LIBRARY OF THE • Theological Seminary, PRINCETON, N. J. BS 680 .P68 C5 1831 Clark, Samuel, 1684-1750. A collection of the promises of Scripture, under their a t SELECT CHRISTIAN AUTHORS, WITH INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS. N a 58. PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM COLLINS GLASGOW A COLLECTION OF THE PROMISES OF SCRIPTURE, UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS. / BY SAMUEL CLARK, D. D. WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY, BY RALPH WARDLAW, D.D. GLASGOW. GLASGOW: PRINTED FOR WILLIAM COLLINS; OLIVER & BOYD, WM. WHYTE & CO. AND WM. OLIPHANT, EDINBURGH ; W. F. WAKEMAN, AND WM. CURRY, JUN. & CO. DUBLIN ; WHITTAKER, TREACHER, & ARNOT ; HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO. SIMP KIN & MARSHALL ; BALDWIN & CRADOCK ; AND HURST, CHANCE, & CO. LONDON. MDCCCXXXI. Printed by W. Collins 8c Co. Glasgow. \W ' INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. Promises, it is further said, are not binding, when they are, in the performance, unlawful . We need enter into no discussion of the different cases of hu¬ man engagement which come under this exception. The general principle of the exception is, that a pro¬ mise of what is in its nature unlawful it was wrong XV111 to make, and therefore never can be right to fulfil; for, whether the promise was made in ignorance or in consciousness of wrong, it cannot change wrong to right, or render it lawful to do what it was unlawful to engage to do.—Nothing, however, can be plainer, than that the exception admits of no application to the promises of God. No promise can ever be made by Him, but what is in perfect harmony with the principles of moral rectitude. He has always, too, before his mind, a full view of every circumstance that can intervene between the making of the promise and the time of its fulfilment; so that no unanticipated change can, in the meantime, so alter the relative position of things, as to throw any moral hinderance in the way; a case far from uncommon with the pro¬ mises of short-sighted creatures, whose vision of the future is so obscure and limited,—who t£ know not what shall be on the morrow.” A third case, in which human promises are not obligatory is, when they are in contrariety to previous engagements. But neither is this a case that can ever occur in regard to divine promises. A man may let slip the recollection of what he had formerly engaged to do, and may bring himself under the ob¬ ligation of a counter-promise, at variance with the former. But with the omniscient God this can never be. He C£ knoweth the end from the beginning;” he forgets nothing; and all his engagements, at what¬ ever distances of time they may be made, are in the most perfect harmony; every one being made in the full remembrance of all the rest. To his infinite mind, indeed, they were all present from eternity : all, as we shall afterwards see, in connexion with XIX Christ; one harmonious scheme of promissory kind¬ ness, gradually unfolding itself from the beginning till the fulness of time; and, in regard to its final accomplishment, reaching forward to the close of the church’s and the world’s history, and embracing eter¬ nity. Moral casuists have also debated, to what extent promises are or are not binding, which have been ex¬ torted from the promiser by violence or fear. The very imagination of such a case in regard to the pro¬ mises of God, would be the most fearful impiety. He is infinitely above all such influence. All crea¬ tion is dependent upon him: he is independent of all creation. Immutably blessed in himself, he has no¬ thing to desire, nothing to hope for, from any other being ; and, possessed of almighty power, he can have nothing to fear, were all beings besides to combine against him. A word could annihilate them, as a word gave them existence. Given freely, the divine promises stand sure for ever. It may be at once pleasing and profitable for us, to take a hasty glance of what may be called the history of divine promises. We mean, of course, divine promises in reference to our own world; for with any other we are not acquainted: and they are promises which relate to man, both in his unfallen and in his fallen state.— God is love.” Such is the brief but comprehensive character which he has given us of himself. Benevolence belongs essentially and pre-eminently to his moral nature, and is inseparably associated in its exercise with all his other perfections. When we contemplate Deity as Creator, we cannot imagine him, in bringing de- XX pendent creatures into being, actuated by any other than a benevolent principle. All creation, accord- ingly, is stored with the most irresistible proofs that He who made it is good—supremely good. The Creator of the universe is, at the same time, its moral Ruler; and as such, he is not only good, but righteous. This, too, is a part of his revealed char¬ acter, of which, as well as of the former, there are natural indications. It is discernible in many parts of his providential procedure towards our world; and it is apparent, also, in those sentiments of right and wrong, which, however much modified by peculiar circumstances, may fairly be pronounced common to men. One of these natural sentiments