I! 
 
 9-w 
 
 .\n. 
 
~      OF   THE 
 
 Theological   Seminary, 
 
 PRINCETON,    N.J. 
 
 Case,     "■^^.^r"^^. D.i.visj.o  n , 
 
 Shelf,   JL<^^1        Section , 
 
 Booh,    .::..:.:: No,.,. 
 
 A       DONATION 
 
 FROM 
 
 Beceiued 
 
 i^P^Wilj^-Nw- 
 
\^1 
 
 A  N 
 
 S    S    A    Y 
 
 O  N     T  H  E 
 
 ORIGIN  oi  EVIL, 
 
 By  Dr.  William  King,  late  Lord 
 Archbifhop  oi  DUBLIN. 
 
 Tranilated  from  the  Latiny  with  large  Notes, 
 
 To  which  are  added  two  Sermons  by  the  fame  Au-' 
 thor,  the  former  concerning  Divine  Prefciencey 
 the  latter  on  the  Fall  of  Man. 
 
 The  Third  Edition  corrected. 
 
 By  EDMVND  LAW.  M.  A.  Fellow  of  Chrifi  College. 
 
 w^^ 
 
 i.KS^f5i.;^>«ri  : 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: 
 
 Printed  for   WILLIAM    THURLBOURN. 
 
 And  Sold  by  J.  and  P.  Knapton,  W.  Innys  and  R.  Mavhy,  S.  Birt  znd. 
 C.  RivtJigtoTi,  Booicfellers  in  London.  Mdccxxxix, 
 
TO     THE 
 
 REVEPvEND 
 Dr.  Waterland 
 
 Mailer  of  Magdalen  CoIIese  in 
 Camhridie^  &€,  &c. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 IT  is  a  common  obfervation  that  the  ge- 
 nerality of  fuch  Freethinkers  as  are  feri- 
 rious  and  have  reafon'd  them.lelves  out  of 
 the  Chriftian  RelisT^ion,  have  at  the  fame 
 time  rejected  the  beKef  of  a  Deity.  This 
 muft  arife  either  from  their  entertaining 
 fome  Principles  that  lead  equally  to  both 
 thefe  abfurdities;  or,  which  is  more  proba- 
 ble,' from  their  having  no  Principles  at  all : 
 from  mere  Sceptic! fm  and  a  habit  of  rai- 
 iing  Objedions  without  ever  attending  to 
 the  anfwers ;  without  proceeding  on  any 
 fettled  grounds  of  enquiry,    or  endeavour- 
 
 A  ing 
 
Dedication. 
 
 ing  to  eftablifli  any  thing:  a  temper  of 
 mind  which  may  eafily  bring  a  Man  to 
 disbeHeve  any  thing.  But  whatever  be  the 
 Caufe  of  this,  the  Obferv^ation  is  remarkably 
 verify'd  in  the  prelent  Age.  Moft  of  our 
 modern  Unbehevers  have  fo  far  perplex'd 
 themfelves  with  Difficulties  about  the  Law 
 of  Nature  and  right  Reafon,  Liberty  Divine 
 and  Human,  Prefcience,  Providence,  and 
 the  like,  that  they  feem  to  be  in  univerlal 
 Confufion  The  chief  defign  of  the  follow- 
 ing Book  is  to  clear  up  fome  of  thefe  Diffi- 
 culties, to  eftablifli  true  and  proper  Notions, 
 as  well  as  to  refute  falfc  and  unworthy  ones, 
 concerning  the  Exiftence  and  Attributes  of 
 God,  and  his  Government  of  the  World ; 
 concerning  the  Nature  and  Condition  of 
 Man,  the  Obligations  he  Hes  under,  the 
 Rule  and  End  of  his  actions;  and  to  build 
 the  whole  upon  fuch  Principles  of  Pvcafon 
 as  are  perfectly  confiftcnt  with  Revelation. 
 This,  'tis  hoped,  will  not  be  without  its  ufc 
 at  prefent,  in  flopping  the  growth  of  Ltc- 
 ligion  by  ftriking  at  the  Root  of  it ;  it  may 
 have  fome  influence  toward  fettling  the 
 minds  of  the  unlearned  and  unflablc^  and  be 
 
 fufficient 
 
Dedtcatiom. 
 
 fufflcient  tlio'  not  to  reduce  them  to  a  hearty 
 profeiiion  of  the  true  Faith,  yet  at  leaft  to 
 hinder  them  from  falling  into  downright  In  • 
 fidelity;  efpecially  if  coiintenanc'd  by  a 
 Perfon  eminent  fjr  a  tlioroiigh  knov/ledge 
 of  thefe  Subjedlsj  confefledlyan  able  Judge, 
 an  upright  Defender,  a  bright  Example  of 
 Religion  both  reveafd  and  natural ;  v/ho  is 
 zealous  to  aflert  the  truth  and  enforce  the 
 neceffity  of  the  Principal  Dodrines  and  In- 
 ftitutions  of  the  one,  as  v/ell  as  to  eftaWifh 
 the  true  ground  and  fundamental  Principle, 
 and  fix  the  proper  Limits  of  the  other :  and 
 above  all,  who  has  always  the  Courage  to 
 maintain  thefe  great  Truths,  howfoever  un- 
 fafiiionable  or  unpopular  they  may  be  fome- 
 times  made. 
 
 Thefe,  Sir,  are  very  obvious  reafons  for 
 my  being  ambitious  to  prefix  your  Name  to 
 the  foUcwino;  ¥/ork,  and  endeavouring  to 
 recommend  it  to  the  favour  of  one  to  whom 
 its  Author  wou'd  liave  been  defirous  to  ap- 
 prove himfelf 
 
 'Tis  with  pleafure  alfo  that  I  take  this  op- 
 portunity of  declaring  as  well  my  fenfe  of 
 the  great  benefits  that  attend  the  perufal  of 
 
 A  2  your 
 
Dedication. 
 
 your  Writings,  which  muft  giv^e  equal 
 warmth  and  convidlion  to  all  who  have  the 
 leaft  concern  for  Religion ;  as  my  experience 
 of  that  candid  condefcention  and  commu- 
 nicative temper,  which  is  ready  to  encou- 
 rage and  inftrud:  every  young  enquirer  after 
 Truth. 
 
 To  thefe  more  general  Motives  to  an  Ad- 
 drels  of  this  kind  give  me  leave  to  add  the 
 many  private  Obligations  which  in  a  parti- 
 cular manner  demand  an  acknowledgment 
 from 
 
 S     I    Ry 
 
 Tour  tnojl  obliged 
 humble  Servanty 
 
 Edmund  L  a  w^ 
 
THE 
 
 Tranflator's  PREFACE. 
 
 IH  A  V  E  always  look'd  upon  an  Enquiry  into 
 the  Caufe  and  Origin  of  Evil,  as  one  of  the 
 nobleil:  and  mod  important  Subje(fts  in  Natural 
 Religion.  It  leads  us  into  the  moft  exalted  Spe- 
 culations concerning  the  Exillence  and  Attributes  of 
 God,  and  the  Original  of  Things.  ^It  firft  endea- 
 vours to  difcover  the  true  intent  of  the  Deity  in 
 creating  Beings  at  all,  and  then  purfues  that  Intent 
 thro'  the  feveral  Works  of  his  Creation :  it  (hews 
 how  this  is  fully  anfwer'd  at  prefent  by  the  Inani- 
 mate  and  Brute  Part,  and  how  it  might  and  fliould 
 be,  and  why,  and  in  what  refped,  it  is  not  by  the 
 Rational.  It  contemplates  the  Oeconomy  in  the 
 Government  of  the  Univerfe,  fearches  into  the  va- 
 rious Schemes  of  Providence,  and  takes  in  the  whole 
 Compafs  of  Nature. 
 
 Neither  is  its  Ufefubiefs  inferior  to  its  Extent.  It 
 concerns  every  Man  who  pretends  to  adt  upon  any 
 ferious  Views  here,  or  to  entertain  any  folid  Hopes 
 of  Futurity.  The  Knowledge  of  it,  in  fome  degree, 
 is  abfolutely  neceffary  in  order  to  the  fettling  in  our 
 Minds  right  Notions  of  the  Nature  and  Will  of  God, 
 and  the  Duties  we  owe  him  ;  in  order  to  the  due 
 Apprehenfion  of  his  Defign  in  creating,  preferving, 
 and  directing  us ;  and  to  the  regular  Coadud:  of  our 
 
 A3  Live^ 
 
vlii  P  R  E  FA  C  E. 
 
 Lives,  and  Enjoyment  of  ourfelves  in  that  State  and 
 Condition  wherein  he  has  placed  us.  Nay,  while 
 we  are  ignorant  of  this  one  Point,  what  rational  Plea- 
 fure  can  we  take  in  knowino;  any  other?  When  I 
 enquire  how  I  got  into  this  World,  and  came  to  be 
 what  I  am,  I'm  told  that  an  ablblutely  perfed  Being 
 produced  me  out  of  Nothing,  and  placed  me  here 
 on  purpofe  to  communicate  fome  Part  of  his  Hap- 
 pinefs  to  me,    and  to  make  me,    in  fome  meafure, 
 
 like  himfelf  ^ This  End  is  not  obtain'd  ; • 
 
 the  diredt  contrary  appears  ;■ I  find  myfelf  fur- 
 rounded  with   nothing  but   Perplexity,    Want  and 
 
 Miferys By  whofe  fault  I  know  not, How 
 
 to  better  myfelf  I  cannot  tell       What  Notions  of 
 
 God  and  Goodnefs  can  this  afford  nie  ? What 
 
 Ideas  of  Religion  ? What  Hopes  of  a  future 
 
 State  ? For,  if  God's  Aim  in  producing  me  be 
 
 entirely  unknown  ;  if  it  be  neither  his  Glory,  (as 
 fome  will  have  it)  wdiich  my  prefent  State  is  far  from 
 
 advancing; nor  mine  own  Good^   which   the 
 
 fame  is  equally  inconfiilent  with  ;  how  know  I  v/hat 
 T  am  to  do  here,  and  in  what  m.anner  I  mufl:  endea- 
 vour to  pleafe  him  ?    Or  why  fliould  I  endeavour  it 
 
 at  all  ? For,  if  I  mull  be  miferable  in   this 
 
 World,  what  Security  have  I  that  I  fliall  not  be  fo 
 in  another  too;  (if  there  be  one)  fince,  if  it  were 
 the  Will  of  my  Almighty  Creator,  I  might  (for 
 ought  I  fee)  have  been  happy  in  both  ? 
 
 Such  Thoughts  as  thefe  muff  needs  difturb  a  Per- 
 
 o 
 
 fon  that  has  any  real  Concern  for  his  Maker's  PIo- 
 nour  or  his  own  Happinefs ;  that  delires  to  pay  him 
 a  reafonable  Service,  and  anfwer  the  End  of  his 
 Creation  :  in  fliort,  that  happens  to  think  at  all  upon 
 thefe  things,  and  to  think  for  himfelf.  And  there- 
 fore 
 
PREFACE.  ix 
 
 fore  an  Endeavour  to  rid  the  Mind  of  fome  of  thefe 
 Perplexities,  cannot  fnre  be  unacceptable,  and  a  So- 
 lution of  any  one  of  thefe  Doubts,  is  doing  a  piece 
 of  Service  to  Mankind  which  can  never  be  un- 
 feafonable. But  the  Ufefulnefs,  as  well  as  Anti- 
 quity, of  the  prefent  Debate  ;  and  the  Abfurdity  of 
 the  Manichcan  Scheme  of  accounting  for  Evil,  have 
 been  often  explain'd,  and  need  not  here  to  be  infifted 
 on :  all  that  ever  feern'd  wanting  to  an  entire  Con- 
 quefl  over  thefe  Heretics,  and  their  abfurd  Hypo- 
 thefis,  was  only  a  tolerable  Solution  of  the  many 
 Difficulties  which  drove  them  into  it:  and  this  our 
 Author  has  etFeded,  as  I  hope  to  make  appear  in  the 
 Sequel. 
 
 There  are  two  general  ways  of  Reafoning,  called 
 Arguments  a  Priori^  and  a  Pojleriori^  or  according 
 to  what  Logicians  commonly  flile  the  Synthetic  and 
 Analytic  Method :  The  former  lays  down  fome  evi- 
 dent Principles,  and  then  deduces  the  feveral  Conje^ 
 q^ences  neceilarily  refulting  from  them :  The  latter 
 begins  with  the  Pkenomena  themfelves,  and  traces 
 'em  up  to  their  Original^  and  from  the  known  Pro- 
 perties of  thefe  Phenomena  arrives  at  the  Nature  of 
 their  Caufe.  Now  the  former  of  thefe  is  evidently 
 preferable,  where  it  can  be  had,  fince  the  latter  mufl 
 depend  upon  a  large  Indudion  of  Particulars,  any  of 
 which  failing  invalidates  the  whole  Argument  and 
 fpoils  a  Demonftration. 
 
 An  Attempt  therefore  to  flxew  that  the  Subjed  be- 
 fore us  is  capable  of  the  former  Method,  mull  be  ve- 
 ry delirablej  and  this  our  Author  feems  to  have 
 done,  without  any  precarious  Syftem,  or  illgrounded 
 Hypothefis.  His  fuperior  Excellence  confills  in  ha- 
 ving laid  down,  and  previoufly  eftablifh'd  fuch  folid, 
 
 A  4  fubftantial 
 
%  PREFACE, 
 
 fubftanr'ial  Principles  as  may  be  drawn  out  /;/  infiui- 
 turn.  ?r>d  eafily  apply'd  to  all  the  Difficulties  that  at- 
 tend t^e  prefent  Qticflion. 
 
 He  firil  of  all  enquires  into  the  Nature  and  Per- 
 fe<5lions  of  the  Deity,  and  his  Delign  in  the  Creati- 
 on j  fettles  the  true  Notion  of  a  Creature,  and  exa- 
 mines whether  any  could  be  perfecfl ;    and  if  not, 
 whether  all  fliould  have  been  made  equally  imper- 
 fect; or  feveral  in  very  different  ClafTes  and  Degrees. 
 Having  proved  the  laft  of  thefe  Opinions  to  be  the 
 true  o\\^^  he  proceeds  to  the  lowed  Clafs  of  Beings, 
 mx.  Material  ones:    He  enquires  into  the  Nature 
 and  effential  Properties  of  Matter^  and  the  Laws  of 
 its  Motio?!^  and  thereby  eftabliflies  fuch  Rules  as  di- 
 rect us  to  the  Solution  of  all  the  Difficulties  attend- 
 ing it  as  diftributed   into    various   Maffes^    Syftems, 
 and  Animated  Bodies      He  fliews  the  unavoidable- 
 nefs,    and  abfolute  neceffity  oi  contrary  Motions  in 
 Matter,  for  the  fame  Reafons  that  it  had  any  Motion 
 at  all    and  confequcntly  ol  Attrition^  Corruption  and 
 T)i[[olution,    nnd  all  the  Natural  Evils  that  attend 
 themx.      In  the  next  place,    from   the  Nature  of  a 
 SelfrJno'vi7ig  Principle,  and  the  manner  of  its  Opera- 
 tion, he  deduces  all  the  Irregularities  incident  to  Vo- 
 lition,  and  the  Actions  confequent   thereupon.     He 
 flates  at  large   the    true  Notion  of  Frcc-lVill^  and 
 .demonftrates  the  abfolute  Neceffity  for   ic  in  every 
 Rational  Being,    in  order  to  if^  Happinefs.     Then 
 accounts  for  the  feveral  Abufes  of  it,  and  the  Moral 
 Evils  arifing  from  thence,  and  examines  all  the  pof- 
 fible  Ways  of  preventing  them  ;  and  upon  the  whole 
 makes  it  appear^that  none  or  thefe  could  have  been  ori- 
 ginally avoided,  or  can  now  be  removed,  without  in- 
 troducing greater  5  and  confequently  that  the  very  Per-r 
 
 miffion 
 
PREFACE.  XI 
 
 nilffion  of  thefe  Evils,  and  the  Production  and  Pre- 
 fervation  of  thefe  Beings,  in  the  prefent  State,  is  the 
 higheft  Inftance  of  infinite  Wifdom,  Power  and 
 Goodnefs. 
 
 Now  thefe  arc  not  mere  Arguments  ad  Ignoraiiti- 
 am :  This  is  not  telling  us  that  we  muft  believe  fuch 
 and  fuch  things  to  be  the  Effeds  of  an  infinitely  wife 
 and  good  God,    tho'  no  Marks  of  either  Wifdom  or 
 Goodnefs  appear  in  them  j  which  tho'  it  may  be  true, 
 and  all  that  perhaps  can  be  faid  in  feme  particular 
 Cafes,  yet  has,    1   think,    but  very  little  Tendency 
 towards  either  the  Convidlion  of  an  Infidel,   or  the 
 Satisfaction  of  a  true  Believer.      When  a  Ferfon  is 
 ferioully  contemplating  any  Parts  of  Nature,  and  fo- 
 Hcitoufly  enquiring  into  their  feveral  Ends  and  Ufes, 
 no  Pleafure  furely  can  arife  to  himfelf,    nor  Devoti- 
 on toward  the  Author  of  it,  merely  from  the  Per- 
 plexity and  Unaccountablenefs  of  thofe  Parts.     Nay 
 every  fuch  Inftance,    one  would  think,    muft  caft  a 
 damp  upon  his  Spirits    and  prove  an  ungrateful  Re- 
 flediion  on  his  Weaknefs,  a  mortifying  Argument  of 
 his  Imperfedion.      Whereas   one  fingle  Perplexity 
 clear'd  up,  or  Objed:ion  anfwer'd,    is  a  piece  of  real 
 Knowledge  gain'd,  upon  which  he  can  congratulate 
 himfelf,  and  glorify  his  Maker. 
 
 Our  Author  therefore  was  not  content  with  mere 
 lS[cgative  Arguments,  and  barely  avoiding  Difficul- 
 ties, by  removing  all  Defeds  from  external  things 
 to  ourfelves,  and  multiplying  Inftances  of  the  Nar- 
 rownefs  and  Weaknefs  of  Human  Underftandino-: 
 (which  any  one  that  thinks  at  all  will  foon  be  con- 
 vinced of,  and  heartily  defirous  of  having  it  fome- 
 what  enlarged  and  improved,  to  which  this  manner 
 of  Argumentation,    I  fear,    contributes  very  little.) 
 
 Buc 
 
xli  PREFACE. 
 
 Bat  he  attacks  his  Adverfaries  in  their  flrongeft 
 Holds,  and  plucks  up  the  Manichean  Herefy  by  the 
 Roots :  he  ihews  by  certain  pre-eflabliih'd  Rules, 
 and  necellary  Confeqnence,  that  we  can  eahly  reduce 
 all  to  one  fupreme  Head,  and  clearly  comprehend 
 how  the  prelcnt  ftate  of  things  is  the  very  bell  in  all 
 refpedts,  and  worthy  of  a  mod  wife,  powerful,  and 
 beneficent  Author  :  And  why,  taking  the  whole  Sy- 
 flem  of  Beings  together,  and  every  Clafs  of  them  in 
 its  own  Order,  none  could  poilihiy  have  been  made 
 more  perfed',  or  placed  in  a  better.  He  proves,  in 
 the  firft  place  (as  we  obferv'd)  that  no  created  Be- 
 ings could  be  abfolutely  periedt,  and  in  the  next, 
 that  no  manner  of  Evil,  or  Imperfedion  was  tole- 
 rated in  them,  but  what  was,  either  in  their  Clafs 
 and  manner  of  Exillence,  abfolutely  unavoidable, 
 or  elfe  productive  of  feme  Good  more  than  equi- 
 valent: In  both  which  Cafes  there  will  be  the  fame 
 Reafons  for  the  Creation  of  fuch  Beings  in  fuch 
 Circumftances,  together  with  their  concomitant  E- 
 vils,  as  there  was  for  any  Creation  at  all  j  For  which 
 the  fole  Reafon  will  appear  to  be  an  Intention  in  the 
 Creator  of  communicating  Happinefs  to  as  many  Be- 
 ings as  could  be  made  capable  of  it,  on  the  very  beft 
 Terms ;  or  a  Refolution  not  to  omit  the  leaft  Degree 
 Q^ pure  Good  on  account  of  fuch  Evils,  as  did  not 
 counterballance  it :  Or  (which  is  the  very  fame,  fince 
 'twill  be  evident  that  the  Prevention  of  all  the  prefent 
 Evils,  in  any  conceivable  Manner,  would  have  been 
 of  worfe  Confeqnence  than  the  Permiliion  of  them) 
 an  Intention  always  to  choofc  the  leaft  of  two  Evils^ 
 when  both  cannot  be  avoided. 
 
 This 
 
PREFACE.  :xiii 
 
 This  muft  be  granted  to  come  up   to  the  Point  ; 
 and  when   it  is  once  made  apparent,  will  be  a  full 
 and  fufficient  Anfwer  to  that  old  triumphant  Quef- 
 tion,  rio  gv  tI  Ka;cov;  'twill  be  an  ample  Vindication 
 of  the   Divine  Providence  ;    a  Demonflration  of  the 
 Power,  andWildom,  and  Goodnefs  of  God  in  the 
 Produd:ion,    Prefervation,    and  Government  of  the 
 Univerfe;  and  as  much  as  a  reafonable  Man  can  ex- 
 ped  or  defire.     And  I  heartily  wifli  this  Method  had 
 been  taken  by  more  of  thole  Authors  that  have  wrote 
 on  the  prefent  Subjed,  and  the  Argument  purfued  a' 
 little  farther  by  Natural  Light ^  in  order  to  give  fome 
 Light  and  Confirmation  even  to  Re--cclation  itfelf,   in 
 thefe  inquifitive  Days,    wherein  a  great  many   feera 
 unwilling  to  be  determined  by  its  fole  Authority-; 
 wherein  Men  are  not  a  little  inclined  to  call  every- 
 thing into  queftion^   and  a  weak  Argument,  is  fur e 
 to  be  exploded. Even  the  moil:  learned  and  in- 
 genious Writer  on  this  Subject  often  flies  to  Scrip- 
 ture when  a  Difficulty  begins  to  prefs  him:    which^ 
 in   my   Opinion,    is  deferting  the   Argument,    and 
 owning,  with  Mr.  Bayle  (in  his  Explanation  touch- 
 ing the  Manichees  at  the  End  of  his  Didf  ionary)  "  that 
 the  Queftion  cannot  be  defended  on  any  other  foot,  " 
 
 Whereas,  if  the  Difficulty  be  really  unanfwerable 
 
 by  Reafon,  ora plain  Contradidion  to  our  natural  No- 
 tions of  God;  if  (as  the  fore-mentioned  Author  often 
 urges)  ''  we  perceive  by  our  clear  and  diftind:  Ideas, 
 "  that  fuch  a  thing  is  intirely  repugnant  to  his  Nature 
 "  and  Attributes,  "—referring  us  to  Scripture,  which 
 declares  that  an  infinitely  perfed  Being  did  conflitute 
 it  thus,  will  be  no  manner  of  Satisfadion,  fince(upon 
 
 this 
 
xiv  P  R  E  FA  C  E. 
 
 this  Suppoiltionj  we  cannot  have  greater  AfTurance 
 that  this  Scripture  comes  from  him,  than  we  have 
 that  the  Doctrine  therein  contain'd  is  abfurd  and  im- 
 poflible.  And  what  that  ingenious  Perfon's  intent 
 might  be  in  reprefcnting  the  matter  thus,  and  then  re- 
 ferring us  to  Scripture  for  an  Anfvver,  I  cannot  deter- 
 mine. But  lure  I  am,  that  his  Account  of  it  ferves 
 rather  to  betray  the  Caufe,  and  undermine  the  Autho- 
 rity of  bodiReafon  and  Revelation  and  is  enough  (if 
 no  better  could  be  gi/en)  ro  make  a  Perfon  that  argues 
 confequentially  reject  all  kinds  of  Religion. 
 
 Farther,  every  one  muft  have  obfcrv'd,  that  mofl 
 Authors  upon  this  Subjc6t  treat  of  Gods  Dilpenfa- 
 tions  toward  Man,  as  if  they  were  fpeaking  of  one 
 Man's  Behaviour  toward  another.  They  think  it 
 fjfiicient  to  make  the  Almighty  cboofe  the  moft  pru- 
 dent, likely  Means  of  bringing  Man  to  Happinefs ; 
 and  aCt  upon  the  highell  P?'obabilit\\  tho'  (upon  what 
 account  foevcr  it  matters  not)  he  fail  of  his  End.  Now 
 this  may  indeed  be  the  bell  manner  of  acting  in  all 
 finite,  ifnperfert  Beings,  and  fufficient  to  acquit  the 
 Goodnt^is  and  Jiiltice  of  God,  but  'tis  very  far  from 
 latisfying  his  IVifdom.  To  a  perfect  Being  who  fore- 
 fees  tjie  Ette6ls  of  all  poiTible  Caufes  and  Means,  as 
 the  fame  Authors  allow  God  to  do,  thefe  only  ap- 
 pear fit  and  eligible  for  the  effects  and  End>  which 
 they  will  certain^  produce.  Nor  is  it  any  reafon 
 why  I  fhould  purfue  a  Method  which  is  apt  and  wont 
 to  fucceed  in  moll  Cafes,  if  I  Jzno'-J)  it  will  fail  in  this. 
 To  a  Perfon  therefore  that  takes  all  the  Attributes 
 of  God  toeether  and  confiders  the  whole  Scheme  of 
 Providence  from  end  to  end,  it  will  not  appear  a 
 complete  and  facisfac^tory  Vindication  of  them,  to 
 .aiierc  that  God  either  now  makes  Men,    or  fulfers 
 
 ihera 
 
PREFACE.  XV 
 
 them  to  make   themlelves   miferable,    for  rejeding 
 that  Happinefs  which  he  at  fir  ft  made  them  capable 
 of,  and  endow 'd  them  with  fuch  Powers,  and  placed 
 them  in  fuch  Circum.ftances  as  render'd  it  naturally 
 poffible  and  even   eafy  to  be  attain  d  by  them  :  tho' 
 this  may  indeed  clear  his  Juftice  and  lay  the  Blame 
 upon  ourfelves:  And  yet  thefe  Writers  generally  con- 
 tent themfelves  with  going  thus  far  :  They  bring  all 
 our  Sin  and  Mifery  from  the  abufe  of  Free- Will, 
 (/.  e.  a  Power  whereby  a  Man  might  poflibly  have 
 acted  otherwife,  and  prevented  it;)  without  ever  ex- 
 plaining the  Nature  of  this  Principle,  or  fhewing  the 
 Worth'and  excellence  of  it,  and  proving  that,  asfar 
 as  we  can  apprehend,    more  Good  in  general  arifes 
 from   the  donation  of  fuch  a  Self-moving  Power, 
 together  with  all   thefe  forcfeen  Abufes  of  it,  than 
 could  poffibly  have  been  produced  without  it.     To 
 demonftrate  this  was  an  Actempt  worthy  of  our  Au- 
 thor, who  has  at  leafl  laid  a  noble  Foundation  for 
 it,  and  feems  to  be  the  firft  that  has   propofed   the 
 true  Notion  of  Human  Liberty^  and  explained  it  con- 
 fiftently  :  All  the  Doubts  and  Difficulties  attending 
 which  intricate  Queftion  will,   I  hope,    be  tolerably 
 cleared  up  ;  or  at  leaft  fuch  Principles  eftabliihed  as 
 may  be  fufficient  for  that  Purpofe,    by  this  Treatife 
 of  his,  and  the  Notes  upon  it. 
 
 So  much  for  the  Subjed:  and  our  Author's  way  of 
 treating  it.  As  for  the  T^ranjlatlon^  'tis  barely  Lite- 
 ral. 1  endeavoured  to  keep  clofe  to  the  Author's 
 Senfe,  and  generally  to  his  very  Words.  I  once  in- 
 tended to  have  cut  off  every  thing  that  I  could  not 
 defend,  efpecially  about  the  Beginning  (which  ufed 
 to  difcourage  mod  Readers  from  perufmg  the  reft  of 
 his  valuable  Book,   and  might  perhaps  as  well  have 
 
 been 
 
xvi  PREFACE, 
 
 omitted  -,)  but  confidering  that  he  had  involv'd  it  (o 
 clofely  ill  the  reil:  of  his  Scheme,  that  the  whole 
 would  feem  confufed  without  it,  and  that  others 
 might  perhaps  have  a  different  Opinion  of  it,  I  con- 
 tented myfelf  with  omitting  part  of  his  Notes,  and 
 obviarino;  the  rell  all  alono-.  both  from  other  Authors, 
 and  fuch  Obfervations  of  my  own  as  occurr'd  upon 
 the  Subjed.  » 
 
 Some  perhaps  may  thin^  the  frequent  and  long 
 Rotations  tedious,  and  introduced  only  to  ftuff  up. 
 . 1  can  only  anfwer  that  the  Notes,  and  Refe- 
 rences together,  were  intended  to  point  out  a  fort  of 
 Compendium  of  Mctaphyjics  or  Speculative  Divinity, 
 bv  direfting;  the  Reader  to  a  Set  of  true  Notions  on 
 the  various  Subjeds  which  our  Author  touch'd  upon, 
 and  which  could  not  be  found  in  any  one  particular 
 Book,  nor'  collected  from  feveral,  without  much 
 Trouble,  and  Confufion,  and  unneceffary  Reading. 
 I  chofe  rather  to  quote  the  very  Words  of  the  Au- 
 thors than  either  to  uie  worfe  of  my  own,  or  pretend 
 to  difcover  what  had  been  often  difcover'd  before; 
 or  to  repeat  the  fame  things  over  and  over  again, 
 which  is  endlefs.  'Tis  hop'd  the  Reader  will  find 
 that  a  citation  of  two  or  more  Authors  on  the  fame 
 Point  is  not  always  Tautology:  and  I  believe  it  will 
 appear  th.at  in  the  multitude  of  References  no  more 
 than  one  is  ever  made  to  the  fame  Place,  except  up- 
 on a  very  different  Occafion,  or  in  feme  different 
 Lig;ht.  A  Writer  often  does  more  good  by  fhewing 
 the  Ufe  of  fome  of  thofe  many  Volumes  which  we 
 have  already,  than  by  offcrmg  new  ones;  tho'  this 
 be  of  much  lefs  Advantage  to  his  own  Charader.  I  ' 
 determin'd  therefore  not  to  fay  any  thing  myfelf  where 
 I  could  bring  another  conveniently  to  fay  it  for  me  ; 
 
 and 
 
•         P  R  E  FA  C  E.  xvli 
 
 and  tranfcrlbed  only  fo  much  from  others  as  was 
 judg'd  abfolutely  neceiTary  to  give  the  Reader  a  fliort 
 View  of  the  Subjecin:,  and  by  that  Sketch  to  induce 
 thofe  who  have  leifure,  opportunity  and  inclination, 
 to  go  farther  and  confult  the  Originals ;  and  to  afford 
 fome  prefent  Satisfa<fi;ion  to  thofe  who  have  not. 
 
 Since  the  publication  of  the  former  Edition,  Arch- 
 bhhop  Kifigs  Relations  have  obliged  me  with  a  large 
 Colledion  of  his  Papers  on  the  fame  Subjed:  both  in 
 Lati?!  and  EfigUJh.  They  contain  an  Explication  and 
 Defence  of  the  principal  parts  of  his  Scheme,  and 
 afford  very  good  hints  for  improving  it  in  feveral 
 points;  efpecially  with  regard  to  x\\^Union  of  the 
 Soul  and  Body,  and  their  mutual  hifaience ;  to  Hu- 
 man Liberty  ;  to  the  State  of  Adam  in  ParadiJ'e,  and 
 the  Confequences  of  his  Fall.  The  lafl  of  thefe  is 
 alfo  fully  difcufs'd  in  the  Setmon  annex'd,  which 
 the  Author  had  order'd  to  be  printed  after  his  deceafe, 
 and  which  cannot  but  be  acceptable  to  the  Public. 
 Thefe  advantaged'  encourag'd  me  to  review  the  whole 
 and  endeavour  to  complete  the  Author's  defign.  To 
 make  room  for  the  neceffary  Additions,  I  omitted  all 
 his  Notes  to  the  firft  Chapter,  as  well  as  fome  of 
 my  own  which  had  no  immediate  relation  to  the 
 main  Subjedi.  I  have  compared  the  Latin  and  Eng- 
 liili  Papers  together  on  each  head,  and  give  the  Ar- 
 gument made  up  from  them  both.  What  is  extradl- 
 ed  from  them  I  have  fet  down  by  way  of  Note  un- 
 der thofe  parts  of  the  Book  which  treat  on  the  fame 
 things,  with  Capital  Letters  prefix'd  to  diftinguifh 
 them  from  all  the  reft,  which  I  am  anfwerable  for. 
 
 The  great  Value  which  the  Author  fet  upon  this 
 Work  appears  from  the  pains  he  has  taken  to  vindi- 
 cate it  from  <ivery  the  leaft  cavil  j  in  which  view  tU 
 
 that 
 
0^ 
 
 Xviii  PRE  FA  C  E.  * 
 
 that  he  has  v.'roie  would  make  a  much  larger  Volume 
 than  his  firfl.     It  was  my  intention  to  reduce  it  to  as 
 fmall  a  compaTs  as  poilible  by  infer  ting  no  more  than 
 what  feem'd  to  give  light  to  his  main  Scope  and  was 
 >^fufficiently  clear.  -/-He  begins  with  an  account  of  the 
 prefenc  liate  of  the  Controverfy  about  the  Origin  of 
 Evil,  and  offers  many  Arguments  againil  the  fuppo- 
 iition  of  an  abfolutely  Evil  Principle,  mofi:  of  which 
 are  omitted,    fmce  few,  if  any,    thinking  Perfons 
 now-a-days  can  be  imagin'd  to  embrace  fo  extrava- 
 gant an  Hypothefis,    and  therefore  it  requires  but 
 little  confutation.     In  the  next  place  he  lays  down  a 
 fummary  of  the  chief  Principles  on  which  his  Book 
 is  built,  and  then  proceeds  to  rank  his  Adverfaries 
 into  their  feveral  Clailes,    and  confider  the  various 
 Arguments  which  they  have  urg'd  againft  him.  The 
 fubftance  of  his  Anfwers,  efpecially  to  fuch  Obje(5tions 
 as  have  been  either  omitted,  or  but  flightly  touch'd 
 upon  in  the  former  Edition,   will  be  given  in  their 
 proper  Places.     The  general  view  bf  his  Scheme  as 
 laid  down  by  himfelf,  may  perhaps  be  not  difagree- 
 able  to  the  Reader  before  he  enters  on  the  Book,  and 
 is  as  follows, 
 
 I .  Ali  Creatures  are  necejfarily  imperfeSi  a?jd  af 
 
 infinite  dijhince  from  the  Eerfe^ion  of  the  Deity,  and 
 
 if  a  negative  Principle  were  to  he  admitted,  fuch  as 
 
 tlje  P  R  i  V  A  r  I  O  N  oftJje  P  E  R  I  P  AT  E  T  I  C  S, 
 
 it  might  be  fciid  that  every  created  Being  confifts  of 
 
 Exigence  and  Non-Exiflence  j  for  it  is  nothing  in  re- 
 
 fpcFc'  both  of  tJjofe  perfections  which  it  wants,    and  of 
 
 -t^thoje  which  ot/jers  have.    -^Ind  tins  D^feSt,  or  as  we 
 
 may    fay.    Mixture    of  INJON-ENTITY  in  the 
 
 Confftution  of  created  Beings  is  the  necefjary  Priij-^ 
 
 cipU 
 
PREFACE.  xix 
 
 cipk  of  all  Natural  Evils,  a?id  of  a  pojjlbility  of  Mo- 
 ral ones  ;  as,  will  appear  in  the  fequel. 
 
 2.  An  Equality  of  PerfeBion  in  the  Creatures  is 
 impofibky  [as  our  AdverJ'aries  alloiv)  I  add,  neither 
 ivou  d  it  he  fo  convenient  to  place  all  in  the  fame  fate 
 of  PerfeSfion. 
 
 3 .  It  is  agreeable  to  Divine  Wifdom  and  Goodiiefs 
 to  have  created  not  only  the  more  perfeB  Beings,  but 
 alfo  the  moft  imperfedt,  fuch  as  Matter,  fo  long  as 
 they  are  better  than  nothings  and  no  impediment  to 
 the  more  perfeSl  ones. 
 
 4.  Admitting  Matter  and  Motion  there  necejfarily 
 follows  Compofition  and  Difolution  of  Bodies,    that  is 
 
 Generation  and  Corruption-,  which fome  may  look  up- 
 on as  defeBs  in  the  Divine  work ;  and  yet  it  is  no 
 ObjeBion  to  his  Goodfiefs  or  Wifdom  to  create  fuch 
 thi?igs  as  are  neceffarily  attended  with  thefe  Evils, 
 blowing  therefore  God  to  be  infinitely  powerjul,  good 
 and  wife,  yet  it  is  manifefi  that  fome  Evils,  vix.  Ge~ 
 ration  and  Corruption,  and  the  necejfary  Confluences 
 of  thefe,  might  have  place  in  his  Works  ;  a}id  if  even 
 one  Evil  coud  arife  without  the  ill  Principle,  why 
 not  many  ?  And  if  we  knew  the  nature  and  circmji- 
 fiances  of  all  things  as  well  as  we  do  thofe  of  Matter 
 ftnd  Motion,  it  may  be  prefunid  that  we  coud  account 
 for  them  without  any  i?nputation  of  the  Divine  Attri- 
 butes. For  there' s  the  fame  reafon  for  them  all,  and 
 one  Inftance  to  the  contrary  deflroys  an  univerfal  Pro- 
 poftion. 
 
 5.  //  is  not  inconfijlent  with  the  Divine  Attributes 
 to  have  created  fome  Spirits  or  thinking  Subfiances, 
 which  are  dependant  on  Matter  and  Motio?i  in  their 
 Operations,  and  being  united  to  Matter  may  both  move 
 their  Bodies  and  be  affcBed  with  certain  Pajjions  and 
 
 b  Senfations 
 
 ^, 
 
XX  PREFACE, 
 
 Sen  fat  ion  5  by  their  Mot  ion  ^  and  jl  and  in  need  of  a 
 certain  dijpofition  of  Organs  for  the  proper  exercife  of 
 their  thinking  faculty  j  fuppofing  the  number  of  thofe 
 that  are  quite  fepar  ate  from  Matter  to  be  as  comp/eat 
 as  the  Syftejn  of  the  whole  Vniverfe  laou'd  admits  and 
 that  the  lower  order  is  tw  incowoenience  to  the  higher. 
 
 6.  It  cannot  be  co?icei'v'd  but  that  fome  fe?ij'ations 
 thus  excited  by  Matter  and  Motion  Jhoud  be  dif agree- 
 able and  tend  to  difohe  the  union  between  Soul  and 
 Body,  as  well  as  others  agreeable.  For  'tis  impojjible 
 as  well  as  inconvenient  that  the  Soul  jlmid  feel 
 itfelf  to  be  lofing  its  faculty  of  thinking,  which  alone 
 can  make  it  happy,  and  not  be  afeBed  with  it.  Now 
 di [agree able  fenfation  is  to  be  reckon  d  atnong  natural 
 Evils,  which  yet  cannot  be  avoided  without  removing 
 fuch  kind  of  Atiimals  out  of  nature.  If  ajiy  one  ask 
 why  fuch  a  Law  of  Union  was  ejlablifjd  ?  Let  this  be 
 his  anfwer  -,  Becaufe  there  cotid  be  no  better.  For  fuch 
 a  necejjity  as  this  flows  from  the  very  nature  of  the  uni- 
 en  of  things,  and  confidering  the  circumftanccs  and 
 conditions  imder  which,  and  which  only  they  coiid 
 have  exifence,  they  coiid  neither  be  placed  in  a  better 
 State,  nor  govertid  by  more  commodious  Laws.  Thefe 
 Evils  therefore  are  not  inconfijient  with  the  Divine 
 Attributes,  provided  that  the  Creatures  which  are 
 fubjeSl  to  them  enjoy  juch  benefits  ds  over-ballance  them, 
 'T^is  to  be  obfervd  alfo  that  thefe  Evils  do  not  properly 
 arife  from  the  Exiftence  which  God  gave  to  the  Crea- 
 tures, but  jrom  hence  that  they  had  not  more  of  Exif- 
 tence given  them,  which  neverthelefs  their  State  and 
 the  place  they  fill  in  the  great  Machine  of  the  World 
 CQU  d  not  ad?nit .  This  Mixture  therefore  of  Non-ex- 
 ijlencefupplies  the  place  of  an  ill  Frinciple  in  the  Ori^ 
 gin  of  Evil,  as  was  f aid  before^ 
 
 y,  The 
 
PREFACE.  xxi 
 
 7.  ^be  Happinefs  and  Perfetlion  of  every  thing  or 
 Agent  ar'ifes  from  the  due  Excrcfe  of  thofe  Faculties 
 which  God  has  given  it,  and  the  more  Faculties  and 
 PerfeBions  any  thing  has,  'tis  capable  of  the  greater 
 and  more  perfect  Happinefs. 
 
 8.  T'he  lej's  dependent  on  external  things,  the  more 
 felffuficient  any  Agent  is,  and  the  more  it  has  the 
 principle  of  its  Anions  in  itfelf,  'tis  fo  fnuch  the  more 
 perfect  j  Since  therefore  we  may  conceive  two  Sorts  of 
 Agents,  one  which  do  not  ail,  unlefs  impell'd  and 
 det er mill  d  by  external  force  the  other  which  have  the 
 Principle  of  their  Anions  within  themfelves  and  can 
 determine  themfelves  to  aBion  by  their  own  natural 
 Power :  'tis  plain  that  the  latter  are  much  more  per- 
 
 feB  than  the  former.  Nor  can  it  be  denyd  but  that 
 God  may  create  an  Agent  with  fuch  a  power  as  this, 
 which  can  exert  itfelf  itito  aBion,  without  either  the 
 concourfe  of  God  or  the  determination  oj  external  Cau- 
 
 fes,  fo  long  as  God  by  a  general  Concourfe  preferves  the 
 Extflence,  Powers  and  Faculties  of  that  Agent, 
 
 9.  Such  an  Agent  may  prejcribe  to  itfelf  an  End, 
 and profectite  it  by  proper  Means  and  take  delight  in 
 the  profecution  of  it,  thd  that  end  might  be  perfeBly 
 indifferent  to  it  before  it  was  propofed,  and  be  no  more 
 agreeable  than  any  other  of  the  fame  or  a  different  kind 
 woud  be,  if  the  Age?7t  had  once  refolvd  to  profecute 
 it,  Forfince  all  the  pleafure  or  happinefs  which  we 
 receive,  arifcs  from  the  due  exercife  of  our  Faculties^ 
 every  thing  which  is  equally  commodious  for  the  exer^ 
 cife  of  our  faculties,  will  give  us  the  fame  delight.  'The 
 reafon  therefore  why  one  thing  pleafes  above  another  is 
 
 founded  in  the  AB  of  the  Agent  himfelf,  viz.  his  Elec* 
 tion.     This  is  largely  explain  d  in  the  Book  itfelf,  to- 
 
 b  2  gether 
 
xxii  PREFACE. 
 
 gether  with  the  limits  within  which  it  is  conjinedy  and 
 Jhall  be  illiiflrated  more  fully  her e aft e?-. 
 
 10.  It  is  impojjible  that  all  things  Jljoii  d  agree  to 
 ally  that  is  be  good;  for  fine e  the  things  are  limited ^ 
 diflincl  and  different  one  from  another ^  and  are  en- 
 dow d  with  finite y  dijlinB  and  different  appetites ^  it 
 neceffarily  follows  that  the  relations  of  cont'efiieftt  and 
 inconvetiient  mufi  arife  from  this  di've?fity.  Since 
 therefore  every  created  being  isjrom  the  imperfeBion 
 of  its  nature  neceffarily  limit ed^  and  from  that  limi- 
 tation there  neccfjarily  follows  diftin^ion  and  diver- 
 
 fity,  2t  follows  that  a  pojjibility  at  leafl  of  Evil  is  a  ne- 
 cejfary  attendant  on  all  Creatures,  and  cannot  he  fe- 
 parated  from  them  by  any  Power,  JVifdom  or  Good- 
 nefs  whatfoever.  For  when  a  thing  is  applied  to  afi 
 Appetite  or  Being  to  which  it  is  not  appropriated,  as 
 it  is  not  agreeable  to  it,  it  necejfarily  affeSis  it  with 
 iineafinefs  \  nor  was  it  pofible  that  all  things  foud  be 
 appropriated  to  every  Being,  where  the  things  them- 
 felves  and  the  appetites  are  various  and  different ^  as 
 they  7nujl  neceffarily  be,  if  created,  evefi  in  the  mofl 
 perfeB  ?nanner. 
 
 1 1 .  Si?ice  fome  Agents  have  a  power  over  their  Ac- 
 tions, as  above,  and  can  pleafe  the?nfelves  in  the  choice 
 offuch  thi?igs  as  may  exercife  their  faculties  j  and  fine  e 
 there  are  fome  ways  of  exercifing  them  which  may  be 
 prejudicial  to  themf elves  or  others  -,  'tis  plain  that  front 
 this  power  there  arifes  a  poff.bility  of  choofuig  amifsy 
 and  they  ma\  exercife  thcmfelves  to  their  own  preju-^ 
 dice  or  that  of  others. 
 
 12.  And  fine  e  infuch  a  variety  of  things  thofe  that 
 are  beneficial  or  hurtful  cannot  be  known  by  an  intel- 
 ligent Joeing  which  is  in  its  own  nature  limited  and 
 imperjediy  it  was  agreeable  to  the  Divine  JVifdom  and 
 
 Goodnefs 
 
PREFACE.  xxlii 
 
 Goodnefs  to  prefcribe  fome  Rides  and  DireBiofis  toftich 
 aoents^  in  order  to  inform  them  of  what  woii'd  bene^ 
 fit  or  incommode  them  and  their  Fellow  Creatures^ 
 i.  e.  what  woud  be  good  or  evil ;  that  they  might  choofe 
 the  one  and  avoid  the  other. 
 
 13.  Since  therefore,  as  was  faid  before^    an  Equa- 
 lity of  PerfeBions  in  the  Creatures  is  impoffible^    nei- 
 ther woud  it  be  convenient  for  them  to  be  placed  in 
 the  fame  State  of  PerfeSlion,  it  follows  that  there  are  ■ 
 various  Orders  and  Degrees  even  among  intelligent 
 Creatures  ;  and  fine e  fome  of  the  inferior  Orders  and 
 Degrees  are  capable  ofthofe  benefits  which  the  fuperior 
 ones  enjov,  and  fine  e  there  are  as  many  placed  in.  thofe 
 fuperior  Orders  as  the  Syjtem  of  the  Univerfe  allowed, 
 itjollows  that  the  inferior  ones,  as  a  more  convenient 
 place  coud  not  be  left  for  them,   ought  to  be  content 
 with  a  lower  portion  of  Happinefs,  which  their  nature 
 makes  them  capable  of,    and  to  a  higher  than  which 
 they  coud  not  afpire  without  detriment  to  the  fuperior 
 which  poffeffes  that  Station.     For  he  mujl  quit  his  place 
 before  another  can  afcendto  it;  and  it  jeems  hard  and 
 ^ery  inconfiftent  with  the  nature  of  God  to  degrade  a 
 Superior  as  long  as  he  has  done  nothing  to  deferve  it. 
 But  if  one  of  a  fuperior  Order  fo all  by  his  own  aB, 
 without  any  violence  or  compulfion,   voluntarily  quit 
 his  place,  or  freely  choofe  fuch  things  as  deferve  a  De- 
 gradation, God  wou'd  feem  unjuft  to  thofe  who  are  in 
 an  inferior  Degree  and  by  a  good  ufe  of  their  Liberty 
 become  fit  and  qualify  d  for  a  fuperior  State,    if  he 
 jlmid  refufe  them  the  free   ufe  of  their  Choice.      It 
 feems  unjuft  for  God  to  condemn  or  degrade  any  one  ar- 
 bitrarily, but  he  is  not  to  be  blamed  for  fuffering  one  to 
 degrade  himfelf  by  his  own  a£l  and  choice,  ejpecially 
 when  the  ufe  of  that  eleBive  power  belongs  to  the  na^ 
 
 b  3  t^T^^ 
 
xxiv  PREFACE. 
 
 titre  of  an  intelligent  Beings  and  coiid  not  in  the  prefent 
 fiate  be  prohibited  ivitkout  detriment  to  fome  ether. 
 
 Here  the  IViJdom  ond  Gccdnefs  of  God  feem  to  haTe 
 exerted  thc?}ifelves  in  a  mo  ft  glorious  manner^  the  contri- 
 'vance  appears  to  be  the  effcdl  of  the  highefl  Policy  and 
 Pmidence.  For  by  this  means  God  has  jl^ewn  himfelj- 
 mofi  equitable  to  his  Creatures  ;  fo  that  no  one  can  com^ 
 plain  oj  or  glory  in  his  lot.  He  that  is  in  a  lefs  conve- 
 nient Situation  has  no  room  for  complaint ,  fince  he  is  en- 
 dow d  with  faculties  and  has  power  to  ufe  them  in  fuch 
 a  manner  as  to  acquire  a  more  commodious  one ;  and  he 
 mufi  be  forced  to  own  himfelf  only  in  the  fault  if  he  con- 
 tinues deprived  of  it :  and  he  that  is  now  in  a  fuperior 
 kit  ate  may  learn  to  fear  left  he  fall  from  it  by  an  unlaw- 
 ful ife  of  his  faculties.  'The  Superior  therefore  has  a 
 Dread  that  may  in  fome  meafure  dlminiftj  his  happinefsy 
 and  the  inferior  Hope  that  may  increafe  it-,  by  which 
 means  they  are  both  brought  nearer  to  an  equality^  and 
 in  the  mean  time  have  the  utmoft  provocation  and  incite- 
 ment to  choofe  the  beft,  and  make  the  mo  ft  beneficial  ufe 
 of  their  faculties.  This  Cont  eft  ^  if  I  mi  ft  a  ke  not ,  makes 
 for  the  good  of  the  Univerf\  and  much  more  than  if 
 all  things  were  fixd  by  Fate  and  Ncceftit\\  and  abjo- 
 lutely  confined  to  their  prefent  State.  Either  God  muft 
 have  created  no  free  Agents  to  be  governed  by  the  hope 
 of  rewards  and  fear  of  puiiifijments,  or  this  will  be  the 
 fit t eft  means  to  that  end,  and  worthy  of  a  God.  For  what 
 ground  is  there  to  complain  of  the  Deity  in  this  whole 
 affair ;  except  that  when  an  equal  ftoare  of  happinefs 
 coud  not  befal  every  one^  he  beftows  the  beft  on  fuch  as 
 ife  their  faculties  aright^  and  takes  away  what  he  had 
 given  from  thofe  that  ab  ufe  them":  But  more  of  this 
 hereafter » 
 
PREFACE.  XXV 
 
 14.  If  what  is  laid  down  above  be  true^  from  thence 
 ^tismanifeji  that  all  kinds  of  Evil ^  viz.  that  0/" IM- 
 PERFECTION, PAIN  ana  SIN  may  enter 
 into  a  world  made  by  the  mojl  wife  good  and  powerful 
 Author^  and  that  its  Origin  ?nay  be  accounted  for  with- 
 out {falling  in  the  ajjiftance  of  an  Evil  Principle . 
 
 15,  ^'i is  plain  that  we  are  tied  down  to  this  Earth 
 and  cojifined  in  it^  as  in  a  Pj'ifon,  and  that  our  Know- 
 ledge does  not  extend  beyond  the  Ideas  which  we  receive 
 
 from  the  Senfes  ;  and  who  knows  not  how  fmall  a  part 
 we  underfland  even  of  thofe  Elements  about  which  we  are 
 converfant  ?  But  fince  the  whole  Mafs  of  Elements  is  as 
 a  Point  in  regard  to  the  whole  Univerfe,  is  it  any  wonder 
 if  we  mijiake  when  %ve  are  forming  a  judgment^  or  rather 
 a  conjeBure^  concerning  the  beauty^  order  and  Goodnefs 
 of  the  Whole  fro?n  this  contemptible  Particle  f  T^his 
 Earth  of  ours  may  be  the  Du7igcon  of  the  XJniverfe^  an 
 Hofpital  of  Madmen  or  a  Work-houfe  of  reprobates^  and 
 yet  fuch  as  it  is,  there  is  much  ?nore  both  of  natural 
 and  Moral  Good  than  Evil  to  be  found  in  it. 
 
 T'hus  far  has  the  Controverfy  about  the  Origin  of 
 Evil  proceed  in  the  Author  s  Book.  For  all  that  has 
 been  faid  above  is  either  exprejly  contaiiid  in  ity  or 
 may  very  eafly  be  deduced  from  the  Principles  there  laid 
 down, 
 
 P.  S.  The  Perfons  to  whom  I  am  more  particu- 
 larly obliged  for  the  Papers  abovemention'd,  are  the 
 Reverend  Mr  Spence  Redlor  of  Donnaghmore^  and  the 
 Reverend  Mr.  King  Prebendary  of  St.  Pat}'ick\  and 
 Minifter  of  St.  Brides  Dublin  :  who  are  defired  to 
 accept  of  this  Acknowledgement,  and  to  excufe  the 
 Freedom  I  here  take  of  informing  the  Public,  to 
 whom  I  eileem  it  as  well  a?  myfelf  indebted. 
 
 b  4  The 
 
xxvi  PREFACE, 
 
 The  Author  of  the  following  DilTertatlon  is  well 
 known,  but  I  cannot  have  leave  to  mention  him. 
 
 N,  B  In  this  third  Edition  the  Errors  of  the 
 Prefs,  (which  were  very  numerous)  are  carefully  cor- 
 redted,  fome  fmall  alterations  made  in  the  Tranfla- 
 tion  and  Notes,  and  a  few  additions  in  the  Referen- 
 ces  to  Authors,  fuch  more  efpecially  as  have  ap- 
 pear'd  fmce  the  former  Edition, 
 
 PRELI. 
 
XXVll 
 
 PRELIMINARY    DISSERTATION. 
 
 Concerning  the 
 
 Fundamental  Principle 
 
 o  F 
 
 VJR7VE  or  MORAllfr. 
 
 THO'  all  Writers  of  Morality  have  in  the  main 
 agreed  what  particular  Aaions  are  virtuous 
 and  what  otherwife  yet  they  have,  or  at  lealt 
 feem  to  have  differ'd  very  much,  both  concerning  the 
 Criterion  oi  Virtue,  viz.  what  it  is  which  denonii- 
 nates  any  Adion  virtuous  i  or,  to  Ipeak  more  pro- 
 perly, what  it  is  by  which  we  mull  try  any  Adtion 
 \Qknow  whether  it  be  virtuous  or  no  ;  and  alio  con- 
 cerning the  Principle  or  Motive  by  which  Men  are 
 induced  to  purfue  Virtue.  . 
 
 As  to  the  former,  fome  have  placed  it  in  aoting 
 agreeably  to  Nature,  or  Reajon  j  others  in  the  titnejs 
 of  things;  others  in  a  Conformity  with  ^^^^^-^^  ^^.^ 
 in  promoting  the  Conijnon  Good;  others  in  the  ^ViU 
 of  God,  &c.  This  Difagreement  of  Moralifts  con- 
 cernino;  the  Rule  or  Criterion  of  Virtue  in  general, 
 and  at  the  fame  time  their  almoft  perfect  Agreement 
 concerning  the  particular  Branches  of  it,   would  be 
 
xxvii  Preliminary  Dijferfahon, 
 
 jipt  to  make  one  fufped,  either  that  they  had  a  dif- 
 ferent Criterion  (the'  they  did  not  know  or  attend  to 
 it)  from  what  they  profefs'd ;  or  (which  perhaps  is 
 the  true  as  well  as  the  more  favourable  Opinion)  that 
 they  only  talk  a  different  Language,  and  that  all  of 
 them  have  the  fame  Criterion  in  reality,  only  they 
 have  exprcfs'd  it  in  different  Words. 
 
 And  there  will  appear  the  more  room  for  this 
 Conjediure,  if  we  confider  the  Ideas  themfelves  about 
 which  Morality  is  chiefly  convcrfant,  viz.  that  they 
 are  all  mixed  Modes^  or  compound  Ideas  arbitrarily 
 put  together,  having  at  firft  no  Archetype  or  Origi- 
 nal exifting,  and  afterwards  no  other  than  that  which 
 exifts  in  other  Men's  Minds.  Now  fince  Men,  un- 
 lefs  they  have  thefe  their  compound  Ideas,  which 
 are  fignify'd  by  the  fame  Name,  made  up  precifely 
 of  the  lame  fimple  ones,  muft  neceffarily  talk  a  dif- 
 ferent Language;  and  fince  this  difference  is  fo  dif- 
 ficult, and  in  fome  Cafes  impoffible  to  be  avoided, 
 it  follows  that  greater  Allowance  and  Indulgence 
 ought  to  be  given  to  thefe  Writers  than  any  other : 
 and  that  (if  we  have  a  mind  to  underfland  them) 
 we  fhould  not  always  take  their  Words  in  the  com- 
 mon Acceptation,  but  in  the  Senfe  in  which  we  find 
 that  particular  Author  which  we  are  reading  ufed 
 ^them.  f  And  if  a  Man  interpret  the  Writers  of  Mo- 
 rality with  this  due  Candor,  I  believe  their  feeming* 
 Inconfiftcncies  and  Difagreements  about  the  Crite- 
 rion of  Virtue,  would  in  a  great  meafure  vanifli ; 
 ^and  he  would  find  that  aBing  agreeably  to  Nature, 
 or  ReaJo?7,  (when  rightly  underllood)  would  perfectly 
 coincide  with  the  Fititefs  of  things -,  the  Fitnefs  of 
 things  (as  far  as  thefe  Words  have  any  meaning)  with 
 
 Tirutb  \ 
 
Treliminary  Dijfertation,  xxix 
 
 ^ruth ;  Truth  with  the  Common  Good-,  and  the  Com- 
 mon Good  with  the  Will  of  God, 
 
 But  whether  this  Difference  be  real,  or  only  ver- 
 bal, a  Man  can  fcarce  avoid  obferving  from  it,  that 
 Mankind  have  the  Ideas  of  moll  particular  Virtues, 
 and  alfo  a  confufed  Notion  of  Virtue  in  general,  be- 
 fore they  have  any  Notion  of  the  Criterion  of  it,  or 
 ever  did,  neither  perhaps  can  they,  deduce  all  or  any 
 of  thofe  Virtues  from  their  Idea  of  Virtue  in  general, 
 or  upon  any  rational  Grounds  ihew  how  thofe  Actions 
 (which  the  World  call  Moral,  and  moft,  if  not  all 
 Men  evidently  have  Ideas  of)  are  diftinguifh'd  from 
 other  A(5tions,  or  why  they  approve  of  thofe  Adtions 
 call'd  Moral  ones,   more  than  others. 
 
 But  fince  the  Idea  of  Virtue  among  all  Men  (how- 
 ever they  differ  in  other  refpedts)  includes  either  ta- 
 citly or  exprefly,  not  only  the  Idea  of  Approbation 
 as  the  Confeqi;ence  of  it ;  but  alfo  that  it  is  to  every 
 one,  and  in  all  Circumftances,  an  Objed:  oi  Choice ', 
 it  is  incumbent  on  all  Writers  of  Morality,  to  fhew 
 that  that  in  which  they  place  Virtue,  whatever  it 
 be,  not  only  always  will  or  ought  to  meet  with  Ap- 
 probation, but  alfo  that  it  is  always  an  Object  of 
 Choice ;  which  is  the  other  great  Difpute  among  Mo- 
 ralifls,  'vix.  What  is  the  Principle  or  Motive  by 
 which  Men  are  induced  to  purfue  Virtue. 
 
 For  fome  have  imagin'd  that  that  is  the  only  Ob- 
 jedt  of  Choice  to  a  rational  Creature,  which  upon 
 the  whole  will  produce  more  Happinefs  than  Mifery 
 to  the  Choofer ;  and  that  Men  are  and  ought  to  be 
 guided  wholly  by  this  Principle ;  and  farther,  that 
 Virtue  will  produce  more  Happinefs  than  Mifery  and 
 therefore  is  always  an  Objed;  of  Choice:  and  what- 
 ever is  an  Objed:  of  Choice,  That  we  approve  of. 
 
 But 
 
XXX  Preliminary  DiJJeriation. 
 
 But  this,  however  true  in  Theory,  is  Infufficient 
 to  account  for  Matter  of  Fa(5l,  /".  e.  that  the  genera- 
 lity of  Mankind  do  approve  of  Virtue,  or  rather 
 virtuous  Actions,  without  being  able  to  give  any 
 Reafon  for  their  Approbation  j  and  alfo,  that  fome 
 purfue  it  without  knowing  that  it  tends  to  their  own 
 private  Happinefs ;  nay  even  when  it  appears  to  be 
 inconfiftent  with  and  def}:ru(5tive  of  their  Happinefs. 
 
 And  that  this  is  matter  of  Facl,  the  ingenious 
 Author  of  the  Enquiry  into  the  Original  of  our  Idea 
 of  Virtue  has  fo  evidently  made  appear  by  a  great 
 Variety  of  Inftances,  that  a  Man  mull  be  either  very 
 little  acquainted  with  the  World,  or  a  mere  Hobhifi 
 in  his  Temper  to  deny  it. 
 
 And  therefore  to  folve  thefe  two  Difficulties,  this 
 excellent  Author  has  fuppofed  (without  proving^ 
 unlefs  by  ihewing  the  infufficiency  of  all  other 
 Schemes)  a  Moral  Senfe  to  account  for  the  form.er, 
 and  a  puhlick  or  bene"Jole}2t  Affeciion  for  the  latter : 
 And  thefe,  viz.  the  Moral  Senfe  and  Public  AfFedi- 
 on,  he  fuppofes  to  be  implanted  in  us  like  Infti?i£ls^ 
 independent  of  Reafon,  and  previous  to  any  Inftruc- 
 tion  ;  and  therefore  his  Opinion  is.  that  no  account 
 can  be  given,  or  ought  to  be  expe<fted  of  them,  any 
 more  than  we  pretend  to  account  for  the  Pleafure  or 
 Pain  which  arifes  from  Senfation ;  i.  e.  Why  any 
 particular  Motion  produced  in  our  Bodies  fhould  be' 
 accompany'd  with  Pain  rather  than  Pleafure,  and 
 "uice  ver/a.  ^ 
 
 But  this  Account  feems  ftill  infufficient,  rather 
 cutting  the  Knot  than  untying  it,  and  if  it  is  not  a- 
 kin  to  the  Dodrine  of  Innate  Ideas,  yet  I  think  it 
 reliffies  too  much  of  that  of  Occult  ^lalities.  This 
 ingenious  Author  is  certainly  in  the  right  in  his  Obr 
 
 fervations 
 
Preliminary  Dijfertation.  xxxi 
 
 fervations  upon  the  Infufficiency  of  the  commoii 
 Methods  of  accounting  for  both  our  Ekaion  and 
 Apprvbation  of  Moral  Adions  and  rightly  inters  the 
 Neceffity  of  fuppofing  a  Moral  Senfe  {i,  e.  a  Power 
 or  Faculty  whereby  we  may  perceive  any  Adion  to 
 b-  an  Objed  of  Approbation,  and  the  Agent  of  Love) 
 and  public  Affedions,  to  account  for  the  principal 
 Anions  of  human  Life.  But  then  by  calling  thefe 
 Inftinas,  I  think  he  ftops  too  foon,  imagining  him- 
 felf  at  the  Fountain-head,  when  he  might  have  tra- 
 ced them  much  higher,  even  to  the  true  Principle 
 of  all  our  Anions,  our  own  Happinejs, 
 
 And  this  will  appear  by  fliewing  that  our  Ap- 
 probation of  Morality,  and  all  AfFedions  whatlo- 
 ever  are  finally  refolvable  into  Reajon  pointing  out 
 pri^^te  Happitiefs,  and  are  converiant  only  about 
 things  apprehended  to  be  means  tending  to  this  end; 
 and  that  whenever  this  end  is  not  perceived,  they 
 are  to  be  accounted  for  from  the  Affociation  of  Ideas, 
 and  may  properly  enough  be  call'd  Habits. 
 
 For  if  this  be  clearly  made  out,  the  neceffity  of 
 fuppofing  a  Moral  Senfe  or  public  AfFedions  to  be 
 implanted  in  us,  fmce  it  arifeth  only  from  the  Infuf- 
 ficiency  of  all  other  Schemes  to  account  for  human 
 Aaions  will  immediately  vanilh.  But  whether  it 
 he  made  out  or  no,  we  may  obferve  in  general,  that 
 all  Arguments  ad  Ig72orantiam,  or  that  proceed  a 
 Remotione  only  (as  this,  by  which  the  Moral  Senfe 
 and  public  Affedions  are  eftablifh'd  to  be  Inilinds, 
 evidently  does)  are  fcarce  ever  perfedly  fatisfadory, 
 being  for  the  moft  part  fubjed  to  this  Doubt,  'viz. 
 Whether  there  is  a  full  Enumeration  of  all  the  Parts; 
 and  liable  alfo  to  this  Objedion,    viz.  That  tho'  I 
 
 cannot 
 
xxxii  Pf'eliminary  Dijj'ertatiou. 
 
 cannot  account  for  Phenomena  other  wile,  yet  pofii- 
 
 bly  they  may  be  otherwife  accounted  for. 
 
 But  before  we  can  determine  this  Point,  it  will 
 be  neceffary  to  fettle  all  the  Terms :  We  fliall  in  the 
 firft  place  therefore  enquire  what  is  meant  by  the 
 Criterion  of  Virtue. 
 
 SECT.     I. 
 
 Co?icer7ting  the  Criterion  of  Virtue. 
 
 TH  E  Criterion  of  any  thing  is  a  Rule  or  Mea- 
 fure  by  a  Conformity  with  which  any  thing 
 is  known  to  be  of  this  or  that  fort,  or  of  this  or  that 
 desree.  And  in  order  to  determine  the  Criterion  of 
 any  thing,  we  mufl  firft  know  the  thing  whofe  Cri- 
 terion we  are  feeking  after.  For  a  Meafure  prefup- 
 pofes  the  Idea  of  the  thing  to  be  meafured,  otherwife 
 it  could  not  be  known  (fince  what  is  the  proper  Mea- 
 fure of  one  thing  is  not  fo  of  another)  whether  it  was 
 fit  to  meafure  it  or  no.  Liquids,  Cloth,  and  Flefh, 
 have  all  different  Meafuresj  Gold  and  Silver  different 
 Touchfi:ones.  This  is  very  intelligible,  and  the  Me- 
 thod of  doing  it  generally  clear,  when  either  the 
 Quantity  or  Kind  of  any  particular  Subftance  is  thus 
 to  be  afcertain'd. 
 
 But  when  we  extend  our  Enquiries  after  a  Criteri- 
 on for  abftra6t,  mix'd  Modes,  which  have  no  Exif- 
 tence  but  in  our  Minds,  and  are  fo  very  different  in 
 different  Men  j    we  are  apt  to  be  confounded,    and 
 
 fearch 
 
Prekminary  Dijjerfation.  xxxiii 
 
 fearch  after  a  Meafiire  for  we  know  not  what.  For 
 unlefs  we  are  firft  agreed  concerning  the  thing  to  be 
 meafur'd,  we  fliall  in  vain  expert  to  agree  in  our 
 Criterion  of  it,  or  even  to  underfland  one  another. 
 
 But  it  may  be  faid,  if  we  are  exadly  agreed  in  any 
 mix'd  Mode,  what  need  of  any  Criteriouy  or  what 
 can  we  want  farther  ?  What  we  want  farther,  and 
 what  we  mean  by  the  Criterion  of  it  is  thisj  ^iz.  to 
 know  whether  any  inferior  or  particular  thing  do  be- 
 long to  this  mix'd  Mode  or  no.  And  this  is  a  very 
 proper  Enquiry.  For  let  a  Man  learn  the  Idea  of 
 Intemperance  from  you  never  fo  clearly,  and  if  you 
 pleafe  let  this  be  the  Idea,  viz.  the  Eating  or  Drink- 
 ing to  that  degree  as  to  injure  his  Underftanding  or 
 Health ;  and  let  him  alfo  be  never  fo  much  convinc'd 
 of  the  Obligation  to  avoid  it ;  yet  it  is  a  very  perti- 
 nent Queflion  in  him  to  afk  you,  How  fl:all  I  know 
 when  I  am  guilty  of  Intemperance  ? 
 
 And  if  we  examine  this  thoroughly,  we  fhall  find 
 that  every  little  difterence  in  the  Definition  of  a  mix'd 
 Mode  will  require  a  different  Criterion,  e.g.  If  Mur- 
 der is  defined  the  wilful  taking  away  the  Life  of  ano- 
 ther, it  is  evident,  that  to  enquire  after  the  Criterion 
 of  Murder,  is  to  enquire  how  we  fliall  know  when 
 the  Life  of  another  is  taken  away  wilfully  j  i.  e.  when 
 one  who  takes  away  the  Life  of  another  does  it  with 
 that  malicious  Defign  which  is  implied  by  Wilful- 
 nefs.  But  if  Murder  be  defined  the  Guilty  taking 
 away  the  Life  of  another,  then  to  enquire  after  the 
 Criterion  of  Murder,  is  to  enquire  how  it  fhall  be 
 known  when  Guilt  is  con  traded  in  the  taking  away 
 the  Life  of  another.  So  that  the  Criterion  of  Mur- 
 der, according  to  one  or  other  of  thefe  Definitions, 
 will  be  different.     For  Wilfulnefs  perhaps  will  be 
 
 made 
 
XXX iv  Frcliminary  Differtation. 
 
 made  the  Criterion  of  Guilt,   but  Wilfulnefs  itfelf, 
 
 if  it  want  any,  mud  have  fome  farther  Criterion,  it 
 
 being  evident  tliat  nothing  can  be   the  Meafure  of 
 
 itfelf. 
 
 If  the  Criterion  is  contain'd  in  the  Idea  itfelf,  then 
 it  is  merely  nominal^  e.  g.  If  Virtue  is  defined.  The 
 ai^ting  agreeably  to  the  Will  of  God:  To  fay  the 
 Will  of  God  is  the  Criterion  of  Virtue,  is  only  to 
 lay,  what  is  agreeable  to  the  W^ill  of  God  is  called 
 Virtue.  But  the  real  Criterion,  which  is  of  fome 
 life,  is  this.  How  (hall  I  know  what  the  Will  of 
 God  is  in  this  refpedl  ? 
 
 From  hence  it  is  evident,  that  the  Criterion  of  a 
 mix'd  Mode  is  neither  the  Definition  of  it,  nor  con- 
 tain'd in  it,  For,  as  has  been  ihewn,  the  general 
 Idea  is  neceflarily  to  be  fix'd;  and  if  the  Particulars 
 comprehended  under  it  are  fix'd  or  known  alfo,  there 
 remains  nothing  to  be  meafured,  becaufe  we  meafure 
 only  things  unknown.  The  general  Idea  then  being 
 fix'd,  the  Criterion  which  is  to  meafure  or  determine 
 Inferiors,  rnuft  be  found  out  and  proved  to  be  a 
 proper  Rule  or  Meafure,  by  comparing  it  with  the 
 general  Idea  only,  independent  of  the  inferior  things 
 to  which  it  is  to  be  apply  d.  For  the  truth  of  the 
 Meafure  mufl  be  proved  independently  of  the  Parti- 
 cular to  be  meafured,  otherwife  we  Ihall  prove  in  a 
 Circle. 
 
 To  apply  what  has  been  faid  in  general  to  the  Cafe 
 in  liand.  Great  Enquiry  is  made  after  the  Criterion 
 oi  Virtue  J  but  it  is  to  be  fear'd  that  few  know  dif- 
 tindly  what  it  is  they  are  enquiring  after  j  and  there- 
 fore this  mud  be  clearly  ftattd.  And  in  order  to 
 this,  we  mull  (as  lias  been  ihewn)  firll  fix  our  Idea 
 of  Virtue,  and  that  exa(5tly,;  and  then  our  Enquiry 
 
 v/ill 
 
Prelifhinary  "Differfailon,  xxxv. 
 
 will  be,  how  we  (liall  know  this  or  that  lefs  general 
 or  particular  Action  to  be  comprehended  under  Vir- 
 tue. For  unlets  our  Idea  of  \'irtue  is  fix'd,  we  en- 
 quire after  the  Criterion  of  we  know  not  what.  And 
 this  our  Idea  of  Virtue,  to  give  any  Satisfadion, 
 ought  to  be  fo  general  as  to  be  conformable  to  that 
 which  all  or  mod  Men  are  fuppoled  to  have.  And 
 this  general  Idea,  I  think,  may  be  thus  exprefs'd. 
 
 Virtue  is  the  Conformity  to  a  Ride  of  Lije^  diredl- 
 ing  the  ABions  of  all  rational  Creatures  with  refpeSi 
 to  each  other  s  Happinejs  \  to  which  Conformity  every 
 one  in  all  Cafes  is  obliged :  and  every  one  that  does  fo 
 conform^  is  or  ought  to  be  approved  of,  efteem'd  and 
 loved  for  fo  doing.  V/hat  is  here  exprefs'd,  I  be- 
 lieve every  one,  or  moft,  put  into  their  Idea  of 
 Virtue. 
 
 For  Virtue  generally  does  imply  fome  relation  to 
 ethers:  where  Self  is  only  concern'd,  a  Man  is  call'd 
 prudent,  (not  virtuous)  and  an  A6tion  w^hich  relates 
 immediately  to  God,  is  ilil'd  Religious. 
 
 I  think  alfo  that  all  Men,  whatever  they  make 
 Virtue  to  confiflin,  yet  always  make  it  to  imply 
 Obligation  and  Approbation. 
 
 The  Idea  of  Virtue  being  thus  fix'd,  to  enquire 
 after  the  Criterion  of  it,  is  to  enquire  what  that  Rule 
 of  Life  is  to  which  we  are  ohlizd  to  conform,  or  how 
 
 o 
 
 that  Rule  is  to  be  found  out  which  is  co  diredl  me 
 in  my  Behaviour  towards  others,  which  ought  aU 
 ways  to  be  purfued,  and  w^hich,  if  purfued,  will  or 
 ought  to  procure  me  Approbation,  Ejleem,  and  Love, 
 But  before  I  can  anfwer  this  Enquiry:  I  mull:  firil 
 fee  what  I  mean  by  Obligation. 
 
 c  SECT. 
 
XXXV i  Preliminary  Dijfertation. 
 
 SEC  T.     IL 
 
 Coitceritino;  Oblisfation. 
 
 f\  BUgation  is  the  necejfity  ef  doing  or  omitting  any 
 ^^  Adiion  in  order  to  be  happy  :  i.  e.  when  there  is 
 fuch  a  relation  between  an  Agent  and  an  Adtion 
 that  the  Agent  cannot  be  happy  without  doing  or 
 omitting  that  Adion,  then  the  Agent  is  faid  to  be 
 obliged  to  do  or  omit  that  A6lion.  So  that  Obliga- 
 tion is  evidently  founded  upon  the  Profpe(ft  of  Hap- 
 pinefSy  and  arifes  from  that'neceffary  Influence  which 
 any  AcJ^ion  has  upon  prefcnt  or  future  Happinefs  or 
 Mifery.  And  no  greater  Obligation  can  befuppofed 
 to  be  laid  upon  a.ny  Jree  Agent  without  an  exprefs 
 Contradidion. 
 
 This  Obligation  may  be  confider'd  four  ways, 
 according  to  the  four  different  manners  in  which  it 
 is  induced  :  Firft,  that  Obligation  which  arifeth  from 
 perceiving  the  natural  Confequences  of  things,  /.  e. 
 the  Confequences  of  things  ading  according  to  the 
 fix'd  Laws  of  Nature,  may  be  call'd  Natural.  Se- 
 condly, that  ariiing  from  Merit  or  Demerit,  as  pro- 
 ducing the  Efteem  and  Favour  of  our  Fellow  Crea- 
 tures, or  the  contrary  is  ufually  failed  Virtuous. 
 Thirdly,  that  arifing  from  the  Authority  of  the 
 Civil  Magillrate,  Civil.  Fourthly,  that  from  the 
 Authority  of  God  Religious. 
 
 Now  from  the  Confideration  of  thefe  four  forts  of 
 Obligation  (which  are  the  only  ones)  ic  is  evident  that 
 
 a  full 
 
Prelminariy  Dijfertation.  xxxvii 
 
 a  full  and  complete  Obligation  which  will  extend  to 
 all  Cafes,  can  only  be  that  ariling  from  the  Autho- 
 rity oiGod',  becaufe  God  only  can  in  all  Cafes  make 
 a  Man  happy  or  miferable:  and  therefore,  fince  we 
 are  ahvays  obliged  to  that  conformity  call'd  Virtue, 
 it  is  evident  that  the  immediate  Rule  or  Criterion 
 of  it  is  the  Will  of  God.  But  is  the  whole  Will 
 of  God  the  Criterion  of  Virtue  ?  No.  For  tho'  the 
 whole  Will  of  God  is  equally  obligatory;  yet,  iince 
 Virtue  was  defined  to  be  the  conformity  to  a  Rule 
 dired:ing  m.y  Behaviour  with  refpec^i  to  my  Fellow- 
 Creatures^  the  Will  of  God  can  be  no  more  farther 
 concern'd  about  Virtue,  than  as  it  direds  me  in  that 
 Behaviour. 
 
 The  next  Enquiry  therefore  is,  v/hat  that  Will 
 of  God  in  this  particular  is,  or  what  it  direds  me 
 to  do  ? 
 
 Now  it  is  evident  from  the  Nature  of  God,  "oiz, 
 his  being  infinitely  happy  in  himfelf  from  all  Eter- 
 nity, and  from  his  Goodnefs  manifeiled  in  his  Works, 
 that  he  could  have  no  other  Defign  in  creating  Man- 
 kind than  their  Happinefs ;  and  therefore  he  wills 
 their  Happinefs ;  therefore  the  means  of  their  Hap- 
 pinefs :  therefore  that  my  Behaviour,  as  far  as  it  may 
 be  a  means  of  the  Happinefs  of  Mankind,  fliould  be 
 fuch.  Here  then  we  are  got  one  Step  farther,  or  to 
 a  new  Criterion :  not  to  a  new  Criterion  of  Virtue 
 immediately^  but  to  a  Criterion  of  the  Will  of  God, 
 For  it  is  an  Anfwer  to  the  Enquiry,  How  ihall  I 
 know  what  the  W~ill  of  God  in  this  particular  is  ? 
 Thus  the  Will  of  God  is  the  immediate  Criterion  of 
 Virtue,  and  the  FLippinefs  of  Mankind  the  Criteri- 
 on of  the  Will  of  God  -,  and  therefore  the  Happinefs 
 
 c  2  of 
 
XXXV iii  Preliminary  Dijferfation. 
 
 of  Mankind  may  be  laid  to  be  the  Criterion  of  Vir- 
 tue, but  once  remcoed. 
 
 And  fmce  I  am  to  do  whatever  lies  in  my  Powe-r 
 towards  promoting  the  Happinefs  of  Mankind,  the 
 next  Enquiry  is,  what  is  the  Criterion  of  this  Hap- 
 pinefs: 1.  e.  How  fliall  I  know  what  in  my  Power  is, 
 or  is  not,  for  the  Happioefs  of  Mankind  ? 
 
 Now  this  is  to  be  known  only  from  the  Relations 
 of  things,  (which  Relations,  with  Refpeft  to  our 
 prefent  Enquiry,  fome  have  call'd  their  Fitncfs  and 
 Unfitnefs.)  For  fome  Things  and  Adions  are  apt 
 to  produce  Pleafure,  others  Pain  j  fome  are  conve- 
 nient, others  inconvenient  for  a  Society  ;  fome  are 
 for  the  good  of  Mankind  ;  the  others  to  be  avoided. 
 
 Thus  then  we  are  got  one  flep  farther,  viz.  to 
 the  Criterion  of  the  Happinefs  of  Mankind.  And 
 from  this  Criterion  we  deduce  all  particular  Virtues 
 and  Vices. 
 
 The  next  Enquiry  is,  How  fliall  I  know  that 
 there  is  this  Fitnefs  and  Unfitnefs  in  things  ?  or  if 
 there  be,  how  fliall  I  difcover  it  in  particular  Cafes  ? 
 And  the  Anfwer  is,  either  from  Experience  or 
 Reafon.  You  either  perceive  the  Inconveniencies  of 
 fome  Things  and  Adions  when  they  happen ;  or 
 you  forefee  them  by  contemplating  the  Nature  of  the 
 Things  and  Ad:ions. 
 
 Thus  the  Criterion  of  the  Fitnefs  or  Unfitnefs  of 
 things  may  in  general  be  faid  to  be  Reafon :  which 
 Reafon,  when  exadly  conformable  to  the  things  ex- 
 ifling,  i.  e.  when  it  judges  of  things  as  they  are,  is 
 called  Right  Reafon.  And  hence  alfo  we  fometimes 
 talk  of  ihe  Reajb^t  of  thi'gs^  i.  e  properly  fpeaking, 
 that  Relation  which  we  fliould  find  out  by  our  Rea- 
 fon, if  our  Reafon  was  right. 
 
 The 
 
preliminary  Dijfertation.  xxxlx 
 
 The  expreffing  by  outward  Signs  the  Relations  of 
 things  as  they  really  are,  is  called  ^ruth,  and  hence 
 by  the  fame  kind  of  Metaphor,  we  are  apt  to  talk  of 
 the  T'ruth,  as  well  as  Reafin  of  things  Both  bx- 
 preffions  mean  the  fame :  which  has  often  made  me 
 wonder  why  fome  Men  who  cry  up  Rea/hn  as  the 
 Criterion  of  Virtue,  fl.ould  yet  diflike  Mr.  WoUa^ 
 lions  Notion  of  rruth  being  its  Criterion         _ 
 
 The  Truth  is,  all  thefe  juft  mentioned,  ^oiz.  the 
 Happinefs  of  Mankinds  the  Relations,  or  titnels 
 and  Unfitnefs  of  things;  Reafon  and  1  ruth  ;  naay 
 in  fome  fenfe  be  faid  to  be  Criterions  of  \  irtue ;  but 
 it  mult  always  be  remember'd  that  they  are  only  re^ 
 mote  Criterions  of  it,  being  gradually  fubordinate  to 
 it's  immediate  Criterion,  the  Will  of  God, 
 
 And  from  hence  we  may  perceive  the  Kealon  ot 
 what  I  fuggeiled  in  the  beginning  of  this  Treatile, 
 ^iz    That  theDifpute  between  Moralifts  about  the 
 Criterion  of  Virtue,  is  more  in  Words  than  Meaning ; 
 and  that  this  Diiference  between  them  has  been  occa- 
 fion'd  by  their  dropping  the  immediate  Criterion, 
 and  choofing  fome  a  more  remote,   fome  a  leis  re- 
 mote one.     And  from  hence  we  may  fee  alio  the  In- 
 convenience of  defining  any  mix'd  Mode  by  its  Cri- 
 terion.    For  that  in  a  great  meafure  has  occafion  d 
 all  this  Confufion,  as  may  eafily  be  made  appear  m 
 all  the  pretended  Criterions  of  Virtue  above  men- 
 tioned. J     , 
 Thus  thofe  who  either  exprelly  exclude,  or  don  t 
 mention  the  Will  of  God,    making  the  immediate 
 Criterion  of  Virtue  to  be  the  Good  of  Mankind ; 
 muft  either  allow  that  Virtue  is  not  in  all  Cafes  obit- 
 ^atorv  (contrary  to  the  Idea  which  all  or  molt  Men 
 ^       ^  ^            ''  have 
 
xl  Treliminary  Dijfertation. 
 
 have  of  it)  or  they  muft  fay  that  the  Good  of  Man- 
 kind is  a  lufficicnt  Obligation.  But  how  can  the 
 Good  of  Mankind  be  any  Obligation  to  ?}it\  when 
 perhaps  in  particular  Cafes,  fuch  as  laying  down  my 
 Life,  or  the  like,  it  is  contrary  to  my  Happinefs, 
 
 Thofe  who  drop  the  Flappinefs  of  Mankind,  and 
 talk  of  the  Relations,  the  Fitnefs  and  Unfitnefs  of 
 Things,  are  ftill  more  remote  from  the  true  Crite- 
 rion. For  Fitnefs  without  relation  to  fomc  Etid^  is 
 fcarce  intelligible. 
 
 Reafon  and  Truth  come  pretty  near  the  Relations 
 of  things,  becaufe  they  manifeflly  prefuppofe  them  j 
 but  are  ftill  one  flcp  farther  from  the  immediate 
 Criterion  of  Virtue. 
 
 What  has  been  faid  concerning  the  Criterion  of 
 Virtue  as  including  our  Oblioation  to  it,  may  per- 
 haps be  allow'd  to  be  true,  but  flill  it  will  be  urg'd, 
 that  'tis  infufficient  to  account  for  matter  of  Fad:, 
 *viz.  that  moft  Perfons,  who  are  either  ignorant  of, 
 or  never  confider'd  thefe  Deductions,  do  however 
 purfue  Virtue  themfelves  and  approve  of  it  in  others. 
 I  fliall  in  the  next  place  therefore  give  fome  account 
 of  our  Approbations  and  Affedions. 
 
 SECT.     III. 
 
 Concerinnp'  Anprobation  a'/id  Afteclion. 
 
 ^ 
 
 MAN  is  not  only  ^fcnfihlc  Creature,  not  only 
 capable  of  Pleafure  and  Pain,  but  capable  al- 
 fo  Qi  forcj'ecing  this  Pleafure  and  Pain  in  the  future 
 
 confe- 
 
Preliminary  Dijferfafion.  xli 
 
 confequences  of  Things  and  Actions;  and  as  he  is 
 capable  of  knowing,  fo  alfo  of  governing  or  dire(5t- 
 ing  the  Caufes  of  them,  and  thereby  in  a  great  mea- 
 fure  enabled  to  avoid  the  one  and  procure  the  other  : 
 whence  the  Principle  of  all  Acflion.  And  therefore, 
 as  Pleafure  and  Pain  are  not  indifferent  to  him,  nor 
 out  of  his  Power,  he  purfues  the  former  and  avoids 
 the  latter ;  and  therefore  alfo  thofe  things  which  are 
 Caufes  of  them  are  not  indifferent,  but  he  purfues 
 or  avoids  them  alfo,  according  to  their  diffent  Ten- 
 dency. That  which  he  purfues  for  his  own  fake, 
 which  is  only  Pleafure,  is  called  an  End;  that  which 
 he  apprehends  to  be  apt  to  produce  Pleafure,  he  calls 
 Good,  and  approves  of,  i  e.  judges  a  proper  means 
 to  attain  his  end,  and  therefore  looks  upon  it  as  an 
 Objedt  of  choice  ;  and  that  v/hich  is  pregnant  with 
 Mifery  he  difapproves  of  and  fliles  Evil.  And  this 
 Good  and  Evil  are  not  only  barely  approved  of,  or 
 the  contrary,  but  whenever  view'd  in  Imagination 
 (fmce  Man  confiders  himfelf  as  exiding  hereafter, 
 and  is  concern'd  for  his  Welfare  then  as  well  as  now) 
 they  have  2iprejent  Pleafure  or  Pain  annex'd  to  them, 
 proportionable  to  what  is  apprehended  to  follow  them 
 m  real  Exiftence ;  v/hich  Pleafure  or  Pain  arifmg 
 from  the  profpedl  of  future  Pleafure  or  Pain  is  pro- 
 perly call'd  Paffion^  and  the  Defire  confequent  there- 
 upon, ^ffeciion. 
 
 And  as  by  refleding  upon  Pleafure  there  arifes  in 
 our  minds  a  Defre  of  it ;  and  on  Pain,  an  Averfon 
 from  it  (which  neceffarily  follows  from  fuppoiing  us 
 to  be  fenfible  Creatures,  and  is  no  more  than  faying, 
 that  all  things  are  not  indifferent  to  us)  fo  alfo  by  re- 
 £c<^ing  upon  Good  or  Evil,   the  fame  Defires  and 
 
 c  4  Averlions 
 
xlii  Prelim'uiary   Differtation. 
 
 Averlions  are  excited,  and  are  didinguifhd  into 
 Lo've  and  Hatred.  And  from  Love  and  Hatred  va- 
 rioufly  modify'd,  arife  all  thofe  other  Defires  and 
 Aversions  which  are  promifcuouily  fliled  Paffions 
 or  Affections  ;  and  are  generally  thought  to  he  im- 
 planted in  our  Nature  originally^  like  the  Power  of 
 receiving  Pleafure  or  Pain.  And  when  placed  on 
 inanimate  Objeds,  are  thefe  following,  Hope,  Fear, 
 Defpair  and  its  oppofite,  for  which  we  want  a 
 Name. 
 
 SECT.     IV. 
 
 Approbation  and  JifeBion  co7ifiderd  with  regard  to 
 Merit,  or  the  Law  of  Efteem. 
 
 IF  a  Man  in  the  purfuit  of  Pleafure  or  Hnppinefb 
 (by  which  is  meant  the  Sum  total  of  Pleafure) 
 had  to  do  only  with  inanimate  Creatures,  his  Appro- 
 bation and  Affe<5lions  would  he  as  defcribed  in  the 
 foregoing  Section.  But,  fmce  he  is  dependent  with 
 refped:  to  his  Happinefs,  not  only  in  thefe  but  alfo 
 on  rational  Agents,  Creatures  like  himfclf,  which 
 have  the  Power  of  governing  or  directing  Good  and 
 Evil,  and  of  ad:ing  for  an  End  ;  there  will  arife  dif- 
 ferent means  of  Happinefs,  and  confequently  diffe- 
 rent Purfuits,  tho'  tending  to  the  fame  End,  Hap- 
 pinefs ;  and  therefore  different  Approbations  and  Ai- 
 fedions,  and  the  contrary  \  which  deferve  particu- 
 larly to  be  confider'd. 
 
 That 
 
Prdimijiary  T)iJfertation.  xliii 
 
 That  there  will  arife  diiferent  means  of  Happinefs, 
 is  evident  from  hence,  ^iz.  that  Rational  Agents,  in 
 being  fubfervient  to  our  Happinefs,  are  not  pailive 
 but  voluntary.  And  therefore  fince  we  are  in  pur- 
 fuit  of  that  to  obtain  which  we  apprehend  the  con- 
 currence of  their  Wills  neceflary,  v/e  cannot  but 
 approve  of  whatever  is  apt  to  procure  this  Concur- 
 rence. And  that  can  be  only  the  Pleafure  or  Pain 
 expedled  from  it  by  them.  And  therefore,  as  I  per- 
 ceive that  my  Happinefs  is  dependent  on  others,  I 
 cannot  but  judge  whatever  I  apprehend  to  be  proper 
 to  excite  them  to  endeavour  to  promote  my  Happi- 
 nefs, to  be  a  means  of  Happinefs,  i.  e.  I  cannot  but 
 approve  it.  And  fince  the  annexing  Pleafure  to  their 
 Endeavours  to  promote  my  Happinefs  is  the  only 
 thing  in  my  Power  to  this  end,  I  cannot  but  approve 
 of  the  annexing  Pleafure  to  fuch  Adions  of  theirs 
 as  are  undertaken  upon  my  account.  Hence  to  ap- 
 prove of  a  Rational  Agent  as  a  means  of  Happinefs 
 is  different  from  the  Approbation  of  any  other  means, 
 becaufe  it  implies  an  Approbation  alfo  of  an  Endea- 
 vour to  promote  the  Happinefs  of  that  Agent,  in  or- 
 der to  excite  him  and  others  to  the  fame  concern  for 
 my  Happinefs  for  the  future. 
 
 And  becaufe  what  we  approve  of  we  alfo  defire 
 (as  has  been  fliewn  above)  hence  alfo  we  def.re  the 
 Happinefs  of  any  Agent  that  has  done  us  good.  And 
 therefore  hove  or  Hatred,  when  plac'd  on  a  rational 
 Objed,  has  this  difference  from  the  Love  or  Hatred 
 of  other  things,  that  it  implies  a  defire  of,  and  con- 
 fequently  a  pleafure  in  the  Happinefs  of  the  Objed 
 beloved  3  or  if  hated,  the  contrary. 
 
 The 
 
xliv  Preliminary  Dijfertation. 
 
 The  Foundation  of  this  Approbation  and  Love 
 (which,  as  we  have  feen,  confifts  in  his  voluntary 
 contributing  to  our  Happinefs)  is  called  the  Merit  of 
 the  Agent  fo  contributing,  /.  e.  that  whereby  he  is 
 entitled  (upon  fuppofition  that  we  ad:  like  rational, 
 fociable  Creatures,  like  Creatures,  whoTe  Happinefs 
 is  dependent  on  each  other's  Behaviour)  to  our  Ap- 
 probation and  Love  :  Demerit  the  contrary. 
 
 And  this  AfFedion  or  Qu_aliry  of  any  Adion  v/hich 
 we  call  Merit  is  very  confident  with  a  Man's  a6ling 
 ultimately  for  his  own  private  Happinefs.  For  any 
 particular  Action  that  is  undertaken  for  the  fake  of 
 another^  is  meritorious,  i.  e.  deferves  Efteem,  Favour, 
 and  Approbation  from  him  for  whofe  fake  it  was 
 undertaken,  towards  the  Doer  of  it.  For  the  Pre- 
 fumption  of  fuch  Efteem,  ^c.  was  the  only  Motive 
 to  that  Action  j  and  if  fuch  Efteem,  ^c.  does  not 
 follow,  or  is  prefum'd  not  to  follow  it,  fuch  a  Per- 
 fon  is  reckon'd  unworthy  of  any  favour,  becaufe  he 
 fhews  by  his  Actions  that  he  is  incapable  of  being 
 obliged  by  Favours. 
 
 The  Miftake  which  fome  have  run  into,  'viz, 
 that  Merit  is  inconfiftent  with  a(fting  upon  private 
 Happinefs,  as  an  ultimate  End,  feems  to  have  arifen 
 from  hence,  viz.  that  they  have  not  carefully  enough 
 diftinguifli'd  between  an  inferior  and  ultimate  End; 
 the  end  of  a  particular  A(5lion,  and  the  end  of  Adlion 
 in  general:  which  m.ay  be  explained  thus.  Tho' 
 Happinefs,  private  Happinefs,  is  the  proper  or  ulti- 
 inate  End  of  all  our  Adions  whatever,  yet  that  par- 
 ticular means  of  Happinefs  which  any  particular 
 Adlion  is  chiefly  adapted  to  procure,  or  the  thing 
 chiefly  aim'd  at  by  that  Aiftion  ;  the  thing  which,  if 
 
 poflefs'd. 
 
Preliminary  Differ tation,  xlv 
 
 poflefs'd,  we  would  not  undertake  that  Adlion,  may 
 and  generally  is  call'd  the  End  of  that  Adion.  As 
 therefore  Happinefs  is  the  general  End  of  all  Ani- 
 ons, fo  each  particular  Adion  may  be  faid  to  have  its 
 proper  and  peculiar  End  :  Thus  the  End  of  a  Beau  is 
 to  pleafe  by  his  Drefs ;  the  End  of  Study,  Know- 
 ledge. But  neither  pleafing  by  Drefs,  nor  Know- 
 ledge, are  ultimate  Ends,  they  ftill  tend  or  ought  to 
 tend  to  fomething  farther  as  is  evident  from  hence, 
 mz.  that  a  Man  may  ask  and  exped:  a  Reafon  why 
 either  of  them  are  purfued :  Now  to  afk  the  Reafon 
 of  any  Adion  or  Purfuit,  is  only  to  enquire  into 
 the  End  of  it :  But  to  exped  a  Reafon,  /.  e.  an  End, 
 to  be  afi^ign'd  for  an  ultimate  End,  is  abfur'd.  To 
 alTc  why  I  purfue  Happinefs,  will  admit  of  no  other 
 Anfwer  than  an  Explanation  of  the  Terms. 
 
 Why  inferior  E?2ds,  which  in  reality  are  only 
 Means,  are  too  often  look'd  upon  and  acquiefc'd  in 
 as  ultimate^  fliall  be  accounted  for  hereafter. 
 
 Whenever  therefore  the  particular  End  of  any 
 Adion  in  the  Happinefs  of  another  (tho'  the  Agent 
 defign'd  thereby  to  procure  to  himfelf  Efteem  and 
 Favour,  and  look'd  upon  that  Efteem  and  Favour  as 
 a  means  of  private  Happinefs)  that  Adion  is  merito- 
 rious. And  the  fame  may  be  faid,  tho'  we  defign  to 
 pleafe  God  by  endeavouring  to  promote  the  Happi- 
 nefs of  others.  But  when  an  Agent  has  a  view  in 
 any  particular  Adion  diflind  from  my  Happinefs, 
 and  that  view  is  his  only  Motive  to  that  Adion,  tho* 
 that  Adion  promote  my  Happinefs  to  never  fo  great 
 a  Degree,  yet  that  Agent  acquires  no  Merit ;  /.  e. 
 he  is  not  thereby  entitled  to  any  Favour  and  Efteem: 
 Becaufe  Favour  and  Efteem  are  due  from  me  for  any 
 
 Adion, 
 
xlvi  Preliminary  Dijjertation. 
 
 no  farther  than  that  Adion  was  undertaken  upon  my 
 account.  If  therefore  my  Happinefs  is  only  the  pre- 
 tended End  of  that  Adion,  I  am  impofcd  on  if  I 
 believe  it  real,  and  thereby  think  myfelf  indebted  to 
 the  Agent;  and  I  am  difcharg'd  from  any  Obligation 
 as  foon  as  I  find  out  the  Cheat. 
 
 But  it  is  far  othervvife  when  my  Happinefs  is  the 
 fole  End  of  that  particular  Action,  /.  e.  (as  I  have 
 explain'd  mylelf  above)  wlien  the  Agent  endeavours 
 to  promote  my  Happinefs  as  a  Means  to  procure  my 
 Favour,  /.  e.  to  make  me  fubfervient  to  his  Happi- 
 nefs as  his  ultimate  End  :  Tho'  I  know  he  amis  at 
 my  Happinefs  only  as  a  means  of  his  own,  yet  this 
 leifens  not  the  Obligation. 
 
 There  is  one  thing,  I  confefs,  which  makes  a 
 great  alteration  in  this  Cafe,  and  that  is,  whether 
 he  aims  at  my  Favour  in  general,  or  only  for  fome 
 particular  End.  Becaufe,  if  he  aim  at  my  Happi- 
 nefs only  to  ferve  himfelf  in  fome  particular  thing, 
 the  Value  of  my  Favour  will  perhaps  end  with  his 
 obtaining  that  particular  thing  :  And  therefore  I  am 
 under  lefs  Obligation  {c ceteris  paribus)  the  more/>^r- 
 tiadar\\\^  Expectations  from  me  are;  but  under 
 Obligation  I  am. 
 
 !N'o\v  from  the  various  Combinations  of  this  which 
 "we  call  Merit,  and  its  contrary,  arife  all  thofe  vari- 
 ous Approbarions  and  Averfions ;  all  thofe  Likings 
 and  Dillikings  which  we  call  Moral. 
 
 As  therefore,  from  confidering  thofe  Beings  which 
 are  iht  ini:o!u?itary  means  of  our  Happinefs  or  Mife- 
 ry,  there  were  produced  in  us  the  Paflions  or  Aflec- 
 tions  of  Love,  Hatred,  Hope,  Fear,  Defpalr,  and 
 its  contrary  :  So  from  confidering  thofe  Beings  v/hich 
 
 '■/oluntariy 
 
P?'elimt72ary  Dijj'^rtation.  idvii 
 
 "voluntarily  contribute  to  our  Happinefs  or  Mifery, 
 there  arife  the  following.  Love  and  Hatred,  (which 
 are  different  from  that  Love  or  Hatred  placed  on  in- 
 voluntary Beings ;  that  placed  on  involuntary  Beings 
 being  only  a  Denre  to  poiTefs  or  avoid  the  thing  be- 
 loved or  hated  5  but  this  on  voluntary  Agents  being 
 a  Defire  to  give  Pleafure  or  Pain  to  the  Agent  be- 
 loved or  hated)  Gratitude,  Anger,  'fometimes  cali'd 
 by  one  common  Name,  Refentment)  Generofity, 
 Ambition,  Honour,  Shame,  Envy,  Benevolence: 
 and  if  there  be  any  other  they're  only  as  thefe  are, 
 different  Modifications  of  Love  and  Hatred. 
 
 Love  and  Hatred^  and  the  Foundation  of  them 
 {^iz.  the  Agent  beloved  or  hated  being  apprehended 
 to  be  inflrumental  to  our  Happinefs)  I  have  expbin'd 
 above.  Gratitude  is  that  Defire  of  promoting  the 
 Happinefs  of  another  upon  account  of  fome  former 
 Kindnefs  received.  Anger ^  that  Deiire  of  thwarting 
 the  Happinefs  of  another,  on  account  of  fome  for- 
 mer Difkindnefs  or  Injury  received.  And  both  thefe 
 take  place,  tho'  we  hope  for,  or  fear  nothing  farther 
 from  the  Objeds  of  either  of  them,  and  this  is  flill 
 confident  with  adling  upon  a  Principle  of  a  private 
 Happinefs. 
 
 P^or  tho'  we  neither  hope  for,  nor  fear  any  thing 
 farther  from  thefe  particular  Beings  j  yet  the  Difpo- 
 lition  fnewn  upon  thefe  Occafions  is  apprehended  to 
 influence  the  Behaviour  of  other  Beings  towards  us ; 
 /.  e.  other  Beings  will  be  mov'd  to  promote  our  Hap- 
 pinefs or  otherwife,  as  they  obferve  how  we  refenc 
 Favours  or  Injuries. 
 
 Ambition  is  a  Defire  of  being  efteem'd.  Hence 
 2  Defire  of  B^nng  thought  an  Objed:  of  Efteem  ;  hence 
 
 of 
 
xlviii  Preliminary  Difjerfatiort. 
 
 of  being  an  Object  of  Eileem,  hence  of  doing  lau- 
 dabky  i.  e.  ufeful  Adions.  Generofity^  and  Benevo- 
 lence are  Species  of  it.  Ambition  in  too  great  a  De- 
 gree is  called  Pride,  of  which  there  are  feveral  Spe- 
 cies. The  Title  to  the  Efteem  of  others,  which  ari- 
 feth  from  any  meritorious  Adion,  is  called  Honour, 
 ThePleafure  arifmg  from  Honour  being  paid  to  us, 
 /.  e.  from  others  acknov/ledging  that  we  are  entitled 
 to  their  Efteem,  is  without  a  Name.  Modefty  is  the 
 fear  of  lofing  Eileem.  The  Unealinefs  or  Paffion 
 which  arifeth  from  a  Senfe  that  we  have  loll:  it,  is 
 called  Sha?ne.  So  that  Ambition^  and  all  thofe  other 
 Paffions  and  Affedtions  belonging  to  it.  together  with 
 Shame^  arife  from  the  Efteem  of  others:  which  is 
 the  Reafon  why  this  Tribe  of  affedions  operate  more 
 ftrongly  on  us  than  any  other,  'viz.  becaufe  we  per- 
 ceive that  as  our  Happinefs  is  dependent  on  the  Beha- 
 viour of  others,  fo  we  perceive  alfo  that  that  Beha-*- 
 viour  is  dependent  on  the  Efteem  which  others  have 
 conceived  of  US;  and  confequently  that  our  acquir- 
 ing or  lofing  Efteem,  is  in  effect  acquiring  or  lofing 
 Happinefs,  and  in  the  higheft  Degree.  And  the 
 fame  may  be  faid  concerning  all  our  other  Aftedi- 
 ons  and  Paffions,  to  enumerate  which,  what  for 
 want  of  Names  to  theni,  and  what  by  the  confu- 
 fion  of  Language  about  them,  is  almoft  impof- 
 fible. 
 
 Envy  will  be  accounted  for  hereafter,  for  a  Rea- 
 fon which  will  then  be  obvious. 
 
 Thus  having  explain'd  what  I  mean  by  Obligation 
 and  Approbation ;  and  fliewn  that  they  are  founded 
 on  and  determinate  in  Happinefs :  having  alfo  point- 
 ed out  the  Difference  between  our  Approbations  and 
 
 Affcdions 
 
Frehminary  Differ  tat  ion.  xlix 
 
 Affedlons  as  placed  on  involuntary  and  voluntary 
 Means  of  Happinefs;  and  farther,  that  thefe  Appro- 
 bations and  Affedlions  are  not  innate  or  implanted  in 
 us  by  way  of  Injlindl,  but  are  all  acquired^  being 
 fairly  deducible  from  fuppoiing  only  fenlible  and  ra- 
 tional Creatures  dependent  on  each  other  for  their 
 Happinefsj  as  explain'd  above:  I  fhall  in  the  nexc 
 place  endeavour  to  anfwer  a  grand  Objection  to  what 
 has  here  been  faid  concerning  Approbations  and  Af- 
 fedions  arifing  from  a  profped:  of  private  Happi- 
 nefs. 
 
 T^he  ObjeBion  is  this^ 
 
 The  Reafon  or  End  of  every  Adion  is  always 
 known  to  the  Agent ;  for  nothing  can  move  a  Man 
 but  v/hat  is  perceived:  but  the  generality  of  Man- 
 kind love  and  hate,  approve  and  difapprove,  imme- 
 diately, as  foon  as  any  moral  Charader  either  occurs 
 in  Life,  or  is  propofed  to  them,  v>fithouc  conlidering 
 whether  their  private  Happinefs  is  affeded  with  it, 
 or  no  :  or  if  they  do  confider  any  Moral  Charader 
 in  relation  to  their  own  Happinefs,  and  find  them- 
 felves,  as  to  their  private  Happinefs,  unconcern'd  in 
 it,  or  even  find  their  private  Happinefs  lefTen'd  by  it 
 in  fome  particular  Inftance,  yet  they  ftill  approve 
 the  Moral  Charader,  and  love  the  Agent :  nay  they 
 cannot  do  otherwife.  "Whatever  Reafon  may  be  af- 
 fign'd  by  fpeculative  Men  why  we  fliould  be  grateful 
 to  a  Benefador,  or  pitty  the  Diflreffed;  yet  if  the 
 grateful  or  compaffionate  Mind  never  thought  of  that 
 Reafon,  it  is  no  Reafon  to  him.  The  Enquiry  is 
 not  why  he  ought  to  be  grateful,  but  why  he  is  fo. 
 
 Thefe 
 
I  Treliminary  D/jJl-rtafion, 
 
 Thefe  after- reafons  therefore  rather  fhew  the  Wif- 
 dom  and  Providence  of  our  Maker  in  implanting  the 
 immediate  Powers  of  thefe  Approbations  (/.  e,  in  Mr, 
 Hiitchiiifou^  Language,  a  Moral  Sefife)  and  thefe  Pub- 
 lic AfFeiftions  in  us,  than  give  any  fatisfacftory  Ac- 
 count of  their  Oriorin.  And  therefore  thefe  Public 
 Affedions,  and  this  Moral  Senfe,  are  quite  indepen- 
 dent on  private  Happinefs,  and  in  reality  ad:  upon  us 
 as  mere  Inflinds. 
 
 Anfwer^ 
 
 The  Matter  of  Fadl  contain'd  in  this  Argument, 
 in  my  Opinion,  is  not  to  be  contefted ;  and  therefore 
 it  remains  either  that  we  make  the  Matter  of  Fad: 
 confident  with  what  we  have  before  laid  down,  or 
 give  up  the  Caufe. 
 
 Now,  in  oi-der  to  fiiew  tliis  Confiflency,  I  beg  leave 
 to  obferve,  that  as  in  the  purfuit  of  Truth  we  don't 
 always  trace  every  Propofition  whofe  Truth  we  are 
 examining,  to  a  firft  Principle  or  Axiom,  but  acqui- 
 efce,  as  foon  as  we  perceive  it  deducible  from  fome 
 known  or  prefumed  Truth  j  fo  in  our  Condud  we 
 do  not  always  travel  to  the  ultimate  End  of  our  Adi- 
 eus, Ilappinejs :  but  reft  contented,  as  foon  as  we 
 perceive  any  Adion  fubfervient  to  a  known  or  pre- 
 fumed Means  of  Happinefs.  And  thefe  prefumed 
 Truths  and  Means  of  Happinefs  whether  real  or  o- 
 therwife,  always  influence  us  after  the  fame  manner 
 as  if  they  were  real.  The  undeniable  Confequences 
 of  Prejudices  are  as  firmly  adhered  \6  as  the  Confe- 
 quences of  real  truths  or  arguments ;  and  what  is  fub- 
 fervient to  a  falfe  (but  imagined)  meails  of  Happinefs, 
 
 is 
 
preliminary  Differtation.  li 
 
 is  as  induflriouily  purfued  as  what  is  fubfervlent  to 
 a  true  one. 
 
 Now  every  Man,  both  in  his  Purfuic  after  Truth, 
 and  in  his  Condud  has  fettled  and  fixed  a  great  ma- 
 ny of  thefe  in  his  Mind,  which  he  always  ads  upon, 
 as  upon  Pr/;/a/>/^^,  without  examining.  And  this  is 
 occafion'd  by  the  Narrownefs  of  our  Underllandings  : 
 We  can  confider  but  a  few  things  at  once  ;  and  there- 
 fore, to  run  every  thing  to  the  Fountain-head  would 
 be  tedious,  thro'  a  long  Series  of  Confequences ;  to 
 avoid  this  we  choofe  out  certain  Truths  and  Means 
 of  Happinefs,  which  we  look  upon  as  RESTING 
 PLACES,  which  we  may  fafely  acquiefce  in  in 
 the  Condud:  both  of  our  Underftanding  and  Pradice, 
 in  relation  to  the  one,  regarding  them  as  Axio?ns ;  in 
 the  other,  as  Ends.  And  we  are  more  eafily  inclined 
 to  this  by  imagining  that  we  may  fafely  rely  upon 
 what  we  call  Habitual  Knowledge,  thinking  it  need- 
 lefs  to  examine  what  we  are  already  fatisfy'd  in.  And 
 hence  it  is  that  Prejudices,  both  Speculative  and 
 Pradical,  are  difficult  to  be  rooted  out,  -viz.  few  will 
 examine  them. 
 
 And  thefe  RESTING  PLACES  are  fo 
 often  ufed  as  Principles,  that  at  laft,  letting  that  flip 
 out  of  our  Minds  which  firft  inclined  us  to  embrace 
 them,  we  are  apt  to  imagine  them  not  as  they  really 
 are,  the  Siibftitiites  of  Principles,  but  Principles 
 themfelves. 
 
 And  from  hence,  as  fome  Men  have  imagin'd  In- 
 nate Ideas,  becaufe  forgetting  how  they  came  by 
 them ;  fo  others  have  fet  up  almoft  as  many  diftind 
 InJiinBs  as  there  are  acqiiird  Trinciples  of  ading. 
 And  I  cannot  but  wonder  why  the  Pecuniary  Senfe,  a 
 
 d  Senfe 
 
lii  Freliminary  Diff'erfafion. 
 
 Senfe  of  Power  and  Party,  &c.  were  not  mentlon'd, 
 as  well  as  the  Moral,  that  of  Honour,  Order,  and 
 fome  others. 
 
 The  Cafe  is  really  this.  We  firft  perceive  or  ima- 
 gine fome  real  Good,  /.  e.  fitnefs  to  promote  our 
 Happinefs,  in  thofe  things  which  we  love  and  ap- 
 prove of.  Hence  (as  was  above  explain'd)  we  annex 
 Pleafure  to  thofe  things.  Hence  thofe  things  and  Plea- 
 fure  are  fo  ty'd  together  and  afTociated  in  our  Minds, 
 that  one  cannot  prefent  itfelf  but  the  other  will  alfo 
 occur.  And  the  Ajfociation  remains  even  after  that 
 which  at  firft  gave  them  the  Connexion  is  quite  for- 
 got, or  perhaps  does  not  exift,  but  the  contrary.  An 
 Inflance  or  two  may  perhaps  make  this  clear.  How 
 many  Men  are  there  in  the  World  who  have  as  flrong 
 a  talle  for  Money  as  others  have  for  Virtue ;  who 
 count  fo  much  Money,  fo  much  Happinefs ;  nay, 
 even  fell  their  Happinefs  for  Money  j  or  to  fpcak 
 more  properly,  make  the  having  Money,  without 
 any  Deiign  or  Thought  of  ufing  it,  their  ultimate 
 End  ?  But  was  this  Propenfity  to  Money  born  with 
 them  ?  or  rather,  did  not  they  at  iirft  perceive  a  great 
 many  Advantages  from  being  poffefs'd  of  Money, 
 and  from  thence  conceive  a  Pleafure  in  having  it, 
 thence  defire  it,  thence  endeavour  to  obtain  it,  thence 
 receive  an  acftual  Pleafure  in  obtaining  it,  thence  de- 
 fire  to  prcferve  the  Poflellion  of  it  ?  Hence  by  drop- 
 ping the  intermediate  Steps  between  Money  and  Hap- 
 pinefs, they  join  Money  and  Happinefs  immediately 
 together,  and  content  themfelves  with  the  phantafli- 
 cal  Pleafure  of  having  it,  and  make  that  which  was- 
 at  firft  purfued  only  as  a  Means,  be  to  them  a  real 
 Etidy  and  what  their  real  Happinefs  or  Mifery  con- 
 
 fifts 
 
Freliminary  Dijjerfatiojt,  lili 
 
 iifts  in.  Thus  the  Connexion  between  Money  and 
 Happinefs  remains  in  the  Mind ;  tho'  it  has  long  fince 
 ceas'd  between  the  things  themfelves. 
 
 The  fame  might  beobferv'd  concerning  the  Thirfl 
 after  Knowledge,  Fame,  ^r.  the  delight  in  Reading, 
 Building,  Planting,  and  mod  of  the  various  Exerci- 
 fcs  and  Entertainments  of  Life.  Thefe  were  at  firft 
 *enter'd  on  with  a  view  to  fome  farther  End,  but  at 
 length  become  habitual  Amufements  j  the  Idea  of 
 Pleafure  is  alTociated  with  them,  and  leads  us  on  flill 
 in  the  fame  eager  Purfuit  of  them,  when  the  firll 
 Reafon  is  quite  vanifh'd,  or  at  leaft  out  of  our  Minds. 
 Nay,  we  find  this  Power  of  Affociation  fo  great  as 
 not  only  to  tranfport  our  Paffions  and  Affecflions  be- 
 yond their  proper  bounds,  both  as  to  Intenfenefs  and 
 Duration  ;  as  is  evident  from  daily  Inftances  of  Ava- 
 rice, Ambition,  Love,  Revenge,  ^c,  but  alfo,  that 
 it  is  able  to  transfer  them  to  improper  Objecfts,  and 
 fuch  as  are  of  a  quite  different  Natufe  from  thofe  to 
 which  our  Reafon  had  at  firfl  diredled  them.  Thus 
 being  accuftom'd  to  refent  an  Injury  done  to  our  Bo- 
 dy by  a  Retaliation  of  the  like  to  him  that  oifer'd  ir, 
 we  are  apt  to  conceive  the  fame  kind  of  Refentment, 
 and  often  exprefs  it  in  the  fame  manner,  upon  re- 
 ceiving hurt  from  a  Stock  or  a  Stone,  whereby  the 
 hatred  which  we  are  ufed  to  place  on  voluntary  Be- 
 ings, is  fubftituted  in  the  Room  of  that  Averfion 
 which  belongs  to  involuntary  ones.  The  like  may 
 be  obferv'd  in  moft  of  the  other  Paffions  above-men- 
 tioned. 
 
 From  hence  alfo,  'viz.  from  the  continuance  of 
 xk\\%  Ajfociation  of  Ideas  in  our  Minds,  we  may  be  en- 
 abled to  account  for  that  (almoft  Diabolical)  Paffion 
 called  Rnv)\  which  we  promifed  to  confider. 
 
 d  a  Mr. 
 
liv  Preliminary  Dijfertation. 
 
 Mr.  Locke  obferves,  and  I  believe  very  juftly,  that 
 there  are  fome  Men  entirely  unacquainted  with  this 
 PafTion.  For  moil:  Men  that  are  ufed  to  Refledion, 
 may  remember  the  very  time  when  they  were  firft 
 under  the  dominion  of  it. 
 
 Envy  is  generally  defined  to  be  that  Pain  which 
 arifes  in  the  Mind  from  obferving  the  Profperity  of 
 others :  not  of  all  others  indefinitely,  but  only  of 
 fome  particular  Perfons.  Now  the  examining  who 
 thofe  particular  Perfons  whom  we  are  apt  to  envy 
 are,  will  lead  us  to  the  true  Origin  of  this  Paffion. 
 And  if  a  Man  will  be  at  the  Pains  to  confult  his  Mind, 
 or  to  look  into  the  World,  he'll  find  that  thefe  par- 
 ticular Perfons  are  always  fuch  as  upon  fome  account 
 or  other  he  has  had  a  Rival fiip  with.  For  when  two 
 or  more  are  Competitors  for  the  fame  thing,  the  Suc- 
 cefs  of  the  one  miifl  neceffarily  tend  to  the  Detriment 
 of  the  other,  or  others :  hence  the  Succefs  of  my  Ri- 
 val and  Mifery  or  Pain  are  join'd  together  in  my 
 Mind ;  and  thiskonnediion  or  alfociation  remaining 
 in  my  Mind,  even  after  the  Rivalfhip  ceafes,  makes 
 me  alv^ays  affecfled  with  Pain  whenever  I  hear  of  his 
 Succels,  tho'  in  Affairs  which  have  no  manner  of 
 Relation  to  the  Rivalfhip,  much  more  in  thofe  that 
 bring  that  to  my  Remembrance,  and  put  me  in  mind 
 of  what  I  might  have  enjoy'd  had  it  not  been  for 
 him.  This  may  poflibly  caft  fome  Light  upon  the 
 black  Defigns  and  envious  Purpofesof  the  fallen  An- 
 gels. For  why  might  not  they  have  formerly  had 
 fome  Competition  with  their  Fellows  ?  and  why  may 
 not  fuch  Aifociations  be  as  ilrong  in  them  as  us  ? 
 
 Thus  alfo  we  are  apt  to  envy  thofe  Perfons  that 
 rcfufe  to  be  guided  by  our  Judgments  and  perfuaded 
 by  us.   For  thi§  is  nothing  elie  than  a  Rivalihip  about 
 
 the 
 
Preliminary  Dijferfation!  Iv* 
 
 the  Superiority  of  Judgment;  and  we  take  a  fecret 
 Pride  both  to  let  the  World  fee,  and  in  imagining 
 ourfelves,  that  we  are  in  the  right. 
 
 There  is  one  thing  more  to  be  obferved  in  anfwer 
 to  this  Objedion,  and  that  is,  that  we  do  not  always 
 (and  perhaps  not  for  the  moll:  part)  make  this  AlTo- 
 ciation  ourfelves,  but  learn  it  from  others :  i.  e,  that 
 we  annex  Pleafure  or  Pain  to  certain  Things  or 
 Adions  becaufe  we  fee  others  do  it,  and  acquire  Prin- 
 ciples of  A(^ion  by  imitating  thofe  whom  we  admire, 
 or  whofe  efteem  we  would  procure :  Hence  the  Son 
 too  often  inherits  both  the  Vices  and  the  Party  of  his 
 Father,  as  well  as  his  Eftate :  Hence  National  Vir- 
 tues and  Vices,  Difpofitions  and  Opinions:  And 
 from  hence  we  may  obferve  how  eafy  it  is  to  account 
 for  what  is  generally  call'd  the  Prejudice  ofEduca- 
 tion ;  how  foon  we  catch  the  Temper  and  Affedlions 
 of  thofe  whom  we  daily  converfe  with ;  how  almoft 
 infenfibly  we  are  taught  to  love,  admire  or  hate;  to 
 be  grateful,  generous,  companionate  or  cruel,  ^c. 
 
 What  I  fay  then  in  anf  jver  to  the  Objection  is  this : 
 "  That  it  is  neceflary  in  order  to  folve  the  principal 
 "  Adions  of  human  Life  to  fuppofe  a  Moral  Senfe 
 "  or  what  is  fignify'd  by  that  Name)  and  alfo/'wMc/^ 
 "  AffeBions ;  but  I  deny  that  this  Moral  Senfe,  or 
 "  thefe  public  Affeftiqns,  are  innate,  or  implanted 
 "  in  us.  They  are  acquired  either  from  our  own 
 "  Obfervation  or  the  Imitation  of  others." 
 
A 
 
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E  RRA  ^~A 
 
 Pre/.  Page  i.  1.  13.  r^^^  Divine  Oeconomy. 
 
 Prelim.  Diff.  P.  37.  1.  12.  dele  more.  p.  38.  I.  1 3.  add  others  tend 
 
 to  the  detriment  of  it,  therefore  thofe  are  to  be  chofen  which 
 
 tend  to  the  good  of  Mankind,  p.  41.  1.  1 1.  for  his  r.  ///.  p.  42. 
 
 1,  14.  for  in  r.  on.  p.  45.  1.  2i.  for  in  r.  is.    p.  47.  1.  23. dele  «. 
 
 p  48.  1   3  I .  r.  terminate. 
 Book.  P.  21.  1   17.  for  necejfarily  true  r  neceffary.    p.  140.  1   i.  for 
 
 admit  X.  omit.    p.  1 1 5.  1.  8.  for  drank  r.  drink,     tgo   N.  1.  4. 
 
 for  greater  r.  great    p.  212.N.I.  4  for  altogether  x.  all  together  > 
 
 p.  386.  N   1   I.  fox  intended  x.  attended,    p.  391-  N.  dele  1  6.- 
 
 ib.  1.  22.  r.  prefent.  p.  435.  N.  1.  8.   for  giving  x.  by  giving,    p. 
 
 439.  N.  1.  19  for  inJiiSl  x.  affliSl.    p.  460.  1.  12.  for  natural  r. 
 
 unnatural,    p.  492.  1.  30.  for  are  arifing  r.  there  arifes.  p  493, 
 
 1.  20.  for  affeSled  r.  effeSied. 
 Serm.  P.  21.  1.  ult.  dele  to.    p.  29.  1.  24.  r.  a  Perception,    p.  39. 
 1,  34.  r.  to  be  learned,     p.  43, 1.  15.  r.  ingenuoujly*    p.  53    I. 
 
 3 1 .  for  Now  r.  Nor.    p.  60.  1.  24  for  Men  r.  Man.    p.  67,  J. 
 
 26   r,  /o  ^^.    p.  73,1.  6.  for  and  r,  «;< 
 
Chap.  1= 
 
 Co7icerning  the    Origin    of  Evil. 
 
 CHAP.    I. 
 
 Containing  fomt  Prificiptes  prevtoujly  necejj'a-^ 
 ry  to  the  Vnderjlanding  and  Solution  of  the 
 difficulty  about  the  Origin  o/Evil. 
 
 SECT.    I. 
 
 Of  the  Knowled<^e  of  External  ObjeEisi 
 
 I 
 
 I.  "^f  T  is  allowed  that  external  obje<S:s  are  made  That  fen- 
 known  to.  us  from  without  by  the  Senfes  j  Nations  re- 
 but we  have  entirely  forgot  how  Lights  Co-  P^'^^ent 
 lours,  and  other  external  Things  at  firfl  af-  thines^o, 
 fefted  our  Senfes  and  enter'd  the  Mind  j  nor  ys,  or  at 
 can  we  eafily  recoiled  the  rife  and  progrefs  of  our  ^eait  diT- 
 Knowledge  concerning  thefe  Things.  cover  tht 
 
 However  it  is.  agreed  that  the  Conceptions  which  of^j^",'^^ 
 tve  have  of  thefe  either  repiefent  to  us  the  Things 
 themfelves,  or  at  leaO:  difcover  the  prcfcnce  and  cpc- 
 rations  of  them  :  That  the  fenfation  of  Light,  for 
 inftance,  arifes  from  its  being  prfclented  to  the  Eye  j 
 and  fo  in  all  other  Objeds  of  the  Senfe-. 
 
 II.  But  rt  is  to  be  obferv'd  that  the  reprcfenta-  Thatrhefe 
 tioiis  of  Things  which  we  have  from  the  Senfes,  ^/J  ^^^^'^■^ 
 ar«  bv  no  means  fimple,  but  very  much  confufgd  ^^  ^\  ' 
 and  complicated;   lor  Example?  ths  Eye  reprefents  ed,  .but  af- 
 
 B  to  tsm'ards 
 
a  Concerning  the  Ongm  of  "EvA.  Chap.  I. 
 
 fepanted     to  the  Mind  burning  Wax^  i.  e.  a  thing  that  is  hard, 
 
 by  the  un-  round,  capable  of  being  melted  in  the  Fire,  red,  and 
 
 derftand-    \y}^gj^  foftentd  by  heat  changeable  into  any  Figure^ 
 
 ftanceof     fufceptiblc  alfo  of  various  Colours ;  and  laftly,  re* 
 
 this  in        Solvable  into  Smoke.     The  Eye   exhibits  all   thefe 
 
 burning      Properties  in  the  burning  Wax  alftioft  at  one  glance^ 
 
 Wax,  jjj^jf    ^|-j£    Vnderflanding    fcperates    thofe  things  by 
 
 Refledion,  which  the  Sight  had  convey'd  to  the 
 
 mind  colledively.     For  it  percieves  that  the  Wax 
 
 preferves   its    ElTence  and  Denomination,    though 
 
 from   round  it  be  turn'd  into  fquare,  from  hard  and 
 
 red,  into  foft  and  black.     Fiom  whence  it  appears 
 
 that  all  thefe  Properties  are  extrinjtcal  to  ifj-  but  that 
 
 which  continues  under  all  thefe  Changes  is  call'd  its 
 
 Nature  and  Subfliince. 
 
 Thefirfl         HI.  By   SubfiaNce    I   here   urrderftand   a    thing 
 
 dillindi-     -^vhich  the  Mind  can   conceive  by  itfelf  23  dijlinll 
 
 ^"  °  J;'^    and  feparate  from  all  others :  For  that   Thine,   the 
 
 onsinto      Conception  of  which  does  not  ^f^w«  upon  another, 
 
 fenliblc        nor  incIudc  or  fuppofe   any  othe  ,  is  to  us  ^  Sub' 
 
 ^<alitics    fiance  I  and  accordingly  we  diftinguifli  it   by  that 
 
 MdSub-     ]vT^j,^^.   gyj    jI^^j.  v/^liich    implies   dependence   in  its 
 
 nance.  .  ,,  ~  .    r  Vt     •  r  r 
 
 ■*  conception   we   call    a    Aiode-i   or   Accident.      For 
 
 inftance,  we  can  conceive  a  certain  portion  of 
 matter^  fuch  as  Wax,  fetting  afide  all  others,  and 
 alfo  v/irhout  any  particular  Figure:  But  we  arc 
 not  in  like  manner  able  to  conceive  any  parti- 
 cular Figure  without  matter*  Wax  therefore  is  a 
 Subjlance,  for  our  conception  rcprelents  it  as  di- 
 fiinth  divided  from,  and  independent  of  all  other 
 things:  Nor  is  it  neccflary  to  the  knowledge 
 thereof  that  we  join  the  conceptions  of  other 
 things  when  we  think  of  it :  for  the  conceptions  of 
 that  and  thefe  contribute  nothing  (to,  nor  iland  in 
 need  of  each  other  in  order  to  their  being  under- 
 iiood.  But  Coiotir^  Ti'iiire-^  Softnefs  and  H-.^'dnefs  are 
 wodei  or  ^xcidcnts,  fince  thev  cannot  be  conceiv'd  ; 
 Wiihout  fomething  that  is  colour  d,  fgur'd,  fofr,  or; 
 
 hiird;  i 
 
Bed.  I .     Concerning  the  Orig mofEvW,  .% 
 
 hard;  but  they  enter  not  into  the  Suhflance  or  na- 
 tftre  of  Wax,  for  that  remains,  whatever  may  be- 
 come of  thefc, 
 
 IV*  But   when  this  is   refolv'd   into  fmoke^    or  How  ue 
 fiame,  it  has  no  longer  the  name  of  Wax  given  to '^"O"' that 
 it.     We  call  the  thing  Wax  which  is  applicable  to  ^^^""^^s 
 a  certain  peculiar  ufe;  but  when  it  is  once  I'e^lv- thing^as 
 €d  into  fmoke  or  flame,  it  becomes  unfit  for  that  matter. 
 life  to  which  Wax   is  fubfervient;    and  therefore 
 changes  its    Ejfenccy   and   u^ppellation.      What  then 
 does  it   carry  along  with    it  under  all  mutations? 
 It  is  always  extended,  and  capable  of  wo?;'£?«  or  rf/?j 
 and  has  always   parts  which  are  feparable,  and  ex- 
 clude orie  another  oiit  of  the  fame  place.;  the  Sub-. 
 fiance  therefore  which  is  attended  with  thefe  Qua- 
 lities or  I*roperties  we  call  Matter.     (  i .  ) 
 
 B  2  V.  What 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (i .)  Our  Author's  Notion  of  SuhJIance,  as  including  al!  the 
 conllituent  Properties  of  any  thing,  fccms  to  be  more  plain  and 
 agreeable   to  nature,  and   therefore  of  greater   ufc  in  Philo- 
 fophy   than  that  which  is  commonly  received.     We  find  by 
 experience  that  a  thing  will  always  exhibit  the  fame  appear- 
 ances in  fomc  refpe£ts  though  it  admit  of  Change  in  others  ; 
 or  in  Mr.  Locke\  Language,  tliat  certain  numbers  of  fimple 
 Ideas  go  conftantly  together,  whereas   feme  others  do  not: 
 The  former  of  thefe  we  call  the  SubJJance,  Thing  or  Being 
 itfelf,   tlie  latter  are  term'd  its  Modes  or  Accidenti.     Thus  the 
 fubftance  o^  Body,  as  far  as  we  know  of  it,  confiib  in  Solidity 
 and  Extcnfion ;    which  being  ncceflarily  finite,    it  alfo  be- 
 comes capable  of  Divifion,  Figure  and  Motion.     Thefe  are  its 
 original,  infeparable  Qualities  which  conflitute  the  thing,  and 
 feem  not  to  depend  on  any  thing  clfc  as  a  Suhjcil.     But  a 
 particular  Figure,  Motion,  i3c.  are  only  Accidents  or  Modes 
 of  its  Exiftcnce,  which  do  not  nccellarily  attend  it,  though 
 they  themfelves  cannot  be  fuppofed  to  exift  wlthour  it.     The 
 fubltance   of  Spirit  confifts  in    the  Powers  of  thinking  and 
 acting,  which  likewife  admit  of  various  Modifications.  ,  This 
 feems   to  be  all  that  v/e  can  learn  concerning  the  nature  of 
 things  from  obfervation  and  experience.  .  To  enquire  into  the 
 Mannc*-  how  thefe,  which  we  call  Properties,,  exift  together. 
 
4  Concernittg  the  Origin  ofEvW.    Chap.  I. 
 
 What  it  is.      V.  What   is   obfervable   in  Wax,    niay  alfo  be 
 obferv'd  in  any  other  Subftancej  which  we  know 
 
 by 
 NOTES, 
 
 or  to  attempt  to  explain  the  Caufe,  Ground  or  Reafon  of  their 
 Union  is  in  vain ;  to  aflig;n  the  word  Suhjlance  for  a  rcpre- 
 fentation  of  it  is  faying  nothing;  it  is  fetting  a  mere  word 
 for  what  v/e  have  neither  any  Idea  of  nor  occafion  for.  In- 
 deed if  we  confidcr  thefc  primary  Quahtics  as  needing  fome- 
 thing  to  inhere  in,  we  are  obliged  to  feck  for  fomething  to 
 fupport  them  ;  and  bv  the  fame  way  of  reafoning  we  may 
 feek  for  fomething  clfe  to  fupport  that  other  fomething,  and 
 fo  on;  and  at  lad  fliall  find  no  other  fupport  for  the  whole 
 but  the  Caufe  which  produced  it.  Mr,  Locke  though  he  gave 
 into  this  way  of  talking  yet  he  has  fufficiently  flicwn  his 
 diflike  of  it  in  B.  i.  C  4.  §.  iS.  B.  2.  C.  13 .  §.  18,  19, 
 20.  and  C.  23.  §.  23.  andelfewhere*.  Dr.  M'atts  is  of  opinion, 
 
 •  that  it  is  introducing  a  needlefs  Scbolajlic  Notion  into  the 
 
 •  real  nature  of  things  and  then  fancying  it  to  have  a  real 
 '  Exillcncc'.  Logic  p.  14.  The  Author  of  the  Procedure,  Ex- 
 tent ^'c-  affirms,  '  that  as  far  qs  we  direftlv  knov.-  the  effcntial 
 
 •  Properties  of  any  Subftance,  fo  far  we  have  a  direft  know- 
 '  Icd^e  of  the  Subilancc  it/e/f;  and  if  \%e  had  a  dircft  Knoir- 
 
 •  ledge  of  aU  the  elTential  Properties  of  any  Subftance,  we 
 '  fiioiild  have  an  adeqnc.te  knowledge  of  that  Subihnce  ;  for 
 
 •  iurely,  if  there  be  any  meaning  in  words,  the  kniowing  any 
 '  of  the  effcntial  Properties  of  a  thing  is  knowing  Jo  Jtmch  of 
 'its  very  Subilancc  or  Eflence ;  f  meaning  the  fame  by 
 thefc  two  laft  words,  though  Mr.  Locke  ufcs  them  in  a  very 
 difierent  Signification  ;  the  former  being  only  that  which 
 iuakes  any  thing  an  Ens  or  Being  ;  the  latter  that  which 
 makes  it  a  Being  of  this  or  that  Sort :  Of  which  belo\v. 
 
 In  fliort,  whatever  is  underftood  by  this  word  fubjiancc  ; 
 it  cannot  as  Mr.  Locke  obferves ;{;  be  applied  to  God,  Spirits 
 and  Body  in  the  fame  fenfe ;  and  therefore  the  application  of 
 this  and  the  like  doubtful  Terms  to  Subjefls  of  a  very  dif- 
 ferent nature  (cfpccially  that  of  S-.thjlraiutn,  wliich  more  ap- 
 parently confines  our  thoughts  to  Body)  muft  needs  occafion 
 Error  and  Coniiifion. 
 
 But  though  our  Author's  notion  of  Subftance  be  very  de- 
 fenfilile,.  he  has  applied  the  word  Matter  to  the  Idea  of  Body, 
 
 whereof 
 
 *  Comp.  Mr.  CoUihfr''?,  Enquiry  into  the  Exiftcnce  and  Na- 
 ture of  God.  p.  227,  228.  and  Dr.  S/:er/o:k^s  Yiiidic.  of  the 
 Trin.  p.  69.  &-c.  and  Dr.  //W//s  Philofophical  EfHiys.  Elf.  2. 
 ■   t  B.  1,  C.  iii.  p.  So,  81.  X  B.  II.  C.  xiii.  §;  ^^^ 
 
S.edl.  I.     Concerning  the  Origin  e/* Evil. 
 
 by  the  Senfcs.  For  all  thing>  that  are  perceived 
 by  the  Senfes   admit  of  the  like  changes,    and  the 
 
 above- 
 N  OT  E  S. 
 
 whereof  Matter  is  only  a  partial  Conception  containing  no- 
 thing more  than  the  Idea  of  a  folid  fubllance  whicli  is  every- 
 where the  fame.  Thefc  two  terms  therefore  cannot  be  put 
 one  for  the  other,  as  Mr.  Locke  obferves  *  though  indeed  they 
 are  often  ufed  promifcuoufly. 
 
 Upon  this  occafion  it  may  not  be  improper  to  obferve  tliat 
 the  various  figniiications  of  thefe  general  Terms  Matter,  Sub- 
 Jiance,  Effence,  &c.  will  ferve  to  convince  U3  in  the  iirlt  place, 
 that  thefe  words  don't  denote  the  manner  how  things  really 
 exilt,  but  only  our  manner  of  conceiving  them,  and  lecondly, 
 that  there  are  no  real  Exiftencies  ftridlly  conformable  to  this 
 our  manner  of  conceiving  them,  i.e.  \i\  Generals.  For  if  ei- 
 ther thefe  general  Terms  ilood  for  things  really  cxilting  under 
 fuch  a  Precifion,  or  this  our  way  of  conceiving  things  were 
 fix'd  by  Nature,  neither  of  them  would  be  fo  various  and  un- 
 certain as  we  find  they  are.  The  End  of  making  tnefe  Gene- 
 ral Conceptions  is  to  range  things  into  Sorts  for  the  convenience 
 of  Language.     The  manner  of  acquiring  them  is  as  follows. 
 
 We  arc  at  firft  only  acquainted  with  particular  Subilanccs ; 
 but  obferving  that  as  thefe  particular  Subllances  differ  in  fome 
 relpetts,  fo  they  agree  in  others,  [i.e.  though  this  particular 
 excites  in  the  mind  fome  fimple  Idea  or  Ideas,  which  another 
 does  not,  yet  there  arc  fome  Ideas  excited  equally  from  both) 
 we  take  no  notice  of  thole  Ideas  in  which  two  or  more  parti- 
 cular fabllances  differ,  but  feleft  thofe  only  in  which  they 
 tigree,  and  conned  them  into  one  complex  Idea  by  giving 
 them  one  Name.  Which  cornplex  Idea  becomes  General, 
 ;.  e.  it  may  be  affirm'd  of,  or  belongs  to,  or  is  found  in  more 
 than  one  particular  Subilance;  and  the  fevera!  Subftanccs  of 
 which  it  is  aflirm'd,  ^c.  are  faid  to  be  contain'd  under  that 
 General  Idea.  General  Ideas  of  Subllances  therefore  ars  not 
 made  by  adding  all  or  any  of  the  particular  Ideas  found  in  each 
 Subfunce,  or  by  that  retin'd  method,  which  the  Author  of 
 x\iZ  Procedure  imagines,  of  adding  and  omitting  them  at  the 
 fame  time  ;  but  only  by  leafing  out  all  thofe  Ideas  in  which 
 two  or  more  particular  Subilauccs  differ,  and  ret.uning  thole 
 in  which  they  agree.  And  from  general  Ideas  thus  made  we 
 proceed  to  more  general  ones  in  the  fame  way,  'viz.  by  al- 
 ways dropping  the  particulars  wherein  they  differ.  Thus  ob- 
 '  B  3  ferving 
 
 *  B,  in.  C.  X,  §.  i;.. 
 
Concerning  the  Origin  (j/Evil.     Chap.  I. 
 
 abovemention'd  properties  continue  both  undert 
 and   after  all   the(e  motions  and  mutations.     Any 
 
 fen- 
 NOTES, 
 
 feiving  a  certain  agreement  among  Individuals  and  omitting 
 the  rcll,  wc  forni  an  Idea  of  the  feveral  Species.  In  like  man- 
 ner leaving  out  the  diltinguifliing  marks  of  each  Species,  we 
 get  an  Idea  of  the  Genus,  fuch  as  Ma>t,  Beaji,  or  of  a  higher 
 Genus,  fuch  as  Animal :  and  again  by  dropping  that  by  which 
 Animals  are  dillinguifhed  from  all  other  things  we  acquire 
 the  ftill  more  general  or  partial,  Idea  qI  Behg  or  Suhjiance. 
 When  any  one  of  thefe  general  Ideas  is  found  in  a  particular 
 thing  it  is  call'd  the  Effence  of  that  thing :  EJJ'ence  therefore 
 is  only  that  general  abllra6l  Idea  in  the  Mind  by  which  we 
 determine  any  thing  to  be  of  this  or  that  fort,  which  fort  we 
 ■fignify  by  fuch  a  general  name  as  Animal,  or  Matter.  So  that 
 the  fame  Quality  may  be  eflential  or  not  effential  to  any  thing 
 jiccording  as  that  thing  is  ranked  under  a  diiTerent_^r^*. 
 
 In  the  fa-me  wa}^  that  we  make  General  Ideas  ofSubftances 
 we  alfo  c.>.Jider  fingle  Propeyties,  Monies  and  Relations,  -viz. 
 by  feparating  them  from  a)i  other  Properties,  i3'c.  with 
 which  they  are  found  in  Nature,  or  from  all  particular 
 Subjeds  in  which  they  inhere,  and  leaving  only  fo  much  as 
 remains  in  common,  and  includes,  or  may  be  aflirm'd  of  eve- 
 ry Property,  ^V.  of  that  kind;  Thus  obferving  that  all  Bo- 
 dies agree  in  being  extended,  as  w'cU  as  folid,  though  they 
 differ  never  fo  much  in  magnitude  and  figure,  we  take  the 
 former  of  thefe  Properties  apart  from  the  latter,  as  alfo  from 
 ajiy  particular  Magnitude  or  Shape,  and  call  it  Extevjlon  in 
 the  abftradt  ;  which  being  thus  made  general  it  will  compre- 
 hend all  particular  Extenfions,  and  may  be  enlarged  every 
 way  and  amplified  in  infinitum:  We  can  conceive  it  as  exilling 
 beyond  the  limits  of  Body,  and  by  adding  the  coniufed  Idea 
 of  a  Subjiratum  to  it,  it  will  become  independent  and  ferve 
 both  as  a  common  meafure  and  a  common  Receptacle  for  all 
 Bodies,  which  probably  conftitutes  our  Idea  oi  Space.  See  Notes 
 3  and  9.  In  the  fame  manner  we  form  an  Univerlal  Mode^ 
 I'.g.  Obferving  a  train  of  Ideas  fucceeding  one  another  in  our 
 mijids  at  certain  diitances,  and  being  confcious  that  we  our 
 felves  exift  while  we  receive  them,  or  that  our  own  ^xiftenc* 
 is  commenfurate  to  this  fucceffion,  wc  get  the  Idea  of  con- 
 tinuing. Obferving  alfo  that  leveral  other  things  continue  as 
 well  as  ourfelves,  we  find  that  the  fame  affedtion  belongs  to 
 
 them  ; 
 
 •  See  Loch  ?.  III.  C.  vi.  §.  4,  5,  ^c. 
 
Std.   I.     Cone erni Jig  the  Origin  o/'Evil. 
 
 ienfible  Objeft,  however  chang'd,  is  always  ex- 
 tended^  movecible^  conjifting  o£  Jolid,  dijlin^  and  di- 
 yifibk  parts, 
 
 VI. 
 NOTES. 
 
 them ;  but  it  being  an  endlcfs  work  to  form  as  many  diftinft 
 Ideas  of  this  kind  as  there  are  things  that  thus  continue,  we 
 abftraft  from  particular  Exiilences  and  make  one  general  Idea 
 of  Continuance,  which  ferves  for  all,  and  this  is  Duration. 
 
 The  Parts  or  Periods  of  this  common  Duration  we  call 
 7ime;  and  every  thing  which  is  commenfurate  to  them  is  mea- 
 fured  by  it,  and  faid  to  exift  in  it,  after  the  fame  manner  as 
 was  obferv'd  before  of  Space. 
 
 Mix' J  Moc^es  und  Relations  are  Combinations  of  Ideas  of  dif- 
 ferent kinds  voluntarily  put  together  and  conne<fled  by  their 
 names.  Such  as  G(7(7^;;(?/},  Gratitude;  Identity,  NeceJJjty,  i3c, 
 Thefe  are  apparently  the  work  of  the  Mind,  and  though  many 
 of  them  have  a  real  foundation  in  Nature,  and  may  be  found 
 by  obfervation  in  the  concrete,  yet  they  arc  generally  got  be- 
 fore from  information  or  invention,  abftrafted  from  particu- 
 lar Sabje61s,  and  lodg'd  in  the  mind  with  general  names  anr 
 nex'd  to  them,  according  as  the  circumllances  of  perfons  an4 
 conveniencies  of  Life  require..    See  Locke,  B.  III.  C.  iii. 
 
 I  have  been  the  longer  on  this  fubjedl  o^  AbjIraSl  Ideas,  iince 
 notwithllanding  what  Mr.  Locke  has  hinted,  the  nature  of  'em 
 feems  to  be  but  little  underftood,  otherwife  we  fhould  never 
 hear  of  our  Ideas  of  Infinity,  oi Space,  Duration,  "Nutnber,  Sec. 
 requiring  an  external  Ideatum  or  objeSli-ve  reality;  —  of  their 
 beiijg  real  Attributes  and  neceflarily  inferring  the  Exiftence  of 
 ofiome  immenfe  and  eternal  Being  ;  —  whereas  all  univerfals, 
 or  abftrad  Ideas,  fuch  as  thefe  evidently  are,  (See  Dr.  Clarke''^ 
 Anfvv'er  to  the  4th  letter)  exill  under  i\\3.l  formality  no  where  but 
 in  the  Mind,  neither  have  th^  any  other  foundation,  nor  can 
 they  be  a  proof  of  any  thing,  befidc  that  power  which  the 
 mind  has  to  form  them. 
 
 If  the  nature  of  M;xV  Modes  and  Relations  were  fufficiently 
 attended  to,  I  believe  it  would  not  be  aflerted  that  our  Ideas 
 of  perfeft  Goodncfs,  Wifdom,  Power,  ifjc.  are  all  inadequate 
 and  only  negative.  —  th,at  all  our  knowledge  of  thefe  Pei- 
 fedtions  is  improper,  indireft,  and  only  analogical,  —  and 
 that  the  whole  kind,  nature,  Effence  and  Idea  of  them  is  (^n- 
 tirely  different  v/hen  applied  to  God  from  what  it  is  when  pre- 
 dicated of  his  Creatures.  Whereas  thefe  being  arbitrary  com- 
 binations of  Ideas  made  without  regard  to  any  patticular  Sub- 
 ject in  which  they  may  inhere,  they  are  evidciuly  their  own 
 
 B'4  '  Arc  he- 
 
8  Concerning  the  Origin  of  EvIL    Chap.  I. 
 
 That  this  VI.  Not  that  this  is  a  Definition,  or  Idea  (z.) 
 Definition  ^f  Matter,  any  more  than  the  former  was  of  Suh^ 
 *^°"hThe  i^^»<^^>  ^^^  ^^^^  hereby  we  arc  acquainted  with  its 
 7dea  of  prefence,  and  diftinguilli  it  from  every  other  thing; 
 inatter,but  as  we  know  a  Man  by  his  Countenance,  and  other 
 onlylhews  circumftanccs ;  Nor  is  it  necelTary  that  thefe  flioiUd 
 ^^the  ^g  applicable  to  all  SubjUnce^  at  all  times,  and  x6 
 flin^uifti^"  that  alone:  For  it  is  enough  if  for  this  particular 
 jt  hy.         Time  jind  occafion  we  know  tlie  particular  Sttbfiance 
 
 •'      :      ■  ■'.  WQ 
 
 N  OT  E  S^ 
 
 Archetypes  and  therefore  cannot  but  be  adequate  nnd  pofiti've : 
 Thev  are  what  they  are  immutably  and  univerfally  ;  their  A'a- 
 iur es  :ind  EJ/ences  niuft  be  the  fame  wherever  they  are  found, 
 or  to  whatfoever  fubjec^  we  apply  them,  fo  long  as  the  fame 
 number  of  Ideas  are  included  under  the  lame  word ;  and  no- 
 thing more  is  requifite  than  that  the  Ideas  thus  put  together 
 be  confiftent  to  make  all  our  knowledge  concerning  them,  real, 
 proper,  direil,  adequate  and  miinjerfal.    See  Locke,  B.  \Y.  C.  iv. 
 
 I  fhall  trouble  the  Reader  no  farther  on  this  Head  than  only 
 to  obferve  that  the   method  of  forming  general  Ideas  (which 
 our  Author  had  advanced  ill  his  firlt  Note,  and  which  is  fincc 
 ufed  by  the  Author  of  Procedure,  Sec  )  by  making  the  Idea  of 
 one  Ir^dividual  ftand  for  the  whole  Species,  muft  be  wrong  on 
 this  very  account,  f/s:.    that  according  to  the  foremention'd 
 fchemc  Umver/ah,  fuch  as  Animal  or  Matter  would  have  a  real 
 Kxiltcnce  in  the  fame  prccife  manner  in  which  we  confider 
 them  ;  whereas  under  fuch  Prccifions  they  are  confefledly  the 
 creatures  of  our  o^n  Minds  and  exiftno  where  elle.     Wc  have 
 nothing  at  all  to  do  therefore  with  Analogy  in  forming  Ahjlra^ 
 Ideas,  we  can  never  come  at  them  by  fubitituting  one  particu- 
 lar for  the  roll;  hut  on  the  contrary  muft  conceive  them  by  re- 
 moving all  particularities  of  Exiftcncc  and  leaving  only  what 
 lemams  in  com"mon,  as  explain'd  above.     See  Locke,  B.  ill- 
 C  iii.  ^.  7,  8,  9.  or  N'a^/s's  Logic,  Part.  I.   C.  iii.  §,  3.  or 
 ihe  words  Aijlra^ion  :n\d  Genera/ in  Chambers's  Dictionary. 
 [z)  Our  Author  confines  this  word  Idea  to  the  fenfc  in 
 \\  hich  it  was  firft  ufed  by  Plato,  kj'tx.  as  an  Image  or  Reprefen- 
 tation  of  the  fuppofed   TJfence  of  things;   in   which  \iih.iii.  It 
 was  attributed  peculiarly  to  God,  A\  ho  was  faid  to  perceive 
 things  immediately  by  their  EJ/ences,  whereas  we  only  know 
 them  by  certain  Marks  cr  Chara^ers,  or  by  Anciloij;, 
 
 ■*  'Our 
 
Se(a.  I.     Concerning  the  Origin  o/'Evil.  | 
 
 we  are  talking  of  by  them ;   ^nd  fiifficiently  di- 
 ftinguirh  it  from  othei  things. 
 
 "   VII.  It  is  to  be  obferved  farther,  that  when  a  How  we 
 part  of  this  matter  is  removed  another  fucceeds  in-  come  to 
 to  its  Place,  but  is  not  in  the   fame    Place   con-  fj^^  know- 
 fiftent  with  it.     Vlace  therefore  feems  to  be  fome-  ^'^^^  ° 
 thing  beyofid,   befidc  and  diftind:  from  the  Mat^ 
 ter  which  it   receives.     For    as   from   hence   that 
 Wax  was  fuccedively  capable  of  different  forms,  fi- 
 gures,  colours  and  chaiiges,  it  appears  that  fomething 
 is  init'befide,   and  difl^rent  from  all  thefe,  which 
 we  call  the  Matter  of  the  Wax :  So  in  like  manner 
 from  hence  that  the  fame  Place  or  Space  receives 
 more  and  different   Bodies  and  Particles  of  matter 
 fucceffively,  but  cannot  admit  more  than  one   ac 
 the  fame  time,  it  will   appear   that  Place  or  Space^ 
 is  as  diflinft  from  Matter  or  Body  as  Wax  is  froni 
 the  Colours   fucceffively   receiv'd,   and   does   not 
 depend  on  them  any  more  than  Wax  does  on  any 
 particular  Form, 
 
 VIII.  If  therefore  we  fet  afide,  or  annihilate  What  it  is. 
 Matter i  whatfoever  flill  remains  will  all  belong  to 
 the  nature  of  Spacer  as  in  the  former  cafe  when 
 we  had  fet  afide  the  Properties  of  IVax,  that  which 
 belonged  to  the  A4atter  or  fubflance  of  it  remain- 
 ed. If  you  ask  what  that  is  ?  I  anfwer,  firfl  Lo- 
 cal Mobility  is  to  be  fet  afide,  for  that  feems  pe- 
 culiar to  Matter.  Secondly,  an  a(ftual  feparation 
 of  Parts,  for  what  is  immov^eable  cannot  be  divid- 
 
 ^ or E  s, 
 
 Our  Autlior  Tiad  endeavoured  to  explain  this  in  his  Note 
 upon  the  place;  which  is  omitted  as  ^vc  apprehend  it  to  be 
 much  better  explain'd  and  more  conveniently  applied  by 
 Mr.  Locke,  who  makes  the  word  Idea  Hand  for  every  thing 
 about  which  the  Mind  is  converfant,  or  which  can  be  the  ob- 
 jeft  of  Perception,  Thought  or  Underftanding;  In  which 
 large  fenfe  we  have  an  Idea  of  Matter  ox  Bod^,  as  well  as  of 
 Suljia/ice,  or  of  Space. 
 
 (3  )  Though 
 
iqf\  Concerning  the  Origin  ^Evil.     Chap.  I. 
 
 cd.  Thirdly,  JmpeyietrAbility,  or  Solidity ;  for 
 that  fuppofes  Motion  and  is  neceflaiy  to  the  Pro- 
 dudion  of  it.  It  remains  therefore  that  Sp.ice  (as 
 we  conceive  it)  be  fomething  extended  immovea- 
 ble, capable  of  receiving  or  containing  Matter,  and 
 penetrable  by  it.  Though  therefore  we  have  not 
 a  Definition  or  Idea  of  Space,  properly  fo  call'dj 
 yet  we  can  hereby  fufiiciently  diftinguifli  it  from 
 every  other  thing,  and  may  reafon  about  it  as  much 
 as  we  have  occafion. 
 Thefe  IX.  Thefe  three  conception*?,   namely,  of  fenfi- 
 
 threeCon- bie  Quahties  {viz..  Motion,  dec.)  of  Matter  and 
 Sx.'of*'  ^P^^^^  ^^^^  fo  be  the  chief  of  thole  which  we 
 fenfible  hW^  from  Without,  and  fo  natural  to  us  that  there 
 Qualities  is  uo  reafonable  Man  but  perceives  them  in  him- 
 (v.  g.  Mo-  feif.  There  are  fome  who  deny  that  Space  is  any 
 ci^^Mat^ter  ^^^^S  difl:in6l  from  Matter,  nor  is  it  much  to  our 
 and  space,  purpofe  whether  it  be  or  no:  Yet  we  csnnot  with- 
 feem  to  be  out  offering  Violence  to  our  Underftandings,  deny 
 the  chief  but  that  the  Conception  of  Spacf  is  diftind  from  the 
 ofthofe     conception  of -^^jir^f/-,  (3.) 
 
 external.  atv^l. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (3.)  Though  fo  much  noife  has  been  made  about  Space, 
 (which  Leibnitz  juftly  calls  an  Idol  of  fome  modern  Englijh 
 Men:  ]  and  fo  great  ufe  made  of  it  in  demonltrating  the  divine 
 Attributes,  in  a  way  which  fome  ftile  a  Priori ;  yet  f  am  forc'd 
 to  confefs  that  I  cannot  poffibly  frame  any  other  Notion  of  it, 
 than|cither,  firft,  as  the  mere  jiegation  or  ahfcnce  oi  Matter,  or 
 fecondiy,  as  the  extenlion  o^  Body,  confider'd  abilradlly  or  fepa- 
 fate  from  any  particular  Body ;  or  thirdly,  as  a  SubjcSl  or  Suljlra- 
 ium  of  that  iivnc  general  extenjion,  for  which  lall  Notion  fee  N  9. 
 
 Now  according  to  the  firft  Suppofition  we  may  indeed  have 
 J  pojiti've  Idea  of  it,  as  well  as  oi Silence,  Darknefs,  and  many 
 other  Privations ;  as  Mr,  Locke  has  fully  proved  that  wchave, 
 andlhewnthe  Reafon  of  it  B  III.  C  viii.  §.  4.  But  to  argue 
 from  fuch  an  Idea  of  Space,  that  Space  itfelf  is  fomething  ex- 
 ternal, and  has  a  real  cxiftence,  feems  altogether  as  good  Scnfe 
 as  to  fay,  that  becaufe  we  have  a  different  Idea  of  Darknefs 
 from  that  of  Light ;  oi  jilence  from  that  oi found;  of  the  abfence 
 gfany  thmg,  from  th«t  of  its  Prefence  ;  therefore  Darknefs,  i^c. 
 
 mult 
 
jSect.  2.     Concerning  the  Ongm  of  Evi\,  I.I 
 
 S  E  C  T.     II. 
 
 Of  the  Enquiry  after  the  Tirf  Caufe^ 
 I.  Suppoiinc  thefe  three,   viz.  Aiotion,  Matter,  An  enqu'H 
 
 ^  cerning 
 
 NOTE  S.  Motion, 
 
 jnufl  befomething  pofitive  and  different  from  Light,  l^c.  and  Matter, 
 have  as  real  an  Exitlence  as  Light  has ;  And  to  deny  that  we  and  Space  | 
 have  any  pofitive  Idea,  or,  which  is  the  very  fame,  any  Idea  whether 
 at  all,  of  the  Privations  above-mentionM  (For  every  Idea,  as  ^''^^7  ^^"'" 
 it  is  a  perception  of  the  Mind,    mult  neceffarily  be  pofitive,  orthen^' 
 though  it  arife  from  what  Mr,  Locke  calls  a  privative  Caufe  )  felves. 
 to  deny,  I  lay,  that  we  have  thefe  Ideas,  will  be  to  deny  Ex- 
 perience and  contradift  common  Scnfe.     There  are  therefore 
 Ideas,  andy?/;;/i/e  ones  too,  which  have  nothing  ad  extra  cor- 
 refpondent  to  them,  no  proper  Ideatum,  Archetype,  or  ob- 
 jeftive  Reality,  and  I  don't  fee  why  that  oi  Space  may  not  be 
 reckon'd  one  of  them.     To  fay  that  Space  mull  have  exiflence, 
 bccaufe  it  has  fome  Properties,  for  inllance.  Penetrability,  or  a 
 ffl/i^aVy  of  receiving  Body,  feems  to  me  the  fame  as  to  urge 
 that  darknefs  rriufl:  ht  fomething  becaufe  it  has  the  power  or  pro- 
 perty o'ireceiiitng  Light ',  Silence  the  property  o^ admitting  Sound i 
 and  Ahfence  the  property   of  being  fupply'd  by  Prefence,  i.  e. 
 to  aifign  abfolute  Negations,  and  fuch  as  by  the  fame  way  ot 
 realoning  may  be  apply 'd  to  Nothing,  and  then  call  them  po- 
 fitive properties;  and  io  infer  that  the  Chimera  thus  cloathed 
 with  them  mull  needs  be  fomething.     Setting  afide  the  names 
 of  its  other  pretended  properties   (which  names  alfo  are  ab 
 merely  negative  as  the  fuppofed  properties  to  which  they  be- 
 long) thofe  that  attribute  extenfion  to  fpace  feem  not  to  attend 
 to  the  true  notion  of  that  Property,  which,  as  the  Schoolmen 
 define  it  (and  let  them  who  like  not  this  definition  try  to  give 
 us  a  better)  is  to  have  partes  extra  partes,  and  as  fuch,  /.  e.  as 
 including  Parts  (which  parts,  as  they  differ  in  fituation  front 
 each  other,  may  have  things  piedicated  of  fome  of  them  dif- 
 ferent from  thofe  which  can  be  predicated  of  others)  it  ap- 
 pears plainly  inconfiilcnt  with  their  own  Idea  of  whaC  they 
 call  fimple,  uniform,  indivifible  fpace,  and  is   applicable   to 
 Body  only.     And  to  attribute  Extenfion  or  Parts  to  fpace,  ac- 
 cording to  the  firll  notion  of  it  laid  down  by  ns*  will  be  the 
 lame  as  to  talk  of  the  cxtenfipn  or  parts  of  Ahfence,  q[  Pri'va' 
 tion,  or  of  mc7-e  Noihing.     L^ftly,  to  ask  jf  Space  under  the 
 
 fcronj 
 
"jl^  Concerning  the  Origin  ^'Evii.     Chap.  I. 
 
 and  Space,  wc  arc  in  the  next  phccto  examine  whc- 
 thcf  they  be  of  themrclves,  or  of  fomething  elfc? 
 
 if 
 NOTES. 
 
 fccond  Notion  of  that  word,  (/.  e.  as  Extenfion  in  the  Abftracl) 
 be  extended  or  have  parts,  is  apparently  abfurd ;  it  is  the  lame 
 with  that  noted  Qtiellion  of  the  Man,  who  being  told  that  to 
 have  Riches,  was  to  be  rich,  ask'd  if  Riches  then  thcmfclves 
 were  Rich  ? 
 
 Well  then,  according  to  the  firft  Suppofition,  Space  will 
 be  mere  uon  entity,  or  nothing,  i.  e.  nothing  can  be  aflirm'd, 
 but  every  thing  denied  of  it :  According  to  the  iecond,  it  will 
 be  only  znabjiraS}  Idea  form'd  in  the  mind  from  a  property 
 peculiar  to  matter,  which  property  abflrafled  in  Idea  cannot 
 rtfelf  admit  of  any  other  properties,  nor  be  applicable  to  the 
 Divine  Nature,  nor  capable  of  pofitive  Infinity  jn  any  refped. 
 As  to  the  laft,  '  If  Space,  fays  Dr.   Cud^vorth,    be  concluded 
 
 *  to  be  nothing  elfe  but  the  extenfion  and  difiance  oi  Body,  or 
 
 *  ?natter  con^x^cx'd.  m  general  (without  refpeft  to  this  or  that 
 
 *  particular  body)  and  abfiraBly  in  order  tQ  the  Coi^ccption  of 
 
 *  Motion  and  the  menfuration  of  things,  then  do  we  lay  that 
 
 *  there  appeareth  nQ  fufficicnt  grounds  for  this  pofitive  Infinity} 
 
 *  of  Space,  we  being  certain  of  no  more  than  this,  that  be  the 
 
 *  World,  or  any  figuratt^  Body,  never  fo  great,  it  is  not  im- 
 «  poflible  but  that  it  might  rtill  be  greater  and  greater  without 
 
 *  end.  Which  iiidefinite  increafahlenefs  of  Body  and  Sp.icc 
 \  feems  to  be  miltaken  for  a  pofitive  infinity  thereof.     Whcre- 
 
 *  as  for  this  very  Reafon,  becaufe  it  can  never  be  fo  great,  but 
 
 *  that  more  magnitude  may  ftill  be  added  to  it,  therefore  it  can 
 
 *  never  be  pofitively  Infinite. 
 
 <  To  conclude  therefore,  by  Spice  without  the  finite  World, 
 *:  is  to  be  underilood  nothing  but  the  polfibility  of  Body  farther 
 f  and  farther  without  end,  yet  ib  as  never  to  reach  to  Infinity.* 
 
 Hence  appears  tlie  weaknefs  of  that  common  Argumcnc 
 nrg'd  by  Gajfendus,  Dr.  Clarke,  and  Raphfion,  for  the  ahfiohite. 
 infinity' ofi Space,  viz.  From  the  impoflibility  of  fetting  bounds 
 or  limits  to  it :  fincc  that,  {vj  they,  would  be  to  fuppofe  Sp^cs 
 bounded  bv  yS/;/f/A/\^  which  ///«■// occupies  Space,  or  elfc  by 
 nothing,  both  which  are  contradidlions. 
 
 Which  Argument  either  firft  of  all  fuppofes  that  Space  h 
 really  Ibme  thing,  Qr  fome  pofitive  Quality  ;  which  wants  to 
 be  proved.  Or  elfe  improperly  applies  bounds  and  bounders 
 to  mere  non-entity,  or  bare  poifibility  ;  which  has  nothing  to 
 4o  with  the  Idea  of  Bounds. 
 
 li 
 *  True  Intel! ,  Syft.  P.  644  &  766. 
 
Sed:.  2.     C^ncenii fig  t/jeOtigm  of  Ev'ih  ^3' 
 
 If  they  eyifl:  of  themfelves,  the  Enquiry  is  at  an 
 End.     For  thofe  things  that  Exift  by  Nature  are 
 
 caufes 
 NOTES, 
 
 If  therefore  we  take  Space  in  the  ficfl:  Notion  laid  down, 
 thi5u  its  unboundednefs  will  (as  Dr.  Cudvjorth  fays)  fignify 
 nothing  but  the  poffibility  Of  Body  farther  and  farther  without 
 end  ;  according  to  which  Senfe,  let  «s  ftatc  their  ufual  Quef- 
 tion  in  other  Words,  and  the  great  fallacy  and  impropriety  of 
 it  will  appear.  What  is  there,  fiy  they,  beyond  this  Space  ? 
 You  muft  imagine  more  fuch  Space,  or  nothing.  What  is  there 
 fay  we,  beyond  this  pojjibiltty  of  Exijience?  You  muft  either 
 imagine  more  i'dc\).  foJJibilUx  o't  Exijlende  or  mere  notbing,  i.  e. 
 Mn  Exifience.  What  Coniequence  can  pofTibly  be  drawn  from 
 fuch  an  odd  kind  of  Argumentfttion  ?, 
 
 But  if  Space  be  taken  in  tfee  fecond  Senfe,  /.  e,  as  Exter>» 
 fion  in  ^abJlra3o,  then  the  meaning  of  o«r  not  being  able  to  fet 
 bonnds  to  it  will  only  be,  that  wc  have  a  power  of  enlarging 
 our  abftraft  Idea  in  htfinittim,  or  that  we  always  find  in  our 
 felves  the  fame  ability  to  add  to,  or  repeat  it;  and  if  we  always 
 find  that  we  can  add,  we  Ihall  never  find  that  we  canuot  add, 
 which  (as  a  very  eminent  Writer  on  the  Subjedl  obierves)  is 
 all  the  Myftery  of  the  Matter,  and  all  that  can  be  underftood 
 by  infinite  Space. 
 
 But  it  is  farther  urg'd  that  there  muft  be  fomething  more  in 
 the  prefcnt  Gafc ;  for  luc  _^7id  not  otily  a  Povjer  of  enlarging  ihe 
 Idea,  but  fi lid  it  i?npcijfib/e  to  fet  bounds  to  the  thing  ;  ivbcreait 
 <ue  can  enlarge  tht  Idea  of  Matter  to  Infinity,  and  can  alfo  fet 
 hounds  to  the  thing  itfclf.  In  anfwcr  to  the  firft  part  of  this 
 Objection  it  is  afk'd.  What  thing,  I  pnayyoii,  but  the  thing  in 
 your  own  mind,  that  is,  the  Idea  ?  Prove  it  to  be  a  thing 
 and  then  we'll  enquire  whether  it  has  bounds  or  not;  but  to  fay 
 the  thing  is  infinite  or  boundlefs,  before  you  have  prov'dit  to 
 exift,  orto  be  a  Thing,  is  too  large  a  ftcp  to  take.  The  abovc- 
 mention'd  excellent  Writer  folves  the  Difficulty  arifmg  from 
 the  fecond  part  o'i  the  Objedion  by  another  parallel  Cafe, 
 
 <  Whenlconfider  the  number  of  the  Stars,  I  can  go  numbering 
 
 *  on  in  my  thoughts  ftill  more  and  more  Star^  in  Infinitum,  but 
 
 *  I  can  fet  bounds  to  them,  can  fuppofe  their  number  finite, 
 
 *  but  to  number  itfelf  I  can  fet  no  bounds.    Yet  what  is  Num- 
 
 *  ber.?  Nothing  but  an  abftract  Idea,  nothing  ^i  ^A7r«,  and  to 
 '  fay  that  number  is  infinite,  comes  only  to  this,  that  we  can 
 
 <  fet  no  bounds  to  our  Faculty  of  Numbering,  it  being  always 
 '  as  eafy  to  add  to  a  thoufand,  or  a  Million,  one  more,    bV.  as 
 
 *  to  One.    Well  then,  to  fet  bounds  to  numl-^r  in  the  atftrai^, 
 
 «  i^ 
 
$4  Concerning  tls  Origin  t^Evil.    Chap.  1 
 
 t^aufes  oi Exijlence  to  themfelves,  i.e.  do  not  ftand 
 in  need  of  any  external  caufe ;    if  they  depend  on 
 
 fome- 
 NOTES. 
 
 '  is  to  Tet  bounds  to  the  Faculty  itfelf,  and  to  deny  that  it  is 
 
 *  in  my  Power  to  add,  when  I  plainly  perceive  that  I  can  ;  and 
 '  fo  is  a  direft  Contradiftion.     Eut  as  to  the  number  of  Stars, 
 
 *  or  Hairs,  or  Alen,  or  any  thing,  I  can  fet  bounds  to  that, 
 
 *  without  any  contradi6l;ion,  becaufe  it  iHll  leaves  me  in  pofT- 
 
 *  cflion  of  the  power  of  numbering,  which  I  find  I  have;  and 
 
 *  which  does  not  require  any  fub'iedt  ad  extra,  but  may  goon 
 
 *  independent  of  any,  and   indifferent  to  all.     Now  to  apply 
 
 *  this  to  other  cafes:  The  Mind  finds  in  itfelf  the  faculty  of  en- 
 
 *  larging  and  extending  its  Idea  of  cxtenfion.       It  can  apply 
 
 *  it  to  Matter,  or  can  let  it  alone:  Can  fuppoie  Matter  infi- 
 
 *  nitely  expanded,  or  can  fet  bounds  to  it.  But  to  fct  bound? 
 
 *  to  all  Extenfion,  as  well  imaginary  as  real,  is  cramping  the 
 
 *  Faculty,  is  denying  it  the  power  of  enlarging,  which  is  al- 
 
 *  Ways  prefent  to  the  mind,  and  which  flie  can  never   lofe; 
 
 *  and,  in  a  word,    is  a  contradidlion.     Any,  either  imagina- 
 
 *  ry,  or  real  Subject  is  fufficicnt  for  the  mind  to  exercife  its 
 
 *  Faculties  upon;  and  fo  if  you  cither  JuppolcGod  or  Matter, 
 
 *  or  Space    to  be    infinitely   extended,   it  is  equally  latiffied 
 
 *  with  any.     All  that  fhe  requires,  is,  that  fhe  may  be  able  to- 
 
 *  enlarge  the  Idea  of  Extenfion.    But  if  you  take  from  her  Ex- 
 
 *  tenfion  itfelf,  that  is  the  Idea  of  it,  and  the  Power  of  adding 
 
 *  to  it,  you  deprive  her  of  her  Faculty,  and  deny  her  a  power 
 
 *  which  fhe  finds  fhe  has.     In  a  word,  we  can  fet  bounds  to 
 
 *  any  thing  that  ftill  leaves  us  the  power  of  enlarging  or  ex- 
 
 *  tending   infinitely,  as  we  find  we  always  can:  and  if  we 
 '  \vould  fpeak  ftridtly,  it  is  not  jmmher  that  is  infinite,  nor  cx- 
 
 *  ttnfion  infinite,  which  are  nothing  but  iiotions  abllrailcd  from 
 
 *  things:  But  the  mind  ofMan  is  able  to  proceed  numbering 
 
 *  or  extending  infinitely,  that  is,   without  ever  coming  to  any 
 
 *  Stop  or  Bounds.  For  to  fet  Bounds  is  to  deny  and  dellroy  the 
 
 *  Faculty  itfelf:  If  it  could   not  always  do  it,  it  could  not 
 '  do  it  at  all.  He  that  can  add  one  to  one,  as  often  as  he  will 
 
 *  can  never  find  an  end  of  numbering,  nor  he  that  can  double 
 '  an  Inch  as  often  as  he  will,  find  an  end  of  enlarging;  it  is 
 
 *  all  nothing  more  than  repeating  one  of  the  caficll  operations 
 
 *  or  exercifes  of  the  Mind,  and  it  will  always  be  a  contradic- 
 
 *  tion   for  any    rational  Mind  to  v/ant  it.     The   Cafe  being 
 '  plainly  thus,  1  think  it  fliould  not  be  afk'd,  v;hy  a  Mancan- 
 
 *  nor  fet  bounds  to  Number  or  F.xtcnfion,  but  how  he  comes 
 '  to  have  the  Faculty  of  counting  and  repeating,  which  is  rcil' 
 
Sedt.  2.     Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil.  15 
 
 fomething  eUe,  there  will  be  a  queflion  about  that 
 alfo,  what  it  is,  and  what  are  its  properties. 
 
 II.  Wt 
 NOTES. 
 
 *  \y  tantamount  to  the  other,  and  what  it  ultimately  refolves 
 
 *  into.     And  then,  I  fuppofe,  the  Anfvver  is  very  eafy,  and 
 
 *  we  need  not  go  to  the  utmoft  Limits  of  the  World  to  enable 
 
 *  us  to  rcfolve  the  Riddle. 
 
