.     .^.  <yt  tut  ^I^cofcnjw  ^ 
 
 ^  PRINCETON",  N.  J 
 
 Presented  by  Mr.  Samuel  Agnew  of  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
 
 Agnezv  Coll.  on  Baptism,  No.    g^f 
 . V.& 
 
 '<^CL 
 
THE  WORKS 
 
 REV.  EDWARD  WILLIAMS,  D.D. 
 
 EDITED  BY 
 
 EVAN    DAVIES. 
 
 VOL.  IV. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JAMES  NISBET  AND  CO.,  21  BERNEES  STREET. 
 DENBIGH :  THOMAS  GEE. 
 
 M.DCCC.LXn. 
 
EDINBURGH  : 
 TRINTED  BY  EALT.AXTTST:  AND  COMPANY, 
 
 PAUL'S  WORK. 
 
MISCELLANEOUS  PIECES 
 
 MORAL  SCIENCE  AND  PEILOSOPHY,  AND  ON 
 DOCTRINAL  AND  PRACTICAL  THEOLOGY; 
 
 PUBLIC  LETTERS  ON  VARIOUS  IMPORTANT  SUBJECTS. 
 
Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arcliive 
 
 in  2011  witli  funding  from 
 
 Princeton  Tlieological  Seminary  Library 
 
 Iittp://www.arcliive.org/details/worksofedwardwil04will 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 DISSEKTATIONS. 
 
 I.  On  the  Present  State  of  Moral  Science, 
 
 ■    3 
 
 IL  Evidence  in  Moral  Science,     .... 
 
 21 
 
 III.  Power — ^its  Different  Kinds,  .... 
 
 26 
 
 IV.  Voluntary  Operations, 
 
 54 
 
 V.  Liberty  and  Necessity,            .... 
 
 57 
 
 VI.  Nature  of  Things,  and  Hypothetical  Tendencies, 
 
 80 
 
 VII.  Divine  Prescience  and  Scientia  Media. 
 
 85 
 
 VIII.  First  Cause, 
 
 91 
 
 IX.  On  a  Necessary  Agent, 
 
 99 
 
 X.  Moral  Obligation  and  Inability, 
 
 105 
 
 XI.  Moral  Evil, '         . 
 
 110 
 
 XII.  Motives, 
 
 153 
 
 XIII.  Virtue  and  Vice,          ..... 
 
 157 
 
 XIV.  God's  Ultimate  End  in  Creation,      . 
 
 179 
 
 XV.  Views  on  War,            ..... 
 
 184 
 
 XVI.  Internal  Evidence  of  Christianity,     . 
 
 196 
 
 SVII.  Justification,    ...... 
 
 203 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 ACADEMIC  EXERCISES. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 I.  Hints  to  the  Students,  .  .  .  .  .219 
 
 II.  Syllabus  of  Lectures,*  .  .  .  .  .222 
 
 CHURCH-FELLOWSHIP. 
 
 A  Help  to  Chiistiau  Fellowship,       .....  287 
 
 I.  General  Eemai-ks,      ......  288 
 
 II.  On  the  Scriptural  Design  of   Entering  into   Full  Com- 
 munion,     .......  290 
 
 CHRISTIAN  EDUCATION  OF  THE  YOUNG. 
 
 I.  An  Essay  on  Christian  Education,  ....        301 
 
 II.  The  Evangelical  Catechist,  in  Three  Parts  : — 
 
 1.  The  Young  Child's  First  Catechism,  .  .  .307 
 
 2.  The  Scripture  Catechism,    .  .  .  .  .317 
 
 3.  The  Older  Child's  Catechism,         .  .  .  .367 
 
 *  [This  syllabus  was  never  published,  but  quoted  not  unfrequeutly.  See  Gil- 
 bert's Memoir  of  Dr  Williams,  p.  537 ;  Dr  Payne's  Lectures  on  Christian  Theo- 
 logy, vol.  i.,  p.  250 ;  First  Lines  of  Christian  Theology,  by  Dr  John  Pye  Smith, 
 p.  vi.  Mr  Farrer,  the  learned  Editor  of  Dr  Pye  Smith's  volume,  expresses  Mm.- 
 self  in  the  following  language  : — "  As  early  as  the  year  1798,  he  "  {i.e.,  Dr  Pye 
 Smith)  "  commenced  \\Titing  a  series  of  Theological  Lectures  on  the  basis  of  the 
 Syllabus  drawn  up  by  the  late  Dr  Edward  Williams.  This  fragment  is  still  in 
 existence,  and  supplies  the  link  of  connexion  between  Dr  Smith's  completed  sys- 
 tem and  that  of  his  venerable  instructor.  Through  the  kindness  of  the  Rev.  John 
 Hammond  of  Handsworth,"  (one  of  the  few  surviving  pupils  of  Dr  Williams,)  "the 
 Editor  has  been  permitted  to  examine  a  copy  of  Dr  WilUams's  outline.  A  com- 
 parison of  this  document  with  the  manuscripts  left  by  Dr  Smith,  clearly  indicates 
 the  powerful  influence  which  the  eminent  defender  of  Modern  Calvinism  exerted 
 upon  the  whole  cast  of  thought  of  his  most  distinguished  pupU,  while  at  the  same 
 time  that  this  influence  was  not  such  as  to  involve  a  sacrifice  of  mental  independ- 
 ence on  the  part  of  the  latter."  Many  points  of  similai'ity  between  Dr  WiUiams 
 and  Dr  Pye  Smith  had  struck  my  own  mind  before  I  saw  the  above  paragraph. 
 See  note,  p.  222.— Ed.] 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 ON  A  CONGREGATIONAL  UNION. 
 
 FAGE 
 
 I.  A  Circular  Letter  from  the  Independent  Ministers  of  War- 
 wickshire,        .  .  .  .  .  .  .411 
 
 II.  Thoughts  on  a  General  Union,    .....        431 
 
 III.  Hints  to  a  Committee  in  London,  ....        440 
 
 PUBLIC  LETTERS,  ETC. 
 
 I.  A  Letter  to  the  Rev.  T.  Belsham  ;  with  a  Review  of  his  "  Calm 
 
 Inquiry,"            .......  449 
 
 II.  A  Letter  to  Dr  Priestley,            .....  492 
 
 III.  A  Letter  to  Mr  D.  Levi,              .....  507 
 
 IV.  Letters  on  Sanctifloation — 
 
 Letter  I.,  .   '         .  .  .  .  .  .516 
 
 Letter  II.,         .......  519 
 
 V.  Review  of  Stewart's  Philosophical  Essays,         .            .            .  524 
 
 INDEX, 547 
 
 INDEX  OF  TEXTS, 563 
 
DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 I.  OK  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  MORAL  SCIENCE. 
 n.  EVIDENCE  IN  MOEAl  SCIENCE. 
 m.  POWER— ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS. 
 IV.  VOLUNTARY  OPERATIONS. 
 V.  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY. 
 VI.  NATURE  OF  THINGS  AND  SnTPOTHETICAL  TENDENCIES. 
 Vn.  DIVTNE  PRESCIENCE  AND  SGIENTIA  MEDIA. 
 Vin.  FIRST  CAUSE. 
 IX.  ON  A  NECESSARY  AGENT. 
 X.  MORAL  OBLIGATION  AND  INABILITY. 
 XI.  MORAL  EVIL. 
 XII.  MOTIVES. 
 Xni.  VIRTUE  AND  VICE. 
 XIV.  GOD'S  ULTIMATE  END  IN  CREATION. 
 XV.  VIEWS  ON  WAR. 
 XVI.  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY. 
 XVn.  JUSTIFICATION. 
 
 VOL.  IV. 
 
'\^.:^^ 
 
 DISSERTATION  I* 
 
 ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OP  MOEAL  SCIENCE  IN  GENEEAL  [i.e.,  IN 
 1808] — ACKNOWLEDGED  DEFECTS — CAUSES  OF  DEFECTS  AS- 
 SIGNED— SYLLABUS,  DEFINITIONS,  AND  AXIOMS. 
 
 By  moral  science  I  mean,  a  certain,  as  ojDposed  to  conjectural, 
 knowledffe,  arisino-  from  intuitive  and  demonstrative  evidence  of 
 virtue  and  vice,  in  their  nature,  causes,  and  consequences.  In  other 
 VFords,  moral  science  is  a  sure  and  exact  knowledge  of  virtue  and 
 vice,  as  to  v?hat  they  are  in  themselves,  from  v?hence  they  spring, 
 and  to  what  they  tend,  respectively,  as  their  ultimate  results.  It, 
 therefore,  brings  us  acquainted  doctrinally  with  good  and  evil,  God 
 and  ourselves,  haj)piness  and  misery ;  not  in  the  way  of  doubtful 
 conjecture,  but  by  the  clear  light  of  indubitable  principles  and  in- 
 fallible conclusions. 
 
 Comparing  the  above  definition  with  the  existing  systems  of 
 moral  philosojohy,  we  may  easily  perceive  what  little  progTCSs  has 
 been  made  in  the  science.  Abstracted  from  the  didactic  parts  of 
 theology,  how  little  is  found  in  moral  writers  even  respecting 
 virtue,  as  to  its  nature,  proper  cause,  and  genuine  consequences ; 
 and  as  to  the  same  predicaments  of  vice  much  less  appears  to  be 
 known.  And  that  this  is  the  fact  has  often  been  acknowledged 
 and  lamented  by  eminent  philosophers.  But  while  many  of  them 
 despair  of  success  in  some  essential  parts  of  the  science,  others 
 have  expressed  themselves  in  a  more  encouraging  strain.     Won- 
 
 *  [The  revered  author  had  contemplated  the  publication  of  a  volume  on  Moral 
 Science,  and  had  made  considerable  preparations,  but  the  Almighty  Disposer  of 
 life  called  him  to  his  rest  and  reward  before  that  purpose  could  be  carried  into 
 eflfect.  The  first  eight  of  the  following  Dissertations  constitute  all  the  chapters 
 he  had  prepared  for  the  project.  They  were  written  with  great  care,  and  even 
 copied  out  by  another  hand  for  the  press.  No  liberty  has,  therefore,  been  taken 
 with  the  text.  Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  author's  writings  will  recognise 
 hia  own  mode  of  thinking  in  every  line. — Ed.] 
 
4  ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  MORAL  SCIENCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 derful  progress  has  been  made  in  demonstrating  the  laws  of  matter 
 and  motion,  and  in  mathematical  knowledge  in  general.  It  is, 
 therefore,  an  interesting  question,  What  solid  reasons  can  be 
 assigned  for  the  acknowledged  failure  of  success  in  moral  science  ? 
 For,  though  since  the  days  of  Bacon,  and  especially  those  of  New- 
 ton, natural  philosophy  has  been  gradually  on  the  advance,  moral 
 science  has  been  stationary,  or  even  retrograde.  The  jjrogress  of 
 the  former  is  universally  ascribed  to  the  mode  of  investigation  pro- 
 posed and  employed  by  those  great  men.  Instead  of  coujectiu-e 
 and  hypothesis,  they  ascertained  phenomena,  and  formed  their 
 system  by  induction.  By  pursuing  the  method  of  experiments 
 the  most  sohd  foundation  is  laid  for  systematic  superstructm-es. 
 In  physics,  even  supposing  an  hj-pothesis  to  be  founded  in  truth, 
 if  it  be  not  proved  to  be  true  by  induction,  it  remains  only  as  a  con- 
 jecture. But  if  the  same  hypothesis  (for  instance,  the  Copemican 
 in  astronomy)  be  brought  to  the  test  of  actual  observation,  in  con- 
 nexion with  mathematical  calcidations,  a  glorious  fabric  of  scientific 
 knowledge  is  the  result. 
 
 It  had  been,  therefore,  pretty  generally  supposed  that  the  want 
 of  pursuing  the  same  plan  of  philosophising  with  sufficient  care 
 has  been  the  reason  why  gTeater  progress  has  not  been  made  in 
 the  departments  of  mind  and  morals.  But  we  may  ask,  Has  not 
 this  very  method,  so  pecuharly  successful  in  physics,  been  actually 
 pm-sued  by  men  of  the  first  abilities,  and  in  some  instances  with 
 unremitting  assididty  ?  How,  then,  are  we  to  account  for  a  failure 
 of  result  so  generally  confessed?  We  are  not,  however,  to  sup- 
 pose that  the  science  of  mind,  or  intellectual  philosophy,  is  equally 
 deficient  with  that  of  morals.  By  no  means.  There  has  been  a 
 far  greater  aj)proximation  to  scientific  certainty  in  what  relates  to 
 the  intellectual  powers,  than  in  what  relates  to  the  active  powers 
 of  man,  as  they  are  sometimes  distinguished.  Any  one  who  is 
 acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Dr  Eeid,  for. example,  wOl  easily 
 recognise  the  truth  of  this  remark.  The  reason  seems  to  be  that 
 the  laws  by  which  the  intellectual  powers  operate  are  in  their  na- 
 ture more  closely  allied  in  some  respects  to  j^hysical  mechanism 
 than  to  freedom,  which  we  may  affirm  without  conceding  anything 
 to  the  doctrine  of  materialism.  For  the  freedom  which  belongs 
 to  the  doctrine  of  our  active  powers  is  more  remote  from  the 
 notion  of  cause  and  effect  in  physics  than  the  laws  by  which  the 
 intellect  is  governed. 
 
DISS.  I.]         ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAL  SCIENCE.  O 
 
 There  are  sufficient  reasons  for  concluding  that  there  are  princi- 
 ples influencing  the  operations  of  intellect  which  absolutely  pre- 
 clude complete  success  on  the  plan  which  has  been  so  much  re- 
 commended ;  much  less,  therefore,  can  a  successful  result  be  found 
 in  the  same  procedure  relative  to  the  will  and  the  affections  of 
 mind.  Morals  have  immediately  to  do  with  our  active  powers  and 
 obligations  ;  but  the  knowledge  of  phenomena,  obtained  by  atten- 
 tive observation  on  what  is  actually  found  in  ourselves,  and  on 
 effects  in  ourselves  and  others,  affords  no  sufficient  data  in  order 
 to  ascertain  what  ought  to  he.  For  wei'e  all  the  thoughts,  volitions, 
 and  propensities  of  each  individual  of  the  human  race  clearly  ascer- 
 tained, the  knowledge  would  be  only  that  of  facts,  not  obligations. 
 Indeed  inferences  might  be  drawn  of  considerable  advantage,  and 
 among  others  those  of  obligation  relative  to  the  well-being  of  in- 
 dividuals and  of  society;  but  this  after  all,  however  specious  or 
 partially  xiseful,  would  contain  little  that  is  radical  in  moral  science ; 
 nor  in  strictness  would  it  deserve  the  name. 
 
 We  may,  therefore,  conclude,  that  besides  the  intricacy  of  the 
 subject, — the  too  general  want  of  relish  for  moral  truth  and  good- 
 ness, and  the  consequent  want  of  popularity  in  the  public  estima- 
 tion, which  acts  as  a  stimulus  to  diligent  inquiry,  and  the  moral 
 taste  indispensably  requisite  for  a  patient  and  persevering  investi- 
 gation,— the  process  itself,  generally  recommended  and  employed, 
 is  radically  defective.  It  wUl  be  found  as  we  proceed  that  the 
 only  legitimate  and  successful  mode  of  arriving  at  demonstrative 
 evidence  in  moral  science  is  to  begin  with  axioms,  or  iirst  princi- 
 ples of  knowledge.  These  principles,  whether  perceived  intuitively 
 or  learned  from  Divine  revelation,  are  in  morals  what  experiments 
 or  observed  phenomena  are  in  physics.  As  morals  imply  obliga- 
 tion, obligation  a  law,  law  a  governor,  it  plainly  follows  that  if  our 
 knowledge  of  the  governor  and  of  his  character  be  incorrect,  our 
 knowledge  of  morals  wiU  be  so  in  proportion.  Without  this  it  is 
 clearly  impossible  to  arrive  at  a  correct  notion  of  either  the  law 
 by  which  we  are  governed,  or  the  nature  of  that  obligation  under 
 which  we  lie  as  moral  subjects.  WhUe  theories  have  been  formed 
 with  so  much  disregard  to  the  true  character  of  the  Moral  Gover- 
 nor, and  the  relations  He  bears  to  us,  all  that  can  be  said  on  the 
 subject  of  morals,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  can  be  nothino- 
 better  than  vague  conjecture,  or  mere  uncertain  hypothesis. 
 
 When  any  theory  labours  under  this  radical  defect,  moral  obli- 
 
6  ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAL  SCIENCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 gation  can  never  be  riglitly  imderstood.  For  -what  is  an  obligation 
 ■vrithout  an  obliger,  or  an  obliger  without  a  corresponding  relative 
 character,  or  a  relative  character  ■without  the  ascertained  gTound 
 of  that  character  ?  Who  can  perceive  with  truth  that  either  power, 
 or  wisdom,  or  benevolence,  or  all  united,  are  adequate  reasons  of 
 obligation  ?  However  glorious  are  these  perfections  of  Deity,  and 
 however  concerned  in  moral  government,  without  the  exercise  of 
 EQUITY  moral  obligation  is  not  conceivable.  Nor  is  the  knowledge 
 of  the  real  cause  of  the  subject's  happiaess  to  be  attained  without 
 a  just  conception  of  the  Divine  benevolence  in  its  exercise. 
 
 Another  defect  of  the  most  essential  nature  has  commonly  at- 
 tended the  inirsuits  of  moral  philosophy ;  I  mean  assumed  notions 
 of  the  doctiine  of  motives  in  moral  actions.  By  close  inquiry  it 
 wiU  be  found,  in  the  light  of  evident  first  principles,  that  motive, 
 or  that  which  insures  the  vohtion  of  the  free  agent,  is  a  complex 
 notion,  including  not  only  the  object  of  choice,  but  also  a  subjec- 
 tive ground, — that  is,  the  state  of  the  mind,  arising  from  either  a 
 physical  or  metaphysical  cause,  according  to  the  nature  or  moral 
 quahty  of  the  volition.  And  this  cannot  possibly  be  but  in  the 
 light  of  the  relative  characters  of  the  governor  and  those  who  are 
 governed.  Until  we  have  just  evidence  in  what  respects  the  Sloral 
 Governor  is  pleased  to  exercise  benevolence  and  equity,  and  in  what 
 respects  the  moral  subject  is  a  passive  recipient  of  benefits,  and  a 
 free  agent  left  to  himself,  without  a  pretermiuation  to  a  virtuous 
 choice,  moral  science  is  but  an  unmeaning  term. 
 
 Nothing  has  brought  greater  confusion  into  systems  of  morality 
 than  a  vagTie,  undefined  notion  of  what  it  is  that  constitutes  the 
 moral  quahty  of  an  action.  Until  the  term  itself,  moralitij,  be 
 accurately  defined,  and  a  definite  idea  connected  with  it,  which  is 
 very  generally  overlooked,  what  prospect  is  there  of  certain  know- 
 ledge in  anj'  of  the  subordinate  parts  ? 
 
 Another  very  momentous  defect  has  been  the  neglect  of  sufficient 
 principles  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  vii-tuous  and  vicious  ac- 
 tions. It  is  demonstrable  that  no  principles  which  are,  properly 
 speaking,  either  physical  or  moral,  or  which  are,  in  fact,  so  de- 
 nominated, are  sufficient  to  account  for  by  far  the  most  numerous 
 of  human  moral  actions.  If  we  exclude  metaphysical  causes,  an 
 impenetrable  veU  of  obscurity  and  uncertainty  will  remain,  and 
 defy  the  efibrts  of  the  keenest  penetration. 
 
 This,  in  fact,  is  the  reason  why  so  many  fruitless  attempts  have 
 
DISS.  I.J        ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  MORAl  SCIENCE.  7 
 
 been  made  to  ascertain  the  true  cause  of  the  origin  of  moral  evil. 
 It  should  seem,  from  the  many  efforts  made  to  solve  this  awful 
 problem,  that  if  the  solution  were  but  scientifically  made,  it  would 
 prove  an  important  step  towards  the  advancement  of  moral  science. 
 But,  on  the  contrary,  while  this  problem  remains  unsolved,  it  must 
 needs  continue  radically  defective.  By  some  indeed  this  has  been 
 called  a  speculative  question,  as  if  no  very  important  effect  could 
 arise  from  success  in  it.  This,  however,  has  never  been  proved, 
 nor  that  I  know  of  attempted,  except  by  empty  declamation.  Thus 
 heathen  philosophers  might  declaim  that  the  questions  respect- 
 ing the  unity  and  perfections  of  Deity,  and  the  future  existence 
 of  human  souls,  were  mainly  speculative.  But  such  objections 
 arise  from  a  vain  hypothesis,  that  what  we  do  not  actually  know, 
 or  have  not  sufficient  evidence  on  which  to  form  our  conclusion, 
 cannot  be  of  importance  to  us  even  when  known.  At  this  rate, 
 however,  Christianity  might  be  represented  by  the  uninformed  as 
 of  no  value ;  and  evidence  of  a  resurrection  to  eternal  life  pro- 
 nounced a  speculative  nicety.  But  what  if  there  were  involved  in 
 the  solution  the  truest  grounds  of  the  most  practical  duties — hu- 
 mility, gratitude,  and  resignation?  No  one,  however,  can  either 
 prove  or  disprove  this  to  be  the  consequence  until  he  either  know 
 what  the  true  solution  is,  or  demonstrate  that  the  solution  is  im- 
 practicable. To  declaim  on  the  limits  of  the  human  mind,  and 
 that  it  is  not  adequate  to  discover  so  mysterious  a  subject,  without 
 shewing  any  demonstrative  reason  for  that  conclusion,  is  to  employ 
 sophism  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  prejudice,  and  proudly 
 to  set  up  a  boundary,  beyond  which  none  must  attempt  to  move, 
 without  assigning  any  just  cause  for  the  arbitrary  restriction.  Be- 
 sides, in  proportion  as  the  problem  appears  not  incapable  of  solu- 
 tion, and  still  more  when  actually  solved,  such  declamation  must 
 appear  perfectly  frivolous. 
 
 The  author  has  long  been  of  opinion  that  the  low  state  of  moral 
 science,  and  the  endless  varieties  in  philosophical  intellectual  sys- 
 tems, both  ancient  and  modern,  may  be  traced  principally  to  this 
 source — viz.,  the  want  of  just  views  of  passive  power,  or  "  meta- 
 physical evil,"  and  its  relation  to  that  which  is  physical  and  moral. 
 Some  indeed  have  affected  to  question  its  existence ;  but  probably 
 when  they  know  themselves  better,  cultivate  a  better  acquaintance 
 with  the  only  true  source  of  humility,  and  the  genuine  gi'ound  of 
 spiritual  gratitude  and  scriptural  prayer,  they  wiU  think  differently. 
 
ON  THE  PEESEKT  STATE  OF  MOEAl  SCrEUrCE.         [mSS.  T. 
 
 A  SYLLABUS  OF  MORAL  SCIENCE.* 
 
 MOEAL  SCIENCE  IN  GENEEAl. 
 
 Present  state  of  moral  science  universally  acknowledged  to  he  extremely 
 defective — Seasons  for  this  assigned,  and  the  remedy  suggested.  Defini- 
 tions of  terms  and  x^rinciples.  Axioms.  Different  kinds  of  evidence,  and 
 pi-inciples  of  demonstration.  Power — Its  different  kinds — Active  power 
 — Passive  power.  Other  definitions  and  explanations  of  power — Particu- 
 larly physical  power — Metaphysical  power,  and  its  different  relations. 
 Moral  power — ^ilistakes  respecting  it  rectified.  Will,  voUtion,  and  desire 
 explained  and  distinguished,  and  their  efiicient  causes  assigned.  Volun- 
 tary operations.  Final  causes — Ultimate,  chief.  The  distinctive  charac- 
 ters of  wisdom  compared  with  knowledge  and  prudence.  Liberty  and 
 necessity.  True  nature  of  liberty  ascertained — Ai-gimients  for.  The 
 nature  and  different  kinds  of  necessity — Physical — Metaphysical — Abso- 
 lute and  hypothetical.  Arguments  for  necessity  as  it  stands  opposed  to 
 univei-sal  contingence.  How  absolute  necessity  in  one  respect,  and  abso- 
 lute liberty  in  another,  are  perfectly  compatible.  Dr  Eeid's  objections 
 examined.  The  nature  of  things — Different  senses  of  the  phrase  ex- 
 plained, and  hypothetical  tendencies.  Divine  prescience.  How  the  doc- 
 trine of  scientia  media,  properly  explained,  may  be  rendered  subservient 
 to  moral  science. 
 
 GOOD  IN  GENEEAl — VIETUE — MOEAL  OBLIGATION,  AND 
 THEIE  PEOPER  CATJSIS. 
 
 First  Cause,  or  the  evidence  that  there  is  a  Being  all-powerful,  wise, 
 and  good,  by  whom  everything  which  may  be  denominated  good  exists. 
 The  supposition  that  there  is  not  such  a  Being  is  infinitely  improbable 
 when  compared  with  marks  of  de-sign,  both  in  ourselves  and  in  other 
 beings  around  us.  That  there  is  such  a  Being  is  infinitely  probable  fi'om 
 the  idea  of  posdhility.  A  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God  from  the 
 idea  of  existing  effects.  A  demonstration  of  a  First  Cause  as  absolute 
 Being,  from  the  idea  of  contingent  existence.  Divine  equity  and  benevo- 
 lence. The  origin  and  standard  of  Divine  equity,  wL:-ther  in  the  will  or 
 the  nature  of  the  Deity.  Divine  benevolence — how  it  stands  related  to 
 the  nature  and  the  wLU  of  the  Deity.  Divine  benevolent  purposes — And 
 whether  there  be  anything  purposed  by  the  Deity  which  does  not  bear 
 
 *  [As  the  idea  of  a  fitting  monument  to  the  memory  of  Dr  TVilliams  entered 
 largely  into  the  project  of  a  complete  Edition  of  his  Works,  and  as  this  Syllabus, 
 with  the  Definitions  and  Axioms  that  follow, — the  outline  of  lengthened  and 
 repeated  profound  thought, — was  an  integral  part  of  that  monument,  it  has  not 
 been  judged  right  to  suppress  it  because  of  its  merely  outline  character. — Ed.] 
 
DISS.  I.]         ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAl  SCIENCE.  9 
 
 that  character.  Moral  means,  and  the  various  principles  of  action  in 
 moral  agents.  The  nature  and  influence  of  moral  means — False  notions 
 refuted.  Mechanical  principles  of  action.  Animal  principles  of  action. 
 Rational  principles  of  action.  Divine  principles  of  action — Their  distinc- 
 tive character  compared  with  the  preceding.  Motives  in  moral  actions — 
 Their  nature — Mistakes  concerning  them — The  importance  of  avoiding 
 those  mistakes.  Moral  obligation — Its  true  nature  and  cause — Different 
 theories  essentially  defective.  Real  virtue — False  notions  exposed — Its 
 true  natm-e  established  and  distinguished  into  comparative  and  absolute. 
 
 EVILS  IN  THE  GENEEAl,  AND  THEEB  ULTIMATE  OEIGIN. 
 
 Evils  of  difierent  kinds — Physical— Metaphysical — ^Moral — and  Penal. 
 Different  theories  of  the  origin  of  evil  examined.  The  Persian — The 
 Manichean  hypothesis  examined  and  refuted.  Ancient  and  modern 
 systems  of  Fatalism — None  of  them  account  for  the  origin  of  evil.  The 
 decretive  will  of  Deity  is  not  the  source  of  moral  evil.  The  importance 
 of  ascertaining  the  real  origin  or  cause  of  moral  evil— As  it  relates  to 
 moral  science  and  to  the  practice  of  virtue.  The  possibility  of  ascertain- 
 ing it  on  the  principles  of  strict  demonstration,  notwithstanding  past 
 failm'es.  The  cause  and  mode  of  evil's  origination  not  to  be  confounded. 
 The  true  origin  of  moral  evil  demonstrated.  The  nature  of  a  demonstra- 
 tion smted  to  the  subject.  The  origin  of  evU  demonstrated  in  seven  dif- 
 ferent ways.  The  true  origin  of  moral  evil  demonstrated  from  the  ab- 
 surdity of  denying  the  cause  assigned. 
 
 HAPPINESS  AND  MISEEY,  AND  THEIE  EESPECTIYE  CAUSES,  BOTH 
 IMMEDIATE  AND  EEMOTE. 
 
 Happiness  in  general.  Summum  honum — ^The  source  of  mistakes  re- 
 specting it — How  satisfactorily  ascertained.  The  means  of  happiness — 
 Virtuous  love — Fear — Humility — Resignation — Patience — Purity,  &c.  The 
 cause  of  happiness — Immediate  and  ultimate.  Misery  in  general — Its 
 proper  and  real  causes — Vice — Inordinate  seK-love — Pride — Irreverence — 
 Impatience — False  attachments — Dishonesty — Depravity — Despair,  &c. 
 The  continuance  of  happiness  and  misery — According  to  the  principles  of 
 moral  science.    Heaven — Hell.    Conclusions.    Deductions  from  the  whole. 
 
10  ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAL  SCIENCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 DEFINITIONS  OF  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Definition  I 
 
 The  morality  of  any  action  is  the  manner  of  it,  in  reference  to 
 the  end  or  ends  proposed  by  the  agent. 
 
 It  is  not  enougli  that  an  action  be  voluntary,  for  so  are  confessedly 
 innumerable  actions  which  have  no  morality  in  them.  Nor  is 
 it  necessary,  in  this  definition  of  moraUty  in  general,  to  include 
 the  motive ;  for  the  motive  and  its  character  can  afi'ect  only 
 the  distinctive  qualities,  not  the  general  nature  of  morality. 
 
 Definition  II. 
 
 A  morally  good  action  is  that  in  which  the  agent  proposes  to 
 himself  the  chief  good  for  his  ultimate  end,  whatever  that  be,  and 
 all  other  ends  in  subserviency  to  it. 
 
 This  definition  includes  that  rectitude  ■which  is  the  rule  of  moral 
 obligation ;  for  any  action  possessing  these  qualities  is  morally 
 good,  irrespective  of  either  the  remoter  cause,  or  of  the  imme- 
 diate subjective  part  of  the  motive.  And  it  includes  the  vir- 
 tue of  an  action,  which  is  a  laudable  means  of  happiness ;  for 
 real  happiness  is  included  in  the  ultimate  end,  and  laudable 
 means  in  subordinate  ends. 
 
 Definition  III. 
 
 A  morally  evil  action  is  that  in  which  the  agent  proposes  to 
 himseM  a  different  end  or  ends  from  what  the  Moral  Governor 
 does. 
 
 This  definition  includes  that  obliquity  or  deviation  from  rectitude 
 ■which  constitutes  a  branch  of  moral  obligation ;  for  every  ac- 
 tion possessing  these  qualities  is  morally  evil,  iirespectively  of 
 the  remoter  cause,  or  of  the  immediate  subjective  part  of  the 
 motive.  And  it  includes  the  vice  of  an  action,  which  is  an 
 effort  to  obtain  happiness  by  means  which  are  not  laudable. 
 
 Definition  IV. 
 
 The  rectitude  of  a  moral  agent  is  his  conformity  to  the  nature 
 and  will  of  the  Moral  Governor. 
 
DISS.  I.]         ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAi  SCIENCE.  11 
 
 ,  From  the  preceding  definitions,  it  is  obvious,  that  in  proportion  as 
 an  agent  deviates  from  rectitude,  the  character  of  his  action 
 partakes  of  the  nature  of  vice.  And  it  is  further  obvious,  that 
 no  action  is  properly  virtuous  which  is  not  perfectly  conform- 
 able to  rectitude.  Therefore,  partial  conformity  is  virtue  only 
 in  a  partial  a,nd  improper  sense  of  the  term,  because  it  may  be 
 found  in  the  most  vicious  characters,  and  therefore  not  at  all 
 connected  with  real  and  ultimate  happiness. 
 
 Definition  V. 
 
 Moral  means  are  objective  considerations  afforded  by  tbe  Moral 
 Governor  as  inducements  to  act  morally  well,  and  wbicb  in  their 
 own  nature  are  suitable  to  promote  that  end. 
 
 Through  want  of  precision  in  the  use  of  terms,  these  are  often 
 called  "  motives,"  while  in  strictness  they  constitute  but  one 
 part  of  a  motive,  according  to  the  proper  use  of  the  word. 
 And  sometimes  the  term  "means"  has  been  confounded  with 
 the  proper  cause  of  virtuous  actions,  though  in  reality  per- 
 fectly diflferent. 
 
 Definition  VI. 
 
 Moral  obligation  is  the  indisjoensable  and  equitable  connexion 
 subsisting  between  virtue  and  happiness,  vice  and  misery. 
 
 In  this  definition,  virtue  and  vice  are  the  antecedents,  happiness  and 
 misery  the  consequents  respectively.  The  connexion  subsists 
 of  hypothetical  necessity ;  for  it  arises  from  the  nature  of 
 things,  which  is  ultimately  the  nature  of  the  Moral  Governor, 
 that  the  removal  of  the  consequent  can  take  place  only  by  the 
 removal  of  the  antecedent,  and  therefore  the  obliging  power  ia 
 equity.  It  may  be  further  observed,  though  virtue  and  hap- 
 piness are  included  in  the  definition,  in  order  to  avoid  an  un- 
 necessary deviation  from  the  common  use  of  language,  the  term 
 "obligation"  is  more  strictly  applicable  to  vice  and  misery. 
 For  it  is  more  proper  to  say,  a  vicious  person  is  bound  to  be 
 miserable,  than  to  say,  a  virtuous  person  is  bound  to  be  happy. 
 However,  it  is  proper  to  say,  he  who  would  be  happy  is  bound 
 to  be  virtuous,  and  the  obliging  power  is  Divine  equity ;  and 
 from  the  same  principle,  the  alternative  is  misery.  In  strict- 
 ness, therefore,  "obligation"  expresses  a  hypothetical  cause 
 of  equitable  suffering. 
 
12  ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OP  MOEAL  SCIENCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 Definition  VII. 
 
 A  principle  in  moral  science  Ls  that  ■VYliich  legitimately  accounts 
 for  any  phenomenon  relative  to  virtue  and  vice  to  which  it  is  ap- 
 plied. 
 
 Thus  a  mere  hypothesis,  or  conjectural  cause,  does  not  deserve  the 
 appellation  of  principle.  Thei'e  are,  indeed,  principles  the  full 
 extent  of  "whose  application  we  may  never  be  able  fully  to  dis- 
 cover, but  they  are  to  be  considered  as  such  no  further  than 
 they  fairly  account  for  phenomena. 
 
 Definition  VIII. 
 
 A  physical  principle  is  the  agency  of  either  the  First  Cause,  or 
 of  subordinate  causes  proceeding  from  the  first. 
 
 The  propriety  of  introducing  a  definition  of  a  physical  principle  into 
 moral  science  is  obvious  ;  because  no  moral  act  can  possibly 
 take  place  mthout  it,  as  appears  from  the  natm-e  of  morality 
 before  defiued. 
 
 .  Definition  IX. 
 
 A  metaphysical  principle  is  either  absolute  necessity  or  hypo- 
 thetical necessity,  which  is  the  want  of  ulterior  perfection. 
 
 Metaphysics,  in  general,  is  the  science  of  possibles  and  impossibles. 
 Absolute  necessity  belongs  only  to  the  First  Cause,  whose  exist- 
 ence is  as  absolute  as  the  impossibility  of  it  is  absm-d.  Hypo- 
 thetical necessity  is  the  truth  of  connexion  between  antecedents 
 and  consequents,  which  is  ultimately  reducible  to  God,  who  is 
 the  primary  truth.  The  want  of  ulterior  perfection  is  the  cha- 
 racteristic difference  of  a  creature  compared  with  the  First  Cause 
 as  to  self-existence,  independence,  and  aU-suflicienoy. 
 
 Definition  X. 
 
 A  moral  principle  is  that  state  of  the  mind  which  is  adapted  to 
 render  moral  means  the  occasion  of  either  virtue  or  vice. 
 
 In  a  less  acciu'ate  sense,  a  moral  principle  is  made  to  express  that 
 temper  of  mind  which  is  the  predisposing  cause  of  virtue.     But 
 
DISS.  I.]         ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAL  SCIENCE.  13 
 
 this  last  more  properly  is  only  one  kind  of  moral  principle  ;  for 
 bad  morals  have  a  principle  as  well  as  good. 
 
 Definition  XI. 
 
 A  motive,  in  morals,  is  that  which  actually  induces  a  voluntary 
 determination,  and  which  always  consists  of  a  compound  ratio  of 
 moral  jDrincijjle  and  moral  means  proportioned  to  the  effect. 
 
 The  word  "motive"  is  often  used  in  a  vague  sense  ;  denoting  some- 
 times the  objective  consideration,  and  at  other  times  the  moral 
 principle.  But  neither  of  these,  separately  considered,  actually 
 induces  a  voluntary  determination,  which  detei'mination,  how- 
 ever, no  other  word  so  properly  expresses.  That  it  consists  of 
 a  compound  ratio  proportioned  to  the  effect  wiU  be  shewn  in  a 
 future  definition. 
 
 Definition  XII. 
 
 Divine  heneoolence  is  that  perfection  of  Deity  which  communi- 
 cates good  only. 
 
 To  suppose  that  it  communicates  evil  without  desert,  is  to  convert 
 it  into  malevolence  ;  or  evil  for  desert,  is  to  identify  it  with 
 distributive  justice.     And  between  these  there  is  no  medium. 
 
 Definition  XIII. 
 
 Sovereign  Divine  benevolence  is  the  right  of  dispensing  benefits, 
 according  to  wisdom,  in  one  way  or  in  one  degree  rather  than 
 another. 
 
 It  is  plain,  nothing  in  the  created  subject  itself  can  be  the  gi'ound  of 
 benevolent  communications  ;  for  the  being  and  valuable  pro- 
 perties of  every  created  subject  are  the  fruit  of  benevolence. 
 It  is  also  an  indubitable  fact,  that  benefits  ai'e  dispensed  in 
 various  ways  and  degrees  ;  for  which  variety  Divine  wisdom  is 
 an  adequate  reason. 
 
 Definition  XIV. 
 
 Divine  equity  is  that  perfection  of  Deity  which  is  disposed  to 
 give  every  one  his  due. 
 
 This  definition  includes  universal  being  as  one  object  of  equity,  both 
 
14  ON  THE  PEESKNT  STATE  OF  MOEAL  SCIEIsCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 creatures  and  tlie  Creator ;  for  it  Tvould  be  unreasonable  to 
 suppose  that  infinite  equity  is  not  disposed  to  "give  unto  Gfod 
 the  thinsrs  that  are  God's." 
 
 Definition  XV. 
 
 The  chief  good,  considered  objectively,  is  God  ;  and,  subjectively 
 considered,  the  greatest  conformity  to  Him  of  Tvhich  our  nature  is 
 capable. 
 
 From  this  definition,  it  may  appear  Tvhy  the  discussions  agitated 
 about  the  summum  honum  have  often  been  so  unsatisfactory 
 and  involved.  If  we  do  not  distinguish  between  what  the  chief 
 good  is  in  itself,  and  our  manner  of  possessing  it,  a  confusion 
 of  ideas  concerning  it  will  unavoidably  follow. 
 
 Definition  XVI. 
 
 A  moral  agent  is  a  being  capable  of  enjoying  the  cbief  good ; 
 who  chooses  his  chief  good  with  deliberation  and  with  perfect  free- 
 dom. 
 
 This  definition,  it  is  obvious,  includes  the  Supreme  Being  as  well  as 
 every  order  of  intelligent  creatm-es.  It  also  apphes  no  less  to 
 the  most  depraved  than  to  the  most  perfect 
 
 Definition  XVII. 
 
 Freedom  or  hberty  in  moral  agency,  abstractedly  considered,  is 
 exemption  from  all  control  or  interference  in  the  morality  of  an 
 action ;  or,  in  reference  to  good  and  evil,  exemption  from  restraint 
 and  constraint. 
 
 Hence  we  perceive  an  essential  difference  between  freedom  in 
 morality  and  spontaneity ;  for  the  latter  belongs  to  brutes, 
 though  incapable  of  morahty.  It  also  keeps  clear  of  the  objec- 
 tion raised  against  the  impropriety  of  ascribing  freedom  to  the 
 win,  making  it  the  power  of  a  power,  or  the  faculty  of  a  faculty. 
 
 Definition  XVIII. 
 
 Physical  power  in  moral  agency  is  an  active  wUl  choosing  the 
 greatest  apparent  good. 
 
DISS.  I.]         ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAIi  SCIENCE.  15 
 
 Whatever  power  is  ultimately  reducible  to  the  First  Cause  or 
 Supreme  Agent  is  properly  "physical,"  being  a  part  of  the 
 constituted  laws  of  nature.  A  moral  agent  choosing  the  great- 
 est apparent  good  is  no  less  a  constituted  law  of  nature,  as 
 appeal's  from  universal  fact,  than  the  principle  of  gravitation 
 in  the  material  universe. 
 
 Definition  XIX. 
 
 Passive  power,  sometimes  called  metaphysical  evil,  in  moral 
 science,  is  a  metaphysical  principle  which  is  the  cause  of  fallibility, 
 and  which,  when  not  counteracted  by  the  exercise  of  sovereign 
 benevolence,  is  an  adequate  reason  why  physical  power  and  free- 
 dom will  terminate  in  moral  evil.  It  consists  in  the  essential 
 difference  between  absolute  perfection  and  the  want  of  it,  as  to 
 self-existence,  independence,  and  aU-sufficiency. 
 
 That  fallibility  has  a  cause  as  well  as  infallibility,  cannot  be  doubted; 
 and  to  ascribe  it  to  any  other  cause  than  what  is  here  assigned 
 is  inconceivable  and  contradictory. 
 
 Definition  XX. 
 
 Moral  power  is  abUity  to  produce  moral  effects  with  freedom, 
 and  belongs  to  every  moral  agent. 
 
 "  Moral  power "  is  often  used  to  express  actual  good-will,  but  im- 
 properly ;  and  since  morahty  is  only  the  manner  of  a  physical 
 act,  whether  morally  good  or  bad,  and  vice  is  a  moral  effect  no 
 less  than  virtue,  therefore  to  apply  the  words  to  actual  good- 
 will exclusively  is  an  arbitrary  deviation  from  propriety  of 
 language ;  and  a  deviation,  too,  without  sufficient  cause  or 
 apparent  utihty. 
 
 Definition  XXI. 
 
 A  Divine  decree  is  the  purpose  of  God  respecting  what  He  will 
 effect. 
 
 To  suppose  a  decree  to  extend  beyond  what  He  effects  is  absurd  ; 
 for  whatsoever  comes  to  pass  which  He  does  not  effect,  may 
 for  the  same  reason  come  to  pass  without  His  decree  ;  which 
 is  the  same  as  to  decree  without  reason. 
 
16  ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OP  MOEAl  SCIENCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 Definition  XXII. 
 
 Divine  prescience  is  a  certain  or  infallible  knowledge  of  what  is 
 future. 
 
 Prescience  differs  from  decree,  in  that  it  implies  neitlier  pui-pose 
 nor  efficiency  ;  and  from  mere  science  or  knowledge,  in  that  it 
 respects  what  has  a  certain  f  utmition. 
 
 Definition  XXIII. 
 
 Decretive  necessity  is  that  which  arises  from  the  purpose  and 
 efficiency  of  the  Supreme  Being. 
 
 This  definition  includes  all  the  laws  of  nature,  all  miracles,  and  all 
 the  operations  of  benevolence.  The  connexion  between  the 
 Divine  purpose  and  operation  is  as  necessary  as  it  is  necessary 
 for  infinite  wisdom  to  be  exempt  from  foUy,  and  infinite  power 
 to  be  exempt  from  weakness. 
 
 Definition  XXIV. 
 
 Hypothetical  necessity  is  the  infallible  consequence  of  some- 
 thing supposed,  whether  the  thing  supposed  be  an  object  of  a 
 decree  or  not. 
 
 This  is  often  termed,  and  not  improperly,  metaphysical  necessity. 
 The  connexion  between  the  supposition  and  the  consequence 
 arises  from  the  nature  of  things — that  is,  eternal  truth.  Thus, 
 a  conclusion  flows  from  premises,  dependence  from  creation,  &c. 
 
 AXIOMS  IN  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 
 
 Every  science  has  axioms,  or  first  principles,  peculiar  to  itself, 
 though  some  are  common  to  all  the  sciences.  By  an  axiom  in 
 .morals  is  not  meant  that  which  cannot  be  opposed  and  contro- 
 verted, (for  what  principle  may  not  be  controverted  by  the  ignorant 
 or  perverse?)  but  that  the  denial  of  which  is  reducible  to  a  self- 
 contradiction. 
 
DISS.  I.]         ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  MOEAL  SCIENCE.  17 
 
 Axiom  I. 
 
 There  is  a  First  Cause,  whose  existence  is  absolute,  possessed  of 
 all  possible  perfections. 
 
 It  may  be  shewn  that  the  denial  of  this  axiom  is  infinitely  absm-d. 
 
 Axiom  II, 
 
 All  good  is  ultimately  from  the  Pirst  Cause,  whom  we  call  God. 
 
 The  term  "  good "  here  includes  all  created  existence,  all  amiable 
 qualities,  all  virtuous  actions,  and  all  happiness.  And  all  the 
 good  of  creatures  flows  from  Divine  benevolence  as  the  ulti- 
 mate soiu'ce,  whatever  be  the  secondary  causes. 
 
 Axiom  III. 
 
 Whatever  is  purposed  and  effected  by  the  Pirst  Cause  is  good 
 exclusively. 
 
 To  suppose  that  any  evil  proceeds  from  God  is  the  same  as  to 
 suppose  it  is  not  evil,  properly  speaking.  And  this,  indeed,  is 
 the  fact  respecting  what  is  called  evil,  both  in  common  lan- 
 guage and  in  Scripture,  of  whiolr  God  is  the  author.  What  is 
 called  'physical  evil  is  only  relatively  so  ;  but,  properly  speaking, 
 it  is  good,  and  worthy  of  God's  purpose  and  efficiency. 
 
 Axiom  IV. 
 
 All  moral  and  metaphysical  evils  are  from  the  creatures  ex- 
 clusively. 
 
 The  former  implies,  as  essential  to  it,  a  volition  which  does  not 
 accord  with  rectitude  ;  and  the  latter,  a  want  of  ulterior  per- 
 fection. To  suppose  that  either  of  them  proceeds  from  God  is 
 absm-d. 
 
 Axiom  V. 
 
 The  cause  of  moral  evil  cannot  be  itself  morally  evil. 
 
 To  assert  the  contrary  is  the  same  as  to  identify  cause  and  effect, 
 which  is  absurd. 
 VOL.  IV.  B 
 
18  ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  JIOEAL  SCIENCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 Axiom  VI. 
 
 Every  creature  is  essentially  defectible,  independently  of  any 
 decree  concerning  it. 
 
 For  what  can  be  more  seK-erident  than  that  indefeotibility  is  not 
 only  essential  to  God,  but  peculiar  to  Him  ? 
 
 Axiom  VII. 
 
 Defectibility  has  a  canse,  no  less  than  actual  defection. 
 
 For  defectibility  is  not  a  simple  idea  on  which  the  mind  can  rest 
 as  a  first  principle,  and  beyond  which  it  would  be  absurd  to 
 seek  another  cause. 
 
 Axiom  VIII. 
 
 The  caiise  of  defectibility  is  the  essential  difference  between  an 
 absolute  and  a  conttno-ent  nature. 
 
 Between  absolute  and  contingent  there  is  no  conceivable  medium. 
 Here,  then,  we  have  a  simple,  sjjecific  idea,  and  the  mind  rests 
 on  a  first  princij)le.  An  absolute  nature  must  be  indefectible  ; 
 and  a  contingent  nature  must  be  defectible,  for  the  same 
 reason.  A  higher  cause  appears  impossible  ;  and  to  require 
 one,  therefore,  is  absurd. 
 
 Axiom  IX. 
 
 Every  moral  agent  is  properly  free  from  all  decretive  necessity 
 in  the  morality  of  his  acts,  when  he  adopts  means  of  happiness 
 which  do  not  accord  with  rectitude. 
 
 This,  properly  speaking,  is  the  only  freedom  which  is  essential  to 
 moral  agency.  For  a  creature  to  choose  good  in  general  is  of 
 decretive  necessity,  as  a  part  of  our  constituted  nature  ;  and 
 to  choose  accorchng  to  rectitude  proceeds  from  benevolent 
 efficiency. 
 
 Axiom  X. 
 
 In  every  created  moral  agent  freedom  and  the  cause  of  defecti- 
 bility are  found  co-existent. 
 
 No  illustration,  it  is  presumed,  can  make  this  axiom  plainer  if  the 
 term  "  freedom  "  be  taken  as  before  explained. 
 
DISS.  I.]         ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OP  MORAL  SCIENCE.  ]  9 
 
 Axiom  XL 
 
 The  adequate  grounds  of  moral  obligation  are  a  physical,  depen- 
 dent power  to  produce  moral  eflfects,  objective  means  of  happiness 
 and  undisturbed  freedom  of  choice. 
 
 A  physical,  dependent,  or  borrowed  jjower  to  produce  moral  effects 
 is,  properly  speaking,  moral  power,  since  the  morality  of  an 
 action  is  the  manner  of  a  physical  act.  To  require  more  than 
 what  is  here  stated  is  unreasonable  and  contradictory.  It  would 
 be  to  require  from  God  what  He  actually  withholds,  and  is, 
 therefore,  to  charge  Him  with  injustice,  from  which  He  is  in- 
 finitely remote. 
 
 Axiom  XII. 
 
 The  proper  and  immediate  object  of  law  and  sanctions  in  a 
 moral  agent  is  the  will,  through  the  medium  of  the  understanding. 
 
 This  axiom  is  alike  evident  to  reason,  and  confirmed  by  imiversal 
 experience. 
 
 Axiom  XIII. 
 
 Objective  means  never  determine  the  will  irrespectively  of  the 
 state  of  the  mind. 
 
 This  is  plain  from  the  very  definition  of  moiive,  which  is  ever  com- 
 pounded of  some  objective  consideration,  and  the  subjective 
 state  of  the  mind. 
 
 Axiom  XIV. 
 
 A  morally  good  volition,  as  such,  has  only  a  positive  cause. 
 
 That  is,  it  is  ultimately  reducible  to  the  Supreme  Agent,  and  is  in- 
 separably connected  with  Axiom  II. 
 
 Axiom  XV. 
 
 A  morally  evil  volition,  including  the  whole  of  the  act,  has  both 
 a  positive  and  a  negative  cause. 
 
 That  is,  as  an  act,  physically  considered,  it  is  good,  and,  therefore, 
 has  a  positive,  decretive  cause  ;  but  as  an  evil  act,  metaphysi- 
 cally and  morally  considered,  it  has  only  a  negative  or  a  deficient 
 
20  ON  THE  PEESENT  STATE  OF  MORAL  SCIENCE.         [DISS.  I. 
 
 Axiom  XVI. 
 
 There  are  hypothetical  tendencies  arising  from  the  nature  of 
 God  and  the  nature  of  a  creature. 
 
 That  is,  if  a  natui'e  infinitely  good  be  supposed,  it  has  a  tendency 
 infallibly  certain  to  produce  a  morally  good  effect ;  but  if  a 
 nature  not  good  per  se,  but  only  by  participation,  be  sup- 
 posed, a  morally  good  result  will  be  certain  only  in  proportion 
 to  the  paiticipated  good. 
 
 Axiom  XVII. 
 
 If  a  nature  defectible  per  se  be  supposed  to  produce  moral  effects 
 by  virtue  of  its  physical  powers  and  freedom,  without  further  par- 
 ticipation, its  actual  defection  will  be  certain  from  hypothetical 
 tend^icies — that  is,  from  the  nature  of  created  existence. 
 
 Axiom  XVIII. 
 
 Whatever  tendencies  result  from  the  nature  of  God,  and  from 
 the  nature  of  created  existence,  may  be  said  to  flow  from  the 
 nature  of  things. 
 
 This  is  plain,  for  no  nature  of  things  is  conceivable  ■wbicli  is  not 
 ultimately  reducible  to  either  the  natm-e  of  God  or  that  of  a 
 creature. 
 
 Axiom  XIX 
 
 A  dissatisfaction  with  our  nature,  as  possessing  the  cause  of 
 defectibility,  is  of  the  essence  of  rebellion. 
 
DISSERTATION  II. 
 
 ON  EVIDENCE  IN  MOKAL  SCIENCE — DIFFERENT  KINDS  OF  EVIDENCE 
 — DEMONSTEATIVE  AND  PROBABLE — AND  WHAT  PRINCIPLES 
 ARE  ADMISSIBLE  IN  MORAL  SCIENCE. 
 
 In  natural  philosophy,  as  well  as  in  the  elegant  and  useful  arts, 
 the  evidence  of  sense  is  of  confessed  importance ;  in  history, 
 politics,  commerce,  and  revealed  religion,  the  evidence  of  testimony 
 is  an  essential  ingredient ;  but  in  the  science  of  morals  the  evi- 
 dence of  intuition  and  of  reason  is  of  supreme  consideration. 
 
 Demonstration  is  either  direct  or  indirect.  Direct  demonstra- 
 tion establishes  a  positive  conclusion  from  positive  princiiDles. 
 Indirect  demonstration  establishes  a  conclusion  equally  certain, 
 by  shewing  the  impossibility  of  its  being  otherwise,  or  that  the 
 contrary  supposition  is  absurd.  To  the  science  of  morals  as  well 
 as  to  mathematics  both  kinds  are-  applicable.  In  general,  the 
 legitimate  application  of  the  former  belongs  to  the  nature,  origin, 
 and  consequence  of  vice. 
 
 We  should  not  confound  evidence  in  morals  with  what  is 
 termed  moral  evidence.  From  want  of  jDrecision  on  the  point, 
 some  have  rashly  concluded  that  probable  evidence  alone,  as  op- 
 posed to  strict  demonstration,  is  applicable  to  the  doctrine  of 
 morality.  But  this  unreasonable  prejudice  must  arise  either  from 
 a  wrong  notion  of  morals,  or  the  want  of  acquaintance  with  its 
 essential  princi2Dles. 
 
 Hence  innumerable  contradictory  hypotheses,  and  the  most  ab- 
 surd conclusions  ;  hence  fatalism,  Manicheism,  unfounded  notions 
 of  liberty,  and  weak  conjectures  about  merit  and  demerit.  Hence 
 also  the  arrogant  assumption,  that  a  demonstration  of  the  ori- 
 gin of  moral  evil  is  impossible  ;  that  prescience  necessarily  im- 
 plies foreappointmeut ;  and  that  liberty  and  necessity,  though  not 
 
22  ON  EVIDENCE  IN  MORAL  SCIENCE.  [DISS.  II. 
 
 ill  tliemselves  irreconcilable,  cannot  be  demonstrably  reconciled  by 
 the  human  mind  in  its  present  state  of  existence.  On  false 
 13rincii3les,  indeed,  this  is  the  case ;  but  no  good  reason  can  be 
 assigned  why  demonstrable  evidence  is  not  attainable,  if  the  prin- 
 ciples are  true. 
 
 In  moral  science  there  are  three  sorts  of  j)riuciples  ;  and  the  ex- 
 clusion or  neglect  of  any  one  of  them  must  leave  a  great  number 
 of  subjects  ia  a  state  of  great  embarrassment.  These  principles 
 may  be  denominated  moral,  physical,  and  metaphysical. 
 
 Moral  principles  are  not  to  be  confounded  with  objective  con- 
 siderations, which  stand  immediately  related  to  the  intellect  and 
 free-will  of  the  moral  agent.  These  indeed  are  of  great  import- 
 ance, as  they  constitute  an  essential  part  of  our  motives  to  action ; 
 and  without  which  there  could  be  no  rational  ground  for  persua- 
 sion or  deliberation.  In  these  moral  means  are  founded  the  very 
 existence  of  legislation,  rules  of  conduct,  and  the  sanctions  of 
 rewards  and  punishments.  Without  these,  our  active  powers 
 would  be  destitute  of  apj)ropriate  objects,  and  their  existence  an 
 inexplicable  paradox.  To  enumerate  these  moral  means  would 
 be  useless  as  well  as  difficult ;  for  it  is  sufficient,  in  this  place,  to 
 say,  that  they  are  all  comprised  in  Divine  laws  and  sanctions,  or 
 the  exhibitions  of  good  and  evil, — what  we  are  to  adopt,  and  what 
 to  reject.  But  these,  however  strong,  or  clear,  or  interesting  in 
 their  own  nature,  secure  no  result,  independent  of  the  state  of  the 
 mind ;  and  therefore  are  no  principles  of  action.  For  opposite 
 results  may  spring  from  the  same  objects. 
 
 Therefore,  moral  principles,  i:)roperly  speaking,  are  those  from 
 which  a  moral  effect,  good  or  bad,  may  be  inferred  with  certainty, 
 taking  the  moral  means  into  the  account.  The  very  nature  of 
 moral  government  supposes  that  the  best  means,  the  most  engag- 
 ing or  most  alarming  considerations,  the  most  insinuating  address, 
 the  most  reasonable  persuasions,  may  fail  of  success  on  the  mind 
 of  a  free  agent.  And  we  find,  in  fact,  that  contrary  results  take 
 l^lace  when  the  method  of  persuasion  is  precisely  the  same.  To 
 ascribe  this  diflei-eiice  to  chance  or  to  some  undefinable  power,  is 
 the  same  thing  as  to  declare  our  ignorance  of  moral  principles. 
 
 But  as  every  effect  must  have  a  definite  cause,  and  that  cause 
 cannot  be  in  the  moral  means,  seeing  the  same  means  produce 
 opjiosite  results,  it  is  evident  that  the  moral  princii)le,  as  the  cause 
 of  that  difference,  must  be  in  the  mind.     Nor  can  it  be  admitted 
 
DISS.  II.]  ON  EVIDENCE  IN  MOEAL  SCtENCE.  23 
 
 that  tlie  cause  is  in  the  will  itself,  or  in  any  attribute  of  the  will ; 
 since  it  is  obvious,  that  the  will  is  only  an  instrumental  power,  by 
 which  the  soul  produces  moral  effects.  To  ascribe  to  the  will 
 some  undefinable,  inexplicable  source  of  power,  independent  of  the 
 previous  state  of  the  mind  in  the  act  of  producing  virtuous  or 
 vicious  acts,  is  to  shun  the  evidence  of  an  adequate  principle,  to 
 establish  hyjDotheses  without  proof,  and  to  recur  to  the  deservedly 
 exploded  Peripatetic  mode  of  accounting  for  effects.  At  that  rate 
 we  might  feign  hypotheses  without  end,  and  caU  a  chaos  of  con- 
 jectures jjhilosophy  and  science. 
 
 If,  on  tlie  contrary,  according  to  plain  common  sense,  we  regard 
 the  will  as  a  physical  power  essential  to  the  mind,  operating,  ac- 
 cording to  the  benevolent  intention  of  the  First  Cause,  in  a  manner 
 ever  conformable  to  the  previous  nature  and  state  of  the  mind,  we 
 have  a  certain  principle  that  satisfactorily  accounts  for  all  the 
 phenomena  to  which  it  is  duly  applied,  to  the  exclusion  of  a  pre- 
 tended occult  quality. 
 
 Physical  principles  cannot  be  excluded  from  moral  science 
 without  involving  the  greatest  absurdities.  A  physical  principle, 
 as  before  defined,  is  either  the  First  Cause,  or  subordinate  causes 
 proceeding  from  the  first.  In  order  to  obtain  demonstrative  evi- 
 dence, it  is  not  necessary  to  ascertain  the  number  or  the  order  of 
 subordinate  causes ;  for  whatever  these  may  be,  the  ultimate 
 source  of  causation  remains  as  a  fixed  unalterable  principle. 
 
 Thus  the  act  of  willing  in  general,  irrespectively  of  the  moral 
 intention  of  the  agent,  is  a  physical  principle  of  our  nature,  re- 
 ducible to  the  benevolent  will  of  the  First  Cause.  From  Him  it 
 flows,  and  cannot  possibly  proceed  from  any  other  source.  And, 
 as  all  good  is  from  God,  a  morally  good  volition  stands  indis- 
 solubly  connected  with  a  physical  principle.  It  does  not  signify 
 what  may  be  the  subordinate  cause  ;  and  whether  there  be  any  or 
 not,  it  is  an  unshaken  principle  that  the  goodness  of  the  act,  no 
 less  than  the  physical  act  itself,  proceeds  from  the  First  Cause. 
 
 But  metaphysical  principles,  though  indispensably  necessary  in 
 order  to  a  just  solution  of  phenomena  in  morals,  are  not  so  easily 
 perceived.  Nothing,  however,  is  more  certain  than  their  existence, 
 or  more  necessary  to  account  for  innumerable  moral  facts.  A 
 metaphysical  principle  has  been  defined  to  be,  either  absolute  ne- 
 cessity or  hypothetical  necessity,  or  the  want  of  ulterior  perfection. 
 
 Absolute  necessity  can  belong  only  to  the  First  Cause.     And 
 
24  ON  EVIDENCE  IN  MOEAL  SCIENCE.  [DISS.  H. 
 
 this  is  properly  called  a  metaphysical  principle,  because  meta- 
 physics is  the  science  of  possibles  and  impossibles ;  and  as  the 
 admission  of  an  absolute  cause  cannot  be  shewn  to  be  otherwise 
 than  possible,  so  the  rejection  of  the  principle  must  be  ranked 
 among  the  impossibles.  If  absolute  existence  be  not  certain, 
 nothing  can  be  certain ;  and  if  nothing  be  certain,  universal  scep- 
 ticism is  not  certain,  but  a  mere  gloomy  hypothesis  without  proof. 
 
 Hypothetical  necessity  is  also  a  metaphysical  principle ;  for,  that 
 a  legitimate  conclusion  should  not  stand  connected,  in  a  manner 
 absolutely  certain,  with  its  premises,  is  among  the  impossibles. 
 In  physics,  or  what  we  may  term  the  succession  of  created  exist- 
 ences, causes  aud  effects,  or  antecedents  and  consequents,  the  con- 
 nexion is  the  fruit  of  voluntary  appointment,  and  the  certainty  of 
 sequence  is  not  metaphysical  but  arbitrary.  It  is  no  wonder,  then, 
 that  those  who  confound  physics  and  metaphysics,  which  is  the 
 manner  of  Hume  and  many  others,  should  sceptically  deny  the 
 doctrine  of  causes  and  etFects.  Only  allow  that  cause  is  nothing 
 else  than  a  physical  antecedent  of  some  consequent,  as  what  con- 
 stantly falls  under  the  observation  of  our  senses,  and  a  sophist  may 
 argue  with  aj^parent  triumph,  that  the  idea  of  cause  is  only  a 
 vulgar  prejudice.  But  is  it  a  vulgar  prejudice,  that  if  the  ante- 
 cedents of  a  right  line  falling  on  another  right  line  be  supposed,  the 
 consequents  will  be  the  formation  of  two  angles  equal  to  two  right 
 angles  ?  Is  it  a  vulgar  prejudice,  that  the  existence  of  a  man  is 
 necessarily  connected  with  limitation  ?  It  is  not,  indeed,  meta- 
 physically necessary  that  the  sun,  or  the  solar  system,  existing  to- 
 day, must  exist  to-morrow ;  but  is  it  a  vulgar  prejudice  that  the 
 sun  exists  on  the  cojidition  of  being  finite?  Is  there  any  possi- 
 bility, or  conceivable  supposition,  of  its  being  otherwise  ?  Can 
 equals  added  to  equals  have  unequal  results  ?  Or,  can  the  same 
 thing  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time,  and  in  the  same  respects  ? 
 To  deny  hypothetical  necessity  is,  in  fact,  infinitely  absurd.  Por 
 no  surer  is  it  that  the  First  Nature  is  absolute,  than  that  every 
 other  nature  is  contingent,  and  destitute  of  absolute  perfection. 
 
 That  part  of  metaphysical  necessity  which  has  been  defined  to 
 consist  in  the  want  of  ulterior  perfection,  though  not  equally 
 obvious,  is  equally  real ;  and  the  neglect  of  it  in  moral  science 
 has  been  the  cause  of  great  perplexity  and  many  unprofitable  dis- 
 putes. I  may  venture  to  assert  (for  what  can  be  proved  may  be 
 asserted  without  arrogance)  that,  numerous  as  are  the  phenomena 
 
DISS.  II.]  ON  EVIDENCE  IN  MOKAL  SCIENCE.  25 
 
 of  vicious  acts,  not  one  of  them  can  be  fairly  accounted  for  without 
 admitting  it  as  a  principle  in  moral  science.  As  well  may  we 
 suppose  that  light  is  the  cause  of  darkness,  power  the  cause  of 
 weakness,  or  wisdom  the  cause  of  folly,  as  suppose  that  physical 
 principles,  to  the  denial  of  metaphysical,  are  adequate  causes  of 
 moral  evil,  or  sufficient  reasons  to  account  for  its  existence.  But 
 a  particular  examination  of  this  important  branch  of  our  subject 
 is  reserved  for  a  subsequent  part. 
 
DISSERTATION  III. 
 
 ON  POWER  AND  ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS — ACTIVE  AND  PASSIVE 
 POWER — PHYSICAL  POWER — METAPHYSICAL  POWER — MORAL 
 POWER. 
 
 Me  Locke,  in  his  long  chapter  "Of  Power,"  professes  that  his 
 business  there  was  not  to  search  into  the  original  of  power,  but 
 how  we  come  by  the  idea  of  it.  On  the  contrary,  my  business  is 
 not  to  search  how  we  come  by  the  idea  of  power,  but  to  ascertain 
 its  original.  The  latter  alone  belongs  to  moral  science,  the  former 
 to  probable  conjecture  deduced  from  observation  and  reflection. 
 Were  his  supposition  respecting  the  mode  of  acquiring  our  ideas 
 of  power  admitted  in  its  fullest  extent,  it  could  never  serve  as  a 
 principle  in  the  science  of  right  and  wrong.  For  what  moral 
 phenomena  is  it  capable  of  explaining  ? 
 
 But  notwithstanding  this  profession  of  IMr  Locke,  he  enters 
 pretty  largely  into  the  doctrine  of  power,  in  its  different  relations 
 and  properties.  He  acknowledges  that  power  is  twofold,  "  as 
 able  to  make,  or  able  to  receive  any  change  ;  the  one  may  be  called 
 active,  and  the  oihey passive poiver."  He  adds,  "Whether  matter 
 be  not  wholly  destitute  of  active  poiver,  as  its  author  God  is  truly 
 above  all  passive  piower ;  and  whether  the  intermediate  state  of 
 created  spirits  be  not  that  alone  which  is  capable  of  both  active 
 axA  passive  power,  may  be  worth  consideration."*  However,  as 
 to  power  in  general,  though  he  confesses  that  it  includes  some 
 kind  of  relation,  he  classes  it  among  our  simpile  ideas,  "  being  one 
 of  those  that  make  a  principal  ingredient  in  our  comjalex  ideas  of 
 substances."  -f"  In  my  view,  at  least  as  to  my  jjresent  purpose,  it 
 is  of  little  or  no  moment  whether  the  idea  of  power  be  simple  or 
 complex,  and  whether  or  not  it  be  capable  of  a  logical  definition. 
 
 *  Hum.  Uuder.,  book  ii.,  cliap.  xxi.,  §§  2,  4.  f  Ibid.,  §  3. 
 
DISS.  III.]  POWEK — ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  27 
 
 Perhaps  the  most  radical  and  clear  idea  of  what  is  vulgarly 
 called  "  power  "  is  suggested  by  the  term  possibility,  or  the  term 
 cause.  Where-  there  is  no  possibility,  there  is  no  power,  no  cause  ; 
 and  where  there  is  a  possibility,  there  is  power,  or  cause.  But  as 
 possibility,  cause,  or  power,  are  of  different  kinds,  it  is  of  much 
 greater  importance  to  have  these  accurately  ascertained  according 
 to  the  reality  of  things.  In  most  languages  there  is  a  poverty  of 
 terms ;  and  the  consequence  is,  that  we  are  often  obliged  to  em- 
 ploy the  same  term  to  express  very  difFerent  objects. 
 
 Dr  Eeid  supposes  that  because  the  term  "  power  "  is  weU.  under- 
 stood by  the  vulgar,  an  attempt  to  explain  it  needs  an  apology. 
 But  the  fair  question  is  not,  whether  those  who  understand  the 
 English  language  have  a  clear  idea  of  many  things  expressed  by 
 that  term  ;  but,  whether  new  ideas,  the  result  of  closer  investiga- 
 tion, should  be  expressed  by  some  new  explanation  of  the  term,  or 
 whether  new  terms  should  be  coined  on  purpose.  If  the  shades 
 of  difference  in  the  ideas  be  not  very  essential,  to  adopt  the  latter 
 metliod  would  be  charged  with  affectation  !  The  only  alternative 
 is  to  use  the  old  term  with  suitable  explanations.  To  prohibit  all 
 variation  of  idea,  and  all  future  improvement  relative  to  the  sub- 
 ject "  power,"  is  a  species  of  despotism  which  no  liberal  mind  would 
 choose  to  avow ;  yet  next  in  degree  is  the  prohibition  of  an  exj)lained 
 variation  from  the  vulgar  sense  in  the  use  of  the  old  term. 
 
 Dr  Eeid  seems  to  take  it  for  granted,  that  if  a  "  logical  defini- 
 tion" of  power  ought  not  to  be  attempted,  no  new  idea  ought  to 
 be  formed,  and  no  new  explanation  of  the  term  ought  to  be  given. 
 But  if  this  be  his  real  meaning,  by  what  good  reason  can  it  be 
 established  ?  What  though  magnitude,  thought,  duration,  number, 
 and  motion,  "  cannot  be  logically  defined  ; "  are  there  no  new  re- 
 lations or  properties  of  them  ever  to  be  discovered  ?  Or,  if  dis- 
 covered, are  they  not  to  be  explained  by  a  corresponding  difference 
 in  the  acceptation  of  the  terms  ?  Though  this  respectable  author 
 does  not  "  attempt  to  define  active  power,"  he  says  much  on  his 
 opinion  concerning  it ;  and  much,  in  my  apprehension,  that  is  far 
 more  exceptionable  than  would  be  an  attempt  to  define  it. 
 
 When  the  Doctor  observes,  that  "power  is  not  an  object  of  our 
 external  senses,"  and  when  he  contends  that  it  is  "not  even  an 
 object  of  consciousness,"  the  denial,  if  accurate,  must  depend  on 
 an  equivocal  use  of  the  term  power.  No  man,  it  is  plain,  can 
 either  know  by  his  senses,  or  be  conscious  of  absolute  active  power, 
 
28  POWER — ITS  DIFFERENT  KDfDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 as  a  proi}erty  of  himself,  for  it  does  not  belong  to  him,  but  is  pecu- 
 liar to  the  Pirst  Cause.  But,  for  a  similar  reason,  Clod  is  conscious 
 of  absolute  active  jjower.  To  man,  however,  belongs  hypothetical 
 active  power,  and  of  this  he  may  be,  and  is,  daily  conscious.  Ab- 
 solute possibility  being  peculiar  to  God  does  not  hinder  the  crea- 
 ture from  possessing,  and  being  conscious  of  j)ossessing,  conditional 
 possibility  of  acting.  I  should  be  glad  to  know,  if  such  knowledge 
 be  attainable,  wherein  "  active  power  "  in  any  creature  differs  from 
 "a  conditional  possibUity  of  actiog?"  I  call  this  possibility  (which, 
 until  better  informed,  I  shall  consider  as  synonjnnous  with  power) 
 of  acting,  conditional  or  hypothetical,  because  of  its  dependence  on 
 the  first  possibility,  power,  or  cause.  To  no  creature  can  a  higher 
 active  power  than  this  belong — viz.,  an  ability  to  act  IF  God  assist. 
 Probably  the  want  of  attending  to  the  difference  between  differ- 
 ent kinds  of  power,  led  Dr  Eeid  to  form  this  distinction  : — "  I  am 
 conscious  that  I  have  a  conception  or  idea  of  power,  but,  strictly 
 .speaking,  I  am  not  conscious  that  I  have  power."  He  had  a  con- 
 ception of  absolute  jjower,  but  could  not  be  conscious  of  having  it, 
 because  it  is  not  a  created  attribute.  But  he  had  both  a  concep- 
 tion and  consciousness  of  conditional,  contingent,  dependent  active 
 power  in  himself,  which  may  be  known  with  equal  certainty  as  our 
 existence.  If  we  suppose  that  we  have  any  consciousness  even  of 
 our  existence,  as  an  absolute,  and  not  a  contingent  thing,  it  must 
 be  owing  to  a  great  mistake ;  and  that  which  might  lead  us  into 
 that  mistake  is,  that  we  are  conscious  of  continued  existence,  but 
 not  of  continued  power.  This,  however,  is  no  evidence  against  the 
 nature  of  both  beiug  merely  hypothetical  Our  existence,  as  well 
 as  our  active  power,  are  equally  dependent  on  the  continued  energy 
 of  the  First  Cause.  Without  this  we  have,  in  reality,  no  more  exist- 
 ence than  active  jjower.  The  laws,  indeed,  according  to  which 
 both  are  maiatained  are  different ;  but  these  laws  themselves,  as 
 well  as  their  effects,  are  contingent  things.  Existence  is  a  per- 
 petuated  effect  of  Divine  causation,  iu  order  to  answer  tlie  wise 
 designs  of  the  Creator ;  and  active  power  is  an  interrupted  and 
 varied  effect  of  the  same  absolute  cause,  in  order  to  fulfil  equally 
 wise  purposes.  There  is,  therefore,  no  sufficient  reason  why  con- 
 sciousness should  be  ascribed  to  the  one,  and  only  belief  to  the 
 other.  Vicning  both,  in  an  ahsohde  sense,  we  can  have  only  a 
 belief  of  them;  but  viewing  both  as  contingent  and  dependent 
 things,  we  are  conscious  of  them  alike,  though  not  in  a  manner 
 
DISS.   III.]  POWER — ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  29 
 
 equally  continuous.  I  am  no  less  conscious  of  my  having  a  power 
 to  write,  to  think,  and  to  love,  than  I -am  conscious  of  my  exist- 
 ence; but  all  are  contingent  things,  equally  dependent  on  the 
 supreme  vrill,  though  continued  according  to  different  laws.  My 
 active  power  is,  indeed,  more  liable  to  be  interrupted  than  my  ex- 
 istence, in  virtue  of  their  respective  laws ;  but  I  am  as  conscious 
 of  a.  power  of  loving  an  object  apparently  deserving  of  my  affection, 
 as  I  am  of  my  very  existence. 
 
 Consciousness,  properly  speaking,  belongs  to  present  time,  in 
 contradistinction  to  past  and  future.  To  extend  it  to  the  future, 
 is  to  identify  it  with  belief ;  and  to  extend  it  to  the  past,  is  to 
 destroy  the  difference  between  it  and  reminiscence.  I  cannot  be 
 conscious  that  I  shall  exist  in  any  future  moment,  because  my 
 existence  is  a  contingent  thing  depending  on  the  will  of  another  ; 
 but  I  may  believe  it.  In  like  manner,  I  cannot  be  conscious  of 
 possessing  active  power  in  any  future  moment,  because  my  active 
 power,  like  my  existence,  is  a  contingent  thing ;  but  I  may  believe 
 it  as  a  hypothetical  fact.  In  both  cases  alike,  the  ground  of  be- 
 lief is  the  continued  energy  of  the  First  Cause,  which  continued 
 energy  is  not  in  itself  necessary,  but  a  contingent  effect  depending 
 on  supreme  wUl.  Now,  if  conscious  existence  can  belong  to  the 
 present  moment  only,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  future,  and  if  I  have 
 at  the  present  moment  a  conscious  power  of  loving  a  lovely  object 
 no  less  than  of  my  existence,  Dr  Eeid's  assertion,  "  that  power  is 
 not  an  object  of  consciousness,"  is  directed  altogether  as  much 
 against  conscious  existence  as  against  conscious  power.  Would 
 any  one  say  that  a  jDerson's  own  existence  is  not  an  object  of  his 
 consciousness,  but  only  its  oijerations?  Suppose,  then,  it  were 
 maintained  that  we  are  conscious  of  our  existence  only  by  its  ope- 
 rations, still  it  would  follow  that  we  are  as  conscious  di  active 
 power  as  we  are  of  existence.  The  fact  is,  that  both  power  and 
 existence  are  only  hypothetical  effects,  and  stand  precisely  on  the 
 same  condition — viz.,  the  will  of  the  First  Cause.  I  have  now 
 a  dependent  existence  and  a  dependent  power,  of  both  which  I 
 am  alihe  conscious ;  and  if  it  please  the  supreme  will,  I  shall 
 possess  both  in  continuity. 
 
 From  Dr  Eeid's  account  of  "  power,"  we  are  naturally  led  to 
 conclude  that  he  regarded  it  as  some  inexplicable  occult  quality 
 belonging  to  the  mind  itself.  "  Power  is  no  operation  of  the 
 mind,  •  and  therefore  no  object  of  consciousness.      Indeed  every 
 
30  POAVEE — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 operation  of  the  mind  is  the  exertion  of  some  -power  of  the  mind, 
 but  we  are  conscious  of  the  operation  only — the  power  lies  behind 
 the  scene."  If  this  power  "behind  the  scene"  be  the  Divine 
 energy  operating  according  to  instituted  laws,  let  it  be  frankly 
 acknowledged,  to  the  praise  of  the  bountiful  Giver.  But  if  it  be 
 maintained  that  there  is  in  the  mind  itself  a  hidden  quality  called 
 "  power,"  distinct  from  the  Divine  energy  operating  according  to 
 instituted  laws,  the  ptroof  should  be  produced.  I  will  venture  to 
 affirm  that  it  cannot  be  produced.  That  no  more  causes  ought  to 
 be  admitted  than  are  legitimately  sufficient  to  explain  their  phe- 
 nomena; is  a  rule  no  less  applicable  to  metaphysical  and  moral 
 science  than  to  the  laws  of  motion.  To  seek  for  power  as  an 
 occult  quality  in  the  mind,  distinct  from  Divine  energy  as  the 
 cause  of  the  operation,  is  un philosophical,  as  it  multiplies  causes 
 without  either  necessity  or  advantage.  We  know  that  all  active 
 power  is  ultimately  reducible  to  the  First  Cause ;  until,  therefore, 
 it  can  be  proved  that  the  immediate  energy  of  the  First  Cause  is 
 inadequate  to  account  for  the  efifect,  or  that  it  is  unworthy  of  Him 
 thus  to  exert  it,  it  is  not  allowable  to  suppose  that  there  is  any 
 such  occult  quality. 
 
 Dr  Eeid  further  asserts  that  "power"  is  one  of  those  things 
 "  of  which  we  have  only  a  relative  conception,"  iu  opposition  to 
 direct.  This  representation,  if  applied  to  one  kind  of  active 
 power,  conveys  an  important  truth ;  but  when  advanced  as  a 
 general  rule,  without  distinguishing  the  objects,  I  conceive  it  will 
 be  found  fallacious.  Active  power,  as  before  shewn,  is  either 
 absolute  or  conditional.  Of  the  latter,  it  is  allowed  as  a  plain 
 fact,  our  conception  can  be  only  relative.  Its  very  existence 
 stands  necessarily  connected  with  a  supjMsition ;  and  that  sup- 
 position is  a  supreme  continued  will,  without  which  as  its.  cause 
 no  contingent  jDOwer  is  conceivable.  But  of  absolute  jjower  our 
 conception  is  direct;  that  is,  in  proportion  as  our  concej)tion  of 
 it  is  accurate.  Some,  indeed,  may  imagine  that  we  have  no  direct 
 conception  of  an  absolute  first  power,  because  it  is  generally  sup- 
 posed we  arrive  at  that  conception  by  previous  relative  considera- 
 tions. But  the  ciuestion  is  not  by  what  j)revious  relations  we 
 arrive  at  the  conception,  but  whether  the  conception  itself,  when 
 obtained,  is  direct  ?  My  conception  of  an  object  which  stands 
 necessarily  connected  with  another  object  for  its  existence  is  rela- 
 tive.    Thus  the  idea  of  a  creator,  a  governor,  a  father,  a  friend. 
 
DISS,  ni.]  POWEE — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  SI 
 
 tlie  idea  of  proportions,  of  bodies,  and  of  situations,  and  indeed  all 
 our  ideas  of  contingent  existences,  are  relative ;  because  a  com- 
 parison of  the  object  with  some  other  is  necessarily  implied.  In 
 a  sense,  indeed,  we  say  that  our  knowledge  of  some  objects  of 
 sense  is  direct,  but  it  is  a  lax  sense.  Por  instance,  our  idea  of 
 colour,  suppose  red,  is  called  direct,  as  well  as  simple  ;  but  I 
 believe  that  no  one  can  have  a  conception  of  any  colour,  however 
 simple,  and  however  disengaged  from  all  others  by  means  of  a 
 prism,  without  considering  it  as  related  to  some  substance,  or  at 
 least  to  some  cause.  But  if  I  conceive  of  an  object  which  does 
 not  imply  any  other  object  with  which  it  stands  necessarily  con- 
 nected, or  the  very  existence  of  which  implies  no  relation  to  any' 
 other,  my  idea  of  that  object  is  properly  direct.  Such  is  my  con- 
 ception of  absolute  being,  or  of  absolute  active  power. 
 
 Our  idea  of  active  j)ower,  whether  in  ourselves  or  in  other  crea- 
 tures, is  relative  in  more  respects  than  one :  it  stands  related 
 necessarily  to  absolute  power,  and  most  commonly,  if  not  always, 
 to  its  exertions  or  efiFects ;  it  stands  related  also  to  its  contrary, 
 and  we  necessarily  conceive  of  a  subject  to  which  it  belongs.  But 
 absolute  active  power  stands  necessarily  related  neither  to  some- 
 thing prior  as  the  cause,  nor  to  exertions  or  effects,  nor  to  its  op- 
 posites, — since  none  are  supposed  to  exist, — nor  yet  to  a  subject  to 
 which  it  belongs.  Such  is  the  Fii'st  Cause — absolute  act.  When, 
 indeed,  we  speak  of  this  adorable  object  in  a  common,  a  compara- 
 tive, and  analogical  sense,  we  say  that  power  is  an  attribute  of 
 Deity,  or  of  the  Divine  essence.  But,  pro^serly  speaking,  power 
 is  not  something  related  to  God,  but  simple,  absolute,  infinite  ACT 
 
 ITSELF. 
 
 As  I  consider  this  representation  of  the  supreme  power  to  be 
 more  worthy  of  infinite  perfection  than  any  other,  and  that  the 
 denial  of  it  is  greatly  dishonouring  to  God  as  making  Him  to  be 
 too  much  like  ourselves,  the  reader  will  excuse  me  if  I  digress  a 
 little  in  order  to  examine  what  a  celebrated  writer  has  thought 
 proper  to  say  upon  it.  Dr  Campbell,  in  his  "  Philosophy  of  Rhe- 
 toric," when  treating  of  the  want  of  perspicuity,  produces  speci- 
 mens of  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  "  the  learned  nonsense ; "  and 
 among  others,  the  following  passage  from  Bishop  Beveridge,  which 
 he  had  the  misfortune  of  inserting  in  a  sermon : — "  Although  we 
 read  of  several  properties  attributed  to  God  in  Scripture,  as  wis- 
 dom, goodness,  justice,  &c.,  we  must  not  apprehend  them  to  be 
 
32  PO'W'EK — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  HI. 
 
 several  powers,  habits,  or  qualities,  as  they  are  in  us ;  for  as  they 
 are  in  God,  they  are  neither  distinguished  from  one  another,  nor 
 from  His  nature  or  essence,  in  whom  they  are  said  to  be.  In 
 whom,  I  say,  they  are  said  to  be,  for,  to  speak  properly,  they  are 
 not  in  Him,  but  are  His  very  essence  or  nature  itself;  which, 
 acting  severally  on  several  objects,  seems  to  us  to  act  from  several 
 properties  or  perfections  in  Him  ;  where  all  the  difference  is  only 
 in  our  diiFerent  apprehensions  of  the  same  thing.  God  is  in  Him- 
 self a  most  simple  and  pure  act,  and  therefore  cannot  have  any- 
 thing in  Him  but  what  is  that  most  simple  and  pure  act  itself ; 
 which,  seeing  it  bringeth  upon  every  creatm-e  what  it  deserves, 
 we  conceive  of  it  as  of  several  Divine  jjerfections  in  the  same 
 Almighty  Bemg.  Whereas  God,  whose  understanding  is  infinite 
 as  Himself,  doth  not  apprehend  Himself  under  the  distinct  notions 
 of  wisdom,  or  goodness,  or  justice,  or  the  like,  but  only  as  Jeho- 
 vah." The  philosopher  observes  on  this  quotation : — "  How  edi- 
 fying must  it  have  been  to  the  hearers  to  be  made  acquainted 
 with  these  deep  discoveries  of  the  men  of  science !  Divine  attri- 
 butes, which  are  no  attributes — which  are  totally  distinct,  and 
 perfectly  the  same, — which  are  jxistly  ascribed  to  God,  because 
 ascribed  to  Him  in  Scripture,  but  do  not  belong  to  Him, — which 
 are  something  and  nothing, — which  ai'e  the  figments  of  human 
 imagination,  mere  chimeras, — which  are  God  himself, — which  are 
 the  actors  of  all  things, — and  which,  to  sum  up  all,  are  themselves 
 a  simple  act !"  Is  this  the  philosophy  of  rhetoric  ?  Is  it  not 
 rather  the  abuse  of  it  ?  The  writer  asks,  "Who  is  this  that  dark- 
 eneth  counsel  by  words  without  knowledge  ? "  Of  these  two  wi-iters, 
 I  conceive  impartiality  will  pronounce — Dr  George  Campbell. 
 
 This  kind  of  criticism  (reasoning  it  cannot  be  called)  is  admir- 
 ably well  adapted  to  comitenance  licentious  wits,  to  encourage  the 
 infidel  and  the  sceptic  to  pour  their  profane  ridicule  on  the  most 
 sacred  subjects,  and  especially  to  justify  the  idolatrous  notions  of 
 the  anthropomorphite.  Not  to  justify  Beveridge  in  introducing 
 his  explanation  in  a  popular  address  in  the  way  he  has  done,  and 
 not  to  defend  every  expression  he  has  employed,  did  Dr  Campbell 
 seriously  beheve  that  attributes  ascribed  to  God  in  Scripture  are 
 powers,  habits,  or  qualities  as  they  are  in  us  ?  Did  he  suppose 
 that  God  is  like  an  infinite  man,  as  some  modern  enthusiasts  have 
 called  Him,  because,  in  Scripture,  hands,  eyes,  and  ears,  a  heart, 
 bowels,  and  passions  are  ascribed  to  Him  ?    Surely  not.     And  yet 
 
DISS,  ni.]  POWEE — ITS  DIPPEEENT  KINDS.  33 
 
 his  objection  tends  to  defend  this  enthusiastic  notion  of  Daity, 
 however  absurd : — "  Divine  hands,  which  are  no  hands,  (might 
 the  enthusiast  object,  after  the  manner  of  Dr  Campbell,) — which 
 are  justly  ascribed  to  God,  because  ascribed  to  Him  in  Scrijjture, 
 but  do  not  belong  to  Him, — which  are  something,  and  nothing, — 
 which  are  the  figments  of  human  imagination,  mere  chimeras, — 
 which  are  God  himself, — which  are  the  actors  of  all  things, — and 
 which,  to  sum  up  all,  are  themselves  a  simple  act ! "  He  might 
 add,  "  Who  is  this  that  darkeneth  counsel  by  words  without  know- 
 ledge?" Why,  truly,  the  objectoe, — not  he  who  maintains  the 
 spirituality  and  simplicity  of  the  Divine  nature. 
 
 ACTIVE  AND  PASSIVE  POWEE. 
 
 When  the  epithet  active  is  employed,  as  connected  with  power, 
 it  must  be,  if  used  vnth  any  meaning,  to  distinguish  it  from  some 
 other  kind  of  power.  But  from  what  other  kind  of  j)ower  can  it 
 be  distinguished  ?  Dr  Reid  replies  : — "  The  term  active  p)ower  is 
 used,  I  conceive,  to  distinguish  it  from  specidative  powers."  But 
 is  not  this  a  distinction  without  a  difference  ?  Is  not  speculation 
 an  act  ?  And  is  not  the  power  of  speculating  an  active  power  ? 
 To  denominate  the  power  of  seeing,  hearing,  remembering,  distin- 
 guishing, judging,  reasoning,  and  the  like,  specidative,  as  distin- 
 guished from  active,  seems  too  much  like  a  distinction  invented, 
 without  any  philosophical  consistency,  on  purpose  to  avoid  another 
 more  obvious  disthiction — passive  power. 
 
 The  following  language  of  Dr  Eeid  is  worthy  of  a  great  philoso- 
 pher : — "  As  there  is  no  principle  that  appears  to  be  more  imiver- 
 sally  acknowledged  by  mankind,  from  the  first  dawn  of  reason, 
 than  that  every  change  we  observe  in  nature  must  have  a  cause  ; 
 so  this  is  no  sooner  perceived  than  there  arises  in  the  human  mind 
 a  strong  desire  to  know  the  causes  of  those  things  that  fall  within 
 our  observation.  Felix  qui  potuit  rerum  cognoscere  causas,  is  the 
 voice  of  nature  in  all  men.  Nor  is  there  anything  that  more  early 
 distinguishes  the  rational  from  the  brute  creation  than  this  avidity 
 to  know  the  causes  of  things,  of  which  I  see  no  sign  in  brute  ani- 
 mals." *  We  are,  therefore,  fully  justified  if  we  proceed  to  inquire 
 a  little  further  into  the  causes  of  existing  phenomena.  If,  accord- 
 ing to  Dr  Eeid,  power  be  denominated  active  only  in  contradis- 
 
 *  Active  Powers,  Essay  i.,  chap.  ii. 
 VOL.  IV.  C 
 
 "\ 
 
34  POWER — ITS  DIFFEEEKT  KINDS.  [DISS.  HI. 
 
 tinction  to  speculative ;  and  if,  according  to  common  sense,  what 
 lie  terms  "  speculative  powers "  be  fairly  reducible  to  what  may 
 be  jjroperly  called  active  power ;  and  if,  according  to  philosophic 
 accuracy,  all  active  power  is  derived  from  the  iirst  absolute  power ; 
 from  what  powei',  or  from  what  cause,  proceeds  that  huge  and  de- 
 formed mass  of  moral  evil  which  is  acknowledged  to  exist  ?  That 
 there  is  a  cause,  or  power  of  some  kind,  from  which  it  proceeds 
 cannot  be  disputed,  as  there  is  no  effect  without  a  cause.  Is  it  an 
 active  or  a  speculative  power  ?  Are  not  both  from  God  ?  Is  He 
 then  the  cause  of  all  the  moral  mischief  in  the  universe  ? 
 
 Dr  Eeid  is  very  explicit  in  asserting  that  all  our  power  is  from 
 God : — "All  our  power  is,  without  doubt,  derived  from  the  Author 
 of  our  being ;  and  as  He  gave  it  freely.  He  may  take  it  away  when 
 He  will.  No  man  can  be  certain  of  any  of  his  powers  of  body  or 
 mind  for  a  moment ;  and,  therefore,  in  every  promise  there  is  a 
 condition  understood :  to  wit,  if  we  live,  if  we  retain  that  health 
 of  body  or  soundness  of  mind  which  is  necessary  to  the  perfor- 
 mance, and  if  nothing  ha^Dpeu,  in  the  providence  of  God,  which 
 puts  it  out  of  our  power."*  But  if  all  our  poiuer  is  derived  from 
 the  Author  of  our  being,  I  repeat  the  interesting  question,  Are 
 we  to  regard  Him  as  the  fountain  from  whence  all  our  noxious 
 streams  of  moral  pravity  continually  flow?  The  supposition  is 
 infinitely  absurd.  There  must  be,  therefore,  some  ofhe7-  kind  of 
 power  to  which  innumerable  existing  facts  are  ultimately  re- 
 ducible. 
 
 Mr  Locke  distinguishes  all  power  into  active  and  passive ;  the 
 former  indicating  a  possibility  of  changing,  and  the  latter  a  possi- 
 bility ^of  being  changed.  Dr  Eeid  is  not  satisfied  with  this  dis- 
 tinction, and  supposes,  through  mistake,  that  Mr  Locke  is  the  first 
 good  author  who  has  advanced  it,  though  he  expresses  himself 
 with  some  caution.  His  remarks  on  the  subject  deserve  insertion 
 in  this  place  : — "  Whereas  he  distinguishes  power  into  active  and 
 passive,  I  conceive  passive  power  is  no  power  at  all.  He  means 
 by  it  the  possibility  of  being  changed.  To  call  this  power,  seems 
 to  be  a  misapplication  of  the  word.  I  do  not  remember  to  have 
 met  with  the  phrase  passive  power  in  any  other  good  author.  Mr 
 Locke  seems  to  have  been  unlucky  in  inventing  it ;  and  it  deserves 
 not  to  be  retained  in  our  language.  Perhaps  he  was  unwarily  led 
 into  it,  as  an  opposite  to  active  power.  But  I  conceive  we  call 
 *  Active  Powers,  Essay  i.,  chap.  ii. 
 
DISS,  ni.]  POWEE — ITS  DIPPEEENT  KINDS.  35 
 
 certain  powers  active,  to  distinguish  tliem  from  other  powers  that 
 are  called  speculative.  As  all  mankind  distinguish  action  from 
 speculatioHj  it  is  very  proper  to  distinguish  the  powers  by  which 
 those  different  operations  are  performed  into  active  and  speculative. 
 Mr  Locke  indeed  acknowledges  that  active  power  is  more  properly 
 called  power ;  but  I  see  no  propriety  at  all  in  passive  power :  it  is 
 a  powerless  power,  and  a  contradiction  in  terms."*  As  Dr  Eeid 
 is  pretty  generally  supposed  to  have  paid  more  attention  to  an 
 appropriate  use  of  terms  than  the  generality  of  his  predecessors, 
 it  is  not  surprising  that  this  objection  should  have  weight  with 
 many  of  his  readers.  But,  perhaps,  it  may  be  judged  singular, 
 that  any  one  should  suppose  the  tendency  of  his  objection  to  be 
 that  of  impeding  the  progress  of  moral  science,  and  indirectly  to 
 encourage  scepticism.  Such,  however,  are  my  views  of  it ;  and 
 probably  the  intelligent  and  candid  reader  will  find  in  the  following 
 observations  some  reasons  to  conclude  that  I  ought  not  to  be 
 condemned  for  this  determination. 
 
 1.  Dr  Eeid  sets  out  with  a  petitio  principii,  that  there  is  no 
 other  kind  of  power  than  active  power,  and  then  infers  that  pas- 
 sive power  is  no  power!  This  is  just  the  same  as  to  say,  that 
 active  power  is  not  passive  power !  But  what  right  had  he  to 
 assume,  that  power,  in  the  sense  of  possibility,  or  cause, — a  sense 
 of  it  by  no  means  uncommon, — implies,  exclusively,  a  principle  of 
 action  ?  Is  there  not  a  cause  of  defect,  and  even  of  ceasing  to 
 exist,  as  well  as  of  perfection  and  existence  ? 
 
 2.  Mr  Locke  considers  the  idea  of  power  to  be  the  same  as  that 
 of  possibility :  the  possibility  of  being  changed  signifying  the 
 power  of  being  changed,  and  the  possibility  of  changing,  or  pro- 
 ducing a  change,  the  power  of  doing  so.  But  Dr  Reid  advances 
 no  reason  against  this,  contenting  himself  with  merely  observing, 
 that  it  appears  to  him  a  misapplication  of  the  word  power.  This 
 is  still  begging  the  question,  that  active  possibility  or  cause  has  no 
 direct  contrast. 
 
 3.  The  first  business  of  a  philosopher  should  be  to  ascertain  the 
 truth  of  ideas,  and  the  next,  how  to  express  those  ideas  in  the  most 
 significant  language.  Is  it  not  an  important  truth,  that  the  pos- 
 sibility of  producing  change,  without  the  possibility  of  being 
 changed,  implies  an  active  idea,  or  the  idea  of  action  in  the  agent 
 to  the  exclusion  of  all  passion  ?  and  does  not  the  idea  of  a  First 
 
 *  Active  Powers,  Essay  i.,  chap.  iii. 
 
86  POWEK  —ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  HL 
 
 Cause  necessarily  imply  this  ?  And  is  it  not  an  important  truth, 
 that  in  aU  contingent  beings,  there  is  no  possibility  of  producing 
 change,  which  is  not  accompanied  -with  a  possibility  of  being 
 changed,  even  to  annihilation  ?  Therefore,  the  possibility  of  being 
 changed  is  peculiar  to  a  contingent  existence.  And  does  not  this 
 necessarily  imply  a  passive  idea,  or  the  idea  of  passion  in  the 
 subject  ?  The  truth  of  these  ideas,  I  conceive,  cannot  be  contro- 
 verted. And  is  it  not  equally  clear  to  every  reflecting  and  un- 
 jDrejudiced  mind,  that  the  causes  of  action  and  passion  are  as 
 directly  contrasted  as  these  effects  themselves  are  ? 
 
 4.  Let  us  now  attend  more  particularly  to  the  terms  by  which 
 these  ideas  may  be  best  expressed.  Instead  of  the  term  "  change  " 
 employed  by  Mr  Locke,  let  us  adopt,  for  the  sake  of  illustration, 
 the  term  "  being  "  or  existence.  Now  a  possibility  to  be,  or  a  cause 
 of  existence,  to  the  exclusion  of  a  possibility  not  to  be,  or  a  cause 
 of  non-existence,  is  an  active  idea,  and  peculiar  to  absolute  being ; 
 and  a  possibility  not  to  be,  or  of  ceasing  to  exist,  is  a  possibility 
 du'ectly  oj^posite  to  the  other.  But  what  can  possibly  be  the  direct 
 ojjposite  to  active  existence,  or  mode  of  existence,  but  that  which  is 
 passive  ? 
 
 5.  Instead  of  the  terms  possibility  or  cause,  let  us  now  substitute 
 the  word  "power."  A  jDOwer  to  be,  or  to  exist,  is  active  power; 
 and  a  power  (importing  causality)  not  to  be  is  its  dii-ect  opposite. 
 Now  what  can  be  the  direct  opposite  of  active  but  passive  as  con- 
 nected with  j^oiuer  ?  It  follows,  therefore,  beyond  all  reasonable 
 contradiction,  that  the  phrase  "  passive  power "  is  not  only  allow- 
 able, but  highly  significant.  Were  the  same  ideas  which  are  in- 
 tended to  be  conveyed  by  it  expressed  by  any  other  terms,  though 
 in  many  respects  synonymous,  they  would  be  more  liable  to  mis- 
 conception. Nevertheless,  if  by  any  terms  or  phi-ases  the  same 
 ideas  of  radical  and  most  important  truths  can  be  expressed  to 
 more  advantage,  I  have  not  the  least  objection.  To  contend  for 
 words  further  than  they  are  calculated  to  convey  sentiments  is  but 
 learned  foUy.  Let  but  the  ideas  annexed  to  the  phrase  in  question 
 be  accurately  understood,  and  it  is  of  little  moment  whether  it  be 
 expressed  by  passive  power,  mahmi  metaphysicurn,  possibility  of 
 change,  negative  cause,  or  any  other.  Yet  in  aU  scientific  re- 
 searches, the  most  comprehensive,  concise,  and  significant,  ought  to 
 be  preferred.  And  as  the  idea  to  be  expressed  is  that  which  stands, 
 iu  point  of  causality,  directly  opposite  to  active  potver,  I  conceive 
 
DISS,  in.]  POWEE — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  37 
 
 there  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  preferring  the  phrase  passive  power 
 in  reference  to  moral  science. 
 
 It  must  be  allowed,  that  in  the  connexion  in  which  it  was 
 employed  by  Mr  Locke,  the  confined  relation  in  which  he  seems  to 
 have  considered  it,  and  especially  its  apiDlicatiou  by  him  to  physical 
 changes,  its  comparative  value  as  a  technical  term  is  very  small. 
 But  this  is  by  no  means  the  case  in  the  science  of  morality,  because 
 the  ideas  it  expresses  in  this  connexion  are  infinitely  momentous, 
 and  of  course  the  terms  by  which  they  are  expressed  should  be  as 
 accurate  as  possible. 
 
 It  is  observable,  that  Dr  Eeid's  remarks  are  introduced  in  sub- 
 serviency to  another  object.  He  supposes  that  Mr  Locke's  design 
 in  stating  his  idea  of  power  in  the  way  he  has  done  was  an  attempt 
 to  reconcile  this  notion  of  power  with  his  favourite  doctrine,  that 
 all  our  simple  ideas  are  ideas  of  sensation  or  of  reflection.  Sup- 
 posing this  to  be  Mr  Locke's  intention,  as  probably  it  was,  it  is  not 
 my  wish  to  say  a  word  in  his  defence.  On  this  point  of  the  origin 
 of  our  ideas  I  have  no  controversy  with  Dr  Reid. 
 
 However,  from  the  manner  in  which  this  last  author  has  delivered 
 his  thoughts  on  Mr  Locke's  language,  there  is  reason  for  supposing, 
 either  that  his  reading  on  the  subject  in  question  was  very  partial, 
 or  that  he  had  forgotten  what  he  had  read,  or  else  that  his  notion 
 of  a  "  good  author "  was  such  as  to  be  scarcely  consistent  with 
 candour.  The  deservedly  celebrated  and  eminently  learned  author 
 of  "  The  Court  of  the  Gentiles  "  not  only  uses  the  phrase  p)o,ssive 
 power  in  that  work,  but  professedly  shews  how  the  idea  conveyed 
 by  it  is  essential  to  every  created  existence.*  Brucker,  in  his 
 "History  of  Philosophy,"  which  Dr  Enfield,  who  has  given  a 
 valuable  abridged  translation  of  it,  characterises  as  "a  vast 
 magazine  of  important  facts,  collected  with  indefatigable  industry, 
 digested  with  admirable  perspicuity  of  method,  and  written  with 
 every  appearance  of  candour  and  impartiality,"  expresses  Aristotle's 
 doctrine  of  ESmG  in  these  words,  as  translated  by  Enfield  :— "  Power 
 is  either  active  or  passive :  active  pmver  is  the  principle  of  motion 
 or  change  acting  upon  another  substance ;  passive  p)oiver  subsists 
 in  the  subject  upon  which  active  power  is  exercised."  -f- 
 
 Dr  Eeid  says,   "Mr   Locke  seems  to  have  been  unlucky  in 
 
 *  Court  of  the  Gentiles,  part  iv.,  book  ii.,  chap,  xi.,  §  4,  &;c. 
 +  Hist,  of  Phil.,  vol.  i.,  book  ii.,  chap,  is.,  sect,  1.     Vide  TiuTet.,  vol.  i.,  pp.  206, 
 210,  226,  270,  484,  ■yVolfius. 
 
38  PO-WEE — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 inventing  it."  But  Mr  Locke  did  not  invent  it,  and  I  presume, 
 from  what  has  been  advanced  in  the  preceding  pages,  that  the 
 invention  was  not  an  "  unlucky "  one.  Aristotle,  it  is  true,  has 
 many  obscurities  ;  in  this  particular,  however,  he  seems  abundantly 
 more  perspicuous  than  Dr  Reid,  and  probably  the  term  "  deserves 
 to  be  retained  in  our  language,"  in  proportion  as  moral  science  is 
 improved. 
 
 OTHER  DISTINCTIONS  OF  POWER — PHYSICAL  POWER. 
 
 On  a  subject  equally  interesting  and  profound,  it  may  be  use- 
 ful to  view  the  same  thing  in  different  relations  and  connexions. 
 We  have  seen  that  Dr  Eeid  distinguishes  power  into  active  and 
 speculative ;  or,  according  to  the  titles  of  his  two  sets  of  essays, 
 into  intellectual  or  active.  And  it  has  been  shewn  that  this  dis- 
 tinction does  not  form  any  contrast  as  to  the  kinds  of  power,  but 
 is  merely  a  something  indefinable  "  behind  the  scene,"  producing 
 different  effects  by  the  medium  of  the  intellect  and  the  will.  In 
 his  account,  therefore,  there  is  only  one  kind  of  power,  which,  I 
 conceive,  if  expressed  in  one  word,  may  be  fitly  called  physical. 
 But,  though  I  am  far  from  thinking  that  there  is  no  other  kind  of 
 power,  for  some  reasons  already  intimated,  and  others  to  be  pro- 
 duced more  professedly,  it  may  be  proper  to  take  a  view  here  of 
 physical  power  in  its  different  relations. 
 
 The  term  "  physical "  is  expressive  of  what  is  according  to 
 constituted  nature,  or  the  appointed  connexion  between  the  Divine 
 will  and  its  various  effects  in  the  great  system  of  the  universe. 
 Between  the  Di'idue  ■ndll  and  the  subordinate  effects  there  may  be 
 innumerable  links  ;  but  to  ascertain  these  links,  their  number  and 
 order,  is  at  once  difficult  and  unimportant.  What  is  truly  im- 
 portant in  science  is  to  know  the  ultimate  causes  of  effects.  This 
 has  an  immediate  influence  on  morality.  To  know,  for  instance, 
 from  what  ultimate  cause  our  blessings  flow  has  great  influence  on 
 the  devotional  temper ;  but  controversies  about  the  number  or  the 
 order  of  subordinate  agents,  whether  men  or  invisible  beings,  are 
 matters  of  curiosity  more  than  of  real  use. 
 
 Dr  Eeid  institutes  an  inquiry,  "  Whether  beings  that  have  no 
 wUl  nor  understanding  may  have  active  power  ? "  A  singular 
 question,  including,  no  doubt,  the  following,  Whether  a  snaH  in 
 pushing  out  its  horn,  or  an  oyster  in  opening  and  shutting  its 
 
DISS,  ni]  POWER — ITS  DIFFERENT  EINDS.  89 
 
 shell,  effects  this  in  virtue  of  active  power  ?  Or  these,  Whether  a 
 plant  grows,  water  crystallises,  a  celestial  orb  shines,  or  matter 
 gravitates,  in  virtue  of  active  power  ?  As  preparatory  to  this 
 investigation,  he  says,  "  To  know  the  real  efficient,  whether  it 
 be  matter  or  mind,  whether  of  a  superior  or  inferior  order,  con- 
 cerns us  little."  If  by  "real  efficient"  he  means  the  instruments 
 immediately  employed  in  the  production  of  an  effect,  the  sentiment 
 is,  I  conceive,  just.  But  to  call  this  the  "  real  efficient "  is  diffi- 
 cult to  reconcile  with  precision  of  language.  What  can  a  "  real 
 efficient "  be,  but  that  which  really  effects  the  change  ?  and  if  all 
 active  power  proceeds  from  a  First  Cause,  what  propriety  is  there 
 in  calling  any  other  the  "  real  efficient  ?"  If  he  mean  only  what  is 
 the  immediate  instrument  which  God  emjoloys  in  producing  any 
 change  in  the  universe  of  beings,  it  is  obvious  that,  in  point  of 
 scientific  knowledge,  it  is  a  question  of  little  moment ;  but  if  so, 
 why  confound  instrument  with  efficient  ? 
 
 In  the  following  short  sentence  Dr  Reid  conveys  at  once,  I  con- 
 ceive, a  great  error  and  an  important  truth  : — "  The  weakness  of 
 human  understanding,  which  gives  us  only  an  indirect  and  relative 
 conception  of  power,  contributes  to  darken  our  reasoning."  To 
 suppose  that  human  understanding,  indefinitely,  gives  "  only  "  an 
 indirect  and  relative  conception  of  power,  I  consider  as  a  great 
 error,  for  reasons  before  adduced  ;  but  that  the  sentiment,  when 
 admitted,  "  contributes  to  darken  our  reasoning  "  is  an  important 
 truth.  Hence  it  is  that  several  sceptical  conclusions  are  drawn 
 in  this  connexion.  "  We  perceive  changes  innumerable  in  things 
 without  us ;  we  know  that  these  changes  must  be  produced  by 
 the  active  power  of  some  agent ;  hut  we  neither  jJerceive  the  agent 
 nor  the  power,  but  the  change  only.  Whether  the  things  be  active, 
 or  merely  passive,  is  not  easily  discovered.  Thus  it  is  with  regard 
 to  all  the  effects  we  ascribe  to  nature ;  but  if  it  be  asked  what 
 nature  is, — whether  the  first  universal  cause,  or  a  subordinate  one, 
 whether  one  or  many,  whether  intelligent  or  unintelligent, — upon 
 these  points  we  find  various  conjectures  and  theories,  but  no  solid 
 ground  on  which  we  can  rest." 
 
 On  the  contrary,  they  who  distinguish  power  into  absolute  and 
 hypothetical,  who  liave  a  direct  conception  of  the  former,  and  only 
 a  relative  one  of  the  latter,  have  solid  ground  on  which  they  can 
 rest.  They  are  completely  satisfied,  with  demonstrative  evidence, 
 that  absolute  active  power  is   the  only  real  efficient  in  physical 
 
40  POWER — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 changes,  and  that  all  hypothetical  active  power  is  only  the  instru- 
 ment of  the  other.  And  in  the  light  of  this  truth  they  are  fur- 
 nished with  sufficient  cause  for  leaving  the  gloomy  labjTinth  of 
 scepticism,  and  for  choosing  the  plain  path  of  certainty  and  satis- 
 faction. They  view  God  in  all  physical  changes  ;  and,  however 
 various  and  numerous  may  be  the  instruments  which  He  employs, 
 they  are  certain  He  is  the  primary  agent.  Whether  the  subor- 
 dinate agents  are  called  hypothetical  jDOwers,  real  efficients,  second 
 causes,  instruments,  nature,  laws  of  nature,  or  by  any  other  name, 
 is  of  comparatively  small  moment.  They  know,  on  the  siu'est 
 principles,  that  it  is  God  who  "  worketh  all  in  all."  And,  by  the 
 by,  it  is  observable  that  this  is  the  constant  language  of  revealed 
 religion. 
 
 We  find,  however,  in  physical  or  constituted  nature  a  great 
 variety  of  subordinate  agents.  Sometimes  matter  acts  upon 
 matter ;  at  other  times  mind  acts  upon  matter,  or  even  matter 
 upon  mind ;  and,  finally,  mind  acts  upon  mind.  But  whether  this 
 enumeration  be  sufficiently  comprehensive  or  not,  the  conclusion 
 is  not  affected  by  it ;  we  may  be  as  sure  as  we  are  of  our  own 
 existence  that  God  is  the  supreme  agent,  and  all  intervening  agents 
 between  Him  and  the  effect  are  only  His  instruments,  which  with- 
 out Him  would  effect  nothing.  Nor  does  the  circumstance  of 
 voluntary  or  involuntary  alter  the  case.  It  is  plain  to  unpreju- 
 diced reflection  that  if  \h&  first  agency  were  susjDended  there  would 
 be  no  subordinate  active  power ;  all  the  wheels  of  nature  would 
 stand,  for  no  assignable,  no  possible  cause  of  their  motion  would 
 remain. 
 
 1.  It  is  obvious  that  in  the  system  of  nature  matter  acts  upon 
 matter,  water  acts  upon  the  wheel,  wind  upon  the  sail,  the  sun 
 upon  the  earth,  the  magnet  upon  iron,  and  one  chemical  substance 
 upon  another. 
 
 2.  It  is  equally  obvious  that  mind  acts  upon  matter.  Our  own 
 minds  act  upon  our  bodies,  and  the  First  Cause,  who  is  a  spirit, 
 must  have  acted  upon  matter  in  its  production,  formation,  and 
 preservation.  To  suppose  the  Pirst  Power  to  be  matter  is  absurd, 
 as  matter  is  evidently  a  contingent  existence,  liable  to  perpetual 
 changes ;  and  not  less  so  to  suppose  that  one  contingent  being  has 
 active  power  to  change  another  contingent  being,  independently  of 
 the  first  absolute  power. 
 
DISS.  lU.]  PQ-WEE — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  41 ' 
 
 3.  It  is  also  plain  in  fact  that  matter  in  some  instances  acts 
 upon  mind.  Hence  innumerable  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
 much  of  our  love  and  fear,  our  joys  and  sorrows. 
 
 4.  Mind  acts  upon  mind.  Hence  the  very  existence  of  created 
 spirits,  their  constant  conservation,  the  cause  of  virtue,  the  nature 
 and  consummation  of  final  happiness. 
 
 These  are  some  of  the  changes  mcident  to  what  I  call  physical 
 nature.  For  the  existence  and  changes  of  mind  are  a  part  of 
 physical  nature  from  its  definition,  no  less  than  the  existence  and 
 changes  of  mere  matter;  and  to  suppose  that  any  part  of  the 
 stupendous  whole  is  possessed  of  any  active  power  not  reducible 
 to  the  first  is  as  truly  absurd,  though  not  so  glaringly  so,  as  any 
 atheistical  system  of  the  universe  ever  invented.  Only  sujipose 
 for  a  moment  a  separation  or  suspension  of  the  agency  of  the  First 
 Cause,  with  respect  to  the  remotest  efiect,  and  no  conceivable,  or 
 even  possible  reason  remains  for  the  existence  of  that  efi'ect. 
 
 Dr  Eeid  observes  very  justly,  that  "whatever  is  the  effect  of 
 active  power  must  be  something  that  is  contingent.  Contingent 
 existence  is  that  which  depended  upon  the  power  and  will  of  its 
 cause."  But  when  he  adds,  "  In  certain  motions  of  my  body,  and 
 directions  of  my  thought,  I  know  not  only  that  there  must  be  a 
 cause  that  has  power  to  produce  these  effects,  but  that  I  am  that 
 cause,"  the  assertion  is  either  untrue,  or  must  be  taken  with  great 
 limitation.  If  the  assertion  mean  the  instrumental  cause,  it  is 
 very  true,  but  not  to  his  purpose  ;  but  if  it  mean  an  original  cause, 
 which  in  its  very  operation  is  not  dependent  on  the  first  power  for 
 producing  the  intended  effect,  it  is  an  assertion  incapable  of  proof. 
 For  between  absolute  and  contingent  there  is  no  conceivable  me- 
 dium, but  every  creature's  active  power  is  contingent,  because  the 
 creature  itseK  and  the  very  laws  of  its  existence  are  so.  Now  to 
 be  contingent  is  to  be  dependent  on  "  the  power  and  will  of  its  • 
 cause,"  as  Dr  Reid  allows ;  and  if  the  very  existence  and  essence 
 of  the  creature  be  dependent,  his  active  power  and  operation  must 
 be  so  dj  fortiori. 
 
 "Power  to  produce  any  effect,"  says  Dr  Reid,  "implies  power 
 not  to  produce  it."  To  allow  this  remark  any  force  is  either  to 
 confound  different  kinds  of  power,  or  to  admit  a  certain  mistake. 
 In  reference  to  absolute  and  metaphysical  power  it  is  true,  but  in 
 reference  to  physical  active  power  it  is  demonstrably  erroneous. 
 
42  POWER — ^ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  [BISS.  Ul. 
 
 It  will  not  admit  of  a  doubt  wliether  wind  lias  a  power  not  to 
 blow,  or  the  sun  not  to  shine ;  but  it  may  be  thought  that  the 
 same  does  not  hold  respecting  a  bemg  that  has  luill.  But  let  any 
 one  make  the  experiment,  whether  he  has  a  power  to  produce  a 
 thought,  which  is  an  effect,  or  not  to  produce  a  thought ;  to  pro- 
 duce a  vohtiou,  or  not  a  volition.  I  conceive  repeated  impartial 
 trials  will  soon  convince  any  competent  judge  that  to  prevent  all 
 thought,  or  all  volition,  will  prove  the  fallacy  of  the  proposition. 
 Every  created  rational  being  has  a  power,  hj'jDothetically  under- 
 stood, of  producing  thought  and  voKtion,  but  he  knows  of  no 
 active  power  72ot  to  produce  them. 
 
 It  does  not  appear  to  be  in  the  power  of  any  being  to  choose 
 evil  as  evil  to  him,  or  to  refuse  good  as  apparently  his  good.  A 
 being  endowed  with  intellect  and  will  has  indeed  a  physical  power 
 contingently  of  choosing  his  apparent  good,  as  a  fixed  law  of  his 
 nature.  But  for  the  same  reason,  that  it  is  a  fixed  law,  he  has  no 
 power  of  choosing  the  contrary,  what  is  ap2Mrently  not  his  good. 
 He  has  active  power  to  choose  evil  when  it  appears  good,  and  of 
 refusing  good  when  it  appears  evil.  But  the  reason  ivhy  an  evil 
 in  any  particular  instance  appears  good,  or  good  appears  evil, 
 seems  to  have  been  beyond  the  sj^here  of  Dr  Reid's  hypothesis. 
 However,  an  adequate  reason  for  this  does  exist — a  priacijale  of 
 infaUible  certainty. 
 
 It  is  but  proper  to  observe  that  Dr  Eeid  answers  the  question, 
 "  Whether  beings  that  have  no  will  nor  understanding  may  havi? 
 active  power?"  in  the  negative ;  and  adds,  "  that  the  active  power, 
 of  which  only  we  can  have  any  distinct  conception,  can  be  only  in 
 beings  that  have  understanding  and  wUl."  Surely  we  have  a  dis- 
 tinct conception  of  instrumental  power  through  universal  nature 
 on  which  the  First  Cause  operates,  and  we  have  a  direct  as  weU 
 as  distinct  conception  of  the  active  power  that  employs  these  in- 
 struments. Matter  and  motion  are  instruments  acting  on  matter 
 and  mind  ;  and  minds  are  instruments  acting  on  minds,  and  on 
 matter  and  motion.  But  all  are  alike  contingent  things,  and 
 therefore  alike  dependent  on  the  first  active  power  in  producing 
 those  effects  which  are  peculiar  to  active  power.  Whatever  is  the 
 genuine  effect  of  pure  active  power,  or  this  power  exclusively,  is 
 good,  and  worthy  of  the  First  Cause  as  the  prime  agent.  To  im- 
 pute, therefore,  the  physical  act  of  the  will  to  some  occult  quality 
 as  its  original  source,  rather  than  to  the  Supreme  Agent  operat- 
 
DISS.  III.]  POWBK— ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  43 
 
 jng  according  to  the  representations  of  tlie  intellect,  is  unpMloso- 
 phical,  because  it  multiplies  causes  without  reason,  and  without 
 evidence.  It  is  true  the  laws  of  intellect  and  will  producing 
 change  are  different  from  those  of  matter  and  motion ;  but  to 
 suppose  that  the  former  are  lawless,  or  that  there  are  no  certain 
 principles  in  nature  to  which  they  are  reducible,  is  no  less  absurd 
 than  the  supposition  of  absolute  chance.  Such  active  power,  if  so 
 it  must  be  called,  is  "powerless  power"  to  all  intents.  Its  exist- 
 ence as  active  power  has  never  been  proved,  and  I  may  safely 
 affirm  it  never  can  be.  Consciousness  assui'es  us  that  we  have 
 hypothetical  active  power,  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  act  accord- 
 ing to  the  representations  of  the  intellect ;  and  reason  assures  us 
 that  all  active  power  proceeds  from  God,  whose  energy  operates 
 according  to  the  diiTereut  natures  of  secondary  agents.  But  neither 
 consciousness  nor  reason  teach  us  that  there  is  in  our  nature  an 
 occult  quality  called  active  power,  which  is  neither  Divine  energy 
 itself  acting  immediately  upon  our  nature,  nor  yet  a  settled  law 
 employed  by  Him  to  produce  the  effect.  It  is  good  sense  to  say, 
 I  have  active  power  to  produce  an  effect  if  God  please  to  give  it 
 efficiency,  either  by  His  immediate  energetic  will,  or  by  the  in- 
 strumentality of  the  laws  He  has  appointed ;  but  to  say,  I  have 
 active  power  to  produce  effects  of  myself,  which  power  is  redu- 
 cible to  neither,  is  at  once  contrary  to  common  sense  and  to 
 piety. 
 
 Spirits  of  the  highest  order,  and  worms  of  the  meanest  form,  in 
 point  of  dependence,  are  on  an  equality.  This  is  evident  as  to 
 their  existence.  But  to  suppose  it  true  of  their  existence,  and  not 
 of  their  operations,  physically  considered,  is  infinitely  absurd ;  it 
 is  to  identify  absolute  and  contingent.  Creator  and  creature. 
 
 OF  METAPHYSICAL  POWEE. 
 
 There  is  great  reason  to  suppose  that  Dr  Eeid's  efforts  to  estab- 
 lish an  hypothesis  of  some  undefinahle  principle  which  he  calls 
 active  power,  which  is  neither  the  immediate  agency  of  God  on 
 our  nature,  nor  yet  an  intermediate  agency  by  the  instrumentality 
 of  stated  laws,  have  been  directed  to  counteract  the  supposed  evil 
 tendency  of  philosophical  necessity  as  maintained  by  Hume  and 
 others.  Their  reasoning,  in  attempting  to  establish  universal 
 necessitation,  is  calculated  to  destroy  the  distinction  of  virtue  and 
 
ii  POWER — ITS  DIPPEEENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 vice,  and  to  poison  the  very  source  of  moral  obligation.  An  effort, 
 therefore,  to  find  an  antidote  to  counteract  so  deleterious  an  ingre- 
 dient in  the  vi^ritings  of  ingenious  theorists,  deserves  commenda- 
 tion. But  how  does  Dr  Reid  meet  their  theories  and  reasonings  ? 
 By  introducing  an  idea  of  active  power  which  no  one  can  define, 
 which  is  not  an  object  of  consciousness,  but  something  that 
 "  lies  behind  the  scene,"  of  which  we  have  no  direct,  but  only  a 
 relative  conception, — a  conception  relative  to  its  exertions  or 
 effects.  This  active  power,  also,  is  a  quality  that  exists  in  man  as 
 a  subject  to  which  it  belongs, — a  quality  that  may  be  varied,  not 
 only  in  degree,  but  also  in  kind,  and  a  quality  that  has  no  con- 
 trary. "  Vice  is  contrary  to  virtue,"  he  observes,  "  misery  to  hap- 
 piness, hatred  to  love,  negation  to  affirmation ;  but  there  is  no 
 contrary  to  power.  Weakness  or  imj)otence  are  defects  or  j)riva- 
 tions  of  power,  but  not  contraries  to  it."  And  in  all  this  account 
 of  man's  active  power,  an  api^eal  is  made  to  the  common  belief  of 
 mankind  for  its  confirmation. 
 
 But  is  such  an  account  of  man's  active  power  anything  better 
 than  a  mere  hypothesis  without  proof,  leaving  all  the  difficulties  in 
 moral  science  where  it  found  them  ?  Men  of  thought  demand 
 principles,  and  sound  reasoning  on  such  principles ;  and  cannot 
 put  up  with  vague  hypotheses,  undefinable  occidt  qualities,  and  a 
 vague  ap23eal  to  common  belief.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  fact,  that 
 man's  active  power  may  be  accurately  and  clearly  defined ;  that  it 
 is  an  object  of  consciousness ;  and  that  of  active  power,  speaking 
 indefinitely,  we  have  a  dii-ect  conception.  It  is  also  a  demon- 
 strable fact,  that  active  power  in  man  is  not  a  quality  distinct 
 from  his  will  and  the  Divine  energy, — a  quality  which  he  may  vary 
 in  degree  and  in  kind  irrespective  of  that  energy.  And  it  is, 
 moreover,  a  fact,  that  active  power  (which,  in  Dr  Reid's  estimate, 
 is  the  same  thing  as  power  indefinitely)  has  a  contrary  ;  the  proof 
 of  which  is  the  immediate  design  of  this  section,  as  the  proof  of 
 the  other  facts  has  been  advanced  in  the  preceding  ones. 
 
 When  treating  of  metaphysical  power,  I  shall  consider  the  term 
 "  power  "  under  the  notion  of  a  cattse ;  which  is  an  acceptation  of 
 the  word  at  once  proj^er  and  common.  Physical  power,  as  before 
 shevra,  is  the  Divine  energy  oj)erating  in  every  part  of  the  universe 
 according  to  the  different  natures  of  created  beings.  In  those 
 beings  who  are  intelligent  and  voluntary,  it  operates  according  to 
 the  nature  of  inteUect  and  will,  giving  efficiency  to  the  will  only 
 
DISS.  III.]  POWEE — ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  45 
 
 ■when  tlie  intellect  perceives  the  object  willed.  Bnt  a  power  or 
 cause  which  is  not  included  in  the  constituted  series  of  causes  con- 
 nected with  the  effects  which  follow  them,  is  properly  and  strictly 
 metaphysical,  because  beyond  that  constituted  series.  And  this 
 power  is  of  three  kinds : — 
 
 First,  The  absolute  cause,  or  active  power,  is  metaphysical,  be- 
 cause it  is  beyond,  and  every  way  independent  of  the  constituted 
 series  of  physical  causes  which  proceed  from  it. 
 
 Secondly,  Necessary  truths,  or  those  which  are  true  independent 
 of  appointing  will,  are  metaphysical  causes.  This  is  well  illus- 
 trated by  Dr  Eeid : — "  That  the  planets  of  our  system  go  round  the 
 sun  from  west  to  east,  is  a  contingent  (and  physical)  truth ;  be- 
 cause it  depended  upon  the  power  and  will  of  Him  who  made  the 
 planetary  system,  and  gave  motion  to  it.  That  a  circle  and  a  right 
 line  can  cut  one  another  only  in  two  points,  is  a  truth  which  de- 
 pends upon  no  power  nor  will,  and  therefore  is  called  neces- 
 sary and  immutable,"  and  we  may  add,  being  above  and  beyond 
 cojistituted  or  voluntarily-appointed  relations,  is  properly  meta- 
 physical. 
 
 It  is  here  observable,  that  the  second  of  these  flows  from  the 
 first  as  a  necessary  emanation.  All  necessary  and  immutable 
 truth  is  included  in  the  first  truth,  as  water  in  a  fountain,  inde- 
 pendent of  will. 
 
 Thirdly,  The  contrary  of  physical  active  power  is  metaphysical. 
 For  physical  active  power,  which  pervades  the  universe  of  created 
 beings,  cannot  include  its  contrary.  Physical  power,  which  is  a 
 contingent  existence,  may  be  compared  to  a  parenthesis :  what 
 precedes  it,  is  absolute  power ;  what  follows  it,  is  necessary  limita- 
 tion, defect,  or  want  of  ulterior  perfection,  which  is  contrary  to 
 physical  active  power. 
 
 Dr  Eeid,  indeed,  supposed  that  active  power  has  no  contrary ; 
 but  he  was  greatly  mistaken,  and  that  mistake  involved  him  in  a 
 labyrinth  of  inconsistencies.  He  supjiosed  that  "  weakness  or  im- 
 potence are  defects  or  privations  of  power,  but  not  contraries  to 
 it,"  and  therefore  that  active  power  had  no  contrary.  But  I  would 
 ask,  is  not  privation  an  effect  ?  Who  can  dehberately  question  it  ? 
 As  an  effect  it  must  have  a  cause.  Is  active  power,  then,  the 
 cause  of  its  ow7i  privation  ?  Again,  weakness,  or  impotence,  is  a 
 want  of  active  power,  and  is  an  effect,  and  therefore  must  have  a 
 cause ;  but  is  active  power  the  cause  of  the  want  of  active  power  ? 
 
46  POWER — ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 Impossible.  Moreover,  limitation  of  active  power  cannot  be 
 caused  by  it ;  the  same  may  be  said  of  defect,  or  the  want  of 
 ulterior  perfection.  To  suppose  active  power,  whether  absolute  or 
 physical,  to  be  the  cause  of  the  defect  or  want  of  itself,  is  absurd 
 in  the  extreme.  The  true  cause  of  these  effects  is  properly  termed 
 metaphysical  power  or  cause ;  as  being  beyond  the  sphere  of 
 physical  causes,  and  founded  in  the  nature  of  things  according  to 
 the  highest  import  of  that  phrase,  irrespective  of  all  will. 
 
 Now,  as  the  effects  of  this  metaphysical  cause  are  the  direct 
 contrary  to  those  of  active  power,  the  two  causes,  or  powers,  must 
 be  so  too.  Hence  also  the  propriety  of  calling  this  metaphysic 
 power,  passive  power,  being  the  direct  opposite  and  contrary  to 
 active  power.  According  to  Dr  Eeid  we  have  no  conception  of 
 active  power  but  from  its  relation  to  effects ;  on  his  own  principles, 
 therefore,  from  contrary  effects  we  may  infer  contrary  causes. 
 And  he  who  would  deny  the  existence  of  metaphysic  power,  to  be 
 consistent,  should  also  deny  the  existence  of  active  power ;  for 
 they  stand  on  similar  evidence.  As  this  principle  is  of  the  utmost 
 importance  in  moral  science,  I  shall  enter  into  the  evidence  of  it  a 
 little  further;  whence  it  will  appear,  I  conceive,  why  many  in- 
 genious theorists  have  utterly  failed  in  attempting  to  account  for 
 numerous  moral  phenomena. 
 
 All  being  is  either  absolute  or  contingent ;  absolute  being  is 
 uncaused,  but  contingent  being  is  caused.  It  is  the  necessary 
 property  of  a  contingent  being  to  exist  and  operate  only  by  the 
 will  and  energy  of  that  which  is  absolute.  This  necessarily  im- 
 plies universal  dependence.  To  create  an  independent  being,  or 
 independent  laws  of  continued  being  and  operation,  involves  a 
 contradiction.  For  the  laws  of  a  created  nature  are  evidently  no 
 less  contingent,  and  therefore  no  less  dependent  on  their  author, 
 than  the  created  being  himself.  Dependence  therefore  on  the 
 First  Cause  is  of  metaphysical  necessity ;  the  contrary  involving  a 
 plain  contradiction.  It  matters  not  how  many  laws,  how  many 
 secondary  or  occasional  causes,  are  imagined,  they  are  all  alike 
 dependent,  as  to  being  and  operation,  on  the  first  energy,  and  its 
 continuance. 
 
 Now  universal  dependence,  as  to  being  and  operation,  is  an 
 effect,  and  there  can  be  no  effect  without  a  cause ;  I  ask,  what  is 
 that  cause?  Is  it  active  power?  Is  it  the  supreme  wUl?  To 
 suppose  the  supreme  will  to  be  the  cau,se  of  dependence  involves 
 
DISS.  III.]  POWER — ITS  DIPFEEENT  KINDS.  47 
 
 this  contradiction,  that  the  creature  might  have  been  independent, 
 on  a  par  with  the  Creator  in  that  respect,  had  He  not  willed  the 
 contraiy.  No  will  therefore,  and  consequently  no  active  power, 
 can  be  the  cause  of  dependence  ;  what  then,  I  repeat  the  inquiry, 
 is  that  cause  ?  It  is  the  contrary  to  active  power,  for  the  effects 
 are  contrary.  The  effect  of  active  power  is  the  continued  existence 
 and  operation  ;  but  the  effect  of  the  contrary  is  a  cessation  of  the 
 one  and  the  other.  These  effects  are  contrary,  and  so  must  their 
 causes  be.  The  cause  of  the  one  is  active  power ;  the  cause  of 
 the  other  is  properly  and  strictly  metaphysic  power  or  cause. 
 
 Annihilation,  it  is  true,  is  not  an  actual  effect,  because  the  con- 
 tingent laws  of  conservation  are  still  conturaed  ;  but  this  alters 
 not  the  case  in  the  science  of  possibles  and  impossibles.  We  know 
 that  without  a  creating  energy  the  existence  of  the  universe  would 
 have  been  impossible :  this  we  know  on  the  same  ground  of  in- 
 tuitive certainty  as  the  axiom.  That  there  can  be  no  effect  without 
 an  adequate  cause ;  or  with  the  same  certainty  as  that  a  circle  is 
 not  a  triangle.  With  equal  evidence  we  know,  that  IF  conserving 
 energy  were  to  cease,  the  effect  of  annihilation  must  necessarily 
 follow.  To  suppose  the  contrary  involves  the  contradiction,  that 
 contingent  and  absolute  being  are  the  same ;  that  the  caused  and 
 uncaused  beings  have  the  same  properties. 
 
 But  this  necessarily  implies  a  tendency  to  the  effect,  even  when 
 the  effect  is  not  actually  produced.  If  the  effect  of  ceasing  to 
 exist  must  necessarily  follow,  were  preserving  energy  not  con- 
 tinued, there  must  be  in  the  preserved  existence  a  tendency  to  that 
 effect  during  the  whole  period  of  that  existence.  This  tendency 
 cannot  possibly  arise  from  active  power ;  for  it  is  a  tendency  to 
 an  effect  contrary  to  that  produced  by  active  power,  and  therefore 
 the  cause  of  that  tendency  must  be  contrary  to  active  power ;  which 
 cannot  possibly  be  anything  else  than  metaphysic  power  or  cause. 
 
 It  may  be  observed,  that  this  want  of  ulterior  perfection,  as  it 
 may  be  called, — the  want,  for  instance,  of  self-existence,  indepen- 
 dence, and  all-sufficiency,— ris  not  the  want  of  due  perfection.  For 
 as  they  are  not  possible  in  a  contingent  being,  it  is  manifest  they 
 are  not  required.  The  defect  is  the  necessary  condition  of  created 
 existence,  which  no  will  could  possibly  ordain  to  be  otherwise. 
 For  to  perform  contradictions  is  no  object  of  Omnipotence. 
 
 Hence  we  perceive  what  answer  should  be  given  to  the  question. 
 Has  metaphysic  power  a  cause  ?     It  is  the  same  as  to  ask.  What 
 
48  POWEE — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 is  the  cause  of  difference  between  an  absolute  and  a  contingent 
 nature,  or  between  a  circle  and  a  square  ?  The  difference  is  evi- 
 dently founded  in  the  nature  of  things ;  that  is,  in  the  nature  of 
 God  and  of  a  ci'eature,  in  the  essential  properties  of  the  one  and 
 of  the  other.  This  metaphysic  power,  therefore,  has  no  cause  but 
 what  is  included  in  the  idea  of  contingent  existence.  It  is  a  rela- 
 tive idea,  but  the  relation  is  essential. 
 
 CONCEENING   MOEAL   POWEE,  WILL,  VOLITION,  DESIEE,  AND   THEIE 
 EFFICIENT  CAUSES. 
 
 The  morality  of  any  action  (Del  I.)  is  the  manner  of  it,  in  re- 
 ference to  the  end,  or  ends,  proposed  by  the  agent.  And  a  moral 
 power,  properly  speaking,  is  a  power  of  producing  an  action  which 
 has  a  moral  cpiality.  In  order  to  this,  it  is  agreed  there  must  be 
 understanding  and  will:  an  understanding  to  represent  an  object 
 of  choice,  and  a  will  to  choose  according  to  that  representation. 
 A  power  to  will  according  to  that  representation,  without  any 
 physical  intervening  cause  to  i>revent  the  effect,  is  the  liberty  of  a 
 moral  agent.  To  say  that  he  is  free,  or  possessed  of  liberty,  is  to 
 say  that  he  is  not  prevented,  by  any  iaterference  of  the  Moral 
 Governor,  from  choosmg  his  own  end,  or  ends,  as  he  thinks  best, 
 all  things  considered. 
 
 The  xmderstanding  may  be  called  a  moral  power  in  this  respect, 
 that  without  it  no  moral  effect  can  take  place ;  because  it  is  the 
 power  that  represents  what  the  will  chooses.  But,  more  properly, 
 the  vjill  itself  is  the  power  from  which  the  effect  immediately 
 arises.  The  understaudiug  represents  a  variety  of  objects  and 
 ends,  but  the  wiU  fixes  on  the  one  or  the  other,  and  stamps  the 
 moral  character  of  the  action.  Liberty,  in  strictness,  is  not  a 
 power  of  the  mind,  but  a  condition,  denoting  the  absence  of  all 
 constraint  and  interference  between  the  intention  of  the  agent  and 
 his  act.     He  who  acts  as  he  pleases  is  free. 
 
 Moral  power,  if  we  use  the  term  with  precision,  is  not  a  power 
 of  the  mind  sid  generis,  but  a  physical  power  in  a  specific  relation 
 — its  relation  to  a  moral  effect.  The  supposition  of  a  power  strictly 
 moral,  as  the  lang-uage  of  some  writers  appears  to  imply,  prior  to 
 any  exercise  of  the  will,  arises  from  a  false  notion  of  the  nature  of 
 morality.  The  same  may  be  said  of  what  is  often  termed  a  moral 
 principle ;  the  principle  itself  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  moral,  but 
 
DISS.  III.]  POWEE — ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  49 
 
 the  predisj)osiug  cause  of  morality.  It  is  tlie  will,  a  physical  power, 
 that  gives  existence  to  the  moral  quality  of  an  action ;  the  prin- 
 ciples, however  they  may  predispose  or  influence  the  manner  of  the 
 volition,  can  be  only  physical  or  metaphysical.  The  action  when 
 morally  good  proceeds  from  a  physical,  when  morally  bad  from  a 
 metaphysical  principle,  as  will  be  afterwards  proved. 
 
 The  terms  will,  volition,  and  desire  should  not  be  confounded. 
 The  will  properly  denotes  an  active  power  by  which  we  choose  an 
 object  or  an  end ;  volition,  the  very  act  or  exercise  of  the  will ; 
 and  desire  expresses  a  conscious  state,  or  temper,  or  exercise  of  the 
 mind,  relative  to  some  end  or  object,  under  the  influence  of  its 
 principles,  either  prior  to,  or  even  irrespective  of  its  volitions. 
 That  desire  is  a  state,  or  temper,  or  exercise  of  the  mind,  we  know 
 from  consciousness ;  and  in  the  same  manner  we  know  that  it 
 stands  related  to  some  object  or  end.  It  may  not  be  equally  plain, 
 though  it  be  equally  true,  that  desire  arises  from  the  influence  of 
 those  principles,  either  physical  or  metaphysical,  from  whence  pro- 
 ceed our  volitions.  Without  princijDles  as  the  source,  there  could 
 be  no  desire  any  more  than  an  exertion  of  will.  We  have  the 
 same  evidence  for  the  one  as  for  the  other. 
 
 The  mind  is  conscious  of  desire  ]_wior  to  volition,  when  the  ob- 
 ject of  the  will  and  of  the  desire  is  the  same.  As  there  must  be 
 contemplation  before  will,  so  must  there  be  desire.  But  neither 
 contemplation  nor  desire  is  always  followed  by  an  exercise  of  will. 
 The  mind  contemplates  two  or  more  things  with  a  view  to  choice, 
 when  only  one  thing  is  chosen.  Of  this  every  person  must  be 
 conscious,  that  he  contemplates  a  thousand  things  without  exer- 
 cising either  will  or  desire  concerning  them ;  and  also,  that  he 
 desires  many  things  which  he  does  not  will. 
 
 The  immediate  object  of  desire  is  the  possession  of  an  object, 
 or  the  enjoyment  of  an  end,  irrespective  of  the  choice  of  means 
 in  order  to  secure  it.  The  immediate  object  of  volition  is  the 
 means  chosen  in  order  to  secure  the  end  contemplated.  If  the 
 end  be  good,  and  the  choice  of  the  means  be  laudable,  the  action 
 is  virtuous  ;  but  if  the  end  be  unworthy,  or  the  means  chosen  to 
 secure  it  be  not  laudable,  the  action  is  vicious. 
 
 If  when  in  pain  we  desire  ease,  when  hungry  we  desire  food, 
 when  confined  we  desire  liberty,  when  in  want  we  desire  com- 
 petence, such  desires  arise  from  the  mere  principles  of  our  nature, 
 to  which  no  one  thinks  of  attaching  blame.     These  are  ends  in- 
 
 VOL.  IV.  D 
 
50  POWEE — ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 nocently  contemplated,  and  innocently  desired ;  but  if  a  man  de- 
 sire these  or  similar  ends  by  a  voluutary  adoi^tion  of  illandable 
 means,  the  blame  attaches  to  that  voluntary  adoption.  Thus,  for 
 instance,  if  he  desire  ease  by  means  of  suicide,  if  he  desire  food 
 by  means  of  theft,  liberty  by  fraud  or  falsehood,  or  competence  by 
 any  spiecies  of  dishonesty,  he  becomes  a  criminal.  On  the  con- 
 trary, when  these  ends  are  sought  by  laudable  means,  the  conduct 
 is  praiseworthy. 
 
 Thus  it  appears,  that  the  same  end  may  be  the  object  of  desire 
 and  of  will.  But  desire  contemplates  the  end  only,  while  the 
 exercise  of  wiU  respects  also  the  means  of  obtaining  it ;  and  this 
 last  alone  stamps  upon  the  act  a  moral  quality  of  good  or  evil,  as 
 these  means  adopted  are  either  laudable  or  the  contrary.  It  must, 
 however,  be  observed,  that  if  the  object  of  desu'e  be  unworthy,  a 
 voluntary  approbation  of  that  desire  is  criminal ;  for  the  exercise 
 of  volition  is  implied,  and  one  essential  part  of  a  virtuous  act  of 
 the  will  is  wanting,  that  is,  the  choice  of  laudable  means  ;  for  to 
 coustitxite  a  vicious  act,  the  want  of  either  a  worthy  end  or  of 
 laudable  means  is  sufficient. 
 
 Again ;  when  the  object  of  desire  is  worthy,  and  this  is  followed 
 by  voluntary  approbation,  that  approbation  is  laudable,  and  coin- 
 cides with  virtuous  love  or  delight.  When  the  object  of  desire 
 is  the  chief  good,  objectively  considered,  and  a  voluntary  approba- 
 tion follows,  that  approbation  coincides  with  resignation  and 
 devotion.  But  when  the  object  or  end  is  unworthy,  and  this  is 
 followed  by  a  vohmtary  act  of  disajiprobation,  that  disapprobation 
 is  laudable,  and  coincides  with  virtuous  hatred  or  disgust. 
 
 Moreover ;  as  we  often  exercise  our  oivn  volitions  in  order  to 
 obtain  a  desired  end, — that  is,  when  we  suppose  the  means  of 
 obtaining  it  are  in  our  power, — so,  when  we  consider  the  necessary 
 means  to  be  in  the  power  of  another,  we  use  entreaties,  supplica- 
 tions, or  requests.  Thus  when  we  desire  the  Divine  favour  as  the 
 end,  conscious  that  this  is  not  dependent  on  our  mere  choice,  we 
 present  prayers  and  supplications. 
 
 As  desire,  from  this  account  of  it,  is  not,  properly  sjieaking,  a 
 modification  of  the  will,  much  less  are  oiu'  appetites,  passions, 
 and  affections  in  general,  which  some  philosophers  have  supposed, 
 If  the  will  be  that  power  of  the  mind  by  which  we  determine  our 
 actions  in  reference  to  an  end  contemjalated, — which,  I  conceive, 
 cannot  be  rationally   controverted, — it   is  improper  to  call,   for 
 
DISS.  Iir.]  POWER — ITS  DIFFEEENT  KINDS.  51 
 
 instance,  liope  or  fear,  joy  or  sorrow,  modifications  of  the  will. 
 These,  as  all  onr  affections,  passions,  and  aj)petites,  arise  from  an 
 apprehension  of  different  objects  in  connexion  with  the  different 
 Ijrinciples  of  our  nature,  independent  on  the  power  of  acting  in 
 reference  to  an  end,  and  therefore  are  not  the  modifications  of  that 
 power.  Indeed,  a  voluntary  aj)probation  or  disapprobation  of  the 
 objects  by  which  these  feelings  are  excited,  may  succeed, —  as,  for 
 instance,  of  the  objects  of  love  or  hatred, — which  may  be  the 
 occasion  of  our  confounding  the  feeling  with  the  voluntary  act. 
 The  feelings  (under  which  term  I  here  include  all  our  appetites, 
 passions,  and  affections)  may  exist  antecedent  to  any  voluntary 
 determination  concerning  them  or  the  objects  by  which  they  are 
 excited  ;  but  the  will  is  an  original  power  of  the  mind,  which  may 
 or  may  not  fix  upon  them  the  stamp  of  approbation  or  disapproba- 
 tion, as  they  appear  calciilated  to  subserve  the  end  of  our  happiness. 
 The  truth  of  these  remarks,  any  one,  I  presume,  may  recognise 
 in  his  own  consciousness,  by  carefully  attending  to  his  individual 
 feelings. 
 
 Though  we  may  reflect  upon  our  feelings,  our  feelings  do  not 
 imply  reflection  ;  they  are  found  in  us  prior  to  all  reflection  and 
 deliberation  ;  though  by  these  they  are  capable  of  being  cherished 
 and  increased,  as  well  as  diminished  and  subdued.  "  A  healthy 
 child,"  says  Dr  Eeid,  "  some  hours  after  its  birth,  feels  the  sensa- 
 tion of  hunger,  and,  if  applied  to  the  breast,  sucks  and  swallows 
 its  food  very  perfectly.  We  have  no  reason  to  think  that,  before 
 it  ever  sucked,  it  has  any  conception  of  that  complex  operation,  or 
 how  it  is  performed.  It  cannot,  therefore,  with  propriety,  be  said 
 that  it  wills  to  suck.  Numberless  instances  might  be  given  of 
 things  done  by  animals,  without  any  previous  conception  of  what 
 they  are  to  do — without  the  intention  of  doing  it.  And  though 
 there  is  an  end  evidently  intended  by  the  action,  this  intention  is 
 not  in  the  animal,  but  in  its  Maker." 
 
 This  is  plain  good  sense.  But  when  the  author  adds,  in  the 
 same  connexion,  that  "  they  act  by  some  blind  impulse,  of  which 
 the  eflicient  cause  is  hid  from  us  ; "  he  draws  a  veil  of  obscurity 
 over  what  he  had  before  illustrated.  We  know  that  aH  physical 
 acts  proceed  from  God,  and  we  know  that  their  immediate  produc- 
 tion is  not  unworthy  of  Him ;  why  then  should  we  suppose  that 
 there  is  any  other  efiicient  cause  ?  Between  the  First  Cause  and 
 the  effect  there  may  be  a  chain  of  secondary  causes,  consisting  of 
 
52  POWEE — ITS  DIFFERENT  KINDS.  [DISS.  III. 
 
 many  links ;  but  I  see  no  propriety  in  calling  the  one  immediately 
 preceding  the  effect  the  efficient  canse,  rather  than  the  first,  seeing 
 all  the  effect  must  proceed  from  the  first.  Much  of  Dr  Eeid's 
 reasoning,  on  diflereut  subjects,  depends  on  the  assumption  that 
 the  secondary  cause  immediately  preceding  the  eSect  is  the  proper 
 efficient.  But  it  ought  to  be  no  more  granted  him,  than  ^ve 
 should  grant  a  lecturer  on  electricity  that  the  efficient  cause  of  the 
 electric  shock  is  the  last  link  of  the  chain  that  conveys  it. 
 
 It  is  the  province  of  natural  philosophy  to  investigate  the  nature 
 and  order  of  the  secondary  causes  of  phenomena;  but  in  moral 
 science,  our  inquiry  should  be  after  the  ultimate  causes  of  moral 
 events,  as  of  prime  importance.  An  Atheist  may  be  a  profoimd 
 mathematician,  a  great  astronomer,  an  eminent  chemist,  a  proficient 
 in  any  or  all  the  parts  of  natural  philosophy,  or  the  fine  arts ;  but 
 in  moral  science,  he  cannot  take  one  step  without  betraying  his 
 folly.  If  at  any  time  on  that  subject  he  talk  sense,  it  must  be  at 
 the  expense  of  his  own  princijjles.  Without  recognising  a  First 
 Cause  of  all  physical  eflects,  and  of  aU  moral  effects  worthy  of  Him, 
 as  of  all  goodness  and  virtue,  it  is  impossible  to  recognise  either 
 religion  or  moral  science.  The  recognition  of  a  First  Cause  and 
 its  energy  is  the  very  root  and  life  of  both.  Without  this,  ■what 
 meaning  can  there  be  in  prayer  or  praise,  adoration  or  worship, 
 pious  resignation,  genuine  humility,  virtuous  love,  reverential  fear, 
 and  the  like  1  To  regard  God  as  the  efficient  cause  of  all  physical 
 effects,  or  those  which  are  produced  according  to  the  course  of 
 nature,  is  not  an  hypothesis,  but  a  demonstrable  reality. 
 
 When  the  illustrious  Newton  says,  "Hactenus  phsenomena 
 ccelorum  et  maris  nostri  per  vim  gTavitatis  exposui,  sed  causam 
 gravitatis  nondum  assignavi,"  he  evidently  means  a  secondary 
 cause  of  gravity  intervening  between  the  First  Cause  and  that  eflect, 
 because  the  investigation  of  secondary  causes,  in  reference  to  their 
 effects,  is  the  true  province  of  natural  philosophj'.  Hence  he  adds, 
 "  Rationem  vero  harum  gravitatis  proprietatum  ex  phrenomenis 
 nondum  potui  deducere,  et  hypotheses  non  Jingo."  His  province 
 as  a  natural  philosopher  was  to  ascertain  secondarj'  causes  from 
 phenomena ;  gravitation  was  discovered  to  be  a  uniform  second- 
 ary cause  of  innumerable  efiects ;  but  whether  gravitation  itself  had 
 another  such  cause  intervening  between  it  and  the  First  Cause,  Sir 
 Isaac  could  not  deduce  from  phenomena,  and  as  a  judicious  natural 
 philosojiher  he  was  not  authorised  to  suppose  it.     But  whether  God 
 
DISS.  III.]  POWER — ITS  DIFPEEENT  KINDS.  53 
 
 was  the  primary  agent  was  no  cause  of  doubt  with  him,  concerning 
 whom  he  says,  "  In  ipso  continentur  et  nioventur  universa,  sed  sine 
 mutua  loassione." 
 
 In  physics,  therefore,  there  is  a  propriety  in  calling  the  principle 
 immediately  preceding  the  effect  the  efficient  cause  of  it,  because 
 the  sphere  of  inquiry  is  confined  to  secondary  causes.  But  in  moral 
 science,  in  which  the  First  Cause  is  necessarily  introduced,  He  alone 
 is  the  efficient  as  to  active  power  and  physical  effects,  because  it  is 
 demonstrable  that  His  energy  is  the  only  adequate  cause  of  such 
 effects.  And  here,  I  conceive,  Dr  Eeid,  and  many  other  philo- 
 sophers, have  greatly  erred  in  making  the  laws  and  language  of 
 natural  philosophy  the  standard  of  moral  science.  As  an  inquirer 
 into  secondary  causes,  it  would  not  be  sufficient  to  say,  God  is  the 
 efficient  cause  of  thunder,  lightning,  an  earthquake,  or  the  like  ;  but 
 as  an  inquirer  into  ultimate  causes,  which  is  the  province  of  moral 
 science,  the  first  philosophy,  and  theology,  the  language  is  strictly 
 proper.  Hence  the  propriety  of  regarding  God  as  the  efficient 
 cause  of  our  moral  power,  will,  volition,  desire,  affections,  passions, 
 and  appetites,  considered  as  physical  acts. 
 
DISSERTATION  IV. 
 
 ON  TOLUNTAEY  OPERATIONS.      FINAL  CAUSES  OE  ENDS — 
 TTLTIMATE — CHIEF.      TEUE  "WISDOJI. 
 
 From  the  preceding  observations  it  is  obvious,  and  the  appeal 
 might  be  made  to  every  man's  consciousness,  that  there  are  many 
 operations  of  the  human  mind  which  are  not  voluntary.  Those 
 operations  which  are  properly  termed  voluntary  are  the  effect  of 
 deliberation ;  but  there  are  innumerable  acts  which  are  preceded 
 by  no  deliberation  at  all.  The  principal  secondary  cause  of  such 
 actions  is  that  instinctive  jarincijile  which  mankind  possess  iu 
 common  with  tlie  brute  creation,  of  which  God  is  the  efficient 
 cause.  The  laws  of  our  created  nature  are  only  the  instruments  by 
 which  His  energy  exerts  itself.  The  natural  iihilosopher  may 
 inquire  into  the  nature  and  number  of  the  intermediate  links  of 
 causes,  but  in  the  light  of  moral  science  these  are  of  little,  and 
 often  of  no  account. 
 
 Our  present  object  is  to  inquire  into  the  natiu'e  and  causes  of 
 those  voluntaiy  operations  for  which  we  are  accountable.  It  is 
 plain  that  to  desire  happiness  in  general  has  neither  praise  nor 
 blame  attached  to  it,  because  it  arises  from  an  instinctive  principle 
 independently  of  all  volition  in  the  ^jroper  acceptation  of  this  term  ; 
 but  when  happiness  is  sought  by  a  deliberate  use  of  means  which 
 appear  calculated  to  promote  that  end,  the  operation  is  voluntary, 
 and  the  effect  becomes  morally  good  or  bad. 
 
 Every  accountable  act  of  the  wiU  supposes  some  object  which 
 may  be  called  a  final  cause  or  end  to  be  attained,  for  to  act  for  no 
 end  is  a  merely  animal  or  instinctive  operation.  It  supposes  a 
 choice  of  tneans  conclusive  to  that  end,  for  no  one  is  obliged  to 
 seek  an  end  when  he  has  no  alternative  in  the  choice  of  means. 
 An  accountable  act,  moreover,  supposes  deliberation  in  reference 
 
DISS.  IV.]  ON  VOLUNTAEY  0PEEATI0N3.  0-5 
 
 both  to  ends  and  means.  This  also  implies  liberty,  which  is  the 
 last  thing  supjsosed  in  our  moral  or  accountable  acts. 
 
 With  respect  to  ends,  or  final  causes,  there  is  an  important 
 difference  between  what  is  ultimate  and  what  is  chief.  Our 
 voluntary  actions  may  have  a  great  variety  of  ultimate  ends,  but 
 there  can  be  in  the  view  of  the  agent  only  one  chief  end.  Thus 
 the  ultimate  end  of  a  military  commander  in  undertaking  a  cam- 
 2)aign  may  be  the  conquest  of  a  country,  and  if  he  succeeds,  the 
 end  is  accomjDlished.  When  the  same  person  sits  down  to  a  ban- 
 quet, his  ultimate  end  is  to  be  regaled.  That  end  being  finished, 
 he  proceeds  to  accomplish  a  variety  of  others  in  succession.  But 
 something  different  from  them  all  may  be  his  chief  end  in  all 
 his  actions.  The  ultimate  end  of  a  mechanic  may  be  to  complete 
 a  piece  of  work  according  to  some  given  price,  or  some  standard  of 
 excellence  ;  that  of  a  merchant  in  making  a  contract  may  be  to 
 realise  a  certain  definite  sum.  The  ultimate  ends  of  the  one  and 
 of  the  other  maybe  as  numerous  as  the  objects  they  may  thus  have 
 successively  in  view  to  be  specifically  attained,  but  all  may  be  under 
 the  influence  of  some  one  chief  end  peculiar  to  each  agent. 
 
 Persons  of  opposite  moral  characters  may  be  engaged  together 
 in  pursuit  of  the  same  ultimate  end.  But  this  cannot  be  said  of 
 persons  who  pursue  the  same  chief  end.  When  a  number  of 
 artists  are  engaged  in  completing  similar  works  ;  or  a  company 
 sit  down  to  a  repast,  aiming,  respectively,  at  the  satisfying  of  their 
 corporeal  appetites  ;  their  chief  ends  may  be  as  numerous  as  their 
 persons.  And  it  is  by  this,  principally,  their  moral  character  is 
 denominated. 
 
 The  pursuit  of  happiness,  in  general,  is  instinctive ;  but  the 
 first  concern  of  a  moral  agent  is  to  ascertain  in  what  object  that 
 happiness  is  included,  and  by  what  means  he  may  best  attain  it. 
 If  we  fix  upon  an  end  which,  when  attained,  is  not  perfective  of 
 our  nature,  to  choose  it  for  that  purpose  is  the  worst  and  most 
 dangerous  kind  of  folly.  As  the  business  of  prudence  is  to  calcu- 
 late the  probability  of  events,  and  to  provide  accordingly ;  so  the 
 office  of  wisdom  is  to  fix  upon  a  worthy  end,  and  to  seek  it  by 
 laudable  means. 
 
 Can  any  one  question  whether  the  chief  end  of  a  moral  agent 
 ought  to  be  his  chief  good  ?  Probably  not,  while  he  has  the  power 
 of  reflecting.  But  what  is  the  chief  good?  This  question  has 
 greatly  puzzled  heathen  philosophers.     A  great  part  of  the  per- 
 
56  ON  VOLUNTARY  OPERATIONS.  [DISS.  IV. 
 
 plexity  seems  to  have  arisen  from  the  statino;  of  the  question,  how- 
 ever short  or  simple  it  may  appear.  Good  is  either  absolute  or 
 relative — what  is  good  in  itself,  and  what  is  good  for  the  agent. 
 In  the  present  state  of  moral  science,  every  one  must  acknowledge 
 that  there  is  but  one  absolute  good,  whom  we  call  God,  who  is 
 infinitely  perfect.  He  therefore,  objectively  considered,  must  be 
 the  only  chief  end  on  which  the  mind  can  rest  with  satisfaction, 
 and  consequently  the  only  one  perfection  of  our  nature. 
 
 But  if  the  inquiry  be,  What  is  our  chief  good  subjectively  ?  it 
 cannot  be  doubted  that  the  right  answer  is — happiness.  Hence 
 the  complex  question  is  fairly  answered,  that  our  happiness  in 
 God  is  the  chief  good.  This  is  what  the  moral  agent  ought  to 
 adopt  as  his  chief  end.  And  when  he  seeks  this  end  by  the  use  of 
 commendable  means,  he  may  be  denominated  truly  wise.  He  who 
 neglects  this  end  is  chargeable  with  the  greatest  folly,  however 
 wise  he  may  be  in  adopting  suitable  mean.s,  in  order  to  attain  any 
 other  end  he  clioo.ses  to  adopt.  The  sldll  displayed  in  seeking  an 
 unworthy  end  by  means  the  best  suited  to  attain  it,  in  any  de- 
 partment of  life,  is  j;ariiaZ  Avisdom ;  the  other  alone  is  essentially 
 virtuous. 
 
 A  hero,  a  politician,  or  a  merchant,  may  be  jDartially  wise ;  but 
 as  a  moral  agent,  he  cannot  be  virtuously  wise  if  the  chief  good  be 
 not  deliberately  chosen  as  his  chief  end.  A  person  may  be  wise, 
 in  the  partial  sense  of  the  term,  to  do  evil ;  because  he  seeks  an 
 unworthy  end  with  skill  and  address.  And  it  too  often  happens 
 that  the  most  worthy  end  is  sought  by  means  that  stamp  the 
 agent's  character  with  partial  folly.  The  highest  part  of  wisdom, 
 however,  consists  in  the  choice  of  a  worthy  end ;  and  the  greatest 
 part  of  folly  in  choosing  one  that  is  unworthy.  Then  is  wisdom 
 most  complete,  when  the  best  end  is  sought  by  the  best  means ; 
 and  then  is  folly  the  most  consummate,  when  it  seeks  the  most 
 unworthy,  end  by  the  most  unsuitable  means. 
 
DISSERTATION  V. 
 
 ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.      LIBERTY — AEGUMENTS  FOE. 
 NECESSITY — AEGUMENTS  EOE. 
 
 Sect.  I. 
 Of  Liberty. 
 
 Theee  are  few  subjects  in  moral  science  that  have  been  more 
 clouded  and  perplexed  by  philosoj^hers  than  the  doctrine  of  moral 
 liberty.*  By  this  term  I  understand  that  kind  of  liberty  which  is 
 essential  to  a  moral  agent  in  the  exercise  of  volition,  or  that  which 
 
 *  There  are  three  questions  on  this  intricate  subject,  the  true  solution  of  which 
 seems  to  have  been  but  little,  if  at  all,  noticed : — 
 
 I.  What  is  the  immediate,  cause  of  determining  the  mind's  volitions  ?  In  general, 
 it  is  admitted  by  all,  that,  as  the  proper  object  of  the  understanding  is  truth,  so 
 the  proper  object  of  the  rdll  is  good.     Yet — 
 
 1.  Were  it  always  the  real  good  that  the  mind  perceived,  the  volitions  would 
 always  be  accurate;  but  this  is  contrary  to  universal  experience.  A  good  in- 
 finitely real  is  proposed  in  words ;  but  the  mind  often  chooses  what  is  of  little  or 
 no  value,  in  preference  to  it.     Nor  is  it  enough  to  say — 
 
 2.  That  the  mind  chooses  the  greatest  apparent  good,  which  is  the  common 
 answer  to  the  question.  This  is  insufficient,  because  it  leaves  us  in  the  dark 
 respecting  the  true  cause  why  real  good  does  not  appear  to  be  so.     Therefore — 
 
 3.  It  is  submitted  to  the  attention  of  the  learned,  whether  the  actual  state  of 
 the  mind  in  the  scale  of  rectitude  be  not  the  immediate  cause  of  determining  the 
 will.  I  take  "  rectitude  "  here  as  applicable  to  all  acts,  both  natural  and  moral. 
 I  said,  the  "cause"  of  determining  the  will,  not  the  occasion.  The  "object," 
 whether  it  be  really  or  only  apparently  good,  is  not  the  cause ;  for,  from  an  ex- 
 hihiiioti  of  the  same  object, — yea,  the  contenvplation  of  the  same  object, — contrary 
 eflfecta  follow  in  diiferent  minds,  and  the  same  mind  at  different  times.  The 
 object,  therefore,  is  only  an  occasion  of  determining  our  volitions.  A  rectified 
 mind,  or  a  mind  in  a  right  state,  perceives  objects  presented  to  it  for  moral  choice 
 as  they  are  ;  and  the  volitions  will  be  accordingly.  With  these  remarks  the  next 
 question  stands  closely  connected ; — 
 
 II.  What  is  the  vnvmediate  cause  of  the  mind  sinking  or  rising  in  the  scale  of 
 
58  ON  LIBEETY  AND  >'ECESSITT.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 is  indispensably  requisite  for  the  production  of  accountable  acts. 
 But  as  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  in  general,  may  contribute  to  shew 
 
 rectitude?     The  true  answer  to  this  question  will  bring  us  to  the  root  of  the 
 subject.     But  how  has  it  been  commonly  answered  ? 
 
 1.  Some,  from  supposed  experience,  from  the  acknowledged  fact  of  much  evil 
 existing,  and  the  high  improbability  that  Grod  should  determine  those  volitions 
 which  are  wicked,  and  _perceiving  no  medium;  between  ascribing  aU  determinations 
 to  God  or  to  ourselves,  have  strenuously  maintained  that  the  mind  is  determined 
 "by  its  own  sovereign  pleasure."  According  to  this  hypothesis,  the  state  of  the 
 mind  in  reference  to  the  scale  of  rectitude  is  caused  by  (airc^oucrta)  self-soi'e- 
 rcignly,  or  a  self-determining  poiccr.  According  to  them,  by  a  wrong  choice  our 
 minds  become  erroneous,  criminal,  and  wretched;  but  by  a  right  choice  they 
 become  rectified,  virtuous,  and  happy. 
 
 2.  Others,  perceiving  the  incongruity  of  such  an  hypothesis,  which  ascribes  to 
 the  human  mind  what  they  do  not  experience,  and  which  denies  to  God  the 
 honour  of  directing,  with  infallible  certainty,  the  universe  He  hath  made  to  a 
 happy  issue,  have  adopted  the  doctrine  of  uiiirersal  necessity.  According  to  this 
 hypothesis,  as  commonly  held,  the  immediate  cause  of  the  state  of  the  mind,  as 
 found  in  the  scale  of  rectitude,  is  the  olject  iUelf,  which  begets,  first,  sensations 
 or  consciousness,  then  ideas  and  associations,  and  hence  volitions,  habits,  and 
 character.  It  is  not  surprising  that  those  who  think  thus  should  also  maintain 
 that  God  sees  no  evil  in  the  world,  and  therefore  that  there  is  none  but  in  our 
 feelings, — that  sin,  an  evil  improperly  so  called,  shall  be  at  length  annihilated,  and 
 therefore  men  and  devils  will  be  made  ultimately  happy.  For  how  can  that  be 
 e\-il  which  God  cau^i ,'  Or  why  should  God  cause  evil,  as  felt  by  us  to  be  so,  but 
 in  order  to  make  us  thereby,  as  by  a  wholesome  discipline,  finally  happy  ? 
 
 On  the  pro  and  the  contra  of  these  hypotheses  what  loads  of  learning,  ingenuitj', 
 quibblings,  and  quarrels  have  been  committed  to  paper,  and  i^ued  from  the  press  ! 
 During  the  last  century  the  advocates  of  liberty  have  been  weakened,  and  those  of 
 necessity  have  gathered  strength,  by  the  labours  of  Edwards,  Toplady,  Priestley> 
 Crombie,  and  a  host  besides,  against  Whitby,  Fletcher,  Gregory,  &c.  On  the 
 principles  hitherto  employed  to  bring  the  controversy  to  a  decisive  issue,  it  is 
 much  more  difficult  to  discover  the  source  of  the  truth  than  it  is  to  find  the 
 source  of  the  NUe, 
 
 3.  With  deference, — which  in  no  instance  is  more  becoming  than  in  this,  after 
 the  labours  of  so  many  eminent  characters  on  the  subject, — it  is  proposed  to  con- 
 sideration, whether  every  right  choice  has  not  one  uniform  cause  of  determination, 
 and  a  irrong  choice  another  uniform  cause,  totally  different  from  the  other?  lly 
 answer  to  the  question  is,  the  immediate  cause  of  the  mind  sinl-ing  in  the  scale  of 
 rectitude,  or,  which  is  the  same,  deviating  from  the  line  of  rectitude  into  errors 
 or  crimes,  is  lihtiiy;  and  the  immediate  cause  of  the  mind  maintaining  its  recti- 
 tude, or  else  rising  in  the  scale,  is  necessity.  If  this  be  admitted,  as  I  believe  it 
 must,  every  human  being  on  earth  is  at  once,  in  different  respects,  the  subject  of 
 liberty  and  necessity.  All  decretive  necessity  is  from  God ;  and  its  object  is  all 
 natural  and  moral  good,  in  its  various  degrees  and  combinations,  to  the  utter 
 exclusion  of  all  moral  eviL  But  all  hypothetical  necessity  is  not  of  God,  which 
 Necessarians  in  general  seem  to  overlook.  The  evil  of  imperfection  and  the  evil 
 of  sin  are  of  hypothetical  necessity,  but  not  of  God — any  more  than  a  shadow  is 
 of  the  light,  or  falsehood  of  the  truth.  Again,  passive  power  (by  which  I  mean  a 
 tendency  to  defection  essential  to  every  contingent  existence,  physically  as  to  being. 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  59 
 
 the  true  nature  of  moral  liberty  in  a  more  advantageous  light,  I 
 shall  offer  some  observations  on  it. 
 
 and  morally  as  to  well-being)  is  not  of  God,  yet  of  hypothetical  necessity ;  and  so 
 is  the  origin  of  moral  evU. 
 
 Decretive  necessity  does  not  exclude  liberty,  but  employs  it ;  yet  liberty  may 
 exist  without  decretive  necessity,  and  the  result  will  be  hypotheticaUy  certain. 
 This  hypothetical  certainty  arises  not  from  positive  appointment,  but  from  the 
 ascertainable  tendency  to  defection,  perceived  by  the  Divine  mind  with  infinite 
 precision,  as  a  relative  contrast.     Another  question  remains  : — 
 
 III.  Is  there  any  one  instance  in  which  the  mind  can  choose  otherwise  than  it 
 does  ?  A  solution  of  this  question  wiU  explain  the  chief  difficulty.  To  this  end, 
 observe — 
 
 1.  In  every  instance  of  wrong  choice  the  mind  is  uninfluenced  by  decretive 
 necessity,  and  consequently  free  from  all  "  foreign  cause  or  consideration  what- 
 ever offered  to  it."     Y'et — 
 
 2.  In  every  such  instance  there  must  be  a  cause  in  the  mind  itself,  which  renders 
 the  event  subject  to  hypothetical  necessity.  If  the  mind  stand  high  in  the  scale 
 of  rectitude  from  decretive  necessity,  it  is  hypotheticaUy  necessary  that  the  choice 
 wiU  be  good  in  the  same  proportion.  But  if  the  mind  stand  low  in  the  scale,  (as 
 it  always  will,  from  its  freedom  and  passive  power,  when  not  decretively  sup- 
 ported,) it  is  hypotheticaUy  necessary,  or  absolutely  certain,  that  the  choice  will 
 be  wrong.     Thence — 
 
 3.  If  the  mind  be  placed  exactly  in  the  same  state,  the  object  and  the  representa- 
 tion being  the  same,  the  choice  cannot  be  different.  This  is  a  law  of  imiversal 
 application.  To  be  free  from  it  would  be  no  excellence,  but  the  reverse.  It  is 
 the  glory  of  God  that  He  cannot  lie,  and  the  disgrace  of  the  ofi'ender  that  he  can- 
 not cease  from  sin.  A^Tiile  God  is  infinitely  holy,  for  that  very  reason  His  choice 
 will  be  infinitely  right.  As  the  existence  of  God  is  of  absolute  necessity,  and  there- 
 fore infinitely  glorious,  so  His  volitions  are  of  hypothetical  necessity,  and  infallibly 
 good. 
 
 4.  From  these  remarks  we  see  how  far,  or  in  what  respect,  a  liberty  of  contra- 
 diction and  of  contrariety  can  be  applied  to  the  human  mind.  When  the  state  of 
 the  mind  is  meliorated  by  a  necessitating  cause  or  infiuence,  a  real  good  will  be 
 chosen,  which,  identically  considered,  would  otherwise  have  been  rejected.  On 
 the  contrary,  when  the  state  of  the  mind  is  deteriorated  by  passive  power  and  an 
 abuse  of  liberty,  the  evil  which  otherwise  would  have  been  rejected  will  be  chosen. 
 In  these  cases  we  have  a  Uberty  not  only  of  contradiction,  but  of  contrariety,  if 
 we  regard  the  object  itself  That  is,  a  man  may  not  only  cease  to  choose,  but 
 choose  the  contrary,  if  he  be  otherwise  minded  or  disposed.  If  he  be  otherwise 
 minded  for  the  better,  it  must  be  from  a  decretive,  necessitating  cause,  otherwise 
 God  would  not  be  the  cause  of  all  good;  but  if  for  the  worse,  it  must  be  from 
 passive  power  and  the  exercise  of  liberty,  else  man  would  be  self-sufficient.  But 
 to  suppose  that  any  man  has  a  power  of  choosing  the  contrary  at  the  same  instant, 
 without  being  otherwise  minded,  seems  equally  incompatible  with  fact  and  reason. 
 
 First  Carol. — Decretive  necessity  (the  purpose,  energy,  and  gracious  influence 
 of  God)  is  the  sole  parent  of  good ;  but  liberty,  in  union  with  ^^assive  power,  the 
 parent  of  all  moral  evil. 
 
 Second  Corol. — That  to  be  morally  free,  in  some  cases  at  least,  is  a  great  evil. 
 It  was  so  to  Epliraim : — "  Ephraim  is  joined  unto  idols  :  let  him  alone,"  (Hosea 
 iv.  17.)     And  to  be  deprived  of  this  freedom,  in  some  instances,  must  be  a  great 
 
60  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 Liberty,  generally  speaking,  denotes  exemption  from  restraint. 
 This  liberty  is  either  external  or  internal.  That  which  is  external, 
 is  properly  the  liberty  of  jDerforming  any  action  according  to  our 
 wish ;  that  which  is  internal,  is  the  liberty  of  choosing  according 
 to  onr  conviction.  They  may,  therefore,  be  conveniently  denomi- 
 nated executive  and  elective. 
 
 Executive  liberty  may  be  viewed  in  reference  to  the  individual 
 himself,  or  in  reference  to  society.  As  every  action  of  the  agent, 
 morally  considered,  is  either  good  or  bad,  then  alone  is  liberty  of 
 acting  the  right  of  the  individual  when  it  is  conformable  to  law, 
 or  at  least  not  injurious  in  its  consequences.  In  an  upright  being 
 whose  internal  hberty  is  not  perverted,  the  right  of  exemption  from 
 restraint  is  no  less  in  the  executive  than  in-  the  elective  sense  of 
 freedom  ;  but  no  one  can  plead  a  right  to  injure  either  himself  or 
 others,  when  others  can  jjrevent  it  without  equal  injmy.  Thus  a 
 child  about  to  hurt  himself  by  taking  a  deadly  potion,  or  handling 
 an  edged  tool,  cannot  plead  for  executive  liberty  when  a  parent  or 
 a  friend  restrains. 
 
 And  in  reference  to  society.  When  the  laws  of  society  are  con- 
 formable to  virtue,  no  man  or  body  of  men  can  have  a  right  of 
 exercising  executive  liberty  without  restraint.  This,  I  conceive, 
 is  too  much  overlooked  by  those  who  plead  for  the  "rights  of 
 man  "  in  society,  and  stni  less  is  the  ground  of  the  distinction 
 understood.  In  things  virtuous,  or  things  indiflferent  as  to  inju- 
 rious consequences,  no  man  or  society  of  men  has  a  right  to 
 restrain  another  in  the  exercise  of  his  freedom.  Interference,  in 
 such  case,  degenerates  uito  tp-anuy,  whether  personal  or  social. 
 
 This  shews  the  vast  importance  of  a  constitution  and  laws  being 
 so  formed  as  to  be  conformable  to  virtue.  When  the  good  of 
 society  is  made  to  consist  in  any  jiarticular  which  is  not  com- 
 patible with  virtue,  the  consciences  of  individuals  are  rasulted,  and 
 
 blessing.     So  it  was  to  Sa\il  the  persecutor,  when  arrested  iu  his  mad  career  on 
 the  way  to  Damascus. 
 
 From  what  has  been  advanced  it  would  also  follow,  that  in  no  case,  if  we  con- 
 sult merely  the  happiness  of  the  agent,  is  the  freedom  above  defined  desii-able, 
 though  the  ends  of  moral  government  may  be  answered  by  it ;  and  that  an  in- 
 fringement of  it  from  Divine  interposition  is  always  desirable  in  order  to  our 
 security  and  happiness,  as  being  that  alone  by  which  an  abuse  of  liberty  is 
 prevented,  and  which  is  never  exercised,  properly  speaking,  but  for  our  good.  In 
 strictness,  actions  are  determined  by  the  wiU,  the  will  by  the  disposition,  and  this 
 last  by  either  God's  efficient  energy  or  by  passive  power. 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  61 
 
 their  liberties  unjustly  controlled.  Laws  are  made  for  the  dis- 
 obedient, on  purjjose  to  prevent  their  being  injurious.  Who  can 
 doubt  that  it  is  right  to  restrain  a  man  from  murdering  himself 
 or  others,  from  dishonouring  his  neighbour's  bed,  or  from  taking 
 away  his  property,  however  he  may  plead  that  his  liberty  is  in- 
 fringed upon  ?  But  if  the  restraint  proceeds  so  far  as  to  compel 
 the  agent  to  abstain  from  what  is  virtuous,  or  to  do  what  is 
 vicious,  there  tyrannic  influence  is  exerted.  The  laws  that  require 
 this  are  unjust,  and  the  government  becomes  despotic  and  cruel. 
 
 Elective  liberty  is  quite  of  another  kind.  It  is  the  unalienable 
 right  of  a  free  agent.  To  restrain  it  by  any  external  force,  or 
 to  attempt  its  restraint,  is  inconsistent  with  moral  government. 
 Accordingly  it  is  found,  in  fact,  that  even  the  Supreme  _  Governor, 
 who  has  the  highest  claim  on  the  obedience  of  moral  subjects,  does 
 not  exercise  external  force  in  preventing  our  elections.  And 
 indeed  the  very  essence  of  elective  liberty  consists  in  exemption 
 from  it.  The  means  He  employs  to  prevent  crimes  are  declara- 
 tions of  danger,  awful  warniags,  persuasions,  and  threats ;  and 
 when  He  means  to  insure  obedience,  (and  who  can  question  that 
 He  actually  does  this  in  some  instances?)  it  is  by  an  influence 
 perfectly  compatible  with  free  agency.  Light  in  the  mind  will 
 insure  conviction,  and  this  conviction  wUl  rectify  the  choice. 
 
 Mr  Locke  maintains  that  liberty  does  not  belong  to  the  ivill, 
 but  to  the  nan.  This,  I  apprehend,  is  not  accurate,  except  on  the 
 supposition  that  liberty  is  a  poiuer,  as  well  as  the  will.  The 
 power  of  a  power,  he  observes,  is  not  compatible.  Very  true ;  but 
 if  liberty  be  exemption  from  restraint,  it  must  belong  to  the  will 
 in  the  most  direct  manner.  If  the  exercise  of  volition  be  exempt 
 from  control  in  the  morality  of  our  choice,  the  will  is  equally  free 
 with  the  agent.  This  eminent  author  seems  to  have  taken  it  for 
 granted  that  liberty  is  a  power,  and  therefore,  to  avoid  an  evident 
 absurdity,  transferred  it  from  the  will,  which  is  a  power,  to  the 
 agent. 
 
 Dr  Eeid  also,  who  differs  from  Mr  Locke  in  his  conclusions, 
 seems  to  agree  with  him  in  this  notion  of  liberty.  With  what  pro- 
 priety we  shall  now  examine.  "  By  the  liberty  of  a  moral  agent," 
 says  he,  "  I  understand  a  power  over  the  determinations  of  his  own 
 will."*  It  is  but  natural  to  ask,  Who  can  form  an  idea  of  such 
 p)ower  ?    Dr  Eeid  anticipates  the  question.     "  The  only  distinct 
 
 *  Actire  Powers,  Essay  iv.,  chap.  i. 
 
62  ON  LIBERTY  AST)  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 conception  I  can  form  of  active  po2uer  is,  that  it  is  an  attribute  in 
 a  being  by  which  he  can  do  certain  things  if  he  wills.  This,  after 
 all,  is  only  a  relative  couceiDtion.  It  is  relative  to  the  effect,  and 
 to  the  will  of  i3roducing  it.  Take  away  these,  and  the  conception 
 vanishes."*  Eespecting  his  notion  of  active  power,  whether  we 
 can  form  a  direct  as  well  as  a  relative  conception  of  it,  I  need  say 
 nothing  here,  it  having  been  considered  before. f  Here,  it  is 
 plain,  he  considers  liherty  as  a  powei;  active  power,  in  the  strictest 
 sense  of  the  term.  And  as  he  considers  active  power  to  be  an 
 attribute  in  a  being,  he  must  consider  liberty  to  be  such  an  attri- 
 bute ;  and,  after  all,  he  says  it  is  only  a  relative  conception, — 
 a  conception  relative  to  the  effect,  and  to  the  wiU  of  producing 
 it. 
 
 In  reply  to  this  notion  of  liherty,  I  appeal  to  the  experience  of 
 every  reilecting  person.  Does  any  one,  in  fact,  find  in  himself, 
 relative  to  moral  acts,  anything  more  than  an  apprehension  of 
 the  object  to  be  chosen,  and  a  ivill  exempt  from  control  in  its 
 election  ?  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  minds  of  some 
 men  are  formed  without,  and  others  with  such  an  attribute.  I 
 may  therefore  lodge  my  appeal  in  the  breast  of  any  man,  that  he 
 has  no  power,  no  attribute,  besides  an  aj^ prehension  of  an  object, 
 and  a  will  imrestrained  in  choosing  or  refusing  it. 
 
 In  the  next  place,  I  appeal  to  every  person's  reason  whether  an 
 active  u'ill,  choosing  or  rejecting  according  to  the  rejjresentation  of 
 the  intellect,  be  not  sufficient  to  account  for  every  moral  act,  with- 
 out supposing  another  power  of  which  we  have  no  experience  ? 
 It  is  not  philosophical  to  multiply  causes  beyond  what  are  suffi- 
 cient to  account  for  the  phenomena.  I  may  therefore  conclude 
 that  the  notion  of  Dr  Eeid  is  an  unproved  and  useless  hypothesis. 
 Liberty,  indeed,  does  belong  to  every  moral  agent,  but  not  as  an 
 active  power  distinct  from  the  will,  instinctively  seeking  the 
 greatest  apparent  good,  as  the  effect  of  Divine  causation. 
 
 I  acknowledge  that  to  will  an  apprehended  good,  or  to  reject 
 an  apprehended  evil,  is  the  effect  of  an  original  power  or  attribute 
 of  the  human  mind,  and  essential  to  it.  This  is  a  power  worthy 
 of  the  great  Author  of  our  existence,  and  a  benefit  that  calls  for 
 our  gi-atitude.  And  that  this  power  should  be  exempt  from  re- 
 straint, control,  or  any  interference  whatever,  in  the  moral  agent, 
 is  essential  to  his  accountabihty ;  and  to  require  any  other  power 
 
 •  Active  Powers,  Essay  L,  chap.  v.  +  See  Diss.  III.  on  Power. 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  Co 
 
 to  constitute  oiir  liberty  is  as  unpliilosopHcal  as  the  Aristotelian 
 hypothesis  of  substantial  forms  and  occult  qualities. 
 
 All  active  power  is  from  God.  A  moral  agent's  power,  therefore, 
 "over  the  determinations  of  his  own  will"  can  be  nothing  else 
 but  the  Divine  energy  rendering  the  will  effectual  in  the  choice  of 
 apprehended  good,  or  the  refusal  of  apprehended  evil.  This,  how- 
 ever, is  perfectly  consistent  with  principles  of  action,  according  to 
 which  the  mind  apprehends,  and  subsequently  chooses  or  refuses. 
 But  power  and  principle  should  not  be  confounded.  That  the 
 mind  is  influenced  by  its  principles,  whether  good  or  evil,  is  a 
 great  truth ;  but  these  constitute  the  state  of  the  mind,  not  a 
 power  or  attribute. 
 
 Sect.  II. 
 Arguments  for  Liberty. 
 
 The  liberty  of  which  I  now  treat  is  the  elective,  consisting  of 
 exemption  from  restraint  in  the  choice  of  our  apprehended  good, 
 and  from  coercion  in  the  choice  of  real  evil.  A  man  may  be  de- 
 prived of  executive  liberty,  whilst  his  freedom  of  choice  in  his 
 intention  to  act  still  remains.  An  intention  to  murder,  to  steal, 
 or  to  deceive,  is  an  accountable  act  in  a  moral  agent,  though  the  in- 
 tended effect  be  prevented  by  restraint.  The  agent  is  not  indeed 
 accountable  for  the  effect  so  intended,  which  he  never  executed ; 
 but  the  design  of  producing  it  partakes  of  moral  turpitude,  and 
 often  amounts  to  a  great  degree  of  criminality.  Accordingly,  in 
 many  cases,  the  intention  proved  against  the  agent  is  amenable  to 
 justice  by  Divine  and  human  laws. 
 
 To  deny  to  man  this  elective  liberty,  in  virtue  of  which  he  adopts 
 an  end  and  the  means  of  attaining  it,  according  to  his  conviction, 
 is  a  virtual  denial  of  moral  government.  Without  this  liberty 
 moral  government  is  but  an  illusion,  a  name  without  an  essence. 
 Government  implies  law  with  sanctions ;  and  law,  exemption  from 
 restraint  in  choosing  ends  and  means,  and  from  coercion  when  we 
 act  amiss.  Were  aU  our  evil  actions  from  decretive  or  mechanical 
 necessity,  there  would  be  no  alternative,  no  law,  no  government ; 
 and  consequently  no  moral  or  penal  evil. 
 
 Without  this  moral  or  elective  liberty  there  coidd  be  no  moral 
 obligation.  The  very  nature  of  moral  obligation  implies  liberty 
 in  fixing  our  own  end,  and  adopting  our  own  means  of  attaining 
 
64  ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 it.  How  could  there  be  any  punishment,  or  any  penal  evil  what- 
 ever, for  adopting  what  we  were  constrained  decretively  to  adopt  ? 
 Indeed,  to  be  placed  by  Divine  appointment  in  circumstances,  and 
 to  be  mechanically  induced  by  a  predi.sposiug  principle  to  embrace 
 our  own  happiness,  is  perfectly  consistent  with  benevolence  and 
 equity,  and  with  every  part  of  the  Divine  character.  But  how 
 shall  we  account  for  the  existence  and  turpitude  of  moral  evil 
 witliout  moral  obligation?  or  for  moral  obligation,  with  freedom 
 from  compulsion  ? 
 
 Without  this  elective  liberty  we  could  be  the  subjects  of  neither 
 praise  nor  blame,  virtue  nor  vice.  Virtue  consists  in  the  adoption 
 of  right  ends  by  laudable  means ;  and  vice  consists  in  the  adoption 
 of  any  end  whatever  by  means  that  are  not  laudable.  But  to  be 
 restrained  from  the  choice  of  good  without  an  alternative,  or  urged 
 by  constraint  to  adopt  an  evil,  takes  away  the  essence  of  virtue 
 and  vice.  A  principle  of  action  indeed  may  be  the  effect  of  Diviae 
 causation,  by  which  the  intellect  may  represent  a  real,  and  not  a 
 merely  apparent  good  ;  but  a  forced  will,  in  choosing  criminally, 
 not  only  destroj's  the  very  character  of  virtue  as  well  as  of  vice, 
 but  also  imphes  a  foul  aspersion  of  the  Divine  government. 
 
 For  the  same  reasons,  rewards  and  punishments,  without  this 
 ■  elective  liberty,  could  have  no  existence.  Happines-s,  indeed,  might 
 be  secured,  on  the  supposition  of  constraint  on  the  will ;  but  hap- 
 piness obtaiQed  without  freedom  could  not  be  called  reivard.  And 
 evil  may  be  imagined  as  the  effect  of  constraint,  as  in  the  brutal 
 creation ;  but  that  evU  could  not  be  penal,  and  the  very  existence 
 of  moral  evil  would  be  impossible.  As  no  penal  evil  is  conceiv- 
 able without  moral  evU,  so  moral  evil  is  not  conceivable  without 
 freedom  from  constraint  m  our  blamable  elections. 
 
 Without  this  elective  liberty,  as  before  explained,  there  could 
 be  no  guilty  conscience.  To  be  guilty  of  adopting  means  which 
 we  were  decretively  forced  or  necessitated  to  adopt,  involves  a  con- 
 tradiction. It  is  to  suppose  guUt  attached  to  our  executing  the 
 wUl  and  obeying  the  energy  of  the  omnipotent  and  holy  God. 
 Guilt  supposes  an  alternative,  and  an  alternative  in  our  culpable 
 elections  implies  freedom  from  constraint. 
 
 If  we  have  no  elective  liberty,  deliberation  could  be  of  no  real 
 use.  There  could  be  no  room  for  any  such  thing.  Deliberation 
 supposes  a  contemplation  of  different  ends  and  means.  But  why 
 deliberate,  if  determined  by  an  irreversible  appointment  to  choose 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  65 
 
 an  evil  action  ?  The  power  to  deliberate,  on  that  supposition,  is  only 
 the  power  of  being  tantalised.  Dr  Eeid  observes  very  properly, 
 .that  "  we  have,  by  our  constitution,  a  natural  conviction  or  belief 
 that  we  act  freely; — a  conviction  so  early,  so  universal,  and  so 
 necessary  in  most  of  our  rational  operations,  that  it  must  be  the 
 result  of  our  constitution,  and  the  work  of  Him  that  made  us."  * 
 He  indeed  considers  this  freedom  a  power,  but  I  would  call  it  a 
 privilege  only.  While,  therefore,  I  oppose  the  sentiment  which 
 he  opposes,  I  consider  his  own  notion  as  no  less  objectionable. 
 
 The  reader  will  perceive  that  I  do  not  maintain  a  freedom  from 
 all  necessity,  as  shall  be  further  explained  in  the  foUowing  sections. 
 But  the  liberty  for  which  I  plead  is  that  which  clears  the  Divine 
 character  from  necessitating  evil,  and  which  condemns  the  guilty 
 in  the  choice  of  it.  The  want  of  this  distinction,  I  conceive,  has 
 been  the  source  of  much  useless  controversy,  and,  if  disregarded, 
 must  ever  prove  the  occasion  of  endless  confusion.  Without  it, 
 we  can  never  ascribe  to  God  what  is  His  due,  nor  fairly  establish 
 the  sentiment  of  just  demerit. 
 
 Sect.  III. 
 Of  Necessity. -^ 
 
 The  term  necessity  is  extremely  ambiguous,  signifying  very  dif- 
 ferent ideas  in  different  connexions.     And  the  neglect  of  accurate 
 
 *  Active  Powers,  Essay  iv.,  chap.  vi. 
 
 +  The  distinction  [viz.,  infallible  foreknowledge  Taa,j  prove  the  necessity  of  the 
 events  foreknown,  and  yet  not  be  the  thing  which  causes  the  necessity]  is  of  great 
 importance  in  the  present  controversy;  and  the  want  of  attending  to  the  true 
 ground  on  which  it  stands  has  been,  we  presume,  the  principal  cause  of  Dr  Whit- 
 by's objections,  and  those  of  most,  if  not  all,  other  Arminian  writers.  They  seem 
 to  consider  in  this  argument  no  other  necessity  but  the  decretive,  as  maintained  by 
 their  opponents,  and  therefore  infer  that  to  allow  any  kind  of  necessity  is  the 
 same  as  to  allow  an  infallible  decree.  From  this  view,  the  transition  i,s  easy  to 
 another  conclusion — viz.,  that  if  anything  is  foreknown  because  it  is  decreed, 
 every  thing  is  decreed  on  the  same  ground,  or  for  the  same  reason.  And  then,  this 
 proving  too  much, — the  decretive  appointment  of  all  the  evil  in  the  tmiverse,  which, 
 they  are  sure,  is  incompatible  with  the  Divine  character,  and  therefore  impossible, 
 — they  reject  the  whole  doctrine  of  necessity  as  a  ground  of  foreknowledge,  and 
 suppose  that,  though  they  cannot  clearly  disprove  what  is  advanced  against  them, 
 they  infer  that  there  is  somehow  a  sophism  in  the  reasoning  of  their  opponents, 
 or  some  false  principle  assumed,  were  they  but  happy  enough  to  detect  it.  But 
 our  author,  [i.e.,  President  Edwards,]  in  this  reasoning,  does  not  maintain  that  the 
 connexion  by  which  eveiy  event  is  evidently  certain,  and  therefore  necessary,  is  so 
 because  decreed.  The  truth  is,  that  some  events  are  foreknown  to  be  certain 
 VOL.  IV.  E 
 
66  ON  LIBEETY  An;D  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 distinctions  on  this  head  has  proved  peculiarly  embarrassing  to 
 writers  on  moral  philosophy.  All  necessity  is  either  physical  or 
 metaphysical. 
 
 because  foreordained,  and  others  because  of  the  tendency  there  is  in  the  nature  of 
 the  things  themselves.  Should  any,  in  the  way  of  objection,  assert  that  the  nature 
 of  things  themselres  is  derived  from  the  Divine  will  or  decree,  we  apprehend  that 
 there  is  no  evidence  to  support  such  an  assertion.  For  instance  :  is  it  owing  to  a 
 decree  that  the  nature  of  any  created  being  is  dependent  on  the  First  Cause  ? — 
 that  a  creature,  however  exalted,  is  not  infinite  ? — that  any  relation  should  subsist 
 between  the  Creator  and  the  creature  ? — or  that  if  equal  quantities  be  taken  from 
 equal  quantities,  the  remainders  will  be  equal  ?  Is  there  room  in  thought  for  a 
 supposition  of  any  decree  in  the  case  ?  Nay,  more,  does  it  appear  possible  for  a 
 decree  to  have  made  such  things  otherwise  ■ 
 
 Let  it  be  observed,  however,  that  God  is  the  almighty  Sovereign  over  nature ; 
 not,  indeed,  so  as  to  alter  the  uatui'e  of  things, — which  in  reality  is  no  object  of 
 power,  any  more  than  to  make  spirit  to  be  the  same  thing  as  matter,  and  rice 
 rersd,  or  the  working  of  contradictions,  is  an  object  of  power, — but  by  the  position 
 of  antecedents  and  estabUshed  premises.  To  illustrate  this,  let  it  be  supposed,  if 
 God  create  a  world,  that  world  must  depend  upon  Him  as  a  necessary  consequence. 
 To  deny  this,  is  to  deny  the  nature  and  identity  of  things.  For  what  is  it  to 
 create,  but  for  an  Independent  cause  to  impart,  ad  extra,  a  dependent  existence  ? 
 So  that  to  deny  dependence,  is  to  deny  creation.  But  though  the  consequence  be 
 necessary  if  the  antecedent  be  established,  yet  the  antecedent  itself  is  not  neces- 
 sary, except  from  decree ;  for  there  is  not  in  the  nature  of  things  any  antecedent 
 necessity  that  a  world  be  created, — that  is,  to  suppose  its  non-existence  implies 
 no  contradiction,  it  being  evidently  the  effect  of  sovereign  pleasure.  Hence,  to 
 deny  the  consequence  on  supposition  of  the  antecedent,  is  to  deny  the  nature  of 
 things,  and  to  assert  a  contradiction,  though  the  antecedent  itself  be  not  neces- 
 sary. And  hence,  also,  in  the  instance  now  specified,  among  others  innumerable, 
 the  antecedent  is  an  object  of  decree,  but  not  the  consequence.  It  is  absurd  to 
 say  that  God  decreed  the  dependence  of  the  world  upon  Himself,  as  it  is  to  say 
 He  decreed  that  two  and  two  shall  be  equal  to  four  rather  than  to  five. 
 
 These  remarks,  duly  considered  in  then-  just  consequence,  wiU  abundantly  shew 
 that  some  things  are  necessary  because  decreed, — as  the  creation,  the  preservation, 
 and  the  government  of  the  world,  the  redemption,  the  purification,  and  the  sal- 
 vation of  the  Church ;  and  that  other  things,  as  all  imperfections,  dependence, 
 relations,  and  especially  moral  evils,  come  to  be  necessary,  and  so  capable  of  being 
 foreknon-n,  only  by  connexion  or  consequence, — ^that  is,  if  the  antecedent  which  ia 
 under  the  control  of  the  almighty  Sovereign  be  admitted,  the  consequence  foUowB 
 infallibly  from  the  nature  of  things.  But  if  another  antecedent  be  established, 
 another  consequence  wOl  follow  with  equal  certainty  also  from  the  nature  of 
 things.  For  instance,  if  holiness  be  given  and  continued  to  a  redeemed  creature 
 as  an  antecedent,  excellence,  honour,  and  happiness  are  the  necessary  conse- 
 quences. But  if  sin  operate  without  control  as  the  antecedent,  dishonour  and 
 misery  must  be  the  necessary  consequence  from  the  same  cause. 
 
 Foreknowledge  infers  necessity,  such  a  necessity  as  exists  in  the  connexion  of  a 
 consequent  with  its  antecedent ;  and  President  Edwards  has  represented  in  vari- 
 ous lights  how  the  most  contradictory  and  absurd  conclusions  follow  from  the 
 opposite  hypothesis.     But  as  his  argument,  strictly  speaking,  did  not  req\iire  a 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LTEEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  67 
 
 Physical  uece.ssity  denotes  the  certainty  of  an  effect  by  an  im- 
 pelling cause.    Whatever  effect,  or  event,  takes  place  in  consequence 
 
 further  explanation  or  distinction  of  the  principles  on  which  it  rested,  which  yet 
 are  important,  it  may  not  be  improper  in  this  place  briefly  to  inquire  into  the 
 rationale  of  those  principles,  by  which  his  reasoning  may  appear  with  additional 
 evidence,  and  the  radical  principles  themselves  be  confirmed  by  their  connexion 
 with  others.  As  these  remarks  are  presented  in  the  form  of  a  series  analytically 
 disposed,  we  shall  prefix  to  them  the  corresponding  ordinal  members  : — • 
 
 (1.)  Any  kind  of  necessity  is  a  sufficient  ground  of  foreknowledge  in  the  view  of 
 Omniscience;  but  as  is  the  kmd  of  necessity,  or  the  nature  of  the  connexion 
 between  cause  and  effect,  so  is  the  nature  of  the  foreknowledge.  But  this  differ- 
 ence in  the  natvu-e  of  the  connexion  affects  not  the  certainty  of  the  event,  but  the 
 mode  of  causation,  or  from  what  cause  the  certainty  arises.  (2.)  AU  necessity,  or 
 certainty  of  connexion  between  antecedent  and  consequent,  must  arise  from  one 
 of  these  two  sources — viz.,  the  nature  of  things,  or  the  decree  of  God.  Chance  is 
 nothing ;  and  nothing  has  no  properties,  consequently  has  no  causal  influence. 
 (3.)  The  necessity  which  arises  from  the  nature  of  things  is  either  absolute  or 
 hypothetical.  Absolute  necessity  belongs  only  to  the  First  Cause,  or  God.  He 
 exists  absolutely ;  and  to  suppose  Him  not  to  exist,  or  not  to  have  existed,  is  a 
 contradiction.  For  the  supposition  itself  is  made  by  a  confessedly  contingent 
 being;  but  a  contingent  being  implies  an  absolute  being  with  as  much  certainty 
 as  an  efi'ect  implies  a  cause,  and  consequently  a  First  Cause.  (4.)  The  First  Cause 
 excepted,  every  other  being,  or  mode  of  being,  or  any  event  whatever,  is  only  of 
 hypothetical  necessity.  Any  event  is  necessary,  only  on  accotmt  of  its  relation 
 to  the  First  Cause.  This  relation  or  necessary  connexion  between  an  event  and 
 the  First  Cause  is  either  in  the  way  of  contrast  or  in  the  way  of  dependence. 
 (5.)  There  are  two  things  necessarily  related  to  the  First  Cause  by  way  of  con- 
 trast :  passive  power,  which  is  a  natural  evU,  if  limited  existence,  dependence,  and 
 insufficiency,  in  their  necessary  tendency,  may  be  so  called ;  and  sin,  which  is 
 moral  evU,  or  something  which,  in  point  of  obligation,  ought  not  to  be.  (6.)  The 
 other  mode  of  necessary  relation  to  the  First  Cause,  arising  from  the  nature  of 
 things,  is  that  of  dependence.  Every  contingent  being  and  event  must  necessarily 
 depend  upon  God,  as  an  effect  depends  upon  its  cause.  Nor  is  it  conceivable, 
 without  involving  the  grossest  contradiction  and  absurdity,  that  any  contingent 
 being  shoiild  continue  to  exist,  any  more  than  begin  to  exist,  independent  of  the 
 First  Cause.  Stthlata  cavsa,  tollitur  effectus,  is  justly  entitled  to  be  called  an 
 axiom  in  metaphysical  science.  (7.)  It  was  before  observed,  that  all  necessity 
 must  arise  either  from  the  nature  of  things,  or  from  the  decree  of  God.  What 
 arises  from  the  nature  of  things  as  a  consequence,  has  for  its  antecedent  either  an 
 efficient  or  a  deficient  cause.  (8.)  A  defect,  no  less  than  an  active  efficiency,  may 
 be  an  antecedent,  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  from  whence  a  correspond- 
 ing consequence  must  follow ;  but  there  is  no  defect  in  any  antecedent  but  may 
 be  counteracted  by  a  decree, — so  far  counteracted  as  that  the  defects  shall  not  be 
 an  operative  cause.  (9.)  The  purposes  of  God  are  a  series  of  antecedents,  from 
 whence  follow,  by  the  very  nature  of  things,  corresponding  good  consequences, 
 and  good  only ;  but  the  defect  which  is  inseparable  from  created  existence,  con. 
 sidered  in  itself,  is  also  a  cause  in  the  sense  of  an  antecedent,  otherwise  a  created 
 existence  would  be  as  indefectible  as  the  creating  or  First  Cause,  which  involves 
 the  most  absurd  consequences.  (10.)  Defect  is  either  natural  or  moral;  and  each 
 arises  from  the  nature  of  things,  as  contradistinguished  to  decree,  but  in  a  dif- 
 
68  on  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 of  will,  appointment,  purpose,  or  decree, — whether  it  relate  to 
 matter  or  motion,  substance  or  mode,  mind  or  prmciple,  whether 
 
 ferent  manner.  Natural  defect  arises,  from  the  nature  of  tilings,  in  the  way  of 
 contrast  to  God's  natural  perfections,  which  contrast  forms  the  primary  difference 
 between  Creator  and  creature.  (]  1.)  This  natm-al  defect  is  different  from  defecti- 
 bility,  for  defectibility  expresses,  in  strictness,  an  effect,  not  a  cause — a  liableness 
 to  defection.  But  the  question  returns,  What  renders  a  creature  liable  to  defect  ? 
 To  say,  Its  liableness  to  defect,  or  its  defectibility,  assigns  no  true  cause ;  for  the 
 question  returns  as  before.  What  malies  it  liable?  what  makes  it  defectible? 
 (12.)  Perhaps  there  is  no  term  less  exceptionable,  in  order  to  prevent  circumlocu- 
 tion, than  PASSIVE  powek,  to  express  that  natural  defect  which  exists  in  a  created 
 nature,  as  a  contrast  to  the  natural,  not  the  moral,  perfections  of  God.  (13.)  Pas- 
 sive power  is  as  inapplicable  to  God  as  it  is  applicable  to  a  creature,  for  natural 
 perfection  is  as  applicable  to  Him  as  natural  imperfection  is  to  us.  Therefore  to 
 say  that  a  creature  is  not  the  subject  of  passive  power,  is  the  same  as  to  say  that 
 it  is  perfect  and  indefectible  in  its  nature  as  God  is,  which  is  the  gi'ossest  panthe- 
 ism,— the  deification  of  every  creature,  of  every  atom  that  exists.  (14.)  All  ante- 
 cedents originate  in  either  passive  power  or  the  Divine  decrees.  From  the  for- 
 mer proceed,  according  to  the  nature  of  things,  all  evil  consequents ;  from  the 
 latter,  all  good.  (15.)  Moral  defect  is  a  contrast  to  the  moral  perfections,  excel- 
 lency, or  holiness  of  God,  and  arises,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  not  from  the 
 Divine  decree  as  its  antecedent,  but  from  the  hypothetical  nature  of  things, — that 
 is,  passive  power, — if  not  aided  by  a  decretive  interposition,  and  if  also  united  to 
 liberty  of  choice  in  an  accountable  being.  (16.)  The  removal  of  the  antecedent  is 
 the  prerogative  of  the  Supreme  Lord  of  nature ;  but  if  the  antecedent  be  not 
 removed, — that  is,  altered  from  what  it  was  as  to  its  causal  influence, — the  conse- 
 quence can  no  more  be  prevented  than  the  nature  of  things  can  be  changed. 
 (17.)  That  nature  of  thmgs,  or  that  necessity  of  consequence  whereby  the  effect 
 is  infallibly  connected  with  its  cause,  ia  nothing  else  but  the  essence  of  truth 
 emanating  from  the  First  Cause,  the  God  of  truth,  or  the  true  God.  (18.)  We 
 now  observe  that  an  event  may  be  necessarily  connected  with  its  cause  by  a 
 Divine  decree.  If  the  Divine  will  contemplate  an  end,  and  decree  accordingly, 
 it  neoessarOy  implies  that  the  means,  or  the  antecedents  to  this  consequence, 
 are  decreed.  (19.)  Hence,  an  event  may  be  necessary  either  because  virtually 
 determined  by  the  Divine  will  IN  a  series  of  antecedents,  or  because  the  nature  of 
 things  operates  without  being  affected  as  to  their  causal  influence  by  decretive  ante- 
 cedents. (20.)  To  suppose  any  sort  or  any  degree  of  defect  to  be  decreed  is  absurd 
 in  different  ways.  It  is  contrary  to  an  established  axiom,  that  from  good  notliing 
 hut  good  can  proceed  ;  and  it  is  absm-d  to  imirate  that  to  a  Divine  decree  which 
 antecedently  arises  from  the  nature  of  things.  (21.)  In  reality,  Divine  decrees  (as 
 before  hinted)  are  nothing  else  than  a  wonderful  chain  or  series  of  positions,  which 
 are  so  many  antecedents,  counteracting  defects  arising  from  the  hypothetical 
 nature  of  tilings.  Whence  it  necessarily  follows,  that  if  there  were  no  passive 
 power,  there  could  be  no  Divine  decrees.  For  if  good,  and  only  good,  arose  from 
 the  nature  of  things,  the  decree,  which  has  good  only  for  its  object,  woidd  be 
 superfluous,  and  therefore  unworthy  of  Divine  volition.  (22.)  Hence,  also,  what- 
 ever event  is  in  itself  good  is  an  object  of  Divine  decree  in  its  antecedent ;  and  the 
 event  itself  is  connected  with  the  decretive  position  by  the  very  essence  of  truth. 
 But  whatever  is  in  itself  evil  arises  from  the  hypothetical  nature  of  things  not 
 counteracted   by  decretive   positions.      (23.)   In   God,  His  absolutely  necessary. 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBEKTY  AND  NECESSITY.  09 
 
 it  belong  to  the  material  or  spiritual  world, — is  by  physical 
 necessity.     The  same  thing  is  often  termed  mechanical  necessity, 
 
 eternal,  infinite,  and  unchangeable  nature  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  antecedent,  from 
 which  all  possible  happiness  is  the  necessary  consequence.  Such  an  antecedent  is 
 not  the  result  of  mere  arbitrary  or  decretive  will,  but  of  absolute  necessity  ;  but  all 
 antecedents  in  a  creature,  or  every  causal  influence,  of  which  good  or  happiness, 
 whether  natural  or  moral,  is  the  consequence,  must  be  the  positions  of  decretive 
 wUl,  as  the  only  possible  mode  of  securing  a  good  result.  (24.)  As  the  antecedent, 
 so  is  the  consequent;  for  the  connexion  is  formed  by  eternal  truth.  If,  therefore, 
 a  good  event — for  instance,  a  vu'tuous  or  holy  choice — be  the  consequence,  the 
 antecedent  is  a  decretive  position.  (25.)  In  reference  to  God,  the  proper  and  only 
 ground  of  infallible  certainty  that  His  choice  is  good  and  praiseworthy  is  the 
 goodness  of  His  nature.  Were  we  to  admit  in  thought  the  possibility  of  a  defec- 
 tive nature  in  Him,  in  the  same  proportion  must  we  admit  a  possible  failure  in 
 the  goodness  of  His  choice.  And  in  reference  to  a  created  being,  the  proper  and 
 only  ground  of  certainty  that  his  choice  will  be  good  is  the  antecedent  goodness 
 of  his  nature  or  disposition.  This  alone  is  a  sufficient  causal  influence  ;  but  the 
 goodness  of  a  creature's  disposition  can  be  secured,  as  a  ground  of  certainty,  only 
 by  decretive  influence  of  a  nature  corresponding  with  the  nature  of  the  effect. 
 (26.)  From  these  principles  and  considerations,  which  can  here  be  but  briefly 
 stated,  as  necessarily  connected  with  their  legitimate  consequences,  we  infer  that 
 God  foresees  all  good,  in  every  created  being,  in  every  mode,  in  every  event,  by 
 the  evidence  of  a  decretive  necessity — a  necessity  resulting  from  actiri^  influx  or 
 perpetual  energy  in  the  pcsitiou  of  antecedents,  and  the  essence  of  truth  connecting 
 the  causal  influence  with  the  effect.  (27.)  From  the  same  principles  we  learn  that 
 God  foresees  or  foreknows  all  evil  (however  blended  with  the  good,  as  the 
 diflerent  colours  in  a  pencil  of  Kght  are  blended)  in  every  being  and  in  every 
 event  where  found,  by  that  necessity  which  is  hypothetical  only — a  necessity 
 arising  from  the  nature  of  things  left  to  their  own  causal  influence,  which  influ- 
 ence, in  any  given  circumstances,  will  manifest  itself  either  in  the  way  of  con- 
 trast, of  dependence,  or  both  united.  (28.)  Again;  volitimis  are  acts  of  the  mind, 
 and  each  voluntary  act  is  compounded  of  a  natural  and  moral  quality.  The 
 natural  quality  of  a  voluntary  act  proceeds  from  decretive  necessity ;  for  there  is 
 nothing  in  it  but  what  is  good,  decreed  and  effected  by  the  First  Cause.  The 
 moral  quality  of  a  voluntary  act  is  either  good  or  evil.  (29.)  A  voluntary  act 
 morally  good  is  altogether  of  decretive  necessity,  both  as  to  its  physical  and  moral 
 quality;  and  is  therefore  foreknown  because  of  decretive  appointment  and  energy. 
 But  a  voluntary  act  morally  bad  is  partly  of  decretive  and  partly  of  hypothetical 
 necessity,  or  that  of  consequence.  (30.)  The  physical  quality  of  a  voluntary  act 
 morally  had  is  of  decretive  necessity,  and  is  foreknown  because  foreappointed;  but 
 the  MORAL  QUALITY  of  the  same  act,  or  its  badness,  is  foreknown  only  by  relation, 
 connexion,  or  consequence.  Thus,  deformity  is  the  absence  of  beauty,  and  may 
 be  known  by  the  standard  of  beauty  from  which  it  deviates ;  xceakness  is  the 
 absence  of  strength,  and  may  be  known  by  relation ;  a  shadow  is  known  by  the 
 interception  of  rays,  and  may  be  known  in  the  same  manner ;  darkness  is  caused 
 by  the  absence  of  light,  and  may  be  known  by  the  light  excluded.  (31.)  How 
 the  BAD  quality  of  a  moral  act  may  be  foreknown  by  the  evidence  of  relation  will 
 further  appear  froro  the  consideration  of  the  nature  of  moral  evil  itself.  For  what 
 is  moral  evil,  or  sin,  but  what  ought  not  to  be  in  point  of  moral  obligation .? 
 Now,  for  at  all  knowing  or  foreknowing  what  ought  not  to  be,  which  is  incapable 
 
70  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 because  the  impelliug  cause  operates  by  a  similar  positive  certainty, 
 liowever  ditferent  miglit  be  tbe  medium  of  operation  to  the 
 mechanism  of  natural  causes  and  effects.  Nor  is  it  any  other  than 
 decretive  necessity ;  the  effect  or  event,  as  well  as  the  means, 
 being  decreed  to  take  place,  according  to  Divine  wisdom  and  irre- 
 sistible energy. 
 
 Thus  matter  gravitates,  water  flows,  the  sun  shines,  the  planets 
 move,  the  soul  seeks  hajjpiuess,  and  shuns  apprehended  evil,  in- 
 stinctively ;  that  is,  from  physical  necessity.  And,  in  short,  the 
 existence  and  instinctive  operations  of  all  our  intellectual  and 
 active  powers  proceed  from  the  will  and  energy,  and  consequently 
 from  the  decretive  purpose  of  God.  Whatever  God  efiects  in 
 time,  He  must  have  jmrjwse  to  effect  from  eternity.  And  this  be- 
 longs to  all  worlds  alike. 
 
 This  necessity  may  be  also  termed  natural,  if  we  consider  the 
 word  ((j)vai,<;)  nature  to  denote  a  constituted  series  of  causes  and 
 effects  by  the  supreme  will.  Thus  nature  is  a  wonderful  machine, 
 formed  and  preserved  by  creating  energy,  and  directed  to  the  best 
 ends  by  unerring  wisdom.  The  Divine  will  is  the  moving  cause, 
 however  numerous  the  intermediate  wheels.  Not  one  of  those 
 wheels  could  possibly  move,  nor  one  effect  foUow,  without  the  con- 
 tinuation of  the  origmal  imijulse.  Everytliing  in  nature  is  con- 
 tingent, and  everything  contingent  is  dependent  in  being  and 
 operation.  The  consecutive  series  of  natriral  causes  and  effects  is 
 a  chain  formed  by  infinite  wisdom ;  the  chain  may  be  long,  but 
 the  longer  it  is,  the  more  need  there  is  of  a  fii-st  cause.  Eather, 
 we  may  say,  nature  consists  of  innumerable  chains  ;  aU  proceeding 
 from  the  incessant  operation  of  Divine  providence. 
 
 ]\Ietaphysical  necessity,  the  other  principal  division  of  the 
 subject,  has  two  subordinate  meanings.  These  are  absolute  and 
 hypothetical. 
 
 Absolute  necessity  can  belong  only  to  the  First  Cause,  His  exist- 
 ence and  nature  ;  and  those  unalterable  relations  which  are  included 
 in  that  infinite  nature,  irrespectively  of  aU  will.  Nothing  in  nature, 
 as  before  explained,  is  of  absolute  necessity ;  for  that  is  the  effect 
 of  will,  and  might  have  been  different,  had  it  pleased  the  Creator. 
 
 of  being  decreed,  the  proper  medium  or  eridence  is  the  knowledge  of  what  ought 
 to  be.  (32.)  If,  therefore,  what  ought  to  he  is  known  to  the  Omniscient  by  con- 
 stituted relations  or  voluntary  appointment,  ichat  ought  not  to  be  may  be  known 
 by  evident  consequences. 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  71 
 
 Hy2wthetical  necessity  denotes  the  certainty  of  any  effect  or 
 event  from  a  supposed  antecedent.  It  is  expressive  of  an  infallible 
 connexion  between  something  existing,  or  the  supposition  of  its 
 existence,  and  its  approj^riate  consequence.  Thus,  a  creature 
 existing,  or  supposed  to  exist,  is  dependent  on  the  Creator  for  its 
 being  and  created  properties,  by  an  infallible  connexion.  No  will 
 can  be  imagined  to  make  this  connexion  fail;  because  the  con- 
 trary implies  a  contradiction.  But  this  is  not  the  case  with 
 physical  necessity.  The  connexion  between  a  physical  effect  and 
 its  usual  cause  or  antecedent  may  be  interrupted  by  an  interposing 
 will,  as  in  the  case  of  miracles.  Because  a  river  has  flowed,  or  the 
 sun  has  shone,  and  the  planets  have  revolved  around  him,  for 
 many  ages,  this  constitutes  no  sufficient  reason  that  these  effects 
 must  always  stand  infallibly  connected  with  their  natural  antece- 
 dent. Had  Mr  Hume  properly  understood  the  real  difference  be- 
 tween physical  and  metapihysical  necessity,  he  never  could  have 
 reasoned  as  he  has  done  on  the  doctrine  of  causes,  by  absurdly 
 argumg  from  the  one  to  the  other.  A  physical  cause  is  altogether 
 dependent  on  the  supreme  wiU,  for  a  given  time,  and  in  given 
 circumstances.  But  a  metaf)hysical  cause,  whether  absolute  or 
 hypothetical,  is  subject  to  no  such  failure.  Only  suppose  a  being 
 to  be  created,  and  no  conceivable  will  can  prevent  its  limitation  of 
 existence,  of  j)roperties,  and  powers.  Allow  a  figure  to  be  a  circle, 
 and  the  equality  of  its  radii  follows  by  metaphysical  (as  including 
 mathematical)  necessity.  Only  grant  that  five  may  be  added  to 
 five,  and  no  miracle  can  prevent  the  sum  being  ten.  If  equal 
 quantities  be. added  to  equal  quantities,  it  is  impossible  to  prevent 
 their  sums  from  being  equal,  without  destroying  the  supposition ; 
 that  is,  without  involving  a  contradiction. 
 
 It  should  be  further  observed,  that,  as  in  mathematics,  (which 
 is  but  a  branch  of  metaphysics,)  negative  quantities  are  a  ground 
 of  necessity  of  consequence,  no  less  than  those  which  are  positive ; 
 so,  negative  principles,  in  created  existences,  may  be  an  adequate 
 ground  of  the  same  infallible  certainty.  Thus,  the  want  of  ulte- 
 rior perfection  may  be  the  ground  of  infallible  consequences,  in 
 given  circumstances,  as  well  as  the  contrary. 
 
72  ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 Sect.  IV. 
 Arguments  for  Ifecessity. 
 
 They  who  maintain  that  liberty  is  an  active  power  of  the  mind, 
 and  at  the  same  time  contend  that  this  liberty  is  subject  to  no 
 kind  of  necessity,  must,  to  be  consistent,  maintain  the  doctrine  of 
 absolute  chance.  There  is  no  medium  in  this  case.  On  the  other 
 hand,  if  liberty  be,  as  we  have  defined  it,  exemption  from  restraint 
 in  the  choice  of  good,  and  from  com2)ulsion  in  the  choice  of  evil, 
 chance  is  excluded,  and  the  moral  agent  is  fairly  accountable  for  all 
 his  actions.  What  he  adopts  as  the  end  and  the  means  of  his  hap- 
 piness, he  adofits  freely,  that  is,  upon  conviction  as  being  best  for 
 him.  But  this  conviction  does  not  spring  from  chance.  It  is 
 subject  to  some  kind  of  necessity ;  but  between  chance  and  neces- 
 sity, as  the  predisposing  cause  of  virtue  and  vice,  there  is  no  pos- 
 sible medium. 
 
 I  have  stated  that  all  necessity  is  either  physical  or  metaphysical. 
 The  former,  whether  we  call  it  mechanical,  decretive,  or  natural, 
 results  from  Divine  will,  and  is  the  effect  of  Divine  energy.  Such 
 are  all  created  existences  in  all  worlds,  with  all  their  active  powers 
 and  operations.  This  glorious  system  of  created  nature  no  crea- 
 ture can  alter  or  impede.  To  this  necessity  the  holy  seraph,  the 
 human  free  agent,  the  crawling  worm,  the  growing  shrub,  the  roll- 
 ing tide,  and  gravitating  matter,  are  alike  subject.  Without  it, 
 they  could  neither  exist  nor  produce  any  effect. 
 
 To  suppose  that  any  creature,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  is 
 exempt  from  this  necessity,  in  the  production  of  physical  effects, 
 is  to  suppose  two  original  powers,  which  is  infinitely  absurd. 
 Every  active  power  is  from  God ;  He  gives  and  continues  it  as  He 
 pleases.  The  laws  of  nature  are  no  less  dependent  on  the  will  and 
 energy  of  the  Creator,  than  the  system  of  nature  which  is  governed 
 by  those  laws.  They  are  equally  contingent,  and  therefore  equally 
 dependent.  Man  may  modify  materials  formed  ready  to  his  hand, 
 on  supposition  of  existing  laws ;  but  all  his  art  is  dependent  on 
 those  laws  and  materials,  and  all,  himself  included,  dependent  on 
 Divine  will  and  efficient  power.  To  deny  this,  is  to  assert  pal- 
 pable contradictions.  It  is  no  less  than  to  identify  Creator  and 
 creature,  as  to  the  very  thing  wherein  must  consist  their  essential 
 difference.     A  creature  independent  in  his  physical  nature  and 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  73 
 
 operations !  and  tlie  Creator  dependent  on  the  creature  in  the 
 effects  of  tliose  operations ! 
 
 It  was  also  stated  tliat  metaphysical  necessity  is  either  absolute 
 or  hypothetical.  Respecting  the  existence  and  nature  of  God,  it  is 
 presumed  no  one  but  a  professed  Atheist,  who  delights  to  sport 
 with  his  own  gross  contradictions,  can  question  the  most  absolute 
 metaphysical  necessity.  Nor  is  it  likely  that  any  will  maintain 
 that  wisdom  can  be  made  folly,  falsehood  be  made  a  truth,  a  circle 
 be  made  a  square,  or  misery  be  identified  with  happiness.  Were 
 nothing  absolute,— that  is,  of  absolute  necessity, — there  could  be 
 nothing  contingent.  Without  such  necessity,  neither  ourselves, 
 nor  anything  around  us,  could  have  an  adequate  cause.  Not  even 
 chance  itself,  if  by  chance  we  mean  anything,  could  possibly  exist. 
 Therefore,  to  deny  absolute  metaphysical  existence  and  nature,  is 
 to  deny  the  first  principle  of  all  reasoning,  and  the  strongest  pos- 
 sible evidence. 
 
