,?,?- f Uy LIBRARY OF THE Theological Seminary, PRINCETON, N. J. Case, w .Vs^ Division Shelf,, _Q^^S>^ Book, V» ^ No, i '•■- -*, u J^ ^ ^ ^ COLLECTION O F TRACTS, O N VARIOUS SUBJECTS. Written by THOMAS'^CHUBB. The SECOND EDITION. VOL. II. LONDON. Printed for T. Cox, under ths Rcyal-Exchange. M,DCC,LIV. J i. tJ ^- ^-J^ T H E C O N T E-'N-'T S. Tothe SECOND VOLUME, T Tract. XIX./^ g ^ //£ C^/^ / Reafon, punifliable. Occafionedby Dr. Morgan'j Tra^, entitled, A Defence of Na- tural and Revealed Religion. 3 85 Tract* ^^he CONTENTS. Tract. XXXIV. Some Jhort Reflexions on the ■ Grounds and Extent of Authority and Liberty, with Refpe5l to Civil Government : Wherein the Authority of Civil Governours^ in Matters of Re- ligion^ is particularly confidered^ Occafion^d by Dr. Rogers'^ Vindication of the Civil Ellablifhment of Religion. 395 Tract. XXXV. Reflexions on National Punifh- ments. Wherein two Objedlions, urged againji what is advanced^ in the Author'* s Difcourfe on the Grounds and Extent of Authority and Liberty ^ with RefpeU to Civil Government, are examined. In Anfwer to a private Letter from a Gentle- man, 43 1 THE TRACT XIX. QK^Y^oi ABRAIdtiAM^ WITH ^ Regard to his offering up Ifaac in fa- crilice, re-examined. In a Letter to a Clergyman. Reverend S I R, )K^^)?( H E N I had the happinels of being )^ W" ^ ^^ y^^^ company fome few days pait^ <^ ^ you was pleafed to query, whether )KX^M what I have formerly faid, in a dif- courfe concerning property^ with rcfpe6i: to Ahra - ham^s cfferi'fig up Ifaac /;/ facrafice^ did not clajh with what I have lately faidupon that point, in the fupplement to mY previous quefiion? This query lias given me occafion to re~axamine the fL.bjcct, the refult of which I beg leave to lay before you in the following obfervations. And, Firfi^ I here take for granted ( as being already clfewhere proved) the following propofition, name- ly^ that God is abfolutely zvife and good-, that is- to fay, God always ( without the leail variation ) condudl:s his av!:l:ions by the rules of zvifdom and V o i. II. ■ B good' 2 ^he Cafe of Abraham, (dc, gocdnefs ; or, in other words, he always does that which upon the whole is heft^ or moft fubfervient to the common good. And therefore if I have at any time pail advanced, or endeavoured to main* tain any proportions which are inconftftent witK the above propofition, ail fuch propofitions I now retrcM as erroneous. 1 thought it proper to make this remark, in order to prevent all objections of this kind. For, fuppofmg that at different times I fhould advance two proportions inconjiftant with each other, all I think, that would follow frorri hence is, that my judgment of the fame point has been different at different times \ which furely is a common cafe with thofe men whofe opinions are the refult of a free enquiry, and are not taken, upon truft. I fay, this is all that will follow, fup- poling the cafe as above •, for, as to the proporti- ons themfelves, their truth or falfehood does not depend upon my advancing them, but upon the ftrength or weaknefs of the evidence which attends them. Again, I obfen^e, Secondly^ That Abraham flood to Ifaac in the relation of a father^, that is, he voluntarily became the infrrument of bringing Jfaac into being-, and from hence he became naturally obliged to guard and protect that life, which he had, by a volun- tarily aft, been the inftrument of introducing. For, as life to ?/^^<; was a natural goo d^ fo it mull be right and fit that every perfon, but more efpc- cially he who introduced it, fhould guard and fc- cure that good to him, provided Ifaac did nothing to forfeit his title to life, and confequently his title to that protedion •, and whiift no circiimftance at- tended his cafe, which might render his life inju- rious to the common happinefs, or any other way render it fit that he fhould die. This I take to be a felf-evident propofition. By natural obliga- tion, I mean that it was right and //, in the na- ture ^'he Cafe of Abraham, ^c, 3 t/Ure of the thing, that Abraham fhould guard and proted the life of 7/^^f , as aforefaid. \Vhich ob- ligation as it is founded in nature, lb it is indepen- dent of, and antecedent to any divine command ; yea, it is antecedent to the confideration of a Beity^ becaufe it muft and would be the fame, if there were no fuch a thing as a Deity. Now if this be the cafe, then I think it will unavoidably follow, that no fuhfequent divine command could pofTibly cancel or take off the aforefaid natural obligation ; it being a manifeft abfurdity, and a contradidion in terms, to fay, that a natural obligation arifes from^ or his deftroyed by a divine command ; for if it depends upon a divine command, then it is not a natural in the fenfe I here ufe that term. And, if the divine command could not make void the natural obligation which Alraham was under, then, 1 think, it v/ill follow, that the j^/i'i/^^ fucli a command, with an intent that it fhould be obey- ed, mu?i ht wrcng -^ and confequently, 'that obe- dience to fuch a command mud be wrong alfo. But God did not intend that the command given to Abraham fhould be obeyed, as is evident by his recalling it. Ihis I take to be the ilate of the cafe. Again, I obferve. Thirdly^ Tliat as life is a natural good^ as it ren- ders us capable of tailing thofe pleafures, which the prefent flate of things has furniflied us with*, fo confcquently, death is a natural evil^ whilfl we are capable of thofc pkafures. Now, if this be the cafe, as moil certainly it is, then it will follow, that the taking away of life, caufekfly^ is, in the nature of the thing, morally unfit ; becaufe it is a bar to the enjoyments of life ; and therefore, if Abraham had oot been obliged to guard and pro- tect the \\ic of his fon, yet it would have been unfit that he fnoukl take it away. And if fuch an aclion v/oukl, in the nature of the thing, have ^ ^ been 4 ^he Cafe of Abraham, ^c. been morally unfit, then no divine command can pofribly change its nature, and make it otherwife. If it lliould be urged, that God has originally a properly in all his creatures, and as he gives life to them, fo it mAifl be right and lit that he fhould take it from them, zvhcn and in wbal way he plea- fes : I anfjver^ ■f^'^fh what was fit for God to do, and what was fit for Abraham to do, are plainly two diilin6l quefbions or cafes. God''s relation^ and Abraham^ s relation to Ifaac^ arc here fuppofed to be differ erJ •, which relation is likewife fuppofed to be the ground of the fitnefs or unfitnefs of their aclions, in either cafe. And therefore fuppofmg God's having 2i property in Ifaac rendered it lit that he iliould take away Ifaac' ^ life, when and in what way he pleafed ; yet it will not follow, that it was fit that Abraham fliould do the like, feeing it is not here fuppofed that Abraham had any fuch property in Ifaac^ as aforefaid. It it fliould be Jaid, that tho' Abrahara had no right to take away Ifaac's life, upon the account ot property ^ yet it was fit that he fliould do it, when under a divine ccm?nand^ feeing he v/ho gave the command had a property in Ijaac^ as aiore - la,id ; I anf:va\ li Auraham had not been under a natural obiigaticn to guard and protefl the life of his fon, antecedent to the divine command ; and, if life had not been a natural iccd^ and the taking it away, caiifelefly a moral e-jtU antecedent to that command, then there might have been fome rea- fon to infifl, that it v/as iit for Abraham to take away Ifaac\ life, when commanded, as aforefaid. But this is not the cafe •, for as Abraham became obliged, by his relation to Jfaac^ to guard and protect his life, antecedent to any divine com- mand \ and, as the taking avv^ay of life, caufelefly, was, in the nature of the thing, morally unfit ; fo God's property in Ifaac could r.o: polTibiy make void *The Cafe of Abraham, ^c. '^ void Ahrahani% obligations, nor change the nature of things, by making that a6lion fit, which, in the nature of the thing, is otherwife. Again, I anfwer^ fecondly^ that property in any fubject does not leffen or deftroy the natural obligations of the proprietor ; and therefore it muft be right and fit for him either to exert ov fufpendhi^ power with regard to that fubjedb, when the circumftances of the cafe render it fit and proper fo to do. Thus my ability to convey my mind to another, by words, is my natural property ; and yet I am ob- liged, in the nature of the thing, either to exert or ftifpend the exercife of that power, as the cir- cumftances of the cafe render it fit and proper that I fhould fpeak my mind, or be filent. In like manner, if by my labour and induftry I acquire a property in a plentiful ejlate^ my property in that eflate would not lefien or take off the natural obli- gations I am under to promote the happinefs and /well-being of the reft of my fellow-creatures; and therefore it would be fit that I fhould ufe and employ the efiate which I had thus acquired a pro- perty in, to promote the common happinefs,. as aforefaid. The cafe is the fame with relpedt to e- very kind of property, whether it be original^ na- tural^ or acquired. But, that I may give a cafe more diredly to the prefent purpofe, I will fup. pofe that God had called a creature into being, and had given it a conftitution which might ruh out to the age of fixty years in 2ifiate of happinefs \ and that he had likewife made a plentiful provifion of all things, necefj'ary and conducive to that happinefs; now the queftion is, whether it would be right and fit, in the nature of the thing, for God, from 7nere fovereign plcafure^ to cut off that creature in the midft of his days, when no ill confequence nor inconvenience attended that creature's enjoy- ment of life, And the anfwer to this queftion is B 3 moft 5 ^'he Cafe of Abraham, cBc moil evident, nameh^ that fuch an adion, In the nature of the thing, v/ould be frioraUy unfits feeing it would be a barring that creature of thirty years felicity ; for as the letting fuch a creature live out its time would be an initance of wifdcra and true goodnefs ; fo the taking life from it v/ould be a manifeft inflance of the contrary. And, to fay in this cafe, that God had a property in that creature, would be to urge what does not alter the cafe at all. If it fhould be farther urged, that it is equally as fit for God dirc^ly and immediately to take away fuch a creature's life, as it is for him to do it by an earthquake^ or a tempejl^ or the like : I anfwcr^ ' this is putting a cafe which is not to be admitted, becaufc, in ftridlnefs, God dees not take av/ay the life of thofe creatures who die by earthquakes, i3c, death, in thefe cafes, being an accidential evH^ which arifes from the natural frame and conftitu- tion of the world, and which could not be pre- vented, in the prefent fiate of things, but by breaking in upon thofe kzvs by which the na- tural world is governed. If it fliould be urged, that God could have re- compenfed the lofs of life to Jfaac an hundred- fold in another world, or he could have raifed him again from the dead^ and placed him in a much better flate than he was in before, and that in thefe cafes Ifaac would have been no further a fuffercr than barely the pain he felt in dying by the hand of his father -, fo that upon the whole, death would have been a benefit to him, and con- fequently, it would have been an inilance of di ■ ^•ine goodnefs in taking life from him : I a'nfiver, fuppofing God fhould at any time (as an inilance of his fovereign plcafure) take away the life of any ot his creatures, and then recomperfe that lofs to them, as aforefaid ^ yet this would not affed: the . vhe Cafe cf Abraham, i:^c. 7 the cafe with refpe6b to Abraham^ whofe relation and obligations to Ifaac would be flill the fame. And therefore fuppofing it be admitted, that God might, if he pleafed, have taken away the life of Ifaac J as aforefaid ; yet it was -moft unfit that he fhould do it by the hand of Abraham, God may, if he pleafes, ufe various ways of calling men out of this world ; he could, by an immediate operation, or an exerting of his power, have fo fiagnaied the blood and fluids in Ifaac" % body, or thrown them into fuch a rapid motion^ or taken a variety of other methods, that would effedlually and fpeedily have put on end to Ifaac^s life ; and therefore for him to require Abraham to kill his fon, which a6lion in Abraham (fuppofing the cafe to be as I have ftated it above, and which I think is the prcfent cafe) would have been a breaking thro' an obligation that no divine com- mand could pofTibly cojicel or make void ; which would have been a very bad precedent to others, and have reflected great difhonour upon the moral character of him who required it. All thefe rea- fons, 1 think, make it perfectly unfit that Ifaac fhould die by the hand of his father j and, con- fequently, that God fhould give fuch a command with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, or that Abraham fliould yield obedience to it. I am fenfible that it is fome men's opinion, that if God had commanded Abraham to hate his fon, fuch a command would, in the nature of the thing, have been morally unfit •, and yet thole men infift, that it was 7'ight and fit for God to re- quire Abraham to take away Ifaac\ life. This makes it necelTary to enquire, what it is which renders the pallion of hatred vicious ; and, con- iequently, what it is that would render fuch a command //;///. And here I prefume it v/ili be admitted, that the vicioulhcis of hatred cuniiih in B 4. its 8 lie Cafe of Al^faham, i^cl its being indulged beyond its due hounds^ or in \t% being exercifed upon a wrong object ; and that therefore it would have been wrong in Abraham to hate that objed:, which, in the nature ot the thing, he ought to love. NoWj if this be the cafe with refpcd to our foffions^ then, I think, it muft be the fame with rnd rational foundation for him to conclude that the command was divine. I anfwer, admitting this ^he Cafe of Abraham, £5?^. . ^ this to be the cafe, then I think that Abraham would have been more liable to be deluded or impofed upon, than otherwife he might have been. But it would by no mtdins juftify in argument, or ren- der fuch a conclufion rational, viz. that the aforc- faid commandment was divine. For, Firji., Suppofing that Abraham had before re* ceived divine revelations in or by dreams a hun- dred times ; yet furely it will not follow, by a jufl confequence, that he could not be mis-led by dreaming ; but, on the contrary, he became fa much the more in danger of being deluded. In this way his rtctiving frequently divine revelations, 6y dreams, might render him the lefs upon his gnard^ and he might hereby be more eafily led to think, that every dream was a divine revelation* The cafe is the lame in any other way in which he might receive his informations ; his not being impofed upon, in many inftances, is not a good argument to prove that he was not, or could not be impofed upon in the fame way in one -, becaufc the latter will not follow by a jufl confequence -from the former. Again, . Secondly^ Suppofing that the command for A- Irabam., to kill his Ion, had been backed with ac miracle^ or miracles^ in like manner as feveral di- vine revelations had before been confirmed or proved to him to be fuch ; yet this does not prove the fore-mention'd command to be divine. Miracles are diredlly and immediately evidences only of the pozver., and not of the veracity or good- mfs of the agent that performs them. So that when any thing farther is to be concluded from them, that conclufion muft arife from the purpo- fes^ that the power which is fliewn by thofe mi- racles is made fubfervient to. And therefore as yllraham ]u\\:\y concluded, that thofe former re- velations backed with miracles were divine^ be- caufe 'to -The Cafe of Abraham, &c, caufe the purpofes were good which thofe revelati- ons and that power were made fubfervient to ; fo by a like way of reafoning it would follow, that there was dijlrong prcbability that the com- mand, in the prefent cafe, was not divine, be- caufe this revelation, and the miracle wrought in its favour, were (to appearance at leaft, and as far as he could judge) made fubfervient, not to a good, but to an evil purpofe, ''-If it fhould be urged, that what I have faid feems to be contrary to what is faid of Abraham ^ and contrary to the commendation given of him both in the Old and New Tejlament. I anfwer-y what is faid of Abraham in the prefent cafe is as follows. Gen. xxii. i6, 17, 18. Becaufe thou hafi done this things and haft not witheld thy fon^ thine only [on ; that in blejjing I will blefs thee^ and in multiplying I will multiply thy feed as the ftars of the heaven^ a'dd as the fand which is upon the fea-fhore. And thy feed fhall poffefs the gate of his enemies ; and in thy feed fJoall all the nations of the earth be hleffed^ i^ecaufe thou haft obeyed my voice. - Heb. xi. 1 7, 18, 19. .By faith Abraham when he was tried^ of- fered up Ifaac ; and he that had received the promifes^ offered up his only begotten fon -, of whom it wasfaid^ that in \{2ac fhall thy feed he called ; accounting that God was able to raife him up even frotjt the dead, from whence alfo he received him in a figure. James ii. 21, 22, 23. Was yiGt Abraham, our father., juftified by works ^ when he had offered up Ifaac his fon upon the altar ? Seeft thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect ? And the fcripture was fulfilled^ which faith, Abra- ham believed God, and it was accounted unto him for rightsctfncfs •, and he was called the friend of God. 1 his, I think, is all that is faid in the Bible, with regard to thf point in hand -, from all which it evidently appears^ that Abraha?n's firll truft and confidence I'he Cafe of Abraham, (j^c. i r tonfJence in God, that he would make good his promife to him, and his flrid honefty and integrity y which were fhewn by his fteady refolution to do what ho^ judgtd to be his duy in fuch a trying in- llance ; thefe alone are what Abraham ftands in the Bible fo highly commended for, and which are made the growid of God's extraordinary fa- vours to him. As to the goodnefs of AbrahanC% judgment^ or the juftnefs of his reafoning^ the Bible ukts no notice of it ; neither does it once meddle with thofe queftions. ^iz. whether Abra- ham had or had not any rational fatisfa£iion that the command was divine^ or whether the adlion was fit or mifit ; but leaves thern to be difcovered from the nature of the fubjed. But to conclude, I obferve, • Fifthly^ and laftly^ What great diffiadties men are thrown into, in order to e: A Vindication of God's Moral Character* t § death, may be the meant of preferving his hfc. In this cafe the adion is good^ with regard to its tfftd: ; hfe is prcferv'd by it, but it is evil, with refpefi: to the defign of the ador, inafmuch as death was intended. Yea, an adion may be good in both thefc refpeds, and yet be evil with regard to the motive or principle it fprings from. As thus, one man relieves another in diflrefs, with an intent to minifter that relief; and he does this, not becaufe it is right and fit, in the nature of things, and out of pity to the diftrefs'd, but only, that he may render himfelf capable of doing fome greater mif chiefs when a proper occafion offers. la this cafe the a6lion is good, with regard to its ejfecty the diftreffed perfon is relieved ; and it is good, with refj^ed: to what was immediately intended by the ador, viz. he intended to minifter that re- lief ; but it is evil, v^^ith regard to the motive or principle it fprung from, and which was the ground or reafon of it. And, as adions take their deno- mination of good or evil, upon the different ac- counts above-mentioned ; fo it is the latter of thefe, in which the morality or immorality of the adion is concerned. An adion may be good, w4th regard to its effed, and the aftor may in- tend, that that good effect fhould be produced by it (as in the inftance above) and yet thataclion would be evil, in a moral, fenfe, if the motive or principle, it iprung from, was evil and vicious. Again, I obferve. Secondly^ 1 hat virtue or goodnefs comes under a two- fold confideration, viz. ahfolute and relative. By ablblute, I mean virtue or goodnefs confider'd ahfiraLledly^ or that which has an intrinfick goodnejs in it, when confidered fimply in itfelf, and which does not derive its virtuoufnefs from its relation to any other thing. Virtue or goodnefs, confidered as abfolute, is reducible into a very narrow com- pafs, j6 a Vindication cf God's Moral Cbara£fer» pafs, confifting only in one fingle point -, namely^ in the communicating happinefs to the fuitable fub- jeds of it, or in the endeavouring to do it, by do- ing or avoiding what appears to be proper for the attainment of that end, from a fenfe of thtfitnefs of fuch a temper and condud:. This is goodnefs itfelf, or what is fuch confider'd abftractedly, it not deriving its virtuoufnefs from its relation to any other thing. By relative virtue, I mean that which derives its virtuoufnefs from its relation to goodnefs^ that is, from its relation to what is abfo- lutely good and virtuous, as above explained. Virtue or goodnefs, under this confideration, is more extenfive, and includes in it truth ^ JHf^ice^ iempei'ance^ and the like, Thefe, as they derive their virtuoufnefs from their relation to goodnefs ; fo there are circumilances v.hich will change their nature, and make them otherwife •, that is to fay, tho' the practice of thefe, in almoil every inflance, tends to the common good, yet there may be fome poflible cafes, in which it may be otherwife. Having m^dc the above obfervations, I fhall now proceed to wiiat I propoied •, namely^ Fir ft ^ To lay before my reader xht fever a I kinds cf evidence^ upon which tlic truth of God's moral character may be fuppos'd to depend. And aJl the proof, which this point is capable of, m.ay, I think, be rang'd under thefe three heads, viz. fir fly divine teftimony ; fecondly^ experience and obfervation ; and, thirdly^ the nature and reafon of things. The proof, which each of thefe afford, I fhall confider diftindlly. And, Fir ft y I am to enquire, what proof divine tefi- mony attbrds, or can afibrd, with regard to the grand queftion now before us ? And in order to let this matter in a true light, I will fuppofe a per- fon upon the enquiry, vv^hcther God is in reality a w//'r and a good Being, i^c, I will likewiis con- fider A Vindication of God's Moral Chara5ier. 17 fidcr him, as feeking for fatisfadion from cUvine revelation^ and that therein he finds God teftifying of himfelf, that he is really wife and good, as aforcfaid. I fay, fuppofing as before, yet this clone does not prove the point, becaufe in this cafe here is another point taken for granted, vi'z, that God will not deceive ; which point muft not be prefumed, but proved. For as the idea oi vera* city is not diredlly contained in the idea of neceffary exiftence •, fo if God, or the neceflary exiftcnt Be- ing, may deceive, then his teftimony alone is no certain proof in the cafe. So that, before any thing, and confequently the point in queftion, can be proved from divine revelation^ this point muil firft be proved, viz, that God will not deceive^ at lead: in all thofe cafes, in which the truth of the revelation is for our advantage^ and the difappoint- ing our trufl will be to our lofs. I fay, the nature of the thing requires, that we have a well- grounded affurance, that God will not deceive us, in any of thofe cafes, before we can have any juft ground of confidence^ in any thing which he has revealed. Again, fuppofe the fore- mentioned perfon carries his enquiry farther, and examines^ whether God is a Gcd of truthy and confequently, whether his tellimony may be ahfolutely relied upbn^ in this, or in any other cafe •, and fuppofe he feeks for fatisfadlion from divine revelatioHy as be- fore, and that therein he finds God teftifying of himfelf, that he will not deceive nor impefe upon his creatures -, yet this, and confequently the fore- mentioned point, is not proved by it, there being juil the fame ground o'i uncertainty as before. Here is a perlbn, witneifing for himfelf, that he will not deceive \ but whether he will, or no, is flili the queftion ^ becaufe he may deceive in this, a$ well as in any other cafe, here being no more th^n his own teftimony concermng himfelf, which Vot. II. , ' g tejlimony T5 Jl yinaicanon oj KaQa s iviorai K^toaraair. teftlmcny alone y in the nature of the thing, is not a proper foundation for credit^ nor a fufficient ground cf cw dainty. And this brings me to confide r^ Secondly^ Wliat proof experience and ohfervation afford, in the cale under confideration ? And thefe, fo far as we are capable of judging from them> bear their teflimony, that God is a wife and a good Being, i^c. Whoever takes a view of the creation, cannot but fee the marks of wifdom, and gcodnefs^ that run thro' the whole* I'his is abundantly evident to all thofe, who are qualified to examine, and look into the works of nature. The late difcoveries that have been made in aftro- nomyy anatomy^ and all the parts of natural philofo- phy^ abundantly fatisfy the curious and inquifi- tive, that God, has in all his works,, wifely exer- cifed his natural properties, to ferve the purpofes cf benevolence. But then, it muil be remember'dy that the pra6i:ifing an adion, which is produclivc of red good^ and the frcq^uent repetition of fuch a6lions, are net certain figas of a fnoral property (that is, that thofe actions proceed from a princi- ple of true goodnefe) becaufe the ground, or rea-' fon of them, may be net a moral motive^ but fome other cafe ^ feeing God may,, v/ith regard to his natural liberty, ad: from arbitrary pleafure, or from vain-glbry, that he may have the empty praife of his creatures, and the like. And con- sequently, tho' the repeated inftances of God's- performing adions, that are produ<5live ofmucb good, and the want of an in fiance of his ever pradifing the contrary, are a Jlrong prefwnptiony and make it highly probable^ that fuch a moral property takes place in him ; yet theie alone do not amount to an abfolute proof that it certakily is fo \ becaufe the action, tho' ever fo often re- peated, is not fuiticient to difcover the motive is A Vindication of God 'j Moral Chara^er, 1 5 it proceeded from. And this leads me to enquire, i'hirdly^ What proof the nature of thi?7gs af- fords, in order to evince the truth and certainty of the point in queflion ? And here I muft beg leave to re-affume the argument which I have already laid down (both in my previous quejiion^ and in my fupplement to it) and rcprefent it more at large, for the fuller ejtablifhmmt of the prefent proportion. That God is, and what he is with regard to his natural properties, I fhall not en- quire into, nor enter upon the proof of ; but Ihall' take it for granted, that God is, and that he is neceflarily an immenfe, eternal, all-knowing, all- powerful, a felf-fufficient, and an unchangeable Being. This being allowed, from hence it will follow, that as God is always capable of doing what is moil 'u; or thy and valuable in itfelf, and which, in the nature of things, is rights good^ befi and fittefi to be done, feeing he knows wherein the goodnefs, fitnefs, and valuablenefs of every ad:ion lies •, fo he always ivill act thus^ becaufe right, good, fit, ifc. are fo very beautiful, and excellent in themfelves ; and are fo preferable, in the nature of things, to their contraries, that they always will afford a proper and fujfident motive to intiuence the divine v/ill, and conlequently to di- rect God's actions, in all his dealings with his creatures, feeing he cannot poUibly hav^e 2iny felf- interefi to miflead him, and therefore cannot pof- fibly be under a temptation to acl othervviie. And, thus I prove, that God will always exer- cile his natural properties^ (viz. his knowledge and power) to ferve the purpofes ot be'nevclence. For as God cannot but know, from the nature of the thing, that the communicating of happinefs, in the mofl proper way, is profrcuting tht mofl no- lie and valuable end^ which his natural properties C a are 20 A Vindication of God's Moral CharaSler. arc capable of profecuting, and attaining ; fo thk will always be a reafon^ or motive ftrong enough to induce him, when he does a6l, to exercife his knowledge and power in ferving thefe purpofes v and will always lecure him from, profecuting their contraries. And,, thus, from the nature of things, I prove God to be a God of truths who will not deceive with a he. For tho' God can have no intereil of his own to ferve, in any revelation that he makes to his creatures, and confequently, can have no excitement from felf inter efi^ to reveal ei- ther truth or falfhocd -, yet, thofe, to whom he gives a revelation, are capable of being Interefted. in it y and when that is the cafe, then the nature of the thing requires^, or makes it fit> that they fliould be dealt fairly^ and candidly with ;, and confequently, there is a moral unhtnefs in deceiv- ing them^ it being a deceiving them to their hurt^ And as truth,, in fuch a cafe^ is right, and fit^, and highly preferable to deceit, axid faliliood v fo this will aJways difpofe fuch a Being as God is, to prefer the form.er to the latter, and to govern his. actions accordingly •, feeing he cannot polTibly be under a temptation, from any other motive^ to a6l otherwife. And, thus 1 prove, that God governs his aClions by the principles of reafon. By which I mean, that God in his dealings with- his creatures, v/ith regard to what he requires, from, and difpenles to them, whether in a v/ay of favour or difpleallire, does not act arbitrarily, or from mere will and pleafure •, but on the con- trary, he makes the reafon of things the rule,, and meafure of his a^^lions. He has a regard ta the mcrd fitmfs of what he requires, and to the ftdtahknefs of the fnhjeth^ to whom his corredi- ons and his favours are difpenfed. To command what is // and fnitahle for a wife and good being to command^ and what is ^ro-^er for creatures conftir 'AVindkaihn of God^s Moral CharaBer. 2 1 conftituted, circumftanced, and related as we are, to be in the pra(5tice of is ih rights and agreeable in itfelf, and kt preferable to its contrary, that God will be dilpofed, from the reafon of the thing, to make it the rtde^ and meafure of his au- thority. Whereas, on the other fide, to be ar- bitrary in his government, and thereby to a6l the part of a weak and chlldijh^ or of an eijil and vi- cious being, is fo mean and difreputable^ that God will, upon that account, be at the farthcfl dillance from it. Again, to love and value, to hate and defpife arbitrarily^ either perfons, or things, with- out regarding the fuitablenefs or the unfuitablemfs of the perfons, or the things themfelves \ or on the other hand, to love and value what is truly lovely and valuable in itfelf, and to hate and de- fpife what is really difagreeable^ in the nature pf things ; the latter of thefe is fo right and fit, and fb preferable to the former, that God will be dif- pofed, upon that account, to make it the rule and meafure of his adlions. Thus again, to reward, and puniih arbitrarily^ without making the fitnefs of things, and the fuitablenefs of the fubje<5ts, the rule, and meafure of fuch difpenfations •, or on the other hand, to reward and punifh according to the rules of reafon^ that is, according as crea- tures have made themfelves, by their perfonal virtuoufnefs or vicioufnefs, more or lefs, the fuit* able and proper objeds of his approbation or diflike •, the latter of thefe is fo right and fit in it felf, and fo preferable to the former, that God will be difpofed, from the reafon of the thing, to make it the rule and meafure of his adions. From what I have fiiid, I think, it plainly ap- pears, that the nature of things evidently, and cer- tainly, proves God to be a zvife^ and good Being ; who prudently exercifes his natural properties, to icrve the purpofcs of benevolence^ and that he C 3 governs ^2 A Vindication of God^s Moral CharaBer, governs his alliens by the principles of reafon. The fum of the evidence in iliort is this, namely^ that as a right life and application of knowledge and pov^er, to ferve the purpofes of kindnefs and benevolence, and as ading by the rules of reafon^ are truly valuable and excellent in them- felves, and highly preferable^ in the nature of the thing, to their contraries •, fo, fuch a Being as God is, who has, independently in himfelf, all knowledge and power, and therefore perfectly knows the moral difference betwixt thefe, and is at liberty (with regard to every other being, and with regard to any natural or phyfical necefiity) for the choice of either of thefe, and has no felf- intereft to mi/lead him ; he will, from the nature of the thing, be difpofed to prefer, in his choice, a right ufe of his natural properties, and a rational condudl, before their contraries. Having thus examined the feveral kinds of evidence, upon which the truth of God's moral chara6ler may be fuppofed to depend, and thereby proved, at large, that God is in reality a wife^ and a good Beings &c. I now proceed, Secondly ^ To vindicate that chara6ler, as to the taufe and origin of evil, by returning an anfwer to tPie grand queflion now in debate, namely^ that if God is in reality a wife and good Being, From whence then does evil proceed ? To which I an- fwer, that this pofTibly is a knot that is more eafily cut than untied ; and tho' no man could be able to give a fatisfadory anfwer to this quef- tion, yet that would not weaken the evidence v/hich I have produced, much lefs would it prove God to be otherwife^ than what I have endeavour'd to prove him to be ; becaufe the difficulty in this cafe may not arife from the ftate of things, but from the v^eahiefs of our underflandings, and the fhortnefs of our knowledge, which render us uncapable ^A Vindkatkn of God's Moral CharaSler. 23 lancapable of feeing thro\ and to the end of them. The evil, that is in the world, is ufually dif- tinguiihed into two forts, najnelyy natuml and mcraL As to natural evil, this is occafioned partly by tht follies and vices of men, partly hy fupe'rflition^ and other like caufes, with which God is not in the leaft concern'd, and therefore it cannot, with any colour of juflice^ be put to any of his ac- count. And, as to all thofe evils which arc the confequence of the naiural frame and conjiituti^ en of the ivorld^ thefe plainly appear to be the ef- fedt and produce o{ wifdom 2ind goodnefs. For tho* particular perfons are accidentally fufferers by thefe means, yet tht g€cd of the whole is perfecuted, and carried on by them. Thus, fliorm.s and tem- pefts accidentally become the accafion of m.uch e- vil to many individuals •, and yet thefe are necejfajy^ as they rarify the air^ and thereby render this pla- net a convenient habitation for a multitude of creatures, whom God hath provided to tail: plen- tifully of his goodnefs upon it \ and as the not re-r moving the cmije of thefe diforders would intro- duce more evil, upon the whole ^ than is introduced by the diforders themlelves. And, as to pain it- {t\^^ which perhaps conflitutes the ftrongeft part of the objedbion, our being liable to it pofTibly is neceffary^ in order to render us capable of tailing the pleafures of life. Pain and fenfible pleafure, for any thing we can fee to the contrary, are fo conneffed ( if I may fo fpeak ) in the nature of things, that we cannot be capable of the one, but WT muil: be liable to the other. That V'ery capa- city, we have to tafle the plealures of life, renders us capable of their contraries. Befides, pain, in the nature of the thing, is highly necelTary, as it is the gT(t3.t gtiard and fecurity of life. If the re- iraining from food, or the being wounded, or C 4 bruifed. i4- ^ Vindication ef Gcd's Moral Chara^fif. bruifed, or the touching of fire, or the like, did not give pain, then Hfe and health, and all the en- joyments arifing from them, would be guardlefs. Men would be perpetually running into danger, were they not under feme fenfible reilraint •, and therefore pain is wifely provided to be a guard and afecurity from it. So that, natural evil, as far as God is concerned in the pi'odudion of it, is the effed: d^ wifdom and goodnefs. It is tnie, God hiight, if he pleafed, have prevented this fort of evil ; but then he would have prevented himielf from excrcifmg that kindnefs and benevolence^ which he has fo plentifully difpenfed thro' the world. But, PofTibly, it may be thought, that i\it great diffi- culty is ftill behind -, for tho' that good, which is in the world, could not take place, in the prefent ftatc of things, without giving occafion for the evils, aforefaid •, yet this, at befb, is but doing that which is prod u d ive ^^r//y di good, and partly of eviL "Whereas if God be luch a wife and good Being, and be indued with fuch knowledge and power, as is here fuppofed, then he would take care fo to adl:, as that evil fhould not be the necej[ary conjeqiience ot his prodiittions , becaufe evil is the fame in itfeif, and is as fit to be avoided or prevented, whether it be produced by accident or defign, feeing fuch accidents are fuppofed to be forefeen. To which it may be replied ; this ob- jection is founded upon a fuppofition, that it is pcjjihle^ in the nature of things^ for God to give us thofe pleafures we here enjoy, without our being any vjay liable to their contraries. Whereas, this may poflibly be a miliake; and, till it be made good, the objection will be of no force. Befides, tlv^TQ IS -A Jlrong prefumption, thaf what is fuppofed iii the objedlion is not the cafe. For as God will be difpofed, from the moral Rtnefs of the A Vtndkation of God*s Moral Chara^cr, 2-5 the thing, to difpenfe his favours to his creatures in fuch a Way as will moji effe^ually contribute to their happinefs ; and as the giving us pleafures in a way, wherein we are not liable to their con- traries (fuppofing fuch a thing can be) feems more likely to anfwer that end, than giving them in the way he now does 5 io this makes it highly probable^ that it is not pofTible, in the nature of things, for us to tajle thofe pleafures, without our being liable to their contraries \ feeing they are given in a way, in which we are capable of fuffering all the evils we at prefent are liable to. And tho' I would by no means take upon me, abfolutely, to determine what is, or is not polTible, in the nature of things j yet, with re- gard to the prefent queltion, I beg leave to offer what follows. Happinefs and mifery are not only diflingullh- ed from, but are ufually confidered as oppofitc and contrary to each other* By happinefs I mean pleafure and delight^ that is, the happy per- fon is pleafed and delighted. And by mifery I mean, uneajinefs and grief that is, the miferable perfon is uncafy and grieved. The happinefs which mankind are here capable of enjoying, or at leaft, which nature leads them to, may, I think, be rang*d under thefe three heads, *viz, fenfibUy in^ telletluaU and moral. By fe)ifible happinefs, I mean that pleafure and delight which arifes from the enjoyment of fenftble objects \ with regard to which I have already obferved, that the capacity we have, for tailing thofe pleafures, render us ca- pable of their contraries. And to fay, in this cafe, that it is ppfllble for things to be fodifpofed, as that we may be capable ot fuch pleafures, without our being any way liable to their contraries, is to pre- fume a point, v/ithout any thing in reafon or ex- perience to fupport it. By intelkpAial happinefs, I meai) 26 A Vindication of God^s Moral Chara^er. mean that pleafure which arifes from the difcovety and contemplation of t^'uth ; with regard to which I have this to obferve, that all the pleafure we tafle, of this kind, are either to our 'preceding ignorance^ to the care and pains we take in the difcovery of truth, or to the degree of our knowledge, when we attain to a greater mtafure than other men. All truth, when confider'd feperate from thefe, is alike as truth ( tho' not of the like importance to us ) the objeft of the underftanding , and as fuch it mull afford the fame delight. If we all could, with equal eafe and clearnefs, fee all the relations of things, they mull all, in the nature of the thing, equally elfedls us. We fliould tafle as much pleafure in knowing and contemplating that two and two make four, as in knowing or contemplating any propofition which now appears the mofi difficulty and fo affords the mofl plealiire ; or rather, we fhould not have pleafure from any of them. Now if this be the cafe, then it is evi- dent, that the capacity we have, for tailing this kind of pleafure, renders us capt^le of its contrary. We could not be delighted in the difcovery or contemplation of truth, if we were not capable of being ignorant, and of the unhappinefs which arifes from it. By moral happinefs, I mean that pleafure and delight which arifes from the love and practice of virtue or goodnefs. This pleafure as it is the moil noble and excellent in its nature, and as it is what mankind feems deiign^d to tafle upon this globe, fo it is the moil permanent and durable. Other pleafures drop in the enjoyment, and the indulging them to any great degree deflroys them ; but this kind of pleafure, the more it is indulged, the more it increafes ; and yet, goodnefs cannot take place, without indigent ol>jecrs for it to be excrcifed upon ; and confequently the fuppofi- tion of moral happinefs y with regard to us, fuppo- » fes A Vindication of Gcd's Moral Char aEler^ iy fcs likewife tipojfihiliiy of vice and ?nife?y. If there are any other ways of being happy, than thofe I have been confidering, thefe, I imagine, will appear to have their allay^ like thofe above-men- tioned, that is, we cannot be capable of fuch plea* fures, without our being liable to their contraries. Thus I have, in fome meafure, vindicated the gGod?2cfsofGod, by anfwering whatis urged againft it from natural evil -, and have fhewn, that if God had prevented it, he would have prevented him- lelf from exercifmg hisgoodnefs and loving- kind- nefs in that way, in which he now gives plea- fure and delight to his creatures. As to moral evil, this poffibly may be reduci- ble into a much narrower compafs, than it is ufu- ally thought to be. For as there are many things that are efteemed virtuous^ which have no moral goodnefs or virtuoufnefs in them ; fo there are many other things that are efteemed vicious^ which have no ^noral turpitude or vicioiifnefs in them. And, as to that which properly conilitutes vice^ or mo- ral evil •, this is occafioned by that liberty and freedom of adion, which God, by conftituting us moral agents^ has rendered us capable of. By li- berty, in this cafe, I mean, that every man has fower to adl, or to refrain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to any motive that prefents, without being conftrained to it by any foreign power or agent whatever. Man is a compound being, confifling partly of underftandingy partly of appetite^ of affetlion^ &c. and each part of this compofition affords 2 diftindl kind of motive^ or excitement to a6lion, or to refrain from adling. And thus a man is excited to ad:, or to refrain from ading ; fometimes from a motive arihng from one part of his compo- fition, fometimes from another, and fomerimcs irom 2B A Vindication of God^s Moral Chm-aBer. from feveral motives arifing from feveral parts of that compofition. And, tho' motive is neceffary to adlion, feeing the adive faculty will not be exerted without fome previous reafon to induce to it, yet we are not the lefs free ; for as motives influence by perfuation, and not by compulHon fo every man has power to comply with, or to re- je5i thefe excitements, that is, every man is at iiberty to aft, or to refrain from ading, agreeably with, or contrary to what each of thofe motives, confideredTf;/^/^, v/ould excite him to. And that this is the cafe, is evident in fad; we feel or experience fuch a power, or that we are thus at liberty, and every adion we do is the produd of fuch a choice. And, tho' when an excitement to adion takes place, fome motive or other will finally pre^-jail^ and that motive, with regard to the event, is as effedual to pro- duce ox prevent the adion as phyfical necefilty ; yet there is not the like compulfion in one cafe, as in the other. The motive that prevails being not 2i power y or active caufe^ but barely a ^^"Z/^ reafon of, or an excitement to the adion, or to the refraining from ading. There being this appaxem difference betv/een ynotive 2ivA phyfical ne- eeffity^ viz. ihtont forces^ the other does hut invite % one is an addrefs to an active^ the other is acting upon a pafjiv.e being •, the one fuppofes liberty^ the oxhtrp^Jjivenefsm thefubjed influenced or wrought on by them. And confequently man has power and is as much at liberty to rejed the motive that ^oes prevail^ as he ha5 power^ and is at li- berty to reject thofe motives that do not. To tFiis I may add, that if motives did work ir- r^fflahly^ then the adive power would unavoidably be excited to ad, or be refirained from ading, whenever any motive is prefent to the mind. But tiiat this is not the caie^ is evident from experience \ fon)c«- A Vindication of God's Moral ChaMcter". zg- fomctimes the motive, that prefents, prevails, and fometimes it does not. Again, if motives work irrefiftibly, then in every inilance, v/here two mo- tives are preient to the mind, one exciting to acty and another exciting to the contrary (which is fre- quently the cafe) a man mufl be under a neceffity of doing and avoiding xhtfame a6lion, at the fa?ne time, which is plainly impoiTible in the nature of things. If it fhould be urged, that as in phyfical caufcs, xhtftronger ^iOWQT prevails^ tho' both work necef- farily ; fo in this cafe, the ftronger motive prevails, and the weaker would do it, did not the ftronger intervene and prevent it ; which (hews that moral and phyfical caufes work alike irrejiftihly. I anfwei^ the ftrength of this objedlion lies in the wrong application of the term Jirongcr •, it being applied to the motive that prevails^ without any regard to what is ftronger or weaker, in the nature of things. The fubjeds which fall under the cognizance of the underftanding are fuch, as relates either to the truths or to the fitnefs of things. With re- gard to the former, the terms ftronger or weaker are only applicable to it, as they figuratively ex- prefs the fujficiency or injufficiency of thofe argu- ments, by which the truth of a proportion is de- ftgned to be eftablifhed, there being no other way, in which arguments are capable of being compa- red ; and accordingly, an argument is faid to be firong or weak^ as it more or lefs proves or con- firms the truth of the propofition it is brought to prove. And, widi regard to the latter, the fore- mentioned terms are applicable to it, only as they figuratively exprels the fitnefs or unfitnefs of thofe adions, v/hich the motives of perfuafion would excite us to, there being no other way, in which motives are capable of being compar'd ; and accordingly a motive \% fcrong or weak, as the JO A Vindicaticn of God's Moral Character, the a^lion is more or Ms fit to be performed which ic excites to. And the', with regard to phyfical caufeSy that wjiich is ilrongefb always prevails ; yet it is otherwife vs^ith regard to moral caufes. Of thefe fometimes tliQ Jiro^iger^ fometimes the weaker prevails ; and the ground of this difference is e*^ videnr, namely^ that what we call moral caiifes, ftriClly fpeaking, are no caufes at all-, but barely faffke rccilons ol"^ or excitements to the adion, or to the refraining from acling. Which excitements we have power, or are at liberty to comply with cr rejed, as I have Ihev.cd above. And, thus at one time a man chufcs to gratify a natural appetite, tho* he IS convinced of the imfityiefs of that gratifi- cation, and then the weaker motives prevails ; and at another time, he rejeds that excitement, be- caufe of its iinfitnefs^ and then the fironger pre- vails. Now to fay, in this cafe, that the motive, arifing from the man's appetltej was ftrongell at one time, and that, arifmg from Kis jiidgme?it^ was flrongeft at the other ; this is to determine the ftrength weaknefs of a motive from the event only, and not from v/hat is ihongcr or weaker in the 7iattire of things. And to fay that the motive pre- vailed^ becaufe it was ilrongeil, is the fame as to fay, that it prevailed, becaufe it did prevail-, pre- vailing itfelf being made the ground of that dif- tin6lion. To this I may add, that as one argu- ment, in the nature of the thing, \% fironger than another, that is, one does redly prove what the other does not; and as our underflandings do not conftittite th2ii difference, but only judge right or wrong concerning it •, lb to fay that a conclufivc argument is weak, becaufe it does mt convince^ is prepofcerous •, k being evident, that the defed, or weaknefs, is not in tlie argument, but in the man's under ftanding^ who is not convinced by it. So, in like manner, one motixe is^ in the nature of A Vindication of God' J Moral Character. 31 of the thing, ftronger than another, that is, it is fitter to excite to adion \ and our "duills do not conllitute that difference, but only determine us to a right or wrong choice. And therefore to fay, that a motive, which excites to a right choice^ is weak, becaufe it does not prevail, is alike prepofle- rous ; it being alike evident, that the defect or weak^ nefs is not in the motive, but in our wills^ which re- fufe to be influenced or wrought on by it. A"-ain, If it Ihould be urged, that the exertion of the fi^li've facidty in man in necelTarily connected with the lafi judgment^ qx perception of the iinderftanding: and as man is allowed to htpaffive^ with regard to fuch judgment or perception ; fo confequently, thofe aclions cannot be free which are necejfarily conneBed y^\i\\ it. I anfwer^ the preception and the judgment of the underflanding may be confider'd, either as the fame things or elfe as t-ivo different things : that is to fay, tho' every ad of judging may be truly faid to be an a6t of perception ^ yet every act of perception is not an adl of judging. So that perception, when diflinguifhed from jud7- ingy is th^ feeing things as they are (or as they ap- pea.r to be) with their circiimftances and confeqiiences ; zxidi judging is the feeing, or judging of their ^''- yiefs or unfitnefs^ as they ftand related to thofe ck- cumftances, ^c. and, tho' the underflanding does as tridy perceive the fitnefs or unfitnefs of things (or what they appear to be) when it jiido- cs, as it doth the things thernfehes, with their cir- cumfianceSy oPr. yet thcfe are plainly two diitinct kinds of perception, the one natural ^ the other morale if I may thus diftinguiih them. And, tho' we zvQpaffive with regard to thefe perceptions, and cannot lee things othervvife than as they ap- pear to us, whether in a natural or a moral view j and tho' there cannot be fuch a thing as adlion, without aprecedint preception -, yet perception and adioa 32 A Vindicathm of God^s Moral Character, a(5lion are not necejfarily cornered. I fliall explain this by a familiar example •, Two men are in company together ; the one offers in words to give the other feme valuable thing, and likewife reacheth forth his hand to give him that thing ; the other, not only perceives the kind offer of his friend, and the thing thus offered as likewife the valuablenefs of that thing ; but he :i\{o per ceiveSy or judgeSy that it is a thing not fit to be given by his friend, and that it is unfit for him to receive it from him, with regard to each of their circumfian- ces. In this cafe, tho' the thing be perceived, as aforefaid, and tho' there could be no place for accepting, or refLiiing, if there had been no per- ception of the offer ; yet that perception is not ne- cefTarily connected, that is, it is not t\itphyftcal r<^z^ of the action that toliov^s. The man, not- withftanding thefe preceptions, has power ^ and is at liberty covetoudy to accept or generoufly to re- fufe the gift, which his friend has fo kindly, but unfitly offered him. There being not any thing more clear and evident, from experience, than this, namely^ that one man covetoufly prefers the leffer good of himfelf to the greater good of another, or to the good of the pnhlick^ v/hen he fees that thcfe come in competition j and another man ge- neroufly prefers the ^rt'^/^r ^W of another, or the ^c^^ of the puhlick^ to the leffer good ^i himfelf, when thofe come in competition ♦, which could not poffibly be, if perception and adtion were rcceffarily conne^edy as aforefaid. For if that were the cafe, then all men would ht generous or feljijh alike, as their underltandings inform them of the confe- quences of their actions, with regard to the good or evil of themfelvcs or others ♦, the fame caufe would produce the fame effed ; tht^zmc perception mufl neeelTarily produce the fame a^ion in every fubje^. But furely the contrary to this is evident io 'A Vindication of Gcd^s Mcfal Character. 33 in fadl. Befides, That perception and aflion are not necejfarily conneSied^ as aforefaid, is farther evi- dent from hence ; a man in a dream has a real perception, not only of the excitements to action, but of a5lion itfelf^ even whilfl: the active power is at reji. And thus, a man has a real perception of his eating and drinking^ walking and talking^ and the like ; and yet none of the motions of the body talce place, by which thofe complex actions are per- formed. And from hence I argue, if the real perception of the excitements to adion, and of the a6lions themfelves which they excite to, be not fufficient to produce real aclion, which is the prcfent cafe, then it will unavoidably follow, thac a6lion is not necejj'arily conjiected with perceptions but is produced by fome other caufe. \x. is true, adlion does fometimes follow or accompany fuch perception ; m.en fometimes talk and v/alk, and perform other anions in their dreams ; but this is feldom. Whereas if action were necel!arily con- ned:ed with perception, this v/ould always be the cafe. And tho' the perceptive faculty is deluded^ the objedts of perception being fictitious, and not real •, yet that cannot alter the cafe, vvith regard to the pb^cal influence of fuch perception •, feeing the perception itfelf is real, whether the objedts of it are fo, or not. A man has as real a percep- tion, and is as much convinced at the time, that he eats and drinks when he is afleep, as when he performs thofe anions when awake •, only they arife from, and are produced by different caujes. In fine^ perception and ac1"ion are the effec^ts of tv/o caufes, which have no more conne6iion than activenefs and puffrcenefs. If I pals along the ftreet, and a miferalle ohjetl be preilntcd to m.y view, my perception is neceffary \ the idea of that object being raifed in my numi, independent of my wilU and if I am copJcious that I have power to deliver the aforv*faid object from the mifcry it labours un- Vol. 11. D dcr. J4 AVhtdicatton 6f Gm^s Moral Char act &. der, and \S. I judge that it is right and fit I fhould do fo ; I am, with regard to thefe perceptions, fo far pctjfive^ as that, if I attend to the fubjedl, I cannot think otherwife of it than I do. But if I minifter that reUef, this muft be done by a power ^ in the cxercifc of which I am not pajfive but a^ive : I muft give fuch motions to my body, as are neceflary to produce that efFeft,. when I am at liberty either to gxert the adive faculty, or to be at reft. And if fuch motion does take place, it is not the perception of the miferabU object^ nor of my Mity to relieve, nor of the fitnefs of that re- lief, nor yet the perception of reliiving itfelf^ which is the phyfical caufs of that motion ; all thefe perceptions may take place in a dream, and yet no motion follow ; motion being performed by a power, which is as diftincft from the power of perception, as perception is from a£lion. If it Ihould be farther urged, allowing that perception and adlion are not neceiTarily conne6l- cd ', yet feeing every man always does what ap- pears to him to be befi at the timey therefore liber-- tyzmXneceJfttyy in the iifue,, amount to tht fams thing. Before I return an anfwer to this objecti- on, I iind it proper to obfervc, that the term beji is comparative. For when feveral things or ani- ons come in competition^ as to their goodacfs, fttnefs, and the like, and the underftanding has taken a view of them in thefe refpeds, then it judges that particular thing or action to bc./^^f, which, upon fuch enquiry, appears to have the preference in thatpaiticularwhcrein the compariiba, h made. So that, to do always what appears to be bejl^ at the time^ is to a6l always upon a. judg^ mcnt form*d, as aforefaid. This being premifed, I anfwer, frft^ man is fo far from following his judgment in all cafes, that on the contrary, | he fometimcs acts 'without it^ and fometimes acts ^ againjl it^ as is abundantly evident from experi- ence. Bry ading without judgment, I do not A VtndieaUon of God's Moral Character, 3^ mean that a man acts without thinking ; but this I mean, that he a6ts without entering into the q^nef-^ tion^ \vhether the adion be good or evil, fit or unfit. He drinks to gratify a natural incHnation^ 'without examining, whether it is beft to gratify that inclination, or to den>f i^ And as we/^;;^^, times a(5l without judgment, fo fad experience /hews, that we fometimes acl againft \x, iV man whp is thoroughly gqnvinced, from ex« perjence, tha| drinking to excefs will draw upoa himi fuch illncfs, as is ten times more than equivalent tp the pleafure he takes in that: indulgence ; he will, nqtwithftanding that con-s Viction^ drink to excefs, even tho' his con- vi6lion of the fad confeqtienc^ of that excefs be urged to him as a reajon againft it, And not pnJy in this^ biit alfo in m^ny other cafes, our appetitesv and pafTions lead us to aft [iQt only ^vitbouty but Againft cur judgment. And, thp' full convidlion^ -of the unfitnefs of an aftiqn is^, in the nature of the thing, a proper motive ovr^a^ fin againft fuch a6lion •, yet it does not akvajspri^ vail. The underftanding may interpofe, ^nd urge even mathematical demonjiffjion, in order tp engage to aclion, or to refrain from it ; and yet<^ alas, thefe bonds qf full conviftion ^re too weak tp hold men with. Tt>efe ropes 2iyt fometimes broken in funder like a thread, when paj/ion or appetite jnterppfes, apd whillt the Samfonh lock Qf Ijl^erty remains. Again, I anf\^Tr, jecondl^y fupppfing man did always ^61 from a conviftion pf the fitncfs of the aftion, yet this woyld not affect his liierty, bec^vUe his f^cyjties ?re exercifed in the fame iva)\ and with the/7?7/c freedom when he follo'u:s h^ judgment^ as when hs '^6ts againfi it. That is, the litneft of the aftiofi is no more than j^ motive^ cr the ground^ qr reafm. of afting in one cafe •, ^s the niotives which arife iron) apppticc, j;?ffiQn, pr any other part of our P 7- C^^ipofitipn. 3^ J Vindication of Gods Moral Character^ compofition, rse in any other cafe. And there- fore, to fay that libeTty and neceffily^ in the ifTue, airiount to the fame things is the fame as to fay, that t'VJO different and contrary ideas, in the ilTue, amount to xh^ fame idea % which, furely, is moft ahfurd and i:ontradictory^ and introduces the utmoft confufion. If it fliould be farther urged, that by being hefi cit the tirne^ as in the objection above, is not meant what at the time is judged befh upon the whole, but only what will then give the greateft prefcnt pleafure : I anfwer, that every adl of felf- denial is a manifefh proof of the contrary, in which men forego what to them appears the greateft prefent pleafure \ either to ward off fomc greater tuture evil from themfeives, or others, or elfe to procure fom.e greater future good. Upon the whole, I think I may venture to fay, that tho' God is the author of nature^ and confe- quently of all the parts of that compofition, from v/hence the jnctives to acSticn arife ; yet he cznnol fairly be charged vvHth the atlions tbemfehesy which thofe motives are the grotoid or reafon of; feeing he has left the direfticn of this well com.po- fed fyilem {v^z. the htrnian ccmfcfdion) to be the fubiecSt of every man's /r^^ choice. Again, If it fhould be urged, that it is allowed, on all hands, to be impcffble for God to ad: contrary to his fnoral ferfculions \ and if fo, then his adions muft be neccffary ; and if God's adions are ne- ceflary, then ours may be fo. I anfwer y the ftrength of this objection lies in the improper ufe of the word impoffibk'^ which, in this cale, is fi- guratively ufed to exprefs the prevailing infiuence of thofe motives of perfuafion, which wc know will as effedualiy prevent^ as any phyfical impoiTibili- ty. And thus we fay, it is morally impofTible for God to do evil ; by which is meant, that the moral 'A Vinikatkn of God's Moral Character, ^-^ moral unfitnefs of fuch a conducl: affords a motive, which, by its perfuaijve influence, will as effcdu- ^\\y prevent God from doing evil, as any phyfical impoilibihcy, that is, as any impoiTibihty arifing from -ph^ical impediments can do. So that the ground oi this knowledge, viz. that God will not do evil, does not arife trom our knowing that he wants either power or liberty to do evil, or that the forementioned motive will always neceffarily pre- vent every intelligent being from aflingthus, and thereby that it is ilri^Lly impoiTible ^ but it arifes from hence, that, as in the nature of the thino-, no aently man is not free, becaufe the volition of his will is determined by that caufe. But if the will is the firft mov-»r, then its volition cannot be foreknow- able, in the nature of things ; becaufe there ii not the knowledge of any precedent cflufe to difcover it by. I a7ifivir^ tho' the effeds of phyfical caufes Can- not be abfolutely foreknown, without the know- ledge of their caufes, or unlefs that knowledge be communicated from thofe who know thofe caufes and thofe caufes cannot be foreknown, without the knowledge of their caufes, and fo on ; yet, I think, this does not conclude againft t\\^ foreknozv- iedge of the volition of the will in all cafes, even tho' that volition has no precedent caufe to difco- D 4 vcrf 40 A Vindication of Coi^s Moral Characterl ver it by. For, tho' the will is the /;^ mover ^nd confequently its volition has no caufe externai to, or without itfelf -, yet that volition cannot take place, without iome^^r^w'<7^j reafon or motive to induce to it. And, therefore, if an excitement to action takes place, and that excitement is fore- knowable in the nature of things ; and if it is likewife foreknowable that no other excitement can poflibly take place to influence in the choice ; then that excitement v/ili be the ground or reafon of the volition of the will, and confequently fuch volition is foreknowable, in the nature of things. And thus it holds good, in the negative, as we foreknow that God will ?iot do evil^ inafmuch as we know that there cannot poffibly take place any reafon or motive to induce him to it. And thus far v/e foreknow that God will do goody inafmuch as wc know, that the doing good is truly valuable in \Xaq\i^ and, as fuch, is a mo- tive proper and fufficient to influence the divine will, and confequently to excite him to a6lion, whenever the nature and circumftances of the cafe render it fit and proper that he iliould do fo. And, if we could fore fee fuch a cafe, in which it w0Ui!<^ be morally fit for God to ad thus, or thus then wJ fhould have an equal certainty of the event, hefc^\^^ ^s after the action. And tho' the event would be certain, antecedently to the adion, Yct the divine ^EhO:^ would not be necelTary, but fr^e : that is, in fuch :^ cafe, God would not be moved or determined X.0 ad from any natural or phvfical necelTrty, but he Tvpu Id be />^;/aW^i to 11^ 'i^ I may thus fpeak,' from a moral motive^ -, which' motive is not a power, or phyfical caufe, but ba.n^iy a palTive reafon of the iCclion. And therefore^ to fay, that certainty ofth e-Z'ent makes tht action ncce£ary, this appears plainly to be a mifiake, L^caufe certainty, in the ^rcktxi ^^^^^ • " " does A Vindicatmt of God's Moral Character, 4t does not arife from any natural neceffity God h under to aft, but from the knowledge of the ftnefs of the a6lion ; which fitnefs, as it will be (not the phyfical caufe, but) the ground or reafon o^ ^di- ing to God J fo the knowledge of that fitnefs will be the ground of prefcknce^ and confequently of oertainty of the event, with refped to us. But with regard to men, v/ho have different motives arifing trom their compofition, one exciting to ad,, and another exciting to the contrary ♦, this r allow very much alters the cafe, and renders the foreknowledge of the volition of the will, in fuch cafes, more diffvcidt to be accounted for •, the', I think, it is not a froof of the contrary. And therefore, abfolutely to determine that prefcience and human liberty are, or that they are not con- fident; this, I think, is prefuming, and is. void of proof. As to the term contingent^ which is fometimes made ufe of in this cafe, if it be applied only to thofe precarious circumfiances of human actions, which take place not only without, but fometimes contrary to the will and intention of the agent, and fo are perfecftly accidental ; then, I think, that there is not any thing in nature, which can be a foundation iox prefcience^ with regard to fuch cafual circumfiances. And, I take it, the cafe is the fame with regard to all thofe a(5lions which are occafioned by them. For if there is not any foundation for foreknowing the accidental circumfiances o'iXx^vsx^.n -2.