^^X OF PR/.v,:?;^ i'A'f'.^a Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2009 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library http://www.archive.org/details/historyofphiloOOwebe History of Philosophy ALFRED WEBER BY / V * NOV 23 1909 PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF STRASBURG ^ t/r#/o.-.. — ..»1^' %fi/CAL %mi ^ut|}0ri|eti 3Eranslati0n BY FRANK THILLY, A.M., Ph.D. PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI FROM THE FIFTH FRENCH EDITION NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1907 yAll rights i^tserved'i Copyright, 1896, By Chaklks Scribner's Sons. John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U. S. A. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE Theee is, in my opinion, no book so admirably fitted for acquainting the student with the development of thought as the able work of Professor Weber of the University of Strasburg. The author combines in his person the best elements of French and German scholarship. His knowl- edge of the subject is thorough and extensive, his judgment sound, his manner of expression simple, clear, and precise. His expositions remind one vividly of Kuno Fischer's fas- cinating presentation of philosophical teachings. They reproduce the essential thoughts of the great masters in language which is singularly free from obscurities and un* defined technical terms. The different systems are not mechanically joined together like so many dominos ; the history of philosophy is not conceived as an aggregate of isolated, disconnected theories, but as an evolution, as a more or less logical development, as a process from the simple to the complex. It is not a comedy of errors, a Sisyphus labor, a series of might}^ efforts and corresponding failures, but a gradual advance towards truth. There are differences and contradictions, it is true, and many devia- tions from the ideal straight line which the historian, overlooking the entire course of development, may draw between the beginning and the end. Philosophy often follows false paths and loses itself in blind alleys. Yet this does not mean that it is a wild-goose chase. iV PREFACE We have long wanted a text-book of the history of phi- losophy that covers the whole field, and presents the subject in a manner suited to the needs of the beginner. Zeller's admirable compendium of Greek philosophy and Falcken- berg's History of Modern Fhilosophy deal with special periods. Windelband's voluminous History of Pliilosojphy, with its arbitrary divisions and unfortunate method of cut- ting up a system into parts and discussing these separately, under entirely different heads, hopelessly confuses the stu- dent. Besides, its account of phik)sophy since the days of Kant — a period in which our age is especially interested — is wholly inadequate. Professor Weber's work is the most serviceable manual thus far published. It begins as simply as the history of philosophy itself, and gradually introduces the reader to the complex problems of modern thought, to which it devotes more than one-half of its entire space. The portions dealing with Kant and his successors are particularly admirable. The clear and comprehensive ex- position of the Hegelian philosophy will greatly assist the student in his endeavors to understand that much abused system. And the modern theory of evolution, which has revolutionized the thought of our century, and which is barely mentioned by Falckenberg and Windelband, surely deserves the attention and criticism it here receives. This translation is made from the fifth French edition (1892), and includes a number of changes and additions which the author kindly communicated to me in manu- script. I have taken pains to render the original into clear and simple English, and to increase the usefulness of the book wherever it seemed possible and proper to do so, al- ways keeping in mind the demands of the readers for whom the work is intended All material inserted by me is PREFACE ▼ placed in square brackets. I have increased the bibliog- raphy (1) by adding the titles of standard American, Eng- lish, German, French, and Italian works ; (2) by mentioning translations of foreign books referred to in the text and notes ; (3) by giving the names of important philosoph- ical journals published in this country and abroad ; (4) by placing at the end of the volume a list of the best modern works on logic, epistemology, psychology, anthropology, ethics, aesthetics, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of religion, jurisprudence, politics, etc. I have also pre- pared an index. FRANK THILLr University of Missouri, May, 1896. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Page § 1. Philosophy, Metaphysics, and Science 1 § 2. Division 4 § 3. Sources 6 I. GREEK PHILOSOPHY THE AGE OF METAPHYSICS PROPER, OR PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (B. c. COO-400) § 4. The Origin of Greek Philosophy 17 § 5. The School of Miletus. Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes 21 § 6. The Problem of Becoming 24 A. The legation of Becoming § 7. Eleatic Philosophy. Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Gorgias 24 B. The Apotheosis of Becominc § 8. Herachtus 33 Viii CONTENTS C» The Explanatio7i of Becoming Page § 9. Thk Pythagorean Speculation 37 § 10. Empedocles 44 § 11. Anaxagoras 48 § 12. Diogenes of Apollonia, Archelaus, Leucippus, De- MOCRITUS ,.,... 53 THE AGE OF CRITICISM, OR PHILOSOPHY OF MIND § 13. Protagoras 59 § 14. Socrates ... 63 § 15. Aristippus and Hedonism. — Antisthenes and Cyni- cism. EUCLIDES AND THE SCHOOL OF MeGAR4 . 71 A. The Negation of Matter. — The Apotheosis of Thought § 16. Plato 75 (1) The Idea 81 (2) Nature 91 (3) The Highest Good 98 § 17. Aristotle 104 (1) First Philosophy 108 (2) Second Philosophy, or the Philosophy op Nature 118 B, The Ajyotheosis ofMatfei\ — The Negation of the Th ought' Substance § 18. Epicurus 134 C The Apotheosis of Will § 19. Stoicism 140 § 20. The Sceptical Reaction. — Pyrrhonism .... 148 .§ 21. Academic Scepticism - . 150 CONTENTS IX Paok § 22. Sensationalistic Scepticism 152 § 23. The Scientific Movement 159 § 2i. Eclecticism 162 § 25. Plotinus and Neo-Platonism 167 § 26. The Last Neo-Platonic Polytheists. — Porphyry, Jamblichus, Proclus 179 II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES fit^t ^erioti THE REIGN OF PLATONIC-CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY § 27. Christian Platonism 185 § 28. St. Augustine .188 § 29. The Death Struggles of the Roman World. — Barbarism. — The First Symptoms of a New Philosophy 198 § 30. Scholasticism 201 § 31. ScoTus Erigena 204 § 32. St. Anselmus 210 § 33. Realism and Nominalism 219 § 34. Abelard 222 § 35. Hugo of St. Victor 227 § 36. The Progress of Free Thought 230 THE REIGN OF PERIPATETIC SCHOLASTICISM A. Semi-Realistic Peripateticism § 37. Growing Influence of the Philosophy of Aristotle 235 § 38. The Peripatetics of the Thirteenth Century . 239 § 39. St. Thomas of Aquin . . 241 § 40. Duns Scotus 246 X CONTENTS B, NominalistiG Peripateticism Paw s5 41. The Reappearance of Nominalism. — Durand, Oc- cam, BURIDAN, D'AlLLY 252 §42. The Downfall of Scholasticism. — The Revival OF the Interest in Nature and Experimental Science. — Roger Bacon. — Mysticism .... 256 § 43. The Revival of Letters 261 §44. Neo-Platonism. — Theosophy. — Magic 265 § 45. Aristotle versus Aristotle, or the Liberal Peri- patetics. — Stoics. — Epicureans. — Sceptics . 267 § 46. The Religious Reform 274 § 47. Scholasticism and Theosophy in the Protestant Countries. — Jacob Bohme 277 § 48. The Scientific Movement 281 III. MODERN PHILOSOPHY THE AGE OF INDEPENDENT METAPHYSICS (From Bruno to Locke and Kant) § 49. Giordano Bruno 286 § 50. ToMMAso Campanella 291 '^§ 51. Francis Bacon 295 § 52. Thomas Hobbes 300 V § 53. Descartes 305 ' § 54. The Cartesian School 317 § 55. Spinoza 303 I. Definitions 395 11. Deductions 326 (1) Theory of Substance 326 (2) Theory of Attributes 329 (3) Theory of Modes 334 § 56. Leibniz 343 CONTENTS Xi THE AGE OF CRITICISM Page § 57. John Locke . 370 § 58. Berkeley , . 391 § 59. CONDILLAC » . 399 § 60. The Progress of Materialism 404 § 61. David Hume 417 § 62. Immanuel Kant 434 I. Critique of Pure Reason 437 11. Critique of Practical Reason 462 III. Critique of Judgment 468 § 63. Kant and German Idealism 473 § 64. Fichte 481 § 65. Schelling 487 § 66. Hegel 496 I. Logic, or Genealogy of Pure Concepts . 501 II. Philosophy of Nature 510 III. Philosophy of Mind 513 § 67. Herbart 535 § 68. Schopenhauer 544 § 69. Darwin and Contemporary Monism 560 § 70. Positivism and Neo-Criticism 573 § 71. Conclusion 587 Bibliography 605 Index 613 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY INTRODUCTION § 1. Philosopliy, Metaphysics, and Science Philosophy is the search for a comprehensive view of nature, an attempt at a universal explanation of things. It is both the summary of the sciences and their completion ; both general science and a specialty distinguished from science proper ; and, like its elder sisters, religion and poe- try, forms a separate branch among the manifestations of the human mind. The different sciences have special groups of facts for their subject-matter, and seek to discover the causes of these phenomena, or to formulate the laws according to which they are produced. In philosophy, on the other hand, the human mind endeavors to rise beyond such groups and their particular laws, and to explain the world as a whole, or the universal fact or phenomenon^ by the cause of the causes, or the first cause. In other words, it attempts to answer the question. Why does this world exist, and how does it happen to be what it is?^ 1 As a search for the first cause, philosophy is defined, more par- ticularly, as metaphysics, ontology, or speculative philosophy. The phil- osophy which abandons this search, and contents itself with being scientific synthesis, is called positive philosophy or positivism. Posi- tivism may simply be grounded upon the historical fact that systems constantly contradict each other, in which case it rests on a purely empirical basis, or it may be based upon the rational analysis of tho human understanding. In the former case, it is scepticism, in the latter, criticism. Opposed to scepticism we have dogmatism, that is, the naive or deliberate belief in the ability of the human mind to 1 2 INTRODUCTION But though philosophy has its own subject-matter and a separate sphere of its own, it is none the less connected with positive science by the closest of ties; and science cannot break these bonds without danger to itself. It is from the positive sciences, and particularly from psychol- ogy and allied branches, that philosophy derives its methods and the matter for its systems. The sciences, without phil- osophy, are an aggregate without unity, a body without a soul; philosophy, without the sciences, is a soul without a body, differing in nothing from poetry and its dreams. Science is the indispensable foundation and the matter, as reach an objective knowledge of things and their first cause. Ration- alism claims to arrive at this knowledge by a priori reasoning ; em- piricism assumes no other method than observation and induction, or a posteriori reasoning. Pure, or a priori, speculation is the method pre- ferred by idealism, w^hich regards thought as the original fact, prior and superior to all reality. Empiricism, on the contrary, is based upon the view that thought, far from being the first cause, is derived from a pre-existing reality ; that is, upon realism in the modern sense of the word. (See also § 33.) When the action of the first cause is considered u.nconscious and involuntary, as distinguished from teleo- logical (or making for an end), realism becomes materialism and mech- anism. Idealism in turn becomes spiritualism when it personifies the first cause, and regards it, not merely as an idea that realizes itself, but also as a being that hovers above things (supranaturalism, transcen- detitcdism) and governs them according to its free-will (theisni), or by means of unchangeable laws {deisni) ; this is the dualism of mind and matter, of creator and nature, as opposed to pantheism, naturalism, or monism. Pantheism, naturalism, or monism identifies the idea of cause with the concept of substance, and considers the first cause as the innermost substance of things (immanency of God), and the totality of its modes or phenomena, the universe, as a living unity (monism), as one and the same collective being governed according to the laws which follow from its own nature (natm^alism) . Monism is either absolute or plural, according as it considers the cosmic substance as an absolute unity, or as a collection of irreducible unities ; it is atomism or dynamism, according as these unities are regarded as infinitely small extensions (atoms^, or as absolutely unextended centres of force {dyna- mides or monads). PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICS, AND SCIENCE 3 it were, of philosophy ; it is, to use an Aristotelian phi'ase, potential philosophy. Philosophy, in turn, is science in actu, the most exalted function of the scholar, the supreme satisfaction of the scientific spirit and its natural tendency to comprehend everything into a unity. Philosophy and science are intimately related, not only in essence and in interests, but also as to their origin and destiny. Animated by the same all-powerful instinct to discern the causes of things — rerum cognoscerc causas — and to comprehend them into the unity of a first cause, the human mind no sooner reaches certain elementary truths in physics, mathematics, and morals, than it hastens to synthesize them, to form them into universal theories, into ontological and cosmological systems, i. e. to philoso- phize, to make metaphysics. It makes up for its ignorance of reality either by means of the imagination, or by that wonderful instinct of childhood and of genius which divines the truth without searching for it. This accounts for the aprioristic, idealistic, and fantastic character of the philoso- phy of the ancients, as well as for its incomparable grandeur. In proportion as our stock of positive knowledge is in- creased, as scientific labor is divided and consequently de- veloped, philosophy becomes more and more differentiated from poetry; its methods are recognized, its theories gain in depth what the sciences acquire in scope. Every scientific -^^ movement gives rise to a philosophical movement ; eveiy new philosophy is a stimulus to science. Though this bond '^ of union seems to have been ruptured during the Middle Ages, the breach is but an apparent one. Whatever hostil- ity or indifference is manifested towards science, comes from the official philosophy of the School ; it is never found among the independent philosophers, be they Christians, Jews, or Arabians. There may be as much opposition between sci- ence and a certain philosophy in the nineteenth century as there was in the times of Roger Bacon and Lord Verulam, 4 INTRODUCTION True science and true pMlosophy have always been in perfect accord, and though there may be a semblance of rivalry, their relations are to-day as harmonious as they can be.^ § 2. Division To the Ionian Greeks belongs the honor of having crea- ted 2 European philosophy ; to the Neo-Latins and the Ger- mans, that of having given to it its modern development. Hence there are, in the history to be outlined by us, two great and wholly distinct epochs, which are connected by tlie Middle Ages (period of transition). 1 [On the nature and import of philosophy, and its relation to other sciences, consult Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy, New York, 1891 ; Yolkelt, Vortrcige zur Einfiihrung in die Philosophie der Ge gen- wart, ]\Iunich, 1892; Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 3d ed., Berlin, 1895 ; English translation by Frank Thilly, New York, 1895. -Tr.] 2 By this word we do not mean to imply the absolute originality of Hellenic philosophy. The influence exercised upon its development by the Orient cannot be doubted. There is no trace of philosophy, properly so called, among the Greeks before they come in contact with Egypt, that is, before the reign of Psammetichus, who admits them into the country. Moreover, the fathers of Greek philosophy are all lonians ; from Asia Minor philosophy was imported, first into Italy, and at a comparatively recent period into Athens, that is, into Greece proper. But what is most important, we find in Ionian phil- osophy, and that too at its very outset, conceptions the boldness of which is in marked contrast with the comparative timidity of Attic philosophy, — conceptions which pre-suppose a long line of intellectual development. The influence of Egyptian and Chaldean science, which is, moreover, attested by Herodotus, may be compared to that exer- cised by the Arabian schools upon the development of Christian thought in the Middle Ages. It has been exaggerated by Roth {Ge- schichte unserer abend Idndischen Philosophie, vol. I., 1846, 1862 ; vol. II., 1858) and unjustly denied by Zeller (Die Philosophie der Oriechen, 5th ed. 1892, vol. I.; English translation by Sarah AUeyne). Concerning the relation of Pythagoreanism and Platonism to Indian and Iranian speculation, and the part played by Babylon as the centre of intellec' tual exchange between the Orient and the Occident, see § 9. DIVISION 6 I. In the development of Greek philosophy, we have two separate periods, — a period of spontaneous creation, and one of sceptical reflection and reproduction. 1. The problem which dominates the former is the problem of the origin of things : the problem of hecoming. Among the lonians, this pliilosox)hy assumes the form of materialistic pantheism; among the Italian philosophers, Avho are influenced by the Doric spirit, it is essentially spiritualistic pantheism. The systems produced by these two schools contain in germ all the doctrines of the future, especially the monistic and atomistic hjrpotheses, the two poles of modern scientific speculation. — From Thales to Protagoras, or from 600 to 440 B.C. 2. The age of critical reflection is inaugurated by the TrdvTcov jjLerpov avOpcoiro^ of the Sophists. This period evolves the important truth, foreshadowed by Zeno, Par menides, and Anaxagoras, that the human understanding is a coefficient in the production of the phenomenon. To the problems of nature are added the problems "df the soul . to the cosmological questions, logical and critical questions ; to the speculations on the essence of things, investigations concerning the criterion of truth and the end of life. Greek philosophy reaches its highest development in Plato,'^ as far as depth is concerned ; in Aristotle and in the sci- ence of Alexandria, as regards analysis and the extent of its inquiries. II. Scientific progress, and consequently speculation, was arrested by the invasion of the Northern races. The philosophical spirit was extinguished for want of something to nourish it. Ten centuries of uninterrupted labor were followed by ten centuries of sleep, — a sleep that was deep at first, and then broken by bright dreams of the past (Plato and Aristotle) and forecasts of the future. Although the logic of history is less transparent during the middle ages than before and after this period of transition, we 6 INTRODUCTION notice two epochs that run parallel with those of Attic philosoph} : one, Platonic, realistic, turned towards the past (from St. Augustine to St. Anselm), the other, Peri- patetic, nominalistic, big with the future. III. Modern philosophy dates from the scientific and literary revival in the fifteenth century. Its history, like that of Greek speculation, presents, — 1. A period of expansion and ontological synthesis (Bruno, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), and, 2. A period of critical reflection and analysis (essaj^s concerning the human understanding : Locke, Hume, Kant, and his successors). § 3. Sources The principal sources for the history of philosophy are : For pre-Socratic speculation : Plato and Aristotle.^ For Socrates: Xenophon^ and Plato, particularly the Apology^ the Crito^ and the Fhcedo. For Plato : the Bepuhlic, the Timceus, the Symposium, the Phcedrus, the Thecetekis, the Gorgias, the Protagoras,^ For Aristotle : the Metaphysics, the Logic, the Ethics, the Physics, the Psychology, the Politics ; the commentators of Aristotle, especially Simplicius.* 1 Especially the first book of the Metaphysics (see § 17, first note), which is a historical summary of philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. The fragments of the pre-Socratic authors have been collected by MuUach, Fragmenta phil. grcec. ante Socratem, 3 vols., Paris, 1860 [also by Ritter and Preller (mentioned on page 8). English trans- lations in Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy (page 8), and of Heraclitus, in Patrick's Heraclitus on Nature. For translations of classical writers, consult Bohr's Classical Library. — Tr.]. 2 Memorabilia Socratis recens. J. G. Schneider, Oxf., 1813. 8 [See § 16, note 2. — Tr.] ^ Comment, in Arist. physicorum libros, ed. by Hermann Diels, Berlin, 1882 ; Comment, in libros de anima, ed. by M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1882. SOURCES 7 ^ For the post-Aristotelian schools and Gi-eek philosophy in general : Lucretius,^ Cicero,^ Seneca,^ Plutarch,* Sextus Empiricus,^ Diogenes Laertius,^ Clement of Alexandria,*^ Origen,^ Hippol}i:ns,^ Eusebiiis,^'^ Plotinus,^^ Porphyry,^^ 1 Lucretii Cari de rerum natura libb. C. Lachmann rec. et illustr., Berlin, 1850 ff. [edited also by Bernays, Mimro, and others]. 2 The De divinatione et de fato, the De natura deormn, the De offi- ciis, the Dejinihus, the Tusculance disputationes, and the Academica ; Opera omnia, ed. Le Clerc, Bouillet, Lemaire, 17 vols., Paris, 1827-32 ; Opera philosophica, ed. Goerenz, 3 vols., Leipsic, 1809-1813; Ciceronis historia philosophice antiquce, ex omnibus illius scriptis collegit F. Gedike, Berlin, 1782, 1801, 1814. 3 Opera quae extant c. not. et comment, varior., 3 vols., Amsterdam, 1672. * De plujsicis phUosophorum decretis libb., ed. Beck, Leipsic, 1777 ; Scripta moralia, 6 vols., Leipsic, 1820 ; Opera omnia graece et latine ed. Eeiske, 12 vols., Leipsic, 1774-82. ^ Sexti Empirici opera {livppoiveloiv vTroTVTraxrecdv libb. III. ; Ad ver- sus mathematicos libb. XI.) grsec. et lat. ed. Fabricius, Leipsic, 1718 and 1842 ; ed. Emm. Bekker, Berlin, 1842. * Diogenis Laertii de vitis, dogmatibus et apoplithegmatihus clarorum phUosophorum libb. X. gr?ece et latine ed. Hiibner, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1828, 1831 ; D. L. 1. X. ex Italicis codicibus nunc primum excussis recensuit C. Gabr. Cobet, Paris, 1850. Diogenes Laertius flourished about 230 of our era. ' dementis Alexandrini opera, Leipsic, 1830-34 (Adyo? npoTpenTiKos Trpos^EXXrjvas; Haidaycoyos ; Srpwfiarets) . 8 De principiis gr. ed. c. interpret, lat. Rufini, et annot. instruxit ed. R. Redepenning, Leipsic, 1836 ; Contra Celsum libb. ed. Spencer, Cam- bridge, 1671 ; Origenis opera omnia quae graece vel latine tantum ex- stant et ejus nomine circumferuntiu', ed. C. et C. V. Delarue, denuo recens. emend, castig. C. H. E. Lommatzsch, 25 vols., Berlin, 1831-48. ® S. Hippolyti refutationis omnium hceresium libror. X. quae super- sunt graece et latine ed. Duncker et Schneidewin, Gdtt. 1856-59. The first book, known by the title (f)ihoao({)ovfxeva, was for a long time attributed to Origen ; booko IV.-X., which were discovered in Greece in 1842, were first published by Emm. Miller, Oxford, 1851, under the title Origenis philosophumena, etc. ^^ Eusebii Pamph. Prceparo^io evanqelica ed. Heinichen, Leipsic, 1842. " See § 25. S INTRODUCTION Proclus,^ Eunapms,2 Stobaeus,^ Photius,* Suidas,^ and mod* ern historical works.^ 1 See § 25. 