^55^'of princT?^ 
 
 ^ f O/-OGICAL St^^V" 
 
 BR 45 .B35 1867 
 Bampton lectures 
 
y*. 
 
 f k^ 
 
THE 
 
 BAMPTON LECTURES 
 
 FOR M.DCCC.LXVII 
 
RIVINGTONS 
 
 London Waterloo Place 
 
 Oxford High Street 
 
 Cambridge Trinity Street 
 
THE DOGMATIC FAITH 
 
 %\x Jfrtquiru into % !lclaticnt mhmttim% fatimm 
 lUbclafiou anir gagma 
 
 IN EIGHT LECTURES PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF OXFORD IN THE YEAR 1867 
 
 ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE LATE 
 
 REV. JOHN BAMPTON, M. A 
 
 CANON OF SALISBURY 
 
 / 
 BY EDWARD GARBETT, M.A 
 
 INCUMBENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, SURBITON 
 
 RIVINGTONS 
 
 f onfton, %ih%\ \\\\\ Cambridge 
 
 18G7 
 
EXTRACT 
 
 FROM THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
 
 OF THE LATE 
 
 EEV. JOHN BAMPTON, 
 
 CANON OF SALISBURY, 
 
 " I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to the 
 
 " Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University of 
 " Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and singular the 
 " said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the intents and 
 " purposes hereinafter mentioned ; that is to say, I will and 
 " appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ox- 
 " ford for the time being shall take and receive all the rents, 
 " issues, and profits thereof, and (after all taxes, reparations, 
 " and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the re- 
 " mainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Ser- 
 " mons, to be established for ever in the said University, and 
 " to be performed in the manner following : 
 
 " I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in 
 " Easter Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads 
 " of Colleges only, and by no others, in the room adjoining 
 " to the Printing- House, between the hours of ten in the 
 " morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity 
 " Lecture Sermons, the year following, at St. Mary's in 
 " Oxford, between the commencement of the last month in 
 " Lent Term, and the end of the third week in Act Term. 
 
vi EXTRACT FROM CANON BAMPTON's WILL. 
 
 " Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity Lecture 
 " Sermons shall be preached upon either of the following- Sub- 
 " jects — to confirm and establish the Christian Faith, and to 
 " confute all heretics and schismatics — upon the divine au- 
 " thority of the holy Scriptures — upon the authority of the 
 " writings of the primitive Fathers, as to the faith and prac- 
 " tice of the primitive Church — upon the Divinity of our Lord 
 " and Saviour Jesus Christ — upon the Divinity of the Holy 
 " Ghost — upon the Articles of the Christian Faith, as compre- 
 " bended in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. 
 
 " Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lec- 
 " ture Sermons shall be always printed, within two months 
 " after they are preached ; and one copy shall be given to the 
 " Chancellor of the University, and one copy to the Head of 
 " every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the city of 
 " Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; 
 " and the expense of printing them shall be paid out of the 
 " revenue of the Land or Estates given for establishing the 
 " Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the Preacher shall not be 
 " paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, before they are 
 " printed. 
 
 " Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be quali- 
 " fied to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath 
 " taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, in one of the 
 " two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge ; and that the 
 " same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Ser- 
 " mons twice." 
 

 PREFACE 
 
 IN preparing these Lectures for the press, it has been ray 
 object to reduce the notes to as narrow a compass as possible. 
 I have therefore abstained from the use of matter simply 
 illustrative, and have only given references where the facts 
 relied upon in the body of the Lectures or the arguments ad- 
 vanced were likely to be called into question, and therefore 
 needed to be strengthened by corroborative testimony. I am 
 conscious of many faults in execution and defects of detail 
 throughout the volume. But I appeal for an indulgent 
 criticism on the ground that the last twenty-seven years of 
 my life have been incessantly occupied by the duties of a 
 laborious ministry, and that these Lectures have been prepared 
 under the pressure of deep domestic affliction, and amid the 
 constant distractions of parochial work. 
 
 Christ Church Parsonage, Surbiton, 
 October 8th, 1867. 
 
LECTURE I 
 
 THE FAITH AND THE CHURCH 
 
 JUDE 3 
 
 Beloved, when I gave all diligence to write ttnto you of the 
 common salvation, it loas needful for me to write unto you, 
 and exhort you that ye should earnestly contend for the faith 
 which was once delivered unto the saints. 
 
 lHESE words sound like the battle-cry of the 
 Church, the trumpet-note of the Spirit of God 
 summoning her to the conflict. They appeal to 
 the heroic virtues of constancy of purpose, forti- 
 tude, and courage. No childish uncertainty of 
 conviction or womanly weakness of purpose must 
 characterise the " followers of them who through 
 faith and patience inherit the promises." Many 
 of the highest qualities of manhood are taxed by 
 war, and by none should they be so illustriously 
 displayed as by the saint who has attained unto 
 "a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature 
 of the fulness of Christ." Such was the appeal 
 of St. Paul to his Corinthian converts: "Watch 
 ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men, be 
 strong." 
 
 B 
 
2 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 The need for manly vigour is not diminished 
 by the fact that the sphere of conflict is spiritual, 
 not material. The shock of outward battle calls 
 into play the excitement of the physical spirits and 
 the combativeness natural to man. It has about 
 it a terrible pomp of its own, and an outward dis- 
 play singularly attractive to some minds, and only 
 intensified into a sterner reality by its 'dreadful 
 accompaniments of suffering and death. The spiri- 
 tual war taxes constancy and courage the more 
 from the absence of these outward stimulants. To 
 stand firm to principle amid reproach, steadily to 
 separate abiding truth from its temporary counter- 
 feits, to resist ridicule and the strength of lan- 
 guage often substituted for strength of argument, 
 to throw on one side accusations of narrowness and 
 ignorance, irritating as they are to a just self- 
 respect, to rise superior to periodic fluctuations of 
 opinion as ceaseless as the ebb and flow of the 
 sea, and amid these various influences to maintain 
 with singleness of heart and undistracted accuracy 
 of eye the truth of God, is the most difficult of 
 all conflicts and the most glorious of all victories. 
 
 The exact nature of the conflict implied in St. 
 Jude's words must be carefully discriminated. They 
 do not refer to the triumph of the martyr, daunt- 
 less amid danger and triumphant over death. To 
 this trial the saints were called during the stroke 
 of the ten fiery persecutions of primitive times. 
 No more heroic epoch has ever occurred in human 
 history. It is perhaps well for the Church that 
 
I] The Conflict 3 
 
 our knowledge of the detailed events of these cen- 
 turies is scanty and imperfect. Had each individual 
 martyr stood forth from the past distinctly pour- 
 trayed in all the particulars of his suffering and 
 his triumph, there would have been danger of a 
 Christian hero-worship. These figures of the an- 
 cient saints would have stood between us and the 
 company of the inspired Apostles, and have ob- 
 scured to our view the august figure of the Sa- 
 viour, as amid them and above them all He towers, 
 single and alone, "in all things having the pre- 
 eminence/' We know that the Church passed 
 through these tempests and triumphed over them. 
 The glimpses we catch of the history of the martyrs 
 illustrate to us their lofty confidence in God and their 
 intense sight of the Unseen. There is, for instance, 
 something wonderfully striking in the joy with which 
 Ignatius appears to dwell upon his approaching 
 agonies from the lions in the Roman amphitheatre. 
 He saw in them but a brief and bloody entrance into 
 Heaven, true discijole of the Master who in dying 
 destroyed death, and on His cross "spoiled princi- 
 palities and powers, triumphing over them in it." 
 
 But it is evident from the context that St. Jude 
 looked beyond these outward persecutions to some- 
 thing further. His entire Epistle does not contain 
 a word expressive of the expectation of outward 
 persecution. His warning is against men within 
 the pale of the Church herself, " crept in unawares." 
 He specifies the instruments of their warfare against 
 the truth as twofold : immoral laxity of practice 
 
 B 2 
 
4 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 " turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness," 
 springing out of doctrinal unfaithfulness as out of 
 its natural root, "denying the only Lord God and 
 our Lord Jesus Christ." The words are re-echoed 
 in the language of 2 St. Peter ii. 1. If the conjecture 
 of modern criticism be correct that St. Jude wrote 
 earlier of the two, and that St. Peter composed 
 his second letter after seeing Jude's Epistle and 
 with a reference to it, the language of the Apostle 
 of the Circumcision supplies an inspired enlarge- 
 ment of Jude's inspired description. " There shall be 
 false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in 
 damnable heresies, denying the Lord that bought 
 them." If these false teachers were steadily op- 
 posed, it was probable that they would break off 
 from "the Catholic Church," (as the orthodox be- 
 lievers were early called to distinguish them from 
 heretics,) and would form parties of their own. This 
 result St. Jude foresaw. " These be they who sepa- 
 rate themselves, sensual, having not the Spirit." 
 The warning was not addressed therefore against 
 avowed enemies without, but against secret enemies 
 within the Church, and the conflict intended is 
 not a struggle of endurance against heathen vio- 
 lence, but of firm adherence to truth against doc- 
 trinal error. The evil already worked in Jude's 
 days, but it reached its full development only in 
 later times. For a period the process was merci- 
 fully checked by the pressure of outward violence : 
 centuries of persecution elapsed before the battle 
 of the Church took its permanent direction. 
 
I] The Conflict. 5 
 
 Those who believe in the providence of her great 
 Head over the fortunes of the Church and delight 
 to trace its actings, illustrated by the facts of the 
 past as by the finger of God Himself, will adore 
 the over -ruling wisdom manifested in this order. 
 It is of the utmost importance to us to be able 
 to identify the pure teaching of the Scriptures 
 with the belief of the earliest ages of Christianity. 
 In tracing our own doctrinal genealogy back to 
 the pure fountain of " God's word written," the 
 faith of the first three centuries is a vital link of 
 the process. Had not their witness survived, the 
 Church of our own days might have been charged 
 with putting a meaning upon the sacred records 
 never assigned to them by the ages living nearest 
 to the time of their composition. For this apolo- 
 getic reason the Church of England has ever placed 
 the highest importance on the doctrinal identity 
 existing between our own standards and the faith 
 of the primitive ages. 
 
 But we can trace an object even beyond this 
 in the providential order of things. The persecu- 
 tions of the earlier ages were disciplinary and pre- 
 parative to the controversies of the ages subsequent. 
 There can, I think, be no doubt that a conflict of 
 truth against error is more difficult and crucial than 
 a conflict of Christian stedfastness against persecu- 
 tion, in exact proportion as it is more subtle and 
 less palpable. The elements entering into the ac- 
 ceptance and maintenance of truth are very com- 
 plicated. They lie in the intellectual as well as 
 
6 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 the moral sphere of human action. They afford 
 room, as the other conflict does not, for honest 
 question and sincere hesitation. The man challenged 
 either to curse the Saviour or to endure for His 
 sake, could not possibly doubt the nature of the 
 issue submitted to him. But the man called to 
 discriminate between the true teaching of dead 
 Apostles and the false glosses of living heresiarchs, 
 has a much more difficult problem to solve. The 
 conflict no longer appeals to the obvious claims 
 of duty, but reaching into the inner sphere of con- 
 viction shakes faith on its first and lowest founda- 
 tions. The struggle is not less really a struggle, 
 and does not for this appeal less urgently to manly 
 fortitude and courage, but rather tasks them to 
 a nobler exercise and carries them into a higher 
 sphere. 
 
 It pleased God that the lesser trial should ex- 
 haust its strength against the Church first, and the 
 higher conflict was for a while restrained. How 
 the force of violence without would naturally check 
 the progress of doctrinal corruption within the 
 Church, simply by excluding insincere and un- 
 spiritual members, is too clear to need illustration. 
 The providence of our Master gave time to rear the 
 Church into manhood, and to mature her confidence 
 by trial, before He let loose the more dangerous 
 elements of error. Thus when the time came to 
 "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to 
 the saints," as for life and death, the saints of the 
 later period could draw strength from the example 
 
I] The Faith. 7 
 
 of their sainted predecessors. They could strengthen 
 their zeal by the recollection that on behalf of this 
 very faith the noble army of the martyrs in other 
 days had bled and conquered. Should they prove 
 false to their charge and treacherously betray the 
 trust for which the saints of other days had wit- 
 nessed unto death ? 
 
 The more closely we examine St. Jude's teaching 
 the more clearly shall we see it to convey this 
 view of the Church's conflict. The text contains 
 four distinct assertions. 
 
 I It asserts the existence of an organised and 
 formal body of truth under the title of " the faith" — 
 not fides qua creditur, but fides qua creditur — 
 not the act of believing, but that which is believed. 
 The whole text and context so imperatively fix this 
 meaning on the word, as to admit of little dispute. 
 That which was delivered to the saints, and for 
 which they were to contend against false disciples, 
 could not be the quality of belief; nor could it be 
 the revealed necessity for this moral quality, since 
 St. Jude is not explaining the doctrine of faith, as 
 St. Paul in the third chapter of his Epistle to the 
 Romans, and St. James in the second chapter of 
 his Epistle. It remains, therefore, that the word 
 expresses the truth believed, and in this sense the 
 general consent of criticism may be said to accept 
 it [i]. In the New Testament usage of the word 
 'faith' two stages may be traced. Throughout the 
 Gospels it is used solely in its subjective sense, in 
 that meaning of trust or reliance which the word 
 
8 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 had acquired in the Old Testament Scriptures ; but 
 in the Acts of the Apostles it gradually assumes an 
 objective sense. Three classes of passages occur. 
 In one class it is used with the article in contexts 
 where it can only be understood of the act of faith 
 in the believer ; in another class of passages its 
 objective meaning is equally clear ; while in a 
 third class of passages the word may bear either 
 meaning ; rather, perhaps, the two meanings are 
 so combined together that it is impossible to say 
 with certainty which of the two ideas was most 
 prominent in the mind of the writer [2]. 
 
 Now this use of the word in a subjective sense 
 alone during the lifetime of our Lord, and its use 
 in an objective sense likewise after our Lord's ascen- 
 sion into heaven, are wholly congruous with the 
 circumstances. For Christ Himself is the centre and 
 heart of Christianity. Union with a Divine living- 
 Person, and not adherence to a dead creed, however 
 great and noble, is the essence of the Gospel. This 
 is true now, as it was true during the term of 
 Christ's personal ministry. But there is this differ- 
 ence. While our Lord was upon earth He was 
 Himself the Gospel, for He was visibly present, 
 and could be seen by men's eyes, and heard by 
 their ears, and touched by their hands, before He 
 was revealed to their hearts as the object of trust 
 and adoring affection. Nothing else was needed to 
 stand between the soul and Him, or to make Him 
 known to men, but Himself. Accordingly during 
 this period His Gospel was not extended beyond 
 
I] The Faith. 9 
 
 the possible sphere of His personal presence. No 
 attempt was made to gather converts from a 
 wider circle than conld be reached by His own 
 ministry. The missionary journeys of the Twelve 
 and of the Seventy did not extend beyond the cities 
 of Israel. During this period He was presented 
 to men immediately, and faith was the act of trust 
 in His office and affection to His person. 
 
 But after our Lord's death this was changed. 
 He was no longer visibly present upon earth, and 
 could no longer be known immediately. Present 
 He still was with His Church, in fulfilment of the 
 perpetual promise, " Lo ! I am with you always, even 
 unto the end of the world," but His presence was 
 spiritual, not corporeal, — invisible, not visible. Before 
 men could believe in Him they needed to know Him ; 
 but as they could no longer come into His corporal 
 presence they could only know Him by knowing 
 about Him. They knew Him no longer immediately 
 by eye and ear and hand, but mediately through the 
 preaching of truths relative to Him and to His office 
 and work as Prophet, Priest, and King. These truths 
 were the medium of their knowing Himself. They 
 were, so to speak, the atmosphere through means of 
 which the Sun of Righteousness Himself might shine 
 upon the hearts and consciences of mankind. By a 
 simple and easy transition, the idea of trust and 
 reliance upon Christ came also to involve the truths 
 without which knowledge, and therefore trust, would 
 have been impossible. 
 
 Here, therefore, is the true solution of the difficulty 
 
10 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 presented by the palpable difference between the 
 preaching of our Lord and that of His Apostles. 
 Undoubtedly our Lord did not teach doctrine in 
 the sense that the Apostles taught it. He presented 
 Himself to mankind and claimed their allegiance. 
 But it is totally to misapprehend the Divine order 
 to say that our Lord adopted attachment to Himself 
 as the mark of discipleship in opposition to accept- 
 ance of doctrinal truths. He claims attachment to 
 Himself now that He is in heaven exalted to the 
 right hand of the Father, as much as He claimed 
 it while still upon earth and hiding beneath the 
 veil of the flesh the lustre of His Deity. Doctrines 
 are so far from standing in opposition to this per- 
 sonal attachment to Himself, that it is only through 
 means of doctrine that it can conceivably be ac- 
 quired. We cannot love what we do not know. 
 And as we do not live during His earthly ministry 
 and cannot watch Him with our eyes as He accom- 
 plished the mysteries of His life and death, resur- 
 rection and ascension, we can only know Him 
 through His revelation of Himself by the mouths 
 of His inspired Apostles. 
 
 Now all these truths are gathered round His person 
 and work. They either reveal what He did during 
 His life on earth, or what He is doing now in 
 heaven, or what He will do when He comes again 
 to judgment. As He is one, so the truths making 
 Him known to us are one also ; one in that organic 
 and structural unity which pervades them as con- 
 sistent members of a completed body. Hence they 
 
I] One Faith. 11 
 
 are capable of being described together, and consti- 
 tute "the faith" once delivered to the saints. 
 
 II It asserts that this body of truth is complete, 
 and admits neither of change nor of addition. It 
 is a faith " once" delivered, and admitting of no 
 repetition. Bengel's words again echo the sentence of 
 modern criticism : " Particula valde urgens ; Nulla 
 alia dabitur fides." The word is used emphatically 
 for a single act. St. Paul employs it in the 
 assertion, " once was I stoned." It is the word em- 
 ployed with earnest reiteration in the Epistle to 
 the Hebrews to express the singleness of the offering 
 of Christ, in contrast to the oft-repeated sacrifices 
 of the Mosaic priesthood. The sacred writer illus- 
 trates this singleness by the singleness of death : 
 " As it is appointed unto men once to die, so Christ 
 was once offered." But while the word implies an 
 act completed and not admitting of repetition, it 
 does not imply that the act itself was necessarily 
 done all at once, and not slowly and by degrees. 
 Thus St. Paul employs it for the work of grace : 
 " It is impossible for those who were once en- 
 lightened." Where it does not enter into the 
 Apostle's purpose to assert whether the enlighten- 
 ment was wrought all at once as with St. Pau], 
 or by degrees as with the Ethiopian Eunuch, but 
 only that when accomplished it admits of no rejDeti- 
 tion. Thus the faith was delivered to the saints 
 not in one act but in many, by a succession of in- 
 spired writers at very different periods of the world. 
 But once completed it was for ever completed — 
 
12 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 ana£, once for all. If the conjecture of modern 
 criticism be correct that the Epistle of St. Jude 
 was written at the latest verge of the apostolic 
 age, the last of all the Apostolic Epistles with the 
 sole exception of the Second Epistle of St. Peter, 
 then the faith was already complete when he wrote. 
 For neither of these two Epistles deal formally with 
 doctrines, except the doctrines of the inspiration of 
 the Scriptures and of the second coming of Christ. 
 They may therefore be regarded as Divine seals 
 put by the Spirit on the authenticity and authority 
 of all that had gone before. 
 
 Ill It asserts the authority due to the faith to 
 be the authority of God. It was once delivered. 
 The sacred writer does not indeed specify by whom 
 it was delivered, but the language scarcely admits 
 of doubt. For the word " delivered" is a word 
 of authority, and implies a trust committed by a 
 superior to an inferior [3]. It is certain, moreover, 
 that the person delivering the faith and the persons 
 to whom it was delivered cannot be the same. It 
 was delivered " to the saints," — where the very width 
 of the word includes the entire company of the 
 redeemed. The Apostles themselves were therefore 
 receivers, not givers. Thus our Lord, in His won- 
 derful prayer recorded in John xvii, declared, " I have 
 given unto them the words which Thou gavest Me a ." 
 The great Apostle, called after the rest as one born out 
 of due time, asserts his own knowledge of the Gospel 
 to have been the result of an immediate revelation. 
 
 a John xvii. 8. 
 
I] Authority and Trustees. 13 
 
 " I neither received it of man, neither was I taught 
 it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ b ." The 
 faith is no discovery of man, no flash of light from 
 the intuitions, no development of human sentiment, 
 but a solemn charge entrusted to the saints, cha- 
 racterised by the immutability and invested with 
 the authority of the Deity from whom it comes. 
 It was given through the instrumentality of men, 
 whence the Apostle spoke of the " tradition re- 
 ceived of us e ;" but the author of the trust, and 
 He who will demand an account of the stewardship, 
 is God. 
 
 IV Lastly, the text specifies the trustees — " the 
 saints." There is no exclusive or sectional meaning 
 about the word. It reaches to the whole company 
 of the people of God. But the people of God are 
 not a loose mass of unorganised units. It has 
 pleased the Holy One to frame them into a Church, 
 with a visible order and polity. By virtue of the 
 Word of God she preaches and the Sacraments she 
 administers, by her doctrinal creeds and public 
 services and Divinely-appointed ministry, she dis- 
 charges her office as " the pillar and ground of the 
 truth d '" or, as our own Church expresses it, the 
 " witness and keeper of Holy Writ e ." Who should 
 so fitly maintain and defend the faith as those who 
 have solemnly sworn before God and the Church 
 to drive away all erroneous and strange doctrines 
 contrary to God's Word, and have moreover stated 
 
 b Gal. i. 12. c 2 Thess. iii. 6. d i Tim. iii. 15. 
 
 e Art. XX. 
 
14 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 their solemn belief that they are truly called to 
 this work " according to the will of our Lord Jesus " 
 and by the inward motions of " the Holy Ghost V 
 Who should stand forward as the leaders among 
 the saints but they who in every act of their 
 sacred office perpetually reiterate that unfeigned 
 belief in all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old 
 and New Testaments which was the condition of 
 their admission into holy orders % But while God's 
 ministers are called to stand foremost in the conflict, 
 it is in their character of representatives and ser- 
 vants of the Church, not as lords over God's heritage. 
 Not to them alone has the faith been entrusted, but 
 to the Church at large. It is the inalienable birth- 
 right of every Christian man. Each and all alike 
 have their share equally in the responsibility and 
 in the glory of its maintenance. The nature of 
 the trusteeship suggests at once the occasion of 
 the danger (for had there been no human agency 
 employed in the delivery and preservation of the 
 faith, there would have been no room for scepticism) 
 and the motive for overcoming it. The faith was 
 once delivered " to the saints." 
 
 These four particulars meet in one general pro- 
 position. They involve the existence of a consistent 
 body of truth, doctrinal and practical, necessary to 
 make men " wise unto salvation through faith which 
 is in Christ Jesus." It is " a faith " not in contrast 
 with reason, but with sight and sense, since it reveals 
 truths with which sight and sense cannot make us 
 acquainted. It is a complete faith, admitting neither 
 
I] The Scriptural claim. 15 
 
 of addition nor of diminution, for it was given " once 
 for all." It is invested with a Divine authority, 
 inasmuch as it is no creation of the human intellect 
 or expression of the human sentiment, but a re- 
 velation from God, " delivered," not discovered, and 
 therefore changeless as the God from whom it comes. 
 Its preservation in purity and integrity is the test 
 of faithfulness or unfaithfulness in the Church ; the 
 means of her moral trial and discipline, at once her 
 inalienable inheritance and the crown of her glory. 
 It is invested with the attributes of the Giver, — 
 unity, perfection, immutability. 
 
 This is the teaching of Scripture. It is not my 
 present object to plead that the statement is true 
 because it is scriptural. Such indeed is my deep 
 conviction, in common with the long line of the 
 saints and fathers of the Church. No epithet is 
 applied more frequently to the Scriptures by the 
 great writers alike of the Primitive and of the Re- 
 formation periods than the epithet " infallible," and 
 in such illustrious company no p erson need be 
 ashamed to profess his belief in this attribute of the 
 Word. But my present argument will be addressed 
 to those who deny the inspiration of the Bible, 
 and to them an appeal to its authority is in- 
 applicable. Few topics occur with greater frequency 
 in what a Dutch divine ostentatiously calls " the 
 theology of the nineteenth century" than the con- 
 temptuous rejection of the dogma of Scriptural in- 
 fallibility. There are many degrees of rejection. 
 Some only reject the inspiration of its historical 
 
16 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 portions, and accept the inspiration of its doctrinal 
 teaching : a distinction intelligible, however far it 
 may fall short of being reasonable or may fail to 
 accord with the facts of the case [4]. Some reject 
 the inspired authority of the Book altogether, but 
 accept its pure and lofty morality, not because it 
 is found in the Bible, but because it commends itself 
 to their own consciousness. This also is intelligible, 
 however much such a foundation for faith may 
 prove to be a quicksand entirely inadequate to sup- 
 port the superstructure reared upon it [5]. Others 
 accept only the portraiture of our blessed Master, 
 the alone " perfect ideal" known to man. This, 
 again, is intelligible, inconsistent although it be with 
 a rejection of dogmatic Christianity, for once given 
 the character of Christ, from that premise may be 
 proved step by step the entire structure of the 
 faith [6]. Others, lastly, take a step further in 
 subtle distinction, and while professing still to ac- 
 cept the Scriptures as the Word of God, place its 
 divinity not in the infallible accuracy of its state- 
 ments, nor in the sublimity of its doctrines, but in 
 "the spirit and the life which breathe in the written 
 words'' as contrasted with the mere flesh or letter 
 of the words themselves [7]. This view appears to 
 me not less unintelligible than it is unreasonable : 
 for it denies, one by one, alike the facts and the 
 doctrines of the Bible, and yet professes to accept 
 an impalpable and indefinable something termed " its 
 spirit and life." In other words, it regards the con- 
 tents of Scripture as human error, and Scripture 
 
I] Dogma. 17 
 
 itself as an inextricable mass of mythical tradition. 
 Yet this mass of imposture is asserted to have 
 a spirit and life that are divine, a contradictory 
 mysticism about as reasonable as it would be to 
 recognise the sweet breath of fresh roses in the 
 effluvia of a corpse. These varieties of opinion 
 need to be borne in mind, but their refutation does 
 not enter into the formal and direct purpose of 
 this series of Lectures. 
 
 I do not therefore affirm the existence of such 
 an authoritative faith as I have described to be 
 certainly a fact, but for the present only affirm that 
 it is the indisputable teaching of Scripture. Now 
 supposing this teaching to be true, such a faith as 
 it describes must necessarily be dogmatic. For 
 " dogma" is only another word for a jwsitive truth, 
 positively asserted in contrast to an opinion, a con- 
 jecture, or a speculation. It is a proposition re- 
 garded as so certainly true, as to be presented for 
 acceptance but not for discussion. This is the his- 
 torical meaning of the word, both in its Pagan and 
 its Christian usage. In the Pagan philosophy it 
 was the descriptive term for that great school of 
 thought which maintained the reality of the know- 
 ledge acquired by the right use of the intellectual 
 faculties, in distinction to the negations of the 
 sceptics and the speculations of the mystics. In 
 Christian philosophy it expresses the theology based 
 on the authority of Scripture and the judgment of 
 the Fathers. Dogma expresses a settled and certain 
 truth, an attained resting-place for belief, from which, 
 
 c 
 
18 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 as from the axioms of mathematical science, we may 
 confidently argue. 
 
 In this sense the faith once delivered to the 
 saints is necessarily dogmatic, by virtue of each 
 and all of the four assertions shown to be contained 
 in St. Jude's words. The structural unity of the 
 faith and the nature of its subject-matter, its com- 
 pleteness, the Divine authority with which it is 
 invested, and the responsibility of the trusteeship 
 of the saints, are the four seals to this title-deed. 
 What God teaches must necessarily have the autho- 
 rity of a command. It was the opinion of Chrysos- 
 tom, Theodoret, and Theophylact, that the doctrines 
 of the Gospel are described in Scripture under this 
 term, and the opinion is shared by many critics of 
 later times [8]. But the ideas of stability, certainty, 
 and authority conveyed by "dogma" are confirmed 
 the more, if in all the five places where the word 
 occurs in the New Testament it is understood in 
 that sense of command or decree which it un- 
 doubtedly bears in three of them [9]. That early 
 in the history of Christianity the word 'dogma' was 
 employed as a distinctive description of the faith 
 at large is certain. Christians were called oi rod fioy- 
 /uaTos, men of the faith ; and the Emperor Aurelian, 
 in his rescript against Paul of Samosata, designates 
 
 the bishops of Italy as eirta-KOiroi rod Soy/maro?, bishops 
 
 of the Faith [10]. What has the stamp of certain 
 truth is necessarily dogmatic. That is dogma, and 
 that alone truly dogma, upon which has been set 
 the seal of the Divine infallibility. 
 
I] Dogmatism. 19 
 
 But a further idea has become associated with 
 the term, and we need to be on our guard lest 
 we confound it with the other. Dogmatism has 
 become a term of reproach, and, in our modern 
 sense of the word, rightly. We express by it the 
 habit of mind which in an over-confidence on its 
 own individual powers is disposed to depreciate 
 the judgment of other men, and to assert personal 
 opinions with confident arrogance as certainly and 
 indisputably true. Thus employed, the word bears 
 a very different meaning to the Soy/narl^w and Soy- 
 imaTiKos of classic usage, for it expresses, not a 
 mode of thought, but a moral disposition. But 
 the tone of authority, consistent and necessary in 
 the infallible, is inconsistent and offensive in the 
 fallible, because by using it the fallible disavows 
 his fallibility. Positiveness of statement is as con- 
 gruous with what is divine as it is incongruous 
 with what is human. A settled and positive truth 
 must necessarily be stated in words sharply defined 
 and trenchant, because if it were otherwise the 
 vagueness and uncertainty of the expressions would 
 attach vagueness and uncertainty to the thing ex- 
 pressed. But in matters of human opinion the 
 errability of the speaker suggests modest qualifica- 
 tion in the words he uses. The dogmatical temper is 
 an assumption of superiority on the part of one man 
 over other men, such as Job rebuked : " No doubt 
 but ye are the people, and wisdom shall die with 
 you f ." It is justly offensive, and if modern thought 
 
 1 Job xii. 2. 
 C 2 
 
20 Tlie Faith and the Church, [Lect. 
 
 only protested against this dogmatical temper, every 
 candid and honest thinker would sympathise with 
 the protest. 
 
 I therefore employ the word dogma for a revealed 
 truth, and for ecclesiastical formulas so far, and so 
 far only, as they truly express the mind of God 
 in His Word. It is a condition arising from the 
 delivery of the faith into the charge of the saints 
 that the formulating; of its truths for the con- 
 venience of instruction and defence is necessarily 
 a human work. Nor will any deny the abstract 
 possibility of human error in the process. If it 
 can be proved to exist, we are bound by our own 
 principles to give up what ceases to be dogmatic 
 as soon as it is proved to be a human miscon- 
 ception or misstatement of the Divinely-given faith. 
 It would be treachery alike to ourselves and to 
 our Master to shrink from making the examina- 
 tion, and making it over and over again, as the 
 exigencies of controversy call attention to one par- 
 ticular dogma or to another. 
 
 But the undogmatic spirit of our day does not 
 rest on any allegation of inaccuracy in the process 
 of formulating truth, but on objections against the 
 existence and certainty of the truth itself. Not 
 against this dogma or that, but against all and 
 every dogma, against dogma at all, is the attack 
 directed. In this relation dogma means dogmatic 
 theology, a system of definite propositions concern- 
 ing God and man and the relation between the 
 two, gathered out of the Scriptures and resting 
 
I] Dogma. 21 
 
 upon them for its ultimate authority. Human 
 language scarcely supplies terms of condemnation 
 stronger or more sweeping than have been applied 
 to this dogmatic teaching. It is declared to be 
 no part of religion, but the unsightly incrustation 
 of ignorance, superstition, and fraud upon the pure 
 belief and natural worship of mankind. Religion 
 is admitted to be Divine ; but theology is asserted 
 to be human, — human not alone in its technical 
 form, upon which there is no dispute, but in its 
 substance, in the truths it professes to teach and 
 the authority on which it professes to teach them. 
 It is contemptuously described as the result of 
 men's ignorance of natural science, and their con- 
 sequent disposition to explain the natural by the 
 supernatural. In this relation the records of the 
 faith are conceived to stand on exactly the same 
 ground as a scientific work of two thousand years 
 ago would stand, accurately expressing the belief 
 of that time, but wholly useless and obsolete amid 
 the advancing science of our own days. At other 
 times it is described as being the creation of the 
 Christian Fathers, or as framed by the definitions of 
 the Schoolmen, or even as the product of the six- 
 teenth century. Nay, stronger language yet has 
 been used. As if it were not sufficient to attribute 
 to it the weakness of a human origin, dogmatic 
 theology is declared to be a creation of Satan him- 
 self, an immense delusion on the credulity of man- 
 kind. As the climax of all, to protest against dogma 
 and resist it in every way is affirmed to be the 
 
22 The Faith and the Church, [Lect. 
 
 most religious of all religious acts, and a prime 
 obligation of Christianity itself [n]. 
 
 Thus the language of the sacred writers and the 
 language of "the theology of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury" stand in direct and irreconcileable opposition. 
 They not only conflict in detail, but they embody 
 two contradictory systems of thought. The whole 
 conceptions on which they rest are different. From 
 the first principle to the last conclusion they are 
 wide asunder as the antipodes. The questions 
 involved in this difference embrace all the mys- 
 teries of life and death, and are the most vital 
 and important that can touch the human heart and 
 exercise the human intellect. If modern thought 
 be right, and all dogmatic teaching is an offence 
 to the self-respect of man and an insult to the 
 majesty of God, then it will not be enough to 
 bring the teaching of our Church into closer con- 
 formity to its truths, but the teaching itself must 
 be swept away altogether. For if there be no dogma 
 because there is no certain truth, then no one form 
 of religious belief ought to be taught more than 
 another, because it cannot be true more than an- 
 other. If, on the other hand, the Apostolic teaching 
 be correct and the dogmatic faith is a revelation 
 made by God to man, then the denial of it must 
 be among the greatest of sins, and a lack of zeal 
 on the part of the Church in defending the trust 
 committed to her among the most fatal of treacheries. 
 In the one case the ancient pagans represented the 
 highest advance of human wisdom, for they regarded. 
 
I] The Argument, 23 
 
 as some men do in our own day, all special beliefs 
 to be but fluctuations in the outward accidents of 
 religion. Then Christianity was a retrogression, not 
 an advancement in the progress of humanity, and 
 our effort should be to get back as fast as possible 
 to that ethical love of the good and the beautiful 
 which constituted their highest advance upwards. 
 In the other case "the revolution of Calvary" was 
 the grandest epoch in the world's history, and the 
 faith of Christ the rising of a Sun of Righteousness 
 upon a race sick with its own miseries and sitting in 
 the valley of the shadow of death. 
 
 Such are the alternatives presented to us, and the 
 present course of Lectures will be devoted to their 
 discussion. It is only possible to deal with argu- 
 ments so Protean as those of modern rationalism by 
 classifying them under certain heads corcesponding 
 with the agencies asserted to be operative in the pro- 
 duction, progress, and results of Christianity, and said 
 to eliminate the action of a Divinely-given and dog- 
 matic faith. These may be reduced to six in num- 
 ber: the influence of a ministerial or priestly class, 
 the force of a religious sentiment, the discoveries 
 of the intuitional faculty, the conclusions of the 
 speculative intellect, the accumulative power of a 
 progressive civilisation, and the instincts of natural 
 conscience. My argument will be directed to prove 
 that the dogmatic faith is no creation of the Church ; 
 that it is not indebted for its influence to a natural 
 sentiment of religion ; that its truths are not the 
 spontaneous discovery of the human mind ; that its 
 
24 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 dogmatic statements do not rest on the same basis 
 as the results of a speculative philosophy ; that it 
 is not a mere passive result of a civilisation far 
 advanced equally for good and evil; and, lastly, that 
 it is not a subordinate instrument of instruction 
 over which the natural conscience rules supreme, an 
 all-sufficient and authoritative judge. 
 
 But the argument will have a positive and affirma- 
 tive side likewise. In the second lecture I shall 
 endeavour to prove that the Church of Christ bears 
 unanimous testimony to the nature of her trustee- 
 ship, and refers the authority of her teaching to 
 those sacred Scriptures of which she is the witness 
 and keeper. Nor does this assertion stand alone, 
 but is supported by the clear testimony of facts. 
 For this authoritative and therefore dogmatic faith 
 can be identified and traced backwards in unbroken 
 continuity of descent to the first age of the Chris- 
 tian era. 
 
 The third lecture will be directed to shew that 
 religion cannot survive without a creed, and never 
 has survived without one. In its absence nothing 
 remains under the name of religion but a dim, 
 vague, and formless sentiment, totally incompetent 
 to answer the questionings of the human heart and 
 conscience, inadequate to restrain human passion, 
 and impotent to correct human misery. It can 
 neither live itself, nor can it give life. Dogmatic 
 truth is the very soul and heart of religious senti- 
 ment, the spring alike of its reality and of its 
 power. 
 
I] The Argument. 25 
 
 The fourth lecture will carry this argument a 
 step further, and prove that revealed Christianity 
 can alone supply this creed. Religious belief rests 
 on revelation only, and not on intuition. Not one 
 solitary religious truth accepted by any school of 
 opinion is to be found outside the circle of revealed 
 dogma. In every case without exception, rationalism 
 is distinguished from Christianity, not by what it 
 teaches, but by what it denies. Hence if all re- 
 vealed dogma were swept away, the entire religious 
 belief of the world would be swept away with it, 
 and we should not be in possession of one solitary 
 ascertained fact relative to God and the world of 
 the Unseen. 
 
 In the fifth lecture I shall seek to show the 
 difference between the propositions of theological 
 science and the systems of speculative philosophy. 
 Speculation carries hi its own professed principles 
 and methods the inevitable seeds of its failure. 
 Dogmatic theology works by a totally different pro- 
 cess, and rests on that inductive method of reason- 
 ing to which physical science is indebted for its 
 triumphs. The Divine truth embodied in ecclesi- 
 astical formulas is not deprived of its divinity by 
 the human character of the definitions. By virtue 
 of its Divine principle, dogma lives and works. 
 In contrast to it, speculative philosophy is born 
 to wither and die. Every successive school has 
 started with some germ of truth, but has destroyed 
 it by the refinements of its speculation, till philo- 
 sophy itself, weary of failure, has found its climax 
 
26 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 in proclaiming through the positivism of Comte its 
 impotence and ignorance. 
 
 The sixth lecture will adjust the relations of 
 Christianity and civilisation, and shew that revealed 
 dogma can alone supply to civilisation the principle 
 of an abiding life. The contrast between Pagan and 
 Christian civilisation is pregnant with this lesson. 
 The two were essentially different alike in duration 
 and in character. Pagan civilisation grew old with 
 the weight of its own evils; Christian civilisation 
 has the elements of an eternal youth. The dif- 
 ference of duration is naturally explained by the 
 difference of character. But al] the distinctive 
 characteristics of Christian civilisation are the result 
 of dogmatic truths, and live or die with the dogmas 
 out of which they grow. 
 
 In the seventh lecture I shall discuss the asserted 
 supremacy of conscience over religious belief. The 
 theories of conscience held in successive periods of 
 moral philosophy will need to be considered. Within 
 the bounds of the same rationalism will be found 
 the assertion of the absolute supremacy of conscience 
 on one side, conflicting witli a denial of the very 
 existence of the faculty upon the other. The fact 
 is conclusive against the theory of an universal 
 conscience and the infallibility of its conclusions. 
 Supposing conscience to be an authoritative and 
 sufficient guide wherever it is in a position to 
 decide, yet in regard to Divine things it is not 
 able to decide for want of the data requisite for 
 a decision. Conscience is not only tainted by 
 
I] Prejudices of the day. 27 
 
 human weakness, but infected by human corruption, 
 and needs to be corrected by the fixed standard 
 of the dogmatic faith before it is competent to 
 discharge its natural function in the constitution 
 of man. 
 
 The eighth lecture will be devoted to gathering 
 up the threads of these arguments, drawing the 
 general conclusion, and tracing its practical bear- 
 ing upon the dangers, conflicts, and duties of our 
 day. 
 
 For the fair consideration of these arguments 
 all antecedent prejudice against dogmatic theology 
 should be discarded. It is very difficult to main- 
 tain exemption from the prevailing tendencies of 
 thought. The current tone of literature is apt to 
 produce an unconscious bias even in honest and 
 independent thinkers. The rejection of dogma has 
 itself become the common dogma of free thought, 
 and may be considered the characteristic principle 
 of writers who loudly claim to represent modern 
 criticism and enquiry. The pre valence of this mode 
 of thinking is however no proof of its reasonableness. 
 If convicted of error, it will not be the first time 
 by a great many that the common judgment of a 
 class of thinkers, and even of an age, has proved 
 to be in the wrong. The disdainful rejection of 
 authoritative teaching should the less disturb the 
 equanimity of a Christian, because it flows out of 
 the social and intellectual developments of the 
 day and the tendency of the age to lawless self- 
 sufficiency. The temper of men's minds is eager, 
 
28 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 restless, and impatient. A headlong rapidity of change 
 is common to all departments of human thought, 
 and it is no matter of surprise that religion should 
 not be exempt from it. At a time when a decade 
 of years exhibits more progress and alteration than a 
 century at other periods, men are naturally tempted 
 to forget the limitations of our human powers, and 
 to claim progress and modification of belief in 
 this as in all other directions. Nor is it difficult 
 to trace the misapprehensions to which the pre- 
 valent prejudice against dogma may reasonably be 
 ascribed. 
 
 Thus the assertion of dogmatic truth may be 
 supposed to fetter the free action of the intellect. 
 For dogma is founded on authority, and the inter- 
 vention of authority implies a domain of truth 
 inaccessible to the unassisted reason. Authority 
 does not indeed limit the range of man's intellectual 
 powers, but it does assert the existence of a limita- 
 tion. It stands at the entrance of Divine knowledge 
 like the cherubim with flaming swords at the gate 
 of Paradise, and exclaims to human genius in its 
 highest flight, " Hitherto canst, thou come, but no 
 further." This restriction offends the pride of reason, 
 and reason, flushed with its triumphs, revolts against 
 it. Yet it should be remembered that it is a very 
 different thing to fix a limit and to assert the ex- 
 istence of a limit already fixed in the constitution 
 of our nature. If there be a sphere of Divine kn< >w- 
 ledge lying above the reach of reason ; if in this 
 inability of reason God has been pleased to give 
 
1] Prejudices of the day. 29 
 
 us revelation ; if the truths contained in this re- 
 velation, being given on Divine authority, have a 
 dogmatic fixity about them admitting neither of 
 change or modification ; if the province of reason 
 is consequently confined to the evidences of a Divine 
 revelation, and this being ascertained to exist, 
 nothing is left but obedient acceptance, — it is best 
 and wisest and noblest to recognise the fact. Truth 
 is ever great, and it is ever great to know it. To 
 square truth to our own preconceived notions and 
 wishes is the sign of weakness ; to square our pre- 
 conceived notions and wishes to truth, making the 
 love of what is true the predominant affection over 
 all others, is the sign of strength and of true nobility 
 of mind. 
 
 Moreover, the self-sufficient impatience that frets 
 at the restraints of dogmatic truth is in the highest 
 degree unhealthy. No doubt it would be a glorious 
 thing to be as God, filling all, searching all, and 
 knowing all. But the trivial limitations of our 
 power and knowledge inherent in the commonest 
 transactions of daily life, warn us by how infinite 
 a distance our narrow capacities are separated from 
 the reach of the Infinite and Unconditioned. We 
 do not move a limb or do an act, but there are 
 involved in the motion and the action mysteries 
 wholly beyond our solution. To a creature so cir- 
 cumstanced patient enquiry and a becoming humility 
 diffident of itself are among the most necessary 
 of graces. Petulant impatience disdainful of con- 
 trol, intolerant of contradiction, and contemptuously 
 
30 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 neglectful of limitations, belongs rather to the fretful- 
 ness of an intellectual childhood than to the quiet 
 self-respect and reverent love of truth characteristic 
 of intellectual maturity. Not such has been the 
 spirit of the great discoverers of nature's laws, of 
 the men whose genius has unlocked her hidden 
 secrets and laid open the marvels of the universe 
 to wonder and to praise. These men have been with- 
 out exception believers in the dogmatic faith [12]. 
 And why 1 Because they learned to apprehend alike 
 the weakness and the strength of man's intellect ; 
 to measure what he can do and what he cannot 
 do. They have not in the pride of what is 
 known lost sight of the immense world of the un- 
 known, reaching: within them and beyond them, 
 around them and above them, mysterious and im- 
 penetrable. 
 
 Nor should we forget that if authoritative dogma 
 places a limit upon reason, reason herself recognises 
 and accepts the limit. The harsh coercion of au- 
 thority is not to be confounded with the temperate 
 self-restraint of the reason, taught to know itself and 
 exercising a wise control over its own flight. It is 
 an idle misapprehension to set faith in opposition 
 to reason, or reason in opposition to faith. There 
 can be no faith without an appeal to the reason, 
 alike to apprehend the truths to be believed and 
 to measure the evidence for believing them. If the 
 faith be from God, reason places her seal of ac- 
 ceptance upon the authenticating proofs of its di- 
 vinity. If this faith contains doctrine, such as the 
 
I] Prejudices of the day. 31 
 
 nature of the Godhead and the union of the two 
 natures in the person of our Lord, having heights 
 and depths beyond our reach, reason witnesses that 
 it must be thus, because a Deity wholly within the 
 comprehension of the human mind could not be a 
 Deity, but would be only an impersonation of man 
 himself. At every step a dogmatic faith appeals 
 to the reason, and the act of accepting the limits 
 placed by it on speculative thought is no more than 
 the act of adoring worship, in which the created 
 intellect acknowledges the supremacy of the Un- 
 created. 
 
 Most certainly the complaint, that a dogmatic 
 faith cramps the freedom of thought and narrows 
 and confines the progress of human knowledge, is 
 singularly at variance with the history of the past. 
 Where will be found a succession of nobler intellects, 
 of profounder thinkers, of more learned scholars, of 
 more elevated moralists, of more subtle philosoj^hers, 
 or more successful toilers after truth, than within 
 the pale of the Church of Christ 1 Freedom of 
 thought, largeness of affection, nobility of character, 
 and political freedom have all been nursed beneath 
 the shadow of dogma. The sole exceptions to this 
 fact are to be found in the corrupt periods of the 
 Church, when she had departed from the teaching 
 of the inspired Scriptures and substituted dogmas 
 of man's making for dogmas of God's revealing. 
 The instinct of self-preservation required that a 
 corrupt Church should not allow men to think, lest 
 
32 The Faith and the Church. [Lect. 
 
 thinking they should cease to be misled. The per- 
 secuting sjDirit displayed towards Galileo in one 
 department of enquiry, and towards Erasmus in an- 
 other, was only an effect of the policy of suppression 
 necessitated by the unfaithfulness of the Church 
 herself. But so long as the Church has been faith- 
 ful to her trust, and has taught no dogmas but 
 what are contained in or may be proved by Holy 
 Writ, she has ever proved herself the nursing- 
 mother of free enquiry, religious liberty, and an 
 ever-advancing civilisation. The emblem of dogma 
 is not the upas-tree blighting everything within 
 its shadow, but the fertilising river carrying plenty 
 and beauty in its course. 
 
 To those, at all events, who accept the inspiration 
 of the Word of God, dogma will have no terrors. 
 Whatever truths there are in Scripture above the 
 full grasp of the mortal intellect, we devoutly accept 
 as part of our disciplinary probation. To believe 
 them because we find them clearly taught in the 
 Word, although we may not be able to understand 
 them, is a duty of our religion and an exercise of 
 submissive faith. Truths contrary to reason and 
 conscience we find none. The objections urged 
 against some of the loftiest and most blessed of re- 
 vealed dogmas we can see to arise either from partial 
 conception or prejudiced misapprehension of their 
 nature. Such, for instance, are the common pleas 
 against the doctrine of the Atonement, as implying 
 the passion of revenge in God and involving the 
 
:l] 
 
 Belief of the Church. 33 
 
 injustice of punishing one person for the offences of 
 another. Both ideas are such palpable perversions 
 of the truth, that one knows not whether most to 
 wonder at the perversity that will not, or at the 
 prejudice which cannot understand it. To the 
 enlightened reason and awakened conscience the 
 dogmas of the faith are the subjects of endless 
 praise and adoration. Their sublimity and loftiness, 
 their breadth and grasp, their coDgruity with the 
 highest conceptions of God, and their adaptation 
 to the spiritual wants of man, alike stamp them 
 with the signet of Divinity. Our submission to 
 the evidence that authenticates the dogma is not 
 more full and absolute than our adoring admiration 
 of the dogma itself. On this rock we place our 
 feet, as adequate to support us amid the struggles 
 of life and the fears of death. Here we rest, con- 
 fident that the faith which has survived the tem- 
 pests of the past, and has remained unaltered amid 
 the change and vicissitude of all other things, will 
 equally triumph in the future. Over that victory 
 there does not hang, to a believer hi revelation, the 
 shadow of a doubt. The only question is by whose 
 hands the triumph will be accomplished. God grant 
 that it may be by our own beloved Church. Here 
 may she place her feet and prove herself the true 
 successor of prophets and apostles by her faithful- 
 ness to her great trust. May she proclaim aloud this 
 testimony, and never cease to witness to the last, 
 whether amid reproach or persecution, if needs be 
 
 D 
 
34 Th e Ft i ith of th e Ch inrh. [ Lect. I 
 
 amid suffering and death, to the faith once delivered 
 unto the saints. Now unto Him that is able to 
 keep us from falling, and to present us faultless 
 before the presence of His glory with exceeding 
 joy, to the only wise God, our Saviour, be glory 
 and majesty, dominion and power, both now and 
 ever. 
 
LECTURE II 
 
 THE HISTORICAL FAITH 
 
 Heb. xiii. 7, 8 
 
 Whose faith follow, considering the end of their conversation. 
 Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. 
 
 J. HE force of these words is in no degree lessened 
 by separating the two clauses from each other and 
 turning the latter of them into an independent sen- 
 tence. The sequence of thought irresistibly connects 
 the person of the Saviour and the doctrine of His 
 immutability with the faith of the saints. As the 
 whole sentence stands in the authorised version, the 
 words may simply denote that those who spoke 
 the Word of God to the Hebrews included the 
 unchangeableness of the work and office of Christ 
 among the truths they taught The separation of 
 the two clauses demanded by the critical neces- 
 sities of the passage carries the assertion further, 
 and converts their belief into an inspired and autho- 
 ritative verity : " Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, 
 to-day, and for ever." 
 
 D 2 
 
36 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 The words thus understood affirm the same con- 
 flict of Christian stedfastness against doctrinal error 
 which has already been shown to be graphically 
 taught in the language of St. Jude. It would have 
 been unnecessary for the inspired writer to press 
 upon the Hebrew Christians the duty of following 
 the faith of their apostolic teachers unless there had 
 been danger of their behig led away from it. The 
 exhortation is analogous to the warning of our 
 Lord against the false Christs of the days of the 
 Son of Man : " If they shall say unto you, Behold, 
 he is in the desert ; go not forth : behold, he is in 
 the secret chambers; believe it not. For as the 
 lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even 
 unto the west ; so shall also the coming of the Son of 
 Man be a ." The caution of the text is to the same 
 purpose. False projDhets would arise, teaching an- 
 other gospel. Varieties of opinion would surround 
 them on every side. Men unlearned and unstable 
 would wrest the Scriptures unto their own destruc- 
 tion. Opinions would change and fluctuate. But 
 they were to stand amid all these things firmly 
 upon this assurance, that the Saviour who had been 
 preached unto them could never change. Men's 
 subjective notions might vary, but the objective 
 truth of the Saviour's nature, person, and work was 
 the same for ever ; a solid rock amid the heaving 
 ocean of human controversies, fixed and immoveable 
 as Him over whose cloudless being there passes not 
 the shadow of a change. 
 
 8 Matt. xxiv. 26, 27. 
 
II] The Faith immutable. 37 
 
 The text is thus another accent of the voice of 
 the Spirit of God in the Word, emphatically re- 
 iterating the assertion of a dogmatic faith given 
 by God to man. The fact pervades the Scriptures 
 everywhere, proclaimed in its positive teaching, pro- 
 minent in its examples, repeated in its exhortations, 
 promises, and warnings, and not obscurely latent in 
 its moral precepts. Revelation is a message from 
 God to man containing all things necessary to make 
 him wise unto salvation through faith in Christ 
 Jesus, a complete system of faith invested with the 
 authority of its Divine Author, and delivered to 
 the keeping of the saints. Faithfully to maintain 
 it, personally to live upon it, and ministerially to 
 preach it throughout the world, is the appointed 
 office of the Church ; — the instrument of her con- 
 flict and the crown of her glory.- 
 
 Thus Scripture teaches. The fact is not con- 
 clusive in this controversy, because the authority 
 and character of Scripture are involved in dispute. 
 But the assertion puts it into our power to bring 
 the question to the test of facts. Could we suppose 
 human agency to be sufficient to have produced the 
 Christian Scriptures, yet no human agency can have 
 changed the order of the world, or have moulded 
 the course of its events into accordance with its 
 own predetermined plan. The theory of a revela- 
 tion from the Supreme Governor of the Universe 
 involves, certain conditions. Their failure would be 
 at once conclusive against the claims of a dogmatic 
 faith ; their fulfilment raises a strong presumption 
 
38 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 in its favour. Let it be supposed, for instance, that 
 no organised Church existed, dating back its life 
 to the times of Christ and to the authority of His 
 institution; or that on putting the Church to the 
 question we found her never to have claimed the 
 possession of such a deposit of truth ; or that the 
 claim was a modern claim, and the further it was 
 traced back into the past the more vague and 
 shapeless it grew; or that the Church, although 
 she claimed to possess such a faith, could give no 
 reasonable account of it nor offer any pledge beyond 
 her own assertion for its antiquity and authenticity, 
 ■ — either of these alternatives would be conclusive 
 against the claim. 
 
 It is evident that the reputed author of the Bible 
 has both omnipotence of power and perfection of 
 wisdom enough to control the order of the world 
 and the minds of men into that channel of moral 
 and religious trial which we find to be explicitly 
 stated in the Word. If He has not done so, we 
 can only conclude that the statement is not His. 
 On the other hand, if the facts of the case be such 
 as would certainly follow on the supposition that 
 the statement of the Bible is the statement of God, 
 their accordance supplies an argument of no little 
 cogency, and is al it were the seal of a Divine Pro- 
 vidence placed upon the declaration of the Divine 
 Word. Whether this be the case or not is a 
 matter of simple historical enquiry. In conducting 
 it the saints of the past must, be regarded as wit- 
 nesses, not as authorities. The faith must derive 
 
II] The Theory of Dogma. 39 
 
 its sanction not from the human witnesses who 
 attest the facts, — for this would be to rest the autho- 
 rity of God upon the authority of man, balancing 
 the mountain upon the pin's point, — but on the 
 facts attested by them. 
 
 The theory of dogma includes three elements. If 
 we start from our own standing-point, the first in 
 order is the Church as a visible community of 
 saints, linked by a continuous succession of mem- 
 bers to the time of our Lord. The second element 
 is the existence in the possession of this Church 
 of a body of dogmatic truth traceable to the same 
 period and identical in substance during every age. 
 Third in the calculation is the canon of the Scrip- 
 tures, as the authoritative documents of the faith; 
 the fountain-head, from which all the streams of 
 truth have flowed, and to which they may be traced 
 back. All the three, the Church, the dogma, and 
 the documents, synchronise. They appear in the 
 history of the world at the same time, that time 
 being identified by independent evidence with the 
 ministry of Jesus Christ the Prophet of Nazareth. 
 They are found to stretch side by side from that 
 date continuously to the present time, and they 
 still exist in indissoluble union. They are thus, 
 when considered simply as matters of historical fact, 
 three distinct lines of evidence converging into one 
 conclusion, three rays of light shining out of one 
 Sun. The Church might conceivably have existed 
 without the dogma, the dogma without the Church, 
 and the sacred writings considered as ancient books 
 
40 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 without either the one or the other. As a matter of 
 fact they all exist and have . ever existed together, a 
 threefold cord between man and God. 
 
 To complete the theory of the dogmatic faith, the 
 relation existing between the Scriptures on the one 
 side, and the Church and the dogma on the other, 
 must be borne in mind. The Scriptures are the 
 criterion of the Church and the standard of the 
 doctrine. The language of St. Paul to the Ga- 
 latians clearly includes this ; for the false teacher 
 is condemned by the false doctrine. " Though we, 
 or an angel from heaven, preach any other Gospel 
 unto you than that we have preached unto you, let 
 him be accursed b ." An authoritative communication 
 from God, conveying the commission of the Church 
 and giving authority to the doctrine taught by 
 her, constitutes the theory of the faith. Whether 
 it be accepted or rejected, it ought to be considered 
 in its completeness. To leave out one part of it, 
 and then to condemn the rest, is a palpable in- 
 justice. 
 
 Yet with this mistake, whether consciously made 
 or unconsciously matters not, rationalistic thought 
 is chargeable. In reviewing the facts of the past, 
 and using them as the data for general conclusions, 
 the third element is omitted. The act is like taking 
 the pivot out of a machine ; the whole falls to pieces. 
 The entire aspect both of the Church and of the dog- 
 matic faith is changed, and it is no wonder that the 
 conclusion should be adverse to them both [i]. 
 
 b Gal. i. 8. 
 
II] The Theory of Dogma. 41 
 
 When the authoritative record of the faith is 
 left out of view, no standard of discrimination 
 remains between a false Church and a true 
 Church, a corrupt Church and a pure Church, a 
 Church which is no Church and a Church truly 
 Apostolic both in doctrine and form. The name 
 alone survives to constitute the thing. To the 
 eye of the historian the entire Church is viewed 
 together, as one, and as being in every member 
 of it an equally true representative of dogmatic 
 Christianity. Whatever is found within this circle 
 is charged equally upon " the faith," and the faith 
 is accordingly dishonoured by the shifting extrava- 
 gancies of superstition. Against this conclusion the 
 Church of England in her Master's Name emphati- 
 cally protests. In her XlXth Article she asserts 
 the general errability of Churches, specifying by 
 name the Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, An- 
 tioch, and Home. In six of her doctrinal Articles 
 she charges it as a crime upon the Church of Rome 
 that she has taught dogmas which not only are 
 not Scriptural but are contradictory to Scripture; 
 guilty of " arrogancy and impiety ," " a fond thing 
 vainly invented d ;" giving "occasion to many super- 
 stitions e ," "blasphemous fables and dangerous de- 
 ceits^" In the rubrics, in the Preface to the Prayer- 
 book, in the Canons, and in the Homilies she reiterates 
 the same charge with great energy of language [2]. 
 The sceptical critic may sneer at these accusations, 
 
 ° Art. XIV. * Art. XXII. e Art. XXVIII. 
 
 f Art. XXXI. 
 
42 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 as the sectarian fruits of dogmatic teaching ; but 
 so long as the Scriptures exist, their truth or other- 
 wise is a simple matter of fact. Here are the 
 Scriptures and here the dogmas, — the dogmas ever 
 held in common by the universal Church on the 
 one side, and the dogmas taught by special branches 
 of the Church on the other. Are the Scriptures 
 and the dogmas consistent, or are they not % The 
 dogmatic faith is responsible for its own teaching, 
 and for that alone. 
 
 But the error reaches beyond this. For the 
 claims of the Church, deprived of their historical 
 basis in the Word, become a mere form of human 
 speculation, instead of a Divine ordinance. They 
 are thus regarded by the disciples of rationalism, 
 as standing on precisely the same footing as other 
 modes of thought, with the authority of the under- 
 standing and nothing else for their ultimate basis. 
 In the supposed absence of a Divine revelation the 
 rationalist, it appears to me, is unquestionably right. 
 The Church of Rome, for instance, has been accus- 
 tomed in times past to accept the true inspiration 
 of the Scriptures, and only since she has been pressed 
 by the arguments of the Reformers has she found 
 it her policy to depreciate their authority. But 
 she teaches that the rule of faith is in herself, and 
 that she gives authority to the Scriptures, not de- 
 rives authority from them. When, therefore, she 
 is asked for her credentials, she has none to give 
 beyond herself. She affirms herself to be the de- 
 positary of the authority of Christ upon earth, 
 
II] The Theory of Dogma. 43 
 
 but she has no evidence to offer beyond her own 
 affirmation. The old argument of antiquity and 
 universality she has practically given up, and taken 
 the theory of development in exchange. The breach 
 between her and all Christian antiquity consequently 
 becomes wider day by day. Hence she possesses 
 no evidence for her asserted authority save her own 
 consciousness of its existence. But this is exactly 
 the ground of the theist, the pantheist, and even 
 the atheist. The instruments of discovery used by 
 these several schools of thought are different. With 
 one it may be a natural sentiment, with another a 
 mystical intuition, with a third the speculative in- 
 tellect ; but in each case the process is equally in- 
 ternal and subjective. They have no historical basis, 
 and if the existence of the inspired records of the 
 faith be denied or forgotten, the Church sinks into 
 exactly the same position. In such a case the most 
 dogmatic creed, philosophically considered, becomes 
 a form of human speculation and nothing more. 
 
 Thus the dogma itself becomes involved in the 
 same confusion as the Church. I have already 
 stated that I employ the word dogma in these 
 Lectures for a revealed truth and for ecclesiastical 
 formulas so far, and so far only, as they truly ex- 
 press the mind of God in His Word. True dogma 
 is the expression of authority. But its claims 
 do not rest on the use of the dogmatic form, 
 but on the proof of the authority whence it is 
 derived. There may be Church dogmas which 
 are not Divine dogmas. Thus the seventh canon 
 
44 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 of the Council of Ephesus condemns the " wicked 
 and perverted dogmas" of Nestorius. Our Church 
 positively asserts this distinction, for she rejects the 
 dogmas of tradition, of free-will, of justification by 
 works, of works of supererogation, of purgatory, of 
 transubstantiation, wholly and solely upon this ground. 
 She rests the rejection not on her own " ipsa dixit," 
 but on the authoritative documents of the faith ; " the 
 very pure Word of God" as she calls them in the 
 Preface to the Prayer-book, " God's Word written" 
 as she designates them in the XXth Article. Take 
 away this ultimate standard and all dogma must 
 be confounded together and allowed to stand on the 
 same footing. No process exists for distinguishing 
 one part from another which is not wholly specu- 
 lative. This is the fatal error of rationalism when 
 it becomes the historian of Christian doctrine. It 
 contemptuously throws all dogmatic teaching, whe- 
 ther Scriptural or not, into the same category, and 
 visits it with the same condemnation. Look at the 
 Church and the dogma without the Word which 
 conveys the commission of the one and furnishes the 
 standard of the other, and the result is inevitable. 
 
 The same mistake destroys the unity of dogmatic 
 teaching. We affirm the faith of the Church to be 
 one, and ever to have been one and invariable 
 from the beginning. If we are taunted by the 
 variations perceptible in the history of religious 
 opinion and in the tone and proportion of religious 
 teaching, we reply that variations in the mode of 
 teaching dogma are one thing, and variations in 
 
II] The Theory of Dogma. 45 
 
 the dogmas themselves another. We do not deny 
 the existence of variations of opinion and of modes 
 of teaching during the history of the Church, for 
 the faith has been delivered to the saints and the 
 weaknesses of human nature necessarily affect the 
 discharge of the trusteeship. It cannot possibly be 
 otherwise. But the objective faith has remained 
 the same, and has ever supplied the standard of 
 the human aberration. For instance, we admit that 
 the principle of religious toleration and freedom of 
 conscience has not always been fully understood. 
 It would have been little short of a miracle if 
 Christian writers had been able to throw off alto- 
 gether the influence of their own times and antici- 
 pate the character of centuries long subsequent. The 
 general progress of mankind, the increase of human 
 intercourse, the closer bonds of common interest, 
 the acquisition of a better mutual knowledge, and 
 a thousand influences of the same kind, have made 
 men more tolerant of diversities of religious opinion. 
 But men do not necessarily become indifferent to 
 the maintenance of God's truth because they become 
 more conscious of the weaknesses of the human 
 trustees of it. This progress of opinion represents 
 no change in the dogmatic truth of the Church, 
 but only a better appreciation of its principles. The 
 dogma is the same now as in the days of Augustine ; 
 was the same in the days of Augustine as it is 
 now. The more tolerant spirit of our own times 
 arises not from the discovery of any new principles 
 of truth, but from our clearer and more accurate 
 
46 The I list of iad Faith. [Lect. 
 
 apprehension of the old principles. Faults in the 
 application of truth constitute no just ground of 
 accusation against the truth. We are taunted with 
 the fact that great and holy men of the past believed 
 it right to employ the sword of the magistrate for 
 the propagation and defence of the Christian faith, 
 and justified themselves by the authority of the 
 Scriptures. We admit the fact, but we reply that 
 the fault was in the men who misunderstood the 
 Scriptures, not in the Scriptures which were mis- 
 understood. We are able to judge for ourselves 
 what the Bible teaches. Does it teach persecution, 
 or does it not 1 If it does, then charge the fault 
 upon the faith. But if it does not, charge the 
 fault upon the men who misunderstood it. 
 
 That the tone of opinion has undergone modifica- 
 tions at different periods of the world, being brought 
 more or less into accordance with the true teaching 
 of the faith, is not to be denied. There is nothing 
 strange or incomprehensible in the fact, for the 
 saints are men like other men, and liable to the 
 same influences. But the change has consisted in 
 the proportionate prominence and importance given 
 to different portions of Christian dogma, not in any 
 alteration of the dogma itself. Individual disposi- 
 tion acting upon mankind in general through the 
 influence of men of peculiar genius and aptitude to 
 teach or govern, the special circumstances of an age, 
 its external events and its moral and intellectual 
 characteristics, have all contributed to produce this 
 ''fleet. What, for instance, was more natural than 
 
II] The Theory of Dogma. * 47 
 
 that the early Christians, familiar with persecution 
 and holding their faith at the daily peril of their 
 Jives, should find comfort in fixing their eyes pro- 
 minently upon the power of their crucified and risen 
 Master and His future coming to judge the world 
 in righteousness'? What more accordant with all 
 human experience, both within the Church and 
 without it, than that the establishment of Chris- 
 tianity by Constantine should have introduced Pagan 
 elements into the Christian Church and mixed up 
 Pagan modes of thinking with the interpretation 
 of Scripture \ What more true to the experienced 
 tendency of human nature to run into extremes 
 than that men, fighting at once for political and 
 religious liberty, should recall the heroic saints of 
 the ancient Jewish Church, and in the recollection 
 should sometimes forget that " the wrath of man 
 worketh not the righteousness of God V If the 
 Church has sometimes worn too stern an aspect, 
 if firmness has run into obstinacy, constancy into 
 violence, zeal into persecution, the cause is to be 
 found in the human weaknesses of the saints who 
 have held the faith, not in the faith itself. No 
 change has passed over it ; for here are its records, 
 unchanged and unchangeable. The sun in the midst 
 of the heavens does not always present the same 
 appearance to the eye ; but the difference exists, 
 not in the radiant orb itself, but in the earthly 
 atmosphere through which it shines. 
 
 In thus claiming that the relation existing be- 
 tween the Scriptures on one side, and the Church 
 
48 * The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 witnessing to the faith and the faith to which she 
 witnesses on the other, should constantly be borne 
 in mind, I am only pleading for common justice. 
 The Word of God constantly speaks of its own 
 office. I do not argue that what Scripture says 
 is therefore necessarily true. I wish to bring the 
 claim to the test of fact. But the claim must first 
 be clearly understood. The theory of the faith 
 as stated in Scripture itself involves three elements, 
 the Church, the dogma, and the Word. In ex- 
 amining the theory by the facts, the three elements 
 resolve themselves into two, namely, the Church 
 accredited by the Word, and the dogma taught in the 
 Word or gathered out of the Word. For no other 
 Church, for no other dogma, do I plead. Our own 
 branch of the body of Christ recognises these, and 
 these alone. Her faithful children must neither 
 be more narrow than her comprehensiveness, nor 
 more lax than her jealousy for the truth of God. 
 " The visible Church of Christ is a congregation 
 of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of 
 God is preached, and the sacraments are duly ad- 
 ministered according to Christ's ordinance." " Holy 
 Scripture containeth all things necessary to salva- 
 tion, so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor 
 may be proved thereby, is not to be required of 
 any man that it should be believed as an article 
 of the faith." 
 
 From the theory I pass on to the facts. How 
 far do they corresjwnd, or not correspond, with the 
 conditions of the theorv 1 
 
II]. The Messenger. 49 
 
 I On the existence of the Church it is needless 
 for me to dwell. Her history is as conspicuous as 
 the sun in the midst of the heavens. As clearly 
 as we can trace the day backwards to its dawn, 
 can we trace the life of the Church back to the 
 Christian era. In the 750th year of Home she was 
 not in existence. A hundred years later she not 
 only existed, but had spread so widely from Pales- 
 tine over the provinces of the Roman world, and 
 had struck her roots so deeply into the hearts and 
 consciences of mankind, that the whole strength of 
 the iron empire was inadequate to destroy her. In 
 the 850th year of Home the Church was already a 
 power in the world, with a definite faith and a 
 collection of sacred books, and an internal organisa- 
 tion and an active missionary agency. The links 
 of her unbroken succession from that time to this 
 are among the most indisputable facts of human 
 history, and simply as facts of history I propose to 
 treat them. Our knowledge relative to the historical 
 rise of the Christian Church does not depend in the 
 slightest degree upon the authority of the Bible 
 considered as a collection of sacred books, but on 
 ordinary historical testimony. The most absolute 
 sceptic must believe this, unless in consistency with 
 his principles he believes nothing. 
 
 The first step towards ascertaining the nature of 
 the Church's message to the world is to cross- 
 examine the messenger. What is her own account 
 of the faith she preaches, and how does she pro- 
 fess herself to have gained it ? Is it a product of 
 
 E 
 
50 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 Christian speculation gradually developed out of one 
 or two germinal truths ? Is it the accretion of old 
 beliefs hardening by tradition into a conventional 
 shape 1 Is it a system rounded off into logical 
 completeness by schoolmen \ Is it the conscious 
 invention of a priesthood, taking advantage of the 
 ignorance and superstitions of mankind % What 
 account does the Church herself give of the message 
 she professes to deliver'? 
 
 The reply of the Church, extending as it does 
 over nineteen centuries, can only be gathered from 
 her formal documents, or from the extant writings 
 of her most illustrious members. It is useless to 
 speculate on the number of Christian works de- 
 stroyed by bigotry or lost through ignorance. We 
 must accept the evidence as it exists, and rest our 
 conclusions on facts however imperfect, rather than 
 on theories however ingenious. The voice of the 
 Church may ring during the early ages of the 
 faith less loudly from this cause, but it is firm 
 and distinct nevertheless, and never stammers in 
 its utterance. Her testimony is unanimous that she 
 has been put in charge of a message to mankind, 
 and that the truths she teaches are not her own, 
 but a revelation invested with the authority of 
 her glorified Master. Her mission, as she herself 
 has ever understood it, is not to propound a philo- 
 sophy or develop a speculation, but to preach a reve- 
 lation, and give to the world what she has herself 
 received, " the faith once delivered to the saints." 
 
 This conviction has ever run like a thread of 
 
II] The Church a Witness. 51 
 
 gold through all the phases of Christian contro- 
 versy. The life of the Church in its intense mental 
 and moral activity has displayed itself in freedom 
 and diversity. Disputes have arisen concerning the 
 rule of faith, concerning the interpretation of Scrip- 
 ture, concerning the limits of Church authority, 
 concerning the definitions of doctrine, and concern- 
 ing its technical expression. But amid an almost 
 endless diversity on other questions, on this one 
 great central fact — that she is the keeper and wit- 
 ness of a revelation from God — the Church has 
 never faltered for an instant. From the time that 
 Apostolic lips first raised the proclamation, it has 
 never ceased to be heard amid the din of human 
 strife. In weakness or in strength, from lonely 
 wastes or from stately temples, from secret dun- 
 geons or from the heart of great cities, amid times 
 of sorrow when she has witnessed in sackcloth or 
 amid times of imperial prosperity, the one cry has 
 ever been heard. The lapse of ages has not weak- 
 ened, nor has persecution sufficed to interrupt, nor 
 death itself been able to silence "the voice crying 
 in the wilderness." 
 
 It is easy to assert this unanimous witness of 
 the Church to the nature of her own commission. 
 But it is not equally easy to realise what this 
 unanimity involves, to understand its meaning, or 
 even to measure its extent. To speak of the testi- 
 mony of nineteen centuries conveys little impression 
 to the mind till we analyse the notion, and pass 
 under review, however rapidly, the varied fortunes, 
 
 E 2 
 
52 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 the successive changes, the great events, the dis- 
 asters and revolutions, the rise and fall of empires, 
 the progression of knowledge, arts, and science, 
 embraced within their circuit. 
 
 It is difficult for us at this distance of time to 
 realise the condition of the world when the voice 
 of the Church first took up her proclamation, so 
 strangely different was it from the features and 
 associations of the present. At a time when philo- 
 sophy was sick of its own speculations, when the 
 East was already cumbered with the ruins of fallen 
 empires, when civilisation had run to seed and 
 society was rotten with its own irremediable cor- 
 ruptions, when the greatness of the world was 
 centred in spots now desolate and peoples now 
 effete, and when Western Europe, the present' mis- 
 tress of the world, lay in the thick darkness of 
 barbaric ignorance, the Church entered upon her 
 commission. 
 
 The accents were at first the accents of Apostles 
 and Prophets. The voice of inspiration then spoke 
 from living lips what it still speaks from pages 
 instinct with the living Spirit. The tongue of the 
 Incarnate God began the message. From amid the 
 garden of Gethsemane and the gathering shadows 
 of His agony on Calvary, the words yet thrill upon 
 the ears of faith, " I have given unto them the 
 words which Thou gavest Me£." The tongues of the 
 Apostles echo the lesson. Peter declares both the 
 authority of the message and its universal purpose: 
 
 s John xvii. 8. 
 
II] The Church a Witness. 53 
 
 " He commanded us to preach unto the people, and 
 to testify that it is He which was ordained of 
 God to be the Judge of quick and dead. To Him 
 give all the prophets witness, that through His 
 name whosoever believeth in Him shall receive re- 
 mission of sins h ." Paul swells the strain of tes- 
 timony : " The Gospel which was preached of me 
 is not after man. For I neither received it of 
 man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation 
 of Jesus Christ 1 ." James rests his practical wisdom 
 on the same basis, for he recognises Christian virtue 
 to be the doing "of the Word k ," and warns his 
 readers against those who "err from the truth 1 ." 
 John's gentle voice describes his own commission: 
 "This then is the message that we have heard of 
 Him, and declare unto you m ." Jude writes of 
 "the common salvation" and the integrity of "the 
 faith 11 ." The latest book of the Divine Canon opens 
 with the words, " The revelation of Jesus Christ, 
 which God gave unto Him .... Blessed is he 
 that readeth ," and closes with the warning that 
 no human hand should add to or take away from 
 "the words of the book of this prophecy P." 
 
 Here the voice of inspiration ceases. As its last 
 solemn accents die away upon the ear, the Church 
 takes up the cry and echoes on the testimony. 
 The single tones of her multitudinous tongues no 
 longer carry with them the force of an infallible 
 
 h Acts x. 42. i Gal. i. 11, 12. k James i. 22. 
 
 1 James v. 19. m _i John i. 5. » Jude 3. 
 
 Rev. i. 1-3. i' Ibid. xxii. 19. 
 
