flPPAPYOr ppiMPPTOM MAR 16 2004 THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY %le]'UoiU'hnil , 1862- 1951. A social theory of religioui education A SOCIAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION A SOCIAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION BY GEORGE ALBERT COE PB0FEB80B IN THE CNION THSOLOGICAL SEMINABT, NEW TOBE CITT LIBRARY OF PRINCETON MAR 16 2004 THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1919 COPTHIOHT, 1917, BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS Published October; 1917 TO HARRY F. WARD WHO SEES AND MAKES OTHERS SEE FOREWORD What consequences for religious education follow from the ^ now widely accepted social interpretation of the Christian mes- sage ? The present work is an attempt to answer this question. The answer is not simple. For the social message does not require us merely to insert this or that new duty into our present scheme of living, but also to judge every detail of conduct from a higher point of view. We are required to organize the whole of life upon a different level. It would be strange indeed if the new meaning that this gives to e very-day affairs did not change our outlook upon child life. If we are to be logical and practical in our social Christianity, we must revise our policies with respect to children at least as much as our policies with respect to adults. The chapters that follow undertake to show the directions that this revision will need to take. As we proceed, it will appear that the whole perspective of religious education undergoes a change. The central purpose, to begin with, grows more specific because the nature of good- ness is seen to be as concrete as the neighbor who lives next door. Christian experience comes out of the clouds, because in our dealings with our brother whom we have seen we are deal- ing with the Father whom we have not seen — yes, we here come into relation with what is deepest in his character and purposes. To Christian ears these statements do not sound strange, per- haps, yet when they are applied to the religious life of the young they do sing a new melody. A profounder significance attaches to the will of a child, and especially to his relations with persons, whether children or adults. ^ All the plans and methods of religious education have now to be reorganized with reference to these social relations and vii viii FOREWORD experiences. A new measure is provided for the material that goes into the curriculum of instruction. Organizations that undertake to educate, whether the family or the church, meet a different test from that which has been traditional. Theological and ecclesiastical types take on new meaning, and they encounter demands that they have not always foreseen. The educational relations between state and church, likewise, have a different look when we approach them from the stand- point of a thoroughly socialized religion. Not less true is it that emphasis now shifts from one part of educational psychology to another. Through my whole discussion there runs a conviction that within Protestantism there is, or is coming to be, a distinctive religious principle, that of a divine-human industrial democracy. "My Father worketh even until now, and I work." I believe that here the Christian religion contains a permanently progres- sive element, and therefore a motive for self-criticism as well as for criticism of "the world." Religious education, conse- quently, is here thought of not merely as a process whereby an- cient standards are transmitted, but also as having a part in the revision of standards themselves. Another conviction that controls my discussion is that educa- tional organization and methods are not static tools, like saws and hammers, which are indifferent to the structures that they build, but living and moving parts of the collective life. A democracy cannot afford to use in its public schools the methods that an autocratic state finds adapted to its purposes. When the purposes of society are transformed, education must be made over. Protestantism cannot make Protestants of its children by the methods of Catholic teaching. A divine- human democracy cannot grow up through educative processes that have in their nostrils the breath of autocracy. These are themes of high intellectual interest. They are also religious issues of the greatest import. They have a direct bearing upon even the ordinary duties of religious educators. The humblest worker will do better work if he knows the why and the whither of it than he will if he merely follows some FOREWORD ix prescription. Therefore I hope that this book of mine will be found practically helpful by those who bear the heat and the burden of the day in the schools of the church, as well as by those who guide congregations or whole communions. As my study of this theme has progressed, I have been more and more conscious of the magnitude of the problem, and of its unending ramifications. I cannot hope to have said the last word, nor to have escaped error, but I dare to hope that others will be stimulated to face the issues and to declare their own convictions. I trust also that my faults will be judged in the light of the fact that this is the first attempt to work out in a systematic way the consequences that will follow for religious education when it is controlled by a fully social interpretation of the Christian message. While these chapters have been in progress the wail of chil- dren in the lands at war has been in my ears, a wail for the fathers of whom they have been bereft, a wail for bread, a wail for a decent world in which to grow up. To my thinking it is a cry from all the children of the world for the sort of education that faces, and understands, the great madness that is abroad, and not only understands, but also knows the resources of human nature and of religion. Even while I have been writing about educating children in the love that loves to the utter- most, I, as a citizen of the United States, have gone to war I I am so bound into one with my neighbors that I cannot, if I would, act as a mere individual; and my neighbors and I, who constitute the United States of America, are so bound up with neighbors beyond our national boundaries that our moral destiny is intertwined with theirs. We and they must rise to- gether, or we shall not rise at all. Forward, out of nationalism, with its limitations upon brotherhood, into world society ! But we are partly of the past, "red in tooth and claw," and only partly of the ideal future. With our hands we fight our broth- ers; with our hearts we abhor fighting. 'Wretched men that we are 1 Who shall deliver us out of the body of this death ? ' The future of society depends upon the sort of social education that we think it worth while to provide. X FOREWORD Any reader who is familiar with present movements in educa- tional thought will perceive, as this work proceeds, how much I owe to writers who have had in mind the public school rather than religious education. I am indebted most of all to John Dewey, who is foremost among those who have put education and industrial democracy into a single perspective. George A. Coe. Glendora, California, May 12, 1917. CONTENTS PAoa Foreword vii INTRODUCTION CHAPTEB I. Why So Much Theorizing? 3 PART I THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT IN MODERN EDUCATION II. General Exposition of the Social Stand- point 13 III. The Philosophical Setting of the New Social Ideals in Education 25 IV. The Place of the Individual in a Socialized Education 38 PART II THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY REQUIRES SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION V. The Aims of Christian Education .... 53/^ VI. The First Essentials of an Educational Plan 64 xi xii CONTENTS CHAPTEB PAQB VII. The Educative Process is Religious Experi- ence 74 VIII. The Church as Educator 85 IX. A New Theory of the Curriculum .... 97 PART III the psychological background of a social- ized RELIGIOUS education X. The Social Nature of Man 119 XI. Children's Faith in God 138 XII. The Religious Limitations of Children . 147 XIII. The Struggle with Sin 164 XIV. The Learning Process Considered as the Achieving of Character 184 PART IV THE ORGANIZATION OF A SOCIALIZED RELIGIOUS EDUCATION XV. The Christian Reorganization of the Family 207 XVI. The Church School 226 XVII. Educational Relations between State and Church 248 XVIII. The Denominational Department of Relig- ious Education 266 XIX. Beyond the Denominations 283 CONTENTS xiii PART V CHAPTER PAQB EXISTING TENDENCIES IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION VIEWED FROM THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT XX. The Roman Catholic Type 295 XXI. The Dogmatic Protestant Type 304 XXII. The Ritualistic Protestant Type .... 316 XXIII. Educational Tendencies of Evangelicalism 324 XXIV. Educational Tendencies of Liberalism . . 335 Classified Bibliography 343 Index 357 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I WHY SO MUCH THEORIZING? Have we theory enough abready? Whoever makes a re- flective choice between educational ends, and then determines by systematic analysis what are in general the means whereby the chosen ends can be most certainly and most economically reached, has a theory of education in the sense in which the term "theory" is used in this work. A theory of education, then, is simply knowledge of what we as educators want and how to get it. A committee was discussing plans for a training institute for workers in religious education. "What we want," said one member of the committee, "is something practical. We don't want theories." To this another committeeman replied: " What have you against theories ? We have practice already, and practice is what makes all our trouble. Theory is the thing we need. We're perishing for want of it!" Doubtless the first of these men meant to stand for applied knowledge as against ineffective thinking, while the second meant to stand for applied knowledge as against ineffective practice. Both really wanted theory in the present sense of the term. Of theory in this sense we can never have too much. That we have, in fact, altogether too little of it — that our workers do not discriminate with sufficient care either ends or means, do not think enough upon what they are about — is certain. An enthusiastic young student of religious education, upon a visit of observation to a certain Sunday school, asked the super- intendent: " What is the purpose of this school ? " The super- intendent hesitated, requested that the question be repeated. 4 THE NEED OF THEORY hemmed and hawed, and finally replied: "Well, what do you think it ought to be?" The simple fact is that we are doing a great many things because they have been done before rather than because we have a reason for doing them. If we are asked for a reason we commonly give one that is so general as to be without point. We say, for example, that our aim is to make our pupils Christians, but if we are then required to say whether we aim to make all of them Christians immediately, on the present Sunday, or only by and by, and just what we mean by a pupil-Christian, it turns out that our apparently clear end is foggy after all. Nor is the case any better with our notions of the means to be employed. Which is the most certain and the most eco- nomical way to produce such or such a change in this or that Sunday-school class ? Are you pursuing your present methods because you have any reason to suppose that they are the most effective possible ? And when the work of a year or of a series of years is done, how do you definitely know to what extent you have attained your purpose ? Questions like these answer themselves. Our work is famishing, and our pupils are perish- ing, because we have not enough theory. Ineffective practice produces defective theory, and per- petuates ineffectiveness thereby. It is no more true that a poor theory leads to poor practice than that poor practice leads to poor theory. Theories of education have all arisen within practice; they are attempts to think out what already exists. The reason why we stop to think is, indeed, that we are not altogether satisfied with things as they are, but yet we do not invent a better state of things "just out of our heads." No, we make improvements by mixing a little that is new with much that is old, and this mixing occurs in our thinking as well as in our practice. That is, more or less of yesterday's practice is always taken into to-day's thinking as a presupposi- tion, or not-yet-analyzed premise, and then this thinking is used to justify the very practice from which it is derived. Now, some of yesterday's faults always escape attention; some of them are ever being accepted as virtues. For example, methods of THE NEED OF THEORY 5 family (iisclpllne that defeated their own aims have dominated theories of such discIpHne. Many a parent has conscientiously made goodness unattractive to his children, and then recom- mended that all parents go and do likewise ! Many a progres- sive-minded Sunday-school worker unconsciously bends his standards to fit Sunday schools as they are. He has a theory, but it is not sufficiently critical. The consequence of this is that the cause of religious educa- tion requires the repeated reopening of matters that seem to be already settled. The reason is not that revolutions are desirable, but that our thinking, being under the influence of our own defective past, never reaches a point where it can prop- erly say: "Here I have reached finality; here revision will never be necessary.' ' This is the pride that goes before a fall. The spirit of true theorizing is humble. It says to itself: "In all probability my present views of religious education are a mixture of truth and error. Let me, then, scrutinize them once more, and may the succession of scrutinizers never fail I" The main problem is how to make Christian education sufficiently, as well as efficiently, Christian. We should stum- ble into a total misconception if we were to think of a theory of religious education as an attempt to control religion from outside itself, as, for example, by mere speculation. No, it is an attempt to judge our religious performances from within religion. Christian education is to be thought of as through and through the Christian religion in operation. Its methods are to be scrutinized and revised from the sole point of view of religious effectiveness. Its aims also are to be weighed in religious scales, and no others. Not only do old methods come to us bringing hay, wood, and stubble along with precious metal, but the same is true of old purposes. They, also, as well as methods, have to be " trued up" from time to time, partly because we forget something that came to us in the hour of spiritual vision, partly because insight Into the meaning of life does not attain fixity in any generation. There ar« depths in the Christian message that our fathers' plummets did not sound ; there are depths that will 6 THE NEED OF THEORY remain unknown until generations yet to be born shall ask their own fresh questions. Accordingly, when we reflect upon the existing aims of Chfistian education with a view to revising them, we are engaged in an attempt to make them more Chris- tian. We are not satisfied to become more efficient upon yes- terday's religious level; we aspire to raise the level itself. Our problem is to make Christian education as Christian as possible. The application of this remark to the situation of the churches to-day is unmistakable. The aims and methods of Christian education, as of church life in general, that this generation inherited were predominantly mdividualistic. We have been so taught as to think of the great salvation as a rescuing of in- dividuals, each by himself, from the guilt and the power of sin, and of establishing them, each by himself, in the way of right- eousness. When Canon Fremantle gave us the phrase "the world as the subject of redemption" we had to think twice be- fore we could see just what it meant. For most Christians were still thinking of the increase of Christ's kingdom in terms of a mere census, a mere count of individuals rescued out of an evil world. But our generation has come to see that the re- demptive mission of the Christ is nothing less than that of transforming the social order itself into a brotherhood or family of God. We are not saved, each by himself, and then added to one another like marbles in a bag or like grains of sand in a sand pile. A saved society is not made by any such external process. We are members one of another in our sins, and we are members one of another in the whole process of being saved from sin. I cannot go alone either toward or away from the kingdom, for it is my relation to some one else, a relation of help or of hinderance, that^determines the direction that my own character is taking. " In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil: Whosoever doeth not righteous- ness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother. For this is the message that ye heard from the beginning, that we should love one another." For us of the present generation the duty of making Christian education sufl[iciently Christian will mean bringing it into line with this social message. THE NEED OF THEORY 7 Love as an inclusive law for education has not been worked out in theory or tried in practice. This is an astonishing thing to say, but it is strictly true. We have endeavored to include love within education as one item among many, but we have not taken it as the higher and inclusive conception by which to determine our aims and by which to test our methods. We have been accustomed to start the educative process out- side of the act of loving, say in some dogma or religious rite, expecting somehow to get inside love at some later time. We have not thought of method as systematized love producing its like, that is, as the divine social order, already started on earth, and here and now giving children a place and an incentive to grow within itself. We have not conceived religious educa- tion as itself a part of the campaign for the social righteousness that the law of love requires, or as an actual initiation into the social relations that belong to the citizens of the kingdom. Rather, we have assumed that the campaign for social righteous- ness is an affair of adults exclusively. We have even hesitated to bring it to church with us lest it should disturb reposeful contemplation of God. As if we could contemplate the Father without thinking about that upon which his heart is set, or as if he himself could have peace of mind only by taking a vaca- tion from the rest of the family ! Here and there, in fragmentary ways, we have begun, it is true, to experiment with lessons that touch upon love in action. Social-service activities, moreover, have here and there be- come a regular part of the educative procedure. But as yet these are additions to presocial religious education, or pallia- tives of it, rather than an attempt to socialize the whole con- trol. Thorough socialization will require a fresh approach to the curriculum as a whole. It will require us to re-examine the organization of religious education in order to see whether the social relations in which the child is here already placed do themselves train him in active love and in methods of co-operation. It will require us to scrutinize every de- tail of teaching method to see what sort of social relation it involves between teacher and taught, and between pupil 8 THE NEED OF THEORY and pupil. Here, surely, is need for a theory of religious edu- cation. The theory of public education is undergoing a trans- formation that is of the utmost significance for the churches. The old assumptions of public education, like those of religious education, were individualistic. The day school was expected to put the pupil into possession of certain tools (as reading and writing), and to impart a certain minimum amount of useful knowledge (as geography), all of which was thought of as preparing him to live as an individual. To-day we cannot think of the public schools as having any smaller task than that of preparing young citizens for living together. Moreover, we are engaged, in both theory and practice, in bringing school training closer and closer to the every-day occupation of a citi- zen, his labor for a livelihood. The growth of the social idea and of the industrial idea in public education is significant for the churches in several ways. In the first place, humanitarianism is getting a new organ, one that promises to become immensely efficient. The state can hardly train its citizens in the art of living together without teaching, more or less, the brotherhood that is of the heart. Nor can this teaching go very far before it awakens thought upon the ancient injustices that persist in society. Moreover, when the school, with this growing social outlook and inlook, is brought close to the industries, it is bound, sooner or later, to interpret to our whole people, either intentionally or other- wise, the meaning of " the food which perisheth," the significance of labor, of income, and of wealth. All these are ancient in- terests of the Christian preacher, and they are present, vital concerns for Christian teaching, whether of adults or of chil- dren. What shall the churches do, then, with respect to these new developments in the theory of public education? How can we be unmoved by what is going on? If we really believe in the axioms of Christian living, we cannot be indifferent. Nay, we whose consciences are just now being pricked by the neglected social elements in our religion, if we have even a moderate THE NEED OF THEORY 9 amount of practical sense, must take our place as citizens be- side those who have seen a social vision in public education. We must try to understand what the vision saith; we must support and encourage the reformers in their hard task, and we must gladly tax ourselves for public education as we have never taxed ourselves before. But we shall not empty out of the church into the state school the whole function of social education. Rather, we shall define and realize more definitely than ever before the educa- tional implications of the old faith that God himself is love. Gladly co-operating with every one who endeavors to put the love of one's neighbor into education, we shall go on to probe the educational significance of the two great commandments in the Christian faith. For us there must be a theory and a practice in which the love of God to us and our love to him are not separated from, but realized in, our efforts toward ideal society, the family or kingdom of God. Such a theory of Christian education we have not as yet. Four components of educational theory. The divisions adopted by each writer upon this subject are likely to depend more or less upon his notion of convenience in exposition. But the following components will be found in one or another form in any broad analysis: (1) An indication of the kind of society that is regarded as desirable. (2) A conception of the original nature of children. (3) A conception of the sorts of individual experience that will most surely and economically produce in such children the kind of sociality that is desired. (4) A statement of at least the more general standards and tests by which one may judge the degree to which these sorts of experience are being provided by any educational institu- tion or process. All four of these parts of a complete theory will be found in the following pages, though not in this precise order. In a general way. Chapters II to V, inclusive, concern the first point; Chapters X to XIII, the second; Chapters VI to IX and 10 THE NEED OF THEORY Chapter XIV, the third, and the remainder of the book the fourth. But I have made no effort to schematize my treat- ment. Rather, I have endeavored to be concrete, even though thereby problems crowd together somewhat, and even though the same problem appears more than once. PART I THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT IN MODERN EDUCATION CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPOSITION OF THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT Various uses of the term education. Education, in the broadest sense of the term, takes place wherever a plastic mind acquires a set of any kind. It is often said, for example, that a child receives much of his education from contact with nature— from falls and bruises, obstacles and achievements, and the beauty of natural scenery. In a less broad sense, education lies in the contribution made by society to the set of a mind. Again and again has it been pointed out that only through association with his elders can a child attain to civilized life at all. The total difference that such association makes in the organization and outlook of his mind may be regarded as the education that he receives. The ways in which society forms an individual are, however, in large measure unsystematic and even unintended. The "social inheritance" of an American child, for example, in- cludes the influence upon him of all such things as sights and sounds upon the street; newspapers; public amusements; political contests; business and social customs; waves of public opinion; home conditions — indeed, the influence of every man and of every "man way" that he meets. As far as these things — any of them — are controlled for the 'purpose of giving a set to young minds, we have education in the third and strictly technical sense. It is with education thus technically understood that the present book is primarily concerned. Often, indeed, we shall find ourselves analyzing the unintended influence of men and women upon children, but always for the sake, ultimately, of more clearly defining our deliberate purposes. Deliberate ~^ 13 14 THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT educational purpose underlies many undertakings besides schools. A family is an educational institution. The same can be said of certain phases of the public library, the art mu- seum, and the natural history collection of to-day. For they arrange their possessions and advertise them in part with the young in mind, and they even provide trained instructors. The children's room, the children's adviser, and the story hour in the modern library are educationally eloquent. The playground movement likewise is educational in the strict sense, for it accepts the axiom that facilities for play should be so organized that the players will form socially valuable habits. The position of the churches in this constellation will have our attention after a time. But even this partial and merely representative list of the educational institutions of modern society would be defectively representative if it did not men- tion juvenile courts and new types of law concerning children and youth. When a child violates a law or an ordinance, an enlightened legal system no longer merely inflicts pain and deprivation upon him because of his past, but considers how to form him into a good citizen. To this end, physical, mental, and social diagnosis is employed to discover the causes of the delinquency, and then the offender is sentenced to he educated by the most skilful methods that science can devise ! This blending of the conception of justice with that of education is extending itself to various parts of law. The abolition of child labor, and the restriction of labor in the adolescent years, have an avowedly educational motive, as have ordinances that regulate the relations of children to the streets and to public amusements. We are, in fact, moving toward the notion that society, wherever it is in contact with children and youth, should be a consciously educational force — in short, that the young should be constantly at school merely by virtue of their presence in our civilization. Society is not merely one educator among many; it is the prime educator within all educational enterprises. If teach- ers, parents, librarians, story-tellers, playground directors. THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT 15 judges in juvenile courts, and legislators who press for child- labor laws will but reflect upon their educational enterprise, they will perceive that it is not their own. They act as agents for society. This means not only that they labor toward social ends, but also that the power that does the work is one or another social influence operating through them. This is obvious in the case of all who are employed by state or church, but it is true of the others also. A parent teaching his child a grammatical form, or manners at table, or a standard of moral conduct, is himself at the moment under the control of his group in respect both to what he teaches and to the fact that he teaches anything at all. Moreover, the effectiveness of his teaching depends in large measure upon the existence of a social environment that backs it up. In a profound sense, then, the educator in all education is society. This proposition is not invalidated by the incompleteness of our social integration — our divisions into parties, social classes, and churches — with the resulting ambiguity of the term "society." For in each of these groupings the educational worker is moved by his group consciousness, and he endeavors to give effect to the things that bind him to his fellows, be the fellowship narrow or broad. "Unfolding the powers of the child" is an inadequate con- ception of the work of education. Since society is the educa- tor, we may ask next. What is society about when it educates ? It is dealing, of course, with unfolding powers or growth. But every child has many powers, better and worse. It is the essence of education to discriminate between them, and while promoting the growth of some, to prevent the growth of others. The same distinction has to be made when we meet the state- ment that the aim is to help children toward " self-realization," for behind this statement lies the unexpressed assumption that there are different sorts of self that an individual may become, and that education must give the advantage to some of these as against others. What education does is, in a word, to bring the child and society together. It increases one's participation in the com- 16 THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT mon life. It puts a child into possession of the tools of social intercourse, such as language and numbers; opens his eyes to treasures of literature, art, and science that society has grad- ually accumulated through generations; causes him to appre- ciate such social organizations as the state, and develops habits appropriate thereto; prepares him to be a producer in some socially valuable field of labor, and evokes an inner control whereby he may judge and guide himself in the interest of social well being. Education aims at "social adjustment and social effi- ciency." This phrase represents the strong reaction of re- cent years against all formal conceptions of education, that is, conceptions that involve no notion of guiding the young in the social application of the powers that education brings out. To define the aim of education as the unfolding of children's powers is like saying that the purpose of a railroad is to cause cars to move from one place to another. What the cars carry and whither they are going are the important considerations. The strains that have developed within our industrial and civic life since the coming of machine manufacture, steam transporta- tion, and the massing of the populace in cities have compelled us to see that the attitudes and the outlook of children with respect to their fellow men are the prime concern of schools. At the same time, poverty on the one hand, and the increas- ing specialization of occupations and of industrial and commer- cial processes on the other, have convinced educationists — that is, those who investigate education and promote educational standards — that every child ought to receive assistance in the selection of his occupation, and also specific preparation for skilful work in it. The more democratically minded among us are coming to think of the future in terms of industrial de- mocracy, an organization of producers governed by producers. Hence it comes to pass that progressive schoolmen are largely occupied at the present moment with problems of occupational training and vocational guidance. Scarcely more than twenty-five years ago educationists were still disavowing industrial ends, which they distinguished from THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT 17 those of "general" culture. Manual training was in some of the schools for the sake of formal mental discipline and the teaching of numbers, but avowedly not as an introduction to fundamental processes in manual industries. I remember a time when college heads turned up their noses at "bread-and- butter education." If the blindness of some efforts at the " prac- tical" partly justified this scorn, it in turn was blind in that it saw not the social-ethical significance of earning one's living by daily toil in one's trade or profession. To-day we think of education as a way of getting the human energy of each new generation effectively applied to the main- tenance and the increase of human welfare of whatever sort. Keeping children well, and teaching them how to keep them- selves and their community well; showing them how to manage a home, with its need for many sorts of skill; introducing them to the civic, industrial, and philanthropic institutions of their community; acquainting them with the machinery of govern- ment and with the duties of citizens; opening the way to skill in an occupation, and revealing the riches of play as well as of literature and the fine arts — all this, which the schools of yesterday left largely to chance, is being incorporated into an education that deserves to be called " new." The reason for mentioning these things in a discussion of religious education will appear fully in later chapters. Al- ready, however, it must be evident that the relations of the church to the child as well as to the adult are going to have their setting in a new world. Religious education is bound to be judged from fresh standpoints. "Imparting" certain "sub- jects of instruction" is becoming thin and threadbare as a conception of teaching. "Inciting" to "virtue" in general will seem flat to children who are accustomed in their daily school- ing to the enrichment of concrete social experience and to par- ticipation in important specific social enterprises. Moreover, when the schools become an agency for applying human en- ergy, instead of providing a merely general or unapplied cul- ture, they move in the realm of life purposes in which religion has a vital interest. In particular, education that aims to pro- 18 THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT duce devotion to the social weal touches at its very heart the religion that has set out to change society into a brotherhood. Education aims also at the progressive reconstruction of society. Adjustment of a child to society just as it is does not satisfy the educational conscience, or even the conscience of society in general. Our social conservatives themselves would condemn an educational system that sought to preserve our social organization unchanged. No; education selects some parts for preservation, while it condemns other parts, and toward still others is silent lest children should find out how bad we are. What a confession society makes in every school that it supports ! It says, in substance : " Here are a few things of permanent worth that we have already achieved; here, in addition, are our many unfulfilled aspirations, our unsolved problems. Try to be wiser and better than we have been." Thus, education is not only society's supreme act of self- preservation; it is also society's most sincere judgment upon its own defects, and its supreme effort at self-improvement. These statements do indeed outrun most of our educational practice. Our dealings with the young, especially our insti- tutional dealings, have no immunity from the inertia of tradition or from the anaesthesia of self-interest; and our thinking, as was indicated at the beginning of Chapter I, grows within practice, not in a different world. Actual education is a mix- ture of points of view. Nevertheless, the idealization of life, which implicitly if not explicitly condemns our actual life, is of the essence of educational practice. At the present moment, far more than yesterday, this idealizing takes on the social hue of almost all intense ethical reflection in our day. If, then, I have myself idealized the social aim of education, I have merely used with respect to education its own method of viewing life. The basal process in education is social interaction. To bring society and the individual child together is the aim. This means that what we have to teach the child is humane and jiist living in the various relationships, and also active, well directed labor that contributes to the common life of the pres- ent and likewise to the improvement of it. It might seem THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT 19 superfluous, but the history of schools proves that it is not, to point out that, in the last analysis, social experience is the only thing that can thus socialize any one. The first concern of education is not a text-book or anything that printer's ink can convey, but the persons with whom the pupil is in contact, and the sort of social interactions in which he has a part. On the face of the matter, how could any one become adjusted to society in the absence of society, or become socially efficient without social practice? Some applications of this principle appear as soon as we begin to reflect upon it, but others are less obvious and more at variance with tradition. In respect to the more obvious per- sonal relations between pupil and teacher, and between pupil and pupil, the principle is already in operation in progressive schools. Thus: (1) The conduct and the personality of the teacher are generally recognized as of prime importance. It must be admitted, never- theless, that present methods for training teachers do not luminously suggest any theory as to how the desired personal qualities can be developed. Moreover, neither the economic status of teachers, nor methods of appointment and dismissal, nor provisions for growth and for social practice after entering the service, can be quite reconciled, as they stand to-day, with the universal emphasis upon personality. (2) In the organization and management of a school, and of each schoolroom, every enlightened teacher sees an opportunity to train children in co-operation and self-government. The term "self-government" should not be restricted to experiments in which pupils have been organized in imitation of the State, with its legislative, judicial, and executive officers. Self- government is more than social mechanism of any pattern. It is first of all socialization of the teacher's attitude toward pupils, that is, recognition of the present value of the pupil's personality. From this recognition will flow encouragement to free action, to free reflection, and to specific methods for the organization of freedom, with its inevitable social pleasures and pains. It is not the elaborateness of these methods that 20 THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT counts, nor yet the absence of influence from the teacher. There can be, and in some experiments in pupil-government there appears to have been, an artificial sociality — artificial be- cause created merely ad hoc and isolated from the larger society. What is needed is the development of freedom, initiative, and co-operation within the existing relations not only between pupil and pupil, but also between pupils on the one hand and their teachers, the local community, and the State, on the other. Self-government in this sense is the sure touchstone of school discipline. (3) In the modern school, the play of pupils, which is made up almost altogether of social interactions, comes under supervision. The least reason for supervision is the prevention of abuses; the primary function is the promotion of social and socializing play. Hence, the supervisor of the playground teaches the children games adapted to their respective social capacities, and assists in the management of contests, all with a view to the discipline of social joys through the enrichment of them. (4) Studying and reciting also are a field for social experience. Instead of trying to isolate each pupil with his book, and then instead of stimulating each one in the recitation to selfish emulation, or to purely self-regarding avoidance of discomfort, the teacher treats the subject-matter as a social possession, and as a sphere for a co-operative enterprise in learning, so that each pupil " contributes to the recitation." (5) The school of to-day introduces the pupil to community life, and gives him real functions in it. Around elections, holidays, civic anniversaries and festivals, much instruction in the ideals and the ways of society is made to centre. Historical incidents are dramatized, and community pageants are produced. The pupils are made acquainted at first hand with the machinery of the local government. They meet the policeman face to face, and learn from his lips how they can co-operate with him in the maintenance of laws and ordinances. Children are organ- ized to keep streets and alleys clean, and to combat disease. A few hours before these words were written, there passed under my window a squad of children ("squad" is the name that they THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT 21 used for the group) all equipped with paraphernaha for removing cocoons of the tussock moth from the shade-trees of a city. It is significant of the educational organization of this campaign that the squad was under the command of an elder pupil. (6) It now becomes evident that if the basal process in educa- tion is social interaction, the ancient isolation of school experience from other experience must he overcome all along the line. This, I take it, is the fundamental idea of a new type of boarding- school that has appeared in the German and Swiss Landerzieh- ungsheim, and in the Bedales School in England. Children, both boys and gu'ls, ranging in age from the primary to the mid-high-school grades, are placed in a country home under conditions that reproduce as far as may be the life of a family that supports itself upon the land. Here, in connection with the traditional "studies," the pupils sow and reap, manage domestic animals, construct and repair buildings, and make apparatus for their games and plays, all in the continuous society of their teachers. These groups are necessarily small, but the same principle appears in the large public schools of Gary, where pupils repair the furniture, keep the accounts, and even pay the teachers. The same principle is determinative of the subject-matter, the order, and the use of the curriculum. The procedures that have just been described have general approval because they provide for social training through social experience. But they are almost altogether outside the pupil's experience of the contents of the curriculum' as something to be learned. Can the curriculum, too, be brought under the head of social experience, or must it, in the nature of things, remain, as it is in most schools, a thing that contrasts with practice, a prelimi- nary to social experience rather than a part of it ? The answer has been given by Professor Dewey. Organized and stated in my own way, it is this: (1) The claim of any sort of knowledge or of skill to a place in the curriculum mu^t meet the test of social fruitfulness. It must be something that enriches the common life. The content of instruction is to be drawn primarily from the area of social 22 THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT experience in the strict sense, that is, experience that men have of one another, and specifically from experiences that society has an interest in reproducing and developing. Sub- ject-matter that is not thus directly social, as parts of mathe- matics and of the physical sciences, is to be treated as social in the sense of being a common interest of society. (2) The '^knowledges'' and ''skills" thus selected are to be taught in an order that is determined by the pupil's own growing social needs and functions. In his relations within the family, the play group, the school, the city, a child has from the be- ginning problems of social adjustment, social efficiency, and social reconstruction of his own. Grading the subject-matter of instruction consists primarily in introducing him, in each of these social situations, to the material that he can use and enjoy. This genetic-social order cuts across and to some extent supplants the old logical classification or linear arrange- ment of studies (reading, arithmetic, history, etc.)- What has to be mastered at each turn is a function or enterprise — a term that applies equally to learning a trade, learning the duties of a voter, and mastering the processes involved in playing at storekeeping or with dolls. In the strict sense, the curriculum is a succession of these enterprises, not a succession of " subjects of instruction." These subjects will now come along in order and amount as they are needed, and they will draw their vitality as instruments of education from the fact that need for them has arisen. (3) Each piece of subject-matter is to be approached through a motive that is, in this very act, in process of social growth. The ideal is that no pupil should ever have a purely individualistic attitude toward any item or toward the labor that is required to master it. To develop self-centred individuality first, as traditional methods tend to do, with the intention of subse- quently transferring its strength to social enterprises, is a double blunder. On the one hand, it tends to defeat its ultimate social purpose by forming individualistic habits that are hard to break; on the other hand, it makes no provision, or inadequate provi- sion, for the growth of social purpose, but assumes that it can THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT 23 spring into being fully formed. The social approach to subject- matter that is only indirectly social may be conveniently illus- trated by one of the present approved methods of teaching certain numerical processes. Instead of merely drilling the pupil upon printed tables and imaginary problems, the play of storekeeping is introduced, with its demand for measuring and weighing, making change, and keeping accounts. (4) All this means that the old separation between living and preparing to live is to be done away with even in studies. The separation is to disappear from the mind of both the pupil and the society that educates him. Just as play, which is so large a part of real life from the pupil's point of view, is being incorporated also into the adult's interests, so, on the other hand, the occupations of adults, and their civic ideals and enter- prises, instead of being withheld from the pupil until he shall in some mysterious way pass from education into life, now be- come material of education, a sphere in which the child and his seniors live an unbroken community life. In short, in their entire life in the public schools, pupils are to be thought of as simply fulfilling their functions as members of the State. An important corollary, or more properly part, of this move- ment to identify education with life, is the transformation that is taking place in our notions of what constitutes a school. We are beginning to see that a school is not a thing to be grad- uated from and left behind. Within a mile or two of the desk at which I wi-ite these words there are school buildings and grounds at which the people provide for themselves the follow- ing facilities for their common life: Evening classes in wood- working and cookery; classes in citizenship for immigrants, and a reception to new citizens upon their naturalization; free baths for young and old; match games of baseball for the young men; dancing-classes and dancing-parties under wholesome supervision; a forum for political discussion; art exhibitions; entertainments of various kinds, as on the evening of election day, when the returns are received by a special wire. A brief formulation of this theory of school organization, methods, and curriculum is as follows: Social character and 24 THE SOCIAL STANDPOINT efficiency are to be achieved through social experience; social experience is to be had primarily through the performance of social functions, but it may be extended through imagination in the use of well-selected and well-graded subject-matter that represents the social experience of the race; school experi- ence is most effective educationally when the pupil experiences the least break between it and the life of the larger society. CHAPTER III THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING OF THE NEW SOCIAL IDEALS IN EDUCATION The general relation of education to philosophy. The tendencies to which the last chapter called attention may be summed up as the social idea in education. Because of its depth or comprehensiveness, this idea may be called philosophi- cal, and as far as it controls educational practice we may say that education is applied social philosophy. We do not stum- ble any longer at the notion that life and philosophy may be one. To the old saying that "Philosophy bakes no bread," the reply is. What but philosophy can bake bread? Wheat does not make itself into loaves; fire and oven are breadless without the baker, and he is a baker because of the ideas that guide his hands. These ideas, because they concern the ends and means of living, represent, as far as they go, a philosophical interest. To philosophize is to open one's eyes and gaze all around the horizon so as to see whence and whither one's steps are tending. Neither by its subject-matter, nor by its methods of analysis, nor by any aloofness of aim is philosophical thinking set off from any other. It is distinguished as philosophical by its comprehensiveness, thoroughness, and persistence. A glance at the setting of the movement for socializing educa- tion will show that we are dealing with no split-off part of thought or of social life, but with the whole moving social mass, and with its growing awareness of the meaning of its own move- ment. The educational ideals that this generation inherited. If the question "What is the ideal of modern education?" had been asked thirty years ago, the most probable answer would have been somewhat as follows : " The mark of moder- 25 26 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING nity is recognition of education as falling within mental growth, which proceeds from within outward by unfolding, not by accre- tion. This implies that the freedom of the child is respected, and that the great function of teaching is to assist him to ade- quate free self-expression.'