 Hypothetical  necessity  also  must  be  admitted,  except  we  re- 
 nounce the  first  principles  of  reason.  If  we  deny  a  certain  con- 
 nexion between  antecedents  and  their  appropriate  consequents, 
 reason  has  no  room  to  infer  anything.  Everything  is  the  sport  of 
 chance,  and  that  chance  is  nothing.  No  conclusion  can  follow 
 from  any  premises,  and  the  reasonings  of  an  objector  must  be  as 
 unmeaning  as  his  favourite  contingence.  Without  this  necessity 
 mathematical  truths  are  all  illusive  ;  great  and  small,  beauty  and 
 deformity,  truth  and  falsehood,  have  no  distinction  of  character. 
 
 The  intelligent  reader  will  perceive  that  this  necessity  is  ex- 
 tremely different  from  that  which  is  physical  or  decretive.  The 
 truth  of  a  conclusion  from  given  premises  is  not  the  effect  of 
 decree ;  for  no  decree  can  be  supposed  that  could  make  it  other- 
 wise. Only  suppose  the  position  of  an  antecedent,  with  which 
 the  consequent  stands  connected  in  the  nature  of  things,  and  a 
 decree  must  appear  to  have  no  place.  Physical  necessity  follows 
 from  a  constituting  sovereign  will,  but  metaphysical  necessity 
 from  that  nature  of  things  which  is  no  object  of  will — that  is, 
 from  the  nature  of  God  and  essential  relations. 
 
 But  here  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  state,  that  good  and 
 evil  have  not  the  same  cause.  Good  is  worthy  of  Divine  causa- 
 tion, but  not  evil,  whether  metaphysical  or  moral.  What  we  call 
 physical  evil  is  only  relatively  so ;  a  real  good  becomes  to  indi- 
 viduals relatively  an  evil.     Goodness  in  God  is  not  an  effect,  but 
 
7-1-  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 His  e.ssential  nature ;  but  goodness  in  a  creature  is  an  effect  of 
 His  good  pleasure.  And  as  every  effect  of  His  production  may  be 
 termed  physical,  it  follows  that  our  good  of  every  kind,  wMch  can 
 have  no  other  cause  ultimately  than  God,  flows  by  physical  neces- 
 sity ;  our  volitions,  and  the  goodness  of  our  volitions  not  excepted. 
 
 Dr  Eeid,  when  discussing  this  subject,  objects  in  the  following 
 manner: — "If  there  be  a  better  and  a  worse  in  actions  on  the 
 system  of  necessity,  let  us  suppose  a  man  necessarily  determined, 
 in  all  cases,  to  will  and  to  do  what  is  best  to  be  done :  he  would 
 surely  be  innocent  and  inculpable,  but,  as  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge, 
 he  would  not  be  entitled  to  the  esteem  and  moral  approbation  of 
 those  who  knew  and  believed  this  necessity.  What  was,  by  an 
 ancient  author,  said  of  Cato,  might  indeed  be  said  of  him :  He  was 
 good  because  he  could  not  he  otherwise.  But  this  saying,  if  under- 
 stood literally  and  strictly,  is  not  the  praise  of  Cato,  but  of  his 
 constitution,  which  was  no  more  the  work  of  Cato  than  his  exist- 
 ence." On  this  very  singular,  and  in  my  view  singidarly  errone- 
 ous passage,  I  would  offer  a  few  remarks. 
 
 Dr  Eeid  allows  that  such  a  man  would  be  innocent  and  incul- 
 pahle,  but  denies  that  he  would  be  entitled  to  the  esteem  and 
 moral  approbation  of  those  who  knew  and  believed  this  necessity. 
 But  with  what  propriety  he  denies  this,  it  may  deserve  considera- 
 tion. Is  an  action  less  entitled  to  esteem  because  it  proceeds  from 
 a  good  cause  ?  Surely  not.  The  goodness  of  the  cause  can  be 
 no  objection  to  its  estimable  quality.  That  it  should  proceed  from 
 no  cause  is  absurd  ;  and  that  it  should  proceed  from  a  had  cause 
 is  inconceivable  ;  it  must,  therefore,  proceed  from  a  cause  either 
 derivatively  or  originally  good.  A  cause  originally  good  can  be 
 no  other  than  God ;  man's  goodness,  therefore,  is  only  derivative, 
 and  consequently  the  goodness  of  his  volitions  is  from  the  Source 
 of  all  good.  It  is  in  vain  to  urge  that  his  actions  would  uot  then 
 be  in  every  sense  his  own.  They  are  as  much  his  own  as  it  is 
 possible  for  those  of  any  creature  to  be.  For  the  exertion  of  active 
 power  to  be  our  own,  independently  of  the  first  active  power,  and 
 His  continued  energy,  is  absolutely  inconceivable,  and  replete  with 
 contradictions.  In  p>erforming  a  good  act,  though  the  goodness  of 
 that  act  be  traced  to  physical  necessity,  it  is  as  much  his  oiun  as 
 he  or  any  one  else  can  require ;  for  this  plain  reason,  that  for  it  to 
 be  his  own  in  any  higher  sense  is  a  metaphysical  impossibility. 
 He  has  intellect ;  he  has  a  will  unrestrained ;  he  acts  from  couvic- 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  75 
 
 tion,  and  thus  performs  the  good  act.  What  more  can  be  required? 
 What  more  is  conceivable  to  constitute  the  act  his  own?  To 
 require  an  original  active  power,  in  addition  to  these,  is  the  same 
 as  to  attempt  tlie  establishment  of  two  independent  principles, 
 two  original  active  causes, — a  being  dependent  in  his  essence,  but 
 not  in  his  operations,  while,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  plain  that  the 
 operations  cannot  be  more  independent  than  the  essence.  Active 
 power  onghuiting  in  a  creature,  rather  than  the  medium  of  ope- 
 ration in  producing  effects  by  the  will  and  influence  of  the  first 
 active  power,  is  reducible  to  the  grossest  contradiction.  It  sup- 
 poses a  creature  that  has  not  the  essential  qualities  of  a  creature; 
 for  if  dependence  in  the  exertion  and  right  direction  of  his  active 
 powers  be  not  essential  to  a  creature  possessed  of  such  powers,  the 
 distinction  between  dependent  and  independent,  derived  and  un- 
 derived,  Creator  and  creature,  is  done  away. 
 
 The  subject  of  physical  necessitation,  it  is  acknowledged  by  Dr 
 Eeid,  would  be  innocent  and  inculpable.  In  this  position  we  are 
 agreed,  but  widely  differ  in  the  inference  deduced  from  it.  Dr 
 Eeid  would  surely  grant  that  he  who  has  an  intellect  to  perceive, 
 a  will  to  choose,  and  freedom  from  restraint  in  his  moral  acts,  and 
 in  these  circumstances  does  "  what  is  best  to  be  done,"  bids  fair  for 
 perfection  in  moral  agency.  And  yet  this  very  person  may  be  the 
 subject  of  physical  necessity.  His  intellect  and  active  will,  being 
 powers  of  the  mind,  can  acknowledge  no  other  than  this  necessity 
 for  their  source.  And  to  suppose  their  existence  to  be  derived 
 thence,  but  not  their  operations,  is  to  recur  to  those  absurdities 
 which  have  been  already  exposed. 
 
 A  person  exercising  his  intellect  and  will,  without  restraint,  ac- 
 cording to  his  conviction  of  what  is  best  for  him  upon  the  whole, 
 is  a  free  agent.  To  suppose  some  inexplicable  original  power,  some 
 occult  quality,  which  has  activity  in  some  manner  independent  on 
 the  first  active  power,  is  at  once  to  beg  the  question  in  debate,  and 
 to  deviate  from  the  acknowledged  rule  of  philosophy — viz.,  "That 
 no  more  causes  ought  to  be  admitted  than  those  which  are  truly 
 sufiicient  to  explain  the  phenomena."  This  rule  is  so  universal  in 
 its  nature,  that  there  is  no  good  reason  for  confining  it  to  matter 
 and  motion.  It  is  alike  applicable  to  physics  and  metaphysics. 
 A  free  agent  doing  "what  is  best  to  be  done,"  is  an  estimable 
 character,  and  is  highly  deserving  of  our  approbation  in  his  moral 
 acts.     He  does  what  he  ought  to  do.     He  acts  according  to  pro- 
 
76  ON  LEBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  T. 
 
 priety  and  rectitude.  To  act  innocently  and  wiblamahly  is  the 
 same  thing  as  to  act  estiniably  and  commendably.  No  medium, 
 I  believe,  is  conceivable. 
 
 When  Dr  Eeid  represents  "  a  man  necessarily  determined  in  all 
 cases  to  will  and  to  do  what  is  best  to  be  done,"  as  "  not  entitled 
 to  esteem  and  moral  approbation,"  he  ought  certainly  to  have 
 assigned  some  good  reason  for  this  assertion,  since  we  all  know 
 that  the  volitions  of  the  Supreme  Agent  are  at  once  necessarily 
 good,  and  yet  perfectly /ree  from  all  restraint ;  and  at  the  same 
 time  deserving  of  the  highest  esteem  and  approbation.  The  truth 
 is,  and  which  Dr  Eeid  was  not  sufficiently  aware  of,  that  it  is  the 
 nature  of  an  agent  that  secures  the  quality  of  his  moral  actions, 
 and  not  some  inexplicable  power  exercised  over  the  determinations 
 of  his  own  wilL  Thus  the  Divine  nature,  being  necessarily  good, 
 by  the  highest  kind  of  necessity,  and  liable  to  no  restraint  in  the 
 exercise  of  volition,  is  "  necessarily  determiued  in  all  cases  to  will 
 and  to  do  what  is  best  to  be  done."  And  is  not  this  the  chief 
 glory  of  the  Supreme  Agent  ?  Because  He  is  necessarily  deter- 
 mined, by  His  holy  nature,  "  in  all  cases  to  will  and  to  do  what  is 
 best,"  is  He  nothing  more  than  "innocent  and  inculpable?"  Is 
 He  "not  entitled  to  the  esteem  and  moral  approbation  of  those 
 who  know  and  beUeve  this  necessity  V  Eather,  should  not  our 
 esteem  and  moral  approbation  rise  in  proportion  to  the  strength 
 of  that  necessity  which  preserves  from  liability  to  failure  ?  And 
 in  proportion  as  the  Great  Supreme  necessitates  the  nature  of  a 
 subordinate  agent  to  resemble  His  ovra,  though  in  a  small  degree, 
 — from  whence  arises  the  quality  of  his  morallj^  good  actions,  as 
 tlie  predisposing  cause, — two  consequences  follow :  first,  that  every 
 good  action  is  necessitated ;  and,  secondly,  that  every  such  action 
 is  worthy  of  esteem  and  approbation,  bearing  a  resemblance  to  the 
 moral  quality  of  the  Divine  acts,  which  are  ne-cessitated  by  a  holy 
 nature,  and  at  the  same  time  infinitely  estimable. 
 
 "What  was  said  by  an  ancient  author  concerning  Cato,  had  it 
 been  true,  would  have  been,  as  it  was  intended,  the  highest  praise. 
 The  more  incapable  any  being  is  of  moral  failure,  the  more  praise- 
 worthy ;  that  is,  the  more  he  resembles  the  pattern  and  source  of 
 excellence.  However,  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  Dr  Eeid,  as 
 well  as  many  others,  objected  to  all  necessity,  principally,  at  least, 
 because  of  the  supposed  other  consequence — that  the  decretive 
 necessity  to  good  implies  a  similar  necessity  to  moral  evU.     But 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  77 
 
 this  is  the  (jrpcoTov  ■<\revho'i)  fundamental  error  of  Dr  Eeid's  doc- 
 trine. That  a  decretive  necessity  to  good  is  not  inseparably  con- 
 nected with  a  similar  necessitation  of  moral  evil,  deserves  particular 
 consideration.  For  ought  that  I  can  perceive,  it  is  a  doctrine  but 
 very  little  known,  though  of  the  utmost  importance  in  moral 
 science  and  the  purity  of  religion.  This  being  the  case,  I  shall 
 consider  it  at  large  in  a  future  part  of  this  work.  At  present, 
 however,  it  may  be  proper  to  notice  the  following  objection,  and  in 
 a  brief  manner  to  shew  its  futility.  The  objection  is  this  : — "  If 
 a  man  be  necessarily  determined  to  do  ill,  this  case  seems  to  me  to 
 move  jDity  but  not  disajDprobation.  He  was  iU,  because  he  could 
 not  be  otherwise.  Who  can  blame  him  ?  Necessity  has  no  law. 
 If  he  knows  that  he  acted  under  this  necessity,  has  he  not  just 
 ground  to  exculpate  himself  ?  The  blame,  if  there  be  any,  is  not 
 in  him,  but  in  his  constitution.  If  he  be  charged  by  his  Maker 
 with  doing  wrong,  may  he  not  expostulate  with  Him,  and  say. 
 Why  hast  Thou  made  me  thus  ?  I  may  be  sacrificed  at  Thy  plea- 
 sure for  the  common  good,  like  a  man  that  has  the  plague,  but  not 
 for  ill  desert ;  for  Thou  knowest  that  what  I  am  charged  with  is 
 Thy  work,  and  not  mine."  * 
 
 The  intelligent  reader  will  observe,  that  this  language  is  appli- 
 cable only  to  decretive  necessity ;  and  in  that  view,  I  admit  its 
 utmost  force.  To  be  thus  necessitated  to  moral  evil,  is  to  destroy 
 the  very  nature  of  such  evil ;  and  to  be  punished  for  it  is  an  act  of 
 manifest  injustice.  Let  the  advocates  for  philosophical  necessity, 
 as  commonly  explained,  answer  the  objection  if  they  can,  and  urge 
 as  they  please  the  propriety  of  the  Supreme  Being  doing  evil 
 in  this  way  that  good  may  come.  Their  efforts  will  be  vain. 
 What  God  does,  or  deeretively  necessitates  to  be  done,  cannot  be 
 evil,  nor  can  it  be  the  object  of  punishment.  His  necessitation 
 exculpates  from  criminality,  and  exempts  from  being  obnoxious  to 
 penal  sanctions.  But  what  has  this  to  do  with  hypothetical  neces- 
 sity ?  This  only  requires  that  there  should  be  some  cause  of  moral 
 evU,  in  opposition  to  perfect  chance.  And  let  it  be  even  called 
 chance,  still  something  is  a  predisposing  cause  of  evil,  else  we  have 
 an  effect  without  any  cause ;  than  which  nothing  can  be  more 
 absurd.  To  satisfy  reason,  I  allow,  it  is  highly  desirable  to  ascer- 
 tain this  predisposing  cause ;  and  particularly  to  shew  that  it  is 
 not  of  Divine  appointment.     This  I  hope  to  be  able  to  do  when 
 
 *  Active  Powers,  Essay  iv.,  chap.  i. 
 
78  ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  [DISS.  V. 
 
 treating  of  the  origin  of  evil.  At  present  it  is  sufficient  to  shew 
 that  the  denial  of  all  necessity  in  moral  actions  is  unreasonable 
 and  contradictory. 
 
 Dr  Reid  denies  that  moral  actions  are  subject  to  any  necessity, 
 and  yet  he  maintains  that  liberty  is  power,  active  poiver,  and  that 
 we  derive  it  from  God  : — "  All  our  power  is,  without  doubt,  derived 
 from  the  Author  of  our  being  ;  and,  as  He  gave  it  freely,  He  may 
 take  it  away  when  He  will.  No  man  can  be  certain  of  the  con- 
 tinuance of  any  of  his  powers  of  body  or  mind  for  a  moment ; 
 and,  therefore,  in  every  promise  there  is  a  condition  understood  : 
 to  wit,  if  we  live,  if  we  retain  that  health  of  body  and  soundness 
 of  mind  which  is  necessary  to  the  performance,  and  if  nothing 
 happen,  in  the  providence  of  God,  which  puts  it  out  of  our 
 power."*  Here  we  have  in  detail  what  implies  the  most  direct 
 contradiction  to  what  he  holds  as  a  maxim  ;  a  maxim  fundamental 
 to  his  hypothesis.  Active  power,  derived  from,  and  continued  by 
 the  sovereign  pleasure  of  God,  implies  a  necessitation  of  that 
 power  while  it  continues.  Therefore,  Dr  Eeid's  notion  of  liberty 
 itself  is,  that  it  is  the  offspring  of  necessity ;  while  at  the  same 
 time  he  maintains  it  is  a  fundamental  principle  that  it  is  subject 
 to  no  necessity,  which  is  a  direct  contradiction.  And  indeed,  if 
 his  maxim  were  admitted,  and  his  concessions  fairly  analysed,  his 
 system  excludes  alike  both  liberty  and  necessity.  For  denying  all 
 necessity  in  moral  actions,  and  maintaining  that  liberty  is  active 
 power  derived  from,  and  continued  by  the  first  active  power,  he 
 gets  rid  of  both  together.  There  is  no  necessity,  and  there  is  no 
 liberty.  Such  are  the  genuine  consequences  of  his  notion  of  active 
 power,  and  of  his  denial  of  all  necessity. 
 
 Such  contradictions  must  ever  attend  those  philosophers  who 
 ascribe  the  same  source  to  good  and  evil,  whether  active  power  or 
 anything  else.  To  make  actions  morally  good  and  actions  morally 
 bad  proceed  alike  from  the  same  ultimate  or  predisposing  cause,  is 
 to  make  good  fruit  and  bad  ai-ise  from  the  same  root,  or  water  of 
 opposite  qualities  iiow  from  the  same  fountain.  Indeed,  as  the 
 ivill  stamps  the  character  of  actions,  and  all  moral  actions  proceed 
 from  the  will,  considered  as  a  power  of  the  mind,  in  that  sense 
 they  have  the  same  origin ;  but  this  is  an  argument  that  strongly 
 proves  a  difference  in  the  ultimate  cause  or  predisposing  principle 
 from  which  the  will  acts.     Were  not  this  the  case,  there  could  be 
 
 *  Active  Powers,  Essay  i.,  chap.  ii. 
 
DISS,  v.]  ON  LIBEETY  AND  NECESSITY.  79 
 
 no  differejice  in  the  effect.  For  like  causes  produce  like  effects,  as 
 all  just  rules  of  philosophising  reqiiire  us  to  conclude,  both  iu 
 physics  and  metaphysics.  To  admit  a  diversity  of  effects  without 
 a  corresi:)ondino-  diversity  of  causes,  is  the  same  thing  as  to  admit 
 an  effect  without  an  adequate  cause ;  which  is  subversive  of  all 
 reasoning,  and  of  common  sense. 
 
DISSERTATION  VI. 
 
 ON  THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS  AND  HYPOTHETICAL  TENDENCIES. 
 
 This  phrase,  "  the  nature  of  things,"  is  used  in  two  different 
 senses,  accordino-  as  the  subject  is  either  physical  or  metaphysical 
 In  a  2}f>ysical  sense,  it  denotes  the  whole  system  of  created  exist- 
 ences as  constituted  by  the  sovereign  will  of  the  Creator,  whereby 
 one  thing  differs  from  another,  including  an  endless  variety  of 
 antecedents  and  consequents  which  take  place  according  to  ap- 
 pointed rules.  This  comprehends  the  world  of  spirits  as  weU  as 
 of  matter.  For  their  existence  and  active  powers,  as  well  as 
 matter  and  motion,  are  a  part  of  constituted  nature,  and  are  sub- 
 ject to  appointed  laws,  though  these  laws  are  extremely  differ- 
 ent. It  is  a  sophism  which  has  too  much  influence  on  the  human 
 mind,  that  because  the  laws  of  mechanism,  whether  celestial  or 
 terrestrial,  are  very  different  from  those  of  minds  and  their  opera- 
 tions, therefore  minds  are  subject  to  no  certain  laws  of  any  kind. 
 Were  this  admitted,  it  would  follow  that  minds  and  their  ojiera- 
 tions  form  no  part  of  the  physical  nature  of  things,  and  conse- 
 quently are  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Author  of  nature. 
 To  suppose  minds  and  their  operations  to  be  subject  to  no  certain 
 laws,  is  to  suppose  that  the  Author  of  nature  has  made  chance,  or 
 uncertainty  itself,  a  part  of  His  most  accurate  and  certain  plan. 
 That  God  renders  what  men  call  chance,  contingence,  or  uncer- 
 tainty, subservient  to  His  wise  designs,  is  very  true  ;  but  to  suppose 
 that  anything  is  imcertain  with  Him  before  it  take  ftlace,  is  equally 
 false.  It  is  a  gross  impeachment  of  supreme  knowledge,  wisdom, 
 and  power.  Surely  He  who  formed  all  beings,  made  them  what 
 they  were,  as  differing  physically  one  from  another,  cannot  be 
 supposed  to  be  ignorant  of  their  tendencies  and  operations,  or  to 
 abandon  them  to  absolute  uncertainty,  without  any  regard  to  one 
 
DISS.  VI.]  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS,  ETC.  81 
 
 result  rather  than  another.  And  it  would  be  an  insulting  libel 
 on  the  Divine  jDOwer  to  say  that  though  He  knew  and  designed  a 
 certain  result,  yet  He  could  not  effect  it,  because  that  active  power 
 which  is  called  liberty  stood  in  the  way.  The  truth  is,  that  in 
 the  constituted  nature  of  things,  there  is  the  most  wonderful  uni- 
 formity of  design,  amid  an  endless  variety  of  means,  concurring  to 
 produce  the  designed  result.  "  Where  there  is  most  wisdom  there 
 is  least  chance,"  is  a  maxim  worthy  of  tlie  fii'st  philosophy.  From 
 which  it  is  but  a  just  corollary,  that  perfect  wisdom  excludes  all 
 chance. 
 
 In  a  metajihysical  sense,  "  the  nature  of  things  "  denotes  what- 
 ever belongs  to  God  or  to  a  creature  which  is  not  the  effect  of 
 will.  Thus  the  self-existence,  independence,  all-sufficiency,  immu- 
 tability, indefectibility,  and  infinitude  of  God,  belong  to  Him,  not 
 as  the  result  of  will,  but  of  necessity.  And  thus  the  contraries  to 
 these  attributes — derived  existence,  dependence,  insufficiency,  nmta- 
 bUity,  defectibility,  and  limitation — belong  to  a  creature,  not  as  the 
 effect  of  will,  on  the  hypothesis  of  their  having  existence,  but  of 
 consequent  necessity.  No  will  could  possibly  have  made  them 
 otherwise,  because  the  supposition  is  contradictory,  and  therefore 
 can  be  no  object  of  power.  Hence  that  God  has  all  possible  per- 
 fection, and  a  creature  the  want  of  ulterior  perfection,  or  the  want 
 of  something  which  may  be  conceived  as  more  perfect,  is  founded 
 in  the  nature  of  things ;  that  is,  in  the  idea  of  God  and  a  crea- 
 ture. To  suppose  the  contrary  is  to  suppose  that  the  nature  of 
 the  one  and  of  the  other  may  be  reversed.  As  sure  as  God  is,  so 
 sure  is  it  that  His  nature  cannot  be  otherwise  than  illimitably 
 perfect ;  and  as  sure  as  a  creature  is,  so  sure  is  it  that  his  nature 
 is  essentially  different  from  that  of  God.  In  brief,  it  is  absolutely 
 impossible  that  these  things  should  be  otherwise ;  which  is  meant 
 when  we  say  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  things. 
 
 But  'his  cannot  be  said  of  the  constituted  nature  of  things  ;  be- 
 cause, for  anything  we  know,  the  series  of  created  existences  might 
 have  been  otherwise,  or  the  laws  of  nature,  as  they  are  called,  may 
 be  suspended  or  reversed,  and  even  that  suspension  or  reversion 
 be  itself  the  effect  of  decretive  design.  Thus  we  conceive  it  possible 
 that  all  the  present  laws  of  creation  and  providence  may  be  com- 
 pletely altered  in  some  future  period,  and  others  take  the  place  of 
 them. 
 
 When,  therefore,  we  speak  of  hypothetical  tendencies,  in  refer- 
 
 VOL.  IV.  F 
 
82  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS,  [DISS.  VI. 
 
 eace  to  the  nature  of  things,  in  a  physical  sense,  we  can  only 
 mean,  that  while  it  pleases  God  to  continue  the  same  existences, 
 and  their  operations,  subject  to  the  same  laws  of  antecedence  and 
 consequence,  such  effects  will  follow.  Thus  while  matter  exists, 
 and  the  same  laws  of  attraction  continue  to  operate,  which  is  a 
 constitution  of  sovereign  pleasure,  heavy  bodies  will  tend  to  the 
 centre  of  gravitation ;  and  bodies  specifically  lighter  will  tend  to 
 recede  from  that  centre.  There  are  therefore  hypothetical  tend- 
 encies in  2^hysical  nature ;  that  is,  things  tend  to  certain  results 
 on  supposition  of  the  constituted  antecedents. 
 
 But  the  metaphysical  nature  of  things  has  also  hypothetical 
 tendencies.  Por  if  there  be  a  First  Cause,  He  tends  to  be,  and  to 
 be  all  that  He  is ;  and  ir  there  be  a  creatm-e,  he  tends  not  to  be, 
 and  not  to  be  all  that  he  has  received.  For  this  is  the  nature  of 
 the  one  and  of  the  other ;  the  one  as  absolute,  and  the  other  as 
 contingent.  To  suppose  an  absolute  being  that  tends  not  to  be, 
 or  a  contingent  being  that  tends  to  exist,  or  to  be  what  it  is  in 
 any  other  way  than  by  participation,  involves  a  contradiction. 
 The  supposition  is  not  less  absurd  than  that  a  circle  may  become 
 a  square,  or  a  square  a  circle ;  for  both  ahke  are  inconsistent  with 
 the  nature  of  things. 
 
 The  nature  of  things,  in  the  metaphysical  sense,  is  ultimately 
 nothing  else  than  the  nature  of  God,  which  is  prior  and  superior 
 to  aU  will,  and  the  nature  of  a  creature,  which  is  essentially  de- 
 fective compared  with  ulterior  perfection.  Respecting  the  former 
 of  these,  there  will  be  no  dispute ;  for  no  one  imagines  that  the 
 Divine  nature  is  the  effect  of  its  own  ^uill.  But  the  other  truth, 
 though  necessarily  implied  in  that  now  mentioned,  and  of  infinite 
 importance  in  moral  science,  is  not  so  easily  admitted,  because  not 
 in  so  familiar  a  train  of  observation.  Simple  existence  is  a  fami- 
 liar idea,  and  needs  but  little  effort  to  perceive  it.  But  a  tendency 
 to  exist  requires  a  little  more  thoiight ;  because  tendency,  in  refer- 
 ence to  existence,  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  existence  in  ques- 
 tion ;  and  different  tendencies  imply  different  natures.  Hence 
 the  subject  becomes  more  difficult. 
 
 Simjple  existence  being  the  most  obvious  and  familiar  idea,  and 
 knowing  that  God  exists,  and  the  world  exists,  we  too  hastily  in- 
 fer that  the  terms  or  the  manner  of  existence  in  each  case  have 
 no  difference  of  any  moment ;  whereas,  in  reality,  they  are  infinitely 
 different.     We  also  perceive  that  we  continue  to  exist,  and  from 
 
DISS.  VI.]  AND  HYPOTHETICAL  TENDENCIES.  83 
 
 thence  naturally  infer  some  tendency  to  exist ;  but  for  want  of 
 due  attention  we  further  erroneously  infer,  that  this  tendency  does 
 not  essentially  differ  from  a  tendency  to  exist  in  the  Divine  nature. 
 Whereas,  in  truth,  we  contingent  beings  and  all  the  created  uni- 
 verse, including  all  constituted  laws,  exist,  and  consequently  tend 
 to  exist,  only  by  the  will  of  the  Creator ;  but  the  Creator  himself 
 exists  antecedently  and  irrespectively  of  any  wiU.  He  therefore 
 tends  to  exist  absolutely,  but  we  only  hy pathetically,  on  supposi- 
 tion of  His  continued  will. 
 
 Hence  it  foUows,  if  we  compare  the  two  natures  and  their  tend- 
 encies with  the  idea  of  absolute,  the  one  tends  to  be,  and  the  other 
 not  to  be.  There  is  no  conceivable  medium.  If  the  one  exists 
 and  tends  to  exist  absolutely,  and  tlie  other  not,  this  last  must 
 needs  tend  the  contrary  way.  For  if  we  suppose  a  medium,  with 
 respect  to  absolute  and  contingent, — a  nature  that  has  no  tendency 
 either  to  be  or  not  to  be,  in  itself  considered, — we  suppose  as  great 
 a  contradiction  as  a  medium  between  being  and  not  being. 
 
 What  has  been  now  said  with  respect  to  simple  existence,  and 
 its  tendency,  is  equally  applicable  to  created  qualities,  and  their 
 tendency.  Thus,  for  instance,  holiness  in  a  creature  is  a  good 
 quality,  and  its  tendency  to  continue  can  no  more  be  absolute 
 than  the  existence  of  which  it  is  predicated.  Consequently,  com- 
 pared with  absolute,  the  tendency  is,  for  the  same  reason,  the  con- 
 trary way.  If  it  does  not  tend  to  continue,  in  an  absolute  sense, 
 it  tends  not  to  continue,  in  itself  considered.  Its  continuance  is 
 merely  hypothetical,  on  supposition  of  continued  wiU.  If  this  will 
 be  supposed  not  to  continue,  there  remains  no  possible  ground  of 
 its  continuance.  To  deny  this,  involves  the  same  palpable  contra- 
 diction as  before — that  the  same  thing  may  be  and  not  be  at  the 
 same  time  and  in  the  same  respect. 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  it  is  plain  that  our  existence,  our  good  quali- 
 ties, and  their  continuance,  being  contingent  things,  depend  neces- 
 sarily on  the  will  and  contmued  energy  of  our  Creator  and  Pre- 
 server ;  and  to  deny  this  is  to  contradict  the  nature  of  things. 
 The  tendency  of  the  most  exalted  and  the  most  holy  creature, 
 compared  with  absolute  being  and  goodness,  is,  from  the  nature  of 
 things, — that  is,  from  the  nature  of  God  and  of  a  creature, — the 
 contrary  way.  This  consequence  cannot  be  avoided,  and  an  at- 
 tempt to  avoid  it  is  the  same  as  an  attempt  to  identify  natures 
 infinitely  different.     The  sum  of  what  has  been  argued  is  this, 
 
84  ON  THE  NATXJEE  OF  THINGS,  ETC.  [DISS.  VI. 
 
 that  God  alone  is  the  bountifiil  Giver  and  continual  Preserver  of 
 
 aU  the  good  iii  the  universe,  according  to  His  good  pleasure  ;  and 
 that  the  nature  of  things  requires  that  they  should  have  no  tend- 
 ency of  their  oiun,  strictly  speaking,  either  to  existence  or  to  good- 
 ness. 
 
DISSERTATION  VII. 
 
 ON  THE  DIVINE  PBESCIENCE  AND  SCIBNTIA  MEDIA. 
 
 Feom  the  doctrine  of  the  natiire  of  things,  and  hypothetical  tend- 
 encies, the  transition  is  natural  to  the  consideration  of  the  Divine 
 prescience.  The  phrase  itself  is  plain  and  common,  and  suffi- 
 ciently indicates  a  certain  foreknowledge  of  what  is  future.  It  is 
 needless  to  enumerate  ivhat  things  are  foreknown ;  for  if  moral 
 good  and  evil,  which  are  the  proper  objects  relating  to  moral 
 science,  are  foreknown  as  certainly  future,  everything  else  must 
 needs  be.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  discuss  the  question  hoiu  the 
 Supreme  Being  foreknows  future  events,  or  what  is  the  modus 
 of  His  knowledge.  This  would  be  to  indulge  a  curiosity  equally 
 bold  and  unprofitable.  Were  the  solution  of  this  question  within 
 the  grasp  of  a  finite  mind,  (which  I  think  it  is  not,)  no  peculiar  ad- 
 vantage, that  I  can  conceive,  would  accrue  from  it  to  moral  science. 
 The  present  subject  of  inquiry,  therefore,  is  the  fact  of  Divine 
 prescience,  relative  to  moral  good  and  evil,  and  that  there  are  as- 
 signable  grounds  for  it  in  the  nature  of  things. 
 
 It  has  been  a  notion  too  much  taken  upon  trust,  that  the  ground 
 of  the  certain  futurition  of  morally  good  and  morally  bad  actions 
 is  the  same.  As  this  is  a  point  of  great  importance,  and  the  re- 
 futation of  it  is  calculated  to  place  the  doctrine  of  Divine  pre- 
 science in  a  proper  light,  I  shall  confine  myself  principally  to  these 
 two  points,  and  then  proceed  to  make  some  remarks  on  the  scholastic 
 notion  of  scientia  media. 
 
 A  sufficient  ground  of  the  certain  futurition  of  morally  good 
 actions,  and  therefore  of  their  being  foreknown  to  be  certain,  is 
 their  being  the  effect  of  Divine  purpose.  It  is  not  conceivable  that 
 good  actions  should  proceed  from  any  other  cause,  ultimately,  than 
 the  first  active  power,  by  the  medium  of  an  agent  who  is  free 
 
86  ON  THE  DIVINE  PEESCIENCE  [DISS.  VH. 
 
 from  restraint  in  clioosing  them.  All  good  is  from  God,  whatever 
 means  He  employs  in  producing  it.  Morally  good  actions  have 
 their  character  from  the  will  of  the  subordinate  agent ;  but  the 
 power  of  producing  them  is  derived  from  Him  who  is  absolute 
 active  power.  It  has  been  before  shewn  that  an  original  active 
 power  of  producing  moral  effects,  which  is  not  reducible  to  the 
 Fii'st  Cause,  is  an  absurd  hypothesis,  iavolving  the  contradiction 
 of  two  original  powers  of  the  same  quality. 
 
 Whatever  God  produces  in  time.  He  must  have  intended  to  pro- 
 duce from  eternity ;  and  whatever  future  effect  or  event  He  had 
 in  design,  He  must  needs  know  always.  Therefore,  the  certain 
 futurition  of  morally  good  actions,  and  the  foreknowledge  of 
 them,  must  have  an  adequate  ground  in  the  Divine  purpose  of 
 effecting  them.  It  cannot  be  pretended  that  it  is  unworthy  of 
 God  to  effect  what  is  good,  and  consequently  of  purposing  to  do 
 so.  But  it  is  evident  that,  in  reference  to  such  effects  and  pui'- 
 poses,  prescience  is  necessarily  implied. 
 
 The  only  plausible  objection,  I  conceive,  that  can  be  made 
 against  what  has  been  now  advanced,  is  a  supposed  degradation  of 
 our  active  power.  If  we  have  not,  it  may  be  asked,  an  original 
 power  to  perform  good  actions,  does  not  this  reduce  agency  into 
 instrumentality  1  If  the  power  be  not  originally  mme,  how  can 
 the  good  action  be  mine,  or  deserve  commendation?  However 
 plausible  this  objection  may  appear  at  first  sight,  it  has  no  real 
 force,  being  fuUy  answered  by  demonstrable  fact.  There  is  no 
 medium  between  original  and  instrumental  power ;  and  as  it  is  no 
 less  contradictory  to  common  sense  to  admit  two  original  active 
 powers,  than  to  admit  two  First  Causes,  it  follows  that,  to  claim 
 for  a  creature  anything  more  than  an  instrumental  power  of  per- 
 forming good  actions,  is  to  claim  what  is  inconsistent  with  the 
 nature  of  thiags. 
 
 As  to  commendation,  it  behoves  them  who  give,  and  them  who 
 receive  it,  to  keep  within  proper  boimds,  and  not  to  ascribe  that 
 to  a  creature  which  is  due  only  to  the  Creator.  Truly  virtuous 
 characters  have  been  ever  careful  to  ascribe  all  power,  as  well  as 
 all  glory,  to  Him.  To  an  agent  performing  actions  morally  good, 
 I  would  allow  all  the  esteem  and  commendation  which  are  consist- 
 ent with  tlie  nature  of  things ;  what  rational  being  could  wish  for 
 more  ?  And  as  to  agency,  to  requii-e  for  a  moral  agent  some 
 imdefinable  original  active  power,  besides  an  intellect  to  represent, 
 
DISS.  VII.]  AND  SGIENTIA  MEDIA.  87 
 
 a  will  to  choose  objective  good,  and  freedom  from  restraint,  in 
 reference  to  a  good  volition,  whUe  he  acts  from  principle  and  con- 
 viction, is  very  unreasonable.  It  is  to  require  an  impossibility : 
 two  original  active  powers, — a  creature  acting  independently  of  his 
 Creator  in  the  production  of  moral  good. 
 
 A  truly  virtuous  agent  performing  morally  good  actions  is  a  fair 
 image  of  his  Maker.  What  better  notion  of  the  adorable  Supreme 
 considered  as  an  agent  can  be  formed  by  creatures  than  that  He  is 
 possessed  of  an  intellect  to  rej)resent,  a  will  to  choose,  with  perfect 
 freedom  from  restraint,  with  a  nature  infinitely  good,  according  to 
 which  He  ever  chooses  ?  His  power  is  His  will ;  and  the  indefecti- 
 bihty  of  His  choice  flows  from  the  purity  of  His  nature. 
 
 We  should  carefully  distinguish  between  what  is  essential  to 
 agency,  and  what  is  the  predisposing  cause  of  the  quality  of  moral 
 actions.  One  being  has  a  large  intellect  and  a  vigorous  will, 
 another  has  a  narrow  intellect  and  a  feeble  will;  and  both  per- 
 fectly exempt  from  restraint  as  to  good,  and  compulsion  as  to  evU. 
 They  are  moral  agents  alike.  But  what  constitutes  their  agency  is 
 no  sufficient  ground  for  the  quality  of  their  actions.  An  intellect, 
 however  large,  and  a  will,  however  vigorous  and  free,  without  a 
 holy  principle,  would  produce  evil  deeds.  This  is  perfectly  con- 
 formable to  history  and  observation.  And,  on  the  contrary,  an 
 intellect,  however  confined,  and  a  will,  however  feeble,  with  a  holy 
 principle  or  nature,  will  perform  actions  morally  good. 
 
 These  observations  are  made  in  order  to  shew  that  the  decretive 
 influence  which  is  an  adequate  ground  of  prescience,  with  regard 
 to  morally  good  actions,  does  not  imply  any  superadded  impulse 
 given  to  the  will.  More  than  what  is  included  in  a  voluntary 
 agent  is  not  necessary.  What  secures  the  goodness  of  an  action, 
 according  to  Divine  purpose  and  prescience,  is  not  any  additional 
 force,  vigour,  or  energy,  imparted  to  the  luill,  but  the  goodness  of 
 that  nature  according  to  which  the  will  operates.  Though  free 
 agency  supposes  a  nature  or  principle,  the  quality  of  that  principle 
 cannot  aflect  the  existence  of  the  agency  itself.  The  best  and  the 
 worst  of  beings  are  alike  free  agents,  while  their  principles  are 
 directly  opposite  in  quality.  It  is  therefore  plain,  that  a  principle 
 may  be  altered  for  the  better  and  confirmed  without  any  uiterfer- 
 ence  with  free  agency ;  or,  in  other  words,  while  the  agent  continues 
 perfectly  exempt  from  any  additional  restraint  or  compulsion  as  to 
 his  will.     Only  let  a  good  princii^le  be  secured  by  Divine  purpose. 
 
88  ON  THE  DIVINE  PKESCIENCE  [DISS.  VH. 
 
 aud  an  adequate  ground  is  assigned  for  tlie  goodness  of  any  moral 
 action. 
 
 Let  us  now  consider  the  Divine  prescience  relative  to  actions 
 morally  evil.  This  has  always  been  considered  the  most  difficult 
 part  of  the  subject.  But  I  humbly  conceive  the  difficulty  is  by  no 
 means  insuperable.  The  perplexity  has  been  occasioned  by  the 
 adoption  of  false  j)riaciples,  aud,  particularly,  from  the  assumption, 
 that  the  certainty  of  all  events,  the  good  and  the  evU,  proceeds 
 from  the  same  cause.  It  has  been  shewn  before,  and  particularly 
 in  the  last  Dissertation,  that  there  are  hypothetical  tendencies  ac- 
 cording to  the  nature  of  things.  For  illustration's  sake,  let  us 
 allow  that  the  original  state  of  a  free  agent  is  perfectly  conformable 
 to  rectitude.  He  has  not  only  what  is  essential  to  constitute  free 
 agency,  as  before  explained,  but  also  a  goodness  of  nature  and 
 princii^le  by  participation.  Yet  the  continuance  of  such  goodness 
 is  only  hypothetical,  depending  exclusively  on  the  will  of  the  first 
 active  power  whether  it  shall  be  continued  or  not.  To  suj^pose 
 that  a  created  nature  has  an  inherent  absolute  tendency  to  good- 
 ness, any  more  than  to  existence,  is  to  contradict  the  natm-e  of 
 things,  as  before  shewn.  It  is  the  same  as  to  assert  the  existence 
 of  two  indefectible  natures ;  or  else,  which  is  no  less  absurd,  to 
 reverse  the  natures  of  Creator  and  creature. 
 
 But  it  may  be  asked.  Is  it  worthy  of  God  to  suffer  a  defectible 
 nature  to  fail  of  goodness  ?  or,  in  other  words,  to  jjermit  a  nature 
 when  holy  to  manifest  that  tendency  which  essentially  belongs  to 
 it  ?     This  question  admits  of  two  answers. 
 
 1.  It  is  plain  from  acknowledged  fact,  in  connexion  with  the 
 indefectibUity  of  the  Divine  nature,  that  it  was  not  unworthy  of 
 God  to  suffer,  or  not  to  prevent  morally  evil  actions.  It  is  abso- 
 lutely impossible  for  an  infinitely  perfect  nature  to  do  anything 
 unworthy  of  Himself ;  but  He  ha.s,  in  fact,  suffered  the  defection  of 
 some  of  His  rational  creatui'es  ;  therefore,  the  suffering,  or  nou-^jre- 
 vention  of  that  result,  was  not  unworthy  of  Him.  Nor  can  it  be 
 doubted  that  He  had  infinitely  wise  reasons  for  conducting  Him- 
 self in  that  manner  towards  His  creatures,  even  were  we  left  totally 
 at  a  loss  respecting  the  good  ends  to  be  answered  by  it.  But  we 
 are  not  left  without  sufficient  reasons  for  adoring  His  perfections, 
 and  admh-ing  His  conduct.  His  equity  and  benevolence  are 
 wonderfully  displayed  by  it. 
 
 2.  If  it  be  worthy  of  God  to  create  any  being  at  aU,  aud  to  form 
 
DISS.  VII.]  AND  SCIENTIA  MEDIA.  89 
 
 it  indefectible  is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  things,  it  cannot 
 be  unworthy  of  Him  to  leave  any  created  being  to  its  own  essen- 
 tial tendencies.  So  that  from  the  acknowledged  fact  of  its  being 
 not  unworthy  of  Him  to  create,  we  may  fairly  infer  it  is  not  un- 
 worthy of  Him  to  suffer  it  to  manifest  its  defectibility,  while  every 
 thing  essential  to  moral  agency  remains  without  infringement.  We 
 may  therefore  safely  conclude,  that  as  sure  as  it  was  worthy  of 
 Him  to  create  an  intelligent  being  at  all,  it  was  worthy  of  Him  to 
 suffer  his  defection.  That  He  was  able  to  prevent  that  result  is 
 not  disputed  ;  but  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  it  is  unworthy  of 
 Him  not  to  do  all  He  was  able  to  do. 
 
 Enough  has  been  said  to  prove  that  there  are  adequate  assign- 
 able grounds  for  the  certain  futurition  of  acts  morally  evil,  ex- 
 clusive of  any  Divine  necessitation,  and  therefore  of  the  Divine 
 prescience  of  such  acts.  He  who  beholds,  with  infinite  precision, 
 the  nature  of  things,  and  all  their  tendencies,  both  absolute  and 
 hypothetical ;  He  who  sees  His  own  tendency  to  indef  ectibiUty  in 
 every  future  period,  and  the  contrary  tendency  of  every  creature, 
 as  included  in  the  nature  of  things  ;  and,  finally,  He  who  sees  in 
 what  instances  He  will  prevent  that  tendency  from  taking  effect, 
 and  in  what  instances  He  will  suffer  it  to  operate, — -He  must  needs 
 foreknow  every  free  action,  both  good  and  evil  alike,  though  upon 
 different  gTOunds.  And  the  reader  will  observe  that  these  argu- 
 ments are  designed  to  shew,  not  merely  the /aci  of  the  Divine  pre- 
 science of  all  future  events,  but  also  the  assignable  adequate 
 grounds  of  prescience.  We  may  not  only  believe  it  as  a  truth 
 worthy  of  infinite  perfection,  but  we  may  also  perceive  sufficient 
 cause  why  it  must  be  so,  from  the  very  nature  of  moral  actions. 
 
 From  the  premises  we  may  infer  what  judgment  ought  to  be 
 formed  of  the  scholastic  doctrine  of  scientia  media,  or  hypothetical 
 prescience.  By  this  is  meant  a  knowledge  of  what  would  follow 
 on  the  supposition  of  any  antecedent :  for  instance,  how  a  free 
 agent  would  act  if  placed  in  any  given  situation  and  circum- 
 stances. It  is  manifest  that  there  is  both  a  physical  and  metaphy- 
 sical nature  of  things.  The  former  implies  a  constituted  series  of 
 antecedents  and  consequences.  Now,  He  who  appointed  the  pre- 
 sent series  could  have  appointed  another  ;  and  for  the  same  reason 
 that  He  foresees  the  present,  on  the  ground  of  His  own  appoint- 
 mient,  He  must  have  foreseen  the  other.  But  to  suppose  other 
 antecedents  in  the  present  system  than  what  ai-e  appointed,  is  the 
 
90  ON  THE  DIVINE  PRESCIENCE,  ETC.  [DISS.  VII. 
 
 same  thing  as  to  suppose  another  system.  If,  however,  we  suppose 
 partial  changes  with  the  continuance  of  existing  laws,  we  may 
 infer  what  consequents  would  follow.  If,  for  instance,  we  suppose 
 a  large  river  to  flow  where  there  is  now  but  a  small  rivulet,  vessels 
 of  a  given  burden  might  sail  on  it.  If  a  machine  of  a  given  form 
 and  character  were  made,  we  may  infer  its  mechanical  power.  And 
 on  suppositions  of  this  nature  all  works  of  art  must  be  formed. 
 The  continuance  of  the  constituted  laws  of  physical  nature,  gravi- 
 tation, solidity,  fluidity,  action,  and  reaction,  elasticity,  &c.,  are 
 always  supposed.  And  if  an  artist  foresees  what  would  be  the 
 effect  of  a  supposed  antecedent,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  the 
 Omniscient  does  not  foresee  the  consequence  of  every  possible 
 antecedent  on  supposition  of  continued  laws. 
 
 The  same  reasoning,  mutatis  mutandis,  holds  true  respecting 
 the  metaphysical  nature  of  things.  If,  for  instance,  a  free  agent 
 be  suj)posed  to  exist  in  given  circumstances,  the  nature  of  things — 
 that  is,  the  nature  of  God  and  of  a  creature — continuing  unchange- 
 ably the  same,  withoiit  any  interposition  to  prevent  the  operation 
 of  the  creature's  essential  tendencies  in  themselves  considered,  the 
 consequence  of  any  supposed  case  has  the  same  ground  of  cer- 
 tainty and  prescience  as  in  any  case  that  iu  fact  exist.s.  And  the 
 same  holds  equally  true  on  supposition  of  an  iaterposition  to  pre- 
 vent the  creature's  own  tendencies,  by  counteracting  princiiDles 
 which  may  secui-e  a  different  residt.  And  indeed  this  last  suppo- 
 sition coincides  with  physical  antecedents  and  their  appointed  ten- 
 dencies. So  that,  upon  the  whole,  an  adequate  assignable  ground 
 of  Divine  prescience,  with  respect  to  actions  morally  good,  is  found 
 in  the  Divine  purpose,  as  in  effects  of  a  physical  nature  ;  and,  with 
 respect  to  actions  morally  evil,  in  the  natm'e  of  things  and  theu' 
 hypothetical  tendencies. 
 
 The  principal  ground  on  which  divines  and  metaphysicians  have 
 opposed  the  doctrine  of  scientia  media,  or  hyj)othetical  prescience, 
 seems  to  have  been  a  mistaken  apprehension  that  good  and  evil 
 have  vmiform,  rather  than  opposite  causes.  Those  who  are  jealous 
 for  the  honour  of  sovereign  grace  cannot  allow  good  works  to  be 
 only  foreseen ;  and  those  who  are  jealous  for  the  honour  of  moral 
 government  cannot  endure  the  thought  of  sin  heing  foreappointed. 
 Each,  therefore,  seems  to  possess  half  the  truth.  The  hypothetical 
 tendency  oigood  is  known  in  its  all-sufficient  cause;  but  that  of  evil 
 in  its  deficient  cause,  the  liberty  and  passive  power  of  the  creature. 
 
DISSERTATION  VIII. 
 
 OF  A  FIRST  CAUSE  ;  OE,  THE  EVIDENCE  THAT  THERE  IS  A  BEING, 
 ALL-POWERFUL,  "WISE,  AND  GOOD,  BY  WHOM  EVERYTHING 
 EXISTS — THAT  THERE  IS  NOT,  INFINITELY  IMPROBABLE — THAT 
 THERE  IS,  INFINITELY  PROBABLE. 
 
 However  obvious  the  general  truth  that  there  is  a  First  Cause,  it 
 is  far  from  easy  to  produce  the  evidence  of  it  in  a  convincing 
 Hght.  Por  my  own  part,  I  am  as  fully  convinced  that  there  is  a 
 Being,  all-powerful,  wise,  and  good,  by  whom  everything  exists,  as 
 I  am  of  my  own  existence ;  yet  the  success  of  my  attempt  to 
 demonstrate  this  to  the  conviction  of  others  must  depend  on  two 
 things.  The  first  is,  the  order  and  perspicuity  of  the  evidence  in 
 itseK  considered;  and  the  second  is,  the  state  of  the  minds  to  whom 
 it  is  presented.  Por  to  some  persons,  arguments,  however  con- 
 vincing, will  not  produce  conviction  ;  the  strength  of  prejudice,  or 
 confirmed  associations,  having  prejudiced  the  cause.  To  a  mind 
 candid  and  open  to  conviction,  I  trust  sufficient  evidence  will  appear 
 in  favoiu'  of  my  conclusion. 
 
 It  should  be  previously  noticed  that,  as  difi'erent  subjects  admit 
 of  different  kinds  of  evidence,  that  only  should  be  expected  which 
 is  appropriate  to  the  subject  under  consideration.  The  evidence 
 of  sense,  for  instance,  is  out  of  the  question,  because  no  one  can 
 suppose  that  a  First  Cause  is  an  object  of  sense.  Nor  can  the 
 evidence  of  testimony,  or  that  of  consciousness,  have  a  legitimate 
 place  in  a  professed  demonstration. 
 
 In  strictness,  metaphysical  evidence  alone,  in  the  comprehensive 
 acceptation  of  the  term,  (including  the  mathematical,)  can  demon- 
 strate. I  call  that  metaphysical  evidence  which  necessarily  flows 
 from  some  first  principle  ;  and  this  is  the  case  with  mathematical 
 
92  OF  A  FIKST  CAUSE.  [DISS.  VIII. 
 
 conclusions,  which  do  not  dei^end  on  the  accuracy  with  which  a 
 diagram  is  formed,  but  upon  principles  and  consequences. 
 
 As  in  mathematics  there  are  two  kinds  of  legitimate  demonstra- 
 tion,— the  direct  and  indirect, — so  in  other  parts  of  metaphysics. 
 By  the  one  mode,  the  conclusion  follows  by  direct  comparison  of 
 the  thing  asserted  for  jDroof  with  some  first  i^rinciple,  or  a  truth 
 before  demonstrated.  By  the  other  mode,  the  denial  of  the  propo- 
 sition is  compared  with  some  first  principle,  or  a  truth  demon- 
 strated before,  and  thereby  shewn  to  be  absurd  or  impossible. 
 
 These  two  methods  appear  to  me  applicable  to  the  subject  under 
 consideration,  and  in  discussing  it  I  shall  avail  myself  of  both. 
 The  direct  mode,  indeed,  is  regarded  as  more  strictly  demonstra- 
 tive, but  the  other  is  not  denied  the  honourable  epithet.  That 
 the  reader's  mind  may  be  gradually  prepared  for  the  more  ab- 
 stracted part  of  the  evidence  intended,  I  think  it  best  to  begin 
 with  what  is  indirect,  by  shewing  the  absurdity,  or  j)erhaps  I 
 should  say  the  infinite  improbability,  of  the  sentiment  that  there 
 is  not  a  Being,  all-powerful,  wise,  and  good,  by  whom  everything 
 exists. 
 
 Sect.  I. 
 
 That  there  is  not  a  Being,  all-powerful,  luise  and  good,  hy  whom 
 everything  exists,  is  a  supjwsition  infinitely  ibipeobable, 
 w/iert  compared  luith  maeks  of  design  both  in  ourselves  and 
 other  beings  around  us. 
 
 Evidence  of  design,  and,  therefore,  of  intelligence,  in  calculations 
 of  probability,  admits  of  indefinite  degrees.  This  may  be  best 
 illustrated  by  a  few  familiar  similes.  Suppose,  for  instance,  I  cast 
 my  eyes  on  a  marble  chimney-piece,  and  observe  the  appearance  of 
 petrified  animals ;  I  am  not  certain,  from  this  appearance,  whether 
 they  have  been  always  in  the  stone,  as  a  jDart  of  the  system  of 
 natiu'e,  under  an  endless  variety  of  resemblances,  or  whether  these 
 objects  had  once  been  animated  substances,  which,  by  some  slow 
 unknown  process,  or  by  some  sudden  convulsions  in  this  terra- 
 queous globe,  were  brought  to  this  petrified  state.  But  respect- 
 ing petrifactions  on  the  mantel-piece,  I  have  more  certainty  of 
 confidence.  Some  appear  evidently  the  result  of  a  slow  process 
 in  the  laboratory  of  nature,  (whether  this  could  operate  without  a 
 designer  is  another  question,)  but  others  bear  the  marks  of  imita- 
 tive design  and  artificial  polish. 
 
DISS.  VIII.]  OP  A  FIKST  CAUSE.  93 
 
 Again,  suppose  a  person  levelling  a  mound  finds  a  plain  brick, 
 of  the  same  colour,  apparent  texture,  form,  and  dimensions,  with 
 those  which  are  commonly  used  in  the  neighbourhood.  He  has 
 no  doubt  remaining,  nor  has  his  more  learned  employer,  that  this 
 is  the  work  of  art,  rather  than  of  nature,  however  inferior  may  be 
 the  value,  or  coarse  the  texture  of  the  brick,  compared  with  a 
 polished  obelisk  of  marble.  Many  considerations  might  be  urged 
 against  the  probability  of  an  artificial  brick  being  found  in  that 
 .situation.  But  probability  is  comparative,  and,  in  this  case,  is 
 borne  down  by  stronger  probability  with  irresistible  force.  A 
 learned  antiquarian  might  undertake  to  shake  the  confidence  of 
 one  less  learned  than  himself,  by  comparing  this  piece  of  matter 
 with  many  circumstances ;  and  particularly  the  various  forms  of 
 bricks  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  and  in  different  periods  of 
 time.  But  no  arguments  deduced  from  negative  considerations, 
 from  probable  circumstances  of  locality,  of  time,  or  any  other,  with 
 whatever  learning  or  ingeiruity  they  might  be  pressed,  are  calcu- 
 lated to  move  him,  unless  he  can  be  prevailed  upon  previously  to 
 renounce  an  incomparably  stronger  degree  of  evidence  on  the  con- 
 trary side. 
 
 Suppose,  moreover,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  difi'erent  degrees  of 
 probability,  a  number  of  persons  employed  on  a  new  plantation  in 
 America,  which,  as  universally  believed,  had  never  before  been  the 
 seat  of  either  wealth  or  civilisation.  These  persons  are  engaged 
 in  making  a  fish-pond  at  a  little  distance  from  the  recently-erected 
 mansion.  Towards  the  bottom  of  the  intended  cavity,  the  work- 
 men discover  an  urn  full  of  gold  and  silver  coins  closely  covered 
 with  a  lid.  But,  what  is  very  remarkable,  there  is  no  perceivable 
 difierence  between  the  state,  the  firmness  and  quahty  of  the  soil 
 about  it,  either  perpendicularly  or  in  any  other  direction,  and  that 
 adjoining.  There  is  not  the  least  appearance  of  its  having  been 
 disturbed,  or  of  its  having  been  lately  deposited  there  by  the  hand 
 of  man ;  and  yet  there  was  the  urn  found,  and  there  are  the  coins, 
 without  any  possibility  of  trick  or  collusion  among  the  workmen. 
 
 How  to  account  for  this  fact  is  a  great  difficulty.  All  the  men, 
 however,  are  unanimous  in  one  conclusion,  that  the  vessel  and  its 
 precious  contents  are  the  work  of  design.  The  gentleman  on 
 whose  estate  this  extraordinary  circumstance  took  place,  invites  a 
 number  of  literary  friends,  with  a  view  to  collect  their  learned 
 opinions  on  so  mysterious  a  point.     One  of  these  flippantly  ob- 
 
9-i  OF  A  FIEST  CACTSE.  '  [DISS.  VIII. 
 
 serves,  that  it  came  there  by  chance.  Another,  with  as  little  rea- 
 son, but  souie  ingenuity  of  remark,  thiaks  it  might  be  a  lusus 
 naturce,  or  accounted  for  on  the  same  princii^le  as  the  cornu 
 amonis  in  stones.  But  the  general  body,  who  were  examining  in 
 the  meantime  the  coins  and  their  inscriptions,  think  it  as  impro- 
 bable that  these  were  the  work  of  chance  as  that  theu'  friend  him- 
 self should  be  so,  without  either  father  or  mother ;  and  that  they 
 could  be  no  more  a  lusus  natures  than  the  gentleman  who  thought 
 them  to  be  such. 
 
 Once  more  :  suppose  a  person  fixes  upon  a  spot  near  his  house 
 for  sinking  a  well ;  and  though  a  thick  stratum  of  hard  rock  must 
 be  penetrated,  this  he  will  not  allow  to  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  de- 
 sisting. When  the  workmen  liave  sunk  the  well  to  ten  fathoms  deep, 
 and  the  last  two  of  these  were  a  solid  rock,  they  find  a  gold  bos, 
 perfectly  square,  in  the  heart  of  it,  firmly  closed  and  made  as  one 
 piece.  United  to  a  fragment  of  the  rock,  they  bring  it  up,  and 
 present  it  to  their  master.  He  examines  the  box,  and  has  it 
 opened ;  and,  to  his  further  astonishment,  he  fuids  a  beautifully 
 formed  watch  laid  in  a  bed  of  cotton.  He  compares  it  with  other 
 watches,  and  finds  that  the  parts  are  all  perfect,  and  when  womid, 
 its  movements  are  the  same.  Anxious  to  account  for  this  sm'- 
 prisiug  phenomenon,  he  consults  all  the  naturalists  and  literati 
 within  the  circle  of  his  acquaintance,  in  order  to  decide  on  the 
 point  of  probability — what  it  was,  and  how  it  came  there.  The 
 first  point  to  be  decided  with  each  is,  whether  it  was  actually 
 found  in  the  solid  rock ;  but  every  part  of  the  investigation  con- 
 firmed the  fact.  The  next  question  is.  Which  is  most  probable, 
 that  this  watch  was  the  work  of  nature  or  of  art,  the  produce  of 
 chance  or  of  design  ?  They  unanimously  agreed  that  they  could 
 not  jjossibly  renounce  the  ojiinion  that  it  was  a  work  of  human 
 art,  however  impenetrable  the  mystery  of  its  being  found  in  that 
 situation.  This  instance  proves  that  evidence  of  design  may  be 
 stronger  than  any  miracle  ;  for  they  could  sooner  admit  a  miracle 
 in  the  case  than  renounce  their  general  conclusion. 
 
 May  we  not,  from  these  last  instances,  safely  lodge  an  appeal  to 
 every  rational  being  in  the  world,  whether  marks  of  design  are  not 
 calculated  to  produce  irresistible  conviction?  Instances  of  such 
 marks  might  be  accumulated  without  end.  Out  of  countless 
 millions  of  objects,  formed  by  human  art,  you  may  choose  any 
 one  of  them  ;  and  rationally  infer  that  it  is  infinitely  improbable 
 
DISS.  VIII.]  OF  A  FIEST  CAUSE.  95 
 
 that  it  sprung  from  chance,  though  you  know  nothing  of  the 
 author,  and  never  saw  one  of  them  made.  And  the  evidence  of 
 an  intelligent  cause  is  equally  clear  to  the  illiterate  and  the  learned, 
 though  the  latter  may  be  better  able  to  discuss  the  subject  than 
 the  former. 
 
 Now,  marks  of  design  no  less  decisive  pervade  the  whole  grand 
 system  of  matter  and  motion ;  and  if  it  is  infinitely  improbable 
 that  a  small  piece  of  mechanism  should  spring  into  existence  with- 
 out an  intelligent  cause,  so  it  is,  a  foHiori,  that  the  solar  system 
 should.  Sooner  may  a  house  with  all  its  furniture,  with  time- 
 pieces, pictures,  and  books, — I  may  add,  with  a  family  to  inhabit  it, 
 — spring  up  at  once  without  a  desigumg  cause,  than  that  the  solar 
 system,  so  full  of  exquisitely  beautiful  parts  and  proportions, 
 should  have  done  so.  Nor  is  it  at  all  necessary  that  the  observer 
 should  be  able  to  point  out  the  design  for  which  the  grand  system 
 is  formed,  in  order  to  receive  conviction  that  it  has  an  all-powerful, 
 wise,  and  good  Author,  any  more  than  that  he  should  be  able  to 
 decipher  and  read  a  book  written  in  the  Chinese  language,  in 
 order  to  -ascertain  that  it  is  the  work  of  man.  To  know  that  a 
 picture  is  the  work  of  an  artist,  it  is  not  necessary  to  know  his 
 person,  his  name,  or  the  time  in  which  he  lived.  We  may  be  cer- 
 tain that  a  telescope  or  a  microscope  is  the  work  of  intelligence, 
 though  we  are  unable  to  explain  their  parts  and  uses.  To  a 
 mind  unperverted  by  obstinate,  universal  scepticism,  or  the  most 
 unreasonable  soj)histry,  the  conviction  is  comjjlete  as  to  authorship. 
 The  pleasure,  indeed,  would  be  increased,  and  our  admiration  of 
 the  author's  art  cherished,  in  proportion  to  our  growing  acquaint- 
 ance with  his  design,  and  the  consummate  subserviency  of  every 
 part  to  promote  it.  To  see  every  part  explained,  the  construction 
 and  principles  accounted  for,  to  an  inquisitive  mind  would  be 
 highly  gratifying ;  but  still  the  original  conviction  of  causation 
 woidd  remain  the  same.  In  this  respect,  the  learned  has  but 
 little  advantage  over  the  rustic ;  the  latter  is  constrained  to  ac- 
 knowledge a  cause  as  well  as  the  former,  though  not  with  the 
 same  gratification.  Ignorance  of  construction  and  design  is  no 
 deduction  from  that  which  is  adequate  to  induce  the  main  conclu- 
 sion. Though  the  philosophy  of  second  causes  may  be  wanting, 
 religion,  which  has  to  do  with  the  First  Cause,  is  immediately  sub- 
 served. 
 
 A  design,  not  less  evident  to  a  rational,  unprejudiced  mind, 
 
96  OP  A  FIRST  CAUSE.  [DISS.  VIII. 
 
 pervades  all  the  organised  parts  of  the  universe.  To  maintain 
 that  a  flower  or  plant,  a  worm,  a  fly,  a  fish,  a  fowl,  a  qnaclruped, 
 or  a  man,  sprung  up  from  chance,  or  a  fortuitous  combination,  im- 
 connected  with  any  jDrogenitor  of  the  same  species,  would  be  quite 
 as  reasonable  as  the  sentiment  that  the  first  of  each  species  sprvmg 
 up  in  that  manner.  To  sujjpose  a  law  of  conformations  is  absurd 
 if  we  exclude  a  lawgiver;  for  in  that  case  "law"  would  be  an 
 unmeaning  term,  a  mere  nonentity.  If  it  be  ridiculous  to  suppose 
 that  a  stone,  a  lump  of  clay,  or  quantity  of  earth,  began  to  exist  to- 
 day, is  it  less  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  this  terraqueous  globe 
 began  to  exist  in  like  manner  ?  Or  who  that  has  not  an  impious 
 cause  to  serve  can  persuade  himself  that  the  senses  and  organs  of 
 animals  do  not  bear  marks  of  design  ?  Allow  an  intelligent 
 designer  of  the  eye,  the  ear,  and  other  parts,  and  reason  has  a 
 resting-place ;  deny  this,  and  all  is  confusion  and  absurdity. 
 
 To  assert  an  eternal  succession  without  design,  power,  or  wisdom, 
 and  the  difficulty  is  rather  increased  than  diminished.  The  weight 
 of  a  chain  is  not  lessened  by  multiplying  links  out  of  sight,  for  the 
 longer  it  is  supposed  to  be,  the  greater  need  there  is  of  a  primary 
 support.  By  multiplying  marks  of  design  it  is  folly  to  suppose 
 that  a  designer  is  less  necessary.  In  reality,  the  longer  the  suc- 
 cession, the  more  exquisite  the  contrivance ;  as  the  longer  a 
 time-piece  is  made  to  go,  without  interference  on  our  part,  the 
 greater  is  the  skiU  of  the  maker.  If  an  eye,  an  ear,  or  any  other 
 curious  part  of  an  animal,  cannot  be  supposed  to  arise  from  non- 
 existence to  day,  much  less  can  the  same  be  supposed  to  arise  in 
 that  way  countless  millions  of  ages  past.  And  to  suppose  these 
 to  be  from  eternity  without  design  only  augments  the  folly.  It 
 is  only  to  evade  the  light  of  evidence  by  running  into  the  dark. 
 Sooner  could  I  believe,  on  rational  grounds,  that  a  microscope  or 
 a  drum  were  made  by  chance,  than  the  eye  or  the  ear  of  an  animal ; 
 sooner  that  a  ship  and  its  sails  were  the  effect  of  chance,  than  a 
 bird  and  its  wings  ;  sooner  that  a  globe  or  an  orrery  had  no 
 author,  than  this  earth  and  the  solar  system.  I  could  sooner  infer 
 that  the  metropolis  of  a  countiy  came  into  existence  without  the 
 aid  of  man,  than  that  the  heart  of  an  animal  has  no  marks  of 
 design;  or- that  aU  the  carriages  that  run  from  and  to  the  metro- 
 polis move  by  chance,  without  any  human  wUl  concerned,  than  that 
 the  blood  of  any  animal  is  impelled  from  the  heart  to  the  arteries, 
 and  returns  again  by  the  veins,  without  the  intention  of  a  designing 
 
DISS.  Vm.]  OF  A  FIEST  CAUSE.  97 
 
 cause.  I  coiild  sooner  conclude  that  a  lighted  lamp,  with  its 
 reflector,  found  in  some  solitary  place,  had  sprung  up  that  same 
 hour  out  of  nothing,  without  a  makei',  than  that  the  sun  and  the 
 moon  had  not  an  all-powerful,  wise,  and  good  Creator. 
 
 Were  I  introduced  into  a  museum  of  curiosities,  and  shewn  two 
 automatons  at  work,  forming  different  parts  resembling  those  of 
 the  human  body,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  me  to  abstain  from 
 admiration  of  the  ingenuity  of  the  contriver.  But  what  would  be 
 my  surprise  on  hearing  it  asserted,  that  such  was  the  contrivance 
 of  the  machinery  that  these  automatons  would  at  length  complete 
 an  image  like  themselves,  as  the  sole  effect  of  the  complicated 
 apparatus ;  and  in  order  to  produce  in  me  a  complete  conviction 
 of  the  truth  of  the  assertion,  I  was  permitted  to  watch,  from  day  to 
 day,  the  progress  of  the  work,  and  the  final  effect  in  a  well-propor- 
 tioned figure  very  nearly  resembling  the  two  former !  The  sup- 
 position is  not  in  itself  impossible.  What  could  I  infer  from  this 
 phenomenon  but,  as  these  automatons  produced  the  third  without 
 knowing  how,  the  skill  of  the  contriver  must  be  the  more  apjoarent  ? 
 But  this  is  not  so  wonderful  as  the  formation  of  a  human  pair  who 
 should  propagate  their  species ;  nor  are  the  signs  of  contrivance 
 so  manifest.  The  various  parts,  their  uses,  their  exquisite  struc- 
 ture, are  incomparably  superior  to  the  other,  independently  of  the 
 informing  mind.  In  a  striking  respect  these  also  are  living 
 automatons.  They  can  produce  nothing  without  the  efficacy  of  a 
 power  superior  to  themselves.  One  family  has  no  heir  to  possess 
 a  large  fortune ;  another  has  more  ofispring  than  there  is  any 
 prospect  of  rearing  with  comfort.  Are  they  not  in  this  respect  as 
 much  dependent  on  a  design  above  themselves  as  the  third  figure 
 on  the  will  of  the  inventor  of  the  contrivance  1  The  evident  con- 
 clusion is,  that  it  is  infinitely  improbable  that  the  human  race 
 should  propagate  their  species  without  an  intelligent  Designer,  who 
 is  all-powerful,  wise,  and  good. 
 
 Should  any  still  object,  that  the  existence  and  propagation  of 
 every  vegetable,  and  of  every  animal,  however  great,  and  however 
 small,  may  possibly  be  all  the  effect  of  chance;  this,  in  one  view, 
 may  be  only  a  dispute  about  a  wame,  and  resolvable  to  this  ques- 
 tion. Whether  we  may  not  "  possibly  "  do  right  in  denominating  an 
 all-powerful,  wise,  and  good  Designer  by  the  term  "  chance  ?"  But 
 if  the  question  be.  Whether  the  universe  and  all  its  parts  might 
 not  possibly  have  either  arisen  from  nonentity  without  a  design- 
 
 VOL.  IV.  G 
 
98  OF  A  FIEST  CAUSE.  [DISS.  VHI. 
 
 ing  cause,  or  been  from  eternity  in  a  similar  form  ?  I  scruple  not 
 to  say  that  the  evidence  already  produced,  and  which  might  easily 
 have  been  increased  indefinitely,  amounts  to  an  infinite  improh- 
 abiliti/  against  the  suj)position. 
 
 Sect.  II. 
 
 That  there  is  a  Being,  aU-pou'erful,  xvise,  and  good,  is  infinitely 
 PKOBABLE,  ivhen  compared  ivith  the  idea  of  the  possibility 
 of  such  a  Being. 
 
 The  ideas  of  possibility  and  impossibility  are  quite  familiar  to 
 every  reflecting  mind.  Who  is  there  that  does  not  acknoTvledge  it 
 a  possible  thing  for  a  unit  to  be  so  often  added  to  a  first  unit, 
 that  the  number  becomes  a  thousand?  Or  who  is  there  that  will 
 not  at  once  own,  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  numbers  two  and 
 one  to  be  the  same  thing  ?  Does  any  one  suj)pose  that  a  circle 
 can  be  identified  with  a  triangle  ?  or  that  one  triangle  cannot 
 be  equal  to  another  ?  Does  any  imagine  that  an  oak-tree  may  in 
 an  instant,  from  mere  chance,  or  without  any  will  concerned  in 
 the  case,  be  turned  into  a  lion,  or  a  man-of-war  into  a  whale? 
 "What  should  we  think  of  a  man  who  maintained  it  to  be  a  very 
 possible  thing  for  lions  to  live  in  the  sea,  and  whales  in  a  forest, 
 without  any  alteration  either  in  the  constitution  of  these  animals, 
 or  of  the  elements  that  siu'round  them,  or  any  ivill  to  effect  it  ? 
 
 And  j'et  the  notion  of  an  Atheist,  who  renounces  the  idea  of  a 
 First  Intelligent  Cause,  is  far  more  absurd  than  any  of  these  im- 
 possibilities, even  in  the  proportion  of  one  to  innumerable  imits. 
 And  the  absurdity  is  accumulated  without  bounds  when  he  sup- 
 poses the  impossibility/  of  a  First  Cause  possessed  of  power,  wis- 
 dom, and  intelligence.  This,  however,  is  the  onus  prohandi  incum- 
 bent on  an  Atheist — that  it  is  impossible  there  should  have  been 
 an  uncaused  intelligent  Former  of  the  universe,  and  of  the  amaz- 
 ing varieties  of  animated  substances.  For  to  admit  the  jiossibility, 
 is  to  admit  the  fact* 
 
 *  [The  hand  that  penned  the  preceding  pages  was  .arrested  here  by  Infinite 
 Wisdom,  in  the  prosecution  of  the  Treatise  on  Moral  Science.  They  will,  though 
 only  a  fragment,  possess,  therefore,  in  the  estimation  of  every  one  able  rightly  to 
 appreciate  a  remarkably  penetrating  mind,  characterised  by  the  most  exalted 
 piety,  that  special  value  which  the  reHcs  of  departed  worth  and  genius  ever  have 
 on  that  very  ground,  even  if  on  no  other.  The  thoughtful  reader  will,  however, 
 find  them,  especially  some  portions  of  them,  amazingly  suggestive. — Ed.] 
 
DISSERTATION  IX. 
 
 ON  A  NECESSAEY  AGENT. 
 
 Weee  the  Iraman  mind,  indeed,  not  the  subject  of  either  passive 
 power,  on  the  one  hand,  as  the  predisjjosing  cause  of  vice,  or  of 
 Divine,  holy  influence,  on  the  other,  as  the  predisposing  cause  of 
 real  virtue  ;  and  were  the  determining  motive  what  some  have  re- 
 presented it  to  be, — the  object  itself,  irrespective  of  the  changeable 
 state  of  the  mind  perceiving  it, — the  objection  that  "  a  necessary- 
 agent  is  a  plain  contradiction,"  or,  in  other  words,  that  man  is  no 
 proper  agent,  would  be  unanswerable.  For  the  rank  and  place  of 
 man  in  creation,  and  his  relative  circumstances,  in  the  arrange- 
 ment of  Providence,  being  the  result  of  decretive  appointment,  if 
 he  himself  were  not  liable  to  any  change  but  by  the  same  appoint- 
 ment, it  would  follow,  that  if  the  objects  themselves  determined 
 him  to  choose,  and  to  choose  always  according  to  the  strongest 
 motive,  his  very  volitions  in  the  acts  themselves  would  be  necessi- 
 tated decretively,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  hypothetical  or  moral  pos- 
 sibility of  failure,  and  therefore  could  never  be  erroneous,  any 
 more  than  the  First  Cause  could  act  erroneously.  On  such  prin- 
 ciples, moral  evil,  vice,  or  fault  could  have  no  existence.  No  efiect 
 CQuld  be  otherwise  than  good,  amiable,  and  perfectly  innocent, — a 
 moral  possibility  of  failure  being  excluded  by  natural  necessity. 
 For  the  volition  itself  to  be  so  necessitated,  and  not  in  a  moral  or 
 hypothetical  manner  only,  is  the  same  thing  as  giving  it  no  oppor- 
 tunity of  choice  or  preference,  or  constraining  it  to  choose  one 
 way  by  a  settled  purpose,  with  a  natural  impossibility  of  acting- 
 otherwise.  But  if  every  act  of  man  be  thus  the  result  of  settled 
 purpose,  why  should  he  be  blamed  for  any  one  act  whatever  ?  He 
 does  nothing  but  what  he  is  constrained,  or  decretively  necessitated 
 to  perform,  the  contrary  being  rendered  naturally  impossible ;  and 
 
100  ON  A  NECESSARY  AGENT.  [DISS.  IS. 
 
 if  he  deserves  no  praise,  he  can  incur  no  blame,  any  more  than  a 
 clock  for  not  keeping  time.  Such  a  necessary  agent  would  be,  in- 
 deed, a  plain  contradiction.  There  is  much  reason  to  apprehend 
 that  some  philo.sophical  Necessarians  have  no  better  notion  of 
 agency  than  that  which  Mr  Chubb  charges,  and  justly  charges, 
 with  "  a  plain  contradiction."  For  those  who  hold  the  sentiment 
 that  every  act,  even  as  to  its  moral  quality,  and  every  event,  are  of 
 decretive  appointment  in  subserviency  to  ultimate  good,  must 
 allow,  in  order  to  be  tolerably  consistent,  that  the  Supreme  Being 
 is  "the  only  proper  agent  in  the  universe,"*  and  thus  reduce 
 human  agency,  and  everything  else  called  agency  in  a  creature,  to 
 an  appointed  necessary  choice,  however  odious  in  its  nature,  mis- 
 chievous iu  its  tendency,  or  painful  in  experience.  Thus,  accord- 
 ing to  them,  God  is  the  only  proper  agent  in  all  foul  crimes  and 
 horrid  blasphemies  on  earth  and  in  hell !  They  have  a  right  to 
 define  their  terms,  and  to  say  what  they  mean  by  agency  in  God, 
 or  in  a  creature,  and  to  state  their  hypothesis  accordingly ;  but 
 others  also  have  a  right  to  deduce  the  genuine  consequences  of 
 that  hypothesi.?,  and  to  shew  whei'ein  its  error  lies. 
 
 The  design  of  these  observations  is  not  to  excite  a  sjjirit  of  un- 
 profitable controversy,  but  to  assist  the  serious  inquirer  in  detecting- 
 errors,  and  recognising  truths  of  radical  importance  in  ethics  and 
 theology ;  and  it  is  hoped  that  to  promote  these  ends  the  follow- 
 ing observations  may  conduce : — 
 
 1.  It  is  granted  that,  in  reference  to  natural  acts,  the  Supreme 
 Being  is  the  "only  proper  agent"  in  the  universe,  as  they  aU 
 spring  from  His  energy.  In  this  respect,  He  is  the  First  Cause  of 
 all  causes  efficiently;  and  the  description  of  the  poet  is  phUosophi- 
 cally  just.     He 
 
 "  Warms  in  the  sun,  refreshes  in  the  breeze, 
 Glows  in  the  stars,  and  blossoms  in  the  trees ; 
 Lives  through  all  life,  extends  through  all  extent. 
 Spreads  undivided,  operates  unspent." — Pope. 
 
 2.  It  is  also  granted  that  in  all  acts  morally  good  the  created 
 agent  is  the  subject  of  necessity  several  ways.  He  has  an  active 
 nature  from  decretive  necessity,  which  it  is  not  in  his  power  to 
 alter.  He  is  also,  accordingly,  compelled  to  some  act  of  choice 
 from  the  activity  of  his  nature.  He  is,  moreover,  the  subject  of 
 physical  influence  of  a  holy  and  purifying  nature,  whereby  the 
 
 *  Belsliam's  Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Mind,  p.  254. 
 
DISS.  IX.]  ON  A  NECESSAKY  AGENT.  101 
 
 goodness  of  his  choice  is  infallibly  secured,  and  without  which 
 there  could  be  no  assignable  ground  of  certainty  that  any  action 
 would  be  morally  good.  There  is  also  a  necessity  of  connexion, 
 arising  from  the  nature  of  things  or  the  essence  of  truth  :  first, 
 between  the  disposition  and  the  act,  or  that  the  act  will  be  of  the 
 same  nature,  morally  considered,  with  the  disposition ;  and,  secondly, 
 between  the  act  and  the  end  or  consequent,  which  is  happiness. 
 
 3.  It  is,  moreover,  allowed,  that  in  all  acts  morally  evil  the  soul 
 is  passive  in  reference  to  that  necessity  of  dependence  which  is 
 inseparable  from  a  created  nature,  which  may  be  called  passive 
 power,  without  which  the  existence  of  moral  evil  would  be  im- 
 possible. This  necessity  also  arises  from  the  nature  of  things,  not 
 from  decree ;  for  no  decree  can  alter  its  existence,  (though  it  may, 
 and  actually  does,  counteract  it,)  any  more  than  it  can  alter  the 
 state  of  a  creature  from  dependence  into  independence  on  the 
 Pirst  Cause.  A  creature  without  passive  power  involves  the  most 
 palpable  absurdities  ;  for  its  very  definition  is,  "  that  property  in 
 a  creature  whereby  it  differs  essentially  from  the  independence, 
 self-sufficiency,  and  indefectibility  of  the  Creator :"  and  to  deny  it 
 is  to  suppose  that  a  creature  may  be  indeiDendent,  self-suiBcient, 
 and  indefectible, — that  in  these  respects  the  creature  and  the 
 Creator  are  on  a  par, — that  a  necessary  and  a  contingent  being- 
 are  the  same  in  those  very  things  which  constitute  their  essential 
 difference  !  Were  it  not  for  this  property  in  an  agent,  he  could 
 never  sin  ;  for  all  his  acts  would  be  physically  necessary,  without 
 any  hypothetical  medium  or  moral  alternative. 
 
 4.  He  is  a  moral  agent  whose  volitions  might  have  been  other- 
 wise than  they  are,  if  the  motives,  and  consequently  the  state  of 
 his  mind,  had  been  otherwise.  But  to  suppose  that  his  volitions 
 might  have  been  otherwise  than  they  are,  the  motives  and  state  of 
 mind  being  the  same,  would  be  to  make  him  in  his  volitions  the 
 sport  of  chance,  or  a  mere  nonentity. 
 
 5.  He,  then,  is  a  moral  agent  who  has,  in  reference  to  voUtion, 
 a  moral  alternative,  or  a  hypothetical  possibility  of  a  different 
 choice.  Where  this  alternative,  or  this  possibility,  is  not,  there  the 
 agent  (if  he  may  be  so  called)  is  not  morally  obliged,  and  therefore 
 is  not  accountable. 
 
 6.  But  if  so,  where  does  the  ground  of  such  an  alternative  lie  ? 
 It  lies  in  the  agent's  mind,  or  the  disposition  whence  the  volition 
 springs  and  whence  its  character  is  derived.     If  God  influence  the 
 
102  ON  A  NECESSAEY  AGENT.  [DISS.  IX. 
 
 miud  so  as  to  make  it,  iii  a  given  degree,  to  resemble  His  own 
 moral  natm-e,  in  that  degree  would  the  choice  made  be  morally 
 good.  But  if  passive  power  be  not  counteracted  by  such  influence 
 (wliich,  being  gracious,  God  is  not  bound  in  equity  to  do)  in  any 
 given  degree,  the  nature  of  things,  the  essence  of  truth,  connects 
 in  a  corresponding  degree  the  state  of  mind  with  the  volition. 
 
 7.  Hence  it  is  plain  that  moral  influence,  as  such,  eflects  nothing 
 certain,  but  always  requires  a  previous  state  of  mind  in  order  to 
 insure  a  certainty  of  good  eflect ;  and  that  previous  state  of  mind 
 is  eflected  by  no  other  possible  means  but  a  physical  energy  or 
 agency,  producing  assimilation.  There  must  be  a  virtuous  miad 
 before  a  vii-tirous  choice ;  the  quality  of  the  act  is  derived  from 
 the  agent. 
 
 8.  One  thing  which  has  been  a  source  of  much  obscurity  and 
 confusion  in  reference  to  moral  agency,  is  the  supposition  that  the 
 mind  is  equally  free,  in  all  respects,  when  choosing  good  and  when 
 choosing  e\'il ;  in  other  words,  that  the  one  volition  and  the  other 
 becomes  morally  certain  from  the  same  sort  of  necessity.  But 
 this  is  not  the  real  case.  Indeed,  the  necessity  of  connexion 
 between  the  previous  state  of  the  mind  and  the  corresponding 
 volition  is  the  same,  for  it  is,  in  each  case,  nothing  else  but  the 
 nature  of  things  ;  but  that  necessity  which  eflects  a  state  of  mind 
 previous  to  good  volitions  is  as  different  from  the  other  necessity 
 which  eflects  a  state  of  mind  previous  to  volitions  morally  evU  as 
 light  is  from  darkness.  They  proceed  from  opposite  quarters,  and 
 operate  in  contrary  directions.  A  holy  disposition  is  generated  by 
 decretive  holy  influence ;  the  other  di.sposition  (which  ought  not, 
 however,  to  be  called  unholy)  proceeds  from  the  hypothetical 
 nature  of  things.  Such  a  disjiosition,  though  not  morally  vicious, 
 yet  generates  vice  in  union  with  free  agency. 
 
 9.  It  is  highly  worthy  of  remark,  that  though  a  good  volition 
 must  proceed  from  a  good  heart,  morally  considered,  yet  a  bad 
 volition  does  not,  originally  and  necessarily,  proceed  from  a 
 morally  bad  heart.  The  reason  is,  that  the  one  state  of  heart 
 proceeds  from  God,  from  His  decretive  holy  will ;  the  other  j^ro- 
 ceeds  from  passive  power,  which  is  onlj'  a  natural,  and  not  a  moral 
 evil.  Besides,  were  the  disposition  which  immediately  precedes 
 a  bad  volition  necessarily,  or  in  every  case,  evil,  in  a  moral  sense, 
 either  moral  evU  coiild  have  no  jilace  at  all  in  the  universe,  no 
 origin  whatever,  or  else  it  must  be  the  same  as  passive  power. 
 
DISS.  IX.]  ON  A  KECESSAET  AGENT.  1 03 
 
 But  passive  power  is  a  contrast,  not  to  the  moral  perfections  of 
 God,  but  His  natural,  and  has,  when  alone,  no  moral  quality.  And, 
 seeing  it  belongs  as  a  property  to  every  creature  as  such,  were  it 
 anything  morally  evil,  moral  evil  would  be  essential  to  the  very 
 being  of  every  creature,  which  is  absurd. 
 
 10.  Hence  it  is  plain  that  freedom  is  experienced  in  a  higher 
 sense,  or  a  greater  degree,  in  bad  volitions  than  in  good  ones ;  in 
 such  a  sense,  and  to  such  a  degree,  as  to  justify  this  mode  of  ex- 
 pression— that  man  is  necessitated  to  good,  but  free  to  evil.  This, 
 however,  may  need  some  explanatory  qualification ;  for  he  is  not 
 so  necessitated  to  good  as  not  to  be  morally  or  hypotheticaUy  free, 
 nor  so  free  to  evil  as  not  to  be  subject  to  a  necessity  of  consequence. 
 He  who  acts  or  chooses  amiss,  without  constraint,  compulsion,  or 
 interfering  voluntary  force  in  that  act,  notwithstanding  his  passive 
 powers,  is  properly  a  free  agent ;  for  in  the  moral  quality  of  the 
 act  there  is,  properly  and  strictly,  no  will  concerned  but  his  ovra. 
 But  he  who  acts  or  chooses  aright  is  subject  to  a  physical,  decretive 
 necessity  as  to  his  disposition,  and  a  physical  concourse  of  Divine 
 energy  in  the  natural  act  of  the  vsdll.  He  is,  indeed,  morally  free, 
 inasmuch  as  his  volition  might  have  been  of  a  different,  yea,  of  an 
 opposite  moral  quality,  if  the  state  of  his  mind  had  been  different. 
 Hence  it  is  evident,  that  in  a  good  wiU,  choice,  or  act,  man  is  an 
 agent  in  a  less  proper  or  secondary  sense ;  but  in  a  bad  wUl, 
 choice,  or  act,  man  is  an  agent,  a  moral  agent,  a  free  agent,  in  the 
 most  proper  and  strict  sense.  And  in  the  production  of  an  act 
 morally  good,  two  wills  are  concerned,  that  of  the  agent,  and  the 
 decretive  will  of  God ;  in  that  of  evil,  only  one,  the  agent's  own 
 will. 
 
 11.  If  the  Supreme  Being  is  the  only  proper  agent  in  the  imi- 
 verse,  either  moral  agency  is  no  proper  agency,  or  else  man  is  not 
 a  moral  agent ;  and  if  so,  he  is  not  accountable,  and  has  no  con- 
 cern in  religion  and  morals.  Besides,  if  God  be  the  only  proper 
 agent  in  the  universe,  how  come  there  to  exist  evil  deeds  ?  God's 
 agency  is  good,  else  we  have  no  evidence  that  He  is  a  good  Being ; 
 but  there  are  in  the  world  evil  deeds  proceeding  from  evU  minds, 
 Avhich  common  sense  and  universal  consent  allow,  and  the  nature 
 of  the  thing  proves,  to  be  properly  evU  agencies  ;  consequently  man 
 is  an  agent,  a  moral  agent,  proi3erly  so  called. 
 
 12.  If  there  is  no  proper  agent  in  the  universe  but  the  Supreme 
 Being,  there  is  no  evil  in  the  nature  of  bad  volitions,  but  only  in 
 
104  ON  A  NECESSAEY  AGENT.  [DISS.  IX. 
 
 their  effects.  Sin,  ou  that  supposition,  is  not  bad  in  its  own 
 nature,  but  only  injurious  in  its  effects  on  the  sinner.  Sin  is  not 
 to  be  hated,  it  seems,  on  its  own  account,  as  odious,  but  only 
 shunned  as  dangerous.  But  as  this  must  arise,  according  to  the 
 system  of  its  abettors,  from  a  sovereign  appointment,  it  follows, 
 that  millions  of  beings  are  by  this  very  appointment  doomed  to 
 the  greatest  sufferings  in  the  universe,  for  that  in  which  they  had 
 no  proper  agency,  no  possible  alternative.  Where  is  equity,  or 
 benevolence  ? 
 
 13.  The  only  clue  out  of  this  labyrinth,  and  out  of  many  others 
 formed  by  writers  on  human  agency,  is,  we  are  fully  persuaded, 
 a  right  view  of  passive  power,  in  its  nature,  origin,  and  tendency, 
 in  conjimction  with  a  morally  or  hypothetically  free  choice. 
 
DISSERTATION  X. 
 
 MOEAL  OBLIGATION  AND  INABILITY. 
 
 Why  is  moral  ohligation  consistent  with,  moral  inability  ?  The 
 subject  is  professedly  profound ;  but,  perhaps,  the  following  series 
 of  remarks  may  contribute  in  some  degree  to  assist  our  inquiries, 
 and  to  bring  them  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion. 
 
 1.  Obligation,  if  we  regard  the  term,  is  a  binding  power,  or 
 an  irresistible  force  ;  but,  in  reference  to  morality  and  voluntary 
 actions,  obligation  is  espressive  of  a  hyjMthetical  indispensable  coti- 
 nexion  between  an  antecedent  and  a  consequent,  or  between  an 
 end  proposed  and  the  means  of  obtaining  it.  Thus,  IF  a  moral 
 agent  would  attain  the  end,  he  is  obliged,  or  bound  indispensably, 
 to  use  the  required  means.  And,  on  the  contrary,  IF  a  moral 
 agent  adopt  a  different  antecedent  from  what  is  required,  not  only 
 he  shall  not  attain  to  the  proposed  consequent,  but  another  is  to  fol- 
 low, indispensably  connected  with  the  antecedent  actually  adopted, 
 by  a  necessity  of  consequence.     Therefore— 
 
 2.  The  consequent,  or  the  end,  which  is  proposed  by  the  Moral 
 Governor,  is  always  a  supposed  good ;  for  it  would  be  unworthy 
 of  a  Governor  wise  and  good  to  propose  any  other,  especially  as 
 the  antecedent  prescribed  and  requu'ed  is  indispensably  connected 
 with  it.  But  if  the  connexion  be  broken  by  the  free  agent,  by  the 
 adoption  of  an  antecedent  naturally  connected  with  a  different  con- 
 sequent, he  then  becomes  naturally  obliged,  or  forced,  to  sustain  a 
 proportionable  evil. 
 
 3.  In  the  system  of  moral  government,  it  is  the  prerogative  of 
 the  Supreme  Governor  to  propose  the  consequent  of  the  indispen- 
 sable connexion  ;  and  it  is  the  part  of  the  moral  agent,  who  in  the 
 act  of  choice  is  left  free,  to  choose  the  antecedent,  which  the 
 Governor  has  objectively  furnished,  and  indispensably  required. 
 
106  MORAL  OBLIGATION  AND  INABILITY.  [DISS.  X. 
 
 To  tliis  clioice  he  is  morally,  or  hjrpothetically  bound,  yet  is 
 naturally  free ;  and  IF  the  required  choice  be  made,  the  good 
 follows  ;  bxit  IF  NOT,  the  corresponding  evil  follows.  Por  instance, 
 if  the  forgiveness  of  sin  be  the  consequent  proposed,  and  repentance 
 the  antecedent  required,  the  agent  is  morally  hound  to  repent, 
 but  naturally  free.  If,  however,  he  break  through  the  moral 
 bond,  which  is  done  by  abusing  his  natural  freedom,  or  continuing 
 bis  wrong  choice,  forgiveness  does  not  follow,  but  he  stands  ex- 
 posed to  the  natural  and  threatened  consequences  of  that  wrong 
 choice  or  impenitence. 
 
 4.  Hence  it  is  obvious,  that  in  the  system  of  providence,  and 
 the  execution  of  all  decretive  designs,  it  is  the  prerogative  of  the 
 Sovereign  of  the  universe  to  establish  the  chain  of  all  antecedents, 
 and  the  consequents  follow  from  the  nature  of  things  ;  but  in  the 
 system  of  moral  government,  it  is  equally  obvious,  the  reverse 
 takes  place,  for  here  the  Supreme  Governor  proposes,  and  estab- 
 lishes objectively,  the  chain  of  consequents,  while  the  moral, agent, 
 or  the  obligee,  establishes  optionally  the  antecedents ;  and  as  the 
 actual  choice  of  an  antecedent  is,  such  will  be  the  actual  conse- 
 quence. When  the  moral  agent  chooses  that  antecedent  which  is 
 required,  or  which  is  conformable  to  rectitude,  the  proj)Osed  conse- 
 quent is  obtained  by  the  nature  of  things ;  but  when  that  whicli 
 is  not  required,  or  is  not  conformable  to  rectitude,  is  chosen  for 
 an  antecedent,  the  evil  consequence  flows  from  the  same  nature  of 
 things,  that  is,  from  the  essence  of  eternal  truth. 
 
 5.  Required  antecedents  are  either  a  state  of  mind,  or  voluntary 
 actions,  according  as  the  particular  consequent  proposed  may  be. 
 For  example,  if  happiness  be  the  end  or  consequent  proposed, 
 holiness,  or  a  holy  state  of  mind,  is  the  means  or  antecedent  re- 
 quired. If  we  would  see  the  Lord,  we  must  be  holy,  ov  pure  in 
 heart,  by  a  new  birth  unto  righteousness.  If  justification  be  the 
 end  proposed,  believing  is  a  means  required ;  for  to  us  nghteous- 
 ness  shall  be  imputed,  if  we  believe.  If  a  subsequent  favourable 
 treatment  of  the  obligee  be  the  end  proposed,  obedience,  or  con- 
 formity to  rule,  is  the  means  required. 
 
 6.  When  an  agent  is  said  to  be  obliged  in  or  by  any  thing  or 
 consideration,  that  thiug  or  consideration  in  or  by  which  he  is 
 obliged  is  to  be  considered  as  the  consequent  proposed,  and  the 
 state  or  act  leading  to  it  is  the  antecedent  required.  To  be  obliged 
 in  conscience,  in  duty,  in  law,  in  honour,  &c.,  expresses  the  end  to 
 
DISS.  X.]  MOEAL  OBLIGATION  AND  INABILITY.  107 
 
 be  obtained  by  a  certain  state  or  conduct  as  the  means  or  ante- 
 cedent required.  Thus,  for  instance,  if  conscience  be  satisfied,  if 
 duty  be  discharged,  if  law  be  conformed  to,  or  if  honour  be  secured, 
 the  required  antecedent  means  must  be  adopted,  or  such  acts  must 
 be  performed. 
 
 7.  If  the  required  antecedents  be  not  performed,  it  is  manifest 
 that  the  free  agent  has  voluntarily  established  other  antecedents, 
 and  the  injurious  consequents  of  these  last  flow  (as  before  ob- 
 served) from  the  nature  of  things ;  which  consequents  will  be 
 similar  or  dissimilar  to  those  proposed  by  the  Supreme  Governor, 
 in  proportion  as  the  antecedent  established  voluntarily  by  the 
 agent  is  similar  or  dissimilar  to  what  was  required.  Hence  we 
 may  see  the  true  standard  and  measure  of  guilt,  and  of  the  dif- 
 ferent gradations  of  praise  or  blame. 
 
 8.  Having  considered  the  nature  of  moral  obligation,  let  us  now 
 advert  to  the  subject  of  it.  This  inquiry  has  more  immediately 
 for  its  object  the  qualifications  of  the  moral  agent,  or  those  consi- 
 derations whereby  he  stands  obliged,  in  contradistinction  to  those 
 beings  in  the  universe  that  are  not  moral  agents.  An  attentive 
 and  long-continued  investigation  of  the  subject  has  taught  us  that 
 they  are  included  in  these  three  particulars  : — (1.)  A  natural  cajDa- 
 city  of  moral  enjoyment ;  (2.)  A  sufficiency  of  suitable  means  ;  and, 
 (3.)  A  freedom  from  comj)ulsion  in  the  choice  of  means.  "Whatever 
 being  is  possessed  of  these  qualifications  is  morally  obliged,  for  he 
 has  a  suitable  ability  to  establish  his  own  antecedents,  as  required, 
 in  order  that  the  proposed  consequents  may  follow. 
 
 9.  The  first  qualification  is  a  natural  capacity  of  moral  enjoy- 
 ment. This  belongs  to  no  being  that  is  not  a  free  agent,  but  to 
 every  being  who  is  so  it  inseparably  belongs.  This,  more  than 
 any  superior  degree  of  reason,  (however  great  and  however  forcible 
 the  influence  from  that  superiority,)  constitutes  the  chief  and  most 
 essential  diflerence  between  men  and  brutes.  That  such  a  capacity 
 is  an  indispensably  requisite  qualification  is  clear.  Por  free  agency 
 necessarily  implies  a  consequent  moral  advantage,  or  a  natural 
 good  to  be  morally  enjoyed,  either  explicitly  proposed  by  the  Moral 
 Governor,  or  fairly  implied  in  the  system  of  moral  government ; 
 but  this  could  not  be  proposed  if  there  were  no  capacity  of  enjoy- 
 ment, as  now  stated.  And  this  consequent  advantage  may  properly 
 be  called  the  perpetual  enjoyment  of  God,  the  chief  good,  because 
 the  chief  end  of  all  subordinate  enjoyments,  as  well  as  of  all  obe- 
 
108  MOSAL  OBLIGATION  AND  INABILITY.  [DISS.  X. 
 
 dience,  and  the  sum  total  of  all  happiness,  is  the  conscious  enjoy- 
 ment of  Divine  favour  and  excellence. 
 
 10.  The  second  qualification  is  a  sufficiency  of  suitable  means. 
 This  is  indispensably  requisite ;  for  to  require  an  end  whUe  the 
 means  are  out  of  the  agent's  reach,  or  physically  out  of  his  power, 
 and  that  under  the  forfeiture  of  the  Governor's  displeasure,  is  of 
 the  very  essence  of  injustice.  But  the  Divine  Governor  is  a  "  God 
 of  truth,  and  without  iniquity ;  just  and  right  is  He."  And  that 
 these  means  ous'ht  to  be  sufficient  and  suitable  in  their  own 
 nature  to  attaia  the  end, — in  other  words,  that  the  antecedents 
 required  to  be  adopted  by  the  agent  are  infallibly  connected  with 
 the  proposed  consequent, — is  equally  plain,  for  the  same  reason  that 
 there  should  be  any  means  at  all.  For  means  in  themselves 
 insufficient  and  unsuitable  have  no  true  connexion  with  the  end 
 proposed ;  even  as  a  law,  in  itself  bad,  has  no  obliging  power. 
 
 11.  The  third  qualification  is  a  freedom  from  constraint  and  com- 
 pulsion in  the  choice  of  means,  or  in  the  voluntary  estabhshment 
 of  means.  By  "  constraiat "  and  "  compulsion,"  we  mean  a  physical 
 interference  with  the  free  agent  in  his  act  of  choice,  in  such  a  sense 
 as  that  the  choice  would  not  be  the  genuine  effect  of  the  motive, 
 or  that  the  nature  of  the  fruit  should  not  correspond  with  the 
 nature  of  the  tree ;  but  some  extraneous  force  interposing  would 
 make  the  natm-e  of  the  volition  to  be  different  from  the  nature  of 
 the  mind  or  disposition,  which  otherwise  would  be  its  immediate 
 cause. 
 
 12.  Divine  influence  is  admitted  to  be  requisite,  in  order  to  pre- 
 pare the  state  of  the  mind  for  a  right  choice,  even  as  a  good  tree 
 is  requisite  for  good  fruit ;  but  this  is  no  interference  with  the  act 
 of  choice  itself,  nor  has  it  the  least  tendency  to  break  the  con- 
 nexion between  motive  and  choice,  or  between  the  mind  and  its 
 volition.  Such  influence,  indeed,  forms  one  glorious  link  of  the 
 decretive  chain  which  the  Sovereign  Governor  has  established  as 
 so  many  antecedents ;  and  a  right  choice,  in  a  free  agent  thus 
 divinely  influenced,  or  formed  anew,  is  the  unrestrained  and  un- 
 impelled  effect  which  follows  by  a  necessity  of  consequence.  In 
 other  words,  no  bad  choice  can  possibly  follow  but  by  a  failure  in 
 the  cause,  the  mind,  or  disposition  itself. 
 
 13.  On  this  principle  it  is  that  the  Sovereign  Being  himself 
 never  errs  in  His  choice.  The  source  from  which  the  act  of  choice 
 proceeds  is  perfectly  good,  (an  infinitely  holy  nature,)  and  the  con- 
 
DISS.  X.]  MORAL  OBLIGATION  AND  INABILITY.  ]  09 
 
 nexion  between  this  cause  and  the  effect,  which  is  a  right  choice, 
 is  infallibly  and,  in  the  nature  of  things,  necessarily  secure.  Hence 
 it  is  that  we  never  admit,  or  suspect,  an  error  in  His  choice,  how- 
 ever great  His  freedom  ;  and  hence  we  have  a  firm  ground  of  confi- 
 dence that  the  Judsje  of  the  whole  earth  will  do  rio'ht. 
 
 14.  The  three  qualifications  mentioned  belong  to  man  as  a  free 
 agent ;  but  we  must  not  confound  this  idea  with  that  of  a  subject 
 of  moral  government.  An  infant  may  be  the  subject  of  govern- 
 ment, both  human  and  Divine,  but  cannot  be,  properly  speaking, 
 a  free  agent.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  first  of  the  qualifications 
 mentioned  alone  is  essential  to  constitute  a  subject  of  moral 
 government,  in  the  most  extensive  sense  of  the  term ;  but  in  order 
 to  constitute  that  class  of  subjects  who  are  also  free  agents,  the 
 other  two  are  essential. 
 
 15.  When  these  three  qualifications  are  found  in  any  free  agent, 
 nothing  more  is  requisite  to  constitute  moral  obligation.  An  end 
 is  proposed  ;  means  firmly  connected  with  that  end  are  afforded, 
 and  required  to  be  used  ;  these  means  are  physically  in  the  power 
 of  the  agent,  who  is  also  free  from  aU  constraint  and  compulsion 
 in  his  act  of  choice. 
 
 If  these  qualifications  are  not  sufficient  morally  to  oblige,  we  are 
 fully  persuaded  nothing  can  be  suflicient.  As  to  the  notion  that 
 moral  ability  is  necessary  to  constitute  moral  obligation,  which  is 
 maintained  alike  by  many  Armiaians  and  most  Antinomians,  (for 
 extremes  will  sometimes  meet,)  President  Edwards  abundantly  de- 
 monstrates its  futility  and  absurd  contradictions.* 
 
 *  See  Freedom  of  the  Will,  sect.  iv. 
 
DISSERTATION  XL 
 
 MOEAL  EVIL — ITS  TKUE  OEIGIN  ASCERTAINED — NO  INCONSISTENCY 
 BETWEEN  ITS  EXISTENCE  AND  THE  DIVINE  PERFECTIONS — HAS 
 AN  ADEQUATE  CAUSE — DIVINE  DECREE  NOT  ITS  CAUSE — NE- 
 GATIVE CAUSALITY — THE  FEDERAL  CHARACTER  OF  ADAM. 
 
 While  Adam  stood  in  a  sinless  condition,  his  beiug,  Lis  weU- 
 being,  his  holiness  and  hajifiiness,  were  entirely  and  exclusively 
 the  fruit  of  sovereign  favour.  For  God  oives  to  a  creature,  as 
 such,  nothing ;  but  to  an  accountable  creature,  as  such.  He  owes 
 the  real  g?'ounds  of  accouutableuess,  otherwise  His  requisition  of 
 accountabihty  would  be  capricious,  arbitrary,  and  unequitable. 
 The  preservation  of  his  being  indeed  is  not  his  due,  but  if  that 
 be  not  continued,  he  ceases  also  to  be  accountable.  What  God 
 owes  to  an  accountable  being,  as  such,  is  intellect,  will,  freedom 
 from  impulse  (or  decretive,  positive  causation)  to  sin,  and  objects 
 suitable  to  his  wants  exhibited  to  his  choice  ;  in  short,  a  capacity 
 for  enjoying  the  chief  good,  and  sufficient  moral  (or  objective)  means 
 for  that  end.  The  exercise  of  equity  is  the  giving  to  all  their  due; 
 hence  the  being,  or  continuance  in  being,  of  an  accountable  crea- 
 ture is  not  a  point  of  equity,  because  this  cannot  be  called  the 
 creature's  due  from  the  Creator,  but  to  give  him  precisely  neither 
 more  nor  less  than  is  sufficient  to  constitute  his  grounds  of  ac- 
 countability, or  moral  agency,  is  to  deal  with  him  in  piure  equity. 
 There  are  assignable  reasons  why  Adam,  even  in  the  state  of 
 original  probation,  possessing  the  real  grounds  of  accountability, 
 or  moral  obligation,  if  dealt  with  in  j;i(re  equity,  would  certainly 
 fall.  Superadded  sovereignty,  indeed,  which  is  a  right  to  do 
 everything  not  unequitable,  and  which  never  can  be  exercised  but 
 in  favour  of  the  creature,  (otherwise  it  would  be  no  longer  save- 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  Ill 
 
 reignty,  but  injustice,)  might  have  prevented  his  fall,  as  it  has  pre- 
 vented the  fall  of  angels ;  but  this  was  not  the  case. 
 
 The  exercise  of  mere  equity,  therefore,  towards  a  moral  agent, 
 is  the  rigid  operation  of  justice,  to  the  exclusion  of  sovereignty ; 
 but  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  is  not  incompatible  with  equity, 
 though  it  is  with  mere  equity  towards  the  same  person.  All  the 
 possible  dealings  of  the  Divine  Governor  with  man  are  reducible 
 to  either  equity  or  sovereignty  in  diflFerent  prop)ortions.  Equity 
 engages  to  bestow  all  the  good  that  is  due  to  us,  or  that  we  can 
 rightly  claim ;  to  give  less  would  be  injustice.  But  if  its  operation 
 were  equally  and  positively  rigid  on  the  other  side, — that  no  creature 
 should  from  any  source  have  more  good  than  is  due  to  him, — the 
 operation  of  grace  and  mercy  would  then  be  utterly  excluded. 
 Equity,  therefore,  never  can  distribute  more  evil  or  wiore  good 
 than  is  due  to  its  object ;  but  sovereignty  may  distribute  more 
 good  than  is  due  to  it.  Consequently,  sovereignty  may  counteract 
 the  operation  of  justice  by  giving  its  objects  more  good  than 
 equity  could  do.  This  being  the  ease,  Adam  was  the  subject  of 
 jKhSsive  poiver  and  defectibility  in  his  perfect  state.  This  consists 
 in  that  tendency  to  defection  physiccdly  as  to  being,  and  morally 
 as  to  well-being,  (when  united  with  freedom,)  which  is  essential  to 
 aU  contingent  or  absolutely  dependent  existence.  He  also  pos- 
 sessed the  grounds  of  moral  obligation  before  mentioned.  If  his 
 sin  was  certainly  future,  in  opposition  to  absolute  contingence  or 
 mere  chance,  there  must  be  an  adequate  cause  of  such  an  effect. 
 
 This  brings  us  to  the  source  of  the  difficulty,  or  the  ORIGIN  OF 
 
 EVIL. 
 
 In  this  affair  there  are  three  objects  of  primary  consideration — 
 God,  Adam,  and  sin.  That  God  was  a  sovereign  cause,  impel- 
 ling to  the  act,  is  evidently  inconsistent  with  equity,  or  it  would 
 have  been  an  act  of  injustice.  To  say  that  He  interposed  by 
 sovereignty  to  cause  the  event,  for  the  sake  of  great  consequent 
 good,  does  not  mend  the  matter,  but  is  to  make  Him  the  author 
 of  sin,  the  "doer  of  evil  that  good  may  come;"  and  implies  a 
 vain  attempt  to  annihilate  the  nature  of  moral  evil,  or  to  sanctify 
 abomination.  But  as  all  the  acts  of  the  Moral  Governor  towards 
 a  free  agent  must  be  the  exercise  either  of  sovereignty  or  of  equity, 
 and  as  sovereignty  cannot  impel  to  sin,  and  was  not  exercised 
 (though  it  might  have  been)  in  the  prevention  of  sin,  it  remains 
 that  equity  alone  was  exercised  on  the  part  of  God. 
 
112  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XL 
 
 The  next  object  is  Adaji,  who  may  be  considered  as  possessing 
 positive  holiness,  freedom,  and  passive  poiver.  This  positive  lioli- 
 iiess  was  the  effect  of  sovereignty,  and,  had  sovereign  acts  been 
 continued,  his  fall  would  have  been  prevented.  'S\s  freedom,  in 
 order  to  accountableness,  was  the  effect  of  equity,  for  if  he  must 
 account  for  his  actions  he  might  claim  it  as  his  rightful  due  ;  yet, 
 abstractedly  considered,  it  was  a  natural  power,  capable  of  being 
 instrumental  to  the  production  of  moral  effects,  either  good  or 
 evil.  His  passive  power,  as  before  hinted,  was  that  which  consti- 
 tuted one  essential  difference  between  a  necessary  and  contingent, 
 and  an  independent  and  dependent  being,  implying  a  tendency  to 
 failure  and  defection  in  the  use  of  liberty,  except  while  preserved 
 by  sovereign  goodness ;  and  which  it  is  not  possible  for  equity  to 
 counteract,  its  nature  being  not  the  effect  of  ivill,  any  more  than 
 the  eternal  essences  of  things  are  so. 
 
 The  remaining  object  is  sin,  which  must  proceed  from  one  or 
 more  of  the  sources  now  mentioned.  Positive  holiness  must  be 
 out  of  the  question  ;  for  from  a  positively  good  cause  nothing  but 
 good  can  come.  Freedom  and  passive  jwwer,  therefore,  neither  of 
 which  is  the  offspring  of  sovereignty,  as  before  shewn,  must  claim 
 the  origin  of  moral  evil, — that  is,  it  has  been  fairly  excluded  from 
 every  other  source. 
 
 Now,  it  remains  to  consider  whether  either  of  these  is  exempt. 
 Freedom  cannot  be  exempt,  it  is  plain  from  this  consideration,  for 
 were  there  no  freedom,  man  would  not  be  accountable,  and  could 
 not  be  guilty  of  actual  sin  ;  and  passive  power  cannot  be  exempt, 
 because  its  very  nature  is  a  tendency  to  defection,  (though  it  would 
 never  terminate  in  moral  evil  without  the  union  of  liberty,)  and 
 it  is  not  capable  of  being  counteracted  by  equity.  Sovereign 
 favour  alone  can  counteract  its  influence  ;  but  that  was  not  exer- 
 cised, for  sin  was  not  prevented.  They  are  therefore  both  con- 
 cerned ;  but  in  ivluit  manner,  and  in  luhat  proportion  ?  Here  lies 
 the  chief  difficulty.  Let  it  be  recollected  thut  freedo7n  is  a  natural 
 power  which  is  capable  of  no  moral  effect  where  it  does  not  ter- 
 minate on  a  subject.  From  itself,  unaUied  to  a  subject,  no  moral 
 effect,  either  good  or  bad,  can  proceed ;  and  the  subject  cannot  be 
 any  other  than  the  disposition  of  the  mind.  Freedom  terminating 
 on  a  good  disposition,  supported  by  sovereignty,  produces  holy 
 acts  alone ;  such  were  those  of  Adam  while  he  stood,  such  are  the 
 acts  of  holy  angels,  such  are  those  of  renewed  minds,  and  such 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  1  ]  3 
 
 are  the  acts  proceeding  from  Divine  freedom  terminating  on  infi- 
 nite holiness.  But  a  mind  or  disposition  not  sup2}orted  by  sove- 
 reignty, but  left  in  equity  to  its  native  passive  power,  being  now 
 the  subject,  and  freedom  terminating  on  it  in  that  state,  becomes 
 instantly  the  seat  of  moral  evil.  Here  it  may  be  asked.  Which  of 
 these  two,  freedom  or  passive  power,  has  the  greatest  proportion 
 of  concern  in  the  production  of  sin  ? 
 
 Each  of  them  is  essentially  necessary  to  the  effect ;  but  as 
 freedom  is  an  evil  in  no  sense  per  se,  and  passive  power  is  a 
 natural  (though  not  a  moral)  evil  per  se,  it  should  seem  that  the 
 hateful  progeny,  sin,  claims  the  latter  for  its  more  immediate 
 parent. 
 
 To  render  this  view  of  the  origin  of  moral  evil  still  more  plain, 
 let  it  be  well  considered,  that  liberty  is  a  mere  natural  instru- 
 ment— in  itself,  unconnected  with  disposition,  it  is  neither  good 
 nor  evil,  morally  considered ;  that  PASSIVE  POWEE,  as  before  ex- 
 plained, prior  to  the  action  of  liberty,  remains  morally  innocent ; 
 that  a  EECTITUDE  of  disposition,  which  is  the  effect  of  sovereign 
 influence  counteracting  passive  power,  and  which  is  antecedent  to 
 the  exercise  of  liberty,  is  morally  good.  That  rectitude  of  disposi- 
 tion is  antecedent  to  the  exercise  of  liberty,  is  plain  from  the  case 
 of  Adam,  who  was  holy,  prior  to  all  volitions :  the  tree  was  good 
 before  it  brought  forth  good  fruit.  The  same  ought  to  be  concluded 
 respecting  angels  ;  their  volitions  did  not  constitute  them  holy,  but 
 their  dispositions  being  antecedently  holy,  their  actions  partook  of 
 the  same  character.  And  still  more  is  this  applicable  to  the  great 
 God,  who  is  holy  antecedently  to  all  will,  and  therefore  His  volun- 
 tary acts  are  holy.  The  absolute  First  Cause  is  infinitely  removed 
 from  passive  power  and  infinitely  secure  of  antecedent  holiness  in 
 the  highest  perfection ;  His  moral  acts,  therefore,  must  be  in- 
 fallibly and  infinitely  right. 
 
 The  holy  angels,  who  are  absolutely  dependent  on  the  thrice- 
 holy  Jehovah,  owe  the  continuance  of  holy  acts  to  a  sovereign 
 communication  of  antecedent  holy  influence  to  secure  a  holy  dis- 
 position. A  suspension  of  such  influence  would  leave  them  in 
 the  state  of  their  proper  passive  power ;  and  this  towards  a  moral 
 agent  is  to  deal  with  liira  in  mere  equity.  The  exercise  of  equity 
 terminated  on  Adam  ;  but  equity  did  not  constitute  him  morally 
 bad — it  only  left  him  to  his  passive  power ;  liberty,  however,  act- 
 ing on  this  latter,  produced  moral  evil.     The  certainty  of  actions 
 
 VOL.  IV.  H 
 
114  MOEAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 morally  good  is  in  proportion  to  that  iufluence  which  counteracts 
 passive  power ;  and  this  has  various  gradations,  from  the  smallest 
 degree  of  saving  subjective  grace,  to  the  highest  holy  character. 
 Corollary — (1.)  The  conversion  and  salvation  of  a  sinner  can  pro- 
 ceed from  no  other  source  than  the  sovereign,  iDreventing,  holy 
 influence  of  God.  (2.)  The  fall,  sinful  acts,  and  misery  of  a 
 creature  are  entirely  of  himself. 
 
 NO  mCONSISTENCT  BETWEEN-  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MOEAL  EVIL  AND 
 THE  DH^INE  PEEFECTIONS. 
 
 To  say  that  the  existence  of  sin  is  only  a  common  difficulty, 
 which  belongs  to  every  hypothesis ;  that  though  God  is  the  author 
 of  sin  in  some  sense,  yet  He  is  not  the  agent,  therefore  the  phrase 
 should  be  disliked  and  rejected ;  that  though  God  wUls  the  event 
 of  sin,  yet  He  wills  it  not  as  an  evil,  but  for  excellent  ends ;  that 
 the  events  of  moral  evils  are  disposed  by  wisdom  ;  that  God  may 
 be  the  orderer  and  disposer  of  moral  evil,  which  in  the  agent  is 
 infinitely  evil,  but  in  the  orderer  of  it  no  evil  at  all ;  that  in  order 
 to  a  thing  being  morally  evil  it  must  be  unfit  and  unsuitable, 
 or  of  a  bad  tendency,  or  from  an  evil  disposition,  but  that  in 
 willing  the  event  of  sin  neither  can  be  attributed  to  God  ;  that  if 
 a  wise  and  good  man  knew,  with  absolute  certainty,  that  it  would 
 be  best,  all  things  considered,  there  should  be  moral  evU,  he  might 
 choose  that  it  should  be  so ;  that  the  reason  why  he  might  not 
 order  it,  if  he  were  able,  would  not  be  because  he  might  not  desire, 
 but  only  the  ordering  of  that  matter  does  not  belong  to  him  ;  and 
 that,  in  the  language  of  Tiu-nbull,  "  there  is  no  evil  in  the  universe, 
 no  absohite  evU ;  sins  are  evUs  only  in  a  partial  view,  but  with 
 respect  to  the  whole  system  they  are  not  evil  or  mischievous,  but 
 good,"  &c. ; — to  say  these  things,  and  more  of  a  similar  cast,  is  not 
 calculated  to  satisfy  a  mind  that  wants  the  best  evidence  which 
 the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit. 
 
 "We  have  had  occasion  only  to  explain  principles  adopted  ;  but 
 we  feel  ourselves  obliged  to  attempt,  at  least,  to  point  out  prin- 
 ciples which  we  conceive  are  attended  with  no  such  embarrassment 
 as  to  expose  them  to  self-contradiction,  and  which  represent  the 
 Great  Supreme  in  an  amiable  light.  The  task  is  indeed  arduous, 
 but  let  it  not  be  thought  impossible,  nor  let  the  imperfection  of 
 language  be  confounded  with  the  inadequacy  of  principles.     And 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  115 
 
 while  we  solicit  the  candour  of  the  reader,  whereby  he  will  be  pre- 
 pared to  make  such  allowances  as  the  nature  of  the  subject  requires, 
 and  be  prevented  from  drawing  hasty  conclusions  of  the  impracti- 
 cability of  bringing  the  subject  of  inquiry  to  a  satisfactory  issue, 
 or  of  presumption  in  attempting  it,  we  no  less  demand  a  strictness 
 of  examination.  The  real  inquirer  after  truth,  the  Christian  divine, 
 and  the  moral  philosopher,  should  be  solicitous,  not  to  have  "  the 
 last  word"  in  controversy,  but  to  make  all  possible  advances  in 
 ascertaining  the  genuine  grounds  of  acknowledged  truths,  in  dis- 
 covering radical  principles,  and  in  ascertaining  their  just  bearings 
 and  tendencies. 
 
 1.  The  true  point  of  inquiry  is,  not  whether  there  be  moral  evil,  or 
 whether  God  be  just ;  but  how  the  actual  existence  of  sin,  or 
 moral  evil,  in  the  universe,  is  to  be  reconciled  with  the  moral  per- 
 fections and  character  of  God.  Therefore,  the  thing  wanted  is  a 
 middle  term,  or  argumentative  medium,  whereby  it  may  be  shewn 
 that  this  proposition  is  true — viz..  There  is  no  real  inconsistency 
 between  the  existence  of  sin  and  the  moral  jaerfections  of  God. 
 
 2.  "VVe  may,  therefore,  consider  the  following  propositions  as  first 
 principles  : — 
 
 First  Axiom. — There  does  exist  in  the  universe  moral  evil. 
 
 Second  Axiom. — God  is  infinitely  free  from  injustice,  unholi- 
 ness,  and  aU  imperfections.     Hence — 
 
 Gorol. — There  is  no  real  inconsistency  between  the  existence  of 
 moral  evil  and  the  moral  perfections  of  God. 
 
 3.  Now,  the  question  returns.  What  is  the  best  evidence  that 
 there  is  no  such  inconsistency  ?  Those  who  are  satisfied  with 
 these  plain  propositions,  the  axioms  and  corollary,  may  have  the 
 evidence  of  faith  that  there  is  no  inconsistency  between  the  subject 
 and  predicate  of  the  last  proposition.  They  may  know  so  much 
 of  God  as  to  be  assured  that  the  existence  of  sin  in  the  world  is 
 no  impeachment  of  the  moral  character  of  the  Most  High.  For 
 such  evidence  it  behoves  iis  to  be  thankful.  Millions  are  now  in 
 heaven  who  enjoyed  no  other  evidence  while  on  earth  than  that  of 
 faith.  But  this  is  no  sufficient  reason  why  those  who  have  oppor- 
 tunity should  make  no  further  inquiries  into  the  subject.  Some, 
 indeed,  suppose  that  no  rational  evidence  is  in  the  present  state 
 attainable  by  man.  But  why  any  should  so  conclude  it  is  difficult 
 to  say,  except  it  be  that  they  wish  to  make  their  own  minds  the 
 standard  of  all  others,  or  their  own  attainments  the  ne  j)lus  ultra 
 
116  MOEAX  EVIL.  [diss.  XL 
 
 of  moral  philosophy.  Such  persons  are  not  likely  to  acknowledge 
 or  perceive  the  real  evidence,  on  supposition  that  it  is  laid  before 
 them,  as  their  minds  ^lillbe  strongly  prejudiced  against  aU  reason- 
 ing on  the  subject. 
 
 4.  One  thing,  however,  is  incontrovertible,  as  necessarily  con- 
 nected with  the  axioms,  that  the  existence  of  moral  evil,  and  the 
 spotless  and  infinitely  excellent  moral  character  of  God,  are  per- 
 fectly consistent ;  and,  therefore,  there  must  be  somewhere  good 
 evidence  of  it.  And  another  thing  is  equally  plain,  that  the 
 brighter  the  evidence  we  have  of  the  truth  of  the  proposition 
 which  asserts  the  consistency  of  the  two  axioms,  the  more  will 
 be  our  acquaintance  with  God's  real  character,  and  the  real  nature 
 of  sin,  which  aU  must  allow  to  be  advantageous.  To  which  we 
 may  add  :  that  increased  evidence  of  such  a  proposition  is  far  from 
 being  injurious  may  be  further  inferred  from  this  consideration, 
 that  the  higher  any  beings  rise  in  holiness  and  happiness,  the  more 
 clear  will  be  that  evidence  to  their  view. 
 
 5.  The  terms  of  the  question  are  so  plain,  and  so  generally 
 imderstood,  that  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  notice  them  :  we  may, 
 however,  briefly  observe,  that  moral  evil  is  what  stands  in  direct 
 opposition  to  the  moral  character  of  God  ;  and  that  this  latter 
 excludes  universal  rectitude,  or  holiness,  and  perfect  benevolence. 
 Therefore — 
 
 Postulate. — Whatever  is  perfectly  consistent  with  universal  rec- 
 titude, and  perfect  benevolence,  is  consistent  with  the  moral  per- 
 fections of  God.  The  reader  will  observe,  that  what  is  asserted  of 
 rectitude  and  benevolence  is  different ;  the  one  is  said  to  be  uni- 
 versal, but  not  relatively  so.  Thus,  His  rectitude  is  both  perfect 
 in  itself,  and  riniversal  with  respect  to  its  object ;  but  His  benevo- 
 lence, however  infinitely  perfect,  is  restricted  as  to  its  objects,  both 
 in  extent  and  in  degree.  And  this  restriction  is  necessary  two 
 ways  : — 
 
 6.  First,  The  objects  of  benevolence,  at  least  in  this  world,  com- 
 pose a  system  ;  and  every  system,  whether  natural  or  moral,  im- 
 plies a  .subordination  and  comparative  superiority  of  parts ;  there- 
 fore the  very  idea  of  a  systematic  whole,  implies  a  restriction  of 
 benevolence  as  to  extent  and  degree. 
 
 7.  Secondly,  The  exercise  of  benevolence  is  an  exercise  of  will ; 
 and  the  exercise  of  will  implies  diversity  of  objects,  and  a  pre- 
 ference of  some  rather  than  others  to  occupy  the  more  excellent 
 parts  of  the  whole  system  ;  so  that  perfect  universality,  or  a  strict 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  ]  1 7 
 
 equality  of  benevolence,  without  a  distinguishing  preference,  is 
 necessarily  excluded  by  the  very  nature  of  benevolence  in  exercise. 
 
 8.  Divine  benevolence,  therefore,  admits  of  gradations,  from  the 
 smallest  degree  conceivable  to  the  utmost  extent  of  the  system 
 while  rectitude  admits  of  no  such  degree.  Were  we  to  attempt  an 
 illustration  of  so  abstracted  a  subject  by  mental  images,  we  might 
 say,  that  rectitude  in  its  exercise  towards  the  creatures,  may  be 
 compared  to  a  plain  surface,  as  widely  extended  as  the  universe,  of 
 infinitely  perfect  polish,  and  without  a  flaw  in  any  part.  Hence 
 in  its  exercise,  it  is  universal  as  its  objects,  and  can  no  more  admit 
 of  degrees  than  a  perfect  polish  can  admit  of  flaws.  On  the  con- 
 trary, benevolence  may  be  compared  to  a  cone,  in  an  inverted  form, 
 the  vertex  of  which  is  in  contact  with  a  point  of  that  plane,  and 
 which,  from  tlie  least  possible  degree,  is  capable  of  rising  at  sove- 
 reign pleasure,  in  its  exercise  towards  the  universe,  to  such  a 
 height  as  that  the  base  of  it  may  be,  or  may  not  be,  of  equal  extent 
 with  the  plane  below. 
 
 9.  Prom  just  views  of  benevolence  we  may  infer,  that  its  exer- 
 cise is  purely  free  and  undeserved  by  the  creature,  being  the  fruit 
 of  will,  choice,  and  sovereign  pleasure.  The  absence  of  it,  with 
 respect  to  creatures,  implies  no  flaw  in  perfect  rectitude.  Every 
 degree  of  benevolence,  from  the  least  to  the  greatest,  must  be 
 altogether  optional.  Perfect  rectitude  with  respect  to  created 
 beings,  and  each  individual  creature,  may  subsist  without  any  more 
 benevolence  than  what  is  necessarily  included  in  mere  existence. 
 
 10.  This  being  the  case,  the  state  of  the  universe,  in  reference 
 to  perfect  rectitude,  and  irrespective  of  benevolence,  may  be  further 
 compared  to  a  balance  in  perfect  equilibrium.  The  least  weight  of 
 benevolence  makes  it  preponderate,  proportionally  in  favour  of  virtue 
 and  liappiuess,  but  without  which  weight  neither  could  take  place. 
 
 IL  But,  according  to  what  has  been  said  already,  every  created 
 being  is  the  subject  of  passive  power ;  which,  with  respect  to  its 
 influence  on  the  creature,  is,  in  some  respects,  the  opposite  of 
 benevolence.  In  some,  not  in  all  respect^,  benevolence  is  an 
 exercise  of  will,  and  implies  an  agent ;  but  passive  power  is 
 a  quality  or  principle  inseparable  from  every  creature,  and  from 
 the  universe  at  large.  In  reference  to  a  former  illustration,  this 
 may  be  compared  to  another  cone  exactly  02Dposite,  the  vertex  of 
 which,  from  below,  meets  that  of  the  other  in  the  same  plane.  The 
 intermediate  point,  and,  indeed,  every  point  in  the  same  plane,  may 
 represent  the  perfect  rectitude  of  God  towards  every  individual ; 
 
1 J  8  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  SI. 
 
 the  inverted  cone  above,  Divine  benevolence ;  the  cone  below,  pas- 
 sive power,  with  its  base  necessarily  equal  to  the  whole  plane,  as  it 
 respects  the  created  universe. 
 
 12.  Hence  we  may  say  that  the  neutral  state  of  any  being  is 
 placed  in  the  plane ;  his  degree  of  influence  from  passive  power, 
 the  predisposing  cause  of  vice,  is  represented  by  a  corresponding 
 given  part  of  the  cone  below ;  and  his  degree  of  .predisposition  to 
 virtue  from  Divine  benevolence  is  represented  by  a  corresponding 
 given  part  of  the  cone  above.  Or,  to  change  the  comjDarison,  if  a 
 perfectly-poised  balance  be  made  to  represent  perfect  rectitude,  then 
 we  may  suppiose  weights  at  each  end  in  all  possible  proportions, 
 from  the  smallest  to  the  greatest.  Passive  power  not  being  the 
 effect  of  will,  but  of  the  relative  nature  of  things,  and  inseparably 
 connected  with  one  end  of  the  balance,  it  is  evident,  that  it  can  be 
 counteracted  in  its  tendency  only  by  the  weight  of  benevolence,  or 
 sovereign  pleasm-e.  Therefore,  whoever  on  earth  or  in  heaven 
 rises  to,  and  is  confirmed  in  virtue,  his  attainment  must  be  the 
 effect  of  mere  benevolence.  And  whoever  on  earth  or  in  hell 
 falls  into,  and  is  confirmed  in  vice,  his  deterioration  must  be  the 
 effect  of  passive  power,  as  the  predisposing  cause  of  vice,  which 
 nothing  in  the  universe  can  counteract  but  sovereign,  free,  un- 
 merited benevolence. 
 
 13.  Consequently,  all  the  good  and  happiness  in  the  universe  is 
 the  effect  of  benevolence  or  sovereign  pleasure,  and  exists  above 
 the  plane  of  perfect  rectitude ;  but  all  the  evU  and  miseiy  in  the 
 world  is  the  effect  of  passive  power,  in  union  with  free  agency, 
 and  exists  below  the  plane  of  rectitude.  The  one  generates  virtue, 
 and  raises  to  happiness  and  heaven ;  the  other  generates  vice,  and 
 sinks  to  misery  and  heU. 
 
 14.  Everything  in  the  universe  planned,  decreed,  and  effected  by 
 Jehovah  is  a  structure  of  benevolence.  All  He  effects  is  good, 
 and  only  good.  The  evil  that  exists  is  not  His  work.  Benevo- 
 lence has  decreed  an  endless  chain  of  antecedents,  including  the 
 natural  and  moral  worlds  ;  and  the  consequents  peculiar  to  them 
 result  therefrom  with  infallible  certainty.  But  other  antecedents, 
 in  this  world  and  in  hell,  are  constantly  interposed  by  free  agents 
 under  the  influence  of  passive  power,  whose  consequences  also 
 follow  with  equal  infalUble  certainty.  To  the  eye  of  created 
 intelligence,  these  counter  positions  and  opposite  consequents 
 appear  blended  in  an  inextricable  manner,  like  the  different  rays 
 of  light  in  the  same  pencil,  different  gases  in  a  given  space,  and 
 
DISS.  XL]  MOEAL  EVIL.  119 
 
 different  subtle  fluids  in  the  same  body.  But  to  the  eye  of  Omnis- 
 cience, they  appear  perfectly  distinct,  in  their  proper  nature,  in 
 all  their  directions  and  bearings,  in  all  their  tendencies  and  effects. 
 
 15.  Instead,  therefore,  of  saying,  "There  is  no  evil  in  the  uni- 
 verse," we  should  say,  "  There  is  much  evil  in  the  universe," — there 
 is  much  on  earth,  and  more  in  hell ;  but  none  of  God's  appoint- 
 ment. It  is  demonstrable,  that  passive  power  can  be  no  more  an 
 object  of  appointment  than  the  most  direct  contradictions ;  and 
 yet  it  is  equally  demonstrable  that  such  a  pirinciple  is  the  insepa- 
 rable concomitant  of  every  creature.  It  is  of  prior  consideration 
 to  moral  agency ;  for  whatever  is  a  property  of  a  created  nature, 
 as  such,  is  of  prior  consideration  to  the  agency  of  that  creature. 
 Consequently  is  a  property  neither  divinely  appointed,  nor  yet  a 
 moral  evil. 
 
 16.  Liberty,  in  one  sense,  bears  the  same  relation  to  good  and 
 evil,  as  rectitude  does  to  benevolence  and  passive  power.  Liberty, 
 in  itself,  is  equally  a  medium  between  good  and  evil,  as  rectitude 
 is  between  benevolence  and  passive  power ;  and  the  medium  is  of 
 a  nature  perfectly  distinct  from  both  extremes.  To  which  we  may 
 add,  that  liberty,  united  to,  or  under  the  influence  of  sovereign 
 benevolence,  generates  virtue ;  but  liberty,  united  to,  or  imder  the 
 influence  of  passive  power,  generates  vice. 
 
 17.  From  the  premises  it  may  be  seen,  that  the  existence  of  all 
 evil,  and  especially  moral  evil,  in  the  universe,  is  not  inconsistent 
 with  the  moral  perfections  of  God.  It  is  evident,  also,  that  in  no 
 sense  whatever,  except  by  a  total  misapi^lication  of  terms,  can 
 God  be  said  to  be  the  "  author  of  sin."  Nor  can  it  be  said  that 
 God  "wills  the  event  of  sin;"  but  the  contrary  is  plain,  that  He 
 does  not  will  it,  either  in  a  decretive,  a  legislative,  or  any  other  sense. 
 
 18.  The  great  source  of  confusion  into  which  many  authors 
 have  jslunged  themselves  is,  that  they  draw  too  hasty  an  inference 
 in  attempting  to  make  not  hindering  an  event  to  be  ultimately 
 the  same  as  willing  it.  Upon  their  data,  indeed,  it  may  be  true, 
 while  they  regard  every  event  alike  to  be  the  effect  of  Divine 
 energy,  and  even  the  worst,  in  order  to  answer  a  good  end.  And 
 this  will  always  be  the  case,  for  self-consistency  requires  it,  until 
 we  see  and  acknowledge  a  metaphysical  negative  cause  of  moral 
 evil,  and  an  eternal  nature  of  things  antecedent  to  all  will,  with  their 
 infallible  effects,  when  not  counteracted  by  sovereign  benevolence. 
 
 19.  Let  us  now  view  the  subject  in  the  light  of  terms  a  little 
 different.     Much  error  often  arises  through  the  defect  of  language ; 
 
120  MOEAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 and  where  there  is  danger  of  misapprehension,  it  may  be  of  use  to 
 change  expressions.  Hereby  a  difficult  subject  may  be  taken  by  dif- 
 ferent handles,  or  a  reader  may  apprehend  it  by  one  handle,  which 
 he  could  not  by  another.  Let  us  then  substitute  the  word  equity 
 instead  of  rectitude,  and  undeserved  favour  instead  of  benevolence. 
 Postulate. — Whatever  is  perfectly  consistent  with  equity,  is  also 
 perfectly  consistent  with  the  moral  character  of  God. 
 
 20.  Whatever  is  the  pure  effect  of  equity  and  the  nature  of 
 things,  or  essential  truth,  united,  cannot  be  inconsistent  with  the 
 moral  perfections  of  God ;  the  existence  of  moral  evil  in  the  uni- 
 verse is  the  pure  effect  of  these  ;  therefore,  the  existence  of  moral 
 evil  in  the  universe  cannot  be  inconsistent  with  the  moral  perfec- 
 tions of  God. 
 
 21.  The  only  ground  of  hesitation  here  is,  How  moral  evil  is 
 the  effect  of  equity  and  the  nature  of  things  ?  Liberty  itself  is  a 
 natural  good,  and  therefore  is  the  fruit  of  Divine  favour,  and  the 
 mere  exercise  of  liberty  must  be  ascribed  to  the  same  cause.  But 
 he  who  is  hypothetically  free  to  good,  must  be  in  like  manner  free 
 to  evil.  Por  this  hypothetical  freedom  either  to  good  or  to  evil  is 
 what  constitutes  the  morality  of  his  acts  of  choice.  Take  away 
 this  hypothetical  freedom,  and  you  take  away  the  essence  of  moral 
 agency.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  to  possess  this  freedom  and  conse- 
 quent moral  agency  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  equity,  rectitude, 
 or  moral  perfections  of  God.  Yet  it  is  demonstrable  that  freedom 
 cannot  be  influenced  in  its  choice,  so  as  to  constitute  it  virtuous 
 or  viciou.s,  holy  or  sinful,  morally  right  or  wrong,  good  or  evil, 
 but  from  two  causes  radically — Divine  favour  and  passive  power. 
 If  the  agent  be  under  the  influence  of  Divine  favour,  a  happy  re- 
 sult, in  the  same  proportion,  is  secured  by  the  same  essential  truth 
 as  renders  the  choice  of  the  great  I  AM  infallibly  good ;  which  no 
 one  will  say  is  inconsistent  with  the  Divine  perfections.  'Eov 
 though  favour  raises  the  agent  above  what  rigid  or  pure  equity 
 can  do,  there  is  no  inconsistency  between  them,  any  more  than 
 between  paying  a  just  debt,  and  bestowing  also  a  free  gift  in 
 addition.  But  if  the  agent  be  not  under  the  influence  of  unde- 
 served favour,  the  only  alternative  is,  that  he  must  necessarily  be 
 under  the  influence  of  passive  power.  And  as  nothing  can  pos- 
 sibly secure  a  happy  result  but  undeserved  favour  or  benevolent 
 influence,  a  negative  cause  becomes  an  infallible  ground  of  cer- 
 tainty of  an  opposite  result.     Again — • 
 
 22.  When  God  gives  to  creatures  what  is  their  due.  He  deals 
 
DISS.  XL]  MOEAL  EVIL.  121 
 
 with  them  in  equity  ;  but  when  God  gives  them  less  grace  than  is 
 actually  sufBcient  to  secure  from  sin,  or  will  in  fact  do  so,  He  gives 
 them  their  due.  Were  it  otherwise,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
 any  to  sin.  If  to  give  them  so  much  favour,  or  benevolent  influ- 
 ence as  would  actually  preserve  them  from  sin,  were  their  due,  it 
 is  plain  that  the  God  of  ecpity  would  give  them  their  due,  and 
 preserve  them  from  sin  accordingly.  But  the  fact  is  widely  other- 
 wise. They  are  not  all  preserved  from  sin,  tliough  all  might  be, 
 through  the  interposition  of  sovereign  favour ;  therefore  it  is  not 
 their  due,  or  equity  does  not  require  it. 
 
 23.  If  it  be  said,  It  is  owing  to  their  own  fault,  it  is  very  true  ; 
 but  how  came  any  creature  to  be  faulty?  God  made  men  and 
 angels  iipright ;  and  He  has  always  dealt  with  every  creature, 
 however  debased  by  sin,  in  equity.  He  has  also  given  to  every 
 creature  capable  of  sinning,  liberty  unconstrained.  He  often  in- 
 fluences the  disposition  by  benevolence,  and  the  goodness  of  God, 
 by  providential  and  gracious  dispensations,  leadeth  to  repentance. 
 But  never  has  He  dealt  with  any  unjustly,  or  given  them  less  than 
 their  due.  Not  a  fallen  spirit,  however  deeply  sunk,  can  verify 
 such  a  charge.  Assuredly  they  have  destroyed  themselves,  but  in 
 God  is  the  only  help.  A  principle  of  which  God  is  not  the  author, 
 as  before  explained,  in  union  with  the  abuse  of  their  liberty,  satis- 
 factorily accounts  for  the  fact.  Oar  evil  is  of  ourselves,  but  all 
 our  good  is  from  God. 
 
 2-i.  From  what  has  been  said  we  may  safely  draw  this  inference, 
 that  the  existence  of  moral  evil  in  the  universe  is  not  inconsistent 
 with  the  moral  perfections  of  God.  And  the  proposition  would 
 be  equally  true  had  the  proportion  of  moral  evil  been  greater 
 than  it  is.  But  some  will  continue  to  cavil,  it  is  probable,  because 
 every  objection  is  not  professedly  answered,  and  some  difficulties, 
 or  Divine  arcana,  will  always  remain.  They  will  still  be  asking 
 why  benevolence  is  not  more  universal,  and  thereby  moral  evil 
 altogether  prevented?  why  the  cone  (to  which  benevolence  has 
 been  compared)  is  not  a  cylinder,  whose  base  is  commensurate  with 
 the  plane  of  creatural  existence,  and  whose  top  rises  ad  infini- 
 tv/m  1  They  might  as  well  inquire.  Why  is  not  every  atom  a  sun  ? 
 why  not  every  drop  an  ocean  ?  why  not  every  moment  an  age  ? 
 why  not  every  worm  an  angel  ?  why  not  the  solar  system  as  large 
 as  all  material  systems  united  ?  why  the  number  of  angels  and 
 men  not  a  thousand  times  greater  ?  And  to  complete  the  absurdity 
 of  demanding  evidence  for  everything,  as  an  objection  against  de- 
 
122  MOEAL  Evn..  [diss.  XI. 
 
 monstrable  truth,  Why  is  not  any  given  part  on  the  surface  of  a 
 cone,  a  cylinder,  or  a  globe,  not  in  the  centre  ?  To  all  such  in- 
 quiries— and,  if  advanced  as  objections,  impertinent  inquiries, — it 
 is  sufficient  to  reply.  Infinite  wisdom  has  planned  a  universe,  in 
 which  Divine  benevolence  ajDpears  wonderfully  conspicuous ;  and 
 even  the  evils,  whether  natural  or  moral,  which  are  intermixed,  and 
 which  iu  their  origin  are  equally  remote  from  Divine  causation  and 
 from  chance,  are  overruled  to  answer  purposes  the  most  benevolent 
 and  the  most  wonderfully  sublime. 
 
 First  Carol. — The  only  jjossible  way  of  avoiding  the  most  ruin- 
 ous consequences — moral  evil  and  misery — is  to  dii-ect  the  will 
 through  the  instrumentality  of  its  freedom  to  a  state  of  union  to 
 God,  submission  to  His  wUl,  and  an  imitation  of  His  moral  perfec- 
 tions, according  to  His  most  merciful  appointment. 
 
 Second  Oorol. — To  creatures  fallen  below  the  line  of  rectitude, 
 and  yet  the  subjects  of  hope,  prayer  to  God  for  grace,  undeserved 
 favour,  or  benevolent  iufluence,  is  an  exercise  the  most  becoming, 
 a  duty  the  most  necessary  and  important,  and  a  privilege  of  the 
 first  magnitude. 
 
 MOEAL  EVIL  HAS  AN  ADEQUATE  CAUSE. 
 
 It  is  indeed  of  infinitely  greater  importance  to  be  acquainted 
 with  that  celestial  art,  and  that  sacred  influence,  whereby  we  may 
 emerge  from  the  gulf  of  sin  to  hoUness  and  heaven,  than  to  be 
 accurately  versed  in  the  science  of  its  origination.  And  so  it  is 
 far  more  important  to  see  objects,  and  improve  sight,  than  to  be 
 able  to  demonstrate  the  theory  of  vision ;  to  recover  health,  and 
 to  use  it  aright,  than  to  have  skill  to  ascertain  the  cause  and  the 
 symptom  of  disease  ;  to  contribute  vigorously  in  extinguishing  a  fire 
 that  threatens  to  destroy  our  dwelling  and  ourselves,  than  to  know 
 the  author  of  the  calamity  ;  to  jiarticipate  in  the  effects  of  varied 
 seasons,  than  to  understand  astronomically  the  precise  reason  of 
 those  variations.  The  mariner  may  navigate  without  knowing 
 why  his  needle  points  to  the  north  ;  and  the  celestial  bodies  in  the 
 solar  system  were  as  equally  regular  iu  their  motions  before  Sir 
 Isaac  Newton  had  existence  as  they  have  been  since  he  has  ascer- 
 tained those  laws  and  proportions  according  to  which  they  move. 
 And  yet  the  science  of  optics  is  not  useless,  the  healing  art  is  not 
 to  be  despised,  to  discover  an  incendiary  is  desirable,  and  never  is 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAl  EVIL.  123 
 
 that  philosopher  who  attempts  to  ascertain  the  causes  of  natural 
 phenomena  held  up  as  blameworthy.  In  like  manner,  though 
 millions  are  delivered  from  the  infiuence  of  sin,  and  raised  to  the 
 most  exalted  eminence  of  happiness,  who  never  knew,  or  even 
 sought  to  know,  scientifically  the  origination  of  sin,  this  is  no 
 good  reason  that  such  knowledge  is  useless,  or  even  unimportant. 
 
 As  the  basis  of  our  present  demonstration,  we  begin  with  pro- 
 posing a  few  axioms. 
 
 Axioms. 
 
 1.  No  effect  can  exist  without  an  adequate  cause.  On  this 
 truth  are  founded  aU  reasonings  and  all  metaphysical  evidence. 
 
 2.  Sin  is  an  eiTect,  and  has  a  cause.  On  this  truth  are  founded 
 all  moral  means  and  aU  religious  principles. 
 
 3.  The  origin  of  moral  evil  cannot  be  moral  evil ;  or,  the  cause 
 of  sin  cannot  be  sin  itself.  Except  we  admit  this,  the  same  thing- 
 may  be  and  not  be,  at  the  same  time,  and  in  the  same  respect, — 
 the  same  thing  may  be  sin  and  no  sin,  cause  and  no  cause, — or, 
 contrary  to  the  first  axiom,  a  contingent  event  may  be  the  cause 
 of  itself,  or  may  exist  without  an  adequate  cause. 
 
 4.  There  is  no  positive  cause  but  what  is  ultimately  from  God. 
 If  otherwise,  something  positive  may  begin  to  be  without  a  posi- 
 tive cause,  or  something  may  exist  without  an  adequate  cause ; 
 which  is  the  same  as  for  an  effect  to  exist  without  a  cause,  con- 
 trary to  the  first  axiom. 
 
 5.  There  may  be  a  negative  metaphysical  cause,  where  there  is 
 no  decretive  Divine  operation  to  effect  it.  Were  there  no  negative 
 metaphysical  causes,  such  ideas  as  absence,  ignorance,  folly,  weak- 
 ness, and  the  Uke,  could  have  no  metaphysical  effects  ;  contrary 
 to  universal  experience.  And  we  must  renounce  all  ideas  of  con- 
 gruity  to  suppose  that  such  things  are  the  mere  efi'ects  of  Divine 
 decree  and  ojieration. 
 
 Having  premised  these  positions  as  axioms  not  to  be  disputed, 
 we  proceed  to  make  a  few  observations,  which,  though  equally  true, 
 may  not  be  equally  obvious. 
 
 1.  The  origin  of  moral  evil  cannot  be  one  principle  ;  for  were  it 
 one,  it  must  be  either  a  positive  or  negative  cause.  If  positive,  it 
 would  be  ultimately  from  God ;  but  this  would  exclude  a  moral 
 alternative,  the  vei-y  essence  of  moral  agency,  and  consequently 
 
124  MOEAL  ETIL.  [DISS.  XI- 
 
 be  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  moral  evU.  But  if  a  nega- 
 tive cause,  it  must  ultimately  be  referred  to  the  prime  negative 
 cause,  which  can  be  no  other  than  passive  power,  as  before  explamed ; 
 which  is  nothing,  independent  of  positive  existence,  and  conse- 
 quently can  have  no  effect  but  in  union  with  positive  existence. 
 
 2.  It  remains,  then,  that  the  origin  of  moral  evU  is  a  compound 
 of  two  causes  at  least.  Yet  not  more  than  two,  because,  as  we 
 shall  see^  these  are  sufficient,  and  more  would  be  superfluoiis,  in 
 order  to  produce  the  effect. 
 
 3.  Now  the  question  remains,  What  are  these  compounded  prin- 
 ciples? Are  they  two  positive  causes,  two  negative,  or  one  of 
 each  ?  They  cannot  be  two  jjositive  causes  ;  for  then  they  might 
 be  ultimately  reduced  to  one,  the  Fii-st  Cause,  as  before  proved. 
 Nor  can  they  be  two  negative  ones,  for,  ultimately,  there  is  but  one 
 cause  properly  negative.     Consequently — 
 
 4.  The  first  entrance  of  sin  into  the  world,  or  the  true  and  pre- 
 cise origin  of  moral  evil,  may  be  found  in  two  causes  united — the 
 one  positive,  and  the  other  negative ;  but  neither  of  which  is 
 morally  good  or  morally  evil  If  the  cause  were  moraUy  good,  the 
 effect  could  not  be  morally  bad ;  and  if  morally  evil,  it  would  be 
 contraiy  to  the  third  axiom  and  to  common  sense.  These  two 
 causes  are — first,  liberty,  a  cause  naturally  good  ;  secondly,  passive 
 power,  a  cause  naturally  evU.  And  these  two  causes  are  as  neces- 
 sary for  the  production  of  moral  evil  as  two  parents  for  the  pro- 
 duction of  a  human  being  according  to  the  laws  of  nature. 
 
 5.  Dr  Clarke,  whose  brief  account  has  been  more  implicitly 
 admitted  than  any  other,  says,  that  moral  evU  "  arises  wholly  from 
 the  abuse  of  liberty,  which  God  gave  to  His  creatures  for  other 
 purposes,  and  which  it  was  reasonable  and  fit  to  give  them  for  the 
 perfection  and  order  of  the  whole  creation ;  only  they,  contrary  to 
 God's  intention  and  command,  have  abused  what  was  necessary 
 for  the  perfection  of  the  whole,  to  the  corruption  and  depravation 
 of  themselves."  This  extract  from  Dr  Clarke  (in  his  "Demonstra- 
 tion of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,"  p.  113,  5th  edit.)  has 
 been  advanced  by  celebrated  -mriters,  as  "  containing  all  that  can 
 be  advanced  with  certainty"  on  the  subject.  But  surely  those 
 minds  must  be  easily  satisfied  who  can  be  satisfied  ■nith  such  evi- 
 dence. Dr  Clarke  allows  and  piroves  that  liberty  is  a  perfection 
 rather  than  an  evU.  How  came  it,  then,  to  produce  evU  ?  He 
 answers,  "  This  arises  wholly  from  the  abuse  of  libert}'."       But 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  125 
 
 what  is  the  cause  of  this  effect  called  "  the  abuse  of  liberty  ?"  This, 
 in  fact,  is  the  whole  of  the  difficulty,  and  yet  he  leaves  it  un- 
 touched. The  free  agent  fails  in  the  exercise  of  liberty;  this 
 failure  is  an  effect ;  but  there  is  no  eifect  without  a  cause ;  there- 
 fore this  failure  must  have  a  cause ;  and  this  cause  (not  the  abuse 
 of  liberty)  must  bring  us  to  the  origin  of  moral  evil. 
 
 6.  What  Dr  Clarke  has  left  untouched  may  yet  be  ascertained. 
 We  think  it  has  been  fairly  excluded,  by  what  has  been  already 
 advanced,  from  everything  excej^t  liberty  and  passive  power. 
 Therefore,  the  abuse  of  liberty  can  arise  only  from  its  associate. 
 But  how  can  this  operate  as  a  cause  of  the  abuse  of  liberty  ?  In 
 order  to  answer  this  question,  we  must  recollect  what  liberty  it- 
 self is — viz.,  a  natural  power,  or  instrument  of  the  mind,  capable 
 of  producing  moral  effects.  Not  a  self-determining  power,  which 
 would  be  contrary  to  the  first  axiom,  and  which  President  Edwards 
 has  abundantly  demonstrated  to  be  full  of  contradictions,  and  an 
 utter  impossibility.  It  must,  then,  be  determined  by  motives. 
 But  motives,  as  will  be  shewn,  are  the  objects  of  choice  in 
 union  with  the  state  of  the  mind,  as  a  compound  effect.  Now, 
 the  cause  why  the  real  good,  supijose  the  chief  good,  which 
 is  absolutely  unchangeable,  is  not  chosen,  and  an  inferior  good 
 appears  at  the  instant  of  choice  preferable,  and  is,  in  fact,  pre- 
 ferred, must  arrive  from  that  part  of  the  motive  which  is  the 
 state  of  the  mind. 
 
 7.  Now,  there  are  only  two  states  of  the  mind  conceivable 
 whereby  liberty  can  be  influenced :  the  one,  a  state  naturally  evil ; 
 the  other,  a  state  morally  good.  Were  we  to  say  that  the  state 
 was  morally  evil  at  the  first  entrance  of  sin,  we  should  contradict 
 the  third  axiom ;  and  were  we  to  say  that  the  cause  was  only 
 naturally  good,  we  should  contradict  the  first  axiom.  Therefore, 
 the  cause  of  the  abuse  of  liberty  is  a  state  naturally  evil.  No 
 other  cause  can  possibly  be  assigned,  without  involving  contradic- 
 tion. But  what  is  a  state  naturally  evil,  and  without  any  mixture 
 of  moral  evil  ?  It  can  be  no  other  but  a  state  under  the  influence 
 of  what  we  call  passive  power. 
 
 8.  Let  us  view  the  subject  in  another  light.  Perfect  liberty, 
 in  reference  to  virtue  and  vice,  the  scale  of  merit  and  demerit,  and 
 its  attendant  degrees  of  happiness  or  misery,  is  a  medium  standing 
 between  all  extremes — between  virtue  and  vice,  merit  and  demerit, 
 happiness  and  misery.     If  we  regard  Divine  rectitude  or  equity. 
 
]  26  MOEAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 according  to  a  former  simile,  in  reference  to  the  moral  system,  as 
 a  universal  plane,  liberty  may  be  said  to  coincide  with  it.  And, 
 being  a  natural  perfection,  or,  when  exerted,  a  good  which  has  a 
 positive  cause,  it  is  the  effect  of  benevolent  energy.  If  the  mind 
 be  under  unmerited,  sovereign,  benevolent  influence,  its  liberty 
 attaches  itself  to  real  good ;  then  the  agent  rises  on  the  scale  of 
 excellence,  and,  therefore,  of  happiness.  But  if  the  mind  be  under 
 passive  influence,  or  the  influence  of  passive  power,  (a  depraved 
 nature  and  confirmed  vicious  habits  being  now  out  of  the  question,) 
 its  hberty  attaches  itself  to  apparent  good,  in  opposition  to  real ; 
 then  vice  is  generated,  the  agent  sinks  on  the  scale  of  deterioration, 
 and,  consequently,  of  misery. 
 
 9.  It  apj)ears,  then,  that  the  will,  in  the  exercise  of  its  freedom, 
 when  producing  moral  effects,  is  the  instrument  of  the  disposition, 
 and  that  the  character  of  the  effect  bears  an  infallible  and  exact 
 proportion  to  that  of  the  predisposing  cause.  Yet  the  will  in  the 
 exercise  of  choice  is  so  free,  that  all  constraint,  coaction,  and  im- 
 pulse, are  entirely  excluded  from  that  which  constitutes  the 
 morality  of  the  act.  Here  lies  the  essence  of  moral  agency,  and 
 the  ground  of  accouutableness.  The  agent  has  a  moral  alterna- 
 tive :  if  he  be  differently  minded,  he  may  choose  otherwise  than  he 
 actually  does.  If  under  benevolent  influence  he  will,  in  proportion, 
 infallibly  choose  aright ;  if  under  equitable  passive  influence,  the 
 apparent  good  will  not  be  the  real  one,  and,  consequently,  the 
 choice  will  be  morally  bad.  Means,  objects  perfectly  suitable  and 
 sufficient,  are  exhibited  to  view ;  but  these  of  themselves  would 
 never  determine  the  will,  otherwise  the  same  efifect  would  always 
 follow  the  same  means.  Temptations  also  are  presented ;  these, 
 in  like  manner,  of  themselves  never  determine  the  wiU,  otherwise 
 temptation  and  sin  would  be  infallibly  connected.  Then  the  holy 
 Jesus  could  not  have  withstood  the  numerous  and  powerful  solici- 
 tations of  the  tempter.  But  why  did  He  withstand  all  ?  Because 
 objects  of  temptation  did  not  constitute  the  whole  of  motives ;  be- 
 cause objects  operate  according  to  the  state  of  the  mind  ;  and  be- 
 cause in  Him  benevolent  influence  counteracted  jDassive  power. 
 Hence,  when  the  prince  of  this  world  came,  he  found  nothing  in 
 Him  ;  and  hence  He  rose  to  the  greatest  height  of  glory,  having 
 "  a  name  above  every  name." 
 
 10.  There  is  no  end  of  objections  and  cavils,  however  demon- 
 strative the  proof ;  for  such  there  have  been  against  all  the  first 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MORAL  EVIL.  1 27 
 
 principles  of  religion  :  the  being  of  God, — a  revelation  of  His  will 
 to  the  human  race, — the  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  &c.  Some  may 
 say.  Why  should  sin  be  made  to  originate  in  these  two  things, 
 liberty  and  passive  power  ?  We  answer,  it  has  been  demonstrated 
 that  all  metaphysical,  positive,  and  negative  causation,  in  reference 
 to  moral  evil,  is  reducible  to  these  two  ;  and,  therefore,  they  might 
 as  well  ask,  Why  one  and  one  make  two,  rather  than  any  other 
 number  ? 
 
 11.  Others  may  say.  Why  not  proceed  from  God  alone  ?  They 
 might  as  well  ask,  Why  is  not  the  sun  the  cause  of  darkness  ? 
 love,  the  cause  of  enmity  ?  wisdom,  the  cause  of  folly  ?  hapijiuess, 
 the  cause  of  misery  ?  order,  the  cause  of  confusion  ?  But  the 
 effect,  it  may  be  said,  is  the  same.  We  rejDly,  the  assignation  of  a 
 cause,  whether  true  or  false,  does  not  alter  the  nature  of  j)heno- 
 mena.  It  would  be,  indeed,  a  strange  phenomenon,  hitherto  un- 
 known and  unknowable,  for  an  hypothesis,  however  demonstrable, 
 to  alter  the  nature  of  the  things  in  question.  The  effects  are  the 
 same.  Very  true  :  but  the  question  is  not  about  the  effects  ;  the 
 inquiry  is  about  the  true  cause  of  those  effects,  in  opposition  to 
 false  philosophy.  The  effect  of  moral  evil  is  misery,  or  deserved 
 suffering.  Now,  does  it  make  no  difference,  in  justifying  the  ways 
 of  God  to  men,  whether  a  rational,  immortal  being  suffer  de- 
 servedly or  undeservedly?  To  suffer  for  moral  evil  is  to  suffer 
 deservedly ;  but  were  sin  and  suffering  from  God  alone,  or  the 
 effect  of  constitutional  laws,  this  could  not  be  the  case.  To  say 
 that  this  partial  suffering  may  be  ultimately  counterbalanced  by  a 
 restoration,  is  begging  the  question  that  there  will  be  a  restoration  ; 
 and  if  there  were,  what  is  it  better  than  an  ajDology  for  past  in- 
 justice ?  To  suffer  undeservedly  is  to  suffer  unjustly ;  and  to 
 punish  at  all  is  an  act  of  injustice,  if  undeserved,  as  well  as  to 
 punish  for  ever. 
 
 12.  It  may  be  again  asked.  What  advantage  is  there  in  fixing 
 on  this  origin  of  moral  evil  rather  than  another  ?  We  reply  by 
 putting  another  question — Why  should  we  put  up  with  a  false 
 cause  assigned  for  anything  ?  Surely,  phenomena  more  interesting, 
 more  alarming  in  their  nature,  and  more  awful  in  their  consequences 
 than  moral  evils,  cannot  arrest  human  observation.  And  it  would 
 be  passing  strange  to  suppose  that  the  ascertaining  of  their  true 
 cause  and  origin  is  not  an  important  part  of  philosojDhy,  and  de- 
 serviuo-  of  the  closest  investigation.     What  can  be  more  dishon- 
 
128  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 Durable  to  the  moral  character  of  Deity  than  to  make  sin  origi- 
 nate in  His  will  alone  ?  Or,  if  this  be  its  origin,  how  preposter- 
 ous to  call  it  moral  evil,  as  distinguished  from  natural !  How 
 cruel  and  unjust,  beyond  precedent,  to  punish  it ;  and  how  absurd 
 the  idea  of  threatening  iranishment  for  what  was  irreversibly  ap- 
 pointed ! 
 
 1 3.  Some  may  say.  Why  may  we  not  be  satisfied  with  the  idea 
 of  permission  ?  If  properly  understood,  we  acknowledge  that  this 
 goes  a  considerable  way.  But  we  suspect  few  seem  acquainted 
 with  the  full  implication  of  the  term.  God  permits.  True,  if  by 
 it  we  mean  He  does  not  hinder.  The  free  agent  acts  amiss  when 
 he  is  not  hindered.  This  only  shews  that  God  might  hinder  if  He 
 pleased,  but  it  assigns  no  cause  why  the  agent  acts  amiss.  Per- 
 mitting, or  not  hindering,  implies  a  cai;se  distinct  from  Divine 
 causation.  And  the  question  returns,  What  is  the  cause  of  sin 
 taking  place  when  not  hindered  ?  In  vain  do  we  fix  on  chance,  or 
 a  self-determining  power ;  these  explain  nothing,  and  in  fact  are 
 nothing.  In  vain  do  we  say,  sin  arises  from  the  abuse  of  liberty. 
 Por  the  question  recm-s.  What  is  the  cause  of  that  abuse  ?  If  this 
 be  not  explained,  nothing  is  effected.  In  vain  shall  we  say  it  pro- 
 ceeds from  the  Cause  of  causes.  Por  that  Cause  is  good  only.  From 
 such  a  Cause  only  good  can  proceed  ;  and  to  abscribe  sin  to  this 
 Cause  is  as  proper  as  to  say  that  moral  evil  is  a  good  thing,  and 
 ought  to  be  rewarded  rather  than  punished.  If  this  be  not  a 
 reprovable  mode  of  calling  "  evil  good,  and  good  evil,"  (Isa.  v.  20,) 
 we  know  not  what  is. 
 
 Corollaries. 
 
 1.  Tliose  who  renounce  the  idea  of  passive  power,  as  before 
 explained,  and  its  influence  on  the  mind  of  a  free  agent  as  a  nega- 
 tive metaphysical  cause,  can  never  find  the  true  iDhilosophical 
 cause  of  vice  and  sin,  and  consequently  of  deserved  suS'eruig.  As 
 soon  might  they  ascertam  the  laws  of  the  planetary  motions,  while 
 rejecting  the  principle  of  gravitation.  If  it  be  asked.  What  is  the 
 link  of  connexion  between  this  princijjle  and  the  event  ?  we 
 reply,  essential  truth,  the  same  truth  as  connects  2  x  2  :=  4,  or 
 2  —  1  =  1. 
 
 2.  Those  who  renounce  a  sovereign,  benevolent,  physical,  holy 
 influence  on  the  mind  can  never  find  the  true  philosophical  origin 
 of  virtue  and  holiness,  and  consequently  happiness. 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MORAL  EVIL.  129 
 
 3.  From  the  premises  we  infer  that  the  highest  wisdom,  the 
 best  interest,  and  the  greatest  honour  of  a  rational  and  accountable 
 being  is  to  employ  his  liberty  and  all  his  powers  in  the  way  of 
 absolute  submission  to  the  Divine  will ;  in  supreme  affection,  fear, 
 and  love  to  the  infinite  majesty  and  self-existent  excellence  of  God ; 
 and  in  the  way  of  humble  and  diligent  obedience,  according  to  the 
 manifestation  which  God  has  made  of  Himself. 
 
 MOEAL  EVIL — DIVINE  DECEEE  NOT  ITS  CAUSE. 
 
 Were  the  true  origin  of  moral  e'v'il — that  is,  the  adequate  rea- 
 son of  its  taking  place  as  a  consequence — more  generally  known, 
 there  would  be  less  unprofitable  disputing  about  the  Divine 
 decrees  in  general,  and  about  predestination  and  election  in  par- 
 ticular. It  is  to  the  want  of  this  knowledge  that  we  must  ascribe 
 many  things  advanced  by  ancient  as  well  as  modern  writers,  who, 
 in  other  important  respects,  are  truly  valuable  and  judicious. 
 President  Edwards  appears  never  less  at  home  than  when  he 
 touches  upon  those  points  which  are  immediately  connected  with 
 that  knowledge,  and  his  reasoning  [upon  them]  is  a  striking 
 specimen.  The  conclusioii  he  draws  is  true  in  one  sense,  but  not 
 in  another.  It  is  applicable  only  to  real  entities,  while  it  does 
 not  afi'ect  negative  causations,  and  consequences  flowing  from 
 them.  That  God  "knows  beforehand"  all  things,  whether  of  a 
 positive  or  negative  kind,  is  an  important  truth,  but  things  coming 
 to  pass  or  not  coming  to  pass  is  no  proper  criterion  of  His  "ap- 
 proving or  not  approving  them."  He  may  approve  of  what  does 
 not  come  to  pass,  and  He  may  not  approve  of  what  does.  He 
 approves  of  aL.  possible  excellence.?,  and  He  disapproves  of  all 
 possible  moral  evil.  But  who  will  say  that  there  are  as  many 
 excellences  among  creatures,  or  as  much  moral  evU,  as  it  is  pos- 
 sible there  might  be  ? 
 
 When  it  is  said,  "  He  either  is  willing  they  should  be,  or  He 
 is  not  willing  they  should  be,"  the  terms  require  a  distinction,  and 
 the  sentiment  an  explanation.  If  by  "  they  "  or  "  things "  be 
 meant  real  entities,  it  is  very  proper  to  say  that  God  is  either 
 willing  they  should  be,  or  not  willing  they  should  be ;  but  if  the 
 former,  they  must  exist  from  His  will,  and  therefore  are  decreed  ; 
 but  if  the  latter,  they  must  not  exist,  for  there  is  no  other  ade- 
 quate cause  of  their  existence.    But  this  reasoning  is  not  valid  when 
 
 VOL.  IV.  I 
 
130  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 applied  to  negations  and  effects.  For  there  are  mxiLtitudes  of 
 things  (as  all  failings,  wants,  and  negative  considerations)  concern-^ 
 ing  which  there  is  no  decretive  will  exercised  for  their  existence, 
 (if  existence  it  may  be  called,)  nor  yet  any  contrary  will  to  prevent 
 their  existence.  What  intelligent  person  can  suppose,  for  instance, 
 that  a  mathematical  point,  a  relative  nothing,  was  decreed  either  to 
 be  or  not  to  be  ?  And  yet,  when  it  stands  related  to  real  entities, 
 which  are  decreed,  what  innumerable  demonstrative  consequences 
 follow  from  it. 
 
 By  whomsoever  sanctioned,  it  is  an  erroneous  notion  that  a 
 decretive  will  is  implied  in,  or  is  at  all  requisite  for  the  production 
 of  a  negative  cause.  It  is  not  less  erroneous  than  to  suppose  that 
 negative  causes  may  produce  real  entities.  That  the  latter  is  an 
 erroneous  notion  may  be  easily  made  to  appear.  Millions  of 
 inhabited  systems  are  among  possible  effects,  but  who  would  say 
 that  there  must  be  a  decretive  will  or  any  wiU  to  prevent  their 
 existence  ?  Would  they  start  into  being  of  themselves  if  not 
 prevented  by  an  act  of  wiU?  To  suppose  that  an  exercise  of 
 Divine  will  is  requisite  for  confirming  the  negative  consideration 
 of  their  non-existence  is  an  absurd  idea,  except  these  ideal  possibles 
 had  an  inherent  tendency  towards  actual  existence  of  themselves. 
 And  as  there  is  no  will  requisite  to  prevent  their  existence,  so 
 neither  is  there  any  required  to  continue  their  non-existence.  But 
 though  a  negative  cause,  like  a  mathematical  point,  be  a  relative 
 nothing,  yet,  on  the  supposition  of  existing  free  agents,  in  given 
 circumstances,  millions  of  sins  would  come  to  pass,  more  than  do 
 in  fact,  were  they  not  prevented  by  a  counteracting  wiU.  This 
 counteraction  is  very  properly  termed  "restraining  or  preventing 
 grace,"  for  the  object  of  a  decree  which  counteracts  evil  is  the 
 positive  existence  of  an  opposite  good.  And  if  moral  evil  be  the 
 object  of  prevention,  it  must  be  prevented  by  Di^e  gracious  will 
 and  influence,  which  counteracts  the  operation  of  that  negative 
 principle  in  the  agent  from  which  the  moral  evil  takes  its  origin. 
 Therefore,  our  author's  conclusion,  "to  will  that  they  .should  be  is 
 to  decree  them,"  applies  only  to  one  sort  of  "  things  " — viz.,  real 
 entities ;  but  negative  considerations,  defects,  and  moral  evils,  no 
 more  imply  a  decree  concerning  their  causation,  and  their  appro- 
 priate consequences,  than  does  absolute  non-existence  imply  it. 
 
 The  true  notion  of  moral  evil,  or  the  sinfulness  of  a  free  act,  is 
 the  absence  or  the  want  of  conformity  to  rectitude.     And  if  God 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  131 
 
 were  the  decretive  cause  of  moral  evil,  by  "  wUling  it  should  be," 
 the  will  of  the  agent  would  be  only  the  instrument  of  the  first  will 
 in  producing  an  intended  or  decreed  event.  But  if  such  event  be 
 decreed,  and  if  there  be  no  cause  of  failure  in  the  agent  but  what 
 is  decreed,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the  consequence  that  God  is  the 
 primary  author  of  sin.  And  how  could  He  hate  and  blame  the 
 effect  of  His  own  causation  any  more  than  He  hates  natural  evils, 
 or  blames  volcanoes  and  storms,  diseases  and  death  ?  He  is  never 
 said,  or  even  supposed,  to  hate  or  blame  these,  because  He  is  the 
 primary  source  of  them,  according  to  established  laws  and  instru- 
 ments of  His  own  appointment.  If  moral  evil  were  decreed  by 
 Him,  He  must  be  the  efficient  of  it ;  for  whatever  He  decrees  He 
 effects,  and  notwithstanding  any  kind  whatever  of  instrumentality 
 in  its  production,  the  human  will  or  anything  else.  He  could  no 
 more  disapprove  of  it  than  He  does  of  lightning  and  earthquakes. 
 
 But  if  "  willing  they  should  be  "  denote  not  exercising  a  will  to 
 prevent  moral  evils,  the  expression  is  inappropriate,  and  implies  a 
 contradiction,  for  a  decree  implies  the  exercise  of  will ;  but  hot 
 exercising  a  preventing  will  (by  which  alone  the  event  can  be 
 arrested)  is  an  idea  directly  contrary,  and  the  two  ideas  are 
 absolutely  incompatible.  The  same  intelligent  cause,  indeed,  may 
 produce  effects  different  from  itself ;  and  this  must  be  the  case,  as 
 cause  and  effect  cannot  be  identified,  (for  identity  is  that  which 
 excludes  difference  ;)  but  the  same  intelligent  cause  cannot  produce 
 effects  contrary  to  itself.  All  the  decrees  of  God  are  holy  like 
 Himself,  but  to  suppose  a  decree  of  moral  evil  is  to  suppose  an 
 effect  contrary  to  its  cause  ;  which  is  to  suppose  incompatible  ideas 
 to  be  a  truth.  The  intei-ventions  of  a  secondary  will  make  no  real 
 difference  if  there  be  not  another  cause  of  failure  in  the  act,  totally 
 different  from  decretive  will. 
 
 But  is  there  any  adequate  cause  or  sufficient  reason  of  the  con- 
 sequence, why  moral  evil  takes  place  if  we  exclude  a  Divine  decree 
 of  it  ?  Most  assuredly  there  is ;  as  sure  as  all  the  decrees  of  God, 
 and  the  exercise  of  those  decrees,  are  holy,  and  as  sure  as  moral 
 evil  is  an  effect  which  He  blames  and  infinitely  hates.  And  this 
 cause  is  of  such  a  nature,  that  if  God  decrees  one  kind  of  good  but 
 not  another  also,  moral  evil  is  certain  to  follow.  That  is,  if  He 
 decree  the  existence  of  an  active  will,  in  perfect  liberty  from  con- 
 straint to  evil,  together  with  a  variety  of  objects,  aU  of  which  are 
 good  in  themselves,  but  at  the  same  time  has  not  decreed  preserving 
 
132  5I0EAL  EVIL.  '  [DISS.  XL 
 
 grace, — a  continued  holy  influence  enlightening  and  purifying  the 
 mind, — the  intellect  will  be  certain  (as  chance  is  out  of  the  question) 
 to  give  a  defective  representation  of  good,  because  it  is  necessarily 
 connected  with  the  soui'ce  of  failure — viz.,  comparative  defect,  and 
 therefore  the  want  of  infallibility.  If  the  choice  be  right  and 
 virtuous,  it  is  the  infallible  index  of  two  good  things  decreed — the 
 natural  act,  and  a  holy  principle  in  the  heart,  which  is  the  source 
 of  moral  actions.  If  the  choice  be  wrong  and  vicious,  it  is  also  an 
 infallible  index  of  two  things — the  natural  act,  which  is  good  and 
 therefore  decreed,  and  a  principle  of  limitation  and  failure,  which 
 neither  is  nor  can  be  an  object  of  decree.  The  negative  principle 
 in  fallen  angels  and  men  is  intimately  connected  and  intermixed 
 with  moral  depravity,  yet  in  itself,  abstractedly  considered,  it  is  not 
 sinful,  biit  is  the  cause  of  all  sinfulness.  It  is  an  essential  property 
 of  creatures  in  every  state  of  their  existence,  and  therefore  cannot 
 be  in  itself  sinful ;  nor  is  it  possible  for  anything  sinful  to  be  the 
 origin  of  sin,  for  then  sin  would  be  the  origin  of  itself  or  self- 
 existent,  which  is  infinitely  absurd.  How  can  the  same  thing  be 
 both  before  and  after  itself  ? 
 
 Here  it  may  be  asked,  If  the  origin  of  moral  evU  be  not  itself 
 sinful,  why  may  not  God  be  its  origin  ?  The  reason  is  plain,  be- 
 cause God  is  absolute  perfection,  and  has  not  in  Him  a  principle 
 of  defection,  and  therefore  it  is  impossible  for  Him  to  impart  what 
 He  has  not.  He  can  no  more  impart  imperfection  than  He  can 
 impart  falsehood.  Why  is  He  a  God  that  cannot  lie  ?  Because 
 He  is  absolute  truth.  Why  caimot  He  impart  imperfection,  or 
 decree  sinfulness  ?  Because  He  is  absolute  goodness  and  holiness. 
 But  though  that  principle  which  is  the  origin  of  sin  is  not  sinful, 
 it  is  not  a  perfection  in  any  sense,  but  a  relative  defect.  This  is 
 its  real  character,  and  such  character  must  necessarily  be  the  origin 
 of  moral  evil  Were  it  sinful,  it  could  not  be  the  cause  of  sin,  for 
 this  would  be  absurdly  to  identify  the  cause  and  the  effect,  or 
 to  ascribe  to  imperfection  the  perfection  of  seK-existence.  And 
 were  it  a  perfection,  or  something  that  was  not  an  imperfection, 
 the  effect  would  be  contrary  to  the  tendency  of  its  cause,  which 
 would  be  to  subvert  the  first  principles  of  knowledge,  reason,  and 
 truth. 
 
 Moral  evil,  which  is  the  sinfulness  of  a  free  act,  is  a  defect,  a 
 failure  of  conformity  to  rectitude ;  and  therefore,  though  a  source 
 of  misery  to  the  subject  of  it,  (a  misery  generated  by  the  defect 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MORAL  EVIL.  133 
 
 itself,)  it  can  no  more  be  caused  by  the  Divine  wUl,  than  pure 
 nihility,  or  a  mathematical  point,  can  be  so  caused.  The  entity  of 
 the  free  act  is  indeed  effected  by  Divine  ■will  and  energy  operating 
 on  a  secondary  cause,  but  this  constitutes  no  part  of  its  defect,  its 
 failure  of  conformity,  or  sinfulness.  Thus  the  very  nature  of  sin 
 proves  that  the  Divine  wiU  neither  is,  nor  can  possibly  be,  the 
 caiise  of  it.  To  suppose  that  God  decrees,  or  any  way  wUls  a  de- 
 fect or  a  failure  of  perfection  of  any  kind,  is  even  more  absurd 
 than  to  suppose  that  He  decrees  mere  nihility ;  because  it  involves 
 more  absurd  consequences,  when  compared  with  His  declared  op- 
 position to  sin.  Though  He  counteracts  nihility  by  actual  creation, 
 and  providential  preservation,  it  is  no  object  of  blame  or  holy 
 hatred,  as  moral  evil  is. 
 
 As  the  point  under  discussion,  though  deep,  is  far  from  being  a 
 mere  speculation  which  has  no  practical  advantage,  but  has  an 
 extensive  influence  on  many  important  theological  subjects,  and 
 on  the  rational  ground  of  experimental  religion,  it  may  be  advan- 
 tageous to  view  it  in  different  lights.  StiU,  it  may  be  asked  by 
 some,  If  moral  evil  does  not  take  place  because  "  God  wills  it 
 should  be,"  whence  does  it  originate?  It  may  be  replied,  its 
 immediate  origination  is  a  moral  agent's  abuse  of  his  free-wUl,  or 
 of  his  will  acting  freely,  without  restraint  from  good,  or  constraint 
 to  evU.  But  the  question  still  returns.  What  is  the  ultimate  cause 
 of  that  abuse  ?  Every  one  must  allow  that,  as  an  effect,  it  must 
 have  some  cause,  some  adequate  reason  why  it  takes  place  in  a 
 moral  system,  and  it  must  be  further  allowed  that  this  cannot  be 
 chance,  or  absolute  contingence,  for  then  there  would  be  no 
 ground  of  its  being  foreknown.  To  foreknow  what  is  in  itself 
 uncertain  is  a  direct  contradiction,  and  a  contradictory  jjosition 
 cannot  be  an  object  of  foreknowledge,  because  it  cannot  be  an 
 object  of  any  knowledge,  except  as  a  falsehood.  To  attempt  an 
 evasion  of  this  argument  by  recurring  to  the  infinitude  of  the 
 Divine  knowledge  is  a  weak  subterfuge,  for  if  anything  be  in  itself 
 uncertain,  the  more  perfect  the  knowledge  is,  the  more  perfectly 
 it  is  known  to  be  uncertain.  What  is  contingent  with  respect  to 
 us  is  only  relatively  so,  because  our  knowledge  is  limited ;  but 
 with  respect  to  God,  whose  understanding  is  infinite,  there  is  no- 
 thing contingent, — that  is,  there  is  no  absolute  contingence  or  mere . 
 chance  in  the  nature  of  things.  There  must  therefore,  of  necessity, 
 be  an  origin  of  moral  evil  which  is  certainly  foreknown,  or  fore- 
 
134  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 known  as  a  certain  fact ;  and  it  has  been  proved  that  it  is  not, 
 and  that  it  cannot  possibly  be,  divinely  caused  ;  it  must  therefore 
 originate  in  the  creature,  and  in  something  of  which  he  is  the  sub- 
 ject which  is  not  an  object  of  Divine  causation. 
 
 It  may  still  be  objected,  Is  there  anything  in  a  creature,  as  such, 
 which  is  not  divinely  caused  ?  If  by  "  thing "  be  meant  what  has 
 positive  existence,  there  certainly  is  not;  but  in  another  sense  there 
 certainly  is,  otherwise  there  would  be  a  creature  without  any  rela- 
 tive defect,  compared  with  the  Creator.  If  he  has  no  defect  or 
 imperfection  of  any  kind,  then  the  Creator  and  the  creature  must 
 necessarily  be  identified.  Por  what  can  constitute  the  difference 
 between  a  caused  and  an  imcaused  being,  if  not  the  absolute  per- 
 fection of  the  latter,  and  the  comparative  imjjerfection  of  the 
 former?  And  this  comparative  imperfection  cannot  be  sinful, 
 otherwise  there  could  be  no  creature  without  .sin  ;  which  is  absurd 
 in  thought,  and  contrary  to  revealed  facts.  This  relative  defect, 
 which  constitutes  an  essential  difference  between  a  derived  and  an 
 underived  existence,  is  an  adequate  (and,  indeed,  the  only  possible) 
 origin  of  moral  evil ;  but  it  is,  however,  only  hypothetical,  that 
 is,  on  supposition  that  there  is  no  decreed  operation  of  a  contrary 
 prmciple  to  prevent  the  occurrence  of  moral  evil  as  a  consequence. 
 And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  God  actually  does,  in  millions  of 
 instances,  "  overcome  this  evil  with  good,"  in  preventing  the  in- 
 habitants of  this  world  from  being  worse  than  they  are.  That 
 interrogation,  "  Who  hath  made  thee  to  differ  from  another  ?"  is 
 full  of  important  meaning.  It  imjilies  a  strong  affirmation,  that 
 God  alone  makes  any  man  to  difler  for  the  better  from  another,  and 
 that  no  one  has  any  excellence,  either  natui-al  or  spiritual,  but  what 
 is  a  Divine  gift. .  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  agent  alone  makes 
 himself  to  differ  for  the  worse,  whether  from  others  or  from  his 
 former  self,  otherwise  he  could  not  be  the  object  of  Divine  dis- 
 pleasure and  blame.  It  is  not,  however,  the  cause  of  sin  that  is 
 the  object  of  blame  and  displeasure  in  the  exercise  of  holy  govern- 
 ment, but  the  sin  itself,  and  the  person  who  commits  it. 
 
 It  is  of  little  moment  by  what  words,  or  in  what  language, 
 this  essential  principle  is  expressed, — whether  by  passive  power, 
 (perhaps  the  most  significant  and  convenient  as  a  technical  term,) 
 comparative  irbperfection,  the  evil  of  imperfect  existence,  meta- 
 physical evil,  the  want  of  ulterior  perfection,  an  essential  tendency 
 to  defection,  &c., — the  thing  itself,  as  possessing  a  relative  influence 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOKAL  EVIL.  135 
 
 ill  the  demonstrations  of  moral  science,  is  absolutely  certain.  If 
 we  reject  it,  nothing  in  morality  can  possibly  be  the  subject  of 
 scientific  demonstration,  any  more  than  in  geometry  any  proposi- 
 tion can  be  demonstrated  if  we  reject  that  relative  nothing,  a 
 mathematical  point,  which  is  imiDlied  in  every  diagram.  But  if 
 we  admit  it,  there  is  nothing  imj)ortant  in  moral  science  but  is 
 capable  of  being  reduced  to  rigid  and  fair  demonstration.  It 
 should,  however,  be  carefully  remembered,  that  though  it  is  an 
 adequate  reason  of  the  event,  and  is  the  only  ultimate  origin  of 
 moral  evil  as  the  consequence,  it  is  suspended  on  this  condition — 
 "  If  the  all-sufficient  First  Cause  do  not  communicate  to  the  agent's 
 mind  a  supporting  holy  influence."  Grant  the  agent  (that  is,  a 
 created,  and,  therefore,  a  dependent  agent)  active  powers  and 
 freedom,  (that  is,  freedom  from  decretive  constraint  to  an  evil 
 choice,  and  from  restraint  as  to  a  good  choice,)  and  nothing  but 
 sovereign  or  arbitrary  goodness  can,  in  the  nature  of  things,  (that 
 is,  in  the  natiu-e  of  God  and  of  the  creature,)  prevent  the  conse- 
 quence— moral  evil.  What  an  argument  for  godly  fear,  profound 
 humility,  and  constant  dependence  on  God  all-sufficient  !  and  what 
 a  proof  of  our  need  of  gracious  influence  (even  abstracted  from  the 
 additional  consideration  of  our  sinful  apostasy)  to  keep  us  from 
 sin  !  and,  considered  as  apostate  creatures,  what  a  powerful  recom- 
 mendation of  a  life  of  prayer  and  the  gospel  system  of  salvation ! 
 
 First  Coroll. — Hence  we  may  see  that  a  decree  of  good  does 
 not  imply  a  decree  of  evil ;  predestination  to  life  does  not  imply 
 predestination  to  death ;  in  other  words,  that  a  decree  of  election 
 does  not  imply  a  decree  of  reprobation,  as  maintained  by  some  of 
 the  Eeformers.  The  17th  Article  of  the  Church  of  England  steers 
 clear  of  this  dangerous  rock. 
 
 Second  Coroll. — Since  aU  the  disputes  between  Calvinists  and 
 Arminians  are  founded  in  difiering  notions  about  the  Divine  decrees 
 and  free-will ;  and  since  these  differing  notions  are  thoroughly  re- 
 moved by  a  right  knowledge  of  the  origin  of  moral  evU,  which  is- 
 capable  of  demonstrative  evidence  ;  we  may  infer,  that  in  proportion 
 as  Calvinists  and  Ai-minians  are  capable  of  estimating  absolute  de- 
 monstration, their  disagreement  will  be  annLhilated,  and  that  no- 
 thing but  ignorance  and  prejudice  can  prevent  their  harmonious- 
 coalition.  0  happy  period,  when  all  God's  people  shall  "  see  eye  to 
 eye  ! "  Let  the  Calvinist,  from  full  conviction,  assure  his  opponent 
 that  God  decrees  only  good,  whether  natural,  moral,  or  spiritual,  but 
 
136  MOEAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 in  no  sense  whatever  decrees  or  any  way  wills  moral  evil ;  let  him 
 further  state,  that  the  origin  or  cause  of  moral  evil  is  in  the  crea- 
 ture, in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  neither  created  nor  wiUed  by  the 
 Author  of  our  being,  but  yet  is  inseparably  related  to  our  exist- 
 ence ;  and  let  him  further  insist  that  God  could,  if  He  saw  it  best, 
 prevent  by  His  grace  the  commission  of  sin,  in  every  possible  in- 
 stance, while  He  leaves  the  human  will  perfectly  free ;  and  that 
 to  Him  alone  we  should  look  for  assistance  to  enable  us  to  avoid 
 sin,  as  well  as  for  pardon  and  acceptance.  Firmly  persuaded  of 
 these  things,  on  the  clearest  ground  of  evidence,  let  him  invite  his 
 opponent  to  give  him  the  right  hand  of  fellowship.  If,  after  all, 
 the  Arniinian  draws  back,  he  must,  in  the  view  of  every  intelligent 
 mind,  appear  either  profoundly  ignorant  or  most  unreasonably 
 bigoted.  In  this  case,  though  not  blameless,  he  should  be  the 
 subject  of  pity  and  of  j)rayer. 
 
 MOBAL  EVIL — NEGATIVE  CAUSALITY. 
 
 The  phrase,  "  to  will  to  permit,"  could  never  have  obtained 
 cm-rency  among  either  moral,  theological,  or  metaphysical  writers, 
 had  they  duly  considered  the  subject  of  negative  causality — its 
 peculiar  nature,  its  relation  to  what  is  positive,  and  its  appropriate 
 consequences.  By  "  causality  "  is  meant,  an  adequate  reason  for  a 
 certain,  as  opposed  to  a  mere  probable  consequence ;  which  cau- 
 sality, it  is  maintained,  may  be  negative  as  well  as  positive,  passive 
 as  weU  as  active.  A  positive  and  active  causation  must  be  from 
 the  Pirst  Cause,  but  not  that  which  is  negative  and  passive.  That 
 the  latter  is  connected  with  consequences  which  are  infallibly 
 certain,  will  be  shewn  in  the  course  of  this  discussion,  which  is  in- 
 tended to  vindicate  the  Divine  character  and  government  from  un- 
 deserved imputations. 
 
 The  word  "  permit  "  must  either  include  an  act  of  the  will  or 
 not  include  it.  If  the  former,  to  will  to  permit  must  be  "  to  will 
 to  will "  something,  or  to  will  some  act  of  the  will  If  it  be  said 
 that  the  phrase  means  a  will  in  general  to  exercise  some  other  will 
 in  particular,  it  is  replied  that  this  does  not  constitute  any  differ- 
 ence of  will,  except  as  one  thing  is  subservient  to  another  in  the 
 series  of  decrees.  But  a  little  consideration  ^vill  shew  the  impro- 
 priety of  apj)lying  the  word  in  this  manner.  The  Divine  decrees 
 must  necessarily  be  direct  or  indirect  as  there  is  no  medium  ;  and 
 
DISS.  XI.]  *  MOEAL  EVIL.  137 
 
 the  fonner  mu.st  be  of  those  objects  which  are  excellent  for  their 
 own  sake,  but  the  latter  must  be  made  respecting  objects  for  the 
 sake  of  something  else  which  is  excellent.  Nothing  can  be  the 
 object  of  a  direct  decree  but  what  terminates  in  God,  as  well  as 
 emanates  from  Him  in  a  direct  manner,  as  goodness,  holiness, 
 truth,  &c. ;  and  nothing  can  be  an  object  of  an  indirect  decree — as 
 the  creation  of  a  material  world,  the  appointment  of  its  laws,  &c. — 
 but  what  terminates  in  Him  in  an  indirect  manner  as  subservient 
 to  the  other.  For  "  of  Him,  and  through  Him,  and  to  Him  are  all 
 things  "  decreed  by  Him.  Thus  far  most  agree.  But  the  word 
 "permit,"  in  reference  to  moral  evil,  cannot  mean,  in  any  con- 
 sistency of  language  or  thought,  even  an  indirect  decree  or  will ; 
 for  it  would  involve  a  decree  of  opposite  objects,  and  thereby 
 contradictory  causations.  God  decrees  the  holiness  of  His  crea- 
 tures in  order  to  their  happiness,  and  their  happiness  for  His  own 
 glory.  But  were  we  to  say  that  He  decrees  the  creature's  com- 
 parative defect  for  the  sake  of  his  moral  failure,  and  the  latter 
 for  the  sake  of  shewing  His  justice.  He  must,  on  that  supposition, 
 decree  opposite  things,  and  thereby  put  the  stamp  of  approbation 
 upon  the  evil  as  well  as  upon  the  good.  To  say  that  sin  is  willed 
 for  the  sake  of  good  does  not  mend  the  matter ;  for  still,  on  the 
 supposition,  it  would  be  willed,  and  consequently  decreed,  as  a 
 contrary  object.  That  an  inferior  good  should  be  willed,  in  sub- 
 serviency to  another  superior,  is  very  just ;  and  that  the  laws  of 
 nature,  which  are  good,  should  be  the  occasion  of  harm  to  indi- 
 viduals is  not  unworthy  of  the  holy  Author  of  those  laws ;  but 
 moral  evil  stands  directly  opposed  to  His  rectitude  and  infinitely 
 holy  nature.  According  to  the  doctrine  here  controverted,  God 
 would  be  the  fountain  of  good  and  evil  alike,  and  he  who  commits 
 a  ,sin  may  as  justly  ascribe  it  to  God  ultimately  as  another  may 
 ascribe  to  Him  the  goodness  of  his  deeds.  If  the  latter  is  called 
 to  exercise  gratitude,  the  former  is  entitled  to  plead  exculpation. 
 Nor  is  it  sufficient  to  say  that  the  sinner  aims  at  an  end  in  trans- 
 gressing different  from  that  which  God  aims  at;  for,  on  the 
 hypothesis,  his  circumstances,  without  one  exception,  are  decreed 
 from  whence  the  sin  arises,  and,  indeed,  the  very  existence  of  sin 
 must  proceed  from  the  Divine  will.  But  that  the  sinner  should 
 be  blamed  for  doing  what  was  decreed  to  be  done,  including  his 
 defects, — the  ground  of  fallibility, — whence  proceed  his  wrong 
 ends  in  sinning,  is  to  subvert  all -proper  ideas  of  justice,  right  and 
 
138  JIOEAL  EVIL.  [diss.  XI. 
 
 wrong,  good  and  evil.  Some  wiU  aUow  that  the  diiScidties  ■which 
 their  hypothesis  involves  are  iaexplicable, — at  least,  by  our  con- 
 tracted miuds  in  the  present  state, — but  yet  hold  that  we  are 
 forced  to  determine  thus,  in  order  to  avoid  still  greater  difficulties ; 
 for,  say  they,  we  must  either  adopt  this  plan  or  deny  God's  fore- 
 knowledge. But  this  is  a  hasty  and  Ulegitimate  inference,  and 
 which  is  owing,  as  before  intimated,  to  the  want  of  properly 
 ascertaining  the  doctrine  of  negative  causality.  If  this  be  over- 
 looked, embarrassments  wiU  be  sure  to  follow,  nor  can  the  most 
 subtle  penetration  be  of  any  avail  to  effect  a  disentanglement 
 This  oversight  is  the  cause  why  many  anxious  inquirers  after 
 truth  have  met  with  a  mortifying  disappoiatment  in  endeavouring 
 to  reconcile  what  otherwise  is  demonstrably  irreconcilable  ;  and 
 this  is  the  reason  why  many  have  di-awn  back  with  disgust  from 
 a  science  with  which,  the  more  they  viewed  it,  the  more  they  were 
 perplexed.  They  neglected,  or  did  not  sufficiently  perceive,  the 
 only  principle  by  which  the  greatest  difficulties  in  moral  science 
 may  be  satisfactorily  explained,  and  by  the  aid  of  which  some  of 
 the  most  important  truths  [principles  ?]  of  revealed  religion  which 
 appear  to  clash  may  assume  a  beautiful  consistency,  and  may  be 
 shewn  to  be  founded  in  eternal  truth.  Faith,  indeed,  may  live  and 
 even  triumph  without  a  scientific  knowledge  of  its  objects  ;  but  it 
 may  gTow  stronger,  and  triumph  still  more,  {ctBteris  paribus^  in 
 the  front  of  daring  opposition,  or  when  insidiously  attacked  by  the 
 "  opposition  of  science,"  falsely  so  called,  when  possessed  of  de- 
 monstrative evidence  of  the  harmony  of  Divine  perfections  and  of 
 truths  which  depend  on  that  harmony.  But  before  we  come  to 
 state  'and  illustrate  more  particularly  the  principle  in  question, 
 we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  other  idea  included  in  the  term 
 "  permit." 
 
 If  the  phrase,  "  to  will  to  permit,"  cannot  mean  "  to  wUl  to  will," 
 or  "to  win  to  decree,"  an  act  of  the  wUl  is  not  included  in  the 
 term  "  permit."  And  this  exclusion  of  an  act  of  will,  undoubtedly, 
 enters  into  its  only  justifiable  acceptation  in  reference  to  the  pre- 
 sent subject.  To  permit,  is  not  to  hinder  what  has,  or  appears  to 
 have  a  tendency  to  take  place.  To  wUl  to  hinder,  to  prevent,  to 
 oppose,  to  counteract,  or  to  eflect  anything,  is  strictly  proper,  when 
 a  contrary  eifect  or  tendency  of  any  kind  is  implied.  But  to  will 
 to  hinder  a  dead  man  from  walking  is  nonsense.  When  a  person 
 has  an  inclination  or  a  tendency  of  any  kind,  and  when  it  is  in 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MORAL  EVIL.  139 
 
 the  power  of  another  to  hinder  its  operation,  but  does  not  hinder, 
 it  is  proper  to  say  he  permits  it ;  that  is,  he  does  not  wUl  the  con- 
 trary. An  exercise  of  will  is  both  useless  and  unmeaning  where 
 only  to  permit  is  intended ;  for  the  event  is  supposed  to  take 
 place  if  not  prevented.  For  one  man  to  permit  another  to  do  a 
 good  or  a  bad  action,  when  it  is  in  his  power  to  prevent  it,  is 
 good  sense ;  because  it  implies  an  inclination  in  the  person  per- 
 mitted. But  why  is  it  improper  to  say  that  God  permits  a  man 
 to  do  his  duty?  It  is  because  He  neither  would,  nor  could, 
 do  it  by  mere  permission.  If  permission  imjilied  an  act  of  will, 
 there  would  be  no  impropriety  in  a  language  which  yet  all  allow  to 
 be  absurd — viz.,  that  God  permits  a  man  to  be  good !  But  to  per- 
 mit evil  is  good  sense,  and  approved  language.  Why  ?  Because 
 no  exercise  of  will  on  the  part  of  the  permitter  is  required ;  or 
 because  it  is  implied  that  it  would  take  place  if  not  prevented. 
 To  decree  the  continued  existence  of  the  world  in  its  present  form 
 for  a  given  time,  expresses  a  clear  and  consistent  idea  ;  but  to  say 
 that  God  has  decreed  that  He  will  not  do  the  contrary  during  the 
 same  period,  is  unmeaning  language.  When  a  declaration  is  made 
 that  God  will  not  do  a  thing,  as  drowning  the  earth  with  another 
 deluge,  &c.,  the  plain  meaning  is,  that  it  expresses  the  non- 
 existence of  an  imagined  event.  But  the  non-existence  of  an 
 imagined  event  no  more  implies  a  decree  concerning  it,  than  does 
 the  non-existence  of  other  imagined  worlds,  or  another  fancied  First 
 Cause.-  To  prevent  implies  will  in  counteracting  the  intended 
 effect,  but  to  permit  is  not  to  will  the  counteraction.  Therefore 
 "  to  will  to  permit "  is  the  same  thing  as  "  to  will  not  to  wUl," 
 which  both  in  meaning  and  in  language  is  alike  indefensible. 
 And  when  we  say  that  God  permits  moral  evil,  if  we  have  any 
 consistent  meaning,  it  must  intend  that  He  does  not  will  to  hin- 
 der it,  except  in  a  legislative  sense  ;  and  if  so,  what  possible  room 
 is  there  left  for  any  exercise  of  will  in  permission  ?  Infinite  per- 
 fection forbids  it.  Man,  indeed,  may  determine  not  to  do  a  thing ; 
 but  this  must  refer  either  to  a  former  intention  of  doing  that  thing, 
 which  now  is  altered,  or  to  some  expectation  of  the  contrary.  But 
 nothing  of  this  kind  can  belong  to  God,  who  "  is  of  one  mind." 
 
 Can  any  sin  then  take  place  without  God's  will  and  concurrence  ? 
 It  is  replied,  if  by  "  sin "  be  meant  the  act  of  the  sinner  in  its 
 concrete  form,  the  Divine  will  and  concurrence  are  implied.  But 
 we  should  remember  that  in  every  act,  however  morally  evil,  there 
 
liO  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XL 
 
 is,  and  necessarily  must  be,  a  natural  good  included.  The  natural 
 powers  and  energy  of  the  mind  are  of  that  quality  proceeding  from 
 the  Divine  will,  and  without  which  there  could  be  no  moral  act 
 either  good  or  bad.  But  the  sinfulness  of  the  act  (which  is  often 
 expressed  by  the  shorter  word  "  sin  ")  cannot  possibly,  except  from 
 some  defect,  which  therefore  must  be  a  negative  cause,  and  which 
 no  more  needs  the  Divine  wUl  for  its  production  than  does  mere 
 nihility  need  it.  The  idea  of  perfection  and  of  mU  is  positive ; 
 but  that  of  imperfection  and  of  permission  is  negative.  And  as 
 perfection  admits  of  degTces,  considered  as  existing  in  creature.s,  so 
 does  the  want  of  perfection.  The  former  is  the  effect  of  Divine 
 will,  but  the  latter  needs  no  will,  nor  can  admit  any.  Nay,  for  a 
 creatm-e  to  exist  without  any  want  of  perfection  is  the  same  as  a 
 self-sufficient  creature,  (for  then  alone  could  he  be  without  imper- 
 fection,) which  is  infinitely  absitrd. 
 
 We  may  further  observe,  that  if  there  were  nothing  good  in 
 an  act  concretively  sinful,  no  evil  could  attach  to  such  act ;  for 
 what  is  moral  e^H,  if  not  the  perversion  of  that  which  is  naturally 
 good  ?  If  the  natural  powers  and  their  acts,  abstractedly  con- 
 sidered, were  not  in  themselves  good,  moral  evil  would  be  impos- 
 sible. And  were  there  no  negative  cause,  or  some  kind  of  defect 
 in  the  agent,  all  his  acts  would  be  morally,  as  well  as  physically 
 good,  and  that  infallibly,  as  those  of  the  absolutely  perfect  Being. 
 In  the  Deity  there  is  no  defect  of  any  kind,  nor  any  negative  cause 
 of  any  effects  or  consequences ;  and,  therefore,  no  liability  to  moral 
 e^il. 
 
 But  how  can  we  conceive  of  a  negative  cause  affording  a  de- 
 monstration of  an  infaUible  consequence  ?  Is  there  anything 
 analogous  to  it  in  the  nature  of  things  ?  And  if  there  be,  what 
 importance  can  be  attached  to  it  ?  Let  us  cooUy  endeavotir  to 
 fiiruish  a  reply  to  these  questions.  We  can  easily  conceive  of  a 
 mathematical  point,  and  it  is  universally  allowed  that  it  has  no 
 dimensions, — it  has  neither  length,  breadth,  nor  thickness, — and 
 therefore  is  a  negative  idea.  It  implies  a  negation  of  everything 
 that  has  positive  existence.  It  is  therefore  pure  nihility  under  a 
 relative  consideration.  But  though  in  itself  it  is  nothing  positive, 
 yet  that  nothing,  when  it  stands  related  to  a  Hue  which  has  posi- 
 tive length,  becomes  a  source  of  innumerable  demonstrations. 
 For,  if  we  take  into  the  account,  together  with  a  point,  a  circum- 
 ference and  equal  radii,  we  have  the  positive  idea  of  a  circle,  com- 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL,  141 
 
 pcsed  of  a  centre  and  circumference.  And  without  this  relation 
 subsisting  between  a  relative  nothing  and  a  positive  something, 
 the  idea  of  a  circle  is  not  possible ;  and,  consequently,  the  ideas  of 
 the  properties  of  a  circle  (which  are  innumerable)  are  absolute  im- 
 possibilities. iSo  nearly  allied,  and  so  perfectly  similar,  are  the 
 very  first  principles  of  geometrical  and  metaphysical  science.  For 
 as  without  the  negative  idea  of  a  mathematical  point,  (for  points 
 are  the  boundaries  of  lines,)  constituting  an  adequate  reason  of  an 
 infallible  consequence,  not  a  single  demonstration  in  geometry  can 
 be  effected  ;  so  without  the  negative  idea  of  passive  power,  as  the 
 oijposite  to  that  power  wliich  is  active  and  positive,  not  one  demon- 
 stration, properly  so  called,  can  be  effected  in  metaphysical  and 
 moral  science.  This  may  appear  to  some  a  bold  assertion,  but  it 
 is  not  more  bold  than  true.  He  who  would  dispute  the  fact,  may 
 just  as  well  dispute  the  truth  of  the  very  first  definition  in  geo- 
 metrical science — viz.,  that  of  a  point.  He  may  indeed  raise 
 objections,  and  plead  that  we  can  see  a  point,  and  therefore  it  must 
 have  some  dimensions  ;  or  if  it  be  nothing,  it  can  be  no  cause,  no 
 adequate  reason  of  anything  as  a  consequence,  &c.  But  if  he  at- 
 tempt seriously  to  vindicate  his  objections  by  argument,  he  cannot 
 avoid  shewing  himself  perfectly  ridiculous  to  those  who  under- 
 stand the  subject.  And  equally  ridiculous  must  he  ajDpear  who 
 would  attempt  to  disprove  the  fact  of  negative  causation  in  moral 
 science. 
 
 But  how  can  we  admit  that  there  may  be  two  co-existent  causes 
 in  the  same  subject,  one  positive  and  the  other  negative?  We. are 
 obliged  to  admit  it  from  a  due  consideration  of  stubborn  facts. 
 For  what  fact  can  be  more  plain,  than  that  from  the  same  agent 
 may,  and  actually  do,  proceed  effects,  virtue  and  vice,  which  are 
 diametrically  opposite  to  each  other  ?  And  surely  such  effects 
 must  proceed  from  opposite  causes.  If,  therefore,  virtue  proceeds 
 from  a  positive  cause,  as  all  must  allow,  vice  must  proceed  from  a 
 negative  causality.  This  evidence  is  demonstrative.  Yet  the  in- 
 quisitive may  ask,  Is  there  any  phenomenon  in  the  nature  of  things 
 analogous  to  this?  Though  an  answer  to  this  question  is  not 
 necessary  to  the  end  of  establishing  the  fact,  it  may  serve,  ex 
 ahmdanti,  for  illustration.  For  this  purpose,  then,  we  may  appeal 
 to  a  mathematical  line  which  has  positive  length,  with  a  negation 
 of  breadth ;  and  without  this  negative  causality  no  geometrical 
 demonstration  can  be  established.     And  the  same  may  be  said  of 
 
142  MOEAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 a  plane  superficies,  the  boundaries  of  which  are  lines.  Thus,  a 
 negative  causality  enters  into  every  geometrical  demonstration,  in 
 conjunction  vdih  what  is  positive  But  the  reader  should  keep  in 
 mind  that  these  instances  are  adduced  for  illustration,  not  pro- 
 fessed proofs  of  the  doctrine.  The  latter  is  founded  on  direct 
 evidence  from  the  very  nature  of  God  and  that  of  a  creature. 
 
 That  a  comparative  defect  is  a  negative  cause,  in  the  sense  be- 
 fore explained,  is  evident,  when  we  consider,  (as  before  intimated,) 
 that  in  no  creature  can  it  be  found  without  a  comparative  good 
 conjoined  with  it ;  and  that  in  free  agents  this  good,  which  con- 
 sists chiefly  in  the  natural  intellect  and  will,  is  capable  of  opposite 
 directions — one  conformable  to  rectitude,  and  another  opposed  to 
 it.  Now,  it  is  clearly  impossible  that  these  directions — one  for 
 the  chief  good,  and  the  other  against  it — should  proceed  from  the 
 same  cause,  whether  good  or  bad.  The  direction  of  the  wUl  to- 
 wards rectitude  cannot  be  caused  by  defect,  any  more  than  some- 
 thing positive  can  proceed  from  nihility.  Nor  can  the  direction 
 of  the  wlU  against  rectitude  be  caused  by  perfection  of  any  kind 
 or  degree.  But  intellect  and  will  in  aU  beings,  whether  original  or 
 derived,  are  perfections,  and  therefore  cannot  be  the  cause  of  a 
 direction  against  perfection ;  for  then  there  would  be  a  cause  re- 
 pugnant to  itseK,  which  is  impossible.  The  wrong  choice,  there- 
 fore, which  is  a  wrong  direction  of  the  will,  must  proceed  from  a 
 negative  cause,  for  in  causes  there  is  no  medium  between  positive 
 and  negative. 
 
 But  though  infinite  perfection  cannot  be  the  cause  of  imperfec- 
 tions of  any  kind  or  degi-ee,  for  reasons  which  have  been  already 
 adduced,  yet  perfection  aflbrds  occasion,  an  innocent  occasion,  for 
 imperfection  to  shew  itself  by  way  of  contrast.  Thus,  if  absolute 
 perfection  were  to  produce  no  creature,  no  occasion  would  be 
 alforded  for  comparative  imperfection  to  shew  itself;  and  without 
 the  latter,  moral  evil  would  be  impossible.  The  inference,  there- 
 fore, is  irrefragable,  that  moral  evU  originates  from  a  negative 
 causality,  or  that  defect  in  the  agent  which  is  the  want  of  ulterior 
 perfection.  Yet  here  it  may  be  proper  to  add,  as  of  the  utmost 
 importance  to  be  taken  into  the  account,  that  though  eflects  may 
 proceed  from  negative  causes  as  weU  as  from  positive,  and  with 
 equal  certainty,  yet  there  is  this  important  diS'erence — the  for- 
 mer is  only  hypothetical,  the  latter  absolute,  originally  considered. 
 The  Pirst  Cause  is  positive  existence  independent  of  will,  and  nn- 
 
DISS.  XT.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  143 
 
 conditional,  and  every  other  positive  cause  must  emanate  from  the 
 First  Will ;  but  a  negative  cause,  consisting  in  defect,  cannot  pos- 
 sibly take  place,  with  respect  to  causality,  but  on  conditions — 
 viz.,  the  condition  of-  a  created  nature,  and  that  of  permission,  in 
 the  explained  sense  of  the  word.  A  positive  cause  may  counter- 
 act the  tendency  of  a  negative  one,  but  not  vice  versa. 
 
 Hence  is  derived  the  proper  notion  of  permitting  moral  evil  to 
 take  place ;  the  negative  cause  is  not  hindered  from  taking  effect, 
 for  reasons  infinitely  good  and  wise.  But  to  represent  this  per- 
 mission or  sufferance  as  willing  or  decreeing  the  negative  as  well 
 as  the  positive  part  of  sin,  is  an  infinite  absurdity  ;  for  the  sinful- 
 ness of  an  act  being  the  direct  opposite  to  infinite  perfection,  such 
 representation  makes  infinite  perfection  to  oppose  itself.  Thus 
 all  good  in  every  kind  and  degree,  every  quantum  of  created 
 nature,  from  the  greatest  to  the  least,  together  with  all  positive 
 and  active  causality,  are  from  God.  "  He  is  light,"  knowledge, 
 and  purity,  "and  with  him  is  no  darkness  at  all," — no  ignorance, 
 no  want  of  hohness.  And  thus,  also,  all  moral  evU  proceeds  from 
 the  offender,  who  is  the  subject  at  once  of  a  quantum  of  derived, 
 and  therefore  limited  perfection,  and  of  comparative  defect.  And 
 these  two  things  (perfection  and  defect)  enter  into  the  very  notion 
 of  a  created  nature. 
 
 Is  it  necessary  to  say  anything  more  in  confirmation  of  the 
 general  theorem,  That  there  is  in  the  human  mind  a  negative 
 causality,  from  whence  may  flow  a  certainty  of  consequence  ?  It 
 may  tend  to  the  further  satisfaction  of  the  reader  if  we  advert  to 
 another  argument  founded  on  free-will.  The  term  will  designates 
 a  power  of  the  mind  which  is  positive  and  active ;  but  the  term 
 free,  connected  with  it,  expresses  a  negative  idea,  for  it  expresses, 
 when  properly  used,  the  absence  of  coercion  and  restraint,  but  in 
 different  respects.  The  complex  idea  of  free-iuill  is  resolved 
 into  this  plain  proposition.  The  will  is  free  ;  that  is,  the  will  is 
 not  constrained  in  one  respect,  and  is  not  restrained  in  another. 
 It  is  neither  decretively  constrained  to  evU,  nor  decretively  re- 
 strained from  good.  No  other  freedom  can  be  predicated  of  the 
 will  as  the  cause  of  moral  effects ;  and  it  is  as  much  a  relative 
 nothing  as  a  mathematical  point.  We  may,  therefore,  safely 
 affu-m,  that  among  the  countless  millions  of  moral  effects  which 
 take  place,  not  only  among  men,  but  also  in  the  created  universe 
 of  free  agents,  there  is  not  one  but  what  is  beholden  to  a  negative 
 
Hi  MORAL  EVIL.  [diss.  XL 
 
 causaKty  for  its  existence,  in  connexion  with  what  is  positive ;  f or 
 if  freedom  be  excluded,  no  act  can  have  a  moral  quality. 
 
 To  conclude  this  discussion,  which  has  already  exceeded  the  limits 
 first  intended,  we  must  observe  once  more,  and  it  cannot  be  too 
 strongly  inculcated,  that  there  is  no  case  or  circumstance  in  which 
 moral  evil  might  not  be  prevented  by  the  su23reme  will,  were  it 
 employed  for  that  purpose.  For  as  God  is  all-siifficient,  and  as 
 His  control  over  His  creatures  for  their  good  is  absolute,  His 
 power  to  effect  a  prevention  of  moral  evil  is  undoubted.  Nor  can 
 there  be  any  question  that  this  power,  in  pursuance  of  Divine 
 decrees,  does  in  fact,  and  in  instances  which  to  us  are  inconceiv- 
 ably numerous,  counteract  the  tendencies  of  negative  causes  to 
 prevent  moral  evil.  But  if  it  be  inquired,  why  in  any  instances  it 
 is  permitted  to  take  place  when  God  might  with  infinite  ease  pre- 
 vent it,  it  is  sufficient  here  to  say,  that  God  is  infinitely  wise  as 
 well  as  powerful,  and  equitable  as  benevolent.  But  a  further 
 answer  to  this  inquiry  would  lead  us  to  consider  the  ultimate  rea- 
 sons of  moral  government,  or  why  a  moral  system  is  at  all  estab- 
 lished ;  and  the  question  has  been  discussed  in  the  first  volume 
 of  President  Edwards's  works,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred. 
 
 First  Gorol. — Negative  causahty,  in  connexion  with  what  is 
 positive,  is  an  essential  principle  of  moral  science.  If  either  be 
 excluded,  we  can  have  no  clear  and  adequate  idea  of  any  moral 
 act,  much  less  a  demonstration  of  its  cause. 
 
 Second  Corol. — These  two  principles,  relatively  coimected,  fur- 
 nish us  with  sufiicient  data,  and  the  only  sufficient  ones  for  a 
 demonstrative  solution  of  this  problem — What  is  the  origin  of 
 moral  evil  ? 
 
 Third  Corol. — In  these  principles  we  have  the  means  of  demon- 
 strating the  origin  of  all  evil  whatever,  as  weU  as  of  all  good. 
 
 Fourth  Corol. — We  may  further  infer,  that  Mr  Locke  was  not 
 mistaken  when  he  said,  "  I  am  bold  to  think  that  morality  is  capa- 
 ble of  demonstration,  as  well  as  mathematics,"  (Essay,  book  iii., 
 chap.  XL,  §  16.)  And  again,  "The  idea  of  a  Supreme  Being,  in- 
 finite in  power,  goodness  and  wisdom,  whose  workmanship  we  are, 
 and  on  whom  we  depend ;  and  the  idea  of  ourselves  as  under- 
 standing, rational  beings,  being  such  as  are  clear  in  us,  would,  I 
 suppose,  if  duly  considered  and  pursued,  afford  such  foundations 
 as  might  place  morality  among  the  sciences  capable  of  demonstra- 
 tion ;  wherein  I  doubt  not,  but  from  self-evident  propositions,  by 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  14-5 
 
 necessary  consequences  as  incontestable  as  those  in  mathematics, 
 the  measures  of  right  and  wrong  might  be  made  out  to  any  one 
 that  will  ap2Dly  himself  with  the  same  indifferency  and  attention 
 to  the  one  as  he  does  to  the  other  of  these  sciences,"  (Book  iv., 
 chap,  iii.,  §  18.)  Once  more,  "This  gave  me  the  confidence  to 
 advance  that  conjecture  which  I  suggested  (chap,  iii.) — viz.,  that 
 morality  is  capable  of  demonstration,  as  well  as  mathematics. 
 And  I  doubt  not  but  if  a  right  method  were  taken,  a  gi'eat  part 
 of  morality  might  be  made  out  with  that  clearness,  that  could 
 leave,  to  a  considering  man,  no  more  reason  to  doubt,  than  he 
 could  have  to  doubt  of  the  truth  of  propositions  in  mathematics 
 which  have  been  demonstrated  to  him,"  (Book  iv,  chap,  xii.,  §  8.) 
 
 Fifth  Corol. — As  geometrical  evidence  proceeds  upon  the  suppo- 
 sition of  points,  Unes,  angles,  &c.,  and  the  province  of  the  demon- 
 stration is  to  shew  the  consequence  resulting  from  the  supposition  ; 
 so  the  above-stated  principles  afibrd  the  means  of  demonstrating 
 moral  consequences,  on  the  supposition  of  effects  being  given  to 
 shew  their  necessary  causes,  or  of  causes  being  given  to  shew  their 
 necessary  effects.  If  the  quantum  of  moral  good,  or  of  moral  evil, 
 in  any  given  act  be  supposed,  the  business  of  a  demonstration  is 
 to  shew  the  relative  proportion  it  bears  to  its  appropriate  cause  or 
 causes ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  quantum  of  causal  influence 
 be  supposed,  to  shew,  as  a  demonstrative  consequence,  the  nature 
 and  relative  proportion  of  moral  good  or  evil  in  the  act.  This  is 
 the  true  province  of  moral  science,  as  contradistinguished  from 
 conjectural  observations  and  a  set  of  rules.  These,  in  their  proper 
 place  have  an  important  use  for  the  purpose  of  moral  conduct ; 
 but  they  can  by  no  means  furnish  data  for  scientific  knowledge. 
 
 Sixth  Corol. — There  is  one  inference  more  that  must  not  be 
 omitted — viz.,  That  the  true  principles  and  demonstrative  conse- 
 quences of  moral  science  are  incomparably  more  important  in 
 themselves,  and  ought  to  be  more  interesting  to  all  mankind  than 
 any  others,  because  they  lead  us  in  a  more  direct  manner  than  any 
 others  to  the  knowledge  of  God  and  ourselves.  They  point  out  to  us 
 at  once  the  sources  of  good  and  evil,  happiness  and  misery ;  they 
 afford  motives  for  devout  affections  of  the  noblest  kind  ;  and  in  pro- 
 portion as  they  are  properly  applied,  they  stimulate  to  the  practice 
 of  the  sublimest  vktues,  and  the  most  circumspect  conduct.  With- 
 out a  Divine  revelation,  indeed,  it  is  highly  probable,  that  the  true 
 principles  and  relations  of  moral  science  could  never  have  been  dis- 
 
 VOL.  IV.  K 
 
146  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 covered  by  mankind ;  but  that  circumstance,  while  it  has  no  ten- 
 dency to  depreciate  the  evidence,  demand.s  our  gratitude  to  Him 
 who  is  the  only  source  of  "  every  good  and  every  perfect  gift." 
 
 MOKAL  EVIL — THE  FEDERAL  CHAEACTEE  OF  ADAM. 
 
 1.  It  is  probably  more  philosophical,  as  well  as  more  intelligible, 
 in  describing  the  two  kinds  of  principles  possessed  by  Adam,  to 
 say  that  the  infei'ior  ones  were  those  faculties  in  man  which  con- 
 stituted him  a  moral  agent ;  rather  than  calling  them  "  the  prin- 
 ciples of  mere  human  nature."  The  superior  ones  are  very 
 accurately  described,  by  calling  them  "  supernatural  principles  ; " 
 yet  they  may  more  properly  be  termed  Divine,  benevolent, 
 sovereign  influence  superadded  to  those  faculties  which  constituted 
 Adam  a  moral  agent.  This  representation  leads  to  the  essential 
 relations  that  subsist  between  God  and  His  creature  man.  "  Mere 
 human  nature "  and  "  supernatural  principles "  convey  no  dis- 
 tinctive character  of  relation.  "Faculties  which  constitute  a 
 moral  agent ''  express  the  ground  of  relation  between  equity  in 
 God  and  accountableness  in  man  ;  and  "  benevolent  influences " 
 express  the  ground  of  relation  between  sovereignty  in  God  and 
 forgiveness  in  man. 
 
 2.  That  Adam  had  siich  qualifications  or  faculties  as  rendered 
 him  a  moral  agent  independently  of  his  spiritual  knowledge,  right- 
 eousness, holiness,  dominion,  honour,  and  glory, — in  other  words, 
 his  Divine  light,  holy  Ufe,  and  supreme  love  to  God, — is  self- 
 evident.  For  after  he  had  losl  these  excellences,  he  confessedly 
 was  no  less  a  moral  agent,  and  accountable  to  his  Divine  Governor 
 and  Judge  for  his  temper,  thoughts,  desires,  words,  and  works  than 
 he  was  before  he  lost  them. 
 
 3.  The  philosophical  cause,  or  the  true  origin  of  Adam's  defec- 
 tion was  his  liberty,  in  iinion  with  passive  power.  For  an  explana- 
 tion of  these  terms  and  the  proof  of  the  proposition  just  laid  down, 
 we  must  refer  the  reader  to  the  preceding  discussion,  where  the 
 subject  is  professedly  treated. 
 