2 Eunapii Sard. Vitce philosophorum et sophistarum, ed. Boissonade, Paris, 1849. * Stobsei Eclogarum pliysicarum et ethicarum libb. graece et latins ed. Heeren, 2 vols,, Gdtt. 1791, 1801 (out of print) id. ed. Meineke, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1860, 1861:; Stobsei Florilegium, ed. Th. Gaisford, 4 vols., Oxford, 1822 ; Leipsic, 1823 ; Meineke, 4 vols., Leipsic, 1855-57. * Myriobiblion, ed. Hoschel, Augsbui'g, 1801. The patriarch Pho- tius flourished in the 9th century. * Lexicon of Suidas, ed. Gaisford, London, 1834 ; Bernhardi, 2 vols., Halle, 1834. Suidas flourished about 1000. ^ Especially: [Mullach, Fragmenta philosophorum Grcecorum, ^ vols., 1860-1881; Diels, Doxographi Grceci, Berlin, 1879] ; Hitter and Preller, Historia philosophice Graeco-Romance ex fontium locis contexta [7th ed., Schultess and Wellmann, Gotha, 1888] ; Ritter, Geschichte der Philo- sophie alter Zeit, Berlin, 1829 ; Brandis, Handhuch der Geschichte der griechisch-rbmischen Philosophie, 3 vols., Berlin, 1835-1860 ; same author, Geschichte der Entwickelungen der gr. Philosophie, etc., 2 vols., 1862-64; Roth, Geschichte unserer ahendlandischen Philosophie, 2 vols.; Mannheim; 1848-58 ; Laforet, Histoire de la philosophie ancienne, 2 vols., Brussels, 1867 ; Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtliche" Entwickelung [(five editions since 1844), 5th ed. begun in 1892, 3 pts. in 5 vols., Leipsic (Engl, transl. of all but part dealing with Aristotle and elder Peripatetics, by S. F. Alleyne and O. J. Reichel, London and New York, 1876-1883. Same author's smaller work, Grujidiiss der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, 4th ed., Leipsic, 1893 ; Engl, transl. by S. F. Alleyne and Evelyn Abbot, New York, 1890. — Tr.]. The following may also be consulted with profit : Grote, History oj Greece, 6th ed., 10 vols., London, 1888 ; the same author, Plato and the other Companions of Socrates, 5th ed., London, 1888 ; [same author, Aristotle, 2 vols., 2d ed., 1879; Schwegler, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, 3d ed. Tiibingen, 1886; Ferrier, Lectures on Greek Philoso- phy, 2 vols., Edinburgh and London, 1866 ; London, 1888 ; Teichmiiller. Studien zur Geschichte der Begrijfe, Berlin, 1874 ; Neue Studien, Gotha, 1876-79; Byk, Die vorsokratische Philosophie, Leipsic, 1875-77; Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London and Edinburgh, 1892 ; Mayor, A Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Tholes to Cicero, Cambridge, 1881 ff. ; Benn, The Greek Philosophers, 2 vols., Londoii, 1883 ; Windelband, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, 2d ed., Munich, 1894 ; Marshall, A Short SOUECES 9 For the Patristic period : the polemical writingH of the Fathers,^ especially the X070? TrporpeirTLKo^ tt/jo? "EWt;- z/a?, the Pedagogue., and the arpco/jLara of St. Clement of Alexandria, the Principles and the Anti-Celsus of Origen, the Apologeticus of Tertullian, the Institutiones divince of Lactantius, the Citg of God and the Confessions of St. Augustine. For the Scholastic period: the Be divisione naturce of Scotus Erigena, the Monologiiim^ the Proslogium^ and the Cu7' Deus homo of St. Anselmus, the Theology., the Ethics., and the Dialectics of Abelard, the Sentences of Peter the Lom- bard, the Commentary of Averroes, the Sum of St. Thomas, the Qucestiones of Duns Scotus and Occam, the Opus majus of Roger Bacon, the writings of Raymundus LuUus, the historical works of Ritter, Cousin, and Haureau.^ History of Greek Philosophy, London, 1891 ; Chaignet, Histoire de la psychologic des Grecs, 5 vols., Paris, 1887-92 ; Ziegier, Die Ethik der Griechen und Romer, Bonn, 1881 ; Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Grie- chen, 2 vols., Berlin, 1881 ; Kostlin, Die Ethik des klassischen Alte'- thums, Leipsic, 1887; Luthardt, Die antike Ethik, 1887', Walter, Die Geschichte der Aesthetik im Alterthum, Leipsic, 1893; Rohde, Psyche, Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen, 2 vols., Freiburg, 1890-91:; Bergk, Griechische Litteraturgeschichte, 2 vols., Berlin, 1872, 1883; K. O. Miiller, Die Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1882-84 ; Mahaffy, History of Classical Greek Literature, 3 vols., 2d ed. London, 1892 ; Teuffel, Geschichte der romischen Littera tur, 5th ed., Leipsic, 1890 ; Bender, Grundriss der romischen Litteratur- geschichte, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1889 (Engl, transl. from first ed. by Crowell & Richardson, Boston, 1884) ; Preller, Griechische Mythologie, 2 vols., Berlin, 1875; Lehrs, Popiddre Aufsdtze aus dem Alterthum, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1875; Laiu'ie, Historical Survey of Pre-Christian Education^ London, 1895 (first published as a series of articles in the " School Review," May, 1893-April, 1895). For further references, see Ueber- weg-Heinze, § 7, pp. 27-33. Consult also the general histories of philosophy mentioned on pages 13 ff. — Tr.]. 1 Collected by J. P. INIigne, Paris, 1840 ff. 2 [For primitive Christianity, patristic and scholastic philosophy^ consult, besides the general histories of philosophy mentioned on pages 10 INTRODUCTION For the philosophy of the Renaissance : the De docta tgno- rantia of Nicholas of Cusa, the De subtilitate and the De rerum varietate of Cardanus, the De immortalitate animce of Pomponatius, the Animadversiones in dialecticam Ari- stotelis of Ramus, the Essais of Montaigne, the Triumphus philosophic^, the De rerum ceternitate, and the De mundo of Taurellus, the Aurora of J. Boehme.^ 13 ff. : Driimmond, Philo Judceus, or the Jewish- Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion, 2 vols., London, 1888; Deutinger, Geist der christlichen Ueberlieferung, Regensburg, 1850-51 ; Eitschl, Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche, 2d ed., Bonn, 1857; de Pres- sense, Histoire des trois premiers siecles de Veglise, Paris, 1858 ff. ; Baiir, Das Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, 2d ed., Tubingen, 1860 ; J. Alzog, Grundriss der Patrologie, 3d ed., Freiburg, 1876 ; Pfleiderer, Das Urchristenthum , Berlin, 1887; Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen Zeit, Wurzburg, 1859 ; Huber, Die Philoso- phie der Kirchenvdter, Munich, 1859 ; N"eander, Christliche Dogmenge- schichte, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1857 ; Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 vols., 2d ed., Freiburg, 1888-90 ; Donaldson, A Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine, 3 vols., London, 1865-66 ; same author, The Apostolic Fathers, London, 1874 ; Ritter, Die christliche Philosophie, 2 Vols., Gottingen, 1858-59 ; Rousselot, Etudes sur la philosophie dans le moyen-dge, Paris, 1840-42; Haureau, De la philosophie scolastique, 2 vols., Paris, 1850; same author, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique, 2d series, Paris, 1872-80 : Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 3 vols., Mayence, 1864-66; Baeumker, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Miinster, 1891 ff. ; Renter, Die Geschichte der religiosen Aufkldrung im Mittelalter, 2 vols., Berlin, 1875-77 ; W. Kaulich, Geschichte der scholastischen Phil- osophie, Prague, 1863; Werner, Die Scholastik des spdteren Mittelalters, 3 vols., Vienna, 1881 ff. ; Gass, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, Berlin, 1881 ; Ziegler, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, Strasburg, 1886 ; 2d ed., 1892; Luthardt, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, 1888; Lecky, A History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne, 2 vols., London, 1869; 3d ed., 1877 ; Denifle, Die Universitdten des Mittelalters, Berlin, 1885 ; Laurie, The Rise and Early Constitution of Universities, New York, 1888. For further references, see Ueberweg-Heinze, vol. TL, §§ 1, 3,4ff.; §§ 19 ff. - Tr.] ^ [For the Renaissance, see the general and modern histories of philosophy (pp. 12-16), and the following : Carrifere, Die philoso SOURCES 11 For modern times : Bruno's Del infinito universo and De wionade, Campanella's Atheismus trimnphatics, Pliilosophia sensihus demon strata^ and De gentilismo^ Francis Bacon's No- vum organum^ Hobbes's De cive and De cor]}ore^ Descartes's Discourse on Method and Principles^ Malebranche's Recherche de la verite^ Spinoza's Ethics^ Locke's Essay concerning Hu- man Understanding^ Leibniz's Neiv Essays and Monadology^ Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge^ Condillac's Treatise on Sensations^ Holbach's System of Nature^ the Essays of Hume and Reid, Kant's Criticiues^ Fichte's Science of Knowledge^ Schelling's System of Transcendental Idecdisni, Hegel's Logic and Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences^ the Metaphysics and the Psychology of Herbart, Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea^ Comte's Course on Positive Phil- osophy^ J. S. Mill's Logic^ Herbert Spencer's First Prin- ciples^ Albert Lange's History of Materialism^ Ed. von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious^ etc. ; likewise the chief Avorks of modern scientific literature of general and therefore philosophical interest, like the Celestial Revolutions by Copernicus, the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy by Newton, the Spirit of the Laujs by Montesquieu, the Ancdytical Mechanics by Lagrange, the Natural History of the Heavens by Kant, the Celesticd Mechanics and Exposition of the System of the World by Laplace, Darwin's book on the Origin of Species^ etc. ; phische WeltanscTiauung der Refnrmationszeit, 1847, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1887; Voigt, Die Wiederhelehung des classischen Alterthiims, 1859; 3d ed., edited hy Lehnerdt, 2 vols., Berlin, 1893 ; Burckhardt, Die Cidtnr der Renaissance, 2 vols, 1860, 4th ed. by L. Geiger, Leipsic, 1886 (Engl, transl. by S. G. C. Middleman, London, 1878 and 1890); Geiger, Renaissance und Humanismus in Tf alien und Deutschland, Berlin, 1882; Symonds, The Renaissance in Italy, 7 vols., London, 1875- 1886 ; Peschel, Geschichte des Zeitalters der Entdec'kungen, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1879. For further references, Ueberweg-Heinze, toI. IIL, §§ 2-6. -Tr.] 12 INTRODUCTION finally, the historical works of Ritter,i Erdmann,^ Barchou de Penhoen,3 Michelet^ (of Berlin), Willm,^ Chalybseus,^ Bartholmess,^ Kuno Fischer,^ Zeller,^ Windelband,!^ etc.^^ 1 GescTiichte der neueren Philosophie (vols. IX.-XII. of his Ge- scJiicTite der Philosophie), 1850-53. 2 Versuch einer loissenschafUichen Darstellung der neueren Philosophie^ 6 vols., Riga and Leipsic, 1834-1853. 3 Histoire de la philosophie allemande depuis Leihniz jusqu'a nos jours, Paris, 1836. ^ Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel, 2 vols., Berlin 1837-38. s Histoire de la philosophie allemande \puis Kant jusqu'a Hegel, 4. vols., Paris, 1846-49. * Historische Entwickelung der spekulativen Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis^ Hegel, Dresden, 1837, 5th ed., 1860; Engl, translation, 1854. ■^ Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la philosophie moderne, 2 vols., Paris, 1855 ; Histoire philosophique de VAcademie de Prusse, 2 vols., Paris, 1851. 8 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 8 vols., Mannheim and Heidel- berg, 1854 ff.; [2ded., 1865 ff. ; 3d ed., vol. I., 1 and 2, 1878, 1880; vol. II., 1889; vols. III. and IV., 1882; 2d ed., vol. V., 1885, vol. VI. 1895; vol. VII. (Hegel) not yet published ; voL VIII. (Schopen- hauer), 1893. Engl, translation of vol. I., 1, by J. P. Gordy, New York, 1887; of vol. III., book 2, by J. P. Mahaffy, London, 1866; of vol. v., chaps, i.-v., by W. S. Hough, London, 1888. Baco und seine Nachfolger, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1875, Engl, translation by Oxenford, Lon- don, 18.57. — Tr.]. ^ Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz, Munich, 1872; 2d ed., 1875. 1*^ Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vol. I., 1878, vol. II. 1880. " [Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, Stuttgart and Tubin- gen, 1841; Biedermann, Die deutsche Philosophie von Kant bis auj unsre Zeit, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1843; Damiron, Essai sur Vhistoire de la philosophie au 17"^ siecle, Paris, 1846 ; Fortlage, Genetische Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant, Leipsic, 1852 ; Ch. de Remusat, Histoire de la philosophie en Angleterre, etc., 2 vols., Paris, 1875; Harms, Die Philo- sophie seit Kant, Berlin, 1876; Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, London, 1876 ; Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, Leipsic, 1878 ; 2d ed., SOURCES 18 For European philosopliy in general : (Stanley ^), Brucker,2 Tiedemann,^ Buhle,* Degdrando,^ Tennemann,^ 1893 (Engl, transl.by Stuart Phelps, 1880) ; Seth, From Kant to Hegel, London, 1882 ; Eucken, Beitriige zur Geschichte der neueren PhilosopMe, 1886 ; Monrad, Denkrichtungen der neueren Zeit, Bonn, 1879 ; Hoffding, Einleitung in die englische Philosopliie unserer Zeit (German transl. by Kurella), Leipsic, 1889 ; Bowen, Modern Philosophy, 6th ed., New York, 1891 ; Roberty, La philosophie du siecle, Paris, 1891 ; Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, Xew York, 1892; Burt, A History oj Modern Philosophy, 2 vols., Chicago, 1892; Falckenberg, Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophic, 2d ed., 1892 (Engl, transl. by A. C. Ai^mstrong, Jr., New York, 1893); Hoffding, Den Nyere Filosojie Historic, Kopenha- gen, vol. I., 1894; vol. II. will be issued in 1895; German translation of both volumes, by Bendixen, in the press (O. Reisland, Leipsic) ; W. Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, London, 1837, 3d ed., 1863 ; J. Schaller, Geschichte der Natur philosophie seit Bacon, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1841-44 ; J. Baumann, Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathe- matik in der neueren Philosophie, 2 vols., Berlin, 1868-69; Konig, Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems von Cartesius his Kant, Leipsic, 1888; same author, Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems in der Phi- losophie seit Kant, 2 pts., Leipsic, 1889-90 ; Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalisr his Newton, 2 vols., Hamburg and Leipsic, 1890; Grimm, Zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissprohlems von Bacon his Hume, 1890 j Yorlander, Geschichte der philosophischen Moral, Rechts-, 1 [History of Philosophy, London, 1655 ; in Latin, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1712. Also, Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, 2 folio vols., 1695-97 ; 4th ed., revised and enlarged by Des Maizeaux, 4 folio vols., Amsterdam and Leyden, 1740 ; Boureau-Deslandes, Histoire critique de la philosophie, 3 vols., Paris, 1730-36 ff. — Tr.] 2 Historia critica philosophice hide a mundi incunahilis, 6 vols., Leip- sic, 1742-67. 3 Geist der spekulativen Philosophie, 6 vols., Marburg, 1791-97. * Lehrhuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, 8 vols., Gottingen, 1796- 1804. * Histoire comparee des systhnes de la philosophic, 3 vols., Paris,1803-, 2d ed., 4 vols., 1822-23. ^ Geschichte der Philosophie, 11 vols., Leipsic, 1798-1819; Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipsic, 1812 ; [Engl, transl. 1833 and 1852 (Bohn'a Library)]. 14 INTRODUCTION Ritter,^ Hegel,^ Schwegler,^ Renouvier,* Nourrisson, Cousm,^ Janet,^ Prantl,^ Lange,^ Erclmann,^^^ Ueberweg,!^ und Staatslehre der Engldnder und Franzosen, Marbui'g, 1855 ; Mack intosh, On the Progress of Etldcal Philosophy during the 17th and 18th Centuries, Edinburgh, 1872 ; Jodl, Geschichle der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1882-89 ; Bluntschli, Geschichte des all- gemeinen Staatsrechts und der Politik seit dem 16. Jahrhundert, Munich, 1864 ; O. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophic auf geschichtlicher Grundlagcy 2 vols., 3d ed., Berlin, 1893 (vol. I. : Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie von Spinoza his zur Gegenwart) ; Engl, transl. by A. Stewai't and A. Menzies, London, 1886-1888 ; Piinjer, Geschichte der christlichen Re- I Geschichte der Philosophie, 12 vols., Hamburg, 1829-53. * Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, published by Michelet, Berlin, 1833 (vols. XIII.-XV. of the Complete Works)', [Engl, transl. by E. S. Haldane in 3 vols., London, 1892-1896. -Tr.] * Geschichte der Philosophie im Umriss, Stuttgart, 1848 ; 15th ed. 1891 ; [Engl, translations by Seelye, Xew York, 1856 ff., and J. H. Stirling, 7th ed., Edinbui-gh, 1879]. * Manuel de philosophie ancienne, 2 vols., Paris, 1844 ; Manuel de philosophie moderne, Paris, 1842. ^ Tableau des progres de la pense'e humaine depuis Thales Jusqu'a Leibniz, Paris, 1858, 1860. ® Cours dliistoire de la philosophie, Paris, 1829 [Engl, transl. by 0. W. Wight, 2 vols., New York, 1889. — Tr.] ; Histoire generale de la philosophie depuis- les temps les plus anciensjusqxi'au dix-neuvihme siecUy 1 vol., Paris, 1863; 12th ed. published by Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1884. ' Histoire de la philosophie morale et politique dans Vantiquite et dans les temps modernes, Paris, 1858. ^ Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 4 vols., Leipsic, 1855 ff. 9 Geschichte des Materialismus, 3d ed., Iserlohn, 1876-77; [Engl. transl. m 3 vols, by E. C. Thomas, London, 1878-81. — Tr.]. "^^ Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 vols., 3d ed., Berlin, 1878, [4th ed. prepared by B. Erdmann, 1895; Engl, transl. 3 vols., ed. by W. S. Hough, London, 1890. — Tr.]. II Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 3 vols., 7th ed., published and enlarged by Heinze, Berlin, 1888 ; [8th ed. vol. L, 1894, vol. Ill, 1, 1896; Engl, transl. by G. S. Morris, New York, 1872-74. — Tr.J. SOURCES 15 Scholten,^ Duhring,^ Lewes,^ Lefevre,* Alaux,* Franck,^ Fouillee,^ Fabre,^ Kirchner.^ ItgionspMlosophie seit der Reformation, 2 vols., Braunschweig, 1880-83; Engl, transl. by W. Hastie, vol. I., Edinburgh and London, 1887; Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie, vol. I., Berlin, 1895; Buckle, History of Civilization in Ejiyland, London, 1857-60; Draper, History of the Intellectual Development of Europe, New York, 1863; Lecky, History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Ratiojial- ism in Europe, London, 1865, 5th ed., 1872 ; Dean, T'he History of Civ- ilization, New York and London, 1869 ; Hettner, Litter atur geschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts, 3 parts, Braunschweig, 1862-70; Paulsen, Ge- schichte des gelehrten Unterrichts (from middle ages to the present time), Leipsic, 1885 ; Engl, transl. by E. D. Perry, New York and London, 1895. For further references, see Falckenberg (trans.), pp. 15-17 ; also Ueberweg-Heinze, vol. III., § 1 ff. ; and AVindelband's History of Philosophy. — Tr.] 1 History of Religion and Philosophy, 3d ed. much enlarged, 1868 (Dutch) ; French transl. from 2d ed. by Reville, Paris and Strasburg, 1861 ; German translation from 3d ed. by Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1868. 2 Kritische Geschichte der Philosophic, 4th ed., Leipsic, 189L ^ A Biographical History of Philosophy from its Origin in Greece down to the Present Day, 3d ed., London, 1863. * La philosophic, Paris, 1879. * Histoire de la philosophic, Paris, 1882. ^ Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques, 2d ed,, Paris, 1875. ■^ Histoire de la philosophic, Paris, 1875,4th ed., 1883; Extraits des grnnds philosophes, Paris, 1877. 8 Histoire de la philosophic, Paris, 1877. ^ Katechismus der Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipsic, 1878; 2d ed., 1881. [To these may be added : Trendelenburg, Historische Beitrdge zur Philosophie, 3 vols., Berlin, 1846-67 ; Zeller, Vortrdge und Abhandlungen, 3 series, 1865-84; Hartenstein, Historisch-philosophische Abhandlungen, Leipsic, 1870; Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, 2 vols , 1881 ; 2d ed., 1889; Eucken, Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker, Leipsic, 1890; Bau- mann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1890; Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, Freiburg, 1892 (Engl, transl. by J. H. Tufts, London and New York, 1893) ; Bergmann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 vols., Berlin, 1892-94; Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, in six parts, vol. I., part 1, Leipsic, 1894; Willmann, Geschichte des Idealisms, 16 INTRODUCTION 3 vols., vol. I., Braunschweig, 1894. For further references, see Ueber- weg-Heinze, vol. I., § 4, Falckenberg, and Windelband. Histories of special philosophical sciences : Prantl (mentioned above) ; Harms, Die Philosophie in ihrer Geschichte, vol. I., Psychologie, vol. II., Logik, Berlin, 1877, 1881 ; Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, Gotha, 1880-- 84; Sidgwick, History of Ethics, London and New York, 3d ed., 1892; Paulsen, System der EthiJc, 2 vols., 3d ed., Berlin, 1894 (vol. I., pp. 31-191, contains a history of ethics) ; Paul Janet, Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec la morale, 3d ed., Paris ; same author's History of Ethics, mentioned above ; Bosanquet, The History of ^Esthetics, London and New York, 1892 ; Flint, History of the Philosophy of History, New York, 1894. For further references, see Ueberweg-Heinze, vol. L, § 4, pp. 8-15; Windelband (transL), pp. 20, 21: and Falckenberg, pp. 15-17, 628-629. The following are the most important philosophical journals : The Philosophical Review, vol. 4, 1895 ; Mind, New Series, vol. 4 ; The Monist, vol. 5 ; The Amer- ican Journal of Psychology, vol. 6 ; The Psychological Review, vol. 1 ; International Journal of Ethics, vol. 5 ; Zeitschrift fur Philosophie and philosophische Kritik, New Series, vol. 106 ; Vierteljahresschrift fiir wissenschafiUche Philosophie, vol. 18 ; Philosophisches Jahrhuch, vol. 8 ; Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Pedagogik, vol. 2 ; Jahrhuch far Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vol. 9 ; Zeitschrift fur exacte Philosophie, yol. 21 ; Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 8 ; Archiv fiir systematische Philosophie (N^w Series of the Philosophische Monats- hefte), vol. 1; Philosophische Studien, voL 11; Zeitschrift fur Psy- chologic und Physiologic der Sinnesorgane, vol. 8 ; Zeitschrift fiir Volker- psychologie und Sprachivissenschaft, vol. 25 ; Revue philosophique, vol 20 ; Revue de metaphysique et de morale, vol. 3 ; Uannee philosophique, vol. 5, 1894 ; Uannee psychologique, vol. 1 ; Rivista Italiana di Filosofia, vol. 9. The following American and English philosophical series are of value to the student of philosophy : Griggs's Philosophical Classics (German philosophers), G. S. Morris, editor, Chicago; Philosophical Classics for English Readers, W. Knight, editor, Philadelphia and Edinburgh; Series of Modern Philosophers, E. H. Sneath, editor, New York ; Ethical Series, E. H. Sneath, editor, Boston ; 2'he Library of Philosophy, J. H. Muirhead, editor, London and New York ; The English and Foreign Philosophical Library, London ; Ethical Library, J. H. Muirhead, editor, London and New York ; Bohn Library, London. The most extensive German collection of philosophical works is the Philosophische Bibli- othek, J. H. von Kirchmann, editor, Heidelberg. Felix Alcan, Paris, publishes the Bibliothlque de Philosophie. — Tr.] I GREEK PHILOSOPHY FIRST PERIOD IGE OF METAPHYSICS PROPER OR PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (600-400) § 4. Origin of Greek Philosophy ^ I'^E philosophy of the Hellenes emancipates itself from their religion in the form of theology and gnomic mo- rality .^ Aryan naturalism, modified by the national genius ^ [Cf. chapters on mythology, etc., in Grote's History of Greece (Cited page 8) ; Preller's Mythologie (cited page 9) \ Lehrs, Populare A ufmtze (cited page 9) ; and histories of Greek philosophy. — Tr.] 2 That is to say, philosophy is of comparatively recent origin, while religion, which precedes it historically, is as old as nations and hu- manity itself. Philosophy, being a late product of human develop- ment, plays but a subordinate and intermittent part in history, v^ /Religion, on the other hand, guides its destinies. It is the primordial and permanent expression of what lies at the very root of our nature, that is, the will, and consists essentially in the will to he, until the evolu- tion of consciousness enables it to foresee its highest and absolute end, the good. To will-to-live means to resist annihilation, conse- quently, to di-ead everything that is supposed to have the power of destroying and of preserving life. Now, the horror of death and of the forces which produce it, the passionate desire for life and what- ever is able to preserve it, is precisely what constitutes the essence of fvae^eia, the characteristic trait of the religious phenomenon. This is so true that we find the belief in immortality and the worship of the dead as beings that continue to live in spite of all, intimately con- nected with all religions. Such a belief simply represents the desire of the will-to-live to continue even after death and beyond the grave. 