* If one had asked to see a dis- tinctly modern school, a kindergarten would have been pointed out, and the progressiveness of other schools would have been measured chiefly by their responsiveness to the great message of the movement that bore the name of Froebel. In the ideal of freely unfolding individuality two closely related influences are discernible, that of philosophical idealism and that of the movement for popular government. On the philosophical side the greatest single impulse came from Kant. In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) he maintained that mind does not come upon its world as something ready made, but builds it forth out of mere raw materials of the senses. We have a coherent world at all, it was said, only because we impose upon these materials certain forms and categories that are of the nature of our mind. Otherwise stated, the structure of our mind is the organizing principle of any world that we could possibly know. In a sense, then, the meaning of all experience is preformed in us. Kant's great idealist successors, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, labored to show, each in his own way, what this meaning is and how we become aware of it. The educational corollary of this idealistic movement is that we should not impose ready-made ideas or rules upon the child mind, but rather provide conditions favorable for spontaneous mental growth whereby what the child already implicitly is will become explicit both as world-outlook and as ethical self-guidance. Thus it was, in part, that teacher-wis- dom took on forms like these: Adjust your procedure to the child mind, not the child mind to some preconceived method (hence the necessity of child study and of child psychology); to teach is not to impart ideas, but to develop the ideas that the pupil already has; no impression without expression; we are not to mould the child, but to provide material for him to mould; we learn by doing; utilize, do not repress, the child's THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 27 curiosity, his imagination, and his impulses to play and to con- struction; the end of the whole is not information or skill, but a free personality at home in its world ; the ideal teacher is not a taskmaster, much less a mechanic, but a friend, a revealer, a protecting divinity. We cannot stop to inquire what specific part Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Herbart had respectively in making such educa- tional ideas convincing, or in devising methods for applying them. Nor is there space to show how far these ideas ever prevailed in the schools. But the essentially religious pre- suppositions that are here involved should be noted. Mind has the primacy in the universe; experience has meaning that we can discover, and even be a part of; duty is the voice of God. Hence, if teaching becomes a prophetic office, none the less the child himself becomes a "prophet of the soul.'* To the rever- ence for their elders that had been demanded of children, the nineteenth century added reverence of adults for childhood itself. Every birth was a fresh incarnation of the ultimate meaning that pervades things. To invade the personality of a child was more heinous than to rob a householder of his goods. The second great factor in this educational ideal is the aspiration for political freedom that came to partial expres- sion in the French Revolution and in the early stages of the American experiment in popular government. Consider the extraordinary value attributed to the individual by the Decla- ration of Independence: Freedom is the natural right, the in- alienable inheritance of every man; all just government de- rives its powers from the consent of the governed. These conceptions belong in the same thought-sphere as idealism, and they reinforce its educational corollaries. Into the phases of this reinforcement, from Rousseau's demand for education that shall protect the child from social conventions to Horace Mann's labor in behalf of schools for all the people controlled by all the people, we are not permitted, in this discussion, to enter. What characterizes the whole is insistence upon opportunity for the individual, and emancipation for him. As far as the schools were interested in good citizenship, it meant, pre- 28 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING domlnantly, individual competency, particularly intellectual competency, for the use of the ballot. Why religious education has been slow to assimilate the educational doctrines of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the present century we behold in religious circles an awakening of educational consciousness that takes the form, to a large extent, of self-criticism for the formalism of religious teaching, and for its failure to appreciate growth and free self-expression. Here was educational twilight after a whole century of essentially religious ideals in educational thinking. The explanation lies partly in the slowness of schools and colleges generally to respond to the newer ideals. The practical problems with which the present generation of educa- tionists had to start were still those of a curriculum imposed upon growing rninds rather than expressive of their growth, and of formalism in method rather than free self-expression. But the main reason for the backwardness of religious educa- tion lies elsewhere, namely, in the control of ecclesiastical ma- chinery by belief that the meaning of life was fully and authori- tatively revealed in ancient times, so that the central function of religious teaching is to pass on a completed, unchanging de- posit of faith. It is true that in the latter half of the nine- teenth century some attention was given to methods in the Sunday school. Efforts to train teachers were by no means altogether lacking. It is true, also, that in large ecclesiastical areas the conscious aim of the Sunday schools was religious life, not merely orthodox belief. Yet religious living was prescribed, imposed, added to the child; under the ruling as- sumptions, spiritual life could not be treated as a free forth- living on his part. In Protestantism, then, as well as in Catholicism, our century inherited a hiatus between appre- ciation of free individuality and the content and the methods of religious teaching. How the ideals of the scientific movement modify the notion of education. Regulated observation and experiment; the resultant discovery of laws; new control of natural forces as an end result — these are the marks of the scientific movement. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 29 Its progress during the nineteenth century constitutes perhaps the most momentous, as it certainly does the most rapid, change that has ever taken place in the method and the content of thought. The already accomplished increase in man's control of nature is astonishing; the possibilities that it suggests are fascinating. But the scientific movement has bearings upon the relations of man to man that are solemnizing, in some cases terrifying, as when we contemplate the present industrial conflict and the clash of nations. The most obvious educational effects of the movement are the introduction of various sciences into the curriculum, and increase in the number and the thoroughness of technical courses and of technical schools that have as their aim fitness for an occupation. A cultivated individual, valued for what he is in and of himself, is less and less the standard of educational success. The purpose is shifting toward increase of human efficiency. The notion of efficiency or scientific control is modifying our approach to educational processes as well as our ideals of cul- ture. Psychology, having become an experimental science, is bringing back into educational theory the concept of definite control of pupil by teacher — not control in the old school- masterish sense of command and compulsion, yet something different from the "protecting divinity" attitude, which as- sumes that the proper control for the child is already implicitly within him, and in need of nothing but adequate encouragement to self-expression. What psychology offers to-day is such in- sight into details of the teaching process as teachers never before possessed or dreamed of as possible. Just as agriculture is moving from control by the traditional wisdom of generations of farmers to "scientific farming," with its analysis of soils, its tests of seeds, and its plant pathology, so the generalized, largely incalculable, and partly intractable "human nature" of school traditions is being replaced by measured relations of antecedence and sequence. We are beginning to control certain factors of inheritance also. The upspringing of eugenics brings within sight a time 30 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING when congenitally defective individuals, who produce the least educable of children, will be estopped from reproduction, and the better-endowed strains will deliberately control the choice of mates, the number of offspring, the conditions of birth, and the care of children, all in the interest of an improved human stock. Thus education and eugenics, working together, will place in somebody's hands unprecedented power over our social destinies. A humanly guided development of racial quality, and a humanly guided application of human energy in the mass — foresight of these things must be included in any comprehensive philosophy of education.^ Scientific education requires a political philosophy. Scien- tific control of nature, which is now an end in education, is not separable from scientific control of men and of society. It is true that when we arrange the parts of the universe in the order of their significance or value, as when we rank them under the category of means and end, we contrast man with nature. But when we think of the world as an orderly proc- ess, as when we ask under what conditions this or that change occurs, we include man within nature and its laws just as we include the winds and the clouds. Consequently, the sciences of man, revealing the specific conditions of specific human acts, become a means for controlling men, and scientific education puts this control into the hands of specific members of society. Mental hygiene and therapeutics, the psychology of advertis- ing and of salesmanship, analysis of vocational aptitudes, the movement for "scientific management," and various parts of sociology — all are recent advances in this direction. We are confronted, then, even as educationists, with the question: In what part of society is control to be lodged? And to what ends shall control be guided? By educational proce- dures we can make an aristocratic or a democratic attitude 1 Control that approximates this already exists in Germany. Reproduction is consciously guided, as respects the size of families, by a national ideal, and the same ideal permeates education from top to bottom. Back of the amazing ef- ficiency that the German nation has displayed in the present war is something more than mihtary training and scientific organization of material resources; there is also a mobilization of feeling and thought that was made possible by previous regimentation of the mind by educational processes. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 31 toward one's fellows habitual. We can produce submissive- ness or self-assertion. We can fix the assumptions of our pupils' social thinking. The paramount question, therefore, is this: What social likes and dislikes — that is, habits of feel- ing with respect to the regulation of human life by human beings — shall we cultivate ? For what kinds of authority shall we secure respect? We should flatter our day and generation unduly if we assumed that educational philosophy has kept pace with the multiplying needs for reconstruction of our social controls. Yet, all in all, the political philosophy that has the greatest influence with American educationists looks forward to democratic rather than aristocratic control of the resources of both nature and man. That is, the trend is toward industrial democracy. • The educational significance of the doctrine of evolution. The evolutionary view of nature, man included, has not only provided fresh matter of instruction, it has also placed the whole educational enterprise in a new perspective. (1) ^ genetic view of the human mind has been achieved. When Kant lectured upon the categories of the understanding, or upon the pure practical reason, he referred to mind as he thought he found it in himself, an adult human being. Such was to him "the" human mind. He felt no necessity for asking how it had acquired the traits that he attributed to it. The moral imperative — to take the point in his thinking that is of greatest social importance — could be understood, he thought, by mere introspection, without reference to the moral growth of the child, or to the moral development of the race. But present thought is convinced that exactly the contrary is the truth. We cannot understand the fact of a moral imperative without examining the genesis and growth of the sense of duty. Mental faculties, or better, processes, of whatever kind have a history that connects the adult mind with the child, and the human mind with animal minds of all grades. Therefore mental beginnings and growth processes in both the human and the subhuman realm become significant determiners of economical educative processes. 32 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING (2) The instincts acquire a fundamental 'place in educational psychology. The older treatments of the learning or the teach- ing process were occupied with perception, ideation, and reason- ing; to-day we include as fundamental a mass of unlearned tendencies to action, and also the constant influence of plea- sures and pains. A teacher must now be ready to answer the following question concerning each part of his dealing with children: Upon what habits already formed, and upon what original or instinctive tendencies do you rely for securing the reaction that you desire the pupil to make? This question applies in the same sense to the learning of arithmetic and the learning of courtesy and upright conduct. (3) The doctrine of evolution, which contemplates the indi- vidual in his relations to a species, leads us to think of education in terms of racial processes and of racial betterment. Individual- istic notions tend to be crowded out of our minds even by our attempts to follow nature. For the inclusion of education within the notion of natural history looks both forward and back- ward — backward from the human toward the brute, forward from the brute toward the human, and from the human that is toward that which may be. The idea of progress, it is true, has no place in the definition of evolution as a mode of change. Yet the actual history of life cannot be contemplated in its entirety without seeing that progress does occur under natural law. Each stage of this history has for us a forelook that gives it poetic coloring. Says Emerson: "And the poor worm shall plot and plan What it will do when it is man." Thus in its own way evolutionism reinforces idealism. If from the natural-history point of view children belong to na- ture, from the same point of view nature belongs to them. In their education nature takes possession of herself and reaches consciously toward goals that are only dimly foreshadowed in prehuman species. Whether or not acquired characters can be inherited, Davidson is right in regarding education as con- THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 33 scious evolution.^ For, in the first place, eugenic control of the stock through education concerning reproduction and racial interests is already in sight, and in the second place, education organizes and directs the actual use of the instincts, which are so large a part of our mental inheritance.^ The influence of industrial conditions upon educational philosophy. Machine manufacture, the factory system, great cities, steam and electric transportation, electric communica- tion, the massing of capital, and mass movements of laborers — these, joined with popular suffrage, have produced not only our characteristic social strains, but also a type of social thinking that is comprehensive enough to be called philosophical. Those who say that our problem is to determine the place of the human factor in industry do not go deep enough. We are really working at the problem of the place of industries in human life. Here the question that underlies all others is this: Shall there be a permanent servile class ? The outlook with respect to social stratification has immediate and far-reaching educational bearings. The so-called laboring classes have cherished the public schools largely as a means of lifting their children above the necessity of manual labor, or if possible out of the class of employees into that of employers. On the other hand, industrial training in the schools, with its correlate of vocational guidance, constitutes in effect the actual predetermination of masses of children to manual pursuits and the rank of employee. Labor leaders have been apprehensive lest capital should secure control of industrial training, and make it not only a means of supplying skilled labor, but also of strengthening capitalistic control of the terms and conditions of labor. That the wage-workers carry an undue proportion of the social burdens has become clear. The wage system itself is competition in getting the most out of men for the least return. Those who receive the least wage are the ones who bear the heaviest burden of unemployment, industrial accidents and dis- 1 Thomas Davidson, History of Education (New York, 1901),. -' » I shall deal more at large with this point in Chapter X./ 34 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING eases, and the support of children and of the aged; and this condition coexists with unprecedented fortunes amassed by applying the labor of these very men to the freely given re- sources of the earth. This situation is producing a demand that the entire maintenance of the laborer and his family in health and disease throughout life be included in the cost of production, so that it shall be paid for by those who consume the product. But the sense of justice, having gone thus far, does not stop. Once take the point of view of a life in its whole- ness, especially a life in which father, mother, and child count as one, a life therefore that entails itself upon the future without known limit — once take this point of view, and you will go on to ask why the human factor in industries should not be the con- trolling factor; why the conditions under which human energy whether of hand or of brain is expended should not be determined by those most immediately concerned ; whether all the producers should not determine the distribution of all the product of their joint expenditure; further, in view of the inextricable inter- meshing of the industries with commerce, finance, and politics, whether the whole economic mechanism must not be taken over by organized society as an instrument of the common life. When we commit ourselves to a genuine popular franchise and to humanitarianism, we commit ourselves against social stratification. Education, under such presuppositions, is bound to undermine whatever makes for the permanence of a servile class on the one hand, and a leisure class on the other. How- ever long the road that leads to industrial democracy, popular education has entered upon it and cannot turn back. Educational bearings of the pragmatic movement in philosophy. I shall assume that the reader has some familiar- ity with the fresh philosophical doctrines called pragmatism. It is a river into which four streams that are of immediate in- terest to us have poured themselves. First, psychology, moving away from intellectualism toward voluntarism, away from mind as contemplation of a world to mind assisting in the struggle for existence, provoked the question : Why, then, look for the con- stitution of reality in intellectual structure? Why not look THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 35 for it in the direction of will and action? Second, theology, largely because of the results of historical study, found a shift of position necessary. The shift was partly toward mysticism, but far more toward an ethical grounding for faith. To this the Ritschlian movement, which gave the first position to value judgments, had already made a large contribution be- fore pragmatism as an inclusive philosophy appeared. Third, the scientific movement, emphasizing active experimentation as the supreme method of discovery, and leading on to the notion of indefinite extension of the control of nature in the interest of human welfare, secures a completely generalized expression in the pragmatic doctrine that the very notion of truth is to be assimilated to that of active experimentation and its results. Fourth, the fascination that an age of machin- ery experiences in its unprecedented enterprises and in its immense eflSciency crystallizes into the thought that life as a whole is enterprise within a universe that contains nothing eternally finished and final, but rather invites us to be part creators of its flowing destiny. Metaphysical idealism had bequeathed to educational phi- losophy the notion of a predetermined human nature moving toward an eternally predetermined goal, which is the same for all individuals. Pragmatism reverses all this as far as possible. It undertakes to carry out the notion of cosmic becoming, plasticity, potentiality. The glory of human life, it teaches, lies not in the faithful repetition of any prescribed program, but in fresh impulses that have the vigor to test themselves in action. Some specific educational tendencies of this mode of thought '^ may be formulated as follows : (1) Dissolution of the traditional generalized ideal of the cultivated man. Each man is now defined by his purposes and what comes of them. (2) Con- sequently a drastic criticism of traditional curricula and methods of teaching on the ground that they are removed from the world's work, that they lack definiteness of purpose, and that they are unable to develop the spirit of enterprise or to test the results of it when it is present. (3) Demand ^ 36 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING for definite standards and tests of school efficiency. Measure- ments in education are stimulated — measurements of the in- go at every point in terms of space, time, dollars, and persons, and of the outcome in terms of health, amount and accuracy of work done, rate of improvement, extension of interests, and persons equipped for specific functions in society. This in- sistence that we shall know how costly and how efficient each factor is tends to displace the notion that faithful teaching is patient persistence in prescribed methods. (4) The unifica- tion of the school with the enterprises of the community, among which making one's living is frankly included. In a farming population the old break between the school and the farm will be done away with by bringing agriculture into the school. A shoe-manufacturing community will be recogniza- ble as such from its schools. This principle has many applica- tions, some of which, especially those that involve conflict between social ideals, are far from being easy. The pragmatic movement takes as reality that which works, or has positive results, satisfactory or otherwise. It invites us to measure the world and men in these terms, and to steer our further enterprises accordingly. But in view of the multiplicity of satisfactions, the various levels of de- sire from instinct upward, and the conflicts between under- takings that are equally natural, some principle of discrimina- tion is necessary. It does not appear that we guide ourselves altogether by the satisfactions that we have found achievable in the greatest amount and with the greatest certainty. Some enterprises that achieve just what they go after, and are there- fore successful from their own point of view, are nevertheless regarded as in reality dismal failures. What pragmatism might conceivably do with this "in reality" I shall not stop to inquire. The query is raised merely for the sake of indicating the chief difficulty in the pragmatic control of education, namely, how to avoid a shallow pragmatism of immediate ends. Pragmatists are in general convinced that social enterprises and social satisfactions have validity that individualistic ones do not. Thus far pragmatism reinforces the social THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 37 philosophy that we have seen forming itself within the theory of education. Moreover, the forward look of pragmatism, its expectation of the unprecedented, its readiness to press onward into the unknown, relate it closely to religious faith and to the practical influence of idealism itself. These various lines of thought converge toward social idealism as a philosophy of life. The metaphysical ideal- ism that underlay the educational aspirations of the last century offered an inspiring view of human nature. Enfolded in the personality, or coming to consciousness in human ex- perience, was infinite reason, absolute moral law, the ultimate good. Men shared in the very life of God. From such con- victions there could but grow concern for common welfare, as when, under the stimulus of Thomas Hill Green's teaching, Arnold Toynbee started the social-settlement movement. What happens to this reverential regard for man when em- pirical science proclaims that there is continuity between him and the brute ; when philosophy denies the existence of finished and eternal principles in his mental structure; when man as he is, not as he ought to be, has the franchise; when teeth and stomach take seats at council tables where heretofore intellect and conscience only had conferred together in solemn dignity; and when education takes into its hands the grimy tools of industry? What has already happened is an unprecedented convergence of conviction that experience finds meaning, and aspiration finds scope, in social welfare and social progress. This is not the place for raising the question whether this con- viction can be reached from so diverse starting-points by rigor- ously logical processes. For our purpose it is enough to note that attention, in so many types of reflection, does as a matter of fact focus upon man as of supreme significance, and upon social good as the one adequate sphere of man's endeavor. Social idealism is the philosophy of life that prevails among reflective persons, and it constitutes the corner-stone of pro- gressive educational theory. CHAPTER IV THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN A SOCIALIZED EDUCATION Ambiguity of the terms "social" and "individual." Shall we assume, even in our use of terms, that life can be- come "individual'* without reference to society, or that "so- ciety" implies of itself nothing as to individuality? Are the two merely antithetical, or may they be complementary phases of the same experience? The term social is sometimes applied to mass action simply as such. In this sense of the term, social action might be the blindest sort of conduct, and it might have no regard for other human masses, or even for the individuals who constitute the acting mass. On the other hand, the term individual is sometimes used in a way that suggests, if it does not assume, that individuality can be con- strued without reference to any human interrelatedness. Yet action might conceivably be most highly individualized pre- cisely where it is most highly social, and because it is so. In- dividual welfare might be individual just because it is shared. For separatistic self-regard we already have a special term, "individualistic," but we have no corresponding term for mass action that disregards either individuals or other masses.^ The crowd versus the deliberative group. When we speak of the movement to socialize education we should under- stand, not increase of mass action merely as such, but increase of effective regard for one another — regard of individual for individual, reciprocal regard of the individual for his group and of his group for him, and regard of one group for another. » I! Nationalism," however, is coming to mean something of the sort. 38 THE INDIVIDUAL 39 Now, social living in this sense involves as a basic function in education the disengaging of the individual from the mass, both in the consciousness of the teacher and in that of the pupil. Social education as such indimdualizes men. It is sometimes assumed that if we only induce children to act together in groups we shall thereby socialize them. To forget oneself, and gladly to expend one's energy upon something that brings no private profit has, in the statement of it, an ethical sound. And the sound is not altogether misleading. When a small child is allured beyond the solitary plays of infancy into even the planless romping of an unorganized group of chil- dren he unquestionably makes a social gain. It comes by the way of simple mental contagion or imitation. But soon his play, if it is to continue to be educational, will require some planning, and especially "rules of the game'' and keeping the score, all of which must develop in the players a sharper and sharper realization of one another as individuals. Again, adults as well as children find it wholesome to relax now and then by "letting themselves go" for a while with some crowd that is bent upon innocent enjoyment. But the complementary truth is that in the background even of "letting go" there can and should be some " choosing of our crowd," and some trained tastes with respect to what constitutes fun. Within mass action we must therefore discriminate two main types, that of the crowd and that of the deliberative group. A crowd is made up of persons who in the process of forgetting self forget others also. What so heedless of individual welfare as a mass that is consolidated by forgetting or failing to take notice? What so incapable of appreciating other groups, and therefore so ready for partisanship ? We observe this not only in primitive society, but also close at home, as in the senseless, lawless, sometimes cruel conduct of student crowds and school- boy gangs. It is a trite remark of social psychology that with- out any compunctions of conscience the members of a crowd often conduct themselves as nothing would induce them to do when they act singly. In a deliberative group, on the other hand, mass action — 40 THE INDIVIDUAL so far is it from the crowd type — stimulates rather than sup- presses reflectiveness and regard for others. In fact, we have here mass action that arises and maintains itself precisely by promoting individuality. This is seen most distinctly, perhaps, in groups that have formal rules of order. Here, preliminary to each common act, the entire mass "pauses, the chairman say- ing: 'Are there any remarks?' Then, as if challenging each individual to full self-expression, he asks: *Are you ready for the motion?' This procedure has been devised so as to pre- vent action under suggestion. Individual inhibitions are not avoided or suppressed, but invited, spread out- for inspection, often acted upon separately by dividing the question or by voting upon proposed amendments."^ The same social prin- ciple appears in many groups of a less formal character. Thus, a kindergartner offers to retell the story that is best liked, whereupon one child says: "I like this one best," and another child: "I like that one." "How many Hke this one best?" says the kindergartner, "And how many that one? Why do you think it the best?" and then she acts according to the deliberate preference of the majority. Similarly a recitation can often take the form of a mass opinion of the deliberative sort on what "we should do next." In this way classes are led, in actual practice, to assign their own lessons and to agree upon one another's proper grade. Let it be noted, now, that children of school age act in crowds without any assistance or training from their elders, but that without such assistance the deliberative type of sociality lags. The needs of the situation are not met by merely guiding crowd action toward worthy ends — the group's mode of action must be transformed into co-operative deliberation. There is no security for worthy ends short of the habit of considering others' points of view. Without such consideration party government becomes tyrannical. Therefore, education for society must consist in no small measure in replacing crowd action, and susceptibility to crowd influences, by deliberative 1 1 have discussed these distinctions more at length in chap. VIII of The Psychology of Religion (Chicago, 1916). THE INDIVIDUAL 41 / groupings and by habitual readiness for reflective co-opera- Motive, as well as knowledge and skill, must become a conscious possession of the pupil. A socialized education will have four immediate aims: (1) That the pupil shall ac- quire control of the tools and methods of social intercourse, such as language, number, and various social forms and con- ventions. (2) That he shall be favorably introduced to society through happy acquaintance with the sciences, liter- ature, and the arts, and through participation in the present social life. (3) That he shall be trained for an occupation. (4) That the motives of his conduct, that is, his own individually appreciated and chosen ends, shall be intelligently socialized. All four of these aims are included in the educational aspira- tions of the day, but the putting of aspiration into articulated theory and practice has not proceeded equally in the four directions. The problem of scales of values, oi inmost loyalties, _of life purposes — of this germinating centre of every growing character — this is the educational problem that teachers are taught least about, and it is the one with respect to which their plans and methods are least definite and consistent. Along with constant proclamation of the ethical or social pur- pose of the schools there goes disagreement, as well as much hazi- ness, as to the particular ends and processes of moral education. In practice there are corresponding hesitation, delay, frag- mentariness, and opposition of methods. Some phases of the problem of "direct or indirect'' methods in moral education must be postponed to a later chapter. But we cannot complete our present sketch of the social conception of education without a preliminary statement upon the point. The social aim in education includes the purpose to produce individual self -guidance toward the social good. Now, such self-guidance implies both knowledge of social causes and effects, and preference for certain effects as against others. Preference for social good implies resistance to natural, in- stinctive selfishness. How, then, can we train children to open- eyed social conduct unless we train them in social motives or 42 THE INDIVIDUAL preferences; and how can there be discrimination of social ends unless one thinks about one's own relation to the social whole and recognizes one's own tendencies to selfishness? Self-conquest is an inevitable phase of social education. This point of view implies, of course, that the ethically good has some reference to the consequences of conduct. Ethi- cal theories that deny this, holding that duty and the good will are something in themselves regardless of satisfactions of any sort, or that the goodness of an act is measurable by some quality of the impulse whence it springs — a quality that can be defined without any reference to the foreseen results of the act — are largely responsible for the confusion that prevails in educational thinking and practice with respect to moral growth. Though these types of ethical philosophy are generally giving way before others that define the good, and duty, and the good will in terms of social satisfactions and social progress, the educational significance of the change has not fully dawned upon the schools. We may sum up the matter by saying that the pupil must be led to form conscious life purposes, not by comparing himself with some abstract ideal of duty or of per- fection, but by considering the consequences of conduct, espe- cially in the welfare or illfare of others. The educational use of rules and of authority. What has just been said gives us a clew to the proper and the improper use of rules and of authority in the school. At least four theories of the matter exist in various mixtures : (1) Rules are necessary because a school cannot do its work without them. True; but how did the teacher become competent to prescribe rules, and how shall these children in their turn be worthy to control the system of education? Parental authority, it is often said, should be so exercised as to make itself unnecessary in the life of the child as early as possible. Does not the same principle - apply to schools ? (2) We know what is good for children better than they can know; therefore we prescribe for them. No doubt we do know better; but wouldn't it be worth while to bring them up so that they will ultimately know even better than we do what is good for children ? If so, what about simply THE INDIVIDUAL 43 imposing our present ideas ? (3) Human experience has settled some things, and to these the children simply must conform. Let us have no ifs or ands here, especially a child's. Yes, we have learned some things by experience. But does it seem likely that a child can learn them by the utterly different sort of experience that the mere enforcement of rules brings him? How are you to make him see and know that the foundations of existing social customs and institutions are sound? And if he does not see, but instead is confronted with what seems to him to be mere power, what is likely to happen? (4) Some things are eternally right, and they simply must be. But is the eternally right actually realized in anything short of the free loyalty of the heart? Moreover, who determines what is eternally right ? Do you maintain that capacity for apprehend- ing it has disappeared from the earth never to return? Do you hold that this capacity belongs to one class or set of individ- uals exclusively? Unless we intend to have a permanent cleft in society be- tween those who command and those who obey, we must, it is now evident, so employ rules and authority that they shall be continuously passing into something else as the child grows. The primary function of some rules, as those that con- cern firearms and explosives, may be simply protection of life. But the educational use of any rule lies essentially in furnishing the conditions that are most favorable for deliberative group action. What is required in one case may be postponement of action until reflection can set in, or until other individuals can be heard from. In other cases rules and authority may so dispose satisfactions and dissatisfactions that difficult social conduct is made easier and unsocial conduct less easy. This is not an approval of either anarchy or the sugar-coating of duty so as ta conceal its real nature. What is here insisted upon is that pupils shall be able as individuals to find present social meaning and value in their contacts with society in the person of the teacher. Whatever confronts the child at first as a sheer necessity (the occasions for which are far less frequent than we ordinarily suppose) must, even as he faces it, melt into stimulus 44 THE INDIVIDUAL to the use of his own judgment in ways that are social and pleasurable.^ A social interpretation of the sacredness of personality. Something fine, and in its way social, is represented in the phrase, "the sacredness of personality." It means at least this, that we are to place some checks upon our conduct sim- ply because other persons are affected by it. But the "sacred" or "set apart" may be more or less closely related to taboo. Does an exalted view of the rights of persons imply that there is in each individual something that belongs to him in such an exclusive sense that it ought to be kept to himself, forever un- shared? Shall we not hold, rather, that personality is sacred precisely because in free individuality, and in it alone, can soci- ety fully realize itself ? Personality is sacred, not from society, but to society. Therefore nothing over which the individual has control is to remain unshared. There is to be no purely private affair.2 Society, if it is wise, will, indeed, encourage individual initiative, and also the reticence that keeps the common good in the foreground, and not-yet-socialized impulse in the back- ground. Moreover, intimacies that only a few can share, as in the family, will be encouraged, but only as far as their own happy realization makes also for the wider social good. The right of private property will be understood, not as a natural right with which one's fellows must not interfere, but as an in- strument of society for the nourishment and education of its members, particularly in families. The educational applications of this conception of person- ality are direct and vital. First, it tends to take officialism 1 On the playground of a certain elementary school the penalty for foul playing and for lying is a week's exclusion from the plays. But the whole management of the playground is such that even this drastic rule expresses the social consciousness of the players. Result: Remarkable objectivity of judgment concerning both one's own play and that of others, gentlemanly acceptance of one another's word, correct scoring, and relative absence of dis- putes. I have witnessed true sportsmanship, and unclouded happiness in it, among boys of eight and nine years who were thus privileged. 2 The evils of self-involution have been made strikingly evident by various branches of the psychotherapeutic movement. Merely to open one's whole mind to another, whether physician or priest, often brings relief, inner eman- cipation, and fresh social capacities. THE INDIVIDUAL ' 45 out of the pupil-teacher relation, as it does also out of parental government. Only a part of the teacher's business can be put into a schedule of specific tasks to be performed, such as sub- jects to be taught with this or that degree of efficiency. No interest of a pupil or phase of his life is foreign to the true teacher, for everything in every child — everything — is sacred to society. On the other hand, everything in the teacher also is sacred, and therefore to be shared in due season. The teacher and the man are not two. The teacher-pupil relation is that of reciprocal self-realization by the sharing of experience. Happy the teachers — there are many of them — who through their occupation have obtained not only a living but also life ! Education, being an agency of justice, looks beyond social averages. In the juvenile court, as we saw, justice to the offending child takes the form of education. Why should this be considered exceptional? Is not education as a whole the bringing home to each child of what is his due in view of ^ the upbinding of his life with that of his fellows? Therefore the exceptional child, whether a backward pupil or an unusually gifted one, is entitled to exceptional teaching. In the end this will mean, of course, adaptation to every individual, and therefore important modifications of class teaching. We shall thus discover that talent exists in certain "classes" of the population in greater measure, and in other "classes" in smaller measure, than has been supposed. Education will discover favorable variations, and bring them to social fruitage. Enormous social waste exists at present because individual talent goes undiscovered through childhood, and then is smothered by too early entrance into the industries. And there is ground for more than a suspicion that the students who attend our institutions of higher education, where the expenditure per pupil is highest, are not being selected for this post out of the whole people by rigorous demonstration either of superior talent or of superior social spirit in the use of talents.^ 1 Emancipation of the schools from the fallacy of social averages would help to rid us of it in other directions. What is the social significance of such statements as that the average wealth of the United States is so or so much per person ? Or that the average wage in a given industry or industrial estab- 46 THE INDIVIDUAL Shall the individual exist for the state ? The concept of national efficiency, which the present war has brought to our attention with unprecedented force, is a challenge to educa- tional theory and practice in every land that boasts the free- dom of its citizens. Can efficiency of the mass be achieved by education that disengages the individual consciousness, and puts it into the attitude of mutual deliberation? Must not national policies be settled long before the people can arrive at a deliberate social judgment? Must not minorities be ignored and even repressed lest they draft off energy from the main purpose? Must not even majorities be circumvented at times because they are clumsy and not overwise ? In short, does not national efficiency ultimately depend upon applying human energy approximately after the manner of a machine? Will not the advantage always be on the side of a mechanized group as against any group in which the members have ideas of their own and a will of their own with respect to the work that they do ? Thoughts like these, which are now in the air, put in jeopardy what is most vital to our educational progress. If national and international groupings are not to be of the deliberative type; if society is to consist, even for a part of the time, of masses of men regimented in body and mind, the result will be that in times of excitement, when deliberation is most necessary, the group will become a mere crowd with its impetuous and ruth- less mode of action. This view of national efficiency implies, of course, corresponding regimentation within the industries. Signs are not lacking that this implication is at least partly understood by some of the "captains of industry." They lishment is so or so much per piece, per hour, or per day ? Or that the general level of wages has risen a certain amount in a given period ? An industrial commission recently listened to an argument for seven-day labor in a certain steel-mill on the ground that the average time ofif is, or will be, as much as one day in seven anyway. Shall we base a minimum wage for men upon the average family, or for women upon the average cost of decent Uving for a woman upon whom no one is dependent ? There is no room for doubt that we are concealing social truth from ourselves by thinking of mankind as made up of masses, classes, and averages. The average man, or pupil, or welfare, is a mental construct of statisticians. To govern education or the conditions of social welfare by mere averages is to render oiu* dealings with actual men and actual pupils more or less fictitious and unjust. THE INDIVIDUAL 47 should reflect that regimentation of labor means ultimately crowd action by laborers. It is possible to cling to the semblance of freedom when the soul of it has departed. Not all submission is irksome. The members of any crowd feel emancipated when unreflective contagion is at its height; at the moment when a designing leader makes tools of them, they imagine that he leads by virtue of their free choice. This is the pseudofreedom of irresponsibility. It may easily seem preferable to the birth- pangs of real liberty. Let us not be blind to the possibility that, under the influence of some nation-wide emotion, our public schools, instead of going steadily forward toward de- mocracy, which must be deliberative, may be made instruments for fastening upon the people one or another class control concealed under such specious concepts as efficiency, patriot- ism, and self-sacrifice.^ The cost of a socialized education. We have reached the conclusion that socialized education, precisely because it is social, must be individualized. The alternatives that have to be considered are not "social vs. individual," but "social vs. individualistic," and "society vs. a class within itself." In- 1 Do we realize the import, as respects our liberties, of the recent merciless hazing of militiamen to compel them to enter the military service of the United States, the hazers and the hazed both being mider miUtary command at the time ? In the free land to the north of us a newspaper was suspended by military order because of an editorial opinion that Canada had already furnished her proper quota of soldiers for the European war, and that en- listments should cease. In the same land a recruiting officer may accost a citizen upon the streets, and tease him any number of times, but if a citizen repUes disrespectfully he subjects himself to legal penalties. It is a fair question whether war can be engaged in by any free people without sacrifice of liberty within its own borders. For, must not miUtary control extend not only to industries and to consumption, but also to communication between men, which is a fundamental process in any popvilar government ? Is it not of the essence of war to repress criticism of military acts and poUcies ? Repres- sion begins by egging on those who are willing to hm-l disrespectful epithets at their fellow citizens. This of itself interferes with conditions that are necessary to the life of a deliberative group. But this informal censorship, which is of the crowd type, is crowned by a legaUzed censorship which, what- ever its conscious purpose, has the effect of party government maintaining its policies and perpetuating its control by force. The inference to be drawn from this is that government by the people has a vital interest in discovering some way to end war forever. There will be no security for democracy until peace is assured. This^truth has educational consequences the full considera- tion of which must be postponed to another chapter. 