 4.  The  true  and  idtimate  cause  of  the  first  sin  of  Adam,  of  all 
 his  subsequent  sins,  and  those  of  his  posterity,  whether  infants  or 
 adults,  is  not  essentially  difierent.  If  the  principles,  as  President 
 Edwards  calls  them,  or  the  faculties  and  qualifications  which 
 constitute  moral  agency  and  accountability,  be  left  to  themselves. 
 
DISS.  XI,]  MOEAL  EVIL.  147 
 
 ■whereby  they  become  influenced  by  passive  power,  not  counter- 
 acted by  sovereign,  benevolent,  or  holy  Divine  influence,  the  eflect 
 will  be  the  same,  though  attended  with  difi'erent  circumstances. 
 
 5.  When  the  cause  of  Adam's  integrity,  perfection,  sp)irituality, 
 and  happiness  in  his  paradisaical  life  was  no  longer  operative  for 
 his  j)reservation,  defection  ensued  ;  which  consisted  in  the  loss  of 
 the  chief  good,  together  with  that  disorder,  confusion,  and  con- 
 scious exposedness  to  a  continuance  in  that  state,  whereby  happi- 
 ness was  necessarily  exchanged  for  a  restless  uneasiness  called 
 misery. 
 
 6.  This  was  the  case  of  Adam  in  his  own  person.  But  Pre- 
 sident Edwards  (see  Works,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  342-364)  excellently 
 shews  that  Adam  and  all  his  posterity  were  strictly  one.  This 
 union  we  may  call  a  systematic  whole.  For  mankind,  or  the 
 whole  race  of  man,  has  a  constituted  connexion  no  less  than  a 
 seed  with  its  plant ;  for  instance,  the  acorn  with  the  oak  plant, 
 and  that  with  its  future  branches.  We  justly  called  it  the  same 
 tree  from  the  time  it  was  planted  to  its  utmost  longevity,  though 
 some  of  its  branches  came  into  existence  a  hundred  years  or  more 
 after  the  first  shoot.  This  union  of  Adam  with  his  posterity  is 
 no  less  a  constituted  union  than  that  which  connects  the  solar 
 system  or  any  other  systematic  whole,  as  an  animal  body,  which  is 
 regarded  as  one  from  its  birth  till  its  death.  For  instance, 
 nothing  but  a  constitution  founded  in  the  sovereign  pleasure  of 
 God  caused  the  body  of  Methuselah  to  be  the  same,  regarded  as 
 the  same,  when  in  infancy  and  above  nine  hundred  years  after. 
 The  parts  of  his  body,  at  least  most  of  them,  were  as  different  in 
 old  age  compared  with  his  infancy,  as  any  of  his  posterity  are 
 different  from  Adam.  In  each  case  alike,  the  aj)pqintment  of 
 God  in  forming  a  course  of  nature,  or  His  operations  according  to 
 a  constituted  plan,  could  make  the  body  of  Methuselah  to  be  the 
 same  body  from  the  first  to  the  last,  and  the  posterity  of  Adam 
 the  same  with  himself. 
 
 7.  In  every  vital  system  there  is  a  vital  part ;  and  in  every 
 system  as  such  one  part  is  more  essential  than  another.  Adam 
 was  the  vital  part  of  the  system  of  mankind— the  root  of  the  tree, 
 the  foundation  of  the  building,  the  mainspring  of  the  machine,  the 
 sun  of  the  system.  We  his  posterity  are  but  so  many  members  of 
 a  body,  and  are  aU  dependent  on  him  as  on  our  head  or  heart ;  but 
 not  so  on  one  another.     There  may  be  the  amputation  of  a  limb 
 
148  MOBAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XI. 
 
 while  the  other  limbs  are  not  injured ;  but  if  the  head  or  heart  be 
 deprived  of  life,  all  the  members  are  deprived  at  the  same  time.  A 
 branch  of  a  tree  may  be  lopped  off  without  injury  to  the  other 
 parts  ;  but  if  the  root,  the  vital  part,  be  affected,  all  the  branches 
 are  also  affected  as  a  necessary  consequence.  A  dead  root  and  a 
 living  tree  are  incompatible,  though  a  dead  branch  and  a  living 
 branch  of  the  same  tree  are  not.  A  watch  is  a  system  formed  on 
 prmciples  of  mechanism  :  the  index  may  be  mutilated,  or  the  cog 
 of  a  wheel  may  be  broken  or  detached,  without  affecting  the  more 
 essential  part ;  but  if  the  mainspring  be  broken,  the  whole  system 
 as  to  its  designed  use  is  destroyed.  A  building  is  a  system  :  a  slab 
 or  a  chimney  may  be  blown  down,  without  affecting  the  foundation  ; 
 but  if  the  whole  foundation  be  undermined,  the  whole  fabric  must 
 fall  to  ruin.  The  solar  system  might  subsist,  for  aught  that  appears 
 to  the  contrary,  though  a  comet,  a  satellite,  or  a  planet  were  anni- 
 hilated ;  but  if  the  sun  were  annihilated,  ruin  and  confusion  must 
 ensue. 
 
 8.  AVhatever  Adam  lost  by  transgression,  he  could  have  no  claim 
 either  in  equity  or  by  promise — that  is,  he  could  have  no  claim  at 
 aU — for  a  restoration  of  it.  And  what  he  could  have  no  claim  for 
 himself,  could  not  be  claimable  by  or  for  his  posterity,  any  more 
 than  a  branch  or  a  member  could  obtain  life  when  the  root  of  that 
 branch  or  the  head  of  that  member  had  ceased  to  live  ;  or  any  more 
 than  the  subordinate  parts  of  any  system,  when  the  radical,  vital, 
 fundamental,  and  essential  parts  had  failed. 
 
 9.  What  Adam  lost  was  divine  life,  and  the  happiness  implied 
 in  it  as  a  favour  granted  on  a  condition.  Observing  this  condition, 
 he  was  to  have  it  continued ;  but  on  breaking  the  condition,  it 
 was  to  be  forfeited  Adam  may  be  compared  to  a  lord  in  waiting, 
 who  should  have  free  access  to  every  room  in  the  king's  palace,  one 
 excepted.  By  abstaining  from  this  intrusion,  he  should  have  his 
 house  and  dignity  presei-ved  and  confirmed  to  his  heirs  for  ever ; 
 but  by  offending  as  to  the  condition  prescribed,  he  must  sink  to 
 the  rank  of  a  common  subject,  stripped  of  all  his  former  dignity. 
 How  absurd  would  it  be  for  the  heirs  of  such  a  lord  to  step  forward 
 and  claim  what  he  had  forfeited  !  Equally  absm-d  is  it  to  say  that 
 Adam's  posterity  are  no  sufferers  by  his  transgression. 
 
 ]  0.  If  we  would  form  accurate  notions  of  Adam's  transgression, 
 original  sin  and  the  imputation  of  guilt,  it  will  be  of  the  utmost 
 importance  to  consider  the  Divine  law,  by  which  is  the  knowledge 
 
DISS.  XI.]  MOEAL  EVIL.  1 49 
 
 of  sin,  under  a  twofold  consideration  :  as  a  rule  requiring  con- 
 formity and  obedience  in  every  period  of  our  existence,  or  the 
 measure  of  moral  obligation ;  and  as  a  covenant,  the  condition  of 
 which  was  perfect  conformity  and  obedience,  under  a  forfeiture  of 
 a  special  favour.  The  law  as  a  rule  may  be  transgressed  times 
 and  methods  iimumerable ;  but  as  a  covenant  it  could  be  trans- 
 gressed only  once.  For  the  very  first  offence  was  a  breach  of  the 
 condition,  and  a  forfeiture  of  that  favour  which  depended  on  the 
 performance  of  that  condition.  It  is  possible  for  the  transgressor 
 of  the  law  as  a  rule  to  become,  through  grace,  a  perfect  character, 
 and  therefore  perfectly  conformable  to  that  law.  But  to  be 
 perfectly  conformable  to  the  required  condition,  once  broken,  is 
 impossible ;  as  impossible  as  to  recall  time  once  passed,  or  to  make 
 transgression  to  be  no  transgression. 
 
 11.  President  Edwards  very  justly  remarks  that  "  there  is  not  the 
 least  need  of  supposing  any  evil  quality  infused,  supplanted^wrought 
 into  the  nature  of  man  by  any  posititive  cause  or  influence  what- 
 soever, either  from  God  or  the  creature ;  or  of  supposing  that  man 
 is  conceived  and  born  with  a  fountain  of  evil  in  his  heart,  such  as 
 is  anything  properly  positive."  But,  however  just  this  remark, 
 there  is  reason  to  fear  that  many  [persons]  have  imbibed  a  notion 
 of  original  sin  considerably  different  from  what  is  here  asserted. 
 It  is  not  improbable  that  the  terms  by  which  the  evil  has  been 
 commonly  expressed,  without  a  due  examination  of  the  idea  intended, 
 have  had  no  small  influence  to  effect  this.  The  frequent  use  of 
 such  analogical  and  allusive  terms  as  pollution,  defilement,  corruga- 
 tion, contamination,  and  the  Uke,  seems  to  intimate  something 
 pofsitive,  as  these  expressions  in  their  original  meaning  convey  an 
 idea  of  something  superadded  to  the  subject.  Whereas  other  terms, 
 though  equally  analogical  and  allusive,  imply  no  such  thing,  such 
 as  disorder,  discord,  confusion,  and  the  like.  We  do  not  mean  to 
 condemn  the  use  of  the  former,  or  recommend  the  latter  to  their 
 exclusion,  but  only  design  to  caution  against  a  wrong  inference 
 from  a  frequent  use  of  them. 
 
 12.  On  the  subject  of  the  imputation  of  Adam's  offence  to  his 
 posterity,  [President  Edwards  has  written]  very  ably  and  fully. 
 But  we  here  observe,  that  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  have 
 just  views  of  what  is  called  original  guilt.  It  is  to  be  feared 
 that  many  form  very  confused  notions  of  the  subject  when  it  is 
 said,  "  we  are  guilty  when  born,"  or  "  we  are  guilty  of  Adam's 
 
150  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XL 
 
 transgression,"  or  "  the  guilt  of  Adam's  offence  is  ours."  Though 
 we  conceive  these  and  similar  propositions  to  be  expressive  of  an 
 important  truth,  yet  we  are  not  less  liable  to  be  led  astray  from 
 the  true  idea  referred  to  by  these  expressions  than  by  others  em- 
 ployed to  represent  moral  depravity. 
 
 13.  It  may  contribute  to  clearness  of  conception  on  the  subject 
 if  we  keep  in  mind  that  Adam  was  guilty  by  his  first  offence  under 
 a  twofold  consideration.  He  was  guUty  of  a  breach  of  law  con- 
 sidered as  a  rule  of  rectitude,  and  of  the  same  law  as  a  covenant, 
 enjoining  the  observance  of  a  spiecial  duty,  which  was  the  avowed 
 and  express  condition  of  it.  The  performance  of  the  condition 
 was  to  secure  not  merely  moral  purity  and  innocence,  but  also  the 
 favour  or  gracious  benefit  which  he  possessed  on  the  footing  of  a 
 sovereign  grant.  This  was  his  federal  privilege.  Now  by  the 
 transgression  of  the  law  considered  as  a  covenant  this  favour  was 
 forfeited ;  and  for  God  to  treat  him  as  one  deprived  of  this  favour 
 is  the  same  thing  as  to  treat  him  as  guilty.  For  how  could  he  be 
 treated  otherwise  when  every  condition  on  which  he  retained  the 
 favour  was  broken  ? 
 
 14  Whatever  Adam  possessed  beyond  those  considerations 
 which  constituted  him  a  moral  agent,  was  the  fruit  of  sovereign 
 benevolence.  Hence  arises  the  projjriety  of  regarding  the  pos- 
 session of  his  privilege  on  the  observance  of  a  specified  condition, 
 under  the  term  covenant.  Por  if  Adam  possessed  some  spiritual 
 principles  or  benevolent  influences,  as  a  person  possesses  immuni- 
 ties and  privileges  by  charter  for  himself  and  his  heirs,  and  if 
 these  chartered  benefits  be  retained  on  condition  of  not  offending 
 in  a  specified  manner,  it  follows  that  a  privation  of  such  benefits 
 belongs  as  much  to  the  heir  as  to  the  individual  offending.  But 
 if  they  are  treated,  for  breach  of  such  covenant  or  charter  held  on 
 condition,  as  persons  included  in  the  forfeiture,  it  is  manifest  they 
 are  regarded  so  far  guilty,  or  worthy  to  suffer  such  loss. 
 
 15.  From  these  considerations,  it  follows  that  Adam's  breach  of 
 law  as  a  rule,  which  brought  guilt  upon  him  as  an  individual,  is 
 not  the  guilt  imjjutable  to  his  posterity.  During  his  long  hfe,  no 
 doubt,  he  was  guilty  of  innumerable  offences  after  the  first  trans- 
 gression, but  not  one  of  these  is  imputed  to  us  ;  the  reason  is, 
 that  after  he  broke  the  condition  of  the  charter  he  stood  upon  the 
 bare  ground  of  personal  moral  obligation.     But  personal  guUt,  on 
 
DISS,  XI.]  MORAL  EVIL.  151 
 
 such  ground,  cannot  in  equity  be  transferred  from  one  to  another. 
 The  sins  of  the  father,  whether  the  first  father  or  any  other,  con- 
 sidered merely  as  a  joersonal  deviation  from  rectitude,  or  a  breach 
 of  moral  obligation,  cannot  be  imputed  to  the  children. 
 
 16.  What  Adam,  therefore,  suffered  for  breach  of  covenant  was 
 a  privation  of  chartered  benefits.  The  unavoidable  effect  of  this 
 was  death, — a  pirivation  of  spiritual  life,  which,  continued,  is  death 
 eternal,  and  a  i^rivation  of  that  protection  and  care  which  would 
 have  preserved  from  temporal  death.  There  seems  little  room  to 
 doubt  that  even  the  corporeal  or  elementary  part  of  Adam  under- 
 went a  great  change  by  the  fall.  However,  having  forfeited  his 
 charter  of  preservation  by  transgression,  he  and  all  his  posterity 
 became  exposed  to  the  natural  operations  of  this  world  and  its 
 elements.  Matter  and  motion  in  animals  and  vegetables,  in  the 
 natural  state  of  things,  insure  a  dissolution. 
 
 17.  Much  has  been  said  by  some  divines  about  the  probability 
 of  Adam,  had  he  kept  the  condition,  being  promoted  to  some 
 situation  still  more  exalted.  But  there  is  reason  to  suspect  that 
 such  a  sentiment  proceeds  on  the  supposition  of  Adam  possessing 
 a  less  exalted  situation  than  he  really  did  possess.  The  idea  seems 
 to  be  founded  on  a  probable  promotion  for  continued  obedience. 
 But  what  could  be  a  greater  reward  than  a  continuance  of  his 
 chartered  privileges?  and  what  a  greater  loss  than  their  for- 
 feiture ? 
 
 18.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  demonstrate  that  Adam,  dealt 
 with  on  the  ground  of  strict  equity,  would  have  been  not  less 
 liable  to  defection  than  his  posterity  are  when  they  begin  to 
 exercise  moral  agency ;  therefore,  the  objection  against  the  con- 
 stitution of  Adam  and  his  posterity  being  regarded  as  one  is  de- 
 prived of  all  force.  For  whatever  creature,  in  whatever  world,  was 
 dealt  with  in  strict  equity,  without  benevolent  influences  to  counter- 
 act passive  power,  he  would  have  no  advantage  against  a  liability 
 to  defection  above  the  race  of  man  after  the  fall ;  the  only  difi'erence 
 is,  that  Adam  once  actually  possessed  an  exalted  privilege,  and  fell 
 from  it.  And  if  his  posterity,  rendered  so  far  guilty  as  to  be  de- 
 prived of  chartered  benefits  with  him,  cannot  be  raised  to  happi- 
 ness from  their  fallen  state  without  the  exercise  of  benevolent 
 sovereign  influence  m  the  plan  of  salvation,  it  should  be  recollected 
 that  Adam  himself  could  not  have  maintained  his  standing  but  by 
 
]"52  MORAL  EVIL.  [DISS.  XL 
 
 the  same  benevolent  sovereign  influence,  though  exercised  in  a 
 dififerent  way. 
 
 Corol. — Hence  the  propriety  and  the  true  ground  of  the  well- 
 known  distinction  of  a  believer  in  the  second  Adam  not  being 
 under  the  law  (i.e.,  the  condemnation  of  the  law)  as  a  covenant, 
 though  under  the  law  as  a  rule.  It  is  found,  as  to  its  true  reason, 
 in  the  state  of  Adam  as  above  explained. 
 
DISSERTATION  XII. 
 
 MOTIVES,  DEFINITION  OE — SINCERITY  AND  INSINCEEITY  IN  ESHOE- 
 TATIONS   AS   MOTIVES — NOT   INCONSISTENT   "WITH   NECESSITY. 
 
 Our  author  [President  Edwards]  does  not  mean  by  "  motive"  the 
 object  presented  to  the  mind  according  to  its  intrinsic  worth,  but 
 he  takes  into  the  account  also  the  state  of  the  mind  itself  in  refer- 
 ence to  that  object,  according  to  which  wUl  be  the  appearance  of 
 it,  Therefore,  strictly  speaking,  the  motive,  as  he  has  intimated 
 at  the  commencement  of  his  work,  denotes  the  object  as  it  stands 
 in  the  view  of  the  mind.  If  we  do  not  maintain  this  distinction, 
 the  dispute  will  soon  degenerate  into  a  confused  logomachy ;  and 
 we  should  be  forced,  in  defending  this  position, — that  the  wUl  is 
 "  necessarily  determined  by  the  strongest  motive," — to  adopt  this, 
 the  most  absurd  of  all  conclusions,  that  the  will  of  every  man  in 
 the  present  state  always  chooses  what  is  reaUy  best,  or  never  errs 
 in  its  elections.  Whereas  the  world  is  full  of  errors  and  delusions ; 
 things  the  most  excellent  in  themselves  are  commonly  rejected,  and 
 others  the  most  worthless  are  preferred.  But  this  could  not  happen 
 except  on  this  principle,  that  the  reality  of  worth  differs,  in  these 
 instances,  from  the  appearance  of  it.  In  such  eases  the  difference 
 is  not  in  the  object,  but  in  the  mind,  when  the  choice  takes  place. 
 For  instance,  suppose  the  blessed  God,  in  His  true  character,  as 
 revealed  in  the  Scriptures,  the  chief  and  an  unchangeable  good,  be 
 proposed  to  the  contemplation  of  a  wicked  man,  and  his  will 
 rejects  that  good.  Now,  as  the  mind  is  incapable  of  rejecting  a 
 good,  or  of  choosing  an  evil,  as  such,  it  is  plain  that  the  proper 
 and  immediate  cause  of  difference  between  the  reality  and  the  ap- 
 pearance of  good  is  in  the  state  of  the  mind.  Here  lies  the  essence 
 of  an  erroneous  choice — the  will  preferring  an  object  which  is  ap- 
 
154  MOTIVES.  [diss.  XII. 
 
 parently,  but  not  really,  preferable.  Hence  it  follows  irrefragably, 
 that  the  state  of  the  mind  is  the  true  and  proper  source  of  a  right 
 and  wrong  choice.  This  it  is  that  influences  the  appearance  of  an 
 object,  so  as  to  stand  in  the  apprehension  and  practical  judgment 
 of  the  mind  as  worse  or  better  than  it  really  is.  Therefore,  the 
 true  state  of  the  mind  and  the  real  state  of  the  object  of  choice, 
 united,  are  the  genuine  parents  of  the  objective  appearance  in  the 
 mind,  morally  considered,  or  according  to  the  qualities  of  good  and 
 evil ;  and  this  offspring — objective  appearance — is  what  [is  meant 
 by]  the  "  strongest  motive." 
 
 On  the  subject  of  sincerity  or  insincerity  in  prohibitions,  com- 
 mands, counsels,  invitations,  and  the  like,  in  cases  where  God  fore- 
 knows that  the  event  will  not  take  place  by  the  compliance  of  the 
 moral  agent  addressed,  we  may  remark  a  few  particulars  in  [con- 
 nexion with  the  doctrine  of  motives]  : — 
 
 1.  The  sincerity  of  j)rohibitions  and  commands,  counsels  and 
 invitations,  and  the  like,  is  founded,  not  in  the  event  of  things  as 
 good  or  bad,  or  the  knowledge  of  events,  or  the  purpose  that 
 secures  some,  or  the  necessity  of  consequence  from  which  others 
 flow,  nor  in  the  moral  ability  of  the  agent,  but  in  the  very  nature 
 and  tendency  of  the  things  themselves  which  are  prohibited,  com- 
 manded, or  proposed,  as  good  or  evil,  either  intrinsically,  if  of  a 
 moral  nature,  or  else  relatively,  if  of  positive  appointment.  There- 
 fore— 
 
 2.  Whether  the  event  be  compliance  or  non-compliance,  the 
 command,  invitation,  &c.,  is  perfectly  sincere.  For,  in  truth,  these 
 are  neither  more  nor  less  than  testimonies  respecting  the  goodness 
 or  badness  of  the  things  in  question,  in  the  sense  before  mentioned, 
 and  the  consequent  obligations  of  the  agent  respecting  them,  under 
 a  forfeiture  either  declared  or  implied.     Consequently — 
 
 3.  Insincerity  can  attach  to  a  command  only  on  supposition 
 that  the  goodness  or  badness  of  the  event  were  the  ground  of  the 
 signified  will,  while,  at  the  same  time,  another  event,  diverse  from 
 that  which  actually  takes  place,  was  proposed  by  the  same  will. 
 But— 
 
 4.  Strictly  speaking,  no  events,  as  such,  are  the  objects  of  pur- 
 pose; but  rather  the  purpose  respects  the  good  antecedents,  whereby 
 good  events,  following  by  necessity  of  consequence,  are  infallibly 
 secured.     Besides — 
 
 5.  It  is  highly  absurd,  as  must  appear  from  the  nature  of  law 
 
DISS.  XII.]  MOTIVES.  155 
 
 and  obligation,  to  suppo,se  that  the  sincerity  of  legislative  or  in- 
 viting will  should  depend  on  the  event  of  compliance  or  non-com- 
 pliance. Surely  the  sincerity  of  a  lav^giver  is  not  affected,  whether 
 all  obey,  or  only  some,  or  even  none.  Legislation  is  a  testimony, 
 with  sanctions,  that  the  thing  prohibited  is  evil,  or  the  thing  com- 
 manded is  good  to  the  jDarty.     Hence — 
 
 G.  The  consequent,  whether  good  or  bad,  is  objectively  esta- 
 blished, or  hypothetically  proposed,  by  the  legislator  ;  and  the  an- 
 tecedent is  supposed  to  be  within  the  reach,  or,  jphysically  considered, 
 placed  within  the  power,  of  the  agent.     Therefore — •• 
 
 7.  The  agent's  abuse  of  his  physical  power,  in  reference  to  the 
 antecedent,  constitutes  the  criminality,  and  the  right  use  of  it  con- 
 stitutes the  virtue,  of  an  action.  And  then  alone  is  physical  power, 
 in  fact,  used  aright,  when  it  is  the  instrument  of  moral  rectitude, 
 or  a  right  state  of  mind.  "  Do  men  gather  grapes  of  thorns,  or  figs 
 of  thistles  ?  Even  so  every  good  tree  bringeth  forth  good  fruit ; 
 but  a  corrupt  tree  bringeth  forth  evil  fruit.  A  good  tree  [as  such] 
 cannot  bring  forth  evil  fruit ;  neither  can  a  corrujpt  tree  [as  such] 
 bring  forth  good  fruit." 
 
 The  true  reason  why  counsels,  exhortations,  &c.,  commonly 
 called  motives,  are  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  necessity  held 
 by  Calvinists,  may  be  here  noticed,  in  addition  to  some  hints  before 
 given.  In  order  to  this,  we  must  guard  against  ambiguity  in  the 
 word  "  motive,"  which  at  one  time  is  intended  for  the  object 
 ^  exhibited,  abstractedly  considered  ;  at  another,  the  object  concre- 
 tively,  as  it  stands  in  the  view  of  the  mind.  The  ojDposers  of 
 that  necessity  for  which  [we]  plead  must,  in  order  to  make  even 
 a  show  of  consistency,  understand  the  word  "  motive  "  in  the  first 
 of  these  acceptations. 
 
 And  if  so,  it  is  nothing  marvellous  that  they  should  maintain 
 the  existence  of  a  power  in  the  human  mind,  which  can,  on  the  one 
 hand,  successfully  oppose  the  strongest  possible  motive ;  and,  on 
 the  other,  be  determined  by  a  weaker,  and  even  sometimes  by  the 
 weakest  motive.  For  how  often  is  the  most  insignificant  bauble 
 preferred  to  infinite  excellence  !  But  consistent  Calvinists  do  not 
 understand  the  term  in  any  such  manner,  but  rather  as  an  effect 
 compounded  of  the  state  of  the  mind  and  the  real  object.  And, 
 seeing  the  object,  in  itself  considered,  is  not  changed  by  mental 
 perception,  the  difference  of  the  efi'ect,  or  change  of  mental  view, 
 must  arise  from  the  mind  itself.     Hence  one  motive,  in  the  Armi- 
 
156  MOTIVES.  [diss,  xa 
 
 nian  sense,  may  produce,  in  the  other  acceptation  of  the  term,  a 
 thousand  different  motives,  according  to  the  different  mental  states 
 to  which  the  object  is  presented. 
 
 Therefore,  counsels,  exhortations,  invitations,  &c.,  are  most 
 rationally  employed  by  Calvinists  ;  for  that  which  determines  the 
 human  wUl  to  action  is  the  motive  as  it  is  perceived,  or  that  which 
 results  from  an  ap2:)lication  of  the  object  to  the  mini  According 
 to  them,  without  an  object  presented  there  can  be  no  motive  ;  any 
 more  than  there  can  be  a  motive  without  a  mind  to  which  it  is 
 presented.  Without  evangelical  truth,  and  an  evangelical  mind  or 
 disposition,  there  can  be  no  evangelical  determining  motive. 
 Consequently,  if  the  mind  be  at  aU  roused  from  ignorance  and 
 apathy,  determining  motives  must  be  produced  tu  it  by  a  repre- 
 sentation of  objects,  by  counsels,  exhortations,  invitations,  expos- 
 tulations, &c.  These  will  succeed,  or  fail  of  success,  morally,  ac- 
 cording to  the  state  of  the  mind. 
 
 But,  as  the  agent  is  free  from  coaction,  constraint,  and  compul- 
 sion in  the  act  of  choosing,  the  true  inference  is,  not  that  such 
 use  of  the  means  is  unsuitable  or  inconsistent,  but  that  here  is 
 clearly  implied  the  necessity,  the  rationality,  and  the  perfect  con- 
 sistency of  prayer  to  the  God  of  grace  for  success  in  the  use  of 
 means.  Paul  may  plant,  and  Apollos  may  water,  but  God  giveth 
 the  rocrease.  To  influence  the  mind  without  moral  motives  is  the 
 prerogative  of  God.  AU  hearts  are  in  His  hand  to  form  them  as 
 He  pleases.  If  the  tree  be  good  by  sovereign  influence,  or  a  new 
 birth,  the  fruit  of  love  to  God,  and  hatred  to  sin,  holy  fear,  un- 
 feigned faith,  humble  hope,  &c.,  wiU  foUow,  according  to  the 
 objects  presented.  A  crop  wiU  not  follow  without  the  union  of 
 two  things — seed  and  soU.  If  both  be  good,  the  crop  will  be 
 good,  but  not  otherwise.  That  motive  which  determines  the  wiU 
 cannot  arise  from  any  other  cause  than  the  object  and  the  cUspo- 
 sition  united.  And  then  only  can  the  determining  motive  be  good 
 when  it  results  from  a  good  object  apphed  to  a  good  disposition 
 or  state  of  mtad.  These  things,  duly  considered,  will  sufficiently 
 prove  why  Calvinists  use  counsels,  exhortations,  invitations,  &c. 
 
DISSERTATION  XIII. 
 
 VIETUE  AND   VICE — THE   ESSENCE   OP   YIETUE  AND  VICE,  WHERE  1 
 — ^VIRTUE,  ITS  NATURE. 
 
 The  [foUowing]  may  appear  to  some  to  be  an  identical  proposi- 
 tion : — ■"  Tlie  essence  of  a  thing  lies  in  its  nature."  But  it  is  not 
 wholly  so,  and  the  whole  of  the  proposition  is  exceedingly  im- 
 portant, on  account  of  the  negative  part,  or  the  incidental  proposi- 
 tion it  contains — viz.,  The  essence  of  virtue  and  vice  lies  not  in 
 their  cause.  A  single  consideration  may  be  sufiBcient  to  shew  the 
 truth  and  importance  of  one  part  of  this  last  proposition. 
 
 If  the  essence  of  virtue  lies  in  its  cause,  how  could  the  Pirst 
 Cause,  or  the  uncaused  nature,  be  virtuous  ?  If,  therefore,  the 
 First  Cause  be  virtuous,  or  have  the  essence  of  virtue,  as  all  theists 
 will  allow,  it  is  plain  that  essence  must  lie  in  the  nature  of  that 
 cause  itself.  Hence,  as  God  is  the  standard  of  all  moral  excellence, 
 created  natures  are  morally  excellent  in  proportion  as  they  resem- 
 ble Him.  And  as  virtue  is  an  imitable  excellence,  and  as  no  good 
 reason  can  be  assigned  why  the  resemblance  should  not  hold  in 
 this  particiilar,  it  is  highly  probable,  a  priori,  that,  in  reference  to 
 created  natures,  the  essence  of  their  virtue  lies  not  in  its  cause. 
 
 Again,  as  the  essence  of  virtue  lies  not  in  its  cause,  so  neither 
 does  the  essence  of  vice  lie  in  its  cause.  But  the  philosophical 
 ground  of  this  part  of  the  general  proposition  demands  more  par- 
 ticular attention.  And  as  this  proposition,  "The  essence  of  vice 
 lies  not  in  its  cause,"  affects  the  whole  system  of  morals,  and  in- 
 deed of  theology,  we  beg  leave  to  propose  a  series  of  remarks 
 which,  it  is  hoped,  will  cast  some  light  on  the  subject. 
 
 1.  Causes  are  of  two  kinds,  and  of  two  only — either  positive  or 
 negative.     Positive  causes  produce  positive  effects,  from  the  First 
 
158  VIRTUE  AIv-D  VICE.  [DISS.  XIIL 
 
 Cause  tlirougli  all  secondary  causes  ;  and  these  positive  secondary 
 causes  are  nothiug  else  but  so  many  decretive  antecedents,  which 
 act  physically,  and  their  consequences  follow  from  the  nature  of 
 things ;  even  as  number  follows  the  repetition  of  units,  or  happi- 
 ness results  from  true  virtue. 
 
 2.  The  term  "  cause  "  is  applied  less  properly  to  express  a  nega- 
 tive idea ;  for  it  expresses  merely  an  antecedent  of  a  consequent. 
 
 For  instance,  if  we  say  that  a  man  cannot  read  because  he  is 
 blind,  or  cannot  walk  because  he  has  no  legs,  or  cannot  go  to  hea- 
 ven because  he  does  not  love  God,  and  the  like ;  it  is  manifest  that 
 blindness,  want  of  legs,  and  want  of  love  to  God,  are  "  causes " 
 only  as  antecedents  are  causes  to  their  consequents,  without  posi- 
 tive influence. 
 
 3.  Negative  causes,  though  they  have  no  positive  operation  in 
 producing  their  consequents,  are  no  less  the  ground  of  certainty 
 than  those  causes,  properly  so  called,  which  exist  in  physical  ope- 
 rations. For  the  consequent  follows  the  antecedent  with  equal 
 certainty,  whether  the  connexion  be  formed  by  decretive  vnW  and 
 energy,  as  in  all  positive  causes,  or  by  the  nature  of  things  only, 
 which  is  essential  truth,  as  in  all  negative  causes. 
 
 4.  The  cause  of  vicious  acts  is  a  vicious  disposition ;  in  other 
 words,  it  is  the  want  or  the  absence  of  a  virtuous  disposition. 
 The  essence  of  the  vicious  act,  however,  is  not  in  the  cause  or  dis- 
 position. The  vice  of  the  disposition  is  one  thing,  and  the  vice  of 
 the  act  is  another.  For  as  the  nature  of  the  disposition  and  the 
 nature  of  the  act  are  different,  so  the  vice  or  moral  badness  of 
 the  one  is  a  different  badness  from  that  of  the  other.  The  one 
 and  the  other  is  a  bad  thing,  whatever  be  the  cause,  and  irrespec- 
 tive of  any.     Hence — 
 
 5.  Evil  dispositions  or  acts  should  be  denominated  such,  not 
 from  their  cause,  but  from  their  nature.  Were  it  otherwise,  per- 
 sonal fault  or  blame  could  never  exist ;  for  the  vicious  act  would 
 transfer  the  blame  to  the  disposition,  and  the  disposition  to  the 
 cause  of  that ;  whereby  persons  would  be  free  from  blame,  and 
 this  would  attach  to  piinciples  only.  But  to  suppose  a  moral 
 agent  incapable  of  blameworthiness,  which  on  the  supposition 
 would  be  the  case,  is  a  gross  absurdity.  It  would  be  to  suppose 
 an  accountable  being,  who  at  the  same  time  can  be  accountable 
 for  nothiug ;  and  it  would  be  to  impute  blame  to  principles,  or  a 
 principle,  which  is  incapable  of  moral  agency. 
 
DISS.  XIII.]  VIRTUE  AND  VICE.  159 
 
 6.  The  cause  of  virtuous  acts,  or,  if  we  may  so  speak,  the  soil  in 
 which  they  grow,  is  a  previous  iuchnation  or  disposition  to  good, 
 before  any  actual  choice  takes  place.  TJiis  may  be  called  a  vir- 
 tuous inclination  or  disposition.  But  the  original  and  predis- 
 posing cause  of  that  is  Divine  energy,  influx,  or  influence  ;  in 
 other  words,  an  assimilating  emanation  from  the  holy  nature  and 
 decretive  will  of  God. 
 
 7.  Nevertheless,  this  is  not  a  good  or  a  virtue  attributable  to 
 man,  until  he  is  actually  possessed  of  it,  or  it  becomes  his  as  a 
 quality  of  his  nature.  God,  the  Father  of  lights,  from  whom 
 every  good  and  perfect  gift  proceedeth,  is  the  cause  of  that  virtu- 
 ous disposition  ;  but  while  the  virtue  remained  in  the  cause,  and 
 not  in  the  man,  it  was  no  human  virtue.  Nor  does  the  essence  of 
 human  virtue  lie  in  the  communication  itself,  for  this  was  the 
 eSect  of  Divine  will ;  but  no  will  can  alter  the  nature  of  virtue  ; 
 therefore  the  essence  of  virtue  consists  not  in  the  cause,  whether 
 we  understand  by  "  cause  "  the  will  that  communicates  the  vir- 
 tuous disposition  or  the  communication  itself.  Consequently,  the 
 absence  of  virtue  is  so  completely  confined  to  the  disposition  of 
 the  agent  and  the  consequent  acts,  as  to  exclude  everything  else 
 that  may  be  termed  its  cause. 
 
 8.  The  cause  of  vicious  acts,  whatever  it  be,  is  opposite  to  the 
 cause  of  virtuous  acts,  for  these  acts  have  diametrically  opposite 
 eflects.  That  vicious  acts  have  a  cause,  as  well  as  virtuous  ones, 
 cannot  be  denied  by  any  reflecting  person ;  for  this  plain  reason, 
 that  there  is  nothing  in  the  universality  of  things,  beings,  qualities, 
 &c.,  but  has  a  cause,  either  positive  or  negative,  as  before  explained. 
 Neither  degree,  liberty,  nor  anything  else,  considered  as  an  effect 
 or  a  consequent,  can  exist  without  a  cause  or  antecedent.  The 
 denial  of  this,  and  universal  scepticism,  are  the  same  thing.  Then 
 all  reasoning  and  all  common  sense  vanish  ;  then  body  and  spirit, 
 cause  and  effects,  good  and  evil,  &c.,  are  huddled  up  in  endless 
 confusion,  without  either  first  or  last,  great  or  small,  order  or  pro- 
 portion. 
 
 9.  The  original,  predisposing  cause  of  a  vicious  disposition  is  the 
 very  ojDposite  of  the  original,  predisposing  cause  of  a  virtuous  dis- 
 position. This  last,  it  has  been  shewn,  is  Divine  energy,  which  is 
 a  positive  cause ;  the  other,  the  opposite  of  this,  is  a  negative 
 cause.  The  cavise  of  good,  as  before  observed,  is  a  cause  properly 
 so  called,  in  the  way  of  physical  influence ;  but  the  cause  of  evU 
 
160  VIETTJE  AMT)  VICE.  [DISS.  XIH. 
 
 is  called  a  "  cause  "  imi}roperly,  as  it  implies  no  physical  influence, 
 but  only  stands  as  an  antecedent  to  a  consequent ;  from  Tvliich, 
 however,  the  consequent  may  be  inferred  with  as  much  certainty 
 as  if  the  influence  were  physical  and  mechanical.  Wliether  you 
 suppose  positive  quantities  or  negative  quantities,  consequences 
 are  equally  certain  :  it  is  no  less  true  that  5  — 2  =  .3,  than  that  3  + 
 3^6.  Whether  you  say,  If  the  sun  were  not,  it  would  cause  dark- 
 ness, or  say,  If  the  sun  shuie,  it  will  cause  light,  the  difference  is 
 only  in  the  nature  of  the  cause,  as  either  positive  or  negative,  not 
 in  the  certainty  of  the  consequence. 
 
 10.  It  would  be  very  absurd  and  contradictory  to  say  that  the 
 cause  of  vice  is  vicious  ;  for  that  would  be  the  same  as  to  say  that 
 a  thing  was  before  it  existed.  To  be  vicious  is  to  have  vice ;  and 
 for  this  to  be  the  cause  of  \'ice  is  for  it  to  be  the  cause  of  itself, 
 or  self-caused,  which  is  absui'd.  It  is,  therefore,  impossible  that 
 the  cause  of  vice  should  be  vicious ;  consequently  the  essence  of 
 vice  is  nowhere  but  in  its  own  proper  nature,  to  the  exclusion  of 
 every  cause  whatever ;  and  yet,  as  it  is  an  efiect,  it  must  have  a 
 cause. 
 
 11.  The  principal  question  to  be  determined  in  this  investiga- 
 tion is,  What  is  precisely  the  original,  predisposing  negative  cause 
 of  a  vicious  disposition  ?  The  answer  is  plain  and  short :  It  is 
 that  property  of  a  creature  which  renders  it  absolutely  dependent 
 for  its  being  and  well-being.  Or,  it  is  that  property  which  is 
 the  very  opposite  to  independence,  self-sufiiciency,  and  immuta- 
 bility ;  and,  therefore,  is  a  property  peculiar  to  a  creature,  and 
 cannot  belong  to  God. 
 
 12.  Nor  can  this  be  said  to  be  an  actually  existing  property 
 from  eternity,  since  it  cannot  belong  to  God  ;  and  nothing,  the 
 only  alternative,  has  no  property.  It  is  not,  therefore,  the  Mani- 
 chean  eternal  evil  principle,  if  by  this  be  meant  anything  actually 
 existing  as  coeval  with  a  good  princii3le.  Good  is  a  principle  posi- 
 tively eternal ;  but  what  we  speak  of  is  a  mere  negative  principle, 
 and  owes  its  existence  as  a  property  to  a  created  nature  ;  and  were 
 every  creature  annihilated,  this  property  would  also  cease  to  be. 
 
 1 3.  But  what  shall  we  call  this  principle,  property,  or  predisposing 
 cause  of  vice  ?  Shall  we  call  it  defectibility,  defect,  limitation,  or 
 imperfection  of  existence  ?  Not  the  first,  for  the  question  would 
 return.  What  makes  a  creature  defectible?  Not  the  second,  for 
 the  term  is  ambiguous,  as  there  are  several  kinds  of  defect,  natu- 
 
DISS.  Xni.]  TIETUE  AND  VICE.  161 
 
 ral  and  moral ;  and,  therefore,  as  the  word  is  of  common  use,  and 
 of  frequent  occurrence,  it  would  require  perpetual .  explanations. 
 Not  the  third  or  the  fourth,  for  the  same  reason.  A  term,  there- 
 fore, not  ambiguous,  and  sufficiently  expressive,  .should  be  em- 
 ployed, as  we  employ  technical  terms  to  express  a  specific  object. 
 For  this  purpose,  no  term,  perhaps,  is  less  objectionable,  or  more 
 suitable,  than  PASSIVE  POWEE  ;  for  it  is  free  from  ambiguity,  and 
 is  sufficiently  expressive  of  the  idea  already  explained.  The  idea 
 of  passivity  is  clearly  implied  in  the  name,  as  in  the  thing ;  and 
 the  term  power  seems  preferable  to  property  or  quality,  because 
 less  ambiguous,  and  yet  more  expressive  to  convey  the  intended 
 idea  of  metaphysical  iirfluence  of  cause  and  effect. 
 
 14.  To  which  we  may  add,  that  "passive  jDower"  is  by  no 
 means  a  new-coined  expression,  but  has  often  been  used  to  ex- 
 press the  very  idea  to  which  it  is  here  applied.  Thus,  above  a 
 century  and  a-half  ago,  that  eminently  pious  and  profoundly 
 learned  divine,  Theophilus  Gale,  in  his  "  Court  of  the  Gentiles," 
 says  : — "  The  root  and  origin  of  all  creatural  dependence  is  the 
 creature's  passive  power,  and  God's  absolute  dominion  over  it. 
 Now,  all  limits,  as  to  nature  and  essence,  speak  a  mixture  of  nihi- 
 lity, passive  power,  and  dependence  resulting  therefrom ;  whence 
 Damascene  adds,  Movov  'yap  ro  Oeiov  airadei;  eari,  'The  Deity 
 alone  is  impassible,' — namely,  because  exempt  from  nihility,  pias- 
 sive  power,  and  dependence.  This  nihihty  or  nothingness  of  the 
 creature  is  the  same  with  its  passive  power,  either  physic  or  meta- 
 physic,  natural  or  obediential,  whereby  it  is  limited  and  confined  to 
 such  or  such  a  degree  of  entirety,  existence,  and  operation,"  (Court 
 of  Gent,  part  iv.,  b.  i.,  chap,  xi.,  §  4.) 
 
 15.  Now  that  the  essence  of  vice  consisteth  not  in  this  pro- 
 perty is  plain,  in  that  passive  power  is  essential  to  a  creature  ; 
 which  vice  neither  is  nor  can  be.  It  is  the  soU  in  which  vice 
 grows,  and  without  which  it  could  not  grow  or  have  existence, 
 but  is  not  itself  vicious ;  otherwise  we  should  be  forced  to  seek 
 the  cause  of  that  cause  in  perpetual  retrogradation,  and  move 
 from  one  difficulty  to  another  into  endless  absurdity.  The  predis- 
 posing cause  of  vice,  therefore,  is  passive  power,  which  in  itself  is 
 not  vicious,  or  morally  evil.  But  how  moral  evil  came  to  exist, 
 and  what  is  its  true  origin,  will  be  more  conveniently  considered 
 in  a  subsequent  part  of  this  work. 
 
 16.  As  the  essence  of  the  virtue  and  vice  of  dispositions  and 
 VOL.  IV.  L 
 
1 62  YIKTUE  AND  VICE.  [DISS.  XIII. 
 
 acts  lies  not  in  their  cause,  so  neither  does  it  lie  in  their  efiects ; 
 that  is,  dispositions  and  acts  are  not  to  be  denominated  virtuous 
 or  vicious  on  account  of  their  effects  or  consec[uences,  such  as 
 their  being  productive  of  happiness  or  misery.  Por  as  the  pro- 
 perties of  anything  must  be  different  from  those  of  its  cause, 
 however  similar,  so  must  those  properties  differ  from  their  effects. 
 The  immediate  effect  of  virtue  is,  not  happiness  to  the  individual, 
 for  instance,  but  that  the  agent  is  approvable  or  praiseworthy. 
 But  were  the  essence  of  virtue  to  consist  in  "  its  tendency  to  idti- 
 mate  happiness,"  as  some  have  aflfirmed,  immediate  approbation 
 and  praise  could  not  be  safely  given  to  any  individual  act  or  dis- 
 position, as  its  relation  to  ultimate  happiness  coidd  not  be  ascer- 
 tained but  by  the  final  event.  If  the  essence  of  the  virtue  or  vice 
 were  not  in  the  act  or  disposition,  but  to  be  denominated  from  its 
 effects,  many  other  absurdities  would  follow.     I"or  instance — 
 
 17-  On  that  supposition,  the  supreme  excellence  of  Jehovah 
 would  not  be  ajiprovable  and  praiseworthy  on  its  own  account,  or 
 its  intrinsic  excellence,  but  only  because  of  its  effects  and  conse- 
 quences. On  that  principle,  to  hate  God  would  be  nothing  bad, 
 it  wordd  have  no  intrinsic  demerit ;  or  to  love  God  would  be 
 nothing  good,  nothing  in  itself  jDraiseworthy,  were  it  not  for  con- 
 sequences ;  which  is  not  only  absui'd,  but  bla.sphenious  also,  and 
 shocking. 
 
 18.  That  sentiment  is  evidently  founded  on  the  supposition  that 
 everything,  jjroperty,  quality,  and  event,  is  the  fruit  of  Divine 
 wlQ,  and  therefore  that  everything  must  be  equally  good  in  itself, 
 though  relatively  good  or  bad  to  the  individual ;  even  as  matter 
 and  motion,  and  their  laws,  are  equally  good  in  themselves,  but 
 not  relatively  so  to  the  individuals  who  suffer  from  them.  But 
 this  is  a  great  mistake,  as  it  confounds  things  totally  distinct  in 
 their  nature,  such  as  positive  and  negative  causes,  natural  neces- 
 sity and  moral  certainty.  Decretive  positions  and  their  conse- 
 cjuences  are  one  ground  of  certainty,  negative  causes  and  their 
 consequences  are  another ;  therefore,  from  the  certainty  of  result 
 in  the  Divine  view,  we  cannot  rightly  infer  that  aU  results  are 
 decreed.  Decretive  positions  comj^rehend  neither  negative  causes 
 nor  the  nature  of  things.  Por  an  intelligent  being  to  love  God  is 
 agreeable  to  the  nature  of  things ;  it  is  what  ought  to  be  independ- 
 ent of  any  decretive  position  or  legal  demand  in  reference  to  the 
 case.     In  like  manner,  for  an  intelligent  being  to  hate  God,  is  a 
 
DISS.  SIII.]  VIKTUE  AND  VICE.  163 
 
 voluntary  contradiction  to  the  nature  of  things,  or  the  essence  of 
 eternal  truth,  which  is  above  all  will,  or  is  not  founded  in  will,  as 
 well  as  to  constituted  law.     Again — 
 
 19.  To  deny  the  "intrinsic  merit  and  demerit  of  voluntary 
 actions  independent  of  their  consequences,"  as  some  do,  is  to 
 deny  the  nature  of  things  ;  and  this  is  nothing  less  than  an 
 attempt  to  divide  eternal  unity,  to  give  the  lie  direct  to  essential 
 truth,  and  to  convert  the  first  uncaused  essence  into  contradictory 
 contingences.  The  nature  of  things  is  nothing  else,  radically,  but 
 the  nature  of  God,  which  is  essential  truth  as  well  as  essential 
 goodness.  Decretive  positions,  or  an  arbitrary  constitution  of 
 things  by  Divine  wiU,  therefore,  can  no  more  alter  the  intrinsic 
 merit  or  demerit  of  actions,  aflPections,  habits,  or  characters,  than 
 Divine  will  can  alter  the  character  of  essential  truth,  or  choose 
 real  contradictions.     Moreover — 
 
 20.  Ultimate  happiness  is  the  effect  or  consequence  of  virtue  as 
 a  reward.  Now,  to  make  the  merit  or  excellence  of  virtue  to  depend 
 on  ultimate  happiness,  which  hajjpiness  is  the  reward  of  virtue,  is 
 most  inconsistent ;  it  is  to  reward  for  nothing  rewardable.  If  virtue 
 be  not  of  intrinsic  worth,  it  must  be  a  mere  moral  nothing  as  to 
 rewardableness,  and  therefore  ultimate  happiness  would  be  a  reward 
 for  a  mere  moral  nothing,  that  is,  happiness  would  be  no  reward ; 
 which  is  contradictory. 
 
 21.  As  to  vice,  its  consequence  is  punishment.  If  indeed  this 
 consequence  were  the  mere  effect  of  arbitrary  positions  or  sovereign 
 appointment ;  if  it  were  the  plan  of  God  first  to  cause  the  exist- 
 ence of  vice,  and  then  to  punish  the  subject  of  it,  as  what  the  good 
 of  the  whole  required,  there  would  be  great  plausibility  in  the 
 sentiment  we  oppose.  But  the  assumption  itself  is  fundamentally 
 erroneous.  It  confounds  hypothetical  antecedents,  as  the  whole  of 
 decretive  plans  may  be  termed,  with  that  eternal  truth  which  con- 
 nects them  with  their  consequences.  To  suppose  the  hatred  of  God, 
 for  instance,  to  have  no  intrinsic  demerit  in  it,  or  that  it  is  bad 
 only  as  dependent  on  its  consequences,  is  the  same  as  to  say,  it  is 
 agreeable  to  the  nature  of  things,  conformable  to  eternal  truth,  that 
 God  should  be  hated,  and  therefore  that  He  must  approve  of  it, — only 
 to  the  agent  it  is  attended  with  bad  consequences ;  that  is,  on  the 
 supposition,  God  has  appointed  misery  as  the  consequent  for  doing- 
 nothing  that  is  in  itself  bad,  yea,  for  doing  what  is  perfectly  innocent, 
 agreeable  to  the  nature  of  things,  conformable  to  eternal  truth,  and 
 
164  TIETUE  AND  VICE.  [DISS.  XIII. 
 
 acceptable  to  God,  as  everything  which  He  appoints  must  be. 
 Whether  such  a  sentiment  be  nearest  akin  to  "profound  philo- 
 sophy," or  to  something  else,  let  the  competent  reader  judge. 
 
 VIETUE,  ITS  NATUEE. 
 
 1.  Virtue,  if  we  regard  the  use  of  the  term  {apsT-q)  among  the 
 Greeks,  seems  to  have  been  appropriated  as  much  to  the  idea  of 
 martial  courage  as  the  English  term  is  appropriated  to  that  of 
 female  chastity.  Not  that  it  -^^-as  iised  exclusively  in  the  former 
 case  any  more  than  iu  the  latter.  It  often  signifies. power,  energy^ 
 efficacy,  and  excellence,  but  by  moral  writers,  both  ancient  and 
 modern,  it  has  been  unanimously  adopted  to  represent  a  very 
 general  moral  idea.  It  would  be  ea.sy  to  produce  a  great  number 
 of  definitions  from  moralists  and  divines,  but  this  is  neither  neces- 
 sary, nor  does  it  comport  with  our  present  purpose. 
 
 2.  If  we  mistake  not,  there  is  no  just  definition  of  virtue  which 
 is  not  reducible  to  this  general  one :  Virtue  is  a  laudable  mean  of 
 real  happiness.  Cicero,  indeed,  says  of  it,  that  it  is  "  afFectio  animi 
 constans,  conveniensque  laudabiles  efficiens  eos,  in  quibus  est,  et 
 ipsa  per  se,  sua  sponte,  seperata  etiam  utilitate,  laudabilis," 
 (TuscuL  Qusest.,  lib.  iv.,  §  15.)  But  virtue  being  laudable  from 
 its  very  nature,  independently  of  any  advantageous  result,  does  not 
 hinder  it  from  being  "  a  laudable  mean  of  real  happiaess." 
 
 3.  Now  hapj)iness  being  the  uniform  and  voluntary  end  of  intel- 
 tectual  existence,  a  desire  of  it  being  inseparable  from  our  nature, 
 we  become  liable  to  err,  not  only  by  adopting  wrong  means  for 
 accomplishing  the  end  we  propose  to  ourselves,  but  also  by  forming 
 a  false  estimate  of  the  nature  of  happiness,  or  the  end  itself.  If 
 the  happiness  be  not  real  but  imaginary  in  the  contemplation  of 
 the  agent,  however  well  adapted  the  means  may  be  in  order  to 
 attain  it,  they  deserve  not  the  epithet  virtuous. 
 
 4.  To  discover  the  nature  of  true  happiness  the  light  of  wisdom 
 is  requisite  ;  and  while  desire  is  blind,  false  estimates  will  be  made. 
 But  every  one  thinks  himself  wise  and  prudent  enough  to  prescribe 
 his  own  hapfiiness  till  such  folly  be  shewn  him  by  the  wisdom  which 
 is  from  above ;  and  he  who  supposes  himself  adequate  to  fix  the 
 end  cannot  be  very  diffident  about  the  means  to  be  employed. 
 
 5.  Hence,  there  is  room  for  as  many  representations  of  virtue 
 
DISS.  XIII.]  VIETUB  AND  VICE.  1 65 
 
 as  there  are  kinds  of  happiness  which  men  think  to  be  real ;  in 
 addition  to  as  many  means  employed  to  accomplish  their  proposed 
 end,  as  they  judge  to  be  laudable. 
 
 6.  From  these  preliminary  remarks,  it  appears  that  the  nature 
 and  real  character  of  virtue  must  arise  from  the  nature  of  the  end 
 proposed,  and  of  the  means  emj^loyed  for  securing  it.  We  shall 
 now  attempt  to  illustrate  the  ground  of  numerous  representations 
 of  virtue  by  a  comparison. 
 
 7-  Let  the  different  kinds  of  happiness  which  we  propose  to 
 ourselves,  whether  those  which  have  been  classified  by  moral  writers, 
 or  any  others,  be  represented  by  so  many  concentric  circles.  For 
 instance,  let  happiness  be  considered  as  personal  and  relative,  pri- 
 vate and  public,  domestic  and  national,  temporal  and  eternal,  or 
 the  like  ;  and  for  every  species  of  happiness  let  there  be  a  corre- 
 sponding circle  drawn.  Let  the  filling  up  of  that  circle  express 
 the  virtue  requisite  to  attain  the  happiness  thus  represented. 
 
 8.  Sujjpose,  for  example,  that  health,  friendship,  domestic  una- 
 nimity, national  prosperity,  the  welfare  of  the  human  race,  and 
 our  individual  conformity  to  God  in  His  moral  excellence  through 
 eternal  ages,  or  the  happiness  implied  in  these  respectively,  be  re- 
 presented by  the  concentric  circles  above  mentioned.  Then  the 
 happiness  implied  in  health,  in  a  small  circle,  will  be  filled  by  cor- 
 responding virtues,  when  the  end  is  sought  by  laudable  means ; 
 such  as  temperance,  moderation,  chastity,  government  of  the  pas- 
 sions, &e.  The  circle  representing  the  happiness  implied  in  friend- 
 ship will  be  filled  by  corresponding  vii'tues,  when  the  end  is 
 sought,  as  before,  by  laudable  means  ;  such  as  benevolence,  fidelity, 
 prudence,  sympathy,  &c.  The  circle  of  domestic  happiness  is 
 filled  by  the  virtues  of  kindness,  meekness,  patience,  industry, 
 economy,  &c.  That  of  national  prosperity,  by  diligence  in  busi- 
 ness, honesty,  justice,  truth,  liberality,  conscientious  submission, 
 fortitude,  real  patriotism,  &c.  The  circle  representing  the  welfare 
 of  the  human  race,  as  the  common  ofl^spring  of  one  progenitor, 
 and  who  are  regarded  by  the  Supreme  Parent  as  the  children  of 
 one  family,  is  filled  by  the  virtues  of  philanthropy,  expansive 
 benevolence,  zeal,  self-denial,  public  spirit,  passive  courage,  &c. 
 And  the  circle  of  that  happiness  which  is  implied  in  our  indi- 
 vidual conformity  to  God's  moral  excellence, — in  other  words,  that 
 happiness  which  is  ultimate  and  supreme, — is  filled  by  nothing 
 
166  YIETUE  AXD  \1CE.  [DISS.  SIH. 
 
 short  of  supreme  love  to  God,  or  in  language  more  pliilosopliically 
 accurate,  consent  of  will  to  being  in  general,  benevolent  attach- 
 ment to  universal  being. 
 
 9.  Now,  who  can  question  wliether  temperance,  fidelity,  meek- 
 ness, lionesty  and  liberality,  philanthropy  and  public  spirit,  should 
 be  ranked  among  the  virtues  ?  And  who  can  doubt  that  they  are 
 calculated  to  secure  the  happiness  implied  in  health,  friendship, 
 national  prosperity,  and  the  welfare  of  the  human  race  respectively  ? 
 And  yet,  if  we  exclude  the  disposition  which  is  required  to  fill 
 the  largest  circle, — benevolent  attachment  to  universal  being, — 
 which  of  those  virtues  may  not  an  Atheist  actually  possess  ?  Nay, 
 may  not  an  Atheist  possess  them  all  ?  For  may  he  not  promote 
 his  healtli  by  temperance,  moderation,  chastity,  and  the  like? 
 May  he  not  exercise  friendly  benevolence,  fidelity,  prudence,  sym- 
 pathy, and  similar  virtues  ?  Have  not  Atheists  been  great  patriots, 
 if  by  patriotism  we  mean  a  supreme  regard  for  the  prosperity  and 
 gloiy  of  the  nation  to  which  they  belonged,  manifested  by  severe 
 studies,  by  the  lightning  and  thunder  of  their  eloquence,  the 
 fatigues  of  war,  and  a  willingness  to  shed  the  last  drop  of  their 
 blood  in  defence  of  their  country  ?  Nay,  more ;  may  not  an 
 Atheist  possess  the  vu-tues  of  generous  philanthropy,  and,  to  a 
 certain  extent,  of  benevolent  zeal  for  the  welfare  of  mankind  in 
 general,  expressed  by  an  attempt  to  remove  their  ignominious 
 chains,  to  promote  the  civiKsation  of  savage  nations  whom  he  has 
 never  seen,  to  alleviate  the  sufleriags,  and  to  enhance  the  comforts 
 of  all  mankind  ? 
 
 10.  Far  be  it  from  us  to  suppose  that  Atheists  are  favourable  to 
 vh'tue  in  these  inferior  acceptations  of  the  term.  The  revei-se  is 
 abundantly  evident.  But  this  is  what  we  assert,  that  such  virtues 
 as  those  above  mentioned  are  what  an  Atheist  may  possess  without 
 inconsistency ;  and  that  they  have  no  moral  worth,  no  direct  con- 
 nexion either  with  the  complacency  of  God  in  them,  or  with  the 
 ultimate  happiness  of  the  agent.  However  attentive  a  man  may  be 
 to  jjractise  virtues  in  subservience  to  his  health,  whUe  he  repels  those 
 of  friendship,  while  he  repels  others  which  are  conducive  to  domes- 
 tic, national,  and  universal  happiness,  his  virtues,  if  the  name  be  re- 
 tained, are  those  of  a  had  character.  Some  have  been  conspicuous 
 and  zealous  patriots,  while  determined  foes  to  phDanthropy  and 
 general  good-will  to  mankiad,  as  such.  And  how  many  have 
 fought  with  the  most  patriotic  zeal  and  courage  in  the  field  of 
 
DISS.  XIII.]  VIRTUE  AND  VICE.  167 
 
 honour,  though  tyrants  at  home,  and  in  private  life  trampling  on 
 those  virtues  which  constitute  a  good  husband,  a  good  father,  a 
 good  master,  a  good  neighbour,  a  good  friend,  or  a  good  anything. 
 In  short,  were  a  man  "  to  give  all  his  goods  to  feed  the  poor,  and 
 his  body  to  be  burned,"  out  of  2;eal  to  promote  some  public  good, 
 yet  without  love  to  God,  without  benevolent  attachment  to  uni- 
 versal being,  he  is  morally  nothing,  or  worse  than  nothing. 
 
 11.  What  are  called  virtues,  without  a  disposition  to  embrace 
 universal  being  and  excellence,  are,  morally  considered,  lifeless 
 images.  To  compare  them  to  a  series  of  decimal  figures,  which 
 however  increased,  will  never  amouut  to  a  unit  of  moral  worth, 
 is  to  place  theui  iu  too  favourable  a  view;  they  are  more  like^ 
 ciphers.  But  let  these  unmeaning  ciphers  be  preceded  by  a  figure, 
 let  these  images  have  an  informing  and  invigorating  principle, 
 let  these  dry  bones  have  the  spirit  of  life  in  them,  and  they  will 
 acquire  a  moral  excellence, — they  will  deserve  the  name  of  real 
 virtues. 
 
 ]  2.  Some  have  defined  virtue  by  calling  it  "  a  tendency  to  ulti- 
 mate happiness."  If  the  meaning  of  this  definition  be,  "  a  tendency 
 to  God,  in  whom  our  ultimate  happiness  is  found,"  it  may  be 
 admitted ;  otherwise  it  seems  not  admissible  on  many  accounts. 
 Tendency  may  be  considered  as  either  voluntary  or  involuntary. 
 In  the  first  jjlace,  let  us  suppose  it  to  be  voluntary.  We  then 
 observe  that  it  is  not  rational,  nor  even  compatible  with  common 
 sense,  to  say  that  virtue  is  a  voluntary  tendency  to  a  quality  of  our 
 own  mind,  as  happiness  evidently  is.  For  happiness,  from  its  own 
 nature,  is  a  relative  state  or  quality  of  mind  which  is  the  result  of 
 enjoying  an  object  suited  to  our  wants.  And  to  desire  ultimate 
 happiness  without  including  the  object  of  choice  from  whence 
 happiness  results,  is  the  same  as  to  seek  happiness  in  nothing.  If 
 it  be  said  that  happiness  itself  is  the  object  sought,  then  virtue 
 consists  in  a  voluntary  tendency  to  seek  happiness  in  happiness ; 
 wliich  is  absurd. 
 
 13.  Ultimate  happiness  has  been  defined  "  the  durable  possession 
 of  perfect  good."  If  this  be  a  just  statement,  which  few  or  none 
 will  question,  what  is  the  perfect  good  possessed?  If  it  be  an- 
 swered, the  Supreme  Being,  to  this  there  is  no  objection.  But  if 
 it  be  said,  the  ultimate  happiness  itself  is  the  perfect  good  enjoyed, 
 then  the  happiness  to  which  the  choice  is  directed  is  both  cause 
 and  eS'ect  at  the  same  time.     Both  the  thing  enjoyed  and  the 
 
168  TIETUE  AND  VICE.  [DISS.  XIII. 
 
 enjoyment  itself  are  the  same  thing ;  which  is  no  less  absurd  than 
 for  a  man  to  assert  that  the  stock  of  a  tree  and  the  fruit  on  its 
 branches  are  the  same  thing  ;  or  that  his  relish  of  food  is  the  same 
 as  the  food  itself.  A  tendency  to  happiness  resulting  from  no 
 object  of  that  tendency  is  the  same  thing  as  a  tendency  to  no 
 happiness.  In  other  words,  according  to  this  definition,  supposing 
 the  tendency  to  be  voluntary,  virtue  is  a  desire  of  ultimate  happi- 
 ness. And  this  will  reduce  it  to  another  absurdity ;  for,  as  a 
 desire  of  ultimate  happiness  is  an  inseparable  property  of  intelli- 
 gent beings,  the  most  vicious  being  in  existence  is  vh'tuous.  These 
 consequences,  however  just,  will  not  be  thought  very  extraor- 
 •dinary  when  compared  with  the  following  declarations : — "  The 
 following  seems  to  be  at  present  the  true  moral  state  of  the 
 world.  In  every  moral  agent  the  number  of  virtuous  actions 
 greatly  exceed  that  of  vicious  ones.  In  by  far  the  greater  number 
 of  moral  agents,  and  even  amongst  those  who  are  considered  as 
 most  vicious  and  proiligate,  the  number  of  virtuous  affections  and 
 habits  greatly  preponderates  over  the  vicious  ones.  A  character 
 in  which  there  is  preponderance  of  vice  is  very  rarely,  if  ever,  to 
 be  met  with,"  (Belsham's  Elements,  p.  400.)  And  to  advance 
 one  step  further  in  this  hopeful  way,  as  this  desire  belongs  to  all 
 intelligent  beings  alike,  all  intelligent  beings  are  alike  virtuous ! 
 
 14.  In  reality,  a  mere  desire  of  ultimate  happiness  is  no  virtue, 
 has  nothing  laudable  in  it,  but  is  a  mere  instinct  of  intellectual 
 nature,  and  belongs  alike  to  the  best  and  the  worst  of  intelligent 
 beings.  But  virtue  consists  in  the  choice  of,  or  a  disposition  to 
 choose,  laudable  means  in  order  to  arrive  at  tliis  end.  A  bad  man 
 in  his  choice  of  objects,  or  a  virtuous  choice  itself,  aims  at  ultimate 
 happiness ;  but  the  means  are  not  laudable,  and  this  wrong  choice 
 of  means  constitutes  the  very  essence  of  his  vice. 
 
 ]  5.  If  it  be  said  that  virtue  is  a  tendency  to  ultimate  self- 
 enjoyment  as  constituting  happiness,  then  it  follows  that  self  is 
 the  perfect  good  desired  ;  and  then  every  one  is  himself  ah-sufBcient 
 to  constitute  his  own  happiness.  Let  any  rational  person  judge 
 whether  this  be  not  a  definition  of  sordid  vice  rather  than  of  vii-tue, 
 and  whether  such  a  disposition  would  not  be  a  tendency  to  insub- 
 ordination, anarchy,  and  confusion,  rather  than  to  happiness — the 
 very  temper  of  an  apostate  spirit. 
 
 16.  If  it  be  said,  moreover,  that  "  a  tendency  to  ultimate  happi- 
 ness" does  not  refer  to  the  will,  desire,  or  choice,  but  expresses 
 
DISS.  XIII.]  VIETUE  AND  VICE.  169 
 
 anytliing  wliicli  in  fact  tends  to  ultimate  happiness  ;  this  leads  us 
 to  suppose,  secondly,  that  the  tendency  is  involuntary.  It  seems, 
 then,  on  this  supposition,  that  the  means  employed  to  acquire  ulti- 
 mate happiness  ueed  not  be  laudable.  This  is  the  genuine  result 
 of  that  account  of  virtue  which  is  here  animadverted  upon,  and 
 which  the  abettors  of  it  are  forced  to  admit.  The  doctrine  of 
 "  intrinsic  merit  or  demerit  of  actions  independent  on  their  conse- 
 quences," they  call  an  "  absurd  supposition,"  (Belsham's  Elements, 
 pp.  309,  372,  873.) 
 
 1 7.  It  seems,  then,  we  are  all  bound  to  be  virtuous  at  our  peril, 
 and  yet  we  must  wait  the  result  of  all  our  actions  before  we  can 
 know  what  is  virtuous  and  what  is  not.  Por  if  virtue  and  vice 
 have  no  intrinsic  character  of  good  or  evil,  but  actions,  affections, 
 habits,  or  characters  are  either  good  or  bad  from  their  ultimate 
 consequences,  then  we  must  wait  for  those  consequences  as  the 
 only  expositors  of  virtue  and  vice. 
 
 18.  Can  anything  more  be  necessary  in  order  to  show  the  ab- 
 surdity of  such  a  notion  of  virtue  ?  Happiness,  it  is  allowed,  is  a 
 consequent  of  which  virtue  is  the  antecedent.  But  what  is  the 
 moral  nature  of  this  antecedent  ?  Is  it  anything  good,  beautiful, 
 or  laudable  per  se  ?  No,  say  they ;  it  has  no  nature  besides  ten- 
 dency, which  has  no  intrinsic  merit  or  demerit ;  and  consequently 
 that  which  has  no  moral  nature  is  a  moral  nothing ;  that  is,  virtue 
 is  a  moral  nothing,  or  nothing  moral.  And  whether  this  character 
 of  virtue  be  not  totally  distant  from  the  dictates  of  right  reason, 
 philosophic  accuracy,  common  sense,  and  Christian  piety,  let  the 
 reader  judge. 
 
 It  is  with  some  reluctance  that  we  [are  constrained  to]  notice 
 in  this  place  a  writer  who,  by  his  masterly  attack  on  modern 
 infidelity  and  atheism,  has  rendered  such  important  service  to  the 
 cause  of  truth  and  virtue,  but  who  seems  either  to  have  been  dis- 
 satisfied with  these  reasons,  or  to  have  omitted  a  strict  examination 
 of  them  when  duty  required  it.  We  shall  not  here  inquire  into 
 the  candour  of  Mr  Robert  Hall's  remarks,  in  associating  President 
 Edwards  with  modern  infidels  on  the  subject  of  virtue;  nor  on 
 the  congruity  of  the  business  whereby  a  definition  implying,  and 
 an  explication  declaring,  the  love  of  God  to  be  essential  to  true 
 virtue  is  made  to  coincide  with  a  definition  adopted  by  infidels, 
 and  consistent  with  atheism  itself     These  are  his  words  : — 
 
 "  It  is  somewhat  singular  that  many  of  the  fashionable  infidels 
 
170  VIETTJE  AND  VICE.  [DISS.  StJI. 
 
 have  hit  upon  a  defiuition  of  vii-tue  -which  perfectly  coiucides  with 
 that  of  certahi  metaphysical  divines  iu  America,  first  invented  and 
 defended  by  that  most  acute  reasoner  Jonathan  Edwards.  They 
 both  place  vii'tae  exclusively  iii  a  passion  for  the  general  good,  or, 
 as  Mr  Edwards  expresses  it,  love  to  being  in  general,  so  that  our 
 love  is  always  to  be  proportioned  to  the  magnitude  of  its  object  iu 
 the  scale  of  being ;  which  is  liable  to  the  objections  I  have  already 
 stated,  as  well  as  to  many  others  which  the  limits  of  this  note  will 
 not  permit  me  to  enumerate.     Let  it  suffice  to  remark — 
 
 "(1.)  That  virtue,  on  these  principles,  is  an  utter  impossibility, 
 for  the  system  of  being  comprehending  the  Great  Supreme  is  in- 
 finite ;  and  therefore,  to  maintain  the  proper  proportion,  the  force 
 of  particular  attachment  must  be  infinitely  less  than  the  passion 
 for  the  general  good.  But  the  limits  of  the  human  mind  are  not 
 capable  of  any  emotions  so  infinitely  diflerent  in  degree. 
 
 "  (2.)  Since  our  views  of  the  extent  of  the  universe  are  capable  of 
 perpetual  enlargement,  admittiug  the  sum  of  existence  is  ever  the 
 same,  we  must  return  back  at  each  step  to  dimiuish  the  strength 
 of  particular  aflections,  or  they  will  become  disproportionate,  and 
 conseqxiently,  on  these  j^rmciples,  vicious  ;  so  that  the  balance 
 must  be  contmually  fluctuating  by  the  weights  being  taken  out  of 
 one  scale  and  put  into  the  other. 
 
 "  (3.)  If  virtue  consist  exclusively  in  love  to  bemg  in  general,  or 
 attachment  to  the  general  good,  the  particular  aS'ections  are,  to 
 every  purpose  of  virtue,  useless  and  even  pernicious  ;  for  their 
 immediate,  nay,  their  necessary  tendency  is  to  attract  to  their 
 objects  a  proportion  of  attention  which  far  exceeds  their  com- 
 parative value  iu  the  general  scale.  To  allege  that  the  general 
 good  is  promoted  by  them  will  be  of  no  advantage  to  the  defence 
 of  this  system  ;  but  the  contrary,  by  confessing  that  a  greater  sum 
 of  happiness  is  attained  by  a  deviation  from,  than  an  adherence  to 
 its  principles ;  unless  its  advocates  mean  by  the  love  of  being  iu 
 general  the  same  thing  as  the  private  affections,  which  is  to  con- 
 found all  tlie  distinctions  of  language,  as  well  as  all  the  operations 
 of  mind.  Let  it  be  remembered,  we  have  no  dispute  respecting 
 what  is  the  ultimate  end  of  virtue,  which  is  allowed  on  both  sides 
 to  be  the  greatest  sum  of  hapipiness  in  the  universe.  The  question 
 is  merely,  What  is  virtue  itself  ?  or,  in  other  words.  What  are  the 
 means  appointed  for  the  attainment  of  that  end  ? 
 
 "There  is  little  doubt,  from  some  parts  of  Mr  Godwin's  work 
 
DISS.  XIII.]  TIKTUE  AND  VICE.  I7l 
 
 entitled  'Political  Justice,'  as  well  as  from  his  early  habits  of 
 reading,  that  he  was  indebted  to  Mr  Edwards  for  his  principal 
 arguments  against  the  private  affections  ;  though,  with  a  daring 
 consistence,  he  has  pursued  his  jjriuciples  to  an  extreme  from 
 which  that  most  excellent  man  would  have  revolted  with  horror. 
 The  fundamental  error  of  the  whole  system  arose,  as  I  conceive, 
 from  a  mistaken  pursuit  of  simplicity, — from  a  wish  to  construct 
 a  moral  system,  without  leaving  sufficient  scope  for  the  infinite 
 variety  of  moral  phenomena  and  mental  combination,  in  con- 
 sequence of  which  its  advocates  were  induced  to  place  virtue  ex- 
 clusively in  some  one  disposition  of  mind  ;  and,  since  the  passion 
 for  the  general  good  is  undeniably  the  noblest  and  most  extensive 
 of  all  others,  when  it  was  once  resolved  to  place  virtue  in  any  one 
 thing,  there  remained  little  room  to  hesitate  which  should  be 
 preferred.  It  might  have  been  worth  while  to  reflect  that  in  the 
 natural  world  there  are  two  kinds  of  attraction, — one  which  holds 
 several  parts  of  individual  bodies  in  contact,  another  which  main- 
 tains the  union  of  bodies  themselves  with  the  general  system, — and 
 that,  though  the  union  in  the  former  case  is  much  more  intimate 
 than  in  the  latter,  each  is  equally  essential  to  the  order  of  the 
 world.  Similar  to  this  is  the  relation  which  the  public  and  private 
 affections  bear  to  each  other,  and  their  use  in  the  moral  system," 
 (Modern  Infidelity  Considered,  p.  62,  &c.,  note,  6th  edition.) 
 
 On  this  note,  so  very  uncongenial  with  the  body  of  the  work, 
 — we  were  going  to  say,  as  unseemly,  when  connected  with  the 
 discourse,  as  a  deforming  wart  on  a  fair  countenance, — justice 
 constrains  us  to  make  a  few  remarks  : — 
 
 1.  "  Singular"  indeed  would  it  be  to  find  an  Atheist,  or  an  in- 
 fidel, who  should  even  approve  of  Edwards's  definition,  and  still 
 more  "  singular"  to  find  them  maintaining,  in  conformity  with  his 
 explanation  of  that  definition,  that  supreme  love  to  God  is  of  the 
 essence  of  true  virtue.  But  so  far  are  their  definitions  from  "  co- 
 inciding "  that  they  diifer  toto  ccdo.  A  passionate  attachment  for 
 the  welfare  of  a  country,  or  "  a  passion  for  the  general  good,"  in 
 any  sense  wherein  this  expression  can  be  ascribed  to  infidels,  is  a 
 representation  not  more  different  from  that  of  President  Edwards 
 than  Mr  Hall  is  different  from  Voltaire  or  D'Alembert.  Our 
 author's  meaning,  as  explained  by  himself,  is  as  truly  sublime  as 
 tJieirs  is  truly  selfish  and  contracted.  Por  their  definition  had  no 
 regard  to  the  Being  of  beings ;  but  this  adorable  Being  is  neces- 
 
172  VIETTJE  AND  VICE.  [DISS.  SHI. 
 
 sarily  included  in  Mr  Edwards's  definition,  and  essential  to  it.  ^Ye 
 say  "  is  included,"  beeaiise  the  Supreme  Being,  together  with  every 
 derived  existence,  is  contained  in  "  being  in  general." 
 
 2.  If  by  a  "metaphysical  divine"  he  meant  "a  most  acute 
 reasoner,"  we  feel  no  objection  in  having  the  term  "metaphysi- 
 cal" applied  to  our  author,  for  few,  if  any,  have  deserved  it  better. 
 If  error  and  absurdity  appeal  to  metaphysical  discussions,  and  in- 
 volve the  truth  in  a  labyrinth  of  sophisms,  surely  hard  would  be 
 the  case  of  a  man  who  should  be  called  by  an  opprobrious  name 
 for  venturuig  into  that  labyrinth  by  the  hght  of  essential  princi- 
 ples, in  order  to  detect  and  expose  the  false  reasoning. 
 
 3.  Mr  Hall  objects  to  the  sentiment  "  that  our  love  is  always 
 to  be  pro]3ortioned  to  the  magnitude  of  its  object  in  the  scale  of 
 being."  We  presume,  however,  he  will  allow  that  the  whole  sys- 
 tem of  being  is  in  itself  the  most  worthy  of  being  prized,  other 
 things  being  equal  But  if  so,  the  nature  of  true  vhrtue  requires 
 this  regard  to  the  whole  system  of  being,  compared  with  its  parts. 
 Nor  does  it  follow  from  this  that  the  same  princijjle  in  the  i^ro- 
 cess  of  its  operations  disregards  the  smaller  circle  of  attachments. 
 Surely  a  virtuous  person,  loving  God  supremely,  is  not  on  that  ac- 
 count less  qualified  for  personal  and  domestic  duties.  Besides,  Mr 
 Edwards  does  not  maintain  that  our  love  is  always  to  be  propor- 
 tioned to  the  magnitude  of  its  object  in  the  scale  of  being,  except 
 where  these  things  are  equal.  Tliis  he  expressly  and  repeatedly 
 mentions — ■"  other  things  being  equal."  To  this  impiortaut  dis- 
 tinction Mr  Hall  does  not  appear  to  have  adverted ;  his  repre- 
 sentation of  the  case,  therefore,  is  defective,  and  calculated  to 
 mislead  the  unwary. 
 
 4.  Mr  Hall's  statement,  in  the  first  objection,  does  not  distin- 
 guish between  the  natiu-e  of  the  attachment  and  its  force  or  degree. 
 A  little  reflection  wiU  fully  shew  that  these  are  entirely  distinct 
 considerations.  The  greatest  force,  or  the  highest  degTce  of  attach- 
 ment may  exist  when  the  nature  of  it  is  not  at  all  virtuous.  If,  in- 
 deed, attachment  be  made  to  include  accurate  knowledge,  a  Divine 
 relish,  and  deliberate  esteem,  in  appreciating  the  worth  of  any  ob- 
 ject, then  the  degree  of  attachment  may  be  justly  considered  as 
 proportionate  to  the  "magnitude  of  the  object  in  the  scale  of 
 being,"  but  not  otherwise.  A  truly  virtuous  mother,  for  instance, 
 may  have  a  gi-eat  force  of  affection  for  her  child,  or  husband,  and 
 be  more  conscious  of  it  than  of  her  love  to  God ;  but  let  her  be  put 
 
DISS.  XIII.]  VIETUE  AND  VICE.  173 
 
 •  to  the  test  of  deliberate  esteem,  and  she  would  sooner  part  with 
 child,  husband,  or  life  itself,  than  renounce  her  supreme  love  to 
 God. 
 
 5.  Our  author's  representation  of  true  virtue  by  no  means  im- 
 plies, as  Mr  Hall  supposes,  that  the  degree  of  force  or  attachment 
 in  its  operation  should  bear  an  exact  proportion  to  the  magnitude 
 of  its  object.  The  nature  of  virtue  indeed  is  to  be  denominated 
 according  to  its  object,  but  its  degree  must  necessarily  be  measured 
 pro  captu  agentis.  The  nature  of  love  to  God  may  be  the  same 
 in  the  heart  of  a  child  as  in  that  of  an  angel,  because  the  object 
 of  it  is  the  same  ;  but  the  degree  of  it  will  be  as  differently  varied 
 as  the  views  and  capacities  of  the  subjects.  It  is  not  a  little  sur- 
 prising how  Mr  Hall  came  to  imagine  that  our  author  held  the 
 sentiment  he  is  pleased  to  ascribe  to  him, — a  sentiment  so  absurd 
 as  to  be  held,  we  apprehend,  by  no  person  in  the  world, — a  senti- 
 ment which  requires  an  infinite  force  of  affection  from  a  finite 
 being,  an  affection  equal  in  degree  to  that  of  his  Maker. 
 
 6.  So  far  is  the  exercise  of  virtue,  according  to  Mr  Edwards's 
 definition,  from  being  an  impossibility,  that  we  think  he  has  fully 
 proved  there  can  be  no  true  virtue  on  any  other  principle.  To 
 illustrate  this,  suppose  a  man  has  a  strong  attachment  to  himself, 
 but  none  to  his  family;  will  that  force  of  affection  constitute  him 
 virtuous  ?  Again,  suppose  his  affection,  with  any  assignable  force, 
 be  extended  to  his  family,  but  repels  the  well-founded  claims  of  a 
 whole  nation ;  can  that  be  virtuous  ?  Or,  if  he  extend  his  force  of 
 affection  to  a  whole  nation,  if  it  repels  all  the  human  race  beside, 
 can  it  be  virtuous  ?  Moreover,  suppose  his  ardent  affection  em- 
 brace the  whole  human  kind ;  can  it  be  virtuous  while  it  repels  all 
 other  created  beings  ?  Or  if,  together  with  himself,  he  feels  an 
 affectionate  attachment,  in  different  and  proportionate  degrees,  to 
 every  created  being,  but  repels  the  Creator  of  all ;  can  that  forcible 
 and  orderly  affection  be  denominated  truly  virtuous  ?  If  the  reply 
 be  in  the  affirmative,  then  an  Atheist  may  be  virtuous  ;  which  is 
 absurd.  Therefore,  attachment  to  the  Supreme  Being,  or  to  being 
 in  general,  is  essential  to  the  very  nature  of  true  virtue. 
 
 7.  No  one  yet  denied,  except  those  who  deny  the  being  of  a  God, 
 that  supreme  love  to  Him  is  virtuous,  if  anything  be  so.  The 
 Great  Supreme  is  infinite ;  and  if  He  ought  not  to  be  loved  ac- 
 cording to  His  greatness,  what  constitutes  the  crime  of  idolatry  ? 
 And  if  supreme  love  to  an  infinite  Being  were  inconsistent  with 
 
174  VIllIUE  AST)  VICE.  [diss.  SIU. 
 
 subordinate  attacliments,  we  ought  to  extinguisli  the  supremacy  of 
 our  love  to  God  before  we  could  discharge  our  dutj^  to  our  feUow- 
 creatures  ;  which  every  one  must  allow  to  be  preposterous. 
 
 8.  As  the  second  objection  is  founded  on  the  same  principle 
 which  was  assumed  in  the  first,  it  has  been  already  virtually  an- 
 swered. But  it  may  be  controverted  on  another  account.  That 
 "  extended  views  "  diminish  the  strength  of  particular  affections, 
 does  not  appear  consonant  with  experience.  Is  it  consistent  with 
 experience  that  the  acquisition  of  a  second  friend  must  rob  the 
 first  of  a  moiety  of  his  friendly  affection  ?  Does  a  parent  expe- 
 rience any  diminution  of  affection  to  a  first  child  in  proportion  to 
 a  subsequent  increase  of  munber  ?  Has  a  tenth  child  but  a  tenth 
 part  of  a  mother's  former  affection  to  her  first  ?  Does  a  man  love 
 his  neighbour  the  less  because  his  views  are  extended  to  an  infinite 
 object  ?  Or  when  the  heart,  or  .supremacy  of  affection,  is  fixed  on 
 God,  is  virtuous  affection  to  man  diminished  ? 
 
 9.  Besides,  this  objection  proceeds  on  another  gratuitous  prin- 
 ciple— viz.,  that  there  may  be  true  virtue,  or  virtuous  affection, 
 when  our  views  of  existence  do  not  include  God.  For  if  we  view 
 Him,  we  view  an  object  infinite  and  unchangeable,  who  is  all  in 
 all,  and  the  sum  of  existence.  That  our  views  of  the  extent  of  the 
 created  universe  are  capable  of  perpetual  eulai-gement,  is  no  good 
 reason  why  "particular  affections"  .should  fluctuate,  become  dis- 
 proportionate, vicious;  any  more  than  the  love  of  God  should  con- 
 stitute the  love  of  our  neighbour  criminal  So  that  there  is  no 
 necessity  for  "  the  balance  to  be  continually  fluctuating  by  the 
 weights  being  taken  out  of  one  scale  and  put  into  the  other,"  except 
 it  be  by  correcting  past  mistakes,  as  those  do  who,  when  grown  up 
 to  manhood,  put  away  childish  things. 
 
 10.  Vu'tuous  love,  however  forcible  to  one's-self,  to  relatives,  to  a 
 nation,  to  mankind,  or  to  the  whole  created  universe,  is  not  vir- 
 tuous because  of  this  particular,  private,  or  limited  attachment,  but 
 because  of  its  tendency  to  God,  except  we  prostitute  the  terra 
 virtue  to  signify  something  claimed  equally  by  the  worst  and  the 
 best  of  men.  And  this  general  attachment,  or  love  to  God  and 
 universal  beuig,  does  not  at  all  counteract,  or  even  lessen,  the 
 commendable  force  of  private  ones,  auy  more  than  the  force  of 
 general  gravity  tends  to  destroy  the  force  of  cohesion. 
 
 11.  Mr  Hall's  third  and  last  objection,  like  the  preceding  ones, 
 rests  on  a  mistaken  apj)rehension  of  Mr  Edwards's  real  sentiment. 
 
DISS.  Sni.]  VIRTUE  AND  VICE.  17.5 
 
 Mr  Hall  still  confounds  the  nature  of  attachment  with  its  degree. 
 If  virtue,  according  to  Mr  Edwards,  consists  exclusively  in  love  to 
 being  in  general,  his  meaning  is,  that  no  force  of  affection  which 
 has  not  universal  being  for  its  ultimate  object  can  be  virtuous  in 
 the  most  projjer  sense  of  the  word.  He  cannot  mean  that  there  is 
 no  virtuous  love  to  particular  beings ;  for  in  perfect  consistency 
 with  his  views  even  a  love  of  ourselves  may  be  virtuous,  as  well  as 
 a  love  of  our  neighbour.  What  he  maintains  then  is,  that  the 
 love  of  ourselves,  of  our  neighbour,  our  nation,  or  any  private  sys- 
 tem whatever,  if  detached  from  a  tendency  of  affection  to  universal 
 being,  is  not  truly  virtuous.  And  what  is  this  more  or  less  than 
 what  all  judicious  divines  have  maintained,  that  he  who  really  does 
 not  love  God  does  not  truly  love  his  neighbour  ?  If  Mr  Edwards 
 uses  language  more  philosophically  exact,  and  investigates  the  prin- 
 ciple on  which  a  commonly  received  truth  is  founded,  he  certainly 
 deserves  commendation  rather  than  blame. 
 
 12.  On  Mr  Edwards's  jDrinciples,  the  particular  affections  are  so 
 far  from  being  "  useless,"  that  their  operations  are  not  at  aU  affected 
 by  those  princij^les,  except  in  being  more  exalted  and  refined. 
 When  the  heart  is  enlarged  to  the  love  of  being  in  general,  it 
 includes  all  jJarticular  objects  ;  and  then  the  attachment  to  them 
 is  for  the  sake  of  the  whole  system  of  being.  Thus  a  truly 
 virtuous  love  of  our  neighbour  springs  from  our  love  to  God  ;  or 
 without  a  supreme  regard  to  God,  there  is  no  genuine,  or,  in  the 
 highest  sense,  praiseworthy  love  to  oiu-  neighbour.  And  so  far  are 
 particular  affections  from  being  "  pernicious  "  on  Mr  Edwards's 
 principles,  that  they  are  highly  useful.  Those  objects  which  con- 
 tain, or  are  apprehended  to  contain,  only  a  secondary  beauty  at- 
 tract a  particular  affection,  which  is  useful  in  various  respects,  as 
 explained  by  our  author ;  and  those  which  contain  the  primary 
 beauty  attract  affections  still  more  useful.  For  governors,  and  sub- 
 jects, and  friends,  and  relatives  to  feel  attachment  to  their  subjects, 
 governors,  friends,  and  relatives,  must  be  useful,  even  when  not 
 virtuous  •  but  when  these  attachments  are  animated,  regulated, 
 and  enabled  by  the  love  of  God,  or  benevolence  to  universal  being, 
 they  must  be  still  more  so.  Benevolent  affections  are  like  a  plea- 
 sant flame, — a  flame  which  is  not  lessened  by  an  addition  of  fuel. 
 Zeal  at  home  is  not  found,  in  fact,  to  be  weakened  by  the  exten- 
 sion of  zealous  and  benevolent  affections  abroad.  National  reform 
 and  religious  revival  will  not  be  impeded  by  a  truly  benevolent 
 
176  VIETUE  AND  VICE.  [DISS.  XIII. 
 
 missionary  spirit.  Neither  will  the  love  of  God  nor  of  universal 
 being  prove  detrimental  to  "  particular  affections." 
 
 13.  Eespecting  the  "particular  affections,"  Mr  Hall  remarks 
 that  "  their  immediate,  nay,  their  necessary  tendency  is  to  attract 
 to  their  object  a  proportion  of  attention  which  far  exceeds  their 
 comparative  value  in  the  general  scale."  But  surely  "  attention  " 
 is  a  very  different  thing  from  "  attachment !'  A  man  who  is 
 about  to  buy  a  horse  has  his  attention  attracted  very  forcibly  to 
 the  size,  the  shape,  the  age,  and  the  action  of  the  animal ;  but 
 does  this  imply  attachment  ?  The  word  Satan  may  attract  our 
 "  attention  "  to  the  malevolent  being  signified  by  it ;  but  does 
 this  prove  that  the  "immediate,  nay,  the  necessarj' tendency"  of 
 the  word  is  to  attract  to  this  object  any  degree  of  "  attachment  ?" 
 It  would  be  difficult  to  find  either  man,  woman,  or  child  but  has 
 much  attention  attracted  to  what  he  does  not  esteem,  and  to  which 
 he  feels  no  attachment.  If  a  person  feels  an  attachment  to  any 
 object  not  founded  on  the  "  comparative  value  "  of  that  object,  let 
 the  "  particular  affection "  be  denominated  as  we  please,  but  let 
 us  not  attach  to  it  the  idea  of  true  virtue.  Per  why  .should  we 
 be  tempted  to  call  that  truly  virtuous  which  has  no  relation  to  God^ 
 the  object  and  fountain  of  all  excellence  ? 
 
 14-.  It  is  but  justice  to  our  author  to  say  that  his  definition  of 
 virtue,  against  which  Mr  Hall  objects,  by  no  means  countenances 
 that  perversion  of  our  powers  which  is  but  too  justly  ascribed  to 
 modern  infidels.  No  one  acting  on  the  principles  of  this  Disserta- 
 tion wUl  be  less  amiable  in  private  life  than  whUe  acting  on  any 
 others  which  Mr  Hall  might  point  out.  This  hypothesis,  which 
 we  believe  is  the  scriptural  one,  and  which  in  substance  has  been 
 maiutained  by  theological  wiiters  and  holy  men  of  every  age,  pours 
 no  chilling  influence  on  the  affections,  encourages  no  uuscriptural 
 disregards  or  antipathies  in  society,  nor  does  it  countenance  any 
 neglect  of  private  duties  under  pretence  of  public  utility.  We  are 
 assured  by  an  authority  from  which,  in  the  view  of  Christians, 
 there  lies  no  appeal,  that  "  to  love  God  with  all  our  heart "  is  the 
 first  and  great  commandment.  We  would  fain  know,  if  knowable, 
 wherein  this  requisition  differs  from  that  which  is  implied  in  Mr 
 Edwards's  notion  of  true  virtue  ?  Moreover,  whether  loving  God 
 with  aU  our  heart  is  calculated  to  render  "  the  particular  affec- 
 tions to  every  purpose  of  virtue  useless,  and  even  pernicious  1" 
 And,  once  more,  whether  that  act  of  the  mind,  which  is  compatible 
 
DISS.  XIII.]  VIETtTK  AND  VICE.  1 77 
 
 with  a  rejection  of  what  the  Divine  oracle  thus  requires,  can  in 
 any  propriety  of  language,  among  Christians,  be  termed  virtuous  ? 
 
 15.  "To  allege,"  Mr  Hall  observes,  "that  the  general  good  is 
 promoted  by  them  will  be  no  advantage  to  the  defence  of  this 
 system."  We  apprehend  he  means  that  some  may  be  disposed 
 to  allow  that  the  private  affections,  though  not  virtuous,  may  yet 
 promote  the  general  good,  on  some  other  account.  But  the 
 objector  is  under  a  mistake,  if  he  suppose,  as  he  apparently  does, 
 that  Mr  Edwards  held  any  notion  of  true  virtue  which  will  admit 
 no  private  or  "  particular  affections  "  to  be  virtuous.  In  fact  the 
 system  explained  in  this  Dissertation  excludes  no  particular  affec- 
 tion ;  but  fully  admits  that  any,  yea,  that  all  of  them,  may  be 
 virtuous,  by  a  proper  direction.  Supreme  love  to  God,  or  attach- 
 ment to  universal  being,  is  virtue  per  se ;  but  any  other  affection, 
 however  public  or  private,  particular  or  general,  is  a  virtue  only 
 relatively, — that  is,  only  so  far  as  it  is  a  tendency  to  universal 
 being.  When  the  affection  terminates  on  any  particular  object, 
 without  any  relation  in  its  tendency  to  universal  existence,  it  is 
 not  a  means  of  ultimate  happiness  in  itself  commendable,  and  there- 
 fore is  not  virtuous. 
 
 16.  "We  have  no  dispute,"  says  Mr  Hall,  "respecting  what  is 
 the  ultimate  end  of  virtue — the  question  is, '  What  is  virtue  itself?' " 
 Very  true  ;  what  is  it  ?  We  say  a  love,  an  attachment,  or  a  tend- 
 ency of  mind,  to  general  or  universal  existence,  whatever  be  the 
 immediate  object  of  the  will  or  the  affections.  If  the  affection  be, 
 for  instance,  that  of  a  parent  to  a  child,  however  strong  in  its 
 operation,  it  is  no  further  truly  virtuous  than  there  is  a  regard  to 
 God  in  it,  or  a  tendency  to  general  being.  But  what  is  virtue  it- 
 self, according  to  Mr  Hall  ?  The  answer  is  not  given.  Had  Mr 
 Hall  thought  proper  to  give  us_  a  definition  of  virtue,  we  might 
 compare  notes,  and  form  an  estimate.  It  is  much  easier  to  find 
 fault  than  to  amend  it ;  but  this  we  feel  disposed  to  promise,  that 
 if  the  objector  produce  what  he  thinks  a  better  definition  than 
 what  he  opposes,  we  wiU  endeavour  to  examine  it  with  impar- 
 tiality. 
 
 17.  Mr  Hall  supposes  that  the  author  of  the  work  entitled 
 "Political  Justice"  was  "indebted  to  Mr  Edwards  for  his  prin- 
 cipal arguments  against  the  private  affections."  Surely  that 
 author  must  possess  a  most  perverse  kind  of  ingenuity,  who  could 
 deduce  anything  from  the  works  of  President  Edwards  against  the 
 
 VOL.  IV.  M 
 
178  VIETUE  AND  VICE.  [DISS.  XIII. 
 
 private  affections  ;  such  ingenuity  as  an  infidel  sometimes  em- 
 ploys -when  he  is  indebted  to  the  writers  of  the  Old  or  New 
 Testament  for  his  principal  argument  against  religion,  and  in 
 favour  of  infidelity. 
 
 18.  "A  mistaken  pursuit  of  simplicity,"  Mr  Hall  supposes, 
 "  attaches  to  their  system,  whereby  its  advocates  jjlace  virtue  ex- 
 clusively in  some  one  disposition  of  mind."  We  conceive  there  is 
 just  as  much  propriety  in  this  remark  as  in  the  following  :  A  mis- 
 taken pursuit  of  simplicity  led  a  certain  writer  to  place  conformity 
 to  law  "  exclusively "  in  some  one  disposition  of  mind,  where  he 
 says  that  the  law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word,  love.  We  are  not  aware 
 that  it  is  a  matter  of  doiibt,  whether  moral  acts,  and  conseciuently 
 virtue,  proceed  from  the  will  or  the  heart ;  and  as  every  exercise 
 of  will  or  affection  is  not  virtuous,  it  requires  no  long  "  pursuit  of 
 simplicity  "  to  determine  that  the  virtuous  character  of  the  afi'ec- 
 tion  must  arise  from  its  nature,  rather  than  its  degree ;  and  from 
 its  being  directed  to  a  worthy  rather  than  an  unworthy  object. 
 
 19.  Mr  Hall  illustrates  his  meaning  by  two  kinds  of  attraction ; 
 and  so  does  Mr  Edwards  illustrate  his.  Private  affections  or  in- 
 stincts, irrespective  of  their  various  cpialities,  may  be  represented  by 
 the  attraction  of  cohesion,  whereby  the  several  parts  of  bodies  are 
 held  in  contact.  A  truly  virtuous  affection  may  be  reiDresented  l)y 
 the  attraction  of  gravitation,  which  maintains  the  union  of  bodies 
 themselves  with  the  general  system.  And  "  though  the  union  in 
 tlie  former  case  is  much  more  intimate  than  in  the  latter,"  and 
 "each  is  equally  essential  to  the  order  of  the  world;"  yet  private 
 affections,  irrespective  of  their  tendency  to  God,  can  with  no  more 
 propriety  be  respected  as  virtues  than  'cohesion  can  be  termed 
 gravitation. 
 
DISSERTATION  XIV. 
 
 ON  god's  ultimate  end  in  ceeation. 
 
 1.  A  CLEAR  and  comprehensive  view  of  the  universe,  or  the 
 "world,"  will  lead  us  to  observe  two  grand  divisions,  which  may- 
 be termed  physical  and  moral.  And  though  in  both  the  glory  of 
 God  is  the  chief  end,  yet  this  end  is  not  attained  by  the  same 
 means  in  the  moral  as  in  the  physical  department. 
 
 2.  By  the  creation  and  disposal  of  the  physical  part  of  the 
 universe,  the  glory  of  God's  natural  perfections,  as  of  sovereign 
 wisdom,  power,  and  goodness,  is  chiefly,  displayed.  But  by  the 
 creation  and  government  of  the  moral  part,  the  glory  of  the  moral 
 perfections  of  Deity,  that  is,  of  infinite  moral  rectitude,  or  equity, 
 and  of  sovereign  benevolence  and  mercy,  is  made  to  appear. 
 
 3.  God  being  an  infinite  sovereign,  controlled  by  no  considera- 
 tion but  iufinite  rectitude,  or  a  regard  to  the  consistency  of  His 
 own  character, — and  a  created  ruiiverse  being  capable  of  two  forms, 
 and  it  should  seem,  for  ought  that  appears  to  the  contrary,  of 
 two  only,  physical  and  moral, — a  full  emanation  and  display  ad 
 extra  of  the  moral  perfections  of  Deity  could  not  be  made  without 
 a  moral  system  in  all  its  capabilities  of  relation. 
 
 4.  The  physical  part  of  the  universe,  even  including  the  physical 
 operations  of  intelligent  beings,  may  subsist,  it  is  evident,  without 
 requiring  any  other  display  of  glory  than  what  is  included  in 
 sovereign  wisdom,  power,  and  goodness ;  and  it  is  equally  plain, 
 that  there  would  be  no  opportunity  of  manifesting  strict  equity, 
 much  less  mercy,  to  existent  beings,  without  a  moral  system. 
 Therefore — 
 
 5.  If  strict  or  absolute  equity,  and  sovereign  mercy,  be  mani- 
 fested, a  moral  system  was  necessary.  To  exercise  strict,  unmixed, 
 or  absolute  equity,  whereby  is  given  to  its  object  what  is  due  to  it, 
 
180  ON  god's  UL-JIMATE  end  in  CEEATION.         [diss.  XIV. 
 
 (a  capacity  for  moral  agency  being  supposed,)  and  yet  to  preserve 
 that  object, — that  is,  a  moral  agent, — from  being  liable  to  sin,  in- 
 volves a  contradiction.  For  it  is  the  same  as  to  say,  a  free  agent  is 
 not  free  to  sin,  though  fully  permitted  to  follow  his  own  tendencies. 
 And  this  is  the  same  thing  as  to  say,  an  accountable  creature  is 
 not  liable  to  fail ;  in  other  words,  a  moral  agent  is  no  moral  agent, 
 and  a  moral  system  is  no  moral  system.  Man  would  be  impeccable, 
 and  the  very  existence  of  sin  impossible. 
 
 6.  If  it  be  asked.  Might  not  the  whole  of  the  moral  part  of  the 
 universe  have  been  preserved  from  sin?  we  reply,  undoubtedly 
 it  might,  if  sovereign  benevolence  had  thought  proper  to  interpose, 
 in  order  to  counteract  the  exercise  of  strict,  unmixed,  and  absolute 
 rectitude  or  equity ;  but  then  it  must  have  been  at  the  expense  of 
 eternally  concealing  the  glory  of  this  Divine  perfection — absolute 
 rectitude. 
 
 7.  To  permit  the  creature  to  sin,  and  to  exercise  absolute  equity, 
 is  the  same  thing;  in  other  words,  to  exercise  this  glorious  per- 
 fection, and  not  to  permit  the  creature  to  sin,  are  incompatible 
 ideas.  If  this  perfection  be  exercised,  there  is,  there  can  be,  no 
 principle  belonging  to  a  moral  system"  which  preserves  it  from 
 being  liable  to  sin.  Nor  is  there  any  principle  belonging  to  it, 
 independent  of  sovereign  benevolence,  which  is  adequate  to  pre- 
 serve that  liability  to  sin  from  actual  defection.  But  to  appeal  in 
 the  way  of  objection  to  the  alternative  of  sovereign  benevolence, 
 which  alone  can  preserve  from  sin,  is  the  same  as  to  concede  what 
 the  proposition  asserts. 
 
 8.  Equity,  in  one  view  of  it,  is  indeed  compatible  with  the 
 exercise  of  sovereign  benevolence  towards  the  same  object,  and  at 
 the  same  time.  To  question  this,  would  be  to  question  God's 
 proper  sovereignty,  and,  therefore.  His  right  of  creating  and  pre- 
 serving- the  universe,  and  of  beatifying  any  creatures  He  hath 
 made.  For  neither  of  these  effects  could  take  place  but  by  sove- 
 reign benevolence  as  a  cause.  But  if  sovereign  benevolence  were 
 not  compatible  with  justice  or  equity,  in  one  view  of  it,  God 
 could  not  be  benevolent  without  being  unjust ;  which  is  absurd. 
 
 9.  Yet  equity,  in  another  view,  stands  as  a  contrast  to  benevo- 
 lence. Strict  or  absolute  equity  is  that  which  excludes  all  sove- 
 reign benevolent  influence ;  and  when  moral  agents  are  its  object, 
 (their  being  and  natural  capacities,  or  their  moral  capabilities, 
 being  supposed,)  the  exercise  of  absolute  equity  must  necessarily 
 
DISS.  XIV.]         ON  god's  ultimate  END  IN  CREATION.  181 
 
 exclude  benevolent  sovereign  influence.  Thus  among  men  we 
 find  some  resemblance  of  this  abstract  but  momentous  truth.  In 
 one  view,  justice  and  generosity  are  compatible ;  while  one  deals 
 justly  with  another,  he  may  also  be  additionally  generous.  But  in 
 another  view,  these  are  incomiDatible ;  for  strict,  absolute  justice, 
 is  the  same  as  justice  and  nothing  more,  and,  therefore,  must  ex- 
 clude generosity. 
 
 10.  Therefore,  equity,  in  the  one  view,  implies  the  exclusion  of 
 injustice  ;  and  in  the  other,  the  exclusion  of  undeserved  favour  or 
 sovereign  benevolent  influence.  The  exercise  of  rectitude  in  the 
 former  sense  might  have  been  without  the  permission  of  sin,  but 
 not  so  in  the  latter  sense.  If  perfect  absolute  rectitude  towards  a 
 moral  system  be  made  to  emanate  ad  extra,  to  the  full  develop- 
 ment of  the  capabilities  of  such  a  system,  the  permission  of  sin  is 
 not  only  equitable,  but  even  metaphysically  necessary.  That  is, 
 it  involves  a  contradiction  to  say  that  such  a  Divine  perfection 
 may  be  so  displayed,  or  its  glory  made  to  appear  ad  extra,  and 
 yet  not  to  permit  the  existence  of  moral  defect,  or,  in  other  words, 
 to  actually  hinder  its  existence. 
 
 11.  The  very  idea  of  a  moral  system,  in  which  the  permission 
 of  defect  is  excluded  by  equity,  is  one  of  the  most  absurd  that  can 
 be  conceived.  Por  it  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  God  was  bound 
 in  equity  not  to  permit  sin,  while,  at  the  same  time.  He  constituted 
 the  agent  free,  and  accountable  for  the  exercise  of  his  freedom  ; 
 and,  as  He  has  in  fact  permitted  the  introduction  of  sin  into  the 
 world,  such  an  idea  would  be  the  same  as  to  charge  Infinite  Per- 
 fection with  want  of  equity. 
 
 12.  We  may,  therefore,  safely  conclude  that  the  glory  of  the 
 Divine  rectitude  towards  the  intelligent  and  moral  part  of  the 
 universe,  considered  as  accountable  and  to  the  full  extent  of  its 
 moral  capabilities,  could  not  be  manifested  without  the  permission 
 of  sin.  The  full  exercise  of  equity  must  necessarily  leave  the 
 moral  system  to  its  own  tendencies  and  operations. 
 
 1 3.  To  i^ermit  the  event  of  sin,  or  not  to  hinder  it,  implies  that 
 the  cause  of  defection  is  not  in  the  Permitter,  but  in  the  permitted, 
 not  in  the  Governor,  but  the  governed.  There  is  in  the  moral 
 part  of  the  universe  a  cause  why  an  event  which  ought  not  to  take 
 place  will  take  place,  if  not  hindered.  If  there  be  such  a  cause  in 
 the  system,  how  could  the  event  take  place  on  permission  ?  If  it 
 be  said  there  is  a  chance  that  it  may  not  take  place,  and  there  is 
 
182  ON  god's  tTLTIMATE  END  IN  CREATION.         [DISS.  SIV. 
 
 a  chance  of  the  contrary ;  it  is  bnt  fair  to  ask,  Is  this  chance 
 something  which  has  a  cause,  or  has  it  no  caiise  ?  If  the  latter, 
 the  concession  itself  reduces  chance  to  a  mere  nothing  ;  for  a  con- 
 tingent event,  as  the  operation  of  chance  is  s\ipposed  to  be,  without 
 any  cause,  is  a  metaphysical  impossibility.  If  the  former,  what  is 
 the  cairse  of  what  the  objector  calls  chance  ?  Is  it  something  ex- 
 ternal or  internal  ?  What  is  its  nature  and  character  ?  To  say  that 
 liberty  of  indifference,  or  a  self-determining  power,  is  the  chance 
 which  requii'es  no  preceding  caiise  to  produce  the  event,  is  to  con- 
 tradict absolute  demonstration,  if  ever  there  was  a  metaphysical 
 demonstration  of  any  subject,  as  [President  Edwards]  has  abund- 
 antly shewn  in  his  "  Essay  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will." 
 
 14.  It  is,  therefore,  inaccurate  and  unintelligible  langaiage  to 
 say  that  either  chance,  liberty  of  indifference,  or  a  self-determining 
 power,  independent  of  any  antecedent  cause,  is  adequate  to  account 
 for  the  event  of  sin,  or  a  deterioration  of  a  moral  system.  God, 
 therefore,  permitting,  there  is  an  inherent  adequate  cause  of  failiu-e 
 distinct  from  Divine  causation.  What  this  cause  is,  and  what  is 
 its  nature,  has  been  shewn  and  proved  in  [the  Dissertation  on 
 Moral  Evil.] 
 
 15.  Permission  is  an  act  of  equity,  or  it  is  the  exercise  of  recti- 
 tude to  the  exclusion  of  benevolent  influence,  whether  we  regard 
 that  influence  as  preventing  the  event  of  sin,  or  as  delivering  from 
 its  power.  Sovereign  benevolence  prevents  the  faU  of  angels  ;  and 
 it  dehvers,  restores,  and  eternally  saves  a  goodly  number  of  the 
 human  fallen  race.  Without  the  permission  of  sin,  restoruig 
 benevolence  or  the  exercise  of  mercy  would  have  been  impossible ; 
 and,  consequently,  the  glory  of  that  perfection,  which  can  be  fully 
 displayed  only  by  its  exercise  towards  the  miserable,  would  have 
 been  eternally  concealed. 
 
 1 6.  If,  therefore,  equity  be  a  glorious  attribute  of  God,  its  emana- 
 tion and  exercise  must  be  glorious.  But  the  exercise  of  equity,  in 
 the  strict  sense,  includes  the  permission  of  sin,  as  before  proved. 
 And,  here  we  may  add,  if  not  to  hinder  be  an  exercise  of  strict 
 rectitude,  the  continued  existence  of  sin  is  not  inconsistent  with  it. 
 
 17.  It  will  be  allowed  by  every  one,  that,  as  mercy  itself  is  a 
 glorious  attribute,  so  is  the  exercise  of  it  a  glorious  thing.  But 
 this  would  have  been  imjjossible,  if  sin  had  no  existence  ;  nor  could 
 sin  have  had  existence,  if  not  permitted  to  exist :  and  sin  could 
 not  have  been  permitted,  if  strict  equity  had  not  been  exercised  ; 
 
DISS.  XIV.]        ON  god's  ultimate  END  IN  CREATION.  183 
 
 nor  could  strict  equity  have  been  exercised,  if  the  exercise  of  pre- 
 venting sovereign  benevolence  had  not  been  excluded  in  those  in- 
 stances vpherein  moral  defect  actually  took  place. 
 
 18.  First  Carol. — The  ultimate  and  chief  end  of  God  in  the 
 creation  and  government  of  the  moral  part  of  the  universe  is  the 
 glory  of  His  moral  perfections,  which  are  virtually  included  in 
 strict  rectitude  and  sovereign  benevolence. 
 
 19.  Second  Corol. — If  strict  rectitude  be  exercised  towards  the 
 degenerate  part  of  the  system,  the  restoration  of  those  who  are  the 
 objects  of  it  is  not  possible ;  that  is,  to  suppose  it  possible  involves 
 a  contradiction.     Therefore — 
 
 20.  Third  Corol. — If  any  degenerate  moral  agent  be  restored, 
 it  must  necessarily  be  by  the  exercise  of  that  sovereign  benevolence 
 which  we  call  mercy. 
 
 21.  Fourth  Corol. — "  Behold  therefore  the  goodness  and  severity 
 of  God :  on  them  who  fell,  severity  ;  but  toward  thee,  goodness,  if 
 thou  continue  in  his  goodness :  otherwise  thou  also  shalt  be  cut  off." 
 Goodness  and  severity  are  but  other  words  for  sovereign  benevolence 
 and  strict  equity,  the  glory  of  which  is  abundantly  conspicuous  in 
 the  various  Divine  dispensations  towards  the  children  of  men  even 
 in  this  life,  but  will  ajppear  stiU  more  transcendent  in  the  day  when 
 God  shall  judge  the  world  in  righteousness,  and  in  tho  day  of 
 eternity. 
 
DISSEETATION  XV. 
 
 WAE — CIVIL  EIGHTS — PUBLIC  GOOD — EEVEXGE — CTPEIAN  ON — 
 NATIONAL  SUMMU3I BONUM — OFFENSIVE — FULLY  PEESUADED 
 ON  ITS  CAUSE — OFFICEES  OF  HIGH  BANK — INNOCENT  SUBJECTS 
 — PEESECUTION. 
 
 Theee  can  be  bo  doubt  that  civil  rights,  liberties,  and  privileges 
 are  great  blessings,  and  therefore  ought  to  be  secured  by  aU  fair 
 and  lawful  means.  But  the  question  is,  Whether  it  becomes  the 
 Christian  character  to  secure  these  things,  any  more  than  other 
 desii-able  enjoyments,  by  destructive  violence  ?-  Christians  are  to  be 
 thankful  to  Providence  for  blessings,  and  so  are  they  for  sufferings 
 too,  as  of  that  number,  ■when  endured  in  the  way  of  righteousness. 
 It  is  but  a  fail-  question,  Would  the  Christians  have  done  right, 
 supposing  it  had  been  in  their  jDOwer,  to  dethrone  Nero  in  favoitr 
 of  another  more  promising  emperor,  while  the  probable  sacrifice  of 
 lives  in  the  achievement,  including  both  sides,  was  less  than  the 
 number  of  innocent  Christians  who  should  be  sufferers  by  Nero  ? 
 But  before  the  decision  is  made,  let  Eom.  siii.  1-5  be  read  and 
 well  considered. 
 
 TVAE — PUBLIC  GOOD. 
 
 To  make  the  public  good  to  consist  in  civil  rights,  freedom  from 
 slavery,  and  privileges  promised  by  express  contract,  and  then  to 
 make  the  j^robable  advancement  of  such  public  good  to  be  the  rule 
 of  conduct  at  all  events,  may  pass  for  good  doctrine  with  secular 
 politicians,  but  surely  spiritual  Christians  have  not  so  learned 
 Christ.  If,  indeed,  any  land  of  con.siderable  improvement  could  be 
 effected  without  inflicting  any  real  injury,  as  voluntarily  to  deprive 
 men  of  life  is,  it  is  plain  that  no  law  either  of  nature  or  of  Chris- 
 
DISS.  XV.]  WAE.  185 
 
 tianity  proliibits  it.  Even  coercive  measures  in  the  way  of 
 disciplinary  corrections,  and  the  prevention  of  social  mischief,  are 
 not  only  innocent,  but  to  be  commended  and  encouraged  by 
 suitable  rewards. 
 
 WAE — EEVENGE. 
 
 Nor  is  it  necessary  that  a  judge,  even  one  appointed  to  pro- 
 nounce the  deathful  sentence  dictated  by  a  black  inquisitorial  court 
 on  the  innocent,  should  have  "  any  degree  of  malice "  against  the 
 injured  victim ;  it  is  effected  according  to  a  certain  legal  process, 
 and  private  revenge  is  out  of  the  question.  But  ought  he  to  be 
 thus  employed  because  the  higher  powers  appoint  him,  or  because 
 the  "  public  good  "  requires  it  ?  The  previous  question  with  him 
 should  be.  Are  they  right  in  making  such  appointment  ?  and  is 
 that  public  good  which  requires  this  of  me  consistent  with  the 
 laws  of  Christ  ? 
 
 WAR — DESPEEATE  VILLANY. 
 
 This  representation*  gives  but  a  very  confined  and  partial  view 
 of  the  subject  in  debate.  It  leaves  no  alternative  between  deathful 
 force  and  the  most  infantile  or  idiotic  helplessness.  But  is  it  a 
 fair  inference  from  the  doctrine  of  the  unlawfulness  of  war,  that  it 
 "  would  make  every  desperate  villain  irresistible,  and  consequently 
 would  give  up  all  the  property  and  lives  in  a  city  or  province  to 
 one  such  person  ? "  Nothing  less  ;  though  he  were  a  Goliath  in 
 arms,  or  a  Polypheme  for  human  victims.  He  must  have yboc?,  he 
 also  inust  have  sleep;  and,  though  a  sword,  a  jjike,  or  a  bullet, 
 might  save  time,  trouble,  and  money,  yet  were  there  a  thousand 
 guineas  reward  for  taking  him  a  -living  prisoner,  depend  upon  it 
 we  should  soon  behold  many  a  courageous  champion  equipped 
 with  helmet,  shield,  and  habergeon,  and  soon  should  we  find  him 
 safely  lodged  in  a  prison.  An  argument  so  improbable  deserves 
 not  a  more  serious  reply. 
 
 *  Viz.  : — "  The  following  scriptures  ai'e  often  referred  to  as  countenancing,  if  not 
 Tindicating  arms  :  Luke  iii.  li,  Matt.  viii.  10,  Acts  x.  1,  &c.  But  it  is  an  argu- 
 ment of  much  greater  importance,  that  the  doctrine  [viz.,  of  the  unlawfulness  of 
 war]  we  have  here  been  opposing  would  make  every  desperate  villain  irresistible, 
 and  consequently  would  give  up  all  the  property  and  lives  in  a  city  or  province  to 
 
 one  such  person The  common  law,  therefore,  of  benevolence  to  society, 
 
 requires  an  assault  on  such  a  person,  which  does  not  imply  any  such  malevolence 
 to  him  as  is  inconsistent  with  the  Christian  temper  in  its  greatest  heights." — See 
 Dodch-idge,  vol.  v.,  p.  280. 
 
186  "WAR.  [diss.  XV. 
 
 He  wlio  would  disallow  of  magistracy  must  be  strangely  inat- 
 tentive to  the  wants  of  human  nature,  the  necessity  of  subordina- 
 tion, and  the  real  welfare  of  mankind,  as  well  as  the  whole  tenor 
 of  revealed  religion.  But  cannot  "  the  decree  of  the  magistrate 
 against  a  desperate  villain  regularly  take  place  before  he  has  been 
 brought  to  trial,"  &c.,  consistently  with  the  principle  of  the  unlaw- 
 fulness of  war  ?  Why  not  ?  May  not  a  magistrate,  on  the  pacific 
 system,  which  all  Christians  expect  will  one  day  take  the  place  of 
 the  martial  one,  decree  that  every  desperate  villain,  as  well  as 
 every  disorderly  person,  should  be  apprehended  ?  May  he  not 
 decree,  that  those  whose  immediate  office  it  would  be  should  have 
 ample  rewards  in  securing  them  without  injury  to  their  persons, 
 but  none  if  they  killed  them  in  the  attempt  ?  Lives  might  occa- 
 sionally be  lost,  but  alivays  by  an  unlaivful  hand ;  and  all  reward- 
 able  courage  would  be  in  saving  men's  lives,  not  destroying  them. 
 After  all,  the  number  of  human  victims,  if  the  sacrificers  of  such 
 victims  were  branded  as  illegal  and  disJionourable,  and  also  de- 
 prived of  all  selfish  interest,  would  not,  in  all  probability,  be  one 
 in  a  hundred  of  those  who  fall  on  the  current  system. 
 
 But  the  most  formidable  objection  to  that  system  which  op- 
 poses the  necessity  of  war — a  system  which  consistent  Christians 
 expect  will  be  put  in  practice  at  some  distant  period,  and  which, 
 therefore,  it  may  reasonably  be  expected  ought  to  begin  with  indi- 
 viduals— is  the  difficulty  of  keeping  free  from  the  insults  of  ex- 
 ternal foes.  In  the  present  state  of  society,  pacific  men  form  but 
 a  small  portion  of  any  state ;  much  less  have  they  the  formation 
 and  direction  of  public  arrangements.  They,  therefore,  have 
 given  no  provocation,  their  advice  is  neither  sought  nor  valued ; 
 they  may  therefore  consistently  say.  Let  those  who  war  upon  the 
 principle  of  utility  abide  by  the  consequences ;  and  let  those  who 
 act  on  the  pacific  principle,  from  conscience,  prepare  for  the 
 result  with  undaunted  fortitude,  yet  with  humble  dependence  on 
 almighty  providence  and  all-sufficient  grace.  But  when  in  any 
 future  period  the  principle  in  question  is  adopted  by  a  majority, 
 and  the  rulers  of  a  state,  war  wUl  be  shunned  as  worse  than  a  pesti- 
 lential contagion ;  the  attention  will  be  turned  to  a  revision  of 
 existing  laws,  moral  and  religious  education  will  share  largely  in 
 the  national  encouragement  and  bounty,  and  evangelical  virtue 
 will  be  set  up  as  the  national  good.  Wisdom,  a  soft  answer,  pru- 
 dence, moderation,  an  appeal  to  the  universe  in  a  cause  of  imjjort- 
 
DISS.  XV.]  WAE.  187 
 
 ance,  will  generally  preserve  the  neutrality  of  any  state  without 
 further  insults.  But  suppose  the  worst ;  shall  we  suppose  the 
 adventures  of  Huns,  Goths,  and  Mohammedans  to  be  repeated  ? 
 The  fury  of  conquerors  is  evermore  directed  more  against  the 
 warlike  and  wealthy,  than  the  peacable  and  moderate.  An  in- 
 stance or  two  wlU  tend,  perhaps,  more  effectually  to  illustrate  this 
 remark  than  a  volume  of  abstract  reasoning. 
 
 Among  furious  conquerors  of  ancient,  middle,  or  modern  times, 
 it  would  be  difficult  to  select  one  more  lost  to  humanity  than 
 Attila.  This  warrior,  after  having  brought  into  subjection  all  the 
 northern  nations,  began,  as  his  ambition  had  no  bounds,  and  his 
 arms  had  hitherto  been  attended  with  wonderful  success,  to  enter- 
 tain thoughts  of  reducing  not  only  the  Goths  settled  in  Thrace, 
 but  the  Romans  themselves,  and  making  himself  master  of  the 
 whole  empu'e.  With  this  view,  having  drawn  together  a  vast  army, 
 without  any  regard  to  an  existing  treaty  which  his  uncle  Eouas 
 had  entered  into  with  the  Emperor  Theodosius  II.,  he  passed  the 
 Danube,  and,  entering  Thrace,  put  all  to  the  sword,  without  dis- 
 tinction of  sex,  age,  or  condition.  Elated  with  the  success  of  con- 
 quest, he  sent  to  Theodosius  a  messenger  with  haughty  claims, 
 adding,  that  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost,  since  he  coiild  no  longer 
 restrain  or  moderate  the  ardour  of  his  troops  thirsting  after  blood 
 and  spoil.  Theodosius  at  first  chose  rather  to  try  the  chance  of 
 war,  but  afterwards  more  wisely  concluded  a  peace  with  Attila. 
 According  to  Priscus,  no  prince  ever  subdued  such  numerous 
 countries  in  so  short  a  time.  His  authority  was  acknowledged  by 
 all  the  states  and  princes  from  the  Ehiue  to  the  most  northern 
 boundaries  of  the  Persian  empire.  What  vieAVS  he  had  of  his  own 
 superiority  may  be  gathered  from  this  contemptuous  observation 
 of  his,  "  that  the  emperors  had  slaves  for  their  generals,  whereas 
 his  generals  were  upon  a  level  with  the  emperors  themselves."  He 
 had  a  passion  for  war ;  but  depended  more  upon  his  council  than 
 his  sword,  employing  not  only  force  and  menaces,  but  frequently 
 craft,  and  sometimes  low  artifices,  and  even  falsehood,  to  obtain 
 his  end.  He  was  constantly  forming  new  projects,  and  vast  de- 
 signs, aspiring  at  nothing  less  than  the  monarchy  of  the  universe. 
 He  was  so  elated  with  his  great  power  and  success  as  not  to 
 hearken  to  reason,  however  clear  and  evident.  The  pride  and 
 haughtiness  of  his  mind  appeared  in  all  his  actions  and  motions, 
 in  his  gait,  eyes,  and  look ;  insomuch  that  no  one  could  beliold 
 
188  WAE.  [diss.  sv. 
 
 liim  without  concluding  that  he  was  sent  into  the  world  to  disturb 
 its  repose.  His  presence,  joined  to  the  reputation  he  had  acquired, 
 struck  all  who  beheld  him  (though  low  in  stature,  with  small  eyes) 
 with  such  awe  and  terror,  that  very  few  ventured  to  approach  or 
 speak  to  him.  We  are  told,  however,  that  an  ambassador  sent  to 
 him  by  Valentinian  III.  appeared  quite  unconcerned  before  a  man 
 who  made  the  world  to  tremble.  As  the  ambassador  had  justice 
 on  his  side,  he  was  not  intimidated  by  his  wild  and  menacing 
 looks ;  but,  in  spite  of  the  rage  to  which  he  abandoned  himself,  he 
 answered  all  his  complaints  without  betraying  the  least  fear,  leav- 
 ing him  at  his  departure  calm  and  capable  of  reason,  though  he 
 had  found  hiiu  quite  outrageous  and  intractable. 
 
 Let  those  who  have  to  do  with  an  Attila  foUow  the  example  of 
 this  illustrious  ambassador  of  Valentinian. 
 
 WhUe  the  Eomans  carried  on  a  war  against  the  Volsci,  under 
 the  generalship  of  Camillus  and  L.  Purius,  military  tribunes,  they 
 made  themselves  masters  not  only  of  the  field  of  battle,  but  of  the 
 enemy's  camp.  Among  the  prisoners  were  discovered  some  Tus- 
 eulans,  who  confessed  that  they  had  aided  the  Volsci  by  order  of 
 the  public,  and  the  authority  of  their  magistrates.  The  senate,  on 
 this  report,  thought  it  necessary  to  declare  war  against  Tusculum, 
 and  charged  Camillus  with  that  expedition.  The  Tusculans  op- 
 posed the  Roman  arms  by  a  method  entirely  new,  that  made  it 
 impossible  to  commit  hostilities  against  them.  When  the  troops 
 entered  their  country,  the  inhabitants  neither  abandoned  their 
 places  upon  their  march  nor  desisted  from  cultivating  their  lands. 
 A  great  number  of  citizens,  dressed  as  in  times  of  peace,  came  out 
 to  meet  the  generals.  Camillus  having  encamped  before  the  gates, 
 which  were  open,  and  desiring  to  know  whether  the  same  tran- 
 quillity prevailed  within  the  walls  as  he  had  found  in  the  country, 
 he  entered  the  city.  All  the  houses  and  shops  were  open,  and  all 
 the  artificers  were  intent  uf)on  their  trades.  The  schools  resounded 
 with  the  voice  of  children  at  their  books  ;  the  streets  were  full  of 
 people  going  backwards  and  forwards  on  business,  without  any 
 sign  of  terror,  or  even  amazement,  and  not  the  least  trace  of  war. 
 Everything  was  tranquil  and  pacific.  CamiUus,  surprised  at  such 
 a  sight,  and  overcome  by  the  enemy's  patience,  caused  the  assembly 
 to  be  summoned  by  the  magistrates.  "  Tusculans,"  said  he,  "  you 
 are  the  only  people  who  till  now  have  found  out  the  true  arms  and 
 forces  capable  of  securing  them  against  the  anger  of  the  Romans.'' 
 
DISS.  XV.]  WAE.  189 
 
 Sucli  probably  will  be  the  conduct  of  future  Christians,  on  gospel 
 principles,  as  an  introduction  to  the  glorious  millennium  —  the 
 empire  of  universal  tranquillity,  under  the  spiritual  government  of 
 the  true  Solomon,  the  Prince  of  Peace. 
 
 WAR — CYPEIAN  ON. 
 
 The  excellent  Cyprian  saith  expressly,  when  shewing  the  obliga- 
 tions of  Christians,  quihus  occidere  11011  licet, — that  it  is  not  lawful 
 for  them  to  kill  their  enemies,  (Epist.  58,  Ed.  Fell.)  The  Chris- 
 tians of  his  day  are  further  described  in  these  words : — "  Hoc 
 ipso  vinctos  esse,  quia  niori  non  timent ;  nee  7-epugnare  contra 
 impugnantes,  cum  occidere  innocentihus  nee  nocentem  liceat ;  sed 
 prompte  et  animas  et  sanguinem  tradere  ; " — "  They  are  invincible, 
 because  they  dread  not  death  ;  and  they  make  no  warlike  resistance, 
 because,  though  innocent,  it  is  not  lawful  for  them  to  kill  an  ag- 
 gressor," (Epist.  60.)  TertuUian,  in  his  "Apology  for  the  Christians 
 against  the  Gentiles,'"  says  : — "  Christianus  etiam  damnatus  gratias 
 agit.  .  .  .  Aristoteles  familiarem  suum  Hermiam  turpiter  loco  exce- 
 dere  fecit;  Christianus  iiec  inimicmn  suum  Icedit ; " — "A  Christian, 
 though  condemned,  [andwe  may  be  sure  unjustly,]  gives  thanks.  .  .  . 
 Aristotle  behaved  haughtily  to  his  intimate  friend  Hermias,  but  a 
 Christian  does  not  injure  even  his  enemy,"  (Cap.  46.)  And  again  : 
 — "Male  enim  velle,  male  facere,  male  dicere,  male  cogitare  de  quo- 
 quam,  aequo  vetamur ;" — "To  wish  ill,  to  do  ill,  to  speak  ill,  or  even 
 to  think  ill,  with  respect  to  anything,  we  are  justly  prohibited," 
 (Cap.  36.)  "  Si  inimicos  jubemur  diligere,  quern  habemus  odisse  ? 
 Item  si  Isesi  vicem  referre  prohibemur,  ne  de  facto  pares  simus, 
 quem,  possumus  lasdere  1 " — "  If  we  are  commanded  to  love  our 
 enemies,  whom  have  we  to  hate  ?  In  like  manner,  if  when  injured 
 we  are  prohibited  a  retaliation,  lest  we  degrade  ourselves  like  them, 
 whom  can  we  injure  ? "  Once  more  : — "  Cui  bello  non  idonei, 
 non  prompti  fuissemus,  etiam  impares  copiis,  qui  tam  libenter 
 trucidamur,  si  non  apud  istam  disciplinam  magis  occidi  liceret 
 quam  occidero  ? " — "  What  war  are  we  not  prepared  for,  though 
 with  unequal  forces,  since  we  are  in  the  habit  of  cheerfully  meet- 
 ing death,  were  it  not  the  genius  of  our  religion  that  we  should 
 suffer  ourselves  to  be  killed  rather  than  to  kill  others?" 
 
 Origen  says  in  rejily  to  Celsus  : — OvKert  \a/j,8avo/j,ev  eV  e6vo<i 
 fia'xat.pav  ovBe  navdavofiev  in  iroXefietv,  yevo/Mevoi  Sta  tov  'Irjaow 
 
190  WAR.  [diss.  xy. 
 
 vioi  elp7]vr]<i, — "  We  no  longer  take  the  sword  against  any  nation, 
 nor  do  we  learn  the  art  of  war,  being  made  by  Jesns  the  sons  of 
 peace." 
 
 WAR — PUBLIC  WELFAEE. 
 
 On  the  other  side  of  this  question  *  it  has  been  pleaded  that  no 
 benevolent  person  holds  war  to  be  desirable /o?'  its  own  sake,  if 
 the  public  welfare  can  be  secured  without  it ; — that  the  public 
 welfare  may  be  secured  on  pacific  j)rinciples  directed  by  wisdom 
 without  war,  to  such  a  degree  as  is  consistent  with  the  real  interest 
 of  Christians,  though  probably  not  so  far  as  to  secure  national 
 aggrandisement,  or  any  one  uninterrupted  form  of  government ; 
 — that  if,  in  any  case,  the  distinguishing  protection  of  a  superin- 
 tending providence  may  be  expected,  it  must  be  while  exercising 
 the  most  benevolent  dispositions  towards  oiir  enemies ;— that  there 
 is  a  manifest  difference  between  the  Christian  dispensation  and  all 
 preceding  ones  with  respect  to  the  exercise  of  justice  and  mercy  : 
 the  prominent  feature  of  each  preceding  dispensation  was  that  of 
 justice  divinely  executed,  and  often  in  the  way  of  resistance, 
 retaliation,  and  death ;  but  that  of  the  gospel  is  benevolence 
 tempered  with  mercy  towards  all  men,  and  most  ex^jressly  to  our 
 enemies ; — that  the  language  of  prophecy  concerning  the  design 
 of  the  gospel,  and  the  genuine  effects  of  its  prevalence,  is  highly 
 pacific,  with  which  accords  the  angelic  anthem  at  the  Saviour's 
 birth ; — that  the  spirit  and  language  manifested  in  our  Lord's 
 doctrine  and  discourses,  and  those  of  His  inspired  servants 
 recorded  in  the  New  Testament,  are  full  of  those  principles  which 
 are  utterly  inconsistent  with  fighting  ; — that  the  manner  in  which 
 they  exemplified  their  principles  clearly  shews  that  they  resisted 
 not  evil  to  the  real  injury  of  any ; — that,  on  the  contrary  principle, 
 no  one  can  be  a  martyr  to  doctrinal  or  moral  truth  ;  for  to  fall  in 
 a  contest  because  weak,  or  destitute  of  means  to  crush  the  adverse 
 power,  is  not  martyrdom ; — that  it  is  unreasonable  to  expect  the 
 fulfilment  of  prophecies  in  a  state  of  universal  peace  while  the 
 pacific  system  is  rejected  ;  for  there  will  always  remain,  in  the 
 best  of  men,  so  much  imperfection  as  will  be  construed  by  their 
 neighbours,  equally  imperfect,  injustice ;  and  if  injustice  be  a 
 sufficient  cause  of  fighting,  there  never  can  be  a  prospect  of  con- 
 
 *  Viz.,  that  "  cases  may  occur  in  whicli  opposing  force  to  force  may  tend  to 
 public  good — i.e.,  in  which,  virtue  may  allow  and  require  ua  to  engage  in  war." 
 
DISS.  XV.]  .  WAE.  191 
 
 tinued  peace  in  this  world ; — that  those  who  have  adopted  the 
 pacific  side  from  conscience  have  actually  found  the  smiles  of 
 Providence,  and,  in  case  of  suffering,  an  inward  feast ; — that  more- 
 over, those  who  hold  the  unlawfulness  of  fighting,  may  consistently 
 defend  themselves,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word ;  that  is,  so  far 
 as  defence  can  be  effected  without  offering  offence  or  irreparable 
 injury  to  another ; — that  the  pacific  principle,  which  discards  all 
 threats  and  hostile  menaces,  is  conciliating,  by  the  exercise  of 
 benevolence,  meekness,  wisdom,  reason,  by  negotiations,  conces- 
 sions, and  self-denial ; — that  it  does  not  prohibit  a  Christian  from 
 holding  the  reins  of  civil  government,  so  long  as  they  can  be  held 
 without  bloodshed; — that  it  does  not  forbid  coercion,  while  the 
 life  is  preserved  and  the  lasting  welfare  of  the  individual  is 
 consulted. 
 
 WAR — NATIONAL  SUMMUMI  B0NU3I. 
 
 It  is  of  some  importance  to  observe  that  the  "  public  good  "  is 
 a  phrase  of  very  equivocal  import.  If  by  it  we  understand  exten- 
 sive territory,  strict  independence,  stationary  or  growing  wealth,  a 
 powerful  navy,  a  war  establishment,  a  flourishing  commerce,  valour, 
 honour,  patriotism,  liberty,  and  life  SECURED  AT  ALL  EVENTS,  and 
 the  possession  of  these  the  national  sunimum  honum,  it  is  plain 
 that  destructive  violence,  or  war,  may  be  sometimes  necessary. 
 But  if  we  place  the  "public  good"  in  righteousness,  peace,  virtue, 
 industry,  frugality,  benevolence,  justice  tempered  with  mercy,  a 
 humble  dependence  on  Almighty  Providence  for  protection  from 
 evil  and  for  all  needful  prosperity, — if  these  be  the  national 
 summum  honum,  while  extensive  territory,  strict  independence, 
 Avealth^  trade,  commerce,  liberty,  and  life  are  only  subordinate 
 considerations,  it  is  equally  plain  that  destructive  violence  may  in 
 no  case  be  necessary  while  the  end  may  be  fully  attained.  And 
 it  may  deserve  consideration  whether  these  heavenly  mandates  ai'e 
 binding  on  collective  bodies  of  men,  even  the  largest  nations,  as 
 well  as  individuals ; — "  Seek  ye  first  the  kingdom  of  God,  and  his 
 righteousness ;  and  all  these  things  [all  subordinate  comforts]  shall 
 be  added  unto  you."  "  Love  your  enemies,  bless  them  that  curse 
 you,  do  good  to  them  that  hate  you,  and  pray  for  them  who  de- 
 spitefully  use  you,  and  persecute  you."  If  every  event  in  the 
 course  of  Divine  providence,  every  transaction  in  society,  and 
 every  temporal  enjoyment  be  considered  as  only  subordinate  to 
 
1 92  WAE.  [diss.  XV. 
 
 real  virtue,  which  is  here  supposed  to  be  the  true  NATIONAI, 
 summum  bonum,  the  degree  iu  which  the  subordinate  or  secondary 
 objects  are  jDossessed  or  enjoyed  is  cheerfully  referred  to  the  over- 
 ruling wisdom  and  distributive  pleasure  of  God,  to  whom  such  a 
 nation  would  commit  itself  in  well-doing.  It  is  not  improbable 
 that  a  peculiar  blessing  would  attend  a  nation  acting  on  those 
 principles,  and  that  prophecies  will  be  fulfilled,  and  the  full  bless- 
 ings of  the  gospel  introduced  among  all  nations,  in  that  way. 
 "  Eighteousuess  exalteth  a  nation."  "  Who  is  he  that  shall  harm 
 a  people  who  are  followers  of  that  which  is  good  ? "  "  If  men's 
 ways  please  the  Lord,  he  maketh  even  their  enemies  to  be  at  peace 
 with  them."  But  where  the  other  objects  have  been  made  the 
 principal,  as  in  all  the  renowned  warlike  empires  of  antiquity, 
 and  others  in  modern  times,  the  proposed  end  has  not  been  at- 
 tained. Who  can  ascertain  what  real  advantage  has  accrued  to 
 the  Assyrian,  Babylonian,  Persian,  Grecian,  and  Eoman  empires, 
 not  to  mention  others  of  later  date,  from  having  proposed  to 
 themselves  such  a  standard  of  "  public  good  "  as  made  it  necessary 
 to  employ  destructive  force  in  its  support  ?  The  evils  are  but  too 
 obvious  and  shocking.  On  the  other  plan,  states  might,  indeed, 
 be  less  powerful  and  formidable,  wealthy  and  splendid  ;  but  it  is 
 morally  certain  they  would  be  more  virtuous,  and  more  under  the 
 protection  and  approving  smiles  of  Providence. 
 
 WAE — OFFENSIVE. 
 
 The  term  "  defensive  war,"  though  commonly  used,  seems  to 
 border  on  solecism  in  language,  if  not  contradiction  in  terms. 
 War  implies  an  "endeavour  by  open  violence  to  hurt  and  de- 
 stroy ; "  and  therefore  the  phrase  in  question  denotes  defensive 
 violence,  defensive  hurting,  defensive  destruction,  or  defensive 
 offence.  War  is  violent,  hurtful,  destructive,  and  offensive ;  but 
 defence  is  innocent,  consulting  only  self-j)reservation,  warding  off 
 injury,  but  not  returning  it.  Christ  and  His  first  followers  used 
 self-defence,  but  never  warred  or  fought. 
 
 Substitute  the  word  arms  for  war,  and  the  proper  import  of 
 the  word  "  defensive"  will  appear. 
 
 Defensive  arms  are  such  as  preserve  the  person  from  being  in- 
 jured, as  helmets,  breastplates,  and  shields  ;  but  offensive  arms  are 
 those  which  are  used  to  injure  others,  as  the  sword,  bayonet,  nius- 
 
DISS.  XV.]  WAE.  19  S 
 
 ket,  &c.    Proiierly  speaking,  persons  who  are  only  on  the  defensive 
 cannot  be  said  to  be  in  a  state  of  war. 
 
 WAS, — BEING  FTTLLY  PEESUADED  ON  THE  SUBJECT. 
 
 It  win  easily  occur  to  the  reader  that  an  "  unjust  war"  and  an 
 unjust  cause  are  very  different  considerations.  A  man  may  have 
 justice  on  his  side,  if  simply  the  point  of  right  or  wrong  be  con- 
 sidered, while  his  fighting  for  it  may  be  a  very  unjust  thing,  even 
 on  supposition  that  he  could  have  no  other  mode  of  redress  from 
 the  civil  power,  or  were  commanded  to  adopt  that  mode.  To  be 
 "  fully  persuaded,"  therefore,  that  an  enemy  is  unjust  in  his  de- 
 mands or  provocations,  cannot  be  a  sufficient  reason  why  fighting 
 with  him  is  a  just  thing  ;  except  it  could  be  shewn  that  it  is  proper 
 to  fight  on  every  provocation,  or  that  every  act  of  injustice  ought 
 to  be  punished  that  way.  For  the  question  would  still  return. 
 What  degree  of  injustice  can  warrant  such  conduct,  whether  on  a 
 private  or  public  scale?  Whether  any  degree  of  injustice  can 
 be  greater  than  what  Christ  and  His  disciples  endured  with 
 patience,  meekness,  benevolence,  a  forgiving  temper,  and  inter- 
 cessions for  the  ofi"enders?  And  whether  their  conduct  ought 
 not  to  be  regarded  as  a  proper  example  to  be  imitated  by  all 
 Christians  ? 
 
 WAE — OFEICEES    IN    THE    HIGHEE   BANKS   ACT  A  PART   OF   MUCH 
 GEEATEB  IMPOBTANCE. 
 
 The  argument  of  this  scholium*  has  been  thought  to  prove  too 
 much ;  for  on  this  principle  virtue  may  require  that  two  or  more 
 armies,  provided  neither  of  them  be  "fully  persuaded"  that  the 
 war  on  their  side  is  unjust,  may  face  each  other  as  enemies  ;  and 
 as  virtue  requires  that  an  army  should  obey  the  orders  of  the  com- 
 manding oflScers,  so  it  may  require  that  two  or  more  armies  may 
 desig-n,  at  the  command  of  their  chiefs,  the  destruction  of  each 
 other,  on  the  supposition,  all  fight  under  the  banner  of  virtue, 
 
 *  Viz. ; — "'  Subjects  may  not,  even  when  commanded  by  their  prince,  engage  in 
 any  war  which  they  are  fully  persuaded  is  unjust ;  but  if  it  appears  a  dubious  point 
 to  them,  the  same  obUgation  does  not  hold,  for  otherwise  common  soldiers  could 
 hardly  engage  at  all,  since  they  seldom  have,  or  can  have,  a  full  view  of  all  the 
 circumstances  of  the  aifair " — Doddridge's  Lectures,  83,  §  19. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  N 
 
194  WAE.  [diss.  XV. 
 
 and  may  be  required  to  charge  and  kill  each  other ;  that  is,  virtue 
 may  oppose  and  crush  itself,  which  is  absurd. 
 
 WAE — INNOCENT  StTBJECTS. 
 
 The  argument  of  this  scholium*  proceeds  on  the  supposition, 
 that  the  refusal  of  an  "  equitable  satisfaction"  is  a  just  cause  of 
 war.  The  necessary  distinction  between  a  cause  just  in  some 
 degree,  and  a  cause  that  justifies  war,  is  overlooked.  However, 
 the  question  returns,  What  is  equitable  ?  The  parties  differ  in 
 their  views  of  equitable  satisfaction.  One  observes : — "Let  any  man 
 coolly  and  impartially  examine  the  history  of  the  past  and  the  pre- 
 sent times,  and  say  whether  every  dispute  between  nations  might 
 not  have  been  settled  by  negotiation,  if  the  parties  had  been  so  dis- 
 posed." But  suppose  one  party  be  so  disposed  and  the  other  not, 
 how  much  is  to  be  given  up  to  prevent  violence?  Suppose  the 
 equitable  balance  in  the  view  of  one  party  amount  to  a  million  of 
 money,  an  island,  or  a  province  ;  the  other  views  the  affair  in  nego- 
 tiation perfectly  equitable,  exclusive  of  the  claimed  balance.  Now, 
 the  true  question  is,  not  who  has  equity  on  his  side,  but  whether  a 
 million  of  money,  an  island,  a  province,  and  thereby  an  accession 
 of  more  wealth,  influence,  power,  or  liberty ;  nay,  more  properly, 
 whether  the  chance  of  gaining  this  be  really  worth  the  certain  ex- 
 pense of  money,  the  probable  sacrifice  of  innocent  lives,  family 
 afHictious,  the  cessation  of  industrious  labour,  the  agitation  of  the 
 public  mind,  and,  above  aU,  the  moral  evils  ever  attendant  on 
 actual  war  ? 
 
 PEESECUTION  IN  ITS  EELATION  TO  "WAE. 
 
 Persecutions  are  of  two  kinds — private  and  public.  Private 
 liersecutions  are  the  scintillations  of  pride,  envy,  hatred,  malice,  and 
 false  zeal,  without  public  authority.  Public  persecutions  are  a 
 fire  fed  by  the  supreme  power,  maintained  systematically  and 
 deliberately,  upon  principle,  or  legal  reasons  of  state.  They  bear  a 
 similar  relation  to  each  other  as  partial  quarrels,  affrays,  or  com- 
 
 *  Viz.,  That  "  lie  who  offered  the  injury  may  defend  himself,  when  the  party 
 injured  has  refused  an  equitable  satisfaction  proposed :  in  that  case  the  pai'ty 
 injured  becomes  the  aggressor;  miich  more  may  subjects  defend  themselves  even 
 when  their  prince  has  been  to  blame,  if  the  enemy  endeavour  to  avenge  the  quarrel, 
 not  on  the  person  of  the  prince,  but  on  his  innocent  subjects." — See  Doddridge's 
 Lectures,  as  above. 
 
DISS.  XV.]  WAR.  195 
 
 bats  bear  to  national  wars.  Systematic  persecution  attacks  persons 
 not  by  a  transient  passion,  but  merely  as  transgressors  against 
 established  rides  of  public  good.  Wlien  the  unity,  honour,  or  sup- 
 posed purity  of  the  Church  is  in  danger  ;  when  uniformity  of 
 professed  doctrine  or  mode  of  worship  is  violated,  and  this  viola- 
 tion is  supposed  to  have  great  influence  on  the  public  temper  and 
 habits,  which  constitute  or  affect  a  great  part  of  the  public  good ; 
 and  when  everything  inconsistent  with  it  must  be  crushed  by 
 violence,  it  is  a  plain  case  that  persecution  is  unjustifiable  only  in 
 proportion  as  a  wrong  NATIONAJL  summuni  honum  is  adopted,  and 
 this  must  be  secueed  at  all  events.  Confessors  and  martyrs 
 prosecute  an  end  which  is  inconsistent  with  what  the  persecuting 
 state  has  fixed.  Each  party  attains  its  end  respectively :  the  one 
 by  violence,  the  other  by  patient  suffering ;  one  obeys  the  national 
 will,  the  other  the  apprehended  Divine  will. 
 
DISSERTATION  XVI. 
 
 INTEENAL  EVIDENCE  OF  CHEISTIANITY. 
 
 On  this  subject,  a  work,  entitled  "A  View  of  the  Internal  Evi- 
 dence of  the  Christian  Religion,"  by  Soame  Jenyns,  Esq.,  deserves 
 a  perusal.  The  author  was  once  an  infidel,  "  but  having  some 
 leisure,  and  more  curiosity,  he  employed  them  both  in  resolving  a 
 question  which  seemed  to  him  of  some  importance :  Whether 
 Christianity  was  really  an  imposture  founded  on  an  absurd,  incred- 
 ible, and  obsolete  fable,  as  many  suppose  it?  Or  whether  it  is, 
 what  it  pretends  to  be — a  revelation  communicated  to  mankind  by 
 the  interposition  of  supernatural  power  ?  On  a  candid  inquiry,  he 
 soon  found  that  the  first  was  an  absolute  imj)ossibility,  and  that 
 its  pretensions  to  the  latter  were  founded  on  the  most  solid 
 grounds." 
 
 The  author  undertakes  to  shew,  among  other  things,  that  from 
 the  New  Testament  may  be  collected  not  only  doctrines  of  religion, 
 but  also  a  system  of  ethics,  in  which  every  moral  precept  founded 
 ■  on  reason  is  carried  to  a  higher  degree  of  purity  and  perfection 
 than  in  any  other  of  the  wisest  philosophers  of  preceding  ages  ; 
 that  every  moral  precept  founded  on  false  principles  is  totally 
 omitted,  and  many  new  precepts  added,  peculiarly  corresponding 
 with  the  new  object  of  this  rehgion  ;  that  such  a  system  of  reli- 
 gion and  morality  could  not  possibly  have  been  the  work  of  any 
 man,  or  set  of  men ;  and  that,  therefore,  it  must  undoubtedly  have 
 been  effected  by  the  interposition  of  Divine  power.  The  work, 
 though  not  faultless,  abounds  with  valuable  remarks,  some  of 
 which  are  here  inserted  : — 
 
 1.  In  all  former  religions,  the  good  of  the  present  life  was  pro- 
 posed as  i\i.e  first  object ;  in  the  Christian  it  is  but  the  second.  In 
 those,  men  were  incited  to  promote  that  good  by  the  hopes  of  a 
 
DISS.  XVI.]        INTERNAL  EVIDENCE  OF  CHEISTIANITY.  197 
 
 future  reward  ;  in  this,  the  practice  of  virtue  is  enjoined  in  order  to 
 qualify  them  for  that  reward.  Hence  it  is  that  Christianity  insists 
 more  strongly  than  any  preceding  institution,  religious  or  moral, 
 on  purity  of  heart  and  a  benevolent  disposition,  because  these  are 
 absolutely  necessary  to  its  great  end. 
 
 2.  The  personal  character  of  the  Author  of  this  religion  is  no 
 less  new  and  extraordinary  than  the  religion  itself.  For  instance, 
 He  is  the  only  founder  of  a  religion  in  the  history  of  mankind 
 which  is  totally  unconnected  with  all  human  policy  and  govern- 
 ment, and  therefore  totally  unconducive  to  any  worldly  purpose 
 whatever.  All  others,  Mohammed,  Numa,  and  even  Moses  himself, 
 blended  their  religious  institutions  with  their  civil,  and  by  them 
 obtained  dominion  over  their  respective  people  ;  but  Christ  neither 
 aimed  at,  nor  would  accept  of  any  such  power.  He  rejected  every 
 object  which  all  other  men  pursue,  and  made  choice  of  all  those 
 which  others  fly  from  and  are  afraid  of.  No  other  ever  made  his 
 own  sufferings  and  death  a  necessary  part  of  his  original  plan,  and 
 essential  to  his  mission. 
 
 3.  Before  the  appearance  of  Christianity  there  existed  nothing- 
 like  religion  on  the  face  of  the  earth,  the  Jewish  only  excepted  ; 
 all  other  nations  were  immersed  in  the  grossest  idolatry,  which  had 
 little  or  no  connexion  with  morality,  except  to  corrupt  it  by  the  in- 
 famous examples  of  their  imaginary  deities.  They  all  worshipped 
 a  multiplicity  of  gods  and  demons,  whose  favour  they  courted  by 
 imj)ious,  obscene,  and  ridiculous  ceremonies,  and  whose  anger  they 
 endeavoured  to  appease  by  the  most  abominable  cruelties.  In  the 
 politest  ages  of  the  politest  nations  in  the  world,  at  a  time  when 
 Greece  and  Eome  had  carried  the  arts  of  oratory,  poetry,  history, 
 architecture,  and  sculpture,  to  the  highest  perfection,  and  made  no 
 inconsiderable  advances  into  those  of  mathematics,  natural,  and 
 even  moral  philosophy,  in  religious  knowledge  they  had  made  none 
 at  all ;  a  strong  jDresumption  that  the  noblest  efforts  of  the  mind 
 of  man,  unassisted  by  revelation,  were  imequal  to  the  task.  They 
 sometimes  talked  of  virtue  carrying  men  to  heaven  and  placing 
 them  amongst  the  gods,  but  by  this  virtue  they  meant  only  the 
 invention  of  arts  or  feats  of  arms  •  for  with  them  heaven  was  open 
 only  to  legislators  and  conquerors,  the  civilisers  or  destroyers  of 
 mankind.  This  was,  then,  the  summit  of  religion  in  the  most 
 polished  nations  in  the  world;  and  even  this  was  confined  to  a  few 
 philosophers,  prodigies  of  genius  and  literature,  who  were  little  at- 
 
198  INTEENAL  EVIDENCE  OF  CHEISTLOIITY.         [DISS.  XVI. 
 
 tended  to,  and  less  understood,  by  the  generaKty  of  mankind  in 
 their  own  countries,  while  aU  the  rest  were  involved  in  one  com- 
 mon cloud  of  ignorance  and  superstition.  At  this  time  Christianity 
 broke  forth  from  the  east  like  a  rising  sun,  and  dispelled  this  uni- 
 versal darkness. 
 
 4.  Christianity  has  taught  doctrines  as  inconceivable  to  the  wisest 
 of  mankind  antecedent  to  its  appearance,  as  the  Newtonian  system 
 is  at  this  day  to  the  most  ignorant  tribes  of  savages  in  the  wilds 
 of  America ;  doctrines  which  human  reason  never  could  have  dis- 
 covered, but  which,  when  discovered,  coincide  with  and  are  con- 
 firmed by  it,  and  which,  though  beyond  the  reach  of  aU  the  learn- 
 ing and  penetration  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Cicero,  are  now  clearly 
 laid  oj)en  to  the  eye  of  every  peasant  and  mechanic  with  his  Bible 
 in  his  hand.  These  are  aU  plain  facts  too  glaring  to  be  contra- 
 dicted, and  therefore,  whatever  we  may  think  of  the  authority  of 
 these  books,  the  relations  they  contain,  or  the  inspiration  of  their 
 authors,  of  these  facts  no  man  who  has  eyes  to  read,  or  ears  to 
 hear,  can  entertain  a  doubt,  because  there  are  the  books,  and  in 
 them  is  this  religion. 
 
 5.  Christianity  enjoins,  with  peculiar  plaioness  and  authority, 
 piety  to  God,  benevolence  to  men,  justice,  charity,  temperance,  and 
 sobriety,  with  aU  those  duties  which  prohibit  the  commission  of 
 the  contrary  vices,  all  which  debase  om-  natures,  and,  by  mutual 
 injuries,  introduce  universal  disorder,  and,  consequently,  universal 
 misery.  But  it  entu-ely  omits  precepts  founded  on  false  principles, 
 those  which  recommend  fictitious  virtues,  which,  however  cele- 
 brated and  admired,  are  productive  of  no  salutaiy  efiects,  and  in 
 fact  are  no  virtues  at  all  Valour,  for  instance,  is  for  the  most 
 part  constitutional ;  and  so  far  is  it  from  producing  any  salutary 
 effects  by  introducing  peace,  order,  or  happiness,  into  society,  that 
 it  is  the  usual  perpetrator  of  aU  the  violences  which,  from  re- 
 taliated injuries,  distract  the  world  with  bloodshed  and  devastation. 
 It  is  the  engine  by  which  the  strong  are  enabled  to  plunder  the 
 weak,  the  proud  to  tramjjle  upon  the  humble,  and  the  guilty  to 
 oppress  the  innocent.  It  is  the  chief  instrument  which  ambition 
 employs  in  her  unjust  pursuits  of  wealth  and  power,  and  is,  there- 
 fore, so  much  extoUed  by  her  votaries.  It  was,  indeed,  congenial 
 with  the  religion  of  Pagans,  whose  gods  were,  for  the  most  part, 
 made  out  of  deceased  heroes  exalted  to  heaven  as  a  reward  for  the 
 mischiefs  they  had  perpetrated  upon  eai-th ;  and  therefore  with  them 
 
DISS.  XVI.]         mTEENAL  EVIDENCE  OF  CHEISTIANITY.  199 
 
 this  was  the  first  of  virtues,  and  had  even  engrossed  that  denomi- 
 nation to  itself.  But  Christians  are  so  far  from  being  allowed  to 
 inflict  evd,  that  they  are  forbidden  even  to  resist  it ;  they  are  so  far 
 from  being  encouraged  to  revenge  injuries,  that  one  of  their  first 
 duties  is  to  forgive  them  ;  so  far  from  being  incited  to  destroy 
 their  enemies,  that  they  are  commanded  to  love  them,  and  to  serve 
 them  to  the  utmost  of  their  power.  If  Christian  nations,  there- 
 fore, were  nations  of  Chnstians,  all  war  would  he  impossible  and 
 unhnown  amongst  them. 
 
 6.  Patriotism  also,  that  celebrated  virtue  so  much  practised  in 
 ancient,  and  so  much  professed  in  modem  times, — that  virtue 
 which  so  long  preserved  the  liberties  of  Greece,  and  exalted  Eome 
 to  the  empire  of  the  world,  must  also  be  excluded,  because  it  not 
 only  falls  short  of,  but  directly  counteracts  the  extensive  benevo- 
 lence of  this  religion.  Christianity  commands  us  to  love  all  man- 
 kind ;  patriotism,  to  op})ress  all  other  countries  in  order  to  advance 
 the  imaginary  prosperity  of  our  own.  Christianity  enjoins  us  to 
 imitate  the  universal  benevolence  of  our  Creator,  who  pours  forth 
 His  blessings  on  every  nation  upon  earth  ;  patriotism,  to  copy  the 
 inean  jiartiality  of  a  jsarish  ofiicer,  who  thinks  injustice  and  cruelty 
 meritorious,  whenever  they  promote  the  interests  of  his  own  in- 
 considerable village.  This  has  ever  been  a  favourite  virtue  with 
 mankind,  because  it  conceals  self-interest  under  the  mask  of  public 
 spirit,  not  only  from  others,  but  even  from  themselves,  and  gives 
 a  licence  to  inflict  wrongs  and  injuries  not  only  with  impunity, 
 but  with  a2Dplause ;  but  it  is  so  diametrically  opposite  to  the  great 
 characteristic  of  this  institution,  that  it  never  could  have  been 
 admitted  into  the  list  of  Christian  virtues. 
 
 7.  Of  those  new  precepts  in  this  religion  peculiarly  correspond- 
 ing with  the  new  object  of  it, — that  is,  PEEPAEiNG  US  FOE  the 
 KINGDOM  OF  HEAVEN, — the  chief  are,  poorness  of  spiirit,  forgive- 
 ness of  injuries,  and  charity  to  aU  men ;  to  these  we  may  add,  re- 
 pentance, faith,  self-abasement,  and  a  detachment  from  the  world, 
 — all  moral  duties  peculiar  to  this  religion,  and  absolutely  neces- 
 sary to  the  attainment  of  its  end.  By  j^oorness  of  spirit  is  to 
 be  rmderstood  a  disposition  of  mind,  meek,  humble,  submissive  to 
 power,  void  of  ambition,  patient  of  injuries,  and  free  from  all  re- 
 sentment. This  was  so  new,  and  so  opposite  to  the  ideas  of  all 
 Pagan  moralists,  that  they  thought  this  temper  of  mind  a  criminal 
 and  contemptible  meanness,  which  must  induce  men  to  sacrifice 
 
200  INTERNAL  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.        [DISS.  SVI. 
 
 the  glory  of  their  country,  and  their  own  honour,  to  a  shameful  pusil- 
 lanimity ;  and  such  it  ajDpears  to  almost  all  who  are  called  Chris- 
 tians, even  at  this  day,  who  not  only  reject  it  in  practice,  but  dis- 
 avow it  in  principle,  notwithstanding  this  explicit  declaration  of 
 their  Master.  We  see  them  revenging  the  smallest  afironts  by 
 premeditated  murder,  as  individuals,  on  princijjles  of  honour ;  and, 
 in  their  national  capacities,  destroying  each  other  with  iire  and 
 sword  for  the  low  considerations  of  commercial  interests,  the 
 balance  of  rival  powers,  or  the  ambition  of  prmces ;  we  see  them 
 with  their  last  breath  animating  each  other  to  a  savage  revenge, 
 and,  in  the  agonies  of  death,  plunging  with  feeble  arms  their 
 daggers  into  the  hearts  of  their  opi^onents ;  and,  what  is  still 
 worse,  we  hear  all  these  barbarisms  celebrated  by  historians,  flat- 
 tered by  poets,  applauded  iu  theatres,  approved  in  senates,  and 
 even  sanctified  in  pulpits.  But  universal  practice  cannot  alter  the 
 nature  of  things,  nor  universal  error  change  the  nature  of  truth. 
 
 8.  Another  precept,  equally  new,  and  no  less  excellent,  is  for- 
 giveness of  injuries.  The  wisest  moralists  of  the  wisest  nations 
 and  ages  represented  the  desire  of  revenge  as  a  mark  of  a  noble 
 mind,  and  the  accomplishment  of  it  as  one  of  the  chief  felicities 
 attendant  on  a  fortunate  man.  But  how  much  more  magnani- 
 mous, how  much  more  beneficial  to  mankind  is  forgiveness !  It 
 is  more  magnanimous;  because  every  generous  and  exalted  dis- 
 position of  the  human  mind  is  requisite  to  the  practice  of  it :  for 
 these  alone  can  enable  us  to  bear  the  wrongs  and  itisults  of  wicked- 
 ness and  folly  with  patience,  and  to  look  down  on  the  perpetrators 
 of  them  with  pity,  rather  .than  indignation  ;  these  alone  can  teach 
 us,  that  such  are  but  a  part  of  those  suS"erings  allotted  to  us  iu 
 this  state  of  probation,  and  to  know,  that  to  overcome  evil  with 
 good  is  the  most  glorious  of  aU  victories.  It  is  the  most  beneficial ; 
 because  this  amiable  conduct  alone  can  put  an  end  to  an  eternal 
 succession  of  injuries  and  retaliations :  for  every  retaliation  be- 
 comes a  new  injury,  and  requires  another  act  of  revenge  for  satis- 
 faction. But  would  we  observe  this  salutary  precept,  to  love  our 
 enemies,  and  to  do  good  to  those  who  despitefuUy  use  us,  this 
 obstinate  benevolence  would  at  last  conquer  the  most  inveterate 
 hearts,  and  we  should  have  no  enemies  to  forgive.  This  noble  and 
 iiseful  virtue  is  an  obvious  remedy  for  most  of  the  miseries  of  this 
 life,  and  a  necessary  qualification  for  the  happiness  of  another. 
 
 9.  Detachment  from  the  world  is  another  moral  virtue  consti- 
 
DISS.  XVI.]        INTEENAIi  EVIDENCE  OF  CHEISTIANITY.  201 
 
 tuted  by  this  religion  alone ;  so  new,  that  even  at  this  day  few 
 of  its  professors  can  be  persuaded  that  it  is  required,  or  that 
 it  is  any  virtue  at  all.  But  such  an  unremitted  and  perpetual 
 anxiety  as  engrosses  our  whole  time  and  thoughts  is  forbidden, 
 because  it  is  incompatible  with  the  spirit  of  this  religion,  and 
 must  utterly  disqualify  us  for  the  attainment  of  its  great  end. 
 The  Christian  system  forbids  all  extraordinary  efforts  to  obtain 
 wealth,  care  to  secure,  or  thought  concerning  the  enjoyment  of  it : 
 "Lay  not  up  for  yourselves  treasures  on  earth."  The  chief  object 
 of  the  Pagans  was  immortal /fw;ie;  for  this  their  poets  sang,  their 
 heroes  fought,  and  their  patriots  died  ;  and  this  was  hung  out  by 
 their  philosophers  and  legislators  as  the  great  excitement  to  all 
 noble  and  virtuous  deeds.  But  what  saith  the  Christian  Legislator 
 to  His  disciples  on  this  subject  ? — "  Blessed  are  ye  when  men 
 shall  revile  you,  and  shall  say  all  manner  of  evil  against  you  for 
 my  sake ;  rejoice  and  be  exceeding  glad,  for  great  is  your  reward 
 in  heaven."  Nothing  has  so  much  contributed  to  corrupt  the  true 
 spirit  of  the  Christian  institution,  as  that  partiality  which  we  con- 
 tract from  our  earliest  education  for  the  manners  of  Pagan  anti- 
 quity :  from  whence  we  learn  to  adopt  every  moral  idea  which  is 
 repugnant  to  it ;  to  applaud  false  virtues  which  that  disavows  ;  to 
 be  guided  by  laws  of  honour  which  that  abhors ;  to  imitate  char- 
 acters which  that  detests ;  and  to  behold  heroes,  patriots,  conquer- 
 ors, and  suicides  with  admiration,  whose  conduct  that  utterly  con- 
 demns. From  a  coalition  of  these  opposite  principles  was  gene- 
 rated that  monstrous  system  of  cruelty  and  benevolence,  of  bar- 
 barism and  civility,  of  rapine  and  justice,  of  fighting  and  devotion, 
 of  revenge  and  generosity,  which  harassed  the  world  for  several 
 centuries  with  crusades,  holy  wars,  knight-errantry,  and  single  com- 
 bats, and  even  still  retains  influence  enough,  under  the  name  of 
 honour,  to  defeat  the  most  beneficent  ends  of  this  holy  institution. 
 A  man  whose  ruling  principle  is  honoicr,  in  the  common  accepta- 
 tion, however  virtuous  in  a  sense  he  may  be,  cannot  be  a  Christian, 
 because  he  erects  a  standard  of  duty,  and  deliberately  adheres  to  it, 
 diametrically  opposite  to  the  whole  tenor  of  that  religion. 
 
 10.  Every  one  of  these  propositions,  I  am  persuaded  is  in- 
 controvertibly  true ;  and  if  true,  this  short  but  certain  conclu- 
 sion must  inevitably  follow — that  such  a  system  of  religion  and 
 morality  could  not  possibly  be  the  work  of  any  man,  or  set  of 
 men,  much  less  of  these  illiterate  and  obscure  persons  who  actu- 
 
202  INTERNAL  EVIDENCE  OF  CHEISTIANITT.         [DISS.  XVI 
 
 ally  did  discover  and  publish  it  to  the  world ;  and  that,  therefore, 
 it  must  have  been  effected  by  the  supernatural  iuterijosition  of 
 Divine  power  and  wisdom — that  is,  that  it  must  derive  its 
 ORIGIN  FROM  GoD.  If  any  one  can  believe  that  these  men  could 
 become  impostors  for  no  other  purpose  than  the  propagation  of 
 truth,  viUaius  for  no  end  but  to  teach  honesty,  and  martyrs  with- 
 out the  least  prospect  of  honour  or  advantage ;  or  that,  if  aU  this 
 should  have  been  possible,  these  few  inconsiderable  persons  should 
 have  been  able,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years,  to  spread  this  their 
 religion  over  most  parts  of  the  then  known  world,  in  oijposition  to 
 the  interests,  pleasm-es,  ambition,  prejudices,  and  even  reason  of 
 mankind  ;  to  have  triumphed  over  the  power  of  princes,  their  in- 
 trigues, the  force  of  custom,  the  blindness  of  zeal,  the  influence 
 of  priests,  the  arguments  of  orators,  and  the  philosophy  of  the 
 world,  without  any  sujDeruatural  assistance ; — if  any  one  can  believe 
 all  these  miraculous  events,  contradictory  to  the  constant  experi- 
 ence of  the  powers  and  dispositions  of  human  natiu'e,  he  must  be 
 possessed  of  much  more  faith  than  is  necessary  to  make  him  a 
 declared  Christian,  and  remain  an  unheliever  from  mere  credulity- 
 On  the  evidences  of  Christianity  in  general,  and  the  internal 
 ones  in  particular,  the  reader  is  referred  to  Archdeacon  Paley's 
 work,  entitled  "  A  View  of  the  Evidences  of  Christianity,"  and 
 more  especially  vol.  ii.,  chap.  ii.-v. 
 
DISSEKTATION  XVII. 
 
 JUSTIFICATION — VITAl  UNION  WITH  CHEIST — JUSTIFICATION  BT 
 FAITH — BY  WOEKS. 
 
 The  word  "  union  "  in  tliis  connexion  is  both  more  intelligible  and 
 more  appropriate  than  the  word  relation,  since  in  this  connexion 
 the  latter  is  the  consequence  of  the  former.  As  the  doctrine  of  a 
 vital  union  to  Christ  is  fundamentally  important  in  Christianity, 
 and  inseparable  from  the  doctrine  of  justification,  a  few  observa- 
 tions upon  it  may  appear  needful. 
 
 1.  The  Scriptures  are  not  only  fuU  of  the  fact,  but  they  abound 
 with  illustrations  of  it.  The  first  part  of  John  xv.  is  fuU  and 
 explicit  to  this  purpose. 
 
 2.  What  the  Scriptures  assert  and  illustrate  is  abundantly 
 corroborated  by  the  reasonableness  of  the  thing.  To  suppose  the 
 reality  of  vital  religion  without  a  corresiDonding  vital  union,  is  to 
 
 ■  suppose  an  important  efl'ect  without  an  adequate  cause,  as  shall  be 
 further  shewn. 
 
 3.  The  question  then  is.  What  is  the  immediate  cause  of  this 
 vital  union  ?  Now  as  the  union  subsisting  is  between  the  Spirit 
 of  Christ  and  man,  the  immediate  cause  must  be  in  the  one  or  the 
 other  of  these,  or  in  both  at  the  same  instant,  or  in  neither.  If 
 the  immediate  cause  be  in  man,  he  makes  his  approach  to  Christ 
 either  as  a  carnal  or  a  spiritual  man,  for  there  is  no  conceivable 
 medium.  But  the  idea  of  a  carnal  man  uniting  himself  to  Christ 
 in  order  to  form  a  vital  union  is  both  imscriptural  and  unreason- 
 able. It  is  unscriptural,  for  the  Scrij)ture  asserts  that  "  the  carnal 
 mind  is  enmity  against  God."  How  then  can  it  be  the  cause  of  a 
 vital  union  ?  "  Of  him  are  ye  in  Christ  Jesus  ;"  "  And  you  hath  he 
 quickened  who  were  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins."  It  is  not  there- 
 fore the  carnal  man  that  unites  himself  to  Christ,  or  quickens 
 
204  JUSTIFICATION.  [DISS.  XVII. 
 
 himself  in  order  to  effect  it.  It  is  also  unreasonable,  for  it 
 supposes  a  glorious  effect  without  an  adequate  cause.  The  effect 
 is  spiritual,  while  the  cause  is  carnal ;  which  are  not  only  different, 
 but  even  directly  opposite.  What  ideas  can  be  more  contra- 
 dictory, or  sentiments  more  unreasonable  ? 
 
 4.  The  supposition  of  two  simultaneous  causes,  the  one  being 
 the  Spirit  of  Christ,  and  the  other  the  carnal  man,  involves  the 
 same  inconsistency ;  for  how  can  the  mere  cii'cumstance  of  time, 
 irrespective  of  causal  iniluence,  make  any  difference  ?  If  the  carnal 
 mind  be  adequate  to  unite  itself  to  Christ  at  one  time,  why  not  at 
 another  time  as  well,  except  some  causal  influence  makes  the 
 difference  ?  For  surely  no  one  can  suppose  that  some  individual 
 moment  of  time,  as  distinguished  from  others  preceding,  constitutes 
 the  cause  of  difference. 
 
 5.  To  suppose  a  spiritual  man,  whether  by  the  exercise  of  his 
 faith  or  by  auy  other  mental  act,  in  the  cause  of  a  vital  union,  is 
 no  less  inconsistent  than  the  former  suppositions.  For  how  came 
 he  to  be  a  spiritual  man  without  a  spiritual  causal  influence  ?  But 
 if  such  influence  be  admitted  as  a  predisposing  cause  of  his  vital 
 acts,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  objector  to  shew  that  such  causal 
 influence  may  take  place  without  vital  union.  This,  I  am  per- 
 suaded, no  one  can  do.  It  is  contrary  to  all  analogy,  and  to  every 
 sound  principle  of  true  philosophy.  It  is  contrary  to  Christian 
 experience  and  revealed  statements.  What  effect  in  physical  nature 
 can  be  produced  which  does  not  imply  a  causal  union  ?  Does  not 
 the  Divine  energy  pervade  aU  second  causes,  in  the  way  of  union 
 with  them  in  order  to  the  production  of  their  effects  ?  and  what 
 miraculous  effects  have  ever  been  produced  without  a  present  uniting 
 cause  ?  For  instance,  when  Lazarus  came  forth  from  death  to  life, 
 was  there  not  a  uniting  causal  influence  to  produce  the  change  ? 
 And  if  we  appeal  to  an  experienced  intelligent  Christian,  wiU  he 
 not  own,  wiU  he  not  maintain,  according  to  his  views  of  revealed 
 truth,  that  the  j)owerful,  the  quickening,  and  uniting  presence,  the 
 vital  and  transforming  energy  of  the  Spirit  of  God  or  of  Christ  in 
 him,  was  the  cause  of  his  own  vitality  ?  Nay,  would  he  not  be 
 shocked  to  hear  auy  one  maintain  the  contrary  ? 
 
 6.  Perhaps  it  may  be  thought,  that  though  in  the  great  laboratory 
 of  lahysical  nature,  in  the  bowels  of  the  earth,  and  in  the  surround- 
 ing atmosphere,  a  causal  union  be  necessary  to  produce  chemical 
 effects, — and  that  though  in  aU  works  of  mechanism  a  causal  uuion 
 
DISS.  XVII.]  JUSTIFICATION.  205 
 
 is  requisite  to  the  existence  of  mechanical  effects, — and  that,  more- 
 over, thoiigh  the  sun  by  his  light  and  heat  produces  an  effect  upon 
 objects  by  a  causal  union  with  them, — yet  what  shall  we  say  of  one 
 body  affecting  a  change  of  situation  in  another  at  an  immense 
 distance  ?  Does  not  the  sun  powerfully  attract  aU  the  planets  that 
 surround  him  however  distant?  and  how  can  this  be  by  causal 
 union  ?     This  objection  admits  of  two  answers : — 
 
 7.  First,  It  has  never  been  proved  that  there  is  no  causal  union 
 between  these  bodies  adequate  to  the  effect,  while,  on  the  contrary, 
 several  philosophers  have  at  least  attempted  to  shew  its  existence. 
 The  solar  system,  for  aught  we  know,  may  be  perfectly  mechanical, 
 though  we  should  never  be  able  to  perceive  the  intermediate  parts. 
 
 8.  Secondly,  As  the  universe  in  general  depends  on  the  causal 
 presence  of  the  First  Cause,  so  must  every  part  of  it.  Scripture 
 and  reason  assure  us  that  in  God  we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our 
 being.  Therefore,  whether  there  be  any  intermediate  cause  of 
 gravitation  or  not  between  the  effect  and  the  First  Cause,  causal 
 union  is  still  necessary  to  the  effect.  What  difference  there  is  lies 
 against  the  objector.  For  if  there  be  no  intermediate  cause  of 
 gravitation,  the  presence,  the  energy,  the  causal  union  of  the  First 
 Cause  is  proportionally  the  more  immediate. 
 
 9.  Having  shewn  that  neither  the  carnal  man  nor  the  spiritual 
 man  is  the  immediate  cause  of  the  union  subsisting  between  Christ 
 and  the  Christian,  it  remains  to  be  ascertained  what  else  is  the 
 cause.  If  it  be  not  man,  it  must  be  the  Divine  Spirit,  either  as 
 the  Spirit  of  the  Father  or  of  Christ.  In  one  view,  this  difference 
 is  not  very  material ;  but  in  another  it  is  of  considerable  import- 
 ance. Allow  it  to  be  from  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  either  sense  it 
 secures  the  great  point  of  salvation  by  grace  in  opposition  to  our 
 own  merit.  But,  as  it  respects  the  nature  of  Christ's  mediation, 
 and  particularly  His  federal  headship  and  suretyship,  it  is  of  moment 
 to  ascertain  whether  He  or  the  Father  economically  be  the  imme- 
 diate cause  of  the  vital  union. 
 
 10.  The  Scripture  fully  declares  that  the  influence  of  the  Spirit 
 on  the  minds  of  men  is  from  Christ.  "  The  Lord  from  heaven  is  a 
 quickening  Spirit;"  "  He  quickeneth  whom  He  will;"  "  He  sends  the 
 Holy  Ghost ;"  "He  gives  repentance,"  or  the  spirit  of  repentance ;  "In 
 Him  was  life,"  (without  whom  nothing  was  created),  "  and  this  Hf e  is 
 the  true  hght  of  men  ;"  "  He  shines  into  the  heart,  but  grace  and 
 strength  constitute  our  sufficiency,"  &c.     These,  and  other  passages 
 
206  JUSTIFICATION.  [DISS.  xvn. 
 
 innumerable,  shew  that  quickening  influence  proceeds  from  His 
 fuMess  of  life  and  grace. 
 
 11.  That  other  passages  ascribe  spiritual  efiects  to  the  Holy 
 Spirit,  or  the  Spirit  of  God,  is  of  no  force,  except  with  such  as 
 deny  the  Divine  nature  of  Christ,  who  are  confuted  on  other 
 grounds.  But  supposing  His  divine  nature  in  union  with  huma- 
 nity, the  Spirit  of  God  is  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  and  vice  versa ;  and 
 in  the  Divine  economy  of  grace,  Christ  is  the  head  or  source  of 
 influence  to  the  Church.  It  is  He  who  gives  gifts  to  the  rebellious, 
 who  endows  with  the  Spirit  of  life,  and  who  bestows  the  living 
 water  to  which  Divine  influence  is  comjpared. 
 
 12.  And  how  beautifully  consistent  must  this  appear  when  we 
 consider  that  as  a  covenant  head  He  is  the  surety  of  His  chosen 
 people.  The  office  of  a  surety  engages  to  perform  what  is  requi- 
 site in  behalf  of  a  person  or  persons  as  required  by  another.  Thus 
 Jesus  not  only  brought  iu  an  everlasthig  righteousness  in  behalf  of 
 His  people  as  their  federal  perfection,  iu  lieu  of  those  who  could 
 never  attain  to  it  by  any  obedience  of  their  own,  but  it  also  belonged 
 to  His  office  to  secure  for  them  a  voluntary,  penitential,  believing 
 obedience  to  the  equitable  requisitions  of  the  Divine  Governor. 
 This  can  be  efi'ected  only  by  Divine  influence,  and  that  influence 
 must  needs  proceed  from  Him  as  the  immediate  cause,  otherwise 
 we  make  the  creditor  and  surety  to  be  the  very  same.  God, 
 as  Governor,  demands  obedience  from  aU  the  subjects  of  His 
 government ;  and  Christ,  as  the  Surety  of  those  who  were  given 
 Him,  enables  them  to  comply  with  those  demands, — that  is,  to 
 submit,  to  repent,  to  believe  with  the  heart,  to  love  God,  and  to 
 walk  with  Him.  • 
 
 13.  From  the  premises  it  follows  plainly,  that  the  immediate 
 cause  of  vital  union  is  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  which  He  bestows  in 
 the  exercise  of  His  ofiice  as  the  federal  head  of  tufluence,  and  in 
 virtue  of  His  suretyship  for  His  Church  and  people.  He,  as  the 
 time  vine,  communicates  life  to  the  branches ;  and,  as  the  head  of 
 His  Church,  biings  dead  souls  to  be  His  living  members.  Faith 
 is  a  fruit  of  the  Spirit,  and  not  the  cause  of  a  spiiitual  existence. 
 Yet— 
 
 14.  \Ye  maintain  that  faith  forms  a  consequent  union.  Man 
 being  a  subject  of  moral  government,  and  therefore  a  free  agent, 
 at  Uberty  to  choose  his  end  and  means  of  hapjiiness,  for  which  he 
 is  accountable ;  and  God,  in  infinite  mercy,  proposing  Jesus  as  the 
 
DISS.  XVII.]  JUSTIFICATION.  207 
 
 way,  the  truth,  and  the  life,  the  all-sufficient  and  only  Saviour  of 
 sinners,  in  whom  we  are  required  to  believe,  and  to  trust  with 
 confidence,  and  whom  we  are  encouraged  to  receive  into  our  hearts, 
 that  He  may  dwell  there  by  faith ;  the  regenerate  soul,  by  be- 
 lieving, unites  itself  to  this  object. 
 
 15.  The  former  union  is  the  immediate  effect  of  sovereign 
 favour ;  the  latter  union  is  the  immediate  effect  of  exercised 
 grace  in  the  performance  of  an  incumbent  duty,  or  the  discharge 
 of  moral  obligation.  Now,  since  men  are  exhorted,  warned, 
 directed,  reasoned,  and  expostulated  with,  on  the  ground  of  what 
 they  ought  to  do  or  abstain  from  doing,  the  Scripture  abounds 
 with  such  addresses.  But  lest  any  false  inferences  should  be 
 drawn,  derogatory  from  the  honours  of  sovereign  grace,  we  are 
 assured  that  every  good  and  perfect  gift  cometh  from  the  Father 
 of  lights.  "  "When  we  have  done  all,  we  are  unprofitable  servants." 
 "  Work  out  your  own  salvation,"  says  Paul,  "  with  fear  and  trem- 
 bling. For  it  is  God  who  worketh  in  you  both  to  will  and  to  do 
 of  his  own  good  pleasure."  "  No  one  can  come  unto  me  except 
 the  Father,  who  hath  sent  me,  draw  him ; "  that  is,  without  Divine 
 influence  ;  "  and  whosoever  cometh  unto  me,  I  will  in  no  wise  cast 
 out."  "Ye  have  not  chosen  me,  but  I  have  chosen  you."  "Ye 
 are  saved  by  grace,  through  faith,  and  that  not  of  yourselves,  it  is 
 the  gift  of  God."  Among  many  other  parts  of  Scripture,  where 
 grace  and  obligation  are  strikingly  intermixed,  and  illustrative  of 
 the  preceding  remarks,  the  reader  is  particularly  referred  to  the 
 sixth  and  fifteenth  chapters  of  St  John's  Gospel. 
 
 16.  Corol. — The  old  mode,  adopted  by  many  orthodox  divines, 
 of  distinguishing  the  vital  union  between  Christ  and  His  people, 
 first,  on  His  part,  and,  secondly,  on  their  part,  is  founded  on  Scrip- 
 ture and  the  reason  of  the  thing ;  and  the  former  is  the  cause  of 
 the  latter.  And,  therefore,  as  the  cause  must  ever  precede  the 
 efiect,  the  first  union  not  only  may  be  prior  to  the  second,  as  in 
 the  case  of  happy  infants,  but  also  must  be  so  in  the  case  of  adults. 
 
 JUSTIFICATION — BY  FAITH. 
 
 A  few  observations  on  this  intricate  subject  may  probably  assist 
 the  reader  in  seekiag  scriptural  and  consistent  notions : — 
 
 1.  Justification  implies  a  charge,  a  plea,  and  a  virtual  declaration 
 of  approval. 
 
208  JTJSTIFICATION.  [DISS.  XVH. 
 
 2.  The  charge  against  Adam  and  all  his  posterity  is  twofold — 
 including  a  breach  of  covenant,  or  a  failing  in  federal  perfection, 
 and  also  disobedience  in  transgTessing  a  Divine  rule.  These  con- 
 siderations are  perfectly  distinct  in  their  nature.  A  rule  may  be 
 momentarily  transgressed  for  a  long  series  of  years,  as  it  was  by 
 Adam,  and  constantly  is  by  his  rebellious  descendants  ;  but  a 
 federal  faUui'e  was,  from  the  nature  of  perfect  righteousness,  the 
 very  fii-st  act  of  delinquency. 
 
 3.  No  plea  can  be  valid  against  a  federal  delinquency,  as  was 
 the  case  in  Adam,  but  a  particijjation  of  a  federal  perfection. 
 Nothing  less  can  answer  the  charge,  and  nothing  more  is  requisite. 
 This  averts  condemnation,  and  entitles  to  a  virtual  approval  in 
 reference  to  that  part  of  the  charge. 
 
 4.  No  plea  can  be  valid  against  disobedience  to  Divine  authority, 
 or  the  rule  of  moral  government,  but  a  personal,  voluntary,  actual 
 compliance  with  that  authoritative  rule  of  government ;  which  we 
 find,  by  Divine  revelation,  to  be,  in  reference  to  fallen  man,  sub- 
 mission to  the  righteousness  of  God,  or,  as  differently  expressed, 
 believing  on  the  Son  of  God,  receiving  Him  as  the  Lord  our 
 righteousness,  &c. 
 
 5.  No  man  has  possessed  a  federal  perfection,  except  by  impu- 
 tation, besides  the  first  Adam,  while  he  obeyed  without  failure,  and 
 the  second  Adam,  when  He  had  completed  His  work  of  humiliation. 
 For  no  eminence  of  grace  in  a  mere  descendant  of  Adam  could 
 possibly  attain  to  federal  perfection  from  the  very  nature  of  such 
 perfection.  Nor,  indeed,  can  the  perfect  obedience  of  glorified 
 saints  rise  higher  than  a  conformity  to  the  Divine  law  as  a  rule  ; 
 their  federal  perfection  is  stUl  derived  from  their  imion  to  Christ, 
 and  a  consequent  imputation  which  implies  a  vii'tual  approval. 
 Hence — 
 
 6.  The  federal  perfection  of  Messiah  is  the  proper  and  sole 
 ground  of  an  actual  interest  in  reconciliation  and  justification.  In 
 other  words,  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  His  perfect  obedience 
 unto  death  as  our  substitute,  is  that  alone  on  account  of  which 
 we  can  stand  before  God  with  acceptance,  in  reference  to  the 
 charge  of  a  federal  failure  in  Adam. 
 
 7.  An  actual  interest  in  this  federal  perfection  is  obtained  only 
 by  a  vital  or  an  effectual  union  to  the  Lord  our  righteousness. 
 This  is  plain  from  Scripture,  and  is  perfectly  rational.  It  is 
 compared  to  the  union  of  a  vine  and  its  branches,  the  head  and 
 
DISS.  XVn.]  JUSTIFICATION.  209 
 
 members  of  the  human  body,  &c.  That  a  participation  of  nature 
 between  Christ  and  us,  or  an  effectual  union,  is  requisite  for  a 
 ground  of  imputation,  is  evident  not  only  from  scriptural  com- 
 parisons, and  the  rational  consistence  of  such  an  idea,  but  also 
 from  the  fact  of  the  Saviour's  incarnation.  Without  this  union 
 to  us,  our  sin  could  not  have  been  imputed  to  Him ;  and  without 
 a  vital  union.  His  righteousness  could  not  be  imputed  to  us. 
 This  is  fairly  and  fully  implied  in  many  parts  of  Scripture,  as 
 might  be  shevm  if  necessary.  From  whence  it  is  plain,  that  union 
 is  the  indispensable  ground  of  imputation. 
 
 8.  Whoever  is  the  subject  of  a  vital  union  to  Christ  is  in  a 
 justified  state,  as  partaker  of  a  federal  perfection,  prior  to  the 
 performance  of  any  moral  duty  whatever.  But  in  order  to 
 explain  and  prove  this,  it  is  requisite  to  attend  to  the  following 
 joarticulars : — 
 
 9.  Union  to  Christ  is  of  two  kinds — on  His  part  by  His  Spirit, 
 and  on  our  part  by  faith,  as  explained  in  a  preceding  note.  In 
 the  former  we  are  passive,  and  in  the  latter  we  are  active.  In  the 
 one  He  acts  as  a  sovereign  dispenser  of  benefits,  in  the  other  we 
 act  as  accountable  creatures. 
 
 1 0.  By  the  order  both  of  nature  and  of  time,  the  union  begins 
 with  Him  who  is  a  quickening  spirit ;  and  that  of  faith  is  conse- 
 quent upon  the  other,  and  is  the  proper  effect  of  it. 
 
 11.  By  His  uniting  act,  which  may  be  termed  effectual  calling, 
 the  enmity  of  sin  is  destroyed  in  the  soul,  and  the  spirit  of  Christ 
 is  imparted,  which,  as  occasion  offers,  wOl  manifest  itself  as  the 
 spirit  of  faith,  of  love,  &c.     Hence — 
 
 12.  To  the  soul  thus  in  Christ,  whether  infant  or  adult,  there  is 
 no  condemnation  arising  from  federal  delinquency,  for  this  charge 
 is  answered  by  the  union  on  his  part,  and  righteousness  is 
 imputed. 
 
 13.  From  the  premises,  it  follows  that  the  generally-received 
 theological  maxim  is  perfectly  just  and  plain — viz.,  that  justification 
 and  regeneration  are  simultaneous.  Union  is  the  immediate  cause 
 of  both  ;  and  because  the  one  is  a  relative  and  the  other  a  vital 
 effect,  there  is  no  interference  as  to  the  order  of  time.  Thus  a 
 union  of  a  tree  and  a  branch  by  engraf ture,  is  attended  with  two 
 simultaneous  effects,  the  one  relative  and  the  other  vital :  it  is 
 related  to  the  tree  as  a  branch,  and  at  the  same  time  partakes  of 
 
 VOL.  IV.  O 
 
210  JUSTIFICATION.  [DISS.  XVII. 
 
 the  vital  sap.      The  union,  however,  must  precede  both,  as  to 
 nature  and  time. 
 
 14;.  But  where  two  effects  are  both  real,  as  distinguished  from 
 relative,  the  one  must  precede  the  other,  both  as  to  nature  and 
 time.  Thus  union  precedes  vitality,  and  this  of  necessity  must 
 precede  vital  acts ;  and  regeneration,  as  the  act  of  the  Spiiit  of 
 Christ,  must  necessarily  precede  believing,  which  is  one  mode  by 
 which  a  vital  princijile  operates.  For  to  suppose  that  the  opera- 
 tion produces,  or  is  prior  to  the  principle,  either  in  nature  or  in 
 time  is  a  direct  contradiction. 
 
 15.  If  the  preceding  steps  of  these  remarks  be  thoroughly 
 weighed,  it  wiU  be  found  that  justification,  according  to  Scripture, 
 and  just  reasoning  iipou  it,  has,  for  its  foundation,  the  federal 
 perfection  of  Messiah,  and  takes  place  as  the  immediate  result  of 
 union  to  Him. 
 
 16.  But  since  union  is  twofold, — the  one  as  the  effect  of  the 
 other,  that  is,  union  by  faith  is  the  effect  of  union  by  the  Spirit 
 of  Christ,  and  these,  cause  and  effect,  cannot  possibly  be  simul- 
 taneous,— there  must  necessarily  be  a  twofold  justification  as  the 
 result  of  the  corresponding  unions.  Though  in  that  union  which 
 is  first  in  the  order  of  nature  and  of  time,  the  jierson,  whether 
 infant  or  adult,  is  passive ;  the  result,  however,  is  the  imputation 
 of  righteousness,  which  is  Messiah's  federal  perfection,  and  which 
 entitles  to  life  eternal.  And  by  that  union  which  is  the  effect  of 
 the  other,  and  consequently  posterior  to  it  in  the  order  both  of 
 nature  and  of  time,  (and  of  which  infants  cannot  be  partakers,) — 
 that  is,  by  the  union  effected  by  believing, — the  result  is  the  impu- 
 tation of  the  same  righteousness  in  circumstances  totally  different. 
 
 17.  These  two  different  circumstances  clearly  perceived  wUl 
 develop  the  seeming  difficulty.  In  the  first,  the  person,  whether 
 infant  or  adult,  is  the  passive  possessor  of  decreed  benefits — union, 
 righteousness,  and  life ;  in  the  second  circumstance,  the  adult 
 person,  as  a  free  and  accountable  agent,  is  required  to  determine 
 for  himself  on  what  to  found  his  plea  of  acceptance  with  God. 
 If  he  found  his  plea  on  his  ovm  obedience,  jjast  or  intended, 
 whether  moral,  ceremonial,  or  both ;  he  shews  at  once  both 
 ignorance  and  rebellion.  Ignorance :  tliat  he  supjioses  it  even 
 possible  for  him,  by  his  own  obedience,  to  attaiu  to  that  federal 
 perfection  which  is  justly  recj^uired  by  the  righteous  Governor  ; 
 and  also  in  that  he  does  not  perceive  the  love  and  wisdom,  the 
 
DISS.  XVir.]  JUSTIFICATION.  211 
 
 superabomiding  grace  and  wonderful  mercy  of  God  as  a  sovereign 
 Benefactor  in  providing  the  needful  remedy.  Rebellion :  in  that 
 he  rejects  the  counsel  of  God,  and  resists  by  obstinate  unbelief 
 the  Divine  authority  requiring  submission  to  this  righteousness  as 
 the  vi^ay  to  favour  and  life.     Hence — 
 
 18.  As  all  reasonings,  expostulations,  threats,  jDromises,  and  en- 
 couragements, all  testimonies,  declarations,  appeals,  inducements, 
 and  sanctions,  are  addressed  to  men  as  moral  agents,  with  whom, 
 in  the  business  of  accountability,  it  rests  what  mode  they  will 
 adopt  for  obtaining  acceptance  with  God, — whether  by  doing  the 
 work  themselves,  or  by  believing  His  testimony,  and  receiving  His 
 gift, — it  fully  accounts  for  justification  by  faith  being  the  great 
 point  argued  in  the  apostolic  writings. 
 
 19.  And  it  further  appears  that  justification  by  faith  alone 
 should  be  strenuously  urged  by  all  gospel  ministers,  while  they 
 have  to  do  continually  with  persons  whose  inquiry  is,  "What 
 shall  we  do  to  be  saved  ? "  To  such  as  thus  inquire  after  the  way 
 of  salvation,  who  seek  acceptance  with  God,  who  are  about  to 
 choose  for  themselves  "  the  way  they  will  take,"  what  answer  can 
 be  given  in  effect  but  what  is  contained  in  the  apostle's  words  ? 
 "To  him  that  worketh  not,  but  believeth  on  him  that  justifieth 
 the  ungodly,  his  faith  is  counted  for  righteousness."  The  above 
 statement  not  only  agrees  with  these  words,  but  also,  as  I  humbly 
 conceive,  explains  their  import ;  and  the  embarrassment  respecting 
 the  office  and  influence  of  faith  in  justification  is  removed,  without 
 expunging  faith,  or  the  act  of  believing,  from  the  class  of  moral 
 duties. 
 
 20.  It  may  be  objected.  If  there  be  any  justification  before 
 believing,  then  an  unbeliever  may  be  justified;  whereas  the 
 Scripture  saith,  "He  that  believeth  not  is  condemned  already." 
 This  objection  arises  from  a  mistaken  notion  of  the  true  meaning 
 of  such  passages  of  Scripture.  Condemnation,  in  the  real  import 
 of  Scripture,  is  levelled  against  the  rejecters  of  Christ,  or  of  the 
 Divine  testimony,  and  these  only  considered  as  free  agents  in  seek- 
 ing acceptance  with  God  and  final  happiness.  These,  not  believ- 
 ing in  Christ,  while  prevailingly  devoted  to  Moses  or  Mohammed, 
 moral  obedience  or  ceremonies,  or  indeed  any  other  object  what- 
 ever, reject  in  fact  the  testimony  of  God  and  His  righteousness, 
 and  expose  themselves  to  a  double  condemnation.  They  are  con- 
 demned as  being  destitute  of  a  perfect  righteousness,  and  also  for 
 
212  JUSTIFICATION.  [DISS.  xvn. 
 
 their  actual  disobedience  to  the  Divine  authority.  The  sentence 
 of  the  law  is  against  them,  both  as  a  covenant  and  a  rule,  and  the 
 gospel,  which  they  reject,  will  be  a  witness  to  prove  the  wicked- 
 ness of  their  heart.  But  this  can  never  take  place  in  one  who  is 
 vitally  united  to  Christ.  All  allow  that  infants,  not  believing,  are 
 not  to  be  ranked  with  unbeUevers.  To  them  no  testimony  is  pro- 
 posed, and  therefore  no  testimony  is  rejected  by  them.  Nor  does 
 any  adult  imited  to  Christ  reject  the  Divine  testimony  even  before 
 he  believes.  Let  but  the  object  of  faith  be  presented  to  him,  and 
 his  vital  union  secures  the  exercise  of  the  living  principle  towards 
 the  projDOsed  object,  in  proportion  as  the  terms  are  understood. 
 A  testimony  not  presented,  or  one  presented  in  an  unknown  tongue, 
 cannot  be  believed,  notwithstanding  the  principle  of  faith.  The 
 existence  of  a  principle  does  not  necessarily  imply  its  exercise, 
 whether  it  be  sense,  reason,  or  faith.  Men  are  not  necessarily 
 conversant  with  the  objects  of  sense  because  they  possess  the 
 senses  requisite  for  these  purposes  ;  nor  are  they  always  exercis- 
 ing the  powers  of  the  mind,  however  essential  these  powers  are 
 to  human  nature.  In  like  manner,  not  exercising  faith  is  a  very 
 different  thing  from  not  possessing  the  principle.  A  vital  union 
 and  the  spirit  of  faith  are  inseparably  and  essentially  connected ; 
 but  a  vital  union  and  believing  are  connected  secundum  quid,  in 
 certain  circumstances.  Without  the  circumstances  of  adult  age, 
 or  a  capacity  of  understanding,  believing  is  impracticable.  But 
 how  absurd  would  it  be  to  say  that  a  sinner  cannot  be  justified 
 because  he  has  not  arrived  at  a  certain  advanced  portion  of  under- 
 standing, or  has  not  learned  some  lang-uage,  as  if  a  title  to  heaven 
 depended  on  age,  or  knowing  a  language  !  And  equally  absurd  is 
 it  to  suppose  that  Christ  cannot  effect  a  vital  union  because  the 
 sinner's  voluntary  consent  to  it  is  wanting,  as  if  God's  high  sove- 
 reignty were  bound  by  the  human  will !  That  God  requires  the 
 sinner's  consent,  as  a  matter  of  obligation,  is  a  solemn  fact ;  but 
 God  has  not  laid  Himself  under  any  obligation  that  He  wiU  never 
 unite  a  soul  to  Christ  for  justification  of  life  but  by  the  sinner's 
 previous  consent.  He  has  declared,  however,  that  the  continued 
 unbeliever,  who  is  properly  a  wilful  rejecter  of  Christ  and  His 
 righteousness,  shall  be  condemned.  Hence  it  is  e^ddent  that  to 
 make  believing  essential  to  a  vital  union  on  the  part  of  Chri.st, 
 and  to  make  the  exercise  of  faith  on  a  Divine  testimony  essential 
 
DISS.  XVII.]  JUSTIFICATION.  213 
 
 to  its  existence,  are  erroneous  conclusions,  derogatory  to  gospel 
 grace,  and  founded  on  wrong  notions  of  moral  government. 
 
 21.  To  make  this,  if  possible,  stUl  more  plain,  the  gospel  finds 
 men,  as  aj)0statised  with  Adam,  in  a  state  of  condemnation ;  infants 
 and  adults  alike  are  under  the  condemnatory  sentence  which  is  the 
 result  of  a  breach  of  covenant.  This  evil  can  be  removed,  and  a 
 restoration  to  favour  be  effected,  only  by  an  act  of  sovereign  grace, 
 whereby  Christ  becomes  vitally  united  to  the  soul.  Without  this 
 vital  union  there  is,  there  can  be,  no  faith.  This  being  the  case, 
 a  vital  union  is  formed  before  faith  can  have  any  ground  of  exist- 
 ence ;  and  consequently  a  justification,  which  is  a  necessary  result 
 of  this  union,  takes  place.  For  to  him  who  is  thus  in  Christ  Jesus 
 there  is  no  condemnation,  but  he  is  passed  from  death  into  life, 
 as  an  object  of  mere  grace  and  mercy. 
 
 In  this  resjDect  an  adult  and  an  infant  are  perfectly  on  a  par 
 while  justified  and  regenerated  for  the  kingdom  of  God.  But  God, 
 in  the  character  of  a  Moral  Governor,  has  a  further  claim  on  every 
 free  agent.  He  exhibits  to  the  view,  and  solicits,  yea,  demands,  a 
 voluntary  compliance  with  the  plan  of  mercy  through  the  blessed 
 Redeemer,  who  was  delivered  for  our  offences,  and  was  raised 
 again  for  our  justification.  The  regenerate  person  that  is  capable 
 of  acting  for  himself,  as  the  subject  of  commands  and  iavitations, 
 complies ;  he  becomes  an  active  recipient  of  the  appointed  righte- 
 ousness, which  he  now  pleads  in  opposition  to  all  charges  presented 
 against  him.  By  faith,  or  believing  God's  testimony,  he  makes 
 his  appeal,  and  by  faith  alone  he  is  justified.  An  investigation  of 
 the  rationale  of  Christian  doctrines  is  not  necessary  for  poj)ular 
 use,  but  may  be  peculiarly  useful  as  a  guard  against  inconsist- 
 encies, and  a  means  of  strengthening  our  attachment  to  those 
 doctrines. 
 
 JUSTIFICATION— BY  WOEKS. 
 
 To  him  that  is  in  Christ  Jesus  by  a  vital  union  there  is  no 
 condemnation ;  and  there  is  no  medium  between  condemnation 
 and  justification.  He  who  is  in  Christ  is  justified,  or  "  accepted  in 
 the  beloved"  Saviour.  That  union  which  Christ  efi'ects  by  His 
 quickening  Spirit  makes  the  tree  good,  and  believing  with  the 
 heart  in  order  to  receive  the  promised  righteousness  is  the  fruit  of 
 a  good  tree.     Therefore  the  justification  which  is  received  as  the 
 
214  JUSTIFICATION.  [DISS.  XVII. 
 
 consequence  of  believing  is  only  the  manifestation  of  vmion,  even 
 as  justification  by  works,  as  asserted  by  St  James,  is  mauifestative 
 of  a  living  faith.  As  without  works  there  is  no  sufficient  evidence 
 of  union  to  Christ  on  our  part,  so  without  faith  in  Christ  as  our 
 complete  righteousness  there  is  no  sufficient  evidence  of  union  with 
 Him  on  His  part. 
 
 The  true  Christian's  works  are  "  works  of  faith  and  labours  of 
 love,"  performed  in  obedience  to  God's  authority,  directed  to  His 
 glory,  and  inspired  by  gratitude  for  the  blessings  of  His  grace  ; 
 and  this  is  the  first  of  all  such  works,  called  "  the  work  of  God," — 
 even  to  believe  on  Jesus  Christ,  in  whom  alone  is  righteousness 
 and  life.  By  believing  we  receive  the  Divine  testimony  concerning 
 a  gratuitous  righteousness,  and  renounce  all  hope  of  obtaining 
 justification  by  any  other  way. 
 
 The  justifying  righteousness  is  only  one  ;  but  the  appointed 
 ways  of  becoming  interested  in  it  are  divers.  One  way  is  by  the 
 will  of  God  our  Saviour;  the  other  by  the  will  of  man,  the  ac- 
 countable agent— each  in  its  own  order.  The  will  of  God  gives 
 the  fundamental  interest,  and  the  will  of  man  the  consequent  and 
 manifestative  interest.  In  the  first  way,  we  are  interested  in 
 Christ's  righteousness  by  one  act  continued,  commencing  with,  and 
 jDermanent  as  the  primary  vital  union  ;  in  the  other  way,  it  is  by 
 repeated  acts,  commencing  with  the  first  act  of  faith  in  Christ,  and 
 repeated  with  every  succeeding  reception  of  Him. 
 
 Among  persons  who  have  made  any,  even  the  smallest  progress 
 in  Christian  knowledge,  there  can  be  no  dispute  respecting  the 
 fundamental  cause  of  justification.  All  such  acknowledge  that 
 the  righteousness  or  federal  i^erfection  of  Jesus  Christ  is  that 
 for  the  sake  of  which  any  of  the  fallen  race  of  Adam  can  be 
 justified. 
 
 The  difference  of  sentiment  arises  from  the  appointed  method 
 of  obtaining  an  interest  in  this  meritorious  cause.  Por  want  of 
 consideration,  we  too  hastily  infer  that  if  the  Scripture  states  one 
 ajjpointed  method,  it  must  be  an  exclusive  appointment.  Hence, 
 one  j)leads  from  Scripture,  and  especially  St  James's  Epistle,  that 
 this  appointed  method  is  by  works, — that  is,  evangelical  obedience, 
 of  which  faith  is  a  leading  part ;  another  pleads  from  Scripture 
 that  it  is  by  faith,  not  as  an  act  of  moral  obedience,  but  as  a 
 suitable  bond  of  union,  to  the  exchision  of  all  works ;  and  a  third, 
 from  the  same  Scripture,  pleads  that  we  are  justified  by  an  eternal 
 
DISS.  XVII.]  JUSTIFICATION.  215 
 
 immanent  act  of  God,  and  that  faith  only  brings  us  to  enjoy  a 
 privilege  which  belongs  to  the  elect  from  eternity. 
 
 Now,  each  of  these  schemes  overiooks  the  important  truth  that 
 the  immediate  ground  of  justification  is  the  vital  union  between 
 Christ  and  the  soul.  Justification  from  eternity  precedes  vital 
 union  ;  justification  by  works  denies  the  fact  of  a  vital  union 
 being  an  adequate  ground  of  a  justifying  sentence  ;  and  jiistifica- 
 tion  by  faith  alone,  or  believing  in  Christ,  to  the  exclusion  of  a 
 prior  vital  union  on  the  part  of  the  Spirit,  confounds  the  work  of 
 man  and  the  work  of  God.  This  last  being  the  most  difi&cult  part 
 of  the  subject,  I  beg  leave  to  make  a  few  observations  upon  it : — 
 
 1.  The  claims  of  God  in  reference  to  justification  are  twofold. 
 In  the  first  instance.  He  claims  from  man  a  federal  perfection  ;  and 
 in  the  second  instance.  He  claims  compliance  with  His  method  of 
 bestowing  an  interest  in  it.  The  former  claim  may  be  answered 
 by  the  Surety,  and,  in  fact,  is  answered  by  His  act  of  a  vital  union 
 on  His  part.  By  this  He  gives  an  interest  in  Himself  to  the  soul 
 He  savingly  adopts.  Thus  there  is  no  condemnation  to  you  that 
 are  in  Christ  Jesus.  But  the  latter  claim  can  be  answered  only 
 by  the  believer  himself,  when  he  actually  receives  Christ  as  his 
 righteousness,  and  so  answers  the  Divine  requisition.  Thus,  he 
 that  believeth  iu  Christ  is  justified  from  all  things.  In  the  first 
 instance,  Christ  pleads  His  own  righteousness  in  behalf  of  the 
 adopted  sinner ;  in  the  last  instance,  the  believer  pleads  the  same 
 righteousness  in  his  own  behalf. 
 
 2.  The  obligations  of  man  in  reference  to  justification  are  also  of 
 two  kinds.  In  the  first  place,  he  stands  obliged  to  be  conformed 
 to  the  law  as  a  covenant  whicli  demands  a  sinless  perfection ;  and 
 in  the  second  place,  he  is  obKged  to  conform  to  the  law  as  a 
 rule.  Now,  whatever  God  enjoins  as  a  duty  is  a  part  of  this  rule, 
 whether  it  be  to  hate  sin,  to  love  God,  to  believe  in  Christ,  or  to 
 observe  whatever  Christ  hath  commanded. 
 
 Our  obligation  to  be  conformed  to  the  law  as  a  covenant  is  dis- 
 charged by  Christ  only  as  our  Surety  ;  and  our  ability  to  discharge 
 our  obligation  of  being  conformed  to  the  law  as  a  rule  is  from 
 Him.  We  are  obliged  to  believe  on  Him  as  our  justifying  right- 
 eousness, under  pain  of  God's  displeasure ;  biit  man  will  ever 
 continue  in  unbelief  imtil  Christ  slays  his  enmity,  and  enables 
 him  to  believe.  But  to  slay  a  sinner's  enmity,  to  change  his 
 nature,  or  to  give  him  ability  to  believe,  is  the  effect  of  a  vital 
 
216  JUSTIFICATION.  [DISS.  XVII. 
 
 ■union  ;  for  as  there  is  no  such  ability  without  gracious  influence, 
 .so  there  is  no  gracious  influence  without  union  to  the  source  of 
 spiritual  life.  When  thus  enabled,  man  exercises  repentance  to- 
 wards God  and  faith  in  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  Eeceiving  Hiiu 
 by  faith  alone,  as  our  righteousness  and  life,  the  law  is  obeyed  as 
 the  voice  of  God,  requiring  the  obedience  of  faith. 
 
 3.  The  method  of  mercy  in  reference  to  justification  includes 
 the  substitution  of  the  Saviour,  and  our  acceptance  in  Him,  with- 
 out any  works  of  righteousness  on  our  part.  In  this  respect,  "  not 
 by  works  of  righteousness  which  we  have  done,"  whether  faith, 
 repentance,  or  any  kind  of  obedience,  "  but  according  to  His  mercy 
 He  saveth  us,"  provides  a  Saviour,  aud  gives  us  a  saving  interest 
 in  Him.  Grace  provides,  and  grace  applies  the  remedy.  Mercy 
 imputes  to  Jesus  our  sins,  and  imputes  to  us  His  righteousness. 
 He  who  knew  no  sin  was  by  sovereign  mercy  made  a  sin-ofieriug 
 for  us,  that  we  might  be  made  the  righteousness  of  God  in  Him. 
 Mercy  laid  the  foundation,  and  placed  us  on  it,  that  we  might 
 become  living  stones  on  Him,  and,  in  consequence,  find  Hjm  to 
 be  precious. 
 
 4.  The  rule  of  moral  government  in  reference  to  justification  is 
 that  we  believe  on  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  as  the  end  of  the  law  for 
 righteousness.  For  tliis  end  is  the  gospel  proclaimed  to  all  nations, 
 even  for  "  the  obedience  of  faith."  This  is  tlie  language  of  Divine 
 government :  "  He  that  believeth  shall  be  saved  ;  but  he  that 
 believeth  not  shall  be  condemned."  The  unbeliever  is  condemned 
 already,  because  he  rejects  the  counsel  of  God,  and  neglects  so 
 great  salvation.  Mercy  hath  pro\'ided  an  adequate  and  all-suf- 
 ficient remedy ;  and  government  requires  our  closing  with  it  as 
 the  only  ground  of  hope  left  us.  An  endeavour  to  set  up  our  own 
 obedience  instead  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ  is  rebellion  against 
 the  authority  of  God,  and  imdervaluing  His  wisdom  and  grace. 
 None  deserve  condemnation  more  than  those  who  reject  the  only 
 remedy.  And  even  tliey  who  believe  have  no  ground  of  boasting ; 
 for  we  are  saved  by  grace,  and  justified  by  faith  ;  and  that  is  not 
 of  ourselves,  but  is  the  gift  of  God. 
 
 The  influence  of  works  in  justification  our  author  has  well  ex- 
 plained. 
 
ACADEMIC  EXEECISES. 
 
 I.  HINTS  TO  THE  STUDENTS. 
 II.  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES. 
 
ADDEESS  TO  THE  STUDENTS  ON  ENTEKING 
 THE  COLLEGE, 
 
 CONTAINING  HINTS  OF  ADVICE. 
 
 My  young  Friends, — You  are  come  to  this  place  professedly  as 
 candidates  for  preaching  the  everlasting  gospel,  and  administering 
 Christian  ordinances  in  the  Church  of  the  hving  God.  You  may 
 well  exclaim,  Who  is  sufficient  for  these  things  !  Be  assrired  that 
 no  natural  gifts,  no  mental  abilities,  no  acquired  learning,  however 
 desirable  in  their  proper  place,  can  be  found  sufficient  either  for 
 pleasing  God,  satisfying  your  own  minds,  or  profiting  your  fellow- 
 men. 
 
 The  leading  design  of  your  academical  pursuits  is  usefulness  to 
 immortal  souls  in.  reference  to  a  future  life.  If  you  fail  here,  your 
 acquisitions  in  literature  will  be  but  a  poor  compensation  in  the 
 eye  of  our  Divine  Master,  and  in  the  prospect  of  another,  an 
 eternal  world.  If  destitute  of  a  suitable  temper,  of  godliness,  of 
 that  mind  which  was  in  Christ,  humility  of  heart,  a  devotional 
 temper,  simplicity  of  aim,  fervour  of  spirit,  and  zeal  to  be  useful, — 
 what  can  be  a  sufiicient  substitute  ? 
 
 That  literature  and  science  are  useful  handmaids  to  theology, 
 and  that  the  acquisition  of  these  is  one  important  object  to  be 
 aimed  at  by  students  who  are  trained  up  for  the  work  of  the 
 Christian  ministry,  is  very  evident ;  but  it  is  equally  plain,  that 
 solid  improvement,  such  as  may  promise  usefulness  to  the  souls  of 
 men,  depends  much  on  the  state  of  the  heart, — more  by  far  than  is 
 
220  HINTS  TO  THE  STUDENTS. 
 
 generally  imagined.  Even  reason  in  its  highest  improvements,  and 
 knowledge  in  its  largest  and  brightest  forms,  are  but  the  instru- 
 ments of  the  heart. 
 
 Study,  therefore,  above  all  things,  your  own  hearts  and  the 
 doctrine  of  salvation,  by  the  light  of  God's  word  and  the  Holy 
 Spirit.  Seek  truth  with  a  humble  heart,  with  diffidence  of  yom-- 
 selves,  but  with  filial  confidence  ia  Divine  assistance.  Strive  every 
 day  to  shew  more  convincingly  than  before  that  you  are  born  of 
 God,  united  to  Christ,  and  thirst  after  purity,  humility,  meekness, 
 and  love.  Improve  time  as  incalculably  precious,  not  only  in  order 
 to  acquire  the  knowledge  of  languages,  of  liberal  arts,  of  composi- 
 tion, of  science,  and  of  systems  ;  but  more  especially  for  the  higher 
 purposes  of  spirituality  and  heavenly-mindedness.  This  is  to  en- 
 rich the  soil,  in  order  to  insure,  with  the  increase  of  God,  a  pro- 
 fitable crop  of  holiness  and  usefulness, — to  go  forth,  though  weep- 
 ing, bearing  precious  seed, — to  humble  yourselves  in  the  sight  of 
 the  Lord,  that  you  may  be  exalted  in  due  season. 
 
 Then  alone  may  you  expect  to  become  fishers  of  men,  when  you 
 "  follow  Christ," — when  you  enter  most  into  His  views,  imbibe  most 
 of  His  Spuit,  learn  well  what  He  teaches,  communicate  to  others 
 what  He  prescribes, — and,  finally,  when  you  cultivate  that  noble 
 simplicity  of  manner  which  He  recommended  and  adorned.  Ye 
 are  the  salt  of  the  earth ;  but  if  you  retain  no  savour  of  Christ, 
 how  worthless  your  profession,  and  how  contemptible  your  char- 
 acter !  Oh,  flee  youthful  lusts,  that  war  against  the  soul's  best 
 interest ! — perfect  holiness  in  the  fear  of  God.  Guard  against  an 
 idolatrous  love  of  fame,  or  unsanctified  popularity.  It  is  a  subtle 
 poison  to  the  new  man,  and  exposes  it  to  much  danger.  It  is 
 high  full  saU  to  a  ship  ;  and  what  will  be  the  consequence  without 
 suitable  ballast  ?  Watch  against  levity,  the  sin  that  so  easily  be- 
 sets the  social  intercourse  of  young  people.  Cultivate  a  courteous 
 and  obliging  disposition  towards  one  another,  and  derive  it  from 
 Him  who  was  meek  and  lowly  in  heart.  Eemember  that  too  great 
 freedoms  and  familiarity  among  yourselves,  even  in  moments  of 
 relaxation,  cannot  fail  to  operate  unfavourably.  Habituate  your- 
 selves to  the  love  of  order,  in  all  the  branches  of  your  engagement.s. 
 Do  not  suppose  that  there  is  any  virtue  in  carelessness  and  negli- 
 gence, or  that  purity  of  heart  and  cleanliness  of  person  and  apparel 
 are  inconsistent.  Su23press  passion.  This  advice  I  must  earnestly 
 repeat :  suppress,  on  its  first  appearance,  every  unworthy  passion, 
 
HINTS  TO  THE  STUDENTS.  221 
 
 every  irritating  word.  Eemember  in  whose  bosom  wrath  resteth, 
 and  is  fostered.  If  we  are  indispensably  required  to  love  our 
 enemies,  how  much  more  should  we  cultivate  the  love  of  the 
 brotherhood,  on  Christian  principles  !  Shun  every  mean  or  even 
 suspicious  action.  Abstain  from  every  appearance  of  evil ;  that 
 your  good  may  not  be  evil  spoken  of.  Shine  as  lights  in  the  world, 
 as  lamps  kindled  with  fire  from  heaven,  supplied  with  the  oil  of 
 grace,  and  burning  with  a  bright  and  steady  flame.  Eegard  your- 
 selves as  dead  to  sin ;  but  as  the  living  children  of  God,  as  the 
 honoured  members  of  Christ,  as  called  by  Him  to  an  honourable 
 work,  and  whose  faithful  diligence  will  be  approved  by  a  Sove- 
 reign whose  gracious  bounties  are  beyond  our  calculation. 
 
A  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES 
 
 ON  THE  MOST  IMPORTANT  SUBJECTS  IN  THEOLOGY.* 
 
 LECTURE  I. 
 on  the  study  of  theology. 
 
 Paet  First. 
 On  the  Imjyortance  and  Relative  Views  of  the  Subject. 
 
 How  may  the  sacred  science  of  theology  be  best  defined  ? — in  the 
 most  general  notion  of  it  ? — also  that  which  is  called  natural, 
 revealed,  and  particularly  Christian  ? 
 
 lu  this  introductory  lecture  it  will  be  proper  to  consider  the  impoi't> 
 ance  of  the  subject,  some  relative  views  of  it,  the  most  eligible 
 
 *  [Mr  Gilbert,  in  liis  Life  of  Dr  Williams,  gives  the  following  account  of  the 
 design  of  this  Syllabus  of  Lectures  : — "  Besides  the  Lectures,  of  which  Mark's 
 "  Medidla,"  or  Turretine's  "  Compendium,"  was  the  subject  for  reading,  the 
 students  wrote  a  course  of  compositions  foimded  on  a  Syllabus  of  Questions.  The 
 object  of  this  plan  was  to  call  into  exercise  their  own  powers,  to  oblige  them  to 
 think,  to  form  an  acquaintance  with  books,  and  to  accustom  them  at  the  same 
 time  to  write.  The  Doctor  delivered  no  lectures  on  the  commonplaces  of  sermon- 
 divinity,  but  in  the  praxis  drew  the  attention  of  his  pupils  to  a  general  siu'vey  of 
 theology  in  its  history,  its  principles,  its  doctrines,  its  morals,  and  its  administra- 
 tion." The  Syllabus  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  regarded  in  any  light  as  a  system  of 
 divinity.  Its  design  was  to  call  forth  the  ability  of  the  student  on  the  various 
 topics  introduced,  while  giving  him  such  hints  as  he  might  need  for  the  prompting 
 and  guidance  of  his  own  thinkings.  For  such  a  purpose  it  is  sufiBciently  systematic 
 and  extensive.  It  abounds  in  suggestions,  while  it  is  not  wanting  in  pl.-in  and  con- 
 secutiveneas. — Ed.] 
 
LECT.  I.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  223 
 
 method  of  treating  it,  with  some   general  cautious  to   the 
 student. 
 
 I.  From  what  topics  may  be  evinced  tlie  importance  of  the  sub- 
 ject in  general. 
 
 This  may  be  shewn  by  attending  to  its  principal  objects,  its  proper 
 subject,  its  important  design,  its  chief  properties,  and  its  pecu- 
 liar effects.    Reflect — 
 
 First,  What  are  principal  objects  of  theology  ? 
 
 Here  may  be  introduced,  in  a  brief  manner,  God's  nature,  glorious 
 attributes,  and  perfections — His  wonderful  works  of  creation, 
 providence,  and  grace — and  His  eternal  purposes  appointing  all 
 the  good,  and  overruling  all  the  evil  in  the  universe. 
 
 Second,  How  may  the  importance  of  the  subject  be  deduced 
 from  its  proper  subject — man  ? 
 
 This  may  be  shewn  from  its  reference  to  his  nobler  parts,  his  intel- 
 lect, will,  and  conscience,  through  the  whole  period  of  his  ever- 
 lasting existence. 
 
 Third,  What  is  the  immediate  design  of  theology  ? 
 
 Here  may  be  remarked  how  it  has  a  direct  reference  to  happiness, 
 the  immediate  end  of  intellectual  existence — our  own  happi- 
 ness, and  that  of  others — happiness  of  the  best  kind,  and  in 
 duration  the  most  permanent.  Of  all  subjects  this  has  the 
 most  direct  reference  to  the  Divine  glory,  the  chief  end  of  crea- 
 tion ;  and  that  in  the  most  effectual  manner,  compared  with 
 all  other  modes  of  displaying  it,  since  God  graciously  revealed 
 Himself  for  that  end. 
 