54 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 inspiration ; but the ordinary gifts of the Spirit 
 still remained, and His teaching was not less true, 
 although it was less plenary, in the post-Apostolic 
 ages than before. Had the number of inspired 
 teachers been continued and indefinitely enlarged, 
 faith itself would have become confused and be- 
 wildered by the multiplicity of their teaching. The 
 Apostolic company, conspicuous alike in their gifts 
 and in their labours above all succeeding preachers 
 of the truth, announced the Divine message. Ten 
 thousand times ten thousand voices were now to 
 repeat, and by repeating multiply it. The Truth 
 was one, and the Church, like a many-sided lens, 
 reflected the one unchanging image on every side. 
 
 Five great periods, successive waves of time, have 
 passed over the Church since then. First came 
 the ante-Nicene period, during which she witnessed 
 in sackcloth. The number of individual witnesses 
 is comparatively small, and we are therefore able 
 to exhaust their evidence. A voice or two at first 
 sound to us out of the remote antiquity, and fresh 
 accents swell the cry into a louder sound as she 
 gathered strength and courage from the very blasts 
 of the persecuting tempest. Ten times the stroke 
 fell upon her, scathing as it seemed her life ; and 
 after each blow a louder chorus of voices, proclaim- 
 ing the same everlasting message, meets the ears. 
 The distinctness of the office assumed by the Church, 
 and the definiteness of the message conveyed during 
 this first period, is of especial importance; for here 
 was forged the first strong link of the chain which 
 
II] Ante-Nicene Fathers. 55 
 
 knits, by an indissoluble unity, the faith of our own 
 day to the faith of Apostolic times [3]. 
 
 From no voices do the assertion of a solemn trust 
 and a completed deposit of truth issue with more 
 trenchant decision than from the voices of the men 
 whose experience stretched back into the first cen- 
 tury, and who conversed personally either with the 
 Apostles or with their immediate successors. The 
 tongues of Ignatius, Polycarp, and Irenseus first take 
 up the message, and their voices ring to our ears, out 
 of the far distance , sharp and clear as the battle- 
 cry of the Church. How strong are the words of 
 Ignatius : " For if they who do these things after 
 the flesh perish, how much more if they shall cor- 
 rupt the faith of God by bad doctrine for which 
 Jesus Christ was crucified. Such a man being 
 wicked shall go into unextinguishable fire, and every 
 one who listens to him." Not less keen was the 
 sword of martyred Polycarp : " For whosoever does 
 not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh, 
 is anti-Christ ; and whosoever does not confess the 
 testimony of the Cross, is of the devil ; and whoso- 
 ever perverts the oracles of the Lord to his own 
 lusts, and says there is neither a resurrection nor 
 a judgment, is the first-born of Satan ; wherefore, 
 forsaking the vanity of many and their false doc- 
 trine, let us return to the Word which has been 
 handed down to us from the beginning." Clement 
 of Home, Barnabas, and Hermas, in the broken 
 accents alone sounding from the tongue of these 
 primitive saints, repeat the same testimony. " The 
 
56 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 rule of faith is but one alone, unchangeable and 
 unreforinable," are the words of Irenseus. But as 
 the multitude of witnesses thickens, individual quo- 
 tation becomes in tins place impossible. Sainted 
 Justin, and stern Tertullian, and philosophic Clement 
 of Alexandria, and Origen subtle and speculative, 
 and lofty-hearted CyjDrian, and great Athanasius 
 still speak, as if we heard the cry of the distant 
 battle-field. Not from one of them does a fal- 
 tering word or a hesitating utterance reach us. 
 The voice is urgent, as in the sight of the other 
 world, announcing to a heathenism lying in the 
 valley of the shadow of death God's saving message 
 of pardon and peace. 
 
 Then followed the second great period of the 
 Church's history. Hitherto she had stood alone in 
 the midst of a Pagan darkness. Great and mar- 
 vellous as had been her success in leavening the 
 world with her Divinely-given truth, shaking the 
 foundations of superstition and gathering souls be- 
 neath the banner of the Crucified, she was after 
 all but a little light in a dark place. The twenty 
 millions of Christians witnessed amid the two hun- 
 dred millions of the population of the Roman 
 Empire, strong in the faith and in the quickening 
 Spirit of God, but numerically lost amid the cor- 
 rupting- masses on every side. The line of separation 
 between the two had hitherto been strongly defined 
 and clear. But now all at once it was broken down, 
 and the two nominally became one. The distinc- 
 tion of a true faith visible to the eye of God alone, 
 
II] Establishment of Christianity. 57 
 
 still remained ; but the external line of demarcation 
 perceptible to human eyes, was gone. What wonder 
 is it that this abrupt external expansion should 
 have weakened the inward life, and involved the 
 faith itself in perils comparatively unknown in the 
 tune of her fiery persecution 1 The establishment 
 of Christianity by Constantine rather brought the 
 world into the bosom of the Church than rendered 
 the Church triumphant over the world. The tri- 
 umph was great indeed, and I see upon the whole 
 no adequate reason for regarding it as otherwise 
 than a triumph, for such indeed it is depicted in 
 the vision of the Apocalypse. If the historical in- 
 terpretation of that marvellous book be true, and 
 the evidence in its favour appears to me to be as 
 near positive demonstration as internal proof can 
 conceivably approximate, the victory of Christianity 
 over Paganism by its establishment under Constan- 
 tine is symbolised by the hand of God Himself. 
 It is presented less as a gain to the Gospel of the 
 Crucified than as an infliction of God's wrath upon 
 the Pagan world ; in the language of Gibbon, " a 
 dreadful and amazing prodigy, winch covered the 
 earth with darkness and restored the ancient do- 
 minion of chaos and of night [4]." The establish- 
 ment of Christianity was therefore a triumph, but 
 it was a triumph full of peril to the purity of the 
 faith. No other result could follow, humanly speak- 
 ing, but the infusion of Pagan ideas into the teaching 
 of the Church, correspondent to the admission of 
 Pagan members within her pale. 
 
58 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 Yet the declension of the Church's purity was 
 so ordered as not to interrupt her witness to the 
 character of her commission. The charge with which 
 she was put in trust was yet held sacred, although 
 she began to think more of herself than of her work, 
 and in the excessive consciousness of her privileges 
 to forget the weight of her responsibility. The 
 gradual corruption of her doctrine consisted not so 
 much in denying the truth with which she had 
 been put in trust, as in adding to it dogmas of her 
 own which she had never received. The result 
 was the same in its practical effect, but less abrupt. 
 It was as if some stately tree, pointing towards 
 the skies, had become so laden with the snowdrift 
 as little by little to bend its pliant boughs towards 
 the earth. 
 
 Nevertheless the voice of the Church and her 
 battle-cry against the world still rang out loud 
 and clear. " That only ought to be believed con- 
 cerning God, for the belief of which concerning 
 Himself He Himself is both the witness and the 
 author," are the words of Hilary. " As it respects 
 the Divine and holy mysteries of the faith," says 
 Cyril of Jerusalem, " not even the least point 
 ought to be declared without the Holy Scriptures." 
 " Limits are presented to us, and foundations laid 
 both in the structure of the faith and the tradi- 
 tions of the Apostles and the Holy Scriptures, and 
 the instructions delivered from one to the other, 
 so through all these the truth of God is preserved 
 safe, and let no man be deceived by new fables." 
 
II] Post-Nicene Fathers. 59 
 
 These are the words of Epiphanius in his exposi- 
 tion of the faith. Basil repeats the exhortation : 
 " We adjure every man who fears the Lord and 
 expects the judgment of God, not to be carried 
 away by divers doctrines. If any one teaches other- 
 wise and adheres not to the wholesome words of 
 the faith, but rejecting the oracles of the Spirit 
 holds Iris own teaching to be of more authority 
 than the evangelical documents, avoid such a man." 
 " Which faith," re-echoes Gregory, " word for word 
 we keep pure and intact as we received it, and 
 judge the least depravation of the words delivered 
 (TrapaSoQevTwv) the extreme of blasphemy and im- 
 piety." 
 
 Ambrose spoke in the same spirit to Constantine: 
 " I would not, sacred Emperor, that you should 
 trust to argument or any reasoning of mine ; let 
 us enquire of the Scriptures; let us interrogate the 
 Apostles ; let us interrogate the Prophets ; let us 
 interrogate Christ." " The doctrine of the Church, 
 which is the house of God, may be found in the 
 fulness of the Divine books," writes Jerome. " It 
 would be the instigation of a demoniacal spirit," 
 adds Theophilus of Alexandria, " to follow the con- 
 ceits of the human mind, and to think anythiDg 
 Divine beyond what has the authority of the Scrip- 
 tures." Rich are the expressions in which Crysos- 
 tom's burning tongue enlarges upon "the depth of 
 the Divine Scriptures," "the secrets of the Divine 
 oracles," "the spiritual weapons," "the Divine charms" 
 of the revealed Woixl. " Let us hear, as many of 
 
60 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 us as reject the reading of the Scriptures, to what 
 harm we are subjecting ourselves, to what poverty. 
 For where are we to apply ourselves to the real 
 practice of virtue, who do not so much as know 
 the very laws according to which our practice should 
 be guided." " It is impossible for us," is the devout 
 explanation of Cyril of Alexandria, "to say or at 
 all think anything concerning God, beyond what 
 has been divinely declared in the Divine oracles 
 of the Old and New Testament." " These are the 
 doctrines of the Divine Spirit, which it behoves 
 every one to follow continually, and to preserve 
 the rule of these doctrines immovable," argues 
 Theodoret. From the seat of the Roman Episco- 
 pate how vigorously sounds the voice of Gregory : 
 "What indeed is Holy Scripture but a letter of 
 the Omnipotent God to His creatures ! " Nor must 
 we fail to note the testimony of Augustine : " The 
 city of God believes also the Holy Scriptures of the 
 Old and New Testaments which we call canonical, 
 whence that faith itself takes its rise by which the 
 just lives." Thus clearly sound the voices of the 
 past ; and whether we catch the louder tones of 
 the great leaders of the Church, or the lower utter- 
 ances of the throng of holy witnesses, still it is 
 the same. No dissentient accent or faltering utter- 
 ance interrupts the swell of testimony. The tone 
 is one and the subject one, and the message is one, 
 "the faith once delivered to the saints," and the 
 centre of that faith "Jesus Christ the same yester- 
 day, to-day, and for ever." 
 
II] Medicevalism. 61 
 
 Now, however, the Church entered upon a new 
 phase of her life, one period passing away into 
 another gradually as the rainbow hues of sunset. 
 The mediaeval period was the period alike of re- 
 ligious and of intellectual darkness. Learning of 
 a kind, and piety cramped and narrow like the 
 learning, still survived, but they followed the stag- 
 nating tendencies of the times, and were concen- 
 trated here and there, like waters locked up in 
 lonely spots, and not flowing freely through the 
 land, carrying abundance and making music in their 
 course. Learning was cramped, for it was confined 
 within a most limited range and fettered with tech- 
 nicalities. Attention was directed much more to the 
 instrumental portion of our knowledge, the mind's 
 tools and apparatus, than to the knowledge itself. 
 Words rather than ideas, arguments rather than 
 truths, distinctions rather than generalisations, were 
 the tendency of the time. It was impossible that 
 piety should escape the trammels thrown round the 
 free limbs of knowledge. It caught the formality 
 of the circumstances under which it lived, and be- 
 came narrow and angular as the cells and cloisters 
 that sheltered it. 
 
 Nor were learning and piety less limited in ex- 
 tension than in character. They flourished beneath 
 the shadow of convents, where men, shut out from 
 the struggling world outside, betook themselves to 
 study and speculation out of very sickness of heart 
 and weariness of mind. Their spheres of influence 
 lay amid the general barbarism of the time, like 
 
62 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 the green gardens beneath the monastery walls, spots 
 of fresh and pleasant fertility contrasted with the 
 war-trodden and desolated aspect of the land beyond. 
 Now an age takes its character not from the few, 
 but from the many. Not the exceptions, but the 
 rule ; not the isolated instances, but the general 
 average fixes its mental and moral features. Hence 
 the mediaeval centuries were truly the dark ages. 
 Learning and piety appeared to hide themselves in 
 secret from the rude interruptions of lawless violence 
 and unprincipled force. 
 
 The picture was much the same all the world 
 over. In the East, activity and enterprise lay buried 
 beneath the ruins of past magnificence. In the 
 West they were prostrated by barbaric conquest or 
 pined in exhaustion, as the heavings of the storm 
 began to subside and peace and order to emerge 
 out of the chaos. Yet the witness of the Church 
 to the one great fact that she is the bearer of a 
 message from God survived nevertheless. The voice 
 iimy still be heard, though it sounds as if it were 
 stifled by authority and choked by definition. 
 
 The scholastic theology represented a new school 
 of thought, characterised not alone by mental ac- 
 tivity, but also by a deep interest in the great 
 questions of Divine truth. On such a subject it 
 befits me to .speak with great modesty. But it ap- 
 pears to me that the tone and spirit of the school- 
 men, although thoroughly impregnated with the 
 Church principles of their day, is something much 
 higher and better than simply ecclesiastical. Their 
 
II] The Schoolmen. 63 
 
 fatal error lay not so much in an excessive logical 
 subtlety, as in the purposes to which they applied 
 it. Had it been confined simply to the refutation 
 of error and used as an apologetic weapon against 
 heresy, employing subtlety in defending the faith 
 against subtlety in attacking it, its use would have 
 been legitimate. But they unhappily employed it 
 on its positive side as an adequate instrument for 
 teaching, and even for working out the truth of 
 Divine things, and thus they unconsciously throned 
 reason in the place of revelation. I say uncon- 
 sciously, because the language of Anselm, for in- 
 stance, shows how very far such a result was from 
 his intention [5]. Hence great and broad truths, 
 lying beyond the reach of the reasoning faculty, were 
 merged in subtle questions, minute and curious be- 
 yond the finding out of man. Such, for instance, 
 were the theses of Peter Lombard relative to the 
 Divine Essence, whether the Father begot the Essence 
 or the Essence begot itself. Such the discussions of 
 Aquinas on the nature of truth and falsehood, and 
 whether the notions of "the one" and of "the 
 many" were contradictory. The wonder is, not that 
 religion should have suffered from such disputations, 
 but that so much real and genuine piety should have 
 survived amid them. 
 
 The unfavourable impression produced by a critical 
 account of the philosophy of the schoolmen is con- 
 siderably modified by a personal acquaintance with 
 their writings. The witness of the Church to the 
 dogmatic nature of her faith at all events survived. 
 
64 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 They not only maintained dogmas as the very life 
 of the Church, but they carried their foundations 
 below Church authority, to their only true and per- 
 manent basis in the revealed Scriptures. Take, for 
 instance, Anselm's celebrated treatise on the Atone- 
 ment, " Cur Deus Homo." In one place only does 
 an explicit reference occur to the authority of re- 
 velation [6]. But it would be a great mistake to 
 conclude from this that reason and not Scripture 
 was made the ultimate basis of belief. In truth 
 Scripture is latent in the argument from end to 
 end. There is not a proposition which does not 
 admit of defence by Scriptural quotation. The same 
 deep reverence for the Word pervades the stateliness 
 of Peter Lombard, the tender grace of Abelard, the 
 pious fervour of Aquinas, and the glowing devotion 
 of John Scotus. It may be traced beneath the 
 arrogant haughtiness of Langfranc, who seems ever 
 to have written with the episcopal staff in his hand. 
 It underlies even the dry dialectics of Alexander 
 de Ales, the Doctor irrefragabilis, whose laborious 
 subtlety and ponderous argumentation, unillumined 
 as it seems by a solitary spark of spiritual life, place 
 the study of his works beyond the power of any 
 ordinary mental digestion. 
 
 But the more distinctive the characteristics and 
 the greater the evils produced by the system of 
 the schoolmen, the more need is there to rescue 
 from forgetfulness their emphatic assertion of the 
 dogmatic authority of the Word. Thus Langfranc 
 declares lli" Scriptures to be sufficient for salvation 
 
II] The Schoolmen. 05 
 
 because God is the author of them, and rests his 
 arguments against Berengarius on the teaching of 
 the Scriptures and "the inviolable authority of the 
 Prophets and sacred Fathers." Anselm professes 
 that anything he might possibly have taught con- 
 trary to Scripture was undoubtedly false, and de- 
 clares in another place that reason is not to be 
 believed even on grounds apparently indisputable 
 if its conclusions contradict the Word. Kosceline 
 vehemently charges Abelard with ignorance of the 
 Word of God. Abelard himself declares that he 
 rests his convictions on the rock on which Christ 
 built the Church, and then proceeds to explain this 
 rock to be the faith, and to prove the articles of 
 the faith by quotations from the Scriptures. Peter 
 Lombard, anxious to direct Ms readers, under the 
 guidance of God (Deo duce), to the knowledge of 
 Divine things, adopts "the Divine Scriptures" as 
 "the prescribed rule of doctrine." Alexander de 
 Ales argues at length upon the ground that what- 
 ever is learned from the Scriptures is taught by 
 "the testimony of the Spirit." Aquinas points out 
 the necessity arising from the fallibility of the reason 
 that we should be taught concerning " Divine things" 
 by " Divine inspiration." John Scotus dwells most 
 eloquently on the perfection of "the Divine Scrip- 
 tures/' and the wisdom of God in giving them to us 
 in their existing shape. He describes them as a tem- 
 ple where God dwells and into which He brings those 
 that love Him ; and thus he prays — " Lord Jesus, 
 I ask from Thee no other reward, no other happiness, 
 
 F 
 
66 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 no other joy than this, that I may rightly under- 
 stand Thy words inspired by Thy Holy Spirit [7]." 
 
 Centuries rolled on and the world entered upon 
 another period. Its mind and conscience and heart 
 awoke to life together, and mankind began to be 
 agitated by the first throes of the Reformation. 
 The first spark was lit in the East, but was fanned 
 into a flame throughout the West. A freer spirit 
 of enquiry, a more liberal learning, and a more 
 enlightened estimate of the true dignity of man 
 sprang up together. The electric spark once kindled 
 could not be precluded by any straining of autho- 
 rity from entering into the domain of the conscience 
 as well as the domain of the intellect. With one 
 great and vigorous rebound from the tyranny of 
 the past the world sprang into freedom. The im- 
 pulse was like the kindling of a fire. While the 
 heel of authority was trampling it out in one di- 
 rection, it burst into more resistless strength in 
 another. Of that movement the Reformed Church 
 of England was the child, linked as closely and 
 inseparably to the primitive and apostolic Church 
 of Christ on the one side, as on the other she is 
 parted by a whole abyss of irreconcileable differences 
 from the superstitions of medievalism and the fixed 
 corruptions of the Church of Rome. 
 
 Yet this very difference only invests with the 
 more force the unanimous testimony of the universal 
 Church to the dogmatic character of the faith. The 
 ( 'lnirch of Rome, as she must now be called, is trebly 
 dogmatic, and must ever be dogmatic to excess. 
 
II] Reformation Period. 67 
 
 She is dogmatic by virtue of the truth inherited 
 from the days of the Apostles, by virtue of the 
 doctrines she has herself added under the plea of 
 development to the Apostolic and primitive teach- 
 ing, and by virtue of the absolute jurisdiction she 
 claims over faith and conscience. The Reformation 
 was a rebound from the strain imposed on the 
 human heart and intellect by Romanism and Scho- 
 lasticism, and it would have been perfectly natural 
 if the whole fabric, compounded of what was Apo- 
 stolic and what was mediaeval, had been cast away 
 together. In the rejection of the false the rejection 
 of the true might easily have been included. The 
 history of the unestablished Churches of the Reforma- 
 tion at home and abroad shows how strong was the 
 tendency in this direction. In snapping the links 
 of Church authority the links of inspired authority, 
 had they been forged of the same material and 
 welded by the same hand, might have been snapped 
 likewise. Considering the tendency of human nature 
 ever to run into extremes, such a result would not in 
 any case have been wonderful. Had the entire teach- 
 ing of the Church been equally human, and identical 
 in its character and in its claims upon faith and con- 
 science, such a result would inevitably have followed. 
 But the fact was different, and the result has been 
 different. Her glorified Head has graciously watched 
 over His Church. The open Bible, which supplied 
 under the agency of God the Holy Ghost the 
 stimulus and the object of the movement, suggested 
 at the same time its limits. " Prove all things, 
 
 F 2 
 
68 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 hold fast that which is good," was the Divinely-given 
 principle, and the Scriptures were the Divinely- 
 given standard for its application. Dogmas found 
 to be in accordance with Scripture were retained ; 
 dogmas found to be contrary to it were rejected. 
 The dogmas rejected were found to be new ; the 
 dogmas retained to be ancient and Apostolical. 
 The human additions to the faith were carefully 
 taken down, that the House of God might stand 
 before the world, like a glorious edifice, resonant 
 with the songs of the saints, and witnessing in 
 every part to the skill and wisdom of its Divine 
 Architect. 
 
 So loud is the witness of the Church, and so 
 many are the voices that swell her testimony from 
 the Reformation downwards, that individual utter- 
 ances are comparatively lost to the ear. Passing 
 on rapidly as I am doing, they cannot be separately 
 distinguished. A catena of the English Fathers, 
 bringing the witness down to our own days, may 
 properly be added in an appendix, but can form 
 no part of the body of this lecture [8]. The facts of 
 the case show that the evidence is still the same 
 and still unanimous. A laborious ingenuity mav 
 perhaps discover an isolated expression here and 
 there, which separated from its context and general 
 bearing may appear to express impatience of the 
 trammels of dogmatic divinity. But I believe that 
 no formal suggestion can be found that the doctrine 
 of the Church is anything of her own framing, or 
 anything less august than a direct message from 
 
II] The Faith identified, 69 
 
 God — a completed message, fixed and definite and 
 changeless as the Deity from whom it proceeds. 
 
 Thus the proclamation of the saints in the first 
 century yet rings full and clear in the nineteenth. 
 The possession of a revealed message from God 
 to man is not an idea caught at intervals by 
 enthusiasts and fanatics ; held and then lost, and 
 then recovered ; a succession broken and inter- 
 rupted ; but it is a succession in all ages, under 
 all circumstances continuous and unbroken, con- 
 sentient and unanimous, — a voice never for a 
 moment silenced, repeating from first to last the 
 one faith, and centering it round the one person, 
 "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for 
 ever." 
 
 II From the facts relative to the Church and 
 to her testimony I pass on to the facts relative to 
 the dogmatic faith itself. For it is not enough to 
 show that the Church of Christ has ever unani- 
 mously asserted herself to be in possession of a 
 Divinely-given and therefore dogmatic faith, unless 
 the faith itself can be presented and identified. 
 The finks of the doctrinal succession must be traced 
 from the beginning downwards ; or backwards, as 
 will be more convenient, from our own times to 
 the times of the Apostles. The task is compara- 
 tively easy, because the enquiry deals with formal 
 doctrines embodied in formal Confessions. These 
 Confessions, either by the fact of their authori- 
 tative composition in one age, or of their autho- 
 ritative adoption in another, constitute the chain of 
 
70 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 ecclesiastical descent. It is not my purpose to enter 
 into the question whether these doctrines are true 
 or not. I am only concerned to show that the 
 Church has ever held them, and that, whether true 
 or not, they constitute the one unchanged dogmatic 
 faith held by her from the beginning hitherto as 
 a sacred trust, to be maintained at the cost of life 
 itself. 
 
 The natural starting-point of the enquiry is sup- 
 plied in the doctrinal Articles of our own Church. 
 This basis is, however, too broad for my argument, 
 and needs to be narrowed. Our Articles contain 
 not the faith only, but the faith guarded by special 
 definitions, having reference to the circumstances 
 existing at the date of their composition, and 
 amplified (as other creeds have been) to meet the 
 exigencies of controversy. Not with the temporary 
 corruptions, but with the eternal truths of the 
 Church, my present argument has to do. I narrow 
 therefore the platform of the Articles by comparing 
 them with those priceless remains of antiquity, the 
 Apostolic, Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds. The 
 Nicene Creed, as standing between the other two, 
 being fuller in expression than the Apostolic, and 
 at once more comprehensive and less minute than 
 the. trenchant definitions of the Athanasian Creed, 
 supplies the best representative of the immutable 
 faith of the Church of Christ. That all the articles 
 of the Nicene Creed are to be found in the Articles 
 of the Church of England is a fact too palpable to 
 admit <>!' denial. I put on one side all explanatory 
 
II] The Faith identified. 71 
 
 and defining statements in excess of the Nicene 
 Creed, and I take this Creed alone. 
 
 It is important to note that the articles of the 
 Nicene Creed when properly understood (and the 
 key to their interpretation is supplied by the struc- 
 ture of the Creed itself), are not, as they have 
 sometimes been represented, a mere dry enumeration 
 of facts. I admit that they are, if I may so ex- 
 press it, the bones of the doctrinal structure of the 
 Church. But the Church is a living Church, and 
 has ever consisted of living members ; and a living 
 Church involves not a doctrinal skeleton alone, but 
 the flesh, and form, and colour, and motions of 
 life. The very words " I believe" imply the moral 
 element of the whole — the contact of the asserted 
 facts with the wants and weaknesses, the duties 
 and responsibilities of living souls. Who is it that 
 believes but a member of the ruined and fallen 
 race to whom the purpose of saving mercy has 
 been adapted 1 Why do I believe, but because the 
 saving purpose of the Christian faith embraces all 
 my personal hopes and fears for time and eternity ? 
 What do I believe but Divinely-revealed dogmas on 
 subjects with which faith alone, and not sight, can 
 possibly make me acquainted % Why do I stand forth 
 publicly to declare my belief, but because I bear 
 the responsibilities of a Christian man and look 
 for a future judgment and a final recompense 1 — 
 truths directly taught as well as indirectly implied 
 in the Creed, " I believe that He shall come again 
 with glory to judge the quick and the dead." 
 
72 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 Or we may argue in another way. The Creed 
 asserts certain facts concerning God either in regard 
 to His existence or to His conduct and agency. 
 But it would be blasphemy to suppose that God 
 does ought in vain, or without an adequate object 
 for doing it. The assertion of the fact consequently 
 implies the existence of a reason for it, and the 
 reason and the fact must alike be found, where 
 alone they both exist, in the Word of God. The 
 facts are not therefore dead facts, ending with them- 
 selves, but living facts, full of meaning and power, 
 and linking themselves on to other influences. The 
 truths relative to the three Persons of the Godhead 
 and the history of their dealings with mankind 
 contain the whole economy of salvation, the entire 
 length and breadth of the faith. To say that God 
 the Father creates, God the Son redeems, and God 
 the Holy Ghost sanctifies, is to express in few 
 words the human side as well as the Divine side 
 of salvation. The Divine side is the engraving on 
 the seal, and the human side is the impression made 
 by it. The engraved seal pourtrays the operations 
 of the indivisible Trinity ; but press it upon the 
 heart, and it throws up in reverse the whole story 
 of the human sin, ruin, and suffering it was the 
 purpose of the indivisible Trinity to remedy. 
 
 The articles of the Nicene Creed contain there- 
 fore the faith of the Church, and all more minute 
 and detailed Confessions are but enlargements and 
 explanations of them. They may be true or false, 
 Scriptural or unscriptural, ancient or modern, but 
 
II] The Faith identified. 73 
 
 they all take their matter from these articles. If 
 they be true and orthodox, as the Athanasian Creed 
 for instance, they do not assert one idea not already 
 involved in the articles of the Nicene Creed. If 
 they are untrue and heterodox, they are either ad- 
 ditions to them or perversions of them. These arti- 
 cles are the germinal principles out of which all 
 other Confessions spring, and by which, in the 
 judgment of the Church, they are to be measured, 
 as the articles themselves are to be measured by 
 the final test of the Word of God. 
 
 I have already said that the dogmas of the Nicene 
 Creed are all contained beyond a question in the 
 Articles of Religion of the Church of England. 
 They also constitute the basis of every other Con- 
 fession known in the Church. In our own country 
 they are embodied more or less fully in the West- 
 minster, Irish, and Scotch Confessions, and in the 
 Confessions of the Baptists, Congregationalists, Ana- 
 baptists, and Quakers. On the Continent they 
 enter into the Waldensian, Augustinian, Tetrapolitan, 
 Saxon, Bohemian, Helvetic, Belgian, and Polish 
 Confessions. In the East they are embodied in the 
 "orthodox doctrine of the Apostolic Eastern Church;" 
 and lastly, in the West, in the Romish Confession 
 contained in the Creed of Pope Pius IV. 
 
 In reviewing the whole range of extant Church 
 Confessions, about forty in number [9], although 
 some of them exist in a very fragmentary form, 
 one thing is worthy of a passing remark. It is 
 that the later' creeds, those for instance of the 
 
74 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 sixteenth century, — a century, as was natural, prolific 
 in Confessions, — are intimately related to the earliest 
 creeds by their precise assertion of the dogmatic cha- 
 racter of the Scriptural faith. All creeds are neces- 
 sarily dogmatic. But the early creeds and the later 
 creeds agree in referring their dogmatic character 
 specifically to the authority of the written Word. 
 During the middle ages the assertion of this prin- 
 ciple was dropped, and, later still, Church authority 
 took its place. The Reformation again brought the 
 true principle into prominence, and rested dogma on 
 its proper basis, the Divine authority of the Chris- 
 tian revelation. 
 
 It is true that in many of the Confessions referred 
 to the definitions and explanations widely differ 
 from those of other creeds ; but this very fact gives 
 to the testimony itself its irrefragable cogency. 
 There is method in the diversity. With the ex- 
 ception of the Eastern and Roman Churches, all 
 the other Confessions agree in essentials and differ 
 only in circumstantials : in other words, their faith 
 is the same, and they only differ on questions of 
 Church government and discipline. Beneath an 
 apparent discrepancy there exists a real substantial 
 identity. With the Eastern and Roman Churches 
 it is different : there the differences are in essen- 
 tials and the resemblances in circumstantials. With 
 the exception of the claim of Church supremacy, 
 the three bodies — the Church of England, the 
 Eastern Church, and the Church of Rome — mainly 
 agree in circumstantials, but they widely and vitally 
 
II] The Faith identified, 75 
 
 differ in essentials. Accepting the same articles, 
 they interpret and define them so differently that 
 they really become different dogmas, as wide apart 
 as light and darkness. But it must be recollected, 
 that while these two Churches corrupt the faith 
 with dogmas rejected by the Protestant Churches, 
 they teach all that the Protestant Churches teach. 
 Up to a certain point — the point defined in the 
 Nicene Creed — the objects of belief are identical. 
 Within these limits, therefore, lies the one immu- 
 table creed of the Church of all ages, "the faith 
 once delivered to the saints." 
 
 Now let the whole body of dogmatic truth as 
 taught in the visible Church of Christ, whether it 
 be true or whether it be false, be considered to- 
 gether. Whatever we may think of the doctrine, let 
 us view the whole as one stream; then let us trace 
 it backward to its fountain-head, and see what 
 happens. The process is the same as tracing a river 
 to its source. We wish to know whence it derives 
 its waters ; we therefore trace it carefully up the 
 stream, and note where every branch separates, to 
 the light hand or to the left. No stream that falls 
 in along the course can form any part of the 
 original waters ; we therefore let it alone, and 
 steadily pursue the central current, till we reach 
 the spot where it flows out of the broad lake or 
 the precipitous mountain's side. Let us do the same 
 thing with the dogmatic teaching of the Church ; we 
 shall then see which branch traces its original fur- 
 thest back and forms part of the parent stream. 
 
76 The Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 We scarcely commence the process before one 
 doctrine is separated from the mass and falls behind 
 us. The dogma of the immaculate conception of 
 the Virgin Mary reaches no further back than our 
 own memories [10]. Steadily tracing the course of 
 time backwards, the dogma of purgatorial fire 
 branches off about the middle of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury, and dies away as a formal doctrine about the 
 middle of the twelfth [n]. In the early part of 
 the fifteenth century the mutilation of the sacra- 
 ment of the Lord's Supper, by taking away the cup 
 from the laity, disappears [12]. A little further 
 back, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, we 
 find transubstantiation for the first time dogmatically 
 taught, and in another two or three centuries all 
 traces of it are lost again [13]. In the twelfth cen- 
 tury five of the seven sacraments disappear, and the 
 two " ordained by Christ Himself" alone survive [14]. 
 In the ninth century the power of canonisation for 
 the first time falls into the stream of doctrine, 
 although the tendency to saint-worship and to in- 
 cipient Mariolatry reaches further backward [15]. 
 In the beginning of the sixth century the Papal 
 supremacy is left behind, and with it the last formal 
 trace of the corrupt dogmas of the East and the 
 West [16]. 
 
 We have reached a date still distant from the 
 Council of Nice. Nearly three hundred years must 
 be traced back till then. Yet we have already left 
 behind all that separates us from the Greek and 
 Roman Churches. We have seen at what dates 
 
II] The Faith identified. 11 
 
 their doctrines one by one arose, and where they 
 fell into the central stream. We now stand far 
 above them, and yet the river itself has become no 
 scanty stream, no trickling brook, weak and shallow. 
 It yet flows on, a river of truth, deep, broad, and 
 strong, only the swifter because the banks have nar- 
 rowed on either side. Still we trace it back, the 
 faith of our own beloved Church and the faith of 
 the Nicene Fathers flowing together, a stream of 
 truth one and indistinguishable. 
 
 And now we have reached Nicaea, and yet we have 
 not arrived at the fountain-head. Thirteen creeds 
 or fragments of creeds still lie between ■ us and the 
 first parent spring of all, bearing the same general 
 character, reflecting the same truths. Further back 
 therefore flows the river. The original spring is 
 still beyond us ; although every voice now loudly 
 proclaims where it is, and what. Still we take no 
 man's word, but from saint to sahrt carefully trace 
 the current to its source. Further back than the 
 time of Irenaeus the line of descent for a brief 
 period becomes comparatively obscure. Intimations 
 of a formal definite creed may be found in Ignatius, 
 Clemens Romanus, Polycarp, and Justin Martyr, but 
 they are fragmentary and uncertain. The period is 
 like some reach of the earthly stream, where, amid 
 the precipitous rocks and overhanging woods, its 
 exact course cannot be positively traced. A little 
 further on and the full river breaks into view again. 
 We tread with reverent hearts and holy fear, for we 
 are close to the fountain-head. We are looking- into 
 
78 Tlie Historical Faith. [Lect. 
 
 the first century of the Christian era, and here 
 we find the abysmal depth whence the glorious 
 river flows. It may be traced yet further back in- 
 deed even than this, but it is through secret 
 channels, through type and symbol and ceremony and 
 prophecy, with the clear light of day breaking upon 
 it here and there ; but rather like a river flowing 
 underground than like a river in the full light of 
 day, challenging by the strength of its first rush 
 and the loud music of its flowing depths the eyes 
 and ears of men. We are looking into the first cen- 
 tury. Let us as it were go round, and get, so to 
 speak, at the back of the cavernous profound whence 
 the stream of truth rushes into the daylight. Let 
 us go back to the year 750 of Rome, and behold! 
 the open river is not. Somehow in that myste- 
 rious century it has its earthly birth. Here, explain 
 it how you will, here, for an historical certainty, the 
 faith begins. This admits of no denial. The proofs 
 that the articles of the Nicene Creed are deduced 
 from the Scriptures exist in the familiar text-books 
 of the University. Whatever may be concluded as to 
 the character of the Scriptures, it is certain that 
 they and the faith sprang into being together ; and 
 their birthday is in the period to which step by step 
 I have traced the genealogy back. We stand, as it 
 were, looking at the depths mysterious, yawning be- 
 neath and before the eye, inscrutable and unfathom- 
 able, whence the waters spring into the daylight. 
 Look and watch and wonder. What spring is ca- 
 pacious enough to have given them birth I The 
 
II] The Faith identified, 79 
 
 channel itself we can see to be human as ourselves, 
 though of finer and purer soil, as if the ever-gushing 
 fountains of truth close by had clothed it with peren- 
 nial beauty and verdure. Whence it issues the out- 
 ward eye cannot see. The spring is there where no 
 human hand can reach, no human foot can tread. 
 It lies in the unseen, not the seen. Stand and watch 
 the waters. All the dear familiar truths are there, 
 known to us from our childhood, almost the very 
 words in which the Church is accustomed to express 
 them. How sweetly, purely, freshly, vigorously they 
 well forth from the fountain infinite, for that fount 
 is — God. 
 
 Here then we find both the witness to the fact 
 and the fact itself coincident. The Church from the 
 very beginning to the very end has consistently 
 declared herself to be in possession of a sacred gift 
 of truth, a solemn charge from God. Had the faith 
 entrusted to her been lost, we might have regarded 
 the assertion as the instinct of an ignorant fanati- 
 cism or the extravagance of a self-exalting pride. 
 But here the faith is, traceable from own days to 
 the days of the Apostles, unchanged and unchange- 
 able. The facts are plain historical facts ; they lie 
 within the reach of any man's examination. In the 
 face of them to speak of dogmas as the modern 
 creation of the Church, to refer them to the six- 
 teenth century, or to the Schoolmen or to the an- 
 cient Fathers, is either ignorance or carelessness. To 
 put out of view the plain fact that the dogmatic 
 faith and the Scriptures synchronise, and must either 
 
80 The Historical Faith. 
 
 be accepted together or rejected together, is a gross 
 injustice. 
 
 The theory of the Scriptures and the actual facts 
 of human history are consistent with each other 
 throughout. It is useless to battle against the 
 theory, unless the hand of the objector can also 
 sweep away the facts. The marvellous coincidence 
 between the two is itself a fact, pervading all the 
 other facts ; and it penetrates through the distant 
 haze of time and the shifting lights and shadows of 
 human events, as if it were a smile from the face 
 of Christ Himself, the shining of His cloudless light 
 and truth who is " the same yesterday, to-day, and 
 for ever." 
 
LECTURE III 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT 
 
 Eph. ii. 12 
 
 Without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, 
 and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, 
 and without God in the world 
 
 JL HE existence of the dogmatic faith as an histo- 
 rical fact is wholly independent of any opinion that 
 may be formed regarding its origin or character. 
 The fact rests on precisely the same evidence as the 
 ordinary facts of history. A series of writings, 
 genuine and authentic beyond controversy, reach 
 from the present time back to the first century of 
 the Christian era, and attest, at each successive stage 
 of the descent, alike the existence of the faith and 
 its identity. Two further questions immediately arise: 
 whence this faith has been derived, and what is the 
 amount of its authority. The latter question is in- 
 volved in the former. The range of enquiry is limited 
 to the first three centuries of the Christian era. 
 Evidence of the strongest character may be adduced 
 for referring the origin of the faith to a date earlier 
 than the Council of Nice, for the ante-Nicene Fathers 
 
 G 
 
82 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 reach back to the close of the first century. At this 
 date they themselves refer the origin of their faith to 
 the sacred Scriptures, which must therefore neces- 
 sarily have been anterior to their own time. But 
 without pressing this fact to the utmost, it must in 
 any case be admitted that the origin of the Christian 
 faith must be traced to a period earlier than the 
 third century after Christ. The Nicene Creed fixes 
 this date. For here we find the doctrines of the 
 faith not diffused through various books, or latent 
 in reference and allusion, but already formulated and 
 methodised, expressed in a strict theological lan- 
 guage, and classified in a logical synthetic order. 
 A considerable period of time must have elapsed 
 before the faith could have created its own lan- 
 guage, literature, and organisation. 
 
 But is the account given by the Church of the 
 beginning of her own faith credible and true 1 ? She 
 has ever consistently affirmed that she received it 
 by revelation from God, through men specially in- 
 spired for that purpose. Inasmuch as the revelation 
 so given includes all things necessary for faith and 
 practice, it can admit neither of enlargement nor 
 diminution. It is therefore dogmatic ex hypothesi, 
 because it was delivered by authority of God, not 
 gained by discovery of man ; and what man in no 
 way created, man can in no way change. This is 
 the account given by the Church. That the saints 
 themselves devoutly believed it to be true is proved 
 by the sacrifices they made for it, the devotedness 
 of their lives, and the heroic constancy of their 
 
Ill] Origin of Religious Ideas. 83 
 
 deaths. But perhaps they were themselves deceived. 
 Such is the suggestion of modern rationalism, and 
 several natural influences have been specified, to 
 which it is believed that the origin of Christianity 
 can be much more rationally referred, than to a super- 
 natural revelation. My object is to test these sup- 
 posed causes one by one, and examine their adequacy 
 to produce a result so memorable as the faith, and 
 effects so wide in their reach and so ennobling in their 
 character, as the results of Christian civilisation. 
 
 It is not enough in answering this question to 
 trace the faith back to the Scriptural books, or to 
 show that every article is either clearly contained in 
 the Holy Scriptures, or gathered from it. The cha- 
 racter of the Scriptures themselves is called into 
 discussion. According to the modern idea, they are 
 not the creators of the faith, but the product of it, 
 the embodiment of the religious consciousness of a 
 particular period of the world. The faith therefore 
 and the books containing it are involved in the same 
 suspicion, and must be considered together. The 
 question is thus rendered more specific. The faith 
 and the Scriptures must stand on one side, and the 
 cause producing them, whatever it may be, on the 
 other. The cause must precede the effect, and be 
 distinguishable from it, however much they may act 
 and react on each other. 
 
 Foremost among the causes alleged to have been 
 operative, is the religious instinct. That a religious 
 sense or sentiment or emotion, whichever it may be 
 called, exists in the human heart independently of 
 
 G 2 
 
84 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 the dogmatic faith contained in the sacred books, is 
 undeniable. It has been found to exist where the 
 books are unknown and the specific religious doc- 
 trines of Christianity have never been preached. 
 A belief of some kind in a deity of some kind, if 
 not absolutely universal to all known tribes of hea- 
 thendom, is, at all events, almost universal. Some- 
 times it is a dim superstition, vague and terrible, 
 such as holds in chains the benighted heart of suffer- 
 ing Africa ; a formless, shapeless dread of evil spirits, 
 the more oppressive because it cannot be reduced 
 into definite form or brought within the reach of 
 the understanding. Sometimes it is a dark mono- 
 theism, because it is the worship of a great spirit, 
 terrible not beautiful in his attributes, dreadful not 
 glorious in his doings. Sometimes it is a gross 
 polytheism, not only shaping the powers of nature 
 into a host of divinities, but tracing the spark of 
 deity in dead things and objects revolting and offen- 
 sive. Sometimes it is a worship of the Evil One, 
 conceived in fear, and finding expression in the fires 
 of the Phoenician Moloch or the dreadful sacrifices 
 of the Mexican divinities. But whatever may be 
 its special shape, a religious belief of some kind, 
 associated with some form of inward consciousness 
 and outward worship, has ever been found to con- 
 stitute a characteristic of the heathen world, whether 
 in the heart of huge continents or in smiling islands 
 green in everlasting beauty, whether beneath the 
 heat of the tropics or amid the everlasting snows 
 and ice-bound solitudes of the pole. 
 
Ill] Origin of Religious Ideas. 85 
 
 It was long supposed that no exception whatever 
 existed to this common consciousness of the human 
 soul. Christian apologists have been in the habit 
 of arguing on this supposition. The assertion can 
 no longer be very confidently maintained in this 
 extreme form. One exception is asserted to exist, 
 although it must be admitted that the evidence is 
 as yet partial and inconclusive. The Andamanese 
 are said to have no religion [i]. Should the fact 
 be established, it modifies the Christian argument 
 to a certain extent, but strengthens it in the modi- 
 fication. If a religious consciousness were an uni- 
 versal attribute of man, it would justify a belief in 
 an innate religious sense, constitutional and con- 
 genital, and by the creating will of God inseparable 
 from the structure of the soul itself. Some reli- 
 gion would then be antecedent to all revelation. 
 But if its existence be only general and not abso- 
 lutely universal, the consciousness can no longer be 
 considered to be a jDart of the soul itself, but some- 
 thing bestowed upon it from without, that is from 
 above. The first origin of our religious ideas must 
 be transferred from nature to revelation. The reli- 
 gious constitution of the soul would consist in its 
 receptivity, being like a sensitive photographic plate 
 affected by the most delicate ray of light, but in 
 the absence of that ray to evoke its latent capacities 
 blank and empty. In this case the all but univer- 
 sality of the tradition would establish the primeval 
 unity of the human race with a force of evidence 
 little short of demonstration. 
 
86 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 At all events the religious consciousness is general, 
 if no more [2]. It is the tendency of modern 
 thought to regard this sentiment as religion, and as 
 its only essential and eternal element [3]. Religion 
 is thus sharply severed from theology ; for theology is 
 the science of revealed dogmas, and revealed dogmas 
 are asserted to be no part of religion. Religion 
 is therefore regarded as one thing, and theology as 
 another. Doctrines, points of specific belief, are con- 
 sidered to be human incrustations on religion, and not 
 a part of it. Religion is the first antecedent cause, 
 a flame burning brightly in the human soul where 
 it is not darkened by what are esteemed to be the 
 theories of priestcraft or the credulities of super- 
 stition. This religious consciousness is therefore the 
 one formative principle of which all religious systems 
 are but distorted developments, the offspring of 
 ignorance or of imposture. In the dark times of 
 the past the imperfect acquaintance with the natural 
 created an ignorant belief of the supernatural. What 
 men did not understand was supposed to be miracu- 
 lous. Thus they referred to unseen agents of another 
 world what we now know to be the result of natural 
 and ordinary causes. Physical science has dissipated 
 these delusions, and by resolving back the super- 
 stitions of the past into the results of its ignorance 
 is enabled to strip the false from the face of the 
 true, and to present once more the original and 
 universal religion in its purity and grace. 
 
 Thus modern thought pleads. In order to bring 
 the assertion to the test of examination, let us 
 
Ill] Feeling without Conviction. 87 
 
 analyse the sentiment itself, and ascertain to what 
 it amounts. For if it is to be considered as the 
 germinal source of all religious action, it must have 
 substance and reality. A mere feeling, vague, dim, 
 and formless, too indefinite to be stated in a pro- 
 position, can scarcely be deemed sufficient by any 
 one to satisfy the wants of the soul ; still less suffi- 
 cient to produce out of itself an elaborate system of 
 belief; still less to exercise a moral discipline over 
 the passions and irregular impulses of man. A sub- 
 jective emotion with no reality to answer to it can 
 scarcely be the religion of a rational and immortal 
 being. The very lights and shadows that come and 
 go over the landscape and leave no trace behind on 
 the earth they darken into gloom or paint with ten 
 thousand hues of beauty, have a substance and 
 a life and a cause. A religious emotion devoid of 
 dogma, but beginning and ending as an emotion, is 
 more unreal even than they. It is absolutely un- 
 substantial — a thing causeless and self-created, not 
 only without a form but even without a name, in- 
 distinguishable as the spectral shadow of death con- 
 ceived by the genius of Milton — 
 
 " If shape it might be called that shape had none 
 Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb, 
 Or substance might be called that shadow seemed, 
 For each seemed either." 
 
 The very conception of such a religion is a contra- 
 diction to the constitution of the human soul. We 
 are endowed with the capability of feeling and with 
 
88 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 an exquisite sensitiveness of emotion. But there 
 must ever be something to call the feeling and the 
 emotion into existence, some reality to which they 
 more or less accurately correspond. Were the case 
 otherwise, the soul would be a mere region of ghosts. 
 There are indeed feelings and sensations that come 
 and go over the soul, so subtle in their nature and 
 so dej)endent on fine and secret sympathies, that we 
 cannot always analyse them. So difficult is it some- 
 times to perceive their connexion with recognised 
 thought, or their dependence on any known law of 
 our mental selves, that they appear as if they were 
 reflections out of the unseen world, shadows cast 
 upon the soul's finer powers by realities lying as 
 yet equally beyond the reach of the senses and the 
 comprehension of the intellect, But this veiy feeling 
 is the unconscious witness of the understanding that 
 there are realities corresponding with them some- 
 where. For the intellect and the heart of man are 
 cast after all upon the same mould. The intellect is 
 unable to conceive objects attested by no past expe- 
 rience, direct or indirect. An object wholly different 
 from anything we have ever seen or known by our 
 own knowledge or by the description of others, 
 could neither be conceived in thought nor expressed 
 in words. Feeling follows in this respect the same 
 law as thought. Itself more quick and subtle, more 
 spontaneous and variable, it can no more spring 
 out of the non-existing than thought c;m do. Some- 
 where or other, i ven should the sphere be too deep 
 for analysis, must oxi^t realities to which feeling 
 
Ill] Feeling without Conviction. 89 
 
 corresponds. In the absence of all knowledge of 
 the reality, the feeling itself would die. Anything 
 different from this would be creation, and any being 
 not subject to this law would be God, not man [4]. 
 
 Now let it be borne in mmd that if Divine 
 realities exist and are known to exist, dogma must 
 exist likewise. Dogma is but the statement of truth, 
 and acquires its positive character from the invaria- 
 bility of truth. To say that there is no dogma, is 
 either to say that nothing Divine exists, or that 
 nothing is known to exist. Let us try the reli- 
 gious sentiment by this test. 
 
 Either there is a reality corresponding to the 
 sentiment, or there is not. There is, for instance, 
 a religious feeling in the soul reaching out to a 
 world unseen, and gathering itself, more or less 
 definitely, around the notion of a Supreme Being. 
 Either the unseen world and the Supreme Being 
 exist, or they do not. 
 
 Let me first suppose that they exist. The existence 
 must be known to us under modes and conditions. 
 To state them is dogma; to know them is to know 
 dogma. In proportion as they are known, the re- 
 ligious sentiment must shape itself into correspond- 
 ence with them. It takes the form of love towards 
 a being believed to be beautiful ; or of fear towards 
 a being believed to be terrible ; or of trust towards a 
 being believed to be kind and wise ; or of cringing 
 submission to a being believed to be cruel and severe. 
 But in every such case the faith has become dog- 
 matic, and the sentiment has moulded itself to the 
 
90 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 dogma. But suppose that the unseen world and the 
 Supreme Being do exist, but are not known. The mind 
 guesses at their existence and its modes, the sensitive 
 soul gropes in the darkness and feels if haply it 
 might find them. In this state the religious senti- 
 ment remains a sentiment only because the reality is 
 not discovered. The absence of dogma is simply the 
 absence of knowledge, and the indefinite sentiment 
 of the heart is the expression of the ignorance of the 
 head. Is ignorance good, and to be coveted 1 Is it 
 the nursing-mother of progress and civilisation \ Is 
 it the crown and climax of nineteen centuries of 
 definite knowledge and positive revelation'? But if 
 religion be the sentiment without the dogma, this 
 is the inevitable conclusion. Then indeed the sneer 
 of the infidel is true, and religion altogether is but 
 the superstition of the ignorant or the idle credulity 
 of the fool. 
 
 But let the other alternative be considered. Let 
 it be said that the religious sentiment is undogmatic, 
 not because we do not know the world unseen, but 
 because there is no such world to be known. No 
 reality exists to which the religious sentiment corre- 
 sponds. Does it not follow in this case that the 
 sentiment is unreal likewise, a creation of the imagi- 
 nation, a vague sense of moral want, reaching after 
 what is not and never has been, a sentiment as 
 wholly without power as it is without vitality ? 
 
 Yet to this religion itself is reduced when separated 
 from dogma, that is, from theology. Let the doc- 
 trines be stripped away, and nothing remains but 
 
Ill] Religion without Dogma. 91 
 
 the sentiment. If religion be prior and superior to 
 theology, it must of course be distinct from it. To 
 see what religion is on this supposition we must take 
 theology away. The Trinity of Persons in the unity 
 of the Godhead ; the creative work and claims of the 
 Father ; the eternal Deity of the Son ; His incarna- 
 tion, life, sufferings,- death, resurrection, ascension, 
 session in glory, return to judgment and final king- 
 dom ; the procession of God the Holy Ghost ; His 
 work in the inspiration of the Scriptures, and in the 
 conversion and sanctification of the heart, — must all 
 be rejected, for these are the technical propositions of 
 the Mcene Creed. With them must be rejected the 
 resurrection of the body, the future judgment, and 
 heaven and hell, as directly asserted; and the fall of 
 man, the depravity of the heart, and the necessity of 
 atonement and regeneration as indirectly implied. 
 But when all these truths are gone, all definite re- 
 ligious motives are gone likewise, because all definite 
 belief is gone. The Church of Christ in the enjoy- 
 ment of her glorious faith was like Israel in the 
 midst of a goodly land of fountains and depths 
 springing out of valleys and hills. But now the 
 Church has gone back into the wilderness, with no 
 grand heights to break the dead monotony, no rich 
 vegetation to gratify the eye, no pleasant streams 
 of joy and holy hope to make it rich in love and 
 musical with praise. 
 
 When religion has thus been separated from all 
 theology, what remains of religion itself? It has 
 become naked Theism. It may be an enlightened 
 
92 The Religious Sentiment [Lect. 
 
 Theism, compared to the belief of ancient times, for 
 the unconscious influence of Christian truth has 
 moulded men's modes of thinking, in regard to 
 Divine things, too deeply to admit of its being 
 shaken off. Thus the God of modern thought is 
 not the terrible Deity of ancient paganism or of 
 savage idolatry in modern times, but distinctively 
 a God of benevolence and love. The whole tenden- 
 cies of modern feeling have thus far coloured our 
 conception of the Deity, and the knowledge obtained 
 of the marvellous adaptations of the material world 
 have aided in transforming the frightful Theism of 
 ancient tunes into the beautiful and light-clothed 
 angel of our own day. But this mode of feeling 
 has itself grown up under the sheltering wing of 
 Christian dogma, and has never existed to the full 
 apart from it. 
 
 This Theism has, moreover, an inevitable tendency 
 to give less and less prominence to the personality of 
 God in proportion as positive dogma relative to the 
 Divine Being is more and more merged in subjective 
 sentiment. It resolves itself in a great degree into 
 Pantheism, for prominent among the dogmas rejected 
 as human perversions of the religious sentiment, is 
 the belief in the supernatural. But what is called 
 the supernatural is nothing more than the interference 
 of the Divine Personality in the course of human 
 tilings, modifying by His agency the operation of 
 His own laws, just as man himself modifies them by 
 his persona] agency in every production of his skill, 
 and every ;icti<>n of his life. In the place of personal 
 
Ill] Theism and Pantheism. 93 
 
 action is substituted natural law, supposed to be con- 
 stant and invariable, and therefore to supersede the 
 possibility of a Divine interference. 
 
 The very conception will, I believe, be found on an 
 accurate analysis to be unphilosophical, and there- 
 fore untrue. For it rests on a confusion between 
 a law and the power enacting a law. A law is 
 itself not a power, but a product ; the expression 
 of a will which stands towards it as an antecedent 
 to a consequent. As ordinarily used by the ablest 
 of the modern school, it represents a mere summary 
 of effects rather than the operation of a cause ; the 
 statistical statement of a fact rather than the ex- 
 planation of an efficient energy. But on this I can- 
 not dwell. My present purpose is only to remark 
 that in denying the personal agency of God in human 
 things we practically deny the personality itself ; we 
 relegate it to the sphere of the unknown and the 
 unpractical. In proportion as we substitute natural 
 law for personal agency we merge Theism into 
 Pantheism. 
 
 Nor is this all. For if the Theism be definite, that 
 is, if it be founded on a belief in positive truths rela- 
 tive to the Divine existence, nature, and character, in 
 that proportion dogma still survives. Dogma is the 
 formal statement of a positive belief, and to get rid 
 of the dogma we must get rid of the belief. All the 
 sharp lines defining our conceptions of God must 
 therefore be taken away, for all these are dogmatic. 
 Guesses too uncertain to be asserted, and specula- 
 tions too vague to be defined, alone remain. The 
 
94 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 statement of " what is " is changed into the stam- 
 mering and hesitating suggestion of something that 
 "may be." The Theism itself becomes subjective 
 only, a thing of many shapes and forms, which 
 chameleon-like changes its colours with the mental 
 and moral peculiarities of the thinker. 
 
 Here we find the answer to another plea lying in 
 the course of my argument. The ultimate end of all 
 religion is confessed to be God, and its ultimate 
 object union of the soul with God. If the soul by 
 its own inherent powers of thought and feeling can 
 attain to this union, by intuitive instinct or medi- 
 tation, as the Neo-Platonists believed, why argue for 
 the retention of dogmatic truth as a means of this 
 union when the union can be attained without it ? 
 If there may be an immediate contact of heart and 
 affection between man and God, why do we need this 
 elaborate system of belief. In ancient times, when 
 the human intellect was less enlightened, when the 
 soul knew less of its own wondrous gifts and far-reach- 
 ing capacities, when the laws of its own operations 
 and of the outer world around it were alike un- 
 known, the aid of dogmas may have been necessary. 
 But the human mind has now outlived the need, and 
 all}"ing itself by an immediate sentiment of religion 
 with God, indignantly flings away the effete doctrines 
 of the past, as the man rejects in the maturity of his 
 strength the toys of his childhood. The result pre- 
 viously shown to follow on the separation of religion 
 from theology has already suggested the answer. We 
 acknowledge thai union with God is the ultimate 
 
Ill] Union with Deity. 95 
 
 object of religion ; but we deny that a sentimental 
 Theism is competent to produce it. 
 
 Such an union must depend either on intellectual 
 conception, or on moral sympathy, or on both. But 
 intellectual conception cannot exist where there is 
 no knowledge of the facts of the Divine nature and 
 character. Without the doctrines contained in the 
 Bible we know nothing for certain of God. He may 
 be a glorious Being, reposing idly from everlasting to 
 everlasting in the abysses of His own sublime self- 
 consciousness and never emerging into contact with 
 human things. He may be a dreadful Fate, marching 
 on His inexorable way utterly indifferent to the joys 
 or sorrows of the individual men and women making 
 up the great total of humanity. He may be a mere 
 name for the sum of all things, an abstract idea of 
 human creation. We know not. Having rejected 
 all dogma we are absolutely in the dark, and neither 
 know anything for certain nor can know anything 
 for certain. We have barred the very portals of the 
 temple of truth against our own entrance, for directly 
 we gain positive truths we get dogma, and are 
 thus endlessly involved in the meshes of our own 
 self-contradictions. There can be no intellectual 
 conception where there is no definite notion, and 
 there can be no intellectual contemplation where 
 there is no intellectual conception, 
 
 Nor can moral sympathy survive, where there is 
 no knowledge of the qualities of the Being with 
 whom we are to sympathise. If we know nothing 
 about God, His attributes may be shocking to us, 
 
96 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 and utterly alien from everything in ourselves, for 
 aught we know to the contrary. If this cannot be, 
 and we say such a Being cannot be our God, then 
 we are slipping back into dogma again, although 
 it be but a dogma of our own. We become creators 
 of an ideal Being, and with him we sympathise. 
 That ideal is but a reflection of the intellectual and 
 moral self. In other words, we sympathise with 
 ourselves, not with God. 
 
 I can conceive one other objection, and only one 
 other, capable of being urged against the conclusion 
 that if we destroy dogma we destroy religion : — if 
 we admit religion we must admit dogma. It may 
 be said that I am too sweeping in my conclusions, 
 that the objection is not against all dogma but only 
 against Christian dogma, the particular system of 
 theological doctrines deduced from the Scriptures and 
 dependent upon their authority. The relation exist- 
 ing between the technical statement of these truths 
 by the Church and the teaching of the Scriptures will 
 remain for future consideration. Meanwhile, let it 
 be seen whether it be possible in objecting to dogma 
 as dogma, to draw a line short of the rejection of all 
 positive belief, and if it be, at what point it can be 
 drawn. Look round the whole range of religious be- 
 lief and see what common truths there are concerning 
 God and our relations towards Him which are not 
 included in the circle of revealed doctrine. I believe 
 you will not find a solitary one. There are certain 
 common features traceable in the religious sentiment 
 found fco exist universally among mankind, with one 
 
Ill] Doctrines of Heathenism. 97 
 
 possible exception, all the world over. But every- 
 one of these is contained hi the Scriptural theo- 
 logy, and is dependent on it for its definiteness and 
 authentication. Moreover all these features, with 
 one exception, are earnestly repudiated by the free 
 thought of our day, and can therefore form no part 
 of its original and undogmatic religion. 
 
 Thus a belief in the doctrine of human sin may 
 be traced alike amid the traditions of savage idolatry 
 and the speculations of Pagan philosophy. But 
 modern free thought indignantly rejects it, and 
 considers the notion of an hereditary stain, or of an 
 inherent depravity of all mankind, to be among the 
 most monstrous of dogmas. Thus a belief in the 
 necessity for an atonement, sometimes expressed in 
 a manner shocking to all the instincts of human 
 affection, has existed as widely as human nature 
 itself. But this also modern free thought rejects, 
 denying atonement in any sense of a vicarious 
 sacrifice, and only admitting it, if at all, in the sense 
 of moral reconciliation. Thus a belief in some kind 
 of purgative process, to be accomplished on human 
 nature before it can find access to a holy Deity, is 
 co-extensive with the faintest traces of religious sen- 
 timent, however external and sujDerficial the senti- 
 ment may be. But this too modern free thought 
 rejects, holding that man needs no other intercessor 
 than himself ; no other purification than the honesty 
 of his own search after truth. Thus a belief in a 
 future life of rewards and punishments has been 
 fonnd to exist alike amid the jungles of the tropics 
 
 H 
 
98 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 and the sterile solitudes of the North, in the heart of 
 terror-stricken Africa and among the splendid savages 
 inhabiting the sunny isles of the Pacific. But this 
 likewise modern free thought rejects as equally dis- 
 honourable to the goodness of God and offensive to 
 the just independence of man. 
 
 Now these four beliefs, as they exist among 
 the heathen, are the traditional remains of great 
 truths originally given by revelation. In what I 
 may call their natural state they are dim shadows, 
 and Christian dogma gives them permanent form and 
 reality. Thus the doctrine of human sin is explained 
 by the narrative of the creation and the fall ; the doc- 
 trine of the atonement is copiously illustrated and 
 cleared of all its shocking human perversions by the 
 doctrine of the vicarious sufferings and death of the 
 God incarnate ; the acknowledgment of man's need of 
 a purgation finds its complement and satisfaction in 
 the doctrine relative to the person and work of God 
 the Holy Ghost; the belief in future rewards and 
 punishments is realised in the Scriptural doctrine 
 of the resurrection and the judgment, and heaven 
 and hell. 
 
 One doctrine alone remains held in common by 
 modern free thought and by the Christian faith ; I 
 refer to the belief in the merciful and benevolent 
 attributes of God. I fully admit that a man is 
 quite free, while he rejects the great mass of Chris- 
 tian dogma because it appears to him to be in itself 
 incredible, to accept this one dogma of the Divine 
 goodness and benevolence because it appears to him 
 
Ill] Character of God. 99 
 
 to be in itself credible. There is nothing inconsistent 
 in such a position logically considered, bnt it must 
 be modified by other considerations. 
 
 Thus it may justly be urged that in rejecting the 
 doctrines of salvation we deprive ourselves of the 
 great evidence of the Divine love. The proof from 
 creation remains, but unless supplemented by the 
 proof from redemption, is not strong enough for 
 conviction. For if on one side there are in creation 
 and Providence clear traces of goodness, there are 
 also traces equally clear of severity and chastisement. 
 As a matter of fact, persons have become Atheists 
 because they have been unable to reconcile the 
 apparent disorder and miseries of life with the 
 existence of a benevolent God [5]. It must, I 
 think, be admitted that if the disciplinary purposes 
 of the present state, as revealed in Scripture, are 
 lost sight of, the problem is an embarrassing one. 
 
 It may be further urged, as a matter of experi- 
 ence, that those who, out of the natural sentiment of 
 religion, believe in a God, do not always believe in 
 His goodness and benevolence, but more frequently 
 in His harshness and severity. Hence the evidence 
 from nature for the goodness of God cannot be 
 very conclusive, or it would have been universally 
 admitted. 
 
 It may be further urged that a belief in the 
 merciful and benevolent attributes of God, as held 
 apart from Christian dogma, is founded on a denial 
 of His attributes of holiness and justice. A God 
 made up of love, and love alone, loses His claims on 
 
 h 2 
 
100 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 reverence and worship, and becomes contemptible ; 
 since an indiscriminating love, recognising no dis- 
 tinction of good or bad, worthiness or imworthiness, 
 in its objects, is deprived of its moral character, and 
 becomes mere easiness of disposition. An ideal God 
 of love alone, instead of being higher and nobler than 
 man, becomes lower and weaker than man, and must 
 be wholly incapable of influencing or elevating a 
 nature already superior to himself. 
 
 These considerations may be urged with great 
 force and conclusiveness. But I do not press them 
 now, being content with the acknowledgment that 
 a religion severed from theology can be nothing 
 higher than a Theism, and this Theism vague, in- 
 definite, and uncertain. I have separated one by one 
 the dogmas of theology from what is said to be re- 
 ligion, and now that the process is completed, nothing 
 remains but a sentiment, not a creed ; a purely sub- 
 jective emotion ; a shadow without a substance, a 
 form without a life, a name without a power. 
 
 But it is said, that this, and this alone, is religion, 
 the divine spark in man's soul, that all dogmas are 
 but the incrustations formed by ignorance or priest- 
 craft around the divine original ; that this sentiment 
 is prior and superior to theology, since definite doc- 
 trines are the variable forms in which the religious 
 consciousness has developed itself in different stages 
 of the world's education ; that it is, in fact, the for- 
 mative principle of all doctrine. Claims so high and 
 lofty make it necessary for us still to keep the eyes 
 steadily fixed on the sentiment, till we can measure all 
 
Ill] Philosophy not Religion. 101 
 
 its proportion and test its worth by the evidence of 
 the past. In doing this, I must adopt new names. 
 To consent to this separation of the sentiment from 
 the doctrine, and call the first religion, and the second 
 theology, is to do an injustice to Christianity, and to 
 religion itself. I can therefore no longer admit that 
 the holy name " religion " belongs to the vague and 
 dreamy sentiment alone surviving after the elimina- 
 tion of Christian doctrine. I can neither exalt the 
 sentiment into a divine reality, nor degrade the doc- 
 trine into a human system. I shall therefore desig- 
 nate the one as the religious sentiment, and the 
 other as the religious dogma. 
 
 The inevitable tendency of the sentiment, deprived 
 of the doctrine, is to lose its religious character alto- 
 gether. It is, consequently, incapable of maintaining 
 its own life. I do not deny that it may survive in 
 any one particular man while thought and conscious- 
 ness survive. The human sold is endowed with a 
 strange power of living in a world of its own, and 
 peopling it with ideal inhabitants. But I mean that 
 such a sentiment, in the process of its transmission 
 from mind to mind, has an irresistible tendency to 
 lose its sacred character, and from a religion to 
 become a philosophy. Religion deals with the 
 relation between man and God, but where no 
 definite knowledge of God exists, the soul falls 
 back upon itself. It leaves what it does not know 
 of the Divine, for what it does know of the human. 
 Thus it drops its theistic character and merges itself 
 into the love of the true and the good, and the 
 
102 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 beautiful — a kind of moral and intellectual aestheti- 
 cism, in which the soul itself is at once worshipper 
 and temple, subject and Deity. It is an apotheosis of 
 human nature, and the result is not a religion, for it 
 has no relation to God, but a philosophy. 
 
 To this sequel the religion of sentiment has 
 already passed among ourselves, and the change 
 is avowed with no doubting or hesitating lips. 
 A change more momentous cannot be conceived. 
 Could it become universal it would be a destruc- 
 tion of Christianity, for what would an empty name 
 avail when the reality was gone % We should have 
 a new dogma, but a dogma of morals not of religion, 
 of earth not of heaven. The sacred name of the 
 Saviour of the world would ring no more from the 
 pulpit, and would be hushed in the language of our 
 devotion. The ministry would no longer witness, 
 trumpet-tongued, before the world to the solemn 
 realities of the soul, and God, and sin, and the 
 Saviour, and judgment, and heaven, and hell ; but in 
 their place would sound the dull platitudes of senti- 
 ment or the cold speculations of morality. Christian 
 learning, losing its noblest theme, would lose its 
 breadth and vigour, as they were lost in the middle 
 ages. Here, in this University, our loftiest subject 
 would be the to ayadov and to koXov of Aristotle, or 
 the primal ideas of Plato; if for such a dull level of 
 humanity his idealistic philosophy would not be too 
 spiritual. And what amid this spreading and uni- 
 versal darkness, what would become of the human 
 soul and of its inalienable wants and instincts I 
 
Ill] Philosophy not Religion. 103 
 
 We must not forget, in tracing the effects of such 
 a change, that the message of salvation is ever de- 
 scribed in the Word as a remedy for an actual and 
 specific ruin. We are taught that man is as far as 
 possible gone from original righteousness, " that the 
 flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit, and therefore 
 that in every man born into the world it deserve th 
 God s wrath and damnation f that we can be justi- 
 fied "by faith only," " for the merit of our Lord and 
 Saviour Jesus Christ ;" that Christ will come again 
 " to judge all men at the last day." These are not 
 my words, but the words of the doctrinal articles of 
 our Church. 
 
 I do not forget that all these are Christian dogmas, 
 and that upon the supposition that the religious 
 sentiment is alone to be cultivated, all these dogmas 
 woidd be swept away as things of the past. But 
 there are instincts in the human soul and conscience, 
 hopes and fears, glimpses of unseen things and awful 
 anticipations of a world to come, that will not sub- 
 mit themselves to any speculative control. They will 
 make themselves felt every now and then, stirring 
 the depths of our nature so strongly that even the 
 sceptical education of a lifetime will not always 
 eradicate them. It cannot be said that they are the 
 products of Christian dogma, and would cease to 
 be felt when Christian dogma had been swept away ; 
 for they have been coeval with man himself, and 
 have existed at periods and in spots where no con- 
 ceivable influence of Christian teaching can have 
 called them into life. Beneath the most utter 
 
104 T/if Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 stagnation of the human intellect and conscience they 
 have still made themselves felt. It must be ad- 
 mitted to be the province of religion to meet and 
 satisfy them, to answer these awful questionings of 
 life and death, to allay these tremendous fears of 
 the future, to aj)pease these dreadful conflicts. 
 What can the empty sentiment do in this emergency 
 of our nature \ To talk of the good and true and 
 beautiful to a conscience shaken with the sense of 
 sin and the alarms of judgment ; to parade empty 
 feelings when the soul is already groping in the 
 dark beneath the first shadows of the world to 
 come ; to exalt human self to a heart sick with self 
 and pining to its depths to escape from itself and 
 to find God, — is as vain and empty a process as to 
 feed a hungry man with the wind, and slake his 
 devouring thirst with the sands of the desert. 
 
 It is the further work of religion to give force 
 to moral obligations, and bring the instincts of our 
 lower nature into subjection to the reason and the 
 conscience. What can the sentiment of religion do 
 to fulfil this office 1 We may as well bind the arms 
 of a giant with fetters of sand as combat the wild 
 and passionate impulses of human nature by aesthetic 
 proprieties and abstract love of the beautiful. The 
 tremendous truth of an over-seeing and avenging God, 
 of a future judgment and an eternal recompense of 
 good and evil, can scarcely abash the bold forehead 
 of sin, and check its effrontery. But take them 
 away, and the Last authority would be stripped 
 from morals. The very heathen felt tin's. Cicero 
 
Ill] Prospects of Morality. 105 
 
 declared that morality would not survive the shock 
 that destroyed religion. Modern thought catches 
 up almost the very echo of his words ; for, sweep- 
 ing away all dogmatic truth, it proclaims the advent 
 of a new morality suited to the genial temper of 
 that new theology which, by its own statement, is only 
 a sentiment and not a theology at all. That the 
 old morality cannot survive the destruction of the 
 old dogmatic religion is certain. For if religion be 
 the love of the good and the true, and the good 
 and the true be tested by human nature, morality 
 must follow suit with religion and become human 
 likewise. But a morality based on human sanctions 
 and drawn from human laws, must necessarily re- 
 flect the characteristics of the nature which has 
 given it birth. If human nature be depraved, a 
 morality of human nature must be depraved likewise. 
 Thus every argument asserts the absolute weak- 
 ness and futility of a religion of sentiment alone. 
 But the evidence of existing experience does not 
 exhaust the case. The experiment is only imper- 
 fectly tried among ourselves, and amid the elevating 
 and restraining influences of Christian doctrine. The 
 theology of reason unconsciously borrows the ideas 
 and even the language of the theology of revelation, 
 although it disavows the shelter under which it has 
 nestled. We must therefore appeal to the expe- 
 rience of human history under other circumstances. 
 For common causes should produce common effects 
 all the world over, especially if natural law be the 
 only force in action, and if it be, according to the 
 
106 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 modern theory, constant and uniform. If the theistic 
 sentiment be the only pure and true religion, it 
 should prove itself competent to fulfil the functions 
 of religion. Its invariable tendency should be 
 to self-preservation and self-expansion, to alliance 
 with liberty, civilisation, and progress. There can 
 be no influence in humanity itself to check this ten- 
 dency ; at least our opponents can make no appeal 
 to it. For human nature, upon their theory, is a 
 pure thing, ever tending towards perfection, and 
 the notion of any hereditary disposition to error of 
 opinion or mistakes of practice is indignantly de- 
 scribed as no more than an exploded dogma of 
 the past. 
 
 We turn to heathen lands. Here the testimony 
 of the facts is too clear and positive to admit of 
 doubt or to need reiteration. If the religious senti- 
 ment be religion, and Church dogmas are only a 
 human corruption of it, then the less dogma there is, 
 the purer should be the religion. The more power- 
 ful therefore should be its influence, and the more 
 beneficent its effects. In the lands where definite 
 religious doctrine least exists, human virtue, hap- 
 piness, and peace should flourish most. The more 
 undefined and vague the religious impression, the 
 purer must it be, and the higher should be the con- 
 dition of its votaries. It seems absurd gravely to 
 argue such a question, for the identity of savagism 
 and superstition is proverbial. Yet if a common 
 sentiment of religion, without any dogmatic faith 
 to give it definite direction, he the ideal of religion. 
 
Ill] Heathenism. 107 
 
 and religion be confessed to be good, it follows by 
 a most absolute necessity that the less dogmatic 
 religion you have, the more virtue and happiness 
 you ought to have. I am not sure that some are 
 not prepared openly to avow and defend this con- 
 clusion so far as happiness is concerned, and even so 
 far as morality is concerned, monstrous as it would 
 be, and contradictory to the most positive evidence 
 of facts. For look where we will, the less religious 
 knowledge exists the deeper is the general degrada- 
 tion. The course is downwards, not upwards. The 
 tendency is not to a spontaneous activity, growing by 
 its very luxuriance into definite systems of belief, but 
 to an ever-deepening stagnation, losing what once it 
 had or believes itself to have had. The result is 
 not life, but torpor, silence, death [6]. 
 
 But it may be urged that the fault in this case 
 is not in the inability of the sentiment but in the 
 degraded condition of the mind. On the theory 
 that all mankind began their career hi a state of 
 savagism and have slowly worked their way up- 
 wards into civilisation, it may be maintained that 
 the proper effect of the religious sentiment cannot 
 be seen in the savage, but must be sought in the 
 civilised. The rudeness and ignorance and ferocity 
 of barbarous tribes have overlaid the religious senti- 
 ment with empty superstitions, and crushed its energy 
 beneath the savage instincts of the animal man. 
 But couple, it may be said, the sentiment with 
 knowledge and learning on one side, and the human- 
 ising effects of an enlightened civilisation on the 
 
108 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 other, and then you will see the original religion 
 in its beauty, neither darkened by foolish dogma 
 nor degraded by moral corruption. Most happily 
 for the truth, it has pleased Divine Providence to 
 supply the means of bringing this assertion to the 
 test, and I adore the prescient wisdom which has 
 equally closed up the avenues of scepticism by the 
 barbarism of savage tribes and the full blaze of the 
 ancient Greek and Roman civilisation. 
 