48 THE INDIVIDUAL dlvidualistlc education need not be costly, but individualized education must be. For, first, It will require educational diag- nosis, and educational adaptation, with respect to each pupil, and therefore a larger budget; second, it will undertake the hard- est of educational tasks, which is the production of self-sacrifice, and therefore will call for the highest training of teachers; third, it will make the new generation discontented with the social-economic order. Let us consider for a moment the third of these items, and In a subsequent paragraph return to the second. To make children deliberately social implies In the first place that impulsive good-heartedness must be transformed into steady, reflective good-will. It implies, further, that mere rules of conduct toward others, as giving money or goods to the unfortunate, are to be supplemented by a habit of reflection upon the situation of others as Individuals, that is, a habit of putting oneself in their place. This will lead straight to the question, Why should their situation be what It Is ? Why need there be poverty ? Why^ is there so much sickness ? Is there sufficient knowledge, and are there anywhere sufficient re- sources to remove in any large measure the causes of poverty and of disease? If so, why are not knowledge and resources applied to these primary human necessities? What is it that stands in the way of the widest distribution of human welfare ? When we teach the young to think socially they will not re- gard social classes and economic class conditions as naturally predetermined and static, but rather as a sphere for the de- liberate justice that values human life supremely, and that values things and even rights only as they actually minister to life. Moreover, such teaching, with its tendency to produce deliberative group action, will lead the inheritors and the dis- inherited to sit together In calm judgment upon the justice of their respective situations, and upon the possibility of a more ,just, that is to say humane, distribution of opportunities for adequate living. The result is bound to be discontent with the existing social order. It is futile to think that any effective teaching of de- THE INDIVIDUAL 49 mocracy, or of the supreme value of human Hfe, will leave un- challenged the present control which a few exercise over the conditions of life — mental and moral as well as bodily life — of the many. The outcome must be, not alone increased doing for others, but also surrender into their own hands of the means to do for themselves. Not less than this will be the cost of a really socialized education. Consequences with respect to the theory of interest. The doctrine of interest in education, stated most generally, runs to the effect that the material of instruction must be chosen and graded, and methods of teaching devised, so that the activities of the pupil in the learning process will produce spontaneous pleasure, and therefore be performed from free internal impulsion rather than from external pressure emanating from the teacher. The pupil is not to be driven, but led; and he is not to be led by any and everything but by the inherent value of the material or of the enterprise from his own point of view. At first sight this may seem to imply "soft pedagogy," which follows the whims of the child, letting him do what he likes instead of seeing that he does what is good for him. This would be the consequence if children were shut up by nature to a single interest at each period of time. But as a matter of fact diversity and mobility of interest are prime characteristics of childhood. The educator always has several possible interests between w^hich to choose, and therefore it is possible to feed one repeatedly while allowing another to atrophy from lack of exercise. This is not the same as following a child's whims, nor is it equivalent to indulging him in doing what is easy and avoiding what is hard. On the contrary, the theory of interest requires us to put before the pupil what is inherently so attractive that he will work hard with a feeling that the enterprise belongs to him as a part of himself. This individualizing of what one is doing as one's very own is essen- tially what we mean by interest. In point of technic the first requirement for social education is socialization of the habitual interests of the pupil with re- spect to his school work. This implies, first of all, choosing 50 THE INDIVIDUAL material of instruction and arranging the conditions of school life so that instinctive social satisfactions shall be the basal ones. But this is not all. The pupil must be helped to ad- vance beyond the unreflectlve level of instinct. He must be led up to the point of self-denial. He must be Initiated into the great paradox of personality, which Is, ability, after facing an easier and a harder alternative, to choose the harder as one's very own, and thus determine where one's satisfactions shall He. The social way is not that of smug self-security through canny control of others, but of self-sacrifice for them. We shall never stabilize human relations by playing off one selfish in- terest against another, but only by freely sacrificing selfish interest, only by taking into one's individual will the very thing that opposes it. Here is where the teacher's view of interest in education will meet its severest test. Shall the last appeal to the pupil be addressed to selfish interest, or to unselfish ? Can the teacher reveal in his own conduct, and demonstrate to the pupils by their own guided experiments in living, that to live we must lose our individualistic life ? PART II THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY REQUIRES SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION CHAPTER V THE AIMS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION Traditions as to the aim of Christian education. The aim has been conceived in all of the following ways: (1) That the purpose is to instruct the child in the things that a Christian ought to know. Back of this purpose lies an assumption that our religion consists primarily of a completed, authoritative revelation concerning God and duty that needs merely to be handed down from generation to generation. (2) That the purpose is to prepare the child for full member- *' ship iri the church. This definition rests upon such assump- tions as that the church is the authoritative expositor and ad- ministrator of the fixed revelation just referred to, or that the will of God is to be done on earth by drawing men into a par- ticular society of the saved. (3) That the purpose is to save the child's soul here and here- after. Behind this lie the dogmas of depravity, guilt, and re- demption out of the world as distinguished from redemption of the world. (4) That the purpose is unfoldment of religious capacities,- or of a germinal di\ane life, already within the individual. Here we witness the influence of idealism, with its doctrine of the eternal within the temporal, the infinite in the finite, and with its maxims regarding free self-expression. (5) That the purpose is the production of Christian char- ■ acter. This may mean any one of several different things according to the view that is taken of "Christian character." In the statement as it stands there is, for example, no discrimi- nation between the notion of a merely individual goodness or merely individual relation to God, on the one hand, and the 53 64 THE AIMS contradictory view that genuine goodness can never be merely individual and that the Christian God permits no merely in- dividual reconciliation with him. Without denying that in each of these aims there is some- thing that is worthy of permanence, we may assert that they do not, either singly or collectively, do justice to the social ideal- ism that characterizes the most vigorous Christian thought of the day. The ideal of a democracy of God as the determinant of ultimate ends. I use the term "democracy of God*' in place of "kingdom of God," not because I desire to substitute a new social principle for that which Jesus taught, but because the idea of democracy is essential to full appreciation of his teach- ing. After making all needful allowances for the influence of contemporary political and religious conditions upon his modes of speech and the content of his thought — allowances that are to be determined by New Testament criticism — the fact re- mains that his desire for a brotherhood of men leads on with the inevitableness of fate to the ideal of a democratic organiza- tion of human society, and that his fusion of divine with human love presents us with a divine-human democracy as a final social ideal. Without doubt this view of the Christian life has been hast- ened by our experiments in popular government, and by our experience of social strains connected with the new economic order. These modern factors have contributed to Christian thought partly by challenging social conditions and assump- tions that had been accepted by Christian teaching as the very sphere in which the Christian life is to be lived. Instead of being a Christian within these limitations, we are asked why we should not remove the limitations. The virtue of feeding the hungry, for example, loses something of its impressiveness un- less it is combined with determination to find and remove the causes of poverty. A re-examination of prophetism, the teach- ings of Jesus included, has made it clear that thinking upon ethical problems, and upon the will of God, in terms of social causes and effects belongs within Christian teaching; it is not THE AIMS 55 merely a modern accretion or fashion. On the other hand, mod- ern conditions have helped to reveal the mind of Christ by dis- pla^'ing more significant outlets for the ancient sentiment of brotherly love. When the business relations of most men were limited to a small circle of neighbors, good will seemed, naturally enough, to find its circumference in the misfortunes that fell under one's own eye. But the enlargement of our social horizon by the enormous increase of human intercourse, together with the realization that a man's ballot counts simply because he is a man, reflects itself in a vast enlargement of meaning in the command that we love our neighbors as ourselves. Therefore such questions as the following are becoming a prime "V concern of Christian tliought: If one human life outweighs a \ world, as Jesus taught, what should we do with a social order j that stunts multitudes of human lives for the sake of money, and does it, not by disobedience to the laws of the state, but under the protection of laws and of courts ? How can we really believe in human brotherhood if we are willing to acquiesce in a stratification of society into the servers and the served, the rulers and the ruled? Moreover, if brotherly love is, as our religion has always taught, the carrying out of the Father's loving will in human relations, how can the Father himself be willing to be an autocrat, an aristocrat, or a plutocrat? Must not Christians think of God as being within human society in the democratic manner of working, helping, sacrificing, per- suading, co-operating, achieving? "My Father worketh even until now, and I work." Divine love, it appears, cannot ^realize itself anywhere but in a genuine industrial democracy. Granted this social idealism as the interpretation of the life that now is, the aim of Christian education becomes this : Growth of the young toward and into mature and efficient devotion to the democracy of God, a7id happy self-realization therein. The aim is growth because there is now no separation be- tween human society and divine, and because the rudimentary conditions of human society are already provided for in our social instincts. 56 THE AIMS The aim is devotion to a cause, not the attainment of a status. Whoever thinks that Christian education has achieved its main end with any pupil when it has led him to cross a line that separates the saved from the unsaved — whoever thinks this misses the meaning of love. Love is active, outgoing. The lover accepts no security that does not include his loved ones. Moreover, because the aim is active devotion, Christian edu- cation does not consist primarily in the transference of a set of ideas from one generation to another, but rather in the cultiva- tion of intelligent will. When our will is in accord with the loving purpose of God, we have the good heart, the life that is from above. Though the goodness of such a will must be measured by its intent rather than by its power, the only test for the Christian education of the will lies in increase of the social efficiency of our pupils. There can be no successful Christian education that does not increase the amount of effective, not merely senti- mental, brotherhood in the world. Efficiency in achieving these ends must be measured by con- crete evidence such as health, food, laws, ballot-boxes, homes, streets, schools, happy children, and happy husbands and wives. Patience or any other virtue on a pedestal is unconvincing. ^' In and through his growing participation in the creation of an ideal society the pupil will realize his fellowship with the Father. Not by release from toil or from the turmoil of social endeavor, not by any retirement within himself as an individual, will the growing child achieve a mature Christian experience, but only by doing God's social will even to the point of suffering with him.^ In this losing of his individualism the pupil will gain life. He will gain it, not in the ascetic sense of despising satisfactions, * This does not deny all value to times of retirement. When they are not a method of evading or forgetting the issue, but of gathering up one's powers to meet it, they are as Christian as hours of active labor. Moreover, eesthetic contemplation of nature or of art is a fitting thing for a child of God whenever it does not separate itself from the purpose of putting all of God's children into possession of their proper eesthetic heritage. THE AIMS 57 not in the mystical sense of denying value to the individual, but in the social sense of individual satisfactions that are height- ened because they are shared. Everything that is worth while, from health to good music, from play to scientific learning, from food to friendship, will be most worth while when the dis- tribution of it is most wide. Here will be found Christian peace because feverish calculation of benefits to one's little self has ceased. Here will grow Christian joy in a fellowship of endeavor so profound that it can rejoice even in tribulation. Here hope lifts up its head unabashed by the vastness of time and the tragic frailty of life. This is the life of faith, which is the iden- tification of one's very self with ideal good. Social issues of the present as determiners of the end. When we ask a Sunday-school teacher what he is trying to accomplish with his class, the reply that we commonly receive is that he is endeavoring to make his pupils Christians. But if we examine the text-book that is in use, or listen to the con- versation between teacher and pupil during the class session, or observe the general exercises of the school, how much con- sciousness do we find of the concrete situations wherein lie the issues of to-day between the love of the Father and the love of the world? In most cases we behold an effort to make pupils Christians in a general, unfocalized sense, which is almost certain to encourage a private, ineffective sort of goodness. The expression of this goodness in palliative benevolence may even beget self-deception as to the Christian quality of one's character. Softening the inhumane results of an unjust social order can partially, but not adequately, represent the Christian purpose. Let us teach pupils to respond heartily to the call of distress, but let us not lull them into spiritual slumber by rep- resenting charitableness as the luxury of the good. We must reveal the terrible meaning of love. Suppose that parental love should suddenly acquire power to deal as it likes with everything that blasts or stunts the life of offspring; sup- pose that wives and husbands could deal as love would dictate with every human condition that tends to break up the happi- ness of families; suppose that a neighbor could do as a neigh- 58 THE AIMS bor would like to do with everything that injures one's neigh- bor; suppose that welfare workers could control the causes of illfare; suppose that every business and business method, every law, all civil and criminal administration were to be halted until it could prove that it is an expression of human good will; suppose that love in all these relations should suddenly insist upon having its way — ^what wreckage of our social as- sumptions and standards should we witness ! Religious educa- tion must bring to the light, discredit, undermine, attack, these assumptions and standards. It must be clear in its own mind that the vocation of the Christian is not to be as benevolent as an unbenevolent occupation permits, but also to re-create the social system that tends to restrict the sphere of good will 1 in his daily occupation. The social issues of the present, then, • must be taken as the call of God to our pupils, and as the sphere of entire consecration to the will of God. These issues may be conveniently classified under three heads: (1) Social welfare, which has to do with the control of the non-human environment in the interest of human life. Here belong relief work of every kind; the fight against disease, especially at the present moment against tuberculosis, syphilis, and gonorrhea; the fight against the saloon; the struggle for proper housing; for adequate wages ; for good conditions of labor; for short hours of labor; for provision against accidents, illness, unemployment, and old age, and for facilities for cul- ture and for recreation. (2) Social justice, which has to do with each man as a factor in the life of some other man. Justice to the child means the abolition of child labor, provision for the best education, pro- vision for play, and protection from unwholesome influences. Justice as respects family relations implies a life-and-death fight against the disintegrating influences that are all too evi- dent. Justice to the citizen requires that he be enfranchised in fact and not merely in form, and that partisanship and civic corruption, both of which circumvent and depress the franchise, be overcome. Justice with respect to the criminal requires that society shall requite his evil with good — the good of oppor- THE AIMS 59 tunity for a better life and help toward it — and that the mak- ing of criminals by social forces shall stop. Justice to each man as a man commands that we find ways to rebuild our indus- trial and economic system, which at present invites each man to grab what he can of the free gifts of nature, and then to grab what he can of the products of other men's toil. A brotherly economic order will be vastly different from regu- lated grabbing, mere selfishness made respectable by rules of moderation; it will be nothing less than love employing law as a means for securing the maximum benefit of every person in the industrial commonwealth. (3) ^ world society, or the regulation of the conduct of each social group with respect to other groups in such a way as to promote the integration of all mankind into a single, demo- cratically governed brotherhood. What justice requires from each individual in his relations with his neighbor is required also from each nation in its relations with other nations. The idea of the sovereignty, that is to say the irresponsibility, of the state may possibly represent a stage in the social integra- tion of men, and therefore not a fall from brotherhood but progress toward it. But the same is true of tribal morals. Like tribal society, nationalism is at best nothing more than a step in a stairway; to pause here as though we had reached finality is as unjust as to rest in prenational achievements. Patriotism must melt into a larger regard for men. Is it not monstrous to find twentieth-century Christians less cosmo- politan than the ancient non-Christian maxim: "Nothing hu- man is foreign to me"? Religious education must take up as one of its specific tasks the production in its pupils of a world- consciousness controlled by a sense of justice. Amelioration of the horrors of war, important as it is, is not enough. War does not merely happen to us, like earthquakes and tidal waves; it is rather a climactic expression of the selfish- ness, that is to say the injustice, that is organized in our legal systems and our national sovereignties. It is a part of the same economic grab that erects seizure of natural resources into a right to them, and then makes laborers into hirelings. 60 THE AIMS The inner reality of war, of armaments, of national sovereignty, and of national policies that seem to render armaments neces- sary must all be revealed to our pupils so that they shall enlist — heart, conscience, intelligence — in a lifelong, never-relaxing crusade against the legalized injustice that underlies them all, and for positive measures for organizing good will on a world- wide scale. Nothing less than this can be the will of God, who is love. Are the social issues of the present the affair of adults only, or of children also ? It seems to be taken for granted that if the specific social issues of the present are to be intro- duced into the Sunday-school curriculum at all, the proper place for them is in the adult class or at most in the later years of adolescence. Up to this point the instruction and training are directed to the formation of such good habits as obedience, truthfulness, and fair play; induction into such exercises as private prayer and public worship, and into such enterprises as missions; and a meagre introduction to social welfare in the form of relief of the poor, the sick, and other sufferers, and in some instances in the form of the fight against the saloon. Not ^a word is ordinarily said to children and young people with respect to the enormous extent of poverty and the reasons there- for, nor as to the reasons why preventable sickness is so prev- alent, nor as to the interest of fundamental justice in such current events as labor disputes and international friction. There is, probably, a sincere belief that tender minds should be shielded from the luridness of the contrast between Fifth Avenue and First Avenue, and between the multimillionaire and his employees. These are felt to be the hard problems of maturity, not at all subject-matter for the instruction of children. But let us not deceive ourselves. While we thus sleep the enemy sows tares. From infancy the pupil is in contact with the social order as it is; through this contact he is forming habits, and not only habits, but also the presuppositions of his thinking with respect to men and society. He meets the industrial system in many cases in the family "servant," THE AIMS 61 and in all cases in the various purveyors of the goods that the family consumes. He forms very early in life his notions of buying, selling, bargaining, and employing. The current ideas as to what constitutes success he takes as his own just as a sponge soaks up water. The unrighteous standards all about him constantly whisper: "This is real life; this is what hu- man nature is; this is what everybody does; grab your share !" He gets acquainted with newspapers and with newspaper morality long before the Sunday school even mentions problems of social righteousness. He is aware of the general run of cur- rent events, and he interprets them incautiously under the in- fluence of whatever social standard happens to get his ear. If, then, education postpones mentioning these great issues until the near approach of maturity, it has to correct social pre- suppositions and purposes already formed. Shall we forever go on making the foolish assumption that the ^(Vill of the child remains neutral for years and years with regard to the con- test between justice and injustice ? Shall we go on postponing in education what is not and cannot be postponed in the child's social experience? Some consequences of not focussing the pupiPs atten- tion upon concrete social issues. Ethical reality is found in social relations, and nowhere else. Here and here only are the issues of conscience and of character. Hence it is that, when the ideals that religious education seeks to inculcate lack social insight and breadth, results like these follow: (1) The pupil is led to struggle against faults conceived as simply his own instead of for co-operative objects that will super- sede his faults and help some one else at the same time. Whenever we lead a child to think that he alone is blameworthy for his faults, we err as to the facts. A faulty will, as distinguished from mere inexperience, always involves a conjoint fault in which adults have some share. The child has taken on the selfish ways of adults, and then been blamed for doing so; or adults have indulged or neglected childish impulses that require training; or adults have misunderstood and mistrained him. The cure for these conjoint faults is not introversion of the 62 THE AIMS child mind, but enlargement of social outlook and purpose, particularly in co-operation with adults. (2) The pupil is led into unwholesome, sometimes paralyzing introspection of the ups and downs of his inner life, or into fruit- less reflection upon his status in the eyes of God. That is, religious education that ought to fix the pupil's attention upon the things that express the outgoing, self-forgetting character of the Father, does exactly the contrary. Consequently pupils form petty and distorted notions of the divine. God is taken to be a taskmaster, or spy, or aristocrat instead of a worker with whom all workers can have fellowship, and from whom all can get help. (3) The machinery of the church, and exercises that go on within church buildings acquire undue prominence as compared with the influence that the church has upon the world that sur- rounds it. Ecclesiasticism, it is true, readily associates itself with remedial charity even to the point of noble self-sacrifice. But this is not the same as devotion to justice in the broadly human sense, which is also the broadly divine and democratic sense. On this broad basis churchmanship, and all ecclesias- tical zeal and loyalty, have to be judged, like the love of one's country, by their tendency to pass or not to pass through all narrower societies into world society. (4) The pupil is led to separate his daily occupation, the sphere in which he makes a living or accumidates property, from his Christian vocation. Instead of trying to Christianize his busi- ness, he endeavors to be a Christian in business. Consequently he imagines that he fulfils the law of love when he gives away, by his own arbitrary act, some part of a product that is due to the joint labor of many besides himself. If wealth be his, he is taught to think of himself as a divinely appointed steward, even though traces of God's love are not obvious in the process whereby the wealth was accumulated. The point of this is not that one should blame oneself or be blamed by others for doing business in the only ways that are possible at the present time. Accumulation of property does not neces- sarily imply accumulation of individual sinfulness, for the fault THE AIMS 63 IS a conjoint one. In every business that is conducted under our present system of competition in profit taking, the owner has associated with him all the social forces that make and administer our laws, all those that create rigid business cus- toms, yes, earlier generations that have bequeathed to us their own ideas and ways. What is to be expected of the Christian business man is that he will not only be generous as generosity is measured under our capitalistic presuppositions, but that he will also be just by doing everything within his power to curb and ultimately make impossible the exploitation of human life for the sake of profits. The real function of every business must be held to be, not the greatest possible concentration in the control of goods, which are conditions of welfare, but the greatest possible increase and the widest possible distribution of welfare itself. To hold business to this function is one of the fundamental phases of any real Christianization of the world. In the daylight of a purpose like this, what a shadowy thing is the private goodness upon which the attention of our pupils has been traditionally fixed I r / CHAPTER VI THE FIRST ESSENTIALS OF AN EDUCATIONAL PLAN We have seen that the social ideahsm of Christianity pre- scribes for reHgious education as an ultimate goal the trans- formation of a social order that is largely unjust into one that shall be wholly just, and that, consequently, religious educa- tion must enter directly, not merely by distant implication, into the social struggles of the present. Let us now see how this large purpose can become a guiding principle for determining the main essentials of an educational plan. It is hardly necessary to argue again that to socialize the group we must individualize the pupils, that is, lead each one to adopt justice as his very own desire, purpose, and practice. This involves four aspects of religious growth, and provision therefor. I. Provision for growth in knowledge of the Christian ideal, and of the means and methods whereby it is gradually securing control of social forces. The function of the curric- ulum maker is to select and systematize such knowledge; the function of the text-book maker is to prepare it in some detail with reference to the established principles of the learn- ing process; the function of the teacher is to effect the assimila- tion of this material by particular pupils with their individual capacities and needs. The whole may be called instruction. (1) The aim of instruction is not to impose truth but to pro- mote growth. The whole teaching enterprise is to be brought under the notion of growth — of vital, not mechanical proc- esses. Hence the term "instruction" must be emptied of its traditional implication of telling pupils what to believe. To impose our beliefs upon a child, even though the beliefs be 64 THE FIRST ESSENTIALS 65 utterly true, is not to promote the growth of a free personality — it may even be an invasion of personality; it may subject one individual to another instead of emancipating each and every one into full membership in a self-governing society, the de- mocracy of God. To argue that we already possess the truth, since it has been revealed, and that therefore we ought to impose beliefs upon children, betrays an interesting confusion. The elements with which the argument deals are three: The truth, the pupil, and the teacher who is supposed to bring these two together. What, now, if the teacher is unable to eliminate himself from the finished product? What if the teacher comes between the pupil's mind and the truth, and stays there? This, in fact, does happen when the attempt to impose beliefs is most success- ful. WTien pupils are tractable, what is the authority to which they submit — what is it, that is, from their own point of view ? It is the Sunday-school teacher, the pastor, the text-book, or tradition in the form of hearsay. Even if we train the pupil to say sincerely that it is the Pope, the church, or the Bible to which he submits, this say-so of his is our own handiwork; we have interposed ourselves between the pupil and reality, and we have no guarantee that the truth becomes his own possession. The whole notion of transferring ready-made thoughts to the mind of another is psychologically fallacious. When a pupil trustingly repeats our formulae after us, and even when he sincerely believes that he grasps and holds as his own the truth that the formulae represent, what really happens is that he is moved by social forces to conform to the group that surrounds him and to separate himself by pseudoknowledge from other men. What we have here is neither knowledge nor belief in any vital sense, but partisanship. This kind of instruction in childhood produces not only in Catholicism but also in Prot- estantism an easily recognized adult type, the man who settles historical and scientific questions without historical or scientific study, and by the results judges whether his neighbors are sheep or goats. 66 THE FIRST ESSENTIALS (2) What is gradation of material f The essence of instruc- tion is promotion of genuine thinking. Consequently the con- tent of instruction should change with the pupil's growing capacity for thought. Here is the foundation for gradation of material as an unescapable necessity of good teaching. The principle goes deeper than is realized even by many who insist upon it. From the history of religious instruction a ladder like the following might be constructed: First, a fixed and formulated body of doctrine or of ritualistic forms is drilled into the pupil's memory. Second, in order to secure some adaptation to the pupil, the language is simplified, or the formula is abbreviated. Third, still further to help the pupil to understand this material, stories, pictures, and analogies are introduced from outside. Fourth, when the fallacy of the attempt to transfer a whole system of doctrine to child minds becomes unbearably clear, the next move is to select from this system, or from the Scripture, or from ecclesiastical history, traditions, and usages, the parts that seem likely to have the greatest inherent interest for children of each grade, so that a part of the system may be transferred at one age, a part at another, and in due time the whole. Fifth, when the re- ligious growth of the pupil as distinguished from the transfer of a system comes to be accepted as the proper aim of in- struction, a curriculum is constructed by picking out from the same presupposed body of doctrine, history, sacred story, and church usages the parts best adapted to help pupils live religiously on their own level at the different periods of growth. Many teachers have believed that here at last the principle of gradation is completely in control. But is not the ancient fallacy still here in the limitation of the sources when the ma- terial of instruction is drawn? When we have made clear to ourselves what sort of world the Father and we as his chil- dren desire, must not our next concern be that the young also should desire it ? What boots it if they know all Scripture, all doctrine, all church history, and church usages, if they have not both the forward look and the sort of desire that can re- construct a world? What the pupil needs to adjust himself THE FIRST ESSENTIALS 67 to is not anything as it has been, but something as it ought to be. Let the curriculum be drawn from any sort of material — \ Scripture, history, church life and enterprise, the world of the pupil's present experience and of his imagination — anything that will most surely and rapidly make him share in the Father's desire and labor for society. At each point in the child's grow- ing experience, the essential question is : What in all the world is most likely, if we turn his attention to it, to increase his active, intelligent devotion to the Christian purpose? (3) The sources of material for Christian instruction. Two sorts of knowledge are central in Christian instruction, knowl- edge of what the Christian purpose is, and of means and me.thods^ for making it prevail. The Scriptures are to be used as a means to this end, not as an end in themselves, and we must not as- sume in advance that they contain everything that is needful for this vital sort of graded instruction. As a matter of fact, they do not. We might guess as much from the simple consider- ation that nearly all parts of the Bible were written with adults and their problems in mind. But the limitation goes deeper than this. Every biblical writing reflects, to a greater or less extent, the social presuppositions of its own age, presupposi- tions that have to be examined, criticised, and revised. Ele- ments of our own social problems we do find there, indeed, and they are highly instructive, as the land problem, for example. But if we would master the fresh perplexities that have come with the advent of popular government and machine manu- facture, and if we would press toward a democracy of God, we must turn the attention of pupils to many matters that are this side of the biblical horizon. The notion that the Bible contains everything that is needed in Christian instruction is sometimes supported by the asser- tion that if we loved our neighbors as the Bible tells us to do, our whole social problem would be solved. This statement is either a paralytic truism or else it is false. If it means that love, intelligently exercised by all persons concerned, would find a way to cure the ills in question, it is a truism, and it is almost as ineffective as the insight that if we could keep all 68 THE FIRST ESSENTIALS the cells of everybody's lungs functioning properly we could rid the world of pulmonary tuberculosis. On the other hand, if it means that our social ills arise altogether from the fact that men who have faced the issue of justice take the side of injus- tice, it is false. One of the fundamental reasons why we do not love one another more generally and more intelligently is that the conditions under wliich children grow up constitute a training in selfishness and in partisanship. We are prevented from seeing the real issues, and from getting sufficiently ac- quainted with our neighbors to know how capable they and we ^are of disinterested neighborliness. / What we need is not merely to be advised to love men more / regardless of conditions, but also to see clearly that we are sup- I porting social customs and even laws that actually reward self- \ ishness with power and honor. We who would like to love our '^neighbors as ourselves are maintaining systems of social con- trol that actually prevent us from doing it. What ails us is not merely that we have grown up in ignorance of the Scriptures, nor that our hearts are unresponsive to the call of Jesus. How many men and women who are well versed in the Scriptures, and whose loyalty to the Master is unquestioned, nevertheless do not see that Scriptural principles, and particularly the mind of the Master, are vitally concerned in the present struggle for social justice. A glowing inner life of good will and tender- ness and aspiration, a life that feeds daily upon the manna of religious history, is of itself no guarantee of the kind of in- telligence that is necessary for the reconstruction of the world. To produce such intelligence. Christian instruction must turn the attention of pupils directly upon economic, political, and any other social conditions that contradict the spirit of brother- hood, upon successful experiments in social living, and upon outreaching ideals and reforms. This conception of Christian instruction refuses to separate knowledge and belief from the enterprise of living. It assumes that intelligence and active desire should be awakened as a single experience. Yet this is far from implying any narrow-gauge practicality or spiritual fussiness. A social conception of life <^n THE FIRST ESSENTIALS 69 has room, as perhaps no other has, for high valuation of art, nature, Hterature, philosophy, and historical forms of doctrine. The worth of them all grows from being shared, and because the generations are knit together. Everything that can be democratically enjoyed without consequences that are undemo- cratic belongs within the Christian conception of the life that is appropriate to sons of the Highest. "All things are yours." ^ n. Practice in using the tools of the Christian enterprise. Just as a child's social thinking is influenced from infancy by his contacts with society, so his actual practices with respect to others tend from the beginning to become fixed as a per- manent mode of life. Because this practice is constant, there is no neutral period during which specific training in social enterprises must wait. Planned or unplanned training goes on anyhow; the hand is being shaped to some sort of social tools. Habits formed now go deep in respect both to what they include and to what they exclude. For it is by doing some- thing in a given situation that particular elements of it come to our attention. Thus it is that we form habits of noticing or of not noticing the feelings and interests of others. A habit of not noticing is also a habit of not sympathizing. Many an amiable man is callous toward one or another class of his fel- lows, and impermeable to important humanitarian appeals, because in his plastic years he did not acquire the technic of seeing and feeling and acting in such matters. Nothing in Christian education can be more fundamental, therefore, than participation of pupils with one another and with their elders in Christian enterprises, that is, enterprises that aim at social welfare, social justice, and a world society. Re- serving for succeeding chapters various problems of metho( and of organization that are related to this training in the use of social tools, let us now guard against possible miscon- ceptions of its place in a total view of educational ends. Cau- tion is particularly necessary lest "tools'' and "practice" be thought of as something apart from normal social living, as mere preparation for such living. On the contrary, the point is that children obtain the best social training by being a real 70 THE FIRST ESSENTIALS part of the working force of the world. They mature their control of tools not by merely handling them or by brandish- ing them in the air, but by doing some part of the world's work. We as educators are not to place the child in any invented scheme of spiritual gymnastics — things done wholly for the sake of the future — but rather, recognizing the vast variety and scope of social need, we are to admit even little children to partnership with us in the enterprise of meeting it. This is the way for them to acquire not only the mechanics of social work, but also the intelligence and the trained and sympa- thetic perceptions of a mature Christian. What a practical absurdity it is that so many church members should make their first real acquaintance with philanthropies, social reforms, and missions, in mature life, and what wonder is it that inti- mate acquaintance under these conditions is so rare ? m. Preparation for a particular place in society, first in the family, and second in an occupation. The inclusion of domestic and vocational training within religious education is necessitated by the fact, already pointed out, that the love that is justice demands the whole of a man's social allegiance. To help, in his own sphere, to rebuild society is the life-work of every Christian. It is to be foreseen, studied, planned for in the true professional spirit, and with the same regard for tech- nical proficiency that one looks for in a lawyer, a physician, or a mining engineer. This is the spirit that should control marriage, family life, and the procreation and rearing of children. Domestic life is to be governed and tested, not by its contribution to the comfort of the individual members as such, but by its actualiza- tion of the democracy of God within itself, and then by its outgoing influence upon the wider society. Marriage is to be specifically prepared for as a calling of God, and the domestic habits of both husband and wife are to be lifted above mere conventionality, inclination, and happen-so into the sphere of defined social service and efiiciency. The household labor of women, and the bearing and care of children, are to be treated as a professional, skilled occupation — a sphere for ambition, study. THE FIRST ESSENTIALS 71 and social recognition. That women who devote them- selves to these duties have at present so scanty recognition as producers, being regarded as dependents upon their husbands, or as being supported by the industry of another, is a partial indication of the reconstructive work that has to be done by education. It is no new thing to think of all legitimate occupations as so many spheres for the service of God. But one does not serve God in one's occupation any further than one serves human society. God does not require to be fed and clothed; the only thing that we can do for him that he cannot do for himself is to be brothers one to another. Every occupation is to be transformed into a specialized method of an effective brother- hood, and to this end a proper part of every occupation is to help in improving the social standards, including the laws, that apply to it. Our religion dissents profoundly from the world's generally accepted standards. If we were half awake to the radical character of this dissent, we should not accept the cur- rent assumption that vocational studies concern simply the methods of getting certain things done; instead, we should insist that analysis of the human relations involved in any occupa- tion is the fundamental vocational study. Until such analysis is included in our systems of general and vocational education, the churches should themselves provide it for the children and young people who are committed to their care. In and thi^ough such analysis we can hope to develop a Christian vocational purpose, the purpose to use one's particular position in the social and economic complex as a fulcrum for moving this complex itself toward the level of brotherhood. IV. Growth in social motives. Our discussion of knowl- edge, practice, and vocational preparation has already included the notion that all along the line of advance there should be a growing socialization of the inner life of desire. Growth in motives is now set down as a fourth phase of growth, not be- cause it is separate or separable from these three, but because it requires special attention. It requires attention in the first place because existing reh'gious education does to a consider- 72 THE FIRST ESSENTIALS /^able extent assume a separation between motive on the one \ hand, and on the other hand knowledge and practical activities. ] What is the ordinary meaning of loving God, or of accepting / Christ, or of entire consecration? Are they not presented as ^ if they could take place in a social vacuum, and as if the char- acter of God, of Christ, and of oneself required no reference to concrete brotherhood ? Is it not true that children and young j people are being taught to "get right with God" first, and be I social-minded afterward? ^ The result of such efforts to produce an mner life, or Chris- tian motive, as something per se we behold in a multitude of church members who mean well but do not know what " well " means; who intend to be loyal to Christ but do not realize to what he is loyal; who sincerely desire the triumph of right but leave social technic to those who have individualistic interests to serve by it. We shall overcome these things, which are a reproach to us, only when, accepting in simple literalness our ancient doctrine that the supreme revelation of God is one with the supreme revelation of man, we teach the young that to I know God we must be socially intelligent, that to make his will I our own is a matter of social practice, and that entire consecra- ' tion is a strictly vocational concept. Another reason why motives require specific attention is that growth in motives is a relatively neglected notion. We must make clear both that change is normal and in what a normal change consists. Here again we are dealing with the forward, not the backward, look. What distinguishes a motive from a merely instinctive impulse is just looking ahead. A motive is anything in a contemplated, not yet actualized, situa- tion that renders it attractive and thus stimulates us to make it actual. The good heart is nothing esoteric, nothing merely inner; it can always be defined objectively in terms of that upon which we are actually expending our energy and our resources. Growth in Christian motives means, therefore, changes in the pupil's outlook toward future social good. It means finer discrimination between relative values, and be- tween ends and means, and corresponding change in fineness THE FIRST ESSENTIALS 73 and breadth of appreciation, which is the beginning of fine and broad social conduct.^ This is the inner life that is to be cultivated; this is "growth in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." To this end is Christian self -discipline. To this end also is culture of the devotional lif^. whether in public worship or in private meditation and prayer. That we may be conformed to the social will of God, and enjoy being con- formed to it — this is the p urpose and meaning of devotional exercises of all sorts. This does not mean substituting human society for fellowship with God, but rather finding God where he himself is pleased to dwell. Where shall the child find the Father? Wherever the child's desire goes out after the things that the Father loves, that is, the persons who are the supreme objects of divine solicitude. There can be no purely private relation to God, for our very selfhood is conjunct. We are made selves by a give-and-take with others — and we are made in his image. 1 This brief statement must suffice imtil we reach Chapter XIV. CHAPTER VII THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS IS RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE Why do some persons deny that religion can be taught? In some types of Protestantism the following remarkable anomaly is to be found: .^Insistence upon religious teaching for the young, but denial that religion can be taught. The argu- ment for religious teaching runs to the effect that the impres- sionable, plastic years of childhood and youth are of crucial importance for adult character. The argument against the possibility of teaching religion bases itself upon the assertion that real religion, at least in the fully Christian sense, is an inner, intimately personal, and therefore incommunicable experience. The attempt to teach religion simmers down, according to this view, to teaching about religion. That the two elements of this view have not been recon- ciled in practice will appear from the next section. How, in- deed, can one produce an educational system when in the same breath one asserts and yet denies the efficacy of teaching? Let us ask, then, how any Christian thought could manoeuvre itself into this corner. The answer is twofold: (1) Because they endeavor to hold at the same time to a vital or experiential view of the Christian life, and a dogmatic-intellectual- istic view of the Christian revelation. If the Christian revela- tion consists in certain dogmas, then the Christian life should consist in the intellectual act of learning and holding the dog- mas. In this case Christian education would be identical with intellectualistic instruction. But if, on the contrary, the Christian revelation is " made flesh," if it is a concrete life that inspires and renews our life, then to be a Christian would be 74 THE PROCESS 75 something far more vital, and Christian education, instead of being instruction about dogmas, would be an initiation into actual living upon the plane of the Christian purpose. But what will be one's view of Christian education if one holds at the same time to an intellectualistic view of revelation and an experiential view of the Christian life? What has actually happened in this case is this: Education has been viewed as essentially a means of transmitting dogmas; but, since even the devils can believe and still be devils (as we are often assured), it has been insistently claimed that religion cannot be taught. And indeed vital religion does not and can- not get into education through dogmatic-intellectualistic as- sumptions as to God's approach to man. The language that is attributed to God is not that which the child's heart speaks; the problems that are raised are those of the theologian, not of the child, and, besides, the whole is finished, fixed, rigid, while the child is all movement, all becoming. Yet many who hold to a dogmatic view of revelation insist upon an experiential or vital view of the Christian life. They cannot be blind, of course, to the significance of childhood plasticity for such a life. But, having committed themselves to a dogmatic type of religious education, they deny that re- ligion can be taught, and then they flounder in search of some method for religiously influencing children. All the inconsis- tency and all the floundering could be avoided by a whole- hearted acceptance of the idea that God's revelation of himself is always in the form of flesh; that it is in Jesus, and in every human will that follows him. One could then look upon a child's gradual achieving of the full Christian purpose as itself a growing communion with God, a gradual self-impartation of God to his belcyved child. The educational process would then fuse with Christian experience. (2) A second reason for this educational anomaly is that this type of thought, though it holds that religious living includes both relations to God and relations to men, does not fuse the two as Jesus did. If we can hold that the love that is toward God and the love that is toward men are not two, but one, and that 76 THE PROCESS this one is communion with the Father, then the social unfolding of a child can be luminous with divine meaning. There is then no antithesis between the socializing of the will and Christian experience. God speaks to the child, and the child to God in a language that both understand. But if we hold that one's primary relation to God is purely private, that it has to do with subjective mysteries, and that only through a pre- liminary grasp of these mysteries is one prepared for truly Christian social relations, then indeed religion cannot be taught. Consequences of the doctrine that "religion is caught, not taught." The attempt to teach religion at the same time that the possibility of teaching it is denied leads quite naturally to dualism in practice. (1) Unsteadiness of aim prevails, and consequent failure to set up defi7iite standards. If we ask what the purpose of a Sunday school is, we are told that the purpose is to teach the Bible. But if we point out that those who avow this as their purpose do not teach the Bible with any thoroughness at all, the ground is shifted. We are now told that the purpose is to mould the character of the pupil by placing him directly under Christian influences for an hour and a half every Sun- day. If we go on to ask why these influences have not been systematized, and why recognizable standards and tests of their efficiency have not been set up, we are reminded that religion is caught, not taught ! The \drtue of this epigram is missed by some who are fond of using it. It is, or should be, a drive at intellectualism, or at the identification of instruction with education. When it is used to discredit system, and standards, and tests, in the Christward guidance of the child's social experience, it becomes an arrow shot at the goose that lays the golden eggs. It is true that many a teacher untrained in methods, and making many a blunder in methods, has nevertheless had a profoundly educative influence upon his pupils. Shall we not assume that his success is due to the fact that he really conformed, though without realizing it, to fundamental laws of religious growth? Surely the life of the spirit is a realm of order, not a chaos of THE PROCESS 77 forces. Why, then, do we not analyze the ways of teachers who succeed, whether with or without training, to the end that we may systematize the principles of their success, and thus show others how to succeed ? In other words, the laws that underlie effective religious education are identical with the laws of spirit- ual growth. Therefore a wabbly scheme of religious education justifies a query as to the views of religion that underlie it. (2) Interruptions of the educative process are tolerated, and even regarded as nonnal. Any one who will take the trouble to analyze the experience of a pupil minute by minute through one session of an ordinary Sunday school can know for himself how constantly non-educative procedures mix with education. The o^eninp^ exercise s are a jumble of worship, business, and drill. 