
 dogmatical than those who venture to describe the nature and 
 operations of the Almighty. While they ought only to speak 
 with hesitation upon a matter so much beyond their depth, they 
 lay dow^n axioms which they transform into so many articles of 
 faith, and thus resemble prophets rather than reasoners. 
 
 It is in this manner that they establish as a principle that 
 infinite intelligence ought to know everything that is possible ; 
 while Aristotle, arguing with equal assurance upon the same sub- 
 ject, maintains that infinite intelligence can only understand 
 infinite intelligence ; because, from the moment that it descends 
 to the finite, it deteriorates.* 
 
 The first draw from their theory this monstrous conclusion : — 
 that it belongs to the essence of divine perfection to produce all 
 possible things in succession ; and the second, with logic no less 
 triumphant, declares from his own axiom, that God does not act 
 upon the world as an effective cause, and that, if in reality he is 
 the author of good, he has become so without his own knowledge 
 or desire ; just as a flag placed upon a height serves as the 
 rallying- point for an army. But to leave Aristotle, and to occupy 
 ourselves solely with the opposing doctrine we have to discuss, 
 how can any one assert, without proof, such a serious proposition 
 as that it belongs to the essence of infinite intelligence to be 
 actually acquainted with all possible things ? 
 
 * Aristotle's Metaphysics, book xii. chai). 9. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 117 
 
 The different degrees of the possible vary from evil to good ; so 
 in virtue of this hypothesis, the conception of evil is considered 
 one of the necessary forms of perfect and divine intelligence. The 
 proposition that follows this is even more comprehensive, and 
 there is no one who, upon reflection, could adopt as an article of 
 faith, that it belongs to the perfection of infinite power to produce 
 all that infinite intelligence conceives. If infinite intelligence, of 
 necessity, conceives evil, and the greatest possible evil, how can 
 it be maintained that infinite power will, of the same necessity, 
 produce the greatest possible evil? To think or to produce evil 
 is not, according to ordinary ideas, a proof of perfection. But 
 beyond this, true power is the power that is free ; and true intelli- 
 gence is the intelligence that discriminates and decides. The 
 intelligence of God, as represented to us by these pretended 
 axioms, has only a necessary and continued perception of a series 
 of possibilities, without discriminating good from evil, and without 
 predilection ; and the power of God produces and realises these 
 conceptions in a prescribed and inevitable order. Omnipotence 
 becomes then, by the very fact, a blind power : such is the abyss 
 into which human extravagance plunges. We, insignificant atoms 
 as we are, assume the privilege to judge and will ; and that all- 
 powerful God, who is the creative cause of everything, is only 
 allowed to possess, for his whole existence, intelligence, and for his 
 entire actions, the faculty of producing an inevitable and hierarchical 
 succession of worlds which continually ameliorate their own condi- 
 tion, independent of his will. Such notions are utterly untenable. 
 
 This doctrine of continued progression cannot be more solidly 
 maintained, when considered in its consequence and not in its 
 divine cause. It implies that God has originally created so bad 
 a world that he himself could not possibly conceive a worse. Under 
 this condition the theory attempts to explain evil. And what 
 does the explanation amount to ? The abolition of God ! for it 
 removes him and supplies his place by some unintelligible 
 destiny, equally blind and cruel, alike unworthy of love or of respect. 
 No : God has never been the author of such a work. We feel 
 embarrassed by the imperfections of this world in presence of 
 the consummate perfection of the Creator ; and, to escape from 
 the difiiculty, we are called upon to suppose that the world has 
 been a thousand times worse than it is ! It is evident that the 
 world in coming from the hand of its Creator was endowed with 
 every perfection that it was capable of possessing. We do not 
 profess to understand all the metaphysical axioms with which 
 
118 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 false philosophy attempts to overwhelm us ; but we thoroughly 
 comprehend that God is good, omnipotent, and uncontrolled. 
 Thus, the question remains intact, and the solution assumed from 
 the doctrine of continual and universal progression, should be 
 rejected as an empty chimera. Let us, however, pause here, to 
 repeat that we deny the theory of progression in its excess and in 
 the proposed application to the doctrine of Providence, but not in 
 its principle, which is sound, and consistent with truth. 
 
 We discard a theory which impugns the absolute freedom of 
 God, which degrades his intelligence, which under the pretext of 
 exalting and explaining his infinite goodness, condemns him 
 to produce evil, and to commence a series of creations by the 
 worst of all possible worlds, — a theory which, without any better 
 motive than speculative caprice, tends to establish that every 
 thing in created nature inevitably follows the law of progression ; 
 not only man but animals, plants, and all inanimate nature. To 
 this point the doctrine verges, for successive creation cannot be 
 limited to one class of beings — it invades everything, plunges 
 the imagination into a sort of chaos, and opens the door to the 
 most monstrous absurdities ; compels this ambitious philosophy, 
 after beginning with unjustifiable and hardly intelligible axioms, 
 to finish like a tale in " The Arabian Nights." And what do 
 history and science reply to this? for we must not set aside facts, 
 since the law of facts is in question. The changes do not begin 
 from the present day, according to the system ; they date from 
 the creation of the world, and the transformations that have 
 already taken place ought to enlighten us as to those that are to 
 come. But no ; neither history nor science say one word upon 
 tlie subject, and to speak only of the human body, assuredly 
 nothing authorises us to assert that it has been ameliorated or 
 even modified since its first creation. We therefore reject with- 
 out hesitation this overweening and empty theory which cannot 
 be insisted upon without reaching an absurd conclusion. 
 
 But when this theory of progression is restricted to that which 
 is free in nature, then history replies and produces a multiplicity 
 of witnesses. It is too true that the physical world is subservient 
 even at this day to the same laws that were created at its birth ; 
 that the extinction of some living races leaves undecided the 
 question as to whether they have been replaced by other and 
 superior races ; and finally, that the human body has nothing to 
 expect from the future, and has gained nothing throughout the 
 past. But the mind of man and his moral composition have 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 119 
 
 improved ; his inlieritance has accumulated. We must not look 
 for the men of antiquity in Homer, who deals only with heroes, 
 and creates rather than describes ; we can form a more just 
 estimate of what they actually were from their laws, manners, and 
 religion, from those of their acts, of which we preserve a true 
 record, and from the opinions which they themselves have pro- 
 nounced upon remarkable events. Thus, freed from the bias of 
 party spirit and the factitious enthusiasm of some visionary 
 admirers of primitive nature, we see man issue from darkness 
 and night, and advance century after century towards a purer and 
 more brilliant intelligence. The same man is doubtless to be 
 found at every epoch : but first as a child, uncultivated, given up 
 to his own instincts, and powerless against nature. By degrees 
 the faculties within him develop themselves, each generation 
 contributes to the improvement of that which succeeds, societies 
 become more perfect, laws are enacted and improved, genius 
 breaks forth in art, and unfolds itself less rapidly but with more 
 regular and certain adornment in industrial discoveries. Science 
 penetrates, at leisure and step by step, into the bosom of nature y^ 
 studying, sounding, and tracing mysteries to their true source ; 
 human intelligence takes possession of the world, and learns to 
 know itself and its resources ; while the most barbarous vices are 
 rooted out, others of a refined character spring from this new 
 civilisation, and man becomes at the same time more cunning and 
 more gentle. At times some fatal catastrophe occurs, and the 
 world is desolated by a tempest, after which history shows us 
 ruins upon the soil — bewildered nations who have wandered from 
 their path, and children unworthy of their parents. Then these 
 years of terror disappear, great men rise up anew, and recal the 
 past or anticipate the future ; they lead the rest of mankind, 
 restore to them their lost arts, recommence their history, re-erect 
 their altars, inscribe new tables of the law ; and thus through 
 them another civilisation rises, which effaces the wonders of the 
 last. If we desire to trace human life in the aggregate and 
 through the lapse of centuries, we must disregard these exclusive 
 cataclysms, and not devote ourselves either to one race or one 
 people. To ascertain the results of history we must grasp the 
 whole ; as in order to take in an extensive plain we are obliged to 
 ascend a height. The Greeks, the Romans have had their fall ; 
 but mankind never declines. A nation perishes by our side, and 
 
 * Fiehte's Destiny of Man, translated by Barcbou de Penboen, p. 277. 
 
120 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 another rises. A political convulsion extends itself by degrees, 
 and checks for a time the full play and fertility of intellect. It 
 is but a passing cloud, and we ought to disregard such shadows 
 on the past and future. The sun shone yesterday, and will 
 return with equal brilliancy to-morrow. 
 
 If we feel discouraged, let us enter a library. Why have we 
 not preserved the catalogue of the Alexandrian collection. We 
 should have' there beheld the riches of the ancients, while at the 
 same time their poverty would have lain bare before us. Un- 
 doubtedly we have not now a Homer, neither perhaps have we a 
 Plato nor an Aristotle ; but why are they so highly estimated ? 
 Because they were great in a community of little minds. Plato 
 addressed the select few of Athens, whilst Leibnitz would have 
 found an auditory from one end of Europe to the other, and even 
 in the new world itself. Aristotle investigated and discovered so 
 many of the secrets of nature that he even performed more than 
 his part ; but those who laboured after him started from the point 
 at which he had arrived, and they still advance without our being 
 able to tell or foresee how far they may penetrate. Are we incapable 
 of following the progress of human intellect in theory ? Let us 
 now listen to facts ; materiality speaks. Compare the Chaldean 
 astronomers with those of the Observatory at Paris ; recal to our 
 mind the columns of Hercules ; place the galleys of the ancients 
 beside our screw steam-ships ; enter the office of the electric 
 telegraph ; ascend a railway carriage ; place your hand upon the 
 first object in your cabinet — a watch, a telescope, a lamp, a 
 book. Man was like Enceladus, crushed under three moun- 
 tains — weight, time, and space. He has conquered weight by 
 machinery, and rendered subservient to his own use the strength 
 which impeded him; he has, in two different senses, conquered time, 
 by history and the telegraph ; and is in a fair way to annihilate 
 space by rapidity of motion and the power of optical instruments. 
 
 Take a map of the world ; observe the extent that civilisation 
 occupies in the two hemispheres, and then retrace the course of 
 centuries, to wonder at the rapidity with which that extent 
 diminishes. The fifteenth century alone will deduct half the 
 globe. The Roman empire, which was called the empire of 
 the world, was pressed on every side by barbarism. Under 
 Pericles civilisation was confined to one small corner of the 
 earth.* Progression is written in this history in characters so 
 
 * Fichte, Destimj of Man, p. 285 ct se^:. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 121 
 
 visible that we can hardly speak of and show it without feeliuf^ 
 that we utter the most trite commonplaces. 
 
 God has placed progression where it was necessary and legi- 
 timate — in liberty. Metaphysics agree with history. Let us 
 imagine a perfect being ; progress and even movement are to 
 him impossible, because he cannot change without deterioration. 
 Let us conceive a being who cannot dispose of himself, and can 
 neither know nor modify his own destiny : for him, relative per- 
 fection consists in remaining such as he has emanated from the 
 hand of his Maker, without change or decay, in possession of the 
 same functions on the last as on the first day of his existence. 
 But now, let us suppose an imperfect being, who knows and loves 
 perfection ; will he not necessarily incline towards it ; incessantly 
 improve himself, that he may approach nearer to his model, and 
 ameliorate the condition of all those beings around him who come 
 within the sphere of his action. Thus, to pursue and achieve 
 good is the law, privilege, glory and consolation of humanity. 
 
 It is, therefore, by admitting the theory of progression, and 
 assigning to it its proper sphere of exercise, that we refuse to 
 explain through the same cause the co-existence of the perfection 
 of God and the imperfection of the world. 
 
 There is yet in history one more doctrine that requires con- 
 sideration — the doctrine of Optimism. 
 
 Every one is acquainted mth that formula of optimism which 
 Voltaire has rendered even more popular than Leibnitz : " Every 
 thing is for the best in this best of all possible worlds." 
 
 This formula, as we receive it, has been taken in a very 
 absolute sense. Nothing is so useful in summing up a theory, 
 impressing it upon the mind, and spreading it amongst men, as a 
 formula ; but taken separately, without the system of philosophy 
 it comprises, it is rarely understood in its true sense. 
 
 All those who have not read Leibnitz, and amongst them we 
 should be inclined to class Voltaire, willingly believe that this 
 great metaphysician has asserted that evil is positively banished 
 from the world ; that nothing of the kind exists. Leibnitz does 
 not deny the existence of evil, as the stoics denied that of pain, 
 neither does he dream like Buckland of transforming evil into 
 good by forced interpretations. His theory applies neither to 
 individuals nor even to a species, but to combined creation and to 
 the entire duration of the universe ; and it is from this com- 
 bination of beings, and from the entire continuance of their 
 existence, that he maintains the doctrine, not of absolute but of 
 
12:2 TROVIDENCE. 
 
 relative perfection. This explanation once given and received, 
 the admirable romance of " Candide," without losing any of its 
 originality or attraction, ceases to be an argument. 
 
 Optimism, thus reduced to its true definition, is undoubtedly a 
 very important doctrine. We may consider it alternately by 
 commencing from God, or from the world. If we commence from 
 God, it is evident that we are led directly to the theory of 
 optimism, since without it we feel ourselves obliged to admit a 
 limit to the intelligence, power, and goodness of the Creator. In 
 commencing from the world, we see nothing that induces us to 
 look upon it as a false belief; for though it is true that we jostle 
 evil — if we may be permitted to use the expression — at every step, 
 what proves to us that this evil is not the condition upon which 
 we receive a greater good? We cannot figure to ourselves the 
 totality of being, therefore it is impossible to tell whether what 
 appears to us to be a great evil may not be corrected by some 
 general law which escapes our comprehension. Our personal 
 experience, imperceptible as it is in this mighty whole, teaches 
 us to judge with indulgence ; and science discovers affinities and 
 analogies where the vulgar mind perceives only confusion and 
 disorder. There is nothing more simple and probable than this 
 doctrine, and it cannot be denied that it deprives the objections 
 to the existence of evil of a great portion of their force. 
 
 We do not hesitate to admit it on its principal data, and to 
 acknowledge that the world, taken in its totality, is as perfect as 
 it can be ; but as this doctrine permits the existence of evil in 
 detail, it does not completely destroy the difficulty ; and, to arrive 
 at something decisive, we ask how does this relative perfection of 
 the world in its totality remedy physical pain and moral evil ? If 
 I complain to God of the pain I suffer, will it suffice that Leibnitz 
 tells me that this world is an excellent creation, because it has 
 come from the hands of an excellent Maker. Well, I believe 
 this; but was there any absolute necessity which obliged this 
 Maker to neglect details, or to render them so painful ? If this 
 necessity exists, God's omnipotence is limited by some power 
 independent of himself; and if it does not exist, all the attempts 
 of optimism are futile. 
 
 We are, therefore, reduced to accept optimism solely as a 
 palliation of the difficulty ; and the three great historical theories 
 of the fall, progression, and optimism, leave us up to a certain 
 point disarmed ; it remains, therefore, to try if, by availing our- 
 selves of the help they otfer, and accepting in our necessity 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 123 
 
 incomplete results, we cannot reduce to the proportions of an 
 ordinary difficulty, an objection which at first appeared insur- 
 mountable. 
 
 Let us first begin by examining the nature and scope of the 
 objection. 
 
 We have admitted that there is evil, but we have shown that 
 there is in the world more good than evil; this must not be 
 forgotten. Even though we may fail in removing every possible 
 doubt, it will not be the less proved that the creation of the 
 world has been conceived and executed by a good and intelligent 
 God. This universe is not a chaos ; it is an admirable whole, in 
 which a plan worthy of God reveals itself. It may be difficult to 
 explain imperfections of detail, vices and misfortunes, but it would 
 neither be rational nor philosophical to perm.it difficulties of detail 
 to shake a faith solidly established. There is more than one 
 principle which we are not permitted to doubt, although the 
 application may bafflie us. 
 
 What, then, is the question ? To explain if possible the im- 
 perfections which subsist in a whole so powerfully organised. 
 This is all ; and whatever may be the result of our arguments, 
 the triumph of good over evil remains established and complete. 
 
 The most usual and, at the same time, most simple explanation 
 of evil is this ; it may be called a mitigated form of optimism, or 
 optimism within the limits of reason and common sense. Who can 
 prove, it will be asked, that what we call evil is evil in fact ? We 
 often complain of imaginary evils, which, if we understood the 
 designs of Providence, we should regard as blessings, and return 
 thanks to him who sent them. Certain optimists, through devo- 
 tion to their system, go as far as to maintain that this applies to 
 every calamity of life, and that, either from ignorance or levity, 
 we reproach Providence for the benefits it bestows. In speaking 
 thus they only commit the mistake of exaggeration. It is true 
 that evil does exist, but in a much less degree than at first sight 
 is supposed. One of the offices of science in this world is to 
 conquer evil, and often to employ it for good ; and in proportion 
 as science advances, the amount of evil decreases in the same 
 degree with our ignorance. Thus, restrained within a just limit, 
 the fundamental assertion of the optimists almost overthrows 
 the difficulty ; for we do not suffer so much from the positive 
 evil, as from the relative amount; and this amount is unknown 
 to us. 
 
 Thus, by an exercise of clear reason the difficulty is con- 
 
124 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 siderably reduced. Let us however seek the source of this evil, 
 and enquire whether it is just to attribute it to God. Amongst 
 the misfortunes w^e endure and complain of, there are a great 
 number which we bring upon ourselves."^ We could perhaps 
 avoid half the ills which destroy or embitter our own lives, and 
 by more enlightened cares we might improve the health of our 
 children. If we fancy our share of the good in this world 
 insufficient, our own extravagance or idleness is often the cause. 
 Eemove the evils which spring from this origin ; we shall find 
 their number infinite. We also suff'er evils derived from the 
 errors of our fathers. In certain states, yet but little civilised, 
 the organisation of society is such that an incalculable number of 
 peasants are forced to labour and suffer in order to maintain an 
 oligarchy in opulence and idleness. Is it from God or man that 
 the serf must demand the reason of his misfortunes ? When the 
 French law assigned the paternal inheritance to the eldest son, 
 who was guilty of the poverty of the other children ? AYas that a 
 divine ordinance ? A ship's crew at sea, abundantly provided for a 
 voyage of twenty days, consume their provisions in eight, and perish 
 at the end of fifteen. Is their destruction to be imputed to God ? 
 
 God has created neither tyrants nor slaves, nobles nor ple- 
 beians : these are human inventions consequent upon vices and 
 usurpation consecrated under the name of right ; neither has 
 God made misers, assassins, voluptuaries, nor perjurers. =!^ He has 
 created us free, sufficiently intelligent to resist the world and 
 appropriate it to our wants, numerous enough to assist one 
 another, and not too numerous to find by our own labours an 
 assured subsistence in the produce of the earth. This is what 
 we derive from him : the rest proceeds from ourselves ; let 
 us bless God and deplore all our weakness. 
 
 It has been objected that God in creating us free knew that we 
 should misuse our freedom. He knew, above all, that we had the 
 power to misuse it. But what is the gist of this argument ? It 
 goes to the full extent of claiming for man the privilege of 
 impotence, and reproaches the Creator with having made us after 
 his own image. If he had chained us to our appetites, like the 
 brute creation ; if we had been without strength, power of dis- 
 
 * '* Corporis exigua desideria sunt : frigus submovere vult, alimentis famem 
 ac sitim extinguere : quidquid extra concupiscitur, vitiis, non usibus laboratur." 
 — Seneca, De Consolatione, chap. ix. 
 
 * ** Man, seek not the author of evil, that author is thyself." — /. /. Rom- 
 ieaUf Emile, Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Curate. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 1'25 
 
 crimination, or responsibility, we should then have been happy 
 and have rendered justice to his goodness and power ! 
 
 Not only do we by our vices create real evils, but also by our 
 weakness, imaginary ones. It is not too much to say that half 
 our tears are shed in vain.* We laugh, unconscious of our own 
 failings, at the child who cries for a toy. Louis the XIV. who 
 understood the government of a court, if not that of a kingdom, 
 invented favours which cost him nothing, and conferred nothing 
 on those who received them ; they were not even symbols of 
 merit which would have given them value, but literally barren 
 and unmeaning fovours. The greatest men under the monarchy, 
 and St. Simon the first of all, sought eagerly to be appointed by 
 the king to hold the chamber candlestick while his majesty 
 disrobed. This furnishes a striking image of half our objects of 
 ambition and half our misfortunes. It would have been a fine 
 spectacle to have seen some Marquis de Dangeau accusing 
 Providence and deploring the condition of mankind, because 
 the king would not bestow upon him the honour of holding his 
 candlestick ! 
 
 Instead of weeping and lamenting over a headache, low spirits, 
 or a fever, and groaning because an end of ribbon has been 
 thrown to another when we coveted it, let us rather try to be 
 men and look upon life as a serious pilgrimage. Let us leave the 
 candlestick to courtiers and complaints to the effeminate. Let 
 us think less of material interest, and more of our own advance- 
 ment, not in the quality of functionaries or courtiers, but in our 
 capacity as men. If we require ambition, let us seek to possess 
 that of doing good, the only ambition worthy of our nature. Let 
 us recollect that life is short, and followed by immortality : let 
 us traverse the passage bravely: as soldiers who march to victory. 
 We are not masters of our own fortune, but we are of our own 
 hearts f The world may condemn us to suffer, but not to suffer 
 like cowards ; it may destroy and yet not sully us.| It can 
 take from us, one by one, all the joys it bestows, but it depends 
 on ourselves to despise its pleasures, its injustice, its griefs, and 
 to remain calm, devoted, and true to ourselves under the eye 
 of God. 
 
 * "Quidquid optimum homini est, id extra humanam patientiam jacet, nee 
 dari, nee eripi potest." — Seneca, De Consolationc, chap. viii. 
 
 + " Et mihi res, non me rebus submittere couor." — Horace, Epist., book i. 
 epist. i. verse 19. 
 
 X *' Fear not them -which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul." — 
 St. Matthew, chap. x. verse 28. 
 
126 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 Again we say that we do not here vvish to deny evil ; but in a 
 question of comparison we have the right to reduce to their just 
 value those complaints which cowardice and ignorance exaggerate 
 beyond truth. 
 
 Without subterfuge we are able from the outset to treat lightly 
 the question of degree. It is necessary, say our adversaries, that 
 evil should exist, but not to such an extent. How then do they 
 estimate it ? What is their standard of comparison ? =5-- They 
 measure it not by itself but by their own cowardice, and this is 
 why they make it so great. Let us suppose that this very day 
 and hour, God, by his sovereign will, should remove from the 
 world half the evil that he suffers to exist there ; what would the 
 enemies of Providence say to-morrow ? Precisely what they said 
 yesterday, unless indeed their hearts were changed. Evil 
 resembles all things that belong exclusively to this world ; it has 
 no fixed measure. It is great or small according to the strength 
 with which it is borne. In the ward of a hospital it is not the 
 greatest sufferer who groans the most, but the most sensitive. 
 In a time of scarcity at sea, one bravely endures privations, while 
 another at once despairs and succumbs. Custom, in such cases, 
 does much. There are rich men who would be miserable if 
 obliged to content themselves with the ordinary fare of a labourer. 
 The misery of one contributes to the ambition and happiness of 
 another. The same individual may change according to cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 He who faints at a slight incision of the lancet, bears a sabre 
 cut without flinching. We ought to blush more at the impatience 
 with which we suffer pain, when we consider that this pain is 
 almost always the just measure of our own weakness, f 
 
 Thus then we admit that there is evil, but we must not say 
 there is too much ; for this would be to confound ourselves in 
 our own conclusions. But this evil, whatever it may be, is it 
 reconcileable with the power and goodness of God ? A small por- 
 
 * "Undecumque ex sequo ad ccelum erigitur acies, paribus intervallis 
 omnia divina ab omnibus humanis distant." — Seneca, Be Consolatione, 
 cliap. iv. 
 
 t " However ingenious we may be in fomenting our own miseries by means 
 of fine institutions, we liave not, up to the present time, reached that point of 
 perfection which considers life a burden, and would induce us to prefer 
 nonentity to existence. But for this, discouragement and despair would have 
 possessed the majority of the world, and mankind would ere long cease to 
 exist. Now, if it is better for us to be than not to be, this conclusion is 
 sufficient to justify our existence." — /. /. liomseau, Letter to Voltaire on the 
 Poem called Natural Relic/ion. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 127 
 
 tion of evil in the presence of such a proponderance of good does 
 not hinder the workl from being essentially good in itself; but why 
 has God suffered any evil whatever to exist there ? 
 
 This is to ask why God, who has made us after his own image, 
 has not at the same time elevated us to his own standard ? 
 What then do we desire? — to be perfect? is this what we 
 demand? Can we in conscience content ourselves with less? 
 God who can do everything could not do this. He could not 
 create a perfect being, for then there would be two Gods, which 
 would be absurd. It forms the essence of a perfect being, not 
 to be created, but to be, and to continue to be, by its own internal 
 sufficiency. 
 
 When we wish to demonstrate the existence of God, we rest upon 
 the principle that a self-existent being is necessary to explain the 
 possible existence of other beings. And when we reason upon 
 this necessary being, the first truth that we perceive, is, that there 
 can be no defect in this being, and that no argument whatever 
 can prove that there is any limit to his power. 
 
 The necessity of his existence, and the perfection of his 
 nature, are two dogmas of the same degree, established on the 
 same foundations, correlative one to the other, ever inseparable, 
 and without which any speculation upon the existence and nature 
 of God is impossible. From whence it follows incontestably, that 
 if the world were perfect it would be God, and would have no 
 first cause : and that not being God, and possessing a first cause, 
 it is absolutely necessary that it should be imperfect. 
 
 This being the case, it is as absurd to reproach God with the 
 imperfections of mankind, as to maintain that a stick can have but 
 one end, that the whole is less than a part, or that a straight line 
 is not the shortest distance between two given points. 
 
 We have established two illustrations ; one that we must not 
 argue on the amount of evil, because this amount is unascertained, 
 and often imaginary ; the other that the existence of evil is 
 the necessary accompaniment of a created being, not because that 
 being is what he is, but simply because he is created. This double 
 demonstration being admitted, the objection can exist no longer. 
 
 When we say that the existence of evil is necessary, that it is 
 a condition absolutely inseparable from a created being, it must 
 not be understood by this, that evil exists separately in virtue of 
 being a special and distinct reality. God has not produced, and 
 could not produce evil, but he has made a relative good, beneath 
 which imagination can always conceive a still greater good ; and 
 
128 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 what is wanting in this actual good, to render it equal with that 
 of the same kind which we imagine, is precisely what we call 
 evil. This word expresses only a nonentity, being simply the 
 absence or deficiency of good. 
 
 We may further state, to follow up the same idea, that every- 
 thing that falls within time and space, is directly susceptible of 
 measurement. Now, being susceptible of measurement, that is 
 to say, in other words, being great or small, what is this, if not 
 possessing only a certain extent of existence — an existence in 
 a given time from now until then, restrained within a specified 
 condition ? Limit, measurement, multiplicity, and divisibility, 
 want, or defect, — all these are only mere abstract forms of what in 
 ordinary language, is called evil. To ask why there is evil, or 
 rather, why there is change, multiplicity, measure, time, or space, 
 is all the same thing, and amounts in fact to asking, why the 
 world is the world ? Doubtless this last question is a problem in 
 itself. The existence of the world is an incontestable fact, — 
 more difficult to comprehend and admit than the other incon- 
 testable fact, that there is a God. But let us think of God, that 
 is to say, of a perfect Being, having the entire plenitude of being. 
 It is impossible that he could not exist. Let us think of the 
 world, or rather of an existence necessarily imperfect. It is 
 quite possible that it should not exist, and even difficult that it 
 should ; for it could not come into being without a perfect cause, 
 and we cannot imagine how a perfect cause should be induced to 
 create, not this, but any world. This is the sole problem, — the 
 problem of the creation. We have discussed it under its 
 abstract form when treating of creation. We have only now to 
 repeat, with reference to evil, what we then said with regard to 
 imperfect or limited existence ; for evil is nothing more than 
 the limit of existence. We must not suffer ourselves to be 
 deceived by a simple distinction of terms, and believe that 
 there are two problems, when in fact there is only one. Why 
 did God desire the world ? Why and how has he made it ? How 
 can the existence of God and the existence of the world be 
 reconciled ? Can it be that God knows the future, and that man 
 is free, — that the power of God is without limit, and the freedom 
 of man entire ? By what mystery does the all-powerful God, 
 whose essence is at the same time, all goodness, allow evil to 
 exist ? Here is, in fact, a single question under three different 
 forms. 
 
 As algebra simplifies calculations, philosophy can simplify all 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL, 129 
 
 arguments upon creation, foreknowledge, and evil, by bringing 
 them back to this leading point,— the co-existence of the uni't 
 and the multiple. If we once admit the fact of creation, we have 
 no occasion to be disturbed on the question of free-will, or the 
 existence of evil. After this reply, there remains but one point 
 more to consider — injustice. 
 
 We may care little for deformity— we may resign ourselves 
 to pain, and even learn to comprehend vice : all this is apparent. 
 Imperfection is inseparable from the created being, and from the 
 moment when God leaves man partly to his own guidance, human 
 liberty must exercise itself in the conditions of the struggle, between 
 the solicitations of good and evil, between pleasure and pain, with 
 the chance of failure ; but more frequently with the prospect of 
 success. But this abdication of God from the government of man 
 is far from complete. The liberty he has bestowed on us is subject 
 to a law ; and that law is his will, which we can transgress, but 
 ought to obey. It is our noblest privilege to know this will, and to 
 submit ourselves voluntarily to it as the price of sacrifice. This 
 law is written everywhere throughout creation. 
 
 First, in man's conscience, which means also, at the same 
 time, in his reason and feelings; for every thing within us 
 speaks of duty, the faculty by which we think as well as that by 
 which we feel. We further find this law written in startlinc» 
 characters in all human enactments ; for if some of them are 
 unjust, hateful, or tyrannical, they are known for what they are 
 and deceive no one, or at least, a very small number. The great 
 majority of laws is nothing more than written reason and the 
 formula of duty ; and this is why the name of law remains holy, 
 even when passions and violence intrude their absolutism into 
 the code of human civilisation. History also explains duty to 
 us : and to find it in the succession of facts, we require no com- 
 ment from the historian ; the simple progress of events sufficientlv 
 informs us. Finally, there is nothing in the visible world thai; 
 does not everywhere reveal traces of harmonious intention, of 
 the appropriation of all existence to one special object, and of the 
 application of all these combined forces and influences to a 
 single end. 
 
 Nevertheless, evil is unequally distributed ; one man is happj-, 
 another miserable. Or if it be insisted upon, that none are happy, 
 the misery of one is greater than that of the other. Let us be 
 careful ; for here is evidently injustice, and this constitutes a real 
 difficulty. It cannot be said in this case, that the degree of evil is 
 
230 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 nothinct ; for we no longer compare the amount of evil with a 
 fictitious ideal, but one positive evil with another ; and we do not 
 reproach God with causing us to suffer, but with causing one 
 man to suffer more than another. He may send what sufferings 
 appear to him good; but if he is just, all ought to suffer 
 
 This' difficulty appears more formidable when we reflect that 
 inequality of suffering is never justified by inequality of merit. 
 If we could reply, this man is less unfortunate because he is 
 better, all would be answered ; but this is not the case. Here 
 is one man born in luxury, another in poverty. One works 
 and suffers for the other; is this just ? Let us not say that fortune 
 is nothing. These lofty maxims are only true in proportionate 
 decrrees : it is absurd and criminal to prefer riches to duty, but 
 riches are in this world a great instrument and condition of 
 happiness. Those who maintain that happiness or misery 
 ought to be estimated solely by the measure of our own 
 sensibility, assert a paradox; for they exaggerate truth until it 
 becomes almost falsehood. To convince ourselves of this, we 
 have only to enumerate in the different phases of a single life, 
 which have been the happiest and which have been the most 
 miserable periods; we shall see that happiness is in some degree 
 dependent upon wealth. In other words, an upright man who 
 is rich, is happier than an upright man who is poor. This 
 being the case, why does God suffer a just man to be born in 
 
 poverty? 
 
 Finally, injustice appears still more apparent, if we consider, 
 not a just and an unjust man, but a good man and a criminal. 
 Let us suppose the good man, overwhelmed with privation 
 and misery, betrayed in his affections, imprisoned, driven from 
 his country, disgraced by an unjust sentence, and crushed under 
 the weight of calumny. The other triumphant, surrounded with 
 luxury, enjoying the pleasures of intelligence, and perhaps the 
 gratificatioa of being loved and admired ; held up as a model to 
 youth ; speaking of virtue, in all probability, without shame ; 
 living' in apparent respectability on the fruits of crime— for 
 virtue is easy to him who wants nothing ;— and even spoken 
 well of after his death, through the fascinating influence of 
 
 success. 
 
 Let us think of this, and for this alone let us appeal to the 
 
 justice of God. 
 
 Three answers are ready. Certain liberal-minded Utopians 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. 131 
 
 persuade themselves that all this evil comes from man himself, 
 and from the manner in which society is organised. According to 
 them, we have only to change the foundation of social order, to 
 restore each person to his proper position, and to establish the 
 reigu of universal justice. God forbid that we should discourage 
 sucli expectations. We believe that abuses are numerous, and 
 that for many, a remedy may be found ; and we only ask that 
 ambition may not take the mask of patriotism, that ignorance 
 may not presume to detract from merit, that the desire of curbing 
 evil may not change into the mania of transforming every thing, 
 that objectionable means may not be used even to accomplish 
 a good end, and that defective order may never be replaced 
 by absolute confusion. Above all we ask that we may not feed 
 on vain hopes, and that in the midst of all reforms, we may 
 never forget the nature of that social being for whom they are 
 made. 
 
 Such is the construction of man that imperfection and con- 
 sequently injustice will invariably accompany him. Every effort 
 of the legislator ought to tend to render injustice less frequent, 
 or less complete. Let us then quit these vain aspirations, which 
 deal too harshly with society, and too leniently with man ; and 
 seek not to reply to this objection to the existence of injustice by 
 attempting to set up a new code. There is still a point which 
 resists the arguments of all Utopians. According to their regu- 
 lations, we should all be born equally rich : let it be so ; riches 
 are after all a purely human conventionality. But shall we also 
 be born equally intelligent? It is useless to say that all 
 functions may be made equally honourable and attractive ; these 
 are empty dreams. By the side of intellectual inequality is there 
 not also moral inequality ? This fact is startling, and can neither 
 be denied nor remedied. Education can do much, but we must 
 neither mistake its power nor exaggerate it to the point of saying 
 that it can re-establish intellectual equality amongst men. 
 
 A more conclusive reply to the objection drawn from injustice 
 is this, that God has assigned to man an influential position in 
 the government of society. Providence rules the world from 
 above, but the part allotted to us, injustice, has still the trace or 
 mark of Providence. This is not, under anew form, the reply 
 we have just rejected. On the contrary, whatever may be the 
 construction of society, if it is human, we maintain that it cannot 
 be absolutely just. Thus the existence of injustice is explained 
 by the interference of man in the government of human nature; 
 
 K 2 
 
13'2 PEOVIDENCE. 
 
 as the existence of vice in every individual, is accounted for by the 
 conditions and requirements of liberty. 
 
 This reply has both truth and plausibility ; it extenuates 
 without destroying evil. If the law of justice is absolute, and it 
 is so, virtue constitutes an imprescriptible right, and God is, if vre 
 may dare to use such an expression, the just man's debtor. 
 The just may wait — the hour of God must surely come. 
 
 Thus the difficulty is invincible, or rather it would be so if 
 there \vere no immortality. Philosophy triumphs over every thing 
 but this alone. Physical evil is nothing — pain is contemptible ; 
 iniuBtice alone when persisted in, is an invincible objection to the 
 goodness of God. If we seek to explain or palliate this, we 
 find nothing but evasion. For injustice is an absolute evil, 
 one of the greatest — in fact the sole evil.^'' Whoever permits 
 or sanctions injustice is either impotent or wicked. The most 
 consummate and irreparable injustice would be the non-existence 
 
 of God. 
 
 We do not here speak of the virtuous man ; we do not say that 
 recompense is necessary for him. Virtue may dispense with 
 reward, hut God cannot dispense with rewarding virtue. We 
 may die for justice without a murmur, but in the presence of 
 this death we should accuse Providence if the tragedy were a 
 final consummation, and not, on the contrary, a transition and 
 a trial .i 
 
 This is the delicious fruit that suffering bears, and it is from 
 this we may say that it overflows with immortality. Let us 
 bless God for rendering the law of duty so evident, and often 
 so austere, that each day presents us with either the oppor- 
 tunity or the realisation of a martyrdom. This subversion of 
 truth and justice manifests to us that life is only a commence- 
 ment and a trial — the hour before eternity. 
 
 What can other demonstrations signify ? this includes all. Not 
 only do I console myself for the injustice I behold, but I find 
 a pleasure in that which I experience. I am just and I am 
 persecuted, but God is waiting to receive me.| 
 
 * ' ' Whatever is evil in itself will always remain evil. I speak in the 
 moral, not in the physical sense, for in the latter there is nothing absolutely 
 bad; all is good." — /. /. Jiousseau, Letter to M. D' Alemhert, etc., Ed. 
 Lahure, vol. L p. 251. 
 
 t ' ' Bonum virum (Dens) in deliciis non habet ; experitur, indurat, sibi 
 ilium prreparat." — Seneca, De Providenfid, chap. i. 
 
 :J: " He that taketh not his cross and followeth after me is not worthy of 
 me." — St. Mattlieic, chap. x. verse 38. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL. ] 33 
 
 " It appears from the murmurs of impatient mortals that 
 God ought to reward them before they deserve recompense and 
 that he is called upon to pay their virtue in advance. Alas ! 
 let us first be virtuous and then we shall be happy. Let us 
 not exact the prize before we have won the victory, nor demand 
 our wages until the work is complete." ■■' 
 
 ^ J. J. liousseau, Eni'ile, Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Curate. 
 
134 PKOVIDENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTIONS DRAWN FROM 
 DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 
 
 "I believe that God is immutaWe. It appears evident tliat his is a 
 perfection which cannot be sixbject to change. This is sufficient for me. Even 
 when I cannot reconcile the immutability of God with his liberty, I believe he 
 possesses these attributes, since his perfection is infinite." — Malebranchey 
 Eighth Discourse upon Metajihysics, sect. 2. 
 
 Up to this point "we have considered Providence in its most 
 accessible, and in some degree, most familiar point of view. We 
 have sought in the world the traces of divine wisdom and good- 
 ness, and the objection we have discussed is that which first 
 presents itself, and which strikes even the minds of the least 
 attentive observers — the existence of evil. 
 
 We have no occasion to examine the world to learn that God 
 directs it. We know that God exists, and how^ever little w^e may- 
 be able to comprehend his nature, we know that he is perfect and 
 therefore good, intelligent, and powerful. 
 
 Now it is impossible that a being essentially good could love 
 disorder, or that a being essentially intelligent should produce a 
 work without arranging it according to a fixed plan ; or finally, that 
 an all-powerful being should not realise the plan which his 
 intelligence has conceived. 
 
 Thus the data with which we are already supplied , as the nature 
 of God, are sufficient to show us that there is order in the world. 
 And let it not be said that we make use of this order to establish 
 the existence of God, for we require nothing more to enable us to 
 believe in a perfect deity than that which we feel in our own 
 thoughts and hearts. We accept only as addenda the arguments 
 which the world supplies. 
 
 But whether we directly establish the existence of Providence 
 by following out the idea of divine perfection, or that we adopt 
 the longer and less accessible path of contemplating the wonders 
 of nature, is there not something of contradiction between the 
 
OBJECTIONS TO DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 135 
 
 idea of Providence and the absolute immutability that we are 
 compelled to attribute to God ? 
 
 The power of human thought is so feeble when applied to 
 these matters, that it even contradicts itself in the develop- 
 ment of its ideas of perfection. For sometimes it only desires to 
 see in perfection immutable unity, and at others it endeavours to 
 discover all the attributes of Providence, goodness, foresight, 
 solicitude, and unceasing action. Hence result, in some degree, 
 two opposite philosophical doctrines which we must strive to 
 reconcile, as each appears true and necessary to the other. Let 
 us first examine the nature of the difficulty closely, before we 
 attempt its solution. 
 
 It is incontestable that when we think of God, beginning from 
 the idea of absolute perfection which our reason suggests to us, 
 and when we elevate ourselves towards him by the aid of our 
 conception of originating cause, making the world our starting- 
 point, we arrive at speculations of a totally different nature, and 
 which have each their peculiar disadvantages. 
 
 The first method leads us to an immutable God in whom there 
 is neither imperfection nor limit ; and the second to a more 
 human and accessible Deity, whose majesty attracts our love 
 without implanting fear in our minds, and whose paternal hand 
 we, in some measure, feel above us. There is equal difficulty in 
 both systems : in one, because we descend to creation; in the other, 
 because we mount up to the Creator. 
 