2 18 GREEK PHILOSOPHY and the physical conditions under which it developed, forms its starting-point. This naturalism had passed the period of infancy long before the appearance of philoso- phy. The luminous Ether (Diaus-Zeus), the Sun and its fire (Apollo), the Storm-cloud and its thunderbolts (Pallas-Athene), were originally taken for the gods them- selves. Just as the child transforms its surroundings into an enchanted world, and regards its doll and wooden horse as living beings, so the humanity-child makes na- ture after its own image. For the contemporaries of Homer and Hesiod, such objects are merely the sensible manifestations of the invisible divinity concealed behind them, a being that is similar to the human soul, but superior to it in power, and, like it, invested with immortality. The gods form a kind of idealized, transcendent humanity, wliose vices as well as virtues are magnified. The world is their work, their empire, the theatre of their wishes, The Old Testament, which might be cited against us, and which is cer- tainly far from being explicit on the subject of individual immortality, is so much the more outspoken on the question of the immortality of Israel. Nay, the immortality of Israel is its fundamental dogma. It has been well said, men would have no religion at all if there were no death ; and the essence of the religious phenomenon was excellently characterized by the preacher who once remarked : " I never have such well-disposed hearers as on Good Friday, and what makes them so religious is the memento mori" Hence we may define religion as fol- lows : Subjectively, it is the fear with which the givers of life and death, be they real or imaginary, inspire us ; objectively, it is the sum of ideas, doctrines, and institutions resulting from this feeling. Religious theory, or theology, and religious practice, or worship, the orig- inal form of morality, are constitutive, but derived and secondary elements, the products of an essentially emotional, instinctive, and sesthetical phenomenon called religion. By reflecting upon itself religion becomes theology ; theology, in its turn, reflects upon itself, and becomes religious criticism, philosophy (Xenophanes). [Concern- ing the origin and evolution of religion, see Paulsen's Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 266 ff.] ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 19 defeats, and triumphs. Man, whom they envy rather than love, exists for their pleasure. They are the highest personifications of the will-to-live, and are jealous of their unquestioned superiority; hence they deny him perfect happiness. The most assiduous worship, the richest sacri- fices, the most perfect fidelity, cannot move them when our prosperity displeases them. Hence the melancholy which breathes in the gnomic poetry of a Solon or a Theognis, who prefer death to life, and esteem them happy who have never been born or who die young.^ In the measure in which the moral conscience is devel- oped and refined, religious ideas are transformed and spirit- ualized. The gods of Homer, who reflect the exuberant, versatile, and quarrelsome youth of the Hellenic nation, are succeeded by the just and wise gods, the creations of its riper manhood (Pindar, ^schylus, Sophocles). This quaU itative transformation of the religious ideas is accompanied by a quantitative transformation. Polytheism aims at greater simplicity. The good, which the will perceives as its highest end, is synonymous with harmony, and harmony means unity in diversity. Religious and' moral progress is, in consequence, a progress in the unitary and monotheistic direction. -^ " The moral consciousness, which among the Greeks is identical with the sense of the beautiful, finds a powerful ally in reason and its natural tendency to unity. Guided by the monistic instinct, theology asks itself the question, Who is the oldest of the gods, and in what order do they spring from their common Father ? and receives an answer in the theogonies of Hesiod, Pherecydes of Syros,^ and Orpheus.2 Here, for the first time, the philosophical spirit * Cf. Zeller, vol. I., Introduction. * Pherecydis fragmenta coll. et illustr. Fr. G. Sturz, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1834. 3 See concerning Orpheus the scholarly work of Lobeck, Aglaopha- mus sive de theologice mysticcK Grcecorum causiSf 2 vols., 1829. ^0 GREEK PHILOSOPHY jads satisfaction; these fantastic conceptions are anticipa- tions of the rational explanation of nature. To conscience and reason a third factor, experience, is added. This, too, assists in the transf-^rmation of religious ideas by demonstrating, with increasing evidence, the im- possibility of explaining all phenomena, without exception, by capricious wills. The facts of mathematics, because of their universality and necessity, especially defy theo- logical interpretation ; how indeed can we assume the fact that twice two is four or that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, to be the result of caprice and not of absolute necessity ? In the same way the obser- vation of astronomical and physical facts, and their constant regularity and periodicity, gives rise to the idea of a Will iiat is superior to the whims of the gods (avdy/cr], aSpdcrTeLa, fiolpa, Tvxv)-) of ^^ immutable Justice (Slkt], el/jLap/juevT])^ of a divine Law (^eto? vofjLo^), of a supreme Intelligence (deto<; X070?, 6elo<; vov^). The pioneers of philosophy, men like Thales, Xenophanes, and Pythagoras, who were the first to protest against theological anthropomorphism, were like- wise mathematicians, naturalists, and astronomers, if we may so designate men who had an elementary knowledge of the course of the stars, the properties of numbers, and the nature of bodies. Philosophy dates her origin from the day when these 'physicians^ as Aristotle terms them in distinction from their predecessors, the theologians, relegated the traditional gods to the domain of fable, and explained nature by prin- ciples and causes {apxal /cal alria). Emerging as she did from the conflict between reason and religious authority, which sought revenge by systematically accusing her of atheism and treason, philosophy did not at once cast off the mythological garb. She loved to express herself in the rhythmical language of the poets; and even her concep- tions retained the marks of the religious faith from which THE SCHOOL OF MILETUS 21 she sprang. The gods are not abolished ; they are restored to their true nature, and regarded as elements {aTOixela), Following the example of theology, philosophy begins to ask herself the question, What is the primitive element, the one that precedes the others in dignity and in time, and from which, consequently, the others have been gen- erated ? The theogonies become cosmogonies, and the only important question concerning which the first thinkers differ is the question as to what constitutes the primor- dial natural force, the princi2:)le (Jipxi)' § 5. The School of Miletus. Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes ^ 1. Thales,^ the head of what may be called the school of Miletus, and the father of all the Ionian schools, lived about 600 B. c. According to him, water is the fost prin- ciple, the universal substratum, of which the other bodies are merely modifications ; water envelops the earth on all sides ; the earth floats upon this infinite ocean, and con- stantly derives from it the nourishment it needs. This doctrine is the old Aryan myth of the heavenly Okeanos translated into scientific language : the water o" the storm-cloud fructifies the earth and is the father of all living things.^ It is all we know positively of the philosophy of Thales. He is, moreover, represented to us by antiquity as the first geometrician, the first astronomer, and the first physicist among the Greeks. He is said to 1 [For the pre-Socratics, see the collections of Fragments, Teich- miiller's Studien and Neue Studien, Byk, Burnet, etc., cited above. Translations of the Fragments found in Burnet. See also Hitter, Geschichte der ionischen Philosopliie, Berlin, 1821. — Krische, For- schungen auf dem Gehiet der alten Philosophie, Gottingen, 1840. — Tr.] 2 Chief source, Met, I., 3; [Hitter and Preller, 7th ed., pp. 6-11. - Tr.]. P Plato, Cratylus, 402 B. 22 GREEK PHILOSOPHY have predicted the eclipse of the 28th of May, 585, and to have been acquainted with the phenomenon of magnetism, as well as with the attractive property of polished amber (rjXeKTpov). 2. According to Anaximander,^ a fellow-countryman and disciple of Thales, the author of a work On Nature, the first principle is not water, but the infinite atmosphere {to aireipov), from which it comes in order to fructify the earth. This infinite, indistinct matter is the mother of the heavens and the worlds which the}^ encompass {tmv ovpavwv koL to)v ev avToU Koa-fjicov). Everything that exists owes its being to the first principle, and arises from it by separation ; it is therefore just that everything render to it, at the hour appointed by Fate, the life which Fate has given it, in order that this life may circulate and pass to new beings. The opposites, warm and cold, dry and moist, which do not exist in the aireipov, the primitive chaos where everything is neutralized, are gradually parted off, and form nature, with its contraries, its opposite qualities, and separate ele- ments. The first opposition is that between the warm and dry, on the one hand, and the cold and moist, on the other ; the former occurring in the earth, the latter in the heavens which surround it. The earth is a cylindrical body, and floats freely in the infinite ether, being held in equilibrium because of its equal distance from all the other heavenly bodies {hta rrjv ofioiav irdvTcov airoaraaiv). There are an infinite number of worlds (OeoC), which are alternately formed and destroyed. The first animals were produced 1 Soui'ces : Aristotle, Met., XII., 2; Phys., III., 4; Simplicius, In Phys., L 6, 32 ; Plutarch, in Eusebius, Prcep. evang., I., 8; Hippolytus, Refut. hceres., I., 6; Cicero, De nat. deor., I., 10; Schleiermacher, Ueber Anaximandros, Complete Works, 3d series, vol. II., pp. 171-296; Ritter and Preller, pp. 12-19; [Mullach, Fragmenta, I., p. 240; Burnet, pp. 47 ff . — Tr] ; C. Mallet, Histoire de la philosophie ioniennCf Paris, 1842 ; [Teichmiiller, Studien and Neue Studien. — Tr.]. THE SCHOOL OF MILETUS 28 in the water, and from them the more advanced species gradually arose. Man sprang from the fish. Individuals and species constantly change, but the substance Avhence they are derived, the aireipov^ is indestructible (ac^OapTov^ addvarov^ avwXeOpov)^ because it is uncreated {ayewrjrov). It envelops everything, produces everything, governs ev- erything (irepLe^ei diravTa kol irdvra Kvfiepva). It is the supreme divinity {to 6elov\ possessing a perpetual vitality of its own. 3. Anaxenienes 1 of Miletus, the disciple of Anaximan- der and third representative of the Ionian philosophy, calls the generative principle of things air or breath (arj/?, irvevfia^ t/tu;;^?;). His philosophy, which is a more exact formulation of Anaximander's doctrine, may be summarized in the fol- lowing words : infinite Tiif^tter, a perpetual motion of con- densation and rarefaction that is something like a plastic principle, necessity directing the motion (Sl/ct], avdyKj]). Matter, motion, motive force, directing necessity : we find among the lonians all the elements of the explanations of nature attempted afterwards. But their systems are like rudimentary organisms. The perfection of a living being depends upon the greater or less differentiation of its organs; the more its constitutive parts differ from each other and become specialized, the higher it rises in the scale of beings. Now, the Ionian philosophy is, when com- pared with that of Aristotle, perfectly uniform. Thales regards water, Anaximenes air, as substratum, motive force, and fate, or the law of motion.^ Progress in science, as well as in nature, is made possible by the division of labor, by differentiation of the constitutive elements of being, by the multiplication and opposition of systems. * Plutarch, in Eusebius, Prcep. evang. , I., 8 ; Cicero, De nat. deor., I., 10 ; Schleiermacher, Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia (loc. cit.) ; Ritter and Preller, pp. 20-23 ; [Burnet, pp. 79 ff. — Tr.]. « Aristotle, Met., L, 10, 2. 24 GREEK PHILOSOPHY § 6. The Problem of Becoming 1. The first question that arouses controversy is the problem of becoming. Being persists, heings constantly change ; they are born and they pass away. How can being both persist and not persist ? Reflection upon this problem, the metaphysical problem par excellence^ since it lies at the root of all the sciences and dominates all questions, gives rise to three systems, the types of all European philoso- phies, — the Eleatic system ; the system of Heraclitus ; the atomistic system, wliich was proclaimed in the idealistic sense by the Pythagoreans, in the materialistic sense by Leucippus and Democritus, and with a dualistic turn by Anaxagoras. The first two are radical; each suppresses one of the terms of the antinomy ; the third is a doctrine of conciliation. According to the Eleatic hypothesis, being is everything, change is but phenomenal ; according to Heraclitus, change is everything, and being, or permanence, is but an illusion ; according to the monadists and atomists, both permanence and change exist : permanence in the he- ings,^ perpetual change in their relations. The Eleatics deny becoming ; Heraclitus makes a god of it ; th^ atomists explain it. A. Negation of Becoming § 7. Eleatic Philosophy. Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Gorgias ^ At the time when Anaximander flourished in Miletus, another Ionian, Xenophanes of Colophon, immigrated into 1 Considered by the Pythagoreans as ideal unities or numbers ; by the atomists as real or material unities. 2 [Karsten, Philosophorum grcecorum veterum operum reliquicB, 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1835 ff. ; Bergk, Commentatio de Arist. lihello de XerKf phane, etc., Marburg, 1843. — Tr.] ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY 25 Magna Graecia, travelled through the cities as a philosopher and rhapsodist, and finally settled in Elea in Lucania, where he gained adherents. His theological innovations were developed and systematized by Parmenides of Elea and Melissus of Samos, who raised them to the dignity of a metaphysic. Zeno of Elea, the disciple of Parmenides, undertook to defend them by means of dialectics, thereby becoming the precursor of the Sophists. 1. Xenophanes ^ is a decided opponent of the national mythology, towards which he assumes a similar attitude to that of the Hebrew prophets who raised their powerful voices against polytheism and its empty conceptions. His written and spoken words prot-laim him as the real creator ^-J. of philosophical nionutheism, which he identifies with pan- , -^ theism. With an eloquence that is full of irony, his satires some fragments of which are extant, combat the error ot those who infinitely multiply the divine Being, who attrib- ute to him a human form (anthropomorphism) and human passions (anthropopathism). There is one God, he says- one only God, comparable to the gods of Homer or to mor- tals neither in form nor in thought. This God is all eye, all ear, all thought. Being immutable and immovable, he Aas no need of going about, now hither, now thither, ir order to carry out his wishes, but without toil he governs 1 Aristotle (?), De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgia ; Clement of Alex., Irpoi^aTa, V.,p. 601 C ; ibid., p. 711 B; Biihle, Commentatio de ortu et profjressii pantJieismi inde a Xenophane, etc., Gott., 1790; V. Cousin. Xenophane, fondateur de Vecole d'Elee (in the Nouveaux fragments phi- losophiques), Paris, 1828; Kern, Qiiresdones Xenophanece, Xaumbnrgi 1846; Mullach, Fragmenta, I., pp. 101 ff.; Ritter and Preller, pp. 75- 84; [Burnet, pp. 11.5 ff.] ; J. Freudenthal, Ueber die Theologie dts- Xenophanes, Breslau, 1886. Freudenthal bases his view partly on the words iv rois Beo'iai (Mullach, p. 101), and makes Xenophanes a polytheist. This is a strange misconception of the spirit for the letter, and would be like reckoning Spinoza among the theists, because he calls nature God, and God a thinking thing. 26 GREEK PHILOSOPHY all things by his thought alone. Mortals, of course, accept the authority of Homer and Hesiod, and think that the god^ are born as they are, and like them have feeling, voice, and body ; and they ascribe to the gods all things that are a shame and disgrace among men, — theft, adultery, and falsehood. They do as the oxen or lions would do if they could paint: they would certainly represent their gods in the form of lions or oxen. In place of these imaginary beings, let us adore the one infinite Being, who bears us in his bosom, and in whom there is neither generation nor corruption, neither change nor origin.^ 2. Parmenides ^ completes the teachings of his master, and makes them the starting-point for a strictly monistic 1 Mullach, pp. 101-102 : Els Oebs €v T( BeolcTL km dvOpanoia-t fxeyKFTOSj ovre defxas OvrjToicnv ofioiios ovt€ vorjua. OZ\os opa, ovXos 8e i/of t, ovXos St' r aKovei. *AXX* airavevOe nopoio v6ov (}>pev\ irdvra Kpa^alvti. AU\ S' €U ravTco Tf [xeveiv Kivovjievov ovSev, Ov8e iJL€T€px^o-6ai piu eTriTrpeVet ak\oT€ a.Wrj. . , ciXXa ^poToi boKeovdi deovs yevvdcrBai rfju a(f>€T€pr)u T aiadijcnu e^eiv (jxovrjv re depias re. Havra 6eois dvedrjKav Oprjpos 6* HcrtoSo? t€ oaaa trap dv6pa>Troi(nv oveidea koL ^oyos iariv, Koi TrXeiOT* ((^dey^avTO deav dOcpiiaTia epya, uXerrrety, jxoi-)(€veiv re /cat aXXi^Xouy aTrareuetv. AXX' f iTot x^'^'P^^ y fix^" i^°^^ h^ \eovTC5, ^ ypdyj/'at ;(eipecr(ri Ka\ epya reXelv anep avdpeg, Sttttoi p€P 6' tmroiai, jSocy 8e re ^ovalv opoias Kal K€ 6foov ideas eypa(f)ov * Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math., VII., Ill ; Simplicius, Inpliys., f. 7, 9, 19, 25, 31, 38; Proclus, Comment, in Plat. Timceum, p. 105; Clem, of Alex., Strom., V., pp. 552 D, 614 A ; Mullach, Fragm. phil. gr., L, pp. 109 ff.; Ritter and PreUer, pp, 85 ft-} [Burnet, pp. 218 f£.]. ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY 27 system. Since there is no change in God, and since God is everything, that which we call change {aWoiovaOat) is but an appearance, an illusion {h6^a\ and there is in reality neither origin nor decay. The eternal being alone exists: this thesis forms the subject of a philosophical poem, the fragments of which are the most ancient monu- ment in our possession of metaphysical speculation proper among the Greeks. In the first part, dedicated to Truth, he demonstrates by means of specious arguments that our notions of change, plurality, and limitation contradict reason. In the second part, which deals with the merely illusory, he attempts to give an explanation of nature from the standpoint of illusion. Starting out with the idea of being, he proves that that | ^ which is cannot have become what it is, nor can it cease to be, nor become something else ; for if being has begun to exist, it has come either from being or non-being. Now, in the former case, it is its own product, it has created itself, which is equivalent to saying that it has not origi- nated, — that it is eternal. The latter case supposes that something can come from nothing, which is absurd. For the same reasons, that which exists can neither change nor perish, for in death it would pass either into being or into non-being. If being is changed into being, then it does not change ; and to assume that it becomes nothing is as impossible as to make it come from nothing. Consequently ^ being is eternal. It is, moreover, immovable ; for it could move only in space ; now space is or is not ; if space is, it is identical with being, and to say of being that it is moved in space is to say that being is moved in being, which means that it is at rest. If space is nothing, there cannot be any movement either, for movement is possible only in space. Hence, movement cannot be conceived in any way, and is but an appearance. Being is a continuous (avvex^) and indivisible whole There is no void anywhere. There 28 GREEK PHILOSOPHY is no break between being and being ; consequently these are no atoms. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there existed a void, a break between the assumed parts of the universe. If this interval is something real- it is what being is, it continues being, instead of interrupt- ing it ; it unites the bodies instead of dividing them into parts. If the void does not exist, then it can no longer divide them. There is then no interval between being and being, and all beings constitute but one single being. Being (the universe) is absolute and self-sufficient; it has neither desires nor wants nor feelings of any kind. If it were relacive, it could depend only on that which is or on that which is not. If being depends on being, it depends upon itself or is independent ; if it depends on that which does not exist, it is still independent ; which excludes from it all desire, all need, all feeling. When one is everything one has no desires. Finally, being is one ; for a second being or a third being would be but a continuation of it, that is, itself. Hence, to sum up: Being can only be conceived as eternal, immutable, immovable, continuous indivisible, infinite, unique. There is for the thinker but one single being, the All-One, in whom all individual dif- ferences are merged. The being that thinks and the being that is thought are the same thing (tcovtov 8' iarl voelv re Koi ovve/cev ean vor^fxa)} In the second part of his poem, Parmenides deals with opinion {^6^a\ which depends on the senses and is con- cerned with what is merely illusory. The universe, which reason conceives as an indivisible unity, is divided by the senses into two realms or rival elements: night or cold; and light, fire, or heat. The universe, which to reason is without beginning or end, has its apparent origin, its genesis ; and this genesis is the successive victory of the principle of 1 Simplicius In Phys., f. 19 A, 31 B. ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY 29 light over the principle of darkness. Night is the mother, the luminous principle is the father, of all forms (etBr]). The world shows the traces of the two elements to which it owes its origin even in its smallest parts. The warm and the cold, the clear and the obscure, are universally combined in constant proportions. The universe is com- posed of a series of concentric spheres, in which the light and warm spheres alternate with the dark and cold spheres. The outermost sphere, which encloses all the rest (to TTepLidxov\ is solid, cold, and dark ; beneath it lies the fiery sphere of the fixed stars ("OXv/jltto^; ea^aro^). The central sphere is also solid and cold, but it is surrounded by a sphere of light and life. This fier}^ sj)here which encircles the solid core of the earth is the source of movement (that is, of illusion ^), the hearth of universal life (ecrrLa rov Traz/To?), the seat of the Divinity (Aat]uwz^), the Queen of die world {Kvpepvr)Tr]^\ Justice (Al/ct)), Necessity (AvdjKrj), the Mother of Love ('AcppoSirri). These doctrines, which partially reproduce Ionian and Pythagorean speculations, are not offered as the truth, but as hypotheses intended to orient us in the world of illu- sion. They have not for Parmenides the importance which they have for the lonians. Inasmuch as he does not grant ^ the existence of motion, but rejects as illusory that which constitutes the essence of nature, he accepts no other science than metaphysics, no other metaphysics than that of a i^riori reasoning. On account of the opposition which he creates between the real and the intelligible, he is the chief fore- runner of Platonic idealism, without, however, being a spir- itualist in the modern sense. Spiritualism distinguishes between corporeal substance and soul-substance; Eleatic metaphysics makes no such distinction. The being which it affirms is neither body nor soul, neither matter nor spirit ; it is being, nothing but being ; and everything else ^ Cf. the Maja of the Hindoos, the mother of illusioiis. 