'If we ask why these exercises should be held at all, we may be told that the children should learn to worship. But if we examine the program and method, we find only a feeble grasp, or none at all, of the idea of education in and through worship. The aii^s of the worship are indefinite, and both content and method are unsystematized, unadapted, and untested. Besides, the s etting of worship — the way it is el- bowed by business, speechmaking (sometimes from visitors who can only guess what the situation demands), and crude disciplinary measures (banging of bells, calls for order, shouting above the din, scolding) — this setting is not strongly suggestive of a growing sense of the presence of God. And this sort of thing in the opening and the closing exercises occupies the major part of the meagre time at the disposal of the school. The lesson period, during which educative procedures are sup- posed to be entirely in control, is pared down to a minimum. Not only so; even this minimum is reduced through interrup- tions by secretaries, through encroachments of prolonged open- ing exercises, and through the demands of anniversaries and "special occasions. '* Nor do interruptions of educational procedures end even here. Irruptions of child evangelism occur in various forms, from exhortations by preachers or teachers, through high- pressure "decision days" that are not integrated into the gen- 78 THE PROCESS eral educational work of the school, to mass-meetings of chil- dren conducted by itinerant evangeHsts over whom the educa- tional authorities of the school have no control. All this gives one an impression that "getting religion" is independent of religious education, and it leads one to wonder what, then, religious education is supposed to be and to do. The roots of these incongruities are doubtless manifold. We must of course give religious education time to grow up, and we must not make its immaturity an occasion for bela- boring the faithful men and women, mostly laymen without opportunity for technical training, who are giving the best that they have to the children. All honor to the workers in our Sunday schools ! Here is massed together such an amount of Christian consecration, such an amount of unrequited labor for others, as was never before seen in the history of our religion. Our present question concerns the effective organiza- tion of this enormous energy. We need to know whether it is being scattered, or misdirected, or thwarted by inconsistency of plan and method. If so, we must know why. The conclu- sion that we have reached is that there is vast leakage of energy, enormous waste of consecrated labor, because so many persons, believing that "religion is caught, not taught," counteract their own efforts to teach religion. (3) A third consequence of the doctrine that " religion is caught, not taught" is unfairness to teachers. If religion is to be spread among the young solely by a process of infection, it follows, of course, that the one thing needful is to bring the pupil within the area of a teacher's personal influence. That a profound educational conception lies hidden in the notion of spiritual life as communicated from person to person by fellowship will appear from our next section. But dim vision of a great truth may give it the effect of a half-truth, and half-truths have re- markable power to hurt as well as to heal. The current em- phasis upon the teacher's personality is a case in point. How often do we hear that the success of a given teacher is due to a "natural gift for teaching," or to an attractive personality, or to intense consecration. If we should take this at its face THE PROCESS 79 value, what ugly implications it would carry with respect to the rank and file of earnest teachers who do not have success of the shining sort that brings out such remarks. Because certain persons have stumbled upon methods that succeed, we praise their personalities; because the stumbling of others has not turned out quite as happily, we put them in an inferior class. Yet within this class we shall find, If we look for it, the capacity to succeed if only the requirements of the work in hand can be pointed out clearly. Here are Christian character, zeal, faith- fulness, intelligence; what right have we to discount them? Granted the presence of these qualities, with no positively counteracting twist, we ought to be able to say: "We will show you how to succeed, and we will provide the remaining conditions of success." (4) A fourth consequence is inertia in the matter of teacher- training. There are several reasons why the training of Sunday- school teachers has been so halting an affair. We shall have occasion after a time to analyze the complications that are involved. But, running through the whole, at least in certain quarters, is the silent, counteracting, anaesthetizing vapor of an educational scepticism that supposes itself to be religious faith. If such scepticism were not abroad, and deep seated, how could so many pastors give religious education only a secondary place, or worse, in their plans for pastoral adminis- tration, and how could they abandon teacher-training to the chance that somebody else will see its importance and do some- thing about it ? To correct this educational scepticism we must proclaim not only laws of psychology, but also laws of Christian life and experience. We must think of Christian living neither in terms of a dogmatic system nor in terms of an esoteric and incommunicable salvation, but in terms of objective social relations that produce and are produced by the individually realized attitude and purpose called love. From this point of view we shall be able to see that Christian education falls under the head of promoting a life of deliberate purpose, a life that fulfils itself by methods that It itself can objectively view, analyze, and systematically control. How readily the elements 80 THE PROCESS of the educative process fall into place, and form a unified whole, under this conception we shall now see. The central fact of the educative process is a growing Christian experience in and through the pupil's social interactions. If we really believe that "where love is, God is," and if by love we understand, as Jesus did, not a mere sentiment or impulse, but a purpose, a policy for self -guidance, a thing that does not evaporate as soon as one turns deliberate attention to it, then we can have a religious education that moves entu-ely within religion. It will consist fundamentally in providing for children conditions in which love is experi- enced, practised, wrought into steady and deliberate living by the help of both intellectual analysis and habit formation, and developed into a faith that illumines the crises and the mysteries of life. To speak more in detail, such education will include the following part processes: (1) Making the pupil acquainted with persons who really love him and others also. The first thing in Christian education is not an idea, but a personal fellowship. Here is the truth that is confusedly contained in the current emphasis upon the person- ality of the teacher. The confusion lies in the substitution of personal attachment between pupil and teacher for attachment of the pupil to society through the teacher. The importance of the acquaintance depends upon the degree to which the pupil realizes that the love that the teacher has for him is not a merely individual attachment, and that the joy of it is all the richer because others have a share in it. We merely express this in another way if we say that the first and fundamental element in the Christian educative process is the introduction of the pupil to the specific happiness of being a member of a v^. society. Here lies the measureless potentiality of the family lias an agency of Christian education. Here, as we shall see, is the base-line for a theory of the church as educator. In the detailed work of religious teaching, the principle is already beginning to appear in such practices as these: The teacher of a new class of beginners undertakes as her first task to make the little children happily acquainted both with her and with THE PROCESS 81 one another; the principle of the organized Sunday-school class is moving downward from the adult and senior divisions through the whole school, effort being made to cause each class to feel itself as a little society, even though there be no formal constitution or by-laws; and effort is being made, by many en- richments of social joy, to obliterate the break between the social grouping on Sunday and that of week-days. self known to us in concrete human life; that we obey him and commune with him in any and every brotherly attitude that we take toward any of his children, and that this experience of God does not occur merely once or twice in history, but con- tinuously. The realization of God on the part of the prophets and of Jesus is transmitted to us primarily in the human lives that have already come under its influence. We are linked with God in ancient history by nothing less than God himself within the intervening generations. Life is continuous. The generations are not separated from one another like the banks of a stream over which a bridge must be built. No non-living thing could communicate the divine life to us, but only this life itself. The consequence for religious education is that j it consists primarily in the awakening of religious experience in children through their contacts with persons who already have such experience. The Bible then takes its place as a'"^ means that mightily assists in promoting, illuminating, and confirming these contacts, and in extending the Christian fel- ^ lowship backward to Jesus and the prophets, and forward toward the fulfilling of the prophetic ideals. From of old it has been a custom among Christians to go 114 THE CURRICULUM to the Bible for specific help for specific needs. Does the shadow of death menace us? We turn to the Twenty-third Psalm or to the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians. Do the uncertainties of life's struggle tempt us to compromise with evil? The sixth of Matthew comes to our aid. Does our prayer life require refreshing? We restudy the Lord's Prayer. Do we desire to think straight on the social question ? We ponder the profoundly simple words of Jesus and of the prophets concerning justice and brotherly love. In short, we take our start from needs involved in our present situation, and we then select from the multitudinous wealth of the Scrip- tures the part that gives us the greatest help. We shall discover the true place of the Bible in the curricu- lum by applying to childhood the same principle of using the Scriptures in the interest of present living. If the curriculum is fundamentally a course in Christian living, the Bible will be used at each turn of the child's experience in such a way as to help him with the particular problem that is then upper- most. We as teachers shall then select for the child just as we select for ourselves, leaving unconsidered for the time anything in the Bible that does not feed the pupil's present need. The result will be that the progressive social experience of the child will be reflected in the successive passages that are chosen, and if need be repeated from time to time. That is, we shall have a truly graded scheme of biblical lessons. It will begin with stories topically arranged, but as the pupil's outlook grows, it will deal with whole periods, whole books, and finally the whole movement of the religious consciousness that the Bible reflects. On precisely the same principle so-called extra-biblical material will be used as it is needed. When I as an adult Chris- tian meet the problem of how large my missionary contribution shall be, I seek information concerning the missions of to-day. When I want to know what my duty is with respect to the liquor traffic, I study its baleful effects .and also the methods of fighting it. When the preacher asks me to support a pro- posed child-labor law, I want him to give me the facts with THE CURRICULUM 115 regard to children in industry and witli regard to the laws on the subject. It' loyalty to the church is in questii)n, T nuist know something of the history of the church, something of its actual position in present society, and something concerning the more eifective forms of church life. This is the way that we adults study to be Christian. The way for children is not ditVerent in principle but only in the application. Extra-biblical material for study is just as necessary for them as for us because their problems, like our own, have to do with enterprises and adjust- ments concerning which the Bible gives no whit of information — missions in lands unknown in ancient times; philanthropic en- terprises under conditions and by methods not so much as con- ceived of by any biblical writer; social adjustments in the home, on the playground, at school, in the choice of an occu- pation, in the conduct of oner's occupation, in the use of the bal- lot, which must be studied directly if they are to be understood at all. Such extra-biblical factors in the problems of Christian living are bound to have a large place in the socialized curriculum. But they will not supplant the Hible, or derogate from its unique- ness as an instrument for social education. For the Bible contains a body of social literature of unique power for the stim- ulation and criticism of social motives and ideals. It is in and through the use of the Bible that we come into fellowship with tlie greatest of our social leaders, meeting God in them. No mystical introduction to the Christ who dwells in the heart of every believer can be substituted for fellowship with the historical Jesus and with the great Old Testament charactei*s who influenced In's own social education. The fellowship of a common social purpose is, indeed, the foundation of Chris- tian education, and this foundation is laid in the pupil's present acquaintance with persons in whom God's presence shines out as love. But this fellowship, this social experience, can be I extended by imagination. It is thus extended through memory, j^ for how often does one become better acquainted with the real character of a loved one by separation from him. Similarly, imagination extends our fellowship to persons whom we have 116 THE CURRICULUM never seen, whether they are separated from us by oceans or by centuries. "Whom, not having seen, we love." The educative power of such imaginative association depends partly upon the law of suggestion. Merely associating with persons of positive goodness tends to habituate us to the ex- pectation of goodness in ourselves. Likewise emotional re- actions against imagined badness can have a part in forming habitual attitudes. But this is only atmosphere or background for something far more specific, namely, the use of imagined persons, events, and situations in the analysis of present issues and of universal laws of living. The uniqueness of the Bible as a source of material for social education lies, in large measure, in the sharpness with which it presents issues without abstract- ing them from persons and events. Here is the truth of life presented in the form of life, a form so characteristically drawn that he who runs perceives the ethical meaning. There are many biblical tales that one can hardly read or listen to in a naive manner without, in the very act, criticising one's own conduct. There are aphorisms and formulae without number that become tools for mastering our own experience. Nevertheless, the history of religious education shows that even this magnificent body of concrete truth can be so taught as to seem far away and unrelated to us. We must therefore assume, on this ground also, the necessity of the living teacher, and of art in teaching. Thus the literary material of the curric- ulum finally becomes, not something per se, but ideas actually performing their function. Material and method become in- dissolubly one. PART III THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF A SOCIALIZED RELIGIOUS EDUCATION CHAPTER X THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN The problem of Part III. We come now to the nature of the human material that religious education undertakes to modify. What, for the purpose of the present discussion, is a child? That is, what is there in children that justifies any expectation that they will make a favorable response to the social principles of the Christian religion? Does child nature include any obstacle to such response? What is child religion as compared with the religion of adults? Are there any laws of growth that condition a child's religious experience? Wliat sorts of situation, controllable by the educator, are most con- ducive to religious growth ? And what is the process whereby a social purpose grows mature ? These questions are different from the ones that text-books for Sunday-school teachers ordinarily undertake to answer. Child study for teachers of religion abounds in discussions of children's imitativeness, their imagination, their memory, their activity and changeability, their play, their constructive- ness; all of which is important, but little of which touches upon the religious capacities of childhood. It fails to touch upon these capacities because it concerns the general form of children's reactions rather than interests and motives. As a consequence, a teacher who understands all these formal char- acteristics of children, and guides the teaching process in the light of them, may nevertheless appeal to either social or in- dividualistic motives, and therefore may start the child either well or ill. Therefore, with our eyes upon the content of the Christian purpose, the democracy of God, we must go on to ask what capacities children have for being interested in any such thing, or for responding to any part of such an ideal. 119 120 HUMAN NATURE Some of these questions have already been touched upon In our sketch of the new reHglous education, particularly in Chapters VII, VIII, and IX. The general conception of a child's religious progress there presented is that of the con- tinuous achievement of intelligent good will in his growing social relationships, and the enlargement of these relationships them- selves in the church and in its worship. We assumed that children respond to social incentives, and that worship of a Father who loves us can be a vital experience in childhood as truly, though not necessarily In the same degree or form, as in adulthood. These assumptions are not violent ones. Perhaps they do not need defense, but they do need further analysis in the interest of specific control of particular sorts of reaction. Rel- atively simple as a child's interests and motives are, they are nevertheless sufficiently complicated to make the understand- ing of children, and skill in teaching (as distinguished from knack) something of an achievement. We shall presently see some evidence of the ease with which we misinterpret children, and it will grow increasingly clear that the misplacing of a mo- tive in teaching is a most serious matter. What is meant by " the psychological background of a social- ized religious education," then, is this: The social and the anti- social impulses of a child, and particularly how social instincts can grow into social purposes of ideal scope. This is back- ground only. If middle ground and foreground also were to be presented, practically the whole of educational psychology would have to be reviewed. For the teaching of religion, as of anything else, involves such matters as sense-perception, imagination, memory, habit, attention and interest, judgment and inference, the laws of transfer and the laws of fatigue. For topics like these the reader is referred to the general works on educational psychology. Instinct-factors in the conduct of one human being toward another. By Instinct is meant, in this discussion, any readi- ness to act in a specific way in a particular sort of situation with- out having learned to do so, or (as it is often put) the first time HUMAN NATURE 121 that a situation of the sort is presented. This definition, it will be noted, refers to specific kinds of action rather than to broad tendencies in either the race or the individual. There are such broad tendencies. The evolution of the race exhibits movement toward refinement in various directions, and toward the organization of conduct into social institutions of increas- ing scope. Similarly, growth of an individual mind consists, in large measure, in the achievement of organized self-conscious- ness and self-control. These tendencies are of course to be included in the concept of man's social nature. They will have our attention in subsequent sections. But first it is im- portant, for the purpose of effective control through teaching, to see that human nature is not merely a few general tendencies that are to be promoted or resisted by appealing to general motives, but also a vast complex of readinesses to act in this or that specific way under specific conditions. What the teacher has to do is to secure particular social reactions and to prevent particular antisocial ones, to the end that social habits and social thinking may grow with the pupil's increasing con- tacts with his fellows. The effectively good will is more than a benevolent sentiment toward mankind in general; it is also a will trained to meet particular human situations. In the following summary of instinct factors in social and anti-social conduct I shall follow chiefly Thorndike, who has carried the analysis of the instincts farther than any other psychologist, but I shall subsequently make use also of certain analyses by McDougall. The list summarizes factors only, treating each one in its simplicity and in isolation, and without reference at this point to the integral life of individual self- control or of social organization. We are to notice, as it were, certain bones of the human skeleton, rather than the living body performing its functions.^ » Even if limitations of space permitted me to describe in detail the situa- tion that evokes each sort of response, and the muscular and physiological features of each response, I could do Uttle more than reproduce the sub- stance of Thorndike's descriptions. The reader is advised by all means to read them for himself. See E. L. Thorndike, The Original Nature of Man (which is vol. I of his three-volume Educational Psychology). New York, 1913, pp. 52 /. ; 68-122. 122 HUMAN NATURE (1) Simple gregariousness, or pleasure in the mere presence of other members of the species, and discomfort in their absence. (2) Special interest in what is being done by human beings, as distinguished from all other objects in the environment. (3) Wanting to be noticed by other human beings. (4) Craving for approval from other human beings, and discomfort from their disapproval, whether the grounds of it be ethical or not. (5) Approval or admiration not only for those who are useful to u^, but also for those who exhibit strength, daring, or beauty ; and disapproval, scorn, or disgust for persons of the opposite sorts, even though they have not injured us. This instinct is primarily directed toward qualities that are important for savage society, but the sphere of its application grows with the growing standards of society. Thus it is that moral strength (what is ''moral" being determined by the then existing standard) is an object of instinc- tive admiration. (6) Effort to master others, particularly weaker animuls and hu- man beings, and to subdue them if they resist; but also readiness to submit to the strong or self-assertive individual. Thorndike classes instinctive display or showing off as a partial manifestation of the instinct of mastery, and shyness as a partial manifestation of the instinct of submission. Both are prominent in courtship, but they play a part also in much other conduct. (7) Rivalry (attempting to get something for oneself rather than let another get it), greed (getting for oneself regardless both of the need of others and of oneself), and jealousy (annoyance with, and perhaps attack upon, another who receives attention or benefits that one desires for oneself). < (8) Hunting. Though primarily related to the securing of food, the hunting instinct does not stop here, but goes on to kill- ing for sport, mastering and tormenting animals, bullying weaker human beings, callous pursuit of persons whom we dislike, and some forms of warfare. (9) Anger and pugnacity. The primary instinctive response to situations like being physically restrained, thwarted, or attacked is (unless submission intervenes) struggling, or screaming, or kicking, or striking back, or counter-attack, commonly with more or less of the emotional commotion called anger. Secondarily, pugnacity applies to any kind of thwarting, as in argument, and it becomes pleasiu'e in combat as such, whether with weapons or in sport, whether with muscles or with wits. HUMAN NATURE 123 (10) Sex attraction. The social significance of the sex instinct far outruns the mere perpetuation of the species. "It is true that sex attraction as such does not seem to include regard for another's interests; nothing can be more ruthless than the sex instinct, in some of its manifestations, at least. Yet it does not generally exist 'in and by itself in the human species. The fixa- tion of attention upon another, the vivid realization of his presence as chis particular individual, which is characteristic of sex attrac- t/on, has an unportant consequence. We individualize another by Einfuhlung — that is, by imaginative putting of oneself in another's place — so that we reciprocally feel one another's satis- factions and discomforts. Now, sex attraction, as well as pa- rental instinct, strongly individualizes its object. Therefore we may assume that sex makes a direct contribution to the apprecia- tion of benevolence and justice. Something very like the parental attitude also appears between lovers — ^the attitude of protection, intense response to every sign of pain, cuddling." ^ It is a matter of great social import, moreover, that sex attraction influences conduct toward persons with whom sexual union is out of the ques- tion, as in the attitudes of the two sexes toward each other in the family, in social gatherings and diversions, in friendships, and in the many respects in wliich we treat the two sexes differently. The emotional accompaniments of the adolescent sex awakening affect even the attitudes of males toward males and of females toward females; yes, the fresh aesthetic, idealizing, and compan- ionship-seeking state of mind often modifies one's whole social attitude, and even one's attitude toward nature. (11) Parental regard. It is most obvious and most tender in mothers, being related in origin to sensations connected with suckling and with other close and frequent physical contacts. But it is instinctive in both men and women. Undoubtedly the attachment of the father for the mother has much to do with the attention that he gives to their children, and thus with the activity of paternal affection. Possibly self-giving maternal affection is the evolutionary link that has united the father with the child, and thus given rise to the permanent monogamous family. Yet the father's regard for his children is, conversely, an added bond between him and their mother. In any case, whatever was first in origin, the spontaneous readiness of both parents to feed, pro- 1 G. A. Coe, The Psychology of Religion, Chicago, 1916, pp. 163 /. (note). 124 HUMAN NATURE tect, and succor their offspring through the extraordinarily long human infancy is a prime psychological foundation of what is finest, and most difficult, in the larger social integrations of men. Its relation to the larger society grows out of two circumstances: a. In the family, which rests upon parental instinct, and spe- cifically through the intimate domestic manifestations of this in- stinct, children receive social training that is in some measure transferred to then* life in the larger society, h. The parental instinct is not limited to parents, nor are small children the only objects that stimulate it. This matter is so involved and its social bearings are so important that detailed attention will be given to It In a subsequent section. (12) The kind of imitativeness that produces crowd action. The unique social significance of the parental instinct. Two groups of facts will indicate how broad and deep is the influence of this instinct in the evolution of society, particularly of democratic society. (1) Parental attitudes arise spontaneously long before physi- ological capacity for parenthood arrives; they live on through life, even though one never has children of one's own, and they attach themselves not only to children, but to adults as well. Noth- ing less than parental are the relations that small children, boys as well as girls, assume with dolls, animal pets, smaller children, and toys. This is not mere imitation of older per- sons, for the activities are clearly different from those of adults in many respects, and the emotional fervor and tenacity are too obviously original with the child. There is no escaping the conclusion that this is actual parental instinct. Its instinc- tive character is proved by: (1) Its universality. (2) The possibility of identifying its primary objects as a class, namely, smaller things thought of as living, especially those that are helpless, lonely, or sufTerlng. (3) The specific nature of its motor discharges, such as taking into one's arms, keeping near one (as at night), providing food (real or imaginary) and other objects to meet particular assumed needs, patting, stroking, laying the cheek against. (4) A surprising confirmation of this theory that has been brought to my attention by one of HUMAN NATURE 125 my students. The evidence consists of photographs of two half-grown bluebirds, one of which is in the act of feeding a worm to the other. One of the pictures shows the two facing each other, one with the worm, the other with open mouth; the other picture shows the bill of the first bird well down the throat of the other. Here the instinct to swallow whenever a worm is in the mouth is inhibited exactly as it is when a mother bird has her first brood; it is inhibited, obviously, by another instinct. That this instinct lives on through life, especially if it re- ceives frequent indulgence either in affectionate acts toward one's own offspring or toward other objects, hardly needs argu- ment. The parental petting of animals does not cease with childhood; with the childless it is often a substitute for literal parenthood. A baby, too — anybody's baby, white, yellow, or black — is an object of peculiar interest. I have seen the tired faces of a whole group of men and women in a New York sub- way car relax and mellow as their eyes all sought the face of a baby playing in its mother's lap. Austere men, hard men, boys who are ready to bully those only a little younger than them- selves, all are gentle, all take the attitude of protection toward very small children.^ The teaching profession, education as a whole, is permeated by a truly parental interest in the young. When parents reach the weakness of old age, then the chil- dren, in their turn, assume the parental attitude toward those who bore them. A gentleman who was showing exquisite tenderness toward an aged parent remarked: "I have had no children of my own, you know." In general, too, does not reverence for gray hairs contain this instinct as one of its con- stituents? And why is it that everybody is ready to help a blind man find his way upon the street? No doubt the im- pulses that underlie our relations to our fellows are complex, and to some extent contradictory. Some of them become dominant, others are smothered, or contradictory impulses 1 Without doubt males would be more demonstrative in this direction but for a social tradition of sex inequality, and but for that other balefUl tradi- tion, that manliness is demonstrated by fishting rather than by tenderness. These, too, rest back upon instinct, of covirse. 126 HUMAN NATURE alternate. But any one who has eyes can see continually com- ing to the surface, in fragmentary ways at least, spontaneous helpfulness of the parental type. (2) The parental instinct is the chief source ^ probably the exclusive source, of tender regard for individuals as such, that is, taking another's happiness or woe as one's very own. Thorn- dike is, on the whole, inclined to regard the pitying response to signs of weakness, fright, and pain, as an instance of, or derivative from, "motherly behavior."^ Whatever be the fact in this matter, pity is only one aspect of mothering, and it is only one aspect of regard for individuals as such. The major manifestation of this regard is demand for justice for all men simply as men, and readiness to suffer actively with them in the struggle to obtain it. There is something in us that makes us individualize our fellows, think of them one by one apart from possessions, apart from their age and social status, apart even from their individual defects, and believe in them. The one point at which we can indisputably discern an instinctive tendency to do this is the relation of parents to their children. We follow the line of probability, then, when we look upon the sacrifice of one's own welfare that others may have their rights (welfare, that is, as measured by any less social standard) as being, on the large human scale, the same thing as a parent's insistence that each of his children shall have life, and liberty, and happiness. Our problem here, it will be perceived, concerns the instinc- tive basis of the love of mankind that is required by the second of the two Great Commandments. We call it brotherly love, and speak of its goal as the brotherhood of man. But what is brotherly love, even within the limits of the family? Is the bond between brothers and sisters a specific fraternal instinct? The existence of such an instinct is by no means proved by the obvious naturalness of the affection. Consider the closeness of the association between brothers and sisters, then consider the long period through which it lasts, and finally ask what, under these conditions, is to be expected from the instincts numbered » Pp. 102 /, HUMAN NATURE 127 1 to 6 in our list. From these alone, under the laws of habit formation, we should expect a rather close group life which is likely to make a lifelong distinction between one's own brothers and sisters and other persons. What we have to account for in addition is positive outgoing affection, which far transcends the habitual accommodations to one another that grow out of the instincts just referred to. That is, we have to account for affection like that of parent for child. What if fraternal affec- tion, in its most intimate phase, is the exercise of parental in- stinct? We cannot be mistaken in seeing this instinct in cer- tain attitudes of older children toward brothers and sisters who are much younger. We are not likely to err when we interpret in the same way all the rest of the sympathetic fraternal loyalty that springs up in domestic intimacies. Finally, the parents' own instinctive attitudes act as a constant suggestion to the children to take the same attitudes toward one another. The sum of the matter is that the fraternal relation in the family is a highly ^jomplex thing, and that it gets its quality of justice or feelingly taking the brother's interests as one's own, from the factor of parental instinct. From what quality of original nature comes the affectionate response of a child to a parent's affection? Love begets love, no doubt, but how ? If we had to rely upon antecedent proba- bilities we should guess that there is a filial instinct that answers to the parental. But when we analyze an infant's earliest reactions to maternal care, we discover that they fall chiefly under the first six heads of our list together with the twelfth. What remains to be accounted for is filial affection or love in the strict sense already defined in the last two paragraphs. But this is the same sort of attitude that distinguishes parental affection. What, then, if filial affection, like the corresponding phase of fraternal affection, is an early manifestation of parental instinct? What but this is the attitude of protection and of succor toward a father or a mother who is weary and heavy laden, sick, in sorrow, injured by others, or suffering reverses and disappointments? Family intimacies provide precisely the opportunity, scarcely existent elsewhere, for small children 128 HUMAN NATURE • to play the parent to mature persons. Small children pat and stroke a parent's face or hand, and when is a little one as happy as when he can play parent to the whole family? A boy of about four years, when his mother was nursing him through the croup, said : " Show me just what you do for me, mother, so that when I have little boys and girls with croup, I will know what to do for them." About six weeks later, when his mother had a headache, he assumed the attitude of physician and parent to her just as he had done to his own prospective children. Nothing seems to evoke filial affection as surely as being permitted to help father and mother. Doing things for a child does not touch his heart half as much as permittiu^g him to do things for you I^ The conclusion is that our love for our fathers and mothers is of the same instinctive quality as their love for us. We can be good sons and daughters by letting free in ourselves the very thing that makes a good parent. A side-light upon this question may be discerned in the com- mon chivalric devotion of sons to their mothers, to which noth- ing in the ordinary relations of sons to fathers corresponds. This devotion probably has one of its roots in some obscure response to sex differences, but another part of the explanation, without doubt, is that the more frequent manifestation of weak- ness or of distress by the mother has called out, and by habit confirmed, the son's parental instinct. It is not less true that love for mankind as such, to the ex- tent that it is anywhere realized, is an exercise of parental instinct. We see this clearly in child-welfare movements. The parent mind in us is what yearns over sick babies. This it is that insists, even at great expense to ourselves, upon giving to the next generation, through education, a better and larger life than we have had. It is the same impulse that hastens to the relief of sufferers from famine, flood, and war, and that takes pure joy in seeing others well fed and happy. To this, in the end, must we appeal for the community spirit that puts sanitation, education, civic beauty, and diffused happiness upon the plane of simple humanity, that is above all consid- i Cf. Patterson Du Bois, Beckonings from Little Hands (1900). HUMAN NATURE 129 erations of private advantage, either immediate or ultimate. What makes us struggle for democracy, too, is that, putting ourselves imaginatively in the place of the narrowed, thwarted, stunted lives about us, we feel toward them as we would if they were our own children. What we democrats demand, in fact, is that all men everywhere should have opportunity to grow up. Because all men are potentially parent-minded, the world is capable of being won to democracy. We can make the sacri- fices that this will require — sacrifices of our substance, of our labor, and of our aristocratic and plutocratic privileges — for the same reason that we can do it for our natural offspring. Social education requires that some instincts be suj)-^_ pressed. When the term instinct is used for broad, general qualities of human nature rather than for readiness to act in a specific way in a specific situation, it is possible to claim that no instinct should be suppressed. If, for example, we classify all spontaneous getting under an "acquisitive" instinct, we shall hold that it has some permanent value. But when we come to details we discover that some acquisition is just a grab- bing that increases in intensity if another person is seen to get or to be likely to get any part of the desired objects. Grabbing away from others goes on, too, until one accumulates more than one can use. In such rivalry and greed one's relation to per- sons is exactly contrary to parental instinct, which delights in seeing another feed himself. W^hat must be done with rivalry and greed in the interest of society is to suppress them if we can. Similarly, scorn for those who are weak, physically de- fective, or lacking in good looks, seems to serve no present social ends, but to hinder them only. -- Likewise, instinctive mastery and submission seem, though not quite as certainly, to be at least needless, and possibly without exception a hinderance to the growth of society toward democracy. What democracy requires is co-operation. Lead- ership is of course necessary, but leadership that is itself co- operation, a fulfilling of the w ill of the led, not mastery of them. Curbing of individual will also is required, but this again is, ideally, not submission to the arbitrary will of another, but 130 HUMAN NATURE one's contribution to a common will from which arbitrariness has been eliminated by maldng it truly a common will. These remarks apply to sex relations as well as to others. Instinctive mastery by the male, and instinctive submission by the fe- male, are a social evil because of their effect upon the character of both the man and the woman, and because of the support that they lend to social inequalities beyond the conjugal rela- tion. Conjugal affection must be democratized along with the other social relations. The instincts of hunting, anger, and pugnacity, in many instances, though scarcely in all, have an antisocial tendency. The tormenting of animals, or the killing of them for other purposes than food and protection, the hunting down of men in partisanships, persecutions, and wars, and all the purely destructive forms of anger and pugnacity, are obviously un- social in fact and in tendency. But most persons suppose that these instincts are sometimes useful socially, not for purposes of destruction, but as constituents of a rationally controlled good will. There can, it seems, be anger and pugnacity toward evil without hating the evil-doer. But how much reflectiveness, how much self-restraint are required to maintain this distinc- tion in practice I We need to be cautious lest the undeniable pleasure of destroying living things that we dislike be indulged under the specious name of " righteous indignation," or " hatred of wrong," or "standing for righteousness." When anger or pugnacity separates me from any human being so that he ceases to have value for me, or so that the value that I theoretically attribute to him does not control my conduct toward him, social ends are not promoted, they are hindered only. If I must fight against something that you fight for, I must herein fight /or you, for a better and happier you, yes, for a fellowship with you that is yet to be. The deep depravity of war, just as of enmities between in- dividuals, lies in the implied denial that my enemy is still my brother, and that I am his keeper — all the more his keeper if he has faults that I can help him to overcome. Herein con- sists the profound difference, the impassable gulf, between war HUMAN NATURE 131 and the exercise of police power. If a policeman discovers me in the act of picking your pocket, he does not dispose of my case by clubbing me. No, he brings me before a court in which, though I have done wrong, I still have rights which society protects, the very society that I have wronged. Here, in the calmness of reason, my relations to the welfare of society are determined, and also, in any enlightened penal system, my re- lations to my own welfare. What modern penology aims at is not to separate me from my fellows, but by separating me from my evil ways to unite me closer to my fellows. If, now, the policeman undertakes to settle my relations to society with a club, if he assumes that I am nothing as against the offended will of the state, if he is not my policeman, acting for me as well as my neighbors, he exemplifies the tooth-and-claw con- ception that underlies war. War, which endeavors to impose one national will upon another by force, must be supplanted by a system of world-law, world-com'ts, and a world-police, which will seek the welfare of offender and offended alike, and work always toward the maintenance, and if need be the restoration, of fellowship. Tliis implies educational measures for suppress- ing our socially destructive instincts, for stopping war at its source in our own minds. ^ The socially constructive instincts, all of them, require training. Even the best natural impulses, taken by themselves, are uneconomical; they are not sufficiently fine for the work that has to be done. Maternal affection prompts mothers to give to infants coffee and beer as well as milk; and until this 1 See H. R. Marshall, War and the Ideal of Peace. A Study of Those Char- acteristics of Man That Result in War, and of the Means by Which They May Be Controlled. New York, 1915. (Note. — The above paragraph was written while I still believed that a war between the United States and Germany might be avoided. Before I conmiit the paragraph to the typesetter I have opportimity to review my words in the light of tlie actuality of the dreaded conflict. It is clear that the pmT)ose of our war as defined by President Wilson takes the standpoint of what I have called above "the exercise of poUce power." There is, in fact, a remarkable parallel between my conception of "world-law, world-courts, and world-police," and the requirements of world-decency as he defines them. For he calls upon us to employ force, not to impose our national will upon any nation, but to secure "the riglits of nations, great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience." *'We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We 132 HUMAN NATURE instinct is trained It reacts in the same way to pure and to im- pure milk. Thorndike remarks that "the irrational impulse to get the sick to eat seems to prevail the world over."^ These examples would of themselves be convincing. The full pro- portions of the task of positive social training should, however, be faced. This can be done by going carefully through our list of instincts, noting how, from beginning to end, they consti- tute the basis of possible social conduct, not at one level only but at any one of many levels. This is most often recognized in respect to sex attraction, which underlies conduct that ranges all the way from brutality to saintliness. The same sort of analysis will show that, in the sphere of the gregarious instinct also we may habituate ourselves to pleasure in one type of society as against another. We have an instinctive interest in what other human beings are doing; yes, but we may acquire a habit of being more interested in important than in unim- portant doings. Here is the possibility of growing out of gossip into conversation! We want to be noticed by others; yes, but we may learn to take more pleasure in being noticed by one sort of persons than another. We instinctively like to be approved, but by training we can make ourselves unresponsive to praise and blame from certain quarters, and we can concen- trate our claims to approval upon that in us which we can our- selves approve. We spontaneously admire beauty, but upon our training it depends whether or not we notice beauty of spirit. We instinctively go with the crowd, but we can form a discriminating taste with respect to crowds, so that some of seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make." We are "seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples." We are to work toward "the ultimate peace of the world . ' ' We are to make the world ' ' safe for democracy ' ' by ' ' setting up amongst the reaUy free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as wiU henceforth insure the observ- ance of " . . . "peace and justice in the Ufe of the world as against selfish and autocratic power." "We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibiUty for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are ob- served among the individual citizens of civiUzed states." The implication of all this is that we have before us the task of establishing a genuine world-police power.] 1 P. 193. HUMAN NATURE 133 them we do not enjoy. In short, there is not a single point at which our instincts are sufficient of themselves to provide for social progress. Blind impulse makes happy hits, of course, as it makes unhappy ones. What we have to do is to raise above chance the proportion of hits and misses. An inevitable pnrt of our ethical calling is to bestow sight upon even the best of our instinctive qualities. Popular confusion between what is instinctive and what is acquired. How often do we hear it said of one child that he is "naturally" amiable, and of another that he is "naturally" self-willed, the implication of "naturally" being that the quality in question is a matter of original endowment, and therefore unchangeable. No doubt the amiability and the self-will are both natural. But the popular mind does not realize that habit-formation (which is as spontaneous, as "natural" as anything else), intertwining with instinct, fixes some of the early instinctive responses so that they w^ill be repeated there- after to the exclusion of other responses that are equally possible at the beginning. One's instinctive endowment is not a walled lane that offers no alternatives to one's feet, but an open trail, with many forks and branches, some leading into life's swamps and quagmires, some onto the meadows of conventional good- ness, some upward to the bright peaks and the dark valleys of social idealism. Children's dispositions are complexes of what is native and what is acquired. The acquired part is the habits whereby certain impulses, specialized by experience, are given a per- manent and specific direction, while other native impulses, unused or repressed, remain in the background, or decrease toward complete atrophy. Favorable or unfavorable nervous conditions (whether they are determined by health and disease, or by such hygienic matters as proper and improper feeding) are one fundamental factor. When nerves are irritated, and vitality is depressed, the range of possible happiness is limited, and the particular narrow range of satisfactions tends to be- come permanent in its narrowness. If peevishness, obstinacy, or screaming is what brings the child his satisfactions, of course 134 HUMAN NATURE it becomes a habit. It is then called the child's disposition, and is attributed to the stepmotherliness of nature ! On the other hand, granted favorable nervous conditions, jplus con- stant and abundant opportunity for mutual pleasures (the child with his parents and with other children), plus steady, unrelaxing arrangements whereby individualistic reactions are prevented from bringing pleasure — granted these things, any child will acquire an amiable disposition. Unthinking persons will attrib- ute it to some mystery of original nature, whereas, as settled disposition it is a result of habit formation, a product of social training, whether intended or unintended. The superinstinctive factors of our social nature. The inventory of man's original social capacities includes, as was noted a little way back, certain general tendencies toward the organization of a self, and toward the increasing integration of men in social institutions. The special instinct-factors that have just occupied our attention are not a mere collection of zoological specimens — odd forms, odd voices, odd ways — each living its own life without regard to others. Our instincts are more like the multiplicity of a city. When we look from the upper stories of a tall office-building far down into streets thronged with incessantly moving men, our first impression is likely to be that of the utter irrationality of what we behold. It seems to be a meaningless coming and going, like dust particles carried in air currents hither and thither. Yet what we see is not a chaos of impulsive acts, but acts organized into great systems — systems for feeding and clothing the people, for teaching the children, for distributing news, for healing the sick, for protecting the public health, for restraining those who lack self-restraint. Moreover, if we look into each of these moving particles of humanity, we find its own diverse elements at least partly organized, each man be- ing an individual self, not walking at random, but going some- whither that he desires and approves. There is not a man in the throng who has not to some extent taken notice of his instinctive impulses ; there is not a man who is not holding some of these impulses in leash. HUMAN NATURE 135 To become individual selves is a part of our original nature. It is a part of our original nature to form societies not merely on the basis of instincts that flow in the same direction but also on the basis of recognized selfhood. Now, these two, the formation of a definite self and the formation of societies, are not in reality separate processes, nor are the results separate; rather, we have here two phases of a single process, two phases of a single achievement. For the achievement of a self is possi- ble only in and through recognition of other selves, and what is distinctively human in society is precisely the organization of regard for individual selves as finalities. Movement, effort toward this achievement, is natural to man — as natural as fleeing from a lion or pursuing a deer. Here is something in human nature that is superinstinctive, some- thing that reflects upon, regulates, and uses instinct, and this something is in the profoundest possible sense both individual and social.