 Here we look at a civilisation which was, according 
 to the Scriptural chronology, the growth of at least 
 two thousand years, and according to some modern 
 theories, of a period indefinitely greater. I do not 
 pause on the character of this civilisation, for this 
 remains for consideration from another point of view. 
 I only refer at present to its effects, and to the evi- 
 dence afforded by the undoubted facts of the past to 
 the adequacy or inadequacy of a religious sentiment 
 either to maintain its own life or to elevate the condi- 
 tion of mankind. During the successive waves of em- 
 pire that have swept over the world since the deluge, 
 Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman, 
 each inherited the advancement of its predecessor. 
 It was not that the tide of progress flowed and 
 then absolutely ebbed to the same point again, and 
 that each wave rose independently, lived its own 
 separate life, and died its own separate death. But 
 the remnants of the one wave were in each case in- 
 corporated into the strength of the other. The mag- 
 nificent Babylonian empire absorbed the Assyrian 
 greatness into its own glory. The Persian spread 
 
Ill] Ancient Civilisation. 109 
 
 its shadowing wings in a wider flight, and drew 
 its glory from a thousand tributary nations, but 
 still included the more ancient civilisation within 
 itself. The Greek infused its own keen life and 
 restless enterprise to the furthest bounds of the 
 known world. The Roman inherited all the rest, 
 and welded it together by its own vast organisation 
 and iron strength. At each stage the area of em- 
 pire was extended, but included the same nation- 
 alities. The civilisation of the world at the Chris- 
 tian era was thus the inheritor of all that had gone 
 before, the climax of the world's life, the culmina- 
 tion of its progress during all the preceding ages. 
 
 Of the intellectual greatness of this civilisation, it 
 can be nowhere so unnecessary to speak as in this Uni- 
 versity, where we are taught to live over again the 
 life of that great past, and incorporate into our own 
 mental selves the force of its intellect, the acuteness 
 of its reasoning, the riches of its learning, the subtlety 
 of its thoughts, and the exquisite taste of its artistic 
 genius. Its influence is ineradicably stamped upon the 
 present. We yet look back with wondering astonish- 
 ment at the blaze of light shining from Athens and 
 Alexandria, from Tarsus and Pergamos, and at the 
 height of voluptuous luxury reached in Corinth, and 
 Antioch, and Home. We have far outgrown their 
 state, indeed, in some respects ; but never has there 
 been such a vigour of human genius as then, and 
 never since, happily for the world, such a civilisation. 
 
 Here then, at all events, the religious sentiment 
 had a fair field to display its powers. Certainly, on 
 
110 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 the intellectual side of it, ancient philosophy made 
 a sweep of popular superstitions clean enough to 
 satisfy any man [7]. It stood just where modern 
 thought, in its most advanced stage, stands at our 
 own day. Neither did Socrates and Plato fall short 
 of the position occupied by Colenso and Mill, by 
 Michelet and Penan, by Strauss and Baur ; neither 
 do these advance, in the results of their philosophy, 
 one step beyond Socrates and Plato. The ideas of 
 the two periods, and almost the language, are 
 identically the same. The scene is very different 
 indeed. We must unravel two thousand years 
 and more of the world's tangled history. The 
 place is very different. We stand beneath the 
 sunny skies of Attica, and breathe its fragrant 
 air. Around us stretch the temples and arcades, 
 the tapering columns and majestic structures of 
 Athens. Shapes of beauty are on every side, 
 and glancing towards the Acropolis we see the 
 majestic figure of Minerva stretching her guardian 
 shield in front of the Parthenon. The forms 
 around us are strange to our eyes — majestic men, 
 such as yet live in the imperishable sculptures of 
 Phidias and Praxiteles. We walk through the 
 groves of the Academy beneath the venerable shade 
 of trees where Plato taught, or in the Stoa 
 with Zeno, or along the flowery garden with 
 Epicurus. The forms and faces and associations 
 are those of the long-distant yesterday ; but the 
 ideas and the language are the ideas and language 
 of to-day. We almost appear to catch the accents 
 
Ill] Ancient Civilisation. Ill 
 
 of some well-known modern philosophers in the 
 words of the men of that day, as Justin Martyr 
 reports them: "The Divinity extends its care to the 
 great whole and its several classes, but not to me or 
 to you, to men as individuals. Therefore, it is useless 
 to pray to Him, for all things recur according to the 
 unchangeable law of an endless progression [8]." 
 What is this but the latest modern discovery of 
 invariable law, coming out of the grave where it 
 was buried two thousand years ago 1 Let us listen 
 again. The foundation idea of all anti-dogmatic 
 thought sounds in our ears, and one of the most 
 amiable of the ancients utters it : " The Divine 
 religion is something imperishable, but its forms 
 are subject to decay." So wrote the gentle and 
 philosophic Plutarch, quoting the ancient Greek 
 tragedians. A living voice echoes back the senti- 
 ment in Christianised words [9]. 
 
 The civilisation of that day embraced, therefore, 
 the identical principles of modern rationalism. It 
 stood on the same platform, thought the same 
 thoughts, used the same language. Yet what was 
 the result when the religious sentiment thus worked 
 clear of any embarrassing dogmas, and in the midst 
 of the most voluptuous civilisation ever known to 
 the world % There followed its own loss of life in an 
 universal scepticism ; its absolute impotence in an 
 incredible profligacy unfathomable by modern con- 
 ceptions ; its touching and pathetic wretchedness in 
 a heart, sick even unto death, and crying out in the 
 anguish of its desolation for some better hope and 
 
112 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 clearer teaching. From its depth of misery it looked 
 and longed for the divine instruction modern philoso- 
 phy contemptuously rejects, and pathetically mourned 
 the ignorance and misery modern philosophy osten- 
 tatiously embraces [ i o]. 
 
 The experiment of a religion without dogma has 
 therefore been tried, and has failed. To try it over 
 again would be the wantonness of incredulity, if 
 the circumstances of our day did not render the 
 attempt impracticable. Results accomplished in 
 the past would be accomplished over again in the 
 future. Philosophers who push the constancy of 
 natural law into such an absolute invariability, as 
 to eliminate the possible action of the Deity in 
 human affairs, cannot suppose its operation to be 
 irregular where the agencies are altogether human. 
 Of all men else, they should be the slowest to distrust 
 the experiences of the past. A religion without an 
 authoritative creed has been tried, and has failed. 
 The mass of mankind, unable to live without a creed 
 of some kind, fell into a coarse and debasing poly- 
 theism. Higher minds either lost the religions senti- 
 ment altogether in losing definite belief, or retaining 
 the sentiment fell into hopeless despondency alike 
 of intellect and of heart, because, ever haunted by its 
 influence, they vainly groped like men in the dark after 
 the corresponding realities. The pen of inspiration 
 in one graphic verse couples the cause and the 
 effect together in the pathetic description of the 
 ancient heathen : " Without Christ, being aliens from 
 the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the 
 
Ill] The Light of the World. 113 
 
 covenants of promise, having no hope, and without 
 God in the world." 
 
 Upon this darkness broke the light of Christianity, 
 revealing a system of truth sharply defined and in- 
 vested with absolute authority over faith and con- 
 science. Christianity is essentially a religion of 
 dogma, because it is essentially a religion of autho- 
 rity. It is scarcely possible to conceive a sharper 
 contrast than exists between the speculative uncer- 
 tainty of heathen philosophy and the calm assurance 
 of Christian teaching. "He taught them as one 
 having authority" is as true of the Gospel in its 
 written form as it was of our Lord's personal teach- 
 ing. But we must be careful not to be led away by 
 the love of contrast into a misapprehension of the 
 facts. Heathenism cultivated the religious senti- 
 ment without religious dogma, but Christianity does 
 not teach religious dogma without religious senti- 
 ment. Heathenism held morality without doctrine, 
 but Christianity does not hold doctrine without 
 morality. The contrast has often been stated in 
 this form, but most falsely. The faith is so far 
 from setting up what men believe in opposition to 
 what men do, that it presents right belief and right 
 practice as inseparable. Religious affections supply 
 the link between them. The faith, made powerful 
 by the Spirit of God to quicken the will and en- 
 lighten the conscience, first awakens the affections 
 and through them directs and sanctifies the life. 
 
 Dogmatic Christianity has thus accomplished what 
 speculative heathenism failed to do. It came, giving 
 
 i 
 
114 The Religious Sentiment. [Lect. 
 
 definite shape to what was good and true in the 
 existing convictions of mankind, establishing what 
 was uncertain and ambiguous, and sweeping abso- 
 lutely away what was false and superstitious. It 
 cleared away the clouds from ancient truths and 
 allied itself with all the longing hopes of the human 
 soul. It thus gave humanity a new life. It did 
 not begin with a sentiment, and out of the senti- 
 ment proceed to develop the doctrine; but it began 
 with the doctrine, and by means of it gave energy 
 and elevation to the sentiment. If anywhere the 
 sentiment did not exist, the faith called it into 
 existence. Where it existed, it explained it by re- 
 vealing the eternal realities to which it vaguely cor- 
 responded. It came therefore as the superior, not 
 the inferior. The revealed dogma and not the sen- 
 timent is the spring and primal source of the Divine 
 life, because the Spirit of Life first gives the doctrine 
 and then works by it. Christianity has triumphed 
 hitherto because it is dogmatic, and supplies in that 
 very dogma the yearning wants of human nature. 
 With this it has already revolutionised the world 
 and inaugurated the visible kingdom of Christ upon 
 earth. With this are bound up all the hopes of the 
 Church for the present and her prospects for the 
 future, when the inchoate work shall be completed 
 and the knowledge of the glory of the Lord shall 
 cover the earth as the waters cover the sea. 
 
 Both sides of the contrast, the failure of a religious 
 sentiment without dogma and the triumph of reli- 
 gious dogma quickening and exalting the sentiment. 
 
Ill] A Creed necessary. 115 
 
 are eloquent with the same lesson. Religion cannot 
 survive without a creed. In its absence the religious 
 sentiment itself vanishes and dies. It would be as 
 reasonable to expect a shadow without a substance as 
 a religious influence without a religious faith. The 
 necessity lies deep in the very constitution of our 
 nature. To reject dogma is to reject religion. 
 
 I 2 
 
LECTURE IV 
 
 THE FAITH AND THE INTUITIONS 
 
 Job 
 
 XI. 
 
 Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the 
 At mighty unto perfection ? 
 
 JaELIGION cannot survive without a creed. The 
 religious sentiment, deprived of its natural founda- 
 tion in dogma, loses its definite shape, evaporates and 
 dies. Love cannot exist without a knowledge of the 
 character and qualities of the Being to be loved. 
 Fear can possess no intelligent character without 
 definite acquaintance with the object of fear, and 
 the reasons why He should be feared. Gratitude 
 springs from the sense of benefits received and 
 from the contemplation of the generous benevolence 
 of the Benefactor. Desire must be directed to a 
 special object if it is to be real and operative. Wor- 
 ship is the expression of a recognised relation of 
 dependent inferiority between the worshipper and 
 the Worshipped. Reverence and adoration can only 
 be kindled by the consciousness of a Being com- 
 petent to claim them by the glory of His attributes. 
 In every case the affection is called out by some 
 
The Creed of Revelation. 117 
 
 corresponding truth. The hand which sweeps away 
 the truth necessarily strangles the affections. 
 
 As the life of the affection depends upon the exist- 
 ence of truth, so also are its intensity and force 
 exactly proportioned to the definiteness and certainty 
 of the truth. The shapeless substance will ever 
 produce a shapeless shadow. The most vague and 
 dreary superstition may be traced back to certain 
 definite beliefs. The horrible dread of witchcraft, 
 for instance, which haunts the fear-shaken savages 
 of equatorial Africa, springs out of the belief in 
 the existence of malevolent spirits and their wil- 
 lingness to become the instruments of the evil pas- 
 sions of man. In proportion as the object of belief 
 is undefined, the belief itself becomes unreal and 
 therefore uninfluential. For this reason it is that 
 I have called the religious instinct, found to exist 
 throughout the human race, a sentiment and not 
 an affection, because in the absence of definite 
 knowledge it is itself devoid of definite shape. It 
 would be to dishonour our nature to call this vague 
 and dim instinct an affection. It is a sentiment 
 at once as dark and shapeless as the shadows of 
 the other world out of which it springs. 
 
 Moreover, all experience proves that the minds 
 of men are influenced as much by the certainty as 
 by the magnitude of the objects presented to them. 
 All mankind are influenced by appeals from without. 
 Minds of a higher order are distinguished from 
 others of a lower only by the greater nobility of 
 their objects. Some seek the gratification of the 
 
118 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 loftier and purer parts of their nature, and others 
 the gratification of the lower. Butin the calculation 
 of gain or loss, hope is in every case excited less by 
 the extent of the reward, and fear less by the ex- 
 tent of the punishment, than by their certainty. A 
 heavier penalty with a chance of escape from it 
 affects men less than a lesser penalty with a moral 
 certainty of its infliction. The same thing is true of 
 religious motives as of secular. The mind is moved 
 by truths in proportion to the vividness with which 
 they are presented, and the evidence by which they 
 commend themselves to the understanding. An in- 
 tense dream affects the feelings of the sleeper, but exer- 
 cises no influence whatever over the waking thoughts. 
 The noblest ideas, if they are ideas alone and not 
 realities, will be outweighed, to the vast majority 
 of men, by the smallest practical certainty of life. 
 
 It is necessary, therefore, in order to keep the re- 
 ligious sentiment alive and develop it into affections, 
 to present religious truth in such a definite shape 
 as the mind can grasp, the memory retain, and the 
 heart appreciate, and at the same time to invest it 
 with certitude. Yet more necessary is this in order 
 to give the sentiment force and strength enough to 
 control the passions, form the character, and regu- 
 late the conduct. All loopholes of escape must be 
 stopped, and the conscience brought face to face 
 with realities so sure and great as to abash, before 
 bheir own majesty, the arrogance of self-will and 
 tin- selfishness of self-indulgence. The dogmas of 
 the Christian faith are invested to an extraordinary 
 
IV] The Creed of Revelation. 119 
 
 degree with both these characteristics. They are 
 at once broad and simple enough for the compre- 
 hension of the most ignorant, and yet have heights 
 and depths about them surpassing the grasp of the 
 profoundest intellect. They come to the conscience 
 invested with a Divine authority. The faithfulness 
 of Him who is a God of truth, the omniscience 
 of Him to whose piercing eyes all things in heaven 
 and earth are open, and the authority of Him who 
 is Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, King, Father, and 
 Judge in one indivisible Deity, are pledged for their 
 certainty. The evidences constituting the credentials 
 of the faith bear on them the visible signature of 
 God. The inspired records of the faith speak with 
 a confident authority unknown to any human books. 
 Their sanctions are drawn from the highest exercise 
 of enlightened reason and conscience, and from the 
 tremendous interests of a future world of reward 
 and punishment. The dogmatic faith possesses every 
 quality fitted to instruct the reason, satisfy the 
 conscience, and move the affections. But the cause 
 and the effect must stand or fall together. The 
 loss of the truth involves the loss of the sentiment 
 evoked by it. To destroy the dogmatic faith is to 
 destroy Christianity, and to destroy Christianity is 
 to destroy religion. 
 
 But it is possible that the general proposition 
 that religion cannot survive without a creed may 
 be admitted, and yet the assertion that the existence 
 of a religious creed is bound up with the main- 
 tenance of Christian dogma denied. The intuitions 
 
120 TJie Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 of the human mind are asserted to be competent 
 to furnish all we need to know in regard to God, 
 and thus to supply the mental food necessary for 
 the life of the emotions. The soul, it is said, has 
 powers of its own competent to reach into the other 
 world and to unveil the Unseen. There is a voice 
 ever speaking within the soul of Divine realities, a 
 far safer guide than any sacred books of a distant past, 
 or any technical^ formulas of faith, for it is an innate 
 part of the soul, and as God made the soul, so the 
 voice within it is the voice of God. To this we 
 should listen as the absolute revealer of all truth, 
 not only competent to keep alive the religious 
 affections, but adequate to enable man to worship 
 the spiritual God in spirit and in truth. If this 
 be so, we no longer need the intervention of creeds 
 and articles, since the soul reaches up directly to the 
 Deity, and by its own powers finds out the Al- 
 mighty to perfection. The claim is as ancient as 
 the Alexandrian Platonists, and re-echoes the lan- 
 guage of Plotinus and Porphyry [i]. 
 
 In examining this plea, it is important to maintain 
 the method already pursued in these lectures, and to 
 bring it as far as possible to the test of facts. Are 
 the intuitions competent to furnish mankind with 
 religious truth, and supposing this answer to be in 
 any degree in the affirmative, does the truth so sup- 
 plied possess the definiteness and certainty necessary 
 to make it influential over the conscience and the 
 affections 1 
 
 It is impossible not to be struck in the first place 
 
IV] The Intuitional Faculty. 121 
 
 by the personal and arbitrary character of the selected 
 guide. For the intuitions, supposing them to be any- 
 thing more than the primary grounds of all reason- 
 ing, are subjective and personal. In their highest 
 form, therefore, and supposing them to possess the 
 authority claimed for them, they can be a guide to 
 the individual alone, and not to others beyond him- 
 self. Either all men possess alike these scintillations 
 of Deity within the soul, or they are the peculiar 
 gifts of a favoured few. If all men possess them, each 
 man must be guided by his own ; for to him they 
 are asserted to be the voice of God, and conse- 
 quently to possess an absolute authority. He can- 
 not consent to submit his inward convictions to the 
 convictions of any other man. Each must believe 
 for himself, and on no principle can the belief of one 
 have the slightest possible supremacy over the belief 
 of another. If all men do not possess these asserted 
 glimpses into the other world, the independence of 
 individual belief still remains the same. Your intui- 
 tions, is the natural reply to any man who should 
 claim to be a revealer of Divine things, tell you that 
 there is a God, but mine tell me that there is no 
 God. You believe in another world, and are there- 
 fore quite right to act in accordance with your 
 belief; I do not believe it, and am therefore 
 equally bound in conscience to follow my convic- 
 tions as you are to follow yours. Such a reply is 
 unanswerable on the principles of intuitionalism. 
 For the man who claims to possess the knowledge 
 of Divine things has no evidence whatever to give, 
 
122 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 and does not profess to have any, beyond his own 
 subjective convictions. If men were not misled by 
 the mere sound of words and the ostentatious use of 
 philosophical phrases, this fact would be sufficient of 
 itself to expose the futility of the claim. Let us 
 drop the word intuitions, and call these individual 
 and self-formed conceptions of Divine things, notions 
 or fancies, and the imposing appearance of the plea 
 is lost at once. Such they really are. They are no 
 creed, and never can furnish a creed. They are but 
 the phantasies of the individual brain, and to the in- 
 dividual brain alone can they have authority. 
 
 But against this is cited the existence of a natural 
 religion. To the prevalence of a religious sentiment 
 among almost all known portions of the human 
 family I referred in my last lecture. It is not 
 to be denied that a creed of some sort exists side 
 by side with the sentiment; and in exact proportion 
 as this creed is definite it is dogmatic, although de- 
 void of the authority out of which alone dogma can 
 properly spring. But whence this creed has been de- 
 rived is a very different question. Our common use 
 of the descriptive phrase, " natural religion," in no 
 degree forecloses the enquiry [2]. For we use the 
 word to distinguish the common belief of the heathen 
 world from the definite system of Christianity re- 
 vealed in the sacred Scriptures and constituting the 
 foundation of the Christian Church. How "natural 
 religion" has been obtained, is a question wholly 
 different from the recognition of its existence. 
 
 Two answers are given to this enquiry. On one 
 
IV] Witness of Gentilism. 123 
 
 side it is declared to be the natural outgrowth of a 
 Divinely-implanted sentiment, the product of the in- 
 tuitive faculties of the soul. It is indisputable that 
 Scripture meets this assertion with a direct negative, 
 and teaches that it has been derived, not from within, 
 but from without, the Divinely-given supply to the 
 cravings of a created, and therefore dependent being. 
 The inability of man to discover aught about God 
 for himself, pervades the inspired teaching through- 
 out, and furnishes the very reason for the inspiration. 
 The acknowledgment of Eliphaz finds its echo in the 
 teaching of prophets and apostles. I quote his words 
 because the very position of the speaker renders them 
 peculiarly applicable to my argument. Eliphaz was 
 an Arabian, not a Jew. The Book of Job itself was, 
 in all probability, antecedent in date to the times of 
 Moses and to the giving of the Law. Yet the know- 
 ledge possessed by Job and his friends, relative to the 
 nature of God, to man's dependence moral duties 
 and final destiny, is equally considerable and specific. 
 Whence was this knowledge obtained 'I The question 
 is the more interesting because this group of ancient 
 saints does not stand alone in Scripture, but forms a 
 portion of a distinct fine of holy men, entirely sepa- 
 rate from the seed of Abraham, and yet holding a 
 definite faith identical, so far as it went, with the 
 completed revelation of later times. We trace the 
 links of this descent in Melchizedeck, in Jethro 
 the priest of Midian, in Balaam the prophet, as 
 St. Peter calls him, and the old prophet of Bethel. 
 Whence was their knowledge of God received % The 
 
124 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 answer is recorded by inspiration, and therefore is 
 written for our learning, although it is not itself in- 
 spired. It conveys moreover the earliest expression 
 of Gentile experience that we possess. There is 
 something of indignant wonder hi the interroga- 
 tive form of the assertion, " Canst thou by search- 
 ing find out God % Canst thou find out the Almighty 
 unto perfection V 
 
 But the Scriptural history itself goes further, and 
 supplies a definite explanation of the origin of all 
 religious knowledge. It is important that this ac- 
 count should be clearly understood. 
 
 God originally framed man for holy intercourse 
 with Himself, to be the mortal reflection of His own 
 moral likeness. He accordingly made Him neither 
 autocratic nor self-sufficient, but a vessel, as it were, 
 to be rilled with the Divine Presence. His holiness 
 and happiness were those of dependence, and God 
 was the source and complement of them. The 
 human soul was like an earthen cistern, and God 
 the fountain which flowed into it. When man 
 fell, the channel between the two was broken. The 
 Divine justice cut off on one side the outflowing of 
 the Divine benevolence, and on the other the guilty 
 will of the fallen creature was alienated from the 
 Divine fountain. 
 
 It pleased God to scheme a mode of reunion by 
 the atoning work of God the Son and the sanctify- 
 ing power of God the Holy Ghost ; the one ex- 
 piating the guilt, the other removing the infection 
 incurred by the Fall. Jt pleased God for this purpose 
 
IV] The Scriptural Statement. 125 
 
 to renew and deepen upon men's souls the conscious- 
 ness of their sin and of their need of a redemption. 
 The truths acquired by Adam and Eve in Paradise 
 by immediate intercourse with "the Lord God" as 
 He " walked in the garden in the cool of the day," 
 were not effaced from the memory of our first parents 
 by the Fall, although their power was weakened 
 over the heart. They communicated them to their 
 children. And that, amid the degenerate tendencies 
 of human nature, they might not be wholly lost, God 
 refreshed and deepened them from time to time by 
 a special order of prophets, commissioned by imme- 
 diate inspiration from Himself to preach them to 
 the world. Thus they spread as mankind spread, 
 and after the Flood, as before, became the common 
 heirloom of the race. When the dispersion of man- 
 kind took place, and men in the course of the 
 primary migrations spread themselves gradually over 
 the world, they carried with them this original tra- 
 dition of truth. It met the wants and cravings of 
 a soul deprived by the Fall of that immediate inter- 
 course with God for which it was made, and still 
 retaining a vague sense of moral want and a dim 
 apprehension of an unseen world. God has inscribed 
 on the soul a witness for Himself as it were in in- 
 visible ink, and the influence of these truths prevents 
 it from being altogether effaced. Who shall doubt 
 that God's Spirit has ever continued to strive with 
 men, and that the heart of heathendom has dimly 
 felt His influence % Thus the feeling of another world, 
 the instinctive belief in a God, the consciousness 
 
126 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 of sin expressed in sacrifices, the need of a priest- 
 hood, and some apprehension of another world 
 of reward and punishment, have survived to the 
 present day, — survived, I believe it will be found, 
 universally, whenever a more accurate acquaintance 
 of facts shall enable us to look more closely into 
 the only apparent exceptions. 
 
 If this account be true, the whole of the Divine 
 plan of revelation lies before us, alike consistent and 
 consecutive. When the event proved — not to the 
 Divine prescience, for God knew the end from the 
 beginning, but to man himself, and, may we not 
 add, to the inhabitants of other worlds who watch 
 the wondrous history — that fallen human nature was 
 incapable of maintaining this tradition of truth, 
 much less of working itself upward by its means 
 into a higher knowledge of the Divine will, God laid 
 up the truth in one special channel in the family 
 of Abraham ; surrounded it with special enact- 
 ments ; cradled the family into a great and con- 
 spicuous nation ; acted alike through the influence of 
 its contact and of its isolation on the heathenism 
 outside ; vindicated in the history of this chosen race 
 His prerogatives alike of mercy and of power ; pre- 
 pared the line of descent from which the Saviour 
 of mankind should take flesh ; wrought out the 
 mysterious drama of His life, sufferings, and deatli ; 
 gave by the mouth of the Apostles and Evangelists 
 all the dogmatic truths necessary to enable men to 
 understand the nature of His work ; poured out the 
 Spirit to enable them to believe and live ; laid up 
 
IV] The Scriptural Statement. 127 
 
 all these truths in the written Word ; established 
 by miraculous signs and wonders the Church, that 
 she might maintain and witness to this deposit of the 
 faith, — and then, having raised Christ from the dead 
 and given Him glory, pauses, as it were, during the 
 existing dispensation, till the number of His elect being 
 gathered out of the world, the glorified Jesus shall 
 return to reign, welcomed by ten thousand times ten 
 thousand voices " King of kings and Lord of lords." 
 
 Thus the dogmatic faith, enshrined in Scripture, 
 and thence gathered and formulated by the saints, 
 is but the completion of a purpose framed in the 
 mind of God from everlasting. It entered upon its 
 first accomplishment in time in the creation of the 
 first man. Then shone the earliest ray of light, 
 and it has ever waxed brighter and brighter since 
 then, ever risen higher and higher towards the 
 zenith, till, like the sun in the material firmament, 
 it fills the world with light and glory. Who can 
 survey so vast a scheme and not adore the infinite 
 love that prompted, the infinite wisdom that schemed, 
 the infinite power that accomplished it % " O the 
 depth of the riches both of the wisdom and know- 
 ledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments, 
 and His ways past finding out ! " 
 
 Such is the teaching of Scripture. None can deny 
 that it is intelligible and consistent with the facts. 
 The causes asserted to have been in action are 
 plainly competent to the effect. Side by side with 
 its broad, clear, definite explanation, let us place 
 the claims of the intuitions, lofty and confident 
 
128 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 enough, it is true, but avowedly devoid of any his- 
 torical evidence. It is very difficult to bring within 
 the reach of argument a system professedly resting 
 on assertion, not on argument. I can only place 
 the claims of the intuitive faculty in contrast with 
 the historical facts of the case, as I have already 
 placed the claims of the Church in contrast with 
 thein, and draw the conclusion. 
 
 On doing this, one broad, palpable fact attracts 
 attention. It is that all our religious knowledge 
 whatever is included within the circle of the faith 
 " once delivered unto the saints." Not one solitary 
 religious truth is consequently known to have been 
 discovered by this religious intuition. It is not 
 simply that the doctrines held by the Church lie 
 within the circle of inspiration; but that none are 
 found outside the circle, recognised as truths by 
 those who do not belong to the Church. Let the 
 Church, with her faith in a revelation, be placed on 
 one side, and rationalism, with its assertion of mans 
 self-sufficient capacity, upon the other. It is quite 
 conceivable that the rationalist might accept cer- 
 tain religious truths, or religious sentiments, which 
 the Church, on the ground that they have not the 
 sanction of revelation, disavows. In this case ration- 
 alism would have a religious creed of its own beyond 
 and in addition to the creed of the Church. But 
 when the facts are examined this is found not to 
 be the case. Rationalism has neither any distinct 
 religious truth, nor any distinct religious sentiment. 
 All that rationalism holds the faith includes. Up 
 
IV] Pantheism. 129 
 
 to a certain point the two advance together, and 
 then the distinctive province of rationalism is marked 
 out solely by denial, not affirmation ; destruction, 
 not construction. 
 
 It must be remembered also that the teaching 
 of the Church is a logical whole, so coherent and 
 complete that the rationalistic denial dislocates and 
 disjoints the truth falling within the rationalistic 
 acceptance. The common truths accepted by both 
 are as incoherent without the special truths rejected 
 by rationalism, as the backbone of an extinct plesio- 
 saurus would be incoherent without the head and 
 legs of the animal. In every case, without exception, 
 the creed of rationalism is included within the creed 
 of Christianity. Take away from the former all that 
 is possessed by it in common with the faith, and 
 you take away everything. Literally nothing re- 
 mains beyond the asserted power of intuitive dis- 
 covery. And the power of discovery, which has 
 never discovered anything, is left in its own vanity 
 and emptiness, vox et 'prcetcrea nihil. 
 
 I Let us take the creed of the Pantheist. He 
 believes that a Divine life and energy pervade the 
 entire universe of being. In every atom of matter 
 and in every new form of it, in every organized ex- 
 istence and in every pulse of life pervading it, there 
 is to be found God. The whole uni verse throbs 
 and beats with life. In saying this he only says 
 what the Christian believes as heartily as the 
 Pantheist. He can employ no language of uni- 
 versality, extension, eternity, constancy of action, 
 
 K 
 
130 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 immutability of being, and pervasiveness of strength 
 which the Christian will not echo. He can raise 
 no hymn of praise to this ubiquitous Omnipresence, 
 this vast, immense, Unknown of life, to which the 
 Christian may not say, in yet louder and more 
 rapturous tones, " Amen." 
 
 Beyond this indeed the two separate, and directly 
 they separate the Pantheist ceases to affirm and 
 begins only to deny. The Christian goes on to 
 refer this universal life to an Infinite, All-pervad- 
 ing Personality, conscious, intelligent, self-existent, 
 eternal, perfect in moral perfection and attributes, 
 and in His very nature unlimited and unconditioned. 
 He thus makes a chaos into a cosmos, for he recog- 
 nises mind everywhere. He not only sees mind in 
 the countless units of the intelligent whole, related 
 to other minds as the separate drops of a multi- 
 tudinous sea are related to each other, but one 
 single mind, pervading, and organising, and repro- 
 ducing its own likeness in all else, like a sun 
 reflected in every atom but itself distinct from its 
 reflections. This the Pantheist denies, and his de- 
 nial throws him back on a vague and dreadful 
 abstraction, without consciousness, intelligence, will, 
 or affection ; a tremendous something fearful in 
 its vague negation of personality — a thick and im- 
 penetrable darkness. 
 
 II Take the case of the Theist. He advances 
 with the Christian a step further, and believes with 
 him in a Divine Personality, " in all, through all, 
 over all." He agrees further that this God is a 
 
IV] Theism. 131 
 
 Being of benevolence and love, recognising amid the 
 sterner features of the world the predominant cha- 
 racteristics of far-seeing wisdom and infinite good- 
 ness. But here he stops, professing to know no 
 more of Him now in the nineteenth century of the 
 Christian era and amid all the prodigious advances of 
 human civilisation and knowledge, than the great 
 Roman orator knew and expounded with singular 
 eloquence nearly two thousand years ago. 
 
 The Christian advances further, and asserts that 
 tills benevolent Deity, touched by the misery of 
 His human creatures, has made Himself known to 
 them by a revelation communicated through the in- 
 strumentality of men like themselves, and fixing 
 itself so inextricably into the very framework of all 
 human evidence and human belief, that it is im- 
 possible to tear it out without destroying the whole. 
 By means of this revelation the full character of 
 the personal God has become known to us as a God 
 of justice as well as a God of love, clothed with the 
 awful prerogatives of truth, as with the gentler 
 attributes of goodness. This manifestation of His 
 attributes is accomplished in the provision of a 
 remedy for the present misery of man and his final 
 restoration to his primeval dignity and happiness, upon 
 principles identified by immediate analogies with the 
 ordinary moral government of the world. This plan 
 of redemption is the great key-note of the Gospel. 
 To this one pervading theme all the other truths 
 of revelation are subordinate and preparatory. The 
 grandeur of the plan is equally seen in the urgency 
 
 K 2 
 
132 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Legt. 
 
 of the human danger, the dignity of the Divine 
 agents, and the magnificence of the results. " God 
 was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself." 
 
 All this the Theist denies. His denial involves 
 him in the most perplexing contradictions. For, 
 according to him, the loving and merciful God of his. 
 belief has looked down on our human misery and all 
 the anxious questionings and conflicts of the human 
 mind in its search after truth, without one solitary 
 touch of pity. No word of sympathy has broken 
 from His lips, no compassion touched His heart, no 
 remedial purpose of love stretched His hand towards 
 us. This God of love is thus found to be either 
 stern and inexorable as the deity of Stoic fatalism, 
 in that He feels no pity ; or else weak and dreamy 
 as the deity of Epicurus, in that He is unable or 
 unwilling to express it. 
 
 It is confessed that if Christianity be not a reve- 
 lation from God, there is no such revelation in a 
 positive or written form. The only communication 
 from God to man, asserted to exist, consists of His 
 ordinary motions on the natural intellect and affec- 
 tions. But these are wholly powerless for real good, 
 according to the Theist himself. The dim intuitions 
 of the intellect have neither brought to light one 
 solitary truth to guide human perplexity, nor have 
 they sufficed to preserve the vast majority of man- 
 kind from the influence of that dogmatic faith which 
 he believes to be no more than a mischievous super- 
 stition. The painful gropings of the heart after 
 God, "feeling after Him, if haply they might find 
 
IV] Transcendentalism. 133 
 
 Him," are no more than pathetic acknowledgments 
 of the soul's unsatisfied wants. Yet, according to 
 the Theist, this God of love has seen and known 
 all this, and yet has never spoken a word of com- 
 fort, either too darkly reckless of human suffering to 
 do anything to alleviate it, or too helplessly fettered 
 by His own laws to be able to break through the 
 veil of the unseen and convey an intelligible com- 
 munication to His suffering creatures. A more humi- 
 liating picture of the Deity in the one case, or a 
 more dreadful one in the other, cannot be conceived. 
 
 Ill Take the theory of the Transcendentalist. He 
 has lofty views of the natural dignity of man, of 
 the subtlety of his genius, the strength of his will, 
 the instincts of his moral nature, and his ambition 
 after the great and true. In this estimate the Chris- 
 tian fully concurs, for no one has so lofty a con- 
 ception of man as he. Christianity exalts man 
 almost to the loftiest standard of the created. The 
 disciple of the faith not only agrees that man is 
 great and noble, but goes on to explain the source 
 of his dignity and to carry it to a yet higher reach. 
 He maintains that, in addition to the subtlety of 
 his intellect, and the strength of his will, and the 
 instincts of his moral nature, man has another claim 
 for honour in the immortal soul tabernacling within 
 him. He neither depreciates the intellect nor the 
 heart of man below his opponent. He only ad- 
 vances further and glorifies them both by his be- 
 lief in a spiritual nature, yet larger in its capa- 
 cities, loftier in its hopes, and endless in its life. 
 
134 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 He explains whence man derives His greatness by 
 the fact that he was made in the image of God 
 Himself after the very likeness of the Deity, and 
 that, great as man is now, he is no more than the 
 wreck of the yet greater self he was before the Fall, 
 and his state on earth no more than the childhood 
 of the glorified maturity still remaining for him in 
 heaven. 
 
 Here again modern thought and Christian belief 
 go hand in hand up to a certain point. Christian 
 belief then carries the dignity of man higher yet. 
 Modern thought begins to deny and reject. The 
 moment it thus severs itself from revealed theology, 
 that moment its inextricable difficulties begin. It 
 labours at every step, like the Egyptians when the 
 Lord troubled their host and broke off their chariot 
 wheels that they drave them heavily. It cannot 
 be denied that man with intellect and conscience 
 and affection, and a moral nature and an immortal 
 soul, is greater than man with intellect and con- 
 science, and affection and a moral nature without 
 a soul. The Christian therefore outstrips the Tran- 
 scendental ist in his own course, and holds a yet 
 loftier estimate of man. 
 
 Equally certain is it that, taking man as he is, 
 the doctrine of the Fall invests him with an addi- 
 tional nobility. For if man be not a fallen creature, 
 then his present condition must be the highest 
 measure of his capability and of his hopes. If he 
 never was greater than lie is now found to be in 
 the past, there is no probability that he will ever 
 
IV] Transcendentalism. 135 
 
 become greater in the future. Modern thought 
 therefore fixes him where he is, and stereotypes 
 him for ever as he is. Christian thought, starting 
 from the same point, believes that he was greater 
 in the past, and will again become incomparably 
 greater in the future. 
 
 This belief reconciles, moreover, the loftier side 
 of man, as the defaced lineaments of his original 
 glory, with the existence of a lower side with meaner 
 impulses and at discord with his nobler self, as fol- 
 lowing from the disorder and ruin of the Fall. To 
 the man who rejects the Christian doctrine, human 
 nature is an inextricable puzzle, nor can he throw a 
 ray of light on its contradictions. Thus it is very 
 common to hear Transcendentalists speak in one 
 breath of the perfectibility of human nature and 
 its self-sufficiency in all things, and in the next 
 breath lament man's ignorance of his own good and 
 his liability to what he considers the superstitious 
 follies of religion [3]. Yet if man be perfect, whence 
 come this ignorance and weakness, this tendency to 
 accept the false instead of rising to the true % 
 
 Moreover, the facts of human life sternly prove 
 that there is something out of joint, both in man 
 and in his condition. The records of individual life 
 are too black with the shadows both of moral and 
 physical evil to be reconciled with such a sun- 
 shiny philosophy. Hence the Transcendentalist is 
 driven to sink the individual in the mass. Forced to 
 confess that his theory does not hold good of single 
 men, he applies it only to the aggregate of mankind. 
 
136 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 In this respect modern thought shakes hands with 
 ancient philosojDhy, and re-echoes its complaint that 
 Christianity makes too much of the individual. 
 Yet how a whole made up of intelligent and con- 
 scious individuals, each with a life of his own, is 
 to realise the dream of moral perfectibility, while 
 the individuals composing it are singly corrupt and 
 degraded, is a problem baffling all solution. Chris- 
 tianity begins with the individual and thus logi- 
 cally rises to the mass. Modern thought, driven 
 out of its theories by the patent facts of individual 
 life, can only hide its perplexity under the abstract 
 notion of an aggregate without individuals, a whole 
 without parts, a perfection made up of imperfec- 
 tion. So far as it agrees with revelation, all is 
 consistent ; directly it takes a path of its own, all 
 becomes confusion. 
 
 IV Take the Optimist, who makes a step in 
 advance, although it be but a small one. He 
 holds that all things are for the best, and that 
 amid the sufferings and struggles of mankind human 
 nature is yet working its way upward and onward, 
 and advancing towards a more perfect condition. 
 No true believer in revelation can doubt either 
 the one or the other without being faithless to 
 his principles. He not only accepts, but in this 
 case, as in the preceding, enlarges and explains. 
 All things are for the best, by virtue of no inherent 
 power in evil to develop good, for evil must ever 
 gravitate towards an increase of itself ; but by virtue 
 of an overruling Wisdom bringing good out of evil, 
 
IV] Optimism. 137 
 
 and converting the evil itself into the instrument 
 of good. This is true of natural laws. The storm 
 destructive of life and property fills the atmosphere 
 with the seeds of larger and freer life. Pestilence 
 is the providential stimulus of sanitary progress. 
 Difficulties and conflicts are the school of all the 
 heroic virtues. Fortitude, self-control, heroic force of 
 will, unselfish generosity, a rational love of liberty, 
 and liberality tolerant of other men's opinions, 
 all grow out of this soil. They are no hot-house 
 exotics needing to be stimulated into artificial life, 
 but vigorous evergreens, flourishing only in the 
 free air of heaven, and striking their roots deep 
 only hi their native soil. The exercise of a Divine 
 wisdom and power over-ordering evil for good is but 
 the application of the same principle to the higher 
 sphere of God's moral government, but another 
 and a louder strain of the same harmonious music. 
 The past history of the world is one long illus- 
 tration of this truth. The experience of the past 
 becomes prophetic, and catching its language from 
 the glowing pages of the inspired Scriptures, sings 
 its song of triumphant hope for the future. Look- 
 ing back to the past and forward to the future, faith 
 recognises that all is best. From the height of the re- 
 vealed promise peeping on tiptoe into the future, it 
 catches a glimpse of a more glorious hereafter. The 
 Christian has reason for this confidence, for he rests 
 upon positive promises and recognises a Divinely- 
 given system of truth as the instrument, and the 
 Holy Spirit of God as the agent of its accomplish- 
 
138 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 ment. These the Optimist rejects, and the rejection 
 cuts the wings of hope, and reduces his confidence 
 into a belief without a reason, an effect without 
 a cause, a faith without an evidence, a superstruc- 
 ture without a foundation. 
 
 V Take the case of the Rationalist. He holds 
 the authority of the reason, and that nothing is 
 to be believed without the assent of reason. 
 Christianity entirely agrees with this, or it would 
 be involved in the absurdity of supposing that the 
 Creator gave man reason but did not intend him 
 to use it. The duty of a personal enquiry into 
 truth is prominent in Scripture. Private judg- 
 ment, let us argue how we will about it, is in- 
 separable from individual identity, and is as much 
 exercised by the man who bows before the foot 
 of Church absolutism and accepts a human priest 
 vice Dei, as it is by the wildest disciple of lawless 
 sectarianism. The nature of the act done is the 
 same, the direction only differs. In the balances 
 of the revealed Word, a formal or hereditary faith, 
 accepting without earnestness and believing without 
 enquiry, is not faith at all. Personal conviction 
 following on personal enquiry, conducted on some 
 process or another, is the essence and very life- 
 blood of true piety. Thus far, therefore, Rationalism 
 and Christianity agree. 
 
 Then indeed they separate, for Christianity goes 
 on to assert two further truths, and Rationalism 
 rejects them. First, she asserts that human reason 
 needs to be assisted by an enlightenment from 
 
IV] Rationalism. 139 
 
 above, and she rests the assertion on the doctrine 
 of the Fall and the corruption of human nature 
 maintained by her against the Transcendentalist. 
 If the doctrine be true and supported by the in- 
 dubitable evidence of experience, it must be ad- 
 mitted that the need of a Divine teaching to direct 
 and rectify the operations of the reason follows 
 necessarily from it. Without some such explanation 
 it is impossible to understand how it happens that 
 one portion of mankind are ever breaking out into 
 wondering admiration of truths which another por- 
 tion declare to be incredible and absurd. 
 
 But Christian thought maintains not only that 
 reason needs to be assisted in its search after 
 truth, but also that its range of capability is 
 strictly limited. In proof of this she appeals 
 to reason itself. She pleads in unison with the 
 saints of God from the earliest times of the 
 Church, that the subjects belonging to religion 
 lie in their very nature beyond the reach of 
 possible human discovery [4]. In regard to the 
 nature of God and His purposes towards mankind, 
 the human reason has no data for argument. 
 The thoughts of God can in the nature of things 
 be known to God alone. The wildest fanaticisim 
 has never claimed the power of discovering by in- 
 tuition the thoughts of man, and its incapacity to 
 discover the thoughts of God must be as much 
 greater as, on the theory of Theism, Deity tran- 
 scends humanity. God can only be known by reve- 
 lation. In the absence of it we may guess at 
 
140 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect- 
 
 what we can never positively assert. In the presence 
 of revelation we must worship and believe. 
 
 Hence we plead that the first question submitted 
 to the reason is a question of evidence, whether 
 we have received a revelation or have not. I 
 most fully admit that internal evidence must be 
 as consistently included as external ; but this evi- 
 dence must be tested by its congruity with the 
 theory of revelation itself, and not with antecedent 
 notions of our own relative to the principles and 
 conduct suitable or unsuitable to God. Ration- 
 alism rejects these limitations, and asserts the auto- 
 cratic self-sufficiency of the reason. In so doing 
 she stultifies herself. For in regard to many sub- 
 jects of enquiry, reason is palpably insufficient. 
 If it were not so we should not be in the nine- 
 teenth century absolutely devoid of any scientific 
 theory of life [5]. In fact, we should not have 
 progressive science at all, for progressive science 
 is imperfect science, and imperfect science is par- 
 tial ignorance. If we are compelled to confess 
 that we are ignorant of manv of the Creator's 
 works, is it likely that we should be competent to 
 understand and measure the Creator ? 
 
 VI Advancing into the region of dogma, let 
 us take the case of the Unitarian. He takes 
 his stand upon the humanity of Christ, and 
 alleges the clear declarations of Scripture in sup- 
 port of his view. The Trinitarian does not call 
 one of these texts into doubt, nor depreciate the 
 certainty or precision of the truth they teach. The 
 
IV] Unitarianism. 141 
 
 Church yields to no man upon earth in her de- 
 vout recognition of the true humanity of Christ 
 and her resolute maintenance of it. She echoes 
 back with her deep Amen every sentiment ,of ad- 
 miration and praise. Before the picture of the 
 Perfect Man, complete in every human lineament of 
 sympathy and affection, and made more tender by 
 the shadow of earthly weaknesses and wants, she 
 sits in rapt meditation, counting every tear He 
 shed, catching every smile of affection, sympathising 
 with every grief, and seeking to realise with fond 
 affection the very face and form of the " Man of 
 Sorrows." She blends up the recollection of His 
 august figure with her own earthly conflict, still 
 sees Him walking upon the storm and smiling 
 in the sunshine, and by the association of her 
 own daily conflicts and experiences with those of 
 her suffering Lord, sanctifies the very earth we 
 tread and the very air we breathe. 
 
 So far the Unitarian and the Trinitarian are one. 
 But here they separate. To our eyes the despised of 
 Nazareth wears upon His shoulders a more august 
 robe, and carries upon His brow a yet loftier 
 crown. Side by side with every text expressive 
 of humanity the Church j^laces another text ex- 
 pressive of His Deity. Through the veil of the 
 flesh she watches the outflashing lustre of the 
 Godhead breaking forth in sign and miracle, in 
 more than human holiness, in an all-searching 
 omniscience and a power to suffer and to merit, 
 transcending the loftiest reach of the creature. 
 
142 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 She clings to Him as true man born of a human 
 mother. She worships Him as true God, " Light of 
 Light, very God of very God." She trusts to Him as 
 God and man in one person, the perfect mysterious 
 and indivisible Christ. 
 
 The Unitarian denies all this. His denial makes 
 the life of Christ inexplicable. All attempts to ex- 
 plain it on the principles of a humanitarian philo- 
 sophy are as unreasonable as it would be to explain 
 the life of man with reference to his body alone, and 
 leave out of view the indwelling Spirit that fills it 
 with motion, intelligence, and will. 
 
 VII Take the case of the Universalist. There is 
 a common truth even here, and that one of the dis- 
 tinctive truths of revelation. God loves all ; " so 
 loved the world that He gave His only-begotten 
 Son." The reach of the gift is equal to the breadth 
 of the love. The work of Jesus Christ "the right- 
 eous " was to make propitiation " for the sins of the 
 whole world." The heart of ancient heathenism 
 never grasped this idea of the equality of all men 
 before God, or of the community of the hope of 
 salvation. Yet potentially the merits of Christ are 
 wide as the world ; and if they are not equally wide 
 efficaciously, the limitation does not arise from any 
 narrowness of object with God, but from the perverse 
 absence of a suitable condition in ourselves. As re- 
 gards the width of the Divine purpose we are agreed. 
 
 But the orthodox Christian adds the truths of 
 a future judgment and of differences of reward 
 or punishment. The entrance into life eternal 
 
I V ] Un iversa lism. 143 
 
 lies across the narrow way, and Christ is Himself 
 both the road and the gateway. In His grand 
 parables He has told us over and over again that 
 there will be some in the great day on the left 
 hand as well as some on the right. There must 
 be a moral fitness between the heavenly mansions 
 and their inhabitants. It is no fault of God that 
 it is absent. For the promise of access to God 
 through the blood of Christ and the sanctifying 
 work of God the Holy Ghost is free to all. " Come 
 unto Me all ye that travail." The everlasting 
 separation of condition hereafter will only correspond 
 to the separation of moral character here, and the 
 judgment-day will be the public proclamation of it. 
 The Universalist denies this, and is perplexed accord- 
 ingly to explain whence the moral fitness for heaven 
 is to be derived, and how the mere act of dying is 
 supposed to change sin into holiness, the wicked into 
 the good, and the criminal into the saint. 
 
 VIII Lastly, take the case of another school of 
 thought which advances beyond all these. Its dis- 
 ciples admit, in terms at all events, the dogmas of 
 human sin and of vicarious atonement. But as they 
 lower the standard of the latter, so they void the 
 former of its distinctive meaning. To them atone- 
 ment means reconciliation, and the atoning work 
 itself the message of reconciliation. The Cross of 
 Christ is used as a synonym for the sublimest self- 
 sacrifice, the loftiest and purest act of heroical con- 
 stancy and amazing love ever accomplished upon 
 this world of selfishness and strife [6]. He who 
 
144 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 believes with our Church that the death of Christ 
 was " a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, 
 and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world/' 
 agrees with all this to the very utmost. We do not 
 detract one iota from that grand and marvellous 
 example of love given upon the Cross, because we 
 recognise in it a yet loftier character, a yet deeper 
 mystery. We do but advance further, draw as it 
 were nearer to the innermost agony of the Son of 
 God. Holding the sublime example, the self-sacri- 
 ficing love, the heroic strength of endurance, we 
 invest them with a more amazing wonder when we 
 add to them the belief of a vicarious and substi- 
 tutionary sacrifice for the sins of the world. 
 
 Thus we add another element to the anguish of 
 the dying Redeemer in the actual endurance of sin's 
 penalty, the actual dying of its death. We thus 
 give to our Lord's work a distinctive character, to 
 Himself a distinctive glory, solely and indivisibly 
 His own. None but He has ever trodden that wine- 
 press of the wrath of God. He alone " who knew 
 no sin" was yet "made sin for us," and suffered 
 its extremest agony, "that we might be made 
 the righteousness of God in Him." Was our 
 Lord's death but a sequel to His ministry and 
 the pledge of His commission, then many others 
 have died for us as He died for us ; many an Apostle 
 and holy saint laying down his life for the service 
 and sacrifice of our faith. But if the dying God 
 bore upon His mighty shoulders the weight of a 
 world's sins, then in this He stands alone, one, single, 
 
IV] The Creed of Rationalism. 145 
 
 and unapproachable. We hold all that our opponents 
 hold, or rather, they hold our truth up to a certain 
 point of it, and when they stop they void the 
 mystery of the Cross of its meaning and its blessed- 
 ness. They leave the sinner outside the gate, as it 
 were, mourning under a burden of sin the more in- 
 tolerable from its contrast with the unapproachable 
 holiness of Christ ; while we lead him on into the 
 Holy of Holies through the rent veil of the body and 
 blood of Jesus, along the new and living way that 
 He hath consecrated for us, because " the Lord hath 
 laid on Him the iniquity of us all." 
 
 Thus, in every case without exception, the creed 
 of the Rationalist is also the creed of the Christian. 
 The Christian, in relation to the nationalist, occupies 
 a position of progress, affirming truths coherent 
 with the common belief of both ; but in every case 
 the Rationalist, in relation to the Christian, occupies 
 a position of retrogression, rejecting truths comple- 
 mentary of his own belief. It is indeed possible 
 to represent the state of the case in another way 
 and to describe the Rationalist as affirming what 
 the Christian denies. For instance, the Transcen- 
 dentalist affirms the perfection of human nature, 
 the Rationalist the sufficiency of reason, the Uni- 
 versalist the final salvation of all men, the Unitarian 
 the sole humanity of Christ, and in each case the 
 Christian faith rejects the assertion. But this 
 position is only gained by a trick of words. In 
 every instance the affirmation of the Rationalist con-, 
 sists of a denial of some Christian doctrine, stated on 
 
 L 
 
146 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 the reverse side and turned into an affirmation. It 
 remains therefore that in every case where Ration- 
 alism and Christianity differ, the latter affirms and 
 the former denies. The Rationalist has consequently 
 no special truths of his own, not one solitary point 
 either of belief or sentiment belonging exclusively to 
 himself. What is the conclusion but that what he 
 has is not his own discovering, but is really a bor- 
 rowed ray from the sun of revelation, a reflection, 
 it may b e unconsciously received, of the heavenly 
 light. 
 
 Hence it appears that human knowledge, inde- 
 pendently of revelation, possesses no religious truth 
 even to the smallest degree. The utmost that 
 can possibly be claimed is, that it has arrived at 
 what it believes by an independent process of its 
 own, and has not simply borrowed it from revela- 
 tion. Indisputably ancient heathenism was in pos- 
 session of some of these beliefs, but was not in 
 possession of the Christian books in their complete 
 form. But it must be remembered that the world 
 was in possession of the Hebrew Scriptures, and 
 that all the dogmas of the faith are contained 
 more or less distinctly in them. In an imperfect 
 form they were largely possessed by heathen thinkers, 
 and were read with interest and earnestness. The 
 mere fact of the Septuagint version being found 
 in the Library of Alexandria proves this beyond 
 dispute. It was ever alleged by the early Fathers 
 that the heathen philosophers, from Zoroaster down- 
 wards, have been deeply indebted to inspired sources 
 
IV] The Hebrew Scripture*. 147 
 
 for their glimpses of truth. Modern thought has 
 laboured in every way to throw doubt upon this 
 assertion, but I believe that a careful examination 
 leads in this, as in many other instances, to confirm 
 the statements of the past in opposition to the scep- 
 tical doubts of the present [7]. 
 
 At all events, it admits of no controversy that 
 the Jewish theology exercised an immense indirect 
 influence on human thought in general. The opu- 
 lent and flourishing communities maintained by the 
 Jews at the centres of the world's civilisation, in 
 the times subsequent to the Babylonish captivity, 
 and the prodigious number of influential proselytes 
 to Jewish belief known to have existed in imperial 
 Rome herself, are conclusive proofs of it [8]. The 
 direct and indirect influences of Jewish theology on 
 the world are insufficient indeed to explain all the 
 facts without the supposition of an original tradition 
 of truth given to all men before the dispersion of man- 
 kind, such as Scripture positively asserts to have ex- 
 isted. But the facts are sufficient to show that, 
 even in the palmiest times of the world's intellect and 
 learning, the glimpses of truth acquired by ancient 
 philosophy were not the achievements of unassisted 
 human reason, but of human reason constantly stimu- 
 lated by a revelation from without. Great truths, 
 if once caught, are seldom wholly lost. Whether the 
 human mind be capable of maintaining them alive 
 and uncorrupted is another question. I believe it to 
 be incapable of doing so. The condition of the 
 antediluvian world, and the growing idolatries of 
 
 L 2 
 
148 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 mankind after the Deluge, alike justify the con- 
 clusion. But should the question be answered in 
 the affirmative, the power to maintain is a very 
 different thing from the power to discover. 
 
 From the time of Christianity down to the present 
 moment, not one solitary shred of religious truth has 
 been added to the dogmatic faith. Yet during this 
 period human reason has laboured at the problem 
 with every conceivable advantage. It took the 
 question up at the point already reached by the 
 wonderful philosophy of the pre-Christian era. All 
 the stores of ancient thought and learning were 
 there to assist it. It has pursued the enquiry 
 amid a blaze of light reflected from the whole 
 body of dogmatic truth contained in the Christian 
 Scriptures. Should the Divine authority of these 
 books be rejected, yet so large a mass of dogma 
 must contain some germs of truth, some sparks of 
 heavenly light, some suggestions to assist the mind 
 in its own enquiries. Moreover, these twenty cen- 
 turies have culminated in an increase of human 
 knowledge beyond all other periods of the world. 
 The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs 
 of an audacious genius and a fearless adventure, 
 the achievements of skill and industry, have been 
 so wonderful as almost to excuse the intoxication 
 of success, and remove all surprise that science 
 should occasionally forget herself. We may well 
 be proud and thankful to live in such an age. 
 Yet amid it all, at a time when almost every day 
 brings a discoveiy in the sphere of the Seen, not 
 
IV] Inability of the Intuitions. 149 
 
 one solitary shred of a discovery has been made 
 in the sphere of the Unseen. The fact cannot be 
 too earnestly reiterated that not one single truth, 
 esteemed to be a truth in the estimate of Ration- 
 alism itself, has been added to human belief or 
 to the dogmatic Christianity of two thousand years 
 ago. We may go further. Not only has human 
 intuition failed to add a point of doctrine to the 
 old creed, but it has not discovered an additional 
 argument in support of what we believe. Modern 
 labour has accumulated additional stores of informa- 
 tion ; it has enlarged indefinitely the particular details 
 of old facts ; it has gathered out of the distant past 
 corroborative proofs of the marvellous accuracy of the 
 inspired Scriptures, equally surprising in number, 
 varied in kind, and specific in character ; it has 
 enabled us to bring to the study of the sacred 
 text a much closer and more exact criticism, but 
 to our knowledge of the things unseen it has added, 
 literally and as a simple matter of fact, nothing. 
 
 What conclusion must we draw from this failure 
 but that the mind of man is constitutionally in- 
 capable of discovering religious truth % If it has 
 proved itself to be thus incompetent during the 
 singular advantages of the last two thousand years, 
 is it credible that during the two thousand years 
 preceding it can have discovered truth without them 1 
 Or, leaving the comparative sunshine of philosophic 
 times, and passing into the thick darkness of heathen 
 barbarism, is it credible that the savage can have 
 done what all the light and intellect of civilisation 
 
150 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 have signally failed to accomplish ? The other world 
 lies beyond the reach even of the soul's vision. No 
 human faculty has ever crossed the "great gulf 
 fixed " between the Seen and the Unseen, or pierced 
 by one solitary glance the impenetrable barriers of 
 the unknown. 
 
 Here, therefore, we gain another step. Any know- 
 ledge acquired by the intuitions is solely personal 
 and arbitrary at best, and never can carry even a 
 shadow of authority beyond the sphere of the in- 
 dividual. But now it appears that even within this 
 sphere it is incapable of teaching religious truth. 
 Men mistake for flashes of an indwelling Deity the 
 reflected rays of an external revelation. In our 
 Christian civilisation, saturated with the dogmatic 
 teaching of centuries, grand truths impregnate the 
 very air we breathe. Men imbibe them consciously 
 or unconsciously into their mental and moral selves. 
 As the mind dwells upon them in meditation, they 
 flash up every now and then into vivid reality in 
 that secret sympathy of soul which, by the very 
 intensity of its own outgoing, makes old truths new. 
 No man can be wholly devoid of this experience. 
 In some moment of peculiar receptivity the latent 
 truth pours its bright beams through the crevices 
 of our ignorance or indifference. The philosopher 
 calls them intuitions, and claims to have pierced 
 into the Unseen. A devout mind recognises in them 
 the influences of the Holy Spirit of God, leaving 
 Himself not entirely without witness in any man, 
 but mercifully breaking every now and then the 
 
IVJ Inability of the Intuitions. 151 
 
 stagnation of a fallen nature with a breath from 
 the other world, and an ever-pleading voice that 
 speaketh better things than the blood of Abel. 
 
 Truths acquired by the intuitions there are none. 
 If they exist, let them be proclaimed. We invoke 
 this supposed faculty of the soul, but, as it was 
 with the dumb Baal of ancient times, there is neither 
 voice nor any that answereth. There is no other 
 source of a religious creed than revelation. If re- 
 ligion cannot survive without a creed, and the dog- 
 matic faith be rejected, then religion must die. It 
 is not indeed easy even for unbelief wholly to shut 
 out the sunshine. It still steals in through some un- 
 closed crevice of the conscience. For the other world 
 alone is reserved an absolute and eternal midnight. 
 
 It is useless to prove at any length the inadequacy 
 of the human intellect to give certainty to belief, if 
 the facts have already compelled the conclusion that it 
 can furnish nothing to be believed. This conclusion, 
 however, rests only on a very high probability ; it can- 
 not claim absolute certainty where the authority of 
 the Scriptural statement is denied. If, however, we 
 relax the stringency of the proposition, and from 
 asserting the total incapacity of the intuitions assert 
 only the utter absence of any element of moral cer- 
 titude from them, the probability is indefinitely in- 
 creased, and becomes a moral certainty. What admits 
 of being denied altogether with great probability 
 must be weak and uncertain to demonstration. I 
 have already said that the claim asserted for an 
 intuitive knowledge of religious truth does not 
 
152 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 profess to rest on any evidence beyond that of the 
 mental consciousness ; and since this consciousness 
 is individual, the evidence is the individual assertion 
 and no more. So palpable is this total defect of 
 proof, that the most enthusiastic advocates of the 
 intuitional faculty are compelled to admit it [9]. An 
 attempt is made to strengthen the position by the 
 idea of a general or common intuition, so that the 
 errors of any particular person might be corrected 
 by the collective consciousness of other men. But 
 the broad fact that the intuitions of different men 
 do not lead them to the same conclusions, and that 
 consequently no common verdict exists, is fatal to 
 the attempt. The amount of authority due to the 
 intuition is just the amount of authority due to the 
 individual, and no more. The probability that the 
 intuition is true or false is exactly the probability 
 whether this particular man is right or wrong. 
 Let it be noticed as worthy of attention that the 
 claim is one of authority alone, and not of argu- 
 ment. The fallibility of the most perfect human 
 judgment in the commonest affairs of daily life 
 illustrates the instability of the foundation. Faith 
 in such beliefs is a house built upon the sand. 
 When the tempest comes, and the struggles of con- 
 science and the alarms of death and the terrors of 
 judgment test the stability of the belief, the foun- 
 dation of sand must yield, and great will be the 
 fall thereof. 
 
 But with whatever composure we may calculate 
 chances and probabilities in ordinary matters, it is 
 
IV] Craving for Certitude, 153 
 
 a dreadful thing to rest the soul and the prospects 
 of an eternity upon them. Here the soul craves 
 for certitude. It is of the very essence of our 
 created dependence to find a ground of certain 
 trust somewhere. We cannot bear to live in an 
 everlasting doubt. Spite of our theoretical convic- 
 tions we must hold something as firm and fixed, 
 even though, like a man in a dream, we do but 
 clutch ourselves. The absolute sceptic who dis- 
 believes everything, and reduces even all sensible 
 objects into phenomena, is seldom candid enough 
 to disbelieve his own disbelief. He becomes a 
 faith to himself, and scepticism is his dogma. 
 The notorious fact of the gross credulities of many 
 disbelievers in revelation, is an evidence in the 
 same direction. Man must have an object of trust 
 somewhere, and the necessity is but the witness of 
 his created dependence. There can be no self-suffi- 
 ciency but in God. 
 
 Our daily experience of life educates this craving 
 of the soul for some point of rest. Look where we 
 will, change and fluctuation are everywhere. Life is 
 like a restless sea, in motion through every solitary 
 drop of its multitudinous waters. In ourselves, in 
 body, soul, and spirit ; in those social circles which 
 make up our larger selves, and in which we mul- 
 tiply our own joys and sorrows; in the circumstances 
 of life and its chequered scenes of good and evil ; 
 in the physical world around us, the earth beneath 
 our feet, the air we breathe, the firmament above 
 with its crowd of glorious orbs all in motion; in 
 
154 The Faith and the Intuitions. [Lect. 
 
 the whole course of this stupendous cosmos, — move- 
 ment and change are everywhere. Could we find 
 no fixed point on which to rest, the heart would 
 grow sick and giddy with the universal unquiet- 
 ness. The infidel literally has no such fixed point, 
 unless he finds it in the blind fatalism of the great 
 whole. The Theist finds it in God. He is the 
 centre round whom all else revolves. He is the 
 universal sun, and all creation moves upon that 
 axis. He, self-existent and absolute ; in the ever- 
 lasting "now" of His being capable of no change ; 
 in the perfection of His wisdom and knowledge 
 suffering from no incompleteness ; in the glory of 
 His moral attributes susceptible of no caprice, and 
 in the almightiness of His power subject to no 
 limitation, — He abides for ever amid a world of 
 change, absolute and immutable. 
 
 But it is not sufficient for our moral necessities 
 simply to know that thus it must be ; the intel- 
 lectual conception of fixity is not enough. Neither 
 variableness nor shadow of turnine; affect Him. 
 It is we who are tossed by the ceaseless ebb 
 and flow, and we who need to find repose. We 
 need to link our weakness to His strength, our 
 ignorance to His omniscience, our wants to His 
 fulness, our misery to His magnificence. Such 
 was David's experience, and such David's triumph. 
 ' k The Lord is my shepherd, therefore can I lack 
 nothing." 
 
 Brethren, there is but one means of union with 
 God. No intellectual abstraction, no rhapsody of 
 
IVJ Union with God. 155 
 
 the imagination can supply it. The inspired Word 
 of God making known Himself and His will is the 
 instrumental means, unveiling as it were to our ador- 
 ing eyes the very face of the Deity. Meritoriously 
 it can only be wrought by the union of the soul 
 through faith with the incarnate Son of God, when 
 His own words are accomplished in regard to 
 His people, " I in them, and Thou in Me, that 
 they may be made perfect in one." Efficiently it 
 is the special, work of God the Holy Ghost, 
 enlightening the intellect, quickening the con- 
 science, sanctifying the heart. Here, and here 
 alone, can we find rest in life, and hope in 
 death, and beyond the resurrection, heaven. Be- 
 reft of this union the soul disconsolately turns 
 from its own necessities and struggles, and cast- 
 ing its eyes on the deep mysteries of the other 
 world, impenetrable in their thick darkness to the 
 feeble glance of human eyes, cries out in the lan- 
 guage of despair : " Who can by searching find out 
 God ? Who can find out the Almighty unto per- 
 fection V 
 
LECTURE V 
 
 DOGMA AND SPECULATION 
 
 t Tim. vi. 20, 21 
 
 Keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and 
 vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so-called: 
 which some professing have erred concerning the faith. 
 
 JJOGMA is the expression of authority. The foun- 
 dation of all dogmatic truth is laid in the sacred 
 Scriptures. The language of our Church relative to 
 these authoritative records of the faith is very ex- 
 plicit, and has been previously quoted. She declares 
 them to he " God's most true Word," " God's Word 
 written." To offer any proof of this assertion has 
 not fallen within the object of these Lectures. I 
 adopt the teaching of the Church as my start- 
 ing point in vindicating the necessity of dogma. 
 The Word of God contains the faith, and the 
 faith so contained is dogmatic alike by virtue of 
 the infallibility of revealed truth, and alike by 
 virtue of the authority of the Revealer. Propo- 
 sitions may be stated in a dogmatic form without 
 
Church Creeds. 157 
 
 any claim to a Divine authority. But they can- 
 not have a Divine authority without assuming 
 a dogmatic form. It has pleased God to deliver 
 the faith once for all to the saints, and the for- 
 mulating of this faith into definite articles has 
 necessarily been accomplished by their hands. To 
 these Church formulas authority is due so far, 
 and so far only, as they truly embody the mind 
 of God revealed in His Word. 
 
 A common mental tendency of our day draws a 
 line of distinction, broad and deep, between the 
 inspired Word and the Church formulas. The first 
 it acknowledges to be Divine, qualifying the ad- 
 mission, more or less, according to the religious 
 standpoint of the thinker ; but the second it 
 positively asserts to be human. It fixes attention 
 rather on the form of the creeds than on their 
 substance; and in the occasional circumstances of 
 their composition loses sight of the foundation of 
 their authority. To confuse the two questions 
 together, is to sow thick the pregnant seeds of 
 fallacy. That the technical framework of the 
 creeds of the Church is human is denied by no 
 one. We know at what date and under what 
 circumstances they were composed ; who were 
 their principal authors ; out of what emergencies 
 of controversy they grew ; and against what 
 special forms of heresy they were directed. They 
 bear in their structure the clear traces of their 
 birth-time. No one can assert more strongly the 
 human origin of the technical forms, and the 
 
158 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 consequent possibility of error in formulating them, 
 than the framers of the creeds themselves. But 
 though the vessel be earthen, the excellency of 
 the gift may nevertheless be of God. 
 
 Men who fix their attention upon the human 
 side of them alone, naturally ascribe to them only 
 a human character. They regard them as one 
 among many forms of speculation, standing on 
 precisely the same footing as the thousand varied 
 systems schemed by the brain of the philosopher. 
 They therefore submit them to the same tests, 
 and judge of the dogmas of the Church as they 
 judge of the dreams of the Neo-Platonists, the 
 systems of the idealists, the credulities of the spirit- 
 ualists, or the negations of the Positivists. If they 
 were correct in their premisses, they would be in- 
 disputably correct in their conclusions, and would 
 be amply justified in claiming the right to re- 
 model Church dogmas into accordance with the 
 latest ideas of the nineteenth century. 
 
 The question demands a separate investigation. 
 Are the premisses true % Is the faith of the 
 Church a speculative philosophy based on the 
 same principles, working by the same instruments, 
 and therefore claiming no more than the same 
 authority as other philosophic schemes ? Must it 
 descend from the pulpit into the schools, and 
 exchange the sacred garments of the priesthood 
 for the robe of the philosopher \ Or may we 
 continue to sit at the feet of a Divine reve- 
 lation and listen to its grand teachings, assured 
 
V] Superstition and Philosophy. 159 
 
 that beneath the earthly accents sounds the very- 
 voice of God 1 
 
 This enquiry will only carry the argument of the 
 preceding lectures a step further, and follow it into 
 another sphere of thought. Human belief has ever 
 developed itself upon two lines, the one the super- 
 stition of the many, the other the philosophy 
 of the few. In Christianity the separation has 
 no place. The authoritative faith of revelation 
 presents the same grand features to the free 
 and open knowledge of all the world. Whatever 
 differences exist in the practical religion of men 
 do not aiise from any diversities in the faith, 
 but from the differences of capability, moral and 
 intellectual, in those who receive it. Its great 
 principles are brought into immediate contact with 
 the realities of actual life, and find in the work- 
 ing world their truest and highest illustrations. 
 Within the compass of the same faith is milk for 
 babes and strong meat for men — plain truths, 
 simple enough for the loving comprehension of a 
 child, and mysteries high and deep enough to 
 overtask the powers of an archangel. But the 
 two cannot he sharply separated from each other. 
 The man in his strong grasp of the broad truths 
 of saving love, exercises the humility of the child ; 
 and the child in the majesty of the revelation, rises 
 into the maturity of the man. 
 
 This very comprehensiveness bears the stamp 
 and signature of Divinity. In all other religions 
 the narrow exclusiveness of human jealousy has 
 
160 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 maintained the separation between the creed of the 
 few and the superstition of the many as a formal 
 and avowed principle. The philosophic creed of 
 the few has been as inadequate to satisfy the moral 
 cravings of the many as the credulities of the many 
 have been impotent to meet the intellectual wants of 
 the few. The two spheres have existed apart from 
 each other. The popular belief, in the absence of 
 a rational foundation, has sunk into a superstition, 
 and the philosophy of the many, in the absence 
 of the moral element, has become a speculation. 
 
 I have already followed the claims of the religious 
 sentiment in the one direction, and must now follow 
 the philosophy in another. The change of asso- 
 ciation and aspect into which we pass is singular 
 and striking. Hitherto the moral sentiment has 
 been the predominant idea. An actual want on 
 the part of the human soul of some contact with 
 the unseen world, some grasp upon the arm of Deity 
 and some glimpse of His face, some comfort to cheer 
 man in life and some hope to brighten the shadows 
 of his death, have met us everywhere. Now we 
 put all these on one side and pass into the sphere 
 of the intellect alone. The change of association 
 is as great as if we passed from the tangled wilds 
 of an American forest into the silence and sterility 
 of a polar solitude. In the one there was life on 
 every side, although wild and uncultivated, and 
 in its very extravagance pregnant with deadly ma- 
 laria. In the other there is not a trace of life. 
 Every crystal form is clear and sharp ; a thousand 
 
V] Christianity Systematic. 161 
 
 hues and colours play upon the surface of earth 
 and sky: but they are cold and superficial com- 
 pared to the colours of the burning South, and 
 there is not a sound of human life to disturb the 
 terrible monotony of the everlasting silence. It 
 is, however, conceivable that in this cold region 
 of intellectual speculation eternal truth may be 
 found. The disturbing influences of moral feeling 
 and passion are eliminated, and in their absence 
 the accurate and exactly poised intellect may per- 
 haps have discovered the great mysteries of life and 
 death. Let us therefore see whether the specu- 
 lation of the head has proved itself more powerful 
 to find out God than the instinctive sentiment of 
 the heart. 
 
 In comparing the faith with speculative philo- 
 sophy we are assisted by the fact that both 
 are systems. The doctrines of Christianity con- 
 stitute a system by virtue of the organic unity 
 pervading them. It is not only that they have 
 been systematised by theologians ; but it is that 
 an internal sequence and coherence pervades the 
 doctrines themselves. They constitute a complete 
 history of humanity and of the world. The act 
 of creation and the relation existing between the 
 Creator and the created form the first links of 
 the chain. The primeval harmony of the two in 
 the paradisaical state ; the interruption of it by 
 the sin and fall of man ; the purpose of God to 
 restore the broken harmony by the salvation of 
 His fallen creatures ; the work of the Incarnate 
 
 M 
 
162 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 Son, schemed, undertaken, and completed with this 
 object; the operations of the Holy Ghost; the sal- 
 vation of the individual soul, and the final glori- 
 fication of the people of God at the restitution 
 of all things, — are doctrines which beyond all pos- 
 sible dispute are closely connected with each other. 
 So close is their connection that the omission of 
 any one dislocates the order of the rest, as mani- 
 festly as broken links in a chain destroy the con- 
 tinuity of the whole. Any misconception in one 
 doctrine vitiates the conception of the whole, as 
 certainly as a broken circuit interrupts the course of 
 the electric current. For instance, a denial of the 
 full creative work of God, or a low estimate of 
 the extent of the depravity of man, extends its 
 effect throughout the entire circle of doctrine. The 
 faith is not an accidental aggregate of isolated 
 units, but a coherence of connected members in 
 an organised body. 
 
 This structural unity of the faith arises naturally 
 from the personal unity of its Author. One mind 
 has schemed it all, and therefore one thought per- 
 vades it all. The authorship and the authority 
 are equivalent. The faith is equally systematic 
 in the structure of the inspired documents [i], in 
 the relation of its doctrines to each other, and 
 in the grounds of its obligations upon reason and 
 conscience. 
 
 But speculative philosophy is a system likewise. 
 1 do not mean in its results, for these include 
 not one system, but many systems, various and 
 
V] Systematic Philosophy. 163 
 
 antagonistic as an army where every man's hand 
 is against his fellow ; but I mean that it is a 
 system in its claims and principles. A common 
 object, a common method, a common instrumen- 
 tality pervade all systems of speculation, however 
 much they may vary in their arbitrary starting- 
 points and in their ultimate conclusions. It is right 
 that the hand of an admiring disciple should draw 
 the portrait and thus remove all suspicion as to 
 the likeness, lest it should be said either that 
 ignorance has misconceived, or prejudice perverted 
 it. " Speculative thinking," says a distinguished pro- 
 fessor, " is to be regarded as distinct from that 
 which is barely reflective and discursive. They 
 are distinguished in this respect, that the latter 
 is a posteriori, the former a priori ; the one de- 
 serving and critical, the other constructive. Re- 
 flective thinking must have its object given, whether 
 that object be barely perceived, or whether it be 
 the duly formed notion of a thing. Speculative 
 thinking originates its own thoughts. It evolves 
 them out of itself by an inward logical necessity, 
 and constructs an entire system of such a nature 
 that each single thought implicitly supposes the 
 whole [2]." 
 
 Hence we are enabled to compare the dogmatic 
 faith and speculative thought, as systems, each with 
 its distinctive peculiarities, and to perceive not 
 alone their entire dissimilarity, but their absolute 
 and active antagonism. 
 