80 GREEK PHILOSOPHY is merely an accident, an appearance, an illusion. Nay, if we interpret the word matter in the subtle, metaphysical sense of substance or universal substratum^ we may reckon Parmenides among the materialists, like his modern imi- tator Spinoza. But it would be a mistake to call him a materialist in the sense in which the term is applied to Democritus and the modern materialists ; for materialism, properly so-called, exists only in opposition to spiritualism, which is later than Parmenides. The monism of Par- menides and Heraclitus is like the block of marble which may be formed into a basin or a Jupiter, or like the mother- cell from which, according to circumstances, a Socrates or an Erostratus may come ; it is capable of being differ- entiated and developed into materialistic or spiritualistic monism. 3. Plato deduces idealism from it, while Melissus of Samos^ (440) interprets it in an altogether materialistic sense. This philosopher, who was also a brave general and a clever politician, opposes the Ionian cosmogonies with the Eleatic doctrine of the eternity of the world. If becoming is impossible, it is henceforth useless and absurd to inquire into the manner in which the universe originated. Being {to 6v) is infinite in time, and — which is contrary to the view of Parmenides, who conceived it as a sphere — infinite in space (wairep earl alel^ ovrco Kal to fieya6o<; airetpov alel XPV chai). This latter trait, which leaves no doubt as to the materialism of Melissus, gives his system a wholly modern stamp, and distinguishes it from most of the an- cient systems, particularly from that of Aristotle. For the Greek, who judges of things artistically, regards the infi- nite as the imperfect, as without limitation ; and the uni- verse, which is the acme of perfection, is surely the perfect 1 The author of a book, nepl tov outos (in the Ionian dialect), quoted in different passages by Simplicius, In PJiys., i. 22, and passim ; [Ritter and Preller pp. 106-111 ; MuUach, I., pp. 261 ff. ; Burnet, 338 ff. — Tr.]. ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY JTl sphere, one half of which is revealed to us by the sense of sight, and of which the earth is the centre. 4. Zeno,^ a pupil and follower of Parmenides, is the controversialist of the school, the inventor of the process of demonstration called reductio ad absiirdum^ the father of dialectics and sophistry. The One alone is conceivable ; extension, magnitude, motion, and space, cannot be con- ceived. If there is such a thing as a (limited) magnitude, it must be infinitely great and infinitely small : infinitely great, because, being infinitely divisible, it is composed of an infinite number of parts ; infinitely small, because unex- tended parts, even though multiplied by infinity, cannot produce extension or magnitude. Movement cannot be conceived ; for the line which sep- arates its starting-jDoint from its point of rest is composed of points, and, since the point has no extension, of an infi- nite number of points. Hence every distance, even the smallest, is infinite, and the stopping-point can never be reached. However near you may imagine the swift Achilles to be to the slow tortoise, he will never be able to overtake it, since, in order to do so, he would fii^st have to pass over one half of the distance, however small, which separates him from the tortoise, and, in order to pass over this half, he would first have to pass over the half of the half, and so on to infinity. The infinite divisibility of the line is for him an insurmountable obstacle. You have an idea that the arrow flies through space. But in order to reach its destination, it must pass over a series of points in space; hence it must successively occupy these different points. Now, to occupy a point of space, at a given mo- ment, means to be at rest : therefore the arrow is at rest and its movement is but illusory. 1 Aristotle, Phys., VI., 2, 9 ; Simplicius, In PJiys., f. 30, 130, 255; MuUach, I., pp. 266 ft ; Bitter and Preller, pp. 100 ff. ; [Burnet, pp. 328 ff.J. 3^ GREEK PHILOSOPHY Furthermore, if movement takes place, it can take place only in space. Now, if space is a reality, it exists some- where, that is, in a space, which in turn exists in another space, and so on et? aireipov. Motion is, therefore, impos- sible from every point of view, and we cannot suppose it to be real, unless we are willing to affirm an absurdity. Being alone exists, and this being is immutable matter.^ 5. GoKGiAS 2 of Leontinum, the rhetorician, a pupil of Zeno, who was sent by his country as an ambassador to Athens in 427, deduces the ultimate consequences from the Eleatic principle and ends in nihilism. He is not, like Zeno, content with denying motion and space ; as his treatise, irepl rov fir] 6vto<; rj irepl ^vcreo)?, shows, he negates being itself. Nothing exists, he says ; for if a being existed, ^t would have to be eternal, as was proved by Parmenides. Now, an eternal being is infinite. But :iri infinite being jannot exist in space or in time without being limited by them. Hence it is nowhere, and that which is nowhere does not exist. And even if, assuming the impossible, something did exist, we could not know it ; and even if we could, this knowledge could not in any wise be communi- cated to others. Gorgias is the enfant terrible of the Eleatic school, whose extravagances turn the tide in favor of the Heraclitean principle : Being is nothing, becoming is everything. The being of Parmenides and Zeno, which is eternal and im- mutable, but devoid of all positive attributes, is, in fact, a mere abstraction. It resembles the garment of the king, the fine texture of which everybody pretended to admire, until, at last, a little child exclaimed, in the simplicity of its heart : " Why, the king is naked ! " 1 Aristotle, Met, III., 4, 41. * Aristotle, De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgia ; Sextus Empir., A dv. math., VII., 65, 77 ; Ritter and Preller, 187 ff. HERACLITUS 83 B. Apotheosis of BECo:MiNa § 8. Heraclitus Heraclitus,^ who, on account of his love of paradox, was called the Obscure, flourished at Ephesus, near the end of the sixth century. He has left a deeper impress on Greek thought than any of the ph} sicists of the first period, and more than one modern hypothesis is either foreshadowed or expressly formulated in the valuable fragments of his book On Nature (irepl ^ucreoj?). Like the physicists of Miletus, Heraclitus considers all bodies as transformations of one and the same element. But tliis element is not, as with Anaximenes, the atmos- pheric air ; it is a finer, more subtle substance, which he sometimes calls fire {irvp\ sometimes warm breath {^yxv)i and which resembles either what physics formerly called caloric^ or the oxygen of modern chemistry. This original matter extends from the boundaries of the earth to the limits of the world. Everything that exists is derived from it, and strives to return to it ; every being is trans- formed fire ; and, conversely, every being may be, and, as a matter of fact, is, eventually changed into ^vq^ Atmos- 1 Chief sources : Plato, Cratylus, p. 402 A ; Plut. Is, el Osir. , 45, 48; Clem, cf Alex., Strojn., V. pp. 599,603; Diog, L., IX.; Sext. Emp., Adv. math., VIL, 126, 127, 133; Stobaeus; Schleiermacher, Heral'Ieitos der Dunkle von Ephesos, (Complete Wo7'ks, Part III., vol. 2, Berlin, 1838) ; Jac. Bernays, Heraclitea, Bonn, 1848 ; Die HeraUitisclien Briefe, Berlin, 1869 ; [Lassalle, Die Philosophie Herahleitos des Dunkeln von Ephesos, 2 vols., Berlin, 1858; Teichmiiller, Studien and Neue Stu- dien, quoted above ; E. Pfleiderer, Die Philosophie des EeraMit von Ephesus, Berlin, 1886; G. T. W. Patrick, Heraclitus on Nature, Balti- more, 1889. — Tr.] ; Mullach, I., pp. 310 ff. ; Heracliti Ephesii reliquicBj collected by By water, Oxford, 1877 ; Bitter and Preller, 24 ff. ; [Bur- net, pp. 133 ff.]. 2 The physics of Heraclitus reminds one of the mechanical theory of heat taught by modern physics, which, like the sage of Ephesus, considers all organic life as a transformation of solar heat. 34 GREEK PHILOSOPHY pheric air and water are fire in process of extinction or in process of renewal ; earth and solids are extinguished fire, and will be rekindled afresh at the hour fixed by Fate. Ac- cording to an immutable law, the fire of the heavenly regions is successively transformed into vapor, water, and earth, only to return again, in the opposite direction, to its principle ; then it thickens again, re-ascends into the heavens, and so on ad infinitum. The universe is, therefore, fire in the process of transformation (irvpo^ Tpoirai), an ever-living fire, which is periodically kindled and extinguished. It is neither the work of a god nor of a man. It has had no be- ginning, and it will never end. There is an end of the world in the sense that all things ultimately return to fire ; but the world eternally re-arises from its ashes. Universal life is an endless alternation of creation and destruction, — a game which Jupiter plays with himself. Rest, stand-still, in a word, being, is an illusion of the senses. It is not possible to descend twice into the same stream ; ^ nay, it is not even possible to descend into it once ; we are and we are not in it ; we make up our minds to plunge into the waves, and, behold ! they are already far away from us. In the eternal whirl, the nothing constantly changes into be- ing, and being is incessantly swallowed up in nothingness. Since non-being produces being, and vice versa ; being and non-being, life and death, origin and deca}^, are the same. If they were not, they could not be transformed into each other. The perpetual flow of things is not, as the expression might lead one to think, an easy process, like the gliding of a brook over a bed of polished stones. Becoming is a struggle between contrary forces, between opposing cur- rents, one of which comes from above and strives to trans- form the celestial fire into solid matter ; while the other ^ Plato, Cratylus, p. 402 A : Travra x^P^*- '^"t ovhtv fie'pei k. t. X. HERACLITUS 85 re-ascends into the heavens, and strives to change earth into fire. It is this continuous battle between two con- trary currents that produces all vegetable, animal, and intellectual life on the surface of the earth. Everything arises from the strife of opposites.^ Organic life is pro- duced by the male and the female ; musical harmony, by sharp and flat notes ; it is sickness that makes us appre- ciate health; without exertion, there can be no sweet repose ; without danger, no courage ; without evil to over- come, no virtue. Just as fire lives the deatli of air, air, the death of fire, water, the death of air, earth, the death of water ; so, too, the animal lives the death of the vege- table, man, the death of the animal, the gods, the death of man, virtue, the death of vice, and vice, the death of virtue. Hence, good is a destroyed evil, evil, a vanished good ; and since evil does not exist without the good, nor the good without the evil, evil is a relative good, and good a relative evil. Like being and non-being, good and evil disappear in the universal harmony. The emphasis which Heraclitus lays on the perpetual flux and the absolute instability of things, on the vanity of all individual existence, the impossibility of good without evil, of pleasure without pain, of life without death, makes him the typical pessimist of antiquity, as opposed to the optimist, Democritus.2 His negation of being likewise implies scepticism.^ Inasmuch as truth is the same to-day, to-morrow, and forever, there can be no certain and final knowledge if everything perceived by the senses constantly changes. The senses, however, are not our only means of ^ Hippolytus, Ref. Jicer. IX., 9 : noXeixos (Darwin would translate it struggle for life) Trauroov narrip ecrri, koI ^aa-ikevs. 2 See § 12. • The school of Heraclitus, and particularly Cratylus, the best known of his disciples and one of the teachers of Plato, taught scepticism. 86 GREEK PHILOSOPHY knowledge; in addition to them we have reason (vov<;, X0709). The senses show us what passes away, and knowl- edge that is based on sensation alone is deceptive • reason reveals to us what is stable : the divine law (Oeto^ vo/jlo^), the only fixed point in the eternal flow of things. But the most enlightened human reason is still as far removed from divine reason as the ape is removed from human per- f ection.i By distinguishing between the sensible phenome- non and the noumenon, as Heraclitus did, Ionian philosophy emerges from the state of innocence, as it were ; it begins to suspect its methods, to distrust itself, to ask itself whether the ontological problem can really be solved at all ; in a word, it foreshadows the critical question. Anthropology cuts loose from general speculation and begins to form a prominent part in the system of Hera- elitus. The soul is an emanation of the celestial fire, and can live only by remaining in contact with this source of life. It is constantly renewed by means of respiration and sensation. Generation is the transformation of the liquid seed into dry breath. Hence the latent fire of the earth passes through the liquid state and returns to its original condition in the human soul. The driest breath constitutes the wisest soul, but w^oe to the drunkard who prematurely causes his soul to pass back into the liquid state ! In death the breath of life or the soul gradually returns to earth. An individual's energy will depend upon his more or less constant communion with the celestial fire, the supremely intelligent and wise soul of the world. Here we have the first feeble beginnings of physiological psychology, and they are naively materialistic. The phil- osophy of this period speaks of mind as popular chemistry speaks of spirits and essences ; but though materialistic, it is so little aware of the fact that it does not even possess a technical term for matter. We are not con* ^ See the Greater Hippias, p. 289 A. THE PYTHAGOREAN SPECULATION 37 scious of ourselves except in opposition to what we are not. Hylozoism does not become materialism until it is opposed by the spiritualism of the Pythagorean s.^ j To sum up : All things proceed from a dry and warm / principle and eventually return to it ; everything is in a state of perpetual change, and there is nothing immutable in the eternal process but the Law which governs it and wliich neither gods nor men can mochfy. C. Explanation of Beco]ming § 9. The Pythagorean Speculation Do the metaphysical doctrines of Pythagoreanism ^ go back, in part at least, to Pythagoras himself? Are they the teachings of the members of the Pythagorean order, of men like Philolaus, who was exiled from Italy in the first half of the fifth century, and Archytas, who flourished at Tarentum during the second half of that century ? The mystery in which the order was enshrouded from the very beginning makes it altogether impossible to answer this question. Aristotle himself seems to be in doubt in the matter ; he never speaks of the teachings of Pythagoras, 1 Hippasus of Crotona (or Metapontiim) fuses Heraclitean and Pythagorean conceptions. See Hitter and Preller, p. 44. '■^ Stobseus, Eclog., I.; Plato, Timceus ; Aristotle, Met., I., 5 passim, De ccelo, IT., 13; Diog. L., VIIT.; Porphyiy, Life of Pi/thar/oras ; Jam- blichus, Life of Pythagoras ; MuUach {Prjthagoreum carmen aureum, p. 193; Ocelli Lucani de universa na^iira libellus, 388; Plieroclis co?n- mentarius in carmen aureum, 416 ; Pythagoreorum aliorumque philosopho- rum fragmenta, 485 ff. [vol. II., pp. 9 ff.]) ; Ritter and Preller, pp . 40 ff. ; [Ritter, Geschichte der pythagoreischen PhilosopJiie, Hamburg, 1826]; A. Laugel, Pythagore, sa doctrine et son histoire d^apres la critique alle- viande (Revue des Deux-Mondes, 1864); C. Schaarschmidt, Die angehliche Schriftstellerei des Philolaos, etc., Bonn, 1864; Chaignet, Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne, Paris, 1873. [See also Grote's History o Greece, vol. TI.] 38 GREEK PHILOSOPHY but only of the Pythagoreans. However that may be, one thing is certain : the first impetus towards arithmetical speculation known under the name of Pythagorean phil- osophy was given by the great mathematician of Samos, and even though direct and positive proofs are wanting, nothing can hinder us from proclaiming him as the origi- nator of the doctrines set forth in this section. ' Pythagoras, like Thales, of Ionian origin, was born at Samos during the first half of the sixth century. He was at first the pupil of the theologian Pherecydes and perhaps also of Anaximander, the physicist. According to a tradi- tion which, it must be confessed, has nothing to warrant it among the ancients, he visited Phoenicia, Egypt, and Baby- lon, where he was initiated into the Eastern theological speculations, and introduced to the study of geometry, which had already attained a high degree of perfection od its native soil. Returning to Greece about 520, he realized his ideals of religious, social, and philosophical reform at Crotona in Magna Graecia, by founding a kind of brother- hood, the members of which entertained the same opinions concerning morality, politics, and religion.^ 1 When we compare the doctrines, aims, and organization of this brotherhood, as portrayed by the Neo-Platonic historians (especially Jamblichus), with Buddhistic monachism, we are almost tempted (with Alexander Polyhistor and Clement of Alexandria) to regard Pythagoras as the pupil of the Brahmans, nay, to identify him with Buddha himself. Indeed, not only do the names {UvOoiv, UvOayopas = an inspired one, a soothsayer, and Buddha = enlightened) bear such close resemblance to each other that even the most fastidious philol- ogist can find no objection in translating HvOayopeios by " preacher of Buddhism," but the Pythagorean and Buddhistic teachings are very much alike. Dualism, pessimism, metempsychosis, celibacy, a common life according to rigorous rules, frequent seK- examinations, meditar tions, devotions, prohibitions against bloody sacrifices and animal nourishment, kindliness towards all men, truthfulness, fidelity, justice, — all these elements are common to both. The fact that most ancient authors and above all Aristotle himself have comparatiyely little to say THE PYTHAGOREAN SPECULATION 89 Nothing certain is known of the end of the philosopher. His work prospered. The Pythagoreans were the posses- sors of all the sciences known in their time, — geometry, astronomy, music, and medicine,^ — and consequently ac- quired an overpowering influence among the Doric people, who were less advanced than the lonians. They pre- ponderated at Crotona, at Tarentum, and in the Sicilian republics, until the middle of the fifth century, when the victorious democracy partly expelled them. The exiles repaired to Thebes or to Athens. Here their influence counteracted that of the Sophists, and brought about the spiritualistic reaction of Socrates and Plato against the materialism and scepticism which had, in the same epoch, been imported from Sicily, Tlrrace, and Ionia. Ionian metaphysics springs from physics ; Pythago- rean metaphysics is grafted on mathematics, and is conse- quently totally different from the former at the very outset. What interests the philosophers of Miletus is matter and its concerning the person and life of Pythagoras, would tend to confirm the hypothesis of the identity of Pythagoreanism aiid Buddhism. However, the existence of Pythagoras, the mathematician, five centu- ries before the Christian era, is placed beyond doubt by the testimony of Heraclitus, Herodotus, etc. Furthermore, Buddhism in the form of Manichseism (that is to say, monachism) did not begin to spread westward before the third century of our era. We may perhaps ex- plain everything satisfactorily by distinguishing between the Pytha- goreanism of the Neo-Platonic historians and primitive and genuine Pythagoreanism. The biographers of Pythagoras were without exact and sufficient data regarding the life and work of the sage of Samos, and somewhat unscrupulous, besides, in the choice of their sources. They likewise allowed themselves to be misled by certain analogies ; the essential features of their imaginary portrait are derived from Persian dualism and Hindoo pessimism. 1 These sciences, which constituted the subject-matter of P}i;hago- rean instruction, were called nadfjfiara, — the term from which the word mathematics is derived. The original meaning of the word embraces the totality of human knowledge. 40 GREEK PHILOSOPHY perpetual movement ; what impresses Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans is the immaterial in matter, the order which prevails in the world, the unity, proportion, and harmony in its contrasts, the mathematical relations underlying all things. In geometry, in astronomy, and in music, every- thing is ultimately reduced to number. Hence number is the principle and innermost essence of the world; and things arc sensible numbers. Every being represents a number, and the final goal of science is to find for each being the number for wliich it stands. The infinite series of numbers, and consequently of things, is derived from unity. As number is the essence of things, unity is the essence of n-^^^iber. Pythagoreanism distinguishes two kinds of unities : (1) the Unity from which the series of numbers (beings) is derived, and which therefore contains and comprehends them all; the absolute and unopposed unity, the Monad of monads Q-q /xom?), the God of gods : and (2) the One, the first in the series of derived number? which is opposed to the numbers tivo^ ikrce^ and every plu rality (^ttXtjOo^}^ and consequently limited by the two, the three, and the plurality; it is a relative unity, a created monad (to ev). The opposition between the one and the J many is the source of all the rest. All the contrasts of nature, the dry and the moist, the warm and the cold, the clear and the obscure, the male and the female, the good and the evil, the finite {ireirepao-fievov) and the infinite {aireipov)^ are but varieties of the ev and the ttXy^Oo^^ or of the odd {Treptrrov} and the even {apnov). Plurality as such is without consistency and may be divided into unities; the even number is reducible to the odd unit. The absolute unity is neither even nor odd ; or rather, it is as yet both even and odd, singular and plural, God and the world. It is to Pythagoreanism what the aireipov is in the system of Anaximander: the neuter being that is superior and anterior to sexual contrasts, the absolute THE PYTHAGOREAN SPECULATION 41 indifference which precedes and creates the dualism of forces and elements. But the Pythagoreans guard against calling it aTretpov^ since the airetpov is, according to them, opposed to the irepaivov^ as passivity to activity, or matter to the workman, or form, or plastic principle. Inasmuch as everything is, according to them, reduced to number, nu- merical relations, and ultimately to Idea, the matter and motion of the lonians are, in their opinion, merely negative, the absence of ideal unity. Concerning the question of movement and origin, the conclusions of the Pythagoreans do not differ from the Eleatic doctrines. Movement and origin seem to be incompatible with their idealism. Al- though they have their own cosmogony .