 '  I  cannot  but  fmile  to  oblerve  how  grofly  we  are  often  im- 
 
 *  pofed  upon  by  Words  Handing  for  abllraft  Ideas,  for  want 
 '  of  confidering  how,  and  upon  what  Occafions,  thefe  abftrafl 
 
 *  Ideas  were  invented  for  the  help  of  weak  and  narrow  Con- 
 
 *  ceptions,  and  have  been  ufcd  fo  long  till  they  are  thought  to 
 
 *  ftand  for  real  Things. 
 
 This,  I  think,  is  a  folid  and  ample  confutation  of  the  Ar- 
 gument drawn  from  the  Idea  of  Space  and  its  imaginary  Infini- 
 /)'.  We  fhall  only  add  a  Word  or  two  to  fhew  that  Duration., 
 (as  well  as  Space,)  Number,  and  all  ^avtity ;  any  thing  which 
 can  be  confidercd  only  by  way  of  parts,  or  in  Succeffion ;  is 
 abfolutely  repugnant  to,  or  incapable  of  true  pofitive  infini- 
 ty in  any  refpeft.  Now  by  a  pofitive,  or  Metaphyfual  Infi- 
 nite we  always  mean  that  which  is  abfolutely  PerfeB  in  its 
 kind,  which  cannot  admit  of  ^rt'<////ea,  or  Increafe.  It  is  an 
 Idea  of  a  certain  Quality  in  the  Abjiraii,  which  has  no  jnix- 
 iure  of  the  contrary  Quality  in  it,  no  failure  or  defied  ;  and 
 which  therefore  is  our  Standard  to  which  we  always  refer,  and 
 by  which  we  try  all  imperfeftions,  all  mix'd  or  finite  Quali* 
 tics,  which  arc  for  this  reafon  calTd  imperfeft,  becaufe  they 
 fall  fliortof  our  original  Standard,  and  are  properly  negations 
 iofit:  Confequcntly  our  Idea  oi  Peifedion  muft  be  a  pofitive 
 one,  and  prior  to  that  of  ImperfeiiiovL ;  as  will  appear  from 
 Cudivorth  cited  in  Remark  1.  where  the  Reader  may  find  a  full, 
 account  of  this  pofitive  Infinity,  and  how  we  get  the  Idea  of  it 
 and  arc  able  to  diltinguifh  it  from  that  negative  one  explained  by 
 Mr  Locke,  which  is  frequently  confounded  with  it.  To  return. 
 
 If  then  a  Metaphyfical  Infinite  means  perfect,  or  that  ta 
 luhich  nothing  can  be  added,  it  is  plain  that  Diiraiion,  Number, 
 and  all  Quantity,  the  very  Nature  aud  Idea  of  which  includes 
 perpetual  Increafablenefs  or  Addibility  muft  be  effentially  inca- 
 pable of  this  abfolute  or  pofitive  Infinity,  in  like  manner  as 
 Cudnxorth  has  Ihewn  of  Space  and  Body  in  the  Paffage 
 referr'd  to  above.  Farther,  if  we  attend  to  the  Notion  of  an 
 Infinite  Series,  and  take  a  view  of  the  manifold  Abfurdities 
 which  accompany  it  in  any  manner  of  conception,  (from 
 which  abfurditici  vva  draw  our  ©nlv  proof  of  a  /ry?  Canfe,  or 
 
 God) 
 
l6  Conc'srning  the  Origin  o/'EviL     Chap.  1. 
 
 We  arc  \\,  We  muft  prefumc  that   all  our  conceptions 
 
 to  form      of  fimple  Objeds  without  us  are  true,  i.  e.  reprefent 
 
 '':Jif  ^^  'he 
 
 things  NOTES. 
 
 they  exill  ^°^^  ^^^  ^'^^^  ^'^  neccflarily  led  to  exclude  from  Infinity  all 
 
 of  them-  ("-i^^h  things  as  exifl  Seriatim,  or  nuill  be  conceiv''d  as  confifl- 
 
 lelves  Or  "^^  iri  and  compofed  ofyJ/(r<rf|/^w  parts,  i.  e.,  fuch  as  Duration, 
 
 require  a  ^'^"^^^*'y  Space,  Motion,  Mag7iitude,  l£c.  all  which,  when  faid 
 
 Caufe  ^*^  ^^  infinite,  arc  nothing  but  fo  many   infinite   Series,  and 
 
 from  our  ^^^''^^'^'^'^I'^ble  to  the  fame  abfurdities ;  as  the  abovemention'd 
 
 fimple  •Author  has  demonftrated  of  them  all  together,  Intell.  Syjl.  p. 
 
 Conc-Dti-  ^^^' ^'^'^^^^^ ^^''^'"'>'  in  particular,  /».  843.     The  fame  is 
 
 ^^^^^  *  fliewn  cf  Duration  or  Time,  by  Dr.    Bently,    Boyle's    Lea. 
 
 .  Serm.    7.    or  bySir.il/.  Ha/e,  Primitive  Origination  ofMan^ 
 
 there  IS  no     l-    J     r-*  •'  ^-n  o    ■;..         n  ^     ■    •  o  r»    TTr 
 
 ,  '  J-  '•  ^-  *^-  orBiniopiS/J^;«^;?ff/.  Origines  Sacrae,  B.  HI. 
 
 f  r    A>         ^'  '•  prop-  7>  8.  See  alfo  the  confutation  of  an  Infinite  Series  of 
 p  H      r^      fucceflive  Beings  in  the  beginning  of  Note  10.  and  Rem.  b.  *" 
 a  a  }.       'fj^g  jj].^   j^  Ihewn  of  Number  and  all  ^lantitv,  by,  the  Au- 
 thor of  the  Impartial  Enquit'y  into    the  nature  ami  exifience 
 of  God,  p.  z\,lf^c. 
 
 *  If  any  Number  be  abfolutely   or  infinitely  great,  it  can  be 
 
 *  for  no  other  realon  than  becaule  it  is  abfolutqly  or  in  its  very 
 nature  incapable  ofincrcafe  without  an  abfolute  contradic- 
 tion.    But  the  very  nature  of  all  Quantity  infers  on   the 
 
 *  contrary  a  ncceflity  of  the  encrcafe  of  its  Greatnefs  on  the 
 fuppofition  of  the  leaft  addition:  For  fmcc  no  Quantity  is 
 more  or  Xciz  fuch,  or  poIlclTes  more  or  lefs  of  the  nature  of 
 Quantity,  than  another,  it  follows  that  all  Quantities  be- 
 ing of  the  fime  general  Nature  mull  feverally  bear  a  propor- 
 tion to  each  other.  For  example,   that  can  be  no  Unit  which 
 
 .*  by  the  addition  of  an    Unit  will  not  become  two:  and  by 
 
 *  parity  of  reafon,  that  is  bo  Alillion  which  by  the  addition  of 
 
 *  a  fingle  Unit  will  not  incrc-afe  to  the  greatnefs  of  a  Million 
 
 *  and  an  Unit.     For  if  it  b»  but  a  Million  after  the  Addition 
 
 *  of  an  Unit,  it  is  plain,    it   mull    before  that  Addition  have 
 '  been  Icfs  than  a  Million  by  an  Unit.— ———•The  like  may 
 
 *  be  faid  of  all  other  Quantities,  p.  25. 
 
 The  learned  Dr.  Clarke  endeavours  to  evadelhefe  Arguments 
 about  Parts,  Sec.  by  denying  that  any  Number  of  Years,  Days, 
 and  Hours :  or  of  Miles,  Yards,  or  Feet,  '  can  be  confidered 
 '  as  any  aliquot,  or  (onfiitucnt  parts  of  infinite  'lime  or  Space,  or 
 
 *  be 
 
 *  How  this  is  confillent  with  the  Eternity  of  God,  and 
 what  the  true  meaning  of  that  Attribute  is,  See  Note  10.  Rem. 
 c.  or  Dr.  Bcntleys  Bcj/c's  Lect.  Scrm.  3x1. 
 
S^dt.  2.     Cofkermng  the  Origin  of  E^W. 
 
 the  things  as  God  would  have  them  known  to 
 us,   except  we  elfewhere  difcovcr  lome  Fallacy  or 
 
 Pre- 
 
 JVOTE  S, 
 
 ^  be  compsred  at  all  with  it,  or  bear  any  kind  ofpropc'rtioR  to 
 
 <  it,  or  be  the  foundation  ofany  Argument  in  any  Queftion 
 *.  concerning  it  '  Dcmonftr.  ofDiv.  Attr.  p,  37,  38.  Jth-Edit. 
 But  does  not  this  look  ibniething  like  avoiding  one  great 
 difliculty  by  admitting  a  greater?  For  how  do  we  come 
 ^t  out-  confufid  Idea  of  inf5nite  Quantity  but  by  firll:  hav- 
 ing a  clear  Idea  of  fome  certain  part  of  that  Quantity  ;  in. 
 Space,  for  inftance,  of  fuch  a  ftated  Length  as  a  Foot', 
 in  Time,  of  an  Hour,  and  then  by  doubling,  trebling,  or  any 
 way  multiplying  chat  fame  Idea  as  long  as  we  pleafe,  and 
 ftill  finding  as  much  room  for  or  poflibility  of  multiplying  it 
 as  we  did  when  we  began?  See  Lfjike  B.II.  c.  xvii.  ^..3.  But 
 does  this  Idea  of  Infinite  (which  fcems  to  be  the  only  one  the 
 X)o£lor  ever  thought, of)  n'hen  applied  to  Time  ov  Space,  al- 
 ter the  very  nature,  ejjence,  and  idea  of  that  Time  and  Space? 
 Do  not  we  ftill  confider  it  as  an  infinity  of  th.<i  fame  Time  and 
 Space ;  or  as  confiiling  in  a  continual  addihility  oi  fuch  por- 
 tions of  Time  and  Space;  or  as  a  Whole  made  upof  numberleia- 
 fuch  parts  of  time  and  fpace  as  are  of  tiic  fame  kind  wlththefe 
 hours  and  feet  ?  To  fay  that  infinite  Space  has  no  parts,  is 
 (as  Leibnitz  urges  in  his  fourth  Letter  to  Dr.  Clarke,  No.  Xi. 
 p.  99.)   *  to  fay  that  it  does  not  confift  of  finite  Spaces;  and, 
 
 *  that  infinite  Space  might  fabfili:,  though  all  finite  fpaces  fliould 
 
 *  be  reduced  to  nothing.  It  is  as  if  one  fnould  fay,  in  the 
 '  Cartefian  fuppofition  of  a  material,  extended,  unlimited 
 '  World,  that  fuch  a  World  might  fubfift,  though  all  the  Bo- 
 
 <  dies  of] which  it  confills,  fliould  be  reduced  to  nothing  *'.  Is 
 is  therefore  impoffible  to  conceive  that  hours  and  feet,  ^c, 
 {hould  not  be  aliquot  parts  of  infinite  1'ime  and  Space,  and. 
 that  thefe  parts  fhould  not  bear  fome  kii7d  of  Proportion  to 
 this  Infinity.  Thefe  parts  indeed  will  never  reach  o\xx  po,:tii:e,, 
 sbfolute  Infinite  (i.  e,  that  to  which  nothing  can  poliibly  be 
 added)  becai:fe  they  include  a  perpetual  addibility,  as  we  ob- 
 fcrved,  which  is  called  their  Infinity,  and  which  is  a  direil 
 contradidlion  to  what  we  call  a  pofitive  Infinite:  And  there-, 
 fore  poiitive  Infinity  applied  to  them  is  filf.y  .applied,  and  2 
 
 C  pofitive 
 
 *  See  th?s  plea  fully  confuted  by  Mr.  Co/Z/^fr,,  Lpparcial 
 Enquiry  into  the  Exiikuce  and  Nature  of  God.  B.  II.  C  ii. 
 $>.  i57,«fc. 
 
Concerning  the  Ox\gm  of 'EwW,    Chap.  I. 
 
 Prejudice  adhering  to  them.  For  we  can  judge  of 
 things  no  otherwife  than  from  our  Conceptions. 
 Nor  arc  we  to  feck  for  any  other  Criterion  of 
 Trnth  than  that  a  Conception  of  any  thing  offer- 
 ed to  the  Mind  forcibly  extorts  A  (lent;  as  there 
 is  no  other  Criterion  of  Objeds  perceived  by  the 
 Senfe?,  than  that  an  Objed,  by  its  Prefence  forces 
 us  to  perceive  it  even  againfl  our  Will?.  If  there- 
 fore the  Conceptions,  which  we  have  of  thcfe  three 
 before  mentioned,  reprefent  them  to  us  as  exit- 
 ing tiecejfarilj,    fo    that    they    cannot    be  feparatcd 
 
 from 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 pofitive  infinity  of  Matter,  Number,  Time,  Sparc,  or  any 
 quantity  that  confifts  of  parts,  or  muft  be  confidered  in 
 fiicceflion.  i.  e.  to  uhich  this  negative  infinite,  and  this  on- 
 ly, is  and  muft  be  apply'd,  are  all  contradidtions.  Now 
 inllead  of  anfvvering  this  Argument  againft  the  abfolute  In- 
 finity of  Time  and  Space,  Dr.  Clarke  firft  of  z\\  ftifpofcs 
 that  7im£  and  Space  are  abfolutcly  infinite,  and  then  becaufe, 
 according  to  this  our  way  of  conceiving  Infinity  (which  yet 
 is  the  only  v/ay  we  have  of  concci\ing  it  in  thefe  things)  they 
 could  not  polTibiy  be  infinite,  he  argues  that  we  mull  not  con- 
 fider  them  in  this  way,  namely  as  if  their  farts  had  any  re- 
 lation at  all  to  their  Infinity.  But  fliould  not  the  Argument 
 rather  be  rcvers'd,  and  the  confequence  of  it  ftand  thus  ?  This 
 is  our  only  way  of  conceiving  any  infinite  applicable  to.thele 
 Things,  but  this  way  we  cannot  conceive  thefe  to  be  pofitive- 
 ly  infinite  (or  pofitive  Infinity  cannot  be  apply'd  to  thek) 
 without  a  contradiiltion  ;  therefore  we  cannot  at  all  conceive 
 thefe  to  bepofitivcly  infinite  without  a  contradiction,  or  there- 
 fore thcfe  are  not  politively  infinite. 
 
 There  is  indeed  a  certain  ufc  of  the  term  infitiite  among  Ma- 
 thematicians, where  this  reafoning  of  Dr.  Clarke^  might  bo 
 admitted,  but  that  is  only  v.here  they  confider  Quantities  re- 
 latively, and  not  abfolutely,  and  therefore  that  can  have  no 
 place  where  we  arc  confidering  real  Exillences.  Thus  when 
 Geometricians  fay  that  one  Quantity  is  infinitely  lels  than  a- 
 noiher,  they  mean  that  their  infinitely  fmall  Quantity  is  no 
 a!i<^.uot  part  of,  bears  no  proportion  to,  or  cannot  be  compared 
 V,  ith  the  other ;  but  proportion  'is'(not]iing  real  but)  purely 
 relative,  and  therefore  the  term  infinite  apply'd  here  mull  be  lb 
 
 too. 
 
Se6t.  2      Concerning  the  Origin  <?f  E v iL 
 from  Exiftence  even  in  Thought,  we   muft  affirm 
 that  thefe  exift  of  themfdves,  and  reqiure  no  C^«^ 
 of  their  txtiienu.      But  if  we  can  conceive  thefe 
 once  not  to  have  been,  to  have  begtin  to  be,   or 
 to  be  capable  of  Annihilation,  'tis  plain  that   ^^■" 
 ce(^an  Exificr^ce  belongs  not  to  them,  nor  are  they 
 of  thcmfelves;  they  muft  therefore  have  their  Be- 
 ing from    fomething   elfe.     For,  h nee  they   may 
 eitlier  exift  or  not  exift,  Exiftence  is  not  of  their 
 Nature,  and  if  it  be  not  of  their  Nature,  they  mult 
 have  it  from  without;  and  there  wants  a  Caufe  by 
 which  this  Indift^rence  to   or  Poffibility  of  either 
 Exiftence    or    Non-exiftcnee,   may   be  dctermm  d. 
 Nor  do  we  judge  a  Caufe   in  th.ngs  to  be  other^. 
 wife  neceffary  than  as  they  are  in  their  own  Nature 
 iKdiferersty    that    is,   pajjivc  in  regard  to  Exiitence, 
 for,    if  our  Conceptions  reprefent  fomethmg  to  us 
 as  neceflary  in  its  own  Nature,  we  enquire  no  far-- 
 ther  about  the  Caufe  whereby  it  exifts  (4) , 
 
 C  2,  11^' 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 too.  Thus  for  mftance,  the  Angle  of  Contaa  made  by  a  Curve 
 md  its  Tangent  is  inftnitely  Icfs  than  any  ledihnear  Angle, 
 "bears  no  Proportion  to  it,  is  no  Meafure  of  it,  or  cannot 
 any  ways  be  compared  with  it.  But  this  is  nothing  to  Infi- 
 nity in^he  Senie  in  which  Dr.  Clarke  has  ufed  it;  fuice  by 
 that  he  muft  mean  fomc  determinate  thing  fomethmg  ot 
 which  real  Exiftence  may  be  predicated  which  is  very  difte- 
 rcn  from  Infinity  in  a  relative  Senfe,  as  it  is  fometimes  con^ 
 MeredTy  Mathematicians ;  or  in  a  progreiTive  and  ludefimtc 
 one  which  is  the  Senfe  in  which  it  is  app bed  to  Quant  tie? 
 inci'eafmg  or  decreafing  without  End;  and  therefore  what  re- 
 lates  to  thefe  Infinites  cannot  be  the  foundation  of  any  Argu^ 
 ment  concerning  the  other.  The  equivocal  Ufe  of  the  Word 
 Ste  in  thel  different  Senfes  by  P-bhng  Ivlathe-a.atics 
 and  Metaphvfics  together  has,  I  believ^e,  occafion  d  muft  ot  the 
 Confufion  attending  Subjefts  of  this  Kind.        ^^    ^      , 
 
 (4.)  The  Sum  of  what  our  Author  is  here  endeavou  ng  to 
 pviJe'is  that  neither  Matter  nor  Motio.  (and  he  will  ftiew 
 The  lame  by  and  by  oi  Space)  cm  be  inde,pend.nt  or  feU-«c, 
 
it. 
 
 20  Concerning  the  Origin  c/Evil.     Chap.  I. 
 
 ^Tis  pro-  in.  If  we  apply  this  to  our  Conceptions  of  the 
 
 ved  that  xhings  in  Qiieftion,  it  will  appear  whether  they  ht 
 
 qidres'a  fclf-exiftcnf,  or  require  a  Caule.     In  the  firft  Place 
 
 Caufe,  let  us  examin  Aiotion^  whicJi  is  really  ^tiion,  but  in 
 
 tho'  it  be  all  Action   it  is  neceffary,  if  we    may    truft    our 
 
 fuppofcd  Thoughts,    that  there  be  an   Jlgent  and  a  Patient, 
 
 „„j  1  \  without  thefe  we  have  no  Notion  of  Acflion.     In 
 
 anci  that  ,        .  ^ . 
 
 Matter  is  A'lotion  therefore,  lince  that  is  Action,  there  is  re- 
 rot  the  ciuircd  an  ^geyjt  and  a  Patient,  We  have  indeed 
 Caufe  of  x\\Q  Patient,  namely  Aiattcr  i  We  muft  in  the  next 
 Place  (ee  what  is  the  Agent :  viz,.  Whether  Mat- 
 ter produces  IVIotion  in  itfelf ;  or  (to  fpeak  proper- 
 ly) Whether  Motion  be  coeval  with  it,  natural, 
 and  nccelTarily  adhering  to  its  EfTencc,    as  Figure 
 
 is 
 
 NOTE  S, 
 
 iftent,  and  confequently  that  they  require  feme  caufe  of  their 
 Exiftencc  dillind  from  and  antecedent  to  themfelves.  And  tho' 
 lie  fi-equenty  makes  ufe  of  that  confufed  equivocal  Term,  twcef- 
 fary  Exijunce,  yet  he  feems  to  apply  it  only  in  a  negative 
 fenfe  for  Silf-Exijhnce  or  Exi[le7ice  ivithout  Caufe,  wliich  is  as 
 much  as  his  Argument  requires.  For  where  any  thing  ap- 
 pears to  be  an  efieil,  as  Matter  and  Motion  do,  we  muft  re- 
 quire a  Caufe  ;  where  no  luch  Caufednejs  can  be  difcovered, 
 we  call  the  Thing  Self-exijlent,  tho'  perhaps  it  really  be  not 
 fo,  but  might  proceed  from  foracthing  elfe;  and  where  an 
 abfurdity  would  follow  from  fuppofing  any  Being  not  to  have 
 cxified  once,  or  not  to  exift  for  the  future,  we  fay  there's  a 
 fieccffity  for  fuppofing  that  it  did  and  will  always  exift  ;  or  wc 
 flilc  that  Being  recejfarily  Exijietit :  which  is  perhaps  as  far  as 
 we  can  go.  But  as  thefe  Words,  Neceffhry  Exijience  feem  to 
 have  been  taken  to  denote  fome  pofii've,  extrinjic  Principle  of 
 Exiftencc ;  and  which  accordingly  is  often  ftiled  antecedent, 
 ahfoh.te,  original  ISeceJJlty,  a  ISeccJJity  ftinple,  and  uniform,  and 
 abfolutely  fuch  in  its  onxin  nature,  in  itfelf,  &c.  It  may  be  ot 
 fome  ule  to  confider  the  fevcral  Things  to  which  thefe  Terms 
 are  apply'd,  and  what  Ideas  wc  fix  to  them  ;  which  will  per- 
 haps convince  us  that  thcv  are  all  merely  relati've. 
 
 Ncccfiity  is  chiefly  ana  primarily  apply'd  to  Means  ;  and 
 when  it  is  thus  apply'd,  it  evidently  has  Relation  to  fome  End 
 t&  be  attaia'd  by  thole  Means  gf  which  its  aihrm'd.     Thus, 
 
 whwi 
 
Sed.  2.^     Concerning  tbe  Ongm  of  Evil,  2 1 
 
 is  to  Body.  But  if  we  remember  what  was  kid 
 down  above,  and  carefully  examine  the  Sentiments 
 and  Conceptions  of  our  Minds,  it  wiil  appear  that 
 the  Nature  of  Matter  (as  far  as  we  know  of  it)  is 
 indifferent  to  Motion,  or  Refl,  and  moves  not  ex- 
 cept it  be  moved.  Motion  therefore  does  not  fol- 
 low from  its  Nature,  nor  is  it  contained  in  its  Ef- 
 
 C  3  fcence 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 when  we  fay  fuch  a  thing  is  necefTary,  we  mean  that  fome  Emf 
 cannot  be  attained  without  the  Exiftence  of  that  thing.  Thus 
 Religion  is,  tiecejfar'^  to  a  Rational  Creature,  or  more  properly. 
 to  the  Happinefs  of  a  Rational  Creature ;  /,  e,  a  Rational  Crea- 
 ture cannot  attain  Happinefs,  its  ultimate  End,  without  Reli- 
 gion. Farther,  Means  being  a  Relative  Idei,  whatever  is  afr 
 iirm'd  of  Means  as  Means,  muft  be  Relative  alfo  ;  or  which  is 
 much  the  fame,  muft  be  an  AfFe<9:ion  of  a  Relative  Idea,  v  g. 
 When  we  fay,  any  Aflion  is  Good,  Fit,  Right,  Reafonahle,  &c. 
 all  thefe  Ter^is  are  or  fliould  be  apply'd  to  it,  as  it  is  con- 
 ceiv'd  to  be  a  Means  to  fome  End,  and  confequently  are  re« 
 lative ;  therefore  to  call  any  Adtionyf/,  hz.  in  itfclf,  will  be 
 the  fame  as  to  affirm  any  thing  to  be  rdatlve  in  itfelf,  which 
 is  nonfenfe. 
 
 Neceihty  is  alfo  applied  to  Truth,  and  then  it  has  relation 
 10  fome  other  Truths,  either  antecedent  or  confequential,  ac- 
 cording to  the  different  manner  in  which  that  Truth  is  proved 
 to  be  necejfaril)^  true,  i.e.  according  as  the  Proof  is  dire<fl  or 
 indireft.  When  the  Proof  is  diredl,  /.  e.  when  the  truth  of 
 any  Propofition  is  llaewn  to  follow  by  unavoidable  Confequence 
 from  fome  other  truth  before  known;  then  the  A^^r^^/jofthaE 
 Truth  arifes  from  the  Relation  which  it  has  to  fome  antecedent 
 ■Truth:  When  the  Pfoof  is  indireft,  /.  e.  when  the  Truth  of 
 any  Propofition  is  flicwn,  by  {hewing  that  the  Suppofition  of 
 the  con;:rary  to  that  Truth,  /.  e.  the  denying  that,  would 
 imply  the  Negation  of,  or  be  incontillent  with  fome  other 
 known  Truth;  then  the  Neceflity  of  that  Truth  arifes  from, 
 the  Relation  which  it  has  to  fome  confequential  Truth-  iV^ 
 tejjity  is  alfo  applied  to  Axioms;  and  then  it  has  Relation  to 
 the  Terms  themfelves,  /.  e.  ic  arifes  from  the  Relation  which 
 is  between  the  terms,  and  means  that  fuppofing  or  laying 
 down  thofe  Term?,  that  Relation  or  Connexion  between  thcnj 
 cannot  but  be.    Farther,  the  faniie  may  be  fa^  oiTrnth,  as  of 
 
^2i.  Concerning  the  Ongin  of  Y^vW.     Chap.  I.' 
 
 fence,  nor  do  we  conceive  it  to  arife  from  thence : 
 Matter  is  therefore  merely  palTive  in  Regard  to 
 Motion,  and  an  Agent  muft  be  fought  elfewhere. 
 If  you  fay  it  has  been  in  Motion  from  Eternity, 
 you'll  be  never  the  nearer ;  for  Duration  alters  not 
 the  Nature  of  Things.  If  it  has  moved  from  E- 
 ternity,  it  has  had  an  eternal  Caufe;  and  fince 
 Matter  is  only  paffive  with  refpect  to  the  Motion 
 which  is  in  it,  if  it  was  from  Eternity,  it  was  ftill 
 pajjlve  onlj,   and   there  wanted    an    eternal    Agenf 
 
 to 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Means,  Truth  being  relative  alfo ;  confequently  fuch  Phrafes 
 as  thefe,  true  ox  falfe  in  itfelf,  a  Contradi^ion  in  iifelf;  ox  abfo- 
 lutel'yfuch,  &c.  are  very  abfurd  ones, 
 
 Neceflity  is  alfo  applied  to  Exigence,  and  then  it  arifes  ei- 
 ther from  the  relation  which  the  Exiftence  of"  that  thing  of 
 \vhich  it  is  aflirmed  has  to  the  Exiifence  of o/^^r  things',  or 
 from  the  Relation  which  the  Exiffence  of  that  thing  has  to  the 
 Manner  of  its  oivn  Exiftence.  In  the  former  Signification, 
 when  Neccffity  of  Exiftence  has  Relation  to  the  Exiftence  of 
 other  things,  it  denotes  that  the  Suppofition  of  the  Non-exift- 
 cnce  of  that  thing  of  which  Neceflity  is  afKrmed,  implies  the 
 Non-exiftcnce  of  things  which  we  know  to  exift.  Thus  fome 
 independenc  Being  does  necejjarily  exiji.  Becaufe  to  fuppofe 
 no  independent  Being  implies  that  there  are  no  Dependent  Be- 
 ings, the  contrary  of  which  we  knov/  to  be  true;  lb  that  Ne- 
 ceflity of  Exiftence  in  this  Senfe,  is  nothing  elfe  but  Neceflity 
 of  Truth  as  related  to  Confequential  Truth.  And  this  fort  of 
 Froof  is  called  Dctnonjlratio  a  Fojleriori. 
 
 When  the  NecefHty  of  Exiftence  arifes  from  the  Rekition 
 which  rhc  Exiftence  of  any  thing  has  to  the  Manner  of  its  own 
 Exiftence,  then  Neceflity  means  that  that  thing  of  which  it 
 is  afiirm'd  exifts  after  fuch  a  Manner  that  it  never  could  have 
 not  exifted.  '  Thus  every  Independent  Being,  or  every  Being  ex- 
 ifting  without  a  Caufe,  is  neceffarily  exifting.  Becaufe  fuch  a 
 Being  from  the  <z'ery  manner  of  its  exifting,  could  not  begin  to 
 cxift,  therefore  muft  always  have  exifted,  /.  e.  does  ncccfl^arily 
 exift.  For  to  fuppofe  a  Being  to  begin  to  exift,  is  to  fuppofe 
 a  Mutation,  i>iz.  from  Non-entity  to  Entity;  and  to  fuppofe  a 
 Mutation  is  to  fuppofe  a  Caufe',  For  if  there's  no  Caufe,  every 
 .hing  muft  continue  as  it  was.    Therefore  every  Being  which 
 
 had 
 
Secfl.  2^    Concermttg  the  OnginofEvW.  2j 
 
 xo  produce  eternal  Motion  (5)  in  it:  For  eter- 
 nal Adion  cannot  be  more  eafily  conceived,  with- 
 out an  eternal  Agent,  than  temporary,  without  2 
 temporal  one.  But  you'll  fay,  what  is  eternal,  lince 
 it  was  never  made,  requires  no  Caufe.  Why  fo? 
 Suppofe  the  Sun  to  have   fhined   from    Eternity, 
 
 C  4  and 
 
 N  O  T  E  S» 
 
 had  no  Caufe  of  Exiftence,  /.  e.  wKich  is  independent,  cannot 
 begin  to  exift,  confequently  cannot  be  fuppofed  not  to  exift, 
 z.  e.  is  necejfarily  exiftent.  This  fome  call  Demonjiratio  a 
 Priori. 
 
 Neceffity  as  applied  to  Exiftence  in  thcfe  two  Ways,  mull 
 carefully  be  diftinguifhed.  For  tho'  an  independent  Being  can- 
 not be  neceflarily  exiftent  in  the  former  Senfe,  without  being 
 fo  in  the  latter  alfo  ;  yet  it  may  be  neceffarily  exiftent  in  the 
 latter  Senfe  without  being  fo  in  the  former.  There  may  be 
 two  or  more  neceflarily  exiftent  Beings  in  the  latter  Senfe, 
 i.  e.  with  regard  to  Independence,  though  in  the  former  i.  e. 
 in  Relation  to  this  Svjiem,  there  can  be  but  one  neceflarily  ex- 
 iftent Being  ;  which  may  ferve  to  fliew  us  the  inconclufivenefs 
 of  Dr.  darkens  feventh  Propofition.  And  upon  the  whole,  I 
 think  we  may  be  convinced  that  no  Ideas  can  poffibly  be  fixe4 
 £0  thefe  terms,  Neceffity  abjblute  in  itfelj.  See  alfo  the  latter 
 Part  of  N.  10.  and  R.  e. 
 
 (5.)  Eternal  Motion  feems  to  be  a  Contradi6tion,  [See  in- 
 finite Series  in  N.  3.  and  Collibers  Impartial  Enquiry,  c.  7.  and 
 Rem.  b.j  unlefs  we  could  conceive  two  Eternals,  one  before 
 the  other ;  as  every  mover  muft,  in  the  order  of  our  Ideas, 
 neceiTarily  operate  before  they  moved  ;  Thefe  things  there- 
 fore which  imply  Beginning,  Change,  Sacceflion,  or  Increafe, 
 are  finite  as  well  in  Duration,  as  in  any  other  refpecl, 
 and  confequently  the  Siippoiitions  here  and  below  are  all 
 impoflible  ones. 
 
 Of  how  little  Importance  that  old  Controverfy  is,  whe- 
 ther Matter  be  eternal,  may  .be  gathered  from  Note  i* 
 which  fliews  that  there  is  properly  no  fuch  thing  as  Mat- 
 ter, diftindl  from  Body,  /.  e.  a  folld  Subjiance  enjery  ivhere 
 the  fame,  whicli  that  Word  denotes,  and  which  is  not  to 
 to  be  found  in  that  prccife  manner  of  Exiftence.  But  if 
 with  our  Author  we  take  Matter  for  Body  only,  this  as 
 it  undergoes  perpetual  Changes  is  in  its  very  Nature  in- 
 capable of  Eternity  by  Remarks  c  and  d. 
 
 (6.)  Thefe 
 
24-  Concerning  the  Origin  ofEsW,    Chap.  I, 
 
 and  the  Earth,  nouriflied  by  its  Hear,  to  have  un-. 
 dergone  eternal  Viciffitudes  of  Seafon^  ;    had  thofe 
 VicifTitudes  therefore  no  caufe?  Would  they  be  e- 
 ver  the  kfs  dependent  on  the  Sun  as  their  Source 
 and  Original?  Hence  it  appears  that  Eternity    of 
 Aftion  docs  not  exclude  an  aftive  Caufe,  and  it  is 
 fo  far  from  Truth  that  i'uch  Adion  was  never  pro- 
 duced, bccaufe  it  is  conceived  to   have  been  from 
 Eternity,  that  we  mull:  rather  fay  it   has   always 
 been  produced.    Tor  in  the  Inftance   given  it  ap- 
 pears that  the  Sun  did  always,  and  from  Eternity^ 
 iCaufe  the  cjiangeof  Seafons :  Not  that  I  think  the 
 Sun  really  was,  or  could  be  eternal ;  but  if  Motion 
 jfhould  be  fuppof^d  eternal  (which  is  the  only  Sub- 
 terfuge left  to  them  that  deny  the  Neceffity  of  an 
 Agent,  in  order  to  the  Exiftence  of  Motion)  the 
 Sun   might  equally  be  eternal  with  its  Light  and 
 their    Effeds.     And    if  this  be    granted,    it   will 
 plainly    appear,    that  Etermty   of  lAElion    does   not 
 exclude  an  AcHve   Caufe.    If  then  we  follow  the 
 i^uidance  of  our  Thoughts,  we  muft  acknowledge 
 that  there  is  fomerhing  befide  Matter  and  Motion., 
 which  muft  be  the  Caufe  of  Motion. 
 Tl1at^7^^      IV.  Secondly,  as  to  Matter   itfelf,  if   we  may 
 /^;  requires  fuppofe  it  lo  have  had  a  Beginning,  or  to  be  anni- 
 a  Caufe  of  biiated,   tjecejfary   Exiftence  will  manifeftly  not  be 
 jts  Exift-    jnipijj.j  \^  its  Nature,  for  that  may  be  taken  from 
 ^  ''"'         it,  atlcaft  in  Thought;  but  a  thing  cannot  be  fe- 
 paratcd  from  its   Nature  or  Jiftence  even  by  the. 
 Mind:  If  therefore  Exiftence  v/eve ejjemial  to  Mat- 
 ter,  it    could    not    be   divided    from  it  even    in 
 thought,  that  is,  we  could  not   conceive  Matter 
 not  to  exift'.     But  who  doubts  whether  he  can  do 
 that  ?  Is  it  not  as  eafy  to  conceive  that  Spiice  which 
 the   Marerial  World  occupies  to   be  empty^  that  is 
 Void  of  Matter,  z%  fulll  Cannot  the   Underftand- 
 ing  aflign  to  the  Material  World  a  Beginning  ahd 
 In  End?  They  who  admit   of  S^ace,  or  a  F^^ 
 
 cmm 
 
Sed.  2.'    Concerning  the  Ong\n  ofEvWo  11^. 
 
 CHum  (6)    cannot   deny   but    Matter    is    at  Icafl: 
 mentally    feparapl?    from    Exiftence,     For    Space 
 
 may 
 
 MOTES, 
 
 (6.)  Thefe  two  Words  Space  and  Vacuum,  tho'  they  ouglil- 
 perhaps  to  have  both  the  lame  meaning,  i.  e.  neither  of  them 
 to  mean  any  real  thing  or  Quality  exifting  in  Nature,  but  on- 
 ly a  ISegation  of  Matter  and  its  Qualities;  yet  as  the  former  is 
 more  evidently  a  pofitive  Term,  it  is  apt  to  convey  an  Idea  of 
 fomething  pofitive,  and  thereby  lead  us  to  frame  fome  imagina- 
 tion of  that  lomething,  and  fo  at  length  draw  us  into  a  Notion 
 quite  different  from  that,  which  the  latter  Word  more  natural- 
 ly offers,  and  which  comes  nearer  to  the  truth  of  the  Cafe ; 
 and  therefore  it  feems  not  quite  fo  convenient  to  ufe  tl\efe  two 
 Words  promifcuoufly.    It  may  be  doubted  whether  our  fubfti- 
 tuting  the  former  of  thefe  terms  for  the  latter,  when  the  Ideas 
 ufu^Uy  fixt  to  them  have  in  reality  little  to  do  with  one  ano- 
 ther, may  not  have  given  rife  to  moft  of  the  Difputes  againft  a 
 Vacuum,  which  have  been  carried  on  by  many  able  Writers- 
 Vacuum,  in  Natural  Philofophy,  is  (according  to  the  true  irrr 
 port  of  the  Word)  only  Emptinefs,  or  abfence  of  Matter,  /.  e. 
 a  Term  that  implies  mere  Negation  ;  tho'  when  we  come  to 
 prove  that  Matter  exifts  not  every  where,  or  that  there  is  rgai- 
 ly  any  fuch  emptinefs  or  abfence  of  Matter,  we  are  obliged^ 
 thro'  the  Defecl  of  Language,  to  make  ufe  of  pofitive  Terms 
 about  it,  -viz,,  that  there  is  a  Vacuum  in  this  or  that  Place,  or 
 that  there  is  a  real  Foundation  in  ^]'ature  for  fuppofing  it. 
 Hence,  probably,  Metaphyficians,  when  they  come  to  confider 
 it,   being  ufed  to  the  Contemplation  of  abftract  EfTences,  arc 
 led   to   undcrfland  it  as  fomething  pofitive,    which   mighr 
 properly  be  faid  to  be  here  and  there.  Sec.     Their  next  Step 
 IS  to  bring  it  under  the  Imaginatio)2,  and  fo  finding  the  Iden 
 ef  Space  or  Extenfipn  in  fome  Mcafure  connefted  with  this 
 Emptinefs,  they  eafily  fubftitute  one  for  the  other,  and  often 
 change  the  negative  Idea  into  a  pofitive  one,  and  define  Vacu- 
 um to  be  Extcjijion  'void  of  Solidity,  or  Space  ivithout  Body  *» 
 whereas  the  Ideas  of  Vacuity  and  Extenfion  have  no  real 
 Conneclion  with  each  other,  as  was  faid  before,  tho'  they  be 
 very  apt  to  go  together.     Thefe  two  diftin£t  Ideas  then  being 
 both  included  under  the  Word  Vacuum,  it  becomes  equivocal, 
 and  confequently  that  may  be  affirm'd  or  d«;ny'd  of  it  accord- 
 mg  to  the  one  Idea,  which  cwnot  according  to  the  other,  and 
 
 herc^a 
 
 f  IfOcke^  B.  2,  C.  13.  f.  2^j 
 
2h'  Concerning  the  Origin  ^Evil.     Chap.  IJ 
 
 may   be  conceived  either  full  or    empty ;  that  is, 
 with  Matter,  or  without  it.     The   Notion  there- 
 fore 
 
 N  O  'f  E  S. 
 
 here  is  room  for  endlefs  Juggle,  i;.  o-.  It  may  be  faid  that 
 there  is  a  rca!  Foundation  in  Nature  for  fuppofing  a  Vacuum  in 
 the  negative  Senfe  of  the  Word,  i.  e.  as  fignifying  mere  Emp- 
 tinefs ;  but  the  fame  Thing  may  be  denied  of  it  in  the  pofitive 
 i.  e.  as  {landing  for  pure  Extension,  which  is  an  ahjlraB  Idea 
 form'd  by  the  Mind  itlelf,  and  as  fuch  has  no  Foundation 
 any  where  elfe.  Again,  Philofophers,  who  take  a  Vacuum  for 
 Space  or  Extenfion  in  the  Abftradt,  flifRy  deny  that  there  is  a 
 Vacuu?n  in  Nature,  which  is  true  indeed  of  ablolute  Space, 
 which  exifts  only  in  the  Mind,  but  is  not  fo  of  Vacuity  or 
 ab fence  of  Matter,  which  has  as  real  a  Foundation  in  Nature 
 as  Matter  itfelf  has ;  except  we'll  argue  that  'it  cannot  be  faid 
 to  be  or  to  have  Exiftevce  predicated  of  it,  becaufe  it  is  only  a 
 Negation;  which  is  playing  upon  and  puzling  one  another 
 with  Words.  To  illuflrate  what  has  been  faid  of  the  Difputes 
 about  a  Vacuum,  I  fhall  prefent  the  Reader  with  fome  Argu- 
 ments brought  againft  it  by  Mr.  Green  and  Boyle  ;  which  may 
 be  of  ufe  to  us  fo  far  as  they  overthrow  the  Reality  of  abfo- 
 lute,  fimple  Space,  which  they  do  effedlually,  tho'  I  take 
 them  to  be  mere  Quibbles  with  regard  to  the  End  for  which 
 thefe  Authors  feem  to  have  quoted  them.  They  may  ferve  al- 
 fo  for  another  Inftance  of  the  great  Confufion  caufed  by  a  jum- 
 ble of  Mathematics  and  Metaph)Tics  together :  An  Example 
 of  which  was  given  before  in  the  Word  hjinite,  N.  3. 
 
 <f  Extenfion  into  Length,  Breadth  and  Thicknefs,  or  what 
 "  is  called  mere  Space,  or  Diltance,  is  a  Quantity  abftratlcd 
 ,*  by  the  Mind,  as  all  other  Mathematical  f^H-'^iti'^i'-s  are  ;  as 
 "  a  Line,  or  Superficies;  and  can  be  no  more  imagin'd  to 
 <'  exift  in  Nature  alone,  than  Length  or  Breadth  can.  A 
 "  Line  is  produced  from  the  flowing  of  a  Point;  a  Surface 
 "  from  the  flowing  of  a  Line;  and  a  Space  or  Mathematical 
 "'  Solid  from  the  flowing  of  a  Surfice  :  But  it  is  owned 
 *'  that  there  is  no  fuch  real  Point,  and  confequcntly  no  fucli, 
 «'  Line  in  being,  therefore  no  fuch  Surface.  And  what  Rea- 
 <'  fon  can  there  be  afligned  why  we  may  not  go  on  one  Step 
 <'  farther,  and  from  the  flune  Principles  conclude  thare  is  no 
 *'  fuch  Solid.  For  how  is  it  poflible  for  a  Superficies  which 
 '<  has  not  a  Being,  and  is  imaginary  and  abftradred,  to  produce 
 S'  an  Effedi:  which  is  not  equally  fo. 
 js  ^<  We  have  faid,  that  Length,  Breadth,  and  Thicknefs  is 
 I        ■  t  "   the 
 
Sed.  2.     Coficer?img  the  Ongm  of  EwW,  zf^ 
 
 fore  of  the  Creation  of  Matter,  is  no  more  repug- 
 nant to  our  Conceptions,  than  the  Creation  of 
 Space. 
 
 V, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ««  the  Definition  of  imaginary  Space  ;  and  it  is  likcwife  the 
 *«  Notion  we  have  of  Vacuum,  as  to  the  Nature  and  Eflence 
 "  of  it;  for  the  foreign  Properties  of  Light,  or  Heat,  or 
 «'  Sound,  ^c.  are  not  inchided  in  the  Conceptions  our  Minds 
 "  have  formed  of  Room  to  move  in,  or  fimple  Space.  If 
 "  therefore  the  Delinition  of  imaginary  Space  and  a  Vacuunty 
 *'  are  the  fame,  and  a  Vacuum  is  real  Space,  it  follows,  that 
 *'  real  Space  and  imaginary  are  the  lame,  which  is  a  Contra- 
 *'  didlion.  Since  to  abftraft  any  thing  in  the  Mind  from  Be- 
 *'  ings  as  they  really  exift,  is  not  to  confider  Beings  as  they 
 «  reallv  exift. 
 
 "  Fl-om  this  Idea  o?  Space,  being  only  an  abftraded  one,  it 
 *'  is  eafy  to  give  an  Account  of  what  Place  is,  namely,  that  it 
 *'  is  only  a  Portion  of  this  abftrafted  Space,  we  have  menti- 
 *'  oned,  feparated  from  the  reft,  and  applied  to  that  Body 
 *^'  which  it  confiders  as  a  Meafure  of  its  Capacity.  Therefore 
 "  primary  or  abfolute  Place  alfo,  as  well  as  Space  is  a  Crea- 
 •'  tureofthe  Mind,  and  nothing  really  exilling,  as  fome  Phi- 
 •'  lofopher's  imagine.  Mr.  Gr:e.(iXii  Principles  of  Natural  Phi- 
 "  lofophy,  B.  I.e.  4,  8,  18. 
 
 '"■  Let  us  rummage  as  much  as  we  pleafe  into  all  the  Re- 
 "  cefles  of  our  Mind,  we  fhall  never  find  there  an  Idea  of  an 
 "  unmqveable,  indivifible,  and  penetrable  Extenfion.  And 
 «'  yet  if  there  is  a  Vacuum,  there  mull  exift  an  Extenfion  cf- 
 *'  fentially  endued  with  thefe  three  Attributes.  It  is  no  fmall 
 "  Difficulty  to  be  forced  to  admit  the  Exiiicnce  of  a  Nature, 
 "  of  which  we  have  no  Idea,  and  is  befides  repugnant  to  the 
 «*  clearejl  Ideas  of  our  Mind.  But  there  arc  a  great  many  o- 
 "  ther  Inconveniences  which  attend  this.  Is  this  Vacuum,  or 
 ♦'  immoveable,  indivifible,  an4  penetrable  Extenfion,  a  Sub- 
 *'  ftance  or  a  Mode;  Itmuft  be  one  of  the  two,  for  the  ade- 
 **  quate  Divifion  of  Being  comprehends  but  thele  two  Mem- 
 "  bers.  If  it  be  a  Mode,  they  muft  then  define  its  Subftance  j 
 "  but  that  is  what  they  can  never  do.  If  it  be  a  Subftance,  I 
 "  aflc  whether  it  be  created  or  uncreated  ?  If  created,  it  may 
 *'  perifti  without  the  Matter,  from  which  it  is  diftinft,  cea- 
 "  fing  to  be.  But  it  is  abfurd  and  contradidorv  that  a  Va- 
 y  cuum>  that  is,  a  Space  diftin£t  from  Bodies,  ftiould  be  de- 
 
 "  ftroycd 
 
2S^  Concerning  the  Origin  ofEvW.     Chap.  L' 
 
 That  is  is       V.  But    whether  there  be    any   fuch  Thing  as 
 
 not  necef-  Spa^e  or  no,  we  are  certain  that  we  have  an  Idea  of 
 
 farily  exi-     ^ 
 
 ftent,  as  **• 
 
 appears       •  ^        ^  p 
 
 from  the  ISJ   U  I    t.  ^. 
 
 confeflion 
 
 of  thofe  "  ftroyed,  and  yet  that  Bodies  fliould  be  diflant  from  each  o- 
 Perfons  "  ther,  as  they  maybe  after  the  Deftruftion  of  the  Vacuinn.  3ut 
 who  fup-  "  5t"this  Space  diiiinft  from  Bodies  is  an  uncreated  Subftance, 
 pofc  Space  "  i^  will  follow  either  that  it  is  God,  or  that  God  is  not  the 
 to  be  the  "  only  Subftance  which  necefTarily  exifts.  Which  Part  fo- 
 Image  of  "  ever  we  take  of  this  Alternarive,  we  fhall  find  our  felves  conr 
 Bod^.  "  founded.     The  laft  is  a    formal,  and  the  other  at  leaft  a 
 
 "  material  Impiety :  For  all  Extenfion  is  compofed  of  di- 
 "  ftinft  Parts,  and  confequently  feparable  from  each  other; 
 "  whence  it  refults,  that  if  God  was  extended  he  would  not 
 "  be  a  fimple,  immutable,  and  properly  infinite  Being,  but  a 
 "  W^{=,Q'i^t\Xi%%,  Ens  per  aggregationem,  each  of  which  would 
 •'  be  finite,  tho'  all  of  them  together  would  be  unlimited. 
 "  He  would  be  like  the  Material  World,  which  in  the  Car- 
 *' _/?^z«  Hypothefis,  is  an  infinite  Extenfion.  And  as  to  thofe 
 *'  who  fhould  pretend  that  God  may  be  extended  without  be- 
 "  ing  material  or  corporeal,  and  alledge  as  an  Argument,  his 
 <*  Simplicity,  you  will  find  them  folidly  refuted  in  one  of  Mr. 
 **  Arnatild's  Books,  from  which  I  fhall  cite  only  thel'e  Words: 
 "  So  far  is  the  Simplicity  of  God frojn  allon.ving  lis  Room  to  think 
 *'  that  he  mav  be  extended,  that  all  Divines  hanie  acknoavledged, 
 "  after  St.  Thomas,  that  it  is  a  neceffary  Confequence  of  the 
 "  Simplicity  of  God,  not  to  be  extended.  Will  they  fay,  with 
 <'  the  Schoolmen,  that  Space  is  no  more  than  a  Privation  of 
 «'  of  Body;  that  it  hath  no  Reality,  and  that,  properly  fpeak- 
 «'  ing,  a  Vacuufh  is  nothing?  But  this  is  fuch  an  unreafon- 
 •'  able  AfTertion,  that  all  the  modern  Philofophcrs  who  de- 
 "  clare  for  a  Vaanvn,  have  laid  it  afide,  tho'  never  fo  conve- 
 *'  nient  in  other  Rcfpects.  Gaffcndus  carefully  avoided  any 
 **  Reliance  on  fuch  an  abfurd  Hypothefis  ;  but  chofe  rather 
 «*  to  plunge  himlelf  into  the  moit  hideous  Abyfs  ofconjeftur- 
 »'  ing,  that  all  Beings  are  not  either  Subil;ances  or  Accidents, 
 f  and  that  all  Subftances  are  not  cither  Spirits  or  Bodies,  and 
 "  of  placing  the  Extenfion  of  Space  amongft  the  Beings, 
 "  which  are  neither  Corporeal  nor  Spiritual,  neither  Sub- 
 *'  ftance  nor  Accidents. 
 
 "  Mr.  Locke,  believing  that  he  could  not  define  \vhat  a  Va- 
 *'  citum  is  hath  yet  given  us  clearly  to  underlland,  that  he 
 "  took  it  for  a  pofitive  Being.  He  had  too  clear  a  Head  no: 
 «•  to  difcerii,  that  nothingnflfs  cannot  h%  extended  in  Lengthy 
 
 '  ■       ^<  Breadth, 
 
Sed.  ^.     Cmcerning  the  Origin  o/'Evil.  2^ 
 
 it  rho*  whence  we  had  it,    Philofophers  are  not  a- 
 crreed.     Thofe  that  deny  any  Diflindion  between 
 
 it 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ''  Breadth,  and  Depth.     Mr.  Hartfcshr  hath  very  clearly  ap- 
 "  prehended  this  Truth.    There  is  no  Vacuity  in   'Nature  faith 
 *'  he,  this  OHght  to  be  acknoivledged  ivithout  Difficulty.,  becaufe, 
 '*  it  is  utterly  contradiSlory  to  concei've  a  mere  l\lon-entity,  ivith 
 "  all  the  Properties  lubich  can  onl-j  agree  to  a  real  Being.  But  if" 
 **  it  is  contradidlory  thatNothingncfs  fhould  be  endued  with 
 "  Extenfion  or  any  other  Quality,  it  is  no  lefs  contradiiStory 
 *'  that  Extenfion  fhould  be  a  Jimple  Being,  fmce  it  contains 
 *'  fome  things  of  which  we  may  truly  deny  what  we  may  truly 
 *'  affirm  of  fome  others,  which  it  includes.     The  Space  filTd 
 *<  up  by  the  Sun  is  not  the  fame  Space  that  is  taken  up  by  the 
 "  Moon;  for  if  the  Sun  and  the  Moon  filled  the  fame  Space, 
 **  thefe  two  Luminaries  would  be  in  the  fame  Place,  and  pe- 
 *'  netrated  one  with  another,  fince  two  Things  cannot  be  pe- 
 **  netrated   with  a  third,  without  being  penetrated  betwixt 
 *'  themfclves.     It  is  moll  evident  that  the  Sun  and  Moon  are 
 "  not  in   the  fame  Place.     It  may  then  be  faid  truly  of  the 
 *'  Space  of  the  Sun,  that  it  is  penetrated  by  the  Sun;  and  it 
 "  may   as  truly  be  deny'd  of  the  Space  penetrated  by  the 
 "  Moon.     There  are  then  two  Portions  of  Space,  really  di- 
 ^'  Ilinfl  from  one  another,  by  reafon  that  they  receive  two 
 *'  contrary  Denominations  of  being  penetrated  and  not  being 
 ^'  penetrated  by  the  Sun.     Which  fully  confutes  thofe  who 
 "  venture  to  alfert  that  Space  is  nothing  but  the  Immenfity  of 
 "  God  ;  And  it  is  certain  that  the  divine  Immenfity  could  not 
 *•  be  the  Place  of  Bodies,  v/ithout  giving  room  to  conclude 
 "  that  it  is  compofed  of  as  many  real  dillindt  Parts  as  there 
 *•  are  Bodies  in  the  World. 
 
 "  It  will  be  in  vain  for  you  to  alledge,  that  Infinity  hath  no 
 «*  Parts;  this  mull  necefTarily  be  falfe  in  all  infinite  Number i^ 
 *'  fince  Number  ellentially  includes  feveral  Units.  Nor  will 
 "  you  have  any  more  Reafon  to  tell  us  that  incorporeal  Ex* 
 *'  tendon*  is  wholly  contain'd  in  its  Space,  and  alfo  wholly 
 ■  "  contained  in  each  Part  of  its  Space :  For  it  is  not  only 
 *'  what  we  have  no  Idea  of,  and  befides,  thwarts  our  Ideas  of 
 *'  Extenfion ;  but  alfo  what  will  prove  that  all  Bodies  take 
 
 "  up 
 
 *  Tofa  in  toto,  ^3°  tota  in  ftngulis  par  tibia :  that  is  what  the 
 Schoolmen  fay  of  the  Prefence  of  the  Soul  in  a  hu^r^'ah  Body, 
 and  of  the  Prefence  of  An^el*  in  certain  Place?, 
 
2^  Concermng  the  Origin  of  Ewi\.  Chap.  T, 
 
 it  and  Body,  bid  us  imagine  Matter  or  the  World 
 to  be  annihilated ;  and  then,  if  we  remember  the 
 Things  that  did  exift,  without  confidering  of  what 
 Kind  they  were,  but  only  that  they  were  withouu 
 the  Mind,  we  have  what  we  call  Space,  If  this  be 
 true,  then  it  will  be  certain  that  Matter  is  not 
 Self-cxiftent :  For  we  may  conhder  it  as  annihi- 
 lated, neither  can  we  attribute  any  other  Nature 
 to  it,  than  fuch  as  anfwers  to  our  Conceptions  of 
 it.  If  Space  therefore,  according  to  them,  be  a 
 Phantafm  of  Body,  that  is,  an  Idea  of  Body  re- 
 called to  mind  which  formerly  was,  but  now  is 
 nor,  or  is  it  not  fuppofed  tobe, 'tis  certain  that  Bo- 
 dy or  Matter,  fo  far  as  we  know  any  thing  of  its 
 nature,  is  indifferent  as  to  exiftence  or  non-exiflence. 
 It  has  not  therefore  Exiftence  of  itfelf;  for  that 
 which  exifts   by    Neceffity   of  Nature,  Exiftence 
 
 enters 
 
 '•  NOTES. 
 
 ^^  up  the  fame  PIacc,  fince  each  could  not  take  up  its  owa," 
 "  if  the  Divine  Extenfion  was  entirely  penetrated  by  each 
 "  Body  numerically  the  fame  with  the  Sun  and  with  the 
 "  Earth.  You  will  find  in  Mr.  ArnaiiW^,  a  folid  Refutation 
 *'  of  thofe  who  attribute  to  God  the  difFufmg  'himfelf  through- 
 "  out  infinite  Space.  Crtt.  DiSf.  p.  3083,  3084.  He  con- 
 cludes p.  308:;  "  If  the  Nature  of  penetrable  or  impenetrable 
 "  Extenfion  draws  along  with  it  fuch  a  large  Train  of  Incon- 
 *'  veniencies,  the  fliortelt  Way  is  to  affcrt  that  it  hath  no  other 
 "  Exillence  than  in  our  Mind."  If  any  Perfon  want  any- 
 more Arguments  againft  the  Exiflencc  of  fimple  Extenfionj 
 or  the  Application  of  it  to  a  Spirit,  he  may  find  enow  ia 
 Bayle,  p.  2790,  3077,^5'^.  See  alfo  Efifcopitis.  Inji,  7heol. 
 p.  294. 
 
 *  Arnauld,  Letter  8  and  9  to  Father  Malebranchc  See  al- 
 fo  a  Book  of  Peter  Petit.,  de  cxtenfione  Anims.  i^  reruni  incorpo- 
 rearum  natura.  Aud  M.  de  la  Chamhrih  Aufwer  to  it,  which' 
 he  publifhed  at  Paris,  Anno  1666.  \to  with  this  Title,  Defe?tce 
 de  r  Extenj'.on  13  de  partes  libres  de  Vajne. 
 
 All  the  Rcafons  he  alledges  to  fltew  that  Extenfion  ancJ 
 Spirituality  may  be  together  are  {o  weak,  that  they  arc  only 
 good  to  fiiew  the  F.vlfity  of  his  A'ficrtion. 
 
Se£t.  2.     Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil.  gl 
 
 enters    into  its  Uea,  nor  can  it  be  conceived  other- 
 wife  than  as  exifting. 
 
 VI.   Others    deny    that  Space  is  diftinguifhable  And  of 
 from    Matter,    any  other   way  thart  as  a  genericd  thofc  wha 
 Oumtity  is  from  a  particular  one ;  For  as  when  In-  f^^jj^^^?^* 
 divldftals  are  changed^  the  Nature  of  Man  or  Animal  fti,-,gu;f}i, 
 remains    unchanged:     So    when    Body    is    changed    or  able  from 
 iranjlated   into   another  Place,     the    Extenjion    of  the  Matter, 
 Place    7vhich   it    occupied    remains   unchanged,    namely  ^'V  o'^er- 
 /-,»    ;        .  r  ;         -n    /         T  iJ  -  Wife  then 
 
 entpty,   or  filled    with   another    Bodj.     JL  would    not  -^sExtenfi- 
 
 fpend  a  Cenfure  on  this  reafoning  ;    but  granting  it  on  in  gc- 
 To  be  true,  it  would  follow  that  Body  or  Matter  neral  is 
 contains  nothing  in  the  idea  of  it,  which  might  in-  f''°^^  ^ 
 duce  us  to  believe  that  it  is  of  itfelf,  or  cxifts  by  ^f^Son. 
 the  NeceOTity  of  its  Nature:  but  on  the  contrary, 
 that  it  may  be  annihilated  at   leaft  in  Conception. 
 If  therefore  we  confult  our  Ideas,  we  mull  con- 
 fefs  that  Matter  does  not  exift  neceffarily,  but  is  as 
 indifferent    to  Exiftence   or   Ncn-exiftence,  as  to 
 Motion  or  Reji':,  i.  c.  is  in  that  rcfped  merely  paffivc. 
 It  requires  a  Caufe  then  which  may  determine  it  to 
 Exifience  no  lefs  than  to  Motion,     For  that  whicli 
 is  not  of  itfelf  mull:  necellarily  be  of  another,  nor 
 can  we  know  that  any  thing  is  of  itfelf,  otheiwife 
 tl¥in  from  the  Ideas  whfch.we  have  of  its  nature  ;  if 
 thefe  r:prefent  the  nature  of  any  thing  as  necejfarily 
 exifting,  fo  that  we  cannot  conceive  it  not  to  be, 
 we  enquire  no  farther  about  its  caufe;  if  not,  we  fly 
 to  a  Caufe ;  nor  is  the  Underftanding  farisfied  till 
 it  has  found  one.     Why  are  we  inquifitive  about 
 the  Original  of  Man,   or  any  thing  elfe?  but  only 
 becaufe  our  Conceptions  reprefent  thefe  as  indiffer- 
 ent in  themfelves  to  Being,   and  therefore  a;  requi" 
 ring   fome  Caufe  of  their  Exifience  diflind   from 
 themfelves.     From   the  nature   then   of  Matter  as 
 well  as  Alotiony  we  are  forc'd  to  admit  of  mother 
 Principle  to  be  the  Caufe  of  both. 
 
 vir. 
 
•St 
 
 TkitSpace 
 ieems  at 
 ftrft  Sight 
 infepara- 
 ble  from 
 tLxiltencc. 
 
 ihcwn 
 that  this 
 may  a  rife 
 from  Pre- 
 judice. 
 
 ■fiippofes 
 S/>Jtfe  i 
 while 
 therefore 
 we  con- 
 ceive fome 
 thing  to 
 ex  ill  vvi  th- 
 ou t  us, 
 \vc  cannot 
 annihilate 
 Space  in 
 Thought, 
 
 Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil,     Chap.  f. 
 
 VII.  Thirdly.  As  to  Space^  many  doubt  whe- 
 ther its  nature  be  diilinguilliable  from  exiftence. 
 Whether  it  can  be  annihilated  even  in  thought,  or 
 conceived  not  to  have  been.  For  when  the  whol6 
 material  World  is  annihilated  in  the  Mind,  the  Idea 
 of  Space  remains,  as  of  a  thing  yetexifting;  it  ob- 
 trudes itfelf  upon  the  Underftanding,  and  lufFers  us 
 not  to  aflign  any  beginning  or  end  of  its  Bxiftence, 
 It  forces  us  therefore  to  confefs,  whether  we  will  or 
 no,  that  it  exifts ;  nor  doesitfeem  to  require  a  Caufe 
 whyitexifts  fince  it  is  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  being 
 felt  fufficient,  muft  have  exiftence  of  itfelf.  For 
 what  v.'ill  be  felf-e:^i(knr,  if  that  be  nor,  which 
 cannot  even  be  conceived  not  to  exifl:  ? 
 
 Villi  This  feems  to  argue  flrongly  for  the  Self- 
 exijience  of  Space.  Yet  a  Doubt  may  arife  v/he- 
 th'er  this  Inability  of  our  Underftanding  to  fepa- 
 rate  the  Nature  of  Space  from  Exiftence,  proceed 
 from  that  fame  Nature  of  Space,  or  rather  from 
 the  ImperfeElion  of  our  Rcafon.  For  tho'  all  our 
 fimple  Conceptions  mufi:  for  the  mo  ft  part  be 
 look'd  upon  as  true,  as  we  faid  before  ^,  yet  thefe 
 are  to  be  excepted  from  this  Rule  in  which  we  find 
 any  Grounds  of  Fallacy  or  Prejudice.  And  in  this 
 reafoning  about  Space,  it  is  to  be  fufpeQed  that  we 
 conned  Exiftence  with  ics  Nature  merely  out  of 
 Frejudice, 
 
 IX  We  may  underftand  how  this  comes  to  paf?, 
 if  we  confider  ifi-  That  our  Conceptions  come 
 for  the  moft  part  from  7i'ithouty  when  therefore 
 fomething  is  prefented  to  our  Mind>,  we  always 
 conceive  it  as  without  us  :  This  Notion  therefore 
 of  external  and  internal  adheres  to  all  our  Concep- 
 tions, and  we  continually  alhgn  a  P/ace  to  every 
 thing  which  we  happen  lo  think  of;  but  that  there 
 Ihould  be  any  thing  externa),  or  which  ha?  a  Place 
 
 and" 
 
 *  §    II.  Parag.  11.' 
 
Stdi  2 .     Colic ti 'nhig  the  Orig i n  ^ E v  il, 
 
 and  no  SpAce^  is  inconceivable.  As  long  then  as 
 we  think  of  any  thing  external,  we  cannot  but  at 
 the  fame  time  believe  that  Space  exifls,  in  which 
 Space  we  conceive  that  thing  to  exift.  For  while 
 we  fuppofe  any  thing  exifling  b:fide  ourfelves,  that 
 Jieceflarily  feerns  to  be  without  us;  but  imagine  all- 
 Externals  removed,  and  turn  the  Mind  upon  it/'elf, 
 and  that  without  will  be  taken  away,  and  together  with 
 it  the  neceffity  o^  Space  or  Place.  For  while  we  con* 
 ceive nothing  to  exifl  befide ourfelves,  i.e.  our  Minds, 
 we  don't  think  of  this  u-ithout,  that  is,  of  Space )  nor 
 fee  any  necefliry  for  its  Exigence,  (j.) 
 
 x; 
 
 AT  0  T  E  S, 
 
 .  (7.)  From  hence,  I  think,  it  appears  fufficiently  that  Space. 
 Were  itr  granted  to  have  any  real  Exiltcnce  at  all,  I  mean  to  be 
 any  thing  more  than  an  Idea  in  our  Minds,  (which  fome  per- 
 haps will  not  be  very  ready  to  grant,  from  an  attentive  Confi- 
 cjeration  o^  the  Notes  3.  and  6.)  yet  it  cannot  be  fuppoied 
 to  exift  ncceflarily,  in  Dr,  C/arh's  lenlc  o^ necejary  Exijrence,. 
 For  according  to   him,    '  *  Whatever  is  nccefliirily  exiiling, 
 
 *  there  is  need  of  its  Exigence,  in  order  to  the  Suppofal  of  the 
 
 *  Exigence  of  any  other  Thing;  fo  that  nothing  can  pofTibly 
 
 *  be  fuppofed  to  exift,  without  prefuppofing  and  including' 
 «  antecedently  the  Exiftence  of  that  which  is  ncccfiary, ,  There-^ 
 
 *  fore,  the  fuppofing  of  any  thing  poffibly  to  exiil  alone,  fo  33- 
 
 *  not  neceffarily  to  include   the  prefuppoial  of  fome  other 
 
 *  thing,  proves  demonftrably  that  that  oth?r  thing  is  not  ne- 
 
 *  cellarily  exifting ;  becaufe,   whatfoever  has  necelTary   Exi- 
 
 *  ftence  cannot  pojhbly,  in  any  Conception  whatfoever,  be. 
 
 *  flippofed  away.  There  cannot  poffibly  be  any  Notion  of  th«, 
 
 *  Exiftence  of  any  thing,  there  cannot  poffibly  beany  Notion 
 "*  of  Exiftence  at  all,  but  what  fliall  neceffiirily  prcinclude  the 
 '  Notion  of  that  which  is  necefiarily  exiilent. 
 
 Now  if  we  can  confidc.r  our  own  Souls  as  exifting  alone 
 and  without  this  iS/rtc^?,  without  confidering  it  as  a  caufa  Jitu 
 qua  non,  or  in  any  other  refpeft;  \w\x\\o\xt  prefuppojing,  or  unv 
 Vfs.y5  inciudingii:  This  (according  to  the  Dr.  himfelfj  vvijl 
 -prove  demonftrably  that  Space  is  not  necefTariiy  exiftent.  But 
 let  any  one  flicw  us  what  neceffi.ty  there  is  fur  the  Exiftence  of 
 
 D'  Space. 
 
 *  JiifiK-er  to  the  ftrji  tetter  p     10, 
 
34  Co7iccrni?ig  the  Ox\gmof'Ev\\.    Chap.  I. 
 
 That  X.   It  is  to  be  obfervcd  farther,  that  when  we 
 
 things  p.re  Q^nihilatc  any  thine  in  our  Mind,  we  confider  it  as 
 
 conceived  jo 
 
 to  be  an-  lOme-' 
 
 nihilated  a7  n  -r  r    c 
 
 by  fubRi-  N  U  I    h   b. 
 
 tuting 
 
 fomething  Space,  in  order  to  the  fuppofal  of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Spirit . 
 elfe  in  the  Let  him  try  whether  he  cannot  conceive  an  imjuaterial  think- 
 Room  of  ing  Subftance,  without  the  Idea  of  Space  or  Exte7ij,on;  nay, 
 them  J  but  whether  he  can  poffibly  conceive  it  with  them;  whether  thefe 
 we  have  Ideas  are  at  all  applicable  to  an  immaterial  Being,  and  not  ra- 
 nothirg  ther  repugnant  and  contr.:diclory  to  the  very  Notion  of  it ; 
 to  fublli-  whether  they  belong  not  iolcly  to  Matter,  and  if  that  were  an- 
 tutc  for  nihilated,  might  not  eafily  be  fuppofed  away.  Few,  I  believe. 
 Space.  befide  Dr.  Clarke,  can  apprehend  liow  Space  is  (as  he  calls  it 
 
 in  his  4th  Reply  to  Leibnitz*)  the  Place  of  all  Ideas.  Vm. 
 fure  Space  and  Spirit,  and  the  diftincT:  Properties  of  each, 
 appear  to  me  as  diftant  and  incompatible,  as  the  moll  remote 
 and  incondilent  things  in  nature;  and  an  extended  Soul  icems 
 juii:  fucli  another  Phrafc  as  tl  green  Sound,  an  Ell  of  Coiifciouf- 
 nefs  or  Cube  of  Virtue.  Dr.  Clarke  grants  \  that  Extenjwn  does 
 not  beloiig  to  "Thought,  (as  our  Author  has  indeed  proved  in 
 many  of  its  Modes,  in  Pnrag.  XIV.  and  XV.)  and  at  the 
 fame  time  endeavours  to  fliift  off  the  Confequencc  by  anfwer- 
 ing,  that  Thought  is  not  a  Being.  But  where's  the  Diffe- 
 rence in  this  Rei'pect  ?  Don't  we  frame  our  Idea  of  the  Bei7ig 
 from  its  conftituent  Properties  ?  And  if  thefe  have  no  manner 
 of  relation  to  Extenfion,  why  fliould  the  fuppofed  Being  to 
 which  they  belong  have  any  ?  \  Wliich  Being  is  indeed  no- 
 thing but  the  Aggregate  of  thele  Properties.  See  Note  i. 
 I'm  apt  to  think  that  our  conceiving  Subjiance  by  way  oi Suh- 
 f.ratum,  lias  led  us  into  the  Notion  that  all  kind  of  Subftances 
 mull  be  extended;  and  'tis  perhaps  impoffible  for  us  to  imagine 
 any  fuch  thing  as  an  U next  ended  Suljiance  ;  but  yet  Reafon  con- 
 vinces us  that  there  are  many  veal  things  of  which  we  can 
 form  no  Imagination.  And  that  there  are  Beings  in  Nature 
 to  which  no  manner  of  Extenfion  can  poflibly  be  apply'd,  wc 
 find  fufficiently  prov'd  by  Cied--u'orth  |(.  Among  the  various 
 Arguments  there  produced  this  is  the  Subilance  of  one.  '  If 
 '  the  Soul  be  an  extended  Suhjiance,  then  it  mufl  of  neceffity 
 *  be  either  a  Phyjical  Point  (for  a  Mathematical  Poi-nt  has  no 
 
 '  ExtenJiOTi) 
 
 *  N.   29.  p.   144. 
 
 f  Anf^Mcr  to  the  fecond  Letter,  p.   1 6. 
 %  See  R.   h.  at  the  end  of  this   Chapter, 
 i  Imcll.  Syil-  p.  82}  —  832. 
 
Sedt.  2      Co?icernirigtIjeOx\^\nof)^\'\\.  3^ 
 
 fomething  evanefcenr,  and  removed  out  of  Sight; 
 but  yet  \ve  look  upon  fome  other  thing  as  fublh- 
 
 D  2  tuted 
 
 N  0  T  E  S> 
 
 *  Exten/ion)  or  minimiiin,  the  leaft  Extcnfion  that  can  pofiiblf 
 
 *  be  ;  —  or  ehe  it  nuift  confift  of  more  inch.  P hyfecal  Points. 
 "■  joined  together.  As  for  the  former  of  thcfe,  it  is  impoflibl^ 
 «  that  one  fmgle  Atom,  or  fmallcjl  Point  of  extcnfion  ihould 
 
 *  be  able  to  perceive  diitindly  all  the  ijaricty  of  things,  /.  e. 
 
 *  take  notice  of  all  the  diJlinSl  and  different  Parts  of  an  extend- 
 
 *  cd  Objed,  and  have  a  Defcription  ov  Deiifuafirjn  oi  thcwholc 
 '  of  them  at  once  upon  itfclf:  (for  that  would  be  to  make  ic 
 
 *  di-viftbie  and  indi'vifible  at  the  ilime  time)  As  for  the  l?.trer,  if 
 *.  the  Soul  be  an  extended  Subftance  conlilHng  o^  tr.ore  Points,. 
 
 *  one  without  another,  all  concurring  in  every  Seufatioiu  therjf 
 
 *  mull  every  one  of  thefe  Points  cither  perceive  a  Poijit  and 
 '  Part  of  the  Object  only,  or  elfe  the  au/'o/V  Objed :  Now  if 
 
 *  every  Point  of  the  extended  Soul  perceives  only  a  Point  of 
 
 *  the  Objed,  then  is  there  no  one  thing  in  us  that  perceives  the 
 
 *  ^vhole  ;  or  which  can  compare  one  Part  with  another.     But 
 
 *  if  every  Point  of  the  extended  Soul  perceives  the  ivho/e  Oh- 
 '  jedl  at  once  confifting  of  many  Parts ,  then  will  the  former 
 
 *  Abfurdity  return.  And  alfo  there  would  be  innumerable  P^rr- 
 '.  cipients  of  the  fame  Obje£i  in  every  Senfation,  as  many  as 
 
 *  tliere  are  Points  in  the  extended  Soul :  And  from  both  thefe 
 '  Suppofitions  it  would  alike  foUov/  that  no  Alan  is  one  fingle 
 *.  Percipie?it,  or  Perfon,  but  that  there  are  innumerable  diftindt 
 ^  Percipients,  or  Perfons  in  every  Man.  Neither  can  there  be 
 '  any   other  Suppofuion  made  befides  thofe  three  foremea- 
 
 *  tion'd:  As  that  the  whole  ^•.Y/fWfr/5'5«/fliould  perceive  both 
 '  the  nvhole  fenjible  object,  and  all  its  fcveral  Parts,  no  part  of 
 
 *  this  Soul  in  the  mean  tinje  having  any  Perception  at  all  by 
 '  itfelf;  becaufe  the  whole  of  an  extended  Being  is  nothing  but 
 '  all  the  Parts  taken  together;  and  if  none  of  thofe  P^v;/j  hxvz. 
 
 *  any  Life,  Senfe,  or  Perception  in  them,  it  is  impofhble  there 
 '  fhould  be  any  in  the  nvhole.  But  in  very  truth,  to  iay  that 
 ^  the  whole  Soul  percciveth  all,  and  no  Part  of  it  any  thing, 
 '  is  to  acknowledge  ic  not  to  be  extended,  but  to  be  indivifeble, 
 
 *  which  is  the  thing  we  contend  for. 
 
 From  hence  alfo,  that  an  indi'vifible  Being  or  Subftance  is  not 
 capable  of  receiving  a  Di'uijible  <^iality,  nor  a  Di-vijillc  Sub-, 
 llance  an  itidi-i.>ifibie  one,  he  makes  it  tally  appear  that  neither 
 Matter  can   pofliblv  think,  nor  Spirit  be  extended,     ibid.  p. 
 827,  828,  829.      '  , 
 
 D  3'  Where 
 
36  Concernifig  the  Origin  ofEw'il.     Chap.  I. 
 
 tilted  in  the  room  of  that  which  difappeared;  thus 
 when  jiccidcnts  are  removed,  we  conceive  the  Sub- 
 fiance 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Where  Mr.  Collihcr  might  have  found  a  fufficient  Anfvvef 
 to  his  Argument  for  the  Soul's  Extenfion  from  its  recei'ving 
 Ideas  of  extended  Things*.  And  to  his  Maxim,  that  like  is 
 kvov.-n  bv  like,  and  by  Confcquencc  a  Subjeft  abfolutely  void 
 of  extenfion  could  have  no  Ideas  of  extended  things -f. 
 
 '  Nay  the  Soul  (fays  Cud-Tvorth)  conceives  extended  things 
 '  themfclves /iWA7f;;^;'i?(7'/y  and  ifidi^jijihly,  for  as  the  difierenci 
 
 *  of  the  whole  Hetnifphere  is  contrac^ted  into  a  narrow  Compafs 
 
 *  in  the  Pupil  of  the  Eye,  fo  are  all  diftances  yet  more  con- 
 
 *  tra6tcd  in  the  Soul  itfelf,  and  there  underilood  indijlantly : 
 
 *  for  t.}\Q  thought  of  a  Mile  difiance,  or  10,000  Miles,  or  femi- 
 
 *  diameters  of  the  Earth,    takes  up   no    more    room  in  the 
 
 *  Soul  nor  Jirctches  it  any  more  than  does  the  thought  of  a 
 '  foot  or  i}2ch,  or  indeed  of  a  Mathematical  Point  X-''^ 
 
 The  foregoing  Arguments  againft  the  fimplicity  of  exten' 
 fion,  as  well  as  thofc  in  Notes  tj.  and  6.  conclude  equally  a- 
 gainfc  Vix.  ColUbers  Amplitude  or  Expanfton  j|  .  Since,  if  it  hz 
 any  thing  real,  it  mufl:  have  parts  reallv  diilinft  from  one  ano- 
 ther;  which  diftinct  parts  can  never  be  the  fubjeftof  an  undi- 
 vided Quality,  nor  any  addition  of  them  ever  reach  a  pofitive 
 Infinity.  But  in  truth,  thcfc  V.''ords  Expanfion,  Amplitude,  &c. 
 don't  feem  to  imply  any  f  ofitive  thing  or  quality  diftindt  from 
 material  Extenfion,  or  indeed  to  have  any  determinate  mean- 
 ing at  all;  like  the  Vii  cf  the  School-men,  which  was  not 
 place  but  fomething  elfe,  they  did  not  know  v.h.it,  and  mull 
 belong  to  Spirits,  tho'  how  or  why  they  could  not  tell. 
 
 The  lalt  mention'd  Writer  has  a  lecond  Argnment  for  the 
 Amplitude  or  Expavfton  of  the  Dii'ive  Natttre,  grounded  on  a- 
 nother  Maxim,  viz.  Nothing  can  hejlo^v  nvhat  is  has  tiot  in  it- 
 felf: but  God  has  created  material expanfion,  therefore  he  mull 
 be  expanded  himfelf,  p.  223.  Which  Argument  is  anlwefd 
 by  our  Author  in  the  1 8  th  Paragr  who_fliews  that  fuch  Expaii- 
 fion  is  a  mere  imperfedion,  as  well  as  materiality,  and  confe- 
 qucntly  is  equally  inconfillent  with  the  perfcdion  of  the  Di- 
 vine Being.  See  alfo  Rem.  h. 
 
 That 
 
 *   Impartial  Enquiry  p.    222. 
 -j-   Ibid.   p.    223. 
 
 X    hitell.   Syfi.   p    827,   829.   ^c. 
 11  Impartial  Enquiry 
 
SevSt.  2.     Concerning  the  Origin  ofEvW,  37 
 
 fiance  remaining;  fetting  afide  Matter,  we  fubfti- 
 ture  Space ;  but  when  Space  is  removed,  we  have 
 nothing  to  fubftitute  in  its  (lead,  except  material 
 or  external  Things  j  but  all  thcfe  fuppofe  Space, 
 and  cannot  be  conceiv'd  without  it;  no  wonder 
 then  that  we  cannot  annihilate  Space,  while  we 
 conceive  thefe  as  exifting.  If  therefore  we  would 
 come  at  a.  right  Underihnding  of  the  Nature  of 
 Space,  we  muft  not  apply  our  Minds  to  any  thing 
 material  or  external,  but  attend  to  our  own 
 Thoughts  and  Senfations,  which  have  no  rcla'^ion 
 to  external  Things  or  to  Qiiantity :  And  when  our 
 Minds  are  thus  employed,  there  will  appear  to  be 
 no  more  Neceffity  for  the  Exiftence  of  Space  than 
 of  Matter. 
 
 Xr.  It  proceeds  therefore  (vomPrejudiccy    and  an  We  at 
 unwary  way  of  thinking,  that  we  couple  nccefTity  of  ^"^\P  ^,^ 
 
 r    -a  •  L     r  •  L       J  \  f  \  \.  annihilate 
 
 txijtence  with  Space;    neither  do  we  obferve  that  ^^,}^j|g 
 
 for  this  very  Reafon  we  cannot  conceive  Space  not  thofe 
 to  exif},  becaufe  we  imagine  thofe  things  ftill  exi-  things 
 iting,  which  cannot  exift  without  Space;  which  is  continue 
 no  greater  a  Wonder  than  if  any  one  intent  upon  l""      \  ■ 
 the  Mobility  of  the  Heavenly  Bodies,  fhould  cona-  and  there- 
 plain  that  he  could  not    annihilate   the  Matter  of  foreitcan- 
 thera,    while  the    -^or/o'?  continued;    for   material  "pt  be  an- 
 and    extern?.!   things   have  no   lefs  Dependance  on  nihilated. 
 and    Conneiflion   with  Space,    than    Mobility    has 
 with  Matter;  if  then  we   con:eive    God   only  to 
 ejfift,    -vyhile   he    contemplates   himfelf  as  exifting 
 
 D   5  alon^ 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 That  no  CoUcfljon  or  Combination  of  Atoms  can  think^ 
 (and  the  fame  reafon  holds  againft  any  thing  which  can  be  con- 
 ceiv'd by  way  oi parts)  fee  proved  at  large  in  Bayle's  Dift. 
 p.  1924.  under  the  Aricle  Leucippia,  Remark  E.  See  alfo 
 Dr.  Ciarke''&  Letters  to  Z)ui/--zw/ Concerning  the  Immortality  of 
 the  Soul,  if^c.  or  Religio)!  of  Nature  Deli?:,  p.  i86,  ^c.  or 
 H.  Ditionh  Appendix  to  his  Djfcouxft  contcrni;ig  the  R.efL|r- 
 tet^ion. 
 
38  Concerning  the  Origin  o/'Evil.     Chap.  I, 
 
 alone,  he  cnn  no  more  be  judged  to  ftand  in  need 
 of  Space,  or  be  confcious  of  it  as  aclually  exiting, 
 than  we  are  while  we  contemplate  only  the  reflex 
 Ad-s  of  the  Mind.     But  when  he  willed  external 
 Things,     he   made   Flace    or  Space    for    them    to 
 exifl-  in. 
 God  can-       XII.    It  may  be  objecled  that  we  can  fep.ar.ue 
 'not  be        Extfteme  from   God   after    the  fame  manner  as  we 
 conceived  endeavour    to   nmo/e   it  fiom    Space.      For    the 
 ?xiV°        Mind    being   reflected  on  itfelf,    and  folely  intent 
 v.V  upon    contemphting    i^s    Operations,     may    deny 
 
 God  to  exift  as  well  as  Space.  If  therefore  we  de- 
 ny Space  to  be  felf-exittent,  becauf?  we  can  confi- 
 der  our  Mind  as  exifling  alone  in  Nature,  and 
 confequently  Space  as  not  cxifling;  why  may  not 
 we,  by  the  fame  way  of  reafoning,  deny  that  God 
 h  Jclf-exifientt  I  anlwer,  we  are  confcious  that  we 
 do  not  exift  of  ourf'elves,  while  therefore  we  con- 
 template ourfelves  and  our  intelledual  Operations, 
 we  are  ncceflarily  carried  to  fome  Caufe ;  being 
 certain  that  we  have  Exiflence  from  another,  and 
 not  of  (burfelves;  we  cannot  therefore  exert  even 
 one  ad  of  the  Underfl:anding  but  it  mufl:  have  a 
 neceflary  Connexion  with  fome  Cmfc  diflind 
 from  u«. 
 Bccaufe  XIII.    We  cannot   therefore  conceive  ourfelves 
 
 Weave  as  the  only  Beings  in  nature,  for  v/e  mufl:  admit, 
 confcious  along  with  us,  the  Caufe  from  which  we  derive 
 that  we  £xiftence,  which  is  a  confufcd  Conception  of  God. 
 exift°of  ^^^  ^^'^  ^^^^^  cannot  be  faid  of  Space;  for  the  Ope- 
 curfclvEs.  rations  of  our  Mind  aie  fo  intimately  perceived  by 
 '  us  as  to  have  no  neceffary  Connexion  with  Space, 
 
 and  we  underfland  clearly  eaough  that  thefe  may 
 be,  tho'  there  were  no  Space,  and  do  not  fland  in 
 need  of  it  for  their  Exiftence.  If  we  conceive  our- 
 felves as  confifting  of  both  Body  and  Adind^  'tis 
 certain  we  fland  in  need  of  Space  for  our  Exiftence, 
 and  during  that  Conception,  'tis  impoflible  for  us 
 '     ■  ■        .  '■■  '■  ■  ■    ■  to 
 
Sed.  2.     Concerning  the  Origin  of  RwW,  39 
 
 to  conceive  Space  to  be  annihilated;  viz,.  h<^- 
 caufe  fuch  a  Conception  has  a  necelTary  Conneftion 
 with  Space.  After  the  fame  manner,  if  we  con- 
 ceive ourfelves  to  be  Mind  only,  yet  we  muft  own 
 the  Exigence  of  God.  For  a  finite  Mind  requires 
 a  Caufe  from  which  it  may  receive  Exigence,  no  lefs 
 than  a  Body  does  a  Place  tn  which  it  may  exift; 
 and  from  hence,  in  reality,  it  is  that  we  attribute 
 Self-exijience  to  Space,  becaufe  whenever  we  think 
 of  ourfelves,  we  imagine  ourfelves  to  confift  of 
 both  Body  and  Mind.  While  therefore  we  are  con- 
 fcious  of  our  own  Exigence,  we  form  our  Belief 
 of  Space  alfo  as  neceffarily  exifling,  fince  it  is 
 conneiSed  with  the  Conception  of  Bodp  i.  e.  of 
 Qtirftlves, 
 
 XIV.  Secondly,  It  is  remarkable  that  the  Con-  Smell, 
 ceptions  which  we  have  from  hearings  fmclUngt  or  Talk, 
 tafting,   tho'  they   be   produced   in  us  by  external  Hearing, 
 Objects,  yet  they    have  no  Connexion   with  the  aive  us 
 Conceptions  o^  Space -^    for    who   can  imagine  the  any  notice 
 Longitude,  Latitude,  orProfundity  of  5'i??i«i,  Smelly  of  the 
 ovTaJie^  If  then  we  had  only  thefe  three  Senfes,  we  ^^ift^''''^^ 
 fhould  not  fo  much  as  imagine  that  there  was  any        ^ 
 Space.     Our   Conceptions   therefore   abftraft  from 
 all  Extenfion,    nor  do  the  Notion-;  of  external  and 
 internal  adhere  fo  clo'ely  to  our  Thoughts  bnt  we 
 may  lay  them  allde  ',  and  if  we  fet  thefe  afide,  the 
 Sclf-exiftence  of  Space  doe?  not  neceffaily  ohiruds 
 itfelf  upom  u%     Now  as  the  common  People   at- 
 tribute   Smells,    Tajles,     Colours,    and    other  fenjib'e 
 Qualities  to   the  Objeds    themfelves,    and   believe 
 that    they  exift  in  them;  while  they  who  attend 
 better  to  their  Thoughts,  know  that  they  exift  on- 
 ly in  the  Mind,  and  are  nothing  in  the  things  by 
 which  they  are  produced,  befide  the  peculiar  Mo- 
 tion and  Texture  of  their    Parts;    after  the    fame 
 manner,   'tis    probable,  we    are    impofed    upon  in 
 attributing   necelTary    Exiftcnce  to  Space,    becaufe 
 
 P  4  we 
 
40  Concerning  tbe  Origin  ofEvW.     Chap.  I. 
 
 we  obfcrve  that  alinofl;  all  our  Thoughts  are  pro- 
 cluced  in  us  from  withour,  and  thereby  accuftom- 
 ing  ourfclves  to  join  Space  with  them,  while  we 
 arc  confcious  that  we  think,  we  conceive  alfo  that 
 Space  exirts;  Whereas,  if  \vt  remember  that  aH 
 our  Senfation?,  even  thofe  produced  by  exfernal 
 Things;,  fuch  as  Smells,  c^c,  do  not  bring  along 
 with  them  the  Notion  of  Space,  we  may  eafily 
 lay  alide  this  Prejudice ,  and  withdrawing  our 
 Thoughts  fiom  the  Contemplation  of  Space,  ma^ 
 conceive  it  not  ro^f. 
 
 The  XV.    And    this    will  appear  Thirdly,    if  by  a 
 
 il^'-ic/^  reflex  A(5b  we  view  the  Aiind  itfelf  and  its  Opem-. 
 u nor  it-  '^''^^'O'^^s  \  for  nothing  of  Extenfion  or  Space  offer's 
 felt  has  no  itfelf  in  thefe ;  nor  does  the  Mind,  when  employ- 
 relation  to  ed  about  them,  think  at  all  of  Space,  nor  is  it 
 Space, nor  confcious  tliat  it  occupies  Space:  It  withdraws 
 '.(.y  ^^j.|^' therefore  from  the  Conceptions  of  internal  and 
 i* "  externd,    and  may    conceive  nothing  to  be  in  the 
 
 World  befides  hfc]j\  and  its  Cauje ;  i.  e.  can  imia- 
 gine  Space  to  be  non-exiflent.  Thinking  Beings 
 then  may  exift  without  Space ;  It  proceeds  there- 
 fore from  Prejudice  that  we  join  Necejfary  Exijlenc^ 
 with  it. 
 
 We  may         XVI.    Fourthly,    It  is   to    be    remarked   that 
 
 conceive     Space,    fo    far   as   appears    to    our  Conceptions,  is 
 
 Space  to     ^jf  fm-h    a    Nature    as   cannot   be    annihilated    by 
 
 L-fteTall  ^'  ^^^^^i    Toi'  ^hey   are  in  (uch  a  manner    united    t6 
 
 together,    ^nd  dependent  upon  one  another,   that  if  we  fup- 
 
 butnotbypofe     one    Part,    it    will    imply    a    Contradidion 
 
 5*arts.         for  the  others  not  to  exifl.     We  can  in  Thought 
 
 *    '  remove  all   W-ater   put  of -a    VefTel,   or  Chamber, 
 
 and    the     Space    interjacent     between    the    Walls 
 
 remains  extended  in  Length,  Breadth,  and  Depth': 
 
 put  the  Space  caniioc  be  removedj    lince  it  is  of  its 
 
Sedt.  2.     Cojic erni rig  the  Ongm  of 'EvW.  41 
 
 own  Nature  immmovable,  (8.)  nor  can  it  be  an- 
 vihilatcd;  for  Diftance  would  ftill  remain  between 
 the  Bounds,  which  cannot  be  without  Extenlion, 
 nor  Extenlion  without  a  Subjed ;  but  Space,  as 
 fa}'  as  we  can  conceive  itj  is  the  primary  Suhjd^  (c?.) 
 
 ■        ■■  pf 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (8.)  That  is,  as  I  have  often  hinted,  if  we  fuppofe  it  tq 
 have  any  real  Nature  or  to  exijl  at  all,  it  mufi:,  as  our  Author 
 fays,  exill:  every  where,  and  cannot  be  removed  by  parts.  And 
 in  this  Senfe  fli'ould  the  Words  of  Sir  I/aec  NeivtoJi  be  under- 
 ftood  *.  "  The  order  of  the  parts  of  Space  is  immutable  >  re- 
 **  mo've  thefe  from  their  places^  and  you  nvill  remo-ve  them,  as  / 
 *'  may  fay,  from  themfel'ves."  For  to  fuppofe  it  all  at  once  a- 
 v/ay,  feems  fo  far  from  amounting  to  that  ahfw-d  Suppofition 
 xnerLtion'd  by  Dr.  Clarke  f ,  that  it  is  i)o  more  than  what  mufi: 
 be  conceiv'd  in  every  Annihilation  of  any  thing,  which  is  the 
 total  deftrutlion  or  taking  a^vay  of  Exiflcnce,  the  removal  oF 
 it,  as  we  may  {^j,  from  itfclf,  or  from  Being:  Which  is  ^ 
 Suppofition  that  is  generally  thought  to  carry  no  abfurdity 
 along  with  it. 
 
 (9  )  Dr.  Clarke  affirms;]:  that  ^pace  is  not  a  Suhfance ;  and 
 yet  declares  that  it  has  real  ^alities  Ij.  Is  not  this  either  to 
 fuppofe  ^/alities  or  Properties  inherent  in  one  another?  Or 
 clfe,  with  Gnffendus,  to  imagine  fome  middle  thing  betwecii 
 Subfance  and  Accident,  which  is  neither  ofthem^  but  partakes 
 of  both  ? 
 
 The  learned  Writer  referred  to  in  Note  3.  is  of  the  fame 
 Opinion  \vith  our  Author  in  this  Place,  viz.  that  we  are  apt 
 to  conceive  Space  to  be  a  fort  of  Subllancc  or  Subfratum  0/ 
 Exteitfon,  and  fo  are  ufed  to  attribute  that  and  other  imagi- 
 nary Qualities  to  it.  *  The  Idea  of  Space  is  not  the  Idea  qF 
 '  Extenfion,  but  of  fomething  extended,  it  is  the  Subfratum  of 
 
 *  Extenfion,  and  not  Extenfion  itfelf.     But  when  I  fay  it  is 
 
 *  the  Subjlratum,  do  not  imagine  I  make  it  to  be  any  thing 
 '  nvithout;  it  is  an  Ideal St,ifratum,  and  nothing  more.  When 
 
 *  the  Mind  has  been  confidering  the  Idea  of  Extenfion  at)- 
 <  ftraded  from  the  extended  Bodies,  from  ^vhcnce  it  firft  re- 
 
 *  ceived 
 
 *  Princ.  Schol.  ad  dcf  8. 
 
 ■|-  Anfn.ver  to  the  6th  Letter,  p.   39, 
 
 X  Anfwer  to  the  ^d  Lett.  p.  2"?..  and  to  the  ^th  p.  zS, 
 
 L  An^iAjer  to  the  6th  Letter,  p-  30, 
 
42  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil.     Chap.  I. 
 
 of  Extenfion ;  therefore  it  neceflarily  continues 
 with    Diftance,  nor    can   it  be  annihilated,   unlefs 
 
 we 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *  ccived  the  Idea,  (whether  as  they  were  Caufes  or  Occafions 
 «  of  it  I  confider  not  now)  it  is  a  very  eafy  Step  for  the  Mind 
 
 *  to  make  farther,  to  frame  an  imaginary  Subjiralum  to  fupport 
 
 *  an  imaginary  Extenfion.  And  this  is  the  more  eafy  becaufe  the 
 
 *  Idea  we  have  of  a  real  Suhjlratum  or  Subflance,  the  Support 
 '  of  real  Qualities  is  dark  and  confufed,  an  Idea  o'i  fomenjjhat, 
 '  and  that's  all.  Now  it  is  but  joyning  the  Idea  o^fomen.vhat 
 '  with  the  Idea  of  one  Quality  only,  namely  Extenfion,  and 
 
 *  we  have  an  imaginary  Subjiratum  prefently  formed,  that  is, 
 '  an  Idea  o^ Space,  or  an  /^t'a/ extended  fomething.  Whether 
 
 *  this  be  not  the  very  Cafe,  I  mail  leave  to  any  Man  to  judgq 
 
 *  by  reflefting  on  his  own  Ideas. 
 
 Again  ;  To  this  Quellion,  Why  may  jiot  Space  he  rather  de- 
 fined Extenfon  in  the  AbJlraSl,  or  imaginary  Extenfion  rather 
 than  the  imagijiary  Subjiratum  of  imaginary  Extenfion  ?  He  an- 
 fwers,  '  Extenfion  in  the  general  or  in  the  abftraft,  is  an  Idea 
 
 *  of  pure  hitelle^ly  i.e.  is   to  be  underftood,  but  cannot  be 
 
 *  imagind,  any  more  than  Whitenefs  in  the  general,  or  a 
 «  thoufand  other  the  like  abftrafl  Ideas.     But  as  foon  as  Ima- 
 
 *  gination  comes  to  deal  with  this  general  abllrad  Idea  (or 
 «  Ideas)  it  fupplies  it  with  an  imaginary  Subflratum,  and   fo 
 
 *  makes   the  general  which  was  invifble,  be  conceived    as  a 
 
 *  particular,  for  the  help  of  the  Underftanding.     So  if  the 
 
 *  Imagination  comes  to  conceive  any  certain  Degree  of  White- 
 
 *  nefs,  it  fupplies  the  Mind  with  fome  imaginary  white  Sur- 
 «  face,  and  brings  down  the  general   Idea  to  a  particular  Ob- 
 
 *  jedh     In  like  manner,  when  it  comes  to  conceive  a  Lengthy 
 
 <  a  Breadth,  a  Thicknefs,  it  fapplies  the  Mind  with  a  Sabftra- 
 
 *  turn  pro  hac  'vice,  fuch  as  may  ferve  the  Purpofe,  otherwife 
 «  the  Mind  mull  reil  in  pure  intcllcd  only,  as  in  Numbers ; 
 
 <  and  there  is  nothing  more  tedious  or  uneafy  to   the  Mind 
 
 *  generally  than  to  be  wholly  abjlrafted;  which  is  the  Reafon, 
 '  by  the  way,  that  Arithmetical  Demonftrations,  tho'  as  clear 
 
 *  and  certain  as  any,  are  lefs  delightful  than  Geometrical,  and 
 '  nothing  more  irkfome  than  abftraft  Numbers.  Now  Space. 
 «  being  the  Obje£t  of  the  Imagination,  and  not  of  pure  Intcl- 
 
 *  leSi,  as  are  all    general,  abllra£t  Ideas,    it  is   properly  the 
 
 *  imaginary  Subjiratum  of  an  imaginary  Extenfion,  or  the  gene- 
 '■  ral  Idea  of  Extenfion  particularized  in  an  imaginary  SubjeSii 
 «  and  hence  it  is  that  Space  is  faid   to  bo  extended,   which 
 
 «  would 
 
Sea.  2.     Concerfiiftg  the  Ongm  of  Evil.  4J 
 
 we  would  have  Extenfion  without  a  Subjefl, 
 |:hat  is  imo  Length,  Breadth,  md  Depth  ^'nhom^ny 
 Thing  Lo-ag,  Broad  and  Deep.  Hence  it  appears 
 that  Space  cannot  be  partially  annihilated,  and  from 
 hence  the  Opinion  of  its Jelf-exijieuce might  mk. 
 
 XVIT.  For  fince  it  is  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  muft  jJ^^^^J^^' 
 be  annihilated  either  alltogetherj  or  not  at  all,  they  Prejudice 
 that  attempted  to  annihilare  it  only  by  Parts,  faw  for  its  felt 
 that  it  was  impoflible  to  de  done,  the  Nature  of  the  cxiftencc^ 
 Thing  remonftratedagainft  a  partial  Annihilation,  and 
 if  one  Part  be  fuppofed,  all  others  might  be  demonftrat- 
 cd  to  exifl:  by  neceffary  Connexion,  But  if  any  one 
 ihould  fuppofe  all  extended  things  to  be  removed  to- 
 gether at  iOnce,  he  would  find  nothing  impoffiblein 
 that  Suppofition:  For  one  may  imagine  nothing  to 
 exift  in  Nature  befidehis  own  Soul,  and  the  Caufe  on 
 which  it  depends ;  v/hich,  as  a  thinking  Being,  includes 
 nothing  of  Extenfion  in  it:  Every  thing  that  is  ex- 
 tended may  therefore  be  feparated  from  Exiftence. 
 But  they  that  attempted  this  by  Parts,  when  they 
 found  it  impoflfible,  did  not  fcruple  to  refol  ve  the  Caufe 
 into  the  Self-exiftence  of  Space  j  tho'  in  reality  it  did 
 
 noe 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 '  would  be  Nonfenfe  to  (ay  of  Extenfion  Itfelf :  And  Bodici; 
 «  are  faid  to  be  in  Space,  which  would  likewife  be  Nonfenfe 
 
 *  to  fay  of  Extenfion.     And  fo  it  is  conceived  as  immoveable^ 
 
 *  indivifible,  infinite.     Immoveable,  ^c.  all  Properties  ofSiib 
 
 *  fiances ;  which  makes  it  plain  that  it  is  conceived  after  the 
 
 *  manner  of  Sabftance,  and  therefore  is,  becaufe  it  can  be  no- 
 
 *  thing  elfe,  an  imaginary  Subfiratum,  which  the  Mind  takes; 
 
 *  to  particularize,  and  thereby  render  conceivable  its  general 
 
 *  Idea  of  Extenfion  ;  which  could  not  otherwife  fall  within 
 
 *  the  Imagination,  nor  be  ellimated   any  way  but  by  abftraft 
 
 *  numbers,  fo  many  Yards,  or  fo  many  Miles,   lo,  20,  30  j 
 
 *  without  attending  to  any  thing  but  the  numbers,  and  the 
 
 *  meaning  of  the  Words,  Yards,  Miles,  ^c.  as  it  is  when  we 
 
 *  reckon  Ounces,  Pounds,  Iffc.  of  Weight.  —  Thus  then  you 
 
 *  fee  how  we  come  by  the  Notion  otSpace^  ^nd  wh^t  it  i\»\ 
 §ee  alfo  Note  3.  .:...« 
 
4,4-  Concerning  the  Ongm  of  ¥^\i\.     Chap.  I, 
 
 not  arife  from  thence,  but  from  this,  that  they  at- 
 tempted to  fepaiMte  things  naturally  infeperable,  name- 
 ly, the  Parts  of  Space  one  from  another. 
 We  are  XVIII.  But  whether  there  be  any  fuch  Thing 
 
 rifwi""^  as  Space,  or  no;  whether  its  Extenfion  be  diftin- 
 ^laufe  in  g^i'^i^d  from  the  Extenfion  of  Body,  or  not  :  Be 
 Whatman-  it  nothing  at  ail;  Be  it  mere  privation  of  ComaFty 
 Tier  focver  as  fome  are  pleafed  to  term  it ;  be  it  mere  PoJJibi' 
 tl^e  Dif-      lity  or  Capacity  of  exiRin?,  as  others;  be  it,    laftly, 
 
 pute  about     -li         r  /■  J^  r  ■  r,r         j  rr"^ 
 
 Space  be      ^^^"^r  lometliing  credited,   or  or  itfelf   and   necejjar- 
 
 determin-  ^^  cxijJing ;  yet  ftill,  as  far  as  we  know  any  thing  of 
 cd.  the  Nature  of  it,  'tis  an  indolent  thing,  it  neither 
 
 ii^Sy  nor  is  in  the  leail:  aBcd  upon',  it  cannot  there- 
 fore, as  mere  Extenfion,  under  which  Notion  only 
 n  appears  to  us,  be  the  Caufe  o^ Matter,  or  imprels 
 Amotion  on  it.  There  muft  then  neceflarily  be  a- 
 mother  Canfe  o£  Alatter  and  Motion,  that  is  a5iive, 
 Jelf-exifient,  and  the  Caufe  of  all  Things  and  Atiions, 
 which,  fince  they  are  not  of  themfelves,  require  a 
 Caufe. 
 
 SECT.     III. 
 
 Of  the  Tirjl  Caufe, 
 
 Our  Rea-  \'\7'^'^^'^  '■^^'^  active  Principle  is  we  cannot 
 fpniiv^s  a-  '  '  apprclund  otherwife  than  by  Reafon,  for  ;c 
 bout  the  occurs  not  to  the  Senfes,  unlcfs  by  its  EffeEis ', 
 firft  Caufe  nor  is  it  perceived  by  them  any  more  than  Light 
 ^^}^^%.  is  by  the;  Ears:  Our  Reafonin^s  therefore  about 
 blhidMan  ^^"'''^  Principle  will  be  like  thofe  of  a  i?Iind  Mm  about 
 about  Light,  A  blind  Man  may  be  aflured  that  there  is  a 
 light,  certain  thing  called  Light,  which  the  Eye  can  per- 
 fince  It  IS  ceive,  as  the  Nofe  can  Smell ;  he  may  be  taught 
 fea  of°  *  ?^^°  ^y  t\\^m  who  fee,  to  underftand  many  Acf- 
 "Senfc.        vantages  of  Light,   namely  that  it  can  dirc^^  the 
 
 ■  ■  ^teps. 
 
Sed.  3.     Concerning  the  Origin  ^EviL'  4^ 
 
 Steps,  that  it  can  ivarmi  that  it  derives  its  Origin 
 from  a  large  remote  Body,  i.e.  the  Sun;  that  by 
 the  help  of  it  very  difiant  Bodie^  may  be  perceived, 
 with  their  Forw J  and  other  Qualities  unknown  tohim ; 
 and  that  Fire  which  affords  only  heat  to  him,  can 
 give  Light  alfo  to  them  who  fee:  LaRly,  that  it 
 arifes  from  fome  Motion  in  the  minutefl  Partifles 
 of  a  Fluid. 
 
 II.  From  thefe  ^.v/crWProperti  s  h£  might  dif-  Yet  wc 
 courfe  of  L'ght,    and  in  fome  Mcalure  underfland  know  a 
 the  reafonings   of  other   Men  upon   itj    he  would  g'^'^^^'na- 
 believe  it  to  bediftind  from  Heat;   he  would  ea- "-^   J"^' 
 gerly  defire,  and   willingly   undergo  many   Hard-  j^g  {^^ 
 ihips,  to   enjoy  the  Benefit  of  it ;  yet  would  he 
 never  have  any  fuch  Senfe  of  it  as  thofe  who  fee. 
 After  the  fame  manner  we  may  know  many  things 
 about  this  adive  Principb,  which  we  are  compel- 
 led, by  the  force  of  Rsafons,    to    believe  certainly 
 to  exiff,  tho'  we  are  no  lefs  ignorant  of  what  it  is 
 in  itfelf,  than   the  blind   Man  is  of  the  Senfation 
 which  Light  produces  in  thofe  v;lio  fee  *. 
 
 III,  For  Inftance;  In  the  firft  Plice  we  are  certain  Tlut  aU 
 that  all  other  things  come  from  this  aElive  Principle:  och^^r 
 For  nothing  elfe  as  v/e  h:ve  Ihewn  before  t.  con- '^^'"S^ . 
 tains   in  irfelf  Necejfary   Exifisnce  or  aftive  Poii-eri  f^Q^^^], 
 entirely    independent    of  any    other;  as    therefore 
 
 itfelf  is  from  none,  fo  all  others  are  from  it.  For 
 from  hence  we  conclude  that  tliis  Principle  does 
 exiff,  becaufe  after  confjdering  the  refl  of  the 
 things  which  do  exifl,  we  perceive  that  they  could 
 neither  i;e  nor  a5},  if  that  had  not  exiflcd,  and  ex- 
 cited Motion  in  their. 
 
 IV.  Secondly,  we  are  certain  that    this   Principle  That  it  is 
 is  One,  Similar  and  uniform :  For  Aiatter  is  as  to  <>»«' 
 
 *  This  Compart  [on  ii  farther  ilUijirated  h^  thi  Author  of  the 
 Procedure  of  Huiii^n  Underltanding,  in  hn  Int>odu^io»,^Con-. 
 cerning  the  ufc  n-vhich  is  wade  of  it.  See.  Rem.  \. 
 
 f  §.  2.  Paragr.  3,  4,  5,  ^c.  and  Rcmarfc  C. 
 
 its 
 
46  Concernmg  the  Origin  o/'Evil.     Chap.  f. 
 
 its  EJfence,  every  where  One  and  alike;  the  fame 
 muft  be  faid  of  Space,  if  we  grant  it  to  be  any 
 thing  diftind  from  Matter :  much  more  muft  the 
 Caule  which  fills  Space  with  Matter  be  One^  Jimplc 
 md  uniform,  (lo.) 
 
 V.  Thirdly 
 
 NOTE  S, 
 
 fio  j  This  Argument  (as  well  as  Come  cidicri.-  hereafter  men-- 
 ilon'd)  were  the  Foundatioa  of  it  true,  can  but  be  call'd  a  pre 
 fumptive  one  at  beil :  nay,  in  truth  the  contrary  will  rather 
 follow  from  the  multiplicity  and  di-verfty  of  created  Suhjiances. 
 We  fhall  therefore  endeavour  to  give  a  dilHnfl  proof  of  the 
 5m/g- and  Attributes  oC  God,  fo  hx  at  lead  as  the  knowledge  of 
 them  may  aficd:  our  prefent  Subiect. 
 
 Now  thefe  feem  capable  of  a  clear  deduction  from  this  one 
 felf-e'videntVnnc\Y>\c*  I exijl.  I  myfelf  exifl:  therefore _/cw^- 
 thing  exifts.  ICfomethlng  exiits  /'M-zf,  then  fomething  has  exirted 
 altuays.  Otherwife  that  fomething  wliich  now  cxiils,  mult  once 
 cither  have  been  made  by  nothing,  i.  e.  beep  caufed  by  no  Cau/et 
 which  is  abfurd  ;  or  elfe  have  tnade  itfelf,  i.  e.  have  a£led  be- 
 fore it  exifted,  or  been  at  once  both  Effe£l  and  Caufe ;  which 
 is  alfo  abfurd ;  or,  laftly,  (which  is  the  only  fuppolition  leftV 
 it  muft  have  been  produced  by  fomething,  which  had  its  Ex- 
 iltence  from  fomething  elfe,  which  alfo  depended  on  fome  other 
 Caufe,  and  fo  on  in  an  infinite  Series  of  Caus'd  or  Succcifn^e 
 .Beings,  without  any  eternal  or  firll  Caufe  ;  which  is  alfo  ab- 
 furd. For  either  fome  one  Part  of  this  infinite  Series  has  not 
 heew  fuccejji've  to  any  other,  or  elfe  all  the  fevcral  Parts  of  it 
 have  been  fucceflivc:  iC  fo?ne  one  part  of  it  has  not,  then  there 
 \va.s  afrf,  v/hich  deftroys  the  Suppofition  ;  if  all  the  feverai 
 Parts  of  it  have  been  iucceflive  to  each  other,  then  they  have 
 all  once  hetw  future,  and  if  they  have  been  all  once  future, 
 then  there  was  a  time  when  jione  of  them  exiited ;  and  if 
 there  was  a  time  when  «5«f  of  them  exilled,  then  either  all 
 the  Parts  of  this  infinite  Series,  and  confequently  the  ^jhole^ 
 muit  have  arifen  from  nothing,  which  is  abiurd;  or  elfe  there 
 mult  be  fomething  in  the  mchole  befidc  what  is  contained  in  all 
 the  parts  ;  which  is  alfo  abfurd.  Or  thus :  Since  all  the  Parts 
 of  this  infinite  Series  ^rz  fucceffive  ov  future  to  one  another,' 
 they  muit  once  either  ha\c  been  all  future,  i.e.  non  exifient, 
 (and   then   the  fecoiid  abfurdity   will  follow,  /.  e.   that   this , 
 
 t<jhole 
 
 f  See  Kcmarli  a.  (it  thi  aid  of  Ghap.  V. 
 
Sed.  3.     Cojicernmg  the  Origin  o/'Evil.  47 
 
 V.  Thirdly^  that  it  is  Infinite  both  in  Nature  and  Infinite  in 
 Fewer :  For  Unce  it  exifts  of  it/elf^  there  is  nothing  ^^i"''^ 
 
 that 
 JSrOTE  Si 
 
 whole  Series  arofe  from  nothing)  or  elfe  all  but  fome  o«f,  (snd 
 then  the  firft  will  follow,  /.  e.  that  it  had  a  Beginning)  which 
 one  added  to  the  reft  either  makes  them  infinite,  which  is  ab- 
 furd  ;  or  they  are  infinite  without  that  one,  and  then  that  one 
 added  to  them,  either  makes  one  more  than  infimte,  or  adds 
 nothing  at  all ;  both  which  are  Absurdities. 
 
 Ifitbefaid  that  an  Infinite  Series  is  fuppofed  to  have  no' 
 <vjhole',  I  grant  it,  and  on  that  very  Account  the  Suppofition  i^ 
 abfurd,  fmce  whatfoever  has  Parti  muft  have  a  whole,  whiclx 
 whole  is  nothing  but  a  certain  number  or  aggregate  of  thele 
 Parts.  But  as  no  number  can  be  fo  great  but  that  we  may 
 affign  a  greater,  it  follows  that  neither  Number  itfelf,  nor  any 
 thing  to  which  number  can  be  applied,  i.  e.  which  confifts  of 
 Parts,  is  capable  of  real  abfolute  Infinity  *. 
 
 From  the  ImpofTibility  of  an  Infinite  Series  we  gather  the 
 Eternityf  oC  fame  one  Thing  or  Being  [That  every  one  is  not 
 in  like  manner  eternal  a  parte  ante,  or  ne~oer  had  a  Begin- 
 ing ;  particularly  that  no  Body  or  malerial  Syfie?n  can  be  fo 
 (and  the  fome  Reafons  hold  equally  againft  any  ifnperfeSl  im- 
 tnaterial Subfiance)  is  fufiiciently  prov'd  in  the  Enquiry  into  the 
 Evidence  of  the  Chrifiian  Religion'^..'\ 
 
 From  Eternity  comes  Independence  or  Selfexifience.  For 
 that  which  never  had  a  Beginning  of  Exillence,  could  not 
 poffibly  have  any  Caufe  of  that  Exiftence  (for  then  it  would 
 not  be  th.QfirJi  Caufe,  contrary  to  what  we  have  proved  above) 
 or  could  depend  w^on  no  other  thing  for  it,  /.  e.  muit  be  in^ 
 dependent  of  all  others;  or,  which  is  the  fame  thing,  mull  ex- 
 ill  of  itfelf,  i.  e.  he  fiif  cxifienl. 
 
 Eternity  a  parte  pofi,  or  neccjjary  Exifience;  or  an  impofTibi- 
 ty  of  every  ccafing  to  be,  follows  from  Independence ||.  For 
 what  depends  upon  no  Caule  can  never  be  alter'd  or  deftroy'd 
 by  any,  (as  is  fhewn  in  Note  4.  and  Remark  e.)  and  theretorc 
 muil  continue  as  it  is. 
 
 From  Independence  comes  alfo  Omnipotence.  For  a  Being 
 that  depends  upon  no  external  Caufe  for  his  Exiftence,  and 
 has  aSiive  Po^.ver,  (as  was  fhewn  at  the  fmie  time  that  we 
 proved  his  Exiftence,  and  by  the  fame  Medium)  cannot  de- 
 pend upon  any  for  the  exertion  of  tliat  Power,  ai\d  confequent- 
 
 ly 
 
 *  Rem.  b.  t  R.  c.         I  R.  d.         ]j,  R.  c.. 
 
 and  P<nu- 
 er. 
 
48  COnc'^rntng  the  Origin  bf^v'A,     Chap.  I. 
 
 that   can  bound  its  Nature  or  Power.     *Tis   to  be 
 obferved  farther,  that  the  number  of  poJJJhle  thing-*^ 
 
 IS 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 I7  no  /i mi fs  Clin  be  applied  to  either  liis  Exitlence  or  Power<j 
 i'or  Limitation  is  an  e^u7  of  lome  fnperior  cau/e,  whicJi  in  tiie 
 prcftiit  Cufe  there  c.innot  be:  confequently  to  liippoic  Limits 
 wlicre  there  c;ui  be  no  Limitcv-,  is  to  fuppofe  an  EffeSi  <v:ithout 
 a  Caufe  *. 
 
 To  fuppofe  this  being  limited  inov  by  its  own  'Nature,  is 
 to  fuppofe  fome  Nature  antecedent.,  or  limiting  S^tality  fuperior 
 \o  that  Being,  to  the  Exillence  of  whom  no  Thing,  no 
 Quality  is  in  any  xQ{y^Q.&.  antecedent  ox  fuperior :  And  to  fuppole 
 that  there  is  no  fuch  thing  as  ABion  or  Po^er  in  a  Being  which 
 appears,  to  be  the  Fountain  of  all  Aftion  and  Power,  is  (if  poi- 
 fible)  the  woril:  Suppofition  of  all. 
 .  Liberty  is  alio  included  in  the  Idea  of  Omnipotence:  /Icli-ve 
 Po^..ver  implies  Freedom;  Infinite  Ponxcr  is  abfolute  Freedom. 
 What  therefore  has  no  Bounds  fetto  its  Po^ver,  what  can  have 
 t\o  oppofition  made  to  its  WJl,  nor  Rellraintlaid  on  its  Adi- 
 ons,  mull:  both  will  and  ^A/ree/y.  This  Attribute  is  alfo  prov- 
 ed from  the  Beginning  of  Alotiun,  and  the  Creation  and  Dif- 
 pofition  o^  indifferent  things  f. 
 
 But  tho'  this  Being  hfree,  and  as  fuch  the  Author  of  Change 
 in  other  Beings,  yet  he  mull  himfelf  be  Unchangeable.  For  all 
 Changes  have  a  Beginning,  and  confequently  are  Effects  of 
 fome  prior  Caufes:  But  there  can  be  nothing />w;-  to  the  Ex- 
 igence of  this  Being,  ^sXit'isEtertial,  neither  any  C^z^ofit, 
 as  he  is  independent;  nor  confequently  any  change  in  it:  ex- 
 cept we  could  fuppofe  him  to  change  himfelf,  which  is  the  fame 
 Abfurdity  as  to  produce  hirafelf,  i.  e.  to  be  at  the  fimc  time  both 
 Fffea.  and  Caufe. 
 
 Thus  we  come  to  the  Knowledge  of  an  Eternal,  Independent y 
 Omnipotent,  Free,  and  Vtuhangeable  Being. 
 
 Qmnifcience,  as  well  fome  of  the  foregoing  Attributes,  may 
 be  jnore  eafily  deduced  thus.  We  find  in  ourfelves  fuch  Qualir 
 ties  as  T^hought  and  Intelligence,  Po-ixer,  Freedom,  ijfc.  of  w  hich 
 we  have  intniti-ve  Kno^ijledge,  as  much  as  of  our  own  Exijlence; 
 and  that  to  have  thcfe  is  ^ perfection,  or  better  than  to  be-with- 
 out them  :  We  find  alfo  th.u  thefe  have  not  been  in  us  froni 
 Eternity,  confequently  ihcy  mull   ha\c  had   a  Beginning,  -mA' 
 
 ton- 
 
 *  Rom.  r. 
 f  See  Mute  E,  and  |hc'  Rofcrenecsl 
 
•Sed.  3.     Concur ?ii?tg  the  Origin  of  TLwW.  ^c^ 
 
 is  conceived  by  us  to  be  infinite,  at  lealt  in  Pffiuert 
 but  nothing  can  be  foffibl&,  to  wiiich  there  is  nuc 
 
 fomc 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ^oitfc^quently  {ome  Cau/e,  (for  the  fame  realbn  that  :i  Ba'Kg, 
 beginning  to  exifl  in  time,  requires  a  Caufe)  which  Caufe,  as 
 it  mull  htfiiperior  to  its  EffeB,  has  them  in  zfupcrtor  Degree*j 
 and  if  it  be  the  JirJI  Caufe,  as  itfelf  can  depend  upon  no  other, 
 muft  have  them  in  perfeSiioti,  or  in  an  infinite  or  ujiUmttcd 
 Degree  (if  thefe  Words  can  properly  be  here  apply 'df.) 
 Since  Bounds  or  Limitation  would  be  without  a  Limiter  (as  has 
 been  fliewn)  /.  e.  an  Effeft  without  a  Caule. 
 
 The  Pheno?nena  of  Nature  alfo  lead  us  up  to  One  fuch  firft 
 Caufe,  which  is  fufficient  for  their  Produdlion,  and  therefore 
 none  ellc  are  necejfary  ;  and  tho'  fe-veral  more  independent  Be- 
 ings might  pofhbly  exifl,  yet  would  they  be  no  Gods  to  us ; 
 for  they  would  have  no  manner  of  Relation  to  us,  nor  we  any 
 thing  to  do  with  them :{;.  Since  therefore  the  iame  Rcafoii 
 -holds  for  no  more  than  One  fuch,  to  fuppofe  more  than  one  is. 
 at  lead  unreafonable. 
 
 Thefe  feem  to  be  all  the  fitnple  Attributes  obfervable  in  the. 
 Divine  Nature,  which,  as  they  are  differently  combined  by 
 us,  come  under  different  Nam^s.  Thus  the  unlimited  Exer- 
 cife  of  God's  Kno-Miedge  and  Ponver  demonllrates  him  Omni- 
 prefent,  i.  e.  at  all  times  and  in  all  places  fo  prefeat  with  every 
 Creature  as  to  have  an  abfolute  Knoixledge  of  and  Paov^r  ovei: 
 it ;  always  to  fupervife  and  govern  it||. 
 
 His  enioying  all  conceivable  Perfedions  in  an  entire  abfo- 
 lute manner,  denotes  him  Infinite,  or  rather  abfolutely  Per- 
 fea%;  and,  which  is  the  fame  thing,  his  being  capable  of  no 
 ivant,  defeSl^  or  unhappinefs  whatfoever,  defines  him  All-fuf- 
 ficient.  . 
 
 The  Moral  Attributes  6'i  God  may  be  deduced  from  thefe 
 natural  ones,  and  are  immediate  Conlequenccs  of  theiiv  wl;en 
 cxcrcifed  on  other  Beings.  They  feem  to  be  the  Perfeclioa 
 of  his  external  Ads  rather  than  any  new  internal  Perfetiiions 
 of  his  Nature,  and  may  be  termed  his  faomiary,  relative  J  t- 
 tributes**. 
 
 E  And 
 
 *  5ee  the  latter  part  of  R.  k. 
 t  SeeR.  1.  t  R.g.  il  R-  h. 
 
 ^  See  Wollaflan,  p.  70,  93. 
 **  See  the  Impartial  Euqiury,  ^c.   p.  29,   6-" 
 vr  N?fe   ;2. 
 
5©  Concemi?jg  the  Origin  o/'Evll.    Chap.  1. 
 
 feme    Poller    corre/pondent ,     that    might     adually 
 
 efFed: 
 
 N  0  "f  E  S, 
 
 And  tho  the  Exiftenceofany  moral  Quality  or  Ai^ion  is  not 
 capable  of  ftrift  Demonftration,  bccaufe  eveiy  moral  Adiion 
 or  Quality,  as  fuch,  depends  upon  the  Will  of  the  Agent, 
 which  nuift  be  abfolutely  free :  Yet  we  have  as  great  AfTur- 
 ancc  that  there  are  moral  Qualities  in  God,  and  that  he  will 
 always  aft  according  to  thefe  moral  Qualities,  as  the  nature  of 
 the  thing  admits,  and  may  be  as  well  fatisfied  of  it  as  if  we 
 could  dcmonftrate  it*. 
 
 I  fnall  begin  again   with  a  Self-evident  Propofition. 
 
 Pleafure  is  difl'erent  from  Pain  ;  confcquently  there  is  a  dif- 
 ference in  things.  Pleafure  hft  for,  or  agreeable  to  the  nature 
 ofafcnfible  Being,  or  (as  thefe  words  are  commonly  ufed)  a  7m- 
 tural  Good  i  Pain  is  U7ifity  or  is  a  Jiatural  E^oil :  Confequently 
 there  is  a  natural  _/?/«^  zn^  iinfitnefs  of  things;  or  (which  is  the 
 very  fame,  and  what  thefe  Terms  fhould  always  mean)  Natu- 
 ral Good  and  E'vil. 
 
 The  voluntary  Application  of  this  natural  Good  and  Evil, 
 to  any  Rational  Being,  or  the  Produflion  f  of  it  by  a  rational 
 Being,  is  Moral  Good  and  Evil :  Confequently  there  is  fuch 
 a  thing  as  Moral  Good  and  Evil.  An  Inclination  to  and  Ap- 
 probation of  this  Moral  Good  is  in  every  rational  Creature  %, 
 and  is  perfedive  of  its  Nature,  and  theiefore  it  mull  be 
 communicated  by,  and  confequently  be  inherent  in  the 
 Creator  [j. 
 
 To  act  agreeably  to  this  Inclination  and  Approbation  is  alfo 
 a  Peifeflicn ;  the  contrary  an  Imperfection  ;  confequently 
 the  form.cr,  as  it  is  a  Perfection  found  in  fome  Degree  in  the 
 Creature,  mull  belong  to  and  be  in  the  highell  Degree  in  the 
 Creator,  who  has  been  already  prov'd  to  have  all  naturalY&x- 
 feftions  in  an  inlinite  or  pcrfedl  Degree  §;  and  therefore  he 
 muft  have  all  nwral  ones  fo  too. 
 
 As  his  Knonxledge  and  Po-Tverarc  pcrftB,  he  muft  always  both 
 perceive  and  be  able  to  purfue  this  Moral  Good.  And  as  his 
 Happivefs  is  complete.,  there  can  be  no  poffible  Reafon  why  he 
 ihould  ever  m-nll  the  contrary  ;  nay,  there  is  a  good  Reafon 
 why  he  fliould  not,  namely,  otherwife  a  perfedl  Thing  would 
 
 con- 
 
 *  See  Dltton  on  Moral  Evidence,  p.  i,  2. 
 
 t  R.  i. 
 
 X  See  the  latter  Part  of  Rem.  i. 
 
 II  R.k.  §  R.  i 
 
Sed:.  3.      Concerning  the  Origin  ^/Evil.  ^r 
 
 effed  itj  iince  therefore  the  things  that  are  pofli- 
 E   2  blc 
 
 i\r  o  r  £  6", 
 
 <!:ontradift  itfeif,  and  will  a  Defi^ov  hnpcrfcci'ion,  1.  e.  be  per- 
 fe(£l  and  not  perfedl  at  the  fame  time :  or  a  Being  infinitely 
 happy,  and  who  loves  and  approves  hlmfelf  becaufe  he  is  id, 
 ■would  hate  and  difapprovc  the  very  fame  thing  in  others,  i.  e. 
 would  love  his  own  Nature,  and  yet  hate  any  thing  that  rc- 
 fembles  it;  which  is  abfurd  *.  It  follows  then  that  he  muft 
 always  knonju,  be  able,  and  nvllllng  to  do,  and  therefore  aSiually 
 do  what  is  abfolutely  beji,  i.  e.  produce  the  greateft  fum  of 
 Happinefs,  or  be  abfolutely  and  completely  Good. 
 
 This  alfo  was  included  in  the  Inclination  and  Approbation 
 above  mentioned.  For  if  he  has  given  us  Benevolent  Ai- 
 fe£lions  and  a  Senfe  which  approves  them,  he  mud  hlm- 
 felf have  both  the  fame  Affections,  and  the  fame  Scnfe  of 
 them  f . 
 
 Again;  the  Idea  of  GW^^yJ  properly  implies  a  Difpofition 
 to  communicate  Happinefs  to  others;  if  then  this  Being  be- 
 good,  he  muft  aftually  have  communicated  Happinefs  to  others; 
 and  mice  verfa,  if  he  have  communicated  H^appinefs  to  others, 
 he  mull  \i^gQod:  But  this  Being  has  communicated  Happinefs 
 to  others,  therefore  he  is  Good. 
 
 The  Idea  of  W'lfdom  implies  his  Knowledge  and  Obfervance 
 bf  the  moft  proper  Methods  of  effed-.ing  this,  and  is  included 
 in  his  Omnifcience  ',  it  being  nothing  but  that  very  Knowledge 
 conlider'd  with  relation  to  Pradice.  It  appears  farther  from 
 confidering  the  only  Caiifes  of  Imprudence  in  Men,  which  are 
 cither  Ignorance,  ParliaUty,  or  Inattention  ;  none  of  which  can 
 have  place  in  God  :  He  cannot  be  ignorant  of  any  thing, 
 fince  both  all  things  and  their  Relations  to  each  other,  proceed 
 from  him  :  He  cannot  be  wvjd  by  any  Po-iver  or  fivayd  by  any 
 Interejl,  fmce  (as  has  been  fhevvn)  he  is  independent  and  all  fuf- 
 f-ciejit ;  and  he  cannot  be  inattentive,  fince  he  always  fees  every- 
 thing intuiti'vel^  and  at  once  ;  and  confequently  he  muft  al- 
 ways knonx}  and  do  what  hfttcjl  and  avifcji  to  be  done. 
 
 From  which  alfo  follows  his  Jujiice:  For  he  that,  fees  all 
 the  Circufnjiances  of  things  ■^ndi  the  Ratifications  of  Fcrfons  ■xcA 
 \\fis,  Ability  to  regulate  thefe,  and  no  manner  of  lanptation  to 
 do  otherwife,  muft  certainly  fuit  thefe  Circuniftances  to  thofc 
 Qualifications,  or  provide  that  Perfons  receive  the  natural  and . 
 
 pro- 
 
 *  See  Scois  Works,  Vol,  2.  Diic-  ^'^IV .  p.  ^c,  •: 
 
 t  Sec'R.  i." 
 
52  Cojicerningthe  Oxi^inofE^iW.    Chap.  I* 
 
 ble  cannot  be  limited,    there  muft  alfo  be  a  Canfe 
 
 infinitely 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 proper  Confequcnce  of  their  Adlions ;  or  (which  is  the  fame) 
 do  with  every  Pcrfon  what  is  exaftly  j///?  and  right. 
 
 The  fame  alio  holds  for  his  Holinefs  and  Veracity,  or  rather 
 Faithfulnefs.  As  to  the  former,  he  muft  always  diflike  and  de- 
 tell  Evil,  fince  it  can  never  become  in  the  leall  agreeable  to 
 his  Pcrfc^io>is,  or  fcrviceable  to  his  Ufe :  As  to  the  latter,  he 
 muft  adhere  to  Truth,  as  it  is  a  PerfeSlion,  and  co-incident  with 
 Cood,  If^c.  fince  he  can  have  no  poffible  Reafon  or  Moti've  to 
 deviate  from  it*. 
 
 Thus  may  we  reafon  about  the  feveral  moral  Perfeftions  of 
 the  fuprcnie  Being,  as  they  are  commonly  diftinguifh'd.  But 
 (b.at  w  hich  fliould  chiefly  diredl  us  in  thefe  our  Enquiries  is 
 the  Idea  of  his  hijinite  Goodnefs,  which  implies,  or  rather  in- 
 cludes them  allf.  Nay  all  the  other  moral  Attributes  (>f 
 they  can  properly  be  called  Attributes)  arc  fo  far  from  exilt- 
 ing  apart  frOm  this,  that  they  ought  to  be  confider'd  only  as 
 fo  many  different  Fie-ivs  of  the  fame  Goodnefs  in  the  Creator, 
 and  various  Sources  of  Happinefs  to  the  Creature.  Thefe  are 
 always  fub- ordinate  to  and  regulated  by  this  one  principal  Per- 
 icflion  and  brightelt  Ray  of  the  Divinity.  Thus  we  con- 
 ceive his  Jujiice  to  be  exerted  on  any  Being  no  farther  than 
 his  Goodnefs  neccilarily  requires,    in  order  to   the  making 
 
 /that  Being,  or  others,  fenjihlc  of  the  heinous  Nature  and  perni- 
 cious Effeks  of  Sin  ;  and  thereby  bringing  either  it,  or  fomc 
 othtrs,  to  as  great  a  Degree  of  Happinefs  as  their  feveral  Na- 
 tures become  capable  of  J.  His  Holinefs  hates  and  abhors  all 
 Wickednefs,  only  as  the  necejjary  Confequence  of  it  is  abfolutc 
 and  una\oidablc  Mifery ;  and  his  Veracity  or  Faithfulnefs  fcems 
 to  be  no  farther  concerned  for  Truth,  than  as  it  is  connected 
 with  and  produdive  of  the  Happinefs  of  all  rational  Beings : 
 to  provide  the  propercft  Means  for  attaining  which  great  End 
 is  the  exercife  of  his  IVifdorn. 
 
 .1  have  all  along  dsclin'd  the  Argument  a  priori,  drawn  from 
 the  Antecedent  iiecefftty  o'i  Exifience,  as  well  for  the  Reafons 
 giv'en  in  R  e.  as  alfo,  bccaufe  it  fcem'd  not  to  carry  fame 
 Atlril)Ules  fo  fu  as  thcv  might  be  deduced  a  poferiori,  awd   to 
 
 be 
 
 *  See  B_p.  TVin-insN^t.  Rel.  C-  lo.  p.  142.  6th  Edit. 
 f  See  Tillotfon  Scrm.  90.   2d.  Vol.  Fol.  p.  679.      Or 
 Stackhvufci  Body  of  Divinity  C.  5.  Scd.  is.  p.  toil 
 J  R.  m. 
 
Sei^.  3 .     Concerning  the  Origin  qf'E\i\.  j  j 
 
 infinitely  powerful.     For  as    one    Pollibility    re- 
 
 E  3  quires 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 be  fcaree  confillent  with  others.  That  the  Sc/f-cxiftent  Be^ 
 ing,  for  inftance,  is  not  a  blind,  unintellige-nt  Neceflity,  but  in 
 the  moll  proper  Senfe  an  underjianding  and  really  aSll've  Be- 
 ing, cannot  be  demoriftrated  ftridlly  and  properly  a  priori,  as 
 Dr.  Clarke  fliys*  with  a  great  deal  ofRealbn  ;  and  how  nb- 
 folnte  NeceJJtty  is  reconcileablc  with  nhfolute  Freedom  Teems 
 hard  to  conceive.  For  why  fliould  not  this  Neceffity  extend 
 to  all  the  Operations,  the  Wills,  the  Decrees,  as  well  as  the  Exi^ 
 fience  of  the  firfl:  Caufe;  and  take  away  that  Freedom  of  De- 
 termination, that  entire  Liberty  (i{ Indifference,  which  our  Au- 
 thor has  fufficiently  proved  f,  to  be  a  property  of  GWhimfelf, 
 as  well  as  Man  ^  And  if  we  cannot  jidmit  it  in  one  Cafe, 
 why  fhould  we  in  the  other  ?  1  don't  f\y  this  NeceJJity  is  in- 
 conliftent  with  perteil  Freedom piS  the  former  is  an  ImperfeSiiou, 
 fince  we  do  not  conceive  it  to  be  fuch  any  firther  than  as  it 
 proceeds  ab  extra,  from  fome  fuperior  Caufe  impofing  it.  But 
 this  I  fay,  that  be  it  what  you  pleafe,  the  very  Nature  and  Idea 
 of  it  feems  repugnant  to  that  of  Freedom,  i.  e.  the  Po-iver  of  de- 
 termining in  Cafes  a,hfolutely  indifferent,  n.mthout  any  pre-vious 
 Reafon  ImpuHe,  or  Neceffity  -ivhatfoever ;  and  confcquently 
 thefe  .two  can  never  be  co-exiflent  in  tYitfame  Caufe.  He  that 
 confiders  this  attentively  will,  I  believe,  find  it  to  be  more 
 than  a  mere  ^ibble  on  the  Words  J. 
 
 Laftly,  This  Neceffity  of  Exiilcnce,  being  (as  Dr.  Clarke  con- 
 fends||)  fimple  and  uniform,  without  any  poffiblc  difference  or 
 'variety,  Ihould  admit  of  no  difference  or  variety  of  any  fort, 
 or  in  any  refpeft  ;  and  confcquently  mull  exclude  all  di'vcrjit)', 
 or  different  Kinds  of  PerfeBion  {as  Vv'ell  as  different  Perfons) 
 from  the  Divine  Nature,  v/hich  is  fuppos'd  to  exift  thereby.  It 
 mull  be  utterly  inconfiftent  with  that  Variety  of  Attributes, 
 fuch  as  Knonjoledge  and  Ponver,  Sec.  which  we  conceive  to  be 
 very  dijiind  Properties,  and  which  Dr.  Clarke,  and  every  one 
 elfe,  concludes  to  be  effcntially  in  God. 
 
 If  the  Learned  Dotiors  Notion  o^  abfolute  Neceffty  ■pro\es 
 all  this,  I  humbly    conceive   it  proves   too  much,  and  if  it 
 
 does 
 
 f  Demonji.    p,    5-2.   fth.  Edit. 
 
 f  Chap.  5.  §.  I.  Subf  4.  and  elfewhere. 
 
 X  See  R.  e.  and  Note  43. 
 
 \  Demonji.  Prop.  7. 
 
54  Concerning  the  Origin  c/'Evil.     Chap.  I, 
 
 quires  an  equal  Caufe,  fo  infinite  Poffibilites  require  a 
 Caufe infinitely  powerful,  (it.) 
 
 VL 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 does  not  prove  this,  I  cannot  apprehend  how  it  proves  any- 
 thing at  all. 
 
 (i  I.)  I  fliall  give  the  Reader  this  Argument  as  it  is  propo- 
 fed  after  another  manner  by  Dr.  fiddes,  and  the  Anfwer  to  it 
 by  Mr.  Colhber. 
 
 '   To  {liy  a  thing  is  poffible,  is  to  fay  there  is  fome  things 
 
 <  fome  pnj^er  or  other  capable  of  producing  it.     For  mthhigy 
 
 *  or  what  has  no  power,  can  produce  no  effect.  The  Power 
 «  therefore  which  is  to  bring  what  hpojjible  into  Being,  is  ne- 
 
 <  cefTarily  fiippofed  already  to  <*xiil;  otherwifc  a  FcrfeRion 
 «  might  arife  out  oi mti-entify,  or  without  a  Caufe  ;  and  what 
 
 *  wc  conceive  poffible  would  be  really  impoffible  *" 
 
 Which  the  Author  of  the  Impartial  Enquiry,  U'c.  confute* 
 bv  a  parallel  Inftance. 
 
 *  If  a  Perfon  having  firfl:  proved  the  Exiflence  of  a  Power 
 '  that  is  perfect,  and  made  it  appear  that  a  perfect  Power  can- 
 '  not  but  extend  to  whatever  13  a  capable  Objedt  of  Power, 
 «  or  includes  not  a  Contradiction  ;  fliould   proceed   to  prove 
 
 <  that  the  JR  of  Creation  implies  no  Contradiftion,  and  then 
 «  at  laji  fliould  conclude  that  therefore  Creation  is  a  poffibili- 
 
 *  ty  {i.  e.  effeclible  by  the  exercife  of  that  perfe6l  or  almigh- 
 «  ty  Power,  w'hofe  Exifcence  he  had  before  demonftrated)  I 
 '  conceive  there  could  be  no  reafonable  exception  againft  fuch 
 «  a  method  of  arguing.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  he  fhould 
 ?  fay,  I  plainly  perceive  there's  no  Contradidion  in  the  Sup- 
 
 *  pofition  of  the  Creation,  or  produftion  of  a  thing  that  was 
 '  not,  and  Ihould  from  thence  immediately  infer  that  a  Power 
 
 <  capable  of  Creation  exifls,  this  would  be  a  very  preporterous 
 f  way  of  demonftrating:  Which  yet  is  the  fame  method  \\\i\\ 
 c  that  of  the  prefent  Argumcnt'|-." 
 
 The  fame  way  of  reafoning  has  been  made  ufe  of  by  the 
 Cartejians  and  feveral  of  our  own  Philofophers  to  demon- 
 Ifrate  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God  from  our  Ideas  of  them 
 3n  the  following  manner. 
 
 We  can  have  no  Idc,\  of  any  thing,  but  what  has  cither  an 
 aJiUal or  a  foffihle  Exiflence  ;  but  we  have  an  Idea  ot  God,  /.  f. 
 of  a  Being  ci  iniiiiite  Perfections,  which  may  pollibly  exilt  j 
 ■       "  '  therefort; 
 
 ^  Theolog.  Spec.  p.  15, 
 
 ^  Impartial  ^n^iiir^}  p.  1 78. 
 
Sect.  3.     Cmcernhig  the  Origin  ^Evil.  t^i^ 
 
 VI.  Fourthly,  Since  S^ace  is  conceived  as  rilere-  Free 
 ly     idk    and    indijfcnnt    with  refped   to    Repletion 
 
 E  4  or 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 therefore  he  muft  have  an  aflual  Exillenc^:  For  aitual  Kxi- 
 ftence  is  a  Degree  of  Perfeci:ion,  and  the  foremention'd  Idea, 
 according  to  the  Suppoficion,  inchides  all  poOible  Perfe<5lion, 
 therefore  it  mail  include  that,  otherwife  we  fliould  have  an 
 Idea  of  fomething  abfoliitely  perfecl  without  one  polTiblc  De- 
 gree of  Perfection,  which  is  a  Contraditlion  in  Terms; 
 
 But  this  is  all  begging  the  Qiieftion.  For  it  is  not  the  bare 
 fuppofmg  it  to  have  all  poflible  Perfeiftions  that  infers  its  aBual 
 Exijiefice,  but  &iC  proving  it  to  have  them.  Indeed  if  we  fup- 
 pofe  it  to  have  all  poffible  Perfedlions,  ws  muft  at  the  fame 
 time  necellkirily  fuppole  it  to  exift,  fmce  Exiftcnce  is  a  poffi- 
 ble Perfeftion ;  otherwife  we  fnould  fuppofe  it  to  have  all 
 poffible  Perfe61:ions,  and  yet  to  want  one,  which  is  a  Contra- 
 diftion.  But  llill  this  is  only  an  ExiPcence  ex  Hypothefi,  a  true 
 Confequence  from  doubtful  Premifes,  and  which  will  as  eafily 
 follow  from  the  fuppofal  of  its  having  but  any  One  perfection, 
 fmce  that  mull:  neceffarily  imply  exiftcnce.  The  certainty 
 than  of  fuch  aftual  exift.ence  docs  by  no  means  follow  from 
 the  {appokd  pojJihi/Uy  of  it,  as  thefe  Men  would  be  under- 
 ftood:  This  Conclufion  will  never  hold  good  ;  what  cannot 
 be  fuppofed  without  a  Contradidlion,  certainly  does  not 
 exij?,  therefore  what  can  be  fuppofed  without  a  Contradidion, 
 certainly  does. 
 
 Others  endeavour  to  prove  the  exjjlenu  of  God  from  our 
 Idea  of  him  alter  this  manner.  Whatever  we  have  an  Idea 
 of,  that  either  is,  or  if  it  be  not,  it  is  pojjihle  for  it  to  hs  i 
 but  we  have  an  Idea  of  an  Eternal  ^v^d  neceffarily  exijlent  Being  \ 
 therefore  fuch  a  Being  cither  is,  or  it  is  poffible  for  it  to  be. 
 But  if  fuch  a  Being  either  now  is  not,  or  once  nioas  not,  or 
 ever  will  not  ailually  be,  it  would  not  be  poffible  for  it  ta 
 he  at  all  (except  it  could  make  itfelf,  or  be  made  by  No- 
 thing) contrary  to  X.h.t  former  Part  of  the  Suppofition  :  nor 
 would  it  be  either  £/<?;■««/,  or  neceffarily  Exijlent,  contrary  to 
 the  latter.  Therefore  fuch  a  Being  now  is,  and  always  was, 
 and  ever  will  be.  Or  fhorter  thus:  Our  Idea  of  God  is  an 
 Jdea  of  fomething  which  implies  no  contradiciion,  and 
 therefore  fuch  a  Being  may  poffbly  he  ;  and  therefore  he  tniijl 
 aSlualh  be,  or  clfe  he  could  7iat  pffihly  he,  which  is  contrary 
 to  the  Hypo  thefts. 
 
 No'.y  to  make  this  or  the  like  Argument  of  any  force,  it 
 
 raufc 
 
56  Concerning  the  Origin  ^KviJ.     Chap.  I, 
 
 or  Vacuity ;  fince  the  Matter  which  fills  Space  is 
 in  like  manner  merely  paflive  and  indifferent  with 
 i^-fpeet  to  Motion  and  Reji ;  it  follows  that  the 
 Caiifc  \\\\\d\  fills  Space  with  JVIatter,  and  produces 
 Motion  in  that  Matter,  is  perfedtly/r^^ ;  fo  that  the 
 Creation  and  Motion  of  Matter  mull  be  the  Works 
 of  free  Choice,  and  not  Neceffity,  in  the  Agent. 
 Forj  if  the  Agent  cffeded  thefe  by  Neceffity,  they 
 would  alfo  be  necedary  EfFefts,  and  could  not  be 
 conceived  to  be  in  themfelves  indifferent  to  Exifl:-? 
 cncQ  or  Non-ExiftcHce,  as  proceeding  from  a  ne-« 
 ceffiry  Caufe"^. 
 
 VII, 
 NOTES,  ' 
 
 jnuft  be  clearly  provM  thatwehav^e  fuch  an  Idea  o^  3  necejfarl- 
 iy  e XI flent  Being  ■\%\\\\\  infer  its  a6lual  exiflence ;  (whichroay 
 perhaps  appear  fomething  doubtful  from  Remark  e.)  and  alfo, 
 that  this  Idea  n  ftriSly  innate  or  connate  with  us,  and  confe- 
 Iqiiently  capable  of  being  urged  a  priori,  for  a  Proof  of  the 
 Exillence  of  fome  Being  correfpondent  to  fuch  an  Idea  ;  (which 
 5s  now  generally  given  up)  For  if  this  Idea  be  only  gathered 
 a  pofteriori,  vix.  by  a  dedudlion  of  Arguments  from  our  own 
 Exiftence,  then  it  is  only  a  Confequence  of  thefe  Arguments, 
 •and  cannot  of  itfelf  be  alledg'd  as  a  dillinfl:  one.  For  how  can 
 'any  Idea  confequent  upon  fome  certain  proofs  of  fomething  a 
 fofiCi-iori,  be  an  antecedent,  independent  proof  of  the  fame 
 thing  a  priori?  Befides,  either  thefe  arguments  are  enough 
 to  convince  any  Man  of  the  Exiftence  and  Perfedions  of  God, 
 or  they  are  not ;  if  they  are,  this  is  unnecejjary,  if  they  are 
 not,  this  is  ifififffcient ;  nay,  it  is  none  at  all,  iince  'tis  a  bare 
 confequence  o^  thciC,  and  entirely  yoaW/fi/ in  them,  and  there- 
 tore  muft  ftand  or  fall  with  them.  It  is  fubmitted  to  the 
 Reader  whether  the  famous  Arguments  drawn  from  our  Ideas 
 C){ Htcrniiy,  hifivitx,  ^\.  be  not  of  tlie  fame  kind  with  the 
 foregoing.  'Ihofe  that  have  a  Mind  to  be  farther  acquainted 
 with  the  proofs  of  a  Deity  drawn  from  the  Idea,  may  find  the 
 Qiieftion  fully  difcufs'd  in  Cnd-.\:.orth,  p.  721,  ijfc.  or  in  Fid- 
 iias's  Iheol.  Spec.  B.  i.  P.  i.  C  9.  or  in  the  Impartial  Enquiry 
 dnro  the  Exiilence  cf  God.  B.  2.  Parti.  See  alfo  Parker. 
 Difput.  Vl.Sedt.  10,  zo,  24.  orOi^.  Theol.Nat.  p.  26,  n,^'c. 
 *  For  an  excpllent  llluftration  of  this  Argument,  fee  D{. 
 Clarke's  Dc77ionjirdt.  p.  24,  2<j,  26.  and  (><^,  66,  67.  (;th  Ed. 
 See  alfo  Cud'ivorth,  p,    667,  il^c.  and  the  hnpartial  Enc.'ury^ 
 
 p.  31,  32,  i^\/'-     '    ■    .    '■'' 
 
S,e£t,  3'     Cofjcerning  the  Ovigin  of  "Ewil.  57 
 
 VII.  Fifthly,  Tho'by  our  outward  Senfes,  and  That  jtis 
 the  Notices  which  they  convey  to  us,  we  cannot  aconfcious 
 go  beyond  Spaccy  Matter,  MoHoh,  fenjible  Qualities,  g'f  'S^"^ 
 and    this   ^tiive  Principle    which  ^e  are   Ipeaking  Qmnijcient 
 of;    yet,  if  we  infpect  our  own  Minds,  we  miey 
 contemplate   a    Self<onfcioHS  and    thinl^ng    Priwipie 
 within  us,  whofe  A,v5lions  are  to  ivill,  refnfe,  douht, 
 rea/ofj,   affirm  and    deny,    which   carry    nothing   of 
 Extenfion  along  with  them,  nor  necelTarily  include 
 it  in  therji,    nor  have    any  Relation    to    Place   or 
 Space;    but  are   entirely    abfl:ra6led   from  the  No- 
 tions of  external  or  internal.     That  there  is  fuch  3 
 principle  in  us  we  are  certain,  not  only  from  gur 
 Senfes,  or  the  impulfes  of  external  Objecfts,  but  al- 
 fo  from  Refledion  and  Self-confcioufnefs.     *Tis  to 
 be  obferv'd    farther,  that  we    can   at  our  Pleafure 
 move  fome  Parts  of  Matter,  and  fliake  the  Limbs 
 of  our  Body  by  Thought  only,  that  is,  by  Voli- 
 tion "^^  whe^ice  it   appears,  that    Motion    may  be 
 produc'd  in   Matter  by  Thought ;  and  that  fome- 
 thing    of  this  Kind  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  firft 
 Caule,  in  order  to  put   Matter  into  Motion,  nay, 
 to  bring   it  into  Being.     Cogitation  alfo.    Will  and 
 Confcioufnefs,  or   Faculties  equivalent  to  thefe,    are 
 neceffary  to  a  free  Caufe^  ^nd  on  that  Account  to  be 
 attributed   to    the   firft   Caufe,  being   (as  iliall  be 
 fhewn  below)  perfedly  Free;  Which  Caufe,  fince 
 it  is  infinite  (as  we  have  prov'd)   in  its   EfTence 
 and  Power,  it  muH:  be  fo  likewife  in    Intelligence j, 
 viz.  Omnipotent  and  Qmvifcient, 
 
 Vlil.  Sixthly,  Since  this  Principle  (which  we  That  he 
 pU  God)  is  the  Caufe   of   all  things,    and  infinite  ^^s  for  ai^ 
 in  Knowledge  as   well  as  Power,  it  follows  that   he  ^^^' 
 afts,    not  by  blind    impulfe,  but  for  an  End;  and 
 has  ordei'd  his  Works  by  fuch  Wifdom,  as  to  be 
 
 con- 
 
 *  That  Volition  and  ASiion  are  perfeclly  diflinft,  and  miift 
 proceed  from  two  diftercnt  Po^vers,  Sec  Note  42.  That  Jc" 
 //o«  alfq  is  tsyo-fol44  See  Note  43.  ■  •' 
 
5 8  Concerning  the  Origin  o/'  Evil.     Chap.  I, 
 
 confiftent  wich  chemfelves,    and  not  deftruftive  of 
 
 each  other. 
 
 That  the        IX.  Seventhly,  Since  God  is  perfed  in  himfelf^ 
 
 ^^^^°f^       fince    all   Things   fublift    by   his  Providenee,   and 
 
 ivas  to  ex-  ^^"^  ^^  need  of  him,  but  he  of  none ;  aud  (ince 
 
 ercife  the    he  can    neither    be   profited    nor    incommoded   by 
 
 power,       his  Works,  nor  affefted  by  their  Good  or  Evil  j  it 
 
 and  to       follows  that  he  made  thefe  Things  for  no  advantage 
 
 cate  the      °*'   "'^  own,  and  that   he  neither  receives  nor  ex- 
 
 Goodnefs     pe<Ss   any   Benefit    from    them.     For  by   creating 
 
 of  the        things  without   himfelf,  he   mufl   necefTarily   have 
 
 P^J^X-       fought  either  their  Benefit  or  his  own;    but  what 
 
 Benefit  can  God  feek  for  himfelf,  who  poffeffes  all 
 
 Good?  That  certainly  which  was  wanting  to  him, 
 
 and  necefTarily  mufl  be   wanting  to  a  Being  even 
 
 abfolutely   perfed,   till  he  has    created  fomething; 
 
 I  mean  the  Exercife  of  his  Attributes  7vithouty  the 
 
 communicating  of  his  Power  and  Goodnefs  :  That 
 
 therefore  only  mufl  he  be  fuppofed  to  have  fought 
 
 in  the  Creation  and  Difpofalof  his  Works,   (ii.) 
 
 Not 
 
 '     NO  T  IE  S 
 
 (i2.)  Some  have  objefled  here,  that  according  to  this  No- 
 tion, there  muft  have  been  a  Time  before  the  Exigence  of  any 
 created  Beings,  when  God  was  neither  infinitely  happy,  nor 
 abfolutely  _§-90^*.  But  the  one  Part  of  this  Objedtion  evident- 
 ly arifes  from  a  Miftake  of  our  Author's  Notion,  who  has  of- 
 ten told  us,  that  he  does  not  fuppofe  any  thing  external  to  the 
 Deity,  to  add  the  leaft  to  his  own  Happinefs,  or  effential  Per- 
 fetlions ;  (and  indeed  to  think  othcrwife,  would  be  worfe 
 than  to  imagine  the  Fountain  fed  by  its  own  Streams ;  or  the 
 Sun  cnlighten'd  by  its  own  Rays)  but  only  to  manifeft  them  to 
 us  his  Creatures,  and  encreafe  our  Happinefs  and  Perfection, 
 by  our  Knonvledge  and  Imitation  of  them.  T\\t  other  part  can- 
 not be  of  force  againft  Creation  in  any  particular  time,  bc- 
 caufe  it  will  hold  equally  againft  it  in  all  times ;  Againft  the 
 very  polTibility  of  Creation  in  General :  fmce  with  God  there 
 is  no  prior  and  pojlerior,  no  difference  of  time  applicable  to  his 
 
 Exift- 
 
 ^  See  Bp.  Pearfon  on  the  Creed,  24.  E(Ut.  p.  63,  63. 
 
Sea.  3.     Concerning  the  Origin  o/Evil  5? 
 
 Not    that    Exmnds    can    add    any  thing  to  GoA, 
 for    they    have  no    manner   of  Proportion    to  his 
 Tower  or  Nature ;  but  he  has  in  himfelf  the    ade- 
 ciiiate  Exercife  of  his  Power  namely   in  the  Con- 
 templation and  Love  of  himfelf.     Externals  there- 
 fore  can    neither  encreafe  or  diminilli  the  Exerafe 
 of  his  Powers,  which  before  was  infinite,     God  is 
 indifferent  therefore  as  to  thefe,   nor  does  hi^  Ex- 
 ercife withoHt  plcafe  him,  otherwife  than  as  he  has 
 chofen  to  exercife  himfelf  thus;  as  will  be  fliewn 
 below  ^.     And    hence   it    manifeflly    follows    that 
 the   World   is    as   well   as  it   could  be    made  by 
 infinite  Power  and   Goodnejs.     For  fmce  the  Exer- 
 ercife    of  the    Divine    Power,    and  the  Commu- 
 
 nica^ 
 NOTES, 
 
 Exiftence,  as  we  have  endeavoured  to  prove  in  R.  c._    Be- 
 fides,  is  it  not  abfurd  to  talk  of  Time,  before  the  beginning  of 
 Things,  which  (as  we  have  fhewn  in  the  lame  Fiace)^  can 
 only  be  conceived  as  co-exiftent  'with,  or  rather  con/equenimlto 
 die'Being  of  thefe  things?  'Tis  in  vain   therefore  to  ask,  why 
 were   not  Beings  created  /ooner?  Since  no  Part  of  Duration 
 conceivable  can  ever  be  affigned  when  fome  were  not  created, 
 and  every  Period    of  Time  has  equal  relation   to  Eternity 
 *  As  to  the  fecond  Senfe  of  the  Queftion  (lays  Cud^vorth)  Why 
 «  the  World  tho'  it  could  not  poffibly  be  from  Eternity,  yet 
 <  was  no  fooner,  but  fo  lately  -tnade  ?  We  fay  that  this  is  an 
 «  abfurd  Queftion,  both  becaufe  Time  was  made  together  witrt 
 «  the  World,  zn^  there  was  no  fooner  or  later  before  Ttme  i  and 
 «  alfo,  becaufe  whatfoever  had  a  Beginning,  muft  of  Neceliity 
 .  be  once  but  a  Day  oU.     Wherefore   the  World  could  not 
 .  noffiblv  have  been  fo  made  by  God  in  time,  as  not  to  be 
 .  Tnce  but/.,  or/.  no./andYc.rs  old  and  no  -J^  -  ^°J 
 «  ;r  is"  D   887     See  the  fame  more  at  large  in  Fiddes  s  theot, 
 <^r     B     -     Part   I .  Ch.    2.  and  in  Bentiefs  Boyle's   LeSl-  p- 
 \\:  -,,V^thEdit.or7.«/«Vs  ReafonahlenefsofChrijiiariity 
 \    Vnl    2   C  Q    or   Sir  M.   Hale\  Frirn.  Originat.  of  Mankind, 
 Si   C   6    Where  you  have  all  the  abfurd  Queries  of  that 
 kind  foiidly  and  acutely  anfwerd.  ^^ 
 
 *  ^es  Chap.  5-  §.  1.  Subf.  A., 
 
<5o  Concerning  the  Origin  i^Evil.     Chap.  I, 
 
 iiication  of  his  Goodnefs,  are  the  Ends  for  which 
 the  World  was  framed)  there  is  no  doubt  but  God 
 has  attained  thefe  Bnds. 
 When  the       X.  I  knpY/  'tis  commonly  faid,  that  the  World 
 World  is    ^^5  jnadc  for  the  Glory  of  God:    But  this  is  after 
 laid  to  be      I  r     ^^  i-ta/-         r  ^,         ■    ■' 
 
 created  for  '^  mdmer   of   Men,     For    Defire   of  Glory    is    at^ 
 
 Gois  Glo-  tributed  to  God  in  the  fame  manner  a>  ^nger-,  Lovcy 
 
 ry,  'tis  af-  Revenge^  Eyes  and  Hands    (u4.)    When  therefore  tiie 
 
 ur  the  Scripture  teaches  us,  that  the  World    was   created 
 
 ^^^rof  fQ^  jj^g  ^Iq^^  ^f  ^^^^  ,jj^  ,j^  {^g  underftood  tliat 
 
 the  Divine  Attributes,  namely  Poiver,  Goodnefs  and 
 Wifdomt  fhine  forth  as  clearly  in  his  Works,  as:  if  he 
 had  no  other   intent  in  making    them  befide   the 
 
 Oflen- 
 
 N  07  E  S, 
 
 \A.)  We  fee  many  Things  are  afcribed  to  God  in  Scrip- 
 ture by  way  of  Accommodation  ;  as  Hands  and  Feet,  Heart,  An- 
 ger, Revenge,  and  Repentance.  And  fince  we  underlland  all 
 thefe  to  be  fpoken  of  him  by  way  of  Condefcenfion  to  our  Ca- 
 pacity, why  fhould  we  not  underftand  the  Defire  of  Glory  to 
 be  afcribed  to  him  in  the  fame  way  ?  Efpecially  fmce  we  mull 
 conceive  God  to  be  obliged  by  his  Goodnefs  to  fet  a  great 
 value  on  his  Glory,  and  to  require  the  promoting  of  it  from 
 us  as  a  principal  Duty.  For  the  good  and  Advantage  of  all 
 reafonable  Creatures  depends  on  the  Obedience  that  is  paid 
 to  God's  Law ;  and  there  cannot  be  a  more  eftcdhial  Means 
 to  promote  that  Obedience  than  a  due  Senfo  of  the  great  and 
 glorious  Attributes  of  God  ;  of  his  Wifdom,  Power,  juflice  , 
 and  Goodnefs.  The  more  lively  thefe  are  reprefented  to  in- 
 telligent Beings,  the  more  willing  and  careful  they  will  be  to 
 obey  God,  and  the  more  afraid  to  offend  him  ;  and  therefore 
 it  is  agreeable  to  the  Goodnefs  of  God  to  exaft  our  Endea- 
 vours to  beget  this  Apprehenfion  in  us  and  all  other  thinking 
 Beings,  Not  for  any  Adyantage  this  Glory  brings  to  God  ; 
 but  becaufe  the  Reputation  of  the  Lawgiver  and  Governour 
 of  the  World  is  a  Means  necclfary  to  advance  the  Good  of 
 his  Creatures,  and  therefore  it  is  our  Duty  and  Intcrelt  ir>  the 
 higbeft  Degree  to  promote  that  Glory  :  and  tlicrcfore  God 
 may  be  faid  to  do  all  t\iings  for  his  Glory,  becaufe  if  that  were 
 the  end  of  all  that  he  has  done,  he  could  not  be  more 
 concerned  for  it  nor  Avould  it  be  more  our  Duty  to  pro- 
 piote  it. 
 
Sed.  3.     Concerning  the  Origin  of  EvW.  61 
 
 Oftentation  of  thefe  Attributes ;  nor  could  they  have 
 anfwer'd  that  end  more  fitly  if  they  had  been  defign'd 
 {or  Glory:  But  ftridlyfpeaking,  the  Power  of  God 
 is  infinite,  and  when  he  ads  tor  the  Good  of  his 
 Creatures  according  to  that  infinite  Power,  he  is  inji' 
 nitely  good.  Infinite  knows  no  Bounds,  nor  has  the 
 Goodnefsof  Godany  other  Bounds  befidehis  Wif- 
 dam  and  Power,  which  are  alfo  infinite.  And  irt 
 reality  this  makes  moft  for  the  Glory  of  God  viz.* 
 to    have    created    a    World    with    the    greateft' 
 
 GoodneG.      (15.) 
 
 XL 
 
 I^  0  T  E  S, 
 
 (12.)  'The  Reafon  why  God  mauo  the  World  (fays  the 
 <  learned  Author  fo  often  cited  above)  was  from  his  own  over- 
 '  flowing  and  communicative  Goodnefs }  that  there  might  be. 
 
 *  other  Being'?  alfo  happy  befide  himfelf,  and  enjoy  them- 
 
 *  felves.  And  afterwards,  •  God  did  vst-  make  the  World* 
 '  merely  toofleiUate  his  Skill  «k^  Power,  but  to  commvnicati  his 
 '  Goodnefs,  nvhich  is  chiefly  and  properly   his^  Glory,  at  thC(, 
 
 *  Li^ht  and  Splendor  of  the  Skti  is  tht  Glory  of  it* . 
 
 We  have  a  fine  Paragraph  or  two  to  the  fame  purpofc  m 
 Mr.  Wollajlon'%  Dilin  of  the  Religion  of"NcUure,_  p.  1 1  5  —  I  20. 
 
 The  fame  Notiou  is  well  Hated,  in  Scot\  Chrijlian  Life  » 
 where  the  Glory  of  God  and  the  Happincfs  of  Man  are  fhewu 
 to  be  co-incident  f.  As  this  feems  to  be  very  often  mifunder- 
 ilood,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  infert  a  Pallage  or  two  from_ 
 that  excellent  Anthor.  *  %  A  true  Survey  and  infpeaion  ot 
 <■  God's  l^ature  will  inftruft  us,  that  being  infinitely  perf eft,  a* 
 '  he  is,  he  muft  be  infinitely  happy  \^\'Oci\n  himfelf;  and  fo  can 
 «  defign  no  fclf-end  v.-ithout  himfelf;  and  confcquently  that, 
 «   the  end  for  u'hich  he  requires  our  Service,   is  not  any  Ad- 
 
 *  vantage  he  expcds  to  reap  from  it,  or  farther  addition  to  hi* 
 «  own  Happinefs,  he  being  from  all  Eternity /^/t/?,  as  complete- 
 <  ly  happy  as  he  can  be  to  all  Eternity  to  come  ;  and  therefore 
 «  what  other  End  can  he  be  fuppofcd  to  aim  at,  than  our  Gooci- 
 
 *  and  Happinefs.?  It  is  true  indeed,  he  dcfigns  to  glorify  him- 
 '  /'^//'inoftrHappinefs;  but  how  ?  not  to;  rcnieu  himfelf  «?ffr<f 
 
 '    ^  *  glQU- 
 
 *   htell.  Syflem.  p.  886. 
 
 f  See  Vol.  I.  p.  4,  5. 
 
 %  Vol.  2,  Clwp.6,  p.4a-T»  43 i' 
 
Bz  Concemhig  the  Origin  (p/Evil.      Chap.  1 
 
 That  God  XI.  By  Good  I  here  underftand  that  which  is 
 nride  the  convenient  and  commodioni,  that  which  i<5  correjpon- 
 well  as  it  ^^'^^  ^^  '■^^  u4ppetite  ot  every  Creature.  God  there- 
 could  be     iore  created  the  World  with  as  great  Convenience 
 
 made  by  .  and 
 
 the  high- 
 
 GoodS-  NOTES. 
 
 andWif. 
 
 dom,  *  glorious  by  it  than  he  is,  in  himfelf,  for  it  is  impofiible  ;  but 
 
 *  to  difplay,  znAjhcw  forth  his  own  eflential  Glory  to  all  that 
 
 *  are  capable  of  admiring  and  imitating  him,  that  thereby  he 
 
 *  might  invite  them  to  tranfirihe  that  Goodncfs  of  his  into 
 
 *  their  Nature,  of  which  his  Glory  is  the  Shine  ■z.vALnftre; 
 
 *  and  thereby  to  glorify  thetn/elves ;  and  what  can  more  effec- 
 
 *  tually  difplay  the  Glory  of  a  Being  who  is  infinitely  --wife  zn(i 
 
 *  po-ji:erful,  and  good,  than  to  contri've  and  eJj'tB  the  Happinefs 
 
 *  of  his  rational  Creatures,  who,  of  all  others,  have  the  moft 
 
 *  ample  Capacity  of  Happinefs  ? 
 
 And  again  :   '  *  But  doth  not  the  Scripture  tell  us,  that  he 
 
 *  doth  all  thijigsfor  his  o^jjin  Glory,  and  that  he  obtains  this  End^ 
 
 *  as  well  by  punijhing,  as  by  renvarding  his  Creatures  ?  Very 
 
 *  true,  but  then  it  is  to  be  confider'd  that  the  Glory  he  aims 
 
 *  at,  confifts  not  in  receiving  any  Good  from  us,  but  in  doing 
 
 *  and  communicating  all  good  to  us.     Vox  infinite  Goodnefs 
 
 *  can  no  other-^xifc  be  glo7-ifed,  than   by  its  own  overflowings 
 
 *  and  free  communicarions,  and  it  can  no  otherwife  be  glori- 
 
 *  fied  in  the  Punifliment  of  its  Creatures,  but  only  as  it  doth 
 
 *  good  by  it :  For  fhould  it  punifli  without  good  reafon,  it 
 «  would  reproach  and  vilify  itfelf :  but  if  it  doth  it  for  good 
 
 *  reafon,  it  mull  be  becaufe  it  is  good  either  for  itfelf  or  othe}-s : 
 
 *  for  itfelf  \t  cannot  be ;  for  how  can  an  infinitely  happy  Bc- 
 
 *  ing  reap  any  Good  from  another  s  Mifery  ?  And  therefore  it 
 
 *  mull  he  for  the  Good  of  others,  either  to  reduce  thsfe  who 
 
 *  are  pimiflied,  or  to  ■warn  others  by  their  Example  from  run- 
 
 *  ning  away  from  their  Duty  and  Happinefs.     So  that  to  do 
 
 *  Good  is  the  end  of  God's  Punifliment ;  and  becaufe  it  is  fo, 
 '  he  is  glorified  by  it :  And  confidering  that  he  is  fo  infinitely 
 
 *  happy,  that  he  can  no  ways  fervc  himfelf  by  ourMifcries,  it 
 '  is  impollible  he    fhould  have  any  other  end  in  concerning 
 
 *  himfelf  ihoMi  us,  but  only  \.\\c  great,  God  Hie  otiq  of  doing 
 'us  Good,  and  making  us  happy."  Sec  alfo  Difcourfe  14  in 
 tiie  fame  Vol.  p.  302. 
 
 To 
 
 *  Vol.  js.  p.  204.  Fo!. 
 
Sedl.  3-     Coficeniaig  the  Ongm  of  Evil,  63 
 
 and  fitnefs,  wich  as  great  Congruity  to  the  Appe- 
 tites of  things,  as  could  be  effeded  by  infinite 
 Power,  mfiom,  and  Goodnefs,  If  then  any  thing 
 inconvenient  or  incommodious  be  now  or  was  from 
 the  beginning  in  it,  that  certainly  could  not  be 
 hindered  or  removed  even  by  infinite  Power,  Wifdom 
 and  Goodnefsi  (14.) 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 To  the  fame  Purpofe  Is  Smith's  excellent  Difcourfe  of  t!lc 
 Ixifience  and  Nature  of  God  Ch  4.  and  7  f-  And  D'Oyly\ 
 firil  Dijerfatlon,  -p.  12  2.  and  Rymers  GeJieral  R^nfoifation 
 of  Reward  Religion,  p.  260  —  267.  and  p.  511.  Bp.  Kufs 
 Remains  ift  Difcourfe  »  and  Bp.  Burnet's  Expofition  of  the 
 ^Articles,  p.  27.  4th  Edit,  and  our  Authors  Sermon  on  Dii'ine 
 Predefination,  &c.  §.  33.  For  a  fufficient  Anfwer  to  the  Ob- 
 jedion  drawn  from  Prov.  16.  4.  k^fillotforis  2d  Vol.  of 
 Sermons,  Fol.  p.  681.  ,  , 
 
 (14.)  Our  Author  rightly  concludes  from  the  Nature  una 
 Will  oiGoA,  as  difcover'd  above,  that  nothing  can  be  made 
 by  him  (by  whom  are  all  things  made)  really  unworthy  of,  or 
 inconfiftent  with  thefe  ;  however  unaccountable  and  irregukr 
 things  may  at  prefcnt  feem  to  us;  For,  having  demonftratcd 
 the  Divine  Perfeftions  in  one  Senfe  a  priori,  i.  e.  prior  to  the 
 Examination  of  particular  Phenomena,  no  feeming  difficul- 
 ties or  obje£tions  whatfoever  a  pofteriori,  i.  e.  from  theie 
 Phenomena,  ought  to  invalidate  the  Belief  of  them,  but 
 fhould  be  all  overruled  by,  and  giveaway  to  thefe;  except 
 they  amount  to  an  equal  degree  of  Clearnefs  and  Certainly 
 with  the  Proofs  of  theYe  themfelves;  and  alfo  cannot  poffibly 
 admit  of  any  manner  of  5o/«//Wconhftent  with  them;  neithei 
 of  which  Cafes  can  ever  be  made  out,  as  will,  I  hope,  appear 
 in  the  Following  Chapters  of  this  Book. 
 
 t  See  Selea  Difcourfes,  p.  136-  a^^^  ^\7>  ^"'^  39i' 
 
 REMARKS 
 
64  Concerning  the  Origin  ofEv'A,     Chap".  1. 
 
 R  E  MA  R  K  S  referred  to  in  Note  10. 
 
 [Remark  a.]  That  this  propofifion  fnu'fl:  be  allow'd  for 
 fe}f-e'vidcnt,  and  as  fuch,  incapable  oi proof,  appears  from  the 
 abfurditiei  which  they  all  run  into  tvho  attempt  to  prove  their 
 own  Exiilence  from  any  other  medium,  <viz:  from  any  of  their 
 operations.  '  I  think,  fay  they,  therefore  /  ^w  ;'  i.e.  /,  who 
 atn,  think ;  tlxcrefore  /,  who  think,  am.  I  being  fuppofed 
 to  exiji,  do  tliink,  therefore  this  thinking  proves  that  Exijlence. 
 Is  not  this  plainly  arguing  in  a  circle,  and  pronjing  a  thing  by 
 prefuppofing  it?  And  is  it  not  full  as  clear  to  me  firft  of  all 
 that  I  am,  as  that  /  think?  Tho'  I  could  not  be  certain  of  my 
 Exigence  except  /  perceiifd  fomething  ;  yet  fpre  the  percep- 
 tion of  my  own  exiftence  mull  be  both  as  ffl/-^andas  evident 
 as  any  other  perceptions.  The  firft  Propofition  therefore  is 
 felf- evident.  I  begin  with  eur  own  Exiltencc  becaufe  we  have 
 intuitive  Knowledge  of  no  other. 
 
 [R.  b  }  See  the  abfurdity  of  this  infinite  Series,  as  to  Ge- 
 nerations, Motion,  Number,  Magnititde,  ^c.  in  the  Notes 
 3,  and  R.  d.  All  or  any  of  which  Arguments  demonllrate  the 
 Abfurdity  of  it,  as  it  is  fairly  and  fully  Hated  by  Dr.  Green  in 
 his  late  Philofophy*.  Where  you  fee  the  true  old  Atheijiic  Series 
 in  a  diftercnt  drefs  from  that  in  Dr.  Clarke's  2d  Propofition. 
 