 I The objects respectively proposed by them are 
 
 m 2 
 
164 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 different. The objects of speculation are solely in- 
 tellectual. It not only seeks no alliance with the 
 moral wants, but it formally disdains and repu- 
 diates them. So complete is the separation that 
 " if the religious feeling is touched in any degree," 
 that is, if hope, or fear, or love, or gratitude, or 
 sympathy towards a Supreme Being be called into 
 play, " this is proof enough to the speculative theo- 
 logian," I again quote his own language, " that 
 his speculative labours must have miscarried, and 
 he hesitates not for one moment to pull it down 
 to the ground, however much trouble it may have 
 cost him." The reason assigned for this repudia- 
 tion is not simply the irregularity of the moral 
 emotions and their consequent tendency to disturb 
 the calm and accurate processes of the reason, but 
 their variability. The religious consciousness is held 
 to be modified by personal constitution, tempera- 
 ment, and habit. Every mind and every society 
 forms its own type of piety, and from the piety 
 developes its own theology. Each theology is 
 equally true, because it reflects with equal accu- 
 racy the religious consciousness that gives it birth. 
 No thinker can assert his own belief to be more 
 true than any other man's belief without " im- 
 modesty and presumption." What is asserted to 
 be the " inexorable strictness " of the speculative 
 mode, finds its natural issue in an unlimited diver- 
 sity of belief. Hence it is chargeable with the 
 inconsistency of violating the moral consciousness 
 which it affirms to be the primal spring of its own 
 
V] Object of Speculation. 165 
 
 life. This act of intellectual suicide drains away 
 its own life-blood [3]. 
 
 Christian theology protests equally against the 
 adequacy and against the dignity of such thinking. 
 We charge it with inadequacy because at best it 
 only satisfies and only professes to satisfy one part 
 of man's compound nature. It meets the difficulties 
 of the head, at least attempts to do so, but neither 
 quiets the uneasiness of the conscience nor satisfies 
 the wants of the affections, nor supplies the guidance 
 needed by the will. We charge it with frivolousness 
 because by isolating itself from the practical wants 
 of man it lowers the dignity of the reason itself. 
 
 I do not depreciate the greatness of the intellect, 
 or the subtlety of its powers. Speculative thinking 
 tasks its energies to the utmost. A mind con- 
 versant with such studies rises into the highest 
 sphere of pure intellect and exercises gifts worthy 
 of all admiration. Whether conscience and will are 
 not diviner yet, inasmuch as the intellect is but 
 their instrument, may well be questioned. But if 
 we decide that reason is monarch over all other 
 faculties, we must acknowledge that a monarch 
 needs a dominion worthy of his dignity. But 
 reason confined to the limits of its own specula- 
 tions, and forbidden to exercise active control, is 
 a monarch without an empire; as if a man should 
 reign over a kingdom without subjects and think it 
 nobler to rule a desert, himself its sole monarch and 
 sole inhabitant, than a populous empire rich in ac- 
 tivity and wealth. The practical result is to divide 
 
166 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 the living man into two halves, the one all feeling 
 without thought, the other all thought without 
 feeling. The dislocation destroys the greatness of 
 them both. The sun shining in the midst of the 
 firmament and filling a rejoicing world with beauty, 
 is glorious and admirable ; but a sun without a 
 firmament to fill, or a world to brighten, would be 
 a sun no longer, a strange and portentous paradox. 
 
 Such a system is speculative in every sense of 
 the word. It not only looks into itself as into 
 a glass, and gathers its notions from the self 
 reflected in it, but it is speculative in the ordi- 
 nary meaning of doubtfulness and uncertainty. It 
 is devoid of evidence and substantial argument. 
 Severing itself from man's practical wants and con- 
 flicts, it ceases to have any foothold in the actual 
 and working world. It lives in a cloudland of its 
 own, and, like the gods of Epicurus, looks down 
 in idle indifference on the struggles and sufferings 
 of the soul. It becomes a mere display of the 
 powers of the intellect, like an earthly firework 
 scattering its bright sparks for a few moments 
 into the darkness, as useless as it is beautiful. It 
 dazzles the eye for a moment and passes away, 
 leaving the stars in the clear heavens looking down 
 from their changeless orbits, cloudless and glorious 
 as before. 
 
 The faith delivered to the saints is wholly dif- 
 ferent, and in the difference as much higher as 
 heaven is higher than earth. Far from its Divine 
 Author is any such miserable patchwork as shall 
 
V] Object of the Faith. 167 
 
 take account of some one part only of the na- 
 ture lie has Himself bestowed, and shall leave the 
 rest to pine and die. The faith meets every 
 part of man. To supply his practical wants, to 
 alleviate his sorrows, to remedy his ruin, to throw 
 light upon his darkness, and make even the 
 valley of Baca a threshold into glory, is its one 
 all-pervading object. It does not soar heartlessly 
 above us like some bright angel of another world, 
 torturing our human hearts by the vision of a 
 serenity beyond our reach. But it comes like an 
 archangel on an errand of mercy, and walks to 
 and fro our world, a ministering spirit of light 
 and joy. It does not disdain the earthly soil and 
 earthly atmosphere, but imitates the Son of God 
 Incarnate, as He brightened our. earth with His 
 smiles and consecrated it with His tears. The faith 
 is in every part of it intensely practical. Doctrines 
 are but the statement of God's mode of saving us. 
 Even the subtle refinements of the Athanasian Creed 
 are practical, for they are directed to preserve 
 from heretical refinement the plain and blessed 
 truth of the nature and office of our Saviour. 
 Its loftiest heights of truth are like the moun- 
 tain ranges, nursing -parents of the rivers that 
 water the lovely vales beneath, and fill them with 
 fertility and joy. The faith reflects the perfections 
 of its Author, as like a cloudless sun He fills the 
 spiritual firmament with life and immortality. 
 
 II The methods respectively pursued by the two 
 systems are different, Speculative philosophy is 
 
168 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 solely subjective. It begins by taking for granted 
 certain primary ideas, such as were the numbers 
 of Pythagoras, the atoms of Lucretius, the monads 
 of Leibnitz, the ego and the non-ego of Fichte. 
 From these it constructs its scheme by a process 
 of deduction. It thus reverses the foundations of 
 all true knowledge. For speculative reasoning 
 belongs to the childhood of the human intellect, 
 while experimental reasoning is the weapon of its 
 maturity. The one gives facts, the other theories. 
 The one describes the world as God has made it ; 
 the other constructs a world as the thinker supposes 
 that it ought to be made. The one presents a 
 reality, the other exhibits a dream. 
 
 The difference between the two modes of reason- 
 ing is too familiar to this audience, and has too 
 recently been discussed with eloquence and force 
 from this place, to require that I should dwell 
 upon it a . It only remains to apply it to my 
 present argument. That speculative thinking is 
 deductive is but feebly denied [4] ; but it is 
 asserted that Christian dogma as it exists in 
 creeds and formularies is deductive likewise. Doc- 
 trines have been boldly and sweepingly described 
 as human theories, and if they were based on de- 
 duction they would be liable to the charge ; but 
 they are inductive, and rest on exactly the same 
 position, only with far higher elements of certainty, 
 as the truths of natural science. 
 
 I do not depreciate the proper value of deduction. 
 a Mozley's Bampton Lectures for 1865. Lect. ii. 
 
V] Method of Speculation. 169 
 
 It enters largely into every sustained course of 
 reasoning. Nor do I deny that many religious 
 lessons and some points of doctrine are gained by 
 this process. Infant baptism, for instance, is no- 
 where directly asserted in Scripture, but is clearly 
 deduced from direct assertions. Our Church de- 
 clares what is contained in Holy Scripture, and 
 what is gathered from it and proved by it, to be 
 of equal authority. But, in proportion as the 
 links of proof are lengthened, a degree of uncer- 
 tainty, although it may be indefinitely small, hangs 
 about the process. Even this, however, is absent 
 from "the faith" as embodied in the Nicene Creed. 
 For not one of its articles rests on deduction, 
 but on the direct positive assertions of the Word. 
 The immediate voice of God Himself alone ren- 
 ders doctrine binding upon the conscience. The 
 process of gathering these truths out of Scripture 
 is a process of induction. The texts bearing upon 
 the special subjects stand in the position of the 
 facts; the comparison of the texts with each other 
 corresponds to the generalisation from the facts; 
 and the doctrine answers to the scientific truth. 
 The technical statement, like the scientific formula, 
 is but the assertion of the fact [5]. 
 
 Whatever authority therefore is due to the Scrip- 
 tures, is due to the doctrines generalised from them, 
 in the same way that the accuracy of a scientific 
 conclusion depends upon the accuracy of the data 
 from which it is drawn. If the truth of the 
 Scriptures be called into question, the truth of the 
 
170 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 doctrines may consistently be called into question 
 likewise, but not otherwise. The Scriptures and 
 the doctrines have an equivalent authority. 
 
 The technical form and the technical language 
 employed by theology to express the doctrines of 
 the faith arise from the necessities of this induc- 
 tive process. For many texts of Scripture contain 
 one and the same truth. Take, for instance, the 
 true Divinity of Christ, or the indivisible union of 
 the Godhead and the manhood in His one Person. 
 In speaking of the first of these Bishop Pearson 
 quotes more than one hundred texts. But to re- 
 quire for the clear assertion of the Deity of Christ 
 the repetition of the whole of these one hundred 
 texts would be exceedingly absurd. We therefore 
 adopt one formula, so worded as to express the 
 common truth, and to combine in this one expres- 
 sion of it all the particulars contained in the texts. 
 The Church does this in the Apostles' Creed by the 
 words, " I believe in Jesus Christ His only Son." 
 When the Aiian heretics so refined upon language 
 as to enable them to use these words of the Creed, 
 and yet under cover of them to deny that Christ 
 was true God, the Fathers of the Council at 
 Nicsea made their language more positive, and 
 declared the Son to be "God of God, Light of 
 Light, Very God of Very God." The Creed of 
 A-thanasius employs a term of yet more precise 
 M-iiificance, and proclaims Him to be "God of the 
 substance of the Father." The Church of England 
 in the Second Article repeats nearly the same 
 
V] Method of the Faith. 171 
 
 words, " Very and eternal God of one substance 
 with the Father." But these fuller expressions 
 add nothing whatever to the truth of our Lord's 
 true Deity, as the Son of God, expressed in the 
 Apostles' Creed. That one phrase, "His only Son," 
 includes all that the longer definitions include. But 
 although it includes all the truth, it does not 
 specifically exclude all the forms of error with the 
 same definiteness as they do. For they grew out of 
 the experience of controversy, and met its exigencies 
 as they arose. 
 
 So it is likewise with the second subject men- 
 tioned in illustration : the hypostatical union of the 
 two natures hi the one person of Christ. One class 
 of texts of considerable number assert that Christ 
 was man ; another class of texts, equally numerous 
 and equally clear, assert Him to be God. Both 
 these classes of texts refer to one common sub- 
 ject, viz. the Person of Christ. The first series 
 affirm one particular of Him ; the second series 
 assert another. All the texts were given by the 
 same inspiration of God, and are invested with the 
 same authority. They must all therefore be equally 
 true. 
 
 Now, how is this common and combined truth to 
 be expressed \ Is it to be necessary to repeat the 
 whole two series of texts in detail whenever we 
 wish to profess our belief that our blessed Lord 
 was both God and Man ? May we not adopt 
 some formula to express in a few words, selected 
 perhaps even framed for the purpose, the truth 
 
172 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 common to all these texts 1 The Apostles' Creed 
 employs the words, "Jesus Christ His only Son 
 our Lord, who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, 
 born of the Virgin Mary." The Mcene Creed, 
 not more exact, but more full, declares that 
 the only-begotten Son was "made Man." Later 
 still, the Church, pressed by the Nestorian and 
 Eutychian controversies, fenced the dogma by the 
 trenchant definitions of the Athanasian Creed : 
 " Who, although He be God and Man, yet He 
 is not two, but one Christ ; One, not by conver- 
 sion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of 
 the Manhood into God ; One altogether ; not by 
 confusion of Substance, but by unity of Person." 
 Yet in this case, as in the former, these definitions 
 did not add one iota to the truth contained in the 
 shorter form. The full complete dogma was all 
 there on its affirmative side, and the only advantage 
 of the longer form is on its negative and contro- 
 versial side, its protest against the oj^posite heresy. 
 
 The same remarks are true of the separate terms 
 employed, as well as of the technical form. Some 
 of these terms confessedly are not to be found in 
 Scripture — such as the word Person, the word 
 Trinity, the phrase Catholic Church, and others 
 of the same kind. From Athanasius down to 
 Calvin, the Church has ever given the same answer 
 to objections drawn from this source. She has 
 ever replied, that although the words are not in 
 Scripture, the sense expressed by them is there. 
 The words are ;i vehicle to the meaning, a sign of 
 
V] Method of the Faith. 173 
 
 the thing signified. Each one is really an em- 
 bodied dogma, accepted on the authority of many 
 texts summarised into the single word. If the 
 dogma be in Scripture, and no more accurate term 
 can be found to express it, it is sheer wantonness 
 to object to the word. For in no other way than 
 the rise of such terms can separate dogmas be com- 
 bined in a common proposition. 
 
 By an exactly similar process the terminology of 
 science^ has been formed. Each word expresses an 
 ascertained truth, and can only be explained to 
 an untrained mind by the long statement of the 
 truth. Such are the phrases, specific gravity, in- 
 sensible distances, and a host of others. But as 
 the incessant reiteration would be equally absurd 
 and vexatious, the truth is embodied in a single 
 term for the sake of brevity and convenience. 
 Who besides a madman would ever think of 
 calling into question the truth because he did 
 not like the word employed to express it? Change 
 the word by all means if you can find a better, 
 but do not sweep away the meaning of it. In 
 progressive human science, such as geology, such 
 changes have constantly been required, as fresh 
 additions to our knowledge have made the old 
 terms inaccurate [6]. If no such process has taken 
 place in theology, it is simply and solely because 
 the doctrines being Divine and Divinely revealed, 
 and Divinely revealed once for all, no addition can 
 take place to the dogma, and therefore no alteration 
 has been required in the word. 
 
174 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 Now on the accuracy with which her language 
 expresses the true teaching of the Scripture, the 
 Church challenges the criticism of the world. If, 
 as with the Church of Rome, the original documents 
 of the faith were kept out of sight, and the theo- 
 logical articles were alone avowed without any 
 means of testing them, a suspicion might be thrown 
 upon the Church's faithfulness to her trust. But 
 the Church of England, like the Church of Apo- 
 stolic and primitive times, holds out the Scriptures 
 to all men, and with emphatic reiteration refers 
 to them all her authority. The Scriptures are 
 the teacher, and the Church is only the witness. 
 She challenges all men to judge of her faithful- 
 ness to her trust. Here are the Scriptures and 
 here her articles of belief. Do they correspond or 
 not \ If they do not, let us bring them into corre- 
 spondence. If they do, then the truth expressed is 
 the same in both cases, whether scattered through- 
 out the Divine utterances, or concentrated in the 
 human formula. If it is the same truth, it must 
 have the same authority. The assertion that doc- 
 trines are human theories involves either a denial 
 of the infallibility of the Word of God or a denial 
 that the dogma corresponds with the Word. If 
 it rests on neither of these it is a trick of words 
 and no more. 
 
 This difference between all schemes of philosophy 
 and the dogmas of the Christian faith is vital. 
 The process of the former is deductive from hy- 
 potheses arbitrarily assumed in the mind itself, and 
 
V] Meth od of th e Fa ith . 175 
 
 which have no relation or correspondence with the 
 phenomena of the world and are not supposed to 
 have any. The process of the latter is inductive, 
 and therefore transfers the reality of the facts into 
 the generalisation founded upon them. The dogma 
 taught by the Church contains all the truth con- 
 tained in the Scriptures and nothing more. The 
 human speculation inherits all the uncertainty of 
 the human hypotheses : the Christian dogma all 
 the certainty of the Divine revelation. In the one 
 case we start from human theories, and the result 
 is therefore theoretical throughout ; in the other 
 we start from facts, and the result has the nature 
 of a fact throughout. All doctrines are statements 
 of facts in the sphere of the Divine and unseen, 
 as all scientific formulas are statements of facts in 
 the sphere of the material and visible. 
 
 But not only do Christian dogmas possess all 
 the certainty attached to the inductive process of 
 enquiry, but they possess it to a degree belonging 
 exclusively to themselves. This arises from the 
 greater certainty of the facts constituting the pre- 
 mises of the induction. The facts of physical science 
 are sensible phenomena gathered by observation, 
 tested in each case by repetition on the part of 
 each particular observer, and by corresponding 
 results on the part of other observers. In this 
 way we ascertain the facts relative to the strata 
 of the earth beneath our feet, the chemical com- 
 position of the air we breathe, the nature of the 
 electric forces existing on every side, and the 
 
176 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 motions of the planetary orbs over our heads. 
 But however near our knowledge of these facts 
 may be brought towards actual certainty, they are 
 never quite certain and perhaps never can be, on 
 account of the improved methods and instruments of 
 enquiry brought to bear at succeeding periods. The 
 astronomers of fifty years ago probably watched 
 the heavens with as careful and accurate an ob- 
 servation as the astronomers of our own day. 
 But they did not possess telescopes of the same 
 power, and the results of the observations were 
 therefore less accurate. For instance, our theories 
 relative to nebulas have been modified by the fact 
 that nebulae unresolvable by the telescopes of a 
 former day have been resolved by the more power- 
 ful instruments of our own time. This is but an 
 instance of what is taking place in many depart- 
 ments of natural science. A certain possibility of 
 error consequently remains in all the generalisa- 
 tion of science, because it remains in the observed 
 facts which are generalised. 
 
 But with Christian dogma it is different. In 
 this sphere the data themselves, the observed and 
 recorded facts, are not the work of man but of 
 God. For instance, the words " God sent His 
 Son into the world " are the assertion of a fact. 
 " The Son of Man came to give His life a ran- 
 som for many" is the assertion of another fact. 
 "He hath made peace by the blood of His cross" 
 is a third fact. " There is now no condemnation 
 to them that arc in Christ Jesus" is a fourth 
 
V] Method of the Faith. 177 
 
 fact. In this way we might pass through all the 
 dogmatic parts of Scripture and show that every 
 truth is a fact, the statement either of something 
 that has been done, that is being done, or that 
 will be done by God in the sphere of the Un- 
 seen. Now what security have we for the accuracy 
 of the statement, that is, for the truth of the 
 fact % We have the authority of inspiration for 
 it. In this first stage of the inductive process, 
 the observation of the facts is done for us and 
 done by God. In proportion as all error is there- 
 fore eliminated from it, and nothing is left for 
 man to do but the generalisation, in that pro- 
 portion Christian dogma acquires the force of cer- 
 tain and demonstrated truth. 
 
 In thus speaking I am arguing with those who 
 admit the first step, namely, the inspiration and 
 authority of Scripture. If this be denied the 
 dogma must be denied accordingly. If the Scrip- 
 tural books are no more than human books, then 
 I most freely admit that Christian doctrines are 
 no more than human theories ; for the speculation 
 of man can never advance beyond the dignity of 
 a theory. But I am arguing with those — and there 
 are many — who admit in the language of the Creed, 
 that God " spake by the prophets," and believe these 
 books to be, in the language of our own Articles, 
 " God's Word written," and yet call into question the 
 binding character of Christian dogma. To them I 
 reply that the books and the dogma must stand or 
 fall together. In exact proportion as the link uniting 
 
 N 
 
178 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 them is strong and indissoluble, in that propor- 
 tion the full Divine authority of the book exists 
 in the dogma. 
 
 III The two systems are sharply contrasted in 
 the instruments they employ. In speculative philo- 
 sophy they are solely human. Not only does its 
 theory necessarily involve this, but it positively 
 excludes any other action but that of the human 
 mind, and therefore squares all existence to a 
 human rule. It rejects all help from without, and 
 derives its primary ideas, as well as its subsequent 
 deductions, from within. From this narrow starting- 
 point it claims to soar through the universe of 
 created and uncreated life, and to evolve out of 
 its own consciousness a complete system of the 
 world. It professes to possess in itself the key 
 to all secret mysteries, and to explain the eternal 
 laws of the immense whole of intelligent and un- 
 intelligent existence. 
 
 The claim involves the most prodigious assump- 
 tions ; and if these are false the superstructure must 
 be as unstable as its foundations. It exaggerates 
 the ancient principle that man is the measure of 
 all things, for it makes one faculty alone the 
 measure of all things. It wilfully shuts its eyes 
 to the limitations of its own imperfect knowledge, 
 and the notorious fact of man's inability to ex- 
 plain, and incapacity to control, the commonest 
 phenomena of daily life. It despises even the helps 
 afforded by the senses and by the experienced 
 facts of the world outside. By so doing it affirms 
 
V] Instruments of Speculation, 179 
 
 an infallibility so positive that it does not even 
 need to be corrected by the evidence of facts or 
 squared to their most palpable realities. 
 
 It takes its flight in the simple vigour of its 
 own native powers to explore the universe in its 
 depths below and in its heights above, and all 
 its infinitely multifarious and strange 1 y complicated 
 details. It professes to be master of the whole, 
 and thus superior to the whole ; looking into it 
 and through it as some human eye scans the 
 parts of a human machine. The very claim is an 
 assumption of Deity, at least an assumption of 
 prerogatives regarded by every emotion of reve- 
 rence as peculiar to Deity. The thinker converts 
 himself into his own Deity, recognising no superior 
 intelligence to his own. He thus voids the world 
 of any higher mind, un-Gods it, as the lips of 
 unbelief have termed the process. 
 
 For if there be higher minds than the human, 
 whether they be angelic or unangelic, or whether 
 it be the mind of Deity itself, the claim becomes 
 absurd on the face of it. For the higher mind must 
 be capable of a higher exercise and higher ideas ; 
 capable of dealing with more complex relations 
 and with deeper and subtler mysteries ; must move, 
 in short, in a higher sphere, unapproachable by 
 the lower and more limited intellect. To assert 
 that the human intellect is capable of explaining 
 all things, is to deny that any higher intellect 
 exists than itself. It thus empties the universe, 
 so far as its own conceptions are concerned, of 
 
 N 2 
 
180 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 any other intelligence, and stands its own sole 
 and undivided Deity, self-sufficient and autocratic. 
 
 In such a system the recognition of a personal 
 Deity in the world, a moral Governor over it, 
 and still more of a revelation from an unseen 
 Creator for the guidance of His creatures, cannot 
 possibly find any place. These ideas are eliminated 
 by the very assumption with which the process 
 begins. They are accordingly wholly absent from 
 its latest developments, and avowedly absent. Chris- 
 tian language indeed survives sometimes, but it is 
 in ghostly words voided of all their distinctive 
 meaning. Thus, for instance, in the philosophy of 
 Schelhng and Hegel the terms God, Trinity and 
 Unity, the fall of man, redemption, the Spirit, 
 faith, all survive ; but they survive solely as ex- 
 pressive of philosophic ideas, not of revealed dogmas. 
 In this manner the very theory of speculation 
 involves all the questions at issue with Chris- 
 tianity. It takes for granted in the negative all 
 that revelation proves in the affirmative. The entire 
 structure is an enormous petitio prindpii. 
 
 The spectacle presented on comparing the 
 thinker with the prodigious problem he sets 
 himself to solve, is a memorable one. On one 
 side is the man ; on the other side the world. 
 In the man is a brain that toils for a few short 
 years, and then corrupts in the grave ; an intel- 
 lect baffled by insoluble difficulties in familiar 
 facts of existence lying on every side; a conscious- 
 ness confined to its own little circle of idea and 
 
V] Instruments of Speculation. 181 
 
 experience. Here he stands, and over against him 
 is the world of existence — not this little globe 
 alone, but the system of which it forms a part, 
 the world immeasurable even to our thought, 
 mysterious above our searching, and intricate even 
 beyond conception. The two stand in close con- 
 tact ; for on the theory there is no other mind or 
 will to separate them, and by the exercise of its 
 independent volition still further to Complicate the 
 problem. The man stands alone and self-sufficient, 
 and glancing at the immeasurable whole proceeds 
 in his own mental processes to grasp, and analyse, 
 and describe it ; to pierce its darkest depths and 
 search its profoundest secrets. It is impossible 
 not to admire the audacity of such an ambition ; 
 not to wonder at the strength of wing with 
 which it takes its soaring flight. But considered 
 as a serious attempt to solve the great mysteries 
 of man and God, it must be spoken of differently. 
 It can be no wonder that speculation should fail 
 — it is no wonder that it does fail — when the 
 very attempt is monstrous. While we admire 
 the loftiness of its flight we must be shocked 
 likewise at its arrogance. If speculative philo- 
 sophy exhibits the ambition of an archangel, 
 what wonder that it should share an archangel's 
 fall [7]. 
 
 Speculation carries the cause of its failure in itself, 
 since it begins by denying what it should be its ob- 
 ject to ascertain. For if there exists in the world 
 a higher intellect than man's, and if this intellect 
 
182 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 exercises in the higher sphere the same activity, 
 what wonder if the two cross and contradict each 
 other ? Suppose such an intellect to exist and 
 to be infinite, and to an unerring perfection of 
 wisdom to add an unlimited power, so that it 
 is not only able to construct a Cosmos in idea, 
 but to give absolute immediate effect to its ideas 
 by the very force of will. What would such a 
 mind be but God \ For thus He is ever de- 
 scribed in Scripture as creating and constructing 
 by no use of secondary instruments, but by the 
 omnipotence of His own Word. "He spake and 
 it was done, He commanded and it stood fast." 
 Such an exercise of self-existing and self-contained 
 prerogative is natural to Him who is eternal in 
 duration as well as infinite in being, for His ever- 
 lasting " now " gives permanence to what He con- 
 ceives, and by conceiving creates. But such a work 
 is as incredible in the scale of manhood, as it is 
 gloriously consistent in the scale of Godhead. 
 
 As an intellectual exercise metaphysical studies 
 may stand in competition for interest and disci- 
 j^linary value with any other branch of study. 
 Nor should we question but that there are a 
 true philosophy and a true science, the hand- 
 maids of truth and the nursing-mothers of adoring 
 love and devoted service. St. Paul's language implies 
 this. He warns his converts not against philosophy 
 altogether, but against philosophy of a false kind. 
 Thus he warns the Colossians : "Beware lest any 
 man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit," 
 
V] Instruments of Speculation. 183 
 
 and then he explains the source of the deceitful- 
 ness : " after the tradition of men, after the rudi- 
 ments of the world, and not after Christ a ." His words 
 to Timothy are of the same character : " Keep that 
 which is committed to thy trust" — the deposit of 
 divinely-inspired doctrine — " avoiding profane and 
 vain babblings" (rag /3e/3»/Aoi»? Kevocpmuas) — the vam 
 empty boastings of a self-deifying wisdom — " and 
 oppositions of science, falsely so called." The 
 very words imply a true philosophy and a true 
 science. If philosophy be the knowledge of the 
 moral, and science the knowledge of the physical 
 causes of things, or in whatever other way they 
 may be distinguished, they both must have their 
 highest seat before the throne of God, where in 
 the primal fountain of the Divine will all causes 
 have their being. The faith once delivered to the 
 saints is a revelation of God and from God, and as 
 the Worker is greater than His works, it affords the 
 nearest approach to a knowledge of all created and 
 uncreated mysteries possible to us in this world. 
 But when philosophy stands in defiant hostility to 
 revelation, and dethroning Christianity from its 
 seat, claims to be itself the self-sufficient teacher 
 and measure of truth, it assumes a totally different 
 character. We cannot wonder at the energy of 
 the inspired denunciation. The very object of such 
 a philosophy is an impersonated unbelief, and its 
 first principle a lie. 
 
 The contrast presented by the dogmatic faith is 
 a Col. ii. 8. 
 
184 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 sharp and strong. Speculative philosophy discards 
 any other instruments than the human. But the 
 faith does not run into the opposite extravagance 
 and reject any other instrument of knowledge than 
 the Divine. In this temperate wisdom it bears the 
 signature of God and reflects His attributes. God 
 is the same in nature as in revelation, and has not 
 so constructed His word as to supersede or contra- 
 dict His works. He has so framed His world as 
 to employ and stimulate our natural powers up 
 to their highest reach, and only where they 
 necessarily fail has He bestowed His own Divine 
 teaching to reveal what lies beyond their reach. 
 God has not given us His Word to teach us natural 
 science, because here the facts He within sensible 
 experience, and the path into a knowledge of them, 
 however laborious and difficult, is yet accessible to 
 the human intellect and the efforts of successive ages. 
 Nor in revealing things superhuman has He formu- 
 lated and methodised the revelation, because this 
 also we are capable of doing for ourselves, and 
 the very form of the revelation in its contact with 
 our human wants has served to direct and stimulate 
 the effort. But where, from the very nature of 
 things, what we needed to know for life and peace 
 lies beyond our searching out, there, and there alone 
 He has given us His revelation, unveiling with His 
 own blessed hands the smile of His face and the 
 secrets of the world to come. 
 
 This is equally true in regard to the doctrinal 
 teaching of Scripture and the historical narratives. 
 
V] Instruments of the Faith. 185 
 
 We might discover a philosophy of man; but by 
 what faculties could we ever frame a philosophy of 
 God % His everlasting counsels before the world 
 began ; His purposes of mercy towards our race ; the 
 plan schemed, in consistency with His own attributes 
 and the interests of the universe He governs, for 
 our justification and sanctification ; His designs for the 
 future in the glorification of His redeemed people, 
 and the establishment over this sin-stained world of 
 a final kingdom of righteousness and peace, — could 
 be found out by no conceivable human means. Where 
 the thing to be known is human, human faculties 
 are left to discover it ; where the thing to be known 
 is Divine, a Divine inspiration has revealed it. 
 
 This truth lies at the foundation of the whole 
 question discussed in these lectures, and does not 
 need to be amplified. But it is necessary to note 
 that it applies to the facts of Scripture as closely 
 as to its doctrines. It is the strength of Chris- 
 tianity, that its feet are on this earth of ours 
 while its soaring head is in the skies. It is bound 
 up in the history of the actual world and of races 
 still existing ; of one race above all, standing in 
 its mysterious life and equally mysterious isolation, 
 the undying monument of a historic faith. The 
 doctrines relative to the work and office of Christ 
 are inextricably bound up with the facts relative 
 to His life, and to the national platform on which 
 He stood with the prophetic diadem on His brow, 
 the manifest Messiah and the hope of all the ends 
 of the earth. It was impossible for us to know 
 
186 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 the doctrines without knowing the facts ; and as the 
 doctrines and the facts were welded together in the 
 links of the same Divine plan, so the certainty of 
 the one is bound up in the certainty of the other. 
 
 There is, however, this difference between the 
 two : the doctrines were not knowable by man 
 without a revelation ; the facts were among things 
 knowable, but yet in the order of human results 
 could not be known without an inspired revelation 
 to attest them. The circumstance that human his- 
 tory acknowledges itself to know nothing with 
 certainty belonging to a remoter date than eight 
 hundred years before Christ, and that events falling 
 long within this jjeriod are to our own day the un- 
 settled subjects of endless debate, suffices for my 
 purpose [8], If it was necessary for us to know 
 ancient facts, by an authoritative revelation alone 
 could the knowledge be conveyed. This is a large 
 subject, and rich in instructive thought, but it is a 
 landmark alone in my present argument, and the 
 course of my enquiry hurries us on beyond it. 
 
 I have now compared the dogmatic faith with 
 speculative philosophy in three vital particulars : 
 in the objects sought, the method of enquiry pur- 
 sued, and the instruments employed ; and on all 
 three have shown them to be distinguished from 
 each other by irreconcilable differences. On no 
 reasonable grounds whatever can they be identified. 
 To call the faith a form of speculation, and its 
 doctrines human theories, may be a convenient 
 appeal to prejudice, or ;in illusion palmed uncon- 
 
V] History of Speculation. 187 
 
 sciously on the mind itself; but it is a use of words 
 totally irreconcilable with the plain facts of the 
 case, and any honest enquiry must utterly dissi- 
 pate it. 
 
 Here again, as in other cases, the appeal lies to 
 the undeniable facts of human history. Specula- 
 tion should no more shrink from this test than 
 revelation. A comparison of the theory of " the 
 faith once delivered to the saints " with the facts 
 of the past has shown that such a faith actually 
 exists, and is in its substance identical with the 
 faith of apostles and prophets as contained in the 
 Canonical Scriptures. Its history is like the un- 
 broken course of some stately river, ever flowing 
 onwards from its first rise in the apostolic age 
 towards the glorious ocean of the prophetic future, 
 ever widening and deepening as it flows, and from 
 every bright wave echoing the everlasting song, 
 " Glory to God in the highest, and on earth 
 peace." But the history of speculation is totally 
 different. It is a weary tale of ceaseless effort 
 and of ceaseless failure. It is not one river, but 
 many ; a hundred streams, now wasted in the 
 barren sands, now stagnating in the malarious 
 marsh, now evaporating by simple inanition, earth- 
 born and earthly. 
 
 The progress of speculative thought has been 
 like the conduct of a man bewildered in some 
 dense and trackless forest. Brought to his present 
 spot by some able and faithful guide, he has 
 now in some way or another been deprived of his 
 
188 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 assistance, and is left to shift for himself. He 
 has no knowledge whatever to begin with, for he 
 was never here before, and having neither chart 
 nor compass, is devoid of all data beyond what 
 he can gain by his own consciousness. He pro- 
 ceeds after a while in ^search of a path of escape 
 from the silent and solitary forest into the green 
 meadows and smiling scenes of happy industry in 
 the distance. From the dead level where he stands 
 no glimpse of the distance can be gained. The 
 tops of the tall trees close the boundaiy of view 
 on every side, and if he climbs them he but sees 
 the depth and boundless extent of the mysterious 
 circle wrapping him in on all sides. He is left 
 face to face with himself and the problem of 
 escape with all his man's wants and weaknesses 
 to urge him to a speedy solution of it. He 
 therefore makes the attempt and penetrates some 
 distance into the thick forest, till through the 
 matted and tangled labyrinth, or over the yawn- 
 ing fissure, or down the steep precipice, or across 
 the over- hanging side of the barrier rock, he 
 can advance no further. He therefore turns 
 upon his steps, and following his tracks back- 
 wards, finds his way to the point whence he 
 started. Then lie tries again with the same 
 effort, and with the same failure. Over and over 
 the same process goes on. But meantime the 
 day advances and night draws nigh. Natural 
 wants arise and crave in vain for satisfaction. 
 There is neither bread nor water in this lonely 
 
V] History of Speculation. 189 
 
 forest. He lies down amid the darkness, and tries 
 to forget in sullen sleep his anxieties and de- 
 spair. Another . day brings another day's hopes, 
 another day's efforts, and another day's failure ; till 
 like many an unhappy wretch in actual life, ex- 
 hausted with effort, weak with hunger, and tor- 
 mented with thirst, broken down by despair, and 
 sick with fond dreams of the home he will never 
 reach, he lays him down and dies. 
 
 Such has actually been the course of philosophic 
 thought. A succession of new efforts from new ideas 
 as starting-points have ended in a succession of 
 failures, each effort like a faint wave that curls and 
 breaks before it reaches the shore. 
 
 Thus the recognition of a personal and superin- 
 tending Deity, traceable doubtfully in Thales, and 
 distinctly taught by Anaxagoras, became again du- 
 bious in Archelaus. The affectionate morality and 
 piety of Pythagoras degenerated into the super- 
 stitious mysticism of the later Pythagoreans, and 
 his recognition of the immortality of the soul, and of 
 rewards and punishment after death, into a coarse 
 metempsychosis. The clear and lofty Theism of 
 Socrates, his recognition of virtue, and his per- 
 ception of the true dignity of human nature, passed 
 through Plato into the disputative scepticism of the 
 Academy. The emphatic protest of the Eleatic 
 School against a gross and materialistic polythe- 
 ism, and its distinct consciousness of the unity and 
 spiritual nature of God, became secularised in Par- 
 menides, and Atheistic in the sceptical sophistry 
 
190 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 of Zeno and the ascetic dualism of Empedocles. 
 The pleasure-loving school of Aristippus ended in 
 the sullen discontent of Hegesias, the death-per- 
 suader. The recognition of the inductive basis of 
 all human knowledge belonging to Euclid of Me- 
 gara, evaporated in the idle sophisms of Eubu- 
 lides and Diodoras, and the logical fallacies of 
 Stilpo. The idealistic philosophy of Plato, with its 
 strong resemblances to revealed doctrine on the 
 subject of God and the soul, and sin, and the 
 other life, died out in Polemo and Crates in one 
 direction, hi the sceptical uncertainty of Archesi- 
 laus in a second, and in the probabilities and lax 
 morality of Carneades in the third. The philo- 
 sophy of Aristotle, pure if cold, and elevating if 
 selfish, ended in the materialistic Atheism of Strato. 
 The rigid self-control of Antisthenes became an 
 extravagance in the severity of the Cynics and 
 the sullen pride of Diogenes. The natural virtue 
 of Zeno passed into the subtle negations of Chry- 
 sippus. The principle of Epicurus, that pleasure 
 was to be found in virtue, was turned by a play 
 of words into the principle which has made 
 Epicurean a name of reproach throughout the 
 world. The craving of the Alexandrian School 
 after union with God was developed into the im- 
 pious mysticism of Plotinus. Even the philosophy 
 of Locke was perverted into the materialism of 
 Hartley, Priestley, and Darwin, the sensationalism 
 of Condillac, the selfishness of Helvetius, the 
 fatalism of D'Holbach, and the naked Atheism of 
 
V] History of Speculation. 191 
 
 the French Encyclopaedists. Lastly, the idealism 
 of Descartes prepared the way for the blasphemies 
 of Schelling and Hegel [9]. 
 
 Thus throughout all human speculation the same 
 law has prevailed. Many great and noble ideas 
 have been thrown out, fragments of revealed truth, 
 or sparks of heavenly light, received, we know not 
 how, through the mercy of that God who has, 
 more or less, wrought in the loftier spirits of our 
 race as they lived and died. But however they 
 may have been acquired, two things are certain. 
 It is indisputable that in the minds of the founders 
 of philosophic schools they existed only dimly and 
 darkly, and were never framed into a complete 
 and coherent system. Equally certain is it that 
 as soon as men began to reason upon them the 
 fragments of truth themselves were refined away 
 and lost. None of them ever retained permanent 
 vitality. None of them exercised a controlling 
 influence over mankind. The one fact is the ex- 
 planation of the other. What is not able perma- 
 nently to live is not likely effectually to act. 
 The whole process has consisted of flashes of 
 light for a moment illumining the darkness, like 
 rays of divine sunlight shining from heaven, and 
 then gradually dying away amid the ever-deepen- 
 ing shadows of human ignorance and misery. 
 
 I appeal to philosophy itself, and call it as a 
 witness to the correctness of this statement. If 
 it were competent to achieve its objects, its re- 
 sults would exhibit something like uniformity and 
 
192 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 definiteness, or, at least, would approximate to- 
 wards them more and more as it advances. The 
 latest philosophy should present the largest amount 
 of truth, the crown of all its preceding triumphs. 
 Such a philosophy has indeed appeared, claiming 
 to supersede all previous forms of speculation, or, 
 to speak more correctly, to be the final result 
 and climax of all that has j^receded it. An admiring 
 disciple declares it to be the grandest, because the 
 truest, system philosophy has yet produced [10]. 
 The name sounds to the ear as if it would fulfil 
 the conditions of success, but the reality is very 
 different. Positivism derives its distinctive charac- 
 ter much more from what it denies than from what 
 it asserts. Consistently with its materialistic cha- 
 racter it formulates results and calls them laws. But 
 beyond the outside facts of the physical universe, 
 it discards all knowledge, and repudiates its very 
 possibility. In regard to the world of matter, it 
 professes only to know phenomena, and even these 
 not absolutely. " Their essential nature and their 
 ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are un- 
 known and inscrutable" [ 1 1]. It thus rejects with 
 contempt the entire philosophical framework of the 
 past, and brands it with folly. A more pregnant 
 acknowledgment of the utter failure of all human 
 speculations cannot be conceived than this act of 
 public suicide, as weary and sick at heart with use- 
 less searching it strips itself of all its arrogant 
 claims, and stands forth in its bare and naked 
 materialism. 
 
V] Positivism. 193 
 
 Positivism has done more than this. It has found 
 cause of satisfaction in its failure, as if to dis- 
 cover the fact were a triumph. It has reduced 
 the very process into a philosophy. The religious 
 recognition of the supernatural elevated by the 
 sentimental school of scepticism into the highest 
 religion, is regarded by Comte as the lowest and 
 barbaric stage of human thought. From this the 
 reason advances, as he considers it — retrogresses, 
 as the Christian believes — into speculation, and 
 rinding this vain and empty takes refuge in Posi- 
 tivism, and thus finds its highest climax in the 
 recognition and systematising of its own ignorance. 
 He distinguishes three stages of thought : the belief 
 in the supernatural, that is, the sentiment of religion, 
 is the first and lowest ; the process of frittering 
 away belief in the vain effort to explain the 
 causes of things, is the second ; and confessed igno- 
 rance is the third [12]. If we place on one side 
 the whole of revelation and its influence on the 
 course of human opinion, I believe this account 
 to be exactly true and to be supported by the 
 irrefragable evidence of the facts. The undoubted 
 course of unassisted human thought in its efforts 
 to understand and explain the mysteries of the 
 universe has consisted of a series of efforts and 
 a series of failures. 
 
 If a Christian had said all this, he would have 
 been charged with ignorance and prejudice. But 
 who shall doubt the truth of the description when 
 philosophy itself has drawn it 1 Speculative thought 
 
194 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 in this its latest development has surely dug its 
 own grave and written its own epitaph, and written 
 it, moreover, in inspired words : "Vanity of vanities, 
 all is vanity." In its complacent admiration of 
 the beauty of the monument, it forgets the cor- 
 ruption and death within, and how large a por- 
 tion of the mental history of man, how many 
 soaring ambitions, how many hopes and prospects 
 lie buried in that tomb. Often in the history of 
 the world has the heart of man borne unconscious 
 witness to its own disappointment and the utter 
 inadequacy of the creature to fill the affections 
 of an immortal nature ; but never since men first 
 began to think and feel have such a misery and 
 such a pride, such a ruin and such a complacency, 
 found utterance in a confession so complete or so 
 strange as this. 
 
 Thus on every side distinctions between specu- 
 lative philosophy and the dogmatic faith present 
 themselves to the notice. They differ in their 
 objects. Philosophy looks only to the intellect, and 
 does not even attempt to supply the practical 
 wants of the conscience, the will, and the affec- 
 tions. The faith, on the other hand, fixes itself at 
 the central springs of the whole complete man, and 
 throned in the will and the conscience, throws its 
 blessed beams over every part, reason, affection, 
 feeling, character, and conduct, diffusive and quick- 
 ening as the sun in the natural heavens. 
 
 They differ in their methods. Philosophy relies 
 upon deductions from ideas devoid of all external 
 
V] The Contrast. 195 
 
 evidence and speculatively conceived in the mind 
 itself. Its authority is self — the human fallible 
 self; and its conclusions are loose and indefinite 
 as the authority whence they are derived. The 
 faith, in its formal shape, consists of inductions 
 from Divine facts, generalised from the inspired 
 records by the process to which we are indebted 
 for all the marvellous triumphs of natural science 
 and art in modern times. The Divine facts are 
 themselves divinely given, and free therefore from 
 the fallibility attached to human observations even 
 at their best. The dogmatic doctrines as for- 
 mulated by the Church are no more than the 
 Scriptural truths in a technical statement. They 
 therefore rest on the same authority — that is on 
 the authority of God. Hence they are clear, de- 
 finite, positive, and unchangeable as their Author. 
 But philosophy and the dogmatic faith differ no 
 less widely in the course of their history. The life 
 of philosophy has ever been flickering and in- 
 constant, blazing up into flame here and there, 
 and then immediately dying away again. The 
 life of Christian dogma was steadily progressive 
 up to the Christian era. Then, under the special 
 inspiration of our Lord and His apostles, it broke 
 all at once into glory, rising to its zenith in a 
 levelation containing all things necessary for salva- 
 tion, and able to make the man of God " perfect, 
 throughly furnished unto all good works." From 
 that zenith it has never declined. No cloud has 
 permanently interrupted that light ; no progression 
 
 O 2 
 
100 Dogma and Speculation. [Lect. 
 
 of time or change has darkened its beams or ener- 
 vated its quickening powers. It shines like the 
 sun over a troubled sea. Schools of philosophy 
 have been no more than the sea waves rising 
 and falling again ; but the everlasting sunbeams 
 shine on and shine for ever, eternal and immutable 
 as God. 
 
 Lastly, they differ in their results. Philosophy 
 has done little for the world. It has not one 
 practical triumph to show. It has discovered no 
 new truth, it has inaugurated no new principle, it 
 has produced no new element of good. It cannot 
 point to one of life's many evils either removed 
 by its strength or alleviated by its influence. It 
 has achieved no triumph of civilisation, no trophy 
 of human happiness. Were the whole swept away 
 we should not lose any abiding or substantial 
 benefit. Were all else swept away and it left 
 alone, we should sink into absolute ignorance, and 
 should not possess one fixed truth to elevate human 
 nature by its dignity, or bless it by its beneficent 
 influence. 
 
 The dogmatic faith has given us Christian civilisa- 
 tion, with its national liberty, its pure morality, its 
 lofty benevolence, its energetic activity and enter- 
 prise. This is its lowest effect. It reveals all we 
 need to know ; answers every question relative to 
 ourselves and to the Unseen we need to ask ; plants 
 a new life within the soul itself; comforts every 
 distress, brightens every joy, makes life worth living, 
 and then transforms death into the threshold of 
 
V] The Contrast. 197 
 
 another and a higher state. All this it does 
 because it is dogmatic. Take away the dogma, 
 and you take away the Divine foundations, and 
 in their absence the grand superstructure totters, 
 shakes, and crumbles into ruin. 
 
LECTURE VI 
 
 CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILISATION 
 
 i Tim. iv. 8 
 
 Godliness is prof table unto all things, having promise of the 
 life that noiv is, and of that ivhich is to come. 
 
 _T ROM the barren solitudes of intellectual specu- 
 lation, the course of my argument passes back 
 into the busy working world and the conflicts 
 of its principles and interests. Neither in the 
 loose sentiment of religon, nor in the efforts of 
 the human soul to meet its own moral wants, 
 nor in the theories of philosophy, can be found 
 either the originating cause, or the formative prin- 
 ciple, or the influential rival of the dogmatic faith. 
 But another process of contrast and comparison 
 must be gone through. A fresh claimant starts up 
 in what is called Civilisation. 
 
 It is not easy to define what is meant by the 
 word, for it represents rather an aggregate of things 
 than any one single tiling. We denote by it the 
 habits of life, social, domestic, and intellectual, 
 which have grown out of the aggregation of man- 
 kind into communities. The tribes of the human 
 
Civilisation defined, 199 
 
 family, so far as they have maintained their nomad 
 state, have been found in a condition of barbarism 
 or savagism, rude in habits, ill-clothed, ill-sheltered, 
 ill-fed ; for the most part low in intellect, incapable 
 of either governing themselves or of being governed 
 by others ; the creatures of their own wild impulses, 
 and moved, like the beast, by natural passion and 
 affection alone. 
 
 This account of the matter is not without excep- 
 tions. There are savage tribes who live in settled 
 communities of a kind, and their savagism is attri- 
 butable to their isolation from the rest of mankind. 
 There are also communities isolated from contact 
 with their fellow-men for centuries, as in China 
 for instance, who can in no sense of the word 
 be called savages, however rude and barbarous 
 their state in some particulars may be. But it is 
 sufficient to say, in general, that as men have been 
 gathered into settled communities and brought into 
 free contact with themselves and others, a definite 
 and orderly change has taken place in their con- 
 dition. They have occupied themselves in the pur- 
 suits of settled industry, have built permanent cities, 
 have acquired property, have regulated the rela- 
 tion between themselves by fixed laws, have esta- 
 blished regular government, have acquired a taste for 
 luxury and enjoyment, and have cultivated the arts 
 subservient to the wealth, comfort, and prosperity 
 of man. The whole condition thus reached repre- 
 sents a very large aggregate of separate particulars 
 and separate influences. But as all the world over 
 
200 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 it has exhibited a certain unity in its progress, 
 and certain common features in its development, 
 we generalise the effects into one idea, and call 
 it civilisation [i]. 
 
 The exact relation existing between civilisation 
 and the Christian faith, and the precise questions 
 arising out of it, need to be accurately distinguished. 
 The broad controversy is represented by the ques- 
 tion relative to the priority of the two. Should 
 civilisation precede Christianity, and does it in point 
 of fact precede Christianity, or should Christianity 
 precede civilisation 1 But the argument must not 
 be exaggerated on either side. 
 
 Thus when it is urged that civilisation does and 
 must precede Christianity, it is not necessarily 
 intended to deny the value of a definite religion 
 or wholly to exclude its influence ; it is only meant 
 that it is of no use to teach the definite and dog- 
 matic doctrines of Christianity, till men have already 
 advanced to some considerable degree in the culti- 
 vation of the intellect and the arts and habits of 
 civilised life. The argument involves three supposi- 
 tious, each of them suggestive as it arises of some 
 further questions. 
 
 I In the first place, it involves the belief that 
 men in a rude state are mentally incapable of un- 
 derstanding the doctrines of the Christian religion, 
 and need the labours of the schoolmaster before they 
 are able to profit by the ministry of the preacher. 
 That the intellect is generally in a low state in 
 savage peoples, and that it is palpably incapable 
 
VI] The Intellect of Savagism. '201 
 
 of abstract reasoning, is certain ; but we must take 
 care that its defects are not exaggerated. The 
 condition of scattered peoples, such as the wretched 
 Bushmen or the ill-developed Australian, reaches 
 indeed to the lowest degradation conceivable in crea- 
 tures orginally gifted with intelligence. The aspect 
 of humanity among such tribes is most humiliating. 
 The intellect is almost lost, and the entire habits 
 more nearly resemble the irrational animal than the 
 rational man. But such a description is very far 
 indeed from being true of savage tribes accustomed 
 to congregate into communities, such as the North 
 American Indians and the various tribes inhabiting 
 the islands studded like gems on the bosom of 
 the sunny Pacific. There the intellect is found 
 possessed of great acuteness and sharpened into 
 considerable ability, while industrial art flourishes 
 in some directions, and has been found in the 
 past side by side with the atrocities of a revolting 
 cannibalism. Such tribes are by no means devoid 
 of intellectual activity. That they are unable to 
 understand intellectual refinements ; that they could 
 not appreciate, fur instance, the subtle definitions 
 of the Athanasian Creed, is most true. But if the 
 objection means no more than this, it is founded 
 upon a misapprehension. 
 
 I have shown in a previous lecture* that the 
 Creeds really contain no more truth than the simple 
 doctrines out of which they grew. The whole Atha- 
 nasian Creed in its substance is contained in the 
 doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. 
 
202 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 It by no means follows, therefore, that because the 
 savage cannot understand the theological definition, 
 he cannot understand the revealed truth which the 
 definition was invented to defend. Wherever the 
 common relationships of life are recognised, and 
 mutual affections cultivated, and the slightest sense 
 of law possessed, ideas must exist, and correspond- 
 ing language, generally sufficient to teach the grand 
 outlines of Christian dogma. The state of a con- 
 demned being, the act of saving one in danger, the 
 love of God in the forgiveness of an enemy, the 
 incarnation of the Deity, the protection and help 
 of an unseen Spirit, are all truths so germane to our 
 natural modes of thinking, speaking, and acting, as to 
 be easily understood. To this experience positively 
 testifies. The details of doctrine may be beyond 
 comprehension ; but the great simple truths of God s 
 love for sinners have ever been found to be 'within 
 it. The records of modern missions, as for instance 
 to New Zealand, Polynesia, and North America, 
 prove this beyond a doubt [2]. 
 
 Moieover, another consideration should also be 
 taken into account. The Gospel docs not consist of 
 the proclamation of a bare letter, but of a message 
 accompanied by a quickening Spirit. No believer in 
 the Person and office and work of God the Holy 
 Ghost, and in the promise of God that His word shall 
 not return unto Him void, can doubt the sufficiency 
 of this Divine agent, alike to open the portals of the 
 understanding, and to break down the moral barriers 
 of the will for the entrance of God's truth. What is 
 
VI] Influence of Circumstances. 203 
 
 impossible with man is possible with God. To leave 
 out this Divine agency is to omit a vital condition of 
 the case. We must not strip half the truth away 
 and then declare the remainder to be incredible and 
 impracticable. This is done every day, and what 
 wonder if the result be wrong, when the process is 
 so manifestly unjust. 
 
 II The plea urged for the priority of civilisa- 
 tion over Christianity in the progress of mankind, 
 further involves the supposition that the spheres of 
 religious truth and of temporal wellbeing are not 
 only distinct but separate, so that the one may be 
 cultivated without the other. It is the common 
 mistake of dividing a man into two selves, instead 
 of regarding him as one indivisible being, and all his 
 various faculties and powers as branches on one 
 stem, streams out of one fountain. The relation 
 between a man's inward self and his outward life 
 is intimate in the highest degree. It is impossible 
 to modify either one of the two without affect- 
 ing also the other, so close is their mutual de- 
 pendence. It is not however a dependence of 
 equality. None will call into question the supe- 
 riority of the inward over the outward, not alone 
 in the essential characteristics of the two, but in 
 the predominant and ruling influence of reason and 
 conscience over the outward life. The outward is 
 but the reflection of the inward. The true order 
 of progress is therefore not by acting on the inward 
 from the outside, but by acting on the outward 
 from the inside. Such as the man himself is, such 
 
^04 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 will his condition permanently be. True civilisa- 
 tion must not only include the inward self, but 
 must begin there. For till this is raised, all efforts 
 to elevate the outward condition will necessarily and 
 inevitably fail. 
 
 A curious illustration of this is afforded by the 
 known tendencies of savages brought for a while 
 under civilising influences, to relapse into the habits 
 of their barbarism directly they are left to them- 
 selves. This is notoriously the case with the 
 African and the Australian. Let the force of the 
 superior will be removed, and in the absence of its 
 correcting influence the man returns to his savage 
 instincts, flings away the clothing and habits of 
 civilisation, and resumes the wild, wandering, and 
 shiftless habits of his barbarism. The reason is 
 palpable. The civilisation acquired is only skin 
 deep, or not even that. It is but a thin varnish 
 thrown over the untamed instincts of the savage. 
 The man himself has remained unaltered, and the 
 remission of the moral influence leaves him free to 
 show himself in his own natural character. 
 
 On the other hand, there are many instances of 
 true civilisation being accomplished among savages 
 — a true civilisation, although an imperfect one. For 
 civilisation is not the growth of one generation, but 
 of many. Nor can men be expected to lose all the 
 traces of primitive savagism, till the taint has died 
 away in a geneiation of parents and is no longer 
 imbibed by the infant at the breast. But while 
 this is true, it is also true that ;i real civilisation 
 
VI] The Outward and the Inward. 205 
 
 has been wrought both in individuals and com- 
 munities. The existence of a native African bishop 
 bearing rule within the pale of the Church of 
 England is an instance of the one, and the settled 
 communities of Indians established within the bor- 
 ders of the United States and cultivating the habits 
 of European life afford an instance of the other [3]. 
 
 It follows from the evidence at both extremes 
 that civilisation must be primarily and essentially 
 inward. Till it is seated in the character, it can 
 exercise no abiding influence over the life. No 
 amount of external luxury, could the savage be in- 
 troduced at a step into the refined and voluptuous 
 habits of old civilisations, would be of the least 
 effect on the man. But change the man, and in 
 that degree you give him not only new habits, but 
 new principles and powers. 
 
 This being so, where are we to find the trans- 
 forming power to revolutionise the man 1 It is 
 not in himself, and external influences are too 
 superficial. The moral leverage to upset the old 
 self and bring in the new can be supplied by 
 religion alone. In his untaught condition, when 
 his belief is rather a superstition than a religion, 
 this power is still found competent to dominate 
 over his passionate influences. Let religion be pre- 
 sented, not in its human corruption, but in the per- 
 fection and purity of the Gospel, in truths relative to 
 man himself and God equally simple and sublime, — 
 let it be presented, not as a dead human letter, but 
 as a message from God, accompanied by the living 
 
206 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 Spirit of grace and truth, — and then success is 
 possible. It is true of the heathenism of savagery 
 as well as of the heathenism of civilisation, that 
 " the entrance of Thy Word giveth light, it giveth 
 understanding to the simple." 
 
 The results of modern experience confirm this 
 in the highest degree. To those who find their 
 life-work in endeavouring to improve the condition 
 of our fellow -men at home among the crowded 
 haunts of London and other great centres of our 
 population, the two lessons — that you must act 
 upon the man, and that religion alone supplies 
 the effective mode of doing it, are the fixed 
 principles of social science. The most lavish 
 generosity in the provision of all outward com- 
 forts, if it stand alone, is as great a waste of 
 effort as it would be to fling a bag of gold into 
 the midst of the sea. While the moral self re- 
 mains unchanged, the man will ever gravitate back 
 into his normal misery, just as a dead body lifted 
 by a strong hand to the surface of the water will 
 sink into the depths again as soon as it is left 
 to itself. But let the man be changed, and he 
 rises by the buoyancy of his own self-respect. Let 
 the drunkard become sober, the profligate chaste, the 
 liar truthful, the fraudulent honest, and there is no 
 longer occasion for anxiety about the temporal cir- 
 cumstances of his life. The contingencies of sickness 
 and undeserved misfortune still remain to exercise 
 Christian charity, and by the bonds of a common 
 sympathy draw man to man ; but where this pressure 
 
VI] The Outward and the Inward. 207 
 
 is absent, the elevation of the man carries with 
 it by an invariable necessity the elevation of his 
 circumstances. This is the true remedy for human 
 poverty, for it reaches to the deepest spring of 
 earthly prosperity and joy. 
 
 Nor is the witness of experience less decisive 
 regarding the instrument of this elevating process. 
 I do not deny that education and secular morality 
 can do something, perhaps can do much. But 
 religion, working by education, and carrying mo- 
 rality in its train, is the true instrument, far 
 exceeding in its power all others and far more 
 permanent in its action. To the force of secular 
 motives it adds the sanctions of religious duty 
 and the hopes and fears of another life. Religion 
 has all that secularism has, but has likewise 
 mightier influences of its own, powerful in exact 
 proportion as they are taught with definiteness 
 and authority and pressed home into actual contact 
 with the reason, the conscience, and the affections. 
 Experience in this matter does but place its seal 
 on the Divine promise, for even the warnings of 
 the Divine lips grow into the glory of promises : 
 " Bodily exercise profiteth little, but godliness is 
 profitable for all things, having promise of the 
 life that now is, and of that which is to come." 
 
 Ill But another assumption is involved in the 
 priority of influence claimed for civilisation over 
 Christianity. The claim implies that in proportion 
 to the increase of temporal comfort will be the sensi- 
 bility to religious influence. Amid the stern struggle 
 
208 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 with poverty and the bitterness of griping want, 
 men have neither inclination nor time for religions 
 subjects. Take away the external pressure, it is 
 nrged, and then religion will have opportunity and 
 sphere. That poverty does frequently tend to make 
 men indisposed to religious influences, and in its 
 extreme form brings them into a social state of 
 wretchedness, not included in the Divine purposes 
 nor recognised in His Word, may most readily be 
 admitted. The duty of a loving sympathy with 
 every form of distress, and a generous liberality 
 in relieving it, will be accepted by none so cor- 
 dially as by those who set the example of their 
 blessed Master continually before their eyes. But 
 if sorrow sometimes hardens and exasperates, it 
 sometimes softens and breaks down opposition. 
 The effect of external circumstances of prosperity 
 or adversity upon inward character depends on 
 such complicated conditions and such personal 
 peculiarities, that no human knowledge can deter- 
 mine it, much less classify it, so as to say that 
 one outward condition will have one definite moral 
 effect, and another condition a different one. The 
 same precise circumstances may produce totally dis- 
 similar results in different men. 
 
 Nor must it be forgotten that the enjoyments 
 of luxury and the competitions of wealth have 
 their religious dangers as well as the pressure of 
 w.int and the struggle for daily bread. No be- 
 liever in the inspiration of the Scriptures can call 
 this into question ; for we have the direct words 
 
VI] Influence of Circumstances. 209 
 
 of our Lord for it : " How hardly shall they that 
 have riches enter into the kingdom of God a ." Daily 
 experience ratifies their truth. The absorbing oc- 
 cupations of the man of business, the capitalist, 
 and the politician, and the peculiar temptations 
 incident to their lives, are proverbial. In truth, 
 there is no possible condition of human things 
 without its moral dangers. The seat of the evil is 
 in man himself, and he carries it about with him. 
 
 The whole objection is founded on a forgetful- 
 ness of this truth. The Christian dogma of the 
 corruption of the human heart is too plainly sup- 
 ported by the lessons of daily experience to be 
 doubted as a fact, even where it is rejected as a 
 doctrine. The purpose of all law and police is 
 directed against this tendency to wrong-doing ; and 
 the lamentations of the rationalist acknowledge it 
 as fully as the doctrines of the Christian. To us 
 who believe with the Church of England that 
 " man is very far gone from original righteousness, 
 and • is of his own nature inclined to evil," the 
 dogma explains the fact. The essence of sin is the 
 alienation of the will from God. The human soul 
 no longer moves harmoniously with the Divine 
 Soul, and as the motions of the Divine Soul are 
 ever good, the contradictory motions of the human 
 soul must be evil. 
 
 This evil taint cannot be limited or locked up 
 in one corner of the man. It pervades the whole 
 of him. It does not act, therefore, in the strictly 
 a Luke xviii. 24. 
 
 r 
 
210 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 religious sphere alone, but in the social sphere like- 
 wise. It thus affects the entire character, prin- 
 ciples, and tastes. What are all the bad deeds of 
 the world, its acts of treachery, cruelty, oppression, 
 and violence — from the bitter word that stings like 
 a serpent, to the dastard blow that destroys a life — 
 but branches on this stem, waters from this spring. 
 Divine grace alone can change the tendency. " If 
 any man be in Christ," then, and then alone, 
 "he is a new creature ; old things are passed away, 
 behold, all things are become new b ." But till this is 
 done, the tainted nature retains its native tendencies 
 under every variety of circumstance. Outward condi- 
 tions may modify and direct its development, but they 
 do not detract from its activity and force. This is 
 the spring of human repugnance to religion, and it 
 may act as fatally amid the luxuries of civilisation 
 as amid the miseries of savagism. 
 
 But if these cautions are necessary to enable us 
 fairly to estimate the claim of priority of influence 
 for civilisation over Christianity, corresponding cau- 
 tions are equally necessary in estimating the oppo- 
 site proposition. Those who claim the first place for 
 Christianity by no means either exclude or depre- 
 ciate civilisation. In their opinion, Christianity is 
 the only efficient instrument of civilisation, and the 
 one in its highest form cannot exist without the 
 other. The work must begin with the man. Effect 
 a change there, and you accomplish it everywhere. 
 A higher standard of morals, a development of the 
 
 h 2 Cor. v. 17. 
 
VI] The Case of Ch > ■ is I it 1 1 1 ity. 211 
 
 social and domestic affections, freedom of thought 
 and vigour of mind, habits of industry, honesty, and 
 sobriety, and under their shelter the arts subservient 
 to human convenience and enjoyment, will all fol- 
 low. Cleanse the fountain-head and the waters 
 will share the purification throughout every drop 
 and rill. 
 
 On this system all the ordinary motives for self- 
 improvement and progress supplied by the stimulus 
 of an enlightened self-love exist to the utmost. Not 
 one of them is weakened. The motives of self-pre- 
 servation, and the yet nobler motives furnished 
 by the domestic affections and the relative duties 
 springing out of them ; nay the constitutional dis- 
 positions and tastes, either for politics, or science, 
 or commerce, or war, are all there. The native 
 energy of character, capacity of mind, and force 
 of will constituting the heroes of the world, still 
 act under the shadow of religious dogma as else- 
 where. The dogma neither exhausts the fertility 
 of the soil nor withers the free growth of the 
 plant. 
 
 The objection that the prospect of another world 
 unfits a man for the struggles and competitions of 
 the present, rests entirely upon a misapprehension. 
 Certainly no such tendency is either inculcated or 
 permitted in the documents of the faith. If a higher 
 state hereafter be presented as the glorious object of 
 hope, the duties of the present life are presented with 
 equal vividness and force as the road of entrance 
 into it, — the course to be run and the elements of the 
 
 P 2 
 
212 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 account to be rendered at the judgment-day. If 
 any tendency to unfit a man for practical life be 
 seen in individual cases, it derives no sanction from 
 the faith, but arises wholly and solely from per- 
 sonal defects. Its existence is no jewel in the 
 Christian crown, but a shadow detracting from its 
 brightness. 
 
 Nor is there any more truth in the assertion 
 that the heavenly citizenship weakens the spring 
 of patriotism. However plausible in theory, it is 
 disproved by fact. Who can realise the august 
 figure of our Master weeping over Jerusalem and 
 question His patriotism \ The deepening shadows 
 of national ruin may not wholly exhaust the sources 
 of His tears or explain those profounder sympathies 
 which drew them from the eyes of the God Incar- 
 nate; but they constituted a part of them. They 
 concurred with the deeper emotions of the Saviour 
 of the world, and gave pathos to His words. If His 
 prescient eye looked deeper and saw further — deeper 
 because it reached from the temporal to the spiritual, 
 further because it stretched beyond the perishing 
 city to a perishing world, — His patriotism only 
 caught from this a more touching tenderness and a 
 sublimer depth. In consistency with this example of 
 our Master many of the purest -hearted and highest- 
 minded patriots in the world have been disciples of 
 the Crucified and heirs of the city that hath foun- 
 dations, whose builder and maker is God. Who 
 shall count their number and marshall their ranks, 
 from the heroic Maccabees to the gallant men 
 
VI] The Case of Christianity. 213 
 
 who fought and fell amid the sultry heats of 
 India or in the trenches of the Crimea \ 
 
 Christianity, therefore, does not weaken the 
 natural virtues or the motives of temporal in- 
 terest ; it only strengthens and enlarges them by 
 the concurrent action of a religious influence. It 
 elevates them from feelings into principles, and 
 from the uncertainty of a selfish motive into the 
 solemnity of a bounden duty. It takes up the 
 lower motive into itself, and at once ratifies and 
 consecrates it by a Divine and perpetual sanction. 
 Christianity thus enlarges the area of motive, and 
 widens it to the whole nature of man. In its 
 absence civilisation can only appeal to interest and 
 self-love. But on this ground it is open to a retort 
 apparently unanswerable. A man may reply : ' I 
 prefer my barbarism to your civilisation. It suits 
 my taste better, and on a deliberate calculation of 
 gain and loss, I believe that I shall secure a larger 
 amount of pleasure and enjoyment by a life of 
 wandering idleness, and freedom from all restraint, 
 than I shall by treading all my clays the dull 
 routine of respectable industry and order.' No 
 effective answer can be given to such a reply. If 
 you tell him that the moral and mental pleasures 
 he loses belong to a higher sphere and are better 
 worth having beyond all comparison than the bodily 
 sensations, he only retorts that he does not think 
 so. If you talk to him about the dignity of his 
 nature, he tells you that he does not care for 
 it. As a question of merely human philosophy, he 
 
214 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 may not be far wrong ; for we are creatures of 
 habit, and many a sceptical school has been unable 
 to find any firmer basis for morals than the in- 
 stincts of nature, the jus natures of Spinosa. If 
 in despair you urge that he owes it to his fellow- 
 men to sacrifice Ins own inclination to the good 
 of the race, you only fall back on a plea, proved 
 by experience to be as powerless against the active 
 impulses of passion as a barrier of straw against 
 the rush of a swollen river. Thus the human 
 motive fails, simply because it does not appeal to 
 the entire nature of man. But Christianity brings 
 another and a mightier force. The dogmas of our 
 created dejjendence, our responsibility, and of the 
 resurrection, judgment, heaven and hell, at once en- 
 lighten conscience and abash passion by the majesty 
 of God and the tremendous issues of an eternity. 
 
 Lastly, in the act of enlarging the area of mo- 
 tive, Christianity increases likewise the acting force 
 within the soul. The human motive can bring 
 no more than a human influence. It employs 
 one part of the soul to control another part. It 
 thus does no more than divide self against self, 
 and initiate a doubtful conflict where the slightest 
 circumstances may press down the balance in 
 either direction, and turn the fortunes of the 
 dubious battle we know not how. But Divine 
 truth brings with it the promise of a Divine 
 Spirit, working in and through the human under- 
 standing, conscience, and affections, and investing 
 them with supernatural strength. 
 
VI] The Case of Christianity. 215 
 
 The sceptic cannot deny this. If he rejects the 
 dogma of the operations of God the Holy Ghost, 
 and considers it to be no more than the effect of 
 fanaticism, he must yet acknowledge it to be a 
 fanaticism of singular power. If the belief be a 
 belief alone, without any objective reality in the facts 
 of the spiritual world, yet the belief may turn the 
 victory, just as hi ancient times the superstitious 
 confidence of some struggling army in the assist- 
 ance of an angelic warrior has turned many a 
 doubtful battle into a glorious victory. The 
 dogma brings a moral advantage, even if it be 
 untrue. But if it be true, as we believe, it sup- 
 plements human effort with a superhuman energy. 
 Civilisation becomes the result of two great fac- 
 tors, the human agency and the Divine. God 
 and man move on together towards a common 
 goal. The wills of the two are concurrent circles; 
 man the secondary instrument, God the efficient 
 agent, and a future empire of righteousness and 
 peace, such as the world never yet has seen, the 
 magnificent and everlasting issue. 
 
 Such are the two conflicting opinions contend- 
 ing for the mastery. The one places civilisation 
 first in order and influence, and would bring in 
 Christianity to supplement a work already done; 
 the other places Christianity first in order and 
 influence, believing it to be the sole efficient 
 cause of any true and permanent civilisation. 
 Both parties admit the value of Christianity and 
 of civilisation, but differ upon their relative place 
 
216 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 and influence. To settle the question we must 
 make appeal to the experience of the past. The 
 history of the world presents us with two civili- 
 sations, the heathen and the Christian ; the one 
 rested on reason, the other rests on revelation ; the 
 one was sceptical, the other is dogmatic ; the one in 
 its origin and instruments was human, the other we 
 believe to be Divine. We must examine and com- 
 pare the two. The differences are as palpable as 
 they are significant. 
 
 The heathen civilisation presents itself first. This 
 is confessed to be undogmatic, because it was not 
 based on a positive revelation, and in its absence 
 men could discover no positive system of truth for 
 adoption. The state of mind produced by the long 
 series of philosophies which in successive waves had 
 swept over the world of thought, was an almost 
 absolute and universal scepticism. In this con- 
 dition Christianity found mankind. That it was no 
 rebound from excessive authority, no rebellion of 
 the free intellect against the bonds of dogmatic re- 
 straint, is certain from the methods of ancient phi- 
 losophic teaching. It is impossible, for instance, to 
 imagine anything more unlike dogma than the 
 entire structure of the Platonic Dialogues, alike as 
 regards the opinions advanced and the method of 
 advancing them. Free enquiry had the most un- 
 limited scope, and the death of Socrates is no 
 exception. His condemnation was due less to 
 the freedom of his enquiry than to their results 
 upon the popular religion and his own unbending 
 
VI] Heathen Civilisation. 217 
 
 independence in maintaining them [4]. Not only 
 was thought free, but in its freedom it ran in 
 exactly the direction of the free thought of our 
 own day. The modern opponents of dogma only 
 re-echo the thought, and almost the language, 
 of their ancient prototypes. The assertion of an 
 universal and primitive religion surviving un- 
 changed beneath the variations of doctrine ; the 
 sufficiency of the human reason ; the necessity 
 for free enquiry to correct what was deemed 
 the superstitious belief in the supernatural ; the 
 eternity of matter ; the constancy of law and order 
 superseding the possibility of Providence or reve- 
 lation — the koivo). tokoi of modern rationalism, — 
 were all of them known and urged by the ancients. 
 Free thought had every possible advantage, and 
 the civilisation amid which it lived and flourished 
 should accordingly, if its claims were true, have 
 contained the abiding elements of human happi- 
 ness and progress. The stern evidence of the facts 
 compels a very different conclusion. 
 
 It is exceedingly difficult to realise the civilisa- 
 tion of the ancients. The difficulty does not arise 
 from the difference of their climate to ours, and 
 the corresponding difference of their manners and 
 habits; for it is not impossible to make the neces- 
 sary allowances for these conditions. It would be 
 palpably absurd to measure the houses and domestic 
 arrangements, or the meals and dress of the burning 
 East, of sunny Greece, and of imperial Rome, by the 
 standard of Western Europe in our own times. In 
 
218 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 these particulars the ancients followed the conditions 
 of country and climate at least as sensibly, perhaps 
 more so, than we do ourselves. But the difficulty 
 arises from the almost total absence in the ancient 
 civilisation of that moral element which constitutes 
 the very heart and life of the modern. 
 
 The absence was entirely natural, when morals 
 were a theory of philosophy and not a solemn obliga- 
 tion of conscience ; when the popular mythology was 
 an exaggerated caricature of human nature in its 
 vices and its sorrows ; and when actions, esteemed 
 among ourselves too detestable to be named, consti- 
 tuted part of the services of religion. The philo- 
 sophic few doubtless looked down with contempt on 
 the folly of the popular belief; but there is no evidence 
 that they detested the wickedness of the popular 
 practice. It is certain that the most illustrious men 
 of heathendom considered the deepest crimes in the 
 Christian code to be venial and excusable, if they 
 were not even laudable. Plato's Dialogues contain 
 indisputable evidence on this subject [5]. 
 
 The absence of the moral element was therefore 
 no more than natural ; and yet it separates the two 
 civilisations by such an abyss of difference that 
 imagination can hardly cross it. The result is to 
 lower our ordinary estimate of the past below the 
 truth. A state of society where the idea of moral 
 purity was unknown; where the relation between the 
 sexes had no religious safeguards; where women 
 were so degraded that friendship scarcely existed 
 except between men ; where domestic virtue was 
 
VI] Heathen Civilisation. 219 
 
 allied with ignorance, and intellect with such 
 splendid infamy as to fill the month of mankind; 
 where any bond of common humanity was unknown, 
 human life frightfully cheap, and human suffering 
 regarded with such dreadful indifference as to supply 
 sport to the gentle and refined, — such a state of 
 society differs so wholly from what we are accus- 
 tomed to, that we cannot realise it. The result is 
 that, finding the ancients so immeasurably below 
 us in the moral element, we are apt to think them 
 equally below us in all others. Thus we fail to 
 appreciate their civilisation, and are apt to consider 
 it much less complete and wonderful than it was. 
 This is a great mistake. 
 
 It is certain that if we put morals on one side, 
 with all the direct and indirect influences associated 
 with them, ancient civilisation was a splendid 
 achievement. In external circumstances it reached 
 a height of refinement, or rather sank into a depth 
 of selfish luxury, unknown among ourselves. If on 
 one side their domestic habits appear rude to our 
 notions of comfort, the exquisite and genial tem- 
 perature in which they lived must be taken into 
 account. It is said that climates exist even in 
 our own day so perfectly tempered as to make 
 the very act of living a delight, and to produce a 
 physical buoyancy and cheerfulness that give an 
 appearance of amiability even to the repulsive fea- 
 tures of savage life [6]. In judging of the ancient 
 houses and dress, this must ever be remembered. 
 That what we think rude and comfortless, was not 
 
220 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 the necessity of ignorance, is certain from the lavish 
 voluptuousness displayed in other directions. The 
 elaborate entertainments, the costly furniture, the ex- 
 quisite fabrics used for dress by the opulent, and the 
 excessive luxury of ancient civilisation in its latest 
 form are made known to us by Juvenal and others [7]. 
 In industrial arts the ancients had attained consider- 
 able skill. In statuary and architecture modern 
 genius vainly toils to follow in their track. Their 
 idea of physical beauty reached the highest per- 
 fection. In the pure sciences they attained, con- 
 sidering the period of the world, a wonderfully high 
 standard. Their philosophic thinking and writing 
 exhibit the utmost subtlety of genius and force of 
 thought. In every branch of human knowledge 
 they have left us models for our imitation. They 
 had large and generous views of human politics and 
 laws. All these triumphs indicate a very high pro- 
 gress and an advanced civilisation. In every par- 
 ticular, with the one sole exception of the moral 
 element, they carried human advancement to its 
 highest point. For lustre of genius, brilliancy of 
 wit, fertility of imagination, depth of thought, 
 artistic taste and skill, aesthetic sensibilities, and 
 keen relish for pleasure, the latest period of heathen 
 civilisation has never yet been excelled; perhajis 
 never equalled. 
 