^jlike the other schools of the period, they do not assume that the universe had a beginning in time, and consequently that there was a time when the vuiiverse did not exist. The world has existed e| alcovo^ /cal ek alcova^ and the cosmogony simply aims to explain the order, law, or series, according to which things eternally emanate from their principle. Pythagorean physics therefore accommodates itself to human sensualism^ just like the physics of Parmenides. It makes what is in itself immutable, variable. It places itself on the sensualistic standpoint held by the novices among its followers {aKovafMarcKoi), and represents the eternal unity as a sphere {rj rod iravro^ a(f)alpa)^ as a compact sphere, in which the parts are not distinguished (TrXrjpe^, cruz/e^e?), and which floats in the infinite {airetpov). The ideal opposi- tion between the even and the odd, the one and the many, becomes the real opposition of the full and the void. At the origin of things, the full was without the void, or, at least, the void was external to it. The formation of the cosmos begins by the void breaking in upon the full. This process is like a perpetual breath which agitates the world {irvoTj^ irvev^ia). The void penetrates the a(^alpa and establishes itself in it, thereby breaking it up into an 42 GREEK PHILOSOPHY infmifce number of infinitesimal particles, reduced images of the a(j)aipa (the drofjua of the atomists). Since, from the geometrical point of view, quality is reduced to quantity and form, these particles differ only in quantity and in figure. They form either cubes or pyramids (tetrahedrons) or octahedrrs vofii^ovatv 01 EXXr/i/fy • ov8ev yap XPW^ ovbe yiveraL ovhe anoWvTai aXX' aivh iovTdiv ^prjfxdTcov crvpplayeTai re Ka\ dtaKpiverat. Koi ovtohs av opdat taXoicv ru T( yiVfcrSai. wpplaytaOai. Ka\ to OTroXXucr^ai dia 2. Akchelaus.'^ — Archelaus of \thens, or, according to others, of Miletus, is a disciple of Anaxagoras. He ad- heres to his teacher's atomism, but protests against the dualistic interpretation of his system. Tbo ^>ov<; ^^ a sepa- rate thing like water, gold, and iron. 1. differs from these substances as these substances diifer among themselves. Gold is not iron, but iron and gold are both matter. So, too, mind, though neither gold nor iron, is, nevertheless, ^ MuUach, p. 254. [Ritter and Preller, p. 173.] 2 Diog. L., II. ; Simpl., In Arist. Phjs., fol. 6 ; [Ri pp. 178 ; MuUach, I,, pp. 257 if. ; Burnet, pp. 367 ff.] THE ATOMISTS 55 material ; it is the finest, the most subtle, the most intan- gible substance, without, however, being a simj^le thing. A simple substance is a substance that is composed of nothing, and consequently does not exist. Matter and substance are, therefore, synonymous terms. 3. The ATO]vnsTS. — That is also, on the whole, the teaching of Leucippus and his disciple, Democritus of Abdera, in Thrace, the most learned of the Ionian physi- cists and the head of the ancient and modern materialistic ^ school (420 B.C.). His numerous writings have been lost, but important fragments remain. Besides, direct sources being wanting, we may refer to the exposition of atomistic principles in the poem of Lucre tins. ^ The somewhat vague doctrines of Anaximenes, Dio-~ genes, and Anaxagoras, on the nature and organization of matter, are clearly formulated by Democritus.^ With Anaximenes and Diogenes, he affirms the homogeneity of all bodies; but, with Anaxagoras, he conceives this indeterminate matter as divided into an infinite num- ber of infinitely small molecules, which come together and separate. In that way bodies are formed and destroyed. These molecules are infinite in number and indivisible 1 We say materialistic, and not atomistic. For atomism is as old as Anaxagoras and his theory of the xP^Ma^-a aireipa Ka\ irX^jdos koi a-ynKpo- TTjTa, in fact if not in name. 2 [De natura rerum, ed. by Lachmann (1850), Bernays (1852), Munro, with Eng. tr. (1886). See Masson, The Atomic Theory of Lucretius, London, 1884. — Tr.] 8 Aristotle, Met., I., 4; De coelo, III., 2; De anima, I., 2; Sext. Emp., Adv. math., YIL, 135; Diog. L., IX.; Lucretius, De reriim natura ; Clem, of Alex., Stromateis ; Mullach, L, pp. 330 ff. ; Ritter and Preller, pp. 154 ff. ; [Liard, De Democrito philo.^opho, Paris, 1873; Brieger, Die Urhewegung der Atome, Halle, 1884; Xatorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des ErTcenntnissprohlems im Alterthum, Berlin, 1884; Liepmann, Die Mechanik der Leucipp-Demokritschen A tome, Leipsic, 1885; Hart, Zur Seelen- und Erkenntnisslehre des 7)e/«o^-n7, Miilhausen 1886 ; Natorp, Die Ethika des Demokritos, Marburg, 1893. — Tr.]. 56 GREEK PHILOSOPHY (aTOfia)^ without, however, being mathematical points, for an unextended thing would be nothing. They are identi- cal in chemical quality (to yevo^ eV), but differ in size (lx€yedo<;) and form (o-;j^^/>ta). They are endowed with per- petual motion, which they do not receive from a tran- scendent principle, but which belongs to their essence. The force which moves them acts according to necessity (Ka9^ eljJLapfJievr] utt' avdy/crj^;)^ and not, as Anaxagoras seems to think, according to design (vov^) and purpose (reXo?). Democritus rejects all teleology, but denies chance also, though he sometimes employs the word rvxv in the sense of necessity {avdyKrj). According to him, the word " chance " merely expresses man's ignorance of the real causes of phenomena. Nothing in nature happens without cause ; all things have their reason and necessity.^ The Eleatics denied the void and consequently motion. To assume movement is equivalent to affirming the void {to Kevov). If there were no void, the atoms could not even be distinguished from one another; that is to say, they could not exist. Hence the void is the indispensable condition of their existence. It is also the condition of movement, and therefore as important in the formation of things as the full {to irXripe^). The void is, as it were, a second principle, which is added to the matter of material- ism, and gives the system of Democritus the dualistic turn which the most consistent monistic philosophies have not been able wholly to avoid. The void of Democritus meets us under the name of aireipov in Pythagoras ; it is the fjiri 6v of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, the negativity of Campanella and of Hegel. Democritus regards it as the condition of motion and of matter ; the idealists regard it as the condition of the dialectical movement of thought. The perpetual motion {atBio^ Kivrjo-i^) produces a whirl' ^ Stobseus, Eel. phys., p. 160 ; MuUach, p. 365 : Ovdh XPW^ [xdrr]! yivfua, aXKa iravra €K \6yov Kai vn dvdyKrjs. THE ATOMISTS 67 ing movement (hlvo^) among the atoms, in consequence of which they are combined according to their external affin- ities, — that is, according to size and form ; for since they are all chemically the same, they neither attract nor repel each other. The heaviest atoms naturally move down- wards in infinite space, while the lightest form the atmos- phere. Some atoms have uneven, rough, sharp, or hooked surfaces. These catch hold of each other and form acid or bitter substances ; while atoms with smooth surfaces form substances which impress the senses agreeably. The soul consists of the finest, smoothest, and therefore most nimble atoms. When such atoms exist in isolation, or are mixed together in small quantities, the soul-atoms are insensible ; when they are joined together in large masses, they acquire the faculty of sensation. They are scattered over the en- tire body, but gathered together more numerously in the sense-organs, where sensation is produced : in the brain, the seat of thought ; in the heart, the seat of the affections ; and in the liver, thf seat of desire. Sensation and perception are explained as follows : Effluences (aTroppotat) go forth from all bodies and enter our organs of sense, where they excite sensation, and the brain, where they produce ideas or images of tilings (ecBcoXa). Sensation is the only source of knowledge, and there is! . nothing in thought that has not passed tln^ough the channel * of the senses. Our ideas represent our impressions, that is, the relations existing between ourselves and the external world; they are not direct reproductions of the objects themselves, the inner essence of which is concealed from us. We ctre self-conscious as long as the soul-atoms remain intact in the body ; sleep ensues, and with it loss of con- sciousness, when a certain number of atoms escape ; when nearly all of them escape, and but a few remain, we fall into a state of seeming death; and, finally, when all the psychical atoms are separated, from, the body at once, we 68 GREEK PHILOSOPHY die. Death cannot destroy these atoms, because the atom is indivisible and therefore indestructible ; it destroys their temporary union in a body, and, consequently, the individ- uality formed by such a union. Since feeling does not belong to isolated atoms, but is produced only b}^ a combin- ation of atoms in the brain and in other organs, death puts an end to feeling and destroys the personality. The gods are more powerful beings than man, but their immortality is not absolute. Since they are composed of atoms, like mortals, they eventually succumb to the com- mon fate of all, though they live longer than human beings. In the eternal universe, no one has any absolute privileges. Since the gods are more powerful and wiser than ourselves, we should venerate them. We may assume that they come into relation with us, — in dreams for example; but we should free ourselves from all superstitious fears concern- ing them, and not forget that above these beings, however powerful they may be, there is one still more powerful than they, — Necessity, the supreme, impersonal, and impartial law which governs the heavens and the earth. To this law, which nature imposes upon all beings alike, we must submit with joyous hearts. Our happiness depends upon it.^ Atomistic materialism culminates in scepticism in Pro- tagoras of Abdera, the philosophy of Heraclitus in Cratylus, and the Eleatic doctrine in Gorgias. This period forms a fruitful crisis in the history of Greek philosophy. Though temporarily discouraged by the examination of her resources for knowing the truth, philosophy emerged from the dark- ness, strengthened and exalted, conscious of her powers, and enriched by a series of studies that had, until then, never been pursued; I mean the intellectual and moral sciences. 1 See Burchard, Fragmente der Moral des Ahderiten DemoTcrituSy Minden, 1834. For the points of contact between Democritus and modern positivism, see Aristotle, Phys., VIII., J, 27. SECOND PERIOD AGE OF CRITICISM OR PHILOSOPHY OF MJKD § 13. Protagoras ■ Protagoras,^ a fellow-countryman and friend of Demo- critus, acquired fame tlirough the eloquent lectures which he delivered in Sicily and at Athens. He was no longer a (j)L\6ao(f)o^, but a aoiaTri<^^ that is, a teacher of philosophy who received pay for his lessons. His exam23le was fol- lowed by a number of talented men, who undertook to acquaint the educated public with the conceptions of the philosophers, which had hitherto been restricted to the narrow confines of the schools. The laxness of their moral princixDles and their unbelief in polytheism caused these clever popularizers of knowledge to be stigmatized as Sophists. Their work, however, ranks in importance with that of the Humanists and Encyclopedists. Pampered as he was by the cultured, wealthy, and sceptical youths of the age, but detested by the common people, who remained pas- 1 The Thecefetus of Plato ; Diog. L., IX. ; Sext. Emp., Hypotyp., I., 217; Adv. math., VII.; [Mullach, vol. II., Iviii., pp. 130 ff.] ; Ritter and Preller, pp. 183 ff. ; Vitringa, De Protagorce vita et philosophia, Groenhigen, 1852 ; [Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkennt- nissproblems (see above, page 55) ; Harpf, Die Ethik des Protagoras, Heidelberg, 1884. For the Sophists in general, see Grote, History of Greece, vol. VIII. ; Hegel ; Hermann, Geschichte und System der plato- nischen Philosophie, pp. 179 ff., 296 ff. ; J. Geel, Historia critica sophista- rum, etc., Utrecht, 1823 ; Valat, Essai historique sur les sophistes grecs (Investigateur, Paris, 1859) ; Schanz, Beitrdge zur vorsokrafischen Philo- sophie, I.; Die Sophisten, Gottingen, 1867; Blass, Die attische Beredsam- keitvon Gorgias bis zu Lysias, Leipsic, 1868; H. Sidgwick, The Sophists {Journal of Philology, IV., 1872, pp. 288-306 ; V., 1873, pp. 66-80) ; Siebeck Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen (I. : Ueber So krates' Verhaltniss zur Sophistik), 2d ed., Freiburg, 1888. — Tr.]. 60 GREEK PHILOSOPHY sionately attached to the religion of their forefathers, Pro« tagoras, like his contemporaries Anaxagoras and Socrates, fell a victim to the fanaticism of the masses and the hypocrisy of the great. He was banished, and his writings burned in the market-place (411). We may assign as the immediate cause of his condemnation, the doubts which he expressed concerning the existence of the gods in his book irepl decov. The scepticism of Protagoras represents the conclusion of a syllogism of wliich the Trdvra pel ,of Heraclitus forms the major, and the sensualism of Democritus, the minor premise. The sensible world is a perpetual metamorphosis ; the senses show only the things that pass away ; they do not reveal the immutable, necessary, and universal. Hence, if we would know the truth, we must derive it from a better source than our deceptive senses ; we must appeal to reflection, to reason. But, according to Democritus, reflection is simply the continuation of sensation, from which it does not essentially differ. Consequently, if. sen- sation is changeable, uncertain, and illusory, and is at th' same time the only source of knowledge, it necessaril\y follows that all knowledge is uncertain. No one knows a,nything but his own sensations. Things that are not given to us in sensation do not exist for ns. Whatever we feel exists /c?' us. Since the atoms of Democritus are not perceived by the senses, they are merely hypotheses without any real value, and the importance which the philosopher attaches to them is inconsistent with his doctrine. The same may be said of the germs of Anaxagoras, the elements of Empedocles, the principles of the school of Miletus; they are all purely hypothetical theories, and cannot be demonstrated. There is no truth for man except in what he perceives, feels, and experiences. And as sensations differ for different individuals, a thing seeming green to one and blue to another, large to one and small to another, PROTAGORAS 61 it follows that there are as many truths as individuals; that the individual is the measure of the true and the false (ttcivtcov '^prj/jLciTcov fierpov dv6p(07ro but apparent and on the surface. The moral ideas lie concealed and slumbering, as it were, be- neath individual prejudices. We have oiily to remove this SOCRATES 67 superficial layer by means of education, in order to dis< cover in all the same ideas and the same aspirations towards goodness, beauty, justice, and truth. Socrates' merit, therefore, consists in having attempted, at least in morals, to separate the general from the particu- lar ; in having advanced from the individual to the univer- sal ; in having again discovered, beneath the infinite variety of men^ the one unchangeable man. Beneath the confused mass of opinions held by a demoralized century, he finds the true and immutable ojnnimi^. the conscience of the human race, the hiw of minds.^ Hence Socrates not only rendered a service to ethics, he benefited metaphysics as well. In the midst of intellectual anarchy, he teaches thought how to infer and define, and helps to put an end to the confusion of ideas by giving words their exact meaning.2 Thus, as long as there is no exact definition of the notion of God, a man has as much right to espouse atheism as theism : theism, if by God is meant the one indivisible Providence that governs the world ; atheism, if we mean those antln^opomorphic beings with whom the Greek imagination peopled the Olympus. The main thing, therefore, is to come to some agreement as to the terms ; and to this end we must define them exactly, — an art in which Socrates excelled. He was, says Xenophon,^ untir- ing in his efforts to examine and define goodness and wick- edness, justice and injustice, wisdom and folly, courage and cowardice, the State and the citizen. He did not offer his definitions to his hearers ready-made. He differed from the sensualist Protagoras in his conviction that moral ideas are fundamental to humanity, that every human mind is big with truths that education creates nothing that is not already there, but merely awakens and develops the latent ^ The Koti/os Xoyo? of Heraclitus. 2 Aristotle, Met., L, 6; XIII., 4, 8-9, 35; Top., L, 12. « M^m., I., 1, 16. 68 GREEK PHILOSOPHY germs of knowledge. He contented himself with being a spiritual midwife, and his chief delight lay in teaching his hearers how to discover the true definitions for themselves. A better teacher never lived. Pie practised his art, which he loved to compare with that of his mother,^ in the public places, on the walks, and in the work-shops ; wherever he found an intelligent face before him. He was in the habit of plying those whom chance made his pupils with questions, — questions that were often trifling in their nature. He began by chiming in with their views. Then, by means of the most skilful questioning, he gradually forced them to confess that they knew little or nothing, and, finally, brought them to see the truth. The dialogues of Plato give us an insight into the famous dialectical method, which enabled Socrates to confound the learned pretensions of his interlocutors, and which has been called the Socratic irony. Though Socrates sought to enlighten men, to teach them how to think correctly and to know the truth, his object was not to make them learned, but to make them happy and useful citizens.^ Ever since the days of Socra- tes, philosophy has regarded it as her prerogative to take the place of religion, morality, and positive faith, in the absence of a universally recognized official religion. This accounts for the peculiar character of the Socratic and post-Socratic schools, which are as much religious brother- hoods as learned schools. For Socrates, who is, to a cer- tain extent, a national thinker, a full-fledged Athenian, and for whom actual life has greater charms than abstract theory, wisdom or knowledge is not the goal ; it is the means, the indispensable means, of right living, as essential to the private individual as to the citizen and statesman. The intimate relation which exists between knowledge and 1 Plato, Theceteius, 149 A, 151. Mem. IV., 7, 1. 2 Mem., L, 1, 11; Aristotle, Met, L, 6; XIII., 4; De part, anim., L, 1, 642 ; Cicero, Tuseul, V., 4. SOCRATES 69 will constitutes the fundamental principle and, in a meas- ure, the very soul of his philosophy. The essential thought is that the more a man tliinks and kno^Ys, the better will he act ; that our moral value is directly proportional to our lights. From this principle the other characteristic propo- sitions of his philosophy necessarily follow, namely : that virtue is teachable ; that it is onc^ which means that we cannot be virtuous in one thing without being so in all things, or vicious in one without being so in all ; finally, that no one is voluntarily bad ; that evil is the fruit of ignorance.^ The ethical system of Socrates is a mean between the idealism of Pythagoras and the realism that is inseparable from the sensationalistic and materialistic trend of the Ionian schools. It aims at the ideal, but it loves to express this ideal in sensible forms, to reflect moral beauty in physical beauty. Socrates is far from being an ascetic : he strives to subdue nature, to make it the instrument of intelli- gence, to rule over it as an absolute master ; but he never dreams of suppressing it.- He is a Grecian and an Athen- ian above everything else, and so sensitive to external charms and physical beauty that he feels himself obliged to wage constant Avar with the allurements of matter. He agrees with his predecessors on religious matters in that he repudiates mythology and its fables, without, how- ever, being a free-thinker in the modern sense. His spirit- ualistic faith is not even devoid of superstition. He believes in the supernatural, in superior beings who wataL over nations and inspire individuals (SaifiovLa). But he strongly emphasizes the universality of Providence, and thereby attacks the particularism of the Athenians, thus paving the way for the notion of the universal brotherhood of man, taught by Stoicism and Christianity.^ 1 Me7n., m. 9 ; lY., 6 ; Arist., Eth. Nic, III., 1 ; VL, 18. 2 Plato, Sijmposium, 176, 214, 220. « 3fm.,I.,4, 18; IV., 13, 13. 70 GREEK PHILOSOPHY In short, the founder of Attic philosophy is very much inferior, as a theorist, to his modern antitype, Emanuel Kant. Owing to his heroic death, his importance, though great, was overrated at the expense of that of his pre- decessors, who were philosophers of the highest order. But he is, nevertheless, one of those reformers whose sojourn on earth has been productive of lasting and fruitful re- sults. His great work consists in having given to con- science the honored place which it deserves, in having reinstated the absolute, immutable, and universal. At a time when men publicly declared that good and evil are relative, and that the rule for judging an act is not the '' changing " law of conscience, but its success, he had the courage to proclaim the authority of a conscience that merely varies in appearance, and the superiority of the moral law over individual caprice. Now, to maintain the absoluteness of morality meant the reform of philosophy as well as that of morals. For, in spite of what indepen- de7it moralists may say, human thought cannot, without contradiction, affirm the absolute in practice and yet deny it in theory. Of the many disciples of the new school, some, like Aristippus and Antisthenes, develop the ethical teachings of Socrates in opposition to the metaphysical speculations of the old schools ; others, like Euclides and Plato, unite the Socratic conception of the highest good and the Eleatic notion of the absolute, the end of the moralists and the first cause of the metaphysicians, and thereby re-establish the union between the philosophy of morals and the philosophy of nature, which had been dissolved by scepticism. AEISTIPPUS, ANTISTHENES, EUCLIDES 71 § 15. Aristippus and Hedonism. — Antisthenes and Cynicism. Euclides and the School of Megara 1. Aeistippus of Cyrene ^ was a sensualistic Sophist before joining the Socratics, and adhered to the theoretical teachings of that school. With Protagoras, he maintains that all our knowledge is subjective, and that we cannot know what things are in themselves. He sharply dis- tinguishes between the object of knowledge and Kant's thing-in-itsdf^ that is, the external and absolutely unknown cause of our sensations (to i/jLTroLrjnfcov rod irdOov^^? His ethics, too, is more in accord with the principles of Pro- tagoras than those of Socrates. Pleasure (jjhovrf) is, ac- cording 4q him, the ultimate aim of life. Hence the name (^hedonis7Jji is applied to his doctrine, which must not, how- eveiy^e interpreted as a coarse sensualism. He is a follower of Socrates and his moral principles on this important point, and demands, above all, moderation in indulgence, rational self-command in presence of the allurements of sense, and intelligent control of the vulgar instincts of our nature. We must, he said, remain masters of ourselves under all circumstances, so that we may say : ex(o ovk exoiJiat^ or, as the Latin poet translates the maxim of Aristippus : — — Mihi res non me rebus suhjunr/ere conor? Mental pleasures, friendship, paternal and filial love, art and literature, take precedence, in the scale of enjoyments, over fleeting sensuous feelings ; and the wise man should particularly seek, not the pleasures of the moment, but 1 Diog. L., XL; Sext. Emp., .4^/y. matli., VII., 191-192; [Kitter and Preller, pp. 207 ff.