 The immutable God of the metaphysician can only think of, or 
 love himself, and his entire action terminates in himself. If he 
 bestows any thought on the world, if he loves, creates, and 
 governs it, time, space, and consequently imperfection, enter into 
 bis being; he degenerates from his absolute unity. 
 
 To render an action great, it is not sufficient that it should 
 be produced by a mighty power; its effect must also be great; 
 so that the littleness of the world lowers and reduces God. 
 
 On the contrary, the creative Deity of the philosophy of 
 common sense, loves the world, occupies himself with it, governs 
 it, and replies to our prayers with added benefits. He can there- 
 fore be moved, and we in our utter insignificance act in some 
 degree upon this infinite greatness. 
 
 Thus this immutability is not entire ; his eternity which the 
 world can penetrate is not indivisible, he is not all-sufficient in 
 himself, since he requires a witness and a proof of his glory. 
 
 How can such antagonism be reconciled ? Must we renounce 
 
136 PEOVJDENCE. 
 
 the idea of perfection which inevitably comprehends immutability, 
 or give up the notion of Providence which appears to render this 
 immutability impossible ? 
 
 We here again find by another road the eternal and perhaps 
 only problem of philosophy, the accordance of the unit and 
 the multiple. This is, at bottom, the problem of creation; 
 but we here, in a certain degree, see it more clearly manifested, 
 since at first sight it appears that the constant and persevering 
 government of the world implies more motion and variety than 
 the single act of creation. We look upon this problem as one 
 that cannot be solved. 
 
 The efforts of philosophy ought to tend to such an establish- 
 ment of conditions as may render equivocation impossible, and to 
 show distinctly how far science can carry the human mind, and 
 where incomprehensibility begins. Far from injuring reason by 
 depriving it of that which surpasses its scope, we increase its 
 authority in all matters which fall legitimately within its jurisdic- 
 tion. In all things ignorance itself is preferable to false 
 knowledge.^- 
 
 History presents us several attempts at reconciliation between 
 the unity of God and his providence. We shall not return to 
 the already refuted doctrine of the pantheists. Aristotle pro- 
 posed an ingenious system which served as a type for all schools, 
 the theory of which rests upon the hypothesis of an indifferent God. 
 According to him, God is, and remains immutable : nothing can 
 affect his unchanging nature ; no wish, no thought. He thinks 
 only of himself: he neither loves, wills, nor desires any thing 
 external to his own essence. Here is indeed the imaginary God 
 of metaphysics. This God, who disdains to know the world, and 
 consequently to govern the world, is nevertheless the cause of all 
 the order that we behold around us. This is to say that the 
 world is an eternal existence, or to use the words of Aristotle, "an 
 animal whose nature it is to love the good and beautiful and to tend 
 towards them ; so that God governs it as a guiding star without 
 departing from his immutability."! The first difficulty in this 
 
 * "I am wiser than that man : for it may be that neither he nor I possess 
 any wonderful degree of knowledge ; but there is this difference between us, 
 he believes that he has knowledge, althoiigh he knows nothing, and I, although 
 I may know nothing, do not believe that I have knowledge." — Plato s Aj[)ology 
 for Socrates, translated by V. Cousin, vol. i. p. 73. 
 
 + " It is thus that this immutable mover acts ; the desirable and the intel- 
 ligible move without being moved. The first great cause influences what he 
 yfiWs,.'^ —Metaijkysics, book xii. chap. vii. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 137 
 
 system is that it supposes the eternity of matter and of organised 
 matter; the second, that this immutable and indifferent God, 
 whom they wish to render the only object of love, has no longer 
 any thing in his nature by which love can be excited. 
 
 The Alexandrians have adopted a much more profound solution 
 in their theory of the Hypostasis. They suppose a single God 
 under three personifications, of which the first is the immutable 
 unity of metaphysics ; the third, tlie father of the world ; and the 
 second, the link that connects them. This hypothesis would ex- 
 plain every thing, if it could itself be explained, and above all if 
 it were capable of proof. We understand perfectly that it belongs 
 to the pantheistic doctrine of the Alexandrian school ; by whose 
 disciples it can alone be admitted. 
 
 We have seen that the principal objection of the pantheists to 
 the dogma of creation is, that God being an absolute unit, he 
 cannot therefore produce the world, which is a multiple; and 
 that after having explained this objection, and insisted upon the 
 perfection of the divine unit, which cannot produce the world 
 without deterioration, when they propose their solution, they have 
 nothing to offer but the identity of this unit with the multiple. 
 Immediately, and with augmented force, we turn upon them their 
 own arguments against creation ; for if it is difficult for the unit 
 to engender the multiple, it is simply impossible that the unit 
 and the multiple can be one. Now the theory of hypostasis 
 establishes in God the same identity of the one and the multiple, 
 which forms the foundation of the doctrine of pantheism. It 
 may then be admitted by pantheists, as it accords with their 
 principles, but it must be rejected by the partisans of creation. 
 In fact, when having rejected pantheism as absurd and contra- 
 dictory, and admitted the theory of creation, however incompre- 
 hensible, the latter find themselves in the presence of a God, 
 immutable by reason, and Creator by evidence, — if to reconcile this 
 immobility and action they suppose in God the co-existence of 
 action and immobility, is it not evident that they are as defective 
 logicians as the pantheists, and that they have merely, like them, 
 changed the locality of the difficulty, without solving it ? 
 
 What proves still more the falseness of this solution, and 
 shows that it rests only on a vague and ill-defined idea, is, that 
 those who adopt it cannot express what they mean. They say 
 that there is in God a certain duality ; but a duality of what ? 
 Here their embarrassment becomes manifest. Is it a duality of 
 beings ? then there are two Gods ; — or of nature ? this nearly 
 
138 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 amounts to the same thing, and is only replacing one word by 
 another : but even if it were admitted as a clear and intelligible 
 proposition that there can be two natures in one being, nobody 
 has yet dared to assert that there are two natures in God. What 
 then is to be done ? To explain an idea which is not an idea, 
 they have coined a word, and said, that in God there are several 
 hyioostases, or personalities. This amounts to mere puerility ; 
 and the Alexandrians, who invented this word and doctrine, 
 being once in possession of such an easy method of escaping from 
 all difficulties, have so multiplied their hypostases, that their 
 imaginations have become lost in confused enumeration. 
 
 A third and not less solid objection against the theory of 
 hypostases, is this. Since immobility, the characteristic of per- 
 fection, can only belong to the first hypostasis, the first person 
 of God is alone perfect ; and it must be concluded, that it alone 
 is God, which is against the proposition, or that God is imperfect. 
 And since creation is attributed to the third hypostasis, and to it 
 alone, there is no longer between the three hypostases any thing 
 more than an affinity of co-existence ; and they are strangers to 
 each other, although in the same substance ; — which is absurd. 
 
 What we say of the Alexandrians, and of all those who wish to 
 introduce into the nature of God a certain plurality, cannot apply 
 to the Christian doctrine. Christianity admits one God in three 
 persons, and the Alexandrians a single God in three hypostases : 
 herein lies the resemblance. There is not even a difference of 
 terms ; since jjerson is the translation of the Latin word persona, 
 which is equivalent to the Greek hypostasis {vTToa-raaLs) ; and 
 this last word is used by the Fathers of the Greek Church 
 equally with that of TrpoVcoTToz;. Under this great and important 
 analogy, mighty differences are concealed ; for the order, character, 
 and relative value of the hypostases, and even their number (for 
 with some disciples of the school each hypostasis becomes a 
 trinity in its turn), are looked upon by the Alexandrians in quite 
 a different point of view from the Christians.* But the first of 
 all the distinctions, the fundamental and the only one with 
 which we have to deal, is, that the dogma of Christianity is a 
 mystery. This single word at once places it beyond all our 
 objections. 
 
 In fact, what do we say against the Alexandrians ? That their 
 
 * The comparison between the Christian and the Alexandi'ian Trinity may 
 be seen at large in Jules Simon's History of the A lexandrian School, book ii. 
 chap. iv. vol. i. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 139 
 
 doctrine is incomprehensible ? this would amount to nothing ; we 
 declare that it is not, and cannot be, demonstrated. And this is 
 also the Christian argument. They affirm that the doctrine is 
 beyond demonstration, being qualified with mystery; neverthe- 
 less, they admit it because they obey a principle superior to 
 reason. Those who wish to oppose Christianity, must prove that 
 tliere is no principle superior to reason ; and that revelation, upon 
 which tlieir religion entirely rests, has never taken place. This 
 is the point of difficulty between Christians and unbelievers ; for 
 if there has been no revelation, religion falls to the ground ; aud 
 if there has been revelation, if there is any authority superior to 
 reason, this authority once recognised, we must bow before it, 
 without permitting reason to raise a voice in opposition. 
 
 Thus in a revealed religion, mystery must necessarily exist ; or, 
 rather, dogmas which do not appeal to reason, and which reason 
 can neither understand nor prove. As to philosophers whose 
 reason is their sole guide, they can believe nothing but what is 
 rationally demonstrable. 
 
 Let us not exaggerate this last proposition so far as to say, 
 that everything can be demonstrated and understood. There are 
 things which hitherto have never been explained, and which 
 probably never will ; and even amongst those that are demon- 
 strated, there are some that are incomprehensible. Thus we 
 believe that God is incomprehensible, and that creation is incom- 
 prehensible ; yet this does not prevent our admitting the existence 
 of a creative God. But the dogma of the Trinity is not only 
 incomprehensible, but it constitutes what we call a mystery."^ 
 Under this title it may be admitted into a religion, but it can 
 hold no place in philosoph}'-. 
 
 These two words, mystery and incomprehensibility, are often 
 used synonymously. It is clear that all mystery is incompre- 
 hensible, but every thing that is incomprehensible is not of 
 necessity a mystery. To admit an incomprehensibility, is to 
 acknowledge that reason has limits : to admit a mystery, is to 
 have recourse to some other authority than reason. When we 
 maintain that God is incomprehensible, we express nothing more 
 than an acknowledgment of our own insignificance. But when it 
 is said that he is one in three hypostases, a gratuitous opinion is 
 expressed upon the nature of an incomprehensible being ; an 
 
 ' * Dictum est tamen tres personse, non ut aliquid diceretur, sed ne tace- 
 atur." — St. Aurjmtin, Be Trinitate, book v. chap. x. 
 
140 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 hj'potliesis is constructed which rests neither on reason nor expe- 
 rience. There can be no possible confusion between two asser- 
 tions of such opposite natures. Thus, for example, the Catholic 
 religion maintains that God is incomprehensible, and this is so 
 little mysterious, that all schools of theology give reasons 
 for this incomprehensibility ; and then add. that this incom- 
 prehensible God is one and yet three ; one in his substance, triple 
 in his persons ; and in this case they urge no other authority 
 than that of revelation, because the tenet being a mystery, 
 cannot be founded on reason, but depends entirely on faith. 
 
 Let us dwell upon this distinction, which never can be too 
 much impressed. The confusion that has been produced between 
 these two orders of things, troubles the mind of the philosopher, 
 and sets religion and science in opposition. If I show by 
 irrefragable arguments that this world has a cause exterior to 
 itself, am I not compelled to believe in the existence of this 
 cause ? and will this obligation cease if it is then demonstrated 
 to me that I can never know the nature of this cause ? Cer- 
 tainly not. I may therefore believe in a thing that I cannot 
 understand. It is common to say, " I believe only what I com- 
 prehend ; " this an erroneous expression : we ought rather to 
 say, " I only believe that which is demonstrated." Thus there 
 is little difficulty in what relates to the incomprehensible. If an 
 argument is incomprehensible, it amounts to nothing, it proves 
 nothing ; but if it is clear, and of a kind to gain the concurrence 
 of all sensible minds, it must not be rejected under the pretext 
 that its aim is to show the existence of a certain thing of which 
 we can never know any thing, save that it exists. To demonstrate 
 the existence of a being, and to comprehend the nature of this 
 being, are two very different operations ; and the result of the 
 one does not in the least depend upon that of the other. We 
 believe with all the rationalists in the sovereignty of reason, but 
 we can never feel that this sovereignty is unlimited. There 
 exists not in man the faculty which can control reason, but there 
 are realities in nature which reason cannot reach. 
 
 Let us now consider the question of mysteries. When reason 
 has reached its limit, it declares that all beyond is incomprehen- 
 sible. This declaration can only offend those ambitious spirits 
 who believe it possible for finite intelligence to fathom the 
 infinite, and to make itself master of illimitable knowledge. But 
 if instead of stopping at this humble, but assuredly wise admis- 
 sion of the impotence of human reason, they seek to pass beyond 
 
OBJECTIONS TO DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 141 
 
 to the clescription and explanation of a nature ^Yhose incompre- 
 hensibility has previously been recognised ; if in this explanation 
 of the incomprehensible, they set forth propositions which are 
 not proved, and impose them on the strength of supernatural 
 authority ; — this new doctrine is what properly constitutes mys- 
 tery. It is not only incomprehensible : beyond this characteristic 
 there are two others : it is afifirmed, without being demonstrated, 
 and is proposed in the name of a supernatural authority. It 
 follows, therefore, that mysteries cannot be admitted, except by 
 meritorious faith. Philosophical belief is restricted and governed 
 by evidence ; there can, therefore, be no merit in believing a 
 philosophical doctrine ; but when to obey a religious precept, we 
 compel ourselves to admit, by an effort of will, a dogma which 
 reason repudiates, there is true merit in this sacrifice, as respects 
 the religion by which it is imposed. 
 
 To return, after this digression, to the Alexandrian solution, we 
 must, in justice, say that it is not objectionable to the extent of 
 the doctrine of Aristotle, and that of the pantheists. If even 
 nothing could be urged against it, except that it cannot be 
 proved, we might accept it, regardless of science, as a very 
 ingenious hypothesis. When Plato discovered beyond the boun- 
 daries of what was properly called science, a theory which pleased 
 his speculative mind, without being based on sufficient proofs, he 
 hesitated not to examine it, though he foresaw that he would then 
 raise himself to a region where philosophy could no longer guide 
 him. With this reservation, there ceases to be danger in these 
 adventurous speculations ; and as a flash of lightning for an instant 
 pierces the cloud, and leaves us again in darkness, so they may- 
 serve to excite and admonish the meditations of the philosopher. 
 Unfortunately, the theory of hypostases, in affirming the co- 
 existence in God of immobility and motion, implies a contradic- 
 tion in terms, and is therefore inadmissible, even under the title 
 of an hypothesis. 
 
 Such a solution, often revived by various schools of rationalists 
 until the seventeenth century, cannot be of any assistance to us, 
 and history leaves this problem in our hands without proof: 
 How has God been able to create the world, without ceasing to 
 be immutable ? 
 
 Let us frankly acknowledge that this barrenness of histoiy 
 this impotence of philosophy, do not surprise us. There are two 
 distinct problems contained in the complex question of creation. 
 The one which first presents itself is — How is it possible that out 
 
142 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 of nothing God could create something ? And the other is — 
 Who and what is this being that occupies our thoughts? Can 
 it be that He who is all sufficient for Himself, who can desire 
 nothing, who cannot without deterioration think of any other 
 object than Himself, and who is necessarily immovable, since any 
 movement whatever implies change — and there cannot be two 
 modes of being perfect — how can such a being have thought of 
 the world ? have desired or wished to produce it ? One of these 
 two problems turns on the will to create, and the other on the 
 efficacy of that will. Our reply is the same to both — it is 
 equally impossible to explain or to deny creation. 
 
 To reply thus is to confess that we cannot reply, and to 
 declare that we submit to this impossibility. We lose nothing 
 by admitting that philosophy has its limits, and that God who 
 has given human intelligence such a vast field to explore that it 
 can never be exhausted, has reserved exclusively to himself all 
 that relates to his own infinite perfection.''' 
 
 Leibnitz gave utterance to a sentence which philosophers should 
 never forget, when he said " Cave a consequentiariis,'" — beware 
 of too much logic. It belongs to the condition of humanity to 
 be restrained within a certain medium, and we should not seek 
 to pierce beyond our own natural horizon. We there see 
 clearly within our prescribed limits, and we do nothing but err 
 when we venture to exceed them. The most rigorous logic then 
 leads us to conclusions which turn against our avowed principles, 
 and resemble mockery. Amongst the most gifted minds some 
 run wild, while others renounce the means in abhorrence of the 
 end. There is true wisdom in understanding that our faculties 
 are suited to our destiny, in following them as far as they can 
 go, and in not requiring them to conduct us beyond the boundary. 
 Philosopher, remember that thou art but a man ! In geometry, 
 which is universally admitted to be a perfect science, the idea of 
 the infinite causes troubles as soon as it is suggested. Whether 
 we regard infinitely great or infinitely httle infinitude, all argu- 
 ments into which this notion introduces itself, are at the same 
 time false and irrefutable. We find the same obstacle at either 
 extremity of our researches, whether we desire to comprehend 
 eternity or a moment, unlimited space or the monad. On the 
 contrary, as long as we only confine ourselves to what lies between, 
 
 * " Nescire velle, quae magister optimus, 
 Docere, uon vult, erudita inscitia est." 
 
 Verse by Joseph Scaliger. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO DIVINE lilMUTABlLITY. 143 
 
 that is to say, comparison and measurement, the human mind is 
 at home ; it feels at ease, and decides with confidence This 
 IS what we are created for. If philosophy would always confine 
 Itself withni these limits, it would have fewer enemies and 
 superior influence. It would no longer hold intermediate 
 disputes with common sense. In all that relates to the idea of 
 Ood, philosophy has most ceitainly cut off a great portion of its 
 own power, in trying to solve and understand every thin^ We 
 forget the force of what it has actually proved, and think only of 
 the temerity or extravagance of its assertions. When the 
 Ji^leatics declare that God alone exists ; or when Aristotle affirms 
 that God could not interfere in the construction or government of 
 the world without degenerating from the nature of his infinite 
 perlectiou ; or when the pantheists attempt to cut the difficulty in 
 two by doubling it, and in despair confound the finite and the 
 infimte into one single substance,— the good sense of human 
 nature protests against them all, because the world is below us 
 visible to our minds and consciences, and God above rules in our 
 souls and hearts. 
 
 On the face of this absurd, and at the same time melancholy 
 conclusion, m which we find no convincing arguments, but on the 
 contrary a thousand that might be refuted, philosophy is re- 
 jected, through the mistakes of its own schools If on the 
 contrary, assigning to human intelligence its proper position and 
 portion, science would content itself with demonstrating the 
 existence of God, with showing that he is good and all-pov^erful, 
 hat he has created, and governs the universe; and with acknow- 
 ledging in the first place, that it is not in the power of man to 
 comprehend the Divine nature, and its action on the world • it 
 would then carry conviction to every mind: for no one can refuse 
 to know God and to love him ; and none, except a few darin- 
 philosophers, can ever hope to fathom his omnipotence 
 
 It remains for us to enquire whether we ourselves, notwith- 
 standnig our reservations, do not fall into the same inconsistency, 
 since we acknowledge that God is certainly immutable, in virtue 
 ot his perfection, and that he is undoubtedly the Creator of all 
 things. 
 
 There is a most essential difference between the Alexandrian 
 doctrine and that which we profess ; and this difference is entirely 
 in our favour. ^ 
 
 hJh ^'^^^^^''^''^''^ ^'^ ^^ '^'P^^^" t^e difficulty, and explain it 
 
144 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 We do not attempt explanation, and only require that others 
 should admit with us that there may exist in the theory iuexx^licable 
 difficulties. 
 
 Besides this, we also affirm that God, although himself im- 
 moveable, produces motion : while the Alexandrians maintain 
 that immobility and motion are both in the essence of God. 
 
 What is only a difficulty in our system, becomes in theirs a 
 contradiction and an impossibility. 
 
 To say that we do not know how immobility produces motion, 
 or to say that the same being is at once moveable and immoveable, 
 are two assertions which cannot possibly be confounded. The 
 analogy is only on the surface, and disappears before a less super- 
 ficial examination. 
 
 If it were not always dangerous to draw conclusions when in- 
 finity is one of the terms compared, we might say that man in his 
 foundation or basis is a cause entirely one and identical, and that, 
 nevertheless, this single cause has produced multiplied and 
 different effects ; and that we can neither deny nor understand 
 this ; so that it is not necessary to ascend up to God to find the 
 difficulty of reconciling the unit and the multiple, and to acknow- 
 ledge that it cannot be resolved. But we only employ this argument 
 to demonstrate the limits of human understanding, and not to 
 establish any analogy between the Divine, omnipotent cause, and the 
 more limited and inferior cause, which man may be admitted to be. 
 
 Any assimilation and comparison of this kind is so far from 
 our thoughts, that our chief care is to establish that, even without 
 analogy to ourselves and the world, the first great cause is 
 necessarily inaccessible to human reason. Neither let us incur 
 the reproach addressed by the materialists to all philosophy which 
 limits the world and its laws to the existence of God. " God," 
 say they, " is only an hypothesis which dispenses with argument." 
 No : God is not an hypothesis, for there exists nothing more 
 forcibly or completely demonstrated than his actual existence : 
 and to give utterance to this smart sentence, which is, in fact, 
 blasphemy, they have no occasion to turn to the pages of Descartes, 
 Leibnitz, or any of the teachers of philosophy ; or even to Spinoza 
 himself. 
 
 If God were an hypothesis, the entire world would also be an 
 hypothesis ; for we cannot understand the existence of the world 
 without ascribing it to God : and so far from the intervention of 
 God in science being a stumbling-block in the way of reason, God 
 is a component part of all reason, and we cannot exercise this 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 145 
 
 faculty without him, unless we suppose that reason can exist with- 
 out a creative principle. 
 
 God does not forbid us to use our reasoning powers, but he 
 forbids us to teach, with the atheists, that the world is necessary-, 
 and with the pantheists, that the world is God. 
 
 Finally, we must not lose sight of the difference that exists 
 between the various orders of induction which comprise the little 
 we know of the nature of God. A short summary is here in- 
 dispensable : — 
 
 All the proofs of the existence of God may be collected together 
 under two categories ; the first derived from the idea of the 
 absolute, the second from the necessity of a creative cause. 
 
 Proceeding on these lines of demonstration, we know two 
 things of God : — one, that he is perfect ; the other, that he is our 
 creator. 
 
 We know this, in the most positive manner, not by resting 
 upon two or three syllogisms, but upon all psychology, logic, 
 moral doctrine and philosophy. These two truths are both so 
 firmly established that there is nothing, either in science or in 
 common sense, more universally accepted or more incontestable. 
 
 It is impossible that God can exist without absolute perfection ; 
 and his existence is useless if he is not a creator. 
 
 Once in possession of these truths, the certainty of which is 
 evident and complete, science and humanity may deduce from 
 them everything which is essentially requisite for the government 
 and consolation of life. 
 
 If the world and man proceed from a cause, and that cause is 
 perfect, there is nothing which does not depend on the will of that 
 cause, and, consequently, nothing which has not an assigned law 
 and destiny. 
 
 Man finds within himself the clear, precise, and infallible 
 principle necessary to his own government. He develops, ex- 
 plains, and comments on it, in rendering an account to himself 
 of his faculties, his aptitude, his relative position in the world, the 
 place that his endowments assign to him in the midst of all other 
 creatures, and the changes which he must undergo to arrive at 
 the full possession of his being. He feels that this law could 
 only have been placed within him by the hand of the creator. 
 His conviction renders the law still more holy and acceptable-; it 
 gives to virtue the character of love, and takes away from sacrifice 
 its greatest bitterness. Guided by this thought, and warmed by 
 this sentiment, man is armed against all the troubles of mind or 
 
146 PKOVIDENCE. 
 
 heart. He knows whence he comes and whither he goes : he 
 is acquainted with the road, and feels himself upheld by the hand 
 of a father. Nothing is wanting to gratify and assuage these two 
 noble and imperious demands of his nature — adoration and hope. 
 
 This entire assemblage of facts and opinions is solid, and 
 appears sufficient. A great majority of mankind is satisfied with 
 them, but certain minds feel themselves compelled to seek 
 beyond, and from that moment they either enter into less accessible 
 ref^ions, or the hght of reason becomes a less certain guide. 
 
 This passage from an easy and, in some degree, an infallible 
 science, to one which is at once more profound and less confident 
 in itself, ought to be scrupulously distinguished by all who love 
 truth, as it requires to be loved, with fervour, and at the same 
 time with diffidence. 
 
 When we know that God exists, that he is perfect, that he has 
 created the world ; and when we feel that he loves and watches 
 over us, what then induces us to seek beyond this ? A powerful 
 instinct of our nature, which is perhaps the first implement of 
 science, — curiosity. 
 
 As soon as we are convinced that any given thing exists, we 
 wish to know how it can exist. To know first, to comprehend 
 afterwards : such is the law which controls the human mind. 
 Hence proceeds this succession of ideas : — 
 
 God is, and he is perfect : what is perfection ? He has created 
 the world ; what is it to create ? 
 
 Now, there is an infinite difference between these two problems : 
 — to know that a thing exists, and to comprehend how it exists. 
 
 To know that a thing exists is to be in possession of the fact ; 
 to comprehend how it exists is to penetrate the very secret of 
 existence itself. 
 
 We can no more confound these two degrees of knowledge than 
 we can compare the science of him who reads the hours on the 
 dial with that of the mechanician who understands, explains, 
 and produces the movement of a watch. 
 
 Let us at once remark, to excuse, in some degree, human 
 curiosity in what relates to the knowledge of God, that it is very 
 difiicult to restrict ourselves to a clear and defined understanding 
 of the words perfection, creation, and future happiness. Un- 
 explained perfection is very abstruse ; it is not, if we may 
 use the expression, visible. The God who has given us to 
 feel and know that he is perfect, without permitting us to obtain 
 a glimpse of his perfection, remains too far above our reach. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 147 
 
 He astonishes without drawing us towards him ; he overwhelms 
 our faculties. 
 
 B}' a necessary consequence, we cannot clearly conceive the 
 nature of that happiness which he has promised us, and which 
 must evidently depend upon what he himself is. Thus our know- 
 ledge is very limited, and the unknown presses closely on us on 
 every side : an unknown God above our heads, an undescribed 
 happiness beyond the tomb ; we are too little to content ourselves 
 with these few words. This frigid science does not sufficiently 
 protect us. It is thus that human curiosity may find its 
 apology. 
 
 Meanwhile, as we ought to learn wisdom, and put in practice 
 the famous precept of Socrates, "know thyself," on the very 
 threshold of this new world, it is right to remember that in every 
 thing, even when we are perfectly acquainted with a i\ict, we only 
 imperfectly understand the secret of its nature ; that, besides, there 
 are very many important and familiar facts of which the secret 
 completely escapes us, and we delude ourselves as to our actual 
 ignorance, by taking comparisons for explanations, like the valet in 
 the comedy, who ceases to entertain any fear of unlucky meetings, 
 because he sees a house that he knows ; that, if we are in this dark- 
 ness, and feel our incapacity to comprehend the world and ourselves, 
 with how much greater reason ought we to despair of understanding 
 that which is perfect and infinite ; that, between the finite and the 
 infinite there is no degree of comparison, and that the infinite is 
 immeasurable ; that it cannot be compared, that it escapes from our 
 minds, not only because it governs them, but because the laws of 
 our intelligence, consisting only of proportion, comparison, analogy : 
 and measurement, cannot be applied to that which has no analogy; 
 whence it follows that the nature of perfection, of the act of 
 creation, and of promised felicity in another life, are utterly 
 beyond the range of human intellect. 
 
 What are we then to do ? Must we remain in our ignorance, 
 or plunge into rash speculations ? 
 
 The danger appears to be equal on either side, whether we 
 condemn ourselves to a degree of barrenness, which may discourage 
 love and even faith, or whether we run the risk of rushing 
 into false abstractions, and become lost in our own bewildered 
 ideas. 
 
 It is to be remarked that every school takes this second part. 
 The difference only consists in the process. The most essentially 
 metaphysical schools continue to develop the idea of infinite 
 
 L 2 
 
118 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 perfection, and the more essentially human schools endeavour to 
 fathom the notion of Providence. The first tending to lose 
 themselves in an abstract conception : the others debasing them- 
 selves more and more towards anthropomorphism. 
 
 When metaphysicians venture, as the Eleatics, and even 
 Plato at certain moments did, to deny all duality to God, — 
 when they assert that he possesses neither movement, power, 
 action, nor thought, — common sense protests with reason against 
 this conclusion, and declares that this God evades us entirely, 
 that he becomes useless to man, and to the entire world. 
 
 And when naturalists exhibit God as creating the world by 
 weight and measurement, governing it with solicitude, changing 
 his intentions to conform to our wishes, irritated by our faults, 
 appeased by our homage, and afflicted at our miseries, science 
 reasonably reproaches them with having lost sight of the 
 ideal, and of assimilating the nature of God so nearly to that 
 of man, that even the idea of perfection disappears. The 
 serious mistakes into which these two schools have fallen, plainly 
 show the danger of following in theodicy any exclusive method 
 of relying upon experience and despising metaphysics, or of trusting 
 to mere speculation, to the total abandonment of experience. 
 Why refuse to draw from the principles of reason what they 
 really can supply ? And why not listen to the voice of nature 
 which in all its various wonders cries aloud to us " There is a 
 Providence '?" Is it not right, on the contrary, to employ in the 
 solution of so great a problem all the strength of our intelligence, 
 and all the resources of our observation ? It is true that, carried 
 too far, these two methods lead to results difficult of reconciliation ; 
 but either of them, taken separately, arrives at conclusions 
 which reason disavows, for experience only gives us an imperfect 
 God, and metaphysics a useless one. Instead of rushing into 
 extremes which almost amount to blasphemy, is it not much 
 better to admit that immutability and action may coexist in God, 
 although we cannot comprehend how he can create motion without 
 participating in it ? Have we not already, when discussing the 
 subject of creation, felt the necessity of admitting that the unit 
 may produce the multiple without ceasing to be a unit ? If 
 there exist in nature inexplicable mysteries, why should they not 
 exist in God, who is the author of nature ? And, if everything 
 demonstrates that the nature of God is really incomprehensible, 
 why should we recoil whenever a new difficulty presents itself? 
 It is scarcely correct to use the term " a new difficulty," for it is 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE DIVINE IMMUTABILITY. 149 
 
 always a repetition of the same that crosses our path under 
 another form. Is it to demand too much from human pride to 
 propose that it should recognise divine incomprehensibility, 
 because this incomprehensibility saves it from ever-recurring 
 contradictions ? 
 
 Let us conclude here, as "we have decided on the subject of 
 creation and the divine faculties, that the attributes of God and 
 Providence are equally demonstrated and incontestable ; that 
 immutability and providence coexist in God without our being 
 able to account for the association ; and let us acknowledge that 
 if science is sound and confident in itself when it demonstrates 
 facts, it enters upon the domain of supposition as soon as it 
 attempts to explain them. 
 
150 PKOVIDENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER lY. 
 
 GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 
 
 "Your Father knoweth wliat things ye have need of before ye ask him." — 
 St. Matthew, chap. vi. verse 8. 
 
 ' ' God does not act as man, as individual causes, or as limited intelligences. 
 The reason of his choice is derived from the wisdom of his laws, and the 
 wisdom of his laws from their affinity with his attributes, from their sim- 
 plicity, their fruitfulness, and, in a word, from their divinity." — Malebranche, 
 Ninth Conversation on Metaphysics, sect. 2. 
 
 We are to now to examine whether Providence governs all 
 things bj general laws without regarding details, or whether God 
 superintends every event, and interposes directly in human affairs. 
 
 According to the doctrine of the immediate and constant inter- 
 vention of Providence, Providence presides over everything. It 
 governs the moral as well as the physical world; knows every 
 sentiment of our hearts, and all the resolutions of our wills ; not 
 only does it know but it produces them, or at least contributes to 
 produce them. It rules external circumstances with the full 
 power of accommodating them to our wants, and of dispensing 
 reward or punishment. 
 
 This doctrine presents one objection ; it is difficult to reconcile 
 it with the existence of liberty. In fact, if God knows our reso- 
 lutions beforehand, why should we deliberate? if he causes our 
 actions, why do we desire them ? It also includes a corresponding 
 advantage, that of rendering worship possible ; for to enable us to 
 pray to God, it becomes necessary that he should listen and receive 
 our petitions favourably. 
 
 This is the mode of reasoning adopted to establish that God 
 occupies himself with details. 
 
 Is it possible that a thing has existed, does exist, or could 
 exist, without the knowledge of God ? 
 
 No ; for then his omniscience would be limited. He knows, 
 then, at this precise moment what my wishes are, what I 
 shall desire to-morrow, what I shall feel, and what I shall think. 
 And is it possible that any movement should be accomplished 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 151 
 
 without the co-operation, or at least, witliout the permission of 
 God? No ; for then his omnipotence would be incomplete. It 
 is absurd to imagine that the will of God can be absent from any 
 particular portion of space, and from any specified moment of 
 time ; and, if present, it is equally absurd to suppose that it does 
 not act with efficacy. The whole argument is comprised within 
 these few words, and, considered in itself, nothing can be more 
 convincing. It is evident that everything which we deduct from 
 the knowledge and power of God, deducts from his infinity. He 
 tlierefore knows everything, even in its most minute details, and 
 he makes, or at least permits to be made, in perfect knowledge of 
 their cause, the most apparently insignificant movements. The 
 objection which immediately presents itself is the free will of man. 
 Let us examine in the first place whether this liberty cannot be 
 reconciled with the omniscience of God, and afterwards if it can be 
 made to accord with his direct and particular intervention in the 
 resolutions and affairs of men. 
 
 First, the liberty of man appears to contradict the omni- 
 science of God. To know everything is not to know each event 
 only as it arises ; for this knowledge of the present, which 
 does not embrace the future, is limited by the future ; it is 
 therefore incomplete. To establish omniscience, it is necessary 
 that God should know the end simultaneously with the begin- 
 ning, and that the night of ages should have no existence in 
 his mind. 
 
 We understand that it must be thus in physical nature, 
 which is subservient to invariable laws that nothing can derange. 
 The author of these laws is perfectly acquainted with them, and 
 therefore he knows all their various applications in their pre- 
 scribed order, even to the last. We also comprehend the 
 plenitude of divine thought in everything which furnishes us 
 subject for argument. For to argue or reason, is nothing more 
 than dividing the object of meditation, so as to accommodate it 
 to the feebleness of our views. Perfect intelligence instantly 
 perceives in any principle its final consequence, and does not 
 require, as we do, the aid of intermediaries. But when the matter 
 in question is neither to deduce the consequence of a principle, 
 nor, what amounts to the. same thing, to discover the effect in the 
 cause, and all effects in the first originating cause, — when it relates 
 to a free cause, master of itself, which has received from God the 
 privilege of choice between two modes, according to its own 
 iucliuation, — can it be that the determination of such a cause 
 
^5 "2 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 should be really free, and that, nevertheless, before it has been 
 adopted it is infalliblj^ foreseen by the prescience of God ? 
 
 When I wish to prove my own liberty of action to myself, I 
 analyse, I examine, I endeavour to verify it, before I come to' a 
 decision ; my mind deliberates ; often a most anxious deliberation, 
 the principal employment, and vexation of my life. 
 
 While I give myself up to this examination of what is good 
 and useful, I retain, as T may say, my freedom ; I confine it from 
 action— I compel myself to resist its impatience ; I suspend it 
 to give it a more profound and wiser bent ; but can I at the same 
 time doubt its existence, and consequently my own responsibilty ? 
 Nevertheless, God knows already, even while I undergo this 
 effort of thought, the resolution I shall immediately adopt! And 
 I, at length decide, I collect my strength, and point it in one 
 settled direction, with the full, entire, and perfect conviction that 
 I might have employed it otherwise, and that I possessed the 
 power at that very moment of withholding, modifying, or increas- 
 ing this effort of my own unfettered will. 
 
 But even at the instant when I assume this power to myself, 
 all the moral and physical consequences of my act are already 
 known, controlled, ordained ; and more than this, they were so from 
 all eternity, for nothing is unforeseen or unprovided for in the mind 
 of God. In the most important epochs of history, a man springs 
 up, a hero or a criminal (as often the one as the other), who 
 persuades himself that he carries in his hand the destiny of 
 mankind, because he has been permitted to effect the destruction 
 of an empire. But God knew at what minute and by what 
 agency that empire would be destroyed, at what precise instant 
 this new power would fall. What then is liberty under those 
 conditions'? An illusion, a mockery, with which the creator 
 beguiles us. This is not one of the objections which can be 
 utterly swept away. On the contrary, after the most specious 
 refutations, the mind always finds itself beset by this difficulty : 
 a man endowed with free will, and a God who infallibly foresees and 
 pre-ordains all things. Sometimes recourse is had to comparisons. 
 It IS said that there are degrees of human foresight. One man, 
 m reading history sees only a series of events, which succeed 
 each other without connection. Another reduces the succession 
 of occurrences to precise formulas, which explain and connect all 
 things. In the same manner, in the course of life, one is always 
 surprised by a result, while another is rarely deceived or seldom 
 mistaken in his conjectures. Wiience arises this difference? 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 153 
 
 From a greater clearness of cotnparison, from a more profound 
 knowledge of human nature. Then why should we be astonished 
 that he whose vision is perfect, and who sounds the depths of the 
 heart, should infallibly foresee that which men only conjecture or 
 anticipate with a greater or less degree of probability. 
 
 How unsatisfactory is the answer, which derives the certain 
 from tlie probable. The infallibility of divine knowledge creates 
 the diflBculty, because in removing from it all possibility of error, 
 no excuse is left for freedom. If we were permitted to say, 
 " God scarcely ever deceives himself," all would be simple and 
 smooth. But a better reply is furnished by showing that God 
 neither foresees nor remembers, and that everything is present to 
 him at the same moment. Besides that this doctrine is true, and 
 tliat we cannot imagine a succession or distinction of thoughts in 
 God, without rendering him subservient to the law of time, 
 which would deprive him of his eternity, it also brings back the 
 problem of the reconciliation of divine prescience with human 
 liberty, to that of the co-existence of the finite and the infinite. 
 It belongs to the nature of the finite to be successive, and of the 
 infinite to be the reverse. Thus the past, the present, and the 
 future have only the character of succession in the finite, and with 
 finite intelligences ; while infinite intelligence embraces every- 
 thing at the same glance. The question once brought back to 
 these conditions, contradiction disappears and gives place to in- 
 comprehensibility. In a general sense we do not understand the 
 connection of the finite with the infinite ; it is a condition to 
 which we are compelled to submit, whether it pleases us or not. 
 But when we attribute prescience to God, and suppose, as a 
 natural consequence, that a future must exist for him, as he is 
 made to accompany the march of time, we introduce a palpable 
 contradiction between the infallibility which is still accorded to 
 him, notwithstanding this deterioration, and the absolute free- 
 dom of human resolutions. It is in this manner, by a mistake in 
 estimating the nature of God, that we transform a difficulty into 
 an impossibility. 
 
 Thus, to the first part of the doctrine, which consists in main- 
 taining that God sees all things, even in their most minute 
 details, the reply is, that it is difficult to reconcile this omniscience 
 with free will, but that nevertheless the reconciliation is not 
 impossible. Since then it is not impossible, and that there are 
 besides many strong reasons why it should be admitted, we 
 ought not to hesitate in adopting this conclusion. Does the 
 
154 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 same argument apply to the second part, and must we also 
 admit that God interferes in all our actions ? 
 
 No ! We have here no longer to deal with a difficulty 
 or an incomprehensibility, but with a contradiction. In fact, 
 if God takes part in our actions, human liberty and the 
 efficacy of human will disappear. For where is the created 
 power that can add anything to uncreated power? It is sufficient 
 that God wills : by the fact of this will the thing that he desires 
 exists. At most we could only say, that by the side of this more 
 than sufficient power, there co-exists another power, that is 
 entirely useless, and in fact, has the illusive semblance of acting. 
 But this hypothesis gives rise to two difficulties : the first, 
 that God would in that case have condemned us to live 
 on illusions ; the second, that human actions, which are often 
 disgraceful and reprehensible, would become the acts of God 
 himself. 
 
 It is very remarkable that the doctrine of co-operation thus 
 understood embraces all the moral consequences, and, if we 
 examine it closely, all the metaphysical deductions of pantheism. 
 
 An opinion which is attributed to Malebranche, because he 
 adopted and developed it, but which in reality existed long before 
 him, consists in saying that God himself produces all that is 
 good and real ; but that in his great benevolence he has granted 
 to man the power of free consent to any given act, — a power which 
 includes also the privilege of refusing his co-operation. If our 
 desire tends towards the accomplishment of good, God effects it ; if 
 it opposes good, he refrains from interference. In the first case, 
 w^e possess the merit of a good action which God has performed ; 
 in the second case, there is no action, for God has done nothing ; 
 but we have prevented him. This suffices for our responsibility 
 and guilt. These are subtle, specious notions, and their mere 
 statement sets common sense at defiance. It is not perfectly 
 clear that we can only commit evil by refusing to do good, and 
 that crime consists exclusively in omission. 
 