 Yet splendid as was the achievement, the absence 
 of the moral element was fatal. Ancient society 
 perished by its own inherent rottenness. Its enor- 
 mous all-pervading immorality sapped the foundation 
 
VI] Heathen Civilisation. 221 
 
 of virtue. The social virtues perished first and 
 the political followed. The mass was corrupt to 
 the very core. Its strength perished by the mere 
 exhaustion of its own vices. The ancient Roman 
 empire, in which heathen civilisation culminated, 
 became like a tree hollow and rotten within, and 
 scarce maintaining its appearance of solidity, till the 
 breath of the first tempest beat it to the ground. 
 National vigour and patriotism perished with na- 
 tional virtue ; and when the barbarian tempest 
 overthrew it, it was because the manly virtues 
 survived in barbarism which had died out in civi- 
 lisation. The whole previous history of the world 
 had repeated the same lesson. Assyrian, Babylonian, 
 Persian, Greek, all perished from within. Progressive 
 civilisation was retrogressive virtue ; and civilised 
 effeminacy fell before vigorous barbarism. Instead 
 of being the stimulant and conservator of virtue, 
 heathen civilisation was its enemy and destroyer. 
 
 But if we ask why amid all this blaze of in- 
 tellectual knowledge morality should have died 
 out of heathen practice, the answer must, be, be- 
 cause there was no dogmatic basis for morality, no 
 absolute authority to enforce it. Human law re- 
 flected the debased standard of the law-makers, and 
 no Divine law was known to supply its defects. 
 That this is the explanation is proved by two facts 
 which have been less noticed than they deserve to 
 be. The one is that the more ancient periods of 
 heathendom were more virtuous than the later, and 
 exhibit a higher moral standard [8] ; and the other is 
 
222 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 that they were likewise more dogmatic [9]. For the 
 one fact I refer to the comparatively lofty standard 
 of the .Iliad and Odyssey, where the conception 
 of female virtue is far higher and purer than the 
 standard known to have existed in later times. 
 For the other I refer to the ancient Greek trage- 
 dians, where strong gleams of religious truth — what 
 I may call Christian truth — are to be found. Such 
 are, for instance, the intimations of a moral govern- 
 ment over the world, a future state of rewards and 
 punishments, and even of a bodily resurrection. 
 But all these died out, or rather philosophy argued 
 them out of the deep-seated instincts of the human 
 soul. Thus we see that in ancient civilisation re- 
 ligious dogma and moral virtue existed together, 
 and subsequently perished together. 
 
 We now pass from the sceptical to the dogmatic, 
 from the heathen to the Christian civilisation. 
 Great and specific differences meet us here, and are 
 referable to equally specific causes. They are not 
 totally unlike. It might be said that there is on 
 a superficial view great moral resemblance between 
 them. That the Christian civilisation has not ex- 
 pelled vice or engendered universal purity of morals 
 is most true. An enormous amount of moral evil 
 festers at the heart of society. Here, as in all 
 other old civilisations without exception, a class 
 has been found to gravitate to the bottom and 
 fall beneath the recognised level, at whatever 
 standard that may be fixed. But even here the re- 
 semblance is superficial and the difference essential. 
 
VI] Christian Civilisation. 223 
 
 There can be no fair comparison between the moral 
 features of our own and of ancient civilisation, 
 either as to the amount of moral evil or as to 
 its forms of development. The case does not rest, 
 however, on a mere calculation of quantity, for 
 that may be a matter of opinion. But a specific 
 difference has to be taken into account, and it is 
 this. In the ancient civilisation indulgence in 
 illicit pleasure was in accordance with the pro- 
 fessed code of society. It was both advocated in 
 theory and openly permitted in practice. It bore 
 with it no public stigma of reproach ; was not 
 done in secret, but was professed before the eyes 
 of the world. It was not only defended but re- 
 commended in the writings of philosophy on one 
 side, and actually enshrined in the service of re- 
 ligion upon the other [10]. The immorality was 
 therefore the consistent result of the public senti- 
 ment of society and a recognised outgoing of its 
 life. Or, to state the matter yet more accurately, 
 both the principles and the practice of mankind 
 at that period had the same human origin, and 
 therefore bore the same human character. Nature 
 is a corrupt thing, and therefore its principles and 
 practices, unpurified by any higher influence, were 
 corrupt also. So completely is this the case that 
 we can scarcely blame the individual men, from 
 a human point of view. They did but reflect 
 the character and tendencies of their age. 
 
 But with the Christian civilisation it is very 
 different. The great evils existing among us are 
 
224 Christian it if and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 not results of a false principle, but of the viola- 
 tions of a true. They contradict not only the posi- 
 tive laws of the Christian code, but the moral 
 rules adopted by society from that code, and what 
 are considered to be the very decencies of our 
 civilisation. They are, therefore, not the fault of 
 the system, but of the men who violate it. And if 
 it be asked how it is that Christianity is powerless 
 to redress so great an evil, the answer is at hand, 
 stated in the documents of Christianity itself, and 
 with equal distinctness reflected in the facts of com- 
 mon experience. It is furnished by the distinction 
 between a visible and an invisible church, a national 
 and an individual religion. Beneath the shadow of 
 a national faith there exist thousands and tens of 
 thousands who do not profess to be religious men, 
 or actuated by religious motives. To judge rightly 
 of Christian morality we must put these on one 
 side, and confine attention to the more exclusive 
 circle of individual profession. I do not deny 
 that even here grievous inconsistencies are to be 
 found. The depravity of our nature breaks out 
 now and then into open and disgraceful vice. With 
 the warning instances of the ancient saints before 
 us, not only in such a case as the incestuous 
 persons at Corinth, but in the case of sainted 
 David himself, how can we wonder that gross 
 wickedness should still be found lurking among 
 professing Christians in our own day. Yet these 
 are but spots upon the lustre of the sun. Not- 
 withstanding them the lofty morality of professing 
 
VI] Christian Civilisation. 225 
 
 Christians, as a body, may challenge examination. 
 It exhibits a moral purity, a growth of the social 
 and domestic virtues, an activity of love and 
 generous benevolence, to which nothing approach- 
 ing to a parallel can be found in the previous 
 history of mankind. The existence of flaws and 
 defects only supplies another proof of the inspired 
 accuracy of Scripture. For the Word of God 
 declares loudly that such would be the case in 
 the Church militant. Nay, it goes further, and 
 begins with this case that series of doctrines which 
 explain the perplexing phenomena of human nature. 
 It traces the fact back to a dogma — the dogma 
 of the corruption of the human heart. How could 
 the facts be otherwise, if, as the Church of 
 England declares in her ninth Article, " Original 
 sin .... is the fault and corruption of the 
 nature of every man, that naturally is ingendered 
 of the offspring of Adam ; whereby man is very 
 far gone from original righteousness, and is of 
 his own nature inclined to evil. . . . And this 
 infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that 
 are regenerated." 
 
 Passing on to a further examination of Christian 
 civilisation, its greater length of life demands atten- 
 tion. Ancient civilisation was interrupted by a 
 series of catastrophes. It was fixed in definite 
 centres of empire, and was involved in the fall of 
 those empires. It took, indeed, a new start from 
 their ruins, deriving from the founders of each new 
 empire a fresh infusion of the manly virtues, and 
 
 Q 
 
226 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 thus perpetuating itself anew. But the internal 
 decay of these centres of empire and their fall by 
 the mere weight of their own moral corruption, evi- 
 denced the inherent weakness of that civilisation. 
 It ever grew exhausted towards the centre, and 
 was replenished by the inroad of barbaric vigour 
 from the outside. But in the Christian civilisation 
 these conditions are changed. Modern kingdoms 
 have already survived for periods enormously greater 
 than the lifetime of ancient empires. Nor do they 
 as yet show any signs of internal decay. A poison 
 may lurk within the body politic, and throw itself 
 to the surface like a healthy effect of nature in a 
 diseased body. But without, and in comparison 
 with the less civilised portions of the world, they 
 show no diminution of strength. So far from the 
 barbarism outside showing any tendency to break in 
 upon the settled civilisation within, the civilised 
 empires are ever advancing upon the barbaric, and 
 bringing, by little and little, the utmost parts of the 
 earth into subjection. They maintain their unques- 
 tioned superiority not only in arts, but in arms ; in 
 energy and enterprise, and force of will, and the power 
 to govern. The condition which universally obtained 
 under heathen civilisation is exactly reversed in 
 the Christian. Then, as men became polished they 
 became effeminate; now, as they are Christianised 
 they exhibit more illustriously every heroic virtue. 
 Their civilisation was the source of weakness; ours 
 is the source of strength [i i]. 
 
 This effect is itself but the result of a dogmatic 
 
VI] Christian Characteristics. 227 
 
 truth. Embedded in Scripture stands forth to 
 light the revealed promise that the Gospel shall 
 be preached unto all nations, and the earth become 
 full of the knowledge of the glory of the Lord 
 as the waters cover the sea. What is the re- 
 versal of the old conditions of the world, and this 
 ceaseless advance of Christian civilisation over the 
 length and breadth of the world, but the visible 
 realisation of the infallible promise % 
 
 But further, this energy and strength of modern 
 civilisation can be referred to certain specific cha- 
 racteristics distinguishing it from every other 
 development of civilisation previously existing. 
 And what is more, each one of these character- 
 istics can be referred to a dogmatic truth by a 
 connection so close and necessaiy, that, if the dogma 
 be true, these characteristics could not fail to exist. 
 The dogma explains the fact ; and the fact in 
 return verifies and authenticates the dogma. 
 
 I First in the list is the importance placed in 
 the Christian civilisation upon the individual man. 
 Ancient heathenism and modern rationalism alike 
 complain of this, and place their hopes on the 
 great whole of humankind, and not on its individual 
 units. Yet security to person and personal rights 
 must be admitted to be the first condition of 
 civilised progress. With Christian society this re- 
 gard to the individual is the result not of one 
 dogma but of many. It is in part the reflection 
 of the Divine personality. The one man supplies 
 the starting-point of our conceptions of the one 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 God. In part it arises from the dogma of the 
 immortality of the soul. Each man, whatever 
 may be his station, position, condition, becomes of 
 infinite value because he is a man ; and, as a man, 
 carries within his breast an immortal self of price- 
 less value, wide capacities, and everlasting life. 
 Hence flow individual responsibility, individual sin, 
 individual faith with all its fruits, individual sal- 
 vation. Each one is the object of a redeeming 
 Saviour's atonement, and may be the subject of a 
 sanctifying Spirit's work. Each one is dealt with 
 by a special Providence here ; each one will have 
 to render a separate account at the judgment-seat 
 hereafter. When an individual is invested with 
 such tremendous interests, he cannot fail to recognise 
 the dignity of human nature in himself, and to 
 acknowledge it in others [12]. 
 
 II From this again flow the relative obliga- 
 tions of man to man, breaking down the intense 
 and unmitigated selfishness distinctive of heathen 
 morality. The natural principle of self-love could 
 not fail to generate selfishness so long as men 
 regarded themselves as independent and autocratic ; 
 qiasque sui juris, each a law to himself and 
 owing obligation to none but himself. The grand 
 principle of the Christian code stands at the very- 
 opposite pole : " Thou shalt love thy neighbour 
 as thyself." This depends upon two dogmas — the 
 dogma of creation and the dogma of redemption. 
 The whole race thus becomes a family, meeting 
 in one common centre and united by a common 
 
VI] Christian Characteristics. 229 
 
 brotherhood. The revolutionary dreams of unity, 
 equality, and fraternity, find actual realisation here ; 
 for there is no respect of persons with God, either 
 in the kingdom of grace or the kingdom of glory. 
 We are not our own, but twice God's, " bought 
 with a price." The natural bond of sympathy thus 
 created is converted from an affection into a prin- 
 ciple by the positive command of God. Duty to 
 God and duty to man are parts of the same code ; 
 not as isolated and independent duties, but as 
 meeting in one and the same God, and invested 
 with the same tremendous sanctions. Sinai and 
 Calvary — the mountain burning like a furnace and 
 quivering beneath the majesty of the descending 
 God, and the Cross on which Incarnate Deity 
 suffered and died amid the wonder of angels and 
 archangels — both meet in One, and the united voice 
 is love [13]. 
 
 Ill A jealous sensitiveness over human life and 
 human suffering is a special characteristic of our civi- 
 lisation, and, I believe, the great test of all human 
 progress. Under ancient civilisation men rotted and 
 died like brute beasts. The picture drawn by history 
 of the serf population in Borne is shocking beyond 
 imagination. An intense selfishness was the great 
 law, and extended from men to women, not only 
 exhibited in the features of war but in the despe- 
 rate indifference of domestic life. Sympathy with 
 suffering was no part of ancient womanhood, if 
 the sufferer were a slave. Hence arose the fact, 
 often commented upon, that not a single public 
 
230 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 hospital existed in the ancient capitals of the East 
 and of the West. The only trace of such insti- 
 tutions consists of private hospitals for slaves, just 
 as a careful master will provide for his property 
 among ourselves. But general recognition of a 
 man's right, because he was a man, to protection 
 during life, and assistance under suffering, there 
 was none. They might rot and die in thousands, 
 and none cared. How blessedly different is the 
 complex and elaborate machinery of modern bene- 
 volence, as it singles out each form of human 
 misery one by one, and deals with it. We 
 think more of a single life than heathenism, either 
 ancient or modern, thinks of the life of thousands. 
 That this sensitive jealousy over human life and 
 suffering is due to Christianity, and only grows 
 beneath its shadow, can admit of little doubt. It 
 is a necessary deduction from two dogmas — the 
 incarnation of the Son of God and the resurrec- 
 tion of the body. The very flesh of man has become 
 great and honourable by its union with Godhead 
 in the person of the glorified Christ, and by the 
 prospects of its own eternal life and future glori- 
 fication in heaven [14]. 
 
 IV The idea of a moral and internal holiness is 
 the possession of Christianity alone. Among the hea- 
 then it was entirely absent. Their notions of purity 
 were so wholly external, that outward purity was 
 more definite to them than it is to ourselves. A 
 ceremonial uncleanness and ceremonial purification 
 appear to our minds so indefinite by the side of 
 
VI] Christian Characteristics. 231 
 
 sanctity of heart, and will, and affection, that we 
 have difficulty in appreciating them. But they 
 were the sole conceptions of purity possessed under 
 ancient civilisation. The notion is apparent even in 
 the noblest illustrations of ancient female virtue. 
 Livy's Lucre tia, destroying with her own hand the 
 flesh that had been contaminated by the touch of 
 wicked passion, illustrates the feeling. For why 
 the destruction of the body, if the dignity of the 
 chaste and lofty soul within it had been adequately 
 recognised? An estimate of purity and impurity 
 which is distinctively material must ever blunt the 
 moral sense. The horror of Lucretia at the dese- 
 cration was as rare as the mistaken heroism of her 
 death. But in recognising a moral and internal 
 purity, we have risen into a higher sphere of 
 thought and feeling altogether. This is the result 
 of dogma. The doctrine of human sin, pointing 
 out the seat of impurity and the doctrine of the re- 
 generating power of God the Holy Ghost to cleanse 
 the fountain of its bitterness, are the parents, and 
 inward holiness is their offspring [15]. 
 
 V From this principle we naturally pass to 
 another characteristic of Christian civilisation — 
 the sanctity of the home life. Ancient civilisa- 
 tion was gathered aroimd the pivot of collective 
 unity, and on its communistic principle the pos- 
 sible cultivation of the domestic affections was 
 helplessly shipwrecked. The ideal republic of 
 Plato, the actual institutions of ancient Sparta, 
 and, more or less intensely, the prevalent customs 
 
232 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 of other portions of the ancient world, reflect the 
 same character. Individual affections perished in 
 the destruction of individual rights. Home, as we 
 understand it, with its quiet haven from life's 
 daily storms, with its assured confidence of sym- 
 pathy, its affectionate intimacies and mutual obli- 
 gations, is the distinctive product of Christianity. 
 Its pleasant flowers grow best beneath the shelter 
 of the Cross. Nor is it difficult to specify the 
 dogma that has called home into existence. The 
 Fatherhood of God contains the germ of its de- 
 velopment. The relation of the Father towards 
 His only - begotten Son, pregnant in mysteries 
 beyond our searching, and the adoption of the 
 Christian into the family of God, with its privilege 
 of sonship here, and its prospect of a glorious 
 inheritance hereafter, consecrate with their sanctity 
 the duties and the joys of home. How wonder- 
 fully does the language of Scripture climb as it 
 were these heights, and lead the thoughts upward, 
 till, from the pinnacle of the revelation, they look 
 into the other world — " If children, then heirs ; 
 heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ" [i 6]. 
 
 VI Connected with the sanctity of home fife 
 is the sacredness of marriage, and the religious 
 equality of the sexes. The quiet confidence with 
 which, as a matter of course, without the neces- 
 sity for any positive and expressed regulation, the 
 Scriptures imply monogamy as the primeval and 
 eternal law of marriage, has an emphatic force of 
 its own to every careful student of the Word. 
 
VI] Christian Characteristics. 233 
 
 Beneath the withering blight of polygamy, what- 
 ever gives elevation and purity to the relation 
 between the sexes pines and dies. There can 
 be no "home" beneath that upas-tree. But mo- 
 nogamy, too, has a dogmatic basis, for it follows 
 from the spiritual espousals between Christ and 
 His Church. Not only are the prophetic Scrip- 
 tures full of this illustration, but the apostolic 
 Epistles draw the links between the doctrine and 
 the marriage institution, close and strong. The 
 immortality of the soul, and the personal responsi- 
 bility of each living being, fling their solemn sanc- 
 tions over it, while the relations of the devout 
 women to our Lord during His earthly ministry, 
 and especially the Scriptural portrait of the Virgin 
 Mother, blessed among women, invest it with ten- 
 derness and dignity [17]. 
 
 VII Lastly; the identification of religion with 
 practice, and the presentation of the contempla- 
 tive life as the preparation for the practical, have 
 likewise a doctrinal origin. Here, as elsewhere, the 
 faith settles the vexed question of their mutual 
 value, and adjusts the two by including both as 
 the parts of one life, as intimate and inseparable 
 as are the body and soul of man. The solitary 
 life is the perversion of Christianity, not its 
 healthy sequel; and to call such a life the re- 
 ligious life is a total distortion of its principles. 
 Life is, in the inspired teaching, the time for work. 
 The warning words of the wise preacher of Israel, — 
 " Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with 
 
234 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 thy might ; for there is no work, nor device, nor 
 knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou 
 goest c ," — find their echo in the graphic teach- 
 ing of Him whose meat and drink it was to do 
 His heavenly Father's will — " I must work the 
 works of Him that sent Me while it is day, for the 
 night cometh when no man can work d ." Two 
 doctrines, both of them distinctly Christian, throw 
 their guardian shadows over the lesson. First 
 comes the truth that we are not our own, but 
 God's, " bought with a price ; " and next comes on, 
 looking the soul full in the face, the awfulness of 
 the future judgment. Nor does the lesson of judg- 
 ment end in the distinction between the two 
 broad classes recognised in Scripture, the righteous 
 and the wicked, but reaches beyond it into the 
 different degrees of future reward and punish- 
 ment proposed for hope and fear. The parables 
 of our Lord are full of this truth. Twice over, 
 in singularly emphatic words and in this exact 
 relation, the apostle St. Paul affirms the uni- 
 versality of the last solemn account of the great 
 day : " We shall all stand before the judgment- 
 seat of Christ e ; " " We must all appear before 
 the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may 
 receive the things done in his body f ." From indi- 
 vidual duty and individual judgment must follow 
 individual independence, since each must act for 
 himself, and for himself suffer or enjoy. The 
 principle of independence has, therefore, an origin 
 
 r Eccl. ix. 10. cl Juhuix. 4. l Horn. xiv. 10. i 2 Cor. v. 10. 
 
VI] Cause and Effect. 235 
 
 earlier than the Gothic nations, however much 
 their native character and political habits fostered 
 it. It was already at work within the pale of Chris- 
 tianity, for it was a part of its dogmatic teaching: 
 "Every man shall bear his own burden »"[i 8]. 
 
 I have enumerated seven principles distinctive of 
 the Christian in contrast with heathen civilisation. 
 The importance placed upon the individual man ; 
 the mutual obligations of man to man ; a jealous 
 sensitiveness over human life and suffering ; the 
 conception of a moral and internal holiness ; the 
 sanctity of home ; the religious equality of the sexes, 
 and the identity of religious belief with religious 
 practice, — are principles naturally connected with 
 each other as the links of a common chain. Not 
 in any one of these elements singly, but in the 
 combination of them all, is the strength of our 
 civilisation to be found [19]. They are each and 
 all referable to Christian dogmas, springing out of 
 them as naturally as the branches out of a root, 
 and exhibiting their characteristics as closely as the 
 leaves of a tree follow the character of the tree. 
 To the effect of these dogmas, all invested with 
 the same authority and accompanied by the same 
 sanctions, must be added the personal example 
 of the Lord Jesus Christ. His ministry conveyed 
 the teaching ; His personal life and character 
 embodied the illustration of it. He thus drew 
 the lessons out of the sphere of abstract morality 
 into the sphere of actual life. He showed them 
 
 s Gal. vi. 5. 
 
236 Christianity and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 to be practicable lessons capable of adaptation to 
 the working world with its experience, trials, and 
 affections. In the sublime perfection of His character 
 they were all tempered together like the coloured 
 rays of one effulgent sun. The stress laid upon His 
 personal example has never ceased to consecrate the 
 activities of Christian obedience. His doctrine be- 
 comes, through the operation of God the Holy Ghost, 
 a self-developing force, moulding from within the 
 whole character and conduct of His disciples into 
 the likeness of His own perfections, by an influence 
 at once as silent and as pervasive as the life 
 that breaks out in spring-time through every root, 
 and branch, and leaf. The love we bear to our 
 Master, and the absorbing concentration of every 
 hope, feeling, and emotion in His blessed person 
 and atoning work, at once give sweetness to obe- 
 dience here> and ripen the soul for the full fruition 
 of the hereafter, when we shall be like Him, 
 " for we shall see Him as He is." 
 
 Now if none of these seven principles had any 
 influence in heathen civilisation, but are all cha- 
 racteristic of the Christian ; if, when the corre- 
 sponding dogmas were unknown they were unknown, 
 and wherever the dogmas have been preached they 
 have become influential ; if all the world over, 
 wherever the Gospel has been proclaimed, and 
 under every diversity of race and climate the same 
 teaching has been followed by the same effects, 
 one conclusion only can follow. The differences 
 distinguishing Christian from heathen civilisation 
 
VI] Cause and Effect. 237 
 
 must be due to the difference of its principles ; 
 and these principles are the dogmas of the Chris- 
 tian faith. The conclusion is confirmed by the 
 further fact that the activity of the influence is 
 exactly proportioned to the activity of the dog- 
 matic belief. That the character of our civilisa- 
 tion has spread beyond the circle of believers 
 in dogma, and leavens more or less the entire 
 community, is most true. It wouLd be strange 
 indeed if it were otherwise. The wide-spreading 
 influence of moral principles can no more be con- 
 fined within a limited circle than the light can 
 be confined to one portion of the firmament and 
 excluded from the rest. But that among the 
 believers of the dogmatic faith the distinctive 
 principles of Christian civilisation exist with the 
 greatest intensity, admits of an easy proof. Count 
 the charities of the Church of Christ, — or rather 
 they cannot be counted, for their number and 
 extent, as they flow in ten thousand streams of bene- 
 volence throughout the length and breadth of the 
 land, utterly defy calculation, — then look to that 
 portion of our community lying beyond and with- 
 out the Church, and again count their charities, 
 if indeed you can find them to count. I do not 
 deny their existence, but certainly in contrast with 
 the flow of Christian activity they are no more 
 than the summer rill in contrast with the strong- 
 deep river bearing navies on its breast. 
 
 Lastly, it should be observed that these effects on 
 our civilisation are not due to the Church, but to 
 
238 Christian it y and Civilisation. [Lect. 
 
 Christianity and to the action of its primary prin- 
 ciples. Christianity has called the Church into 
 existence, not the Church Christianity [20]. Great 
 and noble has been the mission of the Church, 
 blessed and beneficent her influence ; but the re- 
 vealed truth entrusted to her keeping is greater 
 than herself. She is a witness to her glorified 
 Master, and in the sense of her own dignity to 
 forget for a moment the undivided supremacy of 
 her living Head, is to cut away the ground beneath 
 her own feet. The chased and ornamental cup is 
 beautiful to the eye, but its use is to convey the 
 water to the parched lips of the dying man. The 
 failing senses of the suffering wretch will not heed 
 the beauty of the cup if it be empty of the living 
 water. The glory of the Church is in the faith 
 committed to her charge; and her life and strength 
 are both alike laid up in Him whom the faith re- 
 presents as "the way, the truth, and the life," and 
 on whose brow the adoring hands of the saints 
 place the triple crown, Prophet, Priest, King. Not 
 to the Church alone, as from the fifth century on- 
 wards she maintained the light amid the thick 
 darkness of the middle ages, but to the revealed 
 truth entrusted to her charge, are we indebted for 
 our civilisation. Its birth-place lies higher up the 
 stream of time, even in the times of our Lord and 
 His apostles. There the Sun of righteousness arose ; 
 and in proportion as the Church of succeeding times 
 has been faithful or faithless to her trust, in that exact 
 proportion have His beams brightened the world with 
 
VI] The Present and the Future. 239 
 
 liberty and peace, and consecrated its transient strug- 
 gles with the prospect of an endless immortality. 
 
 In this, as in all other respects, the claims and 
 assertions of the revealed Scriptures find their veri- 
 fication in the actual facts of history. St. John 
 in his vision of the New Jerusalem saw " a pure 
 river of water of life " proceeding out of the throne 
 of God and of the Lamb, and on either side of 
 it the tree of life, whose " leaves were for the heal- 
 ing of the nations V The inspired description of the 
 result is full of grandeur : " There shall be no more 
 curse : but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall 
 be in it ; and His servants shall serve Him : . . . 
 And there shall be no night there ; and they need no 
 candle, neither light of the sun ; for the Lord God 
 giveth them light : and they shall reign for ever and 
 ever." That completed glory will but be the result 
 of agencies already at work, but the full meridian 
 day of which our Christian civilisation is the early 
 dawn. We are taught indeed that He to whom it 
 belongs will come to establish His own kingdom of 
 righteousness and peace; but the glory of that king- 
 dom of the future will be the crown and climax of a 
 work already begun in the present. The hallelujahs 
 of the saints in glory will but re-echo the promise, 
 and place the seal of their experience on its fulfil- 
 ment : " Godliness is profitable unto all things, 
 having promise of the life that now is, and of that 
 which is to come." 
 
 h Rev. xxii. 1-2. 
 
LECTURE YII 
 
 CONSCIENCE, AND ITS RELATION TO 
 THE FAITH 
 
 2 Cor. i. 12 
 
 For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience, that 
 in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, 
 but by the grace of God, tve have had our conversation in the 
 world, and more abundantly to you-ivard. 
 
 IT is in entire accordance with the moral purposes 
 and with the structure of revelation that Holy 
 Scripture contains no theory of the conscience. 
 Appeals to its verdict are frequent ; but they 
 assume its existence and functions as a fact, and 
 do not explain its nature or its constituents as 
 a philosophy. The divinely - inspired references 
 thus supply materials for a judgment by furnish- 
 ing what I may call Divine observations on the 
 action and properties of conscience, but it is left 
 to us to put them together and construct them 
 into a system. A devout believer in the inspi- 
 ration of Scripture finds in its teaching the test 
 of his philosophic theories. The steady light of 
 revealed truth acts like a beacon to point out 
 
Teaching of Scripture. 241 
 
 the course of safety through the - shallows and 
 quicksands and sunken rocks of a most intricate 
 and perplexing controversy. 
 
 In the . Old Testament the word ' conscience ' does 
 not occur. The heart of man is described as the 
 seat of approbation and disapprobation, of convic- 
 tion, contrition, and remorse. But although the 
 term is absent, the idea is not absent. It is truly 
 remarked by a German divine that the " entire 
 economy of salvation in the Old Testament is 
 founded on the fact of the conscience." Luther, in 
 his translation of the Bible, uses the word itself in 
 two places: Josh. xiv. 7, "As it was in my con- 
 science," and Job xxvii. 6, " Thy righteousness I hold 
 fast and will not let it go. My conscience shall not 
 reprove me as long as I live." From the history 
 of the Fall onwards through the entire prophetic 
 Scriptures, the recognition of an inward moral 
 faculty in man underlies the sacred teaching and 
 bears witness to the words of Solomon : " The spirit 
 of man is the candle of the Lord, searching all the 
 inward parts of the belly." 
 
 The teaching of the New Testament is naturally 
 much more specific, and may be reduced into de- 
 finite propositions. The conscience is affirmed to 
 be the possession of the individual man ; in the 
 words of St. Paul, " having their consciences seared*" 1 " 
 (t>/i/ iSiav avi>e!$r]criv). It is asserted to be the su- 
 preme moral guide within the soul ; for the hea- 
 then are to be judged by it. " If a man know his 
 
 a 1 Tim. iv. 2. 
 R 
 
242 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 doing to be in harmony with this law his con- 
 science is ayaQrj b , KctXtj c , KaOapd d , aTrpoa-icoiros e . The 
 two parts of conscience are specified. If his deed 
 be evil, so also is his conscience, inasmuch as it is 
 consciousness of such evil (Trovrjpd *'); it is ij.eixiaaij.evr} s, 
 so far as the evil deeds shadow themselves in it 
 like blots; or /ce/cauT^tao-^eVj;' 1 , so far as it bears 
 them in itself ineradicably and indelibly like 
 brands " [i]. The self- consciousness constituting 
 the original meaning of the word in its Greek, 
 Latin, and French usage finds expression in many 
 passages, as in Heb. x. 2 : " The worshippers once 
 purged should have had no more conscience of 
 sins." A moral verdict of approbation or disappro- 
 bation is involved in other passages, from which 
 I have selected the words of the text as neces- 
 sarily implying the conviction of St. Paul's own 
 faithfulness in the discharge of his apostolic office, 
 for otherwise there could have been no rejoicing in 
 " the testimony " of his conscience. On the words 
 of St. John, "convicted by their own conscience \" 
 I lay no stress, because the genuineness of the text 
 is disputed. Conscience is declared to exist prior 
 to a positive revelation, for it supplies the ground 
 of the Divine sentence pronounced upon the hea- 
 then : " These, having not the law, are a law unto 
 
 b Acta xiii. 1 ; 1 Pet. Hi. 16-22 ; 1 Tim. v. 19. 
 r - Heb. xiii. 18. d , Tim. iii. 9 ; 2 Tim. i. 3. 
 
 ' Acts xx iv. r6. f Heb. x. 22. 
 
 - Tit. i. 15 ; 1 Cor. viii. 7. •' 1 Tim. iv. 2. 
 
 1 John viii. 9. 
 
VII] Teaching of Scripture. 243 
 
 themselves : which show the work of the law 
 written in their hearts." Its verdicts are asso- 
 ciated with the action of the judgment. "Their 
 conscience bearing witness and their thoughts 
 (Xoyia-juwv) accusing or excusing one another." Again, 
 in the Epistle to Titus : " Even their mind (6 vovs) 
 and their conscience is defiled." Lastly, the apo- 
 stolic language implies that conscience may need cor- 
 rection and education, for St. Paul refers repeatedly 
 to the weak conscience of the Corinthian Chris- 
 tians, and to the duty of not offending it : " When 
 ye wound their weak conscience" (aa-Oevova-av) — a 
 conscience out of health and needing the physician — 
 "ye sin against Christ k ." The same idea occurs in 
 St. Paul's language to Timothy, where he describes 
 the false teachers as " doting [voa-wv) about questions 
 and strifes of words 1 ." 
 
 It is remarkable that the latest conclusions of 
 Christian philosophy, although reached by an in- 
 dependent process, and expressing the result of 
 the accumulated thought of ages, are in exact 
 harmony with the Scriptural teaching. On the 
 one side they affirm the existence of a faculty 
 of conscience, and its supremacy in the tribunal 
 of the soul, and yet, on the other side, they deny 
 that it is either independent or infallible. It is 
 a constituent part of the human soul, but like 
 all other parts, exhibits the weakness of a de- 
 pendent and corrupted creature. The estimate of 
 human nature, gathered from a study of our moral 
 
 k i Cor. viii. 2. l 1 Tim. vi. 4. 
 
 R 2 
 
244 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 constitution, is identical with the conclusion already 
 reached in the course of these lectures from an 
 examination of the emotional, intuitional, and in- 
 tellectual parts of man. Dependence is stamped 
 upon every portion of our being. Man needs an 
 external help ; and in every sphere alike that 
 help is supplied in " the faith once delivered to 
 the saints." 
 
 In resting on this conviction we follow a middle 
 path with enemies on either side. The position 
 held by free thought in relation to this question 
 of the conscience is in no small degree remark- 
 able. Rationalism attacks us from two opposite 
 quarters, representing two different and totally irre- 
 concilable views, and on both sides with equal 
 vehemence and apparent absence of any conscious- 
 ness of the inconsistency. At no distant period a 
 critical Review has held " conscientious people " up 
 to contempt, on account of the " vast amount of 
 mischief done by them in the world." A serious 
 accusation is advanced against theological writers 
 of regarding conscience as "an unwritten Bible, a 
 divinely-appointed guide, implanted by Providence 
 in the heart of each individual to tell him what 
 is right and what is wrong." Every man is de- 
 clared to be able to make his own conscience, in 
 language far too frivolous for possible quotation in 
 this place [2]. On the other side, modern thought 
 steps at a stride across the temperate conclusions of 
 Christian philosophy, and asserts the all-sufficient, 
 autocratic power of conscience, with an extravagant 
 
VII] Inconsistencies of Rationalism. 245 
 
 exaggeration peculiar to itself. It declares it to be 
 the triumph of rationalism that " men have come in- 
 stinctively and almost unconsciously to judge all doc- 
 trines by their intuitive sense of right, and to reject, 
 or explain away, or throw into the background 
 those that will not bear the test, no matter how 
 imposing may be the authority that authenticates 
 them." Thus conscience becomes more than a veri- 
 fying faculty. It is throned supreme over the 
 entire soul, as a despotic governor ; in the language 
 of the rationalist himself, the " measure and arbiter 
 of faith » [3]. 
 
 The two views are mutually destructive. If a 
 controversial advantage were all that the cause of 
 truth demanded, it might be enough to set the 
 one extreme against the other. The retort would 
 be perfectly fair. If we are taunted with making 
 too much of conscience, we might appeal to the 
 authority of rationalism itself ; for in asserting the 
 conscience to be the " arbiter of truth " it exag- 
 gerates its claims far beyond the highest estimate 
 of the Christian. If conscience be competent to 
 rule even in the sphere of the intellect, a for- 
 tiori it must be competent to rule in its own 
 proper sphere, the sphere of moral action. Or if 
 we are charged with making too little of con- 
 science, and not accepting it as a final authority 
 supreme over faith itself, we might appeal to free 
 thought at its opposite extreme ; for in making 
 conscience no more than the conscious and volun- 
 tary product of a man's own effort it lowers it far 
 
246 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 below either Scripture or right reason. The Chris- 
 tian theologian might be content to leave the two 
 theories to fight it out between themselves, while 
 the truth, untouched by the conflict, calmly marched 
 on her way. Certainly the two arguments cannot 
 consistently be maintained by the same hands. It 
 is impossible to plead the verifying powers of con- 
 science, and at the same time to deny the existence 
 of such a faculty. The contradictions of free thought 
 cannot go so far as to give supreme authority to 
 a name, and worship before a throne empty of any 
 monarch to fill it. It would be suicidal to argue that 
 conscience is the great spring of all religious truth, 
 and at the same time to argue that it is but the pro- 
 duct of a thousand casual influences — the residuum 
 left in the mind from the ever flowing and ebbing 
 tides of human sympathy and association. 
 
 But the cause of truth is too sacred to be rested 
 on any such retort ; the claims of the faith too 
 solemn and absolute to admit of the slightest act 
 of treacherous compromise. We may use the 
 acknowledgments of our opponents so far, but so 
 far only as this : that a faculty, of which the 
 very existence admits of being called into ques- 
 tion, can never possess the absolute and supreme 
 authority needed for the judge and arbiter of truth. 
 
 With this side of the alternative alone my argu- 
 ment is called to deal. If conscience be a thing 
 too fluctuating and uncertain to supply a fixed rule 
 for moral conduct, it certainly can never become 
 the rival of the dogmatic faith, and with this 
 
VII] The Rationalistic Argument. 247 
 
 conclusion the argument against conscience may 
 be dismissed. But its positive claims are more 
 formidable, for if they could be maintained they 
 would destroy the entire fabric of the faith. We 
 must examine them more closely. 
 
 The objector argues that his conscience is the 
 individual judge of what is right and wrong. As 
 the foundations of rectitude are changeless and 
 eternal, what is right and wrong to him must be 
 absolutely right and wrong in regard to all other 
 beings, and therefore in regard to God. Any de- 
 scription of God winch represents Him as violating 
 this verdict of the moral judge cannot be true, 
 since God is a perfect and absolute being, and 
 to charge Him with moral imperfection would be 
 a contradiction. Any such system of belief is 
 therefore to be indignantly rejected. The Chris- 
 tian faith, the objector proceeds to say, contains 
 dogmas of this khid. For instance, it speaks of 
 the punitive anger of God, and of His consign- 
 ing: countless numbers of His creatures to endless 
 damnation. It asserts that there will be an ever- 
 lasting condition of future woe, from which all 
 hope of mitigation and all prospect of cessation 
 are absolutely excluded. It teaches a doctrine of 
 atonement by the imputation to one person of 
 the guilt incurred by others. " Such teaching 
 offends my sense of right and wrong, and com- 
 pels me to ascribe to a perfect and holy Being 
 feelings and acts contradictory to the verdict of 
 conscience in myself. I cannot believe such doctrines, 
 
248 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 and therefore I reject the revelation professing to 
 contain them." 
 
 I have stated the argument of the objector in 
 this form because it is the form actually taken by 
 the objection in a great majority of cases. I pro- 
 test in the name of conscience itself against the 
 gross injustice of such distorted representations of 
 Christian doctrines. Such caricatures every mem- 
 ber of the Church of England and every inheritor 
 of her teaching must indignantly repudiate. Whether 
 they result from carelessness, or from prejudice, or 
 from ignorance, or from the distorting influence of 
 active hostility, it is not for me to judge ; but two 
 mistakes involved in the false representation He 
 upon the surface. 
 
 Part of the doctrine is stated, and part omitted, 
 and the description is false because it is partial, 
 suppressio veri suggestio falsi. For instance, when 
 the objector speaks of God's consigning countless 
 numbers of His creatures to eternal damnation, he 
 omits to state that He has at the same time offered 
 free salvation to all men, and that if they perish, 
 it is only because they reject a mode of safety pro- 
 vided for them by God, at a sacrifice no less than 
 that of His own Son, and pressed upon their hearts 
 and consciences with a tenderness of appeal and a 
 force of love sublime beyond the appeals and love 
 of man. Again, when the objector says that the 
 doctrine of the atonement involves the imputation 
 to one person of the guilt incurred by others, he 
 omits to add that this Person has of His own free 
 
VII] The Rationalistic Argument. 249 
 
 will assumed the guilt, and that, moreover, this 
 voluntary Representative is one in substance, power, 
 and eternity with the Being who pronounces the 
 judgment, being Himself God blessed for evermore. 
 
 The second mistake is of a kindred character. It 
 consists in applying to the character of God the 
 standard of human imperfection and corruption. It 
 assumes as a literal fact those anthropomorphic 
 illustrations under which alone the nature and cha- 
 racter of the Supreme Being can possibly be known 
 to us. If on the one side Scripture describes God 
 under figures taken from human experience, it 
 emphatically warns us on the other hand that God 
 is as far removed from man as the heavens are 
 higher than the earth, and that the disturbances 
 and selfishnesses, the weaknesses and irritabilities of 
 human weakness have no place with Him. Thus 
 when Scripture speaks of the punitive wrath of 
 God, it reminds us at the same time that the 
 spiritual Deity has neither body, parts, nor pas- 
 sions. To impute to God, for instance, the heat, 
 violence, and disturbance inherent in human anger, 
 is not only to shock all our deepest feelings of 
 reverence, but it is also grossly and coarsely to 
 misrepresent the doctrine it professes to describe. 
 It is to bear false witness against "the faith once 
 delivered to the saints." 
 
 It is impossible not to regard such controversial 
 perversions of the truth with deep indignation. 
 They are unworthy weapons at best, and never 
 so unworthy as when they outrage conscience in 
 
250 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 the name of conscience. The temptation to ac- 
 quiesce in them is great. Only by their use is 
 it possible to transfer the proper authority of con- 
 science in the sphere of the moral into an inva- 
 sion upon the sphere of the intellectual. But 
 this controversial advantage supplies a further rea- 
 son why a high-minded searcher after truth should 
 disdain to use them, because they pervert the very 
 conditions of the question. The Christian theolo- 
 gian emphatically protests against them in the 
 name of truth and of conscience as a libel against 
 the Church of Christ. 
 
 The claim thus asserted on behalf of the con- 
 science to be the judge and arbiter of truth is irre- 
 concilable with the claims of the dogmatic faith, 
 not alone from the uncertainty of the verdict, but 
 from the nature and the extent of the authority 
 claimed for the judge. 
 
 As regards the verdict of the conscience, the Church 
 may well hold her own. It is indeed assumed that 
 a common conscience exists, and that its decision 
 is unanimous against the doctrines of Scripture. In 
 this case the argument would overthrow the faith 
 by rejecting particular dogmas, and dislocating by 
 the rejection the entire system of revealed truth into 
 broken and inconsistent members. But the assump- 
 tion cannot be admitted for a moment, and is plainly 
 contrary to the facts. The conscience of mankind 
 is not unanimous in its judgment upon the doc- 
 trines of Christianity. The conscience of those who 
 accept the dogmas of revelation has at least as 
 
VII] The Rationalistic Argument. 251 
 
 much right to be heard in this matter as the con- 
 science of those who reject them, if it has not a far 
 better right in proportion to its better acquaintance 
 and familiarity with them. What the rationalist 
 considers to be inconsistent with a perfect and holy 
 Being, other men, not less competent from education 
 and earnestness of character to judge than himself, 
 consider to be the most admirable illustration of His 
 attributes. Not only do men educated under Chris- 
 tian intructions regard the doctrines of the Divine 
 justice, His punitive wrath against sin, and the 
 atonement provided in the death of Christ, with 
 adoring praise, but the same feeling is experienced 
 by persons who have passed through no such edu- 
 cational process and who hear the doctrines for 
 the first time. We may extend the range of tes- 
 timony still further ; for the conscience of heathen 
 nations is so far from rejecting these ideas that 
 they enter prominently into heathen belief and the 
 elements of natural religion, as is seen in the 
 institution of priesthood and sacrifice. The as- 
 sumption that the common decision of the human 
 conscience is against the distinctive doctrines of 
 Christianity is contradicted by the fact. Could 
 mankind be polled within the circle of Christen- 
 dom the faith would claim in its favour the deci- 
 sion of a vast and overwhelming majority. 
 
 This consideration is not to be overlooked, for 
 were the result otherwise it would indisputably 
 supply a serious argument against the faith. But 
 we cannot rest with this appeal We must call 
 
252 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 into question the competency of the court to fulfil 
 so great an office as the supreme judge of truth. 
 If the conscience of every living man came to the 
 same decision, and the decision were in favour of 
 Christian dogma, that unanimity would furnish 
 no safe foundation for the faith. In fact, the 
 existence of an universal conscience is but a 
 fiction. Scarcely can a single point of morals be 
 specified on which the moral sense of mankind 
 has not differed at some time, and among some 
 people. But this very variability of conscience 
 only makes the claim of its supremacy the more 
 destructive to the faith. The verdict is so inde- 
 finitely variable that one man's truth becomes 
 another man's falsehood. So long as the just 
 authority of the dogmatic faith is retained, and 
 conscience is limited to its proper function as a 
 regulative faculty, no difficulty arises. For the 
 rejection of particular truths becomes, in entire 
 consistency with the teaching of the faith itself, 
 the sin of individual unbelief. But let con- 
 science be acknowledged to be the supreme veri- 
 fying faculty, and positive, still less authoritative, 
 truth can no longer exist. Belief becomes no more 
 than the subjective act of the individual, without 
 any objective reality to answer to it. The hand 
 of the soul is stretched out, but grasps a shadow, 
 not a substance. If men's judgments are to be 
 accepted as the absolute test of truth, all par- 
 ticular beliefs must be equally true or equally 
 false. 
 
VII] Nature of Conscience. 253 
 
 The principle involved in the claim of conscience 
 to be the judge and arbiter of truth is therefore 
 important in the highest degree. What a man 
 does is necessarily moulded on what he believes. To 
 sit at the very threshold of the soul and regulate 
 at will its incomings and outgoings, is the 
 loftiest of all conceivable functions. Not a spark 
 of light can enter till it has, so to speak, done 
 homage to this supreme faculty, and has been 
 authenticated by its signature. Such a power 
 rules, by virtue of its office, monarch and lord 
 of all. It becomes a confessed Deity. The cre- 
 dentials of so dominant a faculty may fairly be 
 expected to correspond with the loftiness of its 
 claims. Before we submit to its absolute despotism 
 we must be satisfied of the grounds of its autho- 
 rity and the sufficiency of its power. We have a 
 right to ascertain its exact place in our constitu- 
 tion, and the proper sphere of its action. What 
 is conscience ; what are its authority and attri- 
 butes, that religion should bow down before its 
 footstool, and faith herself do it homage % The 
 answer can only be given by reviewing the course 
 of human thought as it has dealt, from age to 
 age, with the problems of moral science. The re- 
 sult will vindicate the legitimate claim of conscience 
 to rule supreme within the soul, but will dissipate 
 to the winds the extravagant assumptions of its 
 autocratic independence and infallibility. 
 
 In rapidly sketching the history of moral science 
 one general rule alone can be constantly adopted for 
 
254 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 my guidance. It is that where the moral distinc- 
 tion of right and wrong has been denied, the existence 
 of conscience has necessarily been denied ; where the 
 distinction has been maintained, there conscience has 
 been recognised. Exceptions may be found even to 
 this rule. Rather, perhaps, I ought to say, that 
 men have been often inconsistent with themselves. 
 Thus, for instance, Hobbes, the first great impugner 
 in modern times of the faculty of the conscience, 
 admits in some parts of his writings the moral 
 faculty which he resolutely denies in others. His 
 disciple, Paley, is guilty of the same inconsis- 
 tency; for in his Sermons he speaks of the con- 
 science, while in his Moral Philosophy he denies its 
 existence [4]. But the distinction, although it re- 
 quires some limitation, yet holds good in general. 
 But when, from the nature of the faculty of con- 
 science, we pass on to discuss the grounds of recti- 
 tude, we are still more devoid of any certain rule. 
 It would be totally unjust to suppose that the great 
 writers who refer the foundation of morals to utility, 
 or to the fitness of things, or to the absolute will 
 of God, intentionally impugn either the existence or 
 the authority of conscience. 
 
 Questions relative to the difference of right and 
 wrong, and to the practical rule of life, had their 
 place among the earliest exercises of human thought. 
 They are recognised, more or less, in all the records 
 of antiquity. In the immortal verses of Homer we 
 find the idea of an innate awe of the Deity, and 
 of the obligations of moral right. The ancient 
 
VII] Nature of Conscience. 255 
 
 Greek tragedians contain the same thought. The 
 Furies were but the terrors of the conscience per- 
 sonified. On the other side, Prometheus is supported 
 under the vengeance of Jove by the consciousness 
 of the benefits he had conferred among mankind. 
 Among the fragments of Menander has been handed 
 down the line, /3poTOig airam (rvvelSqcri? 0e6s. During 
 the prehistoric period of ancient philosophy the 
 familiar problems of moral science are dimly re- 
 cognisable in the denial by Protagoras of any 
 eternal distinction of right and wrong. With 
 Socrates and Plato moral philosophy properly be- 
 gan. Neither of them has left a definite theory 
 of conscience, although both of them recognised 
 it. They conceived of it, however, as intellec- 
 tual more than moral — as in the Eight Reason of 
 Plato and the Prudence of Aristotle. Plato's doc- 
 trine of ideas, and of the ideas of the supreme 
 good, supplied the germ of the immutable morality 
 of later days. Aristotle distinctly asserts in his 
 Politics an inner and divinely-given sense of right 
 and wrong (o navrevovrai n iravres;), and refers to 
 the Antigone of Sophocles as acting upon a sense 
 of eternal right. 
 
 The discussion took a formal shape in the dis- 
 putations of the Stoics and Epicureans, and they 
 still represent the two great divisions of opinion 
 existing in our own day. The Epicureans were the 
 first great advocates of the selfish principle of 
 morals. The Stoical scheme, on the other hand, 
 represented the idea of moral rectitude as peculiar 
 
256 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith, [Lect. 
 
 and independent. They gave force to the idea 
 of duty — that notion of the " ought " which con- 
 stitutes the proper material of the conscience. 
 From this time the nature and supremacy of con- 
 science was recognised with ever-increasing defmite- 
 ness. Persius, Cicero, Plutarch, Marcus Antoninus, 
 Epictetus, and Seneca, all refer to it. Cicero states 
 his belief in an innate faculty of conscience with 
 great distinctness : "Ratio summa insita in natura 
 qua3 jubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque con- 
 traria." Seneca affirms its Divine origin, "animus 
 magnus et sacer inhseret origini suae," and pathetically 
 laments the folly of the man who neglects it — " te 
 miserum si contemnis hunc testem." The familiar 
 language of Horace will present itself to many memo- 
 ries as he describes the real strength of man, — 
 
 " Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa ; " 
 
 while the graphic description of a bad conscience in 
 Juvenal's thirteenth Satire will not be forgotten. 
 Thus the general sentiment of antiquity recognised 
 the reality of conscience. But the faculty was not 
 analysed. No theory was framed of its constitution, 
 and the general course of thought pointed to an in- 
 tellectual rather than to a strictly moral faculty. 
 
 The same want of a scientific examination of the 
 phenomena of conscience continued during the ages 
 intervening between the beginning of the Christian 
 era and the period of the Reformation. The Chris- 
 tian Fathers re-echoed the language of the inspired 
 Scriptures, treating conscience in the light of religion 
 
VII] Nature of Conscience. 257 
 
 and not of philosophy. Fervent appeals to conscience 
 and eloquent desertions of it are frequent, as for 
 instance, in a well-known passage of Tertullian and 
 in the glowing declamations of Chrysostom. It has 
 been thought by some that Augustine, from fear of 
 the Pelagian heresy, was timid of appealing to con- 
 science, lest by so doing he should appear to admit 
 any sufficiency in human nature for the supply of its 
 own moral wants. With the Scholastics authority 
 became prominent everywhere, and beneath its in- 
 fluence moral philosophy sank too frequently into 
 casuistry. Their inveterate habit of logical refine- 
 ment led them to distinguish conscience into the 
 synteresis or the internal law, and the syneidesis 
 or the internal accuser, and to dispute minutely 
 whether conscience was an act, a habit, or a 
 power. Abelard referred the fundamental principle 
 of morality to the immediate will of God, com- 
 municated partly by Scripture and partly by con- 
 science. Bernard calls it " Candor lucis eeternae et 
 speculum sine macula." Peter Lombard carried its 
 claims so high as to hold conscience to be su- 
 preme even where it contradicts the Word. From 
 Anselm to Grotius, for a period of five hundred 
 years, the same system prevailed. The province of 
 morality was not distinguished from religion, nor 
 were the mutual relations of the two adjusted. 
 
 At the Reformation a new epoch of thought 
 begins. The argumerits of objectors to the exist- 
 ence of a conscience stimulated enquiry, and served 
 to clear away ambiguities and to settle what was 
 
258 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 before undetermined. The dates of these alternate 
 movements of attack and defence constitute the 
 historical epochs of the controversy, and mark its 
 order. 
 
 The Reformation itself was the rebound of con- 
 science from the strain of human authority, and 
 rested for its justification on two co-equal prin- 
 ciples — the supremacy of the individual conscience 
 over external authority, and the subordination of 
 conscience to the supreme authority of God in His 
 Word. The importance of the question awakened 
 intense earnestness in its discussion. The con- 
 troversy consequently acquired a new character, 
 and passed from the solution of particular diffi- 
 culties, " cases of conscience," into a philosophical 
 settlement of the nature and sphere of the faculty, 
 and the whole foundation of moral rectitude. The 
 first line of writers on the subject in this country 
 consisted of Perkins, Ames, Hall, Sanderson, and 
 Taylor. Their object was to establish the autho- 
 rity of conscience as the ground of all morality. 
 Their system was, however, incomplete, for the old 
 defect remained of not admitting the relation be- 
 tween conscience and Scripture. Sanderson may 
 be ' taken as the ablest exponent of the school. 
 He defines conscience to be a faculty or habit of 
 the intellect, whereby the human mind, by a pro- 
 cess of reasoning, applies its inborn light to the 
 discrimination of moral actions — " Conscientia est 
 facultas sive habitus intellectus practice quo mens 
 hominis per discursum rationis applical lumen quod 
 
VII] Nature of Conscience. 259 
 
 sibi adest ad particulates suos actus morales." 
 He regarded conscience and Scripture as being 
 two related, but not necessarily co-equal means 
 of making known the will of God : " Adsequata 
 conscientise regula voluntas Dei qualitercunque 
 patefacta." 
 
 This system of thought found an opponent in 
 Hobbes, who wrote about the middle of the seven- 
 teenth century. His object was to sweep away the 
 entire distinction of right and wrong, and to refer 
 them solely to the enactment of external laws. 
 " The civil laws," he argued, " are the only rules of 
 good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest. 
 Antecedently to these laws every action is in its 
 own nature indifferent. There is nothing good or 
 evil in itself, nor are there any common laws con- 
 stituting what is naturally just and unjust. All 
 things are to be measured by what every man 
 judges fit, where there is no civil government, and 
 by the laws of society where there is one." These 
 views, in their very coarseness, accord with the 
 philosophy of the man who held the materiality of 
 the soul and the corporeity of God. The philosophy 
 of Locke, by the rejection of all innate ideas, coun- 
 tenanced the tenet that right and wrong are modi- 
 fications of bodily good and evil. The sensualist 
 school of morals eagerly claimed his support. The 
 school found its extravagant development in the 
 profligate licence of Mandeville. The poison sank 
 deep into the literature and affected largely the 
 manners of the age. 
 
 S 2 
 
260 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 Against these tendencies of thought arose a 
 chorus of protest. The Earl of Shaftesbury led 
 the way, and dropped the first suggestion of a 
 moral sense or instinct of conscience. Two other 
 noted apostles of infidel thought, Hume and Hart- 
 ley, adopted the same view. It found a supporter 
 of sounder views in More. The theorv was de- 
 veloped by Hutcheson into the scheme of an im- 
 planted principle, analogous in its action within 
 its own sphere to the action of the senses upon 
 material things. The sagacious Butler, scrupulously 
 cautious in determining the exact nature and con- 
 stituents of conscience, asserted for the faculty its 
 proper place in the constitution of man, and its 
 claim for supremacy over the other faculties. Reid 
 carried the question a step further by finding a 
 birthplace for conscience amid the fundamental 
 principles of the human soul, "the ethical side of 
 the general sense of truth, the communis sensus 
 which remained in man after the Fall." 
 
 Meanwhile another, but intimately allied course 
 of thought, was pursued upon the foundations of 
 rectitude, and the ultimate principles of right and 
 wrong. My argument is however less directly con- 
 cerned with this side of the question than it is 
 with the authority of conscience on one side and 
 its limitations on the other. Whether we hold with 
 Hutcheson a determination of the mind to approve 
 the beauty of virtue and condemn the deformity of 
 vice; or with Butler resolve conscience into a prin- 
 ciple of reflection by which " we distinguish between 
 
VII] Nature of Conscience. 261 
 
 and approve or disapprove our own actions ;" or with 
 Adam Smith believe our approbation or disappro- 
 bation to be founded on the suitableness or unsuit- 
 ableness, the proportion or disproportion which the 
 affection bears to its object ; or with Brown refer the 
 facts to an emotional constitution of the human mind 
 by which a virtuous action awakens in us a feeling 
 of approbation towards its agent ; or maintain with 
 Ockham that good and evil draw their sole distinc- 
 tion from the will of the Supreme Being ; or with 
 Cumberland consider that the utility of actions con- 
 stitutes their rectitude ; or assert with Woollaston 
 that good and evil depend upon consistency or in- 
 consistency with the truth of things ; or with Price 
 that the distinction arises from the essential nature 
 of God; — the existence of a conscience and the part 
 it plays as the regulative principle of human nature 
 remains to a great degree the same. On this dis- 
 tinction between the faculty of conscience and the 
 foundations of rectitude later writers insist with 
 great earnestness. 
 
 A fresh reaction followed. Another line of writers 
 arose, attacking the doctrine of a moral sense as if it 
 conveyed the idea of a mechanical instinct and dero- 
 gated from the dignity of human nature. They in- 
 troduce the latest period of thought upon the subject 
 of the conscience. The line consists of Gay, Tucker, 
 Paley, and Bentham. The principal figure is Paley, 
 whose views will be familiar to members of Oxford 
 and Cambridge. " On the whole, it seems to me," 
 are his words, " either that there exist no such 
 
2(52 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 instincts as compose what is called the moral sense, 
 or that they are not now to be distinguished from 
 prejudices and habits/' On the other side are 
 ranged the illustrious names of Mackintosh, Stewart, 
 Whewell, Chalmers, Whately, and others of whom 
 I make no mention, because they still live to in- 
 struct the Church by their labours. These writers 
 have brought the doctrine of conscience into its 
 present shape. Sir James Mackintosh may be held to 
 have laid down the clear outlines, and Dr. Whewell 
 to have most accurately filled them up. The con- 
 science, in their view, is not one faculty, but the 
 aggregation of several. " By the culture of the 
 directing and controlling faculties we form habits, 
 according to which we turn our attention upon 
 ourselves, and approve or disapprove what we there 
 discern. These faculties thus cultivated are the 
 conscience." The compound faculty so formed is 
 not strictly innate, but acquired. It is acquired, 
 however, universally and necessarily by all men, 
 by virtue of the innate constitution of the soul. 
 " The testimony of conscience rests on a Divine 
 foundation woven in our natural condition, that is, 
 on a Divine law ordained in the created consti- 
 tution of man." " All theories which treat con- 
 science as built up by circumstances acting on nil 
 human minds," are asserted by Mackintosh " to be 
 liable to misconception unless they place in the 
 strongest light the total destruction of the scaffold- 
 ing which was necessary only to the erection of 
 the building, after the mind is adult and mature, 
 
VII] Nature of Conscience. 263 
 
 and warn the hastiest reader that it then rests 
 on its own foundation." While the conscience is 
 supreme over the practical life it is itself a subor- 
 dinate faculty, and not a master faculty. What 
 produces must be greater than its product, the 
 creator than what is created. 
 
 It follows from these conclusions that if conscience 
 be " in authority " from one point of view, it is " under 
 authority " from another. It is in authority inas- 
 much as it is the supreme regulative power within 
 the soul ; it is under authority inasmuch as, like 
 the soul over which it rules and of which it forms 
 a constitutional part, it is dependent, not autocratic. 
 If conscience in its actual form be the result of an 
 educational process, either conscious or unconscious, 
 it is so far from being an independent and self- 
 contained law, that it only reflects the external 
 influences that have given it shape and direction. 
 Conscience is never fully formed, but always in 
 course of formation. Whewefl's words state the 
 result in its precise form : " Conscience is a subor- 
 dinate and fallible rule." " Since conscience has only 
 subordinate and derivative authority, it cannot be 
 right for a man to refer to his own conscience as a 
 supreme ultimate ground of action." 
 
 Up to a certain point — the point reached in the 
 theory of a moral sense — the course of thought 
 abroad has followed very much the same course, 
 as far as concerns the philosophy of the question. 
 Leibnitz and Malbranche recognise the conscience 
 as an innate love and approbation of the right; 
 
264 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 Crusius considers it to be an inward instinct ; 
 Kant regards it as a moral faculty, innate and 
 independent ; Fichte and De Wette follow him ; 
 while Delitsch defines it as the natural conscious- 
 ness to man of the law within his heart. On the 
 other side Mosheim describes it as an act of the 
 understanding. But the general tendencies of Ger- 
 many have generated another school of thought. 
 Kant stood on the same ground in this question 
 as the Hutchesonians among ourselves. But this 
 was but a stage in the enquiry among ourselves, 
 a standpoint from which later writers have ad- 
 vanced to a closer analysis and a more accurate 
 survey of the constitution and office of conscience. 
 Among some German divines the tendency has 
 been to fall back on one of the mistakes of the 
 past, and confound the groundwork of morality 
 and religion together. The result is gained indeed 
 by a very different process. The Church-school was 
 in danger of absorbing morality in religion : the 
 modern Germans would absorb religion in morality. 
 The one filtered conscience by authority : but the 
 other places all authority, even that of the Scrip- 
 tures themselves, beneath the feet of conscience. 
 
 The result follows naturally from what is called 
 the higher criticism of Germany and its general 
 course of thought. The definite doctrines of Chris- 
 tianity have been resolved by these critical pro- 
 cesses into philosophical ideas, and the sacred 
 Scriptures, with their grand teachings, torn into 
 fragmentary traditions. These processes being com- 
 
VII] Nature of Conscience. 265 
 
 plete, religion itself must perish, as I have shown 
 in the course of these lectures, unless some other 
 teacher of truth can be discovered. Modern Ger- 
 mans endeavour to find it in the conscience. Thus 
 Reinhard considers conscience to be a disposition to 
 be led by the thought of Deity ; Harless calls it 
 an inner revelation ; Rothe considers it to be an 
 infallible subjective religious instinct ; Baader and 
 Schubert, as "privity of the soul with the omni- 
 present omniscient God ;" Hoffman, as " an imme- 
 diate self-evidencing of God in man ;" Marheinecke 
 applies to the subject the pantheistic profanity of 
 Hegel, and says that the conscience is the pro- 
 gress of the Absolute Being to self-consciousness in 
 man. Schenkel represents it as the source of all 
 our religious knowledge, the central organ of the 
 religious and moral activity, and asserts that the 
 doctrinal as well as the ethical function originates 
 in the same fundamental organ. 
 
 Philosophically considered, these later views are 
 a palpable retrogression in the course of human 
 thought, and not an advance into a higher stage. 
 For they confuse and absolutely identify the moral 
 and the religious spheres together, and thus vitiate 
 the whole process of enquiry. If we compare German 
 thought, as expressed by Schenkel, with the result of 
 thought in this country, as expressed by Whewell, 
 it is impossible not to be struck with the loose- 
 ness arid inaccuracy of the one compared with the 
 precision and philosophical comprehensiveness of the 
 other. That the leading minds among English 
 
266 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 rationalists recognise Whewell, and not Schenkel, 
 as the expositor of the latest and fullest conclu- 
 sions of human enquiry on the subject of conscience, 
 may be fairly gathered from the language of the 
 critical Review to which I have previously alluded : 
 " Conscience is nothing more than a collective term 
 applied to the sum total of moral sensibilities we 
 possess, however they may have been acquired, and 
 on whatever foundation they may be based." With 
 this summing up of the history of the past I am 
 content to close [5]. 
 
 The foregoing sketch throws into view two pecu- 
 liarities in the history of this controversy. The 
 one consists in the number and variety of the ques- 
 tions brought under dispute. Some of them cannot 
 be said to be definitely determined to the present 
 day. At least six problems require to be solved : 
 
 (1) Is there such a thing as conscience at alH 
 
 (2) What is its sphere % — is it moral action, or is it 
 also religious truth % (3) If there be a conscience, 
 is it one faculty or many 1 (4) Is it innate or ac- 
 quired, or both innate and acquired ? if acquired, is 
 it universally and necessarily acquired 1 (5) In what 
 relation of authority does it stand towards human 
 action on one side, and towards the influences which 
 form it on the other \ (6) On what foundation does 
 the distinction of right and wrong rest % It would 
 not be difficult from the Christian point of view 
 to give definite answers to these questions. These 
 answers would, however, be based on the recognition 
 of the authority of Scripture as the highest exponent 
 
VII] Results of the Enquiry. 267 
 
 of the Creator's will. But the present controversy 
 is with the impugners of the authority of Scripture. 
 Taking them into account it may confidently be 
 asserted that in the whole range of mental and 
 moral philosophy, there is no question, even at our 
 own day, so unsettled, and bristling with so many 
 disputes, as the constitution and functions of the 
 conscience. 
 
 The second characteristic is, that disputants on 
 this subject cannot be classified by their theological 
 predilections. Great variety of opinion is found 
 within the circle of belief on the one side, and the 
 circle of unbelief on the other. If the indepen- 
 dence and supremacy of conscience have generally 
 been maintained by divines, they have also been 
 maintained by free-thinkers, as the Earl of Shaftes- 
 bury, Hartley, and Hume. If the eternal dis- 
 tinctions of right and wrong have been denied 
 by thinkers like Epicurus, Hobbes, and Bentham, 
 they have likewise been denied, although from a 
 totally different standpoint, by eminent theologians 
 such as Ockham, Cumberland, and Paley. No cir- 
 cumstance can more fully illustrate the difficulties 
 of the controversy. Weapons of an analogous 
 character have been used to attack the faith, by 
 Shaftesbury, Hume, and Hartley; and to defend it, 
 by Hutcheson, Cudwoith, and Clarke. 
 
 If, then, the last results of human enquiry into 
 the conscience have been such as I have described 
 them to be, on what ground can we allow to con- 
 science an exaggerated supremacy over the whole 
 
268 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 incomings and outgoings of the human soul ? Su- 
 premacy as a regulative faculty we admit ; but this 
 is very different from ascribing to it an absolute 
 and unlimited desjDotism alike over all human evi- 
 dence and all Divine authority. The rationalist 
 holds the verdict of the conscience to be supreme 
 over all doctrines, with whatever authority they 
 may be authenticated. A despotism so absolute, 
 an accuracy so infallible as even to supersede en- 
 quiry, to discard evidence, and sit above all autho- 
 rity, human and Divine, as the sole and self-sufficient 
 judge and arbiter of truth, is in strange contrast 
 with the surging sea of controversy amid which 
 conscience has its throne. Surely, when rationalism 
 would thus use conscience to shake the very throne 
 of truth, we are entitled to refer it to the conclusions 
 of its own enquiry, and to reply, in the language 
 of inspiration, " Out of thine own mouth will I 
 judge thee." 
 
 It is clear that the conclusions of modern philo- 
 sophy are totally inconsistent with the acceptance 
 of the conscience as the supreme verifying faculty 
 in man. Either a new theory of conscience must 
 be found, or its claims to be the standard of truth 
 must be given up. In at least three particulars 
 the rationalistic argument and the philosophy are 
 at variance. If, according to the philosophy, the 
 conscience be a regulative moral faculty, it is 
 plainly incapable of originating a scheme of be- 
 lief, or exercising, in the examination of evidence, 
 the proper functions of the intellect. Secondly, if 
 
VII] The Sphere of Conscience. 269 
 
 it be an acquired and subordinate faculty, needing 
 to be educated from without, and actually moulded 
 by a thousand external influences, it can possess 
 neither autocratic independence of office, nor un- 
 failing accuracy of perception to direct the judg- 
 ment. It cannot claim to govern where it is itself 
 governed. Thirdly, if it be an individual and per- 
 sonal judge, it can have no powers beyond the sphere 
 of the individual and the personal. Supreme within 
 the judicature of the soul itself, it is totally incom- 
 petent to decide in that higher sphere of Divine 
 things, where it has neither knowledge to compre- 
 hend the details, nor capacity to grasp the whole. 
 I The claim transcends the proper sphere of 
 conscience, and needs powers which it cannot 
 pretend to possess. By the acknowledgment of 
 all, the function of conscience as a judge of truth 
 must be negative, not positive. No one claims 
 for it a suggestive and originating power over 
 the intellect. It has an impulsive power to prompt 
 the pursuit of the morally good and the avoidance 
 of the morally evil, but this is a totally different 
 thing from a power to affirm the truth of doc- 
 trines, or to originate a scheme of religious belief. 
 Its sole conceivable power is a negative function. 
 Conscience can only repudiate the false, but has no 
 faculties for the discovery of the true. If there are 
 certainties capable of being known, there is in man, 
 according to this theory, no capability of knowing 
 them. But if this be admitted it becomes a ques- 
 tion how far the power of discriminating the false 
 
270 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 can possibly exist apart from the power of dis- 
 covering the true. All our knowledge is a know- 
 ledge of contrasts. We know evil and good, joy 
 and sorrow, virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, 
 by their contrasts with each other. We must 
 know the true and the false in the same way, 
 and test them by the same relation. The argu- 
 ment is, that a certain statement relative to God 
 is false. But if we are too absolutely ignorant 
 to be able to say what God is, are we competent 
 to say what God is not? If we are not able to 
 say what God would do, how can we pronounce 
 what He would not do % 
 
 But however this may be, the adequacy of 
 conscience to the great function claimed for it, is 
 disproved by matters of familiar experience. It 
 would be a great claim to advance in behalf of 
 conscience, to say that it should be the test" of 
 other men's actions. It is the ride for our own; 
 but it is too doubtful and capricious to be the 
 rule by which to measure other men. No one 
 man can put himself into another man's place ; 
 or without any further knowledge than what 
 may be derived from his own inner consciousness 
 decide upon the propriety of that man's plans for 
 life, or his conduct as a father towards his chil- 
 dren, or as a master towards his servants. Such 
 a claim would be esteemed simply monstrous. 
 Each man's conscience is the guide for himself; 
 but one man's conscience is not the guide for 
 another man's conscience, and therefore not for 
 
VII] The Sphere of Conscience. 271 
 
 another man's acts. Certain outward actions we 
 can immediately pronounce to be wrong, whoever 
 does them. We do not hesitate to stigmatise with 
 disgrace the act of the murderer, or the liar, or 
 the thief. But the certainty with which we act 
 in such cases is derived from the sentence of the 
 law and the stigma affixed to them alike by the 
 code of human and Divine morality. But these 
 cases form a very small part of the complicated 
 questions lying for the decision of conscience. We 
 must quit the area of actions on which positive 
 law has pronounced its judgment, for actions not so 
 determined. The question is not whether, if each 
 man was in his neighbour's place, he would be able 
 at once to pronounce on the right and wrong 
 of his actions, but whether he is competent to do 
 so, being in his own place, and standing outside 
 the circle of those associations, facts, and circum- 
 stances by which conscience is ever guided in her 
 decisions. 
 
 Such a claim advanced on behalf of any man or 
 body of men over other men would be rejected 
 with contemptuous disdain as the very climax of 
 fanatical presumption. But if it be not tolerable 
 in the relation of man to man, how can it be 
 vindicated in the relation of man to God ? In 
 this case, leaving all revelation on one side, the 
 Being to be judged must be, by the very force 
 of the name we give to Him, alike different in 
 His nature, and immeasurably greater and higher 
 in His attributes than the person who judges 
 
272 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 Him. Nothing but an infallible accuracy of moral 
 percejDtion, and an all-embracing knowledge of out- 
 ward facts, can justify the claim. Will any man 
 assert for the human judgment either of these 
 qualifications 1 
 
 It must further be remembered that the ex- 
 istence of God, and His government over the 
 world, constitute a totally different question from 
 the character of God ; and that with the latter 
 alone does conscience even profess to deal. Sup- 
 pose it to be admitted — what cannot be admitted 
 for a solitary moment — that the character of God 
 as depicted in the sacred Scriptures is harsh and 
 capricious, such, in short, as might excite the 
 terror, but never could conciliate the adoring 
 affection of an intelligent being, — yet this character 
 would not affect the evidences of His existence. 
 
 The proof of this is mainly external. In what 
 we call natural religion, it depends upon traces 
 of intelligent design amid the creation and the 
 government of the world; and in revealed reli- 
 gion on the miracles attesting the promulgation 
 of His will, from the passage of the Red Sea 
 and the sides of quivering Sinai down to the 
 resurrection of Christ, and "the signs and wonders 
 and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost" 
 attesting the authority of the apostles. To these 
 we add the wonderful structure of Scripture itself — 
 a collection of books of divers dates and author- 
 ship, and yet bearing in their unity of design and 
 sublimity of subject, proofs of an intellectual mind, 
 
VII] The Sphere of Conscience. 273 
 
 and a definite plan, as positive as any that are 
 discoverable in the material creation. No doubt 
 it is an appreciable gain and confirmation of this 
 argument, that this revelation contains a portraiture 
 of God calculable to awaken the sublimest thoughts 
 of Him, and the most adoring praise. But if this 
 last element of the case had been absent, its absence 
 would not in any degree have destroyed the inde- 
 pendent evidence for the existence of an intelligent 
 Being, the author of creation and revelation, and 
 identified by broad analogies of principle in the 
 structure of them both. 
 
 These evidences appeal in no degree to con- 
 science. It is possible to conceive a Deity simply 
 awful and tremendous. Conscience might decide 
 that such a Being could not receive its respect 
 and admiration. Shocking, as He would do, all 
 our instincts of right and wrong, affection would 
 become impossible; yet our dislike of His character 
 could not destroy His being : the moral sentiment 
 would have no power to annihilate Him. We 
 might say that we could not love, and will not obey 
 Him ; we might prefer to defy a power we could 
 not resist, and to suffer the extremest penalty rather 
 than voluntarily obey a Being whose attributes 
 excite our fear and dislike. We might say this ; 
 and language to this effect has been uttered by 
 the most prominent master of free thought in 
 our own country [6]. The very use of it intimates 
 his consciousness that evidence may conceivably 
 compel belief in God's existence when we cannot 
 
 T 
 
274 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 recognise His beauty. In other words, no supposed 
 verdict of the conscience can have the slightest 
 possible effect in invalidating the mass of con- 
 sistent testimony proving the being of God and 
 authenticating His revelation. 
 
 I fully acknowledge that it would be a dreadful 
 thing to find ourselves in contact and relation 
 with a terrible Omnipotence whom we could neither 
 reverence nor love, and yet who breaks forth from 
 the unseen world upon the intellect and the heart 
 with an irresistible might of evidence. But sup- 
 pose such was our condition ; would it not sug- 
 gest a suspicion that perhaps we were wrong, not 
 He % Would not the thought occur that some 
 prejudice or misconception must be blinding our 
 eyes, and that the moral defects were in ourselves % 
 Should we not question whether there might not 
 be some human source of error distorting the 
 image of God, just as the earth-born mists distort 
 to our mortal eyes the sun as he shines in the midst 
 of the heavens, as sloping down into the whiter 
 twilight he lifts his red orb just above the horizon, 
 lurid and awful as the glare of a conflagration. 
 
 The distinction thus drawn between our concep- 
 tion of God's character and the evidences of His 
 being and will, finds ready illustration in actual 
 life. Thus, in ancient days, the God of Israel 
 appeared upon the mountain that burned with 
 fire, amid blackness, and darkness, and tempest, 
 and the sound of a trumpet, and the voice of 
 words, and such a dreadful show of majesty and 
 
VII] The Sphere of Conscience. 'lib 
 
 power that Moses himself exceedingly feared and 
 quaked. The impression awakened was not love, 
 but fear, and an awful sense of His severity and 
 justice. " Why should we die 1 for this great fire 
 will coDsume us : if we hear the voice of the 
 Lord our God any more, then we shall die." But 
 that awful terror did not weaken the visible evi- 
 dences of His presence. There was Sinai, burning 
 like a furnace, and their eves and ears caught the 
 tokens of His greatness. The visible evidence 
 deepened the moral sentiment of fear, but the sen- 
 timent did not weaken the evidence. 
 