^ The notion that human nature does not change. What has now been said as to the variability of habit within the scope of the instincts, and with respect to the naturalness of the correlative growth of self and society, has an important bear- ing upon that ogre's castle of social pessimism: "Your ideals won't work as long as human nature remains what it is." For now we can answer: "What do you mean by human nature?" The problem is by no means ended when we have recognized the fact that the instincts are hereditary, permanent, and fun- damental to character. We must bear in mind, in addition, first, that no instinct is strictly univocal, but that every one has indefinitely many possible modes of expression that vary through a large scale; second, that habit forming is also human nature, and that it makes possible the fixing in human life, in an individ- ual and through the generations by training, of either better or worse instinctive ways; and, third, that to become a self- criticising self, and to form self-criticising societies, are also a 1 1 content myself with this brief statement here because I touch upon It in other places in the present work, and because I have discussed it in my Psychology of Religion (see Index under " Social Aspects of Religion," and chap. XiV). 136 HUMAN NATURE part of human nature, so that nature herself provides fori taking the side of social aspiration as against what is unsocial in our instincts. " As long as human nature remains what it is," therefore, we may expect indefinite transformation of social, life toward the highest ideals that we can conceive. The in- dividual who in full health and vigor lies down under the weight of ancient wrong, saying that it is just human nature, does thereby make himself a critic of that nature, does thereby justify the opinion that he could hate ancient wrong a little harder, and that he could summon his neighbors not to surrender but to keep up the fight. What if, moreover, self-conscious contemplation of our de- sires should give rise to new desires ? How often, as a matter of fact, something like this certainly does occur. When I was a boy I thought it would be sport to shoot a meadow-lark — I thought so until a dead lark lay in my hands. I can see even now how its head hung limp when I lifted the beautiful body. At that instant one desire died and another was born. I saw myself having my desire, but defeated just because I had succeeded. I advanced to a new point of view, a new standard of values, a new arrangement of instinctive likes and dislikes. It makes little difference whether or not the new attitude can be classed under one of the instincts, for I came to myself y to a new self, to an unprecedented desire. Society attains new mass desires in similar ways. When, rising above crowd action, and holding up our social habits to relentless scrutiny, we say: "This is our work, the result of what our community has done or neglected to do. Is this what we desire?" then we cringe before our old community self, or, as the case may be, we are inspired to excel ourselves. In increasing instances a community survey awakens community self-consciousness, and then and there men begin to support one another in having desires that they simply did not have before. Social reconstruction is provided for in the nature of man. This is the reason why the likes and dislikes of men change so markedly between savagery and civilization. We simply could HUMAN NATURE 137 not enjoy some of the things that brought intense satisfaction to our early ancestors unless in some way we could be gradually trained backward. We are sunk enough, God knows, yet wants are better than they were. By giving attention to what we really want, and by training the impulses that we really prefer, we shall develop still other wants and the ways of satis- fying them.^ 1 In chap. XIII of my Psychology of Religion, I have discussed this question at greater length. CHAPTER XI CHILDREN'S FAITH IN GOD Children's notions of God are acquired as other notions are. To the question, How do little children get their notions of God? there is a simple, obvious answer: By instruction and hearsay, just as ideas of angels, fairies, hobgoblins, Santa Glaus, and of historical personages are acquired. This "acquiring" of an idea includes, of course, a complex reaction. Language has no power to transfer a thought from one mind to another, but only to stimulate a mind to think. The meaning of the term God, and of any affirmation about him, has to be con- strued by imaginative combination of thought materials derived from the child's previous experiences. Nor does the idea, once started, continue "in one stay," but items from the child's growing experience are read into it and out of it. The idea of God varies, therefore, from child to child, and from day to day, according to instruction or hearsay, the mean- ings that words (such as father) have already acquired, the characteristic experiences of the child (especially his experience of persons), and his usual methods of association and of infer- ence. A boy not yet four years old who had had difficulty with "bad boys" in his back yard arranged there a house for God, saying: "He'll keep the bad boys out; nobody else can." This "house of God" was merely a large doll-house with some additions of the boy's own devising. When he was four years and eight months old he spontaneously made a drawing, in which God and Santa Glaus, a Christmas tree, flags, home, and toys, which include a locomotive engine on a railroad-track, all figure. It is evident that this child, putting his own con- struction upon the words of others, had built up a notion of God far different from what his elders intended. On the other 138 CHILDREN'S FAITH 139 hand, the direct influence of instruction seems to appear in his argument with a playmate who had asserted that "If you do anything in a dark room God can't see it." "Yes, he can!" was the reply, " He can see you even in a dark room. He looks down through the stars, and I'm not going to do anything to get caught ! " Another boy of about the same age gave the following ob- jective evidence of the Christmas story that he had recently heard. Of his own motion he devised for the entertainment of his parents and some guests a dramatization of the Star in the East. First, extinguishing other lights, he lighted a candle, which was to represent the sun. Then he placed an apple for the moon, and extinguished the candle in order to show that night had come. Finally, announcing that he w^as God, and was going to bring in the Star of Bethlehem, he marched into the room, bearing some sticks crudely fastened together with the apparent pm-pose of representing the conventional picture of a star's rays. As an illustration of how the child's own social experience is read into his thought of God, the following case is instructive. "Mamma," said a boy a little older than those just mentioned, "do you know what I'm going to do the first thing when I get to heaven? I'm going to run up to the Heavenly Father, and give him a kiss!" Obviously this feeling-reaction to the idea of a Heavenly Father is due in part to experience in a human family. Suggestion and imitation in childhood religion. Thus, both the fact that children have ideas of God, and the varia- tions of these ideas from our adult notions are easily accounted for. That children really believe in God thus conceived is also obvious enough. They believe what they are told, and in this respect no difference is discernible between belief in God, in the Sand Man, or in the Black Man. The influence of mere sug- gestion upon children's beliefs is possibly more extensive and more prolonged than we ordinarily suppose. On a certain occa- sion, having told to a group of children a story of how I had seen a chipmunk store food, which included a muscat grape, upon 140 CHILDREN'S FAITH the branches of a fir-tree, I remarked: "So there was a green grape growing upon an evergreen tree ! " One of my listeners, a girl of about eight years, came to me some days afterward to inquire whether the grape really did grow upon that tree ! / Just as children readily accept our instruction, so they will- ingly imitate our religious acts. The evening prayer, grace before meat, participation in public worship — these, under favorable conditions, are well liked; they require no com- pulsion. But they cannot, without further evidence, be re- garded as clear signs of piety. Nevertheless, even such imita- tive acts may have immediate social value, and ultimate relig- ious value. In a certain family that was accustomed to have brief devotions at the breakfast-table there was a girl who was still too young to commit the Lord's Prayer to memory. One morning, just after she had triumphantly learned to count up to eight, she joined her voice with the others when the Lord^s Prayer was repeated by saying loudly: "One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight. . . . One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight!" I would hesitate to deny that even this crude participation in social worship contributed to religious growth. For the social situation was a religious one, and the girl's re- action, bare though it was of definite religious ideas, enriched her membership in the group, and brought her mind nearer to the meaning of the function then being performed. These facts — the credulity of children's beliefs, the desultory associations that cluster therein, and the imitative origin of children's religious acts — go far toward accounting for the am- biguous or even negative attitude that largely prevails among adults with respect to the religious life of children. Besides, we are just now reacting against two types of religious work with them, the formal or catechetical type, and the revival or conversion-experience type. If these are the only practicable ways of promoting spiritual life in children, then indeed we must ^ look for skepticism as to genuine spiritual life much before adolescence. It is not enough to show that children accept the idea of God, join in religious practices, and make an emo- tional response to revivalistic suggestion. The deeper question CHILDREN'S FAITH 141 concerns a life of faith properly so called. This implies not merely belief and imitation, but also emotional satisfaction, and motivation of conduct without feverish excesses — in short, a personal realization or experience in a natural life. Does this exist in the small child ? Is there a special religious instinct? If children — adults, too, for that matter — are to have vital religious experience as distinguished from doctrinal assent, imitation, and emotional forcing, it must doubtless have a basis in instinct. Religious educators therefore have compelling reason to inquire whether there is a specifically religious instinct, that is, a universal in- born readiness to respond in some specific religious manner to particular, definable situations. If there is, then the work of religious education consists fundamentally in creating just these situations and placing children in them. On the other hand, if there is no specific religious instinct, but if religious response consists rather in a particular direction and organiza- tion of the various instinctive capacities for social living, then religious education does not have to create situations or invent special stimuli, but to utilize in appropriate ways the every- day human relations of the child. The alternatives may be roughly suggested by asking whether religious experience is apart from, or a part of our experience of one another.^ It is not possible in this place to go farther toward answering this question than merely to recite conclusions from the general psychology of religion. Of the naturalness of religion there is of course no question. It is not an invention; it is not an im- position of some upon others; its early appearance in the race, its universality, its persistence, and the way in which it is interfused with all sorts of human affairs, are conclusive on this point. This interfusion gives us, in fact, a clew to the sense in which religion is natural. It appears historically as a living out, intensely and insistently, of the interests that seem im- portant, particularly the interests that gather about the life 1 If my purpose were not merely to identify the thing, but also to deflne it with philosophical precision, I should of course suggest that our religious experience may possibly be, not a part of our experience of one another, but a whole, of which oui' human fellowships are parts or phases. 142 CHILDREN'S FAITH of men in societies, and as a tendency to organize and unify these interests. It is not an aside, or a luxury, or any other sort of addition to the common Hfe, but just life most deter- mined to fulfil itself to the utmost. There is here no trace of an instinct that functions by itself, but only of a tendency within the instincts taken as a whole.^ This general conclusion can be made more specific by reverting to the analysis of man's social nature in the last chapter. What is most characteristic of the religious consciousness is closely related, on the one hand, to the general tendency to become personal selves in a society of such selves, and on the other hand to the parental instinct, which plays such a distinctive part in individuating us and socializing us. Faith in God has impulsive roots in desires for a sufficient and certain supply of the things that men want, in the instinct that causes a man to identify his own wants and welfare with those of another, and in the human way of taking our ultimate values as our ultimate reals. What is most significant for our present discussion is that gods have been to their worshippers not only a security for goods of all kinds, but particularly a security for the goods that are socially sought and enjoyed, and that gods have been likewise a spontaneous and last term in fellowship or social unity. In the divine the social principle itself achieves such objectivity and finality as the existing level of social life can appreciate. The tribal god, the national god, and the Universal Father, all have this relation to our fundamental social impulses. The child^s own parental instinct furnishes a natural basis for early appreciation of divine fatherhood. On the surface of the matter it is plain that whatever capacity a child has for responding to the Christian evangel of the fatherhood of God is at least parallel to filial attitudes toward one's earthly parents. We are now ready, in view of the last section, to say that it is not parallel, but identical. Moreover, in view of our analysis of filial affection in the last chapter, it now appears that children can make a vital response to the Christian God 1 Readers who desire to pursue these considerations further will find them fully developed in my Psychology of Religion, especially chaps. IV and XIX. CHILDREN'S FAITH 143 because they themselves possess parental instinct. The yearn- ing of the father toward the child, and the child's appreciation of this yearning are qualitatively the same. It is in the im- pulse to father somebody that the child's Christian experience begins. We love God only when we take his point of view, and we can take his point of view only through some experience of our own in which we actually exercise godlike interest in another. In order to teach children of kindergarten age the love and care of the Heavenly Father, the Sunday-school teacher of to-day is likely to use as a part of her material the care of father-bird and mother-bird for their offspring. How does bird lore lead toward religion? Does the mind of such small children construe divine fatherhood analytically, by means of an analogy with feathered parenthood ? Or, does an induction from different instances of parental care lead the heart up to universal fatherhood? Far different from either of these is the emotional logic of the kindergarten age. What happens is that the child instinctively assumes a parental attitude toward the helpless birdlings that have been brought to his attention, and thereby, nascently entering into the fatherhood purpose, he grasps the meaning of divine love. It is easy, and educationally most appropriate, to awaken in small children a sentiment of gratitude to the Heavenly Father. What, then, is gratitude? Since it is an attitude that one can take toward another who is older, stronger, and not suffering, it appears at first sight to have no connection with the instinct that leads a child to fondle dolls and pet animals and smaller children. But A. F. Shand has shown that gratitude involves some realization of what the kindness of a benefactor has cost him, together with desire to requite this cost.^ Grati- tude is not mere jubilation; it contains also a tender element. This tenderness, as our discussion has shown, and as McDougall holds,2 originates in parental instinct. McDougall is of the opinion that moral indignation originates at the same point. » Chap. XVI of G. F. Stout, Groundwork of Psychology' (New York, 1903). >W. McDougall, Social Psychology (Boston, 1909), pp. 66-81. 144 CHILDREN'S FAITH No doubt it will seem odd to trace pity, gratitude, indigna- tion, longing for justice and equality, and a child's fondness for dolls and pets to one and the same source, even that in us that makes us see worlds in the smile of our own offspring. But thither the facts lead. They are of immense consequence for all moral and religious education. For in them we find not only evidence of capacity for moral and religious life in early child- hood, but also the particular kinds of seed for which the young mind is ready. Other instincts, of course, have a part. Fears drive the child to sheltering arms. Curiosity blends with the rest. G. E. Dawson infers from children's questions that the "instinct for causality" is a principal factor in child-religion,^ and Earl Barnes looks upon the insistent who's and why's of the young mind as signs of a theological interest.^ This interpretation seems, however, to be made under the influence of the outworn dogmat- ism that confuses religion with doctrine or philosophy. When- ever the causal interest is central in the child mind, the appro- priate category is science rather than religion. This is the parent's opportunity to start the young intellect upon a cor- rectly scientific analysis of the world. Religion gains nothing, but loses much, through the well-intentioned answer, "God did it," to questions that we adults answer to ourselves in terms of science.^ It has been said that children must first think of nature after the fashion of mythology. Dawson even makes animism an instinct of childhood.^ If this be so, the precept, "Never 1 The Child and His Religion (Chicago, 1909), p. 38. 2 Studies in Education, II, 1902, p. 287. 3 To Professor Dawson's precious collection of children's questions, I should like to add this one from a boy of about five: "Mother, who weis my mamma before you were?" Lack of space prevents me from discussing the incau- tious use of the term "instinct" in Dawson's book, as "instinct for causality" and "instinct of immortality." The naturalness of child religion, moreover, seems to mean for him that religion is preformed, even to specific beliefs, whereas the growth of mind is not primarily from one set of definite ideas to another but from the indefinite toward the definite. On this point, see Irving King, The Psychology of Child Development (Chicago, 1903), p. 243. An analysis of Dawson's cases will show that, though the children in question re- ceived little or no formal religious instruction, they were nevertheless under the infiuence of the religious ideas of their elders. *0p, cit., pp. 32 ff. CHILDREN'S FAITH 145 y teach as true anything that must afterward be unlearned," is unwise, perhaps impossible of application. But I find no adequate evidence that small children are incapable of employ- ing the causal category in the same manner as adults. Least of all do the facts indicate that there is a definite stage of spontaneous animistic belief in Tylor's sense of animism. Rather, we find a continuous mental movement from indefinite toward definite ideas, and from emotional thinking toward abstraction and objectivity. Not, then, from experience of nature, mythologically conceived, but from the experience of a present social reality in the family, should we expect the Chri§r-^ tian idea of God to grow. A child can, to use BushnelPs words, "grow up a Chris- tian, and never know himself as being otherwise." What- ever be the case with other religions, the Christian religion, which finds the whole meaning and destiny of man in divine fatherhood and human brotherhood, is the flowering of a par- ticular instinct that is active from infancy onward. To Ter- tullian's argument that the soul is naturally Christian we may now add that the child is naturally Christian. To the Chris- tian idea of the All-Father the response (unless the child has already been wounded and scarred by the unparental conduct of others) is positive, free, and vital. Children love and trust him; they struggle to obey him by kindly conduct; they desire to help him in his work; they are grateful for his gifts. This is Christian experience. It is a tender thing, easily distorted, easily blighted. It must have human fellowship in order to flourish. Only in and through some human godlikeness that sustains what is parental^ in us does any of us know the Father. Here is the deep meaning, for childhood as well as for maturity, of the surpassing love wherewith Jesus faced an unloving world. The spirit, the acts, many of the words of Jesus appeal to little ones, to what is elemental in them. Just as the Jewish children who heard him say : " Let them come to me, for the kingdom of heaven belongs to such as they are," must have clung to him and nestled in his arms, so the children of to-day, imaginatively realizing him. 146 CHILDREN'S FAITH make him their actual leader, their helper, who saves them from their own unsocial impulses. The church, as far as in its re- lations to children it is really the church of Christ, makes the same appeal to children and receives the same kind of response. The church belongs to children just as their fathers and mothers belong to them; and children belong to the church just as they belong to families. That is, ideally they belong to the church, from the standpoint of Jesus they belong to it, from the stand- point of their own social capacities they belong to it. But these capacities are as sensitive as they are beautiful; and there are contrary capacities, too; and habit-forming begins at birth. In order that a child may grow up a Christian and never know himself as being otherwise he must have co-operation from those who have the spirit of Christ. That is, the child must have social education upon the Christian plane. CHAPTER XII THE RELIGIOUS LIMITATIONS OF CHILDREN The respective educational consequences of a theory of moral continuity in child growth and a theory of moral dis- continuity. The view of child nature that has now been sketched is different from certain opinions that are widely held at the present moment. The last two chapters have shown that, though antisocial instincts are active in the early years, socially constructive ones also are present, and that even the par- ticular instinct out of which spring the finest and most difficult things in social progress begins its functions in infancy. Here we found natural capacity for entering into the great and fun- damental motives of the Christian religion, fatherhood and brotherhood, and therefore a natural basis for Christian educa- tion. If this view is well founded, there is no necessary break, in moral quality, between the life of an adult Christian and that of a child who receives Christian nurture. The necessary dif- ference between them concerns their respective range of experi- ence, firmness of habit, and extent of foresight. An adult who is already well trained knows better how to be kind to a dog, a baby, a tuberculous family, a foreigner, a laboring man, a capi- talist, a wife. With this wider knowledge of human relations there goes, of course, the possibility of profounder emotional appreciation of the character of God. Moreover, the well- trained adult Christian has so many times resisted his unsocial instincts, and indulged his social ones, and he has so often ex- perienced the joy of Christian fellowship, that habit forming has borne its fruit in the weakened power of some temptations, the actual extinction of others, and relative ease in carrying 147 148 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS high impulses into effect. This difference between childhood and maturity is great, but it is not a moral break. To attain Christian maturity, a child needs only to go on exercising more and more broadly, steadily, and intelligently certain impulses of childhood itself.^ But some voices are saying that childhood Is essentially ego- istic, and that genuine unselfishness must wait for adolescence. If this be true, we must postpone religious education in any vital sense until adolescence, while through childhood we allow motives to grow that must later be counteracted. This would be a saltatory education — education by a leap into society as contrasted with continuous growth within society as a member of it. The widest-spread doctrine of this type is the recapitula- tion theory that is taught by G. Stanley Hall and his pupils. Another instance, which it will be convenient to discuss first, is Ames's chapter on "Religion and Childhood." 2 Taking religion to be identical with "the fullest and most intense social consciousness,"^ which is about equivalent to the consciousness of the socially maturest persons, Ames finds children profoundly deficient in capacity for religion. He asserts: (1) That up to two and a half or three years human beings are non-religious, non-moral, and non-personal ;^ (2) That it is impossible for a child under the age of nine to pass in any considerable degree beyond the non-religious and non-moral attitude;^ (3) That the child has no "religious nature";^ (4) That "The social feeling of adolescence is original, inner, and urgent,"^ and that in adolescence "Religion arises nat- urally, being an inherent and intimate phase of the social 1 In some of my earlier writings I emphasized the notion that a child is not a diminutive adult, but something qualitatively as well as quantitatively dif- ferent. Doctrinal systems, I said, even though abbreviated and expressed in words of one syllable, do not fit. A small child's spontaneous interest does not go out to the Trinity, but to dolls, dogs, hobby-horses, or a game of tag. Moreover, some human relations, as that of conjugal affection, one does not appreciate imtil the sexual instinct ripens. Finally, adult stand- ards of right and wrong do not fit children, and attempts to make them fit do injustice by reason of the gap between rewards and punishments and anything that the child can imderstand. In this sense I still maintain that a child is not a diminutive adult, but qualitatively different. But this does not imply the kind of break in instinctive social capacities, and in social education, that is in question in the above paragraph. 2E. S. Ames, Psychology of Religious Experience (Boston, 1910), chap. XI. ».P. 197. « Pp.- 198, 209. ' P. 209. « P. 209. » P. 222. CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 149 consciousness."^ "For the individual, religion originates in youth." 2 If all this be true, man has a religious nature, original, inner, and urgent, which clearly makes its appearance with adoles- cence. It is denied of young children because of their sup- posed lack of capacity for social response.^ If, now, we should discover that childhood is not set off from adolescence by any such social incompetence, it would follow that children also, in their measure, are religious by original nature. In a subse- quent section I shall endeavor to show that the instinct of sex, which is the distinctive basis of adolescent phenomena, is not equal to the social task, which is nothing less than the social transformation of the mind, that Ames and others lay upon it. Meantime I would set over against the doctrine of the social incapacity of childhood the evidence, already adduced, of the early appearance of parental instinct. The recapitulation theory is a special and recent form of an idea, long held, that there is some sort of parallel between child life and the " childhood of the race." That there is a consider- able degree of similarity between them is clear. Both the race and the individual show a movement of mind from immediate ends toward remote ones; from immediate data of sense toward thought structures of greater and greater complexity; from the impulsiveness of instinct and of crowd action toward self- control and social deliberation; from a narrower to a broader range of social regard. A consequence for education is that young children take the freshest interest in, and are best trained by, objects and processes that correspond in simplicity and in sensuous appeal to the objects and processes with which early man occupied himself, and that as children grow older their ability to be interested in the complexities of civilization grows also. A child of six takes voraciously to Bopp's descriptions of primitive man's struggles with dangerous beasts; how old must one be, the teacher has to ask, before the struggles of the Roundheads with the Cavaliers arrest and hold attention ? iP. 249. 2 p. 214. •Ames's overcaution, not to seem to attribute a religious "instinct" to primitive men, suggests the possibility that I have taken too literally his state- ments concerning adolescence. See pp. 49, 50. 150 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS The special form that the recapitulation theory gives to this old idea is as follows: (1) The theory asserts that the growth of the individual mind shows a succession of definite forms that correspond in motive, content, and order of emergence to defi- nite stages in racial evolution; (2) That this succession in the individual is not determined by anything in his environment, such as his associations, but is predetermined as a set of suc- cessively ripening instincts; (3) That the proper mental and moral food for each period of child growth is to be gathered from the level of the instinct then in action, not from later and higher levels of culture.^ The popular, and here and there the literary, interpretation of recapitulation runs to the effect that children, or at least boys, are different from adults in the same way that savagery is different from civilization, savagery being interpreted in terms of its coarseness and of its relative disregard for the pains and the pleasures of men and of animals. Before examining the grounds for this theory, let us note its educational implications. At each period of growth, says the theory, feed the particular instinct that is then dominant. The child's goodness at the time, and his progress toward mature goodness, are to be measured by the fulness with which he enters into the spirit, the aims, and the characteristic activi- ties of the lower order of society that his then dominant instinct reflects. That is — if we press the point to the utmost — we are to educate children for family, church, and state, not by enlarging as much as we can children's present participation in them, but by withholding and postponing common life on these levels. Social segregation of children with children, and of adults with adults, would then be the preliminary condition of educational efficiency. If we ask how, then, children are ever to acquire an Interest In the higher social organizations and standards, and how adjustment to these standards is to be effected, the answer is that adolescence brings a spontaneous impulse to something like a conversion from egoism to altruism. This leap Into the new life will take place through the innate, 1 References to sources are postponed to the Classified Bibliography. CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 151 internal forces of the individual, it is assumed, if only appro- priate material for these forces to act upon is present. If nature has provided for social continuity in the growth of a child, then the process of social education can be sketched as follows, with the contrasting consequences of the recapitulation theory stated point by point. (1) Theory of continuity: Social education first sees to it that the child is provided with wealth of human association, association with adults as well as with children. To this kind of experience various instinctive responses are made by the child, one or more of them social in a finally valid sense, that is, in the same sense in which the best conduct of adults is social. The teacher picks out these socially valid responses, and endeavors to give them such a distinctive place in the child's experience (by means of satisfac- tions associated with them) that they will have a permanent in- fluence upon his character. Theory of recapitulation: Provide the child with plenty of things, animal pets, and other children; this is the chief and essential educational service that adults can render at the beginning. (2) Theory of continuity: The teacher now has the task of pro- moting repetition of these particularly wholesome responses, and of preventing repetition of the contrary ones. Therefore condi- tions are so arranged that discomfort accompanies the latter, and satisfaction the former, especially shared satisfactions, and these conditions are steadily repeated as often as the situations that tend to call out the responses recur. The result is the forma- tion of certain social habits, and suppression of unsocial instincts by lack of exercise. Theory of recapitulation: The instincts are given right of way, with no such careful selection by the teacher. For it is held that the exercise of an instinct on its own plane makes it not more attractive, but less so, at the next stage of growth. Let the teacher provide plenty of material for the expression of the in- stincts that are dominant. (3) Theory of continuity: As the child's social contacts widen, his social responses become more and more complicated, and his capacity for continuity in social relations increases. The teacher carries into each fresh situation the same principle of selection and of habit forming as before, but attempts to organize the whole- 152 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS some responses In the form of more and more systematic and broad co-operation — co-operation of children with children, and of children with adults. Therefore the policy of the teacher is to admit the children to a part in adult social enterprises. Theory of recapitulation: Organizations of children with chil- dren on their own plane are sufficient for social education. Let children settle their social relations to one another by the clash of opposing instincts. (4) Theory of continuity: Since the problem of society is to produce free individuality rather than mechanized conduct, and also to improve society itself rather than repeat its own perform- ances, the teacher does not stop with a set of habits that con- form to a set of ethical rules, but goes on to awaken reflective intelligence with respect to what one is doing, why it should or should not be done, and how it can be improved, that is, made mutually more satisfactory. Thus, to instinct and habit, analyti- cal reason is added, and genuinely voluntary purposes are formed. Material for this analysis, which proceeds by comparison, is drawn not only from child life and from cruder stages of adult society, but also from the best that is in contemporary social institutions. Thus, intellectually as well as affectively (in respect to satisfac- tions and dissatisfactions) the child is kept in growing fellowship with his elders. Theory of recapitulation: The child's social insight will grow most certainly and normally if he is kept in rich intellectual fellowship with culture epochs of a lower order until the middle or later years of adolescence bring him face to face with the society that he is about to enter as a full member. (5) Theory of continuity: The analysis of situations and of responses is so guided that it not only transforms instinct acts already habitual with the pupil into voluntary purposes, but also leads the pupil to ask what he himself really wants, and so to imagine and desire ideal good. An ideal is a more distant goal by reference to which we judge our particular purposes, and correct them. The process of idealizing, when it is not arrested In mere sentimentality, goes on to the identification of one's own weal and woe with the fate of the ideal, and thus makes the purpose of progress a constituent or modifier of all other purposes. Society thus trains her pupils to re-create their educator. Theory of recapitulation: The upspringing of moral self-con- sciousness will be a part of the broad emotional agitation that CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 153 ushers in the maturity of the sexual instinct. Youth will dream dreams, and see visions, and acquire reforming fervor as a phase of instinctive adolescent longing. The contrast between these two conceptions of the attainment of moral self-consciousness is not slight. One of them makes it an achievement, the other makes it an eruption of volcanic fire; one makes it a discriminating attitude that accompanies analysis, the other makes it an emotional unrest that has yet to become acquainted with its appropriate objects; one puts at its dis- posal, in the whole gradual process of its upspringing, the moral experience of the race, the other lets the individual meet himself in the isolation in which fears, and conceits, and hasty choices are born. This is the logic of the contrasting theories. To what extent the practice of teachers follows the logic of either theory is another matter. Let there be no misunderstanding as to the purpose of this analysis; it aims merely to make the elements of the problem stand out unmistakably. Another possible mis- understanding may grow out of the fact that the analysis is presented in the form of a numerical series. These five points in the theory of continuity do not represent so many successive steps, to be taken at successive periods of the child's growth, but five aspects of the sort of stimulus that society would continuously provide under the supposition that the social growth of the child can naturally be continuous rather than broken. The recapitulation theory Implies that at each stage of growth the child leaves behind the self-and-society that was his at the preceding stage. But the theory of continuity, holding that the social growth of mind consists In defining what was at the outset relatively Indefinite, In stabilizing what was relatively unstable, in differentiating what was relatively simple, and in bringing impulse under the control of permanent choices, implies that the child carries his self-and-society along through the years, enriching It as he goes. The positive service that the theory of recapitulation has rendered to social education. There is no mistaking the fact that, coincident with, and under stimulus from, the spread- 154 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS ing doctrine of recapitulation a great awakening began with respect to methods in the moral training of boys, and to a slight extent of girls. In the boys' departments of Young Men's Christian Associations, in Sunday-school classes and clubs, in the general boys' club movement, and in camps and schools for boys, we witness something that has not only the zest of newness, but also the zest of an obvious reality, or corre- spondence with life itself. I shall raise a question by and by as to the validity of some of the tendencies that have appeared, but without doubting that the new training is better than the old in point of freedom and spontaneity, in point of initiative and constructiveness, in the number of its contacts with nature, in its care for physical well being and for play, and in point of co-operation and of training therein. Moral training of the individual through present group life on the natural level of the pupil — this is now axiomatic among educators of boys. It has become axiomatic with the practical Workers largely because, under the influence of the glittering recapitulation theory, they undertook, as perhaps no teachers had ever undertaken before, to get the pupil's point of view, see through his eyes, feel wdth him, act with him. There was nothing new, to be sure, in the doctrine that the teacher must bend himself to the pupil's natural interests. But here was proclamation of a supposed law of the child's successive interests, a law that implied that children's social interests are even, for the tim^, opposed to those that are habit- ual with the teacher. Here was a challenge to the teacher to stretch his imagination and his sympathies as nothing in the general doctrine of interest and apperception had hereto- fore required him to do. Moreover, the study of boys' gangs as an instance of the supposed recapitulation results in an attempt to use the gang type of sociality as an educational agency. In order to use it, the leader had to become a member of it, and be obedient to laws not of his own devising. This is too brief a statement to represent all the wide-spread effort to enter actively and sincerely into the realities of chil- dren's social motives, but it is sufficient to indicate ways in CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 155 which the recapitulation theory has had an unquestionably vitalizing effect upon moral training. We need not stint our recognition of this effect if we go on to inquire whether we have reached the end of the matter. Is it not possible that if we rigorously apply the recapitulation theory we shall fix children in immature social motives? Granted that fellowship is the basis of social education, does It follow that fellowship is possible only on the basis of children's crude instinctive social inter- actions, and not also on the basis of adult enterprises? The teacher must reach down, no doubt; is It certain that children should not be expected to reach up ? Does the social life of children instinctively recapit- ulate the social evolution of the race? The only sense in which an answer can here be attempted is that of an enumera- tion of points involved, with some indication of sources in which the positions here taken are discussed at greater length. (1) The theory took its start from supposed traces of bodily recapitulation in the embryo. But "the view . . . that em- bryonic development is essentially a recapitulation of ancestral history must be given up. ' '(^ (2) With reference to the brain in particular it does not hold. ** Man's brain in general follows in its growth a course enormously unlike that by which it developed in the race."^ (3) Where comparison of the two mental series, racial and men- tal, can safely be made, "what little is known is rather decidedly against any close parallelism of the two." ^ (4) The sex instinct, which presents in its late ripening the su- preme case of a social acceleration of the individual that is both marked and fairly universal, ripens early in the race, but late in the individual. (5) Further — and this has peculiar weight against those who have relied upon adolescence for evidence of recapitulation — whereas in the race the sex instinct does not appear until it is physi- 1 Adam Sedgwick, "Embryology," in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed. 2 Thomdike, op. cit., p. 255. s Ibid., p. 256. Thomdike's whole chapter should be read. An extended analysis of both the biological and the psychological evidence will be foimd in Davidson, P. E., The Recapitulation Theory and Human Infancy (New York, 1914). 156 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS ologlcally employed, in the individual it appears, and begins to influence social groupings, long before reproduction is possible. (6) Parental instinct, as we have seen at length, does not co- incide, in its appearance and growth, with procreation or with capacity therefor. Here again an instinct that has tremendous social significance appears earlier in the individual series than in the racial series. (7) If any one should hold that, even though other evidence for recapitulation be leaky, common observation of boys shows them to be little savages anyhow, whereas in adolescence they attain to something like civilization, the following answer could be made: **The" boy, who figures so largely as the living demonstration to the popular mind, is a socially neglected boy. He is the boy on the street; or the boy in a boys' school, removed from normal family relationships; or the boy who goes to extremes because he has been misunderstood and mishandled; or the boy who has simply lacked suflicient fellowship with older persons to show what he is socially capable of. Social capacities do not sprout in a vacuum, much less under thumb-screws. Nor does a child's possible social reach appear until he has something to reach toward. We need sorely to realize that what to reach toward can be revealed to a boy only through acquaintance with those who are further advanced. A boy who lives in a good house surrounded by wholesome things, the roof of which covers also refined and affectionate parents, may nevertheless be socially neglected, that is, lack opportunity to take the part that he is capable of taking in the doings of his elders. Over against the results of all these kinds of neglect stands a multitude of boys who have grown up in co-operative fellowship with adults, and as a consequence have conducted themselves in such a civilized way that they have not attracted attention to themselves. In short, the argument from current observation unintentionally picks its cases, and then attrib- utes to original nature social limitations that arise from deficien- cies in boys* social opportunities. (8) The evidence from current observation that is adduced in support of the theory of recapitulation is derived almost ex- clusively from boy life, scarcely at all from girl life. Why? In part, we need not doubt, because girls, being kept in closer con- tact with adult life in the home, and having more opportunity to co-operate with a parent in important duties, develop earlier the social capacities that are common to boys and girls. CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 157 The sociaL significance of adolescence. That adolescence brings changes in the child's social capacities and spontaneous interests, and that these changes are of momentous consequence for social education, no one will question. But that undue reliance has been placed upon the socializing influence of the instinct that now ripens may be asserted without hesitation. Adolescence offers fresh, unique opportunity for social educa- tion; but instinct does not do the work of educating. The opportunity is unique because: (1) There is instinctive effort to please persons of the opposite sex. This regard for others may be extended beyond the courtship process.^ (2) The fact of loosing oneself from dependence upon parents to begin in- dependent life is of itself an assertion of individuality; it may become an incentive to reflective weighing of life's ethical alternatives; it may be the occasion of great choices. (3) The general state of restlessness, excitement, and general emotional susceptibility (as for beauty in nature and in art) makes it comparatively easy to acquire new interests and enthusiasms, which may be highly idealistic and social. Adolescence tends to make the human soil mellow, but mellowness of soil does not determine whether the harvest shall be wheat or tares. (4) More or less parental tenderness, obviously instinctive, mixes with sexual instinct in the attitudes of lovers toward each other. On this compound instinctive basis family life on the highest ethical plane may be built, and this life may radiate into community organization and into world society. What an opportunity is this for social education I But the same thing that makes it an opportunity for education makes it also an open road to evil. The period of adolescence, and the magnetism of its characteristic instinct, fasten upon the individual the worst faults that the race has developed. That criminality here gets its chief entrance into the mind is a serious enough fact, but it is not the most serious one. The profound- est and the most prolific of all evils in the world is the selfish use of the sex instinct. 1 Under the term "courtship process" I include not only the consciously intended preliminaries to marriage, but also the preceding years of taking an interest in, and making oneself interesting to, persons of the opposite sex. 158 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS There is no need to dwell upon the phases of this evil that are prominent in the public mind. There are in addition mo- mentous phases of it that the public thinks nothing about. Even aside from all question of social vice, social idealisms that sprout in childhood and blossom in youth are largely shrivelled by conjugal experience following an undisciplined adolescence. Selfishness in this relation means arrest of social capacity, a hardening of the personality that is likely to affect all the relations that one has with one's fellows. It inevitably affects the children in the family, though they know nothing of its existence. For selfishness in the conjugal rela- tion is per se the drying up of tender regard for the personality of another, and tender regard springs from parental instinct. One cannot henceforth be a whole parent to one's children, much less train them for future parenthood. The canker of this selfishness spreads directly also, not merely through one's children, to relations between persons in the larger social units. Tender regard for the personality of another, which is none other than justice in one's soul — this, wrought into habit by self-discipline in the most intimate association of husband and wife, forms an excellent background and prepara- tion for the recognition of personality in business and in civic affairs, while absence of this soul's justice at home bodes ill for the world outside. Granted that there is no absolute guarantee that a social quality that is habitual in one human relation will be transferred to different relations; granted that we are bundles of inconsistencies; nevertheless it is a safe assump- tion that what my family is to me can easily affect my valuation of the family life of my employees, and that in the by-and- large this effect will occur frequently in a large society. Justice in the conjugal relation will tend, in the long run, to inject domestic considerations into the wage problem, the problems of civic betterment, the problem of industrial disputes, and the problem of war. When we consider all this in addition to the vice and criminal- ity that get their impulse from the adolescent condition of mind, we shall see that incalculable evil and incalculable good CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 159 depend upon the direction that is given to the instinct that comes to maturity in this period. The sex instinct is not self- directing toward the ends of just society — this is evident. Like all other useful instincts, it requires training. It requires training more, possibly, than any other, and not merely in the way of restraint because of its possibilities for evil, but also in the way of positive development into a defined and noble social purpose. Reliance for the right social fruitage of adoles- cence is not to be placed upon even the fine spontaneities of youth, but upon educational foresight and skill. The social limitations of adolescence appear, too, from the fact that it accomplishes its full instinctive work under various social systems, under any system, in fact, that permits be- tween the sexes the relations of courtship and marriage. The primary impulses of youth find outlet under any form of govern- ment; at every level of social organization, from the savage tribe to the great modern state; under social institutions that range through the whole scale from slavery to Industrial democ- racy. What kind of society we shall have depends In no appre- ciable degree upon the sex Instinct as such, but upon the place it occupies in a great complex of instincts, habits, assumptions, and ideals.