 The  fame  way  of  reafoning  is  made  ufe  of  in  a  P  hilofophical 
 EjJ'ay  tczvards  an  Enji^ion  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  by 
 Seth  PFardj-,  This  piece  being  fcarce  as  well  as  curious,  an 
 exftraft  from  it  may  not  be  difagreeablc.  '  That  the  \^orld 
 '  was  not  eternal,  but  created,  is  demonftrable  from  things  that 
 
 *  are   vifible  :     Our  Argument   fhall    be   from    Generation. 
 
 *  Whatfoever  is  begotten,  was  begotten  of  fome  other  ;  for 
 
 *  nothing  can  poffibly  beget  or  make  itlelf,  otherwife  it  will 
 «  follow  that  the  fame   thing  is,  and  is  riot,  both  at  one  in- 
 
 *  ftant,  feeing  it  is  both  the  producer,  and   the  thing  to  be 
 '  produced.     It  is  to  be  produced,  and  fo  it  is  not  yet;  it  is 
 
 *  likcwife  a  producer,  and  that  fuppofcth  tliat  it  is  in  Being : 
 '  It  is   therefore  in   Being,  and  it   is  not  in  Being,  that's  a 
 
 *  manifelt  contradiction.     Wherefore  nothing  can  generate, 
 
 *  make,  or  produce  itfelr":  wj^ecefore  every  thing  that  is  be- 
 
 •  gotten* 
 
 »  B.  6.  C.  5.  ^.  8.  p.  753. 
 t  2d.  Edit.  Oxf  1655. 
 
■Sedl,  3.     Coj'tcmiztig  the  Origin  o/'Evih  6^ 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 «  gotten,  is  begotten  of  fome  other,  and  then  the  cfther  whlth' 
 '  Degot  It,  either  was  itfeltin  the  fame  manner  begotten,  or  it 
 
 *  was  not ;  if  it  was  not,  we  are  already  come  to  the  firfl  Prin- 
 '  ciple,  which  was  unbegotten  ;  and  fo  have  diicover'd  a  God- 
 
 *  head.     If  it  was  begotten,  either  we   muil:  follow  up  the 
 
 *  Courfe  of  fucceflive  Generation    to  fome  firfl   Produdion- 
 
 *  from  a  Caufe  eternal,  or  elfe  we  miiil  necefiarily  fiy   that 
 '  the  Courfe  of  Generations  had  no  beginning,  and  confe- 
 
 *  fequently  that  infinite  Succeffions  are  alrca"iy  pail:,  which  is 
 ■=  as  much  as  to  acknowledge  that  an.  infinite  Number  of  Suc- 
 ceffions are  paft,  and  if  paft,  then  they,  are  at  an  end ;  So  we 
 have  found  an  infinite  Number  Avhich  hath  had  an  end, 
 that  is  another  Contradiclion.  Again;  if  any  fhall  affirm, 
 that  the  Courfe  of  Generation  had  no  beginning,  but  thai 
 the  number  of  them  hath  been  infinite:  I,et  usjuta  Cafe* 
 and  reafon  with  him.  We  will  imagine  the  Generations  of 
 Abraham,  for  Example,  and  Jofepb  the  Son  oi  Jacob  the  Sou 
 oilfaac,  the  Son  oi  Abraham.  I  dem:;nd  therefore  whether  be- 
 fore the  Birth  o^  Abrahatn  there  had  paft  an  infinite  Series  of 
 Generations,  or  not  ?  If  the  Series  was  finite,  the  Work  of  Gc- 
 neracion  had  beginning  ;  which  is  the  Concluiion  I  contend 
 for:  if  the  Series  paft  was  infinite  ;  then  at  the  Birth  of 
 Jafeph,  'tis  evident  that  more  Generations  were  paft,  fo  we 
 nave  found  a  Number  greater  than  that  which  was  fuppos'd. 
 to  be  Infinite:  and  confequently  that  was  not  Infinite; 
 (o  that  it  was  both  Infinite  and  not  Infinite,  a  manifeft 
 fontradiclicn. 
 
 <  But  if  we  fay  thxt  Abraham'?  was  Infinite,  and  that  (o 
 was  Jofeph's  alfo,  then  it  will  follow  that  the  Number  of 
 Abraha/ns  was  equal  with  the  N.imLer  oi  J ofeph'' s ;  but 
 Abrahatns  was  but  a  Part  of  Jofpl's,  wherefore  ths 
 Part  is  equal  to  the  Whole.  Elfe  admjt  that,  Ahraham\ 
 V.'as  finite,  but  when  it  came  to  y.ofephi  that  then  the 
 Number  was  Infinite,  it  follows  then  that  a  finite  num- 
 ber added  to  a  finite  fhall  make  an  Infinite,  which  like-. 
 wife  is  againft  the  common  light  of  re.ifon.  We  fes. 
 therefore  that  fupponng  the  Eternity  of  the  World,  or  the 
 Infinity  of  Generations,  doth  force  the  Mind  to  con- 
 trdidions,  and  confequently  the  Fitlion  i^  vain  and  ut- 
 terly   impoHible.     And  as.  we    have   argued ,  in    the   wa.y  • 
 
 *  of  Gencratioi^,  fo  we  may  likewife  in  every  thing  where 
 ■'■there-is  a    Motion,  or  Mutation,  that   is,  in   ail.  the  parts 
 
 *  of  rh«    vjfibl?    World.     The    Crc<iti(>A    ;h?rcfore  of    tha, 
 
 F  W«r]i., 
 
66  Concerning  the  Origin  ofEvW.    Chap.  I. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 <  World,  from  the  vifible  things  thereof,  is  manifcft. 
 '  ^E.  D.  *. 
 
 And  again -f-.     *  Well  having   concluded  the  Creation  and 
 
 *  Beginning  of  the    World,   we   fee  it  follows  that   thence 
 
 *  we  conclude  the  Eternal  Power  and  God-head ;  that  is, 
 
 *  the  Eternity  and   Power  of  the   God-head.  As  for  Eter- 
 
 *  nity,  we  have  by  undeniable  Confequence  refolved  all 
 '  Motions  in  the  World  into  the  Bofom  of  a  Firft  mover,  and 
 
 *  if  v/e  fuppofe  him  a  Firll  Mover,  the  Suppofition  will  evi- 
 
 *  dently  conclude  that  he  is  Eternal,  i.  e.  that  he  is  without 
 
 *  Beginning  of  ElTence,  or  without  any  term  or  limit  of  Du- 
 
 *  ration.     For  if  it  had  any  Beginning  of  Effence  or  Durati- 
 
 *  on,  that  beginning  of  Being  prefuppofeth  a  priority  of  not- 
 
 *  being,  (that  is,  adtual  Being  is  not  of  the  Effence  of  it)  and 
 '  fo  that  we  m;iy,  without  any  Contradiftion,  fuppofe  it  not 
 
 *  to  be  yet  in  Being;  that  is,  we  may  bring  our  Underlland- 
 
 *  ings,  without  Error,  to  the  Apprehenfion  of  it  as  being  yet 
 «  in  the  State  of  Pwver  onlv,  or  Potential-being,  fo  as  things 
 «  are  in  their  Caufes.  So  then,  let  us  conceit  it  in  this  State, 
 '  ar.d  compare  this  State  with  the  other  when  it  had  Being ; 
 
 *  and  it  is  evident  that  this  Paflage,  or  Tranfuion  from  want 
 
 *  of  Being  to  a  Being,  canno:  be  without  a  Motion,  nor  A-Io- 
 '  tion    viihout  an  adual  Mover :    but  that  which  moves  a 
 
 *  Thing  from  not  being  to  a  State  of  Being,  is  neceffarily  a 
 '  precedent  Mover  to  that  which  from  it  receives  its  Being ; 
 
 *  So  then  that  which  is  fuppofed  to  be  the  lirfl  original  Mo» 
 '  ver  will  have  a  Mover,  which  fiiall  of  ncceffity  have  gone 
 '  before  it,  and  confequently  it  will  be  both  a  Firft  and  not  a 
 
 *  Flrlk  TvJover,  which  is  a  plain  Contradiction.  Inftead  of 
 «  multiplying  Arguments  without  ncceliity,  we  will  only  re 
 
 *  turn  by  the  Foctfteps  of  our  Analyfis,   and  fo  from  the  Be- 
 
 *  iiig  of  the  firll:  Mover   conclude  the    Etcr,iity.     If  it  be  a 
 
 *  full  Mover;  then  it  had  no  former  Mover;  andiffo,  then 
 
 *  it  never  was  produced  from  Nothing  into  Being;  andiffo, 
 '  then  it  never  had  any  beginning  of  its  Being,  then  it  is 
 '  Eternal.     Therefore  whatfoever  is  the  firfl  Mover,  it  muft 
 
 *  ofneceiTity  likeu'ifc  be  Eternal:  but  from  the  common  af- 
 '  fcdlions  of  tainfrs  vifiblc,  we  did  before  dcmonftrate  an  Ori- 
 '  i^inal  and  firll  iMover:  Wherefore  the  Viffole  things  of  this 
 
 *  World,  iLcy  likcwifc  do  evidi  the  Etcinity  oi'  the  God- 
 '  hcadj.       /  '  "  ' 
 
 ♦  Ani 
 
 *  P.  19,  i  P.  2».  fl;  P.  2^-. 
 
Sed.  3.      Concern? ng  the  Origin  ofE\\\.  by 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 *  And  that  God  was  a  God  of  Power,  it  was  demonflrated 
 «  then,  when  we  found  him  to  be  the  firil  Caufe  and  original 
 *  Mover  and  Creator  of  the  World*. 
 
 [R.  c]  The  generally  receiv'd  Notion  of  Eternity,  as  cell- 
 firting  in  a  continual  addibility  of  fucccffi-oe  Duraticn,  is,  I 
 think,  the  very  fame  thing  as  an  infinite  Series,  zni.  confequent- 
 ]y  liable  to  the  fame  objcclions:  We  muH  therefore  try  to 
 refcue  this  Divine  Attribute  from  fuch  an  abfurd  interpre- 
 tation. 
 
 Now,  if  we  attentively  examine  our  Idcei  of  Elrrnity,  I 
 believe  we  fhalJ  find  that  it  amounts  to  thus  much  :  'viz.  uni- 
 form, i}Z'variable  Exi jinnee :  or  Jimple  Ex'fience  join'd  with 
 Nccejfiiy:  by  which  laft  Word  we  only  underhand  an  Impo/Jl- 
 hility  of  hwving  e^jer  began,  or  of  e'ver  ceajlng.  This  I  appre- 
 hend to  be  all  that  can  confiilently  be  affirnvd  of  the  Divine 
 Exillcnce  in  this  rcfpc-ft,  and  perhaps  v,e  may  more  e.ifily 
 and  fafely  determine  what  the  manner  of  it  is  7iot,  than  v.'haL 
 it  is ;  V.  g-  that  it  continues  not  by  time,  or  in  place-.  In- 
 deed local  Exienfion  zxA  fuccrjf've  Duration  are  modes  of  the 
 Exigence  of  mo'l:  Beings,  and  therefore  we  find  it  very  diffi- 
 cfllt  to  confider  any  exiilence  without  them  :  But  as  we  have 
 endeavoured  to  fhew  the  poflibility  of  removing  lac  fot-mer 
 from  the  Divine  Elfence,  in  Notes  3,  6  and  7  fo  iiere,  J,  think, 
 it  may  be  flicvn  alfo  that  the  latter  has  no  neceiiary  connec- 
 tion with  it,  but  rather  the  contrary. 
 
 In  order  to  do  this,  it  will  be  necefTary  to  explain  what  we 
 mean  by  Time,  which  (according  to  Mr.  Locke)  is  of  the  very- 
 fame  kind  •vvlih  Duration  ;  and  may  properly  be  termed  a  part 
 of  it.  This  is  very  well  defin'd  by  Leihnitz,  to  be  the  Oider 
 of  Succi-fion  of  created  Beings.  We  maniteilly  get  the  Noticn 
 of  it  by  reflefting  on  (he  Succefhoi/cf  Ideas  m  our  Mind?, 
 which  we  are  apt  to  conceive  as  a  Chain  dravvn  out  in  length, 
 of  which  all  the  particular  Ideas  are  confider'd  as  the  Link:. 
 Whereas,  had  Vve  but  one  in^oariate perception,  withoL't  any  iuch 
 Succellion  of  Ideas  in  oar  Minds,  we  could  have  no  fuch  no-, 
 tion  as  this  of  Duration,  but  that  of  pure  Exigence  only.  Now 
 Exijie?ice  being  evidently  a  fimplc  Idea,  (iho'  perhaps  Dura- 
 tion be  not)  is  confequently  incapable  ol:  a  Definition,  and 
 we  need,  I  think,  only  obferve  of  it  here,  that  it  we  join  our 
 1^?^0l  Duration  to  it,  we  flill  add  nothing  to  the  Idea  of  it 
 •as  it   is  in  itfelf,  but  merely  a  relation   to  £^t$rnai  things  ;j 
 
 F  2  which 
 
 34- 
 
68  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil.     Chap.l. 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 which  Idea  of  Duration  therefore  feems  purely  accidental  i6 
 it,  and  no  neceffary  Ingredient  of  the  former  Idea,  which  is 
 complete  without  it.  T'ime  then,  or  Duration,  is  an  Idea  en- 
 tirely refulting  from  our  Confideration  of  the  Exiftence  of  Be- 
 ings with  reference  to  a  real  or  imaginary  Succe£io7t.  Whence 
 it  will  follow  in  thc/r/?  place,  that  we  cannot  poflibly  frame 
 any  Idea  of  this  hind  of  Duration  without  taking  in  SuccefG- 
 on  ;  and  fecondly,  that  we  cannot  eafily  feparate  the  Exigence 
 of  any  finite,  changeable  Beings  from,  this  kind  of  Duration. 
 
 Our  next  Enquiry  rauft  be  whether  this  Idea  of  Duration 
 be  connected  with  the  Exiilence  of  ihofe  Beings  entirely  as 
 they  exiji,  or  only  as  they  exill  in  fuch  a  particular  manner  : 
 Whether  it  belongs  to  all  Exiftevce,  as  Exijience,  or  only  to  a 
 particular  5'£?;-r  of  Exiil:ence,  "jIz,  that  which  includes  the  fore- 
 mention'd  relation  to  Succeffion.  The  latter,  I  think,  will  ap- 
 pear more  probable,  when  we  refledl  that  it  is  only  from  the 
 'variahifnefs  and  contingency  of  our  own  Exiftence,  that  all  our 
 Succeifions  fpruig:  Whereas,  were  we  entirely  ivde-pendenty 
 we  muil  be  abioiutely  in:?mitable,  and  \r\V2in-ih\y  per?nanent  i 
 and  alfo,  that  we  can  contemplate  even  this  Exiilence  of  ours 
 without  any  Succeflion,  i.  e.  we  have  a  Power  of  confining  our 
 Thoughts  and  attending  to  one  Idea  aJc?!^  for  fomc  fmall  time 
 (if  that  Word  be  excufible  here)  exclufive  of  all  ether  Ideas 
 and  confequerxtly  excUdive  of  Succeffion.  This  Mr.  Z-of^^  al- 
 lows, being  \vhat  he  calls  an  Ivjiatit,  which,  fays  he,  <  is  that 
 '  ivhich  takes  vp  the  Ti?>ie  only  of  one  Idea  in  our  Minds,  with- 
 
 *  cut  the  Succeffion  of  another,  wherein  therefore  we  perceive 
 
 *  no  Succeffion  at  all  *.' 
 
 Succeffion  therefore  does  not  appear  to  be  neceiTarily  join'd 
 with  the  Idea  of  ablbhite  exiftence,  fmce  we  can  confider 
 one  (for  how  fmall  a  time  focver)  <vjithout,  and  independent  of 
 the  other.  Nay,  laftlv,  there  is  a  certain  Exiftence  to  which 
 it  cannot  poffibly  be  in  anv  fenfe  apply'd,  and  that  is  a  Per- 
 fed  one.  Suppofe  this  perfeft  Being  alone  in  nature,  as  we 
 anuft  believe  him  once  to  have  been,  and  then  \\\^^x.  change  o^ 
 Nature,  or  SticccJJlan  of  Ideas  can  be  found  ?  Whatyi'.vA-  of  Mo- 
 ments, what  altnatic?!  or  increafe  CM\  we  imagine  in  his  o<vn 
 unilorm,  invariable  Effence  ?  What  Idea  have  we  o\  Duration 
 asapply'dto  his  E.xiftcncc,  antecedent  to  his  Willing  and  Cre* 
 eiiing  External  things?  Such  Duration  then  as  we  are  ac- 
 qaaintcd  ivitli,  can,  I  humbly  apprehend,  have  no  manner  of 
 
 relation 
 
 *  EJFay  en  Human  Under jlarJivg,  B,  2.  Ch.  14.  §.  10. 
 
Se(5t.  3.     Concerning  the  Origin  ^Evil.  69 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 Telatlon  to  this  immutable  Being,  wliilc  fuppos'd  to  exift  a- 
 ione:  But  as  foon  as  he  detcrmin'd  to  exercife  his  feveral 
 Attributes  in  the  produ6lion  of  fomething  without  hinj^ch'^ 
 then  we  l;iave  reafon  to  think  that  Time,  Succejfion,  and  Increafe 
 began.  ^'  Tho'  the  eternal  Being  had  no  nccelTary  Succcffi- 
 *'  on  "in  his  own  Nature,  yet  being  perfeflly  felf  aSii've  aiid 
 *'  free,  thence  it  proceeded,  that  the  exercife  of  his  freedom 
 "  in  decreeing  and  producing  the  Creatures,  in  fuch  a  njan- 
 *'  ner  and  order  as  was  judg'd  fit  by  his  mofi:  perfedl  Wifdora, 
 "  became  the  Original  of  whatever  real  Succefhon  has  been 
 "  in  Nature,  and  fuch  SuccelTion  as  w?  arq  apt  to  conceive 
 "  to  ]xx\Q  preceded,  is  no  other  than  imaginary."  "^ 
 
 To  the  feveral  Objedlioas  againft  this  Notion  dra^yn  from 
 God's  eternal  Wifdotn,  Ideas,  Decrees,  iSc.  fee  a  fuiiicicnt  An- 
 fwer  in  the  fame  place. 
 
 i  fhall  tranfcribe  this  Author's  reply  to  the  moft  common 
 and  confiderable  one  about  the  Schoolmens  pundum  Jians, 
 which  we  alfo  elteem  as  indefenfible  an  Hypothefis  as  the 
 other. 
 
 "  Spmc  will  pcffibly  objedl  that  if  there  was  once  no  rea^ 
 "  Succeffion  in  Nature,  it  will  follow  that  the  divine  Exi" 
 "■  rtence  was  then  at  leafl  (as  'tis  ufually  faid  to  be)  Infanta 
 *'  nequs.  But  to  this  it  may  be  reply'd  th.it  Exiilencc  is  no* 
 "  thing,  ifdiftinguifh'd  from  the  Being  which  exifts.  Con- 
 *'  fequently,  there  can  no  real  Qaantity  belong  to  it  as  fo  di- 
 •'  .^inguifh'd.  Wherefore  it  cannot  properly  be  denominated 
 ♦'  either_/f«//^  or  Infinite,  fucceffi've  ox  injlantaneous.  For  thefe 
 *'  are  Attributes  which  have  a  Reference  to  ^antity,  and  can 
 ♦'  no  more  agree  to  exiftence,  which  is  byt  a  Morf'/?  of  Beings, 
 ♦f  th?,n  they  can  to  Neccffity,  or  Contingence,  v/hich  are  Mode? 
 "  of  Exiftence.  To  define  Eternity  or  neceflary  Exiftence 
 •'  by  Infinity  qr  the  Negation  of  Lin^its,  fecms  to  be  no  leii 
 ■"  impertinent,  than  to  define  Virtue  by  the  Negation  of  i?^^ 
 "  or  Blue.  For  Exiftence  (which  has  no  Quantity  or  Dimen- 
 "  fions)  hath  no  more  Analogy  to  Extenfion  and  Limits 
 •'  than  Virtue  (\vhich  hath  no  Colour)  hath  to  Red  or  Blae. 
 *<■  And  for  the  fame  Reafon  it  is  no  lefs  improper  fo  define  ic 
 '^'  to  be  injiantaneous,  fince  even  an  Infant  (as  likewife  an  Atom) 
 *'  is  conceiv'd  as  qaantity,  tho'  the  minuteft  imaginable,    ^at 
 
 F  3  "if 
 
 ^  Impart.  E^iuiry  p.  zoS, 
 
yo  Concerning  the  Origin  5/" Evil.     Chap.  I. 
 
 R  E  Af  j4  R  K  S, 
 
 *'  if  it  cannot  properly  be  denominated  inft.intaneoii3,  much 
 /*'  lefs  can  it  be  facceir:ve*.  " 
 
 To  which  give  inc  leave  to  add  the  Tcftimony  of  Cud-Tvortb  -{-, 
 Having  confuted  the  abl'urd  Notion  of  the  World's  Etcr- 
 ternity,  he  adds:  "  Here  will  the  Atheiit  think  prefeiitly  he 
 **  has  got  a  great  advantage  to  diiprove  the  Exijience  of 
 'f '  a  God.  Do  not  they  m.^ho  thu:  dejlroy  the  Eternit-j  of  the 
 '*'  World  at  the  fame  time  alfo  destroy  the  Eternity  of  the 
 "  Creator?  For,  if  Time  itfc^f  ^ixirre  7rJ  Eterval,  then., 
 **  homo  could  the  Deity  or  any  thing  elfe  be  fo  ?  The  Athciil 
 f'  fecurely  taking  it  for  granted,  that  God  hirafelf  could  not 
 *'  be  othernjjife  Eternal  than  by  a  fucceffive flux  of  ivf7iUe'Ti7ne, 
 "  But  we  fay  that  this  will  on  the  contrary  afford  us  a  pkin 
 *'  DefnonJI ration  of  the  Exijietice  of  a  Deity.  For  fince  the 
 *'  World  and  Time  itfelfwere  not  i7ifinite  in  \\\t\xpaf  Duration^ 
 *'  buthad  a  Bcgijuiiyig,  therefore  were  they  both  certainly  made 
 *'  together  by  fome  other  Being,  who  is,  in  order  cf  Nature, 
 *'  fenior  60  T/;;zf,  and  fo  'zvithout  Time,  before  Time  :  He  being 
 "  above  that  fuccefive  Flux,  and  comprehending  in  the 
 **  Stability  and  immutable  Pe7fcHioti  of  his  own  Being,  his 
 ■"  7'eferday  and  to  D^v,  and  for  Ever.  Or  thus:  Some- 
 *•  thing  was  of  Necefiity  i7ifnite  in  Duration,  and  without 
 *'  a  Beginni72g;  but  neither  the  World,  nor  Motion,  nor  Timc^ 
 "'  i.  e.  no  Succefinje  Being  vv-as  fuchj  therefore  is  there 
 **  fomething  elfe,  whofe  being  and  Duration  is  not  fuccefi've 
 **'  and  foiving,  but  ferma7mit,  to  whom  this  Infinity  be- 
 "  longeth.  The  Atheifis  here  can  only  fmile,  or  make 
 *'  Faces;  and  fliow  their  little  Wit  in  quibling  upon  nunc 
 ■*'  jians,  or  a  fa7iding  No-tv  of  Eternity  ;  as  if  this  funding 
 *'  Eternity  of  the  Deity  (which  with  fo  much  reafon  hath 
 f  been  contended  for  by  the  s.ncisnt  genuine  Thcijis)  were 
 *'  nothing  but  a  pitiful  f/.tall  tnoment  of  Ti7ne  f ending  fill; 
 *'  and  as  if  the  Duration  of  all  Beings  whatfoever  mull 
 <*  needs  be  like  their  ov.'n  ;  Whereas  the  Duration  of  every 
 *'  thing  mull  of  neceffity  be  agreeable  to  its  Nature ;  and 
 *'  therefore  as  that  whofe  i7}iperfcB  Nature  is  ever  flo-^:i7ig 
 *'  like  a  River,  and  confifls  in  co7itinual  Motion,  and  changes 
 "  one  after  another,  mull  reeds  have  accordingly  a  fuccrjfi-je 
 *-  and  fo'-jji:.ig  Duration,  Aiding  perpctuiilly  from  prefuit 
 "  "  into 
 
 *  Impartial  Enquiry,  p.   210.     Sec  alfo   Epifoplus  Inil. 
 
 Theol.  L.  4.  C.  5, 
 f  liitdl.  Syfl.  p.  ^44.  i^'c. 
 
Seel.  3.     Concerning  the  Origin  ofEvih 
 REMARKS. 
 
 *«  into  pafi,  and  always  pofting  on  towards  the  future, 
 "  expecSting  fomething  of  itioli'  which  is  not  yet  in  Being, 
 "  but  to  come ;  {o  rauft  that  whofe  perfeSi  Natu>-e  is 
 "  ejjentiaily  imfuutahlc,  and  always  the  fame,  and  neccjfa- 
 "  rily  exiftent,  have  a  permanent  Duration ;  never  lofing  a- 
 "  ny  thing  of  itfelf  once  prefent,  as  Aiding  away  from 
 "  it ;  nor  yet  running  forward,  to  meet  fomething  of 
 *'  itfelf  before,  which  is  not  yet  in  Being,  and  it  is  as 
 "  contradifticis  for  jt  ever  to  have  begun,  as  ever  to 
 *'  ceafe  to  be  ". 
 
 After  all,  it  muft  be  again  confefled,  tli^.t  the  Idea  of 
 Succeffion  (as  Mr.  ColUber  obferves)  fo  infinuates  itfelf  in- 
 to our  idea  of  Exiltence,  and  is  fo  clofely  connected 
 with  the  Exiftence  of  all  finite  Beings,  th^t  wt  find  it 
 extreamly  difiicult  to  imagine  the  Eternal  Exiilence  of 
 God,  any  other  wife  than  as  an  Eternal  continued  $eries  or 
 .SuccefTion. 
 
 Our  conflant  Converfation  with  mateiial  Objects  m:\kcs  it 
 alnioll  impoiiible  for  us  to  confider  things  abilraftcd  from 
 Time  and  Place,  which  (as  was  obferved  bcfoie)  are  A'lodcs  of 
 the  Exiileace  of  molt  things,  and  therefore  we  arc  apt  raflily 
 to  apply  thefe  Confiderations  to  the  great  Author  and  Prefer- 
 ver  of  all  Things.  We  Teem  to  think  that  as  the  moft  ex.ilted 
 Idea  we  can  form  of  God's  Eternity  and  Qmni-prcfnce  muil  be 
 infinite  Duration,  and  unbounded  Exienjion,  fo  thefe  are  to  be 
 flrjflly  and  pofitively  attributed  to  him ;  whence  muit  fol- 
 low ail  the  Abfurdities  of  Paji  and  Future,  Extenlion  in  this 
 znd t/yat  Place  as  compatible  with  the  Divine  Elfence.  Where- 
 as abfoliite  pofitive  Infinity  (fuch  as  belongs  to  God  * )  docs,  in 
 iis  very  Notion  exclude  the  Confideration  o{ Parts;  fince  no 
 Addition  of  any  Parts  whatfoever  can  amount,  or  in  the  leail 
 degree  approach  to  if  (Tho  fuch  negative  Infinity  as  belongs 
 to  all  ^antity,  cannot  poflibly  be  confider'd  otherwifef.)  So 
 that  whofoever  acknowledges  God's  Perfections  to  be  llriftly 
 infinite,  does,  by  that  Confelfion,  deny  that  they  may  be  coafi- 
 dered  as  made  up  of  Parts:  That  Immerfi'-y  can  be  compofed 
 ol  -iXiy  finite  Extenfions,  or  Eternity  qow^u  ofmultipIyM  Dura- 
 tions, and  confequently,  that  there  can  be  Length  or  Space,  Di- 
 Jiance  qr  Time,  paJi  or  future,  with  the  Infinite  and  Eternal 
 
 F  4  Qod 
 
 *  5eeNote3.  and  R.  1. 
 \  Sc?Note3,  and  R.  1. 
 
^2  Concerning  the  Orlglji  o/'Evil.     CJiap.  I. 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 God*.  When  therefore  we  fay  that  God  nhvavs  hvas,  or  ever 
 ivill  be,  v.'e  don't  mean  by  thefe  and'  the  like  Woi'ds,  that  hi-s 
 Exiftencc  has  (Iridly  any  relation  to  Times  pail  or  future, 
 that  it  is  ar  all  increaled,  altered,  or  affected  thereby;  but 
 on] V thus  much  is  intended,  'viz.  then  whenever  wc  fuppofe 
 any  other  Beings  exilting,  or  Time  and  Succeflion  begun^ 
 then  it  was,  is^  or  will  be  poiTible  for  ihefe  Beings  to 
 sffirm  in  any  Part  of  this  their  Time  or  SuccefTioh,  that 
 God  alfo  exijls.  In  the  fame  manner  as  it  may  be  affirm- 
 ed of  fome  Propofitions  that  they  always  were  and  will 
 be  tnie,  that  they  are  true  in  this  or  that,  and  every  Place  : 
 tho*  fuch-  AiTertions  arc  exceedingly  improper,  becaule 
 Prcpofit  ons  or  neceilary  Truths  have  no  manner  of  Re- 
 lation to  either  Time  or  Place.  All  Expreflions  therefore 
 which  imply  Sacceffion,  fuch  as,  nxias,'  <voill  he,  ahvays, 
 tvi-hen  Sic.  as  well  as  thofe  that  imply  Locality,  fuch  as  Ubi 
 nvberCj  &c*.  can  only  be  applied  to  finite  temporary  things-, 
 which  exift  in  Time  and  Place  :  With  which  things  fo  exift- 
 sng,  as  well  as  every  Point  of  Time  and  Place,  the  Deity  is 
 iuppofed  to  be  co-exifient ;  tho'  his  own  Nature  and  Effence  be 
 very  different  from  thefe,  and  have  properly  no  manner  of  re- 
 lation to  or  connection  with  them.  If  then  wc  will  attribute 
 Dr.  ration  to  him,  it  muR  he  permanent,  u n/uccej/i've  Dnrjitioii, 
 i.  e.  Duration  of  a  quite  difJercnt  ^vWfrom  what  we  meet  with 
 /lere.  But  it  is  to  be  rememberd  that  we  don't  pretend  co 
 explain  the  Nature  of  Eternity,  or  to  dettermine  th^  manner  Oi 
 fuch  Exirtence  as  excludes  all  SuaeJJion;  fince  it  is  fufhcient 
 for  us  here  to  fhew  the  pofTibility  of  conceiving  the  thing  in 
 general,  the  certainty  of  it  having  been  demonllrated  alrea- 
 dy, when  we  proved  that  fomething  muft  be  Eternal,  having 
 alfo  fhevvn  that  Eternity  could  not  confjft  in  fuccefllve  DUr 
 yation. 
 
 .  If  then  the  Divine  Exiflence  cannot  include  fucceffion  of 
 Parts,  Qr  our  kind  of  Duration,  (which  perhaps  by  this  time 
 may  not  fecm  altogether  improbable)  neither  can  his  tffintial 
 Attributes.  His  Kvoivledge,  v.  g.  can  have  no  relation  to  times 
 faft  or  future,  to  fore  or  after ;  nor  can  any  objetS  be 
 iaid  to  be  at  a  Dijiance  frgm  it,-  or  ai,y  imaginarj'  diilance  fv,£ 
 ^o:  nds  to.  i  i-  ,  ^    ' 
 
 ',  ^\iQ  chief  Reafon  why  •-^e  don't  perceive  and  know  any 
 
 thing 
 
 *  See  Locke  on  Hum.  Uud.  13.  2,  C.  J  5.  §.  ^2 
 t  See  H.  h.       :    :  ."' 
 
5^6:.  3-     Concerning  the  On^in  of  11V\\.  73 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 thing  that  his  a  real  Exifteace,  is  bacaufc  that  Exillence  is 
 remov'd  from  us  bv  the  Diftance  of  Tm^  or  i^lace'-,  But  this 
 Realbn  cannot  hold  with  God,  ^vho  is  (tho'  in  a  manner  far 
 xlifFerent  from  his  Creatures)  ahvays  prefint  to  all  times  and 
 places,  and  confcquently  mult  behold  all  things  exifting  there- 
 in, as  well  as  we  fee  any  objecl  at  due  Diftance  direftly  before 
 us.  Thus  he  that  is  travelling  on  a  Road  cannot  fee  thofe  that 
 eome  behind  or  are  gone  far  before  him;  but  he  who  from 
 forae  Eminence hthoMs  the  ^hole  Road  from  end  to  end,  views 
 at  once  all  the  diftant  travellers  fucceeding  one  another.  But 
 this,  I  think,  is  fo  evident  in  itfelf  that  neither  Argument 
 nor  Simile  can  make  it  morefo.  See  Martin  %  Difcourfc  of  Na- 
 tural Religion  Part  i.  C.  8.  or  Note  76. 
 
 Hence  then  appears  the  Impropriety  of  thofe  Terms,  Di'vine 
 Prefcience,  ? redcflination,  ^c.  which  have  fo  long  puzled  the 
 World  to  no  manner  of  Purpofe;  And  the  only  Conclufion 
 at  laft  mufl  be,  that  all  things  which  cvtr  ivere  ox  luill  be, 
 which  with  refpedl  to  fome  former  or  latter  times,  and  to  Per- 
 fons  placed  therein,  may  be  call'd  pajl  or  future,  are  always 
 equally  and  at  once  prefent  to  the  view  of  God;  that  to  him 
 ftridl}^  and  abfolutely  a  thoufand  Tears  are  as  sne  Day,  and  one 
 Day  as  a  thoufand  Tears,  and  that  whatever  Difficulties  feem  to 
 attend  this  conception  of  things  hQ.\ng  fuccejji%<e  to  us,  artd  not 
 fo  to  him,  can  be  no  Argument  againll  the  Matter  itfelf,  which 
 is  demonllrable  ;  biit  only  one  of  the  many  Inftances  of  the 
 Weaknefs  of  Human  Underftanding' in  things  pertaining  un- 
 to God- 
 
 Againft  the  common  Notion  of  £/^r«/Vj,  fee  the  Spe^ator, 
 N.  590.  or  M.  Ha/e^s  Prim.  Orig.  of  Mankind,  §.  I.e.  6. 
 p.  123.  or  a  Philofophical  EJfay,  &c.  by  Seth  Ward,  p.  23.  or 
 Gre'vo  i  Cofenologia  Sacra,  B,  i.  c  i.  par.  9.  or  Ode.  Theologia. 
 naturalis,  p.  220. 
 
 Both  this  Attribute  and  Omniprefenceare  alfo  well  treated 
 of  by  y.  Smith,  in  his  Difcourfc  concerning  the  Exi fence  and 
 Nature  of  God,  C.  2.  §.4,  5.  Selc^  Difourfes,  p.  125,  126, 
 t5fc.  and  by  D.  Martyn.  Difcourfc  of  Natural  Religion  Part  I. 
 C.  7,  and  Dr.  Sherlock  on  the  Trinity  p.  76,  ^c. 
 
 [R.  d.]  '  Kerq  we  find  certain  Chains  of  Caufes  and  Ef- 
 f  feBs,  and   many  Parts  of  thii  Syfem  owing  their  Exifence, 
 
 *  and  the  jnanner  of  their  Exillence,  to  a  preceding  Caufe,  con- 
 
 *  fequently  we  cannot,  with  any  Poffibility  of  Reafon,  affert 
 
 *  that  the  nvhole  Syflem  exills  without  a  Caule,  for  this  is  the 
 f  ^me  ii  to  affert  that  the  Parts  do  net  belong  to  the  nvhole. 
 
 •  ■    "  ■      -         t-Again^ 
 
74  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil.     Chap.  I, 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 f  Again,  a  material  Syftem  compofed  of  Parts  that  are  change- 
 
 <  able,  cannot  exift  without  a  Cauie  dijlinii  from,  and /»7or  to 
 «  fuch  a  Syftem.     For  wherever  the-e  is  a  Change,  there  mull 
 
 <  be  a  Caufe  of  that  Change,  otherwife  there  would  be  a  Be- 
 '  ginning  without  a  Canfe.     The  Caufe  of  this  Change  can- 
 
 *  not  be  in  the  materials  of  th's  Syftem  for  the  very  fame  Rea- 
 «  fon  ;  therefore  it  mufl  be  in  fomething  dijlin^l  from  and  pri- 
 
 *  or  X.O  the  Syftem  itfeif.     The  fame  will  be  the  Cafe  as  to 
 
 *  Motion  in  a  material  Syftem;  there  is  no  Motion  but  what 
 
 *  is  the  efi^ed   of  a  fon/ter  Motion,  confequently  there  is  no 
 
 *  Motion  in  furh  a  Syftem  which  has  been  from  Eternity,  or 
 
 *  which  ha5  not  been  Caufed,  Sec* 
 
 *  From  the  ImperfeBion  alfo,  or  Unhappinefs  which  we  fee 
 
 *  in  this  Syftem,  in  Man  particularly;  from  the  Frame  and 
 
 *  Conjiitutictt  of  it,  'tis  evident  that  it  did  not  exift  without  a 
 «  caufe. 
 
 *  The  Queftion  then  will  be,  what  is  the  Caufe  of  its  Ex- 
 «  iftence  ?  Now  that  cannot  be  in  itfelft  for  then  a  thing 
 «  would  be  before  it  was,  which  is  a  Contradiction.  It  fol- 
 f  lows  then,  that  fome  other  Being  is  the  Caufe  of  its  Exiil- 
 
 *  ence;  and  the  next  Queftion  will  be,  ^vho  is  this  Being? 
 
 *  Now  as  whatever  began  to  exift  muft  owe  its  Exiftence  to 
 «  fome  preceding   Caufe;  fo  that  Caufe,  if  it  has  not  exifted 
 
 *  eternally,  muft  likewife  owe  its  Exiftence  to  fome  other  pre- 
 
 <  ceding  Caufe,  and  that  to  another,  and  fo  on  till  we  afcend 
 "=  to  {x}n.tfirjl  Caufe,  or  to)  a  Being  that  is  Eternal,  and  exifts 
 «  abfolutely  ou/Vi'oz/^  Caufe.     And  that  there  is  fuch  a  Being 
 
 <  is  evident,  otherwife,  as  nothing  could  begin  to  exile  witli- 
 
 *  out  a  Caufe,  fo  nothing  that  is  not  eternal  could  ever  have 
 
 *  exifted  -f-. 
 
 [R.  e.]  That  the  Idea  of  Self-Exifence  can  imply  nothing- 
 more  than  a  Negation  o^ Dependence  on  any  Cauie;  and  thai 
 Tiecefftty  of  Exifence  can  only  be  confidcr'd  as  a  Confequence 
 refulting  fromi  fuch  Independence  feems  very  clear.  A  Being 
 which  is  the  firft  of  all  Caufes,  itlelf  abfolutely  uncaufcd^ 
 cannot  have  any  thing  in  any  manner  of  Conception  prior  to; 
 it,  or  which  may  be  confider'd  as  a  pofitive  Ground  oi  its  Ex- 
 ■Jilence.     We  can  therefore  only  prove  his  Exiftence  a  poferi- 
 
 ori 
 
 *  Sue  CoUiber'' s  Impartial  Enquiry,  p.  31,  32,  life. 
 
 f  Enquiry,  p.  ii,  12,  1 8,  ffff.  See  alfo  Dr.  Bentley'si 
 JBoyle's  Left.  Scrm.  6.  p.  127,  i^c  $x\\  Edit,  aid  the  other 
 Authors  referred  to  in  .Note  3. 
 
Sed.  3'     Concerning  the  Ou^ivi  of  ^vW.  y^ 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 @n  and  argue  from  the  manner  of  it  in  a  negative  way.  Se^ 
 Note  4.  From  the  order  of  Caufes  \vc  gather  that  he  miift  ne- 
 cefTarily  have  beeii  from  all  Eternity,  othcrwiie  his  Exilcence 
 vyoukl  have  arolc  from  nothing  ;  and  that  he  muit  continue  to 
 all  Eternity,  otherwife  an  end  would  be  put  to  that  ExilU 
 ence  by  nothing.  But  tliis  is  flill  only  a  Confcq7i.ential'H<i.LQ.{'- 
 lity  ariling  fronr^  tiie  Abfurdity  \vhich  would  attend  the  con- 
 trary Suppofitiong,  and  to  infer  any  thing  from  hence  con- 
 cerning the  Modus  of  the  Divine  Being  fcemr.  to  be  building 
 a  great  deal  more  on  this  Argument  than  it  will  bear.  This 
 is  indeed  a  ^eafon  by  which  we  find  that  he  mult  always  exift, 
 but  it  is  a  Reafon  to  us  only,  and  does  not  aifedl  hk  own  Na- 
 ture, or  the  Caufeof  it,  and  when  it  is  apply'd  to  that,  I  think 
 'tis  ufed  equivocally.  Conceiving  that  he  cannot  poffibly  be 
 fuppofed  not  to  exiii,  is  far  from  conceiving  honjo  or  ^johy  he 
 aclually  does  exifi  j  we  can  eallly  fliew  a  Reafon  for  the  one, 
 but  it  feems  above  human  Comprchenfion  to  accoimt  in  any 
 Refpeft  for  the  other  :  Nay,  the  Attempt  to  do  it  feems  alto- 
 gether as  abfurd  and  ufelefs,  as  endeavouring  to  fliev/  how  or 
 why  a  thing  is  what  it  is :  How  a  Firft  Caufe  is  a  firfl:  Caufe ; 
 or  why  Truth  is  Truth. 
 
 Farther :  This  eternal  Being,    we  fay,  is  hidependent ;  or,  ^ 
 
 which  is  the  fame  thing,  Self-exijlent,  i.  e.  his  Exiflence  de- 
 pends upon  nothing  beftde  himfeli  ?  But  does  it  therefore  pofi- 
 rively  depend  upon  hiinfelf?  Will  it  follow  that  becaufe  he 
 has  no  external  Caufe,  therefore  he  muft  have  an  int-crnal  one  ? 
 Or  becauie  no  ground  or  reafon  of  his  Exiflence  can  be  drawn 
 from  any  other  Sublhnce,  therefore  one  muft  be  contained  ia 
 his  onvn  Suhjlance,  or  felf?  This  is  uling  the  Word  Self-exiJI- 
 ente  in  two  different  Senfes,  both  as  negatl-ve  and  pojitive, 
 which  have  no  manner  of  Conneclion  with  each  other,  and 
 the  latter  of  which  will  perhaps  appear  to  be  no  very  good 
 one.  It  is  not  then  apparent^  yet  that  there  needs  any  Phy-^ 
 Jlcal  Reafon  at  all  for  the  Exijlence  of  the  etertml,  independent 
 Being. 
 
 Nor,  Secondly,  if  there  did,  would  this  NeeeJJjty  0?  Nature 
 ufually  afhgned  as  fuch,  fcrve  for  that  Purpofe.  For  firll  it  is 
 not  the  Siihjlar.cc  itfcU,  that  would  be  to  make  the  fame  thing 
 the  Ground  of  iifelf  j  which  is  noni'cnfe.  'Tis  therefore  a  Per- 
 fefl!o:i.  Property  or  ^:///;7^v/^  of  that  Subftance  (we  know  no 
 other  Dillinrtion)  and  as  fuch  mull:,  in  the  Order  of  our  I- 
 deas,  bcConfcquent  upon  the  cxiilcnce  of  that  Subftance  in 
 ivhicli  it  is  ilippofed  to  inh<^re.     Whatever  it  is;,  it  has  in  fomc 
 
 reipect 
 
jb  Ccncerning  the  Origin  of^vW,     Clwp.  I. 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 j-e-'pcift  or  other  a  relation  to  the  Subjcdl  to  which  it  belongs. 
 i,et  it  thcii  be  n\  Attribute  fiti  ceneris.,  cujus  cunque generis  (if 
 we  mean  any  thing  at  all  by  this  Word)  it  mu.t  be  predicated 
 of,  and  prefippofe  its  Subjecl  and  confequently  cannot,  accord- 
 ing to  the  Order  of  our  Ideas,  be  the  antecedent  ^»i3^wi^  or 
 foundation  of  it.  And  to  endeavour  to  clear  it  (as  fomc  do)  by 
 making  it  not  an  Attribute  of  the  Suhftance,  but  of  the  attribute 
 of  the  Subftance  ;  or  as  they  phrafe  it,  a  Property  of  a  Proper- 
 ty; is  only  thurfting  it  ftill  farther  back,  and  making  it  pofte- 
 rior  in  conception  to  both  the  Sabftance  and  its  Attribute  or 
 Property. 
 
 But  Thirdly,  fuppohngthis  Necejfiif,  this  Ground ot  Renfon, 
 could  be  confider'd  as  antecedetit  to  the  Divine  Nature,  and  in- 
 ferring its  aftual  exigence,  wc  are  got  upon  one  Step  farther  yet; 
 for,  will  there  not  be  th«  fame  neceffity  for  demanding  a  reafon 
 for  that  reafon,  aground  for  that  ground,  and  fo  on  in  infinitum? 
 And  what  fhall  we  get  by  fuch  an  endlefs  progreiTion  ?  Why 
 Ihould  we  not  ftop  at  a  firft  Being,  as  well  as  at  this  Ground, 
 which  muft  itfelf  want  a  Foundation  if  the  other  does,  fmcc 
 there  cannot  be  any  intuitive  Knowledge  in  either;  and  the 
 fame  reafons  which  are  given  for  flopping  at  this  Ground  wWl 
 hold  equally  for  Hopping  before  v/e  come  at  it,  and  convince 
 us  that  we  might  as  well,  or  perhaps  better,  acquiefce  in  the 
 «6?a/3/ Exiftence  of  the  firft  Being.  We  muft  then  reft  fomc- 
 Avhere:  We  muft  either  admit  one  firft  Caufe  of  all  Things 
 and  Qualities,  itfelf  ^Ar//?/?7o- without  Caufe  (for  that  is  imply'd 
 in  its  being  call'd  the  firft)  or  an  infinite  feries  of  Beings  ex- 
 ifting  without  any  original  Caufe  at  all;  i.e.  e\t\icr  fi)me  one 
 thing  muft  be  without  a  Caufe  or  e^jery  tbing. 
 
 Here  then  are  two  Difficulties ;  the  Icfs  is  to  be  chofen  ; 
 let  us  fee  which  that  is.  Now  if  the  Manner  ofi Exijietice  in  all 
 thefe  Beings  were  entirely  the  fame,  I  grant  m  would  be  as  eafy 
 to  fuppofe  ^// of  them  f'A-//?/;/o'  without  a  Caufe,  as  One.  But 
 hcrel  think  lies  the  Difference :  There  was  a  time  when  all 
 of  them,  except  one,  were  indifferent  either  to  exifience  or  nonr 
 exifience;  were  nothing.  Therefore  for  them  that  were  once 
 indifferent  to  exifience  ox  non-cxfimcey  to  be  aftually  determin'd 
 ipto  Exiftence,  to  be  brought  from  nothing  into  fiomethivg^  or 
 inade  whatlhey  once  were  not;  is  a  real  change,  an  adion,  an 
 effeEl,  and  as  fuch,  muft  require  fome  cha7tger,  agent,  caufe.  But 
 on  the  other  hand,  all  that  we  know  of  this  one  Being,  is,  that  it 
 r.B'w  exifs  and  alivayi  did  fo ;  that  it  never  had  a  Beginning  of 
 ^ts  exifience,  wai  never  dunged  Irom  w^iat  i?  isj  never  mefi^ 
 
Sed.  3.     Concerning  the  Origin  o/'EviL  jj 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 Or  p?odnced :  Here  is  no  eQ'cB^  and  therefore  no  reafoit 
 nor  roo7n  for  a  ground  or  cauje.  Nay,  to  ifllgn  one  in  any 
 refpe£l  frior  to  its  exiftence,  as  it  nuift  be  fuppofed  to  be 
 if  confider'd  as  a  Caufe;  (and  it  muft  be  confider'd  as  a 
 Caufe,  or  cxtrinfic  Principle,  if  confider'd  at  all ;  I  mean 
 fo  as  to  be  made  any  ufe  of  in  the  prefcnt  Queftion,  or  to 
 infer  any  thing  concerning  afiual  Exifience)  I  lay,  to  affign 
 any  Ground  priof  to  the  exijicnce  of  this  Being,  v.-ould  be  to 
 prove  this  Being  -not  €ter7ml,  nor  the  Jiiji  Caufe :  as  at- 
 tempting to  prove  a  /elf-evident  propofition  is  endeavour- 
 ing to  fhew  that  propofition  not  to  be  fclf  evident  by  af- 
 figning  a  clearer. 
 
 Now  to  lay  down  fome  necejpt'f^  ground,  or  reafon  of  Exlil- 
 "ence,  muft  either  be  to  propofe  it  by  v/ay  of  Caufality^  or  to  fix 
 no  manner  of  Idea  at  all  to  thefe  Words :  and  indeed  no 
 manner  of  Idea  feerrjs  polfiblc  to  be  fix'd  to  them,  which  is  not 
 utterly  inconfiftent  with  exiftiiig  without  Caufe,  as  that  Be- 
 ing is  prov'd  to  exift.  For  why  do  we  conlider  that  Ground  ox 
 Reafon  in  the  order  of  our  Ideas  as  antecedent  to  the  Exiltencc  oi 
 the  Being,  otliervvife  than  as  it  fecms  in  the  Order  of  Nature  an- 
 tecedenilj  neceffary  to  the  Exiftence  of  that  Being?  To  which 
 neverthelefs  we  alloiv,  th:>t  no  'Thing,  Mode,  ^ality  vvhatfo- 
 ever  can -be  really  antecedent.  —The  Cafe  will  be  no  better  if 
 we  imagin«  this  neccffity  coetaneous,  or  co-ex; jlcnt  with  the 
 Exiftence  of  the  Being  which  is  fupported  by  it;  Since  this 
 is  to  fuppofe  that  adually  exifting  alrcndy,  in  order  to  the 
 Exiftence  of  which  this  neceffity  is  introduced;  and  alio 
 feenis  much  the  fame  as  an  effe£t  co-cxifent  with  its 
 Caufe.  For  as  we  faid  before,  tliis  N eceffuy  nm^  either  be  a 
 Caufe,  or  nothing  at  all  to  the  prefent  purpofe.  And  that  it 
 was  propofed  as  fuch  by  the  Author  that  introduced  it,  is  I  think 
 pretty  plain,  from  his  terming  it  fometimei  a  formal  Cauie, 
 and  lometimes  one  which  operates*. 
 
 The  whole  Cafe  then  feems  to  ftand  thus.  On  the  one 
 hand  there  is  a  certain  alteration  made,  a  pofitivc  effect  pro-* 
 duced  without  a  Caufe  ;  which  is  a  clear  Contradi&ion.  Ou 
 the  other  luirtd  there  is  a  difficult''!  indeed,  but  not  an  apparent 
 Contradiftion  :  There  is  fomewhat  exifting  of  which  we  can 
 give  no  account  (the  mmner  of  whole  Exijience  is  difiercnc 
 
 from 
 
 *  See  Dr.  Clarke  %  Anfrver  to  the  3d.  Letter,  p.  473.  and 
 Anfwer  to  the  6th,  p.  48S.  Liiiss  i,  8,  35.     Sevcnith  iiditiowr 
 
78  Concerning  the  Origin  ^/EviL     Chap.  !» 
 
 REMARK  Si 
 
 from  that  of  an/  thing  clfc)  n-hich  will  admit  of  no  Caufty 
 tlie  Idea  oT  which  is  entirely  repug:i:mt  to  that  oS  Caufality. 
 
 Thif  may  be  hard  to  conceive,  but  cannot  be  deny'd  with- 
 out afHrming  fomething  worfe,  namely  an  exprefs  contradic- 
 tion, as  has  been  (hewn  above.  In  order  to  fet  this  in  as  clear 
 a  light  as  is  polTiblc,  I  ihall  take  the  Liberty  to  infert  a  Paffage 
 from  the  learned  Writer  cited  in  Note  3.  and  9.     '  The  Idea 
 
 *  of  a  Self-Exiftent  Being  is  the  Idea  of  a  Being   that  alivays 
 
 *  -vjas,  is,  and  luill  be,  becaufe  he  ahvavs  was,  is,  and  will  be 
 
 *  infinitely  ^?^/^  to  be»     If  you  ask  why  he  is  fo,  I  know  not; 
 
 *  V/liv  I  believe  fo,  I  think  I  know;  it  is  becaufe  he  has /;;_/a<f/ 
 '  exifted  from  all  Eternity,  which  he  could  not  have  done,  had 
 
 *  he  not  been  inlinitely  able  to  exifc.      If  vou  afk  after  tne 
 
 *  ground  or  foundation  of  this  infinite  Ability,  it  is  the  fame 
 '  that  is  the  ground  or  foundation  of  all  his  other  Perietlions, 
 
 *  his  infinite  Nature,  Eflence  or  Subftance ;  if  you  afk  farther 
 
 *  for  the  ground  oithai,  I  muft  call  it  trifling:  if  you  affign 
 '  abfolute  Nece//il\>,  I  mufl  afk  what's  next  ?  Or  what  that 
 '  means?  Or  refer  you  to  the  Indian  Philofopher's  Elephant 
 '  and  'Tortoife,  as  the  beft  comment  UDon  abfolute,  antecedent 
 '  Necf/fity: 
 
 Neither  need  we  run  ourfelves  into  fuch  Abfurditles  as  thefe: 
 This  independent  Being  exifis  becaufe  it  does  exifi ;  or,  it  exifls ' 
 by  chance.  Since  it  is  enough  for  us  to  fay.  There  can  be  no 
 Reafonq.<jhy  it  docs  exifi;  or,  which  is  the  very  flime  thing  llil), 
 no  Caufc,  either  £^a>;//  ov  Formal  \  no  caufal  Necefnty,  or 
 antecedent  Ground  of  its  Exiftence. 
 
 I  fxiail  only  beg  leave  to  obfcrve  one  thing  more  in  this 
 place,  namely,  that  all  the  abovementioned  reafoning  about 
 necejfary  exifiencc  fecms  to  be  built  upon  that  falfe  Maxim 
 which  Leibnif»  lays  down  as  the  foundation  of  all  Philoso- 
 phy (and  which  Dr.  Clarke  was  very  ready  to  grant  iiim,  fmce 
 it  was  the  foundation  of  his  ov.n  Euok  on  the  divine  Attri- 
 butes) namely,  that  Nothi>!gis  njuifhoit  arenfon,  ixihy  it  is  rather 
 than  not,  and  ivhy  it  is  fo  rather  than  cther<iuife.  Tho'  the  Dr. 
 is  foon  forced  to  deny  this  very  Principle,  when  (in  his  Way  , 
 of  confidering  ^ime  and  Space)  he  propofes  the  fnere  Will  of 
 God,  as  the  only  reafon  why  the  World  was  c/eated  at  fuch  a 
 certain  period  of  time,  ;ind  in  fuch  a  particular  point  of  Space*. 
 Of  \\'\\\c\\  Divine  Will,  or  of  its  dctcnnination,  according  to 
 hirofclf,  there  can  po.Tibly  be  no  n;afi;Ter  oireafon,  fmce  he  fup- ' 
 
 pofeg' 
 
 *  3i/.  Re^ly.  N".  5.  p.  Sxl 
 
Bed:.  3.     CoriCerning  f  be  Origin  of  Evil.  7^ 
 
 R  E  M  A  R  K  S. 
 
 pofes  thefe  effefls  of  the  divine  Will  to  be,  in  every  poffible 
 manner  of  Conception,  abfolutely  e^uai  and  indiffe7-ent,  and 
 confequently  it  Vv'ould  be  abfurd  to  fuppofe  any  reafon  of  fuch 
 fpecial  Will.,  or  fuch  particular  dctenninat'ion.  If  then  we 
 iiiay  fnppofe  two  things  in  nature  abfolutely  and  in  every 
 refpefl  equal  (which  Leihnitx^  to  be  confiftent  with  himfelf, 
 and  I  believe  for  no  fufficient  reafon  elfe,  found  it  necefiary 
 to  deny)  the  preference  of  cne  of  thefe  before  the  other  mull 
 be  abfolutely  without  a  reafon.  And  tho'  there  may  be  a  fuf- 
 ficient reafoA  for  a  perfon''s  <'.5fing  in  general,  rather  than  not 
 aiSting  at  all,  yet  (as  Leibnitz  well  obferves*)  except  there 
 be  one  alio  for  his  r.cling  in  a  certain  particular  maimer,  whicii 
 in  the  prefent  Cafe  there  cannot  be  (according  to  Dr.  Clarke''^ 
 own  ConcelTion -f-)  the  abovementioned  Principle  is  intirely 
 overthrov/n.  See  more  of  this  in  Note  42,  and  the  lattsr  part 
 of  N.  45. 
 
 The  fame  Argument  will  hold  againft  Locke's  Hypothe- 
 fis  of  Anxiety,  if  it  be  confidered  as  the  fole  and  abfolute 
 determiner  to  all  Artiont,  fince  it  can  never  determine  the 
 Mind  to  Will  one  Aftion  before  another,  where  both  are  en- 
 tirely equal ;  of  which  kind  numberlefs  occur  in  life,  as  will 
 be  fheV/n  at  large  in  its  proper  place. 
 
 I^R.  f  ]  For  a  Being  to  be  limited,  01  deficient  in  any  refpeft» 
 is  to  be  dependent  on  iome  other  Being  in  that  refpciSt,  which 
 gave  it  juil:  fo  much  and  no  more  ||  ;  confcquently  that  Be- 
 ing which  in  no  refpedl  depends  upon  any  ether,  is  not  limit- 
 ed or  deficient  at  all.  For  tho'  Figure,  DivifibiUty,  ifc. 
 and  all  manner  of  Limitation,  is  in  one  Senfe  {'viz.  in  Beings 
 effcntially  imperfedl)  as  Dr.  Clarke  obferves  **,  properly  a 
 mere  Negation  or  Defied;  yet  in  another,  njiz,  iu  a  Being  which 
 is  cifcntially  perfejl  in  any  refpeft,  Finitenefs  muft  be  con- 
 ceived as  a  pofiti've  Effed  of  fome  Caufe  retraining  it  to  a  cer- 
 tain Degree.  In  all  Beings  capab'e  of  Quantity,  Increafe  CS'r. 
 and  confequently /^^/ffi/!^^/^  o'l  PerfieBion  or  abfulnte  Infinity  i 
 Limitation  or  Defect  is  there  a  necelTary  confequence  o{  Exi- 
 fietKc,  and  cloiely  convened  with,  it,  and  is  only  a  Negation  of 
 tlwt  Fcrfcfcion  which  is  cnth-dy  incompatible  with  thdr  Efiencei 
 
 an  4 
 
 *  ^(h  Letter  N".    17.  p.    169. 
 
 f  N°.   I,  2.  p.   12.  of  Ijis  ^i/j  Reply. 
 
 %  See  Note  45. 
 
 jj  See  Scott  in  Note  zr. 
 
 **  Dem.  p.  56,  57.  5th  Edit. 
 
8o  Conteming  the  (Origin  o/'Evil.     Chap.  I. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 and  dif.refore  in  theft  it  requires  no  farther  Caufe.  Btit  iii  a  Be- 
 ing naturally  capable  o'l  Perfiaion  or  abfolate  h;finityy  all  Im- 
 ferfeSiioii  or  Tiv.itenefs,  as  it  does  not  ticaJf'arHy  flow  from  the 
 Nature  of  that  Being,  it  fccms  to  require  iomc  gmund  or  rea- 
 fon,  which  reafon  mufl  therefore  be  foreign  to  it,  and  confe- 
 quently  is  an  effect  of  fome  other.,  ejcternal  Caufe,  and  confc- 
 quently  cannot  have  place  in  the  Firft  Caufe.  That  this  Be- 
 ing is  capable  of  Perfecflion  or  abfolute  Infinity,  appears,  I 
 think,  from  hence,  that  hd  is  manifeftly  the  Subjed  of  one 
 Infinite  or  pcrfeifi  Attritnite,  ^ois.  Eternity,  or  abfolute  inva- 
 riable Exiilence.  His  Exiil-.Mce  has  been  fliewn  to  be  perfedl 
 in  this  one  refpedl,  and  therefore  it  may  be  perfect  in  every 
 other  alfo.  Now  that  which  is  the  Subjedl  of  one  Infinite  At- 
 tribute or  Perfeftion,  and  may  have  others  fo  too,  muji  have 
 all  of  them  Infinitely  or  in  Perfection :  Since,  to  have  any 
 Perfections  in  a  finite  limited  manner  when  the  Subjeft  and 
 thefe  Attributes  are  hoxh  capable  of  ibift /;;/?;;//>-,  would  be  the 
 foremention'd  abfurdity  of  pofitivc  Limitation  without  a  Caui'e. 
 This  method  of  arguing,  will  prove  any  Perfection  to  be  in 
 the  Deity  injinito 7?:odo,  when  v.e  have  once  fhewn  that  it  be- 
 longs to  him  at  all  :  at  leall,  will  fliew  that  ic  is  mireafonable 
 for  us  to  fuppofe  it  limited,  whun  we  can  find  no  manner  of 
 Ground  for  any  Limitation,  which  is  as  far  as  we  need,  or  per- 
 haps can  go. 
 
 [R.  g.]  That  the  Word  God  is  generally  underflood  in  % 
 relati-ve  Senfe  fee  Nev:ton.  Pri>rc.  Schol.  Gen.  fub.  fin.  p.  523. 
 ^t-^  3d.  Edit,  or  Maxrjjell\  Apendix  to  Cumberland,  p.  106. 
 or  Ch amber i  under  the  Word  God. 
 
 To  fhew  that  there  is  only  oue  Eternal  Self  cxiftcnt  Being, 
 which  bears  the  Relation  of  God  to  us,  feems  to  be  going  as 
 far  as  either  is  neatfiaiy  or  natural  Light  will  lead  us.  As  Dr. 
 Clarkeh  Dcmonltrationof  this  and  fcveral  other  Attributes  is 
 entirely  founded  on  his  Idea  o'l  NeccJ/itj  of  Exiilence,  as  that 
 alio  is  nn  Space,  Duration  Sec  *.  they  muil  Hand  or  fall  toge- 
 1)1  cr.  They  who  endeavour  to  deduce  it  from  Independence 
 Or  Omnipotence  evidently  prefuppofc  it  in  their  definition  of 
 fliefe  Attributes. 
 
 The  foregoing  Paffigc  and  part  cf  Note  10,  to  which  it  refers, 
 having  been  called  in  Queltion  by  the  Author  of  Calumny 
 110  Con-viBion,  or,  a  Vindication  of  the  Pica  for  human  Reafon, 
 p.  58.&'c.    r  fha'l  eridcavoar  to   explain   ihtm  in   this  Edi- 
 
 ^ipn? 
 
 *  See  Note  3.  iinJ  R.  c,  p'.  (36.' 
 
Se<a.  ^,     Conccrm?tg  the  Origin  of  Evil.  §x 
 
 R  E  M  A  R  IC  S. 
 
 don.  The  Phenomena  of  "Nature  lead  us.  up  to  07ie  fi'ft  Caufe, 
 ihhich  is  fuffident  for  their  Produ3io7i,  and  therefore  none  ctfe  arc 
 neceffary;  i.  e.neceflary  to  the  Production  ofthefe  Pheiome- 
 na,  according  to  the  former  Scnfc  of  NcceJ/ity  l:iid  down  in  p. 
 23  f .  and  which  is  the  only  Scnfe  that  Word  could  be  ap- 
 ply'd  in  here  without  Equivocation.  Jnd  tho"  fc^oeral  more  in- 
 dependent Beings  might  pojjlbly  exif,  yet  <vjould  the^  he  no  Gods  to 
 us  ;  they  n.vomd  hwve  no  relation  to  us,  nor  ^we  any  thiri's  to  do  njnth 
 them;  i.  e.  if  the  Suppofition  of  their  Exiflencc  were  not  re- 
 qulfite  to  the  Production  of  this  Syftcm  we  could  perceive  rio 
 ncceffity  for  it  at  all,  we  could  never  difcovcr  it  by  o.ir  rea- 
 fon,  and  therefore  it  would  be  nothing  to  us.  And  tho'  two' 
 or  three  fuc'h  Beings  fhould  exiil  and  adl'  in  the  Formation 
 and  Government  of  their  dillinvi  Syllems,  or  agree  in  one,  yet 
 till  their  Exillencc  and  Operations  were  made  known  to  us,' 
 and  a  natural  Relation  difcover'd,  nothing  would  be  owing 
 from  us  to  them,  they  would  have  no  religious  or  moral  Rela- 
 tion to  us  (if  I  may  fo  fpeak)  we  fliould  have  no  reafon  to  call  a- 
 ny  more  than  one  of  them  our  Creator,  Preferver,  and  Gover- 
 nour,  which  Senfe  the  Word  God  more  efpecially  bears,  as  this 
 Author  I'm  fure  will  not  deny. 
 
 Since  the  fame  Reafon  holds  for  no  more  than  oncfuch,  tofup-. 
 pofe  more  than  one  is  at  leaf  unreafonable .  By  an  unreafonable 
 Suppoiition  here  I  mean  a  gfoundlefs  one,  or  that  which  has 
 no  reafon  to  fapportif,  as  the  fame  Word  is  ufed  concerning. 
 Iifnity,  p.  63  *.  It  is  unreafonable  for  us  to  f up  pofe  it  limited 
 Hjchen  ive  can  fndno  manner  of  Ground  for  any  Limitation.  Such 
 Siippofitions  as  thefe  ought  never  to  be  built  on  in  philofophy, 
 but  yet  when  they  are  advanced  I  fhould  not  th'nk  that  my 
 not  feeing  any  reafon  for  them  is  an  effectual  conutatiou  of 
 them.  There  may  be  rainy  Beings  in  Nature  that  h.vc  no 
 apparent  relation  to  any  thing  I  know  of,  and  confcqaently 
 for  or  againll:  whofe  Exiftence  I  can  fiiid  no  reafon.  I  fliould. 
 be  glad  therefore  to  fee  upon  what  this  Author  grounds  the  fol- 
 lowing  Confcquence  which  he  adds,   '  the  fame  Reafon  holds 
 
 for  no  more  than  one,  therefore  there  is  but  one:'' If  by  the 
 
 Word  Reafon  he  means  a  Rc3.ion  a  priori,  I  muH  expe>ft  fome 
 better  Proof  of  it  then  I  have  hitherto  been  able  to  meet  with 
 before  I  can  admit  it;  And  it  was  exclufively  of  any  fuch 
 that  I  afi'ertcd  that  they  ^who  endeavour  to  deduce  the  Unity  from 
 Independence  or  Omnipotence,  pre jtippofe  it  in  their  Deflation  of 
 
 G  theft 
 
 I    I/?  Edition.  *   17?  Ediiitn, 
 
82  Concerning  the  Origin  o/'Evil.    Chap.  I, 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 theft  Jttrihutes;  which  I  think  they  do  in  the  following  man- 
 rer.  Having  proved  the  Exiftence  of  fome  firfl  Caufe,  which 
 as  fach  can  depend  upon  no  other  Caufe  for  its  Being  and  Per- 
 feftions,  and  therefore  muft  exill  alone  or  be  originally  felf  ex- 
 ijient',  (all  which  is  dcmonftrable,  hut  does  not  Ihew  us  why 
 there  may  not  be  twenty  fuch  firft  Caufes,  all  underived  and  fo 
 {^x  independent )  having  got  thus  far  in  their  Proof  of  Indepen- 
 dence, they  add  another  Idea  to  it  and  include  an  abfolute  In- 
 dependence in  every  refped,  an  infinite  extent  or  excrcife  of 
 its  feveral  Attributes  on  every  Being  in  Nature;  which  fuppo- 
 fes  that  there  are  no  other  Beings  of  equal  Perfedions  with 
 himfelf,  but  that  he  exifts  alone,  or  is  fclf-exijlent  in  another 
 Senfe  of  thcfe  Wordr,  which  does  not  at  all  follow  from  the  fc  rm- 
 er.  In  like  manner  inllead  of  defining  Omnipotence  to  be  Power 
 perfeft  in  kind,  which  has  no  defedl  or  mixture  of  weaknefs 
 in  it,  or  a  Power  in  God  over  every  thing  which  he  has  pro- 
 duced, (which  is  enough  for  our  purpofc,  and  all  perhaps 
 that  can  be  ftridtly  demonflrated,  but  yet  docs  not  infer  Unity) 
 they  make  it  a  Power  over  every  thing  which  exiits  befide 
 himfelf,  which  again  fuppofes  that  there  are  no  Beings  ot  the 
 Cime  kind  with  himfelf,  which  I  apprehend  to  be  begging  the 
 Queilion.  If  this  Author  takes  thefe  two  Attributes  in  the 
 larger  Senfe,  I  fhould  be  oblig'd  to  him  for  a  Proof  of  them 
 from  any  Medium  but  that  oi a?itecedent  NeceJJity,  which  I  fear 
 is  a  Principle  that  may  with  equal  Reafon  be  brought  to  prove 
 any  thing.  I  muft  confefs  that  to  me  who  am  oblig'd  to  draw 
 all  my  Notions  and  Arguments  concerning  the  Deity  from  his 
 Etiedis,  it  would  be  difficult  to  demonftrate  againil  the  Sup- 
 pofuion  of  more  than  one  uncaus'd  adlivc  Beings  governing  in 
 their  feveral  Provinces,  and  each  producing  (not  whatevei* 
 was  abfolutely  poflible  or_yf/  to  be  produced*  h\\\)  what  w«s 
 poffible  or  fit  for  hipi  to  produce  ;  tho'  I  don't  know  any 
 Ground  for  fuch  a  Suppofition.  I  fliall  make  no  obfervatioii 
 on  this  Author's  eight  Arguments  for  the  Unity  till  he  has  ta 
 ken  an  Opportunity  (as  he  promifes  f)  to  confider  what  has 
 been  faid  againil  the  Principles  on  which  they  are  founded, 
 which  I  heartily  defire.  His  Appendix  Ihall  be  examin'd  la 
 its  proper  place. 
 
 [R.  h.]  We  cannot  include  any  fuch  Notion  in  Omnipre- 
 Jenu,  as  makes  the  Deity  prefent  in  hisjimple  EJpnce  to  (i.  c.  co- 
 extended  or  CO  expanded  with}  ei'try  point  cf  the  boundkfs  Im- 
 
 ntenfity  5- 
 
 *  P.  59.  f.  P.  Ulh 
 
Sedt.  3,    Concerning  fbeOrigmrfEyiU  $ 
 
 R  E  M  u4  R  K  S, 
 
 ^enfity^ ;  finee  this  Idea  of  Extenfion^  or  Expanfion,  feems 
 plainly  inconfiftent  With  that  Jimplc  EfTencc  f.  Not  that  we 
 fuppofe  thefe  Attributes  o'l  Kno-^ledge  and  Vcvjcr  adtingyr/^- 
 rate  from  his  EfTelice  ;  but  we  fuppofe  his  Eiience  to  have  no 
 iBore  nehitio7i  to  the  Idea  o^  Space,  Place,  ^here,  isfc.  than  ei- 
 ther of  thefe  Attributes  has  J. 
 
 Dr.  C/arh's  Query,    '  how  can  it  be  fhewn  upon  any  other 
 
 *  Principle  than  tliat  of  Neceifary  Exirtenee,   that  his  ^owra- 
 
 *  %  Wifdotn  and  Po'v^er   muft  be  prefcnt  in  thofe  boundlefa 
 
 *  Spaces  where  we  know  of  no  Phcnofnena  or  EfftSls  to  prove- 
 
 *  its  Exiflcnce  II  ? '  is  well  anAvcr'd  hj  Epifcopius.  I  fiiall 
 give  it  in  his    own  Words.     *  Hoc   (ncmpe   Deum    ejfe   extra 
 
 *  mundu7n)    non  modo  prorfus  ejl  ky.i/,-m.y^^a'i,  jcd  etiafn  'ualde. 
 
 *  ahfurdum  ;  c^ma  tot  urn  atqueomne  illud  fpatium  quod  extra  banc 
 
 *  mundum  eJfe  dicitur,  nihil  omnino  reale  cji,  fed  pure  putc  ima- 
 
 *  ginarium,   &  prorfus  nihilum  ',  tit  autem  Deus  eJJ'e  dicatur  in 
 
 *  pure  pute  imaginario,   &  prorfus   }tihilo,  per  fe  abfurdum  ef.  t 
 
 *  quia  effe  in  dicit  realem  hahitudinem  ant  dsnominationem  ab  eo 
 '  in  quo  quid  exi flit :  Realis  autem  hahitudo  ^  denominatio  a  ni- 
 
 *  hilo,  five   ah  eo    quod  vihil  reale  e(i,  accipi  nulla  mo  do  potefi. 
 
 *  Dicere  Deum   ibi  habere  intrinfuam  tff  ahfolutam  prs.jentiam 
 
 *  c^uain  fe  ipfo  realiter  exifit,  efi fingere  prefcntiamfine  Relati- 
 
 *  one  aut  denominatione  ad  id  cui  quid  pr&f ens  effe  dicitur,  quod 
 
 *  implicat  contradiBione7n.  Intr in/tea  eniin  frje  abfolata  pr&fcn- 
 «  tia,  qua  quid  in  fe  ipfo  realiter  exi  flit,  non  eft  pr&fentia  in  ni- 
 
 *  hilo;  fed meraeffentia five  exiftentia  extra  nihilum  §.' 
 
 That  a  wife  and  powerful  Being  knon^)s  and  aBs  upon  all  par;s 
 6f  the  Univerfe  is  plain  from  EffeBs,  but  to  go  beyond  this 
 into  what  is  call'd  extraniundane  Space,  and  prove  the  Exift-. 
 encc  of  Knowledge  and  Power  where  there  is  nothing  ro  which 
 they  can  be  referred,  nothing  to  be  knon.vn  or  ailed  upon,  is  to 
 us  incomprehenfible.  And  no  lefs  fo  to  fpeak  of  the  PrefaKt 
 of  thefe  Attributes,  or  of  a  Being  endowed  with  them,  f/^/-' 
 an  immaterial  uncxtended  one)  to  any  point  or  Part  ot  Ex- 
 tenfion  ;  except  it  be  metaphorically,  as  eternal  Truths  are 
 laid  to  be  the  fame  in  every  time  and  place,  ^c.  Tho'  in  rca-- 
 Jity  they  have  no  relation  to  either  one  or  other,  but  are  in* 
 G  2  commsafuratp 
 
 *  T)x.Clarke\  Demonft.  p.  47,- 
 
 f  See  Note  6. 
 
 "j:  See  Note  7. 
 
 I  Anfrucer  to  jth  Letter,   p.  499.    , 
 
 ^   Lift,  ^hsol  L.  4.  c,    13.  p.   204- 
 
 J 
 
%  Concernhig  the  Origin  o/'Evil.    Chap.  I* 
 
 R  E  M  ui  R  K  S. 
 
 commenfufate  to  and  of  a  nature  quite  different  from  botk 
 Time  and  Space,  as  wc  obfei-ved  in  R.  c. 
 
 To  argue  that  every  Subftance  which  affefts  another  muft 
 be  p-cftnt  to  it,  from  the  old  Maxim  that  nothing  can  acl  nvhere 
 it  is  not,  is  ftill  fuppofmg  that  a  Spirit  exifts  Jomcwhere,  or  is 
 circumfcribed  bv  feme  Parts  of  Space:  'Tis  confining  its  Ex- 
 iftenceto  one  particular  Mode,  concerning  the  Modality  of 
 which  we  can  only  reafon  negatively,  cviz.  that  it  is  not  the 
 fame  as  that  of  Matter,  or  by  way  of  Extenjion  in  any  Senfe. 
 
 To  the  trite  Objection,  that  what  has  no  Magnitude,  or  is 
 no  'where,  is  therefore  Nothing,  fee  a  fufficient  Anfwer  in  Cud- 
 <ivorth,  p.  770,  to  77B,  iffc.  How  this  agrees  with  Philo't 
 Paradox,  that  God  is  e'uery  <vuhere  and  yet  no  inhere,  fee  ibid.  p. 
 773.  Eut  the  ftrongefl  Confirmation  of  this  Opinion,  which 
 Dr.  More^\\cs,  Nullibifm,  may  be  drawn  from  the  learned  Dr's 
 Arguments  againft  it  in  his  Enchir.  Metaph.  C.  27. 
 
 [R.  i;]  By  the  above  mentioned  Pleafure  or  natural  Goody 
 1  mean  that  Pleafure  which  every  one  feels  in  himfelf.  By 
 the  ProduBion  of  it  here  I  underfland  both  the  producing 
 fuch  in  himfelf,  and  alfo  in  others ;  to  both  which  he  is  e- 
 qually  deccrmin'd  by  his  Nature,  tho'  from  quite  dilferent 
 Principles.  To  the  former  he  is  directed  by  Self- Love:  To 
 the  latter  by  a  certain  difintcrefted  benevolent  Inftinft  or  Af- 
 fccflion  ;  and  that  which  determines  him  to  approve  this  Affec- 
 tion and  the  Actions  flowing  from  it  is  called  his  moral  Senfe. 
 The  former  of  thefe  In(lin6ts,  as  it  implies  Increafe  ofHap- 
 pinefs,  is  only  applxable  to  finite,  impcrfeft  Creatures  :  The 
 latter  may  be  common  to  us  and  the  Deity  ;  Who  could  have 
 been  dctennin'd  to  create  us  only  by  fuch  a  difintereiled  Be- 
 nevolent Afledion  as  this  is  fuppofed  to  be.  This  is  always 
 approved  by  the  Moral  Senfe;  tho'  it  may  be  doubted  whe- 
 ther fuch  a  Senfe  be  confined  entirely  to  it.  See  Butler^  Dil- 
 fert.  on  the  Nature  of  Virtue  p.  315. 
 
 The  Object  of  both  thefe  Initincts  is  natural  Good;  and,  I 
 think,  moral  Good  may  be  allowed  to  confilt  in  the  Profecution 
 of  either,  or  borh  of  them  together,  fo  long  as  the  former  is 
 in  due  Subordination  to  the  latter. 
 
 That  all  the  Notion  we  can  pofTibly  frame  o^ Moral  Good 
 or  fcvV,  of  Virtue  or  Vice,  l3c.  confilts  entirely  in  promotino^ 
 thi*  natural  Good  or  is-z//  is  fufficiciuly  confirmed  by  Sherlock  *. 
 '  Whereas,  fsys  he,  u  e  diltingu.Hi  between  Moral  and  Natural 
 
 *  Good 
 
 *  0?i  yudgment,  p.   20,  to  Zi^. 
 
&d.  3 .     Cone er fling  the  Origin  ofEwW, 
 REMARKS. 
 
 *  Good^nA  Evil ;  the  only  difFerence  between  them  is  this,  that 
 
 *  Moral  Good  and  E'uil  is  in  the  Will  and  Choice,  Natural 
 y  Good  ^indi  Evil  IS  in  t\\&  Nature  of  things  ;  that  which  is  o-ooi'/ 
 
 *  or  hurtful  to  ourfelves  or  others,  is  naturally  Good  ox  Evil ; 
 
 <  to  love  J  to  chufe,  to  «(?  that  which  is  good  or  hurtful  to  o«r- 
 «  y^/wj  or  others,  is  morally  Good  ox  Evil;  or  is  the  Good  or 
 
 <  £<y//  of  our  CZ'»/V^  or  ASiions.  If  you  will  but  recoiled  your 
 «  felves,  you  will  find  that  you  hive  no  other  notion  oi  Good 
 
 <  or  Evil  but  this :  when  you  fay  fuch  a  Man  has  done  a  very 
 
 *  Good  ox  very  Evil  Adtion,  what  do  you   mean  by  it?  Do 
 
 *  you  not  mean  that  he  has  done  fomething  very  good  or  very 
 
 *  hurtful  to  himfelf  or  others  ?  When  you  hear  that  any  Man 
 «  has  done  Good  or  Evil,  is  not  the  next  Qaellion,  'what  good 
 
 *  or  what  hurt  has  he  done  ?  And  do  not  you  mean  by  this, 
 
 *  Natural  Good  or  Evil  ?  Which  is  a  plain  Evidence,  that 
 
 *  you  judge  of  the  Moral  Good  ox  Evil  of  Adions,  by  the 
 
 *  Natural  Good  or  Evil  which  they  do'.  See  more  on  this 
 Subjeft  delivered  in  the  fame  Place,  with  an  elegance  and 
 perfpicuity  peculiar  to  that  Author.  And  to  the  fame  purpofe 
 is  Turner^  Difcourfe  of  the  Lavjs  of  Nature  and  the  Reafon  of 
 their  Obligation. 
 
 This  feems  to  be  the  ultimate  Criterion  of  that  Fitnefs,  Con* 
 grnity,  Reafotiablenefs  and  Relation  of  Things,  fo  often  repeated 
 by  fome  late  Writers,  voithout  or  beyond  which  I  can  fix  no 
 meaning  at  all  to  theie  Words.  And  this  Criterion  fhould  J 
 think,  have  been  more  clearly  and  diilinflly  fpecify'd.  For 
 when  you  fay  any  thing  \%fit ;  muft  we  carry  our  Enquiries 
 no  farther  ?  Is  it  not  a  very  proper  QneiUon,  to  alk,/or  vjhat 
 is  it  fit?  Fit,  Congr-uotis,  &c,  (as  well  as  the  Word  NeceJ/arp 
 are  mere  relative  terms  (as  we  obferved  in  Note  4.)  and  evi- 
 dently refer  to  fome  E?id,  and  what  can  the  end  be  here  but 
 Happinefs  *  ?  Thcfe  Relations,  &c.  may  perhaps  in  fome  tq- 
 lerable  Senfe  be  called  Eternal  and  Immutable,  becaufe  when-- 
 ever  you  fuppofe  a  Man  in  fuch  certain  Circumftances,  fuch 
 Confequences  and  Obligations  did  or  will  always  certainlT" 
 -follow  f . 
 
 What  is  now  good  for  me  in  thefe  Circumllinces  and  Re- 
 fpcfts,  will  always  be  fo  in  the  fame  Circumllances  a  id  Re- 
 
 G  3  ipeds, 
 
 ^  See  an  excellent  Piece  entitled.  Divine  Bencvo'ei-re;  par- 
 ticularly, pages  15,  22,  30,  31,  32. 
 
 f  See 'Loch:  5  Effay,  B.  4.  C.  11.  §  \\.  or  Turner  m  t\ 
 lavjs  of  Nature,  und  their  OMig^tion,  §,  20   or  Note  :- 
 
86  Concenilng  the  Origin  ^EviL    Chap.  T*- 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 fpefts,  and  can  never  be  altei'd  without  altering  the  Nature 
 ;of  things,  or  the  prcfent  Syfiem  :  but  we  cannot  imagine  thefe 
 Relations  therefore  to  be  any  real  Entities,  or  to  have  exifted 
 from  all  Eternity,  or  to  be  antecedent  to,  or  independent  cf 
 the  Will  of  God  himfelf ;  as  fome  Writers  feem  to  have  donc', 
 if  they  had  any  determinate  meaning^at  all  (for  which  See  Mr, 
 Hutchefons,  lUuftrat.  §.  2.  p.  250,  25 1.)  We  cannot,  I  fay, 
 imagine  them  to  be  either  ftridily  eternal  or  independent  of  the 
 Will  of  God,  bccaufe  they  mull  neceffarily  prefuppofe  a  deter- 
 mination of  that  Will,  and  are  in  truth  only  Confequences  of 
 ihe  Exillence  of  things  proceeding  from  that  Determina- 
 tion *.  Much  lefs  can  we  apprehend  how  thefe  Relations, 
 &c.     *  Jre  to  be  chofenfor  their  oijon  Sokes  and  intrivjic  Worth  ; 
 
 *  or  ha've  a  full  obligatory  Potver  antecedent   to  any  re-ivard 
 
 *  or  punifnment  annexed  either  by    natural   Confequence  or  pO' 
 
 *  ftti^'e  Appointment  to  the  Obfer'vance  or  NegleSi  of  them  f .' 
 Since  the  Natural  Good  or  Happinefs  confequent  upon  and 
 conneded  'vvith  the  Obfervance  of  them,  is  to  us  their  folc 
 Criterion,  the  Argument  and  Indication  of  |;heir  Worthy  the 
 Ground  of  all  their  0^%<2//<2K. 
 
 *  The  Notion  of  abftratt  Fitnefs  is  pretty  well  handled  by 
 Turner.     '  The  LaiAJs  of  Nature  for  which  is  the  fame,  Nu' 
 
 *  /ural  Right  and  Wrong"]  are  fuch  Laws  and  Rules  of  Life, 
 
 *  as  to  the  Breach  of  which  there  is  a  natural  Punifhment  an- 
 "  nexed.     For  to  fay  a  thing  is  cfTentially  good  or  evil,  to  call 
 
 *  it  by  hard  Names,  and  to  affirm  that  it  hath  a  Natural  Tur- 
 
 *  pitude ;  or,  to  pafs  a  Compliment  upon  it,  and  call  it  a 
 '^  Moral  Reftitude,  and  fuch  like,fine  fcholaftic  Terms  —  with- 
 
 *  out  affigning  a  particular  Reafon  of  Intereft,  why  we  Ihould 
 
 *  do  the  one  or  avoid  the  other,  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  a  thing 
 
 *  is  good  for  nothing ;  or  it  is  bad,  but  we  know  not  why ; 
 
 *  or  it  is  good  or  bad,  for  a  Woman's  Reafon,  becaufe  it  is : 
 
 *  And  this  Reafon  will  ferve  as  xvell  to  prove  that  Murder 
 
 *  or  Adidtery  are  good  things,  as  that  they  are  bad  ones  J. 
 
 *  The  Laws  of  Nature,  therefore,  have  every  one  of  them 
 '  their  Sanation  in  them/elves\\,  i.e.  fome   things  naturally 
 
 *  tend  to  our  Happinels,  and  others  to  our  Mifery,  and  for 
 «  that  Reafon  they  become  natural  Laivs  to  us;,  or  are  Rules  to 
 
 ■     *  diredt 
 
 *  See  «?«/- Authoi-j  C.  I.  §.  3.  par.  9.  and  C.  5.  §.  J.  par. 
 23.  iffc.  cW  Note  52.     ' 
 
 :  •{•  Evidences  (fNaf  and  Rev.  Religion,  prop.  1.  §.  7.  p.  2 1 8, 
 ^  la-j.sofNat.8ic,  §.  :,    .    ,    •'   \\  Uid.  §.  2. 
 
Sed.  3.    Concerning  the  Origin  ^Evil.  dj 
 
 \  R  E  M  A  R  K  S, 
 
 *  diredi  our  Aftions  by;  and  we  zrcohligd  to  do  the  one  and 
 
 *  avoid  the  other   upon   a  Principle  of  Self  happinefs,  and 
 
 *  Self  prefervation,  which  is  the  very  Root  and  Spring  of  all 
 '  Obligation  whatfoever  *. 
 
 *  From  whence  we  may  difcern  the  Vanity  and  Folly  of 
 '  tliofe  learned  Men,  who  are  ufed  to  talk  fo  loudly  o'i  ejfen- 
 
 *  tial  ReBitudes,  and  eternal  Notions,  and  I  know  not  what 
 
 *  phantaftical  Ideas,  in  an  abftradled  way ;  whereas   there   is 
 
 *  indeed  nothing  which  is  cither  good  or  bad  merely  hy  it/elf, 
 «  but  every  thing  which  is  good,  is  good,  that  is,  ufeful  to 
 
 *  fomething ;  and  every  thing  which  is  bad,  is  fo  with  refer- 
 
 *  ence  to  fome  Nature  or  other,  to  which  it  is  more  or  lefs 
 ^  pernicious   and   deftruftive:    from  whence  it  follows  (the 
 
 *  nature  of  Obligation  being  a  refult  arifmg  from  the  ufeful- 
 
 *  nefsor  hurtfulnefs  of  a  thing  propofed  to  be  the  Objedt  of 
 
 *  a  free  Agent's  choice,  with  refpeft  to  that  Agent  which  is 
 ^  converfant  about  it)  that  all  Obligation   mull  be  not  of  a 
 
 *  fimple,  but  of  a  compound,  or  concrete  nature,  and  muft  al- 
 .*  ways  have  an  infeparable  refpedl  to  the  Intereft  or  Happi- 
 
 *  nefs  of  thofe  to  whom  that  Obligation  is  binding.     And  it 
 f  is  not  only  true,  that  our  Intereft  and  our  Duty  are  both  of 
 
 *  them  the  fame,  but  that  it  is  abfolutcly  impoffible  any  thing 
 
 *  fhould  be  our  Duty,  which  is  not  our  Intertill  into  the  Ear- 
 
 *  gain ;  for  no  Man  can  poflibly  be  obliged  to  that  which  all 
 
 *  things  confider'd,  will  be  to  his  Difadvantage  \.^ 
 
 Farther,  moft  Authors  who  treat  of  the  Produflion  of  this 
 Natural  Good  or  E'vil  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  conftitute  Right 
 or  wrong,  moral  Good  or  Evil,  i^c.  appear  either  to  equivo- 
 cate in  a  double  meaning  of  the  Words :  'uix.  as  they  imply 
 producing  Happinefs  either  in  our/elves  alone,  or  in  others^ 
 (which  are  two  very  different  things,  and  fhould  accordingly 
 be  always  dillinguilh'd)  or  elfe  to  be  deficient  in  pointing  out 
 a  Rule,  and  proving  an  Obligation  to  it  in  the  latter  Senfe,  njiz. 
 with  refpedl  to  others.  This  great  defedl  in  their  Syltems 
 feems  to  arife  from  not  fufficiently  attending  to  the  above  inen- 
 tionM  Moral  Senfe  or  Confcicnce,  (is  the  meaning  of  this  latter 
 Word  is  ti^'d  by  Mr.  Butler  X  )  which  ii  of  itfelf  both  Rule 
 
 G  4  and 
 
 *  Laivs  of  Nat.  Sec,  §    6. 
 
 •f-  Ibid.  §.14.  See  nlfo  the  Supplement  to  the  Nature  of  thi 
 Sacraments,  Sec.  The  EfTay  on  Moral  0'olig.ition,  or  Divine  Be^ 
 nevole?ice,  or  Mr.  Clarke's  Foundation  :f  Morality,  or  Bp.  GallrsF^ 
 ill  Bojjle's  Lcfft.  p.  93,  ^c,  X  Senn.  2i/and  ^d^ 
 
88  Concerni?ig  the  Oxi'^iM  ofEvil,    Chap.  I. 
 
 R  E  M  ARKS, 
 
 ;and  OhUgRthn.  As  an  Infihia,  it  direfts  us  to  approve  fuch 
 AcHons  as  tend  to  produce  Happinefs  in  others,  and  fo  is  a 
 "Ride  whereby  we  determine  all  fuch  Adions  to  be  virtuous  j 
 as  it  gives  us  pain,  or  makes  us  uneafy  at  the  Neglect  ot  thefe 
 Anions,  or  at  the  Praclice  of  the  contrary  ones,  it  fo  far  obliges 
 us  to  purfue  them,  or  makes  the  Praclice  of  them  necefTary  to 
 our  Happinefs :  Which  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  Word  oblige^ 
 [OiS  wa.s  {hewn  in  the pre/immry  Dtfferfatio?!;  and  is  proveq 
 more  at  hrgchy  Cumber/an^*.) 
 
 That,  and  that  only  can  be  faid  to  oblige  us,  which  is  ne- 
 tejfary  to  our  Eappinejs,  and  every  thing  does  fo  tar  oblige  as  it 
 is  neceflary.  Now,  as  the  Sum  of  our  Happinefs  depends  up- 
 on the  whole  of  our  Exilicnce,  that  only  can  be  a  complete  and 
 indifpcnfible  Obligation,  which  is  equal  and  commenfurate  to 
 the  Sam  total  of  oar  Happinefs.  Or,  that  Being  only  can 
 abfolutely  and  effectually  oblige  us,  who  has  it  in  his  Power 
 to  make  our  whole  Exiftence  happy  or  miferable;  and  or 
 confequence,  the  Deity  who  alone  has  that  Power,  muft  necef- 
 arily  be  taken  into  all  Schemes  of  Morality,  in  order  to  fuper- 
 induce  a  full,  adequate  Obligation,  or  fuch  an  one  as  will 
 hold  at  all  times,  and  extend  to  every  Aftion ;  and  an  endea- 
 vour to  exclude  the  Confideration  of  his  Will,  or  to  deduce  all 
 Obligation  from  any  Principles  independent  of  it,  has,  I 
 think,  occafion'd  another  great  PefeiSl  in  moft  of  our  moderii 
 ■Sjftems. 
 
 iV^.  J?.  What  has  been  here  faid  about  Injl'm^,  JffeSiioti,  Mit- 
 ral Sen/e,  &c.  may  feem  to  imply  that  thefe  are  all  innate: 
 contrary  to  what  was  proved  in  the  Preliminary  Dijfertatioii; 
 And  indeed  this  was  drawn  up  at  firft  upon  a  Suppofition  bf 
 the  Validity  of  that  Notion^  which  many  may  perhaps  efteem 
 Valid  ftill,  and  therefore  I  let  the  Argument  ftand  in  the  old 
 Terms :  efpecially  as  it  it  is  nof  at  all  afFe£led  by  the  Truth  or 
 Falfity  of  that  Notion  ;  fince  it  will  really  come  to  the  fame 
 thing,  v/;th  regard  to  the  Moral  Attributes  of  God  and  tl^e 
 Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  whether  the  Deity  has  implanted 
 thefe  Inftin-fts  arid  Afleftions  in  us,  ox  lias  framed  and  difpp- 
 |ed  us  in  fuch  a  mmner ;  has  given  lis  fuch  Powers,  and  pla- 
 ced us  in  fuch  Circumilanccs,  that  we  muft  ncceflarily  acquire 
 tHm  ;  they'll  be  alike  natural^  and  equally  valuable  parts  of 
 .  Oat  Conliitut;on  in  either  Senfc,  as  all  A^cioms  fire  equally  cer- 
 
 ta;n 
 
 *  C.  5.  |.  27.   See  alfo  Pufejidorf^  B.  i.  C.  6.  §.  5.  N.  4. 
 
 and  §.  8.  Note'i.       *■■  •—.:-•'. 
 
Sed.  3»     Coficerning  the  Ongia  of  EviL  89 
 
 REMARK  S, 
 
 tain  and  felf-evident  in  Mr.  Locrs  Scheme  of  no  Innate  Princi- 
 ples, and  the  old  one. 
 
 And  tho' I  take  implanted  5^K/^^,  InjilnBs,  Appetites y  Paf' 
 fans  and  Affecllom  l^ c.  to  be  a  Remnant  of  the  OldPhilofophy, 
 which  ufed  to  call  every  thing  hinate  that  it  could  not  account 
 for;  and  therefore  heartily  wifli  that  they  \vere  in  one  ^enfe 
 all  eradicated,  (which  was  undoubtedly  the  Aim  of  that  great 
 Author  laft  mention'd ;  as  it  was  a  natural  Confcquence  of  his 
 firil  Book)  ytX.  as  common  ufe  has  fix'd  this  Notion  of  Innate- 
 nefs  to  them,  I  am  obliged  to  follow  my  Author,  and  treat 
 of  them  in  the  common  Language.  Only  let  it  be  obferved 
 here  once  for  all,  that  every  Argument  which  is  built  upon, 
 thefe  Senfes,  l^c.  will  be  equally  conclufive  whether  they  be 
 implanted  or  acquired.  As  to  the  prefent  point  in  particular, 
 Mr.  Hutchefon  has  fully  proved  that  in  faft  we  are  led  infen- 
 fibly,  and  by  the  Circumflances  of  our  Being,  to  Iqve  and 
 approve  certain  Aftions  which  we  call  virtuous :  Which  is 
 enough  for  my  purpofe  as  was  hinted  above.  Againjl  the 
 Notion  of  implanted  InfiinSs,  See  Velthuyfen  de  Principiif 
 jufti  y  decori,  p.  73,  &c.  AmfM.  1651.  pr  an  EJflay  on  Mor(il 
 Obligation.^  Chap.  5. 
 
 [R.  k.j'That  God  muft  have  the  fame  Judgment  and  Ap- 
 probation of  this  Moral  Good,  which  all  Rational  Beings  na- 
 turally have  *  ;  and  that  we  muft  judge  of  the  Nature  and 
 Perfections  of  the  Deity,  only  by  that  Nature  and  thofe  Per- 
 iedtions  which  we  derive  from  him,  is  I  think,  very  plain : 
 I  mean,  that  we  muft  not  endeavour  to  conceive  the  feveral 
 Attributes  of  God  hy  /nhjlituting  fomething  in  him  of  a  quite 
 different  kind,  and  totally  diverfe  from  that  which  we  find  in  our- 
 felves,  (as  the  learned  Author  of  the  Procedure  of  fJuman  Un- 
 derjianding  feems  to  declare,  p.  133,  and  elfewhere)  even  tho" 
 that  could  be  in  fome  refpedls  fimilar  and  analogous  to  this: 
 But  we  arc  to  fuppofe  fomewhat  of  the  \ try  fame  Aind  and 
 Jirt,  the  fame  Qualities  or  Properties  in  general  to  be  both 
 in  him  and  us,  and  then  remove  all  manner  oi  Defe£iox  hnper- 
 feilion  which  attends  the  particular  Modus  or  Degree  of  their 
 Exiftence,  as  they  are  in  us.  Thus  we  afcribe  to  God  all 
 Icinds  of  apparent  Perfcdion  obfervable  in  his  Creatures,  ex- 
 cept fuch  as  argue  at  the  fame  time  I'mperfediion  (y.  g.  Mo- 
 tion, which  neceifarily  implies  Limitation)  or  are  inconfiftent 
 
 with 
 
 *_SeeS«/'s  Chriftian  Liie^  Part  z.  Q,  l.  p.  zi»  zz.  ifi 
 Edition, 
 
9©  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil.    Chap.  I, 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 with  fome  other  and  greater  Perfeflion  (v  g.  Materiality, 
 which  exdudes  Knowledge  and  Liberty  *  )  We  alfo  remove 
 from  him  all  nvanty  dependence,  alteration,  uneal  nefs,  &c.  In 
 Ihort,  all  that  rcfults  either  from  fimple  finitenefs,  or  from  the 
 mere  Union  of  two  finite  imper^eft  Subflances,  fuch  as  con- 
 ilitiite  Man.  And  when  we  hnve  thus  apply'd  every  thing  in 
 every  manner  of  Eziftence  whch  fecms  to  imply  PerfeftioH, 
 and  excluded  every  thing  in  every  manner  of  Exiftence  which 
 jmpLes  or  includes  the  contrary,  we  have  got  our  Idea  of  an 
 abfolutely  perfecl  Being,  which  we  call  God.  'Tis  therefore 
 attributing  to  God  fome  real  Qualities  of  a  certain  determinate 
 jkind,  (v.  g.  Knowledge  or  Power,  Goodnefs  or  Truth)  the 
 nature  of  which  Qualities  we  do  perceive,  are  direftly  con- 
 fcious  of,  and  knoiu,  which  gives  us  an  Idea  or  Conception 
 cf  him,  and  "3.  proper  one  too,  (it  any  fuch  Dillinftion  of  Ideas 
 were  allow'd)  and  not  imagining  fome  others,  we  cannot  tell 
 ©f  what  fort,  totally  different  in  nature  and  Icind  from  any  that 
 we  ever  did  perceive  or  know  ;  which  ^vould  give  us  no  Ide§ 
 icr  Conception  at  all  of  him,  either  proper  or  improper. 
 
 In  like  manner  we  frame  a  partial  conception  of  a  Spirit 
 in  general  (which  we  confefTedly  have)  not  by  fubftitiiting 
 fome  properties  different  in  kind  from  thofe  which  we  perceive 
 in  our  own  Spirit ;  but  by  fuppofing  the  very  fame  properties 
 z.  e.  in  kind  (<i;/k.  Thought  and  A5lion\  to  be  alfo  inherent  in 
 fome  other  immaterial  Beings  which  we  therefore  call  by  the 
 fame  Names.  Now  this  is  (as  far  as  it  goes)  true,  real  know- 
 ledge, and  may  be  apply'd  and  argu'd  on  intelligibly :  buc 
 the  other  would,  I  fear,  take  away  all  poITibility  of  arguing 
 about  the  feveral  Attributes  or  Properties  of  the  Deity  from 
 thofe  of  ourfelves,  and  'vice  njerfa ;  all  our  rcafonings  upon 
 them  (as  the  learned  Author  fays  o^  Metaphor,  p.  134  )  tvould 
 be  precarious,  and  without  any  folid  foundation  in  the  Nature 
 of  things.  Such  analogical  Knowledge  then  as  that,  is  (ac- 
 cording to  my  Notions  of  Knowledge)  ftriftly  and  properly 
 none  at  all ;  and  if  the  Author  ufes  Analogy  in  that  Senfe, 
 *twill,  I  believe,  be  ftill  taken  only  for  a  foit  or  degree  of 
 Metaphor,  after  all  he  has  faid,  in  the  laft  Chapter  of  his  firil 
 Jook,  to  diftinguifli  them, 
 
 I  would  here  be  underftood  to  affirm  thus  much  of  the  fin^- 
 
 ple 
 
 *  See  Tillotfon,  Serm.  76.  2<^Vol.  Fol.  p.  569,  l^c.  Dr. 
 J.  Clarke  on  Moral  E'vil,  p.  95,  &'c.  and  Scott's  C^r^iaa 
 ^^f,  Part  2.  C.  6.  §.  2.  p.  447,  ^f.  I  ft  Edit. 
 
6ea:.  3'     Concerning  the  Ovigm  of  1£.\\\,  ^% 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 pie  Nature  only,  or  Kifid,  or  our  ahJlraSi  Idea  of  thef^  Qua» 
 lilies  themfel'ves,  and  not  of  the  manner  of  their  Exiftence : 
 which  two  [tho'  this  Author  is  pleas'd  to  ufe  them  promifcu- 
 oufly  in  p.  84,  ^r.]  feem  yet  very  diilinft  Confiderations. 
 For  we  apprehend  feveral  Properties,  or  Qualities,  as  exifting 
 in  our  own  Nature,  independent  of  any  particular  manner ; 
 nay,  in  very  different  manners :  v.  g.  Knovv'Iedge,  either  by  Sen- 
 fation  or  Refledion,  by  Deduftipn  or  immediate  Intuition: 
 Love  attended  with  a  certain  degree  of  Pleafure  or  Pain,  ^c. 
 and  therefore  we  fuppofe  that  thefe  Qualities  may  exift  in  the 
 Divine  Nature  in  a  manner  entirely  diflcrent  from  what  the)r 
 do  in  us,  and  yet  be  the  very  fame  Qualities  ftill;  which  Mo- 
 dus of  the  Divine  Being,  or  of  any  of  his  Attributes,  is  total- 
 ly unknown  to  us,  and  we  can  only  guefs  at  it  by  fome  di- 
 ftant  refemblance  or  Analogy  \  which  Analogy  1  would  there- 
 fore apply  to  this  Mo^-^jof Exiftence,  and  to  this  only;  which 
 feems  fufficient  for  all  the  great  Purpofes  of  Religion,  and  in 
 which  Senfe  the  Notion  is  exceeding  juft  and  ufeful,  but 
 cannot,  I  think,  be  extended  to  our  Idea  of  the  nxihole  Nature 
 and  Genus  of  the  Attribute  itfelf  For  if  the  Divine  Attributes 
 be  toto  genere  dillinft  and  different  from  thofe  Qualities 
 which  we  efteem  perfcdlions  in  our  felvqs  or  others,  if  [as 
 the  fame  Author  urges  *,]    '  the  greatejl  perfeSiions  of  thofe 
 
 *  Creatures  ijohich  fall  under  our  Ohfervatton,  and  thofe  <u;e  fnd 
 
 *  in  ourfelvss  particularly  [and  thefe  he  will  grant  to  be  alf 
 
 *  that  we  have  any  Idea  of]  are  really  hut  fo  many  Imperfedi- 
 
 *  ens,  ivhen  referrd  or  attributed  to  the  Divine  Nature,  as  it  is 
 
 *  in  itfelf  in  any  meaning  ivhatfoever,  enjen  <with  the  moft  exalted 
 
 *  meaning  nxje  can  poffibly  annex  to  ihem^  [the  Author  under- 
 ftanding,  1  fuppofe,  as  ufual,  the  luhole  Nature  and  diflirr- 
 gui/hng  kind  of  thofe  Qualities  in  themfelves.]  Then,  how 
 fliall  we  difcovcr  which  kind  of  Qualities  God  prefers  before 
 the  contrary  ?  How  can  we  be  certain  that  thefe  in  particu- 
 lar are  agreeable  to  him  ?  ok  how  fhall  we  hope  and  endea- 
 vour to  make  ourfelves  like  him  ?  Can  we  know  the  nature 
 of  one  thing  by  another,  entirely  diiFerent  from  it?  Or  can 
 we  imitate  what  we  don't  at  all  apprehend?  '  It  is  foolijhp 
 [fays  A.  Bp.  Tillotfon~\  for  any  Man  to  pretend  that  he  cannot  hioit^ 
 
 *  nvhat  yufice,  andGoodncfs,  and  Truth  in  God  are',  for  if lue  d^ 
 
 *  not  kno^v  this,  *tis  all  one  to  us  njjhether  God  be  gxod  or  not ;  nor 
 \  iould ■'.'.•£  imitate  his  Goodnefs :  for  he  that^mitateSi  endeaivours. 
 
 *  Pag.  82. 
 
9^  Concerning  the  Origin  ofEwih     Chap.  \l 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 *  to  he  like  fomething  that  he  knoivs,  and  muji  of  vccejjtty  hwve 
 '  fame  Idea  of  that  to  nvhich  he  aims  to  be  like  ;  fo  that  if  fwe  had 
 *■  710  certain  and  fettled  Notion  of  the  J  ujlite  and  Goodnefs  and 
 '  Truth  of  God,  he  njoould  he  altogether  an  unintelligible  Being  : 
 
 *  and  Religion,  nvhich  conftfls  in  the   Imitation  of  him,  ivoulJ 
 
 *  he  utterly  impofftble* .''  Thefe  Confequences  will  hold  equally 
 againft  the  Dodrine  deliver'd  by  our  Author  in  the  Sermon 
 annex'd,  if  he  did  not  fuppofe  that  there  were  fome  Qualities 
 in  Men  in  fame  refpeiis  really  correfpondent  to  thofein  God,  and 
 {o  very  like  them  that  nothing  cou'd  be  more  fo  except  that 
 which  exifts  in  j^ the  very  fime  Manner  and  Degree  too,  /.  e.  in 
 a.  perfe^  one.  If  this  be  hi's  meaning,  [as  is  not  improbable 
 from  his  Anfwer  to  the  like  Objeftions  in  §.  22.  where  he 
 declares  that  the  Divine  Attributes  have  much  more  Reality 
 and  PerfeSiion  in  them  than  the  things  by  which  we  re-; 
 prefent  them,  ^c-]  If,  I  fay,  he  be  taken  in  this  Senfe, 
 as  I  would  willingly  underftand  him,  he  is  perfeftly  clear 
 from  the  exceptions  made  above.  I  wilh  the  learned  Au- 
 thor of  the  P roce dure,  tffc.  cow'd  be  fhown  to  be  fo,  who  is 
 generally  fuppofed  to  have  purfucd  his  notion  of  Analogy 
 farther  than  moll  Perfons  will  be  able  to  follov/  him.  As 
 he  has  chargM  our  Author  with  a  mijlaken  nxiay  of  treat' 
 ing  the  SubjeSl  f ,  I  hope  he  will  be  ready  to  excufe  any 
 for  obferving  what  they  conceive  to  be  a  miftake  in  his  owij 
 method,  efpecially  if  they  endeavour  to  Ihew  direSh  that  th? 
 
 foundation  of  Analogy,  as  he  has  placed  it,  i  s  falfe  and  ground » 
 lejs\:  which  Foundation  is  the  general  nature  or  diftinguifl^- 
 ing  kind  of  thefe  Qualities.  Now  the  nature  of  the  foremen- 
 tion'd  Qualities  muft  either  be  wholly  the  fame  in  God  and  us, 
 or  wholly  different:  if  the  former  be  maintained,  then  this  ana- 
 logical Senfe  is  turn'd  into  an  identical  one  ;  if  the  latter,  then 
 can  no  manner  of  Refemblance  or  Analogy  be  drawn  between 
 them ;  fince  one  nature  (as  has  been  obfcrv'd)  cannot  in  the 
 leaft  help  to  reprefent  or  explain  another  cjuite  different  from 
 It;  I  mean,  inthofe  very  points  vi^ herein  they  differ;  for  that 
 is  to  be  different  and  not  different,  alike  and  unlike  in  the 
 very  fame  refpefl,  at  the  fame  time :  And  then  this  analogical 
 Senfe  is  turn'd  either  into  a  difparate  or  quite  oppofite  one,  i.  e, 
 into  no  analogy  at  all:    Or  laftly,    they  mull  be  partly  the 
 
 fame, 
 
 *  Sec  A.  Bp.  Tillotfons  Serm.  76.  Vol.  2.  Fol.  p.  672,  aa^ 
 p.  678. 
 "I"  Introdmaion p.  ly,  %  Ibi^, 
 
Sc<5l.  3.     CoficerntJig  the  Origin  ^Evil.  93 
 
 RE  M  ARK  Ss 
 
 fame,  and  partly  different,  or  alike  and  unlike  in  different  reffeBi 
 (which  is  the  thing  we  contend  for)  f/z.  alike  in  PerfeSiiony 
 or  in  being  Perfeftions  of  a  certain  kind,  and  unlike  in  DefeSly 
 or  impcrfefHon ;  /.  e.  mixed  with  the  contrary  Qualities : 
 or  the  fame  in  Nature,  or  Effence,  but  different  in  Degree,  and 
 the  manner  of  Exiftencc.  Or  take  it  thus :  the  Qualities  at 
 fuch,  or  confider'd  in  the  AhfiraSl,  are  the  fame  ;  as  exifting  in 
 a  particular  SubjeSi,  different.  In  an  infinite  (or  rather  per- 
 feh)  Subjeft,  they  exiil  perfeBly,  or  in  the  highejl  Degree  \ 
 they  are  abfolute,  without  any  Mixture  or  DefeSi.  In  a  finite 
 or  imperfe6l  one  they  are  limited,  allayed,  or  defeBive ;  they 
 exift  in  an  imperfeSi  Manner,  or  inferior  Degree.  Confequently 
 we  conceive  them  to  be  alike  in  both  as  Perfe^ions,  or  Quali- 
 ties of  a  certain  nature  or  kind;  unlike  only  as  mix"d  with 
 ImperfeSiion,  or  as  confined  to  a  certain  Degree.  If  therefore 
 the  Author  founds  this  Analogy  on  the  very  Nature  of  tha 
 thing,  he  feems  to  incur  the  foremention'd  abfurdity,  of  fup- 
 pofing  a  nature  contradidlory  to  itfelf ;  i.  e.  analogous  to 
 fomcthing  from  which  it  is  at  the  fame  time  totally  and  entire- 
 ly different.  If,  with  us,  he  will  pleafe  to  dillinguifh  between 
 the  Nature  of  the  thing  in  general,  and  the  particular  Modus 
 of  its  Exiflence,  he  muft  with  us  alfo  remove  this  analogy 
 from  the  former  foundation,  and  {\x  it  upon  the  latter.  —  Far- 
 ther, no  Similitude  whatfoevcr,  whether  deduced  from  human 
 Reafon  or  Holy  Scripture,  can  have  force  enough  to  pcrfuade 
 us,  that  the  Rvhole  nature  of  thefc  things  is  quite  different  from 
 what  we  apprehend  Or  can  conceive  them  to  be ;  fince  it  is 
 univerfUIy  allow'd,  that  no  comparifon  can  [as  we  common- 
 ly fiy]  run  upon  all  four ;  or  [which  is  the  very  foundation 
 and  defign  of  this  whole  analogical  Scheme]  can  ever  confti" 
 tutc  a  proper  and  conduji've  Argument,  in  order  to  prove  to  us 
 fuch  a  paradox :  and  if  fo  great  Strefs  is  to  be  laid  on  any, 
 V.  g.  that  of  a  Looking-Glafs,  ufed  in  a  ftricl  Philofophical 
 manner,  [as  the  Author  of  the  Procedure  feems  to  do  *J  why 
 may  not  fome  urge  it  ftill  farther,  and  argue  that  as  the 
 Image  of  your  Face  fuppofed  to  be  feen  in  the  Glafs,  is  no-' 
 thing  real,  folid,  and  fubibntial  contain'd  in  the  Glafs  itfclfi 
 but  barely  an  appearance  exhibited  in  the  Brain  ;  fo  all  the 
 conceptions  which  we  pretend  to  have  of  the  Divine  Na- 
 ture and  Attributes,  are  nothing  at  all  in  God  himfelf,  but 
 mere  Phantafms  and  delufive  Images,  exifting  only  jn  our 
 oVi'n  Mind.     This,  will  tlicfc  Men  lay,  muft  appear  abfurd  at- 
 
 firlV- 
 *  Pag.  J  I  2,  ^f. 
 
94  Concirning  the  Origin  o/'Evil.    Chap.  I. 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 firft  Sight,  and  yet  may  be  drawn  from  the  Similitude  with 
 as  much  Propriety  as  the  reft;  coniequently  the  whole  Scheme 
 of  this  Analogy  is  to  be  reje£led  as  entirely  falfe,  and  at  laft 
 the  true  Medium  of  all  our  Knowledge  in  the  Nature  of  thefc 
 things,  will  be  what  we  truly  and  properly  perceive  of  them, 
 in  fome  fmall  degree  in  ourfelves. 
 
 If  it  be  objected  here,  that  the  Nature  ■xr\6.  Modus  of  any 
 thing  muft  be  the  very  fame,  fince  by  different  Natures  arc 
 only  meant  different  Manners  of  Exiftence. 
 
 I  anfwer:  By  the  Nature  of  any  thing,  I  underfland  Its 
 feveral  dtjlinguijh'ing  Properties.  By  the  Nature  of  any  Prcperiy 
 1  underftand  fome  certain  pofitive  Mark  or  CharaSler  which 
 diftinguiflies  that  property  from  any  others.  Thus,  by  the. 
 nature  of  Body,  I  mean,  folid,  divifible,  figurd  and  moveable 
 Extenfion.  By  the  Nature  of  Solidity,  I  mean  Refiltence,  or 
 a  power  of  excluding  other  Bodies  out  of  its  place;  which 
 Mark  fufiiciently  diftinguiflies  it  from  Divifibility,  or  any 
 other  property  belonging  to  the  fame  Body,  as  well  as  all  the 
 forementionM  properties  diftinguifh  a  Body  from  fomething 
 elfe :  both  which  we  may  therefore  properly  enough  be  faid 
 to  perceive  or  kno^v;  tho'  perhaps  we  may  never  in  like  man- 
 ner know  hoiv  thefe  feveral  Properties  are  united  together^ 
 and  come  to  form  one  Aggregate  or  Suhjlance;  nor  ^whence 
 this  Power  or  Property  of  Rcliftence  proceeds,  or  how  it  is 
 cans'' d,  which  is  what  we  underftand  by  the  Mod^w  of  each. 
 So  that  knowing  or  having  a  clear  determinate  Idea  of  a  cer^ 
 tain  Thing  or  Quality,  fo  as  to  be  able  to  diftinguifh  it  from 
 another  Thing  or  Quality,  and  always  to  perceive  it  to  be 
 really  thus  ;  is  quite  different  from  knowing  how  the  faid 
 Thing  or  Quality  comes  to  be  thus  :  Honu  or  Why  it  is,  arc 
 Modes  of  Exiftence,  and  differ  plainly  from  n.vhat  it  is,  or  what 
 Idea  we  have  of  it,  which  denotes  its  Nature  or  EJfeme. 
 
 Againft  this  Notion  cf  Analogy,  as  apply'd  to  the  nvhole  Na' 
 ture  of  the  Attributes  of  God,  fee  Fiddes's  Body  of  Divinity, 
 B.  I.  Part  2.  c.  13.  and  his  PraBical  Dijcourfes,  Fol.  p.  234, 
 ^c.  or  y .  C  lor  kepn  Moral  Evil,  p.  95,  tsc.  ox  Chuhh^TraBs 
 p.  146,  i^c.  or,  the  prefcnt  State  cf  the  Rcpiiblick  of  Letters  for 
 fuly  1728.  or,  a  Vindication  of  the  Divine  Attributes,  by  Dr. 
 Ed-iuards.  See  alfo  the  Minute  Philofopher,  V.  i.  p.  247. 
 
 Some  objedVions  having  been  made  to  this  Remark  by  an 
 eminent  Writer*,.  1  fliall  here  fet  down  the  Siibftance  of  his 
 Arguments  and  what  I  take  to  be  an  Anfwer. 
 
 U 
 *  Caftfof  Reafon,-  by  If.  levj,  p.  6S,  ^c\' 
 
Sed.  3»    Cone erniftg  the  Oxi^m  of  Ewih  ^g 
 
 REMARKS, 
 
 In  the  firfl:  place,  the  learned  Author  would  have  it  obferv'd 
 that  in  a  comparifon  made  between  the  Attributes  of  God  and 
 and  thofe  Qualities  which  we  eftcem  Perfedions  in  ourielves, 
 it  is  affirm'dthat  they  are  of  the  fame  Nature  or  EJJencey  and 
 ytt  partly  the  fame  and  partly  different,  p.  68. 
 
 Anf^er.  "Nature  or  Ejfence  is  only  that  which  determines 
 the  i'/m^^  of  thefe  Qualities,  or  denominates  them  of  this  or 
 that  Sort :  this  may  be  the  fame,  tho'  they  be  different  in  ano- 
 ther fenfe  of  the  word  Nature,  t.  e.  as  including  every  thing 
 which  does  or  may  attend  the  whole  of  their  Exiftence.  Thus 
 Coodnefs  or  Benevolence  is  of  the  fame  kind  in  God,  Angels 
 and  Men,  <viz.  a  Tiifpofition  to  cotrmtinicate  Happinefs,  which  I 
 Call  the  Nature  or  Ejfence  of  it;  but  differs  as  it  is  attended 
 with  Pleafure  or  Pain ;  as  calm  or  paj/tonate,  which  I  call 
 manners  of  Exiflence :  or  as  it  is  more  or  lefs  intenfe,  pure  or 
 unmix' d,  which  I  term  Degrees  of  Perfediion. 
 
 For  affirming  things  to  be  the  fame  in  nature  which  are 
 in  fomc  refpedls  very  different,  we  have  this  Author's  own 
 Authority,  p.  149.     *  As  Love  is  the  fame  paffion  in  all  Men 
 
 *  yet  it  is  infinitely  different;   as  Hatred   is  the  fame  paffion' 
 
 *  in  all  Men  yet  with  infinite  differences ;  fo  Reafon  is   the 
 
 *  fame  faculty  in  all  Men  yet  with  infinite  differences. 
 
 2dly.  'Tis  urged  that  all  the  Attributes  inherent  in  the  Di- 
 vine Nature  arc  KeceJ/hry,  eternal,  infnite,  immufahle,  indepen- 
 dent, &'c.  all  the  Qualities  in  human  Nature  the  diredi  con- 
 trary, therefore  they  cannot  be  partly  the  fame,  but  muft  be 
 nvbolly  different:  as  different  in  their  Nature  as  mutable  is 
 from  immutable,  Iffc.  Jbid. 
 
 Jnftv,  Eternity,  Neceffity,  ^c.  don't  at  all  affe<ft  the  Na- 
 ture of  thefe  Attributes  or  Qualities  in  our  fenfe  of  the  Word 
 Nature,  i.  e.  do  not  make  'cm  to  be  Qualities  of  fuch  a 
 fort,  any  more  than  if  they  were  in  a  contrary  Hate.  Knonju- 
 ledge  is  no  more  K?2ovjhdge  for  being  eternal  or  immuta- 
 ble. Power  is  as  much  Po<vjcr  whether  it  be  independent 
 or  derived,  whether  it  ceafe  to  morrow,  or  laft  for  everii 
 and  foofthe  reft, 
 
 jdly.  If  the  Attributes  in  God  and  Qualities  in  Men  be 
 dike  in  PerfeSlion,  they  muft  be  alike  in  Eternity,  neceffary  Ex- 
 iftence,  l^c,  becaufe  thefe  things  conftitute  the  Pcrfeaion  ofthe' 
 Divine  Attributes,  p.  69. 
 
 Anfw.  This  is  taking  the  Word  PerfeHion  in  a  lenfe  diffs- 
 *ent  from  that  in  which  we  underftand  it,  and  in  which  this 
 Author  himfelf  feem'd  to  ufc  it  in  the  laft  Page,  where  ha 
 
^6  Concerning  the  Origin  c/Evil.      Chap.  Id 
 
 REMARKS^ 
 
 mentions  thofe  PerfeBions  fivhkh  are  in  ourfel-ves.  In  this  plac« 
 he  means  the  ahfolute  perfeflion  of  any  thing  in  all  rcfpcBs  :^ 
 1  take  it  only  for  fome  certain  Quality,  which  as  fuch  is  called 
 a  Perfeclion,  /.  e.  valuable,  or  the  foundation  of  Happinefs 
 to  a  Being  in  one  refpecl,  tho*  not  in  others.  Thus  Know- 
 ledge, as  far  as  it  is  Knoivledge,  or  can  be  intitled  to  that 
 Name,  is  as  much,  or  as  rea'.lv,  a  pcrfedtion  in  Man  as  in  God: 
 the  Jdea  of  this  Quality  as  diftinguifliable  from  any  other 
 Quality  is  the  fame  in  both;  tho'  there  be  a  difference  as  to 
 extent  or  freedom  from  Ignorance,  which  is  the  Degree  oi  it; 
 or  as  it  does,  or  does  not  confift  in  Dedudlion,  or  arife  from 
 Senfition,  id'c.  which  are  Modes  of  its  Exiftence.  'Tis  there- 
 fore properly  alike  in  PerfcBion,  or  in  itsheinga  PerfeHion  of  a 
 certain  kind  ;  unlike  in  DefeSi,  or  in  being  attended  with  Im- 
 perfedlion  in  Manner  or  Degree. 
 
 4thly.  If  Power  in  Man  and  Power  in  God  are  alike  in 
 FerfeBion  but  unlike  in  DefeB,  they  muft  be  alike  in  Otmiipo- 
 ience,  but  unlike  in  Z)^^?  o/^Po^^.-^;-,  Ibid. 
 
 jinfw.  Rather  they  muH  be  alike  as  far  as  they  are  fimply 
 Po'wer,  or  agree  in  the  general  Idea  of  it ;  but  unlike  as  far  as 
 they  are  Power  7nix'il  with,  impotence;  or  as  the  Exercife  of 
 'em  is  attended  or  nor  attended  with  Uneajincfs,  &c. 
 
 5thly.  What  is  alike  in  Perfeclion  mult  be  alike  in  Impcr- 
 feftion,  unlefs  a  thing  may  be  like  another  in  Sirengthy  but 
 not  like  it  in  the  vjant  of  Strength,  p.  70 
 
 Jnfiv.  May  not  a  thing  be  like  another  in  having  fome 
 Strength,  tho'  not  like  it  in  having  the_/2z;/(f  Strength  ?  fure  it 
 is  no  inconfiftency  to  fay  things  are  of  the  fame  Nature  or 
 Cetius-,  tho'  in  a  different  Degree, 
 
 6thly.  That  which  differs  only  in  Degree  can  only  difi«r 
 in  a  certain  Degree,  hnt  fnite  and  infinite^  mutable  znAimtnu- 
 table  c^rC the  faid  to  differ  only  in  a  certain  Degree,  Ibid. 
 
 Jnfjj'  An  abfolute  or  jmfaphfical  Inf?iite,  which  is  the 
 only  one  that  can  be  applied  in  the  prefent  Cafe,  is  a  pofitive 
 Idea  of  fome  certain  Qiiality  in  the  JbfraB,  in  the  highej} 
 Degree,  or  to  which  nothing  of  the  lame  kind  can  he  added i 
 fincc  then  there  is  a  hlghejl  in  all  fuch  Qualities  as  Goodnefi 
 Po^ver,  &c.  contrary  to  what  we  find  in  mathematical  Quan- 
 tities) they  may  be  faid  to  differ  in  a  certain  Degree,  fee  R.  I.' 
 Mutability  or  Immutability  arc  nothing  to  thefe  Qualities  af 
 fuch. 
 
 7th]y.  To  fay  that  they  differ  only  in  a  Degree  or  Manner 
 of  Exillencc  fuppofcs  that  Degree  or  7nanner  of  Exiftence  iigni-' 
 
 if 
 
Se6t.  3«      Concerning  the  Ongm  of 'EwW.  (fj 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 fy;  the  fame  thing,    whereas  they  are  exceedingly  different, 
 IL-id. 
 
 Anf^M.  Or,  is  here  taken  disjunSl-veh.  Tho'  thefe  t^vo  a-, 
 nountto  thcflime  thing:  A  different  Dey^-ee  always  imnlys  s 
 different  Manner  of  Exiftence. 
 
 .  8thly.  The  Exi(lence  of  God  differs  from  the  Exigence  of 
 M^n  in  the  Manner  of  Exiftence  but  not  in  the  Degree  of 
 Exiftence.  p-  71. 
 
 Jnfi.u.  Exijience  is  properly  no  Attribute,  nor  is  it  capable 
 ofDegrees. 
 
 9thiy.  If  tlic'ir  manner  of  Exiftence  muft  bvc  nllthit  Dif- 
 ference there  is  bcuvccn  ftniieand  iniinite,  &c.  then  it  can  fig- 
 liify  httle  whether  you. fay  ihey  are  drfferen!;  in  theii:  Naturit 
 or  EjTmcey  or  only  different  in  their  Manner  ot  Exiftence. 
 Ibid. 
 
 Jnfiv.  Let  the  Manner  in  which  Divine  Knowledge  exifts 
 be  never  fo  different  from  that  of  human  Knowledge,  yet  fo 
 long  as  it  is  Knowledge,  or  agrees  in  the  general  Idea  with  what 
 Men  call  Knowledge,  it  muft  fignify  fomcthing  m.ore  than  if  it 
 Avere  totally  different,  of  quite  another  kh:d  and  had  p.o  more 
 refcmblance  to  it  than  Kno^vlcdge  has  to  Pc^jjer,  as  feems  to  be 
 tlie  Cafe  upon  the  Analo  ical  Scheme. 
 
 lOthly,  Who  can  tell  the  Nature  and  Effcnee'^  of  any 
 thing  any  farther  than  he  knows  the  Manner  of  its  Exift- 
 ence ?  Ibid.     , 
 
 Aafrju.  The  kature  or  Ejence  of  any  Quality  according 
 tons,  is  only  its  abjiraa.  Idea,  or  that  which  determmcs  it 
 to  be  of  this  or  that  Sort,  which  muft  be  the  fame  in  what 
 Manner  foever  it  exifts,  or  is  exhibited  in  any  particular  Sub- 
 je6l.  See  Note  i.  . 
 
 iithly.  But  the  foregoing  Diftinftiou  Utppofos  a  real  dtf-.. 
 ference  between  thefe  two,  and  that  a  thing,  has  not  fuch  x 
 Manner  of  Exiftence  becaufc  it  is  of  ,fi.ch  a  Nature,  nor  is  of 
 fuch.  a   Nature   becaufe  it  has  fuch  a  Manner  of  Exiftence. 
 
 Anf^^^.  No  move  it  is,  in  our  Scnfe  of  the  >Vcrd  A<?^V,'r?, 
 Knowledge  does  not  come  by  Senfation  or  Refleaion  m  parti- 
 cular becaufe  it  IS  Knowledge,  nor  is  it  therefore  ^.Knowledge 
 becaufe  it  comes  by  Senfation  or  Reflexion.  Goodne/s,  Poii-cr, 
 &c.  are  of  the  fame  general  Nature  in  Men  and  Angels,  tho"  ^ 
 they  be  more  imperfeaiy  difplayed  in  one  than  in  the  other; 
 which  can  arife  only'  from  the  different  Capacities  of  theSub- 
 'fSti  that  rcecive  tl^m  ;  or  in  oiIk:^' Word?,  !rsm  the  d liferent,, 
 
98  Co?icerm/ig  t be  Or igm  of  EwW.    Chap.  I. 
 
 R  E  M  A  R  K  S. 
 
 manner  of  their  Exiftence  in  thofe  Subjects ;  which  Mannef 
 is  therefore  entirely  independent  on  their  abflraft  Nature  nor 
 have  they  any  relation  to  each  other. 
 
 1 2thly.  He  muft  fhcw  that  the  Manner  of  Xlnderfianding^ 
 Will  or  Potver  in  God  and  Man  is  not  at  all  ov.^'ing  to 
 the  Nature  ol  Under Jlandlngy  Will  or  Poixjer  in  God  or  Man 
 
 P-  73- 
 
 ji?tfw.  The  Manner  of  thefe  Qualities  may  be  fuppofed  to 
 be  very  different,  and  yet  the  Nature  of  them  (in  our  Senfe  of 
 that  Word)  will  continue  the  fame,  which  fhcvv's  fufficicntly 
 that  the  former  is  not  owing  to  the  latter.  If  pn//  be  defi- 
 ned a  Ponjjer  of  Preferring  or  Ckoofing  ;  is  not  that  the  fame 
 whatever  it  prefi^rs,  or  however  it  be  moved  fo  to  do  ?  Whe- 
 ther it  choofe  Good  or  Evil,  whether  it  be  determined  by 
 Anxiety  or  the  lafi;  Judgment,  or  nothing  at  all?  llPonx-er  be 
 an  Ability  to  produce  ChaJige,  is  not  that  the  fame  whether  it  be 
 done  in  Thougi.t  01  Motion,  v/hethcr  it  be  attended  with  P/ea- 
 fure  or  Pcin?  IfUnderJIandinghQ  a  Conjcbufnefs  of  fo7nething, 
 is  iwt  that  the  fame  whatever  the  manner  be  in  which  it  is  ac- 
 quired, exercifed,  or  cxifts  ?  Is  it  more  or  kfs  yr.derjlandivg 
 for  being  got  by  DeduBion  or  immediate  Intuition,  by  Eyes 
 or  Ears,  or  any  other  Way  ? 
 
 i3thly.  The  Difficulties  charg'd  upon  the  Doftrine  of ^k- 
 alogy  arc  the  fame  in  the  other  Account,  which  fays  that  the 
 Divine  Attributes  are  diftercnt  in  the  Manner  of  their  Exiit- 
 ence  from  the  ^nlitie^  of  Men.  For  if  they  differ  infinitely 
 and  immutably  in  their  Manner  of  Exiflence,  are  we  not  as 
 much  at  a  lofs  to  know  what  they  are,  and  as  unable  to  imitate 
 that  which  flands  at  an  infinite  and  immutable  diilance  from  us, 
 as  if  we  had  faid  that  it  is  diilerent  in  Nature  from  our 
 Qualities? 
 
 Anfiv.  Is  it  rot  much  more  eafy  for  inc  to  imitate  perfc(ft 
 or  abfolute  Goodnefs,  when  I  know  the  nature  ct  Goodnefs 
 in  general,  and  fee  it  partially  exiiibitcd  in  the  World,  than 
 if  I  only  believ'd  it  to  be  fomething  tranfcendaitly  high  (as 
 this  Author  defcribcs  it*,)  and  totuU\'  different  from  any 
 kind  of  Goodnefs  which  I  can  form  an  Idea  of,  and  as  retnote 
 as  my  Idea  of  Goodnefs  is  from  any  other  Idea  ?  \^  the  nature 
 or  the  Qualities  be  but  iixt,  the  Manners  of  their  Exiilence, 
 however  diliant,  niter  not  the  Cafe,  Tho'  I  don't  fee  how 
 thofc  in  the  Deity  can  he  properly  faid  to  be  infivitcly  diftant 
 
 from 
 
 *  P.  65,  67. 
 
Sed.  j.     Coffcermttgfh^OngmofRwW.  99 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 from  thefe  in  us  If  we  ha'/e  any  Degree  r>t  all  oP  them,  and 
 if  we   have  not,    'tis  pLiin  wc  can   knc,,'  nothing  at  all   of 
 them. 
 
 I4thly.  Let  us  fuppofe  the  Creation  of  ail  things  out  of 
 rothing  to  be  an  Eff'eSi  of  Divine  Power,  rnd  changing  the 
 Shape  of  a  Piece  of  Wood  to  be  an  Effl'^  of  human  Power.  I 
 afl;  whether  tliefe  Effects  are  toio  p-enere  diftindl  and  different  in 
 their  Nature? 
 
 Anfiv.  The  Effe£ls  are  different,  the  Idea  o^Cmife  or  Poniu- 
 er  arifing  from  thefe  Effeds  is  the  fime.  I  fhould  liave  the 
 Idea  of  Power  ec^uall)^  (tho'  not  o'i  equal  Power)  from  feeing  a 
 Change  made  in  a  Piece  of  Wood,  as  from  the  Creation 
 of  it. 
 
 I5th!v.  If  the  nature  of  Caufes  can  be  at  all  known  by 
 their  Effofts,  is  it  not  reafonable  to  fuppofe  thefe  Ceufes 
 muft  be   as  different  in  their    Natures  as  their  Efftfts  are? 
 
 P-   75" 
 
 Jnfw.  No :  They  both  agree  in  the  general  Idea  of  Caufe; 
 which  is  all  that  we  require  to  conditjte  their  Nature ;  and  all 
 thefe  Arguments  are  built  only  on  a  different  Senfe  of  that 
 Term,  as  cbfervM  above. 
 
 i6rhly.  Has  any  one  loft  his  Reafons  for  fearing  and  ador- 
 ing the  Divine  Power  becaufe  it  can  only  be  compared  to  hu- 
 Ti;an  Power,  as  inji;iite  may  be  compared  to  finite.  Has  he  no- 
 thing to  ground  his  Fear  upon,  becaufe  this  Power  has  fuch  a 
 reality  as  nothing  can  reprefent  to  him  as  it  is  in  its  oWn  nature  ? 
 &c.  Ibid,  and  p.  76,  77. 
 
 An/iv.  Finite  and  Infinite  (wherever  thefe  Terms  can  pro- 
 perly be  applied)  fuppole  the  !ame  comTtion  Nature,  Kind  ov 
 &ert,  and  differ  only  in  Extent.  If  therefore  Divine  Po'-jjer^ 
 IVifdom  and  Goodnefs  may  be  fo  compared  to  human  Power, 
 Wifdom,  and  Goodnef?,  they  are  Qi!.i!ii.ie3  of  the  fame  Nature 
 
 Kind,  or  Sort,  which  fecms  to  he  giving  up  the  Quefiion. 
 
 If  they  cannot  be  fo  compared  i  fliould  begird  to  know  in 
 wliat  they  are  alike,  or  wherein  this  Anamy  between  them 
 confiib :  Or  in  fliort,  how  wc  fiiall  at  all  be  the  tvifer  by 
 it.  For  to  believe  the  Reality  of  that  which  nothing  can 
 give  us  an  Idea  of  as  it  is  in  Its  own  Nature,  will  be  aC 
 lift  I  fear,  no  more  than  believing  the  reality  of  we  know  not 
 what;  which  can  never  be  a  good  Ground  tor  any  rational 
 Devotion. 
 
 [R.  I.]  By  the  W^ords,  Infinite  Degree,  hern  and  ^boye,  we 
 dwn't  tne.in  ,^ry  indefinite  Addition,  or  encreafaijleuefr.  of  thef^ 
 
 H'  i  fcveraV 
 
100  Co?2cermrig  the  On^m  of  EvW.     Chap.  I. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 feveral  Attributes  partially  confidcr'd  (to  which  fuch  terms 
 arc  vulgarly,  tho'  not  fo  properly  apply'd)  but  only  an  entire 
 abfolute  PcrfeSiion,  without  any  kind  o^ failure  or  deficiency  in 
 thefe  refpefts :  Which  we  have  intimated  in  Note  3 .  *  and 
 elfcwhere,  to  be  our  Notion  of  Infinity  as  apply'd  to  any  of 
 the   Divine   Attributes.     '  Thus    Infinite    Under Jlanding   and 
 
 *  Kno^-ivledge  is  nothing  clfs  but  ferfeil  Knowledge,  that  which 
 
 *  hath  no  dcfecl  or  mixture  of  Igriorancc  in  it,  or  the  Know- 
 
 *  ledge  of  whatfoever  is  knowable.  Infinite  Ponjjcr  is  nothing 
 
 *  elfe  but  ■pcrftSl  Power,  thit  which  hath  no  defect  or  mixture 
 
 *  of  Ijfipotency  in  it :    A  Power  of  producing  and  doing  all 
 
 *  whatfoever  is  pffihlci  i.  e.  whatfoever  is  cojicei'vahh,  and  fo  of 
 
 *  the  reft, 
 
 *  Now,    that  v/e  have  an  Idea  or  Conception  of  Pfr/>(f?/i?;/, 
 
 *  or  a  pcrfeSl  Being,  is  evident  from  the  Notion  that  we  have 
 
 *  of  hnperfeSlion  fo  familiar  to  us  :  PerfeSlion  being  the  Rule 
 '  and  Meafure  of  Impcrfedion,  md  not  ImperfcBlon  oi  Peifedi- 
 '  on,  as   a  Jiraiglt  Line  is   the  Rule  and  Meafure  of  a  crooked, 
 
 *  raid  not  a  crooked  of  a  firaight.     So    that  Perfedtion  is  firlt 
 
 *  conceiweahle  in  order  of  Nature,  before  hr.perfeilion,  as  Light 
 
 *  before  Darkncfs,  a  poftti^je  before  the  pri'vcJion  ox  defect.  For 
 
 *  Perfcftion  is  not  properly   the   want  of  Imperfection,    but 
 
 *  Imperfection  of  Perfection, 
 
 •  Moreover,  we  perceive  feveral  Degrees  of  Perfeftion  in 
 
 *  the  EfTences    of  things,  and  confequehtly  a  Scale  or  Ladder 
 
 *  of  Perfeciions  in  Nature,  one  above  another,  as  oi  li-ving 
 
 *  and  animate  th.'mg^  ^hov efetfele/s  and  inanimate,  o'i rational 
 
 *  thmgs  Tihovcfenj.'ti'vc;  and  that  by  reafon  of  that  Notisn  or 
 
 *  Idea  which  we  firil  have  of  that  which  is  alfilutcly  perfed, 
 '  as  the  Standard  by  comparing  of  things  with  which,  an^ 
 
 *  meafuring  of  them,  we  take  notice  of  their  approaching  more 
 '  or  lefs  near  thereto.  Nor  indeed  could  thele  gradual  Jfcent!: 
 '  be  infinite,  or  without  End,  but  they  muft  come  at  laft 
 '  to  th.^t  which  is  abfolutcly  perfeft,  a.s  the  top  of  them  all, 
 '  Lailly,  we  could  not  perceive  Impcrfct'lion  in  the  moft 
 '  perfect  of  thofe  things  which  we  ever  had  Senle  or  Expe- 
 
 *  riencc  of  in  our  Li\es,  had  we  not  a  Notion  or  Jdea 
 '  of  that  which  is  ahfolutels  pcrfeSl,  which  fecretly  com- 
 '  paring    the    fame   with,    wc    perceive   it   to   come    fhort 
 
 *  thercoff . 
 
 «  Where- 
 
 *  P.   I  J,  16.  t  CW-c^r/Z',  p.  64S. 
 
Sed.  3.     Concerning  the  Origin  ^Evil.  loi 
 
 REMARK  S. 
 
 ■'  Wherefore,  fince  Ivfinlte  is  the  fame  with  abfolutelyperfcBy 
 '  we  having  a  Notion  or  Idea  of  the  latter,  mull  needs  have 
 
 *  of  the  former.  From  whence  we  learn  alfo,  that  tho'  the 
 '  Word  Infinite  be  in  the  Form  thereof  Negatkoe,  yet  is  the 
 «  Senfe  of  it,  in  thcfe  things  which  are  really  capable  of  the 
 '  fame,  pofihnje,  it  being  all  one  with  ahfolutely  perfeSi:  As 
 
 *  likewife  the  Senfe  of  the  Word  Finite  is  negative,  it  being 
 '  the  fame  with  Imperfect.     So  that  finite  is  properly  the  Ne- 
 
 *  gation  o^ ifi^nite,  as  that  which  in  order  of  nature  is  before 
 
 *  It,  and  not  Infinite  the  Negation  of  Finite.  However,  in 
 '  thefe  things  which  are  capable  of  no  true  Infiinity,  becaufe 
 '  chev  are   cffenlially  fi?iite,  as  Number,   corporeal  Magnitude, 
 
 *  and  Time;  Infinity  being  there  a  mere  imaginary  thing,  and 
 
 *  a  non-eutitv,  it  can  only  be  conceived  by  the  Negation  oi  Fi- 
 
 *  xite,  flswe'alfo  conceive  Nothing  by  the  Negation  of  Some- 
 '  thing,    that    is,  we  can    iiave  no  pofiti-ve   Conception  at  all 
 
 *  thereof". 
 
 Now,  all  this  is  not  attempting  to  make  the  Attributes  of 
 God  pofitive/y  infinite  by  fuperadding  a  Negative  Idea  of  Infi- 
 nity to  them:  (as  the  Author  of  the  Procedure  ^c.  juRly  ur- 
 ges againft  Air.  Locke,  in  B.  i.  c.  3.  p.  82,  and  the  f^me  might 
 with  equal  Juftice  be  objedled  to  Dr.  Clarke,  vv-hen  he  applies 
 infinite  Space  and  infinite  Duration  to  the  Deity,  and  calls 
 one  his  Immenfity  and  the  other  his  Eternity.)  But  it  is  mak- 
 ing them  pofitively  and  abfolutely /)^//>6'7,  by  firfl  proving  them 
 to  havefom.e  real  Exijlence  in  the  Divine  Nature,  and  then  by 
 removing  from  it  all  PofHbility  of  Want,  or  Deficiency y  Mix- 
 ture, or  Allay,  as  cxplain'd  in  the  laft  Remark. 
 
 [R.  m  ]  By  the  Word  Jufiice,  as  it  relates  to  Puniniment, 
 we  mean  the  Exercife  of  a  Right,  or  doing  what  a  Perfon  has 
 a  Moral  Poiver  to  do.  Mercy  implies  his  receding  from  that 
 Right,  or  not  exerting  that  moral  Power.  When  we  apply 
 thefe  Terms  to  the  Deity,  we  conflder  his  D'fpenfations  iixa 
 partial  View,  i^/s.  only  with  Relation  to  the  Perfon  offend- 
 ing, and  himfelf  the  oifended  ;  or  as  mere  Debtor  and  Credi- 
 tor, exclufiveof  all  other  Beings,  who  may  be  affe£led  there- 
 by, and  whom  therefore  we  Ihould  fuppofe  to  be  regarded  in 
 thcfe  Difpenfations.  In  this  Senfe  thefe  tv/o  Attributes  have  ^ 
 dillinft  Meaning,  and  may  both  be  always  fubordinate  to 
 Goodnefs,  but  can  never  be  repugnant  to  each  other.  Thus, 
 where   a  Creature  ^las  forfeited  its  Right  to  a  Favour,  or  in- 
 
 ^  Cudivarth;  p.  6^^. 
 
102  Concerning  the  Origin  ^Evil.     Chap.  I„ 
 
 R  E  M  A  R  K  S, 
 
 cnrrcd  a  Penal*/,  by  the  breach  of  foiae  Covcnarjt,  or  the 
 TranfgrelTiOii  of  ioine  Law,  ihe  Creator,  corifider''d  with  refpedl 
 to  that  Being  a-Ione,  and  in  thofe  Circumllances,  has  always  a 
 Right  to  withdraw  the  Favour,  or  to  infliil  the  Penalty  ;  and 
 will  profecutc  that  Right,  whenever  he  iinds  it  ncceffary  to 
 fome  farther  End:  But  yet  his  Goodnefs  may  incline  him  often 
 to  fu-fpend  or  remit  it,  on  fome  foreign  Motive,  ^iz.  on  ac- 
 count of  the  prefcnt  Relation  between  the  Criminal  and  other 
 Men,  in  very  different  Circumflanres,  or  in  view  of  a  future 
 Alteration  in  the  Circumitauces  of  the  Criminal  himfelf.  Now 
 as  thefe  Motives  belong  to,  and  are  generally  known  by  God 
 alone,  tho'  they  may  influence  his  Actions  towards  us,  yet  they 
 don't  at  all  afFed  his  Right  over  us,  and  therefore  ought  not 
 to  diminifli  our  Love,  Gratitude,  iffc  to  him  in  any  particu- 
 lar Inilance  cither  of  Judgment  or  of  Mercy.  Whenever  we 
 fuffer  for  our  Crimes,  we  have  no  Reafon  to  complain  of  any 
 Injury,  nor  can  he,  when  upon  the  foremention'd  Motives  he 
 forgives  us,  ever  injure  himlelf.  For  Juftice,  confider'd  barely 
 as  a  Right  or  Moral Poi.t:er,  evidently  aetnands  notliing,  nor  c-aw 
 properly  be  faid  to  olVge  one  way  or  other  :  And  therefore  the 
 Being  pofTefs'd  of  it  is  at  liberty  either  to  fufpend  or  exert  it ; 
 but  he  Vvill  never  ufe  this  Liberly  otherwifc  than  as  his  Good- 
 nefs requires,  confequently  ynjlke  and  Mercy  in  luch  a  Being 
 ran  never  clafh. 
 
 Whether  this  Way  of  conceiving  thefe  Divine  Attributes 
 be  not  attended  with  lefs  Pifficulty  than  the  common  manner 
 of  treating  them  under  the  Notion  of^  two  Infinites  diametri- 
 tally  oppofite,   mull  be  left  to  the  Judgment  of  the   Reader. 
 
 As  to  the  Nature  of  Difrtbuti--ve  Juftice,  or  the.  true  Reafon 
 of  Renvards  and  Funijhments,  fee  CQiliber's  Impartial  Ensuiry 
 3.  I.  CXI.  prop.  \%,  ■       * 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Chap.  IIJ  103 
 
 CHAP.    II. 
 
 Conce?''ning  the  Natiire  and  Divijton 
 (^/'Evilj  and  the  Difficulty  of  trac- 
 ing its  Origin. 
 
 GOOD     end   Evil    are   cppolites,    and    arife  By  Evil 
 from   the   Relation    which    things    have   to  ^^'^  under- 
 each  Other:  For  imce  there  are  lome  things  which  foever  is 
 profit,  and    others   which   prejudice  one   another j  incommo- 
 lince   fome  things  agree,   and  others   difagreej    as  dious,  in- 
 we  call  the  former  Good,  fo  we  ftile  the  latter  E-  <^o"v^ni- 
 vil.     Whatever  therefore  is  incommodious  or  incon-  jj-ouble- 
 venient  to  itfelf,  or  any  thing   elfe ;    whatever  be-  fome. 
 comes  tronblejome,  or   fruftraces   any    Appetite    im- 
 planted by  God;  whatever    forces   any  Perfon  to 
 do  or  fufFer  what  he  would  nor,  that  is  Evil. 
 
 II.  Now  thefe    Inconveniences  appear  co   be   of  Evils  are]  ] 
 three    kinds,    ihofe    of  ImpcrfeSiion,    Natural    and  ?•  j'^^^ 
 Moral  ones.     By  the  Evil  of  Imperfetiion  I  under-  thofe'of 
 ftand  the  Abfence  of  thofe  Peifedions    or  advan-  ln>perfcc- 
 tages   which,    exift  elfewhere,  or  in  other   Beings :  tio",  Na- 
 
 ;Py  Natural  Evil,  Pains  and  Uneafineffes,  Incon-  *""^  f"^ , 
 
 ■^  •  J     f^  r         •  c    ^  ■  •     Moral.  ,.; 
 
 veniences   and    Diiappointmenc    or  Appetites,  arw  -^ 
 
 fing  from  nitural  Motions:  By  /floral,  vici- 
 ous Eledions,  that  is,  fuch  as  are  hurtful  to  our - 
 felves  or  others. 
 
104  Concerning  the  Nature    Chap.  II. 
 
 TheDiffi-  III.  Tliefe  Evils  muft  be  conHdei-'d  particularly, 
 culty  13  ^  ^^j-j^  ^jf.  ^^Q  ^.j-,  ^i,,.^y  j-^Q^y  tj-^gy  jn;,y  be  reconciled 
 now  tieie  ^j^j    J   ^  of  an  infinitely  powerful  and 
 
 come  inLO  ,         ,  .      ,  ^  , ,  t-        r  i 
 
 the  Work    bemticient  Author  ot  Nature.     For  lince  there  is 
 
 i,t  ota  God  l\Kh  a  ljeing,"^'ris  a  k'd,  as  we  faid  before,  whence 
 
 of  the  come  Evils?    Whence    fo   many    InLonvmences  in 
 
 hjghelt  ^i^g  Woik  of  a  mofl  z^od^  moft  powerful  God'^ 
 Goodners  ,  ,  i   i/>       l  l  j- 
 
 and  Power  Whence  that  perpetual  VVar  between  the  very  £- 
 lements^  between  Animdi^  between  Menf  Whence 
 JLrroYi,  Mijerks  and  F'lccsy  the  conftant  Compani- 
 ons of"  hum^in    Life   from   it^    Infancy?    Whence 
 Good   to  Evil  Men,  Evil  to    the  Good?    If  we 
 behold  any  thing  irregular  in  the  WoilvS  of  Men, 
 if  any  Machine  annver  not  the  End  it  was  made 
 for,  if  we  find  fomcthing   in   it   repugnant  to  it- 
 lelf  or  other-,  we  attribute  that  to  the  Ignorance, 
 Imfjorence,    or    Malice    of  the    Workman  :  >vBuc-/^  ^^ 
 ilnce  the'e  Qualities  have  no  place  in    God,    hov/ 
 come  they  to  have  place  in  any  thing?  Or,  Why 
 does    G|pd  fuffer    his  Works  to  be  deformed  by 
 them  ?  ' 
 5omc  that      IV.  This  Queflion  has  appeared  fo  intricate  and 
 were  uii-    difficult,  that  fome  finding  themfelves  unequal  to 
 f^}^'^  ^°  .     the  Solution  of  it,  have  deny'd,  either  that  there 
 
 Difficulty  ^^  "^"y  ^^^  ^^  ^^^'  °^  ^^  l^^j^i  any  Aui-hor  or  Go- 
 have  de-  vemor  of  the  World:  Thus  Epicurus,  and  his 
 iiyM  the  Adherents:  Nor  does  Lucretipts  bring  any  other 
 Exilknce  i^ojfon  for  his  denying  the  Sjflem  of  the  World  to 
 ^fhe  °  '  ^^  ^^^  ^ff^^  ^f  ^  Deity i  than  that  it  is  Jo  very  faul* 
 have  flip-  ij^*  Others  judg'd  it  to  be  more  agreeable  to 
 pofed  a  Reafon  to  affign  a  double  Caufe  of  things,  than 
 double  none  at  all.  Since  it  is  the  greatefl;  Abfurdity 
 '^"?'  in  Nature  to  admit  of  Actions  and  Effefts,  with- 
 
 out any  Agent  and  Caufe.  Tbtfe  then  perceiving 
 a  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil,  and  being  fully  per- 
 fuaded  that  fo  many   Confuiians  and  Inconlillen- 
 
 ciG§ 
 
 ?  p.  2.  ?,  l^,  A 
 
Chap.  II.     and  Dhijion  of  V.^\\,  105 
 
 ties  could  not  proceed  from  a  good  Bein^,  fupppf- 
 ed  a  tmlcvqlent  Principle,  or  God,  direc^-ly  contra- 
 ry to  the  good  one;  and  thence  derived  Corrup- 
 tion and  Death,  Dileafes,  Griefs,  Miferies,  Frauds 
 and  VUlanies ;  from  the  good  Being  nothing  biic 
 Good  :  Nor  did  they  imagine  that  Contrariety 
 and  Mifchief  could  have  any  other  Origin  than  a'n 
 Evil  Principle.  This  Opinion  was  held  by  many 
 of  the  Ancients,  by  the  Alanichems,  PaHlicians, 
 and    almoft    all    the    Tribe    of  ancient    Heretics. 
 
 (15.) 
 
 V. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (15.)  In  order  to  give  fome  Light  into  the  Opinions  of 
 thefe  Men  concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil,  I  fhall  tranfcrib'p 
 a  Paragraph  from  Ba\les  Diftionary,  in  the  Article  Manicheesy 
 Remark  D.  where  he  introduces  Zoroajler  defending  the  two 
 oppofite  Principles  above  mentioned,  *  Zoroajier,  fays  he,  would 
 
 *  go  back  to  the  time  of  the  Chaos,  which  with  regard  to  his 
 
 *  two  Principles,  is  a  State  very  like  that  which  Ho Mj  calls  the 
 '  State  of  Natur",  and  which  he  fuppofes  to  have  preceded  the 
 
 *  Ellablifhrnent  of  Societies.  In  this  State  of  Nature,  one 
 '  Man  was  a  Wolf  to  another,  and  every  thing  belonged  to 
 
 *  the    firfl:  occupier;  ngne  was  Mailer  of  any  thirig,  except 
 
 <  he  was  the  ilrongell.     To  get  out  of  this  Confufion,  every 
 
 *  one  agreed  to  quit  his  Right  to  the  whole,  that  he  might  be 
 
 <  acknow  ledg'd  the  Proprietof  of  fome  Part,  they  enter'd  into 
 
 *  agreements,  and  the  War  ceafcd.     Thus  the  two  Principles 
 
 *  weary  of  this  Chaos  wherein  each  con foimded  and  overthre\v 
 '  what  the  other  attempted  to  do,  came  at  laft  to  a(i  Agree- 
 
 *  mcnt;  each  of  them  yielded  fomething,  each  had  a  ftiare 
 '  in  the  Produciion  of  Man,  and  the   Laws  of  the  Union  of 
 
 <  the  Soul :  The  good  Principle  obtam'd  thofe  which  procure 
 
 *  to  a  \h,\\  a  thouland  Plcafures,  and  confcnted  to  thofc 
 '  which  expofe  him  to  a  thouland  Pains;  And  if  he  confented 
 
 *  that  Moral'Good  fhould  be  infinitely  lefs  in  Mankind  thai^ 
 '  Aioral  Evil,  he  repaired  the  Damage  in  fome  other  kind  of 
 *■  Creatures,  whereiji  "V'ice  flipuld  be  much  lefs  than  Virtue. 
 
 *  If  many  Men  in  this  Life  have  more  Mifcry  than  Happl- 
 '  nefs,  this  is  recompenced  in  another  State ;  what  they 
 '  have  not  under  a  human  Form,  they  find  un^^er   anotijer. 
 
 *  By  means*of  this  Agr^ement^  the  Chaos  becam<;  difembroil'd. 
 
NOTES, 
 
 1 06  Concerning  the   Nature     Chap.  IT. 
 
 There  are  V.    And    there    are  fome    ftill  who   think  this 
 
 fome  who  DifJiculry    unanfvverable.      Tbey   confefs,    indeed, 
 
 nbn  that'  ^^^    Suppofirion   of  2    double    Principle  to  be  ab- 
 
 jt  is  unan-  furd,    and  that  ir  may  be   deinonftrated  that  there 
 
 Averable,  is  but   one  Author    of  all   things,    ahfolutely  per- 
 
 aiid  that  fgf^    .^^^    good;    yet     there    is   evil     m    things, 
 
 *L^  ^^T^'  this  they  fet  and  feel:  But  whence,  or  how  it  comes, 
 
 fer'd  a  bet-  ^^^Y  ^""^  entirely  ignorant ;  nor  can  human   Reafon 
 
 {er  fokiti-  (if  we  believe  them)  in  any  meafure  difcover.  Hence 
 
 on,  by  they   take    Occafion  to  L-^ment    our   Unhappinefs, 
 
 fuppofing  2j^(^  complain  of  the  hard  Fate  attending  Truth,  as 
 
 itwo  ran-  *■  *j  ^r^^„ 
 
 ihau  the 
 
 Catholics 
 
 do  byown- 
 
 ing  only      *  the  Chaos,  I  fay,  a  paffive  Principle,  which  was  the  Field 
 
 Qn<z.  '  of  Battle  between  thefe  two  adlive  ones.     The  Poets  *  have 
 
 *  reprcfented  this  difentr.ngling  under  the  Image  of  a  Quarrel 
 
 *  ended.     You    fee   what  Xoroafter    might    objed',    valuing 
 
 *  himfelf  upon  it  that  he  does  not  throw  any  imputation  upon 
 '  the  good  Principle  of  having    with  full   purpofe  produced 
 
 *  a  Work,  which  was   to  be  fo  wicked  and  miferable ;  but 
 '  only,  after  he  had  found  by  Experience  that    he  could  do 
 
 *  no  better,  nor  more  efteftually  oppofe  the  horrible  Defigns 
 
 *  of  the  Evil  Principle.     To  render  his  Hypothefis  the    Icls 
 
 *  ofFenfive  he  might    have  deny'd  that  there  was  a  long  War 
 
 *  between     the     two    Principles,     and    lay    afide    all    thole 
 
 *  Fights  and  Prifoners  which  the  Manicheans  fpeak  of.      The 
 
 *  whole    might  be  reduced  to  the  certain  Knowledge  of  the 
 
 *  two  Principles  that  one  could   never  obtain  from  the  other 
 
 *  but  fiich  and  fuch  Conditions :  an  eternal  Agreement  might 
 
 *  have  been  made  upon  this  Foot. 
 
 For  a  farther  Explication  and  Amendment  of  their  Hypo- 
 rhefis,  and  Replies  to  fevcral  Arguments  urg'd  againit  it,  fee 
 the  Words  Manicheans,  Marchionites,  Patdicians,  Origen  and 
 %oroajler^  in  the  abovemention'd  Dictionary. 
 
 That  there  is  no  Occnfion  for  any  Hypothefis  of  this  kind, 
 will  be  fhewn  in  the  following  Chapters.  Let  it  fuffice  in  this 
 Place  to  point  out  fome  of  the  Abfurdities  of  the  Hypothefis 
 
 -^itfelf.fAnd  firft,  it  may  be  obferv'd,  that  the  Suppofition  of 
 
 an  ahfohte  and  infinitely  E'vil  Principle  (if  thefe  Words  mean 
 
 fuel; 
 
 *  Hanc  Desii  ^  Mdior  Litem  Natura  diretnit.  Ov.  Met. 
 
 I   I.   V.  21. 
 
Chap.  II.     and  Dhifion  o/*  Evil.  jo^ 
 
 often  as  a  Solution  of  this  Difficulty  is  attempted 
 unfuccefTfulIy.  The  ALinicheans  folve  the  Pheno- 
 mena of  tilings  a  hundred  times  berter  (as  ihefe 
 Men  think)  with  their  mofl  abfurd  Hypothefis  of 
 two  Principles,  than  the  Catholics  do  with  their 
 nioft  true  Dodrine  of  one  perfect,  abfolutely  pow- 
 erful and  beneficent  Author  of  Nature.  For  the 
 jyhnicheans  acquit  God  of  all  manner  of  Blame 
 as  he  was  compelled  by  the  contrary  Principle  to 
 fuffer  Sin  and  fvjifery  in  his  Work,  which  in  the 
 mean  while  he  oppoles  with  ail  his  Power.     But 
 
 ac- 
 
 NOT  E  S, 
 
 fuch  a  Being  as  is  totally  opponre  to  the  good  One)  is  an  ex- 
 prefs  Contradiclion.  For  as  this  Principle  oppofes  and  refills 
 tlie  infinitely  good  One,  it  alfo  muft  be  independent  and  in- 
 finite: It  mull  be  infinite  or  abfolute  in  Knowledge  and 
 Power.  Bat  the  notion  of  a  Being  infinitely  Evil,  is  of  one 
 infinitely  Impcrfeft  ;  its  Knowledge  and  Power  therefore  muft 
 be  infinitely  imperfect ;  /.  e.  abfolute  Ignorance  and  Impo- 
 tence, or  no  Knowledge  and  Power  at  all.  The  one  of  tlief^ 
 Beings  then  is  abfolutelv  perfect,  or  enjoys  all  manner  ofpofi- 
 tive  Perfections,  confequentiy  the  other,  as  it  is  diredlly  tlie 
 Reverfe,  mull  be  purely  the  Negation  of  it,  as  Darknefs  is  of 
 Light;  /.  e.  it  mull  be  an  hfinlte  DefeSl,  or  mere  nothing. 
 Thus  this  Evil  Being  muft  have  fome  KnouAedge  and  Pp%ve>\ 
 in  order  to  make  ahy  oppolition  at  all  to  the  Good  One  j  but 
 as  he  is  direddy  oppofite  to  that  Good  or  Perfedl  One,  he  can- 
 not have  the  leaft  Degree  of  Knonxiledge,  or  Po^juer,  lince  thefe 
 are  Perfedions:  therefore,  the  Suppofition  of  fuch  an  Exiil- 
 ence  as  this  implies  a  Contradidtion 
 
 But  fippofmg  thefe  Men  only  to  mean  (what  any  under- 
 {landing  Perfon  among  them  mull  mean)  by  this  Evil  Prin- 
 ciple, an  abfolutely  viale-vole-ni  Being  of  equal  Power,  and  o- 
 ther    natural  Perfedtions    with  thofe  of  the  Good  one.  ^V^*  It 
 
 *  would  be  to  no  purpofe  (lays  ABp.  '■lillotfon* ,)  to  fupppfe 
 '  two  fuch  oppofite  Principles  —  For  admit  that  a  Being  infi- 
 
 *  nitely  mifchievous,  v/ere  infinitely  cunning,  and  infinitely 
 '  powerful,  yet  it  could  do  no  Evil,  becaufe  the  oppofite  Prin- 
 %  ciple  of  iufiuite   Goodncfs  being    alfo  infinitely   wife  and 
 
 '   P0WGf« 
 
 f  ?.  Vol.  o£  Seim.  Fol.  p.  690. 
 
io8  Concerning  the  Nature     Chap.  TI. 
 
 according  to  rhe  Catholics,  as  their  Adverfanes  ob- 
 jedl,  he  permits  thee  volunt^-ily  nay  is  the  Caufe 
 snd  Author  of  them.  For  if,  as  thefe  Men  argue, 
 there  be  but  one  Author  of  all  thing*;,  Evils  alfo 
 ihould  be  rcferr'd  to  him  as  their  O  iginal;  but  it 
 can  neither  be  explain'd  nor  conceiv'd  how  infi- 
 nite Goodnefs  can  become  rhe  Origin  of  Evil. 
 If  God   could  not  hinder  it,  where  ii  his  Power? 
 
 If 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 «  powerful,  they  would  tie  up  one  another's  Hands :  So  that" 
 «  upon  this  Suppofition,  the  Notion  of  a  Deity   would  figni- 
 
 *  ty  jufl  nothing,  and  by  virtue  of  the  Eternal  Oppofiticn  and 
 
 *  Equality  of  thefe  Principles,  they  would  keep  one  another 
 <  at  a  perpetual  Bay,  and  being  an   equal  Match  for  one  ano- 
 
 *  ther,  inftcad  of  being  two  Deities,  they  would  be  two  Idols, 
 ^  able  to  do  neither  Good  nor  Evil. 
 
 I  ihall  only  produce  one  Argument  more  as  to  Moral  Evil, 
 out  oi Simplidus''s  Comment  on  BpiBetus,  which,  by  the  Con- 
 feffion  of  Bdyle  himfelf,  ftrikes  home  the  Dodlrine  of  Two 
 Principles,  though  it  be  confidercd  with  the  greatelt  Sim- 
 plicity. 
 /.--^  He  fays  *,  *  It  entirely  deflroys  the  Liberty  of  our  Souls  and 
 '  necejfttates  them  to  Sin,  and confequently  implies  ct  Contradiiiion. 
 
 *  For,  Ji  nee  the  Principle  of  Evil  is  eternal  and  incorruptible,  and 
 f  fo  potent  that  God  himfelf  cannot  conauer  hi?n,  it  fol'c^js  that 
 i  the  Soul  of  Man  cannot  rejiji  the  hnpulfe  iv.it  h  <i.vhich  he  moves, 
 '  it  to  Sin.  But  if  a  Man  be  invi7icibh  driven  So  it,  he  cotn- 
 ^  fnits  KO  Murder  or  Adultery,  Sec.  by  his  o^vn  Fault,  but  by  a 
 '  fuperior  external  Fault,  and  in  that  Cafe  he  is  neither  guilty 
 
 *  nor  punijhable ■  'Therefore  there  is  no  fnch  thing  as  Sin,  and  con- 
 '  fequently  this  Hypothefs  defrays  itfelf;  fince  if  there  be  a  Prin- 
 
 *  ciple  of  Evil,  there  is  no  longer  any  Evil  in  the  World.     But 
 
 *  if  there  be  no  Eiiil  in  the  World,  it  is  clear  there  is  no  Prin- 
 
 *  ciple  of  Evil ;  <vjhe7tce  ^ve  may  infer,  that  thofe  'voho  fuppofc 
 f  ftch  a  Principle,  defray,  by  neceffary  Confeque?ice,  both  Evil 
 '  and  the  Principle  of  it. 
 
 More  of  this  may  be  feen  in  Beyle's  Explanation  concern- 
 ing the  Manichees  at  the  End  of  his  Didtionary,  p.  66,  ^c. 
 See  alfo  Gurdoti's  Boyle's  LeSiures,  Serm.  5.  or  Siillingfieej''^ 
 '  '  Ori^, 
 
 f  P.  152.  ^d.  Lond.  1670,.     » 
 
Chap.  II.     a^id  Blvljmi  of  EviL  109 
 
 If  he  could,  and  would  not,  where  is  his  Goodnefs  ? 
 If  you  fay  that  Evil  neceifaiily  adheres  to  fome 
 particular  Natures ;  lince  God  was  the  Author  of 
 them  ail,  it  would  have  been  better  to  have  omit- 
 ted thofe  with  tlie  concomitant  Evils,  than  to 
 have  debafed  his  Workmanfhip  with  sn  allay  of  thefc 
 Evils,  (i^.) 
 
 VI 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 t)iig.  Sacra,  B.  3.  C.  3.  §.  10,  12.  or  Sherlock  on  Judgmenti 
 lit  Ed.  p,  173. 
 
 Neither  does  Bt^vlc's  amendinent  of  this  Hypothefis  free 
 it  from  the  Difficulty.  He  fuppofes  the  two  Principles  to  ' 
 bf  fenfible  of  the  above  mention'd  Confequcncc  arifing  frorri 
 their  Equality  of  Power,  aud  therefore  willing  to  cotu  pound 
 the  Matter,  by  allo^^ing  an  equal  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil 
 in  the  intended  Creation.  But  if  the  Quantity  of  Good  and 
 Evil  in  the  Creation  be  exaftly  equal,  neither  of  the  Princi- 
 ples has  attain'd  or  could  expeii  to  attain  the  End  for  which  it 
 was  fuppos'd  to  ad.  The  Good  Principle  defigti'd  to  pro- 
 duce fome  abfolute  Good,  the  Evil  One  fome  abfohitc  Evil ; 
 but  to  produce  an  equal  Mixture  of  both,  would  be  in  cffe<it 
 producing  neither:  Ono  would  iuft  counterballance  and  de- 
 ih-ay  the  other ;  and  all  fuch  Adtion  would  be  the  verv'  fame 
 a3  doing  nothing  at  all :  And  th:U  fuch  an  exaft  Equality  of 
 Good  and  Evil  muft  be  the  Refult  of  any  agreement  between 
 them  is  plain:  For  as  they  are  by  Suppofttion  perfectly  equal 
 m  Inclitmtion,  as  well  as  Poiver,  neither  of  them  could  pofiibly 
 concede,  and  let  its  oppoiitc  prevail:  The  Creation  tliereforc 
 cannct  be  owing  to  fuch  a  Compofiticn. 
 
 But  the  beft  Confutation  of  this  Scheme  may  be  found  ii; 
 the  Cliapter  before  us  ;  v/herc  ouj  Author  fliews  that  it  does 
 not  at  all  anfwer  the  end  for  which  it  was  introduced.  This 
 completes  the  abfurdity  of  it. 
 
 (16.)  Since  this  Objeftion  contains  all  that  can  be  faid  up- 
 on Evil  in  gcncrsl ;  and  it  appears  to  me  abfolutely  neceiHiry 
 for  every  Man  to  do  Juftice  to  Objedions,  who  expects  thaJ:' 
 others  fhould  receive  any  Satisfaftion  from  his  Anfwers,  I 
 jhall  infcrt  it,  as  it  is  proj.Qfed  in  its  fall  Force  by  Cndv^orth  *. 
 '  The  fuppofed  Deity  and  Maker  of  the  World,  was  either 
 f  willing  to  aboliili  all  Evils,  bat  not  able;  or  was  able  anct 
 
 *  willing; 
 
 *  ^Triic  Litcll.  Sjjl.  p.  r8,  79. 
 
no  Concerning  the  Nature     Chap.  It. 
 
 This  Dif-  Vr.  It  is  well  known,  that  this  Difficulty  has 
 ^^"^^y.^^^  exercifed  both  the  antient  Philofophers  and  Fathers 
 jhePl^ilof.  of  the  Church:  (17.)  And  there  are  fome  who 
 ophers  and  deny  that  it  is  yet  anfwcr'd;  nay,  who  undertake 
 Fathers  of  to  refute  all  the  Solurions  hitherto  oJBFer'd;  nor  Jo 
 
 theChurch  j  pj-Qp^ifg  ^  connpkte  one  in  every  RefpcvSl,  tho'  1 
 and  lome     ,    '  .,  .     '  1       r-  ,,       .         ^^  •'       ^  ',  .    ^_        .  _ 
 
 deny  that    "^P^  ^^  ^^^  "^  ^"^^  following  Part  ot  this  Trea:if2 
 it  is  an-      that  it  is  not  wholly  unanfweraile. 
 fweredyetjj^u^Vir.  It  is  manifeft    that  tho'  Good   be  mixed 
 ^,       .  ^ith  Evil  in  this   Life,  yet  there  is  much  more 
 
 There  is  •'  r^^^-l 
 
 vjOOu 
 more 
 
 (iood 
 
 than  Evil  NOTES. 
 
 m  the 
 
 World.        c  willing:  Or,  thirdly,  he  was  neither   willing  nor  abie :  Op 
 
 *  lallly,  he  was  both  able  and  willing.  This  latter  is  the  on- 
 '  ly  thing  that  anfwers  fully  to  the  Notion  of  a  God.  Now, 
 '  that  the  fuppofed  Creator  of  all  thing,"-,  was  not  thus  both  able 
 
 *  and  willing  to  abolifii  all  Evils,  is  plaiii,  becaufe  then  there 
 
 *  would  have  been  no  Evils  at  all  iefc.  Wherefore,  fiuce  there 
 
 *  is  fuch  a   Deluge  of  Evils  overflowing  all,  it  muft  needs 
 
 *  be   that   either  he    was  willing   and    not  ab|2   to  remove 
 
 *  them,    and   then  he   was  imi^/itent ;    or    elfe  he   was  able 
 
 *  and  not  willing,  and  then  he  was  en-jious ;    or  laftly,  he 
 
 *  was  neither  able  nor  willing,  and  then  he  was  botli  impotent 
 
 *  and  eti'uious. ' 
 
 Almo!l  the  fame  occurs  in  Lacia:it'iui  *'',  and  is  cited,  and 
 fulhciently  refuted  by  our  Author  in  C.  f.  §.  5.  Snhfcd.  the 
 laft :  See  alfo   Pi-udentii>$  in  E a:na>-t'igcnla,  v.  640   he 
 
 The  Subilance  of  all  Bayie's  Objcdions  may  be  feen  in  a  late 
 Boo!;  Cc'jrd  Yree  Thoughts  on  Rdrgion,  'iS'c.  C.  5.  p.  104,  i^c. 
 The  Anfwers  to  them  follow  in  their  proper  Places. 
 