 The same thing may be observed among our- 
 selves. Many men believe in God, yet regard 
 Him with fear and terror, and under the influence 
 of this feeling banish His name from their lips, 
 and the recollection of Him from their hearts. 
 But the feeling does not change the facts, however 
 much men may dislike them. The feeling itself 
 is perfectly explicable if we turn to the doctrines 
 of the faith. For God is presented as a Holy 
 God, and man as a fallen and guilty creature. 
 What wonder is it that a guilty being, alienated by 
 natural affection, and looking up to this Just Deity 
 as a criminal looks at a strict judge, should think 
 of Him with terror, and shrink from Him in pain- 
 ful dislike 1 If the dogmas of the character of 
 God and the guilty condition of man be true, the 
 feeling could not be otherwise. But suppose a 
 criminal should plead that the law under which 
 he is condemned shocks his feelings, and the very 
 
 T 2 
 
276 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 aspect of the judge contradicts his notions of the 
 fitness of things ; woulcf the feeling change the tre- 
 mendous circumstances of his position, as hanging on 
 the judge's lips he hears the dreadful sentence con- 
 signing him to a grave? Should the sinner plead 
 that the idea of a God of justice and an eternal 
 hell shocks his conscience and contradicts his feel- 
 ing of right and wrong ; would not the answer be 
 that this is very natural under his circumstances, 
 but that it will neither change the facts nor reverse 
 the sentence ? So it is in the present case. Let the 
 verdict of the conscience within the man be what it 
 may, it can neither change the facts outside him 
 nor invalidate the evidence in proof of them. You 
 say that a God, such as He is described in the Bible, 
 shocks your sense of right and wrong, that is, your 
 sense of what God must be. Be it so — the verdict 
 of your conscience is yours, not God's. It therefore 
 affects you, not God. It is not the slightest evidence 
 of any moral defect in God ; but it is strong evi- 
 dence of some great moral defect in yourself. 
 
 II This conclusion is confirmed by the next step. 
 For it must be acknowledged that in familiar 
 things, the human conscience is not gifted with 
 faultless accuracy, still less with infallibility. It is 
 not accurate in its decision in familiar cases, where 
 the whole conditions of the case enter into personal 
 experience. It is not a certain guide for man ; and 
 how then can it be conceived to be a certain guide 
 for God ? If insufficient for the human sphere, it 
 must be far more insufficient for the Divine. 
 
VII] The Powers of Conscience. 211 
 
 This inaccuracy and this defect in conscience can- 
 not be disputed by any school of opinion. They 
 meet us equally when we look to the past or to the 
 present. In the past, we see them in the acknow- 
 ledged variations in the verdict of the conscience. 
 There is scarcely an act shocking to our convic- 
 tions, which, at some other period of the world 
 and among some other men, has not been con- 
 sidered allowable, if not laudable. What our con- 
 sciences, enlightened by Christian teaching, pronounce 
 to be vices, the consciences of other men have 
 pronounced to be virtues ; and what we esteem to 
 be virtues, they have considered to be vices. Acts 
 held by us in actual detestation, infanticide, for 
 instance, awakens no sense of moral guilt in the 
 Hindoo or the Chinese. Humility and forgiveness 
 of injuries, prominent in our catalogue of graces, 
 were defects of character in the estimate of the 
 ancient heathen moralists. The taking of human 
 life, incest, and what has been called even among 
 ourselves the wild justice of revenge, have been, 
 and are still held to be natural, and even proofs 
 of manly vigour. This variation is no disproof 
 of the existence of a conscience, because some dis- 
 tinction of right and wrong exists among all men. 
 Every race and period have had their code of con- 
 scieDce, however perverted. But they are positive 
 disproofs of the accuracy and infallibility of the 
 conscience, therefore of its capability to be the 
 absolute judge of what is congruous or incon- 
 gruous with God, and the absolute test of truth. 
 
278 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 The evidence is the same in the familiar sphere 
 of our own daily life. The inconsistencies of human 
 conduct are palpable, and are only thrown into 
 stronger contrast by the intellect and powers of 
 the agents. There is a strange mixture of good 
 and evil, strength and weakness, in the best of 
 men. Not infrequently the greatest moral in- 
 firmity is found to co-exist with the highest intel- 
 lectual vigour. The familiar history of remarkable 
 men places this beyond question. The clearest 
 sense of moral right may be found side by side 
 with the strongest propension to moral wrong. It 
 must be evident that in these cases the general 
 gifts of the man do not detract from the guilt 
 of the wrongdoing, but very largely aggravate its 
 character and increase its responsibility. 
 
 We are, therefore, reduced to two alternatives. 
 Either the conscience and the conduct are concur- 
 rent, and then if the conduct is wrong the con- 
 science must be wrong likewise : or they are not 
 concurrent, and then the sentence of the conscience 
 is but the idle decree of a powerless judge. If, in 
 this case, its decision be too faint and weak to 
 control character and conduct, how can so infirm 
 and impotent a faculty be thought worthy of the 
 dignity of being throned as the absolute monarch 
 of the sentient and feeling soul of man? 
 
 These plain facts of human experience must 
 be admitted by all men, and there is no way of 
 escaping the conclusion without impugning the ac- 
 curacy of our moral judgments. For if it be said 
 
VII] The Powers of Conscience. 279 
 
 that there is no immutable morality, but that 
 everything is right that a man thinks to be right, 
 we only reduce conscience to yet greater futility 
 and extend the uncertainty from the faculty to 
 the material with which it deals. If there be no 
 immutable morality, there can be no trustworthy 
 and infallible conscience. If there is an immutable 
 morality, the faculty of conscience is found incapable 
 of discovering and verifying it. How then shall it 
 become the verifying judge of a Divine revelation % 
 
 Here again, when we turn to the doctrines of 
 the faith, the dogma explains the facts, and the 
 facts verify the dogma. The doctrine of the cor- 
 ruption of human nature removes all difficulty. 
 For why should it be supposed that conscience 
 has escaped the general corruption more than any 
 other part of the human constitution % The moral 
 nature is the essential seat of sin, and the moral 
 faculty may be expected to show its effects more 
 than any other. The depravity is both in the 
 regulative power itself, and in the sphere it regu- 
 lates ; both in the monarch and in the kingdom. 
 In the faculty itself the perception of right and 
 wrong has grown dim, inconstant, variable, un- 
 certain. It has lost the energy and force of its 
 primeval constitution. It is placed amid the will 
 and the affections, the very strongholds of sin, the 
 very springs of its life. Relatively to the other por- 
 tions of our nature, conscience still retains its pre- 
 dominance as the impulsive and regulative power ; 
 but, in common with the other portions, it shares the 
 
280 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 effects of the Fall, and thus may become the blind 
 leader of the blind. Before it can fulfil its proper 
 office it must be itself corrected and enlightened, 
 and this necessarily from the outside. The wrong 
 measure can only be tested by comparison with 
 a right measure, and the correction can only be 
 supplied by the faith. So far, therefore, is con- 
 science from being the judge of truth, that truth is 
 needed to rectify conscience. 
 
 That the Bible contains the highest and purest 
 morality known to man is the general conviction 
 of mankind, and the conviction is not weakened 
 by the murmured dissent of a few. In truth, 
 the moral code of our day has derived its ele- 
 vation from the faith, although it ungratefully dis- 
 owns the obligation. When this highest of all 
 moral codes is brought into contact with the con- 
 science, the moral faculty, so far from being 
 shocked at the dogmas of revealed truth, accepts 
 them with adoring reverence. The objection to 
 the morality of Christian dogma arises not from 
 those within the Church, and who know it best, 
 for they live upon it, but from those without. 
 
 If it be replied that the conscience of the Chris- 
 tian Church is blind and uninformed, this only 
 brings us back to the same point, and confirms 
 anew the fallibility and vaiiabihty of conscience. 
 What security can therefore be gained by its de- 
 cision % Yet the entire plea for the verifying 
 faculty of conscience rests on this assumption, 
 that the human conscience is, if I may so word 
 
VII] The Data of Conscience. 281 
 
 it without irreverence, the standard of the Divine 
 conscience. ' I should not think it right to act 
 in such a manner, and therefore it is not right 
 for God to act in it. I am so certain that I 
 am right, and that mj right is the measure of 
 God's right, that I discard all other evidence, and 
 fling away all other proof. Christian dogma makes 
 God different in His nature and actions from what 
 I think He ought to be, and therefore I unhesi- 
 tatingly regret the dogma/ The whole argument 
 hangs on the infallibility of the human conscience. 
 Give that up, and the whole superstructure falls. 
 
 Ill But there is another matter to be considered. 
 I said that the claim advanced on behalf of the 
 conscience required not only absolute accuracy in 
 the action of the faculty, but a perfect know- 
 ledge of all the facts of the case submitted to it. 
 In the absence of this, it must judge on partial 
 and imperfect data, and the conclusion will be as 
 partial, that is, as untrue, as the data. A judge 
 needs to be acquainted with all the circumstances 
 of the case in their minute particulars, and in all 
 their mutual bearings, or else the most consummate 
 ability and the most perfect balance of judgment 
 will not preserve him from mistake. A decision 
 perfectly right on half the facts, may be perfectly 
 wrong upon the whole of them. If conscience 
 were infallible as God, its decisions would become 
 fallible if made upon a partial knowledge of the 
 facts. It is a matter of familiar experience that 
 some apparently minute circumstance may alter 
 
282 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 the character of an entire series of transactions. 
 Omitted facts make all the difference between a 
 cruel murder and a legal execution, a kindly act 
 and a forgery, a deed of oppression and an act of 
 benevolence. Could we conceive a perfect stranger 
 admitted into a household and watching the con- 
 duct of a parent towards his child in some particular 
 act without having any acquaintance with the cha- 
 racter of the two, or the circumstances under which 
 they are acting, is it not very likely that he would 
 come to a totally wrong conclusion, and perhaps im- 
 pute to the passion or prejudice of the father, what 
 springs out of the purest love and the most self- 
 denying consideration for his child's good ? The 
 commonest experience ratifies the maxim, that a 
 judge needs to know the entire facts of a case 
 before he can decide its moral character. 
 
 If this be true between man and man, on no 
 principle can it be supjDosed to be less true* between 
 man and God. Conscience cannot pronounce with- 
 out a perfect knowledge of all the facts of the case. 
 
 Such a knowledge it does not possess. Reve- 
 lation does not profess to be a transcript of the 
 Divine mind ; nor is it possible that it should be. 
 The multifarious details of human history baffle the 
 possible grasp of mortal intellect. No history ever 
 written professes to be exhaustive, or to contain 
 more than a certain selection from the compli- 
 cated events making up the sum-total of life. 
 The Bible professes to give such information re- 
 lative to the past history of the world and the 
 
VII] The Data of Conscience. 283 
 
 dealings of God towards man, as God sees to be 
 necessary for our good, including in that good the 
 discipline of faith, alike in the acceptance of what is 
 revealed and in submission to what is withheld. In 
 every case enough is made known for practical action, 
 but for curiosity literally nothing. In every case, 
 either of revealed fact or revealed dogma, enough in- 
 formation is communicated to guide faith, but not 
 enough to make captious objection impossible. 
 
 Just consider the nature of the case. Take, in the 
 first place, the sacred history, in which a diligent 
 ingenuity has laboured to find things contradic- 
 tory to our moral sense, as, for instance, in the 
 much abused instance of the destruction of the 
 Canaanitish nations. I do not argue the case 
 here, for it has been done abundantly over and 
 over again. I only take it as an illustration of 
 a general principle. The whole facts of the case 
 are not known to us. Consider the immense 
 lapse of centuries included in the sacred narra- 
 tive of the Old Testament ; consider the moral 
 purposes of the revelation, and the necessity of 
 giving prominence to the gradual development of 
 God's great remedial plan of salvation : then 
 suppose that the history of all this connected 
 series of transactions had been given in full ; — 
 what a prodigious history would it not have 
 made! Who could ever have waded through it, 
 or what ordinary mind could have disentangled its 
 spiritual and eternal verities from the mass of 
 facts with which they must have been embedded 
 
284 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 and overlaid 1 In such a case the whole structure 
 of the book must have been changed, and the office 
 which the Bible actually fulfils to mankind would 
 have become impracticable. There is an immense 
 range for thought here. It is enough to repeat 
 that in no case are the whole facts known. In 
 no case, therefore, has conscience the materials for 
 a certain decision against the inspired narrative. 
 
 But the case is indefinitely stronger when we 
 pass from the revealed facts to the revealed dog- 
 mas. Here we deal not with man, but with God ; 
 not with the relations of earth, but with the 
 infinitely complex relations of the government of 
 God over the world. Pause over them for a 
 moment, that we may realise the absolute im- 
 possibility of the human intellect ever compassing 
 and measuring them all. Think of God Him- 
 self, so different from ourselves, that only through 
 human analogies is it possible to know aught 
 about Him ; think of the complicated and varied 
 interests involved in His government of this world 
 of ours — in the creation of man at the first, and 
 in the plan of salvation, as during the jDeriod of 
 four thousand years it ripened gradually towards 
 its accomplishment ; think of the lapse of time 
 covered by the counsels of God as they reached 
 backward and forward from the eternity before time 
 to the eternity after it. Then with these thoughts 
 contrast the blunders made by the highest human 
 wisdom in the comparatively simple interests of 
 ;i single nation, or even of a single man; and our 
 
VII] The Data of Conscience. 285 
 
 absolute ignorance of the future and its contin- 
 gencies — an ignorance, shared by the foresight of 
 the wisest politician to an extent far beyond what 
 we commonly realise. Then say what is the capa- 
 city of the human mind to measure or unravel, 
 or even understand such a government. 
 
 Moreover, let it be remembered that even this 
 is not all. In order to understand God's deal- 
 ings we must take into account not only His 
 relations towards man, but His relations likewise 
 towards all the other portions of His universe. 
 Such considerations must have their jidace. The 
 analogy of human things teaches us that the con- 
 duct of any given person towards another must 
 depend in part upon the position in which he 
 stands, not to that person only, but towards others. 
 For instance, we speak familiarly of the necessity 
 of punishing crime in order to deter others from 
 committing it; and in certain cases when that 
 strange contagion of crime observable at periods 
 is at work in society, we rightly argue that it 
 is necessary, and just, and wise, and even bene- 
 volent to increase the severity of punishment in 
 order to increase the emphasis of the warning. 
 In all such cases the conduct of the magistrate 
 towards the single criminal is justly modified by the 
 consideration of others who are not criminals nor 
 personally concerned in that immediate transaction. 
 
 So it must necessarily be with God. His con- 
 duct towards man, speaking after a human manner 
 and from human analogies, must be modified by 
 
286 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 His relation towards other beings, or at least de- 
 termined with respect to them. We are judging 
 of a God who does not rule this world alone, but 
 ten thousand worlds, in an universe full of life 
 and intelligence, and resonant with praise. Thus 
 in order to possess the data for judging God, we 
 should need to know the exact position of the 
 unfallen spirits, and in what way it is that they 
 are concerned in the life and death of Christ. Then 
 we need to know all His relations towards the fallen 
 spirits who left their first estate, and are reserved 
 in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judg- 
 ment of the great day. Lastly, we need to know 
 what other globes are inhabited ; what are the na- 
 ture, position, and interests of the inhabitants, and 
 what their knowledge of the events passing upon 
 this world of ours. What an immense range of in- 
 formation ! and yet without it the materials for a 
 judgment are palpably absent. 
 
 Now who would say that any human intellect 
 can discover these matters, or would be capable 
 of comprehending them, and grasping them at 
 once in their immense aggregate and all the rela- 
 tions of their parts, even if they were revealed. No 
 human understanding is competent to say how 
 the Governor of such a universe ought to act or 
 ought not to act. The simple issue is here : What 
 human being would be capable of administering 
 such a government for a single hour \ Suppose 
 the man possessed of infinite authority and un- 
 limited strength, but just as he is, with his human 
 
VII] The Data of Conscience. 287 
 
 faculties and no more, to exercise them. I believe 
 that the wildest dream that ever entered into a 
 madman's brain never compassed so huge an im- 
 possibility as this would be. 
 
 Yet, if wo do not know how such a world 
 ought to be governed in all its parts, we do not 
 know how it ought to be governed in any one of 
 them. And if we do not know this, we have not 
 the facts of the case, and in this ignorance the 
 human conscience, even if it were itself accurate as 
 God, could not form a judgment. 
 
 The great Christian dogmas are all of them of 
 this character — that they include considerations ne- 
 cessarily reaching, and positively declared to reach, 
 far beyond this our world. Such, for instance, is 
 the dogma of the punitive justice of God; for 
 the measure meted by absolute truth to the whole 
 of the universe He governs must palpably be equal 
 to all. Such is the dogma of the atonement ; for 
 as there is but one only-begotten Son of God 
 revealed to exist, His incarnation, death, resur- 
 rection, and session in glory, must reach far be- 
 yond us. This is stated to be the case. Angels 
 ministered to Him. Among the denizens of the 
 New Jerusalem are specified an innumerable com- 
 pany of angels and the general Church of the 
 first-born. We are told that into the mysteries 
 of the work of Christ archangels desire to look, and 
 that principalities and powers in heavenly places 
 learn from the Church the manifold wisdom of 
 God. Such is the dogma of a future place of 
 
288 Conscience, and its relation to the Faith. [Lect. 
 
 eternal punishment ; for we are expressly told that 
 it was prepared for the devil and his angels. To 
 bring such dogmas to the bar of the human con- 
 science, and pronounce upon their right and wrong 
 in the face of the undeniable inconsistencies, mis- 
 takes, and crimes of familiar life, appears to me to 
 be an act worthy of the audacity of an angel, and 
 as clearly condemned by the voice of all human ex- 
 perience as by the language of the inspired Word. 
 
 Thus we are enabled to place the conscience 
 and the dogmatic faith side by side, and to ad- 
 just their relations to each other. The comparison 
 is not between the claims of revealed Christianity 
 on one side, and the verdict of an universal 
 human conscience on the other. There is no such 
 universal conscience, and the conception of it is 
 but a dream. The contrast only lies, therefore, 
 between the authoritv of the individual conscience 
 and the claims of revelation. The personal opinion 
 of single men relative to what is right and 
 wrong is pitted against the grand doctrines of 
 the faith, authenticated as they are by a mass 
 of irresistible evidence, as by the signature of 
 God Himself, and ratified by the adoring ac- 
 ceptance of the great majority of mankind. That 
 there is any real conflict between faith and con- 
 science the Church most emphatically denies, and 
 has the best right to deny, unless it can be sup- 
 posed that her faith during all ages has been 
 only an enormous hypocrisy. The conflict is be- 
 tween the conscience of a small minority of man- 
 
VII] The Conscience under Authority. 289 
 
 kind and the faith once delivered to the saints. 
 Which of them shall obey ; which be supreme % 
 
 The fact that the consciences of men are not 
 unanimous on the subject of Christian doctrines 
 suffices to give the answer. The dogmas declared 
 by some to shock their moral sense, are regarded 
 by others with adoring praise and admiration. 
 The truth is that conscience, in either case, re- 
 flects the influences by which it has been edu- 
 cated. In the one case, it takes counsel of the 
 pride of reason, and of the natural distaste for 
 Divine things, inseparable from a fallen and cor- 
 rupted nature ; in the other case, it is moulded 
 by the Spirit of God, acting through the revela- 
 tion of His will. That there are in human nature 
 certain ultimate moral principles, distinguishing 
 between right and wrong, and lying at the foun- 
 dation of all moral judgments, we may well be- 
 lieve. But the Fall has weakened and darkened 
 them, and they shine as no clear beacon, but as 
 a dim and ambiguous light. The hand of the Spirit 
 of God must trim the lamp, and His breath fan 
 the flame. The authority of conscience is deriva- 
 tive; and from what fountain shall it be drawn but 
 from the everlasting springs of the Divine truth ? 
 Then alone is the candle of the Lord within man 
 competent to fulfil its great function, when it is 
 set beneath the footstool of God, and derives from 
 Him, the inexhaustible Source of light, wisdom to 
 see and force to govern. 
 
LECTURE VIII 
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF BELIEF 
 i Cor. xvi. 13 
 
 Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men, 
 he strong. 
 
 J. HE associations of war and battle breathe in 
 every word of this exhortation. It touches the 
 heart as the spirit-stirring address of a trusted 
 leader touches the hearts of his comrades at some 
 great emergency of the conflict. As the foe 
 gathers in the distance, half hidden behind the 
 brow of the hill or beneath the shadow of the 
 forest, and it remains doubtful for the moment 
 at what quarter the storm will break, his warn- 
 ing voice calls to vigilance, " Watch ye." As the 
 tide of war rolls its threatening masses onwards, 
 and the advancing column of the enemy, grim 
 and ominous as a thunder-cloud, threatens to over- 
 whelm the slender line of defenders, the leader's 
 clear voice is heard in the momentary hush of sus- 
 pense, exhorting them to steadiness and constancy — 
 
The Conflict of Faith. 291 
 
 " Stand fast." As the opposing lines break in the 
 shock of battle confusedly, like the meeting of two 
 angry tides, and warrior contends hand to hand with 
 warrior, the familiar voice still sounds amid the 
 tumult, " Quit you like men." As beneath the fury 
 of the assault the line of the patriot host shakes 
 and wavers, and the crisis calls for a courage pre- 
 pared to die, but never to yield, I picture to 
 myself the figure of the dauntless leader as he 
 lifts his banner aloft and shouts, " Be strong." So 
 graphic is the language that it suggests the scene 
 — a vivid mind-painting of the actual reality, as the 
 battle of the warrior with confused noise, and gar- 
 ments rolled in blood, surges to and fro in the issues 
 of the doubtful conflict. 
 
 Some such scenes must have been present to the 
 mind of St. Paul when he wrote these words. Yet 
 there was nothing whatever in his position and 
 local circumstances at the time to suggest the illus- 
 tration. At other times when he employed language 
 of the same character, the associations of the mo- 
 ment naturally furnished the imagery. Thus when 
 he exhorted the Ephesians to put on the whole 
 armour of God, the girdle of truth, and the breast- 
 plate of righteousness, and the sandals of peace, and 
 the shield of faith, and the helmet of salvation, and 
 to take the sword of the Spirit, he wrote the words 
 in the barrack of the praetorian guards at Rome. 
 The clash of military accoutrements, the sound of 
 arms, the trumpet-call, the pomp of the parade, 
 surrounded him on every side. It was probably from 
 
 U 2 
 
292 The Obligations of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 the same spot, and in the sight of the rugged war- 
 beaten soldiers who guarded him during his second 
 imprisonment, that he exhorted Timothy : " Thou, 
 therefore, endure hardness as a good soldier of 
 Jesus Christ." But his Epistles to the Corinthians 
 were written from Ephesus, and a totally different 
 class of associations surrounded him at this half- 
 Greek, half-Oriental metropolis of Asia. The sea- 
 port crowded with the trade of the Mediterranean, 
 the inhabitants thronging with song and jest into 
 the amphitheatre, or gathering in the temple, where 
 Diana of the Ephesians was worshipped with semi- 
 barbaric grandeur and the rites of a dark super- 
 stition, were the prominent objects here. Neither 
 local association nor historical record can have 
 helped to suggest to the apostle's mind the ideas 
 of war. If, therefore, in writing from this spot 
 he employs military illustrations, it can only have 
 been from their peculiar fitness to express his 
 meaning ; because they convey the realities of the 
 Christian calling with a graphic vividness and force 
 nothing else could have supplied. 
 
 The structure of the verse, when closely examined, 
 furnishes the interpretation of its language. For 
 it involves two ideas — the moral qualities exer- 
 cised in the contest, and the object for which the 
 contest is maintained. Men do not fight for no- 
 thing. It is not possible to exercise heroic virtues 
 for the sake of exercising them. All moral actions 
 are means directed to an end ; they require a 
 definite and intelligible purpose, and derive from 
 
VIII] Faith as an Object. 293 
 
 the worthiness of this purpose alike their existence 
 and their dignity. To be watchful for the mere 
 sake of exercising watchfulness, and with no object 
 to preserve ; to stand fast without any adequate 
 reason for standing fast, or any definite position 
 on which to stand ; to call out the manly virtues 
 of constancy and courage without any occasion for 
 their exercise ; to tax strength in order to beat the 
 air, would be to make human nature contemptible, 
 and to destroy the very grounds of virtue and 
 vice. The subjective qualities of vigilance, and forti- 
 tude, and manliness, and energy, require occasion, 
 and the occasion must be supplied by an objective 
 something lying beyond and outside of the quali- 
 ties themselves. 
 
 No ingenious manipulation of the words can 
 get rid of this necessity for an object, because 
 it is seated in the constitution of man, and is 
 inseparable from his created dependence. Their 
 meaning cannot be satisfied in the maintenance 
 of given states of mind; for there must be reasons 
 for maintaining them. If we say that the ex- 
 hortation is directed to the cultivation of the 
 religious affections, we only reach the same con- 
 clusion in another way. The dogma, as the root 
 of affection, underlies the moral soil everywhere, 
 and crops up into view. We are to watch, lest 
 through spiritual carelessness we are led away 
 from God ; to stand fast, lest violent temptation 
 should hurry us into sin ; to be steadfast, lest 
 we weary under temptation ; and strong, alike to 
 
294 The Obligations of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 do and to bear, lest out of mere infirmity and 
 weariness we leave our life-work undone. But if 
 there be danger of our being led away from God, 
 there must be a God from whom to be led away. 
 If there be a danger of our being hurried into 
 sin, there must be a law to be infringed. If 
 there be a danger of our growing weary under 
 temptation, there must be something which we 
 ought to do, and something which we ought not 
 to do, and an obligation to pursue the one and 
 to avoid the other. If there be danger of our 
 leaving our work undone, there must be a task 
 to be accomplished, and a reason for accomplish- 
 ing it. Watchfulness without a cause would 
 become unsettled restlessness, fortitude an irra- 
 tional obstinacy, manliness would degenerate into 
 rugged discourtesy, and strength of energy into 
 a display of force, meaningless and therefore con- 
 temptible. 
 
 Some positive truths and fixed principles un- 
 derlie all moral action. But what is positive and 
 fixed is dogmatic. Men are not distinguisehd 
 from each other by the fact that some of them 
 act on dogmatic truths and others do not. They 
 are only distinguished by the nature of the truths 
 they accept, and the reasons for accepting them. 
 A -Trod (tto is needed by all alike ; the question is 
 where we shall find it. Some men rest the basis 
 of their positive principles on themselves, and be- 
 come their own law. Other men dig deeper, and 
 finding that the firmest human principles rest on 
 
VIII] Faith as a Quality. 295 
 
 nothing stronger than the quicksand, derive their 
 positive principles from revelation, and accept their 
 law from God. Men deceive themselves when they 
 profess to reject dogma. They only substitute a 
 human for a Divine foundation for it. 
 
 Thus, in the present text, the quality of faith is 
 involved in the virtues called into exercise. In a 
 Christian point of view, faith is the root of all 
 virtues ; for faith is the hand by which we lay 
 hold of God; and like the God on whom we lay 
 hold, its attributes vary with its relations. We 
 call God wise, and holy, and just, and good, and 
 mighty, just as the occasion calls into display 
 one attribute of His indivisible being or another. 
 So faith becomes impersonated in one grace or 
 another, according to the occasions calling for its 
 exercise. In the presence of fraud it becomes 
 vigilance, in the presence of danger fortitude ; 
 beneath the pressure of difficulty it is manliness, 
 and in prolonged trial strength and energy. But 
 the life of the grace is the same in every case. 
 Faith is the vital principle; and the whole spiritual 
 life ebbs and flows with its alternations. It is 
 faith that overcometh the world. All things are 
 possible to faith, because all things are possible 
 with God. " If ye have faith as a grain of mustard 
 seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence 
 to yonder place ; and it shall remove ; and nothing 
 shall be impossible unto you a ." 
 
 This is the quality of faith. But belief cannot 
 a Matt. xvii. 20. 
 
296 The Obligations of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 exist without something that is believed. This is 
 the object of faith. Faith is not exercised for the 
 sake of itself, but for the sake of what it makes 
 known to us. When this object consists of the truths 
 of revelation, these too are called " the faith," 
 because they rest on the authority of God, and 
 deal with verities lying beyond the sphere of 
 sight. The faith believing and the faith believed 
 are correlative ideas, and never can be far separated 
 from each other. Without the objective reality the 
 subjective quality would be impossible. The two 
 ideas lie embedded together in the language of the 
 text, and neither of them can survive without the 
 other. The quality is constitutionally adapted to 
 the object as the eye is adapted to light, the ear 
 to sound, or the wings of an eagle to the atmosphere 
 through which it soars towards the sun. Faith in 
 both its aspects is secondary, not primary. Bevealed 
 truths are not the central orb of religion ; they 
 are but its atmosphere, necessary but instrumental. 
 They reflect the sun's rays, but do not produce them. 
 The primal fountain is in Christ. His own grand 
 words describe His own grand mission : " I am the 
 light of the world." 
 
 To vindicate the reality and claims of the faith, 
 and to show that it is essentially and necessarily 
 dogmatic, has been the object of these lectures. 
 A brief recapitulation of the argument will show 
 what point I have reached, and enable me to 
 place into immediate contact the object of faith 
 and the quality of faith. From the height of 
 
VIII] Recapitulation. 297 
 
 the truth alone can we adequately appreciate the 
 obligations and the nobility of the duty. 
 
 The facts of the case stand thus. The Scrip- 
 tures assert themselves to contain a revelation from 
 God, communicating such a knowledge of the 
 past, such an explanation of the present, and 
 such promises and directions relative to the future, 
 as are necessary to make us wise unto salvation. 
 The truths contained in this revelation constitute 
 a connected and organised whole, and are described 
 as " the faith." They claim to have a Divine 
 authority by virtue of their Author. Inasmuch 
 as God has given no subsequent revelation, and 
 has declared that He will give none, they admit 
 neither of addition nor of diminution. They are 
 entrusted to the keeping of the Church, and as 
 a result of this trusteeship, are formulated for 
 the purposes of instruction and convenience into 
 Church creeds. This "system of faith is necessarily 
 dogmatic because it is authoritative. It does not 
 propound theories for discussion, but offers to man- 
 kind terms of salvation for acceptance. Whatever 
 is dogmatic claims to be authoritative. In the 
 full sense of the word there can be no dogma be- 
 yond the circle of Divine revelation. But dogma, 
 the expression of Divine authority, is as widely 
 separated from dogmatism, the expression of human 
 arrogance, as the supremacy and omniscience of God 
 are separated from the dependency and fallibility of 
 man. 
 
 This is the claim of the Scriptures. It involves 
 
298 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 three conditions, all affirmed in the sacred writings, 
 and making up in their combination what I have 
 ventured to call the theory of dogma. It includes 
 the existence of an organised Church, taking its 
 origin from the date of the Christian era, and 
 extending uninterruptedly "unto the end of the 
 world." Synchronising with the Church in its 
 origin and duration is a body of definite doctrines 
 regarding God and man and their mutual rela- 
 tions, like the Divine Master around whose Per- 
 son they are grouped, the same yesterday, to-day, 
 and for ever. In addition to the Church and the 
 faith, the trusteeship and the trust, the theory 
 includes likewise the trust-deeds in a collection 
 of authoritative and inspired documents, consti- 
 tuting at once the credentials of the Church and 
 the standard of the faith. If the claim of the 
 Scriptures be true, these three conditions of the 
 theory must have had an historical realisation, and 
 must admit of being proved by ordinary histo- 
 rical evidence. In every branch of this question 
 the evidence is equally copious and conclusive. 
 
 The Church of Christ does exist, and has ex- 
 isted beyond dispute from the time of Clnist to 
 the present moment. Its course may be traced 
 clearly as the current of some great river back- 
 wards to the century elapsing between the years 
 of Home 750 and 850. Whatever different accounts 
 may be given of its origin, no one professes to trace 
 it further into the past, nor calls into question its 
 continuity into the present. During this period 
 
VIII] Recapitulation. 299 
 
 of well-nigh two thousand years the unanimous 
 testimony of all the Church writers affirms the 
 dogmatic character of her faith as a message given 
 to her by God in order that she may communi- 
 cate it to the world. Enormous changes have 
 been accomplished during the period of her own 
 existence, and the inexhaustible activity of her 
 own mental and religious life has stimulated con- 
 troversy within her own pale ; yet never has she 
 faltered, never hesitated on the Divine character 
 of her commission and the grand responsibilities 
 of her trusteeship. The heroic history of her 
 labours, sufferings, and triumphs is but the natural 
 outgrowth of her Divine institution, Divhie com- 
 mission, and Divine strength, — God her founder, 
 the Word of God her message, and the Spirit of 
 God her strength. 
 
 This testimony of the Church is corroborated 
 by the identity of the faith. The Divine deposit 
 is at hand and can be identified. If we take 
 the Nicene Creed as the embodiment of the 
 Church's doctrine, we are carried back at a step 
 towards the third century of the Christian era. 
 When we take into account the history of the 
 Creed, the circumstances of its composition, the 
 controversies producing it, and the (Ecumenical 
 Council by which it was promulgated, the evidence 
 is thrown from the beginning of the fourth cen- 
 tury far backwards towards the first. A line of 
 independent witnesses carry the genealogy of the 
 doctrine into the circle of the apostolic days. The 
 
300 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 dogmas of the Christian religion neither find their 
 birth-time in the sixteenth century, as some have 
 ventured to affirm, nor in the mediaeval ages, nor 
 yet in the time of Constantine, but in the personal 
 ministries of our blessed Lord and His immediate 
 apostles. 
 
 Here the third condition closes up and com- 
 pletes the theory. The authoritative documents 
 constituting the credentials of the Church and the 
 standard of the dogma survive still in the sacred 
 Scriptures. The desultory efforts made here and 
 there to impugn their authenticity and credibility 
 rather illustrate the consilient testimony in their 
 favour than justify a doubt either as to their date 
 or their authorship. The evidences ramify so widely 
 that to tear them up involves the disturbance of 
 the whole ground of all historical certitude. For 
 instance, if it be asserted that the Gospel of 
 St. John was not written till the second centurv, 
 it remains to be explained how three of the Apo- 
 stolic Fathers, Clement of Home, Barnabas, and 
 Ignatius, can have quoted the book before it was 
 written. That the dogmas of the Christian faith 
 are taught in the inspired Word, is a fact entering 
 into the common text-books of this University. On 
 this ground of their inspired authority alone does 
 the Church of England teach them, because they 
 may be proved "by most certain warrants of Holy 
 Scripture." 
 
 This is the affirmative side of the facts. It 
 presents us with a dogmatic faith, changeless, apo- 
 
VIII] Recapitulation. 301 
 
 stolical, Divine. Here we are content to rest. We 
 hold as the ground of our own hope, and preach 
 as the only ground of hope for others, the faith 
 which the glorious company of the apostles, and the 
 goodly fellowship of the prophets, and the noble 
 army of martyrs, and the holy Church throughout 
 all the world, have held and preached from the 
 beginning. 
 
 But from the same storehouse of facts we draw 
 alike the vindication of the truth and the refutation 
 of its opposite errors. Are we told that Christianity 
 has lived and triumphed, not by virtue of its defi- 
 nite faith, but in spite of it, and only because it 
 has embodied and expressed the natural sentiment 
 of religion found to exist universally among man- 
 kind % We point to the facts of the case in reply. 
 They show that religion never has existed, and never 
 can exist, without a creed. The experiment was 
 actually made in the sceptical philosophy of the 
 ancients; and when dogmatic teaching died, religion 
 died, and morality perished with it. The know- 
 ledge of positive religious truth, religion and virtue, 
 were all buried in the same yawning grave of pagan 
 demoralisation and misery. 
 
 Are we told that Christianity may be swept 
 away, and the natural insight of the human soul 
 into Divine things can replace its teaching with a 
 purer, fairer, and nobler creed ? Again I point to 
 the facts in answer. What the soul's intuitive 
 powers have done is the only conceivable test of 
 what they are competent to do. Yet there is not 
 
302 The Obligations of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 to be found one solitary truth accepted as truth by 
 any portion whatever of civilised mankind, which is 
 not contained within the circle of revealed doctrine, 
 and which does not derive from revelation its au- 
 thority, if not its very existence. 
 
 Are we told that Christian doctrines are only the 
 formulas of human theology ; and since they have 
 the same technical form and origin, have the same 
 authority, and no more, as any other product of 
 human speculation 1 I appeal to the facts in proof 
 that the premiss is wrong, and, therefore, that the 
 conclusion is wrong. The system of faith differs 
 diametrically from the system of speculation in its 
 objects, its methods, and its instruments. Specula- 
 tion is but the product of the human intellect, 
 reasoning from assumptions created by itself, and 
 disavowing any other means of information than are 
 supplied by its own self-contained and autocratic 
 powers. The doctrines of the faith are general- 
 isations from the inspired Word of God, and 
 possess all the authority belonging to the Word. 
 If the Word be of God, they are also of God. 
 The human form of expression does not change 
 the Divine realities. Totally different in character, 
 they have been totally different likewise in the 
 course of their history. Speculation, ever since men 
 began to think, has produced a succession of efforts 
 and a succession of failures. Gleams of Divine truth 
 have been caught from time to time, either to be 
 frittered away in logical refinement, or evaporated 
 into sceptical uncertainty. Side by side with (he 
 
VIII] Recapitulation. 303 
 
 undecaying youth and vitality of Christian doctrine 
 stands the latest development of speculative thought, 
 proclaiming in the Positivism of Comte the extent 
 and absoluteness of its own ignorance, and regard- 
 ing it as the loftiest of discoveries. 
 
 No sooner is this door of objection closed than 
 another is opened. In claiming for Christianity 
 the glory of the past since the Christian era, and 
 regarding it as the spring of our marvellous pro- 
 gress, intellectual, moral, social, and political, we 
 are ascribing to religion, so we are told, what is 
 properly due to other causes. The softening of 
 men's manners, the growth of their social life, the 
 advancement of political liberty, a free spirit of 
 enquiry, and an energetic enterprise, and not least 
 of all the progress of toleration, are asserted to be 
 due to civilisation, not to Christianity. Dogmatic 
 religion is so far from having accomplished these 
 results, that but for its hindrances they would have 
 been far greater and higher. Such is the plea. 
 Again I turn to the facts, and I find that what we 
 call human civilisation has not culminated by an 
 unbroken progress from the beginning, but has 
 been divided into two great periods. Ancient civi- 
 lisation was already in articulo mortis, perishing 
 by the weight of its own intolerable evils, when 
 Christian civilisation arose. The grand distinction 
 in the character of the two is to be found in the 
 moral elements absent in the one and predominant 
 in the other. These characteristic elements, sharp 
 and crisp in the contrast of the sceptical and 
 
304 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 dogmatic periods, are every one of them traceable to 
 Scriptural doctrines, out of which they have grown, 
 and with which they stand or fall. Now the differ- 
 ence in the results of the two civilisations must be 
 explained, not by their points of resemblance, but 
 their points of discrepancy. The characteristic re- 
 sults follow the characteristic principles, and these 
 principles, in the case of the latter civilisation, are 
 the dogmas of the Christian faith. 
 
 But the effort to find a rival to Christianity fail- 
 ing, a last desperate attempt is made to enthrone a 
 master over it. Conscience is declared to be the 
 absolute judge and arbiter of truth, and its verdict 
 in the rejection of dogma to be among the most con- 
 spicuous triumphs of rationalism . Once more I make 
 appeal to the facts of the past. A review of the 
 history of human thought on the subject of the 
 conscience is fatal to the claim. So far is conscience 
 from being accepted as the supreme faculty of man, 
 that while free thought exalts it on one side it 
 calls into question its very existence upon the other. 
 Where its existence is recognised, its supremacy, as 
 the ultimate tribunal from which there is no appeal, 
 is refuted. For conscience, in the latest conclusions 
 of philosophy, is not one faculty but many, not 
 innate but acquired, not primary but subordinate, 
 not the formative and originative monarch of the 
 soul but the product of many causes, and edu- 
 cated by a thousand influences. The claim for 
 conscience to be the judge and arbiter of faith 
 contradicts this philosophy. Tt transfers it out of 
 
VIII] Summary of the Argument. 305 
 
 its proper sphere of influence into a new sphere 
 in which it is totally incompetent to pass. It 
 asserts for it an infallibility and accuracy contra- 
 dicted by the universal testimony of human expe- 
 rience, and, lastly, it extends the supposed infalli- 
 bility of the moral sense into such an omniscient 
 acquaintance with facts as belongs to God alone. 
 In short, so far is conscience from being able to 
 judge of truth, that truth is the grand educator of 
 conscience. 
 
 The difficulties thrown by modern thought 
 around the dogmatic faith are thus dissipated by 
 the steady light of historical facts. They roll away 
 as the mists of some mountain-land roll away be- 
 fore the rising sun. The hand of human strength 
 would not more vainly endeavour to tear the sun 
 out of the skies, than human argument endeavours 
 to destroy the facts of the past or to silence their 
 irrefragable testimony to the perpetuity, antiquity, 
 and apostolicity of the Christian faith. 
 
 The body of doctrine described by this name is 
 distinct from the quality of faith, but it is not 
 separable from it. The one is the objective work 
 of the Holy Ghost ; the other His subjective work. 
 In the one, the Spirit provides the material for 
 faith ; in the other, He bestows its living power 
 and energy. The one is the outward structure, 
 the other the indwelling life. The body is not 
 the life, but it is in the organised body that the 
 Spirit lives, and through it the Spirit acts. The 
 outward doctrines are not the soul's inner act : 
 
 x 
 
306 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 yet that Divine faculty by which the soul takes hold 
 of Deity, and comes into actual immediate contact 
 with things unseen, cannot act without the doc- 
 trines. Faith can no more live and work in this 
 imperfect state of ours, without objective truths to 
 throw light into the intellect and supply food for 
 the affections, than a spirit can live and work 
 without the instrument of the body. In another 
 world it may be different. Amid the fruitions of 
 heaven and the full blaze of the beatific vision of 
 God, the glorified spirit of the saint may unite 
 itself by immediate contact with the Deity, just as 
 in the world of the Unseen disembodied spirits 
 live a life, doubtless of intense activity and mea- 
 sureless capacity for enjoyment or for suffering, 
 apart from the body as it moulders meanwhile in 
 the grave. But in our present state body and 
 spirit are constitutionally associated, and it is but 
 the dream of the fanatic to think of separating them. 
 In the same way belief can only live on what is 
 believed. Conviction, affection, emotion, dissociated 
 from definite points of belief, become evaporated into 
 ghostly names, and merge into mystical fanaticism 
 or sceptical indefmiteness. The work of the Spirit 
 within the soul is consistent with His work outside 
 it. God works harmoniously, and does not dislocate 
 His own actings into disorderly fragments. His 
 laws, if not invariable, are yet, in their ordinary 
 results, equable and consistent. If it be true that 
 the inspiration of the Holy Ghost has furnished us 
 with the doctrine, is it not consistent to believe 
 
VIII] The Inward Witness. 307 
 
 that He works through the doctrine He has Himself 
 inspired \ If the Spirit bestows the belief, is it not 
 consistent that He should bestow the object of belief % 
 The conclusions of our reason are congruous with 
 the positive declarations of the Word : "To one is 
 given by the Spirit the word of wisdom ; to another 
 the word of knowledge by the same Spirit ; to 
 another faith by the same Spirit ; . . . but all 
 these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, 
 dividing to every man severally as He will b ." Both 
 parts of the one complete work come from the 
 same hand, and bear upon them the same seal and 
 signature of God the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Suppose the work to be complete in a man's soul. 
 The inward life with its inseparable experiences is 
 strong and vivid. Above and beyond the material 
 objects of sense, his inward eye perceives another 
 world, as real, as actual, as true to his percep- 
 tions as the world seen, and as infinitely more 
 important as things eternal are more important 
 than things temporal. Amid the ebbing and flowing 
 life of his fellow-men, he is ever conscious of the 
 presence of another Being ; great indeed, and awful, 
 but not more great than admirable, not more awful 
 than beautiful — a Being with a threefold Personality, 
 combining the glories of Creator, Redeemer, Sanc- 
 tifier in the indivisible essence of the One God. 
 With this Being he holds daily intercourse. The 
 human spirit meets with the Divine in the subtle 
 sensibilities of a renewed nature, and the Divine 
 
 b I Cor. xii. 8,9, i i . 
 X 2 
 
308 The Obligations of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 Spirit meets with the human in the operations of 
 the Holy Ghost. 
 
 The Divine life within the man in no degree 
 disqualifies him for the work of his temporal life, 
 or renders him indifferent to its joys and sorrows, 
 its hopes and fears, its pleasures and its interests. 
 Never has there been a greater mistake than any 
 such supposition. The whole history of the saints 
 of God refutes the error. If indeed faith were 
 but a sentiment, and piety but the conscious out- 
 goings of the soul itself reaching after a higher 
 state, then they would be unreal, and because un- 
 real, practically inoperative. There would be this 
 plain reason for it, that the impression of Divine 
 things, having no objective historical basis, directly 
 it came into contact with life's practical objects, 
 would come into contact with things more real 
 than itself, and would therefore yield beneath the 
 pressure of active perception and sensation. But 
 the effect is different when belief feeds on objects 
 definite and historical, capable of being proved by 
 evidence, and in the narrative of the life, suf- 
 ferings, and death of Christ possessing a foothold 
 on the actual world of sense. For now what a 
 man believes becomes as definite, as sure, as real, 
 as what a man sees and touches ; and the com- 
 parative defect in the vividness of faith, compared 
 to the vividness of sight, is compensated for by 
 the higher sublimity and incomparable grandeur of 
 the objects. Suppose the man, therefore, with this 
 intense inward life fed bv the definite doctrines 
 
VIII] The Christian Spirit. 309 
 
 of the dogmatic faith, and deriving tenderness 
 and strength from mental contact with them, — 
 would not the faith within be the experimental 
 seal placed upon the reality of the faith without 1 
 Would not the inspired language describe the spon- 
 taneous sentiment of his heart amid the contro- 
 versies of an age of disputation : " Watch ye, stand 
 fast in the faith, quit you like men, be strong." 
 
 Certainly the frame of mind inculcated in the 
 apostolic words stands in strong contrast with the 
 timid pusillanimity too frequently characteristic of 
 modern Christians. The vigilance, courage, forti- 
 tude, and energy of the soldier indicate a very 
 different mental condition. It appears to be thought 
 wise and just to be confident in everything except 
 in our religion ; to be definite and exact in every- 
 thing except what touches the soul, and God, and 
 eternity ; to hold firm everything except the faith, 
 and trust every one except God. Faintness has 
 touched the heart of the Church ; her palsied hand 
 can scarcely grasp her weapons, and her tongue, 
 instead of ringing out her battle-cry clear and 
 sharp as the voices of the saints of old, has 
 learned to speak stammeringly and hesitatingly the 
 truths by which apostles triumphed and for which 
 martyrs died. There is danger of her turning 
 craven in the maturity of her strength. What is 
 worst of all, this doubting and coward spirit is 
 proclaimed to be philosophical and Christian, and 
 the only becoming temper to be cultivated. This 
 alone is praised as a lofty superiority to prejudice. 
 
310 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 If any man dares to hold that truth has not be- 
 come falsehood, and that scepticism is not faith, 
 nor ignorance wisdom, such a man is behind his 
 times, and the age will condescend to ridicule his 
 abilities and look down with contempt upon his 
 ignorance. Be it so. This is not the time when 
 a man can stand diffidently on one side, and excuse 
 himself by pleas of weakness for treacherous com- 
 pliance with the sins of his day. The meanest 
 man in the Church of England, who loves his 
 Lord and his Church, has a right to speak and 
 fling back at the world within the Church the 
 unworthy weapons of its warfare. 
 
 The temper inculcated by the apostle is not 
 to be confounded with a blind adherence to a 
 traditional faith. Ignorant obstinacy may close its 
 eyes, but faith walks circumspectly, and watches 
 and analyses with holy vigilance every movement 
 of the great controversy, as the restless sea heaves 
 and tosses beneath the ark. To maintain this dis- 
 tinction clearly we need to draw another line 
 between the enquirer and the believer. Let me 
 briefly examine the position of the two in this 
 exact relation. 
 
 The position of an enquirer cannot be a perma- 
 nent and final state. It is no more than a process of 
 transition from one mental condition into another. 
 Human nature cannot continue without a belief, 
 even though its belief should be the abnegation 
 of belief, and its dogma the denial of all dogma. 
 Conclusions of some kind are a necessity to the 
 
VIII] Duty of Enquirers. 311 
 
 human mind. To live without them would be to 
 live in a frightful dream ; in a condition of giddy 
 bewilderment, destructive equally of thought and 
 action. Such a state cannot possibly continue, and 
 in point of fact never does continue. Religion 
 consists of certain positive claims on faith and 
 practice. Not to yield to these claims is to reject 
 them. Rejection amounts to an assertion of inde- 
 pendence and a denial of any authority of God 
 over us antecedently to revelation, by virtue of 
 creation, preservation, and moral government. God 
 has a right to speak and to be heard. This right 
 may be equally rejected by formal denial and by 
 practical indifference. In the one case, the claim is 
 admitted to be worthy of consideration and to call 
 for a decision; in the other case, it is treated with 
 contemptuous neglect. In this latter case, rejec- 
 tion is just as positive and much more insulting. 
 The act is recognised in this character in the 
 inspired language of Scripture : " Because I have 
 called, and ye refused ; I have stretched out My 
 hand, and no man regarded ; but ye have set at 
 nought all My counsel, and would none of My 
 reproof : I will also laugh at your calamity ; I 
 will mock when your fear cometh c ." 
 
 A man on such a condition necessarily adopts 
 one of two alternatives. He may not think it 
 worth his while to settle his doubts relative to 
 Divine truth, but may deliberately postpone this 
 great question to the pressing claims of his out- 
 
 c Prov. i. 24. 
 
312 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 ward and temporal being. In this case he does 
 come to a decision, but it is the decision of the 
 secularist. Or, allowing the question to remain be- 
 fore his mind, he yet keeps it open and allows 
 himself to regard it as one which he either need 
 not or cannot determine. He accepts doubt as the 
 chronic condition of his mind. Such a condition is 
 demoralising to every moral principle in the highest 
 possible degree. It is as much a plain duty of 
 our common manhood to use the faculties bestowed 
 upon us for the discovery of truth as to make a 
 right use of any other of our faculties. In this 
 case also the man does come to a decision, but it 
 is the decision of the sceptic. 
 
 The state of an enquirer is therefore a transition 
 state, and neither is nor can be a final condition. 
 The necessities of our mental and moral constitu- 
 tion render it impossible for any man to rest on 
 doubt. The outward facts of our condition, and the 
 moral wants of the soul itself, lead to the same con- 
 clusion. For during this state of hesitating indeci- 
 sion the course of life is passing on all the same. 
 Existence does not stand still nor time check his 
 ever-rolling wheels while we make up our minds 
 how we shall use them. The progression of our 
 bodily life brings with it its natural associations of 
 earthly affections, interests, and pursuits. Health 
 and sickness, joy and sorrow, success and failure, 
 make up the chequered whole of our life, and as 
 they pass over the firmament of our mortal exist- 
 ence they throw their shadows over the soul itself, 
 
VIII] Duty of Enquirers. 313 
 
 No human strength is so firmly poised in the force 
 of its own will but that these outward changes 
 agitate it more or less, as the heaving of a distant 
 storm may set a slumbering sea into motion to the 
 furthest bound of each petty creek and bay. They 
 awaken into life the soul's slumbering sensibilities. 
 They exercise conscience alike by the memories of 
 the past and the instinctive hopes and fears of the 
 future. As life passes on; as its interests thicken; 
 as the decreasing buoyancy of the heart leaves each 
 emotion to indurate into a chronic sorrow ; as we 
 separate from those we love, and death comes nearer 
 and nearer to ourselves, flinging its long foreshadows 
 over our life, — the task of hardening our nature into 
 apathy, and laying to sleep its inward agitation, be- 
 comes more and more difficult. The dread realities 
 of life and death sooner or later break through the 
 feeble barrier, and bring, whether we will or not, the 
 great question to its crisis. Life presents no more 
 pitiable picture of human ignorance and weakness 
 than a thinking, conscious, intelligent, immortal 
 being standing amid such stern facts, and either 
 too frivolous to think about them, or too wilfully 
 ignorant to solve them. 
 
 I repeat, therefore, that the condition of an en- 
 quirer cannot be the permanent condition of any 
 man, but can only represent a transition from one 
 mental and moral state into another. If any mind 
 be exercised by doubts in this greatest of all great 
 subjects, it is its duty to face those doubts, and 
 resolutelv to solve them. The fullest, freest, widest 
 
314 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 enquiry is the only path of safety. An honest 
 mind, resolute to do its duty to itself in laying 
 the foundations of its own belief, and yet, at the 
 same time, modestly conscious of its own weak- 
 ness, and therefore willing and anxious to be taught, 
 represents a very different state from that sceptical 
 frivolity which substitutes a sneer for an argu- 
 ment, which is too indifferent to take the trouble 
 to enquire, and too blindly self-satisfied to be either 
 willing or able to learn. No one who knows the 
 world, and is accustomed to meet with men, can 
 deny that an enormous amount of such scepticism 
 exists, and is often dignified by the name of phi- 
 losophical impartiality. It is in fact unbelief in its 
 meanest and most unworthy shape. The honest 
 enquirer, whatever may be the issue of his enquiry, 
 is in any case worthy of honour and respect. But 
 the work of deciding upon a faith, whether it be 
 the faith of the secularist, or of the sceptic, or of 
 the Christian, must be seriously undertaken. In 
 face of the momentous gravity of the issue it should 
 be made a life work, to be done, not hastily and 
 frivolously, but deliberately and seriously. The ne- 
 cessity of a decision should be met by a solemn 
 conference between the soul and God, and in the 
 immediate sight of the other world. 
 
 Upon the mind of any such enquirer one rule 
 must be earnestly pressed. The question between 
 a dogmatic Christianity, with its majestic claims 
 and magnificent promises, and a rationalism con- 
 fident of its own self-sufficiency, does not run 
 
VIII] Cautions to Enquirers. 315 
 
 upon a single line. No one argument, nor any 
 one single source of proof, can be sufficient in such 
 a court and in such a controversy. The temp- 
 tation to pursue one line of enquiry alone, and to 
 rest satisfied on that single issue, may probably 
 be great. The mental indecision rendering enquiry 
 necessary is probably the result of an experienced 
 difficulty. Some one argument has disturbed the 
 previous balance and repose of faith. The mind 
 in such a condition will naturally be disposed to 
 follow out this line of argument to the end, with- 
 out remembering the necessity of testing its con- 
 clusion by other and collateral" lines. Its influence 
 in unsettling the mind has already invested it 
 with a certain amount of authority. It will carry 
 the prestige of a first success with it. The effect 
 is much the same in the contact of a mind with 
 an argument, as in the contact of one mind with 
 another mind. There is a collision between the 
 two. The one which succeeds in asserting even 
 a momentary superiority, such as is involved in 
 the creation of a state of doubt, naturally takes 
 the precedence ; it becomes the master, and the 
 other the pupil. The pupil having once submitted 
 himself to the master's hand is disposed to sur- 
 render himself to his sole guidance. Once let this 
 conclusion be formed, and even pride itself, for 
 the moment offended, compensates itself for the 
 wound inflicted on its self-love, by tenaciously 
 following its new guide, and obstinately refusing 
 to admit any doubt of its conclusions. 
 
316 The Obligations of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 Now, if the question at issue depended upon the 
 settlement of any one single question, this mode of 
 procedure might be vindicated. But the edifice of 
 Christianity does not rest on a single pillar, but on 
 many ; and were it to be admitted that one here 
 and there had failed us, the rest would still support 
 in its integrity and strength the glorious super- 
 structure. Not one has failed. Not a line of 
 argument ever advanced in the long history of 
 this controversy has been given up as untenable ; 
 not one position has been surrendered. New ones 
 have been added, but the old ones remain where 
 they were. Nevertheless, it is not on any one single 
 evidence that the faith rests, but on many evi- 
 dences. It is built upon them all in combination. 
 At least eight totally distinct lines of evidence con- 
 verge hi a common conclusion, and a new one is 
 supplied by the very convergence [i]. The con- 
 silience of proof is marvellous, and stands alone 
 and unparalleled in the entire history of human 
 controversy. 
 
 To argue from any one is consequently as unjust 
 and unreasonable as it would be for a man to split 
 the surface of a single stone in the strong founda- 
 tions of some human edifice, and then to boast that 
 he had destroyed the entire structure. 
 
 The modern tendency to reduce history to a 
 philosophy, and to find in the ever-fluctuating ele- 
 ments of human action the materials for a science, 
 increases the temptation to isolate one line of 
 argument from all the rest, and to decide the entire 
 
VIII] Cautions to Enquirers. 317 
 
 question upon it [2]. We map out the mental 
 history of the past, divide it into epochs, and 
 assign to each its peculiar characteristics. We are 
 thus tempted to recognise in the fluctuations of 
 human thought the action of an invariable law, 
 and to dismiss the modes of thinking characteristic 
 of a past epoch, as if they were necessarily obsolete, 
 and we in the nineteenth century had no more to do 
 with them than we have to do with the manners or 
 the social habits of the past [3]. 
 
 Such a conclusion is totally unphilosophical. Let 
 the rule be applied to science, for instance, and its 
 fallacy will become apparent. Are we to dismiss 
 from our scientific catalogue in the nineteenth cen- 
 tury every scientific conclusion arrived at in the 
 seventeenth century ? Whatever was true then is 
 true now, and their scientific knowledge is but the 
 basis of our own. It will be replied that we have 
 discarded certain theories of the past in the sphere 
 of science because a more accurate knowledge has 
 proved them to be untrue. Certainly we have, 
 and when modern thought has proved any of the 
 old evidences adduced in support of Christianity to 
 be untrue, we will discard them by all means 
 in the same manner. But among the substantial 
 proofs of Christian apologetics in the past, I ask 
 which have been disproved 1 Let them be speci- 
 fied and flung away. I reply that not one has 
 been disproved, nor has any serious effort been 
 made to disprove them. They are often treated 
 with affected contempt, but disproof of them there 
 
318 The Obligations of Belief [Lect. 
 
 is none. They have many of them received great 
 accumulations of detail, and have been marvellously 
 strengthened ; as for instance, by the geographical 
 and other explorations of Palestine, and by the an- 
 tiquities of Mesopotamia. But there is not one 
 substantial evidence destroyed. They stand, not like 
 the giant columns of Luxor and Karnak, or the 
 exquisite fragments of Baalbec and Palmyra, mere 
 records of a past magnificence, themselves slowly 
 mouldering into ruin ; but they stand like the ever- 
 lasting lulls, jointed into the framework of the solid 
 globe, and looking down upon the perishing genera- 
 tions of mankind, themselves imperishable while the 
 world lasts. 
 
 The history of the Evidential School, as it has 
 been called, of the seventeenth century illustrates 
 the justice of this plea. That the labours of the 
 Christian apologists of that day were triumphantly 
 successful is admitted. Beneath the blaze of their 
 overwhelming arguments, the Deism of the time 
 actually died away and became extinct [4]. Thought 
 in our own day has directed its attack upon Chris- 
 tianity from a totally different quarter, and there- 
 fore has been answered by totally different argu- 
 ments. But because the facts alleged in proof of 
 Christianity two centuries since have become in- 
 applicable to the objections of our own day, have 
 they therefore ceased to be facts, or become less 
 significant and conclusive in their proper sphere 
 than they were? Because it suits the humour of 
 modern thought to regard the external evidences 
 
VIII] Cautions to Enquirers. 319 
 
 with cool indifference, and to ignore them as com- 
 pletely as if they had never existed, are they 
 therefore evidences no longer, or do they cease 
 to be a part of that enormous aggregate of fact 
 which stares the theoretic sceptic full in the face, 
 and must be explained before he can justly claim 
 to have shaken a solitary stone in the deep foun- 
 dations of the faith % The Christian may glory 
 in the multitudinous defences of the truth, as the 
 Psalmist gloried in his glowing language over the 
 situation of the earthly Jerusalem : " Walk about 
 Zion, and go round about her : tell the towers 
 thereof. Mark ye well her bulwarks, consider her 
 pa] aces ; that ye may tell it to the generation 
 following. For this God is our God for ever and 
 ever : He will be our guide unto death d ." 
 
 This survey of the whole field of evidence is 
 the more necessary because it furnishes the only 
 possible safeguard against prejudice. The claim 
 often asserted that an enquirer into truth should put 
 away every conviction of the past, every impres- 
 sion produced by habit, education, or experience, 
 amounts really to the claim that he should put 
 away one class of prejudices in order to take up 
 another. To take out of the mind all active im- 
 pressions is simply impossible. The very demand 
 implies a foregone conclusion that Christianity is 
 not true ; and a foregone conclusion as much warps 
 the mind in one direction as in another. A man 
 can no more disencumber himself at will of all 
 
 d Ps. xlviii. 1 5. 
 
320 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 mental impressions than he can disencumber him- 
 self of his personal identity. The mind once accus- 
 tomed to think cannot become a tabula rasa. Nor, 
 could we suppose the thinking powers never to have 
 acted, would it be possible even then to put away 
 those primary conceptions which are intuitive and 
 cannot be denied without an outrage upon our nature. 
 Are we, therefore, not to cultivate impartiality 1 
 Certainly we should cultivate it. But it can only be 
 attained by opening the mind to conviction from 
 every quarter equally, and admitting every available 
 light into the open avenues of the soul. To pick 
 up one favourite line of argument, and then arbi- 
 trarily to reject and contemptuously disavow all the 
 rest, is to accept prejudice and throne it as a tyran- 
 nical despot over the heart and conscience. 
 
 Another very necessary caution follows from this 
 conclusion. Men are loudly told not to be afraid of 
 the consequences of enquiry, but boldly and un- 
 flinchingly to follow it out to the utmost, to what- 
 ever conclusions it may lead them. In one sense 
 the canon is true ; in another sense most untrue. If 
 it means that truth is to be the simple object of our 
 search, and that it is to be pursued with undivided 
 loyalty of heart, then it is true. Every party 
 to this controversy must learn to discard hard 
 words, and give to each other credit for a sincere 
 pursuit of truth. But if it be meant that any 
 one separate line of argument is to be pursued to 
 its conclusions, and no other considerations are to 
 be taken into account, then it is not true. We 
 
VIII] Cautions to Enquirers. 321 
 
 all desire the truth, but we must not rashly assume 
 the conclusion formed on an isolated argument to 
 be the truth. Such is ever the weakness of the 
 human intellect, that it needs to test and correct 
 its conclusions by every possible experiment. 
 
 It is in this last and untrue sense that the 
 advice is ordinarily given. The circumstances sup- 
 posed are something like the following. An en- 
 quirer pursues a course of investigation which 
 shakes his faith in the Divine character of Chris- 
 tianity, One by one his old convictions, dear to 
 him as life, are loosed from their hold in the 
 soul, and disappear in the black gulf of unbelief 
 yawning beneath his feet. As his logical process 
 proceeds, and he, unconscious of the first vice in- 
 herent in its very premisses, perceives one truth 
 to leave him after another, one star after another 
 to be darkened in the moral firmament, he seems 
 to stand alone in a world without a God, and 
 is filled with horror unutterable and the weight 
 of an infinite desolation at the dreadful prospect. 
 He is bidden to be indifferent to these feelings, 
 to regard them as sheer weaknesses, the remains 
 of obsolete prejudices, not to be surrendered without 
 a struggle. In such a case, I protest that the 
 rule is not true, but is a pregnant and palpable 
 fallacy. I fully admit that, if truth demands it, 
 even this sacrifice must be made ; but I deny that 
 what demands such a sacrifice can be true. 
 
 These emotions of the soul are no prejudices of 
 education, but a vital part of our moral selves. 
 
 Y 
 
322 The Obligations of Belief. [Leot. 
 
 It is possible to educate ourselves out of them, 
 just as it would be possible for a man to destroy 
 his own sight, or to paralyse his own limbs ; but 
 it can only be done by crushing part of the soul's 
 constitution, and reducing its moral life into the 
 silence and torpor of the grave. The agonies ex- 
 perienced in the prospect of reducing this comely 
 world into an infidel chaos arise from the univer- 
 sal wants of the human soul. To crush them out 
 of life is to do outrage to our own nature. From 
 the revulsion of so great an outrage, many who 
 have cut away the moorings of their souls from a 
 Christianity founded on historical evidence, have 
 found refuge from the terror of despair in the abso- 
 lutism of Church authority. The truth cannot re- 
 quire us to place one part of the human soul into 
 conflict with another, and prostrate the bleeding 
 heart, and the tortured conscience, and the desolated 
 affections beneath the heels of a cold and heartless 
 speculation. 
 
 Enquiry is the duty of a soul tormented by 
 doubt. But let the enquiry be solemn, honest, 
 earnest ; let it be truthful and fair ; let it be full 
 and free, and I no more doubt that it will issue 
 in a firm and reasonable faith than I have doubt 
 of the existence of the sun in yonder heavens. 
 
 But we cannot be enquirers for ever. We have 
 voluntarily become members of a Christian society. 
 This Church teaches a dogmatic faith ; not because 
 she would bind any man's freedom of conscience 
 by the despotism of ecclesiastical authority, but 
 
VIII] Duties of a Believer. 323 
 
 because she has inherited a certain trust, and is 
 resolute faithfully to discharge it. To her, in this 
 period of the world, and in this portion of Chris- 
 tendom, has been committed the faith once delivered 
 to the saints, and she cannot prove untrue to the 
 great trusteeship without destroying her own life. 
 She has a definite message to deliver, and whether 
 men will hear or whether they will forbear, she 
 must deliver it. She is the inheritor of the faith 
 of saints and martyrs, apostles and prophets, and 
 she walks in their footsteps. The mantle of the 
 grand past of the Church of Christ has descended 
 upon her shoulders ; and her articles, jealously 
 moulded upon Scripture ; her formularies, steeped 
 in the spirit of dogmatic faith, and penetrated 
 throughout with dogmatic reference, show with 
 how large a portion of the spirit of the ancient 
 saints she holds forth "the Word of Life." It is 
 no more possible, consistently with an honest in- 
 terpretation, to take the dogmatic teaching out of 
 the documents it pervades everywhere, than it is 
 possible to take the colour out of the skies, or 
 strip their thousand hues of beauty from the petals 
 of the flower or the plumage of the bird. When 
 we became members of this Church, we professed 
 ourselves to be enquirers no longer, but believers. 
 We accepted service with the historical Christ, 
 the living centre of the historical faith. We were 
 enlisted beneath His banner at the baptismal font, 
 and were signed with the sign of the Cross " in 
 token that hereafter we should not be ashamed 
 
 Y 2 
 
324 TJie Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 to confess the faith of Christ crucified, but man- 
 fully to fight under His banner, against sin, the 
 world, and the devil ; and to continue His faithful 
 soldiers and servants unto our life's end." 
 
 No dexterity can ever succeed in reconciling such 
 an obligation with the position of a disciple of 
 modern thought. For if there be no divinely- 
 given dogma, there is no faith to maintain. Then 
 Christ was not crucified for us ; then sin is but 
 a variable and arbitrary thing ; then there is no 
 "world" amid the blaze of a national Christianity ; 
 then the devil is but an ignorant fiction of the 
 past ; then we cannot be soldiers, if there be no 
 definite faith to keep, nor servants if there be 
 no authoritative law to obey. The man who, 
 either by adult baptism or by the rite of con- 
 firmation, has accepted membership in the Church 
 of England, has passed onward from enquiry into 
 belief, and can no more reconcile the mental con- 
 ditions belonging to the two states than he can 
 blend the immaturity of the boy with the maturity 
 of the man. 
 
 Yet more cogently does the obligation He upon 
 all who have accepted Orders within the ministry 
 of the Church of England. The position of enquiry 
 is inconsistent with the first conditions of the 
 office. A teacher must know what he teaches ; and 
 when the teaching is moral and experimental, must 
 hold as the guide and comfort of his own soul 
 what he stands forward to proclaim to be the 
 guide and comfort of other men's souls. Who can 
 
VIII] Teachers not Enquirers. 325 
 
 ever forget to the last day of life the solemn 
 question put to him at his ordination : " Wilt 
 thou be ready, with all faithful diligence, to banish 
 and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrines 
 contrary to God's Word ;" or, while memory con- 
 tinues, lose the recollection of the charge : " Take 
 thou authority to preach the Word of God and to 
 minister the Holy Sacraments hi the congregation." 
 
 An enquirer after truth cannot be a teacher of 
 truth. He may teach, no doubt, others less ad- 
 vanced than himself, but it will be the teaching of 
 his own struggles and difficulties. An honest and 
 truthful mind must reflect itself in all its outgoings. 
 The language must be the mirror of the man. What 
 is in the heart must, consistently with self-respect 
 and the love of truth, find its utterance in the mode 
 of thinking, feeling, and speaking. A teacher should 
 be a believer, not an enquirer ; and a teacher in the 
 ministry of a dogmatic Church should be a believer 
 in a dogmatic faith. He dare not teach what he 
 does not assuredly believe, lest he should either 
 convert a lie into the truth of God, or turn the 
 truth of God into a lie. 
 
 Why then should the lips of a Christian teacher 
 be more timid and hesitatir.g than the lips of 
 other teachers \ Masters in the school of doubt, 
 or of unbelief, speak ever firmly and confidently 
 enough ; why should the tongue of the Church 
 alone stammer in her message, or her heart distrust 
 the honesty of her own enquiry and the strength 
 of her own convictions. If the state of an enquirer 
 
326 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 has its own a]3propriate mental condition, so also 
 has the state of a believer. Doubt belongs to 
 the one, but a firm and reasonable conviction to 
 the other. The hesitancy of childhood must ripen 
 into the firm and strong maturity of the man. 
 No dim vagueness of impression, no feeble uncer- 
 tainty of conviction, no faltering grasp of truth, 
 no coward's timidity in maintaining and confessing 
 it, become those who are inheritors of the faith 
 of prophets and apostles. The hero's strength and 
 the martyr's constancy are no less taxed in the 
 sphere of belief than of practice. God Himself 
 appeals to them : "Be no more children, tossed 
 to and fro, and carried about with every wind of 
 doctrine a ," but "Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, 
 quit you like men, be strong." 
 
 Such a frame of mind is not to be confounded 
 with a blind obstinacy, shutting its eyes to the 
 controversies of the day, and disdainfully indif- 
 ferent to the progress of thought and the results 
 of investigation. Teachableness of mind befits the 
 Christian to the last hour of life. No thinking 
 man can spend a day without learning. In the 
 sphere of doctrine itself human mistakes and mis- 
 conceptions become largely blended up with the 
 eternal realities of Divine knowledge, and it is 
 the anxious work of a lifetime to separate them. 
 The acquisition of a fixed standpoint for faith 
 enables a man the better to think, to read, to 
 enquire, to make himself acquainted with other 
 '' Eph. i\ . 14. 
 
VIII] The Christian Spirit 327 
 
 men's thoughts and enquiries, because in the re- 
 pose of a settled conviction his mind has acquired 
 a mental leverage to work from. But if a blind 
 acquiescence in a traditional belief stands at one 
 extreme of the mental scale, a cowardly distrust 
 of truth and an unsettled restless scepticism stands 
 at the other. Between the two lives and works 
 the mature faith of the Christian, equally removed 
 from narrow bigotry and from cowardly compromise, 
 intelligent and enquiring on one side, firmly poised 
 and courageous upon the other, modest and teach- 
 able because conscious of the weaknesses of man, 
 strong and resolute because confident in the wisdom 
 and infallibility of God. 
 
 Against such a faith the mere foam and froth 
 of controversy will beat innocuously as the waves 
 against the immoveable rock. The idle arrogancies 
 of confident assertion and reckless assumption will 
 pass over a mind settled upon this rock harm- 
 lessly as the wind. Charges of ignorance and 
 narrowness and bigotry it will put on one side as 
 such palpable violations of the first courtesies of all 
 controversy as to make the wielders of such weapons 
 unworthy of attention. Its clear, steady eye will 
 pierce at once through those loose generalisations 
 from facts imperfectly known, and guesses elevated 
 into the dignity of conclusions, which sceptical science 
 itself has found it necessary to disavow, and which 
 threaten to make geology a byword and a reproach. 
 From its calm height faith looks down on the rolling 
 mists and troubled waves below, — its foot upon 
 
328 The Obligations of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 the rock, its eye upon the Cross, its hand upon 
 God. 
 
 To a believer thus established in an intelligent 
 conviction, a timid pusillanimity in the mainten- 
 ance of Divine truth is a fourfold treachery. It 
 is treachery to himself, because it involves dis- 
 trust in the honesty of his own investigation and 
 the accuracy of his own deliberate conclusions. It 
 is treachery to his Church, because his unfaith- 
 fulness to her principles weakens her arm in the 
 dav of conflict, and lowers the shout of her battle- 
 cry into the panic-stricken accents of the coward. 
 It is treachery to Christ; for the Cross is the 
 condition of our calling, and he who deserts the 
 banner in the hour of danger proves himself un- 
 worthy of his Master. It is treachery to God; for 
 it distrusts His revelation of the truth, as if He 
 had not revealed to us all we need to know, or 
 had failed to make the revelation clear. Honesty 
 to ourselves, faithfulness to our Church, allegiance to 
 our glorified Master, and confidence in God, should 
 teach us watchfulness in guarding the faith, con- 
 stancy in defending it, manliness in holding it, and 
 strength to live, or, if God will, to die in defence 
 of it. 
 
 Such a courage must, however, have its origin in 
 an influence higher and greater than itself. No 
 merely intellectual apprehension of a creed, no per- 
 ception of its internal unity and coherence, no cold 
 survey of evidence however conclusive, no reluctant 
 acceptance of the force of outward facts can kindle 
 
VIII] The Christian Spirit. 329 
 
 so lofty an enthusiasm. This recognition and con- 
 fession of a dogmatic creed is good, but it can only 
 supply the food of faith, and cannot breathe into 
 faith itself that Divine unction and strength whereby 
 it soars towards the skies. The objective faith is 
 only instrumental, and Christ is its true end and 
 object. The personal contact of the soul with its 
 Saviour, as it is brought into vital union with Him, 
 and derives out of His fulness grace for grace, is 
 the alone true spring of life, and God the Holy 
 Ghost is the efficient Agent of it. Then the soul 
 has the inward witness in itself. The sense of for- 
 giveness through the blood of the Covenant, the joy 
 of the Divine life, as fresh from the heart of God 
 Himself it comes thrilling into the soul with emo- 
 tions strangely new and unutterably sweet, the 
 calm confidence of the heart in the love of a Father 
 in heaven, its sensible consciousness of His presence, 
 the joy of intercourse with Him in prayer and 
 praise at an open throne of grace where God and 
 the soul meet together, constitute experimental proofs 
 of the Divine authority of the dogmatic faith ex- 
 ceeding all others. We no longer believe, but we 
 know. The living spirit works through them upon 
 the living soul, and a man may as soon doubt his 
 own existence as doubt the reality of an inward 
 consciousness higher than nature and stronger than 
 death. 
 
 This experience is no variable sensation ; not 
 one of those ephemeral feelings that play over 
 the human soul, like the lights and shadows of 
 
330 The Obligatio?is of Belief. [Lect. 
 
 a summer day upon the surface of sea and land. 
 The definite promises of the Word constitute the 
 objective standard of the sensation. If the dog- 
 mas of human depravity, and of the operations of 
 the sanctifying Spirit upon the soul, be true, this 
 experience cannot be otherwise than it is. A 
 nature unregenerate must ever shrink from God 
 and from His truth out of the mere instinct of its 
 spiritual alienation. However moral and honest and 
 sincere a man may be, the pride of an alienated 
 nature will ever hold itself aloof from God. Truth 
 which is of God can never be cordially embraced 
 without the teaching of the Spirit of God. Nor can 
 the Spirit of Truth work in the soul without leaving 
 its sensible effects on the head, the conscience, and 
 the heart. Thus the Scripture ever refers a saving 
 faith to a saving knowledge : " How shall they 
 believe in Him of whom they have not heard e V 
 and the effect of the two to the action of an 
 enlightening Spirit : " God, who commanded the 
 light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our 
 hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the 
 glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ f ." 
 