 Fourth,  What  are  some  of  the  chief  propei'ties  of  this  subject  ? 
 It  plainly  teaches  knowledge  the  most  sublime,  interesting,  and  im- 
 proving to  the  mind,  and  recommends  a  practice  the  most  pure, 
 peaceable,  and  useful ;  and  while  it  requires  faith,  it  contributes 
 to  exalt  reason. 
 
 Fifth,  What  are  some  of  its  peculiar  effects  ? 
 
 It  promotes  the  best  wisdom — a  wisdom  which  involves  our  greatest 
 good  through  endless  duration  ;  it  leads  to  purity  and  peace 
 in  the  most  direct  and  effectual  manner,  and  to  the  most 
 profitable  self-acquaintance  ;  exalts  the  affections  of  the  mind, 
 generates  the  best  kind  of  philanthropy,  and  the  most  generous 
 universal  benevolence. 
 
 To  be  well  versed  in  divinity  contributes  to  ministerial  pleasure  and 
 advantage  ;  is  usefiil  in  order  to  shun,  detect,  and  confute  error, 
 and  to  establish  the  faithful,  since  truths  seen  in  their  con- 
 nexion and  harmony  are  more  coniirming  than  in  their  de- 
 tached form. 
 
224  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  I. 
 
 II.  What  are  the  chief  relative  views  of  the  subject  ? 
 
 It  may  be  considered  either  as  exegeiical,  polemical,  casuistical,  ex- 
 perimental, ecclesiastical,  or  systematic. 
 
 First,  What  may  be  understood  by  exegetical  divinity  ? 
 
 Here,  after  explaining  the  term  and  the  thing  intended,  its  prinoipa 
 uses  may  be  pointed  out,  and  a  few  of  the  best  helps  for  im- 
 provement in  it. 
 
 Second,  What  is  the  proper  notion  o?  polemic  theology  ? 
 
 Here  should  be  explained  the  term  and  the  subject,  and  shewn  in 
 what  cases  it  may  be  iiseful,  and  how  it  has  been,  and  is  always 
 liable  to  be  abused. 
 
 Third,  What  is  the  import  of  casuistical  divinity  ? 
 
 Mention  its  very  superior  utility  to  a  minister  of  the  gospel,  and 
 what  have  been  some  of  the  chief  abuses  of  it  when  employed 
 by  arbitrary  men,  and  practised  on  ignorant  credulity. 
 
 Fourth,  What  is  the  true  notion  of  experimental  divinity  ? 
 
 The  allusion  implied  in  the  term  should  be  explained  and  applied  ;. 
 it  is  often  iised  in  a  lax  and  less  proper  sense  ;  its  comparative 
 importance  for  Christian  ministers  is  considerable. 
 
 Fifth,  What  is  intended  hy  ecclesiastical  theology?  and  what  ad- 
 vantage may  be  reaped  by  a  minister  being  acquainted  with  it  ? 
 
 This  differs  but  little  from  the  history  of  religious  opinions  as  held 
 by  the  Church  in  all  ages. 
 
 Sixth,  What  is  designed  by  didactic  or  systematic  divinity  ?  and 
 what  advantages  may  be  derived  from  the  study  of  it  ? 
 
 Whether  we  consider  ourselves  as  Christians,  or  more  jjarticularly 
 as  Christian  ministers. 
 
 Part  Second. 
 0/  Method,  and  the  most  necessary  Cautions. 
 
 III.  What  is  the  most  eligible  method  in  which  the  student 
 n)ay  investigate  the  subject  of  divinity  in  a  systematic  manner? 
 
 Notice  who  they  are  that  plead  for  discarding  all  systems  of  reli- 
 gion, under  pretence  of  exalting  the  Holy  Scriptures  ;  and  with 
 how  little  consistency,  since  the  Scriptures  are  in  theology 
 what  experiments  are  in  philosophy,  which  do  not  preclude,  but 
 rather  assist  us  in  forming  a  systematic  view  of  the  phenomena- 
 
 The  end  we  propose  to  ourselves  should  regulate  our  method  ;  this 
 ought  to  be  well  settled  by  every  student,  and  for  this  piu*pose 
 different  methods  should  be  compared,  as  conducive  to  a  given 
 
LECT.  II.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  225 
 
 end.  Glance  at  the  most  useful  or  j)opular  methods  in  which 
 theological  systems  have  been  drawn  up,  with  a  view  to  form  a 
 more  comprehensive  view  of  the  subject. 
 Meditate  on  the  valuable  end  that  might  be  answered  by  each  of 
 them  respectively.  That  which  is  here  adopted  is  inimical  to 
 none,  but  subservient  to  all — calculated  only  to  fm-nish  the 
 mind  with  ideas  and  suitable  terms,  which  may  be  applied  as 
 occasion  offers,  not  only  to  public  teaching  in  the  ministry  of 
 the  word,  but  also  to  every  other  valuable  pui'pose  of  Chi-istian 
 instruction. 
 
 IV.  What  are  some  of  the  most  necessary  cautions  for  a  stu- 
 dent in  pursuing  his  theological  studies  ? 
 Eeilect  closely  and  devoutly  on  the  following  particulars : — 
 
 First,  The  importance  of  admitting  nothing  for  sacred  truth  with- 
 out that  kind  of  evidence  which  is  appropriate  to  its  nature  ; 
 and  why  all  our  inquiries  after  Divine  truth,  the  chief  good, 
 and  religious  duty,  should  be  sought  from  the  Holy  Scriptures  ; 
 and  why  our  investigations  into  the  nature  of  things,  and  the 
 dictates  of  reason,  should  be  conducted  in  the  light  of  revelation. 
 
 Second,  Tlie  utmost  importance  of  keeping  a  strict  -guard  on  the 
 imagination,  by  which  we  are  ever  hable  to  be  seduced  and 
 betrayed. 
 
 Third,  The  danger  of  being  biased  by  unfounded  prejudices,  and 
 especially  those  which  arise  from  an  unsubdued  mind,  the 
 pride  of  superiority,  and  a  corrupt  heart. 
 
 Fourth,  The  reason  why  a  critical  and  extensive  acquaintance  with 
 the  Holy  Scriptures  contributes  to  form  the  sound  judicious 
 divine,  and  the  useful  preacher — Scripture  language — figures 
 of  speech — local  customs,  &o. 
 
 Fifth,  Why  aim  at  a  comprehension  of  mind,  improved  by  medita- 
 tion—  humility  of  heart  —  the  love  of  truth  —  evidence  and 
 consistency — and  the  holy  tendency  of  each  doctrine. 
 
 LECTURE  IL 
 
 on  the  avowed  enemies  of  chkistian  theologt. 
 
 Paet  First. 
 
 Of  Atheists,  Deists,  Semi-Deists,  Mohammedans,  Modern  Jeivs, 
 ayid  Heathens, 
 
 Since  wickedness  necessarily  implies  opposition  and  enmity  to 
 
 VOL.  IV.  P 
 
226  SYLLABUS  OP  LECTTJEES.  [LECT.  H. 
 
 sacred  truth  and  moral  goodness,  why  is  not  that  enmity  oftener 
 and  more  openly  avowed  ?  Eeflect,  what  are  some  of  the  general 
 steps  by  which  error  has  got  so  gxeat  and  daring  an  establishment 
 in  the  world. 
 
 Who  are  the  chief  avowed  enemies  of  revealed  rehgion,  and 
 especially  of  the  Christian  theology  ? 
 
 It  is  not  meant  to  inquu'e  into  tlie  real  or  the  pretended  reasons 
 of  the  conduct  of  merely  profane  opposers,  who  aim  to  injm-e 
 by  violence,  and  not  to  argue,  but  into  the  avowed  reasons  of 
 literary  opposers.  Reflect,  whether  there  are  any  others  be- 
 sides Atheists,  Deists,  Semi-Deists,  Mohammedans,  modern 
 Jews,  heathens,  and  false  Christians. 
 
 I.  Who  may  be  fairly  deemed  Atheists  in  the  proper  sense  of 
 the  term  ? 
 
 Reflect,  were  there  ever  any  who  did  efFectually  discard  all  notion 
 and  consciousness  of  a  Supreme  Author  and  Supporter  of  the 
 imiverse  ?  Who  have  been  reputed  the  most  conspicuous 
 Atheists  among  the  ancients,  and  especially  in  modem  times  ? 
 Consider  what  are  the  chief  probable  causes  of  avowed  Atheism 
 in  general,  and  especially  of  late  in  France,  and  in  other 
 countries  ? 
 
 How  ought  such  enemies  of  Christianity  to  be  dealt  with  ?  How 
 far  are  the  avowed  opposers  of  all  rehgion  cognisable  by  the 
 civil  magistrate  ? 
 
 II.  What  is  the  proper  acceptation  of  the  term  Deist  ? 
 
 Who  of  these  have  been,  both  in  ancient  and  modem  times,  the 
 most  subtle  and  plausible,  or  the  most  daiiug  and  popidar 
 opposers  of  Chiistianity,  and  what  are  their  chief  objections  ? 
 
 What  is  the  wisest  conduct  of  serious  Christian  ministers  towards 
 themi 
 
 Reflect,  to  what  may  be  ascribed  principally  the  growth  of  Deism 
 at  different  periods,  and  especially  ia  the  present  day?  and 
 what  are  the  most  likely  means  of  checking  it  ? 
 
 III.  Who  may  be  properly  denominated  Semi-Deists  ? 
 
 How  far  do  the  most  open  and  daring  heretics  of  past  ages  deserve 
 that  name  ? 
 
 Can  the  Ebionites,  Gnostics,  Manichees,  and  the  like,  be  exculpated 
 from  that  charge  ? 
 
 Who  of  modem  date  may  be  denominated  Semi-Deists  ?  Reflect, 
 bow  far  the  modem  Unitarians,  who  reject  some  parts  of  the 
 present  canon  of  Scriptiu'e,  can  be  acquitted  of  this  chai-ge  ? 
 and  especially  the  followers  of  Swedenbox'g?  What  line  of 
 conduct  should  a  minister  of  the  pm-e  gospel  observe  in  refer- 
 ence to  such  chai-acters  ? 
 
LECT.  II.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTTJEES.  227 
 
 IV.  What  are  the  leading  truths  of  the  Mohammedans  ?  and  on 
 what  pretences  do  they  oppose  Christianity  ? 
 
 Consider  to  wliat  practical  use  may  an  acquaintance  with  the  reli- 
 gion of  Mohammed  be  ax^plied,  especially  by  a  minister  of  the 
 gospel  in  this  part  of  the  world  ?  What  are  the  principal  facts 
 among  the  Mohammedans  ?  What  were  the  chief  pretended  evi- 
 dences of  Mohammed's  mission  as  a  prophet  ?  What  are  their 
 greatest  prejudices  against  Christianity  ?  And  reflect  what 
 steps  might  be  taken  by  the  Christian  world  with  a  view  to 
 their  conversion?  Have  the  Unitarians  any  advantage  over 
 the  Trinitarians  in  this  respect  1 
 
 V.  What  have  been  the  chief  objections  of  the  Jews  to  Chris- 
 tianity, particularly  those  who  lived  at  the  first  promulgation  of 
 it,  and  those  of  more  modern  date  ? 
 
 What  should  be  the  conduct  of  a  gospel  minister  towards  persons  of 
 this  persuasion,  when  in  the  course  of  providence  he  has  com- 
 munication with  them  ?  What  arguments,  in  general,  may  be 
 most  properly  urged  for  their  conviction  ?  and  what  should  be 
 the  conduct  of  persons  of  mfluence  in  reference  to  their  avowed 
 principles  and  their  naturalisation  1  Does  the  light  of  prophecy 
 afford  us  any  assistance  relative  to  the  probable  continuance  of 
 their  opposition  to  Christianity. 
 
 VI.  In  what  respects  may  the  heathens  be  considered  as  the 
 enemies  of  the  Christian  religion  ? 
 
 Learn  what  were  the  principal  grounds  of  opposition  made  by  the 
 heathen  on  the  first  iwopagation  of  Christianity,  and  especiahy 
 by  the  Gi-eeks  and  Romans  ;  also  in  subsec|;uent  ages,  where 
 Christian  missionaries  have  been  sent,  especially  among  the 
 Chinese,  Brahmins,  Indians,  &o. 
 
 What  parts  of  the  world  appear  most  inimical  to  the  gospel  message  ? 
 
 Eeflect,  and  learn  what  are  the  princip)al  dhficulties  a  Christian  mis- 
 sionary has  to  encounter,  and  what  should  be  the  qualifications 
 of  such,  at  least  the  most  essential. 
 
 Part  Second. 
 Of  False  Brethren,  or  Pseudo-Christians. 
 
 VII.  But  Christian  soundness  of  doctrine  has  enemies  in  the 
 very  bosom  of  the  visible  Church,  who  may  be  termed  "false 
 brethren  "  or  Pseudo-Christians. 
 
 Observe,  that  hitherto  have  been  noticed  the  external  enemies  of 
 the  Christian  religion  ;  but  now  a  view  may  be  taken  of  those 
 who  avow  themselves  to  be  "  of  the  truth  "  in  word  and  pro- 
 
228  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  II. 
 
 fession,  and  yet  in  reality  are  enemies  to  some  of  its  essential 
 parts.  When  the  revolt  is  total,  they  are  apostates — when  it 
 is  only  partial,  it  is  either  schism,  heresy,  or  both. 
 
 First,  What  is  the  scriptural  acceptation  of  the  word  schism  ? 
 Whence  comes  the  appellative  schismatic  ? 
 
 Does  it  mean  anything  more  when  applied  to  a  person  than  one  who 
 makes  or  causes  a  division  in  the  Church  of  Christ  ?  Learn 
 .what  were  some  of  the  principal  schisms  in  the  Christian 
 Church  from  the  first  century  to  the  present  time.  Reflect, 
 what  is  the  most  common  source  of  all  schism — by  what  steps 
 it  commonly  proceeds — and  what  is  the  best  antidote  to  this 
 evil? 
 
 Second,  What  is  the  scriptural  import  of  the  word  heretic  ? 
 
 Does  it  mean  anything  more  or  less  than  one  who  maintains  a  false 
 opinion  from  obstinacy,  faction,  or  hypocrisy?  or  may  he  also 
 be  acooimted  one  who  holds  error  of  considerable  magnitude, 
 while  conscious  of  no  unworthy  motive  ? 
 
 Third,  Though  a  more  particular  account  of  heresies  belongs  to 
 ecclesiastical  theology  or  church  history,  yet  it  may  be  proper  to 
 pay  some  attention  to  the  subject  in  this  connexion.  Inquire  in  a 
 general  way  what  were  the  chief  sources  of  the  heresies  which  ap- 
 peared in  the  first  centuries. 
 
 Wherein  consisted,  in  brief,  the  principal  errors  of  Simon  Magus, 
 the  Nicolaitans,  the  Cormthians,  Ebionites,  Basihdians,  of  Sa- 
 turninus,  Carpocrates,  and  Valentinus.  Learn  what  were  the 
 en-ors  of  Cerdon  and  Maroion,  SabeUius,  Paul  of  Samosata, 
 Novatian,  the  Manichees,  Arius,  Macedonius,  Priscillianus,  and 
 especially  Pelagius,  whose  opinions  are  continually  springing  up 
 as  weeds  in  the  gai'den  of  the  Chm'ch. 
 
 Fourth,  What  have  been  the  most  considerable  heresies  from  the 
 primitive  ages  of  the  Chufch  to  the  reformation  from  Popery  ? 
 
 Fifth,  What  have  been  the  chief  heresies  from  the  Eeformation 
 to  the  present  time  ? 
 
 Sixth,  What  are  those  errors  of  the  present  day  that  appear 
 most  alarming  in  the  world,  esi^ecially  in  Britain  ? 
 
 Reflect  how  a  faithful  minister  of  the  gospel  should  endeavour  to 
 coimteract,  as  favourable  opportunities  offer,  every  growing  and 
 rising  error.  Here,  of  course,  will  be  recognised  the  Pelagian 
 leaven  under  various  imposing  names,  as  well  as  new  editions, 
 with  fine  titles,  of  Socinianism  and  Hobbism. 
 
LECT.  lU.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  229 
 
 LECTURE  III. 
 
 on  the  necessity,  peobability,  teuth,  and  natueb  op  the 
 cheistlin  eeligion. 
 
 Paet  Fiest. 
 On  the  Necessity  and  Probability  of  a  Divine  Revelation. 
 
 This  lecture  treats  of  the  actual  existence  of  religion  in  general, 
 or  moral  obligation — the  insufficiency  of  natural  religion — the  pro- 
 bability of  a  revelation  a,  priori — the  actual  evidences  of  revealed 
 religion,  and  of  Christianity  in  particular ;  also,  the  distinguishing- 
 nature  of  the  Christian  religion. 
 
 I.  By  what  arguments  may  it  be  shewn  that  man  is  the  subject 
 of  religion  or  moral  obligation  ? 
 
 In  order  to  give  a  judicious  answer  to  this  qiiestion,  reflect  very 
 closely  and  seriously  what  moral  obhgatiou  signifies.  Eecollect 
 that  obligation  is  a  binding  force — that  physical  and  moral  ob- 
 ligation are  essentially  different  ;  that  the  one  binds  absolutely 
 or  unconditionally,  the  other  hypothetically  or  conditionally  ; 
 that  the  one  force  leaves  no  alternative  by  the  intervention  of 
 choice,  the  other  supposes  an  intervening  choice  or  free  act  of 
 the  will. 
 Consider  by  what  process  may  a  person  of  matiire  thought  ascertain 
 his  own  accountableness  to  God  as  a  Moral  Governor  1  Are  all 
 the  human  race,  without  exception,  the  subjects  of  moral  obli- 
 gation ? 
 
 First,  What  properties  or  qualities  in  the  subject  constitute  or 
 insure  moral  obligation  1 
 
 Eeflect,  is  anything  more  necessary  than  intellect,  will,  freedom 
 from  constraint  in  the  act  of  choosing,  and  suitable  objects  of 
 choice  ? 
 
 Second,  Is  it  proper  to  say  that_  rewards  as  well  as  punishments 
 constitute  the  objects  of  the  binding  force  of  moral  obUgatiou  ? 
 
 Eeflect,  is  not  the  force  which  insm'es  our  happiness  rather  physical 
 than  moral  ?  or  is  it  proper  to  say.  If  you  choose  ai-ight,  you 
 shall  be  forced  to  be  happy  i  and  is  not  the  case  different  when 
 we  say,  If  you  choose  amiss  or  do  wrong,  you  shall  be  forced  to 
 be  a  sufferer  for  it  ? 
 
 Third,  What  is  the  proper  and  consistent  import  of  being 
 obliged  in  justice,  in  conscience,  in  honour,  in  duty,  and  the  like  I 
 
280  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEE3.  [LECT.  HI. 
 
 Can  anything  else  be  intended  but  that  if  justice,  a  good  conscience, 
 
 honoui',  duty,  &c.,  be  preserved,  he  must  adopt  one  method 
 rathei'  than  another  ? 
 
 Pourth,  What  is  the  binding  force  itself,  in  virtue  of  which  the 
 free  agent  becomes  a  sufferer  on  the  abuse  of  his  free-will  ? 
 
 Can  this  be  anything  else  than  Divine  equity  and  power,  or  Divine 
 power  employed  by  equity  ? 
 
 II.  By  what  considerations  may  it  be  made  to  appear  that 
 natural  religion  is  insufficient  to  lead  us  to  the  chief  good,  or  aU 
 the  happiness  of  which  we  are  capable  ? 
 
 In  order  to  determine  this  question,  distinguish  between  what  has 
 been  actually  attained  in  religion  without  Divine  revelation, 
 and  what  is  attainable ;  also  ascertain  the  diflerence  between 
 the  light  of  nature  and  the  law  of  natm'e.  Eeflect,  that  though 
 natural  rehgion  may  afford  sufficient  premises  for  inferring  the 
 certain  existence  of  a  First  Cause,  yet  it  is  insufficient  to 
 point  out  the  true  character  of  God  to  man  in  his  present 
 state.  And  though  natm^  religion  may  teach  the  reasonable- 
 ness of  paying  some  homage  to  the  Supreme  Deity,  yet  it  can 
 afford  no  satisfactory  aid  in  order  to  an  open,  consistent, 
 steady,  and  fiducial  manner  of  solemn  worehip.  Consider  how 
 the  fact  stands,  and  has  always  stood,  in  reference  to  reUgious 
 worship,  where  Divine  revelation  was  imknown  ;  and  especially 
 how  incompetent  is  the  light  of  nature  to  teach  men,  whether 
 in  public  or  in  private,  to  pray  as  they  ought. 
 
 Here  may  be  inquired,  what  were  the  highest  attainments  of  the 
 best  heathen  morahsts,  in  reference  to  the  chief  good,  and 
 whether  they  were  not  beholden  for  the  best  notions  they  had 
 to  Divine  revelation  ?  Some  of  their  own  concessions  prove 
 their  painful  uncertainty  or  gi-oss  mistakes. 
 
 To  this  may  be  added,  an  appeal  to  constant  unprejudiced  observa- 
 tions of  the  wisest  men,  and  undisputed  facts  respecting  the 
 moral  character  of  such  as  appear  the  advocates  of  natural 
 religion  to  the  esclxision  of  Christianity.  Wherein  has  appeai-ed 
 the  most  important  deficiency  of  such  individuals  as  have  re- 
 jected the  religion  of  Jesus  in  favour  of  then-  pretended  natu- 
 ral rehgion,  in  ancient  and  in  modern  times,  especially  the 
 French  and  Enghsh  infidels  ?  and  how  is  the  national  character 
 of  a  people  affected  and  formed  by  the  propagation  of  such 
 tenets  ? 
 
 III.  What  probable  ground  is  there  on  which  to  expect  a  Divine 
 revelation  a  priori  ?- 
 
 Consider  well  the  difterence  between  the  evidence  of  probability 
 and  demonstrative  evidence,  and  the  great  importance  of  not 
 confoimding  them ;  ascertain  what  is  the  precise  intent  and 
 
LECT.  III.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  231 
 
 utmost  use  of  the  former.  Can  the  argument  for  the  proba- 
 bility of  a  Divine  revelation  cl  priori  be  advanced  any  fm'ther 
 than  to  prove  that  no  absurdity  can  be  fairly  lu'ged  against  the 
 supposition,  antecedently,  of  a  revelation  from  God  to  His 
 ignorant  and  guilty  ci-eatures  ?  It  may  be  noticed  whether  the 
 analogy  of  nature  and  providence  in  providing  for  our  corporeal 
 wants,  does,  or  does  not,  afford  some  room  to  expect  provision, 
 for  the  acknowledged  wants  of  our  souls  ?  Reflect  also, 
 whether  man  has  any  rational  grounds  for  his  conduct  in  kill- 
 ing animals  for  food  without  a  Divine  warrant?  Consider 
 especially  how  far  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  a  Divine  revelation 
 from  a  consideration  of  the  Divine  benevolence  ?  And  what 
 use  are  those  advantages  which  reason  suggests  would  attend, 
 such  Divine  interposition  ? 
 
 Paet  Second. 
 
 Of  the  Truth,  or  Evidences,  and  the  Peculiar  Nature  of 
 Christianity. 
 
 IV.  Wliat  are  the  principal  arguments  in  favour  of  the  truth  of 
 Christianity  as  a  Divine  revelation  ? 
 
 In  reply  to  this  very  important  question,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
 descend  to  particulars. 
 
 First,  How  far  may  it  be  assumed  as  a  principle,  that  if  Chris- 
 tianity be  not  credibly  Divine,  no  other  religion  can  be  so  ? 
 
 Nearly  allied  to  this  question  is  another.  May  it  be  assumed,  or 
 may  it  not,  that  if  Christianity  be  true,  the  ancient  Jewish 
 rehgion  must  be  so  too  ? 
 
 Second,  Is  there  anything  in  miracles  antecedently  incredible  ? 
 Consider  what  might  be  objected  with  the   gi-eatest  plausibihty 
 against  the  credibility  of  miracles  ;  and  more  particularly  what 
 have  infidels  (Hume,  &c.)  mostly  argued,  and  what  is  the  most 
 solid  reply  to  such  objections. 
 
 Third,  How  does  this  evidence,  which  may  be  produced  as  the 
 imited  indubitable  testimony  of  heathen  as  well  as  Christian 
 writers,  in  proof  of  the  great  sufferings  of  the  first  propagators  of 
 Christianity,  on  account  of  their  adherence  to  miraculous  facts, 
 prove  the  sincerity  of  their  belief  respecting  those  facts  ? 
 
 Consider  also,  how  far  is  a  behef  so  attested,  by  a  number  so  con- 
 siderable, as  all  must  allow,  to  be  competent  in  any  other  case 
 when  a  miracle  is  not  in  question,  worthy  of  credence  by 
 rational  impartiality  ? 
 
 Fourth,  How  far  is  the  reformation,  and  the  refined  sublime 
 
232  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  III. 
 
 morality  of  the  first  publishers  of  the  religion  of  Jesus,  as  coeval 
 with  their  profession,  an  argument  for  the  truth  of  their  testimony 
 and  the  religion  they  taught  ? 
 
 Pifth,  What  are  the  principal  arguments  in  proof  of  the  authen- 
 ticity of  the  New  Testament  canon  in  general  ? 
 
 Learn  which  of  these  books  were  thoiiglat  by  some  to  be  not  of 
 canonical  authority — on  what  pretences — and  with  what  reason. 
 
 8ixth,  What  evidence  does  there  appear  for  the  truth  of  Chris- 
 tianity from  the  topic  of  prophecy  ? 
 
 Consider  what  are  the  most  decisive  prophecies  of  the  Old  Testa- 
 ment concerning  the  Christian  religion  and  its  Fomider  ;  and 
 what  are  the  most  conclusive  as  to  the  present  argument  con- 
 tained in  the  New  Testament  already  fulfilled. 
 
 Seventh,  How  far  may  the  success  of  the  gospel  in  the  world,  in 
 connexion  with  the  means  employed  for  that  purpose,  be  fairly  urged 
 as  an  argument  for  the  Divine  origin  of  the  Christian  cause  ? 
 
 Eighth,  Are  there  any  other  arguments  of  importance  besides 
 those  which  may  be  derived  from  the  topics  above  mentioned  ? 
 
 Here,  for  instance,  reflect  how  far  the  efieots  which  universally  fol- 
 low a  cordial  approbation  and  sincere  practice  of  the  rehgion 
 of  Jesus  form  a  proof. 
 
 V.  What  is  the  proper  nature,  and  what  are  the  distinguishing 
 internal  characters  of  Christianity,  as  contradistinguished  from 
 every  other  code  of  rehgion  ? 
 
 Particularly  notice  the  representation  it  contains  of  the  Suj^reme 
 Being,  of  human  nature,  of  moral  obligation  and  government, 
 of  the  chief  good,  &c. 
 
 First,  "SMierein  consist  the  peculiar  excellence  and  imrivalled 
 glory  of  the  personal  character  of  Jesus  1 
 
 Second,  Wherein  consist  the  extraordinary  moral  sentiments 
 He  taught  ?  and  wherein  they  differ  fi-om  the  highest  attainments 
 of  preceding  sages  ? 
 
 Third,  In  what  respects  did  Jesus  exemplify  what  He  taught 
 — with  what  exactness  and  dignity — in  every  situation  of  life  and 
 death  ? 
 
 Fourth,  What  advantages  are  derived  from  Christianity  towards 
 forming  a  rational  and  consistent  view  of  the  Divine  natui-e,  per- 
 fections, character,  providence,  and  operations  ? 
 
 Fifth,  What  aids  are  afforded  by  the  Christian  revelation  to- 
 wards ascertaining  the  true  notion  of  Divine  legislation,  moral 
 government,  and  holy  influence  ? 
 
LECT.  IV.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  233 
 
 Sixth,  What  helps  are  derived  from  the  New  Testament  for  our 
 forming  rational  and  consistent  views  of  human  nature,  and  the 
 history  of  mankind  ? 
 
 LECTUEE  IV. 
 
 ON  THE  GENUINE  PEINCIPLES  OF  THEOLOGT. 
 
 Eemember  that  the  word  principle  is  used  in  this  connexion 
 as  denoting  source  or  authoritative  ground.  Eeflect  how  many 
 different  prevailing  opinions  are  there  on  this  head ;  what  reasons 
 may  be  assigned  against  the  Jewish  and  Popish  account  of  tradi- 
 tion as  a  princi]Dle  of  revealed  religion. 
 
 Consider  what  may  be  assigned  against  tte  sufficiency  of  what  some 
 call  "  the  light  within "  as  superior  to  Scripture  testimony ; 
 also,  what  is  the  nature,  the  use,  and  the  value  of  "  the  moral 
 sense,"  as  used  by  moral  i^hilosophers. 
 
 I.  How  may  it  be  best  proved  that  a  Di^dne  revelation,  as  the 
 Christian  religion  has  been  shewn  to  be,  is  the  only  safe  principle 
 or  genuine  source  of  true  theology  ? 
 
 But  in  order  to  reduce  this  general  notion  of  revealed  authority  to 
 practical  use,  it  will  be  necessary  to  ascertain  its  proper  limits ; 
 and  while  the  Christian,  the  Protestant,  the  consistent  divine, 
 holds  that  "  the  Bible  alone "  is  the  principle  of  which  we 
 speak,  it  is  requisite  that  a  precise  and  determinate  idea  be 
 annexed  to  the  term  "  Bible." 
 
 II.  How  is  the  canon  of  Scripture  to  be  determined  ? 
 
 Here  consider  what  are  those  criteria  by  which  it  may  be  known 
 that  any  book  is  of  canonical  authority ;  and  how  far  do  these 
 criteria  belong  to  all  the  books  which  are  included  in  the  ciu-- 
 rent  editions  of  the  jSTew  Testament. 
 
 III.  In  what  sense  may  it  be  said  that  any  part  of  the  Old 
 Testament  is  abrogated  or  "  disannulled,"  and  on  what  account  ? 
 
 Eeflect  how  the  declared  abolition  of  the  "  old  covenant,"  its  "  de- 
 caying, waxing  old,  and  being  ready  to  vanish  away,"  may  be 
 reconciled  with  that  declaration  of  Jesus, — "  TiR  heaven  and 
 earth  pass,  one  jot  or  cue  tittle  shall  in  no  wise  pass  from  the 
 law  tiU  aU  be  f ulflUed,"  (see  Heb.  viii.,  and  Matt.  v. ;)  and  in 
 what  respect  we  are  obliged  neither  to  "  add  to"  nor  "  diminish 
 from"  the  Sacred  Word,  or  any  part  of  it. 
 
234  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTtJEES.  [LECT.  IV. 
 
 IV.  In  what  respects  are  the  canonical  Scriptures  the  only  rule 
 of  faith  and  practice  ? 
 
 Observe  the  peculiar  importance  of  tliis  phrase  at  the  time  of  the 
 reformation  from  Popery,  when  the  claims  of  contrary  authori- 
 ties (tradition,  the  apocryphal  books,  the  Pope's  infalUbility, 
 &c.)  ran  high.  How  far  may  it  be  said  that  revealed  reUgion 
 does  not  oppose  what  is  properly  called  natural  religion,  or  the 
 authority  of  Scriptm'e  that  of  right  reason  ?  Hence  reflect 
 what  is  the  proper  use  of  reason  in  matters  of  religion.  Par- 
 ticularly, is  reason,  in  any  sense,  the  basis  on  which  faith  is 
 founded  ?  Is  reason  anything  more  than  the  power  by  which 
 we  compare  ideas,  and  draw  inferences  from  that  comparison  ? 
 Does  not  reason  suppose  antecedent  principles,  without  which 
 it  could  have  no  exercise  1  How  far  is  inferential  reasoning 
 allowable  on  subjects  of  revelation  1 
 
 Connected  with  this  inquiry  are  the  foUo-\ving  : — How  far  is  reason 
 useful  in  comparing,  not  only  what  is  revelation,  and  what  is 
 not,  but  also  the  several  parts  of  revelation  with  each  other  ? 
 How  far  to  be  employed  in  illustrating  the  general  import  of 
 revealed  truth,  and  in  shewing  that  no  truth  divinely  revealed 
 can  be  contrary  to  right  reason,  though  above  its  adequate 
 comprehension  ? 
 
 What  was  the  comparative  authority  of  the  unwritten  revela- 
 tions given  to  the  Patriarchs  ? 
 
 Nearly  allied  to  this  inquiry  are  the  following  considerations  : — Has 
 aU  revelation  absolutely  ceased  since  the  closing  of  the  New 
 Testament  canon  ?  Are  we  warranted  in  saying  that  every  im- 
 pression suptposed  by  the  party  to  be  a  Divine  revelation  must 
 necessarily  be  either  impostui'e  or  delusion  ? 
 
 V.  To  what  ought  we  to  extend  the  infallibility  of  the  New 
 Testament  writers,  as  to  persons,  things,  and  expressions  ? 
 
 Consider  whether  this  infallibility  be  affected  by  the  Scriptures 
 having  been  conveyed  down  from  age  to  age  by  a  fallible 
 channel,  and  whether  or  not  by  the  present  varice  lectiones. 
 Here  inquire,  in  what  texts  of  the  Scriptures  extant  may  we 
 expect  to  find  the  Divine  revealed  will  in  the  most  pure  and 
 authentic  form  1  and  what  reasons  may  be  lu-ged  against  the 
 pretended  superior  authenticity  of  the  Latin  Vulgate  ? — the 
 comparative  claims  of  the  Septuagint  version  1  In  this  con- 
 nexion further  inquire,  how  far  is  the  authenticity  of  any  book 
 affected  by  the  circumstance  of  the  author's  name  not  being 
 certainly  known  1 
 
 VI.  How  far  may  it  be  useful,  in  order  to  constitute  a  judicious 
 exposition,  to  be  well  satisfied  respecting  the  j)eriods  of  time  when 
 the  several  books  were  written,  the  occasions  of  writing  them,  both 
 local,  moral,  &c. 
 
LECT.  v.]  SYLLABirS  OP  LECTUEES.  235 
 
 VII.  Have  any  books  divinely  inspired,  or  such  as  were  entitled 
 to  the  name  canonical,  been  ever  lost,  either  entirely  or  for  a  time  ? 
 
 It  may  be  noticed  here,  how  fax  those  books  which  were  extant  and 
 canonical  in  the  time  of  Ezra  were  altered  by  him,  and  what 
 he  probably  did  in  the  affair  ;  also  inquire  into  the  source  and 
 bounds  of  his  commission  for  such  an  undertaking. 
 
 VIII.  Are  the  Hebrew  points  coeval  with  the  Matres  Leotiones 
 and  consonants  ?  What  are  the  principal  arguments  against  the 
 points  being  of  Divine  original? 
 
 Here,  as  opportunity,  the  student  should  avail  himself  of  the  argu- 
 ments of  Morinus,  Capellus,  Grotius,  Walton,  Lewis,  Hutchin- 
 son, &o. 
 
 What  are  the  principal  reasons  assigned  in  favour  of  the  points 
 as  of  equal  standing  and  authority  with  the  consonants  ? 
 
 On  this  consult,  when  convenient,  the  Bustorfs,  Schultens,  Boston's 
 "  Traotatus  Stigmalogicus,"  and  P.  Whitfield's  "  Dissertation  on 
 the  Hebrew  Vowel  Points  ;"  especially  Dr  Owen  "De  Puncta- 
 tionis  HebraioEe  Origine,"  in  his  "  Theologoumena." 
 
 IX.  What  is  the  chief  advantage  that  may  be  expected  from 
 comparing  any  versions,  whether  ancient  or  modern,  with  the 
 original,  in  ascertaining  the  sense  of  a  passage  ? 
 
 What  versions  are  of  greatest  authority,  or  of  most  repute,  of 
 those  that  are  called  ancient,  also  modern  ? 
 
 Here  some  remarks  might  be  made  on  the  character  of  our  English 
 current  version,  with  the  disadvantages  attending  the  habit  of 
 always  coiTecting  it  in  public  exercises,  by  appealing  to  the 
 original. 
 For  an  accoimt  of  the  numerous  translations  of  the  Bible  into 
 English,  see  Lewis's  "  Complete  History  of  the  Several  Trans- 
 lations," &c. 
 
 X.  What  are  some  of  the  best  rules  for  interpreting  or  obtaining 
 the  true  sense  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  ? 
 
 Notice  in  this  connexion  what  is  the  analogy  of  faith,  how  to  find 
 and  preserve  it. 
 
 LECTURE  V. 
 
 CONCEENINa  THE  BEING,  EXISTENCE,  AND  NATURE  OF  GOD. 
 Seeing  theology  presupposes  the  being  and  existence  of  God,  its 
 
236  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  V. 
 
 proper  subject, — as  the  first  and  chief  part  of  it,  from  whence  all 
 the  other  parts  flow,  under  which  they  are  all  virtually  contained, 
 and  to  which  they  all  finally  refer, — of  what  use  is  it  to  a  divuie  to 
 study  the  evidence  of  this  acknowledged  truth  ? 
 
 Though  every  science  presupposes  one  or  more  first  principles, 
 and  Christian  theology  does  this,  "There  is  a  Being  of  infinite 
 perfections,"  yet  important  advantages  may  be  derived  from 
 digesting  well  the  evidences  of  the  all-momentous  fact. 
 
 I.  How  far  is  it  proper  to  admit  the  Cartesian  maxim—"  lu- 
 cumbit  philosophanti  dubitare  ? "  rather,  what  evil  consequences 
 would  follow  from  this  mode  of  investigation  ? 
 
 II.  What  are  some  of  the  most  necessary  cautions  for  a  profit- 
 able inquiry  into  this  most  fundamental  subject? 
 
 Cousider  well  the  extent  of  human  imJerstanding — the  magnitude 
 of  the  object — our  proneness  to  conceive  of  infinites  after  the 
 manner  of  finites,  and  the  danger  of  it  in  theological  subjects — 
 oui'  strong  bias  to  moral  evil  or  to  the  side  of  error.  Here,  too, 
 shew  bow  reasonable  to  expect  objections  of  great  difficulty,  and 
 what  temper  of  mind  is  most  suitable  to  the  inquiry. 
 
 III.  Wherein  consists  the  import  of  the  argument  for  the  being 
 and  existence  of  God  from  the  "position  of  sufficient  causes?"  and 
 how  far  solid  ? 
 
 On  this  principle,  it  maybe  noticed,  proceeded  Locke, — "  That  some- 
 thing must  have  existed  from  eternity ;"  but  the  universality 
 of  which  Clarke  would  not  gi-ant.  Baumgarten  removed  objec- 
 tions to  it,  and  Pestorius  attempted  to  comidete  the  evidence. 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  celebrated  Cartesian  argument  for  the  existence 
 of  God  ?  and  how  far  demonstrative  ? 
 
 V.  What  arguments,  if  any,  in  proof  of  a  First  Cause,  d  priori, 
 are  the  most  convincing  and  incontrovertible  ? 
 
 VI.  What  are  those  arguments,  a  posteriori,  which  are  best 
 calculated  to  convince  a  subtle  and  rational  inquirer  ? 
 
 Here  it  is  obvious  that  the  argument  of  the  "  position  of  sufficient 
 causes"  is  the  basis  of  aU  appeals  to  efi'ects.  That  argument 
 admitted,  every  object  in  natm'e  is  an  argument  sufliciently 
 demonstrative.  Without  it,  to  appeal  to  facts,  however  nume- 
 rous or  mai'vellous,  is  inconclusive.  Hence  the  vast  importance 
 of  the  essential  difference  between  an  absolute  and  contingent 
 being. 
 
 VII.  What  is  the  most  just  and  worthy  representation  of  the 
 Divine  nature. 
 
LECT.  v.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  237 
 
 How  far  are  the  terms  existence,  knowledge,  and  power,  well 
 adapted  to  express  it  ?  or  the  terms  life,  light,  and  love  ?  or  the 
 term  spirit?  What  other  signs  or  names  are  most  expressive  of 
 this  glorious  object,  particularly  scriptural  ones,  which,  for  various 
 reasons,  must  be  most  appropriate  ? 
 
 VIII.  What  useful  inferences  flow  from  the  subject  now  dis- 
 cussed ? 
 
 First,  Mark  the  folly  of  material  representations  of  the  Divine 
 nature.  As  the  systems  and  practice  of  idolaters  must  be  the  result 
 of  thought  and  design,  how  is  the  existence  of  such  a  folly  to  be 
 accounted  for  ? 
 
 Second,  Shew  the  danger  of  a  more  refined  or  ideal  representation 
 of  the  Divine  nature.  Is  Locke's  doctrine  of  ideas  sufficiently 
 guarded  on  this  point  ? 
 
 Third,  Prom  the  superior  evidence  of  this  doctrine  as  a  part  of 
 Christian  theology,  compared  with  the  absurd  notions  and  glaring 
 inconsistencies  of  the  most  enlightened  heathens,  in  connexion  with 
 its  being  on  all  hands  confessed  as  a  principle  the  most  fundamental, 
 mark  the  great  excellence  and  incomjDarable  worth  of  the  sacred 
 writings,  whence  the  superior  evidence  proceeds. 
 
 Here  miglit  be  introduced  a  few  of  the  many  sublime  passages  of 
 Holy  "Writ  which  appear  so  strikmgly  superior  to  all  the  heathen 
 descriptions  of  the  Supreme  Being. 
 
 Fourth,  What  are  some  of  the  many  bad  consequences  that 
 naturally  follow  from  the  denial  of  this  first  principle?  What 
 security  to  human  government  or  society  of  any  kind  ?  Eeligion, 
 ever  deemed  by  the  most  amiable  of  men  their  glory  and  support, 
 would  be  irrational  and  impossible  ;  and  virtue,  which  in  every 
 age  has  extorted  the  approving  admiration  of  its  very  enemies, 
 would  shrink  into  the  contracted  insulated  selfishness  which  has 
 been  universally  despised. 
 
 Fifth,  How  may  the  unity  of  God  be  inferred  from  His  nature  ? 
 and  how  it  applies  to  His  essence  but  not  to  His  attributes  and 
 personalities  ? 
 
 From  an  fit  Deus  follows  the  infinite  importance  of  Quis  fit 
 Deus,  as  in  our  next. 
 
238  SYLLABES-OF-EECTXJEES.  [LECT.  VI. 
 
 LECTURE  VI. 
 
 ON  THE  ATTKIBtrTES  AJTO  PEEFECTIOIfS  OF  GOD. 
 
 If  there  be  a  God,  as  before  proved  there  is, — and  since  oiir 
 capacity  to  do  this  also  implies  oiir  accountableness  to  Him  in  a 
 manner  difierent  from  other  creatures,  who  have  no  ability  to 
 think  and  reason  concerning  Him,  and  who  have  not  theopathetic 
 affections, — it  mnst  be  highly  interesting  to  us  to  be  acquainted 
 with  His  attributes  and  perfections,  His  true  character,  equitable 
 government,  and  sovereign  prerogatives. 
 
 Observe  that  the  same  cautions  that  were  needfiil  in  our  in- 
 quii-ies  respecting  the  being  of  God,  are  also  needful  in  treating 
 of  His  attributes. 
 
 I.  What  is  intended  by  the  terms  "attributes"  and  "perfec- 
 tions," when  applied  to  God  ? 
 
 After  explaining  tlie  import  of  the  teiins,  shew  that  these  infinite 
 excellences  of  Deity  are  inseparable  from  the  Divine  essence — 
 and  from  each  other — especially  since  all  Divine  attributes  are 
 essential  to  God. 
 
 Hence  the  properties  of  God  may  be  shewn  to  be  not  accidental. 
 Though  a  creatiu'e  may  be  divested  of  this  attribute,  or  that 
 quality,  and  yet  not  cease  to  exist ;  yet  to  deny  God  perfection 
 of  power,  Tvisdom,  hoHness,  &c.,  woiild  be  tantamount  to  the 
 denial  of  His  existence. 
 
 Nor  should  we  conceive  of  God's  perfections  as  component  parts  of 
 the  Divine  natm-e  ;  but  their  plurality  is  analogical,  by  way  of 
 allusion  and  resemblance  to  oui'  own  conception  of  other  objects, 
 and  in  order  to  assist  our  own  minds  as  finite. 
 
 II.  How  does  it  appear  that  the  attributes  of  Deity  cannot  differ 
 as  one  created  thing  differs  from  another  ? 
 
 Here  shew  that  the  attributes  of  God  are  in  reality  the  same  thing 
 with  the  essence,  and  the  distinction  arises  not  from  anything 
 in  God,  but  fx-om  our  limited  mode  of  conception  ;  yet  this  is 
 not  formed  without  a  certain  regard  to  the  thing  itself.  Nor 
 should  this  oiu-  mode  of  apprehension  be  denominated  wrong, 
 so  much  as  imperfect — not  false,  but  rather  deficient. 
 
 Hence  we  ought  not  to  confound  these  attributes,  or  their  efiects, 
 but  carefully  define  and  distinguish  ■  thus  goodness  and  bene- 
 ficence difier  as  cause  and  efiect ;  as  do  also  justice  and  punish- 
 ment.    The  attribute  is  necessaiy,  but  the  eflect  is  free. 
 
 III.  In  order  to  assist  our  imperfect  conceptions,  how  may  the 
 Divine  attributes  be  most  conveniently  arranged  ? 
 
LECT.  VI.]  SYLLABUS  OP  LECTXJEES.  239 
 
 First,  How  far  does  the  distinction  of  incommunicable  and 
 commimicable  answer  the  proposed  end  ?  Ascertain  the  just 
 import  of  the  terms  in  this  connexion. 
 
 Second,  Enumerate  and  explain  those  attributes  which  are 
 termed  "  incommunicable." 
 
 Third,  Also  those  that  are  "  communicable." 
 Fourth,  How  far  does  the  distinction  of  the  Divine  attributes 
 and  perfections  into  the  uncaused  and  causing  assist  us  ? 
 
 Fifth,  What  are  those  attributes  which  are  most  eminently 
 expressive  of  God  as  a  Being  imcaused  ? 
 
 Here  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  reconcile  the  seeming  incon- 
 sistency there  is  between  tbe  doctrine  before  advanced  on  the 
 "position  of  sufficient  causes,"  and  that  attribute  of  Deity 
 ■which  asserts  His  being  "  uncaused." 
 
 Is  the  difficulty  sufficiently  solved  by  saying  that  though  ffiiites 
 necessarily  require  a  cause,  in&iites  admit  of  none  ?  If  this  be 
 not  a  sufficient  reply,  what  is  ? 
 
 Sixth,  What  are  those  attributes  which  are  implied  in  the  con- 
 sideration of  God  being  the  "  cause  "  of  every  other  thing  ? 
 
 Seventh,  How  far  does  the  distinction  of  the  Divine  perfections 
 into  natural  and  moral  elucidate  the  subject? 
 
 Eighth,  What  are  those  "natural"  perfections  of  God  which 
 most  eminently  imply  and  constitute  His  moral  character  ? 
 
 Ninth,  What  other  distinctions  might  be  serviceable  to  assist 
 our  conceptions  in  reference  to  the  Divine  perfections  ? 
 
 Here  might  be  noticed  a  distinction  in  the  terms  employed — as 
 
 proper  and  figurative,  negative  and  positive. 
 Also  as  to  the  relations  themselves — as  inimitable  and  imitable, 
 absolute  and  relative,  &c. 
 
 IV.  What  are  those  attributes  of  God  which  the  corrupters  of 
 Christian  theology  are  most  given  to  misrepresent  ? 
 
 First,  Wherein  hes  the  greatest  danger  of  mistake  with  respect 
 to  the  Divine  goodness  or  benevolence  ? 
 
 Here  might  be  noticed  that  rei^resentation  of  benevolence  which 
 makes  the  certain  and  final  happiness  of  creatures  the  chief 
 end  of  its  operations. 
 
 What  other  misapplications  of  this  Diviae  attribute  should  be 
 guarded  against  ?  For  instance,  it  has  been  said,  "  We  can  see  no 
 reason  why  He  should  wish  to  make  His  creation  at  all,  and  not 
 wish  to  make  it  as  happy  as  possible." 
 
240  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUKES.  [LECT.  YI. 
 
 Again,  it  has  been  argued,  "  Since  all  evils  are  necessarily  con- 
 nected with  some  good,  and  generally  productive  of  it,  all  the 
 works  of  God  appear  to  Him  at  aU  times  very  good,  happiness 
 greatly  abounding  on  the  whole." 
 
 Second,  In  what  respects  are  the  attributes  of  mercy  most  likely 
 to  be  misrepresented? 
 
 Notice  here  the  notion  of  absolute  mercy,  irrespective  of  the  rights 
 of  government  and  legal  sanctions,  and  how  far  such  a  notion 
 tends  to  sap  the  foundation  of  moral  government.   Other  abuses. 
 
 Thii'd,  As  justice  also  is  liable  to  be  misrepresented,  wherein  lies 
 the  greatest  danger  of  this  ?     Distinctions  of  justice. 
 
 Perhaps  the  gi-eatest  danger  here  arises  from  wi-ong  notions  of  the 
 objects  of  justice.  Por  instance,  one  who  allows  the  attribute 
 of  justice  in  Deity,  and  its  adequate  operations,  may  yet  gTeatly 
 misreiM-esent  the  effects  on  account  of  wrong  views  of  its 
 objects. 
 
 Fourth,  Prom  what  quarter,  and  on  what  accounts,  should  we 
 expect  an  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  Divine  sovereignty,  espe- 
 cially considered  as  an  attribute  of  Deity  ? 
 
 Perhaps  in  nothing  ai'e  we  more  Uable  to  rest  satisfied  with  incon- 
 sistent notions  than  in  the  relation  subsisting  between  justice 
 and  sovereignty  ;  the  accurate  discrimination  of  theii-  objects, 
 and  then-  precise  eifects  respectively. 
 
 Fifth,  What  are  some  of  the  abuses  of  the  Divine  prescience  ? 
 
 It  has,  for  instance,  been  asserted,  "  That  God  will  not  know, 
 and  much  less  determine,  anything  concerning  the  employment  of 
 the  wicked  in  their  miserable  eternity."  And  respecting  the 
 blessed  and  their  acts,  it  has  been  said  that  God  "  foresees  ia 
 general,  without  limiting  or  determining  anything  particularly 
 concerning  these  acts,  or  their  rangings  and  infinite  multiplicity 
 of  combinations." 
 
 To  what,  therefore,  does  the  Divine  knowledge  extend?  Are 
 free  actions  and  contingencies,  in  the  proper,  or  any  acceptation  of 
 the  word,  included  ? 
 
 What  is  the  difference  between  the  theological  acceptations  of 
 scientia  simjMcis  intelligentice  and  scientia  visionis  ?  And  what 
 is  the  doctrine  of  scientia  media,  and  wherein  is  it  defective  ? 
 
 Sixth,  What  are  the  chief  sources  of  mistake  respecting  the 
 Divine  infinity  ? 
 
 Here  maybe  noticed  the  mode  of  judging  by  analogy;  the  attemjit 
 of  acquiring  an  idea  of  the  infinite  by  a  progressive  series  of 
 
LECT.  VII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECIUEES.  241 
 
 finite  conceptions.    How  far  may  that  idea  be  called  the  idea 
 of  God  ?  or  is  it  not  essentially  defective  ? 
 Therefore,  what  is  the  mode  of  attaining  the  true  notion  of  infinite, 
 as  in  God  ? 
 
 Seventh,  What  other  attributes  of  Deity  are  liable  to  be  mis- 
 taken or  to  be  misrepresented,  and  in  what  respects  ? 
 
 LECTURE  VII. 
 
 ON  THOSE  ATTEIBUTES  WHICH  AEB  COMMONLY  TERMED 
 INCOMMUNICABLE. 
 
 It  is  observed  by  one,  that  "  man  when  he  speaks  of  God  is  but 
 as  a  blind  person  describing  the  light."  And  again : — "  The  most 
 proper  answer  we  could  give  to  the  question,  '  What  is  God  ? ' 
 would  be  to  observe  a  profound  silence  ;  or  if  we  should  think 
 proper  to  answer  anything,  it  ought  to  be  something  next  to  this 
 absolute  silence — viz.,  God  is,  which  gives  a  higher  and  better  idea 
 of  Him  than  anything  we  can  either  express  or  conceive." 
 
 The  above  is  highly  expressive  of  great  reverence  and  modesty, 
 but  should  not  operate  to  the  full  extent  of  the  representation. 
 But  why  ?  Is  there  not  some  real  advantage  to  be  found  in  humbly 
 studying  the  Divine  perfections  ? 
 
 I.  What  are  those  attributes  in  Deity  which  are  so  strictly  and 
 entirely  incommunicable,  that  nothing  in  the  creature  bears  the 
 smallest  resemblance  or  analogy  to  them  ;  and,  therefore,  with 
 equal  propriety  may  be  called  inimitable  ? 
 
 II.  Is  independence  an  incommunicable  attribute  ?  Is  it  abso- 
 lutely so,  or  only  in  part  ? 
 
 Here  might  be  noticed  a  question  of  the  utmost  importance,  Whether 
 it  be  a  proper  object  of  Omnipotence  to  impart  any  degree  of 
 independence  of  Himself  to  a  creature  t 
 
 III.  What  is  the  best  definition  of  the  Divine  simplicity,  and 
 whether  this  be  an  attribute  incommunicable  ? 
 
 What  arguments  chiefly  conclude  that  God  is  a  being  utterly 
 remote  from,  and  infinitely  incapable  of,  all  composition  and 
 division  ? 
 
 Here  note  an  objection  that  may  be  made  against  the  Trinity,  as  in- 
 
 VOL.  IV.  Q 
 
242  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTITEES.  [LEOT.  VU. 
 
 consistent  with  the  simplicity  of  the  Divine  nature.  This  has 
 no  force  but  on  the  supposition  of  a  plurality  of  essences, 
 whereas  absolute  simplicity  does  not  stand  opposed  to  modifica- 
 tions, which  perhaps  is  the  most  proper  notion  of  a  Divine  per- 
 sonality. To  which  might  be  added,  that  simplicity  is  no  more 
 inconsistent  with  a  trinity  of  Divine  hypostases,  or  personal 
 modifications,  than  it  is  with  the  attributes  of  power,  wisdom, 
 and  goodness.  Simplicity  respects  the  essence,  trinity  the 
 modifications.  Notice  and  answer  the  objection  which  may 
 be  made  to  the  Divine  decrees  from  the  simplicity  of  God  ; 
 from  the  former  imjilying  deliberation  and  freedom. 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  just  notion  of  the  infinity  of  God  ?  and  whether 
 it  be  an  incommunicable  attribute  ? 
 
 Distinguish  between  the  proper  and  the  improper  sense  of  the  term : 
 that  may  be  said  to  be  infinite  in  respect  to  us  which  is  not 
 so  in  itself  ;  but  here  the  inquiry  is  concerning  infinity  in  the 
 most  absolute  sense.  Infinity,  -n-ith  regard  to  us,  as  when  ap- 
 plied to  quantity,  extension,  divisibility,  &c.,  is  properly  no- 
 thing more  than  a  denial  of  comprehended  bounds. 
 
 By  what  arguments  may  the  proper,  positive,  absolute  infinity 
 of  the  Divine  essence  be  proved  ? 
 
 Here  might  be  shewn  why  God,  although  infinite  in  the  highest 
 sense,  cannot  produce  an  infinite  effect  ;  why  no  creature  can 
 comprehend  this  infinity  ;  and  how  the  supposition  of  God 
 perfeetlj'  comprehending  Himself  is  consistent  with  His  being 
 thus  infinite. 
 
 If  all  creatures  are  infinitely  remote  from  the  Divine  perfection, 
 how  may  we  prove  that  there  is,  at  the  same  time,  an  inequality 
 of  remoteness ;  or  avoid  the  consequence,  that  all  creatures  are 
 equally  perfect  ? 
 
 V.  What  is  the  proper  dififereuce  between  infinity  and  im- 
 mensity, when  we  apply  the  terms  to  the  Divine  attributes  ? 
 
 It  may  be  observed,  that,  as  infinity  has  an  immediate  and  more 
 direct  reference  to  the  Divine  essence,  so  immensity  has  a  more 
 immediate  reference  to  place,  or  the  infinity  of  the  Divine  essence 
 with  respect  to  place.     Does  this  difi"er  from  omnipresence  ? 
 
 Here  mark  the  difierence  between  the  immensity  or  the  omni- 
 presence of  God,  as  to  its  virtue  and  operation,  on  the  one 
 hand,  and  the  same,  as  to  its  essence,  on  the  other. 
 
 By  how  many  ways  may  it  be  said  that  God  is  present  with  His 
 creatures, — at  least,  more  eminently  ? 
 
 In  reference  to  this  subject,  it  will  be  of  service  to  consider  the 
 following  theological  distinctions  : — A  being  may  be  said  to 
 
LECT.  VII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECl'UEES.  243 
 
 be  in  a  place  either  circumscriptive,  definitive,  or  repletive ; 
 and  God  may  be  said  to  be  in  a  place  irepyrjTiKos,  vojjtikos-, 
 
 By  what  arguments  may  it  be  be.st  proved  that  God  is  immense 
 as  to  His  essence,  as  well  as  per  potentiam  and  cognitionem  ? 
 
 Is  God  more  present  in  heaven,  essentially,  than  elsewhere  ? 
 
 How  does  it  appear  worthy  of  God  to  be  present  in  all  persons 
 and  places,  without  excejDtion  ? 
 
 Here  distinguish  between  an  efficient  and  preserving  cause,  on  the 
 one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  a  physical  contact,  mixture,  or 
 composition.  In  what  sense  may  it  be  said  that  God  is  far 
 from  the  wicked  ? 
 
 How  are  we  to  reconcile  those  expressions  in  Scripture  concerning 
 God, — "The  Lord  ascended,  descended,  came,  went,  &c.1" 
 
 VI.  How  may  the  real  and  absolute  eternity  of  God  be  de- 
 scribed ? 
 
 Here  observe  that  as  immensity,  with  respect  to  our  mode  of  con- 
 ception, refers  to  place,  so  eternity  stands  related  to  time. 
 
 Shew  the  difference  between  eternity  in  an  improper  and  relative 
 sense,  and  in  a  proper  and  absolute  sense. 
 
 How  may  this  attribute  be  proved  to  belong  to  Deity  ? 
 How  are  we  to  understand  difference  of  time,  as  applied  to  God 
 as  He  who  is,  was,  and  is  to  come  ? 
 
 Many  comparisons  have  been  used  to  illustrate  the  difference  be- 
 tween eternity  and  continued  time.  As  the  sun  co-exists  with 
 all  the  days  of  time,  but  these  days  do  not  co-exist  among 
 themselves,  but  each  one  in  his  own  order  successively  ;  so, 
 though  time  were  to  co-exist  with  eternity,  it  would  be  only  as 
 days  co-exist  with  the  sun. 
 The  beginning  of  a  line  or  of  time  may  be  called  a  mathematical 
 point ;  the  smallest  extension  either  of  bulk  or  of  time  may  be 
 called  a  physical  point ;  but  that  which  denotes  a  negation  of 
 extension  and  divisibility  may  be  denominated  a  metaphysical 
 point.  In  this  last  sense  time  may  be  called  a  point  iu  eter- 
 nity, a  channel  and  stream,  &c. 
 
 VII.  Wherein  consists  the  immutability  of  Godi  Does  it 
 extend  to  thought,  as  well  as  essence  ?  to  possibility,  as  well  as 
 act  ?  How  may  it  be  proved  that  God  is  thus  absolutely  im- 
 mutable ? 
 
 How  may  the  immutability  of  God  be  shewn  to  be  consistent 
 with  the  facts  of  creation,  providential  acts,  &c.  ? 
 
 Here  notice  the  difference  between  "  to  change  the  wUl "  and  "  to 
 will  a  change." 
 
244  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [lECT.  VIII. 
 
 VIII.   What  are  some  of  the  most  important  inferences  de- 
 ducible  from  the  incommunicable  attributes  of  Deity  ? 
 First,  From  all  in  general  ? 
 Second,  From  each  in  particular  ? 
 
 Are  there  any  other  known  attributes  of  Deity  which  may  be  called, 
 in  the  same  sense  with  the  foregoing  ones,  incommunicable  ? 
 
 LECTURE  VIII. 
 
 ON  THOSE  ATTRIBUTES  WHICH  AKE  CALLED  COMMUNICABLE. 
 
 In  what  sense  may  any  Divine  attributes  be  called  communicable  ? 
 
 I.  What  are  those  attributes  of  God  which  may  be  called  com- 
 municable 1 
 
 How  far  is  that  distribution  just  which  refers  them  all  to 
 intellect,  will,  and  power  ? 
 
 How  far  is  the  following  distribution  proper — viz.,  life,  wisdom, 
 will,  and  power  ? 
 
 Or  this — viz.,  knowledge,  goodness,  justice  ? 
 
 Or  this — viz.,  wisdom,  power,  holiness,  justice,  goodness,  and 
 truth  ? 
 
 II.  How  may  the  Divine  intellect  be  most  properly  represented  ? 
 
 Here  shew  wherein  consists  the  analogy  or  faint  resemblance  of  some- 
 thing in  created  intelligent  natures  to  this  perfection  of  God. 
 
 And  observe  that  the  life  of  God,  considered  under  the  notion  of 
 "  intellect,"  imphes  both  knowledge  and  wisdom. 
 
 III.  What  is  the  proper  account  that  may  be  given  of  the 
 Divine  knowledge  ? 
 
 In  order  to  this,  it  will  be  proper  to  shew  the  difference  between 
 knowledge  and  wisdom.  While  the  former  is  the  act  of  the  in- 
 tellect alone,  the  latter  implies  an  act  of  the  will  also. 
 
 First,  What  is  the  mode  of  Divine  knowledge  ? 
 
 In  this  it  is  eminently  distinguished  from  all  finite  knowledge,  since 
 God  knows  all  things  perfectly  by  His  own  essence,  and  not  by 
 external  appearance, — intuitively,  and  not  by  outward  search, 
 — distinctly,  without  any  possibility  of  exception  or  mistake, — 
 immutably,  for  as  He  continues  immovable  while  He  gives  mo- 
 
LECT.  VIII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  245 
 
 tion  to  all  things  else,  so  He  sees  the  various  changes  of  things 
 ■with  an  immutable  knowledge. 
 
 Second,  What  are  the  objects  of  Divine  knowledge  ? 
 
 Here  the  following  objects  may  require  some  notice  : — God  him- 
 self, and  all  things  out  of  Himself,  both  universally  and  indi- 
 vidually ;  all  things  which  may  be,  which  He  wills  to  be,  and 
 which  He  does,  which  He  either  wills  or  suffers  to  be  done  by 
 His  creatures  ;  all  causes,  modes,  and  circumstances, — ^present, 
 past,  and  future,  great  and  small ;  the  thoughts  of  rational 
 creatures ;  the  recesses  of  the  mind  ;  words,  endeavours,  and 
 actions,  in  their  beginning,  progress,  and  end. 
 
 Perhaps  a  distinction  should  be  here  made,  that  God  knows  Himself 
 'per  se,  and  directly, — His  own  production  extra  se,  indirectly, 
 — and  moral  evil  per  contraria,  as  a  shadow  is  known  by  light 
 and  substance. 
 
 So  that  God  knows  all  things,  under  all  possible  considerations, 
 whether  of  quantity,  quality,  time,  state,  &c. 
 
 Third,  For  what  reasons  ought  we  to  extend  the  Divine  know- 
 ledge to  future  contingencies,  as  they  are  called  ? 
 
 Here  notice  the  different  acceptations  of  the  term  "  contingent," 
 as  when  any  being  or  event  is  the  effect  of  will,  in  opposition 
 to  absolute  necessity  ;  and  in  this  sense  every  created  being 
 is  contingent, — or.  more  commonly,  that  event  is  contingent 
 which  is  not  certainly  produced  by  second  causes  only. 
 A  contingent  future  event  is  a  complex  notion  :  as  an  event,  it  is 
 certain ;  as  it  is  contingent,  the  mode  of  its  production  is 
 implied. 
 
 FourJ;h,  How  may  it  be  proved  that  physical  contingencies, — 
 that  is,  those  events  which  are  contingent  with  respect  to  second 
 causes, — are  known  to  God  in  the  most  certain,  determinate,  and 
 infallible  manner  ? 
 
 Fifth,  What  are  the  most  prominent  outlines  of  the  much-con- 
 troverted subject  of  scientia  media  ? 
 
 In  order  to  this,  observe  that  scientia,  when  applied  to  God,  is 
 properly  distinguished  into  scientia  simplicis  inteUigentice,  and 
 scientia  visionis ;  the  former  having  respect  to  things  merely 
 possible,  the  latter  to  things  certainly  future. 
 The  one,  therefore,  may  be  called  natural  knowledge,  the  other 
 free  ;  the  former  is  to  be  considered  as  antecedent  to  all  decree, 
 the  latter  subsequent  to  a  decree,  and,  as  to  real  entities,  the 
 proper  effects  thereof. 
 Some  learned  Jesuits,  dissatisfied  with  the  above-represented  kinds 
 of  Divine  knowledge,  invented  another,  which  they  supposed 
 to  be  a  medium  between  them,  and  therefore  called  it  scientia 
 
246  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [LECT.  VIII. 
 
 media.  Among  these,  one  of  the  most  notorious  was  Mo- 
 hna. 
 
 This  representation  of  the  subject  was  opposed  with  great  spirit  by 
 the  Dominicans,  and  afterwards  by  the  Jansenists.  One  of  the 
 first  and  most  noted  opposers  of  the  Jesuitic  notion  of  soientia 
 media  was  Alvarez,  and,  of  our  countrymen,  Dr  Twias,  who 
 published  a  folio  volume,  "  De  Scientia  Media,"  in  answer  to 
 Gabi'iel  Penott  and  Francis  Suarez. 
 
 The  chief  question  is  not,  whether  God  knows  futm-e  contingent 
 events  ?  but,  by  what  medium,  and  particularly  by  any  other 
 knowledge  than  the  natural  and  the  free  ? 
 
 Perhaps  this  intricate  subject  is  capable  of  more  accurate  state- 
 ment by  means  of  a  just  notion  of  passive  power  and  the  origin 
 of  moi'al  evil. 
 
 IV.  Wherein  consists  the  proper  difference  between  Divine 
 wisdom  and  knowledge  ?  also  between  wisdom,  will,  and  power  ? 
 
 Here  observe  that  knowledge  belongs  to  the  intellect  only ;  wisdom 
 implies  an  act  of  the  will  also.  Wisdom  directs,  the  will 
 governs,  and  power  executes. 
 
 V.  What  are  some  of  the  most  important  questions  relative  to 
 the  Divine  will  ? 
 
 First,  May  we  say  that  God  wills  anything  necessarily  ?  What 
 are  those  things  ? 
 
 There  can  be  no  question  whether  God  wills  some  things  freely, 
 seeing  all  His  decrees  or  purposes  are  originally  the  free  acts  of 
 His  will. 
 
 The  question,  therefore,  relates  not  to  hypothetical,  but  absolute 
 necessity ;  therefore — 
 
 Second,  What  things  may  He  be  said  to  will  freely  ? 
 
 Third,  What  is  the  proper  diflerence  between  what  is  called  the 
 will  of  purpose  and  the  will  of  precept, — the  hidden  and  revealed  ? 
 
 Fourth,  By  what  arguments  may  it  be  proved  that  this  distinc- 
 tion is  well  founded  ? 
 
 Does  this  differ  from  the  distinction  of  the  will  into  decretive 
 and  rectoral  ? 
 
 Fifth,  Can  there  be  any  cause  assigned  for  the  exercise  of  the 
 Divine  will  ? 
 
 By  "  cause "  is  meant,  not  a  reason  of  the  Divine  will,  but  a 
 something  which  moves  it  to  choose  this  or  the  other ;  in  other 
 words,  whether  the  will  of  God  be  itself  the  supreme  cause  of  all 
 things  ?  For  if  it  be,  it  can  have  no  cause  of  its  exercise.  Yet  of 
 things  willed,  one  thing  may  be  the  cause  of  another,  though  it 
 
LECT.  VIII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  247 
 
 has  been  maintained  by  sound  divines  that  for  the  act  of  willing- 
 no  cause  can  be  assigned.  Shew  the  reasons  on  which  this  con- 
 clusion is  suspended. 
 
 Sixth,  Closely  connected  with  the  former  question  is  the  fol- 
 lowing— Is  the  will  of  God  the  primary  rule  of  right  ? 
 
 What  has  given  rise  and  importance  to  this  inquiry,  even  among 
 divines  otherwise  agreed,  was  the  difference  in  their  views  of  the 
 causation  of  moral  good  and  evil.  They  who  refer  all  good  and 
 evil  to  the  Divine  will,  must  make  the  Divine  will  the  rule  of 
 right,  and  vice  versa. 
 
 Hence,  a  thmg  is  good,  according  to  them,  because  God  chooses 
 it.  And  moral  evil,  they  say,  as  chosen  by  Him,  is  not  evil ;  but 
 when  chosen  by  us,  it  is  evil,  because  God  wills  and  declares  it  to 
 be  so. 
 
 VI.  By  what  arguments  do  you  prove  that  there  is  in  God  what 
 may  be  properly  called  the  attribute  of  vindictive  justice  ?  and 
 wherein  is  it  different  from  equity  ? 
 
 First  notice  the  term  "justice,"  and  the  difl'ereut  ways  in  which  it 
 is  used — as  universal  and  particular,  distributive,  remunerative, 
 penal,  &e. 
 
 Then  prove  the  existence  of  vindictive  justice  in  God,  from  diiferent 
 topics  of  argument. 
 
 VII.  What  is  the  proper  difference  between  the  goodness,  love, 
 grace,  and  mercy  of  God  ? 
 
 In  order  to  this,  define  the  just  character  of  each,  whence  follows 
 the  relation  and  differences. 
 
 VIII.  Wherein  consists  the  power  of  God  ? 
 
 Here  shew  the  true  nature  of  power  in  general,  and  in  reference  to 
 
 God.    What  is  intended  by  omnipotence  ? 
 What  are  the  proper  objects  of  omnipotence  ? 
 
 IX.  What  is  the  just  nature  v  and  definition  of  Divine  sove- 
 reignty and  right? 
 
 First,  By  what  consideration  may  it  be  proved  that  God  is 
 possessed  of  such  an  attribute  as  that  of  sovereignty  ? 
 Second,  Are  there  any  limits  to  sovereign  right  ? 
 
 X.  What  is  the  proper  nature  and  definition  of  the  holiness  of 
 God? 
 
248  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTTJEES.  [LECT.  IX. 
 
 LECTUEE  IX. 
 
 CONCEEKING  THE  TEINITY  OP  PEESONS  IN  THE  DIVINE  ESSENCE. 
 
 In  treating  on  this  awfully  mysterious,  but  highly  important 
 subject  it  is  requisite  that  all  the  terms  which  relate  to  it  be 
 carefully,  and  accurately  explained,  as  there  is  reason  to  suspect 
 that  most  of  the  controversies  which  have  been  agitated  in  the 
 Church  and  in  the  world  on  the  subject  have  been  greatly  owing 
 to  neglect  in  this  particular. 
 
 I.  Explain  these  terms  which  stand  closely  connected  with  the 
 present  subject,  among  which  are  the  following  : — 
 
 First,  What  is  the  proper  import  of  the  word  essence,  in 
 reference  to  God? 
 
 Second,  When  the  term  substance  is  applied  to  God,  what  is 
 the  import  of  it  ? 
 
 Third,  The  term  subsistence,  as  it  stands  closely  connected  with 
 the  subject  of  this  lecture,  should  be  very  particularly  noticed. 
 What  is  the  difference  between  to  exist  and  to  subsist  ? 
 
 Here  may  be  noticed  the  Greek  words  used  by  the  Christian 
 fathers  in  the  Trinitarian  controversy,  imap^is  and  vTr6crTa(n.s, 
 and  their  precise  import  shewn,  and  wherein  they  differ  from 
 ovcrla. 
 
 Fourth,  But  as  the  term  person  has  been  most  objected  to,  and 
 the  greatest  occasion  of  offence  to  Anti-Trinitarians,  the  sense  in 
 which  it  is  taken,  when  properly  employed  in  this  controverted 
 subject,  should  be  very  accurately  ascertained. 
 
 To  this  end,  shew  the  senses  in  which  it  is  not  taken  ;  and  that  a 
 scriptural  pereon,  in  this  Trinitarian  sense,  is  aUke  remote  from 
 a  Divine  attribute,  and  a  sejsarate  being.  Since  God  is  but 
 one  essence  and  being,  His  attributes  are  innumerable,  and 
 His  personalities  only  three. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  substance  of  the  present  subject  according  to 
 Scripture  1 
 
 In  this  investigation  it  will  be  useful  to  recoUeot,  that  it  is  highly 
 reasonable,  even  a  priori,  to  regard  the  Divine  existence  as 
 differing  essentially  from  all  created  existence.  Nor  is  there 
 any  reason  against  extending  this  difference  to  the  mode  of 
 existence. 
 
 First,  By  what  considerations  may  it  be  shewn  that  there  is  no 
 
LECT.  IX.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  249 
 
 impossibility  in  what  the  orthodox  maintain,  no  contradictory 
 inconsistency,  no  improbability  d  priori. 
 
 Second,  Enumerate  the  principal  particulars  of  the  distinguish- 
 ing doctrine. 
 
 Among  others  the  following  may  be  noticed : — 
 
 That  an  orthodox  Trinitarian  disclaims  Tritheism  no  less  than  a 
 Unitarian. 
 
 That  the  Divine  essence,  or  nature,  subsists  in  a  threefold  mode. 
 
 That  nominal  characters  and  relations  differ  from  personal  sub- 
 sistence ;  and  that  the  latter  is  essential  to  the  orthodox 
 doctrine. 
 
 That  each  Divine  subsistence  assumes  to  itself  peculiar  personal 
 properties,  which  are  not  applicable  to  the  others. 
 
 Yet  that  perfections  peculiar  to  Deity  are  ascribed  to  each ;  which 
 implies  that  each  mode  of  being,  or  subsistence,  or  person 
 possesses  or  partakes  the  Divine  essence. 
 
 III.  How  far  is  the  doctrine  of  eternal  generation,  or  emana- 
 tion of  personality,  declared  or  implied  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  ? 
 
 Notice  what  is  intended  by  those  who  maintain  the  doctrine  of 
 eternal  emanation  ;  which  may  be  expressed  in  some  such  way 
 as  this :  an  eternal  communication  of  the  same  numerical 
 essence  from  the  Father  to  the  Son,  and  from  the  Father  and 
 the  Son  to  the  Spirit.  But  it  cannot  be  too  much  incidcated 
 that  this  communication,  emanation,  or  generation,  is  not  the 
 effect  of  mere  wiU,  but  necessary. 
 
 Perhaps  the  want  of  duly  attending  to  this  distinction  has  been 
 the  chief  hold  of  Aa-ianism,  in  opposing  the  orthodox ;  for 
 if  the  communication  be  the  effect  of  wLU,  wherein  does  it 
 differ  from  creating  act  ? 
 
 It  is  also  probable  that  the  terms  "  begotten  "  and  "  generation," 
 often  used  in  this  controversy,  have  greatly  contributed  to  keep 
 out  of  sight,  what  of  all  other  things  should  be  much  attended 
 to — viz.,  that  the  communication  or  emanation  of  personality 
 is  necessary,  in  opposition  to  contingence,  and  dependence  on 
 will. 
 
 Another  consideration  of  great  moment,  but  very  much  kept  out  of 
 sight  in  this  debate,  is  the  strict  co-existence  of  personalities. 
 
 For  want  of  due  attention  to  the  nature  of  the  subject,  the  mind  is 
 deceived  by  the  sound  of  terms ;  for  no  sooner  is  it  said  that 
 the  Son  is  the  "  only-begotten  of  the  Father,"  than  we  form 
 the  idea  of  priority  in  the  Father,  and  of  posteriority  in  the 
 Son,  analogous  to  the  relations  of  men. 
 
 And  even  among  men,  notwithstanding  the  infinite  disparity  be- 
 tween an  infinite  spirit  and  a  worm  of  the  earth,  and  between 
 the  voluutai-y  acts  of  a  creature  and  an  essential  property  of 
 
250  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [lECT.  IX. 
 
 God,  as  this  emanatiou  may  be  called ;  it  would  be  difficult, 
 nay  impossible,  to  form  an  idea  of  such  relation  of  father  and 
 son  but  as  simultaneous. 
 
 One  may  exist  as  a  man  before  his  son,  but  not  as  a  father  of  such 
 a  son  ;  and  this  is  what  most  consistent  Trinitarians  hold. 
 
 In  the  order  of  time  or  existence,  as  conceived  by  us,  the  notion  of 
 essence  is  prior  to  that  of  personality ;  nor  is  there  any  more 
 imjjropriety  in  this  representation  than  in  our  considering  the 
 Divine  attributes  in  an  order  subsequent  to  the  Divine  essence. 
 
 But  as  to  personal  relations,  and  the  mode  of  subsistence  in  Deity, 
 there  is  no  more  reason  to  suppose  priority,  than  there  is  in 
 saying  that  goodness  in  God  is  prior  to  wisdom,  and  power  sub- 
 sequent to  both. 
 
 Through  carnal  associations,  we  find  a  difficulty  in  preserving  the 
 subject  itself,  and  that  to  which  it  bears  a  partial  analogy, 
 sufficiently  distinct.  Thus,  among  men  a  father  has  a  personal 
 subsistence  prior  to  his  fatherhood  ;  but  not  so  in  the  other 
 case.  In  the  sacred  orthodox  doctrine,  no  personal  subsistence 
 is  to  be  conceived  prior  to  fatherhood  and  sonship  ;  nay,  these 
 relations  constitute  the  personalities.  If  there  be  no  son  there 
 is  no  personal  father,  and  vice  versd.  Here  may  be  noticed 
 that  the  term  "  Father  "  is  not  always  used  in  a  personal  sense, 
 either  in  Scriptm-e  or  among  divines, — as, "  Om-  Father  who 
 art  in  heaven," — but  answers  often  to  the  word  Creator,  because 
 we  "  are  His  offspring ;"  or  Governor,  because  we  are  His 
 family,  &c.* 
 
 *  The  proper  use  of  illustrations  by  comparison  is  not  to  jji'ore  the  doctrine, 
 but  to  shew  from  analogy  the  possibility  of  what  is  apprehended  to  be  the  col- 
 lected meaning  of  revelation  on  the  subject.  Suppose,  then,  the  infinite  mind,  as 
 to  essence,  to  be  necessarily  active,  or  life  itself ;  is  there  anything  unreasonable 
 in  the  thought  of  a  terminus  a  quo,  and  a  terminus  ad  quern,  relative  to  this  essen- 
 tial energy  and  life  antecedent  to  wiU  ?  Is  it  impossible  that  these  teiynini  should 
 contribute  relative  properties,  which  may  not  improperly  be  called  subsistences 
 or  persons  ?  Is  it  not  possible  that  this  infinite  and  infinitely  active  life  should  be 
 denominated,  according  to  the  collective  sense  of  revelation,  as  a  relative  property 
 a  quo,  the  Father ;  and  the  same  life,  as  a  relative  property  ad  quern,  the  Son; 
 while  the  essential  energy  of  this  life  terminating  ad  quern  is  eternal  generation, 
 or  begetting  ?  Again,  is  there  anything  absurd  in  the  supposition  that  this  in- 
 finitely active  life,  proceeding  in  medio  a  duohus  ierminis,  should  constitute  another 
 distinctive  relative  property  called  Spint  ? 
 
 In  all  works  ad  extra,  the  effects  of  power  and  will,  no  one  person  acts  exclu- 
 sively of  the  other ;  therefore  no  work  ad  extra,  whether  creation,  redemption, 
 or  any  other  whatever,  can  be  the  distinguishing  cause  of  these  relative  properties. 
 Is  it  not,  then,  a  possible  and  a  rational  notion,  and  intelligible  language,  when  it 
 is  said,  that  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit,  (into  the  name  of  whom  Chi-istians  were  to 
 be  baptized,)  are  these  positive,  real,  or  personal  modes  of  subsistence  in  God,  or 
 one  infinitely  active  life  ?  and  that  the  Son  of  God,  by  eternal  generation,  as- 
 sumed our  nature  into  personal  union  with  HimseK,  thus  constituting  a  glorious 
 
LECT.  IX.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  251 
 
 In  proportion  as  our  observations  are  just  respecting  the  emanation 
 of  the  Son,  and  the  co-existent  personalities  of  the  Father  and 
 Son,  as  the  results  of  a  necessary  essential  cause,  so  wiE  they 
 apply  to  the  personality  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
 
 IV.  Supposing  the  substance  of  the  doctrine  to  be  scriptural, 
 how  far  is  it  justifiable  to  use  terms  not  used  in  the  Scripture,  to 
 express  a  doctrine  of  mere  Divine  revelation  ?  for  instance,  in  the 
 word  Trinity,  &c.  ? 
 
 There  is  a  great  difference  between  unscriptural  terms  and  terms 
 not  used  in  ^Scripture  :  thus,  the  terms  "  trinity "  and  tri- 
 plicity  are  alike  not  used  in  Scripture  ;  but  the  former,  we 
 conceive,  is  perfectly  consistent  with  Scripture,  (as  the  Greek 
 Tpiay,)  while  the  latter  is  unscriptural. 
 In  like  manner  the  much-controverted  terms  ofiooia-iuv  and  ofioto- 
 ovatoV)  &C. 
 
 v.  How  far  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  a  fundamental  article 
 of  faith? 
 
 Here  it  will  be  necessary  to  distinguish  between  ignorance  and  a 
 denial  of  the  doctrine  ;  also  between  the  several  degi'ees  of 
 knowledge  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  same  means. 
 
 If,  therefore,  after  proper  distinctions,  and  candid  allowance  made, 
 the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  be  fundamental,  or  indispensably 
 necessary  to  salvation,  by  what  arguments  may  it  be  proved  to 
 be  such  ? 
 
 How  far  was  this  doctrine  revealed  under  the  Old  Testament  eco- 
 nomy, and  the  probable  highest  attainments  of  ancient  saints  ? 
 
 In  this  connexion  it  will  be  useful  to  notice  the  difference  between 
 a  doctrinal  fact  and  its  manner. 
 
 Mediator  between  sinners  and  the  Divine  nature,  which,  though  in  itself  love,  is 
 consunung  fire  to  offenders  ? 
 
 The  sentiment  of  eternal  generation,  and  that  which  represents  Father,  Son,  and 
 Spirit,  as  terms  of  distinctive  personal  relations,  seems  much  less  exceptionable  to 
 many  who  have  long  considered  both  sides  than  that  which  holds  these  terms  as 
 expressive  of  works  or  offices  ad  extra,  while  yet  a  Trinity  of  Persons  is  acknow- 
 ledged. For  it  may  be  urged,  either  these  Divine  persons  have  essential  distinc- 
 tive characters,  or  they  have  not ;  if  not,  with  what  propriety  can  they  be  called 
 three  persons  1  The  idea  of  three  distinct  leinffs  is  disclaimed,  and  yet  here  are 
 supposed  three  persons  without  any  difference  of  distinctive  characters ;  that  is,  a 
 diversity  without  any  assignable  ground  of  difference.  But  if  they  have  essential 
 distinctive  characters,  what  are  they  if  not  those  held  by  consistent  Athanasians, 
 in  some  respects  corresponding  with  the  terms  becjctting,  begotten,  and  proceeding, 
 as  before  explained  ?  If  it  be  said,  the  works  of  redemption ;  it  may  be  replied, 
 these  are  works  ad  extra,  and  therefore  belong  to  each  person.  Is  any  Divine 
 perfection,  as  love,  goodness,  mercy,  wisdom,  power,  or  the  like,  a  sufficient  groimd 
 of  personal  distinction  ?  Surely  that  person  is  not  Divine  that  possesses  not  each 
 alike,  and  in  an  infinite  degree. 
 
252  SYLLABUS  OP  LECTUKES.  [LECT.  X. 
 
 How  far  does  the  formula  of  Christian  baptism  imply  the  doctrine 
 of  the  Trinity,  and  the  design  of  the  Institutor  to  teach  those 
 who  were  to  be  initiated  into  the  Christian  Church  both  the 
 doctrine  itself  and  its  fundamental  importance  ? 
 
 Here  notice  the  practical  tendency  of  the  doctrine — the  different 
 views  of  good  men  concerning  it — and  how  far  that  difference 
 affects  its  fundamental  character. 
 
 VI.  What  seems  to  have  been  the  most  common  view  of  the 
 subject  before  the  Council  of  Nice?  At  what  rate  should  the 
 opinions  of  these  fathers  be  estimated  ? 
 
 VII.  What  are  the  principal  objections  that  have  been  made  to 
 this  doctrine,  and  the  replies  respectively  ? 
 
 -   Shew  what  are  the  chief  objections  of  the  Socinians,  Arians,  Semi- 
 Arians,  or  any  others,  the  most  plausible,  and  the  best  answers. 
 What  are  of  all  these  objections  the  most  weighty  in  your  mind  ? 
 
 VIII.  What  are  some  of  the  most  interesting  practical  uses  of 
 the  doctrhie  of  the  Trinity  consistently  maintained  ? 
 
 LECTUEE  X. 
 
 CONCEENING  THE  DEITY  OF  THE  LOGOS,  AND  THE  DEITY  AND 
 PEESON  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIEIT. 
 
 We  now  proceed  to  a  much-controverted  subject,  in  discussing 
 which  much  diligence,  accuracy,  knowledge  of  the  Scriptures,  and 
 unfeigned  humility,  are  highly  requisite. 
 
 I.  What  have  been  the  principal  opinions  of  considerable 
 extent  and  duration,  concerning  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  from 
 the  commencement  of  the  Christian  era  to  the  present  time  ? 
 
 In  prosecuting  this  inquiry,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  enter 
 minutely  into  the  dogmas  of  the  ancient  heretics  ;  but  rather 
 to  shew,  with  aU  due  conciseness,  the  prominent  and  most  dis- 
 tinguishing features  of  the  varieties. 
 
 II.  What  are  the  most  prevailing  opinions  of  Christian  pro- 
 fessors, at  the  present  period,  respecting  the  person  of  Christ,  and 
 what  the  comparative  degree  of  prevalence  ? 
 
 The  same  brevity  is  recommended  in  the  present  case  as  in  the 
 preceding  one  ;  but  the  utmost  care  in  ascertaining  the  precise 
 views  of  those  who  may  be  supposed  as  the  most  dangerous 
 opposers  of  the  true  Scripture  doctrine. 
 
LECT.  X.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  253 
 
 III.  To  what  must  we  ascribe  this  variety  of  opinions  respecting 
 the  person  of  the  Eedeemer  ?  Is  it  to  the  nature  of  the  subject 
 — the  language  of  Scripture — the  state  of  the  mind — to  all  these, 
 or  io  some  other  cause  or  causes  ? 
 
 IV.  How  far  is  the  supposed  increase  of  opposition  to  the 
 proper  deity  of  the  Saviour  an  argument  against  the  truth  of  it? 
 
 V.  What  is  the  most  proper  mode  of  investigating  this  import- 
 ant subject  ? 
 
 As  this  awful  and  mysterious  doctrine  is  confessedly  to  be  decided 
 by  a  right  understanding  of  the  Scripture  testimony  concern- 
 ing it,  is  there  any  better  way  than  to  collect  all  the  passages 
 which  treat  directly  of  the  subject,  and  then  to  collect  all  the 
 other  passages  from  whence  the  truth  may  be  fairly  inferred  ? 
 
 VI.  What  are  the  chief  arguments  in  proof  of  the  proper 
 deity  of  the  Redeemer  ? 
 
 First,  How  far  is  the  Saviour's  deity  inferable  from  the  names  and 
 
 titles  ascribed  to  Him,  which  are  usually  ascribed  to  God  ? 
 Second,  How  far  is  the  same  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the 
 
 attributes,  properties,  or  perfections  which  are  assigned  Him 
 
 in  Scripture  ? 
 Third,  Are  the  works  which  the  Holy  Scriptm-es  ascribe  to  Christ, 
 
 such  as  creation,  upholding  all  things,  and  the  lilie,  conclusive 
 
 arguments  in  the  present  question  ? 
 Fourth,  What  are  we  to  infer  on  the  present  subject  from  the 
 
 adoration  and  praise  which  are  in  Scripture  ascribed  to  the 
 
 Saviour  ? 
 Fifth,  How  may  we  infer  the  deity  of  Christ  from  the  fact  of  His 
 
 resurrection  compared  with  His  assertions  ? 
 Sixth,  How  far  do  the  orthodox  doctrines  of  a  proper  atonement, 
 
 imputed  righteousness,  vital  union  and  influence,  if  granted, 
 
 imply  the  Saviour's  deity  ? 
 Seventh,  What  argumentative  and  real  force  is  there  in  the  con- 
 sideration of  Christ's  universal  empire,  towards  establishing 
 
 the  point  of  Christ's  Divine  nature  ? 
 Eighth,  How  far  mhj  the  same  inference  be  drawn  from  His  being 
 
 our  Judge  at  the  last  day  ? 
 
 VII.  How  far  does  the  title  "The  Son  of  God"  imply  His 
 divinity  ? 
 
 First,  Is  this  expressive  only  of  His  mediatorial  office,  or  of  His 
 
 mode  of  relative  subsistence  ? 
 Second,  If  the  latter,  how  far  is  it  an  argument  for  His  proper 
 
 deity? 
 
 VIII.  What  evidence  is  there  from  Scripture  testimony  that 
 the  Holy  Spirit  is  possessed  of  divinity  and  personality  ? 
 
254!  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [LECT.  XI. 
 
 Here  the  same  topics  may  be  introduced  as  before  in  reference  to 
 the  deity  of  Christ — titles,  attributes,  works,  worship. 
 
 IX.  What  have  been  some  of  the  most  plausible  and  weighty 
 objections  made  to  the  subject  of  this  lecture  ? 
 
 X.  What  are  some  of  the  practical  uses  of  the  doctrine  ? 
 
 LECTURE  XI. 
 
 CONCERNING  THE  DIVINE  PUEPOSES  OK  DECEEES^ — THEIE  NATURE 
 
 AND  OBJECTS. 
 
 Having  treated  of  the  nature,  perfections,  and  personalities  of 
 the  Godhead,  we  proceed  to  discuss  the  profound  and  awful  subject 
 of  the  Divine  decrees. 
 
 As  the  Scriptures  use  various  terms,  expressive  of  purposes  or 
 decrees,  as  Trpoyvcocri';,  irpoOeai';,  wpiafievT]  ^ovKij,  evhoKia,  or  the 
 like— 
 
 I.  What  is  the  most  scriptural  and  theological  definition  of  the 
 Divine  decrees  ? 
 
 To  form  an  accurate  definition,  it  should  be  remembered  that  God 
 has  been  called,  and  not  improperly,  Actus  purus  et  siraplieis- 
 si'/nus. 
 
 Also,  that  the  Divine  decrees  are  among  the  acts  of  God — that  these 
 acts  are  eternal,  in  a  sense  absolute,  and  essential — ^that  they 
 partake  of  some  other  properties  and  differences. 
 
 II.  What  are  the  chief  properties  of  the  Divine  decrees  ? 
 Though  the  hints  given  under  the  former  head  were  chiefly  designed 
 
 to  assist  in  forming  a  definition,  they  may  be  of  f^u^;he^  use  to 
 ascertain  the  properties  of  the  Divine  decrees.  Here  it  will  be 
 proper  to  bring  together  as  into  a  focus  all  those  properties 
 that  properly  belong  to  a  Divine  decree,  whether  mentioned 
 in  the  definition  or  not. 
 
 III.  By  what  arguments  may  the  existence  of  such  decrees  as 
 before  defined  and  explained  be  proved  ? 
 
 It  will  be  necessary  here  to  produce  those  passages  of  Holy  Writ 
 where  the  different  expressions  are  used  which  imply  the 
 doctrine  of  the  decrees. 
 
 The  consideration  also  of  the  Divine  perfections  may  be  advanced, 
 and    especially   omniscience.      Our    absolute    dependence    as 
 
LECT.  XI.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  2.55 
 
 creatures   may  be  also   urged,  or  the  dependence  of   second 
 causes  on  the  first. 
 
 IV.  Wherein  does  a  decree  differ  from  a  resolution,  which  is  the 
 result  of  reasoning  ? 
 
 It  is  obvious  that  the  principal  difference  must  be  sought  from  the 
 infinite  simplicity  of  the  Divine  nature  and  the  intuitive  nature 
 of  infinite  knowledge,  compared  with  the  infinite  deficiency  of 
 our  minds  in  these  respects,  and  the  consequent  discursive 
 manner  of  ratiocination. 
 
 V.  Wherein  do  the  Divine  decrees  differ  from  those  acts  of  the 
 Divine  nature  which  constitute  its  personalities  ? 
 
 VI.  Wherein  do  they  differ  from  the  fate  of  the  heathen  ? 
 Here  insert  that  notion  of  fate  which  has  been  supposed  to  come 
 
 nearest  the  doctrine  of  Divine,  decrees  according  to  the  Holy 
 Scriptures. 
 
 VII.  How  far  may  a  decree  be  termed  the  efficient  cause  of 
 whatever  things  are  future  ? 
 
 Here  distinguish  upon  different  objects  of  the  decree,  or  rather  the 
 qualities  of  events.  Is  sin  or  moi-al  evil  in  any  respect  an  ob- 
 ject of  Divine  decree  ?     If  not,  on  what  piinciple  1 
 
 VIII.  Can  it  be  supposed  that  God  in  any  case  changes  His 
 decree  ? 
 
 How  may  we  reconcile  the  perpetual  changes  that  take  place  in  the 
 creatures  with  the  Divine  decrees  ?  To  which  may  be  added 
 the  solution  of  objections  from  some  declared  purjjoses  of  God 
 not  taking  place;  as,  for  in.stance, the  destruction  of  Nineveh. 
 
 IX.  Whence  does  it  appear  that  the  Divine  decrees  are  intrin- 
 sically one,  and  not  divers  1  If  intrinsically  one,  whence  the  pro- 
 priety of  using  the  plural  term  ? 
 
 X.  How  far  may  a  decree  be  termed  the  exemplary  idea  of 
 things  future  ?  And  when<  ideas  are  ascribed  to  God,  wherein  do 
 they  differ  from  those  of  creatures  ? 
 
 Our  ideas,  it  is  evident,  are  impressed.  Are  those  of  God  so  in  any 
 respect  ? 
 
 XI.  How  may  it  be  proved  that  the  Divine  decrees  are  eternal  1 
 If  eternal,  may  they  be  considered  by  us  as  first  or  last  ?  and  can 
 they  be  considered  as  eternal  a  -posteriori. 
 
 XII.  Are  we  to  consider  the  Divine  decrees  as  in  God  essen- 
 tially, or  only  accidentally  ?  If  they  are  the  immanent  acts  of  the 
 Divine  will,  how  can  they  be  said  to  be  essential  to  God  ?    May  we 
 
256  SYLLABUS  OP  LECTUEES.  [lECT.  XIL 
 
 infer  from  the  supposition  that  they  are  ipsa  essentia  volens, 
 that  therefore  they  may  be  identified  with  the  essence  ?  But  if 
 a  decree  be  an  essential  act  of  God,  how  can  it  admit  of  freedom, 
 which  seems  to  be  implied  in  the  idea  of  a  decree  ?  And  again, 
 if  essential,  how  does  it  appear  that  a  decree  is  not  the  same  as 
 God  himself  ? 
 
 XIII.  Are  any  of  the  Divine  decrees  conditional  ?     If  they  are, 
 in  what  sense  ?     But  if  not  so,  a  priori,  for  what  reasons  ? 
 
 Here  also  notice  the  difference  between  the  decree  itself  being  con- 
 ditional, and  the  thing  decreed  ;  also,  how  we  may  reconcile 
 conditional  promises  and  threatenings  with  the  unconditional 
 decrees  concerning  them  ;  and  shew  that  the  distinction  be- 
 tween the  secret  and  revealed  will  of  God  is  well  founded,  not 
 only  as  implied  in  Scripture  testimony,  but  also  in  the  nature 
 of  things. 
 
 LECTURE  XII. 
 
 ON  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY. 
 
 The  subjects  of  this  lecture  have  long  agitated  the  ingenuity  of 
 the  inquisitive  and  the  learned.  Much  difficulty  has  arisen  from 
 too  hasty  an  assumption  that  liberty  and  necessity  are  inconsistent. 
 Whereas  the  same  subject  may  be  free  iu  one  respect  whUe  neces- 
 sitated in  another. 
 
 I.  How  many  difierent  kinds  of  liberty  are  there  ? 
 
 Here  may  be  shewn  the  most  general  notion  of  hberty,  denoting 
 freedom  or  exemption  from  compulsion  to  evil,  and  from  re- 
 straint, where  good  is  the  object  to  be  chosen,  but  not  from 
 hypothetical  necessity. 
 
 Notice  the  principal  kinds  of  liberty,  and  shew  wherein  liberty  of 
 action  differs  from  that  of  choice. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  difierence  between  the  liberty  of  moral  agents 
 and  the  spontaneity  of  brutes  ?  Is  there,  or  is  there  not,  any 
 difi"erence  between  what  is  called  instinct  and  spontaneity  ?  And 
 is  this  consistent  with  decretive  necessity.  Hence  infer  to  what 
 extent  man  is  free,  and  what  constitutes  free  agency. 
 
 III.  By  what  arguments  may  the  seK-determiuiag  power  of  the 
 human  will  be  defended  or  disproved  ?     And  vice  versa,  by  what 
 
LECT.  XIII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  257 
 
 arguments  may  the  real  freedom  of  man,  such  as  is  essential  to 
 moral  agency,  if  proved  ? 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  best  definition  of  necessity  in  general  ? 
 
 First,  What  is  absolute  necessity,  and  wherein  different  from  the 
 fate  of  heathens  1 
 
 In  the  highest  sense  this  is  apphoable  to  the  Divine  nature  ;  in 
 another  sense,  to  mathematical  and  metaphysical  relations. 
 
 Second,  What  is  hypothetical  necessity,  and  wherein  does  it 
 differ  from  absolute  ?  To  what  things  applicable,  and  to  what 
 not? 
 
 V.  To  what  necessity  are  free  agents  subject,  and  in  what 
 respects  ? 
 
 They  are  subjects  of  Divine  decrees,  and  therefore  to  necessity  in 
 several  respects  ;  though  in  other  respects,  as  before  shewn, 
 perfectly  free. 
 
 VI.  What  is  the  best  mode  of  reconciling  liberty  and  necessity? 
 
 Here  may  be  shewn  that  the  same  thing  may  be  said  to  be  at  once 
 contingent  and  necessary  in  different  respects,  particularly 
 moral  evil :  contingent  as  not  decreed  or  compelled,  but  neces- 
 sary in  a  metaphysical  sense. 
 
 VII.  What  is  the  true  and  ultimate  origin  of  moral  evil  ? 
 
 It  must  be  either  in  God  or  in  ourselves.  Not  in  God,  therefore  in 
 ourselves  ;  not  in  ourselves  as  a  concreated  principle,  for  then 
 it  -would  be  of  God.     In  what  sense,  therefore,  in  ourselves  ? 
 
 LEGTUEE  XIII. 
 
 ON  PEEDESTINATION  AND  ELECTION. 
 
 The  subject  of  this  lecture  is  truly  awful,  yet,  rightly  under- 
 stood, far  more  amiable  than  it  has  commonly  been  represented ; 
 for  it  implies  nothing  capricious,  nothing  inconsistent  with  wisdom, 
 goodness,  or  equity. 
 
 I.  Define  the  terms  predestination  and  election,  according  to 
 the  import  of  the  original,  and  in  what  respects  they  differ. 
 
 The  first  may  also  be  considered  as  a  genus,  and  the  latter  a  species 
 of  it. 
 VOL.  IV.  K 
 
258  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [LECT.  XIII. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  commonly-received  doctrine  of  reprobation,  as 
 used  by  several  of  the  Reformers,  Calvin,  Perkins,  &c.,  and  how 
 far  is  that  representation  scriptural  or  unscriptural  ? 
 
 Many  writers  subsequent  to  the  first  Eeformers  have  followed  the 
 same  track,  in  Europe  and  America. 
 
 III.  "What  is  the  precise  import  of  the  17th  Article  of  the  Eng- 
 lish Episcopal  Church  on  predestination  ? 
 
 Who  were  the  framers  of  these  Articles  ? 
 
 IV.  Who  are  the  objects  of  benevolent  predestination  in  the 
 scriptural  sense? 
 
 The  Scriptures  mention  two  sorts  of  beings,  angels  and  men,  as  the 
 objects  of  benevolent  purposes.  Are  any  of  them  predesti- 
 nated to  sin  as  the  means,  and  to  suffering  as  the  end  ? 
 
 V.  How  is  predestination  (not  the  term,  but  the  thing)  defined 
 as  applied  to  men  ? 
 
 Its  genus  is  a  decree,  and  therefore  a  Divine  act.  And  this  Divine 
 decree  is  not  to  be  confined  to  one  Divine  person,  though  eco- 
 nomically it  is  attributed  to  one  rather  than  another.  It  must 
 partake  of  the  same  properties  as  the  other  decrees — as  abso- 
 lute, independent,  and  eternal,  and  yet  most  wise  and  free. 
 
 Here  observe,  that  it  does  not  regard  merely  the  end  but  also  the 
 means. 
 
 VI.  Wherein  does  election  differ  from  predestination  ? 
 Here  should  be  included  a  definition  of  the  thing. 
 
 VII.  What  are  the  most  direct  proofs  of  the  doctrine  of  election 
 from  the  Scriptures  ? 
 
 Carefully  distinguish  between  passages  which  treat  of  national  and 
 personal  election  ;  also  some  which  treat  of  personal  election 
 to  privileges  and  ofiices. 
 
 VIII.  What  are  some  of  the  strongest  proofs  by  way  of  Scrip- 
 ture inference  or  analogy  ? 
 
 May  not  the  scriptural  account  of  the  fallen,  helpless  condition  of 
 all  men  be  some  evidence  ?  also  the  doctrine  of  Divine  influ- 
 ence, regeneration,  God  justifying  the  ungodly,  &c.  ? 
 
 IX.  What  are  the  most  plausible  objections  to  predestmation  to 
 life,  and  the  Calvinistic  doctrine  of  election?  and  how  best  an- 
 swered ? 
 
 X.  How  may  this  awful  doctrine  be  best  improved  for  the  pur- 
 poses of  devotion  and  practical  godliness? 
 
LECT.  XIV.]         SYLLABUS  OP  LECTURES.  259 
 
 Every  Scripture  doctrine  has  this  tendency,  and  this  doctrine  evi- 
 dently so,  as  the  apostolic  writings  testify,  especially  the 
 epistles  to  the  Romans,  Ephesians,  &c. 
 
 LECTURE  XIV. 
 
 on  the  wokks  of  ceeation  and  pkovidence. 
 
 Part  First. 
 Of  the  Worhs  of  Creation. 
 
 Having  considered  the  perfections  and  purposes  of  God,  His 
 works  come  next  to  be  considered.  And,  among  all  the  Divine 
 works,  those  of  creation  and  providence  claim  the  first  notice. 
 
 I.  Define  the  terms  creation  and  providence;  then  the  things 
 intended  by  them. 
 
 II.  How  would  you  prove,  independent  of  revealed  authority, 
 that  the  world  could  not  be  from  eternity  ? 
 
 III.  What  are  the  leading  features  of  the  Platonic,  Aristotelian, 
 Epicurean,  and  Spinozian  systems  respecting  the  origin  of  the 
 world  ? 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  real  system  of  Moses  with  respect  to  creation  ? 
 Here  notice  whether  Moses  in  his  Principia  treats  of  the  solar 
 
 system  exclusively,  or  also  of  the  material  and  intelligent  uni- 
 verse, and  on  what  grounds. 
 
 V.  What  influence  has  the  Mosaic  doctrine  of  the  creation  on 
 the  philosophic  axiom,  so  generally  received  among  the  ancients. 
 Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit  ? 
 
 VI.  How  far  may  it  be  said  that  a  created  nature  is  possessed 
 of  real  entity  ? 
 
 If  the  affirmative,  how  is  the  consequence  avoided  that  something 
 is  added  to  the  sum  total  of  existence,  or  to  that  of  the  First 
 Catise  ?  If  the  negative,  wherein  does  the  creature  differ  from 
 pure  nihility  ? 
 
 VII.  Is  creating  power  communicable  to  a  creature  in  any 
 degree. 
 
 If  not,  wherein  does  the  power  of  working  miracles  really  and  pro- 
 perly differ  from  creating  power?    And  how  do  the  Arians 
 
2G0  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.         [lECT.  XIV. 
 
 extricate  their  sentiment  from  difficulty,  when  they  allow  that 
 all  things  were  created  by  Jesus  Christ  ? 
 
 VIII.  When  was  our  world  created  according  to  the  Mosaic 
 account  ? 
 
 In  what  year  of  the  Juliaa  period,  and  at  what  time  of  the  year,  or 
 in  what  part  of  the  zodiac,  it  is  most  probable  did  the  sun  first 
 appear  to  Adam  ? 
 
 IX.  Which  is  the  most  probable  hypothesis — that  the  chaos 
 of  the  world  was  created  instantaneously,  or  else  in  the  space  of 
 one  day,  after  the  manner  {mutatis  mutandis)  of  a  chemical 
 process  ? 
 
 Here  also  may  be  conjectured  in  which  of  these  ways  the  work  of 
 each  day  is  most  probably  to  be  understood ;  and  why  Moses 
 obsei^es  at  the  close  of  each  day,  "  and  the  evening  and  the 
 morning  were,"  rather  than  "  and  the  morning  and  the  evening 
 were." 
 
 X.  What  was  the  doctrine  of  the  pre- Adamites  ?  and  how  may 
 it  be  briefly  and  solidly  refuted  ? 
 
 Paet  Second. 
 Of  the  Works  of  Providence. 
 
 I.  Having  before  defined  what  is  meant  by  providence,  now 
 prove  the  reality  of  a  Divine  providence. 
 
 The  topics  here  are  innumerable  ;  but  fix  on  those  which  have  the 
 greatest  weight  in  your  own  mind. 
 
 II.  How  far  is  the  doctrine  of  Divine  providence  implied  in  the 
 doctrine  of  Theism  ? 
 
 Or  how  far  is  the  denial  of  a  Divine  providence  chargeable  with' 
 Atheism  i 
 
 III.  What  are  the  objects  of  providence  ? 
 
 In  general  all  created  things  ;  but  notice  particularly  the  extensive 
 scale  of  beings,  the  amazingly  distant  extremes  of  celestial 
 intelligences  and  animalcules,  and  the  innumerable  inter- 
 mediate ranks. 
 
 IV.  How  far  is  providence  extended  to  the  actions  of  creatures  ? 
 The  actions  of  irrational  animals,  from  the  lai'gest  to  the  smallest, 
 
 from  the  most  to  the  least  sagacious.     The  actions  of  men  are 
 either  involuntary  or  voluntary,  either  indifferent  or  accountable. 
 
 First,  How  far  is  providence  concerned  in  actions  morallv  good  ? 
 
LECT.  XV.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LBCTUEES.  261 
 
 Second,  How  far,  also,  in  actions  morally  bad  ? 
 
 V.  Having  considered  the  objects  of  providence,  proceed  to  its 
 works. 
 
 First,  Wherein  consists  providential  preservation  ? 
 
 Does  this  presei'vation  extend  to  the  physical  acts  and  the  vei'y 
 being  of  its  object  ? 
 
 Second,  Wherein  consists  providential  government  ? 
 
 How  may  the  reahty  of  these  providential  works  be  best  proved  i 
 
 VI.  What  are  the  chief  properties  of  Divine  providence  ? 
 
 VII.  How  far  is  the  usual  distinction  of  providence  into  ordi- 
 nary and  extraordinary,  common  and  special,  accurate  or  useful  ? 
 
 Here  may  be  noted  the  jjroper  nature  of  a  miracle,  its  possibiUty, 
 and  the  probability  of  its  being  employed  in  any  given  case. 
 
 VIII.  Mention  some  of  the  most  natural  and  interesting  in- 
 ferences from  the  doctrine  of  providence,  and  how  it  ought  to  be 
 practically  improved. 
 
 LECTURE  XV. 
 
 CONCEENING  MAN  IN  HIS  STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  PEOBATION. 
 
 Man,  being  the  last  and  noblest  work  of  God  in  our  world, 
 requires  our  particular  attention.  Self-knowledge  has  ever  been 
 deemed  an  object  of  study  the  most  important.  Fvcodi  aeavrov, 
 was  an  ancient  oracle ;  and  one  of  our  own  poets  says,  "  The 
 proper  study  of  mankind  is  man."  For  man  to  be  unacquainted 
 with  himself  may  b^  well  thought  a  matter  of  sui'prise,  especially 
 when  favoured  with  a  Divine  revelation.  "What!"  says  an 
 apostle,  "  know  ye  not  your  own  selves  ? " 
 
 I.  Give  some  account  of  Adam  and  Eve  as  a  noble  part  of 
 Divine  workmanship. 
 
 Notice  the  more  obvious  part  of  man  first — his  body,  corporeal 
 faculties,  &o.  Give  a  sketch  of  the  human  frame  with  respect 
 to  its  obvious  design — the  adaptation  and  suitableness  of  the 
 parts  to  answer  the  ends  of  comfort,  safety,  duty,  and  happi- 
 ness. A  minute  anatomical  detail  would  be  misplaced,  and  a 
 bare,  uninteresting,  general  notice  insufficient.  It  is  desirable 
 to  touch,  therefore,  on  the  principal  parts  and  uses,  with  a  view 
 
262  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [LECT.  XV. 
 
 to  display  the  Divine  wisdom,  power,  and  goodness.  For  tliis 
 piirpose  Paley's  "  Natural  Theology"  will  be  of  great  use  ;  and 
 F^nelon  "  Sur  I'Esistenoe,"  &o. 
 Then  may  be  noticed  the  faculties  of  his  mind — his  intellectual  and 
 active  powers,  his  powers  of  perceiving,  judging,  reasoning,  and 
 classifying  his  ideas ;  understanding,  will,  affections,  and  con- 
 science. 
 
 II.  Give  some  account  of  man's  moral  state. 
 
 Particularly  wherein  consisted  that  image  or  hkeness  of  God  after 
 which  man  was  formed. 
 
 III.  What  was  the  law  under  which  man  was  first  placed,  and 
 whether  it  should  be  considered  as  a  covenant  ? 
 
 Law  is  properly  a  rule  of  action,  with  sanctions.  The  moral  law 
 results  from  the  natiu-e  of  God  and  of  man,  and  cannot  be 
 abrogated  but  by  the  destruction  of  our  nature.  Covenant  is 
 an  appointment :  between  men,  mutual ;  but  with  God  mutual 
 agreements  are  useless,  because  He  is  incapable  of  appointing 
 objectionable  conditions  and  consequences. 
 
 IV.  Wherein  consisted  the  proper  power  of  man  in  his  state 
 of  integrity  1 
 
 Was  it  borrowed,  or  else  a  self-determining  power  ?  And  was  his 
 liberty,  in  reference  to  his  accountable  actions,  of  a  different 
 character  before  and  after  his  fall  ? 
 
 V.  What  was  the  condition  upon  which  Adam  was  to  have  a 
 continuance  of  the  Divine  favour  ? 
 
 In  what  sense  was  the  tree  of  the  forbidden  fruit  called  "  the  tree 
 of  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evU  ? "  What  was  the  tree  of  life  ? 
 — ^why  so  called  ? — and  what  was  its  use  ? 
 
 VI.  As  Eve  was  not  a  descendant  of  Adam,  nor  yet  a  covenant 
 head,  how  was  she  regarded,  or  in  what  situation  are  we  to  con- 
 sider her  in  reference  to  the  covenant  ? 
 
 VII.  In  what  spot  of  the  earth  most  probably  was  the  garden 
 of  Eden,  where  Adam  and  Eve  were  fii-st  placed  ? 
 
LECT.  XVJ.]         SYLLABUS  OP  LECTUEES.  263 
 
 LECTURE  XVI. 
 
 CONCEENING  THE  SIN  OF  MAN,  AND  ITS  PUNISHMENT. 
 
 Having  shewn  the  nature,  state,  and  powers  of  man,  consider 
 how  he  abused  his  advantages. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  true  and  formal  nature  of  sin,  in  the  abstract, 
 and  in  the  concrete  ? 
 
 Shew  also  wherein  it  diifers  from  guilt  and  moral  impotence.  Re- 
 flect how  far,  if  at  all,  is  consciousness,  knowledge,  or  will  es- 
 sential to  the  being  of  sin  ;  or  ignorance  an  exemption  or 
 excuse  ;  and  how  far  sin  can  belong  to  the  body. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  ultimate  and  proper  origin  or  cause  of  sin  in 
 general,  and  that  of  man  in  particular  ? 
 
 Is  it  probable  that  sin  has  a  different  origin  in  different  creatures  ? 
 What  was  the  radical  part  of  Adam's  first  sin  ? 
 
 III.  How  far  is  the  phrase  "  efficacious  permission  of  sin  "  ad- 
 missible, if  at  aU  ? 
 
 Connected  with  this  question  is  another  expression  sometimes  used, 
 "  to  decree  to  permit ;"  is  it  appropriate  ? 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  scriptural  doctrine  of  the  sin  of  our  nature, 
 prior  to  actual  transgression  ? 
 
 In  other  words,  what  is  original  sin  ?  How  far  is  the  sin  of  Adam 
 laid  to  the  account  of  his  posterity  1  or,  wherein  consists  the 
 imputation  of  guilt  ?  Does  original  sin  differ  from  original  de- 
 fect ?  Does  it  enter  into  the  substance  of  the  soul,  making  it 
 essentially  different  from  what  it  would  be  had  not  the  parents 
 been  sinful  1  Does  it  differ  from  the  want  of  original  righteous- 
 ness, and  the  want  of  a  Divine  principle  ?  or  does  it  include  a 
 positive  bias  to  evil,  distinct  from  the  active  powers,  operating 
 by  degrees  whhe  destitute  of  a  Divine  principle  1 
 
 V.  In  what  manner  are  we  to  understand  that  the  sms  of  parents 
 are  conveyed  to  their  children  ? 
 
 VI.  What  is  it  that  chiefly  constitutes  the  aggravation  of  sin  ? 
 
 VII.  What  constitutes  the  unpardonable  sin,  and  what  is  the 
 reason  of  its  being  unpardonable  ? 
 
 VIII.  What  is  the  proper  notion  of  penal  evil,  or  that  punish- 
 ment which  is  the  demerit  of  sin  ? 
 
 Here  inquire  whether  sometimes  one  sin  may  be  said  in  any  sense 
 to  be  the  punishment  of  another. 
 
264  SYLLAEXJS  OF  LECTUEES.  [LECT.  XVII. 
 
 IX.  What  is  the  just  notion  of  the  punishment  of  hell,  and 
 wherein  it  consists  ?  and  what  evidence  is  there  that  it  will  be 
 perpetual  ? 
 
 Here  notice  the  principal  ai-guments  for  the  affirmative,  and  what 
 are  the  chief  objections  to  it,  and  how  they  may  be  best 
 answered  ? 
 
 LECTURE  XVII, 
 conceening  the  covenant  of  geace,  and  its  vaeious 
 
 ECONOSnES. 
 
 Having  considered  the  state,  the  progress,  and  consequences  of 
 sm,  we  now  turn  to  the  more  pleasing  and  delightful  contempla- 
 tion of  grace.  Give  a  concise  view  of  the  proper  nature  of  grace 
 in  general,  and  different  acceptations  of  the  term,  and  scriptural 
 ideas  conveyed  by  it.  It  may  be  also  shewn  how  it  forms  a  con- 
 trast with  sin,  on  the  one  side,  and  with  desert,  on  the  other. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  nature  of  the  covenant  of  grace  ? 
 
 Explain  the  term  "  covenant,"  and  its  principal  acceptations  in  the 
 Scriptures.  Shew  the  parties  concerned,  and  the  conditions  to 
 be  fuimied. 
 
 II.  Wherein  does  the  covenant  of  grace  differ  from  that  of 
 Adam  before  his  trans.gression,  commonly  termed  "  the  covenant 
 of  works,"  and  from  the  Jewish  covenant  of  peculiarity  ? 
 
 III.  In  what  sense  may  we  say,  if  at  all  proper,  that  God  enters 
 into  a  covenant  of  grace  with  men  ? 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  import  of  the  words  "  dispensation "  and 
 "  economy  "  when  they  stand  connected  with  covenant. 
 
 V.  Enumerate  the  principal  dispensations  of  the  covenant  of 
 grace  from  the  beginning  of  time  to  the  present  period,  and  sketch 
 the  distinct  peculiarity  of  each  before  that  of  the  gospeL 
 
 VI.  What  are  most  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  the  gospel 
 dispensation  1 
 
LECT.  XVIII  ]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  265 
 
 LECTURE  XVIII. 
 
 CONCEENING  THE  JMEDIATOE  OF  THE  COVENANT  OF  GRACE. 
 
 Ascertain  the  scriptural  import  of  the  term  (Meo-iV?;?,)  Media- 
 tor ;  then  define  the  proper  office  of  Mediator,  and  explain  the 
 parts  of  your  definition. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  proper  and  important  difference  between  a 
 mediator  and  a  surety  ? 
 
 Shew  also  in  what  sense  could  Moses  be  called  a  mediator,  and  why 
 he  could  be  a  surety. 
 
 II.  Whence  does  it  appear  that  a  mediator  is  necessary  for  faUen 
 man? 
 
 Shew  this  first  on  the  part  of  God,  and  then  on  the  part  of  man. 
 
 III.  Why  was  it  necessary  that  the  Mediator  of  the  covenant  of 
 grace  should  be  partaker  of  the  human  and  Divine  natures  in  one 
 person,  and  of  spotless  purity  ? 
 
 IV.  What  are  the  principal  arguments  to  prove  that  the  claims 
 of  Jesus  Christ  to  the  ofiice  of  Mediator  are  well  founded  ? 
 
 These  arguments  should  be  principally  directed  against  the  objections 
 of  the  Jews.  A  mediator  they  acknowledge,  but  differ  from  us 
 about  the  person. 
 
 V.  How  is  this  passage,  "  There  is  one  Mediator  between  God 
 and  man,  the  man  Christ  Jesus,"  to  be  reconciled  with  the  received 
 scriptural  sentiment,  that  both  natures  are  necessary  to  constitute 
 a  mediator  ? 
 
 Here  shew  what  is  intended  by  the  term  "man"  in  the  passage, 
 (1  Tim.  ii.  5.)    Are  all  men,  or  only  the  elect,  intended  ? 
 
 VI.  What  is  the  ultimate  source  of  the  mediatorial  plan,  and 
 what  is  the  proper  nature  of  that  gracious  constitution  ? 
 
 VII.  What  are  the  principal  blessings  of  the  covenant  of  grace  ? 
 
 VIII.  In  what  respects,  if  at  all,  are  any  of  these  blessings  sus- 
 pended on  terms  or  conditions  to  be  performed  by  us. 
 
266  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [LECT.  XIX. 
 
 LECTURE  XIX. 
 
 0¥  THE  PEESON  OF  JESUS  CHEIST. 
 
 In  treating  of  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  it  will  be  proper  to 
 notice  those  names  by  which  He  is  most  commonly  represented  in 
 Scripture. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  proper  import  of  the  name  Jesus,  and  how  far 
 peculiar  to  the  Messiah  ? 
 
 Under  this  question  will  occur  the  signification  of  the  Hebrew 
 term,  and  the  names  given  to  the  son  of  Nun,  and  the  son  of 
 Sirach,  &c. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  just  import  of  the  term  Christ,  and  is  it  pecu- 
 liar to  the  person  of  the  Mediator  ? 
 
 Here  notice  both  the  Greek  term  and  the  Hebrew  corresponding 
 with  it,  and  on  what  occasions  the  latter  was  employed. 
 
 III.  What  other  names  of  the  greatest  note  are  given  to  the 
 same  person  ? 
 
 IV.  Is  it  proper,  or  how  far  is  it  proper,  to  say  that  the  Divine 
 nature  is  become  incarnate?  and  what  is  implied  in  the  phrase 
 "the  human  nature  of  Christ?"  Also,  in  what  manner,  or  to 
 what  degree,  was  He  the  subject  of  its  infirmities,  if  this  expres- 
 sion be  at  all  admissible?  Moreover,  is  it  proper  to  say  that 
 Jesus  Christ  is,  or  was,  a  human  person  ?  If  not,  for  what  rea- 
 sons? 
 
 V.  Who  have  been  the  chief  opposers  of  the  true  doctrine  of 
 the  person  of  Christ,  and  wherein  did  this  error  consist  ? 
 
 Among  these  wih  be  found  the  Docetje,  Appollinarians,  Nestorians, 
 Eutychians,  MonotheUtes,  Arians,  Socinians,  Swedenborgians,  &c. 
 
 VI.  Wherein  consists  the  hypostatical  or  personal  union  of  the 
 two  natures  of  Jesus  Christ,  or  how  may  this  union  be  defined  ? 
 
 On  these  subjects,  aU  curious  and  unprofitable  distinctions  of  terms 
 without  meaning,  after  the  manner  of  the  schoolmen,  should 
 be  studiously  avoided.  This  is  that  mystery  of  godliness  which 
 is  without  controversy  great,  and  should  be  rather  contemplated 
 in  the  sphit  of  humility  and  devout  adoration,  than  scholasti- 
 cally  discussed  ;  yet,  under  the  influence  of  a  Christian  temper, 
 it  may  be  profitable  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  ideas — particu- 
 larly to  consider  the  commencement  and  continuance  of  this 
 hypostatical  union  ;  and  what  there  is  in  the  complex  person 
 of  Christ  of  a  miraculous  character. 
 
LECT.  XX.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  5i67 
 
 VII.  How  far  is  the  human  nature  of  Jesus  Christ  a  partaker 
 of  the  Divine,  and  of  the  gifts  of  the  Spirit  ? 
 
 VIII.  How  far,  or  in  what  respect,  may  the  Mediatorial  works 
 of  Christ  be  called  Divine  works,  or  the  works  of  God-man  ? 
 
 This  question  claims  a  particular  notice  of  those  actions  which 
 appear  common  to  mankind.  In  this  connesion  may  be  no- 
 ticed the  import  of  the  phrase  communicatio  idiomatum,  as 
 used  by  divines,  and  how  far  conformable  to  Scripture  evidence 
 of  facts. 
 
 IX.  Is  it  right  to  ascribe  adoration  to  the  human  nature  of 
 Christ  ?  If  not,  shew  on  what  principle  He  ought  to  be  adored 
 as  Mediator  ? 
 
 Here  the  inquiry  much  depends  on  the  consideration,  what  in  Jesus 
 Christ  is  the  formal  groinid  of  worship  ? 
 
 LECTURE  XX. 
 
 ON  THE  DIFFERENT  STATES  AND  OFFICES  OF  CHRIST. 
 
 Having  considered  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  proceed  next  to 
 His  different  states  and  offices. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  Scripture  account  of  His  pre-existent  state  ? 
 
 Here  notice  the  occasional  appearances  of  the  Logos,  in  a  corporeal 
 form,  to  the  patriarchs,  &c. 
 
 II.  What  is  included  in  His  state  of  humiliation,  contrasted,  on 
 the  one  hand,  with  His  prior,  on  the  other,  with  His  subsequent 
 glory  ? 
 
 Notice  the  principal  parts  or  degrees  of  it.  His  descent  to  hell, — 
 what? 
 
 III.  What  is  Implied  in  His  state  of  exaltation  ? 
 
 Shew  also,  as  introductory,  what  in  Christ  is  capable  of  exaltation — 
 whether  the  hiunan  nature  only  not.  What  are  the  principal 
 parts  or  designs  of  Cln-ist's  exaltation  ?  Here  treat  of  His  re- 
 sm-reotion,  &c. 
 
 IV.  Why  should  the  offices  of  Christ  be  confined  to  three — the 
 prophetic,  sacerdotal,  and  regal  1 
 
 Man,  it  is  granted,  is  the  subject  of  ignorance,  guilt,  and  slaverj' ; 
 and  the  Saviour  has  undertaken  to  proclaim,  procure,  and 
 apply  salvation  to  His  people  ;  but  is  there  any  other  more 
 probable  ground  for  that  statement  of  offices '( 
 
268  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  XXI. 
 
 V.  What  Ls  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the  Socinians  respecting 
 these  offices,  and  the  cause  of  it  ? 
 
 VI.  What  is  the  proper  nature,  and  what  are  the  chief  parts  or 
 acts,  of  Christ's  prophetic  office  ? 
 
 Here,  also,  shew  what  are  supposed  or  implied  qualifications  for 
 such  an  office,  and  in  what  manner  He  exercises  it,  and  during 
 what  period. 
 
 VII.  "V^Tiat  is  the  proper  import  of  the  term  priest?  what  is 
 the  nature  of  the  sacerdotal  office,  as  applied  to  Christ  ?  and  what 
 does  it  require  or  imply  ? 
 
 VIII.  What  are  the  principal  parts  or  acts  of  this  office? 
 Where  treat  of  His  oblation,  its  nature,  and  extent,  and  interces- 
 sion. 
 
 IX.  What  is  intended  by  "  a  Priest  for  ever,  after  the  order  of 
 Melchisedec  ? "  Where  some  inquiry  may  be  made  after  the  per- 
 son of  Melchisedec,  and  the  perpetuity  of  Christ's  priesthood  ? 
 
 X.  What  is  the  nature  of  Christ's  regal  office  ? 
 
 This  must  be  sought  from  the  nature  of  His  kingdom,  which  must 
 be  ascertained. 
 
 XI.  What  are  the  requisite  qualifications  for  this  office,  and 
 also  the  parts  or  acts  of  it  ? 
 
 Notice  also  the  term  or  period  of  His  reign. 
 
 LECTURE  XXI. 
 
 OF  EFFECTUAL  CALLING. 
 
 Having  considered  the  Mediator,  as  to  His  person,  the  states 
 through  which  He  passed,  and  the  offices  He  sustains  in  general, 
 pass  on  to  consider  that  part  of  His  work  which  consists  in  the 
 application  of  new  covenant  blessings  to  the  elect,  by  Him  as  their 
 Surety.     And  the  fii'st  of  these  is  effectual  calling. 
 
 I.  DefLae  and  describe  efi'ectual  caUing. 
 
 Here  shew,  first,  the  propriety  of  the  term  in  the  theological  sense 
 of  it.  Ascertain  the  difference  (if  there  be  any)  between 
 this  caUing  and  conversion  :  the  Father's  di-awiug — quickening 
 from  a  death  in  sin — a  new  creation,  and  the  hke  ;  also, 
 wherein  this  calling  differs  from  aU  others  which  are  ineffectual. 
 
LECT.  XXII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  269 
 
 II.  Shew  wlio  is  the  proper  author  of  this  work — whether, 
 economically,  the  Father,  Son,  or  Holy  Spirit. 
 
 III.  In  what  sense  may  it  be  said,  if  said  at  all,  that  God's 
 calling  (whether  taken  as  merely  outward,  or  else  includmg  some- 
 what internal)  is  sufficient  for  any  besides  the  elect  ? 
 
 IV.  How  far  may  the  Divine  call  be  said  to  be  effectual,  irre- 
 spective of  the  subject's  compliance  or  co-operation?  or,  is  he 
 passive  in  toto  ? 
 
 V.  As  to  the  order  of  time,  does  it  precede  or  follow  regenera- 
 tion ? 
 
 Here  assign  the  reasons  for  the  sentiment  adopted. 
 
 VI.  Is  this  effected  by  a  higher  degree  of  moral  suasion,  or  by 
 some  superior  and  supernatural  agency  ? 
 
 VII.  How  far  may  this  work  be  termed  irresistible  ? 
 
 Here  explain  those  texts  which  are  usually  adduced  as  objections 
 to  the  doctrine  of  irresistible  grace  ;  as  Acts  vii.  51. 
 
 VIII.  Shew  the  consistency  of  this  doctrine  with  that  freedom 
 of  wiU  which  is  essential  to  our  accountableness. 
 
 LECTURE  XXII. 
 
 ON  JUSTIFICATION. 
 
 Though  justification,  as  an  act  of  sovereign  grace,  might  with 
 great  propriety  have  been  considered  before  effectual  calling,  yet, 
 as  an  act  of  the  Moral  Governor,  it  more  properly  follows  effectual 
 calling.     However — 
 
 1.  Define  justification :  in  which  may  be  noticed,  that  it  is  an  act 
 
 of  God  towards  us,  and  not  a  work  in  us. 
 
 2.  From  the  definition  wiU  appear  its  importance — as  also  from  the 
 
 apostolic  writings — the  preaching  and  works  of  the  Reformers 
 from  Popery — and  each  revival  of  religion. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  main  question  in  dispute  in  the  days  of  Paul, 
 
 when  he  wrote  upon  the  subject  ? 
 
 4.  What  things  are  principally  supposed  in  justification?    What 
 
 charge  is  lodged  against  the  person  ?  AVhat  plea  is  used  to 
 ward  off  condemnation  ?  and  what  is  the  substance  of  the 
 justifying  sentence  ? 
 
270  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  XXIII. 
 
 5.  Is  there  any  sense  in  which  justification  may  be  said  to  be 
 
 eternal  ] 
 
 6.  Is  there  any  sense  in  which  justification  was  efiected  by  the  re- 
 
 surrection of  Christ  ? 
 
 7.  Explain  the  doctrine  of  the  justification  of  saved  dying  infants, 
 
 in  a  manner  consistent  with  your  definition,  with  the  scrip- 
 tural doctrine  of  justification,  and  the  analogy  of  faith. 
 
 8.  In  what  sense  may  the  elect  of  God  be  said  to  be  under  con- 
 
 demnation, though  Christ  died  for  them  and  rose  again  ? 
 
 9.  Is  repentance,  as  well  as  faith,  required  to  justification  by  God 
 
 as  a  Moral  Governor  ? 
 
 10.  Wherein  are  these  requisitions  different  from  the  demands  of 
 
 moral  conformity  to  the  law  of  our  nature  ? 
 
 11.  How  do  you  understand  the  following  representations  of  the 
 
 subject: — First,  Eom.  iii.  24,  "justified  freely  by  grace;" 
 second.  Gal.  ii.  16,  "by  Christ;"  third,  Eom.  v.  9,  "by  His 
 blood  ;"  fourth,  Isa.  hii.  11,  "by  His  knowledge  ;"  fifth,  Eom. 
 iii.  28,  &c.,  "by  faith;"  sixth,  James  ii.  21,  25,  "by  works  ;" 
 seventh.  Matt.  xii.  37,  "  by  words." 
 
 12.  What  is  meant  by  "  God  justifying  the  ungodly  ?"  (Eom.  iv.  5.) 
 
 13.  When  it  is  said  that  "  the  doers  of  the  law  shall  be  justified," 
 
 (Eom.  u.  13,)  what  is  meant  ? 
 
 14.  What  is  meant  by  the  "  free  gift  coming  on  all  men  to  justifica- 
 
 tion?" (Eom.  V.  18.) 
 
 15.  How  should  this  doctrine  be  represented  in  a  popular,  profit- 
 
 able, and  summary  way,  by  preachers  ? 
 
 LECTUEE  XXIII. 
 
 ON  EEGENEEATION,  CONVEKSION,  ADOPTION,  EECONCILIATION,  AND 
 CHEISTIAN  LIBEETY. 
 
 I.  How  may  regeneration  be  best  defined,  and  its  parts  and  its 
 properties  explained? 
 
 Is  it  the  effect  of  moral  suasion,  or  of  supernatural  agency,  in  a 
 physical  way?  Is  the  subject  of  it  entirely  passive  or  not? 
 What  is  the  immediate  design  of  it  ?  Is  it  instantaneous  or 
 progressive  ?  Does  it  extend  to  all  the  powers  of  the  soul,  or 
 only  to  some  part  ? 
 
 II.  What  is  the  time  of  regeneration — before  or  after  justifica- 
 tion? 
 
 If  before,  then  a  soul  is  regenerated  and  condemned  at  the  same 
 moment ;  if  after,  how  is  justification  said  to  be  by  faith  ? 
 
LECT.  XXIV.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  271 
 
 III.  Is  regeneration  wrought  by  the  instrumentality  of  the 
 word,  or  immediately  without  such  instrument  ? 
 
 IV.  In  the  sacred  economy,  which  Divine  Person  (Father,  Son, 
 or  Spirit)  is  the  immediate  agent  of  regeneration  ? 
 
 V.  How  may  conversion  be  defined  ? 
 Wherein  does  it  differ  from  regeneration  ? 
 
 How  are  those  terms,  termimts  a  quo  and  terminus  ad  quem,  to  be 
 understood  and  explained  in  reference  to  this  subject  ? 
 
 VI.  What  is  adoption  ?     Define  it. 
 
 To  wbat  does  it  allude  1    What  is  implied  in  it  ?     Wherein  does  it 
 
 differ  from  effectual  calling  and  justification?    Economically 
 
 considered,  whose  act  is  it  ? 
 In  point  of  time  does  it  precede  or  follow  justification  ?     Or  are  the 
 
 elect  of  God  adopted  as  justified,  or  as  not  justified  ?    What 
 
 are  the  chief  privileges  connected  with  it  ? 
 
 VII.  What  is  that  benefit  of  the  covenant  which  is  called 
 reconciliation  ?     Define  it. 
 
 Wherein  does  it  differ  from  effectual  calling,  justification,  and  adop- 
 tion ?  What  is  implied  in  it  ?  Does  it  differ  from  the  afore- 
 mentioned privileges  as  to  time,  or  only  in  point  of  relation  ? 
 
 VIII.  What  is  Christian  Kberty,  in  the  notion  of  deliverance 
 and  redemption  ?  From  what  enemies  are  they  freed,  and  into 
 what  privileges  are  they  brought  ? 
 
 LECTURE  XXIV. 
 
 ON  SANCTIFICATION,  PEESEVEEANCE,  AND  (JLOEIFICATION. 
 
 r 
 
 Paet  Fiest. 
 Of  Sanctification. 
 
 Sanctification  may  be  considered  as  either  initial  or  progressive. 
 Define  and  distinguish  each. 
 
 I.  Who  and  what  are  the  subjects  of  progressive  sanctification  ? 
 Body,  soul,  spirit? 
 
 II.  Who  is  the  author  and  immediate  cause  of  sanctification  ? 
 Father,  Son,  Spirit? 
 
272  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  [LECT.  XXIV. 
 
 III.  What  are  some  of  the  principal  terms  by  which  the  Scrip- 
 ture expresses  the  progressive  work  ?  Likeness  of  God,  Divine 
 nature,  inward  man,  &c. 
 
 IV.  What  is  intended  by  the  distinction  observed  by  divines, 
 when  they  speak  of  negative  and  positive  sanctification  ?  For- 
 bearance, self-denial,  benevolence,  brotherly  kindness,  &c. 
 
 V.  What  are  some  of  the  chief  properties  of  sanctification  ?  ■ 
 
 VI.  What  are  some  of  the  principal  means  appointed  and 
 calculated  to  promote  it  ? 
 
 VII.  What  are  some  of  the  principal  effects  of  it  ? 
 
 VIII.  Wherein  does  sanctification  differ  from  holiness  and  from 
 morality  and  good  works  ? 
 
 IX.  To  what  degree  is  it  capable  of  arriving  in  a  saint  on 
 earth? 
 
 Here  might  be  noticed  the  doctrine  of  perfection,  and  its  proper 
 limits  ascertained.  The  acceptation  of  the  term  will  be  dif- 
 ferent when  applied  to  different  objects.  It  is  applicable  more 
 propei-ly  to  state,  parts,  desire,  habit ;  but  less  properly  to  grace, 
 degi-ee,  piu'suit,  act. 
 
 Part  Second. 
 Of  Perseverance. 
 
 Define  perseverance,  and  state  the  doctrine. 
 
 I.  Shew  what  is  not  maintained  :  such  as  that  the  saints  are  in- 
 capable of  committing  heinous  offences ;  that  their  perseverance  is 
 owing  to  their  own  strength  or  steadiness,  or  that  it  is  the  mere 
 nature  of  grace. 
 
 II.  Shew  what  is  maintained,  and  prove — 
 
 First,  That  those  who  are  saints  indeed  shall  jjersevere  in  that 
 state ;  or  that  there  is  an  infallible  connexion  between  grace  and 
 glory. 
 
 Second,  That  those  who  do  not  die  saints  never  were  saints. 
 
 III.  How  far  may  the  topic  of  the  Divine  purpose  be  ui-ged  in 
 favour  of  this  doctrine  ? 
 
 IV.  What  other  topics  are  the  most  weighty  in  this  argument  ? 
 v.  What  are  some  of  the   strongest  objections  against  this 
 
 doctrine  ? — with  rephes. 
 
lect.  xxv.]  syllabus  of  lectures.  273 
 
 Part  Thied. 
 Of  Gloriftcation. 
 
 Define  the  term  and  the  thing. 
 
 I.  What  other  terms  are  nearly  sjnionymous  ? — such  as  a  crown 
 — a  kingdom — salvation — fulness  of  joy  ;  and  whether  any  diffe- 
 rence is  to  be  noticed  between  them. 
 
 II.  What  wiU  be  the  difference  between  the  glorification  of  a 
 saint  at  death,  and  at  the  resurrection  ? 
 
 III.  What  is  included  in  the  glorification  of  the  soul  ? 
 
 IV.  What  arguments  may  be  adduced  in  favour  of  immediate 
 glorification,  in  opposition  to  purgatory  ? 
 
 Here  state  and  confute  the  doctrine  of  purgatory,  and  answer  the 
 Popish  objections. 
 
 V.  What  is  included  in  the  glorification  of  the  body  ? 
 
 Here  state  and  prove  the  doctrine  of  the  resui'rection,  and  notice 
 the  change  of  qualities  in  the  raised  body. 
 
 VI.  How  will  the  saints,  in  soul  and  body,  be  glorified  in 
 judgment? 
 
 VII.  Wherein  will  the  final  and  eternal  glory  of  the  saints 
 consist  ? 
 
 LECTURE  XXV. 
 ON  god's  eequieements  of  man  in  geneeal,  and  paeticulaely 
 
 WOESHTP,  law,  and  RELIGION. 
 
 Hitherto  we  have  considered  God's  works  for  and  in  man  ;  we 
 now  proceed  to  treat  of  His  requirements  of  us. 
 
 On  what  grounds  is  it  reasonable  that  God  should  require  the 
 obedience  of  man  ;  especially  in  his  present  state  of  moral  impo- 
 tence, and  in  those  very  things  which  Divine  influence  alone  in 
 fact  produces  ? 
 
 I.  Consider  the  worship  of  God  in  spirit  and  in  truth. 
 
 Here  shew,  first,  what  the  worship  of  God  is,  or  how  defined ; 
 and,   second,  why  God  requires  it,    or  wherein  consists   its 
 equity,  necessity,  and  use.    Third,  Who  is  the  object  of  reli- 
 VOL.  IV.  S 
 
274  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  XXVL 
 
 gious  worship.     Fourth,  What  is  the  rule  by  which  it  is  to  be 
 directed  ? 
 
 II.  Concerning  the  law  of  God,  the  rule  of  His  requirements. 
 
 First,  How  may  that  law  of  God,  which  is  the  rule  of  duty,  be  de- 
 iined?  Second,  How  many  kinds  of  Divine  law  are  there? 
 Here  may  be  noticed  the  distribution  of  moral  and  positive, 
 &c.  Third,  What  do  you  mean  by  the  phrases  "  the  sanctions 
 of  the  law,"  "  penal  sanctions,"  and  "  remunerative  sanctions  ? " 
 Fourth,  Is  there  any  difference  between  the  moral  law,  the  law 
 of  natm'e,  and  the  decalogue,  or  do  they  all  denote  the  same 
 thing  1  Fifth,  What  were  the  seven  precepts  of  Noah  ?  Sixth, 
 What  is  the  moi'al  use  of  Chi-istianity?  Seventh,  Was  the  de- 
 calogue given  as  "  the  rule  of  gratitude,"  or  was  it  designed  as  a 
 "mere  rule  of  right  V  Eighth,  When  it  is  said  that  the  com- 
 mandment or  the  law  is  disannulled,  what  is  intended  by  it  ? 
 (Heb.  vii.  18.)  Ninth,  Is  the  decalogue  a  perfect  rule  of  moral 
 obligation  ?  Tenth,  Are  any  things  indifferent — i.e.,  any  actions 
 neither  wrong  nor  right,  in  themselves,  or  to  the  agent  ? 
 
 III.  How  may  religion  be  defined  ? 
 
 First,  How  may  we  determine  what  are  the  fundamental  articles  of 
 religion  ?  Is  it  necessary  or  prudent  to  ascertain  the  number 
 of  them  ?  Second,  What  are  the  distinguishing  marks  of  true 
 religion  1  Third,  What  are  the  characteristic  marks  of  the  Re- 
 formed religion  as  opposed  to  Popery  ?  Fourth,  What  ai-e  the 
 chief  reasons  for  rejecting  religious  estabhshments  ?  Fifth, 
 Give  a  brief  account  of  the  history  and  principles  of  Noncon- 
 formity, or  the  religion  of  Protestant  Dissenters,  as  to  their 
 distinguishing  difference. 
 
 LECTUEE  XXVL 
 on  the  decalogue  and  good  woeks. 
 
 Part  First. 
 Of  the  Decalogue. 
 
 Having  treated  of  God's  requirements  of  man  in  a  general  way, 
 and  of  religion,  law,  and  worship,  we  proceed  to  consider  the 
 decalogue. 
 
LECT.  XXVI.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  275 
 
 I.  Shew  the  import  of  the  term,  and  what  is  implied  by  it. 
 This  will  include  a  definitiou  of  the  thing  as  well  as  of  the  word. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  primary  design  of  the  decalogue  as  given  to 
 Israel  ?  Is  it  to  exhibit  a  summary  of  moral  obligation  to  men  as 
 accountable,  or  a  summary  of  the  Jewish  constitution,  or  of  the 
 Mosaic  covenant? 
 
 III.  What  is  principally  intended  and  particularly  implied  in  the 
 introductory  part  or  preamble  of  this  Divine  statute  ? 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  principal  design  and  parts  included  in  the  first 
 table  ? 
 
 Shew  that  the  decalogue  may  be  considered  as  conveniently 
 divisible  into  two  parts  ;  that  the  first  of  these  contains  four 
 precepts, — the  second,  six  precepts  ;  then  the  particular  answer 
 to  the  inquiry. 
 
 V.  How  far  does  the  decalogue,  especially  the  first  part  of  it, 
 contain  the  language  of  grace  and  mercy  ? 
 
 VI.  What  arguments  are  there  to  shew  that  it  is  of  perpetual 
 obligation  to  Christians  ? 
 
 VII.  As  these  commands  are  expressed  in  the  prohibitory  form, 
 what  is  to  be  inferred  from  it  ? 
 
 VIII.  What  is  the  precise  difference  between  the  import  of  the 
 first  and  second  commandments  ? 
 
 IX.  By  what  considerations  do  the  Eomanists  and  other  advo- 
 cates for  image-worship  evade  the  force  of  the  second  command- 
 ment? 
 
 X.  What  is  meant  by  the  name  of  the  Lord  which  is  not  to  be 
 taken  in  vain  1 
 
 XL  What  may  be  said  for  and  against  taking  an  oath,  either 
 before  a  civil  magistrate,  or  in  making  a  religious  vow  ? 
 
 XII.  On  wh^t  principles  are  Christians  to  be  justified  in  keep- 
 ing the  first  day  of  the  week  instead  of  the  seventh  ?  and  are  they 
 who  keep  both  to  be  commended  or  blamed  ?  and  on  what  prin- 
 ciples ? 
 
 XIII.  By  what  arguments  may  it  be  proved  that  the  change  of 
 the  day  does  not  affect  the  spirit  and  substance  of  the  command  ? 
 
 XIV.  By  what  considerations  may  we  judge  of  the  degrees  of 
 honour  due  to  parents  ? 
 
 XV.  What  are  some  of  the  chief  arguments  for  and  against 
 killing  our  fellow-men  in  case  of  personal  assault,  in  deliberate 
 war,  and  by  the  magistrate  ? 
 
27G  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  XXVII. 
 
 XVI.  Is  adultery  to  be  f)iinishecl  by  the  civil  or  only  left  to  the 
 Supreme  Judge  ?  and  if  punishable  here,  what  appears  the  most 
 equitable  punishment  ? 
 
 Pakt  Second. 
 Of  Good  Works. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  best  definition  of  "  good  works,"  or  what  con- 
 stitutes a  work  evangelically  good  ? 
 
 II.  How  far  is  the  term  "work"  to  be  extended,  or  what  is 
 implied  in  its  comprehension  in  a  moral  and  spiritual  sense  ? 
 
 III.  What  is  the  rule  of  a  work  evangelically  good  ? 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  cause  or  motive  of  it  ? 
 
 V.  What  is  the  end  of  a  good  work  ? 
 
 VI.  How  far  may  the  virtues  of  heathens  be  called  "good 
 works?" 
 
 VII.  Is  any  work  in  the  present  state  meritorious  ?  if  not,  for 
 what  reasons  ? 
 
 VIII.  Is  any  work  in  this  life  perfectly  good  ? 
 
 IX.  In  what  sense  is  a  man  justified  by  works  ? 
 
 X.  Are  good  works  in  any  way  necessary  to  salvation  ?  In  what 
 persons  and  respects  ? 
 
 XL  What  are  some  of  the  principal  obstructions  and  helps  to 
 good  works  ? 
 
 XII.  How  far  may  faith  and  repentance,  rather  believing  and 
 repenting,  be  denominated  good  works  ? 
 
 LECTURE  XXVIL 
 concerning  faith  and  repentance. 
 
 Part  First. 
 Of  Faith. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  best  definition  of  faith  ? 
 
 II.  May  faith  be  properly  called  a  duty  as  well  as  a  gTace  ? 
 
 III.  Is  there  any  sense  in  which  faith  may  be  called  a  condition 
 of  the  covenant  ? 
 
LEOT.  XXVII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUEES.  277 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  difierence  between  the  faith  of  miracles,  the 
 historical,  temporary,  and  saving? 
 
 V.  What  is  meant  by  the  term  faith  when  we  are  said  to  be 
 justified  by  it? 
 
 VI.  In  what  sense  "cometh  faith  by  hearing?"  Is  faith  "the 
 gift  of  God?"— is  it  "the  work  of  God?" 
 
 VII.  What  is  the  precise  difference  between  "  believing  God " 
 and  "believing  in  God?" 
 
 VIII.  What  are  the  essential  acts  of  faith  ? 
 
 IX.  In  what  respect  does  faith  work  by  love  ? 
 
 X.  What.is  the  difference  between  the  direct  act  of  faith  and  the 
 reflex  ? 
 
 XI.  Is  there  any  act  of  assurance  essential  to  faith  ? 
 
 XII.  Is  it  essential  to  the  "  believing  to  the  saving  of  the  soul " 
 that  there  should  be  a  persuasion  or  satisfactory  certainty  that  the 
 Lord  Jesus  Christ  and  eternal  life  are  ours  in  grant  already  ? 
 
 XIII.  How  far  may  saving  faith  "fail?" 
 
 XIV.  What  are  the  principal  fruits  of  faith  ? 
 
 Paet  Second. 
 Of  Repentance. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  best  definition  of  repentance  ?  In  which  it  may 
 be  useful  to  notice  the  Greek  and  Latin  names. 
 
 II.  What  are  the  principal  objects  of  repentance  ? 
 
 III.  What  is  the  precise  difference  between  legal  and  evangelical 
 repentance  ? 
 
 IV.  What  are  some  of  the  special  acts  of  repentance  ? 
 
 V.  Wherein  does  the  orthodox  account  of  repentance  differ  from 
 the  Catholic  penance? 
 
 VI.  How  far  is  restitution  a  part  or  concomitant  of  repentance  ? 
 
 VII.  What  are  the  principal  fruits  of  repentance  ? 
 
 VIII.  Is  it  the  duty  of  ministers  to  caU  men  promiscuously  to 
 repentance  ?     If  so — 
 
 IX.  How  may  the  objection  be  solved,  "  That  the  impotent  and 
 non-elect  would  be  only  tantalised  by  such  a  call  ? " 
 
 X.  In  treating  of  faith  and  repentance  in  a  popular  way,  which 
 ought  to  be  represented  as  first  in  order  ? 
 
 To  ascertain  this,  in  a  jucliciou.3  manner,  is  a  matter  of  difficulty, 
 
278  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LECT.  XXVni. 
 
 and  requires  accurate  distinctions.     The  following  hints  may 
 
 be  useful  : — 
 First,  If  faith  be  taken,  in  the  more  generai  sense,  to  signify  assent 
 
 to  a  truth,  it  must  precede  all  repentance.     What  we  are  sorry 
 
 for,  we  believe  to  be  true. 
 Second,  If  faith  be  taken  in  a  special  sense,  to  signify  the  reception 
 
 of  gospel  blessings  on  the  Divine  testimony  and  wan-ant,  it 
 
 must  be  after  repentance.     For  we  are  conscious  of  danger 
 
 before  we  receive  the  remedy. 
 Third,  Legal  conviction  and  repentance  may  exist  without  a  Divine 
 
 testimony,  or  even  a  knowledge  of  revealed  law — i.e.,  from  con- 
 sciousness and  reflection. 
 Fom-th,  Evangelical  repentance,  which  includes  a   regard  to  the 
 
 Divine  mercy,  presupposes  faith  in  a  Divine  testimony. 
 
 LECTURE  XXVIII. 
 
 concekning  the  insteujiental  aids  of  devotion. 
 
 Paet  Fiest. 
 Concerning  Prayer. 
 
 I.  Define  the  term  and  the  thing,  and  shew  briefly  the  neces- 
 sary use,  and  the  superior  excellence  of  prayer,  compared  with  most 
 other  helps  of  devotion. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  diiference  between  BeTjai';,  TrpocrevxVi  evT€v^i<i, 
 and  evxapicTTia — prayer,  supplication,  &c.  ? 
 
 III.  How  far  is  it  necessary  to  the  being  and  nature  of  prayer 
 to  include  words  and  posture,  especially  in  private  ?  Also,  what 
 posture  is  most  becoming,  and  to  be  recommended  in  public  ? 
 
 IV.  It  is  universally  allowed  that  God  is  the  proper  object  of 
 prayer  ;  but  how  do  you  shew  that  no  created  intelligences  may 
 be  addressed  in  prayer  in  a  subordinate  sense  ?  How  would  you 
 answer  this  objection,  which  has  been  often  urged:  though  our 
 petition  is  ultimately  made  to  a  king,  we  make  our  first  applica- 
 tion to  him  through  his  ministers  and  oflicers  ? 
 
 V.  In  what  respect  is  each  person  in  the  Trinity  an  object  of 
 prayer,  and  particularly  when  applied  to  Jesus  Christ  ? 
 
 VI.  Who  are  to  be  prayed  for,  or  who  are  not  to  be  prayed  for, 
 
LECT.  XXVIII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  279 
 
 among  men  or  spirits?     Why  may  not  departed  souls,  &c.,  be 
 prayed  for  ? 
 
 VII.  How  far  is  it  lawful  or  unlawful  to  imprecate  Divine 
 judgments  on  blasphemers  and  reprobates,  as  such  1 
 
 VIII.  In  what  light  ought  we  to  view  the  imprecatory  parts  of 
 David's  prayers  ? 
 
 IX.  What  are  those  graces  and  tempers  of  mind  that  ought  to 
 be  especially  engaged  in  prayer  ? 
 
 X.  How  far  are  liturgies  and  forms  of  prayer,  public  and  pri- 
 vate, to  be  approved  or  censured,  especially  the  Lord's  Prayer  ? 
 
 XI.  How  far  should  stated  times  of  prayer  be  recommended  for 
 private  edification  ? 
 
 XII.  How  far  may  the  silent  waiting  of  the  Quakers  be  reckoned 
 prayer  or  worship  ? 
 
 XIII.  What  are  the  principal  parts  of  prayer,  especially  of  the 
 Lord's  Prayer  ? 
 
 Pakt  Second. 
 Fasting,  &c. 
 
 I.  Define  the  term  and  the  thing,  according  to  the  different 
 acceptations  of  it. 
 
 II.  On  what  Scripture  evidence  is  the  duty  founded,  both 
 public  and  private  ? 
 
 III.  How  far  has  the  magistrate  a  right  to  enjoiu  a  public  fast? 
 
 IV.  How  far  is  it  incumbent  on  churches  or  congregations  to 
 set  apart  a  day  of  fasting  on  particular  occasions  ?  By  what  rule 
 should  this  be  determined  ? 
 
 V.  What  is  the  most  profitable  plan  of  discharging  this  duty  in 
 a  private  way,  to  promote  Christian  edification,  and  answer  the 
 avowed  end  of  it  ? 
 
 VI.  What  other  instrumental  aids  of  devotion  are  most  worthy 
 of  attention. 
 
280  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUfiES.  [LECT.  XXIX. 
 
 LECTURE  XXIX. 
 
 ON  THE  POSITIVE  INSTITUTIONS  OP  BELIGION,  PARTICULARLY 
 
 BAPTISM. 
 
 Paet  Fiest. 
 Of  Baptism,  particularly  the  Subjects  of  it. 
 
 I.  Clearly  explain  the  nature  and  obligation  of  jDositive  institu- 
 tions abstractedly  considered. 
 
 II.  "V^Tiat  institutions  in  Scripture,  under  every  successive  dis- 
 pensation, may  be  denominated  "  positive  1 " 
 
 III.  Is  baptism,  as  enjoined  by  Jesus  Christ,  an  institution 
 entirely  positive  ?     If  not,  in  what  degree  is  it  so  ? 
 
 IV.  What  is  the  most  radical  argument  in  favour  of  Peedo- 
 baptism  ? 
 
 V.  What  is  the  most  popular  argument  in  its  favour  ? 
 
 VI.  What  are  the  principal  passages  of  Scripture  that  may  be 
 urged  in  support  of  it,  especially  those  of  the  New  Testament  ? 
 
 VII.  Shew  the  importance  of  the  distinction  between  fact  and 
 right  in  evidence  of  this  subject. 
 
 VIII.  What  is  the  verdict  of  Christian  antiquity,  or  the  prac- 
 tice of  the  Church  in  the  first  ages,  on  the  subject,  and  how  far 
 this  consideration  ought  to  weigh  in  controversy  ? 
 
 IX.  What  is  the  nature  and  design  of  baptism  ? 
 
 X.  What  are  the  facts  or  blessings  represented  by  Christian 
 baptism  ? 
 
 XI.  How  far  is  the  practice  of  John  the  Baptist,  as  to  the  sub- 
 ject or  the  mode,  of  importance  in  this  inquuy  ? 
 
 XII.  What  are  some  of  the  principal  arguments  for  and  against 
 Jewish  proselyte-baptism,  and  of  what  weight  is  it  in  the  Psedo- 
 baptist  controversy  ? 
 
 XIII.  What  argument  may  be  founded  on  the  Abrahamic  cove- 
 nant in  favour  of  the  church-membership  and  baptism  of  infants  ? 
 
 XIV.  How  far  may  the  ordinance  of  circumcision  be  pleaded  in 
 evidence  ? 
 
 XV.  What  are  the  most  weighty  objections  of  Anti-Pa'do- 
 baptists  in  this  controversy  ? 
 
 XVI.  What  are  the  principal  uses  of  Paedobajjtism  ? 
 
lect.  xxx.]  syllabus  of  lectukes.  281 
 
 Paet  Second. 
 Of  the  Mode  of  Baptism. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  precise  point  in  controversy  between  the  Baptists 
 and  Paedobaptists  ? 
 
 II.  How  far  should  the  use  of  the  terms  /SaTrrco  and  ^a-n-Titfia, 
 in  profane  writers,  be  a  guide  in  order  to  ascertain  the  biblical 
 import  of  them  ? 
 
 III.  How  far  is  it  admissible  to  vary  the  mode,  or  to  grant  a 
 latitude  in  the  use  of  water  ? 
 
 IV.  How  far  should  primitive  usage,  in  either  case,  or  the  pre- 
 sent practice  of  the  Greek  Church,  influence  the  present  question  ? 
 
 V.  What  are  the  principal  arguments  in  support  of  aspersion  as- 
 the  mode  ? 
 
 VI.  What  are  some  of  the  chief  objections  urged  by  the 
 Baptists,  with  appropriate  answers  ? 
 
 VII.  Give  a  brief  summary  of  the  arguments  for,  first,  the 
 baptism  of  infants  ;  and,  second,  for  baptizing  in  the  way  of 
 sprinkling. 
 
 LECTUEE  XXX. 
 
 ON  THE  LOED'S  SUPPEB. 
 
 Many  controversies  have  arisen  in  the  Chiu-ch  through  wrong 
 views  of  the  sacred  Supper.  Hence  define  the  thing  intended,  and 
 enumerate  the  various  names  by  which  it  has  been  represented. 
 
 I.  What  is  "the  comparative  propriety  of  the  following  terms,  as 
 applied  to  this  ordinance : — The  Lord's  Supper,  the  Eucharist, 
 the  Communion,  the  Breaking  of  Bread,  the  Ordinance,  &c. 
 
 II.  How  came  the  word  "  mass  "  to  stand  for  the  Lord's  Supper  ? 
 and  what  is  the  mode  of  administering  it  ? 
 
 III.  What  is  the  instituted  design  of  the  ordinance  ? 
 
 Here  notice  that  it  is  to  represent,  to  seal  on  the  part  of  Chi-ist  as 
 testator,  and  to  communicate  :  these  on  the  part  of  God.  But, 
 on  the  part  of  the  communicants,  to  commemorate,  to  shew 
 forth  or  exhibit,  and  to  hold  communion  with  Christ  and  one 
 another. 
 
282  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTUBES.  [LECT.  XXXI. 
 
 IV.  What  are  the  most  suitable  elements  ?  or  what  bread  and 
 wine  should  be  used  as  most  conformable  to  the  Institutor's  design  ? 
 
 V.  What  is  the  most  proper  manner  of  conducting  the  service? 
 On  the  part  of  the  minister  : — Should  sacramental  addresses  be  al- 
 ways used,  or  only  occasionally  ?  what  the  length  and  frequency 
 of  prayer  ?  should  this  be  in  the  form  of  supplication,  thanks- 
 giving, or  both,  and  praise  ?  How  should  the  words  of  the 
 institution  be  used  ?  what  words  1  whether  once,  or  oftener, 
 and  when?  Should  spectators  be  admitted  and  addressed — 
 constantly,  or  at  certain  times  ?  How  far  proper  to  urge  the 
 well-disposed  to  imite  in  fellowship  ?  On  the  part  of  the 
 people  : — In  what  posture  should  the  elements  be  received  ? 
 in  what  quantity  ?  how  should  the  mind  be  exercised  ? 
 
 VI.  What  is  the  most  suitable  preparation,  and  subsequent  im- 
 provement of  the  sacred  rite,  and  how  often  should  it  be  observed  ? 
 
 VII.  Expose  the  folly  of  transubstantiation  and  consubstantiation. 
 
 LECTURE  XXXI. 
 
 ON  SINGING  AS  A  PART  OF  DIVINE  WORSHIP. 
 
 Give  a  short  history  of  sacred  music,  in  the  different  dispensations 
 of  religion  to  the  present  time,  and  the  general  obhgations  to 
 the  exercise. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  true  character  of  that  singing  which  is  most 
 edifying  ? 
 
 II.  How  far  should  the  prevailing  taste  and  practice  of  a  people 
 be  indulged,  though  deviating  from  that  standard  ? 
 
 III.  Which  ought  to  be  most  regarded — the  melody  or  the 
 harmony  of  the  music  ? 
 
 IV.  What  steps  appear  best  calculated  to  raise  or  to  reform 
 psalmody  ? 
 
 V.  How  far  should  a  minister  de  jure  consider  this  part  of 
 Divine  worship,  in  public,  under  his  direction  or  control. 
 
 VI.  How  far  is  it  right  to  encourage  children,  and  persons 
 destitute  of  real  seriousness,  to  join  in  singing  ? 
 
 VII.  Is  it  best  to  adliere  to  a  few  tunes,  with  a  constant  en- 
 deavom-  to  improve  in  the  manner,  or  to  adopt  a  great  variety  ? 
 What  is  the  proper  standard  in  thi.s  respect  ? 
 
LECT.  XXXII.]  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  283 
 
 Connected  with  this  is  another  inquiry,  Which  is  best,  when  a  new 
 tune  is  introduced,  to  sing  it  much,  or  sparingly  ? 
 
 VIII.  How  far  is  instrumeEtal  music  justifiable  ? 
 Thus  far  about  the  music  ;  now  about  the  words. 
 
 IX.  What  are  tlie  arguments  for  and  against  adhering  to  the 
 letter  or  literal  translation  of  the  Psalms  by  Christians  ? 
 
 X.  On  what  principle  may  hymns  of  human  (or  uninspired) 
 composition  be  simg  in  acts  of  worship  ? 
 
 XI.  What  is  the  proper  character  of  such  compositions  ? 
 
 XII.  How  far  is  it  lawful  to  dispense  with  singing  in  family 
 worship  ? 
 
 LECTURE  XXXII. 
 
 ON   THE   CHUECH   OF   CHRIST. 
 
 Having  considered  the  doctrines  and  duties,  the  privileges  and 
 institutions  of  the  gospel,  we  now  proceed  to  the  last  thing  to  be 
 noticed — viz.,  the  church  itself,  the  house  of  God,  where  these 
 things  are  to  be  attended  to. 
 
 I.  What  is  the  church  of  Christ  ? 
 
 Here  distinguish  between  the  different  acceptations  of  the  term 
 eKKXijcria,  the  more  extensive  or  confined  import  of  it,  and 
 what  is  a  church  of  Christ  ? 
 
 Hei-e  the  terms  imiversal,  particular,  visible,  invisible,  triumphant, 
 militant,  &o.,  will  be  discussed. 
 
 II.  Who  are  fit  members  of  these  churches  respectively  ? 
 
 Here  wiU  be  considered  in  what  light  should  be  viewed  unbaptized 
 believers,  unbaptized  infants,  baptized  infants  ;  well-disposed 
 baptized  persons  before  they  join  any  particular  church  ;  per- 
 sons excommunicated  from  any  particular  church,  &c. 
 
 III.  Point  out  the  arguments  pro  and  contra  ecclesiastical 
 establishments  ? 
 
 Where  will  be  discussed  how  far  any  have  been,  are  now,  or  may  be, 
 useful  or  injurious  to  real  Christianity  ;  especially,  what  may 
 be  said  for  or  against  our  British  ecclesiastical  establishments. 
 
 IV.  What  are  the  genuine  characteristic  marks  of  a  true  par- 
 ticular church  ? 
 
28-±  SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES.  [LEGT.  XXXII. 
 
 How  far,  it  may  be  here  inquired,  do  the  Chm'ch  of  Rome,  the 
 Eussian,  or  other  national  Churches,  deserve  the  denomination 
 "aChm-chof  Christ?" 
 
 V.  What  is  the  best  form  of  ecclesiastical  government  ? 
 
 Inquire  whether  there  is  any  one  invariable  form  enjoined  in  the 
 New  Testament ;  and  of  all  the  forms  in  use,  which  comes 
 ngarest  to  the  Divine  directory,  or  the  mind  of  Chi'ist  ? 
 
 Here,  of  coiu'se,  the  Papal,  Episcopal,  Presbyterian,  Independent, 
 &c.,  forms  will  be  noticed,  and  their  respective  pretensions  and 
 merits  considered. 
 
 VI.  What  are  the  officers,  and  their  respective  works,  in  a  'weU- 
 organised  church? 
 
 Shew  how  these  are  to  be  chosen  and  set  apart. 
 
 VII.  Wherein  consists  the  communion  of  churches  ? 
 
 Where  glance  at  councils,  synods,  associations,  and  how  far  their 
 mandates,  or  recommendations,  ought  to  operate  ? 
 
CHUEOH-FELLOWSHIP. 
 
A  HELP  TO  CHRISTIAN  FELLOWSHIP ; 
 
 SCRIPTURAL  DIRECTIONS  AND  RULES 
 
 OBSERVED  BY  MEMBERS  OF  CHRISTIAN  SOCIETIES, 
 
 ESPECIALLY  THOSE   OF  THE   INDEPENDENT  DENOMINATION, 
 
 AS  GREATLY  CONTRIBUTING  TO  THEIR  CONSISTENCY, 
 
 USEFULNESS,  AND  COMFORT. 
 
 This  manual  is  drawn  up,  not  with  a  view  to  promote  unifoi-mity  of  reli- 
 gious observances,  however  desirable  that  maf  be  in  a  good  cause,  so  much 
 as  to  promote  consistency  of  character  and  conduct,  social  usefulness,  and 
 personal  advantage.  It  was  undertaken  in  consequence  of  long  observa- 
 tion, and  a  strong  conviction  that  the  general  state  of  Christian  fellowship 
 greatly  calls  for  some  such  help.  It  is  but  too  evident  to  persons  even  of 
 moderate  reflection,  that  many  have  joined  Christian  societies  who  appeared 
 once  to  possess  necessary  qualifications  for  such  an  important  connexion, 
 but  by  their  subsequent  conduct  proved  otherwise,  often  through  igno- 
 rance or  inattention.  Others  offer  themselves  while  destitute  of  the  neces- 
 sary qualifications,  but  who,  by  reason  of  some  amiable  qualities,  are  often 
 rejected  with  difficulty,  or  not  rejected  at  all,  chiefly  for  want  of  suitable 
 helps  to  point  out  to  them  and  the  society  what  are  the  solemn  requisi- 
 tions of  reason  and  Scripture  with  respect  to  church-membership ;  and 
 many,  even  of  those  who  are  suitable  subjects,  have  but  a  very  contracted 
 notion  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  their  obligations  and  privileges,  whereby 
 
288  GENERAL  REMAEKS. 
 
 solid  edification,  social  comfort,  and  the  prosperity  of  churches  have  been 
 great  sufferers.  They  seem  to  have  no  other  view  than  to  join  the  people 
 of  God  as  a  creditable  step,  to  sit  down  at  the  Lord's  table,  and  to  enjoy 
 all  the  means  of  grace  pecidiar  to  such.  But  who  that  reads  the  New  Tes- 
 tament with  tolerable  attention,  can  help  seeing  that  the  obligations  of 
 professing  Christians  are  much  more  extensive  and  minutely  particular 
 than  persons  of  this  description  imagine  1  Who  can  but  see  that  the  design 
 of  all  religious  ordinances  and  means  of  grace  is  to  promote  conformity  to 
 the  wiU  and  image  of  Christ  in  spirit  and  conduct  ?  And  if  so,  it  must 
 appear  desirable  that  persons  should  have  a  consistent,  concise,  familiar 
 view  of  their  Christian  obligations  before  they  engage  in  such  an  import- 
 ant undertaking,  especially  of  those  obligations  which  are  so  commonly 
 overlooked  in  the  present  day.  To  avoid  these  evils,  and  to  effect  these 
 good  ends,  are  the  avowed  objects  of  this  publication.  As  such,  it  will  be 
 serviceable  not  only  to  put  it  into  the  hands  of  those  who  propose  them- 
 selves for  church-fellowship,  but  also  as  a  help  to  self-examination  in  the 
 closet ;  that  serious  Christians  may  mark  their  conformity  or  want  of  con- 
 formity to  the  spirit  of  the  gospel,  or  the  mind  that  is  in  Christ. 
 
 I.  General  Remarks  tending  to  shew  what  are  usually  expected 
 from   Persons   who  propose   theinselves  for  Church  -  com- 
 munion. 
 
 It  is  an  acknowledged  principle,  in  the  present  day  of  better 
 information,  that  every  person,  individually  considered,  has  a 
 right,  without  the  control  of  his  feUow-creatures,  to  think  and  act 
 for  himself  in  religious  matters.  As  such,  he  may  form  a  system 
 of  faith  and  practice  for  the  regulation  of  his  own  religious  con- 
 cerns without  being  accountable  to  others. 
 
 What  a  person  individually  has  a  right  to  do,  a  number  of  per- 
 sons, of  similar  views,  may  do  with  equal  right  in  a  collective  or 
 social  capacity.  It  is  strangely  inconsistent  and  imperious  for  any 
 one,  adopting  different  views  and  conduct,  to  insist  on  admission 
 into  a  Christian  society.  On  his  principles,  such  a  society  would 
 have  the  greatest  cause  of  complaint,  for  they  do  not  interfere 
 with  his  individual  right  or  liberty,  nor  yet  with  his  associating 
 with  any  body  of  people  of  the  same  views  with  himself.  Besides, 
 every  society,  of  whatever  description,  actually  claims  this  right, 
 and  accordingly  expects  at  least  something  from  its  admitted 
 members      Something  also  is  expected   by  a  Christian  chmxh 
 
GBNEEAL  EEMAEKS.  289 
 
 united  in  bonds  of  holy  fellowship  ;  and  that  is  what  Jesus  Christ 
 our  Supreme  Head  and  Lord  has  enjoined  in  His  revealed  will. 
 The  avowed  end  of  religion  is  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  happiness 
 of  men ;  if  so,  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  that  it  is  a  matter  of  indif- 
 ference what  views  or  conduct  we  pursue.  If  this  end  be  not 
 answered,  of  what  use  is  it  to  make  any  pretensions  to  religion? 
 Ou  the  contrary,  if  this  end  be  pursued,  God  must  be  the  best 
 judge  of  the  line  of  conduct  which  is  to  be  adopted  by  us.  This 
 He  has  given  us  in  His  Holy  Word,  by  precept  and  example,  in  a 
 plain,  particular,  and  decisive  manner. 
 
 According  to  this  Divine  standard,  Christian  obligations  are 
 usually  divided  into  those  of  doctrines  to  be  believed,  and  duties 
 to  be  performed.  But  the  design  of  this  publication  is  not  to  fur- 
 nish the  reader  with  a  system  of  doctrines,  however  valuable  a 
 scriptural  and  consistent  system  may  be,  so  much  as  to  point  out 
 the  practical  part  of  religion  relating  to  church-membership  ;  see- 
 ing the  practical  part  of  religion,  among  those  who  are  orthodox 
 in  sentiment,  is  much  less  attended  to  than  the  doctrines.  It  is 
 therefore  supposed,  or  taken  for  granted,  that  those  for  whose  use 
 these  thoughts  are  penned  are  sound  in  the  faith  on  account  of  the 
 ministry  which  they  attend,  and  the  people  with  whom  they  seek 
 particular  fellowship. 
 
 These  things  being  premised,  it  will  be  proper  to  enumerate  the 
 particular  qualifications  usually  expected  in  such  as  are  candidates 
 for  church-fellowship : — 
 
 1.  It  is  expected,  as  hinted  before,  that  persons  proposing  to 
 join  a  Christian  society  formed  according  to  the  gospel,  entertain 
 views  essentially  the  same  with  those  into  whose  fellowship  they 
 wish  to  enter. 
 
 2.  That  they  have  a  comfortable  persuasion  that  they  are  the 
 subjects  of  a  gnacious  and  real  change. 
 
 3.  That  they  make  a  declaration  of  this  to  the  satisfaction  of 
 the  society,  by  writing,  or  by  word  of  mouth,  as  the  circumstances 
 of  the  person  may  direct. 
 
 4.  That  they  come  to  a  resolution  to  break  off  all  connexions 
 and  practices  inconsistent  with  gospel  obedience,  and  openly  to 
 avow  themselves  to  be  decidedly  on  the  part  of  God. 
 
 5.  That  they  have  given  evidence  of  this,  for  a  reasonable  time, 
 by  their  conduct  in  the  world  and  in  their  families. 
 
 6.  That  they  declare  a  willingness  to  attend  ordinances,  and 
 
 VOL.  IV.  T 
 
290  CiN  THE  SCEIPTUEAl  DESIGN 
 
 seek  the  interest  of  Christ  in  that  particuhir  connexion  to  which 
 they  belong,  in  contradistinction  to  every  other  society. 
 
 7.  That  they  lay  aside  the  pretensions  to  superiority  on  account 
 of  worldly  circumstances,  learning,  or  gifts,  if  any  be  so  distin- 
 guished, in  matters  relating  purely  to  church-fellowship. 
 
 8.  They  are  expected  to  endeavour,  by  example  and  other 
 methods,  to  support  the  ministry  and  the  honour  of  religion  in 
 the  place  and  society  to  which  they  belong. 
 
 9.  If  they  have  been  members  of  another  society,  formed  in  a 
 similar  way,  a  letter  of  recommendation  from  that  society  or 
 church  is  expected  when  they  apply  for  occasional  communion  ; 
 but  if  the  appHcation  be  made  for  full  communion,  a  dismission 
 is  expected.* 
 
 10.  Finally,  that  they  engage  to  comply  with  whatever  shall 
 appear  to  be  the  will  of  Christ  as  revealed  in  His  "Word,  though 
 not  specifically  mentioned  in  these  rules. 
 
 II.  On  the  Scriptural  Design  of  Entering  into  Full  Communion. 
 
 1.  The  chief  end  of  every  human  society,  as  well  as  of  every 
 intelligent  being,  ought  to  be  this — viz.,  to  glorify  God,  or  to 
 reiDresent  Him  as  glorious  in  aU  His  perfections  and  ways.  No 
 human  society,  of  whatever  kind,  is  exempt  from  this  obligation. 
 For  a  society  is  only  an  aggTegate  of  individuals  ;  and  as  every  in- 
 dividual is  obliged  to  do  this  in  aU  his  actions,  he  is  therefore  thus 
 obliged  in  his  social  capacity.  This  obligation  arises  from  the 
 resjjective  natures  of  God  and  the  creature,  and  it  is  clearly  en- 
 joined in  the  Holy  Scriptures : — "  Whatsoever  ye  do,  do  all  to  the 
 glory  of  God."     But — 
 
 2.  The  distinguishing  subordinate  end  or  special  design  of  any 
 
 *  Every  one  who  has  not  been  a  member  before,  enters,  of  course,  into  full 
 communion ;  but  when  persons  are  taken  from  another  church,  they  may  be 
 received  into  the  one  or  the  other  according  to  circumstances.  If  admitted  to 
 full  communion,  they  must  be  dismissed  from  their  former  connexion,  and,  in 
 consequence,  admitted  professedly  into  full  communion.  If  to  occasional  commu- 
 nion, they  need  only  a  recommendation,  not  a  dismission;  in  this  case,  they  have 
 no  rote  in  the  new  connexion,  but  have  in  the  old. 
 
OF  ENTERING  INTO  FULL  COMMUNION.  291 
 
 society  miist  designate  its  peculiar  nature,  wliereby  it  is  best 
 adapted  to  promote  that  end.  Though  every  society  is  bound 
 to  seek  the  one  chief  end,  yet  every  social  union  is  not  adapted  to 
 answer  aU  social  ends.  Societies  of  a  religious,  moral,  charitable, 
 scientific,  or  j)olitical  design,  must  have  members  of  a  correspond- 
 ing character,  otherwise  the  proposed  end  cannot  be  answered. 
 The  qualification  of  the  members  must  have  an  aptitude  to  pro- 
 mote the  design. 
 
 3.  The  distinguishing  design  of  a  society  denominated  a  church 
 evidently  is  to  promote  religion.  Numbers  are  united  by  Divine 
 appointment  to  mauitain  religion,' — to  exhibit  before  the  world  real 
 Christianity, — to  encourage  those  who  seek  the  right  way, — to  edify 
 one  another,  and  the  like.  Such  particulars  we  gather  from  the 
 Sacred  Scriptures : — "  Striving  together  for  the  faith  of  the  gospel ;" 
 "  That  ye  may  be  blameless  and  harmless,  the  sons  of  God, 
 [resembling  Him,]  without  rebuke,  [or  cause  of  rebuke,]  in  the 
 midst  of  a  crooked  and  perverse  nation,  among  whom  ye  shine  as 
 lights  in  the  world  ;  holding  forth  the  word  of  Hfe."  A  church  of 
 Christ  is  appointed  to  shine  in  a  dark  world, — to  be  blameless  and 
 harmless  among  the  crooked  and  perverse, — to  imitate  God,  as 
 far  as  practicable,  while  among  the  children  of  the  wicked  one, — to 
 give  no  offence  to  those  who  are  without  or  those  who  are  within 
 the  church, — to  hold  forth  and  to  hold  fast  the  word  of  life  by 
 doctrine,  by  discipline,  and  by  practice.  "  Him  that  is  weak  in 
 the  faith  receive  ye,  but  not  to  doubtful  disputations."  Provided 
 a  person  be  desirous  of  Christian  fellowship,  and  is  possessed  of  so 
 much  knowledge,  so  much  experienced  efficacy  of  the  truth,  and  so 
 much  good  conduct,  as  is  calculated  to  answer  in  a  prevailing- 
 degree  the  design  of  a  church  being  at  all  formed,  let  him  not  be 
 rejected.  "  Wherefore  comfort  yourselves  together,  and  edify  one 
 another,  even  as  also  ye  do."  This  is  done  by  mutual  instructions, 
 exhortations,  prayers  and  praises ;  by  watchful  discif)line  and  the 
 exercise  of  religious  gifts  ;  by  friendly  offices  and  acts  of  Christian 
 kindness. 
 
 4<.  The  preceding  particulars  are  produced  only  as  instances; 
 but  in  order  accurately  to  ascertain  the  special  end  of  Christian 
 fellowship,  in  full  communion,  all  the  passages  in  the  New  Testa- 
 ment relating  to  the  subject  ought  to  be  included.  For  until  the 
 revealed  special  design  for  which  a  church  of  Christ  is  instituted 
 
292  ON  THE  SCEIPTUKAL  DESIGN 
 
 be  ascertained,  it  is  obviously  not  possible  to  ascertain  the  precise 
 nature  of  the  society,  and  consequently  the  qualiticatiou  of  its 
 members.     However — 
 
 5.  We  vrill  suppose  that,  by  an  appeal  to  all  the  passages  of  the 
 New  Testament,  the  precise  design  is  known,  from  whence  the 
 nature  of  a  church  is  deduced ;  tlie  question  returns — Is  there  any 
 general  rule  that  may  form  an  invariable  standard  by  which  all 
 qualifications  of  candidates  may  be  measured?  There  undoubtedly 
 is ;  for  this  plain  reason,  because  a  church  is  a  society  instituted 
 for  specific  ends  revealed  in  the  New  Testament.  Now,  as  these 
 ends  are  matters  of  Divine  record,  and  not  of  human  opinion,  the 
 standard  is  invariable. 
 
 6.  We  will  further  suppose  that  the  general  rule  by  which  to 
 measure  qualifications  for  full  communion  is.  The  scriptiu-al 
 design  for  which  a  gospel  church  in  full  communion  is  divinely  in- 
 stituted. No  party,  however  they  may  difier  about  other  things, 
 can  object  to  this  rule  with  any  colour  of  reason.  To  deny  its 
 claims,  they  must  either  subvert  the  evident  principles  of  all  volun- 
 tary societies,  or  else  hold  that  a  Christian  church  is  not  instituted 
 in  the  New  Testament  for  any  specific  end.  But  this  no  reason- 
 able person,  much  less  a  serious  Christian,  will  maintain.    Hence — 
 
 7.  Those  candidates  for  full  communion,  and  only  those,  who 
 are  conformed  to  this  rule,  are  fully  qualified.  But  here  it  is  of 
 essential  importance  to  observe,  that  though  a  rule  is,  and  from  its 
 very  nature  must  be,  fixed  and  invariable,  the  qualifications  of 
 individuals  are  variable  things,  admitting  of  less  or  more  con- 
 formity to  it.  The  conjectures  of  men,  however  ungenerous  and 
 plausible,  cannot  be  admitted  as  a  rule,  because  they  are  variable ; 
 but  the  rule  must  be  deduced  from  the  design  itself  of  institutmg 
 a  church,  which  evidently  is  a  matter  of  pure  Divme  fjleasure,  and 
 could  not  be  known  without  a  revelation  from  God.  A  rule,  then, 
 must  be  sought  from  the  sacred  oracles  by  an  induction  of  par- 
 ticulars relating  to  the  point  in  question,  and  from  their  har- 
 monious agreement ;  and  it  is  the  business  of  every  Christian 
 church,  minister  and  member,  to  search  the  Scriptures  in  order  to 
 ascertain  it.  To  contend  about  qualifications,  before  this  is  agreed 
 upon,  is  to  contend  about  the  dimensions  of  diSerent  things  before 
 a  standard  is  fixed  upon  by  which  to  measure  them.  But  the  con- 
 stituent parts  of  the  qualifications  in  candidates  cannot  be  found  in 
 
OF  ENTEEENG  INTO  FULL  COMMUNION.  29o 
 
 Scripture ;  they  must,  most  evidently,  be  sought  in  the  characters 
 of  the  individuals,  which  are  evidently  invariable.  To  suppose  that 
 the  character  or  actual  attainment  of  each  candidate  is  revealed  in 
 Scripture,  is  too  absurd  to  be  maintained  by  any  rational  mind. 
 Therefore — 
 
 8.  What  remains  for  a  church  to  do  in  judging  of  qualifications, 
 is  to  compare  the  proficiency  of  the  candidate  with  the  scriptural 
 rule.  The  former  admitting  of  indefinite  degrees  of  approxima- 
 tion to  the  standard,  must  be  learnt  from  the  person  himself,  from 
 his  conduct,  and  from  the  testimony  of  others.  His  profession,  his 
 declared  experience  of  Divine  truth,  his  deportment  in  society — in 
 short,  his  general  character,  is  to  be  viewed  in  comparison  with  the 
 evident  design  of  God  in  forming  a  church. 
 
 9.  Should  it  be  objected,  that  difli'erent  persons  or  churches 
 might  fix  upon  a  diiferent  standard,  by  adding  more  texts  of  Scrip- 
 ture, out  of  which  a  various  general  result  should  arise ;  it  is 
 answered,  that  therefore  this  is  the  point  to  be  first  settled.  When 
 any  disagree  about  the  rule,  they  cannot,  of  course,  agree  about  the 
 qualifications.  There  are  many  texts,  such  as  those  above  pro- 
 duced, concerning  which  there  can  be  no  disagreement.  The  rule, 
 therefore,  should  be  admitted  as  far  as  it  goes.  A  measiu'e  of  a 
 foot  loug  may,  as  far  as  it  goes,  be  a  standard  of  straightness  and 
 of  measure,  as  well  as  a  yard  or  a  fathom.  Or,  to  change  the  com- 
 parison, a  small  measure  of  capacity  may  be  equally  accurate  to  a 
 certain  degree  as  a  larger  measure.  Let  the  church  of  small 
 attainments  act  charitably,  and  wait  for  brighter  evidence.  If  any 
 lack  wisdom,  let  them  ask  of  God,  who  giveth  liberally.  "  Let  us 
 therefore,  as  many  as  be  perfect,  be  thus  minded ;  and  if  in  any 
 thing  ye  be  otherwise  minded,  God  shall  reveal  even  this  imto  you. 
 Nevertheless,  whereto  we  have  already  attained,  let  us  walk  by  the 
 same  rule,  let  us  mind  the  same  thing." 
 
 10.  The  scriptural  rule  is  not  only  invariable,  but  also  perfect 
 in  its  kind,  as  dictated  by  infinite  wisdom  for  the  noblest  ends. 
 But  no  human  character  in  the  present  state  is  perfect,  so  as  to 
 comport  imiversally  with  the  standard.  Therefore,  no  candidate 
 for  communion  is  perfectly  qualified, — that  is,  his  qualifications  are 
 only  comparative.  One  may  be  qualified  in  a  greater,  and  another 
 in  a  smaller  degree.  One  is  qualified  to  fill  his  place  eminently, 
 another  moderately  well.     One  may  be  strong,  and  another  weak 
 
294  ON  THE  SCKIPTUEAL  DESIGN 
 
 in  the  faith.     Yet  he  who  is  weak  in  the  faith  may  be  compara- 
 tively qualified.     Therefore — 
 
 11.  Since  quahfications  are  so  various,  and  admit  of  indefinite 
 ai^proximations  to  the  perfect  standard,  or  deviation  from  it,  we  are 
 bound  to  accede  to  another  conclusion — viz.,  That  whatever  kind 
 or  degree  of  qualification  appears  to  befriend  rather  than  to  oppose, 
 to  honour  rather  than  to  discredit  the  scriptural  design  of  full 
 communion,  ought  to  be  admitted  by  the  church.  When  a  can- 
 didate for  communion  is  proposed  to  a  church,  its  immediate  busi- 
 ness is  to  consult  the  scriptural  design  of  communion,  and  then 
 to  consider  how  far  the  qualifications  of  the  candidate  appear  to 
 befriend  and  to  honour  it. 
 
 12.  From  the  premises  it  follows,  that  to  reason  from  qualifica- 
 tions for  communion  in  the  Jewish  church,  to  those  for  a  full 
 communion  in  a  gospel  church,  must  needs  be  uncertain  and 
 inconclusive ;  exce2:it  it  could  be  first  proved  that  the  revealed  design 
 of  each  was  the  same.  But  it  requires  no  great  labour  to  shew, 
 by  an  induction  of  particulars,  that  the  design  was  very  different ; 
 and,  consequently,  that  what  would  be  a  suitable  qualification  for 
 the  one  would  not  be  so  for  the  other. 
 
 13.  We  may  further  infer,  that  when  a  church  requires  a  pro- 
 bable evidence  of  grace  as  the  measuring  rule  of  admission,  and 
 directs  nearly  all  its  attention  to  ascertain  this  point,  its  proceed- 
 ings are  irregular,  unscriptural,  and,  therefore,  unwarrantable. 
 The  rule  of  judging,  as  before  shewn,  must  be  in  the  Scripture, 
 and  not  in  the  candidate. 
 
 14.  We  may  therefore  infer,  from  the  preceding  observations, 
 that  a  probable  evidence  of  grace  in  a  candidate  is  not  the  precise 
 ground  of  the  qualifications,  however  desii-able  that  evidence  may 
 be  ;  yet  because,  ordinarily  and  most  probably,  the  absence  of 
 saving  grace  impHes  the  absence  of  the  precise  gi-oxmd  of  answer- 
 ableness  to  the  scriptural  design  of  full  communion,  such  probable 
 evidence  is  of  great  importance.  However  nice  the  distinction 
 may  appear  to  some,  the  want  of  attending  to  it  seems  to  have 
 constituted  the  chief  difference  between  President  Edwards  and 
 his  antagonists.*  And  in  fair  investigation  another  question, 
 different    from   what  was    agitated,    ought    to    have    been    first 
 
 *  In  the  painful  controversy  that  led  to  the  removal  of  President  Edwards  from 
 his  pastoral  charge  at  Northampton,  Massachusetts. 
 
OF  ENTEEING  INTO  FULL  COMMUNION.  295 
 
 settled — viz.,  Whether  any  person  who  is  not  visibly  the  subject 
 of  saving  grace  can  "  befriend  rather  than  oppose,  can  honour 
 rather  than  discredit  the  scrij)tural  design  of  full  communion  ? " 
 Fairly  to  answer  this  question  in  the  negative,  it  is  not  enough  to 
 l^rove  that  such  a  person  cannot  answer  fully  the  scriptural  design. 
 But  it  ought  to  be  proved  that  no  person  destitute  of  such  pro- 
 bable evidence  of  saving  grace,  in  auy  circumstances  whatever,  can 
 be  found  who  might  befriend  and  honour  the  scriptural  design  of 
 communion  rather  than  the  contrary.  This  is  the  real  hinge  of 
 the  controversy. 
 
 15.  It  is  an  unscriptural  notion,  too  much  taken  upon  trust, 
 that  the  immediate  business  of  a  church  is  to  form  an  opinion 
 respecting  the  spiritual  state  of  a  person  before  God ;  as,  whether 
 he  is  the  subject  of  saving  grace  ?  whether  he  has  a  principle  of 
 sincerity  ?  whether  his  motives  are  spiritually  pure  ?  &c.  Whereas, 
 a  church  ought  not  to  act  the  part  of  a  jury  on  the  candidate's 
 real  state  towards  God,  but  on  his  state  towards  the  church.  They 
 are  to  determine  whether  he  is,  or  is  not,  eligible  to  answer  the 
 scriptural  ends  of  such  a  society,  and,  indeed,  of  that  particular 
 church.  For  as  the  circumstances  of  divers  churches  may  be 
 very  diifferent,  there  may  be  cases  where  the  same  person  may  be 
 eligible  to  one  church  and  not  to  another.  In  one  church  he  may 
 promote  its  welfare,  in  another  hinder  it.  This  may  greatly  depend 
 on  his  peculiar  tenets,  and  the  zeal  with  which  he  may  be  dis- 
 posed to  maintain  them.  In  one  society  he  may  be  a  source  of 
 disquiet  and  confusion,  but  in  another  the  reverse. 
 
 ]  6.  Hence  it  is  evident,  that  a  visibility  of  saving  grace,  though 
 it  claims  the  Christian  love  and  resjject  of  the  church,  does  not  in 
 aU  cases  constitute  eligible  qualifications.  For  whatever  has  an 
 evident  tendency  to  produce  disputes,  animosities,  and  divisions  in 
 a  church,  ought  to  be  kept  out  of  it.  But  the  admission  of  a 
 person  who  appeared  zealous  for  sentiments  and  customs  opposite 
 to  those  held  by  the  church,  would  have  this  apparent  tendency, 
 notwithstanding  his  i)ossessing  a  visibility  of  grace  on  other 
 accounts.  Therefore,  though  a  visibility  of  grace  in  some  cases 
 may  be  sufficiently  plain,  yet  an  apparent  failure  in  other  respects 
 may  be  sufficient  to  shew  that  a  person  is  not  qualified  for  full 
 communion.  In  short,  if  the  church  have  not  good  reason  to 
 think  that  his  admission  would  do  more  honour  than  good,  he 
 
296  ON  THE  SCEIPTXJEAL  DESIGN 
 
 should  be  deemed  unqualified  for  meuibersliip  in  that  society, 
 though  he  may  be  entitled  to  a  charitable  opinion  or  even  Chris- 
 tian love  on  other  accounts  ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  if  the  church 
 have  good  reason  to  think  that  his  admission  would  do  more  good 
 than  harm,  he  should  be  deemed  qualified  for  membership,  even 
 though  he  may  be  less  entitled  to  a  charitable  opinion  of  his  state 
 toward  God  than  the  other. 
 
 Corollanes. 
 
 1.  Any  candidate  who  ajjpears,  in  the  charitable  judgment  of  a 
 Christian  church,  likely  to  give  a  favoiirable  representation  of 
 Christianity  to  the  chnrch  and  the  world,  to  encourage  the  desirous 
 by  his  knowledge  and  tempers,  and  to  give  and  receive  Christian 
 edification  in  that  communion,  is  in  the  Scripture  sense  qualified 
 for  communion. 
 
 2.  Personal  religion  in  the  .?ight  of  God  is  to  be  deemed  neces- 
 sary only  for  the  sake  of  enabling  the  candidate  to  answer  such 
 ends,  as  far  as  membership  is  concerned  ;  but  as  final  salvation  is 
 concerned,  personal  religion  is  indisiDcnsably  necessary,  this  con- 
 nexion being  clearly  revealed,  as  well  as  foimded,  in  the  nature  of 
 things. 
 
 3.  A  Christian  minister  may  consistently  exercise  holy  jealousy 
 over  some  church-members,  and  warn  them  of  the  danger  of 
 hypocrisy,  without  threatening  them  with  exclusion  from  their 
 membership  ;  because  only  their  overt  acts,  including  sentiments, 
 tempers,  and  conduct,  are  objects  of  disciphne,  as  they  were  of 
 admission. 
 
 4.  Some  persons,  though  in  a  safe  state  toward  God,  may  not 
 answer  the  forementioned  ends  of  membership  better  than  others 
 who  are  not  in  such  a  state. 
 
 5.  A  person  may  be  qualified  for  the  society  of  heaven  while 
 not  qualified  for  full  communion  in  a  Christian  church,  because 
 the  natures  of  the  two  societies  are  different,  and  consequently  the 
 scriptural  ends  of  their  admission  into  each.  For  infants  oridiot.s, 
 &c.,  may  be  qualified  by  grace  for  the  society  of  heaven,  but  are 
 totally  miqualified  for  full  communion  in  the  church  on  earth. 
 
 6.  Were  Christian  churches  always  to  act  on  these  principles, 
 much  bitter  strife  and  useless  discussion  would  be  avoided  in  the 
 
OF  ENTEEINGf  INTO  FULL  COMMUNION.  297 
 
 admission  and  exclusion  of  members.  Por  in  neither  the  one  nor 
 the  other  would  the  church  jjronounce  on  the  state  of  the  persons 
 towards  God :  for  when  any  were  admitted,  no  handle  would  be 
 afforded  to  the  presumi^tion  that  membership  below  is  a  qualifica- 
 tion for  heaven  ;  and  when  any  were  excluded,  no  occasion  would 
 be  given  to  the  excommunicated  person  or  to  the  world  to  pass  the 
 censure  of  uncharitableness  on  the  church ;  for  every  voluntary 
 society  has  a  right  to  judge  according  to  its  own  appropriate  rules 
 who  is,  and  who  is  not,  qualified  to  j^romote  its  welfare. 
 
CHRISTIAN  EDUCATION  OF  THE  YOUNG. 
 
 .[.  AJSr  ESSAY  ON"  EDUCATION. 
 II.  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST,  IN  THREE  PAETS. 
 
AN  ESSAY  ON  CHEISTIAN  EDUCATION: 
 
 ADDRESSED  TO  CHRISTIAN  PARENTS  AND  TEACHERS. 
 
 §  1.  The  design  of  the  essay.  §  2.  Good  schools  do  not  supersede  parental  duty. 
 §  3.  The  capacity  of  children  to  learn  and  to  be  impres.sed  developed  early. 
 §  4.  The  duty  of  a  mother,  of  a  nurse,  illustrated.  §  5.  The  consequences 
 of  neglect  in  this  world  and  in  the  next.  §  6.  The  necessity  of  guarding 
 against  discouragements.  §  7.  Distinction  between  preparation  for  instruc- 
 tion and  the  work  itself.  §  8.  The  language  of  the  passions  is  first  and  uni- 
 versal. §  9.  Exciting  groundless  fears  and  hopes  to  be  sedulously  avoided. 
 §  10.  Good  health,  spirits,  and  tempers  favourable  to  religious  impressions. 
 §  11.  Example,  the  importance  of. 
 
 §  1.  My  DEAR  Friends, — There  is  nothing  in  which  Christian 
 parents  are  more  wanting  to  their  children  than  that  religious 
 care  of  them  which  the  Scriptures  call  the  bringing  of  them  up  in 
 the  nuHure  and  admonition  of  the  Lord.  To  what  can  this  be 
 owing?  Not  to  the  want  of  natural  affection,  that  principle 
 which  is  common  to  all  animals.  If  sometimes  children  are  so 
 depraved  as  to  be  ivithout  natural  affection  to  their  parents,  or 
 each  other,  seldom  is  the  principle  lost  in  the  parents  towards 
 them.  Is  it  owing  to  a  total  want  of  benevolence  ?  By  no  means. 
 Pop  benevolence  is  essential  to  that  Christianity  which  the  persons 
 now  addressed  are  supposed  to  possess.  It  must  then  be  owing  to 
 the  want  of  a  proper  attention  to  the  subject  of  education,  and, 
 of  course,  unskilfidness  in  the  work,  by  virtue  of  which  every 
 transient  wish  of  excelling  therein  proves  abortive,  To  contribute 
 a  little  towards  remedying  these  defects  is  the  design  of  this  essay. 
 §  2.  The  custom  of  sending  your  children  to  school,  to  qualify 
 
302  AN  ESSAY  ON  EDUCATION. 
 
 them  for  business  and  active  Kfe,  is,  in  its  proper  place,  commend- 
 able. But  has  not  the  idea  of  giving  them  a  good  school  educa- 
 tion relaxed  your  own  efforts  ?  It  is  common  to  observe  parents 
 extremely  anxious  to  fix  upon  a  good  seminary  where  to  place 
 their  children  ;  teachers  of  skill  and  ingenuity  are  sought,  their 
 abilities,  dispositions,  and  methods  of  teaching  are  scrupulously 
 inquired  after ;  and  this  is  commendable.  But  happy  are  those 
 parents  who  prove,  by  their  own  practice,  that  this  concern  pro- 
 ceeds not  from  the  selfish  motive  of  excusing  themselves  from  an 
 important  part  of  Christian  duty. 
 
 §  3.  Will  any  say,  Since  it  is  proper  to  send  out  our  children 
 for  education,  how  is  it  in  our  power  to  instruct  them  ?  While  at 
 a  distance  from  you,  it  is  true,  your  influence  over  them  for  the 
 time  is  lessened,  the  consideration  of  which  justifies  your  solici- 
 tude for  a  good  school.  But  the  greater  number  of  you  send 
 your  little  ones  not  to  boarding  but  to  day-schools,  in  which  case 
 your  opportunities  of  assisting  them  are  sufficient.  Besides,  the 
 dispositions  and  minds  of  children  are  capable  of  improvement 
 sooner  than  most  parents  are  willing  to  allow  ;  at  least,  the  oppor- 
 tunities of  mothers  and  nurses  open  at  a  very  early  period.  To 
 urge  the  incapacity  of  a  child  of  two  or  three  years  of  age,  will 
 be  thought,  by  better  judges,  to  be  but  a  weak  attempt  to  cover 
 either  ignorance  or  indiscretion,  or  both. 
 
 §  4.  To  give  you  some  idea  of  what  ought  to  be  done  by  a 
 mother  attentive  to  her  duty,  and  whose  lieart  is  turned  to  the 
 child*  to  use  the  words  of  a  prophet,  take  the  following  hints : — 
 Education,  remember,  without  arrogating  to  itself  the  production 
 of  effects  which  ought  to  be  ascribed  to  the  sovereign  grace  of 
 God  alone,  is,  nevertheless,  in  the  order  of  appointed  means,  of 
 the  utmost  moment.  Let  this  maxim  be  well  understood,  and 
 well  digested  in  your  mind.  View  the  child,  whether  a  toy  or  a 
 girl,  with  an  eye  of  pity  and  affection :  mournful  pity,  not  only 
 because  of  the  dangers  that  attend  its  future  steps  in  life,  but 
 principally  because  of  its  native  sinfulness  and  propensity  to 
 depart  from  God,  goodness,  and  happiness ;  benevolent  affection, 
 because  your  God  and  Saviour  views  it  so,  and  because,  without 
 this  disposition,  be  assured,  all  rigorous  measures  and  rule  of  con- 
 straint will  disappoint  your  exiDcctations. 
 
 §  5.  Accurately  weigh  not  only  your  own  obligations  as  Cliris- 
 *  Mai.  iv.  6. 
 
AN  ESSAY  ON  EDUCATION.  303 
 
 tians,  but  also  the  probable  consequences  of  your  attempts,  or 
 neglect,  both  in  tbis  world  and  in  the  next.  In  the  course  of  an 
 all-wise  Providence  you  are  the  instruments  of  their  existence  ; 
 and  is  there  any  room  to  hope  that  you  may  be  instrumental  of 
 rendering  that  existence  everlastingly  happy  ?  There  is, — blessed 
 be  God,  there  is.  It  behoves  mothers  to  reflect  how  much  it  lies 
 with  them,  as  the  medium,  to  render  the  manners  of  rising  genera- 
 tions either  amiable  or  the  reverse ;  and  what  a  blessing  to  her 
 posterity  is  a  wise,  religious,  skilful  mother !  If  the  regular  move- 
 ments of  a  family  be  comjoared  to  a  well-formed  machine  in  mo- 
 tion, she  is  the  main  spring.  Even  supposing  the  father  to  have 
 a  superior  degree  of  desire  and  zeal  to  promote  the  same  end  ; 
 yet,  especially  in  these  younger  years,  by  reason  of  her  destination 
 by  Providence  to  a  more  constant  residence  in  the  family,  and  the 
 more  delicate  and  minute  attentions  for  which  she  is  formed,  her 
 opportunities,  and  probability  of  success,  are  far  greater.  Your 
 influence,  you  see,  in  doing  good  or  harm  to  your  children  is  very 
 great.  You  are  made  cajDable  of  doing  your  dear  little  ones  great 
 service  by  example  before  they  are  capable  of  verbal  instruction, 
 as  well  as  in  connexion  with  it.  Have  you  attended  to  it  ?  Chris- 
 tian families  are  the  nurseries  of  particular  churches.  Do  you  aim 
 at  bringing  up  your  children  for  Christ,  and  the  societies  which 
 profess  to  unite  themselves  to  Him  ?  It  is  no  less  your  privilege  than 
 your  duty ;  and  though  the  period  be  distant,  still  keep  it  in  view. 
 Have  you  resigned  them  to  Christ  in  their  baptism  ?  Act  a  consistent 
 part,  until  conscience  be  comiDletely  satisfied  that  you  acted  therein 
 from  a  higher  principle  than  the  slaves  of  mere  custom.  Or,  if  then 
 too  inattentive,  prove  that  you  have  now  juster  views. 
 
 §  6.  You  are  perhaps  ready  to  say,  We  are  convinced  of  the 
 importance  of  the  undertaking,  but  how  shall  we,  in  the  best 
 manner,  put  it  in  practice  ?  Be  assured  that  a  sincere  desire  of 
 succeeding,  if  that  be  permanent,  carries  you  more  than  one  half 
 the  way  to  the  end  of  your  course  of  duty.  You  cannot  be  too 
 much  upon  your  guard  against  the  various  discouragements  that 
 present  themselves ;  and  this  is  not  the  least,  the  supposed  small 
 success  your  efforts  meet  with.  No  temptation  is  more  danger- 
 ous, if  it  operates  to  any  other  purpose  than  to  quicken  your 
 attentions  and  your  diligence.  Are  you  a  Christian?  Then  let 
 this  part  of  your  conduct,  as  well  as  others,  be  by  faith  in  God's 
 promises  of  a  blessing  on  your  endeavours. 
 
304  AN  ESSAY  OK  EDUCATION. 
 
 §  7.  You  should  make  a  distinction  between  instruction,  pro- 
 perly so  called,  and  a  pi-eparation  for  instruction.  The  one  re- 
 quires a  little  enlargement  of  capacity,  whereas  the  latter  belongs 
 to  the  tenderest  infancy ;  and  chiefly  consists  in  that  suitableness 
 of  voice  and  gesture,  and  by  degrees  articulation  and  pronunciation 
 of  words,  which  are  best  calculated  to  engage  the  best  imitation. 
 It  was  well  remarked  by  a  heathen, — from  whom,  in  this  instance, 
 Christian  parents  should  not  disdain  to  learn, — that  "the  morals 
 of  children  ought  to  be  the  primary  consideration,  but  yet  that  it 
 is  requisite  they  should  speak  with  propriety.  The  speech  of  a 
 nurse  is  the  first  the  child  hears,  and  he  lisps  out  an  imitation  of 
 her  expressions.  We  are  naturally  very  tenacious  of  what  we 
 imbibe  when  very  young,  even  as  new  vessels  retain  the  flavour  of 
 the  first  liquor.  "When  wool  is  once  dyed,  it  is  not  to  be  restored 
 to  its  native  whiteness.  And  the  more  vicious  a  habit  is,  the  closer 
 it  will  adhere  ;  for  good  habits  are  easily  changed  into  bad  ones, 
 but  where  do  you  observe  a  vicious  habit  become  a  good  one  ?  A 
 child,  therefore,  should  be  habituated  to  nothing  in  his  infancy 
 which  afterwards  he  must  be  at  the  pains  to  unlearn."  *  This 
 writer  recommends  the  same  care  with  respect  to  the  play-fellows 
 and  companions  of  young  children  ;  and  if  at  any  time  an  impro- 
 priety of  expression  or  behaviour  is  observed  in  the  child,  the  im- 
 mediate and  only  remedy  is  to  take  care  that  it  grow  not  into  a 
 habit.  Who  can  doubt  of  the  amazing  ajstitude  of  children  to 
 follow  the  example  of  those  about  them,  who  reflects  on  the  short 
 time  they  require  to  learn  a  language,  however  difficult,  provided 
 it  be  in  constant  use.  It  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  them 
 whether  it  be  English  or  Welsh,  Prench  or  Italian,  Greek  or 
 Hebrew,  Arabic  or  Chinese.  Let  it  be  but  always  used,  and  accu- 
 rately pronounced  in  their  hearing,  and  set  right  when  thej'  make 
 any  mistakes,  and  they  will  soon  talk  it  with  ease,  and  leave  far 
 behind  them  the  most  learned  and  ingenious  foreigner,  whose 
 habits  are  already  fixed.  These  remarks  may  serve  to  shew  how 
 susceptible  young  children  are  of  strong  impressions,  and  of  what 
 influence  on  after  life  are  early  habits. 
 
 §  8.   There  is  another  language  which  we  may  call  universal, 
 
 and  which  a  child  is  capable  of  learning  before  any  other — that  of 
 
 the  passions.     Observe  how  the  infant  smiles  when  you  smile,  and 
 
 if  you  fro\vn,  how  its  countenance  lowers  before  it  can  articulate,  or 
 
 *  Quintil.,  lib.  i.,  cap.  i. 
 
AN  ESSAY  ON  EDXJCATION.  305 
 
 even  understand  the  import  of  a  single  word.  Do  you  emijloy 
 endearing  gestures,  it  stretches  itself  into  your  arms.  Do  you 
 menace  it,  or  offer  constraints,  it  becomes  immediately  sensible  of 
 it,  and  shuns  your  embrace.  All  that  is  now  necessary  is  to  direct 
 this  early  promptitude  in  the  best  manner.  It  is  easy  to  give  it  a 
 predilection  to  one  person  rather  than  another,  and  to  prevent  a 
 temptation  of  attachment  to  any  whose  characters  are  suspected  of 
 vice,  or  conduct  of  impropriety.  "  By  the  very  different  airs  of 
 your  countenance,  and  by  the  tone  of  your  voice,  you  may  repre- 
 sent to  them  with  horror  those  persons  whom  they  have  seen  in  a 
 rage  or  any  other  disorder ;  and  may  assume  the  serenest  counte- 
 nance and  the  softest  tones,  attended  with  admiration,  to  repre- 
 sent to  them  whatever  they  see  that  is  wise,  good,  and  modest."* 
 These,  it  is  true,  are  the  days  of  small  things,  but  yet  ought  not  to 
 be  despised  ;  for,  as  one  observes,  "  every  hour  saved  in  infancy  is 
 so  much  acquired  to  youth.  ■"-[- 
 
 §  9.  Considering  the  force  with  which  impressions  are  made  on 
 the  minds  of  children,  no  doubt  can  remain  of  the  impropriety  of 
 exciting  groundless  hopes  or  fears.  If  expectations  be  raised,  let 
 deceit  have  no  share  in  it ;  and  if  at  any  time  you  excite  fear, 
 never  employ  for  the  purpose  imaginary  objects,  but  real  evils. 
 Little  capable  as  young  children  are  of  exercising  reason,  nothing 
 that  is  in  itself  unreasonable  is  to  be  instilled  into  them.  Let  not 
 this  tenderness  and  susceptibility  of  their  frames,  and  pliableness 
 of  their  dispositions,  therefore,  be  abused  to  purposes  which  they 
 will  have  occasion  in  future  to  lament.  And  above  all,  endeavour 
 to  render  goodness  and  religion,  in  all  their  forms  and  expressions, 
 amiable,  pleasing,  and  advantageous.  If  this  order  be  not  dili- 
 gently observed,  it  will  be  difficult  for  parents  to  exculpate  them- 
 selves from  the  charge  of  tempting  Providence  and  corrupting  their 
 chUdi'en.  Would  you,  for  instance,  make  them  sensible  of  the 
 glory  of  heaven  and  its  inhabitants  ?  connect  with  it  the  mercy  of 
 God,  and  the  true  religion  which  He  requires.  Is  it  thought 
 expedient  to  make  them  sensible  of  the  gloom  and  horror  of  hell, 
 and  the  misery  of  its  inhabitants  ?  Fail  not  to  shew  them  that  it 
 is  not  owing  to  any  cruelty  in  God  that  angels  and  men  suffer 
 there,  but  wholly  to  their  own  obstinate  wickedness  and  persever- 
 ing disobedience. 
 
 §  10.  With  the  blessing  of  God,  equally  necessary  for  success  in 
 
 *  F^nelou  on  the  Education  of  a  Daughter.  f  Quintil.,  vit  sup. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  U 
 
306  AN  ESSAY  ON  EDUCATION. 
 
 every  period  of  life,  tlie  introduction  of  religious  ideas  and  impres- 
 sions will  be  not  a  little  facilitated  by  a  due  care  of  the  health, 
 spirits,  and  tempers  of  children.  And  to  these  desirable  ends  other 
 things  have  great  iniiuence ;  such  as  regimen,  cleanliness,  gentle- 
 ness of  manner,  order  in  conduct,  and  in  all  things  moderation  and 
 temperance.  Pood,  when  clean  and  wholesome,  cannot  be  too 
 Ijlain.  And  let  early  i-ising  and  moderate  exercise  be  the  only 
 temptations  to  appetite.  It  would  not  be  amiss,  occasionally,  to 
 inculcate  upon  a  child  the  true  end  of  eating,  which  is  health  ; 
 and  the  right  improvement  of  health,  that  thereby  we  may  the 
 better  discharge  our  duty.  Thus,  let  the  bread  of  careful  assiduity 
 be  cast  on  the  face  of  the  water  of  infancy,  and  you  may  hope, 
 without  presumption,  to  find  it  after  many  days  with  abundant 
 increase.  It  was  the  remark  of  a  great  man,  that  "the  little,  or 
 almost  insensible  impressions  on  our  tender  infancies,  have  very 
 important  and  lasting  consequences  ;  and  there  it  is,  as  in  the 
 fountains  of  some  rivers,  where  a  gentle  application  of  the  hand 
 turns  the  flexible  waters  into  channels  that  make  them  take  quite 
 contrary  courses  ;  and  by  this  little  direction  given  them  at  first  in 
 the  source,  they  receive  different  tendencies,  and  arrive  at  last  at 
 very  remote  and  distant  places."  * 
 
 §  11.  It  is  a  well-known  maxim,  that  example  is  more  forcible 
 than  firecept.  The  precept  often  makes  our  depraved  nature  revolt, 
 while  example  imperceptibly  leads  to  imitation.  Hence  it  may  be 
 truly  said,  that  the  single  example  of  Jesus  Christ  has  had  greater 
 influence  in  forming  holy  characters  than  all  the  precepts  of 
 Moses.  And  a  living  example  is  more  forcible  than  a  verbal 
 description  of  one.  But  as  it  is  not  easy  to  have  always  at  hand 
 that  vieiu  of  a  living  character  which  we  desire  them  to  notice,  the 
 best  substitute  is  a  collection  of  anecdotes  and  stories  from  real 
 life.  Next  to  these,  artificial  ones,  drawn  up  in  an  agreeable 
 manner.     Nor  are  fables  without  good  use. 
 
 *  Locke  on  Education,  §  1. 
 
THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST,  ETC/'' 
 
 FIRST  CLASS. 
 THE  YOUNG  CHILD'S  FIRST  CATECHISM ; 
 
 OE, 
 
 THE  PARENT'S  HELP. 
 
 §  1.  Concerning  our  first  parents.  §2.  Cain  and  Abel.  §3.  Noah  and  his  family. 
 §  4.  Abraham.  §  5.  Lot  and  his  family.  §  6.  Moses.  §  7.  Samuel  and  Eli. 
 §  8.  David.  §  9.  Elijah.  §  10.  EUsha.  §  11.  Jonah.  §  12.  Daniel  and  his 
 three  companions.  §13.  John  the  Baptist.  §14.  Jesus  Christ.  §15  Lazarus 
 and  his  sisters.     §16.  Eutychus.     §17.  Timothy. 
 
 §  1.  Concerning  our  first  parents. — Gen.  i.-iii. 
 
 1.  Question.  What  is  your  name  1 
 Answer.  A.  or  B. 
 
 2.  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  who  was  the  first  man  ? 
 A.  Adam. 
 
 *  "The  Evangelical  Cateohist,"  in  three  parts,  is  designed  to  answer,  more 
 immediately,  three  important  purposes  :— 
 
 First,  To  furnish  the  memories  of  children  with  the  leading  principles  of  re- 
 ligion. 
 
 Secondly,  To  settle  the  judgments  of  youth  respecting  truth  and  error. 
 
 Thirdly,  To  exercise  the  consciences  of  professing  Christians  with  regard  to  the 
 influence  of  Divine  truths. 
 
 It  is,  therefore,  published  not  only  in  three  separate  parts,  for  the  several  ages 
 in  life,  for  which  it  is  intended,  but  also  in  separate  classes.  What  is  here  called 
 "  The  Scripture  Catechism,  or,  A  Familiar  Introduction  to  the  Divine  Dispen- 
 sations," is  the  first  class  of  the  second  part. 
 
308  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PART.  I. 
 
 3.  Q.  Of  what  did  God  form  the  body  of  Adam  ? 
 
 A.  Of  the  dust  of  the  gi-oimd. 
 
 4  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  what  was  the  first  bad  thing  he  did  ( 
 
 A.  Eating  the  forbidden  fruit. 
 
 5.  Q.  AVho  was  the  first  woman  ? 
 A.  Eve,  Adam's  wife. 
 
 6.  Q.  Of  what  did  God  form  her  body  ? 
 A.  Of  one  of  Adam's  ribs. 
 
 7.  Q.  And  did  she  do  anj-thing  that  was  bad  ? 
 A.  Yes,  she  took  of  the  fruit  before  Adam  did. 
 
 8.  Q.  And  what  else  did  she  do  ? 
 
 A.  She  tempted  her  husband  to  eat  T\'ith  her. 
 
 9.  Q.  "What  harm  was  there  in  eating  that  fruit  >. 
 A.  It  was  a  very  great  sin. 
 
 10.  Q.  Why  was  it  a  great  sin  ? 
 
 A.  Because  they  were  plainly  told  not  to  eat  of  it. 
 
 11.  Q.  Who  told  them  that  they  must  not  eat  of  it  ? 
 A.  The  great  God  who  made  them. 
 
 12.  Q.  AYhat  became  of  them  afterward  ? 
 
 A.  They  were  tm-ned  out  of  the  garden  of  Eden. 
 
 13.  Q.  And  was  the  gi-eat  God  angry  with  them  ? 
 A.  Yes,  very  angry. 
 
 14.  Q.  Did  He  leave  them  without  hope  of  pardon  ? 
 A.  No,  for  He  promised  them  a  Saviour. 
 
 §  2.  Concerning  Cain  and  Abel. — Gen.  iv. 
 
 1.  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  who  was  Cain  ? 
 A.  Adam's  eldest  sou. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  very  wicked  thing  did  he  do  ? 
 A.  He  slew  his  brother  Abel. 
 
 3.  Q.  Why  did  he  slay  him  ? 
 
 A.  Because  Abel  was  good,  and  himself  wicked. 
 
 4.  Q.  And  what  became  of  Caiu  after  he  slew  his  brother  ? 
 A.  God  Almighty  puni.shed  him. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  became  of  Abel's  soul  ? 
 
 A.  It  went  to  heaven,  to  the  good  and  merciful  God,  and  the  good 
 angels. 
 
 §  3.  Concerning  Noali  and  lus  family. — Gen.  v.-viii. 
 
 1.  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  who  was  Noah  ? 
 
 A.  The  father  of  Shem,  Ham,  and  Japheth. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  great  work  did  he  do  when  God  ordered  him  to  do  it  ? 
 A.  He  built  a  very  large  ark,  somewhat  like  a  great  ship. 
 
 3.  Q.  Who  was  saved  in  the  ark,  when  the  deluge  came  ? 
 A.  Noah  and  all  his  family. 
 
 4.  Q.  How  many  j^ersons  where  they  ? 
 
 A.  Eight  persons  :  Noah  and  his  wife,  his  three  sons  and  their  wives. 
 
 5.  Q.  And  what  else  was  preserved  alive  .' 
 
PART  I,]  THE  YOUNG  CHILD'S  FIKST  CATECHISM.  309 
 
 A.  Some  fowls,  cattle,  and  creeping  things. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  became  of  the  men  and  living  things  of  the  earth  that  were 
 not  in  the  ark  ? 
 
 A.  They  were  drowned  in  the  great  waters. 
 
 7.  Q.  Why  were  all  men  drowned  but  Noah  and  his  family  ? 
 
 A.  Because  they  were  very  wicked,  and  did  not  believe  what  God  said  to 
 them. 
 
 8.  Q.  What  did  Noah  do  after  the  danger  was  over  } 
 A.  He  was  very  thankful. 
 
 9.  Q.  How  did  he  shew  his  thankfulness  ? 
 A.  By  offering  sacrifices  to  God. 
 
 §  4.   Concerning  Abraham. — Gen.  xxi.,  xxii. 
 
 1.  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  who  was  Abraham  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  father  of  Isaac,  and  the  grandfather  of  Jacob. 
 
 2.  Q.  In  what  was  he  remarkably  good  ? 
 
 A.  He  believed  everything  that  God  said  to  him. 
 
 3.  Q.  Why  was  Abraham  called  the  friend  of  God  ? 
 
 -A.  Because  God  shewed  him  very  great  favom's  ;  and  he  chose  God  for 
 his  best  friend,  and  loved  Him  much. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  did  Abraham  do  with  his  son  Ishmael  who  mocked  Isaac 
 his  brother? 
 
 A.  He  turned  him  out  of  his  house  as  not  fit  to  Kve  in  the  same  family. 
 
 §  5.  Concerning  Lot  and  his  family. — Gen.  xiv.-xix. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Lot  ? 
 A.  Abraham's  nephew. 
 
 2.  Q.  Where  did  he  live  ? 
 A.  In  wicked  Sodom. 
 
 3.  Q.  What  became  of  Lot's  wife  ? 
 
 A.  She  was  turned  into  a  pillar  of  salt. 
 
 4.  Q.  Why  was  she  thus  punished  ? 
 
 A.  Because  she  was  very  wicked,  and  God  made  her  a  public  example. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  great  wickedness  did  she  do  ? 
 
 A.  She  looked  back  to  Sodom  and  Gomorrah,  though  she  was  plainly 
 told  not  to  do  so  ;  and  she  minded  earthly  things  more  than  God. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  became  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah,  and  the  peoi^le  that  lived 
 there  ? 
 
 A.  They  were  burned  with  fire  and  brimstone. 
 
 7.  Q.  What  became  of  their  wicked  soiils  ? 
 
 A.  They  went  to  hell,  to  Satan  and  his  companions. 
 
 8.  Q.  AVhat  became  of  righteous  Lot,  who  was  so  much  grieved  at  them  ? 
 A.  He  was  kept  safe  by  the  great  and  gracious  God,  and  at  last  taken  to 
 
 heaven. 
 
 §  6.  Concerning  Moses. — Exod.  ii.,  xiv.,  xv. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Moses? 
 
 A.  The  brother  of  Aaron  and  Miriam,  and  a  faithful  servant  of  God. 
 
310  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  I. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  did  his  parents  do  with  him  when  he  was  a  babe  ? 
 
 A.  They  put  him  in  a  small  ark  of  bixlrushes  daubed  with  pitch,  and 
 laid  him  in  the  flags  by  the  I'iver's  brink,  and  his  sister  watched  him. 
 
 3.  Q.  Who  found  him  there  ? 
 
 A.  Pharaoh's  daughter,  with  her  maidens. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  did  she  do  by  him  ? 
 A.  She  put  him  out  to  nm-se. 
 