^ The relation of adolescence to childhood*s social habits. The irruption of a fresh instinct that profoundly stirs the whole psychophysical organism offers a specially favorable oppor- tunity for the basal educational process of habit making and habit breaking. One notices things not noticed before, reacts to them, experiences satisfactions and dissatisfactions of new varieties, and presto ! the youth has "taken to" fiction, poetry, history, pictures, natural scenery, sport, good clothes, educa- tion, business, politics, or what not. Most certainly of all, he takes to some social circle, which may easily be one unknown and undreamed of In his childhood. So rapid and so radical are the shiftings of adolescence from the personal groupings of childhood, and so positive is the de- » The significance of adolescence for religious conversion wiU be considered in the next chapter. 160 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS sire not to be a child any longer, that the observer can easily get an impression that what occurs is not only a social quicken- ing but also a social break with the individual's past. This impression is deepened by reactions made by youths who en- counter parental opposition to the laying aside of childhood's dependence and subordination. Before we commit ourselves to the opinion that adolescence is such a break, however, we should remind ourselves that a peace- ful river, if it is obstructed by a dam, may break the barrier and become a destructive flood. Many a parent, blunderingly preferring that his child should remain a child, and resenting the individuality and the new social attachments that youth brings, produces the social refractoriness that he blames upon the hot blood of youth. That is, the break in such cases is not brought about by growth into adolescence any more than by resistance to such growth. Educators, moreover, should have no illusions as to the relation of the laws of habit to the adolescent period. It is a truism when one speaks it, and yet it needs to be said, that provision must be made for forming, not social habits (for some social connections will be made anyway), but the particular sort of social habits that is required by the democracy toward which the Christian purpose aspires. Adolescence can produce snobbery more easily than democracy. In fact, no small part of social education at this period consists in widening out the purposes of groups already formed upon the basis of a narrow and exclusive regard of a few for a few. Here again the in- dicated educational method is admittance of the young to social groups and to social practice that are more mature than youth itself would spontaneously devise. The theory of recapitulation, when it asserts that childhood is essentially egoistic, and that genuine altruism must wait for adolescence, seems to assume that selfish habits, made strong by exercise through the whole of childhood, somehow become null and void when one passes from childhood to youth. Is this true? We have already seen that the sexual instinct is not, of itself, unambiguously social except in a narrow sense; CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 161 it can easily mingle with Itself other impulses so as to form a complex whole that is tender and beautiful as well as strong; but it can also be cruel, hard, blind, savage, weak. The par- ticular complex of social attitudes that are henceforth to prevail is not at all predictable from anything in this one instinct. Just as in childhood, so here, the personality is formed by a multitude of particular experiences that bring multiform in- stinctive satisfactions and dissatisfactions. The bonds that are now formed with one's fellows are bonds of habit as well as of instinct. Not only must habit forming still go on; the whole of it will be affected by preadolescent social experience. Nothing occurs that can at a stroke wipe old selfish habits off the slate. On the face of the matter, how can one suppose that instinctive attraction for the opposite sex will reverse an already firm habit with respect to one's own sex ? Even a youth's attitudes toward the opposite sex are like the householder's treasure, which con- tains things new and old. The kind of mother a boy has associated with for more than a dozen years; the way his father has treated her, and the way she has responded to this treat- ment; the sort of sex distinctions that have been cm-rent in the boy's social environment; the amount and the qualities of the comradeship that he has had with girls; the treatment of women to which he has been witness everywhere, all these leave in his mind a sediment so firm that it seems to him to be bed rock, nature itself. These social assumptions are not necessarily affected by his new emotions toward girls and women. He can adore a female without stopping to ask whether women should be treated as equals or as inferiors ; and he can actually treat the adored one as an inferior without ceasing to adore. He can even magnify the virtue of his affection on the ground that he, a superior creature, bestows himself upon an inferior! By the comple- mentary process, too, girls can come to prefer such male atten- tions to any other. The whole instinctive adolescent process can run its course between the fences of almost any social system. To change the figure, the social attitudes of a youth 162 CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS are not like a garden bed of plants just breaking through the soil, and all springing from freshly planted seeds of one and the same variety, but like a bed in which annuals, biennials, and perennials mix, the tender shoots standing side by side with plants that are fibrous and stiff from years of growth. It follows that educational methods that segregate children in such a way as to narrow their social experience tend toward permanent arrest of social growth. It may well be that for particular purposes boys should practise co-operation with boys, and girls with girls, but a general policy of sex segregation, placed within the actual historical setting of the present, can- not fail to leave permanent marks of social impoverishment upon both sexes, an impoverishment that makes both of them unready for certain essentials of democracy. Again, the segre- gation of younger children from older ones, and the segregation of children of any age from adult companionship and from adult thought and enterprise, leave some social capacities un-. developed, and harden the remaining ones into a dominant life attitude. Of course gradation of pupils and of material is essential for certain purposes, but the nature of proper gradation is easily misconceived. Pupils are often graded down to that which is easy for them instead of being graded up toward the most advanced of their interests; or the average performance of an age group is taken as a satisfactory standard for each member of it, whereas there are wide variations within such groups; or an assumption is made that the interests and capacities of an individual go up like an elevator, all at once, whereas their ascent is uneven, like that of a band of children frolicking up a stairway. If the possibilities of co-operation between younger and older are found in a given case to cover only a narrow area, we must not conclude that co-operation within this narrow area is educationally unimportant. This particular readiness of a child may be an open road toward a valuable social habit; ex- perience at this point may awaken further interests; the joy of achievement here may raise the level of all his work. The cordiality of our recognition of social values in new CHILDREN'S LIMITATIONS 1G3 types of bo3^s' club work must now be tempered by reserve as to a single point. As far as these clubs take boys out of edu- cationally wholesome homes; as far as parents are encouraged to transfer their educational responsibility to the boys' work specialist; as far as this specialist conceals the man in himself in order to be a boy with the boys; as far as he binds the boys to himself rather than to the social order; to the extent that he encourages not only the processes of tribal society but also its social standards — to this extent social arrest will mix with social growth. CHAPTER XIII THE STRUGGLE WITH SIN "Sin" is a social conception. WTien I was a boy I was taught that sin is a relation, not between me and my neighbor, but between me and God. Subsequent reflection has led me to regard the distinction here made as not vaHd. The intimacy of the two Great Commandments to each other is too close. The dwelHng place of the Highest is not apart from, but within, the brotherhood, which is the family of God and the kingdom of God. I find neither psychological, nor ethical, nor meta- physical footing for the idea that I can have relations with God in which he and I are isolated from all other society. My very being as a conscious indi\ddual is bound up with that of my fellows; a divine judgment upon what I am and upon what I will to be is yer se a judgment upon my reciprocal human re- lationships. Nor can I judge God otherwise. The only mean- ing that I can give to his supreme goodness, the only ground that I can assign for bowing my will to his, is that he enters into the human social process more fully, more constructively, than I do. The need for any such term as sin lies in the fact that we men, in addition to constructing the human society in which God and men are both sharers, also obstruct it and in some measure destroy. We must now as educators face the fact that we do, individually and collectively, oppose, resist, and undo our own work of social upbuilding. We must inquire into the ground in human nature for the slowness, the delays, the backsets, and the defeat of ourselves by ourselves that are so obviously a part of the process of establishing the democracy of God. The lodgment of sin in the individual and in society. In the light of our previous analysis it is possible to go at once to an inventory of the negative factors with which we have to reckon. 164 SIN 165 (1) We have anti-social instincts. They have been enumerated already. What needs to be noted in addition is that they are not so many isolated impulses, but factors that by various men- tal processes are built into the personality and into the struc- ture of society. (2) The exercise of anti-social as well as of social instincts is pleasurable. The satisfaction of grabbing; of greedy possession ; of venting envy, jealousy, and wrath; of hunting, fighting, and mastering, as well as of sexual license — this satisfaction is what makes all of them hard to resist. Only psychological blindness and educational folly could teach that the pleasures of sin are a delusion. Some sinful pleasures are evanescent, it is true, but not all. Some bring pain in their wake, but not all, and there are great possibilities of foresighted calculation and pre- vention of disagreeable consequences. Social impulses have a way of disturbing the dreams of selfishness, it is true, but then, social impulses can be quieted ! (3) The laws of habit formation are indifferent to social values; therefore a child who experiences satisfaction in his anti-social acts has in himself no protection from anti-social habits. A par- ticular child may be so situated that the constructive social instincts, being called out oftener and yielding greater pleasure than the anti-social ones, counteract them. Such situations the educator deliberately arranges, and he also attaches dis- satisfactions to the anti-social reactions. But there is nothing in the child's own habit-forming mechanism that does this for him. In the absence of help from others, or of some fortunate chance mixture of conditions, he forms anti-social habits as spontaneously as social ones. As a matter of fact, education has not yet perfected its control of the habits of even one child. Every one makes anti-social instinctive reactions, ex- periences pleasure from them, as a result repeats them with added vigor, and thus becomes a victim of habits which educa- tion has to devise methods for breaking. (4) One's habits of conduct reflect themselves in one's social thinking, sometimes as a formulated premise the truth of which is assumed, sometimes as a control of attention whereby social facts REIGMEn READING ROOM \ PRINCEJOH, N. J. 166 SIN of some sorts are noticed and evaluated, while social facts of other sorts are not. Thus, in a perfectly natural way, anti-social prin- ciples and rules of conduct mix with social ones. A thing tends to be defined in our thinking by that which we habitually notice in it. A pine-tree is not the same sort of thing to a lumberjack as to a John Muir. Just so, " human nature" is, in the thinking of each of us, that which we habitually notice in our fellows. Now, what we habitually notice is that which we have to take account of in carrying out our own purposes and lines of con- duct. Many of us not only initiate our plans from our own self- ishness, but in the execution of them awaken self-regarding impulses in others. Thereupon we judge that human nature is rootedly selfish ! You will find no one so doggedly certain of this as the man who makes profits by stimulating other men's cupidity. On the other hand, you will find no one so certain of the inherent nobility of human nature as those who make opportunity for such nobility to show itself. Thus it is that anti-social instincts, confirmed by habit, be- come a basis of anti-social thinking. Probably most persons suppose that the order of psychological dependence is the re- verse of this, at least in part. Justifying their habits by their thinking, they imagine that their habits are a product of rea- son. Socrates, indeed, held that the reason that we do wrong is that we do not clearly see what is right. Aristotle, on the other hand, took the position that practice is itself one of the sources of insight. Without going into some fine questions thus raised, we may say that psychology justifies, on the whole, the tendency of Aristotle's thought at this point. Thoughts about what is worthy of approval do not begin until we have already approved and condemned many things. It is by reflec- tion upon these judgments, already made, and by reaffirming some of them, that we arrive at principles for future conduct. Sin gets control of our thinking, then, as follows: First we experience enjoyment in some anti-social reaction; the enjoy- ment stimulates to repetition of the act; a habit is thus started; we cherish the memory of the experience; then relate it in thought to other things so as to make a system, and to provide SIN 167 for unlimited repetition; this thought system in turn becomes a habit, and now, behold, the unsocial principle that has been derived from instinct is henceforth taken as an axiom of social life. (5) Anti-social instincts, habits, and ways of thinking are intrenched in social institutions, in customs, and in 'public opin- ion. Society expects selfishness from individuals, and to some extent actually rewards it. If we look at society in historical perspective, we perceive that it is, on the whole, an evolu- tionary process in which we are working out the beast, and training ourselves to have regard for what is humane. The or- ganized faults that are in society did not, of course, originate in any fall from a perfectly organized common life; they are simply parts of our instinctive endowment that, confirmed by habit and by being made premises for thought, restimulate themselves from generation to generation by informal education. The social conditions into which a child is born actually train him, though unintentionally for the most part, to be selfish within these conventional limits. It is true that society praises unstinted generosity; it admires, though with more reserve, the fine and sturdy justice that asks for only a democrat's share, and endeavors to secure as much for others. But it takes for granted that these will be exceptional. A general low average of self-seeking is socially expected. Success, in common par- lance, connotes getting something for oneself, and the mass pays homage to success. At the crucially important point of sex morality, young men who are willing to make the fight for character cannot yet count upon effective social support from either men or women. When a morally thoughtful parent or teacher witnesses the generous and trustful impulses of childhood, or the glowing idealism of youth, he sighs to think of the disillusionment that is to come when, "getting into the world," one meets its hard- ness, and is in turn hardened. The withering of ideals as the dews of life's morning are dried up by the heat of competition, of greed, of political self-seeking, and of licentiousness, is the continuous tragedy of education. Sin, that is to say, has social 168 SIN organs by which It is transmitted through the generations, positively preventing the young from even attempting to follow out in maturity their best social impulses. Generation after generation social capacities that are certainly here are wasted by society itself. Sin, then, is rooted in instinct, confirmed by habit, and prop- agated by informal social education. Let us have no illu- sions with respect to the cost of democracy. Education for democracy has to face, not only unsocial traits in the child's original nature, but also a social system that brings them out, sustains them, justifies them in popular thinking, and rewards them when they "succeed." The possibility of success in educating for democracy lies in the fact, first of all, that in our selfishness we are not at one with ourselves, but are stirred to unselfishness also by instinct, and by the habits and institutions that have arisen therefrom, and second, that selfishness and brotherliness do not have equal capacity for organizing themselves. Love of one another produces a degree of co-operation, which is the massing of hu- man energy, that is impossible to greed, licentiousness, and the lust of power. Selfishness tends to disorganization and in- effectiveness in the long run. Temporary equilibrium may be attained in some cases by balancing the selfish interest of one person against that of another, but permanent stability is not attained in this way. Have we not learned the lesson that the massing of individual self-interest into a group selfishness is the way of class struggles within a nation, and of wars without ? Massed selfishness tends thus to be anarchic, and to pull itself down in the ruin of its competitors. But love builds and de- stroys not. Unwise love may destroy, but it is the unwisdom, not the love, that is responsible. What the friends of democ- racy have to do is to put administrative experience and scientific analysis into the service of the brotherly purpose, and to train children in the resulting concepts and methods as well as in the love motive. The psychological approach to children's faults. What has just been said as to the extent and the firmness of the lodge- SIN 169 ment of sin awakens echoes of the old controversy over total depravity. Echoes only; for our problem is different, and our approach to facts is different. BeHef in total depravity was a dogmatic belief, that is, one accepted upon authority that was supposed to be that of divine revelation. The procedure was a priori, the conclusion being first accepted, and facts then being used merely to illustrate and confirm it. Illustration and con- firmation, too, consisted, not in analyzing children's conduct, or in tracing it to its causes, but in contrasting it with a fixed standard of adult or even divine perfection, and then taking all deviation from the standard en bloc as defect of child nature. Even though less deviation had been found, or none at all, the doctrine would have stood nevertheless. The whole landscape is changed as soon as we go at the facts in the spirit of science. We recognize in children multi- tudes of reactions that are social in the same sense in which some of our maturest Christian conduct is social. We perceive other reactions that are anti-social in the same sense in which some of our mature badness is anti-social. But we perceive also that neither sort of reaction has as yet the woody fibre of adult character. Moreover, we see that children's ways are not simple, as the theory of depravity makes them out to be. We do not have just "good children'' and "bad children" to deal with, but personalities already complex because of the influence of preceding experiences as well as because of the variety of the instincts that are always at work. If we are to understand these personalities, we must analyze their conduct into its elements; we must see the relations of these elements to one another and to the particular stimulus that awakens each of them on each occasion; and in all this we must persistently trace each specific item to an equally specific cause. The following questions, which may appropriately be raised when faulty conduct, or con- duct that seems to be faulty, occur, will illustrate this psycho- logical approach. How much in the conduct that is regarded as faulty is a result of physiological conditions such as imperfect nutrition, digestive disturbances, adenoids and mouth-breathing or other diseased 170 SIN conditions that lower the vitality, defective sense-organs, and nervous instability produced by fatigue, lack of sleep, over- stimulation, or other causes ? How much of the faulty conduct is an imitative reproduction of the conduct of others, whether children or adults ? How much of it constitutes an attempt to adjust oneself, protectively for example, to persons who are stronger ? How much of it is a matter of habit, and how did this habit arise? Note the distribution of the child's pleasures heretofore. Has he repeatedly experienced pleasure in acts of this kind, and if so could his elders have controlled conditions so as to deprive such acts of their pleasurable quality? What satisfactions have been provided for conduct of opposite social quality? In short, have his elders arranged conditions heretofore so that social acts on his part have regularly brought satisfaction, and anti-social acts discomfort ? What is the situation that called out this particular unsocial act ? Our reactions do not occur in a vacuum, but in response to specific incitement. What are the specific elements in the situa- tion that the child was reacting to, and in particular what was each of these elements to him at the time? Do not define the situation merely as it looks to an adult; do not define it in merely general terms, but make sure how the particular features of it looked to this child at this time.^ What are the instinctive roots of the reaction? Avoid for the time being all such blanket or cover-up terms as badness, naughty child, selfishness, wilfulness, obstinacy, disobedience, heedless- ness, untruthfulness, cruelty, and guilt and innocence. Find what specific impulses were in play at the moment and immediately before it, and see how each responds to some particular incitement in the situation. » A child of six was told by his mother to perform a certain small service that would take him temporarily from, the room. He started to comply, but paused inside the room, and he remained unmoved even by the second command. A third command brought this rejoinder: "But, mother, I shall miss the story !" For at the moment he was a member of a conversa- tional group in which a story was just then in progress. The mother, promptly perceiving that she, rather than the boy, had strained the mother-child re- lation, gave permission to remain to the end of the story, whereupon the child cheerfully performed his duty. What would have been the educa- tional effect if the mother had insisted upon instant compliance regardless of the elements in the situation to which the child was at the moment respond- ing? How can we expect to make children social minded by insisting that we are right when in fact we are blundering? SIN 171 It will then at last be time to ask which of these impulses, if any at all, needs to be suppressed. We shall often find that the chief difficulty is in an immature application of an instinct that has permanent value. Analysis like this usually discovers that the chief factor in the faulty conduct is some physiological condition or else some previous and continued failure of the child's elders to provide conditions favorable for the growth of social habits and of social intelligence. Even the nervous causes of children's unsocial conduct are most often a product of adult neglect. The "depravity" that the child exhibits, therefore, is com- monly not that of his own heart, but that of remediable faults of adult individuals and of adult society. Educational guidance of self-approval and self-condem- nation. Though the causes of a child's misconduct be thus traced to us his elders, the misconduct is nevertheless his ow^n, and he needs emancipation from it. His act is bound to leave some deposit in the self that he is now forming. The educa- tor's task is to see that childish faults, w^hatever their cause, are so handled as to leave a socially constructive deposit. The fact that a child is not "really bad" does not imply that he should be let alone. In some instances, doubtless, the best thing that can happen is that his misconduct should be mini- mized and forgotten, especially misconduct that involves no immediate danger to others, and misconduct that is not in serious danger of becoming habitual. But in the by-and-large some realization on the part of the child himself that something is wrong, and that it must be corrected, is most important both for constructive social habits and for constructive social think- ing. If a child who is already able to communicate by language is merely wheedled or coddled into being amiable, the best that can result is a blind habit, probably a habit of waiting for the wdieedling or the coddling, whereas he needs to grow in self- reliance, in self-guidance, and therefore in discriminative judg- ment upon his own conduct. This implies that: (1) Things to he done and things to he avoided must he defined in the child's own mind with sufficient clearness to enable him to 172 SIN know whether or not he has acted correctly. This means that there must be rules, but it does not imply that rules are to be imposed by authority that to the child must seem arbitrary. In some matters, especially those that concern health and physi- cal safety, rules must be enforced whether the child understands the necessity of them or not. But every effort should be made to have every requirement, as far as possible, a mutual under- standing between the child and his elders. Moreover, rules must not be so difficult as to discourage efforts to obey. Rather, rules should be made so easy that the child will have the joy of meeting the standard and of triumphing over his own weakness. To children, as to adults, the consciousness that one knows just what is expected, and just how to meet the expectation, gives a sense of power.^ (2) The child must he made aware that other 'persons, if possible both children and adults, approve acts of his that comply ivith the standard, and disapprove acts of his that violate it. Every child is entitled to such social support and correction for his judg- ments upon himself. Social approval and disapproval hold his attention to the point, enable him to look farther ahead, and to some extent help to keep the mind objective and to counteract self-sophistication and self-importance. The power that others thus have over us by strictly psychological means is elemental. Our response to the approvals and disapprovals of others is instinctive and emotional. Here is natural educa- tion, the power of which is little less than marvellous. Chil- dren as young as four years who persist in passionate attacks upon playmates in spite of repeated physical chastisement by parents have been known to struggle for self-control and to achieve it as soon as their playmates unitedly expressed their attitude by withdrawing from the passionate children's so- ciety. Here lie the instinctive roots of the sense of guilt, and in general of what is popularly called conscience. Whatever 1 "How do you do, M.?" said some neighbors to a very small boy who was playing in the front yard. He answered: "Pretty well, thank you," and instantly ran into the house to ask his mother whether he had made the cor- rect reply. SIN 173 sensitiveness we attain toward abstract right, or duty, or ideals, or God, takes its rise in sensitiveness toward the approvals and disapprovals of human beings. The range of this influence has no natural limits. The most exalted sense of obligation is psychologically continuous with the inner impulsion that makes us conform to social expectation in such trivial matters as the style of our shoes; and the self-approval of a good con- science is similarly related to the puffing up of ourselves when we learn that one of our thousand ancestors ten generations back was distinguished for something or other ! Obviously a power like this needs to be used by the educator with discrimination. Both the objects that are to receive social approval and dis- approval, and the emotional intensity of the experience of social opinion must be regulated. Hence: (3) These approvals and disapprovals must he so expressed that the attention of the child is kept upon the grounds thereof , that is, the thing that is good or bad, arid why it is so. What he needs is to form a like opinion, or to see some fact in a new light, yes, even to desire something that he did not desire before. If, when he is condemned, he fixes his mind upon the disapprov- ing persons, he may resent their attitude because it hurts him. He then condemns their condemnation instead of condemning the act that they disapprove. He may even stiffen himself in his misconduct by associating his discomfort with the dis- approval instead of with his own fault. Moreover, the emo- tional effect of condemnation, especially if it is not tempered to the child's individual sensitiveness, may easily be depres- sion and discouragement, paralysis of action, the withering of initiative. Here, again, the persons who condemn get them- selves between the child and his proper goal. When he meets approval, as well as when he meets dis- approval, something depends upon the direction of his atten- tion. If he does not think of the grounds of the approval, but rather forms a mental association between his own enjoyment and the approvers, he will indeed be drawn to them in a sort of fellowship, but the attachment will be that of the clique, not that of a generous sociality. Cliquism consists essentially in 174 SIN admiration for persons without discriminating what is admi- rable or otherwise in them. If discrimination were practised, the traits that are really likable in the members of the clique would be found outside as well as inside it, and unlikable traits would be found inside. The sum of the matter is that the educational effect that is to be sought from social approvals and disapprovals, whether from other children or from adults, should not be the strength- ening of purposeless social likes and dislikes, but increase in the child's intelligent co-operation with other children and with adults for specific objective ends. (4) Condemnation must not he administered so often or made so emphatic, and approval must not he so rare, that the child hecomes convinced that he is really and rootedly had, and accepts himself as such, or concludes that misconduct is not a serious thing after all. The approvals and disapprovals should be of such a kind, and so distributed, as to awaken in him a discriminating judgment upon the tendencies of his conduct, a realization that there is something for him to struggle for, and a hopeful attitude in the struggle. Joy is the handmaid of vigor; depression con- spires with weakness. If frequent repetition of condemnation does not bring depression, it brings nevertheless another evil. As the skin defends itself from undue pressure by becoming thick and callous, so constant fault-finding renders the mind insensitive to its faults. The child must be trained to notice differences; therefore his elders must do so. They must ex- press their appreciation of even feeble efforts toward improve- ment, and they must so habitually show their confidence in him that his habitual notion of himself will be that of improve- ment. This policy fits the spontaneous interests of children. They know that they are children; they aspire to grow; they know that they are faulty; they like change; they are proud to become stronger both mentally and physically, and they are quite capable of the joy of self-conquest. What a pity that our own insensitiveness to the child's capacities for changing him- self should create conditions that dull these capacities instead of using them. SIN 175 (5) In order to educate for democracy, there must he free reciproc- ity of approvals and disapprovals between children and their elders. We cannot make democrats of children by treating their judg- ments as of no account. Merely beating down another will, or flattening it down by constant pressure, whether the will of a nation, or of a man, or of a child, is the mark of an autocracy that is bent upon perpetuating itself. A child does not increase in virtue by absolute submission to anybody or anything. Not training in such submission, but practice in intelligent, volun- tary co-operation, is the thing that will make democrats of children. This principle is violated in self-governing groups of children whenever the public opinion of the group suppresses individual judgment, or leaves no scope for making it effective. The prin- ciple is violated by adults whenever, in their relations with a child, they assume to be infallibly right. The assumption is grotesquely untrue anyw'ay; it is always untrue; the wisest parent or teacher is wise only in spots, and no one is competent to locate wuth precision the boundaries between his own com- petence and his own incompetence. Even when the judgment of an adult is precisely right, it should not be merely imposed upon a child. The way to make the child a democrat is to make him a convinced and therefore free participant in true judgments. Children must be encour- aged, then, to weigh what the educator says and does. Amend- ments proposed by children are always in order; that is, the educator must be sincerely willing (not merely make a pretense of being willing) to reconsider and modify his own plans. The formation of a genuinely common will by deliberation — this is the problem of democracy not only in election campaigns and in the halls of legislation, but also in every schoolhouse, in every home, and in every church school. This will involve children's approval and condemnation not only of what we invite then* judgment upon, but also of what they take it into their heads to have a judgment upon. One of the things in which they will take the keenest interest is our own personal conduct. Here, as well as in child life, they 176 SIN will find objective material in which they can discover and de- fine moral differences. Here they will find fellowship in their faults as well as in their virtues — that is, if we adults have the truly democratic humility, the high educational wisdom, to let children help us in our moral struggle even as we help them. This is democracy in moral education, and it is moral education toward democracy. Socialization by means of punishment. What has been said of social disapproval, which is a kind of punishment, con- tains almost everything that is essential in a general theory of punishment except certain warnings as to what it is not. In the strict and proper sense of the word, to punish is to express disapproval by means more emphatic and generally more pain- ful (though not always so) than words. The disapproval, the personal relationship, is of the essence of it. Punishment, then, is the use of pain as a means of improving the child's social attitudes. The test of it in any instance is the contribution that it makes to the formation of a genuinely common will of the deliberative type. If it puts persons farther apart instead of bringing them closer to one another, it not only fails to be socially educative, it becomes anti-social education. Much that is called disciplinary punishment is condemned at once by this test. Here belong: Punishing in anger or as a means of relieving one's own irrita- tion. Punishing to even up things, under the barbarous theory of retaliation — if you hurt us, we will hurt you. A refined form of this theory holds that abstract justice requires that -WTong be ex- piated by pain, and that right be rewarded by happiness. Here the presupposition is that each individual will act upon purely in- dividualistic motives. Such punishment tends to intensify such motives. It separates the punished from the punisher instead of uniting them. Punishment that compels to the performance or the avoidance of a particular act without regard to the relations between per- sons that are involved in the whole matter. When the punisher steps into the situation he makes the personal factor prominent. SIN 177 whether he intends to do so or not. He may imagine that he is merely adjusting the child to the proper use of material things, or to playmates, whereas he is also changing the relation of the child to himself and to other adults. Unless this change in per- sonal relations is a wholesome one, the punislmient is to be con- demned. In view of these strictures one may well ask whether, then, any punishment can be socially constructive. Must not the deliberate infliction of pain inevitably separate persons even though it secures the performance or the avoidance of a par- ticular act? The disciplinarian, whether parent or teacher, should not flinch at this point. The cement that binds individ- uals into society is ultimately the satisfactions that they have in one another's presence. Something to be enjoyed in common is the genuinely constructive factor, and the only one, in any part of social education. All that the infliction of pain can possibly do is to clear the way for increased social enjoyment. Here, then, is the proper test and control of all punishments. Under some conditions pain deliberately inflicted can, as experi- ence shows, heal a child's mind of one or another social defect just as truly as the painful process of filling a tooth may stop toothache. Let us note some of these conditions : When a child is carried away by some excitement of the moment so that he is unable to use his judgment, as when hilarious play becomes dangerous or cruel, a moderate pain inflicted in good nature may break the spell, "clear the air," and restore him to himself, a self that he actually approves and prefers. Young children often produce pain in others wdthout quite realizing the fact. Inflicting some similar, but harmless, pain, with appropriate explanation, may be the most effective cure.* What is past and gone cannot be corrected; it can only be used to secure some future good. The reason for punishment is not past misconduct or present perversity of will, but the happier »A small boy had bitten his still smaller sister. "Come here," said the mother, "I want to show you just how you have made sister feel." There- upon the mother's teeth, applied firmly and painfully to the lobe of an ear illuminated the small boy's social thinking and strengthened his social motive toward his sister without separating him from his mother's love. 178 SIN future that punishment may bring nearer. The amount of pain, and the method of administering it, must be determined with a view to turning the child's attention toward this better future. Pain that draws attention to itself only can hardly promote self- control or social self-guidance. The consequence of this remark with respect to the severity of the infliction is obvious enough. Not to stop reflection, but to help it, is the proper purpose; not to compel or crush, but to assist toward the realized freedom of self-control. In short, punishment is good when it actually guides the child's attention toward a possible good, the desirability of which he himself sees. If at the moment of the smart he cannot see, the smart must be preceded and followed by deliberative processes that assist him to do so. Many a child has found, and promptly, the sweetness of clarified insight and improved self- control produced by an attention-arresting pain accompanied by calm and friendly discussion of its purpose. But increased pleasures of a social sort, that is, shared pleasures, must be provided by the very hand that inflicts the pain. It is a terrible thing for a child to think habitually of any human being as a pain-bringer. Not fear, but love is what does all the con- structive work. The punisher and the punished must have so many pleasures that they share with each other that the child himself will realize that the pain is only an incident of an unbroken fellowship. As soon as we reach this point we see that we must go one step further if punishment is to be socially constructive in the highest measure. As the ordinary relation of the punisher to the punished is that of pleasure-sharing, so their relation, when occasion for punishment comes, is that of pain-sharing, and this must be real- ized by both. The only way by which the punisher can avoid separating himself from the child is to cause the child to know that the two suffer together. The punisher is not to triumph over the child, is not to be happy while the child is in woe, but to main- tain at-one-ment alike in pleasures and in pains. Turning-points in character. We have seen in preceding chapters why the educator should aim at continuous moral growth rather than rely upon any breaks provided by original nature. In the present chapter we have dealt with another sort of continuity, for again and again we have come upon the SIN 179 fact that the conduct of the young is bound up, in a remarkably close way, with that of their elders. But neither sort of con- tinuity implies either that moral growth can be equally rapid at all times, or that all parts of the complex moral experience can grow at the same rate, or that it can be free from crises, that is, such collocations of internal and external conditions that the child's particular reaction at this time gives a perma- nent direction to future conduct, or in other words a "set" to character. As a matter of fact, all these kinds of unevenness occur. At one time we find acceleration of moral intelligence and of social motives, at another time slowing down; interest now in this phase of conduct, now in that; the costliest errors at critical points, and also decisive and permanent victories for right character. Let us consider the educational significance of the most marked of these deviations, the crises. The turning-points that one can remember as one's own are almost exclusively those of adolescence or of maturity. Con- sequently we form a habit of thinking of crises of character in terms of issues defined at the time and involving decisions of greater or less deliberateness. But a set toward or away from a particular human relationship, or a particular mode of reac- tion, may be established whenever an overwhelming emotion occurs in connection with it. Shocks occur in childhood that produce permanent timidities of one sort or another, with their paralysis of action and of initiative. Set revulsions or attrac- tions toward individuals, or set attitudes toward the opposite sex, are also started now and then in childhood. Moreover, the ground tone of one's subsequent social existence may be determined by early experiences that awaken trust or distrust. Thus we come up from childhood sometimes with permanent scars upon the mind, sometimes with a permanent outreaching impulse toward some social good, neither of which we recognize the source of. With respect to these things the wisdom of the educator will consist not only in providing abundance of whole- some social relationships, but also in the habit of noting chil- dren's emotions, and of preventing children from being isolated and merely self-involved upon the occasion of any overwhelm- 180 SIN ing experience. The sharing of one's emotions with a sym- pathetic, steady, and social minded friend is the sm-est road to balance. Moreover, if the passing of the years reveals the presence of an unfortunate set, again the task is to induce the victim to share this particular side of his nature and experience with such a friend, to share memories, hopes, fears, victories, and defeats.^ That adolescence has a peculiar relation to the establish- ment of the final set of character is evident from a variety of facts. The general psychophysical condition renders the forma- tion and reorganization of habits relatively easy for a few years, after which there comes the relative non-plasticity of maturity, and its absorption in the compelling grind of existence. In this period the new capacity for affection makes possible fresh and profounder ethical appreciation. The general maturing of self-dependence opens the way for a final commitment of one's purposes to some life principle or ideal. Hence the tribal custom of adolescent initiation; the custom, in various denominations, of confirming children just as adolescent inter- ests begin to be pronounced; the great relative frequency of adolescent conversions in denominations that cultivate this experience, and the frequency with which a lifelong interest or ambition takes its rise in this period. On the other hand, the significance of adolescence for character is equally clear from the great number of criminal careers that have their rise here, and from the vastly greater number of persons who are pur- sued through life by vicious habits, such as alcoholism and licentiousness, that are formed at this time. 1 "We are here at the edge of the morbidities that require psychotherapy. We should find, if it were possible to go into them in this work, that social education and psychotherapy are at many points continuous with each other. Two points in particular may be mentioned. Less rehance is placed than formerly upon the corrective power of mere suggestion, and more upon a re- education of the will in which the patient deUberately co-operates with the suggestions of the physician. Here habit formation assisted by the social support of the physician is the essence of the healing. The other point con- cerns the value of bringing one's secrets to the Ught and sharing them with another. Psychoanalysis has many aspects and angles that cannot here be mentioned. But its relation to social education appears in its method of estabhshing normal attitudes toward society at large by first securing complete co-oper9,tion between physician and patient. SIN 181 When, alongside these considerations the recapitulation theory placed its doctrine of the natural and necessary egoism of child- hood, the inference was drawn in certain circles that conver- sion in the sense of a reversal of character, or in the sense of the beginning of genuinely personal religion, is a standard religious experience for adolescents. We have already seen, however, how the theory tliat childhood is doomed to egoism, and that adolescence is spontaneously altruistic, overlooks, oversimpli- fies, and distorts facts. A policy of religious education that postpones the beginning of personal religion of a social sort till adolescence, relying upon the chance that a conversion experi- ence will reverse the set that childhood has given to the char- acter, is a fatal policy. It has not v/orked in practice. For parallel with the stream of adolescent conversions are two other streams that issue from the Sunday schools, a stream of youths who come into full church-membership without a conversion, and a stream of those who go on into mature life without tak- ing any religious stand at all. The constant aim of elementary religious education should be to make conversion unnecessary.^ Nevertheless, the peculiar plasticity of adolescence does make it the scene of many a decisive experience. It contains the main turning-point of many a character. Social educa- tion has here a distinctive work to do. On the positive side it is threefold: To meet the spontaneously enlarging social crav- ing by providing wholesome social experience both with one's own sex and with the opposite sex; to guide this experience toward intelligent ideals of marriage and of the larger society, the democracy of God; and to train the individual specifically for the attainment of his "majority," the assumption of full and independent citizenship, and entrance upon a life occupa- tion. On the other hand, here is opportunity, such as will never 1 One of the evils that result from assuming that an adolescent conversion is normal is weakening and confusion in the term "conversion." It should not be used for any and every sign of reUgious interest, but only in the New Testament sense of a reversal, "about face," in the principle or policy of one's life. I have discussed the psychology of adolescent conversions at considerable length in chap. X of The Psychology of Religion. 