 From this fountain have flowed the zeal of pro- 
 phets, the faith of apostles, and the constancy of 
 martyrs. With this experience Paul preached the 
 Saviour whom once he persecuted. This sustained 
 John in Patmos. This quickened the souls of 
 the primitive martyrs as they were torn by the 
 Eoman lions, or set up as living torches to light 
 
 e Rom. x. 14. { 2 Cur. iv. 6. 
 
VIII] The Witness within. 331 
 
 the darkness of the prophetic Babylon. Through 
 this triumphed the long line of the ancient saints, 
 Cyprian, and Chrysostom, and Ambrose, and Athan- 
 asius, and Augustine, and others whose names are 
 in the book of life. This nerved the courage of 
 the Reformers, and strengthened Luther at Erfurt, 
 Calvin at Geneva, and Zwingle at Zurich, and sup- 
 ported Latimer and Ridley as they gave their 
 bodies to be burned, and consecrated the soil of 
 Oxford with their martyred ashes. What shall 
 I more say ; for the time would fail me to tell 
 of all " who through faith have subdued kingdoms, 
 wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the 
 mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, escaped 
 the edge of the sword, out of weakness were made 
 strong S." These heroes of the Church have ever * 
 built their faith on dogma, and the Spirit of God 
 has cemented, by a personal experience, the sacred 
 foundations. To give up the doctrines of the faith 
 would have been to them more than giving up their__ 
 life. 
 
 This inward, living, personal experience draws the 
 true line between the Church of God and the world . 
 Scripture positively asserts this : " For as many 
 as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the 
 sons of God b ;" " If any man be in Christ he is 
 a new creature 1 ." The apostolic words do but echo 
 the language of One greater than apostles, and who 
 spoke with the authority of a twofold Deity — the 
 Deity of the Spirit given Him without measure, and 
 
 s Heb. xi. 33. h Rom. viii. 14. ! 2 Cor. v. 17. 
 
332 The Obligations of Belief . [Lect. 
 
 the Deity of His own nature in whom dwelt the 
 fulness of the Godhead bodily : " Except a man be 
 born from above he cannot see the kingdom of God k ." 
 To this issue God is manifestly leading His Church. 
 The experimental work of God the Holy Ghost 
 upon the human soul constitutes the broad line of 
 demarcation, the gulf fixed and impassable between 
 the two worlds ; and on either side of it he truth 
 and error, belief and unbelief, life and death. 
 
 I trust I shall not be thought to transgress the 
 proper bounds of the office committed to me in this 
 place, or to be guilty of immodesty and presumption, 
 if before this venerable University I venture, though 
 it be but for a moment, to merge the argument of 
 the lecturer in the message of the preacher. I have 
 recently looked into the open grave, and have seen 
 the other world too vividly flashing through its 
 slender veil for the impression ever to be forgotten. 
 Brethren, partakers of the holy calling, in this 
 light all things should be regarded ; for that other 
 world will be no abrupt transition, no dislocated 
 commencement of a new state, but the consummation 
 and crown of the world that is. The track of glory 
 leading across the waves into the better land must 
 take its beginning on this side Jordan, amid the con- 
 flicts and struggles and anxieties of life. We as much 
 need Divine help to enable us to live as we need it 
 to strengthen us to die. For life, not for death, is 
 the Gospel given. The beginning of spiritual life is 
 in its power ; the consecration of temporal life is in 
 
 k John iii. 3 : yevvt)8Q ava>6cv. 
 
VIII] One Hope. 333 
 
 its blessing ; the inheritance of eternal life is bound 
 up in its promise. Our relation towards Christ 
 is therefore not a question for the future, but a 
 question for the present. To know Him and the 
 power of His resurrection is the true wisdom. The 
 heavenly light flashes upon the soul through the cre- 
 vices of the broken heart, and the triumphant songs 
 of the saints in heaven can alone be learned in the 
 pathetic contrition and tearful supplication of the 
 saints on earth. The faith alone gives dignity to 
 early manhood, for it supplies a noble purpose to ele- 
 vate life, and a pure hope to sanctify it. The faith 
 alone is the glory of riper years, teaching us not to 
 exhaust our spiritual strength in effeminate idle- 
 ness, but to overcome the evil one, strong in faith, 
 firm in hope, and rejoicing with joy unspeakable 
 amid the very heat and labours of the conflict. This 
 alone is the crown and joy of age, as it ripens for 
 the grave, beautiful as some gorgeous summer sun, 
 more lovely in the pomp and splendour of its 
 setting than in the blaze of its midday strength. 
 He who lives upon this faith, and drinks from this 
 fountain of the Spirit of God, is truly the believer. 
 In the absence of this wisdom all other wisdom is 
 valueless ; for it will give neither strength in life, 
 nor hope in death, nor heaven in the life beyond. 
 Then is our whole history a long mistake ; a comely 
 tree of God's planting, but twisted out of shape and 
 distorted by sin. Then is man himself a contradic- 
 tion, life a paradox, and death a blank. Then, 
 indeed, have we cause to plead the pathetic Litany 
 
334 The Obligations of Belief . 
 
 of our Church : " From all blindness of heart, good 
 Lord, deliver us I" But if the believer has learned 
 of Christ, he finds it his highest ambition to walk 
 worthily of Him. In His school, where God the 
 Spirit is the teacher, the loftiest intellect and the 
 maturest wisdom may be honoured in becoming a 
 disciple. Neither will life weaken nor death efface 
 His blessed lessons. They may be commenced in 
 conflict, but they will be carried on in joy, and 
 completed in the beatific vision for ever and ever. 
 
 What then, though the battle rages on every side, 
 and without are fightings, and within are fears : 
 shame be to the craven heart that deserts the banner 
 of his crucified Master. The lips that utter the 
 words are the lips of an apostle, but the Spirit 
 dictating them is the Spirit of Christ : " Watch 
 ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men, be 
 strong." 
 
NOTES 
 
NOTES 
 
 LECTURE I 
 
 NOTE 1, p. 7, 
 
 IN Jude 3 the word ttlcttis denotes not fides qua creditur, 
 but fides quae creditur. " It remains, therefore, that the 
 word expresses the truth received ; and in this sense the 
 general consent of criticism may be said to accept it." 
 Erasmus paraphrases the apostle's words thus : " Pro fide 
 hoc est pro sana doctrina ab apostolis accepta quae semel 
 Sanctis tradita est, nee alio tempore alia atque alia deberi 
 debet, decertare jubemus.'" Beza translates : " Pro fide quae 
 semel tradita est Sanctis/' and adds : " pro viribus tue- 
 amini fidem, sana scil. doctrina et vitae exemplis." The 
 verdict of the older critics is summed up in " Poli Synopsis 
 Criticorum : " " Fidem hie vocat ipsam doctrinam (Grotius, 
 Beza, Piscator) fidei, videlicet Evangelium (Piscator) per 
 metony. (Grotius, Piscator, Vorstius) ut Acts vi. 7 (Grotius), 
 1 Tim. iv. 1 et alibi ssepe (Beza)." Wolfius in his " Curae 
 Philologicae" adopts the paraphrase of Sherlock : " Ut serio 
 teneatis earn, quae vobis tradita est, doctrinam, contra falsos 
 doctores, quos clanculum audio irrepsisse." In this interpre- 
 tation our English critics unanimously agree. Bloomfield, 
 Alford, Wordsworth, and Webster and Wilkinson adopt it. 
 Schleusner in his Lexicon, among other applications of the 
 word, gives the following : " Objective sumitur et ipsam 
 formulam religionis Christianae (quia fidei seu verae in Deum 
 fiduciae praeceptione potissimum continebatur), doctrinam 
 
 z 
 
338 NOTES 2, S. [Lect. 
 
 Evangelicam a Jesu et apostolis traditam fidem quae creditur 
 sen objectivam notat." Among- the list of expositors who 
 adopt this sense may be specified, Hammond, Whitby, 
 Sherlock, and Doddridge, in our own country ; and Bengel, 
 De Wette, Stier, Passow, Huther, and others abroad. 
 
 NOTE 2, p. 8. 
 
 " Three classes of passages occur. In the one it [maris] is 
 used with the article in contexts where it can only be under- 
 stood of the act of faith in the believer. In another class of 
 passages its objective meaning is equally clear ; while in a 
 third class of passages the word may bear either meaning." 
 
 The passages where the word occurs in the Acts of the 
 Apostles are so exceedingly numerous (213, with or without 
 the article), that no object would be gained by loading the 
 Notes with an exhaustive classification. I therefore give in- 
 stances only. The word with the article is used in a subjec- 
 tive meaning in Acts iii. 16; xv. 9 ; Rom. iii. 30, 31 ; iv. 11, 
 14; Eph. iii. 17; Col. ii. 12; and Philem. 4. It is employed 
 with the article in an objective sense in Acts vi. 7 ; xiii. 8 ; 
 Gal. i. 23 ; 1 Tim. iii. 9 ; v. 8 ; vi. 2 1 ; Titus i. 13. In the fol- 
 lowing passages it will bear, consistently with the context, 
 either a subjective or an objective meaning, or both, viz. 
 Acts xiv. 22 ; xv. 9; xvi. 5; xx. 2£ ; xxiv. 24; xxvi. 18; 
 Rom. i. 12; 2 Cor. i. 24; Phil. i. 17; 1 Tim. iv. i; 2 Tim. 
 ii. 18 j iii. 8 ; Titus ii. 2. The transition usage of the word 
 appears also when it is used without the article. Its subjec- 
 tive use without the article needs no illustration. But it is 
 used objectively in Eph. iv. 5, and both objectively and sub- 
 jectively in 1 Tim. i. 2, 4, 19; ii. 7, 15 ; and Titus i. 4. 
 
 NOTE S, p. i2. 
 
 " irapahoOdar]: Tradita divinitus." {Ben/jet.) "Apud Arist. 
 Phys. 4: -napabeboiitvoi; a majoribus t nidi turn." (Scapula.) 
 " mxpahih^jxi : trado docendo, doceo, instituo, praecipio, narro, 
 Mark \ iii. 13; Luke i. 2 ; Acts vi. 14; xvi. 4; Rom. vi. 17 ; 
 
I] NOTE 4. 339 
 
 i Cor. xi. 2, 23; xv. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 2; Jucle 3." {Schleumer.) 
 " To give or hand over to another, as a torch in the torch- 
 race, Plat. Legg. 776 b; then in various ways, like Latin 
 tradere, as a kingdom to one's son, correlative to Trapabe^crOai, 
 Hor. ii. 159; one's son to a tutor, Hor. i. 73; a prize to a 
 winner, Xen. Oec. xx. 28." {Liddell and Scott.) " km tov e£ 
 ap\i]s i)[uv -napaboOa'Ta Koyov e7H0Tpei//-co/u.ey." {Polycarp. ad 
 Phil. c. 7.) 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 16. 
 
 " The object for which Christ appeared to St. Paul was not 
 to impart to him a new system of chronology, but to make 
 him a witness to His resurrection, and to enlighten his mind 
 on truths connected with the everlasting well-being of man- 
 kind. The supernatural gifts of the Spirit were communi- 
 cated, not for the purpose of solving dubious points of history, 
 but to open the minds of the apostles to the end and design 
 of the Incarnation ; to reveal to them the great truths of the 
 Christian revelation ; to bring to the minds of the apostles 
 whatever Christ had said unto them, and to afford a miracu- 
 lous attestation to the truth of their testimony. What right 
 have we to assume that because St. Paul was put in trust 
 with the Gospel and supernaturally assisted in the discharge 
 of that trust — so that when he treated of Gospel truth his 
 assertions were to be received not as the l word of man, but of 
 God ' — or because when he gave commands for the regulation 
 of the Churches, ( the things which he wrote unto them were 
 the Lord's ;' that he was inspired with a supernatural know- 
 ledge of chronology or history without the smallest support 
 for such an assumption in one single assertion in the New 
 Testament. His Old Testament chronology might have been 
 that which he had learned in the school of Gamaliel. If he 
 had learned a system of chronology there, there is nothing in 
 his assertions concerning his own inspiration, or in the 
 promises of our Lord, which requires us to believe that the 
 defects of Gamaliel's chronology would be corrected by in- 
 spiration." (The Nature and Extent of Divine Inspiration, by 
 the Rev. C. A. Row, p. 227.) 
 
 z 2 
 
340 NOTES 5—7. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 5, p. 1 6. 
 
 " It [the modern school of thought] is no longer exclu- 
 sively negative and destructive, but it is on the contrary in- 
 tensely positive, and in its moral aspect intensely Christian. 
 It clusters round a system of essentially Christian conceptions 
 — equality, fraternity, the suppression of war, the elevation of 
 the poor, the love of truth, and the diffusion of liberty. It 
 revolves round the ideal of Christianity, and represents its 
 spirit without its dogmatic system and its supernatural narra- 
 tives. From both of these it unhesitatingly recoils, while 
 deriving all its strength and nourishment from Christian 
 ethics." (Leelcy, History of Rationalism, vol. i. p. 185.) 
 
 " The general bias of the intellect of the age is in the direc- 
 tion of rationalism. In other words, there is a strong pre- 
 disposition to value the spirit and moral element of Chris- 
 tianity, but to reject dogmatic systems, and more especially 
 miraculous narratives." {Ibid. p. 191.) 
 
 NOTE 6, p. 16. 
 
 " The moral progress of mankind can never cease to be 
 distinctively and intensely Christian, so long as it consists of 
 a gradual approximation to the character of the Christian 
 Founder. There is indeed nothing more wonderful in the 
 history of the human race than the way in which that ideal 
 has traversed the lapse of ages, acquiring a new strength and 
 beauty with each advance of civilisation, and infusing its 
 benevolent influence into every sphere of thought and action." 
 {Lecfry, History of Rationalism, vol. i. p. 335.) 
 
 "Passages eloquently descriptive of the character of Christ, 
 from Rousseau, Morell, Theodore Parker, and Greg, will be 
 found in the Authors." {The Bible and its Critics, the Boyle 
 Lectures for 1861.) 
 
 NOTE 7, p. 16. 
 
 "When I say that f the Bible contains God's word/ I 
 do not mean, as some have supposed, that we may pick and 
 choose among the contents of the Bible — that we can separate 
 those books or portions of the Bible which are God's word 
 
I] NOTE 8. 341 
 
 from those books and portions which are not. I mean that 
 throughout the Bible the word of God will be heard by the 
 listening" ear and the obedient heart, reproving, exhorting, 
 instructing, comforting ; but I say that this word is ' the 
 Spirit and the life ' which breathes in the written words, 
 not the mere ' flesh ' or letter of the words themselves. f The 
 flesh profiteth nothing ; the words that 1 speak unto you, they 
 are spirit and they are life/ And as we read the sacred text, 
 we can feed by faith upon this bread of life, and feel our 
 strength renewed, and the daily waste supplied of our spiritual 
 substance ; while yet our spirits have no power to assimilate 
 the mere human elements, which are of the earth earthy, 
 which must pass away, having no fitness in themselves to 
 sustain the life of our souls/'' {Natal Sermons, by the Rt. Rev. 
 John William Colenso, D.D., p. 8.) 
 
 NOTE 8, p. 1 8. 
 
 " It was the opinion of Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theo- 
 phylact, that the doctrines of the Gospel are described in 
 Scripture under this term [do'yuxara], and the opinion is shared 
 by many critics of later times/'' 
 
 The state of the case is ably summed up in Professor 
 Eadie's Commentary on the Ephesians : — 
 
 " Tov vojaov t£>v ZvtoX&v iv boyfxao-i. I take this phrase 
 as a graphic description of the ceremonial law. But the 
 meaning and connection of kv hoyjxacn have been much dis- 
 puted. It has been regarded as the means by which the 
 law has been abolished, to wit, c by doctrines' — Christian 
 doctrines or precepts. Such is the reading of the Arabic 
 and Vulgate, the Syriac being doubtful, and such is the 
 view of Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Aretius, Gro- 
 tius, Estius, Hammond, Zeger, a Lapide, Bengel, Fritzsche, 
 Olshausen, and Scholz. Winer, in his third edition, pro- 
 poses this view, but renounced it in his fourth (§§ 31, 32). 
 Thus Chrysostom says, 8o'y//,ara yap /caAeT T?)y irCariv. Theo- 
 doret and Theopylact follow, while CEcumenius vindicates 
 the use of the word as applied to Christ's teaching, by 
 quoting from the Sermon on the Mount such phrases as 
 1 1 say unto you ;' these being proofs of authoritative dic- 
 tation and warranting the truth propounded to be called 
 80'yjua. To this theory there are insuperable objections/' 
 (p. 163.) 
 
342 NOTES 9—11. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 9, p. 1 8. 
 
 The five places where the word boyfxa is used in the New 
 Testament are: Luke ii. I, e£r)A0e boyp,a napa Kaiaapos ', Acts 
 xvi. 4, Ttapzb'ibovv avTols (pv\aaaet.v tcl boyp.aTa tcl KtKpip.£va vtto 
 tG>v aiioaTokbyv, and Acts xvii. J, ovtoi ttclvtcs cmivavTi, tG>v 
 boyp.aToov KaCaapos irpdaaovat ; Eph. ii. 15, tov v6p.ov rav 
 h'To\G>v kv boyixaat;, Col. ii. 14, e^a\([\}/as to ko.6^ ?//x<3i> \eipo- 
 ypa<j)ov rot? boypacnv. In the first three instances the sense 
 of command is indisputably conveyed. 
 
 NOTE 10, p. 18. 
 
 " Hence it was that Christians were called sometimes oi 
 tov boyp.a.Tos, ' men of the faith' — meaning" the faith of Christ. 
 As in the rescript of Aurelian the Emperor, against Paulus 
 Samosatensis, recorded by Eusebius (lib. vii. c. 30.), the bishops 
 of Italy and Rome are styled i-niaKo-noc tov boyp:aTos, ( bishops 
 of the faith/ that is, the Christian faith." {Bingham's Chris- 
 tian Antiquities, vol. i. bk. i. s. 9.) 
 
 NOTE 11, p. 22. 
 
 " And the grand example of St. Paul, in the mighty 
 conduct which was waged in his day, may be a source of 
 comfort and support to the weakest of us, who in our small 
 measure are called to take part in the great religions move- 
 ment of our own time. However personally insignificant 
 the combatants in the conflict of the present day, compared 
 with the great Apostle of old, yd the conflict itself is the 
 same — one which, in the lapse of time, is continually reversed 
 again and again. It is, as in his days, the battle of the spirit 
 against the letter, against the exelusiveness and narrowness — 
 the bondage— of the Law. We are told that 'whatever 
 was written aforetime in the Scriptures, was written for our 
 learning/ and St. Paul himself had to be taught by his own 
 experience that the disciple was not to be above his Lord; 
 that if they had 'called the master of the house Beelzebub '/ 
 if, out of a blind zeal for God, they had said of thai holy and 
 loving One, ' He hath a devil, He is mad, lie deceiveth the 
 
I] NOTE 12. 343 
 
 people/ — they would not spare those of His household. It is 
 an act of humble faith, my brethren, and not of arrogance ; 
 it is making" that very use of the Bible, which, as Christians, 
 it is our duty and privilege to make of it, if we, in this our 
 day, while doing (as we trust) God's work of any kind, find 
 comfort and support in studying the great examples of the 
 past. The Bible is never so well read and understood, as 
 in the light of experience/'' {Natal Sermons, pp. 5, 6. Ser- 
 mon V, on the Comfort of the Scriptures.) 
 
 " Our duty to God is not now to fear Him, and to love 
 Him, and to walk in His ways, but to hold certain opinions 
 about Him, to maintain the truth of certain old histories 
 about Him. We submit to be sermonised on Sundays, pro- 
 vided our sermons will not interfere with enlightened pru- 
 dence and political economy on week days. Nay, week after 
 week, we can see c the cures of human souls ' advertised for 
 sale in the columns of our religious newspapers, and no shame 
 burns on our cheeks. Surely, surely if there be any imper- 
 sonal Spirit of Evil, he may sit by with folded hands, con- 
 tented to spare interference in a state of things which no 
 help of his can improve." [Fronde's Nemesis of Faith, Preface, 
 p. 12.) 
 
 NOTE 12, p. 30. 
 
 " These men [the great discoverers of nature's laws] have 
 been, without exception, believers in dogmatic faith." This 
 statement is necessarily based on the biographies of the illus- 
 trious dead, in this department of human labour. Of men 
 still living it would be equally unbecoming, unsafe, and pre- 
 mature to speak. In support of the statement, I quote the 
 great authority of the Historian of the Inductive Sciences : — 
 
 " This step so much resembles the mode in which one intel- 
 ligent being understands and apprehends the conceptions of 
 another, that we cannot be surprised if those persons in 
 whose minds such a process has taken place, have been most 
 ready to acknowledge the existence and operations of a super- 
 intending Intelligence, whose ordinances it was their employ- 
 ment to study. When they had just read a sentence of the 
 table of the laws of the universe, they could not doubt 
 whether it had had a legislator. When they had deciphered 
 in them a comprehensive and substantial truth, they could 
 
344 NOTE 12. [Lect. 
 
 not believe that the letters had been thrown together by 
 chance; they could not but readily acknowledge, that what 
 their faculties had enabled them to read, must have been 
 written by some higher and profbunder mind. And accord- 
 ingly, we conceive, it will be found on examining the works 
 of those to whom we owe our knowledge of the laws of 
 nature, and especially of the wider and more comprehensive 
 laws, that such persons have been strongly and habitually 
 impressed with the persuasion of a Divine Purpose and Power, 
 which had regulated the events which they had attended to, 
 and ordained the laws which they had detected. 
 
 " To those who have pursued science without reaching the 
 rank of discoverers; who have possessed a derivative knowledge 
 of the laws of nature which others had disclosed, and have 
 employed themselves in tracing the consequences of such 
 laws, and systematising the body of truth thus produced, the 
 above description does not apply ; and we have not, therefore, 
 in these cases the same ground for anticipating the same 
 frame of mind. If among men of science of this class, the 
 persuasion of a Supreme Intelligence has at some period been 
 less vivid and less universal than in that higher class of 
 which we have before spoken, the fact, so far as it has existed, 
 may perhaps in some degree be accounted for 
 
 " The names of great discoverers are not very numerous. 
 The sciences which we may look upon as having reached, or at 
 least approached their complete and finished form, are Me- 
 chanics, Hydrostatics, and Physical Astronomy. Galileo is the 
 father of modern Mechanics. Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton 
 are the great names which mark the progress of Astronomy. 
 Hydrostatics shared in a great measure the fortunes of the 
 related science of Mechanics ; Boyle and Pascal were the 
 persons mainly active in developing its more peculiar prin- 
 ciples. The other branches of knowledge which belong' to 
 Natural Philosophy, as Chemistry and Meteorology, are as yet 
 imperfect, and perhaps infant sciences, and it would be rash to 
 presume to select in them names of equal pre-eminence with 
 those above mentioned. But it may not be difficult to show, 
 with sufficient evidence, that the effect of science upon the 
 authors of science is, in these subjects, as in the former ones, 
 far other than to alienate their minds from religious trains of 
 thought, and a habit of considering the world as the work of 
 God." {Astronomy and General Physics considered with reference 
 to Natural Theology, by ///>■ Rev. II ". Whewelt ', M.A., London, 
 1833; bk. iii. c. v. pp. 307-309.) 
 
II] NOTES 1, 2. 345 
 
 LECTURE II 
 
 NOTE 1, p. 4T. 
 
 The mistake commented upon in the lecture forms the all- 
 pervading- fallacy of Mr. Lecky's " History of nationalism in 
 Europe." Neither is any reference made to the dogmatic 
 records of the faith ; nor is there any recognition of the 
 place which the Scriptures claim to hold with reference to 
 the Church and to her doctrines, and which the unanimous 
 teaching of the Church herself has ever consistently assigned 
 to them. In vol. i. p. 396, for instance, the Protestant doc- 
 trine of Justification and the Romish doctrine of Justification 
 are placed upon precisely the same footing as two forms of 
 speculative belief equally deserving of consideration. Thus 
 the popular belief in witchcraft is confounded with a belief 
 in the existence of a spiritual and unseen world. (Vol. i. ch. i.) 
 All the evils that have sprung for the last two thousand years 
 from the heat of men's passions and tempers in matters of 
 religion are considered to be the natural and necessary pro- 
 duct of a dogmatic faith. (Vol. i. ch. iv. p. 1, and vol. ii. ch. iv # 
 p. 2.) The same fallacy pervades the entire reasoning. A 
 reference to the Scriptures would have shown that the liomish 
 doctrine of Justification by Works, the popular superstition 
 which believes in witchcraft and magic, and the natural out- 
 going of men's hot passions in controversy whatever may 
 have been its special subject, are not only foreign to the true 
 genius of Christianity, but opposed to its positive letter. 
 Mr. Leeky's views may probably have remained unchanged 
 in any case, but it was equally desirable for himself and for 
 his readers that in a history of opinion the theory of Chris- 
 tianity should be accurately stated. 
 
 NOTE 2, p. 41. 
 See Homily XIV., On the Peril of Idolatry, Part iii. 
 
346 NOTE 3. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 3, p. 55 . 
 
 The following' list forms a very inadequate attempt to pre- 
 sent in one view the unanimous testimony of the Christian 
 writers. In some cases where fragments of works alone re- 
 main we find only a phrase or two on which to rest, as in the 
 fragments of Papias, Lucius, and others of the early authors. 
 But in most cases the testimony is singularly full and explicit, 
 and derives great force from the strong diversity of doctrinal 
 sentiment often existing among the writers. Thus we find 
 the same devout belief in an authoritative revelation, and the 
 same assertion that it is to be found within the limits of 
 Holy Scripture, in Abelard and his opponent Roscellinus, in 
 Berengarius and his judge Lanfranc. The reference given to 
 Durandus is an illustration, for the treatise to which the re- 
 ference is given supports in the most extreme form the cor- 
 poral presence of our Lord's body and blood in the Eucharistic 
 elements. Yet, however widely the great divines of the 
 Church have differed on separate points of doctrine, no con- 
 troversial advantage led them to compromise the truth of an 
 authoritative and dogmatic revelation entrusted by God to 
 the keeping of the Church and embodied in Holy Scripture. 
 
 I have not quoted any passages in detail beyond those 
 given in the body of the lecture, partly to save space, and 
 partly because detached passages are never wholly satisfactory 
 to a student who desires to ascertain for himself the actual 
 facts of the case. As I have carefully verified every quota- 
 tion, I trust that no inaccuracies will be found to have crept 
 into the list. I have found great difficulty in selecting' one 
 passage in each case from the many marked in my common- 
 place book, and can only express the hope that any student 
 who takes the trouble to look into the matter will not rest 
 satisfied without making a further examination for himself. 
 
 A.D. 
 
 Circa- 
 97 Clementis Rom. Epist. i. c. xlii. — Apostolic Fathers. Edinb. 
 
 1867. 
 101 Ignatii, Epist. ad Ephes. s. xvi. — Corpus Ignatian. Lond. 1849. 
 
II] NOTE 3. 347 
 
 A.D. 
 
 Circa. 
 
 1 08 Polycarpi, Epist. ad Philip, s. vii. — Routh's Scrip. Eccl. Opusc. 
 
 117 Hennas, Shepherd of, Simil. viii. — p. 397, torn. iii. Apost. 
 
 Fathers. Edinb. 1867. 
 125 Quadratus, apud Euseb. Eccl. Hist. lib. iv. c. iii. — p. 307, 
 
 torn. xx. Paris 1867. 
 130 Barnabas, Epistle of — ch. ix. p. 115, Apost. Fathers, Edinb. 
 
 1867. 
 130 Papise Fragmenta, s. i. — p. 8, Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae. 
 140 Justini Mart. Dial. c. Tryph. s. 48. — p. 345, torn. i. Paris 
 
 1842. 
 164 Luciani Oratio. — p. 5, vol. iv. Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae. 
 167 Irenaeus adv. Haereses, lib. i. c. x. s. 1. — torn. vii. Paris 1857. 
 170 Theophilus Antioch. ad Autolyc. lib. ii. c. 22. — p. 338, vol. iii. 
 
 Routh's Reliq. Sac. 
 170 Dionysii Corinth. — p. 181, vol. i. Routh's Reliq. Sac. 
 170 Melito Sard. Excerp. ex Novo Test.- — p. 46, vol. iv. Routh's 
 
 Reliq. Sac. 
 170 Hegesippus de Judae Nepot. — p. 217, vol. i. Routh's Reliq. 
 
 Sac. 
 172 Tatiani Oratio c. Graecos, s. xii. — p. 16, torn. ii. Paris 
 
 1842. 
 180 Athenagorae Legat. pro Christ, s. vii. — p. 903, torn. vi. Paris 
 
 188 Asterius Urbanus apud Eusebium Eccl. Hist. lib. v. c. 16. — 
 
 torn. xx. Paris 1857. 
 190 Serapio Antioch. apud Eusebium Hist. Eccl. lib. vi. c. 12. — 
 
 torn. xx. Paris 1857. 
 190 Polycrates Ephes. apud Eusebium Hist. Eccl. lib. v. c. 24. 
 
 — torn. xx. Paris 1857. 
 192 Clementis Alex. Paedag. lib. i. c. 6. — p. 341, Routh's 
 
 Reliq. Sac. 
 192 Tertulliani de Virg. Vel. c. i. — p. 889, torn. ii. Paris 1844. 
 203 Minutius Felix, c. xxxviii. — p. 357, torn. iii. Paris 1844. 
 220 Africani Epist. ad Aristid. — p. 337, vol. ii. Routh's Reliq. Sac. 
 220 Hippolyti c. Haeres. Noeti, s. ix. — p. 64, Routh's Scrip. Eccl. 
 
 Opusc. 
 230 Origen de Principiis, lib. i. s. 2. — p. 115, torn. vi. Paris 
 
 1844. 
 
348 NOTE 3. [Lect. 
 
 A.D. 
 
 Circa. 
 
 247 Dionysius Alex, apud Eusebium Hist. Eccl. lib. vii. c. 24. 
 
 — torn. xx. Paris 1857. 
 
 248 Cypriani Epist. ad Jubaianum, s. xv. — p. 149, torn. iii. Paris 
 
 1844. 
 250 Lucii Epist. s. iv. — p. 981, torn. iii. Paris 1842. 
 250 Novatianus de Trinitate. — p. 117, Oxford 1723. 
 250 Gregorii Neocaes. Anatbematismi. — p. 42, Paris 1622. 
 250 Caius Presb. apud Eusebium Hist. Eccl. lib. v. s. 28. — p. 343, 
 
 vol. v. Eoutb's Reliq. Sac. 
 250 Crescens a Certa apud S. Cyprianum. — p. 350, vol. v. Eouth's 
 
 Reliq. Sac. 
 250 Lucius a Tbebeste Epist. — p. 334, vol. v. Routh's Reliq. Sac. 
 250 Gregorii Neocaes. Orat. Panyg. ad Origen. — p. 351, vol. v. 
 
 Routb's Reliq. Sac. 
 250 Dionysii Romau. Epist. adv. Sabell. — p. 351, vol. v. Routb's 
 
 Reliq. Sac. 
 250 Arcbelai Caschar. Disp. c. Manete. — p. 351, vol. v. Routb's 
 
 Reliq. Sac. 
 250 Tbeonae Epist. ad Lucianum. c. vii. — p. 443, vol. iii. Routb's 
 
 Reliq. Sac. 
 250 Pbileae Epist. ad Thmutas apud Eusebium Hist. Eccl. lib. viii. 
 
 s. 10. — torn. xx. Paris 1857. 
 256 Firmiliani Ep. ad Cyprianum, s. xiii. — p. 245, Routb's Scrip. 
 
 Eccl. Opusc. 
 300 Metbodius de Resurrect. §§ i. ii — p. 267, torn, xviii. Paris 
 
 1857. 
 300 Arnobius adv. Gentes, lib. i. — p. 274, Routb's Scrip. Eccl. 
 
 Opusc. 
 303 Lactantius de Ira Dei, c. i. s. 6. — p. 80, vol. vii. Paris 1844. 
 312 Cbrysostomi Horn, in Matbae. Horn, xlvii. — p. 643, Pusey's 
 
 Library of the Fathers. 
 315 Eusebius Caesar. Prol. ad Orat. in laud. Const. — torn. xx. 
 
 Paris 1857. 
 320 Alexandri Alexand. Epist. ad Alexand. s. x. — p. 25, torn, xviii. 
 
 Paris 1842. 
 
 325 Eustathius in Hexaem. Comm. — p. 3, London 1629. 
 
 326 Athanasii Festal Epp. Ep. xxxix. — Appendix, p. 137, Pusey's 
 
 Library of the Fathers. 
 
II] NOTE 3. 349 
 
 A.D. 
 
 Circa. 
 
 340 J. Firmicus Maternus De Erro. Prof. Relig. cap. xx. — p. 1025, 
 
 torn. xii. Paris 184.5. 
 350 Cyrilli Hiersol. Cateches. v. s. 13. — p. 221, Paris 1842. 
 354 Hilarii Lib. de Synodis. — p. 29, torn. ix. Paris 1844. 
 366 Damasi Symbo. apud Hierony. torn ii. — Corpus Confession, 
 
 Geneve 1654. 
 368 Epipbanius adv. Haeres. lib. ii. Haer. 55. s. iii. — p. 978, torn. 
 
 xli. Paris 1858. 
 368 Optatus de Schism. Donat. lib. v. s. 3. — p. 1020, torn. xi. 
 
 Paris 1845. 
 370 Gregorius Nyssen. de Anima. — p. 50, torn. xlvi. Paris 1858. 
 370 Ephrem Cyrus, Rythm. ag. Disputers, lib. vi. — Pusey's Library 
 
 of the Fathers. 
 370 Basilii Epist. ad Sozopolit. s. iii. — torn, xxxii. Paris 1857. 
 
 373 Macarii Egypt. Horn, xxxix. s. 1. — p. 762, torn, xxxiv. Paris 
 
 i860. 
 
 374 Ambrosius de Fide, lib. ii. c. vi. — p. 537, torn. vi. Paris 
 
 1845. 
 
 378 Hieronymi ad Paulam Epist. Ep. xxx. s. 6. — p. 413, torn. xx. 
 Paris 1845. 
 
 385 Theophili Alex. Epis. Pasch. i. a. § vi. — p. 617, torn. vii. Gal- 
 land. Vet. Patr. 
 
 390 Rufini Aquil. Comm. on Symb. s. xxxvi. — p. 375, torn. xxi. 
 Paris 1849. 
 
 396 Augustinus de Civit. Dei, lib. xix. c. 18. — p. 348, torn. ii. 
 Colon. 1850. 
 
 398 Chrysostomi Horn, in loan. Horn. xxi. — p. 127 ; Horn. xxx. — 
 p. 174 ; Horn, xxxii. — p. 187, torn. xli. Paris 1859. 
 
 412 Cyrilli Alex, de Trinitate, c. i.— p. 1121, torn, lxxvii. Paris 
 
 1859. 
 412 Isidori Pelus. Epp. lib. iv. c. cxiv. — torn, lxxvii. Paris 
 
 i860. 
 423 Theordoreti Haer. Fab. lib. v. c. i. — p. 481. Halae 1769. 
 430 Cassianus de Incarnat. lib. vii. c. 22. — torn. i. Paris 1846. 
 434 Vincentii Lirin. Commonit. lib. ii. s. 29.— p. 677, torn. i. 
 
 Paris 1846. 
 440 Salvianus de Gubern, lib. iii. s. 40. — torn. liii. Paris 1845. 
 444 Prosper. — Goode's Divine Rule, vol. iii. p. 207. 
 
350 NOTE 3. [Lect. 
 
 A.D. 
 
 Circa. 
 
 483 Felix IV. de Eccl. Raven. Const. — p. 13, torn. Ixv. Paris 
 1847. 
 
 500 Fulgentius de Fide, lib. i. s. 4. — p. 675, torn. Ixv. Paris 1847. 
 
 535 Cosmae Indicop. Typograph. Christ, lib. vii. s. 292. — p. 374, 
 torn, lxxxviii. Paris 1859. 
 
 561 Anastasius Sinait. Just. Viae Dux. — p. 100, Ingols. 1606. 
 
 587 Venantii Fortunati Exp. Fidei Cath. de Trinit. — p. 5867, 
 torn, lxxxviii. Paris 1850. 
 
 590 Gregorius Magnus. — Goode's Divine Rule, vol. iii. p. 208. 
 
 636 Isidorus, Hispanl. Etymolog. lib. vi. c. i. s. 50. — torn. viii. 
 Paris 1850. 
 
 700 Sergii Epist. Life of Bede. — Preface, p. xv, Church His- 
 torians. 
 
 730 Bedae Ven. Epist. to Ecgbert, s. xvii. — p. 663, vol. i. p. ii. 
 Church Historians. 
 
 745 Bonifacius. — Cuthberto Epist. p. 143. Giles 1844. 
 
 770 Pauli Deacon. Ascetica, Horn. xli. — p, 1179, torn. xcv. Paris 
 1850. 
 
 804 Alcuinus adv. Haeres Felicis, §§ 57, 58. — p. 112, torn. ci. 
 Paris 1 851. 
 
 830 John Scotus Erigena, Horn, in Prol. S. Evang. S. Joan. lib. 
 v. — torn. cxxi. Paris 1851. 
 
 830 Agabardi Epist. ad Fredegisium, s. ix. — p. 164, torn. civ. Paris 
 1851. 
 
 880 Photii Amphiloch. Quaest. clxxxix. — Wolfii Philolog. Ham- 
 burg 1735. 
 
 888 Anastasii Rom. Syllogismi. — p. 680, torn, cxxix. Paris 1853. 
 1030 Othlonus Mon. de cursu Spirit, c. ix. — p. 169, torn, cxlvi. 
 Paris 1853. 
 
 1044 Lanfrancus, Lib. de Corp. c. Berengarium. — p. 243, Paris 
 
 1548. 
 1060 Durandus de Corp. et Sang. Christi, pt. iv. s. 11. — p. 1391, 
 
 torn, cxlix. Paris 1853. 
 1090 Rosccllini Epist. ad Abelardum. — p. 198, Ed. Schmeller. 
 1090 Abelardi Epist. at Heloisani. — pp. 377, 8, torn, clxxviii. Paris 
 
 1853- 
 1 100 Anselmus do Cone. Presci. Dei.— p. 528, torn, clviii, Paris 
 
 1853. 
 
II] NOTE 3. 351 
 
 A.D. 
 
 Circa. 
 
 uoo Alexander de Ales, de modo S. Scripturae, pt. i. Quest, i. — 
 
 torn. i. Lugduni 1515. 
 1 1 50 Brunonis Exp. to 2 Tim. iii. 16. — p. 470, torn, cliii. Paris 
 
 1854. 
 1 153 Bernardi Serm. in Cantica. Ser. lxii. s. 4. — p. 1077, torn. 
 
 clxxxiii. Paris 1854. 
 1 1 56 Petrus Lombardus de Myst. Trinit. lib. i. s. i. — p. 13, torn. 
 
 cxci. Paris 1548. 
 1250 Thomae Aquin. Summa. Theolog. p. 1, quaest. i. art. i. — p. 
 
 459, torn. i. Paris 1841. 
 1400 John Gerson de Vita Spirit. — quoted by Cosin, vol. iii. p. 35, 
 
 Anglo-Cath. Lib. 
 1520 Luther on the Galatians, ch. i. v. 6. — Middleton. 
 1520 Ph. Melanchthon, Resp. ad Clerum Col. — Bp Cosin, vol. iii. 
 
 p. 39, Anglo-Cath. Lib. 
 1520 Erasmus on Jude iii. — Edit. 1658, November. 
 1526 Tyndale, Answer to Sir T. More. — p. 100, Parker Society's 
 
 Edit, 
 1535 Latimer, Bp., Sermon on Rom. xv. 4. — p. 59, Parker Soc. 
 
 Edit. 
 
 1535 Bullinger, Decades, I. Ser. i. p.i. — p. 37, vol. i. Parker Soc. 
 
 Edit. 
 
 1536 Calvin's Institutes, bk. ii. ch. vi. 64. — Edinb. 1863. 
 
 1540 Bale, Bp., Image of Both Churches. — p. 252, Parker Soc. Edit. 
 
 1541 Becon, Probations. — p. 319, Parker Soc. Edit. 
 
 1550 Bradford, Pref. to Places of Artopaeus. — p. 5, Parker Soc. Edit, 
 1550 Hooper, Bp., Answer to Bishop of Winchester. — p. 111, Parker 
 
 Soc. Edit, 
 1550 Philpot, Arch., Trans, of Curio's Defence. — p. 357, Parker 
 
 Soc. Edit. 
 1550 Cranmer, Archbp. , Confut. of Unwritten Verities. — pp. 52, 64, 
 
 Remarks, Parker Soc Edit. 
 1550 Bacon, Nov. Org. item in Psal. xix. — Oxf. 1855. 
 1550 Coverdale on Acts ii. 5-1 1. — p. 394, Parker Soc. Edit. 
 1560 Nowell's Catechism. — Enchirid. Theologicum, vol. ii. 
 1560 Jewell's Apol. p. i. — pp. 57, 58, Parker Soc. Edit. 
 1560 Parker, Archbp., Address to Convocation, 1572. — Goode's 
 
 Divine Rule, vol. iii. p. 345. 
 
352. NOTE 3. [Lect. 
 
 AD. 
 
 Circa. 
 
 1560 Beza on Jude iii. — Geneve 1580. 
 
 1562 Calfhill's Answer to Martial. — p. 27, Parker Soc. Edit. 
 
 1562 Homilies of Church of England, Homily i. 
 
 1 5 7 1 Canons. 
 
 1 57 1 Reformatio LegumEccl. — Goode's Divine Rule, vol. iii. p. 344. 
 
 1579 Whittaker, Add. appended to Disputations on Scripture. — p. 
 
 705, Parker Soc. Edit. 
 
 1580 Fulke, Defence of the S. Scriptures, p. v. — p. 169, Parker 
 
 Soc. Edit. 
 
 1594 Hooker, Eccl. Polity, bk. ii. ch. v. — p. 207, Ed. 1821. 
 
 1596 Overall, Convocation Book, bk. ii. c. viii. — p. 191, Anglo-Cath. 
 Libr. 
 
 1600 Andrewes' Serm. on Temptation of Christ. — p. 504, Anglo- 
 Cath. Lib. 
 
 1606 Field, of the Church. — p. 151, ch. xxii. vol. iii. Eccl. Hist. Soc. 
 1850. 
 
 1619 Morton, Bp., Catholic Appeal. — lib. iii. ch. xvi. s. iii. London 
 
 16 ro. 
 
 1620 Donne, Serm. clvii. on 2 Pet. iii. 13. — vol. vi. Lond. 1839. 
 1620 Laud, Archbp., Conference with Fisher, § 28.— p. 180, 
 
 Oxf. 1839. 
 
 1620 Ussher, Principles of Christian Religion. — p. 5, Dublin 1843. 
 
 1625 Grotius de Verit. Relig. Christ, lib. iii. c. i. 
 
 1630 Jackson, Thos., The Eternal Truth of the Scriptures, b. i. s. 2- 
 ch. ii. — p. 12, Oxf. 1844. 
 
 1630 Cosin, Sermon xviii. on John xx. 9. — p. 251, vol. i. Anglo- 
 Cath. Lib. 
 
 1630 Hall, Old Religion, Ep. Dedicatory. — p. 310, vol.xvii. Gibson's 
 Preservative, Lond. 1849. 
 
 1640 Hammond on 2 Tim. iii. 16, and Jude 3. — pp. 711, 847, 
 Lond. 1 86 1. 
 
 1640 Reynolds' Serm. xiv. on Phil. iii. 15. — vol. v. p. 152, Lond. 
 1826. 
 
 1649 Thorndike on the Right of the Church, ch. v. p. 601. — vol. i. 
 
 pt. ii. Anglo-Cath. Lib. 
 
 1650 Taylor, Dissuasive from Popery, ch. i. s. i. — Ed. 1844. 
 
 1653 Bramhall, Answer to Milletierc. — p. 49, vol. i. Anglo-Cath. 
 Lib. 
 
II] NOTES 4, 5. 353 
 
 A.D. 
 
 Circa. 
 
 1660 Barrow, Truth of the Christian Religion, Serm. xiii. — p. 8, 
 
 vol. v. Oxf. 1830. 
 1662 Pearson on the Creed, Art. i. — pp. 19, 20, Lond. 1848. 
 1670 Beveridge, Expos, of Art. VI. — p. 205, vol. ix. Lond. 1824. 
 1670 South, Serm. on Matt. v. 8. — p. 154, vol. vii. Oxf. 1823. 
 1673 Tillotson, The Rule of Faith, pt. i. s. iii. s. 8. — p. 536, vol. i. 
 
 Lond. 1728. 
 1680 Bull, Primitive Tradition of the Cath. Faith, Introd. — p. 209, 
 
 vol. iii. Anglo-Cath. Lib. 
 1680 Stillingneet, Rational Account, c. ii. — p. 90. Oxf. 1844. 
 
 1689 Burnet, Exp. Art. VI. —p. 84, Lond. 1836. 
 
 1690 Patrick, Discourse on Tradition, pt. ii. s. 1. — Gibson's Pres. 
 
 vol. v. Lond. 1848. 
 1698 Wilson, Sacra Privata. — pp. no, in, vol. v. Anglo-Cath. 
 
 Libr. 
 1730 Waterland, Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, c. vii. s. 5. — p. 265, 
 
 Ed. 1823. 
 1814 Van Mildert, Bampton Lect., Serm. i. — p. 21, Oxf. 1815. 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 57. 
 
 The Rev. E. B. Elliott in his " Horae Apocalypticae " 
 quotes Gibbon's words: "The ruin of the Pagan religion is 
 described by the Sophists as a dreadful and amazing' prodigy ; 
 which covered the earth with darkness and restored the 
 ancient dominion of chaos and of night." He adds the 
 following note : " kcu tl iivdribes kcu deifies ctkotos Tvpavviqcm ra 
 Zirl Trjs y?]s KakXtara. So Eunapius of the fourth century, in 
 his life of Eustathius, with reference to the then imminent 
 utter ruin of Paganism." 
 
 NOTE 5, p. 63. 
 
 " Siquidem nihil utiliter ad salutem spiritualem praedica- 
 mus quod sacra scriptura spiritus sancte miraculo faecundata 
 non protulerit aut intra se non contineat. Nam si quid 
 ratione dicamus aliquando quod in dictis ejus aperte mon- 
 
 A a 
 
354 NOTES 6—8. [Lect. 
 
 strare aut ex ipsis probare nequimus, hoc modo per illam cog- 
 noscimus utrim set accipiendum aut respicendum." [Anselm, 
 De Concordia Prescientiae Dei cum libero Arhitrio, vol. i. 
 P- 193-) 
 
 NOTE 6, p. 64. 
 
 "Sed memento hocpacto incaepi tuae respondere quaestioni, 
 ut videlicit, si quid dixero quod major non confirmet auctori- 
 tas, quamvis illud ratione probare videar, non alia certitudine 
 accipiat, nisi quia interim mihi ita videtur, donee mihi melius 
 aliquo modo revelet. Certus enim sum si quid dico quod 
 sacrae scripturae absque dubio contradicant, quia falsum est, 
 nee illud tenere volo, si cognovero." (Anselm, Cur Devs 
 Homo, c. xviii.) 
 
 NOTE 7, p. 66. 
 
 The whole passage from John Scotus is so full of beauty 
 that I give it complete. The reference, as well as the refer- 
 ence to the other passages quoted from the Scholastic Divines, 
 will be found under Note 3. 
 
 " Concatenatus quippe est divinae scripturae contextus, 
 Daedalisque diverticulis et obliquitatibus perplexus. Neque 
 hoc Spiritus Sanctus invidia voluit intellegendi, quod absit 
 existimari, sed studio nostram intelligentiam exercendi, sudo- 
 risque et inventionis praemii reddendi ; praemium quippe est 
 in sacra Scriptura laborantium pura perfectaque intelligentia. 
 O Domine Jesus nullum aliud praemium, nullam aliam beati- 
 tudinem, nullum aliud gaudium a te postulo, nisi ut ad puram 
 absque ullo errore fallacis theoriae verba tua quae per tuum 
 Sanctum Spiritum inspirata sunt, intelligam. Haec est enim 
 summa felicitatis meae, finisque perfectae est contemplationis, 
 quoniam nihil ultra rationabilis anima etiam purissima in- 
 veniet, quia nihil ultra est. Ut enim, non alibi altius quaereris 
 quam in verbis tuis, ita non alibi apertius inveniris quam in 
 eis. Ibi quippe habitas et illuc quaerentes et diligentes te 
 introducis ; ibi spirituals epulas verae cognitionis electis 
 tuis praeparas, illic transiens ministras eis. w [Horn, in Prolog. 
 S. Evang. S. ./fun/., lib. v.) 
 
 NOTE 8, p. 68. 
 
 References to the principal English Divines will be found 
 under Note 3. 
 
II] NOTE 9. 35^ 
 
 NOTE 9, p. 73. 
 
 I do not give the following list as an exhaustive enumera- 
 tion, but as containing the best-known Confessions : — 
 
 1 Fragments of a Creed in Irenaeus — lib. i. c. i. 
 
 2 The Creed of Origin : nepl apx&v — Praefat. 
 
 3 Fragments of a Creed in Tertullian — De Vel. Virg. 
 
 4 Fragments of a Creed in Cyprian — Epist. ad Maricon. 
 
 5 Creed of Gregory of Neo Caesarea — Opera, p. 1, apud Gregory 
 
 Nyssen, torn. iii. 
 
 6 The Creed of Lucian the Martyr — recorded by Athanasius, 
 
 Socrates, and Hilary. 
 
 7 The Creed of the Apostolical Constitutions — lib. vii. c. xiii. 
 
 8 The Creed of Jerusalem — partly preserved in St. James' 
 
 Liturgy. 
 
 9 The Creed of Caesarea — given by Eusebius. 
 
 10 The Creed of Alexandria — recorded by Socrates. 
 
 1 1 The Ci'eed of Antioch — recorded by Cassian. 
 
 12 The Apostles' Creed. 
 
 1 3 The Creed of Aquileia — given by Euffinus. 
 
 1 4 The Creed of Damasus — given by Jerome. 
 
 15 The Nicene Creed. 
 
 1 6 The two Creeds of Epiphanius. 
 
 1 7 Nicene Creed as completed at the Council of Constantinople. 
 
 18 The Athanasian Creed. 
 
 1 9 The Huguenot Confession of La Rochelle. 
 
 20 Waldensium Confessio, n 20 a.d. 
 
 21 Confessio Gennadii &c, 1453 AD - 
 
 22 Helvetian Confessio Simplex, 1566 a.d. 
 
 23 Helvetian, Confessions of, 1536 and 1581 a.d. 
 
 24 Basiliensis Confessio. 
 
 25 Jewell's Apology. 
 
 26 Articles of the Church of England. 
 
 27 Ecclesiarum Belgicarum Confessio — Dort, 1618 A.D. 
 
 28 Confessio in Synodo Czengerina, 1570 a.d. 
 
 29 Consensus Majoris et Minoris Poloniae, &c, 1573 and 1643 A.D. 
 
 30 Confessio Tetrapolitana, 1581 a.d. 
 
 31 Augustana Confessio a Ph. Melanchthon, 1534 a.d. 
 
 a a 2 
 
356 NOTES 10—12. [Lect. 
 
 32 Confessio Saxonicarum Ecclesiarum, 1551 AD - 
 
 33 Confessio Christopheri Ducis Wurtembergensis, 1561 a.d. 
 
 34 Confessio Frederici III., 1577 a.d. 
 
 35 Confessio, &c, Regni Bohemiae, 1535 a.d. 
 
 36 Confessio Basiliensis, 1647 a.d. 
 
 37 Cyrilli Patriarchae Constantin. Confessio, 162 1 a.d. 
 
 38 Westminster Confession. 
 
 39 The Heidelberg Confession, 1575 a.d. 
 
 40 Scottica Confessio, 1560 a.d. 
 
 41 Dublin Confession, 1615 a.d. 
 
 42 Anabaptist Confession, 1646 a.d. 
 
 43 Confession of the Quakers, 1673 A.D. 
 
 44 The Brownist Confessions, 1596 a.d. 
 
 45 The Baptist Confession of 161 1, 1643, 1677, 1689 a.d. 
 
 46 The Independent or Savoy Confession, 1658 a.d. 
 
 47 Creed of Pope Pius IV. 
 
 NOTE 10, p. 76. 
 
 The papal decree establishing the dogma of the Immacu- 
 late Conception was dated December 8, 1854 a.d. 
 
 NOTE 11, p. j6. 
 
 The doctrine of a purgatorial fire was first suggested by 
 Origen; was doubtfully referred to by Augustine with refer- 
 ence to 1 Cor. iii. 15; was first positively asserted by Pope 
 Gregory I; was reduced to a system in the thirteenth century 
 by Thomas Aquinas; and firmly established as a dogma of 
 the Church for the first time by the Council of Trent in 
 1563 a.d. 
 
 NOTE 12, p. 76. 
 
 Communion in one kind was decreed by the Council of 
 Constance, 1414 a.d. In the eleventh session it was deter- 
 mined (hat "Christ did institute this sacrament in both 
 kinds, and that the faithful and the Primitive Church did 
 
II] NOTES 13, 14. 357 
 
 receive in both kinds ; yet a practice being reasonably brought 
 in to avoid some dangers and scandals, they appoint the 
 custom to continue of consecrating in both kinds, and of 
 giving to the laity only in one kind, since Christ was entire 
 and truly under each kind." {Quoted by Burnet on Article 
 XXX.) 
 
 NOTE 13, p. 76. 
 
 The doctrine of transubstantiation is ordinarily referred to 
 Paschasius Radbert, a.d. 831. Bishop Cosin, however, ar- 
 gues that there is nothing in his book "that favours the tran- 
 substantiation of the bread, or its destruction or removal." 
 {History of Transubstantiation.) Bertram, Aelfric (Archbishop 
 of York), and Bereng'arius wrote against Paschasius. The 
 term ' transubstantiation ' cannot claim an earlier date than 
 the beginning of the twelth century. The Council of La- 
 teran in a.d. 1316 gave formal authorisation both to the term 
 and to the doctrine. 
 
 NOTE 14, p. 76. 
 
 " As to the number c seven ' insisted upon by the Church 
 of Rome we cannot find it in the writings of the Fathers. 
 Peter Lombard is said to have first devised it in the twelfth 
 century ; and from him it was adopted generally by the 
 Schoolmen. It was laid down with authority in a decree to 
 the Arminians sent from the Council of Florence, 1439, which 
 was only in the name of Pope Eugenius. It was then con- 
 firmed by the provincial Council of Sens, otherwise called the 
 Council of Paris, a.d. 1528, after that by the Council of 
 Trent a.d. 1547. It finally stands as part of the Creed of 
 Pope Pius IV." (Bis/zop Harold Browne on the Articles, Art. 
 XXV.) 
 
358 NOTES 15, 16. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 15, p. 76. 
 
 " The Ecclesiastical Councils found it necessary at length 
 to set limits to the licentious superstition of those ignorant 
 wretches, who, with a view to have still more friends at court 
 — for such were their gross notions of things — were daily- 
 adding new saints to the list of their celestial mediators. They 
 accordingly declared by a solemn decree, that no departed 
 Christian should be considered as a member of the saintly 
 order, before the bishop in a provincial council and in 
 presence of the people had pronounced him worthy of that 
 distinguished honour. ... It is true we have no example of 
 any person solemnly sainted by the Bishop of Rome alone be- 
 fore the tenth century, when Udalric, Bishop of Augsburg, 
 received this dignity in a formal manner from John XV." 
 {Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, Cent. ix. vol. ii. ch. iii. 
 pp. 11, 320. Berwick, 1809.) 
 
 NOTE 16, p. 76. 
 
 " In the year 606 Boniface III received from the blood- 
 stained hands of Phocas, the upstart tyrant, the title of Uni- 
 versal Bishop, notwithstanding that Gregory the Great, one of 
 his immediate predecessors, rebuked the pride of John, Patri- 
 arch of Constantinople, for assuming to himself the very same 
 title ; pronouncing it blasphemous, and as fitly belonging to 
 none but to a forerunner of Antichrist." (Grier's Epitome of 
 General Councils, p. 113.) 
 
Ill] NOTES 1, 2. J359 
 
 LECTURE III 
 
 NOTE 1, p. 85. 
 
 " Having retained his native language he gave them an 
 account of his adventures; and as the Andamanese have no 
 notions of a deity he acquainted them with the knowledge he 
 had of God, and would have persuaded his countrymen to 
 learn of him the way to adore God and to obey His laws ; but 
 he could make no converts." (Hamilton's Account of the East 
 Indies, in Pinkerton's Voyages, vol. viii.) 
 
 Hamilton's statement has recently been repeated. 
 
 On the other side, an account appeared in the " Times " 
 newspaper, some years since, the date of which I have been 
 unable to trace, of a visit to the Andaman Islands made by a 
 party from Calcutta. It was mentioned that at a certain period 
 of each day the natives retired for some time apart from their 
 visitors, and it was not unnaturally conjectured that this un- 
 usual act on the part of these untamed savages was connected 
 with some form of religious worship. The Bushmen, who 
 are about on a par with the Andamanese in physical and 
 social condition, if not still lower, possess a traditional belief 
 in a supreme power beyond the moon, good and evil spirits, 
 and the immortality of the soul. 
 
 NOTE 2, p. 86. 
 
 The bias of modern thought is stated by Mr. Lecky to 
 dispose men " in history to attribute all kinds of pheno- 
 mena to natural rather than to miraculous causes; and in 
 theology to esteem succeeding systems the expressions of 
 the wants and aspirations of that religious sentiment tvhich 
 is planted in all wen." {History of Rationalism, Introduction, 
 p. 18.) 
 
360 NOTES 3, 4. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 3, p. 86. 
 
 " What do we mean by religion ? Is there in fact any 
 definition of it possible to be given that will serve all the 
 occasions under which we have need to employ the term ? I 
 say, no. There is indeed one meaning of religion that I hope 
 is common to all of us, as relating to that eminently most 
 important side of religion which is the one we have to live 
 under — the practical side. But I protest that when, on the 
 contrary, religion is considered as a thing that we have ex- 
 pressly to think and to speak about, a quite different meaning 
 of the term of necessity arises to us. The first is that which 
 relates to the sense of religion, swaying' solely the domain of 
 feeling ; the latter is that which views religion as a thing 
 largely associated with intellect. The former aspect, common 
 to us all, is the one that presents itself so long as we simply 
 consult our own individual consciousness. The definition of 
 religion that under it we should all agree to give, would be 
 this : that it consists in an intimate recognition of Divine 
 guardianship and sympathy, held characteristically in the 
 manner of an intuition, which thought, so far from aiding, 
 only disturbs, and for the time, dissipates." {Hennell's 
 Present Religion, s. ii. p. 24.) 
 
 " Christianity was [in the earliest and purest days of the 
 Church] strictly a religion, that is to say, it consisted of 
 modes of emotion and not of intellectual propositions." 
 (Lech/'s Rationalism, vol. i. p. 390.) 
 
 " A new theology has sprung into being — not a new re- 
 ligion, but a renewing of religion, a return to the simple 
 Gospel of Jesus Christ sti'ipped of the disfiguring accretions 
 Avhich later days have fastened upon it." [Dutch Divine, 
 quoted by Bishop Colenso, Natal Sermons, p. 16.) 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 89. 
 
 " When we begin to interrogate our consciousness, we find 
 that there is one out of the whole number of our conceptions 
 which stands forth, both by it clearness and its uniqueness, 
 far above all the rest — that, namely, of one infinite and all- 
 perfect Being. If, then, clear ideas are always objectively true 
 and (he idea of a God is the clearesl of all, we must have a 
 
Ill] NOTE 5. 361 
 
 direct proof from consciousness itself of the Divine existence 
 there ; then we perceive the nature and validity of Descartes' 
 famous psychological argument for the foundation-principle of 
 natural theology, which may he stated as follows : — The idea 
 of an all-perfect Infinite Being is without controversy in my 
 mind. How could it have come there ? Not from the outer 
 world, not from education, not from any finite source, for 
 the finite and imperfect could never give me the conception 
 of the perfect and the infinite. The effect never transcends 
 the cause. Hence, if I have incontestably a clear idea of 
 God, a God must necessarily exist." (Morell's History of 
 Philosophy, vol. i. p. 170.) 
 
 NOTE 5, p. 99. 
 
 Mr. Holyoake, the editor of the " Keasoner," a paper which 
 claims to he " the accredited organ of free-thinking in Great 
 Britain," alleges the mysteries of Providence to be among the 
 prominent causes of his unbelief. He says : — 
 
 " I once prayed in all the fervency of this same religion. 
 I believed once all these things. I put up prayers to 
 heaven which I cannot conceive how humanity could have 
 refused to respond to — prayers such as if put up to me I 
 must have responded to. I saw those near and dear to me 
 perishing around me ; and I learned the secret I care no 
 longer to conceal, that man's dependence is upon his courage 
 and his industry, and dependence upon heaven there seems to 
 be none." {Grant and Holyoake Discussion.) 
 
 " It has long seemed to me the most serious libel on the 
 character of the Deity, to assume for one moment that He 
 interferes in human exigencies. A mountain of desolating 
 facts rises up to shame into silence the hazardous supposition. 
 Was not the whole land a short time ago convulsed with 
 horror at the fate of the ' Amazon ' ? There was not a wretch 
 in the whole country whose slumbering humanity would not 
 have been aroused in the presence of that dismal calamity. 
 
 How is it that liberty is in chains all over Europe, 
 
 if God be still interposing in human affairs?" (Town ley and 
 Holyoake Discussion.) 
 
Sm NOTES 6-8. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 6, p. 107. 
 
 Abundant evidence of the true condition of mankind in the 
 state of savagism will be found in the two volumes published 
 by the lamented Dr. Livingstone, and the two volumes of 
 " Explorations in Equatorial Africa," by M. Du Chaillu ; 
 in Mr. Murray's " Missions in Western Polynesia/'' and in 
 other works of the same kind. The opposite view is main- 
 tained principally by Capt. Burton, but evidence of the 
 strongest kind against it may be gathered from his own 
 books, "Abbeokuta and the Camaroons Mountain," and 
 " A Mission to the King of Dahome." 
 
 NOTE 7, p. no. 
 
 " Those among the philosophical systems of the Greeks 
 which most completely harmonised with a worldly, thought- 
 less spirit, and were devoid of all susceptibility for the god- 
 like ; those which made pleasure man's highest end, or which 
 led to a doubt of all objective truth — Epicureanism, as re- 
 presented, for example, by a Lucretius, and scepticism — found 
 
 welcome on all sides In the religious systems of 
 
 the several nations which the Roman Empire had brought 
 into contact with one another, as well as in the doctrines 
 of the philosophical schools, men saw nothing but a strife 
 of opinion, without a criterion of truth. The ejaculation 
 of Pilate, 'What is truth?' in which he ridiculed all 
 enthusiasm about such a matter, bespoke the sentiment of 
 many a noble Roman." (Neander's Church History, Bonn's 
 ed. vol. i. p. 11.) 
 
 NOTE 8, p. in. 
 
 Justin Mart. Dialog, c. Tryph. cap. 218, fol. 1686, quoted 
 by Neander, "Church History," vol. i. p. 12. 
 
IV] NOTE 1. 363 
 
 NOTE 9, p. in. 
 
 i . Plutarch, " De Defectu Oraculorum," cap. ix. 
 
 2. "I must beg you to bear in mind, that I am not 
 speaking of the religion, but of the theology of our time. 
 The religious feeling itself, no doubt, varies from age to 
 age ; but still it is much more nearly the same than is the 
 case with the theories of thinking men, who, by their reason- 
 ings upon it, produce what is called theology. Sometimes 
 the religion is behind the theology of an age, sometimes 
 before it, always more or less independent of it." (See paper 
 on the " Theology of the Nineteenth Centuiy " in Eraser's 
 Magazine for February, 1865.) 
 
 LECTUKE IV 
 
 NOTE 1, p. 120. 
 
 Plotinus claimed to have attained to the intuition of the 
 Supreme God in the way recommended by Plato, manifested 
 neither by form nor by idea, but existing in a manner above 
 all that is intelligible. Porphyry adds to the statement : " I 
 also, Porphyry, once approached and was united to the Supreme 
 Deity in the sixty-eighth year of my age." The last words 
 of Plotinus were : " I am endeavouring to rejoin what is 
 Divine in me to that which is Divine in the universe." For 
 a clear sketch of the Alexandrian Platonists, see Douglas' 
 " History of Philosophy." The ablest modern advocacy 
 of the soul's intuitive capability of knowing God, is to be 
 found in Morell's " Philosophy of Religion." 
 
364 NOTES % 3. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 2, p. 122. 
 
 The word ' natural ' expresses that which belongs to the 
 constitution of our nature as originally framed by the Creator, 
 and not necessarily that which falls within the reach of the 
 unassisted faculties or is agreeable to the inclinations of human 
 nature as it has existed since the Fall. This distinction is 
 strongly drawn by Butler in the " Analogy." The religious 
 knowledge existing prior to the gift of a written revelation 
 may therefore be natural, inasmuch as it meets the wants 
 and accords with the instincts of the human soul, and yet 
 not be natural in the sense that it is the product of unassisted 
 human nature. 
 
 NOTE 3, p. 135. 
 
 " Strange conformation of mind ! which can find no ade- 
 quate foundations for its hopes, its worship, its principles 
 of action in the far-stretching universe, in the glorious 
 firmament, in the deep full soul, bursting with unutterable 
 thoughts — yet can rest all, with a trusting simplicity ap- 
 proaching the sublime, on what a book relates of the sayings 
 and doings of a man who lived eighteen centuries ago/* 
 {Greg's Creed of Christendom, p. 219.) 
 
 " This is the state of many men all through life, and 
 miserable politicians or Churchmen they make, unless by 
 good luck they are in safe hands and ruled by others, or are 
 
 pledged to a course And sometimes when their 
 
 self-importance is hurt, they take refuge in the idea that all 
 this is a proof that they are unfettered, moderate, dispas- 
 sionate, that they observe the mean, that they are no party 
 men, when they are, in fact, the most helpless of slaves." 
 {Ilolyoake's Principles of Secularism , Preface.) 
 
 "Reason, which exisfed before all religion and decides upon 
 all — else the false can never be distinguished from the true — 
 seems self-dependent and capable of affording personal direc- 
 tion/' {Ibid. p. 4.) 
 
IV] NOTES 4—6. 365 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 139. 
 
 " Neither by nature nor by human conception is it possible 
 for me to know thing's so great and Divine, but by the gift 
 which then descended from above upon the holy men, who 
 had no need of rhetorical art, nor of uttering anything in 
 a contentious or quarrelsome manner, but to present them- 
 selves pure to the energy of the Divine Spirit, in order that 
 the Divine plectrum itself, descending from heaven, and using 
 righteous men as an instrument, like a harp or lyre, might 
 reveal to us the knowledge of things Divine and heavenly." 
 {Justin Martyr, Hortatory Address to the Greeks, eh. viii. — 
 p. 294, Ante-Nicene Library; Plea of Athenagoras for the 
 Christians, eh. vii. — Ibid.) 
 
 NOTE 5, p. 140. 
 
 " Such speculations as I have quoted respecting the ner- 
 vous fluid, proceeding from some of the greatest philosophers 
 that ever lived, prove only that hitherto the endeavour to 
 comprehend the mystery of perception and will, of life and 
 thought, have been fruitless and vain. Many anatomical 
 truths have been discovered, but, so far as our survey has yet 
 gone, no physiological principle. All the trains of physio- 
 logical research which we have followed have begun in exact 
 examination of organisation and function, and have ended in 
 wide conjectures and arbitrary hypotheses. The stream of 
 knowledge, in all such cases, is clear and lively at its outset ; 
 but, instead of reaching the great ocean of the general truths 
 of science, it is gradually spread abroad among sands and 
 deserts till its course can be traced no longer." {JVheweW s 
 History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. iii. bk. xvii. ch. v. See 
 also his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i. bk. ix.) 
 
 NOTE 6, p. 143. 
 
 The feeling has been eloquently expressed by the late 
 F. Robertson of JBrig-hton. Robertson was one of a small 
 circle of three who ran our college career together, and of which 
 I am the only survivor. The earnest affection I ever enter- 
 tained for his person (for he had singular powers of conciliating 
 
366 NOTE 6. [Lect. 
 
 affection) has never blinded me to the defects of his theology. 
 The peculiarity of his opinions on subjects of religious belief 
 was the subsequent subject of debate during our confidential 
 intercourse at Brasenose. I have ever been disposed to at- 
 tribute his doctrinal peculiarities to his excessive and almost 
 morbid dread of what is conventional. In his honest endea- 
 vour to avoid cant, that is, the use of certain familiar phrases 
 as phrases rather than as expressive of realities, he fell, I think, 
 into the very fault he dreaded. In morbidly shrinking from 
 theological phrases because they were old, he lost his grasp of 
 the great and eternal verities which the Church of Christ, 
 nearly from apostolic days, has employed them to convey. 
 The following extract is taken from the third series of his 
 Sermons : — 
 
 " We are feeble, dwarfish, stunted specimens of humanity. 
 Our best resolves are but withered branches, our holiest deeds 
 unripe and blunted fruit ; but to the Infinite Eye who sees 
 in the Perfect One the type and assurance of that which shall 
 be, this dwindled humanity of ours is divine and glorious. 
 Such are we in the sight of God the Father, as is the very 
 Son of God Himself. This is what theologians, at least the 
 wisest of them, meant by ' imputed righteousness/ I do not 
 mean that all who have written or spoken on the subject had 
 this conception of it, but I believe they who thought truly 
 meant this. They did not suppose that in imputing righteous- 
 ness there was a kind of figment, a self-deception in the mind 
 of God. They did not mean that by an act of will He chose 
 to consider that every act which Christ did was done by us ; 
 that He imputed or reckoned to us the baptism in Jordan, 
 or the victory in the wilderness, and the agony in the garden, 
 or that He believed, or acted as if He believed, that when 
 Christ died each one of us died; but He saw humanity sub- 
 mitted to the law of self-sacrifice, and in the light of that 
 idea He beholds us as perfect, and is satisfied. The profound 
 idea contained therefore in the death of Christ is the duty of 
 self-surrender." (Sermon on 2 Cor. v. 14.) 
 
IV] NOTES 7—9. 3GT 
 
 NOTE 7, p. 147. 
 
 This question is discussed at length by the American 
 Wines in his "Commentary on the Laws of the Ancient 
 Hebrews." His book has reached a fourth edition. He 
 strongly supports the repeated and emphatic assertions of the 
 old Fathers that the ancient philosophers were largely in- 
 debted to the Mosaic writings. Mr. Marsden in his " Influ- 
 ence of the Mosaic Code " maintains the same view. 
 
 NOTE 8, p. 147. 
 
 See Merivale's " History of the Romans/' vol. vi. ch. 54 ; 
 Jahn's " Hebrew Commonwealth/' vol. ii. p. 11, s. 8. 
 
 NOTE 9, p. 152. 
 
 " Every intuition manifests a reality so far as it goes, but 
 when that reality is only perceived dimly and uncertainly, it 
 is impossible to get such an expression of it as shall satisfy 
 the requisitions of certitude, or be adequate as a datum for 
 logical reasoning. The experience of other minds does not in 
 this case at once correspond to it ; there is a colouring in it, 
 or at least in its expression, derived from the idiosyncrasies of 
 the individual ; and the results drawn from it in this its partial 
 and imperfect form may depart very widely from the truth 
 itself. Hence the necessity arises for our having certain 
 criteria by which we may judge whether a given intuition, 
 when realised and expressed, is so distinct and adequate as to 
 be immediately recognised by other properly developed minds, 
 and thus to serve the purpose of a fixed and abiding concep- 
 tion of the objective reality. The three great criteria which 
 have been oft-times recognised by philosophical thinkers are 
 distinctness, uniformity, and universality. When an intuition 
 has attained to such a state that its simplest expression is 
 recognised as conveying an idea perfectly distinct — an idea 
 which is invariably the same — an idea, lastly, which is univer- 
 sally drawn forth from the human soul when placed under the 
 proper conditions of development, and which is finally verified 
 
368 NOTES 1, 2. [Lect. 
 
 by the consistency of all its practical deductions, then we 
 regard it as possessing the marks of certitude, so far, indeed, 
 as human certitude can at all exist." (Morell's Philosophy of 
 Religion, eh. x. pp. 301, 302.) 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 NOTE 1, p. j 62. 
 
 The systematic construction of the Christian Scriptures has 
 been treated by the author at length in his " Divine Plan of 
 Revelation" (Hamilton, Adams, & Co.), being the Boyle 
 Lecture for 1863. 
 
 NOTE 2, p. 163. 
 
 The passage quoted is from the " Theologische Ethik " of 
 Dr. Richard Rothe, Professor of Theology at Heidelberg, and 
 Director of the Protestant Seminary. The following addi- 
 tional extracts will explain the references in the body of the 
 lecture : — 
 
 " Speculative theology must be something essentially dif- 
 ferent from every peculiar form of piety, notwithstanding the 
 strictness of the speculative method, which is equally in- 
 exorable in every case. For in each form of it the starting- 
 point of theological speculation, namely, the peculiar determi- 
 nation of the religious consciousness, is essentially different. 
 There must be, therefore, a speculative theology peculiarly 
 Christian. But for the same reason also, within the limits of 
 Christianity there must be an essentially distinct speculative 
 theology for every peculiar Christian fellowship, since we 
 must suppose that their doctrinal variations rest upon essen- 
 tially peculiar modifications of the universal Christian con- 
 sciousness." [Ibid.) 
 
 " Speculative theology, according to the idea of it now 
 given, is only an individual production. Its starting-point is 
 
 the individual religious consciousness of the speculator 
 
 We cannol come forward with any new attempt at then- 
 
VJ NOTES 3, 4. 369 
 
 logical speculation without the painful consciousness of giving 
 an appearance of immodesty and presumption, and we might 
 almost wish in doing so to fall under the suspicion of light- 
 mindedness, as though we were ignorant what we were doing 
 and what claim we were setting up." (Rothe's Theologische 
 EthiL) 
 
 NOTE 3, p. 165. 
 
 This will be seen from the quotations made under Note 2 ; 
 for Dr. Rothe finds the starting-point of his theory in the 
 individual religious consciousness ; that is, the moral sentiment 
 of the heart : then in the formation of his theology he rejects 
 all further alliance with the sentiment out of which it has 
 sprung. 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 168. 
 
 " In thus doing he [Descartes] established the fundamental 
 principle which we regard as the corner-stone of all the meta- 
 physics of modern Europe, namely, that as natural science is 
 based upon inductions drawn from the actual observation of 
 the world without, so metaphysical science is based upon 
 inductions similarly drawn from reflection upon the world 
 within/ - ' {Morell's History of Philosophy , vol. i. p. 167.) 
 
 On the other side stands the following vigorous protest 
 against speculative thinking from the pen of Mr. Gr. H. 
 Lewes : — 
 
 "If the foregoing discussion has carried with it the reader's 
 assent, he will perceive that the distinguishing characteristic 
 of science is its method of graduated verification, and not, as 
 some think, the employment of induction instead of deduc- 
 tion. All science is deductive, and deductive in proportion to 
 its separation from ordinary knowledge and its co-ordination 
 into systematic science. 'Although all sciences tend to 
 grow more and more deductive/ says a great authority, 
 1 they are not therefore the less inductive ; every step in the 
 deduction is still an induction. The opposition is not be- 
 tween the terms inductive and deductive, but between deduc- 
 tive and experimental/ (Mill's Logic.) Experiment is the 
 great instrument of verification/'' (Laves' Biographical History 
 of Philosophy, Introd. xxiv. ed. 1857.) 
 