is, that there should be no inflicted suffering except for evil desert. When the principle of this sentiment is in any in¬ stance transgressed, we are immediately sensible of a shock to our moral feelings, of a violation of every conception we are able to form of what is right. We may surely, with safety, regard this natural senti¬ ment as indicating the existence of some counterpart to it in the mind of Deity, forming one of the settled laws or principles of his own administration. Under that administration, we may rest satisfied, there is no such thing as suffering inflicted in sovereignty. Wherever it is endured, it must invariably have been deserved by some act or course of evil; and may al¬ ways be regarded as the expression, not of mere ar¬ bitrary will, but of retributive equity. Suffering is in no case the lot of creatures as such; it belongs to them only as transgressors. So firmly settled should be our assurance of this, that if, in any part of the universe, (supposing we could traverse its bounds,) XXI we were to find suffering, we might, with unhesita¬ ting confidence, even previously to any acquaintance with the actual character of the sufferers, infer the existence of moral delinquency. The point to which these observations lead, may not to our readers be at once apparent. It is this— We think that, upon the principles thus laid down, the very bringing of a moral and accountable agent into being may, without impropriety, be considered as implying a promise . The promise may not be formally embodied in words; but it is involved in the essential moral elements, if we may so term them, of the divine character. As, when any man of integrity places another in a situation of dependence, and ser¬ vice, and responsibility, there is tacitly involved, in the very act of so placing him, an engagement for whatever is due to him in the situation on which he enters; so is it, when the Divine Being creates an intelligent agent, and places him in a situation of moral responsibility. I am aware, that the terms in this comparison may, by some, be deemed objection¬ able. What, they may ask, can ever be due from the Creator to the creature? Under what obliga¬ tion can the former ever lie to the latter? or what natural claim of right can the latter ever have upon the former ? Such questions, meant as they are to convey a strong negation, express a sentiment, which is true , and which is not true. It is true in one re¬ spect, and not true in another. It is true, that no creature can properly merit any thing from God. With regard to existence itself, it is self-evident that no creature can, in the nature of things, be entitled to it. There could be no title to it before it was be- XXII stowed,—a title belonging to a nonentity; and, the bestowment of it being an act of God’s sovereign pleasure, there can be as little to its subsequent con¬ tinuance. He who gave it at his pleasure, may at his pleasure resume it. He who has the right to create, has an equal right to annihilate. And, could we imagine such a procedure consistent with his in¬ finite wisdom, he might, without the violation of any claim upon him, have gone on alternately creating and annihilating individuals and worlds every succes¬ sive hour, filling and emptying space with all the endless varieties of inexhaustible contrivance. But still, when existence has been given, so deeply rooted in our moral convictions is the principle we have before stated, as to force upon us the conclusion, without the hesitation of a moment, that the rational agent, when brought into being, shall not, during the continuance of its existence, be a sufferer at the hand of its Maker, unless on account of evil desert. To repre¬ sent Deity as having a right, if he will, to create miserable beings, or to render them miserable at his sovereign pleasure, is to speak without reflection, and to discover a wretchedly mistaken conception of what constitutes the divine glory. So far from glorifying God, it is in the highest degree dishonouring him, to entertain the very supposition of his ever willing such a thing. It is inconsiderately claiming for him a right to do wrong: for if such a supposition can be legitimately made, all our notions of moral principle are thrown into utter confusion, and all the natural sentiments of equity implanted in our bosoms are torn up by the roots.—Creation, then, does, we think, involve a promise; and in the very XX1U act of giving existence to intelligent creatures, the Creator appears in the character of a promiser. He could not make any such creatures otherwise than happy, because he could not make them otherwise than holy. Either was morally impossible. His benevolence forbade the former; his purity, the lat¬ ter ;—and in the very creation of such existences as angels and men, their Maker engaged for their con¬ tinuing happy, so long as they continued holy. His moral nature binds him to this, irrespectively of any formally announced promise. Might it not be on this very account, because this principle was so un¬ derstood as to render its formal announcement un¬ necessary, that at man’s creation we do not find any promise directly given him, but only conveyed by im¬ plication under the denunciation of a threatening? When God said to Adam,