 (17.)  Any  one  that  wants  to  be  ucq^uainted  vvlth  the  An- 
 tiquity of  this  I>irpute,  or  the  Perfons  engaged  in  it,  or  thc 
 way  of  managing  it  made  ufe  of  by  the  Fathers,  may  conf'ilt 
 the  Beginning  of  Dr.  C/arh's  Enquiry  iiuo  the  Caufe  and  O- 
 figin  of  Evil;  and  Unfle'i  Dictionary,  in  the  Auicles  Ma- 
 nicheans.  Remark  B.  Manionhes,  Remark  F.  3nJ  F  A.  rauiid- 
 ans.  Remarks  isT,  and  K  A.  and  Zoroafur,  Remark  E.  Or 
 Ctidvjorih,  from  p.  213,  to  224.  or  Stillingf.-ei^  On'ghn's  Sa- 
 a-A,  B.  3.  C.  3.  §.  S,  9.  IT,  12,  life.  o\- Fabric.  Blblloth . 
 GrAc.  V.   5.  p.  7.37.  or  his  Delectus  Jrgunientofiim,  i^Cf  C\ 
 
 De  Ira  Dei,    G.   13.   p.  435.  Edit,  Cunt. 
 
tto 
 
 Chap.  li.     nnd  Divijion  of  Evil.  1 1 1 
 
 Good  than  Evil  in  Natiire,^and  every  Animal  pro- -A -^^ 
 vides  For  its  Prelervation  by  In(lin6t  or  Reafon, 
 which  it  would  nevtr  do,  if  it  did  not  think  or 
 feel  its  Life,  with  all  the  Evils  annex'd,  to  be  much 
 preferable  to  Non-exiflence.  This  is  a  Pi  oof  of 
 the  Witdom,  Goodnefs,  and  Power  of  God,  who 
 could  thu>  temper  a  World  infefted  with  fo  many 
 Miferies,  that  nothing  fliould  continue  in  it  which 
 was  not  in  fome  Meafure  pleafed  with  its  Exiftcnce 
 and  v/hich  would  not  endeavour  by  all  poinble 
 Means  to  preferve  it '^. 
 
 VIII.  Neither  does  the  Siippofition  of  an  Evil  'TI?  no 
 Principle  help  any   thing  towards  the  Solution  of  ^efs  re 
 this    Difficulty.     For  the    AfTerters  of  two  Prin-  T*?^^'^" 
 ciples   maintain    that    the    great    and   good    God  Gcgjj^efs 
 tolerates    Evil   purely   becaufe   he    is  forced   to  it  to  have 
 by    the    Evil    One,    ai  d    that  eiiher  from  an  A-  created 
 greement  between  themfelves,  oraperpetupl  Strug-  ^^^'^ 
 gle  and  Contcft  with   each    other.     For    fince  the  ^yji'-ffj}, 
 beneficent  Auilior  of  Nature  was  hinder'd  by  the  iawwou'd 
 Evil  Principle    from  producing    all    the   Good  he  be  coi- 
 was  willing  to  produce,  he  either  made  an  Agree-  ''"P'^ed  by 
 raent  wirh  it  to   produce  as  much    as  he  was  al-  ^j|^,^'^r'', 
 iow'd,  but  with  a  Mixture  of  Evil,  according  to  as  would 
 the    Agreement :    or    elfe    there   is    a    Mixture   of  corrupt 
 Good    and    Evil   proportionable     to     the    Power  t-'^em- 
 v/hich    prevails  in    either  of  them.     Hence    they  fr^l^'U 
 think  the  good  God   excufaSle,  v/ho  conferred   as  pofincn^of 
 many  Bleihngs  on  the    World   as    his   Adverfary  a  double 
 permitted,   and    would  have    tolerated  no    manner  Principle 
 of  Evil,     iinlefs    compeli'd   to   it    by    ihe  sdverfe  ^^  ^^^^^'r 
 Power.     So  that    he  mufl  eitlier  create   no  Good  ^^^^,-^^^  ''^ 
 at  all,  or  f.iffer  an  Allay  of  Evil.  toward  the 
 
 All  which  very  great  Abflirdiiies  hsve  this  far-  Solution 
 ther  Inconvenience,    that  they  do  not  anfv/er  the  of  this 
 very  End  for  v/hich  they  v/.re  invented.  For  he  is  Difficulty, 
 
 *  3^  Note  Z. 
 
 no 
 
II z  Concerning  the  Nature     Chap.  II. 
 
 tio  lefs  culpable  who  created  any  thing  whiai  he 
 knew  would  be  rciider'd  mifciabie  by  another,  than 
 if  he  had  made  that  which  he  fore  aw  would 
 bring  Mifery  upon  itself,  If  therefore  God  might, 
 confidently  with  Goodneis,  create  Things  which  he 
 knew  the  Evil  Principle  could  and  would  corrupt, 
 as  the  AJatJtcheaKs  aflerted;  then  he  might,  con- 
 fidently with  the  fame  Goodnef,  have  created 
 Things  that  would  corrupt  themfelves,  or  were  to 
 perilli  in  a  Trad  of  Time.  If  then,  according 
 to  the  Defenders  of  this  Hypotlieii'^,  God  ought 
 to  have  omitted,  or  not  created  thoCe  Beings,  in 
 whole  Natures  Evil  or  Contrariety  is  inherent,  he 
 ought  alfo  to  have  omitted  tho'e,  whole  Natures 
 he  forefaw  the  Evil  Principle  would  corrupt.  And 
 if  there  was  fo  much  Good  in  rhefe,  as  made  him 
 think  it  better  to  create  them,  tho'  they  were  to  be 
 corrupted  fome  time  or  other  by  the  oppolite  Prin- 
 ciple, he  might  aUo  judge  it  prefeiahle  to  produce 
 the  fjme,  tho*  they  were  at  length  to  perifh  by 
 their  own  inherent  Evils.  Nor  v^'ill  God  be  forced  to 
 tolerate  Evil  in  his  Works  more  according  to  the 
 Manicheam,  than  the  Catholics.  For  as  lie  mighc 
 have  not  made  thofe  Beings  which  have  Evils 
 neceifarily  adhering  to  them,  fo  he  might  alfo 
 have  not  made  thofe  v/hich  he  foreknew  the 
 contrary  Principle  would  corrupr.  Aftsr  the  <amc  J 
 manner  in  both  Cafes  he  would  have  prevented  E-  ' 
 vil,  and  fince  he  could,  why  did  he  not?  The 
 Suppofition  of  two  Principles  conduces  nothing 
 J  at  all  therefore  to  the  Sokuion  of  this  Difficulty. 
 
 (B.) 
 
 IX. 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 (B.)  To  this  it  l\as  been  obieftc^^,  Firft,  tint  tlie  Kecr-- 
 iiiination  is  not  jull,  bccaule  there  is  a  great  Dii^'crcnce  be- 
 tween a  C.uiic  thr.t  doth  not  prevent  an  Evil  which  he  conld 
 riot  prevent,  ai;d  "another  that  fuilcrs  -Jr.e  which  he  could  hnvc 
 
 ore- 
 
riiap.  ir.     and  Divifwn  of  Evil.  j  i  o 
 
 (y^IX.  But  if  we  can  point  out  a   Method   of  re-  If  it  can 
 conciling   thefe  Things   with  the   Government  of  ^^  ftewn 
 an  abfolurely  perfed:    Agent,  and    niake  them   not  ^^''"^^tdoea 
 only  confiftent  with  infinite    Wifdom,  Goodnefs  "radift'i" 
 
 and  finite 
 ■     '  •  Power  and 
 
 NOTES.  Goodnefs 
 
 to  permit 
 
 prevented ;  that  it  is  agreed  amongft  alJ  orthodox  Chriftians  jj^^f  \\\tCe 
 that  God  could  have  prevented  the  Fall  0*1  Adam,  and  there-  nccelf    'I 
 fore  the  Blame  of  it  lies  on  him  ;  Whereas  according  to  the  -j-jCg  c     ^ 
 Syflem  of  two  Principles  he  could  not  hinder  it,  and  there-  f],„  „ 
 fore  is  excufed  this  way,  but  not  the  other.  -r     ,. 
 
 •  Put  lannver,  it  is  plain  that  the  Objeilor  does  not  under-  j.u„      ^l 
 fland  the  Force  of  the  Argument.  For  according  to  it^   God  „      '1 
 could  have  prevented  this  Evil.     He  fore  fa  w  the  ill  Principle  rj-o-     t^. 
 would  corrupt  Mankind,  and   he  was  under  no  NecefTity  to  u   '    r 
 make  fuch  a  Creature  as  Man,  and  thereby  to  gratify  his  Ene-     j 
 my,  who,  he  faw,  would  make    him    miferable.     He  could 
 therefore  have  prevented  this   Evil  by  not  creating  Man,  and 
 is  full  as  blameable  for  making  him  that  he  forcfaw  the  ill  Prin- 
 ciple would  involve  in  Sin  and  Mifery,  as  if  thofe  had  befallen 
 Man  by  his  own  ill  ufe  of  his  Free  vjill.  , 
 
 But  2dly.  Who  are  thofe  Orthodox  that  agree  God  could 
 have  prevented  the  Fall  of  Man  ?  Thofe  that  I  am  acquainted 
 with  reprefent  the  Matter  otherwife.  They  fiy  that  confi- 
 dering  the  Nature  of  Man  and  the  Station  he  held  in  the 
 World,  and  the  Inconveniencies  that  mull:  have  happen'd  to 
 the  whole  Syftem  of  free  Beings,  by  hindering  Adam  from  the;- 
 Ufe  of  his  free  Will,  his  fall  could  not  have  been  prevented 
 without  more  hurt  than  good  to  the  whole  Creation.  There 
 was  no  Neceihty  on  him  to  .fin,  but  there  was  a  Neceffity  on 
 G'bd  to  permit  him  the  Ufe  of  his  free  Will  ;n  that  Cafe,  and 
 the  Confequence  of  that  being  his  Sin,  God  Vv'as  under  a  Ne- 
 ceffity notwithftandinghisinhnite  Power,  Wifdom,  and  Good- 
 nefs to  permit  his  Fall.  He  could  have  prevented  it  'tis  true.' 
 by  taking  away  Free  Will  from  Man,    that  is   by   not  ma-  « 
 
 king  fuch  a  Creature  as  Man,  according  to  the  Catholics ;  and, 
 he  could  have  prevented  it  the  fame  way  according  to  the. 
 Man'ichees ;  for  according  to  them  he  was  under  no  NecefTity  to 
 make  fuch  a  Creature;  and  'tis  as  hard  for  one  to  give  an  Ac-, 
 count  why  he  did  make  him  when  he  know  he  would  fall,  a3 
 for  the  other;  fo  far  as  1  fee,  the  Difficulty  is  equal  on  both. 
 Siippofuionsj  and  both  mvift  hav.e  recourfs  to  the  {xm^  Ar.fvver  j 
 
ii4  Concerning  the  Nature    Chap.  II. 
 
 and  Power,  but  neceflaiily  refulting  from  them 
 (fo  that  thefe  would  not  be  Infinite,  if  thofe  did 
 not  or  could  not  pofiTibly  cxift)  then  we  may  be 
 fuppofed  to  have  at  laft  difcover'd  the  true  Ori- 
 gin of  Evils,  and  anfwer'd  all  the  Difficulties  and 
 Objedions  rhat  are  brought  upon  this  Head,  a- 
 gainfl  rhe  Goodnefs,  Wifdom,  Power,  and  Unity 
 ^ijpj-of  God.  -^Let  us  try    therefore  what  can  be  done 
 
 in 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 fvia.  that  the  Wifdom  of  God  judg'd  it  better  to  have  Maa 
 with  his  Sin,  than  the  World  ihould  want  fuch  a  Crea- 
 ture. 
 
 But  3dly.  'Tis  objc£led  tliat  the  Manichees  have  in  reality 
 three  Principles,  two  a£live,  a  good  and  a  bad  one,  and  a 
 third  paffive  or  indifferent,  that  is  Matter*:  Tho'  they 
 voiichfafed  the  Name  of  Principles  only  to  the  a£live. 
 That  this  indiiierent  Principle  was  the  Prey  of  the  iirfl 
 Occupier,  and  the  Evil  one  feized  it  as  foon  as  the  Good, 
 and  would  not  fufFer  him  to  make  good  out  of  it,  with- 
 out a  mixture  of  Evil. 
 
 But  this  is  nothing  to  the  Purpofe ;  for  it  fuppofes  a 
 demonilrablc  Falfliood,  that  Matter  is  felf-exiltent,  whereas 
 there  is  nothing  plainer  than  that  Matter  has  a  Caufef ;  and 
 to  build  Hypothcles  on  manifeft  Falihoods  is  unworthy  a 
 Philofopher. 
 
 adly.  Even  in  this  way  the  good  Principle  might  have 
 prevented  Evil ;  for  he  might  have  let  the  evil  Principle 
 alone  with  his  Matter,  and  then  he  could  never  have 
 made  any  thing  of  it ;  for  his  Produ61ions  muft  all  havo 
 been  abfolutely  evil,  and  whatever  is  {o  mcit  immediately 
 deftroy  iffelf,  or  rather  in  truth  nothing  could  have  been  pro- 
 duced by  fuch  a  Being. 
 
 All  his  works  muft  have  contained  in  them  all  imaginable 
 Evil  and  Repugnancy;  all  the  Parts  of  them  mull  have  been 
 incongruous  aud  inconfiflent,  and  confequcntly  have  deftroy'd 
 themfelves  and  one  another.  Nay,  fuch  a  Being  could  have 
 properly  no  Po^erzt  all  ;  for  if  he  produced  any  thing  which 
 was  confillent,  it  wou'd  be  fo  far  good,  and  fo  good  wou'd 
 
 procee<i 
 
 •  This  Sayle  calls  Chans.  See  N.   15. 
 f  See  Remark  d. 
 
Chap.  II.     cind  Dlvlfmi  of  Evil, 
 
 each  Kind  of  Evil  i  and  firft,  concerning  the  Evil 
 of  lmprfeUion» 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 proceed  from  a  Principle  abfolutely  Evil,  which  Is  no  lefs  a 
 Contradidion  than  that  Evil  fliould  be  produc'd  by  one  abfo- 
 lutely Good :  Which  if  it  be  allowed,  there's  no  farther  Occa- 
 fion  to  enquire  after  the  Origin  of  Evil  at  all.  For  chat  may 
 proceed  from  an  infinitely  good  Being,  as  well  as  good  caa 
 from  one  infinitely  evil.  From  hence  it  is  evident  that  the 
 bringing  in  of  two  Principles  does  not  in  the  leaft  account  for 
 the  Origin  of  Evil. 
 
 IIS 
 
 I   2 
 
 CHAP. 
 
ii6  Chap.  III. 
 
 CHAP,     III. 
 
 Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB. 
 
 Things  A  ^  ^'^^  the  ^vi\  of  ImperfeBio^,  it  is  to  be  con- 
 can  be  no  JL^  fider'd,  that  before  the  World  was  created 
 otherwife  Qq(\  exifted  alone,  and  nothing  belide  him.  All 
 God  ^^1  livings  therefore  are  out  of  nothing,  and  \thatfoever 
 fed.  exiils,    has  its  Exiftence   from   God;    neither  can 
 
 that  Exiftence  be  different  either  in  Kind  or  Degree 
 
 from  what  he  gave  *. 
 All  crca-  II*  Secondly,  God,  tho'  he  be  omnipotent,  can- 
 ted th  ngs  not  make  any  created  Being  abfolmely  perfe^,  for 
 are  necel-  whatever  is  abfolutely  perfed,  muft  necellarily  be 
 farily^im-  ^^^^  exiftent.  But  it  is  included  in  the  very  No- 
 fince  they  ^'^"  ^^  ^  Creature,  ;:s  fuch,  not  to  exift  of  itfelf, 
 do  not  but  from  God.  An  abfolutely  perfed:  Creature 
 exill  of      therefore  implies  a  Contradiftion.     For  it  would  be 
 
 them-  q[  itfelf  and  not  of  itielf  at  the  fame  time  Ci8.) 
 fclvcs.  ^^^ 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 C\^-^' {i^.yt'A perfeJl  Creature  \s  a  Contradiftion  in  terms.  Foi' 
 if  it  hzperfeSi  it  is  independent ',  and  if  it  be  independent,  it  is 
 no  Creature.  Again  ;  to  fuppofe  a  created  Being  infinite  in  any 
 refpcft  is  to  fuppofe  it  equal  to  its  Creator  in  that  refpe£t  j 
 and  if  it  be  equal  in  one  refpeft,  it  miift  be  fo  in  all ;  fince 
 an  infinite  Property  cannot  inhere  in  any  finite  Subject,  for 
 then  the  Attribute  would  be  more  perfedl  than  its  Subjed,  all 
 uhich  is  abfurd.  Granting  therefore  this  one  Principle, 
 which  cannot  be  dciiy'd,  (-^va.  that  an  Effed  mull  be  inferior 
 
 to 
 
 *  Sec  Si.Qtt  in  Note  33. 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  DcfeB.  iiy 
 
 Abfoluce  Perfection  is  therefore  peculiar  to  God,  and 
 if  he  fhould  communicate  his  own  peculiar  Perfec- 
 tion to  another,    (C.)  that  other  would  be  God. 
 
 I  3  The 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 to  its  Caufe)  it  wIH  appear  that  the  Evil  orimperfedlion,  fup- 
 pofing  a  Creation,  is  neceflary  and  unavoidable ;  and  conle- 
 quently,  all  other  Evils  which  necefl:\rily  arife  from  that,  are 
 unavoidable  alfo.     What  our  Author  has  advanced  upon  the 
 
 n following  Head  feems  perfcftly  conclufivc. 
 
 \^{C)   This  Pofition  feems  very  agreeable    to  the  Catholic 
 Faith,  which  teaches  that  the  Father  did  communicate  his  Na- 
 ture and  all  his  Perfeftions  to  the  Son,  and  with  him  to  the 
 Holy   Ghojl:    Each   of  them  therefore  is  very   God  under  a 
 different  5«/^f«f^.  ^The   Divine  Nature  which  is  inherent -f  — -^ 
 in  them  may  be  conceived  to  be  of  itfclf,  but  the  Modus  of 
 Exiltence  cannot.  "^  Now  the  Church  looks  upon  the  Nature^- 
 thus  fubfifting  ?.s  a  Perfon.  ^-Not  that  it  is  a  Perfon  in  the  fame+ 
 manner  as  the  human  Nature  fublifting  by  itfelf,i-but  by  Rea-^ 
 fon  of  a  ce_rtaia_SimiHtude  and  Analogy  which  they  have  be- 
 
 -^ween  them.-^Since  Divine  Matters  are  not  Objefts  of  the 
 Senfes,  they  cannot  be  known  by  Marks  imprefs'd  upon  us  by 
 Senfition  ;  they  are  therefore  conceived  by  Similitude,  Re- 
 lation, Proportion,  or  Connection  with  fenfible  things  :4The  4 
 Paifions,  Affections,  Intelleft,    and  Will,    are   the  Principles 
 of  our  Adlions,  and  therefore  we  attribute  thcfc  to  God.4-For-f 
 if  we  were  to  do  thofe  things  which  God  performs,  thefe 
 would  be  the  Principles  and  Caufes  of  them  :  We  attribute 
 therefore  to  God  fomething  analogous  or  equivalent  to  thefe, 
 but  we  know  that  it  is  as  diflant  as  finite  is  from  infinite. 
 C3*>Nay,  'tis  demonftrable  that  neither  Will,  nor   Love,  nor  An- 
 ger, nor  Juftice,  nor  Mercy,  are  in  God  after  the  fame  man- 
 ner,   as   they  exift  in  and  are  conceived  by  us  *.  -^But  we  -/-  <:.^v 
 muft  make  ufe  of  thefe  Words  becaufe  we  have  no  better,  and 
 they  fufficiently  anfwer  the  End  for  which  God  would  have 
 us  to  know  him  f-Now  after  the  fame  manner  we  point  out  +-  ..=^     «*=5rr 
 the  Diftindtion  declared  in  Scripture  between  the  Father,  Son.,  *v\,,^ 
 
 and  Holy  Ghojl,  by  the  Word  Perfon,  becaule  we  have  nothing 
 nearer  to  compare  them  by  ;>sjnd  the  Reprcfeatatiou  under  this  +• 
 Analogy '^z\s!^  us  very  well  what  we  may  hope  for  from  each 
 
 of 
 
 *  See  Wollajlon,  p.  115,  116.  and  ^/>/;,/:'./'/«j  Inft.  Thcol. 
 \i.  4.  C.  22.  p.  310.  or'c.ur  Author'^  Scrniqn  on  Prcdufti, 
 jiation,  &c. 
 
1 18  Of  the  Evil  of  Befe5i,    Chap.  III. 
 
 The  Evil  of  Im^erfdiion  muft  therefore  be  tole- 
 rated in  Creatures,  notwithftanding  the  Divine 
 Omnipotence  and  Goodnefs  :<f-For  Concradi61:ions + 
 are  Objeds  of  no  Power.  +  God  might  indeed  have -1- 
 refrain'u  from  creating,  and  cont  nii'd  alone,  felf- 
 fufficient,  and  perfed:  to  all  f.ternity,  but  his  in- 
 finite Goodnefs  would  hy  no  Means  allow  it;  this 
 ■  pblig'd   him  to    produce   external   things;    which 
 
 thines 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 of  them,  and  what  Worfhip  we  ought  to  pay  them.  Tho'  at 
 the  fame  time  \vc  are  certain  that  thefe  differ  no  lefs  from 
 human  Perfons,  than  the  Divine  Intelledl  does  from  human, 
 or  the  Principles  of  Divine  Adions  from  human  Paffions ;  for 
 inftance.  Anger,  Hatred,  and  the  like.  VTis  flrange  therefore  ■/- 
 that  Men  who  would  be  elleem'd  learned,  fliould  difpute  a- 
 gainft  a  Plurality  of  Perfons  in  the  Deity  alter  the  very  fame 
 Way  of  Reafoning  with  which  Cotia  in  Cicero  argues  againfl: 
 the  Intelligence,  Prudence,  and  Juflice  of  God*,  namely, 
 becaufe  they  cannot  be  in  God  after  the  fame  manner  as  we 
 conceive  them  to  be  in  Men  ;"^forgetting,  in  the  mean  time, 4- 
 that  thefe  are  attributed  to  God  by  a  kind  o^  Jualogy  and  Ac- 
 commodation to  our  Capacity,  and  rather  from  the  Rcfem- 
 blance  of  things  done  by  God,  to  thofe  done  by  us,  than  of 
 iheT'rinciples  from  which  they  proceed,  -^at  the  Scriptures  f 
 and  the  Church  have  fufficiently  forewarn'd  us  to  beware  of 
 this  erroneous  Way  of  Reafoning.  For  when  God  is  defcribed 
 under  thefe  Figures,  Similitudes,  and  Analogies,  left  we  fhould 
 take  Images  of  things  for  the  things  themfelves,  and  fo  fall 
 into  abfurd  Reafonings  about  them,  the  fame  things  are  de- 
 Tiy'd  of  God  in  one  Senfe,  that  are  affirmed  of  him  in  another. 
 Thus  God  is  often  faid  to  repent;  and  in  another  Place  'tis 
 deny'd  that  \\z  repents  as  a  Man.  »?Thus  Light  is  afcribed  to-f 
 God,  as  his  Habitation ;  and  elfewhere,  thick  Darknefs. 
 He  is  often  faid  to  be  fcen,  and  vet  is  called  invifible.  The 
 Father  is  God  and  Lord,  and  alfo  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghoft  ; 
 and  yet  it  is  faid  there  is  but  one  God  and  Lord.  v^All  whicJif^T^C^ 
 and  more  of  the  fame  kind,  we  muft  believe  to  be  thus  exprci- 
 (ed  for  no  other  Reafou  but  \o  hinder  us  f.'-om  imagining  them 
 I  .  .   .        ......  ^    ■       ■'..■'■  "       to 
 
 *  ^lalcji  autrm  Deum,  i^c.  Cic  ck  Kat.  Dcor,  §.15.  Ed. 
 Lond.  --  See  ouy..  Author  s  Serm.  ^.  37, 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  BefeSi.  1 1 9 
 
 things*  fince  they  could  not  poifibly  be  perfecl:, 
 the  Divine  Goodnefs  preferr'd  imperfed  ones  to 
 none  at  all.  i^Imperfedion  then  aroie  from  the  In--f- 
 finity  of  Divine  Goodnefs.  Had  not  God  been 
 infinitely  Good,  perhaps  he  might  not  have  per- 
 mitted imperfedl  Beings;  but  have  been  content 
 in  himfelf,  and  created  nothing  at  all. 
 
 I  4  III. 
 
 jsr  O  T  R  s. 
 
 t 
 
 to  be  afcribed  to  God  in  the  fdme  manner  as  they  are  in  us  *, 
 but  Smatterers  in  Learning  rejeil  and  ridicule  thefe  Forms  of 
 Speech  as  ^Enigmas,  being  ignorant  of  both  the  Sacred  and 
 Ecclcfiaftical  Dialed,  which  they  refufc  to  learn,"^tho'  we  muil+ 
 make  ufe  of  it  in  Divine  Matters,  or  elfe  entirely  refrain  from 
 all  reafoning  about  them.  f-For  fmcc  they  are  known  no  other- J- 
 wife  than  by  Similitude  and  Analogy,  they  cannot  be  defcribed 
 otherwife,  as  any  one  will  find  who  tries,  "f  But  it  is  no  won--f 
 der  if  thefe  Men,  while  they  take  fimilies  for  the  things  them* 
 felves,  fhould  eafily  imagine  that  they  difcover  abfurdities  in 
 ■them.  If  they  do  this  on  purpofe,    cunningly,  and  with  an  ill 
 Intent,  they  are  Villains  i  but  if  thro'   Ignorance  or  Error, 
 they  deferve  pity,  if  they  did  not  fwell  with  a  proud  Conceit 
 of  Science,  and  exalt  themfelves  above  the  Vulgar  ;  who  yet 
 are  much  wifer  than  thefe  Philofophers.  >  For  they  fear  the-f- 
 Anger  of  God,  love  his  Goodnefs,  embrace  his  Mercy,  adore 
 his  Juftice,  and  give  Glory  to  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
 Ghoft,  and  yet  believe  in  and   woriliip  one  God,  moft  per- 
 fe£l,  and  free  from  PafTions.    Whereas  the  Smatterers  in  Sci- 
 ence have  got  nothing  to  place  in  the  Room  of  thefe,  which 
 they   themfelves,  much  lefs  the  Vulgar,  can  underftand  ;>  or -h 
 which  can  equally  excite  the  Affeftions  of  the  Mind,  or  pro- 
 mote Piety.  (D.) 
 
 (D.)  It  has  been  objefted  againft  the  foregoing  Paragraph 
 and  Note,  that  the  Author  by  his  Principles  necelfarily  intro- 
 duces Imperfection  into  the  Godhead.  For  he  owns  what- 
 ever is  not  of  itfelf  is  imperfeft,  but  the  Subiiftences  of  the 
 Son  and  Holy  Ghoft,  that  is  their  Perfonalities,  as  he  confefTes, 
 :jre  not  from  themfelves,  and  therefore  muil:  be  imperfedt~f-To  *- 
 
 this 
 
 *  This  is  a  good  Inference  from  thefe  and  the  like  Expreffions, 
 hut  can  hardly  be  fuppofed  to  have  been  the  principal  Deftgn,  much 
 lefs  the  only  Reafon,  of  them.  For  more  hifanccs  of  this  Kindt 
 Jee  the  foremention  dZermo7i,  §.  23,  37<. 
 
120  Of  the  Evil  ef  DefeSt,     Chap.  III. 
 
 'Tistobe      HI.  Thirdly,  There  are  infinite  Degrees  of  Per- 
 
 ^^^^''"^"^'   fe^lion   between  a  Being  ahfoltnely  perfe^  and  JVo- 
 
 Divme  ^   '^'«^'  Of  which,  if  Exift  nee  be  conceived  as  the 
 
 Plcafure      Firlt,  every  thing  will  be  fo  many  Degrees  diflan^ 
 
 what  De    from  Nothing,  as  there  are  PerfefHom  to  be  found 
 
 p'^^r^A^^  in  it  joyn'd  with  Exiilence.  In  this  Scale  then 
 Pcrfeaion  ^^j  ^jjj    ^^  ^^^   ^^^^  ^^^    Nothing  the  Bottom ; 
 
 thinw  mufl:  ^nci  how  much  farther  any  thing  is  dillant  from 
 have,  fincc  nothing,  it  is  fo  much  the  more  perfed,  and  ap- 
 all  things  proaches  nearer  to  God.  How  much  any  thing 
 are  nece  -  refcmblc  God   in  Perfedion,    or  how   nearly 
 
 fanly  atari  ■•  •     ,  ,  I 
 
 infinite  approacf^ 
 
 dirtance 
 
 from  the  NOTES, 
 
 higheft 
 
 J  erfeftion.  j^js  j  anfwer,  that  we  may  confider  the  Attributes  of  God, 
 and  likevvife  the  Perfonalitics  in  the  Divine  Nature,  either  ab- 
 llradly,  i  e.  as  didinguifli'd  in  our  Minds  from  the  Nature; 
 or  as  they  are  identified  with  it.  If  we  confider  them  abftraftly 
 it  is  true  they  are  not  from  themfelves,  but  from  the  Nature  : 
 So  the  Wifjom  and  Poiver  of  God  are  not  from  themfelves  but 
 from  the  Divine  Nature  which  neceffarily  includes  Wifdom 
 and  Power:  And  fo  the  Ferfonality  of  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghoft 
 are  not  from  themfelves,  but  from  the  Divine  Nature  which 
 necelTiirily  includes  the  Father's  begetting  his  Son,  and  the  Ho- 
 ly Ghoft's  proceeding  from  both.  But  if  we  confider  thefe  as 
 in  re  the  fame  with  the  Natufe,  then  they  are  from  themfelves; 
 the  fame  Nature  is  in  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Gholt,  and 
 the  three  Ferfonalitiesnecefrarily  arife  out  of  that  Nature,  and 
 therefore  may  be  faid  to  be  neceffary  and  from  themfelves.  I 
 do  confefs  the  Perfonality  of  the  Son  is  from  the  Father  and 
 that  of  the  Holy  Ghoft  from  the  Father  and  Son  ;  hut  thisis 
 ftill  by  the  NccciTily  arifmg  from  the  Nature.  The  Father  be- 
 gets the  Son,  not  out  of  Choice,  but  Necelfity  of  Nature ; 
 and  that  Nature  is  in  the  Son,  and  therefore  his  Subfift:ence 
 and  Perfonality  is  from  his  own  Nature,  that  is  from  Jiimfclf, 
 and  he  is  «i;T«3fo5.  The  Perfonality  of  the  Son  is  indeed 
 from  the  Father,  but  that  doth  not  hinder  it  to  be  from  the 
 Nature  in  the  laft  refort;  and  neceFarilv  too,  tho'  medinnte 
 Verfona  Patris.  When  therefore  it  is  laid  that  the  Divine  Na- 
 ture which  15  inherent  in  them  may  be  faid  to  be  of  itfelf,  but 
 not  x\\z  Modus  fab ftf.endi,  it  it  not  meant  that  the  Modus  fuh ft p^ 
 fW/doth  not  proceed  from  the  N.uure  which  is  in  the  Son 
 
Chap.  III.      Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB,  121 
 
 approach  to  him  (E. )  we  know  not;  but  we 
 are  certain  that  there  is  always  an  infinite  Diftancc 
 between  them.  It  muft  have  beendetermin'd  there- 
 fore by  the  Will  of  God,  where  he  would  flop,  fince 
 there  is  nothing  but  his  own  Will  to  bound  his 
 Power.  ^Now  it  is  to  be  believ'd  that  the  pre- -^ -^pv. 
 fent  Syftem  of  the  World  was  the  very  beft  that 
 could  be,  with  regard  to  the  Mind  of  God  in  fram- 
 ing it.  (19.)  It  might  have  been  better  perhaps 
 in  fome  Particulars,   but  not  without  fome  new, 
 
 and 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 and  Holy  Ghoft,  and  fo  is  in  that  Senfe  ex/e,  but  that  it  is 
 not  immediately  from  it,  but  mediante  Pafris  Subjijientia. 
 
 (E.)  Suppofmg  the  World  to  be  infinite,  there  would  be, 
 as  far  as  appears  to  us,  infinite  Orders  of  Creatures  defcending 
 gradually  ft-om  God  to  Nothing:  But  fmce  neither  our  Un- 
 derftanding  can  comprehend,  nor  does  the  Nature  of  Quantity 
 and  Motion  feem  to  admit  of  Infinity  or  Eternity  ;  'tis  bettet^ 
 to  refer  the  Matter  to  the  Divine  Will.  For  it  an  Infinity  in 
 Creatures  be  impoffible,  'tis  the  fame  thing  whefcver  we  flop: 
 Since  all  Finites  are  equally  diftant  from  Infinite.  If  therefore 
 God  had  created  twice,  or  a  thoufand  thaufand  times  as  great, 
 and  as  many  Beings,  and  a  thoufand  thoufand  Ages  fooner  than 
 he  has,  the  fame  Objeflions  might  he  made.  Why  not  before  ? 
 Why  not  more  ?  The  World  therefore  muft  either  have  been 
 created  infinite  and  frorn  Eternity,  which  the  very  Nature  of 
 the  thing  feems  not  to  allow,  or  it  is  all  one  when  and  hovy 
 great  it  might  be,  and  not  determinable  by  any  thing  befides 
 the  Divine  Pleafure.  See  Chap.  5.  §.  i .  Subf.  4.  and  J.  Claris 
 on  Nat.  Evil.  p.  90,  93,  280,  l^c. 
 
 (19.)  In  order  to  confirm  this  belief,  and  come  to  a  right 
 Knowledge  of  the  whole  Queftion  before  us,  it  is  neceffary 
 to  enquire  a  little  into  the  meaning  of  thefe  Words ;  to  con- 
 fider  (with  reverence)  what  this  Mind  of  God  might  be  in 
 framing  the  Wqrld,  and  what  was  the  moft  proper  Method  of 
 anfwering  it.  Now  it  appeared  from  the  Conclufionof  the  firlt 
 Chapter  and  Note  13.  that  the  fole  Defign  of  Almighty  God 
 in  creating  the  Univerfe,  was  to  impart  Felicity  to  other  Be- 
 ings :  and  in  the  beginning  of  this  Cliapter  it  was  proved  thfjt 
 any  Happinefs  thus  communicated  could  not  be  infinite.  His 
 Defigu  tiien  is  completely  anfwer'd,  if  the  greatell  Degree  of 
 
 .  Uappi- 
 
122  Of  the  Evil  of  Defe5i.    Chap.  III. 
 
 and  probably  greater  inconveniencies,  which  raufl: 
 have  l;)oiled  the  Beauty  either  of  the  whole,  or  of 
 fome  chief  Part. 
 
 IV. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Happinefs  be  imparted  of  which  created  Beings  are  capable, 
 confident  with  one  another  ;  or  when  the  utmoft  poflible  Good 
 h  produced  in  the  Univerfe  collectively.  This  alfo  fhews  us 
 what  we  are  to  underftand  by  the  'very  beji  Syjiem,  viz.  one  that 
 is  fitted  for,  and  produdlive  of  the  greatellabfolute^<?«^;WGW: 
 The  Manner  of  effefting  which  comes  next  under  eoniiderati- 
 on.  As  to  this,  it  is  queried  in  the  firft  place  whether  all  A- 
 ni'mals  ought  to  have  been  created  equally  perfed;  or  feveral 
 in  different  Ranks  and  Degrees  of  Perfection  ;  and  fecondly, 
 whether  God  may  be  fuppofed  to  have  placed  any  Order  of  Be- 
 ings in  fuch  a  fix 'd  unalterable  condition  as  not  to  admit  of  ad- 
 vancement :  to  have  made  any  Creatures  as  perfedl  at  firft  as 
 the  Nature  of  a  created  Being  is  capable  of.  The  former  of 
 thefe  doubts  is  fully  difcufs'd  in  this  and  the  following  Chap- 
 ter, §.  2.  The  latter  feems  not  fo  eafy  to  be  determined.  They 
 who  hold  the  afhrmative  argue  from  our  notion  of  infinite  or 
 ahfolute  Goodnefs,  which  muft  excite  the  Deity  always  to  com- 
 municate all  manner  of  Happi?iefs  in  the  very  higheft  Degree, 
 for  the  fame  reafon  that  it  prompts  him  to  communicate  it  ever 
 in  any  degree.  But  this,  fay  they,  he  has  not  done,  except  he 
 at  firll  endow'd  fome  Creatures  with  all  the  Perfeftion  a  Crea- 
 ture could  poflibly  receive,  and  gave  to  every  fubordinate  Clafs 
 of  Beings*,  the  utmoil  Happine/s  their  feveral  Natures  were 
 capable  of.  Neither  can  this  Opinion  be  confuted  from  Holy 
 Scripture,  which  declares  that  God  made  innumerable  glorious 
 Orders  of  Cherubim  and  Seraphim,  all  far  abov  e  our  Compre- 
 henfion,  and  fome,  lor  any  thing  that  we  know,  in  the  very 
 next  Step  to  the  Top  of  the  great  Scale  oi  Beings,  and  only  Se- 
 cond to  the  Almighty.  Thofe  that  hold  the  contrary  Opinion 
 diflinguilh  between  Happinefs  and  Perfection,  and  think  that 
 thefe  do  not  either  neceffarily  imply,  or  infeparably  attend  each 
 other.  They  deny  therefore  the  confequence  of  the  former 
 Argument,  and  aflign  this  Reafon  for  it,  'vix.  becaufe  a  Being 
 produced  in  the  higheft  degree  of  natural  Perfedlion  which  a 
 Creature  is  capable  of,  and  ftill  continuing  in  th.&  fa7ne,  will  not 
 receive  as  much  Happinefs  in  the  main,  as  others  that  were 
 placed  in  a  much  inferior  State  at  the  firft.     This,  tho'  it  may 
 
 appear. 
 
 *  Concerning  thefe  ClalTes,  fee  Notes  22,  arJ  24. 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  BefeB,  123 
 
 IV.  Fourthly,  From  hence  it  appears  alfo  thar  All  things 
 all  Beings  cannot  have  equal  Perfedions,    For  die  ^^^^^  "OJ^ 
 
 World  ''"  ^,^"^"/ 
 
 perfect, 
 NOTES,  ilncefome 
 
 appear  fomething  like  a  Paradox,  yet  upon  farther  confiderati- 
 on  will  perhaps  be  judg'd  not  improbable.  Thus,  for  a  Crea- 
 ture confcious  of  no  deficiency  of  any  thing  necelTary  to  its 
 well-being,  to  meet  with  a  perpetual  acceflion  of  new,  un- 
 known Pleafure,  to  refleft  with  comfort  on  its  pail:  Condition, 
 and  compare  it  with  the  prefent,  to  enjoy  a  continued  Scries 
 of  frefli  SatisfaiStion  and  Delight,  and  be  always  approaching 
 nearer  and  nearer  to  Perfection,  this  muft  certainly  advance  the 
 Sum  of  its  Happlnefs,  even  above  that  of  others,  whofe  conditi- 
 on is  fuppofed  to  have  begun  and  to  continue  in  that  degree  of 
 perfeftion  where  this  will  end  (if  there  could  be  any  end  in 
 either)  and  which  never  knew  defeft,  variety,  or  increafe.  A 
 finite  Being  fix'd  in  the  fame  State,  however  excellenc,  muft 
 according  to  all  our  Conceptions  (if  we  be  allow'd  to  judge 
 from  our  prefent  Faculties,  and  we  can  judge  from  nothing  elfe) 
 contrafl  a  kind  o^ Indolence  or  Infenfib'ility  {r  e.  cannot  ahvays'be 
 equally  afi-'eftcd  by  an  equal  degree  of  Good  in  the  Objeft) 
 which  Infenfibility  nothing  but  alteration  and  variety  can  cure; 
 It  does  not  therefore  feeni  probable  that  God  has  adlually  fix- 
 ed any  created  Beings  whatfoever  iu  the  very  highefi:  degree  of 
 Perfedion  next  to  himfelf  Nay,  it  is  impoffible  to  conceive 
 any  fuch  highefi  Degree,  and  the  Suppofition  is  abfurd,  iince 
 that  which  admits  of  a  continual  addibility,  can  have  no 
 highefi.  Since  then  the  Creation  cannot  be  infinite ;  and  fi- 
 nites,  how  much  foever  amplified,  can  never  reach  Infinity  or 
 abfolute  Perfe£lion  *,  we  can  fet  no  manner  of  bounds  to  the 
 creating  Powqr  of  God  :  But  mufl  refer  all  to  his  Infinite  Wif- 
 dom  and  Goodnefs :  Which  Attributes  we  know  can  never 
 be  exhaufted,  nor  will,  we  believe,  produce  any  Beings  in  fucl| 
 a  State  as  fliall  not  leave  room  enough  for  them  to  be  itill  grow- 
 ing in  Felicity,  and  i"or  ever  acquiring  new  Happinefs,  togq-^ 
 ther  with  new  Perfection. 
 
 This  notion  of  a  growing  Happinefs  is  embraced  by  molt 
 Divines,  and  affords  the  ftrongeft  Motive  for  endeavouring  to 
 improve  and  excell  in  every  Chriftian  Grace.  'Tis  beautifully 
 touch'd  by  Mr.  Addijon.  Speftator  N°.  III.  "  nere  is 
 **  not,  in  my  Opijiion,  a  jnorc  pleajing  and  triumphant  Conjidera- 
 
 "  tioTi 
 
 *  See  Note  E.  or  Q^or  Dr.  Bentley's  Bojk^s  LeSl.  Serm.  6^ 
 p.  236,  237.  5th  Edit. 
 
 are  Parts 
 of  others. 
 
124  ^f  i^^^  ^'v^l  Hf  I^^fi^'    Chap.  III.' 
 
 World  muil  netfiTarily  be  compofed  of  various 
 PartSy  and  i\\o{k  parts  of  others,  and  fo  on.  But  a 
 Part  muft  needs  come  fhc>rt  both  of  the  Divine 
 Perfedion.,  and  the  Perfedion  of  the  Whole.  For 
 it  is  nothing  with  Regard  to  all  the  Perfeftions 
 ^v^iich  it  has  not,  whether  thefe  be  Divine,  or  cre- 
 ated j 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 "  tion  in  Religion,  than  this  of  the  perpetual  Progrefs  ivhich  the 
 5*  Soul  makes  tonjjard  the  P erfeBion  of  its  Nature,  nxiithout  e'ver 
 *'  arri'ving  at  a  Period  in  it.  To  look  upon  the  Soul  as  going  on 
 "from  Strength  to  Strength,  to  confder  that  She  is  to  Jhine  for 
 "  e'ver  ivith  neiv  Accefions  of  Glory,  and  brighten  to  all  Eterni- 
 **  ty,  that  she  nvill  be  fill  adding  Virtue  to  Virtue,  and  Kna^w- 
 **  ledge  to  Knonvledge,  carries  in  it  fomething  ijuonderfullj  agree- 
 **  able  to  that  Ambition  <vjhich  is  natural  to  the  Mind  of  Man, 
 *'  Nay,  it  muji  be  a  ProfpeB  pleaftng  to  God  himfelf,  to  fee  his 
 f '  Creation  for  ever  beautifying  in  his  Eyes,  and  draining  nearer 
 "  to  him  by  degrees  of  Pefemhlance?'' 
 
 That  the  Happinefs  of  Saints  and  Angels  may  be  continu- 
 ally increafing,  fee  'Tillotfo}t's  77th  Sermon,  Vol.  2d.  Fol.  p. 
 578,  ^c. 
 
 •  From  thefe  Confiderations,  and  fome  which  follow  in  the 
 remainder  of  this  Note,  it  may  perhaps  feem  probable  that  ia 
 us,  and  all  Beings  of  the  like  nature,  changes  from  worfe  to 
 better  muft  be  attended  even  with  greater  degrees  of  Pleafure 
 than  a  fettled  permanence  in  any  the  higheft  State  conceivable 
 of  Glory  or  Perfection,  and  confequently  become  neceffary  ti) 
 the  completion  of  all  finite  Happinefs. 
 
 But  in  Oppofition  to  all  this,  Bayle  urges  that  Encreafe  or 
 Alteration  is  not  in  the  leaft  requilite  to  a  lafting  Felicity  even 
 in  ourfelves. 
 
 ♦'  That  'tis  no  ways  neceffary  that  our  Soul  fnould  feel  E- 
 <■*  vil,  to  the  end  it  may  relifh  what  is  Good,  and  that  it 
 •'  fhould  pafs  fucceffively  from  Pleafure  to  Pain,  and  from 
 <'  Pain  to  Pleafure,  that  it  may  be  able  to  difcern  that  Pain  is 
 *'  an  Evil,  and  Pleafure  is  a  Good.  We  know  by  Experi- 
 *'  ence  that  our  Soul  cannot  feel,  at  one  and  the  fame  time, 
 "  both  Pleafure  and  Pain  ;  it  mull:  therefore  at  firft  either 
 *'  have  felt  Pain  before  Pleafure,  or  Pleafure  before  Pain,  if 
 f«  its  firft  Senfation  was  that  of  Pain,  it  found  that  State  to  be 
 "  uneafy,  altho'  it  was  ignorant  of  Pleafure.  Suppofe  then 
 f*  that  its  firft  Senfation  lafted  iTiany  Years,  without  Interrup- 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB.  125 
 
 ated;  and  fince  one  Part  is  not  anorher,  nor  the 
 7vhole^  'tis  plain,  that  every  Part  wants  the  Per- 
 fedions  not  only  of  the  whole,  but  of  other  Parts 
 aHb.  And  that  the  whole  is  more  perfed  than  a 
 part  is  evident  from  hence,  that  it  necelTarily  in- 
 cludes   the   multiplied  Perfedion  of  every  part; 
 
 and 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *'  tion,  you  may  conceive  that  it  was  in  an  eafy  Condition,  ot 
 **  :n  one  that  was  uneafy.  And  do  not  alledge  to  me  Experi- 
 '^  ence  ;  do  not  tell  me  that  a  Pleafure  tvhich  lafts  a  long  time 
 *'  becomes  infipid,  and  that  a  long  Pain  becomes  infupporta- 
 "  ble :  For  I  will  anfwer  you,  that  this  proceeds  from  a  Change 
 **  in  the  Organ  which  makes  that  Pain,  which  continues  the 
 *'  fame  as  to  kind,  to  be  diiFerent  as  to  Degrees.  If  you  have 
 "  had  at  firll  a  Senfation  of  fix  Degrees,  it  will  not  continue 
 *'  of  Six  to  the  end  of  two  Hours,  or  to  the  end  of  a  Year, 
 ««  biit  only  either  of  one  Degree,  or  of  one  Fourth  part  of  a 
 "  Degree.  Thus  Cuftom  blunts  the  Edge  of  our  Senfations: 
 "  their  Degrees  correfpond  to  the  Concuffions  of  the  parts  of 
 •'  the  Brain,  and  this  Concuffion  is  weakened  by  frequent  Re- 
 *«  petitions:  From  whence  it  comes  to  pafs  that  the  Degrees 
 "  of  Senfation  are  diminifhed  But  if  Pain  or  Joy  were  com- 
 *'  municated  to  us  in  the  fame  Degree  fucceffively  for  an  hun- 
 *'  dred  Years,  we  fhould  be  as  unhappy,  or  as  happy  in  the 
 *'  hundreth  Year,  as  in  the  firft  Day ;  which  plainly  proves 
 *'  that  a  Creature  may  be  happy  with  a  continued  Good,  oc 
 "  unhappy  with  a  continued  Evil,  and  that  the  Alternative^ 
 *'  which  LaSlantius  fpeaks  of*,  is  a  bad  Solutioa  of  the  Diffi- 
 "  culty.  It  is  not  founded  upon  the  Nature  of  Good  and 
 *'  Evil,  nor  upon  the  Nature  of  the  Subjedl  which  receives 
 *'  them:  nor  upon  the  nature  of  the  Caufe  which  produces 
 *'  them.  Pleafure  and  Pain  are  no  lefs  proper  to  be  communi- 
 "  cated  the  fecond  jMoment  than  the  firft,  and  the  third  Alo- 
 *'  ment  than  the  fecond,  and  fo  of  all  the  reft.  Our  Soul  is  alfo 
 *'  as  fufceptible  of  them  after  it  has  felt  them  one  Moment,  as 
 "  it  was  before  it  felt  them,  and  God  who  gave  them,  is  no 
 "  lefs  capable  of  producing  them  the  feccnd  Moment  than 
 «'  the  firft  f." 
 
 As 
 
 *  See  Note  79.  p.  447. 
 t  Critical  Diii.  p.  2486. 
 
126  Of  the  Evil  of  Defect.     Chap.  III. 
 
 and  befides,  the  parts  when  joyned  together  and 
 connefted,  acquire  a  new  and  peculiar  Perfedion, 
 whereoy  they  anfwer  their  proper  Ends,  which 
 they  could  not  do  aOjnder;  they  defend  themfelves 
 fnuch  better,  and  airift  each  other.  The  Perfec- 
 tion of  the  whole  therefore,  is  not  only  more  ex- 
 
 tenjivs 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 As  this  is  one  of  the  ftrongeft  Objedtions,  and  applicable  to 
 &]\  kinds  of  Evil,  I  have  quoted  it  at  length  (tho'  ibinc  parts 
 may  not  relate  immediatey  to  our  prefent  purpofe)  and  fhall 
 endeavour  to  give  a  full  anfvver  to  it  in  the  following  Notes. 
 It  will  be  confider'd  with  refped:  to  Moral  Good  and  Evil,  in 
 Notes,  68,  83,  84.  Let  us  confine  ourfelves  at  prefent  to  Na- 
 tural Good,  which  may  be  divided  into  fenfitive  and  intellec- 
 tual. As  to  the  former,  we  perceive  that  the  Mind,  for  the 
 Augmentation  of  its  Happinefs,  is  endowed  with  various 
 Senfes,  each  of  which  is  entertain'd  with  a  variety  of  Objedts; 
 irow,  any  one  of  thefe  Senfes  can  convey  fo  much  Pleafure  for 
 fome  time  as  is  fufhcient  to  fill  our  prefent  narrow  Capacit}', 
 and  engrofs  the  whole  Soul,  She  can  be  entirely  happy  in  the 
 Satisfaftion  arifmg  from  the  Sight,  Hearing,  t^c.  or  from 
 the  Memory,  or  any  other  Mode  of  Perception  by  itfelf.  If 
 therefore  any  one  of  thefe  Organs  could  (as  Z?/ry/p  fuppofes) 
 continue  to  communicate  the  fame  Degree  of  Pleafure  to  us  for 
 an  hundred  Years,  all  the  rell  would  be  unneccfTary  :  But  an 
 All-wife  Being,  who  cannot  a£l  in  vain,  has  implanted  this 
 Variety  of  Senfes  in  us ;  this  then  is  a  good  Argument  (to  thofe 
 who  allow  fuch  a  Being,  upon  the  Belief  of  which  I  am  now 
 arguing}  that  none  of  thefe  particular  Senfes  could  continue  in 
 its  prefent  State,  and  always  communicate  the  fame  Degree  of 
 Happinefs.  Farther,  his  Suppofition  will  appear  to  be  impof- 
 lible,  from  confidering  the  Nature  and  Properties  of  that  Mat- 
 ter of  which  the  fenfuive  Organs  are  compofed.  If  there  be 
 (as  Bay/e  maintains)  fo  clofe  a  Conncfcion  between  the  Soul 
 and  certain  Modifications  of  Matter,  as  that  the  Degrees  of  fen- 
 fitive Pleafures  are  diminifhed  by  a  ChMge  in  the  Organ,  by 
 weakening  the  Concuilion  of  fome  pnrts  of  the  Brain  by  frequent 
 Repetitions  ;  then  we  fay,  'tis  plainly  impoffible  that  the  fame 
 Degrees  fliould  be  continued  by  this  Organ,  which,  as  it  is 
 material,  is  perpetually  expofed  to  this  Chavge,  and  liable  toi' 
 Difiblution,  and  neccflarily  weakened  by  \^\^{q.  fre(]u,cvt  Con- 
 ciiffions.     Every  Motign  in  it  muft  in  time  be  flopped  by 
 
 contrary 
 
Chap.  IIL     Of  the  Evil  of  BefeB.  127 
 
 tenfive  than  that  of  the  Parts,  by  the  accumula- 
 tion of  many  Parts,  perhaps  equal  to  one  another; 
 but  more  intenje  alfo,  by  the  Addition  of  certain 
 Degrees,  whereby  the  whole  muft  of  Neceffity 
 excell  the  Parts.  As  therefore  we  have  proved 
 that  an  abfolutely  perfed:   Creature  is  an  Impoffi- 
 
 bility, 
 
 N  0  i  E  S, 
 
 contrary  ones,  as  our  Author  has  fully  fliewn  in  Chap.  4. 
 
 §.  I. 
 
 If  he  fuppofes  that  the  fame  Degree  of  Pleafure  may  ftilfbe 
 communicated  tho'  the  Organ  alters,  he  fuppofes  that  there  is 
 no  fuch  Conneftion  between  any  Portion  or  Pofition  of  Matter 
 and  our  Spirit ;  which  is  directly  contrary  to  his  former  Sup- 
 pofition,  and  alfo  to  truth,  as  will  perhaps  appear  from  the  fol- 
 lowing Chapter.  If  then  Bayle  imagines  that  the  fame  or  dif- 
 ferent Matter,  when  moved  or  at  reft;  or  when  moved  in  diffc- 
 lent  Diredions,  may  ftill  affe6t  the  Mind  in  the  very  fame  man- 
 ner, he  muft  either  take  it  for  granted  that  the  Affedlions  of 
 Matter  are  no  Caufes  of  the  Senfations  of  the  Mind,  that  is,, 
 contradi6l  his  former  Suppoficion ;  or  elfe  he  muft  fuppofe 
 ihe  fame  Effefl  to  proceed  from  different  Caufes ;  either  of 
 which  will  tend  equally  to  advance  his  Syftem.  But  in  re- 
 ality, this  Decreafe  of  Pleafure  in  Familiarity  and  Cuftom. 
 does  not  perhaps  entirely  depend  on  any  Change  of  the  cor- 
 poreal Organs,  but  on  the  original  Faculties  of  the  Soul  it- 
 {t\^,  as  may  be  gathered  from  fome  fuch  Obfervations  as  this 
 which  follows.  View  a  delightful  Landllcip,  a  pleafant  Gar- 
 den, or  any  of  the  Figures  which  appear  moll  beautiful,  renew 
 the  Profpecl  once,  or  twice,  to  Day,  to  Morrow,  and  at  feve- 
 ral  diftant  Periods ;  it  fliall  afford  a  great  degree  of  Pleafure 
 for  fome  time,  while  any  No'velty  may  be  fuppofed  to  remain  j 
 but  that  Pleafure  perifhes  together  with  this  Novelty,  tho'  the 
 external  Organs  of  Vifion  fcill  continue  perfeft,  and  your 
 Senfations  are  moll:  evidently  the  lame  the  laft  Day  as  the 
 firft.  You  are  able  to  behold  the  fame  Scenes  over  again, 
 with  the  fame  e.^fe  and  acutcnefs,  but  not  with  the  fame  In- 
 tenfenefs  of  Delight.  To  attempt  a  Mechanical  Solution  of 
 this  by  a  fuppofed  alteration  of  feme  imaginary  'Traces  in  the 
 Brain  (which  yet,  if  they  were  allowed,  cannot  mend  the 
 matter  a  jot,  as  was  jnft  now  fliewn)  will  only  throw  us  into' 
 ftili  greater  DilFiculties,  as  any  one  that  attentively  confiders 
 the  whole  of  that  chimerical  Hvpothefis  mull  conclude*  and 
 
 of 
 
128  Of  the  Evil  of  Defedl.     Chap.  III. 
 
 bility,  fo  it  may  be  proved  from  hence  that  all 
 tannot  have  an  cqud  Degree  of  Perfedion.  For 
 the  World  confifts  of  Parts,  and  thofe  again  of 
 others,  perhaps  divifible  in  mfinittrm :  But  that  e- 
 very  lingle  Part  lliould  have  the  Perfcftion  of  all, 
 or  many,  is  impoiliblei  and  we  are  not  to  arraign 
 
 the 
 
 "    NO T  E S 
 
 r'F which  Bnyle,  who  foon  perceived  tiie  Defedts  and  Abfurdiv- 
 ties  of  moft  other  Syftems,  was  undouhtediy  convinc'd.  It 
 feems  to  fne  much  more  properly  refoivablc  into  a  native  Pro- 
 perty of  the  Soul  itfelf.  Is  it  not  probable  that  the  Mind  of 
 Man  is  originally  framed  with  a  Difpofition  for,  or  Capacity 
 of  being  delighted  with  Variety?  That  it  cannot  be  always 
 on  the  fame  Bent,  but  as  it  is  cndow'd  with  different  Fa- 
 culties, fo  thefe  relieve  one  another  by  turns,  and  receive  an 
 additional  Pleafure  from  the  Nonjelty  of  thofe  Objefts  about 
 which  it  is  converfant ;  and  that  by  this  means  it  enjoys  a 
 greater  Sum  of  Happinefs  than  it  could  other  ways  attain  to? 
 See  the  Spedator,  N".  59O.  N*',  625.  of  No.  411.  or  Watts 
 on  the  Fajjiom,  §.4. 
 
 I  Ihall  only  add  ah  Obfervation  on  this  Head  frora  the  Au- 
 thor of  the  Vindkatioh  of  God'' s  Moral  CharaSler,  p.  21.  which 
 fhews  us  the  Neccffity  tor  this  Variety  or  increafeablenefs  of 
 Perfeflion,  in  order  to  our  Imellednal  Happinefs,  fince  moll  of 
 that  arifcs   from  our  pall  Defects.     '  ^j  Intelle£lual  Happi- 
 
 *  nefs,  1  ?nean  the  Difcovcry  and   Cbntemplation   of  Truth, 
 
 *  nuith   regard  to   ■n.vhich    I  have  this  to  obfervc,  that  all  the 
 
 *  Pleafures   ive  tafe    of  this   Kind  are  oiAiifig   either   to    our 
 
 *  preceding  Ignorance,    to  the   Care  aud    Pains  nve   take    in 
 
 *  the    Difco'very  of  Truth,  or  to   the  Degree  of  our  Know- 
 
 *  ledge,  <when  <zve  'attain  to  a  greater  meafure  tha7i  other 
 *■  Men.  All  Truth,  ixihen  conftderd  fcparate  from  thefe,  is 
 '  alike  as  Truth  ( tho^  not  of  the  like  hnportance  to  us  J  the 
 '  Objed  of  the  Underfianding,  and  as  fuh,  it  viujl  afford 
 *.  the  fame   Delight.     If  ive  all  could,  -zvitb  equal  Eafeand 
 
 *  Clearnefs,  fee  all   the    Relations  of  things,  they  miijl  all  in 
 
 *  the    Nature    of   the    things    equally     affeSl  us.     We   Ihould 
 
 *  tafe  as  much  Plcafuie  in  knonxjing  or  contejnplating  that 
 ',  t'Zvo    and  tv:o  makes  fur,  as    in  kno-iviiig   or   contemplating 
 
 *  any  P ropoftion  ixlhich  noiv  appears  the  mcjl  difficult,  and 
 *._/&   affords   the   jnof    Pleafure:     Or    rather,     ive  fjould    7iot 
 
 *  hai'e    Pleafure   from    any    of  them.     Kovj  if  this   be  the 
 
ehap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  BefcB.  12^ 
 
 the  Power   or   Goodnefs  of  God    for   not  work- 
 ing Contradictions.      There  muft  then  be  many, 
 
 per- 
 
 N or E  S. 
 
 ''  Cafe,    then  is    is  evident   that  the  Capacity   ive  have  fb^ 
 
 *  tajling    this .  kind   pf  PJeafure   renders    us     capable   of  its 
 '  contrary.  •    If'e    could  not  be    delighted  in   the   Difovery  or 
 
 *  Contemplation   of  Truth,  if  nve    'were    not  capable    of  being 
 
 *  ignorant,   and  of  the   XJnhappinefs    njohich    arifes  from  it  ^^   ' 
 This  is  the  Confeqii€nce  we    would  draw  frojn  al)  that 
 
 xvent  before:    But  of  this  more  at  large  under   the  Head  of 
 Moral,  Ei'il.  .   .       .. 
 
 We  reply  then  to  Bayle,  that  this  Alternatinje  or  Variety  of 
 either  Good  or  Evil,  fo  far  as  concerns  the  pteferit  Argument 
 h  founded  on  the  Nature  of  the  SubjeSi  njuhich  recei'ves  thttn, 
 and  that  our  Soul  in  its  prefent  State,  is  not  fo  fufceptible  of 
 them  after  it  has  felt  tjlem  two  or  three  times  as  at  firft.  What 
 it  might  have  been  made  capable  of,  is  nothing  to  the  Pur- 
 pqfe,  fince  (a«  it  was  obferved  before,  and  mull  often  be  re- 
 peated) we  are  to  confider  Man  as  we  find  him  at  prefent;  and 
 <;lrawall  our  Arguments,  not  from  fuch  Faculties  as  are  per- 
 haps in  other  JBeings,  b"t  from  thefe  only  which  we  per- 
 ceive and  experience  in  him.  If  thefe  cannot  be  alter'd  and 
 improved  confiftently  with  each  other*,  nor  fubjeifted  to  any 
 general  Laws  more  fuitable  to  his  prefent  Circumftances,  and 
 produ(fl;ive  of  more  good  to  the  whole  Syftemf,  then,  all 
 Arguments  built  on  this  Topic  againft  the  Divine  Attributes 
 muft  fall  to  the  Ground-^  Thefe  and  the  like  Suppofitions 
 therefore,  'uiz.  that  the  fame  Degree  of  Pleafure  might  be  com- 
 municated to  us  fuccejjinjelyfor  a  hundred  Tears',  —  if  underftood 
 of  one  uniform  Caufe  producing  it:  'That  our  Pleafures,  (mean- 
 ing fenfiti've  ones)  might  not  depend  upon  the  Fibres  of  the 
 Brain,  —  and.  That  thefe  Fibres /hould  not  nxiear  out  at  all\ ,  — 
 or,  if  thefe  Fibres  did  wear  out,  that  the  P leafure Jhould  ne'vcr 
 decay,  —  are  all  unreafonable  Suppofitions  :  They  offend  a- 
 gainft  the  Rule  laid  down  above,  and  always  to  be  remem- 
 bered, of  taking  the  whole  of  human  Nature  as  it  is;  of  con- 
 fidering  our  prefent  Body  and  Spirit,  and  the  obvious  Proper- 
 ties of  each,  and  the  kno\yn  Laws  of  their  Union  together. 
 All  fuch  Objeflions  therefore  are  befide  th-e  Qiicfiiion  ;  and 
 founded  upon  the  old  abfurdity  of  reducing  us  to  a  different 
 
 K.  Claf 
 
 *  See  Note  28.  ,      f  Sec  Note  25. 
 
 tSeeJSflv/t'sDia.  p.  2487. 
 
Of  the  Evil  of  DefcB.    Chap.  III. 
 
 perhaps  infinite  (20.)  Degrees  of  Perfedion  in 
 the  Divine  Works;  for  whatever  arifes  from  AV 
 thing  is  necelTarily  imperftd;  and  the  lefs  it  is 
 removed  from  nothing  ^taking  Exifience  for  one 
 Degree  as  we  faid  bcforej  the  more  imperfcd  it  is. 
 There  is  no  Occafion  therefore  for  an  Evil  Prin- 
 ciple to  introduce  the  Evil  of  Dcfed,  or  an  Ine- 
 quahty  of  Perfeftions  in  the  Works  of  God :  For 
 the  very  Nature  of  created  Beings  neceffar.ly  re- 
 quires it,  and  we  may  conceive  the  Place  of  this 
 malicious  Principle  to  be  abundantly  fupplied  from 
 hence,  that  they  derive  their  Origin  from  -A/b- 
 thing.    (zi.) 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Clajs  of  Beings,  when  (as  will  appear  prefently)  all  conceiva- 
 ble Clafles  and  Orders  are  already  full. 
 
 Thus  much  for  one  Query  about  the  manner  of  creating 
 things,  'VIZ..  whether  any  fhould  have  been  fix'd  immutably 
 in  a  certain  Degree  of  Perfeftion:  Our  Author  proceeds  to 
 examine  the  other,  ^oiz.  Whether  all  Things  could  and  ought 
 to  have  been  at  firft  created  in  the  fa?fic  Degree  of  Pcrfeftion  ? 
 (20.)  That  is  indefinite,  or  greater  than  any  given  Number  ; 
 for  neither  the  Univerfc  itfelf,  nor  any  thing  that  belongs  to 
 it,  can  be  properly  and  abfolutely  Infinite,  as  our  Author 
 maintains  in  his  Note  E,  and  we  have  largely  proved  from 
 Cud-zvorth,  (Sc.  in  the  former  Chapter. 
 
 (21.)  It  is  fcarce  nccelTary  to  obferve,  that  this  muft  all 
 along  be  underftood  only  Materiallf,  i.  e.  that  thefe  things 
 were  not  produced  from  any  Matter  pre-exijlent,  but  were 
 made  i%  chc  I'vtuv,  and  brought  into  Being  from  mere  Nof2- 
 Exijience.  For  the  PolTibility  of  which,  and  the  Opinion  of 
 the  Antients  on  this  Subjeft  fee  Cudiiorth,  C.  5.  §.  2.  p. 
 738,  i^c.  The  other  Senfes  of  the  Words,  ws.  That  any 
 thing  can  come  from  nothing  caufally,  or  be  produced  kf  no- 
 thing, or  by  iijcif,  or  <ra-ithout  an  Efficient  Caufe,  are  manifcft- 
 ]y  abfurd,  as  is  demonftraicd  at  large  in  the  fame  excellent 
 Seflion.  For  an  Illulbation  of  our  Author's  Notion  before 
 us,  {tc  Scott'' s  Clrifiian  Life.,  Part  2.  Vol.  i.  C.  6.  §.  2.  p. 
 446,  447.  I  ft.  F.dit.  *  Gud  is  the  Caufe  ofVerfeBion  only, 
 '  but  not  of  Defcd',  which  fo  hx  forth  as  it  is  vatttral  to  cre- 
 
 *  aieJ 
 
Chap,  ni     Of  the  Evil  of  DefeSl.  13 1 
 
 V.  Fifchly;    'Tis  plain,   that  Creatures  are  not  Things 
 only  unequally  impcrfed:  in  refpeft  of  their  Parts  "ecefllinly 
 and  Vnder-partSt  and    fo    on,  which   by  continual  '     ?-i^^^' 
 Sub-divilion,  approach    m  a    manner   to    nothing j  fedions 
 but  a  neceffary  inequality  arifes  among  them  alio  with  re- 
 in refpeft  to  their  uittributes.     For  a  conicious  or  '^^^'^  ^^ 
 thinking    Subftance  is  more   perfed   than  one  that  [j-ju,^.    f 
 wants  Senfe  or    Undsrllanding.     If  it    be    ask'd,  but  it  is' 
 How  is  it  agreeable  to  the   Divine  Goodncfs  to  agreeable 
 have  created   thefe  alfo?    I    anfwer.    If  the  Crea-  ^^  ^^e 
 tion  of  thefe  be  no  impediment  to   the  ProduCli-  q    j    r 
 on  of  the  more  perfeft;    if  neither  the   Number  to  create 
 nor   Happinefs  of  ihe  more  perfeft  be  diminiflied  thofe 
 by  the  Creation  of  thofe  th  it  are  lefs  perfect,  why  v/hich  are 
 
 K  z  will  ^'^'^  P^"^- 
 
 fedir,  if 
 NOTES,  „^|^i„. 
 
 ,  ,■  .    .  drance  to 
 
 *  ated  Beings  hath  no  Caufe  at  all,  but  is  merely  a  Negation  or  theNum- 
 =  Non-entity.     For  every  created  thing  was  a  Negation  or  Non-  ber  or 
 
 *  e,ntity  before  ever  it  had  a  pofttlve  Being,  and  it  had  only  {(y  conveni- 
 <  much  of. its /irzW//'L'^  Negation  taken  a^ujay  from  it,  as  it  had  ence  ot 
 
 *  pojiti've  Being  conferred  upon  it ;  and  therefore,  fo  far  forth  the  more 
 
 *  as  it  is,  its  Being  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  Sovereign  Caufe  perfedV 
 «  that  produced  it ;  but  fo  far  forth  a3  it  is  not,  its  not  Be-  ones. 
 
 *  ing  is  to  be  attributed   to  the    Original  Non-entity  out  of 
 
 *  which  it  was  produced.     For  that  which  was  once  Nothing, 
 
 *  would y?/// have  been  Nothing,  h.id  it  not  been  for  the  Caufe 
 
 *  that  gave  Being  to  it,  and  therefore  that  it  is  fo  far  Nothing 
 
 *  ftill,  /.  e.  limited  and  dcfeBiaie,  is  only   to  be  attributed  to 
 '  its  own  primitive  Nothingnefs.     As  for  inftance,  If  I  give  a 
 
 *  poor  Man  a  hundred  Pounds,  that  he  is  worth yS  ?nuch  Mo- 
 
 *  ney  is  wholly  owing  to  ?ne,  but  that  he  is  not  worth  a  hun-. 
 
 *  dred  more  is  owing  only  to  his  own  Poverty }  and  juft  fo, 
 
 *  that  I  have  fuch  znA  fiich  Perfe^lons  of  Being  is  wholly  ow-f 
 
 *  ing  to   God  who  produced  me  oat  of  Nothing ;  but  that  I- 
 *.  have  fuch  and  fuch  Dcfeds  of  Being  is  only  owing  to  that. 
 
 *  iVo7z-^«//Vj;  out  of  which  he  produced  me.'  . 
 
 The  fame  Notion  is  largely  difculTed  ia  Eilhardi  Lubini 
 Phofphorus,  ISc.  Chap,  6,  7,  and  17.  From  Vv'hom  it  appears,, 
 that  mod  of  the  anticnt  Philofophers  meant  no  more  than  this 
 i»y  thdr  Evil  Principle, 
 
 '  '   .■■•n 
 
 '22.;  Froi?3. 
 
132  Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB.    Chap.  IIL 
 
 vill  it  be  unfit  to  create  thefe  too?  Since  God 
 does  what  is  beft  to  be  done,  nothing  more  or 
 greater  can  be  expedcd  from  the  moft  benevolent 
 and  powerful  Author  of  Nature.  If  therefore  it 
 te  better,  cceteris  p^rihus,  that  thefe  more  imper- 
 fe(5t  Beings  fhould  exifl,  than  not,  it  is  agreeable 
 to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  that  the  beft  that  could 
 be  fhould  be  done.  If  the  Production  of  a  lefs 
 perfed:  Being  were  any  hindrance  to  a  more  per- 
 fed:  one,  it  would  appear  contra;  y  to  Divine 
 Goodnefs  to  have  omitted  the  more  perfect  and 
 created  the  lefs ;  but  fince  they  are  no  manner  of 
 of  hindrance  to  each  other,    the    more  the  better. 
 
 VI. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (22  )  From  the  Suppofition  of  a  Scale  of  Beings  gradu- 
 ally defcending  from  PcrfeSlion  to  Non-entity,  and  compleat  in 
 every  intermediate  Rank  and  Degree  (for  which  fee  Note  24.} 
 ^ve  fliall  foon  perceive  the  Abfurdity  of  fuchQueftions  as  thefe. 
 Why  was  not  Man  made  more  perfed:  ?  Why  are  not  his  Fa- 
 culties equal  to  thofe  of  Angels?  Since  this  is  only  afking 
 why  he  was  not  placed  in  a  quite  different  Clafs  of  Beings, 
 when  at  the  fame  time  all  other  Claffes  are  fuppofcd  to  be  al- 
 ready full.  From  the  lame  Principle  alfo  we  gather  the  In- 
 tent of  the  Creator  in  producing  thefe  fcveral  inferior  Orders 
 imder  our  View.  They  who  imagine  that  all  things  in  this 
 World  were  made  for  the  immediate  Ufc  of  Man  alone,  run 
 themfclves  into  inextricable  Difficulties.  Man  indeed  is  the 
 Head  of  this  lower  Part  of  the  Creation,  and  perhaps  it  was 
 defigned  to  be  abfolutcly  under  his  Command.  But  that  all 
 things  here  tend  diredly  to  his  own  ufe,  is,  I  think,  neither 
 eafy  nor  nccclTary  to  be  proved.  Some  manifcillv  Icrve  for 
 the  Food  and  Support  of  others,  whofe  Souls  may  be  neceflary 
 to  prepare  and  prcferve  their  Bodies  for  that  Purpofe,  and 
 may  at  the  fame  time  be  happy  in  a  Confcioufncfs  of  their  own 
 Kxiilence.  'Tis  probable  that  they  are  intended  to  promote 
 each  others  Good  reciprocally  :  Nay,  Man  himielf  contri- 
 butes to  the  Happinefs,  and  betters  the  Condition  of  the  Brutes 
 in  feveral  Refpecfts,  by  cultivating  and  improving  the  Ground, 
 by  watching   the  Scafons,  by  protcding  and  providing  for 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB,  133 
 
 VI.  An  Inftance  will  make  this  more  clear.  Sup-  This  con- 
 pofethat  God  made  the  World /«/V^;  fuppofe  that  ^^^^^y 
 Spirits,  or    pure   immaterial    thinking  Beings,    are  J^^nceof 
 the  mo/i  perfeH  Species  of  Subftances:   Suppofe  in  Matter, 
 the  laft  Place,  that  God  created  as  many  of  this  which  is 
 fort  as  were  convenient  for  the  Syftem  he  had  made,  "plmpe- 
 fo  that  if  there  were  more,    they    would  incom-  JJ^Jf "g  ^-^ 
 mode  one  another;  yet   there  would    be    no  lefs  ^^^^^ 
 Rx)om    for    Matter,    then   if  there  were  none  at 
 all,     (F.)     This   Suppofition  is   by  no  means  ab- 
 
 K  5  furd  5 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 them,  when  they  are  unable  to  protect  and  provide  for  them- 
 felves*.  Others  of  a  much  lower  CLifs,  may,  for  ought  wc 
 know,  enjoy  themfelves  too  in  fome  Degree  or  other;  and 
 ahb  contribute  to  the  Happiaefs  even  of  fuperior  Beings,  by 
 a  Difplay  of  the  Divine  Attributes  in  different  Ways,  and  af- 
 fording ample  Matter  of  Refledion  on  the  various  Ranks  and 
 Degrees  of  Perfeftion  difcoverablc  in  the  animal  World  ; 
 wherein  the  higheft  Order  may  with  Pleafure  contemplate 
 numberlefs  Species  infinitely  below  them  ;  And  the  lower 
 Clafs  can  admire  and  adore  that  Infinity  of  Divine  Wifdom 
 and  Goodnefs  and  Power  which  fhines  forth  in  fo  many  Be- 
 ings fo  much  above  them.  They  may  conduce  to  the  Beauty, 
 Order,  and  Benefit  of  the  whole  Syftem,  the  general  Good 
 of  which  was  the  Aim  of  its  Creator,  and  with  regard  to 
 which  every  Part  is  chiefly  to  be  elleem'd  f .  They  may 
 have  ten  thoufmd  Ufes  befide  what  relates  to  Man,  who  is 
 but  a  very  fmall  Part  of  it :  Several  Inltances  might  be  giv- 
 en which  would  make  this  very  probable;  at  lealt  the  con- 
 trary, I  tHink,  cannot  ever  be  proved.     Seo  C.  4.  §.  2.  Subl\ 
 
 (F.)  If  any  one  had  a  mind  to  f^Il  a  certain  VefTel  with 
 Globes  of  various  Magnitudes,  and  had  diftinguiih'd  them  in- 
 to their  feveral  Degrees,  fo  that  thofe  of  the  fecond  Degree 
 might  have  Place  in  the  Interftices  left  by  thofe  of  the  firll ; 
 
 and 
 
 *  See  Chubb'^  Sup.  ^c.  p.  Jz.  and  Dr.  J.  Clarke,  p.  284, 
 285. 
 
 t  See  Cudworth,  p.  875,  876.  or  Tillotfon  Serm,  91.  p. 
 683.  2d  Vol.  Fol.  or  Ray  on  (he  Creation,  Part  2.  p.  AZJ. 
 4th  Edit,  or  Note  G. 
 
134  Of  the  Evil  of  Defeat.    Chap.  III. 
 
 furd;  for  fmce  thefe  may  be  conceived  without 
 local  Extenjio^,  and  have  no  relation  to  Space  or 
 Flacc,  as  Bi  dies  have  *,  in  whatever  Number  they 
 were  created,  they  would  contribute  nothing  at  all 
 either  to  the  filling  up  of  Space,  or  excluding  Bo- 
 dies out  of  it,  yet  they  would  have  a  certain  Sy- 
 (lem  or  Society  among  themfelves,  which  might  re- 
 quire a  determinate  Number,  which  if  it  were  ex- 
 ceeded, they  muft  become  troublefome  to  one  ar 
 nother  by  too  great  a  Multitude  in  a  finite  World. 
 Nay,  if  the  World  were  fuppofed  to  be  infinite^ 
 and  as  many  fuch  Spirits  created  as  were  pofTible, 
 yet  would  they  be  no  impediment  to  Matter,  or 
 Matter  to  them,  neither  would  their  Number  be 
 lefs,  nor  their  Convenienfes  fewer,  becaufe  Matter 
 did  or  did  not  exift.  Since  then  material  and  im-^ 
 material  Beings  confift  fo  well  together,  is  it  not 
 agreeable  to  tlie  greateft  Goodnefs  to  have  created 
 bothf  Let  Matter  be  flupid  and  devoid  of  Senfe 
 as  it  is;  let  it  be  the  moft  imperfed  of  all  Sub- 
 dances,  and  next  to  nothing,  (fince  not  to  per- 
 ceive its  Exiitence  is  little  different  from  Non-ex- 
 iflcnce)  'tis  better  to  be  even  fo,  than  not  at  all; 
 for  Exiftence  is,  as  we  faid,  the  Foundation,  or  firft 
 
 Degree 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 and  thofe  of  the  third  Order  in  the  intcrftices  of  the  fecond, 
 and  fo  on.  'Tis  evident  that  when  as  many  of  the  firll:  Mag- 
 nitude were  put  in  as  the  Vefl'el  could  contain  yet  there  would 
 be  Room  for  thofe  of  the  fecond.  Neither  could  any  wife 
 Man  afk  why  the  whole  Veffel  was  not  filled  with  the  greater 
 Globes,  or  why  all  of  them  were  not  of  the  fame  Migai 
 tude. 
 
 This  Inftance  may  afford  an  Anfwer  to  fuch  as  demand 
 why  God  has  not  given  a  different  and  more  perfecfi:  Nature 
 to  Animals,  ntiz.  There  was  no  room  in  the  mundane  Syrtem 
 for  Beings  cf  n  more  perfcc"  ^ature.  But  when  as  many 
 1  :S  .  ..      Creatures 
 
 *  See  Note  '/. 
 
Chap.  in.     Of  the  Evil  of  Defeci.  135 
 
 Degree  of  Perfedion,  and  the  next  a^  it  were  to 
 this,  the  fecond  is  perception  of  Exiftence.  But 
 you'll  fay.  Why  did  not  God  add  this  Second  De- 
 gree to  Matter?  I  anfwer,  if  tliat  could,  ic  is 
 probable  it  would  have  been  done :  But  fince  we 
 fee  that  Matter  is  in  itfelf  a  piflive,  inert  Sub- 
 ftance,  we  muft  believe  that  its  Nature  would  not 
 admit  of  Senje^  or  if  it  had  been  capable  of  Senfe, 
 that  greater  Inconveniences  would  liave  flowed 
 from  thence,  than  if  it  had  been  made  infenfible, 
 as  it  is.  (25.)  However,  without  this  there  would 
 be  a  kind  of  Foid  in  the  Univerfe,   and  fomething 
 
 K  4  want- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Creatares  were  made  of  the  fuperior  Order  as  tlie  Syllem  of 
 the  World  was  able  to  conta'm,  whether  you  fuppofe  it  finite 
 or  infinite ;  nothing  liinder'd  but  that  there  might  he  room 
 for  others  of  a  lower  Degree  :  As  when  as  rnany  Globes  of 
 greater  Magnitude  were  put  into  the  Vefl'el  as  it  could  hold, 
 yet  there  was  ftill  a  Space  for  others  of  a  lefs  Dimenfion  ; 
 and  To  on  in  infinitum.  When  therefore  any  afk  why  God  did 
 not  make  all  of  the  fame  Perfeilion  with  the  Angels: 
 
 We  anfwer,  that  after  as  many  Angels  had  been  made  as 
 were  convenient,  there  was  a  Place  left  for  inferior  Animal";, 
 and  after  as  many  Animals  of  a  more  perfeil  Nature  were 
 made  as  the  Syitem  required,  there  was  ftill  room  for  other 
 more  imperfeft  ones ;  and  fo  perhaps  in  infinilum. 
 
 If  you  afk  why  God  does  not  immediately  tranfplant  Men 
 into  Hewen,  fince  'tis  plain  they  are  capable  of  that  happier 
 State  :  Or  why  he  detains  them  ib  long  from  that  Happinefs, 
 and  confines  them  on  the  Earth  as  in  a  darkfome  Prifon  where 
 they  are  forced  to  ftruggle  with  fo  many  Evils. 
 
 I  anfwer,  Becaufe  the  Heavens  are  already  furnlfli'd  with 
 Inhabitants,  and  cannot  with  convenience  admic  of  new  ones, 
 till  fomc  of  the  prefent  Pofleflbrs  depart  into  a  better  State, 
 or  make  room  fome  other  way  for  thcfe  to  change  their  Con- 
 dition.    See  Note  y. 
 
 {23.)  Mattel;  as  fuch,  is  at  prefent  incapable  of,  or  has  pro- 
 perties totally  inconfiilent  with  Thought  and  Sclr-niotion,  (as 
 Is  at  large  demonftrated  by  the  Authors  referred  to  in  Note  7.) 
 it  is  therefore  in  a  Degree  below  Animals,  or  ("as  our  Au- 
 thor fays)  next  to  Nothing.    But  yet,  fuch  as  ii  ii,  'tis  firft, 
 
 abfolutely 
 
136  Of  the  Evil  of  Defea.    Chap.  III. 
 
 wanting  which  might  exift  :  But  it  was  better  that 
 there  Ihould  be  Matter  than  nothing  at  all,  and 
 fince  one  fide  was  to  be  chp^en,  the  Divine  Good- 
 nefs  prefer'd  Matter,  becaufe  that  was  the  greatef 
 Good.  For,  fince  it  is  no  hindrance  to  the  Mul- 
 tiplication or  Convenience  of  thinking  Beings, 
 nor  climinifhcs  the  Number  of  the  more  perfeds 
 *tis  plain  it  adds  to  the  Pcrfedion  of  the  Univerfc, 
 2nd  whatever  it  be,  tho'  the  mofl:  imperfeft  thing 
 m   Nature^  'tis  gain  to  the  whole.     It  was  there^^ 
 
 fori 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 abfolutely  neceJTary  to  many  Animals,  and  fecondly,  would 
 not  be  fo  convenient  for  their  Ufe^  if  it  could  think.  It  is  the 
 Bajts  or  Support  of  Animals  in  this  our  Syllem  ;  it  \?,  as  w^ 
 may  fay,  the  Cafe  and  Covering  of  their  feyeral  Souls  j  it  ferves 
 for  the  clothing  of  that  Cafe,  for  their  Food,  their  Defence,  and 
 various  ufes.  JJut  were  \\  all  Life,  or  confcious  (not  to  in- 
 fill on  the  Abfurdities  of  fuch  a  Suppofitipn  in  itfelf)  whas 
 ^lifery  and  Confufion  would  arife?  If  all  were  Animals. 
 what  mull  thefe  Animals  fubfilt  on?  If  they  were  of  the 
 fame  Nature  with  fuch  as  we  arp  acquainted  with,  they  muft 
 alfo  be  fuflain'd  after  the  fame  manner,  i.e.  they  muft  live 
 by  FooJ,  and  confequently  jive  upon,  and  continually  torment 
 pnd  confume  one  another;  and  confequently  more  Happineft 
 would  be  loft  than  got  by  fuch  |->ife,  which  is  as  plentiful  at 
 prefent^,  as  feems  agreeable  to  the  Syftem.  If  Matter  as  Mat- 
 ter, were  endowed  wjth  the  Power  of  Self-Motion,  whg^ 
 Ufe  could  .we  put  it  to?  What  Clothing  or  Habitations? 
 Whaf  Inftruments  or  Utenfils  could  we  make  of  it?  But 
 this,  I  think,  needs  no  farther  Explanation.  Matter  then,  in 
 ^ts  prelent  State,  as  united  with  and  lubfervient  to  luch  Spi- 
 rits as.  we  conceive  ours  to  be,  is  in  gcnpral  more  conducive 
 to  the  Good  apd  Happincfs  of  the  whole,  taan  it  would  be 
 ::i  any  other  conceiv;ible  manner  of  Exiftence,  To  afk  yet 
 \\\\y  fome  certain  Portions  or  Syftems  of  it  might  not  have 
 pccn  made  more  perfefl,  or  why  it  was  not  farther "fublimated', 
 refined,  and  io  unaccountably  modified  as  to  be  rendered  c.i- 
 pable  of  Thought ;  is  the  abfurd  Qiieuion  above  mentioned, 
 njiz,,  Why  was  it  not  made  fcmething  elfe,  or  removed  into  k 
 
 ■'  '■'  '.    "     ^'     ■     ^'''i\%^ 
 
 '^  See  Note  26^ 
 
Chap. III.     Of  the  Evil  of  Dfe^,  137 
 
 fore  agreeable  to  the  greatefl:  Power  and  Cood- 
 nefs  to^  have  created  this  aUo ;  nor  need  we  the  Df?- 
 miurgm  of  the  antient  Heretics  to  produce  it,  as 
 if  unworthy  of  the  great  and  good  God.  The 
 Evils  of  Imperfe(5lion  then  muft  be  permitted  in 
 the  Nature  of  things;  an  inequality  of  Perfec- 
 tions muft  be'  permitted  alio,  fmce  it  is  impoflible 
 that  all  the  Works  of  God  fliould  be  endowed 
 V/ith  equal  Perfe«3:ions.     (Q.) 
 
 •' .  "     '■    '■  yii. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Kigher  Oafs  ?  When  at  the  fame  time  there  appears  fo  much 
 Reafon  for  the  Exiftence  of  fuch  a  thing  as  this  now  is ;  and 
 all  fuperior  ClafTes  are  concluded  to  be  full.  What  Reafon 
 there  is  for  this  laft  conclufion  may  be  feen  in  Note  24. 
 
 (G.)  The  Author  has  been  blamed  here  formaking  any  Dif- 
 ficulty about  fuch  Evils  as  thefe  of  Imperfeftion,  which  are 
 properly  fpeaking  no  Evils  at  all.  'Tis  trifling,  fay  the  Ob- 
 jeftors,  fince  we  fee  that  the  Perfeftion  of  any  Sfrudlure  or 
 Machine  confills  in  this,  that  the  Parts  thereof  have  different 
 Powers  and  Offices,  and  therefpre  \ve  can  eafily  conceive  it  tq 
 be  no  Imperfedion  in  the  Machine  of  the  World  that  its  Parts 
 are  of  unequal  perfcjdlions  ;  for  thofe  that  feem  to  have  the  lefs 
 Perfection  would  not  anfwer  their  Defign,  nor  fi)!  their  Places 
 if  they  werQ  not  fo  unequal.  And  as  for  inanimate  things  they 
 are  neither  capable  of  Good  nor  Evilj  it  fignifies  nothing 
 v/here  they  are  phced,  or  to  what  A'lotions  they  are  fubjeftedj, 
 fmce  they  cannot  complain  or  be  fenfible  of  their  Condition. 
 Confecjaently  there  is  no  fuch  thing  as  the  Evil  Qi  Imperfec- 
 tion, but  all  is  properly  Natural. 
 
 To  all  which  we  anfwer  \Ji.  The  World  and  every  Part  of 
 it  is  in  its  own  Nature  imperfect,  for  whatfoever  is  naturally 
 perfcdV,  is  felf  fufficient,  and  does  not  ftand  in  need  oi  the 
 Combination  of  more  Parvus  or  the  Affilfance  of  other  things  i 
 for  tha^  Complication  of  parts  which  is  obfervable  in'  Ma- 
 chines is  neceifaiy  upon  this  account  only,  that  one  may  fupply 
 the  Defecls  of  another. 
 
 zdly.  From  hence  it  is  evident,  that  the  Pcrfedion  of  the 
 I'aits  is  not  to  be  eftimated  from  their  own  private  Conveni- 
 ency  alone,  but  from  the  Relation  which  they  have  to  the 
 whole.  And  there's  a  great  deal  of  Difference  between  rela- 
 ijvc  and  abfolute  Perfection  {  a  thing  may  psrfqdly  anfwer  the 
 '    •     '    ^  '  Office 
 
138 
 
 'Tis  lefs 
 agreeable 
 to  the 
 Divine 
 Goodnefs 
 to  have  o- 
 Jiiitted, 
 than  to 
 have  crea- 
 ted thefe 
 more  im- 
 perfeit 
 Jeings. 
 
 Of  the  Evil  of  Defccf.     Chap.  IIL 
 
 VII.  If  you  fay,  God  might  have  omitred  the 
 more  imperfed:  Bcmgs  I  grant  it,  and  if  that  had 
 been  beft  he  would  undoubtedly  have  done  it.     But 
 
 ic 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Office  it  bears  v^Ith  regird  to  the  whole,  without  any  Conve- 
 nience to  itfelf,  nay  to  its  own  Dcftrudion. 
 
 ^dly.  It  appears  that  notwithllanding  the  Infinite  Power, 
 Wifdom,  and  Goodnefs  of  God,  Creatures  mult  necelTarily 
 labour  under  the  Evil  of  Imperfection;  and  that  this  Imper- 
 fection is  to  be  coniider'd  two  Ways,  the  one  with  regard  to 
 the  whole,  the  other  in  refpeft  of  particulars. 
 
 4thly.  The  Good  of  the  whole  cannot  be  in  every  thing  at 
 all  times  conMent  with  the  Good  of  each  Particular.  For 
 as  every  Part  is  in  its  own  Nature  imperfedl and  limited,  'tis 
 poffible  for  it  not  to  be  Self-fufficient,  and  that  it  may  have  as 
 much  Occafion  for  external  Affillance,  as  reafon  to  affiil  others. 
 The  Poffibility  of  fuch  a  State  follows  from  the  very  Nature 
 ©f  Limitation  and  Imperfeftion.  For  fuppofmg  more  thing5 
 than  one  of  a  limited  Nature,  if  they  have  any  intercourie  to 
 gether,  they  muft  neceffarily  affedt  each  other.  And  it  be- 
 longs to  the  Divine  Goodneft  fo  to  frame  them,  that  they  fhall 
 affift  and  relieve  each  other.  Now  limited  Natures  ought  to 
 have  limited  Powers  and  Acts,  nor  can  all  Faculties  agree  to 
 every  Nature,  lince  they  may  be  different,  diltinct  and  oppo- 
 fite.  And  tho'  thefe  Agents  which  have  contrary  Faculties 
 cannot  promote  each  others  Benefit  immediately  ;  yet  by  tak- 
 ing a  Compafs,  and  confpiring  to  aft  in  concert,  they  may 
 conduce  to  the  good  of  the  whole  and  of  each  other.  But 
 fmce  created  things  are  almoft  infinite,  and  endowed  with  an 
 infinite  diverfity  ot  Powers  and  Properties,  and  fince  an  inter- 
 courfe  is  eitablifhed  between  all  of  them  io  that  they 'may  a<ft 
 upon,  and  be  a(£led  on  by  each  other,  it  is  impolnble  but  that 
 fome  Oppofition  and  Contention  fhould  arife  among  the  parts; 
 which  nevcrthelefs  may  make  for  the  Benefit  of  the  whole; 
 neither  can  thefe  Oppofitions  and  Contentions  be  any  bar  to 
 the  Divine  Power  and  Goodnefs,  fince  they  proceed  not  from 
 any  Defeifl  in  the  Creator,  but  from  the  necellary  Imperfecfli- 
 on  of  fuch  things  as  are  in  their  own  Nature  limited  and  fi- 
 nite, but  which  are  necefiary  to  the  Good  of  the  whole  Sy- 
 flem,  the  general  Benefit  whereof  is  to  be  preferred  to  the 
 Good  of  fome  particulars  whenfoever  they  are  inconfiftent. 
 There  muft  then  be  Defedls,  or  want  of  Perfcftion  in  feveral 
 parts  of  the  Creation,  and  this  Wantof  Pertcction  mull  of  Ne-, 
 
 ceffuy 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  BefeB.  13^ 
 
 it  is  the  p.irt  of  infinite  Goodnefs  to  chufe  the  ve- 
 ry beft;  from  thence  it  proceeds  therefore,  that 
 the  more  imperfedt   Beings  have  Exidence;  for  ic 
 
 was 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ceffity  bring  many  Inconvenlencies  on  the  Perfon  whofe  Lot 
 it  is  to  fill  that  Part  of  the  Univerfc,  which  requires  a  Creature 
 of  fuch  an  imperfedl  Nature.  For  Example,  a  Man  has  no 
 Wings,  a  Perfeftion  granted  to  Birds.  'Tis  plain,  that  in  his 
 prefent  Circumilances  he  cannot  have  them,  and  that  the  Ufe 
 of  them  wou'd  be  very  milchievous  to  Society  ;  and  yet  the 
 Want   of  them  necefiarily   expofes   us   to   many    Inconveni- 
 
 ^cncies. 
 
 ijc^  A  Man  falls  from  a  Precipice  or  into  a  Pit ;  Wings  wou'd 
 fave  him  from  the  Fall,  and  relieve  him  from  his  Imprifon- 
 ment ;  whereas  now  he  breaks  his  Bones  or  IlarTCs  by  his  Con- 
 finement. A  thoufand  Inftances  may  be  given  where  the 
 Evil  of  Imperfection  necefiarily  fubjeftsus  to  Difappointment 
 of  Appetite,  and  fevcral   other  natural  Evils ;  which  yet  are 
 
 -,  all  neceflary  for  the  Common  good. 
 
 i/r^  If  it  be  afk'd  why  God,  as  he  is  of  Infinite  Power  and 
 Wifdom,  did  not  order  things  in  fuch  a  Manner  that  the  good  of 
 the  whole  (hould  in  all  cafes  and  at  all  times  confpire  with  that 
 of  each  particular.  Or  ifthefe  Evils  necefiarily  arife  from  the 
 mutual  Intercourfe  of  Parts  of  a  different  and  contrary 
 Kind,  why  did  he  ordain  fuch  an  Intercourfe  ?  Could  he  not; 
 have  created  all  Things  in  fuch  a  State  of  Perfe£lion,  that 
 they  fhould  find  their  Happinefs  in  themfelves  without  the 
 Help  of  any  thing  external  ?  At  leaft  he  could  have  made 
 thofe  things,  which  he  himfelf  had  the  Framing  of,  in  fuch  a 
 Manner  as  to  have  no  Intercourfe  with  any  Being  but  himfelf. 
 For  they  might  have  had  enough  to  exercife  their  Faculties 
 upon  in  the  Contemplation  and  Love  of  the  Divine  Nature  ; 
 which  would  have  been  fufiicient  for  their  Happinefs,  with- 
 Qut  any  Cornmerce  with  or  Dependence  upon  other  Creatures  ; 
 efpecially  fuch  as  would  incommode  them.  Why  therefore 
 did  God  choofe  fuch  a  Syileiu  as  made  room  for  other  imper- 
 feft,  miferable  Bemgs. 
 
 /^We  anfwer,  that  granting  fuch  Creatures  as  thofe  above- 
 mention'd  to  be  poflible,  God  has  aftually  created  as  many  of 
 that  Kind  as  the  Syftem  wou'd  admit,  infomuch  that  if  there 
 had  been  more  it  wou'd  have  been  more  inconvenient.  Nor 
 is  it  of  any  confequence  whether  we  fuppofe  this  Syftem  to 
 be  Finite  or  Infinite.     If  Finite,  'tis  plain  that  a  certain  Num- 
 
140  Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB,    Chap.  III. 
 
 was  agreeable  to  that  not  to  admit  the  very  leaft 
 Good  that  could  be  produced.  Finite  Goodnefs 
 Diight  poffibly  have  been  exhaufted  in  creating  the 
 
 grea- 
 
 NO  r  E  S, 
 
 ber  mny  fill  it  fo  that  there  will  be  no  room  for  more.  If 
 Infinite;,  infinite  Creitures  of  the  fame  Kind  will  equally 
 fA\  an  infinite  Syficm,  as  a  finite  Number  will  fill  a  finite  One; 
 for  there's  the  fame  Proportion.  In  this  then  as  well  as  the 
 former  Syftem  there  will  be  no  Place  for  more.  But  yet 
 xvhen  this  Syftem  or  Order  of  Creatures  is  filled  up,  there 
 wou'd  be  room  left  for  other  lejs  perfe£t  Orders,  whofe  Na- 
 tures and  Faculties  might  hive  a  mutual  Relation  to  each  otier 
 and  whofe  Happinefs  might  require  their  mutual  Help  and 
 Afliftance.  'Tis  certain  that  many  and  various  Orders  -and 
 Begrees  of  this  Kind  were  polfible;  neither  would  they,  if 
 created,  be  any  Impediment  to  the  more  perfcft  Orier,  which 
 is  already  compleated,  and  the  Number  of  which  could  not 
 be  encreafed  without  Damage  to  the  Syftem ;  neither  would 
 the  Addition  of  thefe  inferior  Orders  and  Degrees,  lefTen  the 
 Number  of  the  prior  and  more  perfedl  Ones. 
 Q^^Whzt  therefore  was  to  be  done  ?  Let  us  now  fuppofe  God 
 deliberating  with  himfelf  (as  a  Man  wou'd  do)  whether  he 
 Ihould  create  any  of  an  inferior  Order.  If  he  does,  'tis  ma- 
 nifeft  that  he  will  introduce  unneceffary  Imperfeftions  into 
 his  Works.  Nay,  fince  fome  of  thefe  may  have  Natures  and 
 Powers  contrary  to  each  other,  it  will  be  poflible  for  Clafh- 
 ing  and  Oppofition  to  arife  among  his  Creatures.  If  he  does 
 not  create  them,  he  will  appear  unkind  in  grudging  and  re- 
 fufing  them  a  Benefit,  which  he  was  able  to  conirRunicate 
 without  Detriment  to  the  Syftem.  For  I  fuppofe  thefe  infe- 
 rior Ones  not  to  be  fo  very  imperfe£t,  but  that  their  Exiftencc 
 wou'd  be  decm'd  a  great  and  valuable  Blefhng. 
 g^  Who  does  not  fee  what  way  the  Divine  Goodnefs  wou'd 
 incline  in  this  Debate  ?  For  fince  it  was  better  that  thefe  fliou'd 
 be,  than  not,  is  it  not  agreeable  to  infinite  Goodnefs  to 
 choofe  the  beft  ?  At  leaft  fuch  a  Choice  could  be  no  Inj  ury  to 
 the  greateft  Goodnefs. 
 
 Whatever  Syftem  God  had  chofen,  all  Creatures  in  it  could 
 not  have  been  equally  perfeft,  and  there  could  have  been  but  a 
 certain  determinate  Multitude  of  the  moft  Perfed,  and  when 
 that  was  Compleated,  there  wou'd  have  been  a  Station  for  Crea- 
 —  itiires  lefs  pe rfe6l,-<-and  it  wou'd  ftill  have  been  an  Inftance  of. 
 Goodnefs  to  give  them  i  Being,  as  well  as  others:  And 
 "*  therefore 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB.  141 
 
 greater  Beings,  bnc  Iriftnitc  extends  to  all.  The 
 infinite  Power  and  Goodnefs  of  God  then  were 
 the  Caufe  why  imperfed  Beings  had  Exiftence  to 
 
 gether 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 therefore  whatever  Syilem  had  been  chofen,  it  would  have 
 come  to  what  we  fee,  perhaps  it  wou'd  have  been  worfe/SJnce  ^  *~A.i»^^ 
 therefore  whatever  God  had  chofen,  there  mud  have  been  De- 
 grees of  Perfeflion,  and  one  Creature  mull  have  been  more 
 imperfeft  and  infirm  than  another,  ought  we  not  to  conclude 
 that  our  prefent  Syftem  is  at  leaft  equal  to  any  other  that  we 
 could  have  expefted  ? 
 
 p>- Hence  it  appears  why  God  created  fach  Beings,  as  mufl 
 neceffarily  have  an  Intercourfe  with  each  other,  and  how  a- 
 greeable  it  was  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  not  to  deny  them  Ex- 
 iftence. There  could  be  no  reafon  to  afk  why  he  did  not 
 make  them  of  a  more  perfedl  Order,  fmce  as  many  of  that' 
 Kind  are  made  already  as  the  Syftem  could'  receive,  of  v^hac. 
 Kind  foever  that  Syftem  were  fuppofed  to  be.  Neither  could 
 the  Benefit  of  the  whole  be  rendered  abfolutely,  in  all  Cafes,, 
 and  at  all  times  confiftcnt  with  that  of  Particulars.  For  tho* 
 this  might  perhaps  be  effetled  in  the  more  perfcft  Orders,  yet 
 it  is  plainly  impoffiblc  in  the  lefs  perfect  ones,  fuch  as  have  a 
 Connexion  with  Matter,  that  is  neceffarily  fubjefl  to  Con- 
 trariety and  DifFolution  ;  and  cfpecially  thofe  which  have  fo- 
 lid  and  hard  Bodies.  Either  therefore  no  fuch  Ani.iials  as 
 thefe  were  to  have  been  created,  or  thefe  InconVcniencics  to- 
 lerated :  Suppofing  always  that  their  Exiftence  is  a  Bleffing 
 to  them  notwithftanding  thefe  Inconveniences,  and  that  more 
 Good  than  Evil  accrues  to  them  from  the  Poffeflion  of  it. 
 
 pt- From  hence  it  U'ill  appear  how  fruitful  a  Source  of  EvilV 
 this  Imperfeftion  of  Creatures  may  be,  and  that  from  this 
 Head  there  flows  a  Poflibility  of  Evil  among  the  Works  of 
 God,  notwithftanding  Infinite  Power  and  Goodnefs.  How 
 every  particular  Evil  may  be  reduced  to  this  Origin,  fhall  be 
 fhewn  (God  willing)  in  the  Sequel. 
 
 In  the  Interim  who  can  doubt  whether  this  Source  of  all 
 Evils  be  itfelf  to  be  call'd  an  Evil  ?  Evil  is  by  many  defanecf 
 a  Privation  of  Good.  In  this  it  agrees  with  Defeft  or  Im- 
 perfeftion,  and  a  Man  is  called  Evil,  or  an  Adion  Evil, 
 which  brings  us  into  Inconvenience?,  or  is  prejudicial  to  the 
 Author  or  any  other  Perfon.  With  how  much  more  rcafori 
 then  may  Imperiection  be  called  an  Evil,  fince  'tis  the  Ori- 
 
142  Of  the  Evil  of  hefe6i.    Chap.  III. 
 
 gether  with  the  more  peifed.  'Tis  plain  therefore 
 that  the  Syftem  of  the  World  may  be  the  V/ork 
 of  a  Deity  i  tho*  it  has  this  Fault,     Nay,  that  is  was 
 
 created 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 gin  of  all  the  Evils  we  endwc,  or  which  arlfe  in  the  Mun- 
 dane Syfcem. 
 
 ^But  inanimate  Things,  you  fay,  are  capable  of  neither 
 Good  nor  Evil,  and  therefore  it  does  not,  fignify  in  what 
 Condition  they  be  placed,  fenfible  Things  only  can  be  mife- 
 rable.  I  anfwer,  'tis  true  inanimate  Creatures  are  not  capa- 
 ble of  fome  kind  of  Evils,  W3.  Pain,  Grief,  or  undue  Elecli- 
 ons;  but  are  there  no  other  Evils  which  they  may  be  fubje6t 
 to  ?  Who  wou'd  not  think  himfelf  ill  dealt  with,  if  he  fhould 
 be  reduced  to  the  State  of  an  inanimate  Creature  ?  He  wou'd 
 feel  no  Inconvenience,  fay  you.  1  grant  it,  but  this  very  not 
 feeling  is  dreaded  by  us  as  one  of  the  greateil:  of  all  Evils. 
 This  Deprivation  ofSenfe  therefore,  is  far  from  being  defira- 
 ble,  and  confequently  far  from  being  good.  To  be  deprived 
 ■    of  Senfe  is  what  we  call  an  Evil  oi  Lofs,  tho'  it  be  not  a  fenii- 
 
 ble  one. 
 I^^^-If  any  one  fnould  take  away  a  Man's  Feeling  by  a  blow  or 
 jiny  other  way,  nay  if  he  did  not  rellore  it  to  him  when  he 
 had  this  in  his  Power,  wou'd  he  not  be  mifchievous  and  in- 
 jurious to  him,  tho'  the  Sufferer  be  not  at  all  fenfible  of  the 
 Injury?  Now  who  can  affirm  that  God  cou'd  not  have  en- 
 dowed every  thing  with  Senfe,  at  leail  have  join'd  a  fcnfitive 
 Soul  to  every  Particle  of  Matter  ?  May  we  not  complain 
 therefore  that  he  has  not  done  it  ?  It  is  not  equally  difadva'nta- 
 geous  for  inanimate  things  never  to  have  had  Senfe,  as  for  ani- 
 mated Beings  to  be  deprived  of  it? 
 
 And  yet  fome  are  fo  perverfe  that  they  will  not  have  this 
 Imperfeclion  called  an  Evil,  tho'  it  really  be  as  great  an  one  as 
 the  other. 
 
 &*-However,  we  mail:  obferve  that  inanimate  Things  are  not' 
 made  for  themlelves,  but  for  the  Ufc  offuch  as  are  endowed^ 
 with  Senfe  and  Reafon,  they  have  therefore  a  relative  good 
 or  Evil,  both  in  regard  to  God,  and  to  thole  Creatures  for 
 \vhofe  Ufe  they  v/erc  deiign'd,  and  as  far  as  they  anfwer  the 
 End  they  were  made  for  we  efrecm  them  good,  fuch  as  do 
 othcrvvifeare  Evil:  Of  which  Good  or  Evil  tliere  is  no  other 
 ground  but  their  Perfeclion  or  Imperreftion. 
 
 Tho  Origin  of  Evil  is  the  fame  therefore  in  both  fenfitive" 
 sfiid  inanimate  Beings,  w'k,  the  Abfehcc  of  Pcrfc(ftion. 
 
 (H)The- 
 
Chap.  III.     Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB.  143 
 
 created  is  evident  for  this  very  Reafon,  becaufe  it  is 
 imperfeUi  for  if  it  were  Self-exijlent,  it  would  be 
 a&folmely  perfe^*     (l^.) 
 
 N  0  T  £  S. 
 
 (24.)  The  chief  Argument  of  the  foregoing  Chapter  is 
 beautifully  illuflrated  by  Mr.  Addifon'm  the  Spc&ator,  N".  5 19. 
 As  frequent  ufe  will  be  made  of  this  Obfcrvation  concerning 
 the  Scale  of  Beings,  I  hope  the  Reader  will  excufe  my  tran- 
 fcribin^  fo  much  of  the  abovemention'd  Paper  as  is  neceflary- 
 to  explain  it. 
 
 (;&-'  Infinite  Goodnefs  is  of  fo  communicative  a  Nature,  that 
 it  feems  to  delight  in  the  conferring  of  Exiftence  upon  eve- 
 ry Degree  of  perceptive  Being.  As  this  is  a  Speculation 
 which  I  have  often  purfued  with  great  pleafure  to  my  felf, 
 I  fhall  enlarge  farther  upon  it,  by  confidcring  that  part  of 
 the  Scale  of  Beings  which  cjnes  within  our  Knowledge. 
 There  are  fome  living  Creatures  which  are  raifed  juft  above 
 dead  Matter.  To  mention  only  the  Species  of  Shell-Fifii, 
 which  are  formed  in  the  Fafhion  of  a  Cone,  that  grOw  to' 
 the  Surface  of  feveral  Rocks,  and  immediately  die.  upoa 
 their  being  fever'd  from  the  place  where  they  grow.  There, 
 are  many  other  Creatures  but  one  remove  from  thefe,  which 
 have  no  other  Senfes  befides  that  of  Feeling  and  Talle. 
 Others  have  fall  an  additional  one  of  Hearing,  others  of 
 Smell,  and  others  of  Sight. -fit  is  wonderful  to  obferve,  bv  •#- 
 whit  a  gradual  progrefs  the  World  of  Life  advances  thro' 
 a  prodigious  variety  of  Species,  before  a  Creature  is  form- 
 ed that  is  compleat  in  all  its  Senfes  ;t-and  even  among  thefe -f  ^^^wv.. 
 is  fuch  a  different  Degree  of  Perfeftion,  in  the  Sen fe  which 
 One  Animal  enjoys  beyond  what  appears  in  another,  that  tho' 
 the  Senfe  in  different  Animals  be  dilHnguifh'd  by  the  fame 
 common  Denom.ination,  it  feems  almofl  of  a  different  Nature. 
 If  after  this  We  look  into  the  feveral  inward  Perfeftions,  Cun- 
 ning and  Sagacity,  or  what  we  generally  call  7/?/?/;/^*,  we 
 find  them  rifmg  after  the  fame  manner  imperceptibly  one  a- 
 bove  another,  and  receiving  additional  Improvements  ac- 
 cording to  the  Species  in  which  they  are  implanted.  +This-f-  -=^~ 
 Progrefs  in  Nature  is  fo  very  gradual,  that  rhe  moft  perfeft 
 of  an  inferior  Species  comes  very  near  to  the  raoft  imperfeft 
 of  that  which  is  immediately  above  it.  ^'Thc  exuberant  and  -f- 
 
 •  ovcr- 
 
 *  To  which  we  may  add,   Will  and  Liberfy.     See  Belle's 
 ©i4l.  p.  2609.  2610. 
 
144  ^f  (^^^  -Ei;/7  of  Defea.    Chap.  III. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 «  overflowing  Goodnefs  of  the  fuprcme  Being,  whofe  Mercy 
 '  extends  to  all  his  Works,  is  plainly  ken,  as  I  have  before  hint- 
 
 *  ed,  from  his  having  made  io  little  Matter,  at  Icall  ivhat  fills 
 
 *  within  our  Knowledge,    that  does  not  fwarm  with  Life: 
 
 *  Nor  is  his  Goodnefs  lei's  feen  in  the  Diverfity   than  in  the 
 
 *  Multitude    of  living  Creatures.     Had    he  oijly  made  one 
 
 *  Species  of  Animals,  none  of  the  reft  would  have  enjoy' J 
 
 *  the  Happinels  of  Exillence,  he  has  therefore  fpacified  in  his 
 '  Creation  every  Degree  of  Life,  every.  Capacity   of  Being, 
 
 *  The  whole  Chafm  in  Nature,  from  a  Plant  to  a  Man,,  is  fil- 
 '  led  up  with  diverfe  kinds  of  Creatures,  rifing  one  over  ano- 
 
 *  ther,  by  fuch  a  gentle  and  eafy  afcent,-  that  the  little  Tran- 
 
 *  fitions  and  Deviations  from  one  Species  to  another,  are  al- 
 
 *  mort  infenfible.     This    intermediate  Space  \^  fo  v/ell  huf- 
 
 *  banded  and   managed,  that  there  is  fcarce  a  Degree  of  Per- 
 
 *  fedtion  which  does  not  appear  in  fome  one  pa^t  of  the  World 
 
 *  of  Life.     Is  the  Goodnefs  or  Wifdom  of  the  Divine  Being 
 
 *  more  manifefted  in  this  his  Proceeding  ?.t  There  is  a  Con- j 
 
 *  fequence,  befides  thofe  I  have  already  mentioned,  which 
 '  feems  very  naturally  deducibJc  from  the  foregoing  Conilde- 
 
 *  rations. -t  If  the  Scale  of  Being  rifes  by  fuch  a  regular  Pro- 
 
 *  grefs,  fo  high  as  Man,  we  may,  by  a  parity  of  Reafon,  fivp- 
 '  pofe  that  it  Hill  proceeds  gradually  thro'  thofe  Beings  which 
 '  are  of  a  fuperior  Nature  to  him  ;  fince  there  is  an  infinitely 
 
 *  greater  Space  and  Room  for  different  Degrees  of  Perfection 
 '   between  the  fupreme  Being  and  Man,  than  between  Man 
 
 -*  and  the  moll  defpicable  Infed.  ^fhis  Confcquence  of  fo  great 
 
 *  a  variety  of  Beings  which  are  fuperior  to  us,  from  that  vari- 
 «  ety  which  is  inferior  to  us,  is  made  by  Mr.  Locke,  in  a  Paf- 
 
 *  lage  which  I  fliall  here  fet  down,  after  having  premiied*  that 
 
 *  notwithitanding  there  is  fuch  infinite  Room  between  Man 
 '  and  his  Maker  for  the  creative  Power  to  exert  itfelfin,  it 
 '  is  impoffible  that  it  fliould  ever  be  filled  up,  fince  there  will 
 
 *  be  ftill  an  Infinite  Gap  or  Dillance  between  the  highelt  cro- 
 
 *  atcd  Being  and  the  Power  which  produced  him.'   . 
 
 The  fine  Paflage  there  cited  from  Mr.  Locke,  occurs  in  the 
 3d  Book  of  his  Effay,  Chap.  6.  §.  i  z. 
 Sec  alfo  Notes,  K.  and  26. 
 From  the  foregoing  Obfervation,  that   there  is  no  manner 
 oS  Chafm  or  Voidy  no  Link  deficient  in  this  great  Chain, ot  Be- 
 ings, and  the  Re.ifon  of  it,   it  \\\\\  appear  extremely  probable 
 alfo  that  evtry  dilUndt  Order,  every  Clafs  or  Species  of  them, 
 is' as  full  as  the  Nature  of  it  would  admit,  and  God  faw  pro- 
 per 
 
Cbap.  if  I.     Of  the  Evil  of  Defedi. 
 
 ^4s 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ftv.  There  are  (as  our  Author  fays)  perhaps  {o  many  in  each 
 Clafs  as  could  exift  together  without  ibme  inconvenic-nce  or  ii?i- 
 cafitieff  to  each  other.  .  This. is  eafily  conceivable  in  Mankind, 
 and  may  be  in  fuperior  Beings,  tho'  for  want  of  an  exaft 
 Knowledge  of  their  fcveral  Natures  and  Orders,  we  cannot 
 apprehend  the  manner  of  it,  or  conceive  how  they  affeft  one 
 another;  only  this  we  are  furc  of,  that  neither  the  Species,  nor 
 the  Indivi4«als_in  each  Species,  can  polhblybe  Inhnite  ;  and. 
 that  nothing  but  an  ImpaJJlbillfy  in  the  Nature  cf  the  thing,  or 
 fome  greater  Incon^venicnce^  can  rellrain  the  Exe.-cife  ot  the; 
 Power  of  God,  or  hinder  him  from  producing  ftill  more  and 
 more  Beings  capable  of  Felicity.  When  we  begin  to  enquire  in-, 
 to  the  Number  of  thefe  and  the  Degrees  of  their  Perfection,  we 
 foon  lofe  ourfelves,  and  can  only  refer  all  to  the  D.vme  Wii"- 
 dom  and  Goodnefs  '.iCFrom  our  previous  Notices  of  which  At— f- 
 tributes,  we  have  the  higheft  Reafon  to  conclude  that  every- 
 thing is  a?  perfedl  as  poflible  in  itspwn  kind,'  and  that  every 
 Syftem  is  in  itfelffull  and  complete. 
 
 1^  '" 
 
 u 
 
 CH  A;P, 
 
146  Chap,  IV. 
 
 CHAP.     IV. 
 
 Concerning  Natural  Evil. 
 
 SECT.     I. 
 
 Of  Generation  and  Corruption. 
 
 A  Crea-      TT  appears  from  the  foregoing  Obfervations  that 
 ture  can-    X  Created  Beings  mufb  necelTarily  be  defective,  i.  e. 
 not  com-    fome  muft  want  the  Perfeftions  which  others  have. 
 Its  Fate      ^"^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  impoffible  for  them  to  enjoy  either  an 
 tho'  it  be    abfolute  or  equal  Perfeftion ;  alio,  that  thereis  no  Oc- 
 lefs  pertea  cafion  for  an  Evil  Principle  oppofite  to  infinite  Good- 
 than  o-       j^gj-j  ^^^  Power.  And  from  hence  we  may  affirm  that 
 God,  tho'  infinitely  good  and  powerful,  could  not  k- 
 parate  things  from  the  concomitant  Evils  of  Imperfec- 
 tion, and  did  not  el}eem  it  unbecoming  himfelf  to  cre- 
 ate the  Good,  rho'  that  brought  fome Evils  along  with 
 it,  fo  long  as  thefe  Evils  are  lefs  than  the  Good  with 
 which  they  are  connefted.  Nor  can  the  Creature  jufl- 
 ly  complain  of  its  Condition,  if  it  have  not  all,  or  e- 
 qual  Perfc6lion  with  fome  others;  fmce  'twas  ne- 
 cefTary  that  it  fhould  fill  the  Station  wherein  it  was 
 placed,  or  none  at  all.  This  we  have  fhewn  fufficient- 
 ly,  I  think,  in  the  former  kind  of  Evils,  viz,  thofe 
 Qi  Imverfeclion. 
 
 ir. 
 
Sed.  r.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  147 
 
 II.  The  fame  muft  be  attempted  in  the  fecond  The  Ori- 
 kind,  viz,,   the  Natural.     Now,  as  all  created  Be-  S'"  of 
 ings  are  made  out  o£ Nothing,  and  on  that  account  are  |-,.o"^\/i  * 
 necefTarily  imperfeft  ;  fo  all  natural  things  have  a  Re-  ter,  is  the 
 lation  toj  or  arife  from  Alatier^  and  on  this  account  fource  of 
 are  neceSarily  fubjeded  to  natural  Evils :  Nor  is  the  Natural 
 rife   of  all    created    Beings  from   Nothing  a  moe  ^j^  •    .-r' 
 fruitful  and  certain  Caufe  of  the  Evils  of  Imper-  ^^.^^  ^^^ 
 fedion,    than   the  rife    of  all  natural    things  from  thirg  is 
 Matter  is  of  all  natural   Evils.    (H.)  If  therefore  the  Caufe 
 
 L    2  we  ofthofeof 
 
 I  m  per- 
 
 NOTES.  ^''"^^ 
 
 (H.)  The  Ol:je£tion  againll  this  Pofition  ftands  thus.  Not 
 only  Generation  and  Corruption  arc  natural  Evils,  but  like- 
 wife  Pains  of  Body  and  Diffatisfaftion  of  Mind,  Diflippoint- 
 ijients  of  Appetite  and  Death.  Now  it  is  manifell  that  all  ma- 
 terial Beings  are  not  fubjeit  to  thefe,  particularly  Man  in  Pa- 
 radife  as  to  his  Body  was  material,  and  yet  free  from  Death, 
 and  all  natural  Evils,  and  the  fame  is  true  of  the  BlelTed  ia, 
 Heaven.  Since  therefore  material  Beings  may  be  fee  from 
 all  natural  Evils,  it  follows  that  they  are  not  neceffarily  fub-. 
 jeft  to  fuch  becaufe  they  are  Material,  and  confequently  we 
 muft  look  for  anotlier  Origin  of  natural  Evils  dillind.  frora 
 
 ^  Matter,    . 
 
 '^^T^The  Anfwer  to  this  Objeftion,  that  feems  to  have  fo  great. 
 force  in  it,  is  not  difficult.  'Tis  manifeft  from  the  Book  that 
 when  it  affirms  all  material  Beings  are  liable  to  natural  Evils, 
 it  is  not  meant  that  they  ^are  always  a£lually  affedled  by  them, 
 but  that  they  are  capable  of  being  fo  afFefted  at  certain  Times, 
 and  in  certain  Circumftances ;  and  yet  their  Circumftances  may. 
 perhaps  be  fo  ordered  that  they  fhall  be  always  free  froin. 
 them. 
 
 For  Example,  Man  in  Paradife  was  naturally  Mortal,  and 
 
 tho'  we  do  not  know  what  fort  of  Body  he  had,  yet  we  are 
 
 fure  that  he  had  an  Appetite  to  eat  and  drink,  and  needed 
 
 thefe  to  fupport  him.  ...  . 
 
 How  then  could  hg  avoid  Pain,'  Difappointmcnt  of  Appe- 
 
 -f^ite  and  Death  ?aI  aftfv/er  by  being  placed  in  fuch  Circum- 
 ftances that  he  fhould  always  have  fufficient  Provifion  ready 
 to  fatisfy  his  Hunger  and  Thirft,  and  fuch  a  Knowledge  of 
 all  things,  that  could  hurt  him,  that  he  might  eafily  avoid, 
 them.     His  Blood  was  infi.^mable   then  as  well  as  now,  and 
 
 con  fa- 
 
148  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 we   can  ihew  that    thefe   Evils   are    fo  neceflarily 
 conneded  with   this  Origin  that  they  cannot  be 
 
 feparatcd 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 confequently  he  was  fubjeil  to  a  Fever.  His  Limbs  might  be 
 broken  and  disjointed  then  as  well  as  now,  and  that  muft  dif- 
 able  him  to  manage  his  Bufmefs,  and  difappint  a  natural 
 Appetite  of  moving  where  his  Occafions  required.  But  God 
 gave  him  the  Tree  of  Life  as  a  Remedy  againft  all  natural 
 Diftempers  and  Decays  of  Body,  and  either  fuch  a  Profpedt 
 of  what  tou'd  hurt  him  as  might  enable  him  to  avoid  the 
 Occafion,  or  elfe  if  that  happeu'd  he  was  reftored  by  the  ufc 
 Cof  the  fame  Tree  of  Life,  v  After  all  it  doth  not  appear  from 
 Scripture,  that  Man  in  his  Innocency  was  fecure  from  all  natu- 
 ral Evils,  but  only  from  fuch  as  might  deprive  him  of  Life, 
 or  make  that  Life  uncomfortable  to  him.  If  any  Divines 
 have  gone  farther  it  is  mere  conjefture,  and  no  part  either  of 
 the  Faith  taught  in  Scripture,  or  conveyed  to  us  by  the  Catho- 
 lick  Church.  The  Author  of  the  Origin  of  Evil  has  given  his 
 Thoughts  concerning  the  Eftate  of  our  iirft  Parents  more  ful- 
 ly in  a  Difcourfe  on  Cc7i.  ii.  17.  Where  he  founds  himfelf  on 
 the  Word  of  God  and  fpeaks  conformably  to  the  Senfe  of  the 
 Primitive  and  reformed  Churches,  but  it  were  too  long  to 
 infert  here  *. 
 
 From  what  has  been  faid  already  I  fuppofe  it  is  manifeft, 
 that  the  Happinefs  of  Man  in  Paradife  is  no  Argument  againil 
 the  Pofition  in  the  Book,  that  all  things  material  are  liable  to 
 natural  Evils,  to  Corruption  and  Diflblution,  and  if  united 
 to  a  Spiritual  Subftance  that  has  Senfe  or  Reafon,  they  make 
 it  likewife  capable  of  Pain,  and  of  the  Diifatisf^dion  that  a- 
 rifes  from  the  Difappointment  of  Appetites. 
 
 As  to  the  Blcfied  in  Heaven,  their  Cafe  is  much  more  eafy 
 to  be  accounted  for,  and  I  think  thofe  Words  of  the  4th  C. 
 S.  3.  Subl".  2.  are  fufficient.     '  I  anfwer,  thefe  Bodies  are  not 
 
 •  tlierefore  immortal,  bccaufc  they  are  naturally  incorruptible 
 
 ♦  for  that  would  be  inconlillent  with  the  Nature  of  that  Mat- 
 
 *  ter  whereof  thev  are  compofed)  but  becaufe  they  are  put  in- 
 
 •  to  fuch  Places  and  Circumltances  by  the  Deity,  that  they 
 '  can  even  with  Pleafure  forefee,  and  prevent  all  fuch  things 
 
 *  as  tend  to  introduce  either  Corruption  or  Pain.''  I  am  apt 
 to  think  the  Objector  either  never  read,  or  did  not  ^confidcf 
 this  when  he  made  the  Objeftion. 
 
 *  See  the  Sermon  annexed. 
 
Sedl.  I.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  149 
 
 feparared  froni  ir,  it  follows  that  the  Strudure  of 
 the  World  either  ought  nor  to  have  been  framed 
 at  all,  or  that  thefe  Evils  muft  have  been  tolerat- 
 ed without  any  Imputation  on  the  Divine  Power 
 and  Goodnefs.  But  it  is  better  that  they  iliould 
 be  as  they  are,  fince  they  could  not  be  more  per- 
 fed.  Let  us  examine  the  particular  Sorts  of  na- 
 tural Evils,  and  if  there  be  nothing  in  them 
 which  could  be  removed  v/ithout  greater  Damage 
 to  Nature,  and  introducing  a  larger  Train  of  Evils, 
 the  Divine  Goodnefs  may  fecurely  applaud  itfelf, 
 fince  it  has  omitted  no  manner  of  Good  nor  admitted 
 any  Evil  which  could  poflibly  be  prevented,  /.  e, 
 hach  done  in  every  thing  what  was  beft. 
 
 III.  God  has  accomplifh'd  this  in  the  Creation  Matter  is 
 of  Matter,   as  we  faid  before,  nor  has  he  been  lefs  ufelcfs  ex- 
 b(eneficent   in  what  relates  to  the  Motion  of  Mat-  ?^^P^  ^' 
 ter.     In  the  firft  Place,  Matter,  tho'  in  itfelf  un-  ^^^l     °'- 
 ad;ive,  is  neverthelefs  capable  of  Adlion,  viz,,  local 
 Motion,  which  is  the  Aftion  that  belongs  to  Mat- 
 ter.   But  'tis  better  that  it  fhould  ad:  as  far  as  it 
 
 is  capable,  than  be  entirely  flill   and  fluggifh:    If 
 it  were  without  Motion,    rigid  and   fix'd   in   the 
 fame  Place,    we  cannot  conceive   what   Benefit   it 
 could  be  of  either  to  itfelf  or  any  thing  elfe:  But 
 when  'tis  put  into  Motion,  it  may  be  of  ufe,  as 
 is  plain  from  Experience;  tho**  not  always  without 
 a  Mixture  of  Evils:  But  Adion  is,  cdterii  paribus, 
 preferable  to  Inadivity ;  it  is  therefore  agreeable  to  g^^^j^  y^^^ 
 the  Divine  Goodnefs  to  produce  Motion  in  Matter,  don  was  to 
 if  the  Good  arifing  from  thence  do  not  overballance  berais'din 
 the  Evil,  and  fo  long  as  no  Evils  are  permitted  which  Matter,  as 
 are  feparable  from  Motion,  nor  fuch  as  can  affed  ^^^f^^^  \^ 
 Spirits,  which  are  purely  immaterial.  into  parts 
 
 IV.  Now,  if  it  be  granted  that  God  could,  con-  Hence  the 
 fiftently  with  his  Goodnefs,  both  create  Matter  d^wA  Genera- 
 put   it  into    Motion,   it  necelfarily  follows  that  its  Cg^/ 
 Motions  muft  interfere  with  one  another.    If  you  ^on  of 
 
 "  J,  5  fajr  Bodies, 
 
i£;o  Concerning  J^atiiral  ^s'A.     Chap.  VI. 
 
 fay  that  Matter  might  move  uniformly  and  all  to- 
 gether, either  in  a  direct  Line  or  a  Circle-^  and  the 
 
 -  contrariety  of  Morions  by  that  means  be  pievent- 
 ed:  I  anivver,  The  wliole  Mafs  of  Matter  would 
 be  no  Ids  rigid  and  ufelefs  with  fuch  a  Morion  as 
 this,  than  if  it  were  entirely  at  refl ;  it  would  nei- 
 ther be  more  fit  for  Animals,  nor  more  adapted  to 
 the  ufes  which  it  now  anfwers.  Such  a  Motion  there- 
 fore was  to  be  excited  in  it,  as  would  feparate  it 
 into  parts,  make  it  fluid,  and  render  it  an  Habita- 
 tion fit  for  Animals.  But  that  could  not  be  with- 
 out contrariety  of  Motion,  as  any  one  that  thinks 
 of  it  at  all  will  perceive:  And  if  this  bs  once  ad- 
 tnitttd  in  Matter^  there  nece0arily  follows  a  Dm- 
 
 fon  and  DifpiYity  of  Parts,  Clajljing  and  Opfojition 
 Comminiitiot-g-  Concretion  and  Repuijion,  and  all  thofe 
 Evils  which  we  behold  \n  Generation  and  Corruption. 
 God  could  indeed  have  removed  all  thefe  irom 
 ■Matter,  by  taking  away  its  Motion,  but  they  are 
 either  to  be  tolerated,  or  Matter  muft  remain  fix'd 
 and  immoveable  in  the  fame  Situation.  Some  may 
 ask,  why  God  would  not  produce  fuch  Motion 
 in  Matter  as  might  render  all  its  Concretions  fo 
 perfed:  as  not  to  be  liable  to  Dijfolmion  or  Corrup- 
 tion. For  fince  the  Power  of  God  is  infinite, 
 nothing  on  his  fide  hinders  this  from  being  done; 
 what  hinders  therefore  on  the  fide  of  Matter?  I 
 anfwer,  Its  Motion  and  Divifihility.  For  if  you 
 fuppofe  any  fort  of  Motion  in  Matter,  it  mufl 
 neceffarily  be  cither  ufelefs,  as  we  faid  before,  or  in 
 (Tfpojite  BireBions,  The  mutual  cla filing  of  thefe 
 Concretions  could  therefore  not  be  avoided,  and  as 
 they  flrike  upon  one  another,  whether  we  fuppofe 
 them  hard  cr  foft,  a  Concuflion  of  the  Parts  and 
 d  Separation  from  each  other  would  be  neceffari- 
 ly produced  :  But  a  Separation  or  Diflipation  of 
 the  parts  is  Corruption.  This  therefore  could  not 
 be  avoided  without  violence  done  to  the  Laws  of 
 -  Motion 
 
Sed.  T.'     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  i^i 
 
 Motion  and  the  Nature  of  Matter,  For  to  hinder 
 moveable  things  from  ever  interfering,  and  the 
 Parts  which  are  naturally  feparable  from  ever  fe- 
 parating  by  mutual  impulfes,  would  require  a  per- 
 pcmal  Miracle.  (2,5.) 
 
 V.    Secondly;    Since   it   is  proper  that   Matter  ™'«" 
 
 ^,,1  ^   ■  «,/••  J-i  1^1-     under  ccr- 
 
 fhould  be    put   mto  Motion,    'tis   better  that  this  ^^j^^  j  ^^^^^ 
 
 fhould   be  done  according   to  fome    certain    Laws  tends 
 
 and  in  an  orderly  Courfe,  than  at  random,  and  as  more  to 
 
 it  were    by  chance.     For  by  this  Means  the  Sy-  the  prefer- 
 
 ftems  compofed    of  Matter  will  have    both   more  J'j'^i"?"^^ 
 
 durable   and  more    regular   Periods.     The  firft  E-  jj^^,^  jj-j^ 
 
 vil  arifing  from  Matter  was,  we  faid,  the  jarring  of  were  left 
 
 Eleaaents ;     from    hence    comes    this     Corruption  at  ran- 
 
 and  DifTolution,  Inftability  and  Viciffitude,  It  may  ^^^j^ 
 
 be  furprizing,  that  all  thefe  fhould  proceed  from  a  q^^  jj_ 
 
 flable,  fix'd    and   uniform    Good.     But    we   have  ^  rihuted 
 
 made  it  appear  that  Matter  could  not  move  at  all  Bodies 
 
 without  thefe,    and   it  was  more  eligible  that  the  into  vari- 
 
 World  fhould  be  liable  to  them,    than  deftitute  of  «"s  ^y-    . 
 
 L  4  Ani-  ^^^^"^• 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (25.)  That  is,  there  could  be  no  general  pre-  eftablifh'd  L  anxjs 
 of  'Nature,  but  God  muft  continually  interpole  and  effeft  t.\Q' 
 ry  thing  by  his  own  dired  and  immediate  Power:  The  bad 
 confequences  of  which  are  very  obvious.  There  could  be  no 
 Jrts  and  Sciences,  no  Skill  or  Indujiry  ;  no  regular  Methods  of 
 providing  for  our  Bodies,  or  improving  our  Minds  in  the 
 Knowledge  of  things.  All  which  evidently  prefuppofe  and 
 are  entirely  founded  on  fome  fettled,  certain  Laws  of  the 
 Univerfe  difcoverable  by  us. 
 
 '  We  are  fo  far  acquainted  (fays  the  Author  of  the  Religion 
 '  of  Nature  Delin.  p.  96.)  with  the  LawJ  of  Gra-vitation  ani 
 «  Motion,  that  we  are  able  to  calculate  their  Effeds,  and  ferve 
 
 *  ourfelves  of  them,  fupplying  upon  many  Occafions  the  de- 
 «  fed  of  Power  in   ourfelves  by   Mechanical  Powers,  which 
 
 *  never  fail  to  anfwer  according  to  the  Eftablilliment  ^r.' 
 Concerning  the  Neceffity  of  the  prefent  Laws  of  Motion,  and 
 the  Fitnefs  of  them  to  attain  the  intended  Ends,  fee  Dr.  J. 
 Clarke  on  Natural  Evil,  p.  92,  ^c  and  250,,  158. 
 
 (L)  Tis 
 
1^2  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 Animals.  And  that  thefe  Evils  ijiould  not  multi- 
 ply beyond  Neceffity  the  pivine  Goodnefs  has 
 taken  care,  by  reftraining  its  Motion  under  cer- 
 tain Laws,  fo  as  to  make  it  fteady,  and  as  conftant 
 as  could  be ;  fo  that  the  Machines  compofed  of  it 
 might  be  as  little  fliock'd  with  contrary  Motions 
 ss  polTible,  and  endure  for  a  long  time  ',  nay  fome 
 of  them  in  certain  Places  and  Circumftances  for 
 pver.  For  if  no  parcels  of  Matter  were  direded 
 by  any  certain  and  determinate  Rule,  fuch  a  cpn- 
 fufed  Motion  vould  jumble  every  thing  together, 
 nor  could  any  thing  lafl:  for  ever  fo  fhort  a  time. 
 On  this  account  God  eftablifh'd  certain  Laws'  of 
 Motion,  and  perpetual  Rules;  and  framed  the 
 great  Mafs  of  Beings  into  certain  Machines  and 
 Syftems,  which  have  fuch  an  exad  Correfpondence 
 as  to  contribute  their  mutual  Afliftance  towards 
 preferving  the  Motion  and  Order  prefcribed  by 
 the  Deity.    (L)    Neither  was  it  convenient  that 
 
 Iviatt^r 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (L.)  'Tis  objefled  that  the  Author  avoids  the  chief  Diffi- 
 culty, and  which  flood  moft  in  need  of  an  Anfwe?-.  For  he 
 iuppofes  certain  general  Laws  upon  the  Eftablifhment  whereof 
 Evils  muft  necefTarily  invade  the  Works  of  God  ;  but  he'doei 
 not  tell  us  why  God  eftablifhed  thefe  Laws,  which  mull 
 bring  fo  great  Evils  along  with  therh  :  could  not  an  Omnipo- 
 tent, All  knowing,  and  abfolutely  Good  God  have  made  o- 
 ther  Laws  free  from  all  thefe  Defcfts  ?  Why  did  he  bind 
 himfelf  to  fuch  univerfal  Rules  ?  Could  he  not  have  interpof- 
 ed  his  Omnipotence  and  difpens'd  with  thefe  Laws,  and  there- 
 by prevented  every  Evil  which  wou'd  arife  from  the  Obferv- 
 ance  of  them  ?  The  Author  is  filent  on  this  Head. 
 
 But  it  is  evident  that  the  Author  had  thefe  Difficulties  in 
 view,  and  has  given  a  proper  Reply  to  each.  Wherever  he 
 has  mcntion'd  any  univerfal  Law,  he  fliews  that  it  arifes 
 from  the  very  Nature  and  Conftitution  of  things,  and  that  a 
 better  could  not  poffibly  be  made,  nor  one  which  is  more  ne- 
 ^QiXary  for  rh^  Frcfcrvacion  of  thofe  Beings  to  which  it  is  gi- 
 l'>  • '-  '■   *-    .;  "  ■'••'•..'.  '   ven; 
 
Sed.  I.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  153 
 
 Matter  fhould  every  where  confift  of  the  fame 
 kind  of  Parts ;  but  rather  that  it  fhould  be  in  one 
 place  very  fluid,  fimilar  and  homogeneous,  fuch  as 
 we  believe  the  z/£ther  to  be ;  in  another,  folid  and 
 compad,  as  the  Earth  is,  and  perhaps  the  Stars; 
 in  another,  rnix'd  with  heterogeneous  Particles, 
 fuch  as  we  find  the  Air  and  Water. 
 
 VI.  We  mult  confefs  that  fuch  a  Mafs  as  the  It  appears 
 Earth  is,  fcems  not  fo  beautiful  or  fo  fit  for  Mo-  !j^°^ 
 tion,  as  the  pure  fluid  JKthcr;  'tis  alfo  more  liable  o/fg/p^^g. 
 to  Corruption  and   Changes;    yet  it  is  moft  cer-  nomena, 
 tain  that  the  Earth  was  not  cpnlfituted  in  this  man-  that  the 
 ner  for  no  reafon  at  all,  or  unneceflarily :  Perhaps  Syftems  of 
 the  Muttdaae  Syftem  could  no  more  confift  with-  ^J^^  U"'- 
 out  thefe  folid  Mafles,  than  the  human  Body  with-  ^        ^^^ 
 out  Bones.     No  fober  Man  doubts  but  God  could  and  beau 
 have  difpofed   this  Material  World  into  other  Sy-  tiful. 
 Items;    and  of  what    kind  foever  thefe  had  been, 
 Qur  reafon   could   never    have   comprehended  the 
 contrivance    of  them.      For,    fince   our  Planetary 
 Syftem  is  incompiehenfible  to  us,  much  more  will 
 the  Fabrick  of  the  whole  Univerfe  be  fo;  but  as 
 far  as  we  do  underftand  the  Difpofition  of  it,  all 
 is   well,    elegant  and  beautiful:    and  if,  among  all 
 the  Phenomena  of  Nature,  we  were  only  acquainte4 
 vith  Lightfi  that  would  fl^ev/  us  the  juft  and  ad- 
 mirably- 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ven :  And  tnat  it  could  not  be  difpens'd  with,  at  leafl:  frequent- 
 ly, without  detriment  to  the  whole*. 
 
 If  therefore  all  the  Fault  muft  needs  be  laid  upon  God ; 
 yet  he  is  not  to  be  blamed  for  fi>.ing  fuch  general  Laws,  but 
 rather  for  making  fuch  imperfedl  Creitures,  which  ncceffarily- 
 required  thefe  Laws  and  were  incapable  of  better.  This  is  the 
 true  ftate  of  the  Quellion,  and  of  this  the  Author  has  alfo 
 ^',lvcn  an  account  in  the  foregoing  Chapter.     See  Note  (G.) 
 
 *  Sc-e  C.  j-.  §.  5.  Subf,  ^. 
 
154  Concerning  Nafiiral  "Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 mirable  Strudureof  it.  Ic  is  reasonable  therefore  to 
 believe  that  this  is  rhe  very  beft,  and  attended  with 
 the  leaf}  In^  onvenieri"'°s. 
 'Tis  rafh         YH,   You'll   fay    chat    fome    particular    things 
 tha^tMat-   "^^b^"^^   ^^^^   ^^^^  better.     Bur,  fince  you  do  not 
 ter  might  thoroughly  underhand  the  whole,    you    have   no 
 be  diftri-    right  to  affirm  thus  much.     We  have  much  great- 
 buted  into  er  Reafon  to  prefume  that  no  one  Part  of  it  could 
 better  Sy-  ^^  changed  for  the  better,   without  greater  "Detri- 
 fince  we     ™£nt  to  the  reft,  which  it  would  either  be  incon- 
 donot       fiftent  with,    or  disfigure  by  its  Difpioportion*. 
 thoro'ly      For  we  have  fhewn  before  that  all  mraner  of  lur 
 ft"^d^']i     conveniencies  could  not  be  avoided,  becaufe  of  the 
 prdent.  ^    Imperfedion  of  Matter,    and  rhe  Nature  of  Mo- 
 tion.    That  State  of  things  was  therefore  prefera- 
 ble, which  was  attended  with  the  feweft  and  leaft 
 Inconveniencies.     And    who  but  a  very  raili,  in-* 
 difcreet   Perfon  will  affirm   that  God  has  not  ad- 
 ually  made  choice  of  this?    Nay,    who  can  do  it 
 with  any  Shadow  of  Reafon,  unlefs  he  throughly 
 underftands  both   this   and   that  other  which    he 
 would    prefer  to  it?    Whoever   pronounces  upon 
 them    before   this,    gives   Sentence   before    he  has 
 look'd  into  the  Caufe,  and  is  at  the  fame  time  both  a 
 partial  and  an  incompetent  Judge. 
 
 It  concerned  us  the  more  to  have  this  well  ex- 
 plained, that  being  convinced  of  the  Convenience 
 or  Meliority  of  the  whole  Material  Syfliem,  we 
 may  more  eafily  perceive  the  Origin  of  thofe  Evils 
 which  neceffarily  follow  from  the  Contrariety  of  Mo- 
 tion, and  the  Corruftion  of  things. 
 
 ^  See  Note  28. 
 
 SECT. 
 
Se(5l.  2.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  i£^ 
 
 SECT.     II. 
 
 Concerning  Animals  and  the  Variety 
 of  them. 
 
 SINCE  Matter  is   not  S elf-con fcious,  nor  able  Matter 
 to   enjoy   itfelf,   nor  capable  of  receiving  any  ^°f^  ^^^ 
 Benefit  from  itfelf,  it  follows  that  it  was  not  made  be  made 
 for  itfelf,  but  for  fomething  elfe,  to  which  it  was  for  its 
 to  be  fubfervient  in  Senfation   Thought,    or  Fru-  own  fake 
 rion.   We  find  by  Experience  that  Matter  can  be  ^^"^^j,^^^ 
 thus  ferviceable  to  a  thinking    Being,  tho'  ftupid  confcLus 
 and  infenfible  itfelf:    'Tis  probable    therefore  that  'tis  there-* 
 God  defigned  and  direded  all  Matter  to  this  end  forede- 
 as  far   as  was  poiTible.     Hence    comes  the  Union  %"'^  fot 
 of  fenfible  and  thinking  Beings  with  the  Particles  ^f^ni-^  ' 
 of  Matter,    as   we   experience   in  ourfelves.     The  mals. 
 fame   may  be   faid    of  all   its    Parts,  as  far  as  the 
 order  and  conftitution    of  things  allow'd.     There 
 IS  nothing  therefore  in  vain,  nothing  idle,  nor  any 
 Region   without  its   Animals.     For  fuppofing,  S5 
 we  faid,  fo  many  pure  Spirits  feparate  from  Mat- 
 ter, to  be  made  as  were  convenient^    as  thefe  ac-^ 
 cupy  no   Place*,    there  would   be  no  lefs  Room 
 for   other   thinking  fenfible   Subftances   that  Hood 
 in  need  of  Matter   for  the  Exercife  of  their  Fa^ 
 eulties,  and   enjoyment   of  themfelves,  which   for 
 tjie  future  let  us  call  Souh,  (K.) 
 
 II, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (K  )  The  Author  has  endeavoured  to  account  for  this  Varie- 
 ty  of  Creatures  in  the  following  Manner.     AH  ^eings  could 
 
 ■  not 
 
 *  See  Note  j7,  ■ 
 
"\^6  Concerning  Natural  Ew'iL     Chap.  IV. 
 
 'Tis  pro-  11.  Now,  fince  the  Striidure  of  this  viliblc 
 bable  that  \Yorld  confifts  of  various  Bodies,    viz,,  pure   JK- 
 
 vary  ac-  ^^^r, 
 
 to  the  va-  NOTES, 
 
 riety  of 
 
 thole  re-  not  be  placed  in  the  fame  Degree  of  Happinefs  or  in  the  fame 
 gions  order  of  Perfeftion,  neither  could  all  of  the  fame  Order  be  in 
 
 which  the  fame  Degree,  or   enjoy   the  fame  Conveniencies.     The 
 
 they  arc  good  of  the  whole  wou'd  not  allow  it.  For  Inllance,  fup- 
 deftin'd  pofe  a  certain  Order  of  intelligent  Creatures  made  by  God, 
 to  inha-  which  have  a  mutual  Intercourfe,  and  ftand  iu  need  of  each 
 bit  :  others  Afliftance  to  promote  the  comnjon  Happinefs,  which 
 
 Therefoie  they  are  obliged  to  promote  with  united  Powers  and  Incli- 
 the  M-       nations. 
 
 ther  and!  'Tis  plain,  that  there's  a  Neceffity  for  Government  among 
 Air,  in  all  them  ;  for  as  they  have  Appetites  and  Choice,  and  a  limited 
 probabili-  Underllanding,  'tis  impoffible  for  them  to  adminifter  the  Af- 
 ty,  have  fairs  of  the  Publick  (in  which  the  good  of  all  confifts)  by  the 
 their  pro-  fame  means,  at  the  fame  time  and  with  a  joint  Endeavour, 
 per  Inha-  without  devolving  a  Right  to  determine  thefe  things  on  fome 
 bitants,  one  or  more  Perfons.  Whence  arifes  a  Neceffity  for  Rule  or 
 .ns  well  as  Government  among  fuch  reafonable  Creatures.  Nor  could 
 the  Earth,  it  be  avoided  where  there  is  both  a  mutual  Intercourfe  and 
 a  limited  Underftanding.  On  which  account,  the  fame  is 
 obfervable  among  the  Angels  themfelves. 
 
 But  now  'tis  plain  that  thofe  who  happen  to  have  this  Go- 
 vernment over  fuch  as  are  naturally  their  equals,  are  in  better 
 Circumllances  with  regard  to  externals,  than  thofc  w  hich  have 
 only  the  Honour  of  obeying.  They  may  with  greater  certain- 
 ty and  eafe,  and  in  more  Cafes  obtain  their  Ends,  efrcft  their 
 Choice,  and  accomplilh  their  Dcfires,  (/.  e.  be  happy)  than 
 thofe  whichjare  obliged  to  poftpone  the  Gratification  of  their 
 Scnfes  and  the  Execution  of  their  Dcfigns,  and  abfolutely 
 conform  themfelves  to  another's  Will,  which  they  mull:  ne- 
 teil'arily  do  who  are  fubjeft  to  the  Rule  of  others. 
 
 And  yet  it  is  impoiTible  that  this  fliould  be  every  one's  Lot. 
 "Tis  impofhble  all  fliould  be  Rulers  and  none  Subjects.  From 
 this  Example  we  fee  how  the  Relations  which  Creatures  have 
 to  one  another,  may  put  a  Reftraint  even  on  infinite  Power, 
 io  that  it  Will  be  a  Contradiction  for  them  while  they  keep 
 the  Nature  which  they  have  at  prefent,  to  be  in  fome  refpedts 
 other  wife  difpofed  than  they  now  are,  nor  can  all  of  the  lame 
 Order  be  gratified  with  the  fame  Conveniencies.  From  hence 
 it  follows  either  that  a  God  of  infinite  Wifdom  and  Good- 
 ^     liefs,    is  obliged  by  thefe  Attributes  to    rgiUain  his   Power 
 
 froxr^ 
 
Sccft.  2.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  i^;^ 
 
 ther,  Air,  Earth,  p^t.  'tis  highly  probable,  as  we 
 /aid  before,  that  each  of  thefe  has  its  proper  In- 
 habitants, viz,,  by  the  Union  of  Souls  with  Par- 
 cels of  Matter.  Without  fuch  an  Union,  we  can- 
 not apprehend  how  there  fhould  be  either  ^Ethereal 
 or  Aerial  Animals.  For  the  moft  fluid  Bodies  if 
 not  united  to  an  immaterial  Soul,  or  compacted 
 together,  would  be  immediatly  diffolved,  and  eve- 
 ry blaft  of  Vv'"ind  would  diflipate  fuch  Animals : 
 Either  then  thefe  vafl  Fields  of  Air  or  ^ther 
 muft  b^  entirely  deftitute  of  Inhabitants,  which 
 very  few  will  believe,  who  behold  every  clod  of 
 Earth  ftock'd  with  Animals  ;  or  furnifhed  after 
 fome   fuch  Manner  as    we   conjecture.    Ci<S.)    If 
 
 you  ^ 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 from  creating  any  fuch  Creatures,  or  that  he  mufl  aflign  them 
 Stations  very  diftant  from  the  highcft  Happinefs  which  they 
 are  capable  of  Hence  alfo  it  appears,  why  all  things  do  not 
 anfwer  every  one's  Appetite.  Why  we  are  not  enriched  with 
 as  many  Benefits  as  the  Capacity  of  our  Nature  fecms  to  re- 
 quire. For  tho'  the  infinite  Goodnefs  of  God  encourages  us 
 to  promife  ourfelves  thus  much,  yet  Wifdom  and  Juftice  fet 
 bounds  as  it  were  to  his  Goodnefs,  and  fhevv  that  this  cannot 
 be  done  without  Detriment  to  the  whole  ;  that  either  this  In- 
 convenience muft  be  tolerated,  or  no  fuch  Creatures  made  ; 
 and  that  it  was  better  not  to  give  fome  fo  great  a  Degree  of 
 Happinefs  as  their  Natures  might  receive,  than  that  a  whole 
 Species  of  Beings  fhould  be  wanting  to  the  World. 
 
 If  it  be  afk'd  why  God  did  not  make  this  Species  in  another 
 and  more  perfeft  Manner,  fo  as  to  be  free  from  this  Inconve- 
 nience. I  anfwer,  that  then  it  would  have  belonged  to  ano- 
 ther Species,  and  been  of  a  different  Order  of  Creatures : 
 And  I  fuppole  as  many  of  the  Species  to  be  made  already  as 
 the  Syftem  would  adnjlt,  but  chat  there  was  ftill  room  for  thele 
 inferior  ones,  which  muft  neceffarily  have  had  the  Nature  they 
 now  are  of  or  none  at  all,  as  has  been  often  laid,  and  I'm 
 unwillingly  obliged  to  repeat  it. 
 
 (26.)  We  have  a  bcautifnl  Dcfcription  of  our  Author's 
 conjc6lure  in  the  Spectator,  N°,  5-19.  '  If  we  confider 
 *  thole  Pans  of  the  Material  World  which  lie  the  neareft  to 
 
 '  us 
 
t^S  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 ^ou  fay,  here's  Room  for  pure  Spirits.  I  anfwer; 
 Since  thele  do  not  fill  up  Place,  nor  have  any  Re- 
 lation to  it,  'tis  th:  fame  thing  wherever  they  be, 
 and  Material  Subftances  have  nothing  at  all  to  do 
 ■Jrvith  them:  It  is  not  therefore  neceflary  to  fuppo'e 
 
 fuch 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *  us,  and  arc  tliereforc  fabjett  to  our  Obfervations  and  En- 
 '  quirles,  it   is  amazing  to  confiuer  the  Infinity  of  Animals 
 
 <  with  whici'i  it  is  ilockcd.  Every  part  of  Matter  is  pco- 
 «  pled  ;  every  green  Leaf  fvvarms  with  Inhabitants.     There 
 
 *  is  fcarcc  a  fingle  Humour  in  the  Bodv  of  Man,  or  of  any 
 <^  other  Animal,  in  which   our  Glafics  do  not  difcover  myri- 
 
 *  ads  of  living  Creatures.  The  Surfice  of  Animals  is  alfo 
 «  covered    with  other  Animals,  which  are  in  the  fame  man- 
 
 *  ner  the  Bafis  of  other  Animals  that  live  upon  it ;  nay,  we 
 '  find  in  the  moll:  folid  Bodies,  as  in  Marble  itfelf,  innu- 
 «  merable  Cells  and  Cavities  that  are  crowded  with  fuch  im- 
 
 <  perceptible  Inhabitants,  as  are  too  little  for  the  naked  Eye  to 
 «  difcover.  On  the  other  Hand,  if  we  look  into  the  more 
 ^  bulky  Parts  of  Nature,  we  fee  the  Seas,  Lakes  and  Hivers, 
 «  teeming  with  numberlefs  kinds  of  living  Creatures:  We 
 «'  find  every   Mountain  and  Marfli,    Wildernefs  and   Wood, 
 
 <  plentifully  ftockcd  with  Birds  and  Beafts,  and  every  Part  of 
 '  Matter  affording  pro^-er  neccffaries  and  conveniences  for  the 
 ^  Livelihood  of  Multitudes  which  inhabit  it.  The  Author 
 ^  o^X.h.c  Plttrality  of  PForlds  draws  a  very  good  Argument  from 
 
 *  this  Confideration,  for  the  peopling  of  every  Planet  ;  as  in- 
 
 *  deed  it  feems  very  probable  from  the  analogy  of  Reafon, 
 
 *  that  if  no   part  of  Matter  which  we  are  acquainted  with, 
 
 *  lies  wafte  and  ufelefs,   thofe  great  Bodies  which  are  at  fuch 
 
 *  a  dilhxnce  from  us,  fhould  not  be  dcfart  and  unpeopled,  but 
 *'  rather  that  they  fliould  be  furnidied  with  Beings  adapted  to 
 *'  their  refpcflive  Situations.     Exijlence  is  a  Blefling  to  thofe 
 
 *  Beings  only  which  arc  endowed  with  Perception,  and  is  in 
 
 *  a  manner  thrown  away  upon  dead  Matter,  any  farther  than' 
 
 *  as  it  is  fubfcrvient  to  Beings  which  are   conicious  of  t^eir 
 
 *  Exillence.      Accordingly  ■we  find  from  the  Bodies  \vhich 
 
 *  lie  under  our  Cofcrvation,  th.u  Matter  is  only  made  as  the 
 '■  Bafis  and  Support  of  Animals,  and  there  is  no  more  ot  the 
 
 *  one  than  what  is  nccefiary  for  the  Exigence  of  the  other.' 
 See  alio  Dr,  Sotth  Works,  Vol.  2,  Difcoulfe  15.  p.  l^^'i 
 ^c.  Fol. 
 
Sect.  2.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.      ^  159 
 
 fuch  large  Trads  of  Air  or  ^Ether  void  of  Animals, 
 in  order  to  make  Room  for  thefe,  for  which  it 
 would  be  no  lefs  commodious,  if  repleniQi'd  with, 
 than  if  deftitute  of  Animals.  If  then  this  be  grant- 
 ed us  we  may  affirm  that  there  is  as  great  varie- 
 ty of  Souls,  as  of  Anim?ls;  and  that  it  is  one 
 Species  which  exerts  its  Operations  by  the  help  of 
 ^therial  Matter,  and  another  which  ftands  in 
 need  of  Aerial,  and  a  third  of  TerreQrial.  Nei- 
 ther will  every  Element  be  fit  for  every  Animal, 
 but  each  will  have  its  proper  Inhabitants :  Nor  can 
 there  be  any  juft  Caufe  of  complaint  that  they  are  un- 
 eafy  out  of  their  proper  Element,  that  Men  cannot 
 live  any  while  commodioufly  in  -^Ether,  nor  perhaps 
 -/Etherial  Animals  upon  the  Earth  :  For  'tisfufficient 
 if  every  one  nouriihes  its  proper  Inhabitants,  accord- 
 to  the  Nature  and  Conftitution  of  each. 
 
 III.  That  is  afoolifh  Objedion  therefore  of  the  TheEartfr 
 Epicm-ean  LtarePius  "^ ,   that  the  World  owes  not  its  as  being 
 original  to  a  Divine  Power  and  Goodnefs,  becaufe  '■^'^  ^^^f-^ 
 Mountains  Woods  and  Rocks,  large  Fens,  sndthe  Mundane^ 
 Ocean  cover  fo  great  a  fhareofit:  that  the  burning  Syaem,  is 
 heat,  viz.  of  the  Torrid  Zone^  and  the  eternal  Frojt,  not  to  be 
 viz.  of  the  two  Frigidy  take  up  almoft  two   Parts  chiefly  rc- 
 ofit;  fmcetheSea,  the  Rocks,  Winds  and  Moun- S'"'?"^^^;'^ 
 
 •     \  n    r     •         1      •  r  r  •  -      yet  IS  nOt 
 
 tarns,  are  not  entn-ely  uielels  m  then-  present  Situati-  made  to 
 on;  which  was  requifire  for  the  good  of  the  Uni-  no  pur- 
 verfe,  and  the  Order  of  the  Mundane  Syftem.  Nei-  pofe,  ci- 
 ther was  the  Earth  or  its  Inhabitants  to  be  regarded  J'^"0"'- 
 in  the  firft  Place.  For,  fince  it  is  but  a  fmall  Part  of 
 the  whole,  and  almoft  a  Point,  where  would  have 
 been    the  Wonder  if  it  had  not  been  fit  for  any 
 Inhabitants  at  all  K  If  it  did  but  promote  the  good  of 
 the  whole,    while  itfelf  was  barren  and  empty.    If 
 
 this 
 
 *  See  Dr.  Bentlfys  Eighth  Sermon  §.  lo.  p.  329.  5th  Ed. 
 ^r  Bates  on  the  Exifience  of  God,  Sec.  Ch.  i,  2,  and  3. or 
 Cockburns  Effays  I  ft  Part,  EfT.  7.  par.  5,  is'c  and  2d  Part, 
 EfT.  4.  par.  5,  i^c.  and  the  Authorr  mznuoyx'di  in  Netc  3SJ. 
 
i6d  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IL 
 
 tliis  had  been  the  Cafe,  it  would  not  have  proved  an 
 ufelefs  part  of  the  World,  any  more  than  a  Nail  is  of 
 a  Man's  Body ;  and  it  is  as  abfurd  to  defire  that  all 
 parts  of  the  Univerfe  Ihould  immediatly  afford  Habi- 
 tation to  Animals,    as  that  every  Part  and  Mem- 
 ber of  an  animated  Body  fhould  by  itfelf  confti- 
 tute  an  Animal;  'tis  fumcient    if  every  particular 
 Member    confpire  with  the   reft,    and  exercife  its 
 own  proper    Funftion,  and   confequently  that   the 
 Earth,  which  is  a  Member  of  rl^ie  Univerfe,  have 
 its  peculiar    ufe   in    promoting    the   Good  of  the 
 whole.     If  therefore  the  whole  Earth  was  fervice- 
 able,  not  to  preferve  Animals,   but    only   Motion, 
 nothing  could  be  objeded  from  thence  againft  the 
 Goodnefs  of  its  Author,     Neither   would  it   ap- 
 pear ftrange  to  any  that  cohfiders  the  Immenfity 
 of  the  Works  of  God,  and  how  minute  a  Portion 
 of  them  the  Earth  isj  if  it  were  entirely  deftitute 
 of  Inhabitants :  Nor  would  it  therefore  be  in  vain. 
 How  much  more  then  may  we  admire  the  Good- 
 nefs and  Wifdom  of  God  therein,  who  has  filled  the 
 whole  and  every  part  of  it  with  Life. 
 The  Earth       IV.  He  knew  beft  what  Creatures   every   part 
 ""■■^■^  l''^  .    of  it  was  fit  for,  and  has  affigned  to  each  its  pro- 
 as  a  Wheel  P^*^  Place,    as  IS  evident   to  every   Obferver :   The 
 m  this        Mountains,  the  Woods,  the  Rocks,  the  Seas,  have 
 Automa-     their  proper  Inhabitants,  which  they  fupply  with 
 ^^°^,^^^  Nourilhment.     The  Syftem  of  t lie  World  requi- 
 widiout      ^^^  ^  Globe  of  folid  Matter  fuch  as  the  Earth  ii 
 which  its    and  we  have  Reafon  to  believe  that  this  is,  as  it 
 Motion      were,  a  Wheel   in  the  great  r  Automaton,  without 
 would  be     which  its  Motibn  would  be  very  imperfe(5l".    But 
 in  tS'j-n-"   ^^^^*^^s   this  principal   End,    the    Divine  Wifdom 
 tcrim    it    ^^^^  fhat  it  might  ferve  for   Nutriment  to  feveral 
 alFordsan    k'inds  of  Animals,  that  no  manner  of  Good  there- 
 Habitati-    foie  niight  be  omitted  which   was  confiftent  with 
 Food!      ^^^  primary  End,  he  filled  it  with  all  thofe  Ani- 
 Animals.    ^''^^^  ^^"^^^  i^  ^^^"^  capable  of,   nor  could  the  Earth, 
 
 afford^ 
 
Sed.  2.    Co?icermng  Natural  'E\\\,  261 
 
 aflford  Suftenance  to  any  fuperior  or  mote  proper 
 Beings.  God  has  given  thofe  Parts  to  the  Brutes 
 wjiicn  are  unfit  for  Menj  and  that  there  might 
 be  nothing  ufelefs,  which  yet  could  not  be  alccr'd 
 without  Detriment  to  the  whole,  he  has  .idapted 
 Animals  to  &very  Part  and  Region  of  it ;  and 
 Iince  the  Habitations  could  not  conveniently  be 
 converted  into  any  other  Form,  he  provided  fuch 
 Animals  as  wanted  and  were  agreeable  to  thefe 
 Habitations.  Hence  Mountain^,  Woods  and  Rocks 
 give  Harbour  to  wild  Beafts,  the, Sea  to  FillifSy, 
 the  Earth  to  Infedis.  Neither  ought  ws  to  com- 
 plain that  the  whole  Earth  is  not  of  ufe  to  Man, 
 lince  that  was  not  the  principal  End  it  was  made 
 for;  but,  on  the  contrary,  Man  was  for  this  reafon 
 placed  upon  the  Earth,  becaufe  it  afforded  a  convex 
 nient  Receptacle  for  him.  And  what  if  it  had 
 been  totally  unfit  for  Man  ?  Would  it  therefore  have 
 been  in  vain  ?  By  no  means.  On  the  contrary,  we 
 are  certain  that  God  would  have  given  it  other  Inha- 
 bitants, to  whofe  Maintenance  it  might  have  been 
 fubfervient.  (27.) 
 V. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (27.)  Our  Author's  Argument  here  might  be  carryM  much 
 farther,  and  the  Infinite  Wifdom  of  the  Creator  demonftrated 
 not  only  from  his  having  rhade  nothing  in  vain,  or  ufelefs  iri 
 itfelf,  but  alfo  from  the  dillinft  and  'various  Relations  w\iic\i 
 every  thing  bears  to  others,  and  its  contributing  to  the  good  of 
 the  whole :  From  the  double,  the  manifold  apparent  Ufes  of 
 almoft  every  thing  in  Nature. 
 
 Thus  the  Mountains  mentioned  in  the  Objeftion  of  Lu^ 
 cretius,  and  vs/hich  many  Moderns  alfo  have  mifreprefented  as 
 deformities  of  Nature,  have  not  only  their  own  peculiar  Inha- 
 bitants, but  alfo  afford  to  other  Animals  the  moll  commodi- 
 ous Harbour  and  Maintenance,  the  beft  Remedies  and  Re= 
 treats.  To  them  we  owe  the  moll  pleafant  Profpedts,  the 
 ■  5noft  delicious  Wines,  the  moll  curious  Vegetables,  the  rich- :. 
 
 M  eft 
 
l62 
 
 The 
 Earth  is 
 made  not 
 for  Man 
 alone,  but 
 for  the 
 Univcrfe: 
 to  think 
 otherwifc 
 favours  of 
 human 
 pride. 
 
 Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 V.  Thofe  therefore  who  urge  the  unfitncfs  of 
 certain  Parts  of  the  Earth  for  the  Suftenance  of 
 Man,  as  a  Fault  and  Defed  of  the  Divine  Skill 
 in  making  them,  are  oblig'd  to  prove  that  the 
 Earth  was  made  for  the  fake  of  Mankind  only, 
 and  not  of  the  Univerfe;  and  that  every  thing  in 
 the  World  is  ufelefs  which  does  not  immediately 
 tend  to  the  ufe  of  Man.  But  this  is  abfurd,  and 
 what  no  one  would  objed,  who  is  not  blinded 
 with  Pride  and  Ignorance*.  We  ought  rather  to 
 admire  the  Power  and  Goodnefs  of  God  who  has 
 
 fo 
 
 NOTE  S, 
 
 efl  and  mofl:  ufeful  Metals,  Minerals,  and  other  Foflils ;  and, 
 what  is  more  than  all,  a  whollbme  Air ;  and  the  Conveni- 
 ence of  navigable  Rivers  and  Fountains. 
 
 The  Ocean,  bcfides  the  Support  of  its  own  Inhabitants 
 {which  are,  in  all  probability,  as  numerous  and  various  as 
 thofe  of  the  Earth)  provides  alfo  vaft  Quantities  of  Vapours, 
 which  refrefli  and  fruftify  the  Earth  itfelf,  and  nourifli  and 
 fiipport  its  Inhabitants,  producing  Springs,  Lakes  and  Rivers. 
 The  leffer  Seas,  Fenns  and  Lakes,  are  fo  admirably  well  diftri- 
 buted  throughout  the  Globe,  as  to  afford  fufficient  Vapours 
 for  Clouds  and  Rains  to  temper  the  Cold  of  the  Northern  Air, 
 to  cool  and  mitigate  the  Heats  of  the  Torrid  Zone,  and  re- 
 frefli the  whole  Earth  with  fertile  Showers :  As  is  fully  prov- 
 ed by  Mr.  Derham  ■\. 
 
 As  to  the  variety  of  Ufes  which  the  fame  thing  is  render'd 
 capable  of,  and  manifeilly  defigned  for  by  its  All-^vife  Au- 
 thor, fee  Collther''^  Impartial  E7iquir\  into  the  Exijience,  Sec.  of 
 God,  p.  80.    *  To  obtain  a  great  number  of  Ends  by  as  few 
 
 *  means  as  may  be,  is  the  higheft  point  of  Wifdom.     But  no- 
 
 *  thing  can  be  imagin'd  more  admirable  in  this  rcfped  than 
 
 *  the  prcfent  frame  of  things.     Thus  tho'  the  human  Body  is 
 
 *  compofed  of  a  great  variety  of  Parts,  yet  how  much  more 
 
 *  numerous  are  their  Ufes  ?  How  many  are  the  Ufes  of  the 
 
 *  Hand,  which  directed  by  Reafon  is  inftead  of  all  other  In- 
 '  ilruments  ?  How  many  Advantages  do  we  owe  to  the  Eye, 
 
 *  the  Ear,  and  the  Tongue  ?  And  if  we  take  a  deeper  View, 
 
 *  ani 
 
 *  See  Note  22. 
 +  Thyfico-llml.  £.   2.  C.   5.  &  B.  3.  C.  4. 
 
peel.  2.     Concermng  Natural  ^w\\.  163 
 
 fb  temper'd  his  Works,  though  they  be  immenfe 
 and  infinitely  various*  that  there  is  nothing  in 
 them  which  exifts  not  in  the  very  beft  manner 
 with.  refpe(5i:  to  the  Whole,  and  which  he  ha^  not 
 repleniili'd  with  its  proper  Inhabitants.  And  fince 
 the  Variety  of  the  conlliruent  Parts  and  Regi- 
 ons of  the  Earth  is  no  greater  than  the  Nature  of 
 the  whole  Machine  required,  nor  the  Species  of 
 Animals  fewer  than  the  Food  would  fupply,  we 
 muft  conclude  that  there  is  nothing  deficient  or 
 redundant  in  it.    (z8.) 
 
 M  1 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ^  and  look  into  the  minuter  parts  of  which  thefe  are  compound- 
 «  ed,  what  can  be  more  admirable  than  the  Variety  of  Aims 
 
 *  and  Intentions  that  may  be  obferved  in  each  ?  The  feveral 
 «  Ufes  of  the  Strudiure  and  Pofiticn  of  each  fmgle  Mufcle  have 
 
 *  l>een  computed  by  Galen  in  his  Book  de  Formationc  Fostus  to 
 
 *  be  no  lefs  than  ten.     The  like  may  be  obferved  with  refe- 
 
 *  rence  to  the^  Bones  and   other  fimilar  Parts,  but  efpecially 
 
 *  with  refpedt  to  the  Members  of  fuch  as  are  heterogeneous 
 
 *  or  diflimular.'  p.  8i. 
 
 The  fame  is  fliewn  at  large  by  Dr.  Gre'w,  Cofmologia  Sacra, 
 B.  I.  C.  5.  par.  13,  14,  ^c.  or  W.  Scott  on  the  IVifdoni  and 
 Coodnefs  of  God,  Serm.  i.  p.  15,  ^c.  or  Bp.  Wilkins  Princ.of 
 Hat.  kelig.  C.  6. 
 
 (28.)  Hence  I  think  we  may  fafely  conclude  with  our  Au- 
 thor in  general,  that  there  could  have  been  no  partial  Alte- 
 ration of  this  Syftem,  but  for  the  worfe,  as  far  as  we  know  ; 
 at  leaft  not  for  the  better.  They  who  hold  that  there  might 
 have  been  a  total  one,  that  the  whole  Scheme  of  Things 
 might  polTibly  have  been  alter'd  or  revers'd,  and  that  either 
 the  diredt  contrary,  or  a  quite  different  one,  would  have; 
 been  more  worthy  of  God;  the  Men,  I  fay,  that  hold  this, 
 are  oblig'd  to  fhew  the  poliibility  of  conceiving  it,  and  to. 
 explain  the  manner  how  it  may  be,  before  we  are  oblig'd  to. 
 believe  them.  They  muft  flievv  that  the  fame  things  which 
 are  now  conducive  to  our  Happinefs,  and  confequently  the 
 Objc£ls  of  our  Love,  might  as  eafily  have  tended  to  our  Mi- 
 fei\'  :  and  confequently  have  been  as  reafonably  the  Qbjeds 
 of  our  Averfion;  that  the  fame  Paffions,  Objects,  Exerciies, 
 and  Inclinations   which  now  create  plcafure  in  us,    might 
 
 hivg 
 
164  Concerning  Natural  Evil.    Chap.  IVi 
 
 NOTES^ 
 
 have  produced  a  diiFerent,  a  quite  contrary  effeft,  or  no  efFeft 
 at  all.  This  they  are  obliged  to  do :  and  when  they  have 
 done  all  this,  and  compleated  their  Syftem,  and  made  a  total 
 alteration  of  things,  as  they  imagine,  for  the  better,  they  are 
 at  laft  only  got  to  the  above  mention'd  abfurdity  of  putting 
 this  Syftem  into  a  higher  Clafs,  whereas  all  the  different 
 Clafles  in  every  conceivable  Degree  of  Perfeftion,  were  fup- 
 pofed  to  be  entirely  filled  at  the  firft.  We  muft  therefore  take 
 things  as  they  are,  and  argue  only  from  the  prclent  Nature 
 of  them  colleftively  :  In  which  View  we  fliall  find  no  poflible 
 alteration  of  any  thing,  but  what  would  produce  the  fame  or 
 greater  Inconveniences,  either  in  itfelf,  or  others,  to  which 
 it  bears  a  ftridt  relatibh.  Inftances  of  this  kind  are  every 
 where  to  be  met  with:  particular  Proofs  of  it  in  the  natural 
 World,  occur  in  Dr.  Bentleys  Boyle's  LeB.  particularly  with 
 regard  to  the  five  Senfes  of  the  human  Body,  p.  95,  96.  [See 
 aKb  Locke  on  Human  Utiderjinnding,  B.  2.  C.  23.  §.  12]  with 
 refpeft  to  the  figure  and  ftature  of  it,  in  Gren.vs  Cofmologia 
 Sacra,  B.  I,  C.  5.  §.  25,  ^c.  and  to  the  fcveral  Parts  of  it, 
 all  over  Boyle  *,  Cheyne,  Derham,  Neiventyt,  Ray,  Cockburny 
 Ed-vuards,  W.  Scott,  or  Felling, 
 
 The  fame  might  eafily  be  fhewn  in  the  immaterial  World; 
 aud  in  the  moft  exceptionable  Part  of  it,  viz.  the  Soul  of 
 Man,  its  Knowledge,  Freedom,  AfFettions -f-. 
 