 B b 
 
370 NOTE 5. [Lect. 
 
 " While this is the course of science, the course of philoso- 
 phy is very different. Its references start from no well 
 grounded basis; the arches they throw are not from known 
 fact to unknown fact, but from some unknown to some other 
 unknown. Deductions are drawn from the nature of God, 
 the nature of spirit and the essence of thing's, and from what 
 reason can postulate. Rising from such mists, the arch so 
 brilliant to look upon is after all a rainbow, not a bridge." 
 (Lewes' Biographical History of Philosophy, Introd. xxvi. ed. 
 I587-) 
 
 It will be observed that in the latter quotation Mr. Lewes 
 entirely bears out my description of the deductive basis of 
 speculative philosophy. In regard to the distinction made in 
 the former passage to the relative use of the terms induction 
 and deduction, it must be remembered that the words are 
 often used in different senses by different writers. In the 
 passage in question, Mr. Lewes appears to refer, as the quota- 
 tion from Mill indicates, rather to the systematising of what 
 is known, than to the process by which we acquire our know- 
 ledge. I subjoin a definition of the terms from an authority 
 to which Mr. Lewes himself refers with great respect : — 
 
 " Induction is usually defined to be the process of drawing 
 a general law from a sufficient number of particular cases ; 
 deduction is the converse process of proving that some pro- 
 perty belongs to a particular case from the consideration that 
 it comes under a general law. More concisely, induction is 
 the process of discovering laws from facts, and causes from 
 effects ; and deduction that of deriving facts from laws, and 
 effects from their causes." (Thomson's Laios of Thought, 
 s. 115, p. 215.) 
 
 In a note Dr. Thomson explains the cause to which the 
 variable usage of the two terms is to be attributed. 
 
 NOTE 5, p. 169. 
 
 "Furnished as we are with the clue of Bacon's philosophy we 
 can traverse through with slow steps, and meeting with many 
 an obstacle, the labyrinth of nature ; unravelling the mysteries 
 that are without us by the aid of observation, and the mys- 
 teries that are within us by the more painful and precarious 
 operation of reflection upon our own thoughts; but where is 
 the new philosophy or the new organum by which we might 
 
V] NOTES 6, 7. 371 
 
 find out the Almighty. We can know exactly as much of Him, 
 but no more, than He Himself is pleased to reveal. It is to 
 the Bible alone that inductive philosophy is to be applied, 
 receiving- the Divine declarations as the ultimate facts of re- 
 ligion in the same way in which the laws or ultimate facts 
 of nature become the basis of natural philosophy, and the 
 ultimate principles of consciousness become the foundation of 
 morals." [Douglas, Truths of Religion, p. 76.) 
 
 NOTE 6, p. 173. 
 
 "When engaged in 1828 in preparing for the press the 
 treatise on Geology, I conceived the idea of classing the 
 whole of this series of strata according to the different 
 degrees of affinity which their fossil testacea bore to the 
 living fauna. . . . After comparing 3,000 fossil species with 
 5,000 living ones, the result arrived at was that, in the 
 lower tertiary strata there were about 3^ per cent, identical 
 with recent ; in the middle tertiary (the f aliens of the Loire 
 and Gironde) from ^>5 ^o 5°> an( l sometimes in the most 
 modern beds as much as 90 to 95 per cent. For the sake of 
 clearness and brevity I proposed to give short technical names 
 to these sets of strata, or the periods to which they respec- 
 tively belonged. I called the first or oldest of them Eocene, 
 the second Miocene, and the third Pliocene." [Lyell's An- 
 tiquity of Man, ch. i. p. 4.) 
 
 NOTE 7, p. 181. 
 
 If the language of the lecture should appear too strong to 
 any reader not acquainted with speculative philosophy, as 
 may very probably be the case, I commend to his attention 
 the following description of Schelling's system from the able 
 and competent pen of Mr. Morell : — 
 
 "It is now easy to see the vast comprehensiveness of 
 Schelling's philosophy as a whole. It begins by advocating 
 a kind of Divine intuition by which we gaze upon the real- 
 istic ground or basis of all the phenomena, both of mind and 
 matter. From this it goes on to construct by means of an 
 absolute and a priori law the whole phenomenal universe, de- 
 riving it from the self-unfolding of the Absolute. One region 
 of existence after another yields, as by a magic spell, to the 
 bidding of this law, and confesses its secret unveiled. Matter 
 
 b b 2 
 
372 NOTE 7. [Lect. 
 
 with all its dull inertia puts on the garb of contending- powers 
 and shows itself to be the objective reflection of the Absolute 
 itself. Those subtle agencies which we term magnetism, 
 electricity, galvanism, light and heat, each avows itself to be 
 but one pulsation in the self-developing process of the uni- 
 versal mind ; and even the phenomena of organised life are 
 still but the complete objectifying of the Absolute, each 
 animal nature being a perfected type of the eternal nature 
 itself. From the philosophy of nature Schelling passes on in 
 one unbroken chain of argument, without a chasm between, 
 to the philosophy of spirit. The same great law of the 
 Absolute solves the mysteries of sensation, of intelligence, 
 and of human freedom : from thence it proceeds to explain 
 the phenomena of man as an individual agent; of man in his 
 connection with society ; and, lastly, of man as he has de- 
 veloped his being upon the broad page of his history. Finally, 
 it enters into the many regions of human genius and art, 
 and finds in them the crown and the summit of the whole 
 process, the highest expression of the Deity in the world. 
 
 " Here it mig'ht be supposed that the author would have 
 found his goal, and having constructed the universe out of 
 almost nothing, have at length enjoyed his Sabbath in peace. 
 But, instead of this, Ave find that the work is only half done ; 
 he has developed the law of the universe, but not explained 
 the substance; he has exhibited the form, now he must go on 
 to the matter; he has analysed the full idea of God, and now 
 he must make manifest His existence. Upon this, with un- 
 wearied wings, he begins another flight : pantheism is left 
 behind, and the real Triune Jehovah is placed before us in all 
 the plenitude of a Divine personality. Next the whole nature 
 of the dependent creation is developed, the procedure of the 
 material universe from the Absolute expounded, and the mys- 
 teries of existence, which had been hidden before in thick 
 darkness, made irradiant with light and intelligence. The 
 destiny of man next comes upon the stage. To shew this, we 
 have the origin of moral evil discussed, and the question so 
 long tossed upon the billows of controvers}^ for ever set at 
 rest. The door being thus open into the region of Christian 
 theology, the philosopher boldly enters in to grapple with the 
 great ideas which we there meet with. The law which has 
 unveiled the mysteries of nature and the soul, we may be sure 
 does not fail in explaining the whole rationale of Christian 
 faith — the great doctrines of revelation, the fall of man, the 
 theory of redemption, the effusion of the Spirit — all are con- 
 verted from objects of faith to objects of science ; all flow, as 
 
V] NOTE 8. 373 
 
 by natural consequence, from the great rhythm of existence : 
 nay, the controversies of the Church herself are settled, and 
 the repose of the world announced, in the predominance of 
 the doctrines of the loved apostle over the equally partial 
 views of the Protestant and the Catholic." (Morell's History 
 of Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 154-157.) 
 
 NOTE 8, p. 186. 
 
 " I begin the real history of Greece with the first recorded 
 Olympiad, or 776 before Christ. To such as are accustomed 
 to the habits once universal, and still yet uncommon, in 
 investigating the ancient world, I may appear to be striking 
 off one thousand years from the scroll of history; but to 
 those whose canon of evidence is derived from Mr. Hallam, 
 M. Sismondi, or any other eminent historian of modern 
 events, I am well assured that I shall appear lax and credu- 
 lous rather than exigent and sceptical. For the truth is, that 
 historical records, properly so called, do not begin till long 
 after this date ; nor will any man who candidly considers the 
 extreme paucity of attested facts for two centuries after 
 776 B.C. be astonished to learn that the state of Greece in 
 900, 1000, i 100, 1200, 1300, 1400 B.C., or in any earlier 
 century which it may please chronologists to include in their 
 asserted genealogy, cannot be described to him upon anything 
 like decent evidence." {Grote's Hist, of Greece, Preface, xi.) 
 
 " The work of Niebuhr has formed a great landmark in the 
 recent treatment of early Roman history. Almost all the 
 subsequent works on the subject are either founded upon his 
 researches, or are occupied to a great extent with criticisms 
 on his conclusions, and with reasons for rejecting or doubting 
 them. Among the former of these the work of Dr. Arnold 
 stands conspicuous, which had been brought down to the end 
 of the first Punic war, before he was unhappily carried off by 
 a premature death. Among the latter it will be sufficient to 
 name the work of Bekker on ( Roman Antiquities/ continued 
 since his death by Marquarat, and the history of Schwegler, 
 one volume of which, comprising the regal period, has alone 
 appeared. In these and other works many of Niebuhr's 
 opinions on questions of Roman history are disputed or 
 doubted ; and it may be said that there is scarcely any of the 
 leading conclusions of Niebuhr's work which has not been 
 impugned by some subsequent writer. Even his views upon 
 the Agrarian Laws, the soundest and most valuable part of his 
 
374 NOTES 9—11. [Lect. 
 
 history, have not escaped contradiction on certain points. 
 Furthermore, a recent history of Rome, published at Basle by 
 Gerlach and Bachofen, and written with considerable erudi- 
 tion, not only repudiates the reconstructive part of Niebuhr's 
 work, but even refuses assent to his negative criticisms, and 
 returns to the old implicit faith in the early period such as it 
 was in the time of Echard, Catron, and Rollin." {Credibility 
 of the Early Roman History, by Sir G. C. Leiois, vol. i. 
 p. 12.) 
 
 NOTE 9, p. 191. 
 
 In confirmation of the facts stated in this brief sketch 
 of the results of speculative philosophy, I refer to the fol- 
 lowing- standard works : Enfield's " History of Philosophy, 
 after Brucker," Bitter's " History of Ancient Philosophy/' 
 Morell's " History of Speculative Philosophy in Europe," and 
 Lewes' " Biographical History of Philosophy." 
 
 NOTE 10, p. 192. 
 
 " In the ' Cours de Philosophic Positive,' we have the 
 grandest, because upon the whole the truest, system which 
 philosophy has yet produced; nor should any differences 
 which must inevitably arise on points of detail make us 
 forget the greatness of the achievement and the debt we owe 
 to the lonely thinker who wrought out this system." {Lewes' 
 Biographical History of Philosophy, art. on Auguste Comte, 
 p. 662.) 
 
 NOTE 11, p. 192. 
 
 "The fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according 
 to M. Comte, and the character by which he defines Positive 
 philosophy, is the following : — 
 
 " We have no knowledge of anything but phenomena ; and 
 our knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. "V\ e 
 know not the essence, nor the real mode of production of any 
 fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succes- 
 sion or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, 
 always the same in the same circumstances. The constant 
 
V] NOTE 12. 375 
 
 resemblances which link phenomena together, and the con- 
 stant sequences which unite them as antecedent and conse- 
 quent, are termed their laws. The laws of phenomena are all 
 we know about them. Their essential nature and their 
 ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and 
 inscrutable to us." {Mill on Positivism.) 
 
 I have preferred to make the extract from Mr. Mill's own 
 words, in order to avoid the possibility of being- charged with 
 having misrepresented M. Auguste Comte's meaning. 
 
 NOTE 12, p. 193. 
 
 " M. Comte's law may be thus stated : — 
 
 " Every branch of knowledge passes successively through 
 three stages: 1. The supernatural or fictitious; 2. The 
 metaphysical or abstract; 3. The positive or scientific. The 
 first is the necessary point of departure taken by human 
 intelligence ; the second is merely a stage of transition from 
 the supernatural to the positive; and the third is the fixed 
 and definite condition which knowledge is alone capable of 
 — progressive development. 
 
 " In the supernatural stage the mind seeks after causes — 
 aspires to know the essences of things and their modes of 
 operation. It regards all effects as the production of super- 
 natural agents whose intervention is the cause of all the 
 apparent anomalies and irregularities. Nature is animated 
 by supernatural beings. Every unusual phenomenon is a 
 sign of the pleasure or displeasure of some being adored and 
 propitiated as a god. The lowest condition of this stag'e is 
 that of the savages, viz. Fetichism; the highest condition is 
 when one being is substituted for many as the cause of all 
 phenomena. 
 
 " In the metaphysical stage, which is only a modification 
 of the former, but which is important as a transitional stage, 
 the supernatural agents give place to abstract forces, personi- 
 fied abstractions supposed to inhere in the various substances, 
 and capable themselves of engendering phenomena. The 
 highest condition of this stage is when all these forces are 
 brought under one general force, named Nature. 
 
 " In the positive stage the mind, convinced of the futility 
 of all enquiry into causes and essences, applies itself to the 
 observation and classification of laws which regulate effects ; 
 that is to say, the invariable relations of succession and 
 
376 NOTES 1, 2. [Lect. 
 
 similitude which all things bear to each other. The highest 
 condition of this stage would be to be able to represent all 
 phenomena as the various particulars of one general view." 
 (Lewes' Biographical History of P/dlosojj/iy, art. Auguste 
 Comte.) 
 
 LECTURE VI 
 
 NOTE 1, p. 200. 
 
 " Civilisation is, as it were, the grand emporium of a 
 people in which all its wealth, all the elements of its life, 
 all the powers of its existence, are stored up." (Guizot on 
 Civilisation, Lect. I. p. 6.) 
 
 " Wherever the exterior condition of man becomes enlarged, 
 quickened, and improved ; wherever the intellectual nature of 
 man distinguishes itself by its energy, brilliancy, and its gran- 
 deur ; wherever these signs concur — and they often do so, 
 notwithstanding the gravest imperfections in the social sys- 
 tem — there man proclaims and applauds civilisation." {Ibid. 
 Lect. I. p. io.) 
 
 NOTE % p. 202. 
 
 The statistics of missionary work in New Zealand give the 
 following results: — In 1863 the Church Missionary Society 
 occupied 21 stations, with 5,500 communicants. In 1864, 
 the Wesleyan Missionary Society, working in the north- 
 western portion of the island, had gathered 1,978 Church 
 members, and 13,622 attendants at public worship. To take 
 a more general view, 62 missionary agencies in various parts 
 of the world occupied in 1863 1,516 mission stations, and 
 maintained 1,591 places of worship. The number of agents 
 employed was 7,372, of whom 3,868 were fully ordained. 
 The attendants at public worship were 541,072, of whom 
 468,345 were communicants. The number of scholars under 
 instruction was 232,353. 
 
VI] NOTE 3. 377 
 
 The interesting" circumstances connected with the first 
 successful results of the Moravian missions at Labrador esta- 
 blish the proposition maintained in the lecture. The report 
 of the Society's agent is as follows : — 
 
 " June 3. Many of the natives of the south that passed our 
 habitation visited us. John Beck was at that time writing 
 a translation of the Evangelists. The savages earnestly re- 
 quested to hear the contents of that book. He accordingly 
 read part of it, and taking the opportunity to enter into con- 
 versation, asked if they had each of them a soul. They 
 answered Yes. He asked again where their soul would go 
 after death. Some said up yonder, pointing to the sky ; 
 others, down to the abyss. After setting them right on that 
 point, he asked them who had made heaven and earth and all 
 things visible. They replied that they did not know, nor had 
 ever heard, but it must have been some great and opulent 
 lord. He then told them that God had created all things, 
 particularly man, but that the latter had revolted through 
 disobedience, thereby plunging himself into eternal misery 
 and ruin j but that his Creator had mercy on him, and 
 became a Man to redeem him by suffering death. And now, 
 said John Beck, we must believe in Him if we wish to be 
 saved. He afterwards read to them the narrative of Christ's 
 sufferings on the Mount of Olives. Then the Lord opened 
 the heart of one of them called Ragarnak, who stepped up to 
 the table and said in a loud, earnest voice, ' How was that ? 
 Tell me that once more, for I would fain be saved too/ 
 These words, the like of which I never heard from a Green- 
 lander before, thrilled through my frame, and melted my 
 heart to such a degree that the tears ran down my cheeks 
 while I gave the Greenlander a general account of our 
 Saviour's life and death, and the whole counsel of God 
 concerning our salvation." (Quoted in From Pole to Pole, 
 p. 103.) 
 
 NOTE 3, p. 205. 
 
 An interesting account of these settlements will be found 
 in Baird's " Religion in America," book viii. ch. 2. 
 
378 NOTES 4—7. [Lbct. 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 217. 
 
 " In such a state of things, and recollecting- moreover that 
 Socrates in his defence would not condescend to the usual 
 practices of accused persons, and disdained to move the com- 
 passion of his judges by lamentations, or their good- will by 
 flattery, but in the proud consciousness of innocence — without 
 a fear of death, perhaps even with a desire to die — boldly 
 defied his judges, and made them listen, not to sweet words 
 of adulation, but to bitter truths, — there is nothing to sur- 
 prise us in his condemnation. Indeed his contemporaries do 
 not appear to have been amazed at the result, but rather 
 to have wondered that he should have been condemned by a 
 bare majority of five or six votes." (Hitter's History of Ancient 
 Philosojjki/, vol. ii. p. 30.) 
 
 NOTE 5, p. 218. 
 
 Plato "De Legibus," lib. v. c. 10; also "De Republica," 
 lib. v. 
 
 NOTE 6, p. 219. 
 
 A statement of this kind is contained in one of the very 
 agreeable narratives of the American writer Mr. G. H. Dana; 
 but I regret to add, that while the fact is distinct in my 
 memory, I have not yet been able to verify the reference. 
 
 NOTE 7, p. 220. 
 
 The information we possess relative to the social and 
 domestic life of the Romans will be found put together in 
 a form both interesting and amusing in a curious book en- 
 titled " Literary Conglomerate, or a Combination of Various 
 Thoughts and Facts on Various Subjects, by P. B. Duncan, 
 Oxford, 1839." See also Merivale's " Hist, of the Romans/' 
 vol. iv. ch. 41. 
 
VI] NOTE 8. 379 
 
 NOTE 8, p. 221. 
 
 An immense difference is perceptible between the female 
 characters of Homer, as, for instance, Nausicaa, Penelope, 
 Arete, and Andromache, and the female characters of Terence, 
 where there is not a trace of nobility, and little of yirtue of 
 any kind. This higher type has not escaped the attention 
 of historians. Bishop Thirl wall in his " History of Greece " 
 says : — 
 
 " Homer has drawn a pleasing picture of maidenly sim- 
 plicity, filial tenderness, and hospitable kindness, in the person 
 of the Phaeacian princess Nausicaa, one of his most amiable 
 creations ; yet he seems to dwell with still greater satisfaction 
 on the matronly dignity and conjugal devotion which com- 
 mand our respect and admiration in a Penelope, an Arete, and 
 an Andromache. If, indeed, we should draw our notions as 
 to the state of domestic society in the heroic age from these 
 characters, we might be in danger of estimating it too favour- 
 ably/'' (Vol. i. ch. vi. p. 199.) 
 
 In the previous chapter he had expressed the opinion : — 
 
 " There may perhaps be room for suspecting that he 
 [Homer] has unwittingly passed over some gradations in the 
 advance of society, — that he has sometimes transferred to the 
 age of his heroes what properly belonged to his own, and still 
 oftener that he has heightened and embellished the objects 
 which he touches : but there is no ground for the opposite 
 suspicion, that he has anywhere endeavoured to revive an 
 image of obsolete simplicity, or for the sake of dramatic . cor- 
 rectness has suppressed any advantage or knowledge or refine- 
 ment which his contemporaries possessed." (ch. v. p. 179.) 
 
 Of the state of society he says : — 
 
 "The intercourse between the sexes, though much more 
 restricted than by modern European usages, was perhaps sub- 
 ject to less restraint than in the later times of Greece. If it 
 is entirely destitute of the chivalrous devotion which has left 
 so deep a tinge on our manners, it displays more of truth and 
 simplicity in the degree of respect which the stronger sex 
 pays to the weaker." (ch. vi. p. 197.) 
 
 Mr. Grote estimates the earlier periods of Greek society in 
 much the same way. He considers the ancient legends to be 
 
380 NOTES 9, 10. [Lect. 
 
 valuable memorials of the state of society as to feeling- and 
 intelligence. In vol. ii. bk. xx. p. 8i he speaks favourably of the 
 moral and social feeling- of the heroic period (p. 109), and of 
 the influence of religion upon custom (p. 112); expresses the 
 opinion that in the heroic period the wife " seems to live 
 less secluded, and to enjoy a wider sphere of action, than 
 was allotted to her in historical Greece'''' (p. 112), and 
 warmly commends the hospitality, the generous sociality, 
 and strong affections of the time (p. 116). 
 
 NOTE 9, p. 222. 
 
 See Homer's "Odyssey," bk. xi. ; Aeschylus in the "Pro- 
 metheus Bound/'' the " Prometheus Delivered," and the 
 "Eumenides;" Sophocles in the "Oedipus Coloneus." Justin 
 Martyr in his " Hortatory Address to the Greeks," and in his 
 " Treatise on the Sole Government of God," quotes some 
 striking passages from works no longer extant, by Aeschylus, 
 Sophocles, and Euripides. Athenagoras, in his " Plea for the 
 Christians," emotes from Sophocles and Euripides, the object 
 being in both cases to show that Christian truths were pos- 
 sessed through tradition by the ancient poets, but in a form 
 too imperfect and corrupt to exercise any practical influence on 
 morals. The relation of the ancient Greek tragedians towards 
 Christian truth will be found discussed by Dollinger in the 
 " Gentile and the Jew," vol. i. bk. v. ch. i. How completely 
 the notion of an existence after death and future rewards died 
 out of heathen belief is shown in a learned note of Whitby 
 on 2 Tim. i. 10. 
 
 NOTE 10, p. 223. 
 
 "Aristotle thought it lawful to procure abortion (Polit. 
 lib. vii. eh. xvi.) ; and Plato to expose children (De Repub. 
 lib. v.). Democritus and Epicurus condemned marriage (C -in. 
 Alex. Strom, lib. ii. ch. xxiii. ; Plato, De Repub. lib. vii. V the 
 Epicureans and Stoics (Sext. Empir.Pyrrh. lib. iii. c. xxiv.), nay 
 
VI] NOTES 11, 12. 381 
 
 Socrates and Plato (Tert. Apol. c. xxxix.), allowed fornication 
 and a community of wives." 
 
 For the remainder of the passage, with the authorities on 
 which the statement is founded, see Ryan's " Effects of 
 Religion/' s. i. p. 64, ed. 1788 ; see also Merivale's "History 
 of the Romans/' vol. iv. ch. xl. 
 
 " It was a custom among Phoenicians, Babylonians, and 
 other ancient nations, to appoint women for prostitution in the 
 
 temples of Venus and Priapus These temples were 
 
 decorated with obscene figures of naked Jupiters, gladiators, 
 and other emblems of strength and lewdness, and one thou- 
 sand religious prostitutes were solemnly dedicated to such 
 services at Corinth, and maintained in a temple." (Strabo, 
 lib. viii. ; Lewis' Hebrew Antiquities, bk. v. ch. i. ; Ryan's 
 Effects of Religion, lect. ii.) 
 
 NOTE 11, p. 226. 
 
 The history of all the great nations of antiquity confirms 
 this statement. Assyria under Sardanapalus, Babylon under 
 Belshar-uzzar, Persia under Xerxes, and the Roman Empire 
 under Nero and his successors, are instances admitting of no 
 dispute. The same fact holds good in a remarkable degree 
 in oriental history ; for instance, in regard to the successive 
 dynasties which held sway in Hindostan. 
 
 NOTE 12, p. 228. 
 
 " Christianity represents all men as children of the same 
 God, and heirs of the same salvation, and levels all distinc- 
 tions of rich and poor, as accidental and insignificant in His 
 sight, who rewards or punishes according to the merits or 
 demerits of His creatures. This doctrine, so friendly to virtue, 
 tends to humble the proud, to add dignity to the lowly ; to 
 render princes and inferior magistrates moderate and just, 
 gentle and condescending to their inferiors ; subjects resigned 
 and contented with their situation, cheerfully obedient to the 
 laws, and consequently quiet and peaceable citizens." {Ryan's 
 Effects of Religion, lect. iii. p. 188.) 
 
382 NOTES 13, 14. [Lect. 
 
 "The Greek was a political being* in the strictest sense 
 of the term. Citizenship and political freedom, consisting- in 
 a participation in the supreme power of the State, was his 
 highest good. A complete dependence on the State, and the 
 absolute surrender of the individual member to the body, 
 was the sentiment that had grown with his growth and 
 formed the groundwork of his moral being. The sum of his 
 duties was to merge his personality in the State, and to 
 have no will of his own distinct from that of the State. 
 What position an individual was to occupy in the community 
 was not left to his own good pleasure, but was traced out 
 beforehand for him. And, properly speaking, there was no de- 
 partment within which a Greek could be justified, according 
 to his judgment, in free action merely as a man." {Bollinger, 
 The Gentile and the Jew, bk. ix. ch. i.) 
 
 NOTE 13, p. 229. 
 
 Gibbon, in his account of the causes of the spread and 
 triumph of Christianity, specifies the spirit of mutual love 
 to which their faith gave rise : — 
 
 " The more they were persecuted, the more closely they 
 adhered to each other. Their mutual charity and unsus- 
 pecting confidence has been remarked by infidels, and was 
 too often abused by perfidious friends." 
 
 NOTE 14, p. 280. 
 
 " The contests of wild beasts, and of men with beasts, were 
 a corruption of the noble science of war, which the gladiatorial 
 combats were supposed to teach. They were a concession to 
 the prurient appetite for excitement engendered by an indul- 
 gence which, however natural in a rude and barbarous age, 
 was actually hardening and degrading. The interest these 
 exercises at first naturally excited degenerated into a mere 
 passion for the sight of death." (Merivale's History of the 
 Romans, vol. iv. ch. 41.) 
 
 The delight taken by all classes in the bloody games of the 
 circus, as they existed during the later times of the Empire, 
 proves how cheap was the estimate of human life. These 
 
VI] NOTE 14. 383 
 
 games were oftentimes miniature battles, and sometimes 
 battles on a considerable scale. After the triumph of Trajan 
 over the Dacians, spectacles were exhibited for 123 days, in 
 which 11,000 animals of different kinds were killed, and 
 10,000 gladiators fought. 
 
 For the condition of the slave population at Rome, see 
 Merivale's '' History of the Romans," vol. iv. ch. xxxix. ; 
 Massey's " History of the Romans," p. 59 ; Gibbon, ch. ii. 
 Tacitus records that the prefect of the city (Pedanius 
 Secundus) being murdered by one of his slaves, the whole 
 body of his slaves at Rome, amounting to a vast multitude, 
 and including* many women and children, were, in accordance 
 with the ancient law, executed together. (Tac. Ann. xiv. 
 42-45-) 
 
 "The Greeks and Romans had no charitable buildings 
 until the humane spirit of Christianity encouraged almsgiving 
 and laid the foundation of such buildings wheresoever it was 
 
 adopted It appears, from the first volume of the 
 
 ' Byzantine History/ that there was no charitable buildings 
 in Constantinople in the time of Arcadius and Honorius, and 
 
 soon after the establishment of the Christian religion 
 
 In Rome, where a martial spirit prevailed, the generals and 
 emperors paid extraordinary attention to the recovery of sick 
 soldiers (Pitiscus, 'Lexicon/ vol. ii. p. 1032), but it does not 
 appear that the state provided any charitable institutions 
 similar to those now established in Christendom. A writer 
 (Publius Victor, 'De Urbis Romae Regionibus et Rosini Antiq./ 
 lib. i.) who describes all the buildings of ancient Rome, does 
 not mention a single house for the accommodation of the sick 
 or of persons in distress. It is true the word valetuclinarium 
 is found both in Seneca (De Ira, lib. i. cap. xvi. and Epist. 
 xxvii. Com. Notes Lipsii) and Columella (De Re Rustica), but 
 most commentators are of opinion that the word only signified 
 an infirmary in or near the houses of great men, for the sick 
 servants of the family." (Ryan's Effects of Religion, s. iii. 
 vol. ii.) 
 
 This statement has been called into question in an in- 
 teresting volume, " Collections relative to Systematic Relief 
 of the Poor, by J. S. Duncan, Esq., Bath, Fellow of New 
 College. Bath and London 18 15." The passage is as follows, 
 
384 NOTE 15. [Lect. 
 
 and confirms rather than impugns the statement of the 
 lecture : — 
 
 " The Roman valetudinarium was an infirmary attached 
 to the houses of the rich, for the use of sick dependents, and 
 possibly occasional strangers. The term is also applied to a 
 military hospital. It has been said that no establishment 
 existed in ancient Rome on a more extended plan. But the 
 expression of Seneca seems to mark a difference between a 
 valetudinarium, of a general nature, and one attached to a great 
 man's house : ' Si intrassem valetudinarium exercitatus et 
 sciens, aut domum divitis, non idem imperassem omnibus per 
 diversa aegrotantibus/ It indeed strictly opposes the valetu- 
 dinarium to the house of the rich, therefore may signify that 
 the disorders of the poor in the valetudinarium require a dif- 
 ferent treatment from those of the rich in the domus. Yet 
 in Epist. 27 he says : l Tamquam in eodem valetudinario 
 jaceam de communi malo tecum colloquor, remedia com- 
 munico.' This seems to refer to a kind of place in which he 
 and his friend might have come together, without a total 
 change of condition from freedom to slavery. . . . Whatever 
 might be the case of the poor in ancient Rome, it is not to be 
 doubted that it was sublimely extended, and for a long time 
 usefully directed, by the early Christians.'" (pp. 59, 60.) 
 
 NOTE 15, p. 231. 
 
 Dollinger, speaking of the Greek mysteries, says : — 
 
 " If purity was desired in those who were to be initiated, 
 we are not to understand by the expression e moral purity of 
 soul/ the idea of which, to the extent we are acquainted with 
 it as an ordinance of religion, was quite strange to heathen- 
 dom/'' {The Gentile and the Jew, bk. iii.) 
 
 " Before approaching matters of Divine worship and cele- 
 bration of rites among the Greeks — their sacrifices, prayers, 
 and festivals — we must mention their purifications, as they 
 necessarily preceded each act directed towards the Deity. As 
 far as the case admits of investigation, the idea of these 
 ablutions and lustrations was a merely mechanical one." 
 (Bid, bk. iv.) 
 
 Of the Roman purifications he says : — 
 
 " It was not on the strength of any ideas of morality 
 
VI] NOTES 16, 17. 385 
 
 attaching to this abstinence, but because such abstaining, like 
 the fresh -washed garments and hands, was calculated to 
 produce that physical purity with which a person ought 
 to present himself before the Deity and enter into the com- 
 munion of sacrifice with Him ; hence the poetical dictum, 
 'The pure is pleasing to the celestial/ and Cicero's pre- 
 scription, f One should approach the gods in purity/" {Ibid. 
 bk. vii. ch. 4.) 
 
 NOTE 16, p. 232. 
 
 "Spartan legislators, regarding marriage entirely as an 
 institution for the supply of healthy and robust children, regu- 
 lated the relations of husbands and wives accordingly. Their 
 maidens, obliged to the gymnastic exercises of the Palestra in 
 a state of nudity, and in the presence of men young and old, 
 including frequently strangers, were educated to a hardihood ill 
 becoming their sex : their very dances are represented as of 
 a licence degraded to indecency. The idea of conjugal fidelity 
 being of sacred obligation was in reality never dreamed of." 
 (Dolling er, Gentile and Jew, bk ix.) 
 
 See also Guizot's " Lectures on Civilization : " — 
 
 " In Greece the principle was the unity of the social prin- 
 ciple ; and Greece had hardly become glorious before she 
 appeared worn out." (Lect. ii. p. 34.) 
 
 See Plato " De Republica," bk. v. c. 9. 
 
 NOTE 17, p. 233. 
 
 " In the ancient world there prevailed two practices equally 
 pernicious to the peace and happiness of the married state. 
 From the most early times polygamy appears to have been 
 universal among the Eastern nations, and men married as 
 many wives as their fancy wished or their fortune could 
 
 maintain By it were banished from domestic life all 
 
 those enjoyments that sweeten and endear it. Friendship, 
 social intercourse, confidence, and the mutual care of children, 
 were to a great measure unknown, — on the one hand rigour, 
 voluptuousness, jealousy ; and on the other subjection without 
 love, fidelity, or virtue. One half of the human species 
 became the property of the other; and the husband, instead 
 of being the friend and protector of the wife, was no better 
 than the master and tyrant over a slave. 
 
 C <• 
 
386 NOTE 18. [Lect. 
 
 " In the western parts of the world the notions in regard 
 to marriage were more conformable to nature. One man was 
 confined to one woman, but at the same time their laws 
 allowed a practice which introduced the most fatal disorders 
 
 into domestic life No sooner had the progress of 
 
 luxury and the establishment of despotic power vitiated the 
 taste of men, than the law in regard to divorces was found to 
 be among the worst corruptions which prevailed in that 
 abandoned age. . . . Among the Romans domestic corrup- 
 tion grew of a sudden to an incredible height ; and perhaps 
 in the history of mankind we can find no parallel to the 
 undisguised impurity and licentiousness of that age.'" [Robert- 
 son's Discourse on the Situation of the World at Christ's 
 Coming.) 
 
 The laws to prevent the crying evil of promiscuous bathing 
 in the Roman baths, passed by Adrian and Marcus Aurelius, 
 repealed by Heliogabalus, and re-enacted by Constantine; 
 and yet more clearly the laws passed to regulate prostitution, 
 illustrate the incredible licentiousness of the later times of 
 the empire. In regard to the last, and the licence issued 
 yearly by the ^Ediles, with its degrading conditions, we are 
 told that women who were wives and daughters to Roman 
 knights were not ashamed to apply for such licences ; and the 
 infection even reached higher. Viotella, a lady of praetorian 
 rank, was not ashamed to apply for a licence ; but the Romans, 
 debauched as they were under Tiberius, were shocked at this, 
 and several laws were passed to prevent ladies of rank from 
 so degrading themselves. The cruelty that went hand in 
 hand with their profligacy — as was natural, for selfish passion 
 is at the bottom of them both — was illustrated by the con- 
 duct of Fulvia, the wife of Anthony, towards Cicero. An 
 immense collection of facts bearing on this subject will be 
 found in the " History of Women/'' by William Alexander. 
 London, 1782. 
 
 NOTE 18, p. 235. 
 
 (in/or in his "Lectures on Civilisation" justly puts stress on 
 the character of the Gothic nations as having helped to infuse 
 
VIJ NOTES 19, 20. 387 
 
 the principles of hardy independence into modern Europe. 
 But he presses this one element too far. The tendency to an 
 Eremitic life in the early days of Christianity was pre-Chris- 
 tian in its origin. Doubtless the institution of conventual 
 establishments was over-ruled for good during the darkness 
 and the disordered state of society prevailing in the middle 
 ages. But the benefits which the wise providence of God 
 has secured for the world by their means is no proof that 
 they are good in themselves, and had not a dark and preju- 
 dicial side as well as a favourable one. But according to the 
 argument of the lecture it is no question for a balance of ad- 
 vantages and disadvantages, but of distinctive characteristics. 
 Neither the teaching of Scripture nor the examples of its 
 recorded saints supply the slightest authority for the life 
 of forced seclusion which the Church of Rome, and some 
 among ourselves, term the " religious life." 
 
 NOTE 19, p. 235. 
 
 " Nothing can, I conceive, be more erroneous or super- 
 ficial than the reasonings of those who maintain that the 
 moral element of Christianity has in it nothing- distinctive or 
 peculiar. The method of this school, of which Bolingbroke 
 may be regarded as the type, is to collect from the writings 
 of different heathen writers certain isolated passages embody- 
 ing precepts that were inculcated by Christianity ; and when 
 the collection had become very large the task was supposed 
 to be accomplished. But the true originality of a system of 
 modern teaching depends not so much upon the elements of 
 which it is composed, as upon the manner in which they are 
 fused into a symmetrical whole ; upon the proportional value 
 that is attached to different qualities, or, to state the same 
 thing by a single word, upon the type of character that is 
 formed. Now it is quite certain that the Christian type 
 differs, not only in degree, but in kind, from the Pagan type." 
 (Lec&j/'s History of Rationalism-, vol. i. pp. ^S~339-) 
 
 NOTE 20, p. 238. 
 
 See Guizof s " Lectures on Civilisation," where he refers 
 the origin of modern civilisation to the Church of the fifth 
 century. 
 
388 NOTES 1, 2. [Lect. 
 
 LECTURE VII 
 
 NOTE 1, p. 242. 
 
 "Biblical Psychology, Delitzsch," bk. iii. s. iv. p. 165, 
 Clark's ed. 1867. 
 
 NOTE 2, p. 244. 
 
 Allusion is here made to an article on Conscience which 
 appeared in the " Saturday Review" for August 5, 1 866. To the 
 philosophy of this article, as expressive of the general result of 
 encpuiry, allusion is made in p. 266. This statement fairly 
 reflects the general opinion ; but in coming to it all the great 
 thinkers of modern times have held the existence of an in- 
 born germ of conscience in every man, a natural witness for 
 God which is trained and developed, but not itself produced, 
 by the educational processes of life. When, therefore, the 
 writer of this article proceeds towards the close of his paper 
 to say that a man produces his own conscience as he raises his 
 own vegetables, the illustration is as philosophically untrue as 
 it is painfully irreverent. For in the illustration the man is 
 a conscious and intelligent agent in sowing the seed, and tin- 
 production of the fruit is so entirely dependent upon his own 
 volition, that he can have it or not have it as he likes. But 
 the possession of a conscience is not left to any man's choice. 
 Its existence is as absolutely independent of his own will, as if 
 the faculty were in no degree acquired, but were altogether 
 innate. A man has it in his power to abuse the gift by eithei 
 corrupting the verdicts of conscience or by crushing its power ; 
 but he is totally unable to relieve himself of the responsi- 
 bility of its possession 
 
VII] NOTES 3, 4. 389 
 
 NOTE 3, p. 245. 
 
 " A system [rationalism] which makes the moral faculty of 
 man the measure and arbiter of faith must always act power- 
 fully on those in whom that faculty is most developed/' 
 {Lecky's History of nationalism, vol. i. ch. ii. p. 183.) 
 
 " Men have come instinctively and almost unconsciously to 
 judge all doctrines by their intuitive sense of right, and to 
 reject or explain away, or throw into the background, those 
 that will not bear the test, no matter how imposing may be 
 the authority that authenticates them." {Ibid. vol. i. ch. 4, 
 p. 411.) 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 254. 
 
 The views of Hobbes are stated in the body of the lecture. 
 His inconsistent references to the grounds of conscience are 
 found in the "Leviathan," pt. i. ch. 15; pt. ii. ch. 26, 28. I 
 subjoin the first of these passages : — 
 
 " The laws of nature are immutable and eternal ; for in- 
 justice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, deception of 
 persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can 
 never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it." 
 
 Paley's words in denial of an innate faculty of conscience 
 (" Moral Philosophy," bk. i. c. 5) are also quoted in the 
 lecture. On the other hand, in his Sermons he says : — 
 
 "Conscience— our own conscience — is to be our guide in all 
 things," " It is through the whisperings of conscience that 
 the Spirit speaks. If men are wilfully deaf to their con- 
 sciences they cannot hear the Spirit." {Sermon xxv. on 1 Cor. 
 iii. 16. See also Sermon xxxii.) 
 
 NOTE 4* p. 266, line 5. 
 "Saturday Review" for August 5th, 1866, 
 
390 NOTE 5. [Lect. 
 
 NOTE 5, p. 266. 
 
 The following' list will supply the works to which reference 
 is made in the lecture, in the order in which they occur : — 
 
 Homer's Odyssey, bk. vii. 
 
 Aeschylus, Eumenides and Prometheus Bound. 
 
 Menander, 326, edit. Meineke ex Aldo. 
 
 Plato, De Republica, lib. ix. 
 
 Aristotle, Politics, lib. i. c. xiii. ; Nic. Eth. lib. ix. c. 4. 
 
 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, lib. iii. 35 ; De Finibus, lib. iii. 4 ; 
 
 De Legibus, i. 6. 
 Plutarch, Moralia. 
 Marcus Antoninus, lib. v. c. 27. 
 Epictetus, lib. i. c. 14. 
 Seneca, Ep. 4; De Beneficiis, c. 17. 
 Horace, Ep. i. 1, 60. 
 Juvenal, Sat. xiii. — 
 
 " But why are those, Calvinus, thought to 'scape 
 Unpunished, whom in every fearful shape 
 Guilt still alarms, and conscience, ne'er asleep, 
 Wounds with incessant strokes, not loud but deep ; 
 While the vexed mind, her own tormentor, plies 
 A scorpion scourge, unmarked by human eyes. 
 Trust me, no tortures which the poets feign 
 Can match the fierce, the unutterable pain 
 He feels, who, night and day, devoid of rest, 
 Carries his own accuser in his breast." 
 
 (GijfonVs Translation, 260 — 270.) 
 
 Tertullian, Apology — p. 40, Pusey's Libr. of the Fathers. 
 Chrysostom, Horn. viii. to people of Antioch. 
 Abelard — quoted by Whewell, Lect. on Moral Philosophy. 
 Bernard, De Interiori Domo, c. xxii. — quoted by Bishop Taylor 
 
 in his Rule of Conscience. 
 Peter Lombard — quoted by Schcnkel. 
 Perkins, Treatise on Cases of Conscience. 
 Aims. Conscience, the Power, and Cases thereof. 
 
VII] NOTE 5. 391 
 
 Hall, Resolutions and Decisions of Cases of Conscience. 
 
 Sanderson, De Obligatione Conscientiae. 
 
 Taylor, The Rule of Conscience, or Ductor Dubitantium. 
 
 Hobbes, Leviathan. 
 
 Locke, On the Human Understanding. 
 
 Mandeville, Fable of the Bees. 
 
 Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics. 
 
 Hume, Enquiry into the Principles of Morals. 
 
 Hartley, Observations on Man. 
 
 More, Enchiridium Ethicum. 
 
 Cudworth, Eternal and Immutable Morality. 
 
 Hutcheson, Enquiry into Principles of Beauty and Virtue. 
 
 Butler's Sermons, ii. iii. v. viii., &c. 
 
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
 
 Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 
 
 Ockham, Questiones et Decisiones, in iv. Libb. Sententiarum. 
 
 Cumberland, De Legibus Naturalibus. 
 
 Woollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated. 
 
 Price, Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in 
 
 Morals. 
 Gay, Dissertation on the Fundamental Principles of Virtue and 
 
 Morality. 
 Tucker, The Light of Nature Pursued. 
 Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy. 
 Bentham — Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
 Mackintosh, Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, in the first vol. 
 
 of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
 Chalmers, Natural Theology. 
 Whateley, Notes on Paley's Moral Philosophy. 
 Whewell, Systematic Morality. 
 Leibnitz, Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus. 
 Malbranche, Traite de Morale. 
 Crusius, Elementa Theolog. Moralia. 
 
 Kant, Religion innerhald der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. 
 Fichte, System der Sittenlehre. 
 De Wette, Christl. Sittenlehre. 
 Mosheim, Sittenlehre der L. Schrift. 
 Reinhard, System der Chi 1 . Moral. 
 Harless, Christl. Ethik. 
 
392 NOTES 6, 7. [Lect. 
 
 Rothe, Theolog. Ethik. 
 
 Schubert, Christl. Ethik. 
 
 Hoffman, Schriftheweis. 
 
 Marheiueke, System der Theol. Moral. 
 
 Schenkel, Herzog, Real. Encyklop'adie. 
 
 Delitzsch, System der Bibl. Psychologic 
 
 NOTE 6, p. 273. 
 
 " If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being 
 in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind 
 can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am in- 
 formed that the world is ruled by a Being whose attributes 
 are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what 
 are the principles of His government, except that ' the highest 
 human morality which we are capable of conceiving ' does 
 not sanction them ; — convince me of it and I will bear my 
 fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe 
 this, and, at the same time, call this Being by the names 
 which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say, 
 in plain terms, that I will not. Whatever power such a 
 Being may have over me, this is one thing which He shall 
 not do : He shall not compel me to worship Him. I will 
 call no Being good who is not what I mean when I apply 
 that epithet to my fellow-creatures ; and if such a Being can 
 sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will 
 go." (An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, ly John 
 Stuart Mill, p. 102.) 
 
VIII] NOTES 1—3. 393 
 
 LECTURE VIII 
 
 NOTE 1, p. 316. 
 
 The distinct lines of argument available for use in proving 
 the Divine origin and authority of the faith may be variously 
 classified. As my object is only to point out their number 
 and variety, the following enumeration will be accurate enough 
 for the purpose : — I. External ; (a) Miracles, (b) Historical tes- 
 timony, (c) Mode of propagation, (d) Effects upon the world. 
 II. Internal ; (a) Unity of design and teaching, (b) Sublimity 
 of doctrine and of style, (c) Prediction, (d) Undesigned coin- 
 cidences, (e) Adaptation to the moral wants of man and the 
 experienced constitution of the world in which he is placed. 
 
 NOTE 2, p. 317. 
 
 This is singularly the case with modern thought. Not 
 only is the external side of the evidences wholly ignored 
 in the majority of modern attacks upon Christianity, but in 
 many cases it is difficult in the extreme to believe that the 
 author can ever have made himself acquainted with them, 
 so wholly is all reference to them absent, and so constantly 
 is stress laid upon arguments inconsistent with the external 
 facts of the case. It is deeply to be regretted that, on such 
 a subject, care should not be taken to ascertain what has pre- 
 viously been thought and said by the many great men of 
 the past who have laboured in this sphere. 
 
 NOTE 3, p. 317. 
 
 Mr. Buckle's " History of Civilisation," and Mr. Lecky's 
 " History of Rationalism in Europe," supply two notable in- 
 stances of this tendency. A very spirited examination of 
 
 Dd 
 
394 NOTE 4. 
 
 Mr. Buckle's philosophy will be found in the first paper con- 
 tained in Mr. Froude's new book, " Short Studies on Great 
 Subjects/' It is well to be able to cite a witness so free 
 from all possible suspicion of a tendency to dogmatic pre- 
 judices as Mr. Froude. 
 
 NOTE 4, p. 318. 
 
 An unexceptional testimony to this fact is supplied by 
 Mr. Pattison in his paper on " The Tendencies of Religious 
 Thought in England, 1688-1750/' contributed to "Essays 
 and Reviews." 
 
EKRATA. 
 
 On page 56, line 2, for "Irenseus " read " Tertullian." 
 
 On page 56, line 5, for " stern Tertullian " read " gentle Irenseus." 
 
 On page 135, line 19, for "he considers" read "they consider." 
 
OXFORD: 
 
 BY T. COMBE, M.A., E. B. GABDNER, E. P. HALL, AND H. LATHAM, M.A., 
 PRINTERS TO THE UNIVERSITY. 
 
October, 18G7. 
 
 IN COURSE OF PUBLICATION 
 
 H Y 
 
 Messes. BIVINGTON, 
 
 WATERLOO PLACE, LONDON; 
 
 HIGH STREET, OXFORD; 
 TRINITY STREET, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 The Dogmatic Faith i 
 
 an Enquiry into the Relation subsisting between Religion and 
 Dogma. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1867. By Edward 
 Garbett, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Surbiton. 
 
 8vo. 105. GJ. 
 
 The Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus 
 
 Christ. Being the Bampton Lectures for I860. By Henry- 
 Parry Liddon, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Prebendary 
 of Salisbury, and Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Salisbury. 
 
 8vo. lis. 
 
2 &Tc&i'g. ltfbtngtou'3 
 
 The Annotated Book of Common Prayer ; 
 
 being an Historical, Ritual, and Theological Commentary on 
 the Devotional System of the Church of England. Edited by 
 John Henry Blunt, M.A., E.S.A., Author of "Household 
 Theology," &c, &c. Second Edition, pp. 700, with three 
 Plates. Imperial Svo, '66s. ; or royal 4to, with largo margin for 
 Notes, £3 3s. 
 
 A Glossary of Ecclesiastical Terms ; 
 
 containing Explanations of Terms used in Architecture, Ecclesio- 
 logy, Hymnology, Law, Ritualism, Theology, Heresies, and 
 Miscellaneous Subjects. By various writers. Edited by Orby 
 Shipley, M.A. 
 
 Crown Svo. (/« preparation.) 
 
 On Miracles ; 
 
 Being the Bampton Lectures for 1SG5. By J. B. Mozley, B.I)., 
 Vicar of Old Shorehain, late Eellow of Magdalen College, 
 Oxford. 
 
 Second Edition. Svo. 10s. Gd. 
 
 Curious Myths of the Middle Ages, 
 
 By S. Baring-Gould, M.A., Author of »« Post-Mediaeval 
 
 Preachers," &c. With Illustrations. 
 
 Ci'own 8vo. 7*. Gd. 
 A Second Series is in the press. 
 
 Farewell Counsels of a Pastor to his Flock, 
 
 on Topics of the Hay : Nine Sermons preached at St. John's, 
 Paddington. By Edward Meyrick Goulburn, H.H., Deau o\' 
 Norwich. 
 
 Second Edition. Small Svo. 4s. 
 
An Illuminated Edition of the Book of 
 
 Common Prayer, printed in Bed and Black, on fine toned 
 Paper; with Borders aud Titles designed after the manner 
 of the 14th Century by R. E. Holmes, P.S.A., and engraved 
 by O. Jewitt. 
 
 Crown Svo. lGs. 
 
 This Edition of the Peayee-Book may he had in various 
 Bindings for presentation. 
 
 The Prayer-book Interleaved, 
 
 with Historical Illustrations and Explanatory Notes arranged 
 parallel to the Text. By W. M. Campion, B.D., Bellow and 
 Tutor of Queens' College, and W. J. Beamont, M.A., Bellow 
 of Trinity College, Cambridge. AVith a Preface by the Lord 
 Bishop of Ely. 
 
 Second Edition. Small Svo. 7s. Gd. 
 
 The Victory of Divine Goodness, 
 
 By Thomas Rawson Birks, M.A., Incumbent of Holy Trinity, 
 Cambridge. 
 
 Crown Svo. 4s. Gd. 
 
 Yesterday, To-daj^ and For Ever s 
 
 a Poem in Twelve Books. By Edward Henry Bickersteth, M.A , 
 
 Incumbent of Christ Church, Hampstead. 
 
 Second and Cheaper Edition. Small Svo. Gs. 
 
 Six short Sermons on Sin, 
 
 Lent Lectures at S. Alban the Martyr, Ilolborn. By Orby 
 Shipley, M.A. 
 
 Third Edition. Small Svo. Is. 
 a 2 
 
4 fH«Wr$. sfttutngton's 
 
 The Sacraments and Sacramental Ordinances 
 
 of the Church ; being a Plain Exposition of their History, 
 Meaning, and Effects. By John Henry Blunt, M.A., Author 
 of "The Principles and Practice of Pastoral "Work," "House- 
 hold Theology," &c, &c. 
 
 Small 8vo. 4*. 6^/. 
 
 Church Seasons and Present Times : 
 
 Sermons chiefly preached at St. Luke's, Torquay. By George 
 Collyer Harris, M.A., Incumbent of St. Luke's, and Preben- 
 dary of Exeter; Author of " Lessons from St. Peter's Life." 
 
 Small 8vo. 5s. 
 
 Sermons preached before the University 
 
 of Oxford, chiefly during the years 1863 — 18G5. By Henry 
 Parry Liddon, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Prebendary 
 of Salisbury, Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of 
 Salisbury, aud lately Select Preacher. 
 
 Second Edition. 8vo. 8s. 
 
 Scripture Acrostics. 
 
 By the Author of " The Daily Life of the Christian Child." 
 Square lGmo. Is. (id. 
 
 Semele ; or , The Spirit of Beauty : 
 
 a Venetian Tale. By J. D. Mereweather, B.A., English Chap- 
 lain at Venice. 
 
 Small 8vo. 3s. (id. 
 
The Holy Bible ; 
 
 with Notes aud Introductions by Chr. Wordsworth, D.D., 
 Archdeacon of "Westminster. 
 
 Vol. I.— The Pentateuch. 3Ss. 
 
 Vol. II. — Joshua to Samuel. 21s. 
 
 Vol. III.— Kings to Esther. 21s. 
 
 Vol. IV., Part 1.— The Book of Job. 9s. 
 
 Vol. IV, Part 2.— The Psalms. 15s. 
 
 The Greek Testament, 
 
 with Notes, &c. &c. By Chr. Wordsworth, D.D., Archdeacon of 
 Westminster. 
 
 2 Vols. Impl. 8vo. 4/. 
 
 The Parts may be had separately, as follows : — 
 The Gospels, 5th Edition, 21s. 
 The Acts, 5th Edition, 10s. Gd. 
 St. Paul's Epistles, 4th Edition, 3 is. Gd. 
 General Epistles, Revelation, and Indexes, 3rd Edition, 21s. 
 
 The Acts of the Deacons ; 
 
 being a Commentary, Critical and Practical, upon the Notices of 
 St. Stephen and St. Philip the Evangelist, contained in the 
 Acts of the Apostles. By Edward Meyrick Goulburn, D.D., 
 Dean of Norwich. 
 
 Second Edition. Small Svo. Gs. 
 
 A Christian View of Christian History, 
 
 from Apostolic to Mediaeval Times. By John Henry Blunt, 
 M.A., E.S. A., Editor of " The Annotated Prayer-book." 
 
 Crown 8vo. Is. 
 
iHfSSrs. iUbfngton's 
 
 Sermons to Children ; 
 
 being Twenty-eight short Headings, addressed to the Children 
 of St. Margaret's Home, East Grinstead. By the late J. M. 
 Neale, D.D., Warden of Sackvillo College. 
 
 .Small 8vo. 3s. 
 
 Faith and Life : 
 
 Readings for the greater Holy Days, and the Sundays from 
 Advent to Trinity. Compiled from Ancient Writers, By 
 William Bright, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of University College, 
 Oxford. 
 
 Second Edition. Small Svo. 5s. 
 
 Parish Musings ; or, Devotional Poems, 
 
 By John S. E. Monsell, LL.D., Vicar of Egham, Surrey, and 
 Rural Dean. Tenth Edition. 
 
 ISmo., Is. ; or, in limp cloth, Is. Gd. 
 A superior Edition may be had, in small Svo. , price 2s. Gd. 
 
 The Office of the Most Holy Name i 
 
 a Devotional Help for Young Persons. By the Editor of " The 
 Churchman's Guide to Eaith," &c. 
 
 1 Smo. 2.9. Gd. 
 
 Standing and Stumbling. 
 
 Part I. — Seven Common Faults. 
 Part IT.— Your Duty and Mine. 
 Part III.— Things Rarely Met with. 
 By James Erasmus Philipps, M.A., Vicar of Warminster. 
 Small Svo. 2s. Gd. 
 
$eto $uMtaitfon5. 7 
 
 Thoughts on Men and Things : 
 
 a Series of Essays. By Angelina Gushington. 
 Crown 8vo. 3*. Gd. 
 
 The Electra of Sophocles ; 
 
 with English Notes by E. C. Jebb, M.A., Fellow and Assistant 
 Tutor of Trinity College, Cambridge. Forming the first Part 
 of Catena Classicorum. 
 
 Crown 8vo. 3s. Gd. 
 
 The Acharnians and the Knights of Aris- 
 tophanes; with English Notes by W. C. Green, M.A., late 
 Fellow of King's College, Cambridge ; Classical Lecturer of 
 Queens' College. Being the second Part of Catena Classi- 
 coeum. 
 
 Crown 8vo. 4<s. 
 
 Thirteen Satires of Juvenal ; 
 
 with Notes and Introduction by G. A. Simcox, M.A., Fellow 
 and Lecturer of Queen's College, Oxford. Being the third Part 
 of Catena Classicorum. 
 
 Crown 8vo. 3s. Gd. 
 
 *#* For farther particulars of this important Seines, see last page. 
 
 Arithmetic for the use of Schools ; 
 
 with a numerous collection of Examples. By R. D. Beasley, 
 M.A., Head Master of Grantham Grammar School, and formerly 
 Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge ; Author of " Elements 
 of Plane Trigonometry." 
 
 12mo. 3*. 
 The Examples are also sold separately : — Part I., Elementary 
 Utiles, 8(7. Part II, Higher Hales, Is, Gd. 
 
8 f&t&m, fttofnjjton'* 
 
 A Greek Primer for the use of Schools, 
 
 By Charles H. Hole, M.A., Scholar of Worcester College, 
 Oxford ; late Assistant Master at King Edward's School, 
 Bromsgrove. 
 
 Crown 8vo. 4*. 
 
 The Greek Testament ; 
 
 with a Critically revised Text ; a Digest of Various Readings ; 
 Marginal References to Verbal and Idiomatic Usage ; Prole- 
 gomena ; and a copious Critical and Exegetical Commentary in 
 English Eor the use of Theological Students and Ministers. 
 By Henry Alford, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. 
 
 4 Vols. 8vo. 102^. 
 
 The Volumes are sold separately as follows : — 
 Vol. I.— The Eour Gospels. Fifth Edition. 28s. 
 Vol. II.— Acts to II. Corinthians. Fifth Edition. 24*. 
 Vol. III. — G-alatians to Philemon. Fourth Edition. ISs. 
 Vol. IV. — Hebrews to Revelation. Third Edition. 32-?. 
 
 The Greek Testament with English Notes, 
 
 intended for the upper forms of Schools and for Pass-men at the 
 Universities. Abridged from the larger work of tho Dean of 
 Canterbury. 
 
 In one Volume, crown 8ro. (In the press.) 
 
 The Formation of Tenses in the Greek Verb; 
 
 showing the Rules by which every Tense is Formed from the 
 pure stem of the Verb, and the necessary changes before each 
 Termination. By C. S. Jerram, M.A., late Scholar of Trinity 
 College, Oxon. 
 
 Crown Svo. 1*. Qd. 
 
$cfo $3u3bIuaitona. 9 
 
 Professor Inman's Nautical Tables, 
 
 for the use of British Seamen. New Edition, by J. W. 
 Inman, revised, and enlarged by the introduction of Tables 
 of | log. haversines, log. differences, &c. ; with a more compen- 
 dious method of Working a Lunar, and a Catalogue of Latitudes 
 and Longitudes of Places on the Seaboard. 
 Royal Svo. 21s. 
 
 An Outline of Logic, 
 
 for the use of Teachers and Students. By Francis Garden, 
 M.A., Sub-Dean of Her Majesty's Chapels Royal ; Professor of 
 Mental and Moral Science, Queen's College, London. 
 Small Svo. 4s. 
 
 The New Testament for English Readers; 
 
 containing the Authorized Version, with a revised English 
 Text ; Marginal References ; and a Critical and Explanatory 
 Commentary. By Henry Alford, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. 
 
 Now complete in 2 Vols, or 4 Parts, price 51s. Gd. 
 Separately, 
 Vol. 1, Part I.— The three first Gospels, with a Map. 12s. 
 Vol. 1, Part II.— St. John and the Acts. 10s. Gd. 
 Vol. 2, Part I.— The Epistles of St. Paul, with a Map. lGs. 
 Vol. 2, Part II. — Hebrews to Revelation. Svo. 16s. 
 
 Priest and Parish. 
 
 By Harry Jones, M.A., Incumbent of St. Luke's, Berwick 
 Street ; Author of " Life in the World." 
 Square crown Svo. Gs. Gd. 
 
 The Annual Register : 
 
 a Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, for the Year 
 1866 ; being the Fourth Volume of an improved Series. 
 Svo. 18s. 
 *** The Volumes for 1863, 1861, and 1865 may le hid, 
 price 18s. each. 
 
10 JHfriftfc ${fe{ri£tdft'£ 
 
 Four Sacred Allegories : 
 
 The Shadow of the Cross— The Distant Hills— The Old Man's 
 Home —The King's Messengers. By the Eev. W. Adams, M.A., 
 late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. With Illustrations. 
 
 New Edition. Small 8vo. Price 5s. 
 
 The Four Allegories are also published separately in 18«zo., price Is. 
 each in limp cloth. 
 
 Thoughts on Personal Religion; 
 
 being a Treatise on the Christian Life in its Two Chief Elements, 
 Devotion, and Practice. By Edward Meyrick Goulburn, D.D., 
 Dean of Norwich. New Edition. 
 
 Small Svo. 6s. Gd. 
 An edition for presentation, Two Volumes, small Svo. 10s. Gd. 
 
 Also, a Cheap Edition. 3s. Gd. 
 
 The Last Words of our Lord and Saviour 
 
 Jesus Christ ; being a Course of Seven Sermons preached 
 during Passion Week, 1867, in the Parish Church of S. Mary, 
 Twickenham. By K,, Stately Cobbett, M.A., of Pembroke 
 College, Oxford. 
 
 Small Svo. 3s. 
 
 Thomas a Kempis, Of the Imitation of Christ; 
 
 a carefully revised translation, elegantly printed in red and 
 black. 
 
 3 6mo. 2s. Gd. {Just ready.) 
 
 Sermons, 
 
 Preached in Liverpool by Andrew Wilson, B.A., Curate of 
 St. Catherine'^, Liverpool. 
 
 Small 8vo. Gs. 
 
$cl» |9uMf rations. 11 
 
 Consoling Thoughts on Sickness, 
 
 Edited by Henry Bailey, B.D., "Warden of St. Augustine's 
 College, Canterbury. Large type. 
 
 Small Rvo. (In the press.) 
 
 Sermons. 
 
 By K. S. C. Chermside, M.A., late Sector of Wilton, and Pre- 
 bendary of Salisbury. 
 
 Small 8vo. (Nearly ready.) 
 
 The Ajax of Sophocles, 
 
 with English Notes by R. C. Jebb, MA.., Fellow and Assistant 
 Tutor of Trinity College, Cambridge. 
 
 Crown 8vo. (In the press.) 
 
 Thucy elides. 
 
 Books 1 and 2. Edited by Charles Bigg 1 , M.A., Senior Student 
 and late Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford ; Second Classical 
 Master of Cheltenham College. 
 
 Crown 8vo. (In the press.) 
 
 The Olynthiacs and Philippics of Demos- 
 thenes. Edited by G. H. Heslop, M.A., late Fellow and 
 Assistant Tutor of Queen's College, Oxford ; Head Master of 
 St. Bees. 
 
 Crown Svo. (In the press.) 
 
 Family Prayers s 
 
 compiled from various sources (chiefly from Bishop Hamilton's 
 Manual), and arranged on the Liturgical Principle. By Edward 
 Meyrick Groulburn, D.D., Dean of Norwich. 
 
 Cheap Edition. 18mo. (In the press.) 
 
12 {&t*&vi. SUfbfngton'sf #cfo $utftc«tfotttf. 
 
 The Life and Times of 8. Gregory the Illu- 
 
 minator, patron Saint and Founder of the Armenian Church. 
 By S. C. Malan, M.A., Vicar of Broadwindsor. 
 
 (In preparation.) 
 
 Stones of the Temple : 
 
 a familiar Explanation of the Fabric and Furniture of the 
 Church, -with Illustrations, engraved by 0. Jewitt. By Walter 
 Field, M.A., Vicar of Godmersham. 
 
 (In preparation.') 
 
 A Summary of Theology and Ecclesiastical 
 
 History : a Series of Original Works on all the principal subjects 
 of Theology and Ecclesiastical History. By Various Writers. 
 
 In 8 Vols., 8vo. (In preparation.) 
 
 Flowers and Festivals ; 
 
 or, Directions for Floral Decorations of Churches. With 
 numerous Illustrations. 
 
 Small 8vo. (In preparation.) 
 
 A Key to the Use and Understanding of 
 
 the Book of Common Prayer. By John Henry Blunt, M.A.. 
 F.S.A. 
 
 Small Svo. (In the press.) 
 
SMALL BOOKS AND TRACTS 
 
 ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. 
 
 A Manual of Confirmation ; with a Pastoral Letter on First Communion. By 
 
 the Dean of Norwich. Fifth Edition. Is. 6d. 
 A Short Catechism on Confirmation. By Archdeacon Bickersteth. Fifth Ed., Id. 
 The Bite of Confirmation Explained. By D. J. Eyre, M.A. Fourth Edition. 
 
 4d., or 35. 6d. per dozen. 
 Questions and Answers on Confirmation. By the Dean of Chichester. Ninth 
 
 Edition. 2d., or 15s. per 100. 
 " It is Written •" or, The Catechism Teaching from Scripture. By C. J. 
 
 Heathcote, M.A. Fourth Edition. 4d., or 3s. per dozen. 
 A Plain Catechism hefore Confirmation. By Archdeacon Dodgson. New Ed., 2d. 
 Manual on Confirmation. By Archdeacon Wordsworth. Neio Edition. 9d. 
 On the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. By the Plain Man's Friend. Ninth 
 
 Edition. 4?d. 
 A Companion to the Lord's Supper. By the same Author. Fifth Edition. 
 
 8d. hound. 
 The Happy Communicant ; or, The Soldier Armed : a true Story. By John 
 
 James, D.D. Second Edition. 3d. 
 The Benefit of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper Explained. By Edward 
 
 Burton, D.D. New Edition. 2d., or 15s. per 100. 
 
 Eyes and Ears; or, The History of one who was Deaf and Blind. Thirl i/ fourth 
 
 Thousand. 2d., or 25 for 3s. Gd. 
 Blindness; its Trials and Blessings. By the Author of "Eyes and Ears." Sixth 
 
 Thousand. 2d. 
 Pussy-Cat ; a Tale for the Young. With an Engraving. Is. in limp cloth. 
 The Infant Christian's First Catechism. By Mrs. Parry, of Barbados. Sixth 
 
 Edition. 3d., or 2s. 6c?. per dozen. 
 
 Your Duty and Mine. By J. E. Philipps, M.A. Third Thousand. Is. in cloth. 
 
 Seven Common Faults. By the same Author. Twelfth Thousand. Is. in cloth. 
 
 Things Barely Met with. By the same Author. Is. in cloth. 
 
 Waiting through the Weary Day : a few Thoughts for the Hurried and Hard- 
 working. By Lady Charlotte-Maria Pepys. Second Edition. Is. 
 
 Help and Comfort for the Sick Poor. By the Author of " Sickness : its Trials 
 and Blessings." Fourth Edition, in large print. Is. 
 
 Private Devotions for School-Boys ; with Rules of Conduct. By Lord Lyttelton. 
 
 Fifth Edition. Gd. 
 Prayers for Schools (Sunday, Day, and Infant). By F. II. Thicknessc, M.A. 
 * ISmo. 6d. 
 
 EIVINGTONS, 
 Hontrmt, «£>>-forir, nnfc Camfcrfogc 
 
NEW PAMPHLETS. 
 
 Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion, holden at 
 Lambeth Palace, September 24—27, 1867. I. An Address, delivered at the 
 Opening of the Conference, by Charles Thomas, Lord Archbishop of Canter- 
 bury. II. The Resolutions of the Conference. III. Address of the Bishops to 
 the Faithful in Christ Jesus. Published by authority. 8vo. Is. 
 
 BY THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY. 
 
 The Liturgy and Ritualism : a Sermon, preached at the Con- 
 secration of the Church of St. Mary Brediu, Canterbury, on Saturday, the 
 29th of June, 1867. By Ciiarles Thomas, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. 
 8vo. Is. 
 
 BY THE BISHOP OF ST. DAYlD's. 
 
 The Episcopal Meeting of 1867: a Letter to the Lord Arch- 
 bishop of Canterbury. By Connop Tiiirlwaxl, D.D., Bishop of St. David's. 
 8vo. Is. 
 
 BY THE BISHOP OF OSSORY. 
 
 The Case of the Established Church in Ireland. By James 
 Thomas O'Brien, D.D., Bishop of Ossory, Ferns, and Leighlin. Second 
 Edition. 8vo. Is. 
 
 BY THE BEAK OF CANTERBURY. 
 
 The Work of Him that sent me : a Sermon, preached in 
 
 Lambeth Parish Church, at the Archbishop of Canterbury's General Ordina- 
 tion, March 17, 1867. By Henry Aleord, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. 
 Published at the request of the Candidates for Holy Orders. Svo. Is. 
 
 BY ARCHDEACON CHURTON. 
 
 Unity and Truth in Catholic Toleration : a Charge, delivered at 
 
 the Annual Visitation of the Archdeaconry of Cleveland. By Edward Churton, 
 M.A. 
 
 BY ARCHDEACON BICKERSTETH. 
 
 A Charge delivered at his Ninth Visitation of the Archdeaconry 
 of Buckingham, in June, 1867. By Edward Bickerstetii, D.D., Prolocutor 
 of the Lower House of Convocation of the Province of Canterbury , Archdeacon 
 of Buckingham, and Vicar of Aylesbury. Svo. Is. 
 
 The Conscience Clause : a Letter to his Grace the Duke of 
 
 Marlborough, Lord President of Her Majesty's Privy Council. By Edward 
 Bickersieth, D.D., Archdeacon of Buckingham. Svo. 6d. 
 
 BY THE REV. II. P. LIDDON. 
 
 There is a Holy Ghost : a Sermon, preached before the University 
 
 of Oxford, at SI. Mary's, on Whitsunday. Ifi67. By H. 1'. Ln>i><>\, M.A., 
 Student of Christ Church, Prebendary of Sarum, and Examining Chaplain to 
 the Lord Bishop of Salisbury. Svo. Is. 
 
0tbi ipampMete- 15 
 
 BY THE REV. E. METIIICK. 
 
 Intercommunion ; or, the Church of England's Message to the 
 
 Churches : a Sermon, preached before the University of Oxford, on the Fourth 
 Sunday after Easter, May 19, 1867. By the Rev. Fkedeuick MEYEICK, 
 M.A., H. M. Inspector of Schools; Select Preacher] late Fellow and Tutor of 
 Trinity College. 8vo. 
 
 BT THE REV. II. A. WOODGATE. 
 
 The Scrihe instructed unto the Kingdom of Heaven : a Sermon, 
 
 preached in the Cathedral Church of Rochester on the Feast of St. Barnabas, 
 18G7, at the Consecration of the Right Rev. Thomas Legh Claughton, D.D., 
 Lord Bishop of Rochester. By Heney Abtiitje Woodgate, B.D., Rector 
 of Belbroughton, Hon. Canon of Worcester, and Rural Dean of Kidderminster. 
 Svo. 6d. 
 
 BY THE EEV. C. E. LOWDER. 
 
 S. Katharine's Hospital ; its History and Revenues, and their 
 Application to Missionary Purposes in the East of London : considered in a 
 Letter to the Right Hon. and Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of London. By 
 the Rev. C. F. Lowder, M.A., Perpetual Curate of S. Peter's, London Docks. 
 Svo. 6d. 
 
 BY THE REV. T. T. CARTER. 
 
 The lioyal Commission and the Eucharistic Vestments. A 
 Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. By the Rev. T. T. Caetee, 
 Rector of Clewer, Berks. Svo. Is. 
 
 BY TRE REV. PHILIP IIEDGELAND. 
 
 Two Assize Sermons, preached in the Parish Church of Bodmm. 
 By Philip Hedgeland, M.A., Perpetual Curate of Penzance, and Chaplain 
 to the High Sheriff of Cornwall. Svo. Is. 
 
 BY THE REV. MAZE AY. GREGORY. 
 
 The Sins and Punishment of Our Members : six Lectures, 
 
 delivered on the Fridays in Lent, 1SG7, on the Ancient Paintings recently 
 discovered in the Parish Church. By the Rev. Maze W. Geegoey, M.A., 
 Vicar of Wlsborough Green, and Chaplain of Loxwood, Sussex, and late 
 Perpetual Curate of Roade, Northamptonshire. Crown Svo. Is. 
 
 BY THE REV. BENJAMIN STREET. 
 
 In Search of a Ritual. By Benjamin Street, B.A., Vicar of 
 
 Barnetby-le-Wold. Small 8vo. Is. 
 
 Lay Suggestions on Modern Preaching and Preachers. Crown 
 "8vo. l*. 
 
 A Few Thoughts on Eucharistic Worship. By a Priest of the 
 
 Diocese of Oxford. Svo. 6c/. 
 
 Suggestions for the Revision of the Lcctionary ; submitted, with 
 
 humility and respect, to the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into 
 the Rubrics and Lcctionary of the Church, By a Presbyter of the Diocese of 
 London. With an Appendix upon certain Rubrics ; and a further Appendix 
 of Hints for the Introduction of Additional Occasional Prayers. 8vo. '2s. 
 
 EIVINGrTONS, 
 
 EontTon, (IDrfori?, anif Cam&rfogc. 
 
Iii the course of Publication, 
 
 CATENA CLASSICOEUM, 
 
 A SERIES OF CLASSICAL AUTIIOES, 
 
 EDITED BY MEMBERS OF BOTH UNIVERSITIES UNDER 
 THE DIRECTION OF 
 
 THE REV. ARTHUR HOLMES, M.A. 
 
 EELLOW AND LECTURER OF CLAEE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
 
 AND 
 
 THE REV. CHARLES BIGG, M.A. 
 
 SENIOR STUDENT AND LATE TUTOR OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD, SECOND 
 CLASSICAL MASTER OF CHELTENHAM COLLEGE. 
 
 The Editors of this Series design to issue texts of all the authors which are com- 
 monly read, and to illustrate them with au English Commentary, which they will 
 endeavour to render compendious as well as clear. Standard books of Classical 
 reference being now accessible to every Scholar, it has become needless to insert in 
 notes the mass of extraneous matter which for older editions was indispensable. 
 On many subjects collateral to the text the Editors of the present Series will be 
 able to substitute reference for quotation, and will thus obtain greater scope for 
 carefully discussing points of scholarship closely connected with the text itself. 
 The Series is intended to be available not only for Classical Students at the 
 Universities, but also for the highest Forms of Public Schools. 
 
 The following Works 
 
 IIOMERI ILIAS, edited by S. H. Rey- 
 nolds, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of 
 Brasenose College, Oxford. 
 Vol. I. Books I. to XII. (In the press.) 
 SOPHOCLIS TRAGOEDIAE, edited 
 by 11. C. Jebb, M.A., Fellow and 
 Assistant Tutor of Trinity College, 
 Cambridge. 
 
 Part I.— Elect ra. 2s. 6 J. (Ready.) 
 Part II. — Ajax. (In the press.) 
 ARISTOPHANIS COMOEDIAE, 
 edited by W. C. Green, M.A., l;>.te 
 Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. 
 Classical Lecturer at Queens' College. 
 Part I. — The Acharnians and the 
 Knights. 4?. (Ready.) 
 TIIUCYDIDIS IIISTORIA, edited by 
 Charles Bigg, M.A., Senior Student 
 and late Tutor of Christ Church, Ox- 
 ford ; second Classical Master of 
 Cheltenham College. 
 
 Vol. I. Books I. and II. with 
 Introductions. (/,> (he press.) 
 HERODOTI HISTORIA, edited by 11. 
 Q-. Woods, 15. A., Fellow and Tutor of 
 Trinity College, Oxford. 
 
 are m progress: — 
 
 DEMOSTHENIS ORATIONES PUI5- 
 LICAE, edited by G. H. Heslop, 
 M.A., late Fellow and Assistant Tutor 
 of Queen's College, Oxford ; Head 
 Master of St. Bees. (In the ]iress.) 
 
 DEMOSTHENIS ORATIONES FBI. 
 
 VATAE, edited by Arthur Holmes, 
 M.A., Fellow and Lecturer of Clare 
 College, Cambridge. 
 
 Part I. De Corona. 
 
 TERENTI COMOEDIAE, edited by 
 T, L. Papillon, M.A., Fellow and 
 Classical Lecturer of Merton College, 
 Oxford. 
 
 IIORATI OPERA, edited by J. M. 
 Marshall, M.A., Fellow and late 
 Lecturer of Brasenose College, Oxford. 
 One of the Masters in Clifton College. 
 
 JUVENALIS SATIRAE, edited by 
 G. A. Simcox, M.A., Fellow and 
 Classical Lecturer of Queen's College, 
 Oxford. 8s. 6d. (Ready.) 
 
 MARTIALIS EPiaRAMMATA, edited 
 by George Butler, M.A., Principal 
 of Liverpool College; late Fellow of 
 Exeter College, Oxford. 
 
 1UVINGTONS, 
 itonUon, ©yfovtr, auU Camfirfrgf. 
 
V 
 
 \ 
 
Princeton Theological Seminary -Speer Library 
 
 012 01131 1497