^10^%^ then there can be no foundation for fcrekncuuing thofe actions, which depend upon fuch circumltances, as the ground and reafon of them. As thus, a man throws a ftone with an intent to hit a dog, but mifTing the dog, he hits a man pafTing by. In this cafe as the circumflancc of the action, z-iz. hitting the 7i:an^ was not only v^'irhour, bur contrary to the will 42 A VindkatioH of God's Moral Cbaracitr^ •will and intention of the agent, and therefore was pcrfedly accidental ; fo, I think, that there is not any thing in nature which can be a foundation for prefcience^ with refped to this precarious circunaftance* And, iffo, then whatever adions follow^ or are ouaftoned by it, thefe mull Hand upon the fame foot, with regard to prefciencc, as the cinumjiance of the a£fion does, which either mediately or immediately is the ground or reafon of them. But this, I think, does not affed the cafe, as to the iHconfiJiency of prefciencc with human liberty. Upon the whole, my anfwer to the objedion is this. I have already proved that man is free, by ihev/ing that the motives which excite him to ad:, or to refrain from adling, influ- ence perftiqfiz'elj^ and not neceflarily ; . which per^- fu alive influence every man has power, or is at liberty to comply with, or reject -, and confequent- ly, either there is no prefciencc, or elfe prefciencc and human liberty are conflftent -, but which of thefe is the cafe, as it is not eafy to determine, fo it is beiide the prefent argument. Again, If it fhould be urged, tho* we are at liber- ty to act from what motive we pleafe, and tho* motive is not an a6tive or phyfical caufe, but on- ly a paffive reafon of adting, or of refufing to ad:-, yet as we are not arbitrary with regard to what ihall pleafe, but are determined independant of our will-, \o confequently we are not free, or, in other words virtue and vice are not the fubjeds of our free choice. I anfwer, firft^ if the freedom of an agent con- ilfls in his having power and being at liberty to <:onfl:itute a difference in things, that is, arbitrarily to determine what Ihall be good or evil, right or wrong ; and confequently, what fliall be pleafing or difpieafmg, then it mufl be granted, that there neither A Vindication of God*s Moral Character* 43 neither is nor can be any fuch thing as liberty, becaufe thefe arife from, and arc founded in the nature of things, independent of any fuch deter-- mination. Befides, t\it fuppojition of fuch a power carries in it an abfurdity j for as right and wrongs good and evil, necelTarily fuppofe a natural differ* ence in things (take away that difference, and there can be no fuch dillihdions, crooked and Jiraight cannot take place without a difference in nature) fo without that difference, there cannot be a foun« dation for being pleafed with one thing, and dif- pleafed with another, but all things mufl pleafe 01* difpledfe alike. And, therefore, to fuppofe a power to make a difference in things, when there is none in nature, is to fuppofe that things can differ, while they are alike, which is a contra- didion. But farther, I anfwer, feccnd^^ that the liberty here con«* tended for, as the foundation of virtue and vice^ does not arife from a power or liberty to confti- tute a difference in things, but it arifes from a power or freedom to av5l agreeably with, or contrary to the moral fitnefs of things, fuppofing fuch a difference in nature. And, for the clearing of this point I obferve, that virtue or ^oodnefs^ ftrittly and properly fo called, confifb^ in com- municating happinefs to the juitahk fubjedls of ir» or in the endeavouring to do it, by doing and avoiding what appears to be proper for the at- tainment of th^t end • and that vice, or moral evil, confifts in communicating unhappinefs to the improper fubjeds of it, or in contributing either negatively or pofitively to that unhappinefs. Again^ I farther obferve, that as man is a com* pouv.d being y fo this renders him capable of feveral diflinft kinds of pleafure, which in other wordi We call happinefs, and the capacity he has, for tafting thole pieafurcs, readers him capable of '44 i^ Vindkatkn of God's Moral Character. their contraries, as I have before fliewn. He is hereby alfo qualified for fociety^ that is, for the giving and receiving pleafurc to, and from others of his kind -, and this Hkcwife renders him capa- ble of giving and receiving the contrary. And as the appetites and paffions, which in part con- ititute human nature, difpofe men to procure the comforts, and guard againfl the evils of life, both For themfelves and others ; fo they are capable of being vitiated^ that is, of being indulged to an cxcefs, and thereby of difpofing men contrarily to what they were defigned, and what the moral fitnefs of things requires. Man is alfo endowed with a faculty of iinderftandingy which renders him capable of difcerning the moral difference in things, and thereby of knowing that it is right and fit, in the nature of things, that all others fliould be happy as well as himfelf ; and confe- quently, that it is right and fit that he Ihould profccute the happinefs not only of himfclf, but of all others as far as it is in his power, and is confiftent with his own ; yea, that he fhould deny himfelj\ when his own and the common felicity come in competition. Man being thus conftituted, he is hereby qua- lified to render himfelf a generous or a felfijh crea- ture, that is, he is qualified to dired his inclina- tions and endeavours towards the attaining his ov/n pleafure, in conjunction with, and in fubordi- iiation to the common happinefs, or to dire6l thcfe in diflincStion from, and in oppofition to the icramcn felicity % and, in the free exercife of this power, he becomes either virtuous or vicious, i-or, tho' every man will be difpofed, from the nature of the thing, to prefer happinefs to mifer ry ^ and tho' every man's particular confliiution may incline him to prefer one kind of pleafure to another, which, I think, is all that can be urged in A Vindication of God^s Moral Character, 45 in the prefent cafe ; yet no man is hereby deter- mined to be generous or felfifh. A generous man prefers the common felicity to his own, and a ielfilh man prefers his own to the pubHck \ a gc-* nerous man prefers one kind of pleafure to ano- ther, but denies himfelfm both, when his own, and the common happinefs, come in competition j '^ felfiHi man likewife prefers one kind of pleafure to another, and he indulges himfelfm both, tho' they are. inconfiflent with, and deftruclive of the common good. And the ground of this difference, viz^ that one man is generous or virtuous, and another man is felfifh or vicious, does not arife from the natural difference in things •, for then all men would be virtuous or vicious alike ; nor yet from an inclination, arifmg from every man's particu- lar conilitution, to prefer one kind of pleafure to another, that being equally the cafe both of vir- tuous and vicious men •, but it arifes plainly from that power^ or liherty^ which takes place in every man, to direB or refrain his inclinations and en- deavours, either one way or the other. If it fhould be farther urged, allowing that virtue and vice are the fabjeds of mens free choice, as the term free is oppofed to neceffity ; yet they are not free with regard to every thing which may ir.fluence or hiafs them in that choice ; feeing their natural conilitution very ftrongly dif- pcfes them to vice -, by which means, vice has much the advantage of virtue, and it is great odds but men v/ill be vicious, they being fo llrongly inclined, by their natwal appetites and affedions to chufe it rather than virtue. To this it may be anlV/ered, men arc generally too hafly in their cenfures of nature. 1 hat we have appe- tites and atfedions is beyond difpute •, but that thefe, as they are of nature's providing, dfp'ofe and incline us to vice, will bu denied ; yea, our natu- ral 4^ A Viniicaiton of God^s Moral Chara^er*^ ral conftitution, upon the whok^ is fo far from dilpofing us to vice, that on the contrary it is an excitement to virtue. Man is a compound crea- ture who is fitly conftituted to anfwer the pur- pofes of fodal felicity -, his appetites and paffion* difpofe him to ^promote and fecwe the publick good ; his underftanding quahfies him to difcern betwixt ri^ht and wrong, good and evil ^ and confequently, to judge of the fitnefs or mfitnefs of his adlions., with relation to that end. And he is endowed with fewer ^ to guide his behaviour as his judgment ftall direct \ and when the har- mony of this compofition is preferved, then m^n is an agreeable and ufful^ or, in other words, ^ virtuous creature. It is true, man is capable of being the contrary ; all his appetites and pafTions arc capable of being intiated^ that is, of being iii'^ dulged beyond their due bounds ; by which in- dulgence, the harmony of that compofition is diflurbed, evil is introduced^ and man becomes^ in many inftc^nces, a difo.greeahk and hurtful^ or, in other words, a vicious creature. But then,, it ought to be remembered J that his condudl, upon the whole, is unnatural^ feeing his compofition taken together djfpoies him to the contrary. This, J imagine, v/ill appear more plainly to be the cafe, when I have examined two or three branches of human affedion, which are the chief occrjions of evil. Self-love (which unhappily proves introduftivc to much vi^cy vras rightly planted in human na:r ture, by the great Author of our being, to dif« pofe us to do all that is ncceffary for our fupr port and prefervatigp, and to guard againft every danger, to which we are expofed. But then there arc other pafTions planted in us, vix. fymfa- thy^ pity^ and compaffiGu^ which difpofe us to enter into the concerns of our fellow-creaiures^ and to dp A Vindication of God^s Moral Character. 47 do what is necefTary to make them happy. And^ as thefe different affedions were defigned for a ba- lance to, and a confiant check upon each other ; and as the direding each, and every of thcfe to their fropr ot>jed:s, and keeping them within due bounds^ not indulging one to the deprefling of another, is properly our natural fiate ; and as reafon joins ifllie, and fhews us that it is as fit, in the nature of things, that all others fliould be happy, as that we fhould be fo, and thereby con- vinces us of the jitmfs of our endeavours in profe- cuting thehappinefs of others, as well as our own; fo this fhews plainly, that our compofition, taken together, is fo far from inclining us to vice^ that on the contrary it difpofes us to virtue -y and that, when felf-love becomes the occajion of m/, it is not by our following nature, but by perverting it. Thus again, the affedionate concern we have for the happinefs and welfare of our children and kin- dred (a palTion which pofTibly occafions more vice in the world than any other branch of our com- pofition) was rightly and wifely planted in human nature, to point out to us who they are, upon whom v/e are firji to exercife our care and kindnefs^ For as our power of doing good is limitted, by which means we are uncapabie of ferving all who need affiilance from others ; fo this affedlion points out to us thoi'e, v/ho, of all others, are the immediate Qh](ttt% or our regard. We arc to love, and take care ot fuch relatives, \n dijiinction from, but not in ofpcfdion to the reft of our fellow^ creatures •, who need our help, and who have, or would have, an equal right to our affillance, if we had equal power of helping aiJ, as we have of afTifting thofe, who are providentially made our immediate dependents. So that when love to our off-fpring, and relations, is moderated and kepc. within dua boundsy tliva it leads to virtue, that is,, tQ 48 A Vindication of Go3h Moral CharaBer, to the promotino: the common happinefs ; but when this affedioji is fo indulged^ as that it de- preHes our ply and compajjlon to the reft of our fellow-creatures, and thereby prevents us from doing that good to others, which their necefTity calls for, and our ability enables us to do ; in thefe cafes, the affection is vitiated, and becomes the occafwn of much evil. But then it ought to be remembered, that this evil is not juftly charge- cUe upon nature, but upon its perverfion and abufe. The like m.ay be faid, v/ith regard to love to our country. Ail that devajiation and mifery^ which has been, at any time, introduced by this branch of human affection, did not fpring from the na- tural ufe, but from the perverfion and abufe of it. When love to our country is moderated, and kept within due bounds, that is, when it difpofes ■ us to guard againft all approaches to arbitrary fGwer^ and ^very thing by which the cor,imonwealth is in danger of fuffering ; and when we love, and do good to our country, in diftin^ion from, but not in oppof:tion to other countries^ which v/ould have an equal right t6 our regard, if we had equal power of helping all, as we have of affift- ins our own, then love to our countrv is 3. virtue. But if v/e indulge the paffion beyond its due bounds, and love our country moppcjitionto other countries, \^o as to do them hurt and damage^ in order to promote the interefi^ and raife the glo-ry of our own ^ or if we negled otlier countries, when it is in our power to ferve our own, and them alfo \ in thefe cafes, the proper ufe of the affedlion is perverted^ and love to our country is eml and vicious :, there being as much reafon, that thofe people lliould be happy who live upon any other part of the globe, as that they lliould be iQ^ who live upon tlie fame fpot of earth widi u^. As A Vindic their being engaged in this or that farty •, their diligence m pfopagating what they efteem truth, and their patience and con- ftancy in fiffering for it. Others think that con- Jiancy and ferioufnefs in reading and hearing the word of God, attending upon divine ordinances'^ and the like, are what conllitute a good and vir- tuous charader ; whereas all thefe may take place in the fame perfon, and yet he may net have any thing of virtue or gcodnefs in him ; becaiile, notwithftanding thefe,. he may be deftitiite of what is truly valuable, viz. that temper and be- haviour, before-mentioned.. Yea, a man may abound in thefe, and yet be exceedingly vicionsy by his moncpoUziiig the bielTings and 'comfort! of life to himfelf, and by his contributing much to the mifery and unhappinefs of others. But,, that whi<:h men are in the greatelt danger o£ being deceived by, in this cai'e, is, when they are fiber and temperate in their enjoyments, quief and peaceable among their neighbours, true and faithful in their covenants and promifes, itridly jiiji in anlV/ering every legal demand, and the like ; thefe are eiteemed great virtues^ whereas in reality they are not fo ; a man may have all thefe^ 'jiXid yet not be a good man j, becaufe he may want A Vindicatkn of Cod's Moral Character, 53 ■want the fpirk, and pradlke of true goodncfs, which is effential to a good and virtuous cha- rader. The former confbitutes but a negative charader, -viz. not an evil man, that is, tlie man in whom the abovementioned quaHtics r^fide, may be faid mt to do evil. But, alas ! there is a wide difference betwixt not doing evil and doing gocd \ the latter being a pcfttive character which can arife from nothing lefs, than tiie love and praftice of virtue and true gcodnefs^ as above defcribcd. St. Paurs remark is very much to my prefent purpofc, Rom. v. 7. he faith, Scarcely for a righteous man will one die \ yet per adventure for a good man fome would even dare to die.* The Apoftk here diilingui flies betwixt a righteous man, and a good man 5 and he obferves, with regard to the former, who by his jufl behaviour, in anfwering every legal demand, had entitled himfelf to the chara6ler of a righteous man^ for fuch a man one would fcarce die.^ his life had nothing valuable in it, to render it worthy of fuch a ranfom ; for tho' he did no evil, yet as he did no good, he was but a cypher in the creation. But then the Apoflle obferves, with regard to the latter, who by his doing good to all around him, and wjio by communicating his kind afllilance and pro - tedion to all that ftocd in need of his help, had entitled himfelf to the charader of a good man ; that tho* life is exceeding dear to every m.an, yet for fuch a one^ fome would even dare to die. His life was of fuch confequence to the good and hap- pincfs of mankind, that fome would even ven- ture tp ranfom it with the lofs of their own. Would we then be valuable creatures } and would we deferve the charadler of good men ? let us put pn the fpirit of virtue and true goodnei's, and that ^v'dij moll certainly entitle us to it- But to proceed, p 3 ^ecjr:dh. 54 ^ Vindication of God's Moral Chard^er. Secondly^ I am to reprefent to my reader, what- it is which conftitutes true religion^ or what it is he mull be and do to render himielf truly acceptable, and well-pleafing to God. And here, I chink,- 1 have no great difficulty upon my hands *, be- caufe this is what lies open to the view of every man. We need not nin from fe6t to fedl, nor from one religious teacher to another •, we need not ranfack hiftory, nor be at the tedious fearch of examining all the evidence which every mifllo- nary offers, to prove his meflage to be divine ; nor turn over all the numberlels volumes which have been written by each religious party, to prove or explain what they call the word of God. No, the 'word (to fpeak in the language of St. Paul) is nigh us^ even in our mouthy and in our hearts It is but to exercifc that reafoning capacity which is lodged in the bofom of every man ; and this will enable us to diicover, with eafe and cer- tainty^ what w^e mull be and do to plcafe God. If I was to ferve a mailer, whom I knew to be of a covetous temper of mind, who made his vjcrldly intere^ the rule and meafure of his a6tions, in fuch a cale, I Ihould not need a teacher to in- form me what I mtill do to pleafe him •, this the nature of the thing would eafily difcovcr. If I could bend my mind to his avaritious temper, and could lay out myfelf in profecuting his world- ly intereft to the uunoft of my power, then I might know that my fervice would be acceptable to him. In like manner, when we know that Gc-d is in reality a wife and good Beings &cc, then we cannot be at a lofs to know what we mull be and do to pleafe him. The nature of the thing fhews us plainly, that if we have tht fame temper cf mindy and govern our actions by they^^^ rule jls God docs, then we Ihall not fall of his favour ; it being morally impollible, that it ihould be oiherwifc. J VinMcation of GodU Moral Chara^er, 55 ^jOthcrwifc. Heaven and earth may fail and pafs away, but God will not fail of loving and appro-* 'ving fuch creatures, and of difapfroving their con* traries. Would we then propofe die queftion, viz, wherein confifls true religion ? and would we feek for fatisfadion in a way in which we might be certain not to miftake ? Let us take a view of our Creator, when confider'd in his moral capacity, and let us turn our thoughts upon our- felves, and examine what^ fort of creatures we are, how we are confiituted and cinumjlanced, and how we fland naturally related to God, and to our fellow-creatures ; and then wc may difcover, with eafe and certainty, what it is which God expedls from us, and which will make us appro- veable in his fight. Are we derived dependent beings, endowed with a rcafoning capacity to direct and guide our behaviour, owing ourfelves, and ail that we are or have, to that bell of beings, who is our Crea- tor^ and original benefactor ? this we cannot but know, if we exercife our reafoning capacity -y and then we cannot but know likewife, that it is meet^ rights and our bounden d'dty\ upon all proper oc- cafions, to awaken in ourfelves, and ftir up in Others, a due and a fuitable fenfe of our Creator, of his kind iaitentions towards us, and of the ma- ny favours we have received at his hand , and with a fincere affection offer up to him our hum-, ble and thankful acknowledgments. Again, are we focial creatures, endowed with a reafoning ca* ■ pacity, whom nature hath fitted to give and re- ceive all that kind afjtfiance and proteciion to, and from each other, that each other's circumflances and abilities make necelfary and call for ? Which furely we cannot but know, if we turn our thoughts upon ourfelves, and upon the refl of 9ur fellow-creatures ; and then wc cannot but il 4 kno\^ 5^ A Vindication of God's Moral Chara^ferl know llkewife, that it is right and//, in the na- ture of the thing, that we fhould introduce as much happinefs into the creation as we can, by rendering ourielves the mcil agreeable and the nioft tifejul members of fociety, that we arc capa- ble of ' being. We cannot but know, if we re- ficd:, that when we Hve under a fuitable fenfe of the divine kindnejs^ and pay our acknowledgments to God, in a way which is mofl expreiTive of his excellency and gocdnefs -, and when, by an humble, meek, affable, and courteous behaviour, we have rendered ourielves agreeable to all around us ; and by the exercife of love and pity, and a kind afTiftance, we have removed the uneofinefs^ and contributed to the happinefs of our fellow- crea- tures, as far as it had been in our power : I fay, as we cannot but know, that fuch a temper and condud is highly valuable in itfelf, and becoming us as men ; fo we cannot but know, that it will ren- der us truly acceptable and well-pleafing to God, This, in fliort, is true religion, 1 his is filling up that relation we fland in to God and to our fellow- creatures, andanfwering the wife and good purpofe of our Creator, in calling us into being. And therefor^ it is this, and this only, which, in the nature of the thing, can, and will render us approveable in his fight. This is what approves itfelf to the underflanding of all men ; and yet it is thought by fome, that there is npt any thing more difficult to difcover^ nor reprefented as more myfterioiis^ than true religion ; tho' by the way, this rtfie6ls difoonour upon the divine conduct ^ as if God had made the way to his favour fo exceed- ing difficulty that none but men of letters and large alnliti^s could difcovcr it -, and had left the reft of mankind in their 'hands, to guide them right or WTong, as they pleafe, in a matter of llach im- portance, If A Vindication of God's Moral Chara5!er, 57 If true religion was a precarious thing, and Founded upon the arbitrary will of God, then in- deed, as nothing but a revelation of that will could difcover it ; fo it might be delivered in fuch a way, as to leave room for difpute^ and men might be under perpetual doubts and fears about it. And the moft ttiat could be done, in fuch a cafe, would be a diligent and fmcere endeavour to know the divine will, and an honoji pra^ijingvfhziy upon fuch enquiry, appeared to befo; and then to truft to the mercy and goodnefs of its Author for acceptance, tho' even fuch a condud could not afford a proper foundation for comfort 2ind fatisfac^ tion ; becaufe the wifell and bell behaviour may not prevail for acceptance with a being, whofc a(5lions are not direded by the moral iitnefs of things, but by arbitrary plcafure ; at leafl, we can have no afiurance that it will. But this is by no means the cafe ; true religion, or that duty we owe to our Creator and to our fellow-creatures, and which is the ground of divine acceptance, being nothing elfe, but the a^ing agreeably to that relation we ftand in to God and to each other ; the obligation to which arifes not from an arbitrary command, but from the moral iitnefs of things. Would we then be truly religious ? that is, would we find favour and acceptance with our Maker ? this is the only and the certain way to it, viz. to put on fuch a temper of mind^ and fuch a behaviour as becomes us as men ; and then we fhall moft certainly ^n^ favour with God. There is not any thing but agreeablenefs in the fubjed, which can polTibly make it the objedt of divine favour. For tho' men, from a miftaken judg- tnent, or from vitiated affedions, may be led to love that which is the proper objed; of their hatred, and dillike that, which, in the nature of the thin£, is the proper objcci: of their ap- prx)lpation \ yet this C4nnot b^ phe c^e, v»ith re- fpv^. 58 A Vindication of God*s Moral CharaSteri pe6l to God ; becaufe, as his underftanding can- not be miS'kd^ fo there is not any thing in nature, which can pofiibly vitiate his affedions. And if this be the cafe, then certainly it becomes us all to put on fuch a lovelinefs^ that is, fuch an agree* able ufeful temper and condud, as will, in the nature of the thing, render us truly amvahle and hvtly in the eyes of our Maker ; and not to flat- ter ourfelves that we are fharers in divine love, whilfl our difagrceable tempers and adlions render us the proper objcdls of divine difpleafure. Let us not then deceive ourfelves in a matter of fuch importance, by making that the ground of divine acceptance, which does not, in the nature of the thing, entitle us to it. It is not zjlrong ajfent to the truth of a propofition, built upon a divine ieftimony \ nor a conftant zndferious attendance up- on ceremonies, tho' of divine appointment ; nor the being wiited to this, or that religious party, much lefs an a?7g}y and Mtter zeal^ fpent in de- fending and propagating the opinions vv^e embrace, or the party we arc united to : I fay, it is not thefe which can pofiibly render us agreeable to fuch a wife and good Being as God is. That, in the nature of the thing, mufb ariie from the agreea- blenefs of our tempers and actions^ confidering our frame and compofition. Neither will God be any ways bribed into a liking and approbation of us, whilfl, in our tempers and actions, we con- tinue to be difagrceable. It is not the offering to him thcufands of rams^ nor ten thoufands of rivers of ml^ nor the ijoatchings ^ndfqftings^ tho^ prayers and tears of a man's felf, nor the labours^ nov fuffer- ings^ nor the intreaties of another in his behalf, v/hich can polTibly render a difagreeable creature pleafmg to, and acceptable to his Maker. For tho' men's aiieccions may be bribed or betrayed i yet fvrejy this c^i^ox be the cafe, with refpdl to God 'A Vindication of God*s Jiioral Character, 59 God, who is fet far above every iveaknefs of every kind j and confequently there is not any thing but ferfonal viftucufhefs^ which can fecure to a man the divine favour. The fum of the matter is this. Man is an intelHgent free agent, excellent- ly conftitutcd for focial felicity, as 1 have before fhewn ; and when, under a grateful fenfe of di- vine kindnefs, he fludies to imitate his Maker, in communicating happinefs to all, as far as it is in his power, by rendering himfelf agreeable and ufeful to the reft of his fellow-creatures ; and by endeavouring to make them happy, as well as himfelf; then it is that he commences a lovely creature, and mufl approve himfelf to God, And the more or lefs he is of this, or of the con- trary, the more or lefs he is lovely or difagreeahle to his Maker. But, Poflibly it may be urgied, that the principles, I have laid down, are inconfiftent with divine reve- lation, and deftru6tive of all revealed religion, and the like. To which it may be anfwered, that it is not to. I have only been fliewing what it is, in the nature of the thing, that will certainly re- commend men to God^s favour. To which I here add, that the bufmefs of divine revelation is not to make or conftitute duty, but to declare it ; and to propole fuch arguments and motives, as are proper to reduce men to, and engage them in the love and practice of it. If men had followed na- ture, and aded upon reafon, according to our Saviour's juft remark, then there had been no need of revelation. "They that are ivhole (laid he) have no need of the phyfician, (and confequently have no need of phyiicik) but they that arejick. I came not to call the righteous, hut finntrs to repent - mce, Mark ii. 17. But, fuch has been the mis- fortune of the generality of mankind, that par:- iy by a wrong ^d^cation^ and partly by other ca i- 6o A Vindication of God's Moral CharaElerl fes, their orimnal conflitucions have been depraved, that is, their underflandings have been mis4edy and their appetites and affedions vitiated ; and tliey have been fo far from making the moral fit- nefs of things the rule and meaiure of their ac- tions, that, on the contrary, they have fuffered theml'elves to be governed by humour^ private in^ iereftj and the hke ; and have eafily fubmitted to the arbitrary commands of every one, who has declared himfelf a heavenly melTenger •, infomuch that cruel and hurtful, as well as childifh and trifling fuperflirions, have been zealouQy con- tended for as true religion. And, that this has been the ftate of the religions 'world^ I prefumc will not be denied. The proper queflion then, arifing from hence, will be (taking in the ftate and condition of mankind) Whether there is a ■moral funefs or tinjitn&fs in God's interpofing to dif- cover to his creatures fuch rules of adion, as are fuitable to, and becoming their rational and man- ly nature •, and to reprefent to them the certain confequences of a good or bad Ufe, v/ith regard to his favour or difpleafure ? I fay, the proper quefbion is, Whether there is a moral iitnefs or uniitnefs in God's interpofmg, as aforefaid ? If there is a moral unfitnefs in fuch a condudl, then I allow the confequence,^/^. that no divine revela- tion can pofiibly take place upon my principles. But on the other fide, if there is a 7noral fitnefs in God's interpofing to give a revelation to his crea- tures, then, I fay, the principles, I have laid down, are fo far from being -prejudicial to divine revelation, that, on the contrary, they afford the mofb conchtfive argument for it. If it Ihould be father urged, allowing the foregoing principles are confiftcnt with divine re- velation •, yet they muft conclude againft all ■^ofitive injiitiiti.ons which have no mora] fttncfi in A Vindication of Gsd^s Moral CharaBer, 6i in them, but are founded on the arbitrary com- mand of the Almighty. Before I reply, I beg leave to repeat what I have already obferved in the fuppkment to my previous queffion^ namely, "that " in order to judge aright of the moral fitnefs or •' unfitnefs of any action, every circumllance " and confequence, which ftafids related to it, ** muft be taken into the cafe -, becaufe the fitnefs " or unfitnefs of an a6lion arifes from the good or " bad purpofes it is fubfervient to. And thefc *' oftentimes avife from the different circumftan- *' ccs the adion is performed under ; fo that the *' fame ackion may be fit under feme circumilan- *' ccs, and unfit under others." Again, I oi^- ferve^ experience fhews, that the generality of mankind are difpofed to, and much affected with ceremony and external obfervances •, which, Ifke words ferve to excite and exprefs^ not only the conceptions, but tlie paffions ot the mind : and thefe they may make ufe of not only in their ordi- nary intercourfe with each other, but alio in their folemn dddreffes and applications to God : and men vary in the ufe of thsfe, fome ufing one, fome -a nother, fome applying to them one fignification, lome another, according to the difi'ereat ufages or opinions of the ages or countries in which men live, or the diiferent religious parties they are joined with, or the different ways of thinking, which by their education, or fome other accident, they have been led into. Again, I obfcrve^ that as ceremo- nies are fomctimes fubfervient to men's good^ by leading them to proper reflecfions^ and by exciting in them ^oed affections \ lb they are more frequenly fubfervient to the contrary, by bringing men un- der the yoke of hurdenfome and hurtful f up erfiiti ens ; by accafioning in them a hitter zeal againit their feiiovz-creatures, when their opinions and pradicc, wivh ref[>ecl to thcfe, run crgfs to each. other. 6z A Vindication bf 'God^s 'Mcrd ChaHcter', other, and by mijleaiing them with regard to trut religion \ men's attendance on, and zeal for cere- monies, being frequently put in the place of virtue and made the ground of divine acceptance* Thefc things being premifed, I anjwer^ The proper queflion^ in this cafe, will be, ( taking in the ftate of mankind, ) how much they are difpofed to external obfervances, and how liable they are to make a hadufe of them. I fay, the queition is, when all circumllances and confequences are taken into the cafe, whether it is morally fit or unfit {ox God to interpofe, by ap- pointing fome ceremonies (V/hich are leaft bur- denfcme as the marks of our refped to him ; to prefcrve peace and unity amongll mankind, to lead us to virtue, and to prevent our running in- to more burdenfome and hirrtful fuperllitions ? So that, before any confequence can be fairly drav/n from the principles I have laid down ^ either for or againft divine revelation, or pofitive inftitu- tions, this point mufl firft be cleared, viz. that it is either morally fit, or unht, for God tointerpofc in the cafe referred to. Upon the whole I ohferve that God does not command for commanding fake, or by way of tax upon his creatures •, but, on the contrary, all his commands and inllitutions arc intended for our good. And it is when that end is anfwered, that they become ufeful to us, and We become acceptable to God : and therefore the bare compliance with, yea the moft fervent zeal . for ceremonies and divine i'Afiiiuticns^ when feparated from the love and practice of virtue, cannot make us the proper objeds of divine regard. This is evident from the nature of the thing, to which I Ihall add the following tellimcnies, Micah vi. 6, y^2>, JVberewithffoall I come before the Lerdy and bow my f elf before the high God'!' Shall I come before him 'vi^itb burnt offerings^ i^itJb calves oj A Vindication of God^s Aloral ChataEler, 63 ^^ear old? will the Lord be pkafed with thoufands of rams ^ or with ten thoufands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my frji-hornfor my tranfgreffion^ the fruit of my hody for the Jin of my foul? He hath /hewn thee^ O many what is good-, and what doth the Lord thy God require ofthee^ hut to dojujilyy to love mercy ^ and Iq walk humbly with thy God? Ilaiah i. 11 17. 'To what purpofe is the multitude of your facrifices to me^ faith the Lord? 1 am full of thi burnt offtrings of ramSy and of the fat of fed becifls \ and I delight not in the blood of bullocks ^ or of lambs^ or of he-goats. When ye come to appear before mcy who hath required this at your hands to tread my courts? Bring no more vain oblationSy incenfe is an abomination tinto me^ the new moons andfahbaths^ the calling ofaffemhlies lean- not away withy it is iniquity y even thefokmn meeting. T^our new mcciiSy and your appointed feafts my foid ha- teth : they area trouble unto mCy I am weary to bear them, A7id when you fpread forth your hands y I will hide mine eyes from you \ and when you make many prayci'Sy I will not hear\ your hands arc full of blood. IVaJh yCy make you clean^ put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes ; ceafe to do evily learn to do welly feek judgmenty relieve the opprefj'edy judge the fatherlefsy plead for the widow. Inline, divine revtlation muu, when rightly underltood, be con- fillent with nature; and confequently, what I have fairly deduced, from the reafon of things, cannot hz prejudicial to it, ncr to revealed religion found- ed upon it. Thus I have gone thro' what I propofed. I iliall now clofe up tiiis fubjcd with xX\^ following remark ; nanuh^ that as having right notions of the deity, when confider'd in his moral capacity, is the ground and foundation of all true religion y fo the having a wrong and unworthy idea of God, Vvlicn confider'd in that fame capacity, is the foun- ■ datign of ail rdigiQUs fuperPAti^n^ whctlier exercifed in ^4 -^ Vindication of God*s fnoral Character in men's pafTions or anions. For as religious fii- perftition, with regard to our pafTions, confills in exercifmg our i^cp^j and/^^rj, with refpe(5l to God when there is no juil ground for the exercife of them ; fo thofe hopes and fears naturally fpring from zfalfe notion of the deity, with regard to his moral character. When we fuppofe fuch a temper of mind in our Creator as he is a ftranger to, and when we confider him as governing his adions by fuch rules as he is the fartheft from \ as fuch an unworthy conception of God will naturally a- larm our pajfons^ fo all thofe hopes and fears which arife from, and are founded upon it, will be ex- ceedingly fuperftitucus and groundlefs. The cafe is the fame, with refpecl to men's actions. For when they have formed in their minds a wrong and unworthy idea of God, with regard to the moral re<5Htude of his nature, then they zxt fuper- jiituoufly led upon that account to do many things as ^/r, and to avoid many other as fins^ when there is no juji ground nor foundation for either. And the more grofs and unworthy men's con- ceptions of God are in this refpe6l, the more grofs and vikynW that fuperilition be, w^hich is pro- duced by it. When men confider God as an ah- folute Sovereign^ whofe acftioiis are dire(5led not by thefitnefs of things, but by the arbitrary plcafu re, and that he will refped men more for the ortho- doxy of their opinions, or for their attendance on, and zeal for this or that ceremony, and the like, than for the fweetnefs of their tempers, or the *virtucufnefs of their lives ; and that he hates and will punifli men for their innocent 7mjlakes concern- ing himfelf, or the fbrvice they are to pay to him > as fuch an opinion is very wrong in itfelf, and difhonourable to the deity, fo men are eafily and naturally led, by it, to think diat religious ferfeciition is pleafing to God s this being (in their A Vindicniion of God s Moral Character. 05 their way of thinking) a conformity to the divine patterrfy in hating and punifliing thofe, whom they think God hates and will punifli. And thus a falfe and unworthy opinion of the deity, with regard to his moral charatfler, will lead men to actions which are moft injtmous to mankind, and moft dijhonourable and hateful to God. Our Saviour faid to his Dilciplcs, as in fohn xvi. 2, 3. 'They (viz. the yeZ'Vs)Jba/l put you out of the fynagogues ; yea the time cometh^ that zvhofoever kilkth you^ ivill think that he doth Godfervice. And thefe things will they do unto you^ hecaufe they have not known the Father^ nor me. In thefe words our Lord obfcrves, that men's religious fuperftition would lead them to the killing of God's fervants, out of zeal for his honour. He likewife obferves, that the ground of this fupcrilitious zeal is their ignoratice and faife notions of the deity ; which ig- norance muft relate to him, with regard to his moral character. The Jews ignorance of God could not relate to his natural chara&r \ becaufe they had 2isjuft ideas of him in that refpecl, as the chriftians. Neither could their ignorance of this kind ("fuppofmg they had been jullly chargeable) be productive of fuch barbarities 2iS> our Lord faid they would be guilty of. A wrong opinion of God*s natural properties, his perfonality, and the like, cannot, in the nature of the thing, lay a foundation for thinking that religious perfecution \«, f leafing to God \ and confequently cunnot have any fuch influence upon men's tcmpei's and atlions^^ as was the cafe, with reJpeCl: to the Jej:s before- mentioned. Thefe fews confidcrcd God as an ab- folute lovereign, the ground of v/hofe favour or difpleafurc is not thcperfoaal vlrtuoufncfsor vici- oufnefs of his creatures, but their fubmitting or not fubmitting to v>hat he arbitrarily makes the conditions of 'iis acceptance. Thcv Ukewiie con- VoL. II, ^ V ' fidere4 00 A ytnaiiatiQn cf Lea's Mcral Lharaaef, fidercd themfclves as thole v/ho had the good for- tune to be lingled out for divine love P that God had, from mere fovereign pieafure, made them ibis people , that he had given them the only and the certain conditions cA his favour, and that he had excluded the reil of mankind from any Ihiare in his affeclions. And as thefe were the unwor- thy ideas they had of God and cf his condud ; fo they were very eafily led to conclude from them,, that the afflicting znd grieving, and even killing thofe whom they prelumed God had prepared for dif- trudion, would be a facriiice acceptable and well- pieafing to him. The time ccmeth,, that 'whofoever killeth ycu, will think that he cloth God fervice. And. thefe things will they do unto yciiy hecaufe they have. net known the Father, nor me. I will only add, that to know, or have a jufl. idea of God, with regard to his moral character, is the moft ncble and the moil ufefid knowledge^ which the mind of man can be furniflied with.. To know God in his natural capacity, that is, to know him, with regard to his metaphyfical nature or efience, his perionality, his natural properties, fuch as necefiary exiilence, immenfity, and the hke^ fuch knowledge may make w^ ^ccd philcfophersy and that is the m.oft it can polF&ly do. But to know God in his m.oral capacity, this may make us gccd men, as it is capable of having a power- ful influence upon our minds and lives, by dif- pofing us to model them after the divine pattern, and to render ourfelves the fuitahle and proper objedls of his approbation and affedfion. / am. Sir, Tour Obliged Htmibk Serva7it^ &c.- TRACT TRACT XXL A SUPPLEMENT T O T H E Vindication of God's Moral CharaSier^ Wherein three Objec^lions are examw ned J two urged againft the Wif- dom and Goodnefs of God, and the other againft human Liberty, IT being thought by fome, that, in my Viti* dication of God's Moral Charader, I have not ^Q fully vindicated the divine conduct^ as might have been expeded from a performance of that kind ; I think it pH)per to offer v/hat foU lows, by way of anfwer to wha: has been urged on this head. And, to make way for a difficulty in the prefent cafe, the following principles are laid down, viz, firjly that God perfectly fore^ knows in what inftances, and to what degree, e^ very man will be virtuous or vicioys, before hia formation or conception. Secondly^ that there j^r<3 fome perfons, who, in faft, prove to be exceed^ ingly vicious, by their being guilty of a grca? deal of moral evil, with refped to themfelves, and thereby introduce a great deal of natural evil, or unhappinefs, upon others, And, thirdly^ that »s there are fome actions n^ceflary to hUman for- mation or conception -j fo there are a multitude ©1 thofe acttiOR which take phce, ^nd yet no coii^ F 7, ccpdop 65 A Suppkment to the VittdlccMiojt^ Sct^ ception follows. Thefe things being premifed^ from hence it is argued, that either God does immediately mterpofe^ and by his particular provi- dence render all thofe anions luccefsml upon which human conception depends, in all thofe in- ilances wherein conception does follow or accom- pany fuch adions -, or elfe he does not interpofe^ but leaves that affair to be conducted by thofe laws by which the natural world is governed. If the frji is the cafe, then it would be an inftancc of wijdom and goodnefs for God not to interpofe in all thofe cafes upon which the lives of all vicious perfons depend, and thereby to prevent the ex-r iftence of iijch perfons •, whereas, hj his inter- pofing, he does manifeftly occafion a multitude of evil. But, if the latter be the ca^e, then it would be an in fiance of 'ivifdom and goodnefs for God to interpofe^ and by his particular pro- vidence render the conception of all vicious per- fons abortive •, vv^hereas^ his forbearing to do this is a manifefl inftance of the contrary. With refpect to the ff'ft branch of the objecli* on, it is fufficient to anfv/er, that God does not interpofe, as aforefaid, to render thofe a^Vlons fuccefsfgl upon which human conception depends;: conception being as much ^t produce of^ and un- der the diredion of the la-zvs of nature^ as any other branch of this fyilem of things j and thofe laws arc as exadly complied with and followed in ^\l rhofe inflanccs in which conception does, as in thofe inflanccs in which it does not follow or ac - company fuch adions. "Vv ith refpcd to the latter part of the objedion^ the anfwer is, that if it would be an inilance of wtfdom and goodnefs for God thus immediately to interpofe^ and thereby to prevent evil, by pre- venting the cxiflencc of all vicious perfons^ then it Y/»uld be fi like inilance ©f wifdom and goodnefs A Suppkment to thi Vindication^ &c. ^9 for him immediately to interpofe and prevent e- vtvy f/Jtpwreck every injurious Jire, yea, every evi/ of every kind. The confequence of whicii would be the con^2inct fufpauiing of thofe laws by which the natural world is governed. So that the ob- jedion, in its laft refuit, amounts to this, namely^ that it would have been an inftance of wifdom and goodnefs for God noX to have given being to this world. But this objedbion cannot be of weight, except it can be made appear that there has heen tnore unhappinefs than happinefs introdu- ced by it. If it fhould be further urged, that tho' things cannot be otherwife than they are in this refpedl, in the prefent ilate of things ; yet God might, if he had pleafed, have prevented the exiftence of all vicious perfons, by giving fuch laws to the iiatural world, as would have introduced none but perfons of virtue and honour : I /infzver^ that vice is not occafioned by any def£B in the law of nature •, but, on the contrary, it arifes from that liberty and freedom of adtion which takes place in every moral agent. The * hum.an compolition i$ excellently conftituted to ferve the purpofes of virtue and true goodnefs ; and, upon the whole, tends to render man an agreeable and a tifeful crea- ture. But then, as man is a moral agent, he vay^^ be at liberty to direct or reftrain his inclinations and endeavours, either to ferve the purpofes of virtue, or the contrary j fo that when vice takes place, this is fo far from being the produce of the laws of nature, that, on the contrary, it is the perverfion and ahu[e of thofe laws \ and fuch abufe is the fubjed of every man's free choice. So that to fay, God might have given fuch laws as would have prevented this evil, is the fame as to lay that he might have prevented our agencies, * Sefifft^ Vindication o^ God's Moral CKarafler. £ ^ Bcfides. j^o ^1 Supplement to the Vindication^ titt^ Bcfides, this objedlion is founded upon a fuppofi- tion, that God fonknows in what inilances, and to v/hat degree, every man will be either virtuous or vicious, before his formation or conception. But this is only prefumed^ and not proved ; and therefore as the Jirength of the objedion chiefly depends upon the truth of this fuppofition, fo, till this point is proved^ the objedion cannot be of any weight. Again, Secondly^ It is urged, that whereas all the moraU and a great part of the natural evil which is in the world, is occafioned by that liberty and free- dom of adion which takes place in man ; and, whereas God foreknew that man would abufe that liberty, and that he will be jeverely puntjhed in an- other world for that abufe -, therefore liberty, upon the whole, is a curje and not a blefling \ it being better for man not to have this pewer^ than to have it, and be liahlt to abufe it ; and, confe- quently, as the with-hclding this gift from man would have been an inftance of wifdom and good- nefs, fo the making man a free creature is a ma- nifeft inftance of the contrary. I mjjwer according to the laif or final judgment of his underftanding, that is, he will and muft always do what he judges beft at the time, it being im- pofiible for him to do otherwife. This, I think, I have fully * anfwered in the traci: referred to j wherein I have fhewn, that mo- tive is not a pozver or a^ive caufe^ but barely a pajfive reafon of the a6tion -, and in which I have ^ Vindication of God's Mcral Ckarader. ASuppkment to the Vindication, ^c, 7^ likewife fhewn, that a man is not under a 7jece£ity of doing what he judges beft at the time, whe- ther the term beji be ufed tqfi^nify what is judged beft upon the whole, or what is judged will give him the great eft prefent pleafiire. The cafe is the fame^ whether the term heft be ufed to fignify what is beft for a man^sfelf^ or what is beft for the publicky or the like. In which cafes, it is moft evident, that no man is under a necejfity of doing what he judges beft at the time, taking the term heft \n any one refped whatever. The fame per- fon at one time, chufes to gratify a natural incli- nation, without entering into the queftion^ whe- ther that gratification, upon the whole, be beft, or not ; at another time he refolutely follows his inclination, tho' under a convidion that the gra- tification, iTpon the whole, is wrongs and, at another time, he chufes to deny himfelf that pre- fent pleafure, becaufe he is convinced that, upon the whole, it is evil. And therefore to fay that this perfon did, in all thefe inftances, do what he judged beft at the time, is to fix to the term heft different and contrary ideas^ and to introduce the utmoft confufion. If it ftiould be farther urged, that tho' a man does not always do what he judges beft at the time, fuppofing the term heft be ufed in the fame refped •, yet he does always do what he judges' belt, ufing that term in one refped or other : I iinfwer, admitting this to be true, yet it is not to the purpofe ; the being beft at the time, that is, the giving the greateft prefent pleafure, and the being beft upon the whole, thefe are different and tontrary ideas^ when they come in competition; that is, when one is an excitement to ad:, and the other is an excitement to the contrary \ which is frequently the cafe. So, again, the' being beft for a maa's felf, and the being Ixft for the pub- iick. 7^ A Supplemeftt to the Vindication, tec* lick, are different and contrary ideas, when they come in competition, as aforefaid. And there- fore, as there is not any thing in the human com- pofition which necejfarily determines a man to prefer a prefent good to what is bed upon the whole ; to what will give him the greateft prefent plea- fure ; nor to prefer his own intereft to that of the publick, nor the publick interell to his own ; fo from hence it will follow, that aotion^ in either cafe, is the produce, not of neceffity^ but of liber* ty. If he prefers a prefent pleafure to what is beft upon the whole, or if he chufes otherwife, when thefe come in competition, he is voluntary herein ; he might, if he had pleafed, have chofe the con- trary. Again, if a man prefers his own intereft to that of the publick or prefers the pubUck to his own, in either cafe, it is a manifeft inftanceof //- Im'ty ; feeing there is not any thing in nature which Dcceflarily determines him to be either ^^w^r^i^j or (ilfifi. So that the giving fuch a latitude to the term kfi does not affedb-the cafe at all. If it Ihould be farther urged, that when a man prefers a prefent good to that which is beft for him, upon the whole; he then judges that beft which is the fubjed of his prefent choice, or elfe he would not chufe it : I anfwer^ this is a miftake \ for if a man chufes a prefent pleafure, in oppofition to that which is beft, upon the whole, when he makes the comparifon between tliem ^ then it is impofTible for him to chufe the former, under the confideration of its being hft^ becaufe it is impof- fible for a man to judge it beft in the prefent cafe, it is not poiTible, in the nature of the thing, for a, man to judge, that a prefent momentary pkaf an is really better than z. future good^ that is vaftly p-eater in itfelt, and a thoufand time more durable. The Litter of thefe will unavoidably a]>pear beft iQ every moral ^gent ; it being above the power of every A Supplement to the Vindication, &c. / / every fuCh agent to over-rule his judgment, and thereby to make himfelf othcrwile : 1 fay, this will unavoidably be the cafe, if he takes a vie'-jj of thefe, and makes a comparifon betwixt them ; but if he makes no fuch comparifon, then there is no place for the term hefi in the prefent queftion 5 then the prefent pleafures becomes a motive to ad:ion, not under the confideration of its being beil, but under the confideration of its being a prefent pleafure. And tho' a man cannot command his judgment, and make himfelf think that that pleafure is really preferrahk to a vaftly greater and more durable future good ; yet he can command his actions ; and herein confifls his liberty^ he can give or deny himfelf that pleafure, as he pleafes. If it fliould be farther urged, that in this cafe a man does what he judges bed at the time, not as befl, v/hen compared with a greater good j but, in oppofition to felf-denial, he judges it bet- ter at that time to gratify his inclination than to deny it : I anfiver ; that men do fometimes prefer a prefent pleafure to felf-denial is allowed; but that a lenfe of prefent pleafure compels them to chufe it, this is denied upon good grounds, viz. becaufe every acl or felf-denial is an infiayice of, and thereby a:i evidoU proof of the contrary. If it fhould be urged, that, when a man denies himfeif, as aforcfaid, he then judges felf- denial beil •, not beil:, conHdered as fdf-denial, but as it leads to a greater future good : I anfiver^ that to ufc the term hefi m fo lorfe and cofifufed a way, as above, fometimes m^aking it to fignify what is beft in one refped ; ami when that will not anfwer the purpofc, then to make it fignify v,/hat is bell in another refped •, and when that v/ili not do, then to tack about to the former fcnfe of the term hej}^ and fo on : I fay, thus to ring the changes upon the term bcfl is 10 play with v/grds, and looks more lilce banter than argimcnt, TRACT TRACT XXII. A DISCOURSE Concerning PERSECUTION, WHEREIN The Grounds upon which Chriftians afflid and grieve, and bereave each other of Life, for their different Opinions in Matters of Religion, are examined. THAT mankind have various and different opinions, with regard to a variety of fubjeds, is abundantly evi-* dent from experience ; but that fuch difference in fentiments becomes the ground and foundation for refentnient is, I think, pecuHar to the fubje6t of religion. If men differ ever fo much in their judgments, with regard to this or that or the other fcience, no perfecution follows \, but if chriflians have happened to differ from each other in their religious principles, their ^^y^ /ions have been alarm'd, their refentment has been rais'd, and they have been too often led to hurt and injurCy and ibmetimes to dcjiroy one another, And> Tho' A Bifcourfe concerning Ferfecution, jq Tho' the fulFering party, in their remonftran- ftrances with their afflidtors, have urged the un- chrifiianlinefs and the unmanlinefs of fuch a proce- dure, and the unreafonahlencfs of that burdea which their fellow-chriftians have laid upon them j yet this has proved infufficient to obtain them relief. Yea, that which is moft furprizing is^ that thofe very fufferers, when they have gotten the reins of government into their own hands, have turned ferfecutors^ and have rejeded thofe arguments againfl perfecution, which themfelves had urged in their fuffering flate. This having fometimes been the cafe, I thought it might nor be amifs to enter into the queftion, by examining the grounds upon which chriflians afflid: and grieve one another, for their different apprehenfions in matters of rehgion. In order to which I obferve, that chifiian truths^ ox principles, confider'd as fuch, are thofe, and only thofe, which arife from, and are founded upon the chrijlian revelation, Thofe propofitions, whofe evidence arifes from the nature of things^ cannot flrictly and properly be call'd chriftian» tho' owned by chriftians, and tho* contained in the chriilian revelation ; becaufe their truth and certainty, and the evidence by vv'hich they are pro- ved to be fo, are the fame, whether chriflianity and the chriltian revelation have any beincr, or not. So that chrillian truths or principles, con- fider'd as iiich, are thofe only whofe credchility atifes from, and is founded on the chrijlian revela- iion ; that is to fay, is founded on the Bible : and confequentiy it is the BiMe only which is the ruli^ of truth, in th^ prefent cafe. Again, I obfer- e farther, that as the Bibk is the rule of truth, with regard to the point in hand ; fo this qualification, viz, its being confident with the na- ture 3Lnd tli^ truth of things is abfyiutely necefTary CO So J T^ifootirfe toncerning f^erfecutioH, to render it capable of being fjch a rule. For if there are any propofitions in the Bible^ which when rightly underftood are plainly repugnant to the nature or truth of things, ^11 fuch propofiti- ons muft be allow'd to be fatfe. And if the Bible lays down a falfe propofition in one inllance, and with relation to one point, then it may do the fame in any other inftance, and with relation to any other point. I fay, this may be the cafe, for any thing we know to the contrary ; feeing it has not given us T^ny infallible rule^ by which we can judge, whether the propofition referred to be true, or falfe. And con&quently, if this were the cafe, then there could not any thing be fairly concluded from the Bible ; and therefore it would juftly be excluded from being the rule of truth in any point whatever. If it fhould be fald, that we have the ufe and cxercife of our undei-Jlandtngs^ by which we difcern and judge, vvhether the propofition laid down be true, or not 5 then I fay, that in every fuch in- llance it is not the Bihle^ but the evidence arifing from the nature of things^ which is the rule of truth to us. So that if the Btble be admitted as the rule of truth, then the forem.ention'd qualifi- cation muft be admitted as an ejfcntial property oi this rule ^ and confequcntly, every propofition in the Bible^ which in its literal fenfe is repugnant to the nature or to the triith of things, fuch propofi- tion muft not be underftood literally, but figura- tively. As thus, Jtf/'y^ vii. 3S. He that bell eveth en me — ■ out of bis belly fh all floiv rivers of living water. Now I fay, if the Bible be admitted as the rule of truth, then this propofition muft be wndi^r'dooi^ figuratively \ becaufc the terms of which it is compofed, if underftood literally, that is, if we apply to them thof: ideas v/hich common uf:igc has fix'd, then the pc-opofirion i^ plainly re- pugnant 4 Difcourfe ccmcerning Per/ecu tton. g i pugnant to the nature and the truth of things. And, The' the propofitions contained in iht Bible arc partly literal and partly figurative, yet there are not every-where land-marks fet up to point out to us, which is the one, and which is the other. Neither has it given us any certain rule of judging what is intended by thofe figures ; neither is there conllituted an infallible living judge to determine in cafes of this nature. So that this is left to be dif- cover'd by the human under/landing ; man muft ex- ercife his reafoning capacity, by a careful refledi* on, upon the nature of things in general, and in particular upon the fubjed to which the propo- pofition relates. And from thence he muft de- duce^ whether the propofition is to be underftood literally or figuratively ; and if figuratively, then what is intended to be fet forth by thofe figures. And this, of courfe, lays a foundation for mif takesy feeing men are liable to underftand thofe propofitions differently, and to make different ap- plications of thofe figures ; and confequcntly, tho* the Bible be admitted as the rule of truth, yet it cannot, in the nature of the thing, be an abfolutt fecurity againft error. Thus, with relation to the foremention'd propofition. He that believeth on me (faith Chrift) ou^ of his belly fhall flozv rivers of H^ ving water. I have already obfervcd, that tho terms of this propofition muft be underftood ^^ guratively, becaufe if we underftand them literally, then the propofition is plainly repugnant to the nature and the truth of things. So that the quef- tion here will be, what is injtended to be fet torth by thofe figures. Now, tho* feme men^s opinion ot them is as follows ; He that believeth on me, thac is, he who has an aftecling fenfe of thofe impor* rant truths which I have pubUflied to the world, rtit of his belly Jhallfio^ rivers of Uvr^g i^ater -, ;hat Vci,. II. G i3^ Y^^^^DfjcQU^^ncerning Ferfecutioiu - i§, this will be in him a principle of adlipn which will bring forth plentifully the friiic of good works ,t 1 fay, tho' this is fome men's fenfe of the abovemeHtion'd propofision, and tho' they think this is all which can be deduced from a careful reflexion upon the nature of things in ge- neral^ and upon the fubjcdb to which the propofi- tion relates •, yet they may miftake, becaufe there jnay pofTibly fomething eife be intended to be fet forth by thofe figures. I ihall not here enter into the queflion^ what is intended by thofe words, Ms that helieveth on me^ Gut of his belly Jhallflow rivers of living water ^ but what I obferve is, that as there is no infalliahk rule of interpretation laid down in die Bible ; and as there is, not a man^ or body of mmy conftituted to be an infallible judge of the ienfe of fcripture \ fo^ of courfe, it muft be the work of the human .underjianding to do it. And this, opens a wide door to error. And as no man, or body of men, is eonflituted an infallible judge of th« fenfe of the Bihle^ to or fof any other man, fo, in the nature of the tiling,, one ma,n is not artfwerahk to another man, or body of men, for his fenle of fcripture in this or in any ochey point V feeing no man can be obliged to fubmit his judgment to another in any caie^ where that other has no authority over him. But nom.an, or body ©f men, can have an authority over the judgments ©f other men, except he, or they, be ccniltituted an infallible judge ^ to give an abjohte and certain determination in the cafe refer r'd toj which no man, or body of men, can^rc?^'^ themfelvestp.be. And, therefore, if another man fhould give a * different fenfe, of the aforefaid text, to what I may put upon it, it would.be immayily and m^^/ for me to difrcfpedl him, and treat him ill upon that account-, and it would be alike, cruel and inhu- man in him, or in any other man,^ or body of ' ^ - ; men. A'Difcourfe concerning Perfecutlon, S3 men, to difrefpe^ or treat me /// for the like reafon. And, Tho* the church' o^ Rome pretends to ht infalli- hky and under the Ihelter of that pretence fets up her fenfe of the fcripture, as the ftandard for all men to govern their judgments by, and requires them to receive her fenfe as the true fenfe yytx.y alas ! fhe is not able to produce the fliadow of a proof for what fhe thus aiTumes •, and therefore fhe mufl fland condemned^ in thejudgmentof God, and of every judicious man. Tho* ■ it mufl be granted, that fhe is much more e^cufable than that man^ or body of jnen^ who make no pretence to infallibility in the prefent cafe, and yet fet up their fenfe of the Bible as the flandard for other men's judgments to be framed by, and c^ffli^ and grieve them, if they refufe fubjediion to it ; which procedure, furely, is moft exceeding men- frous and vile: And, as men are liable to err, in the prefent cafe, fo if one man^ or body of men, fets up his or their opinion of things, as theftarai- ard for other men's judgments to be formed by, this is making not the Bible^ but his or their opi- nion of things the rule of truth ; feeing fuch a man, or body of men, is not conflituted an in- fallible judge ^ and fo is not qualify'd to give anab- folute and certain determination in the cafe before us. This is what the church o'i'Rome are well aware of; and therefore they not only infill upon the ablblure nccefilty of an infallible judge to de- termine in matters of faith, and to guard and fc- cure men from error, but they likewife infill, that that infallible judge is zvith them. And, as the Papifts infill upon the ablblute necclTity of an in- fallible living judge to determine in matters of faith, and thereby to guard and fccure men from error •, fo they ^r^^v;?^ that necelTity upon this pro- poiition, \'iz. That ■ all nrors, :n mattrri of faith.^ S4 A Difconrfe concerning Perfecufm, are damnable. This is the foundation or ground* work upon which that prodigious fabrick> viz, foprjy refts. Make void this foundation and thcjlrength of popery, in point of argument is loft and gone. And as popery^ io ■perfecution is found- ed upon the fame principle \ for tho' every perfe- cutor docs not infift, that all errors^ in point of faith,, are damnable, yee generally they infift, that thefe errers are Jo y which they perfeeute for ^ which comes to the fame thing, becaufe it is the damnahiencfs of error v/hich is the ground of per- fecution in either cafe. So that if the foremen- tion'd propofition, viz. that errors, in point of faith, are damnable, can be fhewed to be errone^ OTiSy tl\en pGpery and perfemtion-^. in point of argu- ment, mud fall together. But building upon the foreraention'd foundation is like building upon the fand, which when, jufl reafbning and lolid ar- gument is brought againft it,, then the foundation is wafhed away, and the flately flrud:ure, which refts upon it, falls to. the ground. P'or, as the Bibky when admitted as tlie rule of truths is not an ahfolute fecurity againft error, as I have Ihewn above j fo all errors, of what kind foever,. which fpring from it, cannot, in tliu^ nature of the thing, lay ?^jujlfoimdation for divine difpleafure, becaufe they are the product of a nuftaken judgment only, and not of a vicious mind. If the cafe were jother- wife, and mens miftakes were their crimes (tho* this, indeed, is an impoiTible fuppofition, becaufe error cannot poffibly have the nature of a crime in it) or if God would confider it as criminal (tho* this, again, is making another impofFiMe ibppo- fition, becaufe it is morally impoiTible for God to. be guilty oi {o much weaknefs and injuftice) I fay, if the cxjfe were fo, then there would be that ahfo- lute necejjlty of an infallible living judge,- as the church, of i^^w^ con Leads for,, to guard and fecure if Difcmrfe concerning P^rfecutw?. 