 This first point already approaches a sophism. Then we fall 
 again, although in a minor degree, into the former difficulty, 
 since, every action being directly accomplished by the power of 
 God, the activity of man becomes an illusion. 
 
 It is repugnant to reason to think that God has created us in 
 the belief that we can act, if in reality it is invariably he who acts. 
 Let us add, that the hypothesis is useless ; for to admit the co- 
 operation of God in our actions, can arise from no other motive 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 155 
 
 than a desire of not limiting divine power ; and it is evident that 
 the non-interference to which God voluntarily restricts himself 
 when human liberty tends to evil, is a positive limit to his 
 omnipotence. 
 
 It is puerile, when a limit is acknowledged to that which is 
 infinite, to create afterwards an hypothesis expressly to diminish 
 this limit. Finally, what completely renders this hypothesis 
 inacceptable is, that it directly contradicts the idea of divine 
 perfection. This God, who awaits our resolution in order to act, 
 is no longer the infinite deity of reason. If his thoughts and 
 power are thus restricted to the resolutions of a limited intelli- 
 gence, none of the arguments which are adopted to combat pan- 
 theism can hold their ground. 
 
 But this is not all : there are three components in human will, 
 — deliberation, free determination, and execution. These three 
 are connected, because the first is the cause and necessary con- 
 dition of the second, and the second is the condition of the third ; 
 but this connection does not make them one fact, and each can 
 be considered separately. It matters not that the two first 
 pass within the mind of man. The doctrine of divine co-operation 
 embraces everything, and psychological facts as well as others. 
 Thus God is not absent either from deliberation, determination, 
 or execution. We must take care not to think exclusively of 
 execution. The two facts which precede it are still more important. 
 While the mind, before it resolves, examines the consequences of 
 that resolution on either side, and meditates over the useful and the 
 upright, God is present at, and works with the deliberation. The 
 result, if we only consider ourselves, does not depend solely upon 
 the strength of our intellect. The will has some influence : it is 
 that which can either concentrate or abstract our thoughts; which 
 prolongs or abridges the examination ; which urges us to incline 
 more to a particular order of consideration. Why should God 
 act in the place of human will when it operates upon an external 
 object, and not interfere when it concentrates our intellectual 
 strength entirely upon one point? He therefore interferes as 
 much in deliberation as in execution, for there exists no reason 
 why it should be otherwise. But from the moment when he 
 thus interferes, he becomes the cause either of my precipitation 
 and thoughtlessness, or of the maturity and wisdom of my opinions, 
 and then what am I ? What can I be but a plaything with which 
 he amuses himself? What becomes of my individuality, responsi- 
 bihty, intelligence, and liberty ? This simple supposition destroys 
 
156 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 the ^'hole character of man. There can be no evasions. x\ll the 
 subtleties in the world could never refute this consequence ; 
 namely, that the co-operation of God in the acts which I purpose 
 renders me a nonentity. 
 
 With regard to the second term, determination, we have seen 
 that in the system of divine co-operation the most favourable 
 hypothesis allows a shadow of liberty to exist, since it accords to 
 the human being the power of resisting or of consenting to the 
 action of God. But upon what condition does the system make 
 this concession ? On the condition of contradicting itself, for we 
 cannot understand why God should abdicate his omnipotence at 
 the moment of resolution, to resume it again immediately for 
 the execution of that which has been resolved. But if we 
 were to swallow this difficulty, can we do so with the conviction 
 that God has been present ; that he has co-operated in our 
 deliberation, and that then he has remained perfectly inactive 
 at the decisive moment ? Almost all the philosophers who 
 have inclined to adopt this chain of ideas, admit that God, 
 even at this decisive moment, still exercises a supreme influ- 
 ence over human will, and that he induces us to incline more 
 in one direction than in another. Thus he leads rather than 
 compels. 
 
 All that they suffer us to retain of free will is derived from the 
 difference which may be found between these two words. As to 
 the nature of this influence, its origin, its general or particular 
 character, the light which accompanies it, and the efficacies with 
 which it is endowed, the opinions and systems are innumerable. 
 What benefit could we derive from their examination ? Let us 
 take them collectively, and say that they prove the inanity of 
 the principle they attempt to explain. No; this co-operation 
 which commences by a violation of justice, and ends with a farce, 
 is not consistent with the ways and intentions of Providence. 
 Let us reject it, for it savours of blasphemy. It remains true 
 that man is a free agent ; God has granted us this liberty, but he 
 has not given us the power to explain it. 
 
 We shall say little upon the modified doctrine which consists 
 in changing the divine co-operation into a simple permission, 
 except that, like most compromises, it is equally insufficient to 
 maintain a special Providence or to preserve liberty. 
 
 Doubtless, in one sense, nothing happens but by the per- 
 mission of God, because it is true that by this permission we 
 exist, and are free ; but we are now spealdng of a special per- 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 15 7 
 
 mission, accorded, in perfect knowledge of the cause, to each of 
 our actions. Now, does not this permission resemble very closely 
 the action itself? 
 
 When the mind of God conceives and permits an act, what 
 is there to prevent this act from being immediately performed ? 
 Those who put forth such subtle distinctions, amuse themselves 
 with words and mere equivocations. 
 
 But let us leave this war of details, which fatigues without 
 enlightening ; for, in truth, neither the doctrine of co-operation, 
 nor even that of the divine permission, could merit discus- 
 sion, were it not for the important part they have filled in 
 history. There is a more simple, and, at the same time, a 
 more exalted consideration, which refutes them with much 
 fewer words, and is, at the same time, in stronger objection 
 against them than the argument of free will, which we have 
 just examined. 
 
 The multitude of special thoughts and actions with which God 
 is occupied, not only in reference to every created being, but also 
 as regards every individual thought and act of each individual 
 creature, do they leave intact the idea of infinite Deity supe- 
 rior to time and space, and to whose nature multiplicity is a 
 stranger ? 
 
 Malebranche said that God humbled himself when he assumed 
 the condition of creator. We cannot suffer ourselves to indulcre 
 in such bold language ; but if God descended in order to create, 
 what must he have done when he placed himself in a condition 
 of thought and action, secondary to his own creatures ? It is 
 painful to reflect that those who admit the constant and particular 
 co-operation of Providence, believe that by this they avoid 
 assigning a limit to the power and knowledge of God ; while, on 
 the contrary, they only introduce into his nature, by this false 
 notion of Providence, the multiplicity which is identical with 
 non-existence. 
 
 So far from multiplicity existing in God, it cannot even 
 influence him. An hypothesis is proposed to us, intended to enlarge 
 our notion of divine perfection ; and this hypothesis places God 
 at the mercy of his creatures, compels him to live their life, to 
 become, so to speak, one amongst them, to abandon his repose and 
 immobility, and to associate himself in their frivolities and 
 misfortunes. There is a problem in philosophy, which is, to 
 understand how the unit can produce the multiple. The hypo- 
 thesis that we now dispute adds to this single problem, a second 
 
]58 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 entirely of its own creation ; that is, to comprehend how the 
 finite can modify the infinite. These two words, modification 
 of the infinite, present a most incongruous association. But that 
 this proposed modification of the infinite should be produced by 
 a finite being can never be admitted without overthrowing the 
 very fundamental principles of metaphysics. 
 
 To hold to the exact terms of the theory, we should be obliged 
 to say that God only knows himself, and interferes with nothing 
 beyond his own being. 
 
 But the world exists. God has voluntarily produced it. 
 Therefore, this fact must, of necessity, detract from the close 
 definition of the principles laid down. We feel, without being 
 able to understand why, that God knows and governs the 
 world. We ask, if this knowledge, to confine ourselves only 
 to it in the first place, is universal or particular? which is 
 nearly the same as to ask, whether it is complete or incom- 
 plete. To our limited faculties, there is often an advantage 
 in neglecting details, that we may perceive the whole with 
 greater clearness. But infinite intelhgence comprehends uni- 
 versal co-ordination without effort ; and the unity of the whole 
 is not in the least rendered obscure by the immense variety of 
 details. 
 
 Thus, with regard to what touches on divine intelligence, the 
 objection drawn from the unity of God is not more insoluble than 
 that derived from the free will of man ; and since God knows 
 the world, he can, and ought to know everything that therein 
 exists. 
 
 But it is quite the reverse with divine action. If it were 
 simply said that the will of God is present everywhere as well 
 as his intelligence, the affirmation must be admitted : but the 
 question is not thus comprised. What is demanded in the system 
 that we are examining, is, not that God could interfere in every- 
 thing if he pleased, or even that he does interfere : upon these 
 two points there is no argument: but it is asserted that he 
 modifies his resolutions, that he interrupts the course of his own 
 general laws, according to the use that man makes of his liberty. 
 In a word, it is maintained that the plan of the universe is not 
 fixed ; that the resolutions of God are not immutable ; that his 
 views are not exclusively general ; that his action is not single, 
 and his serenity not absolute : but, on the contrary, that he is 
 influenced by the movements of his creatures ; that he replies by 
 formin;:j new resolutions, according to our wishes and our faults ; 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 159 
 
 in a word (for there is no escaping from this deduction, which 
 necessarily recurs), that he falls with us under the operation 
 of time; — which is absurd. Once more, then, the doctrine of 
 tlie direct and particular co-operation of God in human actions 
 must be rejected. 
 
 We have here examined a system whicli at once compromises 
 the immutability of God by a mistal^en zeal for divine greatness, 
 and the liberty of man, by a culpable indifference to this, first 
 attribute of our nature. 
 
 Let us now look into the doctrine which consists in main- 
 taining that God directs the world, and particularly mankind, 
 not at every moment by a special intervention, but by general 
 laws. This is to re-consider the same question under another 
 point of view, and to advance, in some degree, a counter-proof 
 of the solution we have just given. 
 
 We have refuted the doctrine we reject, and we shall now 
 develop that which appears to us to be solid and true. 
 
 Let us first dwell upon the manner in which divine intelligence 
 applies itself to the knowledge of the world, and afterwards 
 enquire how divine power intervenes in the government of the 
 world. 
 
 We have seen that the true and perhaps only difficulty in 
 philosophy, is the co-existence of the absolute and the relative. 
 The absolute could do without the relative, but the relative exists, 
 and cannot do without the absolute. It therefore follows, that 
 the two CO- exist, and that the relative depends upon the absolute. 
 There are three systems by which this co-existence can be 
 explained ; the system of utter confusion, which from the idea 
 of the absolute and that of the relative forms a single idea, into 
 which contradictory terms must of necessity enter; — this is 
 atheism : the system of separation, which gives to the relative a 
 dependent but particular, or, so to speak, individual existence ; — 
 this is the doctrine of creation : and between the two is placed a 
 sort of eclecticism, which separates notions and confounds sub- 
 stances; — this is pantheism; which thinks by this compromise to 
 escape from the contradiction that forms the vice of atheism, and 
 from the incomprehensibility of the first principle, which is the 
 difficulty of creation : a double error, since it only at first distin- 
 guishes the absolute from the relative, to reunite them after- 
 wards ; and, on the other hand, the production of the multiple 
 within unity is not more intelligible, and far from being more 
 rational, than the production of the multiple apart from the 
 
IGO PROVIDENCE. 
 
 unit ; unity remaining what it is, that is to say, infinite and 
 immutable. 
 
 We admit without hesitation, and firmly adhere to the dogma 
 of creation. We believe that time and space are only conditions 
 of a created existence, and commence with it. God remains 
 beyond both in his eternity, which cannot be fathomed by human 
 thought. 
 
 Compelled to admit that God has created, we refuse to ascribe 
 to him any of the attributes of the creature, and consequently we 
 discard from his nature and action, everything which appertains 
 to limit, that is to say, to movement ; for time, space, motion and 
 multiplicity are all the same things. Thus, God is immutable, 
 and the act by which he creates is necessarily simple and im- 
 mutable. God does not resemble an unskilful workman, who 
 makes several attempts before he succeeds in producing a perfect 
 model. He is not like the painter, who first disposes his canvas, 
 mixes his colours, sketches his design, then transfers it, and 
 finally arranges the light and shade. 
 
 It is evident that his mind conceived at the first glance that 
 which was best ; and, that at the same instant, his power produced 
 the execution of his thought. It is not possible that such an arti- 
 ficer should repeat his work at intervals, or that the produce 
 of such hands should be capable of improvement, or require 
 repair.* 
 
 Thus, then, creation was complete at its birth, and possessed 
 within itself at the first moment, all that past centuries have 
 developed, and all that future ages can bring in their progressive 
 course. Do we mean to convey by this that God quitted his 
 repose to create, and that having produced a work which is 
 sufficient for itself, he returned to his former indifi*erence ? 
 Nothing can be further from our design. To speak thus is to 
 divide God ; to attribute to him a duration only equal to that of 
 the world. What to us is development, is to him only co- 
 ordination. Everything is successive to man, but immediate to 
 God. Sometimes time explains certain consequences by demon- 
 strating them in facts ; at others, reason discovers them through 
 investigation; but God neither thinks of reason nor history, 
 
 * ' * God desires that his conduct as well as his work should bear the character 
 of his attributes. Not content that the universe honours him by its excellence 
 and beauty, he even desires that the means he uses should glorify him by their 
 simplicity, their fertility, their universality, and their uniformity." — 3Iale- 
 Iranche, Ninth Conversation upon Metaphysics, sect. 10. 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 161 
 
 because he is omniscient. The world which he created could 
 not be unity, for then there would be two Gods ; but it is made 
 after the likeness of the unit, it is one ; God sees it in tliis unity 
 harmoniously engendering the multiple. Placed, as it were, at 
 the other extremity of the real, we look on the world in its multi- 
 plicity, and we try to discover therein the tmces of that great Unity 
 who rules the universe. All our researches lead to this single 
 end, for the application of sciences to common life are onlv 
 corollaries or notes at the bottom of the page. On one side, 
 experiments are made upon the motion communicated by bodies' 
 with a view to discover the perpetual under the accidental or 
 rather a unit in the multiple ; and hence it is established that 
 this unity or law has more reality than the phenomena it governs 
 because it exists before and after these productions, and resembles 
 more closely the nature of the creator. Then again, another 
 profound metaphysician examines the laws of human nature ; the 
 world shows him the actions and sentiments of men ; science 
 lays open the unvarying causes which make them resemble each 
 other, and occasion them to be moved by the same springs : here 
 ]s another unity comprehended, another round of the ladder sur- 
 mounted. When history is scrutinised, it becomes necessary to 
 divide the task. One only verifies facts by patient research ; he 
 assists memory, and is less an historian than a help to him who 
 composes the history- he performs the part of a compounder in 
 an apothecary's shop. The historian follows after, to explain the 
 connection of events and to demonstrate their meaning ; or rather 
 to show their unity and law. Thus, universal scienc^e slowly and 
 painfully reveals a portion of the secret of creation. 
 
 Philosophy may be denominated science par excellence; for in 
 some degree it gathers the produce of all the other sciences, unites 
 all laws under more general heads, and obtains a clearer insight 
 into the unity of the world, which gives it an approximate con- 
 ception of the splendours of the creative Unity. 
 
 But, even before entering upon the threshold of philosophy 
 and while we keep within the limits of secondary science, we find 
 many degrees of generalisation. The first effort of the scholar 
 ]s, without doubt, to discover a single law or general formula • 
 then a second, and a third. But when found, is he content to 
 leave these laws in their isolated state ? Does he not compare 
 them together? Does he do nothing to reconcile them, and to 
 discover their secret affinities ? Even a secondary science only 
 appears to approach its completion when it is systematised ; that 
 
 2t 
 
1&'2 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 is to say, when the various laws which it has discovered, are 
 themselves included in one universal law, which embraces all the 
 rest. When the rules of any particular science are once 
 generalised and explained by one single rule, this science, thus 
 summed up, becomes an element suitably prepared for philosophy, 
 which applies to all sciences the same process of generalisation ; 
 and raising itself by their assistance above all others, collects and 
 embodies all laws under one single and controlling law. In fact, 
 the diversity of laws conceals an analogy so perfect, that taken 
 separately they are nothing more than the various formulas of one 
 single law. God created the original law^; and the world, w^ith all 
 its bright expansion, has thus been filled with harmony. In this 
 law every thing was included.* 
 
 It is this that, from earliest antiquity, all languages and all 
 philosophers have pre-eminently named the Word. The Word 
 stands alone, and in this single word all language is comprised. 
 The act of creation is unique ; and in it is contained that universal 
 law which in every sense produces and governs, in the sense of 
 duration and in that of history, with so delightful a harmony, 
 that the soul is moved when it can even obtain a glimpse of one of 
 its details. To discover imperfectly, to dream and to guess, is 
 all that is permitted to human weakness. We maintain with 
 confident certainty the unity of the system of the world, or the 
 universal harmony of its laws ; but it is not given to us to form a 
 complete idea, a clear and entire view of this unity and harmony. 
 God, on the contrary, who possesses the only perfect and unlimited 
 intelligence, and who knew what he did in creating the world, 
 embraces at a single glance the combined assemblage of his laws, 
 and the w'hole series of history ; because every thing, successive 
 ages and extended space, are contained in the Creative Word. 
 
 Did not God know what he made? Or was he only half 
 acquainted with it ? What reasoning can show that any thing 
 could exist without the knowledge of God ? Is not his intel- 
 ligence infinite ? Is not all external existence the work of 
 his hands ? What power could interpose itself between the 
 reality that God has willed, and the intelligence of the Creator? 
 
 On the other hand, does the knowledge of a principle consist 
 in knowing it, without at the same time perceiving its con- 
 sequences ? Or of a fact, without connecting it with other facts 
 
 * "A more perfect world, but produced by less fruitful and simple means, 
 would not bear as strongly as ours the impress of the Divine attributes." — 
 Malebraache, Ninth Discourse ujion Metaphysics, sect. 11. 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 163 
 
 to which it gives birth? Or of a law, without weighing its scope 
 and efiScacy — without seeing what it can and will effect? God, 
 therefore, knows every thing, even to a worm or an atom, through 
 his exclusive knowledge of the law of creation, or of the will 
 which has produced that law ; which means, in other words, 
 through his sovereign and entire knowledge of himself. And not 
 only does he know every created being, and the laws that govern 
 all beings, but he perceives, at the same glance, every change and 
 phase of development of each individual ; for if a single move- 
 ment escaped him in the immensity of time or space, there 
 would then exist some law, the exact power of which he was un- 
 acquainted with ; an absurd conclusion, as he would then, like us, 
 confound the possible with the actual. The two human faculties, 
 — experience, which beholds the real, — and reason, which demon- 
 strates and measures the possible, — are, in some degree, inde- 
 pendent of each other ; because the secret of creation has not been 
 imparted to us. Human experience cannot discover every thing 
 that is real ; neither can reason discern, amidst all possible things, 
 those which are only so speculatively, or those which are so in 
 fact, and which consequently have been, are, or will be realised. 
 God, on the contrary, imagines nothing, discovers nothing ; he 
 sees all things, so that to his omnipotent intelligence the possible 
 and the real are one. Thus, while we with difficulty seek in facts 
 the traces of their causes, it is in causes that God perceives facts. 
 His thought reaches the detail, at the same moment that he 
 creates the general principle. We ascend, and God descends. 
 We raise ourselves to him, he lowers himself to us. As often as 
 by laborious study and investigation we succeed, as we may say, 
 in raising our heads above the surface of the visible world, we 
 feel as if we had achieved a great conquest; and if sometimes 
 the hierarchy which, from unity to unity, raises itself to God, 
 appears to us as a dream, we feel that austere and overwhelming 
 joy which ever accompanies the happiest efforts of human thought. 
 This happiness, which is but a flash of lightning, bears a faint 
 and transitory resemblance to that which God eternally possesses. 
 The ancients were not mistaken, when they compared the 
 world and its boasted science to a triangle, of which Divine 
 Intelligence occupies the summit, while man crawls at the base. 
 Therefore, let us feel assured, notwithstanding the difficulties 
 which it is impossible to deny, that the thoughts of God (we do not 
 yet speak of his actions) extend to the smallest details of inanimate 
 nature. 
 
 m2 
 
164 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 But if God, in the unity of his inteUigence, thus unerringly 
 knows in every detail the consequences of the inflexible laws 
 which he has imposed upon the physical world, can the same be 
 stated of actions resulting from the free-will of a created being ? 
 
 There is evidently here a very important distinction. God's 
 law, whence arises order, extending to all time and space, is 
 applied indiscriminately and without changing its nature, to the 
 different beings that compose or inhabit the earth ; and it is this 
 variety of application which leads us to mistake one law for 
 many ; for by the peculiar disposition of our limited faculties, the 
 thing we are first able to perceive is variety, and we discern it more 
 easily and completely than we do analogy. These multiplied 
 laws, which are, in fact, but one law, may be divided into two 
 leading classes, each defined according to its specific cha- 
 racteristics. The laws of one class govern the material world, 
 where nothing exists but secondary causes, which are in some 
 degree charged to transmit without modifying the action of the 
 first cause ; these laws operate with absolute regularity, and the 
 deviations we sometimes fancy we discover, belong only to our own 
 ignorance. The laws appertaining to the other class, control the 
 moral world, or rather the human soul, which alone of all created 
 things has been endowed with the power of following its own 
 inclinations, and consequently, the power of infringing the rule. 
 What the law effects in the physical world is, in fact, effected by God 
 himself the author of physical law ; but in the moral world, where 
 the law is compulsory without being necessitating, it is man who 
 operates instead of God ; therefore in this order of things 
 phenomena arise, which are not comprehended and, as it were, 
 involved in the law. 
 
 He who possesses a perfect knowledge of physical law, ascer- 
 tains by this knowledge all the applications of that law ; but it is 
 possible to imagine an intelligence which, while possessing a 
 complete acquaintance with moral law, is yet ignorant of the 
 infringements to which it is intended to apply. Why not at once 
 admit that such is, as regards us, the position of the Divine 
 nature ? If it be right to say that God knows nothing of the 
 individual, for the individual himself, but to understand more 
 thoroughly the general system, and the general law ; it must then 
 be concluded that he may not be as well acquainted with the 
 determinations of man, as he is with the movements of physical 
 nature. 
 
 This supposition, upheld by plausible arguments, has been 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 1C5 
 
 entertained by several schools, who flattered themselves that they 
 thus escaped the difficulty created by the co-existence of the Divine 
 presence and of human liberty. Nevertheless, the mind cannot 
 resign itself to a doctrine which ahnost entirely renders God a 
 stranger to man. How is it possible to suppose that any change in 
 the world can be produced, any sensation experienced, or any 
 resolution formed, without the knowledge of God ? It is useless 
 to reply that this does not proceed from impotence in God, but 
 from un worthiness in the object. This answer, though it comes 
 from Aristotle," is not sufficient to satisfy the mind. Man is not 
 unworthy of occupying an intelligence which condescends to know, 
 and take an interest in, the rest of the world. And how could 
 God have any knowledge of man, if he were acquainted only with 
 his capabilities and not their application ? Is not this as if we 
 were to say that we are acquainted with the laws of motion, but 
 know nothing of motion itself? 
 
 God is as certainly the author of moral law, as he is of all 
 other laws. He who institutes a law, does not remain in ignorance 
 of the execution of what he has decreed ; he who issues an order, 
 certainly desires to know whether it is obeyed. From the moment 
 when we separate our actions from the superintending eye of 
 Providence, we shake the very foundation of moral law, take away 
 from man the possibility of a sanction, and deprive him at once 
 of his father and his judge. f Human life cannot be indifferent to, 
 or unknown to God, who is at once our legislator and rewarder. 
 
 The peculiar nature of the moral law, so different from all 
 other laws, does not prevent God's knowledge of human actions ; 
 but it probably prevents our being able to comprehend or explain 
 how he acquires this knowledge. 
 
 This impossibility, following so many others, is not intended to 
 arrest our progress. We believe in every thing that is demon- 
 strated, whether we can explain it or not. Besides, we are at 
 present really dealing with an impossibility, respecting which we 
 cannot even hazard an hypothesis. Our freedom of action is 
 complete in itself; but the motives which influence its exercise 
 are common to all mankind, and the sphere in which it is developed 
 is a limited one. We ourselves, by a profound study of the 
 human heart, can predict almost to a certainty the conduct of an 
 
 * Aristotle, Metaphysics, book x. chap. vii. 
 t "But even tlie very hairs of your head are all uuiubereJ. Fear not there- 
 fore." — ^St. Lulce, chap. xii. verse 7. 
 
1G6 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 individual man, in any given situation ; and this power of fore- 
 sight is increased, when we are able to obtain a perfect acquaint- 
 ance with all the exterior circumstances of the case, and when we 
 can measure the strength of the agent against the force of what 
 he has to encounter. If sometimes in particular instances, even 
 when endowed with all that constitutes human wisdom, we find 
 ourselves mistaken, such is never the result as regards the 
 generality ; so little is there of original distinction in human 
 nature, and so much does one man resemble another ! Therefore, 
 God who comprehends all laws, has an infallible cognizance of all 
 human proceedings ; and as he is able to penetrate deeper than 
 ourselves into the secrets of our minds and hearts, he is 
 acquainted with all our resolutions and motives. It is thus that 
 we live under the eye of God, and none of our sentiments, 
 thoughts, or acts can escape his observation. 
 
 We must now, however, inquire whether God co-operates in the 
 actions of man ? We have encountered obstacles in reconciling 
 the existence of free will with omniscience ; and we are prepared 
 for similar obscurity in a question affecting nothing less than the 
 explanation of the connection between time and eternity. If 
 we could clearly expound this, we should be able to comprehend 
 both God and creation. This problem may, therefore, rest 
 unsolved without exciting our alarm; and taking into consideration 
 the absolute difference of nature which divides its two conditions, 
 it is not one of those manifest contradictions at which reason 
 recoils. But the doctrine of God's co-operation in man's actions 
 cannot be viewed in the same manner. To say that God ordains 
 that man shall believe himself the performer of an act while it is 
 God alone who acts in him, is at once an inadmissible contradic- 
 tion, repugnant to the grandeur and veracity of Deity. Let us 
 suppose, nevertheless, that we content ourselves to receive it ; how 
 can we maintain the idea of God being the author of so many 
 defective and evil works ? It is from this inevitable conclusion 
 that the dogma of pantheism has ever been found peculiarly 
 offensive to those who deny it ; and, considered in this point of 
 view, we probably see the repulsiveness of its character more 
 plainly exhibited than in the acknowledged doctrines of the 
 school. They argue, God is the mover of our good deeds, while 
 we only are responsible for the evil, therefore imperfection pro- 
 ceeds from ourselves : this is subtle reasoning, but utterly 
 unsound ; the least objection is, that it sets forward an hypothesis 
 without any foundation. Is it not evident that, if God has 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 167 
 
 bestowed upon us the power of resistance, he could equall3% if he had 
 SO pleased, have given us the power of action ? Why then do they 
 eraharrass themselves with this fancied necessity of extending the 
 divine intervention to all things, when they are forced to renounce 
 it on such an important point ? They are too apt to forget that, in 
 treating of omnipotence, there can be no question of degree. If 
 it be admitted that the almighty power of God is subject to any 
 restriction, no matter what, the whole problem is thus laid down 
 in its full force ; and to imagine any thing gained by lessening this 
 restriction, is to insult the majesty of the Infinite. 
 
 Finally, here is an objection against which the doctrine of 
 co-operation cannot hold ground. If God, as the hypothesis 
 maintains, is no stranger to any of our movements, 'neither is he a 
 stranger to what precedes, accompanies, constitutes, or results 
 from the exercise of human will. Can it be asserted that God 
 produces the movement of my arm, which I believe that I pro- 
 duce myself, and yet that he is ignorant of my intention of 
 moving my arm ? Why have I even formed this intention ? to 
 produce some advantage which I propose to myself. From whence 
 do I derive the idea of this advantage ? according to the hypothesis, 
 from God ; for every thing belonging to me, both- external and 
 internal, is moved by God : he does all, and he must therefore be 
 the author of my sin, my passion, and my precipitate folly. In 
 whatever way we examine this hypothesis, whether it advocates 
 or overthrows the existence of liberty, there is one thing it 
 invariably destroys, and that is the holiness of God. Let us cast 
 aside this impious proposition, and loudly declare that man's 
 liberty is complete, man's will efficacious, and that God does not 
 co-operate in human actions. 
 
 Why should man be denied the plenitude of his personality ? 
 Those who refuse to accord this in order to establish the dogma 
 of special providence, are generally the same who exaggerate this 
 very personal freedom when they seek to refute pantheism. 
 Now, it is not more difficult to admit the free agency of man and 
 the efficacy of his will, than to accord the isolated existence of 
 his substance. As in advocating the doctrine of creation we 
 acknowledge the actual being of a certain substance apart from 
 God, so we, may also acknowledge the existence of a free agency 
 apart from God. The power of God subsists notwithstanding 
 the power of man, and the infinite substance of God, notwith- 
 standing the individuality of human substance. Thus, while we 
 know that God penetrates our most hidden thoughts, we are 
 
168 
 
 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 compelled to allow that man has the uncontrolled government of 
 himself, and that the liberty which God has bestowed upon him 
 is a fact, and not a delusion. 
 
 Here another question immediately springs up. If man acts 
 independently of God, it is man only who regulates human society ; 
 and we must, therefore, condemn whatever seeks to show the 
 finger of God in the history of events. Not so : God in appoint- 
 ing us our part has retained his own. He has made our minds 
 and hearts, and measured our strength. Through these two 
 points he holds humanity in his hand. Each of us works in his 
 own way, one ill, another well ; this man does much, that man 
 little. We are responsible for our faults and omissions, for the 
 consequences 'of our sacrifices and successes; but the motive 
 influence originating from one man, no matter how powerful it 
 may be, cannot extend very far. When we ostentatiously talk 
 of the man of the age, we use an unreasonable epithet of 
 aggrandisement. If this individual had been wanting, another 
 would have been found. Most of those who appear so great, owe 
 their greatness to accident ; they are a sort of optical delusion. 
 Undoubtedly, the world has its heroes ; but he alone who searches 
 the heart, can tell whether those unknown to fame are not often 
 the greatest of heroes. We measure things according to their 
 success ; and of all proofs that can be instanced of human weakness, 
 this is the most impressive. A general forms a magnificent plan 
 of battle, which constitutes him a great commander : the sun is in 
 his eyes, and he is defeated ; a chance for which he is not respon- 
 sible : nevertheless, our opinion is formed upon the result. Let 
 us thoroughly comprehend that the truest distinction between 
 man and man, proceeds from the opposite qualities of vice and 
 virtue. Genius is real, but it counts for Httle. Every indi- 
 vidual man regulates his own life, but God composes history. 
 
 A single point now remains to be examined. Without any con- 
 tinued co-operation, God knows all the fluctuations of human will. 
 Does he ever interfere with the course of events, and from love 
 to man change the order of universal law ? The answer is fur- 
 nished by Malebranche without hesitation. No ; God alters 
 none of the decrees he has issued ; or, to speak more correctly, 
 he has issued but one decree, the virtue of which extends to all 
 creation : this decree is as immutable as the will of God himself. 
 To believe in the fluctuations of Divine will, is to flill into gross 
 paganism.- It is to limit God by time and space, and to despoil 
 
 * '* Even Plato, tliat magnificent reasoner, wlieu he says that God made the 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WOELD BY GENERAL LAWS. 1C9 
 
 him of bis infinity. If he is not immutable, be cannot be infinite ; 
 neither can be be immutable if bis will is subject to modification. 
 Can be be the same Deity before" and after this modification ? 
 These words, " before " and " after," convey no intelligible 
 meaning when applied to God. The eternal can neither change, 
 move, nor endure. If it were even possible for God to undergo 
 these variations without ceasing to be eternal, wherefore should 
 he change, except to arrive at something better ? To change to 
 what is worse is the attribute of a depraved nature. God, then, 
 is susceptible of amendment? be requires experience to gain 
 enlightenment ? he will obtain increased ability with the lapse of 
 time ? — All these propositions verge upon blasphemy. God at 
 once sees and does that which is best. He corrects nothing. 
 He does not, like us impotent beings, aim twice at a single 
 object. His intentions are not multiplied and successive, the last 
 correcting the first. Finally, to move him, if he could be moved, 
 would require a cause adequate to the consequence; some 
 impression must be produced upon his infinite and immutable 
 nature, and by a limited being. Is this possible ? Can the 
 action of a finite being have power to change the decrees of 
 infinity and eternity ? We answer, that it is impossible. 
 
 Metaphysics prove nothing, if they do not prove the immu- 
 tability of God ; and if they demonstrate this, we must declare 
 that God never changes his laws, which amounts to saying, that 
 he never changes himself.''' 
 
 Let us consider science: upon what does it rest? on the 
 fixity of the laws of nature. To what does it lead ? to divine 
 immutability. What are its daily acquisitions ? the demonstra- 
 tion of some new law, or the discovery of some fresh analogy 
 between known laws. If we did not know beforehand that 
 nature is not regulated by chance, we should never think of 
 reasoning or experimentalising ; and if God did not appear as a 
 
 world in his own mould and pattern, savours of tke rust and moss of anti- 
 quity He represents the Divine Architect as a miserable bricklayer, or 
 
 a mason, toiling and sweating at the fabric and government of the world." — 
 Plutarch, On the Opinions of Philosophers, book i. chap. vii. 
 
 * "When Grod performs a miracle, and does not operate in accordance with 
 the general laws with which we are acquainted, I believe that he either acts 
 from the consequence of other general laws unknown to us, or that that which he 
 then does, is determined by certain circumstances which he has foreseen from 
 all eternity, in the creation of this simple, solemn, and unchangeable act ; 
 which is included, not only in the general laws of his ordinary providence, but 
 also in the exceptions to these same laws." — 3fcdebranche, Eighth Discourse on 
 Metaphysics, sect. 8. 
 
170 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 luminous column at the termination of all the avenues of science, 
 how should we be able to direct our route, measure our progress, 
 or determine our discoveries ? But if unity, harmony, and 
 immutability govern science to this extent, how shall any one 
 presume to tell the world that it reveals to us a capricious will, 
 disordered movements, and perpetual derogations from rule '? 
 and how can they venture to represent God as susceptible of all 
 the emotions of human passion — anger, pity, and repentance? 
 If such hypotheses as these were once admitted, all our knowledge 
 of God and the world would be shaken to its foundation. 
 
 Let us also ask what, under such conditions, would become of 
 divine justice ? If God interferes in the affairs of man, is his 
 intervention always similarly bestowed under similar circum- 
 stances ? If so, this doctrine is only a snare, and this interven- 
 tion, which is necessarily uniform, is nothing more than the 
 government of Providence, by which the universe is regulated 
 according to its general laws. But if God interposes to-day, and 
 refuses his concurrence to-morrow ; if he grants to one what he 
 denies to another ; if he arbitrarily decides between men ; if he 
 becomes like one of us, accessible to the emotions and influences 
 of anger and pity, irresolute in his determinations, weak in his 
 intentions and his acts; — then Providence should change its 
 name, and call itself Destiny. 
 
 Let us leave such human gods to pagan theologians, and at 
 once abandon the idea that to preserve the liberty of God it is 
 necessary for us to believe that he is susceptible of passion. Let us, 
 then, conclude that God knows all things, even to the most minute 
 details ; that he leaves the will of man perfectly uncontrolled ; 
 and finally, that nothing can modify the decrees of his infinite 
 and immutable wisdom. The father of a family makes no differ- 
 ence between his children. 
 
 The doctrine which we here lay down, though almost universally 
 admitted in philosophy, appears at the first glance to be very 
 severe and harsh. Does not the God who governs the world by 
 general and inflexible laws, lose in beneficence what he gains in 
 majesty? 
 
 In rendering God accessible to our desires and prayers, his 
 majesty is perhaps diminished, but he is unquestionably repre- 
 sented as more amiable. Why place God at such a distance from 
 man that we can scarcely obtain access to him ? If this imaginary 
 perfection, of which the metaphysician dreams, were carried a little 
 farther, it would end in a solitary God, who existed alone, a 
 
GOD GOVERNS THE WORLD BY GENERAL LAWS. 171 
 
 stranger to the world and to the human race. Such a being our 
 God is not, seeing that he has willed creation. Ought not the 
 certainty of creation to qualify the doctrine of immutability ? 
 
 Since' God, without derogation, has created man, can he not 
 preside over him with the solicitude of a father, direct him in the 
 individual course of his life, afford him encouragement and aid, 
 and bend the laws which govern physical nature, to the graver 
 necessities of the moral world when they demand such a 
 concession ? 
 
 Great pains are taken to show that God is occupied with, and 
 directs the world. This doctrine is, in fact, of all others the most 
 important to man; but only on the condition that this operative 
 God loves, listens to, protects, and sustains us. It is not in our 
 power to be contented with a protection which ignores individuals 
 and recognises only races. To reduce us to this state of isolation 
 and indifference, is to banish from us the God, the Provi- 
 dence, and the Father, which it has been pretended to bestow 
 upon us. 
 
 These complaints are unjust; they misconstrue the doctrine 
 they desire to combat. God knows each of us by his name, 
 and assists in all our works. He does not regard man with 
 indifference, for he is love; but he does not change his 
 laws for him, because his laws are the work of his infinite intel- 
 ligence, and cannot vary according to our ill-regulated desires 
 and frivolous passions. He has given us the world, for it is 
 evident that we reign in the sphere in which we are placed. 
 The power he has accorded to us of transforming physical force, 
 is such, that after three thousand years of civilisation we have not 
 yet discovered its limit. Finally, that he is not indifferent to the 
 march of society is proved by his having instituted the law of 
 progress ; and that which demonstrates beyond all question that 
 he is not indifferent to the interests of the humblest individual, 
 is that he has reserved us for a life of future happiness, and that 
 he daily gives us the means and aid which we require to reach it.''' 
 
 Duty here below : after this life, heaven. 
 
 This is what God has granted to us. What more can a God 
 and Father do for his children ? 
 
 * In the Dissertations of Arrian, Jupiter justifies himself^ for liaying 
 placed Epictetus in the miserable condition of a slave. *' Epictetus, if it 
 had been possible, I would have made thee free, I have at least given thee 
 the power of thinking and willing; with this thou art dependent on no one." 
 The slave replies, " I am content : I thank the gods." 
 
172 PROVIDENCE. 
 
 We murmur at the difficulties of our prescribed path. Such 
 complaints are unworthy of men. What signifies our being torn 
 by the brambles, if we are certain of reaching the goal ? It is 
 base, and even cowardly, to become uneasy or impatient. One 
 thing, above all others, we should struggle to learn — how to 
 endure ; another we ought equally to forget — pollution. Blessed 
 be the name of God ! 
 
PART THE THIRD. 
 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 
 
 '' The immortality of the soul is a matter which so essentially concerns 
 man, and touches him so nearly, that we must have lost all sense of feeling if 
 we are indiiferent on this engrossing subject." — Tlioughts of Pascal. Art. 
 IX. Edit. Havet., p. 133. 
 
 It is the same with the immortality of the soul as with the 
 eternity of God. Ever since the dawn of philosophy, attempts 
 have been made to demonstrate by the most convincing arguments 
 that could be discovered, that this terrestrial pilgrimage is but an 
 episode in human life, and that after the tragedy by which it is 
 terminated, we are destined to obtain, for the first time, true 
 possession of ourselves. It is quite evident, that the most im- 
 portant truths are those which the human mind studies and 
 examines with its earliest impressions. The great fact we are 
 now about to consider, ranks with the existence of a supreme 
 being, the free-will of man, and the principle of immutable justice. 
 Not to speak of the East, where history remains enveloped in 
 darkness, to whatever period of antiquity we trace back the Greek 
 systems of ethics and theology, we find the different schools 
 divided upon these great questions. Even amongst the immediate 
 disciples of Pythagoras, when human thought was, as we may say, 
 only beginning to awaken, we are surprised to find doctrines 
 which require only a little more precision and arrangement to 
 entitle them to a definitive position in the records of science. 
 Socrates, who always appeared to be intent on the practical appli- 
 cation of philosophy, never failed to employ the full strength of 
 
174 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 his genius, at tbe same time daring and sagacious, in the elucida- 
 tion of these three or four leading problems on which the entire 
 destiny of man revolves. Such was the activity of speculative 
 intelligence amongst the Greeks, at that epoch, that the doctrine 
 of the immortality of the soul very nearly complete, is to be found 
 in the Thado of Plato. We observe there, under a close and, 
 stringent form of logic, all the demonstrations of this com- 
 manding dogma; every objection is anticipated and refuted ; and 
 as a consequence even more surprising, Plato discriminates with 
 great vigour, the immortality of the soul, from the second part of 
 the proposition, which turns upon the nature and conditions 
 of that immortality. He shows that the demonstration of the 
 immortality of the soul belongs irrevocably to science, but that we 
 are condemned, perhaps for ever, to mere blind conjectures as to 
 the sequel : and while exhibiting this evidence of superior sense, 
 he throws over the unknown world, that we incessantly imagine 
 without being able to define, the living radiance of his own 
 genius. 
 