 I  fhall  take  the  liberty  to  borrow  a  Section  from  Mr.  MaX' 
 if^/Z's general  Remarks  on  Cumberland,  C.  5.  which  fets  this 
 Subject  in  a  very  good  light.  "  The  Nature  of  Things  in  the 
 *'  natural  World  is  fo  exactly  fitted  to  the  natural  Faculties 
 *'  and  Difpofitions  of  Mankind,  that  were  any  thing  in  it 
 *'  otherwife  than  it  is,  even  in  Degree,  Mankind  would  be 
 «'  lefs  happy  than  they  now  are.  Thus  the  dependence  of 
 •'  all  natural  Efix;£ts  upon  a  ic^N  Jimple  Frinciples,  is  vvonder- 
 *'  fully  advantageous  in  many  refpedts.  The  Degrees  of  all 
 «*  the  fenfible  Pleafures  are  cxadtly  fuited  to  the  ufe  of  each  i 
 <•  fo  that  if  we  enjoy'd  any  of  them  in  a  greater  degree,  we 
 «<  Ihould  be  lefs  happy  :  for  our  Appetites  of  thofe  Pleafures 
 **  would  by  that  means  be  too  ftrong  for  our  Reafon ;  and, 
 **  as  we  are  framed,  tempt  us  to  an  immoderate  enjoyment 
 **  of  them,  fo  as  to  prejudice  our  Bodies.     And  where  wc 
 
 "  enjoy 
 
 *  On  F/W  Caufes. 
 t  See  Sir  M.   Hale's  Prim,  Orig.  cf  Matik  C  2.  Pe  H^, 
 mint,  p.  jz. 
 
Ssd,  2.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  165 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 •''  enjoy  fome  of  them  in  fo  high  a  degree,  as  that  it  is  in 
 "  many  cafes  very  difiicult  for  the  ftrongeft  Reafon  to  regulate 
 «<  and  moderate  the  Appetites  of  fuch  Pleafures,  it  is  in  fuch 
 **  Inftances  where  it  was  necefTaj-y  to  counterpoifc  fome  difad- 
 •*  vantages,  which  arc  the  confequences  of  the  purfuit  of 
 *'  thofe  Pleafures.  Thus  the  pleafmg  Ideas  which  accom- 
 **  pany  the  Love  of  the  Sexes,  are  neceffary  to  be  poffeircd 
 **"in  fo  high  a  degree,  to  ballance  the  Cares  of  Matrimony ^ 
 "  and  alfo  the  Pains  of  Child-bearing  in  the  Female  Sex. 
 "  The  fame  may  be  faid  of  our  Intelledual  Pleafures.  Thus 
 *'  did  wfi  receive  a  greater  Pleafure  from  Benevolence, 
 "  Sloth  would  be  encouraged  by  an  immoderate  Bounty. 
 *'  And  were  the  Pleafures  of  our  Enquiries  into  the  Truth 
 "  greater,  we  fhould  be  too  fpeculative  and  lefs  adtive.  It 
 **  feems  alfo  probable,  that  the  Degree  of  our  Intelle£tual 
 *'  Capacity  is  very  well  fuited  to  our, Objects  of  Knowledge, 
 **  and  that  had  we  a  greater  degree  thereof,  all  other  things 
 '*  remaining  as  they  are,  we  fhould  be  lefs  happy.  More- 
 *'  over,  it  is  probably  fo  adapted  to  the  Frame  of  our  Bodies^ 
 **  that  it  could  not  be  greater,  without  either  an  alteration  ia 
 "  the  Laws  of  Nature,  or  in  the  Laws  of  Union  betweea 
 "  the  Soul  and  Body.  Farther;  were  it  much  greater  tharj 
 **  it  is,  our  Thoughts  and  Purfuits  would  be  fo  fpiritual  and 
 "  refin'd,  that  we  Ihould  be  taken  too  much  off  from  the  fen- 
 *'  fible  Pleafures :  We  fhould  probably  be  confcious  of  fome 
 *'  Defeds  or  Wants  in  our  bodily  Organs,  and  would  be 
 **  fenfible  that  they  were  unequal  to  fo  great  a  Capacity, 
 *'  whicji  woujd  neceffarily  be  followed  by  Uneafinefs  of 
 *'  Mind.  And  this  feems  to  hold  in  the  Brute  Creation : 
 **  For,  methinks  it  would  be  for  the  difadvantage  of  a  HorfCs 
 **  to  be  endowed  with  the  Underftanding  of  a  Man  ;  fuch  an 
 "  unequal  Union  mufl  be  attended  with  continual  difquie- 
 *'  tudes  and  difcontents.  As  for  our  Pains,  they  are  all  either 
 f/  Warnings  againit  bodily  Diforders,  or  as  fuch  as,  had 
 •f  we  wanted  them,  the  Laws  of  Nature  remaiping  as  they 
 *'  are,  we  fhould  either  have  wanted  fome  Pleafures  we  now 
 *,*  enjoy,  or  have  poffeffed  them  in  a  lefs  degree.  Thofe 
 <'  things  in  Nature  which  we  cannot  reconcile  to  the  fore- 
 •^  going  opinion,  as  being  ignorant  of  their  Ufc,  vve  have 
 **  good  Reafon  from  Analogy  to  believe,  are  really  advanta? 
 ^f  geous,  and  adapted  to  the  Happinefs  of  the  Intelligent  Beings 
 "  of  the  Syftem :  though  we  have  not  fo  full  and  com- 
 **  pi^ie  a  Knowledge  of  jhe  entire  Syftenn,  as  to  be  able  ta 
 '  "      -  M  3  "  poinj 
 
1 66  Concerning  JSJ'atural  Evil.     Chap.  VI, 
 
 'Tis  pro- 
 bable that 
 the  Solidi- 
 ty of  our 
 todies  is 
 the  caufe 
 why  we 
 cannot 
 move 
 them  whi- 
 ther we 
 pleafe. 
 
 A  Soul 
 united  to 
 a  portion 
 of  Ethe- 
 real Mat- 
 ter, ^c. 
 can  move 
 It  \\h'ther 
 it  will, 
 and  prc- 
 ferve  its 
 Union, 
 fuch  a 
 Body 
 therefo;-3 
 js  immor- 
 tal. 
 
 SECT.    III. 
 
 Of  Death, 
 
 WE  know  by  Experience  tiiat  Souls  united 
 to  Bodies  move  them  fome  way  or  other; 
 viz,,  by  Thought  and  Volition :  for  thus  we  move 
 our  own.  And  'tis  probable  that  the  Gravity, 
 Solidity,  and  Hardnefs  of  our  Bodies,  together  with 
 the  Kefiftence  of  the  adjacent  ones,  are  the  Caufes 
 why  we  cannot  move  them  every  way  as  we  pleafe. 
 II.  A  Soul  when  united  to  a  portion  of  ethe- 
 real, uniform,  and  perfeftly  fluid  Matter,  free  from 
 the  Impediment  of  Gravity  aud  Refiftence,  may 
 in  all  probability  move  its  Body  whitherfcever  ic 
 pleafes.  Such  a  Body  therefore  would  be  perfectly 
 obfequious  to  the  thought  and  will  of  the  Soul 
 that  inhabits  it:  and  if  it  receiv'd  any  detriment  from 
 the  neighbouring  Bodies,  it  could  repair  it  by  its 
 Will  alone ;  at  lead:  To  long  as  the  ^ther  continu- 
 ed in  its  Fluidity  and  Purity.  Unlefs  the  Animal 
 theiefore  willed  the  contrary,  its  Body  would  be 
 
 incor-^ 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *'  point  out  their  Particularities.  From  thefe  Obfervations 
 '^'  wc  may  conclude,  that  all  the  various  Parts  of  our  Syflcm 
 ?'  are  fo  admirably  fuited  to  one  another,  and  the  Whole  con- 
 *'  trived  with  fuch  exquifite  Wifdom,  that  were  any  thing, 
 •  '  in  any  part  thereof,  in  the  leaft  othcrv.'ire  than  it  is,  with- 
 "•  out  an  alteration  in  the  whole,  there  would  be  a  lefsSum 
 "  of  Happincfs  in  the  Syftem  than  there  now  is*  " 
 
 See  alio  the  Ingenious  Author  of  the  Nature  and  ConduB  of 
 ihf  PaJJjor.s,  p.  179,  ?.oi,  202. 
 
 Eut  this  will  be  more  fully  confidered  in  the  4th  Se£Hon. 
 
 i 
 
Sedl.  3'     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  167 
 
 incorrtiptihle,  and  always  fit  for  Union,  i.e.  immortal. 
 If  any  one  objeft  that  the  Bodies  of  the  Blefifed, 
 which  we  call  Cdeftial,  need  no  Motion  or  Cha  nge 
 of  Condition,  fince  they  enjoy  continual  Pleafure  ; 
 for  no  one  moves  or  changes  his  Stare,  but  in  order 
 to  remove  fome  prefent  Uneafinefs.  I  anfwer;  Thcfe 
 Bodies  are  not  therefore  immortal,  becaufe  they  are 
 naturally  incorruptible  (for  that  would  be  incompa- 
 tible with  the  Nature  of  that  Matter  whereof  they 
 are  compofed)  but  becaufe  they  are  put  into  fucli 
 Places  and  Circumftances  by  the  Deity,  that  they 
 can,  even  with  Pleafure,  forefee  and  prevent  all  fuch 
 things  as  might  tend  to  introduce  either  Corruption  or 
 Pain.  Neither  does  their  Pleafure  or  Happinefs  con- 
 fifl:  in  Reft  properly  fo  called,  but  in  Aftivity, 
 in  fuch  A6ts  and  Exercifes  of  their  Faculties  as 
 they  choofe :  Now,  fince  they  may  exercife  them- 
 felves  perpetually  according  to  their  own  Choice, 
 and  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  them,  they  may  be 
 perpetually  happy;  as  will  be  declared  below.  All 
 which  are  different  in  folid  Bodies. 
 
 III.  We  cannot   certainly    determine  what  Life  The  Body 
 is  in  thefe  Animals  which  have  folid   Bodies,*  but  ofatenei- 
 we  fufficiently  apprehend  -where  it  is,  from  certain  ^"  j  .'■ 
 Marks  and    Tokens.     For    where  there  is   a  cir-  ^mA  of 
 cular  motion  of  the  Fluids,  there  is  Nutrition  and  VefTel, 
 Increafe,   there  is,   as  I   coniefture,    fome  fort  of  which 
 Life.     Now  'tis  evident  that  this  circular  morion  ™^^  °^ 
 may  be  interrupted  by  the  force  of  the  adjacent  Bo-  ii^jniJurs^ 
 dies:  the  folid  Body  of  an  Animal  is  a  kind   of  may  flow 
 VefTel  in  which  the  Humours  have  a  flux  and  re    out,  and 
 flux  through   certain    duds    and    channels  framed  J^'-'  '^^'"<:"' 
 by  Divine   Skill,    in   the  morion  of  which   Life  cea^°^'°^ 
 confifts.     Now  this  VelTel  may  be  broke  in  pieces  Such  .^m- 
 by  the  impulfe  of  other  Bodies,   fince  by  the  na-  mals  then 
 tive  imperfection  of  Matter  it  is  capable  of  Dif-  ^^^^  "^tu- 
 folution :    but    when   the    Veffcl    is    broken,    the  J"^!  ■^  ^^'°''"' 
 Fluids  therein  contained  mull  nrceflarily  flqw  our, 
 '  "  M  4  ■  the 
 
"l68  Concerning  Natural  Yjs'A.     Chap.  IV, 
 
 the  circular  motion  muft  ceafe,  and  together  with  ip 
 animal  Life.  Such  Animals  therefore  as  have  fo- 
 lid  Bodies,  are  by  Nature  Mortal,  and  cannot  laft 
 for  ever,  without  violence  done  to  the  Laws  of 
 Nature,  of  Matter,  and  Motion;  There  muft  then 
 have  been  either  none  at  all  created,  or  fuch  as  are 
 naturally  Mortal.  'The  imperfeflion  of  Matter  could 
 not  fuffer  it  to  be  otherwife.  For  the  hard  and 
 folid  parts  belonging  to  thefe  Bodies  are  of  fuch  a 
 Frame  as  muft  neceflarily  be  fhaken  and  feparated 
 by  others  of  the  fame  bulk  and  hardnefs.  Every 
 t^ing  therefore  that  confifts  of  fuch  kind  of  Parts, 
 may  be  corrupted  and  diffolved.  (i^.)  Therefore 
 .'■  the 
 
 NOXESo 
 
 (29  )  This  point  is  very  well  illuftrated  by  Dr.  "J.  Claris 
 on  Natural  Efil,  p.  245,  iffc.  whofe  Reafoning  is  entirely 
 built  upon  Sir.  /.  A'^^'ou/ow's  Experiments.  "  Human  Bodies 
 "  as  well  as  thofe  of  all  other  Animals,  and  of  Plants,  are 
 "  compounded  of  very  different  Materials,  fjx'd  and  voU- 
 «'  tile,  fluid  and  folid  ;  as  appears  by  the  refolution  of  them 
 *'  into  their  conftituent  Parts ;  and  they  are  nourilh'd  in  xhs 
 "  fame  manner,  'viz.  by  attraftion.  For  as  a  Spunge  by 
 "  Su£lion  draws  in  Water,  fo  the  Glands  in  the  Bodies 
 "  of  all  Ariimals  draw  different  Juices  out  of  the  Blood,  ac- 
 "='  cording  to  the  particular  Nature  and  Conftitution  of  each 
 ,*'  of  them :  So  long  therefore  as  the  nourifhment  is  proper 
 '=*  to  alTimilate  itfelf  to  the  feveral' parts  of  the  Body,  as  it 
 f  approaches  them  in  its  feveral  channels  i  or  fo  long  as  tie 
 «'  folid  Particles  (fpppofe  of  Salts,  which  are  abfolutely  ne- 
 f'  ceflary  to  the  prcfervation  of  all  Creatures)  retain  their 
 *'  form  and  texture ;  fo  long  Life  is  prefervM  and  main- 
 *'  tain'd.  And  when  the  nourifhment  becomes  unfit  to  afli' 
 '♦  milate;  or  the  faline  Particles  (which  towards  the  Center 
 f  are  very  denfe,  and  therefore  capable  of  flrongly  attrail- 
 f  ing  the  Fluids  to  them)  lofe  their  power  of  Attradlion, 
 **  either  by  being  divided  into  lefs  Particles  (as  they  may  be 
 f  by  their  watry  parts  infmuating  thcmfelves  into  their  Pores 
 ?'  with  a  gentle  heat)  or  elfe  by  having  thofe  watry  Parts 
 V  violently  feparated  from  thjm :  in  either  pf  thefe  Cafes  all 
 f*  their  Motion  will  ceafe,  and  end  in  Corruption,  Confu- 
 I'  fion  and  Death.     And  this  is   abundantly    coniirm'd  by 
 
Sc5:.  3.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  56^ 
 
 the  Divine  Power  and  Goodnefs  did  the  verY  befi; 
 even  in  creating  Beings  that  were  mortal :   for  an 
 Animal  fubjed  to  Death  is  better  than  none  at  all. 
 •"  IV.  But   God,  you'll  fay,  created  Man  at  firll  This  Hy- 
 immortal,    as  we    underftand    by   facred  Hiftory :  P^'^^^'^J],^ 
 Mortality    is  not    therefore   an   infeparable    at  ten-  ^yj^^  fa- 
 dant  on  folid  Bodies.     I   anfwer;   It  does  not  ap- cred  Hif- 
 pear  to  us   of  what  fort  the  Bodies  of  Mankind  tory,  con- 
 were    before    the  Fall,   and  confequently   nothing  \^^'^_ 
 can   be  argued  from    thence  againft    the  rieceffary  mortality 
 Mortality  of  all  terreftrial  ones.     Farther,  we  fhould  of  the  firft 
 remember   that    our   firft    Parents    were    naturally  Man. 
 mortal  i  but  that  God  covenanted   with  them  for 
 Immortality  as  a  matter  of  Favour,  and  upon  par- 
 ticular Conditions.     Not    that  they    fhould  have 
 continued    upon  Earth   for    ever;  but   that  Cpd 
 promifed    to  tranflate   them  at  a   proper  time    by 
 his  efpecial   Favour,    and  preferve  them  in  a  place 
 fit  for  the  Enjoyment  of  Eternity :    as  we  believe 
 he  did  with  Enoch  and  £lias.     But  as  foon  as  this 
 Covenant   with  God    was  broken   by   Sin,    Man 
 was  reftor'd  to  his  Native  Mortality,  and  fubjedd 
 to  thofe  other  Inconvenience   to   which    the  Or- 
 der of  Nature,  and  the  Chain  of  Natural  Caufes^ 
 fender'd  fuch  Bodies  as  thefe  of  Mankind  obnoxi- 
 
 N  OT  E  S^, 
 
 «  Experience,  in  that  every  thing  which  is  corrupted  or 
 *'  putrify'd  is  of  a  black  Colour ;  which'  fliews,  that  the 
 •*  component  Particles  are  broken  to  Pieces,  and  reduced  fo 
 ^'  fmall,  as  to  be  unable  even  to'  refleft  the  Rays  of  Light. 
 «'  Thus  we  fee  that.  Death,  or  the  Diffolution  of  the  Body, 
 <'  is  the  neceffary  Confequence  of  thofe  Laws  by  which  it  is 
 «^  framed  and  generated  :  and  therefore  is  not  in  itfelf  pro- 
 *«  perly  an  E^ofl,  any  more  than  that  Fabric  can  be  filled  ///,  ■ 
 *<  the  Materials,  or  manner  of  building  of  which,  would  not 
 ««  permit  it  to  !atl  a  thoufand  Years,  nor  was  originally  in* 
 -«'  tended  to  condnue  half  fo  long.'- 
 
 n 
 
■17^  Concerning  Natural  ^^'A.     Chap.  IV; 
 
 ous.  For  though  God  has  not  fo  fir  tied  himfelf 
 up  to  the  Laws  of  Nature  but  that  he  may  in 
 many  Cafes  iufpend  and  fuperfede  themj  yet  this 
 is  not  done  frequently,  nor  to  be  expeded  for  the 
 fake  of  Sinners.  God  can  indeed  preferve  Man 
 from  aEiud  Death  i  but  thac  a  folid  Machine 
 confiding  of  heterogeneous  Parts,  fuch  as  the  hu- 
 man Body  is,  fhould  not  be  naturally  Mortal,  is 
 impoflible:  'Tis  a  Contradidion  therefore  that 
 Man,  in  the  prefent  State  of  things,  fhould  be  by 
 Nature  immortal.  (L.) 
 
 SEC  T. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (L.)  All  the  Objeclions  brought  againft  this  Seftion  are^ 
 that  the  Author  maintains  fome  things  in  it  which  deftroy 
 his  own  Hypothefis.  ill:.  He  holds  that  a  Soul  united  to 
 an  aetherial,  uniform  matter,  perfeflly  fluid  and  without 
 weight  or  refiftence  may  tranfport  its  Body  where  it  pleafes, 
 and  if  it  receive  any  damage  from  the  neighbouring  Bodies 
 it  may  repair  it  again,  by  the  power  that  the  will  of  fuch 
 a  Creature  has  over  its  own  Body :  fo  if  it  pleafe  it  may  be 
 immortal.  From  whence  the  Obje£lor  concludes,  that  ac- 
 cording to  the  Author,  there  is  no  connexion  between  a 
 Creature  made  of  matter  and  mortality,  or  any  natural  Evils. 
 
 But  furely  this  is  raiflng  Objeftions  againft  a  Book  before 
 one  read  it.  For  if  he  had  read  it,  he  might  have  feen  that 
 the  Author  exprefiy  affirms  that  thofe  Bodies  are  not  im- 
 mortal, becaufe  incorruptible  by  Nature,  for  the  Matter  of 
 which  they  confift  will  not  permit  them  to  be  fo,  but  be- 
 caufe they  are  placed  in  fuch  Stations  and  Circumftances,  in 
 which  they  may  foreknow  and  prevent  with  pleafure  all  thofe 
 things  that  caufe  corruption  or  pain.  From  whence  it  is 
 manifeft  that  the  Author  fuppofes  thcfe  corruptible,  as  well 
 as  our  earthly  Bodies,  but  it  does  not  follow  from  thence 
 that  they  muft  be  corrupted.  There's  a  great  difference  be- 
 tween the  Power  and  Aft ;  nor  is  it  a  good  Confequence, 
 this  is  capable  of  being  corrupted,  therefore  it  muft  be  a£tu- 
 ally  fo.  The  Circumftances  plainly  make  the  difference  be- 
 tween Bodies  of  this  fort  and  ours  that  are  folid,  heavy  an4 
 heterogeneous,  fubjeft  to  the  fhock  and  impulfe  of  others 
 i^hat  are  like  wife  hard,  heavy.  Sec. 
 
 ^ut  then,  zMy,  the  Objedlor  alleges  that  this  ought  not  to 
 
 bs 
 
Sed.  2.     Cojicernijig  Natural 'Evil,  I'ji 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 he  fo ;  for  how  knows  any  body  that  fuch  compofitions  as 
 thefe  have  any  more  malignity  in  them  then  fiibtil  uniform 
 Bodies  ?  Anfw.  If  by  malignity  be  meant  aftual  Corruption, 
 every  body  muft  fee  that  thefe  are  more  liable  to  it  than  the 
 other :  that  a  heavy  Body  can't  be  moved  with  the  fame  faci- 
 lity that  a  Body  exempt  from  Gravity  can,  that  a  certain 
 portion  of  matter  to  which  the  Soul  is  immediately  united, 
 and  v^hich  it  ufes  in  Senfation,  will  become  unfit  for  it 
 when  it  is  diflipated  or  mix'd  with  heterogenous  particles, 
 and  that  in  the  Earth  it  muft  meet  with  fuch,  whereas  therq 
 are  no  fuch  particles  to  mix  with  it  in  an  uniform  ^ther. 
 
 Our  firft  Parents  knowledge  or  Power,  if  they  had  conti- 
 nued in  their  Innocence,  could  not  have  prevented  all  effefts 
 of  thefe,  tho'  God  out  of  particular  favour  wou'd  have  pre- 
 ferv'd  them  from  the  worft  and  moft  mifchievous  of  'em, 
 which  are  reckon'd  up  in  the  Book*,  and  this  but  for  a 
 time,  till  he  found  it  convenient  to  tranflate  them  to  a  bet- 
 ter place,  Tho'  after  all,  we  know  not  how  the  Bodies  of 
 our  firft  Parents  were  framed,  or  what  alterations  were  in- 
 troduced on  their  finning,  and  therefore  no  good  Argument 
 can  be  taken  from  thence. 
 
 But,  2)%i  'Tis  pretended  that  to  fay,  on  Man's  finning 
 God  abandon'd  him  to  his  natural  Mortality,  and  to  the 
 other  inconveniences  that  necefl!arily  follow  the  Lav/s  of  Na- 
 ture, is  a  fort  of  Contradiction.  For  if  there  be  a  natural 
 NecefTity  that  Man  fliould  be  expofed  to  Pains  and  Deaths 
 his  Innocence  could  not  protedl  him  from  them. 
 
 But  this  is  ftill  to  confute  Books  without  reading  them. 
 The  Author  does  not  fay  that  Death  or  Corruption  necefiarily 
 follow  the  Laws  of  Nature,  but  only  that  they  are  the  Effedls 
 of  thef^  fame  Laws  when  left  to  themfelves,  which  God  did 
 not  think  fit  to  do  in  all  things  whilft  Man  continued  InnoT 
 cent. 
 
 Nor  laftly,  does  it  follow  from  thence,  as  pretended,  that 
 Matter  is  indiflerent  to  Diifolution  or  Continuance  of  itfelf,, 
 and  only  determin'd  to  one  or  other  as  the  Creator  pleafes* 
 For  the  Poffibility  of  Corruption  is  inherent  in  all  Matter,, 
 but  whether  it  Ihall  in  all  times  and  places  aflually  be  cor- 
 rupted depends  on  the  Pleafure  of  God,  and  in  many  Cafes 
 on  the  Pleafure  of  other  Agents,  and  that  the  Matter  of  hu- 
 man Bodies  in  their  prefent  Circumftances  fuou'd  not  be  cor- 
 rupted, is  impoffible. 
 
172  Concerning  Nattiral  ^v\\.    Chap.  IV. 
 
 SECT.    IV. 
 
 purSouk  Of  the  PaJJion^. 
 
 require 
 bodies  of 
 
 a  peculiar  QUPPOSING  the  Union  of  a  thinking  or 
 Crafts,  ^  fenfitive  Soul  with  Matter,  its  Thought  and 
 i^dtfor  ^i^^  ^^^  neceffarily  be  afFeded  by  the  Motions 
 der'd  or  of  that,  as  body  muft  be  again  by  thefe.  For 
 xemov'd,  fince  the  Soul  is  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  to  require 
 the  opera-  Matter  of  a  peculiar  Crafs  and  Figur?y  in  order  to 
 T"s°l  ciifcharge  its  Fundions,  it  follows  that  when  this 
 are  cither  Difpofition  is  faulty,  or  quite  fails,  the  Qperati- 
 hinder'd.  ons  of  the  Soul  muft  be  impeded,  or  entirely  ceafe ; 
 ordeftroy-  nor  can  it  poffibly  be  otherwife  while  the  Soul 
 ^^'  ^nd  Body  are  of  luch  a  Nature  as  they  really  are. 
 
 The  Soul       I-^*  Since   therefore  it  is  no  diminution  of  the 
 and  Body    Plvine  Goodnefs  to  have  affign'd  fuch  a  Nature 
 2dmit;ofa  to  them,  as  was  fhewn  before;  we  muft  alfo  ad- 
 inutual       jjjjf  Qf  2  mutual  Sympathy  between  them.     NoW, 
 "^l^"^hence  ^^  ^^^^7  "lutually  affed  each  other,  the  confequence 
 k  IS  the      will  be  that  it  is  the  principal  bufinefs  of  the  Soul 
 firftcareofto    preferve  the   Body  from  harm.     In   order  to 
 the  Soul  to  jhis^  't;is    necefTary   that  the  Soul    fhould    have  4 
 keep  the     perception  of  what  is  good  for,  or    prejudicial  to 
 From   ^      ^^^^  Body ;  and  this  could  not  be  more  effedually 
 |iarm.        procured,  than  by  providing  that  thofe  things  which 
 tend  to  Its  preferVation  fhould  communicate  an  agreea- 
 ble fenfation   to  the  Soul,   and  what  is  pernicious, 
 a  difagrecable  one.     For  otherwife,  the  firft  thing 
 we  met   with  might   deflroy    us,  v/hile  we  were 
 unaware    or    regardlefs   of   it;  nor  fliould   we    be 
 folhcitous  to  avoid  a  River  or  a  Precipice. 
 
 in. 
 
Sed.  4.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  173 
 
 III.  *Tis  necefTary  therefore  that   the  Soul  and  The  fenfe 
 Body   fhould  afFed  each  other  mutually;  that  the  ^^^^"^^ 
 Impairing  or  DifTolution  of  the  Body  fhould  ere-  "0  preSr© 
 ate  uneafmefs,    which,  by  its   importutiity,   might  Life,  as 
 recall  the  Soul   that  was    indifpofed  or  otherwife  alfo  the 
 engaged,   to  take  care  of  the  whole;  nor   ought  ^^^^°^ 
 it   to  ceafe  urging,   till  what  was  hurtful  be  re-  * 
 
 moved:  without  this  importunity  perhaps  the 
 ftrongeft  Animal  would  not  laft  even  a  Day.  The 
 Senfe  then  of  Pain  or  Uneafinefs  produced  in  the  Soul 
 upon  the  Mutilation  or  DifTolution  of  the  Body, 
 is  neceffary  for  the  prefervation  of  Life  in  the 
 prefent  State  of  Things.  It  may  be  proved  froirx 
 the  fame  Principles,  that  the  averfion  to,  or  dread 
 of  Dtathi  is  not  in  vain,  fince  it  cannot  even  be 
 conceived  how  a  frail  and  mortal  Body,  toffed  by 
 continual  Motions,  and  tumbled  among  other  hard 
 Bodies,  fhould  efcape  Diffolution,  if  the  Soul  which 
 moves  that  Body  were  not  forewarn'd  to  avoid  Death 
 by  the  natural  horror  of  its  approach.     (M.) 
 
 IV. 
 
 NO  T  E  S. 
 
 (M  )  Here  the  Enemies  of  the  Unity  of  God  allcdge  that 
 they  are  fatisfy'd,  that  Matter  muft  be  moveable,  that  a' 
 Body  compofed  of  folid  and  heavy  Parts,  as  ours  are,  envi" 
 ron'd  with  other  Bodies  in  continual  Agitation  and  perpe- 
 tually liable  to  their  Shock,  mult  be  alfo  fubjed  to  be  broken 
 and  dilTolved,  but  then  why  fhould  fuch  Separation  and  Dif- 
 fblution  caufe  uneafy  Sentiments  in  us  ?  'Tis  true,  if  a  Man 
 fee  benighted  in  a  Wildernefs  and  deprived  of  Light,  he  may 
 fall  into  a  Pit  and  break  his  Bones  ',  if  he  fall  afleep,  the 
 Wind  may  blow  down  a  Tree  on  him  and  crufh  his  Body,  or 
 Cut  off"  a  Leg  or  an  Arm  ;  thefe  are  by  the  very  Nature  of  Mat' 
 ter  eafily  feparable ;  hut  our  Mifery  doth  not  conlift  in  lof- 
 ing  thefe,  but  in  the  Trouble  and  Concern  we  have  for  the 
 Lofsofthem.  If  the  lofmg  them  caufed  no  Pain  or  Vexa- 
 tion to  us,  we  were  as  happy  without  as  with  them.  Now 
 they  fuppofe  that  the  Soul  is  united  to  the  Body  on  what 
 Terms  God  pleafes,  and  that  he  could  as  eafily  have  joined 
 jheSenfations  gf  Pleafure  with  thefe  In^prefTions  on  our  Bo- 
 
 dieSi 
 
i'?^  Concenihig  Naf lira!  "Evil.     Chap.  IV, 
 
 The  reft  of      IV.  Now   the  reft  of  the    Paflions  are  Confe- 
 the  Paf-      quences  of  Pain,  Uneafinefs,  and  dread  of  Death ; 
 connedld  '^''^*  Anger,   Love,    Hatred,  &c.     An   Animal  in 
 wkhthefe.  the  preient  State  of  things,  muft  therefore  either  be 
 obnoxious   to    thefe,    or   quickly  perifli.     For  'tis 
 impoflible  that  the  Soul  fhould  have  a  difagreeable 
 Senfation,  and  not  be  an^ry  at  the  Caufe  which  pro- 
 duces it :  and  fo  of  the  reft. 
 
 V* 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (i^ies,  as  that  of  Pain,  and  that  an  infinitely  good  God  wou'd 
 jfiave  done  fo,  if  a  contrary  Power  had  not  hindered  him. 
 
 For  ought  I  find  the  whole  Difficulty  concerning  natural 
 Evils  is  reduced  to  this  Point,  and  methinks  'tis  ftrange  that 
 any  Strefs  fnould  be  laid  on  it ;  W'hich  will  appear  if  W8 
 confider,  -•■' 
 
 I  ft.  That  the  Argument  is  drawn  from  a  Matter  concern- 
 ing the  Nature  of  which  we  have  no  Knowledge,  I  mean 
 from  the  Union  of  the  Soul  and  Body,  and  from  the  Man- 
 ner in  which  the  one  affeds  and  operates  on  the  other.  We 
 can  give  no  account  how  one  Part  of  Matter  afts  on  another, 
 jhow  they  are  united,  or  what  it  is  that  makes  them  ftick  to- 
 gether. Much  lefs  do  we  know  how  a  Soul  and  Body  are 
 united  to  one  another,  or  ho^v  it  is  poffible  that  there  fhould 
 be  a  mutual  Adlion  and  Readtion  between  them,  and  there- 
 fore to  fay  that  this  proceeds  from  an  Arbitrary  Power,  or  that 
 it  might  have  been  other  wife,  is  to  affirm  what  Nobody  either 
 ^  doth  or  can  know.  We  fee  the  A£tion  of  one  part  of  Mat- 
 ter on  another  is  neceflary,  and  arifes  from  the  Nature  of  it : 
 Ifit  had  been  otherwife,  it  had  not  been  Matter  but  fome- 
 thing  elfe,  and  he  that  would  not  have  it  fo,  would  not  have 
 God  to  have  created  any  Matter  at  all;  which,  as  the  Au« 
 thor  flievvs,  had  been  to  leflen  God's  Goodnefs,  and  to  hin- 
 der him  from  doing  a  thing  which  was  better  done  than  let 
 alone.  And  how  doth  the  Objeftor  know  but  'tis  the  Na- 
 ture of  Souls,  and  as  nccefiary  to  them  to  be  affefted  thus 
 with  certain  Motions  of  Matter,  as  for  one  Part  of  Matter  to 
 be  moved  by  the  Impulfe  of  another?  If  then  our  Souls  did 
 not  receive  thefe  Imprcffions  from  the  Motions  caufed  in  our 
 Bodies  by  external  force,  they  would  not  be  human  Souls, 
 but  fome  other  Creatures ;  of  which  fort,  I  fuppofe  there  were 
 aS  many  created  as  the  Syikin  vvou'd  allow,  and  therefore  there 
 
Se£t,  i.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  1^^ 
 
 V.  God  could  have  avoided  all  this  by  ordering  The  Paf- 
 
 that  the  Soul  Ihould  not  be  afFefted  by  the  Mo-  1;°"'^^^°"^* 
 
 tions  of  the  Body  ;   or  at  leaft,    that   every  thing  "oided  o"-  ■ 
 
 done  therein   fhould  be  agreeable  :    But  how  dan-  therwife, 
 
 gerous    this    would  be  to  Animals,  any  one  may  than  by 
 
 underftand,  who  recoUeds  how  very    fhort    their  ordering 
 
 Lives  muft  be,  if  they  died  with  the  fame  Plea-  g^^^^^  ^ 
 
 fure    that   they   eat   or  drank   or    propagate  their  fhould  not 
 
 Species.     If  on   tearing  the  Body  the   Soul  had  be  afFedted 
 
 cither    no  Senfation   at  all  or  a  pleafant  one,    we  '^^^^.  ^^'^ 
 
 fhould  be  no  more  aware  of  Death  than  of  Sleep,  ^r°o°"i°. 
 ,  ,   .     ,  .   .  1   n      T»*'^    the  Body : 
 
 nor  would  it  be  any  greater  mjury  to  kill  a  Man  By  thefc 
 than  to  fcratch   him.     And  thus  Mankind  would  means 
 quickly   fail.      We  muft   then    either  have   been  Animals 
 arm'd  with   thefe  Paffions  againft  Death,  or  foon  J'^^^^^f^^J;. 
 have  periih'd :  But  the  Divine  Goodnefs  chofe  that  ^^^^^ 
 Animals  fhould  be  fubjed  to  thefe,  rather  than  the 
 lEarth  ftiould  be  entirely   deftitute  of  Inhabitants. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 muft  either  be  wanting  in  the  World  this  Species  of  Beings., 
 or  they  muft  be  fubjedt  to  fuch  Impreffions.  If  therefore 
 it  be  better  for  Men  to  be  as  they  are,  than  not  to  be  at  all, 
 God  has  chofen  the  better  Part  in  giving  them  a  Being,  and 
 afted  according  to  his  Iniinite  Goodnefs. 
 
 But  zdly,  If  all  the  uneafy  Senfations  caufed  in  us  by  the 
 Incurfions  of  external  Bodies  tend  to  our  Prefervation,  and 
 without  them  we  could  neither  live  nor  enjoy  ourfelves  for 
 any  time;  then  they  do  more  good  than  hurt,  and  confe- 
 quently  are  a  Prefent  worthy  of  God  to  beftow  on  us.  Now 
 this  is  demonftr:ited  by  the  Author  in  his  Book,  and  'tis  con- 
 fefs'd  that  as  things  are  now  ordered,  the  Senfe  of  Pain  is 
 neccflary  to  oblige  us  to  avoid  many  Perils. 
 
 But  then  again  'tis  urg'd,  that  this  doth  not  remove  the 
 Difficulty,  becaufe  it  is  alledged  by  the  Followers  of  Manes 
 that  thefe  Pains  are  from  the  evil  Principle,  and  as  the  good 
 caufes  the  Tafte  of  A'feat  on  the  Tongue  to  pleafc,  (o  the  Evi^ 
 caufes  the  Fire  to  create  Pain  in  us  when  it  burns  us. 
 
 zdly.  They  allcdge  that  there  was  no  Necelhty  for  thele 
 Pains,  becaufe  Adam  was  without  them  in  Paradife.  3dly, 
 We  might  have  been  fu^dentlj  obliged  to  avoid  what  could 
 
 hurl; 
 
176  Concerning  Natural  EwW.    Chap.  IV, 
 
 It  is  not  VI.    Behold  now   how  Evils  fpring  from  and 
 
 ^°"?^'^n-    "^"^"P^J  upon  ^2<^h  other,  while  infinite  Goodnefs 
 line  ^^^^  ""^g^^  ^^^  ^^^0'  '^o  do  the  very  beft.     This 
 
 Goodnefs  moved  him  to  give  ExijUnce  to  Creatures,  which 
 to  permit  cannot  exift  without  Imperfe^ions  and  Iffeqnality» 
 thefe  In-  This  excited  him  to  create  Matter,  and  to  put  it 
 convem-  -^^  Motion,  which  is  necefTarily  attended  with  Se- 
 fince  they  P^^'^tion  and  Diflblution,  Generation  and  Corrup-. 
 could  not  tion.  This  perfuaded  him  to  couple  Souls  with 
 beavoidad  Bodies,  and  to  give  them  mutual  AfFedions,  whence 
 without  pioceeded  Pain  and  Sorrow,  Hatred  and  Fear,  with 
 ^r-j  j.|^g  j.g£^  q£  jj^g  Paflions,  yet  all  of  them,  as  we  havs 
 feen,  are  necelfary. 
 
 yir, 
 
 '    NO T  E S 
 
 hurt  us,  if  we  had  a  perfeft  Knowledge  of  its  approach,  an(J 
 had  been  warned  to  avoid  the  Danger,  not  by  the  Pain  or 
 Fear  which  we  now  feel,  but  by  withdrawing  of  the  Senfe  of 
 Pleafure  on  the  Approach  of  what  might  hurt  or  deftroy  us. 
 Laftly,  that  thefe  Warnings  are  often  in  vain. 
 
 To  give  this  Argument  its  full  Confideration,  I  will  exa- 
 mine it  by  Parts.  And  firft,  as  to  what  is  alledged  that  the 
 pleafant  Senfations  produced  in  us  by  external  Motions  on  the 
 Organs  of  our  Senfes  are  from  God,  and  the  painful  fro  rat 
 the  evil  Principle.  I  delire  it  may  be  confider'd,  ill.  whether 
 any  Motion  caufes  Pain  in  us  that  doth  not  tend  to  our  Deftruc- 
 tion,  and  whether  the  Pain  do  not  ferve  as  a  Means  to  pre- 
 vent it..  And  if  the  Preferving  our  Bemg  be  a  greater  Good 
 to  us  than  thefe  Pains  are  a  Mifchief,  then  it  is  plain  'tis  bet- 
 ter we  ihould  have  than  want  them.  But  zdly.  Pain  feems 
 to  be  nothing  elfe  but  a  Senfe  that  our  Being  is  impairing^ 
 andiffo,  it  feems  impofEble  whilil  we  love  Being  and  are 
 pleafed  with  it,  that  we  fliould  perceive  it  to  decay,  and  not 
 he  difpleafed  with  the  Senfe  of  it,  and  the  Senfe  of  a  thing 
 difpleafmg  to  us  is  Pain.  Either  therefore  in  the  prefent 
 Cafe  our  Senfe  muft  be  taken  away,  or  Pain  feems  unavoid- 
 able. For  that  a  certain  Motion  caufed  in  our  Organs  fhou'd 
 pleafe  us,  becaufe  it  contributes  to  fupport  our  Being,  and 
 the  contrary  which  tends  to  deftroy  us,  fliould  not  difpleafc 
 Tis  when  we  feel  it,  feems  a  Contradidion.  God  there-; 
 fore' in  making' us  feel  the  Senfe  of  Pleafure  by  the  Firft  hai,. 
 
Sedl.  4*     Coticerning  Natural  Evil.  lyj 
 
 VII.  For,  as  created  Exijience  necelTarily  includes  God 
 the  Evil  of  Imperfe6lion,  fo  every  Species  of  it  is  ""'i-refore 
 fubjed  to  its  own  peculiar  Imperfeftions ;   that  is,  ^^"q^^^j 
 to  Evih.     All  the  Species  of  Creatures  then  muft  in  Thin-s 
 either  have  been  omitted,  or  their  concomirantl  Evils  with  the 
 tolerated:    the  Divine  Goodnefs  therefore  put  the  ^vHs 
 iEvils  in  one  Scale  and  the  good  in  tlie  other/  and  ^^'^^^  "^" 
 lince  the  Good  preponderated,   an  infinitely  good  attend^ 
 God  would  not  omit  that,  becaule  of  the  concomi- them;  and 
 tant  Evils,  for  that  very  Omillion  would  have  been  tolerated 
 attended  with  more  and  greater  Evils,  and  lo  would  ^^'J'/^Evils 
 have  been  lefs  agreeable  to  infinite  Goodnefs,  3,^"^  .  r 
 
 °  TTTTT    ^^^""^  mfe- 
 
 VIII.  parable 
 
 ^OTES.  ^t 
 
 fikewife  made  us  of  fuch  a  Nature,  that  we  mult  either  not 
 feel  the  Second  at  all  (/.  e.  the  Motion  that  hurts  us)  orbeuji- 
 eafy  at  it;  and  let  any  one  judge  which  of  thefe  two  is  moft 
 for  the  Advantage  of  Animals. 
 
 There  needs  not  therefore,  any  ill  Principle  to  introduce 
 a  Scnfe  of  Pain  at  the  Prefencc  of  what  tends  to  deftroy  us, 
 for  giving  us  the  Senfe  of  Fleafure  at  the  Prcfence  of  what 
 fupports  us  of  Neceflity  infers  the  other. 
 
 And  'tis  remarkable  as  the  Author  of  the  Book  obferves,. 
 that  when  the  P^iin  exceeds  the  Pleafure  of  Being,  the  Senfe 
 pfbothceafe,  that  is  when  our  Being  ceafes  to  be  a  Benefit 
 God  takes  it  from  us.      ,  , 
 
 As  to  the  2d  Objeftion,  that  thefe  Pains  on  the  Prefencc 
 of  deflirudive  Motions  attacking  us  are  unn'ecefTary  ;  be- 
 caufe  Jdam  in  Paradife  was  without  them,  I  have  already  ac 
 counted  for  it,  and  fhewed  that  it  doth"  not  appear  that  lie 
 was  altogether  without  Pain  or  PafTion  ;  and  that. he  was  on- 
 ly fecured  from  fuch  Pains  as  might  caufe  his  Death,  and  that 
 for  a  time,  till  removed  to  a  better  place.* 
 
 As  to  the  3d  Objeftion,  that  if  we  had  a  perfedV  Knowledge 
 of  the  Approach  of  every  thing  that  could  hurt  us,  and  had 
 only  felt  a  withdrawing  of  Pleafure  when  any  fuch  thing  was 
 nigh,  we  might  by  this  means  have  been  obliged  to  avoid  it  as 
 cfFediually  as  the  Senfe  of  Pain  could  do  it.     I  anfwer. 
 
 ift.  The  withdrawing  of  pleafure  or  dimlnilhing  it,  is  a 
 greater  Evil  to  us  than  the  pains  we  feel  on  fuchOccafions  ;^ 
 
 N  Which," 
 
 f  See  Note  H,  and  the  Sermon  snnexM, 
 
lyS  Concer?jin^  Natural 'EwW.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 The  Ax-  VIII.  The  kaft  Evil,  you'll  fay,  ought  not  to 
 iom  about  j^g  admitted  for  the  fake  of  the  greateft  Good.  (For 
 FvU  for  ^^  affi'iTi  that  God  does  Evil  that  Good  may  come 
 theiakeof  of  i^j  is  Blafphemy.)  Neither  does  the  Diftindion 
 Good,  between  A-Ioralmd  Natural  Evil  help  any  thing  to- 
 does  not     ^y^j-j  ^h^  Solution  of  this  Difficulty  :  For  what  we 
 
 take  place  ^^jj 
 
 whej-e  t^ie 
 ]e.ift  Evil 
 is  chofen. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Which  plainly  appears  from  this,  that  we  rather  cjioofe  to  en- 
 dure thefe  pains  tlian  lofe  the  pleafure  our  Senfes  afford  us; 
 which  is  manifeft  in  fo  many  Inftances,  that  I  hardly  need 
 mention  them.  The  Gout  is  one  of  the  mofl  tormenting 
 Difeafes  that  attend  us ;  and  yet  who  would  not  rather  endure 
 it,  than  lofe  the  Pleafure  of  Feeling?  Mofl  Men  are  fenfible 
 that  eating  certain  Meats,  and  indulging  ourfelves  in  the  ufe  of 
 feveral  Drinks,  will  bring  it;  and  yet  we  fee  this  doth  not  de- 
 ter us  from  them,  and  we  think  it  more  tolerable  to  endure  the 
 Gout,  than  lofe  the  Pleafure  that  plentiful  Eating  and  Drink- 
 ing yields  us.  V/hat  pains  will  not  a  Man  endure  rather  than 
 lofe  a  Limb,  or  the  advantage  that  a  plentiful  Fortune  yields  ? 
 This  expedient  therefore  is  very  improper:  'for  it  would  be  an 
 exchange  for  the  worfe ;  deprive  us  of  a  greater  Good,  to 
 prevent  a  lefler  Evil. 
 
 But,  2dly,  Either  this  Diminution  of  the  Pleafure  would  be 
 a  more  fenfible  lofs  to  us  than  Pain  is  now,  or  otherwiie.  If  it 
 were  more  uneafy  to  us  than  Pain,  the  exchange,  as  before, 
 would  be  for  the  worfe.  If  it  were  not,  it  would  not  be  luf- 
 ficicnt:  for  we  plainly  fee  that  in  many  cafes  the  greateft  pains 
 and  clearcll  profpcft  of  them  are  not  fufficient  to  divert  us  from 
 what  may  be  hurtful,  when  it  comes  in  competition  with  a 
 Pleafure.  We  have  therefore  no  Reafon  to  complain  of  God, 
 who  has  given  us  warning  by  Pain  of  what  might  deftroy  us, 
 fince  a  lefs  eflctlual  means  could  not  have  fecured  us.  In  fliort, 
 this  is  God's  way :  and  for  us  to  think  we  could  have  found  a 
 better,  is  pride  and  impudence  ;  and  there  needs  no  more  to 
 give  us  a  fenfible  proof  of  it,  than  to  confider  the  folly  of  the 
 expedient  propofed  by  the  Objedor. 
 
 But  then  it  is  urg'd  that  here  is  a  f-uther  Degree  of  our 
 Mifery,  and  an  argument  that  an  ill  Principle  had  a  hand  in 
 framing  us,  that  we  cannot  avoid  one  Evil  but  by  the  fear  of 
 a  worfe,  and  that  we  do  not  endure  the  pains  and  fears  that 
 accompany  Life  bi:t  on  account  of  the  greater  fear  we  have  of 
 Death  ;  and  the  imprinting  in  us  fo  great  a  Love  of  Life  which 
 
 llRS 
 
S  eel.  4 •     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  170 
 
 call  Mord  Evil,  as  fhali  be  fliewn  below,  is  that 
 which  is  forbidden;  now  nothing  is  forbidden 
 by  God  but  geneialIy,atleafl-,on  account  of  the  Incon^ 
 'veniencies  attending  the  forbidden  Actions:  Thefe 
 Inconveniencies  are  Natural  Evils;  therefore  Moral 
 Evils  are  prohibited  on  account  of  the  Natural 
 N  2  ones 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 lias  (o  little  Good  in  it,  and  in  truth  much  lefs  than  it  has 
 Evil,  muft  be  the  Work  of  a  malignant  and  mifchievous  Au- 
 thor. Bilt  I  anfwer,  I  have  fliewed*  that  it  is  the  Good  we 
 feel  in  Life  that  makes  us  love  it  and  afraid  to  lofe  it,  and  we 
 only  apprehend  the  lofs  of  Life,  and  fice  it,  bccaufe  wc  fear 
 the  lofing  fo  good  a  thing.  The  love  of  I,ife  is  no  otherwifc 
 imprinted  in  us  but  by  the  fenfe  we  have  of  its  Goodnefs,  and 
 then  the  Quarrel  againft  God  is,  that  he  has  given  us  fo  good 
 a  thing  that  we  are  unwilling  to  part  with  it,  and  chufe  to 
 endure  fuch  pains  as  tend  to  preferve  it,  and  v/ithout  which  we 
 could  not  long  enjoy  it.  It  is  amoft  wicked  thought  to  ima- 
 gine that  God  is  like  a  Tyrant  that  delights  to  torture  and  tor- 
 ment his  Creatures.  The  contrary  is  plain  by  his  fubjc£ling 
 them  to  Pain  in  no  cafes  but  where  that  fenfe  is  neceflary  to 
 preferve  a  Good  to  them  that  counterbalances  it. 
 
 But  then,  in  the  4th  Place,  the  Objedlion  urges,  that  thefe 
 Pains  are  in  many  cafes  fruitlefs,  and  no  way  tend  to  help  us. 
 'Tis  alledg'd  that  the  Gout  and  Gravel,  and  many  acute  Pains, 
 are  of  no  ufe,  nor  do  they  any  ways  contribute  to  prolong  our 
 Lives.  I  reply,  the  Gout,  Gravel,  i^c.  are  diltempers  of  the 
 Body,  in  which  the  Humours  or  folid  Parts  are  out  of  order: 
 The  Qucllion  then  is,  whether  it  would  be  better  for  us  to  be 
 infenfiible  of  this  Diforder,  or  to  feel  it.  Let  us  fuppofe  then  a 
 Man  in  a  Fever  ( z.  e.  that  his  Blood  and  Humours  fliould  be 
 in  fuch  a  Ferment  as  is  obfervable  in  that  Diilemper )  and 
 that  he  fliould  feel  no  Pain  or  Uneafinefs  by  it ;  the  confe- 
 quence  Vv'ould  be  that  he  would  die  before  he  were  aware.  He 
 would  not  avoid  thofe  things  that  increafe  it,  or  take  thofe 
 Remedies  that  allay  it :  He  would  not  know  how  near  he  were 
 to  Death,  or  when  he  v/as  to  avoid  the  Air  or  Motion,  either 
 of  which  would  delfroy  him.  There  are  Difeafcs  that  take 
 away  our  Senfes  and  become  mort.il,  without  giving  us  warn- 
 ing :  None  arc  more  terrible  than  thcfc,  and  mgft  would  chufe 
 
 to 
 
 *  See  the  Note  Z^' 
 
ibo 
 
 Concerning  tsfaftiral  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 ones,  and  for  that  reafon  only  are  Evils,  becaufe 
 they  lead  to  A^.r/«r4/ Evils.     But  that  which  makes 
 
 any 
 NOTES. 
 
 to  die  of  themoft  painful  Difiemper  rather  than  be  thus  fu?- 
 prifcd  :  We  may  judge  then  how  it  would  be  with  us  if  all 
 Diftempers  were  of  the  like  Nature.  I  doubt  whether  w^e 
 could  furvive  one  fit  of  the  Gout,  Gravel,  or  Fever,  if  the  Pain 
 we  feel  in  them  did  not  warn  us  and  oblige  us  to  give  ourfelves 
 that  Quiet,  Eafe,  snd  Abftinence  that  are  neceffary  to  our  Re- 
 covery. Thus  fooliflily  they  reafon  that  go  about  to  mend 
 the  work  of  God. 
 
 But,  2d]y,  we  find  that  Providence  has  join'd  a  certain  train 
 of  Thoughts  and  Senfations  with  certain  motions  in  our  Body, 
 and  it  is  as  impoflible  that  all  motions  fliould  beget  the  fame 
 Thoughts  in  us,  as  that  the  fame  Letters  fhould  exprefs  all 
 Words,  or  the  fame  Words  all  Thoughts.  If  therefore  only 
 fome  Motions  in  our  Body  occafion  pleafing  Thoughts  and 
 Senfations,  then  the  Abfence  of  thefe  Motions  mull  likewife 
 deprive  us  of  the  Pleafure  annex'd  to  them,  which  is  (o  great 
 an  Evil  that  we  are  ready  to  prevent  it  with  a  great  deal  of 
 Pain.  And  the  contrary  Motions  mufl:  by  the  fame  Rule  oc- 
 cafion contrary  Senfations,  that  is  unpleafant. 
 
 If  therefore,  a  Fever  or  Gout  deprive  us  of  thefe  grateful 
 Motions  in  the  Body  that  give  Pleafure,  and  be  contrary  to 
 them,  it  is  a  clear  Cafe,  that  uneafy  Senfations  on  fuch  an  Oc- 
 cafion cannot  be  avoided,  except  Man  were  fomcthing  elfe 
 than  he  is,  i.  e.  no  Man.  Either  therefore  God  mull  not 
 have  made  Man  in  his  prefent  Circumflances,  nor  given 
 him  a  Body  that  is  apt  to  be  put  out  of  order  by  the  impulfe 
 of  thofe  neighbouring  Bodies  that  furround  him,  or  elfe  he 
 mult  fufier  him  to  be  fomctimes  diilurbed  by  ihem,  and  let 
 that  Dillurbance  be  accompanied  with  Pain. 
 
 If  it  fliould  be  alledged  that  God  might  have  put  Man  into 
 fuch  Gircumllances  that    no  impulfe  of  other  Bodies  fhould 
 have  caulcd  fuch  Motions  in  his  as  procure  Pain.     I  anfwer, 
 this   might  have  done  if  the  very  Motion  of  his  Joints  and 
 Mufcles,  and  the  Recruiting  of  the  Liquids  of  his  Body  did  not 
 continually  wear  and  dellroy  the  Organs,  and   alter  and  cor- 
 rupt the  Blood  and  other  Juices;  and  lallly,   if  there  were  no 
 Bodies  in  his  Vicinity  that  could  hurt  or  alter  thefe:   But  as  the 
 Frame  of  the  World  now  is  with  folid  and  heterogeneous  Bo- 
 dies in  it,  and  which  the  good   of  the  whole  required  there 
 fliould  be,  and  whilll  thefe  arc  all  in  Motion,   and  there  is  a 
 contmuul  Change    of  the  Vicinity  of  thefe    Bodies    to  the 
 
 Bodies 
 
Sedt.  4*     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  '         18 
 
 any  thing  to  be  fuch,  is  itfelf  much  more  fuzh  : 
 therefore  the  Natural,  you'll  fay,  are  greater  Evils 
 than  the  Moral,  and  cannot  with  lefs  Blafphemy 
 be  attributed  to  God. 
 
 N  5  Graqt- 
 
 fJVOTES, 
 
 Bodies  of  Men:  whilft  there  is  variety  of  Bodies  on  the  Earth 
 and  thefe  necefTarily  fend  out  different  and  contrary  Effluvia, 
 that  mix  with  the  Juices  of  our  Bodies:  Laltly,  whilil  not  on- 
 ly new  Bodies  move  toward  us,  but  we  move  from  place  to 
 place,  without  which  Power  we  fhould  be  very  imperfedl,  and 
 uncapableof  the  greateft  part  of  the  Happinefs  we  now  enjoy  ; 
 'tis  inconceivable  that  we  fiiould  not  meet  with  things  that  by 
 the  Laws  of  Matter  neceffarily  dilturb  and  diforder  our  Bodies  f 
 and  therefore,  either  the  Earth  muft  be  void  of  Inhabitants, 
 or  they  mull  be  content  to  fubmit  to  and  fuffer  thefe  Dillur- 
 bances  ;  and  I  have  already  fhewed  that  thefe  mull  neceffarily 
 Occafion  uneafy  Senfations  in  us,  which  I  take  to  be  the  De- 
 iinition  of  Pain. 
 
 To  Sum  up  this  Head.  For  ought  I  can  fee,  the  Funda- 
 mental Objedlion  concerning  natural  Evils,  is  that  God  has 
 given  us  mortal  Bodies,  lor  which  I  think  the  Book  fully  ac- 
 counts ;  and  if  it  once  be  confeffed  that  it  is  not  contrary  to  the 
 Goodncfs  of  God  to  make  fome  mortal  Animals,  1  do  not  fee 
 how  we  can  imagine  fuch  Animals  fliould  apprehend  tlie  Ap- 
 proach of  Death  and  not  fear  it;  or  feel  the  Decay  of  their  Bo- 
 dies and  not  be  uneafy  at  it ;  efpccially  when  that  Fear  ferves 
 to  preferve  them,  and  the  Senfe  of  that  Uneafinefs  puts  them 
 on  proper  Methods  to  fupport  themfelves.  I  do  not  deny  but 
 the  Infinite  Wifdom  of  God  might  have  found  other  means, 
 but  I  deny  that  there  could  be  any  better  ;  and  he  that  under- 
 takes to  prove  that  there  might  be  better,  mull  underlland  all 
 the  Circumllances  of  thefe  Animals  as  they  are  now,  and  all 
 the  Coniequences  that  muil  happen  in  an  infinite  feries  of  times, 
 in  purfuance  of  the  Method  he  propofes;  but  it  is  impolTiblc  a- 
 ny  one  fhould  know  thefe  things,  and  therefore,  as  the  Book  con- 
 cludes, no  Man  has  any  Right  to  make  ufe  of  fuch  an  Objeftion. 
 
 [  For  a  particular  account  of  of  all  the  Pajftons  and  their  final 
 Caufes,  and  the  Neceffity  of  each,  fee  Mr.  Hntchefon\  Effay 
 on  the  Nature  and  ConduSl  of  them,  §.  2.  p.  48,  50,  ^c.  and 
 ^.6.  p.  1 79.  or  Dr.  Watts  on  i)\t  U/e and  jhn/eoi' them,  ^.  13. 
 or  Cha7nbers's  Cyclopaedia  under  the  Word  Paffion,  or  Scott's 
 Chrillian  Life,  p,  2.  C.  i.  §.  2.  par.  23.  or  the  Spectator,  N". 
 255,  408.  or  Dr  y.  Clarke  on  Natural  Evil,  p.  256,  <^c.  of 
 Dr.  More'^  Enchiridion  Ethicum,  B.  i.  C.  8,  9,  10,  ii.] 
 
i82  Concerning  Natural  "^vA,     Chap.  IV. 
 
 Granting  all  this  to  be  true,  yet  though  Evil  is 
 not  to  be  done  for  the  fak^  of  Good,  yet  the  k^$ 
 Evil  is  to  be  chofen  before  the  greater:  And  fince 
 Evils  neceflarily  furround  you  whether  you  adt  or 
 nor,  you  ought  to  prefer  that  fide  which  is  attend- 
 ed with  the  leail.  Since  God  was  therefore  com- 
 pell'd  by  the  necelTary  Imperfedions  of  created 
 Beings,  either  to  abftain  from  creating  them  at  all, 
 or  to  bear  with  the  Evils  confequent  upon  them : 
 and  fince  it  is  a  lefs  Evil  to  permit  tho.'e,  than  to 
 omit  thefe,  'tis  plain  that  God  did  not  allow  of 
 Natural  Evils  for  the  fake  of  any  Good;  but  chofe 
 the  lead  out  of  feveral  Evils,  i»  e,  would  rather 
 have  Creatures  liable  to  Natural  Evils,  than  no 
 Creatures  at  all.  The  fame  will  be  fhewn  hereafter 
 concerning  Moral  Evils. 
 
 SECT.      V. 
 
 Of  Hunger,  Thirft,  a7id  Labour. 
 
 The  parts  A  Terreftrial  Anim?l  muft,  as  we  have  faid  ne- 
 of  the  Bo-  Jl^\^  ceffarily  confift  of  mix'd  and  heterogeneous 
 ■^1  •^/•"  Parts:  its  Fluids  are  alfo  in  a  perpetual  Flux  and 
 need  Ferment.    Now    tis  plam  that  this  cannot  bs  without 
 
 therefore  the  Expence  of  thofe  Fluids,  and  Attrition  of  the 
 of  Repara-  Solids;  and  hence  follows  Death  and  DiJfolHtion, 
 \°%  '^T'  except  thofe  be  repair'd:  a  new  AccelTion  of  Mat- 
 ter is  therefore  neceflary  to  fupply  what  flies  off 
 Choice  ^^'^  ^^  worn  away,  and  much  more  fo  for  the 
 Hiuft  be      Growth  of  Animals. 
 
 had  in  II.  But  Animals  have  particular  ConflitHtions,  and 
 
 Food,  cannot  be  nouriflied  by  any  fort  of  Matter:  fome 
 fmce^ali  (;^^^-^^  therefore  mufl:  be  made  of  it,  to  which  they 
 ijot  equal-  ^re  to  be  urged  by  an  Importunity  ilrong  enough 
 iy  projicr.     "  '  to 
 
Sed:.  5.     Cmcerning  Natural  Evil.  ,         183 
 
 to  excite  their  endeavours  after  ir.  Hence  Hunger 
 and  Thirjl  come  to  afFeft  the  Soul ;  Affe(fl:ions  that 
 are  foraetimes  indeed  troublefome,  but  yet  neceflary, 
 and  which  bring  more  Pleafure  than  Pam  along  with 
 them. 
 
 III.  But  why,  fay  you,  are  wc  oblig'd  to /^^o^r  TheMate- 
 in  que(t  of  Food  ?  why  are  not  the  Elements  them-  ^'^^^  of 
 felves  fufEcient?    I  anfwer,    they  are  fufficient  for   ,-     '^  ^^^ 
 fome  Animals :    but  Mankind  required  fuch  a  Dif-   runted  •' 
 pofition  of  Matter  as  was  to   be  prepared  by   va-  they  can- 
 rious  Codions  and  Changes,    and   that   daily,  be-  "ot  there- 
 caufe    'tis  foon  liable  to  Corruption,    and  if  kept  ^^f*^  ^^j 
 long  would  be  unfit  for  Nourilhment.     Hence  La-  J^hoiu 
 hour  becomes  neceflary  to  provide  Viifluals  in  this  Labour. 
 prefent  ftate  of  things :  neither  could  Hunger,  or 
 Thirft,  or   Labour*,    (which  are  reckon'd  among 
 Natural    Evils)   be  prevented  without  greater  In- 
 conveniencies.     The  Divine  Goodnefs  therefore  had 
 
 the  higheft   Reafon  for  affixing  thefe  to  Animals.  Every  A- 
 
 IV.  Now  as  Animals  require  different  forts  of  "j'^^Vf 
 Food,  as  was  fhewn,  according  to  their  different  ^^l  ^^' 
 Conftitutions,  fo  God  has  placed  every  one  of  them  where  it 
 where  it  may  find  what  is  proper  for  it :  on  which  may  have 
 account  there  is  fcarce  any  thing  in  the  Elcmeats  ^^^  proper 
 but  what  may  be  Food  for  fome.  Every  Herb  j^°""!^' 
 has  its  Infed  which  it  fuppcrts.  The  Earth,  the  hence'al- 
 Water,  the  very  Stones,  ferve  for  Aliment  to  liv-  moft every 
 
 ing  Creatures  t.  herbmain- 
 
 V.  But   fome  ftand  in  need    of  more   delicate  '^'""^  '."^^ 
 Food :  Now  God  could   have  created  an  inanimate  [nieVt. 
 Machine,    which  might   have  fupplicd  them  with 
 
 fuch  Food;  but  one  that  is  anirpated  does  it  much  SomeAni- 
 better  and  with  more  eafe.    A  Being  that  has  Life  "^^'^'^^e 
 is  (uteris  paribus)  preferable   to  one  that  has  not:  foTpo^tj 
 God  therefore  animated   that  Machine  which  fur-  to  others, 
 nifhes  out    provifion    for   the   more   perfeft  Ani-  and  would 
 malsi  which  was  both  eracioufly  and  providently  "of^^^ve 
 
 XT  J  exifted  on 
 
 ^   4  done:  any  other 
 
 ?  §ee  Note  33,  f  Sec  Notes  24,  and  26.  terms. 
 
Concenu?tg  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 done :  for  by  this  means  he  gsiin'd  fo  much  Life  to 
 the  World  as  there  is  in  rhofe  Animals  which  are  Food 
 lor  others :  by  this  means  they  themfelves  enjoy  fome 
 kind  of  Life,  and  are  of  fervice  alfo  to  the  reft.  An 
 Ox,    for  inflance,   or   a  Calf,  is  bred,  nouriftied, 
 and  protcdcd  for  fome  time  in  order  to  become  fit 
 rood  for  Man.     This  certainly  is  better  and  more 
 eligible,  than  if  the  Matter  ol  its  Body   had  been 
 converted  into  an  inanimate  Mafs,  fuch  as  a  Pom- 
 pion,  or  continued  in  the  ftate  of  unform'd   Clay. 
 Nor  is  it  hardly  dealt  withal,   by  being  made  for 
 the    Food  of  a  more   noble  Animal,    fince  it  was 
 on   this  Condition  only   that   it    had   Life  given, 
 which  it  could  not  otherwife  have  enjoyed.  Mat- 
 ter which  is  fit  for  the  Nourifliment  of  Man,  is  alfq 
 capable  of  Life;    if  therefore    God  had  denied  ic 
 Life,    he  had   omitted   a  Degree   of  Good  which 
 might  have   been  produced   without   any  Impedi- 
 inent    to   his    principal    Dcfign,    which  does   not 
 ieem  very  agreeable  to  infinite  Goodnefs.  'Tis  bet- 
 ter therefore  that  it  fhould  be  endow'd  with  Life 
 for  a  time,  the'  it  is  to  be  devoured  afterwards,  than 
 to  continue  totally  flupid  and  unaftive.    The  com- 
 mon Objection  then  is  of  no  force,  viz..  That  inan- 
 imate Matter  might  have  been  prepared  for  this  Ufej 
 ibr  'tis  better  that  it  lliould  be  animated;  efpecially 
 as  fuch  Animals  are  ignorant  of  Futurity,   and  are 
 neither   confciops  nor   folicitous  about  their  being 
 made  for    this   Purpofe.     So  that  fo  long  as  they 
 live,  they   enjoy   themfelves    without  anxiety;  at 
 leaft  they  rejoyce   in  the  prefent  Good,    and  are- 
 neirher  tormented  with  the  Remembrance  of  what  is 
 paft,  nor  the  Fear  of  what  is  to  come;  and  laftly,  are 
 killed  with   lefs   Pain  than   they    would    be  'by  a 
 Diftemper  or  old  Age.      Let    us   not  be  furpris'd 
 then  at  the  Univerfal  War  as   ic  were  among  A- 
 jiim^lsj  or  that  the  Stronger  devoiir  the  Weaker  j 
 
S€6t.  5-     Concer?iing  Natiwal  Evil.  J85 
 
 for  thefe   are  made   on  puipofe  to   afford  Alimeht 
 to  the  others.     (50  ) 
 
 VI.  As  for  the  Difficulty  of  procuring  Food,  and  All  parts 
 the  Want  of  it  in  fome  Places,   'tis  to  be  obferved  o^  the 
 that  the  ftate  of  the  Earth  depends  upon  the  light  ^^'^^  ^^^ 
 and  heat  of  the  Sun;  and  tho'  vte  do  not  perfeftl)^  h^ve  af- 
 underfland  the  Strudure  of  it,  yet  we  have  reafon  forded 
 to  conjedure  that  it  is  carried  about  its  Axis  by  a  Nourifii- 
 JDiamal,  and  about  the  Sun  by  an  Annual  Motion :  ^^"^  ^"'^ 
 that  its  Figure  is  a  Spheroid  defcribed  by  the  Re-  ^^^^56°^ 
 volution  of  a  Semi-Ellipfe  about  a  conjugate  Axis ;  ^vhatever 
 
 and  Situation 
 they  had 
 
 JSf  0  T  E  S,  ^^^"  pla- 
 
 ced in, 
 
 (30.)  What  is  here  laid  down  will  upon  Examination  be 
 found  to  be  perfedly  confiilcnt  with  oar  Obfervation  in  Note 
 
 23.  ■ 
 
 As  the  Point  before  ns  is  fet  in  a  very  good  Light  by  Dr. 
 J.  Clarke*,  I  fhall  not  fcruple  to  tranlcribe  the  whole  Para- 
 graph.    <  If  we  confider  the  EtFed  of  Animal  Creatures  being 
 
 *  thus  made  Food  for  each  other,  we  Ihall  find  that  by  this 
 
 *  means  there  is  the  more  Godiwpon  the  whole  :  For  under 
 '■  the  prefent  Circumftances  of  the  Creation,  Animals  living  in 
 
 *  thi;  manner  pne  upon  another,  could  not  have  been  prevent- 
 '  ed  but  a  much  greater  Evil  would  have  followed.     For  then 
 
 *  there  could  not  hnve  been  fo  great  a  Mumber,  nor  fo  great  a 
 «   Variety  of  Animals  as  there  are  at  prefent,  fome  of  which  are 
 
 *  fo  very  minute,  and  the  Qiiantity  of  tlu-m  fuch,  that  mixing 
 
 *  themielves  with  Herbs  and  Plants,  and  Grain  on  which, 
 
 *  themfelves  feed,  and  with  the  Water  and  Liquids  which  the/ 
 
 *  drink,  they  muil  neccffarily  be  de scoured  by  larger  Animals 
 
 *  who  live  upon  the  fame  Food,  without  fo  much  as  being  feen 
 «••  or9,ny  way  perceived  by  them.  It  is  therefore  much  better 
 «  upon  the  whole,  that  they  fhould  live  upon  one  another  in 
 '■  the  manner  they  now  do,  than  that  they  Ihould  not  live  at  all. 
 
 *  For  if  fuch  Animal  Life  is  to  be  elteemed  fuperior  to  not 
 
 *  exifting  at  all,  or  to  a  vegetable  Life  s  and  the  more  there 
 <  is  of  fuch  Animal  Life,  the  more  of  Good  there  is  in  the 
 «  World  ;  it  is  evident  that  by  this  means  there  is  Room  for 
 «  more  whole  Species  of  Creatures,  at  leaft  for  many  more  in- 
 «  dividuals  of  each  Species,  than  there  would  otherwife  be ; 
 
 '  rtn4 
 
 *  Difcourfe  concerning  Natural  Evil,  p.  2b'9. 
 
i86  Concerning  Natural 'E.s^A.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 and  that  this  proceeds  from  the  Laws  of  Motion 
 and  Gravitation.     Now  in  fuch  a  Situation,  fome 
 Parts  of  it  muft  necefTarily  be  unfit  for  fuch  Tnha- 
 ;  bitants  as  Men,  fince  the  Parallelifm  of  its  Axis  is 
 preferv'd  in  the  annual  Motion,    and  the  Revolu- 
 tion about  the  fame  Axis  in  the  diurnal.    If  thefe 
 fhould  undergo  the  very  lead  Alteration,  the  whole 
 Fabric  of  the  Earth  would  be  diforder'd;   the  O- 
 cean  and  Dry   Land  would   change   Places  to  the 
 Detriment   of  the  Animals.      Since  therefore  nei- 
 ther the    annual  nor  diurnal  Motion   of  the  Earth 
 could  be  alter'd  without  harm  ;    'tis  plain  that  fome 
 parts  of  the  Earth  muft  necefTarily  be  lefs  conve- 
 nient for  the  Habitation  of  Mankind,  namely  thofe 
 about  the   Poles;    and   that    others  muft  require 
 much  Labour  to  make  them  convenient,  as  we  find 
 by  Experience  in  our  own  Climate  j  but  it  will  evi- 
 dently 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ?  and  that  the  Variety  of  the  Creation  is  hereby  much  enlarg- 
 
 *  ed,  and  tlie  Goodnefs  of  its  Author  difphyed.  For  the  Con- 
 
 *  ititution  of  Animal  Bodies  is  fuch  as  requires  that  they  fliould 
 
 *  be  maintain'd  by  Food  :  Now  if  this  Food  can  be  made 
 «  capable  of  Animal  Life  alfo,  it  is  a  very  great  Improvement 
 «  of  it.     A  certain  Quantity  of  Food  is  neceffary  for   the  Pre- 
 
 *  fervation  of  a  determinate  Number  of  Animals:  Which  Food, 
 
 <  were  it  mere  vegetable,  would  perhaps  fervc  for  that  Piirpofe 
 
 *  only  :   But  by  being  fo  form'd  as  to  become  Animal,  tho'  it 
 
 *  be  in  a  lower  Degree,  and  the  Enjoyment  of  Life  in  fuch 
 
 *  Creatures  lefs,  yet  it  is  more  perfect  than  unformed  Clay,  or 
 
 *  even  than  the  moft  curious  Plant.  Thus  the  Animal  Part  of 
 <^  the  Creation  has  its  feveral  Degrees  of  Life,  and  as  much 
 
 *  Variety  in  it  as  is  to  be  found  in  the  inanimate  and  vegetable 
 
 *  Part ;  fo  that  in  this  refpedt  there  is  fo  far  from  being  any 
 
 *  juft  ground  of  Complaint,  that  the  Wifdom  and  Contriv- 
 
 <  ance  of  the  Animal  World  is  admirable,   and  plainly  fliews 
 
 *  the  Excellency  of  the  whole,  and  Subfcrviency  of  all  the 
 '  Particulars  in  order  to  obtain  the  greatcft  Good  that  they  are 
 «  capable  of.' 
 
 See  alfo  the  Beginning  of  the  Spe^atar,  N^.  519. 
 
Se6l.  5.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  187 
 
 dencly  appear  to  any  confidering  Perfon  rhat  in  what 
 Situation  or  Motion  foever  you  fuppofe  the  Earth 
 to  be,  either  thefe  or  worfe  Evils  muft  be  admit- 
 ted; 'tis  in  vain  therefore  to  complain  of  thefe 
 Inconvenienciesj  which  cannot  be  avoided  without 
 greater.      C31O 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (^i.)  Thus  if  the  Figure  of  the  Earth  were  chang'd  into  ^ 
 perfefl  Sphere,  the  Equatorial  Parts  muft  all  lie  under  Water. 
 If  it  were  of  a  Cubic,  Prifmatic,  or  any  other  Angular  Figure, 
 it  would  neither  be  fo  capacious  for  Habitation,  nor  fo  fit  for 
 Motion,  nor  fo  commodious  for  the  reception  o^ Light  and  Heat, 
 for  the  Circulation  of  the  Wifids,  and  the  Diftribution  of  the 
 Waters',  as  is  obvious  to  any  one  that  is  acquainted  with  the 
 jfirft  Elements  of  Natural  Philofophy,  and  is  at  large  demon- 
 ftrated  by  Dr.  Cheque,  Derham,  Ray,  SiC.  If  its  Situation  were 
 removed,  its  Conftitution  muft  be  alter'd  too,  or  elfe,  if  placed 
 conliderably  farther  from  the  Sun,  it  would  be  frozen  into  Ice, 
 if  nearer,  'twould  be  burnt  to  a  Coal.  If  either  its  annual  or 
 diurnal  Motion  were  ftopp'dy  retarded,  or  accelerated,  the  ufeful 
 and  agreeable  Viciffitudes  o^  S7immer  and  Winter,  Day  and 
 Night,  would  ceafe,  or  at  leaft  ceafe  to  be  fo  ufeful  and  agree- 
 able as  i':hey  now  are.  The  immoderate  Length  or  Shortnefs 
 of  the  Seafons  would  prove  pernicious  to  the  Earth,  and  the 
 ilated  times  of  Bufmefs  and  Repofe  v/ould  be  as  incommodious 
 to  its  Inhauitantc  i  asdifproportionate  to  the  common  Affairs 
 of  Life,  and  the  various  Exigences  of  Mankind*.  If,  in  the 
 Jaft' place,  we  alter  the  Inclination  of  the  Earth'' s  Axis,  the  like 
 Inconvcniencies  will  attend  the  Polar  Parts:  Ifwedeftroy  the 
 P araUelifm  of  it,  befides  deftroying  at  the  fame  time  the  ufeful 
 Arts  of  Navigation  and  Dialling,  we  bring  upon  us  much 
 worfe  Confequences.  A  Defcription  of  fome  few  of  them  from 
 Dr.  Bejitlefs  Sermon  above  cited  may  perhaps  not  be  difagree- 
 able.     '  We  all  know,  from  the  very  Elements  of  Aftronomy, 
 
 *  that  this  inclin'd  Pofition  of  the  Axis,  which  keeps  always 
 
 *  the  fame  Direftion,  and  a  conftant  Parallelifm  to  itfelf,  is  the 
 
 *  fole  Caufe  of  thefe  grateful  and  needful  Viciffitudes  of  the 
 
 *  four  Seafons  of  the  Year  and   the   Variation    in   Length  of 
 
 *  Days.     If  we  takeaway  the  Inclination,  it  would  abfolutely 
 
 *  undo  the  Nothern  Nations,    the  Sun    would   never  come 
 
 *  nearer 
 
 *  See  Dr.  Bentlcy';  laji  Sermcn,  p.  315  .  5th  Edit, 
 
i8B  Concerning  Natural  "EvW,    Chap.  IV. 
 
 O^  Earth'      VII.  Neither  are  Earth-quakes  Storms,  Thundery 
 
 (quakes,       J)elttges  and   Inundations    any   ftronger    Arguments 
 
 fnd  2^-"   ^8^^"^  ^^^  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  of  God.  Thefe 
 
 Iftges.         ^^^  fometimes  fent  by  a  juft  and  gracious  God  for 
 
 the  Punilliment  of  Mankind  j  but  often  depend  on 
 
 other    natural   Caufcs,    which   are    neceflary,   and 
 
 could  not  be  removed  without  greater  Damage  to 
 
 the  whole.     Thefe  Concuffions  of  the  Elements  are 
 
 indeed  prejudicial,  but  more  Prejudice  would  arife 
 
 to  the  Univcrfal  Syftem  by  the  Abfence  of  them. 
 
 What  the  genuine  and  immediate  Caufes  of  them 
 
 are  I  dare  not  determine :    They    feem  in  general 
 
 to  derive  their  Origin  from  the   unequal  heat  of 
 
 th^ 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *  nearer  us  than  he  doth  now  on  the  loth  of  March,  or  th« 
 
 *  1 2th   of  September.     But  would  we  rather  part  with  the 
 
 *  Parallelifm  ?  Let  us  fiippofe  then  that  the  Axis  of  the  Earth 
 
 *  keeps  always  the  fame  Inclination  towards  the  Body  of  the 
 
 *  Sun:  This  indeed  would  caufe  a  variety  of  Days,  and  Nights, 
 «  and  Scafons,  on  the  Earth  ;  but  then  every  particular  Coun- 
 
 *  try  v^^ould  have  always  the  fame  diverfity  of  Day  and  N'ghr, 
 
 *  and  the  fame  Conllitution  of  Seafon,  without  any  alteration. 
 '  Some  would  always  have  long  Nights  and  fliort  Days,  others 
 
 *  again  perpetually  long    Days  and  fhort  Nights :  One  Cli- 
 
 *  mate  would  be  fcorch'd  and  fwelter'd  with  everlafting  Dog- 
 
 *  Days,    while    an  eternal   December  blafled   another.     This 
 
 *  furely  is  not  quite  fo  good  as  the  prefent  Order  of  Seafons. 
 
 *  But  fliall  the  Axis  rather  obferve  no  conilant  Inclination  to 
 
 *  any  thing,  but  vary  and  waver  at  uncertain  times  and  pla- 
 
 *  ces  ?    This  would  be  a  happy  Conftitiition  indeed!    There 
 
 *  would  be  no  Health,  no  Life,  nor  Subfiflence  in  fuch  an  ir- 
 
 *  regular  Syitem :  By  thofe  furprizing  Nods  of  the  Pole,  we 
 
 *  might  be  tofsM  backward  or  forward,  in  a  Moment,  froni 
 
 *  January  to  June,  nay  poffibly  from  the  January  of  Green- 
 <■  land,  to  the  June  oi  AbeJJi?iia.     It   is  better  therefore  upon 
 
 *  all  accounts  that  the  Axis  fiiould  be  continued  in  its  prefent 
 "-■  Pollure  and  Direftion  ?  fo  that  this  alfo  it  a  fignal  Character 
 '  of  the  Divine  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs.' 
 
 See  alfo  CheynehPhil.?rinc,  C.  3.  j.  24.,  25,  26,  l^c. 
 
 (3-) 
 
Se6t.  5.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  189 
 
 the  Sun,  from  the  Fluidity,  Mutability,  and  Con- 
 trariety of  things.  To  thefe  we  may  add  the 
 Afperity  and  Inequality  of  the  Earth's  Surface, 
 without  which  neverthelefs  the  whole  Earth,  or  the 
 greateft  part  of  it,  would  be  uninhabitable.  For 
 inftance,  we  complain  of  the  Mountains  as  Rubbifh, 
 as  not  only  disfiguring  the  Face  of  the  Earth, 
 but  alfo  as  ufelefs  and  inconvenient;  and  yet  with- 
 out thefe,  neither  Rivers  nor  Fountains,  nor  the 
 Weather  for  producing  and  ripening  Fruits  could 
 regularly  be  preferved*.  In  Mountanous  Coun- 
 tries we  blame  Providence  for  the  Uncertainty  of 
 the  Weather,  for  the  frequency  of  the  Showers  and 
 Storms,  which  yet  proceed  from  the  very  Nature 
 of  the  Climate,  and  without  which  all  the  Moifture 
 would  glide  down  the  Declivity,  and  the  Fruits 
 wither  away.  The  Earth  then  muft  either  not  be 
 created  at  all,  or  thefe  things  be  permitted.  (3  2.) 
 
 VIII. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (32.)  The  feveral  Objeftions  mention'd  in  this  Paragraph, 
 are  iblidly  refuted  by  Dr.  J.  Clarke  in  his  Treacile  on  Natural 
 Evil,  part  of  which  I  fliall  take  the  liberty  to  infert  as  ufual, 
 and  refer  the  Reader  to  the  Book  itlelf  for  the  rcll. 
 
 Having  defcribed  the  Nature  and  Ufe  of  the  Air's  Elajiicityy 
 and  the  add  nitrous,  vcv^fulphureous  Particles  with  which  it  is 
 impregnated,  which  are  the  Caufe  oiFer?nentation,  he  proceeds 
 to  account  for  Earthquakes,  ^c.  p.  190.     '  Thus  the  internal 
 
 *  Parts  of  the  Earth  being  the  only  proper  Place  for  containing 
 
 *  fo  large  a  ftore  of  Sulphur  and  Nitre  and  Minerals,  as  is  re- 
 «  quired  for  fo  many  thoufand  Years  as  the  Earth  in  its  prefent 
 «  State  has,  and  may  yet  continue  ;  it  muft  neceffarily  be, 
 «  that  when  that  Fermentation  is  made  in  fuch  fubterraneous  Ca- 
 
 *  verns  as  are  not  wide  enough  for  the  Particles  to  expand 
 
 *  themfelves  in,  or  have  no  open  PafTage  to  rufh  out  at,  they 
 
 *  will,  by  the  foremcntion'd  Law,  fhake  the  Earth  to  a  con- 
 «  fiderable  diftance,  tear  thofe  Caverns  to  pieces;  and  accord- 
 «  ingto  the  depth  of  i'uch  Caverns,  or  Quantity  of  Materials 
 
 *'  can- 
 
 *  See  Note  33. 
 
IQO  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 The  VIII.  The  fame  muft  be  faid  of  the  Lakes  2xA 
 
 Number     Qqc^^     Por  'tis  manifeft,  that  Fruits,  Vegetables, 
 mals  to  be  ^^*  which  are  the  Food  of  Animals,  depend  upon 
 proporti-     Moifture,    and   that  this   is  exhaled  from  the  Sea, 
 oned  to      and  watry  places,  by  the  Sun  ;    and  fince  the  Show- 
 the  Food    gj.5  ^^^  Oe^ys  thus  elevated,  are  not  more  copious 
 the  Food    ^^^  fuffice  for  the  Vegetation  of  Plants,  'tis  plain 
 to  the         ^hat  the  Seas  and  Lakes  do  not  exceed  what  is  ne- 
 Animals.    cefTary,  and  could  not  be  diminillied  without  De- 
 triment to  the  whole.     Vain  therefore  is  the  Com- 
 plaint o\  Lucret'mst  who  arraigns  all  thefe  2.s  faulty. 
 Neither  was  the   Earth  too  narrow   nor  needed  it 
 too  much   Labour  to  fuftain    its  Animals:    For  it 
 was  fufficient  for  thofe  Animals  which  God  had  gi- 
 ven it  ■^.     But  when  they  multiply  above  the  Pro* 
 portion  of  their  Food,    'tis  impoffible  that  it  jfhould 
 be  fufficient;  it  would  not  be  enough  if  it  were  aU 
 converted  into  Food,     For  a  certain  Proportion  is 
 
 to 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *  contain''d  in  them,  remove  large  pieces  of  the  Surface  of  the 
 
 *  Earth,  from  one  place  to  another,  in  the  fame  manner,  tho' 
 
 *  to  a  much  higher  degree  than  artificial  Explofions  made  under 
 
 *  ground  ;  the  eftccl  of  which  is  fenfiblc  to  a  greater  dillance. 
 
 *  If  it  happens  that  thofe  Fermentations  are  in  places  under  the 
 
 *  Sea,  the  Water  mixing  with  thefe  Materials  increafes  their 
 
 *  Force,    and  is  thereby  thrown   back  with  great  violence,  fo 
 
 *  as  to  fcem  to  rife  up  into  the  Clouds,  and  fall  down  again 
 
 *  fometimes  in  very  large  drops,  and  fometimes  in  whole  Spouts, 
 '  which  are  fufficient  to  drown  all  that  is  near  them.     If  the 
 
 *  Termcntatmi  be  not  fo  violent,  but  fuch  only  as  raifes  large 
 '  Vapours  or  Steams,  which  can  find  their  way  through  fmall 
 
 *  occult  paffages  of  the  Earth,  thofe  near  its  Surface,  by  their 
 
 *  continual  Exfpirations,  are  atfirit  the  Caufe  of  gentle  Winds; 
 
 *  and  thofe  afterwards  by  their  continual  Increafe,  become  per- 
 
 *  haps  Storms,  and  Whirlwinds,  and  Tempefts  which  many 
 *■  times  dellroy  the  Fruits,  tear  up  the  Trees,  and  overthrow 
 
 *  the  Houfcs :  But  if  they   be  ilill  mo*c  gentle,  there  being- 
 
 '  always 
 
 *  See  Derhanh  Phyf;  Th^ol.  B.  4.  C.  i  iv 
 
Sed.  5.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  19I 
 
 to  be  obferv'd  between  the  Provifion  and  the  Eat- 
 ers, which  if  the  Number  of  Animals  exceed,  they 
 muft  at  length  neceffarily  perifti  with  Hunger. 
 Want  of  Provifion  then  ought  not  to  be  made  an 
 Objection :  for  if  the  Number  of  Creatures  to  be 
 provided  for  be  ^enlarged  above  this  Proportion, 
 the  greateft  Plenty  would  not  fuffice ;  if  this  Pro- 
 portion betwixt  the  Food  and  Animals  be  kept  up, 
 the  leaft  would  be  fufficient.  'Tis  our  own  fault 
 therefore,  not  God's,  if  Provifions  fail;  for  the 
 Number  of  Men  may  be  confined  within  the 
 Bounds  prefcribed  by  Nature,  as  might  eafily  be 
 fhewn,  if  it  were  worth  our  while. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 «  always  fome  fulphureous  Exhalations,  efpecially  if  the 
 «  Earth  be  dry,  they  then  afcend  along  with  the  lighter  Va- 
 '  pours,  into   the  upper  Regions  of  the  Air,  where,  when  a 
 
 *  large  Quantity  of  them  is  gather'd  together,  they  ferment 
 
 *  with  the  acid  Nitre,  and  taking  fire  caufe  Thunder   and 
 
 *  Lightning,  and  other  ivleteors.     This,  as  far  as  can  be  ga- 
 
 *  ther'd  from  Experience  and  Obfervatioii  of  the  Works  of 
 
 *  Nature,  is  the  Origin  and  Caufe  of  thofe  Imperfeflions  and 
 
 *  Evils,  which  the  prefent  Conftitution  of  the  Air,   and   the 
 
 *  Laws  of  Motion  obferved  by  thofe  Particles  mix'd  with  it, 
 «  unavoidably  fubjeit  it  to.  They  are  the  natural  and  genuiu 
 «  cffedls  of  the  Regulation  it  is  under,  and  without  altering 
 «  the    primary  laws  of  it  (that  is   making  it  fomethino;  elfe 
 
 *  than  whit  it  is,  or  changing  it  into  another  Form:    the  Re- 
 
 *  fult  of  which  would  be  only  to  render  it  liable  to  Evils  of 
 «  another  kind,  againft  which  the   fame  Objeftions  would  e- 
 
 *  qually  lie)  or  in  a  fiipernatural  manner  hindering  it  from 
 <  producing  fuch  EfFefts,  it  is  impoflible  to  prevent  them. 
 «  And  if  we  add  to  this,  that  thefe  Evils  are  the  feweft  that  in 
 
 *  the  Nature  of  things  could  be,  without  hindering  a  much 
 
 *  greater  Good:  That  they  are  in  tlie  raofl:  convenient  Parts, 
 
 *  and  the  moft  guarded  againft  doing  Mifchief  that  could  be; 
 
 *  and  that  there  are  alfo  good  Ufcs  to  be  made  of  them  ;  we 
 
 *  fliall  have  no  Reafon  to  complain  of  or  find  fault  with  them. 
 
 *  Were  the  Quantity  of  Sulphur  and  Nitre  much  diminifli'd, 
 
 *  there  would  not  be  fufficient  to  fill  the  Region  of  Air  for 
 5  the  purpofes  of  Vegetation  and  Life  ;  but  the  Ground  would- 
 
 <  erow 
 
192 
 
 The  hun- 
 dredth 
 part  of 
 Mankind 
 "tvhich 
 might 
 live  upon 
 
 Cohcefn'mg  "Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV*^ 
 
 IX.  But  there's  no  need  of  Artifice  on  this  oc- 
 cafion;  for  by  our  fault  things  are  come  to  this 
 pafs,  that  even  the  hundredth  pai't  of  thpfe  Eat- 
 ables which  might  be  had,  don't  meet  with  any  to 
 confume  them.  The  Divine  Beneficence  has  there- 
 ,    ^_  ,     fore  dealt  bountifully  with  Mankind  in  refped  of 
 
 the  Earth,    r>        T 
 does  not       PlOVlllonS. 
 
 yet  inha-  X»  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  in  the  lafl:  place,  that 
 bit  it:  vain  Animals  are  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  to  delight  in  Adion, 
 therefore  or  the  Exercife  of  their  Faculties,  nor  can  we 
 ^^^  .  .  have  any  other  Notion  of  Happinefs  even  in  God 
 about  ^  himfelf  ■^.  Since  then  the  Faculties  of  both  Body 
 Seas  and  and  Mind  are  to  be  exercifd  in  order  to  produce 
 Defarts.  Pleafure,  where's  the  wonder  if  God  deflin'd  thac 
 Exercife  in  part  for  procuring  of  Food,  and  con- 
 neded  this  Pleafure  with    it.   C53O     The  infinite 
 
 Power 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 'Tis  ab- 
 furd  for  ■ 
 any  one 
 
 ro  defire  ; 
 different 
 place  or 
 llation 
 from  that 
 which  is 
 allotted 
 him  ; 
 iince  he 
 was  made 
 
 gtow  barfen,  and  the  Animals  would  wafleand  die  :  And  if 
 there  were  a  much  greater  Quantify,  the  contrary  Effeft 
 would  happen,  the  Earth  would  be  too  fat,  the  Plants  would 
 grow  too  grofs,  and  the  Animals  would  be  fufFocatcd  and 
 choaked.  The  Temperature  is  therefore  as  exaft  as  it  could 
 be,  all  Circumrtances  confider'd  ;  and  the  fmall  Inconveni- 
 encics  are  nothing  compared  with  the  general  Good. '  See 
 to  fill  that  alfo  the  Word  Eartb-quake  in  Chambcri'?,  Cyclopedia. 
 place,  and  (33-)  Befide  the  Neceflity  there  is  for  Labour,  in  order  to 
 v/ould  reftrain  Man  in  his  prefent  State  from  an  Excels  of  Folly  and 
 
 otherwife  Wickednefs,  (which  our  Author  confiders  in  the  two  lall  Para- 
 have  had  graphs  of  this  Chapter)  the  ufe  and  advantage  of  it  appears 
 none  at  alfo  from  the  manifeil  tendency  it  had  to  preferve  and  improve 
 all.  the  Faculties  of  both  Body  and  Mind.     If  ui'cd  in  a  moderate 
 
 degree,  it  preferves  our  Health,  Vigour,  and  Adivity  ;  gives 
 us  a  quick  Senfe  and  Relifh  of  Pleafure,  and  prevents  a  great 
 many  Mifcries  which  attend  Idlenefs.  This  is  well  dcfcrib'd 
 by  the  Guardiav,  N".  131.  and  the  Spe^ator,  N".  115.    'I  con- 
 
 *  fidcr  the  Body  as  a  Syllcm  of  Tubes  and  Glands,  or,  to  ufe 
 '   a  more  rullic  Phrafe,  a  bundle  of  Pipes  and  Strainers,  fitted 
 
 *  to  one  anotlicr  after  fo  v/onderful  a  manner,  as  to  make,  a" 
 
 '  proper* 
 
 *  SeeCli,  I.  §^.  3.  par.  9.  and  Ch.  5  §.  i.  Sub.  a.. 
 
Sed.  5.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  193 
 
 Power  of  God  was  able  to  produce  Animals  of 
 inch.  Capacities;  and  lince  the  Creation  of  them 
 was  no  Inconvenience  to  other  Beings  who  might 
 exercife  themfelves  in  a  more  noble  manner,  may 
 not  the  infinite  Goodnefs  of  God  be  conceiv'd  to 
 have  almoft  compell'd  him  not  to  refufe  or  envy 
 thofe  the  benefit  of  Life?  Some  of  this  kind  were 
 to  be  created,  fince  there  was  Room  left  for  them 
 in  the  Work  of  God,  after  fo  many  others  were 
 made  as  was  convenient.  But  you  may  wilh  that 
 ^me  other  Place  and  Condition  had  fallen  to  your 
 Lot.  Perhaps  fo.  But  if  you  had  taken  up  ano- 
 ther's Place,  that  other,  or  fome  elle,  muft  hive 
 been  put  into  yours,  who  being  alike  ungrateful  to 
 the  Divine  Providence,  would  wifli  for  the  Place 
 which  you  have  now  occupied.  Know  then  that  it; 
 was  neceflary  that  you  fliould  either  be  what  you 
 are,  or  not  at  all.  :  For  fince  every  other  Place 
 and  State  which  the  Syflem  or  Nature  of  Things 
 allow'd  was  occupied  by  fome  others,  you  muft  o^ 
 neceflity  either  fill  that  which  you  are  now  in,  or 
 be  banilli'd  out  of  Nature.  For  do  you  expcft 
 that  any  other  fliouid  be  turn'd  out  of  his  Order, 
 and  you   placed  in   his  room?  that   is,  that  God; 
 
 fliould 
 
 k or E  s! 
 
 ^  proper  Engine  for  the  Soul  to  work  with.  This  Defcriptioti) 
 ^>  does  not  only   comprehend   the  Bowels,  Bones,  Tendonsj' 
 
 *  Veins,  Nerves,  and   Arteries,  but  every  Mufcle,  and  every 
 
 *  Ligature,  which  is  a  Compofition  of  Fibred,  that  are  fo  ma-; 
 
 *  ny  imperceptible  Tubes  or  Pipes  interwoven  on  all  fides. 
 
 *  with  invifible  Glands  or  Strainers.     This  general  Idea  of  a 
 
 *  human   Body,  without  confidering  it  in  the  Niceties  ofA-: 
 '  natoniy,  lets  us  fee  how  abfolutely  ncceil  iry  Labour  is  for  the- 
 
 *  right  Preiervation  of  it.  There  muft  be  frequent  Motions- 
 *•  and  Agitations,  to  mix,  digeft,  and  feparate  the  Juices  con- 
 *'  tain'd  in  it,  as  well  as  to  ci^ar  and  cleanfe  the  Infinitude  of- 
 ''Pipes  and  Strainers  of  which  it  is  compofed ;  and  to  give- 
 
 *  their  folid  Parts  a  more  firm  and  lailing  Tone.     Labour  or^ 
 
 O  Exercife 
 
194  Concerning  Natural 'EvW.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 fhould  exhibit  a  peculiar  and  extraordinary  IVliini- 
 ficence  toward  you  to  the  prejudice  of  others.  You 
 ouj^ht  therefore  not  to  cenfure,  but  adore  the  Di- 
 vine  Goodnefs  for  making  you  what  you  are.  You 
 could  neither  have  been  made  otherwife,  nor  in  a 
 better  manner;  but  to  the  Difadvantage  of  fome 
 others,  or  of  the  whole. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *  Exercife  ferments  the  Humours,  calls  them  into  their  prope? 
 
 *  Channels,  throws  off  Redundancies,  and  helps  Nature  ia 
 '  thofe  fecret  Diftributions,  without  which  the  Body  cannot 
 '  fiibfift  in  its  Vigour,  nor  the  Soul  adt  with  Chearfulnefs.  I 
 '  might  here  mention  the  Effects  which  this  has  upon  all  the 
 
 *  Faculties  of  the  Mind,  by  keeping  the  Underftanding  clear, 
 
 *  the  Imagination  untroubled,  and  refining  thofe  Spirits  that 
 
 *  are  neceffary  for  the  proper  Exertion  of  our  Intelledtual  Fa- 
 '  culties,  during  the  prefent  Laws  of  Union  between  Soul 
 
 *  and  Body.     It  is  to  a  Negleft  in  this  Particular  that  we  muft 
 
 *  afcribe  the  Spleen  which  is  fo  frequent  in   Men  of  ftudious 
 
 *  and  fedentary  Tempers,  as  well  as    the  Vapours  to  which 
 
 *  thofe  of  the  other  Sex  are  fo  often  fubject.' 
 
 He  proceeds  to  illullrate  both  the  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  of 
 God,  from  his  having  fitted  and  oblig'd  us  to  this  Labour  and 
 Exercife,  which  is  fo  neceffary  to  our  well-being:  which  Ob- 
 fervation  will  help  us  to  account  for  the  fecond  and  third  Evil 
 arifing  from  the  F^// mention'd  in  §  9.  par.  5.  The  Fitnefs 
 of  a  State  of  Labour  for  fallen  Man  is  Ihewn  at  large  by  Sherlock 
 on  Judgment,  C,  i.  §,  8.  p.  179.  and  D^Oylj  in  his  Jirji 
 DiJJertation,  C.  9.  p.  98,  l^c.  2d  Edit. 
 
 SECT. 
 
Bed.  6.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  in^ 
 
 SECT.    VI. 
 
 Cojicerniiig  Propagation  of  the  Species^ 
 Childhood,  a?td  Old- Age. 
 
 ROM  what  has  been  faid  it  appears,  that  A-  Animals 
 nimals  which    have  folid   Bodies  are  naturally  maybeic- 
 mortal;    though  the  Earth  therefore  were  at  firll  F^^^ 
 fully  ftock'd  with  them,  yet  their  Number  being  vvay/ift. 
 continually  diminilh'd  by  Death,  it  would  at  length  If  Death 
 be  quite  deftitute  of  Inhabitants.     There  migh;,  were  pre- 
 it  feems,    have  been  a  threefold    Remedy  for  this  ^^'^^P^  °y 
 Evil:    Firft,  if  God  by  his  Omnipotence  i"hould  fence fzd- 
 prevent  the  natural  EfFeds  of  the  mutual  Percuffion  ly  by  Cre- 
 of  Bodies,  viz..  the  Corruption  and  DifiTolurion  of  atioius'^- 
 themfelves,  and   the   Change  or   EfFu Hon  of  their  l^'^^y.^'-' 
 Fluids.     For  from   thefe  the  Deftradion   of  Ani-  ^^^'^ 
 mals  neceffarily  arife?,   as  thefe  do  from  the  Com- 
 pofition  of  Bodies,  and  their  ailing  on  e;.ch  othen 
 Secondly,  by  leaving;  Nature  to   itfelf,  and  letting 
 it    ad    by    univerfal    Mechanic  Laws;    and  when 
 thefe  brought  on  a  diffolution    of  Animal  Bodies, 
 that  others  be   fubftituted  in  their  room  by  Crea- 
 tion.    Thirdly  by  ordering  that  an  Animal  fhould 
 generate  its  like,  and  provide  another  to  fupply  its  This  thini 
 Place  when  it  declined.  ^^^^hod  is 
 
 rr.  Who   does  not  fee  that  this  lafl  is  the  bed:  V'l    ,'. 
 Method  of  prclerving  a  conftant   Number   of  In-  canbeef- 
 liabicanrs  upon  the  Earth?  For  'tis  the  hm^  thing,  fetled 
 ceteris   paril;us,    with  regard  to   the   Syiflem,  whe-  without    . 
 tiher   the    Earth    have    thefe   Inhabitants  which  it  ]JJ^"f ^3°" 
 naj  at  prefentj  or  others  equal  in  Number  and  Perfec-  the  Laws 
 
 O   2,  tion  :  of  Nature,' 
 
196  Concerning  Natural  "EvW*    Chap.  IV» 
 
 tion :  but  it  is  not  the  fame  thing  whether  the  Laws 
 of  Nature  be  obferv'd  or  violated*.  In  the  for- 
 mer Methods  God  muft  have  interfered  every  Mo^ 
 ment  by  his  abfolute  Power,  he  muft  have  done 
 infinite  violence  to  the  Laws  of  Nature,  and  con- 
 founded all  the  CorOiirutioris  and  Orders  of  things, 
 and  that  without  any  Benefit;  nay  with  extraord- 
 nary  detriment  to  the  whole,  For  fince  the  uni- 
 verlal  Laws  of  Motion  are  the  beft  that  could 
 poffibly  be  eflabliili'd,  they  would  feldom  bt  re- 
 veis'd  without  damage  to  the  whole.  Neither 
 does  it  become  the  Wiidom  of  God  to  have  left 
 his  Work  fo  imperfeft  as  to  want  continual  mend- 
 ing even  in  the  fmalleft  aiticulars.  'Twas  better 
 therefore  for  it  to  be  made  in  fuch  a  manner  as 
 we  fee  it  is,  viz,,  that  a  new  Offspring  fhould  be 
 propagated  out  of  the  Animals  themfelves,  and  by 
 themfelves. 
 TheDi-  HI.  And  herein  we  may  admire  the  Divine 
 Y!"^  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,    which  hath  fo   prudently 
 
 and  Wh-^  and  effeftually  contrived  this  End.  For  it  has  im- 
 dom  ad-     planted   in  all   Creatures  (as  we  fee)  a  ftrong  and 
 mirable  in  almofi:  irrefiftible  appetite  of  propagating  their  Kind, 
 the  con-      gj^  J  j-j^j  render'd  this   aft  of  propagation   fo  ufeful 
 of  It'^^     ^^*^  agreeable  to  them  who  perform  it,  that  Pofte- 
 rity  becomes  dearer  to  many  than  Life  itfelf;  and 
 if  it  were  left  to  their  choice,  they  would  rather 
 die  than  lofe  their  Offspring  and  the  Rewards  of 
 Love:    nay  there  is    fcarce   any  one   that    is  not 
 ready  to   protedl    its  Young  at    the   hazard   of  its 
 Life.     God  has  therefore  by  one  fingle  Law  and  a 
 fort  of  Mechanifm,  replenilli'd  the  Earth  with  liv- 
 ing Creatures,  and  provided  that  a  fufficient  Num- 
 ber fliould   never  be  wanting,    without   the  Inter- 
 vention of  a    Power,    which   would   be  irregular 
 and  an  Imputation  on  the  Skill  and  Wifdcm  of  the 
 Arvhited:.     Who   would   not  prefer  fuch  a  piece 
 
 of 
 *  Sec  Note  25. 
 
Sed.  6.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  197 
 
 of  Mechanifm,  where  one  Machine  generates  ano- 
 ther, and  continually  produces  a  new  one  in  its 
 turn,  without  any  new  and  extraordinary  Inter- 
 vention of  the  Artificer,  before  one  which  would 
 immediately  and  every  Day  require  his  Alliftance 
 and  Amendment  \ 
 
 IV.  This  Method,  you'll  fay,  is  fit  enough  for  Why  Men 
 the  Brutes,    many  of  which   mufl:   n^sceffarily   die  ^^^  '^°'; 
 not    only   by  the  Law  of  their    Nature,    but  alfo  J^j^^'J^^^^j^g 
 for  the  fake  of  others,  for  whofe  ufe  they  were  creat-  continual 
 ed  to  ferve  as  Food.      Neither  is  Death  the  greateft  dread  of 
 of  Evils  to  them,    fince  they  live  without  being  Death 
 fenfible  of  their   Mortality.      But  Man  is  ^^^^'cily  gr^i'^^^ga^re 
 dealt  withal,  who  from  his  very  Infancy  is  troubled  ^^^^  ^^  ^\\ 
 with  Fear  and  Dread  more  bitter  even  than  Death;  concerned 
 and  who  frequently  foretaftes,  and  by  ruminating  about  it. 
 thoroughly  digefts,  whatever  Bitternefs  there  is  in 
 Death  itfelf.     Neither  does   the   Hope  or  Care  of 
 Offspring,    nor  the  Enjoyment  of  the^e  Pleafures, 
 compenfate  for  fo  many  Miferies  and  Evils:  The 
 Divine  Goodnefs  might  therefore  have  either  con- 
 cealed   from   Man   his  Mortality,  or  elfe  removed 
 that  innate  Terror  arifing   in  our  Minds  from  the 
 profped  of  Death,  which  is  always  dreadful.    (34O 
 
 O  3  V, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (34.)  A  fufficient  anfwer  to  this  Objeftlon  may  be  found  in 
 the  laft  Chapter  of  Dr.  Sherlock''^  admirable  Treatife  on  Death. 
 I  fliall  infert  a  little  of  it.  '  There  are  great  and  wife  Reafons 
 f  why  God  fhould  imprint  this  Averllon  to  Death  on  human 
 
 *  Nature  ;  becaufe  it  obliges  us  to  take  care  of  ourfelves,  an4 
 '  to  avoid  every  thing  which  will  deftroy  or  fliorten  our  Lives : 
 
 *  This  in  many  Cafes  is  a  great  Principle  of  Virtue,  as  it  pre- 
 
 *  ferves  us  from  fual  and  deftru6tive  Vices ;  it  is  a  great  In- 
 
 *  ftrument  of  Government,  and  makes  Men  afraid  of  com- 
 
 *  mitting  fuch  Villanies  as   the  Laws   of  their  Country  have 
 
 *  made  capital :  and  therefore,  fmce  the  natural  Fear  of  Death 
 
 *  is  of  fuch  great  Advantage  to  us,  we  mufl;  be  contented  with 
 \  it,  tho'  it  makes  the  Thoughts  of  Dying  a  little  uneafy ;  efpc- 
 
 '  cially: 
 
1 98  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  I¥. 
 
 This  is  a  V.  'Tis  ro  be  confefs'd  indeed,  that  ihefe  are  In- 
 fign  that  (jjcations  that  Man  has  fome  Relation  to  In^mor- 
 fcnE  L?re  ^^hty,  and  that  the  State  in  which  he  is  placed  at  pre- 
 is  a  pre-  ^cnt  IS  not  entirely  natural  to  him,  otherwife  he 
 ludetoa  would  not  be  uneafy  in  ir,  nor  afpire  fo  eagerly  af- 
 bctt:r.  jgj.  another.  The  prefent  Life  of  Man  is  therefore 
 either  affign'd  him  for  a  time  by  way  of  Punifh- 
 ment,  as  feme  think,  or  by  way  of  Prelude  to  or 
 Preparation  for  a  better,  as  our  Religion  teaches 
 and  our  very  Nature  perfuades  us  to  hope  and  exped:. 
 This  is  prefumed  you'll  fay,  and  not  proved.  Be 
 it  fo.  But  if  by  the  Suppofition  of  a  future  State 
 this  Difficulty  may  be  folv'd,  and  Providence 
 vindicated,  when  it  is  arraign'd  as  dealing  hardly 
 with  Mankind,  who  is  fo  foolilli  as  to  be  will- 
 ing to  call  in  Queftion  the  Power  and  Goodnefs 
 of  God,  rather  then  adm.ic  of  fo  probable  an  Hy- 
 pothefis  ?  To  which  we  may  add,  and  believed 
 by  almofl  all  Mankind.  But  if  it  were  not  fo, 
 God^  lus  bcuowcd  other  Benefits  of  Life  upon 
 us,  which  in  cur  own  Judgments  are  not  all  in- 
 ferior to  the  Prefervation  of  Life;  and  this  ap- 
 pears from  hence,  that  we  often  prefer  thefe  Be- 
 nefits to  LiiC  itfelf,  which  we  ihould  never  do, 
 if  we  did  not  rometimc«;  efteem  them  dearer  to  us. 
 To  come  to  a  Conciufion:  Without  an  univerfal 
 confuHon  of  Nature,  without  violence  offer'd  to 
 the  Laws  and  Order  of  it,  the  fame  Animals  could 
 
 not: 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 '  cially  if  we  confidcr,  that  when  this  natural  Fear  of  Death 
 
 •  is  not  encreafed  by  other  Caufes,  it  may  be  conquer'd  or  al- 
 
 •  lay'd  by  Reafon  and  wiie  Confideration.'   p.  329.4th  Edit. 
 
 For  a  farther  Account  of  both   the  rational  and  irrational 
 Ftar  of  Death,  what  it  is,  and  what  it  ought  to  be  :  the  E^ds 
 and  EfFcfts,  and  a^fo  the  Remedies  of  it.     See  iWW/s  Dif- 
 courfe  on  Ht^h.  2.  1/  *. 
 '.  ■  '. 
 
 *  P radical  DifcoUrfeSy  Vol.  4t]i. 
 
Se(fl.  6.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  igg 
 
 noc  prolong  their  Life    for  any  confiderable  time, 
 
 it   remained  therefore  that   fome  fupply  the  Place 
 
 of  others  fucceffively,  and  that  the  Species  be  per-  ' 
 
 petuared,    fince  the  Individuals  could  not,  left  the 
 
 whole  Animal  kind  iliould  prove  a  thing  of  but 
 
 one  Age's  Duration. 
 
 VI.  From   hence  it  appears  that    the   Race   of  'Tis  expe- 
 Mortals   is  to  be  perpetuated  by   the  Propagation  dientfor 
 of  their  Species ;   and  fince  every  Animal  is  in  a  j  '^j"  ^^ 
 perpetual   Flux  and  may  either  increafe  or  decay ,  ^^^  !^^^ 
 it  was  proper  to  proceed  from  lefs  Beginnings  to  he  Ipleis; 
 greater  J     by    this     means    the     new     Offspring  hence  the 
 would   be  lefs   burthenfome  to   the    Parents,    and  ^°""5l'^": 
 the  Toung  and    Old  agree  better  together.     I  con-  afj"fe°"" 
 fefs  indeed  Men  are  born  defencelefs  and  unable  to  ^^.. 
 proted    themfelves,    and   lefs  qualified   to   provide 
 for  themfelves  than  any  other  Animals :  But  God 
 has   affign'd  .us    Parents,   Guardians,    and  Faithful 
 Guides,    fo  that  we  are   never   more  happy  than 
 when    under  their    protedion.      Hence   Childhood, 
 blefs'd  with  the  fimple  Enjoyment  of  good  things 
 and  void  of  Care,  becomes  more  pleafant  to  us  than 
 any  other  Age.     Hence  alio  comes  Reverence  and         ^ 
 Relief  to   the  Aged;   hence  proceeds  Comfort  to 
 the  Maturey   and  Support    to    the  Decrepit.     Nay 
 the  Seeds  and  principles  of  Social  Life  are  all  laid 
 in  this  appetite  of  Generation.     To  this  propen- 
 fion  we  owe  almoft  all  the  Benefits  of  Society.  No- 
 thing  therefore   could  be  more  defirable  to  Crea- 
 tures mortal  (as  we  are  by  the  necelfary  Condition 
 of  terreftrial  Matter)    and  obnoxious  to  Miferies, 
 than  to  be  born  after,  fuch  a  manner  as  in  the  firft 
 part  of  Life,  while  we   are  tender,    unacquainted 
 with  things,  and  put   under  the  Guardian fhip  of 
 others,  to  enjoy  the  Sweets  without  the  Care;  in 
 the  midAkt  to  pleafe  ourfelves  as   much  in  taking 
 care  of  others ;  and  in  the  Decrepit,  feeble  Age,   to 
 be  allifted  in  our  turn  by  others  whom  we  have 
 
 O  4.  educated » 
 
200 
 
 The  chief 
 Appetites- 
 are  thofc 
 of  Self- 
 preferva- 
 tion,  and 
 Propaga- 
 tion of 
 the  Spe- 
 cies. 
 
 Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 educated.  This  part  of  the  Divine  Oeconomy  is  fo 
 far  therefore  from  needing  an  Apology,  that  it 
 is  rather  a  Demonjlration  of  his  Goodnefs.  The 
 Race  of  Men  wa^  to  be  repaired,  fince  Death  could 
 not  be  prevented  without  a  greater  Evil ;  and 
 that  Reparation  is  order 'd  in  fo  wife  and  benefi'- 
 cent  a  \v:y;  that  nothing  can  be  more  worthy  of 
 the  Divine  power  and  Goodnefs,  nothing  deferve 
 greater  Admirari  n. 
 
 VII.  Now  thefe  tv/o  Appetites,  viz.,  o^ Self-prefer'^ 
 vation,  and  the  Propagation  of  our  Species,  are  th^ 
 primary,  the  original  of  all  others.  From  thefe 
 fpring  Pleafure  and  an  agreeable  Enjoyment  of 
 things;  fom  thefe  comes  almoft  every  thing  that 
 is  advantageous  or  defirable  in  Life.  But  all  tbefe 
 arc  mingled  with  fome  Evils,  which  could  not  be 
 avoided  without  greater. 
 
 ECT, 
 
Btd.  7.     Concernifig  Natural  Evil. 
 
 201 
 
 SECT,    vir 
 
 O/' Difeafes,  Wild-Beafts,  and  Venomous 
 Creatures. 
 
 WE  muft  obferve  Cas  before^)   that  our  Bo-  Bodies  are 
 dies   confift   of  folid  and   fluid   Parts,  and  liable  to 
 that   thefe   folid    Members  may   be    either  cut  or  difloluti- 
 broken  to  Pieces,   disjointed,  or  otherwife  render'd  jiuJ^oi-g 
 unfit  for   Motion :    Whence  Weaknefs,     LanguiJJnng  to  corrupt 
 and  Torments',    that  the  Fluids  alfo  are  liable,  not  tion ; 
 only    to  ConfumptioD,  but   Con  uption  to  ;  to  E-  j^^^^e 
 bullition  by   too   intenfe    Heat,  or    Stagnation  by  j)^}"^^^" 
 Cold :  whence  proceed  various  Maladies  and  Difeafes. 
 
 II.    Now  there  are  certain  Juices  in  the  Earth  The 
 which  we  inhabit,  from  a  mixture  of  which  arife  ^''^"gth 
 Changes  and  Coagulations.      There  are  other  Bo-  ^f^gj.^"! 
 dies  alfo  which  fly  afunder  with  greater  Violence  from  the 
 when  mix'd.    Tluis  Milk,  by  the  infufion  of  a  little  contrarie- 
 Acid,  turns  to  Cheefe  and  Whey :    Thus  Spirits  of  ^y.of 
 Wine  and  Gun-powder,  when  touch'd  by  the  Fire,  *^'"g^' 
 run  into  Flame ;  and  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  the  (.oyjj  j^^^ 
 fame  from  corning  to  pafs  in  the  hlood  and  Hu-  be  remov- 
 mors  of  a  human  Body.     Now  thofe  things  which  ed  with- 
 being   mix'd  with  them  fuddenly  diflblve,   coagu-  p"^  ^^k- 
 late,  or  render  them  unfit  for  Circulation,  we  call  ]y[o^on7 
 Poifonous.     And  if  we  conlider  thofe  contraries  by 
 which  we  are  nourifli'd,  and  in  the  Struggle  or  Op- 
 pofition  of  which   Nature  confifl:s,  'tis  fcarce  con- 
 ceivable but  that  thefe  things  fliould  often  happen. 
 Nor  can  all  contrariety  be  taken  away,  except  Mo- 
 
 *  Sea.  3. 
 
202  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap,  IV. 
 
 tion  be  taken  away  too,  as  we  have  fhewn;  nor 
 could  all  thefe  things  that  are  contrary  to  our  Con- 
 ftitution  be  removed,  except  fome  Species  of  Crea- 
 tures were  extinft,  or  never  created ',  that  is,  our 
 Security  muft  have  been  purchafed  at  too  dear  a 
 rate.  For  if  every  thing  that  is  in  any  refpeft  re- 
 pugnant to  us  were  removed,  it  would  cofi  either 
 the  whole  Syftem,  or  ourfelves  more  Evil  than  we 
 receive  from  thence  at  prefent,  as  will  fufficiently 
 appear  to  any  one  that  enumerates  the  Particulars. 
 pfepide-  ^^^  '^^^  ^^  ^^  ©bferv'd  that  the  Parts  of  this 
 mical  mundane  Syftem  which  are  contiguous  to  us,  viz.. 
 JOifeafes.  the  Air,  Waters,  and  the  Earth  itfelf,  are  liable 
 to  changes  5  nor  could  it  pofTibly  be  otherwife  if 
 the  whole  Machine,  of  which  thefe  are  but  fmall 
 Tarts,  be  thoroughly  conlider'd  :  nor  could  thefe 
 Changes,  efpecially  the  fudden  ones,  always  agree 
 with  the  Temperature  of  the  Humours  of  a  human 
 Eody.  For  they  enter  into  the  very  conftitution 
 of  the  Body,  and  infed;  its  Fluids  according  to  the 
 Laws  of  Nature :  whence  it  is  that  the  due  Crafis 
 of  the  Blood  and  Health  of  the  Body  depend  upon 
 the  Temperature  of  the  Air  and  Weatlier.  Hence 
 arife  pejiilential  aiid  epidemical  Difeafes ;  nor  could 
 they  be  avoided,  unlefs  the  Animals  had  been 
 made  of  a  quire  different  Frame  and  Conftitution. 
 Nay,  whatever  State  they  had  been  placed  in,  they 
 would  have  been  fubjccr  either  to  thefe  or  others  no. 
 lefs  pernicious.  For  Marble,  and  the  very  hardefl; 
 Bodies,  are  diffolv'd  by  the  Viciffitude  of 
 Heat  and  Cold,  Moid  and  Dry,  and  the  other 
 Changes  which  we  are  infcnfible  of;  how  much 
 more  the  Humors  and  animal  Spirits  of  Man,  on 
 a  right  Temperature  of  which  Life  depends?  God 
 might  indeed,  by  a  Favour  peculiar  to  us,  have 
 expeird  all  the  Contagions  arifing  from  thefe  alte- 
 rations, or  provided  that  they  fliould  not  hurt  us. 
 But  what  reafon  have  fuch  Sinners  as  we  now  are, 
 
 tQ 
 
Sed.  7.     Coiicern'uig  Natural  Evil.  203 
 
 to  expeft  it  ?  'Tis  more  agreeable  to  the  Juflice 
 of  God  to  leave  the  Elements  to  themielves,  to  be 
 carried  according  to  the  Laws  of  Motion  for  our 
 Punifhmenr.  ($5.)  Neither  ought  we  to  wonder 
 that  God  denies  the  Guilty  a  Favour,  which  even 
 the  Innocent  have  no  right  to :  nay,  we  ought  to 
 think  that  he  has  inflided  a  very  light  penalty  on 
 reiiellious  Men:  For  lince  the  natural  Evils  we  are 
 forc'd  to  ftruggle  with  are  for  the  mod:  part  of 
 fuch  a  nature  as  could  not  be  warded  off,  but  by 
 the  particular  extraordinary  favour  of  the  Deity, 
 God  fhould  feem  rather  to  have  refumed  a  free 
 Gift,  thaninflided  a  punillimenr,  when  he  is  pleaf- 
 ed  to  permit  them. 
 
 IV.  If  the  Earth  had  been  made  for  the  ufe  of  Rods  and 
 Man   alone,    we   might  have   expeded    that  there  Defertsare 
 ihould  be  nothing  in  it  that  was  prejudicial  or  ufe-  ^'^5^  "*^' 
 lefs  to  him  ;  but  fince  it  was  made,  as  v/e  haveob-  ^^^^  ^^1^^^. 
 ferved  '^t  for  the  Benefit  of  the  Univerfe,    Man  is  Animals 
 
 i  placed 
 
 for  their 
 habitation* 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (35.)  Our  Author's  Argument  here  feemo  to  be  framed  rather 
 in  compliance  with  the  common  Method,  than  in  ftridt  con- 
 formity to  his  own  Scheme  of  the  to  fiixtiov,  or  abfolute  Me- 
 liority  in  things :  which  Syflem  maintains  that  God  is  ftill  in- 
 finitely beneficent,  or  as  kind  as  pofljble  to  all,  or  difpenfes 
 every  thing  for  the  very  bell  in  the  main.  Tho'  what  is  here 
 introduced  by  way  of  Punilhment,  may,  if  rightly  underftood, 
 be  defended  as  an  Inftance  of  the  greateft  poffible  Kindnefs  ; 
 fince  the  only  End  of  all  the  Divine  Judgments  is  either  the 
 Correction  and  Amendment  of  the  Offenders  themfelves  or 
 Admonition  to  others,  or  both  :  and  confequently  is  a  means 
 of  the  greateft  Good  to  Mankind  in  general,  and  the  very  belt 
 difpenfation  towards  them  in  this  degenerate  corrupt  Eftate, 
 and  the  moft  proper  method  of  fitting  them  for  or  diredling 
 and  drawing  them  to  a  better.  And  if  all  this  can  be  efFedled 
 by  the  fame  general  Laws  of  Nature,  v/hich  alfo  bring  Plenty^ 
 Health  and  Happincfs  to  the  Word,  here  is  a  double  demou^ 
 Uration  of  the  abfolute  Wifdom  and  Gocdnefs  of  its  Author.  ■ 
 
 *  Chap.  3.  Note  zz. 
 
2C4  Coftcerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 placed  therein,  not  becaufe  it  was  created  for   him 
 
 only,  but  becaufe  it  could  afford  him  a  convenient 
 
 Habitation:  for  Cod  muft  be  fuppofcd  in  this  cafe 
 
 not  to  have  adapted  the  Place  to  the  Inhabitants,   but 
 
 the  Inhabitants  to  the   Place.      If  therefore    Man 
 
 can  dwell  commodioully  enough  in  thefe  Regions 
 
 of  the  Earth  which  are  fit  for  his  pupof^,  he  muft 
 
 allow  God  in  his  Coodnefs  to  give  the  Earth  as 
 
 many  other  Inhabitants  as  it  can  fuftain  confiftent- 
 
 ly  with  the  Good  of  Men.     Neither  ought  he  to 
 
 repine  that  the  Rocks   and  Defarts,    which   are  of 
 
 no  ufe  to  Men,  fupply  the  Serpents  and  WiU-BeaJis 
 
 with  Coverts.      But  thefe,  you'll   fay,   fometimes 
 
 invade  the  Countries    which   are  rnoft  delightful, 
 
 and  befl  ftored  with  conveniencies  for  human  Life ; 
 
 deftroy  the   Fruits   and  cultivated  Fields,  and  kill 
 
 the  Men  themfelves  by  Bites  and  Poifons.     I  graat 
 
 it;  but  it  may  be  queftion'd   whether  it  has  been 
 
 always  fo. 
 
 Antient  V.  For  in  the  firfl  place,  this  Evil  might  have 
 
 Hiftories     had  its  Origin  from  Man  himfelf ;  viz..   Rage  might 
 
 '^^^^^^^!  ,   be  given  to  the  Lion,  and  Venom  to  the  Serpent, 
 
 Eeafts  and  ^*^''  ^^""^  puniflimcnt  of  Mankind ;  and  this  antient 
 
 venomous   Hiftories,  both  facred  and  prophane,  declare.     But 
 
 Creatures    fince  this  Qiieflion  was    fird   moved    by  fuch  as 
 
 weremade  either   denied  reveal'd  Religion,    or   at   leafl:    were 
 
 ,i^fi,n-^^«^^'  ienorant  of  it,    I  would    not   call    that  in  to  our 
 
 of  Man-     afliltance,    or  make  any  other  ufe  of   it  than  as  a 
 
 kind.         bare  Hypothefis. 
 
 VI.  We  may  affirm  then  in  the  fecond  place, 
 fault  of^  that  thofe  thmgs  happen  through  the  fault  of  Men, 
 Mankind  who  by  Wars  and  Difcord  make  fruitful  and  rich 
 that  thefe  Countries  void  of  Inhabitants  to  till  them,  and 
 multiply ;  jgave  them  to  the  pofTefTion  of  Wild-Beafts  and 
 ki°d"waft^  venomous  Infeds:  Since  therefore  they  neither 
 by  War,  *  cultivate  them  themfelve-',  nor  allow  other  perfons 
 ^(.  to  the  to  dq  its  what  wonder  is  it  if  God,  for  the  re- 
 difgrace  of  proach  of  Men,  give  them  up  to   be  inhabited  by 
 
 'Brutesj 
 
feedt.  7.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  20^ 
 
 Brutes,  Wild-Beafts,  and  Infeds?  Thofe  Parts  Man,  of 
 which  we  have  defer  ted  belong  by  right  to  them,  nor  "g^"^  be- 
 do  they  other  wife  multiply  more  than  is  proper.  ^\^^^^ 
 
 VII.  Thirdly,  'Tis  no  more  repugnant  to  the 
 Divine  Goodnels  to  have  made  an  Animal  by  the  We  may 
 Bite  of  which  a   Man  might  be  deftroy'd,  than  a  ^^"^^  fafi- 
 Precipice.     There's  nothing   in   the   whole  Earth  -^jy^'^ 
 but  what  may  hurt  or  kill  a  Man,  if  it  be  not  ufed  gg^^^g  ^^^ 
 with   caution;  Meat,  Drink,  Water,  Fire.     Mufl  venomous 
 thefe  then  not  be  created  becaufe  they  may  hurt  a  Creatures. 
 Man?  Nor  is  it  more  difficult  to  be  aware  of  Poi-  ^^^^  ^^^^^ 
 fons  and  Wild-Beafts,  than  of  thefe:    Nay,  fcarce  niendes' 
 one  is  killed  by  Foifon  or  torn  by  Wild-Beafts  of  of  Life, 
 
 a   thoufand    that  die  by  the   Sword ;   and  yet  we  about 
 don't  at  all  blame  the   Divine   Goodnefs  for  this,  which  we 
 It  may  be  faid,  that  Iron,  Earth,  Water,   Meats  and  "^^^[^2 
 Drinks,   are    neceffary,   and  on    that   account  the  with  Pro^ 
 Evils  attending  them  may  be  tolerated.     And  who  vidence. 
 will  undertake  to  afiare  us  that  venomous  Animals 
 and  Wild-Beafts  are  not  neceHary  ?  Muft  we  reckon 
 them  entirely  ufelefs  becaufe  we  do  not  know  the 
 ufe  of  them?    Muft  we  fay  that  every   Wheel  in 
 a  Clock  is  made  for  no  manner  of  purpofe  which  a 
 Ruftic  undcrftandsnot  the  DcHgn  of?  But  fuppofe 
 we  grant  that  thefe  are  of  no  fervice  to  us,  yet  may 
 they  not  pkafe  and  enjoy  themfelves  ^  ? 
 
 VIII.  You  may  urge  that  thefe  are  not  worth  ^''^f^^* 
 the  notice  of  the  Divine  Providence.     Thus  indeed  ^^^jer  the 
 proud  Mortals,    admirers  of  themfelves  alone,    def-  Divine 
 pife  the  Works  of  God  ;   But  'ris  not  fo  with  the  Care :  tn 
 Divine  Goodnefs,   which   cliofe  that   fome  Incon-  'Jj'"'^ .?' 
 v^nience  iiiould  befal  Mankind  rather  than  a  whole  favours ^ 
 Species  be  wanting  to  Nature.  of  Pride. 
 
 IX.  f  you  infift  that  a  Lion  might  have  been 
 
 made   without  Teeth  or   Claws,  a  Viper  without  ^^^^^  ^^'^ 
 Venom,-  I  grant  it,  as  a  Knife  without  an  Edge:  Creaulres^ 
 But  then  they  would  have  been  of  quite  another  are  of  ufe 
 *  See  Note  2z.  to  Mei:. 
 
 Speciesj 
 
2o6  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 Species,  and  have  had  neither  the  nature,  nor  ufe, 
 nor  genius,  which  they  now  enjoy.  In  fhort,  I  fay 
 once  for  all,  they  are  not  in  vain.  The  very  Ser- 
 pents, though  a  Race  hateful  to  us,  have  their  ufes; 
 among  the  reft  they  may  ferve  to  gather  Poifon  out 
 of  the  Earth.  (56.)  Nor  is  the  Country  lefs  habi- 
 table where  they  are  than  where  they  are  not. 
 Now,  uteris  -paribus^  Animals  ought  to  multiply; 
 for  Life  is  a  Perfedion:  and  fince  it  is  as  noble  a 
 one  as  Matter  will  admit  of,  'tis  preferable  to  none 
 at  all.  'Tis  therefore  the  Work  and  Gift  of  Godl 
 wherever  he  has  beftow'd  it,  and  does  not  ftand  in 
 need  of  an  Elfil  Principle  for  its  Author. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (36.)  For  an  account  of  the  various  ends  and  ufes  of  thefe 
 noxious  Animals,  poifonous  Plants,  ^c.  fee  Derhanis  Anfwer 
 to  the  abovemention'd  Objection,  in  his  Phyf.  Theol.  B.  2.  Ch. 
 6.  with  the  References  ;  and  Ray  on  the  Creation,  Part  2. 
 p.  432,  l^c.  4th  Edit.  Ok  Chamber i^  CyclopAdia,  under  the 
 Word  Poifon. 
 
 SECT, 
 
Sed.  8.     Concerning  Natural  Evil,  207 
 
 SECT.    VIII. 
 
 Concerning  the  Errors  and  Ignorance 
 of  Man, 
 
 INCH  Man  (  nay  every  created  Being )  is  ne-  Human 
 ceflarily  of  a  limited  Nature"^,   'tis  plain  that  Under- 
 he  cannot  know  every  rhinq'.    The   moft  perfecS;  landing  is 
 
 J  iD  I   ^  ticccli^nlv 
 
 Creatures  therefore  are   ignorant   of  many  things:  ignorant 
 Nor  can  they  attain  to  any  other  Knowledge  than  of  many 
 what  is  agreeable  to  their   Nature  and  Condition,  things. 
 Innumerable  Truths  thcreibre  lie  hid  from  every 
 created    Underftanding :    For    perfed    and   infinite 
 Knowledge  belongs  to  God  alone ;  and  it  mull:  be 
 deterrain'd  by  his  pleaiurc   vhat  degree  every  one 
 is  to  be  endow'd  with  :  for  he  only  knows  the  na- 
 ture and  neceility  of  each,  and  has  given  what  is 
 agreeable  thereto.    Ignorance  is  therefore  an  Evil  of 
 DefeHf    and  no  more  to  be  avoided  than  the  other 
 liind  of  Ifnperfe^ioH ;  for  an  imperfeft  Nature  (as  that 
 of  all  Creatures  is)  underftands  alfo  imperfedly.  We  are 
 
 II.  As  to  human  Knowledge,  'tis  confelTed  that  we  fo"ie"nie^ 
 acquire  it  by  the  Senfes,  and  that  certain  Charaders  j^a^eufe 
 denote,  not  fo  much  the  Nature^  as  the  VJes  and  ofconjec- 
 D/^rf«ca  of  things.     Now,  fince  things  very  difFe-  tures, 
 rent  internally,    have   fometimes  the  fame  external  there- 
 Marks,  we  muft  of  neceffity  be  often  doubtful  and  ^^  ^J[^^ 
 fometimes  deceiv'd  by  the  limilitude  of  the  Marks,  only  be 
 
 ignorant, 
 *  See  Note  iS.  _  but  alfo 
 
 Neither  miftaken. 
 
2oQ  toncerhi'ng  Natural  Evil.     Chi^.  IV," 
 
 Neither  is  it  fufficient  to  the  avoiding  of  Error 
 that  we  fufpend  cur  alTtnt  in  doubtful  Cafes;  for 
 'tis  often  neceflary  for  us  (elpecially  if  we  have  f6 
 do  with  other  Perfons)  to  ad  upon  conjedurc,  and 
 refolve  upon  adion,  bemie  we  have  thoroughly 
 difcufs'd  the  Point  or  difcover'd  the  Truth:  on 
 which  account  it  is  impoflible  that  we  fhold  to- 
 tally avoid  Errors.  God  mufl:  therefore  either  have 
 made  no  fuch  Animal  as  Man  iy,  or  one  th^t  is 
 liable  to  Errors.  As  Contrariety  refults  from  Mo- 
 tion, which  is  as  it  were  the  adion  of  Matter;  fo 
 a  polTihility  of  Error  is  conlequent  upon  the  Adion 
 of  a  finite  Being. 
 Gpdcou'd  III.  ir  any  one  reply,  that  God  can  immediater 
 notalways  ly  reveal  the  Truth  to  us  in  luch  Cafes:  I  anf- 
 guard  us     ^^^^  j-^^  ^^y  (q^  j-^qi-  can  it  be  denied  that  he  has 
 
 ro°"^with-  ^^"^  ^^^   ^^^^  ^^  ^^  fomctimes:    But  that    this 
 out  vio-      fliould  be  done  always,  would  be  a  violence  repug- 
 lencedone  nant  to  the    Nature  and  Condition  of  Man,   and 
 to  Nature,  could  not  poiTibly  be  done  without  more  and  greater 
 Evils  arifing  from  an   Inrerruption  of  the  Courfe 
 of  Natuf..     Now  we   mufl    diftmguifli    between 
 thofe  Errors  which  we  fall  into  after  out  utmoft 
 diligence  and  application,   snd   fuch   as  we  are  led 
 Into   by.  carckfnef,   Negligence,    aiid    a    depraved 
 Will.     Errors  of  the  former  kind  are  to  be  reck- 
 on'd    among  Natural  Evils,  and  not  imputable  to 
 us:  For  ihcy  arife  from  the  very  State  and  Condi- 
 tion of  the  Mind  of  Man,  and  are  not  to  be  avoid- 
 ed, unles  God  would  change  the  Species  of  Being?, 
 and  o.derthar  different  things  lliould  not  affed  thq 
 Senfes  in  the  fame  manner,,  that  is,  that  there  fliould 
 be  no  more  Species  nor  Individuals  than  there  are 
 Senfations  in  us:  for  if  the  Number  of  thefe  ex- 
 ceed the  Difcrimination  of  our  Senfations,   variety 
 of  them  mud  necclfarily  produce  cither  the   very 
 lanae  Senfations  in  us  or  none  at  all,  and  a  great 
 »liany  anfwer  to  the  fame  ScniAtion,  fo  that  we  mufl, 
 
 certainly' 
 
Sed.  8.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  209 
 
 certainly  be  fometimes  impofed  upon  by  the  fimi* 
 litude  of  things.  Either  then  the  Diftindiom  of 
 our  Senfations  muft  be  multipHed  in  infimtum^  or 
 the  infinite  variety  of  fenfible  Objeds  taken  away. 
 But  'tis  evident  that  neither  could  have  been  done 
 in  this  prefent  State.  We  muft  therefore  Lcar 
 the  Inconvenience  not  only  of  being  ignorant  of 
 innumerable  things,  but  alfo  of  ernng  in  many 
 Cafes. 
 
 IV.  To  this  it  may  be  replied.  That  Error  is  a  Ma"  is  no£ 
 Defed  in  that  part  of  Man  in  the   perftclion  oP^^^^^'^Jf 
 which  his  Happinefs  chiefly  confifts;   If  therefore  ^^g^g^jr-g 
 he  rhay   naturally  fall  into  Errors,  it  follows  that  expofed  to 
 Man  may  be  naturally  miferable  without  his  fault.  Errors. 
 But  I  anfwer :  Any  particular  Evil  does  not  bring 
 Mifery  upon  us;  otherwife  every  Creature  would 
 
 be  miferable,  as  of  neceffity  labouring  under  the 
 Evils  of  Imperfe^ion.  He  only  therefore  is  to  be 
 denominated  miferable^  who  is  opprelTed  with  more 
 and  greater  Evils  than  his  Good  can  requite  with 
 Happinefs :  So  that  upon  balancing  the  Conveni- 
 encies  and  Inconveniencies  of  Life,  it  were  better 
 for  him  not  to  be  than  to  be. 
 
 V.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  alfo  jthat  God  has  in  his  Thofe 
 Wifdom   and   Goodnefs   fo   temper'd   our   prefent  E"*^/^ 
 State,  that  we  very  feldom,  if  ever,  fall  into  erie-  7^  %  ^"^ 
 vous  and  pernicious  Errors  without  our  own  fault,  our  fault 
 But  if  this  ever  come  to  pafs,  as  foon  as  the  Evil  are  reldors 
 preponderates.    Life  is  taken   away  together  with  pernici- 
 the  Benefits  of  Nature.     Now  'tis  to  be  efleem'd  °'^^' 
 
 an  Happinefs,  and  an  Argument  of  the  Divine 
 Goodnefs,  that  the  Natural  Benefits  of  Life  can- 
 not be  taken  from  us,  but  Life  is  taken  from  us 
 alfo.  Life  then  cati  be  a  burden  to  none;  nor  is 
 it  necelTary  that  any  one  fhould  withdraw  himfelf 
 from  natural  Evils  by  voluntarily  putting  an  end 
 to  his  Life.  For  if  thefe  Evils  be  fuch  as  toke  away 
 the  Benefits  of  Life,  they  alfo  bring  it  to  an  end* 
 
2IO  Concerning  "Natural  Yu\'A.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 God  produced  all  things  out  of  nothing,  and  gave 
 
 us  Being  without  our  Advice  j   he  feems  therefore 
 
 oblig'd  in  juftice  not  to  fufFer  us  to  be  reduced  to 
 
 a  State  that  is  worfe  than  Non-enity.  (5  7.)  When 
 
 therefore   atiy  State   is  overwhelmed    with    Evils 
 
 which  outweigh  the  Good,  'tis  reafonable  that  God 
 
 fhould  remit  us  to  our  former  States  that  is,  let  us 
 
 return  to  nothing.     Neither  ought  we  to  accufe  the 
 
 Divine  Power  and  Goodnefs  which  has  beftow'd  as 
 
 many  Bleffings  and  Benefits  upon  us,  as  either  the 
 
 whole  Univerfe  or  our  own  Nature   would  admit 
 
 of;  and  fince  it  was  impolTible  but  that  fome  time 
 
 or  other,    upon   the  increafe  of  Evils,    his    Gift 
 
 iviz..  Life)  muft  become  burdenfome,  when  this 
 
 happens  he  breaks  off  its  thread. 
 
 O"^!"  VI.  But  Man,  you'll  fay,   is  ignorant  of  thofe 
 
 Know-       things  which  it  was  his  greateft  Intereft  to  know, 
 
 adapted      namely,    of  Truths   that  are   necelTary   to  the  at- 
 
 to  our        tainment  of  Felicity.     It  was  convenient  for  our 
 
 State.         prefent    State  to   underftand   thefe;    and  who  will 
 
 affirm  that  God  has  not  befiow'd  upon  us  all  the 
 
 Knowledge    that  is   agreeable  to   our  State  \    We 
 
 ought  therefore  never  to   be  deceiv'd  about  fuch 
 
 Truths  as  thefe,  while  we  apply  all  our  diligence 
 
 to 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 {37.)  It  would  be  {o  indeed  if  this  were  our  only  State: 
 but  as  it  is  at  prefent,  I  fear  many  have  nothing  but  the  hopes 
 and  expeiEtations  of  another  to  fupport  them  under  almoft  com- 
 plete Mifery  ;  to  comfort  and  encourage  them  to  undergo 
 Evils  infinitely  greater  than  all  the  benefits  of  Life:  Evils 
 which  make  Life  itfelf  an  Evil,  and  (as  our  Author  fays)  put 
 them  into  a  State  worfe  than  nothing.  Witncfs  the  long  and 
 acute  Torments  of  numerous  Martyrs,  the  Pains  of  Confcflbrs, 
 the  Labours  of  common  Galley-Slaves,  ^c.  Put  the  leaft 
 hint  of  this  is  fufficient,  and  the  common  Anfwers  to  it  very 
 fatisfiftory ;  as  will  perhaps  appear  from  the  References  to  the 
 lall  Chapter  of  the  Appendix,  where  this  Queftion  comes  more 
 properly  under  confideration. 
 
Sed.  8.     Concerning  Natural  ^mW,  ^u 
 
 to  the  Search.  I  anfwer ;  If  this  be  underilood  of 
 the  Happinefs  due  to  us  in  this  Life,  'tis  very  true , 
 nor  is  our  Underftanding  ever  fo  far  miftaken  as 
 not  to  inform  us  of  the  Truths  necelTary  to  this 
 kind  of  Happinefs,  if  proper  care  be  not  wantingo 
 But  fuch  Happinefs  ought  to  fuffice  us,  as  may 
 ferve  to  make  Life  a  Bleffing,  and  better  than  the 
 abfence  of  it.  A  greater  indeed  was  promifed  to 
 the  firft  Man  by  2.  gratuitom  Covenant,  C58.)  but 
 
 P  2  whea 
 
 "    NO TE S 
 
 (38.)  Though  the  firfl:  Man  might  have  been  created  more 
 jjerfeft  in  all  his  Facukies  than  any  of  his  Fofterity  (which, 
 as  fome  thinic,  csnnot  be  eafily  proved  from  the  account  wc 
 have  of  him  in  Gencjis  *  )  though  his  Knowledge  might  have 
 been  much  clearer,  as  coming  entire  and  adult  from  theimma- 
 diate  hand  of  his  Creator ;  yet  it  feems  highly  probable  that 
 this  could  not  have  been  propagated  in  a  natural  Way,  that  is^ 
 by  any  general  pre  eftablilh'd  Laws,  as  our  prefent  Faculties 
 are,  but  Mankind,  as  a  fuccelTive  Body,  muft  neceffarily  have 
 been  left  to  the  known  Laws  of  Propagation,  and  the  prefenC 
 Method  of  improving  their  Intellefls,  and  deriving  all  their 
 Notices  from  the  common  Sources  of  Senfation  and  Refle£tion, 
 And  ^o  our  bountiful  Creator  may  be  fuppofed  to  have 
 deprived  Mankind  of  no  Bleffings  he  could,  confident  with 
 his  other  Attributes  and  the  Order  of  the  Creation,  poffibly 
 have  beftow'd.  Nay,  why  may  not  he  be  thought  to  have 
 converted  even  this  neceffary,  unavoidable  Imperfettion  in  us, 
 compared  with  the  firft  Adam,  into  a  greater  Perfedtion  arifing 
 both  from  our  Notions  of  his  Fall,  and  the  conlequences  of  it,-, 
 and  of  the  wonderful  Remedy  prepared  for  it  and  promifed 
 in  the  fecond  Ada7n  ?  Wc  feem  to  be  made  more  highly  fezi- 
 fible  of  the  infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  of  God,  and  more 
 ihankful  for  our  Condition,  from  our  knowledge  of  his  juft 
 permiffion  of  fo  deferv'd  a  Fall,  and  his  gracious  undelerv'd 
 Exaltation  of  us  again  to  a  fuperior  State,  than  if  we  had  con- 
 ceiv'd  the  Mifery  attending  human  Nature  to  be  (as  perhaps 
 
 in 
 
 ^ee  Eaylc  under  the  Word  Ada m,  Remark  D.  And  Curceltei 
 Infiit.  Relig.  Chri/l.  L-  3.  C.  8.  p.  108,  i^c.  And  Di/ert.  dc 
 Pecc.  On'g.  §.  1 1 .  Or  Epifcop.  Injiif.  Jheol.  L.  4,  C.  6,  7.  p," 
 3  5  ^»  359'     O^  ^'*^  Author'' s  SermQ?}  on  th?  FalL 
 
^12  CoJiceniitJg  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 when  that  was  once  broken  by  Sin,  he  and  his  Pofte- 
 rity  were  remanded  to  thofeimperfeft  Notices  which 
 could  be  had  from  an  imperfed  Underftanding, 
 and  the  Information  of  the  Senfes ;  which  yet  are 
 not  in  the  leaft  to  be  defpifed;  neither  had  Man 
 a  Right,  nor  could  he  naturally  attain  to  a  greater 
 Peifedion.  For  wlicn  the  Faculties  of  our  Souls 
 ivere  injur'd,  and  the  Health  and  Vigour  of  our 
 Bodies  impair'd  by  our  own  Vices,  as  well  as  thofe 
 of  our  Parents,  our  natural  Perfedions  muft  ne- 
 cefTarily  be  impaired  alfo.  For  fince  our  Know- 
 ledge is  to  be  acquired  by  Care,  Induftry,  and  In- 
 flru(5lion,  if  Mankind  had  continued  innocent,  and 
 with  diligent  care  communicated  true  Notions  of 
 
 things 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 mofl:  of  it  was)  a  neceffary  confequence  of  our  being  created 
 in  this  inferior  Clafs.  But  whether  this  Notion  be  allow'd 
 or  not,  the  Scheme  of  Providence  relating  to  Paradife,  &c.  as 
 deliver'd  in  Holy  Scripture,  if  taken  altogether,  can  be  no 
 jull  Obje<5lion  againft  the  moral  Attributes  of  God.  He  crea- 
 ted Man  entirely  innocent,  and  abfolutely  free,  which  Free- 
 dom was  abfolutely  neceflary  to  his  Happinefs  (as  will  appear 
 under  the  Head  of  Moral  Evil  )  He  gave  him  the  Means 
 and  Abilities  to  complete  his  Happinefs,  and  placed  him  in  a 
 World  eveiy  way  fuited  to  his  Condition.  This  liberty  made 
 it  pofPible  for  him  to  lofe  that  Innocence,  though  he  had  but 
 one  lingle  opportunity  of  doing  it*,  and  it  was  highly  reafon- 
 able  and  neceffary  that  he  fliould  have  thatf .  This  one  Op- 
 portunity he  embraced  (which  it  does  not  feem  poffible  for 
 God  himfelf,  though  he  forefaw  it,  to  have  prevented,  con- 
 fill- 
 
 *  See  Nichols's  Conference  avith  a  Theijiy  p.  220,  221. 
 ijl.  Edition. 
 
 •f  See  Dr.  J.  Clarke  on  Moral  Evil,  p.  211,  &c.  and 
 Limborch  'Tkeol.  Chriji.  L.  3.  C.  2.  §.  2.  and  Jenkins's 
 Reafon.  of  the  Chriji.  Reli^,  Vol.  2.  C.  13.  p.  253.  5/A. 
 Ediiim 
 
Sed.  8.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  213 
 
 things  to  their  Pofterityj  and  had  not  infe<51:ed 
 their  Offspring  by  Example,  In{h-a<5lion,  or  any 
 Contagion  attending  Propagation,  we  lliould  have 
 been  lef^  liable  to  Errors;  nay  free  from  pernicious 
 one"?;  and  have  enjoy'd  a  more  perfecl  Knowledge 
 of  thing"?.  For  our  native  intelledual  Faculty 
 would  have  been  ftronger,  and  being  better  fur- 
 niilied  both  with  the  means  and  principles  of  Sci- 
 ence than  we  now  are,  we  fhould  more  eafily  have 
 prevented  the  Occafions  of  Error.  All  pernicious 
 Errors  therefore,  at  lead  in  Matters  of  Neceffity, 
 are  to  be  imputed  to  our  own  Guilt,  or  that  of 
 our  Parents^. 
 
 p  5  vir. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 fjftently  with  that  Freedom  he  had  for  good  Rcafons  given 
 him  and  determined  thus  to  exercife)  and  fo  alter'd  his  Na- 
 ture and  Circumftances,  and  confequently  made  it  neceflary 
 for  God  alfo  to  change  his  Place  and  Condition,  and  to  with- 
 draw luch  extraordinary  favours  as  his  infinite  Wifdom  and 
 Goodnefs  might  otherwife  liave  thought  proper  to  beitow. 
 Thus  with  his  Innocence  Man  loft  all  Title  to  a  Continuance 
 inParadife,  and  of  confequence  became  naturally  liable  to  the 
 common  Evils  and  Calamities  of  a  tranfitory  Life,  and  the 
 Pains  attending  its  Conclufion.  Thofe  that  defcended  from 
 him  and  partook  of  the  fame  Nature,  muil  neceflarily  partake 
 of  the  fame  Infirmities ;  in  particular,  they  muft  inherit  Cor- 
 ruption and  Mortality.  Which  Evils,  though  vye  now  lament 
 them  as  the  chief  parts  of  our  Fore-father's  Punifhment,  yet 
 could  they  not  in  the  prefent  Circumftances  of  things  be  pre- 
 vented; nor  indeed,  were  fuch  a  Prevention  polfible,  would 
 it  be  in  the  rnain  defirable,  as  will  appear  from  the  following 
 Seflion,  par.  6,  7.  Nay  thefe,  by  a  moft  wonderful  Scheme 
 of  Providence,  are  infinitely  outweigh'd,  and  made  the  means 
 of  bringing  us  to  much  greater  Happinefs,  by  Faith  in  him 
 who  was  promifed  from  the  Beginning,  and  hath  in  thefe  lat- 
 ter Pays  brought  Life  and  Incorruptibility  to  light.  See  more 
 on  this  Subjedt  in  Note  (X,]  and  Note  81. 
 
 *  For   niohat  relates  to  the  DoBrine  of  Original  Sin,  &C. 
 fee  the  latter  End  of  the  next  Seilion,  and  Note  4P. 
 
214 
 
 We  prefer 
 
 Life,  with 
 
 all  its  in- 
 
 conveni- 
 
 encies, 
 
 before 
 
 Peath. 
 
 Some  put 
 themfelves 
 to  Death, 
 not  on  ac- 
 count of 
 natural, 
 tut  vo- 
 luntary 
 Evils. 
 
 Concerning  Natural  EviL     Chap.  IV. 
 
 VII.  If  any  be  fo  ungrateful  |as  to  murmur  ftill, 
 and  affirm  that  he  would  not  accept  of  Life  on 
 thefe  Conditions,  if  he  might  have  his  Choice; 
 and  that  himfelf  is  the  beft  Judge  of  his  own  Iti- 
 tereft,  and  he  no  Benefador  that  obtrudes  a  Gifn 
 upon  a  Man  againft  his  Will ;  that  confequently 
 he  owes  no  thanks  to  God  on  account  of  a  Life 
 which  he  would  willingly  refufe:  We  mufl:  reply, 
 that  thus  indeed  impious  Men  and  Fools  ar?  uled 
 to  prate ;  but  this  does  not  come  from  their  Hearts 
 and  Confciences,  For  none  are  more  afraid  of 
 Death,  none  more  tenacious  of  Life  than  they  that 
 talk  thus  idly.  A  great  many  of  them  profefs  that 
 they  don't  believe  a  future  Life;  and  if  fo,  they 
 may  reduce  themfelves  to  the  wifh'd-for  ftate  of 
 Annihilation  as  foon  as  they  pleafc,  and  caft  off 
 that  Exifience  which  is  fo  dilagreeable,  No  Perfon 
 therefore,  except  he  be  corrupted  in  his  Judgment 
 and  indulge  himfelf  in  Error,  can  ferioufly  pre- 
 fer Non-exiftence  to  the  piefent  Life.  (59.) 
 
 VIII.  But  if  any  one  think  fo  from  his  Heart,  he 
 is  not  fallen  into  this  Opinion  from  any  natural  Evil, 
 but  from  others  which  he  brought  upon  himfelf  by 
 7i>rong  EleUions,    We  fee  many  Peribns  weary  of 
 
 Life, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (39.)  '  Self-Murder  is  fo  unnatural  a  Sin,  that  'tis  now-a- 
 
 *  days  thought  reafon  enough  to  prove  a  Man  diftracled.    We 
 
 *  have  too  many  fad  examples  what  a  difturbed  Imagination 
 
 *  will  do,  if  that  muft  pafs  for  natural  Diilracflion  j  but  we 
 
 *  feldom  or  never  hear  that  mere  external   Sufferings,  how 
 
 *  fevere  foever,  tempt  Men  to  kill  themfelves.     The   Stoics 
 
 *  themfelves,  whofe  Principle  it  was  to  break  their  Prifon 
 
 *  when  they  found  themfelves  uneafy,  very  rarely  put  it  into 
 
 *  practice  :  Nature  was  too  Ilrong  for  their  Philoibphy.    And 
 
 *  though  ihcir  Philofophy  allovv'd   them  to   die  when  they 
 ?  pleafed,  yet  Nature  taught  them  to  live  as  long  as  they  could ; 
 
 *  and  we  fee   that  they  feldom  thought  themfelves  miferable 
 
 *  enough  to  die.     Sherlock  on  ProvidencCy  C^  7.  p.  249,  252. 
 3d  Edit.    See  alfo  Note  (Z.) 
 
Se(fl.  8.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  215 
 
 Life,  but  'tis  becaufe  of  their  bad  Management,  left 
 they  fhouid  be  ridiculous  for  miffing  of  Honour,  of 
 Riches,  or  fome  empty  End  which  they  have  un- 
 reafonably  propofed  to  themfelves.     But  very  few- 
 have  been  excited  to    Self-murder  by  any  natural 
 and  abfolutely  unavoidable  Evil   or   Error.     Life 
 therefore,  of  what  kind  foever  it  is,  mufl:  be  look'd 
 upon  as  a  benefit  in  the  judgment  of  Mankind,  and 
 we  ought  to  pay  our  g  ateful  acknowledgments  to 
 God,  as  the  powerful  and  beneficent  Author  ofir. 
 Nor  will  it  be  any  prejudice  to  the  Divine  Good- 
 nefs,  if  one  or   two  throw  Life  away  in   defpair. 
 For   it  is  to   be  fuppofed   that  this   proceeds   noc 
 from  the  greatnefs  of  any  natural  Evil,  but  from 
 Impatience  arifing  from  fome  depraved    Eledion; 
 of  which  more  hereafter.    For  none  of  the  Brutes 
 which  are  deftitute  of  Free-will,  ever  quitted  its 
 Life  fpontaneoufly,  thro'   the  uneafines    of  Grief, 
 or  a  Diftemper.     If  any  Man  therefore  has  killed 
 himfelf  voluntarily,  we  mufl:  conclude  that  he  did 
 this,  as  all  other  wicked   Adions,    by  a  depraved 
 Choice. 
 
 IX.  As  tothefecond  fort  of  Errors  into  which  Thofe  Ei-- 
 we  are  led,  not  by   nature,  but  carelefsners,  negli-  ^^g^^^^^. 
 gence,  curiofity,  or  a  depr?ved  will,   the  number  ^^  ^y  our 
 ofthefe  is  greater  and  their  effeds  more  pernicious:  own  fault, 
 nay  'tis  thefe  only  which  load  and  infeft  Life  with  are  to  be 
 intolerable  Evils,  fo  as  to  make  us  wifh  that  we  had  ^^^^^^"^ 
 never  been.     But  fince  they  come  upon  us  thro*  ^^^^^ 
 our  own  fault,  they  are  not  to  be  reckoned  among  Evils, 
 Natmd  Evils,  but  belong  to  the  third  kind,  viz.. 
 the  Moral,  to  which  we  haften  :  But  mufl:  firfl:  fum 
 up  what  has  been  deliver'd  in  this  Chapter. 
 
 P  4  SECT, 
 
2l6 
 
 Co7icernmg  Natural  Evil. 
 
 Chap.  IV. 
 
 SECT.     IX. 
 
 Containing  the  Sum  of  what  has  been  /aid 
 en  Natural  Evils. 
 
 The 
 
 whole 
 Univerfe 
 one  Sy- 
 flem,  of 
 which  e- 
 
 I 
 
 order 
 
 Reader  a  better 
 
 of 
 
 N  order  to  give  the  Keader  a  better  view 
 what  has  been  faid  we  muit  conceive  this  whole 
 World  as  one  Syllem,  whereof  all  particular  things 
 are  the  parts  and  Members,  and  every  one  has  its 
 place  and  office,  as  the  Members  have  in  our  own 
 very  thing  Body,  or  the  Beams  in  a  Houfe ;  the  Doors  Win- 
 is  a  part,  ^q^j^  Chambers  .uid  Clofets :  Neither  is  there  any- 
 thing ufelefs  or  fuperfluous  in  the  whole:  and  in 
 order  to  unite  all  more  clofely  together,  nothing 
 is  felf-fufficient,  but  as  it  is  qualified  to  help  o- 
 thers,  fo  it  ftands  in  need  of  the  help  of  others, 
 for  its  more  commodious  Subfiftencc.  And  tho* 
 in  fo  immenfe  a  Machine,  we  do  not  fo  clearly 
 perceive  the  connexion  or  mutual  dependence  of 
 the  parts  in  every  refped,  yet  we  are  certain  that 
 the  thing  is  fo.  In  many  Cafes  'tis  fo  evident 
 that  he  will  be  efteem'd  a  Mad-man  who  denies  it. 
 Since  therefore  the  World  is  to  be  look'd  upon  as 
 one  Building,  we  rauft  recoiled:  how  many  different 
 parts,  and  now  various,  fo  grand,  fo  magnificent 
 an  Edifice  fliould  confifl;  of.  We  may  defign  a 
 Houfe  divided  into  Halls,  Parlours  and  Clofets  i 
 but  unlefs  there  be  a  Kitchen  too,  and  places  fet  a- 
 part  for  more  ignoble,  more  uncomely  Offices, 
 *twill  not  be  fit  for  Habitation.  The  fame  maybe 
 affirm'd  of  the  Woild  and  the  frame  of  it.  Gbd 
 could  have  filled  it  all  with  Suns :  but  who  will  en- 
 gage that  fuch  a  Syflem  would  be  capable  of  living 
 Creatures,    or    proper   to    preferve  Motion  ?     He 
 
 could 
 
Seft.  9.     Concerning  Natural  Evil,  217 
 
 could  have  made  the  Earth  of  Gold  or  Gems:  But 
 in  the  mean  while  dejiitme  of  Inhabitants,  He  that 
 has  lived  a  Day  or  tv/o  without  Food,  would  pre- 
 fer a  Danghill  to  fuch  an  Earth.  God  could  have 
 created  Man  immortal,  without  Paffions,  without  a 
 Senfe  of  Pleafure  or  Pain ;  but  he  muft  have  been 
 without  a  folid  Body"  alfo,  and  an  inhabitant  of  fome 
 other  Region,  not  the  Earth.  He  could  have 
 made  the  whole  human  Body  an  Eje^  but  then  it 
 would  have  been  unfit  for  Motion,  Nutrition,  and 
 all  the  other  fundions  of  Life.  He  could  have 
 taken  away  the  contrariety  of  appetites,  but  the 
 contrariety  of  Motions  (nay  Motion  itfelf)  muft 
 have  been  taken  away  with  it.  He  could  have  pre- 
 vented the  fruftrating  of  Appetites,  but  that  muft 
 have  been  by  making  them  not  oppofitei  for  'tis  im- 
 pofliblethat  contrary  Appetites,  or  fuch  as  defire  what 
 is  at  the  fame  time  occupied  by  others  (hould  all  at 
 once  be  fitisfied.  He  could,  in  the  laft  place,  have 
 framed  'b/\2Ln.  free  from  Errors,  but  then  he  muft  not 
 have  made  ufe  of  Matter  for  an  Organ  of  Senfa- 
 tion,  which  the  very  Nature  of  our  Soul  requires. 
 
 II  In  fliort,  if  the  mundane  Syftem  be  taken  to-  ,r  , 
 gether,  if  all  the  Parts  and  Periods  of  it  be  com-  whole  and 
 pared  with  one  another,  v/e  muft  believe  that  it  allitspam 
 could  not  polTibly  be  better:  if  any  part  could  be  betaken 
 changed  for  the  better,   another  would  be  worfej  '^^S^^^^^* 
 if  one  abounded  with  greater  Conveniencies,  ano-  ^^^^^^  j^^ 
 ther  would  be  expofed  to  greater  Evils;  and  that  changed 
 neceffarily  from  the  Imperfedion  of  all  Creatures,  but  for 
 A  Creature  is  defcended   from  God,  a  moft  perfeB  ^'^^  ^vorfe. 
 Father  I  but  from  nothing,  ^shsAiother,  which  is 
 Imperfedion  itfelf.     All  finite  things  therefore  par- 
 take   of  nothing,  and  are  nothing   beyond    their 
 Bounds.      When    therefore   we    are   come    to  the 
 bounds    which   nature   has  fet,    whoever  perceives 
 any  thing,  muft  neceffarily  perceive  alfo  that  he  is 
 deficients  and  feek  for  lomething  without  himfelf 
 
2i8  Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 to  Tiipporr  him.     Hence  come  Evils,  hence  oppo- 
 fitjon  ot  things,  and  as  it  were  a  mutilation  in  the 
 Work  of  God.     Hence  for  the  moft  part  Men  fear 
 and  defire,  grieve  and  rcjoyce.     Hence  Errors  and 
 Darknelsof  the  Mind.     Hence  Troops  of  Miferies 
 marching  thro'  human  Life:   whether  thefe  grow 
 for  the  punifhment  of  Mortals,  or  attend  Life  by 
 the  necejjity  oi  Nature  j  that  is,  whether  they  pro- 
 ceed from  the  conftitution  of  Nature  itlelf,  or  are 
 external  and  acquired  by  our  Choice.     Nor  need 
 we  the  bloody  Battle  oi  the  Ancient s^  nor  the  ma- 
 licious  God  of  the  Manichees  for  Authors  of  them. 
 Nor  is  it  any  Argument  againftthe  Divine  Omni- 
 potence, that  he  rould  not  free  a  Creature  in  its  own 
 Nature  necelTanly  imperfeft,  from  that  native  Im- 
 perfeftion,  and  the  Evils  confequent  upon  it.     He 
 might  as  we  have  often  faid,  have  not  created  mortal 
 Inhabitants,    and  fuch  as  were  liable  to  Fears   and 
 Griefs :  nor,  as  will  be  declared  below  ;  fuch  as  by 
 their  depraved  Elecflions  might  deferve  Punifliment : 
 but  with  regard  to  the  Syftem  of  the  whole  'twas  ne- 
 ceflary  that  he  fliould  create  thefe  or  none  at  all :  eirher 
 the  Earth  mufl:  be  replenifli'd  with  thefe,  or  left  defti- 
 tute  of  Inhabitants.  Nor  could  any  of  the  foregoing 
 particulars   be   omitted,    but   that    very    Omiflion 
 would  bring  along  with  it  much  greater  Evils. 
 Hence  the       III.   From  hence  fprang  the  Error  of  the  Epicti" 
 Error  of     reans,  who  pretended  that   this  World  was  unwor- 
 the  Epi-     |.]^y  Qf  3  good  and  powerful  God.     Thev,  we  may 
 who  knew  believe,  knew  only  the  leait  part,  and  as  it  were  the 
 only  the     Sink  of  the  World,  viz.^  our  Earth,     They  never 
 leaftand      confidered  the  good  and  beautiful  part  of  Nature, 
 Forft  part,  but  only  contemplated  the  Griefs,  Difcafes,  Death 
 and   Delh-U'ffion    of   Mortals,    when   they    denied 
 that  God   was  the  Author  of  fo  many  Evils:    In 
 the    interim  they    forgot    that  the  Earth  is  in   a 
 manner  the  Filth  and  Offscouring  of  the  Mundane 
 Syjlemi  and  that  the  Workmanfhip  of  God  is  no 
 
 piore 
 
Sed:  9.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  219 
 
 more  ro  be  condemn'd  for  it,  than  a  Judgment  is 
 to  be  form'd  of  the  beauty  of  an  Houfe  from  the 
 Sink  or  Jakes.  They  were  ignorant  alfo  that  the 
 Earth  was  made  in  the  manner  it  now  is  not  for 
 itfelf  alone,  but  in  order  to  be  fubfervient  to  the 
 good  of  the  whole;  and  that  it  is  filled  withfuch 
 Animals  as  it  is  capable  of,  with  a  due  Subordinati- 
 on to  the  good  of  the  Univerfe,  and  the  Felicity 
 of  Souls  that  inhabit  the  purer  and  brighter  Parts 
 of  this  Fabric,  viz,,  the  zy£ther  and  the  Heavens » 
 Thefe  are  as  it  were  the  Gardens,  Parks,  and  Palaces 
 of  the  World;  this  Earth  the  Dunghill,  or  (as 
 fome  will  have  it)  the  Work-houfe.  Nor  is  it  a 
 greater  wonder  that  God  fhould  make  thefe,  than 
 the  Jntefiines,  and  lefs  comely,  but  yet  neceffary 
 Parts  of  a  human  Body.  Laftly,  they  are  unmind- 
 ful that  more  and  greater  Good  is  to  be  found 
 here  than  Evil,  otherwife  they  themfelves  would 
 rejed;  Life :  and  he  that  has  more  good  than  E- 
 vil  is  not  miferable  except  he  will.  If  therefore 
 we  could  compare  the  Good  things  with  the  E- 
 vil;  if  we  could  view  the  whole  Workmanlliip  of 
 God;  if  we  thoro'ly  underftood  the  Connetlionj 
 Subdornations,  and  mutual  Relation  of  things,  the  rj 
 mutual  affiftance  which  they  afford  each  other;  and  j-eply  to 
 laftly,  the  whole  feries  and  order  of  them;  it  v/ould  the  Dif- 
 appear  that  the  World  is  as  well  as  it  could  pofFibly  ficuky, 
 be;  and  that  no  Evil  in  it  could  be  avoided,  which  '^^-'^'"^^ 
 
 ,1  r-  1        •         t  (-  comes 
 
 would  not  occafion  a  greater  by  its  abfence.  EojU? 
 
 IV.    We  have  endeavour'd   to   clear    up    thefe  Since  it  a- 
 Points,  and  I  hope  effedually,  as  to  this  kind  of  nks  from 
 Evil.     For  upon  the  fuppofltion  of  our  Principles,  the  very 
 (  which  by  tlie  way,  are  confimonly  acknowledg'd,  )  "re^j-eji 
 fome  natural   Evils  muft  inevitably    be  admitted;  Beings, 
 and  if  even  one  could  arife  in  the  Work  of  an  in-  and  could 
 finitely  wi(e  and  good  God,  there's  no  occafion  for  "°5,^j^" 
 the  Bad  Principle  as  the  Origin   of  Evil,  for  Evil  J'^/thout  a 
 might   have    exifted  n^twithflanding   the   Divine  contradic- 
 
 Omni-  lion. 
 
220^ 
 
 This  re- 
 conciled 
 with  the 
 Mofaic 
 Hiftory, 
 which 
 4oes  not 
 attribute 
 all  kinds 
 of  natural 
 Evil  to  the 
 fall  of  the 
 iirfl:  Man. 
 
 Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV. 
 
 Omnipotence  and  infinite  Goodnefs.  The  difficult 
 Qtielbon  then.  Whence  comes  Evil?  is  not  unnn- 
 fwcnibic.  For  it  arifes  from  the  very  nature  and 
 confHrurion  of  created  Beings,  and  could  not  be 
 avoideo  without  a  contradidion.  And  tho'  we  be 
 nor  able  co  apply  thefe  Principles  to  all  particular 
 cafes  Lind  circumftanceTj  yet  we  are  rare  enough 
 that  they  may  be  applied.  Nor  fhould  we  be  coq- 
 cern'd  ar  our  being  at  a  lofs  to  account  for  fome 
 parricu'ar'-.j  fince  this  is  common  in  the  Solution  of 
 almoil  all  natural  Phenomena,  'and  yet  we  acquiefce. 
 For  preiuppofing  fome  Principles,  fuch  as  IVlarter, 
 Motion,  c^c.  tho'  we  are  ignorant  what  M:itter 
 and  Motion  are  in  any  particular  Body,  yet 
 from  the  variety  of  thefe  we  take  it  for  granted 
 that  various  Compofirions  and  Qualities  proceed. 
 In  like  manner  we  are  perfuaded,  th.u  from,  the 
 various  kinds  of  Imperfedion  neceffarily  inherent 
 in  things,  various  Species  of  Evils  arife,  tho'  in  fome 
 the  manner  in  which  this  comes  to  pafs  does  not 
 appear;  agreeably  to  what  we  experience  in  Light 
 and  Colours.  We  are  certain  that  Colours  arife  from 
 the  different  difpofition,  refradion  and  refledion  of 
 Light ;  but  yet  none  can  certainly  tell  how  it  is  re- 
 ceded or  refraded  when  it  forms  a  blew,  a  green,  or 
 any  other  Colour :  So  that  I  dare  affirm  that  the  Ori- 
 gin of  natural  Evil  is  more  eafily  affign'd,  and  more 
 clearly  and  particularly  folv'd,  than  that  of  Colours, 
 Tafles,  or  any  fcnfible  Quality  whatfoever. 
 
 V.  I  confefs,  that  according  to  this  Hypothefis, 
 Natural  Evils  proceed  from  the  original  Condition 
 of  things,  and  are  not  permitted  by  God,  but  in  or- 
 der to  prevent  greater;  which  fome  perhaps  may 
 think  repugnant  to  facred  Hiftory  and  the  Dodrine 
 of  Mofes.  For  they  will  have  it,  that  the  abufe  of 
 Free-will  was  the  Caufe  of  all  natural  Evils,  and 
 that  when  God  created  every  thing  good  and  per- 
 fed  in  its  kind,  it  was   afterwards   corrupted  by 
 
 Sin^ 
 
Sed:,  9-     Concerning  Natural  ^s^A,  221 
 
 Sin,  and  fubjeded  to  natural  Evils :  But  this  is  aflert- 
 ed  without  Proof.  For  the  Scripture  no  where 
 teaches  that  there  would  have  been  no  manner  of 
 natural  Evil,  if  Man  had  not  finned.  God  indeed 
 made  all  things  good  and  perfed  in  their  kind, 
 that  is,  he  created  and  ftill  preferves  every  thing 
 in  a  ftate  and  condition  fuitable  to  the  whole  Syftem 
 of  Beings  and  which  it  need  have  no  Reafon  to  re- 
 pent of  except  it  will.  But  neither  the  Goodnefs 
 of  God,  nor  the  Perfcdion  that  belongs  to  the 
 Nature  of  things,  required  that  all  natural  Evils 
 Hiould  be  removed:  fome  created  Beings  have  E- 
 vils  inherent  in  their  very  Natures,  which  .God 
 muft  of  neceCfity  either  tolerate  or  not  create  thofe 
 things  in  which  they  do  inhere.  If  therefore  the 
 facred  Hifto:y  be  carefully  examined,  it  will  ap- 
 pear that  fome  kinds  of  Evil  are  attributed  to  the 
 Sin  of  the  firft  Man,  but  others  not.  Of  the  form- 
 er kind  are,  firfly  the  Mortality  of  Man,  who 
 would  otherwife  have  been  immortal  by  Grace,  Se- 
 condly t  the  Barrennefs  qf  the  Earth,  and  growth  of 
 mxioiii  and  improfitable  Plants  in  the  Room  offuch 
 as  were  fit  for  Food,  for  the  puniiliment  of  Man- 
 kind. Thirdlji  that  hard  Labour  necefifary  for 
 providing  Food,  which  is  a  confequence  of  the 
 former.  Fonrthlyy  that  impotent  ^jfeHian  and  Ne- 
 ceflity  of  Obedience  whereby  Women  are  made  fub- 
 jed  to  Men,  Fifthly^  the  pains  of  Child-birth, 
 Sixthly^  the  Enmity  between  Man  and  the  Serpen- 
 tine kind.  Seventhly t  Banifhment  out  of  Paradife^. 
 i.  e.  as  appears  to  me,  an  Expulfion  out  of  that  State 
 of  Grace,  in  which  the  Favour  of  God  had  placed 
 Man  above  what  was  due  to  his  Nature  Thefe> 
 and  fome  others,  are  exprefly  enumerated  as  punifh- 
 ments   of  the   Firfl   Fall,  l^o.)   But  befides  thefe 
 
 there 
 NOTES. 
 