8^ men froiu error, becaufe without fuch a judge men would be perpetually running the utmofl ha- zard*. Tho' t4iis, indeed, would not prove the Bifhop of Rome to be that judge^ or that infallibi- lity is any where lodged in the church of Rome, Seeing then that error is the efFed of judg- ment, and not of choice, and therefore cannot polTibly have in it the nature of a crime ; confe- quently, err or ^ let it relate to what point foever, cannot pofTibly render men the fuitahle and pro- per ohyofs of divine difpleafure. And as error is not criminal in itfeif, fo much lefs will God con* fider and treat men as criminals upon the account of it i feeing God is a righteous '}udge^ and therefore he will not efleem or treat any man as a criminal, except he be really fo. And as this is the truth of the cafe, fo it is fuch an anfwer to the Fapifis and perfecutorSy as they cannot poffibly get over ; becaufe it is made up of felf-evident propofttions ; and confcquently the above proportion {viz. that all, or that any errors in matters of faith are damnable, and which is the ground-work of por pery ar^d perfecution) is to be denied ahfolutely^ it being plainly repugnant to the nature of things, and therefore is abfclutely falfe. To diftinguilli here betwixt points fundamental and not funda* mental^ or in other words, points of greater or lefs importance to mankind •, and to infift, that V)ant of faith., with regard to the former, will be judged criminal by Almighty God •, this is to cafl a moft Ihameful imputation upon the God of truth and goodnefs -, feeing that the only proper ground of aflent or diflent, in any cafe, is not the greater. or lefs importance of the fubjed: to which the propofition relates, but only the flrength or weak- fiefs of that evidence upon v/hich the truth or fullenefs of the propofition depends. And fincc error docs not change its nature by the greater or G 3 kh S6 J DifcGurfe concerning Perfecution,: lefs importance of the fubjed, but continues the fame in every fubjed, of what importance foever it be-i confequently,, dificnt mufl be equally cri- minaU or innocent^ whether the fubject be of great, or of no importance to us at al], If it fliould be urged, that error, in points of faith, does not become criminal by any natural, inknefs in error itfelf, but only in the prefent cafe it becomes fo, as it cafls contempt upon Almighty God, by being a diffent to a proportion which he has revealed : 1 anfwer^ that no man ever yet refufed aflent to a proposition founded upon a di- vine teflimony, when known to be fuch. And if filTent is at any timiC. with-held from fuch a pro- pofition, either for want of convi^lion that is founded upon a divine teflimony, or that the fenfe of the propofition to which ajflfent is de- manded is the true fenfe \ in either of thefe cafes, it is fo far from calling contempt upon Almighty God, that, on the contrary, it is no more than with-holding aflent in a cafe, in which, in the na- ture of the thing, it ought not to be given. In fuch a cafe God's veracity is not in the leall im- peach'd, and confequently no injury is offered to his moral chara6ler ; becaufe the prefent queflion is not, whether the teflimony of God be a proper ^r^/W of credit, and fo whether all propofitions whofe credibility refls upon it be the proper ohje^s ofalTent, that being granted on all fides ; but whether afTent ought to be given in a cafe, where there, does not appear fufficient evidence to deter- mine the judgment on that fide of the queflion. to v/hich afTent is demanded, neither are thofe,^ who demand that afTent, able to produce the ihadaw of a proofs that they are infallible, and fo are qualified to give an abfolute and certain determination in the cafe referred to. I fay, the queflion is, whether, in Juch a cafcy afTent ought ^e ' to .!if Bifcourfe concerning Perfecution, %y to be given ; and I think it is evident, from the nature of the thing, that it ought not ; and if fo, then, furely, it is a manifeft contempt y and an injury ofFer'd to God*s moral charad:er, to reprelent him as requiring aflent, and punilhing men for with- holding it, in a cafe, where, in the nature of the thing, it ought not to be given. If it fhould be faid, that faith has the promife of fahation annex*d to it in the gofpel, and thajt infidelity is declared damnable. To this I ^nfwer^ that faith, or the want of it, is not to be under- ftood in a philofophical^ but in a moral fenfe \ that is, men will not be faved or damned for their giving or with-boLUng their afient to this propo- rtion, viz, that the gofpel of Chrifl is a divine revelation ; but they will be faved or damned, as the end and purpofe of that gofpel is or is not anfwered upon them. It is the fame as if our Lord had laid, tho' men, by their fm and wick- ednefs, have expofed themfelves to the juft dif- pleafure o^ Almighty God, yet he now, by inj miniftryy makes this kind and gracious offer to them, viz. that if they will repent, and bring forth fruits meet for repentance, then he will par- don their fms, and receive them to favour; but, on the other fide, if they will, notwithflanding this kind offer, ; ftili go on in their wickednefs, then God will execute his highell difpleafure up- on them. He that believeth, that is, he who ac- cepts of this gracious offer, anfwers the end and purpofe of it, by turning from the evil of his ways, and by bringing forth the- fruits of newnefs of life, he /hall be faved ; but he that believe4h Jiot^ that is, he who unworthily reiedls this kind offer, by an obftinate continuance in his foliy,^ he fhall be damned. This, I fay, is the fenfe of the aforefaid declaration, as is abundantly- evi- dent^ not only from the nature of the fubjed, G 4. but tt A Difcourfe concerning Perfecuiidn, but dfo from the tenour of the New Tejia* 9ftent. If I was in a houfe with a company of men^ and was abfolutely certain that the houfc would fall to the ground in an hour's time^ and confcquently that every foul prefent would in* ezHtahly fertJJ}:, ej^cept they fled but of itj before that fall •, and if I gave them timely warning of their danger ; in this cafe, it would not be their faith or their infidelity^ with regard to this warn- ingj but their going out, or their continuing in this houfe^ which would be the caufe of their fafety or deftru^ion. So in like manner, man, by his Hn and wickednefs, has expofed himfelf to God's difpleafure> and Chrift is fent to apprize him of his danger, and to fhew him the only and the certain way of cfcaping from it, viz. by re- pentance, and reformation of his evil ways: Now if he fo far hearkens to this meffage as to repent and amend, he will be faved, whether he is fatisfied of the divinity of this meffage, or not ; but) if he goes on in his wickednefs, he will be damned, though he helkves its divinity ever fo 4lrongly. So, that in this cafe, it is not mens in- fidility^ flridly fpeaking, but their ohjlinate con* iinuance in their fins^ which is the ground and caufe of their damnation, Befides, if the forementioned terms were to be underftood in a philofophicaj fenfe, then the propofition, to which they relate, would be plainly repugnant to th^m^re of things ; becaufe it is morally impoflible for God to be pkafed or difpkafed with any agent, for barely giving or with-holding his aflent to this or any other propofition i this aflent being the cffcd of jiidgmentj, and not of choice (as I obferved above) m^n being fo far paffiv€ in the prefent cafe, as that, if he attends to the fubjed, he cannot think W>^ 4M%€ otherwife of it thap he does. An,d, . A5: ^ADifcvttrfi concerning Perfetuiion. $0 As error cannot, in the nature of the thing, lay a juft foundation for divine refcntment, fa much lefs ought it to be the occafion oi difpkafure to men^ with regard to one another ; feeing it is what all men are involved in, or at leaft they cannot be certain of the contrary. For tho' no man thinks himfelf in an error in any point, yet if he has a grain of modeily in him, he will ad- mit that this may poflibly be his cafe in one in- fiance or other^ tho' he i^ts it not. And there- fore for men to be angry with, and to grieve and cifflUl one another for their different opinions^ in any cafe whatever, is moft unreafonable and cruel, and is plainly repugnant to that common golden rule, of doing to nil others as we would they Jhould do unto us. If error did draw forth divine difplea- furCy and men would be plunged into endlefs mi- fery in another world for its fake, then, indeed, there would be fome Jhew of reafon for perfecu- tion, and for taking away mens lives upon the account of it j as the lefs evil of a few is prefer- able to the much greater evil of many others. For tho' punifhment is not a proper means of comiUion^ yet it may be urged, that, in this cafe, it is neceffary to guard and fecure the common good. The robber is executed, not to work a convidioit in him that robbery is an error or a crime, but bccaufe by robbery he is become injurious to the prefent common happinels. So, in like manner, if error were damnable^ then he that propagates it, mull be allowed to be (tho' not intentionally^ yet eventually) a common enemy to the future hap^ pinefs of mankind. And tho* taking away fuch a man's life would be to him a great injury, yet it may be urged, that it would be necelTary for the common fafety ; juft as when a fire breaks forth, the pulling down one man's houfe is ne^ |:eflary to iav« the burning of the tpw/i. But then 90 A Bifcourfe concerning Perfecutiom then it muft be remembered, that if this be the cafe, there would be, as I obferved above, an ifcourfe concerning Perfecution . 9 3 obilinacy and perverfenefs upon another man, as the ground and caufe of error in him \ in fuch a cafe, he takes upon him to determine a point, which he cannot pofTibly be a judge of. The cafe is the fame, if we confider vicious inclinations as the ground and caufe of error -, for tho' this may poffibly be the cafe, in fome inftances, yet ic is what no man^ or body of men ^ can be a judge of, to or for any other man i and therefore no man, or body of men, can have a right to judge of the ground and caufe of error, except he, or they, be conftituted an infalliUe judge^ to give an abfohite and certain determination of the cafe -, which no man, or body of men, can prove themfelves to be. Again, fecondly^ error, in the cafes here re- ferred to, cannot be ^jujl ground for perfecution, becaufe tho' it might be a misfortune to the erro- neous perfon himfelf, yet it is no way injurious to the prefent or future hafpinefs of mankind. If a man fhould be in an error, and if his error fhould fpring either from his ohftinacy or his vicious inclinations^ tfie cafe would be juit the fame to the reft of mankind, as if it had fprung from the moft careful enquiry pofiible ; fo that their happi- nefs and well-being, as to this world and the next, would not be affe6bed by it. And therefore to afii^ and puniflj a man for erring, as aforefaid, would be to do whiit we have no authority for, and therefore would be urfuftifiable , The cafe is the fame, v/hether error relates to this or thztpoiufr of fiiith, or to the rule of faith itfelf ; that is, as chriftians cannot be juftifed in treating one ano- ther ill, for their different opinions, with refped: to the cbriftian religion ; fo neither can chrifiiam or infidels be juftified in perfecuting one another, for their different apprehenfions, with regard to tjie divinity of the chriftian revelation. For as chriitUas csn^^or,^ in die nature of the thing, hav^ '^ UTht tr4- '^ Difcourfe concerning Perfecution. a right of dominion over unbelievers, fo as to <^- mand their afient to this propofition, -viz. that the gofpel of Chrift is a ^ix^i^^ revelation \ nor to ^«;;///j them for with-bolding their aflent, when the evidence propofed is not fufficient to work their convidion •, fo, on the other fide, the unbeUevers cannot, in tlie nature of the thing, have a right of dominion ovGT believers, fo as to prohibit their af- fent, when the evidence produced, for the divinity of the chriilian revelation, is fufficient for their convi(5lion. So that perfecution is equally un- reafonahle^ and cruel^ and therefore is unjuftijiabls on either fide. If it ihould be farther urged, that tho' error is not criminal in itfelf, yet it may be attended with fuch confcqiuncei as are injurious to mankind, that i's, mens errors may lead them into fuch praSfices as are hurtful to their neighbours, and therefore fuch errors ought to be retrained. I anfwer^ that as the end oT government is to guard and fecure the common good, fo it muil be the bufinefs and 4uty of governours to prevent and hinder men from injuring one another, by making fuch laws as are proper to fecure mens perfons^ proper ties y and reputation^ and to execute thofe laws by pu- 7iiJJji7ig tranfgrcjj'ors. But then it will by no means follow, that men are to be punillied, antecedent to rheir faults, and upon a prefimption that one time or other they will be guilty of them •, v/hich is the prcfent cafe. When men perform fuch ani- ons as are injurious to tlie commonwealth^ it is the bufinefs of governours to corre^ and reftrain them, whether thofe adions are the efied of error^ or whether they fpring from any other caufe. But then the ground and r eaf on oViwoh corredion is evidently this, viz. the hurtfulnefs of the anions ihemj elves y and not the*n^^^ or xkiO: wrong judg- ment of the performer, which jnay jpe the ground or AlDifcourfe concerning Perfecution, ^t^ or rcafbn of them. A man's wrong judgment, in any point, cannot .hur^ or injure his neigh- bours, till it be reduced to practice ; and, there- fore, till it be reduced to pradice, it cannot, in the nature of the thing, be the proper object of refentment j and confequently it cannot render the man the proper object of corredion. Suppofe a man fhould be of opinion that there is no fuch thing as property^ and confequently that he has as good 2. title to pofTefs and enjoy what his neighbour is legally pofieffed of as the pofTeflbr. This opi- nion is as dayigerous^ with regard to its confe- quences, as any ; and yet, whilft it continues barely an opinion^ or an a6t of the man's judgment only, it is not injurious or hurtful to any ; and therefore to punijh a man, for being of fuch an opinion, would be to punifli in a cafe, where there is no fault or i7ijury done, and confequently to punifh where there is no jtijl ground for it. But if a man of this principle fhouid take the liberty to break in upon his neighbour's property^ and ihould erroneoufly think .himfelf innocent in lb do- ing, he would be the objed: of puhlick refentment and corretlion^ becaufe he breaks in upon the pub- lick tranquillity^ which it is the bufnejs of govern* iiient to guard and fccure. And in this cafe it is not a man's error, but his injurious anions ^ which render him worthy of punifnment, fuch aiflions being always to be prevented cind guarded againfr, let them fpring irom what jnotive or principle fo- ever. And therefore, as on the one fide a man ought not to be punifhed for his opinion, tho* er- roneous, becaufe his errors in judgment are not injurious nor hurtful to any \ lb, on the other •fide, if his error ihould lead him to aUions which are hurtful to his neighbours, he ought to come iindcr a. puhlick refiraini ; not becaufe he errs, but becaufe he performs fuch aclionj as arc hurtful to Others, gS A Bifcourfe concerning Peyfeeuthn. others, and are equally as hurtful^ when they fpring from error^ as when they fpring from any other caufe. And, As error ought to fcreenz man from corrc6lion, when he performs fuch adlions as are hurtful to his neighbours •, fo when error relates to the per^ fonal character or property of others, and the pub- lication of it is, in itfelf^ inyirious^ then fuch pub- Fication ought to be rejlrained. Suppofe one man fiiould crroneoujly think another man to be a thief^ or a knave^ or that the prefent government is ilk' gal^ and that it ought to be taken out of the hands in which it is lodged, and to be put into the hands of others \ in either of thefe cafes, the publication of error is hurtfuU as it is a breaking in upon the perfonal chara^er and property of others, which it is the bufinefs of government to guard and fe- cure. And tho', in the latter cafe, the govern* rnent is not unhinged by fuch publications, yet every fuch aftion is ^fiep towards it^ and therefore it ought to be rejlrained \ it being as fit that go- vernours ihould guard and fecure their own rights and pojjcjp.cns^ as the rights and pofleffions of thofc they are governours to. But, tho* the publica^ tion of error is to be reilrained, when fuch publi- cation relates to the perfonal character or property of others, and is itfelf injurious and hurtful •, yet it will, by no means, follow, that it is the bufi- nefs and duty of governours to reftrain the pub- lication of all errors whatever. On the contrary, it is the bufmefs and duty of governours to guard and defend men from injury in the publication of their errors, except the publication itfelf be //?j«- rious and hurtful^ as aforefaid -, for as man is a dependent creature^ defigned for fociety ; and as the bufinefs of fociety is principally carried on by ^ mens conveying their ideas one to another j fo it is the bufinefs and duty of governours to guard and prcte^ A Difcourfe concerning PerfecHlicn. ^j prote^ men in fo doing, whilfl that conveyance is, not injurious nor hurtful to the reft of mankind. Every erroneous perfon thinks he judges rightly ^ and that they are in the wrong who are contrary- minded to him ; and as he is naturally difpofed to publifh his opinions, and thereby to bring o- thers to the knowledge of what be apprehends to be truth ; fo herein he ought, in reafon, to be guarded and proteded from harm^ when the pub- lication of his opinions is no way i?iiurious to tho perfonal chara6ler or property of any. Again, If it fhould be further urged, that tho' true re- ligion, or that duty which men owe to their Creator^ and to ihc'iv feliozu- creatures, arifes from xh^ relation they ftand to God, and to each other, and there- fore muft be perpetually and invariably the fame in all ages and places •, yet the externoJs of religion^ or the forms or modes of vv^orfliip, by v/hich men pay their acknowledgments to God, are of an in- different nature^ and therefore may be varied as the circumftances of things fhall require v and as go- vernours are the guardians of humans happinefs, fo they ought to appoint forms of woriliip, and to pu- nijh thofe who diffent from them, and who pay their refped to God in a way different from what the government has appointed, becaufe fuch dif- fent introduces diforder^ and is irjuricus to fociety. I anfwery That as government was defigncd for the good of mankind, by obliging each individual. to pay that debt which (according to his condition and circumftances in life) he owes x.o fcciety, and by guarding the perfons, the reputations, and the properties of men from being injured by each o- thcr ; fo governours ought to ufe all proper fneans for the attaining thofe valuable ends. And as the appointing pubHck forms of worfhip, for men to pay their acknowledgments to God by, and perfons to minifter therein, and to be con- ilant monitors to ftir up the people to their duty. Vol II. H may 98 A Bifcourfe concerning Perfeculion, may ht fuhfervient to xhtpuhlkk good-, fo, I think, it is itght and fit that governours Ihould make fuch a provifion, that every one may have the opportuniiy to pay their pubhck acknowledgments to God, which the generahty of mankind think it is their duty to do. But then as the duty which every mans owes to his Maker arifes from that re- lation which he Hands in to him, and as fociety is no way interefted therein -, fo, in the nature of the thing, he is not anfwerable to fociety for the per^ formance of that duty, or the negle^ of it. If he worlhips Gcd pubhckly, no man is z gainer-, and, if he negleds it, no man is a lofer thereby. If he worfhips God this way or that ivay^ whilil no man is injured in his fo doing, he cannot^ in the nature of the thing, be the proper object of pubhck re- fentment or corredion. The ground and foundation of fociety, and con- fequently of government, I take to be this •, man is a dependent creature, who in a fingle capacity- is not quahiied to />r if perfecution be admitted upon fuch reafoning., as above. But can fo vile 3. thing as perfecution^ which introduces nothing but niifery into this world, and wliich anfv/ers no good endy with rela- tion to another -, Can that, I fay, htjujlified^ or {o much as countenanced from the religion of Chrijl? no, certainly. The chrifLian religion is excellent* ly calculated to promote the comm.on tranquility, by recommending peace^ unanimity., forbearance^ brotherly kindnefsy and univerfal charity to our prac- tice. Yea, it recommends loving and doing good^ and contributing all we can to each other's hap^ pinefs in this 'world., as the only fur e way to obtain the happinefs of another ; and therefore one would think it above the flcill of the mofb fubtle fophifter, to extract the deadly poifon of perfecution from it. And yet, how monfrous and unnatural foever this may be, it has proved true in fad ; chriitians have not only persecuted, but they have likewife endeavour'd to juftify their condu5i herein, from the chriftian revelation^ which, were it not for the ccmmonnefs of it, would be too furprizing a thing to be imagined. Upon the whole I hope it appears that error is not damnable^ and that perfecution is not juftifable. The ufe I would make of this difcourfe is to obfervcj that as perfecution is an evil thing and bitter. A IDlfcourfe concerning Perfecution, 1 03 litter^ and which can by no means be juftified^ as I have before fhewn ; fo it is high time that it v/ere hanijhed out of the chrifiian world. Alas ! How many weeping eyes and aching hearts has it caujlejly produced, and how many precious lives have been facrificed as vi^ims to it ? Is it not, then, full time for chriftians to think with them- felves, that perfecution is not a beauty., but a hkmiJJj to their profeflion ? and that as their obli- gation to love^ and do good to each other, arifes from their being men., who are, by nature, enter- ed into the one great fociety^ or commonwealth of mankind •, fo it is not their different opinions in any point, which can poflibly cancel or take off this obligation ? And, as perfecution is exceed- ing vile in itfelf, fo it does not change its nature irom the different hands thro' which it paffes ; \t continues the fame in all countries., in 2\\ parties., and in all ferfons., tho' it is, indeed, lefs ex-cufahle in fome than in others, as being more inconfillent with fome mens principles, than, with other mens. And thus perfecution is lefs excufable in a Pro^ t eft ant than in a Papift^ as I have fhewn above. And tho' fome men are apt to fee it in a different light., when they view it in another party,- than when they fee it in their own, it being ^i/^^^ over, and called by another 7ia}ne in the latter cafe ; yet it is not really another, but the fame thing. The affii^ing and grieving mien, for the lake of their religious principles., is perfecution, whether it be in Poland or in Britain \ and therefore it ought to be equally detefted by us. The many cruelties prac- tifed by the Roman Catholicks have often deeply affected the proteftant world, and made every ten- der heart to bleed ; and yet Protejlanis have beea too apt to chcrijh that viper in their own. hofoms-y^ which, when feen at a diflance preying upon H 4 • others. 1 04 A Difcourfe concerning Perfecution, others, raiies in them fo much horroj- and indigm- iion. And, as perfecution does not change its nature, from the different hands by which it is ex- ecuted, fo neither is it lefs perfecution, by reafon of the different zvay^ or the different degree in which it is praiHfed. The afliiding and grieving men, for the fake of their opinions, is perfecution, in . Kvhat ivay^ or in ivbat degree foever it takes place. He tlvat makes his neighbour's differing from him-, in opinion, the ground and reafon of his contri- butmg to his unhafpinefsy is guilty of perfecution, whether he afflidls him in this or that way, or to a greater or lefs degree. Perfecution in its notorious injlances (fuch as the cruelties of the inquijiiion^ the maifacres oi France or Ireland^ x\\^ burnings of Smithfteld^ the executions at Tkorn, and the like) is exceeding Jhocking to human nature, as it makes a deep imprefTion upon the m.ore tender part of our compofition, viz. our atfe6lions, and thereby chills our blood, V\^hen v/e refled upon it. And • as the greater in fiances only deeply affe^ us, and firike us with horror ♦, fo fome men are apt to think that thefe only are vile^ and come under the name of perfecution ; whereas every injury^ done to our neighbour, for the fake of his religious principles^ is perfecution, and has the fame natural n)ilenc[s^ of what degree foever it be. It fprings from the fame roct^ and would, if indulged., carry men to the higheft Jeverities. The fame fpirit which difpofes one man to bring another before the judgm.ent-feat, in order to have him fined or imprijhnedy for his advancing a proportion which contradids another proportion that had been advanced before, would, if indulged, difpofe him to hale the other to execution., tho', pofTibly, It is what at firfr he did not intend. \\ thofe jnen vvho are for moderate perfecution^ as fome call It, fnould be*told. that the time would come in which 'A Difcourfe concerning Perfecution, los; which they would imbrue their hands in the blocd of their innocent neighbours^ they would be apt to cry out with Hazael, Am la dog^ that I Jhould do this great wtckednefs ? And yet the fame motive^ and the fame fpirit which difpofed them to the lefs^ would, if followed efFedually, lead them on to do the greater evil. \z it then not high time for chriftians^ of all de- nominations whatever, to put on the fpirit of chrijlianity^ by putting on that fpirit and temper • which abundantly fhewed itfelf in him whofc name they bear ? The fpirit of Chrift is a fpirit of lo%\% and love worketh no ill to its neighbour. And as our being animated by this fpirit is what will be an evidence to us that we are Chrilt's true Difciples ; fo this will be fuch an antidote as will elFeduaily expel and purge out of us the poifonous fpirit of pcrfecution. Perfecution is of a growing nature ^ and, when once it breaks out, wc cannot pofTibiy judge where it will Hop ; and, therefore, we ought carefully to guard againfl all approaches to it, which will be efTedually done by fubjcding our tempers and anions to Chrift's law of love. And, asweought to purge out every thing that may difpofe us to perfecution, fo we ought, from the reafon of the thing, to ufe our endeavours to r/^^f/^ and contr Old ii^ zvhen or wherever \t appears. Perfe- . cution is a deadly evil^ which every heart and every hand lliould be engaged to baniJJj from this world. WeareaJI, by nature, united in l\ift ont great focietyy_ or commonwealth of mankind ; and tho' we arc divided into kingdoms^ nations^ &c. wliich are parts and branches of that one great fociety ; yet our union with one part does not deflroy our relation, nor take off our obligations to the reft. We arc, by nature, fo lar made guardians of each other's hcppincfs^ as that it becomes our J.v/r, whcji their neccflity calls and our ability enables to minijlcr afTifrancc I o6 A Bifcourfe concerning Perfecution, afTiflance and fuccour to them. Let then every Proteftant^ every chriftian^ every man put forth his endeavour to fupprefs and banifh, as a common evily perfecution from this globe. But, O Happy, thrice happy Britain I fhe fitteth as a ^{een among the nations, and as a Princefs among the provinces, and knows no fuch forrowy being under the guardianihip of a Prince *, whofe reign has not been been polkited and ilained with the blood of perfecution^ and I truft will not ; a Prince who has hitherto not only made Britain^s. enemies to be at peace with her, but has kept her alfo from offering violence to her [elf ^ and from thrufl:ing a dagger into her own breaft ; which is the cafe of perfecution. Her children, tho' differ- ing much in their religious fentiments (which, poITibly, is the cafe all the world over, where men have not padlocks put upon their underftandings) may every one fit down under his own vine, and under his fig-tree, enjoying the fruits of their own labour, and have none to make them afraid. In her the fons of violence cannot hurt ; and, by the blciTing of a good government, the lionijhy vjolfifh fpirit^ which is greedy of prey^ and longs to devour^ is made peaceably to lie down with the lamh^ yea, the kid^ the fatlingy and the young lion lie down together. O Britain ! may fucb peace long continue within thy walls, and plenteoufnefs within thy palaces ; and m^ay thy bappy days be lengthened out to many generations ; be thou as a city, that is at unity in itfelf, whofe members are cemented together by the fpirit of love. Let thy virtue and goodnefs render thee amiable in the fight of the nations •, and let thy glory fhine forth as the fun at noon-day. May thy guardian angel long continue to be fuch -, let him not go down to the grave, till he hath filled up 2l good old age^ * K. George I. and A Difcourfe concerning Perfecution. i o 7 and be gathered to his fathers as a fhock of corn that is full ripe. May the Princes that fpring out of his loins be Britain'^ Prote^ors to our lateft pofterity. And, O that it may be a diadem in their crown, that they have anfwered the purpofes of government, by guarding and fecuring the hap- pinefs of this people. And may every defign formed againft them^ or Britain's profperity^ be hlajled and brought to nought. But, can there be any man who can wiJJj the removal of fuch a government y whilfl they happily live under ^tpro- teuton of it ? If any fuch there are, as they mult be monfiers in nature^ fo I truft their number is but fmalL We are guarded from enemies abroad^ and kept in the quiet poflelTion of every blejjfmg at home^ which government was defigned to Jecure, to us. And what farther can we wifli for ? Nor, furely, for the return of a Popijh Pretender^ becaufe that is to wilh the return of popery , the return of mifery. Popery is an engine fitted to defiroy and lay wafle the happinefs of mankind, by introdu- cing opprejjwn, tyranny., and perfecution. Can then any man, who wilhes Britain's glory and happi- nefs, defire the removal of that Prince., thsit family from the throne, which are our only fe cur ity f And can he wifh for the placing a Popifh Pretender in their (lead ? No, that is an apparent co7itradiction ; every fuch perfon being, in the nature of the thing, an enemy to Britain's happinefs. To conclude, let perfecution ceafe ; and be no more heard of, either in Britain or in this world. And let peace and tranquillity flourifli and prevail in this and in all lands. And then the gi-acious purpofe of our kind Creator will be fully anfwer- ed, in the connnon felicity of his creatures ; to which I am perfuaded every good man will itcf^/imen, TR^T TRACT XXIIL A N EXAMINATION OF Mr. BARCLAVs Principles, With Regard to Man's natural Ability fince the fall; As laid down in his Book, entitled, An Apology for the true Cbriftian Divinity^ as the fame is held forth and preached by the People called^ in Scorn^ ^takers. Wherein is fhewn. That the faid Principles are erroneous^ and in which Hti^ ■ man Nuture is vindicated from that Burden - of Reproach he has loaded it with. In a Letter to Friend, occafion'd by the great * Commendation given to Mr. Barclaf% Per- formance, in the Britifh Journal N© XXX. and now offered to the Confideration of the People called fakers, SIR, AS the great commendation given to Mr. Barclay'*^ performance, in the Britifh JonrnaU awakened your curiofity, and difpos'd you to buy the book ; and as your reading it induced you to put it into my hands, that I might give you my opinion of that performance •, fo 1 have, in juftice to truth, fent you An jlxamination of Mr. Barclay V Principles, 109 you my thoughts of it, in this publick. way. For tho' the book has been publifli'd many years, and the author is long fince dead, and fo the take- ing notice of it, in this way, may have the appear- ance of unfairnefs •; yet, feeing it has been lately fo highly commended, in a publick news-paper ; when this, is confider'd, that colour of unfairnefs which otherwife my examing it might be liable to, I think, is taken away* The Britijh Journal^ Saturday, April 13, 1723.' Numb. XXX. gives the the following charader of Mr. ^^rr/^j's fcheme and performance. *' I *' am not afliam'd to own, that I have, with " great pleafure read over Mr. Barclay's Apo- *' logy tor Quakerifm, and do really think it *' to be the moil mafterly, charitable, and rea- *' fonable fyftem, that I have ever feen. It folves " the numerous difficulties, rais'd by other {zdiSy " and, by turns, thrown at one another; fhews " all parts of the fcripture to be uniform and *' confident; and as Sir Ifaac^ewton^ hy allow- ** ing him gravitation, has accounted for all the " phenomena of nature \ fo if we allow Mr. *' Barclay thofe operations of the fpirit, which " the Quakers pretend to feel, and which, he '' fays every man in the world has, and may *' feel, if he watches its motions, and does not " fupprefs them; then, I think, all the jangling " vain queftions, numerous, fuperftitious, and " various opprefiions, which have plagued the " world from the beginning, would ceafe, and *' be at an end." I fhall not concern myfelf, with what this au-t thor has faid of Mr. Barclay's^ book \ my intent not being to oppofe him, but only to take the fame liberty, in giving my opinion of that per- formance, as he has done. I fhall, indeed, pro- ceed one ftep farther than this author, namely^ no? 110 [An Exammation of Mr. Barclay'j Principeh, not only give my opinion , but likewife fhew, upon what grounds that opinion is founded, as Aviil appear in the following lines* And if I ihould, in any particular, differ from him, I am perfuaded I Ihall not offend ; prefuming he will allow, that I have an equal right to diffent from him in my opinion, and to publifh the grounds of that diffent, as he has to diffent from me. I fhall likewife confider Mr. Barclay's fcheme, and performance, what it is in itfelf, and not what it is, when compared with other fyftem sand performances. Thefe things being premis'd, I proceed to obferve, that, I have likewife read Mr, Barclay's book, and do really think it con- tains a confus'dy abfurd fcheme of religion ; in which God is confider'd, as dealing with his creatures, not according to the moral fJnefs of things^ but from arhritary pleafure. For tho* the author fometimes brings Jtiftice^ goodnefs^ truths &c. in- to the cafe, and argues from thefe, and, confe- quently, rcafons from the iitnefs of things, when it turns to the advantage of his argument ; yet, this is what his fcheme, upon the whole, will not comport with, hutmui^ ht overthrown hj. How- ever, I fliall not enter into a particular exami- nation of all the proportions, laid down in the book referred to-, but fhall fingle out one, up- on which, I think, Mr. Barclafs fcheme has an apparent dependence. PROPOSITION IV. Concerning the Condition of Man in the Fall. " All Adam's poferity^ or mankind^ both Jew, ** and Ge«tile, as to the firft Adam, or earthly ** man^ is fallen^ degenerate^ and dead \ deprived of *' the fenfation^ or feeling of this inward teflimo- ** ny, or feed of God j ^nd is fubietJ to the pozver^ nature^ An Examimtion of Mr, Barclay' Principles. 1 1 r nature^ and feed of the ferpent^ which he foweth in men^s hearts^ whiljl they abide in this natural and corrupted efiate. From whence it cometh^ that not only their words^ and deeds ^ hut all their imagina- tions are evil perpetually in the fight ofGod^ aspro^ cee ding from this depraved and wicked feed. Man^ therefore^ as he is in this ft ate, can know nothing aright \ yea, his thoughts and conceptions concern- ing God, and things Ipiritual {until he be disjoined from the evil feed, and united to the divine light) are unprofitable both to himfelf and others, *' That, then, which our propofition leads to treat of, is, " Firfi, What the condition of man is in the fall, and how far uncapable of meddling in the things of God. " So that, tho' we do not afcribe any part of A- dam\ guilt to men, until they make it theirs, by like ad:s of difobcdience ; yet we cannot fuppofe, that men, who are come of Adam na- turally, can have any good thing in their na- ture, as belonging to it, which he, from whom they derive their nature, had not him- felf to communicate unto them. " If, then, we may affirm, that Adam did not retain in his nature, as belonging th«reunto, any will, or light, capable to give him know- ledge in fpiritual things •, then, neither can his pofterity. For whatfoevcr real good any man doth, it proceedeth not from his nature, as he is a man, or the fon ot Adam \ but from the feed ef God in him, as a new vifitation of life, in order to bring him out of this natural con- dition •, io that tho' it be in him, yet it is not of him. And this the Lord himfelf witnef- feth, Gen. vi. 5. Vv^here it is faid, He faw that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart, was oily (vil contirjii^dly. Which words, as they are " very 112 An Examination of Mr, Barclay'j Principles* *' very pofitive, fo are they very comprehenfive ; *' obferve the emphafis of them. Firji^ There is '' every immegination of the thoughts of his heart -, fo *' that this admits of no exception, of any ima- ** gination of the thoughts of his heart. Se- *' condly, is only evil continually. It is neither in *' fonie part evil continually^ nor yet only evil at fome '' times ; but both only evil, and always^ and con- *' tinually evil •, which certainly excludes any good, *' as a proper effedt of man's heart naturally ; for " that which is only evil, and that always cannot, " of its own nature, produce any good thing. " The Lord exprefleth this again a little after, *' Chap. viii. 21. The imagination of man^s heart *' is evil from his youth \ thus, inferring how na- " tural and proper it is unto him. From which ** I thus argue, " If the thoughts of man's heart be not only *' evil, but always evil ; then, are they, as they " fimply proceed from his heart, neither good in *' part, nor at any time : *' But the firft is true, therefore, the laft. *' Again, *' If man's thoughts be always and only evil ; " then, are they altogether ufelefs and ineffediual *' to him in the things of God : " But the firit is true, therefore, the lail. *' Secondly^ This appears plainly, from that *' faying of the Prophet Jeremiah^ Chap. xvii. 9. *' The heart is deceitful above all things^ and defpe- *' rately wicked. For who can, with any colour *' of reafon, imagine that that, which is fo, can ?' have any power, of itfelf, or is any way fit to *' lead a man to rightcoufnefs -, whereunto it is, *' of its own nature, diredlly oppofite ? This is as *' contrary to reafon, as it is impofTible in nature, ^' that a Hone, of its own nature, and proper *' motion, Ihould fiy upwards. For as a ftone, " of Ah Examination df Mr. Barclay V Principles, 1 1 ^ *' of its own nature inclineth, and is prone to " move downward, towards the center -, fo the " heart of man is naturally prone, and inclined *' to evil ', fome to one, and fome to another. " From this, then, I alfo thus argue : *' That which is deceitful above all things, and *' defperately wicked^ is not fit, neither can it lead *' a man aright- in things that are good and ho- *' neft : *^ But the heart of man is fuchj " Therefore, ^f. '•' But the Apoftle Paul defcribes the condition *' of man, in the fall, at large, taking it out of *' the Pfalmift ; There is none righteous-^ no not one ; " there is none that underftandeth^ there is none that '•^ feeketh after God, They are all gone out of the "^^ '-jvay^ they an altogether become unprofitable^ there ^' is none that doth good ^ no not one. Their throat is '^' an open fepulchre ; ivith their tongues have they ufed *' deceit j the poifon of afps is wider their lips ; ivhcfe *' mouths are full of curjing and bitternefs. Their feet '' arefivift to fhed blood, DefiriiSlion and mifery are *- ' in their ways •, and the way of peace have they not ^ *^ known •, there is no fear of God before their eyes, *' What more pofitive can be fpoken ? He feem- " ed to be particularly careful to avoid, that any *' good fhould be afcribed to the natural man. *' He fhews, how he is polluted in all his ways. '" He fhews, how he is void of rightcoufnefs, of *^ underflanding, of the knowledge of God ; how "*' he is out of the way, and in fhort unprofitable j *' than which, nothing can be more fully faid, to *' confirm our judgment. For, if this be the " condition of the natural man, or of man as he " flands in the fall, he is unfit to make one right *' flcp to heaven." I have here fet down, at large, that parr of the fourth propofition, which relates to the oueilion, Vot. II I " ' -^z. 11^ An Exmrlnation of M'. Barclay'^ PrincipU£ viz, whether there is ability,, in the natural man^ to know, and do, either good or evilf I have likewife recited what the author has offered, for the proof of the principles he has here laid down* And tho' he has exprefs'd himfelf veiy darkly and confiifediy upon the fubjed: , yet^ I think, upon the whole (that is* taking in the other branches of his fcheme^ and what he has faid in other parts of h?s book \ and fuppofing he intended ta be underflood, and that th^re rs a meaning and confiflency in his words) his fenle be will juftly exprefledj ia tlie two following propoHtiom. P ROPOS I'TION L Mf^n^ conjiier^d as man^ or that compound creature^ confifiing of underflandingy of appetitey affe^ion^ 8zc, "dubich fprang from Adam^ as his original pa" rent^ has no power or ability^ at any timey to thinky fpiaky or act that zvhick is good, PROPOSITION 11. Many conjd^r'^d as rdan^ or that creature compounded and derived J as afore faid^ is yieceffarily determined^ at all times y cither by his oijun ncJural ccmpofition^ cr by the agency of the ferpenty tc thinky fpeak^ and 4i5i that which is ev.iL Before I proceed to examine thefe propofitions* with regard to the truths or falfehood of them, I iind it is neceifary to obferve two or tliree thing? , in order to make the way clear before me. And^ Firfi^ I obferve, that as I have given what 1 judge to be the author's fenfe, in the tv^o prece- dent proportions ; fo.I have exprefs'd it, interm.^- muchflronger than thofe he ufcs. And the reafou ot it is this, 7iamely^ that I may reduce the con- troverfy into a narrow compafs, by cutting off all occafion for unneccfTar)^ difnutc? about words. And An Examination of Mr, Barclay V Principles, 115 And, in this, I think, I have done the author no wrong \ beeaufe he muft intend to exprefs^ in his ipfe and confiifed way, what I exprefs vaox^ftrongly Sindjlearly ; or elfe his performance is but an a~ mufement^ and he is fighting, without an adverfary. No, in order to clear this point, I lay, either Mr. Barclay did inteiad to ajj'ert and prove^ that man, in his natural capacity, has no power or ability, at any time, to thinK, fpeak, or a6l that which is :good ; or he did not intend to alTert and prove this. If he did not, then, man has natural abi- lity, in himfell\ to know, and do what will pleafe God, for any thing that this author has aflcrted, or proved to the contrary. So that, tho' no man can come to the Father^ hut by the Son, that is, but in that way in which the Son has declared it to be the will of the Father, that men fliould come to him, namely, by keeping God's commandments, and by repentenxe and amendment of life -, there being no other name, or way given among men, but this way given or declared by Jefus Chrift, by which they may htfaved-, yet they may come, acceptably to God without any internal ftiper natural light or ope- ration. And, confequently, there is not that ab- folute neceffity for fuch a fupernatural operation, in order to man's fahation^ as Mr. Barclay's fcheme fuppofes ; and, without fuppofing it, his perfor- mance is an amufement. But if he did intend to affert and prove, that man has not natural ability td think, fpeak, or act that which is good ; then, my exprefling flrongly what he cxprelTed loofly can be no injury to his caufe. PoflTlbly, the adherers to Mr. Barclay's fcheme may here take fandhiary, under the covert of the ttYin fpirilual, and may reply, that tho' he did in- tend to affert and prove, that man has no ability in hiinfjif, at any time, to think, fpeak, or aCt that which \sgood\ ycr he inrmded to confine i\\t i 2. term 1 1 6 An Examination of Mr. Barclay'j Principles! term good to fpirittid things^ or things pertaining to the favour of God-, flill allov/ing, that man has power and liberty, with regard to temporal goody or the good of this hfe •, and that this is plainly the cafe, appears from this, and other parts of Mr. Barclay's book. I anpivery That as men fom.e times confound things, by making that the famc^ which is really diflinul \ fo they fometimes make diflinulions^ where there are none. And thus it is in the prefent cafe ; here are fuppofcd two fets of powers for the per^ formance of good ; one for temporal^ and the other for fpiritual good things. But this is a mere fidlion, it being by one fet of powers only, liz. the human compofition, by w^iich men perform allgocd^ whether it relates to this life, or a better; and by which they pleafe either men, or God. It is the fame natural faculty of undcrftanding, by which a man difcerns and judges of the truth, or falfehood of thefe propolitions, viz. that three times two is ^rx -, and that three angels of a right- lined triangle are equal to two red- angels ; and by which he difcerns and judges of the truth or falfehood of the propofitions and arguments laid down in Mr. Barclay's book. And thcic, furely, will be allow'd to be fpiritual things., feeing they are propofed as an explanation, and vindication of the true chrifian divinily. It is by the fame natural paliion o^ fear., that men are led to guard againil the evils of this life, and of another. It is the fame natural paiTion of hope^ wiiich excites men to profecute their prefent or future happineis-. It is by the lame natural power,, th^at a m.an loves God and his neighbour j v/hich is Xa\q fulfil ling of the la-'jj^ and which will render him acceplahle to his Makers and by which he loves any thing, that renders this life agreeable to him. Only the afte^lion i,s exercifcd upon dilfercnt objecls, and to a differeut An Examination of Mr. Barclay V Principles 1 1 7 a different degree •, and it becomes either virtuous, or vicious, as it is exercifed upon a proper, or an improper objedl ; or, as it is kept within, or is indulged beyond its due bounds. It is the lame natural adive faculty, or power of felf- motion, by which a man ufes the members of his body, to commit murder, or to fave from death, or the like. The cafe is the fame, with regard to all the parts of our compofition, and with regard to all the good which is performed by us. And this leads me to requefl of ihofc men, who depretiate human nature^ by denying it any ability to do good, as aforefaid, to give a cafe, in which it will appear, that the natural man, as they exprefs it, has not ability tp perform any one branch of goodnefs, that will render him acceptable to his Maker. If it fhould be farther urged, that I have not exprefled what they intend by the term fpiritual -, my anfwer is, when they will pleafe to explain this term, in an intelligiJbk way, and fhew what they intend by it, I ihall then, and not till then, be able to reply. Again, Either Mr. Barclay did intend to aflert and prove, that man, confider'd as man, is necefla- rily determined, at all times, to think, fpeak, and adl that which is evil ; or he did not intend to alTert and prove this. If he did not, then, man, in his natural ftate, has power, and is a: liberty, not only to do^ or omit doing evil ; but alio to do^ or omit doing good -, even as a man who has power, and is at liberty to tell a A>, mull, in the nature of the thing, have power, and be equally at liberty to relate the truths which is oppofed to it. I fay, if Mr. Barclay did not intend to af- fert and prove, as atorefaid \ then, man, in his natural (late, has power, and is at liberty to do good, or evil, for any thing that he has allerted, I 3 or x\Z An Examination of Mr. Barclay'^ PrincipUs, or proved to the contraiy, And^ confequently^ there is not that abfolute neceffjy for an internal fupernatural operation, in order to man^sj^ation^ as Mr. Barclay's fcheme fuppoies ; and, without fuppoling it, his performance is an impofitioll upon his reader. But if he did intend to ajferi and prove^ that man is, neceflarily, determined to think, fpeak, and a6l that which is evil ; thert my expieiiing ftrongly what he expreffed loofly can be no injmj to his caufe. Whoever examines^ with care and imparliahty, Mr. Bardafs per- formance, I think, muft grant, that his fchemx fuppofes, and that, to appearance, he endeavours to maintain, that man has not natural ability to do good, and that he is, ncceffarily, determi- ned to do evil ; and that, in confequencc of this deplorable flate of the human nature, fnice th6 fall, he urges the abfoluii necejjity of an internal fu-^ pernatural light or operation^ in order to man's faU Vation. And, therefore, as I faid before, if he did not intend to alTert and prove this, then, his performance is an am.ufement, and he is miflead- ing his reader. But if he did intend to aiTert and prove, as aforefaid, then, my reducing his fenfe into two plain proportions, and expreffing ftrong- ly what he expreiied loofly, and confufedly, can be no injury to his caufe. And, as impofition, an the prcfent cafe, is much worfe than fimple er- ror, or miftake ; fo I ihalJ, in favour to Mr. Barclay, fuppofe, or take it for granted, that he did intend to aflert and prove, tho' erroneoufly^. and innocently, what is laid down in the two fore-r going proportions. Again, Secondly, I obferve that Mr. Barclay in treating of this fuhjed, diftinguiihes betwixt the natural r.2an^ and thtfeed of thtferpent in that man -, and he afcribes the evil, which man brings forth, .ibmQtimes to onc^ and fometinies to the other, as its 4n Examlmtion of Mr. Barclay V Principles. 1 19 it^anfe. And as he thus varies, with regard to th:cite^ tt)enis to adlion, or to be at reft, with regard to all fuch beings, in whom the power of afting refides. And, by aolivity^ I mean a capacity or power of beginning or performing motion or adlion, or of be- ing at reft, in confequence of thofe ideas that take place in the underftanding, and which arc the ground or reafon of fuch motion or adion, or of the fufpending the exercife of that power. I fay, in confequence ofthofc ideas, which are the ground or reafon of fuch action, i^'c. for tho* the ideas, which l^ecome motives to a6tion, are not l\ift phyficdl caufe ef the a6tion that follows-, yet they are riecefjary thereto, innfmuch as the addon TN'Ouid not t»ikc phrc, witliov.t feme rrafon or mo- tive $22 Jn Examnatim of Mr. Barclay'^ Trindples^ tive to induce to it ; it being abfurd to fuppofc, ' that the adive faculty would be exerted, without iomt previous reafon to difpofe the mind to adion ; which reafon is the poduoi of intelligence. And, an order to conftitute a moral agent, it is not only neceflary, that the being fhould be intelligent, in ^the lower and lefs proper fenfe of the term mtelli* gent^ as before delcribed \ but it is alfo neceliary, that he fhould be fo, in the higher and more proper fcnfe of that term •, that is, that he fhould be ca- pable of feeing things in a moral view, and thereby ^{ judging of the moral ficnefs or unfitnels of ac- tions ; and like wife, that he fhoujd have power to a^^ or to refrain from ading, upon fuch moral •motives, as he pleafes. I fay, both of thefe are abfolutely ncceiTaiy, to conftitute a moral agent ^ becaufe, where cither of thefe is wanting, there can be no moral a6i:ion •, and, where both of thefe take place, there the being, in which they ^refide, is capable of ading, or of refraining to ad, upon moral motives ; and, confequently, is a moral agent. As to the >¥ord fi-ee, which is com- monly added in this cafe, this term is wholly fu- perfiuous 5 becaufe every agent is free, in thofe inftances, and fo far as he is an agent ; a neceflary agent being a plain contradidion. This being premifed, I proceed to fhew the confequence of Mv. Barclay^ principles, in the following particu- lars. And, Firjl^ Allowing the tvv^o foremention'd propofi- tions to be true ; from hence it will unavoidably foUov/, that, in the doing gooi^ or evil^ man is not an agent ^ but a patient j the argument Hands thus. If man has not power or ability, in himfelf, to do good, and if he is, neceflarily, determined tQ fio ^vii ^ then, in the doing good or evil, he is 'ain Exafntnation ef Mr, Barclay^ Prip.cipks, n^ not an agent, bwt a patient, he docs not ad, but is acled upon : But man has not power, in himfelf, (Jt\ Therefore, be is not an agent, ^c. In thus argument, the major propofition is fclf- evident, there not being any thing more clcar^ and evident in itfelf, than this -, namely y that if man has not power, and is not at liberty to do good, or evil -, and yet good and evil are perform-, cd in him, or by him j in this cafe, he does not it6t, but is adled upon. The major propofitioa being proved, the minor is alTumed by iVlr. Bar- clafs J and thus the argument is conclulive, Opoa his principles. Again, Secondly^ Allov/ing the propofitions to be tru?^ if v/ill follow, that man is not tliG fulpje^ o{ govern- mnt. The argument ilands thus : If man has not power, in himfelf, to do good, and if he is, necellarily, determined to do evil ; then, he is not the fubje(5t of government, nor can he be obliged by any law •, But man has not power to do good, &c. Therefore, he is not the fubjecl of govern- ment, &c. The major propofition I prove, thus. La-yv and government neceffarily fuppofe a fubje<5l who has power, and is at liberty to do, oi: omit doing what is commanded or forbidden ; and, therefore, to pretend to govern, and give laws to other fub- je6ls, is moll abfurd -, lb that if man has not pow- er, and is not at libeity to do good, or evil ; then, he cannot, in the nature q\ the thing, be the fubjedl of government. The m.ajor propofi- tion being proved, the minor is afilimcd by Mr. Barclay ; and thus the argument is conciufivc, vpon his principles. Again, Tkirdl^'j All-^win^ the propofitions to he trnc ; ;!iei] 124 ^^^ Examination of Mr, Barclay V Principles, . tlieh, it will follow, that man is not an account ablt treatiire. The argument Hands, thus ; If man has not power, in himfelf, to do good, and if he is neceflarily, determined to do evil j then, he is not accountable for that good, or evil, which is perform'd in him, or by him : But man has not power, in himfelf, ^c. Therefore, he is not accountable, iyc. The major propofition is proved, thus. Ac- countablenefs, in the idea of it, neceifanly fuppo* lies a truft lodg'd in fome fubjed; •, and likewife a power and liberty rightly to mploy^ or to abufe that mift V and, therefore, if man is not intruded with a power and liberty of doing good and evil ; then, k will follow by an unavoidable confequence, that he cannot, in the nature of the thing, be accountable for that good, or evil, which is done in him, or by him. The minor propofition is aillim'd by Mr. Barclay, Again, Fourthly^ Allowing the propofition to be true ; then, it will follow, that man is not a proper ob- je5i of reward^ or pimijhment. The argument ilands thus : If man has not power, in himfelf, to do good, and if he is, neceffarily, determin'd to do evil ; then, he is not a proper obje6l of reward, or pu- nifliment, with regard to th^ doing or avoiding cither of thefe : But man has not power, in himfelf, 6fr. Therefore, he is not a proper objed of reward, ^c. The major propofition I prove, thus. Both rev/ard, and punillimcnt carry, in their idea, the ilippoudon of an adlion, either done, or omitted to be done, by a fubje6t which has power, and is at liberty to do, or omit doing, as aforcfaid -, and, conlequently, the fubjecSV, which has it not, can- not; in the nature of the thing, be the proper ob- • An Examination of Mr. Barclay^ Principles, 125 jeft of reward, or punifhment. The minor pro- pofition is afTum'd by Mr. Barclay, As to the clearnefs and conclufivenefs of thefe Jlrguments, I fubmit it to every reader ; though withal, I think I may venture to fay, that my reafoning, as above, is allow'd ,and juflify'd by Mr. Barclay^ in his arguments and reafoning againft the Cahinifts. Having thus (hewn, in the firll place, what confequences will unavoid- ably follow Mr. Barclay's principles, allowing them to be true ; I proceed, Secondly^ To Ihew, or prove that they are e7T0' neous. And this I fhall do, firft^ by appealing to the experience of all mankind -, and fecondly^ by appealing to, and proving it from fcriplta-e. And, Firjf^ I appeal to ciil mankind^ whether they do not experience in themfelves a power and liberty, arifing from their natural compofition, to fpeak the truth, or a //>, to do good, or evil, in all the branches of it, as the occafion Ihall offer, whether it regards their duty to God, their neighbour, or themfelves. And, I am perfuaded, every man will acknowledge, that he has fuch a power, and is thus at liberty, except his religious principles Xzdid him to believe, contrary to what he experiences in himfelf. And, this is not pfefuming, or taking the thing for granted which is i\\ difpute, any more than it would be, if it fhould be deny'd, that a man has any natural pov/er to fee with his eyes, and hear with his ears, in fuch a cafe, to appeal to the experience of all m.ankind, for the proof di the affirmative ; the evidence being the fame, in both cafes ; and Mr. Barclay might, with as much truth, and as good a grace, havedeny'd the latter, as the former. And, here I appeal to Mr. Bar- clay'% performance, and to the performances, v/he- thcr by preaching, or Vv'riting, of all who pretend to an intLTnal fjpcrnaciiral light, as iuppcfincr tiS Ah Bxajnim/m of Mr. Sarcky V Principles^ the truth I here maintain. Mr. Banlay's propo- iitions and arguments, and his reafoning upon them, are ^ffer'd and addrefs^d to mm^ even tho* they relate to fpiritual things. But, why to men ? l>oes ROC this neceiTarily fuppofe, that men, as men^ have abihty to difcern and judge of the t/utji or falicncfs of them, and to direft their adions, accordingly ? For to llippofe, in this cafe^ that Mr. Barclay addrefs'd himfelf, and of^er'd his ar- gimients and reafoning to God.^ as the agent which performs all good in^ and by man •, this is to re- prefent him, as acting the molt childifJo and ridicu- lous parr, and reiieds fadly upon this author. The fame may be faid of all thofe, who pretend to an internal fupernatural light ; they addrefs them- Jelvesto «2^;;, they complain of, and condemn their bad adions ; they exhort and intreat them to ad other wife ; which, neceflarily, fuppofes that thofe, they addrefs to, have ability to diicern and judge of the iitnefs or unhtnefs of their condud, and to guide their behaviour, accordingly. I fay^ this is necefHirily fuppos'd, bccaufe to fup- pofe otherwife makes the addrefiers ridiculous. Befides, if thefe addrefles are not made to man, as man^ or as an ageiit^ as aforefaid ^ then, they muft be either to the ferpent^ or to GW, which, in Mr. Barclay^ fcheme, are the agents that ad in, and by man. If to the fonmer, then, it is God addrelFmg himfelf to the ferpent, becaufe it is God which ads, by man, in thefe addrefles ; man having no power, in himfelf, to perform that ^vhich is good. If to the latter, then, it is God addrefiing himfelf to himfelf j God, in the preacher, addreffing himfelf to God, in the hear-- cr ^ but this is fo monftrous, that I imagine no man will abide by it. And, therefore, as I faid before, Mr. Ba'-day^ and all pretenders of this Hnd:, will, in their turns, give judgment againft them- An Examination of Mr. Barclay'j Principles. 1 1 j themfelves, and allow the thing which they deny. But, Secondly^ I appeal to, and fliall prove, from the Btble^ the erroneoufnefs of Mr. Barclay's prin- ciples, as laid down in the two proportions I here refer to. Tho' I grant it is an odd way of pro- ceeding, to attempt to prove that from the fcrip- ture, which every man feels^ or experiences in him- jfelf ; it being much the fame, as if a difputc fhould arife, whether man has the ufe o^ fpeecb^ the power of felf-motion^ and the like, to appeal to the Bible for the proof of the affirmative; man's natural ability, for the doing and avoiding good and evil, being as much the fubjeft of, and prove- able by experience^ as either of thefe ; or hke pro- ving from the Bible., that bread is changed into flelh, which queilion comes within the cognizance of, and ought to be decided by our fenfes ; be- caufe the terms bread and flejjj are ufed to exprefs ideas which are excited in us, and conveyed to us by thofe fenfes. For, when a compofition of parti-' cles of matter is fo difpos'd, as to affed; our fenfes in a particular manner, when apply 'd to them ^ the idea, which that compolition raifes in our minds,- we exprefs by the term bread ; and, when a com- pofition of particles of matter is fo difpos'd, as to affed: our fenfes in another particular manner, when apply'd to them, the idea, which that com- pofition excites in us, we exprefs by the term /^i?. I fay, when matter is thus difpos'd, as to afiecb our fenfes in a particular manner, when apply'd to them ; it then comes under the denomination cf bread, or Jlejh., or the like. For if we confider matter, ahJlraHedly from the difpofition it is in to affed our fenfes in a particular manner, when ap- ply'd to them ; this is to confider it in a flate^ of which we knov/ not any thing. And, confe- •queatly, when it is t'l^s abftraCtedly confidcr'd:. 128 An Emmination of Air, Barclay'^ Principles, it does not come under the denomination of breads or feft}^ or any other /pedes ^ which matter is dillin- guifhed into ; becaule it does not excite, or raifc in us, any of thofe ideas which we call by fuch names. So that to i-Jbange bread into flefli is fo to difpofe and change a particular compofition of particles of matter -y which compofition, before that change, when it was apply'd to the fenfes, raised in us the idea of bread ; does, after that change, when apply'd to thofe fenfes, raife in u% the idea of fejh-. Now, fuppofe a difpute fhould arife, whether bread is changed into flefli ; that is, whether a particular compofition of particles of -matter, v/hich, the lajl momeni, being alike ap- ply'd to the fenfes, rais'd in us the idea of bread -, does ibis moment^ being alike apply'd to our fenfes,- excite in us the idea of flefli. Would it not, in this cafe, be exceeding prcpofl:erous to appeal to the Bible^ for the determination of this quellion ? feeing it is evident, that it is not the Bihle^ but the bringing or applying the object to the fenfesy which can, and mult affiire us, whether that object excites in us the idea of breads or ficfb ? In Iflv-c manner, if a difpute fliould arife, whether man has, or has not, natural ability^ for the perform- ance of this, or that good^ or bad a6lion ; fuch as the fliewing refpedl to, or the affronting a be^ nefacftor -, the relieving or adding to the burden of the opprelfed, and the like \ would it not be alike prepofl:erous^ to appeal to the Bihle^ for the determination of this quefl:ion ? feeing it is alike evident, that it is not the Bible ^ but every man's experience^ which can, and mufl affure him wliat his natural abilities are, or are not, in this cafe ? But as Mr. Barclay has endeavoured to prove his principles, from the Bible^ which proof I fliall examine, in its due place ; fo I thought it pro- per to let my reader fee, that thofe principles are repugnant An 'hmminatton oj Mr. uarciay v rnnapies. 129 repugnant to it -, and that is all I intend, by proofs in the prefent cafe. And, Firft^ The fcripture fuppofes^ or takes it for granted^ as a felf-evident propofitioni oi- a propo- fition which every man experiences the truth of in himfelf, viz. that every man is enabled, by his natural compofition, to do good, or evil ; and is ut liberty for the choice of either of thefe* To prove this, at large, would be to tranfcribe a great part of the Bihle^ in which this is ev-idently and ne- cejfarily fuppos'd ; and, therefore, I fhall content myfelf, and, I hope, fatisfy my reader, with pro- ducing one text only, which will fufficiehtly clear this point. Gen. iv. 7. If thou doeft well^ fialt thou not be accepted ? and if thou doeft not well^ fin lietb (it the door. In the preceding verfes, we have an account, that Cain and Abel brought^ each, of them, an offering to the Lord ; and the Lord had refped: to Ahel., and to his offering ; but unto 'Cain^ and to his offering, [he had no relpecl ; this rais 'd a refentment in Cain^ and he was very wroth, which was vifibly fhewn, in the change of his countenance. Upon this, the Lord condcfccnded to reafon the cafe with him, in order to convince him of the groundlefnefs and unreafo?mblenefs o'i i\\^i refentment ; and accordingly he addrefs'd himfelf to Caiyi thuS, Why art thou wroth., and why is thy countenance fallen .^ If thou doeft well., thou Cain^ the immediate offspring of Adam., if thou had'fb brought fuch an offering, as thy circumllances en- abled thee, and as might juflly be expeded from thee-, and if thou had'ft brought it with fuch a temper of mind, as thou mightell and oughteftto have done ; fhouldft thou not be accepted ? it would have been wrcnig in me to have rejected thee and thy offering-. And if thou doft not well., that is, if thou doit evil ; thou, Cain^ who had 'ft power ^ ^nd waft at l:brrt\ to do the contrary \ fn Ueth at Vol. II> ' K ' the the door^ Thou oughtefb, in rcafon^ to exped amj reap the fruit of thy folly ; and, theretore, thy rcfentment is perfe£lly groundlefs. Here, I appeal to all men, and particularly to all thofe who pretend to be under the influence of a fiipernatural lights whether the ttxt^ I have here produc'd, does not neccjjanly and evidently fuppofe, that Cain^ and con- fequentiy the reft of Adcwz's fofierity, had a natu- ral ability to do good, or evil, and v^as at liber- ty for the choice of either of thefe. To fuppofe otherwife is to charge God foolijhlyy as a<5ting an unequal part with his creatures ; and Cain might jujily have reply 'd Lord, thy ways are not equal j for if the ferpent- had not brought forth that evil in me, which he did not in my brother, and which it was not in my pcivcr to prevent ; and if thou had'ft brought forth that good in me^ which ihou did*ft in my brother, and which it was not in my power to do^ then had I been accepted^ as well as he -, but now I am rejetledy for not doing and avoiding that, which I had not po'iver to do, or avoid; therefore, thou hail a6led an unrighteom- part by me, and my refentmfni is jujl. Again, Secondly, The fcripture fuppofes man to be the fubjecl of goverr.ment \ and, accordingly, is pefcribes him lav/s to be the rule of his a(:aons ; commanding him to kve the Lord with all his hearty and his neighbour as hi)i;.jelf\ and forbids him to murder, or to /lander^ to do ^vil to man- kind. Now, it is very ridiculous and abiurd^ to fuppofe that God did not give thofc laws to man, as mr.n^ or that creature which is the natural feed of Adajn^ or, as Mr. Barclay expreifes it, man in the fail ; and that man, as fuch, has not natural ability for their per- formance V becaufc, this is to reprefent God> as ading the moft chihiijh and trifling part with his creatures ; as requiring hricky where mere are not mat&mh for the making it. Jin Emmtnation of Mr. Barclay V Frtncipks, 131 If it fhoiild be urg'd, that God gives fuper^ natural ohility^ for the performance of that duty \<^hich he requires : I aniWer, this, in Mr. Bar- clay's fcheme, is not giving abihty to man, but it is God which afls in, and by man, man being pajive in the production of good ; and, there- fore, tho' the command is given to 7r.an, yet oi^e-^ dience is performed by God : which, furely, is moft ridiculous. Befides, as to fupernatural a- bility, I fear thefe are terms with which men a- ',nufe themfelvei and others, by ufing them without any idea. For if I Ihould aHc the queflion, whether there is any new meraher added to the bo- dy, or any new faculty added to the foul ? I am perfwaded, they will anfwer, no \ will it not then, follow, that whatever good a man does, he does it by that ability which arifes from his natural compo/ltion, and by which likewife all evil is performed by him? Hear what St. J^w.^j faith, IVith thejame tongue blefs we God, even the FaJber i and tkereivitb curfe we men, zvho are made after the fimilitude of God. Out of the fame mouth ("or from the fame agency or fpring of a6lion^ proceedeth hkffing and curfing^ James iii. 9, 10. But fuppofing God fhould add any new members to the body; iw^ 2lS '^ pair o^ %vings ', and that, in the ufe of thefe, man could Hy, with as much eafe and fwiftaefs as any of the fowls of the air ; this addi- tion to his compofition might, indeed, enable him, infomeinjiances, to do that good, or evil, which, without wings, he would not be capable of doing. But, then, this would not effect the prelent queflion ; becaufe, ffrickly fpeaking, his power and liberty of doing good, or evil would be fill the fame \ that is, he would be IHli at liberty to exert or fufpend the exercifc of this additional power, or to imploy it, in feiving ^^ Examination of Mr. B arclay V Principles^ Gen. vi. 5. where it is faid, He^ -1;/%. God, faw that every imagination of the thoughts of his^ viz. man's^ heart.