 Such completeness of result, obtained, as we may say, at the 
 first blow, on this question and several others, constitutes one of 
 the objections which has ever since been raised against philo- 
 sophy. It can teach us nothing new, they say ; and creeps slowly 
 on, relying on mere common-places. Happy would it be if this 
 reproach were well founded ! It is unquestionably true that 
 upon certain points, and the immortality of the soul is amongst 
 the number, philosophy is a perfect science. What would they not 
 say, if it were otherwise, of the barrenness of a science which, 
 after a lapse of more than two thousand years, should be still 
 unable to enlighten as to the duration of our being? Providence 
 has, to a certain extent, endowed us with a peculiar faculty for the 
 solution of the problems which are the most important to man, and 
 has given over the rest as food for human curiosity. For this 
 reason there can scarcely, at the present day, be any question as 
 to adding any thing new to the proofs of the existence of God, of 
 the immortality of the soul, and of the free-will of man : we can 
 "scarcely hope to give to earlier demonstrations, superior clearness 
 and precision. We have only to follow devoutly in the track of 
 our predecessors, congratulating ourselves that we find the road 
 distinctly indicated and trodden. The true philosopher abhors 
 invention : he trembles when he stands alone. He ought to be 
 always ready to break a lance against tradition and authority, if 
 compelled by the strong evidence of reason ; but above all, he 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 175 
 
 should ardently wish never to he reduced to that formidable 
 alternative. In affirming that the demonstration of the immor- 
 tality of the soul is complete, and that science can advance nothing 
 new upon this point, we have no desire to compare that demon- 
 stration with those, for instance, of geometry, which compel the 
 assent of the most rebellious minds. No historical or philoso- 
 phical demonstration can possess the character of evidence peculiar 
 to the deductive sciences; and one of the reasons by which 
 scepticism is encouraged and propagated is, that we are too much 
 in the habit of requiring from moral knowledge, a species of light 
 which it is incapable of bestowing. The vast importance of the 
 result concurs, moreover, in rendering coherence difficult. It is 
 no small matter to establish by a process of reasoning, that the soul 
 of man is immortal. Tiiis is worthy of being maturely con- 
 sidered, and demands careful inquiry as to whether the argu- 
 ments are sound, and the objections refutable. We should be 
 less scrupulous if the question only involved the equality of 
 two angles of a triangle, opposite to the apex. 
 
 Let us add also, that the special arguments which serve to 
 establish these great fundamental truths, ought only to be con- 
 sidered as the summary of a complete philosophy ; and even if they 
 did not possess the force which the school attributes to them, we 
 should not therefore be entitled to doubt, upon that ground, the 
 principles which they are intended to establish. But these prin- 
 ciples are so mutually and inseparably linked with the substance 
 of the doctrine, that they must stand or fall with the doctrine in its 
 totality. Herein lies the true utility of systems which unreason- 
 ably terrify the ignorant million. If a school of philosophy unites 
 together in one connected chain, all its various componen-ts, the 
 existence of God, Providence, human liberty, the immortality of 
 the soul, and the principle of justice, in such manner that each 
 supposes and leads to the other, and we cannot suppress one 
 without renouncing all the rest, the whole of these dogmas find 
 in this connection a strength and consistency which they could 
 never derive from the most unanswerable arguments. I believe 
 invincibly in the immortality of the soul, because I cannot abandon 
 that conviction, without giving up at the same time every thing 
 else that I believe. 
 
 Nevertheless, let us not think it either superfluous or trivial, 
 to take a regular review of the arguments of the school. The 
 most staunch believer has moments of langour and doubt. These 
 defined and precise formulas in which a creed is concentrated, 
 
176 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 possess at least the advantages of briuging it in a few moments 
 distinctly before the mind. 
 
 The first battle to be won against doubt must be fought upon 
 another ground ; for we cannot be permitted to discuss immor- 
 tality, until immateriality is fully demonstrated. Every thing that 
 has body or substance is mortal. All that is divisible will be 
 divided. Is the soul a simple faculty of the body, corporeal and 
 substantial? If so, it must be perishable. If, on the contrary, it is 
 immaterial, it becomes extremely difficult to admit, without proof or 
 analogy, that this indivisible principle should be destined to perish. 
 
 Before we examine the nature of the soul, and also that of the 
 body, to show that they are distinct and incompatible, it will be 
 well to propose this general question : Are there in existence 
 only bodies, or are there one or more spiritual essences ? 
 
 We might even change the proposition as follows : Is there a 
 God? If there is, he must be a spirit, and nothing else. Here 
 is a great step made, in a matter of fact, without effort. Either 
 the materialists are atheists ; or, if they believe in God, they must 
 at once abandon all the arguments they are accustomed to extract 
 from the pretended impossibility of the existence of a substance 
 purely spiritual. 
 
 As soon as we have established that the Creator of the world 
 is a spirit, it becomes extremely difficult to comprehend why 
 the world should contain only bodies. 
 
 If we press the arguments of the materialists closely, we shall 
 see that they all rest upon this axiom ; — the existence of a 
 spirit is impossible. With all those who acknowledge the 
 existence of God, materialism vanishes entirely. 
 
 What is called a body? A substance possessed of extent, colour, 
 taste, odour and weight. There are bodies which do not unite every 
 one of these characteristics, but the first, of necessity, belongs to all. 
 
 What is understood by a spirit? A being endowed with activity, 
 sensibility, and the power of thought. 
 
 In what does materialism consist ? In maintaining that every 
 active, sensible, and thinking substance is of necessity extended. 
 
 How is this thesis to be proved ? Thus : All that is real is 
 necessarily extended. Or thus : the properties of extent are 
 indispensable to the exercise of thought, sensibility, and will. 
 
 Not so : all that is real is not necessarily extended — for there 
 is a God. 
 
 Again, not so : extent is not indispensable to the exercise of 
 thought, for again — there is a God. 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 177 
 
 Let US dwell a little on this assumption of the materialists, 
 that extent or space is necessary to thought : this can never he 
 either demonstrated or understood. No materialist, in any school, 
 at any epoch of history, has ever been able to arrive at the proof. 
 There is no analogy whatever between the intellectual functions 
 and the qualities of extent. It is impossible to imagine that an 
 act of human will or intelligence could result from a certain 
 bodily movement, from a form or colour of the cerebral matter. 
 Above all, it is impossible to prove this. Therefore, the mate- 
 rialist theory can never be established upon scientific grounds. 
 It has not even a semblance of probability. It is the most rank 
 and least specious of all extravagant paradoxes. We must not 
 take the converse of this proposition, as is too often the case, and 
 suppose that the spiritualists are called upon to prove the exist- 
 ence of spiritual essence. This is not the predicament ; on the 
 contrary, the materialists are bound to prove the legitimacy of their 
 denial. They wish to force us to confound two natures that we 
 conceive to be entirely distinct, of which we form separate ideas, 
 which have opposite attributes and no corresponding analogy 
 whatever. The attempt is undoubtedly difficult ; so much so, that 
 no one has ever yet accomplished it. They confine themselves to 
 gratuitous assertions. They have appealed to the senses as 
 witnesses, as if all the world did not join in the conviction that 
 the senses can only perceive that which is accessible to their 
 influence and capabilities. Most assuredly no one has ever seen 
 or touched a soul. But, in retort, has any one ever seen or 
 touched a reflection ? a grief ? a resolution ? Shall we thence 
 conclude that grief and suffering have no existence ? We possess 
 a faculty by which we estimate extent, and another of a very 
 different quality, which instructs us to distinguish pain. Since 
 pain and extent have not the most remote analogy, since we 
 perceive them separately and through extremely opposite faculties, 
 and since nothing establishes that the one cannot exist without 
 the other, we might, without more absurdity, maintain the follow- 
 ing thesis — all pain is in an extent ; or this — all extent is 
 comprised in a pain. 
 
 These modes of reasoning are very simple and common-place; 
 the point to ascertain is, whether they are solid. It would be 
 ridiculous to despise an argument, because it is hackneyed or 
 adapted to the comprehension of the world at large. It is of 
 much more value that common sense alone is necessary to refute 
 the paradox of the materialists. 
 
178 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 Not only is their paradox incredible in the highest degree, but 
 it is purely unfounded ; yet if we were reduced to the necessity of 
 proving the existence of the spirit, we should find no deficiency of 
 arguments. The spirit is indivisible : the body extended, which 
 means divisible ; for what is extent, if not divisibility ? We 
 challenge our opponents to conceive an indivisible body or a 
 divisible soul. I am what I am ; I cannot be the half of myself, 
 but my body may be hacked into atoms. Thus my body is not 
 entirely myself. We possess two contradictory characteristics ; my 
 body that of being divisible, and I myself that of not being divi- 
 sible. How, then, is it possible that we can be the same substance ? 
 
 The materialists raise an argument upon the fact that the soul 
 moves the body ; hence they conclude that the soul is corporeal. But 
 whence do they derive the principle tbat a body cannot be moved, 
 except by another body ? In truth, they have invented it. It is 
 neither a self-evident axiom, nor a demonstrated fact. We are 
 justified in treating this vaunted principle as lightly as we should 
 any other axiom of similar value, which it might suit them to 
 invent gratuitously, to help the exigence of their case. We grant 
 that it is difiicult to comprehend and explain how the mind moves 
 the body. But let them explain, if they can, how a given body 
 moves another body ? We fancy that we comprehend this transmis- 
 sion of movement, while, in fact, we comprehend it not. It is 
 familiar to us, and this is all. We have described it a thousand 
 times, we produce it at every moment, and we have determined 
 its laws. We can ascertain quite as much as regards the move- 
 ment of a body by the soul. But a vast abyss lies between 
 description and explanation. The materialists may turn against 
 us the impossibility we are under of explaining the action of the 
 soul upon the body, when they are really able to explain the action 
 of one body upon another. 
 
 We now, in turn, propose a fact for their consideration. Let 
 them tell us how a body moves itself without being moved.* Is 
 
 * " It ifci not so much intelligence M'hicli constitutes the specific distinction 
 between man and the aniaial creation, as the quality of fi'ee agency. Nature 
 dictates to every animal, and the brute obeys. Man receives the same 
 impression ; but he feels himself free either to acquiesce or resist ; and above 
 all, in the consciousness of this liberty, the spirituality of his soul exhibits 
 itself. For physics explain, in some manner, the mechauism of the 
 senses and the formation of ideas ; but in the power of will, or rather of 
 selection, and in the sentiment of this power, we recognise acts purely 
 spiritual, nothing of which can be explained by mechanical laws." — /. /. 
 liousscau, Discourse upon the Orirjin of Inequaliti/ amongst Men. Ed. 
 Lahure, vol. i. p. 90. 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. ITQ 
 
 it not true that, when we observe a movement in any particular 
 place, we affirm that it has been caused by some other movement? 
 Nevertheless, the soul moves itself without being moved. Is this 
 a property of little importance ? Can it be disputed ? Is the 
 soul occupied or controlled by another nature? And if the 
 invariable law of bodies is not to move without being moved, are 
 we not compelled to say that an existence which is not subject to 
 that law, cannot be a body ? 
 
 But the soul is not only independent of this law, but of every 
 other law of physical nature. It has laws belonging to itself, 
 which apply to itself alone, and have nothing to do with the rest 
 of the world. And, finally, as a last difference, which is not the 
 less fundamental, it can escape from its own peculiar laws. On 
 whichever side we turn, we discover nothing but distinctions and 
 incompatibilities, without the slightest analogy ; in materialism, 
 especially, we encounter an improbable and thoroughly unfounded 
 affirmation, or one established upon axioms evidently apocryphal. 
 We are, therefore, compelled to have recourse to the dogma of the 
 immateriality of the soul. 
 
 The materialists appear to have conceived a most exaggerated 
 idea of that quality of physical nature which is called the three 
 dimensions, or space ; as they introduce it on all occasions, and 
 make it a necessary appendage to a substance, in the attributes of 
 which the most sagacious mind cannot discover any thing which 
 has the most remote affinity to length, breadth, or thickness. 
 
 Has space any particular virtue to call for this infatuation ? 
 Has it more reality than other forms of existence ? more than 
 thought, for example ? Quite the contrary : thought is something 
 of itself ; space is only the result of a comparison ; it is not a 
 distinct being. Must we permit space and time, these conse- 
 quences of our nothingness, to usurp such a place in our minds, 
 that we are to take them for realities, and realities of the most 
 actual character ? For many centuries, space, which is not even 
 an existence, has been set up as a sort of idol by the materialists. 
 This chimera obstructs their view, and makes them see the whole 
 world on the wrong side. 
 
 If we examine the question more closely, it is not the mind 
 which impedes us, but the body. We comprehend more readily 
 the movements and mechanism of thought. The existence and 
 nature of the body is full of mysteries. We think little of them, 
 because we are continually influenced by the bodies that surround 
 us. They please, terrify, or threaten us, they inspire us with 
 
 N 2 
 
180 IMMORTALITY, 
 
 pleasure or pain ; they affect us through the eyes and ears ; they 
 follow us even in our dreams. Familiar intercourse deprives 
 them of all the characters of an enigma. We persuade our- 
 selves that space, ^vhich is only an affinity, has actual existence ; 
 that colour belongs to coloured bodies, while colouring itself is 
 only a relative quality ; we suffer ourselves to say that the fire is 
 hot, because it burns us, as if there were some analogy between 
 the sensation that we express by the word heat, and the qualities 
 of substance that we denominate fire. Reid justly observes, that 
 we should not be more insensate if we supposed that the point of 
 the needle which pricks us, possesses some inherent property 
 corresponding with the pain occasioned by the puncture. Meta- 
 physical science has at least this advantage, that it delivers us 
 from the besieging influence of the body, and replaces it in its 
 proper position. First, it deprives it of that rich casket of colours 
 which dazzles us ; then it takes away cold, heat, roughness, and 
 polish. It reduces weight, form, and extent, from positive to com- 
 parative existences. Time and space become simply an arrange- 
 ment of co-ordination and succession. Out of all this immensity 
 and noise nothing remains but a mass of unknown causes, of 
 which we perceive the effects. Where are these effects ? In 
 ourselves. They constitute our individual modifications, feelings, 
 sentiments, and ideas : our knowledge amounts to this ; beyond 
 this point, all is involved in darkness and problems which we 
 cannot solve. No one can be allowed to pretend that these 
 unknown causes of ascertained effects are better comprehended 
 and explained than the facts of human nature. The direct con- 
 trary is the truth. We must, with Descartes, begin with our 
 individual and internal identity, study it long and anxiously in 
 itself, bring before the mind the representation of all its impres- 
 sions, and when we have completed and fathomed this isolated 
 examination, we then reach the external world, which presses 
 closely from without, and forces itself into the domains of thought. 
 World, what dost thou desire of me? What is the true nature 
 of this being ? Canst thou be a phantasmagoria without reality ? 
 A bridge is thrown between man and the world : Kant might 
 have been in error for hesitating so long before he ventured to 
 pass it ; but, in truth, of the two banks divided by this bridge, 
 that on which I stand is the more real. The other may possibly 
 be a mirage, but truth is on this side. 
 
 The materialists extract the semblance of an argument from 
 the necessity under which the mind feels itself placed, of using 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 181 
 
 the body as a medium of thought. They suppose that the human 
 mind would remain indefinitely inactive, if a certain modification, 
 received from the body and transmitted to the brain through the 
 nerves, did not in some manner excite or stir the faculties. No 
 sooner is this physical movement communicated to the reflective 
 organ, than it begins to operate according to laws peculiar to itself, 
 continually remoditied and varied by impressions derived from with- 
 out. If the secondary organs, which we denominate organs of 
 sense, either become effaced or removed, if the nerves lose their 
 efficacy, if the brain itself, the seat of thought, is enfeebled by 
 disease, immediately the faculty of reflection is injured ; some- 
 times it loses strength altogether, and at others becomes weakened 
 in particular applications. This double phenomenon almost 
 invariably accompanies old age. We say proverbially, " He 
 retained his faculties to the last moment." This sufficiently 
 shows that the mind decays and wears out with the body. Again, 
 language supplies the materialists with a favourite argument. 
 Thought, and all the various modifications of the soul, are neces- 
 sarily expressed by words, or rather by traced characters, by 
 gesticulations or sounds, and always through physical agency. 
 These words, which not only serve to express the thought, but to 
 preserve it in the memory and to develop it by reflection and 
 reasoning, are at first merely images, or onomatopoeia (imitative 
 sounds), and affect only material objects. Their signification 
 amplifies by degrees, until they are used to express imaginary 
 beings ; but this operation, which is called metaphor, can only 
 introduce into the mind the notion of incorporeal essences through 
 mutual conventionality and the aid of abstraction. This means, 
 in fact, that what is incorporeal exists only in our thoughts, like 
 the chimeras which we fabricate through our faculty of analysis 
 and recomposition ; but that every existing thing is physical body, 
 and there is nothing that is not both extended and divisible. 
 
 This reasoning is specious, but not sound. What is said 
 respecting the common destiny in this life, of the soul and the 
 body, is very easily explained by this consideration, that the soul, 
 being intended to dwell for a given time in a body, and in the 
 material world, must of necessity be placed during that period in 
 communication with them. It has, therefore, corporeal organs, 
 which serve as messengers to the other bodies, and convey from 
 them the impressions these organs are constructed to produce, and 
 which operate in return as organs to the soul to re-act upon these 
 bodies, and to move and modify them. It is sufficiently apparent 
 
182 
 
 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 that the action of our intellectual faculties must, to a certain 
 extent, depend on these instruments. Every workman relies on 
 the implements that he uses, and the strongest eyes in the world 
 would avail little if they were condemned to see only through the 
 medium of a defective spying-glass. It is not the eyes that see, 
 but it is through the eyes that we see. It is perfectly natural 
 that, being enclosed in a body, we should only perceive other bodies 
 through the intervention of a bodily organ ; but it is also most 
 likely that, if we were without bodily substance, we should see 
 physical objects more clearly than we now distinguish them with 
 the eyes. All these different instruments and organs are helps to 
 human weakness ; they demonstrate at the same time that they 
 alleviate our deficiencies. It is thoroughly amusing to find men 
 persuading themselves that the eyes are necessary to sight, 
 because, in their actual state of physical imprisonment, they can only 
 see through these windows. We may say the same of language. 
 The soul is, to a certain extent, concealed behind a body which 
 it employs to make signals ; and another soul that it addresses is 
 equally imprisoned. All that is external to itself can only reach 
 it through the eyes or the ears ; consequently, the corporeal sign 
 is necessary both to speak and to hear the reply. If we suppose 
 that the two bodies are destroyed, and that the two souls remain 
 (an hypothesis, at the least, extremely intelligible), these two souls 
 could enter into communication, without the intermediary of a 
 material signal. They tell us that language is necessary, not 
 only to the transmission, but to the elaboration, of thought. This is 
 quite true ; and this goes to prove that the human mind is 
 extremely weak and imperfect ; and that it requires, in order to 
 pursue its ideas as they successively arise, a word easily remem- 
 bered, and which recals them when they are wanted. But does not 
 the slightest reflection on this internal use of speech, demonstrate 
 that it proceeds from the weakness, and not from the energy or 
 essence, of thought ? Imagine a perfect mind ; it will need no 
 language. The less imperfect it is, the less will it require the 
 assistance of words. The conclusion may be universally applied, 
 and the result -will be the same. A man is not much to be 
 dreaded with no weapon but his nails ; he becomes dangerous 
 with a sabre in his hand ; but he can never be as formidable as a 
 lion without arms. 
 
 It is not correct to extract an argument from the metaphorical 
 character of many or of all languages. This point regards only 
 the sign, and has no relation to the thought. The idea of an 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 183 
 
 immaterial olyect introduces itself in the train of the metaphor I 
 employ to the mind I am addressing, but my own mind neces- 
 sarily conceived the idea before I adopted or sought for the 
 metaphor. 
 
 This remark suffices to dispose of an objection which is inces- 
 santly repeated. We might go farther if it were necessary, and 
 say that there are certain ideas of such a nature that language 
 can recal them to a mind by which they have been previously con- 
 ceived, without being able to introduce them to another mind 
 from which they were absent. Such, for example, is the idea of 
 the infinite. The French language, to express infinity, employs 
 a materialist word, if we may be permitted to speak thus ; it gives 
 a negative signification to the term which, of all others, conveys 
 the most positive of all ideas. It is totally different in the Greek. 
 But, in reality, what imports the sign ? Nothing finite can embody 
 a complete notion of the infinite. Neither the tongue, nor the 
 senses, nor the conscience, nor any effect of abstraction or gene- 
 ralisation, having for its base the data of the senses or of con- 
 science, can form a full idea of the infinite, or of perfect and 
 eternal existence. 
 
 We might strengthen this answer by a vast number of observa- 
 tions which demonstrate the independent existence of the mind 
 or soul, and the servitude imposed upon it by the vicinity of the 
 body. For instance, it is certain that we employ language pro- 
 fitably to assist thought ; but all quick minds have felt a thousand ' 
 times, that the thought has preceded the expression. We often 
 give the idea more precision by words, but we almost always 
 diminish its animation and intensity. There are unquestionably 
 chosen minds whose value remains for ever unknown, because the 
 faculty of expression is denied to them. We sometimes see these 
 minds overflowing with ideas, overlooked by the mass of mankind, 
 and treated as inferior beings almost void of intelligence, although 
 others of more penetration occasionally discover in their language, 
 strokes and flashes of incomparable brilliancy. When thinking 
 of them, we ask ourselves whether we are not in presence of a 
 Genius reduced by enchantment to a condition which prevents 
 him from shining forth in' his true power and splendour. 
 Sensibility, above all other feelings, being less susceptible of 
 analysis, loses more by verbal expression that it can possibly gain. 
 Of all the mediums that we employ, language properly so called, 
 tliat is to say, articulated speech, is the least adapted to the 
 expression of sentiment. Music is far more valuable, more 
 
I8i 
 
 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 synthetic, more spontaneous, and totally void of abstraction. It is 
 so evident that language is not an additional strength, but a 
 fortunate and influential palliation of our weakness, that the 
 man of genius requires only a single expression, where the 
 common mind requires an absolute flow of words. We may 
 venture here to appeal to enthusiasm, not as a means of dis- 
 covering the truth, nor to control the data of reason; for 
 enthusiasm, thus understood, is a mistake, and the cause of addi- 
 tional error. But enthusiasm is an actual and regularly established 
 fact, exercising an important share in the occurrences of life, and 
 without becoming, as certain mystics pretend, the sovereign of 
 science, is at least, its reward and crown. Enthusiasm" flies 
 from words. Thought embraces a wider extent, sees further, and 
 enjoys its own resources more perfectly, in a state of ecstasy, and 
 without the help of speech. It may employ speech as it 'does 
 music. We can conceive that the last eff'ort of thought may be 
 to sum up all laws in one single law, and consequentlv to render 
 the development, that is, the exposition by words, useless. In 
 God, the full perfection of thought renders the thought unique 
 and expresses itself in a single word. There will be no speech 
 required in heaven, for all things will there be thoroucrhly 
 understood. ° 
 
 But we are not here called upon to maintain a theory in form 
 against materialism : it suffices to have pointed out in a few sen- 
 tences the weakness of the arguments by which that doctrine is 
 supported. We feel happy in being assured of the fact that, 
 amongst all reflecting minds, it loses ground daily, and the immense 
 majority of philosophical schools frankly acknowledge spiritualism. 
 We repeat, that, as soon as we become thoroughly convinced of 
 the immateriality of the soul, we have made a great step towards 
 the demonstration of immortality. In fact, what will henceforth 
 be difficult to explain is, not that the soul can exist without the 
 body, but how it has been able to live under that encumbering 
 mass and within that gross envelopment. The separation becomes 
 not only possible, but extremely probable, and we cannot com- 
 prehend why the tenant of the prison should perish because the 
 dungeon is thrown down. We m'ay, therefore, console ourselves 
 with these agreeable anticipations from the moment when we 
 touch upon the question of the immortality of the soul. We are 
 not here dealing with one abstruse point of doctrine difficult to 
 believe. On the contrary, all probability is in its favour before 
 we enter on the investigation. After having so long endured the 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 185 
 
 exigences of the body, its wants, its pleasures, and its pains, the 
 liberated soul sees and feels its own direct independence ; it is 
 no longer confined within a narrow horizon; it is no longer 
 subject to external faults and vices, and the companion who 
 diverted it from the good and tlie beautiful to attach it to an 
 inferior nature, and to bind it to the earth, has disappeared for 
 ever. 
 
 Sometimes an argument is employed to establish the immor- 
 tality of the soul, the value of which ought not to be exaggerated. 
 It is that drawn from hidivisibility, and which may be stated thus : 
 It is certain that the soul is indivisible, and this indivisibility, 
 which the examination of our own consciousness directly establishes, 
 is also one of the proofs which are brought forward in opposition 
 to the materialists. Now, since the question is, to ascertain 
 whether the indivisible soul is liable to perish, we must first 
 inquire what is death ? Is it the annihilation of our indivisible 
 being, or the dispersion of the different parts of which a divisible 
 being is composed ? It is certain that death is only dissolution. 
 The most ordinary expression proves this fact, which science con- 
 firms. Why then can we suppose that the soul must perish ? 
 Because every thing perishes. But if every thing perishes by 
 dissolution, and the soul is indivisible, and consequently indis- 
 soluble, the soul cannot perish. It is, therefore, immortal by the 
 very necessity and condition of its nature. 
 
 This is a very powerful argument: but it is true that death is 
 dissolution, and nothing more ; and it is equally true that unbe- 
 lievers verge on folly when they say, " All compounded existences 
 dissolve, without any of their component parts being annihilated ; 
 therefore, the soul, which is simple, indivisible, and insoluble, 
 will be annihilated." We have solid ground for maintaining 
 against them, that the aninhilation of the soul is an unfounded 
 and utterly incongruous supposition: only, we must not go so 
 far as to assert that it is impossible. Assuredly it is not impos- 
 sible for God to give back to nonentity that which he has taken 
 from it." The pantheists who deny creation, are welcome also 
 to deny the possibility of annihilation. This is consistent as 
 regards their doctrine. The argument we are now discussing, 
 will be invincible with every pantheist who believes in the imma- 
 teriality of the soul. With us it amounts only to a very strong 
 
 * " As God has issued the decree of creation within the existence of time, 
 so also he could and can desire that the world should cease to he at auy 
 given time." — Malehranche^ Seventh Discourse on Metaphysics^ i 9. 
 
186 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 probability, but does not of itself embrace certain and complete 
 demonstration. 
 
 It has besides another objection : it establishes the immortality 
 of the substance, without guaranteeing that of the person. My 
 individual substance may be perpetuated under such modifications 
 tliat this very perpetuation might become indifferent to me. 
 Thus, I might lose the faculty of remembrance, which alone would 
 suffice to render immortality useless. Two beings who live one 
 after the other, or a single being which has no consciousness of 
 its identity during the entire period of its existence, amount to 
 the same thing, as far as I am concerned. This fact is simple 
 and evident ; nevertheless we shall see that it is frequently mis- 
 understood. Thus, the indissolubility of my being places me 
 immediately above companionship or equality, witliout however 
 assuring me of immortality. So long as 1 placed my soul in the 
 same rank wdth the body, I was bound to believe that it might 
 dissolve, since all compound matter is condemned to dissolution. 
 But now, when I am better instructed on the nature of spiritual 
 substances, I confess that it requires nothing less than an effort 
 of omnipotence to produce my annihilation ; for no established 
 law can reach me. It seems as if the annihilation of a simple 
 substance formed an exception to the general laws of the world ; 
 and assuredly it is not less difficult to destroy than to create this 
 simple substance. Nevertheless, this furnishes no reason why I 
 should not perish with my body, if God so willed, and had a 
 reason for his will. 
 
 But why should he desire this ? He has created me ; was 
 it his object in that act of creation, that I should pass through 
 life to arrive at death ? I see around me many beings whose 
 existence is much shorter than my terrestrial existence, and 
 which disappear without leaving any traces ; but these are only 
 occasional or secondary beings, created for the whole, and not 
 for themselves. As they do not know themselves, they cannot be 
 a centre of action. My condition is very different. Not only is 
 my material body incomparably superior, biit I possess a con- 
 sciousness of what I am ; I feel, as I may say, my life, I love 
 and I desire it. The thought of annihilation fills me with horror. 
 Even in the uncertain future under which it conceals itself, 
 death is the torment of my imagination. Must I believe that 
 God has endowed me with this light, this love, this fear, merely 
 for his own amusement? that it has pleased him to attach me so 
 closely to the life which he has only bestowed on me for a moment 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 187 
 
 of time ? to condemn me to this death which overwhelms my 
 thoughts ? In the midst of all these sleeping beings, why has 
 he awakened me, merely that I may become a ready prey to annihi- 
 lation ? Can this be a wise God, who has only made me so great 
 that I may become equally miserable ? I may live to-morrow, 
 since I live to-day. I am no obstacle in the way of God. He 
 has bestowed my existence on me gratuitously ; but this received 
 benefit confers on me also a claim, for I know that God is just. 
 
 When this argument is used in presence of an unbeliever, he 
 hesitates not to reply, that we acknowledge a future life solely 
 because we desire it. But this desire is not produced by any 
 individual feeling ; it is common to all mankind, it forms a 
 portion of our being, it is God who has implanted it in our 
 bosoms. We have, therefore, the right of asking whether God 
 has made us, at the same time, to love and to lose life ? We 
 collect together all these probabilities, without deceiving ourselves 
 as to their value, and without passing them over as of little 
 import. Unquestionably we forui many desires which will never 
 be accomplished ; but a mere personal wish is very different from 
 an innate conviction of human nature. 
 
 God does nothing without a specific object. Not only does 
 every created being contribute to the general harmony of the 
 universe, but all are fitted for a particular purpose, and endowed 
 with the power and aptitude that they require. To want or to 
 lose strength are two distinct signs of impotence. We ourselves, 
 in our humble sphere of action, scarcely know whom we despise 
 most; he who attempts an enterprise beyond his reach, or he 
 who wastes enormous efforts to attain an object that lies under 
 his hand. If France determines to make war on Russia, she 
 assembles an army of three hundred thousand men ; and this is 
 well. But what would be said of a government that levied three 
 hundred thousand men to take a village ? Not only is it an error 
 in judgment to waste unnecessary strength, but it is the most 
 certain method of insuring failure. The skilful artificer propor- 
 tions the force employed to the resistance to be overcome. It we 
 apply these principles to the author of all things, we shall be 
 compelled to acknowledge that his supreme will has regulated 
 beforehand the faculties of every created being, according to the 
 destiny he has assigned to him; and the glorious spectacle of 
 universal creation confirms this opinion, wherever and in what- 
 ever direction we turn our eyes and thoughts towards it. We see 
 and feel that the study of the human faculties teaches us the 
 
188 
 
 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 futurity of man. A being destined to live eternally in heaven, 
 and a perishable atom condemned to vegetate forty years upon 
 earth, can never have been formed after the same model, if God 
 is great, just, and omniscient. Let us begin at this point ; and 
 since we require to prove whether man is immortal, let us ask 
 the question of man himself. 
 
 The heart should be examined, in the first place. Life ought 
 not to be looked upon, as is too often the case, on the external 
 surface. We must penetrate deeper, and the heart is the foun- 
 dation of life. We know and understand little of the lives of 
 otliers ; and many men, through want of penetration or observation, 
 are totally unacquainted with their own ; they can scarcely esti- 
 mate or distinguish the causes of their joy or grief, or the motives 
 of their actions. They resemble those historians who accumulate a 
 series of events, who relate battles and revolutions, but who never 
 say a word on the state of minds and souls. As soon as we begin to 
 be conscious of sensation, we also begin to love and sometimes to 
 hate. This love may either concentrate in ourselves or seek an 
 object from without. Almost without exception, it attaches itself 
 to another being ; to a father, a wife, a child, or a friend. In 
 certain dispositions love surrenders itself up to the controlling 
 influence of glorj', vanity, or fortune. Sometimes, also, w^e love 
 our native country, art, or human nature. If the love exceeds 
 the ordinary measure, it assumes the common name of passion ; 
 but even the least impassioned temperaments are agitated and 
 influenced by love. Who bestows on us this love ? The object 
 of our preference? Assuredly not — the object is only the 
 pretext. That which is amiable to me, may he amiable to me 
 alone. A loveable object does not of necessity create a loving 
 heart ; but where a heart is disposed to love, love will spring up, 
 even though the object should happen to be unworthy. The 
 lover finds in his own heart the perfections with which he 
 adorns the object of his selection. Nothing can more completely 
 demonstrate that we are something of ourselves, and do not 
 entirely depend on our senses and on the world. Beethoven, 
 after he became deaf, composed sublime music. What a world 
 of enchantment displayed its splendours to the imagination of 
 blind Milton ! If I were disposed to write a poem to embody 
 love, I certainly should not select two perfect lovers. I should 
 take one of those enthusiastic hearts, who give themselves up in 
 spite of reason or reflection, without after-thouglit or reserve ; who 
 live and breatlie but for the object loved ; who worship it with 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 189 
 
 rapture; who lose all thought of themselvesin tending to promote 
 its happiness ; to whom sacrifice is enjoyment, whom nothing can 
 disenthral, who are faithful even after death, and still more, after 
 disdain and treachery; and who lavish their treasures of pure 
 affection upon a deformed hody, a diseased mind, and an 
 ungrateful heart. Such is love in its full intensity and sublime 
 grandeur, a visible trace of the hand of God in the being of his 
 creation. What becomes of this power if man perishes ? Shall 
 we reduce it to the state of a mere physical existence ? Shall we 
 confine it within the limits of human life, this immeasurable sen- 
 timent which dreams but of eternity ? When turning aside all 
 intervening veils, and ascending to the Creator through his 
 works, love attaches itself directly to God, shall its ardent 
 longings be frustrated ? This love, so holy and so absorbing, 
 must it be dissolved with the cold dissolution of death? How ! 
 will not God exhibit and vindicate himself? Shall what has 
 appeared to be the truest and richest reality of life, transform 
 itself into a snare and a punishment? Are insensible souls 
 not disinherited ? and is it true wisdom to preserve a powerless 
 heart, and to pass insensibly through life, without passion or 
 delight, as if man were by anticipation already a corpse ? 
 
 But let us leave love, and consider intelligence. Placed by 
 the side of the faculty which teaches us to know, to measure, 
 and to appropriate the world to ourselves, is there nothing more in 
 the recesses of the mind ? Why are we led by an invincible 
 attraction to seek God and fathom his nature ? Why does 
 science always direct itself to general results? Why does it 
 elevate itself so loftily in man's consideration, that it loses some- 
 thing of its practical utility ? Wherefore does the physical horizon 
 appear to us as a prison ? Whence proceed so many fortunate 
 efforts to triumph over space ? Why this passionate desire to 
 study the past, and this constant anticipation of the future ? We 
 call ourselves mortal, and yet all our inquiries and thoughts tend 
 towards the discovery of eternal and universal laws. Our in- 
 telligence is nourished and fed by eternity alone, and are we 
 then to believe that eternity will escape from us ? Has God 
 expressly created man to struggle against time and to be crushed 
 by his antagonist ? Not so : if the field of science is so exten- 
 sive that an entire life passed in study without interval, can only 
 obtain a glimpse of its dimensions ; if in proportion as we achieve 
 a triumph, a new power develops itself within us, which urges us 
 on with increasing energy; if, notwithstanding so many ages 
 
190 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 exhausted, so much brilliant genius employed, and so many great 
 discoveries accomplished, the little that we know seems only to 
 teach us the immensity of what still remains unknown ; — can we 
 refuse ourselves the consolation that, when these walls of flesh and 
 blood are beaten down, the soul will see, comprehend, and enjoy 
 in full possession, what in this world we only dream of and 
 imagine? The materialists may say what they please, but their 
 system suffocates us. They resemble prisoners who try to make us 
 believe that the dungeon m which we groan together, will never be 
 opened. We, who are spiritualists, adopt the doctrine of hope, 
 liberty, and faith ! In us, love is truth ; the thouf;;ht of the 
 Eternal is truth. Every sentiment which directs itself towards 
 God, every reflection that reveals a more exalted law, elevates us 
 in effect towards the Almighty, not metaphorically or transi- 
 torily, but in actual reality. We employ this life in endeavouring 
 to make ourselves worthy of the next. Thus we imbibe con- 
 solation and strength. Death and pain are deprived of their sting. 
 
 But neither the spirituality of the soul, which delivers us from 
 the dissolution common to all bodies, nor the horror which nature 
 has implanted in us of annihilation, nor the great faculties for 
 which we find no adequate employment in this world, are 
 sufficient to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, and we should 
 be reduced to probabilities approaching certainty, if there were no 
 such thing as evil. 
 
 God exists; he is good and all-powerful; he has created and 
 governs the world. All these truths are instantly proved with 
 impregnable force. Scepticism can find only one objection 
 which carries any weight — the existence of evil. This reality 
 impugns the power, or goodness, or justice of God. We have 
 seen what can be said in reply. It is easy to explain physical 
 evil ; and even in man that portion of evil which is inevitably 
 attached to his condition of a created, and, consequently, of an 
 imperfect being. It would be absurd, as well as impious, to com- 
 plain that he who has made us after his own image, has not made 
 us equal to himself. But what is less comprehensible, is, that in 
 bestowing on us all, with the same name and nature the same 
 destiny, he has not also given the same means of reaching 
 it. Here is one man rich and powerful, there is another poor ; 
 to this individual he has given expanded genius, to that a degree 
 of intelligence scarcely superior to the instinct of animals ; to 
 each is distributed, in unequal measure, his allotment of happiness 
 and misery ; on one all pleasures and indulgences are liberally 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 101 
 
 conferred ; from another every thing is taken by an arbitrary sen- 
 tence — health, honour, wife, children, all that sustains, and all that 
 brings consolation. The stoics reply that the chances of life are 
 a lottery. To be rich or poor, young and beautiful or impotent 
 and deformed, to rule or to serve, are of no more importance to 
 us than it is to an actor whether he plays the part of Orgon or 
 Tartiiffe.-'' We are not allowed to select our own characters ; our 
 business is to perform them to the best of our abilities. If 
 Epictetus is more perfect as a slave than Marcus Aurelius as an 
 Emperor, Epictetus is more fortunate than Marcus Aurelius. 
 To allow our happiness to depend upon others is to live the life 
 of a beggar ; to live like men we should conquer misery by de- 
 spising it, and thus deprive the external world of its sting.f In 
 giving us liberty, God has given us all ; for it depends on ourselves 
 to be virtuous, and the rest is unworthy of a thought. Such are, 
 taken indiscriminately, a few of the maxims which the stoics 
 oppose to counterbalance or disprove what is generally called evil. 
 These lofty sentiments are full of truth and force, but the attire 
 is not suited to every stature. To be satisfied with these con- 
 clusions we require to be either Epictetus or Cato. Can we 
 believe that human nature can adopt them ? and that firmly 
 resolved to change feelings rather than condition, it can arrive at 
 the sublime insanity of the stoics, which denies pain by dint of 
 despising it ? Let us venture to assert, without failing in respect 
 to a sect which did honour to humanity, that there are misfortunes 
 over which it is not salutary or right to triumph. We admire 
 without reserve the broken leg of Epictetus ; but we hesitate, 
 suspended between horror and admiration, before the sentence of 
 Brutus. We feel ourselves almost prepared to say with Bossuet 
 that the pliilosophy of the stoics fancies itself great, because it is 
 severe. \ We can, and ought to know how to despise hunger, 
 thirst, cold, and all other physical privations ; but to hear our 
 own child crying hopelessly for bread, to see him waste in the 
 torments of starvation, to wander with him without shelter or 
 refuge, to leave him dying to the care of God, to lower that 
 
 * "Take care to perform with diligence the part wliich the sovereign 
 director of all things has imposed upon thee ; make it short, if it be short ; 
 long, if it be long. If he has assigned to thee the character of a beggar, 
 endeavour to represent it faithfully ; be either a cripple, a prince, or a 
 plebeian, as he has determined. Thy business is to play thy part, and his to 
 select what that part shall be." — Epictetus, Manual, chap, xxiii. 
 
 t Non quid, sed quemadmodum feras, interest.— ^e/ieca, De Providentid, 
 chap. ii. 
 
 X Bossuet, Sermon on Providence. 
 
192 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 beloved head, and feel that death will speedily leave an insen- 
 sible corpse in our arms— or perhaps, which is a still more 
 bitter agony, to struggle in vain against the overwhelming 
 miseries °of 'crime, to assist impotently in the destruction of a 
 soul for which we would barter our own existence a thousand 
 times— these are inflictions which all the high-sounding sentences 
 of stoicism can neither attenuate nor cure, and the mere existence 
 of which infallibly embraces one of these two consequences— 
 either there is no God, or there is not a future life. 
 