-, Miillach, II., 397 iT- ; AVendt, De pUlosoplda Cyrenak:a^ Gottingerr, 1841. — Tr.] ; H. v. Stein, De philosophia Cyrenaisa, Gottingen, 1855; [Watson, Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer, New York, 1895J. 2 Sext. Emp., Adv. math., YIL, 191. • Horace, Epistles, I., 1^ 17. 72 GREEK PHILOSOPHY lasting joys, a permanent state of moral content (xa/3a, evBacjjLovLa), Moreover, Aristippus and liis adherents agree with the Sophists that all action has for its motive the desire to be happy, and for its end the pleasure which the act procures. They likewise agree with Protagoras in religion. The hedonists were outspoken freethinkers, and helped to demolish the remnants of the polytheistic faith among the educated classes. In a work entitled The Gods, Theodorus of Cyrene, called the Atheist,^ openly espoused atheism; another hedonist, Euhemerus,^ held, in a sensa- tional treatise (lepa avaypa(f>7] ^), that the gods were heroes, kings, and distinguished men who had been deified after their death. This theory proved very acceptable to a great number of Romans, and even Cliristians, who rejoiced at having paganism furnish them with such powerful weapons against itself. However narrow this view may seem, it has the merit of being one of the first attempts at a science which it has been left to our age to study and develop : I mean the philosophy of religion. Hedonism passes through a process of evolution which may, at first sight, seem surprising, but which is no more than natural ; it changes into pessimism in the philosophy of Hegesias,* called ireiaiOdvaTo^ (" persuader to die "). This evolution was the logical outcome of the hedonistic principle. The aim of life is, according to the Cyrenaic school, pleasure; the sensation of the moment (yhovrj iv KLvrjaei), according to some, permanent pleasure or happi- ness (%a/3ct, evSaLjjLovLa), according to others. Now experi- ence proves that life affords more pain than pleasure, and 1 About 310 B. c. ; a contemporary and protege of Demetrius of Phalerus and of Ptolemy I. [Fragments of the Cyi'enaics in MuUach, II., pp. 397 ff . ; Ritter and Preller, 207 ff. — TrT] 2 About 310 B. c. 3 Fragments preserved by Diodorus and Eusebius. * A contemporary of Ptolemy I. ARISTIPPUS, ANTISTHENES, EUCLIDES 73 that unalloyed happiness is a dream. Hence the end of life is not and cannot be realized. Life, therefore, has no value. As a consequence, death is preferable to life ; for death at least procures for us the only happiness possible to human beings, a negative happiness consisting in the absolute suppression of j^ain.^ This is the way in which Hegesias reasons, and all must reason who regard pleasure, joy, or happiness as the only end of life (reXo^). Life has real value only for such as recognize a higher aim, namely, moral goodness, the performance of duty, virtue for virtue's sake ; in other words, life has value only for him who con- siders it as a means and not as an end in itself, that is, in short, for the idealist. For him, virtue is the highest good. Now virtue can be realized only by living beings. Hence life itself, being the means and indisj^ensable condition of virtue or of the highest good, is a relative good, and not the summum homcm. Hence moral idealism necessarily ex- cludes pessimism. The hedonistic school, which again becomes optimistic in Anniceris of Cyrene,^ is continued by the school of Epi- curus,-^ who supplements the ethics of Aristippus with the physics of Democritus. 2. Antisthenes.* — The idealistic teachings of Socrates are reproduced and exaggerated by Antisthenes of Athens, the founder of the. Cynic school. The school was named after the gymnasium~of~^2/7ios«?'^gs, Avhere Antisthenes delivered his lectures. Its motto is : Virtue for virtue's sake ; Virtue is the final and only goal of all our actions ; 1 Cicero, Tusc, I., 34 : A malia mors abducit. 2 About 300 B. c. See Diog. L., II., 93 ff. 8 §19. ^ Diog. L., VI. ; [for A. and his school, see also, IVIullach, II., pp. 261 ff. ; Hitter and PreUer, pp. 216 ff. ; Duemmler, Antisthenica, Halle, 1882. — Tr.] 74 GREEK PHILOSOPHY Virtue is the highest good. The Cynics, his successors, go so far in their enthusiasm as to proclaim the doctrine that pleasure is an evil ; that man cannot be virtuous unless he renounces all material and even intellectual pleasures ; they even reject mental culture and philosophy itself as evils. Despising, as they did, the pleasures of social life, they came to violate the simplest rules of politeness, and, in principle at least, rebelled against the laws themselves. For a life of refinement and civilization these '^ Rousseaus of antiquity " substitute the state of nature ; cosmoj)olitanism takes the place of patriotism. The principle of individual autonomy, which had been proclaimed by the Sophists and by Socrates, passes from theory into practice. Not all the Cynics, however, are radicals. We must make allowances in the well-known history of Diogenes of Sinope,^ the dis- ciple of Antisthenes, for popular malice, which naturally goes to extremes, and is apt to culminate in caricature. The moral idealism of Antisthenes, which was disfigured by the exaggerations of some of the Cynic philosophers, reap- peared in a new and purer form in the doctrines of Zeno and the Stoics, x 3. EucLrDES,2 the founder of the school of Megara, made the first attempt to give the ethical system of the master a metaphysical support, which he finds in the phil- osophy of the Eleatics. He accepts the teaching of Par- menides that being is one, and the Socratic notion concern- ing the reality of the vov<; and of moral principles. From these premises he boldly draws the conclusion, which was again advanced by Fichte in modern times, that mind or goodness is being, the only absolutely-existing being. All ^ [Goettling., Diogenes der Kyniker oder die Philosophie des grieschi- tchen Proletariats (Gescliichtl. Abhancllgn., vol. I.), Halle, 1851. — Tr.] 2 Diog. L., II. [Hitter and Preller, pp. 223 ff . ; MaUet, Histoire d$ Veeole de M^arej etc., Paris, 1845. — Tr.] PLATO 75 we know of Euclides is summed up in this sentence. But this alone assures him a distinguished place among the Attic philosophers ; his system forms the connecting link betw^een Socrates and Plato. The school of Megara, which StiljDO ^ made famous, and that of Elis, which was founded by Phaedo,^ the favorite pupil of Socrates, devoted themselves to the development of eristic dialectics, but soon found themselves eclipsed by the schools of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Zeno. During the first period, philosophical interest was cen- tered upon nature and the problem of becoming. S^^ec- ulative Socraticism inaugurates the era of the philosophy of mind, which predominates in the- second X^eriod, and in turn becomes (A) idealism, (B) materialism and eudee- monism, and (C) concrete spiritualism, according as it re- gards as the essence and highest aim of our being, thought (Plato and Aristotle), sensation (Epicurus), or voluntary action (Stoicism). A. Negation of Matter. Apotheosis of Thought § 16. Plato Plato of Athens was born of a noble f amity, about 427. He received his first instruction from Cratylus, the disciple of Heraclitus, then became a pupil of Socrates, and later of Euclides of Megara, who introduced him to the study of Parmenides. The mathematical speculations of the Pytha- goreans also exerted a decided influence upon the develop- ment of his thought. From 385 to the close of his life (347), he taught philosophy in the Academy, a place which was presented to him by generous friends and for centuries remained in possession of the Platonic school. 1 Diog. L., II. ; Seneca, Ep. IX. 2 Diog. L., loc. cit. 76 GREEK PHILOSOPHY It is not a matter of indifference, says a great writer,^ by which door we enter life. Socrates, the child of a family of artisans and himself an artisan during his younger days, took pleasure in mingling with the crowd whose follies he despised, and endeavored to instruct, elevate, and ennoble them. Plato, the descendant of Codrus and of Solon, was by birth predestined to become the author of the aristocratic Bepullic, tlie idealistic philosopher, for whom form is every- thing and matter a contamination, an obstacle, and a check ; the poet-prophet who will have nothing to do with vulgar reality, and whose home is in the realms of the eternal, the absolute, and the ideal ; the favorite teacher of the Fathers of the Church, the theosophists, and the mys- tics. Socrates exercises a somewhat prosy cautiousness in his thought. He is not willing to take any risks, he avoids hypothesis and the unknown. The philosophy of Plato is conspicuous for its bold imprudence, its love of adventure and mystery. His speculation is not like the Philistine whose life is spent in the market-place or in the workshop, and whose world is measured by the narrow boundaries of his native town ; it is the lord of the manor, who retires to his mansion, after having seen the world, and turns his gaze towards the distant horizon ; disdaining the noise of the cross-roads, he mingles only in the best society, where is heard the most elegant, the noblest, and the loftiest language that has ever been spoken in the home of the Muses. Plato is the oldest Greek philosopher whose writings have been preserved, and the only one of whom we possess the complete works.^ Of the treatises attributed to him by 1 Goethe. ' The principal modern editions of Plato's Complete Works: The Bipontine edition, Zweibriicken, 1781-87 ; Tauchnitz, Leipsic, 1813 ff. ; Bekker, Berlin, 1816-23, London, 1826; F. Ast, Leipsic, 1819-32; Stallbaum, Leipsic, 1821 ff. ; Baiter, Orelli, and Winckelmann, Zurich, PLATO 77 tradition some are surely spurious; others, like the Par^ meiiides^ the Sophist y the Cratylus^ and the Philebus, are of doubtful origin. Criticism has also, but without just grounds, questioned the authorship of the Apology and the Crito. The writings whose genuineness is beyond doubt are nine in number, namely: (1) The Phcedrus^ which opposes the selfish rhetoric of the Sopliists with the true eloquence of the philosopher, whose chief object is the knowledge of the invisible world; (2) the Protagoras^ or the Socratic doctrine of virtue ; (3) the Symposium^ or con- cerning the different manifestations of the eros^ from sensual love to the philosopliical love of beauty, truth, and good- ness, as this was personified in Socrates ; (4) the Gorgias^ the true sage as opposed to the Sophist; (5) the Repuhlic^, or concerning the State which realizes the idea of justice : (6) the Timceus^ or concerning the nature and origin of the 1839-42 ; Ch. Schneider (Greek and Latin), Paris, 1846-56 ff. ; K. F- Hermann, Leipsic, 1851-53 ; [Schanz, Leipsic, 1875 ff. Ritter and Preller, pp. 233 ff.]. [The Dialogues of Plato. Translated into English, tvith Analyses and Introductions, by B. Jowett, 4 vols., Oxford, 1871 ; 3d ed. revised and corrected, 5 vols., New York and London, 1892 ; Platons Werke, Ger- man transl. by Schleiermacher, 3d ed., Berlin, 1855-62 ; also by H. Miiller, 8 vols., Leipsic, 1850-66. — Tr.] ; Plato's Works, French transl. by V. Cousin, 8 vols., Paris, 1825-40. For Plato and his writings, consult : [Ast, Platons Lehen und Schriften, Leipsic, 1816 ; K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie, Heidelberg, 1839] ; Grote, Plato and the other Companions of Socrates, 3 vols., London, 1865 [new ed. 1885], also the same author's History of Greece ; Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlung del platonischen Schriflen, Bonn, 1866 ; Fouillee, La philosophie de Platon. Exposition, histoire, et critique de la the'orie des ide'es, 2d ed., Paris, 1888-89; [Chaignet, La vie et les ecrits de Platon, Paris, 1871 ; Be'nard, Platon. Sa philosophie, precede'e d'un apergu de sa vie et de ses ecrits, Paris, 1892; Huit, La vie et Voeuvre de Platon, 2 vols., Paris, 1893 ; Pater, Plato and Platonism, New York and London, 1893; Van Oordt, Plato and his Times, Oxford and the Hague, 1895 ; B. Bosanquet, .4 Companion to Plato's RepuhliCf New York, 1895]. 78 GREEK PHILOSOPHY world ; (7) the Thecetetus^ or concerning khowledge and Ideas ; (8) the Phoedo^ or concerning the immortality of the soul ; (9) the Laws^ a work which seems to be a partial retraction of the Republic. These treatises are dialogues.^ Socrates is the chief spokesman in the majority of them, and his speeches reflect the author's thought most faith- fully. His use of the dialogue-form enables Plato to present us with his own philosophy as well as with the his- tory of its origin, or the manner in which it arose among the Socratics. It is true, the dialogue-form may perhaps be objected to on the ground that it hinders us from ob- taining a comprehensive view of the author's philosophy ; indeed, the statement has been made that it is so difficult to systematize Plato's teachings because of his use of the dialogue. The reverse seems to be the case ; in our opin- ion Plato employs this form precisely because he has no finished system like Plotinus, Spinoza, and Hegel. The dialogue might be regarded as an unsuitable method of exposition in case it concealed the philosopher's thoughts. But it hides nothing ; form and content are here the same, and the dialogues of Plato present his philosophy in its psychological development.^ A real difficulty, however, arises from the frequent use of myths and allegories. Plato employs them, either in order to assist his readers in understanding abstract truths, or in order to mislead the fanatical democracy as to 1 Regarding the difficult question as to the chronological order of the dialogues of Plato, consult the Introductions of Schleiermacher, the German translator of Plato, and the investigations of Socher, Ast, K. F. Hermann, Bonitz, Zeller, Susemihl, Suckow, Munck, Ueberweg, [Schaarschmidt, Teichmiiller, and Siebeck ; also, Horn, Platonstudien, Vienna, 1893. — Tr.]. 2 Concerning the genesis of Platonism, see Karl Joel, Zur Erkennt- niss der geistigen Entioickelung und der schriftstellerischen Motive Plato*S, Berlin, 1887 (reviewed by M. Reinach in the Revue critique, Aug. 22, 1887). PLATO 79 his religious convictions,^ or, finally, in order to hide the contradictions of his thought and to escape philosophical criticism by seeking refuge in the licence of the poet. Most of the Platonic myths are mere allegories, wliich, as the author himself cautions us, must be taken for what they are worth. Some of them, however, seem to express tlie philosopher's real views. Hence the difficulty which we experience in the Timceus and the Phcedo^ of distinguish- ing clearly between the pedagogical element and the teach- ing itself, between the accidental and the essential, between the poetical symbol and the real meaning. Though Plato himself gives us an allegorical exposition of the di'ama of creation in his Timceics^ does it therefore folloAv that the idea of creation is absolutely foreign to his mind ? When he speaks of a creator and follows popular fancy in pictur- ing him as a human workman, does that mean that theism is not the essential element of his thought ? The Fhcedo, too, is full of mythological allegories, but who would have the boldness to declare, with Hegel, that Plato assumed pre-existence and immortality only for the world-soul and the divine vov^ ? We must, in choosing between the idea and the form, — a delicate and rather difficult task, — avoid two contrary conceptions, both of which our historical sense would compel us to reject. In the first place, we must not be deceived by Plato's symbolism ; we must not lay too much stress on what is but a literary form, and mistake mere figures of speech for the hidden meaning of things. But we must also abandon the notion that Plato was too great a man to be influenced in his reason by the imagi- nation. We have no right to make liim a Christian or a modern philosopher. It is undoubtedly true that Catholic mysticism borrows extensively from Platonic theology, and it is equally certain that Plato's dialectics contain the rudi- » Timceus, '28 C, 29 C-D. 80 GREEK PHILOSOPHY ments of the Hegelian system. But twenty centuries of development lie between the sowing of the seed and the full fruition, and we cannot identify the beginning and the end without anachronism. It is not enough to point out that the future is contained in the past ; we must also in- dicate in what form it is found there, and show that this is not the final stage of evolution. Plato is the product of Heraclitian, Socratic, and Italian philosophy. With the school of Heraclitus he believes that the visible universe is in a state of perpetual change, that the senses are deceptive and cannot yield us truth, that the immutable does not exist in the world of sense, but in the world of ideas. From Socrates he learned that though we cannot know the ultimate principles of the universe, we can at least know ourselves, and that we can attain to a knowl- edge of the highest good through an infallible inner sense. But Socrates remained a sceptic as far as metaphysics v^as concerned. The Italic philosophy induced Plato to take a decisive step. In the Pythagorean and Eleatic systems he finds the inner sense (of Socrates) proclaimed, not only as the moral conscience and practical reason, but as theoretical reason, capable of revealing to us the absolute, eternal, and necessary essence of things. In mathematics and its self-evident axioms he discovers the most powerful weapon against the iravra pel^ in the sense in which Cratylus and the Sophists applied the principle. Geometry made a particularly deep impres- sion upon him : the geometrical method served as a model for his metaphysics. Indeed, he even borrowed his philo- sophical vocabulary from this science. Geometry is based on a priori intuitions ; lines, triangles, circles, and spheres, are ideal figures or intelligible realities ; their properties remain the same forever, and survive all the changes of the material world which reflects them. It is a rational seience and has nothing to do with sense-perception, of PLATO 81 irliicli its truths are absolutely independent. Hence Plato's philosophy is, like mathematics^ the only self-evident and necessary science, a science of a priori intuition and rea- soning. Because of their resemblance to the principles of geometry, these a priori intuitions, upon which the sys- tem is grounded, are called Ideas (ecSr], ISeat), or unchange- able forms, or the eternal types of fleeting things, or nou- mena (voovfieva), the objects of true science (iTnarrjfn]) as distinguished from phenomena, the objects of sense-percej)- tion {aladriat^) and opinion {ho^a). The philosophy of Plato is the science of Ideas.. It is called dialectics after its new method. To this science of first principles, which is the fundamental and only science worthy of the name, is added the theory of nature {(pvaiKrj). The latter, however, is of secondary importance, and does not deserve the name of science. Ethics^ or the science of the highest good, is the last branch of dialectics and the crown of philosophy. Hence we have to consider with Plato : (1) The Idea as such ; (2) the Idea acting upon matter as a plastic principle, or nature ; and (3) the Idea as the final goal of natui-e, or the highest good. 1. The IdeaI When we compare the mother who gives up her life for her child, the warrior who dies in defence of his country, and the philosopher Avho sacrifices himself for his convic- tions, we notice a similarity in their actions ; they have the same common trait, and reproduce one and the same type, — the Idea of the good. When we compare a mas- terpiece of architecture or of sculpture with a tragedy of Sophocles and a beautiful human form, we discover in 1 For Plato's dialectics and ideology, see especially the The.cetefus (151 fe.), the Soplmt (218 ff.), the PMlehm (15, 54, 58 ff.), Parmenideh (130 ff.), and the Republic (especially books VI. and YIL). 6 82 GREEK PHILOSOPHY these apparently different objects a common trait, — beauty, or the Idea of the beautiful. When we compare the indi- viduals of a species, say the human race, we find in them a number of qualities common to all, an identical type ; these common characteristics, or the type which is repro- duced in all, constitute man-in-himself (avrodvOpcoTro^;)^ or the Idea of man. Finally, when we compare all the beings perceived by our senses, we notice that all have this in common : they exist or do not exist, they move or are at rest, they are identical or they differ from each other. Now, this bei7ig, shared by all, this non-being^ or movement, or rest, or identity, or difference, is what Plato calls the Idea of being, the Idea of movement,_etc. Hence he un- derstands by the term Ideas {ethri^ IheaC) : (1) what modern philosophy calls laius of thought, morality, or taste (ISeai) ; (2) what Aristotle calls categories, or the general forms by means of which we conceive things, and which are em- braced under the preceding class (^yevr]) ; (3) what natural science calls types, species, or, as Plato would say. Ideas (etBrj proper). In short, he means by Ideas all possible generalizations; there are as many of them as there are common names. Every common name designates an Idea, as every proper name designates an individual. The senses reveal particulars, or nartural objects; abstraction and generalization {iTraycoyrj) give us Ideas. The great mission of Socmtes Avas to form general ideas. But, like the sensationalistic school, which he opposed in other respects, Socrates simply regarded these ideas as thoughts or concepts of the mind (ivvoTj/jbara). At this point Plato shows his originality. According to sensualism, our sense-peroeptions alone represent real beings existing out- side of us. According to Plato, general notions or concepts also represent realities, and these realities, these objects of our notions, which sensualism denies, he calls Ideas. Ideas axe to our notions what natural objects are to oui' sense- PLATO 88 perceptions : they are their objective causes. The objects which the deceptive and vulgar organs of sense present to us we regard as real objects ; while the Ideas which we acquire through reason, the messenger of the gods, are looked upon by us as fleeting shadows that come and go with self-consciousness ! If we consider sensible objects as real, how much greater reason have we to assume the reality of the objects of the intellect ! The general Ideas, expressed by our concepts, Good, Being, Identity, Man, etc., are therefore realities. Hence the name realism was inaptly applied to mediaeval Platonism, which is diametri- cally opposed to modern realisin. Platonic realism is thorough-going idealism, the theory which conceives Ideas as real beings. What ! Shall we say. Ideas are real beings ; the Idea of being, more real than being ; the Idea of the sun as real and even more real than the sun which shines upon us from the heavens ; the Idea of man as real, and even much more real than Socrates, Antisthenes, and Euclides ! Com- mon-sense rebels against such paradoxes. Socrates I see, but I do not see the man-type ; I see beautiful men, beau- tiful statues, and beautiful paintings ; I do not see the beautiful as such. I see moving bodies ; I do not see motion as such, or the Idea of movement; I see living beings, but being or life in itself I cannot see anywhere. All these generalizations exist only in my mind, and have nothing real corresponding to them. Plato answers such objections by saying that when the sensualist sees beauti- ful objects and just acts, and fails to perceive beauty as such, or justice as such, it is because he has the sense for the former, while his sense for Ideas or his reason is at fault. If this were sufficiently developed, it would no longer see the real reality (jo ovrco^ 6v) in material exist- ence, but in the Ideas ; it would look for reality, not in the world of sense, but in the intelligible world. We 84 GREEK PHILOSOPHY consider general Ideas as the mental copies of sensible beings, whose reality we assume. The reverse is true; the Ideas are the models or the originals, and the natural beings or the individuals are the copies. The Ideas are both our thoughts (Koyot) and the eternal objects (ra ovra) of these thoughts ; they are the thoughts of God, which no human intelligence can wholly reproduce, but wliich are none the less real, absolutely real. Let us take the Idea of the beautiful, or beauty absolute [avTo TO Kokov). For the sensationalist, the beautiful, like the good and the just, is a quality which we abstract in thought Qahstrahere) from the sensible objects, and which does not exist apart from these objects. For Plato, the beautiful is a reality ; it is not only real, but much more real than all the beautiful things put together. Whatever endures is more lasting and therefore more real than that which passes away. Now, every beautiful object, be it a man or a statue, an act or an individual, is doomed to destruction and oblivion ; heauty in itself is imperishable. Hence it must be more real than all the things the sensationalist calls beautiful. So, too, the type of man is more real than the particular man, because it remains unchanged, while the individual passes away ; the Idea of the tree or flower is more real than a particular tree or a particular flower, because it endures. The Idea is what it expresses ; it is this ahsdlutely and without qualification ; all we can say of the sensible object is that it has something of what the Idea is, that it partakes of it {(jLerix^i), while the Idea is undivided being. Let us again inquire into the beautiful, which is Plato's favorite Idea,^ and which he loves to identify with the good. Its manifestations in the sensible world are only relatively beautiful, that is, as compared with ugly objects ; 1 Symposium^ 211ff. PLATO 85 they are not beautiful when we compare tliem with more beautiful things. They are fair to-day, foul to-morrow, fair at one place, or in one relation, or in one point of view, or to one person ; foul under different circumstances and in the judgment of other persons. Hence ever^i^hing in the world of phenomenal beauty is relative, fleeting, and uncer- tain. Ideal beauty (avro to koKov) is ever-lasting ; Avithout beginning and without end ; without diminution and with- out decay; invariable, immutable, and absolute (yttoz^oeiSe? ael 6v) ; it is beautiful in all its relations and from all points of view ; it is beautiful at all times and in all places and for all persons; it is pure and clear and unalloyed, and therefore transcends the powers of the imagination (el\L/cpLV€<;, d/jLLKTov, KaOapov). It is neither a mere notion nor purely individual knowledge [ovhe rU X0709 ovSe rk iirLarrj/jLT]')^ but an eternal reality. What is true of the beautiful is true of the great and the small, and of all Ideas in general. Simmias is tall as com- pared with Socrates, but small by the side of Phsedo. The Idea of the great is great in all points of view ; it is abso- lutely great. Hence to sum up: (1) The Ideas are real bevigs; (2) the Ideas are 7nore real than the objects of sense; (3) the Ideas are the onli/ true realities; the ob- jects of sense possess a merely borrowed existence, a reality which they receive from the Ideas. The Ideas are the eternal patterns (TrapaSeiyfMara) after, which the things of sense are made; the latter are the images (et'ScoXa), the imitations, the imperfect copies (oyLtotcoyLtara, fjLt/jLTjaeK; ^), The entire sensible world is nothing but a symbol, an allegory, or a figure of speech. The mean- ing, the Idea expressed by the thing, alone concerns the philosopher. His interest in the sensible world is like our interest in the portrait of a friend of whose living presence we are deprived. ^ Parmenides, 132 ; Timceus, 48. 