^ was only evil continually. But, furely, if the, author had not been ftrongly prejudic'd^ in favour of the principles he was rfiaintaining -, and if he had but freely exercis'd that ability, which he had, as man^ or which arofe from his natural com- ■ -pofition^ in a careful examination of the fabjeft Jbefore him ; then, I am perfuaded, a man of his. fagacity would have feen that this text was not to his purpofe. The paragraph is as tollows. And God faw J that the wickednejs of man was great in the earth % and that every imagination of the thoughts of his hearty was only ei.nl continually *, a7id it repeyited the Lord^ that be had made man on the earth., and it grieved him at his heart. And the Lord faid^ I will dejlroyman^ whom I have created^ from the face of the earth ; both man and beaft^ and the creeping thing., and the fowls of the air •, for it repenteth me., that I have made them. But Noah found grace in the eyes of the Lord. Again, the fame thing is exprefTed, in the 11, 12 and 13 verfes : The earth alfo was corrupt before God., and the earth was filled with violence ; and God looked upon the earthy and behold it was corrupt^ for all flefo had corrupted his way upon the earth. And God faid unto Noah, the end cf all flefid is come before me., for the earth is filled with violence thro' them *, amd behold^ I will deftroy them with the earth. In thefe verfes, we have an account that God threatened to deftroy the earth, that is, the inhabitants of the earth, by a flood, in the days of l>Joah ; and likewife we have the reafon affign'd, why God would bring this defo- lating judgment upon the earth, at that time ; namely., becaufe, at that time., the wickedjtcfs of man was great \\\ the earth •, all fleJJj., that is, the bulk of mankind, had corrupted their ways before God„ and the earth was filled with violence thro'- them, Man is a creature excellently conftituted to anfwer all mil the purpofes of focid felicity^ and to a6l a part fuitable to^ and becoming that reafon and under- ftanding, which God hath given him to guide his iteps ; and, when he does this, he gives glory to his Maker^ even as the proportion and conveni- ences of a building give glory to the archite^. And as man is thus capable of giving glory to God ; fo he is capable of the contrary^ that is, he is capable or' ading a difagreeable and hurt- fuU or, in other words, an unjociable part in the creation ; and of ading contrary to that hght^ which God hath given him to dired his ways \ and, thereby, of doing great dijhomur to his Maker. And this was the cale of the bulk of mankind, in the tenth generation ; the thought of their hearts; and the work of their hands, was for each other's hurt ; fo that the earth was lill'd with violence thro' them. And as mankind had thus corrupted their ways before God, at that time^ which gave occafion for thofe ftrong expreffions, that every imagination of the thoughts of their heart was only evil continually ; fo this drew on them that tiefolating judgment, by which they were de- flroyed from off the earth. God repented that he had made them, that is, he did what is the produ6l of repentance in men, when they undo, as far as it is in their power, what they repent of4 So, in this cafe, God did undo, that is, he de- , ftroyed his own work. This, I think, is a tair reprefentation of the cafe •, in which it appears, that the words, urg'd by Mr. Barclay^ were not defign'd to exp re fs the yiature oi 7nan m tht fall -^ but, on the contrary, they exprefs the g7'eat wick^ ednefs of the tenth generation^ and are urg'd as a reafon^ why the hood was brought upon them. To this I may add, that, if thefe words were de- fign'd to exprefs tlie ftate of human nature, then, as that nature was tlie fame in every generatia>i fince the fall \ fo ti:ofc words cannot: be a reaf&n tOF 14^ ^ t^xamtnatton oj jvir, joarciay j rrtnapes^ for bringing the flood in the tenth generation^ in particular, which it is plain they were urg'd for^ rather than in any of the preceding generations ; becaufe the fame reafon took place in the ninthy eighth^ and in every generation before it. If it Ihould be urg'd, that, in the tenth gene- ration, men rejifted the aflings of God upon them, more than they did in the generations before it ; and, therefore, that generation became more vile than any that preceded it ; I anfwer, that as, upon Mr, Barclafs principles, man is necejfarily determined to do evil •, fo from hence it will fol- loWj that whatfoever rejijlance there may be in hir4 to that which is good, or to the actings of God upon him \ yet fuch refiftance cannot ht- fairly^ and in juflice^ charged upon him, as his c"a:'n^ or be put to his account. For as it is not in his power to rejirain the evil difpofition of the fer- pent^ v/hen he afts in him -, fo neither is it in his power to rejirain any refiftance to good, which may arife from his natural compofttion \ and, con-' fequently, the ieyith generation v/as altogether as excufabk zs any generation before or after it. For tho' there may be more good, or evil, fhewn forth in one perfon, or in one generation, than in ano- ther ; yet this makes no difference, v/ith regard to man, when he is confidcrM, al>ftracJedly from thofe agents that aft upon him •, feeing the hum.an nature, with refpecl to its inability to do good, or evil, is the fame in every -perfon, and in every generation, fince the fall; And, therefore, the ground of that difference, namely, that one per- fon, or one generation, is more vile than ano- ther, muft be, either tliat God adls more power* fully in one perfon, or in one generation, than another -, or elfe, that the ferpent operates more 'zveakly, and makes lefs refiftance in one perfon, or ia ojie age, tlian in another ; but, which ever of th,cfe tbefe is the cafe, it makes no alteration , with re* gard to man, becaufe he does not a6t, but is aded upon in both cafes. And, therefore, to talk of being pafflve^ in this cafe, as Mr. Barclay does, is very abfurd ♦, becaufe, when we arc pafllve by choice^ with regard to the agency of another, which is the prefent cafe, there muft, in the nature of the thing, be a power and liberty of concurring^ or refifting ; which coyicurrence^ or reftftance^ is a good or an evil adion in us, as it is intended to contri-^ hute tOy or to prevent the good^ or evil^ which that other agent is profecuting. So that here is a power and liberty of doing good, or evil, which Mr. Barclay's fcheme will not admit* Tho' by the way, we feem to ajftime too much to ourfelves, when we confider ourfelves as being voluntarily paffive^ or of concurring^ or refefiing^ with regard to the divine agency. For if God works^ who can let ? If he undertakes to perform a thing by his civn agency ; what agent is there in heaven^ or earthy or M/, which can with/land him^ by oppo* fing his power to God's pov/er ? And if we fup- pole that the natural man can voithftand Gcd^ by oppofing his agency to God's agency, and his power to God's power, zvben a^ing in him ; this, I think, is to magnify the power of man above what is meet^ and v/hich, furely, does not fuit our author^s fcheme. But to return -, As to Mr. Barclay's fyllogifmSy w^hich are under this head of proof, it muft be granted, that ths conclufions are jutliy inferr'd from the premifes ^ but then, all tliat thefe prove is this, namely^ that-~ evil thoughts are not good thoughts^ neither in part^ nor at any time j and that evil thoughts are ufekfs and ineffectual to a man, in the things of God, li it fliould be urg'd, that thefe arguments prove more than I here rtllow, inafmuch as the premifes let forth, not only that man has evil tk:'tgbn^ 1 44 i«^ Jixnmvnation vj Mr, isarciay -j rnnapes, thoughts^ but alfo that his thoughts are only and continually evil \ and, confequently, there is more in the conckifions, than I have inferred from thofe premifes. I anfwer, thefe conckifions are the au- thor's, and not mine, and I only allow that they are jufily inferred \ but if we conclude more from the premifes than the author has done, as the ob- -| je6lion fuppofes we ought to do, then, I fay, that " the Tninor proportions are not proved^ in the fore- going arguments. For tho' the text faith, that every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart was only evil continually j yet thefe words are plain- ly a loftinefs of fpeech, in which, there is more in the exprelTion, when taken ftriUly^ than was in- tended by the fpeaker. And that this is the cafe is evident from the hiilory, of which thofe words are a part ; where we are obiig'd, if we v/iil make the ftory confiftent, to underlland thefe, and fe- veral other general exprefiions, in a limited fenfe. Thus, the hiflory fets forth, that all fiejh had cor- rupted its way upon the earth, and yet it muft be fupposM to exclude Noah out of this all •, feeing it declares him to be a juft man^ and ferfci-zl in his generation, tho' he was a branch of that fiejh ^ v/hich, when the term is taken ftrioJh\ it mud include Mrrk Thus, again, it reprefents God, as declaring that the end of all fiefn w^as come before him •, and yet, furely, it will be allow'd, t\\2Ji]Sioah and his family v/ere excepted^ feeing they were^r^- fo'ved from the dejlru^ion threatened. And, thus it is in the cafe under confideration, wherein the words every^ only^ and continually^ are to be under- flood in a limited fenfe, as cxprelling what gene- rally took place, tho' not fo generally, as to ad- mit of no exceptions. This is evident from the character given of Noah^ v/hOj tho' he was a part of mankind, yet he was ^jujl many and perfect in his generation y whichj furely, docs fupcofe, that he 'An Examination of M'.BdiVcl^.y's Principles. 145 he had fome good thoughts in his heart, ^tfome times at leaft. Befides, Mr. Barclay^ bufinefs was not to prove what man doth, or doth not do, but what he cannot do \ and, inftead of proving the ktter, he attempts to prove the former. It is juft the fame, as if I ihould deny that man can fpeak truth, and then fhould urge the following argu- ment to prove it. If man always tells lies, then, he never fpeaks truth ; But man always tells lies, . Therefore, he never fpeaks truth. Now, tho* the conclufion is here jullly inferr'd, from the premifejs ; yet the argument is not to the purpofe. For tho' man does always tell lies, and this proves that he never fpeaks truth ; yet it does not prove that he cannot fpeak truth j which is the point this argument is brought to maintain. And this is Mr. Barda/s cafe. He afierts, that man has not power, in himfelf, to think, fpeak,, or acl that which is good ; and this he attempts to prove, by fnewing what man does, and not what he cannot dp^ which was his point. But to . proceed, Secondly^ Mr. Barclay urges Jeremiah xvii. o. . fhe heart is deceitful above all things, and defperaiely wicked. But this text, when examined, I imagine, . will appear as little to his purpofe, as the former, v I'he paragraph is as follows. ^ he heart is deceitful ^ ahove all things, and defperately wicked, who can know it ? I the Lord fearch the heart, I try the . reins, even to give to every man according to his waySy . and accordiyig to the jruit of his doings. As the par* tridge fitteth on eggs, ami hatcheth them not ; fo he that getteth riches and not by right, Jljall have them . ift the midji of his days, and at his endfhall be a fooL It is iiere obferv'd, that as the heart is the feat. 3nd fource of wnkediufs ^a man .-, fo it is capiibie of Vol. II. ' L oPiC ji4§- AniLxamnaUono} il^.Barclay'j PrinclpIeK one defperate piece of wickednefs, viz\ deceit^ hf which man conceals his other guilt, and thereby difguife& himfelf, and deceives his neighbour. It is farther obferv'd, that tho' men may thus wick- edly deceive one another; yet they cannot poflibly deceive their Maker^ becaufeto him the moit fe- cret recefles of their hearts lie open ; and, confe* quently, in the illue, they deceive themfelves, fee- ing God, who knows the deceit which is lodg'din. their hearts, will render unto them according to* their works, and according to the fruit of their doings V fo that their hope and expedation will; be difap-pointed^ even as a partridge is difappointed^ that fitteth. on eggs,, and hatcheth them not. This,. I think,, is the fenfe of this place, and all that is^ intended to be fet forth by it. And, as the fcrip- tures reprefent the heart, as the feat and fource of wickednefs in man •, fo they likewife reprefent it as the feat sind four a of that which is good in him; and particularly of that good, namely, upightnefsy and /.^/^^nVj, which is oppos'd to the great evil of/ deceit,, beforemention'd. J^^ xxxiii. 3. Mywordsi (ball he of the uprlghtnef cfmy heart. 2. Kings xx. 3,. / hefeich thet^ Lord, rememkr hczc; I have ijvalkidi hefore thee in truths and with a perfe£l, or upright: heart, and have doyie that which is good in thy fight,. Luke vi. 4^. A good man out of the good treafure of his heart, hringeth forth that which is good, and an- $vil man out of the evil treafure of bis heart, hingetb^ forth that which is evil •, for of the abundance of his- heart his mouth fpeaketh Chap. viii. 15. But that: en the good ground, are they, which in an honeft and- good heart, havi7?g heard the wo7'd, keep it, and bring^ forth fruit with patience.. And as the heart is con- fider'd, as the feat and fource of both good and evil in man -, fo Solomo7i\ advice, in this cafe, is,., 'Prov/\Y, 23. Keep tJjy heart with all diligence, for^ ml of ir are thi iffues. of lijV, T© this I may add, that^ 1^ that, if God had intended to reprefent that deceit and wickednefs, which is here referred to, as the natural and necejfary product of man's heart, he would not have reprefented himfelf, as taking cogmzance of the aAions which are produc'd by it i becaufe this is reprefenting himfelf, as adting the moft unrighteous part by his creatures, in charging them with adions which were out of their power to prevent, as much out of their power, as it is out of the power of a ftone to fly upwards, which is Mr. Bafclay\ fimilitude in the cafe, and which were more properly his own ii5lions^ as being the necejfary froduil of that com- pofition which he was the author of. As to Mr. Barclay* % fyllogifm, which is under this head of proof the fallacy of the argument lies in this > ic fuppofes^ or takes for granted^ that the heart in man cannot be the feat and fource of both evil and good j but this is a millake, as I have ob- ferv'd above. The fame heart which produces evil thoughts^ and is the fpring of evil actions at one time, may likewife produce good thoughts^ and be the fpring of good actions at another \ and this men might be eafily convinc'd of, if they would but obferve the workings of their own minds, and examine more carefully their natural - Irame and compofition. Again, Thirdly y Mr. Barclay urges the v/ords of St. . Paul^ Rom. iii. lo. as quoted from PfalmyJiv. and Pfalm liii. There is none righteous^ ?io not one ^ there is none that uyiderftandeth^ there is no?ie that feeketb flfter God, They are all gone out of the ^xay^ they jare altogether become unprofitable ; there is none that doth good^ no not one. Their throat is en open fepuU chre \ with their tongues have they ufed deceit \ the poifon of afps is under their lips \ whofe mouth is full of curfing and bittn'nefs. Their feet are fivift lo Jbed blood, D'^ftruclion and mifery are in L 2 ihsir their ways. And the way of -peace have they not known. There is no fear of God before their eyes'. The Apoftle's bufinefs, in this place, is, to fhew the gromrdkfnefs of that opinion which the Jews had gone into, viz. that they were the only people which pleafed God, by the obfervation of that larjD which Mofe^ delivered •, and that they only were entitled to his future favours. And this he does, by oblei'ving, frft.,' th^i the Jews were as vile, and altogether as inexcufabie, m tranlgrefTing the M?- faick law, as the Gentiles were, in tTanfgrefTing the law cf nature •, and that the Gentiles were as good and as acceptable to God, in ^heir fubmitting to the law written in their hearts, as the Jews were, m fubmitting to the law given by Mofes, And as the Jews and Gentiles flood upon a level, in this refpe6l ^ io the Apoftle obferv'd, fecondly, that neither of them could have any legal title x.ojuJli^~ ficati-on, inafmuch as they were all tranfgrejjors ; and, confequently, that the jufiihcation of both mufl be of grace, and not of debt. Mankind^ made up at that time of J^-k; and G entile yiYtvolun-- iary agents, who, by their natural compofrtion, arc qualified to difcern and do both good and evil-., and this renders them accountable for their aclions, which otherwife they could not be ; it being moll unreafonc.ble and abfurd to fuppofe a creature an- •fwerable in a cafe, in which he lias not abiUty to know and do what he is accountable for. And a-s man ^ thus anfwerable for his condu(51:, fo God hath appointed a day, in which he will judge him m right eoufnefs % and, fiiially, accjidt him, ot con^ demn him, whether he be Jew, or Gentile, accord- ing as his behaviour has been, whether good, or evil. And, as acquitment or juftiiication mud be either of grace, or of debt j fo the Apoftle affirms, that it is mt of the latter., but of the former, both to Jnvs and Gentiles, foralmuch as thev 'An E>:arninatton of Mr-. Barclay V Prhclphs, 149 they are all tranfgrejfors , This is the purport of the Apoflle's argument and reafoning^ and this is what he undertakes to prove. And as he was writing to Jews^ or rather to the Judaizing Chrif- tians at Rome^ fo he chofe to convince them, by a teftimony, which he prefum'd they would allow, as being a Prophet and writer of their own nation and religion y viz. King David ^ who fets forth the prevailing wickednefs of mankind, according to the ufage of the Eaftern countries, in xho^t Jirong terms, which Mr. Barclay urges, for proof of his point. So that neither St. Paul nor David in- tended to fet forth the inability of human nature in the fall, in the words referred to -, but, on the contrary, they defign'd to exprefs the general wickednefs of mankind, both among Je'ws and Gentiles^ which neceflafily fuppos'd their natural ability to do gocd^ or m/, as aforefaid. To this I may add, if the Apofble had intended to exprefs the itate of man in the fall, in the words referred to 5 then, it will follow, that every natural man, every individual^ his 7nouth will be full of curfing and hitternefsy his feet will be fwift to fhed bloody tec. which, furely, is notorioufly/^^, mfact. Thus, I have gone thro' what I propos'd, and have fhewn, frft, what confequences will una- voidably follow Mr. Barclay's principles^ allowing them to be true. Secondly , that they are erro- neous : And, thirdly , I have fliewn the weaknefs and infufficiency of what he has urg'd, to prove and maintain them. I fhall add but one thing more, viz, if any man Ihould reply, in the common way, to what I have here offered, by .urging a colledion of texts o{^ firipture, as containing in them Mr. Barclay's principles : My anfwer, beiore-hand, is this, either thofc texts, when right /y Ufidcrjiood^ arc confnlcnt L 3 with 'c 50 An Examination of Mr. Barclay^ Principles^ with the nature and the truth of tbi?jgSy or they are not ; if they are, then, they cannot exprefs Mr. Barclay's principles^ becaufe thofe principles are repugnant to the nature and truth of things, as I have largely fhewn : but, if they are not^ then, I prefume, all men will allow the confe- quence^ viz, that fuch texts cannot be of any weight, in the prefent quellion. To conclude, I heartily wifli that all preten- ders to fupernatural light would be modeil in their afTumptions, left they father their own ab* furd and contradidory conceits upon the unerring Spirit of God. Thus, Sir, in compliance with your defire, I have laid before you my thoughts on this fub^ jed:, and fubmit them to your confideration. I am, SIR^ Tour much ohliged humhk Servant^ Scc^ TRACT TRACT XXIV. Human Nature vindicated ^ o R A REPLY T O Mr. BEJFEN's Book, ENTITLED, Supernatural Influences neceflfary to Salvation j being a Vindication of the fourth Propofition oi Robert Barclay' % Apology. Wherein is lliewn. That Man, in his natural Capacity, is a Moral Agent ; that he has Power, and is at Liberty to do both Good and Evil-., and, confequcntly, can render himfelf either acceptable, or difpleafing . to his maker. In a fecond Letter to a Friend. Humbly offered to the Confideration of th« People called Sluakers^ S I R IN my former letter, I gave you my opinion of Mr. Barclays performance, with regard to man's natural ability fince the ff his Majefty., is made a Peer of Great Britain. The thing impUed is, that my Lord King, before his Majefty* s favour to him., as aforefaid., was not a Peer^ but only a commoner of Great Britain ; for, if he had been a Peer, antecedent to his Majefty*s favour, then, that grace could not poiTibly make him to be what he was before. And this is the I'-ery cafe, with refped; to the propofition I have now under confideration ; for, it man is, by a fupernatural influence, put in a capacity of voluntary agency % then, it will unavoidably follow, that man, confider'd abflradlly from, and antecedent to that fupernatural influence, or in the language of Mr. Barclay y man in the fall, is not in aftate or A capacity of voluntary agency. Becaufe fuch a fu- pernatural operation cannot polTibly put him in a ilate or capacity, which flate he was in, antece- dent to that operation. And, confequently, up- on Mr. Barclay''^ principles, man, in his natural ilate is a mere patient \ for betwixt thefe, viz. agent and patient, there is no medium. And tho* the word voluntary is annexed to the term agent ^ in the above propofition, yet that does not help the cafe ; becaufe every agent is free or voluntaiy in thofe initances, and fo far as he is an agent ; a r.ccejfary agent being a manifefl contradiclion. Thus, it appears from tlie propofition which Mr. Beaven has urged,, chat I hdY&juftly and truly re- prclcnted Human Nature vindicated, 157 f fefented Mr. Barclafs fenfe, in the two propofi- tions I have expreffed it by, viz, thatmany as he is in the fall ^ has no 'power or ability to do good ^ and that he is necejfarily determined to do evil, I fay, necejfarily determined, <^c. For, tho' Mr. Barclay^ has not expreffed hmifelf in thofe very terms, yet it is in terms which are equivalent to them -, for he faith, that, as a ft one is -prone and inclined to move down^ towards the center ; fo the heart of jnan is prone and inclined to evil ^ &c. (See the explana- tion of the fourth propofition in Mr. Barclay' s> Apology. ) Now the pronenefs or inclinatian which is in 2,ftone to move down, towards the center, is not fuch a pronenefs or inclination as is in man to liquor^ when he is thirfty -^ be<:aufe this pronenefs fuppofes in man a power and liberty^ either to in- dulge or coRtroul that inclination ; whereas the pronenefs which is in a ftone to move down, to- wards the center, fuppofes neceffity ; the flone ha- ving no power or liberty to check or indulge that inclination ; and therefore, as man, according to Mr. Barclay^ is prone and inclined to evil, in the like manner as a ftone is prone and inclined to move down, towards the center ; fo this pronenefs and inclination, in man, muft be the fame as ne-^ ceffity. And tho' Mr. Beaven has urged the above propofition, as the fum of what Mr. Barclay \\'i% faid upon the point I have under confideration \ yet he intended thereby to ihew; that I had 7nifre- prefented Mr. Barclay's ^^nk^ which is a little fur- prizing •, becaufe he takes Mr. Barclay^ propofi-. tion in one view, intending thereby to deitroy or make void the fame propofition in another view. If it fnould be urged, that Mr. Beaven has quoted from Mr. Barclay's book feveral paragraphs, -wherein the agency ot the natural man is only avowed ♦, I anfwer. this is what I have already al- Uowetl, in my Examinatio/i of Mr. Barclay^ Prin- ciples, ijS Human JNature vinauaua, ciples, £5?^. and, therefore, Mr. Beaven's quotati^ ens were medkfs. But then, what will follow from hence ? why, truly, nothing more nor left than this, viz. that Mr. Barclay' % fcheme is confu- fion^ and 3 contradi^ion to itfclf. Befides, the fiindmncntal prindple^ in Mr. Barclay^ fcheme, I ' take to be this, liz. that mm^ in his natural capa^ (ityy cannot do good^ 'ujithoiit a fiipernatural influence. And if fo, then, man, in his natural flate, muft, iipon Mr. Barclay's principles, be deflitute of moral agency. And, confequently, I have juftly and truly reprefented his fenfe of the point in queftion, in the two propofitions I jiave expref- fed it by. Moral agency confifts in a power ancj liberty to do^ or avoid doing ail that good and evil, confidered as fuch, which comes within the reach of that agency, and, therefore, to fay.^ that a moral agent cannot do good, 'without a fupernatii' ral infiuencCy is to fay a m.anifeit contradidlion ; except the agent be placed in fuch circumftances, 5is that no good adion can pofTibly come within the reach of his agency •, which, furely, is not the cafe of man. Vain and triflings therefore, is that pretence, viz. that Mr. Barclay allows moraJi agency to the natural man \ becaufe fuch an al- lowance is incorjifient with, and deftriiSlive of the forementioned , fundamental principle of his fcheme. This is what I would particularly re- commend to the confideration of Mr. Barcley'z ad- herents ; and I prefume it will be allowed, that they ought either to clear his fcheme from that confufion and coniradiEiion I here charge upon it -, or elfe to give up a fcheme which cannot be de- fended. Upon the whole, it evidently appears that, the queilion oj- point in debate, betwixt Mr» Barclay and nic, is, as I have dated it above^ vi%. whether rnan, in hii^ natural capacity, is an agent^ Human JSature vmdtcatei, 'i jc) ^ent^ or a patient ; which was the firfl thing \ propofed to enquire into. I proceed, next, 1 o examine, on which fide of this queflion the truth Ues. And tho' I tliink I might very fairly cxcufe myfelf from offering any thing, in defence of that fide of the quellion which belongs to me, feeing I have already proved the agency of man^ in my Examination of Mr. Barclaf% Principles, ^c, and Mr. Beaven has not produced the Jhadom^ of a proofs with refped to the contrary ; yet, as the queftion i? now before me, i fhall offer what follows. By man in his natural Hate, I mean man confider'd barely as man^ and as the kind has been propagated down from Adam t.o this prefent time, without any thi^ig fuperadded.. And here I prefume it will be allowed, that the idea, annex'd to the term man^ contains a body fitly organized and formed, in the general, as all our bodies are > and that this body is adluated by a mind^ wliofe principle faculties are intelhgence and aBivity. Intelligence, by which it is capable of thinking or taking in ideas, of refiedling up- on things pad, prelent,. or to come, according as it has received informations, and of looking;- into the nature and the confequences of things, and thereby of fo-rming a judgment of the fitnefs- or unfitnefs of adlions •, and a faculty or power of felf-motion or a^isn^ by which it moves and di- reds the body in that way, and to ferve fuch pur- pofes, as it intends. And as the idea, which we fix to the term man^ ariles from the human com-po^ jition^ as aforefaid •, fo that compofition is the ef- fed or produce of nature^ and not of a fuperna.- tural influence ; that is, it is the produce of thofe laws by which the natural v/orld is governed, aad not the effed of a fupcrnatural influence, which operates above,, or contrary to thofe laws. And as man is thus naturally compounded, fo he is herebv i5a Human Nature vindicated, hereby conftituted a moral agents has power or is^ at liberty for the chufing or refufmg, for the do- ing or avoiding, either geod, or evil-^ and, as fuch, he is accountable for his adions, and is ca-t pable of approving or difapproving himfelf to God. And as the aforefaid compofition is what confti-^ tutes the natural many fo our experiencing in our* felves, that we are thus conflituted, proves to us that we are, in our natural flate, moral 0gents^> Yea, it is by our experiencing thofe powers in ourfelves, by which we prove to ourfelves our very being. How can Mr. Beaven prove to him- felf his own exijlencej but by experiencing in him- felf the principles of intelligence and activity >, ading upon, and dire6ling the motions of that body which he confiders as part of himfelf ? If it fliould be urged, that tho' man, in his natural capacity, is an agent, yet his agency is confined to things natural and rational ; and that, with refpect to things jpiritual^ he is put in a ca^ facity of voluntary agency^ by a jupernatural influence. . To which I anlwer, that agency in man is, at all. timesy and in all inftances and cafeSy one and the • lame thing; that is, it is the fame adive faculty. or power of felf-motion, and the fame intelledlual faculty which excites to, and direds that motion, in all the atlions cf human Itfcy whether thofe adlions.- be natural, rational, or fpiritual y or under any other diftindion which Mv, Barclay has ufed, or which his advocates fhail be pleafed to ufc or in- ■ vent. And tho' the human underilanding may. be enlightened, by a, fuper?mtural influenceytha.tiSy it may, by this means, have fuch truths brought to its view, which othenvife it might have re- mained ignorant of, or might not have attended^ to 'y and tho' thofe truths may become the ground. or rea/onof^ddon to man; yet this does not af-; fed his liberty, nor give him any nezv. agency j he;. is Human Nature vindicated. 161 IS jufl the fame creature as he was before, in that refped ; his adions are performed in the fame way, by the fame natural faculties of intelligence and activity, as they were, antecedent to that illumination. And to fuppofe the contrary is to fuppofe two fets of powers in man, which are the firings of action in him, as I have already ob- lerved in my Examination of Mr. Barclay's Prin- ciples, G>^f. And tho' there is a variety of impe- diments, fuch as Jlotb, bigotry^ and the like, which are bars to the enlargement of human knowledge; and tho' there is a variety of ways by which that knowledge is enlarged, yet that does not alter the •cafe, with refped to the intelle^ual faculty itfelf. The faculty, properly fpeaking, is not enlargedov dimimfljed^ by the enlarging or diminifliing of the obje^s upon which it is exercifed ; nor from the differmt kind of objects which it takes in, whether rjatural, or fpiritual ; nor yet from the different wajs in which it receives its informations ; the fa- culty, in all thefe cafes, being no more than a na~ iurai faculty; and a judgment, formed upon thofe reprefentations made to the mind by a fupernatu- fal influence, is the judgment of that natural fa- culty. And, if action follows fuch a judgment, that aBioH is performed by man's natural facuhy or power of lelf-motion, excited and dired;ed by his intelleclual faculty, as aforefaid. Thus, I have fhewn, that, by man's natural agency^ he perform* xiU the 'actions ^\i\Q\i '^i^ performed by him, whe- ther natural, rational, or fpiritual, z^yix, Barclay has been pleafcd to diilinguifh them. And if, after all this, Mr. Barclafi advocates will 'ftill maintain that man is put in a capacity of volun- tary agency, by a fuperaatural influence -, this is to maintain a point not by argument, but by bare afferiions ; it is lb, bccaufc they will have it to be lb. And, Vol. II. M Tho^ 1^2 Human Nature vindicated. Tho' Mr. Beavm produces feveral inflances^' by which he undertakes to prove that men have been required to do feveral good things^ which were above their natural abihty to pertorm ^ yet, I think > he has failed in this, as well as in the reft. He urges the command our Saviour gave to his Apoftles, to go teaeb all nations^ with an order, that they fhould tarry at Jerufalem, until they were rndowed ivith power from on highy Luke xxiv. 29. Here Mr. Beaven confiders the preaching of the crofpel to all nations, as ^. very good work -, andy truly, fo it was •, and as the Apoftles did not un- derftand the languages of ail nations, neither could they come at the knowledge of thofe languages, injlantly^ by any natural ability of their own *, fo from hence he infers, that they were required to- do a good work, which was above their natural ability to perform, To which I anfwer : That, antecedent to their being in a capacity to teach all nations,, it v/as not their duty \Xi teach alt nations. And, therefore, the execution of that order was iuipended, v\\ they were capable of doing it v that is, till Gody by a fupernatural operation, had brought to their view the ideas of thofe languages, by which the people of every nation conveyed their minds one to another. Here we fee, that the Apoftles re- ceived their ideas of thofe languages, by ?. fuper- natural influence •, and, thus far, they were pafjhe^ Buty in the execution of the atorclhid commiflion, in which they were active^ there is no fupernatu- ral influence to be found ; their tongues, and the organs and inftruments of fpeech to theni^. were' no more than parts and members of their natural hodies. The principles of felf-motion, which were the fprings of aclion in- them, were no other thaa thofe faculties of activity which were parts and branches- of th? hwnan compofition ; and their un-- dorftan dings. Human Nature vindkated. j6^ derftandings, tho' antecedently illuminated in aa extraordinary way, which excited to, ^nd direded thofe alliens, were no other than their natural fa- culties of intelligence ; fo that there was nothing Hipernatural in thofe adions. As weak are his two other inftances, viz. St. Paul's faying, Lordy what wilt thcu have me to do ? And thofe men, i« A^s ii. who cried out faying, Lord., what jhall we do F But does this fuppofe that what was to be done was above the reach of their agency ? No, furely ; for if it had, then, vain was that enquiry. But, Poflibly, Mr. Btavm will here turn upon me, and teli me that I am preaching up the dodlrine o^ Jelf-fufficieng\ a fnow-ball which he throws at me upon all occafions. And here I mufl beg leave to afk him, what he means by felf-fufficien^ cy ? Does he mean that man is fufficient of him* felf, or by his own natural ability, to perform what comes within the reach of his agency ? If he does, then, I own the dodlrinc of felf-fufScien- cy; and, if Mr. Beaven maintains .the contrary, he maintains a contradiction \ becaufe, to fay, that a man c-annot do what comes within the reach of his own agency ., is the fame as to fay, that he can- r.ot do what he mn do. But, if by felf-fufficiency he means an ability to do Vv^hat is above the reach of a man's own agency \ then, I affjre him, that I hold no fuch do6crine. But I beg leave to re- mind him, that, whatever is above a man's agency, is not his duty. God does not require men to do what they cannot do \ he is not fuch an unreafoa- able tafk-mafter, as to require bricks, wjiere there are not materials for the making them. It is not my duty to know that the planet Jupiter is inha* bited, nor yet to take wing and tiy to the »?5C'« •, the one, at prefcnt, i:. -^hovt my intctleclual faculty to difcover, and tlic other is above mv active fa- M z ' culti^ 164 Human Nature vindicated, culty to perform 5 and, therefore, neither of them can be my duty^ in my prefent cirGumftances ; the cafe is the fame, in every other inflance, whether it relates to knowledge^ or practice ; whatever is above our agency, does not come into the line of our duty. Mr. Beaven^ in like manner^ treats vihh contempt what I have * elfewhere laid down, as a rule of adlion to every moral agents whether divine, or ku- man, viz. th« moral fitnefs of things. But I crave leave to afk him, whether this is not a rule of adtion to God, and whether it ought not to be fo to us ? If he fhould fay that we have another rule, ^iz, the word and law of God, to condu^ our adions by ; then, I would remind him that the moral litnefs of things i& the rule and meafurs of all divine commands, taking all circumflances and confequences into the cafe, -j- as I hjive elfe- where ihewn. And, therefore, a divijis law, >^hat way foever it be revealed, is not another, but the fame law and rule of a6lion with the moral ftnefs of things. Thus, I have gone thro^ what came in the fecond place to be confidered ; and have fhewn, that man^ as man, or man in his natural capacity, is a moral agent j and, conlequently, that the truth is not on Mr. Barclay^s, but on my fide of the quellion. And now I proceed. To iliew, that tho* Mr. Beaven has atremptedy yet he has not been able to prove the contrary -, I fay, attempted to prove the contrary , for if he has not attempted to prove the csnirary to what I have now been proving, then, I do not know what he' is at. The quellion or point in debate, betwixt Mr. Barclay and me, is, Whether mm, in his na- tural capacity, is an agejit, or a patient : Whethei* the good and evil, which is performed in, and by many * Supplement to the previous Quellion. t Viudication of God's Moral Charadcr. %S^ Human Nature vindicated. 1^5 £f, ftriEily and properly^ the effe5f and produce of man* s ivill and agency ; ory whether it be the effcoi andpro^ duce of the will and agency of another. I maintain the former •, and as Mr. Beaven has undertook the defence of Mr. Barclay ^ in this point, fo it is his bufinefs to make good the latter -, and what he has faid I now come to examine. Tho' I own I am at a loXs to know what may be properly called argument^ in Mr. Beaven^s book, and what he will allow me to fay is urged in Mr. Barclay's defence, with regard to the queflion before us ; becaufe there is no dired arguing upon the point, but ra- ther a rambling upon the fubjeft ; however, feeing Mr. Beaven if iles his trad:, A Vindication of the. fourth Propofition of Robert Barclay V Apology 5 and feeing that propofition is the ground of the con-^ troverfy betwixt Mr. Barclay and me \ therefore, I fhall confider what Mr. Beaven has faid to incline his readers to be of Mr, Barclay V opinion^ as the ar- gument of his book. And, Fi7'ft, He founds an alarm of danger, which na- turally tends to awaken xhtfear and the refentment of his readers, " It feemed clear to my, Mr^ *' Beaven\ underftanding, that the performance *' of 2". Chubb had a dire6t tendency to flrike at *' the very vitals and effence of the chriflian reli- *' gion ; and to refiedl on the ftupendous million *' and undertaking of Jefus Chrift, the Lord of " life and glory, with regard to the deliverance *' of mankind from the bondage of corruption,, '' and bringing them into the glorious liberty of *' the fons of God." Why, truly, this look^ frightful \ and upon men, who lay by the ufe of their underjlandings^ it is likely to have its eiled -^ that is, it is likely to prevent all further enquir\% For if men's minds can be thus prejudiced againll any fet of opinions ; if they can, be prevailed up- gn to think that thofe opinions arc vile in. them- IVl :? feives*. iCS Human Nature '^vindicated. felves, and deflru^ive to the future happinefs of mankind, antecedent to their being proved to be fo 5 then> fuch proof becomes needlefs^ and all far- ther enquiry is effe6lually barred. This was the pradice of the ferfeciitors of old, and has been in every age fince. They firll reprefenied the prin-* ciple of their opponents, as moil horrid and vile ;, as mofl difioorMirable to God^ and injurious to man- kind 5 and, that being once fixed upon mens minds, as all farther enquiry is needle]} ; fo the heretick, then, becomes the objed: ot contempSy ^nd is thought worthy to be hanijhed from human fo- ciety. Now, tko* fuch a procedure may be fuit-» able and proper to thoie who intend to maintain their opinions by force of arms ; yet, furely, it muft be otherwife to thole who would do it by font of arguments Befides, truth does not need to be defended in fuch a way ; let her but appear in her native fimplicity, and that will be a fuffi- cient guard to her* And, as to errcr^ may we all* fay of her what Jocfb fa id of the Idol Baal^ if he he a god^ let him plead for himfelf Judges vi. 31, But tho' Mr. Eeaven has reprefentcd my princi^ pies, as above; yet I beg my reader to confider the matter, before he gives vent to his p^£lons \ for, as men have fometimes been frightened with fmdows ; lb, if he does not examine the point, it may pofLbly be his cafe here. Man, as I have already proved^ is, in his natural capacity, a moral rigent •, and, as fuch, he is capable of apoftatizing^ that is, of abufing his agency to ' ferve the piw- pofes of vice and wickednefsy ^hereby he expofe$ himfelf to the juft difpleafure of Almighty God. And men, in this flate of apollacy, are, in the language of the Bible, called finners^ and are faid to be lofi. Now, the queflicn is. What Chrift un- dertoofC to do, when he came to feek and iofav€ that whicli was Icf ? Not, furely, what Mr. Bar-^ clay-s. Himicjt Nature viimicated. 167 €laf% and Mr. Beaven's feheme fetf forth, to put men i?i a capacity of voluntary agency j becaufe that ftate they were in, antecedent to his undertaking, and, without it, they could not have apoftatized, could not liave been Tinners ; it being abfurd to fuppofe that there can be finy where there is mt agency. And, therefore, if fupernatural influences are neceiTary to put men in a capacity of voluntary agency y and, thereby, to render them capable of falvation j then, hereby, they are equally neceflary to render them capable of damnation alfo. So that if the title to Mr. Beaven's book had been run out to its full lengthy then, it would have flood thus : Supernatural Inftances necefTary to Salvation and Damnation, For as hare agency does not fave or damn men, fo it renders them equally capable of -either. Thus ftands the cafe, upon Mr. Barclay^ principles. Now, if Chrift does not fave finners, by putting them in a capacity of voluntary agency^ as it is mod manifell he does not ^ then, the quef- tion ilill remains. What he undertook to do, when he came to feek and to fave that which was lofi ? To which I anfwer in fhort ; that Chrift under- took to fave finners, by ufing all thofe methods, whether by internal or external operations, which arc confident with, and proper to work upon mo- ral agents^ in order to bring them out of their apoftacy^ and fo to reduce them, to a 7-ight ufe of thcr agency; that is, to bring them to repentance and amendment of life •, that thereby they might ren- der themfelves. the fui table and proper objects of God'^ mercy and grace. Now, if this be the cafe, which, I think, whoever reads the gofpel with care and attention will cafily fee that it is ; then, it will follow that Mr. Beaven's fears were ^roundlefs , and that my principles are free from jhpft mputaticnshc has laid upon thcni. M 4 Under i6S Human Nature vindicated. Under this head of argument, I fhall confider what Mr. Beaven fays of my principles, with re- fped: to prayer, viz. '* It feems diredlly and un^ '^ avoidably to tend to render all prayer to God, *' for any blelTing, help, or aid from him, for " the performance of any branch of goodnefs '' that will render him acceptable to his Maker, " impertinent, prepoflerous, and ufelefs."P^^^30. But I beg this author to confidcr, whether, if GW kindly interpofes in the hour mens temptations^ and, by a fupernatural influence, brings to t-heir- view fuch ufeful truths.^ as are proper for them tQ refied upon, in order to keep them from finning-^ or, if he prefents to mens minds fiich motives as are proper to excite them to good adiions, which he may do, confiftent with my principles : I fay, I defire to know of Mr. Beaven^ whether thefe are not great favours^ which are worthy of our moil folemn addrej/es and applications to God for ; and that, if we do pray for them, whether fuch pray- ers are impertinent, prepoftcrous, and tifekfs. 1 fhall proceed no farther on this head of argument, be- caufe, I thing, what I have faid is a fufficient an- fwer to whatever there is of this kind which runs thro' Mr. Beaven'^ book. Again, Secondly, Mr. Beaven urges, in favour of Mr. Barclay, thdit he was allowed to be z. very great man^ a man of the Jirfi rank. He was allowed to be fo by the author of the letter in the Britijh Journal, Saturday, April 2'^^ 1723? N° 30. He was allow- ed to be fo by Mr. Norris, who fays that he had rather engage with an hundred Bellarmin's, Hard- ing's, and Stapletcn's, than with one Barclay. Now, admitting that Mr. Barclay was allowed by the perfons beforementioned, and by thoufands moro', to be a vei-y great man, a man of the iirft rank ; yet it will not follow from thence, that his opi-: njon of the point in debate is the truth ; if the judgments Human Nature vindicated. 169 judgments of very great men were to be fet upas the ftandard of trutb^ we fhould be in a very fad cafe ', becaufe very great men have differed in their judgments one from another. Befides, urging the authority of great names is making the ap- peal to fuch ji>idges as, I am perfuaded, Mr, Bea- ven^ in other cafes, will not be determined by. If ' I had urged the epinion of Mr Norris^ or the author of the letter in the Britifh Journal, or fuch and fuch a Pope or Council againft Mr. Banlay ; I ima- gine, Mr. Beaven would have been fo far from fubmitting his judgment to their authority, that, on the contrary, he would have turned them up- on my hands with contempt. He might have told me that this was making the appeal to menj^ who are not conftituted infallible judges -y and fo are not qualified to give an abfolute and certain determi* natfon, in the prefent cafe. And, if this would have been a proper anfwer to me ; tiien, furely, it muft be fo to Mr. Beaven, Again, Thirdly^ Mr. Beaven urges what Mr. Barclay himfelf has faid, in other parts of his book. To which it is fufficient to anlwer, that, with refped: to the point in debate, Mr. Barclay is inconfiftent with himielf. He fometimes allozvs^ and Ibme- times denies^ that the natural man has voluntary agency •, but, fuppofing he had been uniform and confiftcnt, yet his authority is of no weight in the prefent cafe. Again, Fourthly, Mr. Beaven urges, in favour of Mr, Barclay^ what Monro fays, by way of query, v^z. *' I would fain afk thole who deny that any other ^' light is neceifary, in order to know God and " divine things liivingly, but that of reafon af- ** filled by outv/ard revelation ; what tolerable ^' fcnfe they will put on the devout and ardent f ' breathings of the Pfalrnift, Pfl-ilm cxix. Open fJ mine cycy-^ teach ?ne thy ft tut?; ^ o/--* ;;;^ imdcr- ^'Jhndtng, 170 Human Nature vindicated^ "' ftanding^ and the like." He likewife quotes Mr. Locke fpeaking thus : " I am far from deny- >' ing that God can or doth fometimcs enHghten *' mens minds in the apprehending certain truths, *' or excite them to good a6lions by the imme- *' diate influence and afTiftance of the Holy •' Ghoft." To which Mr. Beaven adds ^ully and Hierccles^ This, indeed, was proper to Ihew his reading -, but, as I have not argued againft fu- pernatural influences ; nor have denied fuch in- fluences to be, in fome refpedt and under fome circumfl:ances, neceflTary to man's falvation ; fo I fet by thefe authors, or rather what is quoted from them, 2is, foreign to the prefent quefl:ion. Befides, if thofe authors had advanced fomething, in Mr. Barclafs favour, the quoting them would not have been of weight \ becaufe it is maldng the appeal to fuch judges^ as, I prefume, Mr. Beaven would not be determined by, as I obferved above. And, I am perfuaded, that if I had urged fuch £irgumcnt5 againfl: Mr. Barclay^ as Mr. Beaven does for him ; it Would have minifLer'd to him an oc- icafion oi triumph. Again, Fifthly^ Mr. Beaven urges what I have faid, as iavouring Mr. Barclafs fcheme, and as an evi- dence againfl myfelf , and, accordingly, he quotes my words, which are as follow, page 45 of Mr. Beave?fs book : " If it fhould be farther urged, ^' that man does not receive any addition to his '"- compofltion, neither does God a(^ without the *' agency of man ; but God co-operates with '' man, and thereby enables him to perform that *' good, which, without fuch a co-operation, he *' couid not do : I anfwer, that this may be the ^' cafe, in fome inflances.'* Mr. Beaven having thus quoted my words, he proceeded to make his remarks upon them, which are as follow : r- On which I obferve, if this be the cafe, in ^* fome Human Nature ^vindicated, lyt ** fomeinftances, that God enables man to perform *' that good -which, without lu€h a co-operation^ *' he could not do ; then, his hypothefis of the abi. ^' lity of the natural man to perform every branch *' of goodnefs, without fupernatural help, is ovcr- *' turned by himfelf, and all his reafonings and *' arguments, built on that hypothefis, vanilh *' like fmoak. This fhews the amufement of his *' own fcheme, and not of /l. B. which he un- ^' juftly charges it with, 6ff." Here we fee this author triumphs over me, as if he had gotten zcempleat vitlory. But, if he will be pleafed to read over again with care and attention ^\\ that I have faid upon the fubje<5i:, in the tra(5fc referred to •, I imagine, he will then fee that his triumphs arc groundlefs. For, when I delired rh^ depretiators of m.an's natural ability to give % calc, in which it will appear that the natural man, es they exprefs it, has not abihty to perform any one branch of goodnefs, wliich will render him acceptable to his Maker ; could Mr. Be^ivenhcfo ivecik as to think that, by a branch of goodnefs^ I intended fuch an inftance as is ahtve the reach of human agency, confidering every man's circuiur ftance in life ? and, as fuch, it is not his duty, nor is the practice of it necejfary to render him accep- table to God, Could lie think that I fuppofe ^ poor man, who has fcarce bread and clothing for hiipfelf, has ability to feed and clothe all the poor of this kingdom, when he is deftitute of the ma- terials which confticute that ability ? If he did think fo, I affure him he is mifiaken. And tho* the feeding and clothing all the poor of this kingr dom would be a *very good worky yet it is not the poor man's duty to perform it, nor is the perform- ance of this good work nece£ary to render hini ac- ceptable to his Maker. Not but a poor man has fo far Jiaiural ^bility^ in the prefei^t c■^{c^ as ihat. 'i72 Human Nature vindicated, that, if God Ihould interpofe, and in a miraculous ^tfj put fo much food and apparel into ^/j /j^/- feffion^ he could then diftribute it all, to anfwer the purpofes aforefaid, without 2l fupernatural influence » And tho' this miraculous interpofition ot Al- mighty God renders the poor man capable of ^tx^ jioi'mmg that good^ which, without fuch an interpo- fition, he could not do -, yet, ftridtly fpeaking, this does not add to his natural ability, much lefs does it give him any 7iew agency. For all the hand, which the poor man has in this good work, is pertorm- ed by that ability which arifes Irom his natural compqfition. So that my hypothecs ftands firm and unjhaken^ notwithftanding the attacks of this author. As weak alfo is that which he further urges upon this head, that, becaufe I allow fu- pernatural operations may^ in feme inllances, be necejfary or expedient to reduce men to a right ufe of their agency, like as if a fonffoould do amifs^ it would or wight he necejfary or expedient for the fa^ iher to tell him his faults^ that he might amend them; therefore, he pretends that I overthrow my own fcheme. But how, or upon what account do thofe operations become necefjary^ or ufeful^ on my fcheme ? Not, for want of voluntary agency in man ; not, becaufe he has not natural ability to know and do his duty ; but becaufe he fuffers himfelf to be led away by pajfion^ appetite^ or the like ^ and fo lives in the neglett^ or in the abufe of that natural ability that he has. It is upon thefe accounts tliat thofe operations do or may become necefiary. And, I hope, this will fatisfy my reader, that my fcheme is not fo confufed^ as Mr. Beaven imagined. But further, Man in his natural capacity is a moral agent,, as I have fhewn above \ and if at any time he ahufes his agency, and lives in a way which is unworthy of his mamy character y fuch a cqndud of courfe renders Human Nature vindicated. 173 renders him difagreeable and vile in the eyes of his Maker. And when that is the cafe, then, in the nature of the thing, nothing but his repentance and reformation can poflibly render him agreeable and acceptable to God ; fuppofing God is fuch a wife ^nd good Being, as * I have elfewhere proved him to be. Now, tho' a man be in fuch a wicked Itate, yet that does not defiroy his agency. He is, in the courfe of his wickednefs, as much a moral agents as he was, when htfirfi began to tranfgrefs the rule of his duty. Every criminal a^ion. or omifiion, is the fubjed of his choice-, he has pow- er , and is at liberty to chufe, and do the contra- ry ; and this renders his condu6l criminal^ which otherwife it could not be. And, as repentance and reformation are abfolutely neceflary to render fuch a man acceptable to his Maker ; fo fuch re- flexions and confiderations^ as are proper to work upon him as a moral agent, are neceflary to that repentance. And tho' he is capable of refie^ing up- on^ and amending his ways^ as aforefaid^ and^ there- fore, can do ity if he pleafes -, yet he does not do it, but either carelefly goes on in his wickednefs, without refleding upon his conducflj or elfe ^^- Jiinately perfifts in it, notwithftanding fuch re- flection. This being the ftate of a wicked man, whoever would reform him^ that is, would be an inftrument in perfuading him to reform him- felf; for reformation, flnckly fpeaking, is the fmner's ov/n adl ; it is neceffary^ or expedient^ or proper' that he fhould, fome way or other, intro- duce, or make prefent to the fmner's mind, fuch refleElions as, when attended to and followed, would be to him a proper ground and reafon of his change. And it is in this view^ that I allow iupcrnaturally operations may be neceffary^ or ^r- pedienty to reduce men to a right ufe of their a- * See ?nj Vinaicaiion of God's Moral Character. gency. i ?4 Human l^ature vindicated, gency. So that fuch operations are or may be nc*"' telTary, not to help wicked men to do wjiat they could nor, do, without thofe operations •> but t6 ferfuade them^ if they will be prevailed upon^ that being the fubjed: of their own choice, to Xvhat they could do, but would not, or did not^ 1 Ihall proceed no further upon this head of argu- ment, beClufe, I think, this will fulhce to (liew, that I am not y^X tvnvinced^ upon my own evi- dence; Again, Sixthly and laftly^ Mr. Beaven urges feveral texts of fcripaire, in favour of Mr. Bin-clay^ with regard to the point in hand. So that the queflion here is, whether the Bihk teaches any fuch dodlrine^ viz-. that man in his natural fiate^ as he is the offspring of Adam, is deftitute of agency \ and that he is put in a capacity of voluntary agency^ by a fiipernatural irjiu- ence. To which it is fufhcient to ar.fv/er, that this dodlrine is plainly repugnant to the nature and eh^ truth of things, as I have largely fhewn ; and^ therefore, is abfolately fdfe. Befides, the fcripture confiders man in his natural capacity, as having epoflatized^ as \v2NV[i^finmd^ without once fuppo- fing that a fupernaturai influence was neceiiaryj to render him capable of finning or apoftatizing. And God is reprelented as mercifully interpojing^ not to render men capable of being Apoftates, by putting them in a capacity of voluntary agency -, but to bring them out of their Apofiacy^ by ufing all proper methods of perfuafion, v/hether by in*, ternal or external operations, to bring them to re- pentance and amendment of life. INow, if the cafe be thus reprefented in t4ie fcripture^ as is moil notorioufly evident it is ; then, this is as plain a proof, as the fcripture canpolTibly give, that man, in his natural capacity^ is a moral agent \ has power to ^o good and w/, and is at liberty for the choice ofeither of thefe, becaufe, if this was not his cafe, he tiuman t^ahire viitdicated ty^ he could not Jlny could not apojlatize ; he could not be lofl^ as aforefaid, But, farther in the fcrip- ture, there are fome figurative and borrowed ex- preflions -, as in Ifaiah lix. i . Behold^ the Lord'^ hand is not Jliorteyied that it cannot fave, neither his ear heavy that it cannot hear^ &c. And there are fome lofty and firong expreflions, according to the ufage of the Eaftern countries, in which there is inuch more expreffed, when taken ftrickly, than was intended fhould be underilood ; as in Johyt XV. 5. Without me ye can do nothing. In the firfi of thefe texts God is fpoken of, as having hands and ears \ and in the latter the JDifciples ot Chrill are fpoken, as tmcapable of action . Now fuppo- fing a man fhould found upon the abovementi- on'd words of Ifaiah this dodirine, viz, that God has a meterial body conjiituted of hands and ears^ and formed^ in the general^ as all our bodies are j and, fuppofing he Ihould found upon the above- mentioned words o^Chrifl this do^rine, viz. that many in his natural capacity ^ is deflitute of voluntary agency y in fuch a cafe it would be fufficient to an- fwer, that thofe doctrines are and mull be erroyie- cuSy becaufe reafon and fact fliew the contrary. And, therefore, to infill that the forementioned texts are to be underilood in fuch a fenfe, as ex- prelfes thofe dodrines, is at once to offer an af-. front to the fcripturesy and to tlige underflandings of men. For, as the fcriptures and reafon alTure us that God is a Being purely fpirituai, abftra(fled from body \ fo, in like manner, the fcriptures and experience alfure us that man, as 7na?iy has in him the faculties of intelligence and adivity, which conllitutes him a moral agent. In the prelent cafe, there is no occafionof a ftricl enquiry into the fenfe and meaning of the texts above, or of any other texts of icripture, upon v/hich the afore- faid doctrine may be liable to be founded- For* as tyS Human Nature vlndiccted. as thofe doflnnes contain propqfitions which arc tnanifeftly /^^'^ infaff-y fo from hence it vvill follow^ as the Bible is the 7'ule of truth and the word of Gody it cannot pofTibly contain in it any fuch' do6crines; And, therefore, if Mr. Barclay's adherents lliall ilill mamtain that the latter of thofe dodrines is contained in fcriptnre •, this, 1 think, is to main- tain that the fcriptures are as confufed and contra- dictory^ as their fcheme. To this I may add, thac, what our Saviour faid of his Bifciples^ in the text above, the fame he has faid o^ himjelf diS in John V. 30. / can of mim cwnfelf do nothing. And from ihence I argue ^ if it will follow from thofe words of Chrifl, 'VIZ. without r,is yea can do nothings that man, when confider'd in his natural capacity^ ab- ftraded from all fupernatural iniiuences, h defti- tute of ^ohmtary agency \ then, it will equally fol-. low from thofe other words of Chrift, 'viz, I can of mine ownfelf do nothings that Chriff, when coufider'd in his natural capacity, ab« {traded from the ace and influence of every o- ther agent, is deftitute of voluntary agency cilfo^ But, furely, the latter of thefe will not be admitted, and therefore, not the former. And, From hence, I prefume, my reader, will fee how uiikind^ or rather unjujl^ Mr. Beavcrh charge upon me is, viz. that / mufi think the holy fcrip- tures romantick and wild *, that the Evangelifts w,ere fome of the mojl deftgning or deluded creatures that ever lived -^ and that Jefus Chrift himfelf is not freefi'om fuch imputations^ page 2 of Mr. Beaven's Introduction. With refpedt to which, I beg him to confider what manner of fpirit he is of ; and whether this be the produce of that 7neak^ ^en- de, charitable fpirlt which becomes the gcfpd of Chrift ; or whether it be not rather the produce of that refentment which he has taken up againft me, tfio', I think J without any 7 ^^/'z' ^r^/W„ IIoVv'c- Human Nature 'vindicated. tyf tvtr^ I aflTure him, that I am fo much a chrijlian^ as not to allow myfelf in fuch a practice. Thus, I have gone thro' the principal things, which arc urged in Mr. Barchfs defence. There are other things of lefs note in Mr. Beaven^s book, which I have not yet taken notice of; fuch as his complaining that I quoted from the fourth edition of Robert Barclay*^ Apology, in Englijh. But this, I think, anfwers no other purpofe than to acquaint tjie world, that he is a man of letters^ who has Fiead Mr. Barclay's Apology^ in Latin. And tho' this is Mr Beaven's cafe; yet, I prefume, he does not need to be told that it is not mine. I am ac- quainted with no other language than our own mother-tongue •, neither do I pretend to be a maf- /vT of that, fo as to underftand all the grammar- rules^ by which men of ktJers govern themfclvcs in their writings ; it being fjfficient to my pur- pofe, that I can convey my mind plainly and eajily to my reader *, and, if herein I fhould not be cor^ rect^ I am perfuaded, every ingenuous mind will excufc it. Neither have I yet taken notice of the mighty value put upon Mr. Barclay's fcheme, on the account of its being a mean betwixt Cahinifm. and Pelagianifm. For, fuppofmg it to be a mean- betwixt t^4^nx.y extremes •, yet it makes nothing here- by againft me ; it being fu^^lcient to my purpofe to iliew, which I have dune, that it is inconfiftent with truth, and with itfelf Nor have I hitherto taken notice of that contempt^ with which Mr. Beaven treats what he is pleafed to call my darling notion, viz. the nature and truth of things \ a two- edged fiver d^ with which I am quickly to difpatch the doctrine cf the Bible ; reduce religion to the moral fit- uefs of things •, and difcard and banifh the holy wri^ tings out of the worlds as a collectiin of romantick and wild ftories cf actions dene by men^ impcffible in the. nature dnd reafon of tbi?igs^ &c, Thefc arc fomc of VcL. II. N the ^ HumrnNuturc vmMcap^d, th^fighis which Mr. 3eaveHh^$ been pleafed t& take. But I would beg him to explain himfelf^ and fhew what he would be at.- Would he difarm inankind ©f every gmrdy and lay them open to every impo/iUon ^ that fa when any one of the fpe- eics fhail take it into his head,- that he is under a ^vine impulfe ox ftiper.naturul injiuence \ and, confe- quentiy, that whatever he fliall deliver, as the produce of it, is a dhim oracle \ then, mankind have no rule or meam by w^hich they can judge^ whether it be fo, or not,, but mufl blmdly fubmit to whatever is thus dictated to them, I iay, if this- be his defign in treating with sontempty andthere- l)y endeavouring to defcard what he is pleafed to call my darling wtion (which if it be not, I cannot con- ceive what he is driving at ) then let him opnly avow iu Tho', I imagine, mankind are not fo hezvitched as to give up their underftandings, as aforefaid •, and, I think, Mr. Beavcn pays but ^ mean compkment to the fcriptures^ by confidering; them as a, coiledioji of doctrines and facts^ that will not bear an open and fair examination, So' that the nature -^ndrcafon cf things^ the nature and iruth of thi}igSy and the moral jitnefs of tbingSy muft be fet afide as ridiculous principles to make "way for our receiving them. There are likewife many ©ther things in Mr.. Beavens book, which- Ihave not replied to; but,: then, thefe areperfonai, and, therefore, I difpife them ; and they are fo- reign to the quellion or point in debate, and arc an addrefs to^ the paffions^ and not to t}i€ under- Jtandings of men y and, therefore, I fet them by as fo many blanks. Upon the whole, I think I have fully fhewn that the fcbefne, laid down in Mr. Barclay's book^ is confufedy abfurdy and contradiclmy -, and that Mr. Beaven has not been able to free it from this charge j however^ if he:, or his more able friend^ Ihali "Human Nature vindicated. i;^ fiiail be pleafed to make a rejoinder^ the way is dear before them. It is but to come openly and fairly into the queltion, free from all difguifes and wanderings from the fubjedt ; and, then, I am per- fuaded, the controverfy will foon come to an end. To conclude : I obferve, that the great end and pirpoje of Chrifl's coming into the world was to fave /inner s ; and not to put men in a capacity of iinning. He eame not to make us men^ by put- ting us in a capacity of voluntary agency ; but to make us good men, by ufing all thofe methods which are confiflent with, and proper to work on moral agents^ whether by internal or external operations ; thereby to engage us to repent and amend our ways \ to live godlily^ foberly^ and righ-^ teoujly in this world, and ih to ft and prepare us for the happinefs of another. And, I perfuade myfelf, that, in this view, chriflianity is capable of being defended. ' Once more, and I have done ; eidier man, in Jhis n;,itural capacity, is a moral agent ^ or he is not ^ if he is, then, man, in his natural ftate, has power ^ and is at liberty to do, or avoid doing either good, or evil ; and, confequently, has power, a^id is at liberty to render \-\\m{^\i acceptable ox difpleajing to his Maker, without a fupernatural influence : I fliy, this mult be unavoidably his cafe, fuppo- fing him to be a moral agent. For, if man, in his natural Hate, has not a power and liberty of do- ing or avoiding either good, or evil, and, con- fequently, of rendering himfelf acceptable or dif- pleafing to his Miiker •, then, he is not an agent, but a m^rii patient. And, to fay in this cafe, that there is in nnftn a pronenefs and inclination to fin, is to fay nothing to the piirpofe ^ becaufe, in a free creature^ it is fuppofed that there is a power and liberty cither to indulge of- CG7itrotd that pronenefs and inclination. So that w power and liberty of N 2 doing tSo fluman Nature vindicated. doing good, or evil, of pleafing or difplcafing Godj flill remains ; for if this pronenefs and in- clination to fin either dejlroys or is inconfijlent with a power and liberty of doing good, or evil, oif pleafing or difpleafing God, as aforefaid ; then» it is the fame as necejjity^ and, confequently, it de- ftroys or is inconfiftent with our agency. But if man, in^his natural capacity, is not a moral agent, then, I acknowledge his cafe to be otherwife than I have reprefented it to be •, and, when that i$ iliewn, I will give up the point. However, this, I think, is a matter of the utmoft imprtmce^ and in which mankind are nearly concerned ; becaufc all morality and religion have an apparent depcn- dance upon it. For if man is fuch a creature, as I have above proved him to be ^ that is, if he has in him a power and liberty of doing either good, or evil, and either of thefe is the fubjed: of his own free choice^ fo that he might, if he had pleafed, have chofe and done the contrary •, then, his anions, in every inftance, will be more or lefs re- ligious, or irreligious, virtuous, or vicious, as the motives to thofe aclions, which are the ground and reafon of them, are more or lefs fo ^ and then thofe ad:ions will be Juftly approved^ or conde^jined^ not only in the judgment of God, but of every man's own confcience accordingly. But if mait in his natural capacity, as man, has not a power and liberty, as aforefaid, then, v/ith re/pefl to him^ thofe adlions, which are performed by his inftru- mentality, have no religion nor irreligion, virtue nor vice in them ; neither can he, in )uftice and tqiiily, be approved, or condemned, in his own tonfcience, nor in the judgm.ent of any other be- ing, upon the account of them. And as a power and liberty of doing cither good, or evil is abfo- Intely necejj'ary to render our ad:ions religious, or irreli^'ious, virtuous, or vicious ; fo every princi^ Human ISlatwe vindicate^ iSi pie which deftroys or is inconfifient with human Ttherty. I think, ought carefully to be guarded againft, as being highly injurious to mankind. For when man confider themlelves under a fatality^ and that their adlions are not the fubjed of their own free choice ; whether that fatality be brought upon them by the fall o{ Adam^ or any other way •, or whether it appears under the difguife of another name ; then, not only the exciting or reftraining influence^ which otherwife might arife from a fenfe of the good, or evil, of the a6lion in view, is taken away ^ but alfo every motive to virtue and religion is weakaied^ if not dejlroyed by it ; becaufe, in this cafe, the adlions, which are performed in, and by m.an, are not, flridlly and properly, the effed and produce of his own will znd agency, but of the will and agency of another. And as the fundamental principle in Mr. Barclay^s fcheme is,' that man cannot do good, without a fupernatu- rai influence -, and as this principle is inconfifient with human liberty, as I have fhewn above ; fo the ground or reafon of my examining Mr. Bar- clay, on this head, was not to engage myfelf irt a wrangling controverfy, but to prevent the miflead- ing of mankind in a point of fuch importance. And as, in the foregoing difcourfe, I have fully proved the agency of the natural man, and, I think, thereby have faid all that is necelTary, or that the fubjed requires \ fo I fliall take my leave of it and you, who am, S I R, Tour obliged humMe Servant^ Sec. N ^ TRACT TRACT XXV. SOME SHORT Remarks upon Dr. Morga?t\ Tra£t, ENTITLED, A Letter to Mr, Chubb ^ occafioned by his two Letters to a Friend, &^c. In a third Letter to a Friend. Hum^ bly offered to the Confideration of the People called fakers. SIR, 1H A V E received a letter fubfcribed by Dr. Morgan^ which, he fays, is occafioned by my two former letters to you. The fubjedt of the Borer's letter is chiefly made up of complaints. Firft^ that I offer'd the foremen- tion'd letter to the confideration of the fakers only •, whereas, if I had not been partial^ if I had not made myfelf 2ipar!y-mm^ and the like, I fhould have offered them to the Cahinifticd Church of England^ and to a multitude of others ^ tho', by the way, this, I think, is ufmg the Church of England unkindly ; for, however the cafe were heretofore ; yet, I am perfuaded. Dr. Mor- gan is fenfible that the generality of the Church o^ England at prefent, both Cleigy and Laity, have given up Calvinifm, as erroneous. Secondly^ that I have very much mifreprefented Mr. Bar- clay. And, under both thefe heads of complaint, I am reprefented, as ading a part very unjcin and difingcnuous. As Some Jbort Remarks^ he. i8^ As to the firjl complaint, I anfwer^ that I can- jiot charge myfelf with having any vicious view in this matter. For as Mr. Barclafs book is ftyl'd. An Apology for tht true Chriftian Biviniiy^ as the fame is held forth and preached by the Peofle caUed Qiiakers ♦, and as, I apprehend, Mr. Ear^ flaf Apology is held in great veneration by the people of that prpfefBon, who^ therefore, pro- bably are much influenced by it •, fo I thought ic was fuitable and proper to recommend what I had to offer upon the fubjedl, to their confideration, not in the lea(t intending thereby to make myielf ^ party-man^ or to infmuate any thing which might be difloonourahk to the ^takers. This is the truth of the cafe ; but, whether it will be ta the Boufor's fatisfadion, I know not And, whe- ther I have giren any juft occafion for what he has urged again ft me upon this head, I will leave to the more candid world to judge. Again, Secondly, It is urged that I have very much mif- reprefented Mr. Barclay. In anfwer to which I obferve, that, in the 27th page of Dr. Morgari*% letter, he exprefles himfelf in the following words. " It might, for ought I know, be Mr. Barclay^ " opinion, that the ftate of mankind, con/idered *' merely as fallen in Adam^ without the death of " Chrifi^ or the recovering grace of God thro* *' him, would have been the fame as reprefented *' in your propofitions \ that is, men would have *' been ahfokitely fuhje5led to the po'^.