 5.  Q.  And  who  was  his  nurse  ? 
 
 A.  His  own  mother,  as  Providence  would  have  it. 
 
 6.  Q.  Where  did  he  live  afterwards  ? 
 A.  With  Pharaoh  king  of  Egypt. 
 
 7.  Q.  And  which  did  he  prefer,  the  wicked  Egyptians,  with  all  their 
 riches  and  fine  things  ;  or  the  people  of  Uod,  with  all  their  afBiotions  and 
 poverty  ? 
 
 A.  He  preferred  the  people  of  God. 
 
 8.  Q.  What  became  of  cruel  Pharaoh  who  drowned  the  little  chikben  ? 
 A.  He  was  himself  drowned  in  the  Red  Sea. 
 
 9.  Q.  Who  were  drowned  with  him  ? 
 
 A.  All  the  Egyptians  who  wanted  to  destroy  Moses  and  his  friends. 
 
 10.  Q.  And  what  became  of  Moses  and  his  friends? 
 
 A.  God  Almighty  saved  them  by  opening  the  sea  before  them. 
 
 11.  Q.  AVhat  did  they  do  after  they  were  out  of  the  awful  danger  ? 
 A.  They  sang  a  hymn  of  praise  to  God  their  Saviour. 
 
 12.  Q.  What  part  of  the  Holy  Scriptm-es  did  Moses  write? 
 A.  Genesis,  Exodus,  Leviticus,  Numbers,  and  Deuteronomy. 
 
 §  7.  Concerning  Samuel. — 1  Sam.  L-iii. 
 
 1.  Q  Who  was  Samuel  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  prophet  whom  God  called  when  he  was  very  young. 
 
 2.  Q.  Where  was  he  when  God  called  him 
 A.  He  was  in  the  house  of  Eli. 
 
 3.  Q.  Who  was  Eh? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  priest,  and  a  good  old  man,  upon  the  whole,  but  sinfully 
 neglected  his  childi'en. 
 
 4.  Q.  How  did  he  neglect  them  ? 
 
 A.  By  not  projjerly  correcting  them  for  their  great  faults. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  did  the  good  child  Samuel  say  when  God  called  him  ? 
 A.  He  said,  "  Speak  Lord,  for  thy  sei-vant  heareth." 
 
 6.  Q.  How  did  the  Lord  honour  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  made  a  great  jsrophet,  and  a  judge  in  Israel. 
 
 §  8.  Concerning  David. — 1  Sam.  xvii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  David? 
 
 A.  The  youngest  son  of  Jesse. 
 
 2.  Q.  How  was  he  employed  when  young  ? 
 A.  He  kept  his  father's  sheep. 
 
 3.  Q.  Who  was  the  giant  he  slew  ? 
 
 A.  Goliah  the  Philistine,  a  proud  boaster. 
 
PART  I.]  THE  YOUNG  CHILD'S  FIEST  CATECHISM.  311 
 
 4.  Q.  How  did  lie  slay  him,  seeing  he  was  so  big  ? 
 
 A.  With  a  sling  and  a  stone,  and  the  extraordinary  help  of  God. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  became  of  David  after  this  act  of  valour  and  ]yietj  ? 
 A.  He  was  made  a  king  and  a  prophet. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  was  the  character  of  Absalom,  one  of  his  sons  ? 
 A.  He  was  very  proud  and  disobedient. 
 
 7.  Q.  What  became  of  him  with  his  pride  and  disobedience  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  caught  by  his  bushy  hair  in  a  tree,  and  Joab  slew  him. 
 
 8.  Q.  What  was  the  general  character  of  Solomon,  another  son  of  David  ? 
 A.  He  was  the  wisest  of  men,  though  he  had  his  faihngs. 
 
 9.  Q.  What  part  of  the  Bible  did  Solomon  write  1 
 A.  The  Proverbs,  Ecclesiastes,  and  the  Canticles. 
 
 §  9.  Concerning  Elijah. — 1  Kings  xvii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Elijah  or  Elias  ? 
 A.  He  was  a  very  zealous  prophet. 
 
 2.  Q.  Who  was  the  wicked  king  whom  Elijah  reproved  and  threatened 
 by  the  command  of  God  ? 
 
 A.  Ahab,  the  son  of  Omri,  and  the  husband  of  wicked  Jezebel. 
 
 3.  Q.  When  Ahab  wanted  to  take  away  the  life  of  this  very  good  man, 
 where  did  he  go  ? 
 
 A.  He  hid  himself  by  the  brook  or  small  river  Cherith. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  cUd  he  do  for  meat  and  drink  in  that  solitary  place  ? 
 A.  God  commanded  the  ravens  to  feed  him. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  could  they  bring  him  which  was  eatable  ? 
 
 A.  They  brought  him  bread  and  flesh  in  the  morning,  and  bread  and 
 flesh  in  the  evening. 
 
 6.  Q.  And  what  had  he  to  drink  ? 
 A.  Water  out  of  the  brook. 
 
 7.  Q.  When  there  was  no  water  in  the  brook,  what  did  he  do  ? 
 A.  He  went  to  Zarephath  to  a  widow  woman  and  her  son. 
 
 8.  Q.  When  the  son  of  the  woman  fell  sick,  and  his  sickness  was  so  sore 
 that  there  was  no  breath  left  in  him,  what  did  Elijah  do  to  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  took  him  and  laid  him  upon  his  own  bed,  and  prayed  to  the  Lord 
 that  He  would  cause  the  child's  soul  to  come  into  him  again. 
 
 9.  Q.  And  did  the  Lord  grant  Elijah's  extraordinary  request? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  the  soul  of  the  child  came  into  him  again,  and  he  revived. 
 
 10.  Q.  How  did  Elijah  reprove  Ahab,  and  convince  Baal's  prophets  ? 
 
 A.  Having  told  Ahab  of  his  faults,  he  challenged  all  Israel,  and  all  the 
 false  jjrophets,  to  meet  him  on  Mount  Carmel,  where  he  confounded  them 
 with  a  miracle. 
 
 11.  Q.  AVhen  Jezebel  wanted  to  take  away  his  life,  where  did  he  go  ? 
 
 A.  He  went  into  the  wilderness,  a  day's  journey  from  Beersheba,  and  sat 
 under  a  juniper-tree. 
 
 12.  Q.  Was  he  not  in  great  trouble  there  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  very  great ;  but  an  angel  came  to  comfort  him. 
 
 13.  Q.  Where  did  he  go  from  thence  ? 
 
 A.  He  went  to  Mount  Horeb  and  lodged  in  a  cave. 
 
312  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  I. 
 
 14.  Q.  And  what  became  of  Elijah  after  all  his  troubles  I 
 
 A.  He  was  taken  up  to  heaven  in  a  chariot  of  fire  by  a  whirlwind. 
 
 §  10.  Concerning  Elisha. — 1  Kings  xix.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Elisha  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Saphat,  whom  Elijah  appointed  to  be  a  prophet  in 
 his  room. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  were  the  miracles  he  wrought  ? 
 
 A.  He  first  divided  the  waters  of  Jordan  and  went  over ;  and,  in  a  few 
 days  after,  he  healed  the  water-springs  of  Jericho. 
 
 3.  Q.  When  he  went  up  to  Bethel,  what  did  the  wicked  children  of  the 
 place  say  to  him  ? 
 
 A.  They  said  to  him  in  ridicule,  "  Go  up,  thou  bald  head  ;  go  up,  thou 
 bald  head." 
 
 4.  Q.  How  were  they  and  their  parents  punished  for  their  bad  behaviour 
 to  this  good  man  ? 
 
 A.  Two  she-bears  came  out  of  the  forest  and  tore  forty  and  two  children 
 of  them. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  other  miracles  did  Elisha  perform  1 
 
 A.  A  great  many.  He  multiplied  the  widow's  oil,  raised  to  life  the 
 Shunammite's  son,  increased  the  virtue  of  twenty  barley  loaves,  made  the 
 ase-head  to  swim,  and  some  others. 
 
 §  11.  Concerning  Jonah. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Jonah? 
 
 A.  The  prophet  who  wanted  to  flee  from  the  presence  of  God. 
 
 2.  Q.  How  did  he  want  to  flee  ? 
 
 A.  He  wanted  to  go  to  Tarshish,  instead  of  to  Nineveh,  where  God 
 commanded  him  to  go. 
 
 3.  Q.  And  did  he  prosper  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  the  Lord  raised  a  mighty  tempest  in  the  sea. 
 
 4.  Q.  And  what  became  of  Jonah  ? 
 
 A.  The  mai-iners  cast  him  forth  into  the  sea. 
 
 5.  Q.  Why  did  they  cast  Jonah  rather  than  any  other  ? 
 
 A.  Because  the  lot  fell  upon  him,  and  the  Lord  would  have  it  so. 
 
 6.  Q.  Did  Jonah  utterly  i)eri.sh  in  the  sea  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  the  Lord  had  prepared  a  great  fish  to  swallow  him  up. 
 
 7.  Q.  How  long  was  Jonah  in  the  belly  of  the  fish  ? 
 A.  Three  days  and  three  nights. 
 
 8.  Q.  Was  he  sensible  where  he  was  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  his  soul  prayed  to  God  very  earnestly. 
 
 9.  Q.  Did  God  hear  and  answer  him  1 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  He  made  the  fish  throw  him  up  on  chy  land. 
 
 10.  Q.  What  became  of  him  afterwards  ? 
 A.  He  went  to  Nineveh  to  preach. 
 
 11.  Q.  What  success  had  he  1 
 
 A.  The  people  of  Nineveh  behoved  God,  and  repented  at  Jonah's 
 preaching. 
 
PAET  I.]  THE  YOUNG  CHILD'S  FIEST  CATECHISM.  313 
 
 §  12.  Concerning  Daniel  and  his  three  companions. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Daniel? 
 
 A.  An  Israelite  in  Babylon. 
 
 2.  Q.  Who  were  his  companions  ? 
 
 A.  Shadrach,  Meshach,  and  Abednego. 
 
 3.  Q.  What  did  Nebviohadnezzar  and  the  Chaldeans  do  to  them  1 
 A.  They  were  oast  into  the  midst  of  a  burning  fiery  furnace. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  for  ? 
 
 A.  Because  they  would  not  worship  a  golden  image. 
 
 5.  Q.  Were  they  burned  to  death  ? 
 A.  No  ;  they  were  not  burned  at  all. 
 
 6.  Q.  How  could  that  be  ? 
 
 A.  God,  who  made  the  fire,  hindered  it  from  burning  them. 
 
 7.  Q.  What  became  of  them  aftei-ward  ? 
 A.  They  were  promoted  to  greater  honom". 
 
 8.  Q.  And  what  did  the  princes  and  presidents  of  Babylon  do  to  Daniel  ? 
 A.  They  had  him  cast  into  the  deu  of  lions. 
 
 9.  Q.  What  was  it  for  2 
 
 A.  Because  he  would  not  leave  off  praying  to  God. 
 
 10.  Q.  Did  the  strong,  fierce  lions  kill  him  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  God  sent  an  angel  to  shut  their  mouths. 
 
 11.  Q.  What  became  of  those  who  accused  Daniel? 
 A.  They  were  cast  into  the  lions'  den. 
 
 12.  Q.  And  what  did  the  lions  do  to  them  ? 
 
 A.  They  had  the  mastery  of  them,  and  brake  all  their  bones  in  pieces. 
 
 13.  Q.  Why  did  not  God  send  his  angel  to  save  them,  as  he  did  to  save 
 Daniel  ? 
 
 A.  Because  they  were  wicked,  and  would  not  pray  to  God  ;  but  Daniel 
 prayed,  and  beheved  in  his  God. 
 
 14.  Q.  What  became  of  Daniel  after  this  ? 
 
 A.  He  prospered  in  the  reign  of  Darius,  and  in  the  reign  of  Cyrus  the 
 Persian. 
 
 §  13.  Concerning  John  the  Baptist. — Matt,  iii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  John  the  Baptist  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  great  prophet,  and  was  filled  with  the  Holy  Ghost  from  his 
 mother's  womb. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  his  principal  work  ? 
 
 A.  To  make  ready  a  people  prepared  for  the  Lord — that  is,  to  preach 
 repentance  towards  God,  and  faith  in  the  pi-omised  Messiah  about  to  be 
 revealed. 
 
 3.  Q.  Why  was  he  called  the  Baptist  ? 
 
 A.  Because,  by  God's  appointment,  he  bajjtized  with  water  the  people 
 who  flocked  to  him  confessing  their  sins. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  sort  of  baptism  did  he  teach  the  people  to  look  for  from 
 Jesus  Christ  ? 
 
 A.  The  baptism  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
 
oli  THE  EVAA^fiELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  I. 
 
 5.  Q.  And  do  people  now  need  anything  more  to  make  tliem  good  and 
 happy  Christians  than  to  be  baptized  with  water  ! 
 
 A.  Yes  :  they  need  the  washing  of  regeneration,  and  the  renewing  of 
 the  Holy  Ghost. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  became  of  John  after  his  great  labom-  and  faithfulness  ? 
 A.  He  was  beheaded  by  the  command  of  Herod,  king  of  Galilee. 
 
 7.  Q.  What  was  the  cause  of  that  ungrateftil  and  cniel  command  1 
 
 A.  Herod's  rash  promise  to  his  wicked  niece,  the  daughter  of  Herodias. 
 
 8.  Q.  Who  was  Herodias  ? 
 
 A.  The  wife  of  Phihp,  Herod's  brother  ;  who  had  a  quarrel  against  John, 
 and  would  have  killed  him  ;  but  she  could  not. 
 
 9.  Q.  Why  did  Herodias  quarrel  with  John  ? 
 
 A,  Because  he  had  said  unto  Herod,  "  It  is  not  lawful  for  thee  to  have 
 thy  brother's  wife  ;"  for  Herod  had  married  her. 
 
 10.  Q.  Was  Herod  happy  after  this  ? 
 A.  No ;  his  mind  was  greatly  troubled. 
 
 §  ]  i.  Concerning  Jesus  Clirist. 
 
 1.  Q.  Can  you  teU  me  who  is  Jesus  Christ  1 
 
 A.  The  Son  of  God,  and  of  the  Virgin  Mary,  and  the  Saviour  of  sinful 
 men. 
 
 2.  Q.  Had  He  himself  no  sin  ? 
 
 A,  Ko  ;  He  was  holy,  harmless,  undefiled,  and  separate  from  sinners. 
 
 3.  Q.  Was  He  in  being  before  He  became  a  man,  and  took  upon  Him  the 
 form  of  a  servant  in  our  world  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  the  Word  was  God,  and  all  things  visible  and  invisible  were 
 made  by  Him. 
 
 4.  Q.  And  was  He  really  a  man  as  well  as  God  ? 
 
 A,  Yes  ;  for  He  was  the  man  Chi-ist  Jesus,  as  well  as  the  true  God  and 
 eternal  life. 
 
 5.  Q.  If  He  was  a  person  so  great  and  divine,  how  did  He  behave  to  His 
 mother  Mary,  and  her  husband  Joseph,  when  a  child  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  very  dutiful,  and  always  obeyed  eveiy  lawful  command. 
 
 6.  Q.  How  did  He  love  learning,  and  improvement  in  wisdom  ? 
 
 A.  He  gi'ew  in  knowledge  daily,  as  He  did  in  statui-e,  and  was  very  wise 
 as  weU  as  very  good. 
 
 7.  Q.  Did  He  ever  pray  to  His  heavenly  Father  ? 
 
 A,  Yes  ;  He  prayed  much  Himself,  and  hath  taught  us  to  pray  often  and 
 with  importunity. 
 
 8.  Q.  Though  He  was  a  person  of  such  heavenly  rank,  was  He  not  very 
 humble  ? 
 
 A,  Yes  ;  He  was  meek  and  lowly  of  heart.,  and  hath  taught  us  to  be  so. 
 
 9.  Q.  When  He  was  ill-used  and  reviled  what  did  He  do  ? 
 
 A-  When  He  was  reviled.  He  re\'iled  not  again  ;  when  He  suffered,  He 
 threatened  not ;  but  committed  Himself  to  Him  that  judgeth  righteously. 
 
 10.  Q.  When  any  wanted  Him  to  do  what  was  wTong,  how  did  He  act  ? 
 A.  He  obeyed  God  rather  than  men,  and  told  them  their  faidts  in  a  be- 
 coming manner. 
 
PAET  I.]  THE  YOUNG  CHILD'S  FIRST  CATECHISM.  315 
 
 11.  Q.  When  He  was  grown  up  to  a  man,  did  He  despise  little  children, 
 as  below  His  notice  ? 
 
 A.  No,  for  He  said,  Suffer  the  little  children  to  come  unto  me,  and  forbid 
 them  not ;  and  He  took  them  in  His  arms  and  blessed  them. 
 
 12.  Q.  Seeing  He  was  so  good,  and  went  about  doing  good  to  the  bodies 
 and  souls  of  men  continually,  how  was  He  treated  by  them  at  last  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  crucified  between  two  thieves. 
 
 13.  Q.  Had  they  any  plausible  reason  for  treating  Him  in  this  ungrateful 
 and  cruel  manner  ? 
 
 A.  No,  for  He  did  no  sin  ;  nor  was  guile  found  in  His  mouth. 
 
 14.  Q.  How  did  He  behave  to  His  murderers  1 
 
 A.  He  prayed  for  them  with  great  tenderness  and  compassion. 
 
 15.  What  was  His  prayer 
 
 A.  Father,  forgive  them,  for  they  know  not  what  they  do. 
 
 16.  Q.  And  can  you  tell  why  God  suffered  wicked  men  to  shed  the  blood 
 of  Christ,  and  put  Him  to  death  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  wounded  for-  our  transgressions,  and  His  death  is  of  unspeak- 
 able value. 
 
 17.  Q.  When  He  was  buried,  how  long  did  He  continue  in  the  grave  ? 
 A.  A  pax't  of  three  days. 
 
 18.  Q.  And  after  His  I'esurrection,  how  long  did  He  continue  on  earth 
 with  His  disciples  ? 
 
 A.  Forty  days  and  nights. 
 
 19.  Q.  And  where  did  He  go  after  ? 
 
 A.  He  ascended  above  all  heavens,  where  He  even  now  appears  in  the 
 presence  of  God  for  us. 
 
 20.  Q.  Shall  we  ever  see  Him  again  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  all  shall  see  Him,  and  He  will  judge  all,  according  to  what  they 
 do  in  this  world. 
 
 §  15.  Concerning  Lazarus  and  his  sisters. — John  xi. 
 
 1.  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  who  was  Lazarus  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  very  good  man,  who  lived  at  Bethany  near  Jerusalem,  and 
 who  enjoyed  Christ's  particular  friendship. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  proof  did  He  give  of  that  friendship  ? 
 
 A.  He  visited  him,  wept  over  him  when  dead,  and  raised  him  to  life 
 again. 
 
 3.  Q.  Who  were  the  two  sisters  of  Lazarus  ? 
 A.  Martha  and  Mary. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  is  said  of  Martha  2 
 
 A.  That  she  paid  more  attention  to  the  entertaining  of  Christ  in  the 
 family  and  less  to  His  instructive  discourse  than  was  proper. 
 
 5.  Q.  And  what  is  said  of  Mary  ? 
 
 A.  She  was  more  attentive  to  what  Christ  said,  and  diligently  minded 
 the  one  thing  needful. 
 
 §  16.  Concerning  Eutyclius. — Acts  xx. 
 1.  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  who  was  Eutychus  ? 
 
•316  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECmST.  [PAET  L 
 
 A.  He  was  a  young  man  wlio  slept  under  a  good  sermon. 
 
 2.  Q.  Who  was  the  preacher  when  he  so  fell  asleep  ? 
 A.  The  apostle  Paul. 
 
 3.  Q.  Where  was  it  at  that  St  Paul  then  preached  ? 
 
 A.  In  an  upper  chamber,  which  was  weU-hghted,  at  a  place  called  Troa?. 
 
 4.  Q.  At  what  time  did  he  preach  ? 
 
 A.  When  it  was  late  in  the  evening,  on  the  first  day  of  the  week,  which 
 is  the  Christian  Sabbath. 
 
 5.  Q.  And  what  happened  to  him  when  he  slept  so  imder  the  sermon  ? 
 A.  From  the  window  in  which  he  sat,  which  was  in  the  third  loft,  he  fell 
 
 down,  and  was  taken  up  dead. 
 
 6.  Q.  And  did  he  continue  dead,  as  might  be  expected  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  when  Paul  went  down  and  embraced  him  he  revived,  which 
 was  a  great  comfort  to  them  all,  while  it  was  a  solemn  warning  against 
 drowsiness  in  Di^^ne  worship. 
 
 §  17.  Concerning  Timothy. 
 
 1.  Q.  Can  you  tell  me  who  was  Timothy  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Eunice,  and  the  grandson  of  Lois. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  he  remarkable  for  when  a  chdd  ? 
 A.  For  his  knowledge  of  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
 
 3.  Q.  Had  he  grace  as  well  as  knowledge  ? 
 
 A.  St  Paul  was  persuaded  he  had  unfeigned  faith. 
 
 4.  Q.  And  what  became  of  him  when  he  was  grown  up  ? 
 
 A.  He  became  a  pi-eacher  of  the  gospel,  and  St  Paul  was  very  fond  of  him. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  was  his  distinguishing  character  as  a  gospel  minister  ? 
 
 ^  A.  He  was  remarkably  faithful,  and  free  from  selfish  ends  in  the  great 
 work. 
 
THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST. 
 
 PAET  THE  SECOND. 
 
 CLASS  I. 
 THE  SCRIPTURE  CATECHISM; 
 
 '        OR, 
 
 A  FAMILIAR  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  DIVINE 
 
 DISPENSATIONS. 
 
 §  1 .  Of  the  creation.  §  2.  Of  the  state  of  the  world  when  finished,  particularly 
 man.  §  3,  4.  From  Adam  to  Noah.  §  5-13.  From  Noah  to  Moses.  §  14-41. 
 From  Moses  to  Solomon.  §  42-56.  From  Solomon  to  Malachi.  §  57-77. 
 From  Malachi  to  John  the  apostle.* 
 
 §  1.  Of  the  creation  of  all  things,  and  the  day  of  rest. 
 
 1.  What  was  the  first  clay's  work  of  ci'eation  ?     Gen.  i.  1-5. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  second  day's  work  of  creation  ?     Gen.  i.  6-8. 
 
 *  The  Scripture  history  naturally  divides  itself  into  the  five  foEowing  general 
 periods : — 
 
 Period  I.  From  Adam  to  Noah ;  or,  from  the  creation  to  the  deluge,         .     1656 
 „      II.  From  Noah  to  Moses ;  or,  from  the  deluge  to  Israel's  egress  from 
 
 Egypt,  when  it  became  a  distinct  state,  .  .  .       857 
 
 Carry  forward,         2513 
 
318  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  11. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  third  day's  work  ?     Gen.  i.  9-13. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  fourth  day's  work  1     Gen.  i.  14-]  9. 
 
 5.  What  was  the  work  of  the  fifth  day  ?     Gen.  i.  20-23. 
 
 6.  What  was  the  work  of  the  sixth  day  ?     Gen.  i.  24-31. 
 
 7.  What  is  remarked  of  the  seventh  day  ?    Gen.  ii.  2,  3. 
 
 §  2.  Of  the  state  of  the  world  when  finished ;  particularly 
 
 man. 
 
 1.  What  is  observed  of  the  state  of  the  creation,  on  the  third,  fourth, 
 and  fifth  days  ?     Gen.  i.  10,  12,  18,  21,  25. 
 
 2.  At  the  close  of  the  woi'k  of  creation,  on  the  sixth  day,  what  was  God's 
 remark  on  the  whole  ?     Geu.  i.  31. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  original  state  and  dignity  of  man  ?     Gen.  i.  26-28. 
 
 4.  What   gi-ants  and  privileges  did  God  originally  favour  man  with  ? 
 Gen.  i.  29,  30. 
 
 §  3.  Of  Adam  and  Eve  ;  their  disobedience,  and  what 
 followed  it. 
 
 1.  Of  what  materials  were  the  bodies  of  Adam  and  Eve  made  ?    Gen.  ii, 
 7,  21,  22. 
 
 2.  When  the  serijent,  as  the  instrament  of  Satan,  accosted  the  woman, 
 what  conversation  passed  between  them  ?     Gen.  iii.  1-5. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  immediate  consequence  of  Adam  and  Eve  eating  the 
 forbidden  fruit  ?     Gen.  iii.  7,  8. 
 
 4.  What  was  God's  address  to  Adam,  to  Eve,  and  to  the  serpent  respec- 
 tively, in  consequence  of  the  first  transgression  ?     Gen.  iii.  9-19. 
 
 5.  What  was  God's  appointment  concerning  man  in  his  fallen  state? 
 Gen.  iii.  23,  24. 
 
 §  4.  Of  the  patriarchs  from  Adam  to  NoaL 
 
 1.  What  were  the  oflferings  that  Cain  and  Abel  brought  to  the  Lord, 
 and  how  were  they  received  ?     Gen.  iv.  3-5. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  immediate  punishment  of  Cain,  when  he  slew  his 
 brother  Abel  ?     Gen.  iv.  11-16. 
 
 3.  How  old  were  Adam,  Seth,  and  Enos,  respectively,  when  they  died  ? 
 Gen.  V.  3-11. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  character  and  end  of  Enoch  ?     Gen.  v.  21-24. 
 
 Brought  forward,       2513 
 Peeiod  III.  From  Moses  to  Solomon;  or,  from  Israel's  egress  to  the  partition 
 
 of  the  Jewish  kingdom  into  that  of  Judah  and  of  Israel,  .     516 
 
 „       IV.  From  Solomon  to  Malaehi ;  or,  from  the  partition  of  the  king- 
 dom to  the  close  of  the  Old  Testament,  .  .  .     578 
 „         V.  From  Malaehi  to  John  the  apostle ;  or,  from  the  close  of  the  Old 
 
 Testament  to  the  close  of  the  New  Testament,  .  .493 
 
 4100 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCEIPTTJEE  CATECHISM.  319 
 
 5.  How  old  were  Methuselah,  Lameoh,  and  Noah  when  they  died  ? 
 Gen.  V.  25, 32,  ix.  28,  29. 
 
 §  5.  Of  Noah  and  the  dehige,  with  the  causes  and  conse- 
 quences of  it. 
 
 1.  What  was  the  moral  and  religious  state  of  the  world  in  the  days  of 
 Noah?     Gen.  vi.  5,  11-13. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  character  of  Noah  ?     Gen.  vii.  1,  5,  viii.  20,  ix.  20,  21. 
 
 3.  What  were   the  materials,  dimensions,  and  form   of  Noah's  ark? 
 Gen.  vi.  14-16. 
 
 4.  What  was  preserved  with  Noah  in  the  ark,  and  what  perished  ? 
 Gen.  vi.  17-22,  vii.  throughout. 
 
 5.  How  long  did  the  deluge  continue  ?    Gen.  vii.  11,  viii.  13,  14. 
 
 6.  What  method  did  Noah  take  to  know  if  the  waters  were  abated  from 
 off  the  face  of  the  ground  ?     Gen.  viii.  6-12. 
 
 7.  What  covenant  token  did  God  give  to  Noah,  after  the  flood  ?    Gen. 
 ix.  12-17. 
 
 §  6.  Of  the  patriarchs  from  Noah  to  Abraham. 
 
 1.  How  many  sons  each  had  Japheth,  Ham,  and  Shem  ?    Gen.  x.  2,  6,  22. 
 
 2.  What  x^Eirt  of  the  world  did  Japheth  and  his  posterity  inhabit  ? 
 Gen.  X.  5. 
 
 3.  Whose  son  and  grandson  was  Nimrod,  what  his  character  and  his 
 dominions  1    Gen.  x.  6,  8-10. 
 
 4.  Whose  son,  grandson,  and  brother  was  Peleg  ;  and  what  remarkable 
 thing  happened  in  his  days  ?     Gen.  s.  24,  25. 
 
 5.  At  what  place,  and  by  what  means,  was  the  one  language  of  the 
 descendants  of  Noah  confounded  ?     Gen.  xi.  1-9. 
 
 6.  How  old  were  Shem,  Arphaxad,  Salah,  and  Eber  when  they  died  ? 
 Gen.  xi.  10-17. 
 
 7.  How  old  were  Peleg,  Reu,  Serug,  Nahor,  and  Terah  when  they  died  ? 
 Gen.  xi.  18-26. 
 
 §  7.  Of  Abraham  and  Sarah,  and  their  family. 
 
 1.  Who   were   the  father,   grandfather,   and  brothers    of  Abraham? 
 Gen.  xi.  24-27. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  first  promise  that  God  gave  to  Abraham  ?    Gen.  xii.  1-3. 
 
 3.  What   happened  to   Abraham  and  Sarah   when   in   Egypt?     Gen. 
 xii.  10-20. 
 
 4.  Upon  what  occasion  was  it  that  Abraham  and  Lot  parted,  and  where 
 did  they  both  settle  ?     Gen.  xiii.  7-12. 
 
 5.  By  what  means  did  Abraham  rescue  Lot  and  his  property  from  the 
 four  kings?    Gen.  xiv.  14-16. 
 
 6.  What  passed  between  Abraham  and  Melchizedek,  on  his  returning 
 from  the  slaughter  of  the  kings  ?     Gen.  xiv.  18-20  ;  Heb.  vii.  1-10. 
 
 7.  By  what  sign   was  Abraham   certified  that    his  posterity  should 
 inherit  the  land  of  Carman  ?     Gen.  xv.  7-18. 
 
320  THE  EVANGBILICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  U. 
 
 8.  Wiat  advice  and  encouragement  did  tlie  angel  of  the  Lord  give  to 
 Hagar,  vrheu  gone  out  of  Abraham's  family  ?     Gen.  xvi.  7-13. 
 
 9.  Who  were  the  persons  that  Abraham  circumcised,  according  to  God's 
 command  ?     Gen.  xvii.  1(V14,  23-27. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  did  Abraham  entertain  the  strangers  that  appeai-ed 
 to  him  in  the  plains  of  Mamre  ?     Gen.  xvui.  1-3. 
 
 11.  By  what  arguments  did  Abraham  plead  Tvith  the  Lord  in  behalf  of 
 Sodom  and  Gomorrah  ?     Gen.  xviii.  23-33. 
 
 12.  What  passed  between  Abraham  and  Sarah,  and  AbLmelech,  Mug  of 
 Gerar  ?     Genesis  xx.  thi-oughout. 
 
 13.  In  what  manner  did  Abraham  and  Sai-ah  deal  'nith  Ishmael  and  his 
 mother,  and  what  was  the  event  ?     Gen.  xxi.  9-21. 
 
 14.  What  was  Abimelech's  covenant  with  Abraham,  and  how  was  it 
 ratified  ?     Gen.  xxi.  22-34. 
 
 15.  How  did  God  tempt  or  try  Abi-aham  with  respect  to  his  son  Isaac, 
 and  what  was  the  consequence  ?     Gen.  xxii.  1-19. 
 
 16.  AYhat  is  related  of  Sarah's  age,  death,  and  burial  ?     Gen.  xxiii. 
 
 17.  What  charge  did  Abraham  give  his  servant  about  getting  his  son 
 Isaac  a  wife  ;  and  what  success  attended  him  ia  that  journey  ?     Gen.  xsiv. 
 
 IS.  What  is  recorded  of  Abraham's  age,  death,  and  bm'ial  ?  Gen. 
 XXV.  7-10. 
 
 §  8.  Of  Lot  and  his  family. 
 
 1.  In  what  manner  were  the  two  angels,  who  came  to  Lot  in  Sodom, 
 entertained  by  him,  and  by  the  men  of  the  city  ;  and  what  was  the  event  ? 
 Gen.  xix.  1-11. 
 
 2.  What  advice  did  the  angels  give  to  Lot  and  his  family  with  respect  to 
 Sodom  ?     Gen.  xix.  12-23. 
 
 3.  What  became  of  Sodom  aud  Gtoniorrah  ?     Gen.  xix.  23,  24. 
 
 4.  What  became  of  Lot  and  his  wife  after  this  wonderful  deliverance  ? 
 Gen.  xix.  25-30. 
 
 §  9.  Of  Isaac  and  EebekaL 
 
 1.  Was  thei-e  anything  remai-kable  belonging  to  the  birth  and  infancy  of 
 Isaac  ?     Gen.  xsi.  1-S. 
 
 2.  How  was  Isaac  employed  when  he  saw  Eebetah  coming  from  Meso- 
 potamia to  be  his  \vif  e,  and  what  was  the  manner  of  this  interview  ?  Gen. 
 xxiv.  62-67. 
 
 3.  Who  were  the  relations  of  Eebekah  1     Gen.  xxiv.  24-47,  xxv.  20. 
 
 4  What  befell  Isaac  and  Eebekah  whUe  they  dwelt  at  Gerai-  ?  Cen. 
 xxvi.  1-22. 
 
 5.  What  comforts  and  troubles  did  they  meet  with  at  Beersheba  ?  Gfen. 
 xxvi.  23-35. 
 
 6.  What  was  the  age  of  Isaac  when  he  died  ?  where  and  by  whom  was  he 
 bm-ied  ?     Gen.  xxxv.  27-29. 
 
 §  1 0.  Of  Esau  and  Jacob,  Leali  and  KaclieL 
 
 1.  \Miat  was  there  remarkable  in  the  birth  aud  chai-acter  of  Esau,  and  of 
 Jacob  >.     Gen.  xxv.  21-28. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  321 
 
 2.  In  what  manner  did  Esau  sell  Ms  birthright  to  Jacob  his  brother  ? 
 Gen.  xxv.  29-34. 
 
 3.  Can  you  relate  how  Esau  was  sent  by  his  father  for  venison,  and  how 
 Jacob  was  instructed  by  his  mother,  and  obtained  his  father's  blessing  1 
 Gen.  sxvii.  1-29. 
 
 4.  How  did  Esau  resent  the  disappointment,  and  how  did  Jacob  avoid 
 his  resentment  ?     Gen.  xxvii.  30-45. 
 
 5.  When  Jacob  went  from  Beersheba  toward  Haran,  what  remarkable 
 dream  or  vision  had  he  ?     Gen.  xxviii. 
 
 6.  How  many  children  had  Leah,  and  what  were  their  names  ?  Gen. 
 xxix.  31-35,  XXX.  17-21. 
 
 7.  How  many  children  had  Eachel,  and  what  were  their  names  ?  Gen. 
 XXX.  22-24,  XXXV.  16-18. 
 
 8.  What  was  Jacob's  covenant  with  Laban  ?     Gen.  xxx.  27-36. 
 
 9.  What  was  the  reason  of  Jacob's  leaving  Laban  ?     Gen.  xxxi.  1-21. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  did  Jacob  prepare  to  meet  Esau  ?     Gen.  xxxii.  1-23. 
 
 11.  How  was  Jacob  employed  when  he  was  left  alone?  Gen.  xxxii. 
 24-32. 
 
 12.  Can  you  relate  the  manner  in  which  Jacob  and  Esau  met  ?  Gen. 
 xxxiii. 
 
 13.  What  was  the  occasion  of  Jacob  ending  his  days  in  Egypt  1    Gen.  xlv. 
 
 §  11.  Of  the  twelve  patriarchs,  the  sons  of  Jacob. 
 
 1.  Wherein  was  the  conduct  of  Simeon  and  Levi,  the  second  and  third 
 sons  of  Jacob,  criminal?     Gen.  xxxiv.  25-31. 
 
 2.  How  came  Joseph,  Jacob's  eleventh  son,  to  be  envied  by  his  brethren  ? 
 Gen.  xxxvii.  1-11. 
 
 3.  In  what  manner  did  his  brethren  conspire  against  Joseph,  and  by 
 what  means  did  he  go  to  Egypt  ?     Gen.  xxxvii.  12-36. 
 
 4.  What  family  had  Judah,  and  what  was  there  amiss  in  his  conduct  ? 
 (xen.  xxxviii. 
 
 5.  Which  of  Jacob's  ten  elder  sons  appears  to  be  the  most  humane  and 
 considerate  1    Gen.  xxxvii.,  xlii. 
 
 6.  Which  of  them  was  detained  as  a  hostage  in  Egypt  by  his  brother 
 Joseph  ?     Gen.  xlii. 
 
 7.  Which  of  the  brothers  went  surety  for  Benjamin,  the  youngest  ? 
 Gen.  xliii.  8-14. 
 
 8.  What  sons  had  Reuben,  Simeon,  and  Levi,  when  they  went  with  their 
 father  to  Egypt  ?     Gen.  xlvi.  8-11. 
 
 9.  What  sons  had  Judah,  Issaohar,  and  Zebulun,  when  they  went  to 
 Egypt  ?    Gen.  xlvi.  12-15. 
 
 10.  What  sons  had  Gad  and  Asher  when  they  went  to  Egypt  ?  Gen. 
 xlvi.  16-18. 
 
 11.  What  sons  had  Joseph  in  Egypt,  and  Benjamin  when  he  came  to 
 Egypt.     Gen.  xlvi.  19-22. 
 
 12.  What  sons  had  Dan  and  Naphtali?     Gen.  xlvi.  23-27. 
 
 13.  What  was  the  prophetic  character  of  Beuben,  Simeon,  and  Levi  1 
 Gen.  xlix.  3-7. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  X 
 
322  THE  EVAJSFGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 14.  What  was  the  prophetic  character  of  Judah,  Zebuhui,  and  Issachar  ? 
 Gen.  xlis.  8-15. 
 
 15.  What  was  the  prophetic  character  of  Dan,  Gad,  Asher,  and  Naphtali  ? 
 Gen.  xlix.  16-21. 
 
 16.  What  was  the  prophetic  chai-acter  of  Joseph  and  Benjamin?  Gen. 
 xh'x.  22-33. 
 
 §  12.  Of  Joseph  and  his  family. 
 
 1.  AYhat  was  the  occasion  of  Joseph  being  put  in  the  king's  prison  in 
 Egypt  ?     Gen.  xxxix. 
 
 2.  What  befell  Joseph  while  in  the  pi'ison  ?     Gen.  xl. 
 
 3.  By  what  means  was  Joseph  released  from  the  prison,  and  advanced  to 
 honour  and  authority  ?     Gen.  xli. 
 
 4.  In  what  manner  was  Joseph's  di-eam  concerning  his  own  sheaf  and 
 his  brethren's  fulfilled  ?     Gen.  xsxvii.  5-8,  xhi.  3-9. 
 
 5.  How  did  Joseph  behave  at  first  to  his  brethren  to  try  them  ?  Gen. 
 xlii.-xliv. 
 
 6.  In  what  manner  did  he  make  himself  known  to  his  brethren,  and 
 what  was  the  consequence  of  it  ?     Gen.  xlv. 
 
 7.  When  Joseph,  with  his  two  sons  Ephraim  and  Manasseh,  paid  a  visit 
 to  his  father  Jacob  a  little  before  his  death,  what  passed  between  them  ? 
 Gen.  xlviii. 
 
 8.  Can  you  relate  in  what  manner  Joseph  took  care  of  his  father's 
 funeral  ?     Gen.  1.  1-14. 
 
 9.  How  did  Joseph  behave  to  his  brethren  after  his  father's  death  ? 
 Gen.  1.  15-21. 
 
 §  13.  Of  the  Israelites  from  Joseph  to  Moses. 
 
 1.  To  what  bondage  were  the  Israelites  put,  when  Joseph  was  dead,  and 
 liis  good  services  forgotten  ?     Exod.  i.  7-14. 
 
 2.  What  tyrannical  method  did  the  king  of  Egypt  \ise  to  lessen  their 
 number?     Exod.  i.  15-21. 
 
 3.  When  the  expedient  failed,  what  other  method  did  he  take  to  prevent 
 their  increase  ?     Exod.  i.  22. 
 
 §  14.  Of  Moses  and  Aaron. 
 
 1.  By  what  means  came  Moses  to  be  brought  up  in  the  com't  of  Pharaoh, 
 since  the  king  was  so  great  an  enemy  to  the  Israelites  ?     Exod.  ii.  1-10 . 
 
 2.  How  came  Moses  to  leave  Egypt,  and  to  dwell  in  the  land  of  Midian  ? 
 Exod.  ii.  11-22. 
 
 3..  How  came  he  to  leave  Midian,  and  to  attempt  so  great  a  work  as  the 
 deliverance  of  Israel  from  Egypt  ?    Exod.  iii.  1-12. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  commission  of  Moses,  as  God's  ambassador  to  Pharaoh  ? 
 Exod.  iii.  13-22. 
 
 5.  When  Moses  objected  to  so  arduous  a  task,  how  did  God  remove  his 
 scruples  ?     Exod.  iv.  1-17. 
 
 6.  How  came  Aaron  and  the  Israelites  to  be  acquainted  with  theu'  in- 
 tended deliverance?     Exod.  iv.  27-31. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCKIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  323 
 
 7.  What  success  did  Moses  and  Aaron  meet  with  when  they  delivered 
 their  commission  to  Pharaoh  1    Exod.  v. 
 
 8.  When  Moses  complains  to  the  Lord  of  their  iU  success  with  Pharaoh 
 and  with  Israel,  what  further  encouragement  and  instructions  are  given 
 them  1     Exod  vi.  1-13,  vii.  1-9. 
 
 9.  What  were  the  miracles  performed  by  Moses  and  Aaron,  which  the 
 magicians  of  Egypt  imitated  1     Exod.  vii.  10-25,  viii.  1-7. 
 
 10.  What  were  the  miracles  performed  by  Moses  and  Aaron  which  the 
 magicians  could  not  mimic,  and  what  effect  had  they  upon  Pharaoh  t 
 Exod.  viii.  16-32,  ix.-xii.  29-33. 
 
 11.  What  ceremony  did  God,  by  Moses,  institute,  to  commemorate  their 
 deliverance  out  of  Egypt,  and  how  was  it  observed  1  Exod.  xii.  3-28, 
 43-51,  xiii.  1-16. 
 
 12.  What  number  of  Israelites  was  there  in  Egypt  when  they  began 
 their  march  under  the  conduct  of  Closes  and  Aaron  1    Exod.  xii.  37-39. 
 
 13.  How  long  had  the  nation  been  in  Egypt  before  this  deliverance  ? 
 Exod.  xii.  40-42. 
 
 14.  By  what  course,  and  in  what  manner,  did  God  lead  the  people,  with 
 Moses  and  Aaron  before  them,  to  the  Eed  Sea  1    Exod.  xiii.  17-22. 
 
 15.  By  what  means  did  Moses  and  the  people  escape  the  persecuting 
 rage  of  Pharaoh  and  his  host  ?    Exod.  xiv.,  xv. 
 
 16.  What  advice  did  Jethro  give  to  Moses  concerning  Israel  1    Exod.  xviii. 
 
 §  15.  Of  the  Mosaic  law  first  enacted. 
 
 1.  What  laws  did  God  himself  deliver  to  Israel  in  the  wilderness  of 
 Sinai,  and  how  were  the  people  prepared  to  receive  them  ?     Exod.  xix.,  xx. 
 
 2.  What  law  did  God  give  by  Moses  respecting  temporary  altars  l 
 Exod.  XX.  24-26. 
 
 3.  What  laws  were  given  by  Moses  concerning  servants  'I  Exod. 
 xxi.  1-11. 
 
 4.  What  crimes  were  to  be  punished  with  death?  Exod.  xxi.  12-17, 
 xxii.  18-20. 
 
 5.  What  further  laws  wer^  given  respecting  those  who  would  strike  and 
 hm"t  others,  and  what  were  the  punishments  inflicted?     Exod.  xxi.  18-27. 
 
 6.  What  laws  were  given  respecting  goring  oxen  ?     Exod.  xxi.  28-36. 
 
 7.  What  laws  were  enacted  further  concerning  theft,  fire,  things  in- 
 trusted, or  borrowed,  and  seduction  1     Exod.  xxii.  1-17,  25-27. 
 
 8.  What  laws  were  enacted  respecting  strangers,  the  widow  and  father- 
 less, and  the  magistrates  ?    Exod.  xxii.  21-24,  28,  xxiii.  9. 
 
 9.  What  laws  were  given  about  false  reports,  the  practice  of  the  mul- 
 titude, the  beasts  of  enemies,  tlie  cause  of  the  poor,  and  bribery  ?  Exod. 
 xxiii.  1-8. 
 
 10.  What  injunction  were  given  concerning  the  seventh  year,  and  the 
 seventh  day?     Exod.  xxiii.  10-12. 
 
 11.  How  did  Moses  preserve  these  laws  for  the  use  of  the  people? 
 Exod.  xxiv.  3-7. 
 
 12.  Who  attended  Moses  when  he  was  called  of  God  to  receive  the  laws 
 of  the  tabernacle,  and  the  tables  of  stone  ?     Exod.  xxiv. 
 
32-i  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 §  IG.  Of  the  directions  God  gave  to  Moses  to  make  the 
 tabernacle. 
 
 1.  What  materials  for  the  tabernacle  did  God  accept  as  a  voluntary 
 offering  from  the  people  ?    Exod.  xxv.  1-9. 
 
 2.  What  -were  tlie  appointed  materials  and  the  form  of  the  ark,  the 
 mercy-seat,  and  the  cherubim  1    Exod.  xxv.  10-22. 
 
 3.  What  were  the  prescribed  substance  and  form  of  the  table  of  shew- 
 bread,  the  candlestick,  and  the  altar  of  incense  ?  Exod.  xxv.  23-40,  xxx. 
 1-10. 
 
 4.  What  were  the  prescribed  matter  and  form  of  the  inner  curtains  and 
 outer  coverings  of  the  tabernacle  ?    Exod.  xxvi.  1-14. 
 
 5.  What  were  to  be  the  nimiber,  size,  and  form  of  the  boards  and  bars, 
 or  solid  parts  of  the  tabernacle,  with  the  separating  vails  ?  Exod.  xxvi. 
 15-37. 
 
 6.  What  were  to  be  the  matter,  size,  and  form  of  the  altar  of  sacrifices, 
 the  com't  of  the  tabernacle,  and  its  hangings?     Exod.  xxvii.  1-19. 
 
 7.  What  provision  was  to  be  made  for  supplying  the  lamp  or  golden 
 candlestick  which  was  to  burn  always  ?     Exod.  xxvii.  20,  21. 
 
 §  17.  Of  directions  concerning  the  jiriesthood. 
 
 1.  Who  were  the  first  persons  that  were  appointed  to  be  priests,  and 
 ■what  were  their  garments,  the  high  priest's  ephod  with  its  precious 
 stones  1    Exod.  xxviii.  1-14. 
 
 2.  What  were  the  breastplate,  the  robe,  and  the  mitre  ?  Exod.  xxviii. 
 15-39. 
 
 3.  What  were  the  common  priests'  vestments  ?    Exod.  xxviii.  40-43. 
 
 4.  What  were  the  directions  given  for  the  consecration  of  the  priests, 
 and  the  altar  ?    Exod.  xxix.  1-37,  Lev.  viii. 
 
 §  18.  Of  the  prescribed  sacrifices  and  offerings. 
 
 1 .  What  daily  sacrifices  were  the  priests  to  ofter  ?    Exod.  xxix.  38—42. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  appointed  daily  offering  on  the  table  of  incense  ? 
 Exod.  XXX.  6-10. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  ransom  money  which  the  people  were  to  offer,  and  to 
 what  end  ?     Exod.  xxx.  11-16. 
 
 4.  How  were  Aaron  and  his  sons  to  jsrepare  themselves  for  their  offer- 
 ings and  ministrations  ?     Exod.  xxx.  17-21. 
 
 5.  What  directions  were  given  for  making  the  sacred  anointing  oil,  and 
 the  incense  for  the  golden  altar  ?     Exod.  xxx.  22-38. 
 
 6.  What  further  laws  did  God  give  Moses,  when  he  spake  to  him  out  of 
 the  tabernacle  of  the  congregation,  particularly  concerning  burnt-offerings  ? 
 Lev.  i,  vi.  8-13,  vii. 
 
 7.  What  were  the  matter  and  the  manner  of  the  meai^ofierings  which 
 were  offered  by  themselves,  as  unconnected  with  animal  oblations  ?  Lev. 
 ii.  1-11,  vi.  14-23,  vii. 
 
 8.  What  were  the  matter  and  the  manner  of  voluntary  offerings  of  the 
 first-fruits  ?     Lev.  ii.  12-16. 
 
 9.  What  was  the  law  of  peace-offerings  ?     Lev.  iii.,  vii. 
 
PABT  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUKH  CATECHISM.  325 
 
 10.  What  was  the  law  of  sin-offerings  ?    Lev.  iv.,  vi.  24-30,  vii. 
 
 11.  What  was  the  law  of  trespass-offerings?    Lev.  v.,  vi.  1-7,  vii. 
 
 12.  In  what  manner  were  these  laws,  concerning  sacrifices  and  offerings, 
 first  put  in  practice  1  and  what  was  there  very  remarkable  that  attended 
 it?     Lev.  ix. 
 
 13.  What  part  of  the  offerings  were  prescribed  to  the  priests  for  food? 
 Lev.  vii.  22-27,  x.  12-20. 
 
 §  19.  Of  meats  clean  and  unclean. 
 
 1.  What  laws  were  prescribed  to  the  Israelites  at  large  with  respect  to 
 food  ;  particularly  what  cattle  wei-e  deemed  clean  ?     Lev.  xi.  1-8. 
 
 2.  What  fishes  were  clean,  or  to  be  eaten  ?    Lev.  xi.  9-12. 
 
 3.  What  fowls,  flying  insects,  and  creeping  things  were  pronounced 
 unclean  to  them  ?     Lev.  xi.  13-24,  29,  30,  41-44. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  law  with  respect  to  eating  of  blood  ?  Lev.  vii.  26,  27, 
 xvii.  10-16. 
 
 §  20.  Of  purifying  rites. 
 
 1.  How  was  the  purification  of  men  and  things  for  their  consecration 
 performed?    Exod.  xl.  9-15. 
 
 2.  How  were  men  and  things,  made  impure  by  the  carcases  of  unclean 
 animals,  purified  ?     Lev.  xi.  24-40. 
 
 3.  What  was  required  of  a  woman,  after  child-birth,  for  her  purification  ? 
 Lev.  xii.  6,  8. 
 
 4.  How  were  persons  and  things  purified  from  the  plague  of  leprosy  ? 
 Lev.  xiv. 
 
 5.  How  were  other  pollutions  of  the  flesh  purified  ?    Lev.  xv.  29,  30. 
 
 6.  What  was  the  great  annual  purification  of  the  Jews,  and  how  was  it 
 performed?     Lev.  xvi. 
 
 §  21.  Of  sundry  holy  times :  sabbaths,  feasts,  and  the 
 jubilee,  &c. 
 
 1.  Wherein  consists  the  great  law  of  the  weekly  Sabbath  ?  Exod.  xx. 
 8-11,  xxiii.  12,  xxxi.  12-18,  xxxv.  1--3,  Lev.  xxiii.  1-3. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  law  of  the  Sabbatical  year  ?  Exod.  xxiii.  10-13  ;  Lev. 
 XXV.  1-7,  20-22. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  feast  of  unleavened  bread?  Exod.  xii.  15-20;  Lev. 
 xxiii.  6-8  ;  Num.  xxviii.  16-25. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  feast  of  Pentecost,  (or  the  fiftieth  day,)  otherwise  called 
 the  feast  of  harvest  and  of  weeks  ?  Lev.  xxiii.  15-25  ;  Exod.  xxiii.  16 ; 
 Dent.  xvi.  9-12,  16. 
 
 5.  What  was  the  feast  of  trumpets,  and  how  was  it  observed  ?  Lev.  xxiii. 
 23-25  ;  Num.  xxix.  1-6. 
 
 6.  What  was  the  feast  of  universal  atonement,  and  how  observed  ?  Lev. 
 xxiii.  26-32  ;  Num.  xxix.  7-11. 
 
 7.  How  was  the  feast  of  tabernacles  to  be  observed  ?  Lev.  xxiii.  33-44  ; 
 Num.  xxix.  12-40.. 
 
 8.  How  was  the  year  of  jubilee  to  be  observed  ?     Lev.  xxv.  8-17. 
 
326  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  II. 
 
 §  22.  Of  the  miscellaneous  laws. 
 
 1.  What  law  was  given  about  reaping  and  gleaning  ?     Lev.  sxix.  9,  10. 
 
 2.  AVhat  was  the  law  respecting  fruit  trees  ?     Lev.  xxix.  23-25. 
 
 3.  What  laws  were  given  concerning  tale-bearing,  reproving,  bearing  a 
 grudge,  and  wizards  ?     Lev.  xxix.  16-18,  31  ;  xx.  6,  27. 
 
 4.  What  laws  were  given  concerning  the  aged  and  the  stranger  ?     Lev. 
 XX.  32-34. 
 
 5.  What  was  the  law  against  cursing  and  blasphemy  ?     Lev.  xxiv.  13-16. 
 
 6.  What  were  some  of  the  laws  of  retaliation?     Lev.  xxiv.  17-23. 
 
 7.  What  were  the  laws  of  dedicating  and  redeeming  persons  and  things  ? 
 Lev.  xxvii. 
 
 §  28.  Of  the  men  of  war,  their  number  and  order. 
 
 1.  What  was  God's  command  to  Moses  about  numbering  the  warlike  men 
 of  Israel '     Num.  i.  1-46. 
 
 2.  What  tribe  was  exempted  from  being  numbered  with  the  others,  and 
 why  ?    Num.  i.  47-54. 
 
 3.  In  what  order  were  the  Israelites  to  be  stationed  in  their  camp  ? 
 Num.  ii. 
 
 §  24.  Of  the  Levites  and  their  office.?. 
 
 1.  What  was  the  law  with  respect  to  the  aiapointment  of  the  Levites  ? 
 Num.  iii.  1-39. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  law  with  respect  to  exchanging  the  first-born  of  the 
 Hebrews  for  Levites  ?     Num.  iii.  40-51. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  appointed  service  of  the  Levites,  and  their  particular 
 charge  in  bearing  the  tabernacle  ?     Num.  iv. 
 
 §  25.  Of  the  passover. 
 
 1.  Wherein  consisted  the  institution  of  the  passover?    Exod.  xii.  1-14  ; 
 Num.  ix.  1-5. 
 
 2.  What  further  directions  concerning  it  did  Moses  give  to  the  elders  of 
 Israel  ?    Exod.  xii.  21-28. 
 
 3.  Who  were  to  partake  of  the  Passover  ?    Exod.  xii.  43-51. 
 
 4.  What  new  law  was  enacted  for  observing  the  passover  on  account  of 
 ceremonial  defilement?    Num.  ix.  6-14. 
 
 §  26.  Of  the  miraculous  cloud,  the  manna,  the  water  out  of 
 the  rock,  and  brazen  serpent. 
 
 1.  Wherein  consisted  the  privilege  of  the   miraculous   cloudy  pillar  ? 
 Exod.  xiii.  20-22,  xiv.  19,  20,  24  ;  Num.  xiv.  14  ;  Deut.  i.  33. 
 
 2.  How  did  the  Lord  miracidously  provide /oorf  for  the  camp  of  Israel  ? 
 Exod.  xvi.  1-15. 
 
 3.  AVhat  orders  were  given  concerning  it  ?    Exod.  xvi.  16-36. 
 
 4.  In  what  manner  did  God  provide  water  for  the  camp  of  Israel  in  the 
 wilderness  ?    Exod.  xvii.  1-7. 
 
 5.  What  happened  to  Jloses  and  Aaron  and  the  congregation  of  Israel 
 when  they  wanted  water  at  Meribah  ?     Num.  xx.  7-13. 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  327 
 
 6.  What  were  the  occasion  and  design  of  erecting  the  brazen  serpent  in 
 the  wilderness  ?     Num.  xsi.  4-9. 
 
 §  27.  The  rebellion  and  calamities  of  Israel  in  the  wilderness. 
 
 1.  Upon  what  pretence  did  tlie  Israelites  make  and  set  up  an  idolatrous 
 golden  calf  1    Exod.  xxxii.  1-6. 
 
 2.  What  iDassed  between  God  and  Moses  on  this  occasion  ?  Exod.  xxxii. 
 7-14. 
 
 3.  What  passed  between  Moses,  Joshua,  and  the  jjeople,  on  this  occasion  ? 
 Exod.  xxxii.  15-20. 
 
 4.  By  what  pretence  did  Aaron  excuse  himself?     Exod.  xxxii.  21-24. 
 
 5.  In  what  manner  did  this  rebellion  end  ?     Exod.  xxxii.  25-35. 
 
 6.  What  were  the  crime  and  the  punishment  of  Nadab  and  Abihu  1  Lev. 
 X.  1-7. 
 
 7.  What  was  the  consequence  of  the  people  comijlainiug  after  they 
 departed  from  the  mount  three  days'  journey  ?     Num.  xi.  1-3. 
 
 8.  What  followed  the  people's  murmuring  against  the  manna  and  for 
 want  of  flesh  1    Num.  xi.  4-35. 
 
 9.  When  Miriam  and  Aaron  spake  against  Moses,  what  followed  ? 
 Num.  xii. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  did  the  rebellion  of  the  Israelites  begin  and  ter- 
 minate ujjon  the  discouraging  report  of  the  spies  ?    Num.  xiv.  1-35. 
 
 11.  How  were  the  wicked  spies  dealt  with,  and  those  who  believed  their 
 false  report  ?     Num.  xiv.  36-45,  xxvi.  63-65. 
 
 12.  How  was  the  presum^jtuous  Sabbath-breaker  punished?  Num.  xv. 
 32-36. 
 
 13.  What  were  the  rebellion  and  the  punishment  of  Korah,  Dathan,  and 
 Abiram,  with  their  accomplices  1    Num.  xvi. 
 
 14.  How  were  the  Israelites  seduced  by  the  Moabites,  and  afterwards 
 punished  for  it  ?    Num.  xxv. 
 
 §  28.  Of  Balak  and  Balaam. 
 
 1.  What  were  the  import  and  the  effect  of  Balak,  king  of  Moab,  sending 
 his  first  messengers  to  Balaam,  the  sorcerer  of  Mesopotamia  ?  Num.  xxii. 
 1-14. 
 
 2.  What  were  the  import  and  the  success  of  the  seooud  message  of  Balak 
 to  Balaam  ?     Num.  xxii.  15-41. 
 
 3.  In  what  manner,  and  with  what  success,  did  Balak  and  Balaam  labom- 
 to  ruin  the  Israelites  ?    Num.  xxiii. 
 
 4.  How  was  Balak  finally  disappointed  by  Balaam  ?    Num.  xxiv. 
 
 §  29.  Of  the  affairs  of  Israel  from  the  appointment  of 
 Joshua  to  the  close  of  Moses's  administration. 
 
 1.  What  were  the  occasion  and  the  manner  of  Joshua  being  appointed  to 
 succeed  Moses,  as  the  leader  of  Israel?     Num.  xxvii.  12-23. 
 
 2.  In  what  manner,  and  for  what  reason,  did  the  children  of  Israel 
 punish  the  Midianites  ?     Num.  xxxi. 
 
328  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAJET  II. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  proposal  made  by  the  tribes  of  Reuben  and  Gad  to  Moses 
 concerning  a  settlement,  and  what  was  the  consequence  ?    Num.  ssxii. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  charge  the  Lord  give  to  Moses  concerning  the  Canaan- 
 ites  ?     Num.  xxxiii.  50-56  ;  Deut.  vii. 
 
 5.  What  directions  were  given  about  fixing  the  boundaries  of  Canaan  ? 
 Num.  xxxiv. 
 
 6.  When  Canaan  was  divided,  how  were  the  Levites  provided  for  ? 
 Num.  XXXV.  1-5. 
 
 7.  What  orders  were  given  to  Moses  concerning  the  cities  of  refuge,  and 
 for  whom  appointed?     Num.  xxxv.,  Deut.  iv.  41-43,  xix.  1-13. 
 
 §  SO.  Of  the  repetition  of  the  law  by  Moses,  his  dying 
 exhortations,  and  prophetic  blessings. 
 
 1.  What  ai'e  the  chief  things  of  which  Moses  reminds  the  people,  before 
 their  entrance  into  Canaan?     Deut.  i.-iii.,  ix.  7-29,  x.  1-11,  xi.  1-7. 
 
 2.  What  is  contained  in  the  solemn  charge  of  Moses  to  the  Israelites, 
 and  by  what  argument  does  he  enforce  it  ?  Deut.  iv.  1-40,  viii.,  x.  12-22, 
 xi. 
 
 3.  What  does  he  inculate  on  the  subject  of  family  religion,  and  educa- 
 tion ?     Deut.  vi.,  xi.  18-21. 
 
 4.  How  does  he  guard  them  against  idolatry  ?     Deut.  xiii.,  xvii.  2-7. 
 
 5.  What  directions  were  given  by  Moses  about  mourning,  food,  and 
 feasting  ?     Deut.  xiv. 
 
 6.  What  directions  were  given  with  re.sioect  to  debts,  the  poor,  and  bond- 
 servants ?     Deut.  XV.  1-18. 
 
 7.  What  does  jMoses  say  concerning  prophets  ?     Deut.  xviii.  15-22. 
 
 8.  What  military  directions  does  he  give  the  Hebrews  ?    Deut.  xx. 
 
 9.  How  were  stubborn  and  rebellious  children  to  be  dealt  with  ?  Deut. 
 xxi.  18-21. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  were  the  laws  to  be  made  more  public  on  their 
 entrance  into  Canaan  1    Deut.  xxvii.  1-10  ;  Josh.  viii.  32. 
 
 11.  How  were  their  consciences  alarmed,  and  their  affections  moved, 
 that  they  might  not  slight  the  Divine  laws  ?     Deut.  xxvii.  11-26,  xxviii. 
 
 12.  In  what  manner  did  the  Israelites  renew  their  covenant  with  God  ? 
 Deut.  xxix. 
 
 13.  What  peciiliar  encouragements  to  repentance  and  circumspection 
 does  Moses  give  at  the  close  of  his  long  public  exhortations  ?    Deut.  xxs. 
 
 14.  What  familiar  advice  does  he  give  with  respect  to  the  conquest 
 of  the  promised  land,  and  their  attention  to  the  written  laws?  Deut. 
 xxxi. 
 
 15.  What  were  the  instructions  principally  conveyed  to  Israel,  in  the 
 divine  song  which  Moses  addressed  to  them  a  little  before  his  death  ? 
 Deut.  xxxii. 
 
 16.  What  are  the  prophetic  blessings  pronounced  by  Moses  upon  the 
 Hebrew  tribes  ?    Deut.  xxxiii. 
 
 17.  What  account  have  we  of  the  death,  burial,  and  the  character  of 
 Moses  ?     Deut.  xxxiv. 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCKIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  329 
 
 §  31.  Of  Joshua,  and  the  passage  over  Jordan. 
 
 1.  What  evidence  had  Joshua  that  he  was  to  succeed  Moses  in  the 
 government  of  Israel  ?    Josh.  i.  1-9. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  first  step  Joshua  took  in  the  discharge  of  his  ofl&ce  ? 
 Josh.  i.  10-18. 
 
 3.  By  what  means  did  Joshua  procure  information  of  the  condition  of 
 Jericho,  and  what  was  the  result  ?     Josh.  ii. 
 
 4.  By  what  means  did  they  get  from  Shittim,  on  the  one  side  of  Jordan, 
 to  Gilgal  on  the  other  side  1    Josh,  iii.,  iv. 
 
 5.  What  tokens  of  the  Divine  favour  attended  Joshua  and  the  people 
 while  at  Gilgal  ?     Josh.  v. 
 
 §  32.  Of  subduing  the  Canaanites. 
 
 1.  In  what  manner  was  Jericho  besieged,  taken,  and  destroyed  1  Josh.  v. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  reason  that  a  detachment  of  Israelites  received  a  defeat 
 at  Ai '!  and  what  was  the  consequence  1     Josh.  vii. 
 
 3.  In  what  manner  was  Ai  finally  taken  and  demolished  ?    Josh.  viii. 
 1-29. 
 
 4.  What  solemn  transaction  took  place  on  mount  Ebal  ?    Josh.  vii.  30-35. 
 
 5.  What  reception  had  the  Gibeonites  when  they  came  to  the  Israelitish 
 camp  at  Gilgal  ?    Josh.  ix. 
 
 6.  Under  what  pretence  did  Adoni-zedec,  king  of  Jerusalem,  and  his 
 associates,  declare  war  against  Joshua,  and  what  followed  ?     Josh.  x.  1-27. 
 
 7.  What  other  conquests  were  made  by  Joshua  before  he  returned  unto 
 the  camp  at  Gilgal  ?     Josh.  x.  28-48. 
 
 8.  What  were  the  occasion  and  the  consequence  of  the  very  important 
 engagement  at  the  waters  of  Merom  ?     Josh.  xi. 
 
 9.  What  kingdoms  were  conquered  on  the  eastern,  and  also  on  the 
 western  side  of  Jordan,  for  a  settlement  to  Israel  1    Josh.  xii. 
 
 10.  What  kingdoms   of   Canaan   were   left  unconquered    by   Joshua  ? 
 Josh.  xiii.  1-6. 
 
 §  33.  Of  distributing  the  land  to  Israel. 
 
 1.  What  part  of  th6  conquered  country  was  assigned  to  the  Reubenites, 
 Gadites,  and  half-tribe  of  Manasseh  ?     Josh.  xiii.  8-33. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  inheritance  allotted  to  the  tribe  of  Levi  ?    Josh.  xiii. 
 14,  33. 
 
 3.  In  what  manner  was  the  land  divided  to  the  nine  tribes  and  half- 
 tribe  ?     Josh.  xiv.  1-5. 
 
 4.  What  part  of  the  conquered  country  did  Caleb  enjoy,  and  on  what 
 account  ?     Josh.  xiv.  6-15,  xv.  13-19. 
 
 5.  What  part  did  Judah  possess  1    Josh.  xv.  1-12,  63. 
 
 6.  What  part  did  the  children  of  Joseph,  Ephraim  and  Manasseh,  pos- 
 sess 1     Josh,  xvi.,  xvii. 
 
 7.  In  whose  lot  was  Shiloh,  and  how  long  did  the  tabernacle  stand  there  ? 
 Josh,  xviii.  1  ;  1  Sam.  iv. ;  Ps.  Ixxviii.  60. 
 
 8.  Where  was  the  lot  of  Benjamin  situated?     Josh,  xviii.  11. 
 
330  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 9.  Where  was  the  lot  of  Simeon  ?    Josh.  xix.  1,  9. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  were  the  Reubeuites,  and  the  Gadites,  and  the  half- 
 tribe  of  Manasseh  discharged  by  Joshua  ;  and  what  was  the  consequence  ? 
 Josh.  xxii. 
 
 §  oi.  Joshua's  exliortatiou  and  death. 
 
 1.  What  was  contained,  principally,  in  the  solemn  charge  Joshua  gave 
 to  the  Israelites  a  httle  before  his  death  ?     Josh,  xxiii. 
 
 2.  What  was  contained  in  his  farewell  address  to  all  the  tribes  convened 
 at  Shechem  ?    Josh.  xxiv. 
 
 3.  How  old  was  Joshua  when  he  died,  where  bm'ied,  and  what  circum- 
 stances attended  the  event  ?     Josh.  xxiv.  29-33. 
 
 §  35.  Of  tlie  Israelites,  from  Joshua  to  Samson. 
 
 1.  After  the  death  of  Joshua,  what  success  had  Judah,  Simeon,  and  Eph- 
 j-aim  in  extirpating  the  Canaanites  ?     Judg.  1. 
 
 2.  What  deliverance  was  wrought  for  Israel  by  means  of  Othniel,  and 
 how  came  they  to  want  his  aid?    Judg.  iii.  1-11. 
 
 3.  What  deliverance  was  wrought  for  Israel  by  Ehud  and  Shamgar  ;  and 
 how  came  they  to  want  their  aid  I    Judg.  iii.  12-30. 
 
 4  By  what  means  were  the  Israelites  delivered  from  the  oppression  of 
 the  Canaanites,  in  the  time  of  Deborah  ?     Judg.  iv. 
 
 5.  What  are  the  chief  topics  of  Deborah's  triumphal  song  ?     Judg.  v. 
 
 6.  What  services  did  Gideon  render  to  Israel  against  the  Midiauites,  and 
 by  what  steps  were  they  accomplished  ?    Judg.  vi.-viii. 
 
 7.  What  was  the  parable  of  Jotham,  and  how  was  it  verified  ?     Judg.  ix. 
 
 8.  What  was  the  deliverance  wi'ought  by  Jephthah,  and  what  gave  occa- 
 sion to  it  ?     Judg.  x.-xii. 
 
 §  36.  Of  the  Israelites,  from  Samson  to  Euth. 
 
 1.  What  remarkable  circumstances  preceded  the  birth  of  Samson  ? 
 Judg.  xiii. 
 
 2.  What  was  Samson's  riddle,  the  occasion  of  it,  its  explanation,  and 
 the  consequence  of  his  wife's  treacherous  cUscovery  of  it  ?     Judg.  xiv. 
 
 3.  How  did  Samson  retaliate  the  perfidiousness  of  his  wife's  family  ? 
 Judg.  XV.  1-5. 
 
 4.  How  did  he  revenge  the  cruelty  of  the  Philistines  to  his  wife's  family  ? 
 Judg.  XV.  6-20. 
 
 5.  By  what  steps  was  Samson  reduced  to  the  weakness  of  a  common 
 man  ?     Judg.  xvi.  1-20. 
 
 6.  What  became  of  him  after  he  was  thus  reduced  to  weakness  ?  Judg. 
 xvi  21-31. 
 
 7.  What  have  we  recorded  of  Mioah,  the  idolatrous  Ephraimite  ?  Judg. 
 xvii.,  xviii. 
 
 8.  What  remarkable  accoinit  have  we  of  a  certain  Levite  of  Mount 
 Ephraim,  and  his  concubine,  and  how  they  were  used  by  the  Gibeahites  ? 
 Judg.  xix. 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCKIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  331 
 
 9.  How  were  the  Benjamites  of  Gibeah,  and  the  whole  tribe  of  Benjamin 
 tliat  espoused  their  scandalous  cause,  treated  by  all  Israel  ?     Judg.  xxi. 
 
 10.  How  was  the  remnant  of  Benjamin  treated  by  their  victorious 
 brethren  ?    Judg.  xxi. 
 
 §  37.  Of  the  Israelites,  from  Euth  to  Saul. 
 
 1.  What  was  the  occasion  of  Ruth,  the  Moabitess,  going  to  live  at  Beth- 
 lehem ?     Euth  i. 
 
 2.  What  recej)tion  had  Kuth  at  Bethlehem,  from  Boaz,  her  husband's 
 kinsman  ?     Ruth  ii. 
 
 3.  How  came  Boaz  to  marry  Ruth,  while  another  had  a  px-ior  claim  to 
 her  ?    Euth  iv. 
 
 4.  What  is  recorded  of  Samuel's  parentage,  birth,  and  dedication  to 
 God  ?     1  Sam.  i. 
 
 5.  What  are  the  principal  things  contained  in  Hannah's  soliloquy  at  the 
 presentation  of  Samuel  ?     1  Sam.  ii.  1-10. 
 
 6.  What  is  recorded  of  Samuel's  childhood  and  early  youth  ?  1  Sam.  ii. 
 10,  18,  21,  26,  iii.  throughout. 
 
 7.  What  was  the  reason  why  God  denounced  judgments  and  ruin  on  the 
 family  of  Eli  ?     1  Sam.  ii.  12-36. 
 
 8.  In  what  manner  was  the  threatening  against  Hophni  and  Phineas,  the 
 sons  of  Eli,  executed  ?     1  Sam.  iv.  1-11. 
 
 9.  What  occasioned  the  death  of  Eli  and  his  daughtei'-in-law  ?  1  Sam. 
 iv.  12-22. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  were  the  Philistines  constrained  to  return  the  ark, 
 and  how  was  it  received  at  Beth-shemesh  ?     1  Sam.  v.,  vi.  1-18. 
 
 11.  How  came  the  ark  to  be  placed  at  Kirjath-jearim  ?  1  Sam.  vi.  19-21j 
 vii.  1,2. 
 
 12.  What  occasioned  the  Philistines  to  attack  Israel  at  Mizpeh,  and 
 what  was  the  consequence  1     1  Sam.  vii.  3-17. 
 
 13.  Under  what  pretence  did  the  Israelites  demand  a  king,  and  what 
 reply  did  God  make  by  Samuel  ?     1  Sam.  viii. 
 
 §  38.  Of  Saul  and  Jonathan. 
 
 1.  What  acoounf  have  we  of  Saul  prior  to  his  being  appointed  king? 
 1  Sam.  ix. 
 
 2.  By  what  steps  was  Saul  further  pointed  out  as  king,  and  fully  in- 
 augurated to  his  royal  office?     1  Sam.  x.,  xi.  14,  15. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  first  victory  obtained  by  Saul,  and  what  was  his  con- 
 duct towards  his  domestic  enemies  on  that  occasion?     1  Sam.  xi.  1-13. 
 
 4.  When  Samuel  resigned  the  government  of  Israel  in  favour  of  Saul, 
 and  made  his  monitory  address  to  the  people,  on  what  topics  did  he  insist  ? 
 1  Sam.  xii. 
 
 5.  By  what  means  were  Saul  and  his  subjects  brought  to  a  state  of  con- 
 fusion and  the  utmost  distress  ?     1  Sam.  xiii. 
 
 6.  How  came  Jonathan  into  a  state  of  imminent  danger  from  his  father, 
 and  how  was  he  delivered  ?     1  Sam.  xiv.  1-46. 
 
 7.  What  misconduct  of  Saul  caused  his  being  rejected  as  king,  and  what 
 was  the  conduct  of  Samuel  on  the  occasion  ?     1  Sam.  xv. 
 
332  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  II. 
 
 §  39.  Of  David  to  tlie  death  of  Samuel. 
 
 1.  What  account  have  we  of  David,  before  he  was  anointed  king  by 
 Samuel  1     1  Sam.  xvi.  1-13. 
 
 2.  How  came  David's  music  to  be  solicited,  and  what  efl'eot  had  it  on 
 Saul  ?     1  Sam.  xvi.  14-23. 
 
 3.  How  came  David  to  be  taken  notice  of  at  Saul's  court  ?     1  Sam.  xvii. 
 
 4.  How  came  David  to  be  much  disliked  by  Saul,  but  caressed  by 
 Jonathan  and  the  people  ?     1  Sam.  xviii. 
 
 5.  What  service  did  Jonathan  render  to  David,  when  his  life  was  re- 
 peatedly threatened  by  Saul  ?    1  Sam.  xix.  1-7,  xx.  throughout,  xxiii.  16-18. 
 
 6.  Of  what  service  were  Michael  and  Samuel  to  David,  when  in  danger 
 of  his' life  1     I  Sam.  xix.  8-24. 
 
 7.  By  what  stratagem  did  David  impose  upon  Ahimelech,  the  chief 
 priest  at  Nob,  and  Achish,  the  Philistian  kiug  at  Gath  ?     1  Sam.  xxi. 
 
 8.  How  were  Ahimelech  and  his  family  treated  by  Saul,  on  account  of 
 his  friendly  behaviour  to  David  ?     I  Sam.  xxii. 
 
 9.  What  befell  David  at  Keilah  and  Ziph  ?     1  Sam.  xxiii. 
 
 10.  What  instances  of  generosity  did  David  shew  to  Saul,  and  with  what 
 effect?     1  Sam.  xxiv. 
 
 §  iO.  Of  David,  from  the  death  of  Samuel  to  his  being 
 crowned  king. 
 
 1.  How  did  Abigail  appease  the  anger  of  David,  and  what  was  the  con- 
 sequence of  it  ?     1  Sam.  xxv. 
 
 2.  AVhen  David  went  into  Saul's  camp,  what  was  his  conduct  toward 
 Saul,  and  what  was  the  effect  of  it  ?     1  Sam.  xxvi. 
 
 3.  Why  did  David  go  to  Gath  a  second  time,  and  what  was  the  conse- 
 quence of  it  ?     1  Sam.  xxvii. 
 
 4.  What  made  Saul  consult  the  witch  at  Endor,  what  answer  did  he  re- 
 ceive, and  what  effect  had  it  on  him  ?     1  Sam.  xxviii. 
 
 5.  What  was  the  reason  of  Achish  dismissing  David,  and  in  what  manner 
 was  it  done  ?     1  Sam.  xxix. 
 
 6.  What  were  David's  troubles  and  exploits  at  Ziklag  1     1  Sam.  xxx. 
 
 7.  What  was  the  end  of  Saul  and  his  sons  ?     1  Sam.  xxxi. 
 
 8.  By  what  means  was  David  informed  of  Saul's  death,  and  how  was  he 
 affected  by  it  ?    2  Sam.  i. 
 
 §  41.  Of  the  reign  of  David. 
 
 1.  When  David  was  anointed  king  over  Judah,  what  immediate  oppo- 
 sition did  he  meet  with,  and  what  became  of  his  servant  Asahel  ? 
 2  Sam.  ii. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  cause  of  Abner's  revolt  from  Ishbosheth  to  David, 
 what  was  his  end,  and  how  was  he  lamented  ?     2  Sam.  iii. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  end  of  Ishbosheth,  and  what  was  David's  conduct  on 
 the  occasion  2     2  Sam.  iv. 
 
 4.  When  David  was  anointed  king  over  all  Israel,  what  were  his  first 
 successes  against  his  enemies  ?     2  Sam  v. 
 
 5.  When  David  proposed  to  convey  the  ark  from  Kirjath-jearim  to  Jeru- 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  333 
 
 salem,  what  wrong  step   was  taken,  and  what  was  the   consequence  ? 
 2  Sam.  vi.  1-11. 
 
 6.  When  the  former  mistake  was  rectified,  how  did  they  proceed  with 
 the  ark,  and  what  is  recorded  of  David,  and  Michal  the  queen,  on  the 
 occasion  1    2  Sam.  vi.  12-23. 
 
 7.  What  conversation  passed  between  David  and  the  prophet  Nathan, 
 concerning  the  erection  of  a  temple  for  the  ark  ?     2  Sam.  vii.  1-17. 
 
 8.  What  was  the  purport  of  David's  prayer  on  this  occasion  ?  2  Sam. 
 vii.  18-29. 
 
 9.  What  conquests  did  David  gain  over  the  PhiUstines,  Moabites,  and 
 others,  soon  after  this  conference  with  Nathan  1     2  Sam.  viii. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  did  David  shew  kindness  to  Mephibosheth  ?  2 
 Sam.  is. 
 
 11.  In  what  way  were  David's  messengers  abused  by  Hanun,  king  of 
 the  Ammonites,  and  what  followed  ?     2  Sam.  x. 
 
 1 2.  By  what  shameful  and  wicked  conduct  did  David  displease  the  Lord  ? 
 2  Sam.  si. 
 
 13.  What  conversation  passed  between  David  and  Nathan  on  this 
 occasion,  and  what  became  of  David  immediately  after  ?    2  Sam.  xii. 
 
 14.  On  what  account,  and  in  what  manner,  did  Absalom  cause  Amnon 
 to  be  m^irdered,  and  how  was  David  affected  with  it  ?     2  Sam.  xiii. 
 
 15.  By  what  contrivance  of  Joab  is  Absalom's  pardon  and  introduction 
 to  com-t  procured  ?     2  Sam.  xiv. 
 
 16.  By  what  means  did  Absalom  meditate  a  consijiraoy  against  his 
 father,  and  what  was  the  effect  of  it  ?     2  Sam.  sv. 
 
 17.  How  was  David  treated  by  Ziba  and  Shimei  1     2  Sam.  xvi.  1-14. 
 
 18.  What  was  Hushai's  contrivance  in  favour  of  David,  and  Ahithophel's 
 conduct  in  favour  of  Absalom,  with  the  result  thereof?  2  Sam.  xvi. 
 15-23,  xvii.,  xviii.  1-8. 
 
 19.  What  were  the  circumstances  of  Absalom's  death,  and  how  did 
 David  express  his  concern  on  the  occasion  ?    2  Sam.  xviii.  9-33,  xix.  1-8. 
 
 20.  What  is  recorded  of  David  during  his  return  to  his  throne  from  the 
 seat  of  war,  the  wood  of  Ephraim  ?     2  Sam.  xix.  9-43,  xx.  throughout. 
 
 21.  What  was  the  cause  of  a  three  years'  famine  in  Israel,  and  what  was 
 done,  before  the  Lord  was  entreated  for  the  land  ?     2  Sam.  xxi.  1-14. 
 
 22.  What  exploits  were  performed  by  David  and  his  servants  against 
 the  Philistines  1     2  Sam.  xxi.  15-22. 
 
 23.  When  the  Lord  had  delivered  David  out  of  the  hand  of  all  his 
 enemies,  on  what  topics  did  he  dwell  in  his  exulting  song  of  praise  1 
 2  Sam.  xxii. ;  Ps.  xviii. 
 
 24.  What  are  the  contents  of  David's  last  words  ?     2  Sam.  xxii.  1-7. 
 
 25.  What  were  the  most  remarkable  exploits  of  David's  valiant  men  ? 
 2  Sam.  xxii.  8-23. 
 
 26.  What  concern  had  David  with  Araunah,  the  Jebusite,  and  what  was 
 the  cause  of  it  ?     2  Sam.  xxiv. 
 
 27.  How  was  Adonijah's  usurpation  defeated,  and  how  was  he  ti-eated 
 by  Solomon  1     1  Kings  i. 
 
 28.  What  was  David's  dying  charge  to  Solomon  ?     1  Kings  i.  1-11. 
 
334  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECfllST.  [PAET  H. 
 
 §  42.  Of  the  reign  of  Solomon. 
 
 1.  When  Solomon  sat  upon  his  throne,  how  did  he  execute  justice  upon 
 Adonijah,  Abiathar,  Joab,  and  Shimei  ?     1  Kings  ii.  12-46. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  import  of  the  uiglit-vision  which  Solomon  had  at 
 Gibson  ?     1  Kings  iii.  4-15. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  first  instance  of  Solomon's  wisdom  in  his  pubhc  capa- 
 city ?     1  Kings  iii.  16-28. 
 
 4.  What  account  have  we  of  Solomon's  coiu't,  purveyors,  subjects,  horses, 
 and  of  his  fame  for  wisdom  ?     1  Kings  iv. 
 
 5.  What  agreement  passed  between  Solomon  and  Hiram  king  of  Tyre, 
 and  what  was  the  result  of  that  agreement  ?     1  Kings  v. 
 
 6.  When  Solomon  had  built  the  Lord's  house,  what  palaces  did  he  build 
 for  himseH  ?     1  Kings  vii.  1-12. 
 
 7.  What  fm'ther  account  have  we  of  Solomon's  intercourse  with  Hiram 
 king  of  Tyre,  of  his  buildings,  servants,  sacrifices,  and  navy  ?  1  Kings  vii. 
 10-28. 
 
 8.  What  is  recorded  of  a  visit  which  the  queen  of  Sheba  and  others  paid 
 Solomon  ?     1  Kings  x.  1-13,  24. 
 
 9.  What  accoimt  have  we  of  the  wealth  of  Solomon  ?     1  Kings  x.  14-29. 
 
 10.  In  what  instances  did  Solomon  displease  God,  and  what  was  the 
 consequence  of  it  ?     1  Kings  xi. 
 
 §  43.  Of  Solomon's  temple. 
 
 1.  What  account  have  we  of  the  temple  built  by  Solomon,  from  the 
 time  when  it  was  begun  to  the  finishing  of  it  ?     1  Kings  vi. 
 
 2.  What  sa.cred  furniture  did  Solomon  provide  for  the  temple  ?  1  Kings 
 vii.  13-57. 
 
 3.  What  is  recorded  of  the  dedication  of  Solomon's  magnificent  temple  ? 
 1  Kings  viii. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  purport  of  Solomon's  second  vision  which  he  had  in 
 answer  to  his  building  of  the  temple,  and  his  late  sujjplioations  for  it  ? 
 
 1  Kings  ix.  1-9. 
 
 §  44.  Of  the  kings  of  Judah. 
 
 1.  What  answer  did  Rehoboam  make  to  the  Israelites  when  seeking  a 
 redress  of  their  grievances,  and  what  was  the  consequence  1  1  Kings  xii. 
 1-24. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  character  of  Rehoboam  and  his  subjects  ?  1  Kings  xiv. 
 21-24. 
 
 3.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Abijam  1     1  Kings  xv.  1-8. 
 
 4.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Asa  ?     1  Kings  xv.  9-24. 
 
 5.  What  concern  had  Jehoshaphat  with  Ahab  king  of  Israel  against  the 
 Syrians,  and  what  was  the  event  of  that  alliance  ?     1  Kings  xxii.  1-36. 
 
 6.  How  was  he  delivered  from  Moab  and  Amnon  ?     2  Chron.  xx.  1-29. 
 
 7.  What  were  the  remaining  acts  and  the  character  of  Jehoshaphat  ? 
 
 2  Chron.  xx.  41-50,  xviii.  3. 
 
 8.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Jehoram  ?  2  Kings  viii.  16-24  ; 
 2  Chron.  xxi. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  335 
 
 9.  What  were  the  oouduct,  the  character,  and  the  fate  of  Ahaziah  1 
 2  Kings  ix.  27-29  ;  2  Chron.  sxii.  1-9. 
 
 10.  What  were  the  adventures  and  character  of  queen  Athaliah?  2  Kings 
 xi.  1-16 ;  2  Chron.  xxiii.  1-15,  xxii.  3,  10-12,  xxiv.  7. 
 
 11.  What  was  the  history  of  Joash,  otherwise  called  Jehoash,  from  his 
 birth  to  his  coronation  1     2  Kings  xi.  2-12. 
 
 12.  What  was  the  conduct  of  Joash  before  and  after  the  death  of  his 
 uncle  Jehoiada  the  pi-iest,  and  his  end  1  2  Kings  xii. ;  2  Chron.  xxiv. 
 1-26. 
 
 13.  What  were  the  exploits,  character,  and  death  of  Amaziah  ?  2  Kings 
 xiv.  1-22  ;  2  Chron.  xxv.  1-28. 
 
 14.  AVhat  were  the  reign  and  the  character  of  Azariah,  otherwise  called 
 Uzziah  ?     2  Kings  xv.  1-7  ;  2  Chron.  xxvi.  1-10. 
 
 15.  What  were  the  conduct  and  the  character  of  Jotham  ?  2  Kings  xv. 
 32-38  ;  2  Chron.  xxvii. 
 
 16.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Ahaz  ?  2  Kings  xvi. ;  2  Chron. 
 xxviii. 
 
 17.  What  were  the  iii'st  acts  of  Hezekiah's  reign  ?  2  Kings  xviii.  1-16. 
 2  Chron.  xix._xxxi. 
 
 18.  What  was  the  impious  conduct  of  the  Assyrian  generals  towards 
 Hezekiah  and  his  messengers  ?     2  Chron.  xix.  17-37. 
 
 19.  What  was  the  conduct  of  Hezekiah  on  this  occasion,  his  encourage- 
 ment, and  the  event  ?     2  Kings  xix. 
 
 20.  What  were  the  last  events  of  Hezekiah's  reiga  ?     2  Kings  xx. 
 
 21.  What  were  the  government  and  character  of  Manasseh  1  2  Kings 
 xxi.  1-18 ;  2  Chron.  xxxiii.  1-20. 
 
 22.  What  were  the  conduct  and  character  of  Amon  ?  2  Kings  xxi.  19-26 ; 
 2  Chron.  xxxiii.  20-25. 
 
 23.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Josiah  ?  2  Kings  xxii.,  xxiii. 
 1-30 ;  2  Chron.  xxxiv.,  xxxv. 
 
 24.  What  is  recorded  of  Jehoahaz  1     2  Kings  xxiii.  31-34. 
 
 25.  What  is  recorded  of  Eliakim,  afterwards  Jehoiakim  ?  2  Kings  xxiii. 
 34-37,  xxiv.  1-6. 
 
 26.  What  is  recorded  of  Jehoiakim  ?     2  Kings  xxiv.  8-16. 
 
 27.  What  were  the  acts  and  fate  of  Mattaniah,  otherwise  called  Zedekiah  ? 
 2  Kings  xxiv.  17-20,  xxv.  1-21  ;  2  Chron.  xxxvi.  12-21. 
 
 §  45.  Of  the  king.s  of  Israel. 
 
 1.  What  is  recorded  of  Jeroboam  before  he  was  made  king  ?  1  Kings 
 xi.  26-40,  xii.  2-20. 
 
 2.  What  were  the  acts  and  the  general  character  of  Jeroboam  1  2  Kings 
 xii.  25-33,  xiii.,  xiv.  1-20  ;  2  Chron.  xiii. 
 
 3.  What  is  recorded  of  Nadab's  reign  ?     1  Kings  xv.  25-31. 
 
 4.  What  is  recorded  of  Baashah  1     1  Kings  xv.  16-22,  27-34,  xvi.  1-7. 
 
 5.  What  is  recorded  of  Elah  1     1  Kings  xvi.  8-14. 
 
 6.  What  account  have  we  of  Zimri  ?     1  Kings  xvi.  15-20. 
 .    7.  What  account  have  wc  of  Omri  ?     1  Kings  xvi.  21-28. 
 
 8.  What  were  the  first  acts  of  Ahab's  reign  ?     1  Kings  xvi.  29-34. 
 
;^36  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 9.  What  was  Elijah's  first  message  to  Ahab,  and  what  was  the  conse- 
 quence of  it  ?     1  Kings  xvii. 
 
 10.  By  what  means  was  Elijah  introduced  to  Ahab  the  second  time, 
 what  his  message,  and  the  consequence  ?     1  Kings  xviii. 
 
 11.  What  was  the  conduct  of  Jezebel  the  queen  towards  Elijah,  and 
 what  followed  ?     1  Kings  xix. 
 
 12.  What  were  the  transactions  between  Ahab  and  Benhadad,  king  of 
 Syria  ?     1  Kings  xx. 
 
 13.  What  was  the  conduct  of  Ahab  and  Jezebel  towards  Naboth  the 
 Jezi'eelite  ?     1  Kings  xxi. 
 
 14.  What  was  the  character  of  Ahab,  and  the  circumstances  of  his  deathi 
 
 1  Kings  xxi.  1-40  ;  2  Chron.  xviii. 
 
 15.  What  were  the  acts  of  Ahaziah's  reign,  especially  his  conduct  to- 
 wards Elijah,  and  the  consequence  of  it  ?     1  Kings  xxii.  51-53  ;  2  Kings  i. 
 
 16.  What  were  the  circumstances  of  Elijah's  translation  1  2  Kings  ii. 
 1-12. 
 
 17.  What  miraculous  proofs  did  Elisha  give  of  his  being  appointed  to 
 succeed  Elijah  in  the  prophetic  office  ?     2  Kings  ii.  12-25. 
 
 18.  On  what  account,  with  what  assistance,  and  in  what  manner  did 
 Jehoram  go  to  war  with  the  Moabites,  and  what  was  the  success  ?  2  Kings 
 iii.  4-9,  21-27. 
 
 19.  In  what  manner  were  the  armies  of  Jehoram,  Jehoshaphat,  and  the 
 king  of  Moab  relieved  when  greatly  distressed  ?     2  Kings  iii.  9-20. 
 
 20.  What  were  the  miracles  Elisha  performed  in  favom'  of  a  poor  pro- 
 phet's widow,  the  generous  Shunammite,  the  sons  of  the  prophets,  and  a 
 company  of  a  hundred  men  1     2  Kings  iv. 
 
 21.  What  was  the  conduct  of  Elisha  towards  Naaman  the  Syiian,  and 
 Gehazi  his  own  servant,  and  what  were  the  miracles  he  performed  on 
 those  persons  1     2  Kings  v. 
 
 22.  What  miracles  did  Elisha  perform  in  favour  of  one  of  the  sons  of 
 the  prophets,  the  king  of  Israel,  and  for  his  own  safety,  in  favour  of 
 Samaria  ?     2  Kings,  vi.,  vii. 
 
 23.  What  kindness  did  Jehoram  shew  to  Elisha's  generous  friend  the 
 Shunammite  ?     2  Kings  viii.  1-6. 
 
 24.  What  passed  between  Elisha  and  Hazael  at  Damascus,  and  what  was 
 the  event?     2 Kings  viii.  7-15. 
 
 25.  How  did  Jehoram  end  his   reign,  and  what   was   his  character  ? 
 
 2  Kings  iii.  1-3,  viii.  28,  29,  ix.  14-26. 
 
 26.  By  what  means  was  Jehu  made  king,  and  what  were  his  exploits  at 
 Jezreel  ?     2  Kings  ix. 
 
 27.  What  were  the  other  acts  of  Jehu  against  the  relations  of  Ahab  and 
 worshippers  of  Baal,  and  what  was  his  character  ?     2  Kings  x. 
 
 28.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Jehoahaz  ?     2  Kings  xiii.  1-9. 
 
 29.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Jehoasli,  or  Joash  ?  2  Klings 
 xiii.  10-13,  22-25,  xiv.  8-16. 
 
 30.  What  further  account  have  we  of  Elisha  ?     2  Kings  xiii.  14-21. 
 
 31.  What  were  the  acts  and  character  of  Jeroboam  II.?  2  Kings  xiv. 
 23-29. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEB  CATECHISM.  337 
 
 32.  What  were  the  reign   and  the  character  of  Zachariah  1     2  Kings 
 XV.  8-12. 
 
 33.  What  were  the  reign  and  the  character  of  Shallum  ?     2  King.s  xv. 
 13-15. 
 
 34.  What  were  the  reign  and  the  character  of  Menahem  1     2  Kings  xv. 
 16-22. 
 
 35.  What  were  the  reign  and  the  character  of  Peli:ahiah  1     2  Kings?  xv. 
 23-26. 
 
 36.  What  were  the  reign  and  the  character  of  Pekah  1   2  Kings  xv.  37-31. 
 
 37.  What  is  recorded  of  Hoshea  and  his  kingdom  ?     2  Kings  xvii.,  xviii. 
 9-12. 
 
 §  46.  Of  Ezra  and  Nehemiah. 
 
 1.  When  Cyrus  came  to  the  throne  of  Persia,  what  kindness  did  he 
 shew  to  the  captive  Jews,  and  what  was  the  effect  of  it  ?     Ezra  i. 
 
 2.  What  number  of  Jews  returned  to  Jerusalem  in  virtue  of  Cyrus's  pro- 
 clamation, and  what  their  retinue  ?    Ezi-a  ii.  1 ,  2,  64-67. 
 
 3.  What  offerings  did  the  Jews  bring  at  different  times  for  the  service  of 
 the  temple  ?    Ezra  ii.  68-70  ;  Neh.  vii.  70-72. 
 
 4.  In  what  manner  did  the  Jews  proceed  to  restore  the  public  worship 
 of  God,  and  to  lay  the  foundation  of  the  temple  1    Ezra  iii. 
 
 5.  What  opposition  did  the  Jews  meet  with  from  the  Samaritans  in 
 building  the  temple  1    Ezra  iv. 
 
 6.  What  opposition  did  they  meet  with  from  Tatnai,  a  governor  of  the 
 country  west  of  Euphrates  under  Darius  Hystaspes  1    Ezra  v. 
 
 7.  In  what  manner  were  all  these  oppositions  overruled  for  completing 
 the  temple,  and  how  was  it  dedicated  1    Ezra  vi. 
 
 8.  What  favour  did  Artaxerxes  Longimanus  shew  to  Ezra  and  his  people, 
 and  how  did  they  improve  it  ?    Ezra  vii.,  viii. 
 
 9.  What  account  have  we  of  the  licentiousness  of  the  Jews  in  marrying 
 heathen  wives,  and  how  was  this  abuse  rectified  ?    Ezra  ix.,  x. 
 
 10.  How  was  Nehemiah  employed  at  the  Persian  court  ?     Neh.  i. 
 
 11.  What  success  did  Nehemiah  obtain  on  representing  his  case  to  Ar- 
 taxerxes, and  what  was  the  effect  of  it  1    Neh.  ii. 
 
 12.  What  opposition  did  Nehemiah  and  his  Jewish  brethren  meet  with 
 while  building  the  wall  of  Jerusalem  ?    Neh.  iv.,  vi. 
 
 13.  What  steps  did  Nehemiah  take  to  reform  oppressive  abuses  among 
 the  Jews  ?    Neh.  v. 
 
 14.  In  what  manner  did  Nehemiah  provide  for  the  safety  and  popula- 
 tion of  Jerusalem  after  the  wall  was  finished  1    Neh.  vii. 
 
 15.  What  further  steps  were  taken  by  Nehemiah  and  Ezra  towards  a 
 general  reformation  ?     Neh.  viii.-xiii. 
 
 §  47.  Of  Esther. 
 
 1.  How  came  Ahasuerus   (probably  Darius  Hystaspes)  to  divorce  his 
 queen  Vashti  1    Esth.  i. 
 
 2.  How  came  Esther  to  be  queen  of  Persia  instead  of  Vashti  ?     Esth. 
 ii.  1-20. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  Y 
 
338  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECKtST.  [PAET  U. 
 
 3.  What  good  service  did  Mordecai,  Estlier's  unole,  do  to  Ahasuerus  I 
 Esth.  ii.  21-23. 
 
 4.  TVTiat  attempts  were  made  by  Haman  the  Amalekite,  the  son  of 
 Hammedatha,  to  destroy  the  Jews,  aiid  for  what  cause  ?    Esth.  iii. 
 
 5.  'What  methods  did  the  Jews  adopt,  by  means  of  Esther,  to  prevent 
 the  threatened  destniction  ?     Esth.  iv.,  v.  1-8. 
 
 6.  ^'hat  were  the  reflections  of  Haman  on  these  preparatory  steps? 
 Esth.  V.  9-14. 
 
 7.  By  what  means  came  Mordecai  to  enjoy  royal  favour,  while  the  Jews 
 were  in  the  greatest  danger,  and  what  was  the  conduct  of  Haman  on  this 
 occasion  ?    Esth.  vi. 
 
 8.  How  came  Haman  to  be  hanged  on  the  gaUows  which  he  had  prepared 
 for  Mordecai  ?     Esth.  vLi. 
 
 9.  What  favour  did  Ahasuerus  shew  to  the  Jews,  by  means  of  Esther 
 the  queen,  to  countei-act  the  nim-derous  import  of  a  former  edict  1  Esth- 
 viii. 
 
 10.  How  did  the  Jews  improve  the  latter  edict  for  their  own  safety,  and 
 what  was  the  success  attending  it  ?    Esth.  ix. 
 
 11.  How  did  Ahasuerus  and  Mordecai  end  their  days  ?     Esth.  x. 
 
 §  48.  The  book  of  Job. 
 
 1.  What  account  have  we  of  Job's  piety,  prosperity,  Satan's  malice 
 against  him,  his  heavy  losses,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  bore  aU  ?    Job  i. 
 
 2.  What  further  trial  had  Job  fi-om  Satan  and  his  wife,  and  how  did  he 
 bear  that  trial  ?     Job  ii.,  iii. 
 
 3.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  iirst  speech  of  EUphaz  the  Temanite  to 
 Job  ?     Job  iv.,  V. 
 
 4.  What  is  the  substance  of  Job's  reply  to  Eliphaz  ?     Job  vi.,  vii. 
 
 5.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  first  speech  of  Bildad  the  Shuhite  to 
 Job  ?     Job  viii. 
 
 6.  What  is  the  sub.stance  of  Job's  reply  to  BUdad  ?     Job  ii.,  x. 
 
 7.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  iirst  speech  of  Zophar  the  Namathite 
 to  Job  ?    Job.  xi. 
 
 8.  What  is  the  substance  of  Job's  reply  to  Zophar  ?    Job  xii.-siv. 
 
 9.  WTiat  are  the  contents  of  the  second  speech  of  EUphaz  to  Job  ?    Job  xv. 
 
 10.  What  is  the  substance  of  Job's  reply  to  Eliphaz  ?    Job  xvi.,  xviL 
 
 1 1.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  second  speech  of  Bildad  to  Job  ?  Job 
 xviii. 
 
 12.  What  is  the  substance  of  Job's  reply  ?    Job  xix. 
 
 13.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  second  speech  of  Zophar  to  Job  ? 
 Job  XX. 
 
 14.  What  is  the  substance  of  Job's  reply  ?    Job  xxi. 
 
 15.  What  are  the  contents  of  Ehphaz's  third  attack  on  Job  ?     Job  xxii. 
 
 16.  What  is  the  substance  of  Job's  reply  ?     Job  xxiii,  xxiv. 
 
 17.  What  were  the  contents  of  BUdad's  third  attack  ?     Job  xxv. 
 IS.  What  was  the  substance  of  Job's  reply  ?    Job  xx^"i.-xxviii. 
 
 19.  While  his  friends  continued  silent,  what  account  does  Job  give  of 
 his  former  prosperity,  and  subsequent  adversity  ?    Job  xxix.,  ssx. 
 
PAKT  II.]  THE  SCRIPTURE  CATECHISM.  339 
 
 20.  What  reply  does  he  make  to  several  gross  charges  which  had  been 
 urged  against  him  by  his  pretended  friends  ?     Job  xxxi. 
 
 21.  What  is  contained  in  Elihu's  introductory  speech,  as  umpire  in  this 
 controversy  ?    Job  xxxii. 
 
 22.  What  is  contained  in  Elihu's  iirst  address  to  Job  1    Job  xxxiii. 
 
 23.  What  is  contained  in  Elihu's  second  address  ?     Job  sxxiv. 
 
 24.  What  is  contained  in  Elihu's  third  address  ?     Job  xxxv. 
 
 25.  What  is  contained  in  Elihu's  fourth  address  ?     Job  xxxvi.,  xxxvii. 
 
 26.  When  God  interposes  to  decide  the  controversy,  what  is  the  sub- 
 stance of  His  awful  addi-ess  out  of  the  whirlwind  ?     Job  xxxviii.,  xxxix. 
 
 27.  What  is  the  second  awful  address  of  God  to  Job  ?     Job  xl.,  xli. 
 
 28.  What  effect  had  all  these  addi-esses  upon  Job  ?     Job  xlii. 
 
 §  49.  Of  the  Psalms. 
 
 1.  Who  wrote  the  first  and  second  Psalms,  on  what  occasions,  and  of 
 what  doth  each  of  them  chiefly  treat  1    Ps.  i.,  ii. 
 
 2.  Who  wrote  the  third  and  fourth  Psalms,  on  what  occasions,  and  of 
 what  doth  each  of  them  principaUy  treat  ?    Ps.  iii.,  iv. 
 
 3.  Who  wrote  the  fifth  and  sixth  Psalms,  on  what  occasions,  and  of  what 
 doth  each  of  them  principally  treat  ?     Ps.  v.,  vi. 
 
 4.  Who  wrote  the  seventh  Psalm,  and  the  two  following,  on  what  oc- 
 casions, and  what  are  the  chief  things  they  respectively  contain  ?  Ps. 
 vii.-ix. 
 
 5.  Who  wrote  the  tenth  Psalm,  and  the  three  following,  on  what  oc- 
 casions, and  what  are  the  chief  things  they  respectively  contain  ?  Ps. 
 x.-xiii. 
 
 6.  Who  wrote  the  fourteenth  Psalm,  and  the  three  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  do  they  chiefly  treat  of  ?     Ps.  xiv.-xvii. 
 
 7.  Who  wrote  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  Psalms,  on  what  occasions, 
 and  what  do  they  principally  contain  ?     Ps.  xviii.,  xix. 
 
 8.  Who  wrote  the  twentieth  Psalm,  and  the  four  following,  on  what  oc- 
 casions, and  what  do  they  principally  contain  1    Ps.  xx.-xxiv. 
 
 9.  Who  wrote  the  twenty-fifth  Psalm,  and  the  four  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  doth  each  contain  ?    Ps.  xiv.-xxix. 
 
 10.  Who  wrote  the  thirtieth  Psalm,  and  the  three  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  doth  each  contain  ?     Ps.  xxx.-xxxiii. 
 
 11.  Who  wrote  the  thirty-fourth  Psalm,  and  the  three  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  do  they  contain  ?    Ps.  xxxiv.-xxxvii. 
 
 12.  Who  wrote  the  thirty-eighth  Psalm,  and  the  four  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  do  they  contain  ?     Ps.  xxxviii.-xlii. 
 
 13.  Who  wrote  the  forty-third  Psalm,  and  the  three  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  of  what  do  they  chiefly  treat  ?     Ps.  xliii.-xlvi. 
 
 14.  Who  wrote  the  forty-seventh  Psalm,  and  the  four  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  of  what  do  they  chiefly  treat  ?     Ps.  xlvii.-li. 
 
 15.  Who  wrote  the  fifty-second  Psalm,  and  the  five  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  of  what  do  they  principally  treat  ?     Ps.  lii.-lvii. 
 
 16.  Who  wrote  the  fifty-eighth  Psalm,  and  the  six  following,  on  what  oc- 
 casions, and  what  subjects  do  they  treat  of  ?     Ps.  Iviii.-lxiv. 
 
340  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II 
 
 17.  Who  wrote  the  sixty-fifth  Psalm,  and  the  three  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  subjects  do  they  treat  of  ?     Ps.  Ixv.-lxviii. 
 
 18.  Who  wrote  the  sixty-ninth  Psalm,  and  the  five  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  on  what  subjects  ?     Ps.  lxis.-lxxiv. 
 
 19.  Who  wrote  the  seventy-fifth  Psalm,  and  the  six  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  on  what  subjects  ?     Ps.  Ixxv.-lxxsi. 
 
 20.  Who  wrote  the  eighty-second  Psalm,  and  the  six  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  do  they  treat  of  ?     Ps.  Ixxxii.-lxxxviii. 
 
 21.  Who  wrote  the  eighty-ninth  Psalm,  and  the  six  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  do  they  treat  of  ?     Ps.  Ixxxix.-xcv. 
 
 22.  Who  wrote  the  ninety-sixth  Psalm,  and  the  six  following,  on  what 
 occasions,  and  what  are  the  contents  of  each  ?     Ps.  xcvi.-cii. 
 
 23.  Who  wrote  the  hundred-and-third  Psalm,  and  the  four  following,  on 
 what  occasions,  and  what  are  the  contents  of  each  ?     Ps.  ciii.-ovii. 
 
 24.  Who  wrote  the  hundred-and-eighth  Psalm,  and  the  six  following,  on 
 what  occasions,  and  what  do  they  contain  ?     Ps.  oviii.-cxiv. 
 
 25.  Who  wrote  the  hundred-aud-fifteenth  Psalm,  and  the  four  following, 
 on  what  occasions,  and  what  do  they  contain  ?     Ps.  cxv.-cxix. 
 
 26.  Who  wrote  the  hundred-and-twentieth  Psalm,  and  the  eight  follow- 
 ing, on  what  occasions,  and  what  do  they  chiefly  treat  of  ?    Ps.  cxx.-cxxviii. 
 
 27.  Who  wrote  the  hundred-and-twenty-ninth  Psalm,  and  the  six  follow- 
 ing, on  what  occasions,  and  what  do  they  principally  contain  ?  Ps.  cxxix.- 
 cxxxv. 
 
 28.  Who  wrote  the  hundred-and-thirty-sixth  Psalm,  and  the  seven  fol- 
 lowing, on  what  occasions,  and  what  doth  each  contain  ?  Ps.  cxxxvi.- 
 cxliii. 
 
 29.  Who  wi'ote  the  hundred-and-forty-fourth  Psalm,  and  the  six  follow- 
 ing, on  what  occasions,  and  what  do  they  treat  of  ?    P.s.  cxliv.-cl. 
 
 §  50.  Of  the  Proverbs. 
 
 1.  Who  was  the  writer  of  the  book  of  Proverbs,  what  is  the  design  of  it, 
 and  what  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  first  chapter  ?  Prov.  i., 
 XXX.  1,  xxxi.  1. 
 
 2.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  second  and  third  chapters  '? 
 Prov.  ii.,  iii. 
 
 3.  What  are  the  chief  contents  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  chapters  ?  Prov. 
 iv.,  V. 
 
 4.  What  do  the  sixth  and  seventh  chapters  treat  of  ?     Prov.  vi.,  vii. 
 
 5.  What  do  the  eighth  and  ninth  chapters  contain  ?    Prov.  viii.,  ix. 
 
 6.  What  things  are  contained  in  the  tenth  chapter,  and  the  four  follow- 
 ing?    Prov.  x.-xiv. 
 
 7.  ^Tiat  are  the  subjects  treated  of  in  the  fifteenth  chapter,  and  the 
 four  following  ?     Prov.  xv.-xix. 
 
 8.  What  is  treated  of  in  the  twentieth  chapter,  and  the  four  following  ? 
 Prov.  xx.-xxiv. 
 
 9.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  twenty-fifth  chapter,  and 
 the  four  following  ?     Prov.  xxv.-xxix. 
 
 10.  What  were  Agur's  confession  and  prayer  ?     Prov.  xxx.  1-9. 
 
PAKT  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUKE  CATEdHlSM.  341 
 
 11.  What  is  his  representation  of  four  sorts  of  men  as  remarkably 
 wicked?     Prov.  xsx.  11-14,  17. 
 
 12.  What  does  he  say  of  four  things,  as  insatiable,  mysterious,  trouble- 
 some, small  but  wise,  and  comely  in  motion  ?     Prov.  xxx.  15-31. 
 
 13.  What  was  the  solemn  admonition  Lemuel  had  from  his  pious  mother? 
 Prov.  xxxi.  1-9. 
 
 14.  What  is  the  character  she  gives  of  a  truly  virtuous  wife?  Prov. 
 xxxi.  10-31. 
 
 §  51.  Of  Ecclesiastes  and  the  Canticles. 
 
 1.  What  is  the  text  of  the  royal  preacher,  and  what  are  general  pi-oofs 
 of  the  vanity  of  all  created  things  ?     Eocles.  i.  1-11. 
 
 2.  What  method  did  Solomon  take  to  estimate  the  value  of  human  know- 
 ledge concerning  all  things  that  are  done  under  heaven,  and  what  his 
 estimate  of  sensual  pleasures,  of  carnal  wisdom  and  labour  ?  Eocles.  i.  12- 
 18,  ii. 
 
 3.  How  does  he  further  shew  the  vanity  of  the  endless  variety  of  engage- 
 ments, of  power,  of  studious,  of  pleasurable,  and  busy  natural  pursuits ;  and 
 what  his  inferences  therefrom  ?     Eccles.  iii. 
 
 4.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  fourth  chapter  ?    Eccles.  iv. 
 
 5.  How  does  he  shew  the  vanity  of  mere  pretences  to  I'eligion,  and  of 
 riches  without  the  proper  use  of  them  ?    Eccles.  v.,  vi. 
 
 6.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  seventh  chapter  ?    Eccles.  vii. 
 
 7.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  eighth  chapter  ?  Eccles.  viii. 
 
 8.  What  are  the  principal  things  contained  in  the  ninth  ohaijter  ? 
 Tilccles.  ix. 
 
 9.  What  rules  are  prescribed  for  attaining  wisdom,  and  avoiding  folly  ? 
 Eccles.  X. 
 
 10.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  eleventh  chapter  ?     Eccles.  xi. 
 
 11.  What  are  the  preacher's  concluding  exhortations  ?    Eccles.  xii. 
 
 12.  What  is  the  spiritual  import  of  the  Song  of  Solomon,  otherwise 
 called  the  Canticles  ?     Cant,  i.-viii. 
 
 §  52  Of  Isaiah. 
 
 1.  In  whose  reign  did  Isaiah  prophesy?     Isa.  i.  1. 
 
 2.  What  is  the  substance  of  his  first  prophetic  address  to  the  Jews,  con- 
 cerning Judah  and  Jerusalem  ?    Isa.  i.  2-31. 
 
 3.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  his  second  prophetic  vision 
 concerning  the  same  people  ?     Isa.  ii.-v. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  vision  which  Isaiah  had  in  the  year  that  king  Uzziah 
 died  ?     Isa.  vi. 
 
 5.  What  occasioned  Isaiah's  message  to  Ahaz,  and  what  was  the  import 
 of  it  ?     Isa.  vii. 
 
 6.  What  is  the  substance  of  Isaiah's  alarming  sermon  to  the  Jews  and 
 Israelites,  in  reference  to  the  Syrians  and  Assyrians  ?     Isa.  viii.-xii. 
 
 7.  AVhat  were  the  contents  of  the  burden  of  Bahylon,  or  God's  judgments 
 on  that  oppressive  city  in  favour  of  His  people  ?     Isa.  xiii.,  xiv. 
 
3rl!2  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  H. 
 
 8.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  bui-den,  or  judgment,  of  Moab  ?  Isa. 
 XV.,  xvi. 
 
 9.  What  is  contained  in  the  burden,  or  judgment,  of  Damascus,  and  the 
 land  shadowing  with  wings  ?     Isa.  xvii.,  xviii. 
 
 10.  What  is  the  import  of  the  burden,  or  judgment,  of  Egypt  and 
 Ethiopia  ?     Isa.  six.,  xx. 
 
 11.  What  is  the  bui'den,  or  judgment,  of  the  sea  ?     Isa.  xxi. 
 
 12.  What  is  the  burden,  or  judgment,  of  the  vaUey  of  vision  ?     Isa.  xxii. 
 
 13.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  bm'den,  or  judgment,  of  Tyre  ? 
 Isa.  xxiii. 
 
 14.  What  solemn  warnings  are  given  to  the  Jews  and  their  oppressors  ? 
 Isa.  xxiv. 
 
 15.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  twenty-fifth  chapter,  and  the  two 
 following  ?     Isa.  xxv.-xxvii. 
 
 16.  What  are  the  prophetic  woes,  intermixed  with  mercies  to  the  faithful 
 pronounced  upon  the  crown  of  pride,  upon  Oriel,  upon  the  rebellious  coun- 
 seUors,  and  upon  those  who  seek  the  alliance  of  Egypt  1     Isa.  xxviii.-xxxi. 
 
 17.  What  are  the  contents,  and  the  occasions,  of  the  thirty-second 
 chapter  and  the  two  following  ?     Isa.  xxxii.-xxxiv. 
 
 18.  What  is  contained  in  the  prophetic  description  of  the  glories  of  the 
 Church,  and  what  the  occasion  of  it  ?     Isa.  xxxv. 
 
 19.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  thirty-sixth  chapter,  and 
 the  three  following,  and  what  the  occasions  of  them  ?     Isa.  xxxvi.-xxxix. 
 
 20.  What  are  the  chief  contents,  and  the  occasion  of  the  fortieth  chapter) 
 and  the  four  following  ?     Isa.  xl.-xliv. 
 
 21.  What  are  the  principal  things  contained  in  the  forty-fifth  chapter, 
 and  the  four  following,  and  what  the  occasion  of  them  ?    Isa.  xlv.-xhx. 
 
 22.  What  are  principally  treated  of  in  the  fiftieth  chapter,  and  the  two 
 following,  with  the  occasions  of  them  ?    Isa.  I.-lii. 
 
 23.  What  doth  the  fifty-third  chapter  contain  particularly  ?     Isa.  hii. 
 
 24.  What  are  the  subjects  contained  in  the  fifty-fourth  chapter,  and  the 
 four  following,  and  what  gave  occasion  to  them  ?     Isa.  liv.-lviu. 
 
 25.  What  subjects  are  treated  of  in  the  fifty-ninth  chapter,  and  the  three 
 following,  with  the  occasion  ]     Isa.  lix.-lxii. 
 
 26.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  sixty-third  chapter,  and 
 the  three  following,  and  on  what  occasion  ?     Isa.  Ixiii.-Ixvi. 
 
 §  o3.  Of  Jeremiah. 
 
 1.  Who  was  Jeremiah,  in  whose  reigns  did  he  prophesy,  and  in  what 
 manner  was  he  caUed  and  encouraged  to  his  prophetic  office  ?     Jer.  i. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  substance,  and  what  the  occasion  of  Jeremiah's  first 
 alarming  discourse  to  the  Jews  ?     Jer.  ii.-vi. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  substance,  and  what  the  occasion  of  Jeremiah's  second 
 sermon  ?    Jer.  vii.-x. 
 
 4.  What  was  the  substance,  and  the  occasion  of  Jeremiah's  third  ser- 
 mon?   Jer.  xi.-xiii. 
 
 5.  What  is  the  substance,  and  what  the  occasion  of  Jeremiah's  discourse 
 concerning  the  deartli  ?     Jer.  xiv.,  xv. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTtJEE  CATECHISM.  343 
 
 6.  What  are  the  substance  and  the  occasion  of  Jeremiah's  sermon  which 
 begins  with  the  charge  lie  had,  in  vision,  not  to  set  up  a  family  among  the 
 Jews  ?    Jer.  xvi.,  xvii. 
 
 7.  What  is  the  substance,  and  what  the  occasion  of  that  discourse  which 
 begins  with  the  symbolic  representation  of  a  potter  and  his  vessel  ?  Jer. 
 xviii.,  xix. 
 
 8.  Who  was  Pashur,  what  concern  had  Jeremiah  with  him,  and  what 
 effect  had  it  on  the  prophet  ?    Jer.  xx. 
 
 9.  When  Zedekiah's  messenger  came  to  Jeremiah  for  advice,  what  answer 
 was  made  ?    Jer.  xxi. 
 
 10.  What  was  the  prophet's  message  to  the  king  of  Judah  1    Jer.  xxii. 
 
 11.  What  message  was  delivered  by  Jeremiah  to  the  pastors,  or  the 
 rulers  in  Church  and  state,  and  by  what  was  it  occasioned  ?     Jer.  xxiii. 
 
 12.  What  were  the  imjaort  and  the  occasion  of  the  emblematic  vision  of 
 the  two  baskets  of  figs  ?    Jer.  xxiv. 
 
 13.  What  were  the  import  and  the  occasion  of  those  visions  which  Jere- 
 miah had  concerning  Judah,  in  the  beginning  of  Jehoiakim's  reign  ?  Jer. 
 xxv.-xxviii. 
 
 14.  In  what  manner  did  Jeremiah  contradict  the  false  prophecy  of  Hana- 
 niah,  and  what  was  the  consequence  ?    Jer.  xxviii. 
 
 15.  What  were  the  import  and  the  immediate  occasion  of  Jeremiah's 
 letter  to  the  captives  in  Babylon,  and  how  resented  by  the  false  prophets  ? 
 Jer.  xxix. 
 
 16.  What  is  contained  in  Jeremiah's  prophecy  of  comfort  to  the  captives  ? 
 Jer.  XXX.,  xxxi. 
 
 17.  What  was  the  cause  of  Jeremiah's  imprisonment,  the  import  of  his 
 bujdng  the  field  of  Hanameel,  his  prayer,  and  the  prophecy  immediately 
 following?    Jer.  xxxii. 
 
 18.  What  were  the  import  and  the  occasion  of  the  second  prophecy  of 
 Jeremiah  while  he  was  in  the  court  of  the  prison  1     Jer.  xxxiii. 
 
 19.  What  was  Jeremiah's  alarming  prophecy  against  Zedekiah  and  the 
 Jews  of  all  ranks,  and  by  what  occasioned  ?     Jer.  xxxiv. 
 
 20.  What  were  the  particulars  and  the  import  of  the  discourse  concern- 
 ing the  Eechabites  1    Jer.  xxxv. 
 
 21.  What  were  the  particulars,  the  occasion,  and  the  general  import  of 
 the  discourse  concerning  the  roUs  ?    Jer.  xxxvi. 
 
 22.  How  came  Jeremiah's  prayers  to  be  sought  for  by  Zedekiah,  and 
 what  was  the  reply  ?    Jer.  xxxvii.  1-10. 
 
 23.  What  was  the  cause  of  Jeremiah's  imprisonment  by  Irijah,  and  what 
 was  the  conduct  of  Zedekiah  towards  him  on  the  occasion  ?  Jer.  xxxvii. 
 11-21. 
 
 24.  How  came  Jeremiah's  life  to  be  threatened,  and  what  was  the  event  ? 
 Jer.  xxxviii. 
 
 25.  At  what  time,  by  whom,  and  with  what  circumstances  was  Jerusalem 
 besieged  and  captured  ?     Jer.  xxxix.  1-10. 
 
 26.  How  was  Jeremiah  circumstanced  amid  that  confusion  and  danger  ? 
 Jer.  xxxix.  11-18. 
 
 27.  What  became  of  the  few  Jews  that  were  left  in  the  land  of  Canaan 
 
SO:  THE  EVAJSTGELICAI;  C'ATECHIST.  [PAET  U. 
 
 after  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem,  and  what  concern  had  Jeremiah  with 
 them  ?    Jer.  xl.-xliv. 
 
 28.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  forty-fifth  chapter,  and  the  six  follow- 
 ing ?    Jer.  siv.-h. 
 
 29.  What  is  contained  in  the  fifty-second  chapter  ?    Jer.  Hi. 
 
 30.  What  ai-e  the  principal  things  treated  of  in  the  Lamentations  of  Jere- 
 miah ?     Lam.  i.-v. 
 
 §  54.  Of  EzekieL 
 
 1.  Who  was  the  prophet  Ezekiel,  when,  and  where  did  he  prophesy  ? 
 Ezek.  i.  1-4. 
 
 2.  What  were  the  particulars  of  the  vision  of  four  living  creatures,  and 
 what  was  the  import  of  it  ?    Ezek.  i.  4-28. 
 
 3.  In  what  manner  was  Ezekiel  prepai-ed  for  his  prophetic  work  ?  Ezek. 
 ii.,  iii. 
 
 4.  In  what  manner  was  Ezekiel  ordered  to  portray,  emblematically,  the 
 siege  of  Jerusalem  ?    Ezek.  iv. 
 
 5.  What  was  the  vision  of  Ezekiel  concerning  his  own  hair,  as  an  em- 
 blematic action,  and  how  was  it  apphed  ?     Ezek.  v. 
 
 6.  What  was  the  vision  in  which  Ezekiel  was  commanded  to  set  his  face 
 towards  the  mountains  of  Israel  ?     Ezek.  vi. 
 
 7.  What  is  the  vision  which  begins  with  denouncing  an  end  on  the  four 
 comers  of  the  land  ?     Ezek.  vii. 
 
 8.  What  was  the  vision  which  Ezekiel  had  in  the  sixth  year,  the  sixth 
 month,  and  the  fifth  day  of  the  month  ?    Ezek.  viii.,  is. 
 
 9.  What  was  God's  command  to  Ezekiel  in  reference  to  the  approaching 
 destiTiction  of  Jerusalem  by  the  Chaldeans  ?    Ezek.  sii. 
 
 10.  What  was  the  substance  of  Ezekiel's  prophecy  against  the  false 
 prophets  ?     Ezek.  xiii. 
 
 1 1.  In  what  manner  did  he,  by  Divine  command,  answer  the  elders  of 
 Israel  ?    Ezek.  xiv.,  xv. 
 
 12.  In  what  manner  did  he,  by  Divine  orders,  cause  Jerusalem  to  know 
 her  abominations  ?    Ezek.  xvi. 
 
 13.  What  were  the  two  parables  he  was  ordered  to  speak  to  the  hoiise 
 of  Israel,  and  then-  application  ?    Ezek.  xvii. 
 
 14.  How  did  he  refute  the  proverb  of  the  fathers  eating  sour  grapes,  and 
 the  children's  teeth  set  on  edge  ?     Ezek.  xviii. 
 
 15.  What  is  contained  in  the  paraboUc  lamentation  for  the  princes  of 
 Israel  ?    Ezek.  xis. 
 
 16.  What  reply  was  he  commanded  to  make  to  the  elders  of  Israel  when 
 they  came  to  inqiiire  of  him  in  the  seventh  year,  in  the  fifth  month,  and 
 the  tenth  day  of  the  month  ?    Ezek.  xx.-sxii. 
 
 17.  How  does  he  represent  the  idolatrous  apostasy  of  Israel  and  Judah  1 
 Ezek.  xxiii. 
 
 IS.  What  was  the  purport  of  God's  message  to  Ezekiel  in  the  ninth  year, 
 in  the  tenth  month,  and  the  tenth  day  of  the  month  ?    Ezek.  xxiv. 
 
 ]  9.  What  are  the  judgments  denounced  against  the  Ammonites,  the 
 Moabites,  the  Edomites,  and  the  Philistines  ?    Ezek.  xxv. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  345 
 
 20.  What  are  the  judgments  denounced  against  the  famous  city  Tyre  ? 
 Ezek.  xxvi.,  xxviii. 
 
 21.  What  are  the  predictions  against  Egypt  ?    Ezek.  xxix.,  xxxii. 
 
 22.  How  does  he  justify  awful  warnings  to  the  Jews  ?    Ezek.  xxviii. 
 
 23.  What  is  the  substance  of  his  prophecy  against  the  shepherds  of 
 Israel,  concerning  God's  care  of  His  flocks  ?    Ezek.  xxxiv. 
 
 24.  What  is  he  made  to  prophesy  against  mount  Seir,  or  the  Edomites  1 
 Ezek.  XXXV. 
 
 25.  What  is  contained  in  the  thirty-sixth  chapter  ?    Ezek.  xxxvi. 
 
 26.  What  were  the  visions  of  the  dry  bones,  and  the  emblem  of  the  two 
 sticks,  and  their  import  ?    Ezek.  xxxvii. 
 
 27.  What  does  the  thirty-eighth  chapter,  and  the  following,  treat  of  ? 
 Ezek.  xxxviii.,  xxxix. 
 
 28.  What  were  the  principal  things  contained  in  the  vision  which 
 Ezekiel  had  in  the  five-and-twentieth  year  of  the  Babylonish  captivity, 
 when  he  was  brought,  in  the  visions  of  God,  to  the  land  of  Israel,  and  set 
 upon  a  very  high  mountain  ?    Ezek.  xl.,  xlviii. 
 
 §  55.  Of  Daniel. 
 
 1.  How  came  Daniel  to  be  noticed  at  Nebuchadnezzar's  court  at  Babylon  '? 
 Dan.  i. 
 
 2.  By  what  means  came  he  to  be  made  ruler  over  the  whole  province  of 
 Babylon,  and  chief  of  the  governors  over  all  the  wise  men,  and  what  was 
 his  request  of  the  king  ?     Dan.  ii. 
 
 3.  How  came  Shadrach,  Meshach,  and  Abednego  to  be  fm-ther  greatly 
 honoured  and  promoted  ?    Dan.  ui. 
 
 4.  What  is  contained  in  the  fourth  chapter  ?     Dan.  iv. 
 
 5.  How  came  Daniel  to  be  clothed  in  scarlet,  and  proclaimed  the  third 
 ruler  in  the  kingdom,  by  Belshazzar,  Nebuchadnezzar's  gi'andson  ?    Dan.  v. 
 
 6.  What  was  Daniel's  promotion  in  the  court  of  Darius,  when  that  mon- 
 arch added  Babylon  to  his  dominions,  and  how  came  he  to  be  further  pro- 
 moted 1    Dan.  vi. 
 
 7.  What  was  the  vision  which  Daniel  had  in  the  first  year  of  the  reign 
 of  Belshazzar,  king  of  Babylon,  and  what  its  import  ?    Dan  vii. 
 
 8.  What  was  the  vision  he  had  in  the  third  year  of  the  reign  of  Belshaz- 
 zar, and  what  the  impoz't  of  it  ?     Dan.  viii. 
 
 9.  When  Daniel  understood,  by  computation,  that  the  time  predicted  for 
 the  deliverance  of  the  Jews  was  drawing  nigh,  what  did  he  resolve  upon, 
 and  what  was  the  effect  of  it  ?     Dan.  ix. 
 
 10.  What  was  the  vision  he  had  in  the  third  year  of  Cyrus  king  of  Persia, 
 as  preparatory  to  the  following  series  of  pi'ophecies  ?     Dan.  x. 
 
 11.  What  is  the  general  import  of  the  two  last  chapters  ?    Dan.  xi.,  xii. 
 
 §  56.  Of  the  twelve  minor  prophets. 
 
 1.  Who  was  Hosea,  and  about  what  time  did  he  prophesy  ?     Hos.  i.  1. 
 
 2.  What  was  Hosea's  first  emblematic  vision,  and  how  was  it  applied  to 
 the  Israelites  ?    Hos.  i.  2-11,  ii. 
 
346  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  second  emblematic  vision  of  Hosea,  and  how  was  it 
 apphed  ?     Hos.  iii. 
 
 4.  What  are  the  subjects  principally  insisted  on  in  the  fourth  chapter, 
 and  the  nine  following  1    Hos.  iv.-xiii. 
 
 5.  What  does  the  fom-teenth  chapter  princijially  contain  ?     Hos.  xiv. 
 
 6.  Who  was  Joel,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  what  was  the 
 state  of  the  Jews  at  that  time  ?     Joel  i.  1-3. 
 
 7.  What  are  the  chief  subjects  contained  in  his  prophecy  1  Joel  i.  4r-20, 
 ii.,  iii. 
 
 8.  Who  was  Amos,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  what  was  the 
 state  of  the  Jews  at  that  time  ?     Amos  i.  1,  2. 
 
 9.  What  are  the  objects  of  his  prophetic  reproofs  in  the  two  first 
 chapters?     Amos  i.  3-15,  ii. 
 
 10.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  thii-d  chapter  of  Amos, 
 and  the  three  following  ?     Amos  iii.-vi. 
 
 1 1.  What  are  the  principal  subjects  of  the  seventh  chapter,  and  the  two 
 following  ?     Amos  vii.-ix. 
 
 12.  Who  was  Obadiah,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  what  was  the 
 state  of  the  Jews  in  his  time,  and  the  chief  subjects  of  his  prophecy  ? 
 Obad.  thi-oughout. 
 
 13.  Who  was  Jonah,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  how  was 
 he  cast  into  the  sea  ?    Jonah  i.  1-15. 
 
 14.  How  came  he  to  survive  so  dangerous  an  expedient?  Jonah  i.  17, 
 ii. 
 
 15.  What  was  the  purport  of  God's  command  to  Jonah  a  second  time, 
 and  what  was  the  consequence  ?     Jonah  iii.,  iv. 
 
 16.  Who  was  Micah,  when  and  where  did  he  projphesy,  and  what  was 
 the  state  of  the  Hebrews  at  that  time  ?     Mic.  i.  1,  2. 
 
 17.  What  are  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  three  first  chai^ters  ? 
 Mic.  i.  3-16,  ii.,  iii. 
 
 18.  What  is  contained  in  the  fourth  and  fifth  chapters  ?    Mic.  iv.  v., 
 
 19.  What  is  treated  of  in  the  two  last  chapters  ?    Mic.  vi.,  vii. 
 
 20.  Who  was  Nahum,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  what  was 
 the  state  of  the  Hebrews  in  his  time  ?    Nah.  i.  1,  2. 
 
 21.  What  is  the  principal  design,  and  the  chief  matter  of  his  prophecy  ? 
 Nah.  i.  3-15,  ii.,  iii. 
 
 22.  Who  was  Habakkuk,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  what 
 was  the  state  of  the  Jews  in  his  time  ?     Hab.  i.  1^. 
 
 23.  What  is  the  chief  design,  and  what  the  leading  parts  of  his  pro- 
 phecy?    Hab.  i.  5-17,  ii.,  iii. 
 
 24.  Who  was  Zephaniah,  when  and  where  did  he  jjrophesy,  and  what 
 was  the  state  of  the  Hebrews  at  that  time  ?     Zeph.  i.  1,  2. 
 
 25.  What  was  the  scope,  and  the  main  subject  of  his  prophecy  ?  Zeph. 
 i.  3-18,  ii.,  iii. 
 
 26.  Who  was  Haggai,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  what  was 
 the  state  of  the  Jews  at  that  time  ?     Hag.  i.  1,  2. 
 
 27.  What  is  the  main  scope,  and  the  chief  manner  of  his  prophecy? 
 Has.  i.  3-15,  ii. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  34-7 
 
 28.  Who  was  Zechariah,  wheri  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  what 
 was  the  state  of  the  Hebrews  at  that  time  1    Zech.  i.  1  -7. 
 
 29.  What  were  the  visions  which  the  prophet  Zechariah  had  in  the 
 second  year  of  Darius,  and  what  their  import  ?    Zeob.  i.  8-21,  ii.-vi. 
 
 30.  What  was  the  message  of  Zechariah  to  the  Jews  in  the  fourth  year 
 of  Darius  ?    Zech.  vii.,  viii. 
 
 31.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  ninth  chapter,  and  the  two  following  1 
 Zech.  ix.-xi. 
 
 32.  What  subjects  are  contained  in  the  twelfth  chapter,  and  the  two 
 following  ?    Zech.  xii.-xiv. 
 
 33.  Who  was  Malachi,  when  and  where  did  he  prophesy,  and  what  was 
 the  state  of  the  Jews  at  that  time,  and  what  the  general  design  of  his 
 prophecy  1     Mai.  i.-iv. 
 
 §  57.  Of  Jesus  Christ,  and  the  New  Testament  dispensation  ; 
 particularly  of  the  Gospel  by  St  Matthew. 
 
 1.  What  account  doth  St  Matthew  give  of  the  genealogy  of  Christ,  and 
 the  circumstances  preceding  His  birth  ?    Matt.  i. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  cause  of  Herod's  trouble,  of  Joseph's  flight  into  Egypt, 
 and  of  his  return  to  Nazareth  with  Mary  and  the  holy  child  Jesus? 
 Matt.  ii. 
 
 3.  What  was  the  import  of  John's  preaching  and  baptism  ?    Matt.  iii. 
 
 4.  What  account  have  we  of  Christ  being  tempted  of  the  devil,  and  the 
 final  issue  of  it  ?    Matt.  iv.  1-11. 
 
 5.  What  account  have  we,  by  St  Matthew,  of  Christ's  first  preaching 
 and  popularity  ?     Matt.  iv.  12-25. 
 
 6.  Wiat  are  the  chief  topics  insisted  on  in  Christ's  sermon  on  the 
 mount,  in  Galilee  ?    Matt.  v. -vii. 
 
 7.  When  He  was  come  down  from  the  mountain,  what  cures  did  He 
 perform?    Matt.  viii.  17. 
 
 8  On  His  resolving  to  cross  from  Galilee  to  the  country  of  the  Ger- 
 gesenes  and  Gaderenes,  (so  called  from  the  cities  of  Gergessa  and  Gadara,) 
 across  the  sea,  or  lake,  of  Gahlee,  (otherwise  called  the  sea  of  Tiberias, 
 and  of  Genesareth,)  what  is  recorded  of  Him  before,  diuring,  and  after  His 
 passage  ?    Matt.  viii.  18-34. 
 
 9.  When  He  had  crossed  again  from  the  country  of  the  Gergesenes  to 
 Capernaum,  which  was  over  against  it,  what  remarkable  facts  are  recorded 
 of  Him,  prior  to  His  calling  the  twelve  disciples  ?    Matt.  ix. 
 
 10.  Who  were  the  twelve  disciples  chosen  by  Christ,  and  what  is  the 
 substance  of  His  adchess  to  them  ?    Matt.  x. 
 
 11.  What  answer  did  Christ  return  to  the  inquiries  of  John's  disciples, 
 and  what  were  the  instructions  He  took  occasion  to  inculcate  from  thence  ? 
 Matt.  xi. 
 
 12.  In  what  manner  does  Christ  reprove  the  Pharisees  when  they 
 charge  the  disciples  and  Himself  with  doing  what  was  unlawful  on  the 
 Sabbath  day?    Matt.  xii.  1-21, 
 
 13.  On  what  occasion  did  our  Lord  charge  the  Pharisees  with  blasphemy 
 
348  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  U. 
 
 against  the  Holy  Ghost,  what  is  the  substance  of  it,  with  His  apphcation  ? 
 JIatt.  sii.  22-37. 
 
 14.  ^Vhen  the  scribes  and  Pharisees  required  a  sign,  how  did  He  reprove 
 their  impertinent  cuiiosity ;  and  how  commend  His  sincere  disciples  ? 
 Matt.  xii.  38-50. 
 
 13.  While  Jesus  continued  at  Capernaum,  and  on  a  certain  day  met  the 
 multitudes  by  the  seaside,  -uhat  were  the  parables  He  insisted  upon,  what 
 was  their  import,  and  what  effect  had  they  on  the  multitude  ?    Matt.  xiii. 
 
 16.  On  what  accoimt  did  Chi-ist  leave  Capernaum,  and  sail  along  the 
 coast  (on  the  same  side)  to  a  desert  place,  and  what  miracle  did  He  perform 
 there  ?     Matt.  sir.  1-21. 
 
 17.  What  befell  Himself  and  the  disciples  from  that  time  till  they  came 
 to  the  laud  of  Gennesai'et,  and  what  reception  did  they  meet  with  there  ! 
 Matt.  xiv.  22-36. 
 
 18.  In  what  manner  did  Christ  reprove  the  scribes  and  Phai-isees  for 
 transgressing  the  commands  of  God  thi-ough  then-  traditions  ?  Matt.  sv. 
 1-20. 
 
 19.  What  miracle  did  om-  Loixl  perform  (after  He  left  Gennesaret)  on 
 the  coasts  of  Tyre  and  Sidon  ?    Matt.  xv.  21-28. 
 
 20.  Having  returned  (from  the  coasts  of  Tyi'e  and  Sidon)  to  the  sea  of 
 Galilee,  what  miracle  did  He  perform  there  ?    Matt.  xv.  29-39. 
 
 21.  After  moving  some  miles  northward,  from  the  coast  of  the  sea  of 
 Galilee  to  those  of  Magdala,  (otherwise  called  Dalmanutha,)  in  what  manner 
 did  He  rej^rove  the  Pharisees  and  Sadducees,  and  caution  His  disciples 
 against  them  ?    Matt.  xvi.  1-12. 
 
 22.  When  Jesus  came  into  the  coasts  of  Csesai'ea  Philippi,  (anciently 
 Dan,)  what  passed  between  Him  and  His  disciples  ?  Alatt.  xvi.  13-28, 
 xvii.  1-21. 
 
 23.  What  convereation  had  Chi'ist  with  His  disciples  while  they  abode 
 in  Galilee,  and  when  they  were  come  to  Capernaum  ?  Matt.  xvii.  22-27, 
 xviiL 
 
 24.  When  Jesus  depai-ted  from  Gralilee,  and  came  (probably  by  a  cii'cuit 
 to  the  east  of  Jordan)  into  the  coast  of  Jiidea,  followed  by  gi'eat  multi- 
 tudes, what  discourse  had  He  with  the  Pharisees,  a  certain  ruler,  and  Hia 
 disciples  ?    Matt,  xix.,  xx.  1-16. 
 
 25.  As  Jesus  proceeded  towards  Jerusalem,  by  Jericho  and  Bethphage, 
 what  discourse  had  He  with  His  disciples  and  othera,  and  in  what  manner 
 did  He  enter  into  Jerusalem  ?     Matt.  xx.  17-34,  xxi.  1-9. 
 
 26.  How  did  He  spend  the  remainder  of  that  night  ?    Matt.  xxi.  10-17. 
 
 27.  How  did  He  spend  the  next  day  (answering  to  our  Tuesday)  ? 
 Matt.  xxi.  18-46,  xxii.,  xxv. 
 
 28.  Where  did  Christ  spend  the  following  day,  (answering  to  our 
 Wednesday,)  and  what  oocmTcd  on  it  ?     Matt.  xxvi.  1-16. 
 
 29.  What  were  the  transactions  of  the  day  after  (answering  to  our  Thurs- 
 day) ?    Matt.  xxvi.  17-75. 
 
 30.  What  were  the  transactions  of  the  following  day  (answering  to  our 
 Friday)  untU  the  crucifixion  ?     Matt,  xxvii.  1-34. 
 
 31.  What  were  the  cu'cumstanoe.s  of  the  crucifixion,  death,  and  bm-ial  of 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  3-i9 
 
 Christ,  to  the  close  of  that  day,  which  ended  with  the  setting  of  the  sun  1 
 Matt,  xxvii.  35-61. 
 
 32.  What  passed  on  the  Jewish  Sabbath,  (answering  to  our  Saturday,) 
 while  Jesus  lay  in  the  grave  1    Matt,  xxvii.  62-66.    ■ 
 
 33.  What  were  the  circumstances  of  Christ's  resurrection,  and  what 
 passed  between  Him  and  His  disciples  afterward  1     Matt,  xxviii. 
 
 §  58.  Of  the  Gospel  of  St  Mark. 
 
 1.  What  account  does  St  Mark  give  of  John  the  Baptist,  and  of  Chi-ist 
 until  He  began  to  preach  1     Mark  i.  1-13. 
 
 2.  How  was  Jesus  employed,  in  the  discharge  of  His  prophetic  office, 
 while  at  Capernaum  and  the  neighbouring  places  1  Mark  i.  14-45,  ii.-iv. 
 1-34. 
 
 3.  What  is  recorded  of  Him  from  the  time  of  His  crossing  the  sea  of 
 Galilee  towards  Gadara,  till  the  time  of  His  returning  to  His  own  country, 
 Nazareth  t     Mark  iv.  35-41,  v. 
 
 4.  What  is  recorded  of  Him  and  His  attendants,  from  the  time  when 
 He  returned  to  His  own  country,  Nazareth,  to  His  arrival  in  the  laud  of 
 Gennesaret  ?     Mark  vi.  1-53. 
 
 5.  How  was  Jesus  Christ  employed  from  the  time  of  His  taking  haven  in 
 the  land  of  Gennesaret,  to  the  time  of  His  going  to  the  borders  of  Tyi-e 
 and  Sidon  ?    Mark  vi.  54-56,  vii.  1-23. 
 
 6.  What  is  recorded  of  Him  from  the  time  of  His  going  into  the  borders 
 of  Tyre  and  Sidon  to  His  going  (by  the  parts  of  Dalmanutha)  to  Bethsaida  ? 
 Mark  vii.  24^31,  viii.  1-21. 
 
 7.  From  the  time  of  His  going  to  Bethsaida  to  His  going  to  Capernaum, 
 what  is  recorded  of  Him  ?    Mark  viii.  21-31,  ix.  1-32. 
 
 8.  From  the  time  of  His  going  to  Capernaum,  with  His  disciples,  to  the 
 time  of  their  going  into  Jerusalem,  what  is  related  of  Him  1  Mark  ix. 
 33-50,  X.,  xi.  1-10. 
 
 9.  From  His  entering  into  Jerusalem  to  His  institution  of  the  sacred 
 supper,  what  are  the  principal  things  related  of  Him  ?  Mark  xi.  11-33, 
 xii.,  xiii.,  xiv.  1-21. 
 
 10.  What  are  the  principal  transactions  related  of  Jesus  Christ  from  His 
 institution  of  the  supper  to  His  crucifixion  1    Mark  xiv.  22-72,  xv.  1-23. 
 
 1 1.  What  does  Mark  relate  of  Him  from  the  time  of  His  crucifixion  to 
 His  ascension  into  heaven  1    Mark  xv.  24-47,  xvi. 
 
 §  59.  Of  the  Gospel  by  St  Luke. 
 
 1.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  first  chapter  of  Luke  ?    Luke  i. 
 
 2.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  second  chapter,  and  the  following? 
 Luke  ii.,  iii. 
 
 3.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  fourth  chapter,  and  the  following? 
 Luke  iv.,  v. 
 
 4.  What  are  the  chief  things  recorded  in  the  sixth  chapter  ?     Luke  vi. 
 
 5.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  seventh  chapter  1     Luke  vii. 
 
 6.  What  are  the  principal  things  recorded  in  the  eighth  chapter  1 
 Luke  viii. 
 
350  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 7.  Can  you  recite  the  substance  of  the  ninth  chapter,  and  the  following  ? 
 Luke  ii.,  X. 
 
 8.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  eleventh  chapter,  and  the  following  ? 
 Luke  si.,  sii. 
 
 9.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  thirteenth  chapter,  and  the  two  follow- 
 ing ?     Luke  siii.-xv. 
 
 10.  Relate  the  chief  things  contained  in  the  sixteenth  chapter,  and  the 
 two  following.    Luke  xvi.-xviii. 
 
 11.  Recite  the  contents  of  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  chapters. 
 Luke  six.,  xx. 
 
 12.  What  ai'e  the  contents  of  the  twenty  first  chapter,  and  the  following  ? 
 Luke  xxi.,  xxii. 
 
 13.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  two  last  chapters  ?     Luke  xxiii. 
 
 §  60.  Of  the  Gospel  by  St  John. 
 
 1.  What  is  the  testimony  of  St  John  concerning  the  person  of  Jesus 
 Chi'ist  ?    John  i. 
 
 2.  Relate  the  miracles  which  Jesus  wrought  at  Cana  of  Galilee.  John 
 ii.  1-11. 
 
 3.  Recite  the  principal  parts  of  His  conduct  and  discom-se  at  the  pass- 
 over.    John  ii.  13-25. 
 
 4  Can  you  relate  the  conversation  that  passed  between  our  Lord  Jesus 
 Christ  and  Nicodemus  1    John  iii.  1-21. 
 
 5.  Relate  the  discourse  of  John  the  Baptist  concerning  Jesus,  and  the 
 occasion  of  it.     John  iii.  2.3-36. 
 
 6.  What  conversation  passed  between  Christ  and  a  certain  woman  of 
 Samai-ia,  with  the  occasion  and  consequences  thereof  ?     John  iv.  1-30. 
 
 7.  Wbat  was  the  second  miracle  Jesus  did,  when  He  was  come  out  of 
 Judea  into  Galilee  ?    John  iv.  46-54. 
 
 8.  Relate  the  mu-acle  performed  at  the  pool  of  Bethesda,  with  its  occasion 
 and  consequences.     John  v. 
 
 9.  What  occasioned  the  miracle  of  the  five  loaves  and  two  fishes,  and 
 what  was  the  consequence  ?     John  vi. 
 
 10.  Relate  the  cu-cumstances  of  Jesus  going  up  to  the  feast  of  taber- 
 nacles, and  in  what  manner  He  vindicated  His  doctrine  and  conduct  there. 
 John  vii. 
 
 11.  On  what  occasion  did  He  shew  that  He  was  the  light  of  the  world, 
 and  what  followed  ?     John  viii. 
 
 12.  Relate  the  circumstances  of  Jesus  Christ  restoring  sight  to  a  man 
 born  blind,  with  the  effects  of  it  ?    John  ix 
 
 13.  What  account  does  Jesus  give  of  Himself  as  the  shepherd  of  His 
 people,  and  what  was  the  efiect  of  that  doctrine  upon  the  Jews  ?     John  x. 
 
 14.  Recite  what  happened  to  the  person  and  at  the  house  of  Lazarus, 
 and  the  effect  it  had  upon  the  Jews.     John  xi.,  xii.  1-19. 
 
 15.  What  reply  did  oiu'  Lord  make  to  certain  Greeks  who  desired  to  see 
 Him,  and  to  the  cavils  of  the  people  on  that  occasion  ?     John  xii.  20-50. 
 
 16.  Li  what  manner  did  Jesus  Christ  inculcate  himiihty  upon  His 
 disciples,  after  He  had  finished  His  pubjic  discourses?     John  xiii.  1-17. 
 
PABT  II]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  351 
 
 17.  Relate  how  our  Lord  predicted  who  should  betray  Him,  and  Peter's 
 repeated  denial  of  Him  ?     John  xiii.  18-38. 
 
 18.  What  was  the  substance  of  His  consolatory  address  to  His  disciples, 
 who  were  sorrowful  on  account  of  His  approaching  departure  from  them  ? 
 John  siv.-xvi. 
 
 19.  What  were  the  principal  things  contained  in  our  Lord's  prayer  to 
 the  Father  in  behalf  of  His  disciples  ?    John  xvii. 
 
 20.  Relate  how  our  Lord's  predictions  concerning  Judas  and  Peter  were 
 fulfilled.     John  xviii.  1-27. 
 
 21.  Relate  the  substance  of  his  trial  before  Pontius  Pilate,  the  civil 
 magistrate,  to  whom  he  was  led  fi'om  Caiaphas  the  high  priest.  John 
 xviii.  28-40,  xix.  1-15. 
 
 22.  In  what  manner  was  the  sentence  of  Pilate  executed  upon  Jesus  ? 
 John  xix.  16-42. 
 
 23.  What  evidence  have  we  that  Jesus  Christ  arose  from  the  dead  ? 
 John  XX. 
 
 §  61.  Coucerning  the  harmony  of  the  evangelists,  and  their 
 respective  distinguished  characters. 
 
 1.  What  difference  do  you  find  between  the  account  of  our  Lord's 
 genealogy  by  Matthew  and  that  by  Luke  1    Matt.  i. ;  Luke  iii. 
 
 2.  What  number  of  passovers  do  you  read  of  in  the  evangelists  at  which 
 our  Lord  Jesus  attended  ?    John  ii.,  v.,  vi.,  xiii. ;  Luke  vi.,  &c. 
 
 3.  How  do  you  reconcile  the  following  passages  1  Mark  i.  35,  and  Luke 
 iv.  42. 
 
 4.  What  difference  do  you  find  in  the  accounts  of  Mark  and  Luke  con- 
 cerning our  Lord's  appointment  of  the  twelve  apostles  ?  Mark  iii.  13-19  ; 
 Luke  vi.  12-16. 
 
 5.  How  do  you  reconcile  the  following  passages  ?  Matt,  v.,  vi.,  vii.,  and 
 Luke  vi.  17-49. 
 
 6.  How  do  you  reconcile  these  passages  ?    Matt.  ix.  18,  and  Mark  v.  23. 
 
 7.  How  do  you  make  these  passages  agree  1    Matt.  xx.  21,  and  Mark  x. 
 
 8.  How  do  you  make  the  following  accounts  agree  1  Matt.  xx.  30  ;  Mark. 
 X.  46  ;  Luke  xviii.  35. 
 
 9.  How  do  you  reconcile  the  following  passages  ?  Matt,  xxvii.  44,  with 
 Mark  xv.  33,  and  Luke  xxiii.  39. 
 
 10.  How  are  we  to  account  for  the  difference  in  these  passages  ?  Matt. 
 xsvii.  54  ;  Luke  xxiii.  47. 
 
 11.  What  is  the  distinguished  character  of  the  Gospel  by  St  Matthew 
 compared  with  the  other  evangelists  ?     Matt,  i.-xxviii. 
 
 12.  What  is  the  peculiar  character  of  the  Gospel  by  St  Mark  compared 
 with  the  other  evangehsts  ?     Mark  i.-xvi. 
 
 13.  What  is  the  distinguished  character  of  the  Gospel  by  St  Luke  com- 
 pared with  the  other  evangelists  ?     Luke  i.-xxiv. 
 
 14.  What  is  the  characteristic  difference  between  the  Gospel  by  St  John 
 and  the  other  evangelists  ?    John  i.-xxi. 
 
 §  62.  Of  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  from  the  resurrection  of 
 
352  THE  EVAXGHLICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  H. 
 
 Christ  to  the  separation  of  Barnabas  and  Paul,  containuig  the 
 transactions  of  about  twenty  years. 
 
 1.  TVTio  was  the  penman  of  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  and  to  whom 
 addressed  1     Acts  i.  1,  and  Luke  i.  1-3. 
 
 2.  Relate  the  short  review  of  Christ's  history  after  His  resiUTection,  and 
 the  chcumstances  of  His  ascension  into  heaven.     Acts  i.  1-11. 
 
 3.  Recite  the  names  of  the  apostles  who  tarried  at  Jerusalem,  with  the 
 occasion  and  manner  of  choosing  Matthias.     Acts  i.  12-26. 
 
 4.  Relate  the  transactions  of  the  day  of  Pentecost.    Acts  ii. 
 
 5.  Relate  the  miracle  performed  by  Peter  and  John  by  the  temple,  and 
 the  substance  of  Peter's  address  to  the  people  occasioned  by  it.    Acts  iii.,  iv. 
 
 6.  What  was  the  occasion  of  the  death  of  Ananias  and  Sapphira,  with 
 the  manner  of  it  ?     Acts  v.  1,  2. 
 
 7.  What  was  the  occasion  of  the  impmonment  of  the  apostles  at  Jeru- 
 salem, how  deUvered  and  afterwards  employed  ?     Acts  v.  12-25. 
 
 S.  TVTien  they  were  brought  again  before  the  Sanhedrim  what  was  their 
 examination  and  their  defence  ?     Acts  v.  26-32. 
 
 9.  What  effect  had  their  defence  upon  their  persecutors,  what  the  advice 
 of  Gamahel,  one  of  the  counsel,  and  what  was  the  result  ?    Acts  v.  32-42. 
 
 10.  What  was  the  immediate  occasion  of  choosing  deacons,  what  their 
 intended  work,  their  names,  the  manner  of  their  ordination,  and  the  im- 
 mediate effect  of  their  appointment  ?     Acts  vi.  1-8. 
 
 11.  What  was  the  occasion  of  Stephen,  one  of  the  deacons,  being  accused 
 to  the  Sanhedrim  ?  in  what  manner  was  this  done,  and  what  was  the  effect 
 it  had  upon  him  ?     Acts  vi.  9-15. 
 
 12.  In  what  manner  does  Stephen  make  his  defence  before  the  Sanhedrim, 
 (in  order  to  prove  the  typical  nature  of  the  Jewish  worship,  and  the  impiety 
 of  the  Jews,)  and  what  was  the  consequence  ?     Acts  vii. 
 
 13.  What  was  the  effect  of  the  severe  pei-secution  against  the  Church 
 which  was  at  Jerusalem,  and  who  chiefly  signahsed  himself  among  the 
 persecutors  ?     Acts  viii.  1-4. 
 
 14.  What  success  had  Philip,  and,  a  little  after,  Peter  and  John,  among 
 the  Samaritans  ?  and  what  opposition  did  they  meet  with  from  Simon  the 
 sorcerer,  with  their  conduct  towards  him  ?     Acts  viii.  5-25. 
 
 15.  When  the  apostles  Peter  and  John  returned  to  Jerusalem,  where  and 
 how  was  Philip  (the  deacon  and  evangehst)  employed  ?     Acts  vui.  26-40. 
 
 16.  Relate  the  manner  of  Saul's  conversion.    Acts  ix.  1-9. 
 
 17.  What  command  concerning  him  was  given  by  the  Lord  to  the  disciple 
 Ananias  of  Damascus,  and  what  was  the  result  ?     Acts  ix  10-19. 
 
 18.  Where  did  Saul  (afterwards  called  Paul)  first  exercise  his  ministry  1 
 what  was  his  subject,  and  with  what  effect  ?     Acts  ix.  19-22. 
 
 19.  When  Saul  had  continued  at  Damascus  many  days,  (that  is,  about 
 thi-ee  years,)  how  came  he  to  be  introduced  to  the  disciples  and  apostles  at 
 Jerusalem,  and  what  was  the  occasion  of  his  removal  to  Cfesarea  and  Tar- 
 sus ?     Acts  is.  23-30. 
 
 20.  What  was  the  state  of  the  chiu-ches  in  Judea,  GJalilee,  and  Samaria, 
 at  this  time  ?     Acts  ix.  31. 
 
PAliT  II.]  THE  SCEDPTUEE  CATECHISM.  353 
 
 21.  What  miracles  did  Peter  perform  at  Lydda  and  Joppa  ?  Acts  ix. 
 32-43. 
 
 22.  What  was  the  Divine  admonition  given  to  Cornelius  of  Csesarea,  the 
 Roman  captain  1    Acts  x.  1-3. 
 
 23.  Relate  the  Divine  vision  which  Peter  had  at  Joppa,  and  what  was  the 
 purport  of  it.    Acts  x.  9-16. 
 
 24.  Relate  the  interview  of  Peter  with  the  three  messengers  from  Cor- 
 nehus  at  Joppa,  and  afterwards  with  Cornelius  himself,  and  his  Gentile 
 friends  at  Csesarea,  and  what  its  very  remarkable  effect.     Acts  x,  17-48. 
 
 25.  How  does  Peter,  when  accused  at  Jerusalem,  vindicate  his  conduct 
 in  going  among  the  Gentiles  at  Csesarea,  and  what  effect  had  it  on  the 
 apostles  and  contending  Jewish  Christians  1     Acts  xi.  1-18. 
 
 26.  What  success  did  the  persecuted  preachers  meet  with  at  Phoenicia, 
 Cyprus,  and  especially  at  Antioch  in  Syria,  and  how  was  the  cause  at  An- 
 tioch  encouraged  ?    Acts  xi.  19-26. 
 
 27.  What  was  the  subject  of  Agabus's  prophecy,  and  what  effect  had  it 
 ou  the  disciples  at  Antioch  I    Acts  xi.  27-30. 
 
 28.  In  what  manner  did  the  persecuting  spirit  of  Herod  Agrippa  (not 
 the  tetrarch,  but  the  deputy  king  in  Judea)  manifest  itself  ?     Acts  xii.  1-4. 
 
 29.  In  what  manner  was  Peter  delivered  from  his  murderous  design  at 
 Jerusalem,  and  whither  did  he  go  1     Acts  xii.  5-19. 
 
 30.  What  became  of  the  p)roud  and  cruel  Herod,  what  was  the  state  of 
 the  churches  at  that  time  in  and  about  Jerusalem,  and  who  went  from 
 thence  to  Antioch  ?     Acts  xii.  20-25. 
 
 31.  How  came  Barnabas  and  Saul  (accompanied  by  John  Mark)  to  go 
 from  Antioch  to  Seleucia  and  Cyprus  ?     Acts  xiii.  1-4. 
 
 32.  What  opposition  and  success  did  they  meet  with  in  the  Isle  of 
 Cyprus,  particularly  at  Salamis  and  Paphos  ?     Acts  xiii.  5-12. 
 
 33.  On  their  leaving  Cyprus  and  coming  to  Pamphilia,  what  became  of 
 John,  and  whither  did  Barnabas  and  Saul  direct  their  course  1  Acts  xiii. 
 13-15. 
 
 34.  What  was  the  substance  of  the  sermon  which  Paul  (till  now  called 
 Saul)  preached  at  Antioch,  in  Pisidia  ?    Acts  xiii.  16-43. 
 
 35.  What  was  the  effect  of  their  fiu^ther  attempt  at  this  place,  upon 
 Jews  and  Gentiles,  and  what  became  of  them  1    Acts  xiii.  44-52. 
 
 36.  In  what  manner  were  they  received  at  Iconium,  and  afterwards  at 
 Lystra  and  Derbe,  cities  of  Lycaonia  1    Acts  xiv.  1-21. 
 
 37.  How  did  Paul  and  Barnabas  fulfil  the  remaining  part  of  their  mis- 
 sion until  they  retm'ued  to  the  church  at  Antioch  in  Syria  ?  Acts  xiv. 
 21-28. 
 
 38.  What  was  the  object  of  the  mission  of  Paul  and  Barnabas  from  the 
 church  at  Antioch  to  the  apostles  and  elders  at  Jerusalem  1     Acts  xv.  1-5. 
 
 39.  When  the  apostle  and  elders  had  met  together  as  a  synod  at  Jeru- 
 salem, to  discuss  the  question  "whether  or  not  the  Gentile  converts  should 
 be  circumcised,"  what  were  the  speeches  of  Peter,  Paul  and  Barnabas,  and 
 James  respectively  ?     Acts  xv.  6-29. 
 
 40.  After  delivering  the  joyful  decree  at  Antioch,  what  became  of  Paul 
 and  Barnabas,  of  Judas,  Silas,  and  John  Mark  ?     Acts  xv.  30-41. 
 
 VOL.  IT.  Z 
 
ooi  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  II. 
 
 §  63.  The  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  from  the  separation  of  Barnabas 
 and  Paul,  to  the  end,  contaming  the  transactions  of  about 
 twelve  years. 
 
 1.  After  Paul  and  Silas  had  gone  through  Syria  and  Cilicia,  confiiining 
 the  churches,  what  occurred  in  their  travels  through  Derbe  and  Lystra, 
 Phrygia,  Galatia,  Mysia,  and  Troas,  until  they  came  to  Pliilippi  and  Mace- 
 donia ?    Acts  xvi.  1-12. 
 
 2.  What  were  the  princijial  occurrences  during  their  stay  at  Philippi? 
 Acts  xvi.  13-40. 
 
 3.  Having  left  the  city  of  Philippi  and  passed  through  Amphip)olis  and 
 ApoUonia  to  Thessalonioa,  what  reception  did  Paul  and  Silas  meet  with 
 there  ?     Acts  xvii.  1-9. 
 
 4.  How  came  Paul  to  go  to  Athens,  (leaving  Silas  and  Timotheus  at 
 Berea,)  and  what  success  had  he  there  ?     Acts  xvii.  10-34. 
 
 5.  When  Pavd  departed  from  Athens,  and  came  to  Corinth,  what  friends 
 did  he  meet  with  there,  what  enemies,  how  was  he  employed,  how  long  did 
 he  stay,  and  with  what  success  did  he  preach  the  gospel  ?     Acts  xviii.  1-18. 
 
 6.  When  Paul,  in  pursuance  of  his  plan  of  saiUng  from  Corinth  to  Syria, 
 came  by  the  way  of  Cenchrea  to  Ephesus,  what  excursions  did  he  make 
 from  thence  to  strengthen  the  chm-ches  ?    Acts  xviil.  19-23. 
 
 7.  While  Aquila  and  Priscilla  learned  at  Ephesus,  what  extraordinary 
 preacher  came  to  their  assistance  ?  and  when  he  left  Ejihesus,  where  did 
 he  labour  afterwards  ?     Acts  xviii.  24-28. 
 
 8.  After  Paul  had  made  his  excursions  through  the  upper  coasts, 
 (Galatia,  Phrygia,  &c.,)  and  returned  to  Ephesus,  how  was  he  employed 
 tliere,  how  long  did  he  stay,  and  with  what  success  1    Acts  xix. 
 
 9.  What  fui-ther  excm-sions  did  Paul  make,  and  with  what  friends,  after 
 leaving  Ephesus,  before  he  came  to  Troas  1     Acts  xx.  1-6. 
 
 10.  Relate  what  occurred  at  Troas,  and  the  particulars  of  their  proceed- 
 ings until  they  came  to  Miletus.     Acts  xx.  7-16. 
 
 11.  Relate  the  particulars  of  the  travels  of  Paul  and  his  companions, 
 from  their  leaving  Miletus  and  their  coming  to  Csesarea  in  Canaan.  Acts 
 xxi.  1-8. 
 
 12.  Relate  the  particulars  recorded  during  Paul's  abode  at  Csesarea,  and 
 the  progress  of  himself  and  companions  to  Jerusalem.    Acts  xxi.  9-17. 
 
 13.  How  was  Pavd  employed  at  Jerusalem  on  his  arrival,  and  some  days 
 after  ?     Acts  xxi.  18-26. 
 
 14.  What  opposition  did  he  meet  with  from  the  Asiatic  Jews  there,  and 
 what  followed  1    Acts  xxi.  27-40. 
 
 1 0.  What  was  the  substance  of  his  defence,  which  by  permission  of  the 
 chief  captain  he  addressed  to  the  people  in  the  Syro-Hebraic  language  ? 
 Acts  xxii.  1-21. 
 
 16.  What  eifect  had  this  address  upon  the  hearers,  and  what  was  the 
 consequence  ?     Acts  xxii.  22-30. 
 
 17.  When  Paul  was  set  before  the  council  at  Jerusalem,  what  passed, 
 and  how  was  he  delivered  1     Acts  xsiii.  1-10. 
 
PART  ir.]  THE  SCRIPTURE  CATECHISM.  355 
 
 18.  Wliile  confined  in  the  castle,  what  happened,  how  was  he  delivered 
 from  his  determined  enemies,  and  whither  was  he  taken  ?    Acts  xiiii.  11-35. 
 
 19.  After  his  arrival  at  Csesarea,  by  whom  was  Paul  accused  before 
 Felix  the  Roman  governor,  and  what  was  his  defence,  with  the  result  of 
 it  ?    Acts  xxiv. 
 
 20.  On  Porcius  Festus  coming  into  Felix's  room,  what  became  of  Paul, 
 how  did  he  plead  his  cause  against  his  accusers,  before  Fe.stus,  before 
 King  Agi-ippa,  (son  of  Herod  Agrippa,)  and  his  sister  Bernice,  and  with 
 what  effect  ?     Acts  xxvi. 
 
 21.  When  Paul,  after  having  been  a  prisoner  at  Csesarea  about  two 
 years,  and  sent  a  prisoner  to  Rome,  who  were  his  companions,  and  what 
 were  the  particulars  of  his  voyage  until  the  time  of  his  having  a  Divine 
 admonition  1    Acts  xxvii.  1-20. 
 
 22.  What  was  the  purport  of  the  Divine  admonition  given  Paul,  and 
 how  was  it  accomplished  ?     Acts  xxvii.  21-24. 
 
 23.  The  cx'ew  landing  at  Melita,  (or  Malta,)  what  reception  was  given 
 them,  and  what  befell  them  while  there  ]     Acts  xxviii.  1-10. 
 
 24.  After  leaving  Melita,  (where  they  had  wintered  three  months,)  by 
 what  steps  did  they  proceed  to  Rome  1     Acts  xxviii.  11-16. 
 
 25.  On  his  arrival  at  Rome,  what  was  the  plan  he  pursued,  and  what 
 was  its  effect  1    Acts  xxviii.  17-29. 
 
 26.  How  long  did  Paid  continue  a  prisoner  at  Rome,  and  how  was  he 
 employed  1    Acts  xxviii.  30,  31. 
 
 §  64.  Of  the  Epistle  to  the  Komans. 
 
 1.  What  was  the  situation  and  the  civil  state  of  Rome,  when  this 
 epistle  was  written,  who  was  the  author  of  it,  and  what  the  purport  of  the 
 introduction  ?     Rom.  i.  1-15. 
 
 2.  Why,  and  in  what  manner,  does  the  writer  describe  the  dreadful 
 wickedness  of  the  heathens  ?     Rom.  i.  16-32. 
 
 3.  Why,  and  in  what  manner,  does  the  writer  prove  that,  as  the 
 heathen  were  condemned  by  the  law  of  nature,  so  the  Jews  could  not  be 
 justified  by  their  observance  of  the  Mosaic  law  1     Rom.  ii. 
 
 4.  If  neither  Jew  nor  Gentile  could  be  justified  by  the  observance  of 
 their  respective  laws  equally,  what  advantages  had  the  Jew  above  the 
 Gentile  ?     Rom.  iii.  1-8. 
 
 6.  In  what  manner  is  it  proved  that  the  wickedness  of  mankind  is 
 universal,  and  what  is  the  infei'ence  deduced  from  it?     Rom.  iii.  9-31. 
 
 6.  How  is  the  doctrine  of  justification  fm-ther  proved  from  the  case  of 
 Abraham,  and  what  is  the  inference  therefrom  ?     Rom.  iv. 
 
 7.  How  is  the  doctrine  of  justification,  with  its  fruits,  necessity,  and 
 superior  efficacy  illustrated  ?     Rom  v. 
 
 8.  In  what  manner  does  the  doctrine  of  justification  tend  to  universal 
 holiness  ?     Rom.  vi. 
 
 9.  _In  what  manner  is  it  shewn  that  the  believer  is  freed  from  the  law, 
 as  a  covenant?     Rom.  vii.  1-6. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  does  Paul  describe  the  use  and  excellence  of  the 
 moral  law,  though  ineffectual  for  justification  ?     Rom.  vii.  7-25. 
 
356  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 11.  What  are  the  principal  privileges  of  believers  as  delivered  frora  the 
 law?    Eom.  viii. 
 
 12.  In  what  manner  does  St  Paid  manifest  his  concern  for  his  Jewish 
 countiymen,  while  rejectors  of  the  gospel  ?     Eom.  ix.  1-5. 
 
 13.  In  what  manner  is  the  sovereignty  of  God,  in  the  distributions  of 
 His  favours,  illustrated,  and  the  objections  answered?     Eom.  ix.  6-33. 
 
 14.  How  does  St  Paul  shew  that  the  blessings  of  the  gospel  were  ordained 
 for  the  Gentiles,  as  well  as  the  Jews  ?     Eom.  x. 
 
 15.  How  does  he  shew  the  consistency  of  God's  ancient  promises,  and 
 the  extension  of  the  gospel  to  the  Gentiles  ?     Eom.  xi. 
 
 16.  What  are  the  practical  improvements  which  the  apostle  deduces 
 from  the  doctrines  of  grace  1    Eom.  xii.,  xiii. 
 
 17.  In  what  manner  does  he  inculcate  upon  the  believing  Jews  and 
 Gentiles  the  lessons  of  mutual  love  and  genuine  candour  ?  Eom.  xiv., 
 XV.  1-13. 
 
 18.  What  are  the  principal  miscellaneous  remarks  contained  in  the 
 latter  part  of  the  epistle  ?     Eom.  xv.  14-33,  xvi. 
 
 19.  What  appears  to  be  the  spiritual  state  of  the  church  at  Eome  when 
 this  epistle  was  addressed  to  them  ?     Eom.  i.-xvi. 
 
 §  65.  Of  the  Ei^istles  to  the  Corinthians. 
 
 1.  What  was  the  situation  and  civil  state  of  Corinth  when  this  first 
 epistle  was  written,  who  was  the  author  of  it,  and  what  the  import  of  the 
 introduction  ?     1  Cor.  i.  1-9. 
 
 2.  What  was  the  state  of  the  church  of  Corinth  when  this  epistle  was 
 written?     1  Cor.  i.  10-31. 
 
 3.  In  what  manner  does  he  vindicate  his  manner  of  preaching  at 
 Corinth  ?     1  Cor.  ii. 
 
 4.  How  does  he  discountenance  the  carnality  of  professing  Cliristians  ? 
 1  Cor.  iii. 
 
 5.  What  is  the  true  light  in  which  gospel  ministers  ought  to  be 
 viewed  by  Christian  churches  ?     1  Cor.  iv. 
 
 6.  What  should  be  the  conduct  of  a  Christian  ohiu'ch  towards  an 
 immoral  member  ?     1  Cor.  v. 
 
 7.  What  du-ections  does  St  Paul  give  to  the  Corinthians  about  going 
 to  law  ?     1  Cor.  vi.  1-8. 
 
 8.  In  what  manner  should  Christians  regard  past  crimes,  and  how 
 improve  their  Christian  liberty  ?     1  Cor.  vi.  9-20. 
 
 9.  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  marriage  ?     1  Cor.  vii. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  should  strong  Christians  conduct  themselves  before 
 the  weak  ?     1  Cor.  viii. 
 
 11.  In  what  manner  doth  St  Paul  vindicate  his  apostolic  right  and 
 authority  ?     1  Cor.  ix. 
 
 12.  By  what  arguments  does  he  caution  the  Corinthians  against  apostasy 
 disobedience,  and  unbelief  ?     1  Cor.  x. 
 
 13.  What  were  the  principal  abuses  in  the  Corinthian  church,  and  how 
 doth  St  Paul  rebuke  and  rectify  them  ?     1  Cor.  xi.,  xii. 
 
 14.  What  are  superior  excellences  of  Christian  love  ?     1  Cor.  xiii. 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCEDPTUEE  CATECHISM.  357 
 
 15.  What  are  the  arguments  against  an  unknown  language  in  public 
 worship  ?     1  Cor.  xiv. 
 
 16.  What  are  the  principal  arguments  and  illustrations  advanced  in 
 supi^ort  of  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  ?     1  Cor.  xv. 
 
 17.  With  what  miscellaneous  remarks  does  he  conclude  the  first  epistle  i 
 
 1  Cor.  svi. 
 
 18.  What  were  the  principal  excellences  and  defects  of  this  church  when 
 this  epistle  was  addressed  to  them  ?     1  Cor.  i.-xvi. 
 
 19.  Who  was  the  author  of  the  Second  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians,  and 
 what  is  the  purport  of  the  introduction  ?     2  Cor.  i.,  ii.  1-4. 
 
 20.  What  is  the  direction  to  them  concerning  a  penitent  backslider  1 
 
 2  Cor.  ii.  5-11. 
 
 21.  What  account  does  Paul  give  to  the  Corinthians  of  the  success  of 
 his  own  ministry  ?     2  Cor.  ii.  12-17,  iii.  1-5. 
 
 22.  How  does  he  prove  the  superiority  of  the  evangelical  to  the  legal 
 dispensation  ?     2  Cor.  iii.  6-18. 
 
 23.  What  were  the  animating  springs  of  Paul's  ministerial  labours  ? 
 2  Cor.  iv.,  V. 
 
 24.  In  what  manner  did  Paul  and  his  companions  conduct  themselves  in 
 their  great  work  ?     2  Cor.  vi. 
 
 25.  What  were  the  principal  effects  which  the  first  epistle  produced,  in 
 the  Corinthians  1    2  Cor.  vii. 
 
 26.  How  doth  St  Paid  enforce  the  obligation  of  a  charitable  contribution 
 for  the  poor  saints  in  Judea  ?     2  Cor.  viii.,  ix. 
 
 27.  In  what  manner  does  he  vindicate  himself  against  the  invidious 
 suggestions  of  corrupt  teachers  1     2  Cor.  x.-xii. 
 
 28.  With  what  miscellaneous  remarks  does  he  conclude  this  epistle  ? 
 2  Cor.  xiii. 
 
 29.  What  seems  to  have  been  the  spiritual  state  of  the  church  at  Corinth 
 when  this  second  epistle  was  written  1     2  Cor.  i.-xiii. 
 
 §  66.  Of  the  Epistle  to  the  Galatians. 
 
 1.  What  was  the  situation  and  civil  state  of  Galatia  when  this  epistle 
 was  written,  who  was  the  author  of  it,  and  what  is  the  import  of  the  intro- 
 duction ?     Gal.  i.  1-5. 
 
 2.  What  is  the  cause  of  the  author's  sharp  reproof,  and  of  his  vindication 
 of  his  apostolical  authority  ?     Gal.  i.  6-24,  ii.  1-34. 
 
 3.  By  what  arguments  does  he  prove  the  doctrine  of  justification  by 
 faith,  without  the  works  of  the  law.     Gal.  ii.  15-21,  iii. 
 
 4.  How  does  Paul  shew  the  Galatians  their  folly  in  cleaving  to  legal 
 observances,  and  corrupt  teachers,  who  blended  the  law  and  the  gospel  ? 
 Gal.  iv. 
 
 5.  By  what  arguments  does  he  enforce  his  foregoing  doctrine  of  justifi- 
 cation, and  exhort  them  to  stand  fast  in  gospel  liberty  ?     Gal.  v.  1-12. 
 
 6.  How  does  he  caution  them  against  abiising  their  liberty  ?  Gal.  v. 
 13-26. 
 
 7.  With  what  miscellaneous  exhortation  does  he  conclude  this  epistle  ? 
 Gal.  vi. 
 
358  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  II. 
 
 8.  What  appears  to  have  been  the  spiritual  state  of  the  church  at  Galatia 
 ■R-hen  this  epistle  was  written  ?     Gal.  i.-vi. 
 
 §  67.  Of  the  Epistle  to  the  Ephesians. 
 
 I.  What  was  the  situation  and  civil  state  of  Ephesus  when  this  epistle 
 was  first  penned,  who  was  the  writer  of  it,  and  what  is  the  import  of  the 
 introduction  ?    Eph.  i.  1,  2. 
 
 .     2.  In  what  particulars  does  he  display  the  greatness  of  Divine  grace  to 
 the  church  ?     Eph.  i.  3-12. 
 
 3.  What  is  the  purport  of  his  supplication  for  them  ?     Eph.  i.  13-23. 
 
 4.  In  what  manner  does  he  magnify  the  riches  of  free  grace  ?     Eph.  ii. 
 
 5.  How  does  he  maintain  his  apostolic  commission  among  the  Gentiles  ? 
 Eph.  iii.  1-12. 
 
 6.  What  is  the  purport  of  his  fervent  prayer  for  the  Ephesians  ?  Eph. 
 iii.  13-21. 
 
 7.  What  are  the  principal  lessons  deduced  from  the  foregoing  state- 
 ments of  the  doctrine  of  grace  ?    Eph.  iv. 
 
 8.  By  what  arguments  does  the  apostle  warn  the  Ephesians  against  sins 
 of  uncleanuess,  covetousness,  and  drunkenness  ?     Eph.  v.  1-20. 
 
 9.  What  are  the  relative  duties  enjoined  on  husbands  and  wives  ? 
 Eph.  V.  21-23. 
 
 10.  By  what  arguments  does  he  enforce  the  relative  duties  of  children 
 and  parents,  servants  and  masters?     Eph.  vi.  1-9. 
 
 II.  What  is  the  substance  of  his  concluding  exhortation  ?    Eph.  vi.  10-24. 
 12.  What  appears  to  have  been  the  spiritual   state  of  the  chiu'ch  of 
 
 Ephesus  when  this  epistle  was  addressed  to  them  1    Eph.  i.-vi. 
 
 §  68.  Of  the  Epistle  to  the  Philippians. 
 
 1.  What  were  the  situation  and  the  civil  state  of  Philippi  when  this 
 epistle  was  wi'itten,  who  was  the  author  of  it,  and  what  are  the  contents 
 of  the  first  chapter  ?     Phil.  i. 
 
 2.  By  what  arguments  does  he  exhort  the  Philippians  to  harmony,  kind- 
 ness, humility,  diligence,  and  exemplariness  ?     Phil.  ii.  1-18. 
 
 3.  What  are  the  principal  commendations  he  gives  to  Timothy  and 
 Epaphroditus  ?     Phil.  ii.  19-30. 
 
 4.  By  what  considerations  does  he  caution  the  Philippians  against 
 blending  the  Jewish  law  and  the  gospel  ?     Phil.  iii.  1-14. 
 
 5.  By  what  considerations  does  he  recommend  holiness  and  heavenly- 
 mindedness  ?     Phil.  iii.  15-21. 
 
 6.  What  is  the  purport  of  his  concluding  exhortation  ?    Phil.  iv. 
 
 7.  What  seems  to  have  been  the  spiritual  state  of  the  church  at  Philippi 
 when  this  epistle  was  first  addressed  to  them  1    Phil,  i.-iv. 
 
 §  69.  Of  the  Epistle  to  the  Colossians. 
 
 ].  What  were  the  situation  and  the  civil  state  of  Colosse  when  this 
 epistle  was  written,  who  was  the  writer  of  it,  and  what  is  the  import  of 
 the  introduction  ?     Col.  i.  1-8. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  359 
 
 2.  What  was  the  subject  of  his  prayer  for  them,  and  how  does  he  en- 
 gage their  attachment  to  Christ  and  His  grace  1    Col.  i.  9-29. 
 
 3.  By  what  considerations  does  Paul  caution  the  Colossians  against  vain 
 jihilosophy,  the  traditions  of  the  Jews,  and  human  institutions  ?     Col.  ii. 
 
 4.  By  what  ai-gument  does  he  enforce  heavenly-mindedness,  mortifica- 
 tion, and  mutual  love  ?     Col.  iii.  1-15. 
 
 5.  What  is  the  substance  of  his  exhortation  respecting  the  word  of 
 Christ,  and  various  relative  duties  in  Christian  families  ?     Col.  iii.  16-25. 
 
 6.  What  are  the  principal  jiarts  of  his  concluding  exhortation  to  the 
 Colossians  ?     Col.  iv. 
 
 7.  What  appears  to  have  been  the  spiritual  state  of  the  church  of  Colosse 
 when  this  epistle  was  addressed  to  them  ?     Col.  i.-iv. 
 
 §  70.  Of  the  Epistles  to  the  Thessalonians. 
 
 1.  What  were  the  situation  and  the  civil  state  of  Thessalonica  when  this 
 epistle  was  perused,  who  was  the  writer  of  it,  and  what  the  import  of  the 
 first  chapter  1     1  Thess.  i. 
 
 2.  By  what  considerations  does  he  encourage  their  progress  in  the  Divine 
 life  t     1  Thess.  ii. 
 
 3.  By  what  jDartioulars  doth  Paid  shew  his  love  to  them  ?     1  Thess.  iii. 
 
 4.  How  does  he  enforce  the  duties  of  purity,  brotherly  love,  diligence, 
 and  the  moderation  of  their  sori-ow  after  their  departed  friends  ?  1  Thess. 
 iv. 
 
 5.  How  does  he  enforce  a  preparedness  for  the  Lord's  coming  ?  1  Thess. 
 V.  1-10. 
 
 6.  What  are  the  contents  of  his  concluding  exhortation?  1  Thess.  v. 
 11-28. 
 
 7.  What  appears  to  be  the  spiritual  state  of  the  church  at  Thessalonica 
 when  the  first  epistle  was  addressed  to  them  ?     1  Thess.  i.-v. 
 
 8.  After  what  interval  of  time  from  the  writing  of  the  first  epistle  was 
 the  second  epistle  addressed  to  the  Thessalonians,  and  what  is  the  import 
 of  the  first  chapter  ?     2  Thess.  i. 
 
 9.  What  are  the  mistakes  he  attempts  to  rectify  in  the  Thessalonians, 
 and  by  what  arguments  ?     2  Thess.  ii. 
 
 10.  What  is  his  command  respecting  disorderly  walkers  in  the  church  1 
 2  Thess.  iii. 
 
 11.  What  appears  to  have  been  the  state  of  the  church  at  Thessalonica 
 when  the  second  epistle  was  addressed  to  it  ?     2  Thess.  i.-iii. 
 
 §  71.  Of  the  Epistles  to  Timothy. 
 
 1.  Who  was  Timothy,  and  where  did  he  reside  when  this  first  epistle 
 was  addressed  to  him  ?     1  Tim.  i.  1-3. 
 
 2.  In  what  manner  does  St  Paul  caution  him  against  Judaising  teachers  ] 
 1  Tim.  i.  4-11. 
 
 3.  By  what  considei'ations  doth  he  engage  him  to  maintain  faith  and  a 
 good  conscience  1     1  Tim.  i.  4-20. 
 
 4.  From  what  considerations  does  he  exhort  prayers  to  be  made  for 
 magistrates  and  all  men  ?     1  Tim.  ii.  1-8. 
 
360  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 5.  How  ouglit  women  to  behave  in  their  civil  and  religious  capacity  ? 
 
 1  Tim.  ii.  9-1.5. 
 
 6.  What  are  the  chief  qualifications  of  Christian  bishops,  or  overseers  of 
 their  flocks,  of  deacons  and  their  wives,  respectively  'I     1  Tim.  iii.  1-13. 
 
 7.  What  is  the  great  character  of  the  church,  and  the  great  mystery  of 
 godliness?     1  Tim.  iii.  14-16. 
 
 8.  What  are  his  directions  to  Timothy  in  connexion  with  his  caution 
 respecting  apostasy  ?     1  Tim.  iv. 
 
 9.  What  are  St  Paul's  directions  with  respect  to  old  and  young  poor 
 widows,  church  rulers,  and  Timoth3''s  own  person  1     1  Tim.  v. 
 
 10.  What  are  his  commands  with  respect  to  servants,  contentment,  and 
 riches  ?     1  Tim.  vi. 
 
 11.  What  light  is  thrown  on  the  spiritual  state  of  the  chiu'ch  at  Ephesus, 
 at  the  time  of  writing  this  epistle  ?     1  Tim.  i.-vi. 
 
 12.  What  interval  of  time  was  there  between  the  writing  of  the  first  and 
 second  ejpistles  to  Timothy,  and  what  is  the  import  of  the  fij'st  chapter  ? 
 
 2  Tim.  i. 
 
 13.  By  what  arguments  does  he  exhort  Timothy  to  a  courageous  and 
 persevering  diligence  in  his  ministerial  work  ?     2  Tim.  ii.  1-13. 
 
 14.  What  is  the  subject  of  his  exhoi-tation  with  respect  to  errors,  false 
 teachers,  diflerent  sorts  of  professions,  and  Timothy's  own  personal  con- 
 duct ?     2  Tim.  ii.  14-26. 
 
 15.  WTiat  is  the  character  of  those  who  cause  perilous  times  ?  2  Tim. 
 iii.  1-9. 
 
 16.  By  what  argument  does  he  lu'ge  Timothy  to  persevere  in  fidelity  in 
 his  great  work  1     2  Tim.  iii.  10-17,  iv.  1-18. 
 
 17.  What  is  the  purport  of  his  concluding  address  1    2  Tim.  iv.  19-27. 
 
 18.  What  appears  to  have  been  the  spiritual  state  of  the  church  at  Ephe- 
 sus at  the  time  of  writing  the  Second  Epistle  to  Timothy  ?     2  Tim.  i.-iv. 
 
 §  72.  Of  the  Epistle  to  Titus. 
 
 1.  Where  was  the  residence  of  Titus  when  this  epistle  was  addressed  to 
 him  ?    Tit.  i.  1-5. 
 
 2.  What  are  the  qualifications  of  a  faithful  Christian  minister,  as  dis- 
 tinguished from  false  teachers  ?     Tit.  i.  6-16. 
 
 3.  What  are  the  directions  given  to  Titus  respecting  the  old  and  young, 
 and  the  conduct  of  servants,  and  upon  what  grounds  1    Tit.  ii. 
 
 4.  What  are  his  directions  with  respect  to  civil  magistrates,  and  from 
 M'hat  consideration  ?     Tit.  iii.  1-8. 
 
 5.  What  is  the  concluding  exhortation  of  St  Paul  to  Titus  1    Tit.  iii.  9-15. 
 
 6.  What  appears  to  have  been  the  state  of  religion  at  Crete  when  this 
 epistle  was  written  ?     Tit.  i.-iii. 
 
 §  73.  Of  the  Epistle  to  Philemon. 
 
 1.  Where  was  Philemon  resident  at  the  time  this  epistle  was  ivritten, 
 and  what  was  his  general  character  ?     Philem.  1-7. 
 
 2.  Who  was  Onesimus,  and  in  what  manner  does  St  Paul  recommend 
 him  to  Philemon  ?     Philem.  8-22. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  361 
 
 3.  AVho  were  the  persons  that  joined  St  Paul  in  his  Christian  salutations  ? 
 Philem.  23-25. 
 
 4.  Does  anything  in  this  epistle  cast  any  light  upon  the  state  of  the 
 Church  at  Colosse,  and  what  the  character  of  Philemon  in  particular  ? 
 Philem.  1-25. 
 
 §  74.  Of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 
 
 1.  Who  were  the  persons  addressed  in  this  epistle,  their  residence  and 
 character,  who  was  the  writer  of  it,  and  what  the  import  of  the  introduc- 
 tion ?     Heb.  i.  1-3. 
 
 2.  By  what  arguments  does  the  author  prove  the  superior  excellence  of 
 the  gospel  dispensation  ?     Heb.  i.  4-14. 
 
 3.  What  is  the  inference  he  draws  from  the  dignity  of  Christ  1 
 Heb.  ii.  1-4. 
 
 4.  How  does  he  answer  the  objection  to  Christ's  dignity  drawn  from  His 
 sufferings  ?     Heb.  ii.  5-1 S. 
 
 6.  How  does  he  shew  the  superior  excellency  of  Christ,  in  comparison  of 
 Moses?     Heb.  iii.  1-6. 
 
 6.  How  does  he  enforce  the  danger  of  unbelief  and  apostasy  ?  Heb.  iii. 
 7-19. 
 
 7.  In  what  manner  does  he  prove  the  superior  excellency  of  the  Christian 
 rest  2     Heb.  iv.  1-10. 
 
 8.  By  what  argument  does  he  encourage  our  faith  and  hope  in  approach- 
 ing to  God  1     Heb.  iv.  11-16. 
 
 9.  How  does  it  appear  that  Christ  was  called  to,  and  discharged  the 
 office  of  a  priest  in  a  supereminent  manner  ?     Heb.  v.  1-10. 
 
 10.  In  what  manner  does  he  reprove  the  Hebrews  for  their  deficiency  or 
 want  of  progress  in  Divine  things  1     Heb.  v.  11-14. 
 
 11.  In  what  manner  does  he  display  the  danger  of  apostasy,  though  his 
 views  of  them  were  favourable  1    Heb.  vi.  1-10. 
 
 12.  By  what  arguments  does  he  encourage  them  in  faith  and  holiness  ? 
 Heb.  vi.  11-20. 
 
 13.  By  what  steps  does  he  prove  the  superiority  of  Christ's  priesthood  to 
 that  of  Aaron  ?     Heb.  vii.,  viii.  1-6. 
 
 14.  In  what  manner  does  he  shew  the  excellency  of  the  gospel  dispensa- 
 tion above  the  legal  t    Heb.  viii.  7-13. 
 
 15.  What  was  the  typical  meaning  of  the  Jewish  sanctuary  and  its  prin- 
 cipal utensils  t     Heb.  ix.  1-10. 
 
 16.  How  does  it  appear  that  they  signified  Christ  and  His  work  1  Heb. 
 ix.  11-22. 
 
 17.  How  does  the  necessity  and  superior  efficacy  of  Christ's  piriesthood 
 thence  follow  1    Heb.  ix.  23-28. 
 
 18.  By  what  arguments  does  the  apostle  draw  the  attention  of  the 
 Hebrews  from  the  Levitical  dispensation?     Heb.  x.  1-18. 
 
 19.  In  what  manner  does  he  encourage  them  to  improve  the  doctrine  of 
 Christ's  priesthood  ?     Heb.  x.  19-39. 
 
 20.  In  what  manner  does  he  describe  the  use  and  efficacy  of  faith  ?     Heb. 
 
362  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  II. 
 
 21.  How  does  he  encourage  believers  to  a  patient  enduring  of  their 
 afflicting  circumstances  ?     Heb.  xii.  1-13. 
 
 22.  By  what  arguments  does  he  enforce  reverence  and  gratitude  towards 
 God  as  well  as  jjeace  and  charity  towards  men  ?     Heb.  sii.  14-29. 
 
 23.  What  are  the  apostle's  concluding  exhortations  ?     Heb.  xiii. 
 
 24.  From  a  survey  of  this  epistle,  what  seems  to  have  been  the  state 
 of  the  professing  Jews  at  the  time  it  was  penned  1     Heb.  i.-xiii. 
 
 §  75.  Of  the  Ejjistle  of  James. 
 
 1.  Who  were  the  jjersons  addi'essed  in  this  epistle,  where  did  they  reside, 
 and  what  is  its  general  import?     Jamea  i.  1. 
 
 2.  In  what  manner  are  the  Hebrews  du-ected  to  improve  their  circum- 
 stances, whether  prosperous  or  adverse  1    James  i.  2-12. 
 
 3.  What  are  his  I'emarks  concerning  the  origin  of  sin  and  of  good  ?    James 
 i.  13-18. 
 
 4.  In  what  manner  is  the  word  of  God  to  be  received  and  improved  ? 
 James  i.  19-22. 
 
 5.  What  are  the  genuine  effects  of  pure  religion  as  opposed  to  hypocritical 
 pretenceT     James  i.  23-27. 
 
 6.  What  rule  has  he  given  with  resjpect  to  rich  and  poor,  equity  and 
 mercy  1    James  ii.  1-17. 
 
 7.  By  what  means  does  he  shew  the  foUy  of  pretending  faith  without 
 works  ?    James  ii.  18-26. 
 
 8.  Prom  what  considerations  does  he  argue  the  evil  of  an  unruly  tongue  1 
 James  iii.  1-12. 
 
 9.  How  is  heavenly  wisdom  recommended  ?     James  iii.  13-18. 
 
 10.  What  are  the  genuine  causes  of  wars,  brawlings,  and  ill  success  in 
 temporal  pursuits  ?     James  iv.  1-6. 
 
 11.  What  is  the  most  proper  deijortment  of  jsersons  surrounded  with 
 calamities  t    James  iv.  7-10. 
 
 12.  What  directions  does  he  give  with  respect  to  mutual  candour,  and 
 j)roper  management  of  temporal  affairs  ?     James  iv.  11-17. 
 
 13.  In  what  manner  does  he  reprove  the  covetous  and  oppressive  Jews  ? 
 James  v.  1-6. 
 
 14.  By  what  arguments  does  he  exhort  believers  to  a  patient  and  meek 
 endurance  of  their  tribulations  1    James  v.  7-11. 
 
 15.  What  are  his  du-ections  with  respect  to  swearing,  prayer,  and  praise  ? 
 James  v.  12-15. 
 
 16.  What  are   his   directions  re.speoting  mutual  confessions,  and   the 
 motives  for  prayer  and  zeal  ?    James  v.  16-20. 
 
 17.  What  appears  to  have  been  the  state  of  the  Chi-istian  Jews  at  the 
 time  when  this  epistle  was  written  ?    James  i.-v. 
 
 §  76.  The  EiDistles  of  Peter. 
 
 1.  Who  were  the  persons  addressed  in  the  First  Epistle  of  Peter,  and 
 what  the  import  of  the  introduction  ?     1  Pet.  i.  1,  2. 
 
 2.  By  what  considerations  does  he  endear  to  them  their  gospel  calling  ? 
 1  Pet.  i.  .3-12. 
 
PAET  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  363 
 
 3.  By  what  arguments  does  he  exhort  them  to  hoHness  and  brotherly 
 love  ?     1  Pet.  i.  13-25. 
 
 4.  What  are  the  considerations  suggested  against  the  offence  of  the 
 cross  1     1  Pet.  ii.  1-12. 
 
 6.  What  directions  were  given  respecting  obedience  to  governors,  and 
 masters,  with  the  motives  of  obedience  ?     1  Pet.  ii.  13-23. 
 
 6.  What  are  his  directions  to  liusbands  and  wives,  and  to  all  Christians 
 as  to  mutual  agreement  ?     1  Pet.  iii.  1-12. 
 
 7.  By  what  arguments  does  he  encourage  believers  under  persecutions, 
 and  also  deter  the  wicked  1     1  Pet.  iii.  13-22. 
 
 8.  In  what  manner  should  our  past  disobedience,  the  wickedness  of 
 others,  and  impending  judgments,  be  improved?     1  Pet.  iv.  1-11. 
 
 9.  How  shoidd  persecution  for  righteousness'  sake  be  endured  and 
 improved  ?     1  Pet.  iv.  12-19. 
 
 10.  What  exhortation  doth  St  Peter  give  with  respect  to  elders  and 
 young  persons  1     1  Pet.  v.  1-7. 
 
 11.  What  is  the  substance  of  his  concluding  exhortations  1  1  Pet.  v. 
 8-14. 
 
 12.  What  was  the  spiritual  state  of  the  Christian  Jews  at  the  time  this 
 epistle  was  written  ?     1  Pet.  i.-v. 
 
 13.  What  interval  of  times  was  there  between  the  writing  of  the  first 
 and  this  Second  Epistle,  and  what  is  the  import  of  the  introduction  ?  2 
 Pet.  ii.  1,  2. 
 
 14.  What  is  the  substance  of  this  exhortation  against  slothfulness  and 
 apostasy?     2  Pet.  ii.  3-11. 
 
 15.  By  what  topics  does  he  further  urge  them  to  adhere  to  Christ  and 
 His  gospel  ?     2  Pet.  ii.  12-21. 
 
 16.  In  what  manner  does  he  describe  the  character  and  doom  of 
 seducing  teachers  ?     2  Pet.  ii. 
 
 17.  What  observations  are  made  with  respect  to  Christ's  second  coming  ? 
 2  Pet.  iii.  1-7. 
 
 18.  In  what  manner  ought  the  ceremony  of  Christ's  second  coming  to 
 be  improved  ?     2  Pet.  iii.  11-18. 
 
 19.  What  was  the  spiritual  state  of  the  churches  of  the  Christian  Jews 
 when  this  epistle  was  written  ?     2  Pet.  i.-iii. 
 
 §  77.  The  Epistles  of  St  John.  . 
 
 1.  To  whom  was  the  First  Epistle  of  John  written,  about  what  time,  and 
 what  is  the  general  scope  of  it '?     1  John  i.  1-5. 
 
 2.  By  what  arguments  does  he  shew  the  necessity  of  holiness,  and  of  the 
 blood  of  Christ  ?     1  John  i.  6-10. 
 
 3.  What  are  the  genuine  effects  of  a  saving  knowledge  of  Christ,  and  of 
 union  to  Him.     1  John  iii.  1-1 1. 
 
 4.  In  what  manner  does  he  address  Christians  of  different  attainments 
 to  stand  fast  in  faith,  love,  and  obedience  1     1  John  iii.  12-29. 
 
 5.  What  is  the  true  effect  of  grace,  adoption,  and  Christian  hope  ? 
 1  John  iii.  1-10. 
 
364  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  II. 
 
 6.  What  are  the  distinguishing  marks  aud  great  advantage  of  saving 
 grace  ?     1  John  iii.  11-24. 
 
 7.  How  may  we  distinguish  the  spirit  of  the  gospel  from  any  other  spirit  1 
 1  John  iv.  1-6. 
 
 8.  From  what  considerations  does  he  enforce  brotherly  love  ?  1  John 
 iv.  7-21,  v.  1,  5. 
 
 9.  What  are  the  grand  evidences  of  the  truth  and  importance  of  the 
 gospel?     1  John  v.  6-21. 
 
 10.  To  whom  was  the  Second  Epistle  addressed,  aud  what  is  the  general 
 import  of  it  1     2  John  1-7. 
 
 11.  What  is  the  conduct  recommended  against  persons  holding  errors  of 
 a  very  pernicious  tendency  1     1  John  8-13. 
 
 12.  To  whom  was  the  third  epistle  wi-itten,  and  what  is  the  leading 
 design  of  it  ?     3  John  1-8. 
 
 13.  What  is  the  difference  between  the  character  of  Diotrephes  and  that 
 of  Demetrius  ?     3  John  9-14. 
 
 §  78.  The  Epistle  of  St  Jude. 
 
 1.  To  whom,  or  by  wliom  (or  what  Jude)  was  this  Epistle  wi-itten? 
 Jude  1-3. 
 
 2.  In  what  manner  does  he  shew  the  danger  of  being  infected  with  errors 
 in  sentiment  and  practice  ?    Jude  4-7. 
 
 3.  In  what  manner  are  seducing  teachers  and  their  miserable  end  fore- 
 told ?     Jude  8-16. 
 
 4.  What  are  his  directions  and  cautions  against  seduction  and  imposture  ? 
 Jude  17-25. 
 
 5.  What  light  does  this  epistle  cast  on  the  spiritual  state  of  the  chui'ches 
 at  the  time  it  was  written  ?    Jude  1-25. 
 
 §  79.  Of  the  Eevelation. 
 
 1.  To  whom  and  by  whom  was  this  book  wi'itten  ?    Rev.  i.  1-9. 
 
 2.  By  what  figurative  representation  does  Christ  reveal  Himself  for  the 
 encouragement  of  His  friends,  and  the  terror  of  His  enemies  ?  Rev. 
 i.  10-20. 
 
 3.  What  is  the  pm-port  of  Christ's  address  to  the  chm'ch  at  Ephesus  ? 
 Kev.  ii.  1-7. 
 
 4.  What  is  the  import  of  His  adcbess  to  the  church  at  Smyrna  ?  Eev. 
 ii.  8-11. 
 
 5.  What  is  the  import  of  His  address  to  the  church  at  Pergamos  ? 
 Kev.  ii.  12-17. 
 
 6.  What  is  the  character  of  the  church  at  Tbyatira  ?     Rev.  ii.  18-29. 
 
 7.  What  is  the  character  of  the  ohiu'ch  at  Sardis  1    Rev.  iii.  1-6. 
 
 8.  What  is  the  character  of  the  chui-ch  at  Philadelphia  ?     Rev.  iii.  7-13. 
 
 9.  What  is  the  character  of  the  church  at  Laodicea  1    Rev.  iii.  14-22. 
 
 '  10.  What  was  the  august  representation  made  to  John  as  introductory 
 to  the  vision  of  opening  the  seals,  and  what  its  leading  import  1     Rev.  iv. 
 
 11.  What  are  the  particulars  of  the  vision  of  the  book  sealed  with  seven 
 .seals  ?     Rev.  v. 
 
PART  II.]  THE  SCEIPTUEE  CATECHISM.  365 
 
 12.  What  followed  upon  opening  the  first  seal  ?     Rev.  'vi.  1,  2. 
 
 13.  What  followed  upon  opening  the  second  seal  1    Rev.  vi.  3,  4. 
 
 14.  What  followed  iipon  opening  the  third  seal  ?     Rev.  vi.  5,  6. 
 
 15.  What  followed  upon  opening  the  fourth  seal  1    Rev.  vi.  7,  8. 
 
 16.  What  followed  upon  opening  the  fifth  seal  ?     Rev.  vi.  9-11. 
 
 17.  What  followed  upon  opening  the  sixth  seal?    Rev.  vi.  12-17. 
 
 18.  What  are  the  particulars  of^the  vision  of  the  angel  sealing  the  ser- 
 vants of  God  1    Rev.  vii.  1-9. 
 
 19.  By  what  emblems  is  the  happy  state  of  the  Church  represented? 
 Rev.  vii.  10-17. 
 
 20.  What  followed  upon  opening  the  seventh  seal  ?     Rev.  viii.  1-6. 
 
 21 .  What  followed  when  the  first  angel  sounded  ?     Rev.  viii.  7. 
 
 .  22.  What  followed  when  the  second  angel  sounded  ?     Rev.  viii.  8,  9. 
 
 23.  What  followed  when  the  third  angel  sounded  ?    Rev.  viii.  10,  11. 
 
 24.  What  followed  when  the  fourth  angel  sounded  ?     Rev.  viii.  12,  13. 
 
 25.  What  followed  when  the  fifth  angel  sounded  ?     Rev.  ix.  1-12. 
 
 26.  What  followed  when  the  sixth  angel  sounded  ?     Rev.  ix.  13-21. 
 
 27.  What  is  the  subject  "of  the  tenth  chapter  ?     Rev.  x. 
 
 28.  What  is  the  subject  of  the  first  part  of  the  eleventh  chapter?    Rev. 
 xi.  1-14. 
 
 29.  What  followed  when  the  seventh  angel  sounded  ?     Rev.  xi.  15-19. 
 
 30.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  twelfth  chapter  ?     Rev.  xii. 
 
 31.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  thii'teenth  chapter  ?     Rev.  xiii. 
 
 32.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  fourteenth  chapter  ?     Rev.  siv. 
 
 33.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  fifteenth  chapter  ?    Rev.  xv. 
 
 34.  What  followed  upon  pouring  out  the  first  vial  ?     Rev.  xvi.  1,  2. 
 
 35.  What  followed  upon  pouring  out  the  second  vial  ?    Rev.  xvi.  3. 
 
 36.  What  followed  upon  pouring  out  the  third  vial  ?    Rev.  xvi.  4-7. 
 
 37.  What  followed  upon  pouring  out  the  fourth  vial  ?     Rev.  xvi.  8,  9. 
 
 38.  What  followed  ujjon  opening  the  fifth  vial  1     Rev.  xvi.  10,  11. 
 
 39.  What  followed  upon  pom-ing  out  the  sixth  vial  ?     Rev.  xvi.  12-16. 
 
 40.  What  followed  upon  pouring  out  the  seventh  vial?     Rev.  xvi.  17-22. 
 
 41.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  seventeenth  chapter?     Rev.  xvii. 
 
 42.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  eighteenth  chapter  ?     Rev.  xviii. 
 
 43.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  nineteenth  chapter  ?     Rev.  xix. 
 
 44.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  twentieth  chapter  ?     Rev.  xx. 
 
 45.  What  is  the  representation  given  of  the  New  Jerusalem  ?     Rev.  xxi. 
 
 46.  What  are  the  contents  of  the  twenty-second  chapter  ?    Rev.  xxii. 
 
 §  80.  MiscellaBeous  questions  on  the  Scriptures  in  general. 
 
 1.  What  are  the  three  most  excellent  characters  in  the  Old  Testament, 
 and  why  j'ou  think  them  so  ? 
 
 2.  What  are  the  three  most  excellent  characters  in  the  New  Testament, 
 and  why  ? 
 
 3.  What  are  the  three  worst  characters  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  on 
 what  account  ? 
 
 4.  What  are  the  three  worst  characters  in  the  New  Testament,  and  on 
 what  account  ? 
 
r>GG  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PART  11. 
 
 5.  What  are  the  two  greatest  miracles  recorded  in  the  Old  Testament, 
 and  why  do  you  think  them  so  ? 
 
 6.  "What  are  the  two  greatest  miracles  recorded  in  the  New  Testament, 
 and  why  1 
 
 7.  What  are  the  four  most  important  books  in  the  Old  Testament,  and 
 why  you  judge  them  to  be  so  ? 
 
 8.  What  ai-e  the  four  most  important  books  in  the  New  Testament,  and 
 why? 
 
 9.  What  are  the  three  chief  prophecies  in  the  Old  Testament  now  ful- 
 filled, and  for  what  reason  you  think  them  so  1 
 
 10.  What  is  the  chief  prophecy  of  the  New  Testament  not  yet  fulfilled, 
 and  why  the  chief? 
 
 11.  What  were  the  three  most  important  promises  of  the  Old  Testa- 
 ment, and  why  ? 
 
 12.  What  are  the  three  most  important  promises  of  the  New  Testament, 
 and  why  ? 
 
 13.  At  what  four  periods  was  the  Old  Testament  Church  at  the  lowest, 
 and  why  you  think  so  ? 
 
 14.  At  what  four  periods  was  the  Old  Testament  Church  in  its  gi-eatest 
 glory,  and  why  ? 
 
 15.  What  ai'e  the  three  greatest  sins  of  commission  mentioned  in  Scrip- 
 ture, and  why  you  think  them  so  ? 
 
 16.  What  are  the  thi'ee  greatest  sins  of  omission  mentioned  in  Scriptiu'e, 
 and  why  ? 
 
 17.  What  are  the  two  chief  gi-aces  or  spiritual  virtues  mentioned  in 
 Scripture,  and  why  they  are  so  ? 
 
 18.  What  is  the  greatest  penal  evil  with  which  God  threatens  the  dis- 
 obedient, and  why  the  greatest  ? 
 
 19.  What  is  the  greatest  blessing  that  God  proposes  to  them  that  love 
 Him,  and  why  you  judge  it  so  ? 
 
THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST,  ETC.* 
 
 •    THIRD  CLASS. 
 THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM, 
 
 FOXJNDED   ON 
 
 SCRIPTUEE  CHAEACTEES,  &c. 
 
 §  1.  Concerning  God  creating  all  things.  §2.  Adam.  §  3.  Enoch.  §  4.  Melchizedek. 
 §  5.  Isaac.  §  6.  Jacob  and  Esan.  g  7.  Joseph  and  his  brethren.  §  8.  Job. 
 §  9.  Pharaoh.     §  10.  Aaron. 
 
 §  1.  Concerning  God  creating  all  things. — Gen.  i,,  &c. 
 
 1.  Question.  What  do  you  know  of  that  great  and  good  God  who  created 
 the  heavens  and  the  earth  1 
 
 Answer.  God  is  an  infinite  Spirit,  (John  iv.  24 ;  1  Kings  viii.  27 ;  Jer. 
 xxiii.  24.) 
 
 *  The  chief  design  of  this  Catechism  is  to  render  the  most  important  oharactei-s 
 and  providential  facts  here  noticed  interesting  to  young  persons  of  about  twelve 
 years  of  age.  Far  this  purpose,  the  bare  goodness  or  badness  of  a  character,  or 
 the  mere  existence  of  a  fact,  is  not  thought  sufficient ;  but  special  regard  is  had  to 
 the  evidence  on  which  assertions  are  founded.  Holy  Writ  itself  requires  us  to 
 cxiltivate  this  mode  of  acquaintance  with  Christianity,  and  children  should  be 
 habituated  to  it  betimes,  (1  Pet.  iii.  15.)  Not,  indeed,  in  order  to  suspend  their 
 belief  on  that  alone  which  they  can  comprehend,  but  to  lead  them,  when  easily 
 
368  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  III. 
 
 2.  Q.  When  it  is  said  that  God  created  the  heavens  and  the  eai-th,  what 
 do  you  understand  by  it  1 
 
 A.  I  understand  that  He  made  them ;  and  that  the  things  which  are 
 seen  were  not  made  of  things  that  do  appeal',  (Heb.  si.  3 ;  John  i.  3 ;  Col. 
 i.  16.) 
 
 3.  Q.  When  it  is  asserted  that  God  said,  "  Let  there  be  light ;  and  He 
 saw  the  hght,  that  it  was  good  ;  and  called  the  hght  day,"  do  you  suppose 
 that  He  has  a  body  hke  oui's  1 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  a  spu'it  hath  not  flesh  and  bones  as  we  have,  (Luke  xsiv.  39.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  is  meant,  then,  by  "  God  said  ? " 
 A.  He  made  known  His  will. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  is  meant  by  "He  saw  1 " 
 A.  He  observed  or  took  notice. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  is  meant  by  "  He  called  ? " 
 A.  He  gave  a  name. 
 
 7.  Q.  Was  the  earth,  when  first  created,  the  same  as  it  now  apipears  ? 
 A.  No  ;  it  was  without  form,  and  great  dai-kness  covered  it,  (Gen.  i.  2.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Was  there  no  sea  at  the  very  first  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  God  on  the  third  day  caused  the  waters  under  the  heaven  to 
 be  gathered  together  unto  one  place,  and  called  them  seas,  (Gen.  i.  9,  10.) 
 
 9.  Q.  Were  there  at  first  no  trees  or  grass  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  God  on  the  third  day  also  made  the  earth  to  bring  forth 
 grass,  and  herbs,  and  trees  of  every  kind,  (Gen.  i.  11,  12.) 
 
 10.  Q.  Was  there  always  a  sim  and  a  moon,  and  were  there  always 
 bright  stai-s  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  God  on  the  fourth  day  set  them  in  the  firmament  of  heaven 
 to  give  hght  upon  the  earth,  (Gen.  i.  14-18.) 
 
 11.  Q.  Which  were  made  first — the  grass  and  other  vegetables,  or  the 
 beasts  and  insects  ? 
 
 A.  The  grass  and  other  vegetables  were  made  first,  (Gen.  i.  11,  12, 
 24,  25.) 
 
 12.  Q.  Why  were  they  made  first  ? 
 
 A.  Because  the  beasts  and  insects  could  have  no  suitable  support  with- 
 out them. 
 
 13.  Q.  Which  were  made  first — the  waters  or  the  fishes  ? 
 A.  The  waters  were  made  first,  (Gen.  i.  9,  20,  21.) 
 
 14.  Q.  Why  so  2 
 
 A.  Because  without  water  the  fishes  could  not  have  lived. 
 
 practicable,  to  understand  the  reasons  of  what  they  believe,  and  to  inquire  into 
 the  causes  and  effects  of  what  they  observe.  This  method  is  calculated  to  enlarge 
 the  mind,  and  not  barely  to  store  the  memory,  and  may  be  read  by  children  with 
 advantage  when  not  required  to  learn  it  in  the  usual  way,  though  the  author  id 
 apprehensive  that  the  method  here  adopted  is  peculiarly  favourable  to  easy  recol- 
 lection. How  far  it  is  calciUated  to  answer  the  design  proposed,  in  any  degree 
 superior  to  former  publications  of  the  kind,  judicious  parents  and  teachers  who 
 have  the  highest  welfare  of  children  at  heart,  and  to  whom  it  is  respectfully  pre- 
 sented by  the  author,  will  eventually  decide. 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  369 
 
 15.  Q.  Which  did  God  make  first — the  birds,  or  the  air  in  which  they 
 fly? 
 
 A.  The  air  in  which  they  fly,  (Gen.  i.  6,  7.) 
 
 16.  Q.  For  what  reason  was  the  air  made  first  ? 
 
 A.  Because  without  air  birds  could  not  live,  nor  use  their  wings  by  flying. 
 
 17.  Q.  What  was  the  last  thing  that  God  made  at  the  creation? 
 A.  Man,  male  and  female,  (Gen.  i.  27.) 
 
 18.  Q.  Who  were  the  first  man  and  woman  ? 
 A.  Adam  and  Eve. 
 
 19.  Q.  When  it  is  said  that  "  God  created  man  in  His  own  image,"  what 
 is  the  meaning  of  it  ? 
 
 A.  It  means  chiefly,  that  he  was  righteous  and  holy  ;  very  innocent,  and 
 very  good,  (Eph.  iv.  24.) 
 
 20.  Q.  Is  there  any  man  or  woman  now  innocent  and  good,  hke  Adam 
 and  Eve  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  all  have  sinned,  and  are  guilty  before  God,  (Eom.  iii.  23, 
 V.  12.) 
 
 21.  Q.  Why  was  man  made  last  of  all  the  creatures,  after  herbs,  fruits, 
 beasts,  fowls,  and  fishes  ? 
 
 A.  Because  he  lives  by  them  ;  and  thus  all  other  things  were  made  ready 
 for  his  use. 
 
 22.  Q.  When  God  had  created  the  heavens,  and  the  earth,  and  all  the 
 hosts  of  them  in  sis  days,  in  what  manner  was  the  seventh  kept  ? 
 
 A.  God  blessed  the  seventh  day,  and  sanctified  it,  (Gen.  ii.  2,  3  ;  Exod. 
 XX.  11.) 
 
 23.  Q.  Why  did  God  happily  distinguish  and  set  apart  the  seventh  day 
 rather  tlian  any  other  1 
 
 A.  Because  in  it  he  had  ceased  from  aU  His  creating  work. 
 
 24.  Q.  Were  there  not  other  creatures  made,  possessed  of  rational  and 
 immortal  minds,  besides  human  beings  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  angels  are  among  the  creatures  of  God. 
 
 25.  Q.  How  do  you  know  that  there  are  angels  ? 
 
 A.  Though  they  are  not  mentioned  in  the  account  of  the  creation,  they 
 are  noticed  in  other  parts  of  Scripture  very  often,  (Gen.  six.  1  ;  Matt.  xiii. 
 39,  &c.) 
 
 26.  Q.  What  sort  of  beings  are  they  ? 
 
 A.  They  are  spirits  of  great  knowledge  and  power,  (Heb.  i.  7  ;  Matt,  xiii, 
 49  ;  2  Pet.  ii.  11.) 
 
 27.  Q.  Are  they  all  good  1 
 
 A.  No  ;  some  have  rebelled  against  God,  and  are  called  devils,  (2  Pet.  ii. 
 4  ;  Jude  6  ;  James  ii.  19.) 
 
 28.  Q.  Have  these  any  influence  in  this  world  1 
 
 A.  Yes ;  great  influence  in  tempting  men  to  evil,  and  making  them 
 miserable,  (Eph.  vi.  11 ;  1  Pet.  v.  8.) 
 
 29.  Q.  Have  the  good  angels  any  influence  in  this  world  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  for  they  are  aU  ministering  spirits,  ministering  to  those  who 
 shall  be  heirs  of  salvation,  (Heb.  i.) 
 VOL.  IV.  2  A 
 
370  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 §  2.  Coucerning  Adam. — Gen.  i.  26,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  In  what  state  was  Adam,  the  first  man,  when  created  1 
 A.  In  a  state  of  Hkeness  to  God. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  that  likeness  ? 
 
 A.  Spiritual  knowledge,  righteousness,  and  true  holiness,  (Eph.  iv.  24  ; 
 Col.  iii.  18.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  siairitual  knowledge  1 
 
 A.  Such  knowledge  of  God  and  other  things  as  helps  the  soul  to  be 
 humble  and  hapjiy. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  was  the  righteousness  of  Adam  1 
 A.  His  being  without  fault  or  blame. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  true  holiness  ? 
 
 A.  Purity  of  mind,  and  sincerity  of  obedience,  (Matt.  v.  8,  vi.  22,  23.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Was  Eve,  the  first  woman,  in  such  a  state  as  this  when  created  ? 
 A.  Yes ;  but  she  and  her  husband  soon  failed  by  disobeying  the  com- 
 mand of  God. 
 
 7.  Q.  If  they  were  so  perfect,  how  came  they  to  disobey  God  ? 
 
 A.  Satan,  by  the  serpent,  tempted  Eve,  and  she  tempted  her  husband  to 
 eat  the  forbidden  fruit,  (Gen.  iii.  1,  &c.) 
 
 8.  Q.  What  followed  their  sinning  against  God  ? 
 
 A.  They  became  sinfuUy  knowing,  but  spiritually  ignorant,  guilty,  unholy, 
 and  disobedient,  (Gen.  iii.  7-12.) 
 
 9.  Q.  When  they  had  thus  fallen,  what  did  God  do  to  them  ? 
 
 A.  He  shewed  them  that  He  was  chspleased  with  their  sin  ;  but  signified 
 that  He  had  in  mercy  j^rovided  for  them  a  Saviour,  who  should  destroy  the 
 power  and  policy  of  Satan,  (Gen.  iii.  14,  15.) 
 
 10.  Q.  AVhat  do  you  learn  from  this  account  of  Adam  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  I  ought  to  fear  sinning  against  God,  to  shun  all  tempters 
 to  disobedience,  to  be  deeply  humbled  for  the  fall  of  my  nature,  and  to  be 
 thankful  to  God  for  providing  a  way  of  salvation. 
 
 §  3.  Concerning  Enoch. — Gen.  v.  18-24  ;  Heb.  xi 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Enoch  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Jared,  and  the  father  of  Methuselah. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  his  character  1 
 
 A.  He  was  a  very  good  man,  who  served  and  pleased  God,  though  sur- 
 rounded with  very  wicked  people,  (Gen.  v.  22,  24  ;  Heb.  xi.  5.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  became  of  him  after  thus  walking  with  God  ? 
 
 A.  God  changed  his  body,  and  took  him  to  paradise,  without  experienc- 
 ing the  pains  of  death. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  paradise  1 
 
 A.  A  better  world  than  that  in  which  we  now  live,  and  which  our  senses 
 cannot  perceive. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  this  account  of  Enoch  1 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  it  is  better  to  please  God  than  men,  and  that  eminent 
 piety  will  be  at  last  highly  i-ewarded. 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  371 
 
 §  4.  Concerning  Melcliizedek. — Gen.  xiv.  18-20  ;  Heb.  vii. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Melchizedek  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  king  of  Salem,  and  a  priest  of  the  most  high  God. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  is  a  priest  1 
 
 A.  A  true  priest  is  one  appointed  of  God  to  offer  sacrifice  and  make 
 intercession,  (Heb.  viii.  3,  ix.  24.) 
 
 3.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  he  behave  to  Abraham  1 
 
 A.  He  brought  forth  bread  and  wine  for  refreshment  to  Abraham  and 
 his  friends,  (Gen.  xiv.  18.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  else  did  Melchizedek  do  1 
 
 A.  He,  as  the  minister  of  God,  gave  Abraham  his  blessing,  (Gen.  siv.  19.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  return  did  Abraham  make  for  such  friendly  offices  ? 
 
 A.  He  gave  him  the  tenth  part  of  the  spoil  as  a  token  of  his  gratitude 
 and  submission  to  God,  (Gen.  xiv.  20  ;  Heb.  vii.  4-10.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Who  were  the  father  and  mother  of  Melchizedek  ? 
 
 A.  They  are  not  recorded  in  the  Scriptures,  and  in  this  respect  he  was 
 without  pedigree,  (Heb.  vii.  3.) 
 
 7.  Q.  As  Melchizedek  was  an  eminent  type  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  can 
 you  tell  me  what  is  a  religious  type  ? 
 
 A.  A  religious  type  is  any  person  or  thing  divinely  appointed  before  the 
 coming  of  Christ  to  represent  Him  or  His  Church,  (1  Cor.  x.  6  ;  Heb.  vi.  20.) 
 
 §  5.  Concerning  Isaac. — Gen.  xxi.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Isaac  ? 
 
 A.  The  son  of  Abraham  and  the  father  of  Jacob. 
 
 2.  Q.  Was  Isaac  Abraham's  eldest  son  ? 
 
 A  No  ;  Ishmael  was  older,  but  Isaac  was  the  son  of  promise,  and  the 
 father  of  God's  chosen  people. 
 
 3.  Q.  Who  was  the  mother  of  Isaac  1 
 A.  Sarah,  who  bore  him  in  her  old  age. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  very  great  trial  befell  Isaac  when  a  grown-up  young  man  1 
 A.  He  was  required  by  his  father  to  submit  to  death  as  if  he  had  been  a 
 
 lamb  for  sacrifice,  (Gen.  ssii.  1-14.) 
 