 This inequality in the assignment of good and evil, becomes 
 a pressing argument, in a totally different point of view, when 
 we see all the success in this world fall to the lot of the vicious, 
 and all the misery overwhelm the just. Undoubtedly it is 
 wrong to say, that the moral law would be powerless without the 
 rewards and punishments which constitute its sanction. There 
 is an innate character in virtue, which renders it all-powerful oyer 
 upright minds; and we gratify ourselves with the persuasion 
 that'^we should still cling to it, even with the prospect of 
 enduring misery, rather than purchase happiness at the price of 
 dishonour. But if virtue without happiness suffices for a few 
 exalted souls, under these hard conditions will it satisfy human 
 nature in the aggregate? Will it accord with the justice 
 of God ? 
 
 Let us not ascend to the majesty of God, but let us look on 
 justice in itself, rather than in its source. We carry an impulse 
 within ourselves, which while it urges us towards what is good 
 and right, compels us by a fortunate necessity to acknowledge 
 the existence of a future state : this feeling is conscience. We 
 may argue upon the nature and origin of this conviction ; the 
 rationalists imagine that it exists in man by the sole will of 
 the Creator, and develops itself spontaneously within him, as 
 often as he forms a moral determination, or takes part in the 
 development of moral liberty in one of his own species. But 
 not to introduce here the question of innate ideas and the theory 
 of reason, and to confine ourselves to a point that is not even 
 disputed, all the world agree that we conceive inherently the 
 idea of justice ; and whether derived from education or nature, 
 this idea in a regulated mind possesses such power, that we can 
 neither reject it in theory, nor mistake its ascendancy in practice. 
 Are we dealing with our individual acts? Virtue produces, 
 according to the' circumstances of the case, either remorse, or a 
 species of gratifying and legitimate pride. Are we only spectators 
 of the acts of others? We approve or disapprove with equal 
 
PBOOFS OF THE IMHOETALITT OF THE SOUL. 193 
 
 certainty and precision. If a son strikes his father in n>y 
 p.esence, ,s it possible that I can look upon this as an actionTf 
 no ..portance If I pronounce it criminal, is it sponta ouslv 
 0. after reflection ? Does my mind require to weigh tl, s opinion t'o 
 
 defiw' f^r^'^^""^ """"^y '-wen to'societyfromth: 
 da cation of filial respect ? Can I imagine a written law, which 
 should pronounce Illusive the respect that the son ought to feel 
 and evince for his fother? Do not all schools, without distinction 
 origin or class, agree that there is an eternal justice indepe 'd nt 
 of human justice, and on which human justice is founded^ Le 
 us even endeavour to suppose that this law of justice, reeo<rnised 
 by all men results solely from their condition, and that 1 he 
 nature of humanity were different, justice would cease o be 
 justice, we cannot bring ourselves to imagine this I feel 
 convinced, upon the same ground of convfction, that jus tee 
 
 exist without a cause. I am compelled to believe this or I must 
 renounce the assistance of my reason. If I circun scribe te 
 range of this axiom, and say, '.Justice is true as regards Va^ 
 but cannot apply to a being of a different nature," I must auTe 
 
 Off from this, and look upon my reason only in the liaht of a 
 relative authority. I must say, for instance, "It is True as 
 regards man, that the whole is greater than one of its parts 
 bu this does not apply to a being of a different nature." ' tSb 
 wouM be m reality, ,<, embrace scepticism ; for between relative 
 truth and doubt there is but the substance of a ha Thus 
 justice exists and exercises absolute power; not only as retards 
 
 adopt this conclusion who are not blinded by a theory. It follows 
 from hence that justice ought to be fulfilled; for itcLnot ex t t! 
 be violated ; in like manner it follows, that i^ is impS . "Ih 
 axiom there can he no effect without a cause," s corre t tha 
 there can exist any effect without a cause. Therefore if tl e practica 
 and actual worid exhibits evident injustice, and i he'^seal of 
 
 « "s life. It follows of necessity that there must be a life to come 
 
 ot JUS ice. E ther we must say there is no such thina as justice 
 or that virtue is always rewarded ; if not on earth, infal ibyyTni 
 mcontestably m a future state.* uiauioiy and 
 
 ' "As truly a. I exht, I d.dre to obey tlie dictates of cooseieuce iu all 
 
 
 
194 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 No sooner does this thought take possession of the soul, than 
 it gives us more strength to bear the ills of life than all the 
 maxims that the stoics ever invented, for it shows us at the 
 same time nothingness and promised futurity.- It is^ a false 
 morality which attaches the prosperity of the world to virtue. ^ It 
 has nothing to do with it; neither virtue, nor perhaps genms, 
 can command success. Virtue is so far from being profitable 
 that it is seldom represented otherwise than suffering and 
 oppressed. Vice has all the chances of life on its side. It is 
 the virtue of Cato, and not Caesar, that triumphs over Cato. 
 Men admire success, nothing more; and the most ordinary 
 endowments, when favoured by circumstances, become traces of 
 aenius in the estimation of inferior minds. Nothing overpowers 
 us so much in acts as quantity and completion, which constitute 
 a double incarnation of power. Reason protests in vain ; we 
 almost without exception bow before the result. Cato is scarcely 
 remembered in the triumph of Csesar. When this aspiring 
 citizen, who was yet honest, was preparing to march against the 
 Roman senate, and consequently against the republic and liberty, 
 he halted on the banks of the Rubicon, divided perhaps between 
 personal ambition and a sense of public duty. There was only the 
 breadth of a narrow river between him and crime ; but there was 
 also only that insignificant barrier between him and true glory. 
 No sooner had he passed it than the world and history became his 
 inheritance. t 
 
 Flattery decrees to him the title of father of his country, which 
 the populace hasten to consecrate by acclamations. Millions are 
 bestowed upon him to feed his luxury and easy gifts. This 
 money, which is not his own, and which he dispenses without 
 
 whicli it prescribes to me. May this determination henceforth be irrevo- 
 cably fixed in my mind ; may all my other determinations depend on this, 
 and may this -lepend on no other : may it be the principle, the motive of all 
 ray actions. I know, it is true, in my capacity of a bemg endowed with 
 reason that I can only act on the condition of proposing to myself an end, 
 of expecting a result : I know also, for this has been demonstrated to me, that 
 this obedience to my conscience produces no fruit upon earth. But let not 
 this restrain me. Rather than renounce this obedience, I prefer supposing that 
 bevond this world there is an abode where it will necessarily bear its produce 
 The cloud disperses, a new universe manifests itself to me,^ 
 at the' same moment when I discover a new agent thi'ough which to grasp it." 
 —Flchte, On the Destiny of Man, p. 303, et seq. . ^, . , 
 
 * "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness sake : for their s 
 is the kingdom of heaven."— St. Matthew, chap. v. verse 10. 
 
 t "Successful crime was just, and ceased to be a crime, '—loileau, satire x. 
 Ed. Lachine, p. 114. 
 
PROOFS OF THE IMMOETAHTy OF THE SOUL. 195 
 
 irapoverishiug himself, occasions his liberality to be applauded to 
 the clouds. He establishes a rigorous policy to keep an empire 
 in subjection. He encourages poets, who bestow fame in retuin. 
 He enacts salutary laws, because nothing is difficult to absolute 
 power. If a revolt springs up, he crushes it without leaving his 
 palace ; and posterity, as well as his contemporaries, add "that 
 achievement to his personal glory. Thus his life passes on in 
 power and peace. A single trait of clemency, eulogised by 
 Cicero in emphatic terms, causes the proscriptions to be forgotten. 
 History overflows with examples which it would be impossible to 
 explain, if all consummated and irreparable injustice were not 
 evidences of a future life. Still we are only acquainted with the 
 leading dramas of the worid, for to make a subject historical it must 
 interest the multitude or the powerful. An act of obscure injustice 
 takes place without leaving traces behind. An axe falls, an assistant 
 executioner effaces the marks of blood, and the babbling, busy 
 crowd, pass over the yet lukewarm spot without thinking either 
 of the scaffold or tlie victim ; without asking whether he who has 
 just been executed was called Malesherbes or Carrier. Thus a 
 mischievous and f^ilse philosophy collects all these iniquities and 
 miseries together to crush Providence under their weight. But 
 we who are endowed with faith, and who cannot for a moment 
 suspend our reliance on God, feel ourselves forced and con- 
 strained, in presence of an act of irreparable injustice, to believe 
 and trust in the immortality of the soul. 
 
 2 
 
19(3 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 
 
 «' Let him then take confidence for his soul, who during his life has rejected 
 the pleasures and advantages of the body, as being strangers and bnngers 
 of evil • also, he who has loved the enjoyments of science ; who has adorned 
 his soul not with strange attire, but with that which properly belongs to it, 
 such as temperance, justice, strength, liberty, and truth ;_ he may tranquilly 
 await the hour of his departure for the other world, as being prepared for the 
 voyage when destiny shall call him to undertake it."— Plato s PhcBdo, trans- 
 lated' by V. Cousin, t. i., p. 314. 
 
 After having demonstrated the immortality of the soul, there 
 yet remains a task to be fulfilled— that of inquiring into the 
 destiny that awaits man beyond the grave. Can we acquire no 
 certain knowledge of this rapidly approaching future ? and is the 
 hope which ought to console and sustain us here below solely 
 confined to an abstract idea? The same proofs which are used 
 to establish the necessity of another existence give us the right 
 of asserting that after undergoing- the trial of life in this world, 
 the sinful will be punished and the good rewarded. These 
 words punishment and recompense are insufficient to satisfy 
 human curiosity ; they scarcely suffice to act upon our sensibility, 
 and to intervene with full efficacy in our meditations. This forms 
 one of the ordinary complaints of the ignorant multitude against 
 philosophy. The mere demonstration of the immortality of the 
 soul is held as nothing, unless we can describe from point to 
 point, the unknown regions towards which time, in its course, is 
 carrying us. It is to furnish a reply to this precise demand for 
 particufars, that since, and, we might almost say, even before the 
 origin of philosophy, the dogma of the metempsychosis has been 
 invented. This dogma is intended to solve two problems at the 
 same time— inequality in this world, and rewards and punishments 
 
 When the springs of life are exhausted, and the body sinks in 
 decay, the soul which then escapes from its temporary prison 
 passes into another body and commences a new career. Such is 
 the dogma of the metempsychosis under its simplest form. If 
 under the first trial this soul has well employed its liberty, it 
 obtains as its portion in a second life, a better organised body 
 
OF THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. ]97 
 
 and a happier destiny. If, on the contrary, it has abused the 
 gifts of Providence, its condition will suffer in the following 
 trial, and it will descend some steps in the ladder of hierarchy. 
 Thus we decide our own fate entirely, and that which appears a 
 mere accident of birth, is already, in fact, a recompense or a 
 chastisement. 
 
 This doctrine has occupied a conspicuous position in history. 
 Suffice it to say that we find it in Greece in the school of 
 Pythagoras, in Egypt, in India, in China ; and that it has been 
 revived at intervals, in modern times, by philosophers, who from 
 the brilliancy of their style and the richness of their imagination, 
 might, at the same time, be designated poets. 
 
 Before the accession of these last disciples, the metempsychosis 
 could scarcely be considered anything beyond a legend, since, 
 placing the theatre of our physical changes in this lower world, 
 it made us revive under different bodies, in the midst of our 
 familiar circle of relatives and friends. Plato speaks of the 
 doctrine with a smile upon his lips, more like a sage who amuses 
 himself, than as a philosopher who instructs. He conducts us 
 to an extensive plain where the souls of the departed are called 
 together to select a new condition. Free choice is left to them, 
 but each brings to the grand consideration their individual tastes, 
 passions, or inexperience. Plato exhibits to us Atalanta changed 
 into a wrestler, Epeus, the son of Panopeus (the fabricator of the 
 wooden horse at the siege of Troy), as a workwoman, Agamemnon 
 transformed into an eagle, Ajax as a lion, aixd Thersites banished 
 into the body of an ape. As soon as the allotment is completed, 
 the judges of the souls carry them to the waters of Lethe, where 
 they lose all recollection of their former state.* This is the 
 common rule of all analogous theories ; but if by this the 
 hypothesis is rendered possible, it becomes at the same time 
 useless. When the soul by changing the body ceases to 
 remember, the punishment is no longer a punishment but an act 
 of cruelty ; even the recompense becomes a gift of generosity 
 without motive. The error of the metempsychosis, thus under- 
 stood, resembles that of the legislators who punish the crime 
 of the father upon the children and grandchildren. This doctrine, 
 which transforms misery and vice into punishment, naturally 
 flourished in Egypt where the distinction of castes was con- 
 secrated ; but it has disappeared, with ancient slavery, before the 
 march of universal fraternity. 
 
 * Plato, Republic, b. x. translated by V. Cousin, vol. x. p. 292. 
 
108 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 To preserve consistency between the dogma of the trans- 
 migration of souls and the principle of merit and demerit, we 
 must suppose, in accordance with some schools,* that instead of 
 passing after this life into the body of another terrestrial animal, 
 our souls, without losing the consciousness of their identity, are 
 removed to another planet to animate there bodies of a different 
 species. On this condition, the second existence might become 
 either the reward or punishment of the first, and nothing inter- 
 feres with the supposition that this second trial being followed by 
 several others, the soul may fall still lower and lower, or rise in 
 a similar proportion, until the course of trial is complete and the 
 series of transformations arrested. Nothing can be more poetical 
 than this idea, which carries us from star to star. The imagina- 
 tion may exercise full play, and suppose that in each successive 
 planet there are placed bodies endowed with the most miraculous 
 attributes, and seconded by the most perfect organs ; with forms 
 of society containing institutions which leave far behind them 
 in excellence and purity the most ingenious of human inventions. 
 In such an hypothesis, man may truly believe himself the monarch 
 of creation. Instead of being for ever bound to this terrestrial 
 sphere, which is but an atom, the starry heaven becomes his 
 residence. When the evening sun sets in the horizon, and in 
 the midst of the silence of nature we behold through a soft and 
 tranquil light those golden studs which sparkle in the clear blue 
 firmament, we may ask ourselves which is the region we shall 
 first inhabit, after having put off the mortal covering which now 
 envelops us ; where and in what planet dwell in power and liberty 
 those whose loss we have bewailed, whose ashes we preserve in the 
 tomb, and who from the heaven to which they have ascended, look 
 down in pity upon our ignorance and suffering : 
 
 Sub pedibusque vident nubes et sidera. 
 
 Unfortunately, it is not enough that an hypothesis should be 
 brilliant and seductive to the imagination ; if we cannot establish 
 it on substantial evidence, it remains only an enchanting dream, 
 and can never be admitted into the records of science. It is not 
 correct to say that our souls had a previous being before they 
 inhabited the bodies in which they are at this moment confined ; 
 
 * '* Integer ille, nihilque in terris relinquens, fiigit, et totus excepit ; pau- 
 lumque supra nos commoratus dum expurgatus et inhtereutia vitia situmque 
 oranis mortalis vev'i excutit, deinde ad excelsa sublatus, inter felices currit 
 animas." — Seneca, Be Consolatlone. 
 
OF THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 199 
 
 that this anterior existence is indispensable to explain the 
 inequality of our faculties and fortunes ; and that if the present 
 actual life has been preceded by one or more of a different 
 character, we can thus only consider it as an intermediate link 
 in a chain of transformations. This would be returning to the 
 ancient doctrine of the metempsychosis, or rather to the change 
 without memory, sense of identity, or justice. It is most unques- 
 tionably true that the sum of good and evil is unequally distri- 
 buted to men, and that it is extremely difficult to reconcile this 
 disproportioned division with the justice of God; but it would be 
 still more difficult, or rather absolutely impossible, to admit that 
 God is capable of punishing us in this life for crimes of which we 
 have lost all recollection. There can be no mutual connection or 
 responsibility between our actual lives and those anterior exist- 
 ences of which we retain not the smallest trace or impression. In 
 this invincible ignorance in which I find myself as to any former 
 condition or earlier crimes, I cannot submit to a prescribed 
 punishment and receive it as lawful. He who thus exercises 
 authority is a tyrant and not a father. It is because the punish- 
 ment cannot be separated from the fault committed that I feel 
 assured of rising again with a full and entire consciousness of my 
 identity. If we abandon this principle, the evidence of which is 
 no longer disputed in the application of human justice, we must 
 then admit that the life to come will be, like preceding existences, 
 separated from this by impassable chasms, and that the promised 
 immortality applies to the substance only and not to the indivi- 
 dual. These, the two most important dogmas of moral philo- 
 sophy, perish together ; for, on the one hand, the principle of 
 merit and demerit is vitiated; and, on the other, immortality 
 without consciousness or memory becomes useless and indifferent. 
 
 Finally, if we must make this addition, the doctrine which 
 transforms the good and evil of actual life into rewards and 
 punishments, destroys the sources of charity, for it changes the 
 unfortunate into the guilty. The principle, therefore, of anterior 
 existences is false and out of date. It might have inveigled 
 some minds two thousand years ago, but the modern Pythago- 
 reans are imperatively called upon to renounce it, out of respect to 
 their conception of justice. 
 
 Another evidence in favour of the metempsychosis has been 
 drawn from the shortness of human life. So brief a trial, they 
 say, could not be decisive ; it is too little to satisfy divine justice. 
 But what do they call the brevity of the trial ? To what do they 
 
200 
 
 IMMOETALITY. 
 
 compare it ? If to eternity, such a comparison is too absurd to 
 bold ground. Mortal existence may be lengthened an hundred- 
 fold without in the slightest degree changing its relation to 
 eternity.^' Thus the trial may be complete in a short life. 
 We acknowledge readily that the conditions of the trial are not 
 equally imposed on all men ; but how can we apply this fact to 
 the life to come, unless by supposing that God will keep an exact 
 and scrupulous account of every human transaction ? We know 
 that every one will be punished or rewarded according to his 
 deeds. The inequality of the trial will be compensated by the 
 niequality of the punishment or reward. We may safely affirm 
 this, for it springs from the idea of justice ; the rest is mere 
 conjecture without proof or probability. 
 
 But why, we are asked, cannot the guilty in undergoing punish- 
 ment satisfy divine justice by repentance, and thus obtain a more 
 complete and immediate pardon ? And what prevents us from 
 supposing, if this period of punishment becomes also a second 
 trial, that the just may evince higher merit, and thus establish 
 a claim to a superior reward ? Our answer is ready and direct. 
 The question demanded is, whether it is impossible for the guilty 
 pending the duration of punishment to merit pardon? No, this does 
 not appear impossible. Do we pretend to say that it will happen ? 
 On such a subject no one can speak with certainty. Beyond the 
 proportionality of punishment everything is conjectural. What, 
 then, is this theory of the metempsychosis if not a conjecture 
 founded upon conjectures ? We may add that it is not correct 
 to assume, that if the sinner can obtain a mitigation of his 
 punishment, it follows that the just man can also win an addition 
 to his happiness. It is vain to attempt a parallel between 
 punishment and reward, for justice may be tempered by mercy, 
 without conferring on the good any right to a higher degree of 
 blessedness. 
 
 We are told, and truly, that in accordance with the principles 
 on which the belief in the immortality of the soul is founded, 
 man may return to life entire, and find himself in another world 
 with his former intelligence, affections, and liberty. If (it is 
 said,) he is free after this passing existence, he ought to be able 
 to exercise freedom on the usual conditions of liberty, that is to 
 say, with the chances of merit and demerit ; he is still in a state 
 
 * '' Undecumque ex aequo ad ccelum erigitur acies, paribus intervallis omnia 
 djviua ab omnibus kumauis distant."— ^Se/icca, Be, Consolatione, chap. ix. 
 
OF THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 201 
 
 of trial, and has still to hope and fear. The argument turns upon 
 this point, that action must necessarily be, everywhere and in 
 all beings, exactly what it is here below. Who can prove this ? 
 Who can even prove that action, limited, varied, and divided 
 action, must be indispensable to liberty ? Because man cannot 
 be a free agent except on the condition of possible error, does it 
 therefore follow that liberty in its absolute essence implies the 
 inevitable possibility of error ? To maintain such a doctrine, we 
 must either affirm that God can do wrong, or that he is not free. 
 If it is evident that liberty and infallibility belong equally to the 
 Divine nature, it results thence that the possibility of error is not 
 comprised in the essence of liberty. What solidity or weight can 
 we then find in these accumulated proofs which rest upon false 
 or conjectural data ? 
 
 Finally, an attempt is made to persuade us that we could not 
 enjoy perfect happiness in heaven, unless we had, as in this world, 
 an appointed task to fulfil ; and hence a conclusion is drawn that 
 the life that awaits us, like that through which we are passing, is 
 again a state of transition. To love God, they say, and to know 
 God, constitute two elements of bliss, but not bliss total and 
 entire. We must still endeavour to tend towards the divine ideal 
 of perfection by effort and action. Thus, all the conditions of 
 the question are overthrown. Hitherto, men complained of the 
 harshness and fatigue of the trial, and philosophy replied : it is 
 necessary to merit repose by labour ; but here is a new doctrine 
 which loves labour for itself alone, which rewards us for a 
 triumph by the promise of a new effort to be attempted, and 
 which transforms eternal life into eternal motion. Is it not rash 
 to settle the conditions of a state of happiness which we can neither 
 taste nor imagine in our present condition ? And is it possible to 
 establish a system upon an idea so hazarded ? Action is 
 undoubtedly included in the essence of perfection, but is action 
 inconsistent with or contrary to repose ? The God of Aristotle 
 is at the same time essentially immutable and active : all 
 metaphysics acknowledge a fixed and immovable cause. Let us 
 admit, although it is not proved, that action and repose cannot be 
 reconciled except in the nature of God ; because varied, multi 
 plied, and limited action is necessary to our happiness in the 
 present life, there is no ground for concluding therefore that it 
 continues to be equally necessary in the life to come. Action is 
 of importance to our happiness here, because human life is a 
 state of trial ; and it will also be of importance in the life to 
 
202 lilMOKTALITY. 
 
 come, if that life is in itself only another state of trial ; but it is 
 precisely upon this point that the whole question turns. 
 
 It results, therefore, that the doctrine of the metempsychosis 
 is nothing more than a poetical supposition. This hypothesis, 
 intended to clear up the mystery of a future state, and to give, as 
 is assumed, a specific embodiment to our hopes, is certainly more 
 vague than the simple promise of a reward to which philosophy 
 in general confines itself. In fact, is it implied that this 
 successive ascent from star to star, of which, according to this 
 theory, our future consists, is to be prolonged to infinity ? If so, 
 the hypothesis becomes an empty abstraction — a series of trans- 
 formations, not one of which is known to us, an eternal voyage 
 towards a goal which has no existence. If, on the contrary, we 
 are answered that the soul, after several consecutive migrations, 
 finally loses itself in the bosom of God, why not rather become 
 pantheists at once ? Why take so long a voyage to be swallowed 
 up in this gulf at last ? Shall we not rather say to these poets 
 of the invisible world, as the courtier of Pyrrhus said to his 
 master, " Repose from the first day ? " 
 
 Having given up the doctrine of the metempsychosis, we must 
 now return to the inquiry of what philosophy allows us to affirm with 
 certainty. We have seen that there are meritorious rewards for the 
 virtuous, and penalties for the wicked ; we may add with equal con- 
 fidence, that the soul does not lose the consciousness of what it has 
 been ; this is an indispensable condition of future reward or punish- 
 ment. Thus, we may hold as definitively proved these two points : 
 tlie preservation of the individual person, and reward or punish- 
 ment according to desert. It is sometimes profitable to dwell on 
 assertions that appear indisputable. The advice comes from 
 Leibnitz. The same facts may assume different aspects according 
 to the side from which they are reached. When we are dealing 
 with an important principle, we are bound to examine it carefully, 
 to be quite satisfied that we should recognise it through another 
 and less direct channel. Is it positively necessary that the soul 
 should preserve the memory of what it has been that it may be 
 capable of receiving reward or punishment? Let us thoroughly 
 comprehend this idea of reward and punishment. Punishment 
 is a grief or pain inflicted on the author of a culpable act ; 
 reward is a satisfaction or return conferred upon the author of a 
 meritorious act. In this lower world, in the distribution of human 
 justice, does it ever happen that John is punished for the fault of 
 Paul ? Assuredly this does happen, when we are deceived as to 
 
OF THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 203 
 
 the focts ; but, if we are able to distinguish the guilty, it is he, 
 and he alone, that we desire to punish. Formerly, before the 
 progress of philosophy, there existed a mutual responsibility 
 between all the members of a family ; and because, in certain 
 cases, the recompense accorded to the father descended to his remote 
 posterity, it was thence concluded that society could perpetuate 
 the punishment as it had extended the reward. This was to 
 confound two very opposite ideas ; for a benefit may be gratuitous, 
 while punishment, in its very essence, supposes the culpability of 
 the sufferer. 
 
 If society, to reward the f^ither more effectually, gratuitously 
 extends a gift to his descendants, undoubtedly it has a full right 
 to do so ; but punishment is necessarily, absolutely, and rigor- 
 ously of a personal character. It is so to such an extent, that 
 if the criminal is not in full possession of his faculties when he 
 commits the offence, society deems that its right of punishment 
 is removed. It takes precautions against his again repeating his 
 crime, shuts him up out of consideration for the general interest, 
 but commences by acquitting him of the charge. The word 
 criminal scarcely applies to him.- Further than this, if, after 
 having committed the crime in full knowledge of his intention, 
 and in perfect possession of his faculties, the accused is stricken 
 ^vith insanity before he appears in presence of the judges, it 
 seems as if the law, enlightened by philosophy, feels that it is 
 not entitled to inflict the appropriate punishment, and confines 
 itself to depriving him of the power of committing future mischief. 
 It is essential that the criminal should understand that he is 
 punished ; without this condition, justice changes its name, and 
 becomes barbarism. Finally, let us add, the death of the accused 
 puts an end to all proceedings.! During the dark ages, the dead 
 were sometimes prosecuted. A very mitigated remnant of this 
 custom is still to be found in a neighbouring nation. It may 
 seem reasonable, provided that it is restrained within certain 
 limits; for penalties have a double aim — to punish the criminal, 
 and to check the crime. The criminal is no longer amenable, 
 for he is dead ; but the sentence may be pronounced for the sake 
 of example. Nevertheless, the French law, founded upon philo- 
 sophy, has wisely decided that the death of the accused terminates 
 the indictment. It is most important to restrain evil natures, 
 
 * "There is neither fault nor crime if the accused was in a state of 
 insanity when the act was committed."— Penai Code {French), Art. Qi. 
 t Art. 2, Code of Criminal Instruction. 
 
204 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 but it is even more essential to impress upon all minds tlie true 
 character and object of punishment. Now, we cannot repeat too 
 often, that justice may truly retain its name, — the guilty ought to 
 be made to comprehend that he is punished. 
 
 This leads us to a few analogous reflections on reward. There 
 is a great difference between a gift and a recompence. I may 
 give to whom T please, when I please, and as much as I please. He 
 to whom I give has no right to my benefactions. In giving, I 
 exercise my own liberality ; I perform an act of pure good-will. 
 On the contrary, I can only reward merit, and he I reward has a 
 distinct right to what I assign to him. I do honour to myself, 
 without doubt, in rewarding generously, but simply because we 
 honour ourselves in doing justice. These are elementary prin- 
 ciples. It often happens that an institution destined to reward 
 merit becomes an object of traffic with courtiers, and that favour 
 replaces justice : this is because all human arrangements engender 
 abuse : the distinction accorded to intrigue mocks the name 
 of recompence. The appellation would change, if the truth 
 were known, and would then become disgrace. If sometimes 
 honours are hereditary, this is because there has been no other 
 adequate method found of sufficiently acknowledging the services 
 of the father ; and in this case, the distinction accorded to the 
 family is an additional reward conferred on their progenitor ; as 
 regards the son it is a favour, a benefit. In a word, the principle 
 of merit and demerit and the idea of reward and punishment are 
 necessarily inseparable. No one can be either punished or 
 rewarded without having deserved either the one or the other, 
 and also without the consciousness of having so deserved. This 
 applies with truth even to the public funeral decreed by the 
 state to a great hero. It gives him the glory, being no longer 
 able to confer the happiness. 
 
 This character is not exclusively peculiar to the rewards 
 and punishments distributed by human justice. We cannot 
 admit that God will punish us in another life if we have 
 not transgressed any of his laws ; or that he will treat us after 
 death as he will treat the virtuous, if we have violated our oaths, 
 outraged divine majesty, and preferred personal interest to duty. 
 This conviction adds to the weight of remorse, and mixes the 
 dread of future punishment with the consciousness of degradation. 
 We undoubtedly depreciate human nature too much if we believe 
 that it is solely influenced by the fear of chastisement or the hope 
 of recompense; but, without denying the strength of other motives, 
 
OF THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 205 
 
 these are amongst the most powerful ; and he who has been in 
 the habit of watching a death-bed will know that the thought of 
 futurity mingles either joy or bitterness with the agony of the 
 last sufferings. If at the moment when the expiring criminal is 
 tormented with anxiety at the thought of the God who awaits him, 
 he is told that future existence is a mere invention of philo- 
 sophers and priests, it is possible that he may derive consolation 
 from this hope of annihilation. But let us suppose that, instead 
 of an atheist, a believer in the metempsychosis approaches him 
 and says, " Your soul cannot perish ; it will live, and it will live in 
 misery ; but you will know nothing of the matter. Your memory 
 is about to cease, and your consciousness to be extinguished. 
 A new life is on the point of commencing in your substance 
 without any other community between you, beyond this identifica- 
 tion of inert m.atter." What distinction will the dying man 
 understand between these words and the promise of annihilation ? 
 Does he know what his substance will be when life is abstracted 
 from it ? He scarcely cares about his body, with which he is well 
 acquainted ; and he is supposed to feel regard for this substance 
 which can neither be seen, nor touched, nor felt; and which, sepa- 
 rated from the faculties it develops, is nothing more than a vain 
 and incomprehensible abstraction ! And what signifies to me a pain 
 or infliction that I am not aware of? Can I endure grief without 
 knowing it? Who will ever receive as serious, a threat joined to 
 such metaphysical subtleties ? 
 
 The same may be said of rewards. Let us remember Brutus 
 arrived at the last moment of his existence. He dies vanquished, 
 and seeing the triumph of Octavius Csesar, cries aloud, " virtue, 
 thou art only a name ! " This is a mere imprecation which 
 escaped him hastily, and history has too eagerly preserved. This 
 single sentence, if pronounced upon reflection, tarnishes a life of 
 devotion and sacrifice to duty. It was worthy of the soul of 
 Brutus to love virtue for itself without the hope of recompence. 
 The virtue which requires a salary changes its name, and ought to 
 be called worldly cleverness ; even when the prospect of payment 
 is remote, such virtue is little more than a protracted negotiation. 
 If the masters and martyrs of stoicism could have issued from the 
 grave and been present at the expiring moments of Brutus ; if 
 they had stood in his tent, one habited as a slave, another 
 carrying the instruments of torture by which he had been 
 mangled, they would have denied this false disciple, who believed 
 that he had lost his game because fortune ranged herself on the 
 
206 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 side of vice. Was it thus to estimate virtue that he had 
 embraced the stoical philosophy? Had Zeno promised to him 
 riches and dominion ? When virtue appeared to Brutus attended 
 by ruin and defeat, it was then that he was called upon to 
 worship her. By these august accompaniments she was to be 
 recognised. His dying words were unworthy of his life. 
 
 A Brutus might be required to love virtue for herself. Such 
 an effort could not be expected from vulgar minds. Future 
 rewards supply a powerful incentive for which we ought to thank 
 the bounty of God. Man requires this hope to nerve him for 
 life and death. What intelligent and sympathetic soul does not 
 feel and encounter martyrdoms within itself ? The most to be 
 lamented are not the martyrs who die heroically and whose 
 history commands our tears. There are calamities less visible, 
 daily sufferings, deceptions perpetually recurring, friendships 
 betrayed, affections repulsed, injuries sustained, shame and name- 
 less tortures which endure for sixty years, and fail even to obtain 
 the last of human consolations, pity ! 
 
 When a life has thus been dragged on from suffering to 
 suffering even until death, what recompence has God in store? 
 Annihilation ? He who has witnessed the struggle and the 
 inward victory, who knows the devotion to duty, and who has 
 estimated the price at which it has been achieved, when for sixty 
 years he has refused to this wounded spirit a single enjoyment, 
 a respite, a glimmer of light through the darkness, has he nothing 
 to say in consolation, at the moment when exhausted strength can 
 endure pain no longer, now when the worn-out body is ready to 
 resolve itself into dust ? In that moment, religion watches over 
 the bed of death, and murmurs in the ear of the dying sinner the 
 glorious promise of immortality. He has suffered hunger and 
 thirst, he has loved without being even understood, he has 
 invented great works which have been rejected with contempt, the 
 world has refused to acknowledge either his genius or his heart. 
 Tell him then of a father who is waiting for him beyond the grave, 
 of a father who has tried, but now rewards, and is ready to receive 
 him, worn with his long pilgrimage, broken, tortured and ex- 
 hausted in strength, but ready to be horn again for a new and 
 eternal life. Here are words which will make him smile in 
 the midst of all his agonies. Here is a just idea, and faithful 
 promises ; the true pillow on which to repose in the last sleep 
 of life. 
 
 But to disappear in God is really to die. To lose all con- 
 
OF THE DESTI^'Y OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 207 
 
 sciousiiess of identity, even in preserving substance, is, in fact, 
 anniliilation. It may be said that the high sounding phrase, 
 " to be absorbed in the bosom of God," is merely a metaphor, 
 and one which closely examined involves a contradiction and an 
 absurdity. Can a finite being become so blended with infinity, 
 that the two existences together form but one ? Is such an 
 union and identification possible even in this the sphere of 
 created beings ? Is it possible that this return into the bosom 
 of God of one of his creatures can add anything to the Divine 
 existence ? And if it adds nothing, what diffi:3rence is there 
 between this absorption and annihilation? If God is the only 
 substance, no particle of me can endure after my consciousness 
 is extinguished. If created beings possess identical substance, 
 what can be more monstrous than the supposition that these 
 contingent substances ever become absorbed in absolute substance; 
 and what more inconsistent than to call this death immortality, 
 or to propose such an annihilation of heart and thought as a re- 
 compence ? Pantheism may here be found, at the end, as we 
 have already discovered it at the beginning of such philosophy, and 
 equally devoid of proof, equally contradictory and cruel. Yes — 
 it is in truth a cruel doctrine which questions at the same time 
 the present and the future, which reduces this world to a 
 dream instead of a reality, and destroys man as soon as he 
 awakens. 
 
 The immortality on which we rest our faith is not then the 
 illusive perpetuation of substance which renders immortality 
 useless, and reward or punishment impossible, and which is 
 founded on nonsense and contradiction. It is, on the contrary, 
 the immortality of all that constitutes man, of his heart and mind; 
 in a word, the immortality of the individual being. At the 
 appointed time death casts his shadow over us, the world dis- 
 appears, and we find ourselves, whole and identical, beyond the 
 grave. What in this new world will be the punishment of the 
 guilty ■? and what the occupation of the just ? This question is 
 incessantly repeated, and philosophy is depreciated for not being 
 able to find a reply. It seems, sometimes, as if philosophy were 
 considered unavailing and worthless, because it fails to describe 
 exactly the state of the human soul after death. We forget tliat 
 it belongs to the necessities and conditions of human nature to 
 be unable to comprehend or describe anything beyond the lower 
 world. It is much that God has permitted us to afiirm and 
 
208 
 
 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 prove invisible reality. Even though we knew nothing of God, 
 beyond that he exists, or of futurity, beyond that it is certain, we 
 ought to consider ourselves happy, and value these two assurances 
 beyond all others. But we may go farther, although in a very 
 humble degree. 
 
 Let us lay aside altogether what concerns the specific punish- 
 ment of the guilty. They will be punished. This is all that we 
 are interested in, for this alone is necessary to the justification of 
 Providence ; the nature of the punishment is of secondary im- 
 portance.- We know that it will be proportioned to the crime, 
 for the judge is infallible. But we have no occasion here to 
 discuss matters unconnected with philosophy, and even in the 
 order of speculations, inaccessible to human intelligence : let us 
 separate those which apply to punishment, and confine ourselves 
 to the happiness of the just. 
 
 As we shall certainly rise again in our complete identity, the 
 souls of the just will preserve after death their three essential 
 faculties, sensibilit}^ intelligence, and will. But as they will be 
 delivered from the thraldom of the body, and the period of trial 
 will have terminated, they will no longer have to sustain a 
 struggle, and all their endowments will be applied directly to 
 that object, without being distracted by the sufferings and wants 
 of mortal existence. 
 
 Thus, our sensibility in this world is divided between the pure 
 and elevated conceptions derived from the idea of God, and the 
 more humble feelings which spring from our intercourse with the 
 body, and from the necessity of preserving, and associating with 
 material substance. But, with the majority of men, the body 
 assumes such a predominance, that it almost entirely engrosses 
 sensibility. As soon as the body awakens into life, images enter in 
 profusion through the eyes ; the ears are assailed by a thousand 
 confused sounds, the sense of smell is attracted by innumerable 
 odours; all other surrounding bodies press closely upon us, with 
 allurements of pleasure and menaces of pain ; within, hunger 
 enforces its claims, and compels us to devote an hour each day to 
 its alleviation ; scarcely has hunger disappeared when the nourish- 
 ment introduced into the stomach forces itself on our attention. 
 
 * In the absence of all religious authority npon the eternal duration of 
 punishments and rewards, philosophy ]iresents, at least, as an irrefutable 
 conjecture, an unlimited hope to the good, a terrible doubt to the Avicked.— 
 Thomas JJenry Martin^ On Future Life, Part II. chap. vii. p. 294. 
 
ON THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 209 
 
 Then follow cold and heat, with the necessity of mechanical 
 labour. In the midst of all this, what remains to impress on us 
 the thought of eternity, or to lead us to feel the delights of 
 divine love? Our time is entirely engrossed by the care of our 
 mortal destiny. Thus the body controls and degrades us, and 
 transforms us from masters, as we are by the superiority of our 
 nature, to the condition of dependents and slaves. The same 
 rule applies to our intelligence. Its object is truth ; its destiny 
 is to seek truth, its honour and greatness to know and appreciate 
 truth : but when the mind directs its attention to the true and 
 universal, the body compulsively draws off that attention, to 
 obtain, in consequence of some degrading necessity, the nourish- 
 ment it requires. Philosophy must give place to commerce. We 
 strain our faculties to the utmost to reconcile the interest of 
 Peter with that of Paul ; we study plants, not to admire the 
 wisdom of the Creator, but to discover whether they contain any 
 nutritive substance. This encumbering and exacting body 
 requires much; it must have meat and drink, clothing, heat, 
 shelter, and medicines. If all these are not furnished on demand, 
 the body rebels and gives itself up to extremes of passion which 
 terrify the soul. Even when the mind is able to concentrate 
 itself so as to attend to its natural avocation, science, the body 
 intrudes as an auxiliary. The mind can scarcely think without 
 its aid. As soon as intelligence wishes to study God in his 
 works, it must perforce trust to the evidence of eyes and ears. 
 It suffers all the inconvenience arising from the limited propor- 
 tions of the body, the horizon of which is necessarily narrow, and 
 from the weakness and inaccuracy of the organs which the least 
 exertion fatigues, which the slightest malady deranges, and which 
 even in a natural state supply only information which we cannot 
 control. In fine, our will becomes exhausted in some mecha- 
 nical work, and generally devotes itself to subjects ill studied and 
 examined. There are a great number of creatures made after the 
 image of God, capable of feeling all the charms of poetry, and of 
 comprehending the most lofty discoveries of science, who during 
 an entire life are occupied from morning until night in sawing a 
 beam lengthways, or in boring a hole through a mass of rough 
 stone with an iron hammer. Of what use is their intelligence in 
 this humble trade? It injures rather than helps them. An 
 automaton, a mechanical figure, would do the same work more 
 rapidly and with greater regularity. In actions which implicate 
 moral feeling, the body invariably interferes with its passions, 
 
210 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 and as invariably to incline us to the evil side. This is what 
 may properly be called, interest. Self-interest renders us unjust, 
 ungrateful, selfish, luxurious ; attaches us to trifles, and wastes 
 our energies in the accoraplishment of actions without permanent 
 result; actions which bring no strength to him who performs 
 them, and add nothing to the perfection of the system of which 
 we form a part. 
 