182 SIN recur, for correcting unsocial sets that the personality may have acquired. These sets are of many kinds. In one case a par- ticular an ti-sociar habit has] to be conquered; in another case there is needed an awakening from indifference, or from mere drifting with a social current; or the thrall of an unwholesome social connection may have to be broken; or an already or- ganized self-centredness may have to be undone; or one may have the problem of consecration to a particular life work. In this list we have youths who require conversion in the strict sense of the word, but we have also cases of a milder sort to which the term conversion cannot be applied without confusion. But in all these cases alike educational methods are required — the making and the breaking of habits, the practice of co- operation, the enlargement of ideals, the culture of worship, the increasing control of conduct by knowledge. That is, even turning-points in character that involve a profound re- versal are to be included under the notion of religious education, and they are therefore to be planned for, controlled, and tested, by educational standards. Considerable unsteadiness and confusion exist at this point. Many persons persist in thinking of education as identical with instruction — persist in it to the point of perversity. Even some who know that education has to do with the forming of a will, do not clearly see how much it involves besides habit formation. The most fundamental thing in education is its constant reconstruction of purposes. Christian education, when it Is really social, is through and through an Incoming of the higher life, a renewing of the mind, a laying aside of lower selves. If, then, one of our pupils has already formed such perverse purposes that his present need is conversion, we are still to proceed as educators. We should never turn an adoles- cent over to uneducational evangelism. Evangelism is uneducational to the extent that it is char- acterized by any of these things : Separating the act of surrender to God from devotion to men; inducing a decision so general or so indeterminate in its content as to separate it from the specific decisions involved in the previous and the subsequent SIN 183 education of the youth ; awakening aspiration without providing immediate outlet for it in social living; separating conversion from habit formation on the one side and from intelligent analysis on the other; occasionalism, or postponing specific dealing with the adolescent's purposes to a particular occasion, and then crowding this occasion with appeals so that mental assimilation is impossible; finally, such use of suggestion and of emotional incitements as prevents rather than promotes the self-controlled organization of purposes. CHAPTER XIV THE LEARNING PROCESS CONSIDERED AS THE ACHIEVING OF CHARACTER Various senses of "moral character." In the present chapter certain questions that are fundamental to the problem of method in social education will be opened, particularly ques- tions that have to do with the pupil's awareness of social issues, and with his self -consciousness as related thereto. What are the effects, on the one hand, of shielding a child from knowledge of the issues that we are training him to meet, and on the other hand of letting him know what he is moving toward ? What is the educational value of moral self-consciousness as compared with unreflective adjustment to social situations? How shall we conceive social character in individual terms, and what sort of individual consciousness is involved in the achieving of such character ? In order to clear the ground for these ques- tions, it is necessary to note that each of the main terms in- volved — character, learning process, and self-consciousness — has several senses. Let us begin with the concept of moral character. To have a good character means, of course, to be steady rather than merely impulsive in one's conduct, and to pursue lines of conduct that have, or are worthy to have, social approval. But both the steadiness and the worthiness may be of different kinds. Good character may mean, and actually does mean, any one or more of the following things : (1) Negative goodness, or abstaining from acts that are forbidden by the code that is acknowledged by the society in which one moves, whether this society be a club, a church, one's profession, or the world of business. (2) Conventional goodness, or habitually doing the 184 ACHIEVING CHARACTER 185 acts that are positively prescribed in such a code. (3) The inner deternmiation that involves self-discipHne in addition to habit. This keeps one ' true to standards in difficult situa- tions. (4) Steady devotion to a cause or social ideal that outruns the conventional social code, and perhaps requires that it be revised. If we are to establish the democracy of God, we must, it is obvious, cultivate character in the fourth sense. Just at this point religious education finds its peculiar function and its peculiar difficulties in respect of method. Society as it now exists is quite willing to support an educational policy that makes for negative goodness and for conventional goodness; society would go as far, if it knew how, as to produce in its children the "rock-ribbed" fidelity to principle that constitutes character in the third sense. Up to this point religious educa- tion includes, or fuses with, whatever there is in "generaF* education that effectively socializes children. But beyond this point there lie, not the highways of social conformity, but the mountain trails of social reconstruction. Not the will that is conformed even to what is good in conventional social standards, but the will that is transformed into the likeness of the divine democracy that is far beyond and far above, is the character that Christian education has to produce. From many points in the valley of conventionality men are blazing trails up the steeps of social idealism. The love of man- kind, confidence that human nature contains high possibilities, the gleam of a universal justice that may yet be — these are alluring many men of many minds toward the heights. With these men religious education that is based upon the ideal of a democracy of God has a special affinity. We may agree or not with this or that program of social reform; we must doubtless make many experiments before we shall secure con- trol of essential conditions of democracy, and some of these experiments will fail; but through all the give-and-take of debate upon social programs, and through all the practical measures that succeed or fail, religious education will have the distinctive task of producing men whose motives steadily and uncompromisingly reflect the will of the Father that we should 186 ACHIEVING CHARACTER make ourselves brothers. The democratizing of the heart is the fundamental and the most difficult part in creating effective democratic institutions. Democratic character will be formed, of course, only by participation in specific purposes of democratic quality, and it will go on to require democratic institutions for the fulfilment of itself. No esoteric goodness will suffice. But our specific mission will be to put sufficient heart, and a sufficiently radical character, into this work, even the heart and character of God. Various senses of "to learn." To learn means either (1) To form a habit; or (2) To acquire information; or (3) To attain skill in a particular operation or occupation; or (4) To become wise. No one can mistake the fact that we have to learn wisdom, or the further fact that learning to be wise, though it depends upon and includes the three other sorts of learning, is not quite the same as either of them or as all of them together. Becoming wise implies acquiring better desires, reconstructing one's purposes, self-conquest, and placing one- self effectively within some foresighted scheme of society that awakens social approval. Wisdom is more than intelli- gence; more than craftiness, however successful. It is more than good habits, which reproduce good life but do not trans- form the good into the better. It is more than skill, for one can be skilful in getting what one wants, and yet be unwise in wanting it. Social education, then, must somehow, at some time, or perhaps through all periods of the child's growth, in- duct him into this individual relation to ideals. It must in- spire in him an original foregrasping of social good, even the faith by which alone we can be saved to our highest possibilities. Various senses of "moral self-consciousness." Everybody is familiar with, and everybody who reflects disapproves, the following forms of moral self-consciousness in children and youth as well as in adults: (1) Moral priggery, or habitually thinking about one's own goodness, habitually bringing it to the attention of others, and conforming to standards for this self-centred reason. (2) Moral snobbery, or looking down upon others because of their supposed moral inferiority. (3) ACHIEVING CHARACTER 187 Moral hypersensitiveness, which shows itself in scruples, hesi- tations, and doubts when action is required; in self-condemna- tion so intense or so prolonged as to interfere with moral vigor; in longings for an abstract and contentless perfection; or in failure to co-operate in practical affairs because of the imper- fections that inhere in all social adjustments (which is, prac- tically, insistence that others should always adjust themselves to me). In contrast to all this, we admire a child who does his duty as a matter of course; doesn't cry too much over spilled milk, but goes ahead, endeavoring to do better next time; and doesn't bother his head about the degree of his virtuousness. This is sometimes called moral unconsciousness, which is then contrasted with moral self-consciousness. No one will ques- tion the justice of this judgment, but the grounds for it are not always clearly seen. What is the precise nature of the evil in the moral self- consciousness that has just been described? It is that the child obscures the moral goal by looking at his moral self. Just as a golfer is required, in the act of driving, to fix his attention upon the ball and not upon his club, so moral conduct is in general most effective when one's attention is upon what is to be accomplished, and not upon one's faults and virtues. It is this objectivity of mind that we praise in one child and deplore the absence of in another. We praise objectivity of mind because it is a condition of objective efficiency. Moral self- consciousness in the sense thus far defined connotes in the end moral clumsiness, actual defects in objective social relations. But a distinction has to be made, and the possibility of an- other sort of moral self -consciousness has to be considered. Does the misfortune of the children whom we have in mind lie in the fact that they judge themselves to be good or bad? Hardly, for the so-called morally unconscious child, too, is by no means unaware of his proper classification. If my fellows approve me, especially if I am approved by those who are older and wiser than I, how can I help approving myself ? The trouble lies partly in misjudging oneself, and partly in failure 188 ACHIEVING CHARACTER to organize one's judgments of oneself into a social scheme. To be good, to achieve a moral status, Is not a moral finality. I am a good boy, or a good man, am I ? Or perhaps a bad one ? Well, what of It? What difference does It make? That Is, what persons are affected by it, and how are they affected? How is the social world In which I move either better off or worse off because I am what I am? When I thus make my judgment upon myself a part of a more general judgment upon social welfare, social justice, or the progress of world so- ciety, my self-consciousness is healthily objective. The self- consciousness that stops short of this objectivity becomes self -Involution, and "foozles the ball.'' Self-Involution Is, In fact, a better name than self-conscious- ness for that which Is common to moral priggery, moral snob- bery, and moral hypersensltiveness. Self -consciousness, in the stricter and more proper sense of the term. Is present when- ever what is actually desired is distinguished from something else as an alternative or contrary object of desire. That Is, self -consciousness Is inseparable from the facing of any live Issue, in other words, one that Involves mutually exclusive or mutually limiting satisfactions. This statement is not Intended as a general definition of self-consciousness in distinction from any other sort of consciousness, but only as an indication of the route that Is taken In the progress of a mind from instinctive reactions toward those that are required by membership In a deliberative group. Moral self-consciousness and deliberative group conscious- ness are correlative — they are two aspects of the same experi- ence. There can be no deliberative group the members of which are non-deliberative. The weighing of alternatives takes place within each individual, who then compares his scales and his results with those of other members. Thus each has to be aware both of himself as this particular self and of others as those particular selves, each self being charsLcterized by the alternative that It cleaves to. Self -consciousness is thus an essential factor in the evolution of society. Social education, accordingly, must bring children to moral self -consciousness. ACHIEVING CHARACTER 189 Neither instinct, nor any mere drifting Into social habits, is sufficient for the life of deliberative society. It is true that much, very much, that is socially valuable is acquired by imitation or in response to' verbal suggestion. Moreover, constant social pressure by the massing of pleasures in one direction and of pains in the opposite direction produces a large measure of conformity without deliberation. Such conformity is natural, is economically produced, and is admi- rably "unconscious." It Is an essential part of moral education. But its educational capacity has several limitations: First, Even In the fundamental matter of habit formation self-consciousness plays a most Important role. In many spheres habits are most easily formed, and are most accurately adjusted to specific needs, when at the beginning contrasts are noticed, alternatives faced, and the first acts in the series are fully voluntary rather than imitative or otherwise suggestive in origin. This is the way to acquire skill. It Is the best way to acquire various social habits, such as punctuality at school, neatness In this or that work, proper self-control in eating and drinking, and constructive charitableness. Second, Imitation and other forms of social suggestion, taken by themselves, transmit the imperfections of society as well as its virtues. Third, Imitation and other forms of social suggestion contain within themselves no provision for situations in which society is divided against Itself. Shall one go with the majority or with the minority? "Unconscious tuition," valuable as it is, makes little contribution to a problem like this. Non-conform- ists, stubborn minorities, are vital organs of progressive society. How, then, shall the pupil be trained to deal with them? By the use of suggestion we can make him a partisan, often an active and efficient partisan, of any party with which he has happened to associate during his growing years. But partisanship does not solve the problems of society. A genuine social solution is never merely a resultant of moving bodies that collide. Society, because it is co-operation, can resolve Its strains only by mak- ing individual minds feel both of the opposing interests that 190 ACHIEVING CHARACTER cause the strain. When any citizen does this, he becomes so- cially self-conscious. Now, this part of a citizen's duty does not fulfil itself by any fresh impulsive outburst upon the day that one becomes qualified to vote. Nay, it requires long, persistent, preliminary training — training, that is to say, in social self -consciousness. But self-consciousness of this kind is the precise opposite of self-involution. Self-involution sets me in the centre of a group every member of which is gazing at me; wholesome moral self-consciousness, on the other hand, consists in so control- ling my eyes that they shall surely see some object other than myself toward which the eyes of my fellows are looking — shall see it because they are looking that way. Selfhood of this type is objective-minded because it is social-minded, because it sees through other eyes as well as its own.^ In the end, then, moral self-consciousness is not so much a preliminary to democracy, or a part of the machinery of democracy, as it is democracy it- self realized in an individual will. Ambiguities in the debate upon "direct" versus "indirect" methods in moral education. The conclusion that follows from the last three sections is, in a word, that, though the guidance of instinctive action by deliberate prearrangement of pleasures and pains, and the development of wholesome instinc- tive conduct into habits without premeditation on the part of the child are fundamental essentials in moral education, sound method requires also specific measures for promoting premeditation, the weighing of social standards themselves, and the fully conscious taking of one's position with respect to these standards. If, now, any one asks whether this conclusion supports "direct" methods in moral education, no simple yes or no can be given in reply. For the terms "direct" and "in- direct" have no single or uniform meaning in the writings of those who have debated this question now for several years. A veritable medley of conceptions, some expressed, others im- 1 Compare what was said in the last chapter about keeping the attention of children upon the grounds of social approval and disapproval rather than upon the approvers and disapprovers. ACHIEVING CHARACTER 191 plied, gathers particularly around the " direct methods." Thus, one or another writer thinks that: The direct method consists in telling children what is right and what is wrong, or how to act. It consists in ethical instruction as distinguished from moral training. It consists in setting aside a particular period in the school pro- gram for morals as a subject of instruction. It consists in causing children to single out and define the ethical aspect of situations as distinguished from causing children to deal with each situation in its concrete totality. It consists in causing children to reason about ethical principles, and trying to make them act from ethical reasons rather than from simple and wholesome impulses. It consists in Inducing children to dwell upon their own moral excellences and defects. It is an attempt to secure good conduct by exhortation or by emotional pressure. It is moralizing, or contemplating goodness by itself, in the absence of any occasion for exercising the kind of goodness that is under contemplation. It consists In imposing our moral notions upon children, or in securing good conduct from them by pressure from without as distinguished from action from within In response to a situation that the child himself appreciates. On the other hand, the designation "indirect" is given to methods that are variously characterized as follows: The use of suggestion, rather than either compulsion or reason- ing, to secure good conduct. Rehance upon school organization, classroom management, playground supervision, and the personality of the teacher, as supplying both material and method for moral education. Getting moral reactions by means of actual moral situations as distinguished from the Imaginary situations of mere instruction. More fully expressed, moral growth through solving the problems that arise in one's own social experience. Discussing moral problems when they arise in the pupil's actual 192 ACHIEVING CHARACTER conduct rather than according to a systematic plan — ^that is, ''incidental" moral instruction. Training for the larger society by bringing the school curriculum into closer relation therewith, and in general by getting the school out of its social isolation. That there is some fundamental difference between these two bundles of conceptions one easily feels. But just what the dif- ference is when it is traced downward to its psychological assumptions, or upward to details of practice, is not always so obvious. In respect to practice, we find ambiguities like this: An argument against direct instruction is coupled with an argument for training the pupil to analyze situations so as to pick out the moral element in them. As an example of correct method an instance is given in which a principal dealt with cheating in school work by explaining to the pupils that they were dishonest, and that cheating is stealing. Where lies the indirectness in this case? The principal went directly at the pupils and at the ethical problem, and he did it analytically, not by suggestion. Some writers treat story-telling as an in- stance of direct method; others classify it as indirect. What is needed here is a more strictly psychological ap- proach; that is, we need to ask what happens in the pupil's mind. What are the two things that are to be either directly or indirectly related to each other in the pupil's experience? Himself and his teacher? Or himself and another pupil? Or himself and the larger society of which he is to become an adult member? Or his ideas on the one hand and his acts on the other? And what is it for any of these to be either directly or indirectly related to the other ? It is directness as compared with indirectness in the pupil's own mind that we have to deal with. Method in moral education follows the general principles of good teaching. The polemic against "direct" methods in moral instruction and training is at bottom a part of the general campaign for better teaching. The defects of the old practice, whether in the teaching of arithmetic or of morals, have their roots in these assumptions : ACHIEVING CHARACTER 193 (1) The intellectualistic assumption with respect to the relation of knowledge to life, namely, that thought first grasps reality and then adjusts life to it. The new education reflects the contrary view, that the adjustment process and the cogni- tive process are not two but one. Jesus intimated that up- reach' , conduct is a condition of knowing the higher things — those who put something divine into their acts are the ones who know the things of God. Just so, modern educational reformers in a long procession have proclaimed that we learn by doing, that experience of the real world is the basis of vital instruction about it, that participation in the elements of industrial processes is essential to education, and that character grows by fulfilling one's functions in some social group. (2) The undemocratic assumption that to teach is to im- pose the teacher's thought and will upon the pupil. Here is social bias of the most serious import. It ever seeks to justify itself by considerations drawn from the incapacity of children for self-guidance. But it is ever self-condemned because there is lacking in it any provision for bringing pupils to genuine self- guidance, especially to the union of co-operation and liberty that are essential to popular government. The old type of teaching assumed that the use of authority is simply to control others for any good end; the new type assumes that the use of authority is to bring others to self-control, emancipating them from external controls. The only authority to which the teacher has any right is that which is continuously extinguish- ing itself. Accordingly, the reform that is now demanded in school practice insists not only that pupils shall be active rather than passive, but also that they shall act from within, and shall organize their activities through their own reflection. Instruc- tion in the natural and physical sciences, for example, now aims, not merely to transfer a given amount of biology or of physics to the pupil, but to bring him up to perform scientific processes himself, and if possible, to make him an independent investi- gator. Just so, the moral aim of the school requires that the pupils be led, not only to hold correct views of conduct, not only 194 ACHIEVING CHARACTER to accept loyally and to act upon the superior wisdom of their elders, but also to perform among themselves, each for himself, here and now, the actual processes of social living under free- dom. These processes are not to be mere applications of what the teacher tells or prescribes. The teacher, instead of giving solu- tions, which are then to be merely illustrated by pupil experi- mentation, engages the pupils in a genuine trial-and-error method of learning to live. This is the method by which society as a whole has evolved. Education is able to make the process a short one, abbreviating it into the score or so of years during which the school has the child, by making available the rich social materials that have been deposited by the experi- ence of the race. The art of the teacher consists. In no small measure, in making obvious, at the right moment, the applica- bility of this or that part of the social inheritance to the present purposes of the pupils. In this way waste of time and of effort is reduced, and conformity to social standards is most cer- tainly produced. Conformity, that is, from the heart, because it is self-induced. But by this method conformity is secured through freedom, and it carries with it the training in objective moral criticism that is necessary to social progress through revision of social standards. Sound method in moral education, then, will cause children to face, directly and analytically, their relations to one an- other, to their teachers, and to the larger society. It will not build up a structure of moral ideas apart from moral action, nor will it be content, on the other hand, with conduct, however appropriate, that does not grow into reflective self-control and weighing of standards. Just as the best teaching of arithmetic, or of manual processes, or of physics causes the child to realize what he is doing, why he does it, what the results are, and how it can be improved, so in morals it is open-eyed, forward-looking, and in this sense self-conscious, practice that counts most for the formation of a democratic character. The relation of ethical thinking to virtuous action. From every point of view the lines of our discussion converge upon the ACHIEVING CHARACTER 195 conclusion that the learning process with which moral educa- tion is chiefly concerned is an achieving process — the process of achieving character. But character, not as something static, already accomplished; rather, character conceived as making oneself count for objective ends. Here we find a touchstone for the curriculum aspect of any scheme of moral or religious education. What value does this touchstone reveal in curricula that divide and subdivide and arrange lesson material according to a schedule of the virtues Into which good character can be analyzed ? If we ask what a good man is like, we get from such curricula the answer that a good man is truthful. Industrious, persevering, kind, and so on. Therefore the pupil Is made to study in succession the virtues of truthfulness, industry, and all the others. There are curricula that appear actually to assume that if a pupil thinks about industry he will become industrious. But the teaching profession as a whole condemns the implied method on the ground that It separates thought from life, substitutes ethical instruction for character forma- tion, and tends, by reason of its abstractness and its dryness, to create actual dislike for moral standards. If, in order to create like instead of dislike, admiration-awakening examples are used, the objection is made that such separation of ethical emotion from moral action creates a habit of feeling rather than of action, and actually substitutes sentiment for character. In order to avoid these pitfalls, suppose that. In connection with the study of each virtue, we provide opportunity for the practice of It. There is going on, in fact, considerable hunting up of things that children can do in the way of, shall we say, practice work in goodness? That this search will uncover some really vital things in the moral reactions of children we need not doubt. But the artificiality of the point of view is at best only alleviated thereby. For any such practice is merely added to life. What is added to life can be subtracted upon occasion. It is too like an ex«cursion in a captive balloon; the balloon returns to earth. The whole scheme rests upon the fundamental fallacy that 196 ACHIEVING CHARACTER virtuous character Is made up by combining virtues, whereas, the virtues, one and all, are abstractions, mere thought-things, and therefore static only. Our concern is not that the pupil should possess virtues, but that he should have virtue, that is, strength in right causes. Here two conceptions are essential, firmness of action, and discriminated, objective ends. Now, objective moral ends or "causes" are those that arise in inter- actions between individuals. In fact, only through social give- and-take do ends of any sort — ^whether wealth, science, or artis- tic production — become anything more than self-involution. Ethical ends, such as charitable relief, follow the same law. As long as my charitable act is simply an outlet for me, a mere doing for another, it contains a fatal ethical defect. Real charity, or love, is doing with another. Moral character im- plies, then, that one has found something important to do that requires the union of several wills, and it implies also that one is firmly devoted to getting this thing done. The consequences for moral education are these: (1) The primary material for moral analysis is to be derived from the child's experienced relations with persons, that is, from his ordinary, every -day social contacts with both children and adults, whether in the school, on the playground, on the street, at home, in church, in buying and selling, or wherever. (2) Imaginative material, whether historical or other, is to be selected on the basis of its continuity with what the child has already experienced in his relations with living persons, and it is to be so used as to assist in the analysis of these relations. To this point I shall return in a subsequent section. (3) The natural growth of these contacts from the family hearth outward yields a principle for the gradation of material. Home, church, school and playground, local community, national community, world community — these form a natural ascending order of social contacts and of social interests and functions. But this is an order of increasing complication; it is not a stairway in which each step is left behind in the act of reaching the next higher. We are not to graduate from the home, but deeper and deeper into it, nor from the school, but ACHIEVING CHARACTER 197 further and further into the system of education until we take upon ourselves full responsibility for the schooling of others. (4) In all this material the centre for the pupil's attention is men and women, particularly what they do, why they do it, what the results are, and how perhaps something better might have happened. What father and mother do, and why it needs to be done ; what each family helper does ; what the grocer, the postman, the physician, the policeman does; what the mayor, the councilman, the police judge does; what a school, a fire de- partment, a library, an art museum, a natural history collec- tion does; how charities are organized and what they accom- plish; why the Child Labor Association exists and what it is doing — it is unnecessary to finish this inventory, for already it must be clear that in the actual organization, work, and pur- poses of persons as social agents, all the way from preparing the family breakfast to promoting world peace, we have the concrete material for enabling the pupil to form definite social purposes of his own. In subsequent chapters we shall see how this principle applies to the child's relation to the church. With a large proportion of the persons involved in this in- ventory children can have some personal contact. The most significant thing about a grocery is the grocer, not his goods. Guide the child's knowledge of the goods so that it shall include acquaintance with the purveyors of them, and let buying and selling be guided so that it shall be mutual service between buyer and seller. Treat institutions in the same way. The library clerk and the doorman at the museum, for example, are to be discriminated from the things that they handle, and are to be recognized as persons with whose acts the child's own life is bound up, (5) The irreducible factors in a morally educative situation, whether it is encountered in experience or only in imagination, are persons in their concrete individuality. The presence of persons is what makes a situation ethical. Because they are individual, irreducible, present as persons or not at all, a child's moral progress consists, not in achieving one sort of moral good- ness now, another next year, but in increasing control of whole 198 ACHIEVING CHARACTER personal situations. Thus, in abiding relations like the family, he will show a firmer will to co-operate (ability to act socially under greater strains), and ability to co-operate in more ways. In addition, as his social relations grow more complicated, he will put into them one after another the same intelligent, con- structive good will. Progress like this is not likely to corre- spond with any possible serial order of virtues or qualities of character. Progress does not consist in any increase of a qual- ity, but in achieving ends in "real life.'' One phase of such progress can be measured by testing the changes that occur in the pupil's ideas concerning social relations, but only one phase. The full measure of any method of moral education is the part played by the pupil in actual social relations. Imagination and character. Social education by conscious effort at adjustment to social reality describes the platform that we have now reached. What, then, of story-telling, and what of the world's treasure of imaginative literature? What relation has imagination to the realistic educational processes that are fundamental? This problem, looked at from the psychological angle, is wider than it is ordinarily supposed to be. For the contents of imagination are not at all restricted to what is called imaginative. Historical characters and events are made concrete to me by the same process that enables me to grasp a fairy-tale. When I read the morning paper, too, imagining events that the paper describes is what puts me into touch with the real world. Yes, it is imagination that puts me into touch with myself and with my immediate environ- ment. It does it by holding before me my own yesterday, or my own hour-ago, and also by holding before me the picture of some possible future good. Here, moreover, we have not only a reproductive, but also a productive, inventive, creative process, and it is productive most of all where fresh adjustment to reality is taking place. ^ A child's imagination is a stage upon which programs of possible action are rehearsed, with himself always as one of the actors, albeit he is also a spectator. Small children do their thinking largely in story form, their thinking even of situations ACHIEVING CHARACTER 199 that to grown-ups are prosily literal. This is a necessary part of the trial-and-error method of learning to live. The trial- and-error method, when it is educationally used, is no mere lunging about until one happens to hit upon success, but the following of programs of action previously discriminated from other possible programs, and then noting the results. In the imaginative rehearsals that are so characteristic of chil- dren, particular parts are assigned, distinctions of social quality are recognized, relations of social cause and effect are to some extent noted, and the imaginer himself assumes a character. This assumed character may, under favorable conditions, per- sist as an attitude or special readiness for action after the dra- matic rehearsal is over. An attitude is an initial stage in ac- tual conduct; there is momentum in it. Thus it is that the im- aginary can control the actual with children and with adults. This rehearsing can take place in a story that a child is listen- ing to as truly as in one that he invents. It is safe to assume that any child, when he listens to a story in which the actors dis- play contrasting social characters, takes one of them as himself. In a certain kindergarten a story was told of a wild duck that protected her ducklings from a pursuer b}^ hiding them among rocks along a shore, sa;>dng: "Don't one of you stir, don't one of you make a sound, don't even whisper." Then the story went on: "Not one of them stirred, not one of them made a sound, not one of them even whispered." At this point a boy was heard to gasp : " I couldn't do that ! " The child who made this remark was the one of all the group who was having the hardest time learning to think twice and to await his turn. Obviously this listening child was at work upon his own social problem, upon realities, and it is equally obvious that to arrive at such a true judgment upon one's faults is a natural step toward correcting them. The social experience and experimentation that produce social growth can be extended, then, by imagination. There is no necessary break between a fairy-story, an incident in the life of a historical personage, and to-day's playground experi- ence. It is the teacher's business to select and to use imagina- 200 ACHIEVING CHARACTER tive material, fiction as well as history and current events, so that there shall be in it no break with real life. The match- less power of Jesus as a teller of educative stories lies in part in the utter continuity of the life process in his tales with that of his hearers. If only the actors in stories for children are made to act from simple motives in situations that are not too com- plicated or far-fetched, continuity with child life is possible in material that is derived not only from child life, but also from adult life, animal life, and the realm of myth, folk-lore, and fairy- tale. Plant life, too, and even inanimate objects can be used by endowing them with human motives. Mountains can break forth into singing, and the trees of the field can clap their hands. Parents and teachers of very young children have the special problem of helping their pupils to grasp the difference between fiction and history. The clew to this problem lies in the truth that there is no necessary break between fiction and "real" life. The distinction is not that between stories that are true and stories that are not true. There is nothing in any language more true than, say, the fictitious narratives that Jesus told. The difference between one of his tales and history lies in the sphere in which the event takes place. The story sphere is human motive; the historical sphere adds the full, socially com- plicated bodily expression of motive; both spheres are real, and they are continuous with each other. " Thou," said Nathan to David, "ari the man." The Priest, the Levite, and the Samaritan are realities within our own breasts. Santa Claus, the spirit of Christmas giving, is a blessed reality, and so are the other good fairies. Under favorable conditions, I have said, an imaginatively assumed character may persist as an attitude in overt action. Probably the part that one plays in one's imagination invariably has some tendency toward conduct of like quality. But the tendency may be greater or less, and it may be more or less thwarted by the setting that it has in the imaginary event. The teacher has the task, not merely of causing the pupil to rehearse imaginatively some sort of good act, but also that of arranging the other factors in the rehearsal so that a particular ACHIEVING CHARACTER 201 attitude shall persist and pass on into the child's relations with some actual human being. Before stating what this positively requires, we may well pause to consider some methods that fail, and why they fail. Moralizing, or telling children what the application of the story is, interferes with the educative process by drawing atten- tion away from the concrete and particular to the abstract and general. It interferes likewise by injecting the teacher's per- sonality into the situation. If the story is an appropriate one appropriately told, connection ^vith life is already there as the child listens. To introduce a new vehicle to carry him over from the story into life is to create distraction. Nor is this the worst of it. For moralizing creates a new attitude of the pupil toward the story as a whole. A moment ago he w^as living in the story; now he sees that the story has no reality to the teacher, but is only an extended way of uttering an abstraction; so the imaginary becomes for him the unreal; and the goodness and the badness in the story cease to be live issues. A healthy child is very likely, under these circumstances, to form a habit of regarding moral rules as prosy impositions upon life, dull things. A method much in vogue in sermons to children is teaching by analogy. A sensible object is presented, or a physical or chemical experiment is performed, or an event in external nature is de- scribed, and the attention of the children is then invited to the similarity between this thing or process or event and life issues of right and wrong. The method is apparently an attempt to take advantage of children's spontaneous interest in sense-objects and in sensible happenings, and to move the child mind on from the sense-level to the level of ethical thought and appreciation. But the device rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding. Ana- logical thinking is not characteristic of children. They must have a larger range of identities between the things that they compare, going from person to person, say, with ease, but not from the properties of physical things to qualities of character. When children hang upon the preacher's words as he expounds an anal- ogy they are likely to be attending to the physical side of the analogy only. A minister once illustrated "Thou desirest truth in the inward parts" by holding up a watch and calling attention to the effects that would follow if the little wheels inside it got 202 ACHIEVING CHARACTER rusty. A small boy reported the minister as having said that **If you tell lies you'll get rust in your stomach." In such cases the child's attention fixes upon the symbol so intently as not to move on with the preacher from the symbol to the thing sym- bolized. In short, the imaginative material by means of which children get control of actual social situations is that which has a large rather than small number of elements, and particularly motives, that are continuous with those of the child's social experi- ence. The positive conditions under which a dramatically assumed moral attitude is most likely to pass on into conduct are in general those that favor "transfer of training." The fact that a child has been trained to neatness in his arithmetic papers does not of itself guarantee that he will be equally neat in his map-drawing; the fact that a man is truthful in certain relations or with certain persons' does not prevent him from being untruth- ful in a different set of relations or with a different set of persons. The transfer of neatness, or of trutlifulness, or indeed of any habit, from one situation to another depends upon such condi- tions as the number of points in which the two situations are identical with each other, and the definiteness with which one has faced and understood and accepted as one's ideal the prin- ciple that is involved in the good habit in question. A large part of the present chapter has a bearing, as a matter of fact, upon the transfer of moral training. For we have been occupieci with the difference between particular good habits on the one hand and readiness for moral discrimination on the other, and between the exercise of good will upon conventional levels on the one hand, and on the other hand the carrying forward of good will into reconstruction of standards. The particular application of the principles of transfer to the use of stories, his- tory, current events, or other material of the imagination, is as follows: There must be many rather than few elements in the imagined situation that are identical with elements in social situations aheady experienced by the child. By identical elenients in social situations I mean, not the externals of life, but persons, their char- ACHIEVING CHARACTER 203 acteristic interactions, and consequences of conduct as they are determined by laws (natural laws and laws of the state) and cus- tom. The imagined situation should be so constructed and presented as to contain a social problem of a type that the child has already encountered, together with at least some steps toward the solu- tion. Something unsettled, suspense, light coming from the consequences of conduct, these consequences occurring not ar- bitrarily or by chance but in accordance with the actual laws of life — all this should be in the imagined situation itself, so that the teacher does not need to translate anything into a different language. It is not enough, however, that the material should represent important laws of life; these laws must be made to seem impor- tant. There must be perspective. This is to be had, not by telling the child what is important but by the selection and ar- rangement of details, as in climaxes, and by such methods as emphasis, repetition of key-phrases, and tone of voice. Discus- sion of the story by the pupils under suggestive guidance from the parent or teacher, and dramatization under such guidance, add still further to the production of perspective as well as to depth of impression. Whatever be the proportions of pleasure and pain, joy and sad- ness, in the personal experiences portrayed in the story, these experiences must be so organized and presented that the child who listens will imaginatively side with the right against the wrong, and get pleasure from doing so. Not, indeed, pleasure without cost, not the pleasure of passivity, for this would be untrue to the realities of the moral life. Struggle, pain, failures, sacrifice must not be slurred in the content of the story, or in the pupil's imaginative participation in it. He must be led at times to take sides with what is hard and disagreeable, and even this taking of sides in imagination will cost him an effort. Yet there should be here also the joy of winning, some realization that the socially right alternative is more agreeable than its opposite. It is easy to dislocate the pleasure of the listening child; the story may be very different to him from what it is to the teacher. "Chil- dren," said a clergyman in a talk to a Sunday school, "when you get to heaven, whom do you want to see first?" A ten-year-old boy, being pressed for an answer, replied: "Goliath." When an actual situation subsequently arises that involves a 204 ACHIEVING CHARACTER problem that has already been at least partly solved in a story, the skilful use of a phrase from the story, or a mere allusion to an event in it, may help. But not if reminding constitutes nagging, and whether it does constitute nagging or not depends upon the pupU's attitude toward it, not upon the teacher's intention. But we must not forget that a normal child who lives in wholesome social relations desires to be helped. He wants to achieve. No conceal- ment is necessary, no subterfuge. The effective reminder is the one that brings him this help, and makes him feel that doing right is made easier. Here is another instance of the law that in moral training the major keys of pleasure must predominate. This is the reason why humor is so valuable both in story material and in direct relations between teacher and pupil, humor, that is to say, that enables the teacher to laugh with the pupil, not at him. PART IV THE ORGANIZATION OF A SOCIALIZED RELIGIOUS EDUCATION CHAPTER XV THE CHRISTIAN REORGANIZATION OF THE FAMILY The family as a determiner of the social type. When does a human being make his debut into society ? When he is born into the common Hfe of mother, father, and child. A family is a society, and it is an educational institution of the very first significance. "Where was he educated?" is often asked, and the answer is given: "In such or such a college," or perhaps: "In the public schools of his State," whereas the most that school and college are likely to have contributed to him is some sort of superstructure built upon foundations of social char- acter already laid. Just as it was said of Peter, "Thou also art one of them, for thy speech maketh thee known," so any observant teacher sees in a student's manners and in his use of language an index of his home life. And deeper than words and accents, deeper than manners, is a substratum of social presuppositions and social attitudes that home life has already made firm. The reason why family life has peculiar influence in respect to the social substratum of the character is this: The long de- pendence of the child for so many of his satisfactions upon the same few persons, and the intimacy and continuity of his rela- tions with them. In this intimacy with persons he deals with what is elemental and final in the ethical and the religious life. Many parents believe that the social experiences of small chil- dren are insignificant, mere time-fillers that are to pass away with the time that they occupy, whereas these experiences form firm notions of what a person is, of what is due from one person to another as a person, and of what concerns in life are im- 207 208 THE FAMILY portant or unimportant. These notions become the presupposi- tions of futures thinking on social relations. They are wrought into habits, too, and are bound up with whatever life purpose or ambition a child or youth forms. The family, moreover, is not an isolated society, for Into and out of it flows the life-blood of civilization in the large. Through his parents the child is under the tutelage of the traditions, cus- toms, and economic conditions that have made his parents to be what they are. Thus it is that a social standpoint, high or low. Christian or un-Christian, may, through the personal in- timacy of parent and child, become to the child a self-evident and even sacred thing. No child merely plays around the out- side of society. In the intimacy of the family every member, younger or older, is a feeling part of social processes. He is included within a network of concrete relations between per- sons — between the stronger and the weaker, between male and female, between buyer and seller, between the employer and the employed. The child is not prepared to weigh these relations. He knows not how to sift out the wheat that is always there. He may even accept injustice to himself as something that be- longs within natural and proper social relations.