 5.  Q.  Did  not  his  father  love  him  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  very  dearly  ;  but  God  in  this  way  tried  Abraham,  and  gave  him 
 an  opportunity  to  shew  that  he  loved  the  command  of  God  more  than  his 
 child,  (Gen.  xxii.  15-18  ;  Heb.  xi.  17-19.) 
 
 6.  Q.  How  was  this  prevented  1 
 
 A.  The  angel  of  the  Lord  called  unto  Abraham,  and  said,  "  Lay  not  thy 
 hand  upon  the  lad,  [or,  the  youth,]  neither  do  thou  anything  unto  him." 
 
 7.  Q.  Did  not  Isaac  shew  great  love  to  God  by  being  willing  to  die  in 
 obedience  to  His  command  1 
 
 A.  Yes,  very  gi'eat ;  but  Jesus  Christ  shewed  much  greater  love  in  dying 
 the  just  for  the  unjust  that  He  might  bring  us  unto  God,  (John  xv.  13  > 
 Eom.  V.  7,  8.) 
 
 8.  Q.  What  else  do  you  learn  from  Isaac's  willingness  to  suffer  ? 
 
 A.  That  he  who  submits  himself  to  God,  and  is  willing  to  suffer  for  His 
 .sake,  shall  be  no  loser  in  the  end,  (Matt.  x.  39  ;  Rev.  xii.  11.) 
 
372  THE  EVAJJGKLICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 §  6.  Concerning  Jacob  and  Esau. — Gen.  xxv.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Jacob  ? 
 
 A.  The  son  of  Isaac  and  Rebekah,  and  twin-brother  of  Esau. 
 
 2.  Q.  Was  he  a  good  man  in  his  younger  days  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  upon  the  whole  ;  but  he  did  very  wrong  in  not  telling  the  plain 
 truth  to  his  father,  (Gen.  xxvii.  24.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Was  Esau  a  good  man  1 
 
 A.  No  ;  he  was  a  profane  person,  (Heb.  xii.  16.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  evidence  did  he  give  of  his  profaneness  ? 
 
 A.  He  not  only  hated  his  brother,  but  followed  vain  pleasures,  and 
 undervalued  religious  privileges. 
 
 5.  Q.  When  Jacob  fled  from  the  hatred  of  Esau,  what  happened  to  him 
 at  Luz,  which  he  called  Bethel  ? 
 
 A.  He  there  dreamed  that  he  saw  a  ladder  x-eaching  from  earth  to  heaven, 
 and  angels  ascending  and  descending  on  it,  (Gen.  xxviii.  12.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Were  the  two  brothers  reconciled  after  this  1 
 
 A.  Yes ;  many  years  after,  when  Jacob  retui'ned  from  Mesopotamia  into 
 liis  native  country. 
 
 7.  Q.  How  was  this  effected  ? 
 
 A.  Jacob,  being  the  wiser  and  the  better  man,  sent  a  submissive  message 
 with  presents  to  his  brother,  and  a  reconcihation  took  place,  (Gen.  xxxii.  &c.) 
 
 8.  Q.  How  did  Jacob  behave  while  in  the  house  of  Laban  ? 
 
 A.  With  great  diligence  in  his  business,  and  gi'eat  patience  under  trials, 
 (Gen.  xxxi.  39-42.) 
 
 9.  Q.  Where  did  Jacob  spend  the  last  years  of  his  life  ? 
 A.  In  Egypt  with  his  son  Joseph. 
 
 10.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  fi-om  this  account  of  Jacob  and  Esau  1 
 A.  I  learn  that  nearest  relatives,  even  twin-children,  may  be  one  good 
 
 and  the  other  wicked. 
 
 11.  Q.  Why  was  Jacob  better  than  Esau  ? 
 
 A.  It  was  because  God  loved  him,  and  thus  made  him  to  differ  ;  not  of 
 himself,  but  of  grace,  (Rom.  ix.  11.) 
 
 §  7.  Concerning  Joseph  and  his  brethren. — Gen.  xxxvii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Joseph  t 
 
 A.  The  son  of  Jacob  and  Rachel. 
 
 2.  Q.  Where  was  he  born  ? 
 
 A.  In   Mesopotamia,   in   the   house   of  Laban   his  grandfather,  (Gen. 
 XXX.  22-24.) 
 
 3.  Q.  How  did  his  father  Jacob  shew  his  excessive  fondness  for  him, 
 and  imprudently  distinguish  him  from  his  brethren  ? 
 
 A.  By  clothing  him  with  a  coat  of  many  colours,  or  enviable  finerj', 
 (Gen.  xxxvii.  3,  4.) 
 
 4.  Q.  How  did  his  brethren  behave  to  him  ? 
 A.  In  a  very  jealous  and  envious  manner. 
 
 5.  Q.  Had  not  Joseph  some  very  extraordinary  dreams  i 
 A.  Yes,  he  had  two  verv  remarkable  dreams. 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  373 
 
 6.  Q.  What  was  the  first  dream  he  had  about  some  sheaves  of  corn  ? 
 
 A.  In  it  he  saw  twelve  sheaves  of  his  brethren  bow  before  his  sheaf, 
 which  arose  and  stood  upright  in  the  field,  (Gen.  xxsvii.  5-8.) 
 
 7.  Q.  What  other  dream  had  he,  resj^ecting  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars  ? 
 A.  -He  saw  the  sun  and  the  moon,  and  eleven  stars,  make  obeisance  to 
 
 him,  (Gen.  ssxvii.  9-11.) 
 
 8.  Q.  When  he  related  these  dreams  to  his  brethren,  how  did  they  re- 
 ceive the  discovery  ? 
 
 A.  They  hated  and  envied  him  yet  the  more. 
 
 9.  Q.  When  he  related  his  last  dream  to  his  father,  how  was  it  received  ? 
 A.  His  father  rebuked  him,  and  said,  "  ShaU  I,  and  thy  mother,  and  thy 
 
 brethren,  indeed  come  to  bow  down  ourselves  to  thee,  to  the  earth  ? " 
 
 10.  Q.  How  did  his  brethren  behave  to  Joseph,  when  he  found  them 
 feeding  their  flocks  in  Dothan  ? 
 
 A.  They  said,  "  Come,  let  us  slay  him  and  cast  him  into  some  pit," 
 (Gen.  sxxvii.  20.) 
 
 11.  Q.  How  was  this  prevented  ? 
 
 A.  His  brother  Eeuben  heard  it,  and  delivered  him  out  of  their  hands. 
 
 12.  Q.  What  did  they  do  with  him  ? 
 
 A.  They  sold  him  to  a  company  of  Ishmaelites  who  were  going  to  Egypt, 
 for  twenty  pieces  of  silver. 
 
 13.  Q.  While  in  Egypt,  in  the  family  of  Potiphar,  and  tempted  by  his 
 mistress  to  do  what  was  very  wicked,  what  did  he  say  to  her  ? 
 
 A.  He  said  with  indignation,  "  How  can  I  do  this  great  wickedness,  and 
 sin  against  God  1 " 
 
 14.  Q.  When  his  wicked  mistress  caused  him,  though  innocent,  to  be 
 ]3ut  in  prison,  was  he  left  without  comfort  ? 
 
 A.  No ;  for  the  Lord  was  with  Joseph,  and  shewed  him  mercy,  (Gen. 
 xsxix.  21.) 
 
 15.  Q.  When  Josepih  was  brought  out  of  prison  to  Pharaoh,  in  order  to 
 interpret  his  dreams  for  him,  what  advice  did  he  give  2 
 
 A.  He  advised  Pharaoh  to  lay  up  in  store  provision  against  seven  years 
 of  famine. 
 
 16.  Q.  Who  was  appointed  by  Pharaoh  to   superintend  this  national 
 concern  ? 
 
 A.  Joseph  himself ;  for  Pharaoh  said  unto  his  servants,  "  Can  we  find 
 such  a  one  as  this  is,  a  man  in  whom  the  Spirit  of  God  is  ? "  (Gen.  xli.  38.) 
 
 17.  Q.  Was  not  Joseph  also  made  minister  of  state  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  Pharaoh  said,  "  According  to  thy  word  shall  all  my  people 
 be  ruled  ;  only  in  the  throne  will  I  be  greater  than  thou." 
 
 18.  Q.  How  old  was  Joseph  when  he  was  advanced  to  this  exalted  state  1 
 A.  Joseph  was  thirty  years  old  when  he  stood  before  Pharaoh,  king  of 
 
 Egypt,  (Gen.  xli.  46.) 
 
 19.  Q.  Had  Joseph  any  family  of  his  own  ? 
 
 A-  Yes,  he  had  by  his  wife  Asenath  two  sons,  Manasseh  and  Ephraim. 
 
 20.  Q.  Why  did  he  call  his  first-born  Manasseh,  or  forgetfulness  ? 
 
 A.  "  Because,"  said  he,  "  God  hath  made  me  forget  all  my  toil,  and  all 
 my  father's  house." 
 
ST-i  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  III. 
 
 21.  Q.  And  why  did  he  call  the  other  Ephraim,  or  fruitful? 
 
 A.  "  Because,"  said  he,  "  God  caused  me  to  be  fruitful  in  the  laud  of  my 
 affliction." 
 
 22.  While  Joseph  was  in  Egypt,  what  was  the  state  of  his  father  and 
 brethren  ? 
 
 A.  During  the  seven  yeai's  of  famine,  which  was  felt  by  sm'romiding 
 nations,  Jacob  sent  his  ten  sons  to  Egypt  to  buy  corn,  (Gen.  slii.) 
 
 23.  Q.  Why  did  he  not  send  Benjamin  the  youngest  with  the  other 
 ten? 
 
 A.  Because  he  was  fond  of  him  ;  for  he  said,  "  Lest  peradventure  mis- 
 chief befall  him." 
 
 24.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  Joseph  behave  to  his  brethren  when  they 
 first  came  ? 
 
 A.  When  Joseph  saw  his  brethren,  he  knew  them  ;  but  made  himself 
 strange  to  them,  and  spoke  roughly  to  them,  (Gen.  xlii.  7.) 
 
 25.  Q.  Did  he  act  in  this  manner  through  revenge,  or  want  of  affection 
 to  them  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  but  to  bring  them  to  a  proper  sense  of  their  past  conduct. 
 
 26.  Q.  When  Joseph  had  ordered  his  brethren  to  be  imprisoned  three 
 days,  and  demanded  one  as  a  hostage  until  their  youngest  brother  was 
 brought  to  him,  what  did  they  say  one  to  another  ? 
 
 A.  They  said,  "  We  are  verily  guilty  conceruing  our  brother,  in  that  we 
 saw  the  anguish  of  his  soul,  when  he  besouglit  us,  and  we  would  not  hear ; 
 therefore  is  this  distress  come  upon  us,"  (Gen.  xhi.  21.) 
 
 27.  Q.  Did  they  say  this  in  the  hearing  of  Joseph  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  but  they  knew  not  that  Joseph  understood  them,  for  he  spoke 
 to  them  by  an  interpreter. 
 
 28.  Q.  How  did  Joseph  bear  this  affecting  scene  ? 
 A.  He  turned  himself  about  from  them,  and  wept. 
 
 29.  Q.  Did  he  return  to  them  again  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  and  he  took  from  them  Simeon,  and  bound  him  before  their 
 eyes,  (Gen.  slii.  24.) 
 
 30.  Q.  When  Jacob,  their  father,  heard  that  Simeon  was  kept  as  a 
 hostage,  and  that  Benjamin  was  also  required,  what  did  he  say  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  Me  have  ye  bereaved  of  my  children  :  Joseph  is  not,  and 
 Simeon  is  not,  and  ye  wUl  take  Benjamin  away.  AH  these  things  are 
 against  me." 
 
 31.  Q.  Did  he  then  consent,  at  first,  to  send  Benjamin  with  them  into 
 Egypt  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  he  said,  too  hastily,  "My  son  shall  not  go  down  with  you  ; 
 for  his  brother  is  dead,  and  he  is  left  alone  :  if  mischief  befall  him  in  the 
 way  in  which  ye  go,  then  shall  ye  bring  down  my  gray  hairs  with  sorrow 
 to  the  grave,"  (Gen.  xhi.  38.) 
 
 32.  Q.  But  did  he  not,  at  last,  let  Benjamin  go  with  them  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  their  father  Israel  said  unto  them,  "  If  it  must  be  so  now, 
 do  this.  Take  of  the  best  fruits  of  the  laud  in  your  vessels,  ....  and  take 
 
 double  money  in  your  hand Take  also  your  brother,  and  arise,  go 
 
 again  unto  the  man,"  (Gen.  xliii.  11-13.) 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  375 
 
 33.  Q.  When  his  brethren,  full  of  apprehensions  and  fear,  presented 
 Benjamin  before  Joseph,  how  was  he  affected  with  the  sight  1 
 
 A.  His  bowels  did  yearn  upon  his  brother  :  he  sought  where  to  weep  ; 
 and  he  entered  into  his  chamber,  and  wept  there,  (Gen.  xliii.  30.) 
 
 34.  Q.  Did  Joseph  make  himself  known  to  his  brethren  1 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  having  caused  every  one  of  his  attendants  to  go  out  from  him, 
 he  made  himself  known  to  his  brethren  ;  and  he  wept  aloud,  (Gen.  xlv.  1, 2.) 
 
 35.  Q.  "When  he  recovered  himself  a  little,  what  did  he  say  more  1 
 
 A.  He  said  to  his  brethren,  "  T  am  Joseph  :  doth  my  father  yet  Uve  1 " 
 
 36.  Q.  What  reply  did  they  make  ? 
 
 A.  His  brethren  could  not  answer  him ;  for  they  were  troubled  at  his 
 presence. 
 
 37.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  he  encourage  his  brethren,  when  so  troubled 
 and  terrified  at  his  presence  ? 
 
 A.  He  said  to  them,  "  Come  near  to  me,  I  pray  you  ; "  and  he  said,  "  I 
 
 am  Joseph  your  brother,  whom  ye  sold  into  Egypt Be  not  grieved  ; 
 
 ....  for  God  sent  me  before  you  to  preserve  life,"  (Gen.  xlv.  5.) 
 
 38.  Q.  What  message  did  he  send  to  his  father  1 
 
 A.  "Thus  saith  thy  son  Joseph,  God  hath  made  me  lord  of  all  Egypt ; 
 come  down  unto  me,  tarry  not,"  (Gen.  xlv.  9.) 
 
 39.  Q.  What  useful  caution  did  he  give  to  his  brethren  ? 
 
 A.  He  said  to  them, "  See  that  ye  fall  not  out  by  the  way,"  (Gen.  xlv.  24.) 
 
 40.  Q.  When  his  father  heard  the  affecting  account,  what  did  he  say  ? 
 A.  He  said,  "  It  is  enough  ;  Joseph  is  yet  alive  :  I  will  go  and  see  him 
 
 before  I  die,"  (Gen.  xlv.  28.) 
 
 41.  Q.  What  do  you  chiefly  learn  from  this  history  of  Joseph  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  envy  and  hatred  are  very  bad  things, — that  innocence, 
 piety,  and  wisdom  are  the  path  to  true  honour, — and  that  the  ways  of 
 Providence  are  wonderful. 
 
 §  8.  Concerning  Job. — Chap,  i.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Job  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  great  prince  in  the  land  of  Uz. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  he  remarkable  for  ? 
 
 A.  For  his  holy  character,  for  his  great  change  from  riches  to  poverty, 
 and  for  his  patience  under  great  trials,  (James  v.  11.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  were  some  of  his  trials  1 
 
 A.  He  lost  his  children  by  sudden  death,  and  his  property  by  fire  and 
 by  robbers. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  other  trials  had  he  "i 
 
 A.  He  was  afflicted  in  his  body,  treated  unkindly  by  his  friends,  calum- 
 niated by  Satan,  and  tempted  to  sin  by  his  own  wife,  (Job  ii.,  &o.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  did  he  say  when  he  lost  his  children  and  property  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  The  Lord  gave,  and  the  Lord  hath  taken  away  ;  blessed  be 
 the  name  of  the  Lord,"  (Job  i.  21.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  did  he  say  to  his  wife  when  she  tempted  him  to  curse  God, 
 and  die '.' 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  Thou  speakest  as  one  of  the  foolish  women  speaketh. 
 
376  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 What !  shall  we  receive  good  at  the  hand  of  God,  and  shall  we  not  receive 
 evil?"  (Jobii.  10.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  does  Job  comfort  himself  against  the  persecution  of  his  pre- 
 tended friends  ? 
 
 A.  He  says,  '•  I  know  that  my  Redeemer  liveth,  and  that  he  shall  stand 
 at  the  latter  day  upon  the  earth,"  (.Job  six.  25.) 
 
 8.  Q.  "When  God  shewed  His  own  greatness  and  holiness  to  His  servant 
 Job,  what  did  he  say  ? 
 
 A.  "  I  have  heard  of  thee  by  the  heai-ing  of  the  eai- ;  but  now  mine  eye 
 seeth  thee  :  wherefore  I  abhor  myself,  and  repent  in  dust  and  ashes,"  (Job 
 xlii.  5,  6.) 
 
 §  9.  Conceruiiig  Pharaoli.* — Esod.  iii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Phai-aoh  ? 
 
 A.  A  proud  and  powerful  king  of  Egypt. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  did  he  do  to  Israel  ? 
 
 A.  He  kept  them  poor,  and  made  them  work  hard,  (Esod.  v.  5-19.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Who  were  appointed  to  treat  with  him  about  Israel's  deliverance 
 from  servitude  ? 
 
 A.  Moses  and  Aaron,  (Exod.  v.  1.) 
 
 4.  Q.  When  they  requested  the  freedom  of  Israel,  what  answer  did 
 Pharaoh  make  ? 
 
 A.  Pharaoh  said,  '•  Who  is  the  Lord,  that  I  should  obey  his  voice,  to  let 
 Israel  go  1 "  (Exod.  v.  2.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  did  the  Lord  do  to  shew  him  his  foUy  and  wickedness  ? 
 A,  He  sent  upon  his  laud  ten  plagues. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  eftect  had  these  plagues  on  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  at  fii'st  hardened  his  heai-t,  and  then  relented  and  confessed  his 
 faults,  (Exod.  vii.  13,  14,  viii.  34,  is.  27,  28,  x.  27,  28,  si.  31,  32.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  he  confess  his  faults  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  The  Lord  is  righteous,  and  I  and  my  people  are  wicked," 
 (Exod.  ix.  27.) 
 
 8.  Q.  What  became  of  him  at  last  ? 
 
 A.  He  and  his  army  were  dro^vned  in  the  Eed  Sea,  while  persecuting 
 the  Israelites,  (Esod.  siv.  23-31.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  do  you  leam  fi-om  the  history  of  Pharaoh  ? 
 
 A.  I  leam  from  the  history  of  Pharaoh,  that  he  who  hardeneth  himself 
 against  God  shall  not  prosper,  but  shall  come  to  a  miserable  end. 
 
 §  10.  Concerning  Aaron. — Exod.  iv.,  &c. 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Aaron? 
 
 *  Phai-aoh  was  a  name  qommon  to  the  kings  of  Egypt  for  many  ages ;  for  one 
 of  them  was  contemporary  with  Abraham,  and  others  appear  in  succession  till 
 the  time  of  EzekieL  What  was  the  proper  name  of  this  king  who  opposed  Moses 
 and  Aaron  is  not  easily  ascertained. 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  377 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Amram  and  Jochebed,  the  elder  brother  of  Moses 
 and  Miriam,  and  the  first  high  priest  among  the  Jews. 
 
 2.  Q.  For  what  was  he  remarkable  ? 
 
 A.  For  his  talent  of  speaking  well,  for  performing  many  miracles  before 
 Pharaoh,  and  weakly  yielding  to  the  sin  of  the  golden  calf. 
 
 3.  Q.  What  was  the  golden  calf  1 
 
 A.  The  golden  calf  was  an  idol  which  the  people  of  Israel  would  have 
 made,  while  Moses  was  on  the  mount  with  God,  (Esod.  xxxii.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Who  were  the  sons  of  Aaron  1 
 
 A.  Nadab  and  Abiha,  Eleazar  and  Ithamar. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  became  of  Nadab  and  Abihu  ? 
 
 A.  They  were  killed  by  fire  from  heaven,  (Lev.  s.  2.) 
 
 6.  Q.  For  what  cause  ? 
 
 A.  Because  they  ofiered  before  the  Lord  strange  fire,  which  He  com- 
 manded them  not,  (Lev.  x.  1.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  Aaron  behave  under  this  afflictive  providence  ? 
 A.  He  held  his  peace  in  humble  submission,  (Lev.  x.  3.) 
 
 8.  Q.  What  became  of  Eleazar  ? 
 
 A.  Eleazar  succeeded  his  father  in  the  high-priesthood. 
 
 9.  Q.  How  long  did  the  famUy  of  Eleazar  continue  in  the  high-priest- 
 hood? 
 
 A.  TiU  the  time  of  Eli. 
 
 10.  Q.  What  became  of  Ithamar  ? 
 
 A.  His  descendants  were  common  priests  till  the  time  of  Eli,  and  then 
 became  possessed  of  the  high-priesthood. 
 
 11.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  fi-om  the  history  of  Aaron  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  he  was  a  good  man,  highly  honoured  of  the  Lord. 
 
 12.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  concerning  his  sons,  Nadab  and  Abihu  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  God  is  much  displeased  with  the  profane  and  the  pre- 
 sumptuous, in  His  service. 
 
 13.  Q.  If  you  are  profane  and  presumptuous  until  death,  what  will  be- 
 come of  you  ? 
 
 A.  I  must  go  to  hell  to  suffer  misery  for  ever. 
 
 §  2.  Joshua.  §  3.  Achan.  §  4  Samson. 
 §  5.  Ruth.  §  6.  Saul.  §  7.  Solomon.  §  8.  Ahab.  §  9.  Jehoshaphat.  §  10. 
 Hezekiah.  §  11.  Manasseh.  §12.  Josiah.  §13.  Jeremiah.  §  14  Belshazzar. 
 §  15.  Ezra.     §  16.  Nehemiah,     §  17.  Esther.     §  18.  Haman  and  Mordecai. 
 
 §  1.  Concerning  Balak  and  Balaam. — Num.  xxii.,  xxxi. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Balak  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  sou  of  Zijjpor,  and  a  king  of  the  Moabites,  (Num.  xxii.  4) 
 
 2.  Q.  How  did  he  behave  towards  the  Israehtes  ? 
 
 A.  He  sent  for  Balaam  the  sou  of  Beor,  saying,  "  Curse  me  this  people, 
 for  they  are  too  mighty  for  me,"  (Num.  xxii.  6.) 
 
378  THE  EVANGELICAL  GATECHIST.  [PAKT  III. 
 
 3.  Q.  How  was  Balaam,  who  loved  the  wages  of  imrigliteousuess,  hiu- 
 dered  from  going  to  Balak  with  the  messengers,  and  from  cursing  the 
 Ijeople  l 
 
 A.  God  said  unto  Balaam,  "  Thou  shalt  not  go  with  them ;  thou  shalt 
 not  curse  the  people :  for  they  are  blessed,"  (Num.  xsii.  12.) 
 
 4.  Q.  When  he  was  prevailed  upon  by  other  princely  messengers  to  go 
 to  Balak,  what  befell  him  by  the  way  ? 
 
 A.  He  "  was  rebuked  for  his  iniquity  ;  the  dumb  ass,  speaking  with 
 man's  voice,  forbade  the  madness  of  the  prophet,"  (2  Pet.  ii.  16.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  was  the  occasion  of  this  remarkable  fact  1 
 
 A.  An  angel  hindered  the  ass  from  going  forward,  and  her  master  smote 
 her,  (Num.  xiii.  22,  &o.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Did  Balaam  afterwards  see  the  angel  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  for  "  the  Lord  ojjened  the  eyes  of  Balaam,  and  he  saw  the  angel 
 of  the  Lord  standing  in  the  way,  and  his  sword  drawn  in  his  hand,"  (Num. 
 xxii.  3L) 
 
 7.  Q.  When  Balak  was  full  of  expectation  to  hear  curses  pronounced 
 upon  Israel,  what  did  Balaam  say  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  God  is  not  a  man,  that  he  should  lie  ;  nor  the  son  of  man, 
 
 that  he  should  repent Behold,  I  have  received  commandment  to 
 
 bless ;  and  he  hath  blessed,  and  I  cannot  reverse  it,"  (Num.  xsiii.  19,  20.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Did  he  say  anything  more  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  many  things  ;  and,  among  others,  he  said,  "  Surely  there  is  no 
 enchantment  against  Jacob,  neither  is  there  any  divination  against  Israel," 
 (Num.  xiiii.  23.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  this  history  of  Balaam  and  Balak  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  they  were  both  bad  men, — one  wished  to  curse  the 
 people  whom  God  blessed,  and  the  other  would  have  done  it  if  he  durst. 
 
 10.  Q.  What  else  do  you  learn  from  the  conduct  of  Balaam  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that,  without  a  new  heax't  and  a  right  spirit,  there  may  be 
 great  knowledge,  but  no  salvation. 
 
 §  2.  Concerning  Joshua. — Exod.  xxiv.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Joshua? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Nun,  of  the  tribe  of  Ephraim,  and  the  minister  of 
 Moses,  (Exod.  xxiv.  13.) 
 
 2.  Q.  Was  this  the  only  name  by  which  he  was  called  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  he  was  also  called,  at  the  first,  Oshea,  and  Jehoshua,  (Num.  xiii. 
 16  ;)  and  once  in  the  New  Testament,  Jesus,  (Heb.  iv.  8.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Was  Joshua  a  religious  man  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  he  wholly  followed  the  Lord,  (Num.  xxii.  12.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Was  he  a  "wise  man  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  he  was  full  of  the  spirit  of  wisdom,  (Deut.  xxxiv.  9.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  authority  had  he  over  the  people  of  Israel  compared  with 
 Moses  ? 
 
 A.  The  Lord  magnified  Joshua  in  the  sight  of  all  Israel,  and  they  feared 
 him,  as  they  feai-ed  Moses,  all  the  days  of  his  life,  (Josh.  iv.  14.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Did  God  work  any  miracle  by  him  ? 
 
PAKT  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  S79 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  he  dried  up  the  water  of  Jordan  by  Joshua  as  he  did  the  Red 
 sea  by  Moses,  (Josh.  iv.  23.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Did  not  the  sun  and  the  moon  stand  still  at  the  word  of  Joshua  ? 
 A.  Yes ;  the  light  of  the  sun  continued  upon  Gibeon,  and  the  light  of 
 
 the  moon  in  the  valley  of  Ajalon,  much  longer  than  usual,  (Josh.  x.  12,  13.) 
 
 8.  When  Joshua  had  divided  the  land  of  promise  by  lot  among  the 
 tribes  of  Israel,  what  was  his  exhortation  to  them  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  Cleave  unto  the  Lord  your  God Take  heed  unto 
 
 yourselves,  that  ye  love  the  Lord  your  God Fear  the  Lord,  and 
 
 serve  him  in  sincerity  and  in  truth,"  (Josh,  sxiii.  8,  11,  14.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  was  Joshua's  own  resolution  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  before  all  the  people,  "  As  for  me  and  my  house,  we  will 
 serve  the  Lord,"  (Josh,  xxiii.  15.) 
 
 10.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  from  the  history  of  Joshua  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  religion,  in  a  governor  or  a  master,  is  a  great  blessing  to 
 those  who  are  under  them ;  and  that  no  business,  however  important,  is  a 
 sufficient  excuse  to  persons  in  a  public  situation  for  habitually  neglecting 
 religion  in  themselves  and  their  households. 
 
 §  3.  Concerning  Achan. — Josh.  vii. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Achan  ? 
 
 A.  The  son  of  Carmi,  of  the  tribe  of  Judah. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  great  wickedness  was  he  guilty  of? 
 A.  He  was  guilty  of  oovetousness  and  theft. 
 
 3.  Q.  What  did  he  covet  ? 
 
 A.  A  goodly  Babylonish  garment,  or  a  princely  robe,  a  quantity  of  silver, 
 and  a  wedge  of  gold,  (Josh.  vii.  21.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Did  he  steal  as  well  as  covet  them  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  and  then  hid  them  in  the  earth  in  the  midst  of  his  tent. 
 
 5.  Q.  How  was  he  punished  for  these  crimes  ? 
 
 A.  All  Israel,  by  Divine  command,  stoned  him  to  death ;  and  they 
 raised  over  him  a  great  heap,  (Josh.  vii.  25,  26.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  the  sin  and  punishment  of  Achan  1 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  oovetousness  and  dishonesty  are  very  great  sins, — that 
 God  is  much  displeased  with  those  who  covet  and  steal, — and  sooner  or  later 
 He  will  severely  punish  aU  such  offenders. 
 
 7.  Q.  How  may  you  best  avoid  these  dangerous  crimes  1 
 
 A.  By  being  content  with  such  things  as  I  have,  by  esteeming  honesty 
 in  others,  and  by  seeking  heavenly  treasure. 
 
 §  4.  Concerning  Samson. — Judges  xiii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Samson  1 
 
 A.  He  was  the  strongest  of  men,  and  a  judge  in  Israel. 
 
 2.  Q.  Whose  son  was  he  1 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  ofManoah,  of  the  family  of  the  Danites,  (Judges  xiii.  2.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  was  the  first  proof  he  gave  of  his  strength  ? 
 
 A.  When  he  met  a  roaring  lion,  he  rent  him  as  he  would  have  rent  a 
 kid,  and  he  had  nothing  in  his  hand,  (Judges  xiv.  6.) 
 
880  THE  EVANGELIOAl  CATECHIST.  [PAET  HI. 
 
 4.  Q.  When  the  men  of  Judah  were  compelled  to  bind  him  with  cords 
 and  deliver  him  to  the  Pliilistines,  what  followed  ? 
 
 A.  He  broke  the  strong  cords  before  the  Philistines,  and  with  the  jaw- 
 bone of  an  ass  he  slew  a  thousand  men  of  them,  (Judges  xv.  14^16.) 
 
 5.  Q.  Was  this  great  strength  always  with  him  1 
 A.  No  ;  when  God  was  displeased,  it  left  him. 
 
 6.  Q.  When  he  lost  his  strength,  what  did  the  Philistines  do  to  him  ? 
 A.  They  put  out  his  eyes,  bound  him  with  fetters,  and  made  him  laboui- 
 
 in  the  pi-ison,  (Judges  xvi.  21.) 
 
 7.  Q.  When  the  lords  of  the  Philistines  rejoiced  in  their  idol-god,  as  if 
 he  had  delivered  Samson  into  their  hands,  and  ordered  the  prisoner  to  be 
 brought  forth  for  their  sport,  what  happened  ? 
 
 A.  His  great  strength  now  returned,  and  he  pulled  down  the  house  , 
 where  the  lords  and  the  people  were  assembled,   perishing  with  them  in 
 the  ruins,  (Judges  xvi.  24-30.) 
 
 8.  Q.  How  long  did  he  act  as  a  chief  magistrate  over  the  Israelites? 
 A.  He  judged  Israel  twenty  years,  (.Judges  xv.  20,  xvi.  31.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  from  the  history  of  Samson  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that,  (like  many  others,)  as  he  had  a  great  talent,  he  had 
 great  trials  ;  and  therefore  great  talents  should  not  be  envied. 
 
 10.  Q.  What  else  do  you  learn  ? 
 
 A.  That  it  is  dangerous  to  be  connected  with  wicked  people,  for  most 
 of  his  troubles  were  occasioned  by  his  irreligious  wives. 
 
 §  5.  Concerning  Eutli. — Chap,  i.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Ruth  1 
 
 A.  She  was  a  woman  of  Moab,  (Euth  i.  4.) 
 
 2.  Q.  Did  she  not  marry  an  Israelite  who  lived  in  her  country  ? 
 A.  Yes  ;  she  married  a  son  of  Elimelech  and  Naomi. 
 
 3.  Q.  How  came  she  to  leave  her  own  country  ? 
 
 A.  Her  mother-in-law  Naomi,  now  a  widow,  was  going  to  the  land  of 
 Judah,  and  she  herself  had  buried  her  husband,  (Ruth  i.  5-7.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Did  Naomi  urge  her  to  go  along  ? 
 
 A.  No,  but  rather  dissuaded  her,  (Ruth  i.  8,  &c.) 
 
 5.  Q.  How  did  Ruth  bear  this  proposed  parting  ? 
 
 A.  She  was  much  affected,  and  said,  "Entreat  me  not  to  leave  thee,  or 
 to  return  from  following  after  thee,"  (Ruth  i.  16.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Did  she  not  make  a  strong  resolution  not  to  leave  her  mother-in- 
 law? 
 
 A,  Yes  ;  for  she  said  to  her,  "  Whither  thou  goest,  I  will  go  ;  and  where 
 thou  lodgest,  I  will  lodge  :  where  thou  diest,  will  I  die,  and  there  wiU  I  be 
 buried,"  (Euth  i.  16,  17.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Was  she  not  a  convert  to  the  true  religion  ? 
 
 A.  She  was,  it  seems ;  for  she  said,  "  Thy  people  shall  be  my  people, 
 and  thy  God  my  God." 
 
 8.  Q.  When  they  came  to  Bethlehem,  what  happened  to  Ruth  ? 
 
 A.  She  became  acquainted  with  a  man  of  great  wealth,  related  to  her 
 former  husband,  and  he  married  her,  (Ruth  iv.  13.) 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  381 
 
 9.  Q.  Who  was  this  man  ? 
 
 A.  His  name  was  Boaz,  and  he  was  the  great-grandfather  of  David  the 
 king,  (Ruth  iv.  17.) 
 
 10.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  from  the  history  of  Euth  ? 
 
 A.  That  affectionate  attachment  among  relations  is  very  lovely,  especially 
 when  strengthened  hy  true  religion. 
 
 §  6.  Concerning  Saul. — 1  Sam.  ix.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Saul? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  man  of  the  tribe  of  Benjamin,  and  his  father's  name  was 
 Kish. 
 
 2.  Q.  How  came  he  to  be  made  a  king  ? 
 
 A.  He  providentially  met  Samuel  the  prophet  at  Ramah  ;  and  the  Lord 
 had  revealed  to  Samuel  that  he  must  anoint  him  to  reign  over  Israel,  (1 
 Sam.  ix.  15-17.) 
 
 3.  Q.  When  made  king,  did  he  conduct  himself  properly  1 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  in  many  things  he  disobeyed  the  commands  of  God. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  was  the  consequence  of  his  disobedience  ? 
 
 A.  Samuel  told  him,  "  Because  thou  hast  rejected  the  word  of  the  Lord, 
 he  hath  also  rejected  thee  from  being  king,"  (1  Sam.  xv.  23.) 
 
 5.  Q.  How  did  Saul  receive  the  message  ? 
 
 A.  He  confessed  that  he  had  sinned,  but  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
 truly  humbled. 
 
 6.  Q.  Who  was  anointed  to  be  king  in  his  stead  ? 
 
 A.  David,  the  youngest  son  of  Jesse,  (1  Sam.  xvi.  11-13.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  Saul  behave  to  David  ? 
 
 A.  When  David  had  killed  Goliath  the  Philistine,  he  was  praised  by  the 
 people,  and  Saul  was  envious,  (1  Sam.  xviii.  6-S.) 
 
 8.  Q.  How  did  his  envy  shew  itself  ? 
 
 A.  He  wanted  to  kill  him  several  times,  (1  Sam.  xviii.  11,  xix.  10.) 
 
 9.  Q.  Did  Saul  succeed  in  his  evil  design  1 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  through  the  friendship  of  Jonathan,  the  son  of  Saul,  and  the 
 constant  care  of  God,  he  was  preserved,  (1  Sam.  xix.  2,  3.) 
 
 10.  Q.  What  was  the  character  of  Saul  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  very  wicked  man,  full  of  envy,  malice,  and  I'evenge. 
 
 11.  Q.  What  was  his  end  ? 
 
 A.  He  fell  in  battle  with  the  Philistines,  together  with  his  three  sons, 
 in  Mount  Gilboa,  (1  Sam.  xxxi.  1-6.) 
 
 12.  Q.  What  more  do  you  learn  from  the  history  of  Saul  1 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  a  man  may  be  much  favoured  by  the  appointment  of 
 Providence,  while  his  conduct  is  very  displeasing  to  God, — that  disobedience 
 to  Divine  commands  is  the  way  to  ruin, — and  that  envy  is  a  most  criminal 
 and  dangerous  passion. 
 
 §  7.  Concerning  Solomon. — 2  Sam.  xii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Solomon  1 
 
 A.  The  son  of  David,  king  of  Israel. 
 
 2.  Q.  Had  he  not  another  name  given  him  1 
 
382  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  Nathan  the  prophet  called  his  name  Jedidiah,  because  he  was 
 "  beloved  of  the  Lord,"  (2  Sam.  xii.  25.) 
 
 3.  Q.  When  the  Lord  appeared  to  Solomon  in  a  dream,  saying,  "Ask 
 what  I  shall  give  thee,"  what  was  the  choice  he  made  1 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  Give  thy  servant  an  understanding  heart  to  judge  thy 
 people,  that  I  may  discern  between  good  and  bad,"  (1  Kings  iii.  9.) 
 
 4.  Q.  How  did  God  testify  His  approbation  of  this  choice  1 
 
 A.  God  said  unto  him,  "  Because  thou  hast  asked  this  thing,  and  hast 
 not  asked  for  thyself  long  life  ;  neither  hast  asked  riches  for  thyself,  .... 
 lo,  I  have  given  thee  a  wise  and  an  understanding  heart ;  so  that  there  was 
 none  like  thee  before  thee,  neither  after  thee  shall  any  arise  like  unto 
 thee,"  (1  Kings  iii.  11,  12.) 
 
 5.  Q.  "What  was  one  glorious  effect  of  his  gi-eat  wisdom  1 
 
 A.  Judah  and  Israel  dwelt  safely,  (or,  in  confidence,)  every  man  under 
 his  vine,  and  under  his  fig-tree,  all  the  days  of  Solomon,  (1  Kings  iv.  25.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  was  another  efieot  of  his  great  wisdom  ? 
 
 A.  He  made  suitable  preparations  for  the  exercise  of  true  religion, 
 especially  by  building  a  temple  for  Divine  worship,  (1  Kings  v.,  &c.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Who  was  principally  engaged  at  the  dedication  of  the  temple  ? 
 A.  Solomon  himself,  attended  by  all  the  people  of  Israel,  (1  Kings  viii.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Was  not  the  fame  of  his  wisdom  widely  extended  1 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  "  there  came  of  all  people  to  hear  the  wisdom  of  Solomon,  from 
 all  kings  of  the  earth,  which  had  heard  of  his  wisdom,"  (1  Kings  iv.  34.) 
 
 9.  Q.  How  long  did  he  reign  ? 
 
 A.  The  time  that  Solomon  reigned  in  Jerusalem,  over  aU  Israel,  was  forty 
 years,  (1  Kings  xi.  42.) 
 
 10.  Q.  Notwithstanding  all  his  wisdom,  did  not  Solomon,  in  one  part  of 
 his  life,  gi-eatly  displease  the  Lord  1 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  "  The  Lord  was  angry  with  Solomon,  because  his  heai't  was 
 turned  from  the  Lord  God  of  Israel,  who  had  appeared  to  him  twice,  and 
 had  commanded  him  concerning  this  thing,"  (1  Kings  xi.  9,  10.) 
 
 1 1.  Q.  How  did  God  manifest  His  displeasm-e  ? 
 
 A.  The  Lord  said  unto  Solomon,  "  Forasmuch  as  this  is  done  of  thee, 
 and  thou  hast  not  kept  my  covenant  and  my  statutes,  which  I  have  com- 
 manded thee,  I  will  siirely  rend  the  kingdom  from  thee,"  (1  Kings  xi.  11.) 
 
 12.  Q.  Did  not  Solomon  repent  of  his  misconduct  1 
 
 A.  We  have  reason  to  think  that  this  message  was  the  means  of  his  re- 
 pentance and  reformation,  and  that  the  Book  of  Ecclesiastes  was  expressive 
 of  it. 
 
 13.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  from  the  history  of  Solomon  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn,  that  even  the  wisest  men  ai'e  endangered  by  riches  and 
 honour  ;  and  that  intimate  connexions  formed  with  iiTeligious  persons  are 
 strong  snares. 
 
 §  8.  Concerning  Ahab. — 1  Kings  xvi.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Ahab  1 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Omri,  king  of  Israel. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  the  general  character  of  Ahab  ? 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  383 
 
 A.  Of  him  it  is  said,  as  well  as  of  his  father,  that  he  "  did  evil  in  the 
 sight  of  the  Lord,  above  all  that  were  before  him,"  (1  Kings  xvi.  25,  30.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Whereby  did  he  shew  his  wickedness  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  indefatigable  in  persecuting  the  good  prophet  Elijah,  (1  Kings 
 xviii.  10.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Did  he  find  him  at  last  ? 
 
 A.  Elijah  was  beforehand  with  him,  and  said  to  Obadiah,  the  governor 
 of  Ahab's  house,  "  I  will  surely  shew  myself  unto  him  to-day,"  (1  Kings 
 xviii.  15.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  reception  had  Elijah  with  Ahab  1 
 
 A.  A  very  rough  reception,  for  Ahab  said  unto  him,  in  a  rage,  "Art 
 thou  he  that  troubleth  Israel  1"  (I  Kings  xviii.  15.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Was  not  Elijah  afraid  of  him  1 
 
 A.  'No  ;  for,  full  of  humble  and  holy  courage,  he  answered,  "  I  have  not 
 troubled  Israel ;  but  thou,  and  thy  father's  house,  in  that  ye  have  forsaken 
 the  commandments  of  the  Lord,  and  thou  hast  followed  Baalim,"  (1  Kings 
 xviii.  18.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Who  was  the  wife  of  Ahab  ? 
 
 A.  Jezebel,  the  daughter  of  Ethbaal,  king  of  the  Zidonians,  an  idolatress, 
 and  a  woman  of  the  worst  disposition,  (1  Kings  xvi.  31,  xix.  2.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Who  was  the  man  whose  vineyard  Ahab  coveted,  and  whose  death 
 Jezebel  caused  by  false  accusation  ? 
 
 A.  Naboth  the  Jezreelite,  whose  vineyard  was  in  Jezi-eel,  hard  by  the 
 palace  of  Ahab,  king  of  Samaria,  (1  Kings  xsi.  1,  8-10.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  became  of  Ahab  1 
 
 A.  He  died  according  to  the  prediction  of  Elijah,  who  said,  "In  the 
 place  where  dogs  licked  the  blood  of  Naboth,  shall  dogs  lick  thy.  blood, 
 even  thine,"  (1  Kings  xsi.  19,  xxii.  37,  38.) 
 
 10.  Q.  What  became  of  his  queen  ? 
 
 A.  She  also  died  according  to  Elijah's  prediction,  who  said,  "  The  dogs 
 shall  eat  Jezebel  by  the  wall  of  Jezreel,"  (1  Kings  xxi.  23, 2  Kings  ix.  30-37.) 
 
 11.  Q.  How  is  the  character  of  Ahab  summed  up  1 
 
 A.  "  There  was  none  like  unto  Ahab,  who  did  sell  himself  to  work 
 wickedness  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord,  whom  Jezebel  his  wife  stirred  up  ; 
 and  he  did  very  abominably  in  following  idols,"  (1  Kings  xxi.  25,  26.) 
 
 12.  Q.  What  more  do  you  learn  from  the  history  of  Ahab  1 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  false  views  of  religion  beget  and  foster  evil  passions, — 
 that  pei'secution  is  displeasing  to  God, — and  that  perseciitors  shall  at 
 length  be  themselves  punished. 
 
 §  9.  Concerning  Jehosliaphat. — 2  Chron.  xvii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Jehoshapihat  1 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Asa,  king  of  Judah. 
 
 2.  What  is  the  general  character  of  Jehoshaphat  ? 
 
 A.  His  heart  was  encouraged  in  the  ways  of  the  Lord,  and  he  took  away 
 the  idolatrous  high  places  and  groves  out  of  Judah,  (2  Chron.  xvii.  6.) 
 
 3.  Q.  How  did  he  further  manifest  his  attachment  to  the  true  religion  ? 
 A.  In  the  third  year  of  his  reign  he  sent  suitable  instructors  to  teach 
 
384  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHTST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 the  people  ;  and  ordered  the  gi-eat  men  about  him  to  promote  the  design, 
 (2  Chron.  xvii.  7,  8.) 
 
 4.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  these  instructors  proceed  in  the  work  ? 
 
 A.  "  They  taught  in  Judah,  and  had  the  book  of  the  law  of  the  Lord 
 with  them,  and  went  about  throughout  all  the  cities  of  Judah,  and  taught 
 the  people,"  (2  Chron.  xvii.  9.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  eifect  had  this  religious  reformation  on  the  neighbouring 
 states  ? 
 
 A.  "  The  fear  of  the  Lord  fell  upon  all  the  kingdoms  of  the  lands  that 
 were  round  about  Judah,  so  that  they  made  no  war  against  Jehoshaphat," 
 (2  Chron.  xvii.  10.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Was  not  Jehoshaphat  blameable  for  joining  affinity  with  Ahab, 
 the  wicked  king  of  Israel  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  and  he  was  justly  reproved  for  it  by  Jehu  the  prophet,  who 
 said  to  king  Jehoshaphat,  "  Shouldest  thou  help  the  ungodly,  and  love 
 them  that  hate  the  Lord  ?"  (2  Chron.  xix.  2.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Did  he  not  repent  of  his  folly,  and  proceed  with  the  work  of 
 reformation  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  for  he  endeavoured  to  bring  back  the  people  from  their  wicked 
 ways  unto  the  Lord  God  of  their  fathers,  (2  Chron.  xix.  4.) 
 
 8.  Q.  What  was  his  charge  to  the  judges  whom  he  set  in  the  land 
 throughout  the  cities  of  Judah  ? 
 
 A.  He  said  to  the  judges,  "  Take  heed  what  ye  do  :  for  ye  judge  not  for 
 
 man,  but  for  the  Lord Wherefore  now,  let  the  fear  of  the  Lord  be 
 
 upon  you  ;  take  heed  and  do  it :  for  there  is  no  iniquity  with  the  Lord  our 
 God,  nor  respect  of  persons,  nor  taking  of  gifts,"  (2  Chron.  xix.  6,  7.) 
 
 9.  Q.  When  the  Ammonites  and  others  came  against  Jehoshaphat  to 
 battle,  what  steps  did  he  take  ? 
 
 A.  "  He  set  himself  to  seek  the  Lord,  and  proclaimed  a  fast  throughout 
 all  Judah,"  (2  Chron.  xx.  3.) 
 
 10.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  he  seek  the  Lord  ? 
 
 A.  He  very  earnestly  prayed,  saying,  "  0  Lord  God  of  our  fathers,  art 
 not  thou  God  in  heaven  ?  and  rulest  not  thou  over  all  the  kingdoms  of  the 
 heathen  ?  and  in  thine  hand  is  there  not  power  and  might,  so  that  none  is 
 able  to  withstand  thee  ?  0  our  God,  wilt  thou  not  judge  them  ?  for  we 
 have  no  might  against  this  great  company  that  cometh  against  us  ;  neither 
 know  we  what  to  do  :  but  om-  eyes  are  upon  thee,"  (2  Chi'on.  xx.  6,  12.) 
 
 11.  Q.  How  did  he  exhort  the  people,  when  they  were  alarmed  by  their 
 threatening  enemies  ? 
 
 A.  Jehoshaphat  stood  up  and  said,  "  Hear  me,  0  Judah,  and  ye  in- 
 habitants of  Jerusalem,  Believe  in  the  Lord  your  God,  so  shall  you  be 
 established ;  believe  his  prophets,  so  shall  ye  prosper,"  (2  Chron.  xx.  20.) 
 
 12.  Q.  Did  not  Jehoshaphat  join  himseU,  after  all  this,  with  Ahaziah^ 
 king  of  Israel,  who  did  very  wickedly  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for,  though  at  first  he  was  unwilling,  he  afterwards  joined  with 
 him  to  make  ships  to  go  to  Tarshish,  (1  Kings  xxii.  49  ;  2  Chron.  xx.  35, 36.) 
 
 13.  Q.  Was  he  not  reproved  for  this  imprudent  conduct  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  Eliezer  the  prophet  was  commissioned  to  say,  "  Because 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  385 
 
 thou  hast  joined  thyself  with  Ahaziah,  the  Lord  hath  broken  thy  woi-ks," 
 (1  Kings  xxii.  48  ;   2  Chron.  xx.  37.) 
 
 14.  Q.  How  long  did  Jehoshaphat  reign  over  Judah  1 
 
 A.  Jehoshaphat  was  thirty  and  five  years  old  when  he  began  to  reign  ; 
 and  he  reigned  twenty  and  five  years  in  Jerusalem,  (2  Chron.  sx.  31.) 
 
 15.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  from  the  history  of  Jehoshaphat  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  gi-eat  and  good  men  are  too  often  drawn  into  impro- 
 prieties of  conduct, — that  habits  of  association  with  unprincipled  persons 
 are  dangerous, — and  that  when  any  are  so  betrayed,  they  should  expect  to 
 suffer  for  it. 
 
 §  10.  Concerning  Hezekiah. — 2  Chron.  xxix.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Hezekiah? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Ahaz,  a  very  wicked  king  of  Judah. 
 
 2.  Q.  With  so  bad  an  example  set  before  him,  what  was  the  character  of 
 Hezekiah  1 
 
 A.  He  was  extremely  different  from  his  father,  for  he  did  that  which 
 was  right  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord,  (2  Chron.  xxix.  2.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  evidence  did  he  give  of  his  pious  disposition  ? 
 
 A.  He  charged  the  ministers  of  religion  to  make  suitable  preparations 
 for  the  public  worship  of  the  true  God,  (2  Chron.  xxix.  3-11.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Was  the  charge  readily  complied  with  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  :  "And  Hezekiah  rejoiced,  and  all  the  people,  that  God  had  pre- 
 pared the  people  :  for  the  thing  was  done  suddenly,"  (2  Chron.  xxix.  36.) 
 
 5.  Q.  Had  not  Hezekiah  much  trouble  from  invaders  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  Sennacherib,  king  of  Assyria,  came,  and  entered  into  Judah, 
 and  encamped  against  the  fenced  cities,  and  thought  to  win  them  for  him- 
 self, (2  Chron.  xxxii.  1.) 
 
 6.  Q.  When  thus  endangered  by  a  threatening  invader,  what  steps  did 
 he  take  ? 
 
 A.  "He  took  counsel  with  his  princes  and  mighty  men"  how  they  might 
 best  fortify  Jerusalem,  and  encouraged  all  "  not  to  be  afraid  nor  dismayed 
 for  the  king  of  Assyria,  nor  for  aU  the  multitude  that  was  with  him," 
 (2  Chron.  xxxii.  3,  7.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  he  enforce  his  exhortation  ? 
 
 A.  He  directed  their  thoughts  to  God  ;  "  for,"  said  he,  "  there  be  more 
 with  us  than  with  him  :  with  him  is  an  arm  of  flesh  ;  but  with  us  is  the 
 Lord  our  God,"  (2  Chron.  xxxii.  8.) 
 
 8.  Q.  When  Sennacherib  and  his  servants  spoke  against  the  Lord  God 
 of  Israel,  and  set  Him  at  defiance,  what  course  was  taken  ? 
 
 A.  "  For  this  cause  Hezekiah  the  king,  and  the  prophet  Isaiah,  prayed 
 and  cried  to  heaven,"  (2  Chron.  xxxii.  20.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  did  Hezekiah  do  with  the  blasphemous  letter  he  received 
 from  Sennacherib  ? 
 
 A.  He  went  into  the  temple,  and  spread  the  letter  before  the  Lord,  and 
 then  prayed,  saying,  "  Now  therefore,  O  Lord  our  God,  I  beseech  thee, 
 save  thou  us  out  of  his  hand,  that  all  the  kingdoms  of  the  earth  may  know 
 that  thou  art  the  Lord  God,  even  thou  only,"  (2  Kings  xix.  14,  19.) 
 VOL.  IV.  2  B 
 
386  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAKT  IIL 
 
 10.  Q.  Was  there  any  answer  given  to  this  prayer  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  for  the  pi-oi^het  Isaiah  sent  to  Hezekiah,  saying,  "  Thus  saith 
 the  Lord  God  of  Israel,  That  which  thou  hast  jDrayed  to  me  against 
 Sennacherib  king  of  Assjria  I  have  heard,"  (  2  Kings  sis.  20.) 
 
 11.  Q.  In  what  manner  was  the  insulting  and  blaspheming  king  of 
 Assyria  immediately  punished  ? 
 
 A.  That  very  night  the  angel  of  the  Lord  went  out,  and  smote  in  the 
 camp  of  the  Assyrians  (185,000)  a  hundred  and  eighty-five  thousand  men, 
 (2  Kings  xix.  35.) 
 
 12.  Q.  Wlien  Isaiah,  some  time  after,  on  Hezekiah's  vain  display  of  his 
 treasures  to  some  messengers  from  Babylon,  predicted  the  futm'e  invasion 
 and  captivity  of  Judah,  what  was  the  king's  reply  ? 
 
 A.  "  Hezekiah  said  unto  Isaiah,  Good  is  the  word  of  the  Lord  which  thou 
 hast  spoken.  And  he  said,  Is  it  not  good,  if  peace  and  truth  be  in  my 
 days?"  (2  Kings  XX.  19.) 
 
 §  11.  Concerning  Manasseb. — 2  Kings  xxi. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Manasseh  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  sou  of  good  Hezekiah,  and  his  mother's  name  was 
 Hephzibah,  (2  Kings  xx.  21,  xxi.  1.) 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  the  first  general  character  of  ilanasseh  ? 
 
 A.  "He  did  that  which  was  evil  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord,  after  the 
 abominations  of  the  heathen,  whom  the  Lord  cast  out  before  the  children 
 of  Israel,"  (2  Kings  xxi.  2.) 
 
 3.  Q.  How  did  his  wickedness  manifest  itself  ? 
 
 A.  "  He  built  up  again  the  high  places  which  Hezekiah  his  father  had 
 destroyed  ;  and  he  reared  up  altai-s  for  Baal ;  .  .  .  .  and  worshipped  all  the 
 host  of  heaven,  and  served  them,"  (2  Kings  xxi.  3.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  other  abominations  was  he  guilty  of  i 
 
 A.  They  are  more  than  can  be  mentioned ;  but  some  of  them  were, — 
 "He  bmlt  altars  for  all  the  host  of  heaven  in  the  two  courts  of  the  house 
 of  the  Lord  ;  he  made  his  son  to  pass  through  the  fii'e,  [or,  dedicated  him 
 to  Moloch  ;]....  he  used  enchantments,  and  dealt  with  familiar  spirits 
 
 and  mzards Moreover,  Manasseh  shed  innocent  blood  very  much, 
 
 till  he  had  filled  Jerusalem  from  one  end  to  another,"  (2  Ejngs  xxi.  5, 6, 16.) 
 
 5.  Q.  How  long  did  this  king  reign  ? 
 
 A.  "  Manasseh  was  twelve  years  old  when  he  began  to  reign ;  and  he 
 reigned  fifty  and  five  years  in  Jerusalem,"  (2  Chron.  xxxiii.  1.) 
 
 6.  Q.  But  was  he  not  greatly  afflicted  before  his  death  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  :  '•  The  captains  of  the  king  of  Assyria  took  Manasseh  among 
 the  thorns,  and  bound  him  with  fetters,  and  can-ied  him  to  Babylon,"  (2 
 Chron.  xxxiii.  11.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  he  behave  in  his  affliction  ? 
 
 A.  "When  he  was  in  affliction,  he  besought  the  Lord  his  God,  and 
 humbled  himself  greatly  before  the  God  of  his  fathers,  and  prayed  unto 
 him,"  (2  Chron.  xxxiii.  12.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Did  the  Lord  attend  to  hi.s  prayer  '. 
 
PART  HI.]       THE  OLDEB  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  387 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  "  He  was  entreated  of  liiru,  and  heard  his  supphcation,  and 
 brought  him  again  to  Jerusalem  into  his  tiiugdom,"  (2  Chron.  xxxiii.  13.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  evidence  did  he  give  that  his  prayer  and  repentance  were 
 sincere  ? 
 
 A.  It  is  said,  that  "  Manasseh  knew  that  the  Lord  he  was  God,  .... 
 and  he  took  away  the  strange  gods,  ....  repaired  the  altar  of  the  Lord, 
 and  sacrificed  thereon  peace-ofierings  and  thank-ofi'erings,  and  commanded 
 Judah  to  serve  the  Lord  God  of  Israel,"  (2  Chron.  xxxiii.  13,  15,  16.) 
 
 10.  Q.  Who  succeeded  him  in  the  kingdom  ? 
 
 A.  His  wicked  son  Amon,  who  had  been  dedicated  to  Moloch,  who  wor- 
 shipped carved  images,  "  and  humbled  not  himself  before  the  Lox-d,  as 
 Manasseh  his  father  humbled  himself ;  but  Amon  trespassed  more  and 
 more,"  (2  Chron.  xxxiii.  23.) 
 
 11.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  from  the  history  of  Manasseh  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn,  "  that  grace  does  not  run  in  the  blood,"  that  the  most  atro- 
 cious transgressors  will  make  pretensions  to  some  religion,  and  that  with 
 God  thei'e  is  forgiveness  for  the  chief  of  sinners  who  humbly  pray  to  Him. 
 
 §  12.  Concerning  Josiah. — 2  Chron.  xxxiv.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Josiah  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  wicked  Amon. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  is  the  character  given  to  Josiah  by  the  sacred  historian  ? 
 
 A.  "  He  did  that  which  was  right  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord,  and  walked 
 in  the  ways  of  David  his  father,  and  declined  neither  to  the  right  hand  nor 
 to  the  left,"  (2  Chron.  xxxiv.  2.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Did  he  not  manifest  a  religious  disposition  when  he  was  very 
 young  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  in  the  eighth  year  of  his  reign  (when  about  sixteen  years  of 
 age)  he  began  to  seek  the  Lord,  (2  Chron.  xxxiv.  3.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Did  he  not  after  this  proceed  to  reform  abuses  I 
 
 A.  Yes ;  for  in  the  twelfth  year  of  his  reign  he  began  to  clear  Judah 
 and  Jerusalem  from  idolatry,  (2  Chron.  xxxiv.  3,  4.) 
 
 5.  Q.  After  having  broken  down  the  altars  and  the  groves,  and  destroyed 
 the  images  and  idols  of  the  land,  did  he  not  promote  the  worship  of  the 
 true  God  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  and  among  other  improvements  he  repaired  the  house  of  the 
 Lord,  (2  Chron.  xxxiv.  8.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  remarkable  incident  took  place  while  the  temple  was  under 
 these  repairs  ? 
 
 A.  Hilkiah  the  priest  found  a  book,  or  copy  of  the  law  of  the  Lord,  (2 
 Kings  xxii.  8,  &c.) 
 
 7.  Q.  What  eft'ect  had  this  discovery  on  Josiah  ? 
 
 A.  When  the  king  had  heard  the  words  of  the  book  of  the  law,  he  rent 
 his  clothes,  as  a  sign  how  much  he  was  affected,  (2  Kings  xxii.  11.)* 
 
 *  It  seems  the  king  had  not  seen  a  perfect  copy  of  the  law  before,  containing 
 the  awful  threatenings  of  God  against  the  disobedient.  Probably  only  abridged 
 or  mutilated  copies  were  in  circulation,  and  this  practice  was  countenanced  by  the 
 
388  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III 
 
 8.  Q.  What  was  the  Lord's  message  to  Josiah  on  this  occasion  ? 
 
 A.  The  message  was,  "  Because  thine  heart  was  tender,  .and  thoii  hast 
 humbled  thyself  before  the  Lord,  when  thou  heardest  what  I  spake  against 
 this  place,  and  against  the  inhabitants  thereof,  ....  I  also  have  heard 
 thee,  saith  the  Lord,"  (2  Kings  xxii.  19.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  use  did  the  king  make  of  this  book  ? 
 
 A.  When  he  went  up  into  the  temple,  with  the  priests,  and  the  prophets, 
 and  all  the  people,  "  he  read  in  their  ears  all  the  words  of  the  book,"  (2 
 Kings  xxiii.  2.) 
 
 10.  Q.  What  was  his  latter  end  ? 
 
 A.  He  rashly  engaged  in  a  war  against  Necho,  king  of  Egypt,  though  he 
 was  warned  not  to  do  so  ;  and  the  archers  wounded  him  at  Megiddo,  so 
 that  he  died  soon  after  at  Jerusalem,  (2  Chron.  xxxv.  20-24.) 
 
 11.  Q.  What  usefid  instruction  do  you  gather  from  the  history  of  king 
 Josiah  ? 
 
 A.  We  see  that  a  wicked  father  may  (through  Divine  grace)  have  a  good 
 son, — that  early  piety  is  highly  pleasing  to  God, — and  that  the  reformation 
 of  abuses  in  religion,  and  the  propagation  of  truth,  are  much  to  the  honour 
 of  men  in  authority. 
 
 12.  Q.  What  further  do  you  gather  1 
 
 A.  I  further  gather  that  those  who  are  under  the  influence  of  true  re- 
 ligion win  set  a  high  value  on  the  Holy  Scriptures, — and  that  their  hearts 
 are  tender,  fearing  the  threats,  and  loving  the  promises  of  God. 
 
 13.  Q.  Are  not  even  such  persons  hable  to  do  what  is  wrong? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  for  the  most  eminent  reformers,  the  most  useful  characters, 
 and  the  greatest  saints  are  liable  to  fall  into  sin,  if  they  do  not  watch  and 
 pray  lest  they  enter  into  temptation. 
 
 §  13.  Couceruing  Jeremiah.— Jer.  i.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Jeremiah  the  prophet  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Hilkiah,  who  was  one  of  the  priests  of  Anathoth, 
 near  Jerusalem. 
 
 2.  Q.  How  old  was  he  when  he  began  to  be  a  prophet  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  ordained  to  be  a  prophet  vmto  the  nations  before  he  was 
 born  ;  and  when  about  foiu-teen  years  of  age  he  was  commanded  to  warn 
 the  princes,  the  priests,  and  the  people,  of  the  land  of  Judah,  (Jer.  i.  5,  &c. 
 
 3.  Q.  Did  he  feel  no  objection  because  of  his  youth  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  he  said,  "  Ah,  Lord  God,  behold,  I  cannot  speak,  for  I  am  a 
 child,"  (Jer.  i.  6.) 
 
 4.  Q.  How  was  he  encouraged  against  his  fears  ? 
 
 A.  The  Lord  said  unto  him,  "  Say  not,  I  am  a  child  ;  for  thou  shalt  go  to 
 all  that  I  shall  send  thee,  and  whatsoever  I  command  thee  thou  shalt 
 speak,"  *  (Jer.  i.  7.) 
 
 priests  and  scribes ;  but  when  the  royal  reformer  became  acquainted  with  these 
 awful  sanctions,  he  was  filled  with  awe  and  holy  fear.  To  rend  a  garment  was  a 
 token  of  lamentation  and  sorrow. 
 
 *  Jeremiah  was  about  the  same  age  as  Josiah  the  king.     Josiah  began  to  reign 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  389 
 
 5.  Q.  Wheu  he  was  threatened  by  the  wicked,  because  of  his  faithful 
 warnings,  what  encouragement  did  the  Lord  give  him '? 
 
 A.  The  Lord  said  to  him,  "  I  am  with  thee  to  save  thee  ;  and  I  will 
 deliver  thee  out  of  the  hand  of  the  wicked,"  (Jer.  xv.  20,  21.) 
 
 6.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  they  treat  Jeremiah  at  last,  for  his  great  faith- 
 fulness and  zeal  in  reproving  them  1 
 
 A.  Pashui',  the  son  of  Immer  the  priest,  who  was  chief  governor  in  the 
 house  of  the  Lord,  smote  him,  and  put  him  in  the  stocks,  (Jer.  xx.  1,  2.) 
 
 7.  Q.  When  set  at  liberty  from  this  confinement,  what  other  trouble 
 awaited  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  in  derision  daily,  every  one  mocked  him,  and  aU  his  familiars 
 watched  for  his  halting,  (Jer.  xx.  7-10.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Did  they  do  nothing  else  to  him  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  Zedekiah  king  of  Judah  shut  him  up  in  the  court  of  the  prison, 
 (Jer.  xxxii.  1,  2.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  further  calamity  befell  him  ? 
 
 A.  The  princes  were  wroth  with  Jeremiah,  and  smote  him,  and  put  him 
 again  in  prison  ;  and  afterwards  into  a  miry  dungeon,  (Jer.  xxxvii.  15, 
 xxxviii.  6  ;  Lam.  iii.  52-£5.) 
 
 10.  Q.  By  whose  means  was  he  dehvered  from  this  dangerous  situa- 
 tion ? 
 
 A.  By  means  of  Ebed-melech  the  Ethiopian,  who  interested  himself  with 
 the  king  in  his  favour  ;  and  Jeremiah  was  taken  out  of  the  dungeon,  and 
 remained  in  the  court  of  the  prison,  (Jei'.  xxxviii.  7-13.) 
 
 11.  Q.  How  long  did  he  remain  there  ? 
 
 A.  He  remained  there  until  the  day  that  Jerusalem  was  taken,  (Jer. 
 xxxviii.  28.) 
 
 12.  Q.  What  became  of  him  at  that  time  of  trouble  and  confusion  ? 
 
 A.  Nebuchadnezzar,  king  of  Babylon,  gave  charge  concerning  Jeremiah  to 
 Nebuzar-adan,  the  captain  of  the  guard,  saying,  "  Take  him,  and  look  well 
 to  him,  and  do  him  no  harm,"  (Jer.  xxxix.  11,  12.) 
 
 13.  Q.  Was  this  the  end  of  Jeremiah's  troubles  for  his  prophetic 
 warnings  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  Johanan  the  son  of  Kareah,  and  the  captains  of  the  forces, 
 took  him  and  all  the  remnant  of  Judah  into  Egypt,  (Jer.  xliii.  5.) 
 
 14.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  this  account  of  Jeremiah  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  God  can  make  the  young  in  years  both  very  good  and 
 very  wise, — that  nothing  is  more  provoking  to  the  wicked  than  to  be  re- 
 proved for  their  sins, — that  God  can  raise  up  friends  for  us  from  unexpected 
 quarters, — and  that  His  protection  can  preserve  us  in  the  greatest  dangers 
 to  which  He  calls  us. 
 
 §  14.  Concerning  Belshazzar. — Dan.  v.  1,  &c. 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Belshazzar '/ 
 
 when  eight  yeare  old,  discovered  a  religious  disposition  at  sixteen,  and  began  to 
 reform  abuses  when  about  twenty.  We  may  therefore  infer  that  the  ministry  of 
 young  Jeremiah  contributed  much  to  that  reformation. 
 
390  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAIIT  III. 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Evil-merodach,  and  the  gi-andson  of  Xebuchaduezzar, 
 kings  of  Babylon,*  (Dan.  v.  2,  &c.) 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  his  character  i 
 
 A.  He  was  a  wicked  and  profane  man. 
 
 3.  Q.  Have  we  not  some  account  of  a  remarkable  feast  made  by  him  ? 
 A,  Yes  ;  he  made  a  great  feast  to  a  thousand  of  his  lords,  and  drank 
 
 wine  before  the  thousand,  (Dan.  v.  1.) 
 
 4.  Q.  How  did  he  shew  his  profaneness  on  that  occasion  .? 
 
 A.  He  ordered  that  the  golden  and  silver  vessels  which  Nebuchadnezzar 
 had  taken  from  the  temple  in  Jerusalem,  should  be  brought,  that  he  and 
 his  princes,  his  wives  and  his  concubines,  might  drink  therein,  (Dan.  v.  3.) 
 
 5.  Q.  "What  did  they  do  with  them  i 
 
 A.  They  di'ank  wine  in  them,  and  praised  the  gods  of  gold,  and  of  silver, 
 of  brass,  of  iron,  of  wood,  and  of  stone,  (Dan.  v.  4.) 
 
 6.  Q.  How  did  the  Lord  resent  this  profane  insult  ? 
 
 A.  In  the  same  hour  came  forth  fingers  of  a  man's  hand,  and  wrote  over 
 against  the  candlestick  upon  the  plaster  of  the  waU  of  the  king's  palace  ; 
 and  the  king  saw  the  pai-t  of  the  hand  that  wrote,  (Dan.  v.  5.) 
 
 7.  Q.  What  effect  had  this  very  singulai'  appearance  upon  him  ? 
 
 A.  His  thoughts  troubled  him  to  such  a  degree  "that  the  joints  of  his 
 loins  were  loosed,  and  his  knees  smote  one  again.st  another,"  (Dan.  v.  6.) 
 
 8.  Q.  In  this  very  alarming  situation  what  did  he  do  ? 
 
 A.  He  sent  for  the  astrologers,  the  Chaldean  philosophers,  and  the 
 soothsayers  ;  promising  them  great  rewards  if  they  could  interpret  the 
 WTiting :  but  none  of  them  could,  (Dan.  v.  7,  8.) 
 
 9.  Q.  How  did  he  bear  this  disappointment  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  greatly  troubled,  his  countenance  was  changed,  and  bis  lords 
 were  astonished. 
 
 10.  Q.  Was  there  no  one  who  could  intei-pret,  or  give  the  signification 
 of  the  writing  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  the  queen  had  heard  of  Daniel,  and  recommended  him  to  the 
 king ;  and  Daniel,  after  a  very  solemn  addi'ess  to  him,  interpreted  the  writing. 
 
 11.  Q.  What  was  the  meaning  of  it  ? 
 
 A.  That  his  kingdom  was  at  an  end,  and  should  be  divided  between  the 
 Medes  and  Persians  ;  and  that  he  himself  was  weighed  in  the  balances  of 
 God,  and  foimd  wanting,  (Dan.  v.  25-28.) 
 
 12.  Q.  Was  this  prophecy  fulfilled  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  "  in  that  night  was  Belshazzar  slain,  and  Darius  the  Median 
 took  the  kingdom,"  t  (Dan.  v.  30,  31.) 
 
 13.  Q.  What  may  we  further  learn  from  this  account  of  Belshazzar  ? 
 
 A.  We  learn,  that  plenty,  magnificence,  and  mirth,  are  no  certain  signs 
 
 *  Evil-merodacli,  or  the  foolish  Merodach,  is  regarded  by  the  sacred  historian 
 as  a  blank.  According  to  some,  he  reigned  only  one  year,  and  Belshazzar  is  con- 
 sidered as  the  son  and  successor  of  his  grandfather  ^Nebuchadnezzar. 
 
 ■)•  Cyrus  was  the  general  who  took  Babylon,  under  the  direction  of  his  uncle 
 Darius,  or  Cyaxeres,  the  Jlede ;  and  he  continued  a  partner  only  in  the  throne, 
 until  the  death  of  his  uncle;  which  took  place  about  two  years  after,  when  he 
 became  the  sole  ruler. 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECUitiM.  391 
 
 of  happiness  or  safety, — that  God  is  highly  displeased  with  pi-ofaneness 
 and  irrehgion,  though  countenanced  by  princes, — that  He  can  alarm  the 
 guilty  by  unexpected  methods,- — and  that  a  wicked,  impenitent  man,  though 
 he  may  seek  the  assistance  of  God's  true  ministers  for  relief,  shall  at  last 
 perish  in  his  iniquity. 
 
 §  15.  Concerning  Ezra. 
 
 1.  Q.  "Who  was  Ezra,  or  Esdras  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  priest  among  the  captive  Jews,  who  returned  from  Babylon 
 to  Jerusalem,  at  the  close  of  the  captivity,  (Ezra  vii.  1,  &c.) 
 
 2.  Q.  What  is  said  in  Ezra's  praise  I 
 
 A.  He  was  a  ready  scribe  in  the  law  of  Moses,  and  prepared  his  heart  to 
 seek  the  law  of  the  Lord,  and  to  do  it,  and  to  teach  in  Israel  statutes  and 
 judgments,  (Ezra  vii.  6,  10.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Of  what  service  was  he  to  Israel  I 
 
 A.  Through  his  great  wisdom  and  address  he  procured  from  Artaserxes, 
 king  of  Per.sia,  a  commission  very  favourable  to  the  Jews  ;  in  which  they 
 were  encouraged  to  restore  the  worship  of  the  true  God  at  Jerusalem, 
 (Ezra  vii.  11-28.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  method  did  he  take  in  order  to  obtain  safety  for  himself 
 and  his  friends  on  their  journey  to  Jerusalem  ? 
 
 A.  He  proclaimed  a  fast  for  humiliation  before  God,  and  "  to  seek  of  Him 
 a  right  way,"  (Ezra  viii.  21.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  reason  does  he  assign  for  this  conduct,  in  preference  to  more 
 ordinary  methods  ? 
 
 A.  "I  was  ashamed,"  he  said,  "to  require  of  the  king  a  band  of  sol- 
 diers and  horsemen  to  help  us  against  the  enemy  in  the  way :  because 
 we  had  spoken  unto  the  king,  saying,  The  hand  of  our  God  is  upon  all 
 them  for  good  that  seek  him  ;  but  his  power  and  his  wrath  is  against  aU 
 them  that  forsake  him,"  (Ezra  viii.  22.) 
 
 6.  Q.  In  this  concern  for  a  reformation,  and  returning  into  their  own 
 land,  does  it  appear  that  Ezra  and  the  people  had  much  religious  affection  ? 
 
 A.  It  seems  they  had  ;  for  Ezra  prayed  and  confessed,  mourned  and 
 wept ;  and  there  assembled  unto  him  out  of  Israel  a  very  great  congi'ega- 
 tion  of  men,  and  women,  and  children  ;  and  the  people  wept  very  sore, 
 (Ezi-a  X.  1.) 
 
 7.  Q.  What  do  you  gather  from  this  account  of  Ezra  I 
 
 A.  I  gather  that  wisdom  and  learning  are  of  great  use  in  religion,  and 
 that  the  influence  we  may  obtain  with  great  men  should  be  employed  to 
 the  honour  of  God,  the  I'evival  or  spread  of  religion,  and  the  welfare  of 
 those  with  whom  we  are  connected. 
 
 §  16.  Concerning  Nehenaiali.^ — Neh.  i.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Nehemiah  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Hachaliah,  and  was  born  in  Babylon  during  the 
 captivity. 
 
 2.  Q.  When  he  was  informed  of  the  affliction  of  his  brethren  in  Judea, 
 and  the  desolated  state  of  Jerusalem,  what  eft'ect  had  it  upon  him  i 
 
392  THE  EVAKGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 A.  He  sat  down  and  wept,  and  moiu-ned  certain  days,  and  fasted,  and 
 prayed  before  the  God  of  heaven,  (iSTeh.  i.  4.) 
 
 3.  Q.  As  he  was  one  of  the  cup-bearei-s  of  Artaxerses  the  king,  and  had 
 access  to  the  royal  presence,  did  he  obtain  any  rehef  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  the  king  observed  his  countenance  sad,  inquired  the  cause, 
 and  then  granted  him  all  he  wished. 
 
 4.  Q.  What  was  Nebeniiah's  request  of  the  king  } 
 
 A.  That  he  might  be  sent  to  rebmid  Jerusalem,  the  city  of  his  father's 
 sepulchres,  (Xeh.  ii.  5.) 
 
 5.  Q.  When  he  went  there,  though  encouraged  and  commissioned  by  the 
 king  his  master,  did  he  not  meet  with  some  opposition  ? 
 
 A.  Tes,  with  great  opposition  ;  for  when  Sanballat  the  Horouite  heard 
 that  they  builded  the  wall,  he  was  wroth,  and  took  gi'eat  indignation,  and 
 mocked  the  Jews,  (Neh.  ii.  19,  iv.  1.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Was  he  the  only  enemy  they  had  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  when  the  Arabians,  and  the  Ammonites,  and  the  Ashdodites, 
 heard  that  the  walls  of  Jerusalem  were  made  up,  then  they  were  very 
 wroth,  and  conspired  all  of  them  together,  to  come  and  fight  against 
 Jerusalem,  (Neh.  iv.  7,  8.) 
 
 7.  Q.  When  these  enemies  could  prevail  against  Nehemiah  and  his  men 
 neither  by  threats,  by  force,  nor  by  stratagem,  how  was  the  government  of 
 Jerusalem  settled  ? 
 
 A.  Nehemiah  gave  his  brother  Hanani,  and  Hananiah  the  ruler  of  the 
 palace,  charge  over  Jerusalem,  (Neh.  vii.  2.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Was  his  brother  Hanani  a  good  man  ? 
 
 A.  It  should  seem  he  was  ;  for  it  was  he  who  excited  Nehemiah's  com- 
 passion to  the  state  of  aflfairs  in  the  holy  land  at  the  first,  (Neh.  L  2,  3.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  was  the  character  of  Hananiah  the  ruler  of  the  palace,  or 
 the  viceroy  of  Artaxerxes  ?  ' 
 
 A.  He  was  "  a  faithful  man,  and  feared  God  above  many,"  (Neh.  vii.  2.) 
 
 10.  Q.  Did  not  Nehemiah  make  some  efibrts  for  the  reformation  of 
 manners,  and  the  revival  of  religion  ? 
 
 A,  Yes  ;  he  exerted  himself  much  with  the  nobles  of  Judah  against  the 
 profanation  of  the  Sabbath,  and  with  both  people  and  priests  for  their  im- 
 proper conduct. 
 
 11.  Q.  What  do  you  infer  from  this  account  of  Nehemiah  ? 
 
 A.  I  infer  that  we  ought  not  to  be  unfeehng  towards  our  friends  and 
 relations  in  their  trouble,  though  at  a  distance  from  us, — that  as  oppor- 
 tunity offers,  and  according  to  our  power,  we  should  assist  them, — and  that 
 in  every  great  and  good  work  we  may  expect  opposition  from  the  wicked, 
 but  assistance  from  God. 
 
 *  Judea  was  now  a  province  of  Persia,  and  the  palace  at  Jerusalem  was  occu- 
 pied by  the  Persian  \-iceroy,  and  by  Nehemiah  during  his  visit.  Tie  royal  resi- 
 dence was  at  Shushan,  in  Persia,  during  the  winter  season,  being  a  very  warm 
 climate,  and  in  summer  at  Ecbatana,  a  city  in  Media,  a  more  northern  situation. 
 Chaldea,  of  which  Babylon  was  the  capital,  was  now  only  a  province  of  the  Per- 
 sian emphe. 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  393 
 
 §  17.  Concerning  Esther. — Esth.  ii.,  &c. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Esther  ? 
 
 A.  She  was  the  queen  of  Ahasuerus,  king  of  Persia,  who  reigned  over  a 
 hundred  and  twenty-seven  provinces,  (Esth.  i.  1,  ii.  17.) 
 
 2.  Q.  To  what  family  was  she  related  ? 
 
 A.  Her  parents  were  Jews,  who  both  died  when  she  was  very  young  ; 
 and  she  was  brought  up  by  her  cousin  Mordecai,  as  his  own  daughter, 
 (Esth.  ii.  7.) 
 
 3.  Q.  How  came  she  to  be  advanced  to  so  exalted  a  situation  ? 
 
 A.  Through  her  cousin's  address,  and  her  own  personal  accomplish- 
 ments. 
 
 4.  Q.  Was  she  not  of  great  service  to  her  kindred,  the  Jews  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  she  procured  for  them  deliverance  from  universal  slaughter. 
 
 5.  Q.  How  came  they  to  be  in  so  great  danger  ? 
 
 A.  An  envious  courtier,  Haman,  procured  an  edict  for  their  destruction, 
 by  which  he  might  wreak  his  revenge  on  Mordecai  the  Jew,  who  Lad  dis- 
 pleased him,  (Esth.  iii.  2-11.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  method  did  queen  Esther  take  to  procure  the  revocation  of 
 this  decree  ? 
 
 A.  She  first  recommended  to  all  the  Jews  in  Shushan  fasting  and  prayer, 
 adding,  "  I  also  and  my  maidens  will  fast  Ukewise,  and  so  will  I  go  in  unto 
 the  king,  which  is  not  according  to  the  law  ;  and  if  I  perish,  I  perish."  * 
 
 7.  Q.  Did  she  succeed  in  this  attempt  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  the  king  held  out  to  Esther  the  golden  sceptre  that  was  in 
 his  hand,  and  encouraged  her  to  ask  what  she  pleased. 
 
 8.  Q.  What  did  she  ask  for  ? 
 
 A.  She  said,  "  If  I  have  found  favour  in  thy  sight,  0  king,  let  my  life 
 be  given  me  at  my  petition,  and  my  people  at  my  request,"  (Esth.  vii.  3.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  was  the  event '? 
 
 A.  Haman's  plot  was  turned  against  himself,  the  former  edict  was  re- 
 voked, and  the  Jews  obtained  a  complete  deliverance. 
 
 10.  Q.  What  instruction  do  you  gather  from  this  account  of  Esther  1 
 A.  I  gather  that  in  every  case  of  national  or  family  danger  we  should 
 
 apply  to  God  by  fasting  and  prayer,  and  commit  ourselves  to  His  protection 
 in  the  use  of  lawful  means. 
 
 §  18.  Of  Haman  and  Mordecai — Esth.  ii.,  &c. 
 
 3 .  Q.  Who  was  Mordecai  ? 
 ■    A.  He  was  the  son  of  Jair,  a  Benjamite,  who  had  been  carried  away  from 
 Jerusalem  with  the  captivity  into  Babylon. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  he  remai-kable  for  ? 
 
 A.  For  having  given  his  cousin  Esthei',  who  was  an  orphan,  a  distin- 
 guished education. 
 
 *  It  was  a  law  of  Persia  that  whosoever,  whether  man  or  woman,  the  queen 
 not  excepted,  went  to  the  king  into  the  inner  court  without  being  called,  should 
 be  put  to  death,  except  such  to  whom  the  king  shovxld  hold  out  the  golden  sceptre. 
 
39i  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PART  III. 
 
 3.  Q.  Was  not  Mordecai  of  gx'eat  service  to  king  Ahasuerus  I 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  he  discovered  a  plot  against  his  life,  foi-med  by  two  of  his 
 chamberlains,  (Esth.  ii.  21-23.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Had  he  not  a  dangerous  rival  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  Haman  the  son  of  Hammedatha  the  Agagite,  who  sought  his  ruin. 
 
 5.  Q.  Why  did  he  seek  his  ruin  ? 
 
 A.  Because  Mordecai  bowed  not  nor  did  him  reverence,  (Esth.  iii.  2, 
 V.  13.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Did  not  the  king  shew  him  much  honourable  distinction  above 
 Mordecai  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  he  was  advanced  above  the  princes  and  oflicers  of  the  king : 
 "  Yet,"  said  he,  "  all  this  availeth  me  nothing,  so  long  as  I  see  Mordecai 
 the  Jew  sitting  at  the  king's  gate,"  (Esth.  v.  13.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  envious  Haman  resent  Mordecai's  conduct  ? 
 
 A.  He  procui-ed  an  edict,  under  pretence  of  advantage  to  the  king's  trea- 
 suries, to  liave  all  the  Jews  massacred,  (Esth.  iii.  S-I5.) 
 
 8.  Q.  How  was  this  cruel  purpose  prevented  ? 
 
 A.  Mordecai,  Esther  the  queen,  and  all  the  Jews,  ha'sing  fasted  and 
 prayed,  the  plot  was  discovered  to  the  king. 
 
 9.  What  became  of  Haman  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  hanged  on  a  gallows  fifty  cubits  high,  which  he  had  prepared 
 for  Mordecai,  (Esth.  vii.  9,  10.) 
 
 10.  Q.  "What  became  of  Mordecai  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  advanced  to  greater  honom',  and  all  the  Jews  were  treated 
 favourably. 
 
 11.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  this  account  of  Haman  and  Mordecai? 
 A.  I  learn  that  envy  is  a  ci-uel  and  malignant  passion — and  that  the 
 
 plan  of  Providence  in  preserving  the  innocent  and  punishing  the  guilty  is 
 worthy  of  our  highest  admiration. 
 
 §  1.  Concerning  the  virgin  Mary.  §  2.  Jesus  Christ.  §  3.  St  Peter.  §  4.  St 
 John.  §  5.  Judas  Iscariot.  §  6.  Herod  Antipas.  §  7.  St  Stephen.  §  8.  St 
 Paul.     §  9.  CorneUus.     §  10.  Herod  Agi-ippa,     §  11.  End  of  the  World. 
 
 §  1.  Couceruing  the  virgin  Mary. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  the  virgin  Mai'y  ? 
 
 A.  The  daughter  of  Joachim  and  Anna,  of  the  tribe  of  Judah. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  is  she  remarkable  for  ? 
 
 A.  For  being  the  mother  of  Jesus  Chi-ist,  and  yet  continuing  a  virgin. 
 
 3.  How  could  that  be  ? 
 
 A.  By  the  power  of  the  Highest ;  for  with  God  all  things  are  possible, 
 (Luke  i.  35,  37.) 
 
 4.  Q.  As  the  blessed  God  exists  in  three  Persons,  Father,  Son  (or  Word,) 
 and  Holy  Spirit,  which  of  these  Pei-sons  assumed  our  nature  in  the  blessed 
 virgin  ? 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  3D5 
 
 A.  The  Word,  or  Son,  was  made  flesh,  and  dwelt  among  us,  (John  i.  14.) 
 
 5.  Q.  Is  not  this  a  great  mystery  ? 
 
 A.  Without  controversy,  great  is  the  mystery  of  godliness,  for  God  was 
 manifest  in  the  flesh,  (1  Tim.  iii.  16.) 
 
 6.  Q.  Can  natural  reason  rightly  understand  this  doctrine  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  the  natural  man  receiveth  not  the  things  of  the  Spirit  of  God  ; 
 for  they  are  foolishness  uuto  him,  neither  can  he  know  them,  (1  Cor.  ii.  14.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Why  cannot  he  know  them  ? 
 
 A.  Because  they  are  spiritually  discerned  ;  or,  to  be  distinguished  and 
 understood  only  by  spiritual  illumination. 
 
 8.  Q.  Is  there  not  good  reason  why  Mary  should  be  regarded  as  blessed 
 among  women  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  she  was  the  happy  instrument  of  introducing  into  the 
 world  the  Messiah,  who  is  the  Almighty  Saviour. 
 
 9.  Q.  Mary  being  espoused  to  Joseph  the  son  of  Jacob,  and  grandson 
 of  Matthan,  was  he  not  disconcerted  when  he  learnt  that  she  was  with 
 child  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  but  he  was  soon  convinced  that  the  cause  was  miracidous,  by 
 a  messenger  from  heaven  ;  who  said  to  him,  "  Fear  not  to  take  unto  thee 
 Mary  thy  wife,  for  that  which  is  conceived  in  her  is  of  the  Holy  Ghost," 
 (Matt.  i.  20.) 
 
 10.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  Mary  herself  consider  this  wonderful  visitation  1 
 A.  When  first  informed  by  the  angel  what  should  take  place,  "  she  was 
 
 troubled  at  his  saying,  and  cast  in  her  mind  what  manner  of  salutation 
 this  shoidd  be,"  (Luke  i.  29.) 
 
 11.  Q.  When  certified  of  the  wiU  of  God  concerning  her,  did  she  not 
 manifest  a  resigned  mind  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  :  for  Mary  said,  "  Behold  the  handmaid  of  the  Lord  ;  be  it  unto 
 me  according  to  thy  word,"  (Luke  i.  38.) 
 
 12.  Q.  How  did  she  express  her  gratitude  for  this  unparalleled  condescen- 
 sion of  God  ? 
 
 A.  Mary  said,  "  My  soul  doth  magnify  the  Lord,  and  my  spirit  hath  re- 
 joiced in  God  my  Saviour.  For  he  hath  regarded  the  low  estate  of  his 
 handmaiden  :  for,  behold,  from  henceforth  all  generations  shall  caU.  me 
 blessed.  For  he  that  is  mighty  hath  done  to  me  gi'eat  things  ;  and  holy  is 
 his  name.  And  his  mercy  is  on  them  that  fear  him,  from  generation  to 
 generation,"  (Luke  i.  46-50.) 
 
 13.  Q.  What  further  account  have  we  of  Mary  ? 
 
 A.  She  was  delivered  of  the  promised  child  Jesus  at  the  time  predicted  ; 
 conducted  herself  as  a  devout  woman,  and  an  affectionate  mother ;  beheld 
 the  miracles  of  her  son  and  Saviour ;  heard  His  public  discourses ; 
 witnessed  His  sufferings  and  death  ;  and  lived  (it  is  reported)  to  old  age, 
 under  the  affectionate  protection  of  John  the  apostle. 
 
 §  2.  Concernmg  Jesus  Christ. 
 
 1.  Q.  Why  do  you  believe  that  Jesus  Christ  is  the  promised  Saviour  I 
 A.  Because  "to  Him  give  all  the  prophets  witness  ;"  there  was  nothing 
 
396  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  IlL 
 
 in  Him  which  did  liot  answer  to  that  character,  but  many  things  which 
 could  belong  to  no  other,  (Acts  x.  43.) 
 
 2.  Q.  What  is  the  testimony  of  His  most  familiar  and  intimate  disciple, 
 John,  concerning  His  person  ? 
 
 A.  He  calls  Him  the  Word,  and  says,  that  "  the  Word  was  God, — ^that 
 all  things  were  made  by  him, — and  that  this  Word  was  made  flesh,  (John 
 i.  1,  &c.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  is  the  testimony  of  an  angel  resi3ecting  Jesus  Christ  as  the 
 Messiah  ? 
 
 A.  He  said  to  a  number  of  shepherds,  "  Unto  you  is  born  this  day,  in 
 the  city  of  David,  a  Saviom-,  which  is  Chi-ist  the  Lord,"  (Luke  ii.  8-11.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  aged  Simeon  conceruiug  Him,  when 
 he  took  Him  up  in  his  arms  ? 
 
 A.  He  blessed  God  and  said,  "  Lord,  now  lettest  thou  thy  servant  depart 
 in  peace,  according  to  thy  word :  for  mine  eyes  have  seen  thy  salvation, 
 which  thou  hast  prepared  before  the  face  of  all  people  ;  a  light  to  lighten 
 the  Gentiles,  and  the  glory  of  thy  people  Israel,"  (Luke  ii.  i!9-32.) 
 
 5.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  the  wise  men  from  the  east  bear  testimony 
 to  the  superiority  of  Jesus  ? 
 
 A.  When  they  were  come  into  the  house,  they  saw  the  young  child  with 
 Mary  His  mother,  and  "  fell  down,  and  worshipped  Him :  and  when  they 
 had  opened  their  treasures,  they  presented  mito  Him  gifts  ;  gold,  and 
 frankincense,  and  myrrh,"  (Matt.  ii.  11.) 
 
 6.  When,  at  twelve  years  of  age.  He  was  in  the  temple,  sitting  in  the 
 midst  of  the  doctors,  what  were  their  thoughts  concerning  Him  ? 
 
 A.  "All  that  heard  him  were  astonished  at  his  understanding  and 
 answers,"  (Luke  ii.  47.) 
 
 7.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  John  the  Baptist  before  the  inquiring 
 multitude  1 
 
 A-  He  said  to  them  aU,  "  He  that  cometh  after  me  is  mightier  than  I, 
 whose  shoes  I  am  not  worthy  to  bear :  he  shall  ba2:)tize  you  with  the  Holy 
 Ghost,  and  with  fire  :  whose  fan  is  in  his  hand,  and  he  will  thoroughly 
 pm-ge  his  floor,  and  gather  his  fruit  into  the  gamer  ;  but  he  will  bui-n  up 
 the  chaff  ■n'ith  unquenchable  fire,"  (Matt.  iii.  11,  12.) 
 
 8.  Q.  What  was  John's  testimony  the  next  day,  on  seeing  Jesus  coming 
 unto  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  Behold  the  Lamb  of  God,  which  taketh  away  the  sin  of  the 
 world,"  (John  i.  29.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  God  the  Father  concerning  Him  ? 
 
 A.  A  voice  came  from  heaven,  which  said,  "  Thou  art  my  beloved  Son  ; 
 in  thee  I  am  well  pleased,"  (Luke  iii.  22,  is.  35.) 
 
 10.  Q.  What  was  the  confession  of  two  men  possessed  with  devils  con- 
 cerning Him  ? 
 
 A.  They  cried  out,  saying,  "  What  have  we  to  do  with  thee,  Jesus,  thou 
 Son  of  God  ?  Art  thou  come  hither  to  torment  us  before  the  time  ? " 
 (Matt.  viii.  29.) 
 
 11.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  Nicodemus,  a  ruler  of  the  Jews,  re- 
 specting the  miracles  and  mission  of  Jesus  Christ  1 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  397 
 
 A.  He  said  unto  Jesus,  "  Rabbi,  we  know  that  thou  art  a  teacher  sent 
 from  God  ;  for  no  man  can  do  these  miracles  which  thou  doest,  except 
 God  be  with  him,"  (John  iii.  2.) 
 
 12.  Q.  What  was  Peter's  testimony  concerning  His  Messiahship,  in  the 
 name  of  all  the  disciples  ? 
 
 A.  Peter  said  unto  Him,  "  Thou  art  the  Christ,  the  Son  of  the  living 
 God,"  (Matt.  xvi.  16.) 
 
 13.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  the  officers,  who  were  sent  by  the 
 Pharisees  and  the  chief  priests  to  take  Him,  concerning  His  discourses  ? 
 
 A.  The  officers  answered,  "Never  man  spake  like  this  man,"  (John 
 vii.  46.) 
 
 14.  Q.  What  was  the  conduct  and  record  of  the  multitude  of  His  dis- 
 ciples, on  His  last  entrance  into  Jerusalem  ? 
 
 A.  They  took  branches  of  palm-trees,  and  went  forth  to  meet  him,  and 
 ci'ied,  "  Hosanna  :  Blessed  is  the  King  of  Israel,  that  cometh  in  the  name 
 of  the  Lord,"  and  began  to  rejoice,  and  praise  God  with  a  loud  voice,  say- 
 ing, "  Peace  in  heaven,  and  glory  in  the  highest."  (John  xii.  13  ;  Luke  xix. 
 37,  38.) 
 
 15.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  some  children  in  the  temple  concern- 
 ing Jesus  ? 
 
 A.  When  they  saw  how  He  healed  the  blind  and  the  lame  who  came  to 
 Him  in  the  temple,  they  cried,  saying,  "  Hosanna  to  the  Son  of  David," 
 (Matt.  xxi.  15.) 
 
 16.  Q.  What  was  the  reluctant  confession  of  the  chief  priests  and  Phari- 
 sees respecting  Jesus  1 
 
 A.  Having  gathered  a  council,  they  said,  "  What  do  we  ?  for  this  man 
 doeth  many  miracles.  If  we  let  him  thus  alone,  all  men  will  believe  on 
 him ;  and  the  Romans  shall  come  and  take  away  both  our  place  and 
 nation,"  (John  xi.  47,  48.) 
 
 17.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  Judas  Iscariot  to  the  innocence  of 
 Jesus  1 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  I  have  sinned,  in  that  I  have  betrayed  the  innocent  blood," 
 (Matt,  xxvii.  4.) 
 
 18.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  Pilate,  the  Roman  governor,  concern- 
 ing Jesus,  before  the  chief  priests,  and  the  rulers,  and  the  people  1 
 
 A.  He  said  unto  them,  "  I  have  found  no  fault  in  this  man  touching 
 those  things  whereof  ye  accuse  him  :  no,  nor  yet  Herod."  "  Behold  I  bring 
 him  forth  to  you,  that  ye  may  know  that  I  find  no  fault  in  him."  "  I  am 
 innocent  of  the  blood  of  this  just  person  :  see  ye  to  it,"  (Luke  xxiii.  14, 15  ; 
 John  xix.  4  ;  Matt,  xxvii.  24.) 
 
 19.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  one  of  the  malefactors  who  were 
 crucified  with  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  We  receive  the  due  reward  of  our  deeds  ;  but  this  man 
 hath  done  nothing  amiss.  And  he  said  unto  Jesus,  Lord,  remember  me 
 when  thou  comest  into  thy  kingdom,"  (Luke  xxiii.  41,  42.) 
 
 20.  Q.  What  was  the  testimony  of  the  centurion  who  stood  over  against 
 him  while  on  the  cross,  and  they  that  were  with  him  watching  Jesus  ? 
 
 A.  The  centurion  said,  "Truly  this  man  was  the  Son  of  God."     And 
 
39  8  THE  EVASGELIC.iL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  HI. 
 
 when  they  that  were  with  him  saw  the  earthquake  and  those  things  that 
 were  done,  they  feared  greatly,  and  said,  "  Truly  this  was  the  Son  of  God," 
 (Mark  xv.  39  ;  Matt,  xxvii.  54.) 
 
 21.  Q.  Of  what  weight  is  the  testimony  of  Jesus  himself  in  favour  of 
 His  Messiahship  ? 
 
 A.  Of  the  greatest  weight,  since  He  wi'ought  many  miracles  to  prove  it, 
 rose  again  from  the  grave  according  to  His  own  prediction,  confirmed  it 
 during  forty  days  on  earth,  ascended  into  heaven  in  the  sight  of  His 
 disciples,  and  imparted  miraculous  gifts  to  His  followers,  in  order  to 
 estabhsh  the  same. 
 
 22.  Q.  What  do  you  fiu'ther  learn  fi'om  this  accoiult  of  Jesus  Christ  ? 
 A.  I  learn  that  he  is  proved  to  be  the  promised  mighty  Saviour  by  all 
 
 sorts  of  witnesses,  and  by  every  kind  of  suitable  evidence,  (1  John  v.  6-11.) 
 
 23.  Q.  TTh}'  were  these  things  written  concerning  him  ? 
 
 A.  That  we  may  beheve  on  the  name  of  the  Son  of  God,  and  believing 
 may  know  that  we  have  etei-nal  life,  (1  John  v.  13.) 
 
 24.  Q.  What  will  become  of  those  who  neither  beheve  in  Him,  nor 
 repent  of  their  sins,  nor  obey  the  gospel  ? 
 
 A.  They  who  believe  not  shall  be  condemned,  they  who  repent  not  shall 
 perish,  and  they  who  obey  not  the  gospel  shall  be  punished  with  ever- 
 lasting de.struction,  (Mark  xvi.  16  ;  Luke  xiii.  3,  5  ;  2  Thess.  i.  9.) 
 
 §  3.  Of  the  apostle  Peter. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Peter,  or  Simon  Peter  otherwise  called  Cepha-s,  and  who 
 was  called  to  be  an  apostle  I 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Jonas,  and  the  brother  of  Andrew,  (John  i.  42,  43.) 
 
 2.  Q.  Where  did  he  hve  ? 
 
 A.  At  Capernaum,  a  city  of  Galilee  near  the  sea  or  great  lake  in  that 
 coimtry,*  (Luke  iv.  31,  38.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  was  his  common  occupation  ? 
 
 A.  He  and  his  brother  Andi'ew  were  fishers.  (Mark  i.  16.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  was  the  character  of  Peter  ? 
 
 A.  His  natm'al  temper  was  hasty  and  resolute,  which,  under  the  influence 
 of  grace,  was  made  instrumental  of  much  good. 
 
 5.  Q.  How  did  he  manifest  his  haste  and  resolution  ] 
 
 A.  When  Jesus  one  night  was  walking  on  the  lake  of  Gennesareth, 
 Peter  said,  "  Lord,  if  it  be  thou,  bid  me  come  imto  thee  on  the  water," 
 (Matt.  xiv.  28.) 
 
 6.  Q.  When  oui-  Lord  said,  "  All  ye  shall  be  offended  because  of  me  this 
 night,"  what  did  Peter  say  ? 
 
 A.  Peter  said  mito  Him,  "Though  all  men  should  be  oft'ended  because  of 
 thee,  yet  will  I  never  be  offended  ;  "  and  again,  "  Though  I  should  die  with 
 thee,  yet  will  I  not  deny  thee,"  (Matt.  s^vi.  33,  35.) 
 
 7.  Q.  When  our  Lord  was  surrounded  with  soldiers  who  came  to  seize 
 him,  what  did  Peter  do  ? 
 
 *  Capernaum  is  supposed  to  have  been  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  great  lake  of 
 Gennesareth,  otherwise  called  the  sea  of  Gahlee.  or  of  Tiberias. 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  399 
 
 A.  Having  a  sword,  he  drew  it,  and  smote  the  high  priest's  servant,  and 
 out  off  his  right  ear,  (John  xviii.  10.) 
 
 8.  Q.  Was  he  not  guilty  of  a  great  sin  in  denying  our  Lord  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  but  he  was  a  great  penitent ;  and  ever  after  he  was  eminently 
 devoted  to  Christ  and  His  holy  service. 
 
 9.  Q.  How  was  his  bold  temper  overruled  for  much  good  ? 
 
 A.  On  the  day  of  Pentecost,  when  immense  crowds  were  assembled, 
 Peter,  under  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  stood  up  and  spoke  with 
 great  evidence  and  power  concerning  Jesus  Christ  as  the  promised  Saviour  ; 
 and  great  numbers  beUeved  unto  salvation,  (Acts  ii.  14,  &o.) 
 
 10.  Q.  After  his  great  labours  and  eminent  success  in  preaching  the 
 gospel,  by  what  kind  of  death  did  he  enter  into  the  joy  of  his  Lord  ? 
 
 A.  Historians  relate  that  he  suffered  martyrdom  at  Rome,  about  the 
 year  of  our  Lord  66,  by  crucifixion  with  his  head  downward. 
 
 §  4.  Of  the  apostle  Joliii. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  John  the  evangeUst  and  apostle  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Zebedee  and  Salome,  and  by  profession  a  fisherman, 
 (Matt.  iv.  21  ;  Mark  xv.  40.) 
 
 2.  Q.  Who  was  called  to  be  a  disciple  at  the  same  time  w'th  John  ? 
 A.  James  his  elder  brother,  (Matt.  iv.  21.) 
 
 3.  Q.  What  were  these  two  brothers  otherwise  called,  when  set  apart 
 for  the  apostleship  ? 
 
 A.  Jesus  Christ  surnamed  them  Boanerges,  which  is,  "The  sons  of 
 thunder,"  (Mark  iii.  17.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  besides  was  John  called  ? 
 
 A.  "  The  disciple  whom  Jesus  loved  ; "  and  by  some,  "  The  Divine." 
 
 5.  Q.  What  evidence  is  there  that  Jesus  particularly  loved  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  taken  to  witness  oiir  Lord's  transfiguration,  and  during  His 
 last  supper  he  was  permitted  to  lean  on  his  breast,  (John  xiii.  25,  xxi.  20.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  other  scene  was  he  chosen  to  witness  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  chosen,  with  Peter  and  James,  to  witness  Christ's  agony  iu 
 the  garden,  (Matt.  xxvi.  37.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Where  did  he  reside  chiefly  ? 
 A.  At  Ephesus,  in  Lesser  Asia. 
 
 8.  Q.  What  calamity  befell  him  in  his  old  age  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  banished  by  the  emperor  Domitian  to  the  isle  of  Patmos,  iu 
 the  Egean  Sea. 
 
 9.  Q.  How  did  he  fare,  and  how  was  he  employed,  while  in  that  in- 
 hospitable place  I 
 
 A.  He  was  comforted  by  the  Lord  Jesus,  who  said  unto  him,  "  Fear  not ; 
 I  am  the  first  and  the  last ; "  he  had  wonderful  revelations  of  Christ  and 
 His  Church,  and  was  ordered  to  write  them  for  the  use  of  other.s,  (Rev.  i. 
 1-3,  11.) 
 
 10.  Q.  How  long  did  he  continue  in  Patmos  ? 
 A.  About  two  years. 
 
 11.  Q.  How  came  he  to  be  set  at  hberty  ? 
 
400  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 A.  On  the  death  of  the  emperor  Domitian,  Nerva,  who  succeeded  him, 
 recalled  all  whom  he  had  banished. 
 
 12.  Q.  Did  not  John  live  to  a  great  age  ? 
 
 A.  When  recalled  from  Patmos  he  was  about  ninety  years  old,  and  lived 
 at  Ephesus  till  he  was  about  a  hundred. 
 
 13.  Q.  When  he  was  grown  so  infirm  that  he  could  no  longer  preach  a 
 continued  discourse  to  the  people,  what  is  he  reported  to  have  often  said 
 to  them  ? 
 
 A.  He  used  to  say,  "  My  dear  children,  love  one  another." 
 
 §  5.  Concei'ning  Judas  Iscariot. 
 
 1.  Q.  What  was  the  character  of  Judas,  commonly  called  Lscariot  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  gi-eat  hypocrite ;  for  though  he  was  outwardly  an  apostle, 
 he  was  inwardly  covetous  and  wicked. 
 
 2.  Q.  How  did  he  manifest  his  covetousness  and  wickedness  ? 
 
 A.  He  sold  his  Lord  and  Master  for  money,  and  thus  betrayed  innocent 
 blood,  (Matt.  xxvi.  14-16.) 
 
 3.  Q.  For  what  price  did  this  abandoned  man  sell  his  innocent  Master  ? 
 A.  For  thirty  pieces  of  silver.* 
 
 4.  Q.  What  became  of  him  after  this  ? 
 
 A.  His  conscience  accused  him  ;  and,  having  confessed  his  Master's  in- 
 nocence, he  cast  down  the  pieces  of  silver  in  the  temple,  and  went  and 
 hanged  himself,  (Matt,  xxvii.  4,  5.) 
 
 5.  Q.  What  do  you  further  learn  from  this  account  of  Judas  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  gifts  and  means,  without  gi'ace,  cannot  keep  us  from  sin, 
 — that  evil  men  aud  seducers  gi-ow  worse  and  worse, — and  that  there  may 
 be  a  repentance  which  is  not  saving. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  else  do  you  learn  ? 
 
 A.  I  also  learn  that  a  hypocrite  may  go  a  great  way  in  the  profession  of 
 rehgion, — that  the  love  of  money  is  the  root  of  all  evil, — and  that  he  who 
 is  often  reproved,  but  hardeneth  his  neck,  shall  suddenly  be  destroyed,  and 
 that  without  remedy,  (1  Tim.  vi.  9,  10  ;  Prov.  xxix.  1.) 
 
 §  6.  Concerning  Herod  Autipas. 
 
 1.  Q.  Were  there  not  several  persons  called  Herod  in  the  New  Testament 
 history  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  there  were  principally  thi-ee. 
 
 2.  Q.  How  was  the  first  of  them  distinguished  from  the  others  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  sou  of  Antipater,  reigned  as  king  of  Gahlee  under  the 
 Eomans,  rebuilt  the  temi^le  at  Jerusalem,  and  was  called  "  The  Great." 
 
 3.  Q.  Was  not  this  prince  very  proud  and  cruel  ? 
 
 A.  It  seems  he  did  all  his  great  acts  from  vain-glory ;  and  as  to  his 
 cruelty,  he  murdered,  among  many  others,  his  wife,  her  mother,  his  three 
 sons,  and  young  children  without  number. 
 
 *  A  piece  of  silver  or  of  gold,  among  the  Jews,  signifies  a  shekel;  and  as  one 
 silver  shekel  was  worth  about  half-a-crown,  thirty  would  be  equal  to  about  three 
 pounds,  fifteen  shillings. 
 
PAET  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  4.01 
 
 4.  Q.  How  were  the  other  two  Herods  distinguished  ? 
 
 A.  They  were  called  Herod  Antipas,  and  Herod  Agrippa. 
 
 5.  Q.  Who  was  Herod  Antipas  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  son  of  Herod  the  Great,  an  uncle  of  Herod  Agrippa,  and  a 
 tetrarch  of  Galilee. 
 
 6.  Q.  What  was  his  general  character  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  full  of  criminal  passions,  and  a  slave  to  the  lust  of  the  flesh, 
 the  lust  of  the  eye,  and  the  pride  of  life. 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  he  manifest  his  criminal  passions  i 
 
 A.  He  divorced  his  lawful  wife,  to  marry  Herodias,  the  wife  of  his 
 brother  Philip,  who  was  then  living ;  and  thus  committed  at  once  the  base 
 crimes  of  seduction,  adultery,  and  incest. 
 
 8.  Q.  Was  he  not  acquainted  with  John  the  Baptist  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  he  heard  his  discourses,  and  was  in  some  respects  reformed  by 
 them. 
 
 9.  Q.  Was  he  personally  reproved  by  John  for  his  imlawful  conduct  ? 
 A.  Yes  ;  but  John  suflfered  much  for  it. 
 
 10.  Q.  What  was  the  consequence  of  his  giving  such  reproofs  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  confined  for  eighteen  months  in  the  castle  of  Machrerus,* 
 and  afterwards  beheaded.  (See  Matt.  xiv.  3-12 ;  Mark  vi.  16-28 ;  Luke  iii. 
 19,  20.) 
 
 11.  Q.  Had  not  this  Herod  an  interview  likewise  with  Jesus  Chi-ist  ? 
 
 A,  Yes  ;  for  Herod  was  desirous  of  seeing  Him,  because  he  had  heard 
 many  things  of  Him,  and  he  hoped  to.  have  seen  some  miracles  done  by  Him. 
 
 12.  Q.  Was  he  gratified  in  this  ? 
 
 A.  No ;  Herod  questioned  Him  in  many  words,  but  Jesus  answered  him 
 nothing. 
 
 13.  Q.  How  did  he  receive  this  remarkable  instance  of  silent  reproof 
 from  the  suffering  Redeemer  ? 
 
 A.  Herod  with  his  men  of  war  set  Him  at  naught,  and  mocked  Him,  and 
 arrayed  Him  in  a  gorgeous  robe,  and  sent  Him  again  to  Pilate,  (Luke 
 xxiii.  2.) 
 
 14.  Q.  Was  Herod  tranquil  and  happy  in  the  midst  of  sensual  gratifica- 
 tions ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  his  conscience  terrified  him,  and  he  was  defeated  in  war  by 
 Aretas,  the  father  of  his  lawful  wife,  (Mark  vi.  16.) 
 
 15.  Q.  Was  this  the  end  of  his  trouble  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  independent  of  his  doom  in  another  world,  he  was  disgraced  by 
 the  Eoman  emi^eror,  Caius,  for  treasonable  practices,  and  banished  out  of 
 his  dominion. 
 
 16.  Q.  What  became  of  Herodias  ? 
 
 A.  She  fared  the  same  fate  with  her  adulterous  partner,  and  died  in 
 disgraceful  exile. 
 
 *  Machserus  was  a  castle  and  fort  in  the  tribe  of  Reuben,  a  few  leagues  from 
 the  north-east  side  of  the  Dead  Sea,  near  the  boundaries  of  the  respective  domin" 
 ions  of  Herod  Antipas  and  Aretas,  king  of  Arabia  Petrea,  whose  daughter  Herod 
 first  married. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  2  C 
 
402  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 17.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  this  account  of  Herod  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn,  that  he  who  hardeneth  hia  heart  shall  fall  into  mischief,  and 
 that  sensual  indulgence  is  not  only  oftensive  to  God  and  His  children,  but 
 also  the  som'ce  of  much  evil  to  the  offender. 
 
 §  7.  Concerning  St  Stephen. 
 
 1.  Q.  "WTio  was  Stephen  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  one  of  the  seven  deacons  of  the  church  at  Jerusalem,  (Acts 
 vi.  5.) 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  his  character  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  "  a  man  full  of  faith,  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  of  power  ;  and 
 did  great  wonders  and  miracles  among  the  people,"  (Acts  vi.  5,  8 ) 
 
 3.  Q.  Was  he  not  greatly  opposed  by  the  Jews  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  many  opposed  him  by  disj)utation,  but  they  were  not  able  to 
 resist  the  wisdom  and  the  sph-it  by  which  he  spake,  (Acts  vi.  9,  10.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Did  their  opposition  end  there  ? 
 
 A.  No ;  for  they  suborned  men  who  said,  "  We  have  heard  him  speak 
 blasphemous  words  against  Moses  and  against  God."  And  they  stirred  up 
 the  people,  and  the  elders,  and  the  scribes,  and  came  upon  him,  and  caught 
 him,  and  brought  him  to  the  council,  and  set  up  false  witnesses. 
 
 5.  Q.  What  did  these  false  witnesses  advance  ? 
 
 A.  They  said,  "This  man  ceaseth  not  to  speak  blasphemous  words 
 against  this  holy  place,  and  the  law :  for  we  have  heai-d  him  say,  that  this 
 Jesus  of  Nazareth  shall  destroy  this  place,  and  shall  change  the  customs 
 which  Moses  delivered  us." 
 
 6.  Q.  How  did  Stephen  bear  this  load  of  accusations,  equally  false  and 
 malicious  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  in  a  very  heavenly  state  of  mind,  for  "  all  that  sat  in  the 
 council,  looking  steadfastly  on  him,  saw  his  face  as  it  had  been  the  face  of 
 an  angel,"  (Acts  vi.  15.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Was  he  permitted  to  answer  for  himself  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  he  gave  a  full  reply  to  then-  false  accusations,  and  made  a  very 
 close  application  of  the  whole  to  his  audience. 
 
 8.  Q.  How  did  he  address  them  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  Ye  stiff-necked  and  uncircumcised  in  heart  and  ears,  ye  do 
 always  resist  the  Holy  Ghost :  as  yoiu*  fathera  did,  so  do  ye.  Which  of  the 
 prophets  have  not  your  fathers  persecuted  ?  and  they  have  slain  them 
 which  shewed  before  of  the  coming  of  the  Just  One  ;  of  whom  ye  have 
 been  now  the  betrayers  and  murderers  :  who  have  received  the  law  by  the 
 disposition  of  angels,  and  have  not  kept  it,"  (Acts  vii.  51-53.) 
 
 9.  Q.  How  did  they  bear  this  close  application  ? 
 
 A.  "  When  they  heard  these  things,  they  were  cut  to  the  heart,  and 
 they  gnashed  on  him  with  their  teeth-  But  he,  being  full  of  the  Holy 
 Ghost,  looked  up  steadfastly  into  heaven,  and  saw  the  glory  of  God,  and 
 Jesus  stanchng  on  the  right  hand  of  God,  and  said.  Behold,  I  see  the 
 heavens  opened,  and  the  Son  of  man  standing  on  the  right  hand  of  God." 
 
 10.  Q.  Did  this  wonderful  testimony  appease  them  ? 
 
 A.  Far  from  it ;  for  "  then  they  cried  out  with  a  loud  voice,  and  stopped 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  403 
 
 their  ears,  and  ran  upon  him  with  one  accord,  and  cast  him  out  of  the  city, 
 and  stoned  him,''  (Acts  vii.  57,  58.) 
 
 11.  Q.  How  did  he  bear  this  cruel  usage  ? 
 
 A.  He  called  upon  God,  saying,  "  Lord  Jesus,  I'eceive  my  spirit.  And  he 
 kneeled  down,  and  cried  with  a  loud  voice,  Lord,  lay  not  this  sin  to  their 
 charge.    And  when  he  had  said  this,  he  fell  asleep,"  (Acts  vii,  59,  60.) 
 
 12.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  this  account  of  Stephen  ] 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  they  who  peaceably  suffer  insult  and  reproach  for  the 
 name  of  Christ  are  happy,  for  the  spirit  of  glory  and  of  God  resteth  upon 
 them,  (1  Pet.  iv.  14.) 
 
 §  8.  Concerning  St  Paul. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Paul  or  Saul  1 
 
 A.  He  was  a  native  of  Tarsus  in  CUicia,  and  a  Roman  citizen. 
 
 2.  Q.  Was  he  not  a  Jew  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  he  was  of  Jewish  parents,  and  had  his  education  at  Jerusalem, 
 (Acts  xxii.  3  ;  PhU.  iii.  5.) 
 
 3.  Q.  As  there  were  several  sects  among  the  Jews,  to  which  of  these  did 
 he  belong  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  of  the  strictest  sect,  that  of  the  Pharisees. 
 
 4.  Q.  Was  he  not  brought  up  to  business  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  but  among  the  Jews  that  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  most 
 liberal  education. 
 
 6.  Q.  Was  he  not  very  much  attached  to  the  Jewish  religion,  and  all 
 the  Mosaic  institutions  ? 
 
 A.  Yes ;  to  such  a  degree  as  to  conclude  "  that  he  ought  to  do  many 
 things  contrary  to  the  name  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth,"  (Acts  xsvi.  5,  9.) 
 
 6.  Q.  How  did  this  ignorant  zeal  operate  in  him  ? 
 
 A.  Many  of  the  saints  he  shut  up  in  prison,  having  received  authority 
 from  the  chief  priests ;  when  they  were  put  to  death,  he  gave  his  voice 
 against  them — he  punished  them  oft  in  every  synagogue — compelled  them 
 to  blaspheme  ;  and  thus  breathing  out  threatenings  and  slaughter  against 
 the  disciples  of  the  Lord,  and  being  exceedingly  mad  against  them,  he 
 persecuted  them  even  unto  strange  cities,  (Acts  xxvi.  10,  11,  ix.  1.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  old  might  he  be  at  that  time  ? 
 
 A.  About  four  or  five  and  twenty  yeai-s  of  age. 
 
 8.  Q.  Was  there  not  something  very  remarkable  in  the  manner  of  his 
 conversion  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  when  on  his  way  from  Jerusalem  to  Damascus,  at  mid-day, 
 "  suddenly  there  shined  round  about  him  a  light  from  heaven ;  and  he 
 fell  to  the  earth,  and  heard  a  voice  saying  unto  him,  Saul,  Saul,  why  perse- 
 cutest  thou  me  ? "  (Acts  is.  3,  4.) 
 
 9.  Q.  When  thus  wonderfully  arrested,  and  addressed  by  the  Lord 
 Jesus  Christ,  what  effect  had  it  upon  him  ? 
 
 A.  He  trembling  and  astonished  said,  "  Lord,  what  wilt  thou  have  me 
 to  do?"  (Actsix.  6.) 
 
 10.  Q.  When   Ananias   of  Damascus   objected   to    receive    Paul   as   a 
 
404  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  IIT. 
 
 Christian  bi'other,  because  of  his  well-kuowTi  character  as  a  persecutor  of 
 the  Christians,  Tvhat  answer  Tvas  given  him  1 
 
 A.  The  Lord  said  unto  him,  "  Go  thy  way  ;  for  he  is  a  chosen  vessel 
 unto  me,  to  bear  my  name  before  the  Gentiles,  and  kings,  and  the 
 children  of  Israel.  For  I  will  shew  him  how  great  things  he  must  suffer 
 for  my  name's  sake,"  (Acts  ix.  15,  16.) 
 
 11.  Q.  After  Paul  had  been  certain  days  with  the  disciples  wbich  were 
 at  Damascus,  what  was  his  first  work  as  an  apostle  ? 
 
 A.  "  Straightway  he  preached  Christ  in  the  synagogues,  that  he  is  the 
 Son  of  God,"  (Acts  is.  20.) 
 
 12.  Q.  What  effect  had  his  first  discourses  on  the  people  ? 
 
 A.  All  that  heard  him  were  amazed,  and  said,  "Is  not  this  he  that 
 destroyed  them  which  called  on  this  name  in  Jerusalem,  and  came  hither 
 for  that  intent,  that  he  might  bring  them  bound  unto  the  chief  priests  ? 
 ....  But  some  went  about  to  slay  him,"  (Acts  ix.  21,  29.) 
 
 13.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  the  inhabitants  of  Lystra  receive  Paul,  with 
 his  companion  Barnabas,  after  the  cure  of  a  cripple  who  had  never  walked  ? 
 
 A.  When  the  people  saw  what  Paul  had  done,  they  lift  up  their  voices, 
 saying,  "The  gods  are  come  down  to  us  in  the  Ukeness  of  men.  And 
 they  called  Barnabas,  Jupiter ;  and  Paul,  Jlercurius,  because  he  was  the 
 chief  speaker,"  (Acts  xiv.  11,  12.) 
 
 14.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  they  receive  this  enthusiastic  reverence  ? 
 A.  They  rent  their  clothes  with  concern,  and  ran  in  among  the  people, 
 
 earnestly  exclaiming,  "  Sirs,  why  do  ye  these  things  ?  We  also  are  men 
 of  like  passions  with  you,  and  preach  imto  you  that  ye  should  tm-n  from 
 these  vanities  unto  the  living  God,  who  made  heaven,  and  earth,  and  the 
 sea,  and  all  things  that  are  therein." 
 
 15.  Q.  When  the  keeper  of  the  prison  at  PhiKppi  came  trembling,  and 
 fell  down  before  Paul  and  Silas,  and  said.  Sirs,  what  must  I  do  to  be 
 saved  ?  what  reply  did  they  make  ? 
 
 A.  They  said,  "Beheve  on  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  and  thou  shalt  be 
 saved,  and  thy  house,"  (Acts  xvi.  29-31.) 
 
 16.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  Paul  conduct  himseff  at  Thessalonica  ? 
 
 A.  Paul,  as  his  manner  was,  went  into  the  synagogue  of  the  Jews,  and 
 three  Sabbath  days  reasoned  with  them  out  of  the  Scriptures,  opening 
 and  alleging,  that  Christ  must  needs  have  suffered  and  risen  again  from 
 the  dead  ;  and  that  this  Jesus  is  Chi-ist,  (Acts  xvii.  2, 3.) 
 
 17.  Q.  When  informed  by  the  Holy  Spirit  that  bonds  and  afflictions 
 awaited  him,  how  did  he  bear  it  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  None  of  these  things  move  me,  neither  coimt  I  my  life 
 dear  imto  myself,  so  that  I  might  finish  my  course  with  joy,  and  the  min- 
 istry, which  I  have  received  of  the  Lord  Jesus,  to  testify  the  gospel  of  the 
 grace  of  God,"  (Acts  sx.  24.) 
 
 18.  Q.  When  his  friends  at  Csesarea  wanted  to  dissuade  him  from  going 
 to  Jenisalem,  and  were  much  affected  with  the  prospect  of  his  danger 
 what  reply  did  he  make  ? 
 
 A.  Tlieu  Paul  answered,  "  What  mean  ye  to  weep,  and  to  break  mine 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDER  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  405 
 
 heart  ?  for  I  am  ready  not  to  be  bouud  only,  but  also  to  die  at  Je-i-usaLem 
 for  the  name  of  the  Lord  Jesus,"  (Acts  xxi.  13.) 
 
 19.  Q.  After  Paul  had  undergone  great  abuse  at  Jerusalem,  and  was  in 
 danger  of  being  pulled  in  pieces  of  the  mob,  what  encouragement  had  he 
 from  the  Lord  l 
 
 A.  The  night  following,  the  Lord  stood  by  him,  and  said,  "  Be  of  good 
 cheer,  Paul ;  for  as  thou  hast  testified  of  me  in  Jerusalem,  so  must  thou 
 bear  witness  also  at  Rome,"  (Acts  xxiii.  11.) 
 
 20.  Q.  When  king  Agi'ippa,  on  hearing  Paul's  defence  before  him  at 
 CsBsarea,  said,  "  Almost  thou  jjersuadest  me  to  be  a  Chi'istiau,"  what  reply 
 did  he  make  ? 
 
 A.  Paul  said,  "  I  would  to  God,  that  not  only  thou,  but  also  all  that  hear 
 me  this  day,  were  both  almost,  and  altogether  such  as  I  am,  except  these 
 bonds,"  (Acts  xxvi.  29.) 
 
 21.  Q.  When  he  was  taken  to  Rome  as  a  prisoner,  in  consequence  of  his 
 appealing  to  Csesar,  how  did  he  spend  his  time  there  ? 
 
 A.  He  dwelt  two  whole  years  in  his  own  hired  house,  and  received  all 
 that  came  in  unto  him,  "  preaching  the  kingdom  of  God,  and  teaching  those 
 things  which  concern  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  with  all  confidence,  no  man 
 forbidding  him,"  (Acts  xxviii.  30,  31.) 
 
 22.  Q.  After  all  his  labours  and  sufferings  for  Christ,  by  what  death  did 
 he  glorify  God  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  beheaded,  near  the  city  of  Rome,  by  the  command  of  the 
 emperor  Nero.* 
 
 §  9.  Concerning  Cornelius. 
 
 1.  Q.  Who  was  Cornelius  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  a  Roman  centurion,  or  colonel,  who  lived  at  Caesarea,  and  the 
 first  Gentile,  or  heathen,  who  was  admitted  into  the  apostolic  church. 
 
 2.  Q.  What  was  his  moral  and  religious  character  prior  to  his  conversion 
 to  Chri.stianity  1 
 
 A.  He  was  "  a  devout  man,  and  one  that  feared  God  with  all  his  house, 
 who  gave  much  alms  to  the  people,  and  prayed  to  God  alway,"  +  (Acts  x.  2.) 
 
 3.  Q.  How  came  he  to  be  acquainted  with  Christianity  2 
 
 A.  An  angel  of  God  appeared  to  him  in  a  vision,  giving  him  particular 
 direction  to  send  to  Joppa  for  Simon  Peter,  adding,  "  He  shall  tell  thee 
 what  thou  oughtest  to  do,"  (Acts  x.  3-6.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  was  the  honourable  account  which  the  messengers  of  Cor- 
 nelius (his  two  household  servants  and  a  devout  soldier  who  waited  on 
 him  continually)  gave  of  their  master  ? 
 
 *  It  was  reported  that  Nero  was  exasperated  at  the  conversion  of  some  of  his 
 intimates,  by  means  of  this  apostle,  as  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  mandate. 
 
 ■f-  Though  unacc|uainted  v/ith  doctrines  piirely  Christian,  and  though  no  prose- 
 lyte to  the  Jewish  religion,  he  probably  had  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  Testament. 
 He  who  can  relish  the  Psalms  of  David,  and  enter  into  the  spirit  of  the  other  Old 
 Testament  writings,  is  not  far  from  the  kingdom  of  God. 
 
406  THE  EVANGELICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  HI. 
 
 A.  They  said,  "  Cornelius  the  centurion,  a  just  man,  and  one  that  feareth 
 God,  and  of  good  report  among  aU  the  nation  of  the  Jews,  was  warned 
 from  God  by  an  holy  angel  to  send  for  thee  into  his  house,  and  to  hear 
 words  of  thee,"  (Acts  x.  22.) 
 
 5.  Q.  In  what  manner  did  Cornehus  receive  Peter  1 
 
 A.  Cornelius  had  called  together  his  kinsmen  and  near  friends,  and  after 
 proper  explanations,  he  said,  "  Thou  hast  well  done  that  thou  art  come. 
 Now  therefore  ai-e  we  all  here  present  before  God,  to  hear  all  things  that 
 are  commanded  thee  of  God,"  (Acts  x  33.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  was  the  effect  of  this  visit  of  Peter  to  Cornelius  ? 
 
 A.  While  Peter  preached  the  gospel  to  him  and  his  friends,  they  were 
 made  partakers  of  mii-aculous  gifts  ;  they  were  then  baptized  in  the  name 
 of  the  Lord,  and  thus  became  the  first  from  among  the  Gentiles  who 
 joined  the  Chiistian  Church,  (Acts  x.  11  IS.) 
 
 7.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  fi'om  this  account  of  Cornelius  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  "  that  God  is  no  respecter  of  persons  ;  but  in  every  nation  he 
 that  feareth  Him,  and  worketh  righteousness,  is  accepted  of  Him." 
 
 8.  Q.  What  else  do  you  learn  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  also  that  it  is  a  great  privilege  to  be  more  fully  instructed  in 
 the  truths  of  religion  ;  and  that  they  who  diligently  improve  the  know- 
 ledge they  have,  are  the  most  hkely  to  have  more. 
 
 §  10.  Concerning  Herod  Agrippa. 
 
 1.  Q.  'SSTho  was  Herod  Agrippa  ? 
 
 A.  He  was  the  son  of  Aristobiilus,  the  grandson  of  Herod  the  Great,  and 
 the  nephew  of  Herod  Antipas. 
 
 2.  Q.  Was  he  friendly  to  the  Chiistians  ? 
 
 A.  Ko  ;  for  "  he  stretched  forth  his  hand  to  vex  certain  of  the  chm'ch  ; 
 and  he  killed  James  the  brother  of  John  with  the  sword,"  (Acts  sii.  1,  2.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Did  his  persecuting  violence  stop  here  ? 
 
 A.  No ;  for,  "  because  he  saw  that  it  pleased  the  Jews,  he  proceeded 
 fvu'ther  to  take  Peter  also,"  (Acts  xii.  3.) 
 
 4.  Q.  Did  he  succeed  in  his  wicked  purpose  i 
 
 A.  He  succeeded  so  far  as  to  apprehend  him  ;  "  and  when  he  had  appre- 
 hended him,  he  put  him  in  prison,  and  dehvered  him  to  fom-  quaternions 
 of  soldiers  to  keep  him,  intending  after  Easter  to  bring  him  forth  to  the 
 people,"  (Acts  xii.  4.) 
 
 5.  Q.  Was  Peter  left  in  the  power  of  Herod  ? 
 
 A.  No  ;  for  "  prayer  was  made  without  ceasing  of  the  church  for  him." 
 And  on  the  night  before  Herod  would  have  brought  him  forth,  while 
 Peter  was  sleeping  between  two  soldiers,  boimd  with  two  chains,  an  angel 
 said  to  him,  "  Ai-ise  up  quickly  ;"  then  his  chains  fell  off  fi-om  his  hands, 
 and  he  followed  the  angel  to  another  part  of  the  city,*  (Acts  xii.  5-10.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  was  Peter's  reflection  on  this  sm-prising  dehverance  ? 
 
 A.  He  said,  "  Now  I  know  of  a  surety  that  the  Lord  hath  sent  his  angel, 
 
 *  Herod  then  resided  at  Jerusalem,  but  soon  after  he  removed  to  Cacsarea, 
 where  he  died. 
 
PART  III.]  THE  OLDEE  CHILD'S  CATECHISM.  407 
 
 and  hath  delivered  me  out  of  the  hand  of  Herod,  aud  from  all  the  expecta- 
 tion of  the  people  of  the  Jews,"  (Acts  xii.  11.) 
 
 7.  Q.  How  did  Herod  bear  this  disappointment  ? 
 
 A.  As  soon  as  it  was  day,  there  was  no  small  stir  among  the  soldiersi 
 what  was  become  of  Peter.  And  when  Herod  had  sought  for  him,  aud 
 foimd  him  not,  he  examined  the  keepers,  and  commanded  that  they  should 
 be  put  to  death. 
 
 8.  Q.  What  became  of  him  when  at  Csesarea  addressing  the  inhabitants 
 of  Tyre  and  Sidon  I 
 
 A.  Upon  a  set  day,  Herod,  arrayed  in  royal  apparel,  sat  upon  his  throne, 
 and  made  an  oration  unto  them.  And  when  his  flattei-ers  among  the 
 people  gave  a  shout,  saying,  "  It  is  the  voice  of  a  god,  and  not  of  a  man," 
 immediately  the  angel  of  the  Lord  smote  him,  because  he  gave  not  God 
 the  glory  :  and  he  was  eaten  of  worms,  and  gave  up  the  ghost,"  (Acts  xii. 
 21-23.) 
 
 9.  Q.  What  do  you  infer  from  this  account  of  Herod  Agrippa  ? 
 
 A.  I  infer  that  God  resisteth  the  proud,  though  in  royal  apparel, — that  to 
 give  Divine  honours  to  a  creature  is  highly  displeasing  to  Him, — and  that 
 the  triumph  of  the  wicked  is  short. 
 
 §  11.  The  end  of  the  world. 
 
 1.  Q.  WiU  this  world  in  its  present  form  have  an  end  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  for  "  the  end  of  all  things  is  at  hand,"  (1  Pet.  iv.  7.) 
 
 2.  Q.  In  what  manner  shall  an  end  be  put  to  this  world '? 
 
 A.  "  The  heavens  and  the  earth  which  are  now  are  reserved  unto  fire 
 against  the  day  of  judgment,  and  perdition  of  ungodly  men,"  (2  Pet.  iii.  7.) 
 
 3.  Q.  Will  this  awful  event  take  place  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  for  "  the  day  of  the  Lord  will  come  as  a  thief  in  the  night,  in 
 the  which  the  heavens  shall  jsass  away  with  a  great  noise,  and  the  ele- 
 ments shall  melt  with  fervent  heat,  the  earth  also  and  the  works  that  are 
 therein  shall  he  burnt  up,"  (2  Pet.  iii.  10.) 
 
 4.  Q.  What  improvement  should  you  make  of  this  affecting  subject  ? 
 
 A.  Seeing  that  all  these  things  shall  be  dissolved,  I  should  solemnly 
 consider  "  what  manner  of  person  I  ought  to  be  in  all  holy  conversation 
 and  godhness,  looking  for  and  hasting  unto  the  coming  of  the  day  of  God," 
 (2  Pet.  iii.  11,  12.) 
 
 5.  Q.  Will  there  not  be  another  world  when  this  is  no  more  ? 
 
 A.  Yes  ;  we  are  taught  to  "  look  for  new  heavens  and  a  new  earth, 
 wherein  dwelleth  righteousness,"  (2  Pet.  iii.  13.) 
 
 6.  Q.  What  will  be  the  privilege  of  the  righteous  in  that  new  world  ? 
 A.  In  that  world  "  there  shall  be  no  more  death,  neither  sorrow,  nor 
 
 crying,  neither  shall  there  be  any  more  pain :  for  the  former  things  are 
 passed  away,"  (Eev.  xxi.  4.) 
 
 7.  Q.  Win  there  not  be  a  general  resurrection  of  the  body  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  all  shall  rise  ;  "  for  the  Lord  Jesus  himself  shall  descend  from 
 heaven  with  a  shout,  with  the  voice  of  the  archangel,  and  with  the  trump 
 of  God  ;  and  the  dead  in  Christ  shall  rise  first,"  (1  Thess.  iv.  16.) 
 
408  THE  EVA^"GSLICAL  CATECHIST.  [PAET  III. 
 
 8.  Q.  Will  not  the  bodies  of  the  saints  be  very  diflerent  from  our  pre- 
 sent bodies  ? 
 
 A.  Yes,  very  different ;  for  flesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the  kingdom 
 of  God  ;  neither  can  corruption  inherit  incorruption,  (1  Cor.  xv.  50.) 
 
 9.  Q.  To  what  shall  they  be  like  ? 
 
 A.  Like  the  body  of  the  glorious  Eedeemer  ;  for  He  "  shall  change  their 
 vile  bodies,  that  they  may  be  fashioned  like  unto  His  glorious  body,"  (Phil, 
 iii.  21.) 
 
 10.  Q.  What  will  become  of  the  disobedient  at  that  awful  period  ? 
 
 A.  When  the  Lord  Jesus  shall  be  I'evealed  from  heaven  with  His  mighty 
 angels  in  flaming  fire.  He  will  "  take  vengeance  on  them  that  know  not 
 God,  and  that  obey  not  the  gospel  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,"  (2  Thess.  i. 
 7,8.) 
 
 11.  Q.  In  what  manner  will  He  take  vengeance  on  them  ? 
 
 A.  They  shall  be  "  punished  with  everlasting  destruction  from  the  pre- 
 sence of  the  Lord,  and  ft-om  the  glory  of  his  power,"  (2  Thess.  i.  9.) 
 
 12.  Q.  What  will  be  the  final  sentence  of  the  Judge  upon  these  ? 
 
 A.  He  shall  say  unto  them,  "  Dej^ait  from  me,  ye  cursed,  into  everlasting 
 fire,  prepared  for  the  devil  and  his  angels :  for  I  was  an  hungered,  and  ye 
 gave  me  no  meat :  I  was  thirsty,  and  ye  gave  me  no  drink :  I  was  a 
 stranger,  and  ye  took  me  not  in :  naked  and  ye  clothed  me  not :  sick,  and 
 in  prison,  and  ye  visited  me  not,"  (Matt.  sxv.  41-43.) 
 
 13.  Q.  What  will  be  the  final  sentence  of  the  Judge  upon  the  righteous  ? 
 A.  He  shall  say  unto  them  on  His  right  hand,  "  Come,  ye  blessed  of  my 
 
 Father,  inherit  the  kingdom  prepared  for  you  from  the  foundation  of  the 
 world :  for  I  was  an  hungered,  and  ye  gave  me  meat :  I  was  thirsty,  and 
 ye  gave  me  drink :  I  was  a  sti-anger,  and  ye  took  me  in  :  naked,  and  ye 
 clothed  me  :  1  was  sick,  and  ye  visited  me  :  I  was  in  prison,  and  ye  came 
 unto  me,"  (Matt.  xxv.  34-36.) 
 
 14.  Q.  What  do  you  learn  from  these  awful  facts  ? 
 
 A.  I  learn  that  "  the  wages  of  sin  is  death  ;  but  the  gift  of  God  is  eter- 
 nal life,  through  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord,"  (Eom.  vi.  23.) 
 
ON  A  CONGREGATIONAL  UNION. 
 
 3k 
 
 I.  A  CIECULAR  LETTER  FROM  THE  INDEPENDENT  MINISTERS  OF 
 WARWICKSHIRE. 
 
 II.  THOUGHTS  ON  A  GENERAL  UNION. 
 
 III.  HINTS  TO  A  COMMITTEE  IN  LONDON. 
 
A  CIECULAE  LETTER,  ETC.* 
 
 Deae  Beethren  in  the  Loed, — The  importance  of  the  subject 
 of  this  letter,  and  the  urgency  of  the  occasion,  are  the  only  apology 
 that  you  can  reasonably  expect,  or  we  need  to  offer,  for  the  liberty 
 which  is  now  taken  in  thus  addressing  you.  It  has  been  upon 
 our  hearts  for  some  time  (and  we  trust  it  is  from  the  Lord)  to 
 communicate  our  thoughts  and  afifections  to  you  on  a  subject 
 which  we  are  persuaded  is  dear  to  you  :  we  mean.  The  prosperity 
 of  Zion,  and  the  progress  of  the  everlasting  gospel.  You,  as  well 
 as  ourselves,  must  have  observed  that  we  all  greatly  need  to  be 
 stirred  up  to  a  greater  concern  about  this  matter. 
 
 The  great  enemy  of  all  good  is  busy  and  iadefatigable.  Work- 
 ing on  our  fallen  nature,  he  has  prevailed  to  an  awful  degree  in 
 the  world,  and  his  progress  daily  is  more  and  more  alarming. 
 
 *  A  Circular  Letter  from  the  Independent  Ministers  assembled  at  Nuneaton, 
 August  6, 1793,  to  the  Associated  Churches  in  Warwickshire,  meeting  at  Warwick, 
 Coventry,  Birmingham,  Foreshill,  Bedworth,  Nuneaton,  Stretton,  Atherstone, 
 Stratford-upon-Avon,  Kenilworth,  and  Kineton.  With  a  Postscript,  addressed  to 
 the  Independent  Associations  of  Ministers  in  the  other  Counties  of  England  and 
 Wales.  "  Go  ye  into  all  the  world,  and  preach  the  gospel  to  every  creature." — 
 Mark  xvi.  15. 
 
 At  a  meeting  of  ministers  held  at  Warwick  on  Thursday,  June  27,  1793,  the 
 following  question  was  proposed  for  consideration  : — "  What  is  the  duty  of  Chris- 
 tians with  respect  to  the  spread  of  the  gospel  ? "  After  some  conversation,  the 
 following  resolutions  were  agreed  to  : — 1.  It  appears  to  us  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
 all  Christians  to  employ  every  means  in  their  power  to  spread  the  knowledge  of 
 the  gospel,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  2.  As  ministers  of  Christ,  solemnly  en- 
 gaged by  our  office  to  exert  ourselves  for  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  spiritual  good 
 of  men,  we  unite  in  a  determination  to  promote  this  great  design  in  our  respec- 
 tive connexions.  3.  That  we  will  immediately  recommend  to  our  friends  the  for- 
 mation of  a  fund  for  the  above  purpose,  and  report  progress  at  the  next  meeting. 
 i.  That  the  first  Monday  of  every  month,  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  be  a 
 
412  A  CIECULAR  LETTEE  FKOil  THE 
 
 The  meu  of  the  world  also  collect  all  theii-  ingenuity,  arts,  and 
 forces,  to  promote  the  ends  by  wMch  their  hearts  are  respectively 
 captivated.  And  shall  the  heirs  of  eternal  glory  alone  continue 
 supinely  negligent  ?  Shall  the  consideration  of  everlasting  happi- 
 ness and  everlasting  misery  have  less  influence  on  their  hearts  than 
 the  short-lived  pleasures  of  sin  have  on  those  who  pursue  them  ? 
 
 In  a  short  time,  brethren,  our  opportunities  of  usefulness  in 
 our  generation  will  be  over ;  ouis  who  now  address  you,  and 
 yours  who  are  addressed.  In  a  short  time  we  shall  aU  wish  we 
 had  been  more  active  and  diligent,  and  more  zealously  affected  in 
 every  good  cause,  especially  in  being  any  way  instrumental  in 
 promoting  the  cause  of  Jesus  Christ  in  the  world.  In  a  short 
 time  every  tongue  will  be  sealed  in  silence,  every  hand  and  foot 
 in  perfect  inactivity.  How  pertinent  and  weightj',  then,  is  the 
 wise  man's  advice :  "  Whatsoever  thy  hand  findeth  to  do,  do  it 
 with  thy  might ;  for  there  is  no  work,  nor  device,  nor  knowledge, 
 nor  wisdom,  in  the  grave,  whither  thou  goest." 
 
 After  many  thoughts,  consultations,  and  prayer  among  our- 
 
 season  fixed  on  for  united  prayer  to  God  for  tlie  success  of  every  attempt,  by  all 
 denominations  of  CliristiaDS,  for  the  spread  of  the  gospel.  5.  That  the  Rev. 
 Edward  Williams  be  desu-ed  to  prepare  a  Circular  Letter*  on  the  subject  of 
 spreading  the  gospel,  by  the  nest  meeting.  6.  That  the  next  meeting  be  held  at 
 Kuneaton,  on  Tuesday,  August  6,  1793.  At  the  same  time  a  subscription  was 
 made,  as  a  beginning,  by  the  ministers  then  present,  amounting  to  £5,  5s. 
 
 *  ["  This  letter,"  Mr  GUbert  states,  "  is  particularly  deserving  of  notice,  as  to  it, 
 as  an  instmment  in  God's  hands,  may  be  traced  the  adoption  of  two  most  important 
 measures  amongst  the  Independents — the  general  estabhshnient  of  monthly  meetings 
 in  their  congi-egations  for  special  united  prayer,  and  the  sending  of  missionaries  into 
 pagan  countries."  A  document  possessing  even  already  such  historical  value  is  de- 
 serving of  preseiwation.  'So  one,  if  he  believes  in  the  Divine  appointment  and  efficacy 
 of  prayer,  if  he  values  the  gospel,  and  seeks  the  salvation  of  the  heathen,  can  over- 
 estimate the  importance  of  this  short  but  earnest  letter,  with  its  postscript,  when  it 
 stands  related,  as  the  exciting  or  stimulating  cause,  to  such  movements  as  those 
 specified  by  Mr  Gilbert. 
 
 The  two  papers  that  follow  this  had  for  theii-  objects  the  same  general  purpose — 
 viz.,  promoting  the  evangehcal  action  of  the  Independents  of  England  and  "Wales  in 
 the  establishment  of  Home  and  Foreign  Missions,  and  the  strengthening  of  churches 
 then  existing.  Those  on  a  Congregational  Union  are  already  historically  valuable. 
 Although  we  may  not  be  able  to  trace  their  connexion  with  the  existing  Congrega- 
 tional Union,  it  is  certain  that  discussions  like  these  create  impulses  which  propagate 
 themselves  beyond  the  age  in  which  they  take  place.  Who  can  teU  to  what  extent 
 the  swell  of  the  present  Union  may  be  indebted  to  these  papers  ?  TLe  connexion  of 
 the  first  with  our  monthly  prayer-meetings  and  missionary  institutions  is  historically 
 ascertained ;  and  in  the  nature  of  things  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  latter 
 in  theii-  time  were  not  siuulaily  a  cause  of-  the  good  things  that  have  come  upon  us. 
 —Ed.] 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTEKS  OF  WAEWICKSHIEE.  413 
 
 selves,  we  have  concluded  that  it  is  in  your  power,  the  Lord 
 assisting  you,  to  forward  our  wishes  and  our  plans  of  usefulness. 
 We  shall  therefore,  in  the  first  place,  explain  to  you  in  as  brief 
 and  distinct  a  manner  as  we  can,  what  is  our  immediate  object  in 
 soliciting  your  attention  at  this  time,  and  then  inform  you  in  what 
 particulars  we  wish  and  solicit  your  concurrence. 
 
 Our  immediate  object  is  the  revival  of  true  religion  in  all  the 
 churches  with  which  we  are  connected  in  this  county  of  Warwick. 
 Next  to  this,  we  wish  to  introduce  the  doctrines  which  are  ac- 
 cording to  godliness  into  those  parts  of  the  county  which  are 
 ignorant  and  profane,  or  desirous  of  assistance,  in  the  most  f)rudent 
 and  inoffensive  manner  we  can  ;  and  this  we  conceive  may  be  best 
 effected  by  establishing  and  supporting  two  or  three  circulating- 
 day  schools,  and  a  suitable  itinerant  preacher,  whose  office  would 
 be  to  sujjeriutend  the  schools  and  preach  the  gospel  among  the 
 poor.  And  should  God  open  your  hearts  in  benevolence  and 
 your  hands  in  contributions,  according  as  He  hath  prospered  you, 
 we  greatly  desire  to  have  it  in  onr  power  to  send  a  man  of  God 
 among  the  poor  heathen,  who  perish  for  lack  of  knowledge. 
 
 This  is  our  design,  and  we  humbly  hope  it  is  approved  of  God. 
 If  it  should  meet  with  your  approbation,  as  an  attempt  calculated 
 to  glorify  God  and  win  souls,  we  beg  leave  to  solicit  your  con- 
 currence in  two  things  more  especially : — 
 
 I.  By  your  peayees  for  success.  This  all  of  you,  who  love 
 Jesus  Christ  and  His  cause,  may  do,  the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich. 
 We  doubt  not  but  you  do  pray  for  the  revival  and  success  of 
 religion ;  but  what  we  now  recommend  is  a  special  union  and 
 concurrence  in  all  the  associated  churches,  with  an  explicit  re- 
 ference to  this  object.  And,  in  order  to  shew  that  your  hearts 
 are  with  ours  in  the  work,  to  promote  greater  solemnity,  (perhaps 
 we  might  add  greater  efficacy,)  and  to  engage  a  more  general 
 attention  to  the  duty,  we  recommend  a  monthly  solemn  exercise 
 of  united  prayer.  It  would  be  difficult,  perhaps,  to  fix  on  any  one 
 day  and  hour  that  might  equally  suit  all  the  churches.  In  this, 
 therefore,  we  cannot  urge  comijliance ;  let  each  society  deliberate 
 and  determine  according  to  its  own  convenience.  Yet,  desirous 
 that  the  compliance  be  as  universally  concurrent  as  possible  in 
 point  of  time,  we  recommend,  knowing  it  to  be  convenient  and 
 agreeable  to  the  greater  number  of  our  societies,  the  first  Monday 
 in  every  calendar  month,  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening. 
 
41 4<  A  CIECTJLAE  LETTER  PEOM  THE 
 
 It  is  hoped  that,  in  proportion  as  you  seriously  consider  the 
 subject  to  which  we  are  now  calling  your  attention,  the  more  you 
 will  be  convinced  that  it  is  a  reasonable  service.  God  alone  can 
 revive  His  work  in  the  midst  of  the  years ;  He  alone  can  open 
 effectual  doors  of  usefulness ;  and  who  can  teU  but  the  time  to 
 favour  us,  the  set  time,  is  come  ?  Compared  with  tMs  object, 
 what  is  the  removal  of  legal  restrictions  and  even  penal  laws, 
 however  desirable  ?  And  yet  what  zeal  has  been  often  she^Ti  in 
 procuring  concurrence  of  design  in  the  petitioners,  and  in  solicit- 
 ing the  attention  of  an  earthly  sovereign  or  national  represen- 
 tatives ?  May  we  blush  at  the  thought  of  being  less  imj)ortunate 
 in  seeking  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  true  Jerusalem  !  "  Por 
 Zion's  sake  "  let  us  "  not  hold  our  peace,  and  for  Jerusalem's  sake  " 
 let  us  "not  rest,  untU  the  righteousness  thereof  goes  forth  as 
 brightness,  and  the  salvation  thereof  as  a  lamp  that  burneth/' 
 
 Let  us,  then,  in  the  name  of  the  Lord  of  hosts,  shake  off  that 
 prevailing  supineness  which  too  much  pervades  the  churches,  in 
 tliis  day  of  worldhness,  growing  error,  and  reproach.  Let  us,  in 
 the  power  of  gTace,  be  watchful  unto  prayer,  with  aU  perseverance 
 and  importunity.  Let  us,  with  shame  for  past  omissions,  set 
 Jesus  Christ  before  us  as  our  example,  with  a  constant  desire  to 
 imitate  Him  in  this  particular.  The  connexion  between  the 
 promise  to  be  accomplished  and  the  seeking  of  it  by  appointed 
 means,  should  not  be  forgotten.  Thus  the  connexion  stands : — 
 "  The  heathen  that  are  left  round  about  you  shall  know  that  I 
 the  Lord  build  the  ruined  places,  and  plant  that  which  was  de- 
 solate :  I  the  Lord  have  spoken  it,  and  I  will  do  it  ....  I  will 
 yet  for  this  be  inquired  of  by  the  house  of  Israel,  to  do  it  for 
 them."* 
 
 You  wiU  excuse  the  liberty  we  fm-ther  take  of  recommending 
 to  you  such  helps  as  we  think  pecuHarly  conducive  to  promote 
 the  spirit  of  prayer.  Among  these  we  reckon  the  repeated  perusal 
 of  such  promises  and  prophecies  of  Scripture  as  relate  to  the 
 success  of  the  gospel,  and  the  glory  of  the  latter  day.  Next  to 
 these,  such  parts  of  church-history  as  relate  to  the  success  of  the 
 gospel  in  all  ages,  the  journals  of  missionaries,  and  the  lives  of 
 eminently  useful  persons  in  promoting  the  cause  of  God.  Such 
 reading  feeds  the  sacred  flame  of  benevolence  and  zeal,  furnishes 
 with  matter,  disposes  for  a  more  affectionate  and  profitable  exer- 
 
 *  Ezek.  sxsri.  36,  37. 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTEES  OF  WAEAVICKSHIEE.  41 5 
 
 cise  of  private  and  social  prayer.  We  now  proceed  to  solicit  your 
 concurrent  assistance  to  forward  our  design. 
 
 II.  By  your  pecuniary  contributions.  We  do  not  espiect  or 
 desire  anything  unreasonable,  or  inconsistent  with  your  circum- 
 stances and  other  engagements.  A  little  from  many  hands  would 
 amount  to  an  encouraging  sum,  and  enable  us  to  hope  that  great 
 blessings  are  designed  for  us.  If  each  of  you  were  to  cast  in  a 
 mite,  we  should  be  able  with  peculiar  confidence  to  answer  every 
 insult  or  objection  by  saying,  "Who  hath  despised  the  day  of 
 small  things?" 
 
 We  recommend  to  each  congregation  to  appoint  a  treasurer  of 
 its  own,  who  may  receive  your  contributions  respectively,  which 
 may  afterwards  be  forwarded,  on  proper  notice  given,  to  a  general 
 treasurer  of  aU  the  contributions.  The  treasurers  vrill,  of  course, 
 keep  a  book  for  this  purpose  open  to  the  inspection  of  all.  If  the 
 poorest  among  you  were  to  contribute  one  penny  per  week,  and 
 the  richer  in  proportion,  one  might  hope  that,  at  the  year's  end, 
 the  pittance  would  hurt  none  sensibly,  though  it  would  assist  in 
 benefiting  thousands. 
 
 When  national  safety  is  threatened,  it  is  not  uncommon  for 
 opulent  individuals,  or  societies,  to  stand  forward  with  promises 
 of  pecuniary  aids  very  generous  and  ample,  and  even  to  pledge 
 their  lives  and  fortunes  to  secure  that  end.  We  would  humbly 
 suggest  a  query.  Can  any  step  more  proper  be  taken  than  an 
 earnest  endeavour  to  reform  a  nation  in  order  to  promote  its 
 prosperity  and  safety  ?  But  national  safety,  however  highly  esti- 
 mated, falls  far  short  of  what  we  wish  to  accomplish.  We  have 
 in  view  the  infinitely-deserved  honour  of  the  King  of  kings,  and 
 the  welfare  of  immortal  souls. 
 
 When  a  prospect  opens  for  the  display  of  national  valour,  when 
 a  powerful  and  ambitious  rival  is  to  be  humbled,  when  the  acqui- 
 sition of  conquests,  triumphs,  and  territories,  becomes  probable, 
 then  millions  are  expended.  But  what  is  the  acquisition  of  the 
 most  complete  conquest,  superb  triumph,  for  even  the  richest  of 
 territories,  compared  with  that  victory  which  Divine  grace  gives, 
 the  triumph  which  accompanies  salvation,  and  God's  everlasting- 
 kingdom,  to  possess  which  perishing  sinners  are  invited  ? 
 
 While  those  around  you  cheerfully  contribute  very  considerable 
 sums  to  enable  the  forward  sons  of  liberty  to  sound  their  trumpet 
 in  the  land,  we  only  solicit  your  fervent  prayers,  and  a  rational 
 
416  A  CIECULAE  LETTEE  FEOM  THE 
 
 proof  that  they  are  sincere,  for  enabling  the  messengers  of  the 
 Prince  of  peace  to  sonnd  the  gospel  trampet,  which,  through  His 
 blessing,  may  prove  a  joyful  sound  to  hundreds  and  thousands, 
 and  be  the  means  of  bringing  them  to  walk  in  the  light  of  His 
 countenance. 
 
 Observe,  brethren,  the  zeal  of  politicians,  and  of  all  descriptions 
 of  men  whom  we  behold  engaged  in  the  career  of  human  glory. 
 A  little  luxurious  ease,  a  delicious  morsel,  a  garb  of  trifling  dis- 
 tinction, the  empty  breath  of  mortals,  or  a  clod  of  earth  viewed 
 through  the  medium  of  a  flattering  imagination,  is  often  with 
 many  of  them  deemed  a  sufficient  object,  for  attaining  which 
 their  passions  are  all  alive,  their  ardom-  kindles,  and  their  exertions 
 are  incessant.  Obser%'ing  these  things,  let  us  blush  at  the  small- 
 ness  of  our  own  zeal  in  promoting  the  cause  of  God  in  the  world. 
 
 The  period  will  soon  come  when  civil  societies  are  no  more — 
 when  all  the  revolutions  of  empires,  all  the  states  and  governments 
 of  this  world  shall  appear  to  every  mind  as  unimportant,  when 
 contrasted  with  spiiitual  and  eternal  salvation,  as  a  transient^ 
 dream  is  compared  with  the  highest  concerns  of  time.  One  gene-  ' 
 ration  passeth  away,  and  another  generation  cometh,  each  greatly 
 concerned  and  agitated  with  its  own  peculiarities,  in  the  smaller 
 and  larger  circles  of  life ;  but  in  eternity  aH  meet.  There  all 
 dwell  for  ever.  There  the  dispositions  and  qualifications  which  men 
 seek  and  continue  to  indulge  on  earth  are  unchangeably  retained. 
 There  all  who  die  in  the  Lord,  and  they  alone,  are  blessed;  they  rest 
 from  their  labours,  and  their  works  of  faith  and  love  follow  them. 
 
 We  dwell  on  these  things  the  rather,  brethren,  because  we  have 
 observed  with  regret  in  the  present  day  that  too  many  of  the  dis- 
 ciples of  our  common  Lord  imbibe  the  spirit  of  the  world,  and 
 plunge  themselves,  to  their  no  small  detriment,  into  the  muddy 
 waters  of  contentious  polities.  Instead  of  perpetual  complaints  to 
 men,  do  you  pour  out  fervent  prayers  to  God.  And  let  your  chief 
 joy  be,  iu  viewing  the  affairs  of  the  world,  and  musing  on  the 
 eventful  days  in  which  we  live,  that  tJie  Lord  God  omnijiotent 
 reigneth.  And  we  wish  by  such  considerations  to  stir  you  up  to 
 holy  emulation,  in  hopes  you  wiR  see  it  both  your  duty  and  interest 
 to  do  as  much  for  God  as  others  do  for  mammon, — to  do  as  much 
 from  an  experience  of  the  love  of  Christ  as  others  do  for  the  lore 
 of  fame. 
 
 View  the  greatness  of  those  blessings  which  you  have  now  a 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTERS  OF  WAEWICKSHIRE.  417 
 
 call  to  promote.  Consider  the  interesting  nature  and  uncomputed 
 value  of  revealed  truth,  and  especially  of  the  gospel  of  Jesus  Christ, 
 which  you  are  solicited  to  assist  in  propagating.  Eeflect  on  the 
 inconceivable  worth  of  immortal  souls,  whose  endless  happiness 
 you  may  be  instrumental  in  promoting.  Think  especially  how 
 small  the  number  of  professing  Christians  in  the  whole  world,  and 
 how  smaller  still  that  of  awakened  and  converted  persons. 
 
 If  you  have  tasted  that  the  Lord  is  gracious,  use  your  influence, 
 employ  your  interest  with  a  gracious  God,  and  liberaUy-minded 
 men,  to  prove  to  the  hearts  of  sinners  that  He  is  so.  When  men's 
 hearts  are  engaged  in  meaner  transitory  concerns,  you  know  they 
 "  leave  no  stone  unturned,"  and  strain  every  nerve  to  further  their 
 accomplishment.  Oh,  when  shall  the  children  of  light  be  as  wise 
 in  their  generation  as  the  children  of  this  world  ! 
 
 It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  arguments  from  a  thousand  topics 
 to  enforce  what  has  been  already  recommended,  not  only  in  refer- 
 ence to  a  reformation  among  ourselves  in  this  country,  but  also  to 
 the  propagation  of  the  pure  gospel  of  Christ  among  the  heathen, — 
 and  many  forcible  considerations  might  be  urged  from  the  [state 
 of  the  world  at  this  time,] — but  we  are  persuaded  that  more  is  not 
 necessary,  and  that  you  are  satisfied  with  the  reasonableness  and 
 expediency  of  our  solicitation.  Looking  up  incessantly  to  the  God 
 of  all  grace  for  His  Holy  Spirit  to  influence  our  own  hearts  and 
 yours,  and  that  He  will  be  pleased  to  open  your  views  to  eternal 
 realities,  that  nothing  may  intervene  to  prevent  your  exertions  to 
 bring  souls  to  Christ  and  everlasting  rest,  we,  for  the  present,  take 
 our  leave  of  you,  and  respectfully  address  ourselves  to  others. 
 
 A    POSTSCRIPT, 
 
 ADDRESSED  TO  THE  INDEPENDENT  ASSOCIATIONS  OF   MINISTERS 
 IN  ALL  THE  OTHER  COUNTIES  OP  ENGLAND  AND  WALES. 
 
 DeAJR  AND  RESPECTED  BRETHREN  IN  THE  LORD, — We  trust  yOU 
 
 will  readily  acquit  us  of  the  crime  of  presumption,  should  any  be 
 SO  uncandid  as  to  charge  us  with  it,  while  we  take  this  fraternal 
 VOL.  IV.  2  D 
 
418  A  CIRCULAR  LETTER  FROM  THE 
 
 freedom  of  addressing  you  on  a  siibject  wliieli  lies  very  near  our 
 hearts.* 
 
 From  the  preceding  Letter  you  plainly  see  what  is  our  general 
 design — viz.,  the  revival  of  religion  in  the  churches,  and  the  intro- 
 duction of  gospel  truths  into  those  places  where  most  wanted ;  and 
 you  observe  that  our  immediate  object  is  that  county  in  which  we 
 reside.  We  now  call  your  attention  to  a  few  particulars  that  we 
 earnestly  wish  you  to  take  into  serious  consideration,  and  which 
 we  urge  the  rather  from  a  persuasion  that  you  heartily  concur 
 with  us  in  the  before-mentioned  general  design.  And  this,  we 
 think,  will  be  greatly  forwarded  by — 
 
 I.  Annual  County  Associations.  This  is  what  we  have  adopted, 
 and  now,  with  all  becoming  deference,  recommend  to  you.  It  is 
 no  part  of  our  wish  to  infringe  on  the  monthly,  quarterly,  or  other 
 
 *  Minutes. — Tuesday  Morning,  August  6, 1793. — Met  at  Nuneaton  to  assist  at 
 the  ordination  of  Mr  Daniel  Fleming,  and  the  opening  of  the  place  of  worship 
 there,  which  had  been  enlarged. 
 
 Mr  Morris,  of  Stretton,  began  the  service  by  reading  the  Scriptures  and 
 prayer;  Dr  Williams,  of  Bh-mingham,  delivered  the  introductory  discourse  on 
 the  nature  of  an  ordination;  Mr  Moody,  of  Warwick,  prayed  the  ordination 
 prayer;  Mr  G.  Bm'der,  of  Coventry,  gave  the  charge  to  the  minister;  and  Mr 
 Saunders,  of  Coventry,  preached  to  the  people. 
 
 In  the  afternoon,  the  Circular  Letter  was  produced,  read,  approved,  and 
 ordered  to  be  immediately  printed.  By  request,  the  ordination  service  also  will 
 be  soon  pubUshed. 
 
 On  accoimt  of  the  shortness  of  the  time,  the  meeting  was  adjourned  to  Coven- 
 try, at  sis  o'clock  the  next  morning,  when  it  was  resolved  to  send  copies  of  the 
 Letter,  &c.,  to  ministers,  and  especially  associations,  in  other  counties,  requesting 
 their  concurrence. 
 
 Several  of  the  ministers,  in  hopes  of  exciting  their  friends  by  their  example, 
 paid  their  subscriptions  into  the  hands  of  the  Rev.  G.  Burder,  who  was  appointed 
 treasurer.     The  Rev.  S.  Burder,  his  nephew  and  assistant,  was  chosen  secretary. 
 
 The  next  meeting  is  to  be  at  Coventry,  Vicar  Lane,  Thursday,  October  3, 1793 ; 
 the  Annual  County  Association  at  Birmingham,  Carr's  Lane,  Tuesday,  Wednes- 
 day, and  Thursday,  May  6,  7,  and  8,  1794. 
 
 All  the  ministers  of  the  Association  are  requested  to  prepare  and  produce  an 
 accoimt,  by  letter,  of  the  state  of  their  churches  respectively,  with  the  increase 
 and  decrease  of  members,  that  the  minutes  may  be  di'awn  up  from  these  written 
 documents. 
 
 It  is  requested  that  ministers,  &e.,  in  other  parts  of  the  kingdom,  who  are 
 desirous  of  communicating  or  of  receiving  useful  hints  on  the  subject  of  this 
 address,  wUl  send  their  communications  to  our  secretary,  the  Rev.  S.  Burder, 
 Coventry ;  and  that  all  friends  of  the  gospel,  concurring  with  our  views,  who  wish 
 to  contribute,  may  send  any  donation  or  subscription  to  the  treasurer  at  Coven- 
 try ;  Mr  Joseph  Rogers,  Birmingham ;  or  Mr  Thomas  Wilson,  Wood  Street, 
 London. 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTEES  OP  WARWICKSHIRE.  419 
 
 meetings  dow  existing,  (in  which  ministers  of  different  counties 
 often  join,  from  convenience  of  situation,)  but  to  establish  one  in 
 each  county  annually,  in  addition  to  any  others  which  may  be 
 thought  expedient.  Instead  of  discouraging  these  friendly  meet- 
 ings of  ministers,  we  would  rather  urge  their  continuance  and 
 frequency  where  they  are,  and  their  commencement  where  they  are 
 not  held ;  not  for  political  and  party  purposes,  but  for  the  in- 
 finitely more  important  end  of  promoting  the  religion  of  Jesus, 
 both  in  ministers  and  people. 
 
 Nevertheless,  by  regulating  this  one  jneeting  in  the  year  by  the 
 county  limits,  so  far  as  to  have  one  sermon,  at  least,  preached  by 
 a  minister  of  the  county  where  the  meeting  is  held,  and  the  con- 
 cerns of  all  the  churches  therein  canvassed,  (but  the  meeting  in  all 
 other  respects  common  to  all  who  may  think  proper  to  attend,)  we 
 think  many  advantages  would  accrue.  Among  these  we  might 
 reckon  the  more  practicable  ascertaining  of  the  state  of  the 
 churches  in  our  several  connexions.  Hereby  we  should  be  better 
 able  to  "  rejoice  with  them  that  do  rejoice,  and  weep  with  them  that 
 weep ;"  to  pray  for  success,  or  offer  praises,  with  the  understand- 
 ing, as  well  as  with  the  spirit.  Hereby  materials  would  be  offered 
 for  a  conversation  far  more  profitable  than  what  often  occupies  the 
 professing  circle,  and  the  cause  of  Christ  in  the  world  would  be- 
 come a  more  common,  as  it  is  indeed  an  interesting  topic. 
 
 Often  have  we  heard  our  friends  in  different  parts  of  the  king- 
 dom expressing  their  anxious  wishes  to  form  meetings  of  ministers 
 with  more  determinate  objects,  and  a  bond  of  union  less  liable  to 
 be  broken  by  caprice,  than  those  which  are  held  in  common.  How 
 many  are  there  of  the  Independent  denomination  of  whom  it  may 
 be  said  that  they  belong  to  no  association  whatever,  (not  for  want 
 of  inclination,  but  of  a  proper  inducement,)  and  often  are,  contrary 
 to  their  desires,  independent  to  an  extreme  !  And  the  associations 
 which  are  formed  but  too  commonly  fall  a  prey  to  slackness  of 
 attendance  or  dissolution.  A  connexion  formed  on  principles 
 merely  sentimental  is  far  more  liable  to  be  broken  than  that 
 which  has  an  explicit  and  invariable  boundary.  And  were  every 
 Christian  society  in  a  county,  professing  itself  to  be  of  the  same 
 denomination,  and  willing  to  join,  to  be  taken  into  the  number  of 
 the  associated  churches,  many  things  reprovable  in  churches  or 
 ministers  might  be  reformed,  and,  at  the  same  time,  many  a  weak 
 interest  would  be  strengthened  and  greatly  encouraged  by  the 
 
420  A  CIECULAE  LETTER  FKOJI  THE 
 
 union.     But  these  annual  county  meetings  would  not  by  any 
 means  answer  the  desired  end,  without  adding — 
 
 II.  Annual  Circular  Letters.  These  ought,  of  course,  to  be 
 addressed  to  the  churches,  and  adapted  to  their  general  state  ;  to 
 which  brief  minutes  of  the  meeting  should  be  added.  Were  every 
 county  in  England  and  Wales  to  adopt  this  method,  what  a  fund 
 of  useful  information  and  profitable  entertainment  would  be 
 afforded  to  the  churches !  What  a  channel  of  regular  communica- 
 tion and  mutual  acquaintance  would  it  open  !  To  ascertain  with 
 ease  the  number  and  situation  of  churches  in  each  county,  and  in 
 the  kingdom,  with  the  names  of  their  ministers,  would  be  but  a 
 small  advantage,  compared  with  the  large  field  it  would  open  for 
 prayer  and  praise,  for  tender  sympathy  to  men  and  gratitude  to 
 our  God,  and  for  generous  endeavours  to  assist  our  brethren,  with 
 less  hazard  of  being  imposed  upon  ia  contributions.  Such  minutes 
 of  the  meetings  (in  which  there  should  be  inserted  the  increase  and 
 decrease  of  every  church,  from  year  to  year)  would  be  open  to 
 corrections ;  all  mistakes  would  be  easily  rectified ;  the  movements 
 of  the  Divine  cloud  of  success  would  be  easily  observed,  and  pro- 
 voke the  beholders  to  emulation ;  and  such  a  foundation  would  be 
 laid  for  a  fair  and  exact  history  of  the  state  of  religion  in  those 
 churches  (on  which  the  circular  letters,  also,  would  throw  con- 
 siderable Ught)  as  could  not  be  obtained,  perhaps,  by  any  other 
 way.     What  we  next  beg  leave  to  call  your  attention  to  is — 
 
 III.  Your  fraternal  agreement  with  us  in  carrying  into  efiect 
 the  plan  proposed  in  the  preceding  letter,  especially  in  these 
 particulars : — 
 
 1.  An  expKcit  agreement  in  a  monthly  exercise  oi  prayer,  with 
 occasional  fasting.  In  addition  to  what  has  been  said  in  our  pre- 
 ceding letter,  we  shaU  subjoin  the  follo^ving  observations  from  one 
 who  was  greatly  favoured  of  God,  and  eminently  wise  to  win  souls : — 
 
 "  So  is  God's  will,"  says  he,  "  through  His  wonderful  grace,  that 
 the  prayers  of  His  saints  should  be  one  great  and  principal  means 
 of  carrying  on  the  designs  of  Christ's  kingdom  in  the  world. 
 When  God  has  something  great  to  accomplish  for  His  Church,  it  is 
 His  will  that  there  should  precede  it  the  extraordinary  prayers  of 
 His  people,  as  is  manifest  by  Ezek.  xxx^'L  37,  together  vdila.  the 
 context.  And  it  is  revealed  that,  when  God  is  about  to  accom- 
 plish great  things  for  His  Church,  He  wUl  begin  by  remarkably 
 pouring  out  the  spirit  of  grace  and  supplication,  Zech.  xii.  10. 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTERS  OF  ■WAEWICKSHIEE.  421 
 
 "  Before  the  first  great  outpouring  of  the  Spirit  of  God  on  the 
 Christian  Church,  which  began  at  Jerusalem,  the  Church  of  God 
 gave  themselves  to  incessant  prayer,  Acts  i.  13,  14.  When  Christ 
 is  mystically  born  into  the  world,  to  rule  over  all  nations,  it  is 
 represented  in  Rev.  xii.  as  being  in  consequence  of  the  Church's 
 crying,  and  travailing  in  birth,  and  being  pained  to  be  delivered. 
 One  thing  here  intended,  doubtless,  is  her  crying  and  agonising  in 
 prayer. 
 
 "  One  thing  more  I  would  mention  concerning  fasting  and 
 prayer,  wherein  I  think  there  has  been  a  neglect  in  ministers ; 
 and  that  is,  that  although  they  recommend  and  much  insist  upon 
 the  duty  of  secret  prayer  in  their  preaching,  so  little  is  said  about 
 secvet  fasting.  It  is  a  duty  recommended  by  our  Saviour  to  His 
 followers,  just  in  like  manner  as  secret  prayer  is,  as  may  be  seen 
 by  comparing  Matt.  vi.  5,  6, 16-18.  Though  I  do  not  suppose  that 
 secret  fasting  is  to  be  practised  in  a  stated  manner,  and  steady 
 course,  as  secret  prayer ;  yet,  it  seems  to  me,  it  is  a  duty  that  all 
 professing  Christians  should  practise,  and  frequently  practise. 
 There  are  many  occasions,  of  both  a  spiritual  and  temporal  nature, 
 that  do  properly  require  it ;  and  there  are  many  particular  mercies, 
 that  we  desire  for  ourselves  or  friends,  that  it  would  be  proper  in 
 this  manner  to  seek  of  God."  * 
 
 2.  The  speedy  establishment  of  charitable  contributions,  on  a 
 regular  plan,  is  what  we  greatly  wish  to  see,  as  a  necessary  step, 
 previous  to  any  exertions  of  moment  that  can  be  made  towards 
 the  propagation  of  the  gospel,  whether  at  home  or  abroad.  It  is 
 needless  to  repeat  what  we  have  said  before  on  the  subject.  But 
 we  entreat  your  further  indulgence  to  the  extracts  following, 
 which  you  may  think,  on  several  accounts,  of  greater  weight  than 
 anything  we  can  offer  of  our  own : — 
 
 "  To  encourage  us  to  abound  in  works  of  charity,  the  Scripture 
 tells  us  that  proportionally  to  the  degrees  of  our  charity  shall  be 
 the  degrees  of  our  reward.  Upon  this  consideration  the  apostle  ex- 
 horts the  Corinthians  to  be  liberal  in  their  charity ; — 2  Cor.  is.  6, 
 '  He  that  soweth  sparingly  shall  reap  sparingly ;  but  he  that  soweth 
 bountifully  shall  reap  bountifully.'  So  that  whatever  we  lay  out  in 
 this  kind  is  to  the  greatest  advantage,  and  upon  the  best  security. 
 
 "We  certainly  do  it  to  the  greatest  advantage;  because  God 
 will  consider  the  very  smallest  thing  that  any  of  us  do  in  this 
 
 *  President  Edwards's  Thoughts  concerning  the  Revival  of  Religion,  part  v. 
 
422  A  CIKCTJLAE  LETTER  FROM  THE 
 
 kind.  He  that  shall  give  so  much  as  '  a  cup  of  cold  water  to  a 
 disciple,  ia  the  name  of  a  disciple,  shall  not  lose  his  reward.' 
 These  last  words,  '  shall  not  lose  his  reward,'  signify  much  more 
 than  they  seem  to  speak — viz.,  that  he  shall  have  a  very  great 
 reward,  infinitely  above  the  value  of  what  he  hath  done. 
 
 "  And  we  do  it  likewise  upon  the  best  security.  So  Solomon 
 assures  us,  Prov.  xix,  17,  'He  that  hath  pity  upon  the  poor  [and 
 especially  the  "  ignorant,"  and  such  as  are  "  out  of  the  way "] 
 lendeth  unto  the  Lord  ;  and  that  which  he  hath  given  will  he  pay 
 him  again.'  And  we  may  be  confident  of  our  security  where  God 
 is  our  security ;  nay.  He  tells  us  that  in  this  case  He  looks  upon 
 himseK  as  jmncipal. 
 
 "  And  on  the  other  side,  the  Scripture  no  way  passeth  a  more 
 severe  doom  upon  any  sort  of  persons  than  upon  those  who  have 
 no  bowels  of  compassion  towards  their  brethren  in  distress.  [And 
 what  distress  so  great  as  that  which  relates  to  the  immortal  soul!'\ 
 That  is  a  fearful  sentence  indeed  which  the  apostle  pronouuceth 
 upon  such  persons,  James  ii  13,  '  He  shall  have  judgment  with- 
 out mercy  that  hath  shewed  no  mercy.' 
 
 "  Let  us  who  call  oiu'selves  Christians  do  something  for  God, 
 for  which  we  have  no  hopes  to  be  recompensed  in  this  world  ;  that 
 we  may  shew  that  we  trust  God,  and  take  His  word,  and  dare 
 venture  upon  the  security  of  the  next  world,  and  that  recompence 
 which  shall  be  made  at  the  resurrection  of  the  just."* 
 
 To  these  considerations,  which  are  so  consonant  to  Holy  Scrip- 
 ture and  right  reason,  we  would  add,  as  well  calculated  to  impress 
 the  hearts  of  all,  and  especially  of  Christian  ministers,  "  one  of  the 
 fairest  examples  of  this  kind  which  either  this,  or  perhaps  any 
 other  age  could  easily  present  us  with."  We  mean  the  Eev.  Mr 
 Thomas  Gouge  : — "  Besides  his  constant  and  weekly  labour  of 
 preaching,  he  was  very  diligent  and  charitable  in  visiting  the  sick, 
 and  ministering  not  only  spiritual  counsel  and  comfort  to  them, 
 but  likewise  liberal  relief  to  the  wants  and  necessities  of  those 
 that  were  poor  and  destitute  of  means  to  help  themselves  in  that 
 condition.  He  did,  also,  every  morning  throughout  the  year,  cate- 
 chise in  the  church,  especially  the  poorer  sort,  who  were  generally 
 most  ignorant ;  and,  to  encourage  them  to  come  thither  to  be  in- 
 structed by  him,  he  did  once  a  week  distribute  money  among 
 
 "  Archbishop  Tillotson's  Sermon,  preached  at  the  funeral  of  the  Kev.  Mr 
 Thomas  Gouge. 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTERS  OP  WAEWICKSHIRE.  423 
 
 them,  not  upon  a  certain  day,  but  changing  it  on  purj)ose,  as  lie 
 thought  good,  that  he  might  thereby  oblige  them  to  be  constantly 
 present.  These  were  chiefly  the  more  aged  poor,  who,  being  past 
 labour,  had  leisure  enough  to  attend  upon  his  exercise. 
 
 "  That  virtue  which  of  all  others  shone  brightest  in  him,  and  was 
 his  most  projDer  and  peculiar  character,  was  his  cheerful  and  un- 
 wearied diligence  in  acts  of  f)ious  charity.  In  this  he  had  a 
 singular  sagacity  and  prudence  in  devising  the  most  effectual  ways 
 of  doing  good,  and  in  managing  and  disposing  his  charity  to  the 
 hest  purposes,  and  to  the  greatest  extent ;  always,  if  it  were  pos- 
 sible, making  it  to  serve  some  end  of  piety  and  religion :  as  the 
 instruction  of  poor  children  in  the  principles  of  religion,  and  fur- 
 nishing grown  persons,  that  were  ignorant,  with  the  Bible  and 
 other  good  hooks ;  strictly  obliging  those  to  whom  he  gave  them 
 to  a  diligent  reading  of  them,  and,  when  he  had  opportunity,  ex- 
 acting of  them  an  account  how  they  had  profited  by  them." 
 
 It  is  well  known  what  an  extraordinary  friend  he  was  to  Wales, 
 because  he  judged  there  was  a  very  great  occasion  for  his  charity : 
 accordingly,  he  not  only  contributed  what  he  could  spare  himself, 
 but  also  employed  much  of  his  time  and  pains  to  excite  and 
 engage  the  charity  of  others  to  assist  him  in  it.  "  And  in  this  he 
 had  two  excellent  designs  :  one,  to  have  poor  children  brought  up 
 to  read  and  write,  and  to  be  carefully  instructed  in  the  principles 
 of  religion ;  the  other,  to  furnish  persons  of  grown  age,  the  poor 
 especially,  with  the  necessary  helps  and  means  of  knowledge.  So 
 that,  all  things  considered,  there  have  not,  since  the  primitive 
 times  of  Christianity,  been  many  among  the  sons  of  men  to  whom 
 that  glorious  character  of  the  Son  of  God  might  be  better  applied, 
 that  he  went  about  doing  good."* 
 
 We  are  aware  that  many  objections  may  be  started  against 
 bringing  forward  a  design  of  this  nature  at  present,  owing  to  the 
 badness  of  trade,  &c.  And  yet  even  notu,  bad  as  times  are,  money 
 is  laid  out  on  many  superfluous  things,  at  least  on  things  that  are 
 incomparably  less  deserving  of  our  money  than  the  object  now 
 proposed,  and  which  will  turn  out,  at  the  last,  to  a  less  honourable 
 and  less  profitable  account.  What  is  the  gratification  of  appetite 
 or  fancy,  the  finery  of  dress,  merely  ornamental,  expensive  fur- 
 
 *  Archbishop  Tillotson's  Sermon. — We  rejoice  that  in  North  Wales  some  efforts 
 have  been  made  of  late  among  the  young  poor  that  are  already  crowned  with  con- 
 siderable success. 
 
4<2-i  A  CIECULAR  LETTEE  FROM  THE 
 
 nitui'e,  compared  with  provision  for  the  perishing  souls  of  men, 
 the  pleasure  of  true  religion,  and  the  spiritual  ornaments  of  the 
 mind  ?  What  is  the  secm-ing  of  political,  or  even  religious  liberty, 
 (if  that  is  all,)  compared  with  that  freedom  which  the  Lord  Jesus 
 Christ  has  to  confer  on  all  who  are  found  at  last  His  faithful  ser- 
 vants ?  What  is  the  procuring  (often  at  a  great  expense)  of  know- 
 ledge, of  acquaintance  with  languages  and  science,  and  the  most 
 ingenious  inventions,  compared  with  the  saving  knowledge  of 
 Christ,  His  atoning  death,  victorious  resurrection,  and  perpetual 
 intercession  in  heaven,  of  which  millions,  and  hundreds  of  millions, 
 of  our  brethren  of  the  human  race  know  nothing,  and  of  which 
 numbers  in  our  own  land  know  nothing  to  saving  purpose  ? 
 
 If  a  serious  acquaintance  with  the  fundamental  truths  of  the 
 gospel  be  not  a  concern  infinitely  superior  to  every  other  in  this 
 world,  the  gospel  is  nothing  better  than  a  cunningly-devised  fable, 
 the  most  zealous  of  the  apostles  was  himself  deceived,  and  those 
 act  the  most  consistent  part,  at  least,  who  make  no  pretensions  to 
 a  compliance  with  the  dictates  of  revealed  religion.  But  our  pro- 
 fessed conclusion  is,  that  the  gosjiel  is  true ;  and,  blessed  be  God, 
 while  He  is  good,  holy,  just,  and  faithful-,  we  need  not  hesitate 
 about  retaining  that  conclusion.  The  knowledge  of  the  gospel, 
 therefore,  is  infinitely  interesting  to  all  mankind,  no  clime,  nation, 
 or  tribe  excepted. 
 
 How  is  it,  then,  that  those  persons  who  are  supposed  to  know 
 the  value  of  the  gospel  are  so  indiiferent  about  its  propagation  ? 
 Why  are  the  oiDulent  not  more  liberal  with  their  property,  and  the 
 poor  not  more  ardent  and  importunate  in  their  supplications  to 
 the  Lord  of  the  harvest,  and  Governor  of  the  world?  Let  us, 
 brethren,  "  awake  to  righteousness,"  and  shake  off  this  too  prevail- 
 ing sin.  Let  us  put  up  with  a  few  inconveniences  in  this  world 
 for  the  good  of  others  and  the  Redeemer's  glory,  remembering  that 
 we  have  to  possess,  as  the  gift  of  sovereign  grace,  unsearchable 
 riches,  and  an  everlasting  inheritance.  There  we  shall  enjoy, 
 without  the  least  painful  ingredient,  tranquillity,  rest  from  our 
 labours,  and  uninterrupted  happiness.  Nor  is  this  prepared  for 
 us  only,  but  for  all  those,  also,  who  shall  believe  through  our 
 means. 
 
 If  it  be  asked,  Why  application  should  not  be  made  to  all  de- 
 nominations without  distinction  ?  we  reply,  tbat  our  design  is 
 not  to  reject  any  contrihutions  that  may  occasionally  be  made. 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTEES  OF  WAEWICKSHIEE.  425 
 
 but  rather  would  be  thankful  for  the  least ;  and,  in  some  cases,  it 
 may  be  prudent  to  solicit  them ;  but  we  wish  the  churches  in  our 
 own  immediate  connexion  to  act  without  the  least  dependence  on 
 supplies  of  so  precarious  a  nature.  Though  a  union  of  different 
 denominations,  in  promoting  any  charitable  end,  appears  in  some 
 respects  desirable,  yet  it  must  be  granted  by  all  who  consider 
 attentively  human  nature,  that  an  effect  greatly  superior  may  be 
 expected  from  each  denomination  exerting  itself  separately.  In 
 such  a  case,  numbers  will  do  something  who  otherwise  would  do 
 nothing  at  all.  Besides,  every  religious  body  of  people  has  some 
 peculiarities ;  and,  in  proportion  as  an  individual  is  attached  to 
 these,  wiU  he  be  anxious  that  his  contribution  be  not  applied  to 
 any  purposes  which  counteract  them.  Whereas,  when  those  of  the 
 same  views  unite,  and  manage  their  concerns  by  a  committee  of 
 their  own  choosing,  the  contracted  hand  is  more  freely  and  liberally 
 opened.  And  when  this  mode  of  proceeding  orignates  not  in  a 
 bigoted  partiality,  but  in  the  jpurest  benevolence, — when  one  de- 
 nomination rejoices  in  the  success  of  another,  (especially  in  the 
 faithfulness  and  prosperity  of  parochial  ministers,  which  might 
 render  our  attempts  unnecessary,)  while  the  same  main  object  is 
 in  view,  it  gives  exercise  to  many  Christian  virtues  at  once.  We 
 hope,  however,  that  none  who  have  it  in  their  power,  will  improve 
 (or,  more  properly,  abuse)  this  representation  into  a  convenient 
 shelter  for  excusing  themselves  from  not  doing  anything  of  such  a 
 public  nature,  because  their  own  denomination  is  not  so  engaged. 
 We  next  recommend  a  fraternal  agreement  to  promote— 
 
 3.  A  few  circulating  charity  schools  in  each  county.  These  are 
 not  intended,  in  any  respect,  to  interfere  with  Sunday- schools. 
 Where  the  latter  are  not  introduced,  the  utility  of  a  school  residing 
 for  a  year  or  two  in  one  place,  and  then  in  another,  and  afterwards 
 in  another,  until  it  be  thought  needful  to  return  to  the  same  place 
 again,  must  be  obvious  to  every  one.  And  where  they  are  intro- 
 duced, these  institutions  would  greatly  befriend  them,  by  bringing 
 the  scholars  forward  in  the  week,  and  especially  by  teaching  them 
 the  principles  of  religion.  If  we  hope  to  benefit  the  rising  gene- 
 ration in  reference  to  another  world,  this  last  particular  should  be 
 strenuously  attended  to.  If  the  principles  of  religion  are  not 
 learnt  in  school,  generally  speaking,  the  learning  of  them  by  heart 
 afterward  will  be  much  more  difficult.  In  this  particular,  above 
 all  others,  we  should  "  train  up  a  child  in  the  way  he  should  go." 
 
426  A  CIECULAE  LETTER  FROM  THE 
 
 The  teachers  ought  to  be  men  of  conscientious  diligence,  and 
 serious  godhness,  that  they  may  perform  their  work,  not  by  con- 
 straint, but  of  a  ready  mind,  with  sincere  desires  and  endeavours 
 to  improve  the  children.*  But  what  would  greatly  tend  to  in- 
 vigorate, as  well  as  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  this  part,  would 
 be— 
 
 4.  A  siipernumerary  minister  in  each  county,  to  preach  the 
 gospel  among  the  poor  as  an  itinerant ;  to  superintend  the  concerns 
 of  the  schools,  under  the  direction  of  a  committee ;  and  occasionally 
 to  exchange  with  the  settled  ministers,  as  circumstances  may  re- 
 quire. We  are  persuaded  there  are  vei^  few  who  will  not  readily 
 acquiesce  in  the  expediency  of  this  particular,  and  the  rational 
 prospect  it  affords  of  great  good.  One  thing,  however,  we  must 
 mention,  that  these  itinerant  efforts  in  villages,  &c.,  and  the  schools, 
 would  tend  very  much  to  help  each  other  mutucdly.  In  some 
 places  the  schools  would  conciliate  attention,  and  make  way  for 
 preaching ;  in  others  the  reverse  of  this  mode  ;  and  the  preaching- 
 would  countenance  and  encour-age  the  schools  always.  The  masters 
 would  in  some  respects  be  useful  to  the  preacher.  And  while  the 
 latter  would  have  opportunities  to  advise,  exhort,  or  direct  the 
 
 *  This  part  of  our  plan  we  recommend  with  the  greater  confidence  from  the 
 successful  manner  in  which  a  similar  institution  has  been,  and  still  is,  conducted 
 in  North  Wales,  as  may  be  seen  in  a  printed  account  of  it.  Under  the  care  of  six 
 masters,  there  were  last  year  taught,  in  the  manner  here  recommended,  267 
 scholars.  It  is  hoped  the  following  note,  from  the  close  of  the  printed  report,  will 
 not  be  unacceptable  ; — "  The  quarterly  account  of  the  schools,  delivered  to  the 
 committee  by  the  superintendent,  has  been  very  satisfactory  and  encouraging.  As 
 the  schools  are  attended  to  every  day  in  the  week,  and  circulate  from  place  to 
 place,  as  the  committee  shall  appoint,  according  to  the  exigences  of  places, 
 and  the  proficiency  of  the  scholars,  their  importance  must  appear  very  great.  The 
 benevolent,  who  are  earnestly  sohcited  to  further  this  charitable  and  humane 
 design  for  the  present  and  everlasting  welfare  of  the  rising  generation,  (and  are  so 
 disposed,)  are  requested  to  signify  their  intentions  to  the  Rev.  George  Lewis,  of 
 Caernarvon,  the  present  superintendent  and  secretary;  to  Mr  Thomas  Jones, 
 cutler,  Chester,  the  present  treasurer ;  or  any  one  of  the  aforesaid  committee." 
 
 The  committee  for  1792,  appointed  at  a  meeting  held  at  Wrexham,  December 
 1791,  were^ 
 
 Rev.  Daniel  Lloyd,  Denbigh.  I       Mr  Thomas  Jones,  Chester. 
 
 „     Edward  Williams,  Oswestry.  „    Samuel  Davies,  Holywell. 
 
 „     Jenkin  Lewis,  Wrexham.  |        „    John  Roberts,  Oswestry. 
 
 The  expenditure  for  teachers,  books,  &c.,  amounted  to     .         .         .       £78     2     6 
 The  subscriptions, 74     1     6 
 
 Deficient,  for  1792, 4     10 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTEKS  OP  WAEWICKSHIEE.  427 
 
 masters,  the  object  of  his  arduous  work  would  be  more  interesting, 
 and  his  prospects  of  usefulness  more  promising.  We  now  con- 
 clude our  solicitations  for  your  fraternal  agreement  with  us,  by 
 calling  your  attention  to  one  particular  more,  which,  we  think,  is 
 by  no  means  the  least  important,  viz. — 
 
 5.  The  sending  of  missionaries  among  the  heathen.  We  are 
 sensible  this  is  an  expensive  work.  Some  counties  in  England, 
 and  most  in  Wales,  would  find  a  difficulty  (without  the  aids  of 
 other  denominations)  in  raising  a  fund  sufficient  for  putting  in 
 execution  the  preceding  part  only  of  what  we  propose.  But  then, 
 let  it  be  observed,  there  are  others  who  could  do  something  hand- 
 some without  feeUng  any  inconvenience.  And  some  opulent  indi- 
 viduals in  a  congregation  might,  with  great  propriety,  apj)ropriate 
 something  for  this  purpose  separately ;  and  in  proportion  as  a 
 suitable  person  became  an  immediate  object  of  attention,  in  con- 
 nexion with  the  precise  p)lace  of  his  destination,  &c.,  the  number 
 of  contributors  and  contributions  themselves  would  be  daily  aug- 
 mented. 
 
 Should  any  say,  "  We  ought  to  leave  these  matters  to  the  higher 
 powers  and  opident  companies ; "  we  reply,  if  we  wait  until  the 
 higher  powers  and  opulent  companies  undertake  a  suitable  plan 
 either  of  reformation  among  ourselves,  or  of  sending  proper  mis- 
 sionaries abroad,  and  call  tliat  exclusively  the  signal  of  Providence 
 inviting  our  aids  and  contributions,  we  may  wait  long — perhaps  to 
 the  day  of  our  death;  possibly  to  the  end  of  time.  For  what 
 prosp)ect  is  there  that  people  of  that  description  should  be  fore- 
 most in  setting  forward  such  a  work.  Of  all  the  machines  they 
 set  in  motion,  the  philanthropic  and  truly  Christian  ones  are  seldom 
 among  the  first.  Has  not  the  poor  heathen  world  waited  long- 
 enough  ?  If  not,  how  many  centuries  longer  must  the  ignorant 
 and  uncivilised  wait  ?  Were  one  man  of  God,  truly  qualified  for 
 the  work,  sent  from  each  county  in  the  kingdom,  what  great  things 
 might  we  not  expect  ?  Or  even,  were  some  of  the  larger  and  more 
 opulent  counties  to  do  this  ;  while  the  smaller  ones  joined  together 
 to  send  one  between  two  or  three  ?  The  Lord  pardon  our  too  long- 
 continued  indifference  towards  an  object  of  such  magnitude  and 
 moment !  Let  us  seriously  and  repeatedly  consider  whether  we 
 have  not  now  a  fair  call  to  testify  our  love  and  allegiance  to  Jesus 
 Christ ;  and  what  valuation  we  put  ou  the  souls  of  our  fellow 
 men. 
 
428  A  CIECULAE  LETTER  FEOM  THE 
 
 Some  one  may  urge,  by  way  of  excuse,  "that  attempts  have 
 been  abeady  made,  and  are  still  being  made,  in  promoting  this 
 end."  We  allow  it,  and  rejoice  therein.  There  is  a  Society  for 
 Promoting  Eeligious  Knowledge  among  the  poor,  for  distributing 
 Bibles  among  our  soldiers  and  seamen,  and  even  for  Propagating 
 the  Gospel  in  Poreign  Parts ;  and  one  lately  instituted  by  our 
 Baptist  brethren,  for  sending  missionaries  among  the  heathen. 
 But  are  you,  who  are  the  objector,  a  promoter  of  these,  or  any  of 
 these  benevolent  institutions  ?  Or  if  you  are,  do  you  go  as  far  in 
 your  charitable  contributions  as  is  required  by  the  gospel  ?  Might 
 not  something  be  given  up  which  you  little  need,  in  order  to  cast 
 in  a  second,  or  even  a  third  mite  into  the  treasury,  and  promote 
 among  perishing  sinners  the  one  thing  needful  ? 
 
 Such  is  the  Divine  benevolence  and  mercy,  that  "God  is  in 
 Christ  reconciling  the  world,"  the  whole  world,  "  to  himself,  not 
 imputing  their  trespasses  unto  them."  When,  therefore,  we 
 endeavour  to  propagate  the  gospel,  we  only  concur  with  Him  who 
 seeJceth  spiritual  worshippers,  and  who  says,  "Look  unto  me,  cdl 
 the  ends  of  the  earth,  and  be  ye  saved."  We  are  the  favoured  in- 
 struments of  accomplishing  those  prophecies,  which  assure  us, 
 "  that  the  earth  shall  be  full  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Lord,  as  the 
 waters  cover  the  sea ; "  of  gathering  those  wandering  sheep  in  the 
 wilderness  which  Christ  has  engaged  to  bring  to  His  fold.  Next 
 to  a  concern  for  our  own  souls,  a  concern  for  the  souls  of  others,  is 
 a  mark  of  the  highest  wisdom.  "  He  that  winneth  souls  is  wise." 
 Ministers  especially,  are  commanded  to  "  teach  all  nations,"  in  that 
 very  commission  by  virtue  of  which  they  exercise  their  ministry. 
 The  nature  of  their  office  requires  that  they  embrace  every  oppor- 
 tunity to  promote  the  growth  of  the  gospel  tree ;  that  it  may  not 
 only  take  deep  root,  but  also  extend  its  branches,  that  its  fragrance 
 and  fruit  may  be  communicated  to  all  the  world. 
 
 Dear  brethren,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  we  do  not  enter  enougli 
 into  the  real  spirit,  as  well  as  the  Protestant  interpretation  of  these 
 words : — "  Go  out  quickly  into  the  streets  and  lanes  of  the  city,  and 
 bring  in  hither  the  poor  and  the  maimed,  and  the  halt  and  the 
 blind Go  out  unto  the  highways  and  the  hedges,  and  com- 
 pel them  to  come  in,  that  my  house  may  be  filled."*  If  those 
 who  know  the  Saviour,  and  have  found  Him  precious,  do  not  shew 
 a  readiness  to  fulfil  this  part  of  His  gracious  pleasure,  who  luill, 
 *  Luke  xiv.  21,  23. 
 
INDEPENDENT  MINISTEES  OP  WAEWICKSHIEE.  429 
 
 who  can  be  expected,  who  is  qualified  to  do  it  ?  Must  we  wait 
 until  those  who  do  not  love  Him  undertake  the  work  ?  Do  we 
 expect  grajDes  from  thorns,  or  figs  from  thistles  ?  Have  we  not 
 reason  to  susi^ect  that  a  selfish  and  contracted  spirit,  the  enemy  of 
 a  disinterested  dilTusive  benevolence,  imposes  on  our  judgments  as 
 well  as  chills  our  affections  ?  While  a  spirit  so  entirely  opposite 
 to  the  Divine  philanthropy  prevails,  what  liberal  design,  what 
 generous  effort,  what  great  good  can  be  expected  ?  What  was  the 
 temper  of  the  Jewish  nation  when  the  gospel  was  first  commanded 
 to  be  preached  to  all  the  world  ?  How  spirited  and  admirable  St 
 Paul's  animadversion  on  it !  If  he  did  not  join  with  them  in  ex- 
 tolling their  privileges  to  the  contempt  of  all  other  people,  was  it 
 owing  to  a  criminal  indifference  to  their  welfare  ?  Nothing  less. 
 "  My  heart's  desire,"  says  he,  "  and  prayer  to  God  for  Israel  is 
 that  they  may  be  saved."  But  strong  as  were  his  desires,  and 
 fervent  his  prayers  for,  he  could  not  confine  his  regards  to  them. 
 No,  when  viewing  his  commission  extending  to  the  idolatrous  Gen- 
 tUes,  he  felt  a  pleasing  exultation ;  he  magnified  his  office ;  he 
 counted  it  the  honour  of  his  ministry  to  be  so  employed.  "  For 
 there  is  no  difference  between  the  Jew  and  the  Greek,"  the 
 European,  the  Asiatic,  the  African,  or  the  American ;  "  for  the  same 
 Lord  over  all  is  rich  unto  all  that  call  upon  Him."  But  as  he 
 forcibly  argues,  "  How  shall  they  call  on  Him  in  whom  they  have 
 not  believed  ?  And  how  shall  they  believe  in  Him  of  whom  they 
 have  not  heard  ?  And  how  shall  they  hear  without  a  preacher  ? 
 And  how  shall  they  preach  except  they  be  sent."  How  can  credit 
 be  given  to  the  Divine  testimony,  where  that  testimony  is  not  an- 
 nounced 1  And  how  can  it  be  carried  to  the  heathen  world,  and 
 those  who  are  far  from  salvation,  if  ministers  and  other  Christians 
 do  not  exert  themselves?* 
 
 *  "  It  has  been  said  we  ought  not  to  force  our  way,  but  to  wait  for  the  openings 
 and  leadings  of  Providence ;  but  it  might  with  equal  propriety  be  answered  in  this 
 case,  neither  ought  we  to  neglect  embracing  those  openings  in  Providence  which 
 daily  present  themselves  to  us.  What  openings  of  Providence  do  we  wait  for  ? 
 We  can  neither  expect  to  be  transported  into  the  heathen  world  without  ordinary 
 means,  nor  be  endowed  with  the  gift  of  tongues,  &o.,  when  we  arrive  there. 
 These  would  not  be  providential  interpositions,  but  miraculous  ones.  Where  a 
 command  exists,  nothing  can  be  necessary  to  render  it  binding  but  a  removal  of 
 those  obstacles  which  render  obedience  impossible,  and  these  are  removed  already. 
 Natural  impossibility  can  never  be  pleaded  bo  long  as  facts  exist  to  prove  the  con- 
 trary. Have  not  the  Popish  missionaries  surmounted  all  those  difficulties  which 
 we  have  generally  thought  to  be  insuperable  ?     Have  not  the  missionaries  of  the 
 
i'M  A  CIECULAE  LETTER,  ETC. 
 
 It  deserves  the  closest  inquiry,  Whether  the  want  of  a  powerful 
 and  lively  acquaintance,  in  our  own  souls,  with  Jesus  Christ  and 
 the  benefits  of  His  gospel,  be  not  at  the  bottom  of  all  indifference 
 about  the  salvation  of  others  ?  and.  Whether  those  blessed  characters, 
 in  former  and  latter  ages,  who  were  so  greatly  honoured  in  propa- 
 gating truth  in  their  several  situations,  differed  from  us  in  any- 
 thing so  much  as  in  the  strong  conviction  and  aivakening  apprehen- 
 sion they  had  of  S23iritual  and  eternal  things  ?  Learning  and  parts, 
 philosophy  and  science,  or  the  acquisitions  of  polite  literature, 
 (though  useful  auxiliaries,)  will  never  prove  suflBcient  substitutes  for 
 the  religious  feelings  of  such  men.  Were  the  ministers  of  Christ  now 
 to  feel  as  the  primitive  disciples,  the  Christian  fathers,  the  reformers 
 and  preachers  of  later  times  who  have  been  most  successful  in  the 
 conversion  of  souls,  whose  praise  is  in  the  churches,  and  who  speak 
 by  their  useful  writings,  what  blessed  fruits  might  be  expected, 
 with  the  Divine  blessing,  in  a  short  time  !  We  conclude  with  the 
 following  very  emphatical  words  : — "  The  harvest  truly  is  plenteous, 
 but  the  labourers  are  few.  Pray  ye,  therefore,  the  Lord  of  the 
 harvest,  that  he  wUl  send  forth  labourers  into  his  harvest." 
 
 Vnitas  Fratnim,  or  Morariau  Brethren,  encountered  the  scorching  heat  of  Abyssinia, 
 and  the  frozen  climes  of  Greenland  and  Labrador,  their  difficult  languages  and 
 savage  manners  ?  Or  hare  not  English  traders,  for  the  sake  of  gain,  snrmomited 
 all  those  things  which  have  generally  been  counted  insurmountable  obstacles  in 
 the  way  of  preaching  the  gospel  ?  Witness  the  trade  to  Persia,  the  East  Indies, 
 China,  and  Greenland ;  yea,  even  the  accursed  slave  trade  on  the  coast  of  Africa. 
 Men  can  insinuate  themselves  into  the  favour  of  the  most  barbarous  clans,  and 
 uncultivated  tribes,  for  the  sake  of  gain  ;  and  how  different  soever  the  circum- 
 stances of  trading  and  preaching  are,  yet  this  will  prove  the  possibility  of  ministers 
 being  introduced  there ;  and  if  this  is  but  thought  a  sufficient  reason  to  make  the 
 experiment,  my  point  is  gaiued." — Carey's  Inquiry  into  the  Obligations  of  Christians 
 to  use  Means  for  the  Conversion  of  the  Heathens,  p.  11. 
 
THOUGHTS 
 
 ON 
 
 "  A  GENERAL  AITO  EXPLICIT  UNION 
 
 OF  THE  WHOLE  BODY  OF  CONGEEGATIONAL  CHURCHES," 
 
 OCCASIONED  BY  AN  ADDRESS  FROM  THE  LONDON  COMMITTEE  TO 
 
 MINISTERS  OF  THE  CONGREGATIONAL  ORDER. 
 
 BY 
 A  TRUE  FRIEND  TO  THE  UNION. 
 
 Gentlemen, — A  sincere  friend  to  "  a  general  and  explicit  Union 
 of  the  whole  body  of  Congregational  Churches,"  having  had  oppor- 
 tunities of  discussing  the  subject  with  no  inconsiderable  number 
 of  ministers  and  members  of  churches  in  different  parts  of  the 
 kingdom,  presumes  to  reply  to  your  late  address  in  this  public 
 manner,  rather  than  by  a  private  letter,  principally  for  two  reasons  : 
 first,  because  he  hopes  hereby  to  excite  a  more  general  attention 
 to  a  subject  of  confessed  importance  ;  and  next,  because  he  wishes 
 that  every  one  of  the  numerous  committee  may  examine  his  thoughts 
 at  leisure,  and  so  proceed  to  approve  or  object,  in  any  future  dis- 
 cussion, on  maturest  reflection. 
 
 In  presenting  to  you  these  thoughts,  gentlemen,  I  think  it  need- 
 less to  adopt  any  formal  method ;  but  shall  content  myself  with 
 offering  them  in  the  order  suggested  by  the  successive  parts  of  the 
 address  itseK  which  you  have  circulated.  And  here  I  cannot  do 
 less  than  to  thank  you,  and  to  congratulate  the  public,  on  the  im- 
 
432  THOUGHTS  ON  A  GENEEAl  UNION. 
 
 provements  and  additional  parts  of  the  i^resent  plan,  compared  with 
 the  first  address,  which,  as  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  learn,  was 
 too  brief  and  too  general  to  engage  public  interest  or  attention. 
 
 It  is  pleasing  to  observe  that  there  are  comparatively  few  of  the 
 numerous  class  of  ministers  and  people  in  question  who  do  not 
 approve  of  the  general  idea  of  explicit  union,  though  the  differ- 
 ence is  great  respecting  the  practicability  of  such  a  plan  as  may 
 prove  truly  beneficial  and  lasting.  Some,  indeed,  view  the  whole 
 attempt  through  a  gloomy  medium,  and  would  counteract  every 
 effort  to  effect  a  general  union,  as  if  it  were  somehow  a  violation, 
 or,  at  least,  an  abridginent  of  Independent  Congregational  prin- 
 ciples. But  such  a  surmise  can  have  existence  only  on  supposition 
 that  union  implies  power,  and  that  the  power  so  obtained  will  be 
 ynisapplied.  The  first  of  these  is  readily  allowed ;  but  the  last 
 consequence  is  so  far  from  being  a  necessary  one,  that  even  a  pro- 
 bability  of  it  is  excluded  in  proportion  as  the  plan  is  msely  laid. 
 
 In  fact,  the  excellency  of  the  plan  contemplated  must  consist  in 
 its  instrumentality  to  effect  the  noblest  purposes  of  a  moral  and 
 religious  nature.  It  is  not  any  ^jaj-i  of  religion,  or  of  morality, 
 but  a  grand  mean  whereby  the  most  valuable  and  lasting  good 
 may  be  promoted  with  the  least  possible  expense  or  labour.  It  is 
 a  great  machine  consisting  of  many  parts,  but  not  more  compli- 
 cated than  useful.  And  although  simplicity  of  construction  be  a 
 high  recommending  quality,  it  must  not  be  so  simple  as  not  to  be 
 firmly  connected,  or  not  to  produce  the  effect  proposed.  A  plan 
 which  would  require  strenuous  and  lasting  exertions,  in  order  to 
 support  it,  may  be  safely  pronounced  a  bad  one  ;  and  yet  a  plan 
 without  some  superintending  care,  however  excellent  in  itseK,  re- 
 sembles a  good  engine  without  a  proper  direction  of  its  powers. 
 
 You  modestly  acknowledge,  gentlemen,  that  the  plan  you  have 
 lately  circulated  is  not  "  perfect,"  and  that  you  "  do  not  present  it 
 to  your  brethren  as  such  ;  but  affectionately  invite  their  sentiments 
 upon  it,  to  which  the  most  respectful  attention  will  be  paid." 
 While,  therefore,  I  regard  this  as  a  sufficient  warrant  for  the  free- 
 dom thus  taken  in  addi-essing  you,  I  would  also  disclaim  aU  pre- 
 tentions to  "  perfection  "  in  what  I  have  to  offer.  And  yet,  were  I 
 not  fuUy  satisfied  that  what  is  about  to  be  proposed  to  your  con- 
 sideration, is  calculated  to  answer  the  great  ends  projected,  I  should 
 spare  you  the  trouble  of  reading,  and  myself  of  writing  this 
 address. 
 
THOUttHTS  ON  A  GENEEAL  UNION.  433 
 
 Yolu-  general  principles — that  the  measures  adopted  by  the 
 union  be  perfectly  consistent  with  Christian  liberty ;  "  that  no 
 principle  be  adopted  which  is  clearly  calculated,  in  practice,  to 
 counteract  Christian  benevolence  and  liberality ;  that  those  prin- 
 ciples alone  be  admitted  which  befriend  the  genuine  interest  of 
 every  individual  church" — appear  to  me  unexceptionable,  as  far  as 
 they  go ;  since  they  appear  well  adapted  to  guard  the  several  parts 
 of  the  plan  against  any  infringement  on  the  liberty,  the  liberality, 
 and  the  real  interest  of  every  individual  church,  minister,  or  person 
 connected. 
 
 The  same  unexceptionable  approbation  of  the  proposed  objects 
 of  the  scheme  I  cannot  give,  without  some  exi^lanations.     I  regard 
 it  as  a  rule  dictated  by  plain  common  sense,  that  no  specific  object 
 should  be  proposed  to  be  sought  by  such  a  general,  explicit  union, 
 which  may  be  attained  as  well  without  it.  And,  on  the  contrary,  those 
 objects  alone  should  be  proposed  which  are  at  once  important  in 
 themselves  or  in  their  consequences,  and  which  could  not  be  attained, 
 or  so  well  attained,  as  by  such  union.     The  general  object — vi^., 
 "  The  mutual  benefit  of  the  churches  which  enter  into  the  union, 
 and  the  advancement  of  the  Redeemer's  cause,  in  all  places,  and 
 by  all  scriptural  and  laudable  means" — is  highly  important,  and,  I 
 doubt  not,  may  be  greatly  promoted  by  a  well-formed  concurrence. 
 Let  us  now  examine  the  specific  objects  contained  in  your  plan. 
 The  first  you  propose  is,  "  The  encouragement  of  newly-raised  con- 
 gregations ; "  and  the  second,  "  The  revival  of  inta-ests  that  are 
 fallen  into  decay."     That  these  are  objects  of  no  small  importance 
 is  readily  granted  ;  but  in  what  way  you  suppose  the  union  may 
 contribute  to  secure  them,  it  is  diflicult  to  say.     There  appear  to 
 me  but  two  ways  whereby  such  congregations  or  interests  can  be 
 served — viz.,  by  advice,  or  hy  pecuniary  contributions.     But  for 
 all  the  union  to  give  advice  is  an  impracticable  supjjosition,  with- 
 out incurring  ten  times  more  trouble  and  expense  than  any  indi- 
 vidual case  can  be  supposed  to  merit.     For  it  would  be  necessary 
 to  address  those  ministers  and  churches  of  which  the  union  con- 
 sists by  circular  letters,  and  then  to  receive  their  answers ;  which 
 every  person  who  considers  the  business  impartially  must  allow  to 
 be  equally  tedious,  expensive,  and  unsatisfactory.     If  it  be  said, 
 that  the  union  may  give  advice  by  proxy, — that  is,  by  some  com- 
 mittee,— the  idea  itself  is  too  absurd  to  be  defended  by  any  reflect- 
 ing person.     It  woidd  be  no  less  absurd  than  for  aU  the  parishes 
 VOL.  IV.  2  E 
 
434  THOUGHTS  OX  A  GEXEEAL  UNION. 
 
 in  the  kina^dom  to  appoint  a  committee,  who  should  give  advice  in 
 all  cases  of  apphcation  made  to  them,  respecting  a  point  of  diffi- 
 culty or  distress  occurring  in  any  individual  parish.  Congrega- 
 tional churches  are  too  well  acquainted  with  their  inalienable 
 right  to  think  of  referring  matters  of  ojiinion,  or  of  disputes 
 among  themselves,  to  be  decided  for  them  by  any  distant  com- 
 mittee. 
 
 But  if  the  mode  of  serving  such  congregations  be  by  pecuniary 
 aids,  are  we  to  take  it  for  granted  that  a  general  fund  may  be 
 established  for  such  pnrposes,  to  be  disposed  of  by  a  committee  ? 
 This  deserves  very  attentive  consideration.  Speaking  in  general 
 terms,  that  a  fund  is  highly  desirable  must  be  admitted ;  but  the 
 mode  of  raising  and  applying  the  money  is  a  matter  of  the  ntmost 
 delicacy  and  importance.  Can  it  be  imagined  that  the  congrega- 
 tions of  the  nnion  will  have  collections  for  a  general  fund  to  be 
 at  the  disposal  of  a  committee  ?  I  am  persuaded  that  if  the  trial 
 were  made,  not  one  in  ten  would  see  it  right  to  do  so ;  and  this  I 
 would  infer  without  imputing  to  them  any  blame.  I  would  rather 
 say,  that  in  proportion  as  then-  zeal  is  mixed  with  discretion,  they 
 will  see  the  impropriety  of  doing  so.  Besides,  in  order  to  render 
 collections  effective,  the  object  should  be  specific,  and  not  for  a 
 general  fund.  And  yet  I  am  firmly  of  opinion  that  funds  may  be 
 raised  for  all  the  important  purposes  of  the  union. 
 
 Let  us  then  suppose  the  union  to  be  formed,  and  a  plan  of  com- 
 munication between  the  London  committee  and  all  parts  of  the 
 country  properly  matured.  Li  that  case  it  wdll  be  very  easy  to 
 ascertain,  for  instance,  the  situations  and  numbers  of  churches  or 
 "interests  fallen  into  decay."  Let  the  most  important  out  of  all 
 these  be  maturely  recommended  by  the  respective  country  com- 
 mittees to  that  in  London.  The  London  committee,  from  those 
 various  communications,  may  be  able  to  draw  up  an  interesting 
 case ;  a  case  of  great  importance,  and,  by  reason  of  the  number  of 
 places  included,  of  great  magnitude.  Here  is  a  specific  object 
 capable  of  interesting  the  several  congregations  of  the  union  in 
 proportion  to  the  numbers  which  form  the  aggregate  of  the  case. 
 Supposing  forty  or  fifty  places,  or  double  that  number,  all  over 
 the  kingdom,  were  fallen  into  decay ;  how  desirable  would  be  a 
 plan  whereby  efllectual  relief  may  be  aflbrded  to  them  all  ?  An 
 attempt  of  such  magnitude  would  soon  exhaust  a  general  fund ; 
 and  many  who  had  contributed  might  be  greatly  dissatisfied  with 
 
THOUGHTS  ON  A  GENERAL  UNION.  435 
 
 such  an  application  of  their  coutribiitions.  But  by  the  following 
 method  this  grand  end  may  be  obtained  with  comparative  ease, 
 and  without  any  possible  ground  of  complaint.  Let  a  case — that 
 above  mentioned,  for  instance— be  sent  by  the  London  committee 
 to  every  church  in  the  union,  requesting  a  collection,  and  this  to 
 be  forwarded  to  the'  treasurer.  Those  who  feel  a  sufficient  interest 
 in  one  or  more  of  these  places  will  comply ;  but  all  will  have  an 
 opportunity  to  judge  for  themselves.  If  the  contributions  fall  short 
 of  the  estimate,  they  will  be  applied  in  proportion ;  but  if  they 
 exceed,  the  surplus  remains  with  the  treasurer,  to  be  applied  by 
 the  committee  to  these  or  similar  objects. 
 
 At  another  time  "  the  encouragement  of  newly-raised  congrega- 
 tions "  may  form  a  case.  But  these  should  be  very  select,  and  of 
 peculiar  circumstances.  Suppose,  for  instance,  places  of  worship 
 in  watering-places,  where  there  may  be  neither  church  nor  minister 
 already  found  to  move  in  such  business.  At  another  time,  a  col- 
 lection may  be  solicited  for  fifty  or  a  hundred  itinerants  for  different 
 parts  of  the  kingdom,  in  a  certain  proportion  specified.  Por  such, 
 and  all  other  important  purposes,  the  appUcation  to  the  united 
 congregations  would  be  the  same  as  before  mentioned,  as  well  as 
 the  disposal  of  the  collections. 
 
 In  this  way  it  is  obvious  there  would  be  an  opportunity  of 
 learning  the  minds  of  all  parts  of  the  union  respecting  each  case ; 
 their  contributions  will  be  the  result  of  their  own  deliberation,  and 
 the  application  of  their  benevolence  will  be  without  any  clashing  of 
 claims.  Hereby  an  incomparably  larger  sum  may  be  raised,  and 
 raised  with  the  most  cheerful  concurrence,  than  by  an  annual  con- 
 tribution for  a  gene7-al  fund.  This  is  the  way,  even  without  the 
 superior  advantage  of  explicit  union,  that  the  missionary  collections 
 have  been  so  productive.  Were  the  Missionary  Society  dependent 
 on  a  general  fund  to  be  collected  for  all  religious  purposes,  its 
 finances  would  be  soon  exhausted. 
 
 This  being  a  very  important  point,  it  claimed  a  more  particular 
 notice.  Let  me  now,  gentlemen,  propose  a  few  remarks  on  another 
 object  you  have  thought  proper  to  propose — viz.,  "  Diligent  inquiry 
 for  young  persons  of  a  truly  serious  spirit  and  promising  talents 
 as  candidates  for  the  Christian  ministry,  to  be  educated  in  the 
 seminaries  belonging  to  the  Congregational  denomination,  and  to 
 afford  them  temporary  assistance."  It  is  allowed  that  such  inquiry 
 should  be  made,  and  perhaps  we  might  add,  is  actually  made.     But 
 
436  THOUGHTS  ON  A  GENERAL  UNION. 
 
 how  a  general  and  explicit  miiou  of  Congregational  cliurclies  is 
 calculated  to  afford  any  effectual  aid  in  such  an  inquiry,  I  am  frank 
 to  acknowledge  is  not  within  my  comprehension.  Every  seminary 
 has  its  own  friends  and  connexions,  and  by  their  means  an  inquiry 
 for  suitable  young  men  may  at  any  time  be  more  effectually  made 
 when  suitably  reminded  than  by  any  effort  of  the  general  union. 
 If,  indeed,  the  neglect  of  the  churches  were  so  general  as  to  render 
 it  necessary,  the  committee  in  London  may  be  of  some  service  in 
 calling  upon  the  united  churches  separately  to  make  this  a  peculiar 
 object  of  attention  and  prayer  ;  and  this  may  be  done  though  the 
 churches  be  not  so  united. 
 
 As  for  temporary  assistance,  in  a  pecuniary  view,  it  appears  to 
 me  impracticable,  except  in  the  way  before  explained.  That  is, 
 except  this  object  appear  of  such  magnitude  as  to  call  for  a  specific 
 case  to  be  drawn  up,  and  an  appeal  to  be  made  to  all  the  congre- 
 gations, soliciting  collections  for  this  veiy  purpose,  which  should 
 be  forwarded  to  the  treasurer,  and  be  proportioned  by  the  London 
 committee  to  the  respective  academies.  But  this  would  be  attended 
 probably  with  more  difficulties  than  advantages,  except  the  utmost 
 caution  be  employed.  Li  the  first  j^lace,  many  congregations  would- 
 scruple  to  contribute,  from  an  apprehension  of  difficulty  in  the 
 application  of  such  money.  Nothing  should  be  admitted  into  the 
 plan  which  affords  a  strong  handle  of  jealousy  and  dissatisfaction. 
 But  what  committee  could  pretend  to  act  in  such  an  affair  without 
 giving  offence,  and  probably  a  just  cause  of  offence,  to  some  of  our 
 seminaries,  except  they  had  some  other  rule  to  go  by  than  their 
 own  discretion?  I  see  no  other  method  of  avoiding  unpleasant 
 .surmises,  of  removing  jealousies,  and  preventing  dissatisfactions, 
 but  for  each  seminary  to  draw  up  a  statement  and  estimate  of  its 
 wants,  to  be  examined  by  a  committee  in  its  own  neighbourhood, 
 to  be  adjusted  and  admitted  in  connexion  with  the  London  com- 
 mittee previous  to  the  formation  of  the  general  case.  In  the 
 circular  address,  all  the  objects  and  claims  should  be  specified ; 
 and  the  sum  raised,  if  less  than  the  said  estimate,  should  be  dis- 
 tributed according  to  proportion  ;  but  if  more  than  the  estimate,  it 
 may  be  either  funded  for  a  similar  use  in  future,  or  distributed  in 
 equal  proportions  to  the  claimants. 
 
 I  am  quite  at  a  loss,  gentlemen,  how  a  general  union  can  assist 
 ''vacant  congregations  in  procuring  ministers."  Nothing,  surely, 
 should  be  considered  as  an  act  of  the  union  in  which  every  church 
 
THOUGHTS  ON  A  GENEEAL  UNION.  437 
 
 and  member  of  it  has  not  a  power  of  deliberate  decision.  But  how 
 can  this  be  jDOssibly  done  in  recommending  a  minister  ?  By  means 
 of  a  puUic  office,  indeed,  a  more  general  knowledge  of  churches  and 
 ministers  may  be  obtained  ;  and  it  might  be  of  considerable  use  to 
 preserve  always  in  such  ofHce  two  lists, — one  containing  the  names 
 of  destitute  churches,  another  the  names  of  movable  ministers ; 
 and  these  may  be  printed  and  circulated  annually.  But  all  inter- 
 ference in  the  way  of  official  recommendation  would  soon  bring  the 
 union  into  discredit,  as  it  could  not  fail  to  excite  endless  jealousies, 
 and  one  unsuccessful  attempt  in  the  committee  would  give  a  handle 
 to  the  disaffected  whereby  to  produce  in  the  union  great  confusion 
 and  mischief. 
 