^r of the de- *' vil, and their own lufts^ under an incur able ig- *' norance, blindnefs, and felfiflmefs ; in which *' cafe, man would not have been a vm-al agent y *' or acccuntahle for his aftion^. And, in confe- *' quence of this, man would have perifJoed \\'\x\\ ^' the beafis, or have remained for ever under *' the pczvrr of deaths without any reiiureciivn to ^* life and immortality. And I am tlie more ap^- iS4 ^^^^ /'^^^ Remarks^ &cC, V to think that this might be Barclay*^ opiriioil, " becaufe I take it to be the true fcriftiire account *' of the matter.** Here I obfervc, that Dr. Morgan acknowledges that Mr. Barchy\ opinion of the condition of man in the fall, confidered ab^ ilractedly from ^ and v/ithout the grace of Chrifl, may be, and he thinks that it is, what I have re- prefented it to be, in the two propofitions I have exprefTed it by. Now, if tliis be admitted to be the cafe, then, it is highly reafonable to fuppofe that Mr. Barclay expreifed this opinion in that pro- portion, wherein he profelTedly undertook to treat of this fubje6l •, and if fo, then, furely, I cannot have ndjreprefented him in my two propofitions, becaufe I only reprefented him, as fpeaking his own opinion fet forth and declared in his own proportion. And here I crave leave to obferve, that tho' the Do^or'*^ complaint againft me, of mifreprefenting Mr, Barclay^ makes up a great part of his letter, and is eveiy way reprefented to my difadvantage •, yet this complaint, by his own ac^ knowledgment, is perfectly grotindkfs, Mr. Barclay fpcaks of man under a two-fold confideration, Jirjly as he is in, what we call, his natural condition, viz. man as many or as the na^ iural feed of Adam., or as he is in the fall^ with re- fpe6c to his capacities and abilities, confidered ab* ftradedly from the grace of Chrifl, or any fu- pernatural influence upon him. Secondly y He confiders m.an, with refpedl to his capacities and abilities, when under a fnpernatural influence, and the enlivening aid of Jefus Chrifl,, But, then, he does not confider man, in this lail view, as his fiate in the fall^ but, on the contrary, as having fomething fupernatural afforded him to reilore and recover him from that fall. So that the condition of man in the fall, in Mr. BarcM% fcnfey is the natural itate and condition of evei7 u:an. Seme JJjort Remarks^ &c. iSj man, as he is a mariy or the offspring of Adam^ with refpedt to his capacities and abihties, at all times, and in all places, confidered abftrad:ediy from the grace of Chrifi^ or any fupernatiiral in- fluence upon him. Dr. Morgan indeed, in treat- ing of this fubjed, expreffes himfelf differently from Mr. Barclay^ and fpeaks of man, not what be 7J, but what he would have been in the fall, without the grace of Chrift. Whereas Mr. Bar^ day cxprefles himfelf thus : " All Adam\ pofte- " rity, or mankind, both Jew and Gentile^ as to *' the 'tii^Adam or earthly man, are fallen^ degene- " rate^ and deady* not would have heeii fallen^ de^ generate y and dead. Again, " man, therefore, as *' he is in this fiate^ can know nothing aright;" not as he would have been in another Jlate^ he would not have known any thing aright. Here we fee, that the condition of man in the fall^ accord- ing to Mr. Barclay^ is not any chimerical Hottentot Tahco ftate, which man would have been in^ with- out the grace of Chrift ; but it is the ftate and condition of mankind, which they are in^ as they are barely men^ or the offspring of Adavi^ confi- dered as fuch, without any fupernatural influence upon them. Whether by this different way of fpeaking, which, I find, runs thro' the Do^or*^ letter, he intended to convey to his reader the fame idea of the condition of man in the fall, as plainly appears to arife from Mr. Barclay*^ words, and which, I think, he ought to intend, if he would be ingenuous in the defence of that author; or whether he intended another -i iew of the con- dition of man in the fall, thxin what Mr. Barclay profefledly treats of, I know not, neither am I follicitous about it, becnufe the cafe is not changed by any wrong reprefentation which may be given of it. Man being rcprefenred in a two-fold view by l\lv. Barclay, asIobJcivcd above^ 1 undertook to lS6 Some Jhort Remarks^ &c. to examine his principles, only with refped to one «pf thofe views, viz, man as he is in the fall. And to this I appUed myfelf, both in my Examination of Mr. Barclay^ Principles, and in my Reply to - Mr. Beaven ; wherein I have taken a view of the natural condition of man, confider'd abftradedly from, and without the grace of Chrifl ; and, I think, have fully fhewn, that human nature is very much mifreprefented by Mr. Barclay^ without blend- ing together and confounding his two-fold view of man, as the Do^lor reprefents me to have done. And as I undertook to examine Mr. Bar- clay*^ opinion in this ojie pointy viz. the condition pf man, as man^ or as he is the natural feed of AddLVCiy or as he is in the fall^ confidered abilra6ledly from, and without the grace of Chrift ; fo I reduced his itvSit of this point to two plain proportions ; which propofitions Dr. Morgan allows may be a fiifi and true reprefentation of Mr. Barclay' % fenfe herein ; and that nian in this view, according to Mr. Barclay^ is not a moral agent ^ is not ^r^ countable^ &c. and if fo, then, I have not mif- reprefented him ; and, confequently. Dr. Mor- gan's, complaint is groundlefs^ by his own acknow^ Jedgment. But, then, the Dodlor obferves, that it will not follow from hence that man is a i^tere patient ; for tho', in his natural condition, he is not a moral agent ; yet he is an agent ^ fuch as the hrute beajls are. To which I aniwer, that according to the Dodlor's reprefentation of the condition of man , m the fall, which he thinks may be the opinion of Mr, Barclay^ men, Vv^ithout the grace of Chrift, would be ahfolutdy fuhjetled to the piver of the devil and tlieir own lufis ; and if fo, then, what fort of agency would remain in them, I cannot puncciye j not, furcly, fuch agency as takes place in So7ne fiort Remark^ tec, 3tSy In brutes, becaufe ih^y zvq not cbfotutdy fuhje^ed^ as aforefaid, their actions being the cfiedl of choke or eleP.ion •, forotherwife they could not be agents. A mere machine is ahfolutely fu^jeBedxo the power of the agent, which a<3:s upon it % and pne agent may be ahfolutely fubje^ed to the power of ano- ther, when he has not fufficient llrength to repel force ^vith force •, but, then, in fuch a cafe, he does not aLiy but is acted upon. Whereas, in all cafes, where action takes place, or where there is fuincient frrength to repel force with force ; there both acti-venefs and pajjivenefs^ or action wvipaffwn^ is the produce of choice or election ; and, confe- quently, there is not abfclute fuhjection. So that if man, as he is in the fall, according to Mr. Bar^ clay aad Dr. Morgan^ is ahfolutely fubjected to the pciijer of the devil and his own lufls ; then, in that ilate, he is not an agent ^ but a patient. And this mufl be his cafe, both *ivithout and 'i.ith the grace of Chriil ; except the work of grace confifts in turning 2i patient into an agent ^ which, I prefumc, pr. Morgan will not afhrm. Byt admitting that fuch agency, as In hrut^. hc/ifts^ would take place in the natural man, upon Mr. Barclay^s principles ; yet the Dodlor does not pretend that this is the truth of the cafe ; he only oblervcs, that it appears to him to be the true faripture account of the cafe, and that lie thinks it is not contrary to the reafon of thing$_ or the conftituticn of human nature. As to its be- ing the fcripture account of the cafe, viz, that man, in his natural capacity, is not a moral agents that his foul is naturally mortal^ and dies or periflics with the body, cs?r. This^ I think, is uling the icripture ur^kindly^ becaufe, I imagine, it is out of his power to fhew that there are imy fuch doctrines contained therein. Surely, nothing is more plan and €Z%e?it in the fcripturc^-» thiin that the ivcri of 1 8 8^ Some Jhort Remarks^ &c. of grace confifts in changing men from bad to good^ and not in turning brutes y ftridtly and pro- perly fo called, into me7u And as to its being tlie Bo5fcr\ opinion^ that it is not contrary to the conftitution of human nature, that men Ihould be ki'utesy and not moral agents j in this I can fcarcc believe him. That men may negkoly as well as abiife their faculties, and fo live in a way which is unworthy of and below their reafon^ is eafy to be conceived, and is, I think, the cafe of the Hottentots. But that a man fo well acquainted with the human conftitution, as Dr. Morgan may reafonably be fuppofed to be, can think that bru- tality, and not moral agency, may be the natural refult of the conftitution of man, when that con- ftitution has not fuffer'd any injury by any acci- dent which may attend it; this is whatl am doubt- ful of. I cannot but that think the Dodor his obferved, in the courfe of his pradice, as a fhyjt- aan^ many inftances of perfons who have become delirious or lunatkk^ when they have been under a violent fever^ or fome other diforder upon their confiitutims ; and fo, for a time, have ceafed to be moral agents ; and that, by the application of proper medicines^ the diforder upon the conftitu- tion has been removed^ the deliroufnefs or lunacy has ceafed ; and the perfon has returned again to a ftate of moral agency. Now, the queftion arifing from hence will be, whether deliroufnefs or luna- cy, or whether moral agency in fuch a perfon, be the natural refult of the human conjlitution ? and which of thefe ftates may, ftri6bly and properly, be faid to be the natural ftate of that perfon ? Or the queftion may be, when a man becomes deli- rious or lunatick, whether this arifes from his teafing to be under the grace of Chrifl^ and thereby ccafing to be a moral agent •, or whether it be the ffj^ti of a diforder in his conftitution ? And, when his Bomt fijort Renmrksy Scc^ iSg his dilirioufnefs or lunacy goes off^ whether this be the effe^l of the return of the grace of Chriji upon him, and by its return he becomes a moral agent again •, or whether it be not the effe^ of the re-- moval of 3, diforder from the conflitution, and fo the creature is rejlored again to what is properly its natural Hate, viz. moral agency ? The like may be faid of idiots. For, I think, upon Dr.- Morgarts fcheme, idiotifm is not the refult of fome defiti in the particular confiitution of the idiot, but it is occafioned by the grace of Chriji^ or iifuper- natural influence, being with-held from him/ Thefe are cafes which, I think, are proper to be confidered, in order to our difcerning and judg- ing, whether brutality^ or jnoral agency^ may be the natural refult of the human conilitution. But to return. If it iliould be f;iid, Tho' man, in his natural condition, according to Mr. Barclay^ is ahfolutely JuhjeEled to the -power of the devil and his owa lujis^ and fo is upon a level with the brute beads,- or in a (late helovu them j yet that no contradiction arifes from hence. I anjwer\ Mr. Barclay exprelTes himfelf differently^ with refpect to the natural con- dition of .man in the fall ^ in other parts of his book j^ as in page 144, as quoted by Mr. Beaven : " Jn- " deed, that man, as he is a rational creature, *' hath reafon, as a natural faculty of his foul, '' by which he can difcern things that are ra- " tional," we deny not." Here we fee that the natural man is confider'd as a rational creature ^ one who has rerjcn as a natural faculty of his foul^ by which he can difcern things that are rational •, and, if fo, then, fureiy, he is a tnoral agent ; and this I call coiffftcn and contradiction. Befides, the Do<5lor fays, page 23. *' 'I'is plain, that Mv. Barclay " here luppofcs that the good and evil feedy as he •' calh it, th:ii i>, i\v^ motives '^^nd inducements thai incline IgO S/ ufh and application q( thac *• Vol, IL ^ Y ' ability; 5ro Scripture Evidence cofifidti^dk ability : V/o'iik oitt^ fays he, ycur ownfdlvation wtti fear and trembling \ for it is God who worketh inyott both to will and to do of his good pledfure^ PhiL ii. 12, 13. Which is as if he had faidj feeing.^/- mighty Gcdj who reaps no advantage from the good actions of mcn^ and yet, out of mere ^W- -^7// to them, kindly interpofes and awakens in them a fenfe of what they ought both to will and to do \ how much more ought men to ufe their >utmofl: care and diltgence to conduct their adions a- right, forafmuch as hereby they purfue their own goo dl 2.116. fecure to themfelves t\\t\r own falvation ? For if God Ihews fuch a regard for the happinefs of his creatures •, then, certainly, thofe creatures ought to ihew the ulmfi can and regard for them* felves. Thus, Sir, I have given you a fhort view of the cafe, that is, of the natural condition of m^n in the fall \ and, I think, have difcharged it from 'that confufion and ahfuraity^ which Mr. Beaven and his fcheme have perplex'd it with. What remains is to inquire, wherein the moil material difference Hes betwixt me and Mr, Barclay^ with refpect to the condition of man in the tall ; v/hat the quejiion arifing from hence is •, and what proof has been effered on either fide, Mr. Barclay mai-ntains, that man, as. he is in the fall, ca?:not do good, with refpecl to things fpiritual, by which I underfland what is good in a moral fenfe, without a fupernatural influence ; and that, without fuch influence, he is either by his own na- tural compofition, or by the agency of the fer- pcnt, 7tecejjarily detej'mined to do evil ; and that, this is the natural condition of all mankind^ both Jews and Gentiles: This, I think, appears plainly to be his fenfe, if his words have imy fxed ideas to them; and, therefore, all that complaint which iias been made againfl me, of mifreprefenting Mr. Barclay^ 4 Scripture E:%:idence conftdcr^d^ %ii is perfectly groundlefs. And that this is zjuft FCpre^ fcntaiiqn of" Mr. Barclay" %^ Mr. Beavejts, and the fakers (mk herein, is ipoft evident irqmMr.Bea- fuen^s own rcp;-efefitation thereof j allowing him tp be a proper jpdge iji the cafe. His words are as follows; pa^e 23, 24= ^' Ifgosdnefs be thought fo >* infeparable from the nature of God, as that it is .** not polTilDle fof him to do evil •, what, if evil be ♦^ thought fo infeparal?le frgm the y?;^«/ ;;^///r^ of ♦' fallen and degenerate rpan, as that it is not pof- *' iible for him to do good^ regarding fpiritual ^' things, without the good ^nd fuper natural ope- ^* ration of God in him, to enlighten and quicken ♦^ him thereunto ? Is this to Umil the agency of ^^ man, more thap the agenpy of Gpd is fupppfcd ^' to be limited, as above?'' Here we fee lyir. Beaven conliders evil ip infeparable from th.tfmful mture of fallen man, as that it is not: pofftble for iiim to dp good, regarding fpiritual things, with- out a fupernatural influence.' Which is the fame ■in effe(5t with what I have fet forth in the two pro- pqfiticnSy by which I have exprefled Mr. Barclay^ fenfe of this matter. And tho' the reprcfenta- iion, which is here given of the condition of the statural man-, be put by way of query ; yet, I think, it may juflly be prefumed, that Mr, jBcavcri intended to expjrefs his, and Mr. Barclay's^ ^nd the Shmkers fenfe of the helplefs condition of ;nan in the' fall hereby j or elfehis arguing from a Tiecejfity of doing good, and an impojfihility of doing evil in God^ for ^ like necefTity of doing evil, and ^n irapoflibility pf doing good in man, regarding ipiritual things, without a fuoernatural inHucnce. is no way to Jiis purpofe. And a^ Mr. Barclaf^ fenlc of the conditipn of m^n ii) the fail is, as I Jaave reprefentcd it above;- lb I maintain, in -op- pofition to him, that man, as w^;?, or in his nci* tiii-al capacity ^ is z. moral agent, and, as fuch^ haa Pi in 21^' Scripture Evidence confidei^L in him natural ability, or an inherent power to di both good and evil^ . in a mm'al fcnfe^ without a fu- pernaturai influence ; . yea, that he has natural abihty to do all t\\2X good which is his duty to' do, or that is necejfary to render hini acceptable to his Maker. So that the ftate of- the cafe or point in controverfy is refolv.ed into this ihort ifTue, vi'iS* whether man, in his natural condition as marr, can^ or cannot do good, in a fnoral fenfcrj without % fupernatural influence ? The cafe is plain and obvious, and may eafily be brought to a deci- lion ; it is but to prove the yiegative^ or the affirmct" live fide, of this fmgle quedion, and then the controverfy is\ or ai leail ought to be, at an end. ' I have offered what I efteem proofs on the af-* firmative fide ; and fliewn that man in his natural capacity, without a fupernatural influence, is a moral agent. Now, admitting that I have proved this point, it will unavoidably follow, that man has poive/\ and is at liberty not only to do both good and evil, in a moral fenfe, without a fuper- natural influence; but alio that he has natural ability, or an inherent power, to do all th^t good which is h is ^/^/)' to do, or is necefl^ary to render him acceptable to his Makcr^ without fuch influences. For whatever impctency may attend our fpecies upon the fall oi Adam., it that fall has not dejlroycd our moral agency j as it is moft evident it ha§ not ; then, it will vmavoidably follow, that the ftate of man is as I have reprefented it ^ beeaufe, how weak foever man may be fuppofed to be, his duty Hiuft bear a proportion to the ability h&'has, whe- ther it be great, or fmail. And, therefore, fup- pofmg an adion to be morally good, yet if a man has not ability to perform that a61:ion, or to dif- covei* the moral goodnefs of" it, then, that action cannot he: his duty in thofe circum fiances, neither will God make the 'perfemvince of iinecfjary. to' .. ;' hl3r . 'Scripture Evidence confidtr''d, ix^ his acceptance. The fum of the point is this ; I have proved that man, in his natural capacity, is amoral agent, and, as fuch, has power and is at liberty to do all that good which is his duty to do^ without a fupernaturai influence ; and, therefore, can do it, if he will -, and, confequently, that fu- pernaturai influences are, or may be neceffary, or uJefuU not to render men capable of doing their duty, that implying a contradi5iion\ becaufe, where there is not a capacity, there can be no duty \ but to prevail upon men to do what was their duty, and, confequently, what they were capable of performing, '^»/^i-^^^«/ to fuch influence* Mr. Beaven, in favour of Mr. Barclay, oppofes me. But what has he done ? has h^ invalidated the evidence I brought to prove my point ? or has he proved the contrary ? that is, has he ihewed that the natural refult of the Conititution of man isnot moral agency, and that man, in his natural capacity is not a moral agent ? No ; this he has not done ; this he could not do; and yet this was his point -, and, if he had done this, then, it would have followed that man, as he is in the fall, 'would not have had 2ifmfnl nature, would not have been a finner \ which upon the fakers fcheme he is fuppofed to be. But, then, the queliion will return, what has Mr. Beaven done ? To which, •I think, this general anfwer may be given ; that •he has run into divifions, by which he has either diverted or perplexed the queftion. He pretends, that I have made feveral concejfims, in favour of ^r. Barclay, the groundlefnefs of which I have be- fore fliewn, and like.wife that man may be* an agent and a patient alfo ; and that God and nmn cs- work, in the fahation of man, and the like ; all which '•xvt foreign to the queftion, as I have Ihewn. He iikewife vouches the authority of /r;7/>//^r^, for his opinion > but, furcly, the fcripturcs cannot P ;» make ti^ Scripture Evidence conftder^d% - rnake a falfe p-opafiiio'n true^ which is the prfefeftf cal'e \ tho*, I grant, he is not fingular herein \ almofl all errors among ehriilians being fathered upon the fa'iptures, * Upon the wholes I obferVej that as Mr. Bar- cIu/b fehenie ftands charged with error ^ccnft{fiofi^ and toniradiuiion\ lb Mr. Beaven has not been able to free it from this charge. And it he j(houi4 think fit to appear any more, in Mr. Bcrdafs de- fence, I defire hirh to come to the point, whichj as yet, he has avoided; And I here, once more^ teiriind him what the point is, viz. n. t what man is, and what his abilities are ^^ and with and un- der a ftipernaturai influence ; but what man is, and what his abilities are^ confidei-'d abftraUed^ fromy and uithout fuch influence. Mr. Barclay maintains j and Mr. Beaven has undertaken to de- fend him herein3 that man as man., or man in the falU is either by his (rd)n natural ccmpo/iticH., ot by the ngency of the ferpenty unavoidably decery min'd to do evil 5 and that he cannot do gcod^ re- garding fpiritual things, by which I underiland what is good in a moral fenie, without a fuperna*- tural inhuencSo This I call an error^ and a tnif- teprejentation of hmfan nature \ and,! think, havfe proved it to be fo, by ihewing that, man, in his natural capacity, is a moral agents and, con- fecjuently^ that human nature is not what Mr. Barclay has reprefented it to be. Now, if Mn Beaven has any thing farther tO offer which will invalidate the evidence., whereby I have proved my fide of the quefliion, and which will prove the contrary ; I fliall think myfelf concerned to con^ fider it» But, if he fhall proceed m perplexing and diverting the queftion, then, I prefume, it will not be expelled that I fhould follow him, in fuch a wiid-goofe-chafc. What I have farther to obferve is, that as in Mr. Scr^tnre Evidence confider'*d» Ji^ Mh Barclay\ Mr. Beave?i'Sy and the fakers fcheme, man in the fall is confider'd as incapable of doing good, regarding fpiritual things, with- out a fupernatural influence ; and that he is un- avoidably determin'd to do evil ; whilfl at the fame time man in the fall is allow'd to be 2i ratio- nal creature^ who has reafon, as a natural faculty of his foul, by which he can difcern things that ^re rational ; that he has ^fmful nature, is a ftmwr^ ^nd the like ; this, taken together, I call confufton and contradiction ; and, I prcfume, it evidently ap- pears to be lb to every confidering man, who at- tends to it. And as Mr. Barclay's fcheme is con- fiifed and contradi^ory^ fo this I particularly recom- mended to the confideration of his adherents, in my fecond letter, preluming they ought either to clear his fcheme from that confufion and contra- didlion, or elfe to give it up. But, feeing they do neither, this gives me an occafion of troubling you with a fourth letter, in order to enquire into "the caufe of fuch a procedure, which I take to be this. The ^takers having been train'd up in the belief of this do6lrine, viz, that man, confidered barely as man, -cannot iing and fettling the point in debate j' becaufe, after fuch an exa- iriinationj each party may think their fenfe of icriprure is the true fenfe^ and fo they would end where they began, lliis, I imagine, has often Veen the cafe, and is likely to be io now. And^ therefore^ Scriphire Evidence- confJer'^d. ttf therefore, what I propofe is, that as the Bible \t appealed to, as the rule of truth ; fo I fhall, /r/?, fhevv what qiialif cations are abfolutely necefary to take place in it, in order to render it capable of being fuch a rule. Secondly^ I ihail apply this to the point in hand, by fhewing how any propofi- tion which may be llippoftd to be cbnraincd in fcripture^ \^ ^ffedled by it. From which It will appear^ that Whilft we confider the Bibky as the rule of trtiih, and the ivord ofGod^ the following |)ropofition, viz. That man cannot dt what is tnoralfy gocd^ zviihoiit a fupernatural iiifluence^ ought not to be admitted as the fenfe of faipure^ bt as con- tained therein^ and, confequently, that the urging of texts of fcripture, to proVe the above propo- fition, is trifling in kfelf, and is offering a mani- fefi injury to the Bible, Thirdly.^ and laflly^ I fhall make ibme fliort refiedions upon the whole, .And, ' ' Firft., I jfhall fheW, what qualifications are abfo^ lutely necejjary to render the Bible capable of being .the rule of truth ; I fay, capable of being the rule • of truth ; tor tho' thofe qualifications do not coH^ flitute or make the Bible fuch a rule ; yet, if they were wanting, it would, in the nature of the things be unqualified tbr it. And, therefore, thofe qua* lifications are, and mull be abfolutely and eflen- "tially neceflary, to -tender the Bible capable of be- ing the rule of truth. By the Bible'' s being the rule of truth) I mean it to be fuch a jpfi and cer* fain foundation of ajfenty as will not deceive us, in 'all or any of thofe points which are difcover'd bj It, and whofe credibility arifcs from, and is found- ed upon it. And, Firfl^ The Bible muft be cbnfijlent with the na* ture and the truth of tilings, in order to render it capable of being the rule cf truth. And, here, I Vt'g Ic^ve to re-alTum^ die argument already laid jiov.vi. aiS 'Script are Evidence cq}^,de/d, jdown, in my difcourfe concerning Perfecutidn ^^ and to obfervc, that if there are any propofitions In the Bibky which> when rightly underftood, are repugnant to the nature^ or to the truth of things, all fuch propofitions mull be allowed to be falfe^ And i^t\iz Bible lays down a falfe propofition mom anilance, and with relation to one point, then, it may do the fame in any other inftance, and with relation to any other point. I fay, that this may be the cafe, for any thing we know to the con- trary ; feeing it has not given us any infallible rulcy by which we can certainly judge which propor- tions in the Bible are true^ and which are otherwife. And from hence it will follow, that if the Bibh be admitted as the rule of truths then, the fore- mention'd qualification muft be admitted as an fjfential property of this nale •, and, confequently, every propofition in the Biblcy which, in its literaf fenfe, is repugnant to the nature, or to the truth of things, muft be underftood not literally^ but fgurativcly . And, that 1 may not be mifunder- ftood, with regard to the point in hand, I will give an inftance \ John vli. 38. He that believeth on TnCy faith Chrift, out of his belly Jhall flow rivers of living ''jcater. Now, I fay, that if the Bible be ad- mitted as the ink of truths then, this propofition muft be wvidj^AoQ^ figuratively \ becaufe the term,s of which it is compdfed, if underftood literally, that is, if we apply to them thbfe ideas which common ufage has fix'd to them \ then, the pro- pofition is plainly repugnant to the' ?iature and truth 4uf things. ^ And, firji^ it is repugnant to, or an ImpofBbility in natuje, for rivers of water to flow out of a ma7i's bslly\ fuppofmg, by the term belly ^ be meant that part of a man which is commonly called by that name -, and, by the terms rivers of WMter^ be meant the flowing gr running of fuch krge quantities of water, as we commonly exprcfs by the term nv^rj ; which is the prefentcaje. So "icr^ture t^Jiiince tonftder^lH. aij| tKat, if the foremention*d propofition be under-* Hood Itleralfy^ then, it is repugnant to, and an impofTibility in nature, and, therefore, is abfch- lutely fnlfe. Again, it is repugnant to tlie truth of things^ that is, it is a propofition manifeftly fiilfe in fad •, feeing believing in Chrift has not, in any one inftance, produced fuch an effed, as that out of the ^ehevier's belly have flowed riven ip/'tc'^/^r^ aa afotefaid. And as any propofition, which is repugnant to the nature^ or truth of things, cannpt poflibly be true ; fo from hence it; will follow, that the Bihk\ being confiftent with the nature and truth of things is ahfolutely and ef- fsntiai^ n^cejfany to render it capable of being the tule of truth, Again^ Second^^ Another Qualification dhjohtely neceffa^ ry^ to render the Bible capable of being the rule of* Sruth, is its being uniform and confiftent with itfslf* f the Bible Ihould contain propofitions, which, when rightly underftoodi are plainly inconfiftent ^itb^ and cmtradiUory to each other \ then, one ei other of them mult, confeiledly, be falfe. For ;ho' each of thole propofitions, when confider'd alone, is not repugnant to the nature of things^ tjtid ioi in that refpedt, either of them may be true •, yet if, when they are taken together, one is an apparent contraditiion to the other, of necefli* ty, one of them mull be falje. And if the Bihk lays down a falfe propofition in one injiance^ it may ifi another^ as I obferv'd abovci And, confe- quently, if this were the cafe* then, nothing could tc fairly concluded from the Bihle^ and the Bible would juftly be excluded from being the rule of truth, in any point whatever. And, as the Bibk muft be uniform and confiftent with itfelf, in or* der to render it capable of being the rule oi truth \ (b, coniequently, if there are any propofitions in it Vhich feem to clafh with^ and to coritradifl each ©iiicr, then, one of thefe muft jidd vd the other ; t±6 Scr/phird 'Evidence cmftier^L that Is, the fenfe of one or other oiF them rriuftf ht Jo changed^ from what-it appears to be, as that- thofe feeming contradi(flory propofltiQns maybe ■^tx^tdiX^ reconciled. Again, thirdly ^ and laftjy'i [Another qualification ahfo^ hitely necejfary^ to render the Bible cap'ahk of being the rule of truth, is^ tiiat it mull be a ^r^/?^r ^Z- plication to the tinderjiandings of men 5 by which I mean, that the author muft intend to be underftooi in all * that is therein contained. 5 and, confe* quently, that thfe Bible mufi cpntain only fuch fubj0s^ as are difcernible by, - and come wichirt the reach of the human underftandingy - And thof^ fubjeds muft be dfliver'd in fuch d^ay^ as is like-. ly not to mijleady but to inform mankind! For if the Bible was intended to be und^rftood, only in fome parts of it, and if the author intended that the other parts fhoiild not be underftood ; thenj the Bible is m^mlijled for being the rule of truth, in any point ; becaufe it has n6i giVeri us any rule by \vhich we'Can judge, which parts are intended to be underftood, and which not ; fo that thofc parts of the Bible yf\i\Qh. feem to us^moft plain^ and from which j- we think, - we teceive a true in- formation, may be the mejl difficult i and may only lei^ve more efFe6i:ii ally to mijlead -us.'' Pfay, that t\m may be the cafe, for any things we know, oi for any grounds we .haVe^ from 'W^l^hce we may jiiftly conclude the contrary. For- as every proi- pofition contained in the Bible- i% exprefled in words,' which coinmon ufiige has -fixed- ideas to, and >sfwe-have no rule' laid down iri' the- j5^^,. b^f- j which we (fan forin a judgment -in" v the prefenc cafe ; fb from hence it- will follow, that we- muft be under the great'efi uncertainty r^Mxoh. propoii-^ ' * l\6tc\ I here exceptall prophecies out of the cafe ; for a* ihey cannot, in _ the nature of the thing, be evidences, until they are compleated ; fo the undcrftanding them, before theif completion, is ©f no ufe, . . ' . ^* . . tiohs Scripture \Evidenu cmjider^i. t2t 'tiohs 2irt intended ioht underllood", and which not; -and, therefore, if the Bible be admitted as th^ruk oi truths then, the aforelaid quahfication muft be admitted as an ejjential property of this rule. Anc^ if the Bible was intended to be underftood, in all the parts of it, then, it mufl contain only fuch fubje^fs as are difcernibie by, and come within the reach of the human underjianding ; and all fub- jedls, that are above it, are neceflarily excluded fromi the Bible, For tho' there may be in nature fuch fubjeds as are above the human underftand-^ ing, that is, of which we are hot capable of taking in any ideas concerning them •, yet, if there were any fuch in the Bibky they would be exprefled in words which have certain ideas annex'd to them by common ufage. And this would involve us in the difficulty I mention'd above ; feeing, as I ob- ferv'd, we have no rule by which we can judge, which fubjeds come within the reach of. the hu* man underilanding, and which are above it ; and, confequently, if this were the cafe, then, the Bible would juilly be excluded from being the ?'ule of irutb^ in any point whatever. Again, if the Bible is intended to be underftood, in all the parts of it, then, the fubjedts therein contained muft be delivered in fuch a "duay^ as is likely not to rm/lead; but to inform mankind ; for if there were fome propofitions in the fcriptures delivered in fuch a way, as naturally and apparently intended to mif^ kad us, and, if the ufe of language V72i% perverted^ in fome inftances ; then, it might be fo, in a thou-- fand more, -or "in any inftance which might be re- ferred to, feeing it has. not given us any infallible rule^ by which we can judge, when it deals fairly and candidly with us, and when otherwife; neither is there conitituted an infallibae living judge^ to give an abfuliiteand certain determination, m.the pr6- icnt cafe. And, confequently, if this were the cafe. ■^%t &ripf.urs Evidence cortjider^l^ cafp, then, die fcripturcs would be ju&ly exciuJ^J ircm b«ng the rule of truth, in any point what- ever. God is a Being, in whom all 77toraI j>er^ fe5iiom take place, in the higheft degree -, and as lie could not have any low or mean end, in giving a revelation to his creatures, fo much lefs would Jie do it in a way, which naturally and apparent^; iy tended to miflcad them. The right informing; our mnds^ and the right condudmg our U'V£S.^ mull be ;lie ends, which a wife and a good God had in view, i» giving a revelation to manl^ind ; ?ind, therefore, he would certainly give it in fucb ji way, as was Tuojt fubfervient to thefe ends. An4 tho' diftance of time and place, the alteration of languages, the errors of tranlcribers and trandar tors, and a variety of other things may introduce ^rvrs into the text, and Jay a foundation for mif- takesy with refped to the fenfe of ibripture ; yet this does not alter the c^fe, with refpeft to the in.'- tentim of the author. He muft intend it for a fublick gendy and, therefore, muft intend that it ihould be underjlcod, Let us, then, take hee(^ tow we xeprefent the Bibk^ as a dark and a myi- fimous revdation ; for this is to confider it, as in- tended only to put the human underftanding upon ^c rflck^ and to perplex and miilead it, Man ii paturally an inquifitive creature ; and if a revela»- lion comes forth, under the charajfter of dhine^ thi$ chara6ler heightens his inclination to look >nto it, that he may knovv what his Creator fay* fo bivfy and .cmcernmg him. And as God's end, in jgiving a revelation, was, that it might rightly dir %&^ our minds and lives -, fo the nature of the thing requires that it be deiiver'd in fuch a way, »s is moii plain and eafy to be underftood. And^ ponfequently, if we admit the Btble to be tlie rule pf truth, and the word of God, and yet confider ^ as a dark an^ myilerious revelado^ ♦, this is ta reprefent Scripture Evidence ccnftder^d, 223 rcprefent It, as unworthy of that Being whom we confidcr, as its Author. Note: Thofe propofitions in the Bible ^ which VLVtfelf' evident^ or which are the necejfary refult of propofitions that are felf-evident, that is, whofe evidence arifes from the nature of things \ thefc are out of the cafe j becaufe thefe are true in them- felves, and, upon a due examination, will evi- dently appear to be fo, whether the Bible be ad- mitted as the rule of truth, or not. So that the propofitions, which come into the prefent quefti- dn, are fuch only, as are difcoverabk by the Bible^ and whofe credibility arifes- from, and is founded upon it. If it fhould be urged, that tho' there is not any thing deliver'd in the Bible ^ with an intention to miflead mankind, nor any fubjeds contained there in, that are absolutely above the reach of the human vmderftanding-, yet there may be fuch as are above it. confidering man in his fallen ftate ; and that» God may interpofe, and, by the operation of his fpirit^ enable men to underftand the fcriptures, and tncreby to take in thofe fubjedls, which, antece- dent to his interpofition, they were not capable of difcerning. \anfwer\ this is reprefenting Almigh- ty God, as adling a very firange part by his crea- tures j man is confider'd 2,% fallen^ before the re- velation was given, and this revelation is given him in his, fallen flat e^ confider'das fuch; yea, his being fallen is the occafion of this gift of God ta him ; and, yet, it is fuppofed that part of it is ftbove his capacity to underftand. And this is fo intermixed, without any rule q{ difiinttion^ as that not any thing can htjuftly and certainly concluded from it, which muft render it, in a great meafure, ufelefs. And fuppoling God does interpofe^ and, by his fpirit, imprefs up jn men*s minds thofe truths ^ 'Which lie concealed in the fcriptures, and giv« men a i24 Scripture Evidence confider^i* 9 capacity to take in thofe fubjecls, which, ante* cedent to his interpofition, they were not capable' of difcerningy yet this does not alter the cafe at all; bccaufe it is not from the Biiky bvit from xh^fpi- tit, x\\^i fallen man receive his imprefllons, his in- formations, and his capacity, as aforefaid ; fo that the Bible ^ upon this fuppofition, is but of little ufc to mankind. And upon a fuppofition, that fallen man is under an iricapacity to underfland the fcriptures j then,, I would afl^, how any man can certainly kucw-, or have any rational faiisfa^tony that the impreffions he is under are divine^ or that the ideas he takes in by thofe imprefllons are truths^ or not* If it fhould be faid, that thofe imprefllons the jdea of a proportion by a dhlne imprejjion, wilj Scripture Ei4dence confider'd, will enable h}m t6 take in the iden of the fam6 propofition by a divine revtlatimu - It it fhouid be faid^ that the triith of the pro- pofition, and the divinity of the imprelfion, are evinced by the pleafiire and j^atisfaction that arife from .fuch iinpreffions, and irom the truths con- ;yty''d by them •, I anf-jner^ that this cannot afford any rational fatisf actions and that it makes way for any deliifion \ becaufe, when a man is perfuaded that he is under a divine impreflion) and that the proportion, which is prefent to his mind, is a divtne truth ^ this perfuafion will be a founda- tion for pleafpre and latisfadion to him, whether it be "jjeil or /// grounded 5 that is^ whether he be deluded^ with regard to the divinity of that imprel- (ion, and the truth of that propofition^ or not. Again, if the truth of the proportion, and the divinity of the impreflion, are to be inferred from ^he force and firength of the imprefllon on the mind ; then, man is in a very unguarded ftatej and lies open to all delufion and impofiticn^ becaufe not only when we are afleep^ but alfo in our i:;aJd'g hours^ many ideas llrike/?m^/v on the i- magination i and, if they are cherifhed and in- dulged, will make a Jlrong imp'ejfon on the mind, will raife our defires^ ouv hopes ^ ox fears ^ or v/hat- ever paffon they are fuited to aficcl. And this v/ill be the cafe, whether the objeGt be rcal^ Qi-f^itious, So that if the firength of imprelTions is made the mark of their divinity, then, a door is opened to the 1110(1 wild and extravagant cntbufiafn. A- gain, if the divinity of an imprcifion, and the truth of a propofition thvis prefented to the mind, are to be inferred from the ccnfornnty ol that pro- pofition to the fcriptures \ then, fuppofmg that die truth of the propohtion will /;//(;•:.-; troni hence^ yet the divinity of the inprefTion is yiol^ in the leaft, -proved by \i-^ bttaule, whilil ^y^-c confider the .5/- " V.QL. \l Q hlr. 2 26 Scripture Evidence conpMr*d. hk as the word oi God^ it is very natural for thofe fropofitions which we difcover, or think wc difco^ ver in it, to occur frequently and ftrongly to our minds, without a divine iiTiprefTion to product them. To apply this to the point in debate, becwixt flic and the fakers : I will fuppofe a man t6 have this propofition ftrongly imprefTed upon his mind, viz. That man cannot do what is morally goody without a fupernatural influence^ and that thft imprcffion and t\\t propofition afford him a great deal oipkafure and delight. Then, the queftion wili be, what rational fatisJa£fion he can have, that the impreflion is divine^ or that the propofition attend-^ ing it is the truths if th^ Jlrength of the imprefli-*' on, or the pkajure which attends it, be made the mark ? Then, here is no rational fatisfad:i- on, becaufe ^rror and delufwn may tlrike the mini as ftrongly^ and may afford as much pkafure^ as truth itfelf. If the proportion's being confiftent with or contained in fcripture is made the mark ; then, with refpetl to the divinity of theimpreffion^ here is no rational fatisfadion, becaufe here is nothing, from whence fuch a conclufion may jujlly and certainly be inferred. And, as to the truth of the propofition, the appeal is removed from the imprejjlon^ and made wholly to the Bible, And, if the evidencCy tor the truth of the above propofition be fuppofed to arife pnly from t\\t fcripture^ then, man is fuppofed to be qualify *d to judge of the fenfe of fcripture, independant of any divine imprefTions y and the fcriptures arc fuppofed to have all thofe qtuilifications^ which are abfolutely neceffary to render them capMe of being the rule of truth ; one of which qualifications is, that they muft be confiftent with nature and the /?7>'/.^ ol things : for otherwif^ nothing can ratio^. nally and certainly be concluded from them, as I have • scripture hvtmue covjider a, 227 have lliewn aboye. And, therefore, if the fore- going propofition, viz^ Th^t mav, cannot do ivhat is morally goody Ktnthout a fupernatural influence ^ hje repugnant to the nature or truth of things, as I fhall hereafter fhew that it is repugnant to both; ^nd if the Bible be the rule of truth, as it is here fuppofed to be ; then, it will unavoidably fol- low, not only that the ^takers tnifreprefent tlie icriptures, by reprefenting them as containing the above proportion, but alfo that they are not under a divine impulfe^ when that propofition, is impreffed upon their minds as a fcripture truth. Thus, I "have gone thfo' what I propofed, in the firjt place, and have fhewn, what qualifica- inons are abfolutely neceltary to take place in the Bible i'm order to render it capable of being the rule of truth, I now procpejd. Secondly^ To apply what I have before laid down to the point in hand, by Ihewing how any propo- fition, which may be fuppofed tp be contained in fcriptur^/ is affected by it \ from which it v/ill ap- pear, that whilil we confider the Bible as the nile of truths and the zvord of God, the follov/ing pro- pofitioil, ^iz. That man cannot do "jchat is morally ^oodj '■jjithout a fuper natural influence, aught not to 1)6 admitted as the fcnf^ of fcripture, or as con- tained therein; and, confequently, that the urging tcjits of fcrjpture, to prove the above propofition, js trifling in itfelf, and is offering a manifeil injury to the Bible, And, here, I obferve, that tho' the forementioned .qualifications dp not^afrord us a rule of judging, what is j;he tri{e fence of fcriptiire in' any one inltance^ yet they do afford a certain rule jL)f judging, what is not the fence of fcripture in a variety of cafes, and fo are a proper guard and fecurity againll manifold errors. And, theiTfbrc, w;th ,ref})e(^Vtoany doctrin^c or propofition, which i^iay be lirppofedto be cpr rained in fcripture, the Q^l queftion queflion arifing from hence will be, whether that doclrine or propoiition appears to be conftftent with, or to be repugnant to the naUire,ov truth of things? If it does not appear to be repugnant to the na- ture or truth of things, then, it will follow, that the dodrine or propofition may be contained in fcripture ; I fay, may be contained, becaufe that is all which will follow from hence. For, whe- ther it is contained in fcripture, or not^ that mufl be proved from Juch evidence^ as is neceflary to determine that point. But if any dodrine or pro- pofition, _ which may be fuppofed to be contained in fcripture, does, upon examination, evidently appear to be repugnant to tlK nature or truth of things j then, it will unavoidably follow, not on- ly that that doctrine or propofition is falfe^ but alfo that /■/ is not contained in fcripture. For as the fcripture is • the rule of truths and the "ucord of God^ fo it cannot polfibly contain in it any fitch dodrine or propofition, as aforefaid-, feeing we arc afTured from the nature of the thing, that God will not, thus attempt to impoje upon and mijlead his creatures. Thus, fuppofing it jliould be urged, that the following propofition is contained in fcripture,, fH'Z. That i'Od has predcterminedy that a multitude ef men ft all be exjtremely and eternally rrdferable in miother -ivorld *, and, that this determination is the rejult of mere fovereign pleafure^ confldered ah ftr acted- ly frcm thofe w-er^s volunlarily^chujmg to make them-- felves the proper object of his difplecfure •, then, the queftion will be, v/hether this propofition be f^;2- fiftent with, or repugnant to the nature or truth of things 1 In anfwcr to whicli, it is to be obftrr- ved, that as fuch a conduct is extremely unjuft and cruel ^ snd comx^iy lo ''Jinfdom< ^nd true good^ Tiefs -, and as God cannot but fee the uiifit'nejs and ^jilcnefs of fuch u b;rhaviour •, and as h^ Cannot poflibly Scripture Evidence CQnftder''d. 229 poflibly be under any temptation to evil \ fo from hence ariles a moral certainty^ that he will not, out of mere humour, make and ordain his creatures to be extremely and eternally miferable, as afore- faidi and from hence it will follow, not only that the above proportion is falje^hwx, alio that it can- not be contained in fcripture ; becaufe we are af- fured that God will not publifh fo notorious a /^Z- Jhood to this world. And, therefore, if any man llioyld attempt to prove the above propofition frora the Bihle^ and, in order thereto, fhould col- led a great number of texts, and infill that thofe texts, vf\\tn juftly explained and rightly undcrftoody do contain in them that proportion -, this would be perfed:ly vain and trifling ; becaufe as the Bi- ble cannot polTibly make a falfe propofition true ; fo it mull not be admitted that the Bible contains in it fuch a propofition, whilfl it is confidered a^ the rule of trulhy and the word of God, And ta infill, that it is contained therein, is to offer a manifefl injury to the Bible. Again, Suppofing it fhould be urged, that the dodlrinc o^ tranfubftantiation in contained in fcripture; that is, that a particular compofition of particles of matter, which, being applied to the fenfes, railes in us tht idea of bread, does, indantly, upon the pronouncing a particular form of words, called confecration, by a chriflian priefl, being alike ap- plyed to the fenfes, raife in us the idea oi flejh ; then, the queftion arifing from hence will be, whether this dd6lrine be confiftent with the nature and with the truth of things ? That it is confif- tent with the nature of things ? I think, muflbe granted •, becaufe, I prefume, it will be allowed, that God cayi, if he pleales, intcrpofe, and change bread into fleili. This b^^ing allowed, the quefti- on v> ill be, whether the doctrine of tranfubltanti- ^rion be co;ifij;cnt with the truth of thing r that i^, Q 3 whether i^b Scripturt Evidence covfidei-^a, wlicther it be irue^ ovfalfe^ in fad, that God doc?^ thus, interpole, and change bread into fiefh, up- oni the prieft's pronouncing the words of confer tratibn ? And forafmuch as it evidently appear^ from experience^ that no fuch change is wrought^ as is here fuppofed, but, on the contrary, the particular conipontion of particles of matter, up- on which the change is iaid to be made, appears to be bread, after confecration, a$ much as be- fore it % fo from hence it will unavoidably follow^ rot only that the dodlrine of tranfubiiantiacion i$ falfe^ but alfo that no fuch doclrine is contained in fcripture \ becaufe we are affured, that God will not be guilty of fO mucfi falfbocd and im- pcfitivh* If it riioUld be faid, that the afore faid change Is wrought, and that what was hread^ beiore con- fecratibnv is truly ffefh^ after it, tho' it appears Otherw4fe to our fenfes \ I anfiver^ what the parti- cular compofition of particle!? of matter referred to is>i when confidered abflraftediy from the hn^ preffion it makes upon our fetifes^ and the idea it raifes in our minds thereby, we know nothing of^ nor have any, idea concerning it ; and, therefore^ cannot have any term to exprefs it by. And as its ftriking our fenfes in a particular 7ndnner^ and its raifing in our minds a particular idea^ is what alone brings it under the denomination of breads fo its flriking our fenfes in the fa772e manner^ and its raifmg hi our minds the fame idea^ after confe- trationj as before^ will fhev/ or prove it to be ilri<5lly, and properly^ and truly breads in both tafc \ and, confequently, that there is no fuch change as is pretended, becaufe ^;.^^v>;;r^ and/^r/ fnew the contrary^ Again, Suppofing it fhail be urged, that thfe follow^ Ing propofition is contained in the fcripture, viz), l^hat man cannot do what is mcraliy gocd^ withoui Stripture Et-idence corifider'd, si 31 * fupematura! influence ', then, the quellion will be, whether this propofition htconfiftent with, or repug- nant to the nature or truth of things ? In anfwer to which, I oblerve, tliat, in my Examination of Mr. Barclay^i Principles, and in my former Rep/y to Mr. Beaveny 1 have fhewn that rhan as many or in his natural capacity^ is a moral agent^ and, as iuch, has in him an inherent power, and is at li* bcrty not only to do what is morally goody but alfo all that good which comes within the reach of his agency ; and, confequently, all that good which is his duty to perform, and which Is necejfary to render him acceptable to his Maker. This being the truth of the cafe, it follows that the above propofition is plainly repugnant to the nature and truth of things. It is repugnant to the nature of things, it being an ahfurdityy and a con tradition in terms, to fay that a moral agents which is the cafe of man, cannot do what is morally good, without a fupernatural influence ; becaufe moral agency confifts in a pcjuer and liberty of doing all that moral good and evil, confidered as fuch, which comes within the reach of that agency. It is likewife repugnant to the truth of things, be- caufe experience and fact fhew the contrary ; fee- ing all that moral good and evil which man per- forms, in all common cafes at lead, is performed by that ability which arifes from his natural compofi- tion ; and from hence it will follow^ not only that the above propofition is falfe^ but alfo that it is fioty nor cannot be, contained in fcripture *, be- caufe the fcripture, as it is the rule of truth, and the word of God, cannot polTibly contain in it a lalfhood. And, therefore, if the fakers fhould make a large collection of texts of fcripture, and infift that thofc tcxts^ when juftly explained and tightly t^nderflood, do contain in them the above (4^ 4 propo^ "n^z Scripture Evidence c&rftder^d^ ^rcpofitlcn ; this would be exceedingly "vain and trifling. For as the point in controverfy is not^ whether that propofition be contained in fcrip- ture, but only, whether it be true^ or fal[c \ fo^ if v/hat they iafiit on were granted, it would not ferve their purpofe ; becaufe a thoufand ttxt% of fcripture cannot poflibly make a falfe pro-' pofition true \ which is the prefent caie. And all that would follow from hence would be, that the Bihle u not the rule of truth, nor the word of God, becaufe, in fuch a cafe, it would be defittute of one of thofe qualifications, which are abfoluteiy and elTentially neceffary, to render it capable of being fo ; than which, I think, no- thing can be more injurious to it. But this is not to be admitted.-, for as the ^akers^ by making their appeal to the Bihle^ in the pre- fent controverfy, do fuppofe and allow it to be the rule of truth, and the word of God ; fo, I think, this is virtually allowing that the Bihlt has all thofe qualifications which are abfoluteiy and eflentially necelTary, to render it capable of being fuch a rule. The unavoidable confequencc? of which is, that the above propofition is noty or cannot pofTibly be contained therein. I Ihall purfue this argument no farther -, becaufe, I think, the cafe is as plain, as that the whole is equal to all its parts, or as any other felf- evident propofition ; and becaufe if what I have here offered is not fufiicient for the ^takers con* vic^tion, then, I think, nothing can be offered which v/ill be fuificient for that purpole ; for it men will not be determined by thofe common principles which are the grounds of certainty, in 'A\ cafes where natural or moral certainty is at* tamabiC. then, they are not to ht argued with, ^ecaufe they difcard thofe principles, whi^h arc Scripture Erjidence conftdered. 235 are the foundation of argument, in all cafes, t come now, Thirdly mid laftly\ To make Ibme Hiort reflec- tions upon the whole. And, firft^ I obferve what great influence education., ^uidgar opinion^ and the like, have upon the minds of men ; and what bars they are to their convi^ion-, inlbmuch tliat, where the judgment is biafled by thefe, there the moft clear and convincing evidence proves un- fuccefsful. Thus, the Papijis go on, one gene- ration after another, to believe the dodrine of tranfuhfiantiation^ tho\ in every inftance in which it is pretended that bread is changed into fiefli, they y?f, and feel., and tafle that it is fl:ill bread ; and fo they believe, in oppofition to the molt clear and certain evidence from experience to the con- trary. Thus iikewife the Calvin\jl perfifls in the belief of the doctrine oi ahfolule election and rtpro^ bation^ in oppofition to the mofl: convincing evi~ dence of rcafon •, and thus the fakers go on in believing that the natural man cannot do good., re- garding fpiritual things ^ iiithout a fupernatural in- fiiience^ in oppofition to fuch evidence as is equal to mathematical demonltration, arifmg from rea- Jon and experience^ Alfo if it be afked, what Ihould be done for fuch men, whofe judgments 2L\:taiaJfed and vii/led., as aforefaid ? The anfwer is, that fuch arguments and reafonings, as are proper for their Convidion, ought to be propcfed to them, that if haply they may, fome time or other, exaxninc things with freedo7n and impartiality., and be wrought upon thereby. But if they Ihould con- tinue under the poiver of their prejudices, then. It remains, that he, that is a Papi/iy will be a Papiji fiill ; he, that is a Cahiniji, will be a^ Cal- linijl Jim ; and he, that is a ^^uaker^ will be a ^aker JiilL Again^ Secondh^ 234 Script we Evidence conftder'd. Secondly^ I oblerve that as the Bible is made % common parent to manifold errors^ as in the in- ilances above ; fo mens iindcrftandings are pu: upon the rack^ in 6tder to reconcile the Bible to it- felf, and to make it fpeak in one place what the/ prefume is fpoken in another. Whereas if men. would but confider^ that as the Bible is allowed to be the rule of truths and the word of God, fa it muil of neceflity have all thofe qualijications which are abfolutely and ellentially neceilliry, to render it capable of being fuch a rule, the confc- quence of which would be the barring of a variety qf errors ; then, the do6!:rines of tranfubjiantiaiion^ of abfolute election and reprobation^ and of mayCs rMtural inability to do what is morally goody without 'n fupernatural influence ^ would ceafe to be in the chridian world ; becaufe it would be allowed, that no fuch doctrines can pofilbly take place in tli0 chrifiian revelation. Again, "Thirdly and lafily,, I obferve, that as the Bible is very often ufed to patronize mens errors^ fa fometimes the Spirit of God is made Jubfervient to the fame purpofe. When men are agitated by warm and heated imaginations, then, they are too apt to think of themfelves, and to perJ'uade others to think of them, that they are under a di'vine impidfe^ and that what they preach is the effeol and produce of the Spirit of God in them. And, thus, men of different parties have fathered different and coyitrary principles upon the famd Spirit. And as men are liable to be thus deluded^ fo, I think j this is a jvjl ground to be exceeding cautious how we admit fuch a thought, with re- fpedl to ourfelves, and how we fubmit to what is put upon us by others^ as fuch. Certainly, this 13 a caic in which we ought to have the jufiejk and moil raticnal fatisfa^icn^ that we are not mif- taken % Btripture Evidence copfjder'*d. 2^5 taken ; becaufe it not only afFe61:s ourfelre!?, but our Crtator alfo. For if we err in this particular^ as has certainly been the cafe in a multitude of in- ftances^ thcn^ we make God the farent of wlu^ b«ght not to be flitherM updn him; It is not enough to fay thlt the Apoftks of Chrift were undei' a divine impulfe^ in their priaching the gofpcl to the world •, for fuppofing that to be the cal'ei yct# it will not follow that every man is under die likci impulfe, in iiis preaching and rdnijtring^ who pre- tends to be fo. Befides, St. P^/^/ informs us, that he preathed the gofpel, by the demonftration of the spirit and of power •, that is, the Spirit and power of God, in working of miracles^ attended his mini- tlry, to awaken the attentiony and to work the con* n,nclion of his hearers. But this is not the cafe now •, and, therefore^ nothing can be argiled frorti one cafe to the other. To conclude^ give rhe leave to obferve, that man is endowed with a faculty of under ftojidingy^ Vhich was given him on purpofe, to direct and guide him in all his affairs •, and tho' he is liahle £0 fall into a great many errors\ and is capable, of* receiving information from other agents, in order to rectify thofe errors, and thereby to have his mind furniflied with fuch truths, as otherwife he would or might be ignorant of; yet^ in thefe cafes^ it is his (nvn underllartding which is his prcpet guide. And, therefore^ if Gud fliould, at any time^ imprefs upon our minds any ufeful truths^ this is only applying to^ ahd calling the hutrian under- (landing into exercife. In which cafe, man is not dealt with as a machine^ but as a rr.Dra! dgmt : God doe^: not over-rtde or fuperfede the ufe of the un- dcrftanding, bat only applies and appeals to it. And, therefore, dirine imprejjkvs are not to be confidcfd as a principle or c?:-- :-;?;, Vvi:ich a6ts in every ci^^ Sa'ipture Evidence corfulefd,. every man, but only as a divine application made to the under Jtandings of men, like as one man by Ipeech, writing, or otherwife, af flies to the un- derftanding of another, tho' in a different way % the human underftanding being naturally quali- fied to take it in the ideus it receives, and to form the judgment it makes, antecedent to luch appli- cation. So that the light of nature or reafon^ and the light of Cbrijly are not /w^ diftind: and diffe-- rent principles of difcernment in men, the one dim, ;and the other clear, as fomc chufe to exprefs it, the latter being only an addrefs ox application to the former •, the Spirit of Chrifi only raifing or fnaking prefent to mens minds fome ideas, which other- wife they might not have. For tho' our ideas of things are cither recalled or raifed in our minds by refieUion^ by the wandering of the vmagination^ by our fev.fes being Rruck by objeds from with- <;)ut by divine revelation or divine irnprejjions^ by con- verjhg v/ith others, and the like •, yet thefe arc not fo many diftind pinciples of difcernment in men, but onlyfo many different zvays in which the underftanding is called into exercife, and by which we come at truth. And tho' God may fometime* intcrpofe, and imprefs ufeful truths upon the m.inds of men, yet feeing we have no certain and infallible rule of judging, when he does fo ; there- fore, I think, v/e ought not, in any inflame^ to de- termine that the ideas, which are prefent to the mind, are the produce of a divine irnpulfe. For jf this be admitted in one infiance^ then, it may ir> another, and fo on ; which opens a door to all enthiifiafm. And whoever pretends that they are in any particular inftances, whether in their preach-, ing, or otherwife, under a divine irnpulfe^ if the fub-. je6t imprelled upon the mind be what mankind are inicrcfled in^ then,^ I think, fuch men ought, in jufiice^ Scripture troidence confidcfd. 237 jiifike:, to {hew the grounds upon which they form fiich a judgment," and to maike it plain to the un- derflandings of men, that this is the truth of the cafe. ' If they fhould fay, tho' this is a point which is moft evident and certain^ yet it is what is only to be felt or experienced in themfelvcs, and not to be explained to others. I anfwer ; if a man i^ certain that he is under a divine impreffwny then, furely, it muft be in his power to Hiew what is the ground of that certainty ; whether it be the force and^r^«f//j of the impreffion, or th^ pleafure Tind fatisf action arifing from it, or whatever it be ; if he is convinced upon rational evidence ; then, I pre- fume, our language is not fo barren, but he may iind words to convey his ideas by. And when men talk of experiencing grounds of certainty in themfelves, which they cannot explain ; this is drawing the curtain, and taking fandluary in dark- nefs. By this they effc(5tually prevent all others from examining the point, and difcovering the delufion^ if that fhould be the cafe ; and likewife by this they bar up the way of argument and con- viction from themfelves. And whatever certainty men may pretend to, in fuch a cafe % yet, I think, there is juil ground for fufpicion, that it is bare prefumption y and that it is but very doubtful^ whe^ ther their convidlion be any other than the pro- duce of enthufiafm. I Ihall add no mont at pre* fent, but that lam, SIR, /cur obliged humble S:rkrint^ &c., 'iRACr T K A C T XXVIL Reflections on Natural Liberty, W fi £ R E I N Th^ C^fe of Liberty^ a^d NeceJJjty^ when conlidered^ as a proper Foun- datipii for Virtue and Religion^ for Rewards and PunipmentSy is exa- piined* Occalipned by Dr. Morga?z\ Trad:, entitled, A Defence of Na- tural (ind Revealed Rellgmu Jn a fifth Letter lo a Friend, i 1 R, 1 Should not have given you any farther trou- ble, on the fubjeft of my former letters, werfl^ it not that, fnice my laft, a fcheme ox fatality has been advanced, in favour of Mr. Ba?'c lay' s.^ Principles •, which fcheme is conlidered, as the founv^ . dation of virtue and rdigion^ o^ reivards and punijhi^ tnents. This gives me an occaiion of fendjng you: ^ fifth letter, in order to examine the toremention- pd fcheme^ as tp the particulars here referred to. And, accordingly, I obferve, that, in my E:-:ami- nation of Mr. Barclay' % Trinciples^ I Ihewed what, I apprehend, conftitutes an agmt^ viz. ^' intelligence '^ and activity. By intelligence I m.can a capa- ^' cijty of thinking or taking in ideas, the fubjecit ^* of fuch ideas being motives ^v excitements tp ^^ Svdion, ^t *' 'Reflectkns qh Natural Liherty. 239 aftion, Of to be at reft, with regard to all fuch beings in whom the power of ading refides* And by adlivity I mean a capacity or power of beginning or performing motion or acflion, or df being at reft, in confequence of thofe ideas that take place in the underftanding, and which are this ground or reafon of fuch motion or adion^or of the fufpending the cxercife of that power, And, in order to eonftitute a moral agenty it is not only neceftary that the being ftiould be intelligent, in the lower and lefs proper fenfe of the word intelligent, as before de- fcribed ; but it is alio ncceftary that it ftiould be fo, in the higher and more proper fenfe of that term. That is, that it ftiould be capable of feed- ing things in tl moral view ^ and thereby oi judging ^' of the moral fitnefs or unlitnefs of actions ; and ^' like wife that it ftiould have power to act^ or ♦' to refrain from ading, as' -it pleafes." Here my reader will fee, that as I have diftin- guifhed betwixt moral ageng and mere agency.