86 GREEK PHILOSOPHY The world of sense is the copy of the world of Ideas; and conversely, the world of Ideas resembles its image ; it forms a hierarchy. In our visible world there is a grada- tion of beings from the most imperfect creature to the perfect, sensible being, or the universe. The same holds true of the intelligible realm or the pattern of the world ; the Ideas are joined together by means of other Ideas of a higher order ; the latter, in turn, are embraced under others still more exalted, and so on ; the Ideas constantly increase in generality and force, until we reach the top, the last, the highest, the most powerful Idea or the Good, which com- prehends, contains, or summarizes the entire system, just as the visible universe, its copy, comprehends, contains, or summarizes all creatures. The relation existing between the Ideas and the highest Idea is analogous to that exist- ing between objects of sense and Ideas. The objects, as we have said, j;«r^aZ;e of the Ideas which they express ; ^ they exist, not in themselves, but as reflections of their Ideas ; they have no reality other than that which they receive from these Ideas ; they are, in short, to these Ideas what accidents are to substances. Similarly, the Ideas of a lower order exist by themselves and as substances, only as compared to their visible copies. As compared to the highest Ideas, they cease to be substances ; they become modes of the only really ahsolute Idea, the Idea of the Good; in the presence of this sun of the intelligible world, their individuality passes away as the stars vanish at the coming of the orb of day. Hence the Ideas are both individual or self-existent atoms and members of a higher unity. Plato liimself emphasizes the principle of the unity and connection of Ideas at the expense of their individuality; his dis- ciples, on the other hand, seem to lay more stress on the i Phcedo, 100. PLATO 87 atomic and hypostatic character of the Ideas than on their unity .^ The clear and transparent Ideas of the master are, to use a figure of speech, precipitated by the school, and the Lyceum consequently censures the Academy for adding to the material world another wholly useless material world. The Ideas of Plato form a unity or an organism ; they live a common life ; and it is utterly impossible to separate them from each other and to make distinct beings of them.2 Indeed, they are independent of all time and space, that is, of the j^rinciple of separation and individuali- zation. It is true, Plato speaks of the heavens as their abode, whither we must rise in order to contemplate them in their divine purity.^ But this heaven is not a part of the physical universe. The home of the Ideas is not the same as that of the things (alo-drjro^ tottos:) ; it is sui gen- eris^ a place suitable to the nature of the Ideas, an ideal, intelligible place (votjto^; totto^) ; the home of the Ideas is mind (i^ou?), that is, the Idea as such. The Idea has no place outside of itself ; it does not, like the atoms .)f Denio- critus, exist by virtue of empty space, but by itself {avro KaO' avTQ). A prouder challenge could not be hurled at materialism : Space which you conceiv e as a condition of reality is quite the reverse ; it is the cause of non-being and impotence. The Idea is real because it is one and unextended, and because unity is force, power, or reality. Now, that which is concentrated in the Idea as in a mathe- matical point, is distributed in space and time, scat- tered over a thousand places and a thousand different moments, and consequently enfeebled, impoverished, and 1 This substantialization of the Ideas is already noticeable in the Sophist, and has been regarded by some as an argument against the genuineness of the dialogue. (See Schaarschmidt, in the work cited above.) 2 Menoy 81. » PhcBdruSy 247. 88 GREEK PHILOSOPHY relatively destroyed {{jlt) 6v). Compared with the Idea, which you regard as a poor reflection of the real world, your supposed real world is itself hut an Idea in the vulgar sense which you attach to the word, that is, a shadow, a nothing. The world is the relative; the Idea, the absolute {icad'' avro 6v). If the Idea is the absolute, what is God, to whom Plato often refers, and, as it seems, refers in different senses, sometimes using the plural, sometimes the singular? In the Timcvus,'^ the Creator (o Stj/jllovpjo^) is spoken of as the eternal God (cov ael ^eo?, 6 6e6^) ; his immediate creatures (the stars and the celestial spirits) are called deoi^ Oeol Oewv^ ovpdvLov 6eMV jevo^ ; while the sensible universe is a god in process of becoming {iaojjLevo^ Oeo^). Evidently, the god who is to he and the created divinities are accommodations to official polytheism, and the Creator is the nly true God. But even this highest God does not seem to oe absolute ; in creating the universe he contemplates the eternal (to athiov)^ which serves as his model. Now, the Idea or the Good is the eternal. Hence the Creator is deiiendent on the Idea as the copyist depends on the pattern which he follows. In order that the Creator may be the Supreme Being or the absolute, the model must b^e the Idea in itself or the Good personilied. The assumption of an intermediate principle is apparently a necessary consequence of Plato's dualism between Idea and matter, while the conception of the Demiurge as a workman following a pattern forms a part of the mythical element in the narrative ; the Creator and the pattern of creation are merged in the creative Idea, of which the Demiurge is the poetical personification. God and the Idea are so closely identified in Plato that it seems at times as though God depended on the Idea, at others, as though the Idea sprang from God as the eternal source of * Timceus, 28, 34, 41, passim. PLATO 89 all things. Since God is sometimes represented as below and sometimes as above the Idea, nothing is left to us but to take the middle ground and to say that the God of Plato is neither inferior nor superior to tlie Idea, but that he coincides with it, or that he is the Idea itself, considered as an active, plastic, and creative principle. That the Platonic school identified God with the absolute Idea may be readily inferred from the attributes which are ascribed to the Good and to the Supreme Being. A brief compari- son will suffice to convince us of this fact. The absolute Idea (the Good, the One) is the lord of the spiritual world, as the sun is the lord of the visible world.i It even exceeds being and essence in dignity and power.^ It is the uni- versal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual. On the other hand, the God of gods is represented to us as the eternal cause of the good in the world ; as the supreme wisdom, by the side of which all human philosophy is im- perfect ; as the supreme justice, law-giver, and highest law, who rules the beginning, the end, and the middle of things ; as the pure reason which has nothing to do with matter or with evil.^ Hence, there cannot be the least doubt that the God of Plato is the absolute Idea of the good. Does that mean that because his god. is an Idea he is not a reality ? On the contrary; because he is an Idea, and nothing hut an Idea., he is the highest reality ; for, from Plato's point of view, the Idea only is real. Now the Idea does not exist in space proper, but in the 1 Republic, VI, 508 D. * OvK ovaias ovtos tov dyadov aXX* eVi ineKeiva ttjs ovcrias np^o-^eia. Koi 8vvdfieL vncpe^ovTos- 2 Republic, YI, 506 ff. ; VII, 517 : navrwv avrfj (17 tov dyaOov Idea) 6p6(ov T€ Koi KoXSiV aiTia . . . ovaia ai'S^os tj)? t dyaOov 4>v(T€a>s alria ... en re opara c^coy . . . TfKovtra, iv re votjt^ ^ . . a\ri6^iaVi Koi vovv vapa(T\oii€vr). 90 GREEK PHILOSOPHY intelligence which is its natural and, in a certain sense, its native abode. It cannot, therefore, come to us from with- out,i and it is a mistake to derive it from sensation. The absolute Idea, and with it all the other Ideas, are original endowments of the mind ; they form its very essence. But they are at first latent in the mind, and we are not con- scious of them. The senses show us their external copies, and, to a certain extent, remind us of the originals existing in us {avdfivr]aL) evOevhc ifcelcre (f>evyeLv on rd'^^^Lara)^ and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible (0^7^ Be ofioiwai^ T(p 6e(p Kara to Suvutov). Now God is never in any way unrighteous ; he is perfect righteousness ; and he of us who is the most righteous is most like him.^ Justice is the fundamental virtue, the mother of the virtues belong- ing to each of the three souls. For the intelligence it con- sists in the correctness of thought {(Toh) is not fundamental ; for Aristotle has in mind, on the one hand, the three phases of being {flvai), on the other, the three constitutive prin- ciples of existence (6V). « Met., XII., 3, 8. ARISTOTLE 115 disappears when we take into consideration his definition of the word matter. He means by it matter that has not yet been formed, the provisional as opposed to the final ; it denotes imperfection, capacity, undeveloped germ. If this is Avhat is meant by matter, then, evidently, every being in the universal scale of beings is idea or perfection, as com- pared to the lower stages, and matter or imperfection, as compared to higher beings ; and the Supreme Being — but the Supreme Being only — is pure idea, pure form, or pure actuality. Aristotle also declares that the last matter (mat^ ter in the final stage of development) and the form are the same (77 ea^drrj vXrj kol rj /jLop(f)r] ravro i). Hence we may conclude that he would not, perhaps, have objected to call- ing the Supreme Being iaxdrrj vXrj or the final stage of the universal evolution, though he would have denied that this higher phase of existence is in part material. But he does not accept the pantheistic conception of an abso- lute that develops, and is matter before being form, poten- tiality before being energy .^ If the Supreme Being had fii'st existed in germ and as potentiality, then it would have been necessary for an actual being to exist antecedent to God in order to energize this germ and to make God actual ; for not only does all seed come from a pre-existent actual being, but no capacity ever becomes actual without the cooperation of an actual being. Not capacity but energy, not the potential but the actual, not the imper- fect but the perfect, is the first principle anterior and superior to everything else.^ This favorite conception of Aristotle really agrees with the Eleatic doctrine : ex nihilo nihil ; its logical consequence is the negation of the chaos as the original form of existence, if we may apply the term " form " to the formless as such, or to the complete absence 1 hi, Vm., 6, 19. CI VII., 10, 27 ; XIT., 3, 8 ; 10, 8. 2 Id., XIL, 7, 19-20. Cf. Phys., II.. 9, 6. » Ihid. 116 GREEK PHILOSOPHY of all order. Since form or absolute energy and matter are both eternal, it follows that matter has never been without form, and that there never was a state of chaos. ^ The eternal actual Being is both the motive or generat- ing cause, the form, and the final goal of things. It is the first mover and itself immovable {irpoiTov klvovv ov KLvovfievov). The existence of this first mover is the necessary consequence of the principle of causality. Every movement implies, in addition to the thing moved, a moving principle, which, again, receives its motion from a higher motive force. Now, since there can be no infinite series of causes, we are obliged to stop at a first mover. To deny this and at the same time to assume the reality of motion, to assume with Leucippus, Democritus, and others, an in- finite series of effects and causes without a first cause, is to violate one of the most fundamental laws of thought. Moreover, the first cause acts forever, and the ensuing motion is likewise eternal. The universe has neither a beginning nor an end in time, although it has its limits in space. Here a difficulty (aTropia) arises : How can that which is immovable and remains so, move ? How can the mo- tive cause act without setting itself in motion ? It must be assumed that God acts as the beautiful and the desirable act. Thus, a master-piece of art or nature moves and attracts us, and yet remains completely at rest itself. Similarly, the ideal which I strive to realize, or the goal at which I aim, sets me in motion without moving itself. So, too, matter is moved by the eternal Idea (to tl rjv elvau TO TTpooTov) without tlic sllghtcst movement on the part of the absolute being. It has a desire for God (opeyeTai)^ but God is the ilrst cause of this desire.^ Inasmuch as the Supreme Being is immaterial, it can have no impressions, nor sensations, nor appetites, nor a wil] 1 Met. Xn., 6. 15. 2 /^ XTT., 7r 3. AT?TSTOTLB 117 111 the sense of desire, nor feelings in the sense of passions all these things depend on matter, the passive or female principle, the recipient of the form. God is pure intelli- gence. The human understanding (vov^ 7ra6r]TLfc6^) passes from a potential state through the stages of sensation, per- ception, and comparison. The divine vov^ has an imme- diate intuitive knowledge of the intelligible essence of things. Our discursive thought pursues an object which is different from it and which cannot be attained except by gradual stages, wliile the absolute thought is identical with its object. Since nothing is higher than God, and since the thought of God has the highest possible object, God is the object of his own thought [ Jorjaeco^; i/orjcrt?). God's life is free from all pain and imperfection, and therefore beyond desire and regret (a7ra6r)<;) ; it is supremely happy ; hu- man life with its emotions is but a feeble image of it. God enjoys Avhat but few favored mortals enjoy, and then only for a limited period of time ; his life consists in the pure contemplation of the intelligible truth, in Oecopia (^Staycoyr) 8' iarlv oia t) apicmi fiCKpbv '^povov rjiuv ■^). As the final cause of the universe and the highest good (to ayaOov /cal to apiarov)^ God is both m the things or their immanent essence (rd^t^;) and above the things, apart from the world, or transcendent (KexcoptcrfJLevov n koI avro Kad' avTo), Discipline exists both in an army and outside of it in the mind of the general. Similarly, God is both the law and the law-giver, the order and the orderer of things .2 Everything is organized, ordered, and harmonized b}^ him and with a view to him ; and since he is one (mat- ter alone is manifold ^), there can be but one single, eternal universe. Conversely, the unity Avhich prevails in the world proves the unity of God. Ovfc ayaOov iroXvKOLpavir]' eh Koipavo<; eVro).* 1 Met, XII, 7, 11. 2 Id., XII., 10, 1, 2. 3 /^.^ yin., 6, 21. 4 Id., XII., 10, 23 (quotation from Fomer). 118 GREEK PHILOSOPHY On this principle of principles depend the heavens and nature.^ 2. Second Philosophy, or the Philosophy of Nature According to Aristotle, the sky is the perfect sphere of which the earth is supposed to be the centre ; nature is eveiy thing within this sphere that is subject to motion or to rest ; or, more abstractly, it is motion itself, in so far as the latter emanates from the first mover and is continued by the secondary causes. Physics is a theory of motion.^ It inquires into the immovable principle (the divine), the imperishable moving power (the heaven), and the perish- able world or sublunary nature.^ There are as many kinds of movement as there are categories of being.^ The prin- cipal ones are : (1) movement that affects the substance, or origin and decay {^eveai^ kol (j)6opci) ; (2) movement that affects the quality, or change of quality, alteration (klvt^o-c; /car aWoLcoaiv^ fierafioXTj) ; (3) movement that affects the quantity, or addition and subtraction {f€Lvr)o-L<; kut av^r^atv KOI (j)dL(nv) ; (4) local movement, or change of place (^opd^ fclvrjai^ Kara rov tottov ^). The first (origin and decay), how- ever, is not, strictly speaking, a movement, while, of the other three, change of place is regarded by all the physi- cists, and especially by Anaxagoras, as the most important, the most universal, and the most original form of motion.^ Motion, change, energy, or entelecliy^ is the realization of the potential as suchJ But it is not a substance (oucrta), and does not exist apart from the things which it affects {irapa ra Trpdy/jLara). ^ Met., XII., 7, 11 : *E< rotavrrj^ apa cipxv^ ^'prrjTai 6 ovpavb<: koI q 2 Phys., III., 1, 1. » Id., II., 7. * Id., III., 1, 2, 6 Id., IIL, 1, 7. « Id., VIII., 10. * /dfjLei\ but not actually or in reality {ivepyeid}. It is, according to Aristotle, as impossible to feel, to desire, and to will, without the necessary cor2:)oreal organs, as it is to walk w^ithout feet or to make a statue out of nothing (^^ahi^eiv avev ttoSmv, opav civev 6(f)6a\fjLa)V, avhpta^ dvev XaX/cov^). The soul is to the body wdiat cutting is to the jixe ; the function of cutting would be the soul of the axe if the latter were a living being. Now, just as cutting is impossible without an axe, so too the constitutive functions of the soul are inseparable from the body. ^ De partihus animalium, I., 3. ^ De generatione animalmm, II., 3. Cf. Met., VII., 11, 11. 128 GREEK PHILOSOPHY From the relation obtaining between the organism and its vital principle, it necessarily follows, in the second place, that metempsychosis, or the doctrine according to which any soul may inhabit any body, is impossible. Since the soul is the function of the body, or rather, the sum of its functions or the resultant of its forces, it is evident that its manifestations or acts (that is, in the last analysis, the soul itself, since it is essentially action and energy) are determined by the nature and special organization of the body which it animates. We cannot produce the tones of the flute by means of an anvil, nor the sound of an anvil by a flute. It is equally impossible to have a human soul in the body of a horse, and vice versa. The body is potentiality or capacity, and the soul its energy or function. The latter, again, is potentiality or capacity, or rather a sum of capacities {8vvdfjLet<;) ; it con- sists of the capacities of feeling, perceiving, and willing, of which sensation, perception, and volition are the actions or energies. Hence the soul is the entelecliy or primary ^function of an organized hocly^ and its manifestations or ^' effects are the secondary functions or energies of this body.i In so far as the soul is sensation, imagination, memory, and will, it suffers the fate of all earthly things ; it is perish- able ((^^a/3To?2). The intellect itself has a mortal part in addition to its immortal and divine element. The mortal part comprises the sum of our ideas in so far as these are determined by bodily impressions, that is, whatever the intellect receives, suffers, and does not create or bring forth. The entire passive side of the intelligence {vov^ 7ra6r]TiK6<^) shares the fate of the body, without which it cannot be conceived. Only the active intellect (vov<; iroirj- ^ De miima, II., 1 : Et S/; tl kolvov inX nda-ijs yjrvx^s Set Ae'-yeti/, ("ltj av €VT€X()(€ia T} 7rpa>Trj croiiiaros (pvcrtKov opyavcKov- 2 De anima^ III., 5 : 'O fie Tra6r\TiKos vovypa^^iaTeiov S fi7)6ev virdpx^i ivTeXex^tayeypa/JL/jLevov^). Peripatetic sensualism does not, however, exclude the excipe intellectum of Leibniz, but assumes that ideas pre-exist in the mind, if not actually, potentially at least (Swd/Jiet) ; in other words, it maintains that the mind originally possesses, not ready-made ideas, but the faculty of forming them.^ The ex nihilo nihil is 1 De anima, HI., 5. -^ Id, III., 4. ? See the discussions of this subject by Locke and Leibniz (§§ 56 and 57). ARISTOTLE 131 one of Aristotle's fundamental doctrines. Although he holds that the infant mind is an empty tablet, that expe' rience is the source of our knowledge, that intelligence is developed and realized by sensation, he does not teach either an anti-pliilosophical dualism ur a vulgar mechan- ism. On the contrary, dualism affirms one of the principles of knowledge to the exclusion of the other; it isolates thought and keeps it from having intercourse with nature, on the plea that any increase produced through the senses would be a pollution. Plato teaches such a dualism. As far as Aristotle is concerned, the charge of dualism may with justice be brought against his theology, on the one hand, and his theory of the active intellect, on the other. The presence of the vou<; makes the human soul an inter- mediate being between the animal and God. In sensibility, perception, and memory, it resembles the animal ; in reason it is like God. This dual aspect constitutes its originality as a moral being. There can be no morality without the coexistence of animal and intellectual principles. The ani- mal is not a moral being, because it is devoid of intellect. Nor can there be any question of morality in the case of God, who is pure thought. Hence morality is the distinguish- ing characteristic of human nature, and if the end of every being is the complete and perfect realization of its nature, the end of human life consists neither in the one-sided development of the animal functions nor in changing man into God (which would be foolish and impossible), but in the complete and harmonious expansion of our dual essence. For man the highest good consists in the happiness (evSai- fiovLo) resulting from the harmonious cooperation of the in- tellect and the animal elements. Such a state of equilibrium constitutes virtue. The harmony between the active and passive intellect is called intellectual virtue (aperrj SLavorj- TLKTj) ; this manifests itself as wisdom in theory, and as prudence or common-sense {(f)p6vT]aL^y ev^ovXia) in practice. 