^ It is the fundamentals of social justice that are at stake in the child* s experience in his father's family. Family government, to begin with, tends to fix one's ideas as to the basal rights of men. Consider the educational difference be- tween a family in which each child, however young, has rights that the older and stronger members respect, and a family in which no child is aware that he has any rights that are respected by his own father and mother, or by older brothers and sisters. Genuine parental affection can be mixed with caprice and self- I The educational power of family intimacies is well illustrated by the almost universal regard for family honor. There are few things that awaken anger and resentment as uniformly as opprobrious remarlss about one's family. A stiU more remarkable illustration is the rarity of incest. There is nothing in our instinctive endowment to make incestuous relations unattractive. Yet a traditional standard, passed down from generation to generation merely as a presupposition about which almost nothing is said, holds instinct in complete control, nay, has all the force of a negative instinct or impossibility of desire. THE FAMILY 209 will, and genuine self-sacrifice may lack real respect for the per- sonality of the one on whose behalf the sacrifice is made. Even a firm, steady, and genuinely benevolent family government may fail to produce in the children any heartfelt respect for law simply because the government to which they are subjected is an autocracy. Thus it is that out of the same domestic spring may come water both bitter and sweet — regard for some rights, disregard for others equally basal; respect for persons in one classification, disrespect for persons in another; tenderness in some human relations, callousness in others; sincere belief in the Christian ideal of brotherhood, sincerity in conduct that obviously defeats it. Here is the explanation of the paradox in a rather common attitude of men toward women. Almost every child experi- ences tender maternal affection; hence almost every man re- tains through life some capacity for noble emotion with respect to his own mother and with respect to motherhood in general. Men who have this emotion commonly assume that they hold an exalted view of womanhood. Yet many of them regard marriage as properly the subjection of a woman to a man. Many of them are willing to accept profits that depend upon risks to the health and the morals of working women. Men glorify motherhood in one breath, and in the next buy from a hundred girls their capacity for competent motherhood ! Moreover, how is it that reverence for womanhood "because one has had a mother" can exist in the same breast with accep- tance of prostitution as a matter of course? The key to this situation is this : Boys — and girls too — acquire in the family a second sort of presupposition with respect to womanhood, a presupposition based upon the habitual attitude of the males in the family to wife, daughter, or sister. How far would one overshoot the truth if one should assert that rarely does a boy acquire in his own family a firm presupposition that girls are his equals? It is because boys grow up as intimate parts of actual sex inequality that men fail to see the grotesqueness of the assumption that one sex has an inherent right to determine the "proper sphere'* of the other. Is there not, in fact, a trace 210 THE FAMILY of condescension or patronage even in the common glorification of "mother" ? Admiring tenderness is easier, too, than justice. Thus it is that fundamental social assumptions and habits — those that concern the valuation of the individual, personal liberty, social classifications, the relations of the sexes, the right of property, the nature of law, alid the sphere of government — flow from the large society into the small family society, and thence back into the large society. If we desire to reform any one of them, there can be no more effective measure than to induce parents to reorganize family life. If the Christian churches really believe in universal brotherhood, with its inevitable corollary of a world-democracy, let them begin now to form democratic presuppositions and habits at the source. " " On what conditions can family life educate for democracy? The general answer is. By being, in its measure, a co-operative group of the deliberative type. The family is to prepare chil- dren for democracy by being itself a democracy. On the face of the matter, is it not absurd to think that inequality and arbitrary rule within the society in which an individual spends his most plastic years can prepare him to labor toward a society that is based on exactly contrary principles ? It will be objected, of course, that any attempt to make the family into a deliberative group will hit upon the rock of chil- dren's incapacity for deliberation, the discontinuity of their attention, the fact that it is child nature to act immediately in one way or another. Does not the practical impossibility of suspense and postponement render it necessary for the father and the mother to make decisions for the child, blocking the way to harmful acts, and moving him by their power rather than his own into wholesome ways? To argue thus, however, is to miss the main point of the problem, and to act thus is to miss an opportunity for the social education of the young. The main question is. What sort of experience tends to make the child into a socially deliberative individual ? What is the most certain and the most rapid way to enfranchise him? To pro- vide the conditions for this sort of experience is the base-line of social education. Upon this basis the family must present to THE FAMILY 211 the child opportunity for fellowship in fundamental, outgoing brotherhood. An outline of some of these conditions will in- dicate the direction in which the Christian reorganization of the family has to move. (1) Abajidon the doctrine and the practice of the inequality of the sexes. If children are bred in the assumption that even among the persons with whom they have the most intimate and affectionate relations nature itself has established a permanent, impassable division between the rulers and the ruled, the served and the servers, if children go into the world saturated with any such assumption, the males, already accustomed to the in- dividualistic satisfactions of a superior caste, will tend to lord it wherever they can, and the females, unaccustomed to free initiative, will withhold from society services that they are by nature well qualified to render. It is hard to imagine a way in which Christianity could more decisively promote appreciation of humanity as such, which is the spirit of brotherhood, than the abolition of the sex caste in Christian families. Tender, admiring, reverential affection, ennobling though it be to the one who feels it, is no proper substitute for the recognition of equality. Not seldom tenderness contains in it- self the unrecognized but cruel poison of wanting to keep its object, whether wife or child, permanently dependent and in- ferior. On the other hand, the recipient of such regard is often pampered thereby into selfish receptivity, or else beguiled into a narrow, almost slavish devotion which in turn pampers the man who accepts it. Thus, love itself, acting under the assump- tion of permanent inequality between the lovers, arrests the growth of the social capacities of both. Even within the family this arrest often manifests itself in hypertrophied demands of either lover upon the other. Whether or not children witness such marital infelicity, they have no experience that enables them to see the social significance of the inequality in the midst of which they live. They take this inequality as a matter of nature, as something self-evident. They accept the satis- factions that it brings, or accommodate themselves to the limi- tations involved, and so go into the world with a fundamental 212 THE FAMILY defect in their faith in man and in their preparation for a world brotherhood. (2) Develop capacity for deliberative group life by respecting and effectively utilizing any such capacity, however slight, that any member already possesses. The right to be heard, the right to have one's ideas and desires weighed by others, is the re- verse side of the duty to listen and to be ready, when the com- mon good requires it, to waive one's wishes. The reciprocal relation between rights and duties holds not only as between adult and adult, but also as between adults and children. Par- ents who do not listen and weigh ought not to be surprised if their progeny is heedless and stiff-necked. Parents who never "own up" to a fault, and never make open amends, may expect to encounter the same sort of infallibility in their children. The difficulty of developing a democratic family organization lies less in children's limitations than in the stiffness and unadap- tability that are fostered by current conceptions of parental dignity and authority. Children like to talk things over seri- ously when they know that the outcome of the conversation has not been arbitrarily predetermined. An artificial class-dis- tinction exists in many a family because parents underestimate the thought-capacity of their children. What surer way can there be to create in children a class-consciousness that is un- sympathetic and impervious to parental authority? Any- thing that prevents the honest, serious, and effective utilization of childish capacities tends to stunt them. To be a listening parent implies much more than giving attention to com- plaint or clamor when it arises; it means also consulting chil- dren, sharing with them the really important problems of the family, and letting them participate in working out solutions. It means, too, that this consultative relation between parent and child is to be extended and developed as fast as the child's mental grasp increases, (3) In a democratic family each member will perform regular, defined, personal services for the maintenance of the common life. This innocent-looking proposition is full of sharp points. Each member will contribute personal service, which is a thing that THE FAMILY 213 money cannot buy and that cannot be done by proxy. Personal service may take the form of earning money for family use, but there is much "supporting one's family" that does not include giving oneself. Providing plenty of "servants" is not at all the same as contributing personal service. Every member of the family will be in his own person a servant of the family, being made thereby conformable to the Great Servant who has re- vealed in his own person the great God. Here child and parent will meet on the truly democratic plane of industry, useful labor, done co-operatively for the common weal, and with no compensation except the common weal. Finally, the ser- vice that is required of each individual will have a defined sphere, beyond which one may indeed give but no one may de- mand. When the service of love, freely given, becomes sub- serviency to unregulated, and hence unsocialized, calls for service, the result is little more than slavery. Its undemocratic character is not relieved by the fact that the slave loves the master and willingly obeys. (4) In a democratic family each member will have a defined sphere in which he is entitled to initiative, and likewise one in which his own judgment is final. Dependence of a child upon the decisions of others is to be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with physical safety, health, and the continuance of his educa- tion. Doing for oneself all that one is competent to do is a significant contribution to the common weal, and it is highly ed- ucative. Self-reliant experimentation must be encouraged even though we are certain that errors will be made, and from the uncomfortable effects of his errors a child must not be too much shielded. The important thing is not to get the most perfect possible immediate result, but to promote growth, to develop individuality that is both independent and co-operative. A good example of the principle is presented by certain parents who grant each child a regular allowance of money, require open and accurate accounting, increase the amount with growth, and require each child increasingly to purchase his own clothing from his own income, first with aid from the parent in the way of explanations as to colors, durability, style, etc., but 214 THE FAMILY later without consultation. What a blunder it is to keep on deciding everything for a child up to young manhood or young womanhood, under the expectation that then, by some hocus- pocus of benevolent nature he will suddenly acquire good judg- ment ! And the worst thing about this policy is not that it puts upon young men and young women tasks for which they have not been prepared, but that it leaves their social capacities uncultivated. To keep children dependent-willed as long as possible is to isolate them into a social class even under their father's own roof. Denying them the experience of progressive co-operative judging, it fits them for none but arbitrary social relations thereafter. (5) Democracy in the family is to he promoted by providing common pleasures. Not long ago I learned of a family in which the father as well as the mother takes part regularly in the chil- dren's daily story hour preceding bedtime. In another instance a father and mother provided a combination dining-table and billiard-table, and evening after evening played interesting matches with their children. It is a sinister sign if father, mother, adolescent boy, and adolescent girl must all go out of the home and away from one another in order to have a good time. The sign is sinister even if the diversions that are sought are unobjectionable in themselves, for the absence of common pleasures is the absence of a most important social cement. When a parent and a child frolic together they become ac- quainted with each other. Each finds in the other personality riches that would otherwise, perhaps, be unsuspected. Family life is famishing for want of deep acquaintance between parents and their owti offspring. And not only do common pleasures reveal one to another, but — under the basal law of habit forma- tion that satisfaction in an act tends to prolongation and repeti- tion thereof — they help toward the deep and permanent attach- ments that hold through adversity as well as through happiness. Thus it is that playing together; enjoying literature, music, and pictures together; making family excursions into the open; going together to places of amusement, and even common in- dulgence in jolly nonsense have the deep ethical value of join- ing person to person in a society of reciprocal good will. THE FAMILY 215 (6) The unity of the family cannot he made perfect until family consciousness is fused with a udder social consciousness, particu- larly through participation by all members of the family in remedial and constructive social enterprises. The mere fact that the children, when they marry, and in the social acquaintanceships that precede marriage, link their own family with others is of itself sufficient to prove that regard for one's own flesh and blood is an expansive principle. The weal of my family is inextri- cably bound up in a thousand ways with that of others. Chil- dren of different families play together, go to school together; infect one another with disease germs, with smutt}^ ideas, with bad habits; later they employ one another or are employed, they bargain with one another, they vote for or against one an- other, they determine the sanitary and moral conditions of the community. The child of wealth who was infected with a fatal disease by wearing a garment made in a sweat-shop illus- trates a solidarity that no individual or family can escape. There is simply no possibility of fulfilling love in a narrow circle except by treating the circle as a section of the total social sphere. The exclusive family is the self-undermining family. Therefore the building up of deliberative group living in the family must be continuous with the building forth of the same thing in the community. It is not enough that the father should contribute of his substance and of his energy to the out- going social enterprises of the church or of the neighborhood — the family as a family should talk them over, weigh the needs, form a united purpose, and work together for the fulfilment of it. Even young children can participate from the heart in great social enterprises because the greatness of a social enterprise grows out of the elemental character of the human need that it seeks to meet. There is perhaps no defect of society that does not inflict hunger and sickness upon children, and this appeals to any child. Moreover, children's imaginations easily seize upon some point of difference between better and worse social conditions — between good and poor school buildings and grounds; clean and unclean streets and alleys; sanitary fac- tories and unsanitary sweat-shops; humane and inhumane conditions in industries and in housing; war and peace, and 216 THE FAMILY much more. When the missionary enterprise is clearly con- scious of Its social calling, it comes home to children with the force of reality, and not as an abstract propaganda. The par- ticipation of children In the social movement should, of course, be graded; new enterprises will allure as power of analysis and continuity of purpose grow. But this does not mean that small children can have a vital part in none but small enter- prises. The elemental character of their social attitudes joins them directly and simply with their elders in great undertak- ings. And besides, fellowship with a parent in doing some- thing that the parent feels to be Important brings its own de- light, its own sense of the reality of the matter. Finally, a noble common purpose, and united labor and If need be suffering for another, are essential to the full realiza- tion of Intimate affection. If we go back far enough in the evolution of marriage we find that mating Is a temporary affair, not yet marriage in the proper sense. How Is it, then, that such fleeting sex attraction has grown as far as it has already done toward lasting conjugal affection? In spite of prevalent defects In marriage, and of the great underworld of infidelity on the part of both the married and the unmarried, the world already contains numberless instances of unsullied, lifelong affection between one man and one woman, and, more- over, in the presence of a standard like this the world does not condemn the standard but Itself, or at most seeks excuses for the despite that It still does to such love. What has brought this about is the presence of children who needed long years of care. Thus, historically considered, conjugal affection is not the prius of parental love, but just the reverse. It Is the child who binds the parents together. Love grows rich enough to defy time and the fluctuations of sexual desire because there is common work for the lovers to do, yes, because their fondness ,for each other goes out and takes in a third. This Is not an isolated fact, but a law of life. Idle affection grows stagnant. Our friendships, our social circles, our churches, and our fam- ilies find life for themselves only as they bestow life upon others. THE FAMILY 217 (7) These conditions cannot he met without the domestication I of private property. Family life is psychophysical. Affection between its members is embodied, incarnate. The family table is not only its symbol, but also one of its important in- struments. In the fellowship of eating and drinking the domes- tication of private property is taken for granted. " If any pro- videth not for his own . . . household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever." But if this is so obvious, why do we not see that upon the same principle all the property that any member of the family has should be domesticated? For what is property if not means for human life ? And what is the right of property if not a call to the enlargement of life? And what is the family but partnership in life and in the pro- motion of living? And how can there be the supreme fellow- ship of a common, outgoing purpose if one member of the group is the autocratic master of the means whereby the group itself lives and of the means whereby the group might enrich other life than its own? The reservation of such mastership as a right, even though its actual exercise be liberal, is simply incompatible with the thorough domestication of the master's will. Christian teaching has long recognized that there is a cleft between property as a legal right and property as a moral obligation. The law sustains me absolutely if I withhold my goods while my neighbor starves; it protects the sharp bar- gains whereby I accumulate goods at the expense of others; and, as to the family, it lays upon me only the mild obligation of feeding, clothing, and sheltering wife and children, leaving to my sense or my whim the feeding or the starving of their other capacities. Our religion constantly admonishes us to be better in these respects than the law requires us to be. But at the centre of the problem of private property, which is the family hearth, there is as yet no clear interpretation of the Christian law of brotherhood. The common assumption is that God requires nothing more of the individual in whom the legal title inheres than a certain arbitrary benevolence toward the members of his own family. The admonition to even this 218 THE FAMILY modicum of virtue is not vociferous 1 This assumption lacks, too, the definiteness of the legal right to withhold — a right that individualistic love of power guards with jealousy, and even confuses with moral right. Here, in short, is an ancient wall of division within the family itself, a class distinction, a fundamental denial of brotherhood. Property comes between persons. It is, to be sure, a wall of glass only; any member of the family may look through it at the good deeds wrought by the member who is on the other side, but one may not reach one's hands through so as to share in the doing of the good deeds. In how many churches do hus- bands and wives make contributions as equals? How many holders of the purse escape being infected with the silent as- sumption that those whom one "supports" are dependents, inferiors, persons to be controlled by giving and withholding, or perchance favorites who are to be attached to oneself by lar- gesses ? ^ This is not the atmosphere of democracy, and children who are brought up in it are not being adequately prepared to take the full part of a Christian in the great and growingly acute economic struggle. To be merciful and to be moderate will not be sufficient to reconstruct our social order. Something far more sacrificial will be required of us if the distribution of goods, which is the distribution of power and opportunity to live, is to become brotherly. Even if we are not yet certain which of several forks of the road to take in the legal revision of economic inequalities and injustices, there is no reason why we should not set to work at once to give love full sway in family education. This will involve, first and foremost, the beginning of economic enfranchisement for married women by the volun- tary act of husbands. It would be a great step if a stated amount were to be received by each married woman as her earnings, to be disposed of with freedom equal to that of the 1 What unconscious irony there is in the frequent boast of men who insist upon the inequality of the sexes, "We hold women to be our superiors." What a cheap and tawdry homage is thisl "You are a goddess!" Tagore makes Kumo's husband say, but she replies: "No, no, no! I am not going to be a goddess any longer ... I am just an ordinary woman." The Hungry Stones (New York, 1916), p. 169. THE FAMILY 219 husband in the disposition of his own earnings or income. But beyond this will come partnership between husband and wife as equals in stewardship of the entire family income. The constant problem will be how to do the most good with what we have, and not seldom there will be the added problem of how we shall increase this our power to do good — that is, the wife will not be an outsider to any of her husband's business concerns. What this implies in the training of girls and young women is evident. It will make for a sturdier domestic character in women — and in men, too. And — here is our present con- cern — it will introduce the children, both boys and girls, to the democratic spirit in actual operation, and it will furnish a stand- ard whereby they will be able to detect the various tyrannies that creep, under other titles, through modern society. Finally, the domestication of property will include the gradual economic enfranchisement of each child. That is, he will be given control of property, but held to social responsibilities. By "social responsibilities" is meant not only one's share of domestic labor, but also one's share in studying (which should have economic recognition as productive labor), and one's share in social enterprises in church and community. The whole should be treated from the beginning of the child's experience of money, not as private gain from being good, but as participa- tion in the family's enterprise, and thereby as participation in the life of the community. In short. In the family the child's experience of property can and should be an experience of some- thing that binds men together, not of something that keeps them apart. The interest of religion in the economic status of the family. What has just been said assumes the existence of what may be called well-to-do living conditions such as: Housing that is not only sanitary, but also adequate, in space and in furnishings, for happy group life, and for distributed home duties. Culture material, such as books and music and pictures. Opportunity for each child to have schooling as far as his abilities and his Interests can carry him. 220 THE FAMILY Sufficient leisure on the part of parents to enable them to spend considerable time in the company of their children. Sufficient freedom from fatiguing labor to make it possible for parents to play with their children. Sufficient income to enable the family to take part in com- munity affairs, such as religious, philanthropic, recreational, cultural, and civic enterprises. Every one of these conditions is important for the religious education of children in the family. Yet families whose place in the economic scale is below that of the "middle class" are ipso facto excluded from one or more of these conditions, in multitudes of cases from all of them. That many beautiful characters bloom out of domestic dep- rivation; that suffering itself sometimes brings the sufferers close to one another; that much improvement of home training is possible even under the conditions that prevail below the "middle class family" — all this is true and important. But it is not an appreciable offset to the economic depression that is upon multitudes of families, upon them not merely as an occasional emergency, but upon them permanently as the un- escapable grip of an economic fate. Our glorification of the higher life — the life of persons united with one another by good will — is ignorant mockery if we do not see that depriva- tion of nutrition, of the company of parents, of the physical things whereby knowledge and beauty and good will are com- municated from man to man, is deprivation of opportunity to be a person, deprivation of opportunity to form a good will. Therefore the cause of social education in the family is all one with the demand for improving the economic status of the family as such. Every Christian church and every Christian family may be expected to identify themselves, as a matter that involves their own life or death, with such movements as these : To abolish child labor; To shorten the hours of labor for men and for women; To improve the sanitary and moral conditions of labor; To increase the income of most families; THE FAMILY 221 To forestall unemployment, and to provide for accident, sickness, and old age; To improve housing conditions; To provide playgrounds, wholesome amusements, and cultural opportunities for every community; To remove the saloon, the haunts of vice, and degrading amuse- ments; To keep the organs of the commimity life — local and other govern- mental officials — responsive to the needs and views of the masses; To improve the human stock by adequate supervision of health, by preventing the propagation of obviously unfit strains, and by inducing wiser mating; To provide a diversified education that, keeping close to the people, shall be adapted on the one hand to their industrial needs, and on the other hand to bringing out and developing to the full whatever special talent individuals may possess. There are various ways of putting on the harness of a cause like this. Three of these ways that have a particularly close relation to religious education may be mentioned : (a) Religious education in the Sunday school may well include participation in these movements at the points where they most obviously touch child life, (b) The family can reinforce the Sunday school at these points, feeding during the week the interests that are aroused on Sunday, or even anticipating the Sunday school by taking social problems to it. (c) Most communities contain families that are depressed by the conditions that have just been analyzed. Here pastoral visitation may well include an in- quiry into the child life of the community, and groups of adults may well undertake community surveys, and then adopt such community programs as the conditions seem to require. The problem of family worship. For some years there have been complaints that family religion is declining. The old customs of family prayer, catechizing, and direct, personal religious appeal from parent to child have largely disappeared. The reasons for this disappearance are found partly in industrial and other conditions of modern society that separate the mem- bers of the family for many hours of the day, and partly in sheer parental neglect. The remedy that is most often attempted is 222 THE FAMILY mutual Incitement of ministers by one another to arouse parents to re-establish "the family altar." In spite of untoward con- ditions, it is said, time can be found for devotions, and if neces- sary some sacrifice of other interests should be made in order that children may grow up in the knowledge and the practice of religion. That agitation of this kind has had little practical effect would probably be admitted by all. The so-called seculariza- tion of the family — even of church families — goes on apace even though we continually declare that the issue is a vital one for our religion. Is it not possible that some elements of the problem have been left out of the account? For example, has not the accusation of parental neglect covered, in addition to infirmity of purpose, a certain bewilderment for which parents are not responsible ? Two generations back there was relatively little question as to the sort of religious ideas that should be presented to children. Almost any part of the Bible might be read at family worship, for it was all alike the word of God. No caution was necessary as to the impression made upon chil- dren by a biblical passage, for a particular interpretation, im- posed by authority, was the sovereign antidote for all errors. How to pray was clear, for the outline of the dogmatic system needed only to be rephrased in order to appear as worship. Catechizing was the simple process of drilling certain finished ideas or verbal formulas into the memory. Even personal relig- ious appeal could follow an easy and uniform tradition as to the lost estate of man and the conditions of salvation. It is scarcely necessary to say that neither the content nor the method of such family religion can be restored. The duty that is before us is not restoration, but revision and reconstruc- tion from the foundation upward. Parents are bewildered be- cause they do not see what sort of reasonable religious life can be shared in any vital way by parents and children. The preach- ing of religion as life in distinction from dogma, and the proc- lamation of the social content of the gospel, have not made sufficiently clear as yet what these things imply with respect to the domestic circle. THE FAMILY 223 Let us come at once to the core of the matter. The recon- struction of fireside religion will require the formation within the family of common social purposes so deep that they reach the level of worship. The principle that underlies the discussion, in an earlier chapter, of the church as an organization of worship applies to the family also. Not by saying: "Lord, Lord" shall we introduce children to Christ, but rather by giving them a share in Chris tly enterprises, and then letting the motive thereof come to full consciousness as fellowship with Jesus and with the Father. Here will be found a guide for the selection of biblical passages that are really appropriate for family worship, passages that will be luminous to children as well as to adults. Here, too, will be found a language for prayer that parents and children can use in the same sense. The common joys of the family will utter themselves in gratitude, and so will the joys of others with whom the members of the family feel their unity. Conjoint confession of sin will have meaning because the con- trasts of life will be revealed in the enterprise of social living. From the same vital source will spring the inextinguishable social aspiration that is the heart of intercession, namely, the identi- fication of our claim upon life itself with the claim of others. Children will realize the presence of God, just as their parents will do, in the **love that will not let us go," the love that is at once command, and condemnation, and reconciliation, and the power of a higher life. Education for married life and for parenthood. The sort of sex-consciousness that refuses to face the conditions essential to the rational — that is, socially foresighted — control of one of the primal factors in social weal or woe is an immodest "mod- esty." The essence of the immodesty lies in making self promi- nent in the thought of sex. Once we take the social point of view with respect to it, the whole perspective changes. Frank- ness then becomes natural and wholesome wherever discussion of the physiological and the ethical laws involved in the sexual life can contribute anything to a better society. Specific prepara- tion for marriage and for parenthood then becomes a funda- mental interest of religious education. In the divorce evil we 224 THE FAMILY are reaping tares that were sown while Christian education was asleep to its social calling. While it distributed among the youth maxims of private goodness and of individualistic salva- tion, the conditions of modern life were loosing the family from its old moorings, but providing it with no chart or compass for its voyage. The prevalence of divorce, moreover, is only an acute symptom of a general failure to reorganize the family upon a higher social plane when the old, semi-patriarchal basis began its inevitable crumbling.^ The churches have before them the task of transforming life in church families in accor- dance with the social principles of the gospel. This implies far more than fresh legislation on marriage and divorce, far more than palliation of strains that arise in a family that lacks a clear, outgoing social purpose; it implies nothing less than in- structing and training children specifically for marriage and parenthood as the first and foremost sphere for the deliberate organization and control of society as a democracy of God. Not only is sex-instruction necessary as a part of religious education, but the level of this instruction must be made utterly social. The avoidance of harm to oneself must be simply a phase of a positive purpose of good for others. All the " Thou shalt nots," which have been presented hitherto as laws of one's own individual perfection or righteousness, are to be trans- formed into parts of an ambition to marry, to contribute to the happiness of a spouse, to have healthy, happy children, and through them to contribute to the larger society. Here is the point of view that should prevail with respect to prostitution. A purpose to keep oneself uncontaminated is not enough. There is needed the truly Christian identification of one's own interests with those of others, with the interests of every har- lot and of every girl who may yet be tempted, of every male victim and of every boy who is in danger. * It would be interesting if one could arrange in parallel columns the resolu- tions of ecclesiastical assemblies with regard to marriage and divorce, and the sermons and Sunday-school instruction upon the same subject within the same comxaunions. It would be foimd, I surmise, that as yet the churches have scarcely begim to use the power that they possess for preventing the evils that they urge the state to rectify by legislation. THE FAMILY 225 Thus It IS that problems of personal purity open out into a wide social perspective. They open out toward the family, and toward all the economic conditions that depress its life; they open out toward the causes that unduly postpone marriage; to those that keep white slavery going — both the social and economic causes that add to the force of instinct, and the polit- ical causes that give power to the organization of vice. The question is truly as wide as one's outlook for the race. The question of the eugenic regulation of mating is, with all the rest, a part of the problem of a possible democracy of God. In short, religious education must deal with the whole sexual life as a sphere for deliberate, constructive, social purpose. It must instruct parents as to their part in unfolding these high and holy things to their children. It must support the state and other agencies in every enlightened effort to spread knowledge and social standards. It must itself instruct, inspire, and train the young with marriage and parenthood frankly in view, and it must be ready to assist inexperienced parents with the best knowledge that is anywhere available. CHAPTER XVI THE CHURCH SCHOOL Popular education is the central function of a churchp If the church were simply a purveyor of spiritual goods, a sort of "general store" of the soul, its educational work would not necessarily involve much more than the training of the ministry. But if the church is an agency for developing in the people a certain sort of self-control, especially one that is difficult of achievement, then popular education becomes a fundamental ecclesiastical necessity. It is a necessity because of the inerad- icable difference between the plasticity of childhood and the relative fixity of maturity. True, maturity is only relatively rigid; modifications of character occur at any age, and conver- sions that reverse the whole current of life are scattered through the history of the church. Our religion glories, and should glory, in its power to rescue shipwrecked characters. But the supreme test of its power lies in the prevention of wrecks. To put the matter in terms of construction rather than in terms of disaster, the predominant function of the church is to get Christian motives into control of the growing powers of chil- dren and youth. This function predominates in religion pre- cisely as sanitation and hygiene predominate in matters of public health. More than this, the educational function must predominate in Christianity because of what Christianity is. For: (1) The church can maintain the spirit of prophecy within itself only by educating the people. The priestly function of di.spensing benefits can be handed on from priest to priest with- out intervention of the people, but prophetic insight into life's problems, and prophetic zeal for truly divine justice come 226 THE CHURCH SCHOOL 227 "up from the burning core below," up from the "common" people, not down from any privileged class. If the ministry desires to avoid stagnation, let it keep close to the people; yes, let it train the people to make great demands upon the church. If the church is not to be a belated follower of the social conscience, a sort of "me too" among philanthropic societies and organizations for reform; if the church is to be a perpetual inspiration to the human longing for a humane life, a perpetual organ for the manifestation of the God of love — if this is to con- stitute the very life of the church, then it must continuously stimulate the fresh spirits of the young to make greater and greater demands upon life. Not to keep human vitality in prearranged grooves, but to enlarge its desires, widen its out- look, make it more critical of things as they are, and more ready to pay the cost of social reconstruction — this is religious educa- tion upon the prophetic level. It involves of necessity ever- renewed criticism of the church and of its ministry from the standpoint of human need, and ever-recurring necessity for inner reconstruction of ecclesiastical life and purpose. This is what it means to maintain the spirit of prophecy. This spirit is the divine love-impulse circulating upward from the needs of the people, and pouring itself wherever it can into the hearts of those who can help.^ (2) Education of the people is an indispensable means for cor- recting the faults of the church. Errors of learning, defects in standards, and inefficiencies in methods, all require as their cor- rective one or another sort of democratic judgment. Errors in learning are corrected by the methods of science, which is the democracy of the intellect. Scientific method spreads be- fore the whole world every esoteric doctrine. Here hoary pre- rogative has no standing; here every one must become as a little child who gazes unabashed upon anything whatever, and ' Id Is Christianity Practicable? (New York. 1916). William Adams Brown has eiven striking evidence of this spiritual law of the chtirch's life. The powerlessness of the churches everywhere to avert the present world calamity, and the dominance of church consciousness by nationalistic assumptions in all the warring countries, point back to failure to educate the commonalty In the world outlook that is inherent in the Christian principle of brotherhood. 228 THE CHURCH SCHOOL tells without reserve what he has seen. The emancipation of the church from its chief ancient errors with respect to the Scriptures, for example, came about, not by exercising any self- sufficient ecclesiastical prerogative, but by opening ecclesiastical doors to democratic scientific methods that were already preva- lent outside. This represents a general law. The church can save itself only by the help of those to whom it is sent; it has a vital in- terest in stimulating them to the largest use of their native ca- pacities. Even in respect to standards of conduct ecclesiastical self-sufficiency is self-delusion. That the church's officially pro- claimed standards can fall behind those of church members and of outsiders we all know right well. It is necessary time and again to convert the church as one step in a social reform. Nor is this anomalous; it represents a law of the growth and decay of institutions. Self -involution on the part of any insti- tution involves decay of its social value. Granted that the church is the inheritor of imperishable truth; does it follow therefrom that she always understands and uses the riches that are under her hand ? Nothing, in fact, but the cry of the people for a richer life can keep her awake to the exliaustlessness of the treasure that she carries. If this is true of standards of conduct, how much more true is it of methods of work. It is a trite remark that institutional procedures that arise in response to a particular situation tend to perpetuate themselves regardless of changes of situation, and therefore regardless of efficiency. Institutions tend to measure their duty by their own past performances. Hence the necessity of popular judgments, unhampered by habit, by vested interests, or by pride of official consistency. Thus, on all accounts, the church needs a policy of unreserve in religious education. Does some one suggest that the churches are embarrassed at the present moment by popular criticism? Or that religious education should therefore adopt a defensive policy? The reply is that the danger to the churches from the prevalent popular criticism arises from the fact that it is not thoroughgoing enough; it demands too little of us, not too THE CHURCH SCHOOL 229 much ; it tends to beget In us a multitude of insignificant accom- modations Instead of a more fundamental, more creative, pur- pose. The social deficlences of the religious education of the past are thus returning upon our own heads through the pal- try demands that the people make upon the church. (3) Through popular education the church makes its chief con- tribution to the community life. What has just been said con- cerns the maintenance and the Improvement of the church Itself as an organ of divine inspiration. The conclusion that we have reached may be summarily stated as follows: As it Is the char- acter of God to give himself forth into human life, and as self- forgetting service is the great law of individual vitality, so ecclesi- astical institutions can escape instltutlonali^w only through the influence of an awakened commonalty. The church must educate the people, then, for the sake of its own perpetuity and self- i mpro vement . The power that the church should desire to have is power to transform the common life, and this means the community. Religious education must be outgoing as truly as foreign mis- sions. " Come unto me," said Jesus, but when men had come to him he said to them " Go." This Is the spirit of enlightened Christian education. It seeks to lay upon pupils a mission. It does. Indeed, say: "Come Into the church fellowship," but it adds: "Let us go." There is no denying, however, that the "Come" has been far more In evidence than the "Go." Re- ligious education has had too prominently In mind membership in the church, and not prominently enough membership in the community. Both the church and the community have suf- fered as a consequence. But an awakening is upon us. As never before, proclama- tions of the Christian religion as social reconstruction issue from pulpits and from ecclesiastical assemblies. But these proclamations are addressed for the most part to mature men and women whose social habits are already formed, and whose occupations and stations in life have already enmeshed them in social unrighteousness. The most that can be expected directly from these persons Is some amelioration of bad conditions. 230 . THE CHURCH SCHOOL To their children will be left the more basal parts of social re- construction. Just here is where the church will make its chief contribution to the common life — by providing a constant and increasing supply of young people who have social outlook and purpose before they cast their first vote, and before they enter upon their life-occupations.^ The idea of a department of education in the local religious society. The clergy of to-day, if we may judge by conditions that are prevalent in the churches, commonly look upon educa- tion as an adjunct of the church, an appendix of the ministry, which requires only such strength and such means as may be left over after other things are attended to. If this looks like a harsh judgment, test it by instituting a survey of the twenty churches nearest to you, a survey that will compare expendi- ture for religious education with expenditure for other things in three respects: (a) Hours per week given to religious educa- tion by salaried oJEcials as compared with hours given to other interests; (6) A similar comparison of annual fiscal expenditure, salaries included; (c) A comparison of the space used for re- ligious education with that used for other purposes, a compari- son that shall include both amount of room and degree of adap- tation. It would doubtless be unjust to charge any one with stupidity in this matter. Ministers, like the rest of us, are made what they are by social conditions. It is impossible, too, not to sympathize with pastors upon whom there falls such a multi- plicity of burdens that no strength is left for the improvement of parish education. Yet it must be said that this heaping of 1 From the sporadic attempts at whirlwind reforms that one witnesses here and there, one might suppose: (1) That social wrongs lilse the saloon, white slavery, lonemployment, seven-day labor, child labor, poverty, and war, are discontinuous parts of the social complex, each of which might be cleaned up by itself once and for all. It is nob so. Social wrongs not only intertwine, they are continuous with one another, like teeth, sesophagus, and stomach. , (2) That, after certain reforms are accomplished, the church will be able to devote itself wholly to its more particular work. Again, it is not so. The particular work of the church is the radical transformation of society. The fundamental difference between the church and other institutions is the radical character of its social principle, a principle within which is included Christianity 8 limitless hope for each individual. THE CHURCH SCHOOL 231 miscellaneous duties upon one another occurs because of the lack of an adequate organizing principle for the pastoral office. The question that needs to be answered is not, "How can I possibly do more things?" but "What is my perspective? Which things are large, and which ones small ? What is funda- mental, and what accessory? Which sort of labor brings the largest returns ? " In view of present insight into the church's duty to the com- munity, and in view of the agitation for religious education that has been going on for years, one might say, without un- charitableness, that the minister of the future will indeed be stupid if he permits himself to be made a pack-horse, or an all- 'round handy man, when he is called of God to be a prophet. The spirit of prophecy, when it comes among us, will doubtless manifest itself in many ways, but one of them will surely be the organization of genuine departments of religious education. As a rule, departments of religious education do not yet exist in our churches. Instead, we have a heap of unrelated organiza- tions and activities — a Sunday school, a young people's society, a junior society, clubs of boys and of girls, mission-study classes, week-day religious instruction, classes of catechumens, sermons to children, and, apart from them all, the isolated efforts of church members at religious education in the home. The re- sults are: (a) Overlapping and duplication, as in Bible study or study of missions. (6) Gaps, such as: Lack of social or other activities appropriate to a particular age, or to one sex at a particular age; lack of regular educational procedures for inducting the young into full member- ship in the church; lack of missionary training for one or another group; lack of connection between all these activities and the ordinary functions of laymen in the local society. At present the fact that one has been trained in a Sunday school rarely guarantees that he is fit for skilful churchmanship. (c) Indefiniteness of purpose, and consequently lack of stand- ards. Because the young people's society doesn't quite know what place belongs to it in an educational scheme, the upper age 232 THE CHURCH SCHOOL limit is often left undefined, so that men and women of almost any age are found among the "young" people. Moreover, many a young people's society, instead of training its members in church- manship, has become a competitor of the chiu'ch. Similarly, clubs of various sorts pursue their way, according to chance con- ditions or chance leadership, with little or no vital connection with the church or with any distinctly religious purpose. The Sunday school, in turn, not seldom assumes that it is efficient sim- ply because the school machinery hums. That is, it compares itself with itself instead of judging itself by the ascertained prog- ress of its pupils toward some defined goal. The lack of a defined goal subjects the school, further, to the whims of individuals. For the same reason there is much jumping at fads, or standing **pat" on already discredited methods. (d) In a word, there is no guarantee that any person will re- ceive genuine, continuous pastoral care through his childhood and youth. The gaps and the overlappings in a local society, or in a denominational programme, can be graphically presented by making a table like that shown on the opposite page. The respective provisions for the two sexes may be made still more graphic by using black ink for one, and red ink for the other. The table here given is only a suggestion. In many churches additional items would have to be inserted, and in some cases a different division would be advisable. Thus, church doctrine might be separated from church usages, or usages and worship might be combined. If the conditions in any church were adequately presented in the present table, the following queries would arise: Why duplicate Bible instruc- tion for just these ages; in fact, why duplicate at all? Does instruction in church doctrine and usages begin early enough and continue long enough? Does mission study begin early enough, and why is there so much more for women than for men? Why does tr ^ning in worship stop while the capacity for worship is little more than infantile? Why is there train- ing in giving for women and not for men, and why doesn't this training run all the way through the Sunday school ? Why do THE CHURCH SCHOOL 233 p J2 3 O a o u >» ^3 .S . 1 1 : : : 1 i^ 1 1 ! : : 1 " 1 1 : ; : 1 2^1 1 : : ; 1 ^1 1 : : : 1 oo 1 1 ; . 11 r^ 1 1 ' 1 11 Q !8 .. •is ri -is e : J2 a . (J •• 1 .2 8 rt < >5 8 3 ) CI -2 ca 8 8 rt 8 3 •| ^ ^ i ^^ tn .S . in £-8 1 also Reflcciion as an Aim in Educa- tion. Time-problem, The, in religioiis edu- cation. 243-245. Todd, J., 101 (note 1). Toynbec, A., 37. Training of workers, 28; 79 f.; 270 flf.; 290 ff. Training-schools for lay workers. 279 f. Transfer of training. 202 ff. Tui'ning points in character, 178 ff. Tylor's view of animism, 145. UnemplojTnent, 221. Unfolding, Education as, 15; 53. Union of the churches, see Christian Unity. Universities and religious education, 289 ff. Vice, 22; 225. Virtues, Study of the, 104 f.; 194 ff. Vocational education, 8; 16 f.; 31; 33; 41; 62 f.; 70; 105; 221. Wage-workers, 33 f. War, ix; 59 f.; 130 f.; 168. Week-day religious instruction, 231 f.; 244. Will, Education of the, 56; 79. Women. The place of, in the demo- cracy of God, 70 f.; 130; 161; 209 f. World-society as an aim of religious education, 59 f. Worship and its placojn education, 73: 77; 84; 92-W98; 221 ff.; 232; 271; 316 f.; 321 ff. Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, The, 154; 268. Young People's Societies, 231; 232; 267. 55389Tfl ^s 1-21-93 32180 It Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library 1 1012 01072 2520 ICI DATE DUE rsvi f ft mi~ - 4^^*s^ ^<»i?^-i^*r^ GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.SA