 (40.)   For  an  account  of  the  Scripture  Hiftory  relating  to 
 ^e  Fall  of  Adam,  and  the  confe^uences  of  it,  both  upon  himfelf 
 
 and 
 
222  Concerning  Natural  Evil.    Chap.  IV. 
 
 there  are  many  confequent  upon  the  neceffity  of  Mat- 
 ter, and  concerning  which  the  Scripture  has  nothing 
 to  induce  us  to  believe  that  they  arofe  from  Sin. 
 The  Evils  VI.  'Tis  to  be  oblerv'd  farther,  that  thefe  are 
 which  a-  j^Q,.  pei-niitted  by  God  to  no  purpofe,  but  for  the 
 thenceTre  ?,^^^  ^^  ^^^  UniverfC)  and  at  the  fame  time  of 
 permitted  Mail  himfelf.  For  as  to  Mortality,  it  was  by  no 
 for  the  means  expedient  for  the  Syftem,  that  a  finful 
 g°°'^  °^.  Creature  Ihould  enjoy  Immortahty,  which  was  not 
 V  rfe  "  "d  ^'^^'^g  ^^  ^^^  nature,  but  granted  by  an  extraordi- 
 alfooV  nary  favour  of  the  Deiry.  Nay,  God  feems  to 
 Alan  him-  have  forbidden  our  firft  Parents  theufeof  the  Tree 
 felf.  of  Life  out  of  mere  Compaffion,  left  if  their  Life 
 
 ihould  by  virtue  of  it  be  prolonged,  they  fliould 
 live  for  ever  miferable.  Even  this  Puniiliment,  as 
 all  others,  contributes  to  the  reftraint  of  bad  Elec- 
 tions, and  the  preparation  of  a  new  v/ay  to  Hap- 
 pinefs.  For  when  Man  tranfgrefled,  and  a  per- 
 verfe  abufe  of  his  Free- Will  was  once  introduced, 
 there  would  have  been  no  end  of  Madnefs  if  the 
 Divine  Goodnefs  had  continued  to  preferve  Life, 
 Underftanding,  an  eafy  Food,  and  other  Gifts  of 
 the  Primeval  State,  to  the  abufers  thereof,  as  well 
 as  to  the  Innocent.  'Tis  notorious  how  exorbi- 
 tant bad  Eled:ions  are  even  amongfl:  the  Cares  and 
 Labours  which  Mortals  undergo  in  providing  the 
 Neceflaries  of  Life  ;  and  hov/  pernicious  ftrcngth 
 of  Parts  becomes,  when  upon  a  corruption  of  the 
 
 Will 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 and  his  Poftcrity,  fee  Ihbot"^  Boyle's  LeSi.  Serm.  cj.  2d.  Set. 
 Rymer^  General  Reprefentat'ion  of  re'veaVd  Religion,  Part  i. 
 C.  4.  and  Dr.  J .  Clarke  on  Moral  E-vil,  p.  224,  ^c.  or 
 D'Oylyi  four  DilTcrtations,  C.  2.  p.  3.  Note  b.  and  C.  9.  p. 
 97,  t^c.  or  Bp.  Taylors  Polemical  Difcourfes,  p.  614,  615, 
 623.  See  alfo  Limhorchh  Thcol.  Chrijl.  L.  3.  C.  3,  4,  5.  or 
 Epifcopius  de  Libera  Arbitrio.,  ^c.  or  Ciircelhi  Rel.  Chrift, 
 Inflit.  L.  3.  C.  14,  15,  16.  and  his  DiJJert,  ds  Fac.  Originif, 
 ©r  our  Author's  Sermon  on  the  Fall 
 
ScO..  9.     Concerning  Natural  Evil.  221; 
 
 Will  it  degenerates  into  Cunning.  How  much 
 more  intolerable  then  V/^ould  it  be  if  the  Fear  of 
 Death  were  away ;  if  the  fame  facility  of  procur- 
 ing Food,  the  fame  vigour  ofintelled,  which  our 
 Firft  Parents  enjoy'd  were  continued  to  their  cor- 
 rupt Pofterity  ?  (*.) 
 
 VII.  Nay,  to  confefs  the  truth,    it  could   not  Mortality 
 poffibly  continue;  for  let  their  be  never  fo  great  Sl"^'^' 
 plenty    of  Provifion,    it   might    be   corrupted  by  Difilfes 
 the  voluntary  Ad  of  one  Man.     When  our  Firft  y^.  are* 
 Parent  had  therefore  once  tranfgrefTed,  what  hopes  for  the 
 could  he  conceive  of  his  Pofterity?    Or,  by  what  2°°^^°^ 
 Right  could  they  claim  the  fupernatural  Gifts  of  ii/this^"^ 
 God  ?  certainly  by  none.     All  then  are  made  mor-  corrupt 
 tal,  not  only  thro'  the  Jujliccy  but  the  Goodnefs  of  Eibte. 
 God.     For  while  Men  are  oblig'd  to  ftruggle  with 
 Hunger,    Thirft,    Difeafes   and  Troubles,   few  of 
 them  are   at  leifure  to   run   quite  mad,    and    leap 
 over  all  the  bounds  of  Nature    by  their  depraved 
 EIed:ions.     'Tis   better  therefore  for  us  to  undergo 
 all  thefe  Inconveniences,  than  to  be  left  to  ourfelves 
 without  reftraint  in  this  corrupt  Eflate.     For  by 
 that    means  we    fhould    bring   upon  ourfelves  fliil 
 greater  Evils.     But  thefe  things  belong  to  reveal'd 
 Religion,  and  this  is  not  a  proper  Place  to  treat  on 
 them  at  large.  (41.) 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (41.)  Thus  our  Author  has,  I  think,  fufHciently  accounted 
 for  all  forts  of  Natural  Evil,  and  demonftrated  the  rl  /SiAnfli-, 
 or  Meliority  of  things  in  the  Univerfe,  taking  the  whole  (ax 
 we  always  ought)  together  :  at  leaft,  he  has  laid  down  fuch 
 Principles  as  may  eafily  and  effeftually  be  applied  to  that  End. 
 He  has  clearly  proved,  and  clofely  purfued  this  one  fingle  Pro- 
 
 pofuioa 
 
 (*.)  See  Sherlock  upon  Death,  C.  2.  §.  i.  and  C.  3-  §.  3^ 
 As  to  the  Vigour  0^  our  firft  Parent's  Intelleft,  fee  the  Au- 
 thors referred  to  in  the  beginning  of  Note  38,  particularly 
 Mr.  D'Oylf^  firft  Diflertation.  C  9. 
 
224 
 
 Concerning  Natural  Evil.     Chap.  IV^ 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 pofition  thro'  all  the  abovemcntlonM  Particulars,  njiz.  that  mt 
 one  of  thofe  Evils  or  Incon'veniences  in  our  Syjlem  could  poj/ibly 
 have  been  prevented  vnthout  a  greater:  which  is  an  ample 
 Vindication,  an  evident  Proof  ol"  all  the  Divine  Attributes, 
 in  the  original  Frame  and  Government  thereof.  And  indeed 
 this  feems  to  be  the  bell  andmoft  convincing,  if  not  the  only- 
 proper  Method  of  handling  the  Argument  and  examining  the 
 Works  of  God,  fo  as  to  attain  a  due  fcnfe  of,  and  regard  for 
 the  Author  of  them.  Which  Maxim  therefore,  we  conclude 
 from  the  numberlefs  inftances  of  its  apparent  Validity,  ought 
 to  be  allow'd,  and  may  be  fafely  infilled  on,  tho'  by  reafon  of 
 our  great  ignorance  of  Nature,  ic  cannot  always  be  fo  clearly 
 applied.  However  it  has  been  applied  fuccefsfully  to  the  So- 
 lution of  the  moil  material  Difficulties  in  the  prefent  Queflion, 
 as  may  appear  more  fully  from  the  Authors  referr'd  to  in  the 
 foregoing  Chapter. 
 
Chap.  Vo  2:2^5 
 
 CHAP.     V. 
 Of  Moral  Evil 
 
 Infroduciion^  containing  the  Suhftance  oj 
 the  Chapter, 
 
 A  V I N  G  given  fome  Account  o£  N'atti-^ 
 ral  Evils,  the  Moral  come  next  under 
 confideration:  we  are  now  to  trace  out 
 the  Origin  of  thefe  and  fee  of  what  kind  ic 
 is,  whether  they  flow  from  the  fame 
 Source  with  the  Natural,  viz..  the  neceffary  Imper- 
 fe^ion  of  created  Beings ;  or  we  are  to  feek  for  fome 
 other  entirely  different  from  it. 
 
 By  Moral  Evils)  as  we  fafd  before,  are  under- 
 flood  thofe  Inconveniencies  of  Life  and  Condition 
 which  befall  ourfclves  or  others  thro*  wrong  Ekdi- 
 ons.  For  it  is  plain  rh^t  fome  inconveniencies 
 happen  without  our  knowledge,  or  againft  our 
 Wills,  by  the  very  Order  of  natural  CaufeSj- 
 whereas  others  come  upon  us  knowingly ?  and  in  a 
 manner  with  our  Confent  (when  we  choofe  either 
 thefe  themfelves,  or  fuch  as  are  neceffarily  con- 
 neded  with  them.)  The  Moral  are  to  be  reckon'd 
 among  the  latter  kind  of  Incoveniencies;  and  he 
 mufl  be  efleem'd  the  Caufe  of  them,  who  knov/-= 
 ingly,  and  of  his  own  accord,  brings  them  either 
 '     "  '"     Q^       "  upon' 
 
226  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V, 
 
 upon   himfelf  or  others  by  a  depraved  or   foolifli 
 Choice. 
 
 But  in  order  to  make  this  whole  Matter  con- 
 cerning Moral  Evils  n^.ore  fully  underftood,  we 
 muft  confider  in  the 
 
 I  ft  Place,  What  the  future  of  EleUiom  is. 
 
 idly.  That  our  JF-L^^jfinefs  chiefly   depends   upon 
 Elediotis, 
 
 3d!y>  What  ki^d  of  Ele^,oKS  may  heja'td  to  be 
 made  amifSf  or  foolilhly. 
 
 ^thly,  Hoiu  ire  come  to  fall  into  depraved,  or 
 wicked  EieBions. 
 
 5thlyj  How    fnch    ElcUions   can    he    reconciled 
 with  the  Poder  and  Goodnejs  of  God, 
 
 SECT.     I. 
 
 Co7Ke7'7iing  the  Natu7^e  of  EleEiiom, 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    I. 
 
 A  View  of  their  Opiiiion  who  adtnif  ofFree^ 
 dom  from  Compul/ion  only,  but  not  from 
 Necejjtty, 
 
 That  it  is  !•  T  F  there  be  any  thing  obfcure  and  difficult 
 liotcafyto  jI^  in  Philofophy,  we  are  furc  to  find  it  in  that 
 tr.der-  p^j.j.  >^v j^ J ^;l^  treats  of  Eledions  and  Liberty.  There 
 give  a  true  is  no  point  about  which  the  Learned  are  lefs  con- 
 
 lepielcn-  -      —  .^-    -    -  -  -  -      ^^^j^^ 
 
Se<5l.  I-  Sub.  I.     Of  Moral  Evil,  227 
 
 iiilent  with  themfclves,  or  more  divided  from  each  tation  of 
 
 other.     Nor  is  it  an  eafy  Matter  to  under llaad  tlicm,  ^^.'^  ^?^- 
 
 i  ,-  -  r    1     •     mon!',  Con- 
 
 or to  give  a  certain  and  true  rep'ef^nration  o\  tneir  ^ernino- 
 
 Opinions.     I  think  they  m?y  be  dirtinguilli'd  into  ivberry. 
 
 two  Sect:-,  both  adiiiitiing  of  Liberty,  the  one  from  Some  ac- 
 
 exreinc.l  Co^t^Hlfion^  but  not  from  internal  Nicejfitj\  ^"'^,^^"_ 
 
 the  other  from  both.  LiU;rty 
 
 fr-jiTi 
 
 II  As  far  as  I  can  underfland  the   Opinion  of  Co'TipuIfi- 
 
 ihe   former,    it  is    this:    Firft,   rhey    obferve   tiiat  on  oaiy, 
 
 there  are  certain  Appetites  impir.nted  in  us  by  Na-  ^-^.^^^  -^^^ 
 
 ture,  which  arc  not  to  be  eiteem'd  ule'lefs,  but  con-  ceffiry 
 
 tributing  toward  our  PrefcTvation,  as  was  fnewn  be-  alfo. 
 
 fore;    and  that  fome   thmgs    are    naturally    agreca-  "IJ^cAu- 
 
 ble,    Tome    contrary   to  thefe  Appetites :    that  the  .i^^'^r^^.^,^ 
 ,  J  f.i  ,        J  V    1        the  rormer 
 
 former,  when  prefent,  pleafe  and  rmpreis  a  dehght-  Or,in:on 
 
 ful   Senfe   of  themfelves;    the  latter  dirpleafe   and  fuppofe 
 
 create   uneafincfs.     Thcfe  therefore   are    called   in-  Appetites 
 
 commodious,    troublefome   and    Evil;    and    thofe  V"P^^!^'^^'^ 
 ,.  .  J    ^       I  111  us  by 
 
 commodious,  convenient  and  Good.  Nature     • 
 
 what  i?  a- 
 
 III.  Second'y-,  That  Nature  has  given  us  Reafon,  greable  to 
 
 a  Mind  or    /ntelletj,  to   dirtinfjuiili   Conveniencies  tl^ff^is 
 
 from  Inconveniencies,  Good  from  Evil.     And  lince  ^'^^^ . 
 
 this  may  be  confidered  by  the  Mind  in  a  threefold  ?he  con- 
 
 Refpe6t,  hence  alfo  arife  three  kinds  of  Good  and  trary,EviL 
 
 Hvil ;  namely  Pleafaat,  Profitable  and  Honefi.  Things 
 
 •!■'•>  arc  agree- 
 
 ?h 'G  ^O   t  '1'* 
 
 IV.  For  if  Good  be  confidered  as  pr'/enr  with  Apoctites 
 regird  only  to  the  Appetite  which  is  delighted  with  in  a  three 
 the  Enjoyment  of  it,  and  acquiefces  in  it,  'tis  cal-ed  Bid  re- 
 
 three 
 
 V.  If  it    be  not  agreeable  to  the  Apoetire  of  kinJs  oi 
 itfelf,  bus  only '•(j^^^f^^i  with  fomething  d'j  which  good. 
 is  of  itfelf  agreeable,  or  pre  dut,;  Pl'^ilure,  and  on  J^?^,  . 
 that  account  only  defirable;  then    ti;.   called  Profi-  ^'^^^^^■^^ 
 table.    For  tho'  the  Appetite  cannot  come  at  the  agreeable 
 
 Q^z  imme- 
 
228  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 js  called  immediate  Enjoyment  of  it,  yet  the  Mind  makes 
 ; 'f  •^"^'  life  of  It  in  order  to  procure  thofe  things  which 
 which  is  ^^  ^^"  ^"j^^y*  ^nd  from  thence  it  is  efteem'd  con» 
 conncdkd  vefiicnt,  i.  e.  Good. 
 
 with  VI.    But   fince  thbt  v/hich   is  agreeable  to  one 
 
 fornethmg  Appetite,  may  be  repuenant   or  lels   agreeable  to 
 
 which  IS         ',  f  ■',•',  1  •    I        1     r  ^  1 
 
 ofitfelfa-  <^^her3j  and  ihat  which  pleafes  now,  may  have 
 greeablc,  feme  things  connefted  with  it  which  may  be  dif- 
 i;  cdlgd  ple.ifing  afterwards,  there  is  need  of  enquiry  and 
 I-roiitable.  deliberation,  to  procure  an  nblolute  Good,  /.  e.  one 
 V  hich  is  ^^'"'i^^h,  all  Appetites  and  Times  confider'd,  will  afford 
 iudged  by  ^s  great,  as  certain  and  durable  a  Pleafure  or  De- 
 thcUn-  light  as  pofTible.  For  this  End  therefore  was  the 
 derHand-  ]\;ind  or  Unclerflanding  given  us,  that  we  might 
 thebel!'^  be  able  to  determine  what  appears  fittefl  to  be 
 all  things  ^one  upon  aviev/ofall  fuch  things  as  create  pleafure 
 confidet'd,  or  uneafinefs  for  the  prefenc  or  the  future.  And 
 is  abfo-      wh^x  is  thus  judg'd  by  the  Underflanding  to    be 
 
 -ood      d  ^'^^  ^^^'  ^^  ^^^^^^  ^^  "^  Error  in  the  Cafe,  muft 
 called         be    look'd    upon    as    Hajcjl.     For    that   is    Hcncji 
 Honcil.      which  i>  agreeable  to  a  rational  Agent  j  but  it  is 
 agreeable  to  a  rational    Agenr,   and   Reafon   itfelf 
 dire^f^S  that,  all  things  confider'd,  we  fhould  pre- 
 fer that   which  brings  the  greater,  the  more  cer- 
 tain and  more  durable  advantages. 
 \Tllc7\X       ^^^^'  '^^"^  DefcTiders  of  this  Opinion  reckon  thefe 
 Medicmcs'  kinds  of  Good  to  be  Moral  fo  far  as  they  refpe6t 
 and  fuch     Man,   bccaule  they  fall    under  the  Government  of 
 thing? as     Reafon.     But  finceall  things  cannot  be  always  had 
 are  agree-  ^Qpetj^gj-    ^    comparifon  mufl    be    made    between 
 
 able  to  the     , '-  ,      ,         '    ,  j       i  •   i  i        i 
 
 Rational  ^"cm,  and  tnat  embraced  whkh  appears  to  be  the 
 Appetite,  beft.  Now  the  kinds  may  be  compared  together, 
 as  well  as  the  particulars  of  each  kind.  For  inflance, 
 Heahh  is  a  thing  pleaiant  in  it  (elf,  and  dtlirable  above 
 all  things  that  relate  to  the  Body;  but  for  the 
 prefervaiion  of  it  Medicines  mull:  be  fcmeiimes 
 taken,  which  of  themlelx  cs  arc  far  from  being  a- 
 grecuble  to  the  Appetite,  but  as  they  are  means  to 
 
 an 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  J.     Of  Moral  Evil.  229 
 
 an  End  which  in  itfHf  is  delightful,  they  are  faid 
 to  be  profitable,  and  on  that  account  fit  to  be 
 chofen.  Now  the  Goods  of  the  Mind  are  greater, 
 more  certain  and  more  durable  than  thofe  of  the 
 Body ;  if  therefore  they  cannot  be  had  without  the 
 lofs  of  Health,  or  even  Life,  right  Reafon  dilates, 
 that  Health,  or  even  Life  bedefpifed  in  regard  to 
 thefe.  For  this  appears  to  be  the  mod:  convenient, 
 all  things  confider'd,  and  on  that  account  is  honefl : 
 and  as  Goods  of  a  different  kind  may  be  compared 
 together,  fo  may  alfo  particulars  of  the  fame  kind, 
 as  any  one  will  find  th:it  confiders  it. 
 
 VIII.  As  to  Liberty,  the  Men  of  this  Sed  will  He  thai: 
 haye  it  to   confift  in  this,    that   am.ong  all   thofe  ^'!^-  '^^  ^^ 
 Goods  an  Agent  can   embrace  that   which  pleafes  T|^dame„(. 
 him  beft,  and  exert  thofe  Anions  which  his  own  direfls,  is 
 Reafon   approves :    For,    according  to  thefe   Men,  free  ac- 
 he  that  can  follow  his  own  Judgment  in  Matters  is  carding  to 
 free.     For  Example,  he  that  is  found  in  Body,  and  J^^^^ 
 
 has  his  Faculties  and  Limbs  entire,  if  all  external 
 Impediments  be  removed,  is  at  Liberty  to  walk  : 
 for  he  can  if  he  vnll,  and  nothing  but  his  will  is 
 wanting  to  exert  that  Adion? 
 
 IX.  But  as  to  the  Anions  of  the   Will  itfelf,  ^^^^fj^^^-e 
 namely,  to  ivilli  ox  to  fafpend  the  A61  of  Volition,  ni^in-j  to 
 they  think  that  it  is  determined  to  thefe,  not  by  it-  choofe  ei- 
 felf,   for  that  is  impoffible,  but  from  without.     If  ther  from 
 you  ask  from  whence?   They   anfwer,  from  the  thegood- 
 Fleafare  or  Vncajinefs  perceiv'd  by  the  Underfiand-  ^^J'^'^. 
 ing  or  the  Senfes;    but  rather,'  as  they  imagine,  ablenefsof 
 from  the  prefent  or  mpft  urgent  Vrjeajmefs:  Iince  objeds 
 therefore  thefe  are  produced  in  us  ab  extra,  not  fi'om  perceiv'd 
 the  Will  itfelf,  and  are  not  in  its  power,  bat  arife  ^V^^  ^"' 
 from  the  very  things,  'tis  manifeft,  according  to  thefe  Senfes;^ 
 INjen,  that  we  are  not  free  (  at  leaft  from  Nccejfitj  )  and  there- 
 on 5  to  fore  not 
 
230  Of  Mcral  Evil.       .  Cliap.  V. 
 
 free  as  to  to  'ivill  Of  not  Will,  that  is  v/irh  regard  to  the  imme- 
 theAds  (jiafe  ^^o.^  of  the  Will.  Some  of  them  therefore 
 f/ri^i^^u  .   expicllv  dciiv  that  Liberty  belongs  to   Man  with 
 
 Will,  but         r      ,  ^         1    -■       »  n  ^\  1-1    n-  1 
 
 on]vofthc  I'Pf^ard  to  tneie    Aas,  or  that  an  Jblcction  can  be 
 inferior      faid  to   be  free,  or  Man  himfelf  in  that   refped: 
 Faculties,   They  will  have  it  therefore,  that  Liberty   belongs 
 fK'^^Ji^^^  to  us  properly  with  refpeft  to  the  wfirior  Faculties, 
 its  d^eter'i'    which  are  fubje<5l  to  the  Government  of  the  Will, 
 mination.  and  difcharge  their  Fundions  when  the  Man  him- 
 felf ha'^  willed :  that  is,  a  Man  is  free  to  walk  who 
 can  walk  if  he  pieafcs;  but  not  to  willj  for  he  re- 
 ceives the  Will  to  walk  from  elfewhere:  neverthe- 
 lefs,  he  that  can  £io  what    he   v/ills,  according  to 
 them,  is  free,  even  tho'  he  be  neceffariiy  determiji'd 
 to  will.  C41O 
 
 X. 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 (/i2.)  The  niofl  reiTiavkable  Defenders  of  this  Opinion,  a- 
 inong  the  Moderns,  fcem  to  be  Hohbs,  Locke,  (it  he  be  con- 
 fificntwithhimrclf*)  Leibnitz,  Bayle,  Norris,  the  Juthvrs  of 
 the  Philofiphlcal  Enquiry  concerning  human  Liberty,  and  of  Ca- 
 tos  tetters.  But  in  order  to  have  a  more  diilindi;  Notion  of 
 the  different  Schemes  of  Authors  all  profcffing  to  treat  of  Hu- 
 fmn  Liberty,  Frce-n.v:Il,  Sec.  Let  us  in  the  firll  Place  recite 
 the  feverarPowers  or  Modifications  of  the  Mind,  and  ob  "crve 
 to  which  of  them  Liberty  is  or  may  be  apply'd  —  Thefe  are 
 commonly  diftinguifli'd  into  Perception,  Judgment,  Volition 
 and  Jaion.  The  two  former  are  generally  necejjary,  at  IcalL 
 alw.'ys  pijp.'ve:  For  I  cannot  help  feeing  a  light  when  m/ 
 Eyes  are  open,  nor  avoid  judging  that  two  and  two  make 
 f;ur,  whenever  1  think  of  that  Fropofition;  tho'  I  may  hinder 
 that  Perception  by  fliutting  my  Eyes,  as  well  as  prevent  that 
 Judgment  bv  refufing  10  think  of  the  Propofition'  The  Will 
 then  may  properly  enough  be  faid  to  influence  or  impede 
 thefe f,  but  this  doth  not  make  them  \e.h  fnj/i've  in  them- 
 fclves ;  nay,  the  more  it  does  influence  them,  the  more  evi- 
 dently they  are  io.  The  third  will  appear  to  be  the  cxer- 
 cife  of  a  Self-mo'vivg  Privcipk,  and  as  fuch  cannot  properly  be 
 moved  or  influenced  by  any  thing  clle.     The  Lift  is  the  Ex- 
 
 crcife 
 
 *  Sec  Note  45.  t  Sec  Note  58. 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  I.     Of  Moral  Evil.  231 
 
 X.  If  it  be  granted  that  this  is  the  Nature  of  If  this  be 
 our  Eledtions,  there  is  no  doubt  but  all  our  Adi-  ^'  ^}^  "^""^ 
 ons   are  really  and  truly  necefTary.     For  as  to  the  ^^.^  ^^JJJ_ 
 proper  Aftions  of  die  Will,  ro  will  or  fufpend  the  lately  ne- 
 A(5t  of  Volition,  the  Men  whom  we  are  (peaking  of,  ceflliry. 
 give  up  Liberty  with  relpecl  to  thefe,  v/hile  they 
 alfert  that  it  does  not  belong  to  them.     For  they 
 Q^4  are 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ercife  of  the  inferior  Poivers,  the  aftual  Produiflion  of  Thought 
 or  Motion :  this  is  generaily  diredled  by,  and  an  immediate 
 confequence  of  Volition,  on  which  account  leveral  Authors 
 have  confounded  them  together;  but  tho'  they  be  properly 
 both  Acts  of  tiie  Mind,  yet  thev  are  certainly  diitincl  ones ; 
 the  PFi//  is  an  ability  of  chooftng  feme  particular  Thoughts 
 or  Motions,  Agenq  is  a  power  of  producing  thefe  Thoughts  or 
 Motions  purfuant  to  the  aft  of  choice,  or  of  putting  that  choice 
 in  execution.  A  careful  diftintlion  between  theie  will  lielp  us 
 to  judge  of  all  fuch  Authors  as  have  either  ufed  them  promifcu- 
 oully  or  been  content  to  treat  of  the  lail  only,  as  moll  of  thofe 
 Pcrfons  have  that  are  cited  in  the  14th  and  following  Pages  of 
 the  Phll'jfophical  Enquiry. 
 
 Thefe  two  lafl:  tken  being  the  only  aSIi've  Pozvcrs,  or  rather 
 the  only  Potvers  at  all,  are  the  only  proper  fubjedls  of  Liber- 
 ty :  to  which  again  it  is  varioufly  apply'd.  With  regard  to  the 
 JVill,  fome  content  themfelves  witli  afferting  its  Freedom  from 
 external  Compiiljion  only,  from  being  forced  contrary  to  its  own 
 bent  and  inclination.  And  indeed  it  would  be  very  Ilrange  to 
 fuppofe  it  otherwife:  For  to  fay  that  it  may  be  drawn  a  con- 
 trary way  to  that  which  the  Mind  prefers  and  direcl.^,  is  to  fay, 
 that  it  may  tend  two  contrary  ways  at  once,  that  a  Man  may 
 will  a  thing  againll  his  Will,  or  be  oblig'd  to  will  what  at  the 
 fame  time  he  does  not  will :  but  then  fuch  a  Freedom  as  this 
 equally  belongs  to  the  two  former  Powers,  which  cannot  be 
 forced  to  perceive  or  judge  otherwife  than  they  do  perceive  or 
 judge,  othci  wife  than  as  Objefls  appear,  and  their  own  Na- 
 tures require  ;  it  may  be  applyM  to  any  thing  the  moll  necefl:.- 
 ry,  nay  the  more  neceflary  the  better.  Otliers  therefore  have 
 contended  for  an  abfolute  exemption  of  the  Will  from  all  im- 
 perceptible Byafs  or  Phyfical  Inclination,  from  all  internal  ne- 
 ceffity,  arifmg  either  from  its  own  frame  and  conftitution,  the 
 impulfe  of  fuperior  Beings,  or  the  operation  of  Qbjeds,  Pvca- 
 
 fons. 
 
232  OJ  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 arc  cf  Opinion  that  when  any  thing  is  propofed  by 
 the  Under/landing  to  be  done,  we  either  will  ir. 
 or  fufpend  the  Aft  of  Volition  concerning  it,  ac- 
 cording to  the  profped  of  Hsppinefs  or  importunifo 
 tyof  the  Uneafinefs  which  appears  to  the  Mind,  in 
 the  prcfent  State  and  Circumftancesi  by  thefe 
 therefoje  our  Ekftion.  according  to  thern,  is  de- 
 termin'd. 
 
 XL 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 fons.  Motives,  l^c.  wliich  appear'd  to  them  the  very  effeiice  cf 
 humnn  Liberty,  the  fole  Foundation  of  Morality.  And  in- 
 deed thefe  fcem  to  be  the  only  Perfons  that  fpeak  out,  and  to 
 the  Point,  as  fliall  be  fl-.ewn  Jn  the  following  Notes. 
 
 Laftly,  a  great  many  will  confine  their  Idea  of  Liberty  to 
 A8'ion  only,  and  define  it  to  be  a  power  of  either  aflually  ta- 
 king up  or  laying  down  a  Thought,  of  beginning  Motion  or 
 flopping  it  according  to  the  preference  of  the  Mind  or  Will. 
 Rut  if  this  be  all  the  Liberty  we  have,  'tis  of  fmall  confe- 
 quence,  fince  we  are  confcious  that  \w  fail  all  fuch  Adtions, 
 iuppofing  the  Organs  to  be  rightly  difpofed,  follow  the  deter 
 mination  of  the  Will ;  and  alfo,  that  in  renfon  they  are  no  far- 
 ther  moral,  nor  we  accountable  for  them  than  as  they  do  fo  j 
 we  muft  therefore  go  up  higher  than  this  before  we  come  at 
 any  valuable  Liberty;  and  the  main  QuelHon  will  be,  Whe- 
 ther Man  is  free  to  think  or  refolve  upon  ;  to  will  or  choofc 
 any  thing  propofed,  as  well  as  to  exert  his  other  Faculties  in 
 confcquence  of  fuch  Refolution,  Will,  or  Choice.  This  is  tha 
 only  Point  worth  difputing,  and  wherein  all  Moral  Liberty 
 mull  confifl ;  and  indeed  if  it  be  not  here  'tis  ro  where.  Fo^ 
 if  the  Mind  be  abfolutely  dctcrmin'd  to  choofe  in  a  certain 
 manner  in  any  given  Circumftances,  its -rather  fubordinate  Fa- 
 culties will  immediately  operate,  and  the  feveral  Aftions  which 
 depend  thereon  all  follow  by  ncceflary  confcquence.  Nay,  up- 
 on this  Hypothefis  there  is  properly  no  fuch  thing  as  Choice 
 or  Aclion  in  Man;  but  all  are  Paifions  propagated  in  a  chain 
 t)f  neceflary  Caufes  and  Eftefts.  And  indeed  all  who  fuppofe 
 any  external  Determination  of  the  Will  (meaning  always  a 
 neceffary  and  irrefiftible  one)  whether  they  place  it  in  the  De- 
 fire  of  Good,  Jliixiety  for  the  abfence  of  it,  or  the  laf  Determi- 
 nation of  the  Judgment^  are  involv'd  in  the  fame  conCequence, 
 how  many  Steps  foever  they  may  take  to  remove  the  Diffi- 
 culty.    For  it  is  equal  to  me,  if*vhat  I  call  my  Choice  or 
 
 Aftioii 
 
Sea.  X.  Sub.  I.     Of  Moral  Evil.  233 
 
 XI.     But  when  the  Eledion  is  made,  if  we  can  That  hu- 
 efFeft  what  we  will,  then  they  fay  we  are  free  in  "^^"  ^^^' 
 refped  of  fuch  Acftions,  not  from  Neceffity,   but  fjee^^not 
 only  from   Compulfion;    for  it   is  plain  that  no-  from  Ne- 
 thing  but  our  will  is  wanting  to  the   exertion  of  ceffity,  but 
 them,  and  fuppofing  us  to  will  them,  they  necef-  ^o^ip^il- 
 farily  follow.     For  infliance,  when  nothing  hinders 
 a   Man  from  walking  but  hi*^  own  Will,  luppofing 
 this  Volition,  it  cannot  be  conceiv'd  but  that  he 
 muft    walk,    nor  can  he  reft  while  this  continues. 
 If  therefore,  according   to    them,    all  ads  of  the 
 Will  are  necelfary  (as  being  determin'd  from  with- 
 out, viz,,  by  the  convenience    or  inconvenience  of 
 things  or  circumftances)  the  adions  of  the  inferior 
 faculties  will  be  no  lefs  neceffary,  for  they  will  de- 
 pend on  the    fame    circumftances  and    ads  of  the 
 Will,  which,  as  they   are  neceflary,    thcfe  anions 
 
 will 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 A^darx  be  neceflary,  wherever  that  Neceffity  be  plircJ.  'Tj^ 
 the  ftme  thing  whether  I  be  a£led  upon  and  over-ruled  by  one 
 immediate  Caufe,  or  drawn  on  by  feveral  fucceffively.  Sup- 
 pofe,  V.  g  that  I  am  neccffitated  to  obey  the  laft  rcfult  of  my 
 own  yudgjnent.  From  the  Exijtence  of  tkings  follow  certain 
 Appearances.^  thofe  Appearances  caufe  certain  Perceptiom,  thefe 
 Perrcptions  form  a  "Judgment,  this  yndgment  determines  the 
 Will,  and  this  Will  produces  ASIion.  All  this  is  lix'd  anti 
 inevitable,  every  Link  of  the  Chain  is  equally  neceffary,  and 
 *t:s  all  one  to  me  on  which  my  Determinations  hang:  'Tis  as 
 good  to  take  them  from  the  firft  as  laft,  from  the  Exigence 
 of  ourward  Objects  as  from  my  own  Will ;  fince  the  fuppofed 
 choice  or  aftion  is  in  reality  as  much  out  of  my  power,  or  as 
 incapable  of  being  alter'd  or  prevented  by  me,  as  the  exig- 
 ence of  external  things.  'Tis  eafy  to  obferve  hov>^  deftrudive 
 this  and  the  like  Schemes  muft  prove,  as  well  of  Morality  as 
 Liberty,  both  which  muft  fi,ind  and  fall  together,  and  can,  I 
 think,  only  be  fccurcd  efteAually  upon  the  Principles  laid 
 down  by  our  Author  ;  of  which  in  their  proper  place. 
 
 Sec  alfo  Mr.  ChubPs  Reflections  on  Natural  Liberty,     CoU 
 ieffion  of  Travis,  p.  y^cj,  ^^c.  or  Notes  45-,  48,  58. 
 
 (43.)  Tg 
 
234 
 
 According 
 to  their 
 Opinion 
 there  is  no 
 contingency 
 in  thing', 
 nor  could 
 any  thing 
 be  dane 
 othervvife 
 than  it  is. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil         Chap.  V. 
 
 wifl  be  necefTary  alfo.  (43.)  Tho',  according  to 
 them,  therefore,  there  be  no  CompH'fion  of  the  Will, 
 yet  there  is  NecejJ].ty,  from  which  Neceflity  nothing 
 in  the  World  will  be  free;  nay  a  great  many  of 
 them  openly  profefs  to  believe  that  this  is  the 
 Cafe. 
 
 XII.  Now,  from  this  Hypothefis,  which  they 
 extend  to  the  Divine  a?  well  as  Human  Will,  the 
 following  Corollaries  feem  deducible.  Firft,  that 
 nothing  in  Nature  could  be  done  otherwife  than  ic 
 is.  For,  the  whole  Series  of  things  being  as  ic 
 were  conneded  together  by  Fare,  there's  no  Room 
 for  Chance  or  Liberty,  properly  fo  call'd  :  Cc^-* 
 tigency  then  is  removed  out  of  Nature. 
 
 xiir, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 \ 
 \ 
 \ 
 
 {43.)  To  call  an  Aflion  necejfary,  is  properly  fpealdng  to 
 affirm  that  it  is  no  Adtion.  For  by  the  Word  Jciion  we  mc:i.n 
 an  immediate  effeifl  of  what  is  metaphorically  ftlled  a  Sdf-rno- 
 'ving  P Oliver :  or  the  exercifc  ofan  ability  which  a  Being  has  to 
 begm  or  determine  a  particular  train  of  Thought  or  Motic?;. 
 Now  the  Idea  of  this  Power  in  any  Being,  and  of  fnch  exer- 
 cife  of  it,  is  direclly  repugnant  to  t\^2it  oi  NeceJJtty,  which  lup- 
 pofes  the  Thought  or  Motion  to  be  already  begun  or  dettrmin- 
 ^d,  and  to  be  obtruded  on  this  Being  by  fomtthing  elfe,  and 
 confequently  implies  a  Negation  of  any  fuch  Self  moving  Pow- 
 er in  this  Being,  or  of  its  exercife  by  this  Bein^^;  in  the  Cafes 
 abovementioncd.     '  To  be  an  Jgcnt  (fays  Dr.  Clarke^,)  figni- 
 
 *  fies  to  have  a  Pouuer  of  beginning  Motion,  and  Motioti  c?nnot 
 
 *  begin   necejfarily,  becauie  Nerejjity  of  Motion  fuppofes  an  Ef- 
 
 *  ficiency  fuperior  to,  and  irreiillible  by  the  thing  moved,  and 
 
 *  conlequently  the  hegiwdng  of  MLotion  cannot  be  in  that  which 
 
 *  is  moved  necefi^irily,  but  in  the  fuperior  Caul^e,  or  in    the 
 
 *  eihciency  of  fome  other  Caufe  Hill  fuperior  to  that,  till  at 
 «  length  we  arrive  at  Ibme  Prce  Agent?  Where,  tho'  the 
 Doctor's  Definition  of  Agency  feems  to  be  imperrcd,  that 
 Word  generally  including  the  power  of  beginning  reflex 
 Thought  as  well  as  Motion  (wiiich  are  two  diftincl  Species  of 
 jAdion,  and  proceed  from  different  Bowers,  tho'  they  be  of- 
 
 teo, 
 
 Re.Tiafh  on  the  Philofophical  Enquiry,  p.  6. 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  I.     Of  Moral  Evil.  235 
 
 XIIT.  Secondly,  That  nothing  more  can  be  un-  By  Evil 
 derliood  by  wicked  or  wrong  made  Ele(5ti,ons,  than  "^-^^7  i^n- 
 that  they  are  prejudicial  to  the  Eledor  or  fome  o-  '^'^^1^^"'^ 
 thers ;  which  Scnfe  is  very  remote  from  the  vulgar  moi'^e'^tha 
 one;  for  in  that  Evil  Eleaions  are  blamed,  not  for  hurtful. 
 being  hurtful,  but  for  being  hurtful  without  Neceih- 
 ty,  and  becaufe  they  are  made  otherwife  than  they 
 ought  to  have  been:  lathis  Hypothelis  then  there 
 
 is 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ten  confounded  together  and  comprehended  under  the  fame 
 general  term)  yet  it  fhews  us  an  evident  contradiftion  in  thefe 
 two  Words  necejjary  Agent,  in  either  Senfe :  Unlefs  he  ufes 
 the  Word  Agent  in  both  Senfes  together,  and  then  his  Rea- 
 foning  will  be  falfc,  fmce  what  is  afted  on  and  determin'd  by 
 another  in  regard  to  its  Will,  or  thought,  and  in  that  Senfe 
 mo'v'd  by  a  fuperinr  Efi.dc.ncy,  may  yet  have  a  power  of  be- 
 ginning real  corporeal  Motion  (which  is  a  quite  different  fort 
 of  Aftion)  in  confcquence  of  fuch  predetermin'd  Will,  or 
 Thought,  and  in  that  fenfe  be  an  Agc7it,  tho'  not  a  moral  one. 
 But  whatever  the  Doftov  might  mean  by  the  Word  Agetit,  his 
 Argument  will  hold  in  either  of  thefe  two  Senfes  feparate,  i'/k. 
 that  nothing  can  be  fiid  to  ail  either  in  thinking  or  moving, 
 Vv^hich  does  not  properly  begin  the  train  of  Thought  or  Motion, 
 but  is  put  into  Thought  or  Motion  by  fomething  elfe;  and  al- 
 fc,  that  &\txj  thing  cannot  be  fo  put  either  into  Thought  or 
 Motion ;  and  therefore  that  there  muft  be  fome  firft  Caufe  of 
 both. 
 
 And  will  not  the  liime  Argument  hold  equally  for  fome  firll: 
 Caufe  oi  Exifieme  P  If  the  Dodlor  can  fuppofe  a  iini  Caufe  of 
 ^1  Thought  and  Motion  (as  he  does  here,  and  we  think  very 
 reafonably)  why  may  he  not  alfo  fuppofe  a  firll  Caufe  of  all 
 ExiJJence;  and  fo  entirely  exclude  that  antecedent  Nerejpty 
 which  he  has  often  Recourfe  to  as  a  kind  of  fupport  of  the  exi- 
 llence  of  the  firft  Caufe,  but  is  obliged  to  exclude  from  its 
 Will  and  Aflions  ?  Is  it  harder  to  conceive  how  an  Eternal 
 Independent  Being,  or  Firft  Caufe,  may  cxiji  without  any  an- 
 tecedent NecefTity,  than  how  it  can  <^miII  or  nB  without  any  ? 
 
 But  to  return  to  the  chief  Defign  of  this  Note.  We  fee  hov/ 
 rcceffary  it  is  to  fix  the  precile  meaning  of  the  Word  Ailion  in  a 
 Controverfy  of  this  kind,  and  if  the  Signification  of  it  as  lafd 
 dov.'u  above  be  allow'd,  then  necelTary  Aftion  is  the  fame  aS 
 
 jpaluvc 
 
236  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 is  no  Election  made  amifs.    (44.)    Nor  can  any 
 thing  be  (aid  to  be  done  otherwile  than  it  ought  to 
 be  :  for  what  could  not  polTibly  be  dooe  otherwife, 
 is  certainly  done  as  it  ought ;  lince  it  is  done  ac- 
 cording to  the   exigence   and  neceflfary   order    of 
 things. 
 Villanies        XIV.  Thirdly,  By  the  fame  Principle  all  Evil 
 are  to  be     wou'd  be  in  theftrideft  fenfe  Natural,  for  it  would 
 th^ac-  °    derive  its  Origin  from  natural  and  neceflary  Caufes. 
 count  of    The  diftindion  then  would  be  loft  between  natural 
 human       and  moral  Evil,   a;-  commonly  ucdcrftood.     There 
 Mifcry,      would  be  no  Moral  Evil  at  all.     For  that  only  is 
 look'd°*  >  ^^^^^'^'^^  Moral  by  the  common  confent  of  Man- 
 on  as         kind,  of  which  the  Man   himfelf  is  properly  the 
 Crimes,      Caufe :  but  no  body  looks  upon  himfelf  as  proper- 
 properly     Jy  the  Caufe  of  a  thing  v/hich  he  could  not  avoid, 
 io  call  d.    Qj,  ^Q  which  he  was  neceffitated  by  natural  Caufes, 
 and  fuch  as  were  antecedent  to  the  Will.     For  e- 
 very  one  blames  himfelf  only  on  this  account,  be- 
 caufe  he   was   of  himlelf  neceifarily  the  Caufe   of 
 Evil  to  himfelf  or  others.     Thofe  Inconveniencies 
 which  come  by  Necellity,  he  looks  upon  as  Mi- 
 feries,    as    Misfortunes,    but    never    as    a    Crime. 
 Thefts   therefore.    Adulteries,    Perjuries,    my  the 
 Elatred  of  God  himfelf,    and  whatever  we  efteem 
 bafe  in  Villanies  (as  well  as  the  difgrace  and  punifh- 
 irjent  attending  them)  rnuft  be  placed   to   the  ac- 
 count of  human  Mifery  and  Unhappinels,  but  by 
 
 no 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 paffive  A£tion,  or  beginning  a  thine:  and  net  beginning  it  at 
 the  fame  time,  and  m  the  fame  refped ;  in  wliich  terms  every 
 one  perceives  it  to  be  a  contradi6tion. 
 
 (44.)  Leibnitz  declares  it  to  be  his  fettled  Opinion  *,  *  That 
 *  whenever  we  refolve  or  will  cont/arv  to  an  evident  Rcafon, 
 <  wc  are  carried  by  fome  other  Rcafon  llronger  in  appearance.'* 
 
 *  Remarque s  fur  h  Livre  deTOngine  du  Mai.  p.  483. 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  I.     Of  Moral  Evil.  237 
 
 no  means  reckon'd  criminal,  nor  any  more  repug- 
 nant to  the  Will  of  Godj  to  his  JulHce,  Purity 
 or  Goodnefs,  than  Heat  or  Cold. 
 
 XV.   Fourth'y,   When  therefore   we   blame  a  ^^^r  ,7 
 Thief,  Adulterer,   Murderer,    or   perjured   Pcrfon,  reprov'd 
 when  thofe  Crimes  are  arraign'd  as  fcandalousi  this  not  be- 
 is  not  done  becaufe  they  have  defer v'd  ir,  or  be-  ^^"^e  he 
 caufe  rhefe  things  are  in  rhemfelves  really  fhameful  ^^  'T.^'l 
 or   culpable;    but   becaufe  that  Infamy   may  he  a  ^aufe  re- " 
 means    of  detening  the    guiky   Perfons  or  others  proof  may 
 from  the  like  Eledions.     And  this  is  the  only  Rea-  dnvc  him 
 fon  why   v/e  reproach  a  Thief,  ^c,  and  not  a  fick    °"^  ^^'^^* 
 Perfon,  with  Infamy ;  becaufe  Reproach  may  cure 
 a  Thief,  ^c,  but  can  do  no  Good  to  a  fick  Per.- 
 fon. 
 
 XVI.  Fifthly,  Malefadcrs  are  punifh'd  not  be-  Punifli- 
 caufe  they   defcrve  Punifliment,  but  becaufe  it  is  "^^"^^^^^^ 
 expedient,  and  Laws  arc  ufed  to  reflrain  Vices,  a>  ^IqJ\ 
 
 icines 
 
 Phyfic  to  remove  Difejfes;  Men  lin  therefore  after  to  the  Sick, 
 the  fame  manner  as  they  die,  vi^,  becaufe  an  elfedu-  neither 
 al  Fveraedy  was  not  apply'd.     And  ycc   Laws  are  ^'jp  ^^^* 
 ftoc  entirely  ufclcf?,  fince  they  prevent  fome  Vices,  ^^  ^  ^  \  ^ 
 as  Medicines  protrad  the  Deaths  of  feme  difeaftd  prevent 
 Perfons :    and   a   Ferfop.   infe>^ed   with  the   Plague  Vice, 
 may  be  as  juftly  cut  off  by  ilie  Law,  as  a  Witch, 
 when  by  that  means  there's  hope  of  avoiding  the 
 Contagion.  (^^ 
 
 XVII. 
 NOTES. 
 
 If  this  be  always  the  Cafe,  we  certainly  can  never  will  amift 
 or  unreafonably,  iincc  tliat  Reafon  which  appears  to  be  the 
 llrongcft  mull  and  ought  always  to  determine  us. 
 
 (*)  All  this,  and  a  great  deal  mere  to  the  fame  purpofe,  is 
 exprcfly  afibrted  (as  indeed  'tis,  a  ncceflary  confequence  of  their 
 Hypothefis)  by  Hobbs  *  and  by  the  Author  of  the  Philofophl- 
 cdl  Enqidry\,  and  much  the  fime  by  BaylcX-  The  bare  re-- 
 cital  of  fuch  Principles  is  a  fuliicient  refutation  of  them. 
 
 *  See  his  Treat  if.'  an  Human  Libertv,  or  Bp.  ^''amhaM's 
 Works,  p.  678.  t  P    91,  es^f.' 
 
 X  Crit.  Diil.  p.  2605^  ^\. 
 
 « 
 
238  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 We  are  XVII.  Sixthly,  We  are  nblig'd  to  repay  good 
 
 obliged  to  ofiices,  fince  by  being  thanlifai  we  may  excite  tlie 
 
 onlv  in  ^    Benefaftor  to  continue  or  increase  his  Benevolence, 
 
 pro'fpedt     and  alfo  induce  others  to  do  us  Service.     And  hence 
 
 of  a  feature  it  comes  to  pafs,  that  we  are  oblig'd  to  be  grateful 
 
 Benefit,      towards  Gcd    and    Men,  but   not  to   the  Sun  or 
 
 a   Hor(e,  becaufe  God   ar.d  Men   may  be  excited 
 
 by  thanks  to    feme  farther   Beneficence,    whereas 
 
 the   Sun  or  a  Horfe  cannot.     Thus  no  regard  is 
 
 to   be  had  to  a  Benefit  rcceiv'd,  but  onlv  to  one 
 
 that   may   be  received  j    nor  are  we  oblig'd  to  be 
 
 grateful  to  the  moft  generous  Benefavfi:or  for  what 
 
 IS  paft,  biit  only   for  the  profpeft  of  what  is   to 
 
 come.     All  fen:e  of  giatitude  then,   as  commonly 
 
 underftocd,    is  deftrov'd :    lor  the  Vulvar  reckon 
 
 him  a  cunnings  not  a  grateful  Perfon,  who  returns 
 
 one  favour  merely  out  of  hopes  of  another. 
 
 Accord.  XVIII.  Seventhly,  If  this  Opinion  be  true,  we 
 
 ing  to  thi:  j^^rj.  defpair  of  human  Felicity,  which  will  not  in 
 
 limna'r  "'    ^^^^'  ^"'^^ ''"'  ^"  ^^^  ^^'^  Power,  but  entirely  depend  up- 
 Happinefs  on  external  Objfrds.  Our  Happinefs  (if  there  be  any) 
 is  impofli-  muft,    according  to    them,    be   conceiv'd   to  arife 
 ble,  fince   fj-Qm  the  perfed  enjoyment  oi  thofe  things  which 
 n  de;en  s  ^^^  agreeable    to  the  Appetites.     Where  the  ccn- 
 things        trary  to  thele  are  prelent,  or  the  agreeauie  ones  ab- 
 which  are  fent,  we  muft  necelfarily  be  unealy,  and  while  we 
 not  in  our  ftrijggle  With  Anxieties  we  cannot  be  happy.     Ac- 
 Power,       cording  to  this  Hypothefis  therefore  it  follows  shat 
 our  Happinefi  neccffarily  requires  fuch  an  Enjoy- 
 ment as  we  have  fpoken  of,  and  vhit  this  is  at  the 
 fame  time  impofiTible.     For  who  can  hope  that  all 
 external  things  (with  v/hirh  he  has  to  do)  fhould  be 
 fo  tempered  as  in  every  relpedt  to  anfwer  his  Wilhes, 
 fo  as  never  to  v/ant  what  he  delires,  or  to  be  for*,  cd  to 
 endure  any  thing  contrary  ro  his  naiural  Appetites? 
 If  Happinefs  arifcs  from  the  Fnjoyment  of  thofe 
 things  which  are  agreeable  to  the  Faculties  and  Ap- 
 petites, and  which  can  move  Defire  by   their  in- 
 nate 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  I.     Of  Moral  Evil.  239 
 
 ftate,  or  at  leafl:  apparent  Goodnefs;  if  alfo  the 
 Will  is  necefTarily  determin'd  to  thefe,  according 
 to  the  Judgment  of  the  Underftanding,  or  Impor- 
 tunity of  Appetiies,  every  Man  muft  neceffarily 
 want  a  great  many  things  which  he  has  chofen,  and 
 bear  a  great  many  which  he  wou'd  nor,  than  which 
 nothing  is  more  inconfiftcnt  with  FeUcity.  For  we 
 cannot  pofli'oly  conceive  any  State  of  Life  where- 
 in all  things  anfwer  to  the  natural  Appetites.  In 
 vain  then  do  we  hope  for  Happinefs,  if  it  depend 
 upon  external  OSjeds.  (N,) 
 
 XIX. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (N.)  Againft  the  Argument:  here  urged  'tis  objefled  that  it 
 is  lame  in  all  its  Feet ;  iji,  there  is  no  confequence  in  it.  zJ/y, 
 the  Conclufion  may  le  granted ;  and  ^d/y,  the  Argument  may 
 be  retorted  againli  the  Author. 
 
 To  begin  with  the  lail  ;  It  is  allcdged  that  Men  are  never 
 the  happier,  or  more  independent  of  the  accidents  of  Fortune, 
 by  having  a  po-iver  to  choofc  'vjithout  Peafon. 
 
 To  which  1  reply,  that  the  Author  has  no  occafion  to  afTert 
 any  fach  power  ;  all  that  he  pleads  for,  is  that  the  will  ought 
 not  to  be  dctermin'd  by  the  Judgment  of  the  Underllanding 
 concerning  things  antecedeiitly  agreeable  or  difagreeable  to  our 
 natural  Appetites,  becaufe  all  the  good  of  a  Man  does  not  lie 
 in  them:  li  it  did,  there  would  be  no  need  of  a  will  at  all, 
 bi.'t  we  ought  to  be  abfolutely  deterrain'd  by  them.  Bat  the 
 will  is  a  f  ■culty  that  by  chooiing  a  thing  can  make  it  agreeable, 
 tho'  it  had  no  Agreement  with  any  natural  Appetite,  nay, 
 were  contrary  to  them  all ;  and  for  the  will  to  choofe  a  thing 
 in  order  to  pleafe  itfelf  in  the  choice,  is  no  more  to  choofe 
 without  reafon,  than  to  build  a  Hoafe  in  order  to  preferve  one 
 fron^i  the  inclemency  of  the  Weather,  is  to  act  without  reafon. 
 
 But  2dly,  'Tis  afk'd,  will  Men  be  any  happier,  or  lefs  de- 
 pendent on  the  accidents  of  Fortune  by  having  fuch  a  Faculty  ? 
 Yes,  fure  a  great  deal ;  for  no  accident  of  Fortune  can  take 
 this  Liberty  from  them,  or  hinder  their  being  pleafed  with 
 their  choice;  and  in  the  midil  of  ficknefs,  pain  and  torment, 
 if  they  have  this  faculty,  they  will  find  pleasure  and  fatisfac- 
 tion  in  it,  and  m.ake  the  moll  adverfe  Fortune  eafy  to  them  ; 
 as  we  fee  wife  Men  frequently  do,  at  leaft,  more  eafy  than 
 fuch  circumftances  would  be  without  it, 
 
 3dly, 
 
240  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Its  conre-       XIX.    This,   and  a  greac  deal  more  that  might 
 quenccs      j,g  abided,   mufl  fcem  hard  and  rc-pumiant  to  the 
 
 i):ird,  and  *     «-^ 
 
 tho'  the  common 
 
 Argument  NOTES. 
 
 from  cou- 
 
 b    0-    e  S'^'y*  "^^^  objcfled,  that  it  rhuft  be  impoflible  to  give  ap;ree- 
 
 11       U.A  -blenefs  to  a  thing  which  has  none  antecedently  to  the  Will. 
 J      ^     For  to  do  fo  we  muii  have  a  power  either  to  change  our 
 f  h  7  h  ■  p-  tsfte  of  things,  or  the  things  themfelves  j  but  that  wou'd  al- 
 r  °  moll  be  the  fame  as  to  fay  to  a  piece  of  Lead  be  thou  Geld,  or 
 
 •  j;    ''         to  a  Flint  bd  thou  a  Diamond,  or  at  lealf  produce  the  fame  ef- 
 P  -r  feft  on  mc.  To  which  the  anfvver  is  ealy  ;  Good  is  not  an  al>- 
 
 O  i  ■  •  fol'it^  thing,  but  relnti-je,  and  confitls  in  the  agreeablcnefs  of 
 xvh'  }  '  ^"'^  thing  to  another,  as  fuppofe  between  tne  Appetite  and  Ob- 
 /-  "  ^  jcft;  if  then  thefe  be  difagreeable  to  one  another,  the  one  is 
 tended  '^  ^^'^^  ^^  ^^  other,  and  to  make  them  agreeable,  one  of  them 
 with  the  ™"^'^  ^^  neceffity  be  changed,  and  the  change  of  either  will 
 cfreci  11  <^3ufe  it.  Altho'  therefore  I  cannot  change  Lead  into  Gold  by 
 if  the  h  ^^^'  ^^  of  my  Free-will,  yet  I  can  contemn  Gold  as  much  as 
 acknow  '^^  '''  ^"^^^^  Lead,  and  be  as  well  content  with  a  leaden  Cup  as 
 if  it  were  Gold.  Thoufmds  makes  this  ufc  of  Free-will,  and 
 arife  to  this  pitch  of  Happinefs  by  the  help  of  it :  It  is  an  old 
 Rule  Si  res  hahcri  non  poteji,  deme  aliquid  de  cupiditatlbus.  If 
 you  can't  have  Wealth  or  Honour  refolve,  that  is  choofe,  to 
 be  fatisfied  without  it,  and  experience  will  tesch  you  that  fuch 
 a  Choice  is  m.uch  to  your  Eafc  and  Happineis.  To  fay  that 
 this  is  impofiible,  is  to  give  the  Lie  to  all  who  treat  of  Morals 
 and  Divinity  :  Of  fo  great  m.oment  is  fuch  a  power  of  making 
 things  good  by  choice,  that  in  truth  all  moral  Advices  fup- 
 pofe us  to  have  it,  or  elfe  they  are  not  fen!e. 
 
 But  4th]y,  'Tis  objected,  That  if  the  will  can  make  athing 
 agreeable  by  choofmg,  fuch  a  power  would  be  hrfinite,  and 
 might  make  a  Man  happy  in  all  circumilances,  even  in  Hell. 
 For  if  it  can  give  fix  degrees  of  Pleafure  to  an  Objeft,  it  may 
 as  well  give  infinite;  fince  it  is  without  reafon  that  it  gives 
 thefe  Six.  I  anfwer,  all  created  Powers  and  Pieafures  are  li- 
 mited, and  no  fubjcdt  is  capable  of  more  than  fuch  a  certain 
 Degree,  therefore  there  is  likewife  a  limitation  of  the  pleafure 
 arifing  from  the  ufe  of  Free-will,  as  well  as  from  the  ufe  of 
 feeing  or  hearing,  or  any  other  Faculty  or  Appetite ;  and  as 
 the  VVill  is  an  Appetite,  fo  the  Pleafure  of  it  bears  fomc  pro- 
 portion to  the  Pleafure  arifmg  from  the  fatisfaftion  of  other 
 Appetites ;  but  in  what  degree  we  cannot  precifely  determine,' 
 any  more  than  we  can  fettle  the  proportion  between  the  Plea- 
 fure* of  feeing  and  hearing ;  which  yet  we  know  arc  neither 
 
 of 
 
 iedged. 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub  I,     Of  Mora/  Evil.  241 
 
 common  Notions  of  Men,  and  cannot  be  believ'd 
 without  extraordinary  Prejudice  to  Mankind.  I 
 confefs  indeed  that,  for  the  moft  part,  one  cannot 
 argue  well  againft  an  opinion  from  its  confcquenccs, 
 
 lince 
 
 N  0  T  E  S» 
 
 of  them  infinite.  Tho'  therefore  Vv'C  cannot  precifely  deter- 
 mine the  Proportion,  yet  we  are  certain  that  we  frequently 
 crofs  all  oar  natural  Appetites  to  maintain  our  choice,  and  by 
 means  of  it  bear  up  againft  the  flrokes  of  adverfe  Fortune,  and 
 a  flood  of  natural  Evils. 
 
 But  i^thly,  'Tis  objected,  that  if  we  had  this  Power  of  ma- 
 king things  agreeable  or  dilagreeable  by  choice,  we  need  not 
 trouble  ourfelves  how  our  other  Appetites  were  fatisfied,  for 
 We  might  be  abfolutely  happy  in  fpite  of  all  the  accidents  of 
 Fortune. 
 
 He  that  obje£ls  this,  affurcdly  did  not  confider  the  defcrip- 
 tion  given  by  the  Author  of  this  Faculty,  nor  that  the  having 
 it  doth  not  deftroy  our  other  Appetites,  and  that  when  it 
 choofes  things  contrary  to  them,  it  neceflarily  creates  a  great 
 deal  of  pain,  uneafinels  and  torment,  which  aha.tes  /o  far  the 
 pleafure  we  take  in  our  Eleflions,  that  the  pleafure  we  obtain 
 by  fuch  a  choice  is  little  or  nothing  in  refpeft  of  what  it  might 
 be  if  we  did  not  choofe  amifs.  Thefe  things  are  fo  plainly  and 
 frequently  repeated  in  the  Book,  thatitfeems  ftrange  how  any 
 One  could  imagine  that  becaufe  we  have  a  Faculty  to  pleafe  our 
 felves  by  choofmg,  that  therefore  we  may  be  abfolutely  happy 
 in  fpite  of  all  the  Accidents  of  Fortune. 
 
 If  by  Happinefs  be  meant  a  ftate  more  eligible  than  nothing, 
 I  believe  by  means  of  this  Faculty  we  may  generally  fpeaking 
 be  fo  far  happy,  and  fhat  is  fufficient  to  jullify  God's  putting 
 us  into  our  prefent  Circumftances.  But  if  by  Happinefs  be 
 meant,  as  it  ought  to  be,  a  ftate  wherein  we  have  a  iull  and 
 free  exercife  of  all  our  Faculties,  then  in  as  much  as  our  power 
 of  choofmg  is  but  one  Faculty,  tho'  fuperior  to  all  the  relt,  the 
 exercife  of  it  alone  can  never  make  us  abfolutely  and  compleat- 
 ly  happy,  tho'  it  may  in  fuch  a  degree  as  is  very  defireable. 
 
 6thly,  The  Conclufion  of  the  Argument  is  granted,  and  it 
 is  look'd  on  as  no  inconvenience  that  our  Happinefs  ihould  in 
 fome  cafes  depend  on  things  without  us,  and  not  in  our  own 
 Power.  But  the  conclufion  is  quite  another  thing.  The  words 
 arc,  If  this  Opinion  be  true,  <vje  mtiji  defpair  of  human  Happinefs^ 
 for  it  ivill  not  be  in  the  leajl  in  our  oxfsn  pQ'Vjer,  but  entirely  de- 
 fend upon  external  Obje^s, 
 
 R  The 
 
242  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V* 
 
 fince  a  great  many  things  are  true  which  have  con-' 
 fequences  hard  enough  :  not  to  mention  how  eafily 
 we  miftake  in  deducing  confequences.  But  yet 
 when  thefe  are  acknowledged  oy  the  Authors  them- 
 fclves ;  and,  if  bcliev'd,  would  prove  detrimental 
 to  Morality,  they  bring  no  fmall  prejudice  againft 
 an  Opinion  which  is  attended  with  them,  and  re- 
 commend us  to  fonie  other  as  more  probable,  tho* 
 it  be  not  fupported  by  any  ftrongcr  Reafons. 
 
 XX. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 The  accidents  of  Fortune,  fuch  as  an  Earthquake  may  fink  3 
 Man  and  all  his  concerns,  and  tho'  in  that  extraordinary  cafe, 
 as  it  is  put,  my  choice  be  not  able  to  prevent  my  death,  yet 
 my  Happinefs  in  the  general  management  of  Life  may  be  very 
 much  in  my  own  power,  and  not  altogether  in  the  power  of 
 foreign  Accidents.  And  even  in  the  cafe  of  an  Earthquake,  a^ 
 good  Man  that  had  fixed  his  Eleflion  to  fubmit  to  fuch  a  death 
 and  circumftances  as  it  flioulJ  pleafe  Providence  to  aflign  him, 
 wou'd  not  be  without  fonie  pleafure,  even  in  fuch  an  accident: 
 at  leafl  not  fo  unhappy  as  another  that  had  made  no  fuch  Refo- 
 lution  or  Eleftion.  But  if  fuch  an  Election  can  make  him  no 
 eafier  or  do  him  no  good,  it  were  to  no  purpofe  to  make  it* 
 He  can  have  no  profpeft  or  defign  in  making  it,  if  the  Good 
 or  Evil  relulting  from  the  Agreement  or  Difagreement  of  what 
 happens  to  his  natural  Apj  ctites  be  the  only  Confiderations  that 
 can  determine  his  will.  It  it  plain  that  in  fuch  a  cafe  he  muil 
 be  miferable,  if  outward  things  happen  crofs  to  his  Appetites; 
 whereas  if  he  can  make  them  agreeable  or  difagreeable  in  any 
 meafure  by  his  own  choice,  he  is  ftill  matter  of  his  Happinefs, 
 and  the  confideration  that  he  can  make  them  fo  is  a  good  rea- 
 fon  for  choofmg.  So  far  is  he  from  choofing  ifjithout  Re  a/on , 
 as  is  fallly  objedled. 
 
 But  7thly,  'Tis  urg'd,  that  if  the  will  were  not  moved  but 
 by  the  Reprefentation  of  antecedent  Good  and  Evil  in  the 
 things  that  happen,  it  would  not  indeed  be  in  our  power  to  be 
 happy,  fuppofing  there  were  no  God,  and  that  all  things 
 were  govern'd  by  Matter  and  Motion  ;  But  God  has  fo  or- 
 der'd  it,  that  to  be  virtuous  is  fufticient  to  make  a  Man  happy. 
 If  therefore  the  Soul  follows  Rcafon  and  the  Orders  God  has 
 given  her,  fhe  is  fure  to  be  happy,  altho'  fllC  cannot  find  c- 
 nough  to  make  her  fo  in  this  Life, 
 
 To 
 
Sea:;  I  Sub.  i.     Of  Moral  Evil.  243 
 
 XX.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  alfo,    that  among  the  All  thofe 
 foregoing  Authors  I  leckon  thofe  who  declare  that  ^^^°  ^^" 
 the  Will  is  determin'd  by  the  laft  Judgment  of  tlie  thc'^v/iU 
 tJnderfianding  *,    which   has  taken   with  a    great  jg  p^iffive 
 many    Philofophers;   and  in    (liorr,    all  who  main- in  its  Ope- 
 tain  that  the  Will  is  pajfive  in  Eleftions.     For  thefe  rations 
 muft  be  efteem'dto  have  the  fame   Sentiments  of  J]J^^^^g° 
 Liberty  with  the  former,  which  way  foever  they  Opinion 
 explain  their  Opinion;  as  may  appear  from  hence?  with  the 
 that  mofi:  of  them   exprefly  deny  that  Indifference  former, 
 belongs  to  the  Nature  of  Freedoms    To  that  their  ^"^ PJ^^" 
 
 o  ^<   •    •       edwith 
 
 R  2  Opmionj-^j^e^on- 
 
 fec[uenees. 
 
 "     NO  T  E  S 
 
 .  To  which  I  anfwer,  ift,  That  this  is  giving  up  the  Happi- 
 nefs  of  this  Life,  and  acknowledging  that  God  has  not  provid- 
 ed any  Natural  means  to  make  us  happy  here,  which  is  a  Con- 
 feffion  that  one  who  is  zealous  to  defend  the  Wifdom  and 
 Goodnefs  of  God  will  not  eaiily  grant. 
 
 ,  2dly,  I  have  no  other  Notion  o^  Virtue  than  that  of  an, 
 EletVion  within  the  limits  prefcribed  by  God  and  Nature ;  I 
 think  the  definition  of  it  is  Habitus  cum  ratione  eleflivus  iti  jne- 
 diocritate  conjijlens ;  if  then  to  be  virtuous  is  enough  to  make  us 
 happy,  it  is  plain  that  our  Happinefs  confifts  in  our  EleSlio?!^ 
 which  is  the  very  thing  I  plead  for:  but  if  our  Eledlion  make 
 the  things  elefled  neither  better  nor  worfe,  neither  more  nor 
 lefs  agreeable,  it  is  inconceivable  how  our  Happinefs  fliould 
 confift  at  all  in  Virtue.  If  the  meaning  be  that  God  will  re- 
 ward us  hereafter,  that  is  to  confefs  we  are  miferable  for  the 
 prefent,  but  fliall  be  happy  fome  other  time.  I  own  indeed 
 that  Hope  is  a  great  caufe  of  Pleafure,  but  except  we  choofe  the 
 crolFmg  our  natunil  Appetites  for  the  prefent  out  of  prolpe^t 
 to  the  future,  it  vvill  no  ways  render  our  prefent  fuffering  to- 
 lerable. Nor  will  fuch  a  profpecl,  how  clearly  foever  oftcr'd 
 by  our  Underftanding,  yield  us  this  Pleafure,  except  the  will 
 confent.  For  then  it  wou'd  do  fo  to  all  to  whom  the  offer  is 
 ipade  ;  whereas  we  fee  one  perfeveres  by  means  of  it,  and  ano- 
 ther in  much  more  advantageous  Circumflances  yields  to  the 
 prefent  Tem.ptation,  and  knowingly  lofes  the  Reward. 
 
 (45')  A3 
 
 *  Jgainjl  this  Notion /eg  S^Ct.  5.  Subfedl.  z,  par.  tj". 
 
244  Of  ^oral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Opinion  is  attended  with  the  fame  confequences  as 
 the  former.  (45.) 
 
 SUBSECT. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (45  )  As  Mr.  Lochh-3.s  particularly  laboiir'd  the  point  before 
 us,  and  feems  to  defend  by  turns  the  fevcral  Principles  which 
 our  Author  attacks  here  and  in  the  following  Section,  we  fhall 
 examine  a  little  into  his  Method  of  treating  the  Subje£t.  Hav- 
 ing firft  of  all  defin'd  Liberty  to  be    *  A  Power  in  any  Agent 
 
 *  to  door  forbear  any  particular  Adtion,  according  to  the  Dc- 
 
 *  termination  or  Thought  of  the  Mind,  whereby  either  of  them 
 
 *  is  preferr'd  to  the  other*.'  He  takes  a  great  deal  of  Pains  to 
 prove  that  fuch  Liberty  does  not  belong  to  the  Will ;  which  is 
 very  certain,  granting  his  fenfe  of  Liberty  to  be  the  only  one, 
 fince  by  his  Definition  it  is  evidently  fubfequent  to  the  choice 
 or  prefcretice  of  the  Mind,  and  only  relates  to  the  execution  of 
 fuch  choice  by  an  inferior  faculty  f .  But  then,  befide  this  Idea 
 of  Liberty,  which  is  nothing  to  the  prefent  Queflion,  there  is 
 another  previous  and  equally  proper  one,  which  regards  the 
 very  determination,  preference  or  dire£lion  of  the  Mind  itfelf; 
 and  may  be  called  its  Vovjqx  oi  determining  to  do  or  forbear  any 
 particular  Adtion,  or  o^  preferring  one  to  another;  and  if  Free- 
 dom can  with  any  propriety  of  Speech  be  attributed  to  one  of 
 thefe  PcfjersX  as  he  has  conflantly  attributed  it,  why  may 
 it  not  with  equal  propriety  be  appled  to  the  other?  He  pro- 
 ceeds therefore  to  ftate  the  Quellion  concerning  the  latter, 
 which  he  would  not  have  put,  whether  the  Will  be  free  ?  but 
 whether  the  Mind  or  Man  be  free  to  will  ?  both  which  I  think 
 amount  to  the  fame  thing  with  common  Undcrftandings,  fince 
 in  the  firft  place  we  only  afk,  Whether  this  Will  be  properly 
 an  aSii^e  poiver  of  the  Mind  (z.  e.  as  oppofed  to  Mr.  Locke's 
 ■pajjive  Power)  and  in  the  fecond.  Whether  the  Mind  be  aSlinje 
 or  indifferent  in  exerting  this  Power  call'd  Will  t  and  both 
 which  will  be  equally  improper  Quellions  with  regard  to  his 
 former  lenfe  of  the  Word  Free,  i.  e.  as  only  applicable  to  the 
 ^t7/»«j  fubfequent  on  Volition.  However,  he  goes  on  in  the 
 fecond  place  to  enquire,  whether  in  general  a  Man  be  free 
 ♦  To  Will  or  not  to  Will,  when  any  Adlion  is  once  propofed 
 '  to  his  Thoughts,  as  prefently  to  be  done.'  In  which  refpedt 
 he  determines  that  a  Man  is  not  at  liberty,  becaufe  he  cannot 
 jorbear  Willing  or  preferring  the  one  to  the  other  ||  i    which 
 
 tho' 
 
 *  C.  OfFoivny  %.  8.  t  See  Note  42. 
 
 $  §.  16.  II  §.  23,  24. 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  245 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    II. 
 
 An  Opinion  is  propofed  in  general^  affert- 
 ing  a  Freedom  from  NeceJJity  as  well  as 
 Compuljion. 
 
 THIS    Opinion  determines  almofl   the   fame  This  a- 
 with    the  former   concerning   the    Goodnefs  g/'^es'^^'^h 
 or   Agreeablenefs  of  Objefts  to  the  Appetites,   nor  i„  mofl"" 
 is  there  much  difference  in  what  relates  to  the  di-  cafes  ef- 
 R  5  ftindion  pecially- 
 
 in  thofe 
 NOTES,  relating  to 
 
 the  Appe- 
 tites   to 
 the'  it  be  fcirce  confiftent  with  his  other  Notion  o{ Sufpc7ifion,  Good 
 
 whereby  a  Man  either  avoids  a  particular  determination  in  the  plgoAnt 
 cafe,  and  continues  in  the  fame  ftate  he  is  in  [not  by  virtue  of  a  Pj-ofitabfe 
 prefent  Determination  of  his  Will,  but  of  fome  precedent  one]  ^^^  Hon-- 
 or  elfe  wills  fomething  different  from  either  the  exiitence  or  ^^ .  j^  ^ 
 non  exiftence  of  the  Aflion  propofed*,    and  tho'  it  fliould  u^akes  this 
 comprehend,  as  he  fays  it  does,  moft  cafes  in  Life,  yet  ilill  it  jg  j^^  ju 
 is  not  of  the  leaft  Importance.     For  what  does  it  fignify  to  me  difference 
 that  I  muft  necefTarily  take  one  fide  or   the  other,  right  or  between  a 
 wrong,  fo  long  as  I  can  choofe  either  of  them  indifferently  ?  ]^^j^  „    j 
 If  I  can  will  or  choofe  either  of  the  t^vo,  here's   full  room  for  'Q^nts 
 the  exercife  of.Liberty ;  and  whether  I  can  or  no,  ought  to  ^/^    dnt 
 have  been  Mr.  Locke'' i  next  Queftion.     The  Anfwer  to  which  the  one  is 
 feems  pretty  eafy,  tho'  perhaps  not  fo  reconcileable  with  his  Jeter- 
 Hypothefis.     However,  inftead  of  meddling  witii  it,  he  flips  mj^'d  bv 
 this  abfurd  Query  into  its  Room,  ws.  Whether  a  Man  be  at  \^^  bodilv 
 Liberty  to  will  nxhich  of  the  tavo  he  pleafes  ?  or  which  is  the  Appetite 
 fome,  Whether  he  can  Will  what  he  Wills?  Sed.  25.  f  and  rhe  other 
 then,  inftead  of  {hewing  whether  the  Will  be  naturally  deter-  \^y  ]^jjj^_ 
 min'd  to  one  fide,  in  any  or  all  cafes,  or  whether  the  Man  be  fgjf 
 always  ix^t  to  ivill  this  way  or  that :  (as  might  have  been  ex- 
 pected) 
 
 *  See  Note  48. 
 f  See  Strtitfi  Remarks  on  Locke\  Chapt&r  of  Power,  Do 
 38,  ^c. 
 
246  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 ftinftion  of  Good  into  pleafant,  Profirable,  and 
 Honeft :  Except  that  it  refers  Honeft  to  the  Duty 
 which  a  ^Man  ov/es  to  God,  himfelf,  and  other 
 Men,  as  a  Member  of  an  intelligent  Society,  rather 
 than  to  the  natural  Appetites  j    and  thinks  that  we 
 
 are 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 pefted)  he  tells  us  fomething  very  different,  'y/z,  that  we  can't 
 always  aSI  in  that  Manner,  or  that  Liberty  of  aB'ing  does  not 
 require  that  a  Man  fhou'd  be  a-ble  to  do  any  Aftion  or  its  con^ 
 trary  :  th^n  he  goes  onto  give  us  another  Explanation  of  the 
 word  Liberty,  which  is  ftill  confined  to  Aflion,  and  confe- 
 qucntly  v;reign  to  the  prefent  Quellion. 
 
 In  the  next  place  he  defines  the  Will  over  again  *.    ♦  Which 
 
 *  (lays  he)  is  nothing  but  a  power  in  the  Aiind  to  dired  thi? 
 
 *  operative  Faculties  of  a  Man  to  Motion  or  Reft,  as  far  as  they 
 
 *  depend  on  fach  diredion'.  By  which  Words  if  hq  mean, 
 that  this  Power  of  directing  the  operative  Faculties,  is  proper* 
 ]y  aSiive  (in  the  fenfe  abovemention'd)  or  Phyfically  indiffe- 
 rent  to  any  particular  manner  of  diredling  them,  /.  e.  is  an  abi- 
 lity to  direft  them  either  to  Motion  or  Reft,  without  any  fta- 
 tural  Byafs  to  determine  it  (or  to  determine  the  mind  to  de- 
 termine it)  toward  one  fide  always  rather  than  the  other  :  Ifi 
 I  fay,  he  intends  to  imply  thus  much  in  this  definition  of 
 Will,  then  may  Frecdo:n  be  juftly  predicated  of  that  fame 
 Will,  (or  of  the  Mind  in  the  exercife  of  it,)  not  indeed  his 
 kind  of  Freedom,  i.  e.  \!i\iX.  o'i aSiivg,  which  belongs  to  ano- 
 ther Faculty ;  but  Freedom  in  our  fenfe  of  the  Word,  /.  e, 
 a  certain  Jndifrerence,  or  Indeterminatcnefs  in  its  own  exercife  j 
 wiiich  is  what  mofl  Men  underftand  hy  Liberum  Arhitriumi 
 and  whether  there  be  fuch  a  Liberty  as  this  in  human  Nature> 
 would  here  have  be?n  a  proper  Queftion.  For  if  there  be, 
 then  vi'e  have  got  an  abfolutely  fclf-moving  Principle,  which 
 docs  not  wantany  thing  out  of  itfelf  to  determine  it;  which  has 
 n')  phylical  conneilion  with,  and  of  confequence,  no  necefiary 
 occafion  for  that  grand  Determiner  Anxiety,  which  he  has 
 afterwards  taken  fo  much  pains  to  fettle  and  explain,  and  which 
 fhall  be  confider'd  by  and  by.  But  here  he  flies  off  again,  and 
 inftead  of  determining  this,  which  is  the  main  point  of  the 
 controverfy,  and  wherein  Liberty  muft  be  found  or  no  where, 
 (^3  we  obferv'd  in  Note  42.)  1  fay,  inilead  oi-  ftating  and  de- 
 termining 
 
 *  §  29. 
 
Seft.  I.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  247 
 
 are  to  judge  of  the  Agreeablenefs  of  things  from 
 that,  rather  than  from  thefe.  As  to  the  Eleilion 
 which  the  Will  makes  on  account  of  thefe,  it  aflerts 
 that  this  proceeds  from  the  Will  itfelf,  and  that 
 a   free   Agent    cannot   be   determin'd  like  natural 
 
 R  4  Bodies 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 termining  this  great  Queftion,  Whether  the  Will  or  Mind  be 
 abfolutely  independent  upon,  and  phyfically  indifferent  to  all 
 particular  A£ls,  Objeds,  Motions,  iS'c.  or  neceffarily  require 
 feme  foreign  Mover;  he  feems  to  take  the  latter  for  granted, 
 and  immediately  proceeds  to  the  following  Queftion,  IVhat 
 determines  the  Will  ?  The  Meaning  of  which,  fays  he  *,  is  this, 
 
 *  What  moves  the  Mind  in  every  particular  inrtance  to  deter- 
 
 *  mine  its  general  power  of  direfting  to  this  or  that  particular 
 ^  Motion  or  Reft '  ?  This  Mr.  Locke  calls,  for  fhortnefs  fake, 
 determining  the  Will;  and  declares  that  what  thus  determines 
 it  either  firft  to  continue  in  the  fame  ftate  or  action,  is  only 
 the  prefent  Satisfaiiion  in  it :  or  fecondly  to  change,  is  always 
 fome  U?ieaJinefs-\-.  By  which  Words  if  he  only  meant  that 
 thefe  Perceptions  are  the  common  Moti'ves,  Inducements,  or 
 Ckcajions  whereupon  the  Mind  in  faft  exerts  its  power  of  wil' 
 ling  in  this  or  that  particular  Manner;  tho'  in  reality  it  always 
 can,  and  often  docs  the  contrary  (as  he  feems  to  intimate  by 
 fpeaking  of  a  Will  contrary  to  Defire  J  of  raifing  Defires  by 
 due   Confideration  II  znd.  forfning  Appetites  §,  of  a  Power  to 
 
 fufpend  any  Deftres,  to  moderate  and  reftrain  the  Paftions,  and 
 hinder  either  of  them  from  determing  the  Will  and  engaging 
 us  in  Aclion:  **  Then,  as  we  faid  before,  he  is  only  talking 
 pf  another  Queftion,  and  what  he  has  advanc'd  on  this  head 
 may  readily  be  granted,  at  leaft  without  any  prejudice  to  hu- 
 man Liberty.  For  in  this  fenfe  to  affirm  that  the  Will  or 
 Mind  is  determin'd  by  fomething  without  it,  is  only  faying 
 that  it  generally  has  fome  Mrti'ves  from  without,  according  to 
 which  it  determines  the  abovemention'd  Powers,  which  no 
 }Axn  in  his  Senfes  can  difpute. 
 
 But  if  he  intended  that  thefe  Motives  fhou'd  be  underftood 
 to  rule  and  diredl  the  Will  abfolutely  and  irrefiitibly  in  certain 
 Cafes:  —  That  they  have  fuch  a  neceiliiry  influence  on  the 
 |ylind,  that  it  can  never  be  determin'd  without  or  againft  them; 
 
 —  in 
 
 .         _  II  §.  46. 
 
 29. 
 
 f  Ibid.            X  §.   30, 
 
 52.' 
 
 *!  §•  47»  50'  53- 
 
248  0/  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Bodies  by  external  Impulfes,  or  like  Brutes  by 
 Objefts.  For  this  is  the  very  difference  betwixt 
 Man  and  the  Brutes,  that  thefe  are  determin'd  ac- 
 cording to  their  bodily  Appetites,  whence  all  their 
 Anions    are    neceflaty,    but    Man   has  a  different 
 
 Principle 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 —  in  fhort,  that  the  Soul  of  Man  has  not  a  fhyfical  Pcujer  of 
 willing  independent  of,  and  confequently  indifferent  to  all 
 Perceptions,  Reafons  and  Motives  whatfoever  ;  —  which  the 
 general  drift  of  his  Difcourfe  feems  to  aflert,  particularly  §.  47, 
 48,  4.9,  50.  where  he  confounds  the  Determination  of  the 
 Judgment  with  the  exertion  of  the  fclf  moving  Power  through- 
 out. As  alfo  §.  52.  where  he  alTerts,  That  all  the  Liberty 
 we  have  or  are  capable  of  lies  in  this,  '  that  we  can  fujpend 
 '  our  Defires,  and  hold  our  Wills  undetermin'd,  till  we  have 
 
 *  examined  the  Good  and  Evil  of  what  we  defire ;  what  fol- 
 '  lows  after  that  follows  in  a  Chain  of  Confequcnces  link'd 
 
 *  one  to  another,  all  depending  on  the  kft  Determination  ot 
 
 *  the  Judgment.'  And  when  he  fpeaks  o^i  Caufes  not  in  our 
 Power,  operating  for  the  moll  part  forcibly  on  the  Will, 
 §.   57,  yc. 
 
 If  from  thcfe  and  the  like  Expreffions,  I  fay,  we  may  con- 
 clude this  to  have  been  his  Opinion,  t'iz.  that  all  the  Liberty 
 of  the  Mind  confifts  iblely  in  direfting  the  Determination  of 
 the  Judgment,  (tho'  if  the  Mind  be  always  determin'd  from 
 without  we  muft  have  a  Motive  alfo  for  this  direSiion,  and 
 confequently  fhall  find  no  more  freedom  here  than  any  where 
 elfc)  after  which  Determination  all  our  Adions  (if  they  can 
 be  called  fuch  *)  follow  neceflarily  :  then  I  believe  it  will 
 .  appear,  that  at  the  fame  time  that  he  oppofcd  the  true  Notion 
 of  Free- Will,  he  contradiftcd  common  Senfe  and  Experience, 
 as  well  as  himfelf  For  in  the  firfl,  place,  is  it  not  felf-cvident, 
 that  we  often  do  not  follow  our  own  prefcnt  Judgment,  but 
 run  counter  to  the  clear  conviflion  of  our  Underflandings ; 
 which  A£lions  accordingly  appear  vicious,  and  fill  us  imme- 
 diately with  regret  and  the  iHngs  of  Confcience?  This  he  al- 
 lows, [§.  35,  3S.]  to  make  Room  for  his  Anxiety.  But,  ap- 
 on  the  foregoing  Hypothefis,  How  can  any  Adion  appear 
 to  be  irregular  ?  How  can  any  thing  that  is  confequent  upon 
 the  final  Refuk  o'i J udgment ,  (it  this  Word  be  ufed  in  its  pro- 
 per 
 
 *  See  Note  42. 
 
Sedl.  I.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil  24^ 
 
 Principle    in     him,    and    determines    himfelf    to  That  the 
 Adion.  ^^^f  . 
 
 ir.     This   Principle   whereby    Man  excells  the  ne^e^ri- 
 Brutes  is  thus  explained  by   the  Defenders  of  the  lydefir'd, 
 following   Opinion,  if  I  take  their  Meaning  right:  but  others 
 In  the    hrft  place,  they  declare  that  there  is  feme  ^re  not, 
 
 J   they  may 
 
 1.      >r>  .-r-  7-    <^  ^^  repre- 
 
 NOTES.  fented  by 
 
 the  Un- 
 per  Senfe)  be  againft  Confcience,  which  is  nothing  elfe  but  derftand 
 that  final  Judgment  *  ?  Nay,  upon  the  fuppofition  of  our  be-  ing  in 
 ing  inviolably  determin'd  in  willing  by  our  Judgment  (and,  different 
 according  to  Mr.  Locke,  our  Conftitution  puts  us  under  a  ne-  refpeds. 
 ceffity  of  being  fo,  §.  48.)  it  would  be  really  impoffible  for  us 
 to  will  amifs  or  immorally,  let  our  Judgments  be  ever  fo  er- 
 roneous ;  '  The  Caufes  of  which  (as  he  alfo  obferves,  §.  64.) 
 '  proceed  from  the  weak  and  narrow  conftitution  of  our  Minds, 
 •  and  are  moft  of  them  out  of  our  Power.'  Either  therefore 
 we  can  will  without  and  againft  a  prefent  Judgment,  and 
 therefore  are  not  neceflarily  [i.  e.  phyfically)  determin'd  by  it; 
 or  we  cannot  be  guilty  of  a  wrong  Volition  :  whatever  proves 
 the  one,  by  neceffary  confequence  eftabliflies  the  other.  Far- 
 ther, there  are  innumerjble  indifferent  Aftions  which  occur 
 daily,  both  with  refpedl  to  abfolute  choofmg  or  refuftng,  or 
 to  choofing  among  things  abfolutely  equal,  equal  both  in  them- 
 felves,  aid  to  the  Mind,  on  which  we  evidently  pafs  no 
 manner  of  Judgment,  and  confequently  cannot  be  faid  to  fol- 
 low its  Determination  in  them.  To  will  the  eating  or  not 
 eating  of  an  Egg  is  a  Proof  of  the  former  ;  to  choofe  one  out 
 of  two  or  more  Eggs  apparently  alike,  is  a  proverbial  Inllance 
 of  the  latter;  both  which  are  demonftrations  of  an  aftive  or 
 felf-moving  Power ;  either  way  we  determine  and  ad  when 
 the  Motives  are  entirely  equal,  which  is  the  fame  as  to  aft 
 vvithout  any  Motive  at  all.  In  the  former  Cafe  I  perceive  no 
 previous  Inclination  to  direft  my  Will  in  general,  in  the  lat- 
 ter no  Motive  to  influence  its  Determination  in  particular; 
 and  in  the  prefent  Cafe,  not  to  perceive  a  A^otive  is  to  have 
 none ;  (except  we  could  be  faid  to  have  an  Idea  without  be- 
 ing confcious  of  it,  to  be  anxious  and  yet  infenfible  of  that 
 Anxiety,  or  fway'd  by  a  Reafon  which  we  do  not  at  all  ap- 
 prehend.) 
 
 *  See  Limborch.  Theol.  Chrijl.  L.  2.  C.  23.  Seft.  16.  and 
 for  an  Anfyjer  to  the  latter  part  of  Locke's  48th  Seil,  fee  the 
 fame  Chap.  Sedl.  the  la  ft. 
 
250  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Chief  Good,  the  Enjoyment  of  which  would  make 
 a  Man  completely  happy ;  this  he  naturally  and 
 necelTarily  defires,  and  cannot  rejed  it  when  duly 
 reprefented  by  the  Underftanding.  That  other 
 things  which  offer  themfelves  have  a  Relation  to 
 this  Good,  or  fome  Connection  with  it,  and  are  to 
 be  efteem'd  Good  or  Evil,  as  they  help  or  hinder  our 
 obtaining  it;  and  fince  there  is  nothing  in  Nature  but 
 what  in  fome  refped  or  other,  either  promotes  this 
 End,  or  prevents  iti    from  this  Indifference  they 
 
 declare^ 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 prehend.)  Neither  is  it  neceflary  to  a  true  Equality  or  Indif- 
 ference here,  that  I  be  fuppofed  to  have  no  Will  to  ufe  any 
 Eggs  at  all  (as  the  Author  of  the  Philofophical  Enquiry  abfurdly 
 puts  the  Cafe)  for  granting  in  the  firlt  Place,  that  I  have  not 
 a  will  to  ufe  any  Eggs  at  all,  'tis  indeed  nonfenfe  to  fuppofe 
 afterwards  that  I  fhould  choofe  any  one ;  but  let  me  have  ne- 
 ver fo  great  an  Inclination  to  eat  Eggs  in  general,  yet  that 
 general  Inclination  will  not  in  the  kail  oblige  me  to  choofe 
 or  prefer  one  Egg  in  particular  *,  which  is  the  only  point  in 
 Queftion.  Numberlefs  Inftances  might  eafily  be  given -f-, 
 where  we  often  approve,  prefer,  defire  and  choofe  ;  and  all 
 we  know  not  why :  where  we  either  choole  fuch  things  as 
 have  no  manner  of  Good  or  Evil  in  them,  excepting  what 
 arifes  purely  from  that  Choice;  or  prefer  fome  to  others, 
 when  both  are  equal  Means  to  the  fame  End  :  in  which  Cafes 
 the  Judgment  is  not  in  the  leall  concern'd ;  and  he  that  un- 
 dertakes to  oppofe  the  Principle  by  which  our  Author  accounts 
 for  them,  mull  either  deny  all  fuch  Equality  and  Indifference, 
 or  grant  the  Queflion.  Not  that  this  Principle  is  confined  to 
 fuch  Cafes  as  thefe  ;  nor  are  they  produced  as  the  moll  impor- 
 tant, but  as  the  moll  evident  Inilances  of  its  exertion  ;  where 
 no  Motives  can  be  fuppofed  to  determine  the  Will,  becaufe 
 there  are  none.  To  urge,  that  fuch  Eleclions  as  thefe  are 
 mad^  on  purpofe  to  try  my  Liberty,  which  End,  fay  fome 
 becomes  the  Motive;  is  in  efiedl  granting  the  very  thmg  we 
 contend  for,  <z;/«.  that  the  Pleafure  attending  the  exercife  of 
 the  Will  is  often  the  fole  rcafon  of  Volition.     Befides,  that 
 
 Motiv'c 
 
 *  See  Leibnitz's_y^/^  Paper  to  Dr.  Clarke,  N*.  17.  and  66-, 
 •f  See  Dr.  Cheyne's  Pkil.  Principlest  Chap.  z.  Sc6t.  13. 
 
Sea.  J.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  25 1 
 
 declare,  thac  we  have  an  Opportunity  of  rejefting 
 'or  receiving  any  thing.  For  tho'  we  can  choofe 
 nothing  but  under  the  Appearance  of  Good,  /.  e, 
 unlefs  it  be  in  fome  manner  connefted  with  the 
 Chief  Good,  as  a  Means  or  Appendage;  yet  this 
 does  not  determine  the  Choice,  becaufe  every  Ob- 
 jed  may  be  varied,  and  reprefented  by  the  Un- 
 derftandine  under  very  different  Appearances. 
 
 ^  ^  III, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Motive  is  one  of  the  Mind's  own  making ;  and  to  be  able  to 
 produce  the  Motive  for  Aftion,  is  the  fame  thing,  with  re- 
 gard to  Liberty,  as  to  be  able  to  aft  without  one.  If  by  try- 
 ing our  Liberty  be  meant  an  Experiment  to  affure  us  that  we 
 Have  really  fuch  a  Power ;  there  can  be  no  reafon  for  trying  it 
 in  this  fenfe,  becaufe  we  are  fufHciently  confcious  of  it  before 
 any  fuch  Trial. 
 
 *  The  Mind  (fays   the  Author  of  the  Efay  on  Ccnfcioufnefs, 
 
 *  p.  208.)  before  ever  it  exerts  its  Will  or  Power  of  choofing, 
 
 *  is  confcious,  and  knows  within  itfelf,  that  it  hath  a  Power  of 
 «  Choice  or  Preference ;  and  this  is  a  neceffary  Condition  of 
 
 <  willing  at  all,  infomuch  that  the  very  firft  time  I  had  occa- 
 '  Hon  to  exert  my  Will,  or  make  ufe  of  my  eleftive  Power,  I 
 «  could  not  poOibly  exercife  it,  or  do  any  voluntary  Aft, 
 «  without   knowing   and  being  confcious  to  myfelf  [before 
 
 *  hand]  that  I  have  fuch  a  Faculty  or  Power  in  myfelf  A  thing 
 
 <  that  feems  at  tirlt  fight  very  ftrange  and  wonderful;  to  know 
 «  I  have  a  power  of  adling  before  ever  I  have  adted,  or  had  any 
 
 *  trial  or  experience  of  it :  But  a  little  Refleaion  will  quickfy 
 «  fatisfie  any  one  that  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  it  muft  be  fo, 
 
 *  and  cannot  poffibly  be  otherwife ;  and  which  is  peculiar  to 
 
 *  this  Faculty:  For  we  know  nothing  of  our  Powers  of  Per- 
 '  ceiving,  Underftanding,  Remembring,  ^c.  but  by  experi- 
 
 *  menting  their  Afts,  it  being  neceffary  firft  to  perceive  ox 
 «  think,  before  we  can  know  that  we  have  a  Power  of  preceiv- 
 f  ing  or  thinking.'  The  Author  proceeds  to  (hew,  that  this 
 'pore-confcioufnefs  of  a  power  of  nvilling  or  choofing,  does  moll 
 clearly  demonllrate  that  the  Mind  in  all  its  Volitions  hegim  the 
 Motion,  or  aclcth/ro;^  itfelf*. 
 
 T^ 
 
 *  EffayonConfcioufnefs,  p.  209,  2IQ, 
 
It. 
 
 252  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 Though  III.  Secondly,  When  therefoie  any  Good  is  pro- 
 *h^  W°n  P^^^'^  ^^^^^  is  not  the  Chief,  the  Will  cznfufpend*. 
 follows  ^^^  Adion,  and  command  the  Underftanding  to 
 feme  purpofe  fome  other  thing,  or  the  fame  in  fome 
 Judgment  different  view  :  which  may  be  always  done,  fince 
 oftheUn-  every  thing  except  the  chief  Good  is  of  fuch  a 
 derftand-  jy^^juj-g^  that  the  underlknding  may  apprehend 
 it  is  not  ^o"^6  refpecS  or  relation  wherein  it  is  incommodious. 
 necefTarily  Notwithftanding  therefore  that  the  Will  always  does 
 deter-  follow  fome  Judgment  of  the  Underftanding, 
 mm'd  by  which  is  made  about  the  fubfequent  A6lions,  yet 
 it  is  not  neceffanly  determin'd  by  any,  for  it  can  fuf- 
 pend  its  Ad  and  order  fome  other  Judgment, 
 which  it  may  follow.  Since  therefore  it  can  either 
 exert  or  fufpend  its  Ad,  it  is  not  only  free  from 
 Compulfion,  but  alfo  indifferent  in  icfelf,  with 
 regard  to  its  Adions,  and  determines  itfelf  with- 
 out neceflity. 
 
 IV, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 To  argue  ftill  that  fome  minute  impreceptible  Caufes,  fome 
 particular  Circumftances  in  our  own  Bodies,  or  thofe  about  us 
 mull  determine  even  thele  fecmingly  indifferent  Adions,  is 
 either  running  into  the  former  abllirdity  of  making  us  aft  upon 
 Motives  which  we  don't  apprehend  ;  or  faying,  that  we  aft  me- 
 chanically, /.  e.  do  not  aft  at  all:  and  in  the  laft  place,  to  fay 
 that  we  are  determin'd  to  choofc  any  of  thefe  trifles  juft  as  we 
 happen  to  fix  our  Thoughts  upon  it  in  particular,  at  the  very 
 inllant  of  Aftion,  is  either  attributing  all  to  the  felf  moving 
 Power  of  the  Mind,  which  is  granting  the  Quellion  :  or  re- 
 ferring us  tp  the  minute  and  impreceptible  Caufes  above 
 mcntion'd;  or  obtruding  upon  us  that  idle  unmeaning  Word 
 Chance  inllead  of  a  Phyfical  Caufc,  which  is  faying  nothing  at 
 all.  How  hard  mult  Men  be  prefs'd  under  an  Hypothefis 
 when  they  fly  to  fuch  evafive  fliifts  as  thefc  !  How  much, 
 eafier  and  better  would  it  be  to  give  up  all  fuch  blind,  un- 
 known, and  unaccountable  Impulfes,  and  own,  what  common 
 Senfe  and  Experience  diftate,  an  Independent,  Free,  Self- 
 moving 
 
 *  See  Note  4S. 
 
Seca.  I.  Sub.  2.     Of  Mm-al  Evil.  253 
 
 IV.  It  mufl:   be  confefs'd  that  this  opinion  does  ThlsOpi- 
 eflablifh  Liberty,  and  on  that  account  is  more  agreea-  J^J°!J  ^^^: 
 ble  to  reafon,    experience,    and  the  common  fenfe  bJi-t "  ^ut 
 of  Mankind,   yet   fome  things  in  it   feem   to   be  yet  there 
 prefum'd  upon  and  not  fufficiently  explained.  are  fome 
 
 V.  For  in  the  firft  place,  'tis  faid  that  the  Will  things  not 
 determines  itfelf^  but  we  are  not   inform'd  how  that  j"  ^'^^^i^'^- 
 is  poffible,  nor  what  ufe  fuch  a  Power  would  be  of,  plained 
 were  it  admitted :   nay,  it   feems  rather   prejudical  in  it. 
 than  advantageous  to  Mankind.     For  that  Goodnefs  Such  a 
 which  it  is  fuppofed  to  purfue,  is  in  the  things  them-  Liberty  as 
 felves,    and   arifes  from  their  connexion   with   the      ,  ^*^^^"^ 
 chief  Good  ;  it   is  not  therefore  to  be  form'd,  but  ^^^^  ^^^ 
 difcovered  by  the  Underftanding.     If  then  the  Un-  judice 
 derftanding  performs  its  Duty  right,  it  will  difcover  than  bene- 
 what  is  bed::  but  it  is  our  Advantage  to  be  deter-  ^^^°,. 
 mined  to  that  which  is  bell :  it  had  therefore  been     ^^  ^" 
 better  for  Man  if  Nature  had  given  him  up  abfo- 
 lutely  to  the  determination  of  his  own  Judgment 
 
 and 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 moving  Principle,  the  true,  the  obvious,  and  only  fource  of 
 both  'Volition  and  Adion  ! 
 
 With  rcgird  to  Mr.  iurZ-Zs  Inconfiftencies,  I  fhall  only  add 
 one  Obfervation  more,  'viz,  tliat  he  'eems  to  place  the  Oaufe 
 (Motive,  or  whatever  he  means  by  it)  of  his  Determination  of 
 the  Will  after  the  EfFedl,  The  Caufe  of  that  Determination  is, 
 according  to  him,  Anxiety  ;  this  he  fometimes  makes  concomi- 
 tant, fometimes  confequent  upon  Defire;  and  Sedl.  31.  he 
 fays  tlie  one  is  fcarce  diilinguifliable  from  the  other. 
 
 But  this  fame  Dcfire  appears  to  me  to  be  the  very  Determina- 
 tion of  the  Will  itfelf;  what  we  abfolutely  defire  we  always 
 will,  and  'vice  njcrfa ;  whether  it  be  in  our  Power  to  purfue  that 
 Will,  and  produce  it  into  Ad,  or  not :  and  indeed  Defire 
 feems  to  be  no  otherwifc  dilUnguifhable  from  Volition,  than  as 
 the  latter  is  generally  attended  with  the  Power  oi  A(f!lion, 
 which  the  former  is  confider'd  without.  This  I  think  is  all  the 
 Diftindlion  that  they  are  capable  of,  which  yet  is  only  nominal: 
 Nor  do  his  Inftances  in  §,  30  prove  that  there  is  any  Differ- 
 ence between  'em.     Thus  when  I  am  obliged  to  ufe  perfua- 
 
 fjons 
 
i^S4  Of  ^^^^^  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 and  Underftanding,  and  not  allow'd  that  Judg- 
 ment to  be  {ufpended  by  the  power  of  the  Will. 
 For  by  that  means  he  would  have  obtained 
 his  End  wi  h  greater  certainty  and  eafe,  [  grantj 
 that  if  a  Man  were  abfolutely  determin'd  in  his 
 Actions  to  the  beft,  there  would  be  no  room  for 
 virtue,  properly  io  call'd;  for  virtue,  as  it  is  com- 
 monly underftoodj  requires  a  free  Aft,  and  this 
 Liberty  is  the  very  thing  that  is  valuable  in  vir- 
 tue; and  with  good  reafon,  if  a  free  Choice  be, 
 the  very  thing  which  pleafes;  (For  thus  it  would 
 be  impolfible  to  attain  the  end  of  chooflng,  i.  e, 
 to  pleafe  ourfelves,  without  Liberty,  fince  that  ve- 
 ry thing  which  pleafes  in  Adion,  viz,.  Libertys 
 is^'ould  be  wanting.)  But  yet,  if  any  thing  which 
 
 the 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 fions  with  another,  which  T  wifh  may  not  prevail  upon  him  : 
 or  fufFer  one  Pain  to  prevent  a  greater  :  here  are  two  oppofite 
 Wills,  or  a  weak  imperfeft  Volition  conquer'd  by,  and  giving 
 way  to  a  ftronger :  and  we  might  as  well  fay  Defire  is  oppofite 
 to  Defire,  as  to  Volition.  I  will,  or  defire  that  this  Man  may 
 not  be  prevailed  upon,  but  yet  I  will,  or  defire  more  power- 
 fully and  effedually  to  ufe  thefe  perfuafions  with  him:  Or  ra- 
 ther, here  is  but  one  adual  Defire  or  Will  in  the  Cafe,  and  the 
 other  is  only  hypothetical.  Thus  I  fliould  will  to  be  cured  of 
 the  Gout,  if  that  cure  would  not  throw  me  into  greater  Pain: 
 but  in  the  prefent  circumftances  I  do  not  really  will  it,  nor 
 exert  any  one  adt  which  may  ferve  to  remove  it :  nay,  in 
 this  Cafe,  I  will  or  defire  to  bear  the  Gout  rather  than  a  worfe 
 Evil  that  would  attend  the  removal  of  it.  His  Axiom  there- 
 fore that  wherever  there  is  pain,  there  is  a  defire  to  be  rid  of 
 it,  is  not  abfolutely  true. 
 
 Again,  I  fhould  refufe  a  painful  Remedy  or  difagreeable  Po- 
 tion, if  I  could  enjoy  perfeft  Health  without  them;  but  as  I 
 manifeftly  cannot,  I  choofe  the  lead  Evil  of  the  two.  Nor  can 
 I  indeed  be  properly  faid  to  choofe  or  defire  both  in  the  prefent 
 Circumllances,  or  to  will  one  and  defire  the  contrary;  fince  I 
 know  that  only  one  of  them  is  poiTible:  which  therefore  I  now 
 certainly  will  or  defire,  tho'  I  fliould  certainly  have  will'd. 
 the  contrary  iiad  it  been  ec[ually  poflible.     Thefc  then,  and  the, 
 
 like 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  2^^ 
 
 the  UnderOanding  can  difcover,  be  the  very  beft 
 before  or  independent  of  our  Choice,  it  were  pro- 
 per for  us  to  be  necelTarily  determin'd  to  it;  for 
 the  fruition  of  it,  howfoever  obtain'd,  would 
 make  us  happy,  and  be  fo  much  the  more  valua- 
 ble, as  ic  would  be  certain,  and  not  depend  upon 
 Chance,  as  all  the  Aftions  of  Free-will  are  in  a 
 manner  fuppoied  to  do :  nor  need  we  much  re- 
 gard the  Glory  arifing  from  a  well  made  Choice; 
 fince  the  fruition  of  rhe  greateft  Good  would  give 
 us  Happinefs  without  it;  nay  fuch  Glory  would  be 
 empty  and  defpicable  in  competition  with  the  great- 
 eft  Good.  Hence  it  appears,  that  the  Free-will,  ac- 
 cording to  this  Hypothefis,  cannot  be  reckon'd 
 afty  Advantage. 
 
 VL 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 like  Inftances  are  not  fufficient  to  prove  any  oppofitlon  betweea 
 Will  and  Dellre ;  except  the  latter  be  only  taken  for  a  mere  paf- 
 Jive  Appetite;  in  which  fenfe  the  Words  f^Of?/^,  prefer,  i^c. 
 inufi:  then  be  very  improperly  apply 'd  to  it.  But,  in  reality,  I 
 believe  Mr.  Locke  here  fets  the  Word  Dejire  to  lignify  what  we 
 commonly  mean  by  the  Will,  as  he  does  in  Seft.  48.  where  'tis 
 call'd  the  Poiver  of  preferring:  and  puts  Volition  into  the  place 
 oi  ASiion;  as  Teems  probable  from  his  defcription  of  Willing  in 
 the  1 6th,  28th  and  30th  Seel,  as  alfo,  C.  zi-  Se£l.  18.  where 
 he  defines  the  Will  to  be  a  Po-tver  of  putting  Body  into  Motion  by 
 Thought.  And  the  fame  Notion,  I  think,  runs  thro'  all  his 
 Letters  to  Litnborch. 
 
 Upon  a  review  of  this  Chapter  of  Mr.  Locke's  Effay,  and 
 comparing  the  firft  Edition  of  it  with  the  reft,  I  find  a 
 remarkable  Paffage  omitted  in  all  the  following  ones,  which 
 rhay  ferve  to  Ihew  lis  upon  what  Ground  he  at  iirft  fup- 
 pofed  the  Will  to  be  determin'd  from  <vjiihoiit,  and  why  upon' 
 altering  part  of-  hia  Scheme  and  leaving  the  reft,  he  was 
 obliged  to  take  that  for  grunted,  and  let  his  former  luppofttion 
 ftand  without  its  Reafon.  It  begins  at  Sedt.  28.  "  V^e  muft 
 "  remember  xXy^^x  Volition  ox  Willing,  regarding  only  what  is 
 *'  in  our  power,  is  nothing  but  preferring  the  doing  of  any 
 **  thing  to  the  not  doing  of  it  -,  Action  to  reft,  and  contra. 
 •*■  Well,  but  what  is  this  preferring  ?  It  is  nothiiag  but  the  be- 
 
 "  ing 
 
256  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 It  only  VI.  Secondly,  Ifitbefaid,  that  the  Underftand- 
 
 takes  place  \^^  j^  dubious  in  many  Cafes,  and  ignorant  of  what 
 fulmat-'  ^^  ^^^  ^^^'  ^"'^  ^"  ^^^^^^  Liberty  takes  place;  nei- 
 ters,  and  ther  does  this  clear  the  Matter.  For  if  the  things 
 then  'tis  to  be  done  be  Good  or  Evil  in  themfelvc^  bur  un- 
 ofno  ufc    known  to  the  Intelkd,  there's  no  help  in  the  Will; 
 
 orimpor-      '  ^^^^ 
 
 tance. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *'  iug  pleafed  more  aiith  one  thjjig  than  another.  Is  then  a  Alan 
 *'  indifferent  to  be  pleafed  or  not  pleafed  more  with  one  thing' 
 "  than  another?  Is  it  in  his  Choice,  whether  he  will  or  will 
 *'  not  be  better  pleafed  with  one  thing  than  another? 
 
 "  And  to  this  I  think  every  one's  Experience  is  ready  to 
 •'  make  anfwer,  No.  From  whence  it  follows,  that  the  Will 
 *'  or  Preference  is  determin'd  by  fornething  without  itfelf  ; 
 *'  let  us  fee  then  what  it  is  determm'd  by.  If  willing  be  but 
 *'  the  being  httitx  pleafed,  as  hps  been  fhewn,  it  is  ealy  to  know 
 *'  what  'tis  determines  the  Will,  what  'tis  pleafes  befl ;  every 
 *•  one  knows  'tis  Happinefs,  or  that  which  makes  any  part  of 
 *'  Happinefs,  or  contributes  to  it,  and  that  is  it  we  call  Good. 
 *'  — —  Good  then,  the  greater  Good^  is  that  alone  n,vhich  deter- 
 "  mbies  the  Wilir 
 
 From  hence  we  may  obferve  that  as  he  here  makes  the  Will 
 a  mere  paffi^-e  JffeSlion  of  the  Mind,  a  power  of  being  pleafed 
 with  fome  things  more  than  others,  (which  Definition  will 
 with  equal  propriety  take  in  all  the  Set?fes  too)  he  was  natu- 
 rally led  to  enquire  after  the  Ground  of  thefe  its  different  Plea- 
 fures,  which  cou'd  only  be  the  different  Natures  of  external 
 Objefts  afting  differently  upon  it ;  (as  they  do  alfo  on  the 
 Senfes)  For  what  is  only  aifed  upon,  muft  have  fornething 
 ivithout  itfelf  to  ad  upon  it ;  and  to  be  pleafed  in  a  different 
 manner  by  the  Aftion  of  different  Objeils  is  only,  in  other 
 Words,  to  receive  different  Degrees  of  Happinefs  from  them. 
 Upon  this  Scheme  we  muH  always  be  unavoidably  determin'd 
 by  the  greatell  apparent  Good,  or  neceflarily  prefer  what 
 feems  produftivc  of  the  higheil  Degree  of  HappineG  ;  which 
 is  indeed  fufficiently  intelligible,  and  he  purfued  it  through- 
 out coniiflently.  But  upon  fecond  Thoughts,  finding  this 
 not  very  reconcileable  with  matter  of  Fad,  (as  he  obfervcd  in 
 Sed.  35,  38,  43,  44,  69,  l^c.  of  the  following  Editions, 
 where  he  has  fully  fliewn  that  we  do  not  always  prefer  or 
 choofc  the  greater  apparent  Good)  and  ftill  fuppofing  the  Will 
 to  be  paffi've  or  determin'd  from  without,  he  alters  his  former 
 
 liypo- 
 
&a.  t:  Sub.  2I     Of  Mora!  Evil.  ^7 
 
 nor  does  its  Liberty  aiTift  us  in  difcoveringbr  ob- 
 raining  the  better  Side;  if  they  be  indifferent,  k 
 is  no  rrtgtter  what  we  do,  fince  the  Conveniencies 
 and  Inconveniencies  are  equnl  on  both  Sides.  If 
 then  we  admit  of  Liberty  in  thefe  Cafes,  it  will  be 
 of  nd  ufe  6r  importance  to    Life  or  Happinefs: 
 
 Nayj 
 
 k  0  T  E  S, 
 
 tdfypothefis  fo  far  as  to  make  the  Will  be  determin'd,  not  hy 
 the  greater  Goot/ immediately,  but  by  x\\3Xl}neafinefs,  which 
 is  founded  in  the  Dejire  wluch  arifes  from  the  profpefl  of  fome 
 Good.  But  it  being  likcwiic  evident  that  all  things  .do  not 
 taife  our  Defife  in  proportion  to  their  apparent  Goodnefs ;  He 
 endeavours  to  account  for  this,'  by  faying  that  "  We  do  not 
 "  look  on  them  to  make  a  part  of  that  Happinefs  wherewith. 
 "  we  in  our  prefent  Thoughts  can  fatisfy  o'urfelves,.  Sedl.  43.'' 
 i.  e.  Wc  can  "be  content  without  them  ;  or  in  our  Author's 
 Language,  they  do  not  abfolutely  pleafe  us,  becauTe  we  do 
 not  nvill  them,  He  proceeds  therefore  to  mend  his  Hypothe- 
 lis  farther  by  making  the  Mind  in  f6me  fort  aSii've  in  con- 
 templating,  in  embl-acfng  or  rejefting  any  kinds  of  apparent 
 Good,  by  giving  it  a  power  oi  raijtng,  improving  or  fufpend- 
 ing  any  of  its  Dejtres,  of  governing  and  moderating  the  Pal- 
 Jions,  and  forming  to  itfclf  an  Appeilte  or  R'difh  of  things ; 
 Sedt.  45,  and  53.  All  which'  is  exaftly  agreeable  to  our  Au- 
 thor's Principles,  as  well  a:s  Truth,  and  'tis  a  'vl^onder  one 
 that  fo  attentively  confidcr'd  the  Operations  of  the"  Afind  fliou'd 
 2^ot  be  led  on  to  that  other  part  of  its  Libe'tty  which  is  equally 
 coniirm'd  by  Experience,  <u/z.  of  choofmg  arbitrarily  among 
 different  kinds  and  degrees, of  Pain,  of  over-ruling  any  ordi- 
 nary Defire  of  obtaining  Good,  or  avoiding  Evil,  and  by  cori- 
 fequence  of  its  Will  being  propeHy  afli-je  ox  phyficaliy  indiffe- 
 re7it  with  regard  to  either.  But  tho'  he  has  inferted  feveral 
 Paffages  in  the  fubfequent  Editions,  which  come  near  to  Li- 
 berty, yet  he  takes  in  the  greateft  part  ,of  his  ftrft  paflive 
 Scheme,  and  generally  mi.tes  bot"h  together.  This  has  ot- 
 cafioned  that  great  confufion  in  the  Chapter  abovemention'd 
 which  cannot  but  be  obferv'd  by  every  Reader 
 .  Dr.  Clarke's  i^frgumcnt  for  abfo!ute  FreedonT,  becaufc  all 
 Motives  or  Senfations  are  mere  abftraft  Notions,  and  have  na 
 jphyfical  tiower  *  fc^ms  not  conclufive,'  or  at  lealt  not  clear. 
 
 S  ?»S 
 
 *  Rmarks  tfi  the  Phiiofoj, hle.il  Enquiry,  p.   10, 
 
258  0/  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 Nay,  it  muft  be  efteem'd  an  Imperfedion,  as  de- 
 riving its  Origin  from  the  Imperfeftion  of  the  Un- 
 derftanding.     For  if  the  Underftanding  could  cer- 
 tainly determine  what  were  the  beft  to  be  done,  there 
 would  be  no  room  for  Liberty.  (4(5'.) 
 We  are         VII.  Thirdly,  Thefe   men  are  not  well  agreed 
 Jeft  in        what  this  Chief  Good  is,   from  the  connexion  with 
 doubt        which  the  Underftanding  muft  judge  of  the  Good- 
 i^e'thr"    "^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  things,  as  may  appear  from  their  va- 
 
 Wayto  "01^5 
 
 Happi- 
 
 nefs,  aftd  NOTES, 
 
 can  have 
 
 Tio  help       pof  ^},Q  knows,  fay  the  Fatalifts,  how  far  rcafons,  motives, 
 
 from  Li-     icf^    jjjgy  aiFed  a  Spirit?  Why  may  not  one  immaterial  Sub- 
 
 berty.  ftance  determine  another  by  means  of  Thought,  as  well  as  a  ma- 
 
 terial one  can  move  another  by  means  of  Impulfe?  Nay,  his 
 adherent  Mr.  Jack/on  grants*  "  That  abftrad  Notions  will 
 *'  by  a  forcible  and  irrefiftible  impulfe,  compel  the  Mind  to 
 **  move  the  Body  whether  it  will  or  no."  Which  impulfe 
 if  it  were  conftant,  would  fufficiently  acquit  the  Maintainerj 
 of  Neceffity.  But  that  there  can  be  no  fuch  forcible  impulfe, 
 will,  I  hope,  appear  below,  where  it  will  be  fliewn  to  be  both 
 agreeable  toieafon  to  fuppofe  that  there  are  aftive  or  Self-mo- 
 ving Beings,  which,  as  fuch,  muft  have  a  phyfical  power  of 
 refifting  what  we  call  the  nioft  cogent  Motives  :  and  to  be  con- 
 £rm'd  by  Experience,  that  our  own  Minds  exert  fuch  a  Pow- 
 er ;  which  is  fufEcient  for  our  purpofe.  For  an  Explanation 
 of  the  true  Notion  of  Liberty,  fee  the  following  Subfeftions  of 
 this  Chapter,  and  Note  58. 
 
 (46.)  Thcfe  with  fome  of  the  following  confequences  at- 
 tending fuch  a  confufcd  Hypothefis  of  Liberty,  are  well  urg'd 
 by  Mr.  Locke  (tlio'  I  think  they  return  upon  himfelf )  in  his 
 Chapter  of  Povjer,  Se6l.  4.8,  49,  50.  and  in  the  PhilcJ'oph.  En- 
 quiry, p.  63,  iJc.  and  feeni  to  be  unavoidable  in  any  other 
 Scheme  but  that  of  our  Author;  who  fuppofes  that  in  moll 
 Cafes  the  Goodnefs  of  an  Aft  or  Objedl  entirely  depends  upon, 
 and  is  produced  merely  by  our  choofmgit;  and  of  confe- 
 tjuence  Liberty,  or  a  power  of  choofing,  is  according  to  his 
 Principles,  fo  far  from  bemg  unneccflary,  or  an  Imperfedion, 
 that  it  is  our  nobleft  Perfeftion,  and  conftitutcs  the  greatclt 
 part  of  our  Happinefs :  For  an  Explanation  of  this,  fee  Sedt. 
 •.  2.  of  this  Chapter. 
 
 (47) 
 *  Defence  of  human  Liberty,  p.    19S. 
 
Sed.  r.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  259 
 
 rious  and  contradidlory  Opinions  about  ir.  C47.) 
 We  mufl:  neceiTarily  therefore  be  wavering  and 
 folicitous,  and  even  rebel  againft  Nature  itfelf,  which 
 has  neither  iixt  a  certain  End  nor  granted  any  certain 
 Means  to  attain  it,  but  left  us  in  anxiety  and  doubt 
 about  the  way  which  leads  to  Happinels^  neither  is 
 there  any  help  here  in  our  Liberty,  fince  it  is  blind, 
 and  can  do  nothing  towards  bringing  us  back  into 
 the  right  way. 
 
 VIII.  Fourthly,  'Tis  confefs'd  by  all,  that  Good  Since  that 
 in  general  is  what  is  univerfally  agreeable,  and  what  ^^?°°^. 
 all  defire.    Every  Good  therefore  anfv/ers  to  fome  garecable. 
 Appetite,  and  according  to  thefe  Authors,  Objeds  and  this  is 
 are  good  on  account  of  a  natural  and  neceflary  fuirable-  tobejudg- 
 nefs  which  they  hive  to  our  Appetites.     The  Un-  ^^  ^^^^ 
 derftanding   therefore  does   not   make    good,    but  ^gj-fland- 
 finds  it  in  the   things    themfelves:    and  when  it  ing,  if  the 
 
 S  2  judges  Will  fol- 
 
 low this 
 
 NOTES.  J.tr.'' 
 
 free,  if  ic 
 (47.}  This  uncertainty  about  the  Summnm  Bonttm  is  owi/d  does  not, 
 and  well  accounted  for  by  Mr,  Locke,  B.  2.  C.  21.  Scdl.  55.  it  adts 
 '*  Hence  it  was  that  the  Philofophers  of  old  did  in  vain  en-  againft 
 *'  quire  whether  Summum  Bonum  confiiftcd  in  Riches  or  Bcdi-  reafon. 
 **  ly  Delights,  or  Virtue,  or  Contemplation.    And  they  might  We  had 
 «*  have  as  reafonably  difputed  whether  the  beft  relifh  were  to  better 
 "  be  found  in  Apples,  Plumbs,  or  Nutts,  and  have  divided  therefore 
 **  themfelves  into  Sefts  upon  it.     For  as  pleafant  Taftcs  depend  be  vvith- 
 *'  not  on  the  xKxn^i  themfelves,  but  their  agrecablenefs  to  this  outfuch 
 *'  or  that  particular  Palate,  wherein  there  is  great  variety  ;  Liberty, 
 *'  fo  the  greateft  happinefs  confifls  in  the  having  thofe  things 
 *'  which  produce  the  greateft:  Pleafure,  and  in  the  abfence  of 
 "  thofe  which  caufe  any  dillurbance,  any   pain.     Now  thefe 
 *'  to  different  Men  are  very  different  things."     To  the  fame 
 purpofe  are  the  3d  and  4th  obfcrvations  in  the  Religion  of  Na- 
 ture delineated,  p.  33.  which  may  ferve  to  confirm  the  No- 
 tion which  our  Author  propofes  in  the  next  Subfedion,  miz. 
 that  moft  of  the  Good  or  Agrecablenefs   in  things  arifes  not 
 from  their  own  Natures,  but  our  choice  of  them  ;  or  that  Ob- 
 jeds are  not  chofen  becaufe  they  are  good,  but  are  generally 
 good  only  becaufe  ckofett. 
 
26o  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V". 
 
 judges  any  thing  in  Nature  to  be  agreeable,   that, 
 according  to   rhem,   muft  necefTarily  be  in  refpeft 
 of  fome   natural    Appetite.      All  the  Good  then 
 which  is  in  things  will  be  the  Objed  of  fome  Fa- 
 culty   or   Appetite,    ^   e.   of  the    Underftanding, 
 Senfe,    ^c.      But  all  thefe  are  determin'd  by  Na- 
 ture in  regard  to  the  Appetite  or  Faculty  to  which 
 they  relate,  i,  e,  in  regard  to  their  Pleafantnefs,  or 
 Agreeablenefs;  and  as   to  the  relation  which  they 
 bear   to  each   other,    /.  e.  as   to  their  Profit ablenefi 
 and  Homfiy,  they  are  to  be  judg'd  of  by  the  Un- 
 derftanding,  and  direded  when  and  in  what  man- 
 ner they  muft  give  place  to  each  other,  or  afford 
 their  mutual  afliftance.      Free-will  then  appears  to 
 be  of  no  manner  of  ufe  ',  for  if  it  certainly  follow 
 the  decree  of  reafon,  it  is  not  free,  at  leaft  from  ne- 
 ceflTity,  fince  that  very  reafon  which  it  follows  is 
 not  free :  if  it  does  not  necefTarily  follow  that,  we 
 had  better  be  without  it,   fince  it  preverts  every 
 Will  could  ^^^^ng'  3nd  confounds  the  Order  of  Reafon,  which 
 fufpendits  is  beft;  fucha  Liberty  as  this  w^ould  therefore  be 
 aft  con-      prejudicial  to  Mankind;  it  would  make  them  liable 
 ^ff^V^      todoamifs,  and  produce  no  kind  ofGoodto  eom- 
 T^L^  ^^'  penfate  for  fo  great  an  Evil. 
 
 mentor      r  .„,,o  .  r   i    i         »     v     i  /• 
 
 theUn-  IX.  Fifthly,  It  is  fuppoledthat  the  Judgment  of 
 
 derlland-  the  Underflanding  concerning  the  (joodnefs  of  any 
 mg.  It  thhig,  is  a  condition  without  which  the  Will  is  not 
 direaV""  dire<5led  to  the  Object,  but  yet  that  it  can  either 
 into  Evil ;  ^^^rt  OX  fufpend  its  ad:  about  any  Good  whatfoever, 
 it  fc|ms  Let  us  fuppofe  then  that  the  Underflanding  has 
 faerefore  determin'd  it  to  be  good  to  exert  fome  certain  Ac- 
 iieccfTary  ^j^^^  ^^^  ^^jj  ^^  fufpend  it  y  while  this  Judgment 
 aft  at  the  continues,  if  the  Will  can  fufpend  its  Ad,  it  chcofes 
 time  and  Evil;  if  it  cannot,  it  is  not  free.  You'll  fay,  it 
 in  the  can  command  the  Underflanding  to  change  its 
 ^j^P"  Judgment:  be  it  fo.  But  it  is  evident,  that  the 
 Under-  ^^-  ^^'^  iufpends  his  Aftion  before  he  can  command 
 ftanding  thc  L^nderflanding  to  change  its  Judgment,  r.  e.  he 
 dircils.  fufpends 
 
Sed.  I  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  26  r 
 
 fufpends  the  Adion  while  the  Judgment  deter- 
 mines that  it  is  Evil  to  fufpendj  and  of  confe- 
 cjuence  choofes  that  diredly  which  his  Reafon  judges 
 to  be  Evil ;  which  feems  to  overthrow  their  whole 
 Hypothefis.  C48.) 
 
 S   5  X. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 .(48.)  Farther,  if  the  Mind  can  fufpend  the  Satisfaction  of 
 any  urgent  defire  (which  Mr.  Locke  allows  *  and  therein 
 places  all  its  Liberty)  then  it  can  as  eafily  quite  ftop,  or  run 
 cpunter  to  any  natural  Appetite  ;  fince  no  greater  Power  feems 
 to  be  requifite  for  the  one  than  for  the  other.  If  we  can  hin- 
 der the  Will  from  being  determin'd  by  any  defire  of  abfent 
 Good  without  any  appearance  of  greater  Good  on  the  other 
 Side,  which  might  raife  aaoppofite  deiire  able  to  counterbal- 
 lance  it,  as  our  Author  has  fliewn  that  we  can  ;  then  we  fhall 
 be  equally  able  to  prevent  its  following  the  ultimate  determi- 
 nation of  the  Judgment,  even  without  any  reafon  for  fo  do- 
 ing ;  after  any  Determination  of  the  Judgment,  it  will  be  ftill 
 as  undetermin'd,  and  indifferent  towards  Volition,  as  Mr. 
 Locke  fuppofes  the  operative  Powers  to  be  in  regard  to  A8ion\ 
 and  confequently  Good,  whether  abfolute  or  comparative,  is 
 neither  the  adequate  efficient  Caufe,  nor  a  necellary  Means  to 
 the  determination  of  the  Will.  This  ad:  oi  Sufpenfmi  therefore 
 muft  either  be  folely  founded  in  the  felf  moving  Power  of  the 
 Mind,  and  of  confequence  be  naturally  independent  on  all 
 Motives,  Reafons,  is'c.  and  an  inftance  of  the  Mind's  abfolute 
 Freedom  from  any  excernal  Determination  ;  which  is  a  con- 
 tradiftion  to  Mr.  Locke''s  general  Hypothefis ;  or  elfe  itfelf 
 muft  be  determin'd  by  fome  Motive  or  external  Caufe  ;  and 
 then  it  will  be  difficult  to  make  it  free  in  any  fenfe.  Let  us 
 obferve  how  Mr.  Locke  endeavours  to  reconcile  thefe  two  No- 
 tions together.  Our  Liberty,  according  to  him,  is  founded 
 in  a  general  abfolute  Inclination  of  the  Mind  to  Happinefs, 
 which  obliges  us  to  fufpend  the  Gratification  of  our  Defire  in 
 particular  cafes,  till  we  fee  whether  it  be  not  inconfiftent  with 
 the  general  Good.  "The  ftrongcr  Ties,  fays  he,  Soft  5-1. 
 "  we  have  to  an  unalterable  purfuit  of  Happinefs  in  general, 
 "  which  is  our  greateft  Good,  and  which,  as  fuch,  our  Defires 
 '•'  always  follow,  the  more  are  wc  free  from  any  neccffary  dc- 
 
 "  termination 
 
 *  Book  2.  C.  2 J,  Seil.  47-  and  50. 
 t  Sec  Note  49. 
 
262  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 There  are  X.  I  coiifefs,  they  offer  fome  Solutions  here, 
 ''^ff-^'T^  bi^t  fuch  as  are  fo  (ubtle,  fo  obfcure,  and  (o  much 
 thele  di*^  above  the  compichenfion  of  the  Vulgar,  that  moft 
 ficukies,  Perfons  have  taken  a  diflafle  to  them,  given  up  the 
 but  they  caufe  of  Liberty  as  dcrperate,  and  gone  over  to  the 
 are  far  former  Sed:  but  if  any  one  will  undertake  either 
 ■  ^,  ^'  to  give  a  more  clear  and  full  Explication  of  the 
 On  this  common  Opinion,  or  brmg  Solutions  of  thofe  Dif- 
 account  ficulcies  which  occur  in  it,  he  will  find  me  fo  far 
 many  f,-om  being  his  Adverfary,  that  he  may  exped  my 
 have  gone  ^ffg^t,   encouragement  and  alTiftance.     This  indeed 
 
 over  to  ^,  ,  •  n  .  J      I  •        I 
 
 the  former  ^^^^  very  much  to  be  wim  d,  but  m  the  mean 
 Opinion.  time 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 *'  termination  of  our  Will  to  any  particular  A6lion,  and  from 
 "  a  necefiary  compliance  with  our  Defirc  let  upon  any  parti- 
 *•  cular,  and  then  appearing  preferable  good,  till  we  have  du- 
 ♦'  ly  examin'd  whether  it  has  a  tendency  to,  or  be  inconfiflent 
 *'  with  our  real  Happinefs."  And  again,  Seft.  52.  "  What- 
 *'  ever  NecelTity  determines  to  the  purfuit  of  real  Blifs,  the 
 *'  fame  neceffity,  with  the  fame  force,  eftablithes  Sufpenfe, 
 ^'  Deliberation  and  Scrutiny  of  each  fucceffive  dcfue,  whether 
 "  the  fatisfadion  oi  it  does  not  interfere  with  our  true  Hap- 
 "  and  miflead  us  from  it."  If  by  the  Word  Necejfity  he  means 
 *'  abfolute  phyfical  Necejfity  (which  it  muft  be,  if  it  be  any 
 tiling  to  the  prefent  purpofe)  he  has  difcover'd  a  pretty  odd 
 f:)undation  for  his  Liberty.  Nay,  if  this  force  which  draws 
 us  towards  Happinefs  in  general,  be  abfolute  and  irrefiftible, 
 as  his  Words  import,  it  will  draw  us  equally  towards  all  par- 
 ticular appearances  of  it,  and  conicquently  prove  as  bad  a 
 ground  for  Sufpenjton  as  for  Liberty.  But  in  truth  this  Sufpen- 
 Jion  is  neither  founded  in  any  NecelTity  of  purfuing  Happi- 
 nefs in  general,  nor  is  itfelf  an  original  Power  of  the  Mind 
 diftinft  from  that  of  Volition,  but  only  one  particular  exercife 
 or  Modification  of  it.  " 'Tis  willing  (as  the  Author  of  the 
 "  Philofophkal  Enquiry  rightly  oblerves)  to  defer  willing  a- 
 *'  bout  the  matter  propofed,"  and  is  no  way  different  from 
 jthc  common  cafes  of  willing  and  chonfmg,  except  that  it  ia 
 ^he  moft  evident  demonftration  of  the  Mind^s  perfefl  Liberty 
 in  willing,  and  fo  obvious  that  Mr.  Locke  could  not  get  over 
 it,  and  therefore  ftiles  i;  the  fource  of  all  cur  Libe'rty,  and 
 
 that 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil. 
 
 time  I  ihall  endeavour  to  fee  whether  thefe  things 
 
 cannot  be  explain'd  more  clearly  in  another  manner. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 that  wherein  confifts  FrerwHL  Seft.  47.  Tho'  he  foon  ex- 
 plains it  away  again,  by  endeavouring  to  force  it  into  his  Sy- 
 ftem.  That  this  Power  of  Sufpenfion  is  not  fufficient  to  deuo^ 
 minate  a  Man/w,    Sec  Impartial  Erquiry,  p.  44, 
 
 263 
 
 S  4 
 
 SUBSECT. 
 
2^4  Of  Moral  Evil         Chap.V. 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    III. 
 
 Another  NQtion  of  Liberty  <md  EleSlion 
 fropofed. 
 
 The  Ap-  y  ]sj   order  to  make    my  meaning   better  under-' 
 
 Power^^*^  X  frood,    we   mufi:   obferve,    in    the  firfi    place, 
 
 attain^  ^^at  there  are  certain   Powers,    Faculties   and   Ap« 
 
 their  pro-  petites  implanted  in  us  by  Nature,   which  are  de- 
 
 P''p"'^'  fign'd  for  Aftion  j  and  when  thefe  exert  their  pro- 
 
 cffe      '^*  ^^^  Acflions  about  Objects  they  produce  a  grateful 
 
 which  is  ?"d  agreeable  Senfation  in  us.     The  exercife  of  them 
 
 the  grea-  therefore  pleafcs  us ;  and   from  hence  probably  al! 
 
 teft  per-  our  Pleafure  and  Delight   arifesj    confecjuently  our 
 
 t'l^**    J  Happinefs,   if  we  have  any,    feems  to '  confift  in 
 
 them,  and     ,   ^'  -r       r     i     r"'    x,  ■      i    -r.        ,  • 
 
 their beft  ^"^  proper  excrcile  ot  thpie  Powers  and  Faculties 
 F.ilate.  which  Nature  has  befiow'd  upon  us :  for  they  ap- 
 pear to  be  implanted  in  us  for  no  other  end,  but 
 that  by  the  ufe  and  exercife  of  them  thofe  things 
 inay  be  efFefted  which  are  agreeable.  Nor  can 
 they  be  at  reft,  or  enjoy  themfelves  any  otherwife 
 than  as  thofe  things  are  produced  by  or  in  thems 
 for  the  produ(flion  or  reception  of  which  they  are 
 Hefign'd  by  Nature.  Now  every  Power  or  Facul-^ 
 ty  is  djrefted  to  the  profecution  of  its  proper  Ad:s, 
 They  Pttain  their  End  therefore  by  Exercife-,  which 
 muft  be  efteem'd  the  grcateft  Perfcdionj  and  mofi 
 happy  State  of  any  Being*.  For  that  is  a  State  of 
 Happinefs,  if  any  fuch  can  be  copceiy'd,  wherein 
 ^very  thing  is  done  which  pleafe?,  and  every  thing 
 Removed  which  is  difpleafing:  neither  does  it  feeru 
 poffible  to  imagine  a  more  happy  one, 
 
 f  Sec  ScBtth  Chrifiian  Lifd  Vol  t.  pag.  8,  c^, 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  265 
 
 II.   Secondly,   It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  among  There  is  a 
 our  Appetites,  Faculties  and  Powers,  feme  are  de-  ^'^'"tai"  a- 
 termin'd  to  their  Operations  by  objeds  peculiar  to  ^xTby  Na- 
 themfelves.    For  upon  the  prefence  of  their  Objedls  ture  be- 
 they  neceflarily  exert  their  Adions,  if  rightly  difpos'd,  tween 
 and  ceafe  from  Operation  upon  their  abfence,  and  ^°"]^  ^P- 
 have  no  tendency  towards  any  other  Objeds  but  ^^^^^^j 
 their  own.     Thus  the  Sight  perceives  nothing  but  their  Ob- 
 Light,   Colours,    crc.    and,    upon  the  Removal  of  jefts, 
 thele,    its    Adion  *  ceafes.      The    Underftanding  whereby 
 itfelf  diftinguifhes  thofe  Objeds   which  are  com-  ^  J  ^9- 
 municated  to  it  by  the  Senfes,  or  perceiv'd  by  re-  prefence 
 fledion,    from   one  another,    difpofes   and  repofits  ofthem, 
 them  in  the  Memory  ;  but  yet  has  certain  bounds  and  ceafe 
 which  it  cannot  exceed:  andfo  of  the  reft.     There    .  "^  ^^' 
 is  therefore  a  certain   natural   Fitnefs,  a  fixt  con-  their  Re^ 
 formity  between   thefe  Powers  and  their  Objeds,  moval. 
 on  which  account  they  exert  their  Adions  upon 
 the  prefence  of  the  Objeds,  and  delight  themfelves 
 in   Exercife:    but   are  uneafy   at  the   prefence  of 
 thpfe  things  which  hinder  it.     If  then  there  be  any 
 natural  force  in  any  Objed  to  promote  or   hinder 
 the  exercife  of  any  Power  or  Faculty,  that  Objed 
 in   regard  to  it  is  to  be  efteem'd  Good  or  Evil. 
 
 HI.  Thofe  Objeds  which  thus  promote  or  im-  Liberty 
 pede  the  Adion,  are  fufficiently  difiinguifli'd  from  ^^°"j'^  b« 
 each  other  by  the  Power  or  Faculty   itfelf;  thofe  vice'to^' 
 that  are  abfent  or  future,  are  judg'd  of  by  the  Un-  Agent  en- 
 derftanding,  and  what  the  Mind  determines  to  be  dow'd 
 jhe  befl  in  them,  that  we  are  oblie'd  to  purfue*  He  Y"^^  ^'^^'^ 
 
 thac  ^ppetites, 
 •^c.  as 
 
 NOTES.  ly. 
 
 *  It  may  be  obferv'd  here  once  for  all,  that  our  Author 
 feldom  ufes  this  Word  ASiton  in  a  ftrifl  PhiJofophical  Senfe 
 (according  to  which  thefe  fliould  rather  be  call'd  PaJJions)  but 
 generally  takes   the  vulgar  cxprcfTions,  when  they   will  ferve 
 
 to  e}i:|)|aifj  his  mcanir.g.         ■  \ 
 
:66 
 
 We  may 
 conceive 
 a  Power 
 between 
 which 
 and  any 
 particular 
 Object 
 there  is 
 naturally 
 no  other 
 agreeable- 
 Kefs  but 
 what  may 
 ^rife  from 
 the  Deter- 
 mination 
 of  the 
 Power  it- 
 felf. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 that  does  otherwife  difobeys  the  Law  of  Reafon. 
 If  therefore  all  our  Powers  and  Faculties  were  thus 
 determin'd  to  their  proper  Objecfls,  it  would  feem 
 an  Imperfeftion  for  Man  to  be  free,  and  he  would 
 have  been  much  more  happy  without  fuch  a  Liber- 
 ty; for  he  receives  no  Benefit  from  it,  but  one  of 
 the  greateft  Evils,  viz,,  a  Power  of  doing  amif . 
 
 IV.  It  feems  not  impoflible  to  conceive  a  Power 
 of  a  quite  different  Nature  from  thefe  which  may 
 be  more  indifferent  in  refped  of  the  Objeds  about 
 ■which  it  exercifes  itfelf  *.  To  which  no  one  thing 
 is  naturally  more  agreeable  than  another,  but  that 
 will  be  the  fitteft  to  which  it  lliall  happen  f  to  be 
 apply'd:  Between  which  and  the  Objeft,  to  which 
 is  is  determin'd,  by  it  felf  or  by  fomething  elfe, 
 there  fhould  naturally  be  no  more  fuitablenefs  or 
 connexion  than  between  it  and  any  other  thing  ;  but 
 all  the  Suitablenefs  there  is,  (hould  arife  from  the  ^- 
 flication  or  Determination  itlelf.  For  as  the  Earth 
 is  no  Man's  Right  by  nature,  but  belongs  to  the 
 prime  Occupant,  and  the  Right  arifes  from  that 
 very  Occupation;  fo  there  may  polTibly  be  a 
 Power  to  whch  no  Objed  is  by  Nature  peculiarly 
 adapted,  but  any  thing  may  become  fuitable  to  ir, 
 if  it  happen  to  be  apply'd;  fince  its  Suitablenefs  pro- 
 ceeds from  the  Application,  as  we  laid  before. 
 Now  it  does  not  feem  any  more  abfurd  for  a  Power 
 to  create  an  Agreeablenefs  between  itfelf  ard  an 
 Objed,  by  applying  itfelf  to  that  Objed,  or  that 
 to  itfelf,  than  for  a  Man  to  acquire  a  Right  to  a 
 thing  by  occupying  it.  For,  as  in  Civil  Laws, 
 fome  things  are  forbidden  becaufe  they  are  incon- 
 venient, others  are  inconvenient  and  Evil  becaule 
 forbidden;  fq  it  may  be  in  Powers,  Facuhies  and 
 
 Appe- 
 
 *  See  Se£t.  5.  Subfeft.  2,  par.  12  and  15. 
 
 Tp    That  this  Word  ij  not  intendiid  to  imply  'vjbat  ive  comi/ion/y 
 mean  hy  Chance,  fee  par.  18. 
 
Sedt.  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  267 
 
 Appetites;  viz,,  fome  may  be  determin'd  by  th^ 
 natural  Suitablenefs  of  the  Objeds,  and  in  others, 
 the  Suitablenels  to  the  Objeds  may  arife  from  the 
 Determination.  For  this  Faculty  may  be  naturally 
 inclin'd  to  exercife,  and  one  Exercife  be  more  a- 
 greeable  than  another,  not  from  any  natural  fitnefs 
 cf  one  more  than  another,  but  from  the  Application 
 of  the  Faculty  itfelf;  for  another  would  often  be  no 
 lefs  agreeable,  if  it  had  happen'd  to  be  determin'd  to 
 that.  Nothing  therefore  feems  to  hinder  but  that 
 there  may  be  fuch  a  Power  or  Faculty,  at  leaft 
 with  refpcd  to  vtry  many  Objeds.  (4^. 
 
 V, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (49.)  Our  Author's  Notion  o^  Indifference  has  been  grofly 
 mifunderllood  by  all  his  Adverfaries,  who  have  accordingly 
 rais'd  terrible  Outcries  againft  it,  as  deftroying  the  eflential 
 and  immutable  diltindlion  between  Goed  and  Evil ;  fubvert- 
 ing  Appetites,  making  Reafon  and  Judgment  ufelefs,  and  con- 
 founding every  thing.  We  fhall  juft  obferve  here,  that  it  can- 
 not be  apply'd  to  the  nxjhole  Man,  nor  was  defign'd  by  our  Au- 
 thor to  include  all  manner  of  external  Objefts,  Anions,  and 
 Relations  of  things,  as  they  feem  to  have  underftood  it.  For 
 every  Man  in  his  Wits  mull  be  fufficiently  fenlible  that  all 
 things  don't  afFe<fl  him  in  the  fame  manner,  even  before  he  has 
 will'd  any  of  them.  I  cannot  be  indifferent  to  Meat,  or  Drink, 
 or.  Reft,  when  I  am  hungry,  thirlly,  or  weary.  Some  na- 
 tural Objedrs  are  agreeable,  aud  produce  pleafure  in  me,  and 
 others  the  contrary,  whether  I  will  or  no ;  and  the  fame  may 
 be  faid  of  the  moral  Sejife-  Nay  our  Author  every  where  al- 
 lows their  full  force  to  what  he  calls  the  Appetites  ;  and  aflerts 
 that  whatever  contradi(£ls  them  muft  be  attended  withUneafi- 
 nefs.  *Tis  not  an  abfolute  indifference  therefore  of  the  Man  or 
 Mind  in  general,  nor  of  the  Senfes,  Perception  or  Judgment, 
 which  he  contends  for  ;  but  it  relates  wholly  to  that  particu- 
 lar Po^,ver  of  the  Mind  which  we  call  Willing,  and  which 
 will  appear  to  be  in  its  own  Nature,  or  phyfically,  indifferent 
 to  afling  or  not  afting  in  any  particular  manner,  notwithlland- 
 ing  all  thefe  different  Affeftions  or  Paffions  of  the  Mind  rais'd 
 by  the  different  Objeds.  Let  a  thing  feem  never  fo  pleafant 
 and  agreeable,  never  fo  rcafonable,  fit  and  eligible  to  U5» 
 yet  there  is  ilill  a  natural  pollibility  for  us  to  will  the  con- 
 trary i 
 
268  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Such  a  V.  Fourthly,  if  then  we  fuppofe  fuch  a  Power 
 
 Power  as  jj  jj^jj  .^j^  l^jj^^  ^ j^^j.  ^j^g  Agent  endow'd  with  it 
 this  can-  .      j  •   .  j   ■     •      .--r         •         i 
 
 not  be  de-  """o^^  D^  determin  d  in  its  Operations  by  any  pre- 
 
 termjn'd  cxiftent  Goodnefs  in  the  Oojed,-  for  fince  the  a- 
 by  Good-  greeablenefs  between  it  and  the  Objeds,  at  leaft  in 
 nefsinOh-  jj,q{^  ^f  them,  is  fuppofed  to  arife  from  the  Deter- 
 ^^gQjJ"^^  mination,  the  agreeablenefs  cannot  poffi  jly  be  the 
 nefsof  Caufe  of  that  Determination  on  which  itfelf  de- 
 them  de-  pends.  But  the  congruity  of  the  Qbjed  with  the 
 pends  up  FacuUy  is  all  the  Goodnefs  in  it,  therefore  there  is 
 tennina-^  nothing  Good  in  regard  to  this  Power,  at  leaft  in 
 tion.   *  thofe 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 trary;  and  confequently  the  bare  Power  of 'willing  is  in  itfelf 
 indifferent  to  either  Side  ;  which  is  all  the  indifference  that 
 our  Author  contends  for.     Now  fuch  an  Indifference  as  this 
 Mr.  Zofif  allows  to  be  in  the  operati've  Powers  of  Man,  tho* 
 lie  confines  it,  I  thini,  improperly  to  them  alone  *  "  I  have 
 "  the  ability,  fays  he,  to  move  my  hand,  or  to  let  it  reft ; 
 '•  that  operative  Power  is  indifferent  to  move  or  not  to  move 
 *'  my  hand  :  I  am  then  in  that  refpefl  perfeflly  free.  My  Will 
 *'  determines  that  operative  Power  to  reft  ;  I  am  yet  free,  be- 
 "  caufe  the  Indifferency  of  that  my  operative  Power  to  acl  or 
 *'  not  to  aft  ftill  remains ;  the  Power  of  moving  my  hand  is 
 *'  not  at  all  impaired  by  the  Determination  of  my  Will,  which 
 "  at  prefent  orders   reft  ;  the  Indifferency    of  that  Power  to 
 *'  adl  is  juft  as  it  was   before,  as  will  appear,  if  the  Will  puts 
 "  it  to  the  trial,  by  ordering  the  contrary."     The  fame,  I 
 think,  may  be.  apply'd  to  the  Will  itfelf  in  regard  to  Motives, 
 ^c.  with  much  more  Juftice  than  to  thefe  operative  Powers- 
 IVay  thefe  can  fcarce  be  call'd  indifferent  to  Aclion  after  the 
 determination  of  the  Will ;  but  follow   inftantly  (as  we  ob- 
 ferv'd  in  Note  42.)   in  moft   Cafes  when  they  are  in  their 
 right  State.     What  I  will  or  refolve  to  do,  that  I  certainly 
 effedt  if  I  have  Power  to  do  it,  and  continue  in  the  fame  Will 
 or  Refolution.     However,    this  Indifference  of  the   operative 
 Powers  is   what  can    never  conftitute  Morality  (as  was  ob- 
 fcrv'd  in  the  fame  place)  fmcc  their  Operations  arc  no  farther 
 moral  than  as  they  are  confeq^uent  upon,  and  under  the  direc- 
 tion of  the  Will. 
 
 Therg 
 
 *  B.  2.  C.  21.  Sedt.  71/ 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Ev41.  269 
 
 thofe  Objefts  to  which  it  is  indifFererit,  till  it  has 
 cmbrac'd  it,  nor  Evil  till  it  has  rejeded  it:  Since 
 then  the  Determination  of  the  Power  to  the  Obje(i 
 is  prior  to  the  Goodnefs  and  the  Caule  of  it,  this 
 Power  cannot  be  determined  by  that  Goodnefs  in  its 
 Operations. 
 
 VI.  Fifthly,  Such  a  Power  as  this,  if  it  be  grant-  Nor  by 
 cd  to  exift,  cannot  be  determin'd  by  any  Vneaft'  ^"L^" 
 nefi  arifing  from  the  things  about  which  it  is  con-  ^J""''^' 
 verfant.      For  it  is  fuppofed  to  be  indifferent,  not 
 only  in  refped  of  external  Objeds,  but  alfo  of  its 
 own  Operations,  and  will  pleafe  itfelf,    whether  it 
 accepts  the  thing  or  rejeds  it ;   whether  it  exerts 
 this  Ad  or  another.      Thefe  Objeds  then  will  nei- 
 ther 
 
 N  OT  IE.  S. 
 
 There  muft  then  be  another  Indifference  prior  to  them,  in 
 order  to  make  the  exertion  of  them  free  in  any  tolerable  fenfe. 
 Concerning  this  antecedent  indifference  Mr.  Locke  enqiltres  whe- 
 ther it  be  antecedent  to  the  Thought  and  Judgment  of  the  Vn- 
 derjlanding  as  well  as  to  the  Decree  of  the  Will  *  ?  We  an- 
 ftver  'tis  antecedent  to  and  independent  on  any  particular 
 Thought  or  Judgment,  and  continues  equally  independent  af- 
 ter them  ;  it  remains  after  the  Determination  of  the  Judgment 
 in  the  very  fame  ftate  as  he  fuppofes  that  of  the  operative  Pow- 
 ers to  be  after  the  Determination  of  the  Will.  Its  Liberty  is 
 placed,  as  he  fays,  in  a  ^tute  of  Ddrknefs;  and  fo  is  that  of 
 the  operative  Powers,  which  he  allows :  'Tis  indeed  in  itfelf 
 (as  it  is  commonly  ftiled)  a  blind  Principle,  and  fo  is  every 
 Principle  in  Nature  but  the  Under jlanding:  and  tho'  the  Exer- 
 cife  of  the  Will,  as  well  as  of  the  operatinje  Po-voers,  be  gene- 
 rally accompanied  with  Intelligence,  without  which  there  can 
 be  no  Moral  laberty  ;  yet  thefe  are,  1  think,  very  different 
 Faculties  and  often  exercifed  fcparately,  aud  therefore  fhould 
 always  be  confidercd  diftir.ftly ;  Freedom  is  one  thing,  Intel- 
 ligence  another  ;  a  Moral  or  accountable  Being  confifts  of  both. 
 
 For  a  more  complete  View  of  this  Queltion,  fee  Epi/cop. 
 InJlit.Theol.  L.  4.  C.  6.  and  TraB.  de  Lihero  Arhitrio.  There's 
 alfo  a  good  defence  of  our  Author's  Notion  of  Indifference  in 
 Limhanh,  Theol.  Chrijl.  L.  z.  C,  23   Sedt.  20,  ^c. 
 
 *  Ibid,  *  Obferve- 
 
270  Of  Moral  Evil,        Chap.  V. 
 
 ther  pleafe  nor  difpleafe  till  this  indifference  be  re- 
 moved; but  it  is  luppos'd  to  be  removed  by  the 
 Application  or  Determination  of  the  Power  itfelf; 
 therefore  Anxiety  does  not  produce  but  pre-fup- 
 pofe  its  DeterminatioHc  Let  us  fuppofe  this  Power 
 to  be  already  determin'd  (  it  matters  not  how )  to 
 embrace  a  certain  Objed,  or  to  exert  the  proper 
 Adions  relating  to  it,  Defire  manifeftly  follows  this 
 Determination,  and  Defire  is  follow'd  by  an  En- 
 deavour to  obtain  and  enjoy  the  Objcd  purfuant 
 to  the  Application  of  the  Power.  But  if  any  thing 
 fhould  hinder  or  flop  this  endeavour,  and  prevent 
 the  Power  from  exerting  thofe  Operations  which  it 
 lindertook  to  difcharge  in  relation  to  the  Objed", 
 then  indeed  Uneafinefs  v/ould  arife  from  the  hin- 
 drance of  the  Power.  Anxiety  would  therefore  be 
 the  EffeB^  of  the  Determination  of  this  Power>  but 
 by  no  means  the  Caujc  of  it  *. 
 Not  by  VII.    Sixthly,  Suppofing  fuch  an  Agent  as  this 
 
 tVtUnder-  to  be  endow'd  alfo  with  Undcrftanding,  he  might 
 ftandhig.     life  it  to  propofe  Matters  fit  to  be  done,  but  not  to 
 determine    whether   he  fhould    do  them    or   not. 
 For    the    Underflanding    or   Reafon,  if   it    fpeak 
 Truth,  reprefents  what  is  in  the  Objeds,  and  does 
 
 not 
 
 k  OT  E  S. 
 
 *  Obferve  what  follows  from  Mr.  Locke,  "  There  is  3 
 "  CaCe  wherein  a  Man  is  at  Liberty  in  refpeft  o{ 'uoilling,  and 
 "  that  is  the  chufing  a  remote  Good  as  an  End  to  be  purfued. 
 "  Here  a  Man  may  fufpend  the  aft  of  his  Choice  from  being 
 "  determin'd  for  or  againft  the  thing  propofed,  'till  he  has  ex- 
 "  amin'd  whether  it  be  really  of  a  Nature  in  itfelf,  and  Con- 
 "  fequences  to  mai*,?  him  happy  or  no.  For  when  he  has  once 
 *'  chofen  it,  ^n^ithcreh^'\'i  is  become  a  part  of  his  Happinefs,  it 
 •'  raifes  Dejire,  and  that  proportionably  gives  him  Uneafinefs^ 
 *'  which  determines  his  Will,  and  lets  him  at  work  in  purfiiit 
 "  of  his  Choice  on  all  occafioiis  tli:u  otfcr.    B.  2.   C.   21, 
 
 Sea.  56, 
 
Scd.  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  zyi 
 
 not  feign  what  it  finds  not  in  them :  Since  there- 
 fore, before  the  Determination  of  this  Power, 
 things  are  fuppofed  to  be  indifferent  to  it,  and  no 
 one  better  or  worfe  than  another;  the  Underfland- 
 ing,  if  it  performs  its  Duty  right,  will  reprefent  this 
 Indifference,  and  not  pronounce  one  to  be  more 
 eligible  thAn  another;  For  the  Underftanding  di- 
 reds  a  thing  to  be  done  no  otherwife  than  by  deter- 
 mining that  it  is  better;  as  therefore  the  Goodnefs 
 of  things,  with  refped  to  this  Power,  depends  up- 
 on its  Determination,  and  they  are  for  the  moft 
 part  good  if  it  embrace,  and  evil  if  it  rejed:  them, 
 'tis  manifeft  that  the  Judgment  of  the  Underftand- 
 ing concerning  things  depends  upon  the  fame,  and 
 that  it  cannot  pronounce  upon  the  Goodnefs  or  Bad- 
 nefs  of  them,  till  it  perceives  whether  the  Power 
 has  embraced  or  rejefted  them.  The  Underftand-* 
 ing  therefore  mufl:  wait  for  the  Determination  of 
 this  Power,  before  it  can  pafs  a  Judgment,  inftead 
 of  the  Power's  waiting  for  the  Judgment  of  that 
 Underftanding  before  it  can  be  determin'd. 
 
 VIII.  Seventhly,  But  tho'  this  Power  cannot  be  Yet  fucli 
 determin'd  in  its   Operations  by  any  Judgment  of^^-^S^'^^ 
 the  Underftanding,    yet  the  Underftanding  is   ne-^^^^j^*^ 
 cefTary,  in  order  to  propofe  Matters  of  Adion,  and  ftanding 
 to  diftinguifti   poffible  ones  from  thofe  that  are  im-  in  order  to 
 poffible,     For  tho'  the  Goodnefs  of  things  with  re-  diftinguiih 
 fped  to  the  Agent,  proceeds  from  the  Determina-  P^.^'*^^^ 
 tion,  yet  the  Poffibility  or  Impoflibility  is  in  the  from^^-ixj- 
 things   themfelves,    and  there  is  need  of  the  Un-  pofGble. 
 (landing  to  diftinguifn  between   Objefts,  left  this 
 agent  falling    upon    Abfurdities,    procure  to  itfelf 
 Uneafinefs.     Not  that  an  Objed  is  therefore  Good 
 becaufe  'tis  poffible;  for  if  it  be  rejeded  it  will  be 
 Evil;   nor  will  it  be  immediately  difagreeable   be- 
 caufe   impoffible,   for  attempting  an   Impoflibihty 
 may  be  pleaiing  to  us,  as  we  may  prefer  the  exer- 
 cife  of  this  Power,  (wliich  is  the  thing  that  pleafes 
 
 us. 
 
needs  no 
 other  Li 
 mitation 
 
 272  Of  Moftil  EviL        Chap:  V. 
 
 us,  as  we  faid  before )  biit  he  that  makes  this  At* 
 tempt,  muft  neceflarily  be  unhappy  in  the  Event; 
 for  (incc  the  thing  which  the  Power  undertakes  is 
 impoflibk  to  be  donej  Uneafinefs  muft  necelTarily^ 
 If  the  A-  ^'^^^°w  ^^  hindi^ance  of  its  Exercife,  and  the  final 
 gent  be  of  I^ifappointment  of  its  End. 
 
 infinite  IX,  This  then  muft  be  affign'd  as  the  flrfl  Limi^ 
 
 Power,  he  tation  oi^Mch.  a  Power,  viz..  that  it  confine  itfelf  to' 
 PoffibiUties,  and  there  needs  no  other,  if  the  A- 
 gent  be  of  infinite  Power,  in  order  to  the  obtain- 
 ing of  its  End. 
 But  an  A-      X.  Eightlj,  But  if  the  Agent's  Power  be  finite,' 
 gent  of      jj.  j^^g  ^^^^  ^j^Q  J.Q  confult  its  Abihties,'  and  not  de- 
 Power       termine  itfelf  to  any  thing  which  may  exceed  them,' 
 muft  alfo    otherwife  it  will  be  as  much  difappointed  in  its  En-' 
 confult  his  deavQur  as  if  it  had  attempted  abfolute  Impo{ribili-»' 
 Abilities,    ^jgj^     j^^^  jj-j-j  J5  ^YiQ  fecond  Limitation  of  this  Pow- 
 er.    It  is  impoffiSle,  you'll  fay,  for  an  Appetite  to' 
 purfue  fuch  things  as  the  Underftandirrg  evidently 
 declares  not  to  be  in  the  Power  of  the  Agent.     I 
 anfwer,   the  Senfes   and  natural  Appetites  are  gra- 
 tify'd    with   their  Objefts,  and  pleafe  themfelves, 
 tho*   Reafon  remonftrate  againft   them,    and   con- 
 demn   that    pleafure    as    pernicious.      Hov/   mucit 
 more  eafily  then  may  this  faUitious  j^ppetitcy  which 
 arifes  in  the  Agent  from  Application  only,  be  con-' 
 ceiv'd  to  delight  in  its  good,  tho*  the  Underftand- 
 rng  oppofe  it,  and  condemn  that  D. light  as  foolifli 
 and  ofihort  Duration.     Why  Nature  granted  fuch 
 a  Liberty  to  this  Power,  and  how  it  conduces  to  the 
 Good  of  the  whole,  will  be  fliewn  afterwards. 
 Such  an         XI.  Hitherto  we  have  either  confider'd  this  P'ow-' 
 -Agent        er  alone  in  the  Agent,  or  as  join'd  with  the  Un- 
 cannotbe  dcrftandin^.    But  the  Acr-nt  endow'd  with  it,  may 
 
 detcrmin-     ,^1  '^i         -r^  ^ja  •  i-i 
 
 edbyhis    ^Ifo  have  Other  Powers  and  Appetites  which  arc 
 
 other  Ap-   determin'd  to  their  Obj'-fls  by  a  natural  Congruiry; 
 
 petites.       yet  neither  can  it  be  d  termin'd  in  its  Operations 
 
 by  them.    We  muft  diftinguilh  between  the  Open:- 
 
 tions' 
 
V 
 
 ^cOii  t.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  273 
 
 tioKS  of  thefe  Appetites,  and  the  Pleafure  which  a- 
 rifes  from  the  Exercife  of  them.  Thefe,  when 
 rightly  difpos'd,  muft  necefTarily  exert  their  Ope- 
 rations upon  the  prefence  of  their  Objefts;  but  it 
 is  not  at  all  neceflary  th.it  they  fhould  delight  and 
 pleafe  tthemfelves  in  thefe  Operations.  For  in- 
 ilance,  a  bitter  and  naufeous  favour  is  ciifagrecable 
 to  the  Tafte :  but  tho'  this  be  felt,  yet  urgent 
 Hunger  makes  it  pleafant,  the  craving  of  the  Appe- 
 tite overcoming  the  Di'agrreablenefs  of  the  Taft. 
 This  Pkafure  indeed  is  not  pure,  but  mix'd  and  di- 
 luted proportionably  to  the  Excefs  of  the  prevailing; 
 Appetite.  For,  fuppofe  that  there  are  three  De- 
 grees of  Uneafinefs  from  the  Hunger,  and  two  frorri 
 thejBitternefs;  the  Agent,  to  avoid  three,  muft 
 neceffarily  bear  two;  which  being  deduiScd,  there 
 remains  only  one  Degree  of  folia  Pleafure;  where- 
 as if  he  had  met  with  fuitable  and  fweet  Food,  there 
 would  have  been  three* 
 
 XII.   Since  therefore  tlie  Pkafure    which  arifes  Thii 
 from  the  Satisfaction  of  thefe  natural  Appetites  may  Power  is 
 be  overcome  by  a   ftronger  Appetite,   there's  no  %erior  to 
 Reafon  to  doubt  but  this  Power  which  is  indifferent  \^^^^  ^^"- 
 to  Objeds  may  overcome  all  the  other  Powers  and  and  fub- 
 Appetites.    For  all  thefe  are  limited  by  their  Ob-  dued  by 
 je-fts,   and  therefore  have  certain  Bounds   but  this  "O'^^- 
 Power  has   no  Bounds  *i  nor   is  there  any  thing 
 wherein    it    cannot  pleafe  itfelfs-   if  it   does    but 
 happen   to   be  determin'd  to  it.      Now  fince  the 
 natural    Appetites    themfelves    may     be    contrary 
 to  each  otjher  (as  we  have  fhewn)  and  one  of  them 
 be  o-vercome  by  the  Excefs  of  another,  how  much 
 more  eafily  may  this  pow;er  be  conceiv'd  to  go  a- 
 Igainft  tbele  Appetites,  and  fince  it  is  of  a  very  dif- 
 
 T  feren: 
 
 ^  t,  c.  /«  »V;  Obje^j,  fie  the  ^egit  Nott, 
 
274 
 
 It  feems 
 to  be  gi- 
 ven for 
 this  End, 
 that  the 
 Agent 
 might 
 havefome- 
 ihing  to 
 delight 
 in  when 
 the  natu- 
 ral Appe- 
 tites muft 
 necefTari- 
 ly  be  fru- 
 ftiated- 
 
 This  Pow- 
 er, by  its 
 acceffion, 
 cncreafes 
 the  plea- 
 fure  of 
 the  other 
 Appetites; 
 by  oppofi- 
 tion  re- 
 moves, or 
 at  Icali  al- 
 leviates 
 the  pain. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 ferent  and  fuperior  kind,  *tis  probable  that  it  can 
 conquer  all  others,  and  be  itfelf  fubdued  by  none. 
 
 XIIL  Nay  we  may  imagine  it  to  be  given  for 
 this  very  End,  that  the  Agent  might  have  wherein 
 to  pleafe  itfelf)  when  thofe  things  which  are  agree- 
 able to  the  natural  Appetites  cannot  be  had,  as  it 
 very  often  happens.  As  the  natural  Powers,  and 
 Appetites  receive  Pleafure  and  Pain  from  Objeds, 
 they  muft  neceffarily  be  deprived  of  Pleafure  and 
 undergo  Pain,  according  to  i  the  Laws  of  Motion, 
 and  the  order  of  external  things.  Since  then  they 
 are  often  fruftrated,  they  muft  render  the  Agents 
 poflefs'd  of  them  liable  to  Mifery,  as  well  as  make 
 them  capable  of  Happinefs;  But  the  Agent  can 
 have  this  always  to  delight  itfelf  in;  and  'tis  an  ad- 
 vantage to  it  to  be  able  to  quit  the  other  Appetites^ 
 and  pleafe  itfelf  in  reftrainmg  them,  or  ading  con- 
 trary to  them.  For  fmce  every  Faculty  is  fatisfied 
 in  its  exercife,  the  Strength  of  this  cannot  be  more 
 fignally  difplay'd  in  any  thing,  than  in  running 
 counter  fometimes  to  all  the  Appetites.  For  this 
 muft  either  be  fometimes  done,  or  the  Agent  muft 
 be  deftitute  of  all  manner  of  Good,  and  remain  en- 
 tirely miferable;  fmce  by  the  Laws  of  Nature, 
 things  contrary  to  the  Appetites  ^  muft  be  endured. 
 
 XIV.  And  from  hence  it  is  very  evident  how 
 defirable  fuch  a  Power  as  this  would  be :  for  if  it 
 happen  to  be  determin'd  to  fuch  things  as  are  a- 
 greeable  to  the  Appetites,  it  augments,  it  multi- 
 plies the  Enjoyment ;  but  if  it  fhould  be  deter- 
 min'd to  undergo  thofe  things  which  are  repugnant 
 to  the  Appetites,  and  which  muft  neccflarily  be 
 born  fometimes,  it  might  diminifh,  nay  quite  re- 
 move 
 
 *  viz.  in  painful  R(midkS)di/agr€{ahlePotmS}kc.  fee  %m^ 
 fedt.  5 .  par.  9, 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  275 
 
 move  the  Uneafinefs,   or  convert  it  into  Pleafure. 
 
 (50O 
 
 XV.  It  muft  be  confefs'd  that  fome  kind  of  drug-  The  reft 
 gle  will  be  hereby  excited  in  this  Agent,-  but  a  °^  "i^*^  -^P- 
 ftruggle  attended  with   fome  Pleafure,  tho*  it  be  ^^^^^^  ^^ 
 qualifi'd  and  not  perfedly  pure,  is  better  than  to  baulked 
 be  under  abfolute   Mifery.      Nay,   the  confciouf-  unnecefla- 
 nefs  of  a  Power  to  pleafe  itfelf  againft  the  bent  and  ^^^Z* . 
 Inclination  of  the  natural  Appetites,  may  caufe  a 
 greater  Pleafure  than  could  arife  from  the  fruition 
 of  thofe  things  which   would,   if   prefent,    gratify 
 T  2  thefe 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (50.)  This  is  not  much  more  than  what  Mr.  Locke  afierts  * 
 3n  anfwer  to  the  Enquiry,  "  Whether  it  be  in  a  Man's  power 
 to  change  the  Pleafantnefs  and  Unealinefs  that  accompanies 
 any  fort  of  Aftion  ?  And  to  that,  fays  he,  'tis  plain  in  many 
 cafes  he  can.  Men  may  and  fhould  corre£l  their  Palates,  and 
 give  a  relifh  to  what  either  has,  or  they  fuppofe  has  none. 
 The  relilh  of  the  Mind  is  as  various  as  that  of  the  Body  ;  and 
 like  that  too  may  be  alter'd  ;  and  'tis  a  miftake  to  think  that 
 Men  cannot  change  the  difpleafingnefs  or  indiiference  that  is 
 in  Actions  into  Pleafure  and  Delire,  if  they  will  but  do 
 what  is  in  their  Power.'  But  it  is  objected  by  Leibnitz,  a- 
 gainll  our  Author's  Notion,  that  if  it  could  create  Pleafure  by 
 an  arbitrary  Determination  and  bare  Eledlion,  it  might  for  the 
 fame  reafon  produce  Happinefs  in  infinitum  \  and  then  how 
 could  we  be  ever  miferable  except  we  chofe  to.  be  fo  ?  Which 
 Argument  feems  to  be  founded  on  a  miftake  of  our  Author's 
 meaning,  as  if  he  had  intended  to  affert  that  all  the  good  and 
 agreeablenefs  in  every  thing  or  aftion,  proceeds  abfolutely  and 
 entirely  from  our  Will:  and  alfo,  that  this  will  is  as  unlimited 
 in  its  Exercife  as  in  its  Obje^s,  and  confequently  that  we  might 
 have  any  way,  and  at  any  time,  as  much  Happinefs  as  we 
 pleafed,  purely  by  willing  it;  all  which  Propofitions  are  a3 
 falfe  as  they  are  foreign  to  the  Intention  of  our  Author,  who 
 infifts  only  upon  this,  that  the  ad  of  willing,  like  the  exercife 
 of  all  our  other  Faculties,  is  in  itfelf  delightful  to  a  certain 
 Degree :  This,  when  apply'd  to  an  Objeil  which  is  itfelf  agree- 
 
 able> 
 
 *  B.  2.  C.  21.  Sea.  69. 
 
 i  EjaiifhThtodii-^,  p.  466,  467, 
 
aflive. 
 
 276  Of  Moral  Evil.        Ghap.  V: 
 
 thefe  Appetites.    Yet  this  Agent  is  oblig'd  to  have 
 
 fome  regard   to  the  Appetites,  and  not  to   difturb 
 
 them  unneceflarily,   nor  reftrain  them  from  a  due 
 
 enjoyment  of  their  proper   Objeds.     He  that  does 
 
 this  will  bring  upon  himfelf  uneafinefs,  and  a  need- 
 
 lefs  conteft.     Tho*  therefore  it  be  not  at  all  proper 
 
 that  fuch  a  Power  fhould  be  abfolutely  detcrmin'd 
 
 by   the   natural  Appetites,  yet  it  is  fit  that  they 
 
 fhould 'per fuade  it,  and  that  fome  regard  be  had  to 
 
 them  in  its    Determinations,      And   this  may  be 
 
 reckon'd  its  third  Limitation. 
 
 Such  an         XVI.    Ninthly,  An  Agent  pofTefs'd  of  fuch  a 
 
 Agent  as     Principle  as  this  would  be  Self-a^iive,  and  capable 
 
 this  is        of  being  determin'd  in  its  Operations  by  itfelf  alone. 
 
 ^^l^"  Now  there  is  fometimes  an  abfolute  necefliry  for  it 
 
 to  be  determin'd;  for  when  any  thing  is  propofed 
 
 to 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 able,  mufl:  add  to  the  Pleafure  arifing  from  it ;  when  deterniin'(!' 
 to  a  contrary  one  (both  which  kinds  of  Objeds  he  always  fup- 
 pofes)  muft  dedud  from  the  Pain  ;  when  to  an  indifferent  one 
 it  muft  make  that  pofiti^^ely  agreeable,  by  conferring  fo  much 
 abfolute  and  folid  Happinefs. 
 