132 GEEEK PHILOSOPHY The harmony between the intellect and the will is called ethical virtue {aperrj 7)61/0])^ that is, courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, gentleness, sincer- ity, and sociableness. Virtue is not the extreme opposite of vice (as Plato holds) ; it is the mean (to ^eaov) between two extremes (ciKpa). Courage, for example, is a virtue, and as such the mean between timidity and f oolhardiness ; liberality is the mean between avarice and prodigality.^ Inasmuch as man is (pvaet ^mov ttoXltlkov^ individuals cannot make and change the State at will ; on the con- trary, the State forms the individuals. The family, prop- erty, and slavery are natural institutions. It is no truer that the same form of government is as suitable to all nations and circumstances than that the same garment fits everybody. The monarchy is the best form of government when the power is in the hands of a good prince ; for in this case it is an image of the government of the universe : a perfect monarchy under a perfect monarch. But this form is the most odious of all when it becomes tyranny. The safety of the State consists in a just apportionment of powers, and depends essentially on the strength of the middle classes. ^ Aristotle's ethics and politics, like his metaphysics, are decidedly antagonistic to the Utopian ideals of Plato. He is a realist and a positivist, a common-sense thinker, so to /6peak, and takes into special account the facts of experi- ^ ence ; he is exceedingly careful not to set up an ideal goal which humanity can never reach. His entire philosophy is a doctrine of the golden mean, and as far removed from a coarse sensationalism as from an idealism that is out of harmony with real life. In his love of science for science's sake, the suppleness and versatility of his genius, his predi- lection for measure, proportion, and the harmony of the . ^ Nicomachean Ethics, IL, 5 If . 2 Politics^ IV., 9. ARISTOTLE 133 ideal and the real, Aristotle represents the climax of Greek thought. But he also marks its decline, and inaugurates a new epoch in the general evolution of humanity. He resembles a Semite or a Roman in the unremitting good sense which he displays, and in his sober positivism. His style is not, like that of his master, the work of the Muses. But his pliilosophy is even more realistic in matter than in form. His fundamental metaphysical teaching, which makes matter a necessary element of finite existence ; the epistemological doctrine that the mind- is an empty taUct ; his monotheism, which is much more outspoken and absol- ute than Plato's ; his morality of the golden mean ; his monarcliical tendencies, — everytliing about his sj^stem is a forecast of the new world, the elements of which were pre- pared at Pella, Rome, Alexandria, and Jerusalem. Among the most distinguished scholarchs who succeeded him in the Lyceum are to be mentioned Theophrastus,^ Dicsearchus,^ Aristoxenus,^ and, above all, Strato of Lamp- sacus,* the teacher of Ptolemy Pliiladelphus. Aristoxenus denies the immortality of the intellect, and Strato the exist- ence of God ; which proves, either that the master's doctrine of immortality and the first mover was merely an accom- modation, or that his ancient followers were even less United than his medieeval disciples. What distinguishes the pupils from the master, and what characterizes post- Aristotelian philosophy as a whole, is the gradual division of scientific labor which takes place after Aristotle. The work of Aristotle the scientist was continued in Sicily, 1 Cicero ad Attic. ^ IT., 16 ; Acad, post., I., 9; DeJinibuSjY., 5, 12; Tuscul. v., 9 ; Simplicius, In Phys., f. 225. [See also for Theoplii'as- tus and other disciples of Aristotle, Ritter and Preller, pp. 361 ff. ; Mullach, vol. IT, pp. 293 ff. ; AVritings edited by Schneider, 1818 ff. ; Fragments, by Wimmer, 1854, 1862. —Tr.] 2 Cic, Tuscid. I., 10. 8 Ibid. * Cic. de nat. deor., 1, 13: De Jin., V., 5; Diog. L., V., 58; Sim- plicius, loc. cit. 134 GREEK PHILOSOPHY Egypt, and the islands of the Mediterranean ; while Athens, and in Athens the Lyceum itself, merely retained a philoso- phy of reasoning, dialectics, and eristics, which cared less and less for the physical cos7nos, and devoted its entire attention to the soul. What is the essence, the aim, the destiny of the human soul, the favorite toj)ic of Attic philosophy ? Plato regards thought as the essence and end of the soul, and Aristotle's theology is at bottom simply an apotheosis of I'oO?. Epi- curus, however, like Democritus, negates the thought- substance and teaches a philosophy of pleasure. Between these two extremes we have the concrete spiritualism of the Stoics. B. Apotheosis of Matter. Negation of the Thought-Substance § 18. Epicurus Epicurus ^ was born about 340, at Gargettos, of Athenian parents. Reflection on his mother's superstitious practices and the study of Democritus made him sceptical, and convinced him that our fear of the gods and the hereafter is the principal obstacle to the happiness of man ; and it is the business of philosophy to make us happy by freeing us, through observation and reasoning, from the belief in the 1 Sources : Diog. L.'. X. ; Cic, Dejin., I. ; Lucretius, De rerum natura : Sext. Emp., Adv. math., XI. ; Gassendi, De vita, moribus, et doctrina Epicuri, 1647, and Syntagma pJiHosophice Epic, 1655 ; The Studies on Epicurus and Lucretius by J. Rondel (Paris, 1679), Batteux (1758), etc.; Ritter and Preller, pp. 373 if.; Guyau, La morale d' Epicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines, Paris, 1878; [Trezza, Epi- euro e r Epicureismo, Florence, 1877, 2d ed. Milan, 1885 ; P. v. Gizycki, Ueber das Leben und die Moralpliilosophie des Epikurs, Halle, 1879; W. Wallace, Epicureanism, London, 1880 ; Usener, Epicurea, Leipsic, 1887. See also Grote's Aristotle, and Susemihl, mentioned p. 140. — Tr.]. EPICURUS 135 supernatural. In the society avIulIi he founded at Athens about 306, his personal influence seems to have been very great, and the maxims which he dictated to liis disciples (/cvptai 86^ at') formed the permanent basis of the Epicurean teaching long after his death (270). But neither polythe- ism nor Christianity had any interest in preserving his numerous writings,^ nearly all of wliich have been lost, and this Socrate clotiUe d'un Voltaire has been more bitterly attacked than any other founder of a school. Unlike Aristotle, who loves science for science's sake, and considers the first philosophy as the best and most divine science, "although others may be more useful," ^ Epicurus makes science the servant of life, and is inter- ested in theory only in so far as it is related to practice. The aim of philosophy,^ wdiich he divides into the canonic (logic), physics, and ethics, is, according to him, to make human life tranquil and peaceful {arapa^la)^ and this aim he finds realized in the system of Democritus, with whom he agrees in almost every respect. Matter is not non-being^ as Plato holds, but the positive and only principle of things, the universal substratum^ of which soul, mind, and thought are mere accidents (o-u/^tttw- yLtara rj avjjLJBel^riKOTa). Outside of it, there is nothing but the void, the condition of movement. Matter is composed of innumerable, uncreated, and indestructible atoms in per- petual motion. According to Democritus, these corpuscles naturally and necessarily move clowuAvard. But inasmuch 1 About three hundred, according to Diogenes Laertius. With the exception of the Letters, etc., preserved by this historian, we know nothing of the lost writings except what we can learn from the quota- tions found in various Greek authors, the valuable re'swwe' presented by Lucretius in his De rerum natura, and the fragments of the work irtpi iotf rot fiibatfiova ^lov nepmoioiiaa (Sext. Emp., Adv. math., XL, lOiJ). 136 GREEK PHILOSOPHY as they are joined together and form bodies, it mnst he assumed, according to Epicurus, that they deviated from the perpendicular line. Such a deviation could only have been the result of chance. Epicurus is not, therefore, an absolute determinist, for he assumes chance, that is, the possibility of an effect without a cause. This view allows him to recognize in ethics the freedom of indifference, or causes without effects.^ But though, by an inconsistency that does more credit to his imagination than to his logic, he differs from Democritus on the subject of causality, he agrees with him regarding the eternity of the universe. The absolute creation and absolute destruction of the world are out of the question. .XifiatiQn in the proper sense of the term is impossible. In order to convince ourselves that the world is not the work of the gods, we have simply to consider the nature of its alleged creators, on the one hand, and its imperfections, on the other. Why should such perfect and supremely happy beings, who are self-sufficient and have no need of anything, burden themselves with creating the world? Why should they undertake the difficult task of governing the universe ? Let us, however, suppose for a moment that the world is their product. If they have created it, they have created it either eternally or in time ; in the former case, the world is eternal ; in the latter, we have two pos- sibilities : Either creation is a condition of divine happi- ness, and then the gods were not supremely happy for an entire eternity, inasmuch as they did not create the world until after the lapse of an eternity of inaction ; or, it is not, and in that case, they have acted contrary to their innermost essence. Moreover, what could have been their purpose in making it? Did they desire a habitation? That would be equivalent to saying that they had no dwell- ing-place for a whole eternity, or at least, none worthy of 1 Lucretius, De i^erum natura, XL, 216 ff. ; Diog. L., X , 133-134. EPICURUS 137 them. Did they create it for the sake of man? If they made it for the few sages whom this world contains, their work was not worth the trouble ; if they did it in order to create wicked men, then they are cruel beings. Hence it is absolutely impossible to hold that creation is the work of the gods. Let us examine the matter from the standpoint of the world. How can we assume that a world full of evils is the creation of the gods ? What have we ? Barren deserts, arid mountains, deadly marshes, uninhabitable arctic zones, regions scorched by the southern sun, briars and thorns, tempests, hail-storms and hurricanes, ferocious beasts, dis- eases, premature deaths ; do they not all abundantly j^rove that the Deity has no hand in the governance of things ? Empty space, atoms, and weight, in short, mechanical causes, suffice to explain the world; and it is not neces- sary for metaphysics to have recourse to the theory of final causes. It is possible, nay, it is certain that gods exist : all the nations of the earth agree to that. But these supremely happy beings who are free from passion, favoritism, and all liuman weaknesses,^ enjoy absolute repose. In their far-off home they are unmo\'Ted by the miseries of humanity; nor can they exert au}^ influence on the life of man. There can be no magic, divination, or miracles, nor any kind of intercourse between them and us. We should cease to fear the punishments of Tartarus. The soul is material, and shares the fate of the body. What proves it to be matter — exceedingly fine matter, of course — is the influence exercised upon it by the body in fainting, anaesthesia, and delirium, in cases of injury and disease, and above all, the fact that the advance and the decline of the soul correspond to analogous bodily ^ Diog. L., X. 139 : To ixuKaniov kgI a(f)0apTov . . . ovt opyals ovrt \api(n crvv€)(€Ta.L. iv acrB^vd yap tto.v to tolovtov. 188 GREEK PHILOSOPHY conditions. The intellectual faculties are weak in the period of childhood ; they grow strong in youth, and gradually decay in old age. Sickness causes a serious reaction upon the soul ; without the body the soul has no power to manifest itself. Nay, more than that ; the dying man does not feel his soul gradually withdrawing from one organ to another, and then finally making its escape with its powers unimpaired ; he experiences a gradual diminution of his mental faculties. If the soul retained full consciousness at death, and if, as certain Platonists maintain, death were the transition of the soul to a higher life, then, instead of fearing death, man would re- joice at it, which is not the case. Moreover, our fear of death is not caused by our dread of non-existence ; what makes us res^ard it with such terror is the fact that we involuntarily combine with the idea of nothingness an idea )f life, that is, the notion of feeling this nothingness ; we .magine that the dead man is conscious of his gradual destruction, that he feels himself burning, or devoured by the worms, that the soul continues to exist and to feel. If only we could succeed in wholly separating the idea of life from its opposite, and bravely relinquish all thought of im- mortality, death would lose its terrors. We should say to ourselves : Death is not an evil ; neither for him who is dead, for he has no feeling ; nor for the living, for him death does not yet exist. As long as we are alive, death does not exist for us, and when death appears we no longer exist. Hence we can never come in contact with death ; we never feel its icy touch, which we dread so much. Consequently, we should not be hindered by foolish fears from attaining the goal of our existence, happiness. Pleas- ure is the highest good ; not the pleasure accompanying a passing sensation (r)Bovi^ ev Kivrjo-et)^ but pleasure as a per- manent state (rjSovrj KaracTTrj/JLaTL/o])^ — that state of deep peace and perfect contentment in wliich we feel secure EPICURUS 139 against the storms of life. The pleasures of the mind are preferable to voluptuousness, for they endure ; while sensations vanish away like the moment which procures them for us. We should avoid excess in everytliing, lest it engender its opposite, the permanent pain resulting from exhaustion. On the other hand, we must consider such painful feelings as, for example, painful operations, as good, because they procure health and pleasure. Virtue is the tact Avhich impels the wise man to do whatever contributes to liis welfare, and makes him avoid the contrary. Virtue is not the highest good, but the true and only means of realizing it.^ Owing to its simplicity, its anti-mystical character, and its easy application, the Epicurean system became a for- midable rival of Platonism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism. Italy received it with especial favor, and reckoned among its disciples, the poet Lucretius, who wrote the De reruin natura, T. Cassius, L. Torquatus, T. Pomponius Atticus, Caesar, Horace, and Pliny the Younger. During the reign of the CcEsars, Stoicism was represented by the republican opposition, while Epicureanism gathered around its standard the partisans of the new order of things, who were fortu- nate in being able to realize the ideals of the master under the auspices of a great and peaceful power. Protected as it Avas by the Emperors,^ the school destroyed what re- mained of the crumbling edifice of polytheism, and at the same time attacked the new religion and the supernatural Christian. ^ Diog. L., X., 14:0 : OvK ecTTiv fjbeco? CtJv civev tov (pfjouifxcos Koi Ka\oi9 2 A Latin and Greek inscription recently discovered in the excava- tions of the Archaeological Society at Athens and dating from the time of Hadrian, wholly confirms what we already know as to the special protection accorded to the school of Epicurus by the Em- perors. Owing to this, it exerted the preponderating influence during the first centuries of our era, and aroused great jealousy among the 140 GREEK PHILOSOPHY C. Apotheosis of Will § 19. Stoicism ^ The founder of the Stoic school, Zeno^ of Citiiun in Cyprus, was the son of a family of merchants of Phoenician origin. Upon losing his fortune through shipwreck, he decided to indulge his taste for study. He was alternately the disciple of Crates, the Cynic, of Stilpo, the Megarian, and of the Academicians, Xenocrates and Polemo. There- uj)on he taught philosophy in the ^roa tolklXt] at Athens. Convinced of the rightness of suicide, he put an end to his life about 260, leaving a great reputation and a large number of disciples behind. The school was continued by Cleanthes,^ a native of the Troad, the supposed author of the so-called hymn of Cleanthes,* and after the voluntary Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic schools. The inscription also gives us some information, at least indirectly, concerning matters hitherto little known, as for example, the organization of the school during the imperial period, its mode of appointing scholarchs, etc. 1 [Ritter and Preller, pp. 392 ff. ; Tiedemann, System der sioischen PMlosopkie, 3 vols. Leipsic, 1776 ; Ravaisson, Essai sur le sioicisme, Paris, 1856 ; Leferriere, Memoire concernant Vinfluence du atoicisme sur la doctrine des jnrisconsultes romains, Paris, 1860 ; Hirzel, Untersuchun- gen zu Ciceros Philosophie, 3 vols., Leipsic, 1877-83 (Part II., pp. 1-566, for Stoics) ; Weygoldt, Die Philosophie der Stoa, Leipsic, 1883 ; Oge- reau, Essai sur le systeme philosophique des Stoic iens, Paris, 1885; Bon- hbfer, Epilctet und die Stoa, Stuttgart, 1890 ; and Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, Stuttgart, 1894 ; Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mil- tleren Stoa, Berlin, 1892; Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1895; Stein, Die Psychologic der Stoa, 2 vols., Berlin, 1886-88; F. Susemihl, Geschichte der Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1891-92. — Tr.] 2 Diog. L., yil. [Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, Cam- bridge, 1889]. 8 Diog. L.,VIL, 168 ff. * Hymn to Jupiter (Stobaeus, Ed., I., p. 30). STOICISM 141 death of the latter, by Chrysippus of Tarsus ^ (according to others, of Soli) in Cilicia (280-210), in whose numerous polemical writings against the Academy, the teachings of the school received their final form.^ In order to form a correct conception of Stoicism we must remember (1) that it is not merely a philosophy and a system of ethics, but a religion raised upon the ruins of popular polytheism ; (2) that its founder and its most ar- dent disciples trace their origin either to Semitic Asia or to Roman Italy ; (3) that it is not the work of a single individual, but a collection of doctrines from different sources which meet in one and the same channel like the tributaries of a river. Hence its conservatism in religion and its dogmatism in metaphysics. Hence also its prac- tical turn, and, finally, the complex and wholly eclectic nature of its teachings. Like Epicurus, Zeno and the Stoics pursue science for the sake of life ; truth, in so far as it is good and useful (to eiTiTrjheiov^ to (p(f)eXLfLov) ; the search for the fi?'st cause of being, in order to discover the final goal of life (to TeXo^). Wisdom, i. e., theoretical and practical virtue, is the goal. Theoretical virtue consists in thinking correctly (apeTT) XoyLKYf) and in having correct notions of the nature of things (apeTTj (f>v(nfcr)) ; but practical virtue, which con- sists in right living and in acting according to reason, is the highest type of virtue, the goal aimed" at by theoretical virtue, which is but a means. Whatever does not tend to make us better, and has no influence on our impulses and actions, is indifferent or bad. Logic, metaphysics, and the sciences have no raison d'etre except in so far as they are of practical value. They introduce us to the study of ethics, and this gives them their importance in the teachings of the school. 1 Diog. L., VII., 179 ff; Cicero, passim. 2 Cicero, Defin., IV., 19, 56 ; Diog. L., YIL, 1; Ogereau, op, cit. 142 GREEK PHILOSOPHY Conformably with its voluntaristic and anti-dualistic ten- dencies, Stoicism rejects Plato's separate Idea^ even more emphatically than Aristotle. Ideas or universals have no objective existence ; they exist neither outside of things, as Plato teaches, nor in things, as Aristotle holds ; they are mere abstractions of thought (ivvorjfjLara), to which nothing corresponds in reality. Moreover, the soul has no innate ideas ; it is an empty tablet, and all its concepts come to it from without {OvpaOev). The sensible impres- sion {jviTcoai'i) is, according to Cleanthes, like an impression made upon a material object, like the mark of a seal upon Avax. Chrysippus defines it as a modification of the soul {erepoicoac^). Sensation {ala6r)ats:) is the common source of all our ideas {(^avTao-lai). The latter are divided into four categories, according as they express : substantiality (viTOKeLfjLeva)^ quality (irotd)^ mode of being (ttw? exovra), or relation (Trpo? tl tto)? exovra). An idea is true Avhen it is an exact reproduction of its object. The criterion of the truth of an idea is its clearness, its self-evidence {(^avraaiaL KaTakriTTTiicai), There are, according to Zeno, four degrees of knowledge : presentation, {(^avraaia)^ assent {a-v^Kard- Oeai^), comprehension (/caraXi^-v/rt?), and understanding (iiTicFTrjixiii). In order to illustrate the highest degree of knowledge, which the philosopher alone attains, Zeno, it is said, used to place his left hand upon his clenched right. Following the example of Aristotle, the Stoics regarded grammar and rhetoric as integral parts of logic. They are worthy successors of the great logician in this field ; indeed, the majority of our technical terms in gram- mar and syntax are of Stoic origin.^ 1 For the Stoic logic, see Diog. L., VII., 41 ff, ; Cic, Acad, pr., II., 47, and post, I., 11; Sextus Emp., Adv. math., VIII. ; Stobaeus, Eel. I,.; SimpUcius, In Categ., i. 16b; [Prantl, Geschichte der Logik- Heinze, Zur Erkenntyiii^slehre der Stoiker, Leipsic, 1880 ; Stein, Die Erkenntnisstlieorie der Stoiker, vol. II. of work mentioned above. — Tr.]. STOICISM 143 The Stoic metaphysic is, like their theory of knowledge, even more realistic than the system of Aristotle. It is concrete spiritualism pure and simple. Mind and body are two aspects of one and the same reality. In the real being, mind is the active element {to ttolovv) ; matter, the passive element (to irda^ov). There is no such thing as pure spirit. Whatever Aristotle may think of him, God has a body, and the world constitutes this body. The uni- verse is a living being (J^cpov)^ of which God is the soul ('i^^XV "^^^ k6(t/jlou), the governing intelligence {vov<;^ Xo'709 Tov iravTos:)^ the sovereign law {elfjLap/jLevr}, avajKr]), the motive principle, the animating warmth {irvev^ia irvpoeihe^^ TTvp Te'xyiicov^ irvp voepov^ Trvev/Jia Sirj/cov St oXov tov Koafiov). The Stoic theology is a kind of compromise between pan- theism and theism. God is identical with the universe, but tills universe is a real being, a living God who has a knowledge of things (vov^), who governs our destinies {irpovoia)^ who loves us ((f>L\dv6p(07ro<;)^ and desires our good (fC7)S€/jLOVLK6<;, (o^eXiiio^^ ev7roi7)TLKo<; avOpoi}7roL