 Remove the body and everything is changed. All sensations 
 of physical pain and pleasure disappear, and leave the soul free 
 to indulge in the love of Him who is beauty in its very essence. 
 We shall thenceforward never look for grace or attraction in 
 terrestrial images ; divine beauty exercises its full and direct 
 influence upon us, that we may be filled with sweet and pure 
 intoxication. Our intelligence is no longer assailed by the im- 
 pressions of the senses which prevented it from discovering its 
 own nature and resources, or from studying God who is its star : 
 it yields itself up entirely to the contemplation of absolute omnipo- 
 tence. Here, in this world, the soul is too constantly diverted from 
 its course to be enabled to apply entirely to the proper subject of 
 knowledge, eternal truth ; it is necessary that it should banish 
 from thought, by an energetic effort, all the images and noisy 
 excitements of this world ; that it should examine facts, not to 
 become acquainted with them, but to penetrate the laws by which 
 they are governed ; that it should enter, by a full conception of 
 these laws, into the sphere of invisible realities, which are of all 
 realities the most solid ; that, having once mastered these laws, 
 it should compare them with each other, observe their analogies, 
 and condense them into a superior law, of which they are only 
 transformations ; that it should ascend thus, by logical degrees 
 from these multiplied and varied phenomena, to the all-powerful 
 unity which encloses the universe in a single system ; and, finally, 
 that springing upwards from the corruption of the world to the 
 idea of the Creator, it should obtain a glimpse, through the 
 dazzling clouds by which it is concealed, of the eternal and 
 immutal)le essence which has originated all existence and all 
 truth. Arrived thus, by dint of perseverance, at the summit of 
 knowledge, the spirit grapples, in a rapid moment, all the realities 
 of which it has dreamed before ; it forgets infirmity and misery 
 in the full possession of that which is, by pre-eminence, the object 
 of thought ; it seems as if time and space had vanished, and the 
 eternal liad manifested himself in all his glory. Then everything 
 becomes confused and effaced ; the heart calms down, science 
 
ON THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 211 
 
 once more takes possession of us with its inexorable rigour, the 
 expansive dream leaves us only a recollection, and we recommence 
 labour and research in the hope of enjoying a second ecstacy. 
 This moment, which has passed with the rapidity of lightning, 
 has given us a foretaste of celestial happiness.* " There shall 
 be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there 
 be any more pain."f The human heart, which has hitherto 
 loved so much, and so many various unworthy and frail objects, 
 will now devote its affection exclusively to God ; and the mind, 
 so much bewildered, so often led astray, divested of all doubt and 
 chimera, will think of God alone ; and our love and intelligence 
 having found the object which properly belongs to them, and 
 possessing it fully and directly, will fill us with all the happiness 
 that the nature of a finite being can receive and enjoy. The 
 divorce which in this world so often takes place between reason 
 and desire will cease, because we shall be absorbed entirely in a 
 single idea and a single love. Our liberty will be the more 
 complete, as we shall no longer recognise the strife of conflicting 
 passions. Our entire being, tranquillised and reconciled to itself, 
 will extend all its strength towards absolute Perfection, which is 
 at once the true, the beautiful, and the good — the triple and only 
 ideal of perfection, towards which, since the world began, our 
 hearts, intelligences, and desires aspire. Such is the future 
 which philosophy can promise to man, and founded on infallible 
 inductions. In the face of this definite conclusion, we no longer 
 understand those who reproach philosophy with the barren nature 
 of its promises. It may be said that these objectors cannot think 
 or imagine without including in their conceptions the body and 
 its necessities. Our ideal doctrines appear to them vague and 
 uncertain, solely because they are ideal ; and for this same reason 
 we consider them precise and clearly defined. We sum up our 
 expectations in the words of Bossuet : " In what will the future 
 life consist ? In serving God eternally, such as he truly is, and 
 in loving him for ever without the fear of losing him." | 
 
 Let me collect myself for a moment before I terminate these 
 
 * "God possesses perfect happiness, which we can only enjoy for a 
 moment. He possesses it always, which to ns is impossible. To enjoy, is with 
 him to act ; and this is why to watch, to think, and to feel, are the greatest 
 enjoyments man can experience : to these may be added, as a natural 
 consequence, to hope and remember." — Aristotle, Metaphysics, book xii. 
 chap. 7. 
 
 + Revelations xxi. 4. 
 
 + Catechism of Meaux. Second Part of the Christian Doctrine, Lesson xi. 
 
 p 2 
 
212 IMMORTALITY. 
 
 reflections on the life to come, for I am unwilling to dwell too long 
 upon this all-important subject, or to surround myself with too 
 much light. I return to thought, and ask how God can reward 
 the soul after its separation from the body ; and the more I 
 reflect, the more I feel convinced that the entire system of 
 morality demonstrates to me the future of man; and that it 
 is not by any immediate rule of conduct that I can judge 
 of the destiny that awaits me. Heaven may be found upon 
 this earth, lightening up with its divine brilliancy the heart 
 of every virtuous man. There is not an instant in which, 
 from the miserable dust in which I crawl, I cannot raise myself 
 to that lofty height, and claim possession in the name of intelli- 
 gence and liberty."^ All the passions which moral propriety 
 condemns, all the thoughts and actions which it proscribes, have 
 for their sole object the gratification of my appetites. All that 
 moral propriety approves, and all that it commands, bring me 
 back to God. It teaches me to love what is really beautiful, to 
 seek what is eternally true, and to employ my liberty so as to 
 illustrate by my actions the laws of justice. If the moral law 
 is right, and we cannot doubt this without folly and blasphemy, 
 what is happiness, if not the constant and willing accomplishment 
 of all its ordinances? If the faculty of love that I acknowledge 
 within me tends incessantly from this world towards God, who 
 includes in his divine nature all that is good and beautiful ; if my 
 spirit is urged on by an invincible impulse towards the same 
 omnipotent power, who is the source of existence and the sun of 
 intelligence ; if every act performed in opposition to justice is a 
 degradation, a diminution of my being, while the fulfilment of 
 duty elevates and strengthens me — it must then of necessity follow 
 that once liberated from the body, I live thenceforward only to love 
 God, to see him without a veil, and to unite myself without reserve 
 to his will.f My spirit requires nothing beyond this certainty. 
 It reposes more satisfactorily on this thought than in the hope 
 of those progressive advances towards perfection, which postpone 
 indefinitely the possession of the only good to which it aspires ; or, 
 than in the contemplation of those earthly pleasui'es which pagan 
 
 * FicUe, On the Destiny of Man, p. 309. 
 
 h ' ' Eternal life commenced, consists in knowing by faith ; eternal life con- 
 summated, consists in seeing face to face, and without veil. The knowledge 
 that Christ here speaks of is a tender and affectionate knowledge, which leads 
 
 to love Free and perfect knowledge is a source of love." — 
 
 Bosswt, Meditations upon the Gospel, Second Part. Thirty-seventh Day, 
 
ON THE DESTINY OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 213 
 
 religions accumulate in their paradise. Who can tell whether 
 tliis pretended necessity of rendering the idea of heaven more 
 precise, is not the desire of making it more material ? For all who 
 know and understand the nature and degrees of intelligence and 
 love, nothing is more clearly defined than these comprehensive 
 and consoling words ; "To see God face to face, and to love him 
 with all our hearts, for ever and ever." 
 
PART THE FOURTH. 
 
 / WORSHIP. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF PRAYER. 
 
 " For every one that asketh, receiveth ; and lie that seeketh, findeth ; and to 
 him that knocketh, it shall be opened." — St. Matthew, chap. vii. verse 8. 
 
 "But rather seek ye the kingdom of God; and all these things shall be 
 added unto you." — St. Luke, chap. xii. verse 31. 
 
 We now approach one of the most important points of natural 
 religion. There is an all-good and all-powerful God, who has 
 created and governs the world. He has placed us here to undergo 
 the trial of sorrow and sacrifice, and to prepare us for the happy 
 and eternal life which we are destined to enjoy beyond the grave. 
 These grand dogmas form the basis of natural religion : we know 
 our origin, our rule of conduct, and our end. The God by whose 
 omnipotent will we are created, has treated us like a father, since 
 we are made immortal, and free, and at the same time endowed 
 with love and intelligence. The period of trial we are doomed 
 to undergo is necessarily mingled with bitterness ; nevertheless 
 we are not abandoned to our own strength. All things are so 
 disposed, within and around us, that we are able to accomplish 
 our allotted task, if we undertake it with a resolute desire. At 
 the outset we know our contract with God, and we know also all 
 that we require to be acquainted with, of his nature, to love and 
 worship him. The gifts of affection and understanding are 
 unequally dispensed; but these are only distinctions in the 
 conditions of the trial to be endured : for we all possess, in the 
 necessary degree, a knowledge of the law, and the means whereby 
 
OF PRAYER. 215 
 
 it is to be fulfilled. Herein lies the only point of real im- 
 portance ; for the duration of this life, compared with the eternity 
 of the future, is not worthy of being taken into consideration. 
 Finally, whatever doubt may be attached to the miserable events 
 of the world, one thing we know to a certainty — the happiness 
 that awaits us hereafter, if we are faithful. We have only thus 
 to understand that it is our duty to bless the name of God, even 
 in our afflictions. 
 
 In the act of worship we recognise a just homage rendered by 
 the creature to his creator. Love and admiration, in common 
 with all human feeliugs, are not always legitimate; but they 
 cannot fail to be so, if their selected object is truly beautiful and 
 amiable ; and a well-regulated mind measures its attachment by 
 the perfections of the being adored. To love and admire thus, is 
 to walk in the right path, and to direct steadily the faculties of 
 the mind and heart to a lawful end. Such sentiments increase 
 instead of exhausting our strength. Deadness of soul, languor, 
 and discouragement are unknown to those happy spirits who 
 are attracted and retained by the truly good and beautiful. We 
 may say of them, that they possess something above humanity, 
 for they are gifted with the only earthly power which never 
 exhaij^ts itself, and the source of which augments as it flows. 
 But how can any created being be amiable, except in proportion 
 as he expresses less imperfectly than others the divine perfection ? 
 All that is good and lovely below God, can only be so by the 
 indirect reflection of his complete beauty. He alone concen- 
 trates the essence of the true, the beautiful, and the perfect. To 
 learn how to love him, above every other consideration, is the 
 greatest happiness of which we are capable. All our affections 
 must yield to this paramount feeling, which forms at once the 
 source and consecration of every human sentiment. 
 
 There is yet another cause beyond the perfections of God 
 which ought to incline our hearts to love him. He is our bene- 
 factor, our support, and our hope. We love the man who has 
 snatched us from peril, and he who has instructed us in our 
 duty; the mother who has nourished us with her milk, the father 
 who has watched over us with vigilant anxiety, and who during 
 one half of his life has laboured incessantly for our advantage. 
 How ardently then ought we to love God, who has given us life 
 itself, with all tliat renders life endurable and deliglitful ? We 
 ought to bless him for our creation, and for having gifted us with 
 an intelligence capable of knowing and loving our creator. Wo 
 
216 
 
 WORSHIP. 
 
 ought to adore him for the gift of freedom, and for having imposed 
 on us the salutary yoke of duty. It is not only ungrateful but 
 insane to acknowledge obligations to a fellow-creature, and to with- 
 hold them from the creator; for every advantage that we enjoy 
 proceeds from him. It is he who by his will or by his laws, 
 which express the human formula of his will, sustains and 
 protects the life that he has bestowed on us. We breathe, we 
 act, we think, under his guiding hand. We enjoy good through 
 his bounty ; we suffer evil by our own fault. He has so disposed 
 all things from the beginning, that we everywhere find the 
 remedy by the side of the mischief. He has not made us for 
 this earth, but for an invisible world, the delights of which we 
 are, as yet, incapable of comprehending. The objects to which 
 we attach our hopes can only yield in return transitory and 
 qualified happiness ; and often, instead of the gratification that we 
 anticipate, bring to us misery and disappointment. He alone is 
 our enduring and glorious hope : the bliss that he promises 
 has no parallel. We are sure to reach this if we are faithful ; 
 to be filled with it, for it surpasses all that we can dream of 
 on earth ; to obtain, with the certainty of preserving, for God 
 will never withdraw a gift which he has permitted us to win ; 
 and the same hand has given us, at the same time, liberty 
 and immortality. Either we must root out from the heart of 
 man every sentiment by which it is ennobled and purified, or we 
 must struggle to combine them all in one mingled feeling of love 
 and adoration for the Creator. 
 
 But wherein lies the necessity of showing that we ought to 
 love God ? We do not demonstrate this, we only recall it ; for 
 love is the foundation of worship, or, to speak more correctly, 
 worship is the love of God expressed in act.* Now, if it is just 
 and necessary to express legitimate love, it results from thence 
 that worship is an homage which man cannot refuse to the 
 Creator, f Undoubtedly, the best way of evincing the love and 
 gratitude vvith which God has inspired us, is to practise our pre- 
 scribed duties ; but we have many reasons for good conduct, and 
 when the desire of honouring God is included amongst them, we 
 
 * '*Nec colitur nisi amando." — St. August., Epistola cxl. Ad Honor. 
 cap. xviii. no. 45. 
 
 + "As soon as we believe that God alone is entitled to onr entire love, and 
 in consequence, that this love expands itself over our individual essence as 
 over every other limited good, according to its limits, then we shall find 
 religion entirely developed in om* hearts." — Fenelon, Second Letter oil Heligion, 
 chap. xvi. 4. 
 
OF PRATEK. 217 
 
 are bound to make this evident to our fellow-men by external 
 signs which cannot be mistaken. Let us consider ourselves in 
 the world, as children in the house of their father. Let us, at first, 
 testify our respect and gratitude by exemplary conduct and un- 
 reserved submission ; but, at the same time, let us not imagine 
 that all our duties are faithfully discharged, unless we seek and 
 embrace every opportunity of expressing our sentiments by action 
 and utterance. There are. many who question the necessity of 
 formal worship. God, they say, has no need of worship. This may 
 be true. But the perfection of God does not release man from 
 his duties. When our benefactor is placed so high above us that 
 we can do nothing for his glory or happiness, we are not the less 
 bound to express our gratitude. God loves the world, because he 
 has chosen to make it ; and he loves man with a preference of 
 affection, because he has created him intelligent and free. We shall 
 not inquire with Malebranche,* whether it is himself that he loves 
 in us ; for we are here considering only the result. Is it not 
 rash to affirm that he is indifferent to our worship and our love, 
 when we know that he rejoices in us, and loves us ? God had no 
 necessity for creating the world. It is both reasoning and acting 
 badly to seek a pretext for our own failings in the perfection of 
 the Divine essence. We can only speak with fear and hesitation 
 of the nature of God ; but we are called upon to express ourselves 
 with certainty when we deal with the obligations owing to him 
 by man. But what we chiefly propose to consider here, is, not 
 the right which God has to worship, but the necessity that we 
 feel of tendering our adoration. 
 
 This necessity is so powerful, that of itself it casts a degree 
 of public discredit on any school of philosophy which advocates 
 principles opposed to worship and prayer, We feel instinctively 
 that a system without God, or the God of which is deaf to us, 
 is a mere creation of the fancy. It refuses what we demand 
 above everything else. Very few minds devote themselves to the 
 study of metaphysics from an abstract love of truth, whatever 
 that truth may be. It is almost always some moral necessity 
 which draws the soul to philosophy. We wish to be re-assured, 
 sustained, consoled ; we desire to have an invisible world laid 
 open to our hopes, when we find in this life, nothing but oppression 
 and misery. We have no right to complain of this character of 
 
 * Holy Scripture says also, "The Lord hath made all things for himself." 
 Proverbs, xvi. 4. 
 
218 WORSHIP. 
 
 philosophy, and to cry out that knowledge is not built upon 
 passion or feeling. That which is true of all other sciences can- 
 not apply to the exclusive study of man. Here there is no 
 possible abstraction, and the question involves our entire existence. 
 The necessities of the heart are not less real or legitimate than 
 those of the understanding. Passion ought not to be more foreign 
 to the philosophy than to the history of human nature. 
 
 There are certain minds controlled, as it were, by a ruling 
 necessity of placing themselves in direct communication with 
 God, and of expressing the sentiments of love and adoration 
 which they bear towards him. Souls imbued with this mystical 
 ardour give vent to their sensations through very different 
 channels, according to the gifts with which they are endowed. 
 Some intrench themselves in inward meditation, and become 
 estranged from, and almost indifferent to, the world : others 
 indulge in a sort of fury against this terrestrial life, and all who 
 are attached to it. Their penitential austerities terrify the 
 vulgar, who cannot comprehend (do they comprehend it them- 
 selves?) that this inveterate war against creation is nothing more 
 than an enthusiastic homage rendered to the Creator. In some 
 instances the soul becomes at the same time mystical and 
 expansive, and this particular disposition produces poets and 
 devotees. These dispositions are rare, although less so than 
 may be imagined ; but there are hosts of religiously disposed 
 minds who, without being carried away by enthusiastic love, feel 
 a sort of attraction towards worship, and would find themselves 
 isolated, disinherited, and miserable in this world if they could 
 not pray incessantly, and at all times associate God with their 
 fears and wishes. It has been remarked long since, and with 
 truth, that the most unbelieving spirits cannot escape as much as 
 they hope (strange hope !) from the experience of religious senti- 
 ment. They follow their usual course in the current of affairs, 
 as long as settled habits sustain and occupy them ; but if any 
 extraordinary event deranges their position, and drives them 
 towards the new or unknown, if especially, calamity falls upon 
 them, a name which they think they have forgotten rises involun- 
 tarily to their lips. If not a positive hope, it takes the form of a 
 regret, and that alone amounts to a prayer. 
 
 A poet has said in a verse which has become celebrated : "If 
 there were no God, we should be obliged to invent one.* " 
 
 * "Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait rinventer." — Voltaire. 
 
OF PRAYER. 
 
 219 
 
 He is mistaken ; we are never permitted to announce or to 
 propagate an error. But Voltaire would have been in the right 
 if he had said, If God existed not, the heart of man would be an 
 enigma, for the heart absolutely requires God, and is compelled 
 to hope and believe in him. 
 
 It is in vain for reason to demonstrate to us that if we follow 
 her precepts, life will become more endurable ; a portion of evil 
 will always remain which we can neither explain nor bear without 
 having recourse to the invisible world. The maxims of the stoics 
 seduce a few, but they govern a section almost imperceptible. 
 Of all paradoxes, the most difficult to establish is that which 
 denies the existence of pain. 
 
 Man is naked and defenceless; his intelligence procures him 
 shelter and nourishment, while at the same time it protects him 
 from the attacks of wild animals and his own species. But if he 
 were reduced to the savage state he would cease to be himself, he 
 would be no longer man. In civilised life, which augments his 
 necessities while it elevates his desires, he is compelled to be 
 equal to his own wants. An appalling proportion of human beings 
 are deficient in intellectual cultivation ; many suffer from cold and 
 hunger; sometimes the latter privations are doubled by the 
 proximity of luxury. Poets and philosophers remark emphatically 
 on this, that money does not constitute happiness. A convenient 
 theory for those who repeat it in the midst of all the enjoyments of 
 life. No : undoubtedly money does not comprise happiness ; but in 
 civilised society the absence of money creates positive misery. If it 
 be asserted that there are greater evils, or that this privation must 
 be endured rather than that the immortal soul should be defiled, 
 so far all is just and true ; but this admission does not prevent 
 us from feeling that it is fearful not to possess the common 
 necessaries of life for ourselves and those that belong to us. 
 There is an axiom, which we sometimes have repeated, equally 
 repulsive to those who have suffered themselves, and who have 
 witnessed the sufferings of others. *' No one," they say, "dies 
 of hunger." This is either a mistake or a falsehood. People 
 die of starvation in a ditch in the fields, or in town before the 
 window of a baker s shop. Many, amongst those who are not 
 absolutely starved, die from insufficient or unwholesome food ; or 
 from having earned their pittance of bread in an unhealthy toil ; 
 or sink under illness for want of remedies or rest. 
 
 We all agree in eulogising labour, and in declaring that it 
 strencjthens and consoles : but there is such a thing as labour 
 
220 WOESHIP. 
 
 multiplied upon labour. If the reader has ever been led by curiosit}' 
 to descend into the catacombs of Paris, where you walk between 
 four stone walls so narrow and low that you can touch them on 
 every side, and where you may advance for a league without 
 feeling anything but that description of sepulchre through which 
 you travel without change of situation ; where you can scarcely 
 breathe for want of air ; where the soul is weighed down by the 
 sensation of that thick crust of rock and earth under which you 
 are buried, — you may chance to have encountered an isolated 
 workman, dragging along with slow steps, and by the light of 
 a miserable candle, a wheelbarrow loaded with unhewn stones. 
 He has been there from the earliest dawn to dusli, and he must 
 return again to-morrow. Does he earn enough by this labour to 
 keep his children from hunger and cold ? 
 
 Of all the feelings that bind us to the world, the strongest is 
 paternal love. It increases every day, even when we believe it 
 has reached a point beyond which there is no augmentation. The 
 parent bears every thing for the child ; toil, solitude, want of 
 clothing, and want of food. He braves death under every form ; 
 wounded or dying, he forgets his own agony to supply some 
 little comfort to that dear life which soon will lose his frail 
 support. This love without limit is the last sensation which the 
 heart retains. We can comprehend that the world w^ould be a 
 desert to the father if that eye were closed, if that smile were 
 quenched in death. Yet nature breaks the tie. She casts the 
 opening life into the grave, and condemns the parent to survive. 
 
 These catastrophes are not universal, yet the catalogue is a 
 long one ! Every hour that we live brings with it the chance of a 
 disaster. There is a misfortune yet greater than closing the eyes 
 of a son — that of beholding him a criminal. Imagination would 
 tire before we could exhaust the list of human calamities. 
 
 Even our tenderest affections, love and friendship, have their 
 peculiar sting. If we are not betrayed, we are depreciated. Our 
 best intentions are misrepresented as crimes. At every instant 
 we are wounded in our tastes, in our most delicate perceptions, 
 in our most anxious scruples. We devote ourselves for our 
 country, and we are repaid by imprisonment or exile. We can- 
 not even carry with us the reputation of honest citizens : the 
 calumnies of the conqueror pursue us without shame or remorse, 
 even in the miseries to which he has consigned us. We are con- 
 sidered by our own party as little better than unskilful or 
 ambitious dupes. We think that we have sacrificed ourselves 
 
OF PRAYER. 
 
 221 
 
 for a principle, and at last, as if by chance, an objection starts up 
 until then unperceived. Suddenly the entire edifice falls, carry- 
 ing away all the fruits of our toil, all our long devotion and 
 sacrifices, and our hearts and our lives have no longer a resource 
 to cling to. Genius itself has sometimes proved a fatal gift ; not 
 alone to Columbus, who purchased glory by misfortune, but to 
 a legion of others, who have perished in their labours, unknown, 
 insulted, and trampled under foot, and sometimes even deprived 
 of the consolation of knowing their own strength. 
 
 What resource have we against so many evils ? Glory ? Let us 
 not adopt this mistaken flattery. Glory follows success, and is 
 nothing more than a time-serving courtier. It belongs to the 
 Alexanders and Caesars, those crowned executioners, who would 
 have been consigned to the gibbet by the police of all nations if 
 they had exercised their talents on the highway. With a few 
 more battalions, Cartouche would have been a worthy associate. 
 The empty bubble of glory is not worth feeding on by anticipation. 
 The pleasure of being inscribed after death in the records of 
 memorable deeds, and of furnishing a subject for oratorical display, 
 is a poor compensation for the mortifications and iniquities of an 
 entire life I There is but one true power, the sentiment of virtue ; 
 but where is the soul to which it suffices ? Such an exception is 
 to be met with, for the true exaltation of humanity, from age to 
 age ; but let us not attempt to measure men by the standard of 
 heroes ! 
 
 What then are we to do? To what are we to attach ourselves? 
 To whom are we to have recourse when the world has failed us ? 
 Where are we to address our sighs upon the brink of the grave ? 
 In whom are we to trust when our love is repulsed, our virtue 
 calumniated, and our honour tarnished ? Towards whom are we 
 to lift our cries against the pitiless disdain, against the closed 
 hearts which reject the offered sacrifice? Something within 
 inspires us to raise our eyes to heaven, and to call God to our 
 aid. This is why so many men unacquainted with science listen 
 eagerly to those who speak to them of the future. It is that they 
 may adore and supplicate, that such a multitude of souls dis- 
 inherited in this world, dream of the invisible universe, even when 
 the lights of philosophy are denied to them. If our nature is 
 made to suffer, it is also made to pour out our sufferings to God, 
 and to find in that complaint a solace and an encouragement. 
 Prayer softens, or rather destroys, solitude; from the moment 
 when the world abandons and flies us, we find ourselves once more 
 
222 WORSHIP. 
 
 in presence of the only friend who never deceives, of him whose 
 name is Justice. 
 
 Prayer is not only a resource under calamity, but a preservative 
 against crime. A man yields himself up to the influence of 
 passion : instead of remembering the lessons he has acquired in 
 youth, he dreams of nothing but pleasure and interest. The 
 violence of the sensations he has stirred up within himself pro- 
 duces such a tumult in his soul, that he is lost to every thing 
 else. He applies the utmost resources of his intelligence to the 
 gratification of his appetites, and while he satiates them, he 
 dreams only of the means by which they can be revived, to be 
 again glutted with enjoyment. In this utter subordination of his 
 entire being to pleasure, and the search after pleasure, he loses 
 his perception of what is beautiful and just; his will, incessantly 
 drawn in one direction, loses its active powers and becomes 
 incapable of resistance. His reasoning faculty, badly cultivated, 
 supplied through deteriorated organs, full of disgraceful sophisms, 
 weakened, and misled, can no longer distinguish or follow truth ; 
 all that it retains of strength is employed in the indulgence of 
 ignoble appetites, and perhaps, at last, sinks even below the level 
 of animal instinct. Thus falls from day to day this noble creature, 
 made to reign over creation and over himself, when, instead of 
 turning towards heaven, and commencing the life of the future 
 upon earth, he takes the world for his all, attaches to it his 
 concentrated power, and glories in the oblivion of everything else. 
 What can draw him back from these abysses in which he revolves? 
 Perhaps a sign alone was wanting which might once more recal 
 God to his thoughts. This single idea would have assisted 
 him to conquer himself. The name brings with it an accom- 
 panying train of all that is grand and noble. It signifies virtue 
 and truth. It affords a union of all the pleasures which the soul 
 desires, and compared with which the rest are as nothing. It is 
 a light which exhibits the rottenness of the evil passions under its 
 real aspect. However debased a mind may be, there is somewhere 
 within a collection of touching and revivifying remembrances 
 which the mighty name of God once more awakens. Every 
 physician of the soul knows that the cure is possible from the 
 moment when the patient can be induced to pray. Thus, whether 
 as a consolation or a remedy, prayer occupies an important place in 
 human life. We shall not inquire, with the philosophers of the 
 seventeenth century, whether a nation of atheists could possibly 
 exist; we shall content ourselves with saying, that the religious 
 
OF PEAYER. 223 
 
 sentiment is the most powerful of all social ties. It need not be 
 argued that the family bond is more influential, for filial piety is 
 but a form of religion. It is the thought of God which completes 
 the sanctification of the domestic hearth, that hallowed centre of 
 every tender and social affection. Take that thought entirely 
 away from any associated people, and they are no longer united 
 as a nation except by interest and fear. The civil law, in their 
 estimation, is nothing but a social contract, by which they give on 
 the condition of receiving. But if they give always, and receive 
 nothing in return, they become dupes with their eyes open. 
 That which is pompously denominated the sentiment of fraternity, 
 or the religion of patriotism, ceases to have any signification. 
 Citizens are merely associates, but not brethren. Never will 
 devotion or self-sacrifice find a place in a state so constructed ; 
 never will this compact, founded on such a basis, be regarded as 
 indissoluble by any one who sustains injury from it. If we wish 
 to create one consolidated family, possessing moral unity, tradi- 
 tion, and honour ; all the members of which are to consider them- 
 selves bound by mutual responsibility; whose laws are understood 
 and respected, even when they punish; it is indispensable that the 
 name of country should call up religious ideas, that every citizen 
 should believe himself bound to his native land by divine dis- 
 pensation ; that the transmission of a moral code from father to 
 son should establish a relationship between all who tread the 
 same soil, and speak the same language ; that the laws should 
 rest, not on the balance of interests, but on the eternal perception 
 of justice ; and that in token of this origin, they should be 
 promulgated in the name of God. 
 
 But can a form of worship, whatever may be its nature, or even 
 a prayer, which is the simplest act of worship, be reconciled with 
 such a providence as we have described ? If we could figure to 
 ourselves God as a father incessantly occupied with the happiness 
 of each of his children, enjoying their pleasures, and participating 
 in their troubles, attentive to their daily wants, and modifying 
 general laws to meet their necessities, capable of being moved by 
 a fervent entreaty, and of granting to a persevering solicitation, a 
 boon, which, in his plans and wisdom, he had intended to refuse, — 
 prayer would then be at the same time possible, useful, and effi- 
 cacious. But in this touching picture of divine solicitude there are 
 features which exceed the truth. They only bring God towards 
 us, on the condition of degrading him. When we consider his 
 perfection, it becomes impossible to admit that he can change any 
 
224 
 
 WORSHIP. 
 
 thing he has once determined ; and that such a change should be 
 caused by the intercession of a being so frivolous and improvident 
 as man. It is in vain to seek an outlet from this conclusion, for 
 if God modifies his own will, he ceases to be immutable ; he is 
 not always equal and like to himself ; he falls, as we do, within 
 the action of movement and time, and infinity escapes from his 
 nature. The resolution which God had formed was the best that 
 he could adopt ; in allowing himself to change it, he does less 
 than the best : he diminishes himself twice over, in forming a 
 bad resolution, and in doing so through weakness. To escape 
 from these consequences, we must suppose, on the contrary, that 
 it is we who improve the designs of God, and enlighten him upon 
 what is good. None of these hypotheses can hold ground ; we 
 blush to express, and we feel pain while we listen to them. This 
 God, so good in appearance, is but an imperfect artisan, whose 
 works require to be continually repaired, and who must, of neces- 
 sity, mend them badly if he listens to all our unreasonable and 
 contradictory prayers. It is futile to say that he only yields to 
 our supplications when they are reasonable : this is mere waste of 
 words, for they can only be reasonable when they conform to his 
 will, which amounts to saying that he never hstens to them at all.* 
 
 Thus, God is immutable. He never varies his designs, and 
 our prayers have no power to alter them. We find ourselves 
 placed between two truths, which appear to contradict each other: 
 the first, that prayer with us is a duty and a necessity ; the 
 second, that it is useless, impotent, and impossible. 
 
 The contradiction is more apparent than real. The facts 
 resulting from it, so far from inducing us to renounce prayer, 
 enlighten us as to the true character of worship. 
 
 In the first place, prayer is not absolutely demanded ; it may 
 and can be frequently an act of thanksgiving. In this sense, all 
 difficulty disappears. We are bound to thank God for the good 
 that we enjoy, since all is derived from his bounty and benevo- 
 lence ; and we are also bound, if we are wise, to thank him even 
 for preserving the laws of nature, for this regularity forms the 
 essential condition of universal order. To pray, is, above all 
 things, to adore. The first object of worship is the glory of God ; 
 the necessities of man occupy but a secondary position. We 
 should not be the less enjoined to prayer, even though we were 
 certain that our prayers would produce no beneficial result. 
 
 Prayer, besides, is efficacious in itself without the intervention 
 
 * See Note at the end. 
 
OF PRATER. 226 
 
 of God. What is praying but to think of God, of his glory, hi? 
 goodness, and his perfection ? Can we conceive and express 
 thoughts like these, without finding ourselves bettered and sanc- 
 tified by their presence in the soul, without feeling an impulse 
 of love towards him who is the object of our tidoration, without 
 entertaining a disgust for every degrading passion, and for every 
 propensity unsanctioned by justice ? Let us then thank God, 
 not for yielding to our prayers, but for having permitted us to 
 pray.* 
 
 Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that prayer is not 
 solely an act of thanksgiving, or a sanctifying aspiration in itself. 
 It often becomes a supplication ; and, perhaps we may be per- 
 mitted to say, that the most perfect form of prayer is that which 
 combines both characters. Now, when prayer comprises a request, 
 it seems difficult to reconcile this with divine immutability ; for, 
 on the one hand, we ask to obtain ; and, on the other, God never 
 changes his decrees. To disentangle this contradiction, let us 
 first, before we dwell on the immutability of God, inquire what 
 we can demand from him. Undoubtedly nothing that is wrong, 
 for it would offend his all-perfect nature even to conceive a desire 
 contrary to virtue. Neither can we address him with frivolous 
 applications. We cannot say, "Command this pear to ripen; " 
 or, '* Grant that I may gain this lawsuit." We are not allowed 
 to require of God what we should blush to ask of a friend. Even 
 though the matter involved our whole fortune, is it consistent with 
 the feeling of a religious mind, only to appear before the Creator 
 to make him a confidant in a question of avarice ? To the struggles 
 excited by covetousness, God is indifferent; or if he interferes, it 
 is only to aid courage and perseverance. It is therefore by work, 
 and not by wishes or vows, that we can hope to succeed. In running 
 across a plain, suddenly the ground gives way, and I am thrown 
 down. " Save me, my God ! " is the cry which nature inspires 
 me to utter. But how will God save me ? By a miracle, in 
 suspending the action of the laws of gravity ? No — such an 
 expectation never crosses my mind. I implore God to find me 
 some protecting stay, instead of allowing me to sink into the 
 abyss. But this branch or support is there, in the very direction 
 of my body. If it were so placed before I uttered my prayer, I 
 have prayed needlessly ; if it were not, and God has placed it at 
 the moment, the miracle is not less surprising than would be a 
 
 * * ' Blessed be God, whicli liatli not turned away my prayer, nor his mercy 
 from me." — Psalm Ixvi. 20. 
 
226 WORSHIP. 
 
 suspension of the laws of gravity. Thus, my prayer, seriously 
 addressed, becomes the formal demand of a miracle."^ In reality, 
 it is but the unreflecting instinct of a weak being, who feels that 
 he is about to perish, and invokes the God from whom he derives 
 his existence. If we were always sensible of what we do when we 
 pray, we should not so readily ask for miracles, neither should 
 we request them, to obtain another day upon earth of absence 
 from God. 
 
 During infancy, we depend on those who surround us for all 
 our bodily wants; then, we are allowed to ask; but as the mind 
 and the arm acquire strength, we rise to the dignity of labourers, 
 and achieve the great symbol of liberty, personal independence. 
 From that moment, it becomes our duty and pride to support 
 ourselves ; to earn our daily bread by the sweat of the brow ; to 
 repel danger by resistance, and to stand forth in the light, 
 assuming our proper position by energy and capacity. If, in our 
 turn, we have children to protect, our labour and responsibility 
 increase, and our importance augments with these obligations. 
 There can be no finer spectacle than that of the father of a 
 family, who understands his task, and executes it faithfully. He 
 indulges in no repose but when absolutely necessary ; he selects 
 or submits to his work, and gives himself up to it with all his 
 strength ; he applies his resources of body and mind to the 
 government, education, and protection of his young family. If 
 the produce of his exertion is insufficient, the first portion 
 retrenched is that of the father. This belongs to his position. 
 If misfortune visits them, despite his perseverance and economy, 
 it is he who first perceives, and long conceals the danger, who 
 struggles against it in secret, and who finally discloses it with 
 reluctance, and sets the example of resignation. His necessities 
 must be repeatedly demonstrated to him, before he makes up his 
 mind to borrow, for to borrow is to live on the wages of another, 
 to profit by another's labour. Such is the law and lot of man. 
 It is not pride which teaches him to rely exclusively on his own 
 
 * '* I converse with him, I allow all my faculties to be penetrated with his 
 divine essence, I am moved by his benefits, I bless him for his gifts, but I do 
 not pray to him. What should I require ? That he should change especially 
 for me the order of existence ? That he should operate miracles in my favour ? 
 I, who ought to love above all things the system established by his wisdom, 
 and maintained by his providence, do I desire that this system should be 
 deranged for me ? No — such an audacious wish would deserve to be punished 
 rather than granted." — /. /. Rousseau, Profession of Faith of the Savoyard 
 Curate. 
 
OF PRAYER. 227 
 
 efforts ; it is a mingled sense of duty and justice. What he is in 
 the midst of his equals he ought to be before God ; laborious, 
 persevering, resigned ; enjoying good fortune with moderation, 
 and enduring evil with courage. 
 
 But if we are not to implore Heaven either in pain or trouble, 
 for what can we legitimately pray ? We may ask for strength, 
 resignation, and virtue, for the benefit of the soul, rather than for 
 the advantage of the body ; for what is our destiny rather than 
 for what belongs to our probation. Such is the only true and 
 lawful prayer.* We ought not to say, "0 God, make my corn 
 to grow," but, " Give me strength to sow," or rather, " Console me 
 if I have gathered no harvest." We should not exclaim, " Grant 
 that I may win my lawsuit," but, "Let the suit be gained by him 
 who has justice on his side, and if I am to lose, let me bear the 
 disappointment with the fortitude of a man."f 
 
 This is the description of prayer we are now speaking of, and as 
 in reality it amounts to no more than a firm desire to do what is 
 right, and an aspiration towards God, there is nothing in this 
 which is not perfectly reconcilable to divine immutability. 
 
 Malebranche, at the same time a philosopher and a priest, 
 incapable in his latter capacity of renouncing prayer, and 
 equally prevented as a philosopher from impugning the immuta- 
 bility of God, supposes, that by an eternal decree, the Creator has 
 willed that grace should be extended to all who invoke him with 
 fervour and sincerity. Thus, pardon is, as it were, prepared for 
 us when w^e implore it, without the necessity or the intervention 
 of any temporary act on the part of omnipotence. J This is an 
 ingenious hypothesis, against which Malebranche sees no serious 
 objection, and which suffices to render prayer an actual demand. 
 
 * Kant goes so far as to consider prayer in the light of superstition, when it 
 is elaborated into formal expressions. "Because," he sa3's, "Grod requires 
 no explanation of the desires conceived within us." — On Religion, conclusion 
 of part iv. But if prayer is only an aspiration towards God, and towards Ixim 
 who is the source of all good, it may, according to Kant, be found effectual, 
 or rather, it may produce a moral amendment, and consequently may be 
 admitted by natural religion. The analogy between this doctrine and that of 
 Malebranche is very striking, particularly if we note the difference of origin 
 between the two schools of philosophy, and between the characters of the 
 professors. 
 
 t " Mighty Jupiter, give us all true benefits, whether we ask them or not ; 
 and remove from us all evils, even when we blindly demand them." — Plato, 
 Second Alcibiad,, translation of V. Cousin, vol. v. p. 188. 
 
 X "Whether we cultivate the ground or leave it barren, it rains neither 
 more nor less. The rain falls as usual, in compliance with the general laws of 
 natiu'c, by which God preserves the universe. In like manner, the distribution 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 WORSHIP. 
 
 It appears, at the first glance, that a pre-existing law which ap- 
 plies itself necessarily when the occasion is offered, cannot respond 
 to that desire for direct, intimate, and personal communication, 
 which is essential to prayer ; but when we figure to ourselves the 
 eternal decrees of God under the form of an abstract law, we for- 
 get that the past, the present, and the future exist only in our 
 own beings and imaginations, and that God being eternal, his 
 nature embraces neither past, nor present, nor future. We say 
 that his decrees precede, accompany, and follow our actions, 
 because we express ourselves in human language, and think with 
 human intelligence : but while we submit to this necessity, we feel 
 that it misleads us. 
 
 We read in a celebrated treatise attributed to Jamblichus, that 
 prayer does not act directly upon God, for the finite cannot act 
 upon the infinite ; but that the grace of God acting according to 
 general laws and with infinite power, invariably tends to manifest 
 itself whenever it encounters no obstacle ; and directly so in us 
 without any particular act of the Deity, as soon as we have placed 
 ourselves in a fitting state to receive it through the medium of 
 prayer."^' 
 
 These are undoubtedly the opinions and language of a Christian, 
 and are almost entirely in accordance with Malebranche. 
 
 In conclusion, it is not devoid of interest to retrace the origin 
 of these different hypotheses in the theory by which Aristotle 
 endeavours to explain the relations between eternity and time, or, 
 which amounts to the same thing, of the immutable with the 
 changeable. God, he says, is immovable ; therefore he does not 
 act upon the world to move it. At the same time the world is 
 movable, but cannot move of its own will, neither can it have 
 any other cause for its movement but the immovable God. 
 Now, how can a being, without moving itself, become the cause 
 of motion ? By acting as a final cause.f For instance, when a 
 general directs a movement to be executed by his army, and 
 places a standard upon a given point while he orders his soldiers 
 to rally round it, every man fixes his eyes upon this immovable 
 signal, and knows, while he looks upon it, on what spot he is to 
 take post : or again, when a mariner finds himself in open sea, 
 far distant from any shore, he selects a particular star towards 
 which he guides his vessel. God is the star which serves indif- 
 
 of pardon or favour is not regulated by our natural merits." — Ninth Discourse 
 on Metaphysics, sect. 12. 
 