 But  ftill  this  exercife  of  the  Will,  and  of  confequence  the 
 Pleafure  attending  it,  muft  in  all  finite  Creatures  be  elfentially 
 and  neccffarily_/f«//f,  as  well  as  the  exercife  of  all  their  other 
 Powers :  and  tho'  it  has  no  bounds  as  to  the  number  and  kind. 
 of  its  Objects,  yet  it  muft  be  limited  as  to  its  own  Nature  and 
 the  degree  of  its  exercife.  This  appears  to  me  eafily  conceit-' 
 able,  and  Matter  of  experience.  We  find  ourfelves  generally- 
 able  to  turn  our  Thoughts  to  any  Objeft  indifferently,  but 
 does  any  Perfon  from  hence  imagine  that  he  can  fix  his 
 thoughts  upon  any  particular  Objefl  with  an  unlimited  In- 
 tenfenefs,  or  think  infimtely?  granting  the  Word  Intenfenefs 
 to  be  applicable  here  in  any  tolerable  fenfe :  which  will  per- 
 haps, upon  Examination,  appear  very  doubtful.  However,  it 
 is  evidently  no  good  confequence  to  infer,  that  becaufe  I  can. 
 will  or  choofe  a  thing  abfolutely  and /rr/^/v,  therefore  1  caT\ 
 ^vill  it  in  infinitum.  May  I  not  as  juftly  be  faid  to  perceive  or 
 undcrftand  a  thing  in  infinitum,  becauic  I  perceive  or  under- 
 iland  it  at  all  ?  See  Note  N, 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  3.    Of  Moral  E^ll  2^7 
 
 to  be  done  immediately,  it  muft  neceflarily  either 
 aft  orfufpend  itsadion;  one  of  them  muft  necelTa- 
 rily  be;  but  when  either  of  them  is  done,  the 
 Power  is  determined  by  that  very  aft ;  and  no  lels 
 force  is  requifite  to  fufpend  than  to  exert  the  a6l,  as 
 common  Senfe  and  Experience  may  inform  any- 
 one *.  A  determination  then  about  a  thmg  once 
 propos'd  to  be  done,  is  unavoidable;  and  Imce  ic 
 can  neither  be  determin'd  by  any  Good  or  Evil 
 pre-exiftent  in  the  Objefts,  nor  by  the  natural 
 Powers  or  Appetites,  nor  by  their  Objeds ;  it 
 muft  of  neceflity  either  continue  undetermined,  or 
 elfe  determine  itfelf.  But  tho'  it  be  naturally  free 
 from  any  determination,  yet  the  Nature  of  the  thing 
 requires  that  it  ihould  be  determin'd  on  every  par- 
 ticular occafion ;  and  fince  there  is  nothing  exter- 
 nal to  do  this,  it  remains  that  it  determine  itfelf. 
 We  ftiall  call  this  Determination  an  Ele^ion;  for 
 as  it  is  naturally  indifferent  to  many  things,  it  will 
 pleafe  itfelf  in  elefting  one  before  another. 
 
 XVII.  Nor  is  it  a  proper  Queftion  toasic,  What  Isdeter= 
 determines  it  to  an  Eledion?  For  if  any  fuch  thing  ^^^^Jf 
 were  fuppos'd,  it  would  not  be  indifferent ;  i.  e.  'tis  ^^^  \^{^^^ 
 contrary  to  the  Nature  of  this  Agent  that  there  are  not 
 fhould  be  any  thing  at  all  to  determine  it.     In  re-  chofen  be- 
 lation  to  a  paffive    Power "^y    which    has   a   natural  caufe  they 
 and   neceffary    connexion  with   the  Qbjea,    the  Q'|,',^X 
 prefence  of  which  determines  it  to  aft,   we  may  hiq,  be- 
 reafonably  enquire  what  that  Good  is  which  may  caufe  they 
 determine  it  to  exert  any  particular  aftion ;    but  it  are  cho- 
 is  not  fo  in  an  aaive  Power,  the  very  Nature  of  *^"- 
 which  is  to  make  an  Objeft  agreeable  to  itfelf,  /.  e. 
 good,  by  its  own  proper  ad.     For  here  the  Good- 
 nefs  of  the  Objed  does  not  precede  the  ad  of  E- 
 Jedion,  fo  as  to  excite  it,  but  Eledioi)  makes  the 
 
 X  5  Good" 
 
 *  See  Note  48. 
 
 t  S^e  Lscke,  Chap.  21.  Sea,  s; 
 
27B  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Goodnefsin  the  Objed;  that  is,  the  thing  is  agree- 
 able becaufe  chofen,  and  not  chofen  becaufe  agree- 
 able: We  cannot  therefore  juftly  enquire  after  any 
 other  caufe  of  Eledion  than  the  Power  itfelf. 
 Yet  he  is        XVIII.  If  thefe  things  be  true,  you'll  fay,  this 
 "°^  vf  K '^'  Agent  will  be  determin'd  by  Chanccy  and  not  by 
 Chance."^    ^^^fi^ »  ^^^  ^n  reality  here's  no  room  for  Chance, 
 if  by  Chance  be  underftood  that   which  happens 
 befide  the  Intention  of  the  Agent :    for  this  very 
 Eleftion  is  the  Intention  of  the  Agent,  and  it  is 
 jmpoffible  that  a  Man  Ihould  intend  belide  his  In-? 
 tention.     As  for  Reafon,  he  that  prefers  a  lefs  Good 
 to  a  greater,  muft  be  judg'd  to  ad  unreafonablyj 
 but  he  that  makes  that  a  greater  Good  by  choofing 
 it,  which  before  his  choice  had  either  no  Good  at 
 all  in  it,  or  a  lefs,  he  certainly   choofes   with  rea- 
 fon.    You  may  urge  that  Contingency  at  leaft  is   to 
 be  admitted  5  if  by  this  you  mean  that  this  Agent 
 does  forae  things  which  are  not  at  all  necelTary,  I 
 readily  own  fuch  a  Contingency,  for  that  is  the  very 
 Liberty  I  would  eftablifli. 
 Is  the  true     XIX.  Tenthly,  'Tis  evident  that  fuch  an  Agent 
 Cauie  of    gj  j.j^-j^  j£  -J.  i^g  allow'd  that  there  is  fuch  an  one, 
 ^,jj5^      '    is  the  true  Caufe  of  his  Adions,  and  that  whatever 
 he  does  may  juftly  be  imputed  to  him.     A  Power 
 which  is  not  Maflier  of  itfelf,  but  determin'd  to  ad 
 by  fome  other,  is  in  reality  not  the  efficient  Caufe 
 of  its  adions,  but  only  the  infirumental  or  occafi" 
 end,  (if  we  may  ufe  the  term  of  fome  Philofo- 
 phers)  for  it  may  be  faid  that  the  thing  is  done  in 
 it,  or  by  it,  rather  than  that  it  does  the  thing  it- 
 felf.   No  Perfon  therefore  imputes  to  himfelf,  or 
 efteems  himfelf  the  Caufe  of  thofe  adions  to  which 
 he  believes  himfelf  to  be  neceffarily  determin'd :  If 
 then  any  inconvenience  arife  from  them,    he  will 
 look  upon  it  as  a  Misfortune,  but  not  as  a  Crime; 
 and  whatever  it  be^  he  will  refer  it  to  the  Deter- 
 miner,   Nor  will  he  be  angry  with  himfelf,  un- 
 
 Icfs 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  279 
 
 lefs  he  be  confcious  that  it  was  in  his  power  not 
 to  have  done  them:  but  he  cannot  be  confcious 
 of  this  (except  thro'  ignorance  and  error)  who  is 
 determin'd  by  another.  For  no  others  ought  to  be 
 iook'd  upon  as  true  Caufes,  but  fuch  as  are  free, 
 Thofe  that  operate  neceffarily,  are  to  be  conceiv'd 
 QiS -pajjive,  and  we  muft  recur  to  fome  other  which 
 impofes  that  neceflity  on  them,  till  we  arrive  at  one 
 that  is  free,  where  we  muft  ftop.  Since  then  the 
 Agent  endow'd  with  this  power,  is  determin'd  by 
 himfelf  and  no  other,  and  is  free  in  his  Operati- 
 ons, we  muft  acquiefce  in  him  as  a  real  Caule,  and 
 he  ought  to  be  efteem'd  the  Author  of  whatever 
 Redoes,  well  or  ill.  (0,) 
 
 T  4  XX. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (0)  Againft  this  'tis  objeded  that  the  quite  contrary  fol- 
 lows. For  to  hit  on  a  good  aftion  by  a  Motion  abfolutely  in- 
 different and  not  in  confequence  of  fome  antecedent  Good  or 
 Evil  Qualities  in  the  Agent  is  to  fall  on  it  blindly,  by  mere 
 Chance,  and  fo  Fortune  not  the  Agent  is  to  be  thanked  or 
 blamed.  He  rather  is  to  be  blamed  or  praifed  that  owes  his 
 good  or  ill  Aftions  to  his  antecedent  good  or  ill  Qualities. 
 
 To  which  I  anfwer,  that  this  is  to  deny  and  difpute  againft 
 ihe  Conclufion,  without  anfwering  one  word  of  the  Premifes, 
 which  arc  fo  plain  and  evident  that  I  can't  reckon  the  Argu- 
 ment other  than  a  Demonftration ;  whereas  that  which  is  op- 
 pofed  to  it  is  againft  the  common  Senle  of  Mankind. 
 
 For  thofe  good  or  bad  Qualities  that  oblige  him  to  do  a  good 
 or  bad  Action  are  either  from  himfelf,  that  is  his  choice ;  or 
 pr^iceed  from  outward  Agents  that  produced  them  in  him  :  if 
 from  his  own  Choice,  then  it  agrees  with  the  Author's  Opini- 
 on ;  but  if  from  fome  outward  Agent,  then  it  is  plain  the  good 
 or  Evil  is  to  be  imputed  to  that  Agent  only,  ^tad  eji  caufa 
 Cauja  eji  etiam  Caufa  Caufati. 
 
 I  can't  better  explain  this  than  by  an  Example.  Suppofe  I 
 am  in  diftrefs,  aud  there  is  one  Man  that  by  the  Commands  of 
 his  Prince,  by  his  own  Intereft,  and  Politic  Confiderations  is 
 obliged  to  relieve  me,  and  is  in  fuch  Circumftances  that  he 
 cannot  pofTibly  avoid  doing  it;  the  other  is  under  no  manner 
 of  Obligation,  may  do  it  or  kt  it  alone,  yet  feeing  my  Mif- 
 
 fortune 
 
he 
 
 280  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Is  capable  XX.  Elevcnthly,  'Tis  manifefl:  that  fuch  an  A- 
 ofHapp;-  ggpj.  35  jj^js  is  capable  of  Happinefs.  For  that  Per- 
 ^^^'  fon  muft   be   happy   whq    can  always  pleafe  him- 
 
 felf,  and  this  Agent  can  evidently' do  To.  For 
 iince  things  are  fuppos'd  to  pleafe  him,  not  by  a- 
 ny  neceihty  of  Nature,  but  by  mere  Eledlion, 
 and  there  is  nothing  which  can  compel  him  to 
 choofe  this  rather  than  another,-  'tis  plain  that  the 
 Agent  endow'd  with  this  Power  may  always  choofe 
 luch  things  as  it  can  enjoy,  and  refufe,  /.  e.  not 
 dcfire,  or  not  choofe  ihofe  things  which  are  im- 
 )o{rible  to  be  had.  And  from  hence  it  appears  of 
 low  great  Importance  it  is,  whether  that  agreeable- 
 »efs  by  which  things  pleafe  the  Appetites,  be  efhb- 
 Hlhed  by  Narure,  or  effefted  by  the  Agent  him- 
 self.   For  if  Good  and  Lvil  proceed  from  Nature 
 
 and 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 fortune  he  choofes  and  pleafes  himfelf  in  doing  me  a  good 
 Office.  Let  any  one  of  Scnie  judge  to  which  of  thefe  I  owe 
 the  greateil  Obligation  ;  or  if  the  World  wou'd  with  Patience 
 hear  me  excufe  ray  Ingrntitude  by  faying.  Sir,  there  was  no 
 Obligation  on  you  to  help  me,  you  might  have  done  it,  or  let 
 it  alone,  therefore  it  was  mere  Chance,  that  determin'd  you. 
 Would  not  the  Reply  be  naturally,  the  Icfs  Obligation  was  oa 
 him  that  relieved  you,  the  greater  your  Obligation  is  to  him 
 for  his  kindnefs.  If  it  be  faid  that  the  Relief  proceeded  from 
 Companion  and  good  Nature,  which  were  antecedently  in  the: 
 Benefactor,  and  therefore  it  was  valuable  :  Suppofe  the  Perfon 
 that  did  this  Office  had  always  before  been  remarkable  for 
 cruelty  and  ill  nature,  ought  the  obliged  Perfon  to  value  the 
 Kindnefs  lefs  for  that  ?  Quite  contrary  ;  it  was  rather  a  greater 
 Favour  to  him  that  it  was  lingular.  But  fuppofc  it  proceeded 
 from  a  general  Compaffion  and  good  Nature,  that  had  nothing 
 of  Choice  in  them,  fo  that  the  Perfon  cou'd  not  help  doing  it ; 
 ought  I  not  to  thank  him  for  ir,  and  give  him  the  Praifes  due 
 to  the  Aftion  r  1  ought  to  praifeand  commend  him  for  his  ufe- 
 ful  Qualities,  as  I  do  the  Sun  :  but  if  I  Were  fure  that  there  was 
 nothing  of  choice  in  them,  I  had  no  more  reafon  to  thank  him 
 than  the  Tvrant  whofe  impoithume  was  cured  by  the  W^ouncJ 
 (defigued  to  kill  him,  had  reafon  to  rhank  the  AfTailant. 
 
Sea  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil  281 
 
 and  be  inherent  in  Objeds,  fo  as  ro  render  them  a- 
 greeable  or  difagreeable,    antecedent   to  the  Eledi- 
 on,  the  Happinefs   of  rhis  Agent  will  al(o  depend 
 upon  them  ;  and  unlefs  the  whole  Series  of  thmgs 
 be  fo  order'd,    that    nothing  can   happen  contrary 
 to  his  Appetites,  he  muft  fall  Ihort  of  Happinefs. 
 For  his  Appetites  will   be   difappointed,   which  is 
 the  very  thing  we  call  Unhappinefs.    But  if  Ob- 
 jeds  derive  their  agreeablenefs   or  difagreeablenefs 
 from  the  Choice,  'tis   clear   that    he  who  has  his 
 Choice  may  alway  enjoy  the  thing  chofen,    (  un- 
 lefs he  choofe  Impoffibilities,  &c.)  and  never  have 
 his  Appetite  fruftrated,  /.  e.  be  always  happy.  Not 
 thit  all  things  are  indifferent  with  refped  to  this 
 Power,  for  it  admits  of  fome  Limitations,  as  was 
 obferv'd,  by  choofmg   beyond  which  it  muft  ne- 
 cefTarily  fail  of  Happinefs, 
 
 XXI.  Twelfthly,  It  is   to  be  obferv'd  that  A-  Animper^ 
 gents,  whofe  Felicity  depends  upon  the  agreement  f^a  un-^ 
 of  external  Objeds   to  their  Appetites,    Ifand   in  ;„g  J3  f-^f. 
 need  of  a   perfed  and  almoft   infinite   Knowledge  ^^^^^^  for 
 to   comprehend  diftindly   all    the  relations,    habi-  hishappi- 
 tudes,  natures  and  confequences  of  things,-  if  they  nefs  ifhe 
 come  ihort  of  it,   it  is  impoffible   but   that  they  ""^^^^ 
 muft  often  fall  into  pernicious  Errors,  and  be  dif-  between 
 appointed  of  their  Defires,  that  is  be  often  mifer-  poffibili- 
 able:    Hence  anxiety  and  difquiet  of  Mind  muft  ties,  and 
 neceffarily  arife,   and  they  would  be  agitated  with  f^Pf'^" 
 continual  doubts  and   uncertainty,    left  what  they  ^^^^^^ 
 choofe  fhould  not  prove  the  beft.     Thefe  Agents  agreeable 
 then  were  either  to  be  created  without  a  profped  and  difa- 
 of  Futurity,    or   to   be   endow'd   with  a  perfed  greeable 
 Underftanding;   if  neither  were  done,  they  muft  J°^f^^ 
 of  neceility  be  very  miferable;  for  we   can  Scarce  .^j  con- 
 conceive  a  greater  Mifery  than  to  be  held  in  fuf-  fult  his 
 penfe  about   Happinefs,    and    compell'd  to    choofe  Abilities. 
 among  ODJeds  not  fufEciently  known,   in  which 
 ■^  never- 
 
282  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 neverthelefs  a  Miftake  would  be  attended  with 
 unavoidable  Mifery.  There's  none  but  is  fufficiently 
 apprehenfive  how  anxious,  how  folicitous,  how  mi- 
 ferable  it  muft  be  to  hang  in  fuch  a  doubt  as  this ;  but 
 if  the  agreeablenefs  of  things  be  fuppofed  to  depend 
 upon  EleEHon,  a  very  imperfeft  underftanding  will 
 ferve  to  direft  this  Agent,  nor  need  he  to  com- 
 prehend all  the  natures  and  habitudes  of  things: 
 tor  if  he  do  but  dillinguifh  poffible  things  from 
 impoflible,  thofe  things  which  are  pleafant  to  the 
 Senfes  from  them  that  are  unpleafant,  that  which 
 is  agreeable  to  the  Faculties  from  what  is  difagree- 
 able,  and  confult  his  own  Abilities.  viz.»  how  far 
 his  Power  reaches;  (all  which  are  eafily  difcover'd) 
 he  will  know  enough  to  make  him  happy.  Nor 
 is  there  need  of  long  deliberation,  whether  any 
 thing  to  be  done  be  the  very  beft;  for  if  the 
 EletStion  be  but  made  within  thefe  bounds,  thac 
 will  become  beft  which  is  chofen. 
 
 Tho'  Li-        XXII.  He  that  enjoys  the  Principle  of  pleafing 
 
 berty         himfelf  in  his   Choice  cannot  reafonably  complain 
 
 woul^  be    pf  Nature,  tho'  he  have  but  a  very  imperfe6l  Un- 
 
 1^0  0-    derflanding ;    for  there  will  always  be  Objeds  e- 
 
 iherA-      nough   ready     to    oifer   themlelves    within   thefe 
 
 gents,  yet  bounds.    Upon  which  he  may    exercife  his  choice, 
 
 itisafure  gj^^^  pleafe  himfelf:    that  is,  he  may  always  enjoy 
 
 SHa' ^T  Happinefs,     Tho*  Free-will  then  be  of  no  ufe,  as 
 
 nefstothis  was  faid  before,  to  an  Agent  capable  of  being  de- 
 
 v/hofe        termin'd  only  by  ithc  convenience  of  external  things, 
 
 conveni-     ftgy,  tho*  it  be  pernicious,  as  only  tending  to  pervert 
 
 encede-     j^g^lon  and  produce  Sin;  yet   to  an  Agent  whofe 
 pends  not  .  ' .  ,       ■'  ,  i        i  •  ■ 
 
 on  Ob-      convenience  does  not  depend  upon  the  thing?,  but 
 ]eas,  but    the  choice,  it  is   of  the  greatell:    Importance,  and 
 Eledlion-     ag  we  have  feen,  the  fure  and  only  Foundation  of 
 Felicity,     And   from  hence  it  appears  how  valua- 
 ble and  how  defirable  fuch  an  an  adive   Principle 
 as  this  would  be. 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  283 
 
 XXIII.  All  this  feems  to  be   coherent  enough,  Thefe 
 
 clear  enough,  and  eafy  to  be  underftood,  tho*  fome  ^^'"S^  are 
 
 may  look  upon  it  as  a  little  too  fubtle.     It  remains  gjf  ^'^j^ 
 
 that  we  enquire  whether  this  be  a  mere  Hypothefis  tWthey 
 
 without  any  Foundation  in  faft,  or  there  is  really  mayap- 
 
 fuch  a  Principle  to  be  found  in  Nature.  (  5 1.)  ^^^}  to  be 
 
 ,  a  little  too 
 
 NOTES.  '""'• 
 
 (51.)  For  an  Explanation  of  our  Author's  Principle  of  In- 
 difference, above  what  has  been  faid  in  Note  49.  and  will  be 
 enlarged  on  in  Note  58.  we  Ihall  only  obferve  here,  that  molt 
 of  the  obje£lions  brought  by  the  Author  of  the  Philofophical  En- 
 quiry, p.  69,  ^c.  are  built  upon  the  old  blunder  of  confound- 
 ing this  Indifference  as  apply'd  to  the  Mind,  in  refpeftofits 
 Self  determining  Powers  o? 'willing  or  aSiing,  with  another, 
 which  is  falfly  referr'd  to  the  paffive  Powers  o^ Perception  and 
 Judgment.  With  refpe£t  to  the  former  Faculties  all  things  are 
 phyfically  indifferent  or  alike,  that  is,  no  one  can  properly  af- 
 fcik,  incline  or  move  them  more  than  another ;  with  regard  to 
 the  latter,  moft  things  are  not  indifferent,  but  neceffarily  pro- 
 duce Pleafure  or  Pain,  are  agreeable  or  difagreeable,  whether 
 we  choofe  them  or  not:  Our  Author  is  to  be  underftood  only 
 in  relation  to  the  former,  in  this  and  the  following  Sections^ 
 tho'  he  often  ufes  general  terms. 
 
 SUBSECT, 
 
284  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    ly, 
 
 ^hat  there  is  an  Agent  who  is  pleas' d  with        \ 
 OhjeBs  only  becaiife  he  choofes  theni 
 
 Grd  is       W/^  h^"^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^^  former  Subfediion,  tlias 
 
 fuch  an        \y    fome  things  are  adapted   to  the  Appetites 
 
 ^r"^*^    by  the  conftiturion  of  Nature  rtfelf,    and  on  that 
 
 *  "*  account  arc  good  and  agreeable  to  them;  but  that 
 
 we   may    conceive  a  Power  which    can  produc-e 
 
 Goodnefs  or  Agreeablenefs  in  the  things,  by  con^ 
 
 forming  itfelf  to  them,   or   adapting  them  to  it : 
 
 hence  things   pleafe  this  Agent,   nor  becaufe  they 
 
 are  good  in  themfelves,    but  become  good  becaule 
 
 they  are  chofen.      We  have  demonftrated  before, 
 
 how  great  a  Perfedion,    and  of  what  ufe  fuch  a 
 
 Power  would  be,  and  that  there  is  fuch  a  Power  in 
 
 Nature  appears  from  hence,  viz^.  we  muft  neceila- 
 
 rily  believe  that  God  is  inverted  with  it. 
 
 B^canfe  J  I,  For  in  the  firft  place,  nothing  in  the  Crea- 
 
 nothing      yQj^  J5  either  Good  or  Bad  to  him  before  his  Elec- 
 
 ehher^  ^^  "°"*  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  Appetite  to  gratify   with  the  En- 
 
 "ood  or      joyment  of  things  without  him.     He  is  therefore 
 
 bad  to        abfolutely  ^different  to  all  external  things,  and  can 
 
 him  be-      neither  receive  benefit  nor  harm  from  anv  of  them. 
 
 fe'lbn  ^^^'^^^  ^^^^  ^°^^^  determine  his  Will  to  ad? 
 Certainly  nothing  uithout  him,'  therefore  he  de- 
 termines himfelf,  and  creates  to  himfclf  a  kind  of 
 Appetite  by  choofing.  For  when  the  Choice  is 
 made,  he  will  have  as  great  attention  and  regard 
 to  the  effedlual    procuring   of  that  which  he  has 
 
 chofeii 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  285 
 
 chofen,  as  if  lie  were  excited  to  this  Endeavour  by 
 a  natural  and  neceffary  Appetite.  And  he  will  e* 
 fteem  (uch  thin  gs  as  tend  to  accomplifh  thefe  Eledi- 
 ons,  Good ;  luch  as  obftrud  them.  Evil. 
 
 III.  Secondly,  the  Divine  Will  is  the  Caufe  of  Bccaufe 
 Good  in  the  Creatures,  and  upon  it  they  depend,  disown 
 as  almoft  every  one  acknowledges.  For  created  ^.j^  l,^^  >-^ 
 Beings  have  all  that  they  have  from  the  Will  of  of  Good- 
 God  ,-  nor  can  they  be  any  thing  elfe  than  what  nefs  in  the 
 he  willed.  'Tis  plain  then  that  all  thefe  agree  and  Creatures. 
 are  conformable  to  his  Will,  either  efficient  or  per- 
 miffive,  and  that  their  original  Goodnefs  is  found- 
 ed in  this  Conformity.  And  fince  all  things  pro- 
 ceed from  one  and  the  fame  Will,  which  cannot 
 be  contrary  to  itfelf,  as  it  is  rellrain'd  withia  its 
 proper  bounds  by  infinite  Wifdom,  'tis  aifo  cer- 
 tain that  all  things  <are  confident  with  each  otlaer» 
 that  every  thing  contributes  as  much  as  poflTible 
 to  the  prefervation  of  itfelf  and  the  whole  Sy- 
 f!em ;  which  we  muft  reckon  their  fecondary  Good- 
 nefs.  All  the  Goodnefs  then  of  the  Creatures  is 
 owing  to  the  Divine  Will,  and  dependent  on  it; 
 for  we  cannot  apprehend  how  they  could  be  eithef 
 Good  or  Evil  in  themielves,  fince  they  were  no- 
 thing at  all  antecedent  to  the  ad:  of  the  Divine 
 Will :  and  they  were  as  far  from  being  good  with 
 regard  to  God  himfelf,  till  upon  Willing  their  Exift- 
 ence  he  by  that  aft  of  Eleftion  both  conflituted' 
 them  Good  in  relation  to  him,"  and  by  an  unity  of 
 Will  made  them  agreeable  to  one  another.  *Tis 
 evident  that  the  Divine  Will  was  accompanied  in 
 this,  as  in  all  other  Cafes,  by  his  Goodnefs  and 
 Wifdom;  but  it  proceeds  immediately  from  his 
 Will  that  things  pleafe  God,  i.  e.  are  Good.  For 
 many  things  are  not  agreeable  to  his  Goodnefs  and 
 Wi(dom  purely  becaufe  he  did  not  will  them,  and 
 .while  he  does  not  will  any  thing  it  cannot  be  good. 
 
 FrojTs 
 
a86  Of  Moral  Evil        Chap.  V. 
 
 From  whence  it  appears  undeniably  that  his 
 Will  could  not  be  determin'd  to  Eledion  by  any 
 Goodnefs  in  the  Creatures.  For  before  that  E- 
 leftion,  which  is  declared  to  be  the  Caufe  of  Good- 
 nefs  in  created  Beings,  nothing  could  be  either 
 Good  or  Badj  but  when  the  Eledion  is  made, 
 that  only  is  Evil  which  obftruds  the  execution  of 
 it,  and  that  Good  which  promotes  it.  The  Good- 
 nefs  of  things  is  therefore  to  be  determin'd  by  their 
 agreeabknefs  to  the  Divine  Will,  and  not  that  by 
 the  agreeableftefs  or  goodnefs  of  things.  (P.) 
 
 VI* 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (P)  The  Objections  here  are  ift,  that  if  this  be  tfuc,  before 
 Cod  determin'd  to  create  the  World  he  cou'd  fee  nothing  bet- 
 ter in  Virtue  than  in  Vice. 
 
 It  were  a  fufficient  anfvver  to  this  Objeftion  to  fay  there  is 
 210  harm  in  it,  if  it  were  true  ;  for  we  muft  confider  that  God 
 from  all  Eternity  determin'd  to  create  the  World,  and  there- 
 fore there  neither  was  any  thing,  nor  can  any  thing  be  con- 
 ceived before  that  Determination  ;  and  therefore  he  might  al- 
 ways fee  fomething  better  in  Virtue  than  Vice. 
 
 But  zdly.  We  ought  to  remember  that  Virtue  and  Vice  a- 
 ifife  from  the  Congruity  of  Things  created  by  Godj  what  is 
 agreeable  to  a  reafonable  Nature  is  Virtue,  what  is  contrary 
 Vice,  and  that  there  is  no  other  Caufe  why  one  Nature  is  rea- 
 fonable and  another  without  Reafon,  but  the  Will  of  God,  and 
 therefore  Vice  and  Virtue  muft  entirely  depend  on  that  Will. 
 The  plain  Reafon  of  Mens  miftake  in  the  Cafe  is  this  :  They 
 firft  fuppofe  God  has  willed  that  a  Nature  fhould  be  reafonable 
 and  then  forgetting  that  this  depends  entirely  on  his  Will, 
 they  fuppofe  this  Nature  to  be  of  itfelf,  and  then  argue  that 
 the  Congruity  or  Incongruity  of  things  to  it,  cannot  depend 
 on  the  Will  of  God,  becaufe  he  can't  make  what  is  congruous 
 to  it  incongruous ;  that  is  in  reality  his  Will  can't  be  contrary 
 to  itfelf 
 
 But  2dly,  'Ti$  objefted,  that  this  Opinion  leaves  no  dif- 
 ference between  natural  and  pofitive  Laws :  for  a  pofitive 
 Law  is  what  depends  on  the  Will  of  God  ;  and  according  to 
 this  pofition  Natural  Laws  depend  on  the  fame,  and  fo  the 
 diflinilion  between  them  is  taken  away. 
 
Scd.  i.  Sub  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  2S7 
 
 IV.  Thirdly,  We  muft  not  therefore  attend  to  They  are 
 
 fuch  as  declare  that  God   choofes   things   becaufe  "°^  ^°  ^® 
 
 *l,=,r  minded 
 
 '^ey  who  de- 
 TV  o  7  £  .y*  Clare  th  at 
 
 this  Good- 
 
 But  the  anfwer  to  this  Is  fo  cafy,  that  ^tis  a  wonder  any  fliou'd  •  ,  " 
 ftumble  at  it.  For  it  is  plain  that  the  Natures  of  things  have  -^-i,  c 
 their  Being  from  the  Will  of  God,  and  whilft  that  Will  con-  y->  j 
 tinues  none  can  deftroy  them,  and  the  Congruity  of  things  to 
 thefe  Natures  refults  from  the  Natures  themfelves,  and  is  in- 
 cluded in  the  fame  adl  of  Will,  that  gave  the  things  a  Being: 
 fo  that  as  long  as  it  pleafes  God  to  continue  their  Beings  fuch 
 as  he  has  made  them,  the  Congruity  and  Incongruity  of  things 
 jieceffarily  remain  and  refult  from  that  aft  of  Will,  which  made 
 them  what  they  are ;  infomuch  that  the  Divine  Will  muft.  be 
 contrary  to  itfelf,  if  it  went  about  to  feparate  them  (/.  e.  the 
 Nature  from  the  Congruity)  and  therefore  thefe  are  join'd  to- 
 gether by  a  Natural  Law.  But  when  God  by  a  new  adt  of 
 Will  fubfequent  to  the  Being  of  any  thing  requires  fomcthing 
 to  be  done  by  it  which  was  not  included  in  that  firft  aft  of 
 Will  which  gave  it  a  Being,  then  that  is  faid  to  be  enjoin'd  by 
 ^poJiti<ve  Law;  and  as  this  was  requir'd  by  an  aft  fubfequent 
 to  the  Being,  fo  it  may  be  again  removed  by  another  without 
 (deftroying  the  Being  itfelf  on  which  it  is  impofed,  or  without 
 any  contrariety  in  God's  Will.  Hence  Natural  Laws  are  in- 
 difpenfible,  and  can*t  be  abrogated,  whilft  the  Natures  to 
 which  they  belong  continue  ;  whereas  the  pofitive  Laws  are 
 difpenfible  and  may  be  repealed. 
 
 But  3dly,  'Tis  urg'd  that  this  opinion  leads  us  ftraight  to 
 Pyrrhonifm,  and  makes  God  not  only  free  as  to  Virtue,  fo 
 that  he  may  make  it  either  good  or  bad;  but  likewife  to  the 
 truth  or  fallhood  of  Things,  fo  that  he  may  change  their  Na* 
 til  re  and  make  three  and  three  not  to  be  fix. 
 
 'Twere  a  fufficient  anfwer  to  this,  to  fay  the  Cafe  is  not 
 parallel ;  for  the  Goodnefs  of  Things  is  fuppofed  to  arife  from 
 the  Will  of  God,  which  is  free;  but  the  truth  of  them  from 
 his  Intelled^,  which  is  a  neceflary  Faculty  ;  and  therefore  tho' 
 the  one  might  be  arbitrary,  yet  the  other  cannot.  But  the 
 Truth  is,  Goodnefs  is  a  conformity  to  the  Will  of  God,  and 
 the  reafon  that  God  can't  will  Evil  is  becaufe  it  is  always  con- 
 trary to  feme  other  aft  of  his  Will,  and  his  Will  can't  be  con- 
 trary to  itfelf:  and  at  the  fame  rate,  Truth  is  a  conformity  to 
 his  Intelleft,  and  the  Reafon  that  a  Propofition  is  true,  is  be- 
 caufe it  is  fo  conformable  ;  and  fmce  it  is  io,  to  fuppofe  it  not 
 conforma^ble  is  to  fuppofe  a  contradiftion.    God  in- making  or 
 
288  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 they  are  Good,    as   if  Coodnefs  and   the   greater 
 Good  which  he  perceives  in  Objeds,  could  deter- 
 mine 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 conceiving  fix,  made  and  conceived  threi?  and  three?  and 
 therefore  t^  fuppofe  that  three  and  three  do  not  make  fix,  h 
 to  fuppofe  a  Contradiction.  In  effect  it  is  to  fay  God  conceives 
 it  wrong  ;  and  to  fay  that  his  Power  can  make  it  othervvifc,  is 
 to  fay  that  his  Power  can  falfify  his  Underftanding. 
 
 Thefe  things  are  fo  eafy  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  about 
 fhem,  if  Men  will  not  be  perverfe. 
 
 But  4thly,  Is  not  this  to  make  the  EJfence  of  things  arhilra- 
 ry,  and  fo  fall  in  with' fome  Cartejians  ?  I  anfwer  the  Author 
 is  not  concern'd  with  the  opinions  of  Cartejians,  or  any  other,- 
 farther  than  he  thinks  them  true.  If  by  making  the  Eflence  of 
 things  arbitrary,  be  meant  that  God  inftead  of  making  a  Man, 
 might  have  made  a  Stone,  or  planted  the  World  with  Mulh- 
 rooms  inftead  of  Herbs  and  Trees ;  he  verily  believes  he  might. 
 If  you  mean  that  when  God  has  made  a  Man  and  planted  the 
 World  with  variet)'  of  vegetables,  that  the  Man  continuing 
 what  he  is  fhou'd  yet  be  a  Stone,  or  the  feveral  Plants  con- 
 tinuing in  their  variety  fhou'd  all  be  Mufhrooms,  this  he  thinks- 
 impoffible.  For  a  Man  is  a  Creature  that  is  not  a  Stone,  and 
 therefore  to  fay  he  is  a  Stone,  or  to  make  him  one,  is  to  make 
 him  no  Man.  Six  is  a  Number  confifting  of  three  and  three,- 
 and  to  fay  tkat  a  Number  doth  not  confiil:  of  three  and  three  is 
 to  fay  that  it  is  not  fix,  Man  iy  a  Creature  obliged  to  be  juft* 
 ^c.  by  the  very  Conllifution  of  his  Nature,  and  to  f\y  that 
 he  is  not  obliged  to  be  fo,  is  to  fay  that  he  is  not  a  Man.  If 
 it  be  afk'd,  can't  God  will  him  to  do  fuch  things  as  we 
 reckon  unjuft,  If^c  ?  I  anfwer  he  may,  but  it  muft  be  by  mak- 
 ing him  fomething  elfe,  by  caufing  him  to  ceafe  to  be  a  Man ; 
 in  fhort  by  taking  av/ay  his  Nature  from  him,  and  then  nei- 
 ther the  notion  of  Manhood,  nor  Injultice  will  belong  to  him. 
 The  material  adts  that  we  call  unjuft  might  ftilF  be  perform'd 
 by  him,  but  the  formal  Reafon  ofinjuilice  would  ceafe,  be- 
 caufe  that  arifes  fro.m  the  afts,  not  as  confider'd  in  themfelves, 
 but  as  they  proceed  from  a  Nature  to  \vhich  they  are  unfuitable. 
 
 Thus  a  Klan  that  owes  me  no  Money  may  give  me  lOOoL 
 but  can't  be  faid  to  pay  me  a  Debt,  becaufe  the  paying  a  Debt 
 fuppofes  that  he  owes  it;  and  therefore  tho'  a  Debtor,  and  one 
 that  owes  nothing  may  each  give  me  looo/.  yet  they  differ  m 
 this,  that  the  one  is  Payment  of  a  Debt,  the  other  a  free  Gift. 
 And  fo  it  i.s  jn  all  thofe  Actions  that  we  call  uniuft,  ^c.wheii 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  4.     0/  Momi  Evil.  289 
 
 mine  his  Will"^.  If  the  Matter  had  flood  thus, 
 it  does  not  fecm   poflible   for  the  World  to  have 
 
 beeii 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 riiey  are  done  by  a  Man,  they  are  Crimes,  becaufe  againft  his' 
 Nature  ;  but  when  another  Creatura  that  has  not  Pveafon  does 
 them,  they  can't  be  call'd  unjuft,  ts'c.  For  Example,  if  a 
 Man  kills  one  that  no  ways  injures  him,  and  rofls  and  eats  him, 
 he  commits  MurdCr,  and  is  guilty  or  an  horid  Immorality  ;  hwi 
 if  a  Lyon  unprovoked  kill  and  eat  a  Man  it  is  no  Crime  or  Wick- 
 ednefs  in  him.  But  in  as  much  as  Men  in  their  way  of  think- 
 ing reprefent  to  themfclvcs  a  Nature  with  all  its  Parts  and  Pro- 
 perties, and  find  that  they  can't  remove  any  of  them  from  that 
 Nature,  they  conclude  that  the  Natures  of  created  Beings  are 
 what  they  are  independently  on  th6  Will  of  God  ;  forgetting 
 in  the  mean  time  that  it  is  only  the  Divine  Will  that  gave  or 
 can  give  a  Being  to  any  Creature  with  certain  Parts  and  Pro- 
 perties, and  that  inftead  of  that  Creature  he  cou'd  make  ano- 
 ther without  them  all,  that  fliould  have  quite  different  parts  andE 
 attributes.  'Tis  therefore  merely  from  his  Will  that  Creatures 
 are  what  they  are  ;  but  that  Will  having  given  them  a  Being, 
 or  being  conceived  to  have  given  it,  no  part  or  property  be- 
 Jonging  to  them  can  even  in  thought  be  taken  from  them:  and 
 this  fcems  to  me  a  full  account  of  the  certainty  of  thofe  things^ 
 we  call  Eternal  Truths  ■[. 
 
 I  have  infilled  the  longer  on  this  Point  becaufe  I  fee  fome 
 indifferent  Perfons  as  to  the  main  Difpute  have  thought  the 
 Author  miftaken  in  his  affertiiig  the  Goodnefs  of  things  to  de- 
 pend immediately  on  the  Will  of  God.  Let  me  add  farther, 
 that  the  Author  does  not  fay  that  the  Goodnefs  of  Things  de- 
 pends yo/f/y  on  God's  Will;  but  that  his  Wifdom  and  Power 
 are  Hkewife  concern'd  in  them:  we  mull  not  feparate  God's 
 Will  from  thefe  attributes ;  on  the  contrary  his  Will  is  limi- 
 ted by  the  one  and  executed  by  the  other. 
 
 U  But 
 
 *  This  Notion  is  advanc'd  by  Dr.  Clarh  in  his  Demonjira- 
 tio7i  of  the  DH'ine  Attributes,  Prop.  1 2.  and  afterwards  explain- 
 ed, as  far  as  it  feems  capable  of  Explanation,  in  his  E'vidences 
 nf  li at ur aland  Ren.'eaVd  Religion,  Prop,  i .  I'he  fame  is  infilled 
 on  by  Leibnitz,  Grotius,  Rujl,  Mr.  Chubb,  and  many  others. 
 We  have  enquired  a  little  into  it  already  in  R  i.  See  more  \vi 
 Note  52. 
 
 +  See  the  Impartial  Enquiry,  p.  jQy'i'. 
 
290  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 been  .nade  at  all.     For  they  who  acknowledge  God 
 be  the  Author  of  it,    confefs  alfo,   that   he  is 
 
 abfo- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 But  laflly  it  is  urged  that  according  to  thefe  Principles  Vir- 
 tues are  not  good  antecedently  to  God's  Choice,  and  would 
 not  be  good  if  God  did  not  choofe  them,  nay  if  he  chofe  Vices 
 in  their  ftead,  they  would  be  good  both  morally  and  phyfical- 
 ly.  For  Obedience  to  God  is  Good,  and  if  God  had  com- 
 manded Vice  it  would  have  been  Man's  Duty  to  obey  him;' 
 and  perhaps  Goodncfs  might  this  way  have  been  as  cU'eftually 
 brought  into  the  World,  as  by  thofe  Virtues  that  arife  from 
 the  exigence  of  our  Nature,  as  God  has  now  framed  it.  And 
 from  hence  they  infer  that  God  is  as  free  to  make  his  Jecond 
 Choice,  as  we  conceive  hirA  to  be  in  making  \i\%  firfl. 
 
 But  to  all  this  I  anfwer,  ift,  lacknowledge  that  antecedent- 
 ly to  God's  Choice  there  can  be  nothing  good  or  bad,  becaufe 
 there  can't  be  any  thing  at  all:  the  very  mom.ent  we  conceive  a 
 thing  to  be,  we  mufl:  conceive  nnd  fuppofe  that  God  v.  ills  it 
 to  be  what  it  is,  and  that  he  wills  it  fliould  by  its  Nature  and 
 ConHitution  have  certain  parts  and  properties,  and  that  as  long 
 as  the  thing  continues  what  it  is,  God's  Will  continues  alfo  to 
 preferve  it  fo :  to  ilippole  therefore  that  he  Wills  at  the  fam,e 
 time  it  iiiou'd  be  without  thofe  parts  and  properties,  is  plainly 
 to  fuppofe  two  contradidory  Wills  in  God.  Now  an  Obliga- 
 tion to  Virtue  is  a  Property  nccellarily  lefulting  from  the  Na- 
 ture of  Man,  and  therefore  to  fuppole  God  to  command  him 
 not  to  be  virtuous  when  he  has  given  him  fuch  a  Nature,  is  a. 
 Contradjclioi:, 
 
 V\  :-y\iy  would  in  earncfi;  fhew  that  the  Goodnefj  of  Things 
 doth  not  depend  upon  the  Will  of  God,  the  true  way  of  do- 
 ing it  is  to  gi\e  an  inftance  offomething  that  is  good,  which 
 doth  iiot  fuppofe  an  aci  of  God's  Will,  or  an  Example  of 
 fomething  Evil,  that  is  not  manifellly  contrary  to  fome  adl 
 of  it. 
 
 In  fliort,  the  Coi'.gruity  of  things  is  their  Goodncfs,  and. 
 that  Congruity  arifes  from  their  Natures,  and  they  have  thofe 
 Natures  from  the  Will  of  God,  and  thole  Natures  nuift  have  a 
 Congruity  becaufe  they  proceed  from  one  Will,  which  cannot 
 be  contrary  to  itfelf,,  becaufe  it  is  condudcd  by  infinite  Wifdom. 
 All  this  is  fufricientiy  laid  down  in  the  Book,  and  for  any  one 
 to  urge  ihele  Confequcnces,  and  take  no  Notice  of  the  Soluti- 
 ons given  them  iiii.fl:  cither  proceed  from  not  having  read  the 
 Book,  or  a  w  orle  Reafon,  a\  hich  Ism  unwilling  to  believe. 
 
Sea  I.  Sub.  4=     Of  Moral  Evil.  291 
 
 abfoluteiy  and  completely  lii^iTty  in  himfclf,  and 
 does  noc  Hand  in  the  kail  need  of  other  things. 
 Now  ic  is  inconceivable  hov/  external  things  can 
 be  of  life  to  God,  who  comprehends  in  hiniielf  all 
 things  which  tend  ro  perfect  Hippinef.  He  mud 
 of  neceffity  therefore  be  indifferent  to  all  cxrernal 
 Objeds,  nor  can  any  rcafon  be  illlign'd,  with 
 regard  to  the  ihmgs  thcmfelves,  why  he  iliould 
 prefer  one  to  Another.  'Tis  plain  that  things  are 
 made  by  God  with  Goodnefs,  that  is,  with  a  cer- 
 tain congruity  to  his  own  Nature;  but  they  are 
 fo  far  from  being  made  on  account  of  any  agree- 
 ablenefs  antecedent  to  the  Divine  Will,  that,  on 
 the  contrary,  they  are  neceffarily  agreeable  and 
 pleafant  becaufe  they  are  made  by  his  free  Choice; 
 For  (ince  they  are  nothing  in  themfelve?,  they 
 muft  of  neceffity  have  both  their  Exiftence  and 
 their  agreeablenels  from  that  Will,  from  which 
 they  folely  proceed ;  and  it  is  impoffible  but  than 
 they  (liould  be  conformable  to  the  Will  which  ef- 
 fefted  them :  For  God?  by  willing,  makes  thofe 
 things  pleafing  to  him  which  were  before  indif- 
 ferent. 
 
 V.  Unlefs  therefore  vv'e  attribute  to  him  fuch  a  If  he  had 
 Power  as  has   been  defcribed   (namely,    an  ability  "ot^po^'^'- 
 to  pleafe  himfelf,  by  determining  himfelf  to  adion,  filiCThfu^l^' 
 without   any  other   regard  had  to  the  Quality  of  felf  in 
 the  Objeft,  than  that  it  is  poffible)   it  ieem^im-  Eleftion, 
 poffible   that  ever  he    lliould   begin  to  effect   any  ^^'^  '^^"^'^ 
 tbing  without  himfelf.      For,   as  far  as  we  can  ap-  }|j^e\^j(^g, 
 prehend,  there  can    be   no  reafon  affign'd  why  he  ^ny  thing, 
 fhould  create  any  thing  at  all  "^j    why   a   World, 
 why  theprefent,  why  at  that  particular  time  when 
 it   was   created,    why  not  before  or  after,  v/hy  in 
 this  and    no   other  Form  :     he  receiv'd  no  advan- 
 
 U  z  tage 
 
 *  i  e.    "No  reafon  dra^j^n  froin  the  Naturs  of  the  thing  to  h? 
 created.      See  the  tn):o  foUo<vjbig  Note', 
 
292  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 tage  or  difadvantage  from  thefe,  no  benefit  or  harm  ; 
 in  fliort,  nothing  that  could  move  him  to  choofe 
 one  before  another.  Except  therefore  we  attri- 
 bute to  God  an  adivc  power  of  determining  him 
 lelf  in  indifferent  Matter*?,  upon  every  particu- 
 lar Occafion,  and  of  pkafing  himfelf  in  that  De- 
 termination according  to  his  Choice;  he  would  do 
 nothing  at  all,  he  would  be  for  ever  indolent  in 
 regard  to  all  external  things,  and  the  World  could 
 not  poiTibly  have  been  made,  fince  no  reafon 
 could  be  imagin'd,  why  a  God  abfolutely  perfe(5t; 
 in  himfelf,  and  abfolutely  happy,  fliould  create  any 
 thing  without  himfelf.  {O.) 
 
 ~^  VI. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (^)  '^°  ^^'^  '^^  '^^  ohie£led,  that  the  Undcrftanding  of  God 
 contains  Ideas  of  all  Things  pofiible,  by  means  whereof  al-1 
 Things  are  eminently  in  him.  That  thefe  Ideas  reprefent  all 
 the  Good  and  Evil,  the  Perfections,  Imperfe6lions,  Order  and 
 Difordcr,  the  Agreements  and  Difagreements  that  are  pofliblCj 
 and  his  fupcrabundant  Goodnefs  makes  him  choofe  the  moH 
 advantageous :  Now  thefe  Ideas  are  independent  of  the  Wiil 
 of  God,  and  therefore  the  Perfedion  or  Imperleclion  that  they 
 Teprefent  in  Things  is  antecedent  to  any  act  of  his  Will,  at  kail 
 in  Ordine  NaturA,  tho'  not  of  time  :  v.  g.  Is  it  not  rather  from 
 the  Nature  of  Numbers  than  the  Will  of  God,  that  one  Num- 
 ber is  capable  of  receiving  more  Divifions  than  another?  And 
 can  any  think  that  the  Pains  and  Inconveniencics  that  attend 
 fenfiiive  Creatures,  elpecially  the  Happinels  or  Mifery  of  in- 
 telligent Beings,  are  indifierent  to  God?  And  yet  'tis  pretend- 
 ed that  the  Hypothefis  of  God's  Will  being  the  caufe  of  Good- 
 nefs in  the  Creature  muft  infer  all  thefe  Abfurdities. 
 
 adly,  'Tis  urged  that  God  ads  for  nn  end,  that  it  is  true, 
 he  has  no  need  ot  the  Creatures,  but  yet  his  Goodnefs  induced 
 liim  tacreate  them,  and  therefore  there  was  a  reaibn  prior  10 
 his  Will :  that  it  is  neither  by  accident  nor  without  a  caufc  that 
 he  produced  them,  hor  was  it  of  necellity,  but  he  was  induced 
 to  it  by  Inclination,  and  his  Inclination  always  leads  him  to 
 the  belt.  He  was  not  indifFcrent  therefore  to  create  or  not 
 create  the  World,  and  yet  Creation  is  a  free  a£t, 
 
 Lallly 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  293 
 
 VI.  Fourthly,   If  we  fiippofe  that  there  was  a  If  he  were 
 
 reafon,  and  that  God  was  moved  by  it  to  produce  [51°^^^^^^/ 
 
 U  3  external  „^^  J°  ' 
 
 things  to 
 NOTES.  create  ths 
 
 World,  he 
 
 I.aftly  that  God  is  infinitely  wife,  good  ^nd  powerful,  and  would  be 
 as  his  Wifdom  fhcwed  him  what  was  befi,  fo  his  Goodnels  ob-  ^  "|*^^'  ^" 
 iiged  him  to  chocfe,  and   his  Power  enabled  him  to  execute  ^Y  ^S'^"-' 
 his  Will :  and  in  as  much  as  infinite  Worlds  are  poffible,  a- 
 mong!l  all  thefe  his  Wifdom  ditcovered  to  him  which  was  beft, 
 and  his  Goodnefs  muft  oblige  him  to  will  it. 
 
 Thefe  are  the  Objeftions  that  feem  of  greatell  force,  and  I 
 have  given  them  all  the  Advantage  with  which  I  find  them 
 propofed.     In  anfwcr  to  them  I  obferve, 
 
 I  ft,  as  to  what  is  faid  of  the  Underltanding  of  God,  that 
 Ideas  of  all  things  poffible  are  in  it,  'tis  plain  that  all  Argu- 
 ments drawn  from  the  Manner  of  God's  Undcrftanding  things 
 muft  be  inconclulive,  becaufe  we  are  utterly  ignorant  whether 
 he  Underrtands  by  Ideas  or  not.  adly,  becaufe  our  conceiv- 
 ing God  to  ad  this  way  is  only  taken  from  our  way  of  ading, 
 which  we  afcribe  to  the  Deity  by  Analogy  and  Proportion,  as 
 we  do  our  Virtues  and  Paffions,  becaufe  we  have  no  better 
 way  of  conceiving  the  Principles  of  his  ailing:  which  method 
 neverthelefs  will  run  us  into  many  Difficulties  and  Miftakes. 
 But  of  this  I  have  fpoke  more  fully  in  the  Sermon  anncx'd. 
 
 2dly,  the  whole  ftrength  of  the  Argument  depends  on  this 
 that  God's  Underftanding  reprefents  to  him  among  infinite 
 ways  in  which  things  may  done,  which  is  the  beft,  and  his 
 Goodnefs  obliges  him  to  what  is  fo.  Now  if  this  reafoning 
 hold,  and  amongft  infinite  Schemes  there  is  only  one  beft,  I  dp 
 not  fee  how  it  is  poffible  to  avoid  making  God  a  necelTary  A- 
 gent.  For  in  a  chain  of  Caufes,  where  every  Link  is  necefla- 
 rily  and  infallibly  connefted,  the  whole  muft  likewife  be  ne- 
 cefery.  If  then  there  be  but  one  beft  in  Nature?,  and  if  God 
 nccelTarily  and  infallibly  knows  that  beft,  and  his  goodnefs 
 obliges  him  neceifarily  to  choofe  it,  I  think  the  Cafe  is  plain, 
 ail  his  Actions  are  link'd  and  tyed  together  by  a  fatal  and  in- 
 fallible neceffity. 
 
 ^gainft  this  therefore  I  lay  down  the  following  Pofitions, 
 I  ft.  That  tbere  is  no  Creature  or  Syftem  of  Creatures  fo  good 
 but  that  a  better  is  poffible,  and  consequently  there  is  none  ab- 
 folutely  beft.  There  is  indeed  a  beft  of  Beings,  viz.  God  j 
 but  there  can  be  no  beft  of  Creatures.  To  prove  this,  we  nee^ 
 only  confider  that  there  is  an  infinite  diftance  between  God  and 
 his  Creatures,  and  how  perfect  foever  we  conceive  any  Crea- 
 ;  ture 
 
294  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V 
 
 exferhal  things,  'tis  m^nifcft,  tliat  according  to 
 this  all  th/ngs   will  pjoceed   horn  hini  ncceflarily. 
 
 For 
 
 .V  0  T  E  S. 
 
 tore  or  Syftcm  of  Crcatiivcs,  yet  the  diflance  between  tliat 
 and  God  is  not  kflcn'd,  hut  llill  continues  infinite;  and  there- 
 fore except  we  can  imngine  a  lalt  in  infinity,  there  neither  is 
 jior  cm  be  any  ilcp.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  Nature  of  God 
 and  his  Omnipotence  is  fuch  that  whatever  Number  of  Crea- 
 tures he  has  made  he  may  ftill  make  more,  and  howfoever 
 good  or  perfeci:,  he  may  ilill  make  others  better  and  more  per- 
 iedt.  And  fince  in  this  Caic  whatever  he  was  pleafed  to  create 
 was  flill  infinitely  fliort  in  goodnefs  and  perfcftion  of  what  he 
 could  create,  'tis  plain  his  Underftanding  couM  put  no  limits 
 to  his  Power,  nor  dire£t  h"-m  whether  he  fhouM  create  this 
 Syftem  or  another,  whatever  he  chofe  being  ^infinitely  fhort 
 of  what  hernight  have  done  ;  he  cou'd  never  have  pleafed  him- 
 iclf  in  this  method  or  determin'd  what  World  he  fhou'd  have 
 jnade,  and  confequently  there  cou'd  never  have  been  any 
 World  at  all.  For  if  only  the  beft  determine  him,  and  there 
 be  no  beft,  as  appears  j  then  'tis  impoffible  he  fhou'd  ever  be 
 dftermin'd. 
 
 This  was  in  cfFeft  the  Argument  made  ufe  of  in  the  Book  * 
 to  prove  that  there  was  properly  Free-will  in  God,  that  is  a 
 Power  to  pleafe  himfelf  by  choofmg  one  thing  before  another, 
 where  the  things  were  perfeftly  indiflerent  to  him.  Accord- 
 ing to  which  Principle,  if  it  be  allow'd,  tho'  there  be  no  beii 
 in  Nature  antecedent  to  the  Will  of  God,  yet  by  choofing  one 
 thing  before  another  he  will  make  that  the  beft  to  him,  becaufe 
 his  own  choice  will  pleafe  him  beft. 
 
 But  here  I  muft  obfcrve  that  moO;  of  this  Difpute,  and  the 
 Embarafment  of  Men's  Underitandings  about  it,  feems  to  pro- 
 ceed from  their  taking  thefe  words,  gioa,  better  and  brfi  fur 
 abfolute  Qualities  inherent  in  the  nature  of  Things;  whereas 
 in  Truth  they  are  only  P.elations  arifmg  from  certain  Appetites. 
 They  have  indeed  a  foundation,  as  all  Relations  have,  in  fome- 
 thing  abfolute,  and  denote  the  thing  ii^  which  they  are  found- 
 ed; but  yet  they  thcmfelves  imply  nothing  more  than  a  Rela- 
 tion of  Congruity  between  fome  App^^'^^  ^nd  its  Obje(ft3,  as 
 appears  from  hence,  that  the  fame  Objei^'t  when  applied  to  an 
 Appetite  to  which  it  has  a  Congruity  is  good,  ;;nd  'vice  '--enn, 
 bad.     The  Earth  and  Air  to  terrcltiiai  Animals  arc  good  El 
 
 men 
 <». 
 
 ?  C.  3.  Par.  3. 
 
Seel.  I   Sab.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  295 
 
 For  he  that  is  determin'd  ah  extra  to  do  any  thing, 
 
 ads  by^eceffityj    he  is  pafiive,  and  muft  necefTa- 
 
 U  4  lily 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 ments,  and  necefHiry  to  their  Prcfervation  ;  the  Witer  is  b.id, 
 wliich  yet  affords  the  beft  receptable  for  Filhes.  The  nature 
 of  the  Earth,  Air  and  Water  continue  the  fame ;  and  fnall 
 God  be  faid,  to  have  made  fomething  ill,  when  he  made  the 
 Water  pernicious  to  Men,  the  Air  to  Fiflies?  And  this  alfo 
 lh?ws  the  natural  and  unavoidable  necelHty  of  Evil  in  the 
 V/orld  ;  becaufe  all  Creatures  being  imperfeft  and  limited, 
 they  mufl:  likewKc  have  limited  and  different  Appetites,  and 
 confequently  proper  and  peculiar  Oojedts  fuited  to  their  feve- 
 ral  Appetites:  when  therefore  the  Objeft  proper  to  one  Ap- 
 petite happens  to  be  apply'd  to  the  contrary,  It  is  impoifiblfc 
 but  it  fhould  be  incongruous  to  it,  that  is  Evil.  Nor  is  it 
 polTible  in  a  World,  v.-here  all  Things  are  and  mull  necelTa- 
 rily  be  in  a  continual  flux,  and  every  Animal  changing  its 
 Situation  as  it  is  in  the  material  World,  but  fuch  mifappiica- 
 tion  of  Objefts  to  Appetites  fliould  happen  ;  and  therefore  E- 
 vils  are  ncceffary  in  it,  and  either  God  muft  have  made  no 
 fuch  World,  or  permitted  fome  fuch  Evils  in  it.  There  is  no 
 way  of  conceiving  how  the  prefent  World  cou'd  have  been 
 bettcr'd,  but  either  by  making  more  Creatures,  or  zdly,  more 
 variety,  or  3dly,  giving  tiie  Creatures  that  are  made  more  and 
 ftronger  Appetites :  for  the  good  and  fatisfaftion  of  a  Creature 
 is  always  proportionable  to  the  llrength  of  the  Appetite,  with 
 which  it  enjoys  its  Object.  But  it  plainly  appears  that  in  any 
 of  thefe  three  ways  as  tliere  may  be  more  good,  fo  there  will 
 be  more  Evil  in  the  World  :  For  Creatures  being  multiplied, 
 the  necelTity  of  clafhing  of  Appetites,  and  the  hazard  of  Mil- 
 application  ofObje£is  will  be  the  greater;  and  the  greater  va- 
 riety, ftill  the  greater  Danger  and  Difficulty  to  avoid  difagree- 
 able  Objefts,  and  the  harder  ahvays  to  find  agreeable:  as  the 
 greater  the  Crowd,  the  harder  it  is  to  meet  one's  Friends : 
 And  laflly,  the  encreafmg  the  Appetites  cou'd  no  ways  contri- 
 bute to  the  fure  difcovery  of  proper  Objedls ;  the  DifappoinJ- 
 ment  would  be  the  more  intolerable,  the  more  vigorous  wc 
 conceive  the  Appetite;  and  the  greater  number  of  Appetites, 
 the  more  liable  would  they  be  to  continual  Difappointment. 
 But  to  return,  As  there  is  no  hsft  in  Nature,  or  in  the  Divine 
 Intelled  antecedent  to  the  Divine  Will,  which  can  be  fuppof- 
 cd  to  determine  tliat  Will  r0;'create  one  World  rather  than  a- 
 jiother :    fo  in. the  fecond  Place,  there  is  no  World  fo  good, 
 
 but 
 
296  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 ■^         rily  both  do  and  fufFer,  not  what  he  himfelf,  but 
 v/hat  the   determining  Cau(e  has  elfcded  In  him: 
 
 But 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 but  infinite  Worlds  may  be  conceived  poffiblc  in  all  rcfpccls  as 
 good  as  it.  Good  then  being  relative  to  Appetite,  thai:  is  to  be 
 reckon'd  the  bsfl;  Creature  by  us,  which  has  the  flrongeft  Appe- 
 tites and  the  fureft  means  of  fatisfying  them.  And  tho'  the 
 iiibihnce  in  Creatures  is  chiefly  to  be  regarded  as  contributing 
 to  their  Perfeftlon,  yet  we  have  no  way  of  meafuring  the  Per- 
 feftion  of  the  i'evcral  Subflances  but  by  their  Qualities,  that  is 
 by  their  Appetites,  whereby  they  become  fenfibleof  Good  and 
 Evil,  and  by  their  Powers,  whereby  they  are  able  to  procure 
 thofe  Objefts  whence  they  receive  that  Scnfe  of  things  which 
 makes  them  happy. 
 
 'Tis  plain  therefore  that  whatever  Syftem  we  fappofe  in  Na- 
 ture, God  might  have  made  another  equal  to  it,  his  infinite 
 Wifdom  and  Power  being  able  to  make  other  Creatures  equal 
 in  every  refpecl  to  any  we  knoiv,  and  to  give  them  equal  or 
 ftronger  Appetites,  and  as  certain  or  more  certain  ways  of  fa- 
 tisfying them.  We  fee  in  many  Cafes  that  very  different  means 
 will  aniwer  the  fame  End.  For  Example,  a  certain  Number 
 of  regular  Pyramids  will  fill  a  Space,  and  yet  irregular  ones 
 will  do  it  as  well,  if  what  we  take  from  the  one  be  added  to 
 another;  and  the  fame  thing  may  be  done  by  Bodies  of  the 
 moft  irregular  and  different  Figures  in  the  fame  manner  :  and 
 therefore  we  may  very  well  conceive  that  the  anfwering  of 
 Appetites,  which  is  all  the  natural  Good  that  is  in  the  World, 
 .may  as  well  be  obtained  in  another  Syftem  as  in  this,  if  wc  do 
 but  fuppofe  that  where  their  Appetites  arc  chang'd,  the  Ob- 
 jedts  are  alfo  fuited  to  them,  and  an  equal  Agreeablencfs  a- 
 mong  the  Parts  of  the  whole  introduced  ;  and  in  an  infinite 
 Number  of  poffible  Worlds  I  do  not  fee  why  this  may  not  he 
 done  in  infinite  Ways  by  infinite  Power  and  Wifdom. 
 
 If  then  it  be  acknowledged  that  there  might  have  been  in- 
 iinite  other  Worlds,  or  even  but  one,  equal  to  this  in  all  re- 
 ipefts  as  to  goodnefs,  there  cou'd  be  no  Obligation  in  Nature 
 on  G(xl  to  create  one  rather  than  the  other,  and  therefore  no- 
 thing cou'd  make  one  more  agreeable  to  him,  that  is  better, 
 than  another  but  his  Choice.  We  muft  eirherown  that  there 
 .  cou'd  be  no  fuch  World  at  all,  or  that  God  muft  forever  de- 
 liberate which  of  the  poffible  Worlds  he  fhould  choofe  ;  or  eife 
 his  Determination  m\ift  proceed  from  .his  own  arbitrary  choice, 
 
 and 
 
Sea,  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  297 
 
 But  this  Goodnefs  (which  is  fuppofed  to  be  in 
 things   antecedent  to  the  Divine   Eledion,  and  to 
 
 determine 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 and  he  mult  be  allow 'd  the  Liberty  to  plcafc  himfelf  by 
 choofing. 
 
 \n  fhort,  it  is  eafy  to  fee  that  Men  who  propofe  fuch  Schemes 
 wou'd  drive  all  Liberty  out  of  the  World,  and  pin  down  God 
 in  all  his  Adions  to  a  fatal  neceffity.  They  allow  no  Caufc 
 but  what  is  necefTarily  either  Agent  or  Patient,  which  if  it  be 
 to  allow  a  God,  'tis  fuch  an  one  as  is  a  mere  Machine,  and 
 can  neither  help  himfelf  nor  his  Adorers.  'Tis  plain  if  this 
 were  fo  there  could  be  no  fuch  thing  as  moral  Good  or  Evil 
 in  the  World,  the  very  Effence  and  Idea  of  it  is  lolt,  and  we 
 iliould  be  no  more  obliged  to  a  God  that  afts  neceflarily  for  the 
 good  wc  receive  from  him,  than  vvc  are  to  the  Sun  for  the  be- 
 nefit of  its  Light  and  Heat. 
 
 I  know 'tis  urged  that  where  there  is  no  external  motive  to 
 determine  the  Will,  there  only  Chance  mud  do  it,  which  is  to 
 admit  an  effect  without  a  Caufe.  I  anfvver,  that  it  is  the  Natare 
 of  a  free  Agent  to  be  the  Caufe  of  its  own  Aftions,  without 
 being  impell'd  by  any  thing  without  itfelf.  The  choofing  a 
 thing  gives  it  the  goodnefs  to  this  Bei'ig,  and  it  choofes  a 
 thing,  not  becaufe  it  was  antecedently  an  Obje6i:  apt  to  pleafe 
 it,  but  becaufe  it  intends  to  tnake  it  fo.  When  it  is  obje6ted 
 that  fuch  an  Agent  choofes  without  reafon,  I  anfwer,  itfelf  is 
 the  reifon  to  itfelf  of  its  ading  ;  that  is,  it  ads  to  cxercife  its 
 Faculties,  the  exercife  of  which  caufes  the  fenfe  of  Plcafure  ; 
 and  where  there  are  fcveral  ways  of  exercifing  its  Faculties 
 and  all  indifierent,  to  fhow  the  Dominion  over  its  own  Adions, 
 that  is  its  Liberty,  it  takes  the  way  it  choofes ;  nor  is  it  rea- 
 fonahlc  to  cxped  it  fhould  lie  idle  till  it  find  a  Reafon  why  it 
 ftiould  :\ti  one  way  rather  than  another,  when  in  truth  there  is 
 no  fuch  Reafon,  the  Objeds  being  to  the  Agent  abfolutely  in- 
 different i  and  therefore  amongll  infinite  poffible  Worlds,  theiG 
 wa.-.  no  Reafon  polfible  or  imaginable  to  determine  God  to 
 make  this  rather  than  any  other,  befide  his  Will ;  he  chofe  it. 
 and  therefore  it  pleaies  him,  and  he  may  deftroy  it  when  he 
 will,  and  that  will  likewife  pleafe  him. 
 
 If  it  be  afc'd,  is  there  then  nothing  Good  or  Evil  in  refpeft 
 of  God.?  I  anhver  there  is,  njiz,.  the  ads  of  his  own  W^ili; 
 they  pleafe  him,  and  whilll  that  Will  continues,  every  thing 
 which  crolTes  it,  or  tends  that  way,  is  Evil  or  difpleafing  to 
 him.     Thus  it  i;.  his  Will  that  we  fhould  have  Freedom  ot 
 
 choice 
 
298  CJ  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 determjne  it)  is  fomewhat  External,  with  regard 
 to  the  V/ill  of  Gcd  ;  if  therefore  that  be  the  Caiife 
 which  determines  the  Eledicn,  it  follows  that 
 the  aft  of  Election  and  every  thing  that  depends 
 upon  it  is  neceffary. 
 But  if  VII.  But    if   things  be  good   and    agreeable  to 
 
 things  are  God  for  this  only  reafon  becaufe  he  has  chofcn  to 
 ^•°°^ij'^'  make  them  fo,  he  himfelf  will  be  at  liberty,  his 
 >.as  chofcn  "^^'^^-o'^  Work  will  be  free.  The  World  will  be 
 to  make  made  not  of  neceflity,  but  choice  ;  nor  will  it  be 
 tliem,  his  impoffible  to  be  efFcfted,  tho'  it  be  in  itfelf  un- 
 ivhole  profitable  to  the  Deity,  for  he  will  have  a  com- 
 ^jj'^  ^  placency  in  his  own  Choice.  And  from  hence  it 
 £-ee.  fufficiently   appears  of  how  great  Importance  it  is, 
 
 that  all  the  Goodnefs  of  the  Creatures  fhould  de- 
 pend on  the  Divine  Ekftion,    and  not   that  upon 
 the  Goodnefs  of  them  j    for  fo  we  may  conceive 
 Fate  to  be  taken  away  and  Liberty  eflablifli'd. 
 Extenial         VIII.  Fifthly,    If    he    expedea    no  advantage, 
 things  are  you'll  fay,   from  the  O.  jefts  of  his  Choice,  why 
 in  them-    ihould  he  choofe  them  ?    Is    it    not  more  probable 
 leives  ab-    ^j^^^  j^^  fliould  do  nothing?  at  all,  than  bufy  him- 
 indifFcrcTc  »'^^^^  ^^  things  that  arc  like  to  be  of  no  benefit  \  I 
 to  God,  anfwer, 
 
 but  he  h:is 
 
 3  cbmph-  NOTES, 
 
 cency  in 
 
 Af  .  choice  in  many  things;  and  he   has  fet  certain  limits  to  our 
 
 '  "''  ■  Choice  to  prevent  our  hurting  ourfelvcs  or  others  by  choofmg 
 amifs.  Therefore  it  would  be  contrary  to  our  Nature  to  take 
 away  the  ufe  of  Free-will  from  us  ;  and  fince  it  is  his  will  to 
 give  us  fuch  a  Nature,  'tis  likevvife  his  will  to  continue  the 
 ufe  of  our  Freedom  :  It  would  likewifc  he  contrary  to  the  Will 
 of  God  for  us  to  ufe  our  Freedom  to  mifrhieve  ourfelves  oro- 
 thcrs,  and  therefore  wc  conceive  that  every  one  who  thus  mif- 
 ufes  his  Fredom  incurs  the  difple.'fure  of  God. 
 
 But  then  'tis  plain  that  in  all  ads  which  we  conceive  to  be 
 
 plcaling  or  difpleafmg  to  the  Deity,  we  derive  the  Reafon  of 
 
 their  being  fo  from  the  Confideration  of  their  agreeablcnels  or 
 
 oppofition  to  his  Will :  and  wc  derive  the  Knowledge  of  that 
 
 ■  will  from  nothing  but  the  Manifcftation  God  has  made  of  it, 
 
 either 
 
Sed:.  I.  Sub  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  299 
 
 I  anfwer,  Tha:  it  is  no  more  trouble  to  him  to 
 will  things  than  nor  to  will  them;  and  hence  it 
 comes  to  pafs  that  when  he  wills  them,  they  exift; 
 when  he  retracls  that  Will,  they  drop  into  nothint^. 
 Which  reafon,  as  it  luppofes  an  indifference  of 
 things  in  refped  of  God,  To  it  aflerts  his  Liberty 
 ro  produce  or  not  produce  them,  and  proves  that 
 that  will  be  agreeable  to  him  which  he  fl^^allchoofe. 
 But  we  have  a  better  yet  at  hand,  viz.  that  God 
 chofe  to  create  external  things  that  there  might 
 be  fomething  for  him  to  delight  in  without  him- 
 felf.  For  every  one  receives  Satisfadion  from  the 
 Exercife  of  his  Powers  and  Faculties.  (52-.)  Now 
 
 God 
 NOTES, 
 
 either  by  the  Nature  that  he  has  been  pleafed  to  give  the  Crea- 
 tures, or  elle  by  Revelation.  So  that  after  all,  we  have  no 
 meafuj-e  of  Good  or  Evil,  but  the  Will  of  God. 
 
 (tj2  )  This  reafon  is  very  confillent  with  what  our  Author 
 had  deliver'd  in  C.  i.  §.  3.  par.  9,  10.  where  he  afferted  that 
 the  end  and  intent  of  God  in  creating  the  World,  was  to  exer- 
 cife his  feveral  Attributes,  or  (which  is  the  fame  thing)  to 
 communicate  his  Pcrfe6lions  to  fome  other  Beings :  whicii 
 Exercife  or  Communication  could  proceed  from  no  other  Caufe 
 befide  his  own  free  Choice  ',  and  therefore  he  muil  be  abfolutely 
 and  phyhcally  indifferent  to  it,  in  the  fame  refpeft  as  Man  was 
 Hiewn  to  be  indifl'erent  towards  any  Aftion  *  only  with  this 
 difparity,  tlut  Man,  as  a  weak  imperfeft  Agent,  may  eafily  be 
 imagin'd  to  will  abfurdities  or  Contradiftions,  but  God  cannot 
 be  fuppofed  to  v/ill  or  a£l:  either  inconfiftently  with  his  Nature 
 and  Perfections,  or  with  anv  former  Volition  (as  our  Author 
 pbferves  in  the  12th  and  following  Paragraphs)  and  confe- 
 quently  cannot  be  faid  to  be  indifferent  to  fuch  things  (as  fome 
 have  mifunderifood  our  Author)  any  more  than  he  is  indif- 
 ferent towards  being  what  he  is.  Leibnitz,  urges  farther  ■\- 
 that  it  could  not  be  in  any  i'enfe  indifferent  to  God  whether  he 
 created  external  things  or  not,  fince  his  Goodnefs  was  the  Caufe 
 (according  to  our  Author  himfelf  in  the  place  above  cited) 
 which  determined  him  to  the  Creation.  But  what  do  we  mean 
 
 by 
 
 *  See  Note  4.5,  and  49,  and  Ode.  'Theol.  Nat.  p.  Z\^- 
 ■\  Remar.jues,  p.  473. 
 
;oo  Of  Moral  Evil.         Cliap.  V. 
 
 God  is  invefted  with  infinite  Power,  which  he  can 
 CYercife  innumerable  Ways;  not  all  at  once  indeed, 
 
 for 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 hy  his  Gocdnefs  here  ?  Is  it  any  thing  more  than  an  intent  to 
 exercife  his  Attributes,  or  an  Inclination  to  communicate  His 
 Happinefs  or  Perfedion  ?  And  is  not  this  the  very  Determina- 
 tion or  Eledion  we  are  fpcalcing  of?  To  fay  then  that  God 
 is  determined  by   his  G'jodnefs,    is  faying  that  he  determines 
 himfelf ;  that  he  does  a  thing  bccaufe  he  is  inclined  to  do  it; 
 'tis  affigning  his  bare  Will  and  Inclination  for  a  Caiife  of  his 
 Aftion  ;  which  is  no  more  than  wc  contend  for.     Whereas 
 they  that  would  oppofe  us  fliould  affign  a  Caufe  for  that  Will 
 or  Inclination  itfelf,  and  flievv  a  natural  neceflity  for  the  opera- 
 tion of  the  Divine  Attributes  (for  a  moral  owt  is  nothing  to  tlic 
 prefent  Queftion)  a  ftrid  phyfical  connexion  between  the  Ex- 
 jllence  of  certain  natural  Perfections  in  the  Deity  and  their  Ex- 
 ercife on  outward  Objeds.     But  if  God  had  no  other  reafon 
 for  the  creation  of  any  thing  befidc  his  own  Goodncfs,  he  was 
 perfe<ftly  free  and  naturally  indifferent,  to  create  or  not  create 
 that  thing;  and  if  he  wiird,  or  was  inclinM  to  exert  his  Per- 
 fedions  thus  freely,  he  muit  be  as  frzt  and  indifferent  ftill  in 
 the  adual  Exercife  of  them.  Nor  will  it  from  hence  follow  (as 
 Leibnitz  objeds)  that  there  is  fuch  an  abfolute   Indifference  in 
 the  Deity  as  muft  make  him  regardlcfs  whether  the  World  were 
 well  or  ill  made;  Mankind  happy  or  miferable,  ^c    For  if 
 the  Communication  of  Happ'nefs  be  the  fole  end  of  his  acting, 
 whenever  he  does  ad  he  muft  propofe  that  End,  and  the  Exer- 
 cife of  his  feveral  Attributes  will  lead  diredly  to  it.     Know- 
 ledge, Power  and  Freedom  zrtPerfcBions,  i>  e.  the  Foundation 
 oi  Happinefs  to  the  Being  poUcfs'd  of  them,  and  therefore  when 
 communicated  to  other  Beings  they  muit  produce  that  Happi- 
 nefs, which  is  four.dcd  in  and  n.iiurally  reUilts  from  them  :    to 
 fuppofe  the  contrary,  is  the  fame  abfurdity  as  to  fuppofe  that 
 Knowledge    may  produce   Ignorance,    Power,    Weaknefs   or 
 
 Freedom,  Neceflicy.- The  Communication  of  thefe  At- 
 
 iributes  then,  or  the  Exercife  of  thcle  Pcrfcdions  united,  will 
 conltitute  a  wile,  good  and  holy  Providence  purfuing  a  good 
 end  by  fit  and  proper  Means.  All  which  is  included  (as  our 
 Author  fays)  in  the  very  firj}  yld  of  the  Deity,  or  rather  in 
 his  Will  to  ad  at  all ;  and  to  fuppofe  him  to  will  or  ad  in  any 
 refpedt  contrary  to  this,  is  fuppofmg  him  to  will  and  ad  againll 
 his  own  Nature,  and  in  contradidion  to  himlelf;  or,  which 
 is  the  fame,  imagirijig  an  Effed  to  be  quite  different  from, 
 
 op 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  301 
 
 (for  all  are  not  confiftent  with  each  other)  but 
 fuch  as  are  confiftent  are  for  the  mofl  part  indiiFe- 
 
 rent 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 or  contrary  to  its  Caufe,  The  Moral  Pcrfc6lion3  of  the  Deity 
 are  therefore  immediate  confequences,  or  rather  the  genuine 
 Exercife,  of  his  natural  ones.  And  thus,  I  think,  it  may  be 
 fhewn  how  all  the  aftions  of  the  Deity  mud  certainly  be  Good, 
 Wife,  ^c.  without  recurring  to  any  (xich.  Fitnejes  or  Relations 
 of  things  as  are  by  forae  unaccountably  fuppoled  to  be  antece- 
 dent and  abfolutely  itccejfary  to  the  determination  of  the  Will 
 of  God  himfelf 
 
 But  don''t  we,  when  we  fpeak  of  God's  choofing  fit  and  pro- 
 per means,  evidently  fuppofe  that  fome  things  are  in  them- 
 felves  good  and  eligible,  and  'vice  nierfa,  even  before  any  deter- 
 mination of  the  Deity  about  them  ?  Where  is  the  room  for 
 Wifdom  and  Preference  in  God,  if  all  things  be  alike  and  in- 
 different to  him?  1  anfu-er,  firft.  If  by  things  being  in  them- 
 felvcs  Evil,  i^c.  be  only  meant,  that  fome  particular  ways  of 
 afting  may  be  conceived,  v^^hich  would,  if  the  Deity  could  be 
 fuppoied  \o  will  them,  oe  necclTarily  and  effentially  oppofite, 
 and  have  a  tendency  dtredtly  contrary,  to  his  prefent  method 
 ofafting:  we  grant  that  fome  fuch  things  may  be  imagined : 
 but  then  it  will  be  an  abfurd  and  impolTible  fuppofition  that 
 God  fhould  ever  will  them,  as  he  has  already  will'd  the  con- 
 trary ;  and  therefore,  in  regard  to  him,  they  mull  ftill  be  only 
 imaginary.  Nay,  they  would  be  'io  far  from  being  indepen- 
 dent of,  or  antecedent  to  the  \VilI  of  God  in  any  fenfe,  that 
 the  very  Eltence  and  Idea  of  them  would  proceed  entirely 
 from,  and  pre-fuppofe  its  Determination;  fince  we  can  only 
 conceive  any  Relations  or  Confequences  of  things  to  be  Good 
 or  Evil,  fo  far  as  they  are  confiftent  with,  or  contrary  to  the 
 prefent  Syftem  pre  elhblifh\i  by  the  Will  of  God.  I  anfwer 
 in  the  fecond  place,  that  the  primary  Intent  of  the  Creator  be- 
 ing, as  was  fhewn  above,  to  communicate  his  Perfcftions  to 
 vnrioiTs  Creatures  (to  which  communication  he  was  neverthe- 
 lefs  abfolutely  free  and  indifTerent,  and  therefore  could  be  de- 
 termin'd  to  it  by  no  external  Caufc)  while  that  Intent  conti- 
 nues, the  necell-uy  confequcncc  of  it  is,  that  Creatures  be  fo 
 made  and  conltituted  as  to  attain  that  End,  and  endow'd  with: 
 fuch  Powers  as  will  make  them  refemble  him  as  much  as  pof- 
 fible  in  their  fcveral  States  and  On.lcrs.  All  this  is  only  pro- 
 fecuting  the  fimc  Volition,  or  continuing  to  communicate  him- 
 felf; auid~  what  we  mean  by  choofing  fit  and  proper  Tnetiv^  for 
 
 thiT, 
 
ib2  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 rent,  nor  is  there  any  reafon  why  he  fliould  prefer 
 one    before    another**,    it  muft  therefore   be   his 
 
 own 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 this,  is  only,  that  lie  is  not  a  blind  and  unintelligent  Agents 
 but  confcious  of  his  own  Nature  and  Operations,  and  there- 
 fore able  to  a£i:  in  a  certain  deter7mnate  manner.  Now  fuch 
 determinate  Aftion  mufl:  produce  a  regular  Syflefn,  tlie  feveral 
 Parts  whereof  ■will  be  related  to  r.nd  connected  witli  c.-,th  o- 
 ther,  and  by  a  mutual  dependency  render'd  fubfervient  to  the 
 Good  and  Perfedlion  of  tae  whole.  Tho'  this  whole  Syftcni 
 might  at  firft  perhaps  be  indifferent  to  the  Agent  in  regard  to 
 feveral  other  Syllenris  equally  poffibfej  and  which  might  have 
 been  made  equally  perfeft  in  its  Head  *.  It  is  not  then  as 
 Leibnitz,  argues  f  the  natural  and  nccelTary  goodnefs  of  forrie 
 particular  things  reprefented  hy  the  Di'~jine  Ideas  which  deter- 
 .'nines  God  to  prefer  them  to  all  others,  if  underflood  of  his 
 Ji'Ji  aft  of  producing  them  ;  but  'tis  his  own  free  arbitrary 
 Choice,,  which  among  many  equal  poffibilities,  makes  fome 
 things  aSIuaUy  good,  and  determines  them  into  Exiftence. 
 When  thefe  ?.re  once  fuppofcd  to  cxift,  every  thing  or  adion 
 becomes  _g-W which  tends  to  their  Happinefs  and  Prefarvation. 
 Kence  alfo  in  refpeft  to  us  certain  confequences  and  relations 
 arife,  which,  by  the  very  frame  of  our  Nature  and  Conllitu- 
 tion,  we  are  dircfted  to  approve,  and  obliged  to  purfue,  if 
 we  expedl  to  be  happy.  And  thus  all  moral  Obligation  is  ul- 
 timately referr'd  to  the  Will  of  Gcd,  which  feems  to  be  the 
 only  fure  and  adequate  foundation  of  it,  and  from  which  I 
 think  it  may  be  deduced  with  much  more  clcarnefs  and  con- 
 liflency  than  from  that  H)pcthetic'zl  NeceJ/ity  of  the  Relatione 
 of  things,  which  evidently  prc-fuppofes,  as  was  obferv'd  be- 
 fore, and  is  itfclf  only  founded  on  the  Will  of  God  J. 
 
 Give  me  leave  to  add  here,  that  their  Argument  feems  to  be 
 of  very  little  force  ag.iiafl:  our  Author,  who  urge,  that  if  ail 
 Good  and  Evil  depend  upon  the  Arbitrary  Will  of  God,  then 
 
 •t 
 
 *^  lujlances  rjf  this  Indifftroice  may  be  feen  in  our  Author's 
 Note  E,  and  the  ^th  precedent  Paragraph, 
 
 *  See  Note  ^ 
 
 \  Remarcjues,  p.  447. 
 
 %  Sec  thcPrdimi'^n}y  DiJfcrtAfit,):-,  and  R.  i.  or  Pufendorfo/" 
 the  Lanjj  of  Nature  and  Nation',  B.  i.  C.  I.  '^.4.  Note  7.  avd 
 B.2,  e.  3.  §.  20. 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  -O"^ 
 
 own  Choice  which  makes  one  more  agreeable  than  3- 
 nothcr;  nor  is  it  otherwife  conceivable  how  a  thinjr 
 
 that 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 li  would  not  te  impoffible  for  God  to  will  that  Vice  be  Vir- 
 tue, that  two  and  two  make  five,  <3\.  For  allou'ing  that 
 God  at  firft  made  all  things  v>:;at  they  are,  and  ftill  continues 
 to  them  the  fame  Exiftence,  (tho'  perhaps  no  reafon  a  priori 
 can  be  affignM  why  he  made  them  at  all,  or  in  this  rather 
 than  fome  other  manner)  Vice,  muft  be  Vice,  &V.  that  i?, 
 while  things  are  as  they  are,  the  fame  Confcquences  and  Re- 
 lations will  refulc  from  them;  and  to  fuppofe  the  contrary,  is 
 to  fuppofe  th:^t  things  may  be  different,  or  have  dill"ercnt  con- 
 fequenccs,  while  they  continue  the  fune;  or  that  thev  mav  be 
 what  they  ars  and  Vv-hat  they  arc  not  at  the  fime  tim.e.  TJius 
 all  the  prefent  Relations  are  cvidsviily  fuhfequent  to  the  prefcnt 
 Order  of  Nature,  and  mufl  continue  v.ith  it;  and  this  con- 
 fequential  Neceffity  is  all  the  Fitnejs  that  I  know  of. 
 
 To  iHle  this  Eter?:al  and  Immtitable  can  therefore  only  mean 
 £hus  much,  ws.  fuppofe  things  to  be  at  any  time  what  thev 
 now  are,  and  at  the  iame  time  the  very  lame  confeauences 
 wou'd  flow  from  them  which  we  now  find.  Suppofe  a  Set  of 
 Beings  conllituted  like  ourfclvcs,  and  framed  with  the  like  Ca- 
 pacities for  Happinefs,  and  the  fame  relative  Duties  mufl  be 
 incumbent  on  them  in  order  to  attain  that  Happinefs.  If  they 
 be  imperfeft,  dependent  Creatures,  and  perpetually  Handing 
 in  need  of  each  others  aHiftancc  ;  if  alfo  they  have  fuch  Paflioss, 
 Jnfiinds  and  Inclinations  as  tend  to  unite  them  to  each  other, 
 and  oblige  them  to  aft  in  concert :  if  they  be  thus  framed,  I  fay, 
 they  will  of  confequence  be  thus  related,  and  fubjecb  to  al'- 
 the  moral  Obligations  whirh  n.ve  now  are.  But  ftill  this  ne- 
 ceifity  is  only  hypothetical,  and  like  the  necellity  of  any  cer- 
 tain Confequence  refulling  from  certain  Premifes ;  which  Prc- 
 mifes  being  alter'd,  a  different,  a  quite  contrary  one  will  be 
 equally  ncccfl-ary.  Thus  in  the  former  Inftance,  if  any  ratio- 
 nal Creatures  be  conllitutcd  focial  Beings,  they  will  indeed  be 
 obliged  to  ucl  as  fuch  ;  but  let  fome  be  made  independent  of 
 each  other,  and  unfociable  ;  endowed  with,  or  lo  made  a* 
 neceffaril)'  \o  acquire,  Paffions,  Inilincls  and  Inclinations  quite 
 oppoiite  to  the  tormer,  and  their  Duties  will  be  quite  the  re- 
 verfe.  Tlie  great  Virtue  oi Selfjhnefs  will  then  occupy  the 
 place  of  Vni-uerfai  Bcne'XJoknce,  and  that  Method  of  Lite  per- 
 haps produce  the  greateit  Sum  of  Happinefs  to  each  indi\idua!; 
 and  confequently  be  the  molt  eligible  t«  every  one,  which  ha> 
 
 now 
 
304  ^f  Moral  Evil         Chap.  V. 
 
 that  is  in  ftfelf  indifferent  to  the  Eleclor,  fhould 
 prove  more  pleating  than  any  thing  elfe. 
 
 IX. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 now  tlie  clircft  contrary  ElFeft.  If  fuch  a  fuppofition  be  con- 
 ceivable, 'tis  lufficient  to  flicw  that  thcfe  Relations  arc  not  ah- 
 foluteh  necejfary  in  theiiiftl'vcs,  "but  only  conditionally  and  con- 
 fcqncittially  to  the  prefcnt  Order  nf  the  Creation  *. 
 
 Upon  a  farther  enquiry  into  the  Doflrine  oiahjirail  Fiinejfes 
 and  eternal  Rcafons  of  things,  I  find  a  great  many  Pcrfons  very 
 much  perplexM  about  them,  who  cannot  apprehend  but  that 
 they  mult  neccfTarily  determine  the  Deity  in  all  Cafes,  as  well 
 as  abfolutely  oblige  Aiankino.,  nay  are  the  only  ground  of 
 moral  Obligation.  I  Ihall  therefore  endeavour  to  explain  my 
 felf  more  fully  ori  this  Subjcft,  which  appears  to  mc  in  the 
 follovi/ing  I>ight. 
 
 From  all  Eternity  God  had  in  his  Mind  the  Ideas  of  alf 
 things,  which  cou'd  pofTibly  exifb either  feparatcly  or  all  toge- 
 ther. He  faw  that  fcveral  Syflems  of  Beings  might  be  created, 
 the  refult  of  which  woa'd  be  feveral  Kinds  and  Degrees  of 
 Happinefs  or  Mifery  to  thefe  Beings  (tho'  'tis  impoHible  to 
 fuppofe  any  abfolutely  higheft  degree,  fince  that  wou'd  be  a 
 Limitation  of  infinite  Power.)  As  thefe  various  poffible  Sy- 
 flems were  at  once  prefent  to  his  view,  he  faw  the  ieverat 
 Relations,  which  the  Beings  in  them  wou'd  have  ro  each  other, 
 or  to  themfelves  in  difFerent  Circumihinces,  fuppofing  them  fo 
 be  form'd  in  any  given  manner  i  he  knew  alfo  hov/  to  luit  the 
 Condition  of  thefe  Beings  to  tiicir  Relations,  fo  as  to  produce 
 a  certain  fum  of  Happinefs  or  Mifery  from  the  Compofition. 
 If  we  enquire  whether  of  thefe  two  kinds  of  Creatures  he  fliall 
 choofe,  we  can  find  no  natural  neceiTity  to  determine  him, 
 fince  he  is  abfolutely  independent  and  completely  hap]')y  in 
 himlelf  without  any  Creation  at  all,  nor  can  his  Happinefs  be 
 increas'd  or  impair'd  by  the  Happinefs  or  Mifery  of  his  Cre.i- 
 tures.  We  muft  therefore  have  recourfe  to  his  own  free  Plea- 
 fure,  dircfted  by  his  other  Attributes,  for  the  only  caufe, 
 ground,  or  reafon  of  his  Works.  If  he  be  a  benerolcnt  Being, 
 and  have  perfed  Knowledge  and  Power,  he  will  frame  the 
 World  in  fuch  a  manner  and  fuit  every  Circumibnce  to  each 
 
 Condi- 
 
 *  Sec  Pufetidorf,  B.  1.  C.  2.  f.  6.  and  the  N;jtc.  2.  p. 
 20.  or  B.  2.  C.  3.  §.  4,  5.  and  the  Notes  ^  R.  See  a!^ 
 fo  Dr.  Fdtoii's  Preface  to  his  L.  Moyer''i  Letturc,  p.  18^ 
 %l^^>  p.    34    —  ^I,    iSC: 
 
gea.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  3^05 
 
 IX.  Neither  ought  we  to  enquire  for  any  reafibh  And  de- 
 of  the  Eledion,  i.  e.,  why  he   choofes  this  rather  [ei-mines 
 
 than 
 NOTES. 
 
 Condition  foas  to  produce  univerfal  Good,  if  malevolent,  tne 
 contrary. 
 
 But  from  a  view  of  the  prefent  Syftem  wc  find  that  Happi- 
 nefs,  Beauty,  Order,  are  prepollent ;  and  that  no  good  has  been 
 omitted,  which  cou'd  have  been  beftow'd  confillent  with  the 
 Happincfs  of  the  whole.  Hence  we  gather  that  he  muft  be 
 abfolutely  good,  or  that  he  will  aft  upon  fuch  Reafons,  and 
 produce  Beings  which  have  fuch  Relations  to  each  other,  that 
 the  reililt  of  all  fliall  be  Happinefs  in  the  main.  Theie  Rea- 
 fons and  Relations  we  czW  good,  which  have  this  beneficial 
 tendency  to  the  whole  Syllem,  and  what  we  mean  by  his  be- 
 ing determine  by  them,  is  that  his  Goodnefs  always  inclines 
 him  to  promote  the  Happinefs  o\  his  Creatures,  and  his  Know- 
 ledge reprefents  to  him  the  moft  proper  means  of  efteding  it. 
 Why  he  is  good,  or  inclined  to  afl  in  this  manner,  we  knov; 
 not,  any  more  than  why  he  is  intelligent ;  nor  do  v/e  think  a 
 reafon  a  priori  can  be  given,  Or  ought  to  be  expeded  for  either 
 of  thefe  Attributes. 
 
 Bat  thus  much  feems  evident,  that  unlefs  he  was  previoufl^ 
 fo  inclin'd,  a  profpeft  of  thefe  Reafons  and  Relations  could 
 never  determine  him;  fmce,  as  was  oblervd  above,  he  is  abib- 
 Jutely  independent,  and  incapable  ol-  being  aftedted  by  them  : 
 all  the  Goodnefs  which  relults  from  them  can  be  no  good  ot 
 benefit  to  him,  and  confequently  he  cannot  be  obliged  to  pur- 
 fae  them  by  any  other  necelfity  than  a  Moral  or  Hvpothetitaf. 
 one  /.  e.  one  that  is  founded  on  the  previous  fuppofition  of  what 
 we  call  his  Goodnefs.  It  is  their  being  agreeable  to  this  Divina 
 Attribute,  or  rather  the  v/ajrs  in  which  it  is  exerted  ;  their  be- 
 ijig  the  moil  proper  means  to  the  bell  end,  or  produdlive  of 
 the  greateft  univerfal  Happinefs,  which  denominates  ihcmjit^ 
 right,  t^c.  and  what  we  muft  either  mean  by  thefe  words,  or 
 we  can,  I  think,  have  no  ditlinft  Ideas  to  them. 
 
 Thus  much  concerning  thefe  Relations  with  regard  to  the 
 Deity,  But  tho'  we  may  not  comprehend  the  Nature  of  a  felf- 
 exiftent  Being,  or  the  manner  of  his  adling,  nor  fee  in  what, 
 fenfe  lie  is  determined,  obliged,  or  under  a  neceffity  to  aft 
 Agreeably  to  all  fuch  Relations  as  a  Syftem  of  things  will  have 
 to  one  another's  Happinefs  (nor  indeed  is  it  of  any  ufe,  nor 
 can  it  have  any  meaning,  farther  than  knowing  that  he  is  per- 
 manently ^W)  vet  with  refpeft  to  their  conllfitating  a  La-iv  cf. 
 
 himfelf  to 
 Aftion. 
 
3o6  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 than  that,-  for  upon  luppofition  that  there  is  a 
 reafon  the  indifference  would  be  deftroy'd,  and  the 
 
 Lledion 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 t^alure,  and  our  deducing  moral  Obligation  from  them,  I 
 think  the  Cafe  is  very  clear.  As  we  are  made  fenfible  Beings, 
 or  capable  of  Happincfs  and  Mifery,  nothing  can  be  a  Law  to 
 our  Nature  but  what  produces  the  one  and  prevents  the  other : 
 and  as  we  are  endow'd  with  freedom  of  Will  we  can  never  be 
 under  any  other  fort  of  Obligation.  To  find  out  the  tendency 
 of  things  to  this  great  End,  is  the  Province  of  Reafon,  and  all 
 that  we  can  mean  by  terming  one  thing  more  reafonable  than 
 another  is  its  luperior  tendency  to  Happinefs  on  the  whole, 
 which  is,  and  ought  to  be,  the  ultimate  end  of  all  truly  rati- 
 onal dependent  Beings. 
 
 Can  Man,  for  Inflance,  have  any  reafon  to  purfue  that  which 
 dees  not  at  all  relate  to  him  ?  and  docs  any  thing  relate  to  him 
 or  concern  him,  which  has  no  Relation  to  his  Happinefs?  As 
 therefore  we  have  our  Happineis  to  feek  in  a  great  Meafure 
 from  without,  and  have  no  innate  Inftin£l  or  implanted  Appe- 
 tite, to  dirccl  us  in  the  fearch ;  no  truly  natural  Paffion  or  Af- 
 fcdiion  in  wliich  it  coniifts,  (as  may  be  eafily  gather'd  from 
 Mr.  Locke's  excellent  HiRory  of  the  human  Mind)  it  will  be 
 the  part  of  pure  Reafon  to  difcover  the  means  of  obtaining  it, 
 and  thcfe  means  will  be  the  doing  fuch  Adfions,  and  acquiring 
 fuch  Habits  of  mind  as  are  fuitable  to  our  dependent  State,  /'.  e, 
 iuch  as  tend  to  oblige  all  thofe  other  rational  Beings  on  whom 
 we  are  dependent ;  fuch  as  engage  the  good  Will  and  Affeftions 
 of  all  thofe  who  have  it  in  their  power  to  promote  or  impede 
 our  Happinefs ;  and  m.ore  efpecially  that  Being  on  whom  we 
 depend  abfolutely,  and  who  is  able  to  make  us  happy  or  mife- 
 rabie  to  all  Eternity.  And  as  the  only  means  of  engaging  the 
 good  will  of  all  our  fellow  Creatures  with  whom  we  are  or  may 
 be  concern'd,  is  the  manifelHng  a  Difpofuion  to  promote  their 
 Happinefs;  which  is  at  the  fame  time  complying  with  the 
 Will  of  our  Creator,  who  intends  nothing  but  the  common 
 good  of  us  all;  and  requires  that  we  Ihou'd  co-operate  with 
 him  by  cur  joint  endeavours  to  promote  it;  fo  'tis  evident  that 
 all  fuch  Adions  and  Difpcfuions  of  Mind  as  have  this  tenden- 
 cy and  diredion,  are  Duties  to  us,  the  Difcharge  of  which 
 will  cither  be  attended  with  Happinefs  by  natural  ConfcquencC 
 in  this  Life,  or  by  the  pofitive  Reward  of  God  in  another.— — 
 From  this  fenfc  of  tho  Realbn  or  Relation  of  things  (which, 
 as  was  oi^fci\''d  bctwe.,  is  all  that  can  give  ihcm  an>'  Relation 
 
 to 
 
Sedl.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  307 
 
 Eledion  would  not  be  free.     If  we  fuppofe  that  there 
 
 is  inch  a  thing  as  better  and  worle  in  the  Objeds 
 
 X  2  themfelves, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 to  us,  or  afford  any  Reafon  for  our  obfercing  them)  we  mav 
 cafily  deduce  a  compleat  Scheme  of  Duty  which  muft  be  «/- 
 nvays  obligatory,  and  will  appear  fo  to  all  Beings  of  the  like 
 Nature  with  ourfelves.  This,  if  we  pleafe,  may  be  term'd 
 abfolutely^yf/,  right  and  reafonahle  ;  provided  that  we  keep  the 
 trite  Reafon  and  End  of  all  in  view,  I'z'z.  our  own  Happinr/s ; 
 and  do  it  in  Obedience  to  the  Deity,  who  alone  can  fecure  this 
 main  End  to  us,  and  who  can  only  be  engaged  to  this  by  our 
 performing  every  thing  on  his  Account.  If  on  the  other  hand 
 we  follow  Virtue  for  its  own  fake,  its  native  Beauty  or  intrin- 
 fic  Goodnefs,  we  lofe  the  true  Idea  of  it,  we  miilake  the  means 
 for  the  End  ;  and  tho'  we  may  indeed  qnalific  ourfelves  foraa 
 extraordinary  Reward  from  God  for  fuch  a  ftate  of  Mind,  yet 
 we  do  really  nothing  to  r/;^/7/^  our  feUes  to  it:  it"  we  attain 
 the  good  Effefts  of  every  Virtue  in  this  IJfe,  weba-oe  our  Re- 
 nvard;  if  we  do  not,  what  claim  have  we  to  any  amends  from 
 God,  whom  we  have  never  thought  of  in  it,  and  confequently 
 wliofe  Ser-vattts  we  cannot  be  faid  to  be  ?  The  only  Principle 
 which  can  in  Reafon  recommend  us  to  his  Favour,  muft  be  the 
 doing  all  things  to  his  Glory,  in  Obedience  to  his  Will,  or  in 
 order  to  pleafe  him.  Obedience  to  God  is  the  Principle,  the 
 good  of  Mankind  the  Matter,  our  own  Happinefs  the  End,  of 
 all  that  is  properly  term'd  Moral  Virtue. 
 
 Since  the  Conchifion  of  this  I  have  met  with  a  Pamphlet 
 entitled  Calumny  no  Con'viSlion,  ^"c.  which  contains  fome  Ar- 
 guments againll  our  Author's  Dodlrine,  and  alfo  does  me  the 
 honour  to  take  notice  of  what  I  had  advanced  in  favour  of  it. 
 Tho'  I  cannot  but  think  moft  of  this  celebrated  Writer's  Re- 
 marks already  obviated  in  the  Additional  Fartof  the  foregoing 
 Note,  and  thofeof  our  Author  ;  yet  I  will  incur  the  Cenluic 
 of  being  tedious  rather  than  wholly  omit  them.  He  begins 
 With  an  Exception  againft  the  Fourth  Paragraph ;  the  Deiign 
 of  which  was  to  fliew  that  God  was  perfectly  free  in  creating 
 the  World,  and  cou'd  not  be  determined  by  any  thing  external. 
 Firlt,  Becaufe  he  could  receive  no  benefit  from  any  thing 
 without  him.  zdly,  Eecaufe  he  could  have  no  P.eafon  to 
 prefer  one  thing  to  another  in  every  refre.51  equal,  as  the  Au- 
 thor explains  himfelf  in  the  following  Paragraph. 
 
 He  concludes  that  when  things  are  mad?,  they  muft  be  made 
 in  conforxTiity  to  the  Divine  Nature  ;  but  as  there  are  fevcral 
 
 poijible 
 
3o8  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 themfelves,  who  would  affirm  that  the  Goodnefs  and 
 Wifdomof  God  will  not  necefTarily  determine  him 
 
 to 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 poffible  ways  of  making  them,  in  which  there  will  be  the  fame 
 conformity,  nothing  cou'd  render  one  way  more  agreeable  to 
 the  Deity  than  another,  but  his  free  Choice  ;  this  agreeable- 
 nefs  therefore  of  any  one  before  another  is  not  antecedent,  but 
 coHJequent  to  fuch  free  Choice.  In  fupport  of  this  Notion  I 
 afferted  that  notvvithllanding  this  twofold  Indifference,  'viz.. 
 both  to  adling  in  general  or  not  afting,  and  to  any  particular 
 manner  ofafting  among  equals,  yet  ftill  it  might  be  fhewu 
 that  whenever  he  does  zQi,  all  his  Works  will  be  nx:ife,  goody 
 ISc.  The  Reafon  given  for  it  was  to  this  purpofe,  <viz.  that 
 the  fole  End  of  his  afting  being  to  communicate  his  Happinefs, 
 and  every  one  of  his  Perfedions  being  naturally  produftive  of 
 Happinefs,  it  follows  that  he  is  both  willing  and  able  to  pro- 
 duce it,  and  confequently  muft  produce  it  whenever  he  pro- 
 -  duces  any  thing.  Now  the  voluntary  communication  or  pro- 
 duction of  Happinels  feems  to  comprehend  all  moral  Goodnefs, 
 i^c.  but  this  voluntary  Communication  is  nothing  more  than 
 the  exercife  of  his  natural  Perfections  as  above  ;  it  follows  that 
 the  Exercife  of  his  natural  Perfeftions  muil  conftitute  the 
 Moral  ones,  or  that  thcfe  Moral  Qualities  in  God  which  we 
 llile  Good,  Wife,  Juft,  tf^c.  are  only  confequences  of  the  Ex- 
 ertion of  his  feveral  natural  Perfections  of  Knowledge,  Power, 
 Freedom,  in  purfuanceof  the  abovementioned  End. 
 
 This  brief  Hate  of  the  Qucllion  may  be  in  a  good  meafure 
 fufficient  to  dire6t  the  Reader  in  forming  a  Judgment  of  what 
 this  Writer  has  objected  Firft,  He  fays,  the  Archhijhop  ought 
 to  hai'e  concluded  that  the  Con^ruity  of  things  to  the  Rectitude 
 or  Ferfeilion  of  the  Diiine  Nature  ivas  the  Ground  {^and  not  the 
 Tncre  Will  of  God)  of  their  being  good  or  Perfcd  in  their  kind^ 
 viz.  hythis  refemhlance  of  them  to  it.  *Anfwer,  'Tis  allow'd 
 that  where  one  way  of  afting  is  more  congruous  to  the  Divine 
 Nature  than  another,  that  congruity  is  a  fufficient  Reafon  for 
 its  being  preferr'd  by  the  Deity,  but  that  Realbn  will  never 
 hold  where  many  ways  are  equally  congruous,  which  is  the 
 Cafe  the  Archbifliop  argues  upon  ;  in  which  Cafe  there  is  no 
 room  for  any  thing  but  mere  Will  to  determine,  and  in  which 
 Cafe  alone  the  Will  of  God  is  confider'd  feparately  from  his 
 other-  Attributes.    Wherever  the  nature  of  the  thing  allows 
 
 P  -7? 
 
 fupcrior 
 
Seel.  I  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  309 
 
 to  choofe  the  better  ?  For  who  can  honeftly  poftpofie 
 
 th^  better  and  prefer  the  worfe  ?    As  then  in  indif- 
 
 X  3  ferenc 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 fuperlor  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  there  the  Archbifliop  fuppo- 
 fes  the  Divine  Will  to  be  always  accompanied  with  them,  as 
 he  has  told  us  twice  in  his  third  Paragraph.  I  Ihould  be  glad 
 to  know  the  precife  meaning  of  the  Words  ReBltude  and  Per- 
 feBioriy  which  this  Author  makes  the  Ground  of  the  Divine 
 A£ts ;  if  they  fignify  no  more  than  Goodnefs,  as  I  think  they 
 hardly  can,  if  they  are  to  be  rank'd  among  his  moral  Qiialities; 
 they  coincide  with  our  Notion  of  mere  Will ;  fmce  we  can  ne- 
 ver fhow  why  he  is  good,  or  ailign  a  Caufe  for  that  particular 
 Determination  of  his  Will,  which  we  ftile  Goodnefs,  as  was 
 obferv'd  in  the  beginning  of  this  Note.  If  they  include  only 
 his  natural  Perfeflions,  and  imply  that  all  fuffiaency  which  re- 
 fults  from  the  Union  of  them,  I  fear  there  will  be  no  more 
 conneflion  between  this  and  moral  Perfeftion,  than  bctv/eeu 
 that  and  free  Choce:  *  /.  e.  no  Reafon  can  be  given  why  an  all 
 fufficicnt  Being  fhould  communicate  his  Happinefs  rather  than 
 not,  (except  we  knew  more  fully  wherein  that  Happinefs  con- 
 fifts,)  or  immediate  connexion  fhewn  between  the  Exiftence 
 of  perfecft  Knowledge  and  Power  in  God,  and  their  being  ex- 
 erted in  the  Produftion  of  any  thing  without  him.  But  when 
 fuch  a  Being  is  determin'd  to  make  any  thing,  it  is  reafonable 
 to  fuppofe  that  he  will  make  it  like  himfelf  rather  than  the  con- 
 trary ;  that  one  perfeflly  happy  will  communicate  his  Happi- 
 nefs rather  than  produce  Mifery,  as  was  faid  above. 
 
 This  is  all  the  account  that  I  can  give  of  the  Moral  Perfec- 
 tions of  the  Deity,  or  why  he  fhould  propofe  that  end  in  all 
 his  Works,  which  we  attribute  to  him  when  we  ftile  hira 
 Good.  But  this  goes  no  farther  than  probability  :  and  I  fhould 
 be  obliged  to  this  Author  for  a  ftricl  Proof  of  the  moral  Attri- 
 butes of  God  from  any  property  in  the  Divine  Nature,  which 
 is  itfelf  previoufly  demonitrable.  To  return,  'Tis  not  there- 
 fore the  bare  exercife  of  his  Knonxsledge  and  Vonjoer  which  by 
 necejjity  [  i.  e.  a  Phyjical  one)  conftitutes  his  A'loral  Qualities : 
 but  the  voluntary  Exercife  of  them  (or  the  difpofition  to  exer- 
 cife them)  in  purfuancc  of  this  £77^/,  which  mufl  ncceffarily 
 (meaning  a  Moral  Neceffity,  or  fuppofmg  this  End)  include  al} 
 ttioral  Perfedtipn,  tho'  there  be  feveral  ways  that  equally  lead 
 to  it.     In  this  fcnfe  Qnly,  and  with  this  reftri6tion,  I  wou'4 
 
3IO  Of  Moral  "EvW.         Chap.  V. 
 
 fercnt  Matters  there  can  be  no  reafon  why  one  is  cho- 
 fen  before  another,  fo  there  is  no  need  of  any  :  for 
 
 fince 
 NOTES. 
 
 be  underftood  whenever  I  afl'ert  that  perfeft  Knowledge  and 
 Power  can  produce  nothing  but  wh.it  is  wife  and  juft  i  tlio' 
 it  may  not  have  been  always  mention'd. 
 
 This  I  apprehend  to  be  far  from  fubverting  the  ground  of 
 Morality,  or  making  it  ever  equally  agreeable  to  the  Deity  to 
 have  adicd  for  no  End  at  all,  or  for  a  bad  one:  *  Since  it 
 fuppofes  that  he  was  always  detcrmiii'd  to  purfue  the  very  bcft 
 End,  and  by  the  bcft  means,  (wherever  there  was  room 
 for  better  and  ivorfc)  tho'  <u';6>'  he  was  fo  determin''d  I  cannot 
 pretend  to  fhew  ;  and  in  what  fcnfe  this  was  better  ^rA  Jitter 
 for  him  \  who  cou'd  receive  no  addition  of  Happinefs  from  it, 
 I  muit  confefs  I  do  not  underftand.  I  think  the  Archbifliop 
 was  not  fo  weak  as  to  be  dcceiv'd  by  that  erroneous  Inference 
 which  this  Author  charges  him  with,  p.  77.  -viz.  that  God's 
 Will  coii'd   not  he  determind  by  the  greater  good   in    Obje^fs, 
 
 becaufe  thefe  Ohjefis  -zvere  not  aSiually  produc'd-. but  rather 
 
 argued  from  the  equality  and  indifference  in  Objefts,  which 
 muft  appear  to  the  Divine  Mind  before  his  determining  to  cre- 
 ate them  (as  he  fliews  in  his  Note  ^.)  that  his  Will  could  not  be 
 determin'd  by  them  to  produce  one  Syflcm  rather  than  ano- 
 ther:  which  is  the  beft  proof  of  his  perfect  Liberty  in  produ- 
 cing them,  to  eftablifii  which  was  the  Defign  of  the  Archbifhop 
 Li  this  place.  I  readily  own  that  God  who  fees  all  PoiTibilities 
 rjuiiihave  a  previous  Reprefentation  of  things  in  his  Mind,  which 
 tilings  therefore  are  hypothetically  antecedent  to  the  deter- 
 mination of  his  V/ill.  To  affert  thus  much  is  only  faying  that 
 he  knew  what  he  was  about  when  he  made  the  World,  whicli 
 none  I  hope  will  doubt:  But  this  Reprefentation  will  never 
 come  up  to  what  is  affirm'd  of  thefc  Relations  abfolutely,  an^ 
 at  all  times,  determining  him  to  one  particular  ;  except  there 
 always  were  one  abfolutely  beft,  which  I  think  defcrves  to  be 
 a  little  confider'd.  That  he  fhould  produce  Happinefs  in  ge- 
 neral rather  than  Mifery,  fecms  to  me  very  agreeable  to  his 
 .Nature,  who  is  perfcdly  Happy;  but  what  particular  fort  or 
 degree  of  it  he  Ihall  choofc,  is  perhaps  not  very  eafily  deter- 
 min'd, except  by  fuch  as  will,  with  Leibnitz,  deny  any  per- 
 fedl  equality  or  indifference  in  nature,  and  imagine  they  can 
 always  find  a  beji,  to  whom.  I  would  recommend  our  Author's 
 Note  abovemcntion'd, 
 
 *P.76,  f  p.  74.  75.  76. 
 
Sed.  r.  Sub.4.     Of  Moral  EvM,  311 
 
 lince  the  Divine  Will  is  felf-aflive,  and  mufl  necefla- 
 
 rily  be  derermin'd  to  one  of  the  indiflFerent  things,  it 
 
 X  4  is 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 By  this  time 'tis  hoped,  I  have  explaln'd  myfelf  fufficlently, 
 I  fhall  difpatch  the  reft  of  the  Jppendix  in  as  few  Words  as 
 poffible. 
 
 From  what  has  been  faid  it  appears  that  I  don't  maintain 
 that  the  Moral  Attributes  of  God  proceed  from  the  mere  cxer- 
 cife  of  his  natural  ones,  without  any  end  or  aim;  much  lefs 
 that  thefe  were  exerted  necejfarily;  as  this  Author  feems  to  un- 
 derftand  me,  p.  78,  but  only  that  the  voluntary  Communica- 
 tion of  the  Divine  Happinefs  by  the  free  exercife  of  every  fuch 
 Perfedlion  as  is  productive  of  it,  will  conftitute  all  thofe  which 
 we  call  moral  Attributes :  a  voluntary,  defigncd  Produftion  of 
 Happinefs  or  Mifery  being  all  that  to  me  feems  requifite  to 
 make  any  aftion  Moral  in  God  or  Man.  And  that  an  abfo- 
 lutely  powerful,  intelligent,  free  and  happy  Being,  intending 
 to  communicate  fome  degree  of  thefe  Perfeftions,  needs  no 
 other  ObjeSli-ve  Rule  than  what  is  contnin'd  in  thefe  Perfedi- 
 ons  themfelves;  that  fo  long  as  he  is  pleafcd  to  exercife  thenj 
 in  purfuance  of  this  general  intent,  he  can  never  do  amifs  or 
 go  wrong  in  the  exercife  of  them,  tho'  there  be  ten  thoufand 
 equal  ways  of  exercifing  them,  and  confeqaently  no  objective 
 Rule  to  direft  which  he  fhall  adlually  choofe :  Becaufe  per- 
 k&.  Knowledge,  Power  and  Happinefs  cati  never  produce  anf 
 thing  in  the  main  repugnant  to  Kno^vledge,  Power  and  Happi- 
 nefs, i.  e.  to  themfel'ues. 
 
 To  this  purpofe  *  was  the  foregoing  Obfervation  made, 
 which  I  find  to  be  much  the  fame  with  that  of  Dr.  Clarke. 
 Demonjir.  Prop.  12.  Par.  i,  how  confufedly  foever  it  might 
 be  exprefs'd.  I  meant  therefore  Powoer  and  Kno%vledge  exercife  J 
 'Voluntarily  in  congruity  to  the  Re&itude  of  the  Di'jifte  Natnre. 
 p.  79.  in  one  (txik  of  thefe  Words,  /.  e.  in  conformity  to  his 
 general  intent  of  communicating  Happinefs  (and  if  that  be  all 
 the  meaning  of  ReSiitude,  I  readily  admit  it)  but  not  in  fo 
 large  a  fenfe  as  to  make  the  prefent  method  of  communicating' 
 it,  the  only  right,  ft,  and  reafonable  one,  and  immutably  pre- 
 ferable to  all  other  Methods  conceivable  ;  fiacc  many  others 
 may  be  fuppofed,  any  of  which  would  have  led  to  the  fame 
 End,  and  as  fuch  been  equally  agreeable  to  the  Deity  if  he  had 
 chofen  it.    This  Author  feems  afraid  of  qur  placing  the  Obli- 
 
 gatioH 
 
 *  fage  79. 
 
5 12  Qf  Moral  EwW.         Chap.  ¥, 
 
 is  its  own  reafon  of  Aclion,  and  determines  itfelf 
 freely.  Nay  fo  great  is  the  Pov/cr  of  God,  that 
 whatever  he  lliall  choofe  cut  of  infinite  PolTibiHties, 
 that  will  be  the  bcft  ;  'tis  all  one  therefore  which  he 
 prefers. 
 The  dif-        X.  Sixthly,  But  you  urge  that  you  are  Oill  iin- 
 
 ficulty  of    fatjsfy'd'  how    a    Power    can   determine  itfelf,    to  e. 
 concei-  ...  .         .•  • 
 
 ving  how  ?     ~ 
 
 a  power  N"  0  T  E  S. 
 
 call  deter- 
 
 ^aijon  to  Virtue  on  the  mere  Will  o^Gcd;  as  if  his  Will  were 
 feparated  from  his  other  Attributes:  which  would  indeed  of 
 itl;::lf  be  no  ground  of  Obligation  at  all,  fince  upon  fuch  a  blind 
 Principle  we  could  never  be  fecure  of  Happinefs  from  any 
 Being  how  faithfully  foever  we  obev'd  him,  or  how  much 
 foever  we  refcmbled  hini  in  Perfection.  This  Notion  there- 
 fore of  mere  arbitrary  \VilI  we  muft  exclude  from  both  out 
 Schemes  of  Morality  in  every  cafe  but  that  of  indi^'eroice  fq 
 often  mentioned  ?.bovc. 
 
 I  grant  the  tiatural  Corifequence  of  Virtue  is  Happitiefs  p.  8i- 
 (at  kail  would  be  fo,  if  univerfally  praftifed)   and   as   fuch  it 
 carries  a  partial  Cbligaticn  in  itfelf,  or  is  fo  far  its  own   Re- 
 ward;  but  what  will  become  of  the  Obligation  (according  to 
 my  fenfe  of  that  Word)  when  this  Confequence  does  not  fol- 
 low ?  As  this  Author  very  reafonably  grants  it  camjot  in  the 
 ]nefent  (late,  p.  82.       To  deduce  one  from  the  profpcfl  of 
 Reward  in  a  future  ftate  (tho'  I  think  the  certainty  of  it  equal 
 on  cither  of  the  two  Scheme?)  is  having  rccqurfe  to  the  Will  o^ 
 God  to  fupply  defecVs  and  conipleat  the  Obligation,  inflcad  of 
 founding  it  on  thcie  Relatiovs  as  fuch,  as  ahfolutcly  fit  and  rights 
 r.nd  to  be  follow'd  for  their  tn.vv  fakes  without  regard   to  any 
 farther  End.    'Tis  owning  that  the  Obligation  fuppofed  to  arifa 
 from  them    is   not  in    itielf  adequate  and  indifpenfible,  and 
 fcemsto  be  quite  giving  up  ih^i  full  obligatory  Povjer  of  theirs 
 antecedent  to  atiy  Renvard  or  P laiijhmetit  anf?e\''d  either  by   natu- 
 ral confequence  or  fofiti've  Appointment  to  the  Ohfer'vance  or  neg- 
 leSi  of  than  *  which  the  Authors  df  that  Language   have  fo 
 eagerly  contended  for,  and  to  oppofe  the  ill  Confequences  of 
 which  is  the  only  Delign  of  air  that  has. been  advanc'd  on  this 
 Head.     If  any  Miftakcs  appeir  in  it  (as  probably  there  may) 
 j  ihall  be  obliged  to  this  judicious  Author  for  pointing   theiA 
 out  and  promife  freely  to  give  up   them  or  any.  others  in  the 
 Book  as  foon  as  I  can  be  made  ffJnfiblc  of  them-' 
 
 *  .Evidences  of  .^W.  and  Rev.  Rel.  p,  21?.  5  th  Ed, 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  313 
 
 you  are  Ignorant  of  the  Modus ;  but  a  thing  muft  mine  itfelf 
 not  be  deny'd  becaufe  we  do  not  know  the  manner  ^°  ^^^on 
 hov/  it  is  done :    we  are  entirely  ignorant  how  the  °o^i^der' 
 Rays  of  the  Sun  produce  the  Idea  of  Light  in  the  our  ailent 
 Mind  by  moving  the  optic  Nerves ;  nor  is  jt  bet-  to  the 
 ter  underftood  how  the  Members  of  the  Body  cap  ^^^^^  of 
 be  moved  by  a  Thought  of  the  Mind,  and  at  the  ^^tfQP'°P°'' 
 Dire<5lion  of  the  Will.     Yet  no  body  denies  thefe 
 things,  becaufe  he  knows  not  the  manner  in  which 
 they   are  perform'd.      If  therefore   it   be  manifeft 
 that  the  divine  Will  does  determine  itfelf,   we  fhall 
 not  trouble  ourfelves  much  in  enquiring  how  it  can 
 be  done. 
 
 XL  But  to  confefs  the  truth,  'tis  no  lefs  difficult  'tIs  as 
 to  conceive  a  thing  to  be  moved  or  determined  by  difficult  to 
 another,    than  by  itfelf ;    but  as  we  are  accuftom'd  conceive 
 to  material  Agents  *,   all  which  are  paHivein  their  ,°.^^  ^ 
 
 ^^-  ^  -riT-o  1  thing  an 
 
 Operations,  we  are  certain  or  the  ract,   and  not  at  i^^.  moved 
 all  felicitous   about  the  manner  of  it  :    whereas  if  by  ano- 
 we  confider  the  thing  thoroughly,   we   fliall  find  ther,  as  by 
 ourfelves  as  far  from  apprehending  how  Motion  is  ^^^^^^'-  .^® 
 communicated  from  one  Body  to  another,   as  how  ^^^^j  j^ 
 the  Will  can  move  itfelf:    but  there  feems  to  be  being ac- 
 nothing   wonderful  in  the  one,    becaufe  it   is  ob-  cuftomed 
 ferv'd  to  happen   at  all   times,    and  in  every   Ac-  ^^  materi- 
 tion ;    whereas  the   other  is  look'd  upon  as  incrc-    'J/\ 
 dible,  fince  it  is  feldom  perform'd,  viz,,  by  the  Will  aents. 
 alone.     And  tho'  both  Reafon  and  Experience  prove 
 that  it  is  done,  yet  we  fufped  ourfelves  to  be  im- 
 pofed  upon,    becaufe  we  know  not  the  manner  of 
 it.     The  ground  of  the  miftake  is  this,   that  fince 
 the  Will  is  the  only  adive  Power  which  we  are  ac- 
 quainted with,  the  reft  being  all  pailive,  we  are  not 
 eafily  induced  to  believe  it  to  be  really  fuch,  buc 
 form  our  Judgment  of  it  from  a  Comparifon  with 
 lather  Agent",   v/hich  (ince  they  don't  move  but  as 
 
 they 
 
 Stc  Note  4], 
 
3H 
 
 What  is 
 laid  about 
 indiffe- 
 rence, 
 with  re- 
 fpedt  to 
 the  Will 
 ofGod, 
 takes  place 
 in  his  pri- 
 mary Elec- 
 tions. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 they  are  moved,  we  require  a  Mover  alfo  in  the 
 Will  of  God :  which  is  very  abfur'd  ;  fince  it  is  evi- 
 dent that  if  there  were  no  aUive  Power  in  Nature, 
 there  could  not  be  d^pajfive  one;  and  if  nothing  could 
 move  without  a  Mover,  there  would  have  been  no 
 Motion  or  Adion  at  all  t.  For  we  cannot  conceive 
 how  it  fhould  begin.  Now  it  is  much  harder  to 
 conceive  how  Motion  can  be  without  a  Beginning, 
 than  how  an  Agent  can  move  itfelf.  Since  then  here 
 are  Difficulties  on  both  Sides,  neither  ought  to  be 
 deny'd  becaufe  the  manner  of  it  is  above  human 
 Underftanding. 
 
 XII.  It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  what  we  have 
 faid  concerning  this  Indifference  of  things  in  re- 
 gard to  the  Divine  Will,  takes  place  chiefly  in 
 thofe  Eleftions  which  we  apprehend  to  be  the 
 Primaryt  but  not  always  in  the  fubfequent  ones. 
 For  fuppofing  God  to  will  any  thing,  while  that 
 Eledion  continues,  he  cannot  rejeft  either  the  fame 
 or  any  thing  neceflarily  conned-ed  with  it,  for  that 
 would  be  to  contradid:  himfelf.  In  order  to  ap- 
 prehend my  Meaning  the  better,  we  muft  remem- 
 ber that  the  Divine  Power  can  effed  innumerable 
 things  equal  in  Nature  and  Perfedions.  For  in- 
 flance,  we  may  conceive  numberlefs  Men  equal 
 to  one  another  in  all  refpefts ;  and  alfo  number- 
 lefs Species  of  rational  Beings  equally  perfed  :  no- 
 thing 'but  the  Will  of  God  could  determine  which 
 of  thefe  he  ihould  create  firft.  But  when  it  was 
 detcrmin'd  to  create  Man  ,fuch  as  he  now  is,  /.  e. 
 with  the  Faculties,  Appetites  and  integral  Parts 
 which  he  confifts  of  at  prefent,  it  is  impoflible 
 that  God  fhould  will  or  choofe  any  thing  repug- 
 nant to  human  Nature,    v/hile  that  Eledion  cofH' 
 
 tmues. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 t  otff  Dr.  Clarkes  Demonjirat.  of  the  D.  Attributes,  f.%? 
 87,  tff.  or  S.  Fancourt'i  Ejfay  concerning  Liberty,  is'c.  p.  z^, 
 39,  or  Note  43 . 
 
Sedt.  I.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  31^ 
 
 XIII.  For  when  we  conceive  any  thing  propo-  God  may 
 
 fed  to  the  Knowledge  of  God  as  fit  to  be  done,  ^"y^  -^'^ 
 
 he  mufl:  alfo  neceffarily  have  under  his  Eye,  as  ic  ^^'"^-  \- 
 I       r  .r-M  ^  11     I     ,       1  •       ''1  once  in  his 
 
 were  at  the  fame   Glance,  all  thole  things  that  are  view 
 neceflarily  conneded  with  it,  or  confequent  there-  which  are 
 
 upon  to  all  Eternity  i  and  muft  will  or  rejed  them  cannefted 
 all  by   one  fimple  Ad.     If  therefore  he  derermin'd  ^'jn^^^^ 
 to  create  Man,  he  muft  alio  be  fuppofed  to  will  that  choln. 
 
 he  ihould  confift  of  a  Soul  and  Body,  that  he  Ihould  and  either 
 be  furnifh'd  with   Reafon  and  Senfes,  and  that  his  ^^'^  ^^  ^^- 
 Body  fhould  be  fubjea:  to  the  general  Laws  of  Mat-  ''^^^  ^^^"^ 
 ter  :    for  all  thefe  things  pre  evidently  included  in  ftmnk 
 the  Choice  to  create  Man.  Aft. 
 
 XIV.  Nay   this  primary  Ad  of  Volition  muft  As  he  is 
 be  fuppofed  to  contain  not  only  thofe  things  which  ^  infinite 
 have  a  necclfary  connexion  with  what  is    chofen,  he°airr 
 but  fuch  things  alfo  as  tend  to  promote  its  benefit  wills  the 
 and  happinefs,  as  far  as  they  can  be  made  confiftent  good  of  all 
 with  the  benefit  of  the  whole.     For  fince  God  is  ^^•'^gs 
 infinitely  Good,    'tis  certain  that  he  wills  that  his  h^'^tter- 
 Creatures  ftiould  exift  commodioufly  as  much  as  mTn'd^to^' 
 that  they  ftiould  exift  at  all.     He  therefore  will'd  create,   as 
 fuch  things  as  are  agreeable  to   the    Natures,    and  ^^^  ^^  is 
 tend  to  preferve  the  Conftitutions  of  bis  Creatures  P°^^^^^^' 
 in  the  fame  Eledion  whereby  he  determin'd  to  cre- 
 ate them. 
 
 XV.  We  have  faid  before,    that  there  is  a  dou-  "^^"^^  ^^« 
 ble  Goodnefi  in  things,    the  firft  and  principal  is  ^^^^^r 
 that  which  renders  them  well-pieafing  to  God,  as  L once'^ 
 they  are  conformable  to   his   Will:    the   other   is  made,  it  is 
 that  whereby  they  agree  with  one  another,  where-  impoffible' 
 by  they  afford  each  other  mutual  Affiftance,  where-  f^at  thofe 
 by   they    promote  the   Convenience,    Prefcrvation  fj^"f^ 
 and  Perfedion  of  the  whole :    but  both  thefe  pro-  pieafe  him 
 ceed   from    the  Choice   and   Will  of  God.      For  which 
 when    the   Deity    had  once   determin'd   to   pieafe  tend  to 
 himfelf  in  the   Creation    and    Prefervation  of  the  ?^  ^r/'""- 
 
 World,  of  his 
 Work. 
 
3 16  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 World,  he  muft  be  fuppofed  at  the  fame  time  to 
 have  willed  all  fuch  things  as  contribute  to  the 
 Benefit  and  Perfeftion  of  his  Work,  otherwife  he 
 would  have  contradidcd  himfelf,  and  thereby  been 
 the  caufe  of  fruftrating  his  own  Election.  For 
 he  is  now  fuppofed  to  hare  chofen  that  there 
 fhould  be  a  World,  that  it  lliould  continue  as  long 
 as  he  himfelf  had  determin'd,  that  every  Being 
 fhould  attain  the  End  affign'd  to  it,  and  all  things 
 aft  according  to  the  Nature  he  had  given  them, 
 and  confpire  together  to  preferve  and  perfed:  the 
 whole.  It  is  impoflible  therefore  that  he  fhould 
 will  the  reverfe  of  all  this,  or  that  fuch  things 
 Ihould  pleafe  him  as  tend  to  the  difordering,  maim- 
 ing or  deftrudion  of  his  Work.  For  'tis  impof- 
 fible  to  conceive  that  he  fhould  choofe  the  Exif- 
 flence  of  things,  and  yet  refufe  the  Means  necef- 
 When        jary  thereto. 
 
 Man  IS  XVI.  when  therefore  Man  was  made  what  he 
 
 flch\  na-  i^)  by  ^'^'^  '^'^^y  ^^-  °^  conflituting  him  of  fuch 
 tare  as  re-  a  Nature  and  Condition,  'tis  plain,  that  God  alfo 
 quires  him  •viT'iiled  that  he  fhould  be  pious,  fober,  jufl:  and 
 tobejuft,   ^hafte.  (/?.)     Thefeand  the  like  Laws  of  Nature 
 
 Icber,  l3c.  r\^^ 
 
 Gcdisnot  ^h«^ 
 
 at  Liberty 
 
 rot  to  will  NOTES. 
 
 ^efe 
 
 things. 
 
 [R]  Againft  this  'tis  objeded,  Firfl,  That  it  rnaUs  God 
 require  thofe  Virtues  from  Men,  not  bccaufe  they  are  morally 
 good,  but  becaufe  of  the  Advantages  which  they  bring  by 
 preventing  fuch  things  as  may  trouble  civil  Society  or  hurt  a 
 Man's  felR  To  this  I  anfwer  that  the  Author  has  fliew'd  in 
 his  Book  that  Moral  Evil  is  founded  on  Natural,  and  that  in 
 the  flatc  of  Nature  before  Revelation  Men  had  no  way  to  know 
 what  free  adls  were  good  or  pleafing  to  God,  but  by  obferving 
 what  was  advantageous  to  particular  Men,  or  to  Society.  Ob- 
 ferve  all  the  Laws  of  Nature,  and  you  will  find  them  difco- 
 vcrVl  and  proved  from  this  foie  Principle  :  As  is  manifefl  from 
 all  the  Books  that  treat  of  them.  To  pctcnd  therefore  that 
 the  natural  Mifchiefs  arifing  from  Vice  do  not  prove  them  to 
 
 b5 
 
Sed:.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  3 17 
 
 then  are  immutable,  z//2;.  conformable  to  the  Will 
 of  God,  and  contain'd  m  the  very  firft  Ad  of  Elec- 
 tion 
 NOTES. 
 
 be  morally  Evil  ^  is  aft  uncommon  way  of  thinking  ;  fince  the 
 very  Argument  whereby  we  prove  them  morally  Evil  is  be- 
 caufe  they  are  pernicious. 
 
 But  2dly,  From  hence,  fay  fome,  it  follows  that  the  Tur- 
 pitude of  Vices  is  not  to  be  eftimated  from  their  own  Nature, 
 but  from  the  Evils  which  attend  them  :  as  if  efFefts  did  not 
 flow  from  their  Caufe,  and  thofe  things  which  lead  us  into 
 fuch  Evils  as  miglit  have  been  avoided  by  abftaining  from  them 
 were  not  properly  Evil  ;  or  that  we  ought  to  judge  of  the  na- 
 ture of  any  thing  otherwife  then  from  the  Properties  and  ope- 
 rations that  necelfariiy  attend  it. 
 
 As  to  the  TurpitHde  of  things,  we  give  that  Appellation  to 
 fuch  as  feem  contrary  to  the  Dignity  and  Honour  of  a  rational 
 Nature,  which  cannot  be  feen  or  heard  without  feme  naufe- 
 Ous  abhorrence  and  reluftance  of  the  Scnfes. 
 
 We  attribute  it  to  Vices  by  a  kind  oi  Analogy,  fince  they 
 proceed  from  fuch  Principles  as  are  unworthy  of  human  Na- 
 ture, as  lefTen  the  value  and  efteem  of  him  who  has  imbibed 
 them,  and  make  him  as  it  were  unclean  and  fordid,  and  the 
 averfion  of  all  good  and  modefl  Perfons. 
 
 But  fuch  Turpitude  as  this  does  not  arifefrom  the  Nature  of 
 the  Things  themfelves,  but  from  fome  fordid  Qualities  that  ad- 
 here to  them  and  offend  the  Senfes.  In  like  manner  the  Turpi- 
 tude of  Vices  does  not  arife  from  the  fimple  Nature  of  Adions, 
 but  from  fome  adventitious  Circumftances,  wliich  bring  Evil 
 on  them,  and  as  they  are  undue  and  heterogeneous,  they  as 
 it  were  defile  thofe  Adions  to  which  they  adhere. 
 
 'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  farther,  that  God  can  difpenfe  with  fom<i 
 Afiions  which  feem  contrary  to  the  Law  of  Nature,  but  not 
 with  others. 
 
 For  Inftance,  he  commands  Abraham  to  kill  his  innoceiit 
 Son,  who  prepares  to  obey,  and  if  he  had  executed  che  Divine 
 Command  he  had  done  nothing  amifs.  And  yet  It  feems  con- 
 trary to  the  Law  of  Nature  for  a  Father  to  kill  his  innocent 
 Son.  But  as  God  is  the  Giver  and  Lord  of  Life,  Reafon  tells 
 us  that  he  may  take  it  away  by  whom  he  pleafes. 
 
 But  no  Man  in  his  Wits  can  believe  that  God  may  require 
 any  reafonable  Creature  to  hate  him  or  difobey  his  Commands, 
 to  be  rebellious  or  perjur'd,  or  that  any  fhould  take  thefe  for 
 Duties  owing  to  God,  tho'  an  Angel  from  Heaven  fhould  de- 
 clare them  to  be  f(?.     What  is  the  Reafon  therefore  why  God 
 
 CQmmanded 
 
3 18  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 tion  wherein  he  determin'd  to  create  Man.  Nor  is 
 God  at  liberty  not  to  will  thefe  during  his  purpofe 
 
 to 
 NOTES. 
 
 commanded  the  firft  of  thefe,  and  the  Father  of  the  Faithful 
 was  obedknt;  Avhen  we  believe  that  neither  God  can  com- 
 mand the  latter,  nor  we  be  obliged  to  pay  Obedience  to  any 
 who  fhall  pretend  fuch  a  Command  ? 
 
 1  think  no  other  account  is  to  be  given  of  this  difference  than 
 that  the  flaying  a  Son  is  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  may  be  feparated 
 from  all  thofe  Evil  Confequences  th?t  attend  wilful  Murder, 
 whereas  Hatred  of  God,  i^c.  are  fuch  as  cannot ;  but  natural- 
 ly and  neceffarily  lead  thofe  who  are  guilty  of  them  into  Natu- 
 ral Evils,  and  are  prejudicial  both  to  the  Authors  themfelves 
 and  others:  They  undermine  the  Principles  of  all  Goodnefs, 
 and  diffolve  the  Union  between  God  and  human  Society, 
 which  from  the  very  Nature  he  has  given  Mankind  is  neceffary 
 to  human  Happinefs :  nor  need  we  mention  other  Natural 
 Evils,  which  would  flow  as  certainly  from  the  Allowance  or 
 CommilCon  of  the  like  Crimes  by  natural  Confequence. 
 
 But  3dly,  'tis  urg'd  that  this  is  to  confound  natural  and 
 moral  Evils,  which  all  Divines  have  hitherto  diflinguifh'd. 
 Anfw.  If  the  Objcftor  had  but  obfcrved  the  Diflinftion  which 
 the  Author  Gives  of  Moral  Evil,  Chap.  v.  Introdudl.  he  might 
 have  found  a  full  Anfvver  to  this  Objedlion.  There  he  might 
 fee  that  all  Evil  is  inconveniency,  but  that  fone  inconvenien- 
 cies  arife  from  the  feries  of  natural  Caufes  without  our  Confent 
 *  and  foraetimes  our  Knowledge  ;  thef-e  we  call  natural  Evils ; 
 but  others  happen  from  the  abufe  of  ElccStions,  when  an  un- 
 due Choice  occafions  them,  and  in  this  cafe  belides  the  Natu- 
 ral Evil  that  arifes  from  them,  there  is  likcwife  an  Obligation 
 on  the  Perfbn  that  makes  the  Choice  to  anfwer  for  the  hurt 
 he  has  done  by  it.  Now  thefe  Choices  that  bring  inconve- 
 niencics,  are  called  moral  Evils,  and  the  difference  between 
 natural  and  moral  Evil  is  not  but  that  they  both  bring  incon- 
 vcnicncies,  and  hurt  ourfelvcs  or  others  (for  therein  confills 
 the  nature  of  their  Evil)  but  that  the  ill  EfFefts  of  the  one 
 proceed  from  the  Choice,  thofe  of  the  other  from  natural 
 Caufes,  and  hence  the  Author  of  that  Choice  is  anfwerable  for 
 the  one,  but  no  body  for  the  other.  Moral  Evil  therefore  is 
 Natural  Evil  with  Choice  fuperaddcd. 
 
 But  4thly,  It  is  allcdged  that  Moral  Evil  is  predominant  in 
 the  World,  and  yet  the  Work  of  God  is  not  d.flurb'd  by  it  » 
 Vice  has  quite  overwhelm'd  Mankind,  and  yet  they  flill  fub- 
 filt ;  which  ihcws  that  God  may  very  well  command  Men  to 
 
 be 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  3  19 
 
 to  continue  Man  fuch  as  he  is :  For  by  this  means 
 the  fame  thing  would  pleafe  him,   as  being  agreeable 
 
 to 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 be  impious,  dcbauch'd  unjuft,  l^c.  without  deftroying  the 
 World,  and  therefore  the  Author  ought  to  hold  that  God  is 
 free  as  to  his  fecond  Elections  as  well  as  to  the  firft. 
 
 If  this  Objeflion  prove  any  thing  it  proves  that  before  Reve- 
 lation what  we  now  call  vices  were  not  fo,  fince  at  that 
 time  there  was  no  way  to  diflinguifh  vicious  from  virtuous  Ac- 
 tions, but  by  obferving  which  hurt,  or  help'd  Mankind,  one 
 of  which  Nature  taujht  them  to  cultivate,  and  to  avoid  the 
 other.  But  if  the  Actions  we  call  vicious  (fuch  as  murther, 
 luft,  injultice,  /rontempt  of  God  and  Irreligion)  did  no  hurt, 
 there  was  no  reafon  Men  fhould  be  debarr'd  from  them  or  God 
 be  imagin'd  to  forbid  them,  before  he  declar'd  his  Will  to  that 
 purpofe.  But  adly,  it  is  a  plain  cafe  that  thefe  and  all  other 
 wicked  and  irreligious  Adions  do  mifchief  to  mankind,  and 
 have  a  deftruftive  influence  according  to  their  number,  and  if 
 all  Men  fhould  give  themfelves  up  to  them  without  reftraint. 
 Mankind  could  not  fubfift.  Vi  felf  murder  were  univerfal, 
 there  were  an  end  of  human  race  :  If  none  wou'd  take  care  of 
 Children,  one  Age  would  put  a  period  to  the  Species.  If  all 
 were  falfe,  treacherous  and  cruel.  Life  would  be  fliort  and 
 comfortlefs ;  if  there  were  no  amity,  fociety  and  juflice,  it 
 would  have  the  fame  EfFed.  If  Luft  and  unnatural  Mixtures 
 were  pradtifed  as  oft  as  Opportunity  offer'd  ;  if  drunkennefs, 
 intemperance  and  excefs  were  indulg'd  to  the  utmoft,  mofl 
 would  Itarve,  and  the  reft  live  a  fhort  and  uneafy  Lite.  This 
 plainly  fhews  that  thefe  Vices  are  contrary  to  the  Nature  of 
 Mankind,  and  therefore  God  who  gave  that  Nature  has  clear- 
 ly enough  fignified  that  they  arc  contrary  to  his  Will.  It  mult 
 be  confefs'd  indeed  that  there  is  much  vice  and  wickednefs  in 
 the  World,  and  it  is  proportionably  miferable  ;  but  yet  take  the 
 Actions  of  the  worlt  of  Men,  and  you  will  find  ten  innocent, 
 for  one  that  is  criminal  or  mifchievous.  For  the  truth  of 
 this  J  appeal  to  common  Experience.  Let  any  reckon  the 
 Afts  of  any  one  Man  from  Morning  to  Night,  and  he  will 
 find  the  Proportion  hold  ;  and  this  is  much  more  obfervablc  if 
 we  take  the  whole  Life  of  a  Man  together;  the  proportion  of 
 innocent  adts  to  the  vicious  will  appear  much  greater;  Child- 
 hood and  old  Age  being  much  freer  from  mifchievous  ads 
 than  the  middle  part  of  Life, 
 
 But 
 
i2b  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap:  f. 
 
 to  his  firfl:  Choice  of  creating  Man,  which  is  fup- 
 pofed  to  ftand  yet,  and  dilpleafe  him,  as  being  re- 
 pugnant to  another,  which  rejects  the  very  fame 
 things  that  are  contained  in  the  firfl; ;  that  is,  he 
 would  at  the  fame  time  will  and  not  will  the  fame 
 thing,  which  cannot  be  attributed  to  God> 
 
 XVII.  Yet  he  is  neverthelefs  free,  becaufe  he  can- 
 TKis  is  no  "°'-  ^^^^  ^^^^^  a  Man  be  perjur'd,  a  Murtherer,   ^c, 
 bar  to  the    for  he  is  no  otherwife  determin'd  than  by  his  own 
 Divine       Choice ;  nor  does  a  thing  pleafe  or  difpleafe  hird  on 
 A^ibertv.     ^^^y  qj-j^^^  account  than  becaufe  it  is  agreeable  or  con- 
 trary to  his  Will.     For  While  that  Eleclion  of  the 
 Deity  which  conflitures  me  a  Man,  (/.  e.  an  Animal 
 that  is  obliged  ro  be  pious,  juft  and  fober)  remains 
 'tis  impolTible  that  he  fliould  will  me  to  be  perjur'd, 
 or  a  Murtherer  j  nor  can  the  latter  Choice  take  place 
 in  God  fo  long  as  the  former  flands,    fince  it  is  re- 
 pugnant ro  the  former.   When  therefore  we  acknow- 
 ledge that  things  arc  good,  and  aflcrt  that  fome  Ac- 
 tions are  grateful  to  God,  and  others  odious,-  this  is 
 not  becaufe  we  believe  the  Divine  Elections  to  be 
 determined  by  them,  but  becaufe  we  fuppofe  them 
 to  be  comprehended  in  the  very  firfl:  Aft  of  his 
 
 Will 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Butlaflly,  It  is  iirg'd  that  if  thcfe  things  be  contrary  to  the 
 Will  of  God,  he  ought  not  only  to  have  forbid  them,  but 
 taken  effedlual  Care  that  they  fliould  not  be  praftifed. 
 
 [  anfwer,  God  has  taken  effectual  Care  to  prelerve  Men 
 from  thefe  in  fuch  a  Degree,  that  our  Lives  arc  fccured  as  far 
 as  is  expedient  for  the  good  of  the  whole.  The  Frame  of 
 our  Natures  is  fach,  and  the  Laws  of  God  have  fo  great  Ef- 
 fe£t  upon  us,  that  as  I  have  already  Hiew'd,  a  thoiihmd  afts  of 
 Jufti'cc,  Temperance,  Truth,  Charity  and  Piety  are  done  for 
 one  of  the  contrary  Vices.  'Tis  the  pradife  ot  thefe  Virtues 
 that  fupports  the  World,  and  tho'  many  Vices  are  permitted,' 
 yet,  as  Ihall  be  ihewn  in  due  time,  there  is  none  that  could  be 
 prevented  even  by  Omnipotence  without  g;-eater  Inconveni- 
 ence. 
 
Sedl.  t.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  321 
 
 Will  of  creating  things,  and  to  be  pleafing  or  difplca- 
 fing  to  him  fo  far  as  they  are  agreeable  or  oppofite  to 
 that  Eledion.  Nor  is  the  Liberty  of  God  deftroy'd 
 becaiife  lie  muft  neceffarily  will  thefe  things  while 
 he  does  will  them  :  For  every  thing,  while  it  is,  ne- 
 cefTanly  is ;  but  thii  Neceffity  is  confequent  upon, 
 and  not  antecedent  to  the  Divine  Will.  The  Di- 
 vine Eledion  therefore  is  not  determined  by  the 
 Goodnefs  of  things,  but  the  Goodnefs  and  Fitnefs 
 of  them  arifes  from  thnt  Eledion,  and  that  is  beft 
 for  them  which  is  moft  agreeable  to  that  Choice  of 
 the  Deity  whereby  he  will'd  them  to  be  what  they 
 are.  From  hence,  I  think>  it  appears  fufficiently 
 that  God  is  fuch  an  Agent  as  dehghts  in  things 
 merely  becaufe  they  are  chofen. 
 
 XVIII.  Yet  it  is  to  be  remark'd,  that  this  felf-  A  Being 
 determining  Power  is  not  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  to  im-  e".'^^^ /f 
 J)iy  infinite  Perfedion  j    for  it  may  be  confident  pg^^er  is 
 with  an  impcrfed   underflanding,   and  other  Appe- moreper- 
 tites,  as  we  have  (hewn  before :   'Tis  not  therefore  fetl  than 
 peculiar  to  God,   or  incommunicable;    there  is  no  °"^  ^^^^_ 
 reafon  therefore  for  us  to  doubt  whether  a  Creature  ^"^^^"J^^jg*- 
 may  partake  of  it :  if  God  were  pleafed  to  ccmmu-  joes  not 
 picate  it,  there  Teems  to  be  no  contradidion  in  the  imply  in- 
 thing  for  a  Creature  to  be  capable  of  it.     Now  that  fi"ife  Per- 
 Being  which  has  this  gift  beftow'd  upon  it,    will  ^^'^^°"' 
 manifeftly  be  more  noble  than  the  reft,   and  a  more  j^  j^  ^^j,^, 
 perfect  refemblance  of  the  Deity :    fmce  therefore  munica- 
 God  has  created  the  lefs  pcrfedt  Beings,    we  may,  ble. 
 without    any   abfurdity,    believe  that   he  has   not 
 omitted  the  more  perfeft.     Let  us  fee  then  whether 
 t!iere  be  any  Tokens  of  this   Power  among  the  Di- 
 vine Works  *. 
 
 Y  SUBSECT. 
 
 *  For  the  poffiblllty  of  fuch  a  Po^ver,  and  its  being  commu- 
 nicated, fee  Dr.  ClaikeV  Demonfr.  of  the  Being  and  Jttributes 
 ff  God,  p.  82  fl«i85.  ;th  Edit.  For  the  Peno^ion  of  it,  fs 
 Ncie  81  and  §,  2.  ofthi>  Ch after. 
 
322  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V^ 
 
 fhew  this. 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    V. 
 
 '^hat  Man  partakes  of  the  principle  of  plea- 
 fing  himfelf  by  EleSfion, 
 
 Some  rea-  I.  T  T  appears,  I  think,  from  what  has  been  faid 
 fons  are  J|[_  j}^at;  jj-^^j-g  jj  fuch  a  Principle  in  Nature,  and 
 
 n,_^!.  .u?„  that  it  is  alfo  communicable.  We  are  now  to  en- 
 quire whether  Nature  has  conferred  it  upon  us :  If 
 we  confult  our  own  Minds,  we  may  pollibly  enter-' 
 tain  a  doubt  whether  we  ai'e  always  paflive  in  our 
 voluntary  A6ls :  namely,  whether  the  Goodnefs  of 
 Objeds  determines  our  Ekftions  according  to  the 
 Degrees  of  it,  which  are,  or  'Are  believed  to  be  in 
 them;  or  to  fpeak  more  plainly,  whether  we  al- 
 ways choofe  things  becaufe  they  plcafe  us  or  feem 
 convenient;  or  whether  they  (bmetimes  appear  in- 
 different in  themfelves,  or  mconvenient  before  the 
 Choice,  and  acquire  their  Goodnefs  from  it,  and 
 are  for  this  reafon  only  agreeable  becaufe  they  are 
 chofen.  We  have  feen  that  there  is  in  Nature  fuch 
 a  Power  as  this,  which  can  produce  a  Convenience 
 or  Goodnefs  in  things  by  willing  them ;  but  whe- 
 ther we  partake  of  it  or  no  is  the  doubt.  Now 
 that  we  do  partake  of  it  may  I  think  be  evinced 
 from  the  following  Reafons.  Firfl-,  If  we  be  con- 
 fcious  of  an  inherent  Liberty.  Secondly,  If  we  ex- 
 perience in  ourfelves  thofe  Signs  and  Properties  which 
 have  been  declared  to  attend  this  Principle.  Third- 
 ly, If  the  Caufes  which  are  fuppofcd  to  determine 
 the  Will  be  evidently  infufficientj  or  arifc  from  Elec- 
 tion inftead  of  producing- ic. 
 
 11.  As 
 
Sed.  1.  Sub.  S'     Of  Moral  Evil.  323 
 
 II.  As  to  the  firft;  We  experience  in  ourfdves  a  Firft,  Ex 
 Principle  of  thi<;  kind,  (i.  e.  a  free  one,)  to  fuch  a  perience. 
 degree  of  certainty,  that  if  our  Minds  be  confuked 
 
 we  can  hiirdly  doubt  of  it ;  and  from  hence  it  is 
 that  all  Men  of  all  Nations,  v/hile  they  follow'd  the 
 Guidance  of  Nature,  and  attended  to  the  Percepti" 
 ens  of  their  own  Minds,  have  conftantly  affertecl 
 their  Liberty,  at  kaft  in  fome  particular  Adions : 
 Nor  has  any  one,  unlefs  he  v/ere  forc'd  to  it,  and  as 
 it  were  circumvented  by  Philofophical  Subtikies^ 
 ever  deny'd  either  that  he  was  free,  or  that  he  could 
 pleafe  himfelf  in  chooling  one  or  other  out  of  ma- 
 ny ObjeLts  prefented  to  him,  tho'  that  which  was 
 preferred  were  no  Ways  preferable  to  others  in  refpe6l 
 of  any  intrinfic  worth. 
 
 III.  In  this  therefore,  as  in  many  other  Cafes,  the  The  vul- 
 Vulgnr    feem    to   be    much    wifer,    and  to  reafon  S^^  ^^^^^ 
 more  juftly  than  Philofophers.     For  the  Vulgar  ge-  ^^^^^  ^'' 
 nerally  follow   the  natural  Senfe  of  the  Mind;  and  matters  of 
 tho'  they  be  dull  enough  in  forming  long  Dedudi-  Faft  than 
 ens,    yet  in  fiich  things  as  are  the  immediate  Ob-  Ph-loio- 
 jefts  of  Senfe  and  Experience,  they  are  often  more  P'''^"' 
 acute  than   Pholofophers   themfelves :    who    either 
 
 pufiF'd  up  with  the  Vanity  of  appearing  wife  above 
 the  Vulgar,  or  impos'd  upon  by  their  own  Subtilty, 
 often  frame  Monfters  of  their  own,  and  deny  thing? 
 that  are  the  rnoft  mjuifeu: :  while  they  are  llriving 
 to  purfue  Truth  thro'  Coverts  impervious  and  in- 
 acceilible  to  human  V/it,  they  leave  her  behind  their 
 Backs,  and  are  blind  in  broad  Day.  Hence  fome 
 have  deny'd  Motion,  and  othe'-s  Pveft,  others  Space, 
 others  all  S?nre  in  Brutes,  others  the  being  of  a  Cr?^, 
 and  others  all  manner  of  Truth :  and  on  the  fame  ac- 
 count, fome  have  deny'd  Liberty,  viz,.  becauPe  they 
 were  not  able  to  unravel  the  Ditficukies  in  which 
 they  themfelves  had  involv'd  it  by  their  Subtil° 
 tie^^'    The  ignorant  and  unlearned  do  much  better 
 
324  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 in  flighting  all  fuch  Arguments,  and  judging  of 
 things  ingenuoufly  according  to  the  didate  of  their 
 Senfes  and  Experience,-  and  if  their  Judgments  be 
 taken,  we  have  clearly  gain'd  the  Caufe :  for  all 
 thefe  declare  that  they  are  confcious  of  this  free 
 Principle  within  them,  which  yet  cannot,  as  we 
 have  Ihewn,  be  well  explain'd  otherwife  thsn  we 
 have  done  :  The  Senfe  of  our  unprejudic'd  Mind 
 agrees  with  thefe,  nor  is  the  common  Teftimony  of 
 IVIankind  to  be  eileem'd  of  little  importance  in  a 
 matter  of  Fad:.     (5$0 
 
 IV.  Secondly? 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (53.)  The  Subftance  of  what  Leibnitz.  objefVs  againfl  this 
 Argument*  amounts  to  thus  much,  i^/z  That  it  is  no  proof 
 of  thenon-exillence  ofa  thing  becaufe  the  Vulgar  don't  per- 
 ceive it;  they  are  no  Judges  of  any  thing  but  what  is  per- 
 ceiv'd  by  the  Senfes  ;  tliey  believe  the  Air  to  be  nothing  when 
 it  is  not  mov'd  ;  they  know  nothing  of  the  fubtle  Fluid  which 
 caufes  Gravity,  or  of  the  magrietic  Matter;  much  lefs  of  im- 
 jnatcrial  Subftanccs :  and  therefore  the  fcveral  Caufes  of  Ac- 
 tion, the  fecret  Springs,  the  Reafons  and  Inclinations,  may 
 be  all  unknown  to  them,  and  yet  we  be  abfolutcly  determined 
 (as  he  believes  we  always  arc)  either  by  the  conftitution  of  our 
 own  Bodies,  or  of  thofe  about  us,  or  by  a  thoufand  little  things 
 which,  upon  due  attention  and  refleftion,  we  might  be  able  to 
 difcover.. We  reply,  that  tho'  in  many  Cafes  our  not  per- 
 ceiving a  thing  be  no  Argument  that  it  does  not  really  cxift, 
 yet  in  fomc  Cafes,  in  this  particularly,  it  is.  To  feel  no  Pain, 
 to  be  confcious  of  no  Idea,  is  to  have  none:  and  in  like  man- 
 r.er  to  perceive  no  motive  or  reafon  of  Adion,  is  the  fame  as 
 not  to  adl  upon  any,  or  to  perceive  that  we  ad  without  one. 
 If  any  one  (whether  Philofophcr  or  Peafant)  be  thinking  npon' 
 a  Subjeft,  he  muft,  at  that  inlhnt,  know  the  SubjeA  that  he- 
 is  thinking  on,  or  however,  that  he  does  think  on  fomething  : 
 'tis  likewifc  fclf  evident,  that  every  reafonable  Man,  when  he 
 refolves  upon  fome  >'iew,  or  follows  an  Inclination,  muft  be 
 confcious  of  that  View,  or  at  leaft  be  fenfible  that  his  Refo- 
 lution  was  form'd  upon  fome  Viev/  or  other,  In  thefe  Cafes 
 therefore,  and  in  all  the  modifications  of  Thought,  not  to  be,- 
 and  not  to  hz  fercei'v  d,  is  the  very  fame  thing. 
 
 But 
 •  Rmarquts,  p,  477, 
 
Seft.  I.  Sub  5.     Of  Moral  ^w\\.  325 
 
 IV.  Secondly,  If  we  experience  in  ourfelves  the  'Tis  pro- 
 Signs  and  Properties  which  belong  to  this  Power,  ^^^  '^^'^ 
 it  cannot  be  queftioned  but  we  have  the  Power  it-  t^^eoTthis 
 felf :    Now  thefe  are  a  Self-confcioufnefs  that  we  Power,  bc- 
 are  the  true  Caufe  of  our  Ad:ions  j  an  Ability  to  caufc  we 
 ad  and  pleafe  ourfelves  in  contraditfling  our  natu- '^'^'^°75"", 
 ral    Appetites,   our  Senfes  and  Reafon.      If  it  be  ^^^^  ^^^[^ 
 evident  from  Experience  that  vy.e  can  do  thefe  things,  pertles  of 
 
 Y   5  it  it  in  our- 
 
 -felyes. 
 NOTES, 
 
 ■But  befide  the  abfurdity  of  being  influenc'd  by  a  Motive 
 which  wc  know  nothing  of;  bc(ide  the  ImpofTibility  of  recon- 
 ciHng  thefe  imperceptible  Movers  with  any  kind  of  Liberty, 
 (for  which  fee  Note  45.)  wc  reply,  fecondly,  that  our  Author 
 does  not  conclude  againft  the  Exiltence  of  a  thing  becaufe  the 
 Vulgar  do  not  perceive  and  take  notice  of  it,  but  on  the  con- 
 trary, argues,  that  there  muft  be  fuch  a  thing  as  Liberty  of 
 Indifference,  becaufe  they  do  continually  perceive  and  acknow- 
 ledge it ;  becaufe  they  clearly  perceive  and  experience  it  in 
 themfelves,  or  at  leaft  imagine  that  they  do  fo  ;  nay,  becauCe 
 they  have  as  great  Evidence  of  fuch  a  felf  determining  Power, 
 as  tliey  have  of  any  thing,  even  of  their  own  Exiftence;  and 
 confequently  they  muft  either  be  deceiv'd  in  every  thuig,  or 
 not  deceiv'd  in  this  *  The  prefent  Argument  is  therefore 
 built  on  matter  of  Fa£t,  and  will  be  conclufive  here,  tho'  our 
 Ignorance  be  ever  fo  great  in  other  Cafes.  Our  affurance  of 
 a  Truth  which  we  do  clearly  perceive,  is  not  the  lefs  for  there 
 being  a  great  many  other  Truths  v/hich  we  do  not  perceive : 
 and  tho'  our  not  perceiving  a  thing  were  no  Argument  that  it 
 docs  not  exift,  yet  our  aflual  perception  of  it  is  a  Demonftra- 
 tion  that  it  does.  It  is  not,  therefore,  becaufe  ive  do  ?iot  con^ 
 Jider  the  Caufes  that  commimkate  Motion  to  the  Soul,  or  are  mt 
 able  to  delineate  the  precife  manner  of  that  Communication,  that 
 •voe  affert  the  Soul  to  be  felfmotive  (as  the  Author  of  the  late 
 Dijfertation  on  Liberty  and  Necejfity  argues,  p.  1 5-)  But  we  af- 
 fert that  it  is  felfmotive,  becaufe  wcfeelit  to  be  fo,  and  have 
 as  great  Evidence  of  it  as  we  could  expeft  or  conceive  ourfelves 
 to  have,  were  it  really  fo.  And  that  Author  unreafonably  begs 
 the  Queftion,  in  fuppofing  that  there  are  fuch  Caufes  and  Com- 
 municators in  a  Cafe  where  he  has,  where  he  can  have,  na 
 Evidence  at  all  of  them.  But  this  Dijfertation  is  fully  CQnfut;€4 
 by  Mr,  Jackfon,  to  whofe  Anfwcr  I  refer  the  Header, 
 
 *  See  Not?  58  , 
 
326  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V 
 
 it  will  be  but  too  certain  that  we  have  fuch  a  Powe^ 
 as  is  able  to  pleafe  itfelf  barely  by  Elcdion. 
 Jnthefiift  V.  Inthefiril:  p'ace  then,  we  have  declared  that 
 place,  we  g  Being  endow'd  with  this  Principle  is  the  only  true 
 our^A6ti-  ^ffi^^i^i'''^  Caul'e  of  its  Adions,  and  that  whatever  it 
 nr.s  to  our  <iofS  can  be  imputed  to  it  only.  Now  all  Men  im- 
 felves,  pute  the  Ad-ions  of  their  own  Will  to  thenifelves 
 whereby  gnJ  efteem  them  truly  snd  properly  theirs  whe- 
 weown     ther  they  be  good  or  bad;   which  is  a  certain  Sign 
 
 ourlelves        ii-'j^  -in  ij 
 
 to  be  the    ^"^^  ^'"'^7  do  not  perceive  themlelves  to  oe  deter- 
 tnie  Cau-    min'd  from  tlfcwhere  to  the  Choice  or  Exertion  of 
 fes  of        them,    oiherwiie  they  v;oald  not  look  upon  ihem- 
 ^^^^'  .      felves  as  the  Caufe,    but  the  Determiner.     It  can- 
 i?  that  we  "°^  ^^  othcrv.'jfc  than  from  a  confciou'nefs  and  firm 
 diftingiiifh  perfualion  of  this  Truth,  that  wrong  Elections  give 
 Misfor-      us  more  trouble  than  fuch  things  as  proceed  from 
 nines         Ignorance  and  inevitable  Error.      *Tis  on  this  ac- 
 Crin:es.      count  only    that  a   light  Evil  occafion'd   by   our 
 own  Choice  grieves  and  afflids  us  more  than  a  very 
 great  one   from   the  Adion    of  another.      If  we 
 expofe  ourfelves  to  Poverty,  Di'grace,  or  an  uniimc- 
 ly  End,  by  an  Ad:  of  Choice,  our  Confcience  re- 
 monftrates  againfl  it.  Remembrance  ftings  us,    and 
 ^ve  cannot   forgive  ourfelves,    tho'  we  were  fecure 
 both  from   human  Punifliment  and  the  Wrarh  of 
 God.     But  when  the  fame  Evils  befal  us  by  exrer- 
 v\\  Force  or  the    Neceffity  of  Nature,   we  bewail 
 our   Condi.! 'c^n   indeed,    and  complain  of  Fortune, 
 but  have  none  of  that  wounding  Anxioufnefs,  and 
 vindidive  Reproach  of  Confcience,  which  fcourges 
 thofe  that  become    miferable    by  their   own  fault. 
 As  therefore  lie  that  enjoys  this  Principle  mufl:  ne- 
 ceffarily  blame  himfelf  if  lie  bring  any  Inconveni- 
 ence upon  himfelf  by  his  own  Choice;  fo  he  that 
 does  blame  himfelf,   demonftrates  that  he  has  this 
 Principle,     For  as  it  is  imroiTible  but  that  he  fhould 
 iccufe  himfelf,  who  believes   that  he  is  the  true 
 
 caufe 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  327 
 
 caufe  of  his  own  Mlfery,  fo  on  the  other  hand,  'tis 
 certain  that  he  who  does  accufe  himfelf,  thinks  that 
 he  himfelf  is  the  true  caufe  of  his  Mifery  :  other- 
 wife  he  would  grieve,  complain,  and  be  angry  with 
 the  Perfon  that  compeird  him  to  commit  fuch 
 things  as  he  finds  make  him  uneafy,  but  would  ne- 
 ver condemn  himfelf  as  the  Caufe  and  Author  of 
 them,  uniefs  he  were  confcious  that  he  could  have 
 hinder'd  them.  If  the  grief  arifing  from  a  Crime 
 be  diftind  from  that  which  is  occafion'd  by  a  Mif- 
 fortune,  'ris  plain  that  this  can  be  on  no  other  ac- 
 count,  than  becaufe  the  Crime  proceeds  from  a  free 
 Agent,  /.  e.  one  who  determines  himfelf  to  Adion, 
 but  the  Misfortune  from  a  neceffary  one. 
 
 VI.  'Tis  plain  then  from  our  Confcicme  of  Good  This  Is  a 
 and  Evil  Adions,  that  we  have  this  aflive  Principle  moftcer- 
 in  fome  refpeft  within  us.     For  we  not  only  re-  ^^'"  ^'^^ 
 Joyce  in  fuch   things  as  are  done  well,  and  grieve    "(,0^. 
 at  the  contrary  ;  but  alfo  impute  them  to  ourfelves,  fcious  of 
 and  either  blame  or  applaud  ourfelves  as  the  Authors  our  liber- 
 and  true  Caufes  of  them :  which  is  the  firfl  and  fur*  ^/' 
 efl:  Sign  that  our  Minds  are  fenfible  of  their  Liberty, 
 and  that  they  could  have  pleas'dthemfelves  in  doing 
 Dtherwife  than  they  have  done.     C54.) 
 
 VII.  The 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (54.)  'Tis  pleafant  to  obferve  how  the  Autlnor  of  the  Phila- 
 fophical  Enquiry  endeavours  to  anfwcr  this  Argument,  by  con- 
 founding the  two  Ideas  of  Sorrow  and  Self-a<pcufation  ;  of  a 
 Misfortune  and  a  Crime,  as  Hobbs  had  done  before  him. 
 '*  Confcience  (fays  he)  being  a  Man's  own  Opinion  of  his 
 "  Actions,  with  relation  to  fome  rule,  he  may  at  the  time 
 '-^  of  doing  an  Action  contrary  to  that  rule,  know  that  he 
 "  breaks  that  Rule,  and  confequently  a6l  with  reliiflancc,  tho' 
 ■*'  not  fufficient  to  hinder  the  Adlion.  Eut  after  the  Adion  is 
 "  over,  he  may  not  only  judge  his  Adlion  to  be  contrary  ta 
 ''  that  rule,  but  by  the  abfcnce  of  the  pleafurq  of  the  Sin,  and 
 '^'  by  finding  iunsfelf  obnoxious  t<i>  Shame,  or  by  believing 
 
 ^'  himfelf 
 
328  Of  Moral  "EvW.  Chap.  Y. 
 
 The  fe-  VII.  The  fecond  Sign  or  Property  of  this  Power 
 
 cond  tok-   jj    ^j^jj.  jj  J5  ^j^j^  ^q  oppofe   the  natural  Appetites 
 
 that  it  can 
 
 go  againft  NOTES. 
 
 the  Appe- 
 tites,   ^f, 
 
 *'  himfelf  liable  to  Punifhment,  he  may  really  accufe  himfelfi 
 *«  that  is,  he  may  condemn  himfelf  for  having  done  it,  be 
 "  forry  he  has  done  it,  and  wifh  it  undone,  becaufe  of  the 
 ♦'  confequences  that  attend  it*".  Where,  not  to  infift  upon 
 the  perpetual  abufe  of  the  Words,  do,  aB,  is'c.  which  upon 
 this  Hypothefis  muft  have  a  Signification  direftly  oppofite  to 
 that  which  they  now  commonly  bear  ;  what  can  we  mean  by 
 a  Man's  accufing  or  condemning  himfelf,  when  he  is  fenfible 
 that  he  has  done  nothing  which  he  could  have  altered  or  avoid- 
 ed; or  rather  done  nothing  at  all,  but  only  /ujer''d  all  the 
 while  from  fome  other?  He  may  indeed  perceive  and  judg^ 
 himfelf  to  be  miferable,  and  be  forry  that  he  is  fo,  and  wifh 
 himfelf  otherwife  ;  but  what  is  all  this  to  a  Criminal  Shame, 
 Remorfe,  and  Self-conviftion  ?  Is  this  all  that  we  underftand 
 bv  a  Guilty  Confcience  ?  Can  he  blame,  reproach,  or  be  angry 
 with  himfelf  for  being  only  what  another  made  him,  and  what 
 he  knows  he  could  not  poffibly  help  ? 
 
 As  this  is  matter  of  Facl  and  Experience,  we  appeal  to  the 
 common  Sen(e  of  Mankind,  whether  the  Ideas  of  Gailt,  Re- 
 morfe, ^f.  be  not  entirely  different,  and  evidently  diftinguifh- 
 able  from  thefe.  The  iame  holds  with  regard  to  our  blame  or 
 accufation  of  another,  as  has  been  fhcwn  at  large  by  Bifhop 
 Bramhall,  to  whofe  Cajiigatlovs  of  -7.  Hobbs  I  muft  refer  this 
 Author.  "  I  ask'd  (fays  the  Biiliop  f  )  why  do  we  blame  free 
 «'  Agents?  fmce  no  ]\Ian  blameth  Fire  for  burning  Cities, 
 "  nor  accufeth  Poifon  for  deftroying  Men,  Firft,  he  rcturn- 
 "  cth  an  Anfwer,  VVe  blame  them  kecaufe  they  do  ?iot  ^leafe  us. 
 "'  Why  ?  May  a  Man  blame  every  thing  that  doth  not  pleafe 
 "  his  Humour  ?  Then  I  do  not  wonder  that  'T,  Hobbs  is  io 
 "  apt  to  blame  others  without  Caufe.  So  the  Scholar  may 
 «'  blame  his  Mafter  for  correfling  him  defervedly  fo?  his  Good. 
 »'  So  he  who  hath  a  villous  Stomach  may  blame  healthful 
 «*  Food.  So  a  Lethargical  Perfon  may  blame  his  beft  Friend 
 «'  for  endeavouring  to  fave  his  Life.  And  now,  having  fhot 
 "  his  bolt,  he  begins  to  examine  the  Cafe,  Whethei-  blaming 
 *'  be  any  thing  more  than  faying  the  thing  blamed  is  ill  or  imper- 
 
 *'fea, 
 
 *  Philofophical  Enquiry  cencernitjg  human  Liberty,'^,  105,106. 
 f  Pag.  762. 
 
Eedl.  I.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  329 
 
 Senfes  and  Reafon,  and  can  pleafe  itfelf  in  the  Op- 
 pofition.  If  we  experience  this  AbiUty  in  our- 
 felves,  we  may  be  certain  that  we  partake  of  fuch  a 
 Power. 
 
 VIII.  With  refped  to  the  natural  Appetites,  we  'Tisfliewn 
 have  faid  before  '"'j  that  this  Principle,  when  it  hap-  J.jn*^dQ  j^jg 
 pens    to  be  joined   with   natural  Appetites  in  the  5^  j-egard 
 fame  Perfon,    [often   runs   counter    to   them,    and  to  our  Ap- 
 pleafes  itfelf  in  reftraining  them;   if  we  find  that  petitcs. 
 we  can  do  this,    'tis  a  Sign  that  we  have  it.     But 
 who  has  nof  experienc'd  this  in  himfelf?  who  has 
 
 not 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *' feSl,  Yes,  moral  blame  is  much  more,  'tis  an  Imputatiot^ 
 «  of  a  Fault.  If  a  Man  be  born  blind,  or  with  one  Eye,  we 
 *'  do  not  blame  him  for  it :  but  if  a  Man  has  lofl:  his  Sight  by 
 "  his  Intemperance,  we  blame  him  juftly.  He  enquireth, 
 "  May  ive  not  fay  a  Iztne  Horfe  is  lame?  Yes,  but  you  cannot 
 "  blame  the  Horfe  for  it,  if  he  was  lamed  by  another,  with- 
 ^'  out  his  own  Fault.  May  not  a  Man  fay  one  is  a  Fool  or  a 
 "  Knave  (faith  he)  if  he  he  fo,  tho"  he  could  not  help  it  ?  If  he 
 *'  made  himfelf  a  Sot,  we  may  blame  him  ;  tho',  if  he  be  a 
 "  ftarlc  Sot,  we  lofe  our  Labour.  But  if  he  were  born  a  natu- 
 *•  ral  Idiot,  it  were  both  injurious  and  ridiculous  to  blame 
 **  him  for  it.  Where  did  he  learn  that  a  Man  may  he  a  Knai<e 
 <*  and  cannot  help  it  ?  or,  that  Knavery  is  impofed  inevitably 
 **  upon  a  Man  without  his  own  fault  ?  If  a  Man  put  fire  to  his 
 "  Neighbour's  Houfe,  it  is  the  fault  of  the  Man,  not  of  the 
 "  Fire.  He  hath  confefs'd  formerly,  that  a  Man  ought  not 
 "  to  he  punifF d  hut  for  Crimes,  the  reafon  is  the  very  fame, 
 f*  that  he  fhould  not  be  blamed  for  doing  that  which  he  could 
 "  not  pollibly  leave  undone  ;  no  more  than  a  Servant  whom 
 •'  his  Mafter  hadchain'd  to  a  Pillar,  ought  to  be  blamed  for 
 **  not  waiting  at  his  Elbov/,  No  Chain  is  ftronger  than  the 
 "  Chain  of  Fatal  Defiiny  is  fuppofcd  to  be". 
 