^ or agency considered fmiply as fuch -, {o I have made, not, as it is faid * of me, intelligence an^ ynintelligence, but a different capacity of difcern^ ment in each fubjecl, the ground oi that diftinclion. With me, intelligence is necelfary to mere agency, and to moral agency fuch intelligence is neceftary as renders the agent capable of ieeing things in a moral vieii\ and thereby of difcerning and judg- ing of the moral iitnefs or unfitnefs of actions. And tho' mere agency and moral agency may htly be diftinguiflied into hrutality d^wdi moral agency ^ because, J think, one is the cafe of brutes, and the other of men ; yet they may not be fitly dif- tinguiftied into natural liberty and moral agency y * \\\ Dr. y.qrgans IhftsUQc: of Natural and Rcvenled Religion. bccaufe. '246 Rejlemons en ISatural Ubmy. becaufc, I think, liioral agency is as natural^ an«i as frec^ as mere agency itfelf. And, As I have here confidered intelligence, as nc^ cefiary to agency •, fo I have confidered a^ivity^ as neceiTary alfo. By a6Uvity I mean fuch a power \ii f elf -motion^ as enables the fubjed:, in which it refides, to chufe to move, or to be at reft, in con-- tradiftindion to fuch motion, or reft, as is the re^ fuit of external force ^^ or of necejjity. By external force, I mean iuch force as is the refult of fomc foreign agency or moving power, independent of any agency or moving power in the fubjedt mov» ed, or at reft. And by neceflity I mean the fm* titrd and nec^Jfary refult of any conftitution of things, independent of the free * eledion or choice of the fubject moved, or at reft. As thus^ fuppofing gravitation wer€ neceflarily an inherent property of matter, fo that, when a ftone is mov- ed up into the air by external force, when that force ceafes, the ftone will, from a principle necef- Jarily inherent in itfelf, and independent of any foreign agency or moving power, move down to the earth again- 1 fay, fuppofing this to be the cafe, fuch motion^ in my opinion, would not bf * Notiy By free ehSlhn Or choice I mean, tliat as there is in man 2^ principle Q^ motion ^ which, upon fdme occaAohs, is ex- trted J fo that exertion, or the fufpending tlie exercife of tliat moving power> is not the natural and ?tecejfary reiult of the iuman conftitution ; but it refults from the ^xvill of man, whQ is at liheriy to nil, or not to a<^, under the iame cirGumllance*. And when a man wills to ad, or not to a^fl, and is at liberty to *will either ; then, he is faid to cleSt or chiifi to aft, or not to aft; in oppofition to each of their contraries:. And as fomething or other will be the ground or reafon of choice ; fo when a man chufes, upon any reafon which is prefent to his mind, he being at liberty to chufe as he does, or to chnfe otherways, confonant tO any other reafon which invites hini to the con* trary ; then, his eleftion or choice is faid to be fne ; and tliis is what I mean by a free eleftion or choice, throvighout thcfe reiiet^ioiis. action^ Rtfie^isns on Natural Liberty, ^41 actiotty fuch a principle of motion would not be agency^ neither would the fubjecty in which fuch a principle relldcd, be an agent. And if we con- tiitt intelligencey as a neceffary part of any con- ftitution of things, and neceflary not only to the ^rodHctioHy but to the direction and regulation of motion ) the cafe is ftill the fame ; for as motion, or reft, in fuch a cafe, is the natural and necejfary rcfult of fuch a conftitution, independent of the will or free choice of the fybjedt moved, or ac reft J fo fucb motion woul^ not be action^ fuch a principle of motion would not be agency^ and the fuhjecty in which fuch a principle refided, wowld not be an agent. As thus, Suppofjng man^ with every other creature capable of pleafure ^nd pain, were, from his conftitution, naturally, neceffarily, and unavoidably led to purlue what appeared to him his grcateft felf-rgood, and, confequendy, to the performing fuch motions as ponftitute " that purfuit •, and fuppofing fuch motions were in their diredions, and regulations, necelTarily conform-^ able to the impreflions made upon the underftand- ing, with refpcijl to the gre^teft felf-good, and the way to attain it ? Yet as all fuch motions, together with their dire6ljonSj and regulations, are the natural and necejjary refult of the human conftitiition, independent of any free choice or ^leftion in man ; fo fuch motion wojjld not be (action^ the principle from which if flowed would not be ageyu:y^ and man^ in fuch 2, cafe, would not be an agmt '\ at leaft, thpfe terms would not be rightly applied, in my eftimation. However, whether they would, ©r not, I fhall not here en- quire. For as it is a difpute about the propriety of words i fo I v/ill leave that difpuiie to thofe who are better judges, what ideas common ufage has fixed to them. And, theretpre, admitting |he ufe of thofe terms, four things fcem proper to Vol, \\, ' R ^ *^ jL^e ^42' Refie^ions on Natural Lihertyl be enquired into ; viz. firjly whether any fubjc(!k under fuch a conilitution of things, as is now un- der cpnfideration ; that is, any being whofe mo- tion, or reft, is not the produce of free choice or election, but refults naturally, necefiariiy, and unavoidably from die conflitudon of thac being, or from the nature and conftitution of things in general, be in a ftate of liberty. Secondly y whe- . ther fuch a conilitution is a proper foundation for virtue and rehgicny for rewards and punijhments. ^'hirdlyy whether- it comports with Mr. Barday^s Principles and is z proper defence of them. Fourth-^ ly and hftly^ whether it is the truth of the cafe. Fir^., I am to enquire^ whether any fubjed, un- der fuch a conftitution of things, is in a ftate of liberty. And here, I think, tlie idea, which the word liberty ferves to convey, is a power of felf-. motiony and freedom to exert or fulpend the exer- cife of that power, as that it is a matter of free - choice or eledion to the fubjed, in which it re- fides, whether ir fiiall be exerted, or not. So* that liberty, in the prefent cafe, fuppofes inklU- " ^ence, to direct the principle of fdf-motlon in the iubjeCl, in which it refides. And, therefore, the queftion is not, whether zjlone is free ? becaufe ^ ftone being deftitute of intelligence, fuppofing it to have gravitation, as a neceflary principle of motion inherent in itfelf, which would be exerted under fome circumftances, there is no place for that queftion. But, intelligence being a part of the human conftitution, it becomes a queftion, whether man is free, or not. Again, liberty, in the prefent cafe, does not ftand oppofed to vjant- of power, or to a refiraint of power by external force •, and, therefore, the queftion is not, whe- ther an intelligent creature is at liberty to flyy, which has no wings P or whether a prifoner is at liberty to i^alk farther than his chain will admit ? but Reflexions en Natural Liherly, 245 but It flans oppofcd to fuch rejlraint^ as arifes from necejfity. That is, fqch rellraint as refults yieceffarily from the conftitution of the fubjeft, thus reftrain- ed, whether fuch reflraint refults ultimately from the nature and conftitution of things in general, or from the will or free choice of a fupreme go- vernour. This, I think, is a fair reprefentation of what is commonly underftood by the term li- l^erty, in the prefent cafe. So that any intelligent being whofe motion, or reft, or who is the caufe pf motion to any other being -, if fuch motion, or reft, or the caufe of fuch motion is not the pro- duce of free choice ox election^ but is the natural ;and neqeflary refult of the conftitution of that being, or of the nature and conftitution of things, in general, fuch a being, or a being under fuch ia conftitution of things, is not in a ftatc of liber- ty J but is in a ftate which, I think, is commonly i^xprefted by the term fatality. And, therefore, if man is, from his conftitution, naturally, necef- farily, and unavo'dably led to purfue what appears to him his greateft felf-good, and, confequcntly, to the performing fuch motions as conftitute that purfuit, independent of any free choice or eledion in himfelf, then, he is not in a ftate of liber ty^ he js not a frcs creature. If it Ihould be faid, that tho' man is natural- Jy, neceftarily, and unavoidably led to purfue what ^appears to him his greateft fclf-good, yer, not- ^ithftanding, he is a free being j becaufe he is at- liberty to rejtrain himfelf from that purfuit, and to fxamine v/hether what appears to him to be his jgreateft felf-good be, in reality fo or not. I anfioery if tlie appearance of the greateft felf- good has fuch a nccejfary effect upon the ^dtive i^- culty, as that a man muft unavoidably purfue what appears him to be fp, independent of any i;'«e Choice or eleciion in hJmfcif •, then, he is K ?• nor ^44 Reflexions on Natural Liberty. not at liberty to ^examine that appearance ; be- caufc, by fuch n^cefTity, the door or way to exa- mination is barfed up. And, on the other fide, if he is at liberty to examine whether what appears to him to be his greateft felf-good be, in reahty, fo, or not ^ then, that appearance has no fuch tjecejfary etfed: upon the adive faculty, as is here fuppofed -, thefe being propofitions which deftroy one another. But if examination could come into this fcheme, it would not help the cafe -, becaufc examination would be as necejfary^ and as un- aveidabk^ as the actions would be, which would follow upon it. For as there mufl be the appear- ance of a probability of error, pr the intervention of fome motive^ to be a foundation for fuch exami- nation •, fo where that probability appears, or fuch motive intervenes, man, under fuch a conftitution of things, muil necejjarily and unavoidably examine whether what appears to be his greateft felf-good be, in reality, fo, or not. And, confequently, he is not, in any refpect^ a free being. And this leads me, Secoitdly^ To enquire, whether fuch a conflitu- tion of things is a proper foundation for virtue and religion, for rewards and punifliments. Virtue is fometimes confidered in a larger^ and fometimes in a more rejlrained fenfe. In a larger fenfe, it includes all fuch adions as are in themfelves right and Jit^ and thereby render the agent, in the per- formance of them, the proper objedl of th^ appro- bation of every other intelligent being, who is' qualified to difcern the htnefs of thofe adions and the unfitncfs of their contraries. And, in a re- trained fenfe, it includes only fuch as are ads of kindnefs and benevolence unto others •, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, not only worthy of approbation, but alfo of the kind- nefs and benevolence of every other intelligent being. Reflexions on Natural Liberty. 245 being, who is qulified to difcern the valuablenefs of thofe ad:ions and the bafenefs of their contra- ries. Now, the queflion arifing from hence is» whether fuch a conftitution of things, as I have now under confideration, is ^ proper foundation for virtue^ whether it be confidered in a larger, or in a more retrained fenfe ? and, I think, it is mod evident that it is not. For as, in the pre- fent cafe, every man miift neceflarily fee things in that view, in which they are reprefented to his underllanding, which reprefentation is indepen- dent of his free election or choice ; and as he muft necefTarily ad conformable to fuch appearances, it being no more in his power to fee things other- wife, than as they are reprefented to him, nor to a6t otherwife than confonant thereto \ than it is in the power of a clock to flop or vary its motions, at pleafure ; fo the confcquence is clear that there is nothing approvahle or difapprovabk^ in a moral fcnfe, in fuch a fpring or principle of a<5lion. For whatever good, or m/, fuch actions may be fubfervient to, as they are the produce, not of free choice or ele6lion, but of necejfity ; fo there cannot poflibly be any thing morally good, or evil, in man the agent, or rather the inllrument of per- formance. A man may be ijoell or ill conftituted^ and the produce of his conftitution may be good, or evil, in a natural fenfe, accordingly. But as his conftitution, and his aclions confequent upon it, are not owing to himfelf ; fo the good, or evil, of either, cannot, with any colour of reafon, be placed to his account. For example, fuppofe one man to befo conftituted, as that it appears to him that the way to his greater felf- good is in promoting the good of the publick •, and another is fo con- ftituted, as that it appears to him that the way to his greater felf-good is in the dejiru^ion of the commonwealth i and each of thqlenecefiarily and ]-l 3 WW' 246- Rejle^fwns on Natural Lihertyl Utivoidably ad, accordingly. Now, feing it is not what things are in thernfelves, but what they ap- pear to be, which necelTarily mcves and directs the principle of motion in each ; and feeing thofe dif- ferent appearances are the different refult of theif different ccnftitutton^ and of fuch concurring cir- cumftances, as it was not in the power of either^ to introduce, to remove, to alter, or change -, and feeing the adions, which follow, are neccjjmily con* form.ible to thofe appearances v and ieeing the appearance of the greater felf-gocd is necefiarily the fpring or principle of a6iien in both *, there- fore, neither of them are the proper cbjc'^c of crpprcbaiicn^ or dijlike^ in any other fenfe than as 3 watch or a clock may be the proper rbj^^fl of ei- ther % and, confequently, num^ in fuch a Hate, is not capable of being either 'virtmv.s^ or liacus. Whereas, on the other ftde, if man is a free crea-^ ture\ that is, if he has power, and is ar liberty to do either good, or evii, and ei:her of thele are the produce not of necefllty, but of a free choice or eledion ♦, then, he is capable of rendering him- felf approveable or difapproveable to every other intelligent being ; and, confequently, to be either virtuous, or. vicious. Again, By religion^ I mean that which is a proper ground of acceptance to Almighty Gcd \ fo that all thofe adlions may be faid to be religious, which render the agent pleafing and acceptable in the eyes of his Maker. And the queftion here iSj whether the aforefaid conllitution of things is a proper foundatioti for religion ? and, I think, the arifwer is evident, that it is not. For whatever good, or evil, a good or a bad conftitution, to* gether vvith thofe concurring circumftances which attend itj may be fubfervient to ; yet as fuch goC'di or evil, is not owing to man^ but to the 4utHr of his conftitution ^ therefore, it ought notj 'Reflexions en Natural Liherfy, 24^ not, in reafon, to be placed to man's account, nor cannpt, in reafon, render him pleafmg or dif- f leafing to his Maker. God may have reafon to be pleafed or difpleafed with hmfelf^ if I may fo fpcak, for making a good or a bad conflitution, and for caufing all that good, or evil, which fuch a conftitution necefTarily produced, fuppofing him to be free and voluntary in fuch produdions ; but he cannot, in reafon, be pleafed or difpleafed with man^ feeing it is not in man's power to he other- wife than he is, or to do otherwifc than he does ; and, therefore, this fcheme of fatality cannot be a proper foundation for religion. Whereas, on the fide, if good and evil be the produce, not of ne- cefTity, but of free choice or ele^ion in man, and •he is at liberty to do either j then, he is capable of rendering himfelf either lovely or vi le, Gith.tr pleafng -or difpleaftng to his Maker ; and, confequently, of being cither religious^ or irreligious. Again, By rewards dLndpuniflomentSy I mean {\.\c\i favours and fuch afflictions as are laid upon a creature, up- on account of fome good or had action which that creature has done, which good or bad adlion is the ground or 7'eafon of thofe favours or afflidions being laid upon him. All favours do not come under the denomination of rewards, nor all af- fiiciions under the denomination of punifhments ; but only fuch favours and fuch afflidlions as have fome precedent good or evil adion, or which is judged to be fo, as the ground or reafon of them. And tho' fome favours are confidered as iniro- ■du^ory to other and greater favours ; and fome afflidtions as preventions of other and greater evils ; yet they are not confidered, as rewards and punifli- ments, except there be fome precedent good or evil action, as the ground and reafon of their dillri- biidon. Thus, when a man's houfe is pulled down, to fave the burning of the town •, or vv'hen R 4 fome 24§ R^Jls^lions on Natural Ltheri^, fome men are fingled out to hazard or lofe thek lives, for the preiervation of the comnon-wealth ^ thefc are not confidered, as puniihments. For tho' the lofs of art houfe to one, and the lofs of life to another, be real affiktions ; and tho' thofe are nece0ary to^ and do prevent much greater ; yet they are not confidered, as puniihments, in either cafe ', and the reafon is evident, becaufe the idea^ which the word pmijhment ferves to convey, fuppofes fome precedent evil action, as the ground or reafon of thofe afflidions which are called by that name^ which is not the cafe before us. And therefore, tho' t\it word piinijijmenty wheri ufed in ii loofe or improper fenfe, is fometimes applied to any affli^ion •, yet, when it is taken flridly and properly 5 it is exprelTive only of ftich afflictions, as have fome precedent evil adlions, as the ground or reafon of theni. The cafe is the fame, with re- fpe^ to reward^ for when the term is takcnjftri<5liy and properly, it is exprefiive only of fuch favours, as have fome precedent good anions, which are the ground or reafon of their dillribution. And, Tho' rewards and puniihments may be medici- 7ml \ that is, tho' the rewarding a perfon^ for per- forming a good action, may become ^n excite- ment to the aclor, and to others to perforni the like good actions^ in hope of obtaining the like reward j and tho* the punifhing a perfon, for do- ing an evil adion, may become a means to re- firain the adtor, and others from doing the like evil actions^ to prevent their falling under the like correction ; yet thefe are rather the confequences of, than the ground and foundation of rewards and jpunifnments. Rewards and punilliments have their reafon in what is pajl^ and not in what is to come. It is the valuabienefsof a/)^ action^ which renders one man worthy of reward ; and it is the vilenefs oi-^pafi action ^ which renders another maji %jvorlby k^eBions on Natural Liberty: 24.f ^vorthy and deferving of punifliment. And as re- fentment ^ndgratitude are the fprings of aiSlion^indie prefent cafe ; fo diey are both excited by what is ^qfly and not by any thing which is to come. It is mens bad actions, which raife in us the paflionof r^- fentmenti and it is mens good anions which excite in us the afFedtion of gratitude. And as thcfe are made parts of the himan conjiitution, by the great Author of our being j fo, I think, they are equally found- fed in reafon^ whiift under the dirccftion and govern- ment of it» That is, whilft direifled to their pre- fer objects^ and kept within the bounds of reafon. And fuppofmg the only reafon for rewards and puniihments^ in a civil fodety, were to excite men to perform good adions, and to reftrain them from doing what is evil, without any regard to the perfonal merit or demerit of the ador ; yet that alters not the cafe here, becaule it is not, what is the ground and foundation of rewards and punifh- ments, in point oi policy, but what is fuch, in point of reafon and morality, which is the fubjeCl of our prefent enquiry. Tho' I thinks punifh- ments, in civil fociety^ are not to be confidered barely 2i% medicinal, but allb as ^dis of pub lick re* Jentment, in which the fuffering perfon is afflided for, or becaufe he is injurious and hurtful to fo- ciety ; as well as to prevent the like evils, for time to come. For as it is evident, that laws with thciv fanctions, viz. the threatcnings and pro- mifes annexed to them, look forvuard and have their reafon in what is to come, namely, to dire6l the future behaviour and a6lions of men j fo it isu alike evident, that the execution of thofe fandiions, in rewarding and punilhing, looks backivard and hath its reafon in what is paji , namely, one man is re- warded for, or becaufe he has kept^ and another jman is punifhed for, or becaufe he has tranfgrefj'ed the/^U'. Auci tho' rcv/ards aii«J punilhmentb may have §50 RefleBions en Natural Likriyl have an influence u^on mtns future behaviour; yet that is, as I have obferved above, rather a confe-- qucnce of, than the reafon of them ; it being mens paft adlions which are the ground and reafcn of their diflribution. And, thus, the fcriptures re- ■prefent mens good and bad adlions, as the reafon and rule of actio7i to God^ in the diflribution of re- wards and punilhments, at the general judgments God will then render to every man, not accord* ing to the good, or evil, which his favours and corrections ihall be the occafion of introducing^ or preventing ; but according as every man's workfc haveheen^ whether good, or evil. That is, God will then difpenfc his favours and his corredlions, according as mens fafi behaviour has rendered them worthy and deferving of either. This being, I think, the true ftate of the cafe, the queftioa is, whether fuch a conllitution of things, as is now under confideration, is a proper foundation for re- wards and punilliments ? and the anfwer, I think^ is, that it is npt. For as the adbions of men, whe- ther they are fubfervient to good, or evil, are not the produce of a free choice or eledtion, but fpring from a neceffty of nature^ fo that, taking all cir- cumftances into the cafe, a man cannot poflibly do otherwife than he does, he cannot, in reafon> be the clyject of reward, or punilliment, on their account. Whereas, if adion in man, whether good, or evil, is the produce of will ox free choice ^ io that a man, in either cafe, had it in his pow- '^r, a;nd was at liberty to have chofe and done the ccntratyy he is the proper olject of reward, or pu- hifhment, according as he chufes to behave him- -felf. ■ Upon the whole, I think, it appears, that the forementioned conflitution of things is npt a proper foundation for virtue and religion^ for rewards and punifjrneras, I proceed^ T'hirdhy Refie^ikns on Natural Liberty. t^t nirdly^ To enquire^ whether fuch a conftitu- tion of things comports with Mr. Barclafs Prind* ples^ and is a proper defence of them ? And here I fhall only confider his fcheme, with Vefp^d to the fall of man by Adam's fm^ and of man\ reco- very by grace. And, accordingly, I obferve, that man, by Adam^s tranfgreffion, according to Mn Barclay^ loft his difpofition^ and therewith his ability to do good, and he contradfed a difpofition, or he became thereby fo fiibje^ed to the feed of the ferpent, as that he is necejfarily and unavoidably de- termined to do evil, and his lofs is, by grace, fb far repaired, that he can, by the help of a divine and fupernatural power ^ do good, and avoid do- ing evil ; yet lb, as that this grace does not work irrefiftibly in him, that is, it does not force him to do the one, or avoid doing the other -, but leaves him at liberty to co-operate with^ or reftji the work or operation of grace in him. This, if I under- ftand Mr. Barclay aright, is his fcheme of the fall^ and of the recovery of man. And the quef- tion, here, is not, whether it is the truth of the cafe, but only, whether it fdts with fuch a confii- tution of things, as is now under confideration ? and the anfwcr, I think, is evident, that it does not. For, in that view of the cafe, man, as he is a crc ature capable of pleafure and pain, is, at all times, Heceffarily and unavoidably led to purfue what appears to him his greater felf-good, this be- ing an unalterable part of his conftitution ; fo that all the good, or evil, that he does in the world, is in confequence of this purfuit, and is the natural and neceflary refult of it. And, therefore, what-« foevcr /a'?^/ r/.v^'/ the fm o^ Adam might have upon man's undcrftanding^ as to his difcerning v/hat is his greater lelf-good, or the way to attain it, that could not make any alteration in hin\with n-fjxXE to his dilP\iifion^ and thereby his jM/v to do <20od. 35 2 Rejle5iions on Natural Liberty* or evil, in a moral fenfe ; feeing his difpofition and ability, in thefe refpe6ts, is, and mull be always the fame, the appearance of the greater felf-good neceffarily governing his difpofition s and adions, at all times, in every condition, and under every circumftance which he can poffibly fall into. And, confequently, man has not palTcd through fuch a ihange^ nor fufFered fuch a lofs by Adam's fin, as Mr. Bardayh fcheme fuppofes. If it fhould be faid, that tho' man's difpofiti- on, and thereby his ability to do good^ or evil, is the fame iince, as it was before the fall, he being necefTarily governed in thofe refpects, at all times, by one and the fame principle or fpring of adlion, viz, the appearance of the greater fell -good •, yet his under ft anding became fo blinded by Adam*s mif- carriage, that he cannot, without a divine light, difcern what is his greater felf-good, nor the way to attain it ; and that the work of grace confifts in enlightening mens minds, in thefe refpe6ts; fo that now, by the help of iUuminating grace^ it is in a man*s power to do either good, or evil. That is to fay, if man follows this divine light, he will do good ; if he negletts it, he will do evil ; it be- ing a matter of choice to him to do either. I anfiver^ if this were the cafe, man in the fall, without divine grace, would be in a deplorable znd pitiable^ but he could not poffibly be in 2ifinful ilate ; he would have a darkened under/landings but he could not have zjlnful nature, or a 77atural in- clination to fin. For as man is, from his confli- tution, naturally and unavoidably led to purine what .appears to hira his greater felf-good, and, confequently, to perform fuch motions as con- ititute that purfuit ; and as the blindnefs of his iinderilanding is not owing to hiir.fclf •, lo his de- iires and hib coniequent adions cannot, in rca- ibn, be coiiiidercd as criminal. And as to the dufknefs Rejie5ims on Natural Liberty, 253 darknefs upon man's underftanding, with refpcdl: to his difcernment of the greater felf-good, and the way to attain it ; that muft have been the cafe of Adam before the fall^ or elfe he could not have mifcarried. The profpedl of pleafure in eating the forbidden fruit, or whatever was the motive to adion, in that cafe, muft appear to Adam to be his greater felf-good^ or the way to attain it, or elfe he could not have eat it ; and if it, thus, ap- peared, then, he could not poflibly have done otherwife. So that his fall was neceflarily the refult of the dark?iefs and blindnefs of his under- fbanding, and that was the neceflary refult of his ccnflitutton^ even in his mo^ primitive {[ztt; which, fiirely, does not fuit with Mr. Barclay's Principles. And if we confider the work of grace, as confift- ing in enhghtening mens minds, with refped: to their greater felf-good, and the way to attain it, this will not comport with Mr. Barclay's fcheme ; becaufe, when men are thus enlightened, fuitabU ^di\onv[\ui\neceffarily2indi unavoidably io\\Qi\N -, feeing adion, upon the prefent fuppofition, is the ne- ceffary refult of the impreffons made upon the U7t^ derfianding. And, therefore, fuppofing all men, without divine grace, are invincibly ignorant^ in thefe refpeds, and fuppofing illuminating grace is afforded unto all ; then, it will unavoidably follow that no man can poflibly mifcarry. For, in this view of the cafe, grace works irrefiftibly^ and men cannot receive it in vain ; where light rnterpofes, fuitabk adion muft., and will neceflarily and unavoidably follow, which overthrows Mr. Barclay's fcheme. Thus, I think, it appears, that the conftitution of things, I have now under cori- jideration, does, by no means, coynport with Mr. Barclay s PrirKipies^ and, therefore, it cannot be a proper defence oi them. And it is ftill my opin-on, that thofc principles are indefenf.ble ; at leaif, rlicry 254 Refieulions on Natural Lihertyi are fo, for any thing that the advocates of Mr* Barciafs fchemehave fiiewn to the contrary. As to that Jhif^ which Mr. Beaven is, at lail, driven to, in the defence of thofe principles, 172;. his dillinguilhing betwixt faculties afieep^ and facul- ties aivake \ I cbferve, that tho' mens careleiTnefs and negligence, in not reflecting upon and confi- dering the nature and confequences of their adlions, in an affair of the utmoll concern to themfelves, may, by a figure of fpeech, be called Jkep \ be-r caufe they are as regardlefs of their highell inte^ reft, as men are, when really aileep •, yet, in this cafe, their faculties are fo far from being proper-^ jy ajleep^ that, on the contrary, they are awake^ by being in ufe and excrcife ^ tho' employed, per- haps, to a bad purpofe, and they are guilty of the higheft folly and madnefs, in the ufe and ahufe of them* For as thofe faculties are parts of the hu^^ man conftitution ; fo man, without a fupernatu* ral influence, has -power^ and iis at liberty to neg* led them, to ufc: them aright, or to abufe them, as he pieafes •, and is anfwerable to God for his behaviour, accordingly j and this renders his con- du<5t juflly afproveahk^ or coyideninahle^ which otherwife it could not be either. I now pro- ceed. Fourthly a?td laflly^ To enquire, whether the forementioned conftitution of things is the truth of the cafe ? That is, whether man, as he is % creature capable of pleafure and pain, is, from |iis conftitution, naturally and neceffarily led to purfue Wiiat appears to him his greatefi felf-good.^ and, confequently, to the performing fuch mo- tions as conftitute that purfuit ? and, I think, upon enquiry, it will appear, that this is not the cafe ? I (hall not here examine, what are th^ feveral fprings or excitements to action in m^n» but only make oris or fwo obfervatiops which, J B.efle5fions on Natural Liberty: $55 think, frequent experience will fupport, viz, firfl^ men, in many inllances, purfue pleafure, without entering into the queftion, whether what they pur- fue be, in the enjoyment, their greater felf-good, or not ? And tho' in thefe cafes, pleafure is the motive to action, yet it is only confidered as pre* fent pleafure, and not as the greater felf-good, for if that were taken into the cafe, and to be made the reafon of a6lion, men would, in many inllances, deny themfelves thofe pieafures they* purfue; which fhews, that the greater felf-good, is not the fole principle of adion in man. Again, fecondly^ where t'^jvo goods come in competition^ a prefent and a future, a lefs and a greater, which are known and judged to be To, men, in fome inllances, chufe a greater 'future good, and refufe a lefs that is prefent -, and, in other inllances, the)* chufe a lefs prefent good, and refufe a greater that is future. Thus, a man who is fatisfied there will be a future fiate of happinefs and mifery after death, one or other of which Hates every man mufl be a Iharer in, according as he now behaves him- felf •, and he is likewife fatisfied, upon the moft juft and rational grounds, as he thinks, that all the pleafure and paiyi^ he is capable of enjoying or fuifering at prefent, bears no proportion to the pleafure and pain he mufl enjoy or fuffer here- after ; and, confequently, that his greater felf- good is not any thing which he can enjoy in this world, when it comes in competition with the enjoyment of another. Thus he judges^ and thus he mufl judge, it being no more in his power to judge otherwife, whillt the evidence of a future ftate appears cleu* to him, than it is for him to judge that two and Pido makey?:v. And yet, not- withftanding all this, he does, in many inllances, hazard his greater future good^ for the fake of a Ufs that is prefent \ which Ihews that the appear- ang.e 2^6 Refle^fions on Natural Liberty. ancc of the greater felf-good is not a necejfary 'principle of adion in man. And tho' pleafure is the natural objed of defirey and, therefore, the ^appearance of pleafure is an imitation to enjoy- ment ; yet it is but an invitation, becaufe every man is at liberty to give or deny himfelf that plea- fure, as he pleafes. And tho' felfijhnefs may fometimes be the ground or reafon of fuch felf- denial, as when a man denies himfelf a lefs pre- fent good, for the fake of a greater laid up for him in futurity ; yer this is not always the cafe. Men fometimes deny themfelves a prefent enjoy- ment, not from a profped of farther and greater pleafure to themfelve-, but purely that they may be fubfervient to the good and benefit of others. And tho* fuch felf-denial will naturally introduce pleafure to a man's felf ', yet that plealijre is only the produce of, and not the ground or 7'eafon of fuch benevolent adions. This is what I have -already confidered * elfewherc, and, therefore I Ihali not purfuc it farther ; it being, I think, manifeft, that the appearance of the greater felf- good is not a necelTary, and thereby the fole prin- ciple of action in man. I will only add, that /iZ-^r/j of a6tion« is, I think, the only foundation of moral government ^in contra- diftindion to fuch government as is called natural. By natural government I mean the involuntary and necejfary fubje^ion of any being or fpecies of beings to a lawy which the God of nature hath fubjeded them to. Thus, the regular and necejjdry motion* of the feveral planets^ in the folar fyltem, is con- fidered, as a part of the government of the natu* ral worlds And if intelligence be confidered as ^ necejfary part of any conftitution of things, and if the intelligent fubjed be necejfarily fubjected to that la-iv by which it is governed, this would be * See my Difcourfe on Virtue and Happinef?. but Rejlciiions on JSatural Ul^erty. 257 but natural government, or a part of the govern - mont of the natural world j becaufe, in iiich a cafe, fubjedtion is not 'voluntary y but is zs natural and necejfary^ as the fubjedion of any unintelligent fub- jed can be. And by moral government I un- derfland the giving a law or rule of aflion to in^ telligent beings, who are qualified to difcern the Jitnefs of their fuhje^ion to that law, and the un- fitnefs of their refuftng to be governed by it, with liberty to aft agreeably yi\xkiy or contrary thoreto. And as their fubjeftion or the contrary is voluntary; fo they render themfelves thereby worthy of the favour or difpleafure of the law giver 5 which other- wife they would not be either. And, therefore, if the appearance of the greater felf-good were a /natural and necejfary principle of aftion in man, and thereby his fubjcftion is not voluntary, but he is neceffarily fubjeded to the law by which he is governed ; then, he is not the fubjed: of merai, .hut only of »^/«r^/ government. And if amoral iaWf or any other rule of adion, were delivered to fuch a fpecies of beings, it could not anfwer the purpofes of a law to them j becauje there is a- nother law, to which the whole fpecies are natu- rally and neceffariiy fubjeded. And tho' a given law may, in fome inftances, feem to be complied with ; yet lubmiffjon, in thofe inftances, is acci^ dental^ a5 tl>e law happens to coincide with that other law, viz, the appearance of the greater feif- good, 10 which man is neceffariiy jlibjcded. And if Gody in the government of the world, be natu- rally a[id 7iecej]arily fubjefted to the nature and conllitution of things, fo that his produftions are not the ctFe.ft oi free choice^ h\,\to'i ?hHiiralnecefpdy', then, I think, he is a governour of the world, in no other fenfe than thc^/w^ of a ivatch is a gp- vernour to the reft of the movements in that ma-^ chine. For tho' one is intdliycnt^ and the P- Yoi. IL i " thcr 258 Refle^Jms m Natural Uhrty. ther uninielUgcnt •, ytt as they both are ncc^ffary tmfe^ of what they produce, government muii be the fame^ in both cafes. The cafe is the fa^iie with refjTed to any advaroage ot benefit vjc rzcdvt. That is, we arc as much obliged to xhtfun^ as we iare to G^ for the light and heat we receive from k ; they both being invalwtl^ry^ with refp'ed to tbofe favours.. For as they?/;? cannot avoid ditfufing its light and hca-t i fo God could not avoid giving it beings ^placing it were it is ^nd giving it thofe ufeftil qualities. Whereas, on the other fide, if r the- cofttr^ryy which the parts; cf thole propofitions fband in to each o- ther, and the like. And, therefore^ we cannot poiTibly p'erreite or ji^dge oth^crwife than we do 5 becaufe that fuppofes we tan have a perception of things different trom the images of thofe things raifed in, or imprefTedi upon our minds, which i- rpageSvthusjmprefied, are thofe very. perception s ; and tliat we can judge of propofitions different frorri the relation, Or the contrary, which we difcern the parts of thofe propofitions to Hand in to each o- thef, which "difcernrtient is that^ very judgment ;, both' which are" abfurdities^ and impcfftbtlities m nature; But tho' it thus appears evident, frorri the natufe of the things that a rhan cannot polTi- bly perceive oi*judgeocherwife than he does ; yet it does not appeat aUke evident^ that a man is ne- ceffarily confined to chufe what he does chufe, or td cliufe what. Upon the whole, appears to be beft* And here, if it be admitted that good is the fole ckje^ oi the will, tho'j I think this mayjuftly be '^- queftioned ; yet that does not confine it to the choice of Siny pnrticular good^ which may bepre- * J thihk, it does not imply a contrndi^iony if the will be Ibppofed to chiife e^JU, as fuch. All that can be urged, in the prefent cafe, I think, is only this. njix.. that nature does not afford a •moti^ve, w-liich will be the ground or reafon of fuch a thoice. Aud, if this be the cafe, then, it will foUowj not that a man cannot, but that he nvill mt chufe evil, a» fiich. A )nan, that is at Hackney y can walk to Lo7idoti^ fuppofmg him to have health, and ftrength, and limbs fuffi- cient to carry hiai thither -, and yet he njcill not, without feme frenjiotis reafon, as the ground of fuch choice* To this I may add, that, in ^S^.-renjcngefid aftions, evil, as fuch, tho' not t6 the agent, yet to another, feems to be the ground or reafori »?f them. For when one man revenges an injury upon another, the frnti've to adion, in tliat cale, is not the removing from Jblmfcif the pain and umafinefs of mind, which ariies from, and attends his refentment, tho' that may be the effedoi'My but Jt is to give pain and mifery to anofher, who has been,' as he thinks, voluntarily and unreafonabiy the r^i^/^'of his afflic!:ion. iented $<>me farther RefieHicms on Natural Uberty. 2 6j fented to it» Good admits of a great variety. There are pleafures of different kinds^ which fui^ and afFe<5l the various parts of our conjlitution \ Und thcfe offer themfelves as candidates for our e- lediop. The good of ourfehes and the good of others, prefint good and good at a diftance^ offer themfelves to, and court pur<.^^/V^, when they cannot be chofen and enjoyed together. So that nature is fo far from confining the will to the choice Qi^ny particular good, that, on the contrary, it has laid z foundation^ and made a provijjion tor a iiberty of choice. Every good is ivbat it is, or what it appears to he^ independent of every other good ; and, as fuch, it is the objed of our choice tho' ten thoufand other or greater goods come in <:ompetition with it j becaufe the perception of another or a greater good does not change it* nature, or render it lefs the objed of our choice after, than before fuch a perception. Befides, fcboice^ I think, fuppofes liberty. For if we are -necefllated to take a thing, let what will be the ground of that ncceiTity, that properly fpeaking, ;is ngt chpice : but if we are at liberty to take it, or npt, or to take one thing, and not another, when we may, if we pleafe, take cither, this ex^ prefjcs the idea to which we annex the t^vm choice. And tho* it i% highly reafonable that a man Ihoul^ always chufe; t\i^ greater goody pr that good which upon the whole, is bctl ; yet nature has not laid him under aneceflity of doing fo, but he may, if he pkafe, chufe otherwife. That is, he may, if he pleafe, chufe a prefent pleafure^ in oppolitiofi to what is bed for himfelf, upon the whole, and fo make a foolijh choice i or he may chufe what is hefi^ upon the 'vtibole, and deny himielf a prefent enjoyment, and thereby ad the part of a 'ivife-mcin. He may likewife, if he pleafe, chufe what is good for himfelf^ in oppofuion to the good of xh\: publick, S 4. and 164 S^m farther Reflexions en Natural Lihertji and ft) make a vicious choice ; or he may refufe that good, for the fake of the common-wealthy and thereby aft a virtuous and a generous part. And tho' our underftandings enable us, generally, tho* in fome inflances they may err^ to difcern what good is moft vjorthy of our choice •, yet that dif- ccrnment does not necejfarily determine oura6tion8. The underftanding has a two-fold office, in this cafe, if I may fo fpeak ; frft^ to difcover the gsod^ or evil, of thofe objeds that are prcfented to it, and this is caWcd perception •, fecondly^ to difcern the difference betwixt one objeft and another, with refpedl to their good, or evil, when they arc brought into a comparifon^ ana when the circum- fiances and confequences, that attend them, are taken into the cafe, and this is csWcd Judgment -, and> when the underflanding has thus performed its office, it has not any thing farther to do, with re- fpe(5t to aftion ; this being all that, in the nature of the thing, can polTibly be done by it ; adlion being performed by 2. f elf -deter fnining power ^ which is as diftinft and different from the underftanding, as the underflanding is diftinft and different from thofe objefts which are perceived by it. So that, tho* the will does depend upon the underflanding for its informations^ yet it is not confined by it to the choice of ^ny particular good, whether greater, or lefs ; but it is at liberty to chufe what kind of good it pleafes, whether it be in the pcrfuit of ob- jeds that flrike and affed: our appetites, or affe5iions^ or any other part of our confiitution 5 and confe- quently, nature has left it to our choice to be either virtuous, or vicious, to be either wife-men or fools. And, therefore, tho* the underflanding is, by na- ture, confined to perceive and judge, as it docs, it being impoffible that coyiirary images, or different difcermcnts of the fame thing, fhould beimpreffed upon the mind, at the fame time \ yet it is quite ether-. S^mi farther Refleaions en Natural Liberty, ^6g Ctherwlfe, with refpedl to the will, which can have different ^oods prefented, at the fame time, as the ctjects of its ekcti@n^ and nature has left it free and at liberty for the choice of any of them ; neither are thofe cafes at all parallel, fo as to lay a foun- dation for arguing from one to the other. Again, Secondly^ Experience is urged, in favour of ne- teffity ; the force of which, I think, is as follows; namely^ experience is fuppofed to fhew that men do, in eveiy inftance^ chufe, and, confequently, purfue what, upon the whole, appears to be beft ; and from hence arifes a high degree of probabili* ty, that they are under a neceiTity to ad thus ; •for if it be admitted that men can a^ otherwife^ then, it is highly rcafonable to fuppofe that, in fome injlances^ they would do fo, whereas expe- rience ihews the contrary. This, I think, is the force of the argument, drawn from experience. To which I anfwerj that the evidence, arifing from experience, determines not againft, but in favour of liberty. As thus, fuppofmg a lefs pre^ fcnt geod comes in competition with a greater that is future \ in this cafe, I think, every man mufl: judge that the greater future good is, upon the whole, beft ; it being no more in a man's power to judge, that a \ti% prefent good is, upon the whole, better than a greater that is future, than it is in his power to judge that tivo and tvo9 make /at. Now, the quellion arifing from hence is, whether men do, m every inftance^ ^hufc a, greater future good, in oppofition to a left that is pre- fent, when thefe come in competition ; and there- by always adt conformable to their judgments ? or whether they do not, in forrje in/lanceSy chule a iffs prefent good, in oppofition to a greater that is future, and thereby acl againfi their judg- ments ? and experience is appealed to, as a juagz in th«? (r^e. And, I think, it is fo far from be- 'ibb Seme fdrtbtf' 'R^e^lens on ^Natur'd Zikrff^ mg evident from experience, that men do: a^wiyj ad: co7iformahIe to their judgments, in the prefent cafe ; t^hat, on the contrary, experience iliew» that thi^y do> in many inilances, ad againji thern^ That is, they do^ in many inftances^ chufe a lefs prefcrit good, in oppofition to a greater that is jbture, when thefe come in competition. And I mull intreat my reader to confult his own expe- rience, and fee, whether he he does not, in many inilances, follow his appetites^ and the hke, in op- pofition to his reafon, . \f it Ihould be faid, that, 4tt the iifne of his choice, he judged it to be beft. I anfwer^ If he took a view ot the cafe, he could not polTibly judge fo ; and, if he did not take a view of it, then, the motive to adion was not the greater good, but only prefent pleajure \ and adion ivas the produce, not of judgment, \i\xx. oi appe - iitey ox like. And as men do fometimes purfuc ;a prefent pleafure, without entering into the quef- jtion, whether it be the greater good, or not ? i% in feme inilances, they chufe a prefent pleafure, tho' convinced, at the time, that it is no: the •:greater, but the kfs good. Thus, the drunkard will gratify his defire of liquor, tho' he is re- minded of, and convinced, at the time, that k "will bring upon him fuch a diforder, as is more than an equivalent to the pleafure that arofe from that gratification. If it ihould be faid, that men •prefer a lefs prefent good to a greater that is fu- ture, hecaufe the prefent good is certain^ and the future is mnerlmn. I ■mifwer. Men ad different iy^ in this refped, when tlic grounds of certainty on "the one fide, and of uncertainty, on the other, 'are equal', and, therefore, that cannot be a necef- ■fary caufe of fuch different adions. Befides, fome men v.'ho are fatisfied, upon the bell grounds, as they think, of a future Hate of happinefs, and that all prefeiu enjoyments fall vaftly Ihort of it, do, Sm^fartik& kefic^ioHs on NatUrat tiherty, if; dFo, notwithftanding fuch a coiruiElion^ fometinies hazard the happinefs of another world j for the fake of a /hdrt-lived plcafure here. And as men, in fuch a cafe, do, as it were, give the lit to theni^ felveS, by adting contrary to their judgments •, fo this is a juft foundation for that indignatien and rtfentminty which they take up againft themfeheSi for adting fo fooiifh and ridiculous a part ; which dth^rwife there would not be any foundation in mturc or reafin for. However, as expmence is ap- pealed to, in the prefent cafe \ fo there I mull leave it. That is, I rtiufl leave my reader to confulc his tivn experience^ whether he does, in every inflame^ acl cmformcMc to his judgment, in chufing v/hatj upon the whole, appears to be beil ? or whether, in Jomt inftances, he does not follow his appetites^ and the like, and thereby a6t againft his judgment^ in chufing that, whichj when all things are taken into the cafe, he cannot but fee is the lefs good ? I fay, I muft leave my reader to confuJt his own experience ; becaufe other rhens judgments or experiences may poffibly be of lefs weight with him, with refped to this ar^ gument. Again, Thirdly^ It is urged, in prejudice of Ithtriy^ that it is impoffihU. T he force of this argument, I think, is as follows, vvz. mcui is a r.ecejjhry agent^ becaufe all his anions have a hegiiimig -, tor whaf- tver has a beginning rhuft have a taitfe^ and every caufe i.s a neccjjary caufe. \i any thing can have a beginning which has no caufe, then, nothing can produce fomething \ and, if nothing can produce ibmethingv then, the Kjuerld might have had a be- ginning, without a c^ufe, which is not only an ab- Jurdity commonly chargt^d on Atheifts, but is a real ahfurdity itlelf ; becaufe, if a caufe be not a neref fury caufi\ then, it is 7io caufe at: all ; for M caufes kit not ncccii'iiTy caufes of the cfi^cls they pro^^ . diice,. i68 Some farther Rejleoltons en Natural Liherfjl ^ duce, then, thofe caufcs arc- not fuiud to, or. are indifferent to thefe efFcds, which, in reahty, is the fame as to be no caufe at all. Liberty, therefore, or a power to ad, or not to ad, to do this, or another thing, under the fame caufes^ is 2in impofft-] hility^ and is atbeiftical. To which I anfwer, that A^ion in man is the motion of his body, caufed by the exertion of the moving principle which re- . iides in him, and is a part of his conftitution, as' the parts of the body are which are moved by it v and as thefe are parts of the human conftitution, and, as fuch, are a man^s fclf\ fo fuch motion is called felf-rnotion \ and the caufe of this moving principle in rnan is God^ who is the Author of his conftitution. Thefe are ail the links that are in thi« ghain^viz. adcion is the motion of the body, caufed hy the exertion of the felf-moving principle, which refidcs in man ; and the caufe of this felf-moving principle is God. So that here is not an effed, without . acaufe •, hereisw/animpoflibility j here is not airap- proach to atheifm, as the prefent argument fuppofes. If it fliould be faid, that tho' there is in man a felf-moving principle ; yet that principle ivill not be exerted, without the perception di fome motive^ which motive is the caufe of that exertion ; fo that ticre is one of the links of this chain dropped. I anfwer^ If the moving principle in man is moved, or. caufed to be exerted, by fomething external to «^«, which all motives are, then, it would not be a Jclf-niGving principle, feeing it would be moved by a caufe external to itfelf\ and to fay that a felf- moving priri(;iplc is moved, or caufed to be exert- ed, by a caufe external to itfelf, is ahfurd, and a (ontradi^ion \ becaufe i: fuppofes the prefence and c'^fencc^ the evert ion and non- exertion of the fume power, in the lame fubjed, at the fame time. • And if there is not in man a felf-moving princi- pje, but onlv fuch a principle as is capable of be- ing • Some farther Reflexions on Natural Liberty, 2 69 v-ing tncved or aXed upon by fome external caufe ; • then, agency is not in man, but in that external caufe, or in its caufe, and fo on, 'till we come to •fome fubjed which has in it a principle of felf- "- motion, that is exerted, independent o{ 2iny exter- nal caufe. Befides, motives are as much the caufe •of our not exerting the felf moving power, in fome 'inilances, as they are the caufe of that exertion^ in ether inftanccs. That is, we are as much moved or caufed to fufpendtht exertion of the felf- moving power, by the motive which is the reafon of than > fufpenfion, as we are moved or caufed te exert that power, by the motive which is the ground or rea- fon of that exertion ; thofc motives operating or cauftng^ if I may fo fpeak, the fame way, in both cafes. Now, to fay, that the non-exertion of the felf-moving power is caufed by a motive, is the fame as to fay, that that motive is the caufe of no- thing \ the non-exertion of the felf-moving power being a negative^ it, properly fpeaking, is nothing; fothat a motive, in this cafe, is the caufe of nothing, or, in other words, it is a caufe^ without an effect ; which is as ahfurd as an effeX, without a caufe. But • the truth is, they are not caufes, in cither cafe ; • tho', in common language, they are often called fo. Motives are only the ground or reafon^ why we fufpend or exert the felf-moving power, or why we exert it, in one way, or at one time, ra- ther th.in in another way, or at another time, bur are not caufes of either. Motives are merely paflive^ if I may fo fpeak, in the produdion of •ac^hon. That is, they have no caafality^ in the production of i:. The fine colour of liquor in a -glafs may be z reafon to me, to exert my it\{~ 'moving power, in order to tafle the plcafure which I may propofc to enjoy, in fo doing ; but neither the liqitor^ nor its colour^ nor vi:\y perception • of cither, hai any caufdUty in .thcra to be the caulc of a -]0 Somefiiriher Rejiicli&m on Natural Liha^^ of t hut exertion. Aiid chp*, when the felf-moving poy/er is exerted, it becomes a »iY£^iw^ caufepf its A^rFeCts ; yet as a niiia is jres and vokntary^ in the exertion ot that power i that is, he is not under ^ ueGeirity, froi;ii the conilitution of things,, to ^j^e;>cj:t, or not to exei;t it, t-oe.^ert it this way, (Oi->tl4^t way, tho' tl"kere may be more realbn for l-;€,/Af^":ihan the otl><;r3 /o, in -that fefped, it is A3;d it<) be a jr&i: caufe^ and thofe effc^s aire like* ,>wifc iiiid ,to be /r^<3 which are pro4uc^d by it. .i\.:Rd>iSitnQtive^ are not the-cayfe of ^ipn, fo alJ, %\\4-t iu ;>ecefKuy to the exes not take away the ufe of Jiis appetite^ or his reafon^ biit plainly fuppofes the tife of both ; becaufe, v/ithout the ufe of thcfe, there would be no place for choice, Ag.iin, I anfwer, fifthly^ that perfe8ions are ufually diftinguiflied into natural and 7noraL By statural perlcdions arc mcajit fuch as necefarily refuit from the nature and corffituiicn of any being ; and, thus, the di- vine underflanding and the di^^ine po-iver are called natural ptrfettions in God, By inoyal perfcciions are meant fuch as rcfult from the 'u;ill or choice of ^r.y being ; and, thus, the dhint ':/jifdom and thfr T 2 ' di^r,. 276 Some farther Reflections on Natural Liberty, divine gocdnefs are called the moral perfections o^ xht Deity \ becaufe thefe do not refult necciTarily from his nature, but depend upon his will. That is, God is perfedly wife and good^ as, or becaufe he therefore, they are not morale nor per- fonaly but fiatural^ and confiitutional perfections iri^. both •, tho', I think, when we afcribe wifdom and goodnefs to God^ we confider them of another kind, and more valuable, than when we afcribe wifdom and goodnefs to a clock. Upon the whole, I obferve, that as this argument is founded, for the moft part, on groundlefs principles -, fo to argue, from the degrees of perfection, to the truth of things, is very unfafe ♦, becaufe it may lead us in- to error. Thus, it is moil evident, and, I pre- fume, it admits of no difpute, that an infallible judgment is more perfect than -d, fallible judgment; becaufe the former is abfolutely feciire from error, whereas the latter is liahle to it. Now, to fay, m this Some farther RefleBtonsm Natural Liberty,, 2.77 this cafe, that becaufe an infallible judgment is more perfect than a fallible judgment, therefore, man has an infallible judgment^ would be to draw a conclufion which is manifeftly/^^, in fadl. Again, Fifthly^ It is urged, in prejudice of liberty^ that It is deftructive of morality^ and that it renders re- wards and punifhments ufelefs ; feeing Hberty de- llroys the difference in things, and renders all ob- je6ts and motives indifferent to the perfon, in which it rcfides. To which it is fufficient to anfwer, that this argument is founded upon a groundlefs prefumption^ as I have fhewn above. Natural good and evil are pleafure and pain^ or happinefs and mifery ; moral good and evil are the right or the wrong application of that power, which is lodged in every intelligent being, to introduce or commu- nicate pleafure and pain, or happinefs and mifery, as aforefaid. And as things are thus dijlinct and different in themfelves ; fo that difference is the ground and foundation of choice, and choice fup- pofes liberty. But, for the farther clearing of this point, I beg leave to obferve, that, when a, lefs prefent good comes in competition with a greater that is future, thefe goods admit of a two- fold comparifon ; firjl^ with refpedl to degree^ one is lefsy and the other is greater \ fecondly^ with, re-, fpect to time^ one is prefent^ and the othtr future : Now, let a man chufe either of thefe, upon the principles of liberty, thefe obye6l:s are ?/(?/ indiffe- rent to him, neither does he chufe, at a venture^ as the prefent argument fuppofes ; but, on the contrary, it is the difference in thofe goods, in one or other of the forementioned comparifons^ which is the ground and foundation of his choice, in cither cafe. As to reivards zxid punifhments^ I have elfe- where fhewn, what is the ground and foundation of them, in my former Reflections on Natural L;- kiVty-i to which I refer my reader. Again^ T 3 SislFy. 278 ^^i''^ farther JiejieBions on Natural Liberty. Sixthly^ It is urged in prejudice of liberty ^ that as man is a creature capable of pleaftire and fain ; fo he Cannot but deftrs thofc things he judgcth Vill promote his pleafure, or remove his pain, ancj be CTcrfe to whatever tends to the contrary. And as his defire is thus necejjarily excited ; fo he can- not but will^ or niH^ the ading agreeably to his greater degree of either of thefe. And that this is the truth of the cafe is inferred from hence, viz, it is judged as evident that thefe do follow one another, as that any other effedl does^ or will fol- low its -phyfical caufc. Upon which I obfcrve, that all fkafure^ confidered as pleafure, is the na- iural object of defire •, and all pain^ confidered as pain, is the natural object cf averficn. And as plea- fure and pain admit of degrees^ fuch as greater, and lefs \ fo defire and averfion admit of the like difiin6lion. And as pleafure or pain may htpre- fent^ or at a dijiance -, fo defire and averfion may be the produce of fome prefent affection^ or pajfion^ or the produce of judgment ; and, thus, the lame thing may be the obje6t of defire excited by fome prefent affedion, and yet be the objedt of averfion arifing from judgment •, or it may be the objeft of averfion arifing from fome prefent paflion, and yet be the objeft of defire arifing from judgment. Thus, a man's judgment may lead him to deftre that bitter potion^ which his natural affection^ or pajftofty leads him to loath^ and be moft averfe to. And as affection and judgment lead a man both to defire, and to be averfe to the fame thing-, that is, to like it, upon one account, and diilike it, on another ; fo aclion does not neceffarily follow either, but flows from a principle dijlinci and different from them both. For if defire arifing from either af- fection^ or judgment^ did neceffarily move and diredl the adlive faculty, then, aclion would, in every in- Jla^tce^ foijow the one, or j in every injlance^ it would follow Some farther Reflexions on Natural Lihe^iy, 2 y<^ follow the other ; but experience lliews that this is not the cafe ; bccaufe, in fome inflances, a6lion follows fuch defires as are the produce of appetite^ or affection, and, in others, it follows fuch defires as are the produce of reafon or judgment, when thefe come in competition. So that, tho* dejire, in one or other of thofe views, does always precede aC* tion ; yet it does not, in either cafe, 7teceffarily de- termine the adlive faculty, it being a matter of free choice to a man, which of them fhall be die ground pr reafon of adlion to him. And, there- fore, tho' prefent pleafure naturally excites the af- fcdlion of aefire, and prefent pain, or the pain which is immediately in view, naturally excites the affedlion, or palTion, which we call averfwn ; yet experience ihews, that fuitable adlion does not neceffarily follow either of thefe ; bccaufe a man can deny himfelf the prefent enjoyment of the moil pleaCing, in point of affedion, and thereby the moft defirahle objedl, and he can chufe the mod acute, and thereby the pain which nature is moft aveife to. And when two goods come in compe- tition, a greater, and a lefs ; or when t-ivo evils likewife come in competition, tho* a man cannot judge of thefe otherwife, than as the cafe appears to his underftanding; yet fuitable willing, or nillingy does not neceffarily follow ; becaufe experience Ihews, that, in fome inftances, men act agreeably to their judgment, and in others, they act againft it. Thus, the drunkard, as I obfcrved above, will iometimes gratify his defire of liquor, tho* he is reminded of, and convinced, at the time, that it will draw on him fuch diforder znd pai?i, as will be much more than an equivalent to the pleafure he taftes from his prefent enjoyment -, and this, I think, is acting againft judgment. Again, there is no man who believes a future fate of rewards and punifhments, but dcfircs to be happy in ano- T 4 ther 2 8o Sme farther RefleBions on Natural Liberty] ther worid^ and who^ in point of judgment, prefers and defires the eternal happinefs of another world, before all the pleafures he is capable of enjoying in this ; and this, I think, is the greateft degree of defire arifing from judgment ; becaufe there i^ ho defirable objedl, in point of judgment, which is equal to it ; and yet there are many perfons who, upon the view of a preient enjoyment, will hazard the happinefs of another world, for the lake of a Ihort-lived pleafure here, and, when the enjoyment is over, their fooliih choice gives them gteat remorfe and uneajinefs of mind. If it fhould be faid, that, in fuch inftances, the defli-e arifing from afFedlion was ftronger than that arifing froni judgment, and that this was the natural and ne- cefiTary ground of fuch a choice. I anfwer^ That defires arifing from appetite, or affedlion, and de- fires arifing frorri judgment, are not greater^ or lefs^ with refpe<5tto each other; becaufe there is not any thing in nature to be t\it foundation of fuch a dif- ti nation, they not being capable of being compa- red ; fo that what is urged is of no force. If itlhodd be faidj that defires arifing from affe6tion are, in their kind, ftrong, and have a greater influence upon the adtive faculty in man, than defires arifing from judgment. I anfwer. If this were the cafe, then, when affidibn ^nd judgment come in com- petition, adtion would always follow affection ; whereas experience fiiews the contrary ; feeing, in many infi:ances, men controul their afFecflions, and ad agreeably to their reafon. Upon the whole, I think, it appears that the greater degree of de- fire, or averfion, does not necejfarily determine the adive faculty, as is here fuppofed. Again, Seventhly, It is thought that there is a difference betwixt conftitiition, and the motives to action ari- fing from it ; and thefe ^re confidered, as two dif- tind princiDles or excitements to adion in man. Th.u ^ome farther Reflexions on Natural Liberty i 281 That is, if I underftand the cafe aright, there is a difference betwixt reafon^ coufidered as a part of the human coUftilution^ and a motive arifing from rea- fon\ and likewife betwixt appetite^ ov affe5iion, con- frderedj as a part of that conjiittition^ and a mative arifing from appetite^ and each of thefe are confi- dered, as excitements to adions diflind: from each other. And that, when man docs not a6t ugreea-- My to his greater degree of defire, or averfton, whether thefe are the produce of affedion, or judg- ment, it is becaufe he is neceJJ'arily determined, from his confiitution , to adl otherwife. Upon which I obferve, that this diftinction has mo foundation in nature. For what is underftand- ing or reafon, as a part of the human conftitution, but a capacity of difcerning the fitnefs or mfitnefs of an adion ? and what is a motive from reafon, but an invitation to a6t, or not to adl, confenant to that fitnefs or unfitnefs, arifing from the exercife of our difcerning faculty, as aforefaid ? So that a motive from reafon is not a principle or foundati - on of adion, diftind from our reafoning faculty, but flows from the exercife of it. And what is affection^ or appetite^ when confidered as a part of the human conftitution^ but a capacity or difpofition to tafte foitie fenfual pleafure; and what is a motivt from appetite^ but an exertian of that difpofition, in defiring to tafte fuch pleafure ; which defire is an invitation to enjoyment •, fo that here is a dif- tinction^ without a difference. It is true, a parti- cular conftitution may tafte more intenfe pleafure from one fenfual enjoyment than from another, and that will afford a motive or reafon for prefer^ ring in our choice that particular kind of enjoyment to any other, when thefe come in competition ; but, in this cafe, their is no difference betwixt conftitution., and the motives arifing trom it^ neither tioes conftitution neceftkri/y determine the aftive faculty i^ 5 S 2 Some farther RefleBwns on Natural Liberty. faculty, becaufe wc not only can^ but do, infomc infcances, controiil it in all its branches. That is, at fome times, we deny ourfelves that pleafure which our natural appetite leads us moft (Irongly to de- fire ; and, in other inftances, we gratify our ap* petite, in oppofition to our reafon. Again, Eighthly^ There is a difl:in6lion made betwixt «nen divjeak 2cc\^ftrong reafon^ and likewife betwixt men of "jocak and ftrong appetites -, and men are fuppofed to be neceffarily determined to ad;, or not to ad, as either of thefe are ftronger or weaker in them. Upon which I obferve, that if by this be meant, that fome men are naturally better qua- iified to difcern and judge of the fitnefs or unfitnefs of an adlion, than others; and this makes men to be of ftrong or of weak reafon \ then, I fay that where the fitnefs or unfitnefs of an action is not difcerned^ there a motive from reafon does not take place ; and, confequently, fuch an inftance does not come into the prefent queftion \ and if the fit- nefs or unfitnefs of an aftion is difcerned^ then, rea- fon is not ftronger, or weaker, but is the fame in €n:ery man \ viz. it difcerns the fitnefs or unfitnefs of the a6lion, and that it is more or lefs fo -, and this is difcerned by every man-, and there is not more or lefs difcerned by any man. And, in this view of the cafe, the forementioned diftindiion does not anfv/er any purpofe. But if by frong or '^eak rea- fon, be meant men's making, or not making rea- fon the general rule and meafure of their adions^ fo that men o^ ftrong reafon are thofe who gene^'ally ad: agreeable to reafon, and thereby controul their appetites and paffions more eafily, and with lefs reludancy ; and men of ftrong appetites are fuch s.