 The  next  object,  that  of  "  giving  advice  respecting  trust-deeds 
 and  other  temporalitie,?,"  seems  to  me  superfluous,  as  the  Deputies 
 of  the  Three  Denominations  of  Dissenters  for  the  protection  of  our 
 civil  rights  are  always  accessible ;  or  if  any  advantage  could  be 
 derived  from  the  general  union  in  such  affairs,  it  is  scarcely  worthy 
 of  notice  in  comparison  of  other  objects. 
 
 As  to  the  object  you  propose,  gentlemen,  of  "affording  counsel 
 in  order  to  heal  differences  iu  any  congregation,"  I  would  ask,  who 
 is  to  give  the  counsel  ?  If  it  be  said,  the  union,  that  cannot  be  ; 
 for  surely  no  one  can  suppose  that  the  united  body  of  churches 
 and  ministers  ought  to  be,  or  can  be,  consulted  about  "  differences 
 which  may  unhappily  have  arisen  in  any  congregation."  But  if 
 it  be  said,  the  London  committee  of  the  union,  I  see  two  objections 
 to  the  idea.  The  first  is,  that  it  is  tvrong  to  invite  such  cases 
 which  may  soon  become  a  vexatious  and  intolerable  burden  to  a 
 committee  composed  of  persons  who  are  strangers  to  the  circum- 
 stances of  the  case.  How  much  better  is  the  mode  already  in 
 use — viz.,  to  convene  a -number  of  neighbouring  ministers  and 
 deputies,  who  may  soon  be  made  to  enter  into  all  the  circum- 
 stances, a  minute  acquaintance  with  which  is  often  of  essential 
 importance.  The  second  objection  is,  that  a  committee  of  strangers 
 undertaking  such  a  task  would  not  fail  to  expose  themselves  to 
 public,  severe  censure,  at  least  by  one  of  the  parties  and  their 
 friends,  in  moments  of  disappointment  and  irritation. 
 
 It  is  with  great  pleasure,  gentlemen,  I  proceed  to  notice  the  last 
 thing  you  propose  as  an  object — viz.,  "  The  effectual  prevention  of 
 improper  petitionary  cases  among  the  churches  of  the  union ;  that 
 the  liberal  may  have  all  possible  satisfaction  as  to  the  merits  of 
 
438  THOUGHTS  ON  A  GESEEAL  UNION. 
 
 the  case  proposed."  Every  one  will  acknowledge  that  this  is  an 
 object  highly  worthy  of  the  united  efforts  of  aU  who  wish  weU  to 
 the  interests  of  real  religion.  It  requires  your  united  wisdom  ; 
 and  though  difhcult  to  be  accomplished,  it  is  not  beyond  the  reach 
 of  human  contrivance.  If  an  effectual  rejection  be  made  of  every 
 case  not  recommended  by  the  union,  and  if  the  recommendation 
 be  made  by  the  most  unexceptionable  persons,  the  main,  if  not 
 the  only  difficulty  is  removed. 
 
 Should  any  one  object  that  he  will  not  be  influenced  by  any 
 such  restriction  ;  the  inconvenience  is  all  his  own.  For  those 
 who  unite  in  requiring  certain  credentials  will  have  a  rule  by 
 which  to  act, — a  rule  which,  if  properly  made,  wiU.  never  deceive 
 them ;  while  those  who  reject  it  will  be  liable  to  the  same  imposi- 
 tions as  in  the  former  state  of  things.  If  any  choose  to  he  deceived, 
 or  to  continue  liable  to  deception,  let  them.  They  injure  not  the 
 union,  but  themselves.  Let  them  give  their  property  without 
 discrimination  if  they  please,  no  man,  or  body  of  menj  has  a  right 
 to  control  them  ;  but  let  them  aU  reflect  that  they  are  only 
 stewards,  and  that  they  must  render  an  account  of  their  steward- 
 ship and  their  talents.  If  they  consider  their  own  judgment  as  a 
 sufficient  guide,  it  is  admitted  that  in  some  instances  it  may  be 
 so,  where  a  case  occurs  under  their  personal  knowledge ;  but  in 
 most  others  it  is  presumption  to  suppose  that  individual  judgment 
 is  so  competent  to  decide. 
 
 These  remarks  naturally  lead  us  to  inquire,  "^Tiat  may  we  con- 
 sider as  a  sufficient  recommendation  of  a  case  ?  or,  What  security 
 can  we  have  against  undesernng  cases  ? 
 
 In  the  first  place,  no  case  should  be  encouraged  but  that  of  a 
 society  in  the  union ;  that  is,  in  some  association  subordinate  to 
 the  general  union  of  chiu-ches.  Such  a  rule  would  be  the  best 
 possible  security  of  its  establishment  and  extension. 
 
 In  the  second  place,  no  case  should  be  encouraged  but  what  is 
 unanimously  recommended  by  the  association  to  which  it  belongs. 
 If  these  associations,  representatively,  are  not  competent  judges, 
 it  is  plain  that  no  other  persons  can  be. 
 
 In  the  third  place,  no  case  shoiild  be  encouraged,  out  of  its  own 
 district,  which  is  not  sanctioned  by  a  county  committee.  Without 
 this  there  would  be  no  sufficient  guard  on  some  small  or  obscure 
 associations.      A   county   committee,    on   any   suspicion    arising, 
 
THOUGHTS  ON  A  GENERAL  UNION.  439 
 
 would   correspond    with   a   person   or   persons  of    acknowledged 
 reputation  respecting  any  fact  or  circumstance  in  question. 
 
 In  the  fourth  place,  no  case  should  be  encouraged  in  London  or 
 its  vicinity  which  is  not  admitted  on  record  among  the  approved 
 cases.  Por  it  should  be  a  rule,  that  every  case  admitted  by  a 
 county  committee  should  be  enrolled  in  a  London  office ;  and 
 whatever  case  is  presented  there  without  being  so  enrolled,  should 
 be  rejected ;  but  if  so  entered,  then  it  should  be  admitted  with 
 the  appointed  seal  or  testimonial. 
 
 After  all,  however  weU  guarded  the  plan  of  the  first  admission 
 of  cases  may  be,  it  is  more  than  possible  that  the  best  ever 
 encouraged  and  the  most  worthy  recommenders,  may  become  the 
 innocent  occasion  of  abuse,  except  a  further  precaution  be  main- 
 tained. What  I  mean  is,  fifthly  that  it  be  required  of  every  one 
 whose  case  is  countenanced  by  the  churches  and  members  of  the 
 union  to  present  the  whole  account  of  money  actually  received 
 from  the  first,  without  any  concealment  of  sums  which  have  been 
 collected,  whether  at  home  or  abroad. 
 
 EesjDecting  the  memhei's  of  the  projected  union,  I  have  but 
 little  to  observe ;  and  yet,  if  I  mistake  not,  that  little  is  of  great 
 importance.  The  general  idea  is  this,  that  all  ministers  who  are 
 acknowledged  members  of  associations  professing  themselves 
 Protestant  Dissenters,  and  of  the  Congregational  order,  with  their 
 churches,  throughout  England  and  Wales,  and  no  others,  are  to 
 be  acknowledged  members  of  the  union.  "The  members  of  the 
 Congregational  Board  in  London  "  are  included  of  course  ;  for  this 
 "board"  of  ministers  (which  should  be  carefully  distinguished 
 from  the  Fund  Board)  is,  I  presume,  only  the  London  association 
 of  ministers  and  churches. 
 
 My  reason  for  acknowledging  no  others  as  members  is,  that 
 subordinate  associations  are  of  great  importance,  in  order  to 
 insure  the  extension  and  imiversality  of  the  union.  Nor  can  I 
 conceive  how  this  restriction  could  operate  unfavourably  on  any 
 ministers  or  churches. 
 
HINTS 
 
 PEOPOSED  TO  THE  CONSffiERATION  OE  A  COMMITTEE  IN  LOM)ON, 
 
 FOHMED  FOB 
 
 THE  PTIRPOSE  OF  DIGESTING  A  PLAN  FOB,  A  NATIONAL  UNION 
 
 BETWEEN  THE 
 
 EVANGELICAL  CONGREGATIONAL  CHURCHES,  &c., 
 
 THROUGH  ENGLAND  AND  WALES, 
 
 BY  WAY  OF  ANSWER  TO  QUERIES,  &c. 
 
 1.  What  is  the  best  kind  of  union  among  Christians?  That, 
 undoubtedly,  which  is  founded  on  the  knowledge  and  love  of  God. 
 And  whatever  is  favourable  to  personal  religion,  must  be  pro- 
 portionally favourable  to  such  union.  This  will  cement  the 
 affections  of  Christians  of  every  name  and  clime ;  to  which  end 
 monthly  praj'er  meetings  and  annual  missionary  meetings  have 
 been,  and  we  may  hope  will  still  be,  highly  useful. 
 
 2.  What  kind  of  national  union  is  most  desirable?  It  should 
 be  that  which  is  perfectly  consistent  with  Christian  liberty,  while 
 it  answers  a  general  good  end.  But  we  can  never  sufficiently 
 insist  upon  the  importance  of  distinguishing  between  what  is 
 desirable,  and  what  is  jyracticable, — what  is  plausible  in  theory, 
 and  what  is  founded  in  tried  experience.  Human  nature  is  the 
 same  now  as  in  past  ages ;  and  the  principles  which  have  been 
 found  uniformly  to  fail  hitherto,  should,  in  prudence,  be  distrusted. 
 We  may,  therefore,  rest  assured  that  no  national  religious  union, 
 
HINTS  TO  A  COMMITTEE  IK  LONDON.  -i-tl 
 
 founded  in  voluntary  promises  alone,  can  be  lasting.  The  will  of 
 man  is  a  changeable  thing,  and  disinterested  benevolence  is  ever 
 liable  to  be  supplanted  by  the  subtle  operations  of  self-interest. 
 As  in  a  civil,  so  in  a  religious  union,  those  laws  or  rules  alone  will 
 prove  uniting  and  lasting  ties  which  insure  the  general  good  by 
 the  medium  of  individual  interest. 
 
 3.  Is  there  any  kind  of  union  among  Congregational  churches 
 desirable  which  is  not  reducible  to  practice  ?  Undoubtedly  there 
 are  many  kinds.  It  is  highly  desirable  that  all  should  preach 
 the  same  doctrines,  mind  the  same  thing,  walk  by  the  same  rule, 
 ob,serve  the  same  discipline,  live  in  peace,  support  the  cause  of 
 true  religion  according  to  their  property  and  abilities, — these, 
 and  many  more,  are  among  the  desirables ;  but,  alas !  what 
 rules,  laws,  promises,  or  even  oaths  can  insure  a  permanent  com- 
 pliance ?  If,  therefore,  by  a  skilful  application  of  self-interest  to 
 the  general  good  of  religion,  and  to  those  particulars  which  are 
 immediately  subservient  to  this,  a  few  important,  radical  points 
 can  be  attained,  it  is  all  that  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit  of. 
 
 4.  What  is  that  hind  of  national  union  which  appears  at  once 
 highly  desirable  and  easily  practicable  ?  At  first  it  may  appear 
 that  any  union  founded  on  pecimiary  considerations  must  be  of  a 
 subordinate  nature.  In  one  respect  it  certainly  is  so  ;  but  in  the 
 practical  mode  of  operation  it  wiU  be  found  otherwise. 
 
 In  some  places,  proposals  have  been  made  for  collections  once  a 
 year,  to  be  remitted  to  a  county  treasurer,  and  to  be  applied  by  a 
 committee  for  county  purposes  among  the  churches,  &c.  But 
 such  schemes,  however  desirable,  are  mere  unoperative  theories. 
 Will  every  county  engage  to  have  such  a  fund?  If  they  now 
 engage,  is  it  probable  that  they  will  iperform  their  engagement  ? 
 Will  a  committee  apply  what  is  collected  to  the  general  satisfac- 
 tion of  applicants  ?  If  the  ministers  and  churches  be  not  satisfied, 
 (as,  assuredly,  there  is  no  probability  that  they  will  be,)  will  not 
 the  committee  consider  their  ofiice  a  very  thankless  one  ?  Besides, 
 such  a  plan  as  county  collections,  and  a  general  fund,  is  directly 
 calculated  to  dry  up  the  sources  of  liberality,  without  answering 
 any  one  general  good  end  which  may  not  be  more  efl'ectually 
 answered  another  way. 
 
 5.  What  pecuniary  union  is  both  highly  desirable  and  easily 
 practicable  ?  Whatever  gives  the  religious  public  sufiicient  con- 
 fidence that  their  pecuniary  contributions  are  made  to  answer  the 
 
442  HINTS  TO  A  COMMITTEE  IN  LONDON. 
 
 hest  purposes,  or  that  they  are  not  imposed  upon  for  want  of 
 sufficient  knowledge,  must  be  highly  desirable.  And  to  effect  this 
 most  completely,  let  the  following  particulars  be  considered.  The 
 FIEST  is  a  plan  for  effectually  detecting  every  false  or  improper 
 case  presented  to  the  religious  public,  and  for  inspiring  general 
 confidence  in  countenancing  good  ones,  of  whatever  kind  ;  and  the 
 SECOND  is  a  plan  for  the  most  important  and  general  information, 
 which  may  be  rendered  subservient  to  a  thousand  useful  purposes. 
 I.  A  plan  for  effectually  detecting  eyevy  false  or  improper  case 
 presented  to  the  religious  public,  and  for  inspiring  general  con- 
 fidence in  countenancing  good  ones,  of  whatever  kind.  Let  not 
 this  be  called  a  small  matter,  or  a  subordinate  piart ;  it  will  be 
 found,  in  practice,  to  be  the  mainspring  of  the  national  union. 
 
 1.  It  is,  assuredly,  in  the  power  of  the  London  committee  to 
 form  a  national  union;  and  most  sincerely  and  ardently  do  I  wish 
 that  they  wiU  claim  the  honour,  and  resolve  upon  the  plan  of 
 effecting  it.  But  if  they  decline,  (which  I  hope  they  will  not,)  it 
 may  be  effected  by  originating  in  another  quarter,  though  by  a 
 more  slow  progress.  Next  to  London,  the  county  of  York  has  it 
 in  its  power  to  effect  this  union — even  a  national  union.  Let  us 
 proceed  on  the  suppo.?ition  that  the  Congregational  ministers  (and 
 churches,  through  them)  will  take  it  up  in  London. 
 
 2.  That  the  union  should  originate  in  London  is  preferable  on 
 many  accoimts  ;  not  only  because  it  is  the  metropolis,  the  centre  of 
 inteUigeuce  and  of  wealth,  but  especially  because  no  cases  (or 
 scarcely  any  cases)  are  sent  from  London  to  the  country,  and 
 almost  all  from  the  country  are  sent  to  London. 
 
 3.  Let  it  be  very  particularly  observed,  that  want  of  complete 
 conformity  among  the  ministers,  however  desirable,  is  not  abso- 
 lutely necessary.     It  is  ihextiove  humbly  proposed — 
 
 That  as  great  a  number  as  can  be  brought  over,  at  the  very 
 first,  of  the  London  ministers,  as  the  representatives  of  the  respec- 
 tive societies  to  which  they  belong,  should  form  themselves  into  a 
 iinited  body,  not  only  as  an  example,  but  also  in  aid  of  a  national 
 xmion : 
 
 That  this  body  of  ministers  (to  which  future  accessions  will 
 be  always  admissible,  and  to  which,  when  they  see  it  in  their 
 interest,  all  will  be  glad  to  accede)  form  out  of  their  number  a 
 committee,  a  secretary,  and  a  provisional  treasurer.  This  last 
 office  may  not  be  immediately  iieccs.-^ary,  (except  on  accoimt  (if 
 
HINTS  TO  A  COMMITTEE  IN  LONDON.  443 
 
 incidental  expenses,)  but  as  the  plan  proceeds  in  its  operations, 
 may  become  important : 
 
 That  this  respectable  imited  body  (by  their  committee  and  secre- 
 tary) address  a  circular  letter  to  every  evangelical  Congregational 
 minister  in  England  and  Wales,  containing  proposals,  directions, 
 and  motives,  in  favour  of  a  national  union  : 
 
 (li.B. — The  writer  of  this  has  forwarded  to  JosejDh  Bunnell,  Esq. 
 a  more  correct  list  than  any  extant,  he  supposes,  of  congregations 
 and  ministers,  (out  of  London,)  on  a  plan  which  will  secure  infor- 
 mation, on  future  occasions,  with  the  utmost  accuracy.  On  this 
 plan,  every  congregation  and  minister  in  England  and  Wales  may 
 be  ascertained,  without  exception,  in  the  course  of  a  few  months :) 
 
 That  the  circular  letter  addressed  to  each  minister  and  his 
 congregation  should  contain  a  strong  representation  of  two  advan- 
 tages immediately  affecting  themselves  in  particular,  as  well  as 
 greatly  conducive  to  the  good  of  religion  in  the  nation  at  large — 
 viz.,  that  by  acceding  to  the  union,  they  will  be  eilectuaUy  guarded 
 against  imposition  relative  to  cases  ;*  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
 should  they  ever  need  public  and  honourable  countenance  to  any 
 case  of  their  own,  this  is  the  only  effectual  way  to  secure  it : 
 
 That,  moreover,  the  circular  strongly  recommend  to  each  minis- 
 ter, 1st,  a  district  union,  and,  2d,  a  county  union,  in  subservience 
 to  a  more  general  or  national  union.  But  cui  bono  ?  where  the 
 advantage,  where  the  interest  of  doing  so  ?  It  will  soon  foUow. 
 For  let  it  be  further  stated — 
 
 That  the  London  committee,  formed  in  aid  of  a  national  union, 
 resolve  to  admit  no  case  from  the  country  but  from  a  minister 
 and  congregation  connected  with  some  district  and  county  union. 
 Here  public  and  private  utility  are  united  ;  and  the  general  good 
 is  insured  by  self-interest : 
 
 That  the  number  of  districts  in  each  county  be  left  perfectly 
 free,  as  depending  on  the  size,  convenience,  &c.  But  that  each 
 minister  or  church,  expecting  any  advantage  or  countenance  from 
 the  union,  (whether  of  the  county,  of  London,  or  the  nation,)  in  a 
 pecuniary  view,  should  be  expected  to  unite  with  some  district  in 
 the  county  to  which  they  belong : 
 
 *  [The  reference  here  is  to  chapel  debts.  It  was  the  practice  then,  and  long 
 afterwards,  for  churches  to  send  their  ministers ;  and  many  ministers  were  not 
 loath  to  go  and  beg  money  for  their  liquidation.  Glaring  abiises  not  unf rcquently 
 occun-ed.     This  essentially  degrading  practice  has  ceased. —  Ed.] 
 
» 
 ■i-ii  HINTS  TO  A  COMMITTEE  IN  LONDON. 
 
 That  the  number  of  churches  in  a  district  should  not  be  less 
 than  three ;  but  as  many  more  as  convenience  may  suit : 
 
 That  the  ministers  of  each  district  form  a  committee,  called  a 
 district  committee,  for  the  purpose  of  examining  any  case  ov 
 cases  in  that  district.  And  that,  as  no  case  is  to  be  admitted  in 
 London  but  what  belongs  to  a  district  union,  so  likewise  it  should 
 pass  through  the  hands  of  a  county  committee,  before  it  be  ad- 
 mitted iu  London.  The  advantages  of  this  plan  "will  be  found 
 very  great.  It  will  secure  perfect  regularity,  with  very  little  prac- 
 tical trouble  or  difficulty  of  any  kind  : 
 
 That  district  meetings  of  ministers  be  recommended,  suppose 
 thy-ee  times  a  year  at  least,  and  that  a  part  of  the  business  then  be 
 to  produce  cases,  either  to  be  admitted  among  them,  or  to  be  re- 
 commended by  them.  And  that  no  case  be  admitted  from  any 
 other  district  which  is  not  recommended  by  the  district  com- 
 mittee to  which  it  belongs,  and  the  county  committee  also  of  that 
 district : 
 
 That  when  a  case  is  thought  worthy  of  a  recommendation  by 
 the  committee  of  its  own  district,  it  be  forwarded  by  its  appointed 
 secretary  to  the  secretary  of  the  county  committee,  from  whom  it 
 shall  be  returned  through  the  same  channel  to  the  minister  to 
 whom  it  belongs.  A  case  thus  signed,  first  by  those  who,  from 
 their  situation,  and  a  professed  discussion  of  it,  must  needs  be  the 
 best  judges,  and,  secondly,  by  a  county  committee  opierating  as  a 
 check  on  obscure  districts  in  theu'  coimty,  precludes  all  possibility 
 of  imposition,  either  on  London  or  any  part  of  the  country : 
 
 That  these  credentials,  and  nothing  short  of  these,  be  produced, 
 both  in  London  and  in  the  country,  by  every  holder  of  a  case. 
 The  bearer  now  has  the  whole  land  before  him, — his  case  signed 
 by  two  committees,  (no  other  names  are  neces.sary,)  and  his  time 
 of  admission  iato  London,  or  into  any  county  district,  to  be  pre- 
 viously settled  by  post.  He  enters  on  his  work  with  modest  con- 
 fidence that  his  cause  is  good,  and  can  meet  even  with  refusals 
 without  chagria.  This  removes  all  mutual  susijicions ;  the  bene- 
 volent, by  being  secured  from  imposition,  give  cheerfully ;  the 
 sources  of  liberality  are  opened,  &c. 
 
 These  ends,  however  important,  form  but  one  part  of  the  ad- 
 vantages to  be  further  derived  from  this  plan  of  union.  It  is  cal- 
 culated to  facilitate  every  other  kind  of  union  among  evangelical 
 chiu-ches,  and  every  good  work  (spread  of  the  gospel,  itinerating, 
 
HINTS  TO  A  COMMITTEE  IN  LONDON.  445 
 
 eiiligliteniug  dark  counties  and  corners  of  our  laud,  strengthening 
 weak  interests,  &c.)  wkich  may  be  promoted  by  a  national  imion. 
 
 Having  offered  some  thoughts  on  a  plan  of  union  founded  on 
 the  principles  of  mutiial  interest,  and  therefore  calculated  to 
 become  of  itself  operative  without  the  aid  of  foreign  interference, 
 let  lis  proceed  to  notice — 
 
 II.  A  plan  for  the  most  important  and  general  information, 
 which  may  be  rendered  subservient  to  other  very  useful  purposes  ; 
 indeed,  all  the  purposes  for  which  any  union  whatever,  of  a  na- 
 tional kind,  is  desirable  among  dissenting  evangelical  churches. 
 It  is,  therefore,  with  submission,  proposed — 
 
 That  the  London  committee  address  a  circular  letter  to  every 
 minister  in  the  country,  recommending  the  importance  of  their 
 having  the  most  accurate  knoiuledge  of  the  state  of  all  the 
 churches  in  the  union,  in  order  to  promote  their  advantage,  and 
 the  good  of  the  whole : 
 
 That,  moreover,  it  be  proposed,  and  warmly  recommended,  to 
 every  minister  to  draw  up,  within  a  reasonable  specified  time,  an 
 account  in  writing  of  the  rise,  the  history,  and  the  present  state 
 of  the  church  and  congregation  to  which  he  ministers ;  that  this 
 account  be  produced,  and  read  at  a  district  meeting  of  ministers, 
 and  committed  to  the  secretary.  One  such  account  will  generally 
 be  sufficient  for  one  meeting ;  and  those  which  are  shortest  may 
 more  conveniently  be  produced  first,  that  more  time  may  be 
 allowed  for  longer  and  more  difficult  ones.  And  it  would  be  a 
 good  method  to  propose,  at  each  district  meeting,  who  will  under- 
 take to  produce  his  account  at  the  next  meeting ;  his  acceptance 
 of  the  proposal  will  be  a  pledge  of  his  performance  : 
 
 That  the  secretary  forward  by  letter  an  abridged  account  of 
 each  document  (not  exceeding  in  quantity  one  sheet  of  paper, 
 single  postage)  to  the  secretary  in  London,  for  the  purposes  here- 
 after mentioned. 
 
 This,  it  is  manifest,  will  become  a  business  of  importance  and 
 magnitude,  with  a  London  secretary,  who  corresponds  and  receives 
 communications  from  all  directions.  It  is,  therefore,  humbly  pro- 
 posed further — 
 
 That  the  secretary  of  the  London  committee  have  a  salary  pro- 
 portioned to  his  important  office  and  labours ;  that  there  be  a 
 public  office  appointed,  (suppose  Dr  Daniel  Williams'  Library, 
 Red  Cross  Street ;)  that  a  set  of  books  be  provided,  in  which  may 
 
44.6  HINTS  TO  A  COMMITTEE  IN  LONDON. 
 
 be  inserted  the  abridged  accounts,  (revised  and  corrected  by  the 
 committee,  or  a  select  committee,)  according  to  the  order  in  which 
 they  are  sent ;  and  that  a  full  and  complete  ijideos  be  kept  of  all 
 the  churches  in  the  union  through  England  and  Wales,  both 
 alphabetically  arranged,  and  according  to  each  county,  as  in  Mr 
 Bunnell's  list,  with  a  column  of  reference  to  the  volume  and  page 
 of  historical  records.  Here  all  historical  information  of  the  union 
 is  brought  to  a  focus,  and  the  state  of  each  county  and  each  church 
 is  easily  accessible  by  all  whom  it  may  concern. 
 
 What  a  treasure  should  we  regard  such  records  of  churches  in 
 our  land  since  the  ejectment  of  the  Nonconformists '  But  it  is  not 
 to  gratify  curiosity  that  this  proposal  principally  claims  attention ; 
 it  may  be  rendered  subservient  to  every  good  work.  Hereby  the 
 London  committee  (and  occasionally  others)  may  have  the  most 
 accurate  statement  of  churches  and  ministers  in  the  union,  and, 
 indeed,  in  the  kingdom ;  which  may  prove  a  most  valuable  guide 
 to  direct  the  labours  of  itinerants, — in  some  cases  to  bequeath 
 legacies  for  the  spread  of  the  gosjjel,  &c. 
 
 It  is  probable  that  the  London  committee  may  sometimes  have 
 an  object  to  be  accomplished  of  national,  or  at  least  very  general 
 importance.  The  preceding  plans  and  arrangements  will  greatly 
 facilitate  the  accomplishment  of  such  object,  by  rendering  the 
 channel  of  information  and  communication  plain  and  easy. 
 
 It  is  also  probable  that  the  committee  may  sometimes  see  it 
 I'ight  to  apply  to  all  the  churches  in  the  union  for  a  collection  to 
 answer  some  important  purpose.  Then  especially  a  treasurer  will 
 be  necessary,  who  will  always  have  his  accounts  open  to  inspec- 
 tion, and  occasionally  the  state  of  the  fund  may  be  printed,  and 
 forwarded  to  contributors.  But  no  stated  contributions  should 
 be  proposed,  nor  any  others,  but  on  urgent  specific  occasions, 
 such  as  for  itinerating  on  a  large  scale,  &c. 
 
 Having  extended  these  "  Hints  "  considerably  beyond  my  first 
 intention,  I  ought  now  to  apologise  for  their  length.  Should  any 
 part  of  them  contribute  in  any  measui-e  to  promote  the  cause  of 
 true  religion,  I  shall  rejoice;  and  I  fear  not  to  obtain  your  indul- 
 gence for  the  freedom  with  which  I  have  pro230sed  them. — From 
 your  affectionate  friend  and  brother, 
 
 Edward  Williams. 
 
 To  the  Rev.  George  Burder,  London. 
 RoTHEKHAM,  Janiiary  1807. 
 
PUBLIC  LETTERS,  ETC. 
 
 I.  A  LETTER  TO  THE  EEV.  T.  BELSHAM ;  WITH  A  REVIEW  OF 
 HIS  "CALM  INQUIRY." 
 II.  A  LETTER  TO  DR  PRIESTLEY. 
 
 III.  A  LETTER  TO  MH  D.  LEVI. 
 
 IV.  TWO  LETTERS  ON  SANCTIFICATION. 
 
 V.  REVIEW  OF  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS. 
 
A  FEIENDLY  LETTER  ADDRESSED  TO  THE 
 EEV.  THOMAS  BELSHAM, 
 
 CONCEENING  THE  NATURE,   COMPARATIVE  EXCELLENCE, 
 AND   INFLUENCE    OF    TRUTH; 
 
 TO  WmOH  IS  ADDED 
 
 A  EEVIEW  OF  HIS  WOEK  ON  THE  PERSON  OE  CHEIST. 
 
 §  1.  Introduction.  §  2.  The  subject  stated.  §  3.  Truth,  what?  The  proper 
 nature  of  revealed  truth  is  that  of  a  means  to  virtue  and  happiness.  §  4. 
 Which  Mr  Belsham  grants,  by  making  it  an  object  of  choice.  §  5-7.  But  his 
 further  account  of  truth  is,  Fikst,  Inconsistent  with  that  liberty  which  is 
 essential  to  accountable  agents,  and  God's  moral  government.  §  S-10.  Second, 
 Inconsistent  with  the  superior  excellence  and  peculiar  office  of  goodness  in 
 rendering  means  efficacious.  §  11-13.  Third,  Inconsistent  with  the  Scripture 
 doctrine  of  Divine  influence,  as  the  only  true  source  of  virtue  and  happiness. 
 §  14.  Recapitulation. 
 
 §  1.  Rev.  and  dear  Sir, — For  writing  to  a  gentleman  who  has 
 shewn  himself  to  the  public  as  an  able  advocate  for  "  the  importance 
 of  truth,  and  the  duty  of  making  an  open  profession  of  it,"  -f-  it 
 
 *  [This  letter  was  appended  to  the  first  edition  of  the  Author's  Sermon  on  the 
 Influence  of  Religious  Practice  upon  our  Inquuies  after  Truth,  (see  vol.  iii.,  p.  291 ;) 
 but  it  was  omitted  in  a  second  edition  of  that  discourse,  with  the  intimation  that 
 it  should  be  included  in  a  volume  of  tracts  by  the  reverend  author,  which  his 
 family  contemplated  publishing  at  that  time.— Ed.] 
 
 t  See  vol.  iu.,  p.  292. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  2  F 
 
b 
 
 450  A  LETTER  TO  THE  REV.  T.  BELSHAM. 
 
 may  be  deemed  a  siifficient  apology,  tliat  the  writer  professes  him-- 
 self  to  be  a  lover  of  truth,  and,  according  to  his  humble  ability,  a 
 defender  of  it.  "While  I  approve  and  admire  many  things  in  the 
 discourse  alluded  to,  I  discover,  or  think  I  discover,  several  things 
 which  are  injurious  to  truth.  We  both  profess  to  have  the  same 
 general  end  in  view — "  to  inculcate  a  proper  love  of  truth,  and  a 
 habitual  regard  to  it,  to  excite  an  ardent  thirst  after  it,  impartiality 
 and  unremitting  diligence  in  the  investigation  of  it,  firmness  and 
 fortitude  in  adhering  to  it."  *  And  I  am  persuaded  that  a  free 
 discussion,  conducted  with  a  becoming  temper,  will  always  be  ser- 
 viceable, eventually,  to  the  cause  of  truth.  A  friendly  collision  of 
 thoughts  may  cause  a  spark  of  truth  to  shew  itself  which  might 
 otherwise  have  remained  invisible.  I  am  sorry  now  to  add  that 
 the  objectionable  parts  referred  to  are  in  my  apprehension  of  no 
 small  moment. 
 
 §  2.  Not  to  insist  on  your  Athanasian  f  creed  ;  your  representa- 
 tion of  "  honesty "  as  a  poor  simple  thing ;  your  bold  assertion 
 that  God  created  a  countless  multitude  of  percipient  and  intelli- 
 gent beings,  for  no  oilier  purpose  than  to  display  His  benevolence 
 and  to  make  them  happy ;"  your  severe  reflections  on  the  Assembly's 
 Catechism  | — a  system  that  has  not  only  gained  the  admiration  of 
 
 *  Mr  Belsbam's  Sermon,  p.  1. 
 
 +  "  And  there  seems  to  be  a  plausible  presumption  in  favour  of  that  pleasing 
 hypothesis,  which  some  benevolent  speculatists  have  advanced,  that  the  earth 
 may,  in  process  of  time,  revert  to  its  original  paradisiacal  state,  and  that  the  com- 
 forts of  human  life  will  be  multiplied,  and  its  evils  diminished,  the  limits  of  it  be 
 proportionably  extended,  so  that  they  have  even  ventured  to  express  some  faint 
 expectation  that  death  itself  may  be  annihilated.  Nor  would  it  be  difficult  to 
 shew,  if  there  were  a  proper  time  and  place,  that  the  Scriptures  themselves  are 
 not  unfavourable  to  this  amiable  speculation.  This  account,  which,  for  an  obvious 
 reason,  I  call  an  Athanasian  creed,  [a  pun  on  the  Greek  word  'Adavatria,  which 
 means  deathless. — Ed.,]  appears  to  me  far  less  worthy  of  belief  than  the  estab- 
 lished one  :  only,  it  must  be  confessed,  it  has  no  damnatory  clause,  and  therefore 
 may  be  deemed  harmless,  though  *  visionary  in  the  extreme.' " 
 
 J  "  Native  goodness  of  heart,  the  beauty,  order,  and  happiness  which  prevail  in  the 
 world,  and  the  whole  strain  and  tenor  of  the  New  Testament,  which  xmiformly 
 teaches  that  God  is  love,  all  contradict  and  abate  the  influence  of  that  terrible 
 doctrine  that  all  mankind  are  by  the  fall  brought  into  and  left  to  perish  in  a  state 
 of  sin  and  misery,  excepting  the  happy  few  whom  God  has  out  of  His  mere  good 
 pleasure  elected  to  everlasting  life.  (Assembly's  Catechism.)  But  so  far  as  such 
 principles  are  believed,  and  practically  regarded,  they  naturally  tend  to  contract 
 the  heart,  to  sour  the  temper,  to  inspire  dread  and  hatred  of  God,  and  to  disquiet 
 the  mind  with  the  most  formidable  and  distressing  apprehensions,"  (p.  30.)  Query: 
 Can  we  suppose  that  a  person  who  writes  thus  ever  understood  or  felt  the  genuine 
 
A  LETTER  TO  THE  EEV.  T.  BELSHAM.  451 
 
 the  Reformed  churches  at  home  and  abroad,  but  also  has  been  to 
 millions  the  occasion  of  grateful  praises  ;  your  contradictory  asser- 
 tions that  the  publication  of  the  "  most  dangerous  tenets  "  has  done 
 "no  material  injury;"* — not  to  insist  upon  these  jDarticulars,  and 
 some  others  of  less  moment,  or  to  repeat  what  has  been  noticed  in 
 
 influence  of  the  system  here  opposed  ?  We  are  here  reminded  of  the  sentiments 
 and  experience  of  a  venerable  body  of  Christian  bishops  : — "  As  the  godly  con- 
 sideration of  predestination,  and  our  election  in  Christ,  is  full  of  sweet,  pleasant, 
 and  unspeakable  comfort  to  godly  persons,  and  such  as  feel  in  themselves  the 
 working  of  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  mortifying  the  works  of  the  flesh,  and  their  earthly 
 members,  and  drawing  up  their  mind  to  high  and  heavenly  things,  as  well  because 
 it  doth  greatly  establish  and  confirm  their  faith  of  eternal  salvation  to  be  enjoyed 
 through  Christ :  so,  for  curious  and  carnal  persons,  lacking  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  to 
 have  continiially  before  their  eyes  the  sentence  of  God's  predestination,  is  a  most 
 dangerous  downfall,  whereby  the  devil  doth  thrust  them  either  into  desperation, 
 or  into  wretchlessness  of  most  unclean  living,  no  less  perilous  than  desperation." 
 — Catholic  Doct  of  the  Chwch  of  Englandj  Ai-ticle  xvii. 
 
 *  "  But  are  pernicious  principles  to  be  avowed  and  disseminated,  and  the  peace 
 of  mankind  and  the  good  order  of  society  to  be  disturbed  by  doctrines  tending 
 to  infidelity  and  immorality  ?  I  answer,  that  no  man  deems  his  own  principles  to 
 be  pernicious;  and  if  he  thinks  them  of  sufficient  importance,  he  ought,  without 
 hesitation,  to  avow  them.  If  they  are  really  detrimental,  they  must  be  false,  and 
 easily  overthrown.  No  material  injury  has  ever  yet  resulted  from  free  discussion, 
 nor  from  the  publication  of  the  moist  dangerous  tenets.  Some  few  half-thinking 
 minds  have  been  perverted  to  infidelity,  some  depraved  hearts  have  been  riveted 
 in  vice,"  (p.  41.)  But  are  not  half-thinking  minds  accountable  for  their  actions  as 
 well  as  others,  and  liable  to  endless  punishment  if  perverted  to  infidelity  and 
 riveted  in  vice  ?  Or,  is  the  injury  done  to  these  individuals  by  pernicious  prin- 
 ciples, the  less  in  itself  because  the  wisdom  of  heaven  overrules  it  for  the  good  of 
 others?  "A  man  ought,  without  hesitation,  to  avow  pernicious  principles  if  he 
 thinks  them  of  sufficient  importance  !  "  A  maxim  this  without  any  foundation  in 
 reason,  and  subversive  of  morals — a  proposition  highly  affi'onting  to  the  dignity  of 
 truth  !  If  a  man's  principles  are  pernicious,  he  ought  to  think  them  to  be  so  ;  to 
 deny  this,  is  to  deny  all  moral  obligation.  And  if  he  ought  to  think  them  to  be 
 so,  he  ought  not  to  publish  them.  Again  :  when  a  man  deems  any  principles  to 
 be  true  and  important,  while  in  reality  they  are  false  and  pernicious,  he  deems 
 them  to  be  what  they  are  not,  and  therefore  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  have  clear 
 ideas  in  forming  a  judgment  of  them  :  consequently,  he  judges  without  evidence. 
 But  are  crude  notions  formed  without  evidence,  pernicious  weapons  thus  formed 
 in  the  dark,  to  be  thrown  among  men,  to  their  eternal  danger,  and  the  perpetrator 
 be  blameless  in  the  presence  of  the  just  and  holy  Judge  ?  Or,  does  it  foUow,  that 
 because  his  fellow-mortals  have  no  right  to  control  him  in  these  matters,  that  he 
 ought  to  do  them  mischief  ?  Besides,  the  above  principles  are  contradicted  by 
 Mr  Belsham  himself : — "  No  principle  can  be  more  absurd  than  this,  that  speculative 
 errors  are  of  little  consequence.  A  man's  views  and  principles  have  a  necessary 
 influence  upon  his  volitions ;  volitions  produce  actions,  &c. ;  error,  in  proportion 
 as  it  prevails,  will  debase  the  character,"  (p.  25.)  How  then  can  it  be  said  that 
 "  no  material  injury  has  ever  yet  resulted  from  the  pubhcation  of  the  most  dan- 
 gerous errors  ? " 
 
452  A  LETTER  TO  THE  BET.  T.  BELSHAJr. 
 
 the  preceding  discourse,  there  are  three  things  more  especially  to 
 which  I  must  object,  as  being,  if  I  mistake  not,  radical  parts  of 
 your  view  of  truth.  They  do  not,  indeed,  appear  directly  to  lessen 
 its  importance,  though,  in  my  view,  they  greatly  misrepresent  it, 
 by  making  it  distinctive  of  that  liberty  which  is  essential  to  ac- 
 countable agents,  and  God's  moral  government,  while  acting  other- 
 wise than  as  a  moral  means  ;  by  assigning  it  an  ofhce  which  does 
 not  belong  to  it,  and  which  is  peculiar  to  goodness — viz.,  the  render- 
 ing of  means  efficacious  in  forming  the  moral  character ;  and, 
 finally,  by  putting  it  to  militate  against  the  only  true  source  of 
 virtue  and  happiness,  which  is  the  Divine  influence.  The  first,  I 
 apprehend,  is  inimical  to  the  foundation  of  moral  philosophy  ;  the 
 second  greatly  afiects  the  superstructure  of  it ;  and  the  third  is,  in 
 its  just  consequences,  subversive  of  the  whole  system  of  Christian 
 theology.  It  will  now  be  expected  that  I  should  produce  my  evi- 
 dence from  your  discourse  of  its  containing  these  principles,  and 
 then  shew  that  they  are  chargeable  with  the  tendencies  I  have 
 ascribed  to  them. 
 
 §  3.  Truth,  in  the  most  general  and  comprehensive  import  of 
 the  word,  is  that  which  is  conformable  to  fact.  Hence,  those 
 beings,  properties,  and  relations,  those  ideas,  propositions,  and 
 declarations,  are  true  which  are  conformable  to  fact.  Truth  is 
 essential  to  God,  because  of  His  infinite  knowledge  and  integrity  ; 
 hence  it  is  said  that  He  "canuot  lie."  When  He,  therefore,  forms 
 a  proposition,  or  makes  a  declaration,  we  may  be  quite  siu-e  that 
 such  is  conformable  to  fact ;  or,  that  His  expressions,  whether  in 
 word  or  conduct,  perfectly  correspond  with  the  reality  of  the 
 things  expressed.  Now  all  Diraie  revelation,  as  such,  is  nothing 
 else  than  a  number  of  propositions  infinitely  conformable  to  the 
 reality  of  things,  addressed  to  men  with  the  merciful  and  legisla- 
 tive design  of  their  becoming  virtuous  and  happy ;  and  in  propor- 
 tion as  they  contradict  these  propositions,  either  by  thoughts,  word.s, 
 or  actions,  they  contradict  infinite  truth,  and  give  the  lie  to  the 
 reahty  of  things.  They  declare  some  things  to  liave  existence 
 which  have  none,  and  deny  existence  to  others  which  have  it. 
 And,  on  the  contrary,  in  proportion  as  any  one  accedes  to  those 
 ^propositions  in  heart  and  life,  in  thought,  aflection,  word,  and  con- 
 duct, he  sets  to  his  seal  that  God  is  true  ;  he  becomes  virtuous 
 and  happy.  From  the  jDremises  it  follows,  that  the  proper  nature 
 of  revealed  truth  is  that  of  perfect  means  to  virtue  and  happiness. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  THE  EEV.  T.  BELSHAM.  453 
 
 §  4.  What  I  have  now  advanced — that  revealed  truth  is  only  a 
 means  to  virtue  and  hapjjiness — is,  in  fact,  by  yourself  granted  : — 
 "If  man  be  intended  for  future  existence,  and  if  it  be  the  object 
 of  religion  to  teach  us  how  to  attain  final  hajDpiness,  it  cannot  be 
 denied  that  just  views  of  religious  truth  are  of  the  utmost  conse- 
 quence." And,  indeed,  the  very  terms  employed  by  you  through- 
 out,— such  as  doctrine,  firinciples,  system,  &c.,  to  be  embraced,  be- 
 lieved, judged  of,  &c., — shew  not  only  that  revealed  truth  is  an  ob- 
 ject without  us,  and  therefore  has  a  real  subsistence,  an  invariable 
 permanency,  independent  of  our  conceptions,  but  also,  that  it  is  an 
 object  to  be  improved.  You  allow  that  we  are  to  "judge  of  its 
 comparative  excellency,"  and  to  use  it  as  what  is  calculated  to  im- 
 prove our  character  and  promote  our  happiness,  and  that  "  all  who 
 embrace  just  scriptural  princijDles  of  religion  ought  to  excel  the 
 rest  of  mankind  in  piety  and  virtue."  It  may  be  thought  singular 
 that  any  proof  is  adduced  for  a  point  so  plain ;  but,  plain  as  it 
 may  ajDpear  to  some,  your  whole  system,  as  I  shall  presently  shew, 
 is  built  upon  a  virtual  denial  of  it.     For — 
 
 §  5.  PiEST,  Your  further  account  of  truth  is  inconsistent  with 
 that  liberty  of  choice  which  is  essential  to  accountable  agents  and 
 God's  moral  government.  You  say  that  "truth  will  gradually 
 makes  its  way  by  its  native  energy,  and  will  in  the  end  rise  supe- 
 rior to  every  prejudice."  And  again : — "  A  man's  views  and 
 principles  have  a  necessary  influence  upon  his  volitions :  from 
 good  principles,  good  actions,  valuable  habits,  and  virtuous  charac- 
 ters naturally  take  rise ;  from  erroneous  principles,  the  reverse." 
 That  is,  according  to  the  obvious  import  of  this  language,  and  the 
 general  tenor  of  the  discourse,  truth  will  act  upon  the  mind  mechani- 
 cally, and  it  will  be  in  the  power  of  man  to  resist  its  evidence. 
 And  this  effect  follows  upon  those  whose  "  irregular  conduct  had 
 disgraced  their  ]principles."  But  it  is  contrary  to  experience,  that 
 truth  will  produce  any  effect  but  according  to  the  disposition  with 
 which  it  is  received ;  and  produce  the  disposition  itself  it  cannot, 
 except  it  be  at  once  the  means  and  the  subject  of  conviction ; 
 which  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  truth  sown  in  the  mind  is  both 
 the  seed  and  the  soil. 
 
 §  6.  We  have  before  seen,  and  you  have  granted,  that  revealed 
 truth  is  only  a  means  to  a  higher  end ;  but  the  very  idea  of  a 
 means,  in  connexion  with  a  rational  agent,  implies  that  it  is 
 frustrable.     If  the  human  mind  be  not  free,  as  to  be  capable  of 
 
454  A  LETTEE  TO  THE  KEY.  T.  EELSHAM. 
 
 frustrating  all  means,  as  such,  there  is  no  ground  left  for  its  ac- 
 countableness.  That  there  is  a  necessity  of  consequence,  I  readily 
 grant,  but  yet  maintain,  that  human  Kberty,  in  reference  to  means, 
 is  the  sole  foundation  why  man  is  accountable  for  his  actions. 
 Necessity  is  the  appointment  of  God  as  a  Sovereign ;  but  liberty 
 belongs  to  man  as  a  subject  of  moral  government  only,  and  is 
 essential  to  a  state  of  trial.  Without  necessity  of  consequence 
 God  is  no  Sovereign  over  the  systems  He  hath  formed  ;  and  with- 
 out freedom  in  the  creature  to  use  or  to  abuse  all  means  whatever, 
 as  such,  be  they  ever  so  glorious  and  powerful,  God  is  no  Moral 
 Governor.  But  since  He  is  the  blessed  Sovereign  of  all  worlds. 
 He  cannot  fail  to  render  all  events  infallibly  certain  ;  and  since  He 
 is  the  equitable  Governor  of  all  His  moral  subjects,  all  the  moral 
 means  He  employs  may  prove  ineffectual.  Every  degree  of 
 certainty  with  respect  to  moral  events  is  the  produce  of  absolute 
 sovereign  acts,  and  not  properly  speaking  of  any  means.  It  there- 
 fore follows  that  truth,  which  is  only  a  means  to  promote  a  higher 
 moral  end,  will  not,  cannot,  act  necessarily  on  the  mind,  but  in 
 proportion  as  it  is  sovereignly  predisj)osed.  But  those  whose 
 "irregular  conduct  disgraces  their  principles"  are  not  predisposed 
 to  give  truth  a  favourable  reception,  except  we  say  that  vice  is  a 
 ]3reparation  for  virtue,  or  that  enmity  to  real  goodness  disposes  the 
 mind  to  goodness.  Consequently,  "  truth  will  not  gradually  make 
 its  way  by  its  native  energy,  and  will  not  in  the  end  rise  superior 
 to  every  prejudice,"  to  any  assignable  certainty,  without  a  sovereign 
 act  of  God  superior  to  all  means  whatever. 
 
 §  7.  To  deny  this  reasoning  is  to  undermine  the  foundation  of 
 moral  philosophy.  Por  all  ethics  are  built  upon  the  supposition, 
 that  happiness  is  certainly  attainable  by  a  moral  agent;  for  happi- 
 ness is  the  end  of  ethics,  and  the  subject  of  this  practical  science 
 is  accountable,  that  is  to  say,  free,  absolutely  free,  as  far  as  means 
 go,  either  to  improve  or  misimprove  them.  But,  to  say  that  the 
 mind  is  free  with  respect  to  all  means,  and  yet  that  happiness  is 
 certainly  attainable,  which  constitute  the  foundation  of  morals, 
 involves  a  contradiction,  if  the  intervention  of  sovereign  acts, 
 superior  to  all  mechanism  of  means,  be  not  admitted.  I  there- 
 fore conclude,  that  your  rei^resentation  of  truth  is  inconsistent 
 with  that  liberty  which  is  essential  to  accountable  creatures,  in- 
 compatible with  God's  moral  government,  and  inimical  to  the  very 
 foundation  of  moral  philosophy. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  THE  KEY.  T.  BELSHAM.  455 
 
 §  8.  Second,  But  your  account  of  truth  is  further  inconsistent 
 with  the  superior  excellence  and  peculiar  office  of  GOODNESS  in 
 rendeiing  means  efficacious.  While  you  represent  it  as  producing 
 in  a  vicious  mind,  by  its  "native  energy,"  the  primary  good  dis- 
 position, you  assign  it  an  office  which  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  dis- 
 charge. That  it  is  adapted  in  its  own  nature  to  improve  the  mind, 
 to  promote  virtue  and  happiness,  when  the  disposition  is  capa- 
 citated to  employ  it  for  that  purpose,  is  readily  granted  from  its 
 very  nature  as  a  means ;  but  except  we  argue  in  a  circle,  we  must 
 further  inquire.  How  comes  the  mind  by  that  capacity  of  disposi- 
 tion ?  Truth,  from  its  nature,  being  an  object  held  forth  by  the 
 equitable  Governor  of  the  world  to  solicit  men's  approbation,  and 
 the  human  mind  from  its  very  accountableness  being  free  to  em- 
 brace or  to  reject  this  object ;  what  can  it  be  that  secures  it  success  ? 
 Let  truth  be  clearly  proposed  to  men,  and  confirmed  by  the  most 
 astonishing  miracles ;  will  this  produce  conviction  if  the  mind  be 
 not  predisposed  to  improve  it  ?  If  not,  as  innumerable  Scripture 
 facts  prove,  what  becomes  of  truth's  "  native  energy  "  to  overcome 
 prejudices?  Why  do  not  the  sublime  truths  of  revelation  con- 
 vince those  who  daily  read  the  Scriptures,  and  who  profess  the 
 firmest  attachment  to  the  Christian  revelation  ?  How  many  are 
 there,  who,  notwithstanding  their  opportunities  of  information  and 
 their  embracing  the  Scriptures  as  divine,  are  utter  strangers  to 
 their  efficacious  influence  and  genuine  tendency  ?  How  does  not 
 the  mechanical  energy  of  truth  overpower  the  prejudices,  hypoc- 
 risy, uncharitableness,  covetousness,  luxury,  and  sloth  of  its  pro- 
 fessors? Is  the  fault  in  the  truth  itself  or  in  the  disposition? 
 Not  in  the  truth  itself,  for  that  is  always  the  same,  consisting  of 
 propositions  infinitely  true,  which,  like  their  Author,  know  no 
 variableness,  neither  shadow  of  a  change.  It  remains,  then,  that  the 
 fault  lies  in  the  badness  of  the  disposition;  the  truth  falls  on 
 stony  ground,  among  thorns,  or  on  the  trodden  path.  It  is,  there- 
 fore, the  peculiar  office  oi goodness,  as  a  subjective  quality,  to  render 
 truth  efficacious  in  the  mind. 
 
 §  9.  "Happiness,"  you  say,  "is  the  great  end  of  intellectual 
 existence ;  and  it  is  obvious  that  truth  is  the  only  safe  guide  to 
 happiness.  Properly  speaking,  vice  itself  originates  in  error." 
 Happiness,  indeed,  is  the  great  end  of  intellectual  existence ;  truth 
 is  not  of  itself  capable  of  leading  the  erroneous  and  the  disaffected 
 to  enjoy  happiness  any  more  than  the  gladsome  light  of  day  is 
 
456  A  LETTER  TO  THE  EEV.  T.  BELSHAM. 
 
 capable  of  leading  the  blind  in  a  right  path  to  the  end  of  his 
 journey.  Without  a  previous  principle  of  goodness  in  the  mind, 
 truth  can  have  no  existence  there,  because  nothing  else  can  pro- 
 perly discern  and  embrace  it.  To  suppose  otherwise  is  no  less 
 absurd  than  if  I  should  say  that  the  objects  of  sense,  as  the  moon, 
 a  rose,  an  apple,  a  bell,  or  a  ball  are  the  proper  cause  of  animal 
 life,  as  well  as  the  instruments  of  sensation.  And  for  a  moral 
 means,  as  truth  is,  to  operate  mechanically,  is  contradiction  in  terms. 
 Besides,  the  immediate  effect  of  truth,  when  rightly  improved,  is 
 not  happiness,  but  goodness.  For,  suppose  truth  to  exist  in  the 
 mind  in  any  assignable  form,  if  it  is  not  improved  for  the  purpose 
 of  promoting  universal  goodness,  no  happiness  wiU  be  attained 
 except  what  is  delusive.  Goodness  of  disposition,  therefore,  is  the 
 "  only  safe  guide,"  first  to  truth,  and  tlien  to  happiness.  Truth 
 may  advance,  as  a  means,  a  virtuous  disposition,  and  the  sum  of 
 happiness,  when  rightlj'  used  ;  but  it  is  the  province  of  sovereign 
 benevolence  to  produce  the  one,  and  to  confer  the  other. 
 
 §  10.  Nor,  again,  does  vice  "originate  in  error,"  if  by  error  we 
 understand  any  object  of  choice,  as  the  reverse  of  truth,  evil 
 under  the  semblance  of  good,  or  the  wrong  means  of  hapipiness. 
 Error  may  increase  both  vice  and  misery ;  but  does  not  generate 
 the  first  vice,  any  more  than  truth  can  generate  the  first  virtue. 
 There  must  be  therefore  a  defection  of  another  nature  than  any 
 that  error  can  effect,  to  give  the  first  error  admission.  Error 
 presented  to  a  mind  qualified  and  disposed  to  resist  its  influence, 
 has  no  bad  effect,  as  ajDpears  from  Christ's  temptations.  All  vice, 
 and  all  successful  error,  therefore,  originate  in  the  previous  state 
 of  the  mind.  Nor  does  this  imply  any  unbecoming  reflection  on 
 the  Author  of  our  nature.  For  it  must  be  owned  that  defecti- 
 bility  is  essential  to  an  accountable  agent  as  such ;  therefore 
 certain  perseverance  in  virtue,  or  a  restoration  of  it  when  lost,  are 
 equally  the  effect  of  sovereign  favour,  and  not  of  mere  equity,  or, 
 for  the  same  reason,  of  any  moral  means  whatever.  And  to 
 relax  or  suspend  that  act  of  sovereignty  for  the  very  reason  that 
 it  is  sovereign,  is  not  requisite  on  the  ground  of  equity  in  the 
 Moral  Governor.  This  defectibUity,  therefore,  is  a  suflicient  source, 
 and  indeed  the  only  one,  of  evil  prior  to  the  entrance  of  error. 
 I  say  that  this  defectibility  is  essential  to  a  created  nature  in  a 
 state  of  probation  ;  for  what  can  possibly  constitute  its  account- 
 ableness,  but   its   liableness   to    deviate   from  rectitude,  without 
 
A  LETTER  TO  THE  REV.  T.  BELSHAM.  457 
 
 a  sovereign  prevention,  as  well  as  to  preserve  it?  And  when 
 ignorance  has  once  invaded  the  mind,  no  means  in  the  universe 
 can  enlighten  it  of  themselves ;  whether  revealed  facts,  miracles, 
 examples,  or  anything  else.  He  alone  who  "  commanded  the  light 
 to  shine  out  of  darkness,"  by  an  act  of  mere  sovereignty,  can 
 restore  the  capacity  for  receiving  and  improving  goodness  and 
 truth.  "  The  pursuit  of  happiness  by  wrong  means,  and  the 
 choice  of  evil  under  the  semblance  of  good,"  are  undoubtedly 
 vicious ;  but  what  is  it  that  sets  the  mind  upon  pursuing  these 
 wrong  means  ?  Is  it  a  perfect  or  a  vicious  mind  that  begins  this 
 pursuit  ?  If  vicious,  than  vice  exists  there  without  the  choice  of 
 error ;  if  perfect, — and,  alas  !  in  vain  do  we  look  for  such  in  our 
 world, — how  comes  evil  to  appear  good?  I  therefore  conclude, 
 that  your  account  of  truth  is  inconsistent  with  the  superior 
 excellence  and  peculiar  office  of  goodness  in  rendering  means 
 efficacious.     Nor  is  this  all ;  for — 
 
 §  11.  Third,  Your  doctrine  concerning  truth  is  inconsistent 
 moreover  with  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  Divine  influence,  as  the 
 true  cause  immediately  of  goodness,  and  efficiently  of  virtue  and 
 happiness.  What  yoa  ascribe  to  human  mechanical  skill  in  the 
 philosophy  of  mind,  whereby  the  force  of  truth  is  hajjpily  applied 
 to  the  mental  machine,  the  Scriptures  impute  to  the  immediate 
 influence  of  God's  Holy  Spirit.  According  to  you,  it  is  philosophy 
 "  whicli  teaches  man  to  know  himself,  to  form  a  just  estimate  of 
 the  dignity  [and  why  not  also  the  present  depravity  T\  of  his  nature, 
 of  his  high  and  hapf)y  destination  to  number  and  to  measure  his 
 intellectual  powers,  to  calculate  their  strength,  to  direct  their 
 exertions,  and  to  carry  them  to  the  highest  state  of  improvement, 
 which  opens  to  view  the  hidden  sources  of  knowledge,  which 
 reveals  the  subtle  movements  of  the  intellectual  machine,  the  laws 
 which  it  obeys,  and  those  secret  springs  which,  with  invariable 
 certainty,  regulate  all  its  motions,  and  which,  if  skilfully  touched, 
 will,  as  by  an  infallible  chain,  produce  the  regular  harmonious 
 movements  of  the  whole,  and  carry  it  on  in  a  steady  and  unerring 
 course  to  virtue,  to  honour,  to  ultimate,  complete,  interminable 
 happiness."  The  Holy  Scriptures,  on  the  contrary,  declare  that  the 
 inspiration  of  the  Almighty  giveth  understanding,*  or  true  know- 
 ledge of  God  and  His  dispensations, — that  we  become  virtuous  by 
 being  born  of  the  Spirit,-]-  or  changed  by  His  agency, — that  we 
 
 *  Job  xxxii,  8.  f  John  iii,  3,  7. 
 
458  A  LETTER  TO  THE  REV.  T.  EELSHAM. 
 
 are  begotten  to  virtue  and  hajapiness  hy  the  sovereign  pleasure  of 
 the  Father  of  lights,* — that  it  is  the  Lord  that  giveth  to  some  in  a 
 distinguishing  manner  hearts  to  perceive,  and  eyes  to  see,  and  ears 
 to  hear,-f- — that  a  man  can  receive  nothing  in  a  religious  sense 
 except  it  be  given  from  heaven  as  a  matter  of  sovereign  favour,^ — 
 that  we  are  saved  by  grace  through  faith  as  the  gift  of  God,§ — 
 that  the  truly  virtuous  are  born,  not  of  blood,  nor  of  the  wiU  of  the 
 flesh,  nor  of  the  will  of  man,  but  of  God,|| — that  we  are  saved  by 
 the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost,^ — that  it  is  the  work  of  the 
 Lord  God  to  dispose  the  heart  to  love  Him,  that  we  may  live, — ** 
 and  that  virtuous  persons  ai-e  the  Divine  workmauship,  created  in 
 Christ  Jesus  unto  good  works, -f-f — that  it  is  God  who  worketh  in 
 us  both  to  will  and  to  do  of  His  good  pleasure,|| — that  true  Chris- 
 tians are  chosen  to  salvation  through  sanctification  of  the  Spirit 
 and  belief  of  this  truth,§§ — that  love,  joy,  peace,  long-suffering, 
 gentleness,  goodness,  faith,  meekness,  and  temperance,  are  the  fruits 
 of  the  Spirit.||||  And,  indeed,  some  of  the  wiser  heathens  were 
 constrained  to  own  that  the  source  of  virtue  was  purely  Divine, — 
 that  it  is  neither  capable  of  being  taught,  nor  to  be  acquired  by 
 science, — that  it  comes  not  from  nature  any  more  than  from 
 instruction,  but,  proceeding  from  Divine  inspu^ation,  it  is  com- 
 municated to  the  virtuous  vrithout  the  instrumentality  of  their 
 understanding,^^ — that  every  virtuous  action  originates  in  God,* 
 — that  there  is  no  mind  truly  virtuous  without  Divine  aid,i- — and 
 that  we  are  bound  to  believe  no  virtuous  man  becomes  such  but  by 
 the  special  help  of  God.j 
 
 §  12.  But  while  heathens  with  their  glow-worm  light  ascribe  all 
 real  virtue  to  a  Divme  influence ;  and  while  revelation,  with  its 
 meridian  brightness,  discovers  that  the  source  of  aU  virtue  and 
 happiness  is  the  discriminating  agency  of  oiu:  heavenly  Pather,  who 
 
 *  James  i.  17,  18.  f  Deut.  xsis.  4.  J  John  iii.  27. 
 
 §  Eph.  ii.  8.  II  John  i.  13.  11  Tit.  iii.  5. 
 
 **  Deut.  XXX.  6.  +t  Eph.  ii.  10.  JJ  PhU.  u.  13. 
 
 §§  2  Thesa.  u.  13.  ||||  Gal.  v.  22,  23. 
 
 iril  oil  hihaKTov  i<TTiv  ovB'  eVicn-jjft;;  8'  eTTiyiyvqrai  f]  aperrj.  Aperr}  av  drj 
 oire  (jiicret  ovt€  SiSuktoj/  aWa  Qela  polpa  Trapayiyvofiei/fi  nVeu  vov  ols  av  irapa- 
 y\yvT}Tai. — Socrates  apud  Plat,  in  Men. 
 
 *  Ti  av  ayadov  npaTTrjs  f  is  Oeovs  avanep-TTe. — Bias  apud  Lacrt. 
 ■f  "  iSTulla  sine  Deo  mens  bona  est." — Senec.  Epis.  Ixxiii. 
 
 X  "Et  nostra  civitas  et  Grsecia  tulit  singularis  viros,  quorum  neminem  nisi 
 juvante  Deo  talem  fuisse  credendum  est." — Cicero  de  Nat.  Deor.,  lib.  ii.,  §  66. 
 Glasg.,  174S. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  THE  EEV.  T.  BELSHAJiI.  459 
 
 has  promised  to  give  His  Holy  Spirit  to  them  who  ask  Him  ;  it 
 may  be  shewn,  if  I  mistake  not,  with  demonstrative  evidence,  that 
 if  there  be  any  such  thing  as  virtue  in  our  worki  it  must  be  derived 
 from  a  higher  source  than  the  mechanical  power  of  truth,  whether 
 "philosophical,  political,  or  theological."  And  though  we  grant 
 that  the  particulars  and  the  circumstances  of  this  doctrine  are  to 
 be  learned  from  revelation,  yet  we  maintain,  in  opposition  to  those 
 who  imagine  that  we  have  no  other  foundation  for  it  than  a  mis- 
 taken interpretation  of  the  sacred  oracles,  that  the  necessity  of  its 
 existence  is  founded  in  reason,  and  is  as  capable  of  demonstration 
 as  most  points  in  moral  philosophy.     For — 
 
 First,  The  evil  of  imperfect  existence  is  essential  to  every  crea- 
 ture, except  we  should  say  that  self- existence  is  no  perfection,  or 
 hold  a  contradiction  in  terms,  that  the  want  of  absolute  perfection 
 is  no  imperfection.  Hence  our  absolute  dependence  on  the  Creator 
 for  every  degree  of  existence,  and  every  degree  of  perfection. 
 Therefore — 
 
 Second,  The  good  of  virtuous  existence  is  absolutely  dependent 
 on  the  Creator.  If  intelligence  and  volition,  and  the  heart  itself, 
 are  absolutely  dependent  upon  God,  much  more  do  a  right  intelli- 
 gence, a  good  voUtion,  and  a  vii'tuous  state  of  the  heart,  so  depend 
 upon  Him.     Hence  it  follows — 
 
 Third,  That  every  degree,  even  the  smallest,  of  virtue  and  happi- 
 ness in  creatures  is  a  matter  of  sovereign  favour,  and  not  of  equity  ; 
 and,  on  the  contrary,  that  every  degree,  even  the  smallest,  of  moral 
 pravity  in  accountable  agents  is  equitably  punishable.     But — 
 
 Fourth,  From  the  moment  that  the  desert  of  punishment  com- 
 mences, a  state  of  probation  expires,  upon  the  ground  of  mere 
 equity.  For  the  trial  of  moral  agents,  in  strict  equity,  is  a  trial 
 of  strict  rectitude  according  to  the  moral  means  ailorded ;  and 
 when  the  balance  is  once  turned  to  moral  pravity,  it  is  impossible 
 from  the  nature  of  the  thing  that  equity  should  ever  restore  it. 
 Wherefore — 
 
 If  any  man  becomes  virtuous  who  was  once  otherwise,  it  must 
 be  the  effect  of  sovereign  benevolence,  dispensed  by  way  of  super- 
 natural influence.  For  if  we  assert  that  it  is  dispensed  in  any 
 other  way,  we  shall  be  forced  to  contradict  the  above  plain  axioms. 
 If  any  one  hesitates  about  the  truth  of  this  remark,  let  him  try 
 his  skill  in  formmg  an  objection ;  or,  if  he  prefers  it,  in  disprov- 
 ing either  of  the  principles — which  I  call  axioms — themselves. 
 
460  A  LETTER  TO  THE  EEV.  T.  BELSHASI. 
 
 §  13.  What  appears  to  me  to  be  the  only  objection  of  plausi- 
 bility is  this  :  that  the  sovereign  benevolence  consists  in  affording 
 us  those  means  which  in  strict  equity  God  was  not  engaged  to 
 grant,  such  as  a  revelation  of  mercy,  righteous  laws,  eminent 
 examjjles,  &c.  But  what  are  the  means  to  a  mind  ill  affected  to 
 the  holy  nature  and  immediate  end  of  means,  and  which  is  aKen- 
 ated  from  the  life  of  God  through  ignorance,  as  every  one  with- 
 out virtue  must  needs  be?  But  what  utterly  invalidates  this 
 objection  is,  that  mere  means  are  so  far  from  being  sufficient  to 
 restore  the  balance  from  vice  to  virtue  after  it  is  lost,  that  they 
 are  not  sufficient  to  preserve  it  virtuous  when  put  in  equilihrio. 
 In  short,  I  scruple  not  to  assert  that  if  the  doctrine  of  Divine 
 supernatural  influence  be  not  admitted,  neither  the  entrance,  nor 
 the  existence,  of  moral  evil  in  the  universe  can  be  reasonably 
 accounted  for,  nor  any  rational  prospect  of  deliverance  from  it 
 be  shewn. 
 
 §  14.  Thus,  Sir,  have  I  presumed  to  submit  to  your  considera- 
 tion a  few  strictures  on  your  account  of  truth,  as  inconsistent  with 
 liberty,  degrading  to  goodness,  and  injurious  to  God;  and  I  further 
 presume  that  the  following  language  will  in  your  estimation  justify 
 my  conduct : — "  Nor  will  it  be  difficult  to  prove  that  it  is  the  in- 
 dispensable duty  of  all,  as  far  as  ability  and  opjiortunity  permit, 
 to  bear  testimony  to  truth,  by  diligent  inquiry  after  it,  courageous 
 profession  of  it,  faithful  adherence  to  it,  and  by  using  every  fair 
 and  honourable  means  of  promoting  its  progress  in  the  world." 
 Nor  need  I  request  of  a  gentleman,  so  devoted  to  thought  and 
 reflection  as  yourself,  a  close  attention  to  my  arguments  in  opposi- 
 tion to  the  superficial  haste  and  premature  conclusions  of  many 
 readers ;  but  what  I  request  is,  that  you  will  receive  in  a  candid 
 and  friendly  manner  my  contribution  of  a  mite  towards  advancing 
 the  stock  of  investigated  truth  and  practical  Christianity ;  and  that 
 you  will  believe  me  to  be,  Reverend  Sir,  your  sincere  well-wisher,' 
 
 Edwaed  Williams. 
 
 Oswestry,  February  1791. 
 
A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIEY.  461 
 
 A  EEVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  "CALM  INQUIRY."* 
 
 The  siibstance  of  this  volume,  its  author  informs  us,  was  delivered 
 in  a  course  of  lectures  to  his  puj)ils,  when  he  occupied  the 
 theological  chair  at  Daventry.  The  Dissenting  Academy  at  this 
 place  was  a  continuation  of  tliat  over  which  Dr  Doddridge 
 presided  at  Northampton ;  and  which,  by  the  will  of  its  benevolent 
 founder,  Mr  Coward,  was  placed  under  the  direction  of  trustees, 
 who  were  expected  to  guarantee  the  orthodox  integrity  of  the 
 institution.  Mr  Belsham,  it  should  seem,  began  to  be  dissatisfied 
 with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  seminary,  and  was  in 
 consequence  induced  to  commence  "A  Calm  Inquiry  into  the 
 Scripture  Doctrine  concerning  the  Person  of  Christ."  At  this 
 time,  from  his  own  avowal,  he  was  a  "  firm  believer  iu  the  pre- 
 existence  of  Christ." 
 
 On  this  statement  two  reflections  naturally  occur.  The  first  is, 
 that  the  author,  at  different  periods,  exhibits  himself  "a  firm 
 believer  "  of  opposite  and  contradictory  sentiments  ;  and  therefore, 
 from  his  own  account,  compared  with  his  jDresent  views,  he  firmly 
 believed  without  evidence.  The  other  is,  that  Mr  Belsham  had 
 but  a  slender  claim,  rather  no  claim  at  all,  to  the  theological 
 chair,  when  he  held  the  Arian  pre-existence  of  Christ,  which 
 appears  to  have  been  the  full  extent  of  his  orthodoxy  at  the  outset, 
 while  his  post  was  retained  on  the  condition,  according  to  the 
 founder's  will,  that  he  was  "  a  firm  believer  "  in  the  deity  of  Christ, 
 in  opposition  to  the  Arian,  as  well  as  to  the  Socinian  hypothesis. 
 With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  considerations,  we  think  it  may 
 be  justly  questioned,  whether  a  mind  so  formed  and  so  disposed, 
 however  active  in  learning,  is  ever  likely  to  arrive  at  the  "  know- 
 ledge of  the  truth."  As  for  the  second,  we  must  leave  it  to  Mr 
 Belsham's  casuistry  to  explain,  how,  as  an  honest  man,  he  could 
 retain  an  office  and  receive  a  salary  to  which  he  must  know  he 
 was  not  entitled,  during  eight  years  of  his  doctrinal  vacillation. 
 
 The  plan  adopted  by  Mr  Belsham  in  order  to  ascertain  the  point 
 in  question,  carries,  at  first  sight,  an  air  of  plausible  impartiality ; 
 
 *  "  A  Calm  Inquiry  into  the  Scripture  Doctrine  concerning  the  Person  of  Christ ; 
 including  a  Brief  Review  of  the  Controversy  between  Dr  Horsley  and  Dr  Priest- 
 ley, and  a  Summary  of  the  various  Opinions  entertained  by  Christians  upon  this 
 Subject.  By  Thomas  Belsham,  Minister  of  the  Church  in  Essex  Street."  Eclectic 
 Review,  1813. 
 
462  A  REVIEW  OF  MR  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQTIIEY. 
 
 it  was,  "  to  form  a  coUection  of  all  the  texts  in  the  New  Testament 
 which  in  any  way  related  to  the  person  of  Christ."  We  do  not 
 object  to  this  process,  when  properly  conducted ;  but  we  are 
 convinced  it  cannot  possibly  be  so  conducted  without  some  pre- 
 requisites in  the  mind  of  the  inquirer.  Every  one  who  has  paid 
 due  attention  to  the  princijjles  and  operations  of  the  human 
 mind,  must  know  that  on  subjects  of  this  nature,  minds  differently 
 disposed  may  arrive  at  opposite  results.  It  is  therefore  of  the 
 utmost  importance  to  ascertain  with  what  dispositions,  with  what 
 expectations,  with  what  j^rscognita,  we  enter  upon  this  iuquiiy. 
 That  it  be  "  calm  "  is  not  sufficient.  When  we  peruse  the  records 
 of  civil  history,  the  maxims  of  Confucius,  the  eclogues  of  Virgil, 
 or  the  elements  of  Euclid,  we  may  "calmly"  expect  to  be 
 gratified ;  the  active  principle  of  curiosity  is  kept  awake,  and  we 
 anticipate  some  rays  of  truth  convertible  to  useful  purposes.  But 
 when  we  read  the  will,  the  "last  will  and  testament"  of  a  father 
 or  brother,  we  feel  a  lively  interest  in  the  document.  Here,  to  be 
 perfectly  calm,  is  the  same  as  to  be  stupid  or  rude.  And  yet, 
 when  this  very  document  comes  to  the  decision  of  a  counsel  or  a 
 judge,  to  whom  it  is  a  point  of  speculative  concern,  personal 
 interest  being  out  of  the  question,  a  "  calm  "  investigation  is  most 
 proper ;  though  even  in  this  case  the  form  of  the  words  will  not 
 always  decide  the  import  of  the  will,  without  including  circum- 
 stances, and  especially  the  probable  design  of  the  testator. 
 
 Now,  we  may  ask,  what  were  the  precognita,  what  the  rules  of 
 interpretation,  what  the  requisite  circumstances,  that  Mr  Belsham 
 and  his  pupUs  brought  with  them  in  order  to  learn  "  the  Scripture 
 doctrine  concerning  the  person  of  Christ  ? "  Our  author  shall 
 speak  for  himself  and  his  brethren : — 
 
 "  All  Christians  agi-ee  that  Jesiis  of  Nazareth  was,  to  outward  appearance, 
 a  man  like  other  men ;  and  that  though  he  was  an  inspired  prophet  who 
 performed  miracles,  was  raised  from  the  dead,  and  ascended  into  heaven, 
 he  is  not,  on  these  accounts  solely,  to  be  regarded  as  being  of  rank  superior 
 to  the  human  race,  but  that  separate  and  direct  evidence  is  necessary  for 
 the  establishment  of  this  specific  fact.  Hence  it  follows  that,  in  this 
 inquiry,  the  whole  burden  of  proof  lies  upon  those  who  assert  the  pre- 
 existence,  the  original  dignity,  and  the  divinity  of  Jesus  Christ.  If  any 
 one  affirm  that  a  being  who  has  every  appearance,  and  every  incident  and 
 quality  of  a  man,  is  not  a  real  man,  but  a  being  of  an  order  superior  to 
 mankind,  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to  prove  his  assertion.  If  he  fail  in 
 his  proof,  his  hypothesis  vanishes,  and  the  person  in  question  must  be  re- 
 garded as  a  real  man.     In  this  controversy,  therefore,  the  proper  province 
 
A  EEVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM's  CALM  INQUIRY.  463 
 
 of  the  Ariau  and  Trinitarian  is  to  propose  the  evidence  of  tlieir  respective 
 hypotheses, — that  is,  to  state  those  passages  of  Scripture  which  they  con- 
 ceive to  be  conclusive  in  favour  of  their  doctrines.  The  sole  concern  of 
 the  Unitarian  is  to  shew  that  these  arguments  are  inconclusive  ;  that  the 
 passages  in  question  are  either  of  doubtful  authenticity,  or  misunderstood, 
 or  misapplied.  This  is  the  precise  state  of  the  question.  It  is  admitted 
 hy  all  parties.  It  must  be  continually  kept  in  view.  This  view  of  the 
 subject  points  out  the  true  and  only  projjer  method  of  conducting  the 
 argument.  It  is  by  proposing  and  carefully  examining  the  controverted 
 texts.  He  who  will  not  submit  to  this  labour  must  be  content  to  remain 
 ignorant,  or  to  take  his  opinions  upon  ti-ust,"  (pp.  1-3.) 
 
 "We  are  by  no  means  of  the  number  of  those  who  are  "  content 
 to  remain  ignorant,  or  to  take  onr  opinions  upon  trust."  We  have 
 also  submitted  to  the  labour  of  "  carefully  examining  the  contro- 
 verted texts,"  attended  with  all  the  advantages  of  Mr  Belsham's 
 criticisms  and  comments.  But  to  record  seriatim  what  we  were 
 constrained,  by  apparent  superior  evidence,  to  regard  as  false  de- 
 ductions, and  to  give  at  length  our  reasons  for  so  thinking,  would 
 require  a  ponderous  volume  like  his  own.  An  undertaking,  with 
 this  specific  design,  we  find  is  publicly  announced  ;  and  we  doubt 
 not  the  cause  of  truth,  candour,  and  piety,  will  be  promoted  by 
 the  comparison.  All  that  can  be  reasonably  expected  from  an 
 article  in  a  periodical  work  may  be  comprised  under  two  leading 
 divisions  :  in  the  first  place,  some  observations  on  the  author's 
 assumed  principles ;  and,  secondly,  some  remarks  on  the  general 
 controverted  subject. 
 
 Mr  Belsham  assumes,  in  limine,  that  "all  Christians  agree  that 
 Jesus  of  Nazareth  was  to  outward  appearance  a  man  like  other 
 men."  In  other  words,  he  takes  for  granted  that  all  Christians 
 agree  to  be  Socinians ;  since  who,  besides  these,  professing  Chris- 
 tianity, will  concur  in  this  assertion  without  a  corrective  limitation 
 of  the  similarity  ?  To  that  declaration  of  the  apostle,  indeed,  in 
 his  epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  "in  all  things  it  behoved  Him  to  be 
 made  like  unto  His  brethren,"  as  explained  by  the  apostle  himself, 
 all  Christians,  worthy  of  the  name,  will  unreservedly  subscribe. 
 Some  of  the  ancient  visionaries  who  assailed  the  fundamental 
 articles  of  the  Christian  Church  contended,  it  is  true,  that  He  had 
 not  a  real,  but  only  an  apparent,  human  body.  But  these  dreams 
 are  gone.  It  is  now  universally  maintained, — as  those  who  take 
 the  Holy  Scriptures,  common  sense,  and  right  reason  for  their 
 guides,  have  ever  maintained, — that  Jesus  Christ  had  a  true  body 
 
464  A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAil's  CALM  INQUIRY. 
 
 and  soul ;  that  is,  a  human  nature,  subject  to  the  innocent  in- 
 firmities of  that  natiu'e.  But  the  Scriptures  assert,  that  in  other 
 very  extraordinary  respects  He  was  not  lilce  other  men.  They 
 testify  that,  while  in  this  world,  "  He  was  holy,  harmless,  undefiled, 
 separate  from  sinners," — that  "  He  knew  no  sin,"  or  was  no  sinner, 
 "  did  no  sin,"  but  was  "without  blemish  and  without  spot."  This 
 is  an  essential  difference  of  "  appearance,"  and  the  Bible  teaches 
 us  the  reality.  In  this  respect,  at  least,  Jesus  apjjears  a  perfect 
 unique  of  character  among  the  countless  millions  of  free  agents 
 who  have  inhabited  our  globe  as  the  descendants  of  the  first  man. 
 To  that  declaration,  universally  true  when  applied  to  others,  "  There 
 is  not  a  just  man  iipon  earth  that  doeth  good  and  sinneth  not,"  He 
 was  a  perfect  exception.  Must  we  ask  Mr  Belsham's  pardon  for 
 thus  calling  in  question  one  of  his  first  principles  ?  No ;  but  we 
 will  quote  his  own  language  in  explanation  of  his  assertion,  that 
 Jesus  was  "  a  man  like  other  men  : " — 
 
 "  The  Unitarian  doctrine  is,  that  Jesus  of  Nazareth  was  a  man  consti- 
 tuted ill  all  respects  like  other  men,  subject  to  the  same  infirmities,  the 
 same  ignorance,  prejudices,  and  frailties,"  (p.  447.)  "  When  Jesus  or  his 
 apostles  deliver  oj^inions  unconnected  with  the  object  of  their  mission,  such 
 opinions,  and  their  reasonings  upon  them,  are  to  be  received  with  the  same 
 attention  and  caution  with  those  of  other  pei-sons  in  similar  circumstances, 
 of  similar  education,  and  with  similar  /labits  of  thinking,"  (p.  451.)  "  They 
 maintain  that  it  no  more  derogates  from  the  authority  of  Christ  than  it 
 does  from  that  of  Moses,  that  his  inspiration  should  not  extend  beyond 
 the  proper  objects  of  his  mission  ;  and  that  in  other  cases  he  should  en- 
 tertain the  same  opinions,  and  be  liable  to  the  same  misconceptions,  as  his 
 countrymen,  and  those  among  whom  he  was  educated.  Also,  that  the 
 character  of  Jesus  should  be  gradually  formed,  is  more  useful  as  an  ex- 
 ample to  his  followers,  than  if  he  were  by  nature  and  necessity  a  perfectly 
 holy  and  impeccable  being,  incapable  of  being  influenced  by  temptation  of 
 any  kind,  and  consequently  in  no  respect  similar  to  his  followers,"  (p.  472.) 
 "  The  moral  character  of  Chi-ist,  through  the  whole  course  of  his  public 
 ministry,  as  recorded  by  the  evangelists,  is  pure  and  unimpeachable  in 
 every  particular.  "Whether  this  perfection  of  character  in  public  life,  com- 
 bined with  the  general  declarations  of  his  freedom  from  sin,  estabhsh,  or 
 were  intended  to  establish,  the  fact,  that  Jesus  through  the  whole  course 
 of  his  private  life  was  completely  exempt  from  all  the  errors  and  failings 
 of  human  nature,  is  a  question  of  no  great  lUTRrNSic  moment,  and  con- 
 cerning which  we  have  no  sufficient  da,ta  to  lead  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion" 
 (p.  190.) 
 
 In  this  ample  specimen  of  our  author's  bold,  and  we  are  temj)ted 
 to  add  blasphemous  opinions  concerning  tlie  jjerson  of  Christ,  (and 
 
A  REVIEW  OF  MR  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  465 
 
 they  pervade  every  page  of  the  woi-k  before  us,)  the  gratuitous  as- 
 sumption is  evidently  implied,  that  mankind,  however  chargeable 
 with  errors  and  crimes,  have  no  need  of  a  sinless  mediator,  but 
 that  "a  man  in  all  respects  like  other  men,"  subject  to  the  same 
 ignorance,  prejudices,  and  frailties,  will  answer  the  purjjose  ex- 
 tremely well.  To  men  of  no  conscience,  or  whose  conscience  is 
 thoroughly  cauterised,  this  doctrine  may  cause  neither  alarm  nor 
 uneasiness ;  but  to  those  who  know  the  evil  and  demerit  of  sin, 
 who  feel  the  burden  of  guilt,  who  have  just  apprehensions  of  the 
 holiness  and  justice  of  the  Supreme  Governor,  the  purity  of  His 
 laws,  and  the  awful  nature  of  their  sanctions, — in  a  word,  to  those 
 who  are  acquainted  with  their  moral  state  and  the  true  character 
 of  their  Maker  an  obvious  reflection  presents  itself :  Of  what  pos- 
 sible advantage  can  this  "  man  like  other  men  "  be  to  us,  considered 
 as  criminals  ?    The  author  replies,  Jesus  is  a  "  Saviour  or  deliverer." 
 
 "  This  title  (o-torijp)  is  applied  to  Christ  upwards  of  fifty  times  in  the 
 New  Testament.  Christ  was  the  deliverer  of  the  Jews  from  the  bondage 
 and  curse  of  the  law, — of  the  Gentiles  from  the  bondage  of  idolatry, — and 
 of  all  mankind  ti-om  sin  and  misery.  The  word  o-mrijp,  saviour,  expresses 
 '  dehverer  ; '  and  trtoTrjpia,  salvation,  '  deliverance  in  general,' "  (j).  274.) 
 "  Christ  sometimes  authoritatively  j^ronounces  the  forgiveness  of  sins," 
 (p.  329.)  "  In  the  same  sense  he  confers  upon  his  apostles  authority  to 
 forgive  sins — i.  e.,  to  heal  diseases.  '  The  sin  not  unto  death,'  may  mean  a 
 curable  disorder,  for  recovery  from  which  it  may  not  be  unreasonable  to 
 pray.  'The  sin  unto  death'  may  be  an  incurable  raalady ;  in  which  case 
 prayer  for  recovery  would  be  useless  and  improper,"  (p.  330.)  "  Our  Lord 
 pronounces,  concerning  the  woman  who  washed  and  perfumed  his  feet, 
 '  Thy  sins  are  forgiven.'  This  woman  was  probably  a  Gentile  ;  and  as  it  is 
 said  her  '  sins  were  many,'  it  is  probable  that  she  had  been  remarkably 
 addicted  to  idolatrous  superstitions  ;  but  that  by  our  Lord's  preaching 
 and  miracles  she  had  been  convinced  of  Ms  divine  mission,  and  converted 
 to  the  worship  of  the  true  God,"  {ibid.)  "  By  his  kind  address  to  her,  he 
 publicly  testified  that  she  was  now  translated  from  the  community  of 
 sinners,  i.e.,  heathen  idolaters,  into  the  communion  of  saints  or  holy  ones, 
 i.  e.,  the  true  worshippers  of  God."  "  The  word  .simmer  often  signifies  no- 
 thing more  than  heathen."  "  A  conversion  from  heathenism,  and  admission 
 into  the  commxinity  of  true  worshippers,  is  sometimes  expressed  by  the 
 terms  repentance  and  forgiveness  of  sins,  and  that  without  immediate 
 regard  to  personal  character,"  (p.  331.)  "  Thus  the  apostle  Peter  speaks  of 
 Christ  as  exalted  to  be  a  prince  and  a  saviour,  to  give  repentance  to  Israel, 
 and  the  remission  of  sins,  (Acts  v.  31.)  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
 gospel  teaches  the  free  forgiveness  of  moral  ofiences  to  the  sincere  penitent ; 
 but  this  could  not  with  propriety  be  represented  as  the  distinguishing 
 pecuharity  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  because  the  promises  of  for- 
 
 VOL.  XV.  *  2  G 
 
466  A  EEVIEW  OF  SIE  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIEY. 
 
 giveness  in  the  Old  Testament  are  as  numerous,  as  cleai-,  as  full,  and  as 
 decisive,  as  any  that  are  to  be  found  in  the  New,"  (p.  332.) 
 
 It  is  difficult  to  conjecture  why  this  last  sentence  was  intro- 
 duced in  this  connexion,  except  it  were  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
 molishing the  one  immediately  preceding  it,  and  even  the  whole 
 strain  of  the  foregoing  pages.  It  was  asserted,  (p.  274,)  "that 
 Christ  was  the  saviour  of  all  men  from  sin  and  miser y."  This 
 means,  one  whUe,  lyronoimcing  penitents  to  be  forgiven  ;  another, 
 healing  bodily  diseases.  It  denotes,  either  teaching  idolaters  to 
 worship  the  true  God  ;  or  testifying  that  this  change  was  effected. 
 It  follows,  from  the  author's  own  explanations,  that  Jesus  Chi-ist 
 is  "a  saviour  from  siu"  in  the  same  sense  precisely  that  Moses 
 and  the  prophets,  John  the  Baptist,  and  the  apostles  are  so.  They 
 pronoiuiced,  taught,  and  testified  the  same  doctrine,  and  many  of 
 them  healed  bodily  diseases.  How  is  it,  then,  we  ask,  that  salva- 
 tion from  sin  is  never  ascribed  to  them  as  the  agents,  while  it  is 
 constantly  applied  to  Jesus  Christ  1  Why  is  it  exj^ressly  declared 
 that  "  there  is  no  salvation  in  any  other," — "  that  there  is  none 
 other  name  under  heaven  given  among  men  whereby  we  miist  be 
 saved?"  a  declaration  ascribed  to  the  apostle  Peter  "when  filled 
 with  the  Holy  Ghost,"  (Acts  iv.  8,  12.)  In  the  notion  of  our 
 author,  if  he  wUl  but  keep  consistent  with  himself,  there  is  salva- 
 tion in  ISIoses,  David,  Isaiah,  Peter,  Paul,  and  many  others.  Why, 
 then,  is  the  honoiirable  title, ""  saviour,"  denied  to  them,  whUe  it  is 
 applied  to  Christ  upwards  of  fifty  times  in  the  New  Testament? 
 We  leave  the  reader  to  indulge  Ms  own  reflections  on  this  point 
 
 Mr  Belsham  assumes  another  principle,  on  which  he  supposes  a 
 miaute  inquiry  into  the  import  of  controverted  texts  ought  to  be 
 conducted — viz.,  "That  the  whole  burden  of  proof  Mes  upon  those 
 who  assert  the  pre-existence,  the  original  dignity,  and  the  divinity 
 of  Jesus  Christ."  This  canon  of  inquiry,  in  which  the  author 
 seems  to  jDlace  great  confidence,  and  which,  prima  facie,  bears  the 
 character  of  rectitude,  may  prove  on  closer  inspection,  to  be  a 
 fallacious  one.  "The  whole  burden  of  proof."  The  proof  of 
 what  ?  Of  the  specific  fact  in  question.  Now,  as  diflerent  kinds 
 of  facts  require  their  appropriate  kinds  of  proof,  and  all  proof 
 depends  on  evidence,  we  should  learn  what  sort  of  evidence  is 
 demanded.  Mathematical  and  metaphysical  evidence  are  excluded 
 by  the  nature  of  the  subject.  Not  again  the  evidence  of  sense, 
 whether  direct  or  historically  recorded ;  for,  whether  Jesus  Christ 
 
A  EEViEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  467 
 
 aj)peared  as  possessing  all  the  properties  of  humanity  is  no  part 
 of  the  dispute,  though  Mr  Belsham  has  taken  much  needless 
 trouble  to  record  it.  There  remain,  then,  the  evidences  of  testi- 
 mony, of  reason,  and  of  what  will  satisfy  a  well-instructed  con- 
 science. Each  of  these  is  of  great  importance  in  this  inquiry. 
 The  last,  however,  our  author  has  totally  neglected,  as  if  it  were 
 wholly  out  of  the  question.  The  investigation  regards  the  person 
 and  quahfications  of  one  who,  it  is  allowed  on  both  sides,  is  repre- 
 sented as  "  a  saviour  from  sin  and  misery."  But  the  conscience 
 of  no  man  "  awakened  to  righteousness,"  and  the  reason  of  no 
 man  who  has  a  proper  knowledge  of  his  own  character  and  rela- 
 tions, can  be  satisfied,  without  some  superior  evidence  to  the 
 contrary,  that  a  being  merely  human  may  be  such  a  saviour. 
 Therefore,  "the  whole  burden  of  proof,"  consisting  of  some  supe- 
 rior evidence,  lies  xipon  him  who  obtrudes  the  assertion ;  an  asser- 
 tion which  alarms  and  offends  conscience,  and  insults  reason.  No 
 one  can  wLllingiy  entertain,  a,  priori,  a  probability  of  meeting  any 
 divine  testimony  so  ruinous  to  his  hopes  ;  although  a  man  of  sincere 
 and  upright  mind,  who  is  disposed  to  place  implicit  confidence  in  the 
 infinite  wisdom  and  paramount  authority  of  that  Being  who  has 
 represented  himself  as  "  merciful  and  gracious,"  will  not  refuse  to 
 hear  all  the  arguments  of  an  assailant,  professedly  founded  on 
 Divine  revelation. 
 
 In  order  to  know  the  proper  meaning  of  any  revealed  doctrine 
 or  testimony,  some  facts  necessarily,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
 must  be  presupposed ;  as,  that  the  assertion  is  consistent  with  the 
 possibiUty  or  nature  of  things,  with  other  parts  of  Scripture,  with 
 the  Divine  character  and  dispensations,  with  the  actual  state  of 
 mankind,  and  with  the  first  principles  of  knowledge.  Here,  how- 
 ever, it  concerns  us  to  exercise  the  greatest  caution,  lest  we  arro- 
 gantly assume  that  anything  is  absolutely  incompatible  with 
 primary  truths,  merely  because  ive  cannot  comprehend  the  nature 
 of  the  evidence — except,  in  addition  to  this,  we  have  clear  evidence 
 to  the  contrary.  He,  therefore,  who  enters  on  inquiries  into  sub- 
 jects long  controverted,  and  especially  subjects  which  involve  the 
 eternal  interests  of  men,  should  beware  of  adopting  weak  assump- 
 tions as  the  basis  of  proof.  They,  for  example,  who  assume  that 
 mankind  are  not  in  a  degenerate  state,  or  that  the  consideration 
 of  their  degeneracy  is  of  little  moment  in  reference  to  a  plan  of 
 recovery,  will  inevitably,  while  retaining  that  opinion,  put  a  very 
 
468  A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  rNQTHEY. 
 
 low  construction  on  various  revealed  doctrines  ;  that  is,  a  con- 
 struction degrading  to  the  nature  of  the  subject, — a  construction 
 unsatisfactory  to  men  of  enlarged  views  and  accurate  observation, 
 — a  construction,  we  will  add,  totally  different  from  that  of  others 
 whose  persuasion  is  ojjposite,  supposing  their  critical  skill,  in  other 
 respects,  to  be  equal.  In  proportion  as  any  one  values  his  final 
 happiness,  and  knows  in  what  it  consists,  as  a  matter  of  settled 
 conviction,  he  cannot  be — and  ought  not  to  be,  if  he  could — in- 
 different to  the  result,  whether  he  interpret  a  Divine  testimony  in 
 a  way  that  is  favourable  to  that  happiness,  or  that  threatens  to 
 destroy  it.  In  aU  inquiries  of  this  nature  it  is  obvious  the  previous 
 state  of  the  mind — not  only  its  acciu'acy  and  comprehension,  but 
 also  its  moral  taste  and  habitude — has  a  very  great,  not  to  say  a 
 decided  influence.  Suppose  two  persons  approach  the  sacred 
 oracles  for  information  on  the  present  subject,  the  person  of 
 Christ,  each  equally  disposed  to  submit  to  their  decision :  if  one, 
 from  previous  associations,  thinks  that  his  happiness  is  not  at 
 stake,  on  whatever  side  he  may  finally  settle ;  and  the  other,  for 
 weighty  reasons,  is  persuaded  that  if  he  mistake  the  truth  through 
 ignorance  or  disaffection,  his  everlasting  welfare  is  in  danger ;  is 
 it  not  plain  that  the  inquiries  of  the  latter  wiU  unavoidably  be 
 seriou.s,  marked  with  ardent  solicitude,  with  a  habitual  regard  to 
 conscientious  integrity,  while  those  of  the  former  will  be  of  a 
 character  directly  the  reverse  ?  The  investigation  of  the  one  being 
 more  practical,  he  will  be  in  less  hazard  of  adopting  a  wrong 
 interpretation,  or  even  a  false  rule  of  interpreting ;  whUe  that  of 
 the  other,  being  more  speculative,  he  wiU  be  more  exposed  to  the 
 influence  of  selfish  ends,  the  suggestions  of  fancy,  the  indulgence 
 of  sceptical  doubts,  and  the  adoption  of  false  conclusions. 
 
 Gibbon  has  somewhere  an  observation  to  this  effect — that  the 
 best  emjsloyment  of  reason  is  to  defend  what  we  like  most.  WhUe 
 very  far  from  apjaroving  of  this  fascinating  writer's  vacillancy  and 
 laxity  of  moral  sentiment,  and  further  stUl  from  tolerating  his 
 licentious  insinuations,  we  think  that  his  observation  characterises 
 a  general /acf.  The  mind's  inclination  to  a  result,  and  too  com- 
 monly when  in  the  wi'ong  direction,  prescribes  to  the  reasoning 
 faculty,  as  a  rereward,  its  office  of  defence ;  while  reason  seldom 
 checks  the  devious  and  rapid  strides  of  its  leader.  When,  indeed, 
 the  inclination  is  directed  by  the  light  of  real  knowledge  to  the 
 most  eligible  good,  reason  cannot  be  more  laudably  employed  than 
 
A  EEVIETf  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  469 
 
 in  defending  its  elections  and  forwarding  its  jarogress.  Let  it  be 
 supposed  that  "  Jesus  or  His  apostles  peremptorily  and  unequivo- 
 cally declare  the  doctrine  of  His  pre-existence  and  original  dignity;" 
 who  is  to  judge  what  is  peremptory  and  unequivocal  ?  Is  it  not 
 clear  that  no  declaration  will  be  admitted  to  be  of  this  character 
 by  one  who  assumes  not  only  the  inutiUty  of  the  doctrine,  but  also 
 its  prior  improbability  ?  He  will  not  fail  to  seek,  nor  be  long  un- 
 successful in  finding,  innumerable  evasions  and  expedients — canons 
 of  criticisms,  doubts  of  inspiration,  difference  of  copies,  and  critical 
 conjectures  without  end.  The  conduct  of  another  who  regards  that 
 declaration  as  not  only  possible,  but  also  probable,  and  useful  to 
 his  highest  interests,  is  necessarily  very  different.  He  considers 
 himself  as  an  offender  against  the  infinite  Moral  Governor,  whose 
 every  law  is  equitable  and  good,  and  who  has  declared  that  He 
 "  will  by  no  means  clear  the  guilty."  Though  He  has  revealed 
 Himself  merciful,  and  ready  to  remit  the  offences  of  the  penitent, 
 it  must  be  in  some  way  consistent  with  the  rights  of  moral 
 government, — by  some  wonderful  expedient  whereby  the  attributes 
 of  justice  and  mercy  are  made  to  harmonise.  To  Socinianism  the 
 inquirer  looks  in  vain  for  a  solution  of  his  difSculties  ;  it  offers 
 only  vague  declamations  on  the  benevolence  of  the  Deity,  and 
 does  not  even  pretend  to  shew  how  God  "  declares  His  righteous- 
 ness" in  the  remission  of  transgressions.  It  has  nothing  to 
 suggest  but  what  is  altogether  unsatisfactory  both  to  reason  and 
 conscience,  in  reply  to  the  question,  How  is  the  exercise  of  general 
 benevolence  in  pardoning  a  guilty  sinner  consistent  with  the 
 claims  of  moral  government  and  the  sanctions  of  its  laws  ?  Does 
 repentance  itself,  or  the  appointment  of  repentance,  or  Divine 
 benevolence,  annihilate  the  penal  sanction  ?  The  fact,  indeed,  of 
 repentance  being  required  as  a  condition,  and  of  pardon  being- 
 promised  as  a  consequence,  is  plainly  announced  in  the  sacred 
 code;  but  this,  like  every  other  fact,  must  have  an  appropriate 
 cause.  Press  a  modern  Unitarian  to  assign  one  which  is  rational, 
 consistent  with  peremptory  sanctions,  the  honour  of  a  holy  law, 
 the  unsullied  dignity  of  moral  government,  the  sacred  character  of 
 a  judge,  or  the  wisdom  of  a  benefactor, — a  cause  which  does  not 
 even  involve  the  subversion  of  these  sacred  and  essential  relations, 
 — and  you  will  hear  nothing  but  round  assertions  without  proofs,' 
 and  fanciful  conjectures  without  probability;  you  are  invited  to 
 a  chaos  of  critical  doubts  and  discordant  interpretations. 
 
470  A  EEVrEW  OP  ME  BELSHAm's  CALM  DfQmET. 
 
 The  serious  inquirer  reflects  that  infinite  wisdom  can  assign  a 
 satisfactory  answer  why  the  forgiveness  of  sin  is  not  inconsistent 
 with  sacred  relations, — why  this  act  of  benevolence  involves  nothing 
 irreconcilable  with  the  claims  of  justice, — an  attribute  infinitely 
 awful.  And  he  considers  it  probable  that,  in  the  New  Testament, 
 the  product  of  matchless  counsel,  and  the  fulfilment  of  the  dispen- 
 sations of  God  towards  mankind  in  this  world,  this  problem  will 
 be  solved.  He  feels  it  to  be  extremely  interesting  to  his  happiness 
 to  have  some  discovery  in  this  revelation,  how  the  Divine  justice, 
 government,  and  laws,  may  be  honom'ed,  while  grace  and  mercy 
 are  dispensed  to  sinners.  He  reflects  that  the  Supreme  Being,  in 
 His  nature,  is  infinitely  diSerent  from  every  other, — that  He  may 
 be  so  as  to  the  mode  of  His  existence,  for  aught  that  reason  has 
 to  advance  to  the  contrary, — that,  as  His  existence  cannot  possibly 
 have  any  other  analogous  to  it,  it  is  firobable,  if  not  absolutely 
 certain,  that  His  manner  of  subsistence  has  no  resemblance  among 
 created  objects  on  which  analogy  can  be  founded,— that,  finally,  as 
 the  Old  Testament  contains  freqiient  intimations  of  some  m37ste- 
 rious  essential  distinctions  in  Deity,  whereby  the  grand  and  in- 
 finitely interesting  problem  in  question  may  be  solved ;  so,  pro- 
 bably, the  New  Testament  will  unfold  its  nature,  as  far  as  Divine 
 realities,  which  have  nothing  strictly  analogous  to  created  natures, 
 are' capable  of  being  convej^ed  by  the  language  of  mortals,  (lan- 
 guage so  imperfect  at  the  best,  and  formed  originally  for  other 
 pui'poses,)  while  all  is  commimicated  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
 a  state  of  moral  j^robation.  The  assumptions  of  Mr  Belsham, 
 however,  if  admitted,  would  extinguish  every  spark  of  hope : — 
 
 "The  Unitarians  generally  believe  that  Jesus,  having  exercised  his 
 jDublio  ministry  for  the  space  of  a  year,  and  perhaps  a  little  more,  sufieied 
 death  pubUcly  upon  the  cross, — not  to  appease  the  wrath  of  God,  not  as  a 
 satisfaction  to  Divine  justice,  not  to  exhibit  the  evil  of  sin,  nor  in  any 
 sense  whatever  to  make  an  atonement  to  God  for  it,  for  this  doctrine,  in 
 every  sense,  and  according  to  every  explanation,  they  explode  as  irrational, 
 unscriptm-al,  and  derogatory  from  the  Divine  perfections, — but  as  a  martyr 
 to  the  truth,  and  as  a  necessary  preUminary  to  the  resurrection,"  (p.  449.) 
 "  And  though  they  readily  admit  that  one  positive  unequivocal  declaration, 
 either  of  Christ,  or  his  apostles  authorised  and  instructed  by  him,  would 
 be  sufficient  to  set  aside  all  the  presumptions  arising  from  the  antecedent 
 improhability  of  the  fact ;  that  nevertheless,  this  improbability  is  to  them 
 a  reason  why  they  are  very  sloio  in  yielding  assent  to  any  evidence  short 
 of  the  most  express  and  unquestionable  testimony,  and  why  they  ai-e 
 disjiosed  to  examine  with  the  utmost  rigour  whatever  is  advanced  in  proof 
 
A  EEVIEW  OF  ME  EELSHAm's  CALM  INQUIEY.  471 
 
 of  a  fact  so  unlikely,  so  unusual,  so  contrary  to  all  analogy,  and,  in  their 
 estimation,  of  so  little  use,"  (p.  467.) 
 
 What  declaration  can  be  imagined  f30  positive  or  unequivocal  as 
 not  to  be  controverted  by  persons  assuming  such  principles,  and 
 vyhose  "  sole  concern  "  is  to  shew  its  invalidity  ?  To  pronounce  it 
 impossible  for  the  Deity  to  form  a  personal  union  with  our  nature, 
 in  order  to  reunite  man  spiritually  and  for  ever  to  Himself,  and 
 that  the  operations  of  justice  may  have  a  full  and  honourable 
 course  in  j)erfect  accordance  with  the  exercise  of  mercy,  every 
 modest  person  must  regard  as  most  presumiDtuous  arrogance.  Is 
 there  anything  in  this  antecedently  more  incredible  than  the 
 creation  of  the  world,  the  formation  of  man,  or  the  use  of  tem- 
 porary appearances  as  "the  mere  organs  of  the  Deity,  used  for 
 the  purjDose  of  making  Himself  known  and  understood  by  His 
 creatures,"  which  is  Dr  Priestley's  conjecture  respecting  "  what  are 
 called  angels,  who  had  the  forms  of  men,  who  even  walked  and 
 spake,  &c.,  hke  men?"  (Hist,  of  Early  Op.,  vol.  i.,  p.  5.)  Is  the 
 supposition  more  incredible  than  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection, 
 which  is  professed  by  the  Unitarians  themselves  ?  A  serious  and 
 reflecting  mind  cannot  be  so  positive,  so  dogmatical,  so  arrogant, 
 as  to  set  bounds  to  the  capabilities  of  jjower,  of  benevolence,  and 
 of  wisdom  in  the  Deity.  No ;  he  comes  to  the  revealed  wiU  of 
 God  in  expectation  of  finding  some  "unusual"  truths,  which  no 
 other  source  of  information  could  supply — truths  in  which  his 
 peace  and  felicity  are  deeply  interested.  In  proportion,  indeed,  as 
 he  is  humble  and  pious,  he  submits  his  understanding,  his  will, 
 and  all  his  powers,  to  the  disj^osal  of  that  Almighty  Friend  who 
 has  indulged  him  with  a  revelation  of  truths  "  hidden  from  ages 
 and  generations,"  and  is  resolved  to  receive  them  with  acquies- 
 cence, whatever  may  be  the  result  of  his  inquuies.  Approaching 
 the  revealed  testimonies  in  this  tenijjer  of  mind,  he  thinks  he  dis- 
 covers in  Moses  and  the  prophets,  and  more  clearly  in  the  New 
 Testament,  exhilarating  intimations  of  a  solution  of  his  difficulties, 
 and  a  pleasing  prosjDect  that  his  hopes  will  be  realised.  The  point 
 where  his  inquiries  commence  is  a  state  of  conscious  guilt,  moral 
 darloiess,  and  sinful  dejDravity, — a  state  of  deviation  from  rectitude, 
 contrariety  to  infinite  holiness,  and  exposure  to  penal  evil.  And 
 having  discovered  in  Scripture  what  he  thinks  admirably  calculated 
 to  remove  his  fears,  and  to  promote  his  happines.s,  by  casting  great 
 light  on  the  doctrines  of  justice  and  mercy,  he  cannot  but  regard 
 
472  A  EEVIETV  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  IlsQXTIRY. 
 
 every  hypothesis  of  an  ofiposite  tendency,  and  which  threatens  to 
 deprive  him  of  these  advantages,  with  a  jealous  eye.  He  naturally 
 feels  as  one  who,  when  possessed  of  a  treasure,  encounters  a  sus- 
 pected thief  or  a  robber ;  while,  in  point  of  argument,  he  has  an 
 undoubted  right  to  lay  "the  biu-den  of  proof"  on  his  aggTessor. 
 Mr  Belsham,  however,  follows  a  process  diametrically  opposite, 
 and  recommends  the  same  to  others.  He  sees  nothing  excellent, 
 nothing  desirable,  nothing  important  in  any  respect,  in  a  myste- 
 rious union  between  the  Divine  nature  and  the  human, — in  a 
 Messiah  perfectly  righteous,  "  made  a  sin-ofFering  for  us,  that  we 
 might  be  made  the  righteousness  of  God  in  Him," — but  regards 
 such  representations,  however  often  they  seem  to  occur  in  the 
 Christian  revelation,  as  forbidding,  offensive,  and  absurd  ;  throwing 
 them  aside  as  the  corruptions  of  Christianity,  instead  of  valuing 
 them  as  its  glory  and  its  riches.  Some,  no  doubt,  will  be  glad  to 
 imitate  him  in  this :  such  as  dread  a  rational  inquiiy  into  truths 
 and  relations  below  the  sm-face  of  sensible  appearances,  who  ai-e 
 content  to  estimate  moral  evU  as  a  trifle,  and  who  are  willing  to 
 admit  that  mysterious  truths  and  impossibilities  are  the  same 
 thing.  Let  us  now  look  at  some  of  Mr  Belsham's  canons  of 
 criticism,  and  observe  how  others  differently  minded  will  probably 
 regard  them  : — 
 
 "  When  a  fact  is  coutraiy  to  the  established  order  of  nature,  and  the 
 antecedent  improbability  is  very  great,  the  dii-ect  evidence  must  be  pro- 
 portionably  strong.  The  doctrine  of  the  pre-esistence  and  high  original 
 powers  of  Christ  ought  not  to  depend  upon  a  few  obscui-e,  mystical,  and 
 ambiguous  texts." 
 
 Here  the  question  obviously  occurs.  To  whovi  do  such  texts 
 appear  obscure,  mystical,  and  ambiguous  ?  To  those,  doubtless, 
 who  see  nothing  useful  or  any  way  desirable  in  the  doctrine  which 
 such  passages  appear  to  countenance,  and  who  previously  wish  it 
 may  be  nowhere  found.  In  this  canon  also  we  have  an  instance 
 in  which  a  rule  of  interpretation,  adapted  exclusively  for  physical 
 inquiries,  is  transferred  to  a  moral  use.  What  can  "  the  established 
 order  of  nature "  suggest  to  us  as  a  remedy  for  the  moral  state 
 of  mankind  ?  It  is  reasonable,  therefore,  to  expect  something  above 
 that  order ;  to  anticipate  some  wonderful  disclosure  of  harmony 
 between  apparently  opposite  claims, — inflexible  justice  and  sove-' 
 reign  mercy  in  their  exercise  towards  creatm^es  deserving  of  misery, 
 such  as  the  Divine  and  human  natures  of  Christ  in  one  person  ap- 
 
A  REVIEW  OE  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIEY.  473 
 
 pear  to  afford.  Instead  of  concluding  that  the  evidence  of  such  a 
 doctrine  must  be  "  very  strong  "  in  order  to  admit  the  jDrobability 
 of  its  truth,  how  much  more  just  is  the  contrary,  that  the  evidence 
 against  a  gTound  of  hope  and  happiness,— a  ground  of  which  the 
 established  order  of  nature  is  destitute,  but  which  the  doctrine  of 
 a  Divine  Eedeemer  in  our  nature  affords, — must  be  "  very  strong  " 
 before  we  ought  to  relinquish  it.  We  cannot  but  regard  Mr  Bel- 
 sham,  in  this  instance,  as  resembling  a  pleader  who  should  say  to 
 his  client.  The  direct  evidence  must  be  very  strong,  or  I  will  not 
 utter  a  word  in  your  favour.  Surely  while  a  man  considers  him- 
 self already  possessed  of  an  estate  which  he  values,  he  ought  not 
 to  forego  his  claim  untU  positive  and  irresistible  evidence  is  pro- 
 duced against  it. 
 
 The  following  is  one  of  the  admonitions  which  Mr  Belsham  is 
 careful  to  impress  on  all  who  approach  the  present  subject : — 
 
 "  Impartial  and  sincere  inquirers  after  truth  must  be  particularly  on 
 their  guard  against  wlaat  is  called  the  natural  signification  of  words  and 
 phrases.  The  connexion  between  words  and  ideas  is  perfectly  arbitrary,  so 
 that  the  natural  sense  to  any  person  means  nothing  more  than  the  sense 
 in  which  he  has  been  accustomed  to  understand  it.  But  it  is  very  possible 
 that  men  who  hved  two  thousand  years  ago  might  annex  very  difi'ereut 
 ideas  to  the  same  words  and  phrases,  so  that  the  sense  which  appeax-s  most 
 foreign  to  us,  might  be  most  natural  to  them,"  (p.  4.) 
 
 If,  however,  we  are  to  guard  against  what  is  here  called  the 
 "  natural  signification  of  words  and  i^hrases,"  we  ought  to  be 
 equally  watchful  against  what  may  be  called  an  unnatural  signi- 
 fication of  them.  All  words,  used  as  they  ought  to  be,  are  either 
 natural  or  figurative  signs  of  ideas,  but  the  use  of  language  is  alto- 
 gether perverted  when  these  signs  are  unnatural ;  and  whether  Mr 
 Belsham,  in  order  to  avoid  consequences  destructive  of  his  theory, 
 does  not  very  frequently  betake  himself  to  this  interdicted  refuge, 
 the  impartial  reader  of  his  work  will  judge  for  himself.  It  is  true 
 that  the  original  "  connexion  between  words  and  ideas  is  perfectly 
 arbitrary ;"  but  it  is  also  no  less  true,  that  when  the  connexion  is 
 formed  by  a  writer,  his  interpreter  is  not  to  charm  it  away  at 
 pleasure  in  order  to  avoid  a  disagreeable  consequence.  Again,  it 
 is  "  very  possible,"  no  doubt,  that  men,  living  in  distant  periods  of 
 time,  "  might  annex  very  different  ideas  to  the  same  words  and 
 phrases;"  but  is  it  not  also  "very  possible"  for  a  modern  "Uni- 
 tarian" to  annex  "ideas  to  the  same  words  and  phrases"  very 
 "different"  from  those  which  were  annexed  to  them  by  the  sacred 
 
474  A  EEVIE-W  OF  ME  EELSHAM'S  CALM  INQIJIEY. 
 
 •writers  ?  If  words  are  so  jaerf ectly  arbitrary,  and  the  connexion 
 between  them  and  ideas  is  so  uncertain,  we  should  act  wisely  in 
 devoting  a  proportionably  greater  share  of  our  attention  to  things, 
 — that  is,  to  the  ideas  themselves  which  are  compatible  or  incom- 
 patible with  first  principles  ;  and  most  earnestly  woidd  we  counsel 
 this  mistaken  writer,  that,  instead  of  confiding  in  j)hysical  analo- 
 gies which  have  no  pertinence  to  the  subject  in  question,  he  would 
 learn  to  treat  with  more  regard  those  great  realities  which  we 
 alluded  to  before, — conscience,  law,  justice,  and  mercy, — realities 
 which  are  far  from  depending  on  the  caprice  and  versatihty  of 
 language,  and  which  are  as  permanent  as  they  are  appropriate. 
 
 This  author  lays  down  as  one  of  his  canons,  that,  "  in  examining 
 the  validity  of  an  argument  from  Scripture,  the  first  inquiry  is 
 whether  the  text  be  genuine,"  (p.  4.)  On  this  we  remark,  if  the 
 canon  of  Scriptiu-e  be  left  to  the  decision  of  controvertists,  who 
 have  a  specific  end  to  answer  by  pronouncing  a  text  genuine  or 
 spurious,  what  probability  is  there  of  an  unexceptionable  canon 
 being  ever  established  ?  Sm-ely  it  is  a  much  more  fair  and  a  more 
 rational  process  to  ascertaui  from  appropriate  evidence  the  canoni- 
 cal authority  of  the  New  Testament,  without  any  reference  to  par- 
 ticular controversies, — after  which,  nothing  wUl  remain  but  to 
 settle  the  true  import  of  the  text,  and  the  correctness  of  its  appli- 
 cation. If  neither  the  various  editions  of  Erasmus,  Stephens, 
 Beza,  Elzivir,  of  Walton,  Mills,  Wetstein,  Bengehus,  and  Gries- 
 bach, — if  neither  these  nor  any  edition  extant  wUl  serve  theii-  pur- 
 pose, let  the  Socinians  honestly  come  forward  and  publish  a  Greek 
 edition  of  the  New  Testament,  retaining  only  those  texts  to  which 
 a  decisive  appeal  maj-  be  made  in  point  of  Divine  authority.  With- 
 out more  evasion,  let  them  distinctly  state  whether  they  deem  any 
 parts  of  Scripture  entitled  to  this  honourable  distinction,  and  if 
 so,  let  them  draw  the  discriminative  Une.  We  may  then,  too, 
 have  some  means  of  judging  what  advantage  this  labour  will  be 
 to  their  cause.  Any  other  method  leaves  the  first  principles  of 
 scriptural  e'vidence  uncertain ;  and  every  controverted  subject 
 opens  a  wide  avenue  to  endless  disputes  about  what  is  authori- 
 tative, and  what  is  not.  Who  would  attempt  to  purchase  by 
 weight  or  measure  whUe  the  standard  between  the  ijarties  re- 
 mained unfixed  ?  As  to  the  varice  lectiones,  they  are  but  as  the 
 small  dust  iipon  the  balance  compared  with  the  substantial  truths 
 on  which  all  copies  of  note  and  credit  are  agreed.      Tlie  anti- 
 
A  EEVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  4<7o 
 
 Sociiiiaus  assuredly  have  nothing  to  fear  from  an  appeal  to  real 
 science,  as  contradistinguished  from  that  of  sophists,  from  "  philo- 
 sophy and  vain  deceit,"  and  "science  falsely  so  called."  Keal 
 science  never  can  be  inconsistent  with  revealed  truth  ;  but  it  is  a 
 humiliating  fact,  that  a  large  proportion  of  speculating  men,  when 
 they  discourse  on  morals  and  religion,  deal  in  little  else  than  un- 
 founded assumptions  and  idle  conjectures.  Mr  Belsham  further 
 observes ; — 
 
 "  It  ought  by  all  means  to  be  remembered,  that  profound  learning  and 
 acute  metapbysioal  subtlety  are  by  no  means  necessary  to  settle  the  im- 
 portant question  concerning  the  person  of  Christ.  The  iuquiiy  is  into  a 
 plain  matter  of  fact,  which  is  to  be  determined,  like  any  other  fact,  by  its 
 specific  evidence,  the  evidence  of  plain  unequivocal  testimony  ;  forjudging 
 of  which,  no  other  qualifications  are  requisite  than  a  sound  understanding 
 and  an  honest  mind.  "Who  can  believe  that  the  decision  of  the  great  ques- 
 tion, whether  Jesus  of  Nazareth  is  the  true  God  and  the  Creator  and  Gover- 
 nor of  the  world  depends  upon  a  critical  knowledge  of  the  niceties  of  the 
 Greek  article  ?  With  equal  reason  might  it  be  maintained,  that  no  per- 
 son can  know  anything  of  the  history  of  Greece  who  is  not  perfect  in  the 
 metres  of  the  Greek  dramatic  writers,"  (p.  5.) 
 
 It  is  willingly  allowed  that  learning  and  acuteness  are  not  neces- 
 sary to  settle  this  imjDortant  subject,  except  in  so  far  as  they  assist 
 in  detecting  sophistry,  and  in  setting  the  true  state  of  the  question 
 in  a  fair  light.  The  inquiry,  indeed,  is  to  be  determined  by  its 
 specific  evidence  ;  but  few,  notwithstanding,  can  instantly  agree  as 
 to  what  evidence  is  decidedly  specific  in  the  case,  and  fewer  still 
 can  coincide  with  our  author  when  he  speaks  of  it  as  "a  plain 
 matter  of  fact."  There  are  a  thousand  other  questions  resi^ecting 
 "matter  of  fact"  which  are  by  no  means  "plain."  It  is  a  "fact," 
 for  example,  that  the  human  mind  is  either  immaterial  or  material ; 
 Mr  Belsham  decides  for  the  latter,  but  where  is  his  "  jslain  unequi- 
 vocal testimony  "  for  that  decision  ?  It  is  a  "  fact,"  that  the  con- 
 ception of  our  blessed  Saviour  was  either  miraculous  or  after  the 
 common  course  of  nature ;  Mr  Belsham  pronounces  the  latter  to 
 be  the  case,  but  is  the  judgment  founded  on  "plain  unequivocal 
 testimony  1"  It  is  a  "fact,"  that  the  Logos  existed  before  Abra- 
 ham, or  He  did  not ;  Mr  Belsham  asserts  the  latter,  but  does  he 
 support  his  assertion  by  "a  plain  rmequivocal  testimony?"  Were 
 this  the  question.  Whether  Jesus  had  a  human  body  and  mind, 
 or  appeared  as  a  man  among  men  ?  his  observation  would  be  ad- 
 missible, for  it  would  relate  to  "  a  plain  matter  of  fact ; "  but  this 
 
476  A  REVIEW  OF  MK  BELSHAJi'S  CAIM  INQUIRY. 
 
 we  repeat  over  and  over  again  is  7iot  the  trae  state  of  the  question : 
 it  is  no  part  of  the  dispute,  because  the  afSrmative  is  conceded  on 
 both  sides.  In  our  apprehension,  the  point  at  issue  between  the 
 Trinitarians  and  the  Auti-Trinitarians,  respecting  the  person  of 
 Christ,  is  this.  Whether  the  Supreme  Being,  whose  existence,  it  is 
 demonstrable,  is  essentially  diflferent  from  every  other,  and  whose 
 mode  of  existence  may  be  so,  for  aught  that  reason  can  allege  to 
 the  contrary, — that  Being  whose  energies  of  wisdom,  power,  and 
 goodness  unfolded  themselves  in  the  work  of  creation,  beginning 
 with  a  rude  chaotic  mass,  and  proceeding  to  the  innumerable  forms 
 of  order  and  beauty,  regularity  of  operation,  and  usefulness  of 
 result, — whether  this  First  Being,  in  some  wonderfully  mysterious 
 manner,  a  manner  not  less  mysterious  than  creation  itself,  united 
 HimseK  to  human  nature,  as  the  basis  of  a  new  order  of  things  in 
 reference  to  the  moral  world  ?  It  is  universally  admitted,  that  out 
 of  nothing  He  produced  a  chaos  "without  form  and  void,"  and 
 that  from  this  chaos  He  educed  unspeakable  grandeur  and  beauty, 
 in  order  to  manifest  the  glory  of  His  perfections,  and  to  commmaicate 
 His  goodness  in  a  manner  worthy  of  Himself.  Why  then,  Ave  ask, 
 should  it  be  thought  incredible  or  improbable,  that  the  moral 
 order  of  things,  to  which  the  physical  is  infinitely  subservient, 
 should  originate  in  the  predestined  assumption  of  human  nature, 
 and  that  this  took  place  at  the  fulness  of  time  ?  Why  may  it  not 
 be  concluded  of  this,  "  the  foolishness  of  God  is  wiser  than  men, 
 and  the  weakness  of  God  is  stronger  than  men?"*  The  nature 
 and  perfections  of  Deity,  His  works  of  creation  and  providence, 
 the  generation  and  growth  of  animals  and  plants,  the  formation  of 
 mineral  substances, — are  full  of  mysteries,  and  is  it  to  be  expected 
 that  the  moral  world,  so  much  less  within  the  sphere  of  sensible 
 observation  and  experiment,  should  be  grossly  and  palpably  plain  ? 
 It  is  not  true  that  the  advocates  of  the  Trinitarian  doctrine  re- 
 specting the  person  of  Christ  maintain,  as  their  oj)ponents  are 
 anxious  to  insinuate,  (we  do  not  pretend  to  assign  the  motive,)  that 
 God  was  converted  into  man,  or  that  the  humanity  of  Christ  is  God. 
 It  is  not  true  that  they  hold  that  any  change  whatever  took  place 
 in  the  Godhead  on  the  assumption  of  our  nature.  They  are  not 
 so  grossly  ignorant  as  to  suppose  it  possible.  But  they  do  main- 
 tain, as  a  grand  and  glorious  truth, — a  truth  calculated  to  satisfy 
 the  largest  desii-es,  the  most  importunate  cravings  of  the  mind,  to 
 
 *  1  Cor.  i.  25. 
 
A  EEVIEW  OF  MR  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  477 
 
 shed  the  most  exhilarating  light  on  the  laws  and  sanctions,  the 
 justice  and  government  of  God,  and  their  consistency  with  the 
 exercise  of  His  pardoning  and  purifying  mercy, — that  the  human 
 nature  of  Jesus  was  so  assumed  by  a  modal  distinction  of  Deity, 
 (which  distinction  no  terms  in  any  language  of  mortals  is  adequate 
 to  express,)  that  it  had  no  personal  existence  independently  of  that 
 assumption.  Human  languages  are  formed  on  physical  analogies, 
 but  here  an  exact  analogy  cannot,  it  is  obvious  from  the  nature  of 
 the  case,  be  found  to  convey  the  ideas  intended.  Here,  different 
 expressions  are  used  in  several  connexions,  or  else  recourse  must 
 be  had  to  circumlocutory  explanations ;  which,  after  all,  to  a  mere 
 verbahst,  or  a  cavilling  objector,  must  unavoidably  leave  much 
 room  for  j)etty  criticism.  Whether  the  terms  Form,  Son,  Word, 
 Wisdom,  Power,  Subsistence,  Person,  or  any  other,  be  adopted  out 
 of  hiiman  vocabularies^  in  order  to  express  that  modal  distinction 
 in  Deity  by  which  the  human  nature  was  assumed  ;  still  the  reality 
 intended  cannot  rationally  be  expected  to  be  adequately  designated 
 by  words  and  phrases  originally  formed  to  convey  ideas  so  essentially 
 different. 
 
 Of  this  inadequacy  of  language  to  define,  or  even  to  describe 
 supernatural  realities,  many  of  the  Anti-Trinitarians,  both  ancient 
 and  modern,  have  taken  a  disingenuous  advantage.  This,  also,  is 
 the  frequent  practice  of  sceptics  and  infidels,  in  their  allusions  to  the 
 phraseology  of  Scripture.  But  all  such  men,  and  especially  those 
 who  wish  to  retain  the  Christian  name,  must  be  either  pitied  or 
 blamed ;  because,  if  they  are  free  from  lamentable  ignorance,  they 
 are  chargeable  with  criminal  perversity.  Whether  the  language 
 of  our  author  be  not  too  often  tinged,  we  may  say,  strongly  tinged, 
 with  this  species  of  pollution,  let  the  Christian  reader  judge  for 
 himself : — 
 
 "  The  incarceration  of  the  Creator  of  the  world  in  the  body  of  a  helpless, 
 puling  infant,  is  a  fact  the  credit  of  which  must  rest,  like  that  of  all  other 
 facts,  not  upon  grammatical  subtleties,  but  upon  evidence  direct,  presump- 
 tive, or  circumstantial,  upon  the  validity  of  which  every  person  of  common 
 sense  is  competent  to  decide,"  (p.  6.) 
 
 In  what  an  awful  state  of  obdurate  impiety  must  the  mind  of 
 that  man  be  who  could  pen  such  a  paragraph  as  this  !  The  senti- 
 ment, indeed,  is  worthy  of  an  infidel ;  but  for  the  credit  of  oivr 
 nature,  we  hope  that  the  bad  eminence  of  being  able  to  express  it 
 with  the  same  degree  of  coarse  and  vulgar  levity  belongs  to  Mr 
 
478  A  EEVIEW  OP  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY. 
 
 Belsham.  With  equal  justice  might  a  malignant  spirit  (if,  at  the 
 period  to  which  we  are  going  to  allude,  spirits  there  were  who  had 
 rendered  themselves  vile)  deride  such  mysterious  propositions  as 
 these :  that  the  hidden  energies  of  the  Omnipotent,  operating  in 
 the  first  dark  and  formless  embryo,  would,  in  a  very  short  time, 
 develop  themselves  in  a  bright  and  beauteous  universe,  that  should 
 continue  through  revolvmg  ages  pregnant  with  interesting  wonders 
 and  glorious  benevolence, — that  the  same  energies  would  shortly, 
 through  the  medium  of  a  very  small  portion  of  inert  matter,  shew 
 themselves  in  an  organic  form  of  astonishing  mechanism  and 
 admirable  symmetry,  as  the  lord  of  a  terraqueous  globe,  the  organ 
 also  of  an  intellect,  of  powers  and  passions,  capable  of  dignity,  of 
 happiness  or  misery  beyond  description, — that  these  energies,  also, 
 would  fix  upon  an  insignificant  part  of  the  same  created  form,  and 
 cause  it  to  evolve  itself  into  a  structure  resembling  the  other,  with 
 diversities,  however,  full  of  wisdom  and  design, — that  the  same 
 omnipotent  energies,  moreover,  would,  by  a  mysterious  law,  fix  on 
 a  recondite  i^article,  as  a  physical  rallying  point,  in  perpetual  suc- 
 cession, and  jDroduce  a  race  of  human  beings  of  different  sexes, 
 with  an  exact  adjustment  of  numerical  proportion  of  each, — that, 
 finally,  when  all  these  bodies  should  be  reduced  to  their  primor- 
 dial inert  particles,  these  Divine  energies  would  assume  some 
 physical  jDoints,  around  which  other  subtle  atoms  would  instantly 
 rally,  unfolding  themselves  into  as  many  forms  as  existed  before, 
 but  far  more  splendid  and  permanent,  as  suited  to  a  correspond- 
 ing exalted  state  of  things,  and  possessing  so  much  of  compara- 
 tive identity  (an  identity  of  moral  use)  as  to  justify  their  being 
 called  resuscitated  bodies.  Had  these  facts  been  announced  to 
 the  malignant  s^Dirit  we  have  supposed,  he  would  have  laughed 
 them  to  scorn  as  incredible  fables;  and  yet  they  are  facts 
 acknowledged,  we  presume,  by  modern  "  Unitarians,"  though, 
 d  i^riori,  not  more  credible  than  what  the  Trinitarians  consider  as 
 a  fact  attested  by  various  representations  in  the  New  Testament ; 
 a  fact  at  once  mysterious  as  to  the  modus  operandi,  interesting 
 above  all  comparison  to  every  human  being,  and  infinitely  glorious 
 in  its  consequences.  This  fact  implies  that  a  particle  of  material 
 nature  is  assumed  as  the  element  evolved  by  the  animal  principle, 
 — that  both  are  unfolded  by  a  rational,  more  interior  principle, — 
 and  that,  for  reasons  infinitely  wise  and  benevolent,  all  are  ex- 
 panded by  the  indwelling  energy  of  the  Divine  Word,  or  Wisdom, 
 
A  EBVIEW  OF  MR  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  479 
 
 or  Power,  or  Son  of  God,  for  manifesting  tlie  glories  of  His 
 nature,  His  relations  and  perfections,  to  a  degree  far  more  trans- 
 cendent and  sublime  than  any  other  process  in  the  universe. 
 Such  are  the  characters  of  the  two  natures,  the  Divine  and  human, 
 it  is  maintained  by  some,  as  implied  in  scrijjtural  declarations  and 
 their  uses ;  and  such  the  supernatural  union  subsisting  between 
 these  natures,  the  one  assuming  and  the  other  assumed,  though 
 in  themselves,  abstractedly  considered,  objects  infinitely  dissimilar  ; 
 that  the  humanity  has  no  j)ersonal  existence,  but  the  modal  sub- 
 sistence of  Jehovah,  which,  as  before  observed,  is  variously  ex- 
 pressed ;  and  that  this  Divine  subsistence  has  neither  develo23ment 
 nor  exercise  in  redeeming  men  from  sin  and  misery,  but  by  the 
 humanity  as  its  organ.  So  that  Jesus,  it  is  maintained,  is  the 
 organic  medium  of  the  Divine  nature,  sui  generis,  in  a  way  essen- 
 tially different  from  every  other  prophet.  In  and  through  this 
 medium  the  Deity  displays  Himself  to  the  enlightened,  intelligent 
 imiverse,  by  the  fullest  expansion  and  glory  of  which  the  human 
 nature  is  capable,  through  endless  ages.  Inadequate  as  may  be 
 this  representation  of  the  subject,  as,  indeed,  every  verbal  one 
 must  unavoidably  ever  be,  it  harmonises,  we  apprehend,  with  that 
 which  is  contained  in  the  New  Testament,  without  having  recourse 
 to  the  strained,  far-fetched,  and  unnatural  comments  of  Socinian- 
 ism.  It  fully  justifies  the  scriptural  application  of  names  and 
 titles,  works  and  offices  to  Jesus  Christ,  and  the  strong  ascrip- 
 tions of  honour  and  praise  so  frequently  applied  to  Him ;  instead 
 of  reducing  them,  as  the  Socinians  effectually  do,  by  their  critical 
 alembic,  into  a  mere  caput  mortuum. 
 
 It  is  a  calumny  often  urged  by  these  ingenious  persons,  that 
 the  Trinitarians  are  guilty  of  idolatry  in  worshipping  Jesus  Christ. 
 Now  this  charge  can  have  no  appearance  of  pertinence,  except  on 
 one  of  these  two  suppositions :  either  that  there  is  no  personal 
 union  between  the  Divine  and  human  natures,  which  is  to  beg  the 
 question  in  dispute ;  or  that  the  human  nature  of  Jesus  is  re- 
 garded as  an  object  of  worship,  which  is  peremptorily  denied. 
 The  consistent  Trinitarian  does  not  worship  the  human  nature, 
 though  assumed  by  the  Divine,  and  though  "  crowned  with  glory 
 and  honour"  inexpressible,  but  Him  to  whom  that  nature  is 
 hypostatically  united,  and  who  is  discriminatively  identified  by  that 
 union.  Nor  does  he  present  religious  homage  to  three  ultimate 
 objects,  when  he  adores  the  Fatlier,  the  Son,  or  the  Holy  Spirit ; 
 
480  A  REVIEW  OF  SIR  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIET. 
 
 but  to  tlie  one  Eternal  Existence,  wlio  has  revealed  Himself  under 
 these  personal  relations, — ^relations,  ho^vrever,  Tvhich  are  understood 
 to  be  essential  to  that  Eternal  Existence,  and  without  -wliich  He 
 would  not  be  Jehovah.  Through  the  defect  of  lauo-uage,  terms  of 
 analogical  relations  are  imavoidably  employed ;  but  no  sentiment 
 is  admitted  which  impUes  any  possible  change  in  Deity,  and  much 
 less  is  it  supposed  that  these  expressions  of  personal  relations  are 
 intended  to  countenance  the  absurd  notion  of  their  being  effects  of 
 power  and  will. 
 
 It  will  be  readily  granted,  that  a  critical  knowledge  of  the 
 niceties  of  language  contributes  but  httle  towards  an  accurate 
 perception  of  celestial  truths.*  "  A  sound  understanding  and  an 
 honest  miud  "  are,  doubtless,  of  greater  moment ;  but  it  is  not  easy 
 to  convince  any  man  that  his  understanding  is  not  soimd,  that  his 
 heart  is  not  honest :  and  many  will  suspect  that  the  short  passage 
 last  quoted  does  not  proceed  from  sources  quite  so  respectable. 
 "  The  incarceration  of  the  Creator  of  the  world  in  the  body  of  a 
 helpless,  jjuling  infant."  What  could  produce  this  profane  effusion 
 but  strong  and  unrestrained  prejudice  at  the  commencement  of 
 the  inquiry  ?  The  latter  of  these  marked  expressions  will  appear 
 to  most  "  calm  "  inquirers  as  an  exuberant  ebulhtiou  of  contempt 
 agaiast  the  doctrine  itself,  which  is  here  impiously  ridiculed, 
 and  against  myi-iads  of  Christians  of  unquestioned  virtue,  talents, 
 learning,  piety,  and  integrity.  The  former  expression  indicates 
 either  a  want  of  knowledge,  or  a  culpable  misrepresentation. 
 It  conveys  to  most  readers,  and  to  aU  in  its  plain  construction, 
 that  the  Creator  is  iaclosed  or  circumscribed  by  the  human 
 nature  of  Jesus,  as  a  man  is  by  the  walls  of  a  prison!  Is  it 
 possible  that  this  representation  can  proceed  from  a  mind  im- 
 bued with  the  slightest  tincture  of  candour  or  decency  ?  AYhat 
 Trmitarian  was  ever  absurd  enough  to  entertain  for  a  moment 
 the  sentiment  here  imputed  to  the  whole  body?  Do  they, 
 when  they  with  reverence  represent  the  Deity  as  assuming 
 the  essential  principles  of  our  nature  for  the  purpose  of  ex- 
 panding them  to  the  utmost  limits  of  which  that  nature  is  capa- 
 ble, and  of  illustrating  before  adoring  myriads  the  harmony  and 
 grandeur  of  Divine  perfections  in  the  salvation  of  coimtless  multi- 
 tudes of  the  humau  race, — do  they  deserve  to  be  outraged  with 
 the  low  ribaldry  we  have  quoted  ;  a  mode  of  expression,  we  wiU 
 
 *  1  Cor.  i.  19,  &c. 
 
A  EEVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQTTIRY.  481 
 
 venture  to  say,  which  is  much  more  appropriate  to  the  character 
 of  a  renegade  than  a  Christian.  Mr  Belsham  would  do  well  to 
 reconsider  what  he  has  written  with  "  a  sound  understanding  and 
 an  honest  mind/'  In  truth  his  efforts  to  characterise  "  the  Saviour 
 of  the  world "  as  a  mere  prophet,  who  has  delivered  to  us  great 
 truths,  but  who  does  not  "  save  His  people  from  their  sins,"  either 
 by  a  propitiation  or  by  power,  resembles  that  of  a  man  who  should 
 diligently  labour  to  sink  a  ship,  without  being  able  to  furnish  the 
 crew  with  even  a  plank  for  their  escape ;  or  that  of  one  who 
 shoxild  attempt  to  blow  up  a  citadel,  when  he  has  not  the  means  of 
 providiag  a  cottage  or  a  tent  for  the  dislodged  garrison.  A  pro- 
 phet may  be  more  or  less  influenced  or  filled  with  a  Divine  im- 
 pulse, but  this  does  not  constitute  him  difi'erent  from  other  men 
 in  his  original  formation,  or  in  his  mode  of  subsistence ;  and  con- 
 sequently he  would  be  destitute  of  the  most  essential  requisite  of 
 "a  saviour  from  sin  and  misery."'  Nor  is  it  conceivable  that  such 
 a  man,  however  "  full  of  faith  and  the  Holy  Ghost,"  however  en- 
 dowed with  knowledge  and  wisdom,  with  gTaces,  energies,  and 
 miraculous  gift.s,  could  make  approximations,  even  the  smallest, 
 towards  removing  the  difficulties  introduced  by  sin,  in  the  way  of 
 our  happiness,  or  casting  any  light  on  the  character,  the  govern- 
 ment, and  the  dispensations  of  God. 
 
 We  are  now,  by  the  length  of  this  article,  reminded  of  our  pro- 
 raise  to  make  some  remarks  on  the  general  controverted  subject, 
 accordiog  to  the  arrangement  into  which  this  volume  is  cast,  but 
 with  all  the  brevity  which  the  nature  of  the  work  and  the  topics 
 wiU  admit.  This  inquiry,  after  the  introduction,  consists  of  two 
 very  unequal  parts.  The  first,  which  conducts  us  to  page  446, 
 consists  of  a  selection  and  examination  of  those  passages  in  the 
 New  Testament  which  have  been  alleged  in  favour  of  the  pre- 
 existence,  the  original  dignity,  power,  and  divinity  of  Jesus  Christ. 
 The  second,  which  is  despatched  in  eighty-four  pages,  contains 
 "  A  Summary  View  of  the  various  Opinions  which  have  been  enter- 
 tained concerning  the  Person  of  Christ,  and  of  the  ArgTiments  for 
 and  Objections  against  each." 
 
 That  "  the  Jews  expected  a  pre-existent  Messiah,"  is  the  title  of 
 the  first  section,  which  occupies  but  little  more  than  one  page ; 
 and  the  argument  adduced  by  some  as  founded  on  this  expecta- 
 tion, is  repelled  in  these  words  : — "  Trypho,  the  Jew,  in  his  dialogue 
 with  Justin  Martyr,  early  in  the  second  century,  represents  the 
 
 TOL.  IV.  2  H 
 
482  A  REVIEW  OF  MR  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIEY. 
 
 notion  of  the  pre-existence  and  incarnation  of  Jesus,  as  not  only 
 wonderful  but  silly :  and  he  reproaches  the  Christians  for  their 
 belief  in  the  miraculous  conception  of  Christ,  which  he  ridicules 
 as  a  fiction  equally  absurd  with  that  of  Jupiter  and  Danae,"  (p. 
 11.)  Thus  Mr  Belsham  sides  with  the  rancorous  Jew  against  the 
 primitive  Christians ! 
 
 The  second  section,  about  double  the  size  of  the  former,  notices 
 the  argument  for  the  pre-existence  from  "  the  miraculous  concep- 
 tion of  Jesus  Christ."  This  argument  is  triumphantly  overthrown 
 by  the  remark,  that  "  the  narrative  itself  is  of  very  doubtful  autho- 
 rity ! "  Por  "  the  Ebionite  Gospel  of  Matthew  and  the  Marcionite 
 Gospel  of  Luke  did  not  contain  these  accounts  ! "  Besides,  "  the 
 miraculous  conception  of  Jesus  would  no  more  infer  his  pre-ex- 
 istence, than  the  miraculous  formation  of  our  first  parents."  And 
 thus  Mr  Belsham,  either  artfully  or  ignorantly  changes  the  state  of 
 the  question,  from  the  pre-existence  of  Him  who  assumed  human 
 nature  to  the  pre-existence  of  the  human  nature  itself ! 
 
 The  third  section,  which  occupies  about  137  pages,  professes  to 
 examine  those  "  texts  which  are  conceived  to  express,  in  the  most 
 direct  and  unequivocal  terms,  the  pre-existence  of  Jesus  Christ." 
 Out  of  the  many  ornaments  with  which  this  large  apartment  is 
 furnished,  we  can  present  the  reader  with  only  a  few,  by  way  of 
 specimen : — 
 
 "Neither  the  history  nor  the  discourses  of  Christ,  nor  those  of  his 
 apostles,  for  thirty  yeai's  after  his  ascension,  contain  the  hast  hint  of  his 
 pve-existent  state  and  dignity,"  (p.  16.)  "  They  [i.e.,  John  and  Paul]  never 
 declare  nor  hint  they  wei'e  authorised  to  teach  any  new  doctrine  concerning 
 the  person  of  Christ ;  nor  do  they  lay  down  any  such  doctrine  to  be  re- 
 ceived as  an  article  of  faith"  (p.  18.)  "In  the  Gospel  of  John  our  Lord 
 sometimes  uses  metaphors  of  the  most  obscure  and  offensive  kind."  "  And 
 Paid,  in  his  Epistles,  introduces  many  hai'sh  and  uncommon  figm-es." 
 "  The  principal  appeal  is  to  the  Epistles  to  the  Philippians  and  Colossians, 
 which  are  figurative  throughout  beyond  aU  others  :  and  to  the  Epistle  to 
 the  Hebrews,  the  author  of  which  is  doubtful,  and  in  which  the  writer 
 indulges  himself  in  an  ingenious,  hut  forced  and  fanciful  analogy  between 
 the  Mosaic  institute  and  the  Christian  dispensation,"  (pp.  18,  19.) 
 
 "  The  Logos  is  the  man  Jesus  Christ,  by  whom  God  hath  spoken  to  the 
 •world,  the  teacher  of  truth  and  righteousness,"  (p.  27.)  "  Hence,  Eev.  xix. 
 13,  he  is  called  the  Word  of  God ;  and,  1  John  i.  1,  the  Word  of  life,  because 
 he  taught  the  doctrine  of  eternal  life,"  (p.  29.)  "  And  being  a  pi-ophet  of  the 
 highest  order,  to  whom  the  Divine  will  was  fully  revealed,  who  was  endued, 
 in  a  very  superior  degree,  with  miraculous  powers,  and  who  was  appointed 
 Lord  and  King,  in  that  new  dispensation  which  he  was  authorised  to  intro- 
 
A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIEY.  ^SJj 
 
 duce  to  supersede  the  Mosaic  covenant,  he  is,  for  these  reasons,  in  the  well- 
 known  phraseology  of  the  Jewish  Scriptures,  entitled  to  be  called  a  ^oc?,"  (p. 
 30.)  "  Jesus  is  the  revealer  of  a  future  life  by  a  resurrection  from  the  grave  ; 
 and  this  heavenly  doctrine  is  fhs pri7icipal  means  of  instruction,  reformation, 
 and  comfort,  to  mankind,"  (p.  33.)  "  He  was  in  the  world,  and  the  world  was 
 enlightened  by  him,  yet  the  world  knew  him  not."  "  With  some  hesitation 
 I  adopt  the  method  of  supplying  the  ellipsis  proposed  by  my  learned  and  in- 
 genious friend  Dr  Carpenter,"  (p.  35.)  "Mr  Simpson's  own  translation  is,  'He 
 was  in  the  world,  and  the  world  -was  formed  by  him,  yet  the  world  knew  him 
 not.'  Which  he  paraphrases  thus : — 'He  was  publicly  conversant  with  men ; 
 many  were  reformed  by  him  ;  and  he  imparted  the  best  means  of  renovat- 
 ing the  human  race  ;  yet  mankind  in  general  did  not  receive  him.'  Mr 
 Cappe  gives  quite  a  new  turn  to  the  passage.  He  translates  the  text, 
 '  He  was  in  the  world,  and  the  world  was  made  for  him ' — q.  d.,  '  He  was 
 for  some  time  freely  and  publicly  conversant  among  his  countrymen,  preach- 
 ing the  word  of  God.'  But  though  he  has  brought  abundant  evidence  to 
 prove  that  bia,  with  a  genitive,  sometimes  expresses  the  final  cause,  I 
 nevertheless  feel  some  reluctance  to  understand  it  in  this  passage  in  a 
 sense  so  unusual,"  (pp.  36,  37.)  "John  i.  15,  '  He  who  cometh  after  me  has 
 got  before  me,  for  he  was  my  principal,' "  (p.  39.)  "  John  iii.  13.  He  might 
 imagine  himself  transported  into  heaven,  and  not  be  able  to  distinguish 
 whether  what  he  saw  and  heard  was  visionary  or  real.  And  Mr  Palmer 
 thought  that  when  Jesus  spoke  of  himself  as  having  been  in  heaven,  it  was 
 in  allusio7i  to  this  Divine  vision."  "Mr  John  Palmer  was  a  man  of 
 abilities  and  learning,  and  an  excellent  Scriptm-e  critic,"  (p.  42.)  "  It  does 
 not  appear  that  any  of  the  early  Christian  sects  or  ecclesiastical  writers 
 ever  heard  of  this  supposed  assumption  of  Christ  into  heaven,  or  ever 
 attempted  to  explain  the  evangelists'  phrases  by  that  hypothesis,"  (p.  43.) 
 "  It  is  a  fair  remark,  that  if  '  ascending  to  heaven '  signifies  knowing  the 
 Divine  counsels,  'descending  from  heaven'  may  signify  not  knowing theza. 
 But  the  figure  is  preserved  if  the  person  spoken  of  ascends  to  learn 
 heavenly  truths,  and  descends  to  communicate  them.  'Who  is  in  heaven' 
 is  omitted  in  the  Vatican,  and  some  other  manuscripts,  and  is  at  least  of 
 doubtful  authenticity,"  (p.  51.)  "  Matt.  xi.  27,  '  No  man  knoweth  the  Son 
 but  the  Father ' — q.  d..  No  one  knoweth  the  extent  of  the  Son's  commission 
 but  the  Father,"  (p.  54.)  "  John  vi.  62, '  What  and  if  you  shall  see  the  Son 
 of  man  ascend  up  where  he  was  before  V  Jesus,  knowing  their  mean  and 
 secular  views,  resolved  to  release  himself  from  these  selfish  and  unworthy 
 attendants,  and  for  this  purpose  he  delivers  a  discourse "  (ver.  33-62) 
 "  which  they  could  not  comprehend,  and  the  design  of  which  was  to  shock 
 their  prejudices,  to  disgust  their  feelings,  and  to  alienate  them  from  his 
 society,"  (p.  57.)  "  Ver.  35-40.  Jesus  now  confounds  and  perplexes  their 
 understandings  by  speaking  of  himself  personally  as  the  promised  bread 
 from  heaven,"  (p.  59.)  "  Ver.  43-51.  Jesus  continues  to  assert  the  divinity 
 of  his  mission,  and  the  vivifying  power  of  his  doctrine,  in  language  still 
 more  offensive  and  unintelligible  to  the  multitude,"  (p.  61.)  "Jesus,  know- 
 ing their  mean  and  secular  motives,  and  desirous  of  being  forsaken  by 
 them,  does  not  condescend  to  correct  their  mistake,  but  proceeds  to  express 
 
484  A  EEVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CAXM  INQUIEY. 
 
 bimseK  in  language  stiR  more  offensive  and  disgusting"  (p.  62.)  "  The  Jews, 
 observing  the  seriousness  and  solemnity  of  our  Lord's  manner,  and  under- 
 standing his  declarations  in  a  strict  and  literal  sense,  are  more  offended  and 
 disgusted  than  ever,  and  resolve  to  forsake  his  society,  proha.hly  conceiving 
 him  to  be  disordered  in  his  mind"  (p.  63.)  "  They  did  not  speak  out,  but 
 Jesus  judged  from  their  loolcs  and  whisperings  what  passed  in  theu*  minds," 
 (p.  64.)  "  Ver.  61,  62.  By  his  person,  the  Son  of  man,  he  still  means  his 
 doc/ri'/ie.'"  "  This  will  be  called  a  forced  intei'pretation.  And  it  is  certainly 
 very  different  fi'om  the  plain  literal  meaning  of  the  words,"  (jip.  66,  67.) 
 "  John  viii.  58.  The  Jews  evidently  wnderstood  the  language  of  Jesus  as  an 
 assertion  of  his  existence  before  the  birth  of  Abraham,  for  in  the  paroxysm 
 of  their  rage,  they  took  up  stones  to  stone  him  as  a  liar  and  a  blasphemer," 
 (p.  75.) 
 
 By  the  way,  Tvere  not  the  Jews  as  competeut  to  understand  "  the 
 language  of  Jesus "  as  Mr  Belsham  and  the  modern  Unitarians  ? 
 If  so,  must  not  these,  on  their  own  principles,  draw  the  same  con- 
 clusion ?     "A  liar  and  blasphemer !  " 
 
 "  It  is  not  probable  that  our  Lord  would  have  been  so  very  open  and 
 explicit  upon  this  high  and  mysterious  subject  to  his  enemies  when  he  was 
 so  reserved  to  his  friends,  and  does  not  appear  to  have  hinted  it  to  his 
 disciples."  "  If  he  had  intended  in  this  instance  to  annoimce  his  own  pre- 
 existence  so  vei-y  explicitly  as  many  believe,  he  would  have  taught  this 
 extraordinary  doctrine  more  frequently,  in  a,  greater  variety  of  phrase,  and 
 would  have  laid  greater  stress  upon  it ;  and  finally  that  this  fact,  so 
 solemnly  declaimed,  would  have  been  more  attended  to,  and  would  have 
 made  a  more  permanent  and  vivid  impression,"  (pp.  79,  80.)  "Before 
 Abraham  was  born  I  was  he  ;  i.  e.,  the  Christ — q.  d..  Before  that  eminent 
 patriarch  was  brought  into  being,  my  existence  and  appearance  under  the 
 character  of  the  Messiah  at  tiiis  period,  and  in  these  circiunstances,  was  so 
 completely  arranged,  and  so  irrevocably _/?.fe(^  in  the  immutable  counsels 
 and  purjaoses  of  God,  that  in  this  sense  I  may  be  said  even  then  to  have 
 existed,"  (p.  85.)  "To  the  Jews,  therefore,  who  were  familiar  with  the 
 language  and  imagery  of  their  own  prophets,  our  Lord's  declaration  of  his 
 existence  as  the  Messiah  before  the  birth  of  Abraham  woxild  not  sound  so 
 harsh  and  offensive  as  it  does  to  modern  readers,  who,  not  beiog  accustomed 
 to  the  bold  dramatic  language  of  prophecy,  are  apt  to  imderstand  that  of 
 actual  existence,  which  the  Jews  would  easily  perceive  to  he  figurative," 
 (p.  91.) 
 
 If  the  Jews  "  ea.sily  perceived "  that  the  asserted  existence  was 
 not  "actual"  but  "figurative,"  and  if  this  "would  not  sound  so 
 harsh  and  offensive  as  it  does  to  modern  ears,"  how  came  they,  "  in 
 the  paroxysm  of  theu-  I'age,"  to  take  up  stones  "  to  stone  him  as  a 
 liar  and  blasj)hemer  ?"  Notwithstandii:g  this  glaring  inconsistency 
 in  Mr  Belsham's  own  statement,  he  adds,  "In  the  explanation  of 
 
A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM's  CALM  INQUIRY.  485 
 
 this  important  text,  it  was  thought  necessary  to  be  thus  particular, 
 because  it  is  in  a  great  measure  decisive  of  the  ivhole  controversy," 
 (p.  102.) 
 
 ''  John  xvi.  28.  But  it  is  better  to  take  both  clAnaes  figuratively.  As  Jesus 
 came  into  the  world  when  he  appeai-ed  in  public  as  a  messenger  from  God, 
 so,  conversely,  he  left  the  world  and  returned  to  the  Father  when  his 
 mission  closed,  and  he  ceased  to  appear  any  longer  as  a  public  teacher,"  (p. 
 104.)  "  John  xvii.  5.  The  words  wapa  o-faDrS,  '  with  thy  own  self,'  are 
 opposed  to  the  words  eVl  ttjs  yrjs, '  upon  the  earth,'  in  the  preceding  verse  : 
 and  the  words  napa  aoi,  'with  thee,'  in  the  Scriptures  and  in  all  good 
 writers,  are  used  in  a  local  sense  to  express  '  in  thy  house,'  '  in  thy  pre- 
 sence,' and  the  like ;  and  never  signify '  in  thy  p  iirpose  or  decree.^ — '  0  Father, 
 glorify  thou  me  with  thyself,  with  the  glory  which  I  had  with  thee,'  that 
 is,  in  Thy  immutable  purpose  and  decree,  the  glory  which  was  intended  for 
 me  '  before  the  world  was,' "  (pp.  106, 109.)  "  John  xvii.  24.  Our  Lord  prays 
 that  his  apostles  may  be  witnesses  to  the  great  success  of  his  gospel,"  (p. 
 118.)  "  2  Cor.  viii.  9.  If  the  fact  [i.e.,  of  the  jore-existenoe  of  Christ]  were 
 antecedently  established,  this  passage  might,  indeed,  be  admitted  as  a  grace- 
 ful allusion  to  it,"  (p.  122.)  "The  apostle  affirms  the  existence  of  two 
 contemporary  events,  that  Christ  was  rich,  and,  at  the  same  time,  that  he 
 lived  in  poverty."  "  Jesus  Christ  was  rich  in  miraculous  powers,  which  it 
 was  at  his  option  to  emjdoy  for  his  own  benefit,"  (pp.  125,  126.)  "Phil,  ii- 
 5-9, '  Who  being  in  the  form  of  God.'  As  Christ  is  said,  ver.  7,  to  have 
 assumed  the  form  of  a  slave  when  he  was  not  really  a  slave,  so  he  might 
 appear  in  the  form  of  God,  without  being  reaUy  and  essentially  God," 
 (p.  130.) 
 
 It  is  natural  to  ask  here,  on  what  principle  of  criticism  does  Mr 
 Belsham  render  the  Greek  word,  BovXo<;,  a  slave,  rather  than  a  ser- 
 vant? When  Jehovah  says,  "Remember  ye  the.  law  of  Moses 
 (tov  SovXov  fiov,  Sept)  my  servant,"  are  we  to  understand  by  the 
 term  a  slave,  as  contradistinguished  from  one  rendering  service? 
 (Mai.  iv.  4.)  AVhen  He  says,  "  Behold  I  will  bring  forth  (rov  SovXov 
 jiov)  my  servant  the  Branch,"  does  He  mean,  my  slave  ?  (Zech. 
 iii.  8.)  When  he  says,  "  I  will  take  thee,  0  Zerubbabel  (rov  SovXov 
 fj-ov)  my  servant,"  what  supposable  connexion  has  it  with  slavery  ? 
 (Hag.  ii.  23.)  When  again  it  is  said,  "  Who  is  blind  as  he  that  is 
 perfect,  and  blind  as  the  Lord's  servant,"  is  the  designed  idea 
 slavery  or  service  ?  (Isaiah  xlii.  1 9.)  In  the  parable  of  the  house- 
 holder who  let  his  vineyard  to  husbandmen,  it  is  said  "  he  sent  (Tov<i 
 SovXovi  avTov)  his  servants  to  the  husbandmen,  that  they  might 
 receive  the  fruits  of  it,"  (Matt.  xxi.  34.)  Surely  the  idea  conveyed 
 by  the  term  is  that  of  superintending  servants,  rather  than  of  slaves. 
 The  following  pas.^ige  is  peculiarly  in  point ; — Matt.  xx.  27,  28, 
 
486  A  EEVtEW  OF  MK  BELSHAil'S  CALM  IKQUIKY. 
 
 "And  whosoever  will  be  chief  among  you,  let  him  be  your  {BovXo^) 
 servant :  even  as  the  Son  of  man  came  not  to  be  ministered  unto, 
 but  to  minister,  and  to  give  his  life  a  ransom  for  many."  It 
 would  be  easy  to  produce  many  other  passages,  both  from  the  New 
 Testament  and  Septuagint,  where  it  would  be  preposterous  to  sub- 
 stitute the  word  slave  for  servant ;  but  it  is  of  more  importance  to 
 observe  that  there  is  not,  we  think,  any  one  instance  to  be  found 
 where,  either  by  this  or  any  other  term,  the  idea  of  a  "  slave  "  is 
 attached  to  Jesus  Christ.  "  The  form  of  a  servant "  must  mean, 
 in  aU  consistency,  the  aspect  or  deportment  of  a  servant ;  for  what 
 possible  form  of  a  slave  can  be  applied  to  Him  as  contrasted  with 
 the  aspect  or  deportment  of  one  serving  ?  In  the  whole  course  of 
 His  obedience  He  conducted  himself  as  one  serving,  or  minister- 
 ing ;  this  was  the  aspect  which  He  bore,  this  was  the  appearance 
 He  made.  And,  according  to  the  intended  contrast,  "  being  in  the 
 fo7-m  of  God,"  must  signify,  living  or  existing  (vTrapKtov)  as  God- 
 He  who  existed  as  the/oj'm,  aspect,  mode,  personal  distinction,  or 
 the  relative  subsistence  of  Deity,  assumed  a  nature  capable  of 
 obedience  and  service. 
 
 "  The  words  '  he  thought  it  not  robbery,'  are  attended  with  considerable 
 difficulty.  The  Greek  word  dpnayfibi,  here  translated  robber)/,  scai'cely 
 occurs  in  any  other  Greek  writer.  It  seems,  however,  rather  favouiuble 
 to  the  supposition  that  the  word  is  iised  in  the  active  sense,"  (p.  134.)  "  The 
 proper  simple  meaning  of  the  phrase  appears  to  be,  not  to  covet,  to  be  fond 
 of,  or  to  affect  or  display,  but  to  hold  fast,  as  a  person  does  what  he  has 
 seized  by  force,  claims  as  his  right,  and  is  resolved  not  to  rehnquish.  In 
 this  sense  it  stands  in  opposition  to  eKevaa-f,  '  he  exhausted  himself,'  he 
 parted  with  all,  without  retaining  anything."  "So  far  from  tenaciously 
 grasping,  and  refusing  to  relinquish,  he  voluntarily,  and  of  his  own  accord, 
 divested  himself  of  everything  that  is  intended  by  the  form  or  likeness  of 
 God.  If  the  immutable  attributes  of  Deity  are  intended,  these  were  con- 
 cealed,—or  the  pre-existent  glories  of  the  Logos,  these  were  quiescent, — or 
 his  extraordinary  miraculous  powers,  these  were  voluntarily  suspended, 
 while  he  suffered  himself  to  appear  and  to  be  treated  as  though  he  pos- 
 sessed them  not,"  (pp.  138,  139.) 
 
 Is  Saul  also  among  the  prophets  ?  Yes,  but  he  soon  returns  to 
 more  congenial  occupations : — 
 
 "  The  exaltation  of  Christ  consists  in  his  possession  of  a  Divine  com- 
 mission and  volimtary  miracidous  powers.  His  humiliation  consists  in 
 his  7ieglecting  to  use  those  powers  for  his  own  benefit,  in  submitting  to  a 
 humble,  laborious,  and  dependent  condition,  and,  finally,  in  resigning  him- 
 self to  suffering  and  death  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and /or  t/ie  good 
 
A  REVIEW  OP  ME  BBLSHAM's  CALM  INQUIRY.  487 
 
 of  mankind.  Thus  this  celebrated  text  may  at  least  be  regarded  as  neutral," 
 (pp.  144, 145.)  "  Col.  i.  15.  The  -word,  first-horn  is  used  to  express  excellence 
 of  its  kind.  And  of  the  new  creation  Christ  is  the  head  and  chief,  being 
 the  chief  instrument  of  God  in  the  renovation  of  the  moral  world,"  (p.  147.) 
 "  Col.  i.  47,  '  He  is  before  all  things  ; '  i.e.,  in  time,  dignity,  and  excellence,  in 
 the  natural  creation,  if  that  be  the  subject  of  the  apostle's  discom^e  ;  or, 
 of  the  new  creation,  if  that  be  the  subject  treated  of,  as  Unitarians  main- 
 tain ! "  "  No  argument  for  the  pre-existenoe  of  Christ  can  be  drawn  from 
 this  ambiguous  text,"  (p.  148.) 
 
 The  attentive  reader  will  have  observed,  that  through  the  whole 
 of  this  long  section,  as,  indeed,  throughout  the  work,  the  author 
 seems  to  labour  under  the  same  inveterate  prejudice  we  before 
 noticed, — that  something  may  be  said,  nay,  ought  to  be  said  on 
 every  text  which  is  calculated  to  lower  its  meaning.  This  is  "  the 
 sole  concern  of  the  Unitarian :  that  the  passages  in  question  are 
 either  of  doubtful  authenticity,  or  misunderstood,  or  misapplied." 
 Those  who  can  relish  these  morsels  of  comments  and  criticisms  will 
 find,  in  the  remaining  sections  of  this  part  in  the  work  itself,  an 
 ample  repast ;  beside  the  dessert  contained  in  the  second  part.  We 
 are,  however,  under  the  mortifying  necessity  of  putting  off  our 
 readers  with  little  more  than  "  the  bill  of  fare." 
 
 The  fourth  section  exhibits  "  a  collection  of  texts,  which,  if 
 they  do  not  directly  assert  the  pre-existence  of  Christ,  have 
 nevertheless  been  thought  to  allude  to  it,  and  to  be  most  easily 
 explataed  upon  that  hypothesis." 
 
 "John  viii.  23,  'I  am  from  above;'  /  am,  i.e.,  my  doctrine  is,  from 
 heaven,"  (p.  154.)  "  Gal.  i.  1,  'An  apostle,  not  of  man,  nor  by  men,  but  by 
 Jesus  Christ ;'  q.  d.,  Not  of,  nor  by  ordinary  men,"  (p.  158.)  "  Heb.  ii.  14. 
 The  expression  '  took  part,'  seems  to  indicate  a  voluntary  assumption  of 
 human  nature.  It  ought  to  have  been  rendered  '  he  participated  of  the 
 same,' "  (p.  159.) 
 
 The  fifth  section  notices  the  attributes  supposed  to  be  ascribed 
 to  Christ,  which  infer  His  pre-existence  and  divinity. 
 
 "  John  i.  1.  The  beginning  of  the  gospel  dispensation  is  here  intended," 
 (p.  171.)  "John  ii.  19,  'In  three  days  I  will  raise  it  up.'  Not  that  he 
 would  raise  himself,  but  that  he  would  be  raised  by  God,"  (p.  173.)  "  John 
 X.  17, 18.  If  this  text  is  to  be  understood  of  the  death  and  resurrection  of 
 Jesus,  it  is  to  be  explained  on  the  same  principles  as  the  preceding ;  and 
 though  active  verbs  are  used,  they  are  to  be  taken  in  a  passive  sense," 
 (p.  174.)  "Matt,  xxvii.  20.  The  promise  is  addressed  to  the  apostles  only. 
 It  is  limited  to  the  termination  of  the  Jewish  dispensation  by  the  destruc- 
 tion of  Jerusalem  and  the  temple,"  (p.  179.)  "  Matt.  ix.  4,  Mark  ii.  8.  Perhaps 
 the  historians  might  mean  nothing  more  than  that  he  judged  from  their 
 
488  A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIEY. 
 
 countenances  what  was  passing  iu  their  minds,"  (p.  179.)  "  Luke  vii.  39,  40. 
 The  Pharisees  expected  as  a  matter  of  course  that  a  prophet  woidd  know 
 by  in,?piration  the  character  and  thought  of  those  who  approached  him," 
 (p.  180.)  "  John  svi.  28,  30.  His  accurate  knowledge  of  these  speculations 
 convinced  them  that  he  came  from  God,"  (p.  182.)  "  Col.  ii.  2,  3.  The 
 manuscripts  vary"  lib)  "  Rev.  ii.  2,  23.  To  say  nothing  of  the  doubtful 
 authenticity  of  the  Apocalypse,  or  of  this  portion  of  it,  these  passages 
 would  prove  nothing  more  than  that  Christ,  in  his  exalted  state,  is 
 acquainted  with  the  circumstances  of  his  churches,  and  with  the  character 
 of  individual  members,"  (p.  183.)  "John  xiv.  7,  11.  This  mystical  language 
 of  the  evangelist,  when  translated  into  popular  phraseology,  means 
 nothing  'more  than  that  our  Lord  spoke  and  acted  imder  a  Divine  com- 
 mission" (p.  188.) 
 
 Section  the  sixth,  "  concemiBg  the  alleged  superiority  of  Christ 
 to  angels:" — 
 
 "The  whole  mythology  concerning  angels  is  destitute  of  all  foundation 
 in  the  Jewish  and  Christian  revelations.  By  Jesus  and  his  apostles  it  is 
 alluded  to  as  the  populo,r  and  established  belief  of  the  age  ;  by  whom  it 
 was  never  taught  as  an  article  of  faith.  Revelation  therefore  is  no  more 
 responsible  for  the  existence  of  angels  good  or  evil,  than  it  is  for  the 
 existence  of  witches,  &c,"  (p.  19.5.)  "Heb.  i.  4,  9.  'Being  made  so  much 
 better  than  the  angels ' — the  prophets  mentioned  ver.  1."  "  It  is  with  respect 
 to  them,  and  not  to  angels,  that  the  comparison  with  Christ  is  instituted 
 in  the  beginning  of  this  epistle,"  (p.  206.) 
 
 The  seventh  section  treats  of  the  "titles  and  characters  at- 
 tributed to  Christ,  or  thought  to  be  so  attributed,  which  are  sup- 
 posed to  imply  superiority  of  nature." 
 
 "  The  Unitarians  plead  that  Christ  is  called  Ood,  as  being  a  prophet  in- 
 vested with  miraculous  powers,"  (p.  214.)  "  Luke  i.  16,  17.  Though  strict- 
 ness of  construction  waiTants  the  application  of  the  pronoun  him  to  the 
 antecedent  God,  yet  as  the  phrase  'Lord  our  God'  is  never  apphed  to 
 Christ  in  the  New  Testament,  no  Jew  would  ever  think  of  such  an  applica- 
 tion of  the  words.  John  was  the  forerunner  of  the  Lord  their  God,  by 
 being  the  foreranner  of  Jesus,  the  great  messenger  of  God  to  mankind," 
 (p.  217.)  "John  i.  1,'  And  the  Word  was  God,'  or,  «  God ;  i.e.,  an  inferior 
 God  derived  from  the  Supreme,  and  delegated  by  Him  :  or,  God  was 
 wisdom  :  or,  the  Word,  i.e.,  the  teacher,  was  a  prophet  endued  with  miracu- 
 lous powers,"  (p.  218.)  "John  xx.  28,  'And  Thomas  answered  and  said 
 unto  him.  My  Lord  and  my  God.'  This  is  a  sudden  exclamation  of 
 astonishment  and  joy— y. c?..  My  Lord  and  my  God!  how  gi'eat  is  thy 
 power!  or,  My  Lord  and  my  God  Aas  done  this!"  (p.  218.) 
 
 In  the  eighth  section  we  have  a  "collection  of  passages  which 
 are  supposed  to  teach  that  Christ  is  the  maker  and  preserver  of 
 all  things,"  and  in  the  next  is  considered  the  question,  "  whether 
 
A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  -189 
 
 Jesus  Christ  was  the  medium  of  the  Divine  dispensations  to  the 
 patriarchs  and  to  the  Hebrew  nation;  and  whether  he  ever 
 appeared  under  the  name  and  character  of  Jehovah." 
 
 "  Any  sensible  symbol  of  the  Divine  presence  is  called  an  angel,  and 
 this  symbol  is  called  indifferently  the  angel  of  Jehovah,  or,  Jehovah 
 Himself.  Gen.  xvi.  7, '  The  angel  of  Jehovah  found  her  ; '  but,  ver.  1 3,  it 
 appears  that  this  angel  was  Jehovah  Himself"  (p.  307.)  "  In  the  Chaldee 
 idiom,  the  term  Mimra, '  word,'  is  substituted  for  the  reciprocal  pronoun 
 self ;  so  that  the  'word  of  Jehovah'  means  nothing  more  than  Jehovah 
 Himself,"  (p.  310.)  "  Rev.  xxi.  23.  No  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from  the 
 ohsoxire  undjigurative  language  of  prophecy,"  (p.  312.)  "  Matt.  iii.  1, '  Jeho- 
 vah, whom  ye  seek,  shall  come  suddenly  to  his  temple.'  JeSTis  visited  the 
 temple  as  the  messenger  of  Jehovah,"  (ib.) 
 
 Section  the  tenth :  "  The  present  exaltation  of  Christ,  and  the 
 high  offices  which  he  now  sustains,  or  to  which  he  is  to  be 
 appointed  hereafter,  are  said  to  be  incompatible  with  the  sup- 
 position of  his  proper  and  simple  humanity."  Who  of  Mr  Bel- 
 sham's  opponents  deny  His  "  proper  "  humanity  ? 
 
 The  eleventh  section  takes  into  consideration  the  passages  "  con- 
 cerning the  worship  of  Christ." 
 
 "  I  Pet.  i.  8,  '  Whom  having  not  seen,  ye  love.'  It  seems  surprising 
 that  personal  affection  to  Christ  should  be  so  often  represented  and  insisted 
 upon  as  a  Christian  duty  of  the  higliest  importance.  The  apostles  and 
 other  immediate  followers  of  Christ,  who  knew  him  personally,  and  had 
 derived  personal  benefits  from  him,  in  addition  to  the  greatest  veneration 
 of  his  character,  could  not  but  feel  the  most  affectionate  attachment  to 
 his  person.  But  it  is  impossible  that  Christians  of  later  times,  who  have 
 had  no  personal  intercourse  with  Christ,  and  who  have  received  no 
 personal  benefits  from  him,  can  love  him  in  the  same  sense  in  which  the 
 apostles  and  his  other  companions  did,"  (p.  355.)  "Matt,  xxviii.  9,  17; 
 Luke  xxiv.  51,  &c.  The  •worship  in  these  instances  offered  to  Christ  was 
 civil  respect,  not  religious  homage."  "  The  question  is  concerning  the  law- 
 fulness of  addressing  worship  to  Christ,  now  that  he  is  no  longer  sensibly 
 present,"  (p.  361.)  "  Rev.  v.  8-14.  The  authenticity  of  this  book  is  doubt- 
 ful" "It  is  unreasonable  to  argue  from  visions  to  reahties."  "The  founda- 
 tion of  the  homage  paid  to  the  Lamb  is,  that  he  was  slain :  therefore  he 
 is  not  God,  nor  entitled  to  Divine  honours,"  (pp.  371, 372.)  " '  They  stoned 
 Stephen,  invoking  and  saying.  Lord  Jesus,  receive  my  spirit.'  This  holy 
 protomartyr  had  just  been  favoured  with  an  actual  ■visio?i  of  our  Lord." 
 "  The  example  of  this  primitive  martyr,  therefore,  does  not  fall  within  the 
 limit  of  religious  worship,  nor  in  the  least  degree  authorise  addresses  to 
 Christ  when  he  is  not  sensibly  present,"  (p.  373.) 
 
 Many  more  specimens  of  this  plain  and  obvious  style  of 
 criticism  might  be  produced  ;  but  we  think  our  readers  would  by 
 
490  A  REVIEW  OF  ME  BELSHAM's  CALM  INQUIRY. 
 
 this  time  begin  to  be  wearied  of  them,  even  if  they  came  recom- 
 mended by  the  merit  of  ingenuity.  What  their  feelings  will 
 probably  be  in  contemplating  them  as  they  are,  we  will  not  trust 
 ourselves  to  conjecture. 
 
 The  last  section  of  this  part  contains  "  arguments  to  prove  the 
 proper  humanity  of  Jesus  Christ."  Por  what  honest  purpose  this 
 writer  should  accumulate  arguments,  through  above  forty  pages, 
 to  prove  the  proper  humanity  of  Jesus  Christ,  when  no  one  in  the 
 present  day  questions  it,  we  are  at  a  loss  to  conceive.  Do  any  of 
 Mr  Belsham's  opponents  pretend  that  the  humanity  of  Jesus  was 
 not  "  proper,"  or  that  He  was  only  a  phantom  ?  At  the  close  of 
 this  section,  which  the  author  himself  owns  "is  not  necessary," 
 there  is  an  appendix  containing  an  "  abstract  of  the  controversy 
 between  Dr  Priestley  and  Dr  Horsley  concerning  the  existence  of  an 
 orthodox  church  of  Hebrew  Christians  at  ^lia,  who  had  departed 
 from  the  Jewish  ritual."  Were  this  point  settled  to  the  highest 
 degree  of  probability  on  either  side,  of  what  argumentative  use 
 could  it  be  towards  adjusting  the  controverted  subject?  That  a 
 professing  body  of  Christians  did  believe  a  set  of  opinions  even  in 
 the  apostolic  age,  except  these  opinions  were  sanctioned  by  the 
 apostles,  is  no  evidence  that  they  ought  to  have  believed  them. 
 That  men  should  bestow  so  much  of  their  time,  attention,  talents, 
 and  erudition  on  a  subject  which,  if  ascertained  to  a  certainty, 
 could  be  of  no  conceivable  use  in  solid  argument,  we  regard  as  a 
 lamentable  evidence  of  the  human  mind's  depraved  propensity  to 
 improfitable  speculation. 
 
 The  concluding  part  of  this  work  exhibits  "A  Summary  View" 
 of  different  schemes  of  doctrine  concerning  the  Person  of  Christ, 
 the  proper  Unitarian,  the  Socinian,  the  Low  Arian,  the  High 
 Arian,  the  Semi-Arian,  the  Indwelling  Scheme,  the  Sabellian,  the 
 Swedenborgian  doctrine,  Tritheism,  and  the  Trinitarian  doctrine. 
 It  is  time  for  us  also  to  conclude  this  article,  though  we  find  it 
 not  very  easy  to  give  the  work  a  definite  character.  We  have 
 scarcely  ever  seen  a  book  of  equal  size,  drawn  up  by  a  person  of 
 some  learning  and  much  labour,  (the  labour  of  transcribing  from 
 Socinian  comments  and  criticisms,)  conveying  so  little  instruction  ; 
 and  considered  as  a  theological  work,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find 
 one  less  adapted  to  promote  religion  and  virtue,  in  any  acceptation 
 of  these  terms.  We  can  perceive  no  tendency  in  it  to  elevate  the 
 mind,  to  stimulate  to  action,  to  recommend  the  gospel  as  a  wise 
 
A  REVIEW  OE  MK  BELSHAm'S  CALM  INQUIRY.  491 
 
 and  holy  religion  worthy  of  being  propagated.  It  has  no  adapta- 
 tion to  the  state  of  mankind  as  they  are,  but  to  an  imaginary  set 
 of  beings,  without  laws,  without  sanctions,  without  moral  govern- 
 ment, without  gvult  of  conscience  ;  beings  who,  if  they  have  a 
 little  instruction  from  a  prophet  respecting  present  duty  and 
 future  prospects,  can  save  themselves  ;  beings  who  require  no 
 transforming  influence,  no  secret  energy,  no  religion  of  love ; 
 beings  who  need  "  nothing  more  "  than  objective  means  of  happi- 
 ness, and  those  all  reducible  to  a  little  information. 
 
 On  the  whole,  the  Uuitarianism  of  modern  Socinians  is  the  art 
 of  dilapidation,  detached  from  the  science  of  building.  Its  efforts 
 are  directed  to  .shew — that  is,  to  conjecture — what  Christianity  is 
 not,  rather  than  to  prove  what  it  is  ;  whether  we  regard  its 
 doctrines  or  duties,  the  greatness  of  its  blessings,  or  the  nature  of 
 its  obligations.  By  the  help  of  the  "floods  and  streams"  of 
 pseudo-criticism,  its  aim  is  to  demolish,  not  only  the  fabric  of 
 orthodoxy,  but  also  the  solid  rock,  in  which  its  foundations  are 
 deeply  laid.  Or,  to  change  the  allusion,  it  would  have  us  desert 
 the  Christian  temple,  and  renounce  all  that  we  have  learnt  in  the 
 New  Testament,  in  order  to  make  nearer  approaches  to  the  schools 
 of  modern  Jews,  Mohammedans,  and  Sceptics. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  DE  PEIESTLEY, 
 
 CONOEKNING 
 
 THE  DATA  REQUISITE  FOB  A  RATIONAL  INVESTIGATION  OF  DIS- 
 PUTED POINTS  IN  THEOLOGY,  AND  THE  OPINIONS  OF  FALLIBLE 
 MEN,  AS  A  GUIDE  FOE  THE  PURPOSE  OF  INTERPRETING  THE 
 HOLY  SCRIPTURES. 
 
 Introduction.  The  writer's  motive.  Success  in  our  inquiries  after  truth  de- 
 pends on  method,  as  well  as  industry  and  perseverance.  Some  common 
 principles  requisite  as  data.  Dr  Priestley's,  what  ?  Requested  to  be  explicit 
 on  this  head.  His  appeal  from  Scripture  to  historical  evidence  of  early 
 opinions  unjustifiable.  Not  a  good  guide,  because — 1.  Not  calculated  to  lessen 
 the  difficulty,  as  it  pretend-s,  but  rather  increases  it.  2.  The  precariousness 
 and  insufficiency  of  it  appears  from  constant  experience.  3.  It  has  been 
 solidly  refuted  long  ago  by  Protestants  in  the  Popish  controversy,  and  to 
 revive  it  tends  to  superstition.  4.  It  is  plainly  reproved  by  Jesus  Christ. 
 5.  Highly  imtheological  in  its  just  consequences.  6.  Also  illogical,  the  con- 
 sequences being  gratuitously  assumed.  7.  If  we  have  no  better  guide  than 
 this,  we  are  left  a  prey  to  perpetual  scepticism,  it  being  insufficient  from  its 
 very  nature  to  settle  the  mind.  Divine  revelation  the  only  trvie  data,  because 
 this  alone  affords  objective  certainty.  The  objection,  that  a  diversity  of 
 opinion  stUl  obtains  among  those  who  are  agi-eed  in  their  data  and  method 
 of  inquiry,  answered.  The  plan  of  Dr  Owen  in  this  work.  His  reasoning 
 not  easily  confuted.  This  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  utterly  overthrows  Dr 
 Priestley's  grand  argument,  taken  from  the  historical  evidence  of  early 
 opinions  concerning  Christ. 
 
 Eev.  and  DEAR  Sir, — To  a  gentleman  wlio  has  claimed  for  a 
 number  of  years,  and  in  various  kinds  of  researches,  the  laudable 
 pretension  of  impartially  inquiring  after  truth,  no  other  apology  is 
 requisite  in  soliciting  his  attention  for  a  few  minutes  than  the 
 solemn  avowal  of  a  similar  motive  and  design,  in  prosecution  of 
 the  same  important  end. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  DK  PKIESTLEY.  493 
 
 But  though  I  flatter  myself  that,  for  the  reason  now  mentioned, 
 no  further  apology  is  necessary  for  making  an  epistolary  address 
 to  you,  yet  it  may  be  expected,  by  yourself  and  the  public,  that  I 
 assign  my  reason  for  doing  it  in  the  present  form.  It  is  not  with 
 a  view  to  solicit  any  public  notice  of  it  from  your  pen, — this  is 
 neither  desired  nor  deprecated, — but  it  comes  principally  to  re- 
 quest a  greater  favour — a  candid,  unprejudiced  attention  to  the 
 contents  of  the  volumes*  to  which  this  letter  is  joined,  of  which  I 
 beg  your  friendly  acceptance. 
 
 Indeed,  when  I  consider  the  religious  sentiments  contained  in 
 these  volumes,  the  quantity  of  reading,  though  so  much  abridged, 
 and  your  various  other  engagements,  I  can  hardly  expect  your 
 compliance ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  when  I  reflect  on  your  art 
 in  improving  time,  and  quick  despatch  in  perusing  larger  works, 
 in  connexion  with  your  known  candour,  and  my  author's  unques- 
 tionable character  for  erudition  and  piety,  I  am  not  without  hope 
 that  my  request  will  be  complied  with. 
 
 Having  thus,  dear  Sir,  explained  my  chief  reason  for  addressing 
 you  in  this  way,  I  shall  take  the  liberty  of  suggesting  a  few  things 
 of  another  nature,  and  particularly  of  testifying  in  how  commend- 
 able a  light  I  view  your  persevering  industry  in  a  professed  search 
 after  religious  truth.  And  yet  I  must  observe,  what  you  well 
 know,  that  success  in  obtaining  the  object  of  our  pursuit,  very 
 much  depends  on  the  mode  of  inquiry ;  if  this  be  not  hajDpily 
 chosen,  the  more  persevering  we  are  the  further  we  recede  from 
 the  desii'ed  mark.  Two  philosophers,  or  divines,  may  be  equally 
 industrious  and  persevering,  perhaps  (at  least  in  a  sense)  equally 
 sincere,  in  making  lovely  truth  the  end  of  their  studious  toil,  but  if 
 nevertheless  they  disagree  in  their  data  and  method  of  investigation, 
 the  further  they  advance,  the  more  remote  may  be  their  conclusions. 
 
 Hence,  then,  arises  the  necessity  among  disputants  of  fixing  on 
 some  common  principles,  which  may  be  called  data.  Without  this 
 there  can  be  little  or  no  hope  of  bringing  any  disputed  point  to  a 
 fair  issue.  Without  this,  when  closely  urged,  they  will  be  for  ever 
 shifting  sides,  and  running  from  the  spot  to  which  they  ought  to 
 be  confined,  as  their  skill  in  sophistry  may  tempt,  or  the  life  of 
 their  cause  require. 
 
 Considering  the  matter  in  this  light,  while  occasionally  attend- 
 
 *  [Dr  Owen's  Exposition  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  as  abridged  by  Dr  Wil- 
 liams.— Ed.] 
 
49-t  A  LETTEE  TO  DE  PKIESTLEY. 
 
 ing  to  the  motions  of  the  controversial  Ayar  in  which  you  have  been 
 so  long  engaged,  I  have  been  induced  to  pause  and  put  the  ques- 
 tion. What  aie  the  data  of  these  polemic  champions,  on  -which  to 
 stand,  and  from  which  to  argue  ?  Is  not  this  the  reason  that  they 
 are  so  seldom  brought  to  a  dose  encounter,  and  are  seen  hectoiing 
 one  another  at  a  distance,  spending  so  much  time  and  breath  in 
 the  fruitless  (not  to  say  impertinent)  work  of  estimating  the 
 abilities  and  qualifications  of  each  other?  I  have  sometimes 
 wished  to  know  in  particular,  but  have  yet  to  learn,  what  those 
 common  principles  are  on  which  you  build  your  diflFering  system. 
 How  far,  for  instance,  you  can  travel  in  company  with  a  Calvinist 
 in  the  high  road  that  leads  to  the  temple  of  truth,  and  where  pre- 
 cisely is  the  spot  on  which  you  must  stop  and  say,  I  can  go  no 
 further ;  here  I  must  leave  you,  our  road  now  parts  ?  It  would 
 gratify  my  ciu'iosity  much,  and  perhaps  assist  my  inquiry,  to  meet 
 with  a  candid,  unequivocal  solution  of  such  difficulties.  For  I  am 
 hitherto  of  opinion  that  if  there  be  not  some  infallible  objective 
 certainty  on  which  we  may  depend  as  a  foundation.  Christian 
 theology  is  but  an  empty  name. 
 
 Though  I  have  sought  in  vain  for  your  polemical  data, — whether 
 it  is  revelation  or  something  else,  and  if  the  former,  whether  the 
 whole  of  the  common  canon  or  only  a  part,  and  if  a  part,  what  it 
 is,  and  where  is  the  line  of  difference, — though  I  have  been  un- 
 successful in  this  inquiry,  I  am  fm-nished  with  better  means  of 
 information  respecting  your  method  of  investigating  the  points  of 
 difference,  as  it  is  laid  before  the  public  in  your  various  writings, 
 and  which  is  briefly  summed  up  by  yourself  in  the  following  words  : 
 — "  Christians  are  not  agreed  in  the  interjDretation  of  Scripture 
 language ;  but  as  all  men  are  agreed  with  respect  to  the  nature  of 
 historical  evidence,  I  thought  that  we  might  perhaps  better  deter- 
 mine by  history  -what  was  the  faith  of  Christians  in  early  times, 
 independently  of  any  aid  from  the  Scripture ;  and  it  appeared  to  be 
 no  unnatural  presumption,  that  whatever  that  should  appear  to  be, 
 such  was  the  doctrine  of  the  apostles,  from  whvm  their  faith  was 
 derived  ;  and  that  by  this  means  we  should  be  possessed  of  a  pretty 
 good  guide  for  discovering  the  true  sense  of  the  Scriptures."* 
 
 Now  after  having  thought,  dear  Sir,  pretty  deliberately  on  the 
 method  here  proposed,  viewed  it  in  different  Ughts,  and  endea- 
 voured to  trace  its  genuine  consequences,  it  always,  and  in  various 
 
 *  Defences  of  Unitar.  for  17SS  and  1789,  p.  S3. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  DR  PRIESTLEY.  ~       495 
 
 respects,  appears  to  me  a  "  very  bad  guide,"  for  several  reasons. 
 For— 
 
 1.  The  proposed  method  is  not  calculated  to  lessen  the  difficulty, 
 which  it  pretends  to  remove,  but  rather  increases  it ;  since  men 
 will  no  less  differ  about  historical  evidence  than  the  meaning  of 
 Scripture.  It  increases  the  toil  without  improving  the  fruit.  By 
 avoiding  a  visionary  Scylla  we  are  driven  on  a  real  Charybdis. 
 
 "  Christians  are  not  agreed  in  the  interpretation  of  Scripture." 
 True ;  and  what  is  there  almost  in  the  whole  compass  of  litera- 
 ture, where  mathematical,  demonstration  is  wanting,  in  the  inter- 
 pretation of  which  men  are  all  agreed  ?  One  well  observes  : — "  So 
 wild  and  extravagant  have  been  the  notions  of  a  great  part  of 
 philosophers,  both  ancient  and  modern,  that  it  is  hard  to  deter- 
 mine whether  they  have  been  more  distant  in  their  sentiments 
 from  truth,  or  from  one  another  ;  or  have  not  exceeded  the  fancies 
 of  the  most  fabulous  vsriters,  even  poets  and  mythologists."  *  And 
 yet,  notwithstanding  aU  their  jars  and  blunders,  we  cannot  justly 
 say  that  there  is  no  true  system  of  natiu'c.  But  what  should  we 
 say  of  a  reformer  in  philosophy,  who  should  propose  to  rectify  our 
 notions  of  the  system  of  the  universe  by  setting  before  us  a  train 
 of  "  historical  evidence  "  of  what  was  the  "  opinion  "  of  the  ancients 
 about  it  ?  WhUe  he  urged  their  opinions,  had  we  not  a  right  to 
 demand  rather  the  principles  and  arguments  ?  If  it  be  said  that 
 the  case  is  not  parallel,  because  Thales,  Pythagoras,  Aristotle,  &c., 
 ■were  fallible  teachers,  but  that  Matthew,  John,  Paul,  &c.,  were  in- 
 fallible, this  does  not  alter  the  case ;  it  is  sufficient  for  my  pur- 
 pose that  the  "  o'pinion"  formed  of  the  one  or  the  other  is  fallible. 
 And  therefore  the  opinion  of  Ebion  is  no  more  to  be  confided  in 
 than  that  of  Calvin.  And  there  were  false  opinions  concerning 
 Christ  in  the  apostolic  age  as  well  as  in  the  present.  Had  you 
 taken,  therefore,  the  other  side  of  the  question,  the  impropriety 
 would  have  been  aU  one  ;  for  the  fault  lies  in  the  very  nature  of 
 the  medium  of  proof. 
 
 "  But  all  men  are  agreed  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  historical 
 evidence."  By  no  means ;  for,  if  I  mistake  not,  fact  lies  directly 
 against  it.  Christian  Protestants,  almost  unanimously,  echo  the 
 maxim  of  Chillingworth — "  That  the  Bible  alone  (as  opposed  to 
 tradition  and  historical  evidence,  &c.)  is  the  religion  of  Protest- 
 ants, and  a  safe  way  to  salvation"  and  Divine  truth.  But  let 
 *  Rowning's  Gompend.  Syst.,  Introd. 
 
496  A  LETTER  TO  DE  PEIESTLEY. 
 
 me  not  misuuderstaud  the  position,  which  is  somewhat  equivocal ; 
 for  the  words  "  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  historical  evidence" 
 may  refer  either  to  fact  or  to  right :  either  what  it  is  that  actu- 
 ally constitutes  the  evidence,  so  that  all  are  agreed  about  the  real 
 meaning  of  the  testimonies  of  the  ancients,  and  the  quantum  of 
 evidence  they  contain  for  and  against,  supposing  their  opinion  to 
 be  in  its  own  nature  admissible  and  of  moment ;  or  what  influence 
 such  evidence  ought  to  have  towards  finally  determining  our  judg- 
 ment in  favour  of  the  controverted  point.  But  it  does  not  appear 
 to  me  that  the  position  is  admissible  in  either  sense.  Not  the 
 former ;  for  daily  stubborn  facts  prove  that  what  one  admits  as 
 "  historical  evidence  "  another  does  not,  whom  yet  charity  compels 
 us  to  regard  as  intelligent,  learned,  pious,  and  imjjartial.  They 
 are  as  much  divided  in  their  judgments  about  the  meaning  of  the 
 ancient  fathers  as  about  the  sense  of  the  apostles  ;  not  to  mention 
 the  incomparable  disadvantage  of  this  new  method  of  interpreting 
 Scripture,  arising  from  its  inevitable  tediousness,  supposing  all  the 
 necessary  materials  at  hand.  Not  the  latter ;  for  the  rational 
 inquirer  will  deem  it  quite  unsatisfactory  to  infer  that  because  a 
 party  of  men  had  heard  the  apostles,  or  their  immediate  successors, 
 therefore  the  opinions  they  formed  in  religious  matters  were  just. 
 This  he  can  no  more  admit  than  if  one  should  say  that  the  Unita- 
 rian hypothesis  must  needs  be  true,  because  the  Unitarians  have 
 read  the  writings  of  the  apostles ;  or,  because  all  the  Christian 
 societies  in  England,  in  the  year  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
 ninety,  have  in  use  the  same  version  of  the  Bible,  therefore  their 
 religious  opinions  must  be  the  same.  Nay,  we  cannot  safely  con- 
 clude concerning  the  major  part  of  those  in  England  this  day  who 
 may  be  styled  s^vorn  adherents  to  Calvinistic  doctrines,  that  there- 
 fore their  religious  opinions  are  Calvinistic.  In  short,  that  aU 
 men  are  not  agreed  "  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  historical 
 evidence,"  anyhow  understood,  is  but  too  palpably  evident  in  the 
 storms  of  furious  disputations  and  the  din  of  paper  wars.  Hence 
 I  conclude  that  the  method  you  propose  is  not  calculated  to  lessen 
 the  difficulty,  but  rather  to  increase  it. 
 
 2.  The  precariousness  and  insufficiency  of  it  appears  from  ex- 
 perience. As  a  specimen  of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  let  one  fact 
 suffice  instar  omnium.  It  respects  a  writer  of  the  present  day, — 
 a  writer  of  erudition,  of  extensive  learning  and  knowledge,  and 
 who  can  boast  of  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  tlie  recondite 
 
A  LETTER  TO  DE  PEIESTLEY.  497 
 
 treasures  of  ecclesiastical  antiquity,  and  who  can  also  boast  of 
 being  "  much  at  home  "  in  the  learned  languages.  Dr  Horsley, 
 tlien  Archdeacon  of  St  Alban's,  now  Bishop  of  St  David's,  took 
 upon  him  (in  1786)  to  establish  as  a  fact  "the  decline  of  Calvin- 
 ism, amounting  almost  to  a  total  extinction  of  it  among  our  English 
 Dissenters  ;  who,  no  long  time  since,  were  generally  Calvinists."  * 
 He  adds,  "  I  believe,  however,  that  the  truth  is,  and  is  pretty 
 notorious,  that  Calvinism  is  gone  among  the  Dissenters  of  the 
 present  times."  -f-  '  And  again : — "  I  consider  it  as  the  reproach  of 
 the  Dissenters  of  the  present  day,  that  a  genuine  Calvinist  is 
 hardly  to  he  found,  except  in  a  sect  conspicuous  only  for  the 
 encouragement  which  the  leaders  of  it  seem  to  give  to  a  disorderly 
 fanaticism."!  Were  not  the  writer  already  known,  one  might  be 
 induced,  on  perusing  this  account,  to  exclaim.  Did  this  extra- 
 ordinary declaration  proceed  from  some  tSitur?;?  of  the  eighteenth 
 century  ?  Did  the  writer  reside  in  some  remote  corner  of  the 
 world,  taking  his  information  at  second-hand  from  incompetent 
 vouchers  ?  Was  the  "  religious  opinion "  of  which  he  gives  an 
 account  so  remote  from  his  own  that  he  could  hardly  be  thought 
 sufficiently  interested  in  it  to  make  a  du§  inquiry  ?  Nothing  less. 
 Confessedly  sensible  and  learned,  near  the  metropolis  at  the  time, 
 himself  a  Calvinist,  and  while  he  laments  the  decline  of  Calvinism, 
 he  utters  the  above  declaration ;  nay,  he  undertakes  professedly 
 to  establish  it  as  a  fact.  You  know.  Sir,  too  well  the  state  of  the 
 real  fact  to  need  a  comment ;  and  the  use  I  think  we  should  make 
 of  this  and  similar  mistakes  that  we  so  often  meet  with  is,  that  we 
 should  be  peculiarly  circumsj)ect  in  admitting  "historical  evidence" 
 for  the  state  of  religious  opinions,  whether  in  later  or  in  earlier 
 times.  To  illustrate  this  matter  we  will  suppose  a  case — viz.,  that 
 some  ages  hence  there  will  appear  a  learned  collector  of  the  state  of 
 religious  opinions  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  that  the  ravages 
 of  time  will  destroy  all  monuments  of  counter-evidence  to  invali- 
 date the  above  assertion  :  how  could  the  historical  collector  choose 
 but  admit  it  for  fact,  though  nothing  in  reality  be  less  so  ?  What ! 
 might  the  historian  say,  shall  I  tax  the  veracity,  or  impeach  the 
 knowledge  of  such  a  writer,  and  a  writer  so  advantageously  circum- 
 stanced for  all  necessary  information,  as  to  hesitate  in  my  conclusion? 
 The  application  is  in  promptu.     And  it  is  a  matter  that  we  must 
 
 *  Tracts  in  Controversy  with  Dr  Priestley,  p.  386. 
 t  Ibid.,  p.  397.  t  Ibid.,  p.  400. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  2  I 
 
498  A  LETTER  TO  DK  PEIESTLEY. 
 
 not  forget,  that  the  late  Dr  Worthington,  and  other  eminent  char- 
 acters now  living,  assure  us  that  the  world  grows  better,  and,  there- 
 fore, that  the  ancients  are  less  entitled  to  our  credit  and  confidence 
 than  the  moderns.     Again — 
 
 3.  The  attempt  to  "  determine  by  history  what  was  the  faith  of 
 Christians  in  early  times,  independently  of  any  aid  from  the 
 Scripture,  that  we  may  thereby  gather  what  was  the  doctrine  of 
 the  apostles,"  has  been  long  ago  solidly  refuted  and  justly  ex- 
 ploded by  the  great  Chillingworth,  and  other  eminent  Protestants 
 in  their  controversy  with  the  Papists.  There  is  no  admitting  of 
 it  but  at  the  expense  of  one  of  the  noblest  principles,  and  strongest 
 pillars  of  the  reformation  from  Popery — "  That  the  Scripture  is 
 the  only  ride  whereby  to  judge  of  controversies  ;  "  and  it  appears 
 to  me  that  the  revival  of  it  into  a  rule  would  directly  tend  to  re- 
 store the  Popish  privilege  of  rendering  blind  obedience  to  our 
 sjjiritual  guides.  For  every  attempt  to  explain  Scripture  by  Scrip- 
 ture principles  would  be  checked  as  wrong  and  dangerous,  while 
 the  unlearned — that  is,  the  body  of  the  Christian  Church — would 
 be  called  upon  to  embrace  on  the  word  of  a  few  learned,  and  every 
 Christian  church  on  the  ipse  dixit  of  its  pastor,  however  unquali- 
 fied to  make  a  fair  report,  to  submit  to  the  opinions  of  the  ancient 
 Chvu'ch  for  their  guide  ;  which  leads  at  once  to  imposition  and  im- 
 posture on  the  one  hand,  and  to  blind  obedience,  superstition,  and 
 an  abject  deference  to  human  authority  in  matters  of  conscience, 
 on  the  other.     Besides — 
 
 4.  The  above  method  of  proceeding  is  plainly  reproved  by  Jesus 
 Christ  in  the  New  Testament.  For  it  is  the  same  principle  must 
 give  it  life  as  was  adopted  by  the  Jeivish  doctors,  which  taught 
 them  to  appeal  on  every  occasion  from  revealed  evidence  to  human 
 traditions,  or  a  pretended  oral  laiu — the  sayings  and  opinions  of 
 their  ancients,  which  they  reckoned  a  good  gxdde  for  the  right 
 understanding  of  the  Mosaic  writings.  But  this  pretended  guide, 
 instead  of  being  honoured  and  recommended,  is  by  our  Lord  op- 
 posed and  reproved,  (Matt.  xv.  ;  Mark  vii.,  &c.)  Nor  does  it 
 make  any  difference,  in  the  present  argument,  whether  the  human 
 traditions  and  opinions  be  written  or  umvritten. 
 
 5.  The  scheme  proposed  is,  moreover,  highly  untheological  in 
 its  consequence,  for  it  is  inconsistent  not  only  with  human  falli- 
 bility, but  also  with  free  agency  and  accountableness.  In  physics, 
 indeed,  we  may  often  with  certainty  infer  the  cause  from  the  effect ; 
 
A  LETTER  TO  DE  PRIESTLEY.  499 
 
 but  in  ethics  and  religion,  where  the  morality  of  an  act,  or  the 
 truth  of  an  opinion  is  in  debate,  it  is  absurd  to  say,  that  because 
 a  fallible  creature  acts  or  thinks  in  this  or  that  manner,  he  there- 
 fore ought  to  do  so ;  nay,  it  is  so  untheological  that  it  strikes  at 
 the  root  of  all  religion,  natural  and  revealed.  For  if  men,  confess- 
 edly imperfect  and  uninspired,  are  not  always  liable  to  err,  they 
 are  not  free,  and  therefore  not  accountable.  Therefore,  the 
 "opinions"  of  such  persons,  though  they  lived  in  the  apostolic 
 age,  and  supposing  them  to  be  exactly  ascertained,  can  be  no  safe 
 medium  of  proof.  They  are  utterly  incapable  of  affording  us  any 
 objective  certainty,  any  more  than  ours  to  those  who  shall  come 
 after  us.  Their  antiquity  makes  no  difference,  because  that  does 
 not  alter  their  nature ;  nor  does  it  much  matter,  for  the  same 
 reason,  whether  they  are  few  or  many.  Wherefore  without  better 
 materials,  whether  orthodox  or  heterodox,  the  controversial  war- 
 rior will  do  little  execution  on  a  reilecting  judicious  mind,  though 
 he  should  charge  his  "  cannon "  with  them,  together  with  his 
 "  small  arms." 
 
 6.  I  shall  venture  a  step  further,  and  profess  to  you,  dear  Sir, 
 that  the  method  you  propose  for  settling  our  opinions  appears  to 
 me  illogical,  as  teaching  us  to  infer  the  truth  of  the  premises  from 
 the  fact  of  the  conclusion.  In  other  words,  it  makes  the  conclu- 
 sions of  men,  who  were  fallible  and  fickle  as  ourselves,  and  which 
 they  pretended  to  draw  from  the  premises  of  revelation,  to  be  a 
 safer  guide  by  which  to  form  our  judgment,  than  revelation  com- 
 pared with  itself,  the  premises  from  which  they  professedly  in- 
 ferred their  conclusion ;  that  is,  we  are  led  by  it  to  assume  a 
 fallible  conclusion,  and  from  the  gratuitous  assumption  to  pro- 
 nounce upon  the  truth  of  the  premises. 
 
 7.  Once  more ;  if  we  have  no  better  guide  than  this,  we  are 
 exposed  as  a  prey  to  perpetual  scepticism,  it  being  insufficient 
 from  its  very  nature  to  settle  the  mind.  If  this  guide  leads  any 
 one  to  the  temple  of  truth,  it  is  by  accident,  and  not  because  it 
 was  ever  designed  for  that  end ;  we  cannot,  therefore,  put  any  con- 
 fidence in  it  while  we  are  following  its  footsteps :  the  event  would 
 always  appear  dubious,  and  the  prospect  of  success  would  never  be 
 sufficient  to  counterbalance  the  toil.  In  short,  it  directly  tends, 
 (supposing  the  sole  motive  of  the  inquirer  to  be  the  love  of  truth,) — 
 it  directly  tends  to  retard  the  pace  of  industry,  and  to  clip  the  wing 
 of  genius ;  and,  therefore,  can  be  no  genuine  friend  to  free  inquiry. 
 
500  A  LETTER  TO  DE  PRIESTLEY. 
 
 I  think,  Sir,  that  thus  far  I  have  stood  on  firm  ground  in  my 
 reasoning.  There  is  no  theological  truth  to  be  found  in  which  we 
 may  put  any  confidence  without  some  data,  some  first  principles 
 of  this  Divine  science,  possessed  of  objective  certainty ;  but  the 
 foundation  you  have  chosen  for  your  polemical  building  is  an 
 uncertain  one,  and  the  guide  you  recommend  is,  in  my  apprehen- 
 sion, a  "  very  had "  one ;  seeing  it  is  so  far  from  lessening  our 
 difficulties,  as  Christians  and  theologians,  that  it  considerably  in- 
 creases them, — it  is  found  to  be  insufiicient  from  the  experience  of 
 all  ages  and  undeniable  facts, — it  is  what  our  most  eminent  re- 
 formers from  Popery,  and  Protestant  polemics,  have  solidly  refuted 
 in  their  opposition  to  blind  obedience,  church-authority  over  con- 
 science and  arbitrary  power, — it  is  reproved  and  condemned  in  its 
 principle  by  our  Lord  himself, — is  untheological,  as  incompatible 
 with  the  moral  state  of  man  in  this  life  of  fallibility  and  imper- 
 fection,— is  contrary  to  the  rules  of  just  reasoning,  by  gratuitously 
 assuming  the  conclusion  of  the  practical  syllogism  included  in  it, 
 — and,  finally,  is  deserving  of  a  charge  of  no  small  magnitude, 
 its  being  of  a  sceptical  tendency.  What  weight  my  arguments 
 have  in  oiDposition  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  your  contro- 
 versial and  historical  writings  against  the  orthodox  faith,  is  left 
 to  your  candid  examination,  and  the  verdict  of  the  impartial 
 public. 
 
 Having  shewn  the  necessity  of  some  principles,  as  data  peculiar 
 to  the  science  of  which  we  treat,  and  endeavoured  to  shew  the  in- 
 sufficiency of  what  you  substitute  for  that  purpose,  it  may  naturally 
 be  expected  that  I  should  be  explicit  in  avowing  what  it  is  that  I 
 judge  deserving  of  that  important  claim  ;  and  this  I  very  willingly 
 do,  but  with  the  greatest  brevity,  seeing  it  would  seem  impertinent 
 to  defend  inform,  what  you  have  not  inform  attacked.  My  data 
 then  are,  Divine  Revelation,  and  that  only,  and  the  luhole  of  it. 
 And  it  appears  to  me,  on  the  maturest  reflection,  that  if  Divine 
 revelation  self-compared  does  not  answer  that  purpose,  nothing 
 else  will ;  and  that  whatever  else  is  set  up  for  that  purpose  is  de- 
 monstrably fallacious.  "  The  jjositive  evidence  of  Scripture,"  as  I 
 have  observed  elsewhere,  "  holds  the  same  rank  in  theology  as  ex- 
 perimented  evidence  does  in  reference  to  any  hypothesis  in  philo- 
 sophy. As,  in  the  latter  case,  there  is  no  disputing  in  favour  of  a 
 system  against  facts,  phenomena,  and  experiments ;  so,  in  the 
 former  case,  no  reasoning  can  be  valid  in  opposition  to  positive 
 
A  LETTEE  TO  DK  PEIESTLEY.  501 
 
 evidence,  or  express  discernible  authority."  *  Common  sense,  right 
 reason,  the  opinions  of  the  good  and  great,  &c.,  have  their  use,  and 
 an  important  use,  in  their  proper  jDlaces  ;  but  they  are  no  data  in 
 Christianity.  As  to  the  order  of  investigation,  preceding  revela- 
 tions, and  divinely-authenticated  facts,  are  the  only  safe  rule  by 
 which  we  ought  to  examine  any  particular  part  of  Scripture. 
 Every  foregoing  dispensation  of  religion,  and,  indeed,  every  re- 
 vealed fact,  is,  I  may  say,  a  torch  lighted  in  heaven,  to  illuminate 
 those  that  follow,  imtil  we  come  to  the  "  sealing  of  prophecy,"  or 
 the  end  of  the  canon ;  and  every  succeeding  one,  to  the  last,  re- 
 flects a  still  more  abundant  light  on  all  that  went  before.  Where- 
 fore, let  all  that  revere  the  authority  of  heaven,  all  the  friends  of 
 revelation  and  rational  inquiry,  attend  more  to  this  light  that 
 shineth  in  a  dark  place,  and  not — I  mean  as  the  principal,  and 
 only  safe  means — not  to  the  false  lights  of  human  opinions  (early 
 or  late)  in  the  Church  ;  by  following  which  we  expose  ourselves  to 
 wandering  and  danger  every  step  of  our  road,  while  in  pursuit  of 
 truth  and  happiness. 
 
 If  it  be  objected,  That  a  diversity  of  opinions  still  obtains  among 
 those  who  are  agreed  in  their  data  and  method  of  inquiry,  I  would 
 briefly  reply  in  the  following  particulars  : — ■ 
 
 1.  To  urge  this  objection  is  the  same  as  to  urge  that  men  do 
 not  form  their  opinions  mechanically,  but  freely ;  and  that  some 
 of  them  reason  falsely.  But  what  then  ?  Shall  I  depreciate  and 
 reject  a  rule,  concluding  it  is  not  a  good  one,  because  I  know  not 
 how  to  use  it  ? 
 
 2.  The  objection  implies,  as  far  as  it  has  any  force,  that  men 
 are  not  accountable  for  their  mistakes,  nor  liable  to  make  any, 
 l^rovided  their  means  are  sufficient ;  which  amounts  to  little  less 
 than  self-contradiction.  It  is  much  the  same  as  to  object  against 
 an  experiment — an  accurate  experiment — in  philosophy,  because 
 the  consequences  which  the  learned  draw  from  it  are  various. 
 
 3.  While  men  are  free  and  accountable,  it  is  no  less  necessary 
 that  the  disposition  of  the  mind  be  right,  than  that  the  principle 
 be  well  chosen.  Free  inquiry  of  itself  will  never  insure  success, 
 without  a  right  use  of  that  freedom.  This  is  the  only  way,  that  I 
 know  of,  to  avoid  bad  consequences  ;  and  any  other,  short  of  this, 
 must  prove  abortive. 
 
 But  let  us  not  forget,  that  the  good  disposition  which  we  need 
 *  Antiiieedobaptism  Examined,  chap,  iii.,  §  2;  vol.  ii.,  p.  119,  of  this  edition. 
 
502  A  SETTEE  TO  DE  PEIESTLEY. 
 
 for  this  purpose,  is  not  only  to  be  cultivated  by  the  use  of  means, 
 but  also  is  to  be  received,  in  the  habits  of  it,  from  the  Divine 
 favour,  as  a  matter  of  gospel  promise.  If  there  is  anything  of  a 
 spiritual  nature  promised  ia  the  word  of  God,  there  is  the  promise 
 of  a  Divine  influence  to  be  obtained  by  asking  for  it ;  that  is,  im- 
 portunate seeking  in  God's  appointed  way.  (See  Luke  xi.  1-13  ; 
 James  i.  5-8.)  And  this  is  so  far  from  being  inconsistent  with 
 moral  agency  in  this  our  state  of  trial  for  eternity,  that  the  trial 
 eminently  consists,  with  respect  to  those  to  whom  the  promise  is 
 given,  in  their  subnaitting,  or  not  submitting,  to  its  gxacious  im- 
 port. In  short,  for  "  the  heart  to  be  established  with  grace," 
 (Heb.  xiiL  9,)  is  the  best  preparative  for  using  our  freedom  well, 
 and  the  best  preservative  in  the  line  of  truth.  And  if,  after  all 
 our  pretensions  to  sincerity  and  teachableness,  the  love  of  truth 
 and  impartiality  in  seeking  it,  are  equal,  and  yet  our  sentiments 
 differ,  there  is  no  remedy  in  this  world ;  to  our  common  Master 
 we  stand  or  fall ;  our  own  judgment  of  ourselves,  as  well  as  that 
 of  our  feUow-creatures  concerning  us,  must  be  equally  submitted 
 to  the  Judge  of  the  whole  earth.  "  Every  way  of  man  is  right  in 
 his  own  eyes ;  but  the  Lord  pondereth  the  heart,"  (Prov.  xxL  2.) 
 
 I  must  confess,  dear  Sir,  that  I  was  much  grieved  when  I  per- 
 used the  following  sentence,  which  you  not  only  suffered  to  drop 
 from  your  pen,  but  to  be  published  to  the  world : — "  If,  to  your 
 arguments  you  can  even  add  miracles,  the  doctrine  you  propose 
 \i.  e.,  personal  distinctions  in  the  Deity]  could  not  be  received."  * 
 What  a  reflection  upon  the  Christian  Church,  and  upon  mUlions 
 of  the  most  distinguished  pious  characters  in  every  age!  But 
 though  the  expressions  are  strong,  and  your  conviction  such  as 
 they  represent  it  to  be,  yet  you  must  allow,  that  it  is  possible  you 
 may  be  in  a  mistake ;  for  such  have  been  the  convictions  of  many 
 persons  in  favour  of  an  erroneous  sentiment,  as  to  stand  firm 
 against  actual  miracles,  repeated  miracles,  performed  in  proof  of  a 
 contrary  sentiment.  Your  own  observation  will  justify  and  l11u.s- 
 trate  this  remark  : — "  The  prejudices  of  some  persons  against  the 
 clearest  and  most  important  truths  may  be  so  strong,  (as  we  see  in 
 the  case  of  the  scribes  and  Pharisees  of  our  Saviour's  time,)  that 
 no  evidence  will  convince  them."  + 
 
 *  Defences  of  Unitar.  for  1788  and  1789,  p.  176. 
 
 +  Sermon  on  the  Proper  Conduct  of  Dissenters  with  respect  to  the  Test 
 Act,  p.  10. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  DE  PEIESTLEY.  503 
 
 If  you  condescend,  Sir,  to  peruse  these  volumes,  you  will  find 
 that  the  author,  who,  for  dejjth  of  erudition,  and  extent  of  know- 
 ledge, proper  for  an  accomplished  divine,  has  been  excelled  by  few, 
 if  any, — ^you  will  find,  that  he  undertakes  no  less  a  task  than  to 
 demonstrate  that  this  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  teaches  doctrines 
 and  facts  which  utterly  overthrow  the  opinions  you  espouse  con- 
 cerning the  person  and  priesthood  of  Christ.  His  foundation  is 
 not  laid  upon  the  surface :  he  first  demonstrates  the  canonical 
 authority  of  the  epistle,  before  he  proceeds  to  investigate  the  con- 
 tents of  it ;  and  the  latter  he  does  in  the  light  of  preceding  revela- 
 tions, and  a  very  enlarged  acquaintance  with  Judaism,  both  ancient 
 and  modern,  in  its  pure  and  corrupted  state.  His  exposition, 
 reasoning,  and  doctrines,  are  aU  along  founded  on  the  general 
 scope  of  the  passage  he  is  upon ;  and  it  will  not  be  easy  for  any 
 one  to  convict  him  of  mistake,  without  shewing  that  he  has  mis- 
 taken the  main  design  of  the  epistle  itself,  which,  in  my  opinion, 
 would  be  a  Herculean  task. 
 
 Before  I  conclude,  I  have  one  remark  to  make,  which,  I  presume, 
 is  not  unworthy  your  attention.  It  is  this  :  If  the  Nazarenes  and 
 Ebionites  were  what  you  have  represented  them  to  be, — Jewish 
 Christians,  who  held  the  mere  humanity  of  Christ,  and  who  may  be 
 traced  to  the  very  age  of  the  apostles, — the  plain  inference  is,  that 
 this  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  was  intended  by  the  author  of  it,  and 
 by  Him  who  is  Head  over  all  things  to  the  Church,  as  an  antidote 
 to  counteract  such  an  opinion  in  the  most  direct  manner;  and 
 were  the  historical  evidence  of  the  positions  you  have  advanced, 
 Sir,  concerning  the  person  and  oflSces  of  the  Messiah  a  thousand 
 times  more  clear  than  it  is,  or  is  likely  to  be,  the  irrefragable  con- 
 clusion is,  that  the  writer  of  this  epistle,  and  all  who  embraced  his 
 doctrine,  were  displeased  with  them  in  that  very  thing  for  which 
 you  seem  to  caress  them.  And  if  any  of  the  Nazarenes  themselves 
 sid)mitted  to  what  it  plainly  inculcates,  they  must  have  abandoned 
 the  sentiments  you  ascribe  to  them  ;  or  if  they  did  not,  their 
 obstinate  refusal  stands  condemned  by  it  in  every  page. 
 
 But  "  Paul  often  reasons  inconclusively  " — a  bold  charge !  and  a 
 charge  destitute  of  proof.  Now,  supposing,  without  granting,  that 
 "  he  wrote  as  any  other  person  of  his  turn  of  mind  and  thinking, 
 and  in  his  situation,  would  have  written,  without  any  particular 
 inspiration,"  it  is  but  reasonable  to  say  that  the  number  of  his 
 converts  and  of  the  churches  founded  by  him  was  very  consider- 
 
504  A  LETTER  TO  DR  PRIESTLEY. 
 
 able ;  and  that  they  imbibed  his  sentimeuts,  to  a  great  degree  at 
 least,  appears  from  his  writings  addressed  to  manj'  of  them.  Now, 
 upon  what  principle  of  reason  and  equity  can  we  gather  that  Ehion 
 and  his  adherents,  holding  contrary  opinions,  deserve  the  honour 
 of  being  better  qualified  to  rectify  our  judgments  concerning 
 points  of  the  greatest  importance  in  Christianity,  in  preference  to 
 St  Paul  and  the  churches  founded  by  him  ?  Were  the  Nazarenes 
 infalhble  ?  or  did  Ebioii  ever  reason  inconclusively  ?  Was  the 
 church  at  Jerusalem  infallible  ?  or  were  theu'  jjastors  more  con- 
 clusive reasoners  than  Paul  ?  If  they  were,  upon  what  principle  ? 
 if  not,  why  impeach  Ms  apostolic  teaching  in  particular,  (in  which 
 we  may  presume  he  sometimes  reasoned^  and  degrade  his  abilities  ? 
 The  truth  is,  St  Paul  was  a  wise  master-builder,  who  laid  the 
 foundation  of  many  churches,  and  edified  them  in  the  most  holy 
 faith  by  his  preaching  and  his  pen.  From  Jerusalem,  and  round 
 about  unto  Illyricum,  he  fully  preached  the  gospel  of  Christ.  He 
 was  sent  by  Christ  himself  to  open  men's  eyes,  and  to  turn  them 
 from  darkness  to  light,  through  mighty  signs  and  wonders,  hy  the 
 power  of  the  Spirit  of  God.  He  was  an  apostle,  (not  of  men, 
 neither  hy  man,  but  by  Jesus  Christ  and  God  the  Father,)  and 
 certified  his  converts  that  the  gospel  he  preached  was  not  after 
 man ;  for  he  saith,  "  I  neither  received  it  of  man,  neither  was  I 
 taught  it,  but  by  the  revelation  of  Jesus  Christ." 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  for  any  one  to  prefer  a  few  obscure  accounts 
 of  a  few  obscure  persons  to  the  accounts  we  have  of  the  commis- 
 sion, authority;  principles,  and  reasonings  of  this  man  of  God,  by 
 which  to  form  our  judgments  concerning  true  Christianity,  appears 
 to  me  like  a  person  who  sliould  prefer  a  heterogeneous  mixture  of 
 iron  and  clay  to  pure  gold ;  and  then,  to  make  his  wisdom  appear 
 more  consummate,  that  he  should,  after  having  once  made  the 
 choice,  rummage  aU  the  musty  scraps  of  antiquity  for  something 
 that  may  help  to  stamp  a  current  value  on  it,  and  to  depreciate 
 what  has  been  thus  renounced.  In  reality,  the  Nazarenes  were 
 ignorant  of  the  true  nature  of  the  gospel ;  whatever  instructions 
 they  were  favoured  with,  they  had  made  little  proficiency  in  the 
 school  of  Christ ;  else  why  should  they  be  so  tenacious  of  what  all 
 the  apiostles  laboured  to  disj)ossess  them  of  ? — why  attempt  to  build 
 again  what  they  had  unanimously,  and  by  Divine  direction,  been 
 pulling  down  ?  I  forbear  enlarging  ;  but  disinterested  observers 
 of  what  is  going  on  among  us  will  be  ready  to  exclaim — "  Surely 
 
A  LETTER  TO  DK  PEIESTLBY.  505 
 
 we  may  congratulate  the  laimility  (if  we  cannot  the  wisdom)  of 
 the  eighteenth  century,  so  famous  for  many  other  interesting  and 
 memorable  exploits,  while  we  behold  its  '  most  rational  divines,' 
 after  struggling  for  liberty,  and  improving  science,  commenc- 
 ing, with  no  small  complacency,  the  obsequious  disciples  of  these 
 obscure,  ignorant,  anti-apostolic  Nazarenes  and  Ebionites  !"  * 
 
 *  The  following  passage,  from  a  late  learned  and  acute  Reviewer  of  the  "  History 
 of  Corruption,"  &e.,  appears  to  me  so  just,  and  so  much  to  the  purpose,  that  I 
 cannot  forbear  transcribing  it : — "  But  an  indifferent  reader  may,  perhaps,  stop 
 the  disputants  in  this  career  of  controversy,  and  ask  them  of  what  importance  it 
 is  to  the  main  object  of  the  debate  between  them,  to  know  what  the  opinions  of 
 these  Nazarenes  were ;  especially  as  it  is  a  point  agreed  upon  between  both,  that 
 these  Nazarenes,  whatever  their  principles  of  faith  might  have  been,  were  ignorant 
 and  bigoted  observers  of  the  Mosaic  law,  which  both  the  orthodox  and  heretics 
 acknowledge  to  have  been  abrogated  by  the  death  of  Christ  ?  Do  they  stand  so 
 high  in  the  scale  of  authority,  that  we  should  appeal  to  them  in  the  decision 
 which  respected  the  nature  and  person  of  Jesus  Christ  ?  What  is  gained  on  the 
 one  hand,  and  what  is  lost  on  the  other,  by  settling  this  dispute,  supposing  it 
 capable  of  being  settled  at  all  ?  A  very  proper  question  !  And  the  answer  we 
 shall  make  to  it  is  this  ;  That  though  the  believers  in  the  pre-esisteuce  of  Christ 
 have  a  thousand  testimonies  to  appeal  to  in  proof  of  their  faith,  yet  this  seems  to 
 be  the  last  resort  of  the  Sooinian,  when  he  is  called  on  to  produce  authority  for 
 his  principles  in  the  primitive  ages.  Deprive  the  Socinian  of  this  twig  of  an- 
 tiquity,  and  he  is  ready  to  make  the  same  lamentable  outcry  that  was  made  by 
 Mioah  in  old  times — •'  You  have  taken  away  my  gods,  in  whom  I  trusted,  and 
 what  have  I  more  ? ' 
 
 "  The  argument  drawn  out  iu  form  is  the  following  : — The  first  Christians  were 
 called  Nazarenes  :  those  who  afterwards  went  by  that  name  were  their  genuine 
 followers ;  but  those  succeeding  Nazarenes  did  not  believe  that  Jesus  Christ  had 
 a  pre-esistent  nature .-  therefore  it  was  not  a  doctrine  believed  by  the  first  Chris- 
 tians, because  the  later  Nazarenes  transmitted  their  opinions  (at  least  on  this 
 head)  iu  their  original  purity,  without  the  adulterations  of  those  who  were  after- 
 wards called  orthodox. 
 