 * Jamblichus, Treatise on Mysteries, part i. chap. xii. 
 
 t Aristotle, Metaphysics, book xii. chap. vii. 
 
OF PRAYER. 
 
 229 
 
 ferently as a Pharos for the world and for man, and universal 
 harmony results from this movement towards a single point 
 of light. 
 
 There is something dazzling in these three hypotheses ; 
 hut when we examine them closely, we discover that they fail 
 in the proof of what they are intended to demonstrate. They 
 even estahlish more firmly the immutahility and, we may 
 almost say, the indifference of God. It is only hy a palpable 
 equivocation that Aristotle can speak of Providence after having 
 demonstrated that God takes no thought of the world. Jamblichus 
 and Malebranche himself, who desired to establish between God 
 and man the same reciprocation of demands and benefits which 
 exist between a father and son, are compelled to say that pardon is 
 prepared for all by a general will, in virtue of which it is univer- 
 sally diffused without any individual act of God. What can we 
 say more? And what does Malebranche gain for his hypothesis, 
 beyond the power of expressing himself like the million while 
 thinking as a philosopher. No ; let us try as we may, it is impos- 
 sible to draw God from his immutability, and his eternity. 
 The best of all prayers is the love of God. To love him, and to love 
 and wish for what is good, form the true essence of worship. 
 *' There are few indeed," exclaims Fenelon, " who pray ; for 
 where are they who desire what is truly good in their hearts ? " ^^ 
 
 Let us then be assured that prayer and worship constitute an 
 important duty ; and that by improving the mind, by elevating 
 the soul towards God, by bringing before us under an animated 
 and striking semblance the other duties we are called upon to 
 perform, they serve to render labour agreeable, and to encourage 
 resignation and hope. 
 
 Prayer, then, understood and explained, has nothing in common 
 with superstition. It is healthy and strengthening; it encourages 
 exertion, and inspires a detestation of sloth; it glorifies God 
 without debasing man. It substitutes no empty ceremonies for 
 solid virtue. Far from disturbing and enfeebling reason, it adds 
 to it light and life by bringing it back to its origin. It is the tie 
 which binds man to man, and connects us earth with Heaven. f 
 
 * Manual of Piety, ''Opinion on VrtiyeTy §2. , i, ,,,• 
 
 t "God desires that men should love one another, that they should live 
 together like brothers in the same family, and like the children of one father. 
 They are, therefore, bound to mutual improvement, instruction, correction, 
 exhortation, and encouragement ; they are called upon to join in praise of the 
 common father of all, and to love him with all their hearts."— i^c?t€^o?i, Third 
 Letter on Religion. 
 
230 
 
 WORSHIP. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY IN MODERN 
 SOCIETY. 
 
 " A religion may be natural although it has been revealed ; it is sufficient 
 that men can understand it by the sole exercise of their reason." — Kant, On 
 Religion toithin the Limits of Reason, j^art iv. chap. i. 
 
 To estimate correctly the influence of religious philosophy in 
 modern society, and to foresee how it may operate in future, we 
 shall commence by comparing natural with positive religion. Let 
 us take the argument from the beginning, and compare dogmas 
 in the first instance, that we may be able afterwards to examine 
 rules and their influences with more precision and authority. 
 
 A positive religion is a combination of revealed tenets and 
 precepts. Natural religion is the union of the moral and religious 
 doctrines which philosophy can establish by observation and 
 reasoning. Thus, God himself teaches us the truths of positive 
 religion ; while man, on his own risk and responsibility, endea- 
 vours to discover the facts of natural religion.* 
 
 The first distinction which arises from this double origin, is, 
 that philosophy is compelled to prove all its dogmas separately, 
 while in positive religion it sufiices to show that revelation has 
 taken place, and that the doctrine offered for belief is really therein 
 contained. 
 
 For example, if philosophy undertakes to demonstrate Pro- 
 vidence, it must establish as a preliminary, that God is good, 
 intelligent, and omnipotent; it must show how inconsistent it 
 would be with the goodness of God to abandon men after having 
 created them, and by an inductive process it must conclude by 
 convincing itself and others, that God actually governs the 
 destiny of the world. 
 
 But the minister of positive religion has no occasion to appeal 
 to any of these arguments. As soon as he has proved the 
 existence of revelation and the authenticity of the books in which 
 its history is contained, he has only to show that the doctrine of 
 Providence is taught by these authorities. The sacred text 
 stands in the place of proof, and every mind is required to 
 acknowledge its entire sufficiency. If to assist faith, the minister 
 
 * Kant, On Religion within the Limits of Reason, part iii. chap. v. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 231 
 
 undertakes to explain, to develop, and to demonstrate Providence, 
 he does so as a philosopher, not as a priest : he joins the authority 
 of scientific argument to religion ; but he brings forward these 
 corroborative evidences merely to give additional weight ; for as 
 revelation comes directly from God, it is essentially above demon- 
 stration and philosophical discussion. Even though the dogma 
 were improbable, and contrary to the lights of reason and philo- 
 sophy, still it must be received with implicit faith, it revealed ; 
 for human intelligence can never be permitted to oppose the word 
 of God. Thus, religion rests upon authority, and philosophy 
 upon argument.* . . 
 
 He who refuses to admit purely and simply, without restriction 
 or reserve, every tenet comprised in revelation, places himself 
 without the pale of religious faith. On the other hand, all who 
 honestly search after truth are philosophers, whatever may be the 
 particular doctrines they follow ; for the sovereignty of reason 
 once admitted, there can be no other rule than to acknowledge 
 what appears to be true, to examine what seems to be doubtful, 
 and to reject what is palpably false. 
 
 A minister of religion who receives any one into his communion 
 without requiring implicit adhesion to all revealed truths, has 
 mistaken the nature of his mission. He is no longer a priest, 
 but a philosopher. A philosopher who denies to others the 
 imprescriptible rights of free judgment, ceases to be a philosopher; 
 he becomes a poet, a dreamer, a visionary. It belongs to the 
 essence of religion to be exclusive, and to the nature of philosophy 
 to be comprehensive. 
 
 In certain ancient schools of philosophy, which had not then 
 acquired a full understanding of the science they undertook to 
 teach, while they affected in many respects the form of religion 
 this axiom was professed: "The master has said it In all 
 churches the master is the infallible and omnipotent God himselt. 
 The word intolerance generally conveys an evil impression 
 because it embraces an equivocation. There are two kinds ot 
 intolerance, the one internal, the other external,— the hrst ecc e- 
 siastical, the second political. The first emanates from the 
 principle on which all positive religion is founded ; the second 
 constitutes the most fearful abuse of the divine name in which 
 
 * This is not a fair statement of the case. The supposition that a revelation 
 from God could contain anything contrary to "the lights « /^^^^^;"/f^^ ^^^^^^ 
 philosophy " is simply absurd. Hence the alternative suggested xs one that 
 never could possibly occur. — Editok. 
 
'^^^ WOESHIP. 
 
 man can possibly indulge. In the same degree in which it is 
 reasonable to exclude from the church all who disbelieve the 
 doctnnes which the church inculcates, so is it equally criminal to 
 employ force to compel those who are void of faith to enter into 
 that church. This external or civil intolerance, so exclusively 
 unjust, is entirely comprised in the employment of force : beyond 
 that engine, it has neither lawful defence, argument, nor apostle- 
 ship.* The priest who discusses a doctrine, who shows in what 
 points It departs from orthodoxy, who interdicts to the believers 
 m his communion the use of dangerous books, who seeks out 
 unbelievers and endeavours to convert them by persuasion,— in 
 all this, he merely discharges his duty. He may have ecclesias- 
 tical, but he has no civil intolerance.f If, combining the temporal 
 with the spiritual power, either directly or by influence, he perse- 
 cutes or occasions persecution ; if he either institutes or causes to 
 be enacted laws which restrain the free manifestation of thought 
 which destroy civil and political equality between the faithful 
 and the incredulous, and which demand from dissenters the 
 external observance of the doctrines they have rejected ;— if 
 without possessing this direct influence on temporal authority, he 
 employs the spiritual arm to interfere with the liberty, rights, or 
 interests of unbelievers, by transforming their tenets, calumniating 
 their intentions, or misrepresenting their words and actions 
 thus appealing to violence by indirect means, then he becomes 
 intolerant to the extreme degree that public conviction denounces. 
 He sins against his religion, which he renders odious, against 
 society, which he scandalises and divides, and against all whom 
 he condemns to the calamity of proscription, or to the still greater 
 misfortune of hypocrisy. There was once a time, when by a 
 
 Tp^J'^tl'^iT^'^'' I"^ tad thus spoken, one of tlie officers whieh stood by struck 
 Jesus with the palm of his hand, saying, Answerest thou the high priest so ? 
 
 Jesus answered him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil ; but 
 if well, why smitest thou me ? ''—St. John, xviii. 22, 23 
 nAh^V"^ '^°'*wf ""^ ^- ^-.j^o^^sseau, as laid down in his Profession of Faith 
 of the Savoyard Curate, differs from that which we have here expressed. 
 ^^ Ihe distinction between civil and theological toleration," he says in a note. 
 .^!Jf \T T""- I}^ two are inseparable, and one cannot be admitted 
 apart from the other. The angels themselves could not live in peace with men 
 whom they were obliged to look upon as the enemies of God." Ecclesiastical 
 intolerance does not compel Christians to see enemies of God in those who 
 reject their particular creed ; it calls upon them only to deny that they are 
 L.m-istians. I he toleration which Rousseau seems to understand resembles in- 
 thp L?'-!' ^^i nl ^^Pl^i^^t^e conduct of his Savoyard curate, who repeats 
 the service of the Church although an unbeUever. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF KELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 233 
 
 lamentable error the church confounded the right of imposing 
 its doctrines on those who acknowledged its authority, with the 
 privilege of exercising that authority over those who refused to 
 recognise it. It was then intolerant within and without; not 
 only estranged from, but hostile to liberty ; she taught by con- 
 fiscation, by the sword, and the stake, instead of by preaching, 
 free discussion, and example. It is impossible to deny these 
 facts, which history records, and it would be unjust to attribute 
 them to anything but human passions. 
 
 In speaking of intolerance under its various forms, we have 
 abstained from particularising the Catholic church. This is not 
 from any feeling of vain affectation. What we have said of 
 religious intolerance in general, applies equally to every distinct 
 creed. The absurd paganism of Greece was guilty of intolerance 
 in the worst degree, when it compelled Socrates to swallow the 
 hemlock. Calvin causing Michael Servetus to be burnt at Geneva, 
 differs in nothing from the inquisition condemning a relapsed Jew 
 to the torture and the stake. A few months ago, a great outcry 
 was raised because an Italian subject was condemned to a convict 
 prison for having been converted to Protestantism ; but Europe 
 had heard, about a year before, how, in one of the Northern States, 
 the law had sentenced a citizen to death who from a Lutheran 
 had become a Catholic. Between the autos-da-fe of Spain, and 
 the persecutions recently inflicted on the Euthenian church, '■= in 
 the north of Europe, the only distinction to be drawn is that 
 which separates the genius of two nations and two different ages. 
 The dogma has nothing to do with the question. Whatever it 
 may be besides, it is unquestionably the same passion and the 
 same crime. It is so certain that civil intolerance is not attached 
 to doctrine, and does not naturally flow from the religious principle, 
 that philosophy itself has sometimes become a persecution. It 
 was so under the reign of Julian, who condemned christians to 
 the flame, because they refused to worship the gods of the empire. 
 It became so again under the French republic, when in the name 
 of Reason, the civil power modified the spiritual constitution of 
 the church, and finally suppressed the exercise of worship, and 
 
 The Euthenian Church, here named, is a section of the Greek communion, 
 who had re-uuited themselves to the Roman Catholics in various points of 
 discipline and ritual observances. They are disseminated in Poland and on 
 the western frontier of Russia, and decrease gradually, in consequence of the 
 persecutions to which they are exposed from the orthodox Russian Church, 
 which uses and abuses the privileges of state religion. 
 
234 WORSHIP. 
 
 proscribed the priests. It is still so, at present, as often as by 
 reviving the memory of ancient quarrels, which ought to be 
 forgotten, or by indulging in an unprofitable spirit of retaliation, 
 it reproaches the different churches with practising ecclesiastical 
 intolerance, and attempts at the same time, either directly, 
 through the laws, or indirectly, by an appeal to public opinion, to 
 oppose obstacles to the free manifestation and exercise of religious 
 feeling. The intolerance of philosophy is a complete mistake, 
 and approaches insanity. Philosophers are, in the world, the 
 theorists and apostles of liberty : it is doubly detestable to 
 suppress the freedom in others which we demand for ourselves, 
 and to do this while we make a show of proclaiming its fruitfulness 
 and enjoyments. 
 
 From these reflections, we conclude : — That the political in- 
 tolerance which employs force to constrain men to the outward 
 profession of a doctrine they disbelieve, is invariably the crime of 
 an individual or a chartered community, and that nothing in the 
 nature of positive religion can either explain or justify it. 
 
 That, on the contrary, the very principle of all positive religion, 
 which reposes on direct revelation, compels it to ecclesiastical 
 intolerance ; and finally, that philosophy being founded on reason, 
 and consequently on liberty, neither can, nor ought to, practise 
 intolerance, under any form whatever. 
 
 Let us now follow up our parallel, by no longer comparing 
 sources, but doctrines, and ask ourselves what problems are dis- 
 tinctively applicable to positive and natural religion, and how 
 these problems are to be solved in the church and in the schools. 
 
 Positive and natural religion answering to the same necessities 
 are to be examined by the same questions. The object of all 
 religion is to ascertain the origin of man, the rule of his conduct, 
 the aim of his life, and the future that awaits him after 
 death. Positive religions supply a clear, precise, and detailed 
 solution to each of these separate problems. Natural religion, 
 which, in its essence, is no more than a portion of philosophy, 
 gives only what it is capable of bestowing. Its obligations are 
 not measured by the wants of society, but by the capacity of 
 human intelligence. 
 
 Thus, for example, it belongs to a positive religion, which 
 speaks in the name of God to assign defined and indisputable 
 rules for the least important actions, to declare after what manner 
 God shall be honoured, and to explain the nature of salvation, 
 and the character of the life to come. Natural religion, as far as 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 235 
 
 laws and rules are concerned, allows a greater latitude to free will ; 
 at times, it lias onl}^ hope to offer in place of certainty. Its only 
 criterion is philosophy, which leaves a wide scope to individual 
 interpretations, and being more separated from argument and 
 speculation, exercises no authority over passive intelligences. In 
 a word, its symbol, if it has one, cannot be separated from the 
 proofs by which it is established, and for this cause, it can never 
 become universal. It guides reason by respecting it. 
 
 As regards relative solutions, it is superfluous to say that the 
 distinction is very great between the various positive religions. 
 They differ between themselves as much as schools of philosophy, 
 neither more nor less ; and the reason of this is, that on the 
 supposition that they emanate from human intelligence, — a suppo- 
 sition which can only be erroneous in the case of one, — they all 
 spring from the same source with the systems of the philosophers. 
 Thus there are pantheists, materialists, and fatalists. In some of 
 these modes of belief, the doctrine of a future life itself is wanting. 
 In the midst of this diversity, history nevertheless enables us to 
 point out the prevailing tendencies ; and we may say, to illustrate 
 these, that the majority of religions admit the direct intervention 
 of Deity in the affairs of men, the efiBciency of practical faith, 
 chiefly for salvation, and a future state of rewards and punishments. 
 
 While setting forward these comparisons, with the view of 
 more thoroughly comprehending the range and influence of 
 natural religion, although we reason upon positive religion in the 
 abstract, the Catholic faith presents itself individually and inces- 
 santly to our thoughts ; and after having spoken of the con- 
 ditions of all positive worship, perhaps it may not be impossible 
 to apply our doctrine to this particular creed, to verify by this 
 application the correctness of the principles we have laid down. 
 Let it be remembered in what follows, that we consider the 
 catholic religion under its form and bearing, without entering into 
 any inquiry as to its origin. It constitutes nd part of our plan 
 to ascertain whether the Catholic Church combines a more 
 sincere and legitimate exposition of apostolic revelation than 
 other Christian Churches ; but we select it for the particular 
 reason that it separates itself more than the rest from natural 
 religion. Still less do we dream of discussing the proofs upon 
 which christians of opposite corarauaions rest the divine inspi- 
 ration of the gospel. That question is too complicated and 
 extensive to be approached liglitly or to be dismissed in a few 
 pages. We study natural religion, and we speak of Christianity 
 
236 WORSHIP. 
 
 incidentally, and to enable us more thoroughly to understand the 
 leading object of our inquiry. Nothing can be more sincere than 
 the respect we profess for the Catholic creed ; and while we 
 examine it as a work entirely human, we shall endeavour 
 sedulously to avoid any remarks that might wound or offend 
 susceptibilities drawn from a source entitled to the most delicate 
 consideration. We exercise one of the privileges of freedom, 
 and we think that no one has a right to do this, except on the 
 condition of paying deference to all that contains the true 
 elements of grandeur. We know not which is most opposed to 
 the principles of philosophy, religious or philosophical intole- 
 rance ; and we have learned that liberty and reason are equally 
 outraged, when, through fanaticism, they are checked in the 
 progress of development, or when by a dread of fanaticism the 
 disciples of any religion are denied the right of defending and 
 manifesting their belief. 
 
 It is assuredly unnecessary to repeat a fact so evidently true, 
 as, that since the world began, there has never been a religion 
 to be compared to Christianity. Whether we consider the 
 Christian creed in the Catholic Church, where all is regulated with 
 precision, even to the most minute details of doctrine, moral law, 
 and worship ; or in the Protestant Churches, which, while main- 
 taining the unity of the belief, with the authority of Scripture, 
 allow reason and liberty to take their part, — we find at every step 
 a metaphysical grandeur, a moral purity, and a depth of observa- 
 tion which command the most profound veneration. The Catholic 
 Church, considered only in its form, and without reference to 
 the creed, is distinguished from other communions by the ritual 
 prescriptions of its worship, the strong constitution of its 
 hierarchy, and the multipUcity and rigour of its doctrinal enact- 
 ments. We may say of Protestantism in all its varieties, that 
 it manifests a tendency to unite itself with natural religion, in 
 the association of reason, while Catholicism may be correctly 
 designated the pure ideal of a positive faith. This we shall 
 endeavour to show by examining alternately its principles, 
 dogmas, and practice. Catholicism, in common with all other 
 positive religions, has revelation for its origin. This revelation 
 is complete, for it embraces every question that religion can 
 resolve. It is explicit, and contained in a volume which com- 
 mands the admiration of the whole world. It is supernatural, 
 for it embraces the enunciation of mysteries, which places it at 
 once in a sphere beyond the compass of human reason. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 237 
 
 Further, as the revelation is not individual, it requires, to 
 render it perfect, a body for the express purpose of interpre- 
 tation and preservation, and a transmission through which it is 
 consecrated. This body are the clergy, all the members of which 
 are associated together by the unity of one common faith, and by 
 a skilful organisation which, from the pope down to the lowest 
 clerk, combines this vast association, the greatest that has ever been 
 formed, under a single will, a single spirit, and a single law. No 
 dissension can introduce itself into this unity, for as soon as the 
 required faith is defined, and the rule laid down by supreme autho- 
 rity, whoever hesitates to obey is cut off from the Church. Thus the 
 authority is complete for interpretation and guidance. Tradition, 
 by a natural consequence, obtains in this church all the authority 
 that tradition can possibly acquire ; since the dogma and the rule 
 have been immutably transmitted from generation to generation, 
 even up to the apostles and the Saviour himself; and beyond Jesus 
 Christ by the Jewish people, to the creation of the world. Several 
 of these assertions have been and are still disputed every day, on 
 the ground of historical certainty ; but what we here lay down 
 is the opinion of the Catholic Church on itself. Let us now examine 
 the doctrine. God made the heavens and the earth, and he 
 made them from nothing ; he has created and governs them in 
 perfect goodness. Nevertheless, there is evil in the world. The 
 first man, being free, abused his liberty, and God has punished 
 him in his race. At the same time, as the goodness of God is 
 as infinite as his justice, he consents that an expiation shall be 
 offered, and that by virtue of this expiation man may regain the 
 rank he forfeited by the fall of Adam. Who is to offer this 
 expiation ? A God alone can appease the offended justice of 
 a God. Now, there is only one God, but he has three persons — 
 the mystery of the Trinity. One of these three divine persons, 
 God the Son, descends upon earth, takes upon himself the form 
 of man, and dies upon the cross — the mystery of the Incarna- 
 tion and Redemption. Jesus Christ, by his life and death, is 
 twice our benefactor; for in his life he is an example, and in his 
 death our Saviour. Counting from this sacrifice man may be 
 cleansed from the stain of original sin. He remains free, as our 
 first parent was before he fell, and consequently capable Hke him 
 of desert or transgression. God, who consents to raise him up 
 again, can also superadd, through his great goodness, the merit 
 of the atonement of Jesus Christ. Thus grace is placed by the 
 side of free-will to guide and sustain him. Grace is necessary 
 
238 WORSHIP. 
 
 to man to lead him to good ; nevertheless in virtue of his liberty 
 of action, he is still found to reject the influence of grace, and to 
 commit evil. The great end which religion assigns to human 
 life is expressed in these words which the Church teaches to 
 young children, and the sublimity of which excites our tears : — 
 " God has created and placed us in the world to know, to love, 
 and to serve him, and by these means to obtain eternal life." 
 The happiness of the future state is described as follows : — " To 
 see God face to face, and to love him with all our hearts through 
 all eternity." To these dogmas, on which the Catholic faith is 
 founded, another must be added, which seems to be enveloped 
 in more obscurity. Beyond the visible world spirits exist 
 infinitely inferior to God, whose creation they are, but at the 
 same time far superior to man.* Amongst them there are 
 degrees and a hierarchy of which we have only an imperfect 
 knowledge ; f but we know that they can merit, since one of 
 them is called holy, and they can also forfeit, for another has 
 committed the sin of pride, for which he has been driven for ever 
 from the presence of God.| This rebellious archangel is the 
 contriver of evil in this world, and the minister of celestial 
 vengeance in the next.§ It is he who tempted the first man 
 through the first woman; it is he who tempted the Saviour, 
 before the passion, that no human trial might be wanting to the 
 divine victim ; it is he who by the snares of pleasure and self- 
 interest tempts man daily, and opposes in his heart the influence 
 of grace ; and it is he who will superintend in hell the punish- 
 ment of the condemned. His power is only derivative and 
 secondary, for even man (through grace) can triumph over it ; 
 yet it is not, for that, less formidable. |j Such is the Catholic 
 doctrine in its fundamental points. 
 
 * "God, who is a pure spirit, lias cliosen to create pure spirits resembling 
 himself, who, like him, live on intelligence and love ; who know and love him, 
 as he knows and loves himself." — Bossuet, Elevations, 4th week, elev. i. 
 
 t "Holy Scripture, which never falsifies, and says nothing without a 
 purpose, has named angels, archangels, virtues, dominations, principalities, 
 and thrones ; cherubim and seraphim. Who will undertake to explain these 
 august names, or to tell the beauties and excellences of these transcendent 
 creations ? " — Bossuet, ibid. 
 
 J" These exalted beings are created from nothing like the rest : and from that 
 cause, superior as they are, they are liable by nature to sin." — Bossuet, ibid. 
 
 § " You have degraded yourselves to the base and malicious occupation of 
 being first our seducers, and afterwards the executioners of the victims you 
 have seduced.' — Bossuet, ibid., elev. ii ; also, Sermon on the Foundations of 
 Divine Vengeance. 
 
 II "Those who depart from this world with gi-ace and charity, but still 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 239 
 
 We now return to the consideration of natural religion, in the 
 hope of more thoroughly comprehending its nature by means of 
 the comparison we have drawn. 
 
 Natural religion is the enemy of superstition. Its peculiar 
 characteristics are perspicuity, precision, and sincerity. It 
 makes no pretensions to knowledge beyond its attainment; 
 it does not conceal ignorance under high-sounding words; it 
 admits candidly that there are secrets inaccessible to science, 
 and attempts only to determine with certainty points that 
 can be accurately ascertained, and those which through the 
 limited nature of human intelligence are difficult to discover. 
 It imposes its own boundaries, and suffers nothing within them 
 to remain obscure and unexplained. It never dreams or loses 
 itself in clouds, but is always clear, rational, and methodical. 
 There is nothing in it which cannot be reconciled to common 
 sense. It is intelligible to ordinary understanding, while it 
 satisfies spirits of a higher quality. The poetry with which it 
 abounds is vigorous and healthy. It furnishes a sound and 
 solid nourishment to the mind, equally distinct from materialism 
 and ecstasy. 
 
 The god of natural religion is not a human deity, whom we 
 can bring down to our own level and measure by our own insig- 
 nificance ; for nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that 
 a god who explains nothing in the world, must of necessity 
 resemble that world; but this unknown divinity strengthens 
 instead of disturbing our reason. He forms our point of 
 departure, as every original principle is the source of demonstra- 
 tion without the power of being demonstrated itself. We know 
 nothing of his nature, beyond that he is complete in intelligence, 
 goodness, and power ; nor of his eternity, except that no image 
 of it can be furnished by time. We are better acquainted with 
 him in his works than in himself; but we see everywhere reflected 
 in his works indications of his perfection and greatness. We 
 know that he has created, and we see that he governs the world. 
 We believe and admit creation, although we make no attempt 
 to explain it, for it has no analogy with any human act. In like 
 manner, we follow with love and respect the development of the 
 
 liable to the punishments which divine justice has reserved, will suffer them in 
 another life. This is what the Council of Trent proposes to us to believe 
 respecting? souls detained in purgatory, without specifying in what these 
 punishments consist ; neither does it explain many other similar^ matters, 
 upon which this holy council maintains a strict reserve." — iSossuet, Exposition 
 of the Doctrines of the Catholic Church. 
 
240 WORSHIP. 
 
 views of Providence, without representing God to our minds as 
 an unskilful and uncertain artificer. The true God has no human 
 attributes. Passion, inconstancy, and effort, belong not to his 
 nature ; that serene and omnipotent will extracts worlds from 
 nonentity, with all their incalculable developments ; that unlimited 
 intelligence comprehends at the same moment all time and all 
 space ; that supreme love embraces simultaneously all created 
 beings, and sees every one present before him in his individual 
 identity. God has placed us in the world to govern while we traverse 
 it. We pass along under his eye and hand, but in the fulness of the 
 liberty derived from him, sustained by the eternal decrees of his 
 power, animated by the never-ceasing love which he feels for 
 the creature he has made. Through him, nothing is wanting to 
 us here below in our only important undertaking, for he has given 
 us duty and freedom ; through him, nothing can fail us in the 
 future, for in death he will satisfy the desires of our hearts and 
 minds by giving us himself for nourishment, by filling us with 
 the sight of his glory, and the overflowings of his love. What 
 signifies it that we must tread even over flints upon briars, to 
 arrive at such a termination ? True happiness must be conquered 
 to ascertain its real value. We accept the trial courageously ; 
 and we convert our sacrifices into a hymn of praise to the 
 glory of the God who supports and calls us. This world, so 
 completely filled with his divinity, is no longer a prison, but a 
 temple. 
 
 From the moment when we learn our origin and end, as children 
 of God, destined through his munificent rule to return to him 
 again, we feel that our first duty is to unite ourselves with our 
 heavenly Father, and to employ every moment of life in testifying 
 our gratitude. We owe worship to God, and for our own neces- 
 sities and consolation we are called upon to adore him. How are 
 we to offer up our praises to the great Creator, who, by his single 
 will, has produced the world from nothing, whose power and 
 grandeur have no parallel, and cannot be expressed by words ; 
 who exists above time and space in absolute independence and 
 consummate felicity ? Amongst the most signal IJenefits which 
 God has conferred upon us, we must reckon that he has imposed a 
 law, assigned a task, and furnished an opportunity of serving him, 
 by co-operating, as it were, in his own w^ork. Without liberty, 
 we should be incapable of worship. God has assigned to us, in 
 some measure, for the exercise of our freedom, our active powers, 
 and our duty, a limited sphere, in which, after his example, we 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF EELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. Q4] 
 
 can do good,'and contribute to the general unity. We can maintain 
 ourselves wholly and healthfully, in body and spirit, without con- 
 tracting pollution, without enervating or weakening the under- 
 standing. We are enabled to exercise the faculties of the body, 
 to direct the powers of tlie mind towards eternal truth, and to 
 love everlasting beauty with all our hearts. We can, while fol- 
 lowing the prescribed path, discern in our front, and on every 
 side, those of our brethren who are condemned to suffer, through 
 Ignorance, vice, disease, or calamity, and we can fly to their 
 assistance with indefatigable ardour. We can bind up their 
 wounds, allay their thirst, distribute to them our superfluity, or 
 make them partakers of our competence, enlarge their minds, and 
 cure or revive their hearts ; and in the absence of other aid, we 
 can animate them by our example, while we teach them to know 
 and serve God, and to find enjoyment in his service. While look- 
 ing on life with lofty views, we can devote ourselves to science, 
 labour without intermission, not for ourselves, but in the cause of 
 truth, penetrate the secrets of nature, and distribute to the living 
 world, or consecrate to posterity, those treasures which God 
 has dispensed to us, that our brethren may participate in them 
 through our exertions. Such is the worship which we owe to God, 
 such is the prayer that he loves, and such are the steps by which 
 we can ascend to his presence. God allows churches to be dedi- 
 cated to his service ; but a school, an hospital, or a manufactory, 
 are also temples erected to the glory of his name.* We may 
 address him with prayers, but a simple good action is also 
 acceptable in his eyes. Nature suggests nothing to our lips but 
 these words, " Grant, Lord, that I may live according to thy 
 law, and after thy heart ! " These acts are the first precept and the 
 best prayer.f It is not only the perverse man who is reproved, 
 it is not the blasphemer, the violator of human and divine justice, 
 the murderer, the robber, or the invader of common liberty, who 
 defiles his soul and body by the indulgence of evil passions; but 
 it is the useless sluggard, who buries his own strength, the soli- 
 tary anchorite, who, made for humanity, separates himself from 
 his kind, who lives only for himself, content to do no positive ill, 
 
 * " Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in 
 obeying the voice of the Lord ? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and 
 to hearken than the fat of rams." — 1 Samuel, xv. 22. 
 
 t "External ceremonies are nothing more than signs of internal worship, 
 which comprises all that is essential. These ceremonies are intended to 
 impress ignorant man through the senses, and to nourish love in the recesses 
 of the heart." — Fenelon, Third Letter on Keligion. 
 
242 WORSHIP. 
 
 as if virtue were a mere negation ; who seeks, in the annihilation 
 of the passions, and in an anticipated death, a passive innocence, 
 while he ought to be fighting manfully the struggle of life, sustain- 
 ing the good fight ; endeavouring to love, to think, to act, to leave 
 records of his deeds, to do good, to imitate God, and to scale 
 heaven instead of dreaming that such an enterprise may be 
 attempted ! 
 
 It has been asserted that natural religion gives to man no creed, 
 and no table of the law. This is at once to calumniate reason 
 and liberty.* What is reason, if not a light and a strength 
 whereby to seek and find the truth ? If to arrive at the extent of 
 reason, to clear up, to develop, and to apply the rule, exceptions 
 are necessary, such is the condition and the nature of humanity. 
 God has willed it so in leaving us free. Let us take man in his 
 entire character and attributes. Let us beware how we persuade 
 ourselves that God has given him reason to wrap him up in 
 swaddling-clothes, or liberty to confine him throughout life in the 
 depth of a prison. The schoolmen who, by their pedantic for- 
 mulas, reduce the human mind to a machine, are not more desti- 
 tute of sense than the eternal children who cannot understand 
 that it is impossible to walk in the world without leading-strings, by 
 the aid of the reason that serves as a star, and the all-powerful 
 hand that acts as a support. Do not let us offer as a spectacle to 
 God the systematic diminution of his own work. Neither let us 
 reduce intelligence to the condition of instinct, nor bring down 
 free man to the level of an automaton. God gives us the com- 
 mencement of truth, and the principle of the rule ; he also orders 
 us to lay open these premises, to conquer that belief, to apply and 
 to fathom the law. He commands us to live ! We ought not to 
 treat liberty as an enemy, since it is the greatest gift our Creator 
 has bestowed upon us. It forms the boast of natural religion to 
 leave liberty untouched in the order of thought and action. 
 
 Natural religion has also been reproached with not offering 
 to man beyond this life anything more than an uncertain 
 futurity. AH the arguments on which the hope of immortality is 
 built, are open to dispute, in common with e.very human conclu- 
 sion. Many minds derive entire confidence from these argu- 
 ments ; others remain in doubt ; while some altogether reject the 
 belief in a future state. A hope so much disputed is scarcely 
 
 * And yet the whole paragraph which follows seems to us, by its weakness, 
 to prove the truth of the charge. What is "the creed," what is "the law," 
 about which our author declaims ? , 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF BELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 243 
 
 sufficient to sanction a moral truth. We require during life 
 a faith more confident in itself. Death demands another 
 pillow. 
 
 We might reply, in the first place, that justice does not depend 
 on the recompence, but, on the contrary, that the recompence 
 depends on justice ; that we are enjoined to do good without after- 
 thought, because it is good ; that virtue is not a trade, and that a 
 man worthy of his name ought to be ready to die for virtue, even 
 though death, fulfilling the melancholy expectations of the mate- 
 rialists, should annihilate thought in the dissolution of the body. 
 If truth were useless or injurious, man nevertheless has no right 
 to stain his spirit by a crime ; neither is he permitted to sully his 
 liberty by a vice, though honesty should be attended by misfortune 
 and wickedness by prosperity. Never let us lose sight of this 
 controlling and sacred maxim, which ancient philosophy recognised, 
 which forms the basis of stoicism, and which constitutes one of the 
 noblest principles of the Christian doctrine. 
 
 But, while recognising the maxim, let us admit its austerity, and 
 feel grateful to God who has rendered virtue not only amiable but 
 fruitful, and who has only ordained it so frequently to suffer in 
 this world, that it may be rewarded in the next. The hope of 
 immortality is one of the reliances of virtue, although by no 
 means the only one ; and the dogma of future rewards forms a 
 necessary part of natural religion. But what does this obstinate 
 negation desire of us, which, beaten in the discussion, is compelled 
 to yield to the arguments upon which spiritual pliilosophy relies 
 when promising immortality to man, and retreats upon an alleged 
 insufficiency of human reason, even going to the length of dis- 
 puting all certainty, to deprive us more effectually of our principal 
 support? With the exception of truths established by fact, and 
 even these are sometimes contradicted, where is the doctrine 
 either in philosophy, morality, politics, or economy, which is not 
 daily and hourly scorned and treated with contempt ? The ques- 
 tion is not whether the immortality of the soul is disputed, but 
 whether it is true. The teachers of revealed relit^non who, when 
 revelation is once admitted, require only the promise of God to 
 assure them of immortality, do not disdain to add to this convic- 
 tion another equally strong and of a different nature, derived from 
 the demonstrations of the schools. Who then shall dare to despise 
 philosophical evidences, when even revelation itself calls upon 
 reason to acknowledge their efficacy, before requiring faith 
 and obedience ? Natural religion, in all its dugmas, possesses a 
 
 R 2 
 
2-44 WORSHIP. 
 
 force and authority similar to that of reason. This suffices for our 
 argument, and those who find it unsatisfactory, to be consistent, 
 must take refuge in scepticism. 
 
 But natural religion is not altogether deprived of external 
 worship. Independently of prayer, which every pious man 
 addresses to God in his inmost heart on all the solemn occasions 
 of life, we can and ought to declare our faults loudly, whenever 
 we find ourselves in company with an unbeliever. If we are 
 speaking in public, and it becomes possible to introduce into our 
 discourse some expressions of gratitude to the author of all good, 
 it is our incumbent duty to do so. Still more, if we write, we 
 are bound to draw attention, as often as we possibly can, to the 
 greatness anjj benevolence of the Almighty. Birth, marriage, and 
 death, which the Christian faith consecrates by solemn ceremonies, 
 are all occasions where the sentiments of a religious soul iind 
 opportunities of manifesting themselves. The civil law, although 
 too often impressed with a spirit of denial and assertion, is never- 
 theless compelled to invoke the name of God, particularly when 
 it requires an oath. It is lamentable to see how many people 
 consider an oath as a mere formality. We hesitate to break a 
 word of honour, but we hold ourselves free from all obligation 
 after an oath voluntarily taken, not from necessity, but through 
 ambition or the desire of gain.* We never reflect that to act 
 thus is to make a public profession of atheism. We justify our- 
 selves in our own eyes by the consequent advantages of perjury. 
 We have blasphemed the name of God, but we have saved a 
 bag of crowns. Such is the tendency of our civilisation. Even 
 those amongst us who respect the nature and effect of an oath, 
 seem to profane its majesty by their deportment. Is it then so 
 difficult to recal to our minds the presence of God ? A word 
 suffices to do it, without the aid of official scarfs or accessorial 
 appendages. God is so close to man, so near even to the heart 
 of the atheist, that sincere piety is always understood on the 
 instant. Amongst the funeral processions which pass along our 
 streets, muny affect us doubly by the melancholy appearance of 
 the exhibition, and the indifference of the assistants. Nevertheless, 
 let us accompany it to the tomb, and there at the moment of the 
 final adieu, if we discover a single relation or a dear friend, who, 
 with a choking voice, prays God to console the suffering hearts 
 of the mourners, there will no longer be a scoffer in the com- 
 
 * A lamentable picture of national morality in France ? — Ed. 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 245 
 
 pany ; so powerfully does the sight of present death impress even 
 the most determined unbelievers ! We do not require these 
 imposing occasions to render public homage to God. Every one 
 in exalted stations is called upon to recur to this august name in 
 every relative duty which his position imposes ; a king in speaking 
 to his people, a father in the familiar intimacy of the domestic 
 circle, a master when he addresses his servants ; we are all, in a 
 certain sense, magistrates ; for there is always some one who 
 depends on our words and example. 
 
 In the Catholic church, families are taught to set apart a 
 particular place for prayer. The poorest peasant has in his 
 cottage an emblem of holiness. Not far remote from the present 
 era, evening worship was in universal practice. The father, 
 surrounded by his children and domestics, performed the 
 clerical office, and addressed God in the name of all. Many 
 patriarchal families, throughout all the countries of Europe, still 
 preserve this pious practice. These are for the mort part usages 
 which natural religion consistently adopts. They belong not to 
 the style of modern ideas; we verge more and more every day 
 towards the suppression of everything that has not an imme- 
 diate and material object. The father believes that he has done 
 all that is required of him in looking after the worldly future of 
 his children, and in superintending their scientific and literary 
 education. His first duty is to teach them moral rectitude by his 
 words and example ; and one of the most efficacious methods of 
 making this penetrate to the depths of their hearts, is to combine 
 the idea of just dealing with the image of God. The parent, 
 addressing God in the midst of his children, renders his natural 
 authority at the same time more sacred and touching by the invo- 
 cation of that hallowed name ; he gives increased strength to the 
 family bond; he unites all holy feelings in every bosom, and imparts 
 mutual support. The more civil institutions by the protection 
 of individual rights tend to break up natural attachments, so 
 much the more ought manners and customs to operate in 
 reaction, so that the religion of the domestic hearth may never 
 be extinguished. All the powers of heaven and earth are not too 
 much to preserve the sentiment of fraternity amongst men. For 
 many ages Christianity has placed in the list of acts of piety, 
 giving alms, and visiting the sick poor. Such acts, properly 
 incited and directed, belong equally to worship and to the work 
 of the missionary. We all hold in our hands a direct means of 
 adoring God by ministering to humanity. This is an evidence 
 
246 WORSHIP. 
 
 of worship whicli all the world acknowledges and blesses. Give 
 rather, if you can, an implement of labour, than a sura of 
 money ; open a workshop in preference to a hospital. Treat 
 man as if he were a man. Respect in his person industry, 
 activity, and liberty. Above all things, if you desire to adore 
 God and to serve him in assisting the course of his providence, 
 devote your fortune and talents to the instruction of the people. 
 Win men for society and worshippers for God. Enlighten your 
 brethren by combating their prejudices, and by the dispersion of 
 sound doctrines and useful knowledge. If you enter into the 
 obscure and unfurnished hall in which the village schoolmaster 
 teaches children (as poor as himself) to read, ponder on what you 
 see ; for by that humble instrument, liberty, civilisation, and 
 religion are promoted. To shut up a seminary of instruction, or 
 to pull down a church, is equally criminal. The most unpre- 
 tending school is also a sanctuary. 
 