^ generally follow what their naturally appetites, lead them to defirc, and thereby thofe appetites are re-^ Jtrained with greater rekidancy ; then, I fay, that io be oiJ:nn7 or of iveak reafon, \Se. is a. matter of S^mt farther RefleBiom on Natural Liberty, i S | o^ free choke to every man ; becaufe he may make either rcafon, or appetite, the rule of adlion to himfelf, as he pleafes. So that neither reafon, nor appetite^ let them be confidercd in what way foc- ver, neceflarily determine men to ad, as is here fuppofed. Again, Ninthly^ It is urged that man is under a nc- ceffity to aft, if he is influenced by any motive whatever, provided fome eqnal or greater motive doth not hinder, and experience is urged, as proof, in the prefent cafe. Upon which I obferve, that motives, arifmg from the fame branch of the confti* tution, may be greater^ or lefs ; but motives, which arifc from different branches of the conftitution, ad- mit o^no comparifon. As thus, my deftreto drink may be greater, or lefs, as the liquor is more or lefs dcfirable, or as my thirflinefs is greater or lefs, which excites that defire \ and the reafona- hlenefs or itnreafonabknefs of my gratifying that de- fire may be greater, or lefs, in proportion to the greater or lefs good, or evil, I may fuilain there-* By ; but if reafon and appetite come in competition^ it is not the greater or lei's motive, with refped: to thefe, hvx -3. freedom o^ ele^ion which is the foun- dation of adion^ with rcfped: to either. For tho* motives from appetites may be flronger, or weaker, as I obferved) when compared with each other, and tho* motives from reafon may admit of the like diilindion, yet a motive from appetite and a motive from reafon cannot be greatar, or kfs^ with refped to each other, becaufe there is not zny foun- dation in nature for fuch a diftindion. And, therefore, when men judge that a pcrfon is under 2t neccffty to ad from any motive whatever, if fome equal or greater motive doth not hinder, becaufe, they think, they experie^ice this to be their cafe ;. all that they experience, I think, is only this:, liz. ;ha: with refped to ad ion, fQn^dmef they foiloyv 2 S4 Some farther RefleSiions on Natural Liheny. their reafoHy and fometimes their appetite, when it is a matter of free choice to them^ which of thefc they will follow. And whichfoever of thefe they do follow^ that is, whichfoever of thefe is to them tht ground or reafon o[ 3id:ion^ that, in that inllance, they call the Jtrongeft motive ; and the motive whofe perfuafive influence they reje^^ that, in this inftance they call the weakefi ; the determinatioia itfelf being the only ground of that diitindion.. Thefe few points I have here taken notice of^ becaufe \ would remove every difficulty which the principle of liberty ^ and which, I think, is the truth of the cafe^ may be fuppofed to be incumbered with. I will conclude with recommending one thing to my reader's copfideration ; viz, if aSiion in man, aljowihg the expreflion to be the produce of nccejfity ; then, felfconfcioufnefs of the good^ or m/, of our adtions is a grofs delufion \ becaufe it was not in a man's power to have done otherwife than he did -, and the fleafure^ or unbappinefsy which naturally flows from fuch a confcioufnefs, is, in reafon^ groundkfs. But, I think, the principle of felf-confcioufnefs, of the good, or evil, of our adions, which naturally introduces happinefs, or unhappinefs, as aforefaid, is natural^ and a part of the human conflitntion ; and if this be the cafe as, I think, it is, then, furely, it will be allowed, that the placing fuch a principle in the human confl:itution mufl: be wrongs becaufe it is an unrea- fonahle introduction to mifery : and, if fo, then, 1 think, it will be difficult to account for fuch wrong condud in God, that is, for his placing fuch a principle of felf-confcioufnefs in man which in reajon^ ought not to be in him, whether we consider action in GW, as the produce gf llberly^ Qf niceffii\, ^ If Some farther Reflexions on Natural Liberty, 285 If it Ihould befaid, that tho' the pleafure and iuncafinefs, which naturally flow from a confciouf- nefs of the good, or evil, of our adions, are, in reality^ groundlefs \ yet this anfwers b, good purpofe^ by leading men to the pradtifing the like good ani- ons, and preventing them from pradifing the lik^ evil ones, and, therefore, fuch 4 confcioulhefs was righly placed in human nature, I anfwer^ The remorfe and uneqfinefs of mind, which flows from the confcioufnefs of having done a had adion, is very often the immediate attendant of thole adions, which are the grounds of it \ and tho' thofe bitter reflexions will, upon fome occafions^ return upon a man \ yet it is feldom, when he is in the perfuit of any enjoyment, but rather, when thofe perfuits are over^ and he is taking a review of them ^ or when under fome aJffii£fion^ or at the apprehenfion of gj IS a fecial creature, or a creature, who, in his na* tural compofition, is framed and conftituted for fociety, or for the being happy with others of his kind. And as man is, thus, fitly conftituted to promote and carry on the common happinefs ; fo he is capable of the contrary. Each and every of his appetites and paffions are capable of being vitiated^ by being exercifed upon wrong objeds, or by be- ing indulged to an excefs ; by which means, man becomes a difagreeable and hurtful creature \ and is fo far from contributing to the common good^ that, on the contrary, his lelnfh, brutal, and in- human temper and condu(5l (lands as a bar to it. And, when, or where-ever this is the cafe, fuch men muft be exceeding vile and difagreeable in the eyes of God^ their minds and condud: being diredlly oppofite to the mind and condudl of their Maker, and their defigns and endeavours being to fruitrate and difappoint God's kind intentions towards his creatures.' God is a Being, in v/hom all moral perfe^lions take place, in the higheft degree ; and, therefore, as felfifhnefs could not poffibly be the motive, which induced him to call any of his creatures into being •, fo, of courfe, it muff be true good- nefs •, that is, a true regard to the happinefs and well-being of the creatures themfelves, which ex- cited him to it. And as this planet is made a convenient habitation for a multitude of creatures, who have a mutual dependence upon each other, and whofc happinefs is bound up in the happinefs o^ the whole, if I may fo fpeak, fo the 'common felicity was the common and the only end, which God propos'd, in giving being to thijs worlds And as God has made man a focial creature ; fo the happinefs of fociety, or, in other words, the publick good^ v/as the great end which God in- tended that nr.an fliould be in the purfuit of, and U 2 tQ 292 T'he Glory of Chrifl. to which all his aftions fhould be principally di- redled. And when man carefully purfues the great end of his creation, by rendering himfelf an agreeable and ufeful creature ; then, of courfe, he renders himfelf agreeable and lovely in the eyes of his Maker. And, on the other fide, when he oppofes this end, and fets himfelf as a bar to the common felicity, he muft lay a juft foundatmi for divine difpleafure. I fliall not take upon me to fhew, how many ways, and in what inftances, men are injurious to the common-wealth j it being fuf- ficient to my prefent purpofe, to obferve, that when men covetoufly purfue their own pleafures and dcfires, when they are injurious to others, and obllrud the common felicity ; they, then, in the nature of the thing, become the proper objects of God's difpleafure. Surely, nothing can be more provoking to fuch a wife and good Being as God i%^ than for a moral agent, defign'd and con- ftituted to promote a common happinefs ; for fuch an one to kick againfl his Maker, by dif- appointing his gracious purpofes, and by intro- ducing that mifery into being, which he was de- fign'd to prevent. And yet this is the cafe of every wicked man, who, by his difagreeable and imfocial temper and condud:, obfiruUs the com- mon felicity. Having, thus, difcover'd the dif- eafes, by fhewing, What it is^ in the nature of the things' which renders men the fuitable and proper ob- je^is of divine difpleafure ? I, now, proceed to the remedy j 7iamely^ to fliew, How the means^ Chrifl made nfe of become a proper expedient^ to take away that difpleafure^ and to reconcile fmners to God. And this I ihall do, both negatively and pofitively ; negatively, how Chrift did not do it^ and, pofitively, how he did do it. And, jF/r/?, I am to Ihew, how Chrift did not do it ; namely^ firfl^ he did not reconcile fmners unto Godj The Glory of Chrift, 29^ God, hy ailing in them^ and thereby deftroying their cgency. Surely, nothing can be more romantick and wild, than what has enter'd into the heads of fome Chriflians, viz. that Chriil faves them, by a6ling in them, and thereby adling for them. Chrift is fuppos'd to take poflefTion of the fmner, as the devil heretofore was fuppos'd to take pof- fefTion of fome men -, pofleffing them, by making life of their faculties, and ading in them. And, thus, Chrift, as they imagine, makes ufc of the fa- culties of finners •, he underfiands^ and wills^ and c3s in them^ and thereby he underftands^ and wills ^ and a^s for them •, they, as they think, having no abihty, fince the fall, to underfland, will, or ad: any thing that is good^ in, or for themfelves. I fay, Chrift did not take this method to fave man- kind, by deftroying their agency, and ading in them i but, on the contrary, he confider'd man, as a moral agent ^ and treated with him, as fuch, in order to his falvation, as I fhall fhcw in its due place. Neither, if Chrift had taken fuch a me- thod, would it have been eftedual to that end. As will appear, if we confider, that as man, in his natural conftitution, is a moral agent, which renders him an accountable creature ; fo it is the right or the wrong ufe of his agency^ and that only, which, in the nature of the thing, can render him agreeable or difpleafing to his Maker. And, therefore, to fuppofe that God is either pleafed or difpleafed with one agent, for what was done in him by the v/ill and agency of another, is moft ridiculous and abfurd \ fo that whatever may be the fenfe of thofe places in holy writ, which fpeak of the Spirit of Chrift^ the grace of Chrift^ or the like i they cannot pollibly fignify the atf of Chrifi in man, as above explained. And as the fore- mentioned opinion is exceedingly extravagant in itfelf, fo it is moft pernicious to mankind ; becaufe U 3 It 294 'The Glory of Chrijl, it difpofes the finner to go on in His folly, and to neglecl his repentance and reforhiation j he, as he imagines, having no power in himfelf to per- form what is good, and, therefore, he muft wait^ 'till Chrijl performs that work in him. Again, Secondly^ Chrill did not fave finners, abfolutely and unconditionally, by any a5f of obedience to his Father's will, nor by any ^^7 of fuffering. If he had lived a thoufand yt^.n^ and had differed a thou- Jand deaths^ aiid had felt a thoufand time's more pain and mifery, in every death, than the pain and mifery he underwent ; this might have rendered him, in his own per/on^ fo much the more dear and valuable to his Father ; but it could not alter the cafe, with refpe(5t to God's favour, to any other perfon, whilft that perfon obftmately con- tinues in his fins, and thereby continues the pro- per objed of God's difpleafure. Every fmner is is as much, and as truly, a finner, and as much, and as truly, the objed of God's difpleafure, on the account of his fins, whilft he continues in them, without repentance, after the obedience and fufFerings of Chrill, as before them ; and, there- fore, tho' thefe are highly fubfervient to man's fal- vation, yet they are not, abfolutely and uncondi- tionally, the ground and reafon of God's mercy and loving-kindnefs to mankind. Thirdly^ Chrifb did not reconcile Tinners unto God, by laying down a fet of principles^ and making mens affent to^ or diffent from them^ the ground of God's faiour, or difpleafure. If this had been the cafe, then, indeed, there would have been fome fhow of reafon, for infilling, as the Church of Rome does, that there is an abfolute necejfity of an infallible judge^ to determine in matters of faith, and to guard and fecure men from all dangerous errors ; tho' even this would not afford the Iha- d'ow of a proof, that the Bifijop of Rome is that infallible fht Glory of Chriji, ^o^ infallible judge. But this is not the cafe. Faith and infidelity, with regard to any fubjed, can be no farther valuable, or defpifable, than as they arc, or as they are not, the proper rcfult of that evi- dence, or the want of it, upon which each of them is grounded. And, even then, thefe can- not, in the nature of the thing, be the ground of divine favour, or difpleafure ^ becaufe they are not the fubjedls of our free choice. If we fee that the conclufion jujily follows from the pre- mifes, or if We judge the contrary s in this cafe, we are fo far paflive, as that, if we attend to the fubje<5b, we cannot poflibly think and judge other- wife of it than we do ; and, therefore, it is moft abfurd and ridiculous, to fuppofe that God will ihew his favour to one, for feeing what he could not but fee ; or his difpleafure to another, for not feeing what he could not fee. And tho* the abfur- dity of this appears, at firft view, yet it has en- ter'd into the fchemes of a multitude of Chrifti- ans. Each church has its creed or fet of princi- ples .^ which are fet up, as th.t Jiandard of chriflianity^ and men's afTent to, or difTent from them, is mad- pofc chrillianity, by way of argument, ought not to The Glory of Omfi. 307 to blend with it the doBriiies^ and principles^ and fancies of men^ and argue againft thefe, as againfl chriftianity; which unfair pracflifing will not be admitted in any other cafe. Let them take chrifti- anity in its native fimplicity, free from all human mixtures and additions ; and then let them find out any abfurdity or unreafonahknefs^ if they can. I have before fliewn, what is the chriftian falvation, or the way which Chrifl proposed to fave men in. And as this is the only proper expedient, which could be efFedual to that end •, fo it is highly juft and reafonable. I fhall not here make myfelf an- iwerable for every exprefTion or mode of fpeech, which may be urg'd from the New Teftament^ in the prefent cafe ; but this I do infift upon, that the chriftian falvation^ or the way which Chrill pro- pos'd to fave men in, \^ Jlrickly jufi and rational^ fuitable to the nature of God^ and the nature ofman\ and, therefore, it is highly worthy of all accepta- tion. Again, Fourthly and lafily^ I obferve, tho' a heated paf- fion^ or an indulged appetite^ or the hke, may mif- lead the underftandings of men, bjy which they are drawn into a wrong judgment of perfons and things i and that tho' hy fawning ?ind flattery^ and by many other pra6lices, we work upon the weak- iiefs and vanity of each other by which means we gain our feveral ends ; yet this cannot be the cafe, with refpe6l to God\ for as his underflanding can- not pofTibly be mifled^ fo there is nothing but the love and pra^ice of virtue and true goodnefs, which can poflibly render us worthy of his regard. Let me, then, by way of conclufion, defirc and intreat, that each and every of us, in our leveral places and callings, may fo deport ourfelves, as that we may bt The glory of Chrift in this life, and, after it, may be found worthy to cater into the joy of our Lord. X ^ TRACT TRACT XXX. A L E r^E R of 1" HANKS T O The Author of the Tracer, entitled, A \ Friendly Admo7iition to Mr. Chubb ; wherein the feveral Things com- plained of, in that Admonition, are conlidered. SIR, I Have read the Admonition ; and tho' I do not think your complaints well grounded, yet pre- fuming that they are the produce of kindnefs\ and intended for mine and the publick good, therefore, I return you my hearty thanks. Your good wifhes are the fame, and, therefore, my obli- gations to you mufl: be the fame alfo, whether your opinion and reprefentatioa of my writings are jtift^ or not. And tho' I have hitherto deter- min'd not to take notice of any namekfs tra5l^ be- caufcj I think, it is dealing with an adverfary up- on an unequal foot ; and tho' I intend to abide by this refolution, for the time to come, unlefs fome- thing extraordinary Ihall difpofe me to the con- trary, yet I have thought proper, upon this oc- cafion, to trouble you with a Letter^ becaufe I am willing to write a few words upon thofe points which are tht grounds of your complaints againftmc The general charge is, how little honour , how little fervice I have done to the chriftian religion, Aiid this ;7^^^//ri? charge is, -in the genci-al, fup- • ■ • ported- A Letter ef ^hanks^ Sec: 309 ported by complaints of the fame kind, viz, that I' have afcribed too little 10 faith ^ x.o gofpl-crdinances^ &c. with refpedl to the obtaining God's favour. And here, if I may be allowed to follow the ex- ample of my admonilher, I may likcwife take up my complaint againfl him, and fay, that he has been too fparing in this particular, by omitting to complain againll another perfon^ who ftands equally chargeably with what I am complained of for j one who fays not a word of faith, or gofpel- ordinances, ^c. when he was profeffedly treating of the grounds of divine favour, or difpleafure j one whole fayings are likely to do much more damage^ if any can arife from fuch a procedure, than any fayings of mine can be fuppofed to do. Matt. XXV. 3 1 . to the end of the chapter. When the Son of man fhall come in his glory ^ and all the holy angels with him^ then foall he fit upon the throne cf his glory. And before himfJjall be gathered all na- tions^ and he fhall fepar ate them one from another^ as a fljepherd divideth his fheep from the goats. And he fhall fet the fJ^eep on his right-hand^ but the goats on the left. Then fhall the King fay unto theniy on his right-handy Come ye bleffed of my Father y inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was an hungredy and ye gave m^ meat \ Iwasthirflyy and ye gave me drink ; I was a fir anger y and ye took me in. Nakedy and ye cloath- ed me \ I was ficky and ye vifited me ; / was in pri-^ fony and ye came unto me, Then fhall the righteous anfwer him^ f^y^^g-, Lord^ when f aw we thee an hun* gred^ and fed thee ? or thirfty^ and gave thee drink ? When faw we thee a fir anger., and took the in .^ or nakedy and ckathed thee ? Or when faw we thee fick^ cr inprifon., and came unto thee ? And the Kingfloall anfwer and fay unto themy verily I fay unto youy inaf- pinch as ye have done it unto one of the leaji of thefi m^ bnthreuy ye have done it unto me, Then fJoall he x 3 i^y 3 10- 'A Letter of Thanks y ScCl fay aljo unto them on the left-hand^ 'Depart from mei ye curfedy into everlafling fire^ prepared for the devil and his angels. For I "evas an hungred^ and ye gave me no meat ; I was thirfiy^ and ye gave me no drink ; / was a fir anger y and ye took me not in ; naked^ and ye cloathed me not \ ftck and in frifcn^ and ye vifited me not. Then fhall they alfo anfwer him., faying.^ Lord^ when f aw we thee an htingred^or athirft^ or a fir anger ^ or naked, or ftck, or in prifon, and net w.inificr unto thee ? Then fhall he anfwer them, faying. Verily .^ I fay unto you, inafmuch as ye did it not to one of the leafi of thefe, ye did it yiot to me. And thefe fhall go away into everlafiing punifjment -, but the righteous into life eternal. The words I have here cited are a difcourfe of our Saviour's, in which he gives an account of the lafi judgment, of the grounds of di- vine favour, or difpleafure, and of the righteous^ fentences which will be pronounced upon men, ac- cording as they have rendered themfelves the fuit- able and proper objeds of reward, or punifhment. And this difcourfe, furely, affords a large fubjeft" for my admonilher to have exercifed his complain- ing talent upon. He might, firfi, have obferved the perfonal charaEier of him that fpake, viz. that' he was conftituted to be a light to the world, or a fure guide to eternal happinefs -, by reprefcnting to, and preffing upon men v/hatever was ahfolutely neccffary, and w^ould effedually fecure to them the love and favour of God. Secondly, My admoni- iher might have obferved what the fuhjeEl was, which the fpeaker profeffedly undertook to treat of, vi%. the lafi judgment, the grounds upon which the Judge will ad, and the fentence which he will oafs upon all men accordingly. And, from hence, he might hare argued, in his own way, that for fuch a perfon, upon fuch an occaficn, to take no no- tice of faith, or goipel- ordinances, cf his own me- rits, and the like, and to declare plain virtue, hy-\ manitv;^ 'A Letter §f nanks, &c. 311. 'manity, and charity the ground of God's favouiV and the want of thde the ground of his difplea- fure^ muft be prodigious negleB indeed ; a negle6t, that is not very honourable^ very ferviceahle^ or ra- ther, which is dijidonourahle and dijferviceable to the chriftian religion^ and, therefore, ought to be com- plained of. Now, for my admonillier to pafs it over in filence, when, if any mifchief could arifc to mankind from a difcourfe of this kind, this, furely, mud be more injurious than any writings of mine can poflibly be ; and to fingle out me, to lodge his complaints againft, I think, is an in- flance of partiality^ or at leaft a manifeft negletl in my admonifher. But to return. The faults or errors complained of are of t-wo kinds, viz. excefs and defect. Thofe of excefs arc, that I afcribe too much to reafon^ or the natural ca- pacities of men, to know and do their duty \ and too much to virtue^ humanity^ and charity^ in render-. ing men acceptable and well-pleafing to God. The errors^ or faults of defe^^ are confequences drawn from the foremention'd exceffes, jiamelvy, that I afcribe too tittle to revelation, and to divine ajjiftance, in the knowledge and praflice of our duty, and too little to faith, to gofp el -ordinances'-^ and to the fufferings and death of Chrift, with re- gard to God's favour and the divine acceptance; Thefe, I think, are the fum of what is charged upon me ; and, in fpeaking to each of thefe, I think, I fhall confidcr all that my admonifher has complained of. And, Firft, K fault, or error o^ excefs, which is charged upon me, is, that I afcribe too much to reafon, or the natural capacities of men, to know and do their divty. Here I fliall take for granted, as be* ing elfewhere proved, the following propofition, viz. that God is ahfolutely wife and good. This being admitted, it will follow, that God will not X 4 req^uirt ,•31-2 . ji Letter cf ^hayih^ &c; ,Xequire or ey:pB the performance of any thing, Ti duty^ from any creature, but what is proper for Jhim to require of fuch a creature, and what is fit for that creature to perform, confidering his abi- fities, his condition, and circumilances in life. I fay, this will unavoidably follow, if the foremen-^ tioned proportion be admitted ; becaufe to acl Otherwife is abfolutely inconjiftent with that cha^ l^adler ; that is, if God ihould require any thing, 0S duty^ from a creature, v/hich was unfis for him 1:0 require, or the creature to perform, confidering his abilities, circumilances, and condition in life j this would be fevere^ arbitrary^ and unkind^ and, confequently, be abfolutely inconfiilent with wif* 4om and goodnefs. Now, if this be the truth of the cafe, which, I imagine, my admonillier, notwith-^ Handing all his complaints, will not venture to deny^ then, it will follow that nothing can be 3 man's duty, but what comes within the reach of his inteUe^ual faculty to difcover, and his a^ivs faculty to perform. Whether we confider him fianding^ or fallen^ it alters not the cafe 5 becaufe, as his abilities, his circumilances, or condition in life change, fo his duty changes with them. And, therefore, if there be any change in the natural abilities of man by t\\t fall of Adam ^ then, 3, change of his duty v/ill unavoidably follow ; becaufe, as I obferved above, nothing in the nature and reafon of the thing, w^ith my admcnilher's leave, can be a man's duty, but what comes within the reach of his intelle(B:ual faculty to difcover, and his a(5live faculty to perform ; every thing elfe being unrea- jmiahk and unjufi^ when it is confidered as his duty. If it Ihould be faid that Adam fell from a ftate of innocence into a ftate of apoftacy^ and that this fall muft make a confiderable chavge of his ahili^ ties : I anfwer^ If this be admitted, then, it will ibllow that, as his abilities decreafcd^ his du^- de^ creafed i^ Letter of "Thanks^ &c; 31 j h'eqfed in proportion. But how does it appear that his abilities miift fufFer fuch a change by th^ iofs of his innocence ? Man, hke all other crea- tures, mufl be innocent, when called into being, fmce 'tis abfurd to fuppofe that any creature can be a criminal, antecedent to its exiftence^ or that \X fhould become a criminal by its beginning to he ; becaule cxiltence to every creature is the effedt of the power and will oi another. And as man was made an innocent creature, which was the cafe of fiones and trees ^ which were equally free from fault; as well as man ; fo he was likewife made a morai agents which rendered him capable of becoming -% criminal, by being in a capacity of ading^^r^^^^^ or contrary to that rule of action, by which he ought to condudl his behaviour. yi.2iXitranfgreJJed that rule, and loft his innocence ; but what ha^i this to do with his abilities ? His intellediual an4 adive faculties were not dejlroyed by his tranf-? greffion, but continued the fame after his fall, as before it. Man, it is true, was, from his make and conftitution, liable to abufe his faculties ; but it will not follow from thence, that by his tranf-* greffion he would lofe the ufe of them ; the con^ trary to which is true, becaufe we all experience in ourfelves thofe faculties of intelligence and adi^ vity, which Adam was created with ; which facui-.. ties, as they were placed in us by our Creator to dif cover to us our duty^ and to render us capable of performing it^ fo, if rightly ufed and attended to, they are fufficieni for that purpofe \ and to fup-, pofe the contrary is to charge God foolijhly., by re-, prefenting him, as providing means not fuHicient: to reach the end they are direded to. And as man is thus naturally qualified to know and do his duty, fo he may do it with eafe and certainty^ Duty, furely, is not fuch 2ifirange^ myfierious^ out'^of tbs way things as fome would reprefent it to be, neither '514 'A- Letter of Thanks^ tccl neither is God fuch an unkind and ungenerous Go- vernour, as to lay a trap for his creatures, by making that their duty which is exceeding difficult to be known, and which they are in very great danger not to come at the knowledge of ; much lefs will he make that their duty which is above their ability to difcover or perform, for, then, he muft be a hard and cruel Majler^ indeed. And, here, I would beg my admomjher to confider what a compliment he is paying to his kind Creator^ . by reprefenting, or infmuating, at leaft, that he makes man's duty fo myfierious and great^ as that' it is exceeding difficulty yea, above his ability, to know, or do. This, furely, refle6ls dilhonour upon God's moral charaEler^ becaufe fuch a con- duft is unworthy of a wife and good being. Thus, i have fhewn what I afcribe to man, viz. an ability to know and do his duty. And this, I think, is not too much, becaufe it is not only what he is, but what, in reafon, he ought to be pofieffed of , for, if he had any thing lefs than this, he would have Uo little ; too little for God's honour and his own fafety, or rather too little to render him an account- able creature, becaufe he ought not, in reafon, to be accountable for thofe things which are above his ability to know, or do. And, from the fore- mentioned error or fault of excefs, I am. Secondly, By way of confequence, charged with /-k;^. errors or faults of defect, viz, that I afcribe too little divine revelation,^ith. refpedl to the knowledge of our duty j and too little to divine afftftance, with refpedt to the pradice of it. As to divine revelation, I obferve, that tho' man's intelledual faculty qualifies him to difcover and know his duty, yet he is liable to. negle^ or lay afide the ufe of it, and to commit himfclf to other guides to diredl him, in matters of religion •, and this renders him very liable to be mfid. And as mankind are^ t;lius, liable to lay afide A Lttter of ^hanh^ izcl ^ig afide the ufe of their reafon, fo this was mani- feftly the cafe, in fa<5t. The Pagan world were fo far from ufing^ and following their reafon^ in mat- ters of rehgion, that, on the contrary, they a6led againfi it, being under the diredion of oracles, and ^priefts, and men who pretended to have cornmunica- tis-A with the gods •, fo that their barbarous, ftnpidy and burdenfome religion was fo far from being the refuU of reafon, or of the defe^ls of it •, that it was introduced by men's laying afide their reafon in matters of religion, and fubftituting pretended re^ velations in its Head, And as this was the cafe, with refpecl to the Pagan world, fo, furely, it was an inftance of divine kindnefs, and exceeding ufeful and advantageous to mankind, for God to give them a rroelatii)?t,wheYthY to dehver them from the bondage and corruption of all pretended revelations,and tore- ftore them to their manly liberty, by reducing them to the right ufe and exercife of their reafon in mat-' ters of religion. And this was plainly the cafe of the chrijli^n revelation, the ufe of which was not fo much to fuperfede or fupply the defeds of our natural faculties, as to call us back to a right ufe of them ^ by laying before us a rule of aftion, which was' our duty, independent of, and antecedent to that revelation, and which our reafon approves s^ndjnftl- fes; by prefcribing a mode of worJJjip free from that load of abominable fuperltitions, which was very injurioiis to the Pagan world; and by rcpre- fenting to us the certain confequences of a o;ood or bad life, with refped to divine favour, or difpleafure; thereby to engage our /j^^;/j, our defires,our hopes and fears in the intcreft of religion. This, I think is the flate of the cafe, with refped to the chrifti- an revelation ; the giving of which, as it is a very great inftance of God's kindnefs and good- will to mankind, fo it is highly ufeful and beneficial to them. Thus, have I Ihewn what I afcribe to re- vdatiim 5 and, I think, I have not afcribed too lit- '§i6 ''A Ldter of 'Thsnh^ Sccl iky becaufe, if I fhoiild afcribe more, it might be ioo much : too much for the honour of God, and' for the comfort zndfafely of mankind. For if re- velation is fo ahfolutely Jieceffary, as that man's duty cannot be difcover'd without it, then, fure]y, far the greateft part of mankind mufl be in a deplorabk ioizdition^ indeed. The chriftian revelation was not given, till a multitude of ages wtrepqft : and, lince it has been given, it has been far from pre- vailing all over the world. And, therefore if ma7t, by his condition in nature upon the fall of AdatUy was unqiiaVified to know, and, confequently, to do his duty, then, the multitudes of mankind, who have been deftitue of revelation^ mufl: be wholly 'unae count able y fo far as their incapacity extends, or elfe they mufl: be in a damnable fiate^ beyond all pofllbility of relief, for any thing we can fee to the contrary. For tho' man be confidered as un- der a 7iaiural incapacity ^ yet, I take it, he is not fuppos'd to be free from guilt on that account, upon my admomfhef% principles, and, therefore, lie lies open to the heavy difpieafure of Almighty God. But this is a do6trine as abfurd in itfelf, as d/fljonourable to God, and as itncomfoxtable to man^ Icind, as the dodlrine o{ abfolute ele^ion and reproba- tion: it being equally the fame to a man, whether his damnation be the eifed of an abfclute decree^ or of his helplefs condition in nature., which it was not in his power to prevent, or deliver himfelf from. And this I would particularly recomm.end to the confideration of my admonifJjer:, becaufe, I am per^ fuaded, he would not call'fuch difJmiour upon his kind Creator^ if he faw what his principles, in the Ifllie, would unavoidably lead to. And tho' he may poflibly think to prefs me hard upon this head, by urging quotations out of the writmgs of Mv. Locke and Dr. Clarke^ for whom, he may well fuppofe, I have the hi^heji veneration 3 yet, if it be expeded I Ihould ^A Letter of Thanks^ &c, ^^ fhould fubmk my judgment to their authority^ \h this I beg leave to be excufed. And, if thofe gentlemen have urged the necejfity of a revelation, from the infufficiency of men's natural faculties t& difcover their duty, I muft take the liberty to djjfent from them, upon the grounds I have before laid down. As to the ftate of the Pagan worlds this, I think, is plainly againft them becaufe the caufe of the Pagans mifcarriages, in matters of religion^ was not the infufRciency of reafon, but it was their negle5ling and laying that afide^ and giving themfelves up to be conduced by friejls^ and oracles^ and pretended revelations. Again, "Thirdly^ The other error ovfauk of defeoi^ fup- pofed to follov/, by confequence, from the fore mentioned error or fault of excefs, is, that I afcribe ioo little to divi)2e cjfifiance^ with refped: to the prac- tice of our duty. What I have faid of this matter is moflly contained in my Examination of Mt*. Barclay^ Principles, and in my Reply to Mr, Beaven^s Defence of him ; wherein I have allowed ■*' that God may fometimes kindly interpofe, and "*' by a fupernatural operation, bring to men's *' view fuch uleful truths, as they, thro' floth, *' bigotry, or fome other impediment, are ignorant *' of, or do not attend to : and iikewife that God ** may, by thofe operations, prefent fuch motivers *' to men's minds as are neceifary to excite to good ** adions, ftill leaving them perfedily at liberty *' as moral agents, whether they will hearken to *^ and follow, or rejed thofe wholefome councels *' as he, by fuch fupernatural opemtions, or by *' the written word, is pleafed to lay before them.'* Page 4 of my Reply to Mr. Beaven, Thus far I have allowed \ but this my admonijloer complains ot as too little : tho', I think, he is mijlaken, becaufe, if I had allowed more, it would have been to$ much s too much for man to remain a moral agents .518 A Letter of Thanks^ ccc^ or an accountable creature, or a proper objedl of 'reward, or punijhment •, feeing more than 1 have allowed above would have been inconfiftent with human liberty. Every a6lion in which man is pro- perly a moral agent, for which he is accountable, and which renders him the proper objecl of reward or punifhment, muft, in the nature of the thing be the effe5f and produce of man's will and agency^ and notofthe will and agency of another. And, there fore, if more were afcribed to tht influence of the Spi- rit, with refped to the performance of man's duty^ than I have allowed above, it would be too much. But, here, my admonifher returns upon me by obferving, that I afcribe nothing to the Spirit, with refpe6l: to the heart and affeuiions of men, which he looks upon to be the main point. By the heart and affedlions I underftand the fame thing ; for if my admonijher means otherwife, then, I do not underftand him. However, I fhall confider the heart and affedions as the fame, the affedions being luppofed to htfeated in, or to fpring from that part of man's body, v/hich is called the heart. The affeftions are to be confider'd, as parts and branches of the human compofition, or as fome- thing vj]iic\i flows from it : and thefe are called into exercife, or into being, by obje£ls from without, which are diiFerently, and at different times, pre- fented to the mind. And each afredion is flrcnger or weaker from fomething different in the compofi- tion and conftitution of each creature. Thus, love and hatred, hope and fear, joy and forrow, and the like, are either called into exercife, or into being, by objects from without, which either ftrike and awaken thofe affedions, or elfc give being to them.. And each of thefe affedions is ftronger, or weaker, according to the conftitution of each creature, or as they have been check'd or indulged by that creature. One affeftion may likewifc A Letter of Thanks^ &:c., 515^ likewife take place of, zndfupplant another oppo- fite to it ; thus, the fame objedl which appears agreeable to day, and fo excites the affedion of love may to morrow, when taken in a different view, appeal* dif agreeable^ and excite the contrary affedli- on, z'iz, hatred. And as the affedions are excited by objeds from without, fo thefc objedls are pre- fented to the mind different ways, viz. by thtfenfes by man's own refleolionSj by another agents or the like. Thus, I may reprefent to a man the evil he will draw upon himfelf by the performance of this or that adlion-, and this may awaken his/^^r, and be z check or rejlrainl upon him, with regard to the performance of that adlion. And, in fuch a cafe, I may, in ^fecondary d.nd lefs proper (cnfc., be faid to infltience the man's heart and affedtions, and to work a change m him, when, in ftridnefs of fpeech, I an no more than barely an injirument^ in bringing thofe ideas or objedsto his view, which, by his con^ fidering and refieding upon them, were the ground and reafon of his change. And, here, my- reader will eafily 6i{Qtxn how far I allow the Spirit of God may work upon the hearts and affedions of men, viz, by bringing to their view fuch objects as are proper to excite their affe^ions^ Hill leaving them as much at. liberty to attend to, or rejed what is thus offered, as they are, when thofe objeds arc prcfented to the mind any other way^ or by any o- ther agent or inftrument. And, here, I conceive I do not afcribe too little to the fpirit of God, witk refpedl to the performance of man's duty, bccaufe, if I afcribe more, it will ho. too much. For if God fhould fo far interpofe, as to raife or change the affedionsof men, abjlraEledly from 2iny ohje^s from without, tho' this fuppofition is an abfurdiiy^ be- caufe every affcdion fuppofes fome objedl which it is cxercifed upon, and fuppofe fuch affedions are the fpringi of adlion in man, then, man is a mere g20 rA' Letter df ^anks^ &cJ Sntrc mathine ', he loves, and defires, and a6i:s'/^^ knows not what^ nor why ; or rather, he does not love, nor defire, nor ad at all^ but fome other agent loves, and defires, and ads in him. And, confequcntly, man is not a moral agent, is not ac- countable, is not a proper objed of reward, or punifhment, at leaft, in all thofe cafes in which the Spirit of God interpofes^ as aforefaid. Befides, if the hearts and afFedions of men, by their condi- tion^ in nature are evil^ which evil it was not in their power to prevent^ nor to free them/elves from-y and if this evil expofes them to the difpleafure of Almighty God, then, the cafe is the fame to man- kind, as if their ftate had been determined by an ^Ifolute decree. For as every man, from his condi- tion in nature, mufl of courfe, be a bad man^ ex- except God interpofes and changes his heart and afFedions ♦, fo every man, that is bad^ would be- €ome good^ if God would interpofe and change his hearty as aforefaid. Gcodnefs or badnefs in men, up- on this principle, is not a matter of choice or ele^ion in them ; but one man is bad by or from his con- dition in nature, and another is good by God's in- terpoftng and changing his heart and afFedions. But this do5frine refleds great difhonour upon our kind Creator, and, therefore furely, is not the truth of the cafe. Again, Fourthly^ My other error or fault of excefs is, that I afcribe too much to virtue^ humanity , and charity^ with refped to God's favour and accep- tance. And here, again, I fhall take for granted the proportion I mentioned above, viz. that God is abfoiutely wife and good. This being allowed, it will follow, that he will not love nor hate^ r^- ward nor punijh 2iny ^trion^ upon any other account than his being the fuitable and proper objed of his apprchaticny or averfion-, becaufe to love or hate, reward or punifh, upon any other motive^ is A Lelter of 'l^janKs, 6rc» JTT IS wrong in it felf, and is the efFe6l of weaknefs^ or viciGufnefs^ and therefore, is abfokitely inconfif- tent with :he charafter of the divine Being. The queftion, then, is, what is it that makes a man a lovely creature^ and thereby renders him a proper object of divine regard ? And this, I fay, is vir- tue, humanity, and charity ^ or, in other words, it is the putting on fuch a temper of mind and fuch a behaviour, as becomes us as men^ which ren- ders us worthy of the favour of God. Man is a dependent creature, who owes himfelf and all his enjoyments to the benevolence of his kind Creator, to whom he cannot pofTibly make any grateful re- turn ofkindnefs again; fo that the fome of his duty to God is love and thankfulnefs, and this in- cludes in it his duty to his neighbour, which is t\iQ fulfilling of the law, feeing true love and thank- fulnefs to God confifts in having a jufl fence of his goodnefs upon our minds, and in carefully ufmg the benefits he bellow on us, to anfwer the '3«;//~^ 2,xA good end for which they were given, viz. the common good. The common felicity, and therein the honour and glory of God, is the grand defign of the prefent fyftem of things, and the great end which our kind Creator had in view, in calling this world in- to being. And as man was dehgned and con- ftituted to be a fharer in, and a contributer to the common tranquility -, fo v/hen he has fuch a jufb fenfe of his Creator's goodnefs, as becomes ^prin- ciple of aBion in him, and difpofes him carefully to ufe the benefits he receives, in anfwering the wife and kind purpofe of the benefactor, ^ by contri- buting to the well-being ot the reft of his fellow- creatures, and by introducing as much happifiefs into the creation as he can; this is true love^ true thankftdnefs, and is what will render him tm\y love^ ly ^nd valuable in the fight of God. For tho' e^ very virtuous good man ought> and will be ready, Vqi, IL ¥ ^^ ©n all proper oecafions, puhlickly to acknowlecfge the benefits he receives, to thtpraife of the donor -^ yet thefe acknowledgments are not love or grati- tude, but only the outward marks andy/|-;^Jof them,, and which too often are feperated from them. Thefe acknowledgments, thefe calves of our lipy are no more than an ouiivard prcfejfwn of love and thankfulnefs, or, at moft, the lower kind o^ fruits ©f them. By thefe acknowledgments we tell ^Z- mighty Cod^ or rather tell one another y, that we are loving and thankful. But thefe, confidered ah- firaBedljy, arc far from being love or thankfulnefs itfelf, becaufc the contrary may take place in usj notwithftanding thofe profeiTions. And,- there- fore,, when a man \i2i% fuch a fence of his Creator's goodnefs upon his mind, as engages him to em- ploy die benefits he receives, to anfwer the wife and good end for which they were given ; this is true love and gratitude, and will render a man a. thoufand-fold more valuable in himfelf, and more acceptable to God, than all. the moli pompous numerous compliments which he can polTibly pay to him. As to prayer y whether we eonfider it, as- a folemn addrefs to God for the good things we want, or for the continuance of thofe we already enjoy^ whether, for the removing the evils we fufFer, ©r for the preventing thofe we fear ; in alK thofe views,, it is, ftridly and properly, a duty we- ©we to ourfilvesy like as it is our duty to labour for our daily bread, and to ufe all proper means to procure the great end of being to ourfelves, mz. our prefent 2.116. future happinefs. And, there- fore, as far as prayer is fubfervient to render u* die proper objedls of divine regard, by rendering us worthy of the benefits we pray for, and is a- means to the obtaining of them ; fo far it is a be- . nefit to us, and may, in a fecondary and lefs pro- ber fenfe,. be faid to render us acceptable to God ; A Letter of 'Thanh ^ ^cl 325 I fay, it may render us acceptable to God, not upon its own account, confidered abftraitedly, as prayer^ but as it is a means to produce in us fucli a temper and condutl^ as renders us truly lovely and va- luable in the eyes of our Maker. Thus, I have ihewn what I afcribe to virtue^ humanity^ and cha- rity ; and, I think, I did not afcribe too much^ be- caufe, if I had afcribed lefs, it would have been too little •, too little for God's honour^ for if he does not love and accept the virtuous human charitable man, he cannot be a wife and a ^W being. Again, Fifthly^ One of the faults or errors of defeat which I am charged with, and which is urged, by way of confequence, from the foregoing error or fault of excefs, is, that I afcribe too little to faith. By faith I fuppofe my admonijfher muft mean an affent to this general propofition, viz. that the chriftian revdaiicn is of a divine original ; or elfe fome particular propofition or proportions contained under that general, fuch as, that Jefus is the Chrtfty and the like. Upon which I obferve, that ajjent, as it is fimply an ad: or judgment of the mind arifing from proper evidence, is the fame, and renders a man equally valuable in all cafes ; becaufe the ground of affent is not the goodT nefs or badnefs, or the greater or lefs importance of the fubject to which the propofition affented to relates, but only the Jlrength of the evidence upon which the truth of the propofition depends, or is fuppofed to depend. But tho' alTent, in all cafes, is the fame •, yet the truths or proportions afifent- ed to may be very different, and of much greater concern to mankind in one cafe than in another. That the whole is eqiial to all its parts is a propofi- tion of very little concern to mankind ; but, that good men will be happy ^ and bad men miferable in another worlds are propofitions, the truth of which nearly concerns us all j becaufe it lies upon us to y 2 take 524 ^ Letter of Tbanks^ he. take all proper meafures to guard againfl die one, and to jectire the other, that is, to become good ■men , feeing it is goodnefs which entitles iis to the one, and fecures us from the other. Now, fo far as any revelation or any propofitions con- tain'd in it are fiibfervient to goodnefs^ and do real- ly difpofe us to it ; fo far faith in thefe proporti- ons \% ferviceable to us, and, maytho' in an impro- pei: fenfe, be faid to render us acceptable to God, •not upon the account of any inlrinftck worth or value in faith itfelf, confidered as faith or an a£l of aflent, but as it has been fubfervient to good- nefs ', which goodnefs alone, ftricfely fpeaking, is what renders us acceptable to our Maker •, be- caufc a good man will be equally valuable in him- felf, and acceptable to God, whether faiih be in- trodudlive to his goodnefs, or not ; juft as health will be equally valuable, whether it be procured or prefcrved by this or that means. And, there- fore, as it is right to render to faith its due ; fa, furely, it muft be wrong to render to it more than its due. If the belief of a judgment to come has an influence upon my temper and a^ions^ and ■ changes them for the better, faith i^ infirumentally a benefit to me •, but if faith has no fuch in- fluence, which influence depends upon my own will, then, it is of no advantage to me at all. And, in this cafe, it I am influenced and wrought upon,, it is not faith, flridly fpeaking, but the cb^ je5l of faith ^ or the propofition or truth afl^ented . to, which is the ground and rcafon of my change ; and it isther^i^;/§"^/V/^/^r,andnot theway and means by which it is brought about, that renders me ac- ^ceptable to God^ Thus, I have Ihewn what I • alcribeto/^r/i? -, and, I think, I have not afcribed ' too little^ becaufe, if I had afcribed more, it would have been too muchy as being more than it has a title to, or than the fcriptures afcribe to it. For A Letter ef Thanks^ See, 325 tho* faith is fpoken of there with great applaufe^ yet this was not, on the account ot any intrinjick ivcrth or value in the thing itfclf, but of that vir- tue and goodnefs which it was highly fubfervient to. . The Bihle^ when it fpeaks of and confiders faith, ahftra5iedly from that influence which it fometimes has upon men's adions, pronounces it perfect emptinefs or nothing. Thus, St. Paul faith of him- idU I Ccr. xiii. 2. Tho' I have all faiih^ fo that I could remove mountains^ and have no charily y I am TWthing, And, here, I think, it may be jufhJy pre- fumed, that the faith of ^x., Paul was truly ortho- doXy and fuiliciently Jlrong^ as being founded upoa clear and convincing evidence ; and yet St. Paul declares, that his ftrong orthodox faith^ when con- fidered abilradledly, was nothing \ that is, it would not be of any fervice to him, with refped to the obtaining God's favour. Now, fuppofing the Apoftle's words, in the text above, fhould be tranfpofed, and be read thus. And tho* I have all charity^ and have no faith^ I am nothing \ this, I think, would exprefs m.y admonifher's principles. But, furely, it is not the truth of the cafe ; for as charity is truly valuable in itfclf, fo it difpofes Almighty God, to cover or overlook z multitude of fuch faults, or rather defers, as the want of faith, at moft, can reafonably be fuppofed to be. Again, Sixthly, Another error or fault of defecJ charged ijpon me, and which is fuppofed to follow, by way confequence, from the laft mentioned error of cx- ccfs, is, that I afcribe too little to gofpel-ordinances. And, here, I obferve, that as experience abun- dandy Ihew^s mankind to be much difpcfed to cere- monies and external obfcrvances, there being fomething pompious in them which llrikcs and af- fe6fs our fenfes ; fo in the chrifiian revelation there is provifion of this kind, b); the appointment of zfew ceremonies or inflitutions, which ^x^ plain and y 3 fimpk '5 2^ A Letter of nanks^ &C.' ftmple in themfelves, the leaft hurthenfome^ and the' mcjl inftru^ive to us \ and thefe are prefcribedj not as taxes upon mankind, but to difpofc them to znrtue and goodnefs in the ufe of them, and to prevent their running into hurdenfome and hurtful ftiperfiitions •, and, as tar as they are fuhfervtent to thefe ends, fo far they are ufeful and valuable to us, and, in an improper fenfe, may be faid to ren- der us acceftahle to God, as they are fubfervient to that virtue 2ind goodnefs which, in truth and reahty, does fo. And as every good m^an ought to attend on thofe, as means to Jirengthen and eftaUifJj him- felf in virtue and goodnefs, and to preferve decency and order in the chriftian church , fo, on the other fide, he ought not to make the ufe of thefe the ground of his confidence in God's faz'cur^ bccaufe it is not the ufe of them, confidered abftracledly, but it is that virtue and gccdnefs^ to which thefe are fub- fervient, that renders him acceptable to his Maker. Thus, I have fhewn what I afcribe to gcfpel-ordi- 7ia7ices \ and herein, I think, I have not afcribed too little^ becaufe, if I had afcribed more, it would have been too much ; by raifing the value of thefe above their worth, and above the value which the gofpcl fets upon them. Thus, Gal. v. 6. /;/ Jefus Chriji fieither circumcifion nor uncircunuifion availeth liny thing., but faith., which worketh by., or is pro- du6live of, /ci;^. Rom. ii. 25. For circumcifion ve- rily profit eth if thou keep the law ; but if thou be a breaker of the law., thy circumcifion is 7nade uncircum- cifton. "Which is as much as if the Apoftle had faid ; thou, being a Jezv., valueft thyfelf upon thy being circumcifed -, and, verily, whilfc thy circum- cifion is an argument to thee to keep the law., and leads thee to the practice of thy duty^ fo far and in that refpe6l, it is profitable to thee ; but if a fenfe of thy being circumcifed has no fuch effect or influence upon thee, and thou, no twith {landing, do'll if LetUr of 'Thanks^ &c, 327 do'ft tranfgrefs the /^ze;, then, it is the Irtme to thee as if thou had'ft not been circumcifed. Thy be- jjig circumcifed, coniidered ahfira^edly from the influence it might and ought to have upon thy ad:ions, is of no value. And as this is the cafe, with refped to circumcillon, which is allowed to be an ordinance of divine inftitution \ fo the cafe is the fame, with refped to all other injlitutions. For as they are directed to fome good end^ fo they are no farther valuable than as the means to that end ; and no man is valuable for their fakes, but for the fake of that goodnefs which they are introdudive to. Again, Seventhly^ and laftl)\ The other error or fault of defeci charged upon me, and which is likewife fuppofed to follow from the above error ox fault q^ excefs, is, that I afcribe too little to the death and fufferings of Chrifl, Upon which I obferve, that as Chrift came on purpofe to promote and let for- ward xhtfalvation of mankind-^ lo it was fit and pro- per that he Ihould do and fuffer whatever was ne- ceflary for the attainment of that valuable end. And as the laying down his life willingly and chear- fully, in this caufe, was the 7?r^7/^^/r<7^7^he could give that he was not an impojier^ but was in ear- ned in what he pretended to ; fo it was proper that he fliould lay down his life, when called to it, and thereby give this convincing evidence of the truth and importance of that teJHmony which he then delivered to the world. And as he propofed to mankind the breaking off their fins by repen- tance, and returning to the love and pradlice of virtue and goodnefs, as the only expedient to reflore them to divine favour j fo his yielding up his pre- fent eafe, pleafure, and profit, yea, and life itfelf, when it became fubfervient to the publick good, which was his cafe^ was the moil lively 2Lnd powerful example sind pattern of that virtue and goodnefs Y 4 which 328 A Letter of Thanh ^ hc, which he recommended to, and prefTed np6?f maiikind. And as a fenfe ot the death and fuffer* ings of Chrift, when confider'd in hcth thcfe views^ has '^tendency to lead us to the love and pra6lice of virtue and goodnefs j fo when we are ivrcitght upon by it, then, thefe rhay truly be faid to be the 7neans of our fal vation -, and we may, in an imiproper or figurative fenfe, according to the laKguage of \\\t fcripture^ be faid to htfavedby them\ tno' llrid- ly and properly, in this cafe, it is a man's virtue and goodnefs ^ v/hich the fufferings and death 'of • Chrift may highly tend to promote, which is the ground of God's favour to him. Thus, I have ihevved what I afcribe to t\\(^fufferings and death of Chrifi'^ and, I think, I have not afcribed too little^ becaufe, if I had afcribed more, it would have been too much ; too much for God's honour^ and more than the truth of the cafe will admit. For as the life, and fufferings, and death of one perfon, when confidered ahjira^ledly^ cannot polnbly render • another perfon m.ore or lefs vahahle or dijagreeahle \ ■ fo God will loie or bate^ rczvcrd or pmijh every man for v/hat is perjonally lovely or hateful in him^ and not for what is lovely or hateful in the perfon of another. I am very fenfible that iht ground of divine ac- cept ance'is a point of the utmofc concern to mankind^ and that it ought to be handled with the greatell caution Sihdexa^nefs. And, therefore, as, on the oneftde^ nothing ought to he fupprejfed which is al^- foluteneceffary^ and which, for its ^-z^^y^T^i^^, renders men truly acceptable and weil-pleafmg to God j fo ■ on the other fide, nothing ought to be added to, or - made the ^ri?2^Wj of divine acceptance, but what in truth and reality, does upon its ozvn account^ and for its own fake, render men the fuitable and proper objeds of divine regard : bucaufe every thing fnort of this is, acmofb, but means and helps to ^A Letter cf 'Thanks, Src. ^25^- to tiiat which is the ground of divine acceptance^ and not the thing itlelf, and, therefore, ought never to be confidcred as fuch. Bcfides, the making thofe things the grounds of divine accep- tance, which, in truth, are no more than means or helps to it, is of the moil dangerous confequence to mankind •, becaufe this is to few pillows to all arm-holes y and to lay 2ifalfe foundation for hope and comfort, which vicious men are too apt to lay hold of. And this has been the cafe, in tad:, with refpecl to thofe ve7'y things, which my admonifher has complained of. A multitude of Chrifiians^ v/ho, tho' they have nothing valuable in them- felves, to render them acceptable to God, yet think they can raile, from the abovemention'd points, fome folid grounds of comforts to reft their fouls upon. Thus, Some men think they experience in themlelves a firong orthodox faith, which they judge to be not only 2ijufi ground of confidence, but fometimes it fwells up into an ajfurance of God's favour, tho* this is too weak a foundation for fuch a fuperftruc- ture to reft upon. Faith, fo far as it is the means of our falvation, that is, fubfervient to make men wife and good, fo far it is highly, beneficial to them, and ought to be efteemed and acknowledged as fuch; but, then, it ought by no means to be fet upon a level with that wifdom and goodnefs to which it is infirumentally fubfervient -, becaufe as that is very wrong in itfelf, fo it has a tendency to miflead and betray ynankind. Again, Some men think that, by \\\t\x ferious and confiant attendance upon gofpel- ordinances, they render them felves approveable in the fight of God ; and, as they think, experience in themfelves the Spirit of God moving upon the troubled waters of their hearts ; and from hence, as from the wells of falvation, they draw forth that comfortable cordial, . viz, an ^ , affurance «^3Ct /i Letter of 7%anhy &c; :y ^Jfurance^ or, at leaft, a good hcpe^ as they thinkV of Gods fevcHir ; whereas, in truth, fkis k for- faking the fountain of livivg waUr^ viz, that virtue arrd true goodnefs which alone will render us ac- ceptable to our Maker, mid hewing out to ourfehes dfiernSy hroken cifterns which can hold no water ; that is, it is laying in a falfo foundation of comfort to ©urfelves. Gofpel ordinances were intended to kad men to, and to ejiablijh them in virtue, as I obferved above; and, when they areufed in fuch a way, as to be fublervient to this end, they are highly ufeful to us, and ought to be confidered as fuch ♦, but, then, they ought not to be valued^ and put upon an equal foot with that e77d to which they are only a means ; becaufe, as this is not the truth of the cafe, fo it tends to the hnrt and damage of mankind, by laying a falfe foundation of hope and comfort, as I obferved above. Again, Some men render a vicious courfe of life eafy to themfelves, and prefume that they are beloved and accepted of God, on the account of the life^ •and deaths and refurrellion of Chriji; and this^, when added to either or to both the forementioned ground of comfort, fills them with ail jdy and peace in themfelves ; whereas it is morally as im- pofp.bk for God to love and value any perfon, up- on any other account than is being truly lovely and valuable in himfelf, as it is for him to be a weak or a vicious being. The fufferings and death of Chrift were inftances of the moit e^xalted virtue^ and of his exceeding great love and good- will to mankind •, and, theretore, the memory of them ought to be perpetuated with the utmoft re^ fpe^i and thankfulnefs by us. And as far as ^fenfe ofthehfe. and fufferings, and death of Chrift, has an influence upon our tempers and adlions, {o far 'it is the means of our falvatton^ as I obferved above, and ought to be confidcrcel as fuch. 3tit, then. ^A Letter of 'Thajth^ &ccl 33X' -tlien, the life, and fufferings, and death of Chrill confidered ahfirattedly from the influence which a fenfe of thefe may, and ought to have upon our tempers and a6tions, cannot polTibly be a jujl ground of confidence in God's favour ; becaufe it is not thefe, but fomething which is ferfonally valuable and pleafing in us, which muft render us acceptable and weil-pleafing to God, And, therefore, thefe are not, ftridtly fpeaking, the grounds of divine acceptance, nor ought lo to be confider'd; becaufe as fuch a reprefentation is wrongs fo it had been exceedingly pernicious to mankind. Upon the whole, if m.y admonifher had thought that fr.-th, gofpel-ordinanccs, and the fufferings and death of Chrifb, were proper to bo confidered and treated of, as means or our falva- tiouy in th^ fenfe in which I have fhev/n they are ; and if he had judged that fuch a performance would have been ufeful to 7nankind^ he was at li- berty to have treated of this fubjec^, as largely as he pleafed, in a difcourfe of his ov/n \ and fo might have fupplied every defed which he imagined he had difcovered in mine. But, then, this would . not have jujlified his grcundlefs complaints againfl me, becaufe I did not undertake to fhew, what is in a remote fenfe^ but what is dire^ly and immedi- ately^ and for its own fake^ the ground of divine acceptance? And if my admoniflier judged that faith, gofpel-ordinances, and the fufferings and death of Chrift, are direSlly and immediately the grounds of divine favour, that is, that thefe do, upon their own account^ and not on the account of that influence they have upon men's tempers and adlions, render them acceptable to God ; I fay, if he judged this to be the cafe, v/hich, I think, he muff, or elfe his complaints were trifli7ig\ then, furely, he is miftaken in a point of the greateft con- cern^ '^5 2 -^ -Zf//^r of "Thanks^ Sec, cern, and which has been mo^ pernitious to man^ kmd, as I have fhewn above. I1iu5, Sir, I have gone thro' your Admomtion^ and have taken a Ihort view of the feveral points complained of in it, prefuming I fliall be acquitted of the charge laid againft me by every dif caning^ impartial^ and unprejudiced judge. And, to con- clude this Letter, I beg the favour, that, if you have any more admonitions in florc for me, you would be pleafed to put your name to them, that fo we may be upon an equal foot. And tho* you have laid hold of every /r^;//^ occafion, tojullify your negative but groundlefs charge, and have fuggefied and infiniiatedi^vtrA things of me, which are not yufi^ nor friendly^ but perfedly unkind ^ yet as 1 take the admonition, upon the whole, to be the produce of your pons but mifguided zeal, and to be intended for mine and the puhlick goody fo I, again, return you my hearty thanks^ and crave leave to fubfcribe myfelf, SIR, 2'our obliged humhle Servant y Tho. Chub, b. TRACT TRACT XXXr. A few Things humbly ofFered to the Coniideration both of Believers and Unbelievers^ in thefe happy Days of Liberty of Enquiry. WE of this age and nation enjoy many pi-ivileges and advantages, which other ages and nations have been ftrangers to. One of which is a liberty of enquiry into matters of religion. For tho' men's profef- fing their opinions freely, in fome points, may be contrary to the la'-jcs of this kingdom., and though there may be fome among us, who wijh to fee the laws rigoroufly executed upon their neighbours^ in this refped ; yet thefe are under a proper and a •happy reftraint., by the juft and wife adminiftra- tion of the prefent government. Surely, nothing can be more uyijiijl or unreafonahly affuming^ than for any man, or body of men, to take upon them to dire^ and govern t\vt underltandings and confcien- ccs of others, in matters of religion ; that is, ia matters relating to the favour of God, For as re- ligion is purely ferfonal^ and every man mufl be anfwerable for himfelf to God-^ fo every man mufl, in reafon, have a right to judge for himfelf, in all -matters pertaining thereto ; and, confequently, it •mufl be jufl and reafonable in our governours, to indulge their fubjeds in the enjoyment of that right. And as fuch indulgence is juft and rea- fonable in itfelf, fo it is moft certainly wife and folitick. For when the people of any nation are piade or fuffered to affiicl and perfecute one ano- iher, for religious matters, in which the good, or hurCj. ■^34 A few Things humbly offer ed^ &c.- hurt, of the community is not concerned, then xhtjlrength and* fower of that nation is employed to weaken and deftroy itfelf j as fuch divifion, en- mity, and oppofition, in any nation, naturally tend to its dilTolution. However^ this is not our cafe, perfecution being an evil which our gover- Tiours have^ and, I truft, will carefully guard againft. But, Tho' a liberty of enquiry is kindly indulged, yet we do not fee all the good effects which might be expeded from it ; and efpecially with refped to the grand quefiion betwixt the Believers and the Un- lelievers \ this being a time, in which one might hope to fee that queftion fully and clearly dif- cuffed, every objection and difficulty fairly re- moved, and truth fettled upon the moil folid and lading foundation ; which, I think, as yet, does not appear to be the cafe, each party being too apt to wander from tlie fubjedl, and to endeavour the expftng each other more than the difcovery of truth. The Unbeliever, inilead of fairly pro- pofing his own obje6lions, is too apt to fifh after the weak and abfurd things, which have been at any time faid by Believers. And as this becomes a ground of triumph to him, fo hereby he awa^ kens the paffwns of fome, and gives occafion for laughter and diverfion to others. But, furely, the chriflian religion is not anfwerable for all the zvild and extravagant things, which any of its profef- fors have put upon it ; and, therefore, I think it unfairly urged by the Unbelievers, and to be an ahufe of that liberty, which they are kindly indul- ged in. Whether prophecy^ miracles^ or fuch other topicks, as are urged to prove the divinity of the chriflian revelation, do, when fairly and impar- tially examin'd and confider'd, prove or make good that propofition, is the quefiion betwixt the Believers and Unbelievers : and, therefore, if the Unbe* 'A few Things humhly offered, SrC "JS'S Unbelievers would IHew the weaknefs of thole grounds, upon which that propofition is found- ed, they ought to confine themJelves to the quef- tion betorp thtm, and not introduce that into the cafe, which is foreign to it. I grant, that the Unbelievers are under a very great difficulty, in the prefent cafe \ becaufe,. if they fhould be open and frank in declaring their opinions and objedbi- ©ns, they arc not fure they fhall not fall under a frofeattion. But, then, tho* this may be proper ground to a6l with caution^ in order to guard a-* gainil any evil v/hich fuch freedom may ex-pofe them to \ yet, furely, it cannot be any ground for trifling in argument, or to minifter occalion for di'-jerfioUy in a queflion which ought to be treated of with the utmofl ierioufnefs... Believers are likewife too apt to wander out of their v/ay, and to fifh after the ferfonal faults of the Unhe- Uevers ; and, from hence, they raife a battery a» ^2i\n^ infidelity, and will have it that unbelief, with refpe6l to the divinity of the chrifti an revelation, is not the refult of a free enquiry ^ but the produce of vi* (ious inclinations y and that men chufe to be Infidels^ m order to ^tt rid off thofe reftraints and relu^an-" ciesy which other wife they would be liable to. This, I think, is uiing the Unbehevers txce^d^ ingly unkind and /*//, as if what was true of fome mull be juftly chargeable upon all ; and as if a man could not be an Unbeliever, tliat is, in com- mon language, a Beift^ but he mufl be deftitute of all hcncur and confcimce^ virtm and religion ;, whereas Deifm is not fuhverfive of thele, but per- fedly confiitent with them. And, if I am not mifmform'd, the thing is falfe^ in fa^ ; that is, there are many Deifis who are men of flrid ho- nour, virtue, and religion. And, As Believers and Unbelievers are thus ufing each odier ill ^ fo hereby they alienate their affec- tions '3 3 5 A few things humbly offered^ &:cJ tions from each other, inflame one another's paf^ fionsy flir up refentment^ and bar up the way to that kindnefs^ friendfhip^ and brotherly love to each other, which are eflential to, and are fome of the moft principal parts of true rehgion. And, if any thing farther were in their power, it is to be fear- ed they would not flop here, but would go into all thofe inflances of cruelty and perfecutiony which others have pradlifed. This is what fome men fhew too firong an inclination to, tko', by the bleffmg of a good government, they are happily rejlrained. But this is not all ; for, whilfl the Be- lievers and Unbelievers are thus playing upon each other, they minifler occafion to men of ^^_y tempers and little refie5lion^ to throw \ip the whole, as an amufement^ and to confider it only, as a proper fubjedl for laughter and ridicule j for when they fee fo much wrangling about the grounds of divine re^ velation^ which they confider as the grounds o( re- ligiony tho' thefe are as diflindl and different, as two things can be, and fo little certainty on either fide, for any thing that appears to them, then they are too eafily led to think, that religion has noy^- M foundation ; that it only ferves the purpofes of crafty and defigning men •, and that is right for them to give a loofe to their appetites and defires, and to gratify every vicious inclination. This, I fear, is too much the truth of the cafe \ that, whilfl men are contending about the divinity of the chriflian revelation, religion itfelf is wearing out of the world ; men either throw it up^ or elfe exert fuch zeal in its favour as is fubverfive of it. And, therefore, I think, it cannot be amifs, but rather fuitable and proper, to remind mankind, that whatever diffiadty or perplexity may attend re- velation, which may minifler occafion for difpute, their religious obligations are the fame. For, fup- pofing the divinity of a revelation to be moil ma- nif(^ A few ^Things humbly ojferedy 5rc. 337 Itifeft and clear^ the Believers moral obligations muft be the fame, as if it manifeftly appeared to be otherwife ; bccaufe thole obhgations are antecedent to^ and independent of fuch a revelation ; and, con- fequently, the cafe muft be the fame, wich refpedt to the Unbelievers alfo. And as this is a matter which equally concerns them both, fo I beg leave to offer a few things to their confideration. I fhall not enter into the queftion or point in con- troverfy betwixt them, but only make fuch reflec- tions as are equally jujl, whether this or that reve- lation be of a divine original, or not. And, Firfly I obferve, that whatever uncertainty may attend any revelation, yet it makes no alteration, with refped to true religion^ that not being a pre- carious thing founded on arbitrary -pleafure^ and thereby liable to perpetual change and alteration, but on the moral fitnejs of things -, and, therefore, muft be the fame yefterday, to day, and for ever. For as duty neceftarily fuppofes an intelligent beings who is naturally qualified to difcern and judge of good and m/, or that moral fitnefs and unfitnefs which arifes from the nature and the relations of things, and likewife a power and liberty of acting one way, or the other ♦, fo the duty, which lies upon fuch a creature, muft neceffarily confift in ading agreeably to the nature and the relations of things, as aforefaid. And whoever takes an im- partial view o^humannature will fee, that man is a creature excellently conftituted to anfwer the pur- pofes of focial felicity ^ and to promote and carry on a common happinefs -, all his appetites and paflions, when rightly directed and kept within due bounds, fo as that one is not indulged to the deprefiing of another, lead to this end^ by render- ing man, upon the whole, an agreeable and an ufe- ful creature. His underftanding likewife qualifies him not only to dired and govern his appetites Vql. II. Z and 33^ A fevo Things lumlJy offered^ Szc*^ and paffions, but alfo fhews him the flnefs of ^ common good, and the intrinfick excellency and valuahlenefs of purfuing it. Man being thus conftituted, it will be cafy ta know, what his duty muil certainly be •, namely ^ to put on fuch a temper of mind^ and fuch a beha- vioiify as is fuitable to, and becoming fuch a crea^ lure j or, in other words, it is, Jirft^ to live undeK a grateful fenfe of that gcodnefs^ which God hath fhewn, in calling a multitude of creatures into being, on purpofe to communicate happinefs to them y and in a wife and kind provifion of all things necelTary to make them fo. And, fecondly^ man's duty confifbs in a generous and fteady profe- cution of that grand defign^ viz. the common fell- €ity^ by rendering himfelf an agreeable and an ufeful creature, and thereby introducing as much happinefs into the creation as he is capable of do- ing ; enjoying the blelTings of life in fuch a way^ as is confifient with, and cojiducive to the common tranquillity, and denying himfelf every pleafure which comes in competition with, or is deflru^ive of the common felicity. And, As man is a creature defigned and conftituted- to taile of, and propagate a common happinefs ; fo, when he anfwers that end, by promoting the peace and comfort, the happinefs and well-being, of all around him, and contributes to the common felicity, as much as in his power ; as he, then„ becomes a valuable and a lovely creature, fo, of courfe, he will be accepted and approved of God. And, on the other fide, if he vicioufiy monopolizes the bleffings and comforts of hfe to himfelf, and covctmujly purfues his own pleafures and defires, when they 2,xt defiruBive of the happinefs of others, and ftand in oppofition to the common felicity ; as,, in this cafe, he commences a difagreeable and a hurtful creatures fo he will be difpleafing and vile ''A few Things humbly offer ei^ &a 339 Vile in the eyes of his Maker. And as our duty «irifes from what we are, fo it mud continue ^i?