 "  There  are  many  things  in  this  argument  which  may  be  doubted,  and  some 
 which  may  be  denied.  If  the  Nazarenes  were  the  members  of  the  original 
 Church  of  Christ,-  and  the  genuine  followers  of  the  apostles,  how  came  they  so  far 
 to  counteract  the  design  of  the  Christian  institution  as  to  mix  with  the  ordi- 
 nances of  the  gospel  the  abrogated  ceremonies  of  the  Mosaic  law?  Was  such 
 conduct  in  any  respect  authorised  by  the  New  Testament?  Was  it  not  in 
 direct  opposition  both  to  the  conduct  and  instructions  of  the  apostle  Paul? 
 We  know  what  such  a  Nazarene  as  Toland  would  say  on  this  subject;  but' what 
 would  Dr  Priestley  say  ?  If  the  Nazarenes  were  people  of  such  low  and  carnal 
 sentiments,  so  weak  in  their  understandings,  and  so  superstitious  in  their  prac- 
 tices, can  we  deem  them  fit  authorities  to  be  appealed  to,  in  contradiction  to  the 
 concurrent  testimony  of  the  most  eminent  lights  of  the  primitive  Church  ?  If,  in 
 points  of  practice,  in  which  the  laws  delivered  for  their  direction  were  so  clear 
 and  definite,  they  still  pertinaciously  adhered  to  old  and  exploded  customs,  which 
 the  gospel  had  rendered  totally  useless,  is  it  a  matter  of  any  surprise  that  they 
 should  have  fallen  into  some  errors  of  faith,  and  maintained,  with  an  obstinacy 
 
506  A  LETTER  TO  DE  PRIESTLEY. 
 
 Wishing  that  you  may  possess  an  abundant  measure  of  the 
 Divine  teaching  promised  in  the  sacred  oracles,  to  lead  you  into 
 aU  truth, — that  you  may  have  peace  in  believing, — that  you  may 
 be  found  in  Christ  Jesus,  not  having  your  ovi^n  righteousness,  which 
 is  of  the  law, — and,  finally,  that  you  may  be  replenished  with  the 
 spirit  of  power,  and  of  love,  and  of  a  sound  mind,  I  am,  Reverend 
 Sir,  your  most  obedient  humble  servant, 
 
 Edward  Williams. 
 
 Oswestry,  Fehruanj  1790. 
 
 peculiar  to  theii-  race,  some  of  the  false  prejudices  of  the  Jews  relating  to  the 
 nature  and  qualifications  of  the  Messiah  ? 
 
 "  For  our  part,  we  are  ready  to  confess,  that  if  the  Nazarenes  were,  with  the 
 Ebionites,  given  up  to  the  Socinians,  who  are  so  eager  to  claim  them  as  their 
 elder  brethren,  we  do  not  perceive  the  very  great  advantage  they  would  gain  by 
 such  an  acquisition. 
 
 "Dr  Priestley  is  not  always  careful  to  keep  clear  of  gratuitous  assertion.  It  is  a 
 compendious  method  of  argument ;  but  unless  it  comes  from  an  orade,  we  have  a 
 right  to  admit,  or  reject  it,  jtist  as  we  please.  '  No  person,'  says  he,  '  can,  I  think, 
 reflect  upon  this  subject  with  proper  seriousness  without  thinking  it  a  little 
 remarkable  that  the  Jewish  Christians,  in  so  early  an  age  as  they  are  spoken  of, 
 should  be  acknowledged  to  believe  nothing  either  of  the  divinity,  or  even  of  the 
 pre-existence  of  Christ,  if  either  of  those  doctrines  had  been  taught  them  by  the 
 apostles.'  On  the  same  mode  of  reasoning,  and  with  equal  propriety,  we  might 
 say — '  It  is  a  little  extraordinary  that  the  Jewish  Christians  should  have  con- 
 tinued such  adherents  to  the  rituals  of  the  Mosaic  law,  if  they  had  been  explicitly 
 taught  that  they  were  abrogated  by  the  death  of  Christ.  Can  we  suppose  any 
 who  owned  the  truth  of  the  gospel  to  have  remained  ignorant  of  the  grand  design 
 of  its  promulgation,  if  that  design  had  been  properly  delineated  and  explained? 
 Or  could  they  have  pei-severed  in  an  obstinate  resistance  to  it,  if  it  had  been 
 enforced  by  proper  authority  ?  These  were  the  standards  of  ancient  simplicity  ! 
 at  least  simplicity  of  Christian  doctrine  ;  though  the  veil  of  Moses  was  over  their 
 faces,  and  the  yoke  of  the  old  law  fettered  their  necks!'" — Monthly  Review, 
 vol.  Isix.,  p  219,  &c. 
 
A  LETTEE  TO  MR  DAVID  LEVI, 
 
 RECOMMENDING  THIS  WORK  *  TO  HIS  CANDID  AND 
 ATTENTIVE  PERUSAL. 
 
 Deae  Sie, — What  I  observed  to  your  late  antagonist,  Dr  Priestley, 
 in  my  preceding  letter  to  him,  respecting  my  principal  motive  in 
 addressing  him  in  the  manner  I  have  done,  is  applicable  also  in 
 general  to  the  present  address.  It  is  not  intended  to  provoke  your 
 polemic  pen,  but  to  solicit  a  favour.  Since  you  profess  a  sincere 
 love  of  truth,  and  an  openness  to  conviction,  your  candid  and 
 attentive  perusal  of  the  volumes  herewith  sent  you,  is  amicably 
 requested. 
 
 The  Epistle  here  commented  upon  was  originally  designed  for 
 your  nation,  the  Hebrews ;  not  only  for  the  edification  of  those 
 who  had  embraced  the  gospel,  but  also  for  the  conviction  of  such 
 as  continued  to  reject  it.  This  being  its  primary  designation,  and 
 it  being,  as  I  firmly  believe,  divinely  revealed,  I  can  no  less  than 
 importunately  and  affectionately  recommend  it  to  you  and  your 
 friends,  as  an  instrument  chosen  by  Infinite  Wisdom,  admirably 
 calculated,  when  rightly  understood,  to  subserve  your  best  and 
 everlasting  interest. 
 
 The  writer  of  it  was  a  Hebrew  of  the  Hebrews ;  in  the  former 
 part  of  his  life  zealous  for  the  law,  in  your  view  of  its  import :  he 
 was  a  strict  Pharisee,  and  no  small  proficient  in  the  learning  of 
 the  Jews,  as  well  as  their  rehgion.     Nor  did  he  embrace  the 
 
 *  [Dr  Owen's  Exposition  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  as  abridged  by  Dr 
 Williams.— Ed.] 
 
508  A  LETTER  TO  MR  DAVID  LEVI. 
 
 Christian  faith,  which  I  venture  to  call  the  accomplishment  and 
 perfection  of  the  Jewish,  but  upon  the  clearest  evidence  and 
 strongest  conviction  that  the  mind  of  man,  in  matters  of  this 
 nature,  is,  perhaps,  capable  of.  He  was  well  qualified  to  form  an 
 estimate  of  both;  and  the  result  was,  upon  the  most  deliberate 
 review,  that  he  counted  all  things  but  loss  for  the  excellency  of 
 the  knowledge  of  Christ  Jesus,  his  Lord.  This,  it  is  true,  brought 
 upon  him  the  odium  of  his  countrymen,  as  if  he  were  an  apostate 
 from  the  religion  of  their  forefathers  ;  whereas,  in  reality,  no  man, 
 after  his  embracing  the  gospel,  better  understood  wherein  the  life 
 and  glory  of  that  religion  consisted.  No  man  had  a  higher  vener- 
 ation for  the  Divine  authority  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptm'es,  and  the 
 exalted  character  of  Moses.  What  he  before  thought  to  be  quite 
 inconsistent — the  legislation  of  Moses,  and  the  Messiahship  of 
 Jesus  Christ — appeared  now,  as  indeed  they  are,  perfectly  recon- 
 cilable. 
 
 His  writings  in  general,  as  well  as  this  epistle,  are  characterised 
 not  only  by  a  depth,  compactness,  and  force  of  argument,  but  also 
 by  an  admirable  spirit  of  benevolence.  So  powerfully  did  this 
 Divine  principle  operate  in  his  virtuous  and  holy  mind,  that  it 
 breaks  forth  into  language  iirimitably  strong  and  pathetic.  (See 
 Eom.  ix.  1-5.)  Lest  any  should  imagine  that  his  adherence  to 
 the  Christian  cause  was  the  effect  of  bigotrj^, — that  he  was  only  a 
 violent  party  man, — he  declares  in  the  most  solemn  terms,  that  for 
 the  love  he  bore  to  his  brethren,  his  kinsmen  according  to  the 
 flesh,  he  coidd  even  submit,  were  that  avaOable,  to  the  same  treat- 
 ment from  the  Christian  Church  as  he  had  received  from  the 
 Jewish. 
 
 The  subject  of  this  epistle  is  peculiarly  interesting.  It  treats  of 
 a  religious  controversy  of  great  magnitude ;  indeed,  I  may  say, 
 the  greatest  controversy  that  ever  existed  in  the  Church  of  God, 
 and  in  which  you  and  your  brethren  are  concerned  in  a  direct  and 
 immediate  manner.  This  is  another  reason  that  induces  me  to 
 solicit  your  attention  to  this  work,  in  your  professed  capacity  of 
 an  impartial  inquirer. 
 
 But  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  we  are  very  liable  to  mistake 
 the  true  nature  of  this  controversy ;  and  whUe  we  labour  under 
 that  mistake,  it  is  no  wonder  that  our  prejudices  are  strengthened 
 in  favour  of  our  own  tenets,  right  or  wrong,  while  affronted  truth, 
 indignant,  eludes  our  disappointed  grasp.     Though  the  question. 
 
A  LETTEE  TO  ME  DAVID  LEVI.  509 
 
 Whether  Jesus  Christ  be  the  true  Messiah  ?  be  to  Jews  and  Chris- 
 tians, if  properly  weighed,  infinitely  momentous;  yet,  in  my  ap- 
 prehension, it  is  a  question  too  complicated,  or  not  sufficiently 
 radical,  for  an  accurate  inquirer  to  begin  with.  If  I  may  pre- 
 sume to  ofier  my  thoughts  on  this  important  subject,  the  previous 
 question  ought  to  be,  not.  Whether  any  part  of  the  Old  Testa- 
 ment ought  to  be  attacked  and  renounced,  as  if  not  given  by 
 Divine  authority  ?  but.  What  is  the  teue  impost  of  the  Old  Tes- 
 tament system  ?  Was  it  given  with  a  subordinate  design,  with  a 
 view  to  introduce  a  dispensation  of  a  more  spiritual  form,  or  was 
 it  not  ?  Are  the  Messiah's  kingdom,  and  its  grand  blessings,  as 
 represented  in  the  ancient  promises,  and  by  the  spirit  of  prophecy, 
 of  a  temporary  and  perishing,  or  of  a  loermanent  and  eternal 
 nature  ?  Before  we  can,  therefore,  properly  agitate  the  question 
 about  the  person  of  the  Messiah,  we  ought,  as  regular  investigators 
 and  controvertists,  for  the  sake  of  lessening  the  labour,  to  come 
 to  a  previous  issue  concerning — What  kind  of  a  Messiah  the 
 ancient  records  hold  forth  ?  What  is  the  nature  of  the  loork  there 
 assigned  for  Him  ?  Do  His  offices  relate  only  to  this  transitory 
 life,  or  do  they  respect  redemption  from  moral  evil  and  everlasting 
 misery  ?  If  the  former,  you  are  in  the  right ;  but  if  the  latter, 
 we  bid  fair  for  being  so. 
 
 I  may  here  observe,  that  you  stand,  in  a  sense,  the  representative 
 of  your  English  brethren,  while  publishing  and  defending  that  sense 
 of  the  Old  Testament  writings  which  this  epistle  undertakes  to 
 prove  is  the  ivrong  sense  of  them.  St  Paul's  interpretation  of  the 
 Holy  Scripture,  and  yours,  are  diametrically  opposite.  This  con- 
 sideration also,  in  connexion  with  my  idea  of  Paul's  knowledge, 
 disposition,  and  abilities,  induces  me  to  call  your  closest  attention 
 to  his  different  method  of  explaining  the  sacred  oracles.  And  may 
 the  God  of  all  grace  lead  you  into  all  truth  !  By  the  knowledge  of 
 His- merciful  and  sovereign  pleasure  in  His  various  dispensations, 
 may  you  effectually  learn  wherein  consists  the  true  kingdom  of 
 God! 
 
 With  respect  to  the  exjiosition  of  this  epistle,  by  the  learned  and 
 pious  Dr  Owen,  together  with  the  exercitations,  they  contain,  in 
 my  opinion,  a  full  reply  to  everything  of  moment  contained  in 
 your  late  publications  in  favour  of  Judaism.  Without  reflecting  on 
 what  others  have  done,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  this  work  enters 
 more  into  the  merits  of  the  cause  than  anything  you  seem  to  be 
 
510  A  LETTER  TO  ME  DAVID  LEVI. 
 
 acquainted  with,  as  far  as  I  can  judge  from  your  writings.  Will 
 you  excuse  me  if  I  here  add,  that  I  am  satisfied,  from  the  idea  I 
 have  of  the  general  tendency  of  this  work,  and  a  truly  religious 
 character,  that  were  your  progenitor  Abraham  on  the  land  of  the 
 living  to  peruse  it,  he  would  subjoin  his  hearty  amen. 
 
 When  I  consider  your  notion  of  the  Messiah's  kingdom,  and  of 
 the  unanimity  of  His  subjects,  I  am  aware  of  your  being  ready  to 
 object  to  every  proposal  from  a  Christian,  be  it  what  it  may,  as  in 
 your  first  letters : — "  To  convert  a  nation,  such  as  the  Jews,  to 
 Christianity,  the  professors  thereof  ought  to  be  unanimous  in  what 
 the  work  of  salvation  consists,  otherwise  they  might  be  deterred 
 therefrom,  by  reason  of  the  difliculty  attending  the  making  a  proper 
 choice  of  that  which  is  right."  *  That  Is,  if  there  be  any  force  in 
 the  objection,  you  will  be  right  in  rejecting  Christianity  because 
 Christians  differ  in  their  judgment  about  the  particulars  of  their 
 reKgion.  But  how  unreasonable,  how  preposterous  the  requisition  ! 
 Do  any  Christians  differ  about  Jesus  being  the  Messiah?  No. 
 Give  us  then  the  meeting  tJmsfar  before  you  object  to  less  general 
 differences.  If  you  expect  such  unanimity  among  uninspired  men 
 in  the  present  state,  before  j'ou  grant  them  leave  to  recommend 
 their  religion  to  their  fellow-men,  as  of  Divine  original,  you  must 
 suppose  them  to  be  mere  machines,  that  do  not  act  by  free  choice. 
 On  this  principle  it  is  impossible  that  there  ever  should  be  unan- 
 imity among  men.  For  just  with  the  same  reason  may  every 
 ijidividual  object,  of  whatever  religion — Christian,  Jewish,  Moham- 
 medan, or  heathen.  It  is  the  same  as  to  say,  I  will  never  embrace 
 truth  until  all  who  profess  it  act  a  worthy  part ;  I  wiU  never  aim 
 at  being  truly  religious  until  aU  others  are  so  first ;  I  wiU  have 
 nothing  to  do  with  any  truth  but  what  acts  mechanicaUj^  on  aU 
 who  jyrofess  it,  producing  in  them  a  uniform  good  effect,  whether 
 they  will  or  no  !  But,  dear  Sii-,  you  seem  to  expect  among  the 
 subjects  of  King  Messiah  what  will  never  be  in  this  world,  and 
 which  God  has  never  promised.  That  those  of  the  same  general 
 denomination  are  not  "  agreed  among  themselves "  in  some  par- 
 ticulars is  so  far  from  being  a  characteristic  mark  of  a  false 
 religion  that  it  is  in  reality  no  more  than  the  natural,  and,  in  the 
 present  imi^erfect  state,  the  unavoidable  result  of  human  freedom. 
 It  is  acknowledged  by  yourself,  that  "  conscience  ought  to  be  free  ;" 
 that  is,  I  presume,  in  every  state  under  the  reign  of  the  Messiah 
 
 *  Letters  to  Dr  Priestley,  p.  72. 
 
A  LETTEE  TO  ME  DAVID  LEVI.  511 
 
 not  exceiDted.  Men,  iu  the  present  state,  are  fallible  and  account- 
 able, consequently  no  mere  profession  of  the  sublimest  truths 
 conceivable  can  insure  unanimity.  Modern  Judaism  is  either 
 right  or  wrong,  notwithstanding  the  petty  jars  among  its  pro- 
 fessors ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  Christianity. 
 
 Eeflecting  further  on  your  views  of  religion,  liberty  of  conscience, 
 and  charity,  I  can  easily  conceive  how  uninteresting  must  appear 
 to  you  any  attempt  at  conversion,  whether  by  Jews  or  Christians. 
 "  We  do  not,"  say  you,  "  think  ourselves  bound,  as  the  Christians, 
 to  propagate  our  religion,"  not  even  " by  arguments''  Singular 
 and  frigid  sentiment !  and  not  less  singular  the  ground  on  which 
 it  stands  ;  for,  concerning  mankind,  who  are  not  Jews,  you  observe, 
 "  If  they  do  but  keep  the  law  of  nature,  that  is,  the  seven  precepts 
 of  the  sons  of  Noah,  or  Noachides,  we  maintain  that  they  thereby 
 perform  all  that  God  requires  of  them,  and  wiU  certainly,  hy  this 
 service,  render  themselves  acceptable  to  Him."  *  These  you  caU 
 the  pious  of  the  nations  of  the  world,  who  will  be  partakers  of 
 eternal  life !  The  seven  precepts  are  these : — "  First,  Not  to 
 commit  idolatry.  Second,  Not  to  blaspheme.  Third,  To  appoint 
 and  constitute  just  and  upright  judges,  that  justice  may  be  main- 
 tained, and  impartially  administered  to  all.  Fourth,  Not  to  com- 
 mit incest.  Fifth,  Not  to  commit  murder.  Sixth,  Not  to  rob,  or 
 steal,  &c.  Seventh,  Not  to  eat  a  member  of  a  living  creature." 
 Alas,  alas  !  if  Noah  and  his  sons  had  no  better  ground  of  hope  of 
 eternal  life  than  arose  from  their  performance  of  this  service,  they 
 could  no  more  have  quieted  the  accusations  of  conscience,  or 
 abated  the  horrors  of  an  eternal  existence  with  a  holy  and  just 
 God,  than  they  could  avert  the  stroke  of  death,  or  suspend  the 
 laws  of  nature  !  Is  this  your  view  of  religion  and  the  Divine 
 dispensations  ?  The  absurdity  is  almost  unparalleled,  and  wants 
 a  name.     Blessed  be  God  for  the  gospel ! 
 
 "  If  you  are  really  in  earnest,"  say  you  to  Dr  Priestley,  "  and 
 wish  to  convert  the  Jews  to  what  you  caU  Christianity,  I  think 
 you  must  produce  more  substantial  proofs  in  support  of  your 
 hypothesis  than  what  you  have  yet  done.  And,  if  I  might  pre- 
 sume to  offer  my  opinion  in  so  weighty  a  cause,  I  think  that  the 
 fairest  method,  and  that  which  is  the  likeliest  to  lead  to  conviction 
 on  either  side,  is  to  take  a  review  of  all  the  p)rophecies  concerning 
 the  Messiah,  from  Moses  to  Malachi,  and  compare  them  with  the 
 
 *  Letters  to  Dr  Priestley,  p.  12. 
 
512  A  LETTER  TO  MR  DAVID  LEVI. 
 
 acts  of  Jesus,  recorded  in  the  New  Testament,  to  see  whetlier  or 
 no  they  have  been  fulfilled  in  his  person."  *  I  must  confess  that 
 this  method,  as  far  as  it  goes,  (for  it  includes  only  the  prophetic 
 part  of  the  ancient  oracles.)  appears  to  me,  imder  the  limitations 
 before  observed,  a  good  one,  and  doubt  not  but  that  it  meets  vdth 
 the  approbation  of  all  hberal  Christians.  Nay,  Jesus  Himself  re- 
 commends it : — "  Search  the  Scriptures,  for  they  are  they  that 
 testify  of  me."  And  as  you  aimounce  such  a  desigu,  it  may  be 
 of  service  to  you  to  weigh  very  carefully  what  Dr  Owen  has  done 
 this  way  in  the  Exercitations ;  and  if  you  should  think  him  not 
 sufficiently  minute  iu  the  abridgment,  you  would  do  well  to 
 consult  the  original  edition.  But  excuse  me,  dear  Sir,  if  on  this 
 occasion  I  droj)  a  monitory  hint, — viz.,  that  you  deal  fairly,  and 
 draw  no  conclusions  which  are  not  justified  by  a  thorough  know- 
 ledge of  the  subject,  and  a  comprehensive  view  of  it.  Without 
 this  we  cannot  be  said  to  investigate  the  meaning  of  Scripture, 
 but  to  trifle  with  it  to  our  own  ruin.  Happy  were  it  for  us  all,  if 
 nothing  but  the  clear  evidence  of  truth,  arising  from  an  acc^uaint- 
 ance  sufficiently  extensive  with  any  controverted  subject,  deter- 
 mined our  choice  !  The  happy  efiects  would  be  more  humility, 
 (that  valuable,  though  old-fashioned  virtue,)  more  moderation,  and 
 less  premature  triumph  in  disputants,  more  industry  in  seeking, 
 and  peace  in  enjoying  truth. 
 
 But  to  what  end  is  it  to  examine  prophecies,  while  you  examine 
 them  by  the  following  standard  ?  "  We  hold  the  perpetuity  of  the 
 law  of  Moses,  and  to  which  nothing  is  to  be  added  or  diminished 
 by  any  succeeding  prophet  whatever."  -f  If  this  were  granted  you 
 as  an  axiom,  (but  which  I  call  a  fundamental  error,)  you  would 
 make  quick  work  with  all  the  prophecies  as  well  as  the  gospel. 
 But  wliile  you  hold  this  opinion,  you  hold  what  I  think  can  never 
 be  proved,  what  the  law  neither  requires  nor  intends,  what  is 
 highly  affronting  to  God  himself,  and  destructive  to  the  souls  of 
 men.  "Were  Moses  upon  earth,  he  would,  perhaps,  be  the  first  to 
 contradict  your  interpretation  of  his  words.  We  maintain  with 
 Paul,  what  is,  I  think,  demonstrated  in  the  following  epistle  and 
 exposition,  that  it  is  not  by  a  different  authority  from  that  which 
 enacted  the  law  that  it  is  repealed ;  and  surely  it  must  be  absurd 
 to  contend  (while  His  own  declarations  do  not  oblige)  that  a  local, 
 ceremonial  institution  cannot  be  abrogated  by  the  Supreme  Law- 
 
 *  Letters  to  Dr  Priestley,  p.  90.  f  Second  Letters,  p.  56. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  ME  DAVID  LEVI.  513 
 
 giver.  That  the  "apostles  inculcated  the  aboUsJiment  of  the 
 Mosaical  dispensation  "  is  very  true ;  and  it  is  equally  true  that 
 it  was  at  first  given  with  that  desiarn.  And  has  not  Providence 
 incontestably  confirmed  their  doctrine  ?  Has  it  not  rendered  the 
 observance  of  the  Mosaic  law  absolutely  impossible  ?  If  we  hold 
 with  the  ajiostles,  "that  the  law  of  Moses  cannot  effect  the  justifi- 
 cation of  mankind,"  it  is,  because  we  believe  and  prove  that  it  was 
 never  given  for  that  end,  never  effected  for  tliat  purpose,  and  is,  in 
 its  own  nature,  incapable  of  it.  We  do  not  reject  the  law,  nor  did 
 the  apostles,  as  if  it  were  not  holy,  just,  and  good  in  its  proper 
 place ;  it  is  good  as  a  schoolmaster,  but  not  as  a  Saviour — as  a 
 mirror  of  the  Divine  will,  and  the  rule  of  human  obedience  for 
 the  time,  and  to  the  end  of  its  appointment.  And  we  confidently 
 add,  that  the  Mosaic  law  is  more  truly  and  efl^ectually  honoured 
 by  every  true  Christian,  than  by  any  Jew  in  the  world  ;  for  if  the 
 grand  end  of  it,  in  its  covenant  form,  be  answered  in  the  life  and 
 death  of  Christ,  and  if  the  ceremonial  part  of  it  be  repealed  by  the 
 united  voice  of  the  gospel  and  of  Providence,  (both  which  we  main- 
 tain to  be  facts,)  our  conduct  must  be  more  honourable  to  the  law 
 and  the  Lawgiver  than  your.s  can  be ;  and  obstinately  to  adhere  to 
 a  repealed  law,  is  but  a  slender  proof  of  respect  to  the  legislative 
 authority.  Besides,  the  apostles  were  taught  this  very  doctrine 
 from  the  words  of  Jeremiah,  (chap.  xxxi.  31-34,)  and  other  pro- 
 phetic testimonies,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  the  Jewish 
 economy  and  Divine  direction.  That  "  God  never  contradicts 
 Himself,"  we  readily  believe ;  which  is  a  strong  reason,  among 
 others,  obliging  us  to  receive  Jesus  as  the  Christ  of  God ;  for  we 
 think  that  if  He  is  not  the  Messiah,  we  have  nothing  left  us  but  a 
 heap  of  contradictions,  as  the  venerable  author  here  recommended 
 to  you  abundantly  shews.  On  your  supposition,  we  think,  neither 
 promises,  prophecies,  sacrifices,  characteristic  notes  of  the  Messiah, 
 nor  His  principal  offices,  to  save  from  sin  and  misery,  have  any 
 meaning  ;  and  we  apprehend  that  your  interpretation  must  be  at 
 every  step  subversive  of  itself. 
 
 You,  indeed,  frankly  acknowledge,  that  "if  Christ's  divinity  is 
 false,  and  he  did  not  come  to  sufi'er  for  the  redemption  of  man- 
 kind, as  Christians  hold,  he  came  for  nothing."  *  When  we  hear 
 such  language,  we  cannot  help  inquiring.  What  better  worh  have 
 you  for  your  expected  Messiah  ?     Or  in  what  better  manner  can 
 
 *  Second  Letters,  p.  1 2. 
 VOL.  IV.  2  K 
 
514  _  A  LETTER  TO  MR  DAVID  LEVI. 
 
 you  conceive  of  a  redemption  to  be  brought  to  men,  than  that 
 which  is  exhibited  in  the  New  Testament?  Is  there  any  enemy 
 worse  than  sm,  or  any  better  method  of  deliverance  from  it  than 
 what  we  maintain  ?  If  motives  are  required,  what  can  we  desire, 
 or  even  conceive  of,  more  forcible  and  engaging  ?  And  that  the 
 Mediator  of  the  new  covenant  does  not  authorise  external  force  to 
 procure  uniformity  of  sentiments  and  worship,  is  so  far  from  being 
 a  defect,  that  it  must  appear  to  every  considerate  mind  perfectly 
 consistent  with  all  just  \'iews  of  human  nature,  man's  designation 
 in  this  state  of  trial,  and  the  Divine  perfections.  If  men  act  a  part 
 unworthy  of  the  best  means,  while  they  profess  an  adherence  to 
 them,  this  no  more  argues  the  deficiency  of  those  means  than  it 
 would  argue. the  badness  of  the  seventh  command,  and  the  Mosaic 
 legislation,  because  a  professed  Jew  commits  adultery.  As  to  the 
 insinuation,  that  the  New  Testament  recommends  our  going  after 
 other  Gods — ^because  the  divinity  of  Christ,  as  you  justly  contend, 
 is  taiight  by  the  apostles  ;  or,  that  He  is  God  manifest  in  the  flesh, 
 as  if  the  apostles  and  their  followers  taught  another  God  than 
 the  God  of  Abraham,  is  a  calumny  that  must  be  answered  for 
 before  Him  who  says,  "  Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness  against 
 thy  neighbour." 
 
 You  are  pleased  to  say,  that  you  are  "  a  Jew  by  choice,  and  not 
 because  you  are  born  a  Jew."  *  And  I  am  happy  to  say,  that  I 
 am  a  Christian  by  choice,  and  not  because  I  was  born  a  Christian. 
 But  one  of  us  must  be  certainly  wrong  with  respect  to  the  point  of 
 difference,  which,  if  there  be  any  truth  in  religion  at  all,  is  a  point 
 of  infinite  importance.  While  our  views  of  religion  are  so  dii'ectly 
 opposite,  both  of  us  cannot  have  clear  evidence  that  we  are  right. 
 How  dear  your  religion  is  to  you  I  cannot  tell ;  but  this  I  can  say, 
 that,  according  to  my  habitual  feelings,  I  would  not  exchange  for 
 ten  thousand  worlds,  were  they  at  my  disposal.  I  would  not  ex- 
 change my  present  peace  of  mind,  which  is  the  pure  efi'ect  of  the 
 religion  I  embrace,  as  held  forth  in  the  New  Testament,  indepen- 
 dent of  the  eternal  iveight  of  glory  it  exhibits  to  be  enjoyed  here- 
 after, for  all  the  advantages  that  your  most  sanguine  hopes  can 
 imagine,  as  attending  the  appearance  of  another  Messiah.  And 
 my  saRsfaction  is  derived  as  weU  from  the  Old  Testament  as  the 
 New, — the  writings  of  Moses,  as  well  as  those  of  Paul ;  for  the 
 mercy  of  God,  through  the  Mediator  and  His  atoning  sacrifice, 
 
 *  Letters,  p.  91. 
 
A  LETTER  TO  ME  DAVID  LEVI.  515 
 
 explicit  or  implied,  sMnes  in  every  page,  in  both  I  find  pardon, 
 peace,  righteousness,  and  life ;  grace  reigning  through  righteous- 
 ness, unto  eternal  life  by  Jesus  Christ,  whom  God  hath  set  forth  a 
 propitiation  for  sin,  in  order  to  declare  His  righteousness,  that  He 
 might  be  just,  and  the  justifier  of  him  who  believeth  in  Jesus. 
 And  Dr  Owen  undertakes,  in  this  performance,  to  demonstrate, 
 that  for  any  of  Adam's  race  to  be  pardoned  and  made  happy  with 
 God  for  ever,  without  such  a  provision,  is  utterly  inconsistent, — 
 even  taking  the  Old  Testament  only  for  our  data, — utterly  incon- 
 sistent with  all  just  apprehensions  of  the  attributes  of  Jehovah; 
 and  we  defy  all  the  world  fairly  to  disprove  his  conclusion.  But, 
 alas !  what  a  light  and  insignificant  thing  is  the  demonstration  of 
 a  Christian  in  the  scales  of  a  Jew  !  I  can  easily  conceive  that  the 
 human  mind  (such  is  the  darkness  and  degeneracy  of  our  fallen 
 nature)  is  capable  of  admitting  the  bare  opinions  of  friends  to  be 
 of  greater  weight  and  authority  than  the  demonstrations  of  others. 
 Hence  we  may  learn  to  adore  the  sovereignty  of  Divine  grace  in 
 every  instance  of  a  cordial  submission  to  the  truth  of  God.  If  men 
 hear  not  Moses  and  the  prophets,  in  their  testimony  for  Jesus, 
 neither  will  they  be  persuaded  though  one  rose  from  the  dead — 
 as  He  has  actually  done. 
 
 Dear  Sir,  my  heart's  desire  and  prayer  to  God  for  Israel  is,  that 
 they  might  be  saved.  May  the  God  of  Abraham,  of  Isaac,  and  of 
 Jacob,  the  God  and  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  by  His 
 efiectual  grace,  bring  you  to  know  His  eternal  truth !  How  dif- 
 ferently would  you  then  judge  of  the  evil  and  demerit  of  sin,  and 
 of  the  need  of  a  real  atoning  sacrifice  to  secure  the  honour  of  the 
 Divine  government !  How  infinitely  desirable  would  then  appear 
 a  Saviour  from  the  power  and  love  of  iniquity,  and  from  a  fatal 
 security  under  its  dominion  and  deceitfulness  !  With  what  con- 
 cern would  you  then  regard  the  foUy  of  that  interpretation  of  the 
 lively  oracles  which  confines  the  work  of  the  promised  Messiah 
 to  this  short  life,  the  life  of  a  mere  mortal,  and  a  small  spot  of 
 this  globe!  Seriously  reflect,  dear  Sir,  how  unworthy  of  God, 
 how  inadequate  to  the  real  wants  of  an  immortal  mind,  and  how 
 inconsistent  with  the  whole  tenor  of  Divine  revelation,  as  well  as 
 absolutely  contrary  to  the  clearest  passages,  must  such  an  interpre- 
 tation be. — I  am,  dear  Sir,  your  sincere  well-wisher, 
 
 Edwabd  Williams. 
 
 Oswestry,  Febrim>-y  1790. 
 
LETTERS  ON  SANCTIFICATION, 
 
 AVRITTEN  TO  A  FRIEND. 
 
 LETTER  I. 
 
 ON  THE  IMPORTANCE  AND  NATURE  OF  SANCTIFICATION. 
 
 Dear  Friend, — You  desire  my  tlioxiglits  on  sanctificatioTi.  Surely 
 no  subject  of  greater  importance  can  ever  employ  our  thoughts, 
 our  tongites,  or  our  j^ens.  It  is  recommended  to  our  most  atten- 
 tive consideration,  most  affectionate  regard,  and  unwearied  pursuit, 
 by  the  glorious  character  of  God  himself,  "  whose  nature  is  all 
 holiness ; "  by  the  personal  perfection  and  spotless  example  of 
 Jesus  Christ,  who  even  iii  our  world  was  "  holy,  harmless,  and 
 undefiled,"  and  whose  greatest  excellence  it  was  to  be  so.  To  this 
 interesting  point  all  the  means  of  grace  invariably  tend.  This  is 
 the  merciful  aim  of  all  the  dispensations  of  religion  and  providence 
 towards  the  Cliurch.  From  its  aptness  to  promote  our  sanctifica- 
 tion  is  faith  itself  so  useful  and  excellent.  "  Purifying  their  hearts 
 by  faith,"  (Acts  xv.  9.) 
 
 Indeed,  the  subject  on  which  you  request  my  thoughts  is  power- 
 fully recommended,  as  of  the  utmost  moment,  by  the  consideration 
 of  our  true  hajyjnness.  Pimty  of  heart  and  real  blessedness  are 
 inseparable  companions.  By  sauctification  the  soul  is  led  to,  and 
 qualified  for,  the  happiness  of  heaven ;  and  while  it  restores  to  us 
 the  moral  image  of  our  Maker,  it  serves  as  a  blessed  medium  of 
 communion  with  Him,  both  now  and  to  eternity.  If  we  expect 
 this  privilege  and  attainment  in  any  eminent  measure,  let  us  ever 
 
LETTEE  I.]  LETTERS  ON  SANCTIFICATION.  517 
 
 listen  to  the  voice  of  God  sounding  in  His  Word  and  in  our  hearts : 
 "Be  ye  holy,  for  I  ara  holy/'  (1  Pet.  i.  15,  16.) 
 
 But  though  the  importance  of  sanctification  be  evident,  there  is 
 no  small  danger  in  mistaking  its  nature.  Not  only  the  world  in 
 general,  but  many  professors  of  godliness,  are  quite  mistaken  about 
 it.  The  scriptures  that  treat  of  it  are  but  too  often  misinterpreted ; 
 and  the  best  of  men,  while  ofi'  their  guard,  have  been  biased  in 
 their  opinions  on  this  head,  as  on  many  others,  according  as  they 
 have  connected  it  with  some  peculiar  favourite  sentiment. 
 
 The  subject,  therefore,  being  important,  and  the  danger  of  mis- 
 taking its  nature  great,  your  request  and  my  compliance  appear 
 fully  justifiable,  in  attempting  to  form  and  communicate  clear  and 
 scriptural  ideas  upon  it.  But  as  this  doctrine  is  one  of  the  deep 
 things  of  God,  I  am  sensible  that  success  in  treating  it,  as  well  as 
 the  blessing  in  pursuing  it,  dejDends  on  the  Father  of  lights,  the 
 only  wise  God  our  Saviour.  Let  us  both  look  up  to  Him,  then, 
 that  He  would  impart  to  our  minds  that  ray  of  wisdom  which  may 
 dispel  our  sinful  darkness,  and  favour  us  with  that  unction  which 
 teacheth  all  things.  "Who  teach etli  like  Him?"  He  can  pre- 
 pare the  mind  and  form  the  disposition,  as  well  as  impart  the  real 
 truth.  He  has  the  key  of  all  valuable  knowledge  and  experience  ; 
 nor  is  He  ever  backward  in  communicating  the  blessings  we  need, 
 until  we  are  first  wanting  to  ourselves  in  seeking.  "  Seek,  and  ye 
 shall  find." 
 
 Por  a  profitable  view  of  the  subject  under  consideration,  there 
 seem  to  be  two  princij)al  questions  that  claim  attention : —  What 
 is  evangelical  sanctification  in  itself?  and,  What  is  the  most 
 effectual  and  direct  method  of  obtaining  it,  as  far  as  our  duty 
 is  concerned  ?  The  former  of  these  questions,  though  very  im- 
 portant, does  not  require  much  room  on  my  paper ;  but  the  latter, 
 because  it  refers  to  duty  and  daily  practice,  and  enters  into  the 
 very  heart  of  experimental  religion  and  a  life  of  communion  with 
 God,  will  require  a  larger  space.  Happy  shall  your  correspondent 
 feel  himself  if  he  can  ofier  anything  to  your  satisfaction  on  these 
 points  from  the  Word  of  God  and  his  own  experience ! 
 
 To  sanctify  is  to  set  apart  for  God ;  and  the  nature  of  that 
 seiDaration  for  God  is  principally  determined  by  the  nature  of  the 
 subject  so  set  apart.  To  sanctify  a  j)lace  or  thing,  as  the  taber- 
 nacle or  temple  and  their  furniture  of  old,  and  to  sanctify  the 
 soul,  difl:er  as  much  as  the  natures  of  those  things  difl;er  one  from 
 
5]  8  LETTEKS  ON  SAKCTIFICATION.  [LETTEE  I. 
 
 another.  The  one  is  external  and  ceremonial ;  the  other  internal 
 and  spiritual.  In  a  word,  to  sanctify  is  to  make  Iwly ;  but  that 
 holiness  which  is  effected  is  as  different  in  its  nature  as  the 
 capacity  of  the  subject  which  is  made  holy,  and  the  design  of 
 God  in  effecting  it.  The  sanctification  which  you  inquire  after  is 
 that  of  the  human  soul ;  that  which  is  evangelical,  and  not  cere- 
 monial, or  merely  legal ;  that  which  is  the  work  of  the  Spirit,  and 
 not  the  oflspring  of  nature ;  that  which  is  wrought  in  God's  elect, 
 and  not  the  partial  change  of  apostates  or  pharisees  ;  that  which 
 makes  no  pretensions  to  absolute  perfection  in  this  life,  but  always 
 admits  of  improvements  ia  the  use  of  means.  And  this  may  be 
 defined  in  brief,  "A  gradual  restoration  of  a  siaful  soul  to  the 
 image  of  God." 
 
 On  this  definition  permit  me  to  make  a  few  remarks.  You 
 perceive  it  presupposes  that  the  soul  is  previously  in  an  unholy 
 and  depraved  state ;  and  that  there  is  a  gracious  provision  made 
 to  efi"ect  its  restoration.  When  I  say  gradual,  it  is  to  distinguish 
 it  from  regeneration,  which  is  instantaneous,  as  all  who  attend  to 
 the  sacred  oracles,  and  the  nature  of  the  change,  well  know.  The 
 one  is  the  communication  of  life ;  the  other  its  advancement.  The 
 one  supposes  the  subject  ivJwlIy  passive ;  the  other  both  passive 
 and  active,  as  the  advancement  of  our  natural  life  depends  partly 
 on  the  sovereign  wiU  and  agency  of  God,  and  partly  on  our  own 
 use  of  means  through  His  assistance,  while  its  origin  depends 
 wholly  and  exclusivelj'  on  God. 
 
 Thiis,  my  dear  friend,  the  nature  of  sanctification  is,  I  hope, 
 sufficiently  plain  to  you.  And  you  wiU  easily  perceive,  that,  when 
 the  Scriptui'e  says,  "  This  is  the  will  of  God,  even  your  sanctifica- 
 tion," the  meaning  is,  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  you  should  be 
 separated  from  sin  and  the  world,  made  holy,  or  gradually  restored 
 to  His  moral  image  ;  conformed  to  His  law,  will,  and  holy  nature, 
 by  loving  Him  above  aD,  and  in  aU,  and  serving  Him  faithfully, 
 diligently,  and  constantly.  For  this  end  was  the  Sacred  Word 
 given,  and  all  ordinances  appointed.  For  this  end,  Christ  came 
 into  our  world,  and  loved  the  Church  to  the  death  of  the  cross, 
 "  that  He  might  sanctify  and  cleanse  it,  and  present  it  to  Himself  a 
 glorious  church,  not  having  spot  or  wrinkle,  or  any  such  thing ; 
 but  that  it  should  be  holy  and  without  blemish."  For  this  end 
 were  the  elect  chosen,  "that  they  should  be  holy  and  without 
 blame  before  Him  in  love  ;  through  sanctification  of  the  Spirit  and 
 
LBTTEE  II.]  LETTEKS  ON  SANCTIFICATION.  519 
 
 belief  of  the  truth."  For  this  the  saints  have  ardently  panted  and 
 prayed,  that  their  "whole  spirit  and  soxd  and  body  might  be 
 sanctified  wholly,  and  preserved  blameless." 
 
 But  the  grand  point  which  demands  our  chief  attention  is,  the 
 method  of  obtaining  it ;  or,  as  before  stated,  "What  is  the  most 
 efiectual  and  direct  method  of  obtaining  it,  as  far  as  our  duty  is  con- 
 cerned ? "  This  is  the  holy  art,  if  you  will  excuse  the  expression, 
 to  which  we  shoidd  bend  our  utmost  efforts.  And  we  should  be 
 exceedingly  cautious  not  to  rest  in  it  as  a  theory,  or  mere  science, 
 however  sublime  its  end,  or  excellent  its  nature.  The  Mmits  of 
 this  letter,  however,  wOl  not  permit  me  to  proceed  at  present ;  but 
 if  you  will  indulge  me  with  the  freedom,  on  some  future  day,  you 
 may  expect  my  thoughts  on  that  veiy  interesting  question.  In 
 the  meantime,  let  us  be  looking,  with  ardent  and  glowing  pleasure, 
 to  the  uncreated  Source  of  life  and  holiness,  that  we  may  be  making 
 constant  progress  in  this  great  work,  according  to  the  knowledge 
 we  have  attained. — I  remain,  yours,  &c., 
 
 E.  W. 
 
 LETTER  II. 
 
 ON  THE  REQUISITES  AND  MEANS  OF  SANCTIFICATION. 
 
 My  dear  Feeend, — In  my  former  epistle  concerning  sanctifica- 
 tion,  on  which  you  requested  my  thoughts,  I  made  some  remarks, 
 tending  to  shew  what  it  is  in  its  oivn  nature ;  and  promised  to 
 resume  the  subject  in  reference  to  another  question  of  the  utmost 
 moment — viz..  What  is  the  most  effectual  and  direct  method  of 
 obtaining  it,  as  far  as  our  duty  is  concerned  ?  In  other  words. 
 What  is  that  method  which  Divine  wisdom  prescribes,  and  the  best 
 experience  of  the  saints  approves,  as  the  most  sure  and  speedy  for 
 obtaining  evangelical  sanctification  ?  And  truly  glad  shall  I  be,  if 
 any  remarks  of  mine  prove  in  any  measure  serviceable  to  you,  on 
 a  subject  so  interesting.  But  as  the  method  of  communicating 
 our  ideas  by  words  ought,  in  some  cases,  to  resemble  those  works 
 in  which  what  is  first  and  principal  in  design  is  last  in  execution, 
 excuse  me  if  this  mode  be  now  adopted  which,  no  doubt,  will 
 eventually  prove  more  to  your  satisfaction  than  any  other. 
 
520  LETTERS  ON  SANCTIFICATION.  [LETTER  II. 
 
 If  we  would  be  holy  in  our  obedience,  it  is  indispensably 
 requisite  that  we  love  it  in  all  its  branches.  Love  is  the  grand 
 25rinciple  of  all  acceptable  and  holy  service.  The  real  character 
 and  denomination  of  all  outward  observances  and  works  must  be 
 sought  from  the  inward  principle,  and  nothing  short  of  love  can 
 be  acceptable.  To  jierform  a  service  without  a  love  and  liking  to 
 it,  is  truly  slavish  ;  it  is  to  jjerform  it  from  selfish  motives,  or  for 
 ignoble  ends.  Can  anything  but  love  make  the  yoke  of  Christ 
 easy,  and  His  burden  light  1  Can  anj^thing  short  of  this  render 
 His  commandments  otherwise  than  grievous?  Is  there  anything 
 but  love  that  can  make  us  take  up  our  cross  daily,  with  sweet 
 submission  and  holy  cheerfulness  ?  It  is  our  duty  to  approve  of, 
 and  acquiesce  in  all  the  Divine  dispensations  concerning  ourselves 
 and  others  ;  in  all  the  trials  imposed,  in  all  the  precepts  enjoined, 
 and  in  all  the  sufferings  endured.  But  can  anything  without  love 
 enable  us  to  bear  those  trials  and  suffering.?,  or  thus  to  acquiesce 
 and  approve  ?  It  is  our  duty  to  rejoice  in  tribulations ;  but  is 
 there  any  probability  that  this  will  take  place  if  the  heart  be  not 
 influenced  by  love  ?  And  indeed  to  suppose  otherwise,  is  to  con- 
 tradict all  reason  and  analogy.  If  any  one  offered  to  render  you 
 the  service  of  a  friend,  and  you  knew  it  was  for  sinister  ends  or 
 from  selfish  motives,  would  you  be  pleased  with  his  p)retensions  ? 
 Surely  not;  his  oiiers  would  be  despised,  and  his  hj^ocritical 
 jjretensions  detested. 
 
 Again ;  as  all  obedience  that  is  holy  and  acceptable  must 
 proceed  from  love  to  the  duties  themselve.s,  so  it  must  be  founded 
 on  love  to  the  lawgiver  or  institutor  of  those  duties.  All  duties 
 being  ultimately  of  God's  appointment,  love  to  them  implies  love 
 to  Him  who  made  them  to  be  what  they  are.  The  reason  why 
 duties  are  loved,  if  loved  aright,  is  because  they  are  holy,  just,  and 
 good ;  answering  to,  and  commensurate  with  the  law  which  bears 
 that  character.  But  if  so,  the  Lawgiver  Himself  must  be  loved 
 supremely,  because  He  is  supremely  excellent,  holy,  just,  and 
 good. 
 
 Moreover,  as  holy  obedience  implies  love  to  God,  because  truly 
 and  supremely  excellent,  so  it  implies  that  this  love  has  for  its 
 object  everything  in  God,  or  done  by  Him.  For  He  has  nothing 
 which  is  not  infinitely  excellent ;  and  He  does  nothing  which  is 
 not  worthy  of  Himself.  His  operations  in  grace,  j^rovidence,  and 
 nature,  are  good  in  themselves,  in  their  tendency,  motive,  and  end. 
 
LETTER  II.]  LETTERS  ON  SANCTIFICATION.  521 
 
 Tlierefoi'e,  He  must  be  loved,  not  only  in  His  goodness  and  mercy, 
 but  also  in  His  power,  justice,  judgments,  works,  and  ways  ;  in  all 
 we  suffer  from  His  appointments,  as  well  as  all  we  enjoy  from  His 
 bounty.  This,  my  friend,  is  a  difficult  lesson  to  learn  while  we 
 are  in  the  present  state ;  and  yet  nothing  can  be  more  true,  (as 
 l)lainly  follows  from  what  was  now  said,)  than  that  the  man  whose 
 real  experience  does  not  answer  to  it,  is  in  the  same  degree  im- 
 sanctified. 
 
 From  hence  it  is  plain,  that  in  order  to  a  right  performance  of 
 these  holy  duties,  and  to  be  evangelically  sanctified,  we  must  possess 
 what  the  Psalmist  prayed  for — a  clean  heart  and  a  right  spirit. 
 The  human  mind,  since  the  original  apostasy,  is  carnal ;  the  carnal 
 mind  is  enmity  against  God,  and  therefore  is  not  subject  to  the 
 law  of  God,  nor  indeed  can  be.  And  this  implies  that  it  is  averse 
 from  spiritual  duties,  which  the  law  prescribes  and  requires,  and 
 will  not  perform  them  further  than  self  is  gratified  and  served. 
 Whereas  there  must  be,  as  before  shewn,  a  pleasure  and  holy  de- 
 light in  the  service  itself,  to  render  our  obedience  acceptable.  In 
 proportion  as  a  man  is  truly  sanctified,  he  can  say  from  genuine 
 experience,  "  I  delight  in  the  law  of  God  after  the  inward  man," 
 (Eom.  vii.  22.)  The  sin  of  our  nature  is  a  tree  deeply  rooted,  and 
 grows  with  widely-spreading  branches ;  and  to  aim  at  evangelical 
 sanctification  by  the  performance  of  a  few  or  even  all  outward 
 duties,  without  this  inward  principle  of  renovation,  is  equally  un- 
 successful as  an  attempt  to  root  ujd  a  sturdy  oak  by  lopping  off  its 
 branches.  It  is  to  expect  a  large  and  fair  crop  from  a  barren  soil ; 
 grapes  from  thorns,  or  figs  from  thistles  ;  or,  if  you  please,  a  burn- 
 ing focus  from  the  moon.  Pirst,  then,  make  the  tree  good  before 
 you  expect  that  the  fruit  will  be  so. 
 
 Now,  the  question  remains.  What  are  the  divinely-appointed 
 means  which  we  are  to  use  for  obtaining  this  Divine  principle  1 
 St  Peter  answers,  (2  Pet  i.  4,)  "  To  us  are  given  exceeding  great 
 and  precious  promises,  that  by  these  ye  might  be  partakers  of  the 
 Divine  nature."  He  was  here  addressing  the  Jews,  who  had  been 
 long  favoured  with  the  promises,  as  recorded  in  the  Old  Testament, 
 but  who  did  not  fully  understand  their  nature,  use,  or  j^recious- 
 ness.  And  the  promises  he  refers  to  more  especially,  are  those 
 which  relate  to  the  Messiah,  the  gifts  and  graces  of  the  Spirit,  and 
 life  eternal.  The  end  of  all  dispensations  and  means  of  grace  in 
 the  present  state  is  a  participation  of  a  God-like  nature,  righteous- 
 
522  LETTERS  ON  SANCTIPICATION.  [LETTER  IL 
 
 ness,  and  true  holiness ;  and  this  end  is  accomplished  only  by 
 receiving  Christ,  the  Spirit,  and  immortal  life,  conveyed  by  the 
 promises.  And  their  preciousness  arises  principally  from  the  value 
 of  the  blessings  conveyed ;  the  advantageous  and  easy  terms  on 
 which  these  are  to  be  enjoyed — viz.,  by  faith ;  and  the  certain,  solid, 
 and  blessed  effects  produced  by  them  in  the  behever.  But  to  whom 
 are  these  promises  given  ?  To  us, — to  you  and  me,  my  friend. 
 To  us  God  hath  given,  and  still  giveth  eternal  life,  in  and  with  His 
 Son,  by  way  of  grant ;  not  because  we  ai'e  sanctified,  but  that 
 thereby  we  may  be  sanctified. 
 
 The  Scripture  assures  us  that  by  believing  on  the  Lord  Jesus 
 Christ  we  shall  be  saved.  Now,  salvation  implies  and  includes 
 holiness  and  sanctification.  Without  holiness  and  purity  of  heart, 
 none  shall  see  God,  or  be  saved ;  but  by  believing  we  shall  be 
 saved,  and,  therefore,  sanctified.  Now,  believing  on  Christ  being 
 but  one  uniform,  continued  act  and  exercise  of  the  mind  and 
 heart,  and  not  divers,  it  must  be  necessarily  understood  to  mean 
 such  a  believing  as  derives  virtue  from  Him.  "  Abide  in  me,"  says 
 Christ ;  that  is.  Continue  to  believe  in  me.  To  what  end  ?  That 
 you  may  bear  fruit ;  that  hereby  you  may  derive  life,  the  constant 
 influence  of  my  love  and  grace;  that  hereby  you  may  become 
 strong  and  vigorous,  comfortable  in  your  own  souls,  and  fit  to 
 promote  my  glory.  If  faith  apply  not  to  Him  for  this  very  pur- 
 pose, it  remaineth  alone,  as  a  barren  speculation.  If  it  seek  only 
 happiness  as  the  end,  whatever  that  happiness  be  called, — salva- 
 tion, everlasting  rest,  glory,  &c., — and  not  sanctification  as  the 
 means  for  attaining  it,  no  other  evidence  is  necessary  to  prove 
 that  the  supposed  faith  is  not  a  saving  grace,  but  ig-norant  pre- 
 sumption. That  cannot  be  the  faith  of  God's  elect,  and  what  the 
 gospel  requires,  which  inverts  the  Divine  order.  Besides,  Christ 
 is  made  to  us  sanctification, — the  procuring  and  influencing  cause 
 of  it, — no  less  than  righteousness. 
 
 I  must  not  close  my  epistle  without  observing,  that,  as  by  the 
 promises  Christ  and  aU  His  benefits  are  conveyed  and  received  by 
 faith,  for  the  express  purpose  of  sanctification,  in  order  to  future 
 glory ;  so  faith  must  regard  Christ  with  the  express  design  of 
 being  habitually  united  to  Him  as  our  living  head,  because  aU 
 vital  acts  in  us  presuppose  vital  influence  from  Christ,  and  pro- 
 ceed from  it ;  and  all  vital  influence  presupposes  a  mystical  union 
 with  Christ.     To  receive  influence  is  a  part  of  communication, 
 
LETTER  II.]  LETTERS  ON  SANCTIPICATION.  523 
 
 which  cannot  be  without  previous  union.  "  I  am  the  vine,  ye  are 
 the  branches :  He  that  abideth  in  me,  and  I  in  him,  the  same 
 bringeth  forth  much  fruit :  for  without  me  ye  can  do  nothing," 
 (John  XV.  5.)  Faith,  as  a  sanctifying  principle,  therefore,  unites 
 the  soul  to  Christ. 
 
 At  present  I  must  conclude,  with  sincerest  wishes  and  earnest 
 prayer  that  you,  and  all  the  disciples  of  Jesus,  may  have  a  daily 
 increase  of  that  faith  which  receives  from  His  fvdness  all  mercy 
 to  pardon  and  grace  to  help.  On  some  future  occasion  you  may 
 expect  my  thoughts  on  the  manner  how  faith  seeks  union  to 
 Christ,  and  satisfaction  from  Him.* — In  the  meantime,  I  remain, 
 yours,  &c., 
 
 E.  W. 
 
 May  1795. 
 
 *  [I£  this  purpose  was  ever  carried  into  effect,  the  Editor,  after  the  most 
 diligent  search,  has  been  unable  to  recover  the  letter  here  promised. — Ed.] 
 
EEVIEW 
 
 OF 
 
 STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSATS.^^ 
 
 1.  In  offering  to  tlie  public  the  volume  here  anuounced,  Mr 
 Stewart  has  gratified  a  large  jiortion  of  private  friends,  and  raised 
 the  expectations  of  philosophers  in  general.  Considering  the  re- 
 spectability of  the  author's  character,  his  long  continuance  in  the 
 walks  of  literature  and  science,  the  ofiicial  capacity  he  has  sus- 
 tained as  university  lecturer,  his  unremitting  attention  to  the 
 objects  of  his  profession,  and  his  uncommon  powers  of  discrimi- 
 nation on  subjects  the  most  minute  and  abstruse  which  relate  to 
 the  human  mind  and  its  operations,  fully  evince  with  what  defer- 
 ence the  public  ought  to  receive  what  he  presents  to  their  atten- 
 tion. His  works  abounding  with  philosophical  criticisms,  and 
 those  criticisms,  in  general,  dehvered  with  the  candour  of  a  highly- 
 cultivated  mind,  is  another  consideration  why  the  work  before  us 
 should  be  approached  with  the  utmost  respect. 
 
 2.  The  volume  consists  of  two  parts,  and  a  preliminary  disser- 
 tation. The  chief  aim  of  the  dissertation  is  "  to  correct  some  pre- 
 vailing mistakes  with  respect  to  the  philosophy  of  the  human 
 mind."  One  of  these  mistakes  is  the  supposition  that  it  is  pre- 
 viously necessary  to  ascertain  the  materialism  or  immaterialism  of 
 the  human  system,  in  order  to  make  proficiency  in  the  philosophy 
 of  the  human  mind  ;  whereas  "  matter,  as  well  as  mind,  is  known 
 
 *  [This  Review  of  the  first  series  of  Mr  Dugald  Stewart's  well-known  Essays 
 was  written,  and  then  corrected  with  care,  by  Dr  Williams.  From  that  revised 
 manuscript  it  was  copied  by  another  hand,  evidently  for  publication ;  but  in  what 
 form  I  have  no  means  of  ascertaining.  It  does  not  appear  to  have  been  prepared 
 for  a  periodical.  While  complete  iu  itself,  it  is  clear  it  is  only  the  first  part  of 
 a  critique  on  Mr  Stewart's  entire  volume ;  see  p.  545. — Ed.] 
 
REVIEW  OF  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  525 
 
 to  US  by  its  qualities  alone,  and  we  are  equally  ignorant  of  the 
 essence  of  either,"  (p.  ii.)  "  For  my  part,"  observes  the  Professor, 
 "  I  have  no  scruple  to  say,  that  I  consider  the  physiological  prob- 
 lem in  question  [how  our  different  mental  operations  are  produced 
 by  means  of  vibrations,  and  other  changes  in  the  state  of  the  sen- 
 soriuvi]  as  one  of  those  which  are  likely  to  remain  for  ever  among 
 the  arcana  of  nature ;  nor  am  I  afraid  of  being  contradicted  by 
 any  competent  and  candid  judge,  how  sanguine,  however,  may  be 
 his  hopes  concerning  the  progress  of  human  discovery,  when  I 
 assert  that  it  has  hitherto  eluded  completely  all  the  efforts  which 
 have  been  made  towards  its  solution,"  (p.  iii.,  &c.)  The  philoso- 
 phical inference  that  our  author  would  draw  from  this  conviction 
 is,  that,  "laying  aside  all  hypothesis,  we  should  apply  ourselves  to 
 collect  such  facts  as  may  lead  us  in  due  time  to  the  only  satisfac- 
 tory conclusions  we  have  much  chance  of  ever  forming  concerning 
 the  connexion  between  mind  and  body — the  discovery  of  some 
 general  laws  by  which  their  connexion  is  regulated,"  (p.  viii.) 
 
 3.  P.  viii. : — "  The  circumstance  which  peculiarly  characterises 
 the  inductive  science  of  the  mind  is,  that  it  professes  to  abstain  from 
 all  speculations  concerning  its  nature  and  essence,  confining  the 
 attention  entirely  to  phenomena  which  every  individual  has  it  in 
 his  power  to  examine  for  himself  who  chooses  to  exercise  the 
 powers  of  his  understanding."  But  so  much,  at  least,  must  be 
 known  of  the  mind's  nature  and  essence,  that  it  is  essentially  dif- 
 ferent from  the  First  Mind,  as  well  as  from  gross  matter,  which  is 
 the  subject  of  common  physical  laws.  If  we  do  not  presuppose  it 
 dependent  in  its  nature,  limited  in  its  essence,  and  variable  in  its 
 operations,  in  a  manner  totally  different  from  the  wind  and  the 
 waves,  &c.,  our  author  supposes  that  "those  conclusions  concern- 
 ing the  mind,  to  which  we  are  fairly  led  by  the  method  of  induc- 
 tion, rest  upon  a  firm  and  indisputable  basis  of  their  own,  and  are 
 equally  compatible  with  the  metaphysical  creeds  of  the  materialist 
 and  the  Berkleian." 
 
 4.  As  these  remarks  contain  explicitly  the  author's  object,  mode 
 of  inquiry,  and  expectation  in  the  philosophy  of  mind,  we  would 
 observe  that  the  terms  by  which  he  designates  this  object  of  study 
 — "  the  inductive  science  of  mind  " — appear  to  us  extremely  inap- 
 plicable to  the  nature  of  the  subject.  Science  implies  a  certainty 
 of  knowledge,  as  opposed  to  what  is  conjectural  and  merely  hypo- 
 thetical.    But,  on  the  plan  proposed,  where  shall  we  find  even  one 
 
626  EEVIEW  OP  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS. 
 
 foundation-stone  of  science  ?  We  are  to  search  for  "  some  general 
 laws  by  wMch  this  connexion  is  regulated."  The  question  re- 
 turns, What  evidence  have  we  that  any  such  general  laws  exist  as 
 may  justify  a  scientific  inference  ?  On  the  contrary,  the  evidence 
 is  not  weak  against  their  existence.  General  laws  imply  stability 
 and  uniformity  of  operation,  so  that  similar  means  shall  answer 
 similar  ends.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  that  a  certain  process  will 
 "probably"  produce  the  intended  result,  for  probability  is  not 
 science.  Suppose,  on  the  inductive  plan  of  observation,  we  wish 
 to  erect  a  pyramid  of  science  ;  let  the  philosopher  cautiously  pro- 
 ceed in  his  observations  of  certain  phenomena  which  he  expects 
 may  be  resolvable  into  some  general  laws.  Has  he  any  foundation, 
 either  in  experience  or  analogy,  for  expecting  the  result  of  such  a 
 general  law  ?  But  imagine  him  to  succeed  ten  times  successively, 
 his  conclusion  cannot  be  called  scientific,  except  he  has  evidence 
 of  the  ground  of  certainty  as  well  as  of  the  bare  facts.  Ten  thou- 
 sand coincidences  of  process  and  result  would  not  justify  the  de- 
 nomination of  science,  unsupported  by  the  evidence  of  their  cer- 
 tainty, as  contradistinguished  from  so  many  lucky  chances. 
 
 5.  But  what  shall  we  say  of  those  philosophical  criticisms  which 
 dispute  the  exactness  of  every  statement?  Thus,  in  different 
 minds,  different  theories  on  the  point  in  dispute — as  the  general 
 laws  alluded  to — would  arise,  as  so  many  bubbles  of  air,  filling, 
 floating,  and  bursting  in  perpetual  succession.  In  jjoint  of  science, 
 indeed,  the  advantage  is  incomparably  on  the  side  of  the  bubbles, 
 for  they  are  the  result  of  fixed  and  uniform  laws.  In  a  word,  in 
 order  to  justify  the  application  of  the  term  science  to  that  philo- 
 sophy of  mind  for  which  our  author  is  so  strenuous  an  advocate, 
 it  ought  to  be  at  least  settled  that  the  mind  is  so  fixed  and  uni- 
 form in  its  operations,  at  least  in  some  respects,  as  to  be  liable  to 
 no  failure  or  exception.  To  call  anything  science  which  is  capable 
 of  being  destroyed,  is  an  egregious  abuse  of  terms.  An  ingenious 
 hypothesis,  a  plausible  theory,  a  probable  conclusion,  may  be  de- 
 stroyed, but  science  is  indestructible. 
 
 6.  A  second  prevaiUng  mistake  to  be  corrected  is  the  assumed 
 theory  of  association.  This  was  advanced  by  Hartley,  opposed  by 
 Reid,  and  defended  by  Priestley.  It  is  not  a  little  curious  to  hear 
 a  determined  opposer  of  philosophical  necessity  express  himself  in 
 the  following  manner : — "  The  order  established  in  the  intellecual 
 world  seems  to  be  regidated  by  laws  perfectly  analogous  to  those 
 
REVIEW  OF  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  527 
 
 which  we  trace  among  the  phenomena  of  the  material  system," 
 (p.  xiii.) 
 
 7.  A  third  prevailing  mistake  with  respect  to  the  philosophy 
 of  the  human  mind  is  an  attempt  to  deduce  an  immense  variety  of 
 particular  phenomena  from  some  general  principle  or  law  already 
 acknowledged  by  philosophers.  It  is  difBcult  to  say  why'  such  an 
 attempt,  abstractedly  considered,  should  be  regarded  as  an  object 
 of  censure,  since  in  general  physics  it  has  been  attended  with 
 eminent  success,  and  no  good  reason  appears  why  some  success 
 ought  not  to  be  expected  in  the  study  of  mind.  The  censure 
 ought  to  rest  on  the  persons  who  presume  to  erect  a  scientific 
 structure  on  insufficient  data,  and  who  boast  of  a  discovery  which 
 they  have  not  made.  Devoted  as  our  author  is  to  the  example  of 
 the  Newtonian  school,  and  to  the  footsteps  of  those  who,  disclaim- 
 ing all  pretensions  to  natural  sagacity,  aspire  to  nothing  higher 
 than  to  rise  slowly  from  particular  facts  to  general  laws,  we  may 
 venture  to  assert  that  he  would  have  no  objection  to  rise  quichly 
 from  particular  facts  to  general  laws  when  the  connexion  appeared 
 evident.  May  not  one  man,  like  Newton,  "rise  from  particular 
 facts  to  general  laws"  more  in  one  day  than  another  in  half  a 
 century  ? 
 
 8.  As  a  fourth  (which  is  the  last)  instance  of  prevailing  mis- 
 takes respecting  the  subject  in  question,  we  wish  to  give  the  follow- 
 ing remarks  all  the  publicity  in  our  power  : — P.  xxii.,  "It  is  a 
 circumstance  not  a  little  remarkable  that  the  philosophy  of  the 
 mind,  although  in  later  times  considered  as  a  subject  of  purely 
 metaphysical  research,  was  classed  among  the  branches  of  physical 
 science  in  the  ancient  enumeration  of  the  objects  of  human  know- 
 ledge. The  words  matter  and  mind  express  the  two  great  depart- 
 ments of  nature  which  fall  under  our  notice ;  and,  in  the  study  of 
 both,  the  only  progress  we  are  able  to  make  is  by  an  accurate  ex- 
 amination of  particular  phenomena,  and  a  cautious  reference  of 
 these  to  the  general  laws  or  rules  under  which  they  are  compre- 
 hended. Accordingly,  some  modern  writers,  of  the  first  eminence, 
 have  given  their  decided  sanction  to  this  old  and  almost  forgotten 
 classification,  in  preference  to  that  which  has  obtained  in  modern 
 Europe."  Mr  Smith  ("Wealth  of  Nations,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  163,  &c.) 
 observes  "  that  as  the  human  mind,  in  whatever  its  essence  may 
 be  supposed  to  consist,  is  a  part  of  the  great  system  of  the  uni- 
 verse, and  a  part,  too,  productive  of  the  most  important  efiects, 
 
528         EEViEw  OF  Stewart's  philosophical  essays. 
 
 whatever  was  taught  in  the  ancient  schools  of  Greece,  concerning 
 its  nature,  made  a  part  of  the  system  of  physics."  Mr  Locke,  too, 
 in  the  concluding  chapter  of  his  Essay,  proposes,  as  what  seemed 
 to  him  the  most  general  as  well  as  natural  division  of  the  object 
 of  our  understanding,  an  arrangement  coinciding  exactly  with  that 
 of  the  ancients,  as  explained  by  Mr  Smith  in  the  foregoing  pas- 
 sage. To  these  authorities  may  be  added  that  of  Dr  Campbell, 
 who  observes  that  "  sjjirit,  which  here  comprises  only  the  Supreme 
 Being  and  the  human  soul,  is  surely  as  much  included  under  the 
 notion  of  natural  object  as  body  is  ;  and  is  knowable  to  the  philoso- 
 Ijher  purely  in  the  same  way  by  observation  and  experience." 
 
 9.  On  no  topic  is  our  author  so  much  at  a  loss  as  in  giving  us 
 his  thoughts  about  metaphysics.  We  are  told  that  the  word  meta- 
 physics is  of  no  older  date  than  the  publication  of  Aristotle's  works 
 by  Andronicus  of  Rhodes,  one  of  the  learned  men  into  whose  hands 
 the  MSS.  of  that  philosopher  fell,  after  they  were  brought  by  Sylla 
 from  Athens  to  Rome.  To  fourteen  books  in  these  MSS.,  which 
 had  no  distinguishing  title,  Andronicus  is  said  to  have  prefixed 
 the  words  rd  fierd  rd  (fivaiKa,  either  to  denote  the  place  which  they 
 occupied  in  Aristotle's  own  arrangement,  (immediately  after  the 
 Physics,)  or  to  point  out  that  which  it  appeared  to  the  editor  they 
 ought  to  hold  in  the  order  of  study.  This  hackneyed  story  (whether 
 true  or  false)  is  wonderfully  well  adapted  to  give  a  diminutive  idea 
 of  what  the  term  has  been  used  to  express.  Por,  first,  it  is  not 
 nineteen  hundred  years  old ;  second^,  Andronicus,  not  Aristotle, 
 was  the  father  of  it ;  and,  finally,  not  the  word  itself  was  coined  by 
 him,  but  only  the  rudiments,  or  detached  materials,  from  which 
 some  other  unknown  fabricator  has  ventured  to  make  one  long- 
 word  of  it.  But,  seriously,  of  what  possible  disadvantage  can 
 either  the  age  or  pedigree  of  a  term  be  to  the  objects  which,  from 
 it-s  composition,  it  is  so  well  qualified  to  express,  especially  when, 
 if  this  term  be  rejected,  there  is  no  other  in  existence  so  well 
 adapted  to  express  those  objects  ?  Prom  an  author  who  generally 
 enforces  the  importance  of  precision  in  the  use  of  terms,  and  espe- 
 cially those  which  may  be  denominated  philosoi^hically  technical 
 ones,  we  might  have  natm'ally  expected  some  statement,  some 
 definition  either  of  the  name  or  of  the  thing  intended.  But  this 
 we  look  for  in  vain ;  and  yet  the  use  of  the  words  metaphysics 
 and  metaphysical  perpetually  occurs,  and  on  every  occasion  you 
 are  completely  at  a  loss  what  sort  of  idea  the  author  intends  to 
 
EEVIEW  OF  STEWAET'S  PBEILOSOPHICAI  ESSAYS.  529 
 
 convey,  or  whether  he  has  really  any  meaning.  For  our  part  we 
 have  often  thought  that  the  use  of  the  term  metaphysics  in  modern 
 philosojjhy  bears  a  strong  resemblance  to  the  use  of  the  word 
 Methodism  in  modern  religion  ;  and  that  the  one  and  the  other 
 is  intended  to  signify,  according  to  the  humour  of  him  who  uses 
 it,  either  what  is  good,  what  is  bad,  or  what  is  nonsensical.  There 
 are  cant  terms  among  learned  philosojDhers  as  well  as  among  the 
 illiterate  multitude.  But  it  is  time  either  to  expunge  the  term 
 metaphysics  from  the  philosophical  vocabulary,  or  to  bring  it  to 
 express  some  definite  idea.  We  intimated  before  that  it  is  well 
 adapted  to  express  an  important  province  of  science  which  claims 
 afiinity  to  no  other  term.  Allowing  the  term  physics  to  occupy 
 not  only  matter,  but  also  mind,  and  their  phenomena,  for  its  ob- 
 jects, still  we  want  a  term  expressive  of  a  science  whose  evidence 
 is  absolute  certainty.  Physical  evidence  can  rise  in  certainty  no 
 higher  than  the  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature,  but  the  human 
 mind  ought  to  be  conversant  with  a  science  which  comprehends 
 these  laws  themselves  as  only  one  field  of  its  vast  province.  It 
 wUl  be  some  illustration  of  our  meaning  if  we  advert  to  mathe- 
 matical science  compared  with  physics.  Though  mathematics  be 
 conversant  about  quantity  and  number,  which  are  physical  objects, 
 its  evidence  is  not  physical,  but  of  a  nature  infinitely  more  stable, 
 and  vmchangeably  certain.  A  mathematical  demonstration  would 
 remain  true  were  all  the  physical  laws  in  the  universe  altered,  or 
 even  reversed.  We  further  assert  that  the  human  mind  ought  to 
 be  conversant  with  a  science  of  which  the  whole  compass  of  mathe- 
 matics is  but  a  small  portion  ;  for  there  are  other  things  innumer- 
 able, besides  number  and  quantity,  which  admit  of  evidence  not  at 
 all  inferior  to  the  mathematical,  founded  on  the  same  principles, 
 and  comprehensive  to  infinity.  In  a  word,  it  is  the  science  which 
 treats  of  possibles  and  impossibles,  in  point  of  evidence,  shewing 
 with  the  most  absolute  certainty  why  some  things  must  be  and 
 others  must  not  be.  Now  as  physics  express  actual  phenomena, 
 what  term  can  be  more  significant  than  metaphysics  to  express 
 phenomena  under  the  notion  of  possible  and  impossible,  relative 
 to  evidence?  And  this  is  perfectly  agreeable  to  the  commonly  re- 
 ceived notion  of  metaphysical  evidence, — an  evidence  which  admits 
 not  of  any  exception  or  any  flaw.  It  is  of  little  moment  what  the 
 heathen  or  Christian  Peripatetics  xmderstood  by  the  term  ;  it  is 
 enough  that  it  aptly  designates  the  noblest  of  all  sciences,  and 
 
 VOL.  IV.  2  L 
 
530         REVIEW  OF  Stewart's  philosophical  essays. 
 
 which  presides  eternally  over  all  others.  The  Peripatetic  school, 
 it  is  true,  connected  many  crude  notions  with  the  use  of  this  term, 
 as  they  also  did  with  that  of  physics  ;  but  as  this  association  ought 
 to  form  no  prejudice  in  the  one  case,  so  neither  ought  it  to  be  ad- 
 mitted to  operate  in  the  other. 
 
 10.  The  second  part  of  the  preliminary  dissertation  contains  an 
 answer  to  a  critique  in  the  Edinburgh  Review,  vol.  iii.,  p.  269. 
 The  objector  proceeds  on  the  idea  that  the  inductive  process  of 
 philosoj)hising  recommended  by  Bacon,  and  exemjjiified  with  such 
 good  success  by  others,  is  scai-cely  applicable  to  that  philosophy 
 of  mind  for  which  Mr  Stewart  is  a  strenuous  advocate.  Dis- 
 tinguishing between  experiments  and  observations,  between  what 
 is  subject  to  our  control,  and  what  is  not  so,  and  determining  that 
 observations  on  mental  phenomena  are  of  the  latter  class,  it  is 
 imj^lied,  that  to  direct  so  much  attention  to  Mr  Stewart's  favourite 
 study  is  a  waste  of  time,  and  a  misapi^lication  of  talent.  The 
 reply  to  these  charges  appears  more  ingenious  than  solid,  discover- 
 ing the  skill  and  address  of  the  advocate  rather  than  the  form  of 
 reason. 
 
 11.  But  there  appears  to  lis  yet  a  stronger  objection  against 
 what  is  most  in,significantly  called  the  "  inductive  science  of  mind ;" 
 '  which  is,  that  its  very  foundation  is  merely  hypothetical.     The 
 professed  object  is,  to  rise  from  particular  observations  to  general 
 laws  as  the  basis  of  science.     But  what  evidence  is  there  that  any 
 such  general  laws  exist,  as  connected  with  mental  phenomena? 
 Thus  the  alchymistic  labourers  assumed  it  as  a  fact,  that  a  philo- 
 sopher's stone  was  to  be  found,  while  every  one  hoped  to  be  the 
 successful  discoverer.     And  the  inquirers  after  a  perpetual  motion  ' 
 have  ever  taken  it  for  granted  that  such  motion  was  discover- 
 able.    But,  supposing  that,  by  a  persevering  attention  to  mental 
 operations,  some  general  laws  may  be  discovered  which  may  be 
 applied,  for  instance,  to  the  business  of  education, — a  most  in- 
 teresting question  arises  thence.  Whether  such  a  discovery  ought  to 
 be  hailed  as  a  blessing,  or  deprecated  as  a  curse  to  the  world? 
 Taking  an  impartial  survey  of  the  history  of  mankind,  and  of  the 
 present  state  of  the  world,  who  can  presume  that  the  major  part 
 of  educational  influence  would  be  in  favour  of  virtue  ?     But  how 
 terrific  the  thought  of  general  laws  operating  with  certainty  being 
 directed  in  favour  of  vice,  and  the  selfish  passions  of  individuals ! 
 12.  To  expect,  in  process  of  time,  a  discovery  of  any  general 
 
REVIEW  OF  Stewart's  philosophical  essays.  531 
 
 laws  that  operate  with  ixniformity  and  certainty,  as  a  constituent 
 part  of  science,  and  that  these  laws  should  be  at  the  disposal  or 
 control  of  man,  is  chimerical  in  the  extreme,  as  being  utterly  in- 
 compatible with  that  freedom  which  is  essential  to  free  agency. 
 Supposing  even  the  materialism  of  the  mind,  surely  no  such 
 mechanical  uniformity  could  be  hoped  for  as  was  inconsistent  with 
 the  mind's  active  freedom. 
 
 We  will  put  the  case  on  the  most  favourable  footing  that  can 
 reasonably  be  desired.  Let  the  speculative  philosopher  consume 
 his  days  and  nights  in  experiments  and  observations  on  his  own 
 mind,  and  the  minds  of  others  ;  and  we  will  suppose  him  to  have 
 succeeded  to  his  entire  satisfaction  in  deducing  some  general  laws 
 from  his  particular  observations.  A  momentous  dif&culty  occurs. 
 By  what  means  is  he  to  bring  others  to  see  things  as  he  does,  and 
 to  admit  his  conclusions  among  the  indisputable  certainties  of 
 science?  He  cannot  appeal  to  the  senses  as  vouchers  for  his 
 conclusions ;  testimony  will  not  be  credited ;  the  reasonings  of 
 probability  will  never  be  admitted  in  the  room  of  scientific  cer- 
 tainty. If,  indeed,  the  evidence  of  a  discovery  of  general  laws  be 
 that  of  demonstration,  the  point  is  neared;  but  it  is  neared  on 
 this  condition,  that  metaphysical  evidence  be  admitted  as  the  sole 
 arbiter  and  sovereign  of  the  "inductive  science  of  mind."  De- 
 monstration is  the  result,  not  of  induction,  but  of  principles  known 
 intuitively. 
 
 13.  P.  xlv. : — "  Human  life,"  we  are  told,  "exhibits  to  our  observa- 
 tion a  boundless  variety  both  of  intellectual  and  moral  phenomena  ; 
 by  a  diligent  study  of  which  we  may  ascertain  almost  every  point 
 that  we  could  wish  to  investigate,  if  we  had  experiments  at  our 
 command." 
 
 Allowing  all  this,  how  mortifying  to  the  hopes  of  the  philosopher 
 is  the  stubborn  fact,  that  different  persons  appear  in  circumstances 
 perfectly  sirailai',  as  far  as  human  observation  is  concerned,  and 
 yet  the  subsequent  effects  are  extremely  different !  Such  is  the 
 fact,  and  such  it  must  be,  that  a  similarity  of  result  will  never  be 
 insured  by  similarity  of  observable  circumstances,  except  we  also 
 take  into  the  account  a  perfect  similarity  of  mental  state,  accurately 
 to  observe  and  ascertain  which  is  infinitely  beyond  the  reach  of 
 human  penetration.  The  drift  of  these  remarks  is  not  to  dissuade 
 from  attention  to  mental  phenomena,  much  less  from  a  suitable 
 application   of  any  useful  discovery,  but  to   shew  the   folly  of 
 
632         REVIEW  or  stewaet's  philosophical  essays. 
 
 attempting  to  form  into  a  science  what  is  absolutely  incapable  of 
 being  so  formed.  Never  will  the  materials  collected  by  inductive 
 philosophy,  which  has  the  mind  and  its  operations  for  its  object, 
 be  formed  into  a  compact  fabric  of  science  without  the  cement  of 
 metaphysical  evidence — that  evidence  which  results  from  intuitive 
 first  principles  of  all  knowledge. 
 
 14.  It  has  been  asserted,  (p.  xl.,)  "In  metaphysics,  certainly 
 knowledge  is  not  power."  If  by  metaphysics  be  designed  what 
 is  termed  "  the  inductive  science  of  mind,"  the  assertion  may  be 
 admitted  to  stand,  as  far  as  we  can  perceive ;  but,  in  what  is 
 properly  termed  metaphysical  evidence,  we  are  equally  confident 
 in  reversing  the  sentence — "  In  metaphysics,  certainly  knowledge 
 is  power."  This  evidence,  the  brightest  that  can  have  place  in  the 
 human  mind,  is  Bacon's  j^liilosophia  prima, — a  science  which 
 comprehends  all  others,  and  to  which  we  may  apply  those  words 
 of  his,  Qd.  liv.,)  "  Ita  ut  non  solum  ex  natura  mentis,  sed  ex  natura 
 rerum  quoque  haec  scientia  emanet."  The  value  of  any  science, 
 or  any  kind  of  evidence,  should  be  estimated  according  to  the  use 
 of  which  it  is  capable.  Now  this  philosophia  jirima,  in  the 
 acceptation  before  mentioned,  is  no  less  adapted  to  illustrate  and 
 to  establish  moral  science,  than  the  laws  of  gravitation,  well 
 understood  and  applied,  are  adapted  to  establish  and  to  illustrate 
 the  true  system  of  the  universe.  This  assertion  may  be  thought 
 bold ;  but  we  are  not  unf)ref)ared  to  offer  some  weighty  thoughts 
 in  confirmation  of  it  when  required. 
 
 15.  Considering  how  little  regard  is  paid  to  moral  feelings  in 
 the  speculations  of  philosophers  on  physical  science,  we  are  not  a 
 little  gxatified  to  receive  the  following  testimony  of  one  who  ranks 
 high  in  the  philosoj)hic  school,  (p.  Ixviii.,) — "  According  to  the 
 prevailing  maxims  of  modern  philosoj^hy,  so  little  regard  is  paid  to 
 feeling  and  sentiment  in  matters  of  reasoning,  that,  instead  of 
 being  understood  to  sanction  or  confirm  the  intellectual  judgments 
 with  which  they  accord,  they  are  very  generally  supposed  to  cast  a 
 shade  of  suspicion  on  every  conclusion  with  which  they  blend  the 
 slightest  tincture  of  sensibility  or  enthusiasm.  The  jDrosecution 
 of  this  idea  will,  if  I  do  not  much  deceive  myself,  open  some  new 
 views  with  resj)ect  to  the  logic  of  vtorals ;  and  I  am  induced  to 
 suggest  it  here,  in  the  hopes  of  directing  the  curiosity  of  some  of 
 my  readers  to  an  inquiry,  which,  I  am  persuaded,  will  lead  them 
 to  conclusions  deejjly  interesting  to  their  own  happiness." 
 
EEVIEW  OF  STEWAET'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  533 
 
 16.  It  is  undoubtedly  the  province  of  a  lover  of  wisdom  not 
 only  to  seek  a  discovery  of  new  truths,  but  also  an  exposure  of  old 
 errors ;  which  latter  has  been  attended,  in  many  instances,  with 
 astonishing  effect.  This  idea  is  important,  and  is  well  expressed 
 in  the  following  paragraph  : — "  To  what  did  the  discoveries  made 
 by  Luther  amount,  but  to  a  detection  of  the  impostures  of  the 
 Romish  Church,  and  of  absurdities  sanctioned  by  the  authority  of 
 Aristotle  ?  Yet,  how  vast  the  space  which  is  filled  by  his  name 
 in  the  subsequent  history  of  Europe !  and  how  jjroud  his  rank 
 among  the  benefactors  of  mankind  !  And  I  am  doubtful  if  Bacon 
 himself  did  so  much  by  the  logical  rules  he  gave  for  guiding  the 
 inquiries  of  his  followers,  as  by  the  resolution  with  which  he  in- 
 spired them  to  abandon  the  beaten  paths  of  their  predecessors,  and 
 to  make  excursions  into  regions  untrodden  before.  As  it  is  seldom, 
 in  such  instances,  (p.  Ixxiii.,)  easy  to  trace  to  particular  individuals 
 what  has  resulted  from  their  exertions,  with  the  same  precision 
 with  which,  in  physics  or  mechanics,  we  refer  to  their  respective 
 inventors  the  steam-engine  or  the  thunder-rod,  it  is  not  surprising 
 that  the  attention  of  the  multitude  should  be  so  little  attracted  to 
 the  intellectual  dominion  of  superior  minds  over  the  moral  world  ; 
 but  the  observer  must  be  blind  indeed,  who  does  not  perceive  the 
 vastness  of  the  scale  on  which  speculative  principles,  both  right 
 and  wrong,  have  operated  on  the  present  condition  of  mankind ; 
 or  who  does  not  now  feel  and  acknowledge,  how  deeply  the  morals 
 and  the  happiness  of  private  life,  as  well  as  the  order  of  political 
 society,  are  involved  in  the  final  issue  of  the  contest  between  true 
 and  false  philosophy." 
 
 17.  Of  the  five  essays  which  complete  the  first  part  of  this 
 volume,  the  first  treats  on  Locke's  account  of  the  sources  of  human 
 knowledge,  and  its  influence  on  the  doctrines  of  some  of  his  suc- 
 cessors ;  the  second,  on  the  idealism  of  Berkeley ;  the  third,  on 
 the  influence  of  Locke's  authority  upon  the  philosophical  systems 
 which  prevailed  in  France  during  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth 
 century ;  the  fourth,  on  the  metaphysical  theories  of  Hartley, 
 Priestley,  and  Darwin  ;  and  the  fifth,  on  the  tendency  of  some  late 
 philological  speculations.  These  philological  speculations  are  prin- 
 cipally those  of  Mr  Home  Tooke,  in  his  "  Diversions  of  Parley,"  in 
 which  our  author  discovers  a  sceptical  tendency. 
 
 From  this  brief  syllabus,  it  is  manifest  who  is  the  principal 
 figure  in  the  group,  and  that  the  leading  sentiment  controverted 
 
53i  BEYIEW  OF  STEWAET's  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS. 
 
 is  Locke's  doctrine  of  tlie  origin  of  our  knowledge.  As  the  chief 
 part  of  these  essays  consists  of  philosophical  criticisms  on  passages 
 selected  from  the  numerous  writings  of  authors  who  are  supposed 
 to  have  imbibed  Locke's  notions  on  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  it  can- 
 not be  expected  that,  whatever  may  be  our  views  of  his  doctrine, 
 we  should  foUow  our  author  Kara  iroha.  It  wUl  be  sufficient  for 
 us,  without  appearing  as  partisans,  to  give  a  concise  but  faithful 
 statement  of  the  chief  jDoints  at  issue.  We  begin  with  stating  our 
 author's  own  views,  which  is  best  done  in  his  own  words : — 
 
 18.  P.  1  : — "  In  speculating  concerning  any  of  the  intellectual 
 phenomena,  it  is  of  essential  importance  for  us  constantly  to  re- 
 collect that,  as  our  knowledge  of  the  material  world  is  derived 
 entirely  from  our  external  senses,  so  all  our  knowledge  of  the 
 human  mind  is  derived  from  consciousness." 
 
 P.  5  : — "The  belief  which  accompanies  consciousness  as  to  the 
 present  existence  of  its  appropriate  phenomena,  rests  on  no  found- 
 ation more  solid  than  our  belief  of  the  existence  of  external  objects; 
 or  our  belief  that  other  men  possess  intellectual  powers  and  facul- 
 ties similar  to  those  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  ourselves.  In 
 all  these  cases,  the  only  account  that  can  be  given  of  our  belief  is, 
 that  it  forms  a  necessary  part  of  our  constitution." 
 
 P.  7: — -"Our  own  existence  is  not  a  direct  or  immediate  object  of 
 consciousness,  in  the  strict  and  logical  meaning  of  that  term.  We 
 are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought,  desire,  volition,  but  we  are  not 
 conscious  of  the  existence  of  mind  itself." 
 
 P.  8  : — "The  very  first  exercise  of  my  consciousness  necessarily 
 implies  a  belief,  not  only  of  the  present  existence  of  what  is  felt, 
 but  of  the  present  existence  of  that  which  feels  and  thinks.  Of 
 these  facts,  however,  it  is  the  former  alone  of  which  we  can  pro- 
 perly be  said  to  be  conscious,  agreeably  to  the  vigorous  intei-preta- 
 tion  of  the  expression.  The  latter  is  made  known  to  us  by  a  sug- 
 gestion of  the  understanding  consequent  on  the  sensation." 
 
 P.  9  : — "  As  the  belief  of  our  present  existence  necessarily  ac- 
 companies every  act  of  consciousness,  so,  from  a  comparison  of 
 the  seusations  and  thoughts  of  which  we  are  noiu  conscious,  with 
 those  of  which  we  recollect  to  have  been  conscious  formerly,  we 
 are  impressed  with  an  irresistible  conviction  of  our  -personal 
 identittf." 
 
 P.  1 3  : — "  There  is  a  great  variety  of  notions  so  connected  with 
 our  difi'erent  intellectual  faculties,  that  the  exercise  of  the  faculty 
 
REVIEW  OF  STEWART  S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  OoO 
 
 may  be  justly  regarded  as  a  condition  indispensably  necessary  to 
 account  for  the  first  origin  of  tlie  notion." 
 
 P.  14: — "The exercise  of  a  particular  faculty  furnishes  the  occa- 
 sion on  which  certain  simple  notions  are,  by  the  laws  of  our  con- 
 stitution, presented  to  our  thoughts ;  nor  does  it  seem  possible  for 
 us  to  trace  the  origin  of  a  particular  notion  any  further  than  to 
 ascertain  what  the  nature  of  the  occasion  was  which,  in  the  first 
 instance,  introduced  it  to  our  acquaintance."  "  If  the  foregoing 
 remarks  be  well  founded,  they  are  fatal  to  a  fundamental  principle 
 of  Locke's  .philosophy,  which  has  been  assumed  by  most  of  his  suc- 
 cessors as  a  demonstrated  truth,  and  which,  under  a  form  some- 
 what disguised,  has  served  to  Hume  as  the  basis  of  all  his  sceptical 
 theories." 
 
 19.  Nearly  of  the  same  import  is  the  following  passage,  P. 
 94 :  —  "I  am  always  rxnwilling  to  attempt  innovations  in  lan- 
 guage ;  but  I  flatter  myself  it  will  not  be  considered  as  a  rash  or 
 superfluous  one,  if  I  distinguish  extension  and  figure  by  the  title 
 of  the  mathematical  affections  of  matter,  restricting  the  phrase 
 primary  qualities  to  hardness  and  softness,  roughness  and  smooth- 
 ness, and  other  properties  of  the  same  description.  The  line  which 
 I  would  draw  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities  is  this, 
 that  the  former  necessarily  involve  the  notion  of  extension,  and 
 consequently  of  externality,  or  outness;  whereas  the  latter  are  only 
 conceived  as  the  unknown  causes  of  known  sensations,  and  when 
 first  apprehended  by  the  mind,  do  not  imply  the  existence  of  any- 
 thing locally  distinct  from  the  subjects  of  its  own  consciousness. 
 If  these  observations  be  well  founded,  they  establish  three  very 
 important  facts  in  the  history  of  the  human  mind: — (1.)  That  the 
 notion  of  the  mathematical  affections  of  matter  presupposes  the 
 exercise  of  our  external  senses,  inasmuch  as  it  is  suggested  to  us 
 by  the  same  reasons  which  convey  to  us  the  knowledge  of  its 
 primary  qualities.  (2.)  That  this  notion  involves  an  irresistible 
 conviction  on  our  part,  not  only  of  the  external  existence  of  its 
 objects,  but  of  their  necessary  and  eternal  existence ;  whereas,  in 
 the  case  of  the  primary  quahties  of  matter,  our  perceptions  are 
 only  accompanied  with  a  belief  that  these  qualities  exist  externally 
 and  independently  of  our  existence  as  percipient  beings, — the  sup- 
 position of  their  annihilation  by  the  power  of  the  Creator  implying 
 no  absurdity  whatsoever.  (3.)  That  our  conviction  of  the  necessary 
 existence  of  extension  or  space  is  neither  the  result  of  reasoning 
 
536         EEViEW  OP  stewaet's  philosophical  essays. 
 
 nor  of  experience,  but  is  inseparable  from  the  very  conception  of 
 it,  and  must  therefore  be  considered  as  an  ultimate  and  essential 
 law  of  human  thought.  The  very  same  conclusion,  it  is  manifest, 
 applies  to  the  notion  of  time, — a  notion  which,  like  that  of  sjxice, 
 presupposes  the  exercise  of  our  external  senses  ;  but  which,  when 
 once  acquired,  presents  irresistibly  its  object  to  our  thoughts  as  an 
 existence  equally  independent  of  the  human  mind,  and  of  the  ma- 
 terial universe.  Both  these  existences,  too,  swell  in  the  human 
 understanding  to  infinity,  —  the  one  to  immensity,  the  other  to 
 eternity ;  nor  is  it  possible  for  imagination  itself  to  conceive  a 
 limit  to  either.  How  are  these  facts  to  be  reconciled  with  that 
 philosophy  which  teaches  that  all  oiir  knowledge  is  derived  from  . 
 experience  ? " 
 
 20.  Here  our  author  identifies  extension  and  sjMce,  and  there- 
 fore takes  it  for  granted,  that  if  space  be  necessary  and  eternal, 
 extension  must  be  so,  and  thus  departs  from  the  common  usage  of 
 language  without,  as  far  as  we  can  jperceive,  deriving  any  advan- 
 tage, either  to  science  in  general,  or  to  his  own  views  in  particular. 
 Extension  is  an  essential  property  of  matter  by  common  consent, 
 and  if  matter  be  annihilated,  its  extension  mu.st  be  so  too.  But  if 
 extension  remain  after  the  annihilation  of  the  thing  intended,  how 
 can  it  be  considered  as  the  essential  proiDcrty  of  that  thing  ?  Can 
 the  essential  property  remain  when  the  thing  itself  is  no  more  ? 
 However,  let  it  be  allowed  that  extension  be  taken  to  designate 
 space,  what  propriety  is  there  in  saying  that  it  is  necessary  and 
 eternal  ?  The  only  plausible  answer  is,  that  we  cannot  in  idea 
 annihilate  space.  But  this  answer  is  by  no  means  conclusive, 
 because  it  rests  upon  a  postulate  which  ought  not  to  be  granted 
 — viz.,  that  space  is  an  existence,  as  our  author  calls  it;  a  positive 
 rather  than  a  negative  consideration.  SjDace  being  a  positive  term, 
 we  are  liable  to  be  betrayed  into  the  conclusion,  that  the  idea  in- 
 tended by  it  is  also  a  positive  one.  We  shoidd  rather  say,  that  an 
 extended  substance  bears  the  same  relation  to  space  as  something 
 does  to  nothing.  AVe  cannot  destroy  space,  it  is  said,  in  idea. 
 True,  if  we  allow  it  a  positive  existence ;  nor  can  we  destroy 
 nihility,  if  we  first  suppose  it  to  be  something  positive.  We  are 
 bound  to  regai'd  space  as  a  negative  idea,  until  it  appears  to  pos- 
 sess some  essential  property,  but  no  such  property  is  pretended 
 but  by  begging  the  question  in  dispute.  We  must,  therefore,  con- 
 clude, that  space  is  mere  nihility  as  it  stands  related  to  a  circum- 
 
REVIEW  OF  STEWAET's  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  537 
 
 scribed  substance.  Take  away  the  substance,  and  nothing  remains ; 
 it  is  a  mere  contrast  to  a  corporeal  existence.  A  plenum  and  a 
 vacuum,  as  co-existent  in  the  same  place,  are  incompatible ;  but 
 space  may  be  constantly  regarded  as  co-existent  in  the  same  place 
 in  the  way  of  contrast.  But  suppose  a  plenum  to  be  exchanged 
 for  a  vacuum,  and  nothing  remains,  except  the  negative  idea  of 
 contrast ;  nor  can  anything  be  made  of  this  contrast  but  j3M?'e  nihi- 
 lity, considered  in  the  way  of  relation  to  some  extended  substance. 
 
 Our  author  ascribes  to  time  also  the  awful  properties  of  neces- 
 sary and  eternal.  With  what  propriety,  we  shall  now  consider. 
 The  only  plausible  groimd  for  such  an  opinion  seems  to  be  the 
 identifying  of  time  and  duration,  which  it  would  be  diflScult  to  ex- 
 culpate from  a  wanton  deviation  from  the  estabHshed  use  of  terms. 
 If  there  be  no  difference  between  time  and  duration,  then  time  and 
 eternity  are  the  same  thing,  for  eternity  is  dm'ation  also ;  and  the 
 duration  of  the  Deity  would  be  of  the  same  nature  with  that  of  a 
 creature,  which  would  lead  us  to  the  most  absurd  and  idolatrous 
 conclusions.  To  conceive  of  the  eternity  of  an  infinitely  perfect 
 Being,  even  that  which  is  denominated  a  parte  post,  to  be  the 
 same  in  kind  as  the  everlasting  duration  of  a  creature,  is  infinitely 
 degrading  to  Him.  The  existence  of  every  creature,  however  ex- 
 alted, and  however  durable,  is  continued  by  successive  moments, 
 and  must  consist  of  those  moments  continually  added.  But  how 
 mean,  how  absurd  the  thought,  that  the  duration  of  the  self-exist- 
 ent Being  is  of  this  kind !  As  His  nature  and  perfections  are 
 absolutely  great,  and  not  merely  relative,  so  His  dm'ation  is  equally 
 absolute  as  distinguished  from  relative  succession.  Time,  like  the 
 existence  of  a  creature,  admits  of  addition  of  the  future  to  the 
 present ;  but  eternity,  Hke  the  existence  of  the  First  Cause,  admits 
 of  no  addition.  To  suppose  that  the  existence  of  an  infinitely  per- 
 fect Being  admits  of  increase,  is  palpably  absurd ;  and  equally  so 
 is  the  supposition  that  His  eternity  is  made  u])  of  the  additions  of 
 successive  moments. 
 
 Time  is  a  mode  of  duration,  a  mere  relation  of  co-existence 
 between  what  is  changeable  and  what  is  unchangeable ;  or  it  is 
 the  interval  subsisting  between  one  instant  of  contingent  existence 
 compared  with  another,  which  interval  is  measured  by  another 
 existence  less  changeable  than  itself.  As  our  design  is  not  to 
 contend  about  words,  the  same  notion  may  be  expressed  in  dif- 
 ferent ways.     Time  is  duration  compared  with  created  existence. 
 
538         REVIEW  OF  Stewart's  philosophical  essays. 
 
 at  different  instants  of  tliat  existence,  and  measured  by  what  is 
 permanent.  The  continuation  of  contingent  existence  is  time  in 
 general,  and  tlie  continuation  of  such  existence  from  one  given  in- 
 stant to  another,  as  it  stands  related  to  an  unchangeable  standard 
 of  measure,  is  time  in  particular.  Eternity  is  duration  compared 
 with  absolute  existence  ;  and  time  denotes  the  relation  of  co-exist- 
 ence between  a  fleeting  succession  and  a  permanent  object.  And 
 from  this  view  it  follows,  that  were  there  nothing  j^ermanent,  there 
 could  be  nothing  successive  ;  and  were  there  nothing  absolute,  there 
 could  be  nothing  contingent  and  changeable. 
 
 Our  author,  after  apologising  for  an  apparent  innovation,  calls 
 extension  and  figure  the  mathematical  affections  of  matter.  How 
 this  use  of  terms  contributes  to  the  advancement  of  science,  we 
 acknowledge  our  inability  of  conceiving ;  but  it  has  a  direct  ten- 
 dency to  confound  ideas  that  were  before  clear  and  plain  to  a 
 contemplative  mind.  Does  the  term  "  affections  "  mean  anything 
 different  from  what  is  well  understood  by  the  term  "  properties  ? " 
 However,  say  that  body  is  mathematically  affected  by  figiu-e  and 
 extension,  or  that  there  are  mathematical  affections  of  body;  of 
 what  use  is  it  to  call  these  affections  "  mathematical  ? "  The  term 
 is  probably  adopted  with  a  view  to  shew  that  these  properties  or 
 affections  of  matter  are  as  permanent  and  indestructible  as  mathe- 
 matical verities.  But  the  conclusion  wiU  not  hold  good.  Mathe- 
 matical truths  alwaj's  suppose  the  existence  of  quantity  or  number, 
 and  are  absolutely  dependent  upon  that  supposition.  If,  therefore, 
 figure  and  extension  be  mathematical  affections  of  matter,  they 
 must  suppose  the  existence  of  matter,  and  absolutely  dejiend  upon 
 that  supposition.  If  there  be  no  triangle  or  circle  supposed,  no 
 mathematical  demonstrations  from  them  can  follow ;  and  if  the 
 existence  of  body  be  not  previously  admitted,  no  affections,  whether 
 we  call  them  physical  or  mathematical,  can  possibly  remain,  even 
 in  idea. 
 
 Even  supposing  time  and  space  to  have  a  positive  existence,  and 
 that  they  swell  in  the  human  understanding  to  infinity,  this  is  so  far 
 from  proving  what  our  author  wishes  to  establish,  however  praise- 
 worthy might  be  his  aim  in  opposing  Locke's  indefensible  positions 
 respecting  the  exclusive  origin  of  our  ideas,  that  it  really  makes 
 against  him.  Eor  that  any  ideas  are  capable  of  being  swelled  to 
 infinity,  proves  only  the  operations  of  the  human  mind,  of  which 
 we  are  conscious.     We  are  conscious  of  these  operations  in  two 
 
REVIEW  OF  STEWAKT's  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  539 
 
 respects :  first,  that  we  can  proceed  in  this  work  of  swelling  our 
 ideas  a  great  way ;  and,  secondly,  that  we  can  proceed  in  no  other 
 way  than  by  adding  one  thing  to  another.  Whereas  if  Mr  Stewart 
 had  argued  against  the  Lockeites  from  absolute  infinity,  whether 
 of  existence  or  duration,  rather  than  from  what  is  merely  relative, 
 which  consists  in  our  capacity  of  swelling  our  ideas,  his  conclusion 
 would  have  been  valid,  and  his  opponents  would  have  no  room  to 
 triumph.  The  advocates  of  truth  too  often  injure  their  cause  by 
 insisting  on  weak  and  indefensible  arguments.  And  here  we  may 
 add,  the  most  radical  defect  in  Locke's  jDOsition,  concerning  sensa- 
 tion and  reflection  as  the  exclusive  inlets  of  our  ideas,  is  the  same 
 as  that  of  Mr  Stewart — viz.,  identifying  that  infinity  which  is 
 merely  relative,  and  that  which  is  absolute.  The  latter  can  never 
 be  known  by  means  of  either  sensible  objects  or  a  reflection  on 
 our  own  minds.  For  vrhat  though  we  may  be  conscious  of  the 
 operations  of  power,  wisdom,  goodness,  justice,  &c.,  and  may  swell 
 these  ad  infinitum,  this  kind  of  infinity  has  not  the  least  ajDproxi- 
 niation  to  that  which  is-  absolute.  The  latter,  therefore,  must  be 
 an  original  intriitive  perception,  sui  generis,  whatever  may  be  the 
 occasion  of  exciting  it,  whether  Divine  revelation  or  anything  else. 
 21.  Let  us  now  view  Locke's  own  statement : — 
 P.  15  : — "In  experience  all  our  knowledge  is  founded,  and  from 
 that  it  ultimately  derives  itself.  Our  observation  employed  about 
 either  external  sensible  objects,  or  about  the  internal  operations  of 
 our  minds,  perceived  and  reflected  upon  by  ourselves,  is  that  which 
 supplies  our  understanding  with  all  the  materials  for  thinking. 
 These  two  are  the  fountains  of  knowledge,  from  whence  all  the 
 ideas  we  have,  or  can  naturally  have,  do  spring."  P.  17  : — 
 "  These  two,  I  say, — viz.,  external  material  things,  as  the  objects 
 of  sensation,  and  the  ojDerations  of  our  own  minds  within,  as  the 
 objects  of  reflection, — are  to  me  the  only  originals  from  whence  all 
 our  ideas  take  their  beginning.  But  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the 
 most  exalted  wit,  or  enlarged  understanding,  by  any  quickness  or 
 variety  of  thoughts,  to  invent  or  frame  one  new  simple  idea  in  the 
 mind  not  taken  in  by  the  ways  before  mentioned ;  nor  can  any 
 form  of  the  understanding  destroy  those  that  are  there."  P.  22  : 
 ■ — "  I,  therefore,  cannot  but  confess  here  again  that  external  and 
 internal  sensation  are  the  only  passages  that  I  can  find  of  know- 
 ledge to  the  understanding.  These  alone,  as  far  as  I  can  discover, 
 are  the  windows  by  which  light  is  let  into  this  dark  room." 
 
54:0  EEVIEW  OF  STEWAET'S  PHILOSOPHICAl  ESSAYS. 
 
 P.  2-i : — "  The  prevailing  opinion  since  Locke's  time  has  been 
 that  all  our  simple  ideas,  excejating  those  which  the  power  of  re- 
 flection collects  from  the  phenomena  of  thought,  are  images  or 
 representations  of  certain  external  archetypes  with  which  our 
 different  organs  of  sense  are  conversant ;  and  that  out  of  these 
 materials,  thus  treasured  up  in  the  repository  of  the  understand- 
 ing, all  the  possible  objects  of  human  knowledge  are  manufactured." 
 
 22.  In  opposition  to  this  statement,  partly  expressed  and  clearly 
 imjjlied  in  ]\Ir  Locke's  doctrine,  Mr  Stewart  maintains  that  not 
 only  consciousness  and  reflection  are  necessary  to  furnish  us  with 
 many  of  our  simple  ideas,  but  also  memory,  abstraction,  and  reason. 
 To  which  we  add,  as  what  appears  to  us  still  more  forcible,  if  sen- 
 sation and  reflection  be  the  only  sources  of  our  simple  ideas,  how 
 could  the  notion  of  absolute  esdstence,  as  distinguished  from  con- 
 tingent existence,  enter  into  the  human  mind  ?  Por  neither  in  the 
 material  universe  nor  in  the  phenomena  of  our  own  minds  can  any- 
 thing of  the  kind  be  found.  Here,  then,  is  a  simple  idea,  or  notion 
 rather, — one  too  of  infinite  importance, — for  the  admission  of  which 
 Mr  Locke  has  made  no  provision. 
 
 Again,  on  Mr  Locke's  theory,  the  simple  but  momentous  ideas 
 of  possihility  and  impossibility  can  never  be  accounted  for.  The 
 same  may  be  said  of  absolute  infinity.  It  may  be  said,  that  these 
 ideas,  especially  those  of  absolute  existence  and  infinity,  are  not 
 simple,  but  comjDlex,  or  compounded  of  other  ideas  which  are 
 simple.  Por  instance,  we  have  by  sensation  an  idea  of  existence, 
 and  by  reflection  we  only  deny  to  it  contingence.  But,  it  is 
 replied,  since  no  existence  but  what  is  contingent  can  ever  enter 
 the  mind  by  sensation  and  reflection,  seeing  every  object  of  sense, 
 and  every  subject  of  consciousness  in  ourselves  is  only  contingent, 
 it  must  needs  foUow  that  the  idea  of  absolute  existence  is  not 
 derived  from  these  sources,  but  is  an  original,  simjile  idea,  sui 
 generis.  Mr  Locke's  notion  of  the  manner  in  which  we  acquire 
 the  idea  of  absolute  infinity  is  very  exceptionable.  He  supposes 
 that,  by  the  addition  or  multiplication  of  what  is  finite,  we  arrive 
 at  length  at  the  denial  of  all  bounds,  and  call  this  mibounded 
 accumulation  of  fiuites  infinite.  But  this  is  a  very  inferior  accej)- 
 tatiou  of  the  term  infinite,  and  is  totally  incompatible  with  the 
 notion  implied  in  that  term  when  applied  to  the  Divine  nature 
 and  perfections.     On  Mr  Locke's  princijjles,  the  Supreme  Intelli- 
 
REVIEW  OF  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAJL  ESSAYS.  0-il 
 
 gence  is  infinite  ui  nature  only  by  an  increase  of  wliat  is  finite ; 
 or  else,  that  our  notion  of  this  nature  is  nothing  better,  and,  con- 
 sequently, both  is,  and,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  must  be 
 idolatrous,  which  is  absurd.  How  much  more  rational  is  it  to 
 admit  that  the  simple  idea  of  absolute  infinity  is  suggested  to  the 
 mind,  on  occasions  that  offer  by  the  laws  of  oui-  constitution,  and 
 not  by  either  sensation  or  reflection  ? 
 
 23.  Our  author,  ui  the  next  place,  proceeds  to  state  the  specula- 
 tions of  various  eminent  writers  since  the  time  of  Locke.  But 
 these  are  so  numerous,  and  the  shades  of  variation  so  great,  that 
 it  would  prove  more  fatiguing  than  profitable  to  follow  our 
 author.     A  few  of  these,  however,  we  must  notice  : — 
 
 P.  26  : — "  We  are  percipient  of  nothing  (says  Bishop  Berkeley) 
 but  of  our-  own  perceptions  and  ideas."  "  It  is  evident  to  any 
 one  who  takes  a  survey  of  the  objects  of  human  knowledge,  that 
 they  are  either  ideas  actually  imprinted  on  the  senses,  or  else  such 
 as  are  perceived  by  attending  to  the  passions  and  ojierations  of 
 mind,  or,  lastly,  ideas  formed  by  help  of  memory  and  imagination, 
 either  compounding,  dividing,  or  barely  representing  those  origin- 
 ally perceived  in  the  foresaid  ways."  According  to  this  state- 
 ment, there  is  no  knowledge  of  God  in  human  minds  but  what  is 
 idolatrous. 
 
 P.  27 : — "  AH  our  ideas  (says  Hume)  are  nothing  but  copies  of 
 our  impressions ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
 think  of  anything  which  we  have  not  antecedently  felt,  either  by 
 our  external  or  our  internal  senses."  From  any  disciple  of  Hume 
 we  should  be  glad  to  learn  how  the  idea  of  a  mathematical  point 
 entered  into  his  mind.  As  a  rational  being,  he  will,  of  course, 
 acknowledge  that  it  is  a  simple,  and  not  a  complex  idea ;  as  a 
 mathematician,  he  will  allow  that  it  has  no  sensible  dimension ; 
 and,  as  a  man  of  thought,  he  will  own  that  he  has  "  not  anteced- 
 ently/eZi"  it. 
 
 P.  29  : — "At  present,  I  only  wish  to  infer,  from  what  has  been 
 stated,"  says  Mr  Stewart,  "  that,  according  to  the  most  probable 
 interpretation  of  Locke's  own  meaning,  and  according  to  the  un- 
 questionable interpretation  given  to  his  words  by  Berkeley  and 
 Hume,  his  account  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  amounts  to  this, 
 that  we  have  no  knowledge  of  anything  which  we  do  not  either 
 learn  from  consciousness  at  the  jDresent  moment,  or  which  is  not 
 
542  EEVIEW  OF  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS. 
 
 treasured  wp  in  our  minds  as  a  cojyy  of  what  we  were  conscious  of 
 on.  some  former  occasion." 
 
 P.  31 : — "  All  the  ideas,  or  the  materials  of  our  reasoning  and 
 judging,  are  received  by  some  immediate  powers  of  perception, 
 internal  or  external,  which  we  may  call  senses.  Reasoning  or 
 intellect  seems  to  raise  no  new  species  of  ideas,  but  to  discover  or 
 discern  the  relations  of  those  received."  In  op230sition  to  this, 
 and  similar  statements,  our  author  adduces,  with  great  propriety, 
 the  intuitive  judgments  involving  the  simple  ideas  of  jyei-sonal 
 identity,  causation,  time,  number,  truth,  certainty,  probability. 
 
 24.  Much  as  we  approve,  in  general,  of  Mr  Stewart's  remarks 
 in  refutation  of  those  philosophers  on  whom  he  animadverts, 
 respecting  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  we  regard  the  following  senti- 
 ments as  highly  exceptionable.  He  is  speaking  of  the  manner  in 
 which  Dr  Hutcheson  might  have  made  a  jDlausible  defence  against 
 some  inferences  of  Hume  : — "  Extension  was  certainly  a  quahty 
 peculiarly  fitted  for  obviating  the  cavils  of  his  adversaries ;  the 
 notion  of  it  (although  none  can  doubt  that  it  was  originally 
 suggested  by  sense)  involving  in  its  very  nature  an  irresistible 
 belief  that  its  object  possesses  an  existence,  not  only  independent 
 of  our  perceptions,  but  necessary  and  eternal,  like  the  truth  of  a 
 mathematical  theorem."  Necessary  and  eternal  extension  !  What 
 can  be  the  import  of  such  language,  though  sanctioned  by  the 
 ingenuity  of  Dr  Clarke  ?  Can  there  be  any  doubt  that  extension 
 is  exclusively  a  property  of  matter?  Is  matter  necessary  and 
 eternal  ?  Does  not  the  annihilation  of  matter  include  the  anni- 
 hilation of  extension  ?  Should  it  be  said,  that  extension  is  im- 
 l^lied  in  the  truth  of  a  mathematical  theorem,  which  is  eternal ; 
 we  reply,  that  the  extension  is  not  necessary,  but  hypothetical, 
 and  that  the  relation  asserted  is  alone  necessary.  That  in  a  right- 
 angled  triangle  the  square  of  the  hypotenuse  is  equal  to  the 
 square  of  both  the  other  sides,  is  an  eternal  truth ;  but  the  triangle 
 itself  (and,  consequently,  its  extension)  is  neither  eternal  nor  ne- 
 cessary. It  is  a  necessary  and  eternal  truth,  that  a  creature  should 
 be  dependent  on  the  Creator ;  but  it  is  neither  eternal  nor  ne- 
 cessary that  there  should  be  a  creature.  In  like  manner,  exten- 
 sion is  necessary  on  supposition  of  matter  existing,  but  not  other- 
 wise.    (See  pp.  93,  94.) 
 
 25.  On  the  comparative  aims  of  Berkeley  and  Hume,  the  foUow- 
 
EEVIEW  OF  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  543 
 
 ing  remark  is  not  a  little  interesting.  P.  56  : — "  The  truth  is,  that, 
 whereas  Berkeley  was  sincerely  and  bond  fide  an  idealist,  Hume's 
 leading  object,  in  his  metaphysical  writings,  plainly  was  to  incul- 
 cate a  universal  scepticism.  In  this  respect,  the  real  scope  of  his 
 arguments  lias,  I  think,  been  misunderstood  by  most,  if  not  by  all 
 his  opponents.  It  evidently  was  not,  as  they  seem  to  have  sup- 
 posed, to  exalt  reasoning,  in  preference  to  our  instinctive  prin- 
 ciples of  belief ;  but,  by  illustrating  the  contradictory  conclusions 
 to  which  our  different  faculties  lead,  to  involve  the  whole  subject 
 in  the  same  suspicious  darkness.  In  other  words,  his  aim  was  not 
 to  interrogate  nature,  with  a  view  to  the  discovery  of  truth,  but, 
 by  a  cross-examination  of  nature,  to  involve  her  in  such  con- 
 tradictions as  might  set  aside  the  whole  of  her  evidence  as  good 
 for  nothing." 
 
 26.  P.  84 : — "The  Hindoo  system  represents  the  material  universe 
 as  at  all  times  in  a  state  of  immediate  dependence  on  the  Divine 
 energy.  Coinciding  in  this  respect  with  the  opinions  of  those 
 pious  men  in  our  own  quarter  of  the  globe  who  have  supposed  its 
 continued  existence  to  be  the  effect  of  a  creative  act  renewed  every 
 moment,  but  admitting,  in  the  most  explicit  terms,  the  regularity 
 of  the  laws  according  to  which  its  phenomena  are  exhibited  to  our 
 senses,  and  the  reality  of  these  phenomena  as  permanent  objects 
 of  science.  The  scepticism  of  Hume,  on  the  contrary,  proceeds 
 entirely  on  a  scholastic  hypothesis  concerning  perception,  which, 
 when  followed  out  to  its  logical  consequences,  leaves  no  evidence 
 for  the  existence  either  of  the  Divine  mind,  or  any  other,  nor,  in- 
 deed, for  that  of  anything  whatever  but  of  our  own  impressions 
 and  ideas." 
 
 27.  P.  10] : — "The  account  given  by  Locke  of  the  origin  of  our 
 ideas,  we  are  informed,  has  for  many  years  past  been  adopted  im- 
 plicitly, and  almost  universally,  as  a  fundamental  and  unquestion- 
 able truth  by  the  philosophers  of  France.  It  was  early  sanctioned 
 in  that  country  by  the  authority  of  PonteneUe,  whose  mind  was 
 probably  prepared  for  its  reception  by  some  similar  discussions  in 
 the  works  of  Gassendi.  At  a  later  period,  it  acquired  much  addi- 
 tional celebrity  from  the  vague  and  exaggerated  encomiums  of 
 Voltaire ;  and  it  has  since  been  assumed,  as  the  common  basis  of 
 their  respective  conclusions  concerning  the  history  of  the  human 
 understanding,  by  Condillac,  Turgot,  Helvetius,  Diderot,  D'Alem- 
 
544  REVIEW  OF  STEWAET'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS. 
 
 bert,  Condorcet,  Destutt-Tracy,  De  Gerendo,  and  many  other 
 writers  of  the  highest  repiitation  at  complete  variance  with  each 
 other  in  the  general  spirit  of  their  philosophical  systems.  But 
 although  all  these  ingenious  men  have  laid  hold  eagerly  of  this 
 common  principle  of  reasoning,  and  have  vied  with  each  other  in 
 extolling  Locke  for  the  sagacity  _which  he  has  displayed  in  unfold- 
 ing it,  hardly  two  of  them  can  be  named  who  have  understood  it 
 exactly  in  the  same  sense,  and  perhaps  not  one  who  has  understood 
 it  precisely  in  the  sense  annexed  to  it  by  the  author.  What  is  still 
 more  remarkable,  the  praise  of  Locke  has  been  loudest  from  those 
 who  seem  to  have  taken  the  least  pains  to  ascertain  the  import  of 
 his  conclusions." 
 
 28.  This  account  seems  to  savour  not  a  little  of  prejudice  and 
 paradox.  If  those  who  praised  Locke  the  loudest  were  worthy 
 and  virtuous  characters,  and  his  conclusions  were  dangerous,  they 
 must  have  admired  him  on  other  grounds  than  his  conclusions ; 
 but  if  they  were  of  a  sceptical  and  infidel  cast,  how  coidd  they 
 admire  the  same  things  as  the  others  without  having  "  taken  pains 
 to  ascertain  the  import  of  his  conclusions?"  Candid  and  liberal 
 as  the  Professor  appears  on  most  other  subjects,  he  scarcely  knows 
 how  to  give  Locke  any  quarter  where  he  perceives  him  in  any  re- 
 spect vulnerable  ;  and  probably  most  impartial  judges  will  think 
 that  a  wound  is  often  inflicted  either  without  cause,  or  on  very 
 slight  occasions.  Locke's  own  declarations  are  implicit  against 
 infidelity  and  scepticism,  and  of  those  who  were  tainted  with  these 
 vices,  "  perhaps  not  one  understood  his  principle  in  the  sense  an- 
 nexed to  it  by  the  author."  Protracted  as  this  article  has  been, 
 we  cannot  refrain  inserting  here  a  remark  of  Leibnitz,  containing 
 a  just  statement  of  Locke's  chief  defect,  free  from  the  asperity  of 
 critical  censure  : — "  Had  Locke  sufficiently  considered  the  differ- 
 ence between  truths  which  are  necessary  or  demonstrative,  and 
 those  which  we  infer  from  induction  alone,  he  would  have  per- 
 ceived that  necessary  truths  could  be  proved  only  from  principles 
 which  command  our  assent  by  their  intuitive  evidence,  inasmuch 
 as  our  senses  can  inform  us  only  of  what  is,  not  of  what  must 
 necessarily  he."  This,  we  think,  is  extremely  judicious  and  ac- 
 curate, and,  in  point  of  real  utility,  more  valuable  than  volumes  of 
 desultory  criticisms. 
 
 29.  We  have  neither  room  nor  inclination  to  follow  our  author's 
 
REVIEW  OF  STEWART'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAYS.  545 
 
 remarks  on  the  theories  of  Hartley,  Priestley,  and  Darwin,  or  on 
 the  philosophical  speculations  of  Home  Tooke.  Indeed,  the  whole 
 of  the  first  part  of  this  volume  is  thick-set  with  the  thorns  and 
 briars  of  philosophical  controversy ;  but  we  announce  with  plea- 
 sure, that  the  second  part,  which  we  must  notice  on  a  future  occa- 
 sion, presents  us  with  pleasant  walks,  bordered  with  the  flowers  of 
 beauty,  and  accompanied  with  the  decorations  of  taste. 
 
 END  OP  VOL.  IV. 
 
 VOL.  IV.  2  M 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Aakon,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  376. 
 
 Ability,  viewed  in  connexion  witli  the 
 sin  of  Adam  and  the  merits  of  Christ, 
 vol.  iii.  246. 
 
 Abraham,  offering  Isaac,  Augustine  up- 
 on, vol.  iii.  177;  and  Sarah,  and  then- 
 family,  vol.  iv.  309,  319. 
 
 Accountability,  what  essential  to,  vol.  i. 
 278 ;  and  hberty,  one  a  measure  of 
 the  other,  361. 
 
 Achan,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  379. 
 
 Adam,  how  dealt  with  by  the  Divine 
 Governor  after  his  fall,  vol.  i.  100; 
 the  cause  of  his  sin,  not  the  suspen- 
 sion of  efficacious  grace,  249 ;  federal 
 character  of,  vol.  iv.  146 ;  the  true 
 cause  of  his  fall,  146 ;  his  sin  two- 
 fold, 208  ;  and  Eve,  account  of,  367 ; 
 their  state  and  fall,  370. 
 
 Adults,  none  could  be  baptized,  if  all 
 children  were,  the  implied  objection 
 answered,  vol.  ii.  398 — 400. 
 
 Agents,  free,  actions  of,  only  permit- 
 ted, examined,  vol.  iii.  119;  moral, 
 definition  of,  vol.  i.  52 ;  no  inhe- 
 rent power  to  preserve  themselves, 
 268  ;  and  independency  of  God,  ex- 
 amined, 394 ;  devils,  denied  to  be, 
 by  Mr  Fletcher,  and  even  God  is  only 
 so  in  a  limited  degree,  404 ;  neces- 
 sary. Dissertation  on,  vol.  iv.  99 ;  its 
 importance  in  ethics  and  theology 
 illustrated,  100—104. 
 
 Ahab,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  382. 
 
 Ainsworth,  Rev.  Henry,  (a  learned  Puri- 
 tan— early  life  unknown — works  nu- 
 merous,) quoted,  vol.  ii.  50. 
 
 'AKadapros  and  ayws,  meaning  of,  vol. 
 ii.  223—238. 
 
 Ambrose,  (Bishop  of  MUan,  born  333, 
 and  died  397,)  on  believing  in  Christ, 
 vol.  iii.  174 ;  on  good  works,  184. 
 
 'Avadejxa  eivai  diro  Xpiaroi,  explained, 
 vol.  iii.  382. 
 
 Angels  and  the  spirits  of  the  just  do  not 
 owe  their  standing  to  their  ownpower, 
 vol.  i.  285. 
 
 AntipEedobaptists,  concessions  of,  in  re- 
 gard to  baptism,  vol.  ii.  313;  some 
 reject  immersion,  314 ;  AntipEedobap- 
 tism  examined  in  connexion  with  the 
 law  of  baptism,  vol.  i.  237—239. 
 
 Antinomians  deny  the  necessity  of  pro- 
 gress to  attain  salvation,  vol.  iii.  170. 
 
 Apocrypha,  passages  from,  on  baptism, 
 examined,  vol.  ii.  273 — 279 ;  rejected 
 by  Protestants,  vol.  i.  36. 
 
 Apostles,  the  Acts  of,  a  catechism  on, 
 vol.  iv.  351—355. 
 
 Aristotle,  (the  head  of  the  Peripatetic 
 school  at  Stagyra,  in  Thrace,  flou- 
 rished B.C.  384,)  a  passage  from,  to 
 illustrate  the  meaning  of  ^aitrl^a, 
 vol.  ii.  325,  330,  and  456. 
 
 Arguments,  analogical,  reasoning  on, 
 valid   when   not   set    aside    by   the 
 
548 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 apostles,  and  how  they  understood 
 their  commission,  vol.  ii.  199. 
 
 Aristophanes,  (flourished  at  Athens  B.C. 
 430,)  a  passage  quoted  from,  on  the 
 meaning  of  the  word  /SaTrr/fm,  vol.  ii. 
 329. 
 
 Arminians,  their  pillars,  vol.  i.  265;  and 
 Calvinists,  difference  between,  369, 
 371 ;  how  they  may  be  reconciled, 
 vol.  iv.  135. 
 
 Articles  5.  and  XA''II.  of  the  Episcopal 
 Church  of  England  examined,  vol.  iii. 
 141— 14i,  241. 
 
 Atonement,  for  human  guilt,  a  ground 
 of  glorying  in  the  cross  of  Christ, 
 vol.  iii.  322 ;  as  set  forth  in  Scripture, 
 335;  Calvin  on  the  extent  of,  Dr 
 Owen  on,  and  Charnock  also,  vol.  i. 
 131,  132. 
 
 Augustine,  (an  African  Father,  born  in 
 A.D.  354 ;  his  mother,  Monica,  will 
 be  had  in  everlasting  remembrance 
 on  account  of  her  exalted  piety,)  on 
 the  Christian's  two  births,  vol.  iii. 
 175. 
 
 Authority,  delegated  by  God  to  enforce 
 uniformity,  discussed,  vol.  i.  38. 
 
 Balak  and  Balaam,  account  of,  vol.  iv. 
 377. 
 
 Baptism,  importance  of,  vol.  ii.  1 ;  im- 
 partial inquiry  into,  3 ;  Bishop  Taylor 
 on,  4 ;  kind  of  evidence  applicable  to, 
 5 ;  main  hinge  of  the  controversy,  8  ; 
 terms  explained,  10;  human  autho- 
 rity on,  11 ;  positive  obligation  in  re- 
 gard to,  16  ;  observing  the  mere  let- 
 ter on,  may  lead  to  sin,  33 ;  analogi- 
 cal reasoning  on,  necessary  in  deter- 
 mining the  proper  subjects,  42 ;  best 
 method  of  finding  the  natm-e  and 
 design  of,  55 ;  our  Lord's  instruction 
 on,  considered,  56,  57 ;  passages  of 
 Scripture  that  speak  of,  in  direct 
 terms,  60 — 64 ;  passages  of  Scripture 
 alluding  to,  65;  principle  of  inter- 
 pretation in  regard  to,  66 ;  difference 
 between  that  of  John  and  our  Lord, 
 67 — 71 ;  agreement  of,  71 — 73 ;  sig- 
 
 nificant of  what  ?  blessings  and  obli- 
 gations, 73 — 84 ;  in  connexion  with, 
 meaning  of  the  terms  covenant  and 
 seal,  86 — 96 ;  a  seal  by  whomsoever 
 administered,  108;  consent  not  es- 
 sential to,  109 ;  death,  burial,  and  re- 
 surrection of  our  Lord  not  the  prin- 
 cipal subject  represented  by,  111, 
 112;  spiritual  blessings  not  always 
 attendant  upon,  113;  what  it  does 
 represent,  114—117;  who  are  the 
 proper  subjects  of,  118  ;  positive  evi- 
 dence of  New  Testament  on,  120;  a 
 benefit  and  a  privilege,  131 — 133; 
 dictates  of  nature  respecting,  133; 
 data  of  a  moral  kind  applicable  to, 
 148 — 150 ;  meaning  of  the  terms 
 "baptism"  and  "baptize,"  246;  ap- 
 plying water  in,  to  the  subject,  290 ; 
 general  terms  proved  by  qiiotations 
 from  forty  authors,  296 ;  on  literal 
 burying  in  connexion  with,  350 ;  the 
 argument  from  antiquity  on,  its  value, 
 384 ;  infant  baptism,  benefit  of,  395 
 — 398 ;  it  exhibits  an  objective 
 ground  of  faith,  402 — 404;  provoca- 
 tive of  gratitude,  404 — 407;  a  call  to 
 repentance,  408 — 410  ;  self-dedica- 
 tion, 410,  411;  motive  to  hoUness, 
 412 ;  an  incitement  to  diligence,  413 ; 
 encouragement  to  exercise  faith  in 
 the  promises,  417 — 420;  makes  the 
 call  to  repentance  louder,  421  — 423 ; 
 motive  to  dedication  to  the  Lord, 
 423 ;  to  cultivate  universal  holiness, 
 424,  425;  diligence,  425,  426;  in- 
 fant baptism,  how  should  it  be  treat- 
 ed by  a  spectator  ?  443 ;  the  seal  of 
 the  Divine  charter,  but  torn  off  by  re- 
 fusing infant  baptism,  445  ;  qualifica- 
 tions for,  entirely  moral,  472 ;  Justin 
 Martyr  on,  vol.  iii.  186;  a  positive 
 institution,  vol.  iv.  280. 
 BoTTTifiiJ)  ^aTTTLCfios,  no  words  in  the 
 English  language  equivalent  to,  vol.  ii. 
 258 ;  refer  to  other  modes  besides  dip- 
 ping, 268 — 276 ;  /3djTT<a,  its  meaning 
 examined,  277;  iSanTi^co,  as  used  in 
 the  New  Testament,  285,   322;    on 
 
INDEX. 
 
 549 
 
 ^aTTTKTjioi  8ia(j)6poi,  286 ;  PajTrl^oi, 
 criticisms  upon,  453. 
 
 Baxterianiam,  what  ?  vol.  i.  437. 
 
 Beauty  and  deformity  in  creatures  con- 
 sidered, vol.  iii.  214. 
 
 Belsham,  a  Letter  to,  on  truth,  vol.  iv. 
 449  ;  Review  of  "  Calm  Inquiry,"  461. 
 
 Belshazzar,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  389. 
 
 Benevolence,  infinite,  no  relief  to  a 
 guilty  conscience,  vol.  iii.  329 ;  it 
 requires  perfection,  331. 
 
 Booth,  Rev.  Abraham,  (born  May  1734, 
 minister  of  the  Baptist  Church,  Pres- 
 cot  Street,  London,  and  author  of 
 many  valuable  works,)  views  of,  on 
 positive  institutions,  vol.  ii.  22;  of 
 the  law  of  baptism,  42 ;  his  compari- 
 son of  baptism  and  the  Mosaic  ritual, 
 examined,  44;  illustration  of  absur- 
 dities on  Mr  Booth's  view,  47;  pre- 
 vented by  common  sense,  48. 
 
 Brethren,  false,  in  the  Church, vol.  iv.  227. 
 
 Cain  and  Abel,  state  of,  examined,  vol. 
 iii.  246 ;  account  of,  vol.  iv.  308. 
 
 Calamities,  providential,  should  lead 
 to  penitence  and  submission;  but, 
 sUghted,  an  alarming  sin,  vol.  iii.  420 
 —432. 
 
 Calling,  effectual,  vol.  iv.  268. 
 
 Calvinists  and  Calvinism,  and  Armi- 
 uianism,  the  terms  used  for  conve- 
 nience, vol.  i.  69  ;  Hyper-,  examined 
 in  connexion  with  law,  230 ;  true 
 account  of,  378  —  381;  chargeable 
 with  wickedness,  repudiated,  388 ; 
 and  Mr  Fletcher,  wherein  do  they 
 differ  ?  406 ;  system  of,  inconsistent 
 with  covenant,  examined,  vol.  iii.  125 
 — 127 ;  things  attributed  to,  by  the 
 Bishop  of  Lincoln,  which  are  absurd, 
 148 — 152;  things  imputed  to,  dis- 
 owned by  them,  153;  accused  of 
 dreadful  crimes,  the  charge  refuted, 
 168 ;  do  not  endanger  the  Established 
 Church,  170. 
 
 Canaanites,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  329. 
 
 Catechist,  The  Evangelical,  and  design 
 of,  vol.  iv.  307—408. 
 
 Cause,  negative,  definition  of,  vol.  i.  57; 
 final  causes.  Dissertation  on,  vol.  ii. 
 54 ;  first  cause.  Dissertation  on,  91 ; 
 not  existing,  infinitely  improbable, 
 92  ;    existing,  infinitely  probable,  98. 
 
 Certainty  in  religion  and  morals  dis- 
 cussed, vol.  i.  43. 
 
 Character,  Divine,  vindicated  in  "  Equity 
 and  Sovereignty,"  vol.  i.  14. 
 
 Children,  Jewish,  conduct  of  the  Por- 
 tuguese and  Spanish  Governments 
 towards,  vol.  ii.  398. 
 
 Christ,  Jesus,  the  obligations  of  man  to 
 receive,  how  estimated,  vol.  i.  125; 
 every  blessing  through  His  media- 
 tion, 130  ;  death  of,  Polhill  on,  805  ; 
 rectorally  for  all,  313 ;  wiU  of,  and 
 how  to  be  discovered,  vol.  ii.  119  ; 
 His  will  that  infants  should  be  intro- 
 duced into  the  Chtirch,  165 ;  minis- 
 try of,  in  its  bearing  on  infant  bap- 
 tism, 172 — 176  ;  what  implied  in,  on 
 infant  baptism,  185 — 188 ;  no  one 
 born  without  Him,  according  to 
 Jerome,  vol.  iii.  230  ;  Divine  conduct 
 towards,  on  what  principle  ?  333 ; 
 His  person,  vol.  iv.  266  ;  His  offices, 
 267  ;  Church  of.  Lecture  on,  283. 
 
 Christian  tempers,  their  formation,  may 
 be  called  regeneration,  vol.  iii.  37. 
 
 Christianity,  experimental,  vindicated, 
 vol.  i.  16 ;  internal  evidence  of,  vol. 
 iv.  196 — 202 ;  Soame  Jenyns  on, 
 196 ;  truth,  evidence,  and  peculiar 
 nature  of,  231. 
 
 Christians  have  a  double  birth,  vol.  iii. 
 47. 
 
 Chrysostom,  (John,  born  at  Antiooh 
 A.D.  354,)  on  free  choice,  vol.  iii.  179, 
 181. 
 
 Churches,  national,  does  Padobaptism 
 favour  ?  vol.  ii.  162. 
 
 Church  history,  from  Abraham  to  Noah, 
 bearing  of,  on  infant  baptism,  vol.  ii. 
 14L 
 
 Church-fellowship,  bearing  of,  on  infant 
 baptism,  vol.  ii.  243 ;  help  to,  vol.  iv. 
 287 ;  qualifications  for,  289 ;  design 
 of  entering  into,  290. 
 
550 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Circumcision,  its  bearing  on  baptism, 
 vol.  ii.  97 — 99  ;  of  proselytes,  explain 
 the  nature  of  Abrahamic  covenants, 
 145,  146;  and  baptism,  381. 
 
 Clergy,  evangelical,  blamed  by  the 
 Bishop  of  Lincoln,  vol.  iii.  88. 
 
 Cloud,  miraculous,  and  manna,  &c.,  vol. 
 iv.  326. 
 
 Coats  of  sldn,  an  emblem  of  what  ?  vol. 
 ii.  140. 
 
 Colossians,  Epistle  to,  vol.  iv.  358. 
 
 Command,  positive,  on  its  bearing  on 
 baptism,  vol.  ii.  467 — 469. 
 
 Commission  of  our  Lord  to  His  dis- 
 ciples examined,  vol.  ii.  476 — 482. 
 
 Commimion,  infant,  discussed,  vol.  ii. 
 385 — 392  ;  arguments  against,  no 
 avail  against  infant  baptism,  393 — 
 395. 
 
 Consciousness,  the  evidence  of  liberty, 
 vol.  i.  19 ;  belongs  only  to  present 
 time,  vol.  iv.  29. 
 
 Contingency,  meaning  of,  vol.  i.  69  ;  in 
 respect  to  God,  can  there  be  ?  vol.  iii. 
 112. 
 
 Controversies,  bearing  of  eqmty  and 
 sovereignty  on,  vol.  i.  230 ;  Ai'mi- 
 nian,  Mr  Fletcher  engaging  in,  362 ; 
 fair  mode  of  conducting,  vol.  iii.  1,  2. 
 
 Conversion,  what  is  ?  vol.  iii.  15. 
 
 Corinthians,  Epistles  to,  questions  on, 
 vol.  iv.  356. 
 
 Cornelius,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  405. 
 
 Corruption,  servants  of,  in  most  congre- 
 gations, vol  iii.  163. 
 
 Covenant  with  the  descendants  of  Abra- 
 ham, nature  of,  vol.  L  106 — 109 ; 
 gospel  covenant,  its  natiue,  109 — 
 112;  children  included  in,  vol.  ii. 
 139  ;  with  Noah  and  his  sons,  fade- 
 rati,  142;  Abrahamic,  included  pre- 
 ceding dispensations,  142;  of  grace, 
 and  its  economies,  vol.  iv.  264 ;  its 
 Mediator,  265. 
 
 Creator  and  creature,  essential  difference 
 between,  vol.  i.  5. 
 
 Creatures,  dependence  of,  on  the  Crea- 
 tor, vol.  i.  271 ;  guilty,  passed  over 
 by  the  creature,  not  inequitable,  296, 
 
 299 ;  difference  in,  Origen  on,  vol. 
 iii.  226  ;  anything  in,  not  divinely 
 caused,  vol.  iv.  134. 
 
 Creation,  God's  ultimate  end  in,  vol.  iv. 
 179  —  183;  works  of,  269;  of  all 
 things,  and  the  day  of  rest,  317. 
 
 Cross  of  Christ,  Sermon  on  glorying  in, 
 vol.  ui.  316;  meaning  of,  319;  rea- 
 sons for,  331,  337,  338. 
 
 Cyprian  (an  African  Father  at  Carthage, 
 fiomished  in  the  first  half  of  the  third 
 century)  on  infant  baptism,  vol.  ii. 
 373. 
 
 CyrU  of  Jerusalem  on  the  grace  of  God, 
 vol.  iii.  174. 
 
 Daniel,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  313 ;  book 
 of,  345. 
 
 Death,  of  Christ,  how  for  all,  voL  i. 
 303 ;  how  rendered  harmless,  vol.  iii. 
 350. 
 
 Decalogue,  and  good  works,  vol.  iv.  274. 
 
 Decrees,  multiplicity  of,  charged  as  a 
 defect  in  Calvinism,  vol.  L  392 ;  ab- 
 solute, reject  all  conditions,  examined, 
 vol.  iii.  128 ;  may  be  absolute  in  one 
 sense,  conditional  in  another,  exem- 
 plified in  the  death  of  Christ,  129 — 
 131 ;  infallible,  in  connexion  with 
 motives  considered,  135 — 141 ;  all 
 good  in  time,  the  result  of,  379;  to 
 good  does  not  involve  a  decree  to 
 evil,  vol.  iv.  135;  do  not  contain 
 negative  cause,  or  the  nature  of  things, 
 162 ;  their  nature  and  object,  254. 
 
 Defectibihty,  an  essential  principle  in  a 
 creatui'e,  the  source  of  depravity,  vol. 
 i.  88. 
 
 Dependence,  of  the  creature,  what  ?  vol. 
 i.  273. 
 
 Depravity,  different  views  of,  a  source 
 of  controversy,  vol.  i.  242;  partial, 
 what?  244;  total,  what?  and  how 
 proved?  245 — 248;  total,  rejected  by 
 the  Bishop  of  Lincoln,  vol.  iii.  272. 
 
 Desire,  the  immediate  object  of,  vol. 
 iv.  49. 
 
 Devotion,  aids  to,  vol.  iv.  278. 
 
 Dipping,  in  the  Holy  Ghost,  an  incon- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 551 
 
 gruous  idea,  vol.  ii.  259 ;  if  it  was  the 
 primitive  custom,  is  not  essential  to 
 baptism,  340. 
 
 Disagreement  of  modem  theologians, 
 the  objection  from,  examined,  vol.  ii. 
 378. 
 
 Dispensations,  Abrahamic,  Paul  on,  vol. 
 L  102;  character  of,  102—105;  the 
 more  spiritual,  the  more  favourable 
 to  infant  baptism,  vol.  ii.  161 ;  change 
 of,  does  not  aboUsh  past  privileges, 
 166;  of  Jesus  Christ  and  the  New 
 Testament,  vol.  iv.  347. 
 
 Duties,  relative ;  baptism,  the  means  of 
 inculcating,  vol.  ii.  440. 
 
 EcOLESiASTES,  and  Canticles,  account 
 of,  vol.  iv.  341. 
 
 Education,  Christian,  Address  on,  vol. 
 iv.  301. 
 
 '^HylacTTai  iv,  remarks  on,  vol.  ii.  234. 
 
 Elf,  used  by  enaUage  for  ev,  vol.  ii.  254; 
 MM.  de  Port  Royal  on,  256 ;  and  hv, 
 remarks  on  the  meaning  of,  317. 
 
 Election,  of  churches  and  nations,  ex- 
 amined, vol.  i.  291 ;  to  the  enjoyment 
 of  means,  293;  what  the  primary 
 cause  of,  294;  and  reprobation,  said 
 to  be  a  part  of  Calvinism,  examined, 
 395 ;  and  predestination,  vol.  iii.  105; 
 irreconcilable  with  Divine  goodness, 
 examined,  105 — 107;  does  not  involve 
 a  reprobating  decree,  107;  Jerome 
 on,  219,  233. 
 
 Elijah,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  311. 
 
 ''Ev,  its  meaning  examined,  vol.  ii  232. 
 
 End,  ultimate  and  chief,  distinction  be- 
 tween, vol.  i.  168. 
 
 Enoch,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  370. 
 
 Enthusiasts  claiming  private  revelation, 
 vol.  iii.  169. 
 
 Envy,  Sermon  on,  character  of,  vol.  iii. 
 452—454 ;  evils  of,  456. 
 
 'EirayyeXia,  meaning  of,  vol.  ii.  199 — 
 203. 
 
 Ephesians,  on  Epistle  to,  vol.  iv.  358. 
 
 Episcopacy,  Divine  right  of,  examined, 
 vol.  ii.  35 ;  Dr  Brett  on,  37,  41. 
 
 Equity  and  sovereignty,  principles  on 
 
 which  inquiry  into,  should  be  con- 
 ducted, vol.  i.  8 ;  definition  of,  49 ; 
 could  not  be  exercised  without  a 
 moral  system,  282;  the  Calvinistic 
 .system  said  not  to  be  consistent  with, 
 answered,  290 ;  and  sovereignty,  union 
 of,  in  the  Divine  character,  vol.  iii. 
 275. 
 
 Esther,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  337,  393. 
 
 Eutychus,  account  of,  vol.  iv.  315. 
 
 Evangelists,  their  harmony,  vol.  iv.  351. 
 
 Events,  f  utm'ition  of,  not  caused  by  God'a 
 declaration,  vol.  i.  377 ;  contingent, 
 viewed  in  connexion  with  God,  387. 
 
 Evils,  futurition  of,  how  certain,  vol.  i. 
 3 ;  forbidden  inqmry,  not  warranted, 
 4 ;  moral,  whence  ?  the  great  inquiry 
 from  ancient  times,  20 ;  Archbishop 
 Leighton  on,  21 ;  reasons  for  rejecting 
 his  counsels  on,  23;  Dr  "Watts  on, 
 24 ;  Saurin  and  Butler  on,  25 ;  the 
 grounds  for  Saurin's  embarrassment, 
 27 — 29;  the  examination  of,  a  source 
 and  a  reason  of  devout  emotions,  29 
 — 31 ;  Scripture  testimony  respecting, 
 44;  definition  of,  55;  penal,  perpe- 
 tuity of,  examined,  142;  choice  of, 
 free,  256;  origin  of,  discussed,  262; 
 could  it  not  be  prevented  by  a  decree  ? 
 answered,  283;  origin  of,  430,  432; 
 first  printed  opposition  to  the  au- 
 thor's views  on,  440 ;  Bonnet  on, 
 examined,  447 — 459;  strictures  by 
 Mr  Parry,  answered  by  the  Rev.  T. 
 Hill,  459;  letters  on,  addressed  to 
 the  Theological  Review,  460 — 473 ;  an 
 indissoluble  connexion  between,  and 
 suffering,  vol.  iii.  328 ;  Dissertation 
 on,  vol.  iv.  110 ;  existence  of,  not  in- 
 consistent with  the  Divine  perfec- 
 tions, 114;  proof  of,  no  inconsistency, 
 112 — 115;  has  an  adequate  cause, 
 122 ;  Dr  Clarke  on  the  origm  of,  124; 
 the  advantage  of  the  author's  theory, 
 127;  Divine  decree  not  its  cause, 
 129 ;  why  it  comes  to  pass,  131 ;  why 
 not  Qod  its  origin?  132;  practical 
 advantage  of  a  correct  knowledge  of, 
 133;  negative  causality  of,  138. 
 
552 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Exhortation  not  inconsistent  with  the 
 certainty  of  salvation,  vol.  iii.  131. 
 
 Ezekiel,  Book  of,  vol.  iv.  344. 
 
 Ezra  and  Ifehemiah,  account  of,  vol.  iv. 
 337—391. 
 
 Facitlties,  man's,  their  state  in  con- 
 sequence of  depravity,  voL  L  83. 
 
 Failure,  moral,  what  the  occasion  of? 
 vol.  I  164. 
 
 Faith,  a  branch  of  the  Divine  life,  vol. 
 L  318 ;  Bishop  of  Lincoln's  peculiar 
 notions  of,  voL  iii.  73 ;  of  the  heathen 
 examined,  73,  74 ;  Bishop  of  Lincoln 
 beUeves  that  a  dead  faith  may  he- 
 come  lively,  74 — 77 ;  and  practice,  78; 
 not  bestowed  arbitrarily,  and  the 
 Calvinistic  view  of,  79 — 81 ;  IrenEeus, 
 CyrU,  and  Chrysostom  on,  215 — 217; 
 a  principle  as  well  as  a  duty,  276 ; 
 may  exist  as  a  principle  when  not  in 
 exercise,  vol  iv.  212 ;  and  repent- 
 ance, 276. 
 
 Fall,  why  man  permitted  to?  vol.  i. 
 165 ;  and  inability,  as  maintained  by 
 Mr  Wesley,  involves  the  Calvinistic 
 view,  366. 
 
 Families,  patriarchal,  domestic  relation- 
 ships in,  vol.  ii.  145;  and  nations, 
 used  synonymously,  155. 
 
 Fasting,  vol.  iv.  279. 
 
 Fathers,  the  Christian,  on  the  utility  of 
 baptism,  voL  ii.  375 ;  quotations  from, 
 vol.  iii  1 73 ;  as  teachers,  221. 
 
 Foreknowledge,  examined  in  connexion 
 with  Arminianism  and  Calvinism, 
 vol.  i.  386. 
 
 Freedom,  and  moral  agency,  not  incon- 
 sistent with  the  certainty  of  future 
 events,  voL  i.  356. 
 
 Futmition,  any  ground  for,  besides  the 
 Divine  decree,  vol.  iii.  114,  115. 
 
 Galatians,  Epistle  to,  vol  iv.  357. 
 Genera  and  species,  in  their  appHcation 
 
 to   criticism  on  the  word  /Sanxifm, 
 
 vol.  ii  336. 
 Gift,  the  same  thing  may  be  a,  and  a 
 
 duty,  vol.  i.  309. 
 GUI,  Vi,  (a  learned  Baptist  minister. 
 
 and  a  voluminous  writer,  born  1697,) 
 on  admission  to  baptism,  vol.  ii.  43 ; 
 singular  argument  for  immersion, 
 289 ;  views  of,  on  "  diverse  wash- 
 ings," 2S9. 
 
 God,  government  of,  voL  L  76 ;  rectoral 
 intention  to  make  accountable  crea- 
 tures happy,  122 ;  and  sovereign 
 intention,  when  in  harmony,  123 ; 
 operations  in  regard  to  a  moral 
 system  must  proceed  from  equity 
 and  sovereignty,  163;  love  of,  irre- 
 concilable with  leaving  some  to 
 perish,  examined,  vol.  iii.  1 46 ;  not 
 good  of  necessity,  Jerome  on,  228; 
 supremacy  of,  259 ;  nature  of  supre- 
 macy, evidence  of,  260 — 262;  no 
 respecter  of  persons,  263;  wiU  of, 
 general  remarks  on,  296;  what  re- 
 quired of  man  in  regard  to,  300; 
 His  being,  existence  and  nature  of, 
 voL  iv.  235;  attributes  and  perfec- 
 tions of,  238 ;  those  that  are  incom- 
 municable, 241 ;  communicable,  244 ; 
 the  Creator  of  aU  things,  367—369. 
 
 Good  and  goodness.  Good,  chief,  what 
 is  essential  to  the  enjoyment  of, 
 vol.  i.  81 ;  all  good,  the  source  of, 
 358 ;  goodness,  man  the  cause  of  his 
 own,  Irenasus,  Origen,  Athanasius, 
 Chrysostom,  and  Clement  of  Alex- 
 andria on,  vol.  iii.  222 — 226;  good, 
 permission  of,  Jerome  on,  227. 
 
 Gospel,  the  aspects  of,  on  moral  govern- 
 ment, vol.  i.  113  ;  designed  for  all 
 nations,  115;  many  unacquainted 
 with,  not  owing  to  Divine  restrictions, 
 116;  God's  design  is  not  frustrated 
 by  unbelief,  119 ;  claims  of,  on  the 
 sinner,  1 24 ;  what  is  necessary  for  its 
 full  appreciation,  172;  man  bom  of, 
 meaning  of,  480 ;  grounds  of  obhga- 
 tions  to  obey,  voL  iii  95. 
 
 Governor  and  government.  Govern- 
 ment, moral,  in  its  relation  to  God, 
 voL  i.  72 ;  in  its  relation  to  man,  80 ; 
 developed  in  the  dispensations  of 
 religion  in  general,  97 ;  its  relation 
 to  the  Mosaic  and  Christian  dispen- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 553 
 
 sations,  106 ;  Governor,  Moral,  design 
 of,  in  giving  a  revelation  of  His  wUl, 
 117 ;  relation  to  the  final  judgment, 
 134;  on  what  depends  its  excellency, 
 160;  His  rectoral  intention  in  its 
 bearing  on  particular  redemption, 
 299 ;  just,  and  the  perseverance  of 
 the  saints,  unworthy  of  God,  examined, 
 345. 
 
 Grace,  meaning  of  the  term,  vol.  i.  178 ; 
 sovereign,  in  its  diflferent  relations, 
 179 ;  means  of,  the  effect  of  truth 
 and  Divine  influence  on  the  mind, 
 182;  required  graces,  the  meaning  of, 
 184;  a  holy  principle  generated  by 
 Divine  influence,  1 86 ;  God's  benevol- 
 ence, a  moral  cause,  189 ;  a  physical 
 cause,  190;  Christian,  how  produced  ? 
 191 ;  sovereign  subjective,  nature,  ne- 
 cessity, and  importance  of,  194;  as  an 
 effect,  what?  195;  necessity  of  sub- 
 jective grace,  197 ;  not  conveyed  by 
 verbal  testimony,  198 — 208 ;  objec- 
 tions answered,  208 ;  special,  con- 
 sidered, 320 ;  its  operations  not  in- 
 consistent with  equity,  337 — 339  ; 
 the  exhibition  to  the  understanding 
 of  the  Divine  favour,  408 ;  the  effects 
 produced  on  time  converts,  411 ; 
 required  graces,  the  fruits  of  the 
 Spirit,  properly  so  called,  413;  a 
 holy  state  of  mind,  414 ;  subjective, 
 what?  416;  subjective,  the  result  of 
 sovereign  favour,  418 ;  nature  of, 
 422 ;  subjective  grace,  meaning  of, 
 473;  in  the  mind,  474;  irresistible, 
 prevents  falling  into  sin,  examined, 
 vol.  iii.  29 ;  cannot  be  ui-ged  as  a 
 reason  for  diligence,  examined,  30; 
 and  free  agency,  Irenaeus  and  Hilary 
 on,  214 ;  conferred  by  baptism,  Chry- 
 sostom  on,  237;  not  preventing 
 choice,  Chrysostom  and  Theodoret  on, 
 240,  242 ;  and  nature,  distinction  be- 
 tween,important,  273;  subjective,  275. 
 
 Great  and  small,  difference  of,  vol.  i. 
 213—214. 
 
 Gregory  on  virtue,  vol.  iii.  184. 
 
 Guyse,  Dr,  on  baptism,  vol.  ii.  344. 
 
 Haman  and  Mordeeai,  questions  on, 
 vol.  iv.  393. 
 
 Heart,  the  immediate  object  of  the 
 Holy  Spirit,  voL  iii.  18  ;  God's  power 
 over,  94;  the  special  exercise  of  this 
 power  no  hardship  to  any,  95;  an 
 evil  heart,  the  real  cause  of,  268. 
 
 Hebrews,  the  Epistle  to,  questions  on, 
 vol.  iv.  361. 
 
 Henry,  Matthew,  on  baptism,  vol.  ii. 
 345. 
 
 Heraclides,  Ponticus,  quoted  to  illus- 
 trate the  word  jSairTifffl,  vol.  ii.  334. 
 
 Herod,  Antipas,  accoimt  of,  vol.  iv. 
 400 ;  Agrippa,  account  of,  406. 
 
 Hezekiah,  questions  on,  voL  iv.  385. 
 
 Hilary,  on  the  necessity  of  sinning, 
 quoted,  vol.  iii.  174. 
 
 History,  sacred,  from  Abraham  to  Moses, 
 vol.  ii.  142 ;  from  Moses  to  Christ,  in 
 its  reference  to  infant  baptism,  146 — 
 158. 
 
 HoUand,  in,  Antipsedobaptists  practise 
 affusion,  vol.  ii.  315. 
 
 Holy,  meaning  of,  vol.  ii.  216 — 220. 
 
 Homer,  passages  quoted  from,  on  the 
 meaning  of  the  word  baptism,  vol.  ii. 
 327—329,  332,  334. 
 
 HomOy  on  Justification,  against  the 
 Bishop  of  Lincoln's  views,  vol.  iii.  56. 
 
 Households,  the  meaning  of,  in  its  bear- 
 ing on  infant  baptism,  vol.  ii.  208 — 
 220. 
 
 Ignatius  (a  disciple  of  the  Evangelist 
 John,  and  bishop  of  Antiooh)  and 
 Clement  on  Christian  graces,  vol.  iii. 
 182. 
 
 Immersion,  does  it  make  the  duty  of 
 mortifying  sin  more  impressive  ?  vol. 
 ii.  113  :  cannot  be  proved  from  New 
 Testament,  293 — 296;  trine,  observed 
 by  the  Greek  Church,  339;  admit- 
 ting it,  it  does  not  set  aside  another 
 mode,  346 ;  true  origin  of,  353. 
 
 Imputation  of  righteousness  discussed, 
 vol.  iii.  64. 
 
 Inability,  moral  and  natural,  difference 
 of,  vol.  i.  310  ;  moral,  sinful,  479. 
 
ooi 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Incapacity,  moral,  meaning  of,  vol.  iii. 
 162. 
 
 Infallibility,  held  by  the  Church  of 
 Rome,  ToL  i.  40. 
 
 Infants  and  Infant  Baptism.  Infants, 
 circumcision  of,  a  seal,  examined,  voL 
 ii.  102 — 108:  are  they  qualified  for 
 baptism?  122;  naturally  capable  of, 
 
 129,  130;  will  of  Christ  respecting, 
 
 130,  138;  infant  baptism,  principles 
 of,  136,  137;  dedication  of,  by  Anti- 
 psedobaptists,  177,178;  exclusion  of, 
 from  baptism,  unreasonable,  unserip- 
 tural,  and  uncharitable,  239 ;  does  in- 
 fant baptism  involve  a  right  to  the 
 Lord's  Supper?  examined,  382;  im- 
 proved, 415. 
 
 Infinite,  nothing  can  be,  except  God, 
 vol.  i.  161. 
 
 Inspiration,  meaning  of,  vol.  i.  41. 
 
 Institutions,  positive,  external  char- 
 acter of,  voL  ii.  IS ;  of  the  New  Tes- 
 tament, mixed  nature  of,  23 ;  how  to 
 determine  what  are  positive,  28 ;  and 
 its  reference  to  the  Lord's  Supper, 
 51 ;  under  the  gospel,  examined,  52  ; 
 Bishop  Hoadley  on,  53 ;  a  barrier 
 against  innovation  examined,  54 ; 
 some  rejected  by  Baptists,  inconsist- 
 ency of,  55. 
 
 Invitations,  general,  not  to  be  restrict- 
 ed, voL  i.  128. 
 
 Irenasus  (Bishop  of  Lyons,  a  disciple  of 
 Polycarp)  and  Epiphanius'  views  of 
 human  nature,  vol.  iii.  168. 
 
 Isaac  and  Kebekah,  questions  on,  voL 
 iv.  320,  371. 
 
 Isaiah,  Book  of,  questions  on,  voL  iv.  341. 
 
 Israel  and  Israelites.  Israel  in  Egypt 
 represented  by  Dr  Whitby  as  the 
 state  in  which  Calvinism  places  man, 
 examined,  vol.  i.  315;  history  of, 
 proves  children  to  be  interested  in  the 
 privilege  of  their  parents,  voL  ii.  147; 
 Israelites,  their  affairs  from  Joseph 
 to  Moses,  vol.  iv.  322 ;  under  Joshua, 
 327 ;  distribution  of  the  land  of,  329 ; 
 history  of,  from  the  death  of  Joshua 
 to  the  death  of  Solomon,  330—334. 
 
 Jacob  and  his  sons,  vol.  iv.  321 ;  and 
 Esau,  questions  on,  372. 
 
 James,  Epistle  of,  vol  iv.  362. 
 
 Jehoshaphat,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  383. 
 
 Jeremiah,  Book  of,  questions  on,  voL  iv. 
 342,  3SS. 
 
 Jerome  (a  native  of  Prague,  a  disciple 
 of  Huss)  on  Divine  assistance,  vol.  iii. 
 175 ;  on  good  works,  184. 
 
 Jesus  Christ,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  314, 
 395. 
 
 Jews,  apostolic  benevolence  towards, 
 Sermon  on,  vol.  iii.  433 ;  its  proper 
 nature,  435 ;  foimded  on  knowledge, 
 436 ;  on  self-denying  principle,  437  ; 
 obstacles  to  its  exercise,  440 — 447  ; 
 the  manner  in  which  it  should  be 
 exercised,  448. 
 
 Job,  Book  of,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  338. 
 
 John  the  Baptist,  his  ministry  favour- 
 able to  infant  baptism,  vol.  ii  166 — 
 172 ;  his  baptism  a  topic  of  discus- 
 sion at  Jerusalem,  377 ;  questions  on, 
 vol.  iv.  313. 
 
 John  the  Evangelist,  questions  on  Gospel 
 of,  vol  iv.  350;  Epistles  of,  363;  the 
 apostle,  399. 
 
 Johnson,  Dr,  on  the  word  baptism,  voL 
 ii.  469. 
 
 Jonah,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  312. 
 
 Jordan,  river,  "  in,"  meaning  of,  in  con- 
 nexion with  John's  baptism,  vol.  ii. 
 251,  252. 
 
 Joshua,  exhortation  and  death,  vol.  iv. 
 330 ;  questions  on,  378. 
 
 Judas,  no  difference  between,  and  the 
 other  apostles,  except  good  works,  ex- 
 amined, vol.  iiL  144;  questions  on, 
 vol  iv.  400. 
 
 Jude,  Epistle  of,  questions  on,  voL  iv. 
 364. 
 
 Judgment,  final,  proof  of,  from  Scrip- 
 ture, vol.  i.  135—137;  rule  of,  137; 
 objects  of,  138 ;  process  of,  139 — 141 ; 
 effects  of,  142. 
 
 Justification,  importance  of,  vol.  iii.  52 ; 
 conveyed  by  baptism,  examined,  56 ; 
 with  faith,  productive  of  good  works, 
 56 ;     Paul's    doctrine    of,    58  —  60 ; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 555 
 
 James's  doctrine  of,  60 — 63 ;  lost  and 
 recovered  successively,  examined,  63 
 — 66;  continuance  in,  69,  70;  of 
 persons  and  of  actions,  difference  of, 
 71 ;  in  Chi'ist,  by  faith  and  by  works, 
 277 ;  Dissertation  on,  vol.  iv.  203  ;  by 
 faith,  207;  and  regeneration  simul- 
 taneous, 209;  its  foundation,  the 
 federal  perfection  of  the  Messiah, 
 210 ;  by  faith  alone,  should  be  stren- 
 uously urged  by  ministers,  211 ;  by 
 works,  213;  what  meant  by,  in  James, 
 214,  269. 
 
 Kingdoms  of  this  world,  meaning  of, 
 vol.  ii.  158 ;  of  God,  meaning  of,  159 ; 
 of  heaven,  of  whom  are  its  subjects 
 composed,  179 — 182;  "of  such," 
 meaning  of,  182 ;  the  New  Testa- 
 ment speaks  of  three,  each  having  a 
 king,  vol.  iii.  346 ;  mediatorial,  con- 
 summation of,  352. 
 
 Kings,  of  Judah,  vol.  iv.  334 ;  of  Israel, 
 335. 
 
 KnatchbuD,  Sir  N.,  criticism  on  1  Cor. 
 vii.  14,  vol.  ii.  237. 
 
 Knowledge,  religious,  excellency  of ; 
 advancement  in,  strongly  enjoined  in 
 Scripture,  vol.  iii.  279—283 ;  how  to 
 obtain,  282—287. 
 
 Law,  moral,  its  relation  to  God  and 
 man,  vol.  i.  94;  positive,  nature  of, 
 95 ;  Divine,  controversies  arising  out 
 of  different  views  of,  230 ;  definition 
 of,  vol.  ii.  13 ;  positive,  defined  and  ex- 
 plained, 14;  take  some  principles  for 
 granted,  20 ;  imply  their  negative,  no 
 force  in  the  Baptist  controversy,  139 ; 
 Divine,  requires  decency  and  pro- 
 priety, 339 ;  of  Moses,  vol.  iv.  323. 
 
 Lazarus,  questions  on,  vol  iv.  315. 
 
 Levi,  David,  a  Letter  to,  recommending 
 the  Exposition  of  the  Epistle  to  the 
 Hebrews,  vol.  iv.  507. 
 
 Levites,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  326. 
 
 Liberty,  definition  of,  vol.  i.  61 ;  same 
 in  fallen  as  in  perfect,  334;  Dr 
 Whitby's  views  of,  examined,  335 ; 
 
 its  precariousness,  353 ;  Theodoret  on, 
 vol.  iii.  242 ;  a  physical  power,  a  fal- 
 lacy, examined,  254 ;  Dissertation  on, 
 vol.  iv.  57;  what?  60;  elective,  63; 
 and  passive  power,  the  origin  of  moral 
 evil,  113;  and  necessity,  256. 
 
 Life,  spiritual,  illustrations  of,  vol.  i. 
 420 — 422 ;  middle,  Jerome  on,  vol.  ii. 
 232. 
 
 Locke  on  the  signification  of  words, 
 vol.  ii.  471. 
 
 Lot  and  his  family,  questions  on,  vol. 
 iv.  309,  320. 
 
 Luke,  questions  on,  and  Gospel  of,  vol. 
 iv.  349. 
 
 Man,  degenerated,  if  not,  what  residts 
 follow?  vol.  i.  81;  why  redeemed? 
 166 ;  two  natures  in,  examined,  vol. 
 iii.  196  ;  Marcion  on,  197 ;  Basilides 
 on,  198 ;  nature  of  the  power  of  the 
 Creator  alone  can  change,  197;  na- 
 tural abUity  of,  maintained  by  the 
 Armiuian  hypothesis,  327 ;  in  his 
 original  state  of  probation,  vol.  iv. 
 261 ;  God's  requirements  of,  worship, 
 &c.,  273;  his  state,  when  created, 
 318. 
 
 Manasseh,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  386. 
 
 Manioheans,  origin  of,  vol.  iii.  198. 
 
 Mankind,  moral  state  of,  iii.  92. 
 
 Marcus  Antoninus  quoted  in  illustration 
 of  ^aiTTiia,  vol.  ii.  332. 
 
 Mark,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  349. 
 
 Mary,  the  Virgin,  questions  on,  vol.  iv. 
 394. 
 
 Ma^^reuaare  iravra  ra  e^i/?^,  meaning  of, 
 vol.  ii.  188—199;  DrGuyse  on,  192. 
 
 Means,  moral,  the  Old  and  New  Testa- 
 ment are,  vol.  i.  182,  411 ;  on  what 
 the  efficacy  of  ?  vol.  iii.  255. 
 
 Meat,  clean  and  unclean,  vol.  iv.  325. 
 
 Mediator,  the  appointment  of,  an  in- 
 stance of  sovereignty,  vol.  i.  174. 
 
 Mercy,  proclamation  of,  not  a  cause  of 
 wickedness  and  misery,  vol.  iii.  247. 
 
 Metaphysics  not  to  be  avoided,  because 
 of  their  abuse,  vol.  i.  12. 
 
 Ministers,  how  ought  they  to  regard  the 
 
556 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 duty  of  baptizing  infants,  vol.  ii.  441 
 — 443 ;  main  study,  Sermon  on,  vol. 
 iii.  500 ;  approbation  of  God  essential 
 to  success,  503,  506 ;  means  of  their 
 success,  506 — 511 ;  encouragements 
 to,  511,  515. 
 
 Ministry,  Christian,  correct  views  of, 
 essential  to  its  faithful  exercise,  vol. 
 i.  118;  qualifications  for,  a  Charge, 
 vol.  iii.  488. 
 
 Missionaries,  first,  to  the  South  Sea, 
 Charge  to,  vol.  iii.  477 ;  God's  aU- 
 sulficiency,  the  encouragement  of, 
 485. 
 
 Modus,  the,  of  a  process  may  be  a  pro- 
 foimd  mystery  while  cause  may  be 
 well  known,  vol.  i.  6. 
 
 Moses,  "  baptized  unto,"  meaning  of, 
 vol.  ii.  321 ;  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  309; 
 and  Aaron,  322 ;  his  dying  exhorta- 
 tion, 328. 
 
 Motives,  in  moral  science,  the  import- 
 ance of  correct  ideas  of,  vol.  i.  262 ; 
 subjective  grace  constitutes  but  a  part 
 of,  417;  elements  of,  419  ;  nature  of, 
 explained,  vol.  iii.  132 — -134  ;  nature 
 of,  vol.  iv.  153  ;  Divine  prohibitions 
 considered  in  connexion  with,  154. 
 
 Nations,  all,  meaning  of,  vol.  ii.  188. 
 
 "  Nature  of  things,"  the  expression  de- 
 fined, vol.  i.  57. 
 
 Nebuchadnezzar,  his  condition  in  its 
 bearing  on  baptism,  vol.  ii.  279. 
 
 Necessity,  definition  of,  vol.  i. ;  in  Mr 
 Fletcher's  theory,  and  in  President 
 Edwards's,  375 ;  Calvinistie  view  of, 
 not  correctly  stated  by  Mr  Fletcher, 
 382  ;  in  connexion  with  redemption, 
 385  ;  destroyed  by  free  agency,  main- 
 tained by  Mr  Fletcher,  402 ;  kind  of, 
 admitted  by  Mr  Fletcher,  402 ;  kind 
 pleaded  for  by  Calvinists,  and  Mr 
 Fletcher's  blunder  on,  403  ;  the  term 
 ambiguous,  and  needs  defining,  vol. 
 iv.  65 ;  physical,  67 ;  rationale  of;  67; 
 metaphysical,  70  ;  hypothetical,  71 ; 
 arguments,  72  ;  Dv  Reid  on,  74  ;  his 
 fimdamental  error  pointed  out,  76, 
 
 Nehemiah,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  391. 
 
 Noah  and  his  family,  questions  on,  vol. 
 iv.  308. 
 
 Novatian,  (a  presbyter  of  the  Church  of 
 Rome,  flourished  about  the  year  250,) 
 was  baptized  in  bed,  vol.  ii.  348. 
 
 Obedience,  the  true  rule  of  God's  moral 
 government,  vol.  i.  87  ;  all  sanctions, 
 threats,  &c.,  imply  a  requisition  to, 
 181 ;  sinless,  claimed  by  Antinomians 
 in  one  sense,  by  Arminians  in  another, 
 vol.  iii.  165. 
 
 Obligation,  moral,  freedom  essential  to, 
 vol.  i.  18  ;  a  branch  of  moral  science, 
 258;  Paley  on,  defective,  259;  the 
 Divine  rectitude  the  ultimate  stan- 
 dard of,  261 ;  destroyed  by  Dr  Whit- 
 by's theory,  307 ;  true  grounds  of, 
 437 ;  what  necessary  to,  vol.  iii.  252 ; 
 nature  of,  257 ;  and  inability.  Disser- 
 tation on,  vol.  iv.  105 — 109. 
 
 Operations,  Divine,  Bishop  of  Lincoln's 
 view  of,  examined,  vol.  iii.  16 ;  do  not 
 infringe  on  the  human  wiD,  17;  in- 
 ternal, 17  ;  not  in  the  Word,  18 ;  the 
 end  of,  the  production  of  virtuous 
 principle,  19;  antecedent  to  human 
 co-operation,  20. 
 
 Ordinances,  are  they  converting  in  their 
 nature  and  design  ?  vol.  ii.  121. 
 
 Origen  (flourished  at  Alexandria  about 
 the  end  of  the  second  century)  on 
 infant  baptism,  vol.  ii.  371 ;  and  Cyril, 
 on  the  Divine  source  of  virtue,  vol. 
 iii.  183. 
 
 JIa\iyy(vea-ia,  meaning  of,  vol.  iii.  49. 
 
 Papists,  Psedobaptists  charged  with  fa- 
 vouring, examined,  vol.  ii.  482. 
 
 Parents,  baptism  a  source  of  profitable 
 reflections  to,  vol.  ii.  426 ;  of  thank- 
 fulness to,  426 — 429 ;  a  means  to 
 benefit  their  offspring,  429 ;  gives  in- 
 tensity to  their  prayer,  430 ;  should 
 be  used  as  a  means  of  conversion,  433 
 — 438 ;  the  right  mode  of  reasoning 
 with  a  baptized  child,  438 — 440. 
 
 Passiveness  and  agency,  vol,  iii.  274. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 557 
 
 Passover,  its  connexion  with  baptism, 
 vol.  ii.  Ii6 ;  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  326. 
 
 Patriarchs,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  318. 
 
 Paul,  the  apostle,  questions  on,  vol.  iv. 
 403. 
 
 Psedobaptists,  views  on  baptism  implied 
 in  prophetic  passages,  vol.  ii.  158; 
 charged  with  altering  the  ordinance 
 of  baptism,  discussed,  353;  no  evi- 
 dence for  Psedobaptism  before  the 
 second  century,  examined,  362. 
 
 Peace,  universal,  the  expectation  of  all 
 Christians ;  and  its  beginning  must  be 
 with  individuals,  vol.  iv.  186. 
 
 Pelagius,  Pelagianism,  and  Pelagians. 
 (The  original  name  of  this  man  was 
 Morgan,  and  Pelagius  is  only  the 
 Greek  form  or  equivalent  Latinised.) 
 Pelagians  and  Hyper- Calvinists  meet, 
 vol.  i.  127;  Pelagianism,  its  principles, 
 243 ;  Pelagius  and  Dr  Reid,  views  of, 
 identical,  480. 
 
 Perfection,  Christian,  how  understood 
 by  Calvinists,  vol.  iii.  166  ;  imputed, 
 vol.  iv.  203 ;  how  obtained,  203. 
 
 Permission,  Divine,  meaning  of,  vol.  iii. 
 181. 
 
 Perseverance,  Ambrose  on,  vol.  iii.  191; 
 Augustine  on,  192. 
 
 Peter,  Epistles  of,  vol.  iv.  362;  the 
 apostle,  questions  on,  398. 
 
 Pharaoh,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  376. 
 
 Philemon,  questions  on  Epistle  to,  vol. 
 iv.  360. 
 
 Philippians,  Epistle  to,  questions  on, 
 vol.  iv.  358. 
 
 Philosophy,  moral,  false,  vol.  i.  10 ;  na- 
 tural, province  of,  vol.  iv.  52. 
 
 Plato  (flourished  at  Athens,  430  B.C.) 
 quoted  in  illustration  of  jSuTn-i'fM, 
 vol.  ii.  333. 
 
 Plunging  of  repentance  an  incongruous 
 idea,  vol.  ii.  260 ;  no  one  instance  in 
 the  New  Testament  in  which  /3a?r- 
 Tifo)  necessarily  means  plunging, 
 262. 
 
 Plutarch  (a  native  of  Cheronea,  died 
 A.D.  140)  quoted  in  illustration  of  the 
 word  /SaTrn'fo'!  vol.  ii.  335. 
 
 Popery,  the  charge  that  Psedobaptism 
 involves  it,  examined,  vol.  ii.  357. 
 
 Possibility,  and  impossibility,  viewed  in 
 connexion  with  salvation,  vol.  iii.  108. 
 
 Power,  compulsive,  rejected  in  religion 
 by  consistent  Christians,  vol.  i.  35; 
 passive,  Turretine  on,  89;  Dr  Reid 
 and  Locke  on,  90;  Theo.  Gale  on, 
 271 ;  of  obeying  stiU  left  in  man, 
 examined,  vol.  iii.  8 ;  misapplied  by 
 the  Bishop  of  Lincoln,  245 ;  physical 
 and  moral  propensities  confounded, 
 273;  passive,  what?  365;  different 
 kinds  of,  vol.  iv.  26 ;  Locke  on,  criti- 
 cised, 26 ;  Dr  Reid  on,  examined,  27 ; 
 regarded  by  Dr  Reid  as  an  occult  qua- 
 lity, 29 ;  only  a  relative  conception,  ac- 
 cording to  Dr  Reid's  theory,  30 ;  Dr 
 G.  Campbell  on  Bishop  Beveridge's 
 views,  examined,  31 ;  active  and  pas- 
 sive, treated  of,  33 ;  Reid  and  Locke 
 on,  34;  the  origin  of  the  expression 
 "  passive  power  "  traced  to  Aristotle, 
 37 ;  physical  meaning  of  its  principle, 
 expounded,  38 — 43  ;  metaphysical, 
 what?  43 — 48;  moral,  48;  "passive 
 power  "  not  a  new-coined  expression, 
 161 ;  not  the  seat  of  vice,  161. 
 
 Prayer  and  certainty  not  incongruous, 
 vol.  i.  346 ;  in  connexion  with  grace, 
 its  place,  424. 
 
 Precept,  or  precedent,  no,  for  infant  bap- 
 tism in  the  New  Testament,  the  as- 
 sertion answered,  vol.  ii.  358. 
 
 Predestination,  to  death,  an  impure  mix- 
 ture, vol.  i,  429 ;  to  life,  a  sermon  on, 
 a  cause  of  alarm,  439 ;  a  manuscript 
 by  the  Rev.  A.  Booth  on,  440 ;  to  life, 
 Clement  of  Alexandria,  on,  vol.  iii. 
 187;  to  life,  Sermon  on,  361;  not  a 
 peradventra-e,  secures  the  glory  of 
 God  and  the  end  of  Christ's  death, 
 369;  required  by  the  covenant  of  grace, 
 371 ;  not  arbitrariness  or  partiality 
 in  God,  371 ;  not  a  ground  for  the 
 charge  that  man  is  a  mere  machine, 
 372 ;  not  a  gi'ound  for  licentiousness, 
 373 ;  as  a  doctrine,  not  a  secret,  374 ; 
 a  source  of  great  comfort,  375 ;  affords 
 
558 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 a  pleasing  view  of  the  Divine  charac- 
 ter, 375;  does  not  luU  to  sleep  in 
 sin,  377 ;  man  does  not  do  evil  be- 
 cause of,  377 ;  and  election,  vol.  iv. 
 257. 
 
 Prescience,  as  a  Divine  perfection,  con- 
 sidered, vol.  i.  162 ;  and  free-will,  the 
 principle  of  reconciliation,  264;  the 
 assertion  that  it  cannot  be  reconciled 
 with  free-agency,  examined,  voL  iii. 
 117 — 119;  founded  on  man's  obe- 
 dience and  compliance,  examined, 
 122 — 135;  Divine,  Dissertation  on, 
 vol.  iv.  85 ;  in  connexion  with  actions 
 morally  evil,  SS. 
 
 Priesthood,  directions  concerning,  vol. 
 iv.  324. 
 
 Priestley,  Dr,  Letter  to,  on  the  interpre- 
 tation of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  vol.  iv. 
 492. 
 
 Profession,  credible,  meaning  of,  voL  ii. 
 129. 
 
 Promise  to  Abraham  in  Gen.  xvii.  9 — 
 14,  meaning,  vol.  iL  96;  in  Acts  ii. 
 39,  to  whom  made  ?  203 ;  certainty 
 of,  vol.  iii.  180. 
 
 Prophecy,  relates  to  sin  as  well  as  good- 
 ness, vol.  i.  375 ;  Arminianism  de- 
 stroys, 376 ;  certainty  in  connexion 
 with,  examined,  384;  its  bearing  on 
 baptism,  vol.  ii.  154 — 158 ;  principles 
 of  interpreting,  from  Bishop  Newton, 
 155 ;  in  connexion  with  moral  means, 
 voL  iii.  256;  minor  prophets,  ques- 
 tions on,  voL  iv.  345. 
 
 Proselytes,  meaning  of,  vol.  ii.  197; 
 baptism  of,  in  its  bearing  on  infant 
 baptism,  379. 
 
 npoa-KoKearjTm,  meaning  of,  vol.  ii. 
 205—208. 
 
 Proverbs,  Book  of,  questions  on,  vol.  iv. 
 340. 
 
 Providence,  mixture  of  good  and  evil 
 in,  vol.  i.  217—219. 
 
 Psalms,  Book  of,  questions  on,  vol.  iv. 
 339. 
 
 Purchase  of  Christ,  Athanasius  on,  vol. 
 iii.  200 ;  Jerome  on,  201. 
 
 Purifier  and  purification.     Purifier  of 
 
 silver  in  Mai.  iii.  1 ;  its  bearing  on 
 the  mode  of  baptism,  vol.  iL  252  ; 
 purifications  of  John  the  Baptist 
 considered,  253. 
 Purposes,  the  Divine  character  requires, 
 vol.  iii.  368. 
 
 Rainbow,  its  specific  design,  vol  ii. 
 142 ;  and  baptism,  used  for  new  pur- 
 poses, 165. 
 
 Reason,  testimony  of,  on  the  subject  of 
 man's  depravity,  vol  i.  82 ;  insuffi- 
 ciency of,  by  Justin  Martyr,  vol.  iii. 
 205 ;  human,  undervalued  by  the 
 orthodox,  the  charge  examined,  326. 
 
 Rebellion  of  the  Israelites  in  the  wil- 
 derness, voL  iv.  327. 
 
 Redemption,  itself,  and  its  price,  difier- 
 ence  of,  vol.  i.  129  ;  means  of  secur- 
 ing its  ultimate  end  various,  177 ; 
 particular  and  general,  Coles  on,  300 ; 
 as  set  forth  in  the  New  Testament, 
 vol.  iii.  90 — 92;  Calvin's  views  on, 
 101 ;  ffilaiy  on,  227  ;  price  of,  277. 
 
 Reformers,  what  they  aimed  at,  vol.  i. 
 34  ;  Reformation,  national,  necessity 
 of,  to  avert  national  ruin,  a  Sermon 
 on,  vol.  iii.  415. 
 
 Regeneration,  the  meaning  of,  voL  i. 
 331 ;  as  used  by  Calvinists,  vol.  iiL 
 33  ;  not  confounded  with  conversion, 
 34 ;  not  conf oimded  with  indefectible 
 grace,  37 ;  signifies  baptism,  examined, 
 38 — 46 ;  meaning  of,  used  by  the 
 Christian  Fathers,  48 — 51 ;  Irenjeiis 
 on,  187  ;  Gregory  and  Justin  Martyr 
 on,  217 — 219  ;  and  conversion,  &c., 
 examined,  vol  iv.  270. 
 
 Relationship  between  parent  and  child 
 involves  the  duty  of  baptism,  voL  ii. 
 151. 
 
 Rehgion  and  morals,  the  importance  of 
 equity  and  sovereignty  in  connexion 
 with,  and  importance  of,  in  connexion 
 with  the  worts  of  creation  and  pro- 
 vidence, voL  i.  212 ;  personal,  equity 
 and  sovereignty  in  reference  to,  pro- 
 mote love,  220 ;  promote  filial  fear, 
 221 ;  humility,  223 ;  resignation  and 
 
INDEX. 
 
 559 
 
 gratitude,  225 — 228  ;  settled  enjoy- 
 ment of,  228 ;  externals  of,  overrated, 
 vol.  ii.  3i2 ;  "  Social  Religion  Exem- 
 plified," republication  of,  with  notes, 
 animadverted  upon  and  defended, 
 451,  ad  finem;  revealed,  value  of,  Ser- 
 mon on,  vol.  iii.  469 ;  what  the  book 
 of  nature  teaches  on,  470 ;  how 
 Divine  revelation  supplies  the  defects 
 of,  472;  Christian  necessity,  proba- 
 bility, truth,  and  nature  of,  vol.  iv, 
 229. 
 
 Reprobation,  the  subject  examined,  vol. 
 i.  121 ;  no  foundation  for  in  Scrip- 
 ture, 286 ;  meaning  of,  examined,  vol. 
 iii.  110  ;  why  Calvin  and  some  others 
 inferred  it.  111 ;  advocated  by  the 
 Bishop  of  Lincoln,  250. 
 
 Resurrection,  certainty  of,  a  Sermon  on, 
 vol.  iii.  344 ;  fundamental  to  Christi- 
 anity, 355;  required  by  the  nature 
 of  Christ's  kingdom,  356 ;  an  en- 
 couragement and  terror,  358. 
 
 Revelation,  Divine,  unfolds  a  difference 
 between  the  internal  form  and  the 
 outward  administration  of  God's  plan 
 of  mercy,  vol.  i.  1 ;  axioms  of,  42 ; 
 the  whole  of,  a  testimony,  ISO ;  also, 
 a  proclamation,  181 ;  of  John,  ques- 
 tions on,  vol.  iv.  364. 
 
 Right,  God's,  how  regulated,  vol.  i.  151 
 — 158  ;  man's,  by  Tertullian,  vol.  iii. 
 208. 
 
 Righteousness,  original,  not  entirely 
 lost,  examined,  vol.  iii.  2;  what  it 
 means,  -3  ;  what  the  compilers  of  the 
 articles  of  the  Episcopal  Church 
 meant  by,  3 ;  how  lost,  3 ;  the  sup- 
 position it  means  good  qualities,  ex- 
 amined, 4 ;  proposed  alteration  by 
 the  Assembly  of  Divines,  4,  5 ;  what 
 Calvinists  hold  on  this  point,  6. 
 
 Rites,  purifying,  vol.  iv.  325. 
 
 Romans,  Epistle  to,  questions  on,  vol. 
 iv.  355. 
 
 Ruth,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  380. 
 
 Rule,  moral,  according  to  which  man  is 
 governed,  voL  i.  92. 
 
 Saceipioe  of  Christ,  God's  design  in,  vol. 
 iii.  98 — 100  ;  institution  of,  has  refe- 
 rence to  human  guUt,  332 ;  and 
 offerings,  vol.  iv.  324. 
 
 Saiats,  imion  of  the  Spirit  of  God  with, 
 vol.  i.  196;  perseverance  of,  339;  to 
 be  iinally  lost,  unworthy  of  God,  340 ; 
 not  in  accordance  with  the  Divine 
 faithfulness,  341 ;  with  Divine  wis- 
 dom, 342. 
 
 Salmasius,  (Claude,  aprofessor  of  history 
 at  Leyden  in  the  seventeenth  cen- 
 tury,) assertion  of,  on  the  subject  of 
 baptism,  answered,  vol.  ii.  363. 
 
 Salvation,  itself,  and  means  of,  often 
 confoimded,  vol.  iii.  248. 
 
 Samson,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  379. 
 
 Samuel,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  310. 
 
 Sanctification,  how  carried  on,  vol.  i. 
 477  ;  sanctified,  the  imbelieving  hus- 
 band by  the  wife,  meaning  of,  vol.  ii. 
 220 — 226  ;  and  perseverance,  vol.  iv. 
 271 ;  Letters  on,  416. 
 
 Saul,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  381. 
 
 Saviour,  to  suppose  the  fallen  world 
 without,  is  to  suppose  another  uni- 
 verse, vol.  i.  98 ;  His  obedience  nnto 
 death,  design  of  in  regard  to  the 
 Divine  character,  120  ;  His  cruci- 
 fixion, in  its  relation  to  the  elect,  121 ; 
 and  the  saved,  special  discrimination 
 with  regard  to,  an  instance  of  sove- 
 reignty, 176. 
 
 Science,  moral,  equity  and  sovereignty 
 in  reference  to,  vol.  i.  252 ;  the  exist- 
 ence of  a  First  Cause  a  final  principle 
 in,  252;  of  a  moral  system,  a  first 
 principle  in,  254 ;  essential  difference 
 between  virtue  and  vice,  a  first  prin- 
 ciple in,  255 ;  and  decree,  and  pre- 
 science, distinction  in  the  application 
 to  God,  359 ;  moral  definition  of,  vol. 
 iv.  3  ;  defects  of,  acooimted  for,  5 — 7 ; 
 outlines  of,  8 — 20 ;  evidence  applicable 
 to,  21 ;  essential  principles  of  inves- 
 tigation in,  22;  hypothetical  neces- 
 sity, a  principle  of,  24. 
 
 Scripture,  silence  and  testimony  of,  con- 
 sidered, vol.  i,  47. 
 
560 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Seal,  to  whom  circumcision  was  a,  vol. 
 ii.  100—102. 
 
 Seducers,  evils  of,  a  Sermon  on,  vol.  iii. 
 461. 
 
 Sin  and  sinners.  Sin,  permission  of, 
 vol.  i.  58  ;  original,  not  positive  but 
 negative,  90  ;  sinners,  the  gospel  of- 
 fered to,  for  acceptance,  as  such,  126 ; 
 original,  given  up  by  Dr  Whitby, 
 267 ;  whose  is  the  power  to  commit  ? 
 280 ;  sinning,  what  is  ?  284 ;  sin,  the 
 Arminian  genealogy  of,  372—375 ; 
 Arminianism  makes  God  the  cause  of, 
 376 ;  author  of,  Edwards  not  suffi- 
 ciently guarded  on,  382  ;  permission 
 of,  how  treated  by  Mr  Fletcher,  401 ; 
 God  cannot  in  any  sense  be  said  to 
 be,  433 — 437 ;  in  its  nature  privative, 
 this  view  objected  to,  441  ;  privative 
 nature  of,  imfolded,  441 — 447 ;  ori- 
 ginal. Bishop  of  Lincoln's  views  of, 
 examined,  voL  iii.  1  — 15;  and  its 
 punishment,  vol.  iv.  263. 
 
 Singing,  a  part  of  worship,  vol.  iv.  282. 
 
 Soci-ates,  on  the  aid  given  by  the  gods 
 to  produce  virtue,  vol.  iv.  458. 
 
 Solomon,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  381. 
 
 Son,  subjection  of  the,  its  meaning,  vol. 
 iii.  353;  of  God,  eternal  generation 
 of,  vol.  iv.  249  ;  deity  of,  and  of  the 
 Holy  Spirit,  252. 
 
 Souls,  when  united  to  the  body,  state 
 of,  considered,  vol.  i.  89 ;  how  the 
 Spirit  and  the  truth  operate  in  the 
 conversion  of,  209. 
 
 Sovereignty,  definition  of,  vol.  i.  60 ; 
 differs  from  supremacy,  74 ;  viewed 
 in  connexion  with  means,  151 — 176  ; 
 what  the  exact  object  of,  169  ;  diver- 
 sity in  all  nature  the  result  of,  196 ; 
 a  Divine  attribute,  349 — 352  ;  wis- 
 dom essential  to,  353;  essential,  of 
 God,  shewn  by  all  created  existence, 
 354 ;  consequence  flowing  from,  354 ; 
 no  injury  to  any  one  whatever,  vol. 
 iii.  264. 
 
 Spirit,  Divine,  two  ways  in  which  He 
 can  operate,  vol.  i.  331 ;  never  works 
 without  the  Word,  meaning  of,  424  ; 
 
 His  operations  dishonoured,  425 ; 
 communicated  subsequent  to  belief, 
 examined,  vol.  iii.  20 — 22 ;  influence 
 of,  not  communicated  to  those  who 
 refuse  to  believe,  22 ;  not  communi- 
 cated by  baptism,  23,  24 ;  not  in- 
 separably connected  with  baptism, 
 24 — 28;  never  given  after  baptism, 
 examined,  32. 
 
 Stephen,  questions  on,  vol.  iv.  402. 
 
 Stewart,  Dugald,  review  of  his  Philoso- 
 phical Essays,  vol.  iv.  524. 
 
 Strabo,  (a  philosopher  and  historian  in 
 the  reign  of  Augustus  and  Tiberias,) 
 quoted  to  illustrate  ^aTrrl^a,  vol.  ii. 
 334. 
 
 Students,  Hints  to,  on  entering  college, 
 vol.  iv.  219. 
 
 Supper,  Lord's,  and  baptism,  claims  to, 
 vol.  ii.  350 ;  Lectiu'e  on,  vol.  iv. 
 281. 
 
 System,  moral,  means  of,  vol.  i.  170 ; 
 conducted  on  strict  equity  at  one 
 period,  the  result  of,  171;  the  Cal- 
 vinistic  and  the  Arminian,  what  the 
 real  diflicidty  in,  277 ;  the  Arminian 
 system  of  grace,  summary  of,  321 ; 
 difi'erence  between,  and  the  Calvin- 
 istic  system,  322;  "V^Tiitby's,  a  me- 
 chanical one,  defects  of,  in  various 
 ways,  323 — 326  ;  Calvinistic,  general 
 view  of,  in  contrast  with  the  Armi- 
 nian, 327—329  ;  the  best  method  of 
 testing  the  merits  of,  381. 
 
 Tabal,  the  Hebrew,  equivalent  to  bap- 
 tism, vol.  ii.  265—268. 
 
 Tabernacle,  instructions  to  make,  vol. 
 iv.  324. 
 
 Tempers,  Christian,  the  means  of  incul- 
 cating, vol.  ii.  440. 
 
 Temple  of  Solomon,  questions  on,  vol. 
 iv.  334. 
 
 Tendencies,  hjipothetical,  in  the  nature 
 of  things,  vol.  iii.  359. 
 
 Terms,  equivocal,  use  of,  animadverted 
 upon,  vol.  iii.  249. 
 
 TertuUian,  (Quintus  Septimus  Florens. 
 a  Christian  Father,  flourished  in  the 
 
INDEX. 
 
 561 
 
 reigns  of  Severus  and  Caracalla)  on 
 
 infant  baptism,  vol.  ii.  368. 
 Testimony  of  God,  Hooker  on,  vol.  iii. 
 
 46. 
 Theology,  Lecture  on  the  study  of,  vol. 
 
 iv.    222;    method  of,   and  cautions, 
 
 224 ;  enemies  of,  225 ;  genuine  prin- 
 ciples of,  233. 
 Theory,  the  Arminian,  logically  weak, 
 
 vol.  in.  389—391. 
 Thessalonians,  Epistles  to,  questions  on, 
 
 vol.  iv.  359. 
 Things,   nature  of,    in  moral    science. 
 
 Dissertation  on,  vol.  iv.  80;   nature 
 
 of,  is  the  nature  of  God,  163. 
 Times,    holy,    questions    on,    vol.    iv. 
 
 325. 
 Timothy,   questions    on,  vol.  iv.   316; 
 
 Epistles  to,  359. 
 Tingo,   an   equivalent   to   the    generic 
 
 term,  baptize,  vol.  ii.  263 — 265. 
 Titus,  Epistle  to,  questions  on,  vol.  iv. 
 
 360. 
 Traditions,  Jewish,  authority  of,  vol.  iii. 
 
 32 ;  Church  of  Rome  make,  of  equal 
 
 authority  with  Scripture,  33. 
 Trial,  the  moral,  of  intelligent  creatures, 
 
 explained,  vol.  iii.  349. 
 Trinity,  Lecture  on,  vol.  iv.  248. 
 Truth,    inquiry    after,    influenced    by 
 
 religious  practice.  Sermon  on,  vol.  iii. 
 
 291 ;  definition  of,  by  Belsham,  302  ; 
 
 influence  of,  on  the  mind,  475. 
 
 Unanimity,  Christian,  Sermon  on,  vol. 
 iii.  399 ;  grounds  of,  402—405. 
 
 Unbelievers,  passages  that  exclude, 
 from  the  kingdom,  do  not  exclude 
 infants  from  baptism,  vol.  ii.  124; 
 disqualifications  of,  to  baptism,  do 
 not  belong  to  infants  as  such,  and  so 
 exclude  them  from  baptism,  126. 
 
 Union,  Congregational,  nature  of,  vol. 
 iii.  405 — 408  ;  mode  of  effecting, 
 408—410  ;  advantages  of,  410—414; 
 to  Christ  two-fold,  vol.  iv.  209 ;  Con- 
 gregational, Papers  on,  409 — 446  ; 
 Thoughts  on,  431—439;  Hints  on, 
 to  a  committee  iu  London,  440. 
 VOL.  IV.  2 
 
 Universe,  as  one  mansion,  with  various 
 apartments,  vol.  iii.  348. 
 
 Universalists,  their  theory  examined 
 and  refuted,  vol.  i.  145 — 150. 
 
 'Ytto  and  tV,  meaning  of,  examined,  in 
 connexion  with  the  Baptist  contro- 
 versy, vol.  ii.  321. 
 
 Valesius  (Henry,  or  de  Valois,  a 
 French  critic,  flourished  in  the  be- 
 ginning of  the  17th  century)  on 
 baptism,  vol.  ii.  349. 
 
 Virgil  quoted  in  illustration  of  /3ai7- 
 Tif<o,  vol.  ii.  333,  334. 
 
 Virtue  and  vice,  wrong  notions  as  to 
 the  source  of,  why  some  have  sup- 
 posed the  win  to  be,  vol.  iii  266 ; 
 why  some  of  the  Christian  fathers 
 so  thought,  267 ;  wisdom  illustrative 
 of,  269;  essence  of,  vol.  iv.  157; 
 the  meaning  of  the  term  vii'tue,  and 
 its  nature,  164;  illustrations  of,  165; 
 it  ought  to  embrace  universal  being, 
 167 ;  according  to  Belsham,  168 ; 
 Robert  Hall  on,   169;    observations 
 
 on  HaU,  171—178. 
 # 
 
 Wak,  its  wickedness,  vol.  iii  464 ;  Dis- 
 sertation on,  vol.  iv.  184;  Cyprian 
 on,  189 ;  and  public  welfare,  190 ; 
 and  national  sumnium  honum,  191 ; 
 ofiensive,  meaning  of,  192  ;  and 
 officers  of  high  rank,  193  ;  and  inno- 
 cent subjects,  194;  and  persecution, 
 194 ;  men  of,  in  Israel,  326. 
 
 Warwickshu-e,  circular  letter  from  the 
 ministers  of,  vol.  iv.  411 ;  its  import- 
 ance, 412 ;  Postcript  to,  418. 
 
 Water,  a  specific  mode  of  using,  in 
 baptism,  is  nothing  less  than  baptism 
 itself,  examined,  vol.  ii.  461  ;  born 
 of,  and  of  the  Spirit,  remarks  on, 
 vol.  iii  35. 
 
 Weak  and  strong,  in  created  objects, 
 considered,  vol.  i.  21 4. 
 
 Weakness,  human,  Chrysostom  on,  vol. 
 iii  195. 
 
 Wesley,  John,  on  John's  baptism,  vol. 
 ii  343. 
 
 Will,  the,  a  self  determining  power,  ex- 
 N 
 
562 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 amined,  vol.  i.  84 ;  supreme,  not 
 without  a  rule  to  govern  it,  92 ;  not 
 a  standard  of  right,  but  its  expres- 
 sion, 93 ;  free-will  is  not  a  self-deter- 
 mining, even  in  God,  154  and  192; 
 determination  of,  by  grace,  inconsis- 
 tent with  equity,  on  the  Ai-minian 
 scheme,  332 ;  free-,  the  Bishop  of  Lin- 
 coln's views  of,  examined,  vol.  iii.  11 
 — 16  ;  definition  of,  11 ;  the  ideas  of 
 will  and  freedom,  12 ;  good  impres- 
 sions made  by  Divine  truth  depend- 
 ing on,  examined,  13;  free-,  Origen, 
 EusebiuB,  Augustine,  and  Justin 
 Martyr  on,  208 — 212 ;  ceasing  with 
 this  Ufe,  Hilary  on,  229 ;  weakened 
 by  grace,  Jerome  on,  230  ;  definition 
 of,  vol.  iv.  49 :  will  to  permit,  in  con- 
 nexion with  moral  evil,  the  phrase 
 examined,  136. 
 
 Wisdom,  perfect,  requires  provision  to 
 be  made  for  all  future  good  results, 
 voL  i.  360 ;  prescience  essential  to, 
 vol.  iii.  113. 
 
 Works,  good,  and  faith,  the  Bishop  of 
 Lincoln  and  Paul's  views  of,  examined, 
 vol.  iii.  82  ;  recommend  us  to  God, 
 examined,  83 ;  Calvinistic  addresses 
 on,  86. 
 
 World,  end  of,  questions  on,  vol.  iv. 
 407. 
 
 Worthiness,  human,  Justin  Martyr  on, 
 voL  iii.  201 ;  Cyril  on,  203  ;  Basil  and 
 Chrysostom  on,  203,  204 ;  none  in 
 the  creature  to  be  rewarded,  337. 
 
 Zeal,  apostolic,  recommended.  Sermon 
 on,  vol.  iii.  380  :  nature  of,  383—388; 
 relative  character  of,  388  —  392 ; 
 happy  effects  of,  393—398. 
 
INDEX  OF  TEXTS. 
 
 Chap. 
 
 Ver. 
 
 Genesis. 
 
 Vol. 
 
 Page 
 
 Chap. 
 
 Ver. 
 1  Samuel. 
 
 Vol. 
 
 Page 
 
 i. 
 
 1,      
 
 iii. 
 
 469 
 
 i. 
 
 21,       
 
 ii. 
 
 210 
 
 i. 
 
 26,27,      
 
 i. 
 
 80 
 
 iii. 
 
 15,      
 
 i. 
 
 100 
 
 1  Kings. 
 
 iii. 
 
 15,      
 
 ii. 
 
 139 
 
 xxi. 
 
 8,      
 
 ii. 
 
 87 
 
 iii. 
 
 21,      
 
 ii. 
 
 139 
 
 ix. 
 
 8,11,      
 
 i. 
 
 101 
 
 2  Kings. 
 
 xii. 
 
 3,      
 
 ii. 
 
 143 
 
 V. 
 
 10,      
 
 ii. 
 
 267 
 
 xvii. 
 
 1,      
 
 iii. 
 
 469 
 
 V. 
 
 14      
 
 ii. 
 
 270 
 
 xvii. 
 
 7,      
 
 ii. 
 
 143 
 
 xvii. 
 
 7,      
 
 ii. 
 
 139 
 
 2  Cheonioles. 
 
 xvii, 
 
 7,     
 
 ii. 
 
 104 
 
 xii. 
 
 7,     
 
 ii. 
 
 lU 
 
 xvii. 
 
 9—14,      
 
 ii. 
 
 96 
 
 xxiv. 
 
 21,  25,      
 
 ii. 
 
 114 
 
 xviii. 
 
 25,      
 
 i. 
 
 72 
 
 xxxvii. 
 
 11,      
 
 iii. 
 
 452 
 
 Ezra, 
 
 ■STfTVii 
 
 31,      
 
 Exodus. 
 
 ii. 
 
 266 
 
 ix. 
 
 2,      
 
 Nehemiah. 
 
 ii. 
 
 224 
 
 ix. 
 
 16,      
 
 i. 
 
 300 
 
 ix. 
 
 2,      
 
 ii. 
 
 230 
 
 xii. 
 
 22,      
 
 ii. 
 
 279 
 
 xix. 
 
 3—9,      
 
 i. 
 
 106 
 
 Esther. 
 
 XX. 
 
 3—17,      
 
 i. 
 
 106 
 
 iii. 
 
 12,15,      
 
 ii. 
 
 87 
 
 viii. 
 
 8,10,      
 
 ii. 
 
 87 
 
 Leviticus. 
 
 xix. 
 
 19,      
 
 ii. 
 
 288 
 
 Job. 
 
 ix. 
 
 2,4,      
 
 i. 
 
 174 
 
 Numbers. 
 
 ix. 
 
 30,31,      
 
 ii. 
 
 267 
 
 viii. 
 
 5-7,      
 
 ii. 
 
 287 
 
 •v-TTii. 
 
 8,      
 
 ii. 
 
 457 
 
 xix. 
 
 18,      
 
 ii. 
 
 343 
 
 Psalms. 
 
 Deuteeonomy. 
 
 ix. 
 
 7,8,      
 
 i. 
 
 135 
 
 x.xxiii. 
 
 26—29,      
 
 i. 
 
 178 
 
 XXV. 
 
 H,      
 
 i. 
 
 30 
 
564. 
 
 INDEX  OF  TEXTS. 
 
 Chap. 
 
 Ver. 
 
 ToL 
 
 Page 
 
 Chap. 
 
 Ver. 
 
 VoL 
 
 Page 
 
 H. 
 
 7,      
 
 ui. 
 
 24 
 
 vii. 
 
 9,10,       
 
 i. 
 
 135 
 
 H. 
 
 10 
 
 -12,       
 
 415 
 
 is. 
 
 11,       
 
 iL 
 
 273 
 
 Ixxyiv. 
 
 11,       
 
 186 
 
 Ixxxiv. 
 
 11,       
 
 Proverbs. 
 
 414 
 
 vi. 
 
 HOSEA. 
 3,       
 
 iiL 
 
 280 
 
 L 
 
 17,      
 
 iii. 
 
 461 
 
 Joel. 
 
 i. 
 
 20- 
 
 -23,      
 
 iii. 
 
 261 
 
 iL 
 
 28,      
 
 iL 
 
 75 
 
 iii. 
 
 34,      
 
 i. 
 
 186 
 
 xii. 
 
 12,      
 
 i. 
 
 204 
 
 MlCAH. 
 
 xxiv. 
 
 12,      
 
 ECOLESIASTES. 
 
 i. 
 
 135 
 
 vi. 
 
 8,      
 
 Zephaniah. 
 
 i. 
 
 103 
 
 L 
 
 4,      
 
 ii. 
 
 82 
 
 iii. 
 
 8,      
 
 u. 
 
 114 
 
 ii. 
 
 13,      
 
 iii. 
 
 281 
 
 xii. 
 
 14,      
 
 i. 
 
 135 
 
 is. 
 
 Zechabtah. 
 17,      • 
 
 i. 
 
 216 
 
 Isaiah. 
 
 xii. 
 
 10,      
 
 i. 
 
 187 
 
 i. 
 
 9,      
 
 i 
 
 301 
 
 xii. 
 
 10,     
 
 i. 
 
 414 
 
 xi. 
 
 13,      
 
 i. 
 
 301 
 
 xiL 
 
 10,      
 
 ii. 
 
 75 
 
 vi. 
 
 13,      
 
 ii. 
 
 224 
 
 Malaohi. 
 
 Tiii. 
 
 15,      
 
 i. 
 
 173 
 
 xix. 
 
 23- 
 
 -25,      
 
 M. 
 
 156 
 
 iii. 
 
 1,      
 
 ii. 
 
 252 
 
 ■JTiri. 
 
 4,      
 
 iL 
 
 270 
 
 iv. 
 
 6,      
 
 iv. 
 
 302 
 
 xxviii. 
 
 13,      
 
 I 
 
 173 
 
 Matthew. 
 
 ■jnnrii. 
 
 15,       
 
 i. 
 
 415 
 
 k. 
 
 21,       
 
 i. 
 
 168 
 
 iii. 
 
 5—7,      
 
 ii. 
 
 60 
 
 Ixi. 
 
 3,      
 
 i. 
 
 168 
 
 iii. 
 
 5-7,      
 
 ii. 
 
 68 
 
 Ixiii. 
 
 18 
 
 ,  19,      
 
 i. 
 
 301 
 
 iii 
 iii. 
 
 6,7,11,      
 
 10,     
 
 ii. 
 i. 
 
 251 
 
 204 
 
 Jeremiah. 
 
 vii. 
 viii. 
 
 15—20,      
 
 10,      
 
 i. 
 iv. 
 
 204 
 185 
 
 V. 
 
 3 
 
 —9,      
 
 iii. 
 
 415 
 
 xii. 
 
 33,      
 
 L 
 
 204 
 
 xiii. 
 
 11,      
 
 168 
 
 XV. 
 
 13,      
 
 L 
 
 204 
 
 xvii. 
 
 5 
 
 —9,      
 
 204 
 
 XV. 
 
 19,  20,      
 
 iii. 
 
 268 
 
 xvii. 
 
 10,     
 
 135 
 
 XV. 
 
 24,      
 
 ii. 
 
 185 
 
 xxsi. 
 
 31- 
 
 EZEKIEL. 
 
 106 
 
 XX. 
 
 xxii. 
 
 xxii. 
 
 22,  23,      
 
 23,34,      
 
 23,      
 
 ii. 
 i. 
 
 iU. 
 
 61 
 136 
 361 
 
 vii. 
 
 8,      
 
 ii. 
 
 273 
 
 XXV. 
 
 passim 
 
 L 
 
 139 
 
 xiv. 
 
 9,      
 
 i. 
 
 436 
 
 XXV. 
 
 24—30,      
 
 i. 
 
 173 
 
 sxxvi. 
 
 25- 
 
 -27,      
 
 ii. 
 
 322 
 
 XXV. 
 
 31—46,      
 
 i. 
 
 136 
 
 xliii. 
 
 3,      
 
 Dauiel. 
 
 i 
 
 436 
 
 xxviiL 
 
 19,      
 
 Mark. 
 
 ii. 
 
 86 
 
 iv. 
 
 30,      
 
 ii. 
 
 279 
 
 i. 
 
 i,5,      
 
 iL 
 
 61 
 
 iv. 
 
 34- 
 
 -37,      
 
 i. 
 
 173 
 
 i. 
 
 4,6,      
 
 ii. 
 
 254 
 
 Ti. 
 
 17,      
 
 ii. 
 
 87 
 
 vii. 
 
 4,      
 
 ii. 
 
 61 
 
INDEX  OP  TEXTS. 
 
 565 
 
 Cliap. 
 
 Ver. 
 
 X. 
 
 6, 
 
 X. 
 
 16, 
 
 Luke. 
 
 iii. 
 
 3,      ... 
 
 iii. 
 
 14,      ...      . 
 
 xi. 
 
 9—13,      ...      . 
 
 xi. 
 
 38,      ...      . 
 
 sii. 
 
 5,      ...      . 
 
 xiii. 
 
 34,  35,      ...      . 
 
 xiv. 
 
 16—24,      ...      . 
 
 xTiii. 
 
 15,     ...      . 
 
 xxii. 
 
 31,  32,      ...      . 
 
 John. 
 
 i. 
 
 16, 
 
 i. 
 
 25, 
 
 i. 
 
 25,  26, 
 
 i. 
 
 33, 
 
 iii. 
 
 5, 
 
 iii. 
 
 5, 
 
 iii. 
 
 5,6, 
 
 iii. 
 
 5,  6,  8, 
 
 iii. 
 
 26, 
 
 V. 
 
 24—27, 
 
 vi. 
 
 64, 
 
 vii. 
 
 17, 
 
 XT. 
 
 4-6, 
 
 xvii. 
 
 1-3, 
 
 Acts. 
 
 i. 
 
 5, 
 
 i. 
 
 5, 
 
 i. 
 
 13, 
 
 1*, 
 
 ii. 
 
 16 
 
 17, 
 
 ii. 
 
 38, 
 
 ii. 
 
 39, 
 
 ii. 
 
 41, 
 
 viii. 
 
 13, 
 
 viiL 
 
 14- 
 
 -19, 
 
 viii. 
 
 37, 
 
 viii. 
 
 38, 
 
 X. 
 
 1, 
 
 X. 
 
 47 
 
 48, 
 
 xi. 
 
 23, 
 
 xiii. 
 
 23- 
 
 -25, 
 
 xvi. 
 
 15, 
 
 Vol. 
 
 Page 
 
 ii. 
 
 185 
 
 ii. 
 
 176 
 
 ii. 
 
 62 
 
 iv. 
 
 185 
 
 i. 
 
 208 
 
 ii. 
 
 62 
 
 iii. 
 
 26 
 
 ii. 
 
 186 
 
 i. 
 
 109 
 
 ii. 
 
 176 
 
 iii. 
 
 145 
 
 i. 
 
 414 
 
 ii. 
 
 255 
 
 ii. 
 
 62 
 
 ii. 
 
 67 
 
 ii. 
 
 65 
 
 ii. 
 
 76 
 
 i. 
 
 415 
 
 i. 
 
 188 
 
 ii. 
 
 68 
 
 i. 
 
 319 
 
 iii. 
 
 145 
 
 iii. 
 
 291 
 
 i. 
 
 175 
 
 i. 
 
 177 
 
 ii. 
 
 63 
 
 ii. 
 
 75 
 
 iv. 
 
 420 
 
 i. 
 
 111 
 
 iii. 
 
 23 
 
 ii. 
 
 199 
 
 ii. 
 
 72 
 
 ii. 
 
 72 
 
 iii. 
 
 25 
 
 ii. 
 
 121 
 
 ii. 
 
 317 
 
 iv. 
 
 185 
 
 ii. 
 
 72 
 
 i. 
 
 182 
 
 ii. 
 
 69 
 
 ii. 
 
 208 
 
 Chap. 
 
 Ver. 
 
 Vol. 
 
 Page 
 
 xviii. 
 
 27, 
 
 i. 
 
 414 
 
 xxvii. 
 
 22—25, 
 
 31,         .. 
 
 iii. 
 
 128 
 
 ROMAHS. 
 
 ii. 
 
 2—9, 
 
 i. 
 
 139 
 
 ii. 
 
 12, 
 
 i. 
 
 95 
 
 ii. 
 
 28,  29, 
 
 iii. 
 
 36 
 
 iv. 
 
 9—25, 
 
 i. 
 
 102 
 
 iv. 
 
 11, 
 
 ii. 
 
 88 
 
 iv. 
 
 11, 
 
 ii. 
 
 97 
 
 vi. 
 
 3,4, 
 
 .. 
 
 ii. 
 
 64 
 
 vi. 
 
 3,4, 
 
 .. 
 
 ii. 
 
 74 
 
 vi. 
 
 3—6, 
 
 ii. 
 
 112 
 
 viii. 
 
 2,  9—13, 
 
 26, 
 
 i. 
 
 188 
 
 viii. 
 
 2,  9-13, 
 
 i. 
 
 415 
 
 viii. 
 
 7,8, 
 
 .• 
 
 iii. 
 
 162 
 
 is. 
 
 3, 
 
 iii. 
 
 380 
 
 ix. 
 
 22, 
 
 i. 
 
 300 
 
 X. 
 
 1-4, 
 
 iii. 
 
 433 
 
 xi. 
 
 11-31, 
 
 ii. 
 
 213 
 
 xiv. 
 
 9,10, 
 
 i. 
 
 137 
 
 1  Corinthians 
 
 ii. 
 
 12, 
 
 i. 
 
 188 
 
 iii. 
 
 16, 
 
 i. 
 
 423 
 
 iv. 
 
 7, 
 
 iii. 
 
 260 
 
 vi. 
 
 30, 
 
 i. 
 
 168 
 
 vii. 
 
 14, 
 
 ii. 
 
 220 
 
 X. 
 
 30, 
 
 i. 
 
 168 
 
 xii. 
 
 13, 
 
 ii. 
 
 74 
 
 XV. 
 
 24—28, 
 
 ,, 
 
 iii. 
 
 344 
 
 XV. 
 
 38, 
 
 i. 
 
 197 
 
 2  COKINTHIANS 
 
 iii. 
 
 7,8, 
 
 i. 
 
 111 
 
 iii. 
 
 18, 
 
 ii. 
 
 84 
 
 iv. 
 
 6, 
 
 i. 
 
 210 
 
 iv. 
 
 7, 
 
 319 
 
 iv. 
 
 15, 
 
 i. 
 
 182 
 
 V. 
 
 9,10, 
 
 137 
 
 V. 
 
 17, 
 
 i. 
 
 319 
 
 viii. 
 
 7, 
 
 i. 
 
 182 
 
 xii. 
 
 9, 
 
 i. 
 
 414 
 
 xiii. 
 
 8, 
 
 i. 
 
 46 
 
 Galatians, 
 
 iii.       6—22 i.     102 
 
 iii.  14,      ii.     143 
 
566 
 
 INDEX  OF  TEXTS. 
 
 Chap. 
 
 Ver. 
 
 Vol. 
 
 Page 
 
 Chap. 
 
 Ver. 
 
 Vol. 
 
 Paga 
 
 iii. 
 
 23—26,       
 
 i. 
 
 108 
 
 vi. 
 
 17,  18,       ...       . 
 
 i. 
 
 148 
 
 iii. 
 
 27,       
 
 ii. 
 
 75 
 
 viii. 
 
 6—13,       ...       . 
 
 106 
 
 vi. 
 
 14,      
 
 iii. 
 
 316 
 
 is. 
 
 1,2,      ...       . 
 
 i. 
 
 106 
 
 is.. 
 
 10,       ...       . 
 
 ii. 
 
 73 
 
 Ephesians. 
 
 X. 
 
 24,      ...       . 
 
 203 
 
 i. 
 
 3—12,      
 
 i. 
 
 167 
 
 xii. 
 
 15,      ...      . 
 
 183 
 
 i. 
 
 22,      
 
 i. 
 
 301 
 
 sii. 
 
 28,      ...      . 
 
 415 
 
 ii. 
 
 4,      
 
 i. 
 
 175 
 
 xiii. 
 
 9,      ...       . 
 
 i. 
 
 415 
 
 ii. 
 
 8,10,      
 
 iii. 
 
 235 
 
 xiii. 
 
 9,      ...       . 
 
 iv. 
 
 502 
 
 iv. 
 
 7,      
 
 i. 
 
 414 
 
 iv. 
 
 24,      
 
 i. 
 
 80 
 
 Jamks. 
 
 V. 
 
 25—27,      
 
 i. 
 
 305 
 
 i. 
 
 13-17,      ... 
 
 i. 
 
 4 
 
 v. 
 
 30,      
 
 ii. 
 
 74 
 
 i. 
 
 22,      ...      . 
 
 iii. 
 
 61 
 
 ii. 
 
 14,17,      ...      . 
 
 iii. 
 
 61 
 
 PfTTT.TPPIAUS. 
 
 ii. 
 
 21—23,      ...      . 
 
 iii. 
 
 61 
 
 i. 
 
 6,        
 
 iii 
 
 76 
 
 iv. 
 
 6,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 186 
 
 i. 
 
 10,11,     
 
 i. 
 
 168 
 
 iv. 
 
 6,      ...      . 
 
 i 
 
 414 
 
 i. 
 
 27,28,      
 
 iii. 
 
 399 
 
 iv. 
 
 8,      ...      . 
 
 il 
 
 65 
 
 ii. 
 
 13,      
 
 i. 
 
 417 
 
 1  Petbb. 
 
 COLOSSIANS. 
 
 i. 
 
 2,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 414 
 
 i. 
 
 17,     
 
 i. 
 
 301 
 
 i. 
 
 3,      ...      . 
 
 iii. 
 
 38 
 
 ii. 
 
 11—13,       
 
 ii. 
 
 74 
 
 i. 
 
 10—12,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 180 
 
 iii. 
 
 10,       
 
 i. 
 
 80 
 
 i. 
 
 23,      ...      . 
 
 ni. 
 
 43 
 
 M. 
 
 6—8 
 
 i. 
 
 120 
 
 2  Thessaloniaks. 
 
 ii. 
 
 8,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 300 
 
 i. 
 
 10—12,      
 
 i. 
 
 168 
 
 iii. 
 
 21,      ...       . 
 
 ii. 
 
 76 
 
 ui. 
 
 21,      ...      . 
 
 ii. 
 
 258 
 
 1  TlMOTHT. 
 
 iv. 
 
 11,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 168 
 
 i. 
 
 2,      
 
 i. 
 
 415 
 
 V. 
 
 5,      ...      . 
 
 i 
 
 414 
 
 vi. 
 
 21,       
 
 2  TmoTHT. 
 
 i. 
 
 415 
 
 v. 
 
 12,      ...      . 
 2  Petek. 
 
 i. 
 
 409 
 
 i. 
 
 6,      
 
 i. 
 
 203 
 
 i. 
 
 4,      ...      . 
 
 iv. 
 
 521 
 
 iii. 
 
 18,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 182 
 
 i. 
 
 9,      
 
 iiL 
 
 59 
 
 il 
 
 1,   
 
 i. 
 
 415 
 
 iii. 
 
 18,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 411 
 
 ii. 
 
 7,      
 
 iii. 
 
 488 
 
 1  John. 
 
 ii. 
 
 11—14,      
 
 ii. 
 
 77 
 
 iv. 
 
 9,10,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 
 176 
 
 ii. 
 
 15,      
 
 ii. 
 
 501 
 
 ii. 
 
 17,18,      
 
 Titus. 
 
 i. 
 
 137 
 
 JuDE. 
 
 4,      ...      . 
 4,      ...      . 
 
 i. 
 i. 
 
 180 
 300 
 
 ii. 
 
 14,      ...      ... 
 
 ii. 
 
 65 
 
 iii. 
 
 5,      
 
 ii. 
 
 76 
 
 Revelation. 
 
 si. 
 
 15,      ...      . 
 
 ii 
 
 158 
 
 Hebrews. 
 
 xii. 
 
 1,      ...      . 
 
 ii 
 
 75 
 
 vi. 
 
 13—18,      
 
 i. 
 
 102 
 
 xii. 
 
 iv. 
 
 420 
 
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