 But while we endeavour thus to determine the conditions of 
 an external worship, many serious and honest minds exclaim 
 that there is one already settled, which, as it were, stares us in 
 the face ; that which depends on positive religions. We desire 
 to establish a form of public worship, and we are unable to 
 invent one. If we had taken upon ourselves to do so, no one 
 would have followed us, but all the world would have said we 
 were either impostors or tyrants ; yet still it appears as if society 
 itself, with its traditions of the past, comes at once to our rescue. 
 According to the supporters of this doctrine, when an established 
 law is found to be just and wise, it is not necessary to insure 
 obedience and respect that the origin of that law should be sought 
 for in the obscurity of time. Pascal has written the following 
 commentary on the force of prescription and custom, the boldness 
 of which no communist has ever surpassed ; — " Poor children 
 say, this dog is mine ; this is my place in the sunshine. Such is 
 the commencement and image of usurpation throughout the 
 earth." * But is Pascal for this to be pronounced a foe to personal 
 property ? Habit and custom confer stability. Time is certainly 
 a consecrator, although far from being the best. Philosophers, we 
 are told, are bound to oppose custom when it is mischievous ; 
 but what prevents them from adopting and turning custom to 
 profit, when it happens to be good ? 
 
 This question of the use of an established form of worship naturally 
 
 * Pascal, Thoughts, art. vi. 50, edit. Havet., p. 94. 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 247 
 
 presents itself to the mind, and besets us in spite of ourselves ; 
 
 even though we should close our eyes so as not actually to see, 
 
 we should still have it brought before us on every side ; in 
 
 established customs, in laws, language, in public monuments, 
 
 and in all the leading functions of life. If we walk along the 
 
 streets, we see a church ; if we enter a court of justice, we find 
 
 there a bible or a testament. At every step, we jostle a priest 
 
 in the costume of his order. We find an image of the crucifixion 
 
 where roads meet. If a marriage takes place, the family hastens 
 
 to ask the blessing of a minister of the Gospel. If God sends us 
 
 a child, on the same day all our neighbours begin to talk of a 
 
 christening. Some customs appeal to our convictions, others to 
 
 our regulated habits. If we are not impelled by faith, we are 
 
 governed by fashion. After death, the body is carried to the 
 
 church. Few, even amongst unbelievers, dispense with this 
 
 ceremony. The Catholic clergy sometimes refuse the rites of 
 
 sepulture to those who have notoriously withdrawn from religious 
 
 observances. Then follow complaints and exasperation. He 
 
 who professes no faith in God is the loudest in his outcries. 
 
 He desires for his corpse a benediction, which he scoffed at 
 
 while living, and expects in death an accompanying decorum, 
 
 composed of a priest, and an emblem of Christianity. If the ashes 
 
 of Voltaire were expelled to-morrow from the Pantheon, and 
 
 carried to Pere la Chaise, a cross would be erected over his tomb. 
 
 To understand thoroughly this important question, which ought 
 
 not to be cut short by common-place expressions of oratorical 
 
 indignation, it is very necessary to distinguish three kinds of 
 
 religious actions. In the first place, there are those which are 
 
 not exclusively individual, but which apply to more than one 
 
 conscience ; then there are some which indicate positive adhesion 
 
 to a particular form of worship, and the text of a belief ; and 
 
 finally, there are others which seem to be entirely passive, and 
 
 cannot be received by general opinion as professions of explicit 
 
 faith. 
 
 Let us clear up this distinction by examples. To refuse to b6 
 married in church is to decline the benediction of a priest : but 
 it is at the same time to deny that permission to another. This 
 is the first case. We might also select for another instance, con- 
 fession in the hour of death. Reject this if you please ; for your 
 self, you have a right to do so ; but to take advantage of dying 
 weakness, and to impose a minister of religion on another, either 
 by stratagem or force, is an act of intolerance and oppression. To 
 
248 WORSHIP. 
 
 refuse confession to one who asks for this consolation in his last 
 moments, is a positive crime. 
 
 The distinction established between formal adhesion and simple 
 participation in prayer is not less evident, and the Catholic 
 church furnishes examples in abundance that bear clearly upon 
 this point. In fact, to kneel in a confessional, to make the sign 
 of the cross upon the forehead and bosom, to repeat the Belief, to 
 bow before the absolution of the priest, are all these ceremonies 
 the same as entering with collected meditation into a church, 
 listening to a moral discourse, and uniting the heart and lips 
 in prayers which rise towards the throne of the Eternal? To 
 confess, is to make a direct profession of the Catholic creed ; to 
 pray, in a church, is simply to offer up worship at the same time, 
 and in the same place with Catholics. I see a church open, and 
 I walk in without knowing whether it is dedicated to the Catholic 
 or Protestant form. I observe a full congregation, and I hear a 
 minister who delivers a holy and edifying discourse. After the 
 sermon, the whole assembly present rise and sing a hymn. It is 
 evident that I can join in these exercises, and thus participate in 
 the sweet sanctity of adoring God in public without performing 
 any positive act of adhesion to a particular faith. Here is the 
 question stated under its three leading features. Let us now 
 attempt the solution. 
 
 If we were to pronounce judgment on the conduct of men, who 
 under these three different circumstances participate in the 
 practical rites of a positive worship, while they admit in reality 
 no tenets but those of natural religion, we should condemn with- 
 out hesitation all who perform acts of faith, properly so-called ; 
 such as the repetition of the belief, communion, and confession. 
 They are evidently guilty of falsehood and perjury, if they avow, 
 before God and man, a creed which is not their own. No subter- 
 fuge can palliate such hypocrisy. But we ought assuredly to 
 extend more indulgence to those who fear to wound the consciences 
 of others ; or to those religious minds who join prayer without ad- 
 hering to a particular belief. In general, we ought to be gentle and 
 indulgent in our estimate of human actions, where there is reason 
 to suppose that the intention is pure. Amongst the dissentients 
 who mingle with the crowd of believers, there are perhaps some 
 who think only of honouring God, and there may be others whose 
 sole object is to deceive man. God alone knows and can judge 
 the heart. It is a holy and a salutary maxim to be severe in a judg- 
 ment of doctrine, but to deal charitably with the conduct of men. 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 249 
 
 But these reasons being allowed for the indul<?ence due to 
 involuntary error and weakness, we owe it to the faith we possess 
 to declare that there ought to be neither hesitation nor corapro- 
 Diise on the question of principles. The sin is great when we 
 formally express a belief which we disavow in our hearts ; it 
 becomes more excusable when we assign as a reason or pretext, 
 the obligation of paying respect to the faith of another ; but still 
 there is always sin. We ought never to abandon or conceal our 
 faith ; every believer is bound to do what he feels to be right, in 
 calmness and sincerity, without endeavouring to provoke others, 
 and without fear. A faith founded on conviction, and confident in 
 itself, is at the same time, gentle and inflexible, equally removed 
 from intolerance and weakness. In truth, to say that it is better 
 to keep aloof, than to associate, even passively, with a form of 
 worship, the symbol of which we do not believe, is to say that we 
 ought never to appear what we are not. This moral precept 
 allows no qualification. It avails nothing to separate ourselves in 
 thought from the congregation while we are present at the cere- 
 mony ; that presence is, in the opinion of those who see us, an 
 explicit avowal, and when we repudiate it inwardly, we fall into 
 the mistake of a mental reservation. First, then, such conduct is 
 an equivocation, a juggling with truth, a falsehood. Another 
 reason against it is, that it comprises a formal abandonment of 
 principle. Thus, in all points combined, the act is a heavy sin 
 against social and religious morality. 
 
 We should not take the trouble of demonstrating a truth so 
 palpable, if we were not convinced that it is constantly misunder- 
 stood by the most straightforward minds and the firmest disposi- 
 tions. Custom closes up our eyes, and hides from us the shame 
 of a proceeding without candour or self-respect. No honest 
 man likes to leave a doubt on the minds of his friends as to his 
 political opinions : by what aberration of common reason then are 
 we less fastidious in what concerns religion? There is seldom 
 consistent dignity in any line of conduct which requires explana- 
 tion. What is just and true explains itself, and leaves no cloud 
 or doubt on the mind of any one to whom it is addressed. Is it 
 necessary to say, on the other hand, that respect for the conscience 
 and belief of others is an imperative duty ? We are allowed to 
 discuss creeds that we do not acknowledge, and, within certain 
 bounds, we are called upon to do so ; but in entering on such 
 arguments, we are equally bound to consider no end but truth and 
 the salvation of souls. We may discuss, 1 repeat, but we have 
 
S50 WORSHIP. 
 
 no right to insult or scandalise. It is, indeed, a melancholy 
 sight to see pious men and philosophers employ abuse and 
 calumny against those who dissent from their opinions in matters 
 of faith. Insult provokes added insult ; it irritates and alienates, 
 but converts no one. By what justifiable feeling can we be 
 impelled when we reproach others with their creed ? It is not 
 from any desire to enlighten them ; neither is it to reclaim them 
 from the errors into which they have fallen. These violent 
 diatribes are the very opposite of sound argument. If they 
 proved anything, it would be against those who indulge in them, 
 and against the belief which inspires hatred instead of a spirit of 
 charity. When we are firmly convinced that we have found the 
 truth, we may pity, but we ought never to hate, those who are 
 still in ignorance. 
 
 Our duty then, as regards positive forms of worship, appears 
 to be thus laid down ; we ought not to assume a faith which we 
 do not firmly believe ; nor take part in ceremonies contrary to 
 those of our own church ; nor infringe on liberty by placing our- 
 selves between God and the consciences of our brethren; nor 
 refuse respect to the forms and usages adopted by other men in 
 the sincerity of heartfelt devotion. 
 
 When we speak of the respect which upright minds are bound 
 to show towards a creed which they do not profess, let it be clearly 
 understood, that this by no means extends to superstition. Any 
 religion that outrages the moral code, far from being acceptable 
 to God, is nothing more than blasphemy under the guise of 
 piety. It may be said in reply, '* Who is to decide this ? " All 
 the world can judge as to what is contrary to the immutable 
 principles of right and wrong, and it would be derogatory to 
 human intelligence to deny it the power of discriminating, by 
 unerring signs, religion from superstition. The distinctions may 
 embarrass a legislator who is compelled to examine into the most 
 minute details, but it imposes no difiiculty on philosophy, which 
 deals only with the general duty of tolerating and respecting 
 creeds that we do not profess, when they contain nothing otfensive 
 to moral propriety. 
 
 There are two descriptions of public worship; that which is free 
 and independent of the State, as in all the churches of North 
 America ; and that which is constituted by the government, as in 
 Russia and England ; or where the government accepts and 
 consecrates the law, as in Naples and Spain. In countries where 
 the civil and religious codes are entirely separated, there may be 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 251 
 
 many churches ; they exist openly in the State hut have no 
 connection with it. Under these conditions, worship is public 
 without being othcial or legal. Other countries, again, have 
 established an intimate union between the temporal and spiritual 
 authorities. In them there is but one religion, or rather the 
 State religion alone has an official existence, and is supported by 
 legal authority ; other forms are merely tolerated under certain 
 restrictions. 
 
 Attempts have been made at various intervals to form a public 
 worship upon natural religion, independent of the State. These 
 experiments, whatever may have been the intention of their 
 projectors, have never obtained any serious footing. Every 
 regular association requires a governing power, and no power could 
 possibly infuse into the dogmas of natural religion, either the 
 mission of founding public worship or the authority necessary 
 for its direction. The State itself would be unable to assume 
 the religious character without having recourse to an express 
 revelation. There was a moment in the history of France, when 
 strong minds imagined that the whole fabric of society might be 
 overthrown and reconstructed from the very foundation. The 
 Catholic church, which had connected itself with the old system, 
 the king and the aristocracy, was swept away with them, and 
 proscribed by the civil law. It was not only denied, but perse- 
 cuted. Reason was substituted in its place, but reason ill 
 understood, false, and without a God. Many believed that the 
 celebrated hypotliesis of the seventeenth century had become 
 realised at last — a society of atheists. Nevertheless, during the 
 unprecedented extravagances of an epoch, every minute of which 
 was marked by some signal catastrophe, when blood flowed in 
 such torrents that men became indifferent to death, and when the 
 foundations of great future events were laid in terror or despair, 
 people began to ask themselves what could law be without a 
 God ? and if it were not in fact the tyranny of a few, what could 
 any social system be that acknowledged no deity, if not an asso- 
 ciation of individual interests, liable to be annulled at the pleasure 
 of the contracting parties ? Under this solution whence did the 
 citizen derive those duties of self-denial and sacrifice, which 
 were on every lip, and which rendered life so painful without 
 any possible reward in future? The Convention, who, in setting 
 up the goddess of Reason, thought only of abolishing every form 
 of established worship, enacted a decree which has been laughed 
 at as ridiculous. In form it might be so, but in substance, it 
 
252 WOBSHIP. 
 
 signified this to a philosopher — no human society can subsist 
 without God. Thus, even at such a time, atheism only lasted 
 six months. Up to this point all was well, but tlie next step of 
 the existing government was to organise religious festivals. This 
 same National Convention conferred on its president a sort of 
 pontificate. Ceremonies were prescribed, and an altar erected ; 
 but it proved, in the end, more easy to overthrow a monarchy, to 
 introduce a fresh code of public law, and to make head against 
 combined Europe with undisciplined conscripts, than to found a 
 new system of religious worship. The political State has no 
 mission to establish creeds, formulas of faith, and ritual obser- 
 vances ; it may acknowledge, respect, and protect a particular 
 religion, but it cannot institute one. It has no priests, and 
 recognises magistrates alone. If it erects a church without 
 dedicating it to an exclusive faith, that church will be as empty 
 as was the Pantheon. In a word, natural religion requires 
 prayer, and certain pious actions, rather than public worship. 
 
 We must then admit, that no church or religious communion 
 can be founded on natural religion, either independent, or under 
 the auspices of the State. Philosophical worship may be 
 manifested by external signs, but it can never assume a public 
 character. 
 
 But the inefficiency of the State in public worahip, properly 
 so called, applies only to rites and formulas. The State never 
 can be priestly, but it is necessarily religious. No government 
 can be atheistic. To be convinced of this, it is simply requisite 
 to remember on what it is based. A government might be 
 atheistic, if it were nothing more than a convention agreed upon 
 between the citizens to protect public interests from private 
 encroachment ; in other words, if it were only a social contract. 
 But the doctrine of the social contract is unsound ; or, at least, 
 incomplete. This has produced, in reality, a legitimate, but at 
 the same time, an extensive reaction against the theory of the 
 right divine. This latter, now given up entirely by the greater 
 portion of the supporters of legitimacy, by ascribing to royalty a 
 mystic origin, conferred all rights upon the sovereign, and left 
 none to the subject. Under this system, it appeared as if govern- 
 ments were established that one man should be powerful, and 
 not that his power should strengthen and guarantee the common 
 safety and security of all. When the monarch forgot himself, 
 and thought only of his people, he obeyed the general rule which 
 commands every man to do good, and not the individual law, 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 253 
 
 which calls upon each citizen to sacrifice himself for the public 
 advantage. All that he gave freely to his subjects, or even all 
 that he left in their possession, was received as a benefaction, 
 and looked upon as a purely gratuitous present. Philosophy 
 rectified these ideas, by demonstrating that royalty can have 
 no other lawful origin than the interest and will of the people ; 
 that the king is nothing more than the first citizen and magistrate; 
 that he exercises a delegated power, and that that power can only 
 be legitimate on the condition of being employed for the advantage 
 of those by whom it is conferred. If in most kingdoms the 
 monarchy is hereditary, instead of being temporary and elective, 
 the law has not been established for the benefit of a particular 
 family, but for the good of the people, who believe that by such 
 an arrangement, competition, rivalry, cabals, and instability are 
 avoided. There is, therefore, a mutual contract between sove- 
 reigns and their subjects, or rather between governments and the 
 governed, for the difference between a kingdom and a republic 
 lies entirely in the form ; the magistrate is either one or several, 
 elected or hereditary ; but the source of authority is everywhere 
 the same. 
 
 Such is the philosophy of the social contract, and these 
 principles upon which the privileges of modern society are 
 partly founded, are entirely just; but other principles must also 
 be recognised with them. It is true that governments can only 
 exist for the benefit and by the will of the people ; but it is 
 not true that they only represent public interest in the mass. 
 Their mission is, at the same time, more lofty and more sacred. 
 If they only represented coalesced interests, what could be required 
 of the law beyond being useful, and what more could be expected 
 from the legislature than to watch over the safety and material 
 prosperity of the country ? When the sovereign, whether prince 
 or magistrate, addresses the people, if he only speaks to them of 
 profit and loss, does he rise to the becoming dignity of his station? 
 Will not any one perceive that he degrades himself, and reduces 
 the state to the level of a mercantile association ? When, in a 
 public assembly, a law is discussed, is the advantage only con- 
 sidered ? Is not rather the first thought of the legislator on the 
 justice of the matter ? Are there not a thousand occasions when 
 a nation is called upon to sacrifice interest to duty? If it is 
 necessary to feed the body with bread, is it less essential to 
 nourish the mind, and elevate the soul ? If a country, regardless 
 of right or honour, should increase its territory, extend its 
 
254 WORSHIP. 
 
 influence, or double its wealth, would it be absolved from sin 
 and shame by the ill-acquired prosperity? What then is the 
 state, if it is required to be just before it is skilful ? We answer, 
 the state is armed duty and living morality. Undoubtedly an agree- 
 ment between men, but, first of all, a compact between man and 
 God. If then the state is connected with God by justice, it becomes 
 necessary that this should be declared. If the law that it repre- 
 sents is not a human conviction, but the written expression of 
 the divine will, it is indispensable that this sacred character 
 should be acknowledged. To speak of immutable morality, of 
 devotion to duty and country, and of Divine Providence, is not to 
 infringe upon liberty of conscience. Society inflicts no outrage 
 on the free thoughts of any of its members, when it merely 
 proclaims these sacred dogmas upon which all men are agreed. 
 To force down, or to impede a particular form of worship, is to 
 tyrannise and usurp : to rest upon the doctrine of Divine Providence 
 is to accord with universal conviction, to do honour to ourselves, 
 and to give a religious character to a country and a government. 
 They are ill acquainted with liberty who imagine that it can only 
 be preserved by negatives ; and they are bad judges of mankind 
 who count entirely upon the strength of their reason, and abstain 
 from speaking to their fellow-creatures through the imagination 
 and the heart. Let religions and schools continue to teach their 
 dogmas, but never let the state forget the greatness and 
 protection of Providence. 
 
 Undoubtedly, the thought of God will spring up of itself in a 
 mind naturally disposed to piety; particularly, if by habits of 
 meditation, religious feelings have been fostered and matured. 
 But the man, who by the peculiar construction of his mind and 
 sensibilities, is little given to dwell on invisible things, he who 
 has been brought up to think of nothing but the body and its 
 wants, to gain, to covet, and to disburse money, who voluntarily 
 limits his thoughts to the horizon of his worldly interests, who 
 assumes a want of pride in denying what he cannot see, and in 
 despising what he is unable to comprehend, is there nothing 
 whatever of God in such a being, not a sentiment, or perception, 
 or feeling, which some religious ceremony will suddenly draw 
 from its darkness? 
 
 If we ourselves, accustomed as we are to reflect, we who have 
 sought God with anxiety, who have leaped with joy when know- 
 ledge has enabled us to banish doubt, who make it our daily 
 study to connect all our thoughts with this one supreme idea, 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 255 
 
 and to contemplate the synthesis of the world in its relation with 
 the Creator, if we have moments of oblivion and faintness, if we 
 feel too happy when an impressive image, an exhortation, and prayer, 
 revive our feelings of piety, how then can we believe that religion 
 can sustain itself alone and v/ithout help, in the common mass of 
 minds? Would to God, that the state were not reduced to a 
 few general formulas of piety, and that it possessed the force 
 necessary to create a distinct form of worship ! Tlie power of 
 these external symbols is so great and so universally acknowledged, 
 that all legislators have recourse to them to excite and maintain 
 patriotism. National festivals, popular songs, standards, cockades, 
 what are all these but a worship of which our country is the object ? 
 Blind as we are, our country is living and present ; its interest 
 is our interest, its glory is our glory ; in it we defend and love 
 ourselves. God, in reality, is ever close to us, but through the 
 weakness of our sight, the dazzling attractions of the world, and 
 our own excessive absence of mind, he becomes so far removed, 
 that it requires an effort to raise ourselves towards him. And shall 
 we rely only on our own strength ? shall there be no religious 
 movement in our public places ? shall there be no mention of God 
 in the enactments of public authority ? no solemn acts of thanks- 
 giving to Providence in the name of an entire people, through 
 those by whom they are represented ? Shall there not be in the 
 midst of crowds a voice to cry aloud to us, "Be just in God's 
 name ; love one another in the name of God ? " 
 
 We have now only one more element of Church-worship to con- 
 sider — the apostleship. 
 
 When we mention the word apostleship, our thoughts involun 
 tarily recur to the twelve lowly men who, after the death of our 
 Saviour, and with no power beyond the sublimity of their doctrine, 
 undertook to change the aspect of the world, and succeeded in 
 their enterprise ; or towards those heroes of intellect, who in the 
 darkness of the middle ages, fearlessly braved contempt, misery, 
 and death, to overthrow error, and diffuse truth amongst men. 
 These are the real apostles, animated by invincible faith, ever in 
 the breach, giving up their lives for their creed, and leaving 
 behind them a transformed and vanquished world. At present, 
 the question only involves a peaceful instruction, a mission with- 
 out danger. 
 
 But what is a philosopher ? A man who possesses no more 
 authority than that which he derives from his talent. He makes 
 no domiciliary visits as a pastor, he is not associated with the joys 
 
256 WORSHIP. 
 
 or sufferings of families ; lie has no official duties to perform any- 
 ■where. He writes a treatise without knowing who will read it, or 
 whether it will be read at all. He deals with the most difficult, 
 and sometimes the most unthankful subjects, and cannot be 
 understood except by the most practised and cultivated minds. 
 Nevertheless, he is judged by the first reader without appeal. 
 He is neither safe from calumny, nor contempt, nor (according to 
 the term) from persecution. He may think himself fortunate if 
 he obtains a little absent attention from a few idle persons. The 
 public ignore him, the learned turn him into ridicule, and other 
 philosophers discuss his pretensions with prejudice; scarcely any 
 one comprehends him, for no one is inclined to take the necessary 
 trouble. He himself labours without rest to build up a system 
 with which he is never entirely satisfied. Sometimes he is unable 
 to discover a fact, and at others, having found it, he cannot clearly 
 express his meaning. His life is one painful struggle against 
 envy and prepossession : the more he loves human nature and 
 truth, he more he has to suffer from his impotence and isolation. 
 His superiority constitutes his punishment. 
 
 Nevertheless, whatever may be the obstacles with which the 
 path of the philosopher is beset, there is still something which 
 combats for philosophy — the force of liberty and truth, an 
 invincible power, against which nothing can prevail. It would be 
 in vain to strangle science, shut up the schools, interdict lectures, 
 or burn books. Even persecution itself instructs. It is diffi- 
 cult to say whether full and absolute freedom of speech assists 
 more in establishing a doctrine. Metaphysical discussions are 
 confined to the learned, and seldom pass beyond the threshhold of 
 the academy ; but when once a single truth disengages itself from 
 their disputes, it goes direct to its intended address — the mass of 
 the people. It is quite possible that it may travel slowly, but 
 the advance is noiseless and infallible, until by degrees all the 
 world is convinced, and the paradox of yesterday becomes the 
 fact of to-day. What is common sense, if not a mass of evident 
 opinions, which are derived from education, and which become, as 
 it were, a part of our being ? And why is common sense in any 
 successive age composed of an additional number of new facts ? 
 Because there are unknown and neglected men, who insert in 
 books, which are not read, a single truth in the midst of a legion 
 of errors. Time carries away the error, and humanity inherits 
 what remains. 
 
 When Descartes, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 257 
 
 penned this memorable sentence, " Believe nothing that does not 
 appear to be clearly and evidently true," he excited no sensation 
 except amongst men of letters. A century after, his doctrine, de- 
 spite its force, was forgotten for the moment ; but the sentence 
 remained, and the principle it announced became the common 
 faith of all that was active and enthusiastic in the world ; it 
 engendered the Encylopedists, and the Encyclopedists led to the 
 Revolution. The code which for the first time promulgated 
 Liberty and Equality, is nothing more than a legal consecration 
 of the principles of the Cartesian philosophy. The history of 
 an age is only the development of an idea. 
 
 There is therefore an apostleship of science, and lofty genius is 
 not absolutely essential to its exercise. All that is done in the 
 world to root out prejudices and disseminate instruction, to inspire 
 men with a taste for, and an understanding of liberty, is profit- 
 able to philosophy. When we believe that we have discovered a 
 portion of truth, it becomes our duty to endeavour to give it 
 publicity, to consecrate our lives to its advancement, to hold as 
 nothing in comparison, personal interests, ambition, or vanity ; 
 to persevere without halting or drawing back ; to honour ourselves 
 in our doctrine, to bear witness to it by our conduct ; to identify 
 ourselves with the course we have embraced, and to be ever ready 
 to maintain it by sacrifice and exertion. In the absence of all 
 other consecration, let moral elevation be the seal of philosophical 
 apostleship. An upright heart is the first organ of truth. He 
 who argues upon goodness and truth, without sound conviction, 
 descends to the rank of a sophist ; but to inquire after both with 
 ardour, to teach them with respect and diffidence, is to perform 
 the work of a man and a philosopher. Whatever may be the 
 weakness of individual ability, God will bless and fertilise efforts 
 which are directed towards what is right, and look for no other 
 recompense. 
 
 Let us now bring under view, before we close these pages, the 
 principal dogmas of natural religion, and the leading precepts 
 of worship. An all-powerful and immutable God, who has 
 created and governs the world by general laws ; a future state of 
 existence which will fulfil all the promises and repair all the 
 injustices of this life — such is the doctrine. A heart filled with 
 the love of God and of mankind — a firm resolution to accom- 
 plish an allotted duty, and to carry out the views of providence 
 in doing good ; such are the prayer and the commandment. The 
 whole system is comprised in two words, and these two words are 
 
258 woKSHiP. 
 
 accessible to the knowledge and conviction of every mind. 
 Natural religion is not, like metaphysics, reserved for chosen 
 spirits ; it relies on no particular theory, it demands no extra- 
 ordinary effort of reflection. It is simple, easy, and popular ; it 
 appeals to the heart in conjunction with the understanding ; it 
 seems less to expand before us new horizons, than to call us back 
 to known and cherished localities. In fact, natural religion 
 possesses us from the cradle ; its lessons, mixed up with many 
 others, form the solace and strength of our earliest thoughts ; 
 they return to us on every side in proportion as we arrive at 
 maturity in body and mind ; nature, as soon as we are capable of 
 admiring her, speaks to us of the grandeur and goodness of 
 God ; society, when we become acquainted with its elements and 
 influence, reminds us that without the thought of him and his 
 presence there can be no justice. Grief also is a potent teacher. 
 While the soul is lacerated, and the tenderest ties are broken, a 
 sweet and soothing voice makes itself heard from the depths of 
 the heart — religion with its promises, or rather God with his 
 love. To sum up the precepts of religion, and form them into 
 a body of doctrine, we have only to receive into the mind the 
 ideas which have fertilised it, and into the heart the emotions by 
 which it has been moved. 
 
 To adore and love God, there is no occasion to bring him 
 down to the level of human understanding. On the contrary, it 
 is because we know him to be incomprehensible that we feel and 
 acknowledge him to be the creator and father of the world. In 
 proportion as our own faith is humble, we believe in the divine 
 omnipotence. This is the true hope of humanity, for it is easy, 
 simple, and self-evident. To comprehend it, nothing is wanting, 
 but a heart in the right place, and an unwarped understanding. 
 God is the true father of a family who enlightens all his children, 
 and proportions himself to the weakness of man's intelligence. 
 
 Nothing more strongly proves the importance and truth of 
 natural religion than the efiicacy of its precepts. It cannot but 
 be divine, for it is founded on charity and justice. Its first law 
 is to perform our duty ; its worship is entirely comprised in that 
 sacred obligation. Prayer is labour and benevolence. A pious 
 mind is one that honours God in its own freedom, and the free- 
 dom of its brethren ; in loving, assisting, and instructing them. 
 Knowledge, work, liberty, and love — in these precepts are con- 
 tained the consecration and essence of all natural religion. In 
 times, happily remote from the present, some men believed that 
 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. ^59 
 
 it was sufficient to do no wrong. They placed the perfection of 
 virtue in the haughty consciousness of l^eeping themselves free 
 from stain. They founded a school, the first precept of which 
 was abstinence from the commission of evil. This is what was 
 called stoicism, equally removed from good and ill, at the same 
 time courageous, austere, and unprofitable. Liberty without 
 fraternity, reason without feeling. God has not created us for 
 this sterile innocence. He only lends us our endowments. 
 Wealth, intelligence, sensibility, strength, these human treasures, 
 of which man is the depository, derive all their value and holiness 
 from being imparted and spread abroad. Charity has succeeded 
 to the selfish, haughty, and barren wisdom of antiquity. Men's 
 hearts became accessible to pity and compassion under the soften- 
 ing and controlling influence of Christianity. They went forth to 
 seek the poor and the diseased, in the name of God; they gave them 
 food, remedies, and tears. At last the day burst into light when 
 religion became perfect by a more complete knowledge of the 
 greatness of man's destiny. On that day, the rich, the happy, 
 the learned, and the exalted, were taught that the poor, the 
 suffering, and the ignorant, were their equals and their brethren. 
 They comprehended that the first act of piety to Heaven was to 
 enlighten and to nourish inferior understandings, and to assist 
 liberty, by rendering labour easy. Already national hatreds are 
 becoming antiquated prejudices ; there are no more distinctions 
 of caste, and intolerance is regarded as folly. The spirit of 
 peace is beginning to replace throughout the world the heroic 
 madness of war ; idleness is looked upon as a fault and a mis- 
 fortune, and all who are capable of love and reflection unite in a 
 holy crusade against ignorance. Thy religion, God ! is love, 
 hope, reason, liberty, and peace ! 
 
NOTES. 
 
 I. NOTE, ON THE INFINITE OF LOCKE ; PAGE 49. 
 
 M. Jules Simon scarcely does justice to our great countryman in 
 saying that " the infinite of Locke is composed of an indefinite 
 number of units joined to each other, and for this reason he con- 
 cludes that the world may be infinite :" — "Et c'est pourqiioi il 
 pense que le monde peut-etre infini." 
 
 True, he teaches that we gain our ideas of infinity by joining 
 together an indefinite number of units. " Every one that has any 
 idea of any stated lengths of space, as a foot, finds that he can 
 repeat that idea ; and, joining it to the former, make the idea of 
 two feet ; and by the addition of a third, three feet ; and so on, 
 without ever coming to an end of his addition, whether of the 
 same idea of a foot, or if he pleases of doubhng it, or any other 
 idea he has, of any length, as a mile, or diameter of the earth, or 
 of the orbis magnus : for whichsoever of these he takes, and how 
 often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds 
 that after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts, and 
 enlarged his idea as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to 
 stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition than he was at 
 first setting out. The power of enlarging his idea of space by 
 farther additions remaining still the same, he hence takes the idea 
 of infinite space." It does not however follow, from this argu- 
 ment, that the world is infinite, nor even that infinite space exists ; 
 but only, according to Locke's theory, that by this process we gain 
 the idea of hifinity. Indeed he adds, wath his usual modesty, 
 " This, I think, is the way whereby the mind gets the idea of 
 infinite space. It is a quite diflerent consideration to examine 
 
262 NOTES. 
 
 whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space actually 
 existing, since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of 
 things ; but yet since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may 
 say, that we are apt to think that space in itself is actually 
 boundless ; to which imagination, the idea of space or expansion of 
 itself naturally leads us." Book ii. chap. 17, sees. iii. iv. 
 We cannot find anything in his Essay which gives the least 
 support to the notion that he thought the world might possibly 
 be infinite. Several casual statements which we meet with are 
 inconsistent with it ; as when he speaks of "the possibility of a 
 body's moving into a void space beyond the utmost bounds of 
 body." And again, of "the idea of empty, pure space beyond the 
 confines of all bodies." It is also to be remembered that he thinks 
 it "no insignificant subtilty to say, that we are carefully to dis- 
 tinguish between the idea of infinity of a space and the idea of a space 
 infinite. " The first is nothing but ' ' the endless progression of 
 the mind over the idea of space constantly repeated ; " the latter 
 is "an attempt to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk, 
 which carries in it a plain contradiction. " Essay, Sec. 7. 
 
 ri. NOTE, ON THE LOVE OF GOD ; PAGE 99. 
 
 " The love of God is so necessary a sentiment, that it may be found 
 even in the bosom of the atheist. We may slight, forget, or deny God , 
 but not to love him is impossible." These propositions, as well as 
 Pascal's statement that " the heaii; naturally loves universal being," 
 adduced in support of them, can be received only in a limited 
 sense and with many exceptions. In truth, they are to be taken 
 as instances of that hyperbolical style in which French WTiters 
 love to indulge even in metaphysics ; but which, amongst our- 
 selves, is confined to works of imagination and of fiction. How 
 can the love of God warm the bosom of the atheist ? in what sense 
 is it possible that he who forgets God, or denies his being, should 
 yet love him ? Our author solves the paradox when he explains 
 his meaning. The atheist cannot dispossess himself of all ad- 
 miration for the Creator of the universe. In certain moods of his 
 mind a feeling of wonder and astonishment steals over him, and, 
 in spite of his atheism, he is conscious of a God. This is equally 
 
NOTES. 263 
 
 true of irreligious men in general ; ttey cannot entirely dis- 
 possess themselves of the consciousness of God's presence. Some- 
 times this feeling kindles into admiration of his goodness ; generally 
 it goes no further than to inspire uneasiness, if not awe and terror, 
 such as we feel in the presence of those who have the means, and, 
 perhaps, may have the disposition to destroy us. 
 
 All this we may admit, and it is all that the argument requires. 
 But can any such emotions be properly termed the love of God ? 
 The slightest analysis of our own feelings may convince us that 
 love to a superior is not pure affection, but affection mingled Avith 
 respect. The more exalted the object of our regard, the stronger 
 the sentiment of respect ; till at length it assumes the character of 
 reverence or veneration. This is true of our love of God. It is 
 inseparable from reverence. Now the atheist and the irreligious 
 man having no reverence, have no love to God. Their admiration 
 is a stupid wonder like that of the savage at the triumphs of a 
 science the principles of which he does not understand. For love 
 to God would produce its natural results ; desire to secure his 
 favour, pleasure in obeying his commands, and the disposition to 
 sacrifice our interests to his honour. 
 
 There is no subject upon which the Scriptures are more explicit. 
 The world is in arms against its Creator. If the fall of man had 
 never been related by the pen of Moses, the state of the world 
 would lead a thoughtful mind to the conclusion (as in fact it led Plato 
 and his followers) that mankind are not in the condition for which 
 God designed them. Love to God is no longer a natural emotion ; 
 it is introduced with violence, despised, resisted, misunderstood : 
 and at length implanted only by the regenerating influence of a 
 divine agent acting on the soul. 
 
 III. NOTE, ON PRAYER ; PAGE 224. 
 
 The philosophical objection to prayer, which appears so formid- 
 able to our author, has long perplexed certain schools of theology. 
 The moralist divines of the last century were baffled by it. Dr. 
 Hugh Blair, the most popular though by no means the most pro- 
 found of these wTiters, takes up the same ground with M. Jules 
 Simon. " To what purpose, it may be asked, is homage addressed 
 
264 NOTES. 
 
 to a being wtose purpose is unalterably fixed ; to whom our 
 righteousness extendeth not ; whom by no arguments we can 
 persuade, and by no supplications we can mollify 1 The objec- 
 tion," he rephes, " would have weight, if our religious addresses 
 were designed to work any alteration on God ; either by giving 
 him information of what he did not know ; or by exciting affec- 
 tions which he did not possess ; or by inducing him to change 
 measures which he had previously formed. But they are only 
 crude and imperfect notions of religion which can suggest such 
 ideas. The change which our devotions are intended to make is 
 upon ourselves, not upon the Almighty. Their chief efficacy is 
 derived from the good dispositions which they raise and cherish in 
 the human soul."* This is, in a few words, the explanation of 
 the difficulty given by M. Jules Simon ; to which he adds, in 
 accordance with most writers who take this view of the subject, 
 that devotion consists not so much in acts of supplication as in 
 acts of praise. Thus evading the difficulty, instead of manfully 
 confronting it. 
 
 But, in the first place, these explanations give no satisfac- 
 tion to a christian, because they are du-ectly opposed to the voice 
 of holy Scripture. Did prayer work no change in " measures which 
 God had previously formed," when the life of Hezekiah was pro- 
 longed fifteen years in answer to his supplications ? Or when 
 God staid the destroying angel in the midst of his career of death 
 at the instance of the penitent King David ? Numerous instances 
 not less decisive will occur to the mind of every reader who has 
 the least acquaintance with his Bible. Nor is it true, again, that 
 praise and thanksgiving compose the chief elements of devotion, 
 or that prayer is not always necessary. The case is exactly the 
 reverse. Our Lord delivered a parable to teach us that " men 
 ought always to pray, and not to faint ;" and the point of it lies in 
 this ; that an unjust judge gave a righteous sentence rather than 
 submit to the restless importimity of an injured plaintiff. Hence 
 the moral comes out with overwhelming force : " How much more 
 shall not God avenge his own elect which cry day and night unto 
 hun ? " Luke xviii. And that the practice of prayer as distin- 
 
 * Sermon iv. vol. i. 
 
NOTES. 265 
 
 guished from thanksgiving is enjoined upon us in Scripture, is 
 sufficiently proved by a few quotations : "Ask, and it shall be given 
 you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, and it shall be opened." Matt, 
 vii. 7. " Watch ye therefore, and pray always." Lukexxi. 36. 
 " Be careful for nothing ; but, in every thing by prayer and sup- 
 plication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known 
 unto God." Phil. iv. 6. "Pray without ceasing." 1 Thess. v. 
 
 17. 
 
 We have frequent occasion to notice, with- regret and not 
 without surprise, that M. Jules Simon has but a moderate ac- 
 quaintance with English metaphysicians and moralists. He seems 
 to be ignorant of the works of Paley, whose remarks on this 
 subject, had he ever read them, it is impossible he should have 
 overlooked in the course of this discussion. 
 
 The objection is, that God, being infinitely wise and good, will 
 bestow whatever is fit for us without praying, and that if any- 
 thing be not fit for us, we cannot obtain it by praying. To this 
 Dr. Paley replies, sententiously ; " that it may be agreeable to 
 perfect wisdom to grant that to our prayers which it would not 
 have been agreeable to the same wisdom to have given us without 
 praying for. " This must be obvious ; since, that for God to with- 
 hold favours till we ask for them tends of necessity, as he goes on 
 to observe, "to encourage devotion among his rational creatures, 
 and to keep up and circulate a knowledge and sense of their 
 dependency upon him." It is urged, again, that God will always 
 do what is best from the moral perfection of his nature, and that 
 too whether we pray or not. This objection, likewise, Paley has 
 anticipated. "It proceeds," he says, "upon the supposition that 
 there is but one mode of acting for the best ; and that the di-vine 
 will is necessarily determined to that mode only ; both which 
 positions presume a knowledge of universal nature far beyond 
 what we are capable of attaining."* ** It is indeed," says another 
 very able writer, "it is indeed a very unsatisfactory mode of 
 speaking to say, God wiU always do what is best ; since we can 
 conceive him capable in all cases of doing what is still better for 
 
 * Moral Philosophy. 
 
266 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 tlie creature, and also that the creature is capable of receiving 
 more and more from his infinite fulness for ever. All that can be 
 rationally meant by such a phrase is, that, in the circumstances 
 of the case, God will always do what is most consistent with his 
 own wisdom, goodness, and holiness ; but then the disposition to 
 pray, and the act of praying, add a new circumstance to every 
 case, and often bring many other new circumstances along with 
 them."* 
 
 It may be further said, in reply to the objection derived from 
 the perfection of God's character, and the consequent immutability 
 of his conduct ; that this immutability may consist, not so much 
 in God's adherence to his purposes as in his adherence to the 
 principles of his administration. He may purpose to do under 
 certain conditions which are dependent on the free agency of man 
 what he will not do otherwise. And the reason may be this ; 
 that an immutable adherence to the principles of his administration 
 requires it. Prayer is in Scripture made one of these conditions ; 
 and if God has established it as one of the principles of his moral 
 government to accept prayer, in every case in which he has given 
 us authority to ask, he has not, we may be assured, entangled his 
 actual government of the world with the bonds of such an eternal 
 predestination of pai'ticular events, as either to reduce prayer to a 
 mere form of words, or not to be able himself, consistently with 
 his decrees, to answer it, whenever it is encouraged by hi^ express 
 commands. 
 
 * Kichard Watson. Tbeola2;ical Institutes. 
 
 THE EKD. 
 
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