^.^- tmlly and invariably the fame, whilft we continue to be fuch creatures. Revelation cannot add to, nor dminijh our duty, becaufe it does not alter our compofition •, and, conlequently, whatever diffi- culty, or uncertainty, may attend any revelation, this ought not to be the ground of Libertinifm^ or the foundation o^ uneaftnefs to us^ feeing our duty may eafily be difcovered without it, and feeing true religion and our obligations are the fame, whe- ther this or that revelation be of a divine original, or not. Again, Secondly^ I obferve, that tho' Believers and Un- believers differ in opinion from each other, yet fuch difference in fentimcnts does not alter their compofitions, nor conftitute them two diilindl fpe- cies of beings ; but, on the contrary, they ftill continue to be me7Jy notwithftanding their differ- ing in opinion, as aforefaid. And, therefore, it it is highly juft and reafonable^ and their bounden duty, to ad a part towards each other, and to- wards all men, as is fuitable to, and becoming hu- man nature, and to preferve and maintain their manly character. Surely, nothing can be more ab^ furd than to fuppofe, that we are to put off hu- manity^ in order to become religious. And yet it is too common for perfons to commence creatures of prey^ by biting and devouring one another, in order to exert their religious zeal^ and to fhew that they are religious men. Alas ! we are cafe into an age full of complaints of all kinds •, and thofe which relate to religion, I imagine, are not the feweft. And, among thefe, fome complain of the mighty growth of fcepticifm and infidelity^ and others of the pre valency of bigotry^ fup<:rfti' tion^ and enthuftafm. Now, whether thefe com- plaints are well or /// grounded, on either fide, is Z 2 wh^c ^^S^^jTJewThings humhly offer ed^ ■ czc, what I fhall not enquire into. All I fhall db^ ferve is» that as men are apt to exert a bitter zeal in thefe cafes, fo they are lilvewife apt to vahie that zeal at too high a rate, by confidering it, as that which will render them truly acceptable and well- pleafing to God -,_ but, furely, this muil be a mii- take. For as divine revelation is given by God to men, on purpofe to lead them into the love and pra£lice of virtue and true goodnefs, by laying down fuch rules of adion, as were their duty, in- dependent of:^ and antecedent to that revelation, by reprefenting to them the confequences of a good and bad life, with regard to divine favour, or dii- pleafure, and by appointing a form of worjhip^ to prevent contention and difcord, and to preferve peace and unity amongfl mankind ^ fo, where that end is anfwered, by the love and practice of 'virtue and true goodmfs, fuch men will be accept^ and approved of Gody whether divine revelation be introdu5iive to it, or not. And where tha.t end is not anfwered, but men continue in the love and practice of vice and wickednefs^ fuch men will not be approved, tho' they believe divine revelation ever fo ftrongly ; faith and irftdelity^ in the prefent cafe, being no other than the giving or with- holding our affent to a proportion, %iz, that this or that revelation is of a divine original \ neither of thefe, therefore, can be any farther valuable, than as they are the proper refult of that evi- dence, or the want of it, upon which each of them is grounded. Faith, .ftri(5lly fpeaking, does not add to our duty \. and infidelity cannot take from it. And, therefore,, to exert a bitter zeal, on ei- ther fide, as it is unreafonable in itfelf, fo it cannot be acceptable to our Maker. All, I think, which can fairly be done in the prefent cafe, and which will become us, as reafonabie creatures, is to pro- pofe with decency^ and in the bejl light it can be put> A few mngs humbly offered^ &c. . 341 put, all that can be faid on either fide of the queftion ; to examine it with care and freedom \ to fhew, in the fpirit of meeknefs, what appears to us defeBive in what has been thus offered, and tlien to leave each other to thatconvidion, which fuch evidence^ or the want or feaning want of it, ihall produce in each other's mind \ flill remem- bering that our duty, ftridly fpeaking, is not affedled by it. Let not, then, the Unbeliever defpife the Be- liever, nor the Believer judge the Unbeliever -, for if neither of them anfwer their manly chara5ier^ neither of them will be approved ; and, if both of them a6l the part of good and virtuous men, God will receive them both. Rather let them hear with, and far bear one another in love. For as in all queilions which do not admit of abfo* lute certainty, and which, I think, is the pre- icnt cafe, it is great odds, but fomc will err ^ fo fuch errors cannot, in the nature of the thing, be a proper foundation for refentment. The different abilities, improvements, and opportunities of dif- ferent pcrfons, and the various ways in which men are capable of being biaffed, that is, of lean- ing to one fide of a queftion, rather than to the other ; thefe lay a foundation for error. And as, in all queftions of this kind, a man ought to be modeft in his affumptions, feeing he is liable to miftake -, ^o^ for that reafon, he ought to treat decently and civilly all that differ from him, as knowing that error, in fuch cafes^ is what all men are liable to. The Unbeliever too often looks down upon Believers with an eye of f corn and con- tempt^ and defpifes them, as perfons who are un- der the power of fuperjliticn and bigotry^ and who have captivated their underftandings to the will of defigning priejls. On the other fide, the Believer jnagifterially denounces the judgments of heaven Z 3 upon 342 A few things humbly offered^ &c. upon the Unbelievers, and confiders them, as enemies to God and all that is good, and as men whom hijl and Jin have blinded, that they cannot fee the truth. But, wherefore ail this ? Surely^ which fide foever of the queftion is right, fuch a condud mull be wrongs and highly difpleafmg to that Ged, who has a common concern for the good of us all. Would it not be more decent and candid for the Unbeliever to think widi himfelf,, tliat tho' he is not convinced by the evidence propofed, yet others may ? and that, therefore, it muil be as right for them to give afTent, as it is for him to with-hold it ? and that as mjen's judg- ments are capable of being mifled by education^ authority^ vulgar opinion., and the like, fo they do not difcern the delufion themfelves, and that others cannot be judges for them ^ and, therefore, it be- comes a man to be rather jealous of himfelf, in thefe refpedls, than to charge them, at all adven- tures, upon his opponents ? And, would it not be alike candid and becoming for the Believer ta confider, that evidence does not appear alike <: I think, will, upon a jull enquiry, appear gene- rally to be the cafe, with refped to all violent and extravagant perfuits of pleafures whatever. Solo- mon* s condition and circumftances in life furnifhed him with materials for delight, and gave him the opportunity of enjoyment ; and he feemed refolved, if poffible, to take the jhorteft was to happinefs. And, accordingly, he informs us, that he fet him- felf to perfue pleafure various ways, and in the mod violent manner, that his fuperiour circum- ftances in life rendered him capable off; but, up- on trial, he found tliat this was not the way to j'olid and lafting happinefs. For tho*, by this means, he enjoyed fome very intent but momentary plea- fures ; yet the care and follicitude in procuring them, the uneafinefs mixed with them, and the unhappinefs entailed upon them, were much marc than aquivalent to thofe pleafures ♦, fo that, upon the whole, he pronounces all thofe violent and extravagant perfuits of pleafure, as vanity and vexation of fpirit. The cafe is the fame, if men go into the other extreme, viz. into a violent and extravagant perfuit of riches^ denying themfelves many of the com- forts ^82 Some Jhort RefleElions on Virtue andHappineftl forts of life, and putting off enjoyment to the next generation. This is fo far from introducing a a happy life, that, on the contrary, it bars up the way to it. For tho' their prefent acquifitions and pofeffions, with the faint profped of the ufe which pofterity may make of them, may give a man fome low^ weak pleafure 2.vA fatisfa^ion\ yet they are not once to be named withthofe more intenfe and nu- merous pleafures, both. J enfual^ intelleBual^ and mo^ raly which his conflitution and condition in life render him capable of tafhing, and which he de- nies himfeif the enjoyment of. Befides, an eager perfuit of riches is fuch a difeafe upon a man, as introduces a great deal of care and fallidtttde to procure them, a great deal of anxiety and thought how to fccure and preferve them, together with the danger and fear of lofing them, and the loffes and crojfes which frequently attend them •, all thefe prey upon a man's fpirits, and eat out the comforts of life. And tho' fuch men regard fcarce any other interefl. but their own, yet they are conilantly betraying it •, their very perfiiits and polTelnons ferving only as fuel to feed that fire^ which con- ilimes the moil: valuable pleafures in life. And hereby the moft felfiili are the greateil enerdics to themfelves, by their fruflrating and difappoint- ing themfelves of that happinefs^ which tliey are naturally led to defireand perfue, and which only renders being valuable to them. So that riches, to fuch men, are fo far from being fubfervient to a happy life, that, on the contrary, they bar up the way to it. Whereas if men would avoid thofe extreamsy and perfue pleafure in the way which God and Jia- ture have pointed out to them -, that is^ would moderately perfue 2ind temperately enjoy the good things of this world, and would fo rrn% and refrain theii' enjoyments. Some Jhort Reflexions on Virtue and Happinefs. ^^i^ enjoyments, as that one kind, or one inftance, fhould not break in upon, but heighten the plea- fures which arife from the other kinds, or the o- ther inflances of enjoyment ; this would naturally tend to preferve in them a healthy conftitution^ fcundnefs of mind, cdmnefs in their pafTions, quick-^ nefs in their afFe(5bion3, and a relijh for every kind of pleafure ♦, and when they thus perfue their own. happinefs^ in conjundlion with the happinefs and well-being of the refi of their feliow-creaturesy making a fuitable provifion for their offspring and dependents, miniftering afTiftanGe and fuccour, ac- cording to their ability, to the needy and dijireffed^ living neighbourly and friendly with all, and mak- ing the common good the common and iht grand principle to direct their actions by ; this will be a conikznt fpring of pleafure to them, which willmi- nifter abundantly to their delight and fatisfa£iion^ And as it will give them the enjoyment of many va- luable pleafures, which otherwife they would not tafte; fb it will prevent many evils which other- wife they would be in danger of fallen into. It will cut off a great deal of anxious and needlefs care^ of burdenfome and affliBive toil and hbour^ and re- move the foundation of thofe uneafineiTes which^ many of our fpecies groan under the weight of. In fhort, this is the v/ay to folid and lading felici- ty, and the high road to a happy life. Man is made a facial creature ; and as he is de- • figned, with all other living creatures, for happi- nefs, fo he is defigned to be happy in and with fo- ciety. And when he perfiies his own happinefs, under a ftridt regard to the common good, then- he is in the mofl: proper and likely way to obtain it. Then as he is capable of, and difpofed to tafte of what may give him pleafure ; fo in his enjoy-' ments he is the mofl free homrelu^ancyy and from every 5^4 Somejhorl Refecfions on Virtue and Happinefs, every thing eafe which might be an allay to it. And as he prevents the pain and dif order of body and the uneafinejs of mind, which are the attendants on ^felfijh and ziclent- perfuit of pleafure ; fo the ab- fence of this or that kind or branch of pleafure cannot be the ground of much uneafinefs to him ; becaufe as he is not violently fet upon any enjoy- ment, fo the abfcHce of one kind or branch of pleafure can cafily be fupply'd by the prefence of another. And as he is intereited in the common fe- licity^ fo he is a fharer in every one's happinefs J thereby ; whenever he beholds the peace^ xhtplenty^ the profperity^ which others abound in, thefe afford joy and delight to him \ and whilft the felfifh co- veteous man is gnawing his tongue for pain, at the profperity of another, who plentifully enjoys ■what he would monopolize to himfelf, but would not make ufe of; the other is folacing hinfelf in beholding the pleafure and fatisfadtion in life which his neighbours are enjoying. And tho* the trou- bles and afflictions which befal others will give an ©ccafion of concern to him, yet that is abundantly made up by the agreeable pleafure, which arifes from his minijiering afliftance, comfort, and re- lief to them. And whatever difficulties, afflicti- ons, or diftrelTes he may fall into, he has this fa- tisfadion in himfelf that he has adled a worthy and a manly part. And as he has carefully avoided every thing which might draw upon him the jufi inmity of any, fo he has taken the mofl fure courfe, to fecure to himfelf the ajfeBions and friendjhip of iilL If he looks back upon his life pad, this af- fords no remorfe or uneafinefs of mind, but plea- fure and fatisfadion. And, if he looks forward upon death, this gives him no forebodings of a dreadful judgment and retribution, but good hope of a Lle£'ed immortality, ThuS;, I 8ome Jhort Rejtettions on lirtue and HapptHijs, ^^ Thus, I have given a (liort reprefentation of the true and only way to a happy life^ wifhing that hereby I may prevail upon thole of my readers, who are otherwife- minded, to try the experiment j and, then, I doubt not, but it will turn to ac- count. Surely, if the men of pleafure falQy fo call- ed, that is, thofe who violently and extravagantly perfue this or that kind or branch of pleafure -, if they would but give themfelvcs leave to confidcr the cafe-, and much more, if they would but make trial, they would be convinced that the courfe they are in is not the way to folid and lafting bap- pinefs; and that the way which I here recommend, and which, in truth, is the way that God and na^ ture have provided and pointed out to them, is the high rode to a happy life, 1 am fenfible of my inability to do Jujiice to the fubjed: before me-, and what I propofe and hope for, by this imperfect eflay, is to ftir up fome more able hand to treat of it more clearly, and to reprefent it to a much better advantage, than I am capable of doing ; becaufe, I think, it is a point of the utmoft con- cern to mankind. For as every individual perfues happinefs for himfelf, fo many lofc what they feek for, by perfuing it only and wholly for themfelves. To conclude •, I obferve, that as the love and pradlice of virtue is the moil likely way to hap- pinefs in this life, fo it is the only fure way to the happinefs of another. It is by our thus anfwering the great end of our creation here, that we ef-* fedually recommend ourfelves to the love and fa- vour of God hereafter. For if we are thus faith- ful in the unrighteous mammon, then, God will commit to our trull the true riches. V O L. II C c TRACT 7 1 ix n v^ X ^'^jrs.j^xii. SOMESHORT RefleSiions o?i Virtue and Vice* Wherein is fhewn. What Kind of Virtue is, in Reafon^ reivardable j and what Kind of Vice is, in Reafony punijh- able. Occafioncd, by Dr. Morgan's Tract, en- titled, A Defence of NaUird and revealed Re- ligion. ■^ H E word virtue^ as I have elfewhere * obferved, is fometimes taken in a lar- ger^ and fometimes in a more reftrained fenfe. In a larger fenle, it includes all fuch adions, as are in themfelves r?^i?/ and//, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of tliem, the proper objedl of the approbation of every other intelligent being, who is qualified to difcern the fitnefs of thofe adions, and the unfitnefs of their contraries. And, in a reftrained fenfe, it includes, only fuch as are ad:s of kindnefs and bcfie- ficence unto others, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, not only worthy gf the approbation, but alfo of the Khidnefs and be- neficence of every other intelligent being, who is qualified to dilcern the valuablenefs of thofe ani- ons, and the bafenefs of their contraries. And as virtue is thus confidered in a larger, or in a more reftrained fenfe; fo vice admitsof the like diftinc- tipn. Andp accordingly, in the more extenfive i^it of the vvord, vice^ all actions v/hich, in rea- fon, are wrong and unfit are faid to be vicious, Wherea?, in the more reftrained fenfe of the word, it includes only fuch a6lions as are injurious and hurtful to others, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, not only difopprova- * See ray ilefledions on Natural Liberty. ble. Borne floort Reflt5iions on Virtue andVke, 387 bJe, but alfo the proper objed of refentment to e- Very other intelligent being, who is qualified to difcern the bafenels of thofe a(5lions, and the valu- ablenefs of their contraries. And as vice is thus differently confidered ; fo feme felfijh aEliom are fo far from being, in any refpedt, vicious^ that, on the contrary, they are really virtuous^ in the more general fenfe of the word, virtue. And, therefore, in my Bifcourfe on Virtue and Happinefs^ I did not, as it is faid * of me, confound together a virtuous and a vicious felfijhnefs^ and then argue againft all felfifh adions ; but, on the cpntrary, I carefully diftinguifhed betwixt fuch felfifhnefs.as is, in reafon^ cpprovahle^ and fuch as his jufily condemnahle^ as will repeat from the following quotation, and like- wife from the quotation in the fucceeding para- graph. " If a man perfues happinefs/^r ^/w/^^, *' and prefers his own good to that of any other " individual, this, I think, is perfectly juji and *' reafonahle^ and is what approves itfelf to the *' underflanding of every man. '* And whereas, in my Bifcourfe on Virtue and Happinefs^ I laid down the following proportion, viz, that virtue is folely founded in benevolence ; here the term, vir^ tue^ I underflood, not in the larger^ but in the more refrained fenfe of that word, as is moil evi* dent from that whole difcourfe ; wherein I refer- red only to fuch actions, as are not only approva- ble, but alfo render the agent, upon the account of them, the proper objedt of reward to every o- ther intelligent being, who is no ways interefted in thofe adlions j and fuch rewardable goodnefs ov virtue^ I obferved, is folely founded in benevolence^ This is what I aflerted ; and which I endeavoured to fupport by the following reafon, viz. " When " a man does hurt to himfelf^ thro' fome wrong " conduvft, tho' this would render him worthy of * In Df, Mof'gani Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion* C c 2 ,5 hlamcj?refore, t;o prefume that all others would be ^^Jf^e, or more vicious, were it not for the eftablijh' mmt of fome religious pofitive inflitutions, is a groundlefs fuppafttion., which has nothing in reafon, or experience, to fupport it. Add to this, that pofitive religious inflitutions cannot pofTibly lay men under any reafonable reflraint, which natu- ral religion does not lay them under. And, therefore, all argument and reafoning, founded upon fuch prefumptions and fuppofitions^ ought not, ill reafon, to be admitted. Thefe things being premifcd, I obferve that, in order to proceed fairly, and to reafon juflly and conclufively, upon the fubjecl under confidera- tion, I think, it v/ill be proper to enquire into tiis ground and, reafoji upon which fociety and gc^ vernment Some port KeflelUons^ occ^ 399, 'vtrnment is founded •, and into the end and purpofe \Yhich aflbciation is defigned to obtain ; and like- wile into the nature of that relation which govcr- 'nors ftancj in to their people \ and, from hence, I prefume, tliere will unavoidably arife fome evi- dent principle of reafon, which will be a proper foundation for all farther arguments and reafon- ings upon the point in hand. Man's natural frame and compofition, and his fituation and condition in the world, fliew that he is defigned and conflituted for fociety, and to be happy in, and with it ; and he is hereby naturally and unavoidably led into it. His natural affedii- ons difpofe him to fociety ; his natural ability to conyey his ideas to others by fpeech, the figure and parts of his body, and the endowments of his mind, qualify him for it ; his indigence and dependence upon others, as being unable, in a fmgle capacity, to procure the comforts, or guard againll the evils of life, necelTitate or force him into fociety j and his underftanding Ihews him the fitnefs and reafonablenefs of fo doing. And as man is thus naturally led into fociety, or to con- ftitutea publick interell, which is the fame thing; fo, in reafon, he has a right to claim from fo- ciety protection from thofe injuries he is liable to, and which, in his fingle capacity, he is not quah- fied to guard againft ; and likewife to claim that affiflance from fociety, which his particular ne- ceflities call for, and v/hich fociety is capable of, and, in reafon, ought to afford him. I fay, every individual, from the ground and reafon^ the end and purpofe of afibciation, muft, in reafon, have a right to claim thus much from fociety ^ and, con- fcquently, the fociety muft, in reafon, be obliged to afford fuch affiilance and protedion to him. And as each individual is thus naturally intereft- cd in fociety, fo each individual comes under 71a- tural 40 a Some JJoort Refle5fions^ Sec. tural olligations to it ; that is to fay, each indivw dual is, in reafon, obliged to afford his proportion of affiftancc and protedion to fociety, and thereby to each individual, according to their neceilities and dangers, and which in like circumftances he wouldy in reafon, have a right to claim from them. And he is likewife, in reafon, obliged not to be injurious or hurtful to fociety ♦, and, confe- quently, not to minifter that injury or harm to any individual, which he in like circumftances ought, in reafon, to be proteded from. And as man is under natural obligations to fociety; as afore- faid, fo he ought, in reafon, to be anfwerable to fociety for the difcharge of them ; that is, each individual ought, in reafon, to be obliged or com- pelled, if he does not do it voluntarily, to afford his (hare of affiftance and protedlion to the fo- ciety •, and to be reftrained from being injurious and hurtful to it ; or, rather, to be corrected and punijhed, whenever he is fo. I fay, this ought, in reafon, to be the cafe, becaufe it is the very i'^;/i of fociety, and is abfolutely neceffary to anfwer the end and purpofe of affociation. For if the fociety may not, in reafon, force or compel each individual to afford his ihare of affiftance and pro- tedion to it •, and if each individual is at liberty to hurt and injure each other ; and the fociety may not, in reafon, ccrre5i and reftrain him, then^ the end of affociation is dejlroyed^ or, rather, the fociety itfelf is loft and gone. And as the fociety is naturally and neceffarily invefted with a power to oblige^ or reftrain., each individual to do, or avoid, what each individual is, in reafon, obliged to do, or avoid, voluntarily, without fuch com- pulfion ♦, fo the authority of the one, and the duty of the other, is limited and determined by xht ground and reafon., the end and purpofe of affociation. So- ciety is not a matter of choice or cledipn to man ; but ■Evme Jhort Ke]ietltons^ &c. 4or fcut he is, by his conftitution and condition in lite, naturally and necefTarily led into it -, but, then, his duty to the particular fociety of which he is a member, and the authority it has over him, are to be deduced from the end of alTociation. And as he is, in rcafon, obliged, from the ground of aflb- ciation, not to be injurious or hurtful to the fo- ciety, but to minifter his proportion of alTiftance and protedlion to it ; fo the fociety, from the fame ground of afTociation, is invefled with authority to oblige him to the one, and reftrain him from the other. But, then, that authority can, in reafon, be extended only to thofe things in which the publick is interefted \ the puhlick good being the ground and reafon, and the end and purpofe of fuch afTociation. So that the fociety can, in rea- fon, have no demand upon any individual, but in thofe cafes in which it is for the puhlick good ; nor^ lay a reftraint upon any individual, but in thofe cafes wherein the puhlick is injured. As for origiml contrafls^ I think, the fuppofi- tion is needlefs. It is true, focieties do confult and come to agreements, with refped to the per- fon^ or perfons^ in whofe hands the authority^ which refides in them, fhall be lodged \ and in what way and manner it Ihall be exercifed; and the like. But, thefe, I think, are not confidered, as original con- trads. However, whether there were fuch con- trads, or not, the cafe is the fam.e ; becaufe the authority which arifes to, and is lodged in focie- ty, mufb, in reafon, be extended to^ and hounded by the e?id and purpofe^ the ground and ^'eafon of af- fociation ; which, as I obferved, is the publick good, viz. that each individual may be protected and defended from injury and wrong, and may receive fuch afliftance, as their neceflities call from each other. And As authority in fociety naturally and necefiarily Vol. II. D d arifes 4© 2 Some Jhort Reflexions, &c. arifes from, and is bounded by the ground and reafon, the end and purpofe of alTociation ; fo the nature of the thing requires that it be lodged in the hand of fome perfon, or perfons, for the due admin iftration thereof -, bccaufe otherwife fo- ciety would be a Bai^el of confufion, and the end and purpofe of affociation could not be anfwer- cd* Authority thus exercifed, in the making and executing of laws, is in common language called government y and thofe, who are intrufted with that power, are called governours. Whether the au- thority of the fociety be primarily lodged in one hand, or in many, for the exercife thereof, it al- ters not the cafe j becaufe the authority, thus lodged, is the fame in both cafes. Thofe who are frimarily invefted with the authority, which refides in fociety, are called fupreme governours ; becaufe »the power of making and executing laws, for the good of fociety, is primarily lodged in their hands j and all thofe who arc employed under them, for the due adminiftration thereof, are called fubordi^ fiate governours, becaufe the meafure of authority they are invefted with is delegated to them from the other. So that governours, namely, thofe who are fu~ freme, are the trujlees, the reprefentatives, and the guardians of fociety. They are the trujlees, be- caufe the fociety entrujls them with the execution of their authority ; that is, with a power to ufe the ftrength and wealth of the fociety for its good, and as its exigences Ihall require. Again, Gover- nours are the mimfters and reprefentatives of fociety ; becaufe the authority, which they exercife, is the authority which arifes from the allbciation, and is thereby lodged in fociety ; and governours repre- fent the fociety in the exercife of it, jull as fub- crdtnate governours are the minifters and reprefenta- tives of t\iQ fupreme, whom they derive their autho- rity Some Jhort RefleEltom^ &c.' ^oj Jrity from, and reprefent their principals in the ex- ercife of it. Again, Governours are the guar- dians of fociety, as the truft^ lodged in their hand, is to be employed for the puhlick gsod^ namely ^ to protect and defend every individual from all inju- ries and harm, whether in their perfons, their cha- radters, or properties ; to fecure to them the pof- feffion and enjoyment of every thing they have a right to j and to afford them that affiftance which each one's necefTitous circumflances may, in rca- fon, call for. And, in thefe views, I think, the relation, which gorernours ftand in to lociety, is mofl fully exemplified. And As governours are the trufiees of the fociety, fo they cannot, in reafon, employ the ftrength or wealth of it, to any other purpofe than the fo- ciety 's gQod J becaufe, when it is any otherwife employed, it is a6ling contrary to that truft j and, therefore, cannot, in reafon, be juftijied. It is true, governours may err^ and may ad for the hurt of the iociety, when they thought and intended it for their good ; but, then, tho' their error, and their condud founded upon it, would be fo far excufahle^ as that the ador ought not, in reafon, to be confidered^ as injurious to the fociety, feeing he intended the contrary, provided he took care to be rightly informed, accordiag to his ability and opportunity for fuch information, and as the circumflances of the cafe did require ♦, yet, as the fociety is injured hereby, fuch condud is in itfelf wrong and eviU tho' the a^.or is excufable, as afore- faid. And tho' error, in the circumftances above- mentioned, would, in reafon, be the governour's excufe •, yet he cannot, in reafon, be excufed and jujitfiedy when that is not his cafe ; becaufe the ftrength and wealth of the fociety are a trufi lodged in his hand, to be employed to anfwer the tnd and furpof^ gf aflbciation ; and, therefore, he D d 2 is. 404 Some Jhort Refe5f ions i &c. 1$, in reafon, obliged to employ them to anfwer that purpofe. And, if he employs them otber- wife, it is a6ling contrary to that triift •, efpecially if the fociety have remonjlrated to their gover- noiirs, and Ihewed them the unfitnefs of their con- dudl, or of thofe laws by which the fociety is in- jured ; or their firength or treafure wafted. I fay, when governours have been thus remonftrated to, their condudl is then fo much the more inexcufa- ble J which remonftrance each ^individual muft, in reafon, have a right to make^ becaufe each in- dividual is a part of that fociety, who lodged the truft in the governour's hand, and who are in- terefted in the truft which they abufe ; and be- caufe his weal or woe depends upon the weal or woe of that fociety, of which he is a part, and whofe truft is abufed. Surely, nothing can be more extravagantly unreafonable or abfurd, than to fuppofe that a fociety hath not a right to re- monftrate to its governours, when it is abufed by them, or to redrefs its grievances, when they grow fo heavy, as to fruftrate the end of aftbcia- tion. All trujlees are, in reafon, anfwerable to their principals •, and if it were otherwife in the prefent cafe, the end and purpofe of afTociation would be deftroy'd •, liberty would not be fecured, but would be changed into flavery •, and, the pub- lick intereft into the perfonal property of the go- vernour ; that is, the publick good, which is the ground of afTociation, would not, upon the pre- lent fuppofition, be fecured ; the fociety would be deftitute of all authority ; it would be abfolutely fubjeded to the will of another ; and it would be deftitute of all relief ; which ftate is not a ftate of liberty, but flavery ; and the publick ftrength and treafure would be abfolutely at the difpofal of the governour -, which would make it not a puhlick in- iereji^ but the governour's ferfonal proprty. All which Seme Jhort Reflexions ^ bcQ» 405 which are exceedingly unreafonahle and ahfurd -, and, therefore, the fuppofition is groundlefs. Again, As governours are the minifters and reprefentative of fociety, fo their authority cannot pofliibly be ex- tended /^r/y^^r, or v\{t higher than the authority of the fociety from which it is derived, as the ftream cannot poflibly rife higher then the fountain from which it flows. So that if governours, in any in- flances, either in the makings or in the execution of laws^ exercife fuch power, as is not naturally de- volved upon them/r^;;^ the fociety^ this is what, in reafon, they have no right to. This is fuch pow- er as was not in their principles^ and, therefore, cannot poflibly be derived from them ; and, con- fequently, the exercife of fuch power cannot, in reafon, htjujiified. For as the power or authority of fociey is limited and bounded by the ground and reafon, the end and purpofe of affociation •, fo, of ncceflity, the authority of their reprefentatives muft be limited and determined by thefe alfo. Again, As governours are the guardians of the lociety ; fo their authority is confined to the care of it^ and cannot, in reafon, be extended farther. Guardi- an/hip^ in the nature of the thing, confines the guardian to ufe and employ the power and wealth which arifes to him from that guardian/hip^ in the ufe and fervice of thofe he is a guardian to ; and to ferve fuch purpofes as his guardianfhip re- quires. And as governours are the guardians of the happinefs of the fociety, fo their authority is hereby naturally and necefTarily limited to thofe things, in which the fociety is interefied ; and, if they extend their authority farther, they cannot, in reafon, be juflified. The ground and reafon, the end and purpofe of aflbciation, do not require or make it neceflary, that the liberty of any indi- vidual fhould be abridged or reflrained^ but in thofe D d 3 cafes *5J.oS Some Jhort RefleBionSy Scci cafes in which the good or hurS of fociety is con-i cerned. And, therefore, the guardians of fociety have no right, by virtue of that guardianjhip^ to exercife their authority in any other cafe. Aflb- ciation does not fuppofe a reftraint of Hberty in all cafeSy but only in fuch cafes in which the publick intereft is concerned. And, therefore, every man has an undoubted natural right to ufe and enjoy his liberty in all other cafes, except he is,. in reafon, obliged to reftrain himfelf from fome other con- fideration, notwithftanding fuch aifociation. And if the guardians of the fociety fhould rejirain that liberty, or punijh men for the ufe of it, which comes to the fame thing, their condudl could not, in reafon, be jujlified. And if governours fhould think themfelves obliged, in confcience, to reftrain men's liberty, as aforefaid j yet fuch reftraint would be unreafonable, and, therefore, unjufti- fiable. For as a late ingenious * author very juftly obferves, *' What is one man's right, ano- *' ther man's confcience cannot oblige him upon *^ any juft grounds to oppofe." Thus I have taken the view of the ground and reafon^ of the end and purpofe of ajfociation, and of government^ as arifing from, and tounded upon it ^ and likewife of the nature of that relation which governours ftand in to their people -, prefuming this affords fome evident principle of realon, which will be a proper foundation for all farther argu- ments and reafonings upon the point in hand. I have before obferved, that no reafonings or con- clufions ought to be admitted in argument, which are founded upon groundlefs and uncertain princi- ples ; and, therefore, I humbly recommend it to be confidered, whether thofe principles, which I have laid down, are well grounded, or not. If they are not^ let that be fhewn ; and it will follow that f Dr* Rogtr's Civil Eftablilhment of Religion, Page 1 41 . no Some Jhort Refletltons^ Uz. 4^7^ no arguments ought to be founded upon, nor conclulions drawn from them -, and that, in rea* fon, they ought to be difcarded. But if thofe principles are well grounded •, then, I think, they arc a proper foundation for argument, and for the determining fuch queitions as the fubjc<5l: affords. Having thus confidered the ground and reafon^ the end and purpofe of affociation^ and likewile the nature of that relation which governours ftand in to their people ; I now proceed to build upon this foundation. I fhall not enter into every queition which the fubjed may be liable to-, but only con- fider, whether civil governours have any authority in matters of religion ; and, if they have, then, how far that authority is extended ? And, here it will be proper to ^hl the notion of the term, reli- gion^ and fliew what idea is annexed to it •, for otherwife all arguings and difputings, about reli- gion^ may be but beating the air. By the term, religion^ I underftand that which is confidered, as the ground of divine acceptance, and which does, or is fuppofcd to render men truly acceptable and well-pleafmg to God. So that whatever different opinions men may have about the ground of di- vine acceptance ; yet, I think, they agree in this, that whatever is judged to be the foundation of God's favour, that is eiteemed and called religion. And, confequently, when any adlion is, or is fup- pofed to render men acceptable, or difpleafmg, to God, that ad:ion is, upon that account, confider- ed, as religious., or irreligious. I'his, I think, is the moll general itx^io. of the term, religion. For tho* fome men may confine religion to thofe things, wherein the honour and fervice of God is diredlly and immediately concerned, and the like ; ytt thefe are confidered, as the ground of God's ac- ceptance, and their contraries, as tlie ground of D d A his 40 oeme jd on i^ ejieaions^ (X£ * his difpleafiire. So that religion^ in any limited fenle of the word, comes under the general dcE- nition I have given of it above. But farther. An adlion may come under a twofold confide- fation, viz, civil and religions ; that is, it may be fuch in which the good, or hurt, of fociety is con- cerned ; and, in this view, I call it a civil adlion ; and it may be fuch as renders the a6lor the pro- per objedl of divine favour^ oi* difpleafure^ or may be judged to do fo j and, in this view of it, I call it a religious action. If there are any actions in which fociety is not interefled, and which render the a(5lor the proper object of divine favour, or difpleafure, or are judged to do fo, fuch come on- ly under the denomination of r^%i(9^j or irreligious a6lions; and are ;/^/ of ai/v/ confideration, becaufe fociety is not interefled in, nor concerned with them. If thereare any adlions in which y^aV/y is interefled, and the a6lor does not thereby become the proper obje6t of divine favour^ or difpleafure^ or is not judg- ed to do fo, fuch come under the denomination of civil actions only ; and if there are any actions in which fociety is not interefled, and with which the favour, or difpleafure, of God is not concern- ed, or is not judged to be fo, fuch adions are neither civile nor religious^ but are of an indifferent nature, with refpecl to them both. So that the adlions, which come into the prefent queilion, arc thofe which are confidered, as religious^ viz. fuch as are of religious confideration only, and likewife fuch as are both civil and religious. And, with refped to the latter, the queflion is. Whether the trujlees^ the reprefentatives., and the guardians of fociety, have any authority, with refpedl to fuch a6lions, as they are religious., and under that confi- deration. That they have, as thofe adlions are of civil confideration, is allowed ; becaufe, in that view of them, fociety is interefled in them. And, there- Some Jhort Reflexions, tec. 409 therefore, governours have, in reafon, a right to oblige each individual to, or reilrain him from the performance of fuch aftions, as the good, or hurt, of fociety is affedled by them. This, then, I think, is the ftatc of the cafe, viz. Whether the guardians of fociety have any right, by virtue of that giiardianjhip, to oblige, or re- ftrain, any individual to, or from the performance of any adion, upon account of its being fubfer- vient to render the ador pleafing, or difpleafing, to God ; or to his being happy, or unhappy, in another world ? Barely to affirm, or deny, in the prefent cafe, is not to argue, but to dogmatize. And, therefore, fuch affirmation, or denial, mult be fhewn to be founded on fome evident princi- ple of reafon, to render it of weight in the prefent queftion. I think that the negative fide of this queflion is the truth of the cafe j viz, that gover^ murs haVe no authority in matters of religion ; that is, they have no right to oblige, or reftrain, any individual to, or from the performance of any adion, upon account of that adion's being fub- fervient to render the ador pleafing, or difplea- fing, to God ; or to his being happy, or unhap- py, in another world. My reafon is as follows : The ground and reafon of aJJ'ociation to men is not their relation to, and dependence upon God ; but only their relation to, and dependence upon each other. And the ultimate end and purpofe of af- fociation is not to fecure to each individual the^^- vour of God, and the happinefs of another world y but only to procure to each individual thofe com- forts in life, which each, in a fingle capacity, are not qualified to procure to themfelves ; and to guard and proted each individual from thofe evils, which each, in a fingle capacity, are not qualify'd to fecure themfelves from. Men do not aflbciate or conflitute a publick interelt, becawfe each, in a fingle ^i6 Svme Jhort RefieSilons^ &c. a fingk capacity, are not qualilicd to obtain God*s favour and the happinels ot another world \ or that fociety\ and, confequently, the reprefentatives of it, fhould give, or fecure, thofe advantages to them : I fay, thefe cannot poflibly be the ground and rea- fon, the end and purpofe of aflbciation, becaufe, with refpe(5l to them, aflbciation does not alter the cafe at all. The favour of God and the happinefs of another world are what fociety can neither give, nor fecure, nor take away from any individual •, and, confequently, thcfe are things which fociety, as fuch, are not interelled in, nor concerned with. Every individual muft, in his fingle capacity, ren- der himfelf perfondly pleafing to God, and there- by be the proper objedl of his prefent, or fu- ture, favour ; tor otherwife he cannot poffibly obtain it 5 that is, he muft voluntarily chuic to do, and avoid, whatever is neceflfary to render him acceptable and well-pleafing to his Maker ; k being out of the power of any other to do it for him. And, therefore, if governours fhould aflume to themfelves a power to oblige, or reftrain, any individual to do, or avoid, any adlion, as religiouSy they would hereby deftroy the end which they pro- pofe to obtain. For as every religious adion, or cmifllon, muft have a religious motive to be the ground or reafon of it •, becaufe otherwife it would not be a religious adion, or omiflion -, fo when governours interpofe their authority, by com- pelling, or reftraining, as far as that influences, by being the ground or reafon of fuch a6tion, or omif- iion, fo far the religioujhefs of that adion, or omif- lion, is deftroyed. Again, As the favour of God and the happinefs of another world muft be by erery individual perfonally obtained ; fo it is what every individual is only perfonally interefted in. If any individual is interefted in God's favour, 3ind ervtitled to the happinefs of another zvorld, fo- ciety Some Jhort RefleBions^ &c.' 41 i cieiy IS no gainer •, and, if the contrary is his cafe, fociety is no lofer hereby. It is true, thofe adtions which render men the objefts of God's favour, or difpleafure, may be beneficial, or hurtful, to fo- ciety ; but, then, the good, or hurt, which fociety receives from fuch anions, arifes from the adions themfelves, confidered abltradedly from their be- ing pleafing, or difpleafing, to God -, and they would be equally beneficial, or hurtful, whether they be introdudlive to the favour y or difpleafure^ of God, or not. So that, in this view, thofe ani- ons are not of religiousy but of civil confideration only. The fum of the prefent argument is this, viz. religion is wholly and only perfonal -, that is, every man mull render himfelf perfonally pleafing to God ; this being what fociety can neither give, nor fucure, nor take away ; and it is likewife what fociety is not interefted in. If he obtains God's favour, no man is a gainer, but himfelf •, and, if he lofes that favour, no one is a fufferer, but him- felf, thereby j and, confequently, religion cannot polTibly be the ground and reafon of affociation, or the end and purpofe to which it is intended to be fubfervient. And as the authority which refides in fociety, and, confequently, in governours^ as their reprefentatives, does naturally arife from, and is, therefore, extended to, and bounded by, the ground and reafon^ the end and pmpofe of afiLcia- tion y fo, from hence, it will unavoidably follow, that governours have no authority in matters of re-* ligion ; that is, they have, in reafon, no right to oblige, or reftrain, any individual to, or from the performance of any adlion, upon account of that anion's being pleafing, or difpleafing, to God ; becaufe this is fuch power as was not in their principals, and, therefore, cannot poffibly be de- rived from them. Ccvernours 'j^li Some Jhort Reflexions &CQi Governours, as I have already obfervcd. are the trujlees^ the reprefentativesy and the guardians o^ fociety. But as religion is purely perfonaly and in which fociety is not interefted in any refpedl, there cannot, therefore, poffibly arife any trufly to go- vernours from fociety, upon a religious account ; that is, governours cannot poffibly have a right to govern the underflahdings anda6tionsof men, with refpedl to religion^ upon the account of their being the fociety's trujiees. And as the authority which arifes to fociety from the ground and reafon, the end and purpofe of affociation, cannot poffibly be extended to matters of religious confideration j fo governours cannot poffibly have a right to govern the underflandings and actions of men, upon a r^- Ugious account, by virtue of their being the fociety*s reprefentatives. And as the favour, or difpleafure, of God, and the happinefs, or unhappinefs, of ^?- nother world, are what fociety can neither give, nor fecure, nor take away ; fo governours canaot poffibly have a right to interpofe in matters of re- ligiony by virtue of their being the fociety's guardi- ans. The cafe, I think, is as plain as any thing can poffibly be. And, therefore, if civil gover- nours fliould at any time interpofe in matters of religion^ by making laws, or executing them, when made, in order to oblige, or rcftrain, any indivi- dual, to, or from the performance of any adion, upon a religious account ^ this is manifeftly a ftretch of power j this is what governoursy as governours^ have no right to ; and, therefore, cannot, in rea- fon, be juftified in. Thus, I think, I have fully Jhewn that governours, as fuch, that is, as the iruftees^ the reprefentativeSy and the guardians of fo- ciety, have no right to interpofe in matters of re- ligion % that is, they have no right to oblige, or reftrain, any individual, to, or from the perfor- jnance of any a<5lion, upon the account of its being the Some Jhort ReflemonSy 6ic. 4'? the ground o^ divine favour, or difpleafure. And if governours have no authority in matters of r^Zn gioHy when the term, religion^ is underflood in its utmoft latitude, as, I think, I have fhewn they have not ; then, it will follow, that governours can have no authority in matters of religion^ when the term, religion^ is underflood in any reftrained or limited fenfe. To ihew this at large may be thought needlefs, becaufe it unavoidably follows from what has been before laid down. But becaufe I am willing to go thro' the quefti- on I am now upon, and thereby prevent any ex- ceptions it may be liable to, I will briefly examine the feveral particulars which may be confidered, as religion-, andthefe, I think, may be ranged under four heads, namely^ firft. Men's living in the prac- tice of virtue^ that is, their putting on fuch a be- haviour as is fuitable to a rational and manly cha- rader, by doing to all others as they would be done by, and by rendering thcmfelves as agreeable, ufeful, and beneficial to the world, as their con- dition and circumflances in life renders them capa- ble of. Secondly^ Men's paying their acknow- ledgments to God in fociety^ which is commonly called publick divine worfhip. Thirdly, Men's per- forming fome external adlions, upon a religious ac- count; fuch as hoiving the body, &c. and which are ufually expreffed by thefe terms, viz, rites, cere- monies, ordinances, inftitutiGns,facraments, or the like. Fourthly, Men's ajfenting, and publickly profejfmg that aflent, to certain propofitions, which are com- monly called articles of faith. Thefe are the feve- ral things which are either fcperately, or conjunct- ly, confidered, as the ground of divine acceptance, and, therefore, are called religion. And, Firft, If religion be confidered, as confifting in the pradice of virtue, then, the queftion will be. What authority governomhsi^t. in religious matters? And And the anfwer is, That they have none at all. For tho' religious adions may be beneficial to fociety, and irreligiGUS adions may be hurtful to it; yet the^W, or hurt^ which j^aV/j fuftainsby them, arifes from the actions themfelves, confidercdabllrafledly from the religioufnefs, or irreligioufnefsy of thofe adlions. And, therefore, tho' governours have authority to oblige, or reftrain, men, with refped to fuch ac- tion ; yet it is not, upon account of the religioufnefs^ or irreligioufnefs^ of thofe adbions, but only on ac- count of their being civil adions-, that is, upon ac- count of the anions themfelves being beneficial, or hurtful, to fociety, as aforefaid. So that religion does not come intp the cafe at all. Again, Secodnhy If religion be confidered, as confifling in men's paying their acknowledgments to God iny^- ciety •, then the queflion will be. What authority dvil governours have in matters of religion ? And the anfwer will be. That they have none at all, I iliall not enter into the queftion, Whether men are, in reafon, obliged puhlickly to pay their ac- knowledgments to God ? it being fufficientto ob- ferve, that the generality of men think they are fo. And as men, who are thus perfuaded, muil either come to fome agreement among themfelves, with refped to the time, the place, and the form or mode cf worfhipy and the perfon to minifter therein, or elfe accept of what is provided for them ; I fay, one or other of thefe muft be the cafe -, for other- wife puhlick worfhip cannot take place. Therefore, I think, that it cannot in reafoH, be confidered, as a hurt or injury, but a kindnefs and a benefit to foci- ety, for governours to make a provifion in thefe refpe6ls, that fo each individual may have the op- portunity of paying his publick acknowledgments to God, which the generality of men think it is their duty to do. But, then, there is nothing au- thoritative in all this, fuppofmg men are left per- feaiy u^;j^«/2/ concern, no other being a gainer, or lofer thereby, and it is what eve-ry man isperfcnally anfv/erable to God for-, there- fore, i: is moft reafonable that every man fhould be at/uil liberty to judge for himfelf, and govern his aclions by his own judgment, in all matters per- taining thereto. And, as a learned writer *obferves, whofe juft remark I have already quoted, " What *' is one man's, and every man's right, another " man's confcience cannot oblige him upon any " juft grounds to oppofe." "^ See Dx,Rogn\ Civil Efiablifhment of Religion, Pa^c 141. Thusj Thus, I have gone thro' what I propofed, and I think, have fully Ihewn, that civil governours have no authority^ in matters of religion. However, if thofe, who are otherwife-minded, Ihould think, that the principles ; I reafon from, are not well- grounded, or that I have not reafoned juftly from thofe principles ; let that be Ihewn, and I fhall think myfelf concerned to confider it. But if they fhould make their appeal, not to the un- derJiandingSy but to xht paffions o^ men, by endea- vouring to render me contemptible *, — fuch per- fons, and fuch reafoning, I ihall defpife. To conclude : Truth is what every man has a natural and an undoubted right to. By truth, I mean xht truth of things, or truth, as it ilands op- pofed to frr^r; and, therefore, every man has a right to convidtion, when he is in error; that is, he has a right to hear what others can propofe to him, and likewife to propofe his own opinions to the world together with the grounds upon which his judgment is determined in their favour. This being the only way to his convidlion, becaufe it is the only way by which the weaknefs, or falfenefs, of thofe grounds can be difcovered. So that if the advocates for truth and error were at full liberty to make out their claims, by producing their evi- dences, and by being admitted to a fair hearing truth would then have fo much the advantage of error, that I doubt not but it would ride triumph- ant thro' the v/orld. # # # TRACT TRACT XXXV. RejkBions on Natwtal Punijhments. Wherein two Ohje5!ions^ urged againft what is ad- vanced, in the Author's Difcourfeon the Grounds and Extent of authority and Liberty, with ref- pe6l to civil Government^ are examined. In Anfwer to a private Letter from a Gentleman. SIR, I Received your Letter, in which you have fent me your thoughts on my Refledbions on the Grounds and Extent of Authority and Li- berty, with Refpedl to civil Government, viz^ That what I have offered would be condujive, were it not for two things which, you conceive, lie as ohje5fions againfl what I have advanced. " Namely^ firjly That many texts of fcripture, as '^ well as experience, are fuppofed to tell us, " that a whole feciety have luffered afflictions from " God, for that a part o^ them have negleded to *' worfhip God, or for worfhipping him in a '' manner not agreeable to his will, C^?^." And you query, Whether it will not follow, that go- vernoLirs have a right to oblige, or reftrain men, with refpecl to religious adions, feeing, upon the prefent fuppofition, fociety is manifeflly interell- ed therein? To which you add, '' fecondh\ That «' I have allowed, that the liberty of individuals *' may be rejlrained^ in thofe cafes in which the " gcod^ or hurt^ of the fociety is concerned." And you query, as before. Whether it will not follow that governours ought to abridge the liberty of in- dividuals, in the affair of religion ? Upon which i obferve, that, I think, ihz Jfrength of your fe- cond, TO" *"V' cond objedion arifes from what you have prefumedm youv Jirft^ viz. That God does afflid, or puniih, focieties of men, for the omilTions, or a<5lions, of fome individuals -, which adions, or omifTions, are not injurious to the fociety any other way, than as they induce Jlmighty God to corredl and punifh it for their fakes. This, I think, you mull mean, or elfe I cannot perceive, how what / Jbave allowed can be urged againft me with any /r^;/^/^. And, therefore, as both your objections are founded upon the fame principle ; fo my fliewing the ground- 'lefsnefs of that principle will be an anfwer to them both. And, accordingly. I obferve, That the principle your chje5fions are founded upon, and upon which t\itjufmefs of your reafoning depends, I think, may reafonably be difputed. For as vii'tue and Jin are only and -wholly perfonal ', fo, in reafon, both rewards and punijhnents^ whether in this life, or another, ought to be only and wholly ^f^y^;/^/ alio. That is, as one man is not, nor cannot be vertuous, or crimiiial by the good or bad actions of another ; any other- wife, than as he voluntarily is a fharer in, or a contributer to thofe adlions : fo, in reafon, he ought not to be rewarded^ nov puni/bed, upon their account. And, therefore, it may jullly be quefti- oned, Whether the forementioned principle does not refled dijhonour upon the moral character of our heavenly Father ? That is. Whether it be the produce of, or whether it be contrary to juJiicCy wifdorri't and goodnefs^ for God to reward and puniih men in the lump ? To reward, or puniih, upon account of men's being goody or had^ and to reward and puniih good and bad men together^ and alike ; I fay the queftion is, Whether this is a mark of wifdom-, juitice, and goodnefs, or, of their contraries? For iiwickednefs he the only ground of divine refentment^ and M goodnefs be the only R^fle3lons on National Puni/hnents, 4.^1 only ground of divine aprohation, as, inreafon, they ought to be ; then, I think, it may jullly be urg- ed, that none but ^ad men ought to feel the effects of the former^ and none but good men to reap the fruits of the latter. It may hkewife be farther urged, that if rewards and pimijhments in this life, are intended to excite men to perform good adlions, and to prevent them from their contraries ; then, national rewards^ and national pnniJJjments^ are not adapted to anfwer fuch ends, thefe being dealt forth upon ^W and bad men toge- ther, and alike : fo that the one cannot be an en- couragement to goodnefs^ nor the other a difcourage- ment to vice and wickednefs. And if this be the truth of the cafe, then, I think, it will follow, that the principle^ you reafon from, is not well grounded. What you found the forementioned principle upon is, that many text^ of fcripttire^ as well as ex- perience^ are fuppofed to declare it. As for expe- rience, I think, that m.akes no fuch declaration. And, as to the fcripture. I think, it may juilly be qiiejiioned; becaufe the Prophet Ezekiel^ or rather Almighty God^ by his mouth, aflures us, that no fuch thing ca.n jufily be charged upon the diviiie condudl. Thepurportof the xviif^^ chsip.oi^ Ezek, is to fhew what is more particularly expreiled in ver. 20, viz. The foul i hat ftnneth^ and that only, it fhall die. Thefonjhallmt bear the iniquity of the father \ neither ffjall the father bear the iniquity ofthefon : the right eoufnefs of the righteous foall be upon bim^ and up- on him only, and the wickednefs of the wicked Jl:all be upon him^ and upon him only. And an app al is made to the underftandings of men, whether fuch a procedure is notjuf and equal-, as at ver. 25. Hear noiVy O houf ^/Ifrael, is not my way equals &c. Which fuppofes, that the contrary procedure, inpunifliing one for the faults of another, aud which is appa- V.^i.. 11 V i rcntlf 434 Rifletticns en National Pun'ifhments. rently the cafe in national puniJJjments^ v/ould be unequal^ that is U7ijujt. And the above declaration is made, to vindicate the divine condudl from the charge ofiniqtdty, that is, from the charge of pu- nifhing the innocent and the guilty together, and alike, which was groundlefly judged to be the cafe, with refpecl to the Babyloniffo captivity^ and to fhew the grotindlefnefs of that perverfe proverb, which the Je-ws had taken up ; viz. 1'be fathers have eaten fewer grapes^ and the childrens teeth are- fet on edge. And v/hereas it is faid at ven _^, As I live^ faith the Lord God., yefljdl not have cccafion any mofe to ttfe this proverb in Ifrael j which feems to imply, that there had been occafion given for the ufe of it in tirncfs pait ♦, the meaning is, not that God would take different meafures in his deal- ing v/ith his creatures, in this refpedt, for the timz to come., then he had taken with them in times pafl and thereby prevent giving occafion for the ule of that proverb any more m Ifrael : but the meaning is, that as God, by the mouth of liis Prophet fully dcclaredy what is the rule of a6lion to himfelf- in the diiUibution of punifhments, viz. that he will not puniili the innocent for the faults of the «-^://r, tho* mofl nearly related to him ^ and that every one ihall fuffer for his ovon fins only^ and not for the fins of another •, I fay, alter fuch a decla- ration, the Je^jvs would not have reafon.^ as they before groundlefly thoiight they had, for the ufe of the aforelaid proverb. And that this is the truth of the cafe is mani feii: from the queilion allied in the precedent vcrfe, viz. What mean ye, that ye life this proverb concerning the land of Ifrael ? ^c. which is as much as to fay, tiiat this power was groundlefs., and an imjnfl reflection upon the divine condud, Thusi again, at ver. 25. Tet fay., the ^^ay of the Lord is not equal. Nov/, the iniquity^ which the Jfralites charged ftpon tlie divine con- dua Reflections on National Pmijhments, 455, tlutSl:, refpeded only what was prefent and paft^ and not what was to come ^ and, therefore, God luull refer to his prefent and pajl conduB^ and not to v/hat he would do in time to come, when he ap- pealed to the houfe of Ifrael^ to judge of the^- qiiity o{\\\% dealings with them. And as y/^?Vi? and equiiy which, in the prefent cafe, conlift \\\ punifiiing every man/^r his oivnjins onlj\ and not tor xh^' fins- of another^ are here declared to be the rule of adfion to God, with relpedt to his deal- ings with the children of" Jfrael'. fo they are molt certainly a rule of adlion to him in every cafe^ and to all people^ both ycftsrday^ to day^ and for ever. And, therefore, I think, it ought not to be pre- filmed, that the f crip tures m^ake any declarations corjtrary thereto. If it fhould be urged, that the oppreffwns v/hich the children of Ifrael fuffered form the neighbour- ing nations, and their captivities^ arc, in fome in- ftances, at ieafb, confidcred in the Bihle^ as pitn- ifjments from God for their idolatry -, in which-^ ca- fes, the innocent and the guilty fuffered alike. I cnfwer^ God is fometimes, in the fcriptures, faid to do what his agency is not at all cor.cerned with ; and which, fl:ri6lly fpeaking, is the produce of the cu forderly and ungoverned appetites and pa/Iions of men, Thus, Exod. iv. 21. And the Lord I aid unto Mofes, ':^:hen thou go eft to return into Egy])^, fee that thou do all thofe wonders before Pharaoh which I have put in thine hand ; hut I 'x-ill harden his hearty that he fiall not let the people go : compa- red wqth chap. viii. ver. 15. Rut vjhen PharrifJi faw that there ''Jiuis rcfpite^ he hardmcd his hearty and hearkened not unto them ; as the Lord had fai.i. Plerewefee, that tho' God is faid to b a-r den 'p La ■ raoh^s hearty yet that ftubborni^.cfs or hardnefs of heart is charged upon Pharaoh himfelf as, mff- ice, \i ought to be. For to fuppofe^ that Grd^ by . ^ ' ■^■- h:s 4'^3 Rejie5lions on National Punijhments. his agency, inje5ied ftubbornne^s into the heart of Pharaoh^ and then pmijhed him for that flubborn- nels, is to impute imqtiity to our Maker. And, therefore, when God is faid to harden Pharaoh's heart, this is only a foretelling^ that Pharaoh would harden his own heart-, as is evident fom the verfe I lafl cited-, in which Pharaoh is faid to har- den his heart, as the Lord had faid. Again 2 Sara. xxiv. I. And again the ayiger of the Lord was kind- led againfld Ifrael, and he moved David againjl them^ to fay ^ Go number Ifrael and]uddh •, compared with I Chron. xxi i. And Satan food up againfl Ifrael, -and provoked David to number Ifrael. Here we fee, that the very fame thing is afchbed in fcrip- ture to G6d and to Satan viz. the ftirring up a fpirit of pride and vainnefsof mind in David: which led him to number Ifrael and Judah. But this could not be God/s act; bccaufe if it ware, then, he moved David to do what is difpleafing to him- felf, which is m.oft abfurd to luppofe. From both thefe inftances, 1 think, it is plain and evi- dent, that a thing or a^-im being afcribed to God, in fcripture is not a proof that it was, in reality, done by him -, feeing in the inftances before us, he is faid to do what his agency was not concerned with. Again, with refpecl ro what is reprefented in fcripture^ 2.^ punijhments from God\ God is faid to do what he was not, in the leaft, concerned with •, an inftance of which is more immediately to the prefcnt purpofe. Thus, 2 Sam. xii. 11. 1 2. nus faith the Lord, Behold^ I will raife up evil iigainfi thie., David, out of thine own houfe^ and I will take thy wives before thine eyes^ and give them unto ihy neighbour^ aj-d hefhall lie with thy wives in^ the fight of this fun : for thou didfi it fecretly ; but I will do this thing before all Ifrael, ajid before the fun. tJompared v/ith chap. xvi. 21, 22 yf/;i Ahitop- \w\jatd unto Abfolom, Go in unto thy fathers con- cabin Reflexions on National Punifhments. 4^^' cuhines^ which he hath left to keep the houfe^ and aU Ifrael floall hear that thou art abhorred of thy father ; thenfhall the hands of all that are with thee be ftrong. So they fpread Abfalom a tent upon the top of the houfe^ and Abfalom went in unto his fathers concu- bines^ in the fight of all Ifrael. Here we fee, that the 'vilefi actions are, in fcripture, afcribed to God^ and confidercd, as punifhment's from him upon o- thefs ; when he, of all others, was the fartheft from being c(5neerned in thofe adlions. And thi?* was manifeftly the cafe, with refpedl to the cap-^ tivities of the children of Ifrael^ and the opprejjions with which their neighbours oppreffed them ; thefe were fo far from being, llridly fpeaking, puniihments from God, that, on the contrary, they fprang from the vitiated ap])etites and pafTi- ons of men. And, therefore, I think, a mode offpeech, u^tdm fcripture, ought not, in reafon» to be urged, in prejudice, of the moral char a^er of our heavenly Father. Tho* I am fenfible, that, with refped: to this and many other points, fome men arc apt to put the cafe upon zdefperate ijfucy and chufe rather, thiit God fliould be jufljy char- geable with iniquity, and the fcripture with contra- di^ions, than that their religious principles, or their unreafonable power , (hould want 2ifcriptural fupport. Upon the whole I obferve. That if the principk, you reafon from, is not well grounded, as, I think, I fliewn it is not-, then the objections, founded upoa it, lofe their force. And, confequently, my reafon- ing, in the tradt here referred to, with refpe^: to Civil Government having no Authority, in Mat- ters of Religioyi, is juft and conclufive, for any thing that has yet been (hewn to the contrary. 1 am, SIR, 2^our much obliged humbk Servant^ (sc. F I N J S, BOOKS Printed for T. COX, at the Lamby under the Royal Excha^tge. AColledion of Trafts on various Subjcdls, by the fame Author. Note-i Thele two Volumes continue the former, and is what he printed in his Life Time. Price los. N* B, The under-mention'd Pamphlets are Part of the two Volumes in Odavo, any of which may be had feparately. Chubb on Reafon. — Grounds and Foundation of Religion. ,._ Equity and Reafonablenefs of the Divine Condu6l. .-_— — True Gofpel of Jefus Chrift, «— — True Gofpsl vindicated. .-— on Miracles. on Redemption. ^_-- Grounds and Foundation of Morality. ._ four Differtations. The Adventures of Telemachus, the Son of UlyfTes, by the Archbifhop of Cambray. In French and Englifh. The Original carefully printed according to the bell Editions of France and Holland, and the Tranflation, which is en- tirely new, revifed by Mr. DesMaizeaux, F.R.S, 2 vol. Price bound, 6s. Ditto, French only, bound, 3s. Ditto, Englifh only, bound, 3s. Terence's Comedies, tranflated into Engli/h, with critical and explanatory Notes. To which is prefixed, a DiGTertation on the Life and Vs^ri- tings of Terence; containing. An Enquiry into the Rife and' Progrefs of dramatic Poetry in Greece and Rome ; with Remarks on the Comic Meafure. The Second Edition. By Mr. Cooke. Price bound, 6s. lllP|BjjPUI.I MMII.PUflWI