 See  the  fame  Author's  Definitions  of  Liberty,  Neceffity,  tsTr. 
 with  his  Defence  of  them,  p.  756,  ^c.  and  his  reply  to  ail 
 T.  Hobbs\  Evafions  (fmce  tranicrib'd  by  the  Author  of  the 
 Philofophical  Encfttiry,  p.  91,  ^f.)  in  his  Fifidication,  p,  679, 
 tfc.  ■'      -      ■ 
 
 *  Siibfed.  3.  par.  11,  12. 
 
33C^  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 notTometimes  voluntarily  fufFer'd  fuch  things  as  are 
 hard,  incommodious,  and  painful  to  the  natural  Ap- 
 petites, and  taken  delight  in  fuch  Sufferance,  as  a 
 Good  fuperior  to  the  Gratification  of  the  Appe- 
 tites ?  (5 5.)  Nay  the  Pain  itfclf  arifing  from  the 
 Violence  offer'd  to  thefe  natural  Appetites,  if  we  do 
 but  choofe  to  bear  it,  becomes  in  a  manner  agreeable, 
 which  would  otherwife  be  very  irkfome.  From 
 whence  it  is  rnofl  apparent  that  this  Pleafure  depends 
 upon  the  Choices  for  while  that  continues  it  con- 
 tinues too ;  when  that  is  chang'd,  'tis  gone.  Now 
 fuch  Eled:ions  as  thefe  are  made  every  Day,  and 
 none  can  be  fo  much  a  Stranger  to  himfelf,  as  not  to 
 be  confcious  of  them.  (56^.) 
 Thatwe  ^^'  ^^  '^  ^°  ^^  obferv'd  farther,  that  we  do  nor 
 can  do  it  Only  embrace  with  pleafure  fuch  things  as  the  Ap- 
 petites 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 alfo  in  our 
 Senfes, 
 and  in  a 
 manner 
 change  the 
 
 nature  of         (5?-)  To  this  Leibnitz  anfwers,  "  That  it  is  only  oppofing 
 
 things  by     *'  or  ballancing  one  Appetite  with  another.      We  fonietimes 
 
 ^an  obfti        *'  bear  Inconveniencies,  and  we  do  it  with  pleafure,  but  this 
 
 jaatc  EIcc-  *'  is  only  by  rcalon  of  fome  hope,  or  feme  iatisfacflion  which 
 
 tion.  "  is  join'd  to  the  Evil,  and  which  furpafiey  it".     We  reply, 
 
 if  by  hope  be  meant   an  expedlation  of  fonic  future   Good, 
 
 'tis  plain  that  we  can  oppofe  and  refifi:  any  natuial  Appetite 
 
 without  any  fuch  Expectation,  as   may  be  expericnc'd  when 
 
 we   pleafe,    in  Hunger,  Thiri},  i5'c.     The  profpcdt  of  the 
 
 bare  pleafure  of  willing  to  do  {o  cannot  be  the  Good  hoped 
 
 for,  fince  th<<t  is  a  fure  attendant  on  every  fuch  Volition;   all 
 
 the  fatisfidion  then  which  appears  to  be  join'd  with  the  Evil, 
 
 and  to  counterballance  it  in  any  fuch  Cafes,    can  only  be  the 
 
 pleafure  arifing  from  the  aftual  Exertion   of  the  feli-moving 
 
 Power,  which  is  the  thing  our  Author  contends  for.     See  the 
 
 latter  part  of  Note  45. 
 
 (156.)  'Tis  a  common  and  juft  Obfervation,    that   Men  jo 
 well  as  Children   bear  any  Labour  or  Fatigue  which  they  u.i 
 dertake  voluntarily,  with  half  the  Uneafinefs  and  Grief  whicl 
 £he  very  fame  thing  would  give  them,  if  they  were  forc'd  10 
 undergo  it ;  which  cannot,  I  think,  be  accounted  for,  but  un- 
 on  our  Author's  Principle. 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  331 
 
 petites  refufe,  and  rejed  fuch  things  as  they  defire, 
 but  aher,  as  it  were.  Nature  itfelF  by  an  obllinate 
 Eledion,    and  make   thefe  Appetites   purfue   what 
 they  naturally  avoid,  and  fiy  what  by  Nature  they 
 dehre.     And  this  takes  place  not  only  in  Appetites, 
 but  alfo  in  the  Obicds  of  the  Senfe^.     Some  things 
 are  naturally  unpleafant  to  them,   fome  bitter,   nau- 
 feous,   deform'di   yet  thefe  are  made  tolerable  by 
 the  force  of  Eleftion,  and  by  a  change  of  the  na-? 
 tural  Propenfity,  at  length  become  Delights*.  On 
 the  contrary,  what  was  fweet,  beautiful,  ^r.  being 
 reje(5i:ed  by  the  Will,    becomes  at  length  difagree- 
 able.     We  could  not  poffibly   do  this,    if  we  had 
 not  a  Power  of  „plea(ing  ourfelves  by  other  Means 
 than  the  agreement   of  Objeds   to   the  Appetites 
 and  Senfes.     For  whence  comes  it  that  fuch  things 
 as  are  fweet,  comely,  eiccellent,  commodious ;   nay, 
 all  that  are  grateful  to  the  Appetites  and  Senfes  fliould 
 become  irkfome  and  cffcniive  ?    On  the  contrary, 
 whence   is  it  that   Griefs,    Pains,    Torments,    nay 
 Death   itfelf  fhould  be  agreeable  when  voluntarily 
 undergone,  unlefs  from  this   Principle  which  pleafes 
 itfelf  m  its  Eledicn  ?  If  it  be  granted  that  we  have 
 fuch  1  Principle,   thefe  things  may  eafily   be  ac- 
 counted for  ,•  fince  natural  Good  may,  by  the  Pow- 
 er of  it,  be  chang'd  into  Evil,  and  Evil  into  Good: 
 for  it  has  a  Good  in  itfelf  fuperior  to  thefe,   by 
 meaas  of  which  it  can  overcome  and  alter  the  Na- 
 ture of  them  :  but  that  this  cannot  admit  of  any 
 other  explanation  will  be  (hewn  below  !• 
 
 X.  Thefe   things   are  generally  fuppofed  to  be  "^^^^  '''^'^^ 
 done  by   the    Power  and  Prefcription  of  Rea/on;  ^^^J'^l 
 and  'tis  thought,  that  the  Will  under  its  guidance  only  our 
 embraces  things  difagreeable  to  the  natural  Appe-  Appetites 
 
 ;        tites  aJriSenieSi 
 but  alfo 
 
 *  See  Mr.  Locke';  Chapter  of  Power,  §.  69.     TV  a/I  this  fonby  tha 
 fnay  be  effe^ed  by  the  file  Power  of  Ek^ion^  av4  nxithout  ^he  t^^^^^  Qf 
 ^eafom  which  he  there  a/pgns  for  it.  Eleftiou. 
 
 ■J-  See  the  fillo'imvg  ^e8ion^  ' 
 
332  Of  Mcral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 tites  and  Senfes :  I  confefs  this  fometimes  is,  and 
 always  ought  to  be  done  according  to  reafon  ;  for 
 we  have  hinted  above,  that  feme  regard  fhould  be 
 had  to  thefe  in  Eledions ;  but  very  often  the  Cafe 
 is  far  otherwife.  We  have  fliewn  before,  that  a 
 Power  which  is  capable  of  pleafing  itfelf  in  Elcclion, 
 cannot  be  determin'd  by  reafon  j  for  the  Underftand- 
 ing  depends  upon  it,  rather  than  it  upon  the  Un= 
 derftanding.  'Tis  therefore  the  third  Mark -and 
 Property  of  this  Power,  that  it  can  run  counter, 
 not  only  to  appetites  and  Senfes,  but  alfo  to  Reafort, 
 If  we  can  do  this,  we  muft  own  to  our  Sorrow, 
 that  we  partake  of  it.  But  that  we  can,  by  the 
 force  of  Election,  conquer  not  only  the  Appetites 
 and  Senfes,  but  the  Underftanding  too,  (S.)  daily 
 Experience  teaches,  and  we  have  reafon  to  lament 
 that  it  can  be  prov'd  by  fo  many  inftances  that 
 we  pleafe  ourfelves  in  Eledions  contrary  to  the  na- 
 tural 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (S.)  'Tis  objeftcd  that  the  Will  doth  not  indeed  always 
 follow  the  Judgment  of  the  underftanding,  becaufe  there  arc 
 other  Motives  that  come  from  infenfible  Perceptions  and  fe- 
 cret  Inclinations  which  determine  it :  but  that  it  always  fol- 
 lows the  mod  advantageous  reprefentation  of  Good  and  Evil, 
 which  refults  from  Reafons,  Pafiions  and  Inclinations  whether 
 diftinct  or  confufed  :  and  yet  it  is  alledged  that  this  is  not 
 contrary  fo  Liberty  or  Contingency.  For  there  are  two  kinds 
 of  Neceffity,  one  founded  on  a  Contradiflion,  /.  e.  the  Pro- 
 pofition  affirming  a  thing  to  be  includes  fuch  a  NaceiTity  that 
 it  fhould  be,  as  to  make  it  a  Contradidlion  to  fay  it  might  not 
 be,  the  Caufes  th:.t  produce  it  being  neceflary.  The  other 
 kind  is  when  there  arp  fufficicnt  Caufes  to  produce  the  Eftecl, 
 and  fuch  as  will  infallibly  produce  it,  but  there  is  no  Contra- 
 diction in  fiying  they  may  not  produce  it.  Tho'  therefore  he 
 that  underftands  pcrfcdly  all  the  Caufes  and  Motives  that 
 concur  to  an  Event,  mull  know  the  Reafons  how  it  comes  to 
 p.ifs  i  and  that  thofe  Reafons  were  fo  fufEcieut  that  they  pre- 
 
 vail'd 
 
Sedl.  I.  Sub.  5'     Of  Moral  Evil,  ^33 
 
 tural  propensity  of  our  Senfes  and  Appetites,  and  at 
 the  fame  time  s^ainfl:  th^  didate  of  Reafon. 
 
 xr.  We 
 
 2^  O  T  E  S. 
 
 vail'd  certainly  and  inflillibly ;  and  the  Man  that  had  luch  a  re- 
 
 prcfentation  of  the  prevailing  Good  or  Evil  ofwh'aC  he  was  to 
 
 choofe,  was  carried  certainly  and  infallibly  to  the  Refolution 
 
 he  took  ;  yet  this  is  not  necelTarily,  becaufe  it  doth  not  imply  a 
 
 Contradiction  that  he  fliould  have  determin'd  himfelfofherwife. 
 
 Licei  enim  nunqnam  qutcquam  e-vcniat  quin  ejus  ratio  reddi  pof- 
 
 jtt,  neque  ulla  unc^uam  detur  indifferentia  Aquilihrij,  cum  potius 
 
 Jemper  fint  cutt&datn  pr&pnrntiones  in  caufa,  agente  concurrentibufq; 
 
 qnas  aliqui  pr ^determittatioms  "vocant :    dicendum  tamen  ejl  has 
 
 determinationes  effe  tantum  incllnantes,  non  necejjlt antes  ;  Ita  ut 
 
 femper  aliqtta  indiff'erentiafinic  continge7itia  Jit fal'va  ;  nee  tantus 
 
 unquam   iti  nobis  p.ppetitus  ejl  ut  ex  eo  aSlus  necejfario  feojuatur. 
 
 Nam  quamdiu  home  rfientis  compos  eft,  etiamji  <vehementijijime  ab 
 
 ira,  Jiti,  vel Jimili  caufi  Jiimulatur,  femper  tamen  aliqua  ratio 
 
 Jijiendi  impetum  reperiri  potefl  ilf  aliquando  'vel  fc!a  fujjidt  Cogi- 
 
 tatio  exercends.  libertatis  Cs'  in  affeSiti!  Dominij. 
 
 In  anfwer  to  this,  which  fcems  the  ftrength  of  what  is  ob- 
 jedled  againft  the  Autlwr's  Notion  of  Liberty,  I  defire  thefe 
 ftw  things  nviy  be  conlider'd  : 
 
 Firft,  thit  it  is  not  cafy  to  comprehend  this  neceffity  of  Con- 
 tradidtion,  which  is  inconfiftent  with  Liberty,  or  to  diltinguifh 
 it  from  that  Necellity  which  is  only  foanded  on  Conveniency, 
 and  yet  never  fails  to  fucceed,  becaufe  there  is  always  a  fuffi- 
 cicnt  Reafon  or  Caufc  to  produce  the  effect.  I  wifh  there  had 
 been  an  Example  given  of  the  one  and  t'other  that  we  might 
 have  been  able  to  pafs  a  better  Judgment  of  them.  For  to  me 
 it  feems  that  at  this  rate  all  the  A<ftions  cf  Bcafts  are  as  free  as 
 thofe  of  Men.  If  a  Beaft  be  never  fo  hungry,  and  turn'd  out 
 into  never  fo  tempting  a  Paftiirej  yet  there  is  no  Contraditflion 
 in  faying  that  he  may  abftain  from  eating.  Nor  dc  I  fee  how 
 his  Appetites  being  determin'd  any  more  oblige  him  to  eat, 
 than  a  Man's,  when  all  Circumftances,  Motives,  Predifppliti- 
 ons  and  Qualifications  incline  him  to  it. 
 
 adly.  At  this  rate  the  effefts  of  all  natural  Caufes  would  be 
 free.  For  it  is  no  contradiction  to  fay  the  Sun  will  not  rife 
 to  morrow,  but  his  rifmg  is  no  more  free  on  that  account. 
 And  in  truth  I  do  not  find  that  any  Propofitions  but  thofe  that 
 concern  metaphyfical  and  abftra(5t  Verities,  are  in  this  Senfe 
 receffary.  All  the  eftedts  of  natural  Caufes  have  only  zpofttiTje 
 or  hypothetical  n?c?0ity,    thst  depends  on  th?  Will  of  God, 
 
 Yet 
 
334  Of  Moral  Ew\h        Chap.  V. 
 
 This  ap-         Xl.  We  have  feen  an  Atheift  fupported  by  the 
 fXncT  ^^^i"^<^y  of  a  perverfc  Mind,  enduring  Torments, 
 
 Con-* 
 
 K  O  T  E  S. 
 
 Yet  if  we  confider  only  the  Sun,  and  the  part  he  has  in  nifing 
 himfelf,  he  cannot  be  faid  in  any  tolerable  fcnfc  to  be  free  in 
 tifing.  And  (o  if  we  confider  all  things  given  v/hich  are  ne- 
 ceffary  to  an  Aftion,  either  a  Man  can  in  thele  Circumftances 
 forbear  his  Adtion,  or  he  cannot ;  if  he  can  he  is  indifferent, 
 ior pofitis  omnibus  ad agf. ndiim  requrjitis  potefl  agere  vel  non  agere, 
 which  is  the  very  definition  ot  an  indifferent,  free  Agent:  If 
 he  can't  fufpend  the  acl,  then  is  the  neceffity  as  great  on  him 
 ill  thefe  Circumftances  a;  on  the  Sun  to  rife. 
 
 .  If  it  be  faid'  the  cafe  is  diiferent,  becaufc  a  Man  has  Undet- 
 flanding  which  is  always  ready  to  fuggeft  to  him  new  Confide- 
 r,ations  to  flop  his  Adlions.  I  anfwer,  whence  come  thefe  new 
 Gonfiderations  that  alter  the  Man's  Circumfbnces  ?  If  from 
 the  Will,  then  it  determines  itfelf  after  all,  and  h  not  deter- 
 min'd  by  any  difpolition,  motive  or  reafon  from  without :  But 
 if  thofe  Gonfiderations  that  change  th^  Will  are  independent 
 of  it,  and  arife  from  any  external  difpofition,  reafon,  or  incli- 
 nation, he  is  no  more  free  that  is  detennin'd  to  his  Choice  by 
 thefe,  than  the  Sun  is  free  to  move  when  natural  Caufes  deter- 
 mine him  to  that  Motion. 
 
 Every  one  may  not  fee  all  the  Chains  and  Movements  that 
 lead  him  to  his  Choice,  but  if  the  will  be  prjffive  in  its  Deter- 
 mination, they  areas  certain  and  infallibJ"  as  if  he  were  drawn 
 with  Chains  of  Adamant.  And  whereas  it  is  faid  that  the  mere 
 thought  of  exercifmg  our  Freedom  is  fometimcs  l"u  flic  lent  to 
 ftay  the  importunity  of  all  our  Pafficns  and  Inclinations:  I 
 anfwer,  if  the  Will  can  crofs  all  external  Caufes  v.hich  in-; 
 cline  it  to  a  determination  purely  on  this  account,  that  it  will 
 cxercifc  its  Liberty,  then  it  is  a  clear  c:s{q,  the  exercife  of  its 
 .T>iberty  is  a  greater  good  to  it  than  all  other  Conflderations, 
 which  is  the  very  thing  I  plead  for. 
 
 .  But  3dly,  I  ask  ho vv  comes  this  Confideration  of  exercifing' 
 its  Liberty  in  its  way  ?  The  Underftauding,  you  fay,  ofl^'ers  it. 
 But  is  if  Avithout  Caufe  that  it  offers  it,  or  cou'd  it  not  have 
 offer'd  it  ?  ]i  the  Cauie  be  in  the  Undcrflanding,  that  is  necef- 
 lary,  and  could  no  more  forbear  offering  it  than  the  Sun  could 
 forbear  riiing.  But  luppofe  this  Confideration  oll^er'd,  no  mat- 
 ter how,  can  the  Will  llill  rcjeift  it?  If  it  can,  wears  as  far, 
 from  a  determination  as  ever.  For  that  rejcrting  mull  be 
 citha-  from  die  Will  UreU',  or  fome  other  C.iufs,  concerning, 
 
 which 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  33^ 
 
 Confinement,    and  Death  itfelf,    rather  than  abjure 
 his  beloved  Impiety :  We   have  feen  a  great  many 
 
 Perfons 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 xvhich  the  fame  Queftions  recur ;  and  fo  on  till  we  come  at 
 ihs  firlt  Caufe,  God.  In  all  which  Cham  every  link  is  ne- 
 ceffarily  conne£led  with  the  next  beforS  it,  and  fo  according 
 to  the  Reprefentatidn  in  Poets,  the  f^tal  Chain  is  tied  to  the 
 Chair  oi  Jupiter.  He,  and  he  alone  is  accountable  for  all  the 
 Good  and  111  of  all  Sorts  in  the  World.  Nor  doth  it  in  the 
 leaft  help  Liberty  or  Contingence  that  there  is  no  contradifti- 
 on  in  the  Propofitions  that  relate  to^  the  being  or  not  being  of 
 Things;  for  as  long  as  there  is  a  Chain  of  natural  or  moral 
 Caufes  that  certainly  and  infallibly  produce  the  efFefl,  in  which 
 the  Will  is  abfolutely  paffive,  there  is  no  more  room  for  Li- 
 berty in  intelligent  Caufes  than  in  natural. 
 
 I  know  very  well  Men  do  many  things  willingly,  as  Beafts 
 eat  their  Food,  and  that  fome  call  this  Liberty  and  Contin- 
 gence ;  but  they  might  as  well  call  it  an  Elephant  or  a  Horfe, 
 For  if  this  were  the  Queftion,  whether  Men  did  things  volun- 
 tarily and  with  a  full  inclination,  no  body  cou'd  queftion  but 
 they  did:  but  it  is  plain  v/hen  we  ask  whether  a  Man  be  free 
 or  no,  our  meaning. is  whether  he  has  a  fall  power  to  do  or 
 nofdoany  thing  notwithftanding  all  previous  Conditions  and 
 Circumfances,  in  which  providence  has  placed  him.  Not 
 that  a  Man  is  always  abfoluicly  indifferent :  for  he  may  have 
 Reafons  and  Inclinations  that  may  byafs  him  greatly  one  way  i. 
 yet  notwithftanding  that  byafs  he  has  itiil  a  power  to  adlagainii 
 them  all,  and  plcafe  hirnfelf  in  fo  doing. 
 
 'Tis  plain  to  me  that  they  Vv'ho  arc  againft  this  true  Freedom. 
 muft  be  prepoffelVd  witl\  an  opinion  that  all  things  in  Nature 
 are  paffive  and  adted  on  by  others;  which  was  expreffly  Mr. 
 Hohbs\  Dodrine  :  and  tho'  they  endeavour  to  diftinguifh  them- 
 felves  from  his  Difciples,  'tis  in  vain  ;  their  fentiments  come 
 to  the  fame  thing  as  to  ncceffity,  and  the  fame  caufes,  reafons 
 and  arguments  are  produced  by  both  i  the  conclufion  alfo  is  the 
 fame,  only  the  one  calh  that  an  abfolute  neceffity,  which  the 
 other  calls  neceffity  of  convenience,  that  is  of  a  thing's  being, 
 becaufe  there  is  fufficient  reafon  to  produce  it.  For  the  very 
 reafon  by  which  he  proves  his  neceffity,  is  this  of  zfujictent 
 Caufe.  If  the  caufe,  fays  he,  be  fufficient,  and  all  Predifpoli- 
 tions.  Conditions  and  Qualiiications  requifite  be  prefent,  the 
 effect  will  certainly  follov.' ;  wfiich  is  true..  If  then  the  con- 
 fcnt  of  the  Will  be  cawfed  by  fomething  without  itfelf,  thofc 
 
 condiuons 
 
336  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V, 
 
 Pcrfons  voluntarily  throwing  away  their  Fortunes, 
 Life  and  Soul,  left  they  fliould  be  difappointed  in 
 
 a  foolilli 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 conditions  being  prefent,  it  will  neceflarily  follow.  If  it  be 
 not  fo  caus'd,  it  it  has  a  power  in  itfelf  to  aft  and  make  a 
 thing  good  or  bad,  agreeable  ordifagreeable  by  its  choice,  'tis 
 plain  that  nothing  external  can  determine  it.  This  proves 
 Liberty,  a  priori.  For  if  there  be  fuch  a  poucr  'tis  evident 
 that  pojitis  omnihus  extra  ft  udagfndum  requijitis,  poteji  agere, 
 aut  non  agere.  All  that  is  pretended  to  determine  it  is  the  an- 
 tecedent confiderations  of  Good  or  Evil ;  but  where  the  chief 
 good  expefted  arifes  from  the  deterniination  itre!f,  and  is  con- 
 fequent  to  it,  there  'tis  impoflible  it  (hou'd  be  determin'd  by 
 fiich  Confiderations. 
 
 And  this  feems  to  me  the  true  reafon,  why  fome  are  fo  angry 
 at  this  new  Notion,  as  they  call  it,  of  things  pleafmg  us  becaufe 
 tve  choofe  them,  fince  it  utterly  deftroys  their  Notion  of  a 
 paffive  Will  determin'd  only  by  antecedent  views  of  Good  and 
 Evil,  and  demonftrativcly  eltabliflies  Freedom,  therefore  they 
 treat  it  as  a  Chimera,  a  Fairy  and  Romance. 
 
 But  zdly,  'Tis  urg'd  that  this  is  a  power  to  choofe  without 
 any  Motive,  without  any  final  or  impulfive  Caufe,  which  is  a 
 great  impetfeflion.  Anfwer,  I  deny  that  this  is  to  choofe 
 without  any  motive  or  final  Caufe  'Tis  choofing  indeed  with- 
 out any  motive  or  caufe  which  is  foreign  to  the  Will;  fo  that 
 it  does  not  depend  in  its  Operations  on  any  external  Objeft?, 
 but  h.is  the  Caufe,  motive  and  end  of  its  adions  in  itfelf  j  and 
 fure  'tis  not  the  worfe  for  being  thus  independent ;  it  has  ?. 
 Caufe  and  End,  even  to  pleafe  itfelf,  and  furely  to  have  it  in 
 its  own  power  to  do  fo  is  far  from  an  Imperfeftion. 
 
 Suppofe  two  Men,  one  has  fufficient  to  ieed  and  cloath 
 himfelf  in  his  PofTefiion,  the  other  is  forced  to  go  abroad  and 
 beg  for  both,  and  let  any  one  judge  which  of  them  is  in  the 
 moll  perfeft  or  happy  Condition. 
 
 3dlv,  'Tis  faid  it  docs  not  appear  how  pure  indifFcrencc 
 tan  contribute  to  Happincfs ;  on  the  contrary  the  more  a  Fa- 
 culty is  indifferent  the  more  muft  the  Perfon  poflcfs'd  of  it  be 
 infenfible  of  the  Good  he  enjoys.  But  fure  thofe  that  r.'.ife 
 fuch  Objeftions  have  either  never  read  or  little  mindad  the 
 Book.  If  the  Author  had  taught  that  the  Faculty  continued 
 indifferent  after  the  Choice,  there  had  been  ground  for  fuch  an 
 Objettion  ;  but  on  the  contrary  he  holds  that  after  the  Elec- 
 tion is  made  the  Will  is  ns  much  attached  to  the  thing  cholen 
 
 whilll 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  ^.     Of  Moral  EviL  337. 
 
 a  foolill^  Choice.     We  have  beheld  not  a  few  difre- 
 garding  the  Intreaty  of  their  Friends,    the  Advice 
 
 of 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 whilft  the  Eleflion  continues,  as  the  natural  Appetites  are  tcJ 
 their  Objetts ;  and  it  enjoys  it  with  as  much,  nay  greater 
 pleafure,  and  to  fach  a  degree  that  fometime  it  prefers  the  En- 
 joyment of  it  to  Life.  Bat  the  Happinefs  lies  in  this,  that  it 
 is  not  obliged  to  choofc,  and  when  it  has  chofen,  if  it  can't 
 enjoy  the  Object  of  its  choice,  it  may  rejedl  it  again. 
 :  4thly,  'Tis  urg'd  that  fuch  a  Faculty  as  this  would  rendef 
 Science  ufclefs,  reduce  all  adlions  to  mere  Chance,  and  leave 
 us  no  Meafures  or  Rules  for  them. 
 
 I  can't  but  wonder  what  fliould  induce  any  to  bring  fuch 
 Arguments.  The  Cafe  is  this :  Man  is  placed  by  God  ;in  a 
 World  where  he  is  concerned  with,  and  has  relation  to  many 
 Objefts ;  he  has  many  Appetites  which  he  may  gratify  by  the 
 right  Enjoyment  of  thefe  ObjeiSts ;  he  may  meet  with  many 
 difagreeable  things  in  the  courfe  of  Affairs,  and  may  employ 
 himfelf  in  many  things  that  in  the  end  will  prove  impoinble 
 to  compafs,  that  may  hurt  his  fellow  Creatures,  or  incroach  on 
 things  forbid  him  by  his  Creator :  To  comprehend  thefe  he 
 has  an  undcrftanding  given  him,  as  well  as  a  power  to  choofe 
 or  refrain  from  any  of  them  ;  but  becaufe  his  UnderRanding 
 ic  not  infinite,  and  therefore  he  may  often  miftakc,  and  it  may 
 fo  happen  that  the  bars  and  limits  aflign'd  by  God  and  Nature 
 may  hinder  him  from  enjoying  what  his  natural  Appetites  re- 
 quire, and  his  Judgment  fees  wou'd  be  moil  agreeable  to  him, 
 therefore  God  has  given  him  a  power  of  Choice,  whereby  he 
 may  make  thofe  things  agreeable  that  would  be  otherwife, 
 were  he  only  to  gratify  his  natural  Appetites.  So  that  this 
 Power  is  fuperior  to  them  all,  and  in  a  great  meafure  com- 
 mands them  and  their  Adlions,  infomiich  that  he  finds  a  plea- 
 fure and  Satisfadion  often  in  curbing  and  reftraining  them. 
 Nay  this  Faculty  is  of  fuch. force  that  it  always  carries  its  Sa- 
 Jtisfaclion  with  ii ;  and  tho'  it  cannot  abfolately  change  tha 
 natur«  of  the  Appetites,  or  make  us  not  feel  the  natural  Evils 
 that  furround  us,  fuch  as  pain,  torment,  difappointmcnt ;  yet 
 by  its  exercite  it  raifes  us  fo  much  Satisfaftion  as  to  make  the<'c 
 tolerable,  if  not  pleafing  to  us- 
 
 Now  mull  not  every  one  fee  that  fuch  a  Faculty  as  this  ads 
 on  the  greateft  reaion  and  for  the  bell  end,  even  to  make  all 
 the  adions  of  a  Man's  Life,  as  far  as  poffible,  pleafmg  to  him  ? 
 And  doth  it  not  appf:ar  that  fuch  a  Will  nfcds  plain  and  cer- 
 
 Z  '  uia 
 
33^  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V^. 
 
 of  their  Relations,  the  Didares  of  their  own  Mind, 
 Dangers,  piftrefTes,  Death,  the  wrath  of  God,  and 
 the  pains  of  Hell  ,•  in  fhort,  defpifing  all  that  is 
 Good,  or  could  appear  to  be  fo,  when  fet  in  com- 
 petition with  fuch  things  as,  exclufive  of  the  Good- 
 nefs  which  they  receive  from  Eledion,  are  mere 
 \  Trifles  and  worth  nothing  at  all ;  fuch  as  have  no 
 manner  of  Good  or  pretence  of  Good  in  them. 
 There  have  been  Perfons  who  knowingly,  without 
 any  kind  of  hope,  any  kind  of  belief,  have  dcftroy'd 
 thcmfelves  and  their  Relations,  and  yet  were  in  their 
 right  Mind  and  confiftent  with  themfelves,  if  a  right 
 IVlind  may  be  judg'dof  by  fober  Words  and  a  le- 
 rious  tenor  of  Adion.  Did  thefe  Men  follow  Rea- 
 fon,  or  any  other  Good  befide  the  fruition  of  their 
 Choice  ?  We  have  fliewn  already  that  this  Power 
 may  produce  thefe  and  greater  Abfurdities;  for  fmce 
 it  is  luppos'd  to  be  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  can  pleafe 
 itfelf  in  its  A(5t,  where  ever  it  can  exert  that  Ad,  it 
 can  alfo  pleafe  itfelf,  even  in  oppofition  to  the  natu- 
 ral Appetitesj  the  Senfes  and  Reafon.     If  then  fuch 
 
 a  Prin- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 lj.\n  Aleafures  and  the  greateft  prudence  and  judgment  to  z&. 
 by:  othcrvvife  it  may  fall  into  impoffible,  ahrur'd  or  wicked' 
 Choices,  It  has  been  flievvn  in  the  Book  what  limits  arc  af- 
 iign'd  our  Wills  by  God  and  Nature,  and  how  ncceffary  it  is' 
 we  fhculd  keep  within  them.  In  fliort  the  Argument  is  as  if 
 one  fliould  alledge,  a  Prince  is  abfolute  Govcrnour  of  his  King- 
 dom, and  mull:  not  be  controlcd  by  his  Subjedls,  therefore  he 
 needs  no  Counfellors,  bccaiife  he  is  not  obliged  to  be  deter- 
 min'd  by  them.  But  hire  the  more  abfolute  he  is,  the  more 
 need  he  has  to  prefcribc  good  Rules  to  himfelf,  and  advife  with 
 the  bell  Counfellors  he  can  find,  becaufe  he  has  it  in  his  pow- 
 er to  rule  well,  and  none  is  to  blame  but  himfelf  if  he  do  nor. 
 Whereas  if  he  were  to  be  determined  by  his  Counfellors,  he 
 wou'd  be  under  no  fuch  concern,  fmce  they,  not  he,  wou'd 
 m  all  reafon  be  anfwerabic  for  hi?  Millakes. 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  5.      Of  Moral  Evil.  339 
 
 ^  Principle  be  granted  to  be  In  us,  it  wilt  not  feem 
 Grange   that  we   iliould    be  able    to  do  thing>  that 
 are  repugnant  to  thefe,'    if  this  be  not  allow'd,  ic 
 cannot  be  made  appear  how   fo  many  Abfurdities, 
 fo  many  things  difagree.-'ble  to  Reafon,  to  Senfe  ;  fo 
 many  things   contrary  to  the  di(::iate  of  the  Mind, 
 fhould  every  Day  be  committed  by  Mankind. 
 -   XII.  Nay,  which  may  Teem   more  ftrangc,    the  ^Jj^^^^^*^^ 
 Will  appears  to  have  fo  great  a  Power  over  the  Un-  ftan/jng 
 derftanding  that  the  latter  is  lb  far  fuhdu'd  by  its  admits  not 
 Choice,  as  to  take  Evil  rhings  for  Good,  and  forc'd  only  evil 
 to  admit  Falfities  for  Truths.      Neither  will  this  ^'^'^f''^\ 
 appear   impolhble  to  cne  who  recolkds   thnt  the  |°°fit:es^ 
 Senfes  are  as  much  narural  Faculties,   and  hiVe  by  for  Truths 
 Nature  as  quick  a  Reiifn  of  thdr  proper  Objeds,  wz.  being 
 and  can  as  well  diftinguifh  thofe  that  are  agreeable  ""^5'' ^'^^^■' 
 from  them  that  are  di'?greeable,  as  the  Underdand- J^^'^-jj*^ 
 ing.     If  therefore  we  fometimes  pleafe  ourfelves  in 
 choofing  what  is  repugnant  to  the  Senles,    'tis  alfo 
 poffible  for  us  to  take  pieaCure  in  embracing  what  is 
 difTonant  to  Reafon,    The  Senfes  are  forced  to  ad- 
 mit and   tolerate  fuch  things   as   are  difguftful  to 
 them,  which  rhings  they  take  for  agreeable  by  u'e> 
 having  as  complete  Enjoyment  of  them  as  of  thofe 
 that  are  adapted  to  tlicm  by   Nature  ■*.     The  lame 
 may  happen  fometimes  to  the  Under  (landing,  viz,. 
 to  be  compeird  by  the  Will  to  adm.it  Falfities  for 
 Truths,    to  believe  them  thro'  cuftom,  and  at   laft 
 make  ufe  of  them  fcrioufly  as  Truths.     Hence  comes 
 that  common  Saying,  that  wc  eagerly  belicvs  v^hat  ipe 
 eagerly  dejire ,    and  fome  take  a  pleafure  in  fubduing 
 not   only  Senfe,    but  Reafon  too.      I  confcfs,    he 
 that  does  this,  ads  foolinily  and  is  much  toDhme, 
 but  from  this  very  thing,    that  wc  aft   fooHihlvs, 
 
 Z  z  th'at 
 
 *  Nay  generalh  fnore  fo :  ^Tis  <s  common  Obfervation,  that 
 fuch  things  as  nuere  at  fir  ft  the  mo  ft  dijagreeahle  of  all  to  the  Pa- 
 late, become  hy  ufe  the  mofl  delightful :  v\%.  Wines,  Tobaa^t 
 Olives,  &c. 
 
340  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 that  we  are  to  blame,  'tis  evident  that  we  not  only 
 can,    but  adually  do  pleafe  ourfelves  in  Eledions 
 which  are  made  contrary  to  Reafon ;  and  that  the 
 Judgment  of  our  Undcrftanding  depends  upon   the 
 Will,  rather  than  that  the   Will  is  determin'd  by 
 it.    From  hence  it  is  evident  that  all  the  Sign?  and 
 Properties  of  a  Power  of  pleafing  itfelf  by  Elec- 
 tion agree  to  us,  and  therefore  we  certainly  partake 
 of  it. 
 *Tis  pro-       XIII.  The  fame  will  appear  thirdly,   from  con- 
 wehave    ^^c^ng  the  Reafons  which  move  us  to  the  choice 
 this  Power  of  ihele   Abfurdities  according  to  the  Opinion  of 
 from  a      thofe  Men  who  think  that  the  Will  is  paffive  in  E- 
 confidera-  le^lions.     For  if,    while  they  are  labouring  to  af- 
 thoVrea-  ^S"  Reafons  for  thefe  and  the  like  Determinations 
 fens  which itiey  produce  nothing  for  Reafons  but  the  very  E- 
 arefup-     ledions  themfelves,  or  their  Effeds,  it  will  be  ap- 
 poftd  to    parent  that  they  are  in  a  Mif^ake,  and  offer  EfFeds 
 ^h^^W'H^  for  Caufes;  which  will  appear  more  fully  from   an 
 Enumeration  of  thofe  Reafons  which  are  fuppofed 
 to  move  the  Will  in  fuch  Cafes. 
 Thofe  are      XIV.  The  Principal  of  thefe  Reafons  are  Errors 
 eniime-      ^jr  ^^^  Vnderjlandingt  ObjTmacy  of  the  Mind^  the  force 
 Tared.        ^y  pafjicns^    and  M^dnefs;    on  thefe  are  charg'd  all 
 the  unreafonable,    abfur'd,  and  impious  Adions  of 
 Men  ,  thefe  are  efleemed  the  Caufes  of  all  fuch  E- 
 lecfHons  as  cannot  be  allow'd  to  proceed  from   the 
 intrinlic  Coodnefs  of  the  Objeds  which  are  chofe  ; 
 but  this  is  all  groundlefs. 
 ^"^^'r^k       ^^'  ^°^  ^^  ^^^^  ^^^   place,'  as  to  Errors  of  the 
 Under-'  ^ '^^jderjiandingy  'tis  certain  that  we  fometimes  choofc 
 Handing:  hurtful  Objeds  by  miftake,   which  we  often   la- 
 thefe  are    ment,  but  never  impure  to  ourfelves,  except  we  be 
 Ihewn  to    confcious  that   the  Error   was  voluntary,    ;.  e.  in 
 uporde-    ^°"^^  refpeft  ow*d  its  Origin  to  Ele(5^ion.     Elcdion 
 prav'd  E-  then  is  prior  to  all  culpable  Error,  for  that  depends 
 UCdon  ra-  upon  it,     'Tis  not  therefore  always  by  miftake  that 
 ther  than  ^g  choofe  Abfurdities,    but  by  chooling  Abfurdu 
 tVC3Ul<?it.  -  jjgj 
 
Scd.  r  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  341 
 
 ties  we  miftake  the  Truth.  But  10  confefs  the 
 Truth,  we  are  hurried  on  in  an  abfurd  Elcftion, 
 tho'  we  fee  and  know  all  that  we  are  about  to  do  : 
 if  then  there  be  any  Error,  'tis  only  this  that  we 
 judge  it  better  to  enjoy  a  free  Eledion,  than  to  be 
 exempt  from  natural  Evils.  Hence  it  is  evident 
 that  there  arifes  fo  much  Pleafure  from  Ele<9:ion  as  is 
 able  to  imppfe  upon  the  Underftanding,  and  induce 
 it  to  prefer  that  to  all  kinds  of  natural  Good,  nay 
 to  Life  itfeif.  But  whether  this  be  done  errone- 
 ouflv  or  wifely,  'tis  the  ftrongeft  Argument  that  we 
 have  fuch  an  Eledive  Self-pleafing  Principle  as  this 
 within  us. 
 
 XVI.  Secondly,  as  for  Objiinacy,  by  which  they  Secondiv 
 fuppofethat  we  are  moved  to  choofe  abfurd  things;  obftinacy: 
 'tis  plain  that  this  is  nothing  elfe  but  the  perfeve-  which  is 
 ranee  of  a  bad  Election  :  neither  can  Obftinacy  and  ^ewn  to 
 Perverfenefs  be  explain'd  otherwife  than  by  Eleftions.  ^j^^-"^^  ^'"^ 
 If  it  be  granted  that  things  pleafe  us  becaufe  they  pcrfeve- 
 are  chofen,  we  fee  clearly  enough  what  Obftinacy  ring  in  a 
 is,  vi3j,   an  unnecefTary  adherence  to  an  Eledion,  f^epravU 
 and  a  Self-complacency  in  it  contrary  to  the  didate  ^^^'^^^'^' 
 of  Reafon,  and  with  the  lofs  of  natural  Good.  (57.) 
 But  if  the  Will  be  determin'd  from  without,  there 
 will  be  no  fuch  thing  as  Obftinacy.     By  an  obfti- 
 Z  3  nate 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (57.)  Leibnitz  (in  his  Remarks  frequently  cited  above)  ar- 
 gues *  "  That  Obftinacy  is  not  barely  the  continuance  of  a 
 "  bad  Eleflion,  but  a  difpofition  to  perfevcrc  in  it,  proceed- 
 "  ing  from  fome  Good  that  a  Man  forms  to  himfelf,  or  from 
 "  fome  Evil  which  one  fuppofes  to  attend  the  change.  The 
 **  firft  Eleftion,  fays  he,  was  made  perhaps  thro'  mere  Le'vitj^ 
 ♦'  but  the  refolution  of  adhering  to  it  comes  from  fome  ftron- 
 "  gcr  Reafonsor  ImprefTions".  But  if  this  be  all  that  is  meant 
 by  Obftinacy,  how  come  the  World  to  fix  fo  bad  a  Notion  to 
 fhat  Word  ?    If  it  be  a  difp^lition  always  proceeding  from  a 
 
 profpect 
 
 »  Page  ^8  2 J 
 
342  Of  Moral  Evil.  Qhap.  Y . 
 
 nate  Perfon  we  fliall  only  mean  one  that  has  continu- 
 ed a  long  time  in  a  pernicious  Error,  without  any 
 Motive  to  change  his  Judgment.  Now  he  that  does 
 this  is  miferable  indeed,  but  cannot  be  call'd  in  the 
 leaft  deg'ee  ohRinate,  according  to  the  common  No-? 
 tion  of  Mankind. 
 Thirdljs  XVIL  Thirdly  fince  neither  Errors  nor  Obfli- 
 The  vio-    j^g^y  gj-g  fuHicient  to  explain  the  Nature  of  thele 
 
 cviz.  Be-    'i^iz,.  the  D.fire  of  Fame   or  Glory  ;    Anger,    Ha- 
 fire  of        trcd,  CTf.  Thcfe  are  the  Caufes,  fay  thcy^  why  we 
 
 Fame  and  choofc 
 
 Glorv',  CJc 
 
 all  which  ,-  ^  <t    t-    n 
 
 are  proved  JN   O  7   E  S. 
 
 to  derive 
 
 their  in-       profpect  of  Good,  or  dread  of  Evil,  and  founded   on  fccond 
 ordinate       thoughts  and  ftronger  Reafons :    how  can  it  ever  be  deemed  a 
 force  from  Crime  ?  Again,  if  ihcjirji  Elcflioa  can  be  made  without  any 
 Election,     external  Motive,  (which  he  fccms  to  allow  by  affigning  Leni- 
 ty aS  the  fole  Caufe  of  it)  why  may  not  the  perfeverance  in  it 
 be  fo  too  ?  may  not  the  fame  Caufp  be  fuppos'd  to  produce  the 
 fubfequent  Elc£licns,    as  well  as  the  firfl  ?  In  fliort,  Leihnttx, 
 after  all  his  feeming  oppofition  to  our  Author  on  the  head  of 
 Liberty,  iTicfl:  evidently  grants  the  Queftion  both  here,  and 
 p.  480.  where  he  afnrms,  that  in  eircdt  we  are  able  to  chang^ 
 the  Natures  of  things,  and  make  thefe  transformations  above- 
 mentioned.      "  Eut  this  (fays  he)  is  not  as  ainong  the  Fairies^ 
 "  by  a  fimple  A£l  of  that  Magic  Power ;    but  becaufe  a  Man 
 "  darkens  or  fupprcffes  in  his   Mind,  the   reprcfentations  ot 
 *'  the  good  or  ill  Qiialities  naturally  join'd  to  certain  Objeflsj 
 ^'  and  becaufe  we  only  regard  tliofe  which  are  agreeable  to 
 *'  our  Tafte,    or  PrepoITeffions  3    or  even  becaufe  we  join  by 
 -'  force  of  thought,  certain  Qiialities,  which  are  only  found 
 *'  united  by  accident,  or  by  our  cuilomary  way  ofconfidering 
 "'  them".     New  what  is  it  to  darken  or  fupprefs  the  reprcfen- 
 tations of  good  or  ill  Qualities,  —  to  re^^ird  fome  only  and  neg- 
 kc\  others,  — and  to  join  Qurdities  to  Objeds  by  the  force  of 
 thought, — but  to  exert  this  very  Power  in  debate  ?    Which 
 ofien  choofcs  the  fruition,  or  even  the  confidcration  of  fomc 
 one  out  of-  many  equal   and  indilTercnt  Objeds,  and  by  that 
 iimple  A61  makes  it  agreeable  to  our  Tafte,    and  joins  fuch 
 Si^ulities  to  it  as  could  .ndcher  proceed  from  Chance  nor  Cuf- ' 
 tgin,  no.r"  any  Afibciatiqn  of  Ideas  whalfoever.     S:;c  ihe  Con- 
 cl'olron  ai'  this  Subjcdl  in  the  following  Norr . 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  EviL  343 
 
 choofe  abfurdly,  and  by  them  the  Choice  is  derer- 
 min'd.  But  Fame  or  Glory  have  no  manner  of 
 Good  in  them,  efpecially  to  thofe  who  beheve  that 
 they  iliall  not  exift  after  Death :  why  then  are  thefe 
 Men  content  to  purchafe  Glory  with  Life  ?  Certain- 
 ly from  no  other  Caufe  befide  Eledion;  'tis  by 
 Eledion  that  we  have  form'd  thefe  Idols  to  ou  felves, 
 and  from  thence  they  derive  whatever  Good  is  in 
 them.  To  be  talk'd  of  after  Death,  to  mount  upon 
 the  Wings  of  Fame,  to  extend  our  Name  to  diflanc 
 Regions;  thefe  things  pleafe  us  on  no  other  account 
 but  becaufe  we  will  them.  Obfcurity,  Oblivion, 
 Retirement  will  be  as  pleafing  to  the  Man  that  choo- 
 fes  them,  and  have  been  fo.  Thofe  Perfons  then  who 
 imagine  that  thele  determine  Eledions,  take  EfFefts 
 for  Caules.  For  thefe,  which  are  nothing  in  them- 
 felves,  fhew  us  that  they  acquire  fo  much  Good- 
 nefs  from  Eleftion  as  makes  them  over-ballance  all 
 kind  of  natural  Good. 
 
 XVIII.  The  fame  muft  be  faid  of  Anger,  Hatred,  The  fame 
 Love  and  Defpair,  by  which  many  are  believed  to  isfhewnof 
 be  driven  upon  Abfurdities.     But  in  reality  ail  that  Hatred;^ 
 is  abfurd  and  pernicious  in  thefe  Paffions  proceeds        '^'      ' 
 from  Eledion.     Nature  has  given  us  Paffions  which 
 are  generally  innocens  while  folicitcd  only  by  their 
 proper  Obje(5ls  and  natural  Opportunity,  as  we  fee 
 in  Brutes ;  but  they  are  compell'd  to  change  the  na- 
 tural Objeds  by  the  Power  of  Eledion  :  thus  An- 
 ger and  Hatred  are  excited  by  the  Will,  and  apply'd 
 not  to  fuch  things  as  are  naturally  hurtful,    nor  Love 
 and  Delire  to  fuch  as  are  naturally  defirable,  but  to 
 others  of  a  quite  different  kind,    v/ith  which  they 
 have  no  natural  Congruity,  fuch  as  Fame  and  Glo- 
 ry after  Death.     Of  this  kind  alfo  are  moil  of  the  In- 
 ftruments  of  Luxury,  which  are  commonly  fiid  to 
 pleafe,  purely  by  the  (Irength  of  Fancy,  that  is  in  re- 
 ality,   by  Eledion.     Hence  it  is  that  Men  purfue 
 with  fp  great  eagernefsj  and  emotion  fuch  ^ings  35 
 
 Z  4  "    "        are 
 
344  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 arc  in  thcmftlu#  triflng,    pernicious,    ai)d  abfui'd. 
 Nay  they  barter  away  Life  itfclf  lor  irifles,  and 
 v/hen  they  cannot  enjoy  thcni,  caft  off  that  in  dif- 
 pair.      'Tis  the    EleCrjon    itielf  which   fubftitnrts 
 rhefe  things  as  fit  to  be  proCeciucd  by  thefj  PaOTi- 
 ons  inftead  of  their  natural  Objeds,  and  while  they 
 are  hurry 'd  on,    not  accoiding  to  the  exigaue  of 
 Nature^  but  the  command  of  the  Will,  they  con- 
 found every  thing,  tranfgrefs  the  bounds  of  reafon 
 and  utility,  and  difrcgarding  ihefe  rage  without  li- 
 mits or  reltramt, 
 pfEnvy        XIX.  As  for  Envy  anJ  Revenge,  they  are  not 
 and  Re-     owing  to  Nature  but  the  Will,    and  fetting  afide 
 vcnge.       Election  are  mere  nothing.      For  whatever  is  pre- 
 tended to  the  contrary,  there  can  be  no  other  account 
 given  why  any  one  Ihould  undergo  Labours,  Dan- 
 gers, Griefs  and  Difficulties ;    why  he  fliould  lofe 
 his  Reputation,    Family,    Country,   nay  his  Life, 
 for  the  Satisfadion  of  his  Envy  or  Revenge,  but 
 that  he  refolv'd  within  himfelf,  but  that  he  chofe  to 
 fatisfy  them.     'Tis  evident  that  the  moft  unexperi- 
 enc'dperfon  is  fufficiently  convinc'd  of  this.     But 
 thefe,    when  once  embrac'd   by  Eledion,    becopie 
 jrore  agreeable  than  thofe  things  which  Nature  has 
 inade  neceH'ary.     Tho'e  abluid  Eledions  then  are 
 not  made  by  the  force   of  thdc  Palfions,    but  the 
 abfurd  and  irregular  force  of  tfiefe  flows  from  Elec- 
 tions. 
 Fourthly,       XX.  They  who  perceive  that  thefe  Caufes  are 
 Madnejs:    infufficient,   have  recovirfe  to  Maci»cf$  and  Phrefr^y^ 
 'usprov'd  j,-,  order  to  accovint  for  abfurd  Elections  :    but  this 
 *^"  ^.   r      ^^  pl^)'""?  upon  Words,    and  raking  Madnefs  in  a 
 that  theie  different  Senfc  from  that  wherein  it  is  commonly  un- 
 Mcnare     dcrflood.     He  is  look'd  upon  as  mad  that  is  lo  far 
 in  their      jjiforder'd  in  h^s  Mind  as  not  to  be  able  to  deduce  one 
 Senfcs        jjg^  ^j.^jjj  andther,    nor  make  Obfcrvations    upon 
 choofc  ab-  ^^^t  he  fees:  but  thefe  Men  who  do  fo  many  abfurd 
 f^rdly-      fhings  enjoy  the  abovciFiei^tion'd  Powcr.s  and  hav? 
 "  •         "     '     ■  their 
 
Sed.  I.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  345 
 
 their  Underftanding  and  Senles  ftrong  enough  by 
 Nature  :  what  is  it  therefore  which  drives   them  in- 
 to Abfurdities  \  The  power  and  prevalence  of  the  fu- 
 perior  Faculty,  viz,,  the  WilU    which  has  a  Good 
 peculiar  to  itielf,    which  it  ptoduces  by  Eledion. 
 This  it  purines  regardlefs  of  all  that  Reafon,    the 
 Body,  Circumftances,  Appetites  and  natural  Facul- 
 ties require.     For  while  it  (an  provide  for  and  pleafe 
 kfelf,  it  is  not  at  all  folicitous  about  any  thing  which 
 may  prejudice  thefe,  but  has  a  certain  Complacency 
 in  its  own  Exercife,  and  endeavours  to  augment  its 
 Irlappii^efs  by  the  purfuit  of  fuch  things  as  are  re- 
 pugnant to  them.     The  more  Difficulties  and  Ab- 
 furdities it  encounters,  the  more  it  applauds  itfelf  in 
 %  conlcioufnefs  of  its  own  Abilities  i  which  feems  to 
 be  the  very   thing  that   we  call  Vanity  and  Pride, 
 Hereupon  it  compels  the  Senfes,  Keafon,  and  natur 
 ral  Appetites,  to  be  fubfervient  to  its  Elecfiions:  noi: 
 can  he  becall'da  Madman  who  ads  againft  Reafon, 
 thro'  the  force  of  a  fuperior  Faculty,  any  more  than 
 i>e  t|iat  falls  from  a  Precipece  by  the  violence  of  a 
 greater  impulfe.     Fpr  it  is  not  every  one  who  ads 
 againft  reafon,  that  muft  immediately  be  look'd  up- 
 on as  Mad,  but  only  he  that  ads  abfurdly  from  fome 
 injury  done  to  tlie  underihnding  Faculty  itfelf,  or 
 an  Impediment  to  the  \3{t  of  Reafon :  he  that  could 
 have  followed  the  didate  of  Re,ifon  and  yet  know- 
 ingly violated  it,  muft  not  be  reckon'd  mad,    but 
 wicked,    unlefs  we  will  impofe  upon  ourfelves  by 
 changing  the  cuftomary  Names  of  things.  All  thde 
 
 XXI.  If  it  be  granted  that  we  have  this  fuperior  things 
 Faculty,  'tis  plain  enough  that  all  thefe  things  may  g^""^ng^ 
 come  to  pafs.     For  he  that  is  endow'd  with  it,  will  otherwife 
 be  able  to  pleafe  himfelf  in  the  Profecution  of  his  than  by 
 Eleftions,  even  to  the  detriment  of  both  Body  and  admitting 
 Mind ;  to  tJie  prejudice  of  Senfes,    Appetites  and  ^f  "^""^^^ 
 Reafon;  which  we  often  fee  done  to  our  Amaze-  kjnd, 
 liientj-  but  unlefs  we  have  this  Faculty  imparted  to 
 " -  USa 
 
34^  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 us,  it  does  not  feem  poffible  for  us  to  create  Good 
 to  ourfelves  by  Election,  and  to  prefer  what  is  thus 
 Asmnch  created  to  every  nariiral  Good, 
 goodarifes  XXII.  Thel'c  things,  I  confefs,  ought  not  to  be 
 Primriple  *^°"^ '  ^^^  if  nothing  could  be  done  which  ought 
 fo  it  is  at-  ^°^>  there  would  be  no  fuch  thing  as  a  Fault.  As 
 tended  therefore  much  Good  ariles  from  this  Principle,  fo 
 with  this  there  is  this  Evil  alfo,  that  by  it  Crimes  and  Follies 
 Evil,  wz.  jj.g  committed :  And  it  has  this  Inconvenience,  that 
 
 a  Power      •  j        i        •  i 
 
 of  finnin^.  ^^  ""  "*^  '^^^^  ^^  ought  not. 
 
 XXIII.  From  the(e  and  other  Arguments  which 
 '^\^^  T'^'  ^^g^^^  b^  brought,  I  think  it  is  evident  that  God  has 
 Se^Wiir  S*^^^  ^'^  ^  Principle  of  this  kind,  and  that  our  Will 
 follows      *s  only  determin'd  by   itfelf.      They   are  miftaken 
 the  Judg-   therefore  who  affirm  that  either  the  Appetites,  Paffi- 
 ment  of     ons,  or  Underftanding,  determine  Eledions.    What 
 i?  di^  ^'^'  P^°^^^'y  ?^^^  occalion  to  the  Mi  (lake  was,  that  other 
 arofefro'm  things  pleafe  or  difpleafe  us,  belide  what  we  choofe, 
 Iience,'77/2;.  viz,  fuch  as  are  agreeable  to  the  Appetites  or  Senfes, 
 that  it  is     Now  it  being  oblerv'd  that  we  have  regard  to  thefe 
 impruaent  jj^  Eledirns  and  do  not  choofe  any  thing  repugnant 
 aft' with-    ^^  J^hem,  but  upon  neceility,  and  that  all  Men  are  of 
 out  con-     Opinion,  that  the  Judgment   of  the  Underftanding 
 faking  the  Ought  to  be  made  uieofin  choofing,  and  being  ac- 
 ^'nder-      cuftom'd  to  this  kind  of  Choice,  we  become  at  lad 
 J*^  'I'-g-    perfuaded  that  it  is  abfolutely  neceffary,  and  that  our 
 Wills  are  always  determin'd  by  fome  Judgment  of 
 the  Underftanding :  at  Icaft,    that  it  i^   a  Condition 
 requifire  in  the  O^jjcft,    that  the  Mind  judge  the 
 thing  chofen  to  be  good  and  agreeable  to  the  Appe- 
 tites.    Whereas  the  contrary  to  all  this  is  generally 
 true  viz.,  that  the  Mind  judges  things  to  be  good 
 becaufe  we  have  willed  them,  becaufe  we  have  form- 
 ed an  Appetite  in  ourfclvcs  by  fome  antecedent  Elefti- 
 on,  and  thofe  things  which  we  embrace  by  this  fr.c- 
 'ditions  u4ppetitey    as   we  may  call  it,    give  us  equal 
 Pleafure  with  that  which  we  defu-e  by  the  Neccltuy 
 of  Nature. 
 
 XXIV,  Nay 
 
Sea.  I.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  54;^ 
 
 XXIV.  Nay  we  choofe  Obje(5J:s  vhich  are  con-  We  can 
 traiy  to  all  the  Appetires,    contrary  to  Reafon,  and  ^'^mor- 
 deftitute  of  all  Appearance  of  Good,  perhaps  for  this  fj^^J^^^Q^y 
 only  Reafon,  that  we  may  affert  our  Liberty  of  Elec-  Liberty, 
 tion>     'Tis  certain   that  every  one  can  do  this,  and  which  is 
 he  that  does  iu,  proves  by  an  Experiment  that  he  is  prov'd  to 
 ir^^t  and  has  a  Power  of  pleafing  himfelf  in  Eleftion.  f^^j^J^g 
 >Ior  can  he  be   faid  to  be  determin'd  by  the  Judg-  ^^i^g 
 ment  of  the  UnderQanding ;  for  this  reafon  is  made  without 
 by  the  Mind  itfelf,  and  may  ferve  equally  for  every  any  reafoi? 
 Eledion,  iince  it  is  drawn  from  the  Indifference  of  '^^  ^"* 
 the  Will  itfelf:  and  he  who  does  any  thing  upon  a 
 reafon  which  is  made  by  himfelf,  and  is  indifferent 
 to  either  Side,  muft  be   efteem'd  to  a6t  in  the  fame 
 manner  as  if  he  had  done  it  without  any  reafon  at  all. 
 "Tis  evident  therefore  that  we  have  this  Power,  and 
 make  ufe  of  the  Appetites  and  Senfes  only  as  Spies 
 and  Informers;  of  Reafon  as  a  Counfellor;    but  that 
 the  Will  is  Mafter  of  itfelf,  and  creates  pleafure  for 
 itfelf  in  Objects  by  Eledion.     ("580 
 
 SECT, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (58  )  Upon  the  whole  it  appears  that  the  true  dcfcription  of 
 Free-will  mull  incUide  thus  much.  A  Power  of  choormg  or 
 not  choofing,  or  of  choofmg  either  Side  in  any  given  Cafe ; 
 naturally  independent  of  any  mediate  or  immediate,  external 
 or  internal  force,  compulfion,  influence  or  neccfhty  ;  phyli- 
 cally  indetermln'd  by  either  bodily  Senfations,  Appetites,  is'c. 
 or  mental  Perceptions,  Reafon,  Judgment.  'Tis  an  Ability 
 of  determining  either  among  equal  and  indifferent  Objeits,  or 
 of  preferring  the  purfuit  of  fome  before  others  that  are  entirely 
 different  from  or  contrary  to  them  :  or  laflly,  of  preferring  the 
 very  confideration  of  fome  unknown  Objedls  to  all  the  reft ; 
 of  deliberating  upon,  or  attending  to  fome  particular  Ideas, 
 jnd  refolving  to  overlook  others,  tho'  equally  prefentcd  to  the 
 Mind,  and  fuppos'd  to  be  of  equal  Importance. 
 
 All  this  is  contain'd  in  the  very  Notion  of  a  Se!f-movi7?g 
 Ponver  J  (tho'  none  perhaps  have  given  fo  full  and  diflincl  an 
 Explication  of  it  as  our  Author)  for  that  which  in  ftriclnefs 
 jnovcs  itfelf,   is  properly   and  phyfi.cally  independent  of,  an4 
 
 indifferent 
 
348 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 SECT.     11. 
 
 Where  it  h  Jhewn  that  Happinefi  conjijis  in 
 EleSlions. 
 
 The  more 
 free  any 
 Being  is, 
 the  lefs  he 
 is  exposM 
 80  Motions 
 fiom  with- 
 cut,  and 
 meets  with 
 lefs  incon- 
 venience. 
 
 I.  T7  ROM  what  has  been  faid  above,  it   appears 
 
 Jl    that  a  Being    endow'd    with  a    Power    of 
 
 choofing  is  more   excellent   and  perfeft  than  one 
 
 thai 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 indifferent  to  all  external  Movers,  as  long  as  it  continues  to 
 do  fo;  what  is  determin'd  in  certain  circumftances  by  or  ac- 
 cording to  particular  Senfations,  Motives,  i^c.  and  cannot 
 pofTibly  be  determin'd  either  without  or  againft  them,  is  fo  far, 
 and  in  fuch  circumftances,  only  moved,  afted  upon,  and  pure- 
 ly palTive.  If  then  there  be  any  fuch  thing,  properly  fpeaking, 
 as  an  adlive  Principle,  it  muft  be  endow'd  with  fuch  an  abfo- 
 lutc  Indifference  as  our  Author  fuppofes :  and  when  we  fpsak 
 ox  t\\&  Jirongeji  Motinjes ,  we  don't  mean  fuch  as  have  the  grea- 
 tcft  phyfical  Influence  or  Weight  in  turning  the  ballance  of  the 
 Will  (fince  we  fuppofe  none  of  them  to  have  any  at  all)  but  only 
 fuch  as  the  Mind  moft  commonly  determines  itfelf  upon  in 
 fadt;  and  to  argue  from  fuch  determinations  that  thefe  Motives 
 muft  have  fuch  an  Influence  both  abfolutely  and  comparatively, 
 /.  e.  whether  taken  by  themfclves,  or  in  oppofition  to  each 
 other ;  is  manifeftly  to  beg  the  Queftion,  and  ftill  to  fuppofe 
 that  it  cannot  move  or  direft  itfelf,  notwithftanding  our  moft 
 evident  perception  and  experience  of  the  contrary.  And  that 
 we  have  fuch  experience,  a  little  reflection  on  ourfelves  will 
 convince  us.  "  I  think  (fays  Mr.  CoUiber,)  I  may  appeal 
 «'  to  any  confidering  Man,  whether  he  be  not  in  all  ordinary 
 "  Cafes  fenfible  of  an  ability  of  darting  his  thoughts  upon  an^^ 
 "  particular  Objeft,  even  antecedently  to  any  deliberation, 
 *'  and  then,  whether  after  deliberation  about  particular  Objfds 
 *'  he  cannot  refumc  his  deliberAtiOK,   and  fometimes  vary  his 
 
 •'  Judgment  J 
 
Sea.  2.  Of  Moral  Evil.  349 
 
 that  is  without  it :    For  that    which  neither  ads 
 nor  is  aded  upon,  is  the  farthcft  from  Perfedion, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *'  Judgment;  and  whether,  after  the  cleared  Judgment,  and 
 *'  moft  deliberate  Choice  of  particular  things  or  actions,  he  be 
 *«  not  ftill  confcious  of  a  power  of  fufpending  his  praftice,  of 
 "  refuming  the  corifideration  of  the  Objeds  whenever  he  plear 
 "  fes,  or  of  immediately  choofmg  or  praftifrng  the  contrary, 
 "  without  being  determin'd  by  impreflions  from  without,  or 
 "  impediments  from  within.  But  we  have  no  clearer  proof 
 "  of  our  own  Exiftence  than  Confcioufnefs :  and  I  conceive  we 
 "  need  not  expeft  greater  Evidence  of  any  thing  than  we  have 
 *'  of  our  Exiftence  *". 
 
 If  then  our  Mind  ha?  fuch  a  power  of  felefting  fome  parti- 
 cular Ideas  out  of  many  perceived  by  theUnderilanding,  and 
 attending  to  them  alone  without  any  previous  apprehenfion_ of 
 their  nature  and  tendency,  wit'hout  any  fpecial  Reafon,  Motive 
 or  inducement  wharfoever  to  fuch  particular  Choice;  if  the 
 Mind,  I  fay,  does  in  fonve  Cafes  exert  fuch  a  power  as  this, 
 then  It  is  in  thefe  Cafes  abfolutely  free.     It  cannot  here  be  di- 
 refted  by  the  Judgment,  fmcc  it  is  fuppos'd  to  acl:  independent- 
 ly of  it :  nay  it  may  be  properly  faid  fometimes  to  influence 
 and  direa,  or  rather  to  obftrufl  and'  fubvert  the  Judgment  it- 
 felf,   for  as  much  as  it  confines  that  to  forae  particular  Objefts 
 only,  and  of  confequence  renders  it  partial,  and  precipitates  it 
 in  the  Choice  of  thefe,  and  withdraw*  others  from  it,  which 
 were  abfolutely  necelTary  to  a  compleat  View  of  the  Subjeft, 
 and  an  exadl  determination  about  it.     Hence  the  fpring  of  all 
 Errors,  at  leaft  all  criminal  ones,  hence  vitious,  abfurd  Elec- 
 tions, and  a  Labyrinth  of  Woe.     From  the  fame  Power  alf» 
 duly  apply"d  proceeds  the  happy  confcioufnefs  of  Defert,  and 
 in  it  is  entirely  founded  all  the  reafon  of  Reward.     It's  ufeful- 
 xiefs  then,  and  neceflity,  appear  both  for  the  eftablifhment  of 
 Ivloralityj  the  ground  of  all  rational  Happinefs ;   and  alfo,  that 
 we  might  always  have  wherein  to  pleafe  ourfelves,  which  (as 
 our  Author  has  fhewn  in  the  latter  end  of  SubfeA.  4.)  other- 
 wife  wc  very  often  could  not.     Hence  it  appears  I  think  fuf5- 
 riently,  that  thi^  Power  is  one  of  our  greateft  Perfeftions,  tho\ 
 (like  all  othtr  Pcrfeaions  that  come  ihort  of  Innnityj  it  be 
 
 liable 
 
 *  Impartial  Enquiry,  Sec.   p.  42,  43-     See  alfo  .an  Efaj  9^ 
 Confdoujnefs,   p.  205.,   t^c. 
 
S5^  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 fince  it  is  of  no  more  ufe  in  Nature  than  if  it  were 
 nothing  at  all  ,•    that  which  is  purely  paflive  in  its 
 
 Opera- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 liable  to  the  greateft  abufc,  and  fo  capable  of  being  turn'dinto 
 the  worft  of  Imperfedlions. 
 
 It  remains  to  be  enquired  with  our  Author,  ■whether  all  the 
 Happinefs  arifing  from  it  counterballanccs  the  Mifcry,  and 
 confequcntly,  whether  we  and  all  oth«r  rational  Creatures 
 fnight  not  have  been  as  well  or  better  without  it.  But  for  this 
 fee  §  2.  and  5. 
 
 We  fhall  here  only  add  a  Word  or  two  in  vindication  of  this 
 Principle  againil;  the  three  principal  Oppofers  of  Liberty  above- 
 inentioned.  In  the  firft:  place  then,  we  don't  afl'ert  that  by  this 
 Povver  the  Mind  can  choofe  Evil  as  E-vil  or  refufe  Good  as 
 Qood,  \.  e.  that  the  former,  as  fuch,  is  or  can  be  a  Moti've  for 
 Choice,  or  the  latter  for  refufal :  But  we  fay  that  it  can  choofe 
 the  one  and  refufe  the  other  njoithout  any  particular  Mottle  at 
 all ;  (i.  e.  any  drawn  from  the  particular  nature  of  the  Obje£t 
 chofen,)  nay,  in  oppofition  to  the  rtrongelt  Motive  {^ciz.  that 
 Motive  which  prcfents  the  greatcil  Happinefs,  and  which  it 
 ulually  does,  and  always  ought  to  follow)  purely  by  the  force 
 of  its  free,  a£l:ive  or  fclf  moving  Power.  * 
 
 You'll  fay  it  docs  this  to  prove  it's  own  Po\yer,  and  the 
 pleafure  attending  fuch  proof  is  the  ftrongelx  Motive  in  thefe 
 Cafes,  I  anfwer,  that  granting  this  to  be  fo  (which  yet  is  not 
 very  probable,  as  appears  from  what  was  obferv'd  from  the 
 Bjj'ay  on  Confcioufnsjs  in  Note  45.)  yet  this,  as  our  Author  ob- 
 fervcs,  muft  be  a  Motive  of  its  own  creating,  which,  with  re- 
 fpccl  to  Volition,  is  the  fame  as  none  at  all.  Nay  this  is  x\\z 
 very  thing  we  arc  endeavouring  to  prove,  ws;.  that  the  Soul 
 has  a  Power  of  determining  to  think  or  ad,  and  of  pleafing  it- 
 felf  in  fuch  determination,  without  any  other  iVIotive  or  Rea- 
 ion  but  what  is  produced  by  itlelf,  and  follo\vs  that  very  de- 
 termination ;  without  any  external  Caufe  whatfoevcr  :  in  which 
 Power  all  its  Liberty  confifts,  and  the  greateftPart  of  its  Hap- 
 pinefs, as  will  appear  in  the  next  Sedtion. 
 
 Nor  fecondly,  will  fuch  a  Power  as  this  only  make  us  liable 
 to  miilatc  the  true  Good  which  is  in  things  (as  the  Author  of 
 the  Philofoph.  Enquiry  and  Lcihr.tz  argue)  but  on  the  contra- 
 rr,  it  often  make:  x.n\t  Good  or  Happinefs  in  thole  things  vvhic'^ 
 
 ol 
 
 *  ^ee  JackfonV  Vindication  of  human  Liberty,  p.  49,  CtV.  or 
 the  leginnivg  o/"£,,  ScruttV  Defence  of  Dr.  Cbrkc'j  A'afion,  Skx-. 
 
Sea.  2.  Of  Moral  Evil.  3  5  ^ 
 
 Operations  is  one  degree   more    perfed,    but  that 
 which  has  the  Principle  of  its  Adions  within  itfeU, 
 
 fince 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 of  themfelves  had  none  at  all ;  and  improves  thofe  things  which 
 have,   and  alleviates  thofe  which  have  the  contrary  Qualities  ; 
 and  of  confequence  is  not  an  Itr.perfeaiov,  but  a  veiy  valuable 
 and  neceffary  Perfcdion.      Our    Author  does  not  fuppofe    us 
 left  to   an  abfolute,  blind  indifference  in  all  Objeas  (as  Lf_^i- 
 nitz  often  urges)  without  any  Guide  or  Direftion  m  the  Choice 
 of  them ;  which  would  indeed  be  an  imperfc-aion :  biit  af- 
 firms that  the  Mind  or  Man  is  fcnfiblv  and  neceffarily  afleaeu. 
 by  fome,  and  informed  by  his  Undcrftanding   of  the  Nature 
 and  Effecls  of  others,  and  fo  is  fufficiently  dirccled  to  the  Choice 
 ofthcfe    which  arc  in  themfelves  good  ana  agreeable  to  his 
 Conftitution,  and  ^jhe  n^erfa;  yet  Hill  with   the  referve  of  a 
 full  Power  of  following  or  not  following  that  Guide,  ot  neg- 
 kaing  or  refufmg   that  Direftion :    Which  Vonvcr  therefore, 
 even  in  thefe  Cafes,  remains  Hill  unaffecled.     In  other  Ob- 
 iefts,  he  (hews  that  the  Man  is  totally  indifierent,  which  yet, 
 by  an  arbitrary  Choice,  he  can  make  to  be  no  lefs  conftituenr 
 Parts  of  his  Happinefs.  ,      r       u  u 
 
 Whence,  in  the  third  place,  a  reply  may  be  form  d  to  the 
 common  QueCtion,  What  Benefit  is  there  in  a  Power  of  choof^ 
 ing  freely  among  things  that  are  really  indifferent,  and  exaftly 
 alike  ?  We  anlwer  the  Benefit  of  enjoying  a^iy  one  of  xh?m\, 
 which  Enjoyment  a  Man  could  not  poffibly  have  without  iuch 
 a  Liberty,  but  muft  neceffuily  hang  in  perpetual  Siifpenfc, 
 without  any  Choice  at  all  ?  this  Leibnitz  owns  to  be  an  una- 
 voidable confequence  of  his  Opinion  *  and  to  avoid  this  Ab- 
 furdity,  is  driven  to  a  greater,  viz.  to  deny  that  there  are  any 
 fuch  indifferent  and  equal  things  in  Nature  f  the  contrary  to 
 which  has  been  abundantly  evinc'd  already  with  refpecl:  to 
 ■both  God  and  Man. 
 
 I,aftly,  to  the  Arffuraent  againft  the  Pofibility  Oi  fuch  a 
 Liberty,  fo  frequently  repeated  by  the  two  Authors  above 
 mentionM,  'viz.  that  Anions  done  without  any  Motive,  v/ould 
 be  EJeJIs  without  a  Cau/e ;  We  reply,  in  fhort,  that  it  is  a  plam 
 Petitio  Principij,  in  fuppofmg  Motives  to  be  the  real  phyfical 
 efficient  Caufes  (and  thefe  are  the  only  Caufes  which  can  con- 
 cern" the  prefent  Queilion)  of  Volition  or  Aftion,  which  we 
 
 deny  5 
 
 *  Ejjais  de  Iheodice,  p.  161,  ^c. 
 t  ^ce  his  a^tb  Letter  to  Dr.  Clarke, 
 
352  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 fince  it  approaches,  as  it  were,  nearer  to  God,  an3 
 is  more  independent,    is  alfo  more  of  it  [elf ^  i.  e.  it 
 feemsto  be  made  for  its  own  fake,  and   chiefly  ta 
 refpecl  its  future  Benefit,  and  on  that  account  to 
 be  more  noble    and    perfed:.      Nor  does    it   feem 
 poflible    for  a  greater  Perfe6lion    to  be  communi- 
 cated than  the  fruition  of  fuch  a  Principle.     The 
 more  free  any  one  is,    and  the  lefs  liable  to  exter- 
 nal Motions,  the  more  perfed  he  \^ :  God  has  there- 
 fore multiply'd  this  kind  of  Creatures  as  far  as  the 
 Sy  demand  Order  of  his  Work  allow 'd,  and  decreed 
 that  fuch  as  are  paffive  in  their  Operations  fliould 
 be  fubfervient  to  thele. 
 ilappinefs       II.  Since  therefore  Happinefs,'  according   to  the 
 arifcsfrom  common  Notion  of  it,    is  granted  to  arile  from  a 
 the  proper  ^j^g  ^^^  ^f  jj^^^g  Faculties  and  Powers  which  every 
 ufc  of  the  .  J     ,  1  •     r.  r   J  ■  ^ 
 
 Paculties,    <^"^   en)oys ;    and  lince  this  Power  ot  determining 
 
 ^c.  If  ourfelves    to    Aftions     and    plealing  ourfelves    in 
 
 therefore  them,    is  the  moft  perfed  of  all,  whereby  we  arcf 
 
 *f  r^^  the  moft  confcious  of  our  Exiftence  and  our  Ap- 
 
 Ing  be°  proach   towards    God;    our   chief  Happinefs    will 
 
 the  moil  confift  in  the  proper  ufe  of  it,  nor  can  any  thing 
 
 noble  of  be  abiblutely  agreeable  to  us  but  what   is  chofen. 
 
 all,  the  fj-s  Yi  is  to  be  confefs'd  that  many  external  Ob- 
 
 grcateft  ^  •  ^ 
 
 Happinefs  ^^^^' 
 
 willconfill  •     ^^-_-  _    ^ 
 
 in  the  Ex-  NOTES. 
 
 ercife  of 
 
 it,  /. /.  in  deny;  and  ydt  are  fir  from  filppbfing  thefe  A6>s  to  be  abfolute- 
 
 Eleftions.    Jy  without  a  Caufc;  nay  vvc  alfign  them  another,    and  affirm 
 
 that  their  only  true  and  proper  Ciiufe  is  this  felf-moving  Power, 
 
 and  the  only  Cauic  of  this  is  the  Creator  who  communicated 
 
 it. 
 
 On  this  Subjcft  may    be  fccn    Dr    Clarke's   Demonjirat.    p. 
 I  36,  i5c.  2d  Edit,  or  his  Remarks^  Sec.  p.  28,  &'c.  or  Chubb'i 
 farther  Reflexions   on   Natural  Liberty.     ColleQion  of  Trails, 
 p.  388,  i^c. 
 
 {T.)  Againft  this  it  is  objc(^ed,  ift,'  That  the  Author  here 
 delcribes  Free-will  to  be  a  Power  of  choofing  this  or  that  with- 
 out any  dependence  either  on  the  other  Faculties  or  Attributes 
 •f  the  free  Agent,  or  on  the  Qualities  of  external  Objcds. 
 
 Aufwjr. 
 
Sea.  2.  Of  Moral  Evil.  353 
 
 'jCcfls,   many   that  are  offer 'd  by  the  Senfes,    pleafe 
 lis ;  bus  if  we  look  into  the  thing  more  nanov/ly, 
 
 this 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Anfwer.  TIic  Author  never  faid  or  imagin'd  that  Liberty 
 Tvas  a  power  to  choofc  //'  all  difts  without  any  dependence 
 on  the  other  Faculties,  ur  the  Qualities  of  Obje6>s,  but  the  di- 
 re£t  contrary  ;  'viz.  that  ali  other  Faculties  of  the  Agent  were 
 to  be  confider'd,  his  Appetites  confulted,  and  the  fitnefs  of  Ob- 
 je£ts  obferv'd.  Ke  exprefly  teaches  that  if  a  free  Agent  choofe 
 any  thing  contrary  to  the  natural  Appetites  without  any  Caufe, 
 he  gives  himfelf  unneceffary  trouble,  if  any  thing  above  his 
 power  to  coiupafs,  or  impoflible  in  the  Nature  of  things,  he 
 hiakes  himfelf  fo  far  unhappy.  That  which  the  Author  main- 
 tains is  only  this,  that  Goodnefs  is  the  Agreement  of  a  thing 
 to  foine  Appetite,  and  that  agreemeent  may  either  arife  from 
 the  natural  fitncfs  of  the  Gbjeft  to  the  Appetite,  or  the  Appe- 
 tite's accommodating  itfclf  to  the  Obje£i: ;  that  God  has  given 
 us  a  power  in  many  Cafes,  and  indeed  in  the  mod  common 
 Affairs  of  Life,  to  accommodate  our  will  to  things;  that  this 
 is  done  by  our  choofing  them  and  \v'liatfoever  we  (o  choofe,  if 
 we  can  enjoy  it,  as  long  as  the  Choice  continues,  will  pleafe 
 us  ;  and  lallly,  that  this  power  is  of  mighty  advantage  to  us  ; 
 for  we  can't  expecl  that  things  fliould  always  anfwer  our  natu- 
 ral Appetites,  and  therefore  fince  it  is  unreafonable  all  the 
 World  fliould  be  made  to  accommodate  us,  'tis  a  great  Bene- 
 fit that  God  has  given  us  a  power  to  accommodate  ourfelves  to 
 the  things  as  we  find  them;  if  we  make  a  right  ufe  of  this 
 power  we  may  be  alwayi  happy,  for  we  may  ahva}'s  choofe 
 fuch  things  as  we  can  enjoy,  and  reject  thofe  that  can't  be  had, 
 and  if  we  do  fo  we  may  be  always  pleafcd. 
 
 Thus  things  may  become  Good  or  Evil  to  us  by  our  Choice 
 and  our  Happinefs  or  Mifery  will  depend  upon  it.  Now  he 
 that  v/ould  in  earneft  confute  thii  Notion  has  but  one  of  thcfe 
 two  things  to  do,  either  firft,  to  ftiew  that  tliere  is  no  fuch 
 Power  or  Faculty  pofiible,  or  2dly,  That  there  is  no  advan- 
 tage in  it. 
 
 I  will  put  the  rambling  Obje^licns  that  I  have  met  with  in 
 as  good  a  method  as  I  can,  tho'  they  are  generally  fo  little  to 
 ihe  purpofc,  that  it  is  harder  to  bring  them  in  than  anfwer 
 them. 
 
 2dly,  Therefore  it  is  urg'd  that  we  know  by  experience  that 
 to  make  a  Man  pleafe  himfelf  in  his  Choice,  it  is  notneccflary 
 that  he  fhould  believe  that  he  is  not  infenfiblv  a;id  imDercepti--' 
 
 A  a  '-       bly 
 
354  ^/  ^0^^^  ^vil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 this  will  appear  to  arife  from  hence  only,  that 
 thcfe  are  as  Motives  which  induce  us  to  exert  an 
 
 Ad 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 bly  direfted  to  it  by  fome  external  Caufe ;  and  the  inference 
 from  this,  if  intended  agiinft  the  Author,  muft  be,  that  there- 
 fore a  Man's  choofing  a  thing  doth  not  make  it  pleafing  to 
 him:  but  nothing  like  this  follows;  all  thst  can  be  juftly  in- 
 ferr'd  is  that  whether  a  choice  be  free  or  necefiltated  it  is  luffi- 
 cicnt  to  make  the  thing  chofen  agreeable. 
 
 It  were  in  vain  to  produce  all  the  Inllances  impertinently 
 brought  to  prove  that  a  necelTitated  choi<:e  may  pleafe  us.  Yet 
 to  fhew  how  Urangely  fomc  Authors  can  wander  from  the 
 point  I  will  examine  one  or  two  of  them.  Firll,  it  is  faid,  if 
 a  Man  fhould  upon  mature  Deliberation  refolvc  on  a  thing, 
 and  whilll  about  to  execute  it,  on  a  fudden  a  ftrong  impetu- 
 ous thought  comes  into  his  Mind  to  do  fomething  elfe,  and  he 
 follows  that  and  fuccecds,  he  would  conceive  an  extraordinary 
 Joy  ;  for  he  muft  imagine  that  God,  a  good  Angel,  or  his  good 
 Fortune  had  prompted  him  to  do  it,  and  therefore  it  is  not  his 
 Choice  that  pleafcs  him. 
 
 I  anfwer,  Firlt,  it  is  plain  fuch  a  Man  alters  his  Choice, 
 and  makes  a  new  one,  and  that  new  one  pleafes  him ;  it  his 
 former  Choice  continued,  he  coa'd  not  have  made  the  nev/ 
 one,  nor  would  the  doing  the  thing  he  is  about  otherwife 
 fatisfy  him. 
 
 But  zdly.  We  muft  diftinguifti  between  the  Choice  and  the 
 means  of  obtaining  it.  When  once  the  Choice  is  made,  the 
 mofi;  eafy  and  effectual  ways  of  obtaining  the  thing  chofen 
 pleafe  us  beft.  A  Man  is  to  fight  a  Battle,  his  choice  is  to  con- 
 quer ;  he  thinks  of  means  to  execute  it.  Several  ways  occur 
 and  he  pilches  upon  one,  which  pleafes  and  is  chofen,  not  for 
 itfelf,  but  as  fublcrvient  to  his  deftre  of  Vi£tory.  An  Angel 
 appears  and  direfts  him  to  another :  none  can  doubt  but  this 
 will  caufe  extraordinary  joy  in  him,  bccaufc  it  brings  him  to 
 obtain  his  Choice  by  the  moft  certain  and  infallible  means. 
 Now  this  is  fo  far  from  proving  that  Choice  is  not  the  thing 
 that  gives  goodnefs  to  ObjefVs,  that  it  direftly  proves  the  con- 
 trary. For  here  the  only  thirg  that  makes  him  rejed  wh.at  his 
 reafon  propofed  to  him  as  the  beft  n.eans  to  obtain  his  Choice, 
 is  becaufe  he  ha=!  difcover'd  a  better.  On  the  other  Hand,  it 
 a  General  out  c*  treachery  fhould  defign  to  lofc  a  Battle,  and 
 it  happened  in  ciie  hurry  that  he  fliou'd  be  forced  to  do  fomc- 
 thint^  that  gain'ti  it,  he  wovild  not  pleafe  himlclf  in  the  A6lion. 
 
 Here'* 
 
Sea.  2;  Of  Moral  Evil  355 
 
 Aft  of  Eledioft,  whereby  we  embrace  them  as  if 
 
 they  were  agreeable  to  the  natural  Appetites :    for 
 
 A  a  2  tho*^ 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Here's  a  Viftory  that  is  good  to  one  and  ill  to  another,  and 
 the  difference  lies  plainly  in  the  one's  choofmg  and  the  other's 
 rejefting  it. 
 
 But  zdly,  'tis  obje£led,  that  a  Ja:ifcrJJl  or  Caknniji  who 
 gives  an  Alms,  nnd  is  perfuaded  that  God  infpircs  him  to  do 
 jfo,  is  better  plci'led  with  himielf  than  a  Stoick,  who  attributes 
 to  himfelf  all  the  Glory  of  a  charitable  A£lion.  Well,  v/hat 
 then  ?  Therefore  things  do  not  pleafe  us  becaufe  we  choofe 
 them.  No  fuch  Matter.  A  true  Chriflian,  call  him  Janfeitijlt 
 or  what  you  will,  choofes  to  prefer  the  Glory  of  God  to  his 
 own,  and  therefore  he  is  better  pleafcd  to  think  the  Glory  of 
 what  he  does  belongs  to  God,  than  to  himfelf,  as  this  is  more 
 agreeable  to  his  Choice. 
 
 [n  fhort,  all  the  Initances  I  have  feen  are  of  the  fame  Na^ 
 ture,  and  if  there  were  a  thoufand  of  them  they  all  receive  the 
 Came  anfwer,  they  are  nothing  to  the  purpofc,  and  prove  no 
 more  than  that  Men  arc  beft  pleafed  with  the  moll  ciFectual 
 means  to  obtain  their  Ele£):ions. 
 
 But  3dly,  It  is  alledged  that  if  the  Happinefs  of  Man  con- 
 fills  in  his  Choice,  God  ought  to  have  left  him  fairly  to  that 
 Choice,  fo  that  neither  the  other  Faculties  of  his  Soui  nor 
 QLialities  of  Objefls  fhould  have  any  power  over  him  to  re- 
 llrain  the  ufe  of  his  Freedom. 
 
 If  I  underflrnd  this  rigiit,  the  meaning  of  it  is  that  God 
 fhould  not  have  given  Man  any  particular  Appetites  detcrmin'd 
 to  their  Objeds,  or  made  any  thing  impoihble  for  him  to  at- 
 tain that  he  pleafed  to  choofe.  This  I  confefs  had  been  a  free- 
 dom with  a  witnefs,  for  it  had  put  it  hi  the  power  of  ever)' 
 Man  to  turn  the  World  as  he  pleafed.  But  if  one  Man  had 
 this  power  no  other  could  have  had  it.  For  things  can  be  but 
 one  Wc^y  at  once,  and  if  one  Man  had  put  them  into  a  certain 
 method,  all  the  rcil  mull  cither  have  been  content  with  that  or 
 have  been  miferable  ;  but  God  has  put  them  in  the  way  that 
 is  bell,  and  fince  they  m^ifl  not  be  changed,  he  has  given  every 
 Man  a  Power  to  conform  himfelf  to  them,  and  pleafe  himfelf 
 in  the  Choice  :  And  to  fccure  th-?  preferration  of  Men  the  bet- 
 ter, he  has  given  them  naSural  Appetites  to  fuch  things  as  are 
 neceflary  for  their  fapport,  and  thereby  guarded  their  Choice 
 from  hurting  rhera  as  mucii  as  the  nature  of  things,  and  the 
 circumltances  in  which  thev  arc  placed  wil  oermit  i    which  is 
 
35^  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 tho*  the  Will  cannot  be  determin'd  to  Eledion  by 
 any  thing  but  itfelf,  yet  it  may  be  fcrJHiided  to  de-* 
 
 t  ermine 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 {d  far  frolh  beifig  an  injary,  that  it  is  a  great  inlhncc  of  Divire 
 Goodiieis  by  fctting  bounds  to  our  Choice  where  it  might 
 hurt  us,  and  leaving  us  in  all  other  matters  to  pleafc  ourfelvcy 
 by  a  free  Eleftion.  Thus  he  has  obliged  us  to  take  care  of  our 
 lives  by  a  ftrong  Appetite  to  continue  our  Being.  He  has  fe- 
 curcd  our  feeding  our  Bodies  by  the  Appetite  of  Hunger,  (o 
 that  we  are  unealy  under  it;  and  yet  that  uneafincf:^  is  not  lo 
 great,  but  our  choice,  tho'  with  fortie  difficulty,  will  make  it 
 ipleafing  to  us  :  and  fo  in  all  other  Appetites  by  which  we  are 
 prompted  to  fupply  our  natural  necclTities.  And  thus  they 
 always  millake  the  Matter  that  prefume  to  teach  God  what  he 
 ihould  do. 
 
 But  4thly,  It  is  urged,  that  we  dcfire  Happincfs  nccelTarify, 
 and  cannot  choofe  Evil  as  Evil,  and  therefore  our  Choice  does 
 not  make  things  agreeable,  that  is,  good.  But  I  fee  no  manner 
 of  confequence  in  the  Argument,  it  rather  proves  the  contrary. 
 Forwemufttake  notice  that  Good  and  Evil  are  refpeftivc 
 things,  and  have  relation  to  fome  Appetite.  Now  we  have 
 feveral  Appetites  determined  to  their  Objedls,  and  the  things' 
 agreeable  or  difagreeable  to  them  arc  good  or  bad  antecedently 
 to  choice.  But  there  arc  other  things,  that  have  no  agreeable- 
 nefs  or  inconveniency  to  any  Appetite  before  Eledion,  and 
 then  are  good  or  bad  as  they  agree  with  that  Choice.  Now 
 'tis  plain  that  there  is  nothing  good  or  bad  in  rcfpe'fl:  of  our 
 natural  Appetites,  but  \tc  can  choofe  it,  even  Death  itfelf:  and 
 thereforeit  is  not  meant  of  them,  or  of  this  fort  of  Evil,  when 
 Vv'e  fay  v/e  can't  choofe  Evil.  But  it  is  abfolutely  impofiible 
 that  we  fhou'd  choole  what  is  contrary  to  choice,  and  fo  Evil 
 in  that  fcnfc;  for  then  we  fhou'd  choofe  it  and  not  choofe  it  at 
 the  fame  time.  This  gives  us  the  reafon  why  we  cannot  choofe 
 Evil  as  jnch  ;  becaufc  it  is  made  good  by  our  Choice.  And  if 
 a  ManV  choice  of  things,  and  enjoying  them,  be  that  whicii 
 makes  him  happy,  it  is  impofhble  he  Ihou'd  not  choofe  Happi- 
 ncfs, bccnufe  whilft  he  choofes  and  enjoys  a  thing,  he  cannot 
 at  the  fame  time  choofe  to  rcjedl  and  want  it,  that  is  be 
 unhappy. 
 
 But  fthly,  'Tis  further  objefted  that  ihofc  who  believe  thn.r 
 they  are  only  free  from  conftraint,  thofe  that  think  their  Will 
 is  determin'd  by  the  Underftanding,  and  thofe  who  are  of  opi- 
 nioa  that  they  poiTcfj  indiifcrenccof  Will;  are  all  equally  con- 
 tent 
 
Sed.  2;  Of  Moral  EvH.  337 
 
 t ermine  itfelf,  in  order  to  avoid  what  is  abfurd  and 
 difguftful  to  the  Natural  Appetites. 
 
 A  a  5  III.  For 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 tent  with  themfelves,  fo  they  choofe  conveniently  ;  that  is,  fa 
 they  enjoy  their  choice,  or  attain  fomc  great  good  whether  they 
 torefaw  it  or  no. 
 
 I  anfwer,  this  may  be  true,  but  nothing  to  the  purpofe ; 
 fines  it  is  manifeft  all  of  them  make  n  Choice,  aJ^d  provided 
 ihey  obtain  what  they  have  chofcn,  they  are  fo  far  fatisfy'd; 
 which  only  proves  that  whether  we  believe  our  Choice  to  be 
 neceflitited  or  voluntary,  it  is  of  fo  grer.t  force  as  to  make  the 
 thing  chofen  agreeable,  i.  e.  Good,  as  long  as  the  Choice 
 Ms. 
 
 The  true  point  in  Qneftion  here  is  whicj>  of  thefe  Hypothe- 
 fes  will  beft  fecurc  the  Happinefs  of  Men.  As  to  the  Firfl  of 
 thefe  Opinions,  that  fuppofes  us  free  only  from  conftraint,  and 
 that  our  Choice  is  necelfarily  determin'd  to  the  good  or  ill  we 
 conceive  in  Objecls,  the  Author  has  proved  that  on  this  lup- 
 pofuion  Happinefs  is  impoffible,  in  his  5  th  Chap.  Sefl.  i.  Sub- 
 fe£l.  I.  par.  18.  As  to  the  2d,  which  fuppofes  the  Will  to  be 
 determin'd  by  the  laft  aft  of  the  Underltanding,  this  is  (hewn 
 to  be  equivalent  to  necefiity,  becaufe  the  Underftanding  is  ne- 
 ceffary  and  obliged  to  judge  as  things  appear  to  it.  And  as  to 
 the  3d,  that  places  an  indifference  in  the  Will,  the  Author  has 
 Jhcwn,  Cap.  5.*Se6t.  i.  Subfeft.  2.  par.  8.  that  mere  indiffe- 
 rence of  Choice  is  of  no  ufe,  but  rather  an  impediment  to  Hap- 
 pinefs, except  the  Will  have  ?.t  the  fame  time  a  power  to  make 
 the  thing  chofen  agreeable.  If  fuch  a  Power  be  in  the  Will, 
 the  Author  fhews,  Subfeft.  3.  of  the  fame  Seft.  Par.  22.  that 
 the  Agent  poflefs'd  of  it  may  be  happy  tho'  he  have  a  very  im- 
 perfeft  Underftanding  and  commit  many  Miftakcs. 
 
 It  ought  likcwifc  to  be  confider'd  th:it  if  we  really  have  this 
 Power,  it  is  not  material  whether  we  know  or  believe  that  we 
 have  it  or  no,  for  whatever  our  opiiiion  of  it  be,  it  will  do  its 
 own  Work,  li  a  Man  believe  himfelf  free,  as  generally  Men 
 do,  when  he  really  is  neceflitated  by  a  force  he  doth  not  per- 
 ceive, he  is  never  the  freer  on  that  account.  And  if  he  believe 
 liimfelf  ncccffitated  contrary  to  what  he  feels  in  his  own  Alind, 
 as  fome  are  p':rfu?.dcd  to  do  by  the  fophiftical  Arguments  of 
 vain  Philofophcrs,  he  is  never  the  lefs  free  tor  that.  And 
 hence  it  is  that  whatever  opinion  Men  have  concerning  the 
 I'reedom  or  necelBty  of  choice,  they  are  equally  pleas'd  or  dif- 
 pleas'd  ■witi:^  it,  When  once  if  Is  ma^c ;  becaufe  the  plcafurc 
 
 doth 
 
35?  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V 
 
 Eleflion         m.  For  'tis   certain   that  we  make  ufe  of  the 
 *^  ^J}^    ,     Aflifrance  of  the  Underftanding  in  Eleftions,  and 
 thhiss        ^°^^  ^^  ^^  ^  Light  before  us  to   diftinguifh  Good 
 pleafeus.    from  Evil;  but  we  ufe  it  as  a  Judge  and  a  Coun- 
 fellor,    not    as  a  Sovereign  and  Dictator :    and   to 
 fpeak  the  truth,  in  order  to  avoid  fooUili  and  hurt- 
 ful 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (lotli  not  aiife  from  their  opinion  concerning  the  Faculty,  but 
 from  the  ule  of  it. 
 
 But  laftly,  'tis  (xA  that  good  Angels  and  S.iints  in  Heaven 
 have  no  luch  Liberty  as  this ;  that  the  good  Angels  arc  per- 
 fcftly  determined  to  love  God,  and  the  Souls  of  Men  as  foon 
 as  they  enter  Heaven,  ceafe  to  be  indifferent  to  Good  and  Evif, 
 and  can't  make  any  other  than  a  good  Choice. 
 
 I'i  this  is  intended  againfl  the  Author's  Poficion,  the  Inference 
 muft  be  either  that  the  Angels  and  Saints  do  not  choofe  to  be 
 in  Heaven,  or  that  IJea^'en  doth  not  pleafe  becaufe  they  choofe 
 ■>o  be  there,  neither  of  which  Confequenc:s  do  at  all  follow. 
 But  then  is  it  not  ftrange  that  a  Liberty  of  indifference  which 
 remains  no  longer  than  our  miferable  fojourning  on  Earth,  and 
 is  at  an  end  as  foon  as  a  Man  begins  to  be  perfeftly  happy, 
 fhculd  be  necefDry  to  our  Happineff,  and  the  Fountain  of  it 
 here  ?  To  which  I  ani\',er,  that  the  whole  Argument  is  foun- 
 ded on  a  great  Miflake. 
 
 The  Author  believes  that  the  Angels  and  Biefled  in  Heaven 
 are  happy  only  by  this  means,  that  they  freely  choofe  every  aft 
 that  they  perform,  and  are  always  able  to  execute  what  they 
 choofe.  I  own  that  tliev  never  choofe  amifs,  nor  evei''  will: 
 biU  the  rcafon  of  that  is  not  want  of  Power,  but  becaufe  either 
 ifl-,  their  Circumflaiicrs  are  luch  that  they  have  no  opportunity 
 to  make  fuch  Choices:  Or  adly,  becaufe  they  are  fo  weil 
 plL-a.';'d  with  the  choice  ihcy  have  maie  that  they  will  never 
 alter  it;  or  3dly,  becaule  their  Experience  has  fliewed  them 
 ^vhat  mifery  an  ill  choice  has  brought  on  them  or  others. 
 Time  was  when  fume  Angels  made  an  ill  choice  and  werq 
 thrown  into  Hell  '"or  it;  can  we  wonder  if  thofe  that  remain 
 are  grown  wifer,  and  have  learnt  by  the  mifery  of  their  Fel- 
 Jows  to  choofe  better .''  The  fame  may  be  faid  of  the  Saints. 
 They  may  remember  the  Mifcrics  they  fuffcr'd  iiere  on  Earth, 
 and  that  may  teach  them  how  to  avoid  the  like:  But  to  argue 
 thai  becaufe  they  will  not  choofe  aniif<;,  therefore  they  cannot, 
 is  a  falfe  Conclufjon.  The  truth  is,  herein  confifts  their  Vir- 
 tue, 
 
Sea.  2.'  Of  Moral  Evil.  359 
 
 ful  things,  rather  than  to  acquire  what  is  good  and 
 agreeable.  For  whatever  we  choofe  will  (as  .was 
 ihewn  before)  be  ip/b  fa^o  good  and  agreeable,  ex- 
 cept it  lead  us  into  Ibmething  contrary  to  the  Ap- 
 petites, or  othcrwife  abfurd.  The  Undeiftanding 
 therefore  points  out  and  admoniflies  us  (as  we  faid 
 before)  to  avoid  thefe  external  Evils,  or  to  embrace 
 the  Good  :  but  till  we  have  exerted  an  Ad  of  Elec- 
 tion about  them,  neither  is  the  one  abfolutely  plea- 
 A  a  4.  ling 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 tue,  their  Goodnefs  and  Merit,  that  having  the  power  to 
 ^choofe  amifs  they  will  not,  and  being  pofTefled  of  a  Faculty 
 which  they  may  either  ufe  well  or  abufe,  they  imploy  it  to 
 the  belt.  Thus  we  may  underftand  how  the  Saints  and  An- 
 gels are  confirm'd  in  Goodnefs,  not  mechannically,  or  by  a 
 phvfical  reftraint  on  their  Wills,  but  by  the  lirninefs  of  their 
 refolution  and  lleadinefs  of  choice.  If  the  cale  were  other- 
 wiie,  their  Virtue  were  no  Virtue,  nor  any  way  praife  worthy; 
 they  would  be  good  Creatures,  as  the  Sun  is  gQod,  but  no 
 more  thanks  to  them  than  to  him. 
 
 Let  us  confider  farther,  that  tho'  the  Angels  and  Blefled  in 
 Heaven  fhould  havp  loll  their  Freedom  fo  far  as  not  to  be  able 
 to  choofe  Evil,  yet  this  doth  not  take  away  tiieir  Choice  in 
 other  aflions.  We  mull:  not  think  that  thefc  blefled  Creatures 
 are  altogether  idle,  and  have  no  buflnefs  or  exercife  of  their 
 Faculties;  they  furcly  employ  themfelves  in  what  is  good, 
 and  as  there  may  be  great  variety  of  aftlons  in  which  they  may 
 employ  themfelves  with  pleafure,  there  is  Hill  choice  enough 
 left  them,  and  the  reafon  why  one  fort  of  exercife  pleafes  thcni 
 more  than  another  arifts  from  their  Choice.  For  having  no 
 neceffities  to  fupply  by  labour  as  v/e  have  here,  no  particular 
 exercife  is  neccflary  to  them,  and  therefore  nothing  can  be 
 fuppofcd  to  make  one  exercife  more  pleafing  than  another,  but 
 their  Choice.  And  in  truth  we  coi'nt  ourfelves  the  moft  hap- 
 py here  when  we  have  no  particular  bufinefs  to  oblige  us  to 
 labour,  but  are  left  to  employ  our  time  as  we  pleafe. 
 
 But  lailly,  wc  don't  know  how  'tis  with  the  Saints  and 
 Angels  in  Heaven;  we  know  they, are  h.ippy,  but  how  or  by 
 what  means  we  are  entirely  ignorant,  and  muftbe,  till  we  get 
 there,  and  therefore  no  argument  ought  or  can  be  drawn  from 
 the  ftate  of  their  Happinefs  to  ours, 
 
360  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 fing,  nor  the  ether  dtfpleafing.      We  have  prov'd 
 
 before  that  this  is  the  Cafe,    and  it  will  be  evident 
 
 from  Experience  to  any  one  that  confiders  it.     If 
 
 then  nothing  pleafe  iis  but  what  is  in  fonie  refj^ed 
 
 chofen,    'tis   manifcfl:  that  our  llappinefs  muft  be 
 
 fought  for  in  Eledion. 
 
 He  thcie-      IV.  We  have  fnewn   above,    that  an  intelligent 
 
 fore  that    Creature,  which  is  merely  pafTive  in  its  Operations, 
 
 has  a  ree  ^^p^Q^  ^^  made  entirely  happy :  for  as  it  is  liable  to 
 
 power  ot  1     M      •  •  f)^'  ,-r    -1  •  » 
 
 chcofing,    e"Sternal    Motions    it  mult    necellarily  meet  witn 
 
 can  always  hurtful  as  v/ell  as  ufeful  Objefls;  nor  is  it  poffible 
 
 pleafe        that  all  things  ihould  be  agreeable.     It  remains  there- 
 
 himfeJf.      Iq^^^  jI^^j  ^  Creature  which  is  to  be  exempt  from 
 
 all  kind  of  Grief  fiiouid  have  the   Principle  of  his 
 
 ov/n  Happine's  within  him,  and  be  able  to  deliglit 
 
 Jjimfelf,  in  what  manner  foever  external  things  be 
 
 difpos'd ;  ;.  f.  that  he  have  the  Government  of  his 
 
 own  Actions,  and  may  pleafe  himfelf  by  willmgo 
 
 ther  this  or  fonieihipg  elfe :  Such  an  Agent  as  this 
 
 is,  will  be  fatisficd  with  any  Object   that  occurs  i 
 
 ilnce  ObjCffls  are  not  chofen  by  hun  becaufc  they 
 
 pleafe  him,  but  on  the  contrary,  pleafe  him  becaufe 
 
 they  arc  chofen.    Wiioever  therefore  has  free  Choice 
 
 may  niake  himfelf  ^happy^  viz,,  by  choofing  every 
 
 thing  which  befalls  him,    and  adapting  his  Choice 
 
 to  things. 
 
 We  can         V.  And  this  feems  to  be  the  only  way  that  Crea» 
 
 change  our  lures  can  be  made  completely  happy :  for  fince  things 
 
 Elea;ons  thtmfelves  are  neceffarily  fix'd  by  certain  Laws,   and 
 
 ^f  !^'"  !,v,  cannot  be  chan^'d,  it  remains  that  the  l],le(Si:ions  be 
 them  con-    ,      ,  ,     .         j  '^  ^       i  r  11  i  • 
 
 formrvble    alf^r  d,  m  order  to  ma^e  them  conrormapL'  to  thing'^j 
 
 to  things,  i.  e.  to  the  Will  of  God :  for  thus  free  Agents  will 
 
 and  fo  can  \i2^vQ  a  Power  in  themfelves  cf  attaining  Happinefs. 
 
 attain_^      Hence  it  is  that  we  are  fo  frec|ucnrly  admonifh'd  in 
 
 Ti^k.  Holy  Scripture  to  be  conform' d  to  Cod*-;    on  this 
 
 Point  our  Salvation  and  Happinefs  turn  :  And  with 
 
 good 
 
 ♦  Rom.  12.  2.  Co/.J/l  3.  1,  2,  ^c. 
 
Scv^.  2.  Of  Moral  Evil.  36; 
 
 p-ood  reafon ;  for  what  is  Happinefs,  if  not  to  be  in 
 every  thing  as  we  will  or  choofe  \  But  he  who  choo- 
 fes  to  conform  himlelf  in  all  things  to  the  Divine 
 Will,  muft  certainly  be  always  what  |ie  would  be, 
 and  will  never  be  difappointed  in  his  Choice  :  how- 
 ever external  things  fall  out,  a  Perfon  thus  difpos'd 
 may  enjoy  Happinefs,  nor  does  any  one  feem  to 
 have  been  capable  of  it  on  other  terms. 
 
 VI.  But  perfed  Happinefs,  may  fome  fay,  is  not  Care  of 
 to  be  expected;    for  thofe  Beings  which  are  united  the  Body 
 to  terreftrial   Matter  muft  neceifarily    be  affeded  ^^^J^ 
 with  the  Motions  of  it,  as  was  lliewn  before,  and  Appetites 
 cannot  bear  the  dilfolution   of  the   Body,  or  the  diflurb 
 impairing  of  irs  Organs  (which  are  yet  unavoidable)  Hlcdlions 
 without  fome  Pain  and  uneafy  Senfation.     I  confefs,  ^"  ^J^'^ 
 abfolute  Felicity  is  by  no  Means  to  be  hoped  for  in  J^^^^"  ^^^ 
 the  prefent  State  :  But  yet  the  more  our  Eledlions  hinder  our 
 are  conformable  to  things,  the  more  happy  we  are  ;  Happinefs 
 if  then  our  Eledions  were  perfedly  free,  we  fhould  frombeing 
 alfo  be  at  Liberty  to  eaioy  perfed  Happinefs :  but  P*^"^"*  ■ 
 iince  the  care  of  our  Bodies,  and  the  natural  Appe- 
 tites diflurb  our  Eledions,  and  fomef  imes  byafs  them 
 to  one  Side,  we  cannot  pleafe  ourfelves  va  Eledions 
 abfolutely,    and  without  a  Mixture  of  Uneafinefs, 
 For  the'  they  afford  Delight,  and  even  greater  than 
 the  natural  Appetites,  yet  they  do  not  remove  al! 
 manner  of  Uneafinefs,   nor  extinguifh    the  Senfe 
 of  Pain.     While  therefore  we  are  in  this  State,   we 
 muft  acquiefce  in  a  mix'd  and  imperfed  Happinefs, 
 fuch  as  the  prefent  State  of  things  affords;  and  it  is 
 plain  that  this,  fuch  as  it  i*,  arifes  only  from  Elec- 
 tions.   For  tho*  we  cannot  by  mere  Eledion  always 
 extinguifli  the  Pain  and  Uneafinefs  which  arifes  from 
 pur  being  forc'd  to  bear  fuch  things  as  are  difguftftil 
 to  the  natural  Appetites,  yet  we  can  choofe  to  bear 
 thefe  things  and  pleafe  ourfelves  in  that   Choic©,* 
 the  Confcioufnefs  of  our  Powers  in  bearing  thefe 
 furpafling  the  Uneafinefs  of  Pain,  nay  perhaps  aug- 
 menting 
 
362  Gf  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 inenting  the  Fleafme  fo  fir  as  that  the  Excefs  of  it 
 fhall  overccme  the  Pain  arifing  from  the  fruftrated 
 Appetites  by  fo  many  Degrees  as  could  have  been 
 ohtain'd,  if  there  had  been  no  contrariety  between 
 them  and  the  Eledion.  For  inftance,  '\£  one  feel 
 two  Degrees  of  Pain  from  a  Diftemper,  and  receive 
 fix  Degrees  of  Pleafure  from  an  Eledion  to  bear  it 
 with  Patience  and  Decorum  \  fubftrading  two  De- 
 grees of  Pain  from  thefe  fix  of  Pleafure,  he  has  four 
 of  folid  Pleafure  remaining :  He  v/ill  be  as  happy 
 therefore  as  one  tliat  has  four  Degrees  pure  and 
 free  from  all  Pain.  If  this  be  granted  to  be  pof- 
 lible,  we  may  be  as  happy  with  the  natural  Appe- 
 tites, as  if  nature  had  given  us  none,  nor  will  there 
 be  any  caufe  to  complain  of  them.    {V.) 
 
 VII.  And 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 {U.)  The  true  advantage  of  fuch  a  Faculty  appe.-^rs  in  many 
 inliances,  as  is  obferv'd  in  the  Book.  Firft,  when  by  the 
 courfe  of  Nature  and  the  Order  of  the  World  we  are  obliged 
 to  undergo  many  things  contraiy  to  cur  natural  Appetites, 
 many  things  painful  and  difagreeable.  2dly,  when  by  the 
 weaknefs  of  our  Underttanding  we  are  obliged  to  make  choices 
 the  ccnfequence  of  which  we  cannot  forcfee,  as  it  muft  often 
 Iiappen  to  a  finite  Ur.dcrlbnding.  3dly,  when  the  general 
 good  of  the  World  requires  us  to  facrifice  our  particular  Inte- 
 reft  or  Apcetite.  I.alliy,  where  there  is  little  or  no  diffe- 
 rence in  matter  cf  choice  as  it  happens  in  moll  things  of  Life. 
 Jn  all  thefe  and  mar./  other  Cafes  the  right  ule  of  this  Facul- 
 ty gives  us  eafe  and  Satisfadlion,  and  without  it  we  muft  be  in 
 continual  torment. 
 
 If  it  be  faid  that  Reafon  tells  us  we  ought  to  be  content  and 
 fubmit  in  fuch  cafes,  and  therefore  if  the  Will  be  determined 
 by  the  hit  aft  of  the  Underibnding,  there  will  need  no  fuch 
 Faculty  as  the  Author  pleads  for,  that  can  make  a  thing  good 
 ty  choofing.  I  reply,  on  the  contrary  this  very  cafe  ihews 
 the  neceiTity  of  fuch  a  Faculty.  For  fuppofe  I  am  fick  and  feel 
 great  rain,  my  Underftanding  tells  me  this  is  unavoidable^ 
 ihat  it  is  the  Will  of  God  and  the  courfe  of  nature,  and  there- 
 fore I  ought  to  bear  it  with  patience.  If  I  have  a  power  of 
 chooiing  thus  to  bear  it,  and  by  th.-it  choice  of  making  it  plea- 
 
 fiiip; 
 
Sed:,  2.^  Of  Mural  Evil.  363 
 
 VII.  And  here,  by  the  Way,   we  may  admire  We  have 
 the  Divine  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom,    which  (fince  '■^J^^"""  *<* 
 
 /-XL-    n.    admire 
 Objeds  the  Divine 
 Wifdom 
 N  O  T  E  SI,  whicli  cre- 
 
 ated an 
 Appetite 
 fiT)g  to  me,  it  is  to  very  good  purpofe  ihat  my  Underftanding  that  has 
 makes  this  reprefentation,  for  by  means  thereof  I  obtain  a  de-  where- 
 gree  of  H.ippinefs  in    the  midft  of  all  the  natural  Evils  that  with  to 
 opprefs  mc.     But  if  I  have  no  fuch  ppv/cr  to  choofe,  or  if  I  pleafe  it- 
 choofe  and  that  choice  does  not  make  the  thing  I  fafFer  better,  felf  in  its 
 it  is  in  vain  that  my  Underftanding  makes  fuch  a  reprefentati-  own  Na- 
 on ;  it  only  tells  me  thac  I  am  miferable,    but  yields  me  no  ture,  how- 
 help.     Counfellors  arc  of  great  ufe  to  a  Perfon  that  has  a  Power  foever 
 to  execute  what  they  advife ;   otherwife  their  advices  are  in  external 
 vain,  and  only  ferve  to  augment  thcPerfon's  Mifery  by  (hewing  things  be 
 his  impotence  to  help  himfelf.     'Tis  thus  between  the  Under-  difpofed. 
 Handing  and  the  Will,  if  wc  fuppofe  no  power  in  the  Will 
 by  chooling  to  make  Objeds  agreeable  or  difagreeable,  it  is  in 
 vain  for  the  Underftanding  to  advile  us  to  chooie  them.     To 
 what  purpofe  Ihould  we  choofe  them,  when  our  Choice  can 
 make  no  alteration  in  them  as  to  their  Goqd  or  Evil  Quali- 
 ties ? 
 
 But  here  it  will  be  faid  that  antecedent  to  the  Choice  there 
 is  a  goodnefs  in  bearing  ficknefs  patiently,  and  the  Under- 
 ilandingby  reprefenting  that  Goodnefs  to  the  Will  determines 
 it  to  choofe  it,  and  from  that  fenfe  of  Good  arifes  the  plcafure 
 and  eafe  we  find  in  Patience.  But  this  I  thmk  is  a  plain 
 miftake :  for  we  oftgn  find  one  Man  of  better  ienfe  than  ano- 
 ther uneafy  und^r  pain,  whilft  the  weaker  makes  it  eafy  ta 
 himfelf. 
 
 If  you  difcourfe  thcfe  two,  you'll  find  that  the  Man  of  bet- 
 ter Underftanding  has  a  much  clearer  reprefentation  of  all  Mo- 
 tives that  may  induce  patience  than  the  other ;  knows  exadly 
 all  the  benefits  of  Contentment,  and  how  rquch  it  is  his  in- 
 tcreft  to  comply  with  his  circumftances  i  and  yet  he  does  i,^ 
 not.  How  theji  comes  this  difi'erence  ?  Whence  can  it  arifc 
 but  from  this,  that  the  one  choofes  to  comply  and  tiae  othc^ 
 does  not?  If  it  be  merely  the  reafons  and  motives  being  more 
 advantageoufly  reprefented  to  one  Man  than  the  other,  that 
 makes  the  one  patient  and  the  other  impatient  under  pain ; 
 either  that  reprefentation  arifes  from  fome  free  aft  of  the  Will 
 or  from  fome  natural  or  accidental  difpofition,  inclination, 
 pr  ^ircumlhnce  of  the  A^ent.  If  from  a  fre?  adl  of  the 
 •     ■  •  Will; 
 
364  Of  Moral  EvU.        Chap.  V. 
 
 Objcifls  ar£  generally  fix'd  and  ccnfin'd  under  cer- 
 tain Laws^  could  create  an  Appetite  that  ihould 
 
 have 
 
 jsror  E  s. 
 
 Will;  then  it  rccnrrs  to  what  was  pleaded  fpr  at  the  firfl, 
 I'iz.  that  wc  are  pleafed  becaufe  we  choo(e.  But  if  the  re- 
 prefcntation  that  determines  our  Choice  arifc  from  any  natural 
 or  accidental  difpofitinn,  ^c.  thefe  being  all  external  to  the 
 Will,  and  out  of  its  power,  'tis  plain  the  determination  can't 
 be  free.  He  is  a  happy  Man  to  whom  fuch  a  difpofition,  iff(. 
 happens,  but  he  can't  be  look'd  c;i  as  more  virtuous  or  com- 
 mendable than  he  that  choofes  ill  becaufe  he  wants  them.  lie 
 may  be  commended,  as  oold  or  Je-vels  are,  becaufe  he  has 
 ibme  things  that  agree  to  our  defires,  but  not  as  an  Agent  that 
 merits  thanks  or  praife  for  Virtue. 
 
 And  here  I  muft  obferve  that  the  generality  of  Men  imagine 
 that  every  thing  anteccden\]y  to  choxe  is  either  Good  or  Evil, 
 and  we  fo  far  concerned  in  it,  that  except  we  could  poife  th& 
 whole  World  exactly,  and  ballr.ncc  all  fjwre  coniequence? 
 with  refpetl:  to  our  convenience  or  inconvenience,  we  could 
 never  perform  any  a£l  but  what  xnoCt  either  contribute  to  our 
 Happinefs  or  hinder  it.  But  this  is  a  moft  falfe  Suppofition 
 and  contrary  to  reafon  as  v/ell  as  experience.  For  it  liappens 
 in  a  thoufand  Inftances  that  the  things  we  choofe  areoffo 
 little  moment  as  to  be  pcrfcftly  indifferent  to  us,  and  that  only 
 pieafes  beil  which  we  choofe.  A  Man  is  walking  in  a  bowl- 
 ing-green, the  exercife  of  his  Limbs  is  all  -that  he  defigns,  and 
 %vhich  way  focvcr  he  walks  he  is  equally  pleafed.  But  if  any 
 hinder  him  after  he  has  chofe  his  way,  or  force  him  to  a  diffe- 
 rent one,  it  will  provoke  his  Anger,  and  perhaps  put  him  on 
 a  Quarrel  that  may  colt  him  his  Life. 
 
 There's  no  neceffity  therefore  that  to  make  an  cqaillbrium 
 for  the  Will,  the  World  fhould  be  fc  divided  that  all  imprcffi- 
 ons  from  one  part,  and  ihe  other,  fhould  be  aftually  equal, 
 for  as  a  Man  may  turn  the  beam  of  a  bnllance  v/ith  his  hand^ 
 tho' as  many  weights  lie  in  the  other  Scale  as  it  can  hold; 
 fo  the  Will  may  determine  indi,  rho'  all  the  confidcraticns 
 the  World  aftbrds  lay  in  op'iofitior)  to  the  thi.ig  v.'c  choofe  j  bui: 
 it  ofren  happens  that  the  World  affords  none  at  all  either  way, 
 and  then  the  Will  turns  the  balhnce  as  it  pieafes.  And  in 
 truth,  if  our  Happinefs  were  conccrn'd  in  every  circumilance 
 of  Life,  it  were  unreafonable  to  oblige  u:  to  choofe  before  '.v^ 
 
Sea  2.  Of  Moral  Evil.  36^ 
 
 have  wherewith  to  fatisfy  it  within  itfelf ;  and  might 
 render  any  State  agroeablCi    barely  by  willing  it. 
 
 Now 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 we  knew  them  all,  which  is  impoltiMe,  and  To  God  would 
 have  made  a  right  Choice  to  depend  on  an  impoilible  Condi- 
 tion. Whereas  if  tve  have  a  power  by  the  pleafiiie  of  our 
 Choice  to  ballance  the  inconvcniencics  that  happen  from  out- 
 xvard  things^  it  rafficlenily  juilifies  the  Divine  Good.ids,  tho" 
 he  has  put  us  in  fuch  Circumftances  that  it  is  impofTible  always 
 to  regulate  our  Choice  as  we  would  have  done,  had  we  fore- 
 feea  all  the  Cenfequences  that  attend  it. 
 
 But  here  'tis  urged,  that  tho''  a  Man  doth  not  always  per- 
 ceive the  rcafon  which  determines  him  to  choofe  one  of  the 
 two  things  that  fcem  pf  rfccily  equal,  yet  there  is  always  fome 
 fecret  imprefTion  that  does  determine  him.  But  this  is  to  lup- 
 pofe  the  very  th'ng  in  Quellion ;  juit  as  if  i  Man  fhou'd  go 
 about  to  folve  an  Objeftion,  to  which  he  cou'd  iind  no  oth(?r 
 anfwer,-  by  telling  the  Objedlor  that  it  cou'd  net  bo  true,  bc- 
 caufe  if  it  were,  the  pofition  againlt  which  he  produced  it  mufl 
 be  faife, 
 
 In  fhc.-t,  we  prove  the  Freedom  and  liidifterence  of  the 
 Will  by  producing  many  Injftances  where  there  is  no  motive  to 
 determine  it  one  way  more  than  the  other ;  Nay,  when  alT 
 vif?ble  Motives  are  againft  if.  To  which  the  Enemies  of  Free- 
 will reply,  'tis  true,  they  can't  produce  or  find  any  reafon  ; 
 but  there  is  one,  tho'  imperceptible  to  the  Man  that  choofcs* 
 as  well  as  to  the  rell  of  the  World.  Which  as  it  is  faid  with- 
 out rdafon  needs  none  toconfiite  it, 
 
 Sut  they  ought  to  remember  that  to  choofe  any  thing  for  a 
 reafon  not  known  or  obferv'd;  is  to  choofe  without  reafon? 
 a  reafon  unknown  is  no  reafon  at  all,  except  they'll  fay  that 
 the  vVill  is  determm'd  as  mechanically  as  matter  is  by  impulfe. 
 
 But  we  Carry  the  Matter  yet  much  farther,  and  fliew  that 
 where  there  are  'many  and  ftrong  Motives,  great  conveniency 
 and  agreeabltnefs  to  our  natural  Appitites  on  one  fide,  and  no- 
 thing but  the  exercife  of  our  Liberty  on  the  otiier,  we  often 
 prefei-  that  to  all  thefe  Motives,  and  are  well  pleafsd  with 
 ourfelves,  when  we  have  done  lb. 
 
 The  Men  that  might  live  an  eafy  and  quiet  Life  engage  in 
 hufinefs,  toil  and  labour,  and  every  one  is  fc  well  pleafed  with 
 his  Choice,  that  xi  i?  hard  tQ  fay  amongrt  h  many  Hates,  and 
 
 fuch 
 
366  Of  Moral  EvW.         Chap.V. 
 
 Now  Free-Will  has  this  EfFed  by  accommodating 
 itfelf  to  Objeds,  when  the  Objects  themfelves  can- 
 not be  chang'd.  For  the  Man  will  be  no  lefs  hap- 
 py who  choofes  what  he  knows  will  come  to  pafs, 
 than  he  who  brings  that  to  pafs  which  he  choofes ; 
 the  one  may  be  always  done,  the  other  is  often  im- 
 poilible :  this  therefore,  or  none,  is  the  W^y  to 
 arrive  at  Happincfs.  'Tis  hard  to  comprehend  how 
 he  can  fail  of  Happinefs  who  has  it  in  his  Power 
 to  pleafe  himfelf.  This  feems  to  have  been  the  Opi- 
 nion 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 fuch  variety  of  Conditions,  which  are  moft  happy:  and  tho' 
 they  fometimes  complain  ivhen  preffcd  with  inconveniencies, 
 yet  as  Horace  obferVes,  hardly  one  would  change  if  an  Option 
 were  given  him.  If  the  things  themfelves  pleafe  abftraftedly 
 from  Choice,  moft  Men  being  of  one  Make,  and  having  the 
 fame  Pafiions,  Wants  and  Appetites,  thofe  only  that  had  all 
 things  fuitable  to  thofe  Appetites  cou'd  be  pleafed,  and  all  the 
 World  wou'd  be  confined  to  one  v.'ay  of  living. 
 
 But  as  Happinefs  arifcs  from  the  Choice,  it  fo  happens  that 
 in  the  great  variety  of  Circiimftances  wherein  Men  arc  placed, 
 they  generally  are  pretty  equally  happy,  becaufe  they  enjoy 
 their  Choice.  A  Mariner's  is  a  life  that  feems  intolerable  to 
 me,  and  deftitute  of  all  thofe  things  that  are  agreeable  to  my 
 natural  Appetites ;  fuppofe  then  I  am  forced  to  that  kind  of 
 Lite,  muft  I  needs  be  miferable  ?  No,  I  will  andean  m.ike  it 
 my  choice ;  not  from  any  Motive  v/hich  my  Undeftanding 
 affords  me,  for  it  reprcfents  it  as  difagrceable  in  every  rcfpeft: 
 But  I  will  choofe  it  and  refolve  to  follow  it,  that  it  may  pleafe 
 me,  and  by  the  force  of  that  Choice  it  will  at  length  become 
 agreeable. 
 
 If  it  be  faid  that  the  necefTity  which  is  on  me  to  lead  that 
 fort  of  Life  determines  my  Choice  ;  1  anfwer,  that  qu'te  con- 
 trary ;  notliing  is  more  oppofite  to  choice  than  lorce,  and  we 
 find  nothing  is  apter  to  make  us  rejeil  and  be  difplcafed  with  a 
 thing  than  to  fee  it  forced  on  us.  My  being  ibrced  theretbre 
 on  Ship-board  would  lather  raifcan  averfion  than  pleafurc  in 
 me ;  but  as  foon  as  bv  the  power  of  my  Frcc-\>  ill  I  refolve 
 to  live  that  Life,  and   be  pleafed  with  it,  I  find  the  plcaiure 
 
 begin 
 
Se6t.  2.  Of  Moral  Evil.  367 
 
 nion  of  the  ancienc  Stoizi-,  who  had  the  fame 
 thoughts  of  Liberty  with  thofe  laid  down  above, 
 but  did  not  explain  them  difrindly,  nor  compre- 
 hend the  whole  Series  of  the  Matter, 
 
 However,  'tis  very  plain  that  they  placed  Hap- 
 pinefs  in  the  Ufe  and  Election  of  fuch  things  as  arc 
 in  our  own  Power ,-  which  yet  would  be  impofiible, 
 if  we  were  not  able  to  pleafe  ouiLlves  in  Elec- 
 tion.   (5  p.; 
 
 SECT. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 begin  and  grow  upon  me.  If  there  be  any  Wifdom  in  the 
 World,  undoubtedly  this  is  the  Mailer- piece,  to  make  alJ 
 things  eafy  to  us  by  choofing  theftatc  and  condition  of  Life  in 
 which  neccifity  has  placed  us. 
 
 But  my  Underftanding  reprefentaig  the  evil  and  hardfhip  of 
 a  thing  with  the  neceflity  of  bearing  it,  v/ill  no  way  contri- 
 bute to  my  eafe,  except  at  the  fame  time  it  aiTure  me  that  I 
 can  take  away  or  diminiOi  the  natural  Evil  that  accompanies  it, 
 if  I  choofe  to  endure  it  with  Contentment,  Without  this  the 
 Confideration  of  the  neceifu y  that  is  upon  me  would  rather 
 cncreafe  the  difficulty  and  nneafmcfs  I  feel,  than  allay  it;  as 
 knowing  the  danger  of  a  Jiftemper  encreafes  a  Man's  fear  of 
 Death,  if  at  ihe  llinie  time  no  remedy  be  ofter'd. 
 
 In  fhort,  the  Exercii'e  ot  this  Faculty  of  making  thing'; 
 agreeable  by  Cho'ice  is  all  the  remedy  Nature  aHbrds  us  under 
 unavoidable  fuflerings  ;  if  we  have  it  not,  we  have  none  ;  and 
 if  we  have,  it  takes  oiF  the  complaint  vve  make  againft  God 
 for  putting  us  in  fuch  Circamftances  where  we  neceiiarily 
 mull  undergo  fuch  Evils, 
 
 (59.)  Our  Author's  menticp.ing  the  5/ci/a  here,  m'ght  pro- 
 bably give  Leibnitz,  his  reafon  to  fjfpedl  him  of  maintaining 
 all  the  abfurd  Confcqucr.ces  which  that  SeCl  are  faid  to  have 
 dr.ivvn  from  the  above  mentioned  Principle.  Th-y  indeed  (if 
 they  be  not  greatlv  tnifrcprefontcd)  urg'd  it  io  far  as  to  aflert, 
 that  nothing  external  could  hurt  or  incommode  us  except  we 
 pleas'd  :  That  all  Good  and  Evil  was  entirely  in  our  Power 
 and  of  our  making;  and  confequently  that  all  outward  things 
 were  indifferent  and  alike  to  us,  antecedent  tc  our  ovv'n  Choice. 
 Which  Notions,  being  contrary  to  every  Day'*  Experience  in 
 
 Pleafur© 
 
368 
 
 Of  Moml  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Pleafure  and  Pain,  led  them  on  to  deny  that  tlic  latter  was; 
 properly  an  Evi?,  or  rather  that  there  was  any  difference  at  all 
 between  them.  This  Dodirine  is  indeed  liable  to  Leibvitx^i 
 Objedlions  of  confounding  all  the  diftinftions  of  things,^ 
 
 of  contradicting  the  natural  Appetites, making  Pvcafon  and 
 
 Underftanding  ufelefs, and  iiibverting  all  the  other  Facul- 
 ties of  the  Mind.  Thefe  and  the  like  Refleftions,  I  fay,  are 
 jultly  made  upon  the  Dodlrine  of  the  Stoics,  as  they  have  ge- 
 nerally exprefs'd  themfelves ;  and  overthrow  a  total,  abfolute 
 Indifference  of  the  Mind  to  will  in  all  Cafes ;  but  are  nothing 
 at  all  to  our  Author,  who  never  contended  for  it ;  but  on  the 
 contrary,  infills  upon  a  nccefTary,  fix'd,  and  unalterable  diffe- 
 rence in  the  Natures  of  things,  according  to  the  prefent  Sy- 
 ftem ;  and  has  allow'd  their  tull  force  to  both  Reafon  and  the 
 natural  Appetites,  ail  over  the  laft  Seftion,  as  well  as  in  the 
 foregoing  Chapters  of  this  Book. 
 
 But  this  has  been  explain'd  in  the  Notes  above.  For  an 
 application  of  this  Sedion  See  §.5.  SubfcCt.  2.  and  ^he 
 Notes  to  §.  5.  Subfed.  3. 
 
Scd  3.  Of  Mora/  Evil.  369 
 
 SECT.     III. 
 
 Concerniiig  undue  EleBmis^ 
 
 I.  T7II.OM  hence  it  is  fufficiciitly  evident  what '^o^'^'^ 
 X    kind  of  Eleifl  ions  are  to  be  called  undue  ones :     ?'^''  °^ 
 Por  it  appears  that  Gcd  ha*:  given  us  this  Faculty  choofe  is 
 of  chooling,  that  we  may  plcafe  oiirfelves  in  the  ule  Mifery ; 
 of  it,    and  be  happy   in  ihe  fruition  of  thofe  Ob-  we_ choofe 
 jeds  which  we  choofe.      For  it  is  a  Happinefs  to  ^,^^ 
 
 •  •        \         '•  i>  jT\iT  r     r    therefore 
 
 o5tain  tiie  tnings  cho  r-n,  and  Muery  to  Le  Iruf-  ^^,|^g„  ^, ,, 
 trated  and  fall  Ihort  of  them.      Whcnfcever  there-  choofe 
 fore  we  knowingly  make  fuch  a  Choice^  as  not  to  be  '^^'hat  csn- 
 able  to  enjoy  the  things  chofen,    'tis  pfcin  that  we  ?°^,^"^^  ^"' 
 choofe  foolillily  and  unduely  :  for  \ve  br  ng  upon  ^Li 
 ourfelves  unnecciTary  iVJiicry,  fince  we  could  have  done  ift. 
 chofen  otherwise  with  equal    Pleafurc.      Whoever  when  fuch 
 then  choofes  knowingly  what  he  cannot  obtain,    or  ^'"rigs  are 
 wh'dt  may  produce  unneceffa'-y   trouble   to  himfcif  *^^°  .^"  ^^ 
 or  other?,    he   mult  be  elteem  o  to  cnoofe  undnely.  rjje. 
 And  this  may  be  done,  Mrlf,  If  any  one  choofe  /»?-  " 
 foffib'ilities,      it  may  feem  ftrange  rhit   any    Perfon 
 fnould  choofe  a  thing  which  is  imoolTible,  knowing 
 it  to  be  fo  ;  but  'tis  very  probable  that  this  has  hap- 
 pen'd  fometimes,  as  was  /aid  b  fore.  ^ 
 
 n.  Secondly,  If  he  choofe  fuch  things  as  are  /;>  SecondJyj 
 conftflent  with  each  other  :  he  that   does  iliis  contra-  Wheu 
 dicls  himfelf,    and   evidently   cuts  off  all   hopes   of  ^^^'■'^ 
 Enjoyment.      When  we  will  any  thmf?,    v/e  muft  ^^''^S^  ^-^^ 
 take  all  its  neceilary  confequences  together  wiih  it.  v/hich  are 
 
 B  b  But   inconfijlent 
 
 wirh   esch 
 
 *  Sscl.  I.  Subfcwl.  ^.  r,nr,  lo,  ii.  iz.  ether. 
 
270  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 But  all  tilings  here  are  of  a  mix'd  kind,  and  nothing 
 is  pure  from  all  degrees  of  BitrerncTs :    we  often 
 therefore  will  that  part  in  a  certain  thing  which  is 
 agreeable  to  the  Appetites,  and  refufe  tlie  reft:  but 
 this  is  in  vain,  fince  the  agreeable  Parts  cannot  be 
 feparated  from  the  difagrecable  ones :  we  muft  there- 
 fore either  choofe  or  rejcd:  the  whole.      He  than 
 does  otherwife  cannot  polllbly  (ati':fy  himfelf,  fince 
 he  muft  benr  with  what  he  wouid  not ;  He  is  there- 
 fore voluntarily  unhappy  by  an  undue  Eledlon. 
 Thirdly,         III.  Thirdly,  he  mufl:  be  efteem'd  to  choofe  un- 
 If  the         duely,    who  aims  at  fuch  things  as  he  knows  are 
 *]'"r^^  ,^    not  in  his  Power.      For  it  is  a  hazard  whether  he 
 not  in  the  cnjc/ys  thofe  things  that  are  not  in  his  Powers  and 
 power  of    it  is  fcolifh  to  commit   cur  Happinefs  to  Chance ; 
 the  Elec-    v.hile  therefore  it  is  in  our   Power  to  choofe  only 
 '^^'  fuch  things  as  we  are  certain  of  obtaining,  we  risk 
 
 our  Happmefs,  or  throw  it  away  when  we  purfue 
 Uncertainties :  Nov/  we  owe  as  much  Happinefs  to 
 ourfelves  as  is  in  our  Power,   and  oughi  to  ufe  our  ut- 
 mofl:  Endeavours  to  attain  it ;   but  we  lofe  this  by 
 undue  Ele<5lion  when  v.e  delire  thofe  things  which 
 we  know  to  be  out  of  our  Power. 
 ?ourthly,       IV.     Fourthly,  Thst  alfo  is  an  undue  Eledion, 
 If  any        which  obliges  US  to  feize  thofe  things  that  are  law- 
 f^o^^        fully  occupy'd  by  the  Eledions  of  other  Men.     To 
 th^twhich  j^g  aifappoinred  of  an  Ekdion  is  Mifery,  aswefaid 
 
 3S  pre-oc-     ,     r  •  •       tt        •      r  i-  i 
 
 cupy'd  by  before,-  to  enjoy  it,  Happjnei?.      Everyone  there- 
 the  lawful  fore  that  is  endovs^'d  with  a  Power  of  choofing,  has 
 Choice  of  g  right  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  thing  chofen,  fo  far 
 others.        35  [^  ncceffary  to  the  Exercife  of  his  own  Faculties, 
 and  is  no  impediment  to  the  Good  of  others.     But 
 he  muft  he  ctteem'd  an  impediment  to  the  Good  of 
 others,  who  will  appropriate  to  himfelf  what  is  com- 
 mon, or  affume  more  and  greater  Advantages  from 
 the  common  Stock  than  fall  to  his  Share.     Thofe 
 things  then  which  are  preoccupy'd  by  the  Choice  of 
 other  Men  belons:  to  the  Choofers?  and  cannot  juft'- 
 
Seel.  3.  Of  Moral  Evil.  371 
 
 ly  be  taken  from  them  :  therefore  he  that  covets 
 them  v/ould  have  what  is  not  his  due :  i.  c.  endea- 
 vours by  an  undue  Eledion  to  rob  others  of  their 
 Right.  This  is  to  be  referr'd  in  an  efpecial  Man- 
 ner to  fujh  things  as  are  pre-occupy'd  by  rhe  Choice 
 of  the  D.Mtv  ,  for  thefe  are  to  be  efteem'd  bv  all  as 
 facred  and  prohibited :  nor  can  any  one  meet  v/ith 
 Succefs  that  oppoi'es  himfelf  to  God,  and  choofes 
 what  God  difapproves.  For  what  God  v/ills  muf|: 
 necelTarily  come  to  pafs,  but  God  wills  the  Happi- 
 nefs  of  all  ivlen  as  far  as  it  is  poifible  ,•  therefore  he 
 that  offends  unneccffarily  againft  the  Happinefs  of 
 ?.ny  one,  is  fiippos'd  to  offend  again/l  God,  and  to 
 choofe  what  is  not  his  due. 
 
 V.  Fifthly,   On  this  account  it  is  unlawful  for  Fifthl)--, 
 us  to  delire  thofe  thin.f^s  which  are  hurtful  to  ourfelves  Wher. 
 or  others.    By  hurtful  things  I  underiland  thofe  that^'"^?'^ 
 lead  to  natural  Evils,  viz.    luch  as  are  prejudicial  to  J,yj? 
 the  Body  or  Mind.     It  appears  from  what  has  been  tind  to 
 faid,  that  thmgs  pleafe  us  becaufe  they  are  chofen,  Natural 
 but  Reafon  perfuades  us  to  abftain  from  fuch  Elec-  Evils,  are 
 tions  as  may  prove    pernicious  to  our  own  Mind"?,  ^^"I^"^ 
 or  thofe  of  others  \  or  fuch  as  defraud  the  Appetites  j\^c-ilkv 
 unneceiTarily  :  for  we  owe  a  G:atincation  to  thcfe 
 Appetites,  when  it  can  be  procured  without  greater 
 Detriment.     Therefore  an  Eleftion  oppofed  to  thefe 
 gratis.,  and  without  any  reafon,  mufu   be  jud.^'d  an 
 undue  one,  becaufe  it  deprives  us  of  the  due  Enjoy  ■=■ 
 ment  of  our  Appetites.  {W.) 
 
 B  b  z  SECT. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 \W.)  It  has  been  objefled,  that  'tis  a  ContradidJon  for  God 
 to  create  fuch  a  Facully  as  is  above  defcrib'd,  and  yet  that  it 
 fhou'd  cl'iOofe  amifs:  for  what  can  be  amifs  to  a  Faculty  that 
 can  make  every  thing  good  by  choofing  it  ?  But  the  anfwer  is 
 plain,  the  Faculty  is  not  ib  indifferent  but  it  has  Limitations, 
 ■AvA  he  that  has  limits   certainly   docs    amifs  by  rranfgrefiing 
 
 the.m. 
 
372  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 them.  Tho'  there  is  a  natural  Power  in  the  Will  f'o  choofe  a 
 thing  in  oppofition  to  all  its  natural  Appetites  and  the  didtates 
 of  the  Underftanding,  and  hereby  to  give  itfelf  feme  degree  ox 
 pleafure  for  the  time,  and  we  fee  that  it  forrictimcs  doth  fo  ; 
 yet  the  Evils  that  proceed  from  fuch  an  exorbitant  exercife 
 of  this  noble  Faculty  plainly  fliew  that  it  ought  not  have  done 
 fo;  and  the  Author  never  faid  or  imagin'd  any  one  would 
 think  he  meant  that  Wifdom  and  Prudence  were  ufelefs  to  fuch 
 an  Agent,  or  that  he  ought  not  to  regulate  the  exercife  of  this 
 Faculty  fo  as  to  prevent  its  choofing  impoffible,  abfur'd  or  in- 
 confiftent  things,  or  the  clalhing  of  his  Choice  with  his  na- 
 tural Appetites  and  their  Satisfaftion.  A  King  muft  have  a 
 Power  to  punifh  his  wicked  Subjcfls  with  Death,  and  to  re- 
 ward thofe  that  deferve  it  with  Honours  and  Riches;  if  he 
 had  not  this  Power,  he  could  not  govern.  But  fliall  he  there- 
 fore kill  the  innocent  and  fquander  away  his  Favours  on  the 
 undeferving  ?  So  Man  has  Free-will  by  which  he  may  choofe 
 Objefts,  and  gratify  himfelf  in  the  Choice;  doth  it  therefore 
 follow  that  he  may  choofe  things  impoflible,  things  beyond 
 his  power,  or  contrary  to  his  natural  Appetites  ?  Yet  if  he 
 had  not  this  natural  Power  to  choofe,  he  could  no  more  be 
 happy,  than  a  Prince  could  govern  that  had  not  the  Power  cf 
 Rewards  and  Punifhments. 
 
 <*f»> 
 
Sed,  4.  Of  Moral  Evil.  37^ 
 
 SECT.     IV. 
 
 How  it  is  poffihle  for  us  to  fall  into 
 undue  Ele&ions. 
 
 I.  «  np  I  S  difficult  to  compreliend,  as  was  faid  be-  This  is 
 
 A  fore,  how  one  can  fall  iliorc  of  Happi-  done  (wt 
 nefs  who  has  it  in  his  Power  to  pleaf'e  himfelf;  yet  ^^'^^^^ 
 if  he  choolc  in  the  foregoing  Manner,  or  the  like, 
 he  muft  neceflarily  fail  of  his  Choice,  and  his  Ap- 
 petite be  fi-uftrated,  /.  e,  he  mufl  be  unhappy.  Buc 
 how  is  it  polTible,  you'll  fay,  that  any  one  fliould 
 make  fuch  a  Choice '  1 1  aniVer,  This  may  pro- 
 ceed firHr,  from  Error  or  Ignorance.  Secondly,  fiom 
 Inadvertency  or  Negligence.  Thirdly,  from  Levity, 
 fourthly,  from  a  confrafled  Habit.  FiftWy,  from 
 other  Appetites  implanted  in  us  by  Nature.  Not  that 
 the  Will  can  be  determin'd  by  thefe,  or  any  thing 
 die  which  is  external ;  but  that  from  hence  it  takes 
 an  handle  and  occalTon  of  determining  itfelf,  which 
 it  would  not  have  had  otherwife. 
 
 II.  Firft,  As  to  the  firfl:  of  thefe,  we  have  pro-  Firft,  B7 
 ved  before  that  we  are  liable  to  Errors  and  Igno-  Error  or 
 lance ;  and  that  this  is  to  be  reckon'd  among  natu-  ig^Qrance. 
 ral  Evils.     When  therefore  we  arc  forc'd  to  choofe 
 among  things   not  fufficiently  knov/n,   our  Errors 
 are  not  to   be  charg'd  upon  us,   nor  is  it  credible 
 that  God  will  fuffer  them  ro  prove  fatal  to  us.    Buc 
 when  we  are  under  no  manner  of  Neceility,  an  E- 
 ledion  ofcen  prefents  itfelf  to  us  in  Matters   fuffi- 
 ciently underftood,  and  then  we  hurry  on  without  a 
 B  b  5  ftrift 
 
 t  See  Locke'i  Chapter  of  Power  §,  5  7.  ^c. 
 
374  QA  -^^^^'^^  Evil         Chap.  V 
 
 fliift  and  careful  Enquiry,  and  choofe  Impoffibili- 
 tie,  O'c.  and  rhcietore  are  not  cmrely  free  from 
 Fault,  fince  wc  ought  to  dv-libira.e  and  examine  things 
 before  Blciflion. 
 
 c       ,,  III.  Secondly,    Thefe  undue  El^vTlions  therefore 
 
 Secondly,  ,  i    •'^ ,  t-       i  r     i        i       ^ 
 
 By  Neoli-  ^^y  happen  rbro  Inadf ertenry,  for  by  due  Care  we 
 
 gence.  "      might  pcrccivc  the  Good  and  Evil  which  is  in  Ob- 
 jctfrs,-  but  being  neghgent  and  fupine,   we  are  fre- 
 quently inipofed  upon,   and  fuffer   for  cur   Ncgh- 
 gcncc,  by  i  ailing  into  the  foremeniion'd  Inccnveni- 
 encies. 
 Thirdlv         ^^^^'  ^^  ^^  the  Third,  Since  the  Fleafureof  a  free 
 By  giving   Agent  confifts  in  Elediorj,    'tis  no  wonder  that  he 
 too  great    gives  hiitifelf  as  large  a  Scope  as  he  can  in  the  Ex' 
 Jndul-       ercife  of  ir.     Neirher  will  it  be  any  thing  furprifing, 
 ifhe  Excr-  ^^  ^"  ^^^^  ^^^^^  Exercife  of  Eleflions,    he  fornetimes 
 cife  of       trcnTgrefs  the   Bounds  prefcri/J  him  by  God  and 
 Election.    Narurei  and  light  upon  fome  things  which  are  at- 
 tended with  no  very  profpcrous  I  flue,  (viz,,  Abfur* 
 ditiesand  ImpoflTibiliLies)  In'icc  he  will  atiempt  every 
 thing.     For  he  plca'es  himfclfin  the  Trial,  tho'  he 
 be  unfortunate  in  the  Event ,-  but  this  is  no  Excufei 
 for  every  one  is  obliged  to  take  care  of  himfelf,  lef^ 
 he  be  too  fond  of  indulging  new   Elcdions,    and 
 from  Levity  become  unducly  troublefome  to  hini- 
 fclf  or  others. 
 Fourthly,  ,    V.  Fourthly,  We  fee  that  frequent  Choice  creates 
 By  Otjli-    an  Habit ;  this  feems  to  proceed  from  hence,  that  as 
 ^acy,vx  a  we  delight  in  an  Election  often  repeated,  we  are  ea- 
 ^''       fily  induc'd  to  hope  that  the    fame  Pleafure    will 
 always  follow  the  iame  Ad,  v/hcreupon  we  grow 
 fupine  and  negligent,  and  difrcgard  the  Alterations 
 of  things  j    and  he  that  does  this  may  ealily   fall 
 into   fuch  Eledicns    as   will  not  be  attended  with 
 Succefs.     Befide,  'tis  difficult  for  us  to  change  tho^e 
 Eledions,  the  Delight  of  which  is  fix'd  and,  as  it 
 were,    riveted  in  the  Mind  by    frequent   Experi- 
 ence:   Yet  we  are  not  excufable  for  rufliing  upon 
 
 abfurd 
 
Sea  4:  Of  Moral  Evil  375 
 
 abfurd  and  impoflible  tilings,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
 Uneafinefs  attending  the  Change  of  Eleftion.  And 
 if  we  fearch  into  the  Cafe  more  narrowly,  we  fhail 
 find  that  rroft  undue  Eledions  arife  from  this  un- 
 feafonabie  Perfeverance,  all  v/hich  defervedly  come 
 under  the  Charader  of  culpable  Obdinacy. 
 
 VI.  Fifthly,    It  ha^  been  often  hinted,   that  we  Fifthly. 
 confift  of  a  Soul  and  Body,   that  thefe  arc  mutual-  j,^  g^rm- 
 1y  affeded  by  each  other,  and  that  from  hence  va-  nityofthe 
 nous  Appetites  arife  in  us,  fuch  as  ihe  Prefervation  natural 
 of  the  Body,  Defire  of  Oifspring,    and  the  likej  ^m'^tcs. 
 and  whatever  is  an  impediment  to  thele,  we  reckon 
 hurtful.     If  therefore  we  be  not  upon  our  Guard, 
 
 we  are  hurried  on  by  the  Importunity  of  them  to 
 AbJurdities,  or  when  we  give  a  loo!e  to  our  Elec- 
 tions, we  grafp  at  fuch  things  as  olfer  an  unnecefTary 
 Violence  to  them :  hence  arife  an  immenfe  train  of 
 Unealinefles  to  ourfelves  and  others ;  hence  comes 
 Violence  and  Injury  to  our  Nature  and  the  Natu- 
 ral Appetite?,  to  which  we  owe  at  leaft  a  moderate 
 Indulgence  :  hereupoii  we  raihly  and  unlawfully  feize 
 thofe  things  that  are  pre -occupied  by  the  Eledions 
 or  Appetites  of  other  Men  ;  nay,  are  not  fo  cautious 
 as  to  refrain  from  what  is  determia'd  by  the  Will 
 of  God  himfelf :  from  thefe  and  the  like  Occafjons 
 it  happens  that  we  abufe  our  Liberty,  and  by  un- 
 due Eleftions  bring  natural  Evils  upon  ourfelves  or 
 others.  For  as  we  are  endov/d  with  Liberty  in  thefe 
 and  the  like  Cafes,  we  may  either  ufe  it  according 
 ro  the  diftate  of  Reafon,  or  abufe  it :  this  Power 
 feems  to  be  included  in  the  very  Notion  of  created 
 Jl^iberty. 
 
 VII.  It  appears  from  hence  how  cauriouHy  Elec-  f.  ^"^'^" 
 tions  ought  to  be  made;  for  tho  notning  pleafes  us  ou-^ht  not 
 but  what  is  chofen,  yet  we  do  not  only  take  delight  in  to  be  cho- 
 ihoojing^  but  much  more  in  enjojivig  the  things  chofen,  ^en,  and 
 oiherwife  it  would  be  the  fame  thing  whatever  we  ^I'-^y  E^Igc- 
 chofe  ;   we  muft  take  care  .then  that  our  Eledions  ^ot  eafily 
 
 B  b  ^  be  cluDg'd. 
 
376  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V^ 
 
 be  made  of  fiuh   things  as  we  may  always  enjoy. 
 Foi  if  they  be  of  pcnihabk  O'-jeclSj  or  inch  as  are 
 not  in  the  lead  anfwerablc  to  the  end  of  tlie  Elector, 
 he  that  chocfes  thsm  rrufl:  ncccflariiy  g^ie^  e  at  the 
 Pifappointrnent.     He  niay  avoid  this,  will  feme  fay, 
 by  changing  his  Ekdion,  when    the  tiling  cholen 
 perilhes  or  fails ;  but  it  is  to  be  obferv'd  that  L'eifti- 
 ons  are  not  chang'd   without  a  Senfe  of  Grief  and 
 Remorfe.     For  we  never  think  of  altering  them  till 
 we  are  convinc'd  thit  we  have  chofcn  amils.     When 
 therefore  we  are  difappointed  of  the  Enjoyment  of 
 what  we  have  chofen,  we  deipair,  become  mi ferable, 
 penitent,  and  confcious  of  an  Evil  Choice,  and  then 
 at  la  ft  begin  ro  alter  our  Choice;  which  cannot  be 
 done  without  an  anicious  and  uneafy  Senfe  ofDifao- 
 poinrmcnt,  and  the  more  and  longer  we  have  been 
 ?ntent  upon  any  Elcdion,  fo  much  the  greater  Pain 
 it  will   cofl:   us  to  be  forced  ro  change  it.     Hence 
 proceeds   the  Difficulty   which   we  feel  in  altering 
 EleiSions ,-  hence  many  had  rather  perfift  in  abfuid 
 Eledions  than  under;7o  the  trouble  of  altering  them  : 
 For  things  pleafe  us  becaufe  we  will  them ,  but  to 
 rcjeft  what  we  have  once  willed  is  contradiding  our- 
 felvcs,  and  cannot  be  done  without  a  very  difagree- 
 able  flruggle  and  convuHlon  of  the  JVlind :  a-,  any 
 one  may  learn  from  Experience,  (^o.) 
 
 SECT. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (60.)  Any  one  th;U  attentively  confidcn  the  Workings  of 
 his  own  Mind,  will  foon  be  fatisfy'd  oftlie  Truth  of  ?11  that 
 our  Author  here  r.dvances  ;  he  will  obferve  \^  hat  difnculty 
 and  reluctance  i^e  feels  in  receding  from  wliat  he  has  once 
 firmly  refolv'd  upon,  tho'  perhaps  he  can  perceive  no  manner 
 of  Good  in  it  except  whit  arifes  purely  from  that  Refolution. 
 To  make  a  Vifit  at  a  certain  I'ime;  to  v^'allc  to  any  particular 
 place  ;  to  recreate  oarfclves  with  this  or  that  kind  of  Diverfioh; 
 may  be  Actions  in  themfelves  perlcftly  indifferent  and  trivial: 
 but  when  once  propofcd,  even  upon  mere  whim  and  caprice, 
 and  refolv'd  on  with  as  little  rcafon,  they  become  often  as  much 
 
 the 
 
Sea.  4. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 the  Obje£ls  of  our  Hope  and  Defire,  the  thoughts  of  profecu- 
 ting  them  give  us  as  great  pleafine  and  fatisiadion,  and  we  arc 
 as  unwillingly  withdrawn  from  them,  and  as  much  difap- 
 pointed  when  we  fall  fhort  of  the  fancied  enjcyment  of  them, 
 as  we  fhoi:ld  be  in  Matters  of  the  laft  Importance.  Every  Man 
 that  has  taken  the  leall  notice  of  what  pafles  within  himfelf,  is 
 able  to  give  numberlefs  Inftances  of  the  truth  of  the  foregoing 
 Obfervation :  :.vhich  may  ferve  to  convince  us  how  great  the 
 force  and  power  o'i  Volition  is,  and  what  excellent  ufe  it  may 
 be  of  in  Life.  How  it  fiipplics  us  with  courage  and  conljancy 
 in  the  moll  arduous  Undertakings,  and  enables  us  to  furmount 
 the  grea tell  Difficulties:  how  it  qualifies  and  alleviates  our 
 Pain,  and  augments  the  Sum  of  our  Happincfs ;  and  makes  us 
 run  contentedly  the  Round  of  low  and  otherwife  tedious  pur- 
 fuits,  and  bear  with  pleafure  the  otherwife  infupportable  load 
 of  human  Woes.  This  fliews  the  great  ufefulnefs  and  necelli- 
 ty  of  fuch  a  Principle,  and  will  lead  us  to  confider  with  our 
 Author,  in  what  a  cautious  manner  ir  ought  to  be  exerted,  left 
 it  fall  upon  wrong  and  improper  Objefts,  and  thereby,  inllead 
 of  leilening,  inci-eafe  our  Mifery,  and  become  itfelfthc  greatefl 
 part  of  it.  That  this  Principle  of  Liberty,  tho'  frequently- 
 attended  with  thefe  confequences,  is  yet  a  Gift  worthy  of  the 
 moft  beneficent  Donor,  inuil  appear  from  a  general  cbmputa.- 
 tion  of  its  Good  and  Evil  Effeds,  with  regard  to  the  whole  Sy- 
 ilera,  which  will  be  the  Subjed  of  the  following  Sedions. 
 
 377 
 
57^  of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 SECT.     V. 
 
 How  Evil  EleBions  are  co?tJtJle?tt 
 with  the  Power  and  Good7iefs  of 
 God, 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    I. 
 
 Trofofes  the  Difficulty^  with  a  Preparative 
 
 to  the  Solution  of  it. 
 
 The  Evils  J.  TT  7"E  have  ilifwri  that  moral  Evils  arife  from 
 of  Free-  YV    undue  Eledion  ;  that  Eledions  are  free; 
 
 A8;ents  are        ,     ,        •    .  w  rr        r  « 
 
 riOt  necef-  ^"^^  ^"^t  It  IS  not  at  all  necellary  for  any  one  know- 
 
 fary,  and  iPgly  and  willingly  to  purfue  the  worfe.  Moral 
 Therefore  Evils  cannot  therefore  be  excufed  by  neceflity,  as 
 leein  to  be  the  natural  ones,  and  thofe  of  Imperfedion  are.  'Tis 
 by  God  P^^^*^  ^^^^  created  Nature  implies  Imperfedion  in  the 
 volurtari-  Very  terms  of  its  being  created  (lincewhat  is  abfo- 
 3y.  lurely  perfett  is  very  God)  either  therefore  nothing 
 
 ar  all  muft  be  created,  or  Tomething  imperfcft.  We 
 have  ihewn  that  by  the  fame  NeccfTuy  Natural 
 Evils  are  annex'd  to  things  naturally  imperfect,  and 
 that  God,  agreeably  to  what  infinite  Power  and 
 Goodncfs  required,  permitted  no  manner  of  Evil  in 
 Nature,  the  abfence  whereof  would  not  have  intro- 
 duced more  or  greater  Evil.  Since  therefore  Incon- 
 veniencies  attend  either  the  prefence  or  abfence  of  it, 
 God  m^de  that  which  was  accended  with  the  leaft. 
 
 7'heie 
 
Sed-  5.  Sab.  i.     Of  Moral  Evil.  379 
 
 There  ate  no  Evils  then  which  could  pofTibly  be 
 avoided,  and  therefore  they  muft  be  look'd  upon 
 as  neceflfaiy,  fince  the  Imperfedion  of  a  Creature  did 
 ;iot  admit  of  pure  and  abfolute  Good.  But  this 
 Necellity  does  not  appear  in  free  Agents :  For  the 
 Evils  incident  to  them  ktm  to  proceed,  not  from 
 imperfeftion  of  Nature,  huifree  Choice,  and  are  there- 
 fore permitted  by  God  voluntarily,  fmce  neither  the 
 Nature  of  Things,  nor  the  Good  of  the  Univerfe 
 require  the  permillion  of  them  :  that  is,  the  World 
 would  be  as  well  without  as  with  them. 
 
 ir.  ' Tis  to  be  obferv'd,  that  God  permitted  the  Moral  E^ 
 former  kind  of  Evils  bscaufe  they  were  infeparable  vilshave 
 from  things  s    either  therefore  the  things  muft  not  ^yconnec- 
 havebeen  created,  or  their  iiiherent  Evils  tolerated,  tionwitha 
 But  Evil.  EledioRS  have  no   neceffary  connexion  freeNa- 
 with  the  free  Ads  of  the  Will :   neither  does  the  '^ire,  nor 
 Nature  of  Man  require  that  he  fhould  choofe  amifs :  ^^^^f^^^^ 
 nox  does  any  benefit  accrue  to  him  from  thefe  Elec-  ^^^  ^^"  ^^*^ 
 tions  which  could  not  be  obtained  without  them, 
 as  it  dcss  in  Hunger,  Thirft,  Fear,  and  the  reft  of 
 the  Paffions  ,•  for  without  thefe  Affedions,  as  was 
 fjiewn,  the  Animal  would  Toon  perifh  j  but  no  Evil 
 would  befal  us  (nay  what  Good  would  not  I)  if  we 
 always  attended  to  Reafon,    and  never  chofe  amifs. 
 Since   therefore  Man  might  bring  the  greateft  plea- 
 fure  to  himfelf,    and  exercife  his  faculties  by  choo- 
 fing  always  well>    how  comes  it  to  pafs   that  God 
 fufl^crs  him  to  hurt  himf.1fand   others  unneceiTarily 
 by  Evil  Eledions?    If  it  be  faid  that  a  Power  of 
 chooling  either  Side  is  coatain'd  in  the  very  Notion 
 of  Liberty;    this  muft  be  allow'd,    but  yet  there 
 feems  to  be  room  enough  for  the  Exercife  of  Liber- 
 ty, tho'  the  Will   were  confin  d  to  the  choice  of 
 what  is  lawful  and  convenient ;  what  need  is  there 
 then  of  fuch  a  Power  as  may  extend  to  the  choice 
 pi  Evil  ? 
 
 IIL  Thi§ 
 
3^o 
 
 Here 
 lies  the 
 ftrcfs  of 
 
 theDiiT'- 
 culfy,  -viz. 
 why  did 
 God  per- 
 mit choie 
 Evils 
 which  are 
 neither 
 neceflary 
 fiorufctal? 
 
 "We  don't 
 jknow  fo 
 much  of 
 the  Nature 
 of  think- 
 ing Beings 
 ii  cf  ma- 
 ferial  ones 
 and  thcic- 
 foi'e  are 
 leTs  pre- 
 pared for 
 »n  An- 
 I'wer  to 
 this  Difil- 
 culty. 
 
 0/  Moral  Evil         Chap.  V. 
 
 HI.  This  feenjs  to  be  the  hardeH:  point,  the  main 
 fti'e(s  of  the  DiiTicultyj  viz,.  Whence  come  Moral 
 Evils,-  i,  €.  thofe  that  are  not  neceffary?  If  chey  be 
 faid  to  be  necLffary,  how  are  they  ficcf  If  they  be 
 not  nece/lary,  why  does  God  permit  them  ^  The 
 latter  feerns  repugnant  to  the  Goodnefs  of  God,  the 
 former  to  the  Nature  of  a  (y^q  Agent. 
 
 iV.  It  muft  be  confcfs'd,  that  we  are  lefs  prepar- 
 ed for  a  Solution  of  this  Difficulty  than  the  former; 
 for  the  Nature  and  Syftcms  of  the  Intellevftual  World 
 are  lefs  known  to  us  than  thofe  of  the  purely 
 Material  one  :  Material  Objefts  furronnd  us,  and  oc- 
 cupy all  the  Inlets  to  Knowledge,  and  are  the  only 
 things  that  immediately  nfrc(5t  our  Scnfcs.  They  in- 
 trude upon  us  wirh  an  infinite  Variety,  and  produce 
 many  and  various  Seafatinns  in  us.  But  of  intellec- 
 tual Beings,  of  their  Operations,  or  of  "-he  mutual 
 connexion  between  them,  \\2  have  but  very  fevv^, 
 and  tliofe  very  obfcure  Notions,  viz,,  fuch  as  arife 
 only  from  the  reHecftion  ofour  Underllandiiig  upon 
 itfelf,  or  are  colleded  by  the  ufc  of  F^eafon  deduc- 
 ing one  thing  from  nnorher  :  For,  of  all  intcl!e(5i:ual 
 Ik-ings,  GUI  own  Mind  alone  is  immediately  per- 
 ctiv'd  by  us;  nor  can  v/e  (as  in  Bodies)  compare  the 
 Notions  arifing  from  ir,  with  thofe  that  proceed 
 from  other  Sources:  all  our  Knowledge  therefore  of 
 Spirit:,  or  thinking  ikings  is  derived  from  this  alone. 
 'Tis  no  v/cnder  then  if  we  be  very  much  in  the  da:k 
 in  our  Kca'cnings  about  thcfe  and  their  Opperitions : 
 and  do  not  fo  clea  ly  perceive  the  neceffity  of  allow- 
 ing Fiee-Wil)  to  them,  as  contrariety  in  tlie  Moti- 
 tions  of  Matter;  nor  fo  eali'y  apprehend  what  In- 
 convenience would  follow  from  reih'aininj^  rhe  exer- 
 ciie  of  Liberty,  as  we  lee  the  confequence  of  raking 
 away  the  motion  of  Marrer.  We  know  that  withc.uc 
 Morion  rhe  whole  Mafs  of  Matter  would  prove  en- 
 tirely uiclsis,  and  rhac  there  would  be  no  room  lor  io 
 many  ^loimals  as  now  v;e  find  receive  their  Origir^ 
 
 ^"4 
 
Sta,  5.  Sub.  I.     Of  Moral  Evil.  3,81 
 
 and  Subfiftence  from  ir;  which  is  juftly  efteem'd 
 a  greater  Evil,  and  more  intolerable  than  all  the  na- 
 tural Evils  arifing  from  Matter  and  JMotion:  and 
 we  fliould  nnd  the  Time  thing  in  the  prevention  of 
 the  ufeof  Free-Will,  if  we  underftood  the  Syftem 
 of  the  Intclledual  as  well  as  that  of  the  Material 
 World.  But  if  we  can  iliew  that  more  Evils  necef- 
 f^rily  arife  from  withdrawing  or  reftraining  the  ufe  of 
 Free- Will,  than  from  permitting  the  abiiie  of  it,  it 
 muft  be  evident  thae  God  is  oblig'd  to  fuifer  cither 
 thefe  or  greater  Evils.  And  fince  the  lealt  of  thefe 
 neceffary  Evils  is  chofen,  even  infinite  Goodnefs 
 could  not  poffibly  do  beiter. 
 
 V.  Let  us  try  then  wh  rher  the  abufe  of  Free-Will  The  abufe 
 could  be  prohibited  with  lefs  detiimei^it  to  the  whole  ^m[°^" 
 Syftem,  than  what  arifes  from  the  permifiion  of  it.  be'coiv 
 There  are  three  Ways  v>^hereby  God  may  be  con-  cciv'd  to 
 ceiv'd  able  to  have  prevented  bad  Eledions,-   firft,  have  been 
 If  he  had  created  no  Free  Being  at  all.     Secondly,  P/'^^'^nted 
 If  his  Omnipotence  interoofe,  and  occaflonaily  re-  „,u?!u^!{f 
 
 n     •       }       ^TiT-u         I  •   T     •  '  It      r  r      ^  which  arc 
 
 Irram  the  Wih,  which  is  naturally  liee,   from  any  confidcr'd' 
 wrong  Eleftion.     Thirdly,  If  he  lliould  change  the  in  the  fbl- 
 prefent  ftace  of  things,  and  tranflate  Man  into  ano-  lowing 
 ther,  where  the  occafions  of  Error  and  incitements  ^^^^  '' 
 to  Evil  being  cut  off,  he  fliould  meet  with  nothing 
 thac  could  tempt  him  to  choofe  amifs. 
 
 SUBSECT, 
 
3^2  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V^ 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     II. 
 
 Why  God  has  created  Free  Agents. 
 
 God  I.     A    S  to  the  firfl-,  'Tis  certain  that  God  warJ 
 
 tnight  Jl\.  not  compeU'd  by   any  neceiliry  to   create 
 
 vent-d*^^'    ^"y  ^^^'"?  ^^  ^^^'  ^^^  might  (herelbre  have  prevented 
 moral  E-    all  Pvloral  Evils,  if  he  had  not  endow'd  any  Being 
 ^ils,  if  he  with  Free  Choice  :  for  fo  there  would  have   been 
 iadiefuf-   nothing  that  couM  ini.     But  fuch  a  monftrous  De- 
 edtocre-   f-^^c^  ^^^^  Hidtm  \jo\x\d  have  been  left  in  Nature  by 
 ireeBein-^.  this  means,   vtZ.  ny  taking  away  all  hree  Agents,  as 
 would  have  put  the  World  into  a  worfe  Condition 
 than  that  which  it  is  in  at  prelent,  v/ith  all  the  Mo- 
 ral Evils  that  dillrefs  it,  tho'  they  were  multiply'd 
 to  a  much  greater  Number. 
 Silt  with-       II.  For  in  the  firft  place,  if  we  fet  afideFree  A- 
 outtheie     pents,  /.  f.  thofe  which  have  the  Principle  of  A(fli- 
 ^^orid  ^^  xvithin  themfelves,   there  is  properly  nothing  at 
 Iiave  been  ^^  Self-aftive,  for  all  other  Beings  are  merely  pallive  : 
 a  mere       there  is  indeed  lome  kind  of  A^lion  in  Matter,  viz.. 
 Machine     Motion;  but  we  know  that  it  is  pallive  even  with 
 and  every    j-fg^j^l  ^.o  that ;  'tis  therefore  the  Adron  of  God  up- 
 ,''"Spai-    Qn  Matter,  rather  than  of  Matter  itfelf;  which  does 
 not  move  itfelf,   but  is  moved.     Without  Free  A- 
 genrs  then  the  whole  World  would  be  a  mere  A/.t- 
 'chine,  capable  of  being  turn'd  any  Way  by  the  Fin- 
 ger or  Will  of  God,  but  able  ro  effeft  nothing  of 
 itfelf.      Hay  the  whole  Work  of  God   could  not 
 of  iiifelf  exert   one    fingle  Ad   or   Thought,    but 
 would  be  totally  brute  and  llupid,    as  much  as  a 
 Wheel  or  a  Stone:   it  would  continue  fluggifa  and 
 incapable  of  Adion,    unlefs  aduared  by  external 
 
 force. 
 
 rtve. 
 
Sea.  5-    Sab,  2.     Of  Moral  Evil  38^ 
 
 force.  Second  Caufes  could  therefore  effed  no- 
 thing  which  might  be  imputed  to  them,  but  all 
 would  be  done  entirely  by  the  firfl-.  We  need  not 
 fay,  how  much  a  World  thus  conftirured  would 
 be  inferior  to  the  prefenr,  nor  how  incommodious 
 and  unworthy  cf  its  Divine  Author- 
 
 III.  Man,  you'll  fay,  neceffarily   affents  to  this  objeftiou 
 Propofition,  twice  two   make  four,    but  tho'   his  from  thofe 
 Mind  is  ncceffarily  driven  to  this  AfiTcnr,  and  con- ^^° '^«- 
 fequently  is  not  free,  ye^.  he  is  a^ive :   ior  it  can  ^u^'^tt 
 
 r  1       i  •  1     I  T»  >i         •  /-r        •         •    •         ,  .    the  Un- 
 
 icarce  be  laid  that  a  Man  is    palhve  in  giving  his  acrltand- 
 Aflent  '^.     The  fame  may  be  affirm'd  of  God,   who  ing  is  ad- 
 tho'  we  fuppofe  him  to  be  abfbluteiy  free  in  his  pri- Jve,  tho" 
 mary  Eledions,  yet  when  rhefe  are  once  fix'd,  he  "^^^^^ry^ 
 mult  necefTarily  execute  what   he  had  decreed:  ne-Qg^^^- 
 verthelefs  he  is  properly  Self-adive  in  all  Cafes,  con-felf. 
 fequently  there  may  be  lomething  adive  in  Nature, 
 tho'  there  were  nothing  free. 
 
 IV.  As  to  the  former  Part  of  the  Objedion,  'tis^nfwer  ta 
 not  very  clear  what  may  be  the  efficient  Caufe  of  in-  the  former 
 telleduaj  Afient;    if  the  Objed,    then  the  Mind  is  P^^t  of  the  • 
 merely  paffive  in  the  Ad  of  Underftanding :  nor  ^^i^*^^°°' 
 is  A  {Tent  imputable  to  it  any  more  than  Deicent  to 
 
 a  Stone;  but  if  the  Object;  be  efteem'd  only  a  Con- 
 dition upon  which  the  Underftanding  ads,  we  fhall 
 want  a  Caufe  to  determine  the  Underftanding ; 
 which  cannot  be  fuppofed  to  determine  itfdf,  any 
 more  than  the  Fire  determines  itfelf  to  burn  com- 
 buftible  Matter.  For  no  body  judges  the  combuf- 
 tible  Matter  to  be  adive  v/hen  it  is  fet  on  Fire,  or 
 that  the  Fire  burns  of  itfelf  without  being  kindled 
 by  fomeihing  elfe.  The  World  then  wi.hout  Li- 
 berty will  be  a  piece  of  Mechanifm,  where  nothing 
 moves  itfelf,  but  every  thing  is  mov'd  by  an  ex- 
 ternal Caufe,   and  that  by  another,   and  fo  on  till 
 
 we 
 
 *  See  Note  42.. 
 
3^4  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V 
 
 we  come  at  the  fir/},  namely  God  ;  who  will  be 
 the  only  Sclf-adivc  Being,  and  muft  be  cftcem'd 
 the  real  Caufe  of  all  things :  neither  can  any  thing, 
 whether  well  or  ill  done,  be  afcribed  to  others. 
 Anfwer  to  V.  As  to  the  latter  part  of  the  Objection,  That 
 t  e  latter,  g^j^g  ^^^  l^^  denominated  Free,  who  is  held  by 
 no  other  tie  than  his  own  Eledion  :  But  God  is  no 
 otherwife  oblig'd  to  execute  his  Decrees,  therefore 
 he  is  free,  if  he  did  but  make  his  Decrees  freely; 
 and  is  purely  adive  in  every  Operation  wherein  he 
 executes  them.  For  he  fufFers  nothing  by  necclTity, 
 nor  from  any  other  befide  himftif,  and  is  detei'min- 
 ed  to  aft  by  his  own  Liberty. 
 
 VI.  Secondly,  We  believe  that  God  created  the 
 World  in  order  to  exercife  the  Powers  he  is  poiTcl- 
 fed  of  for  the  Good  of  the  Univerfe;    the  Divine 
 Goodnefs  therefore  delights  and  applauds  itfelf  in  its 
 thing  were  Works,  and   the  more   any  thing  refembles   God, 
 free,  that   ^.nd  the  more  *ti^  Self-fufficient,  it  is  to  be  elkem'd 
 fo  much  the   more  agreeable  to   its  Author.     Bui 
 any  one  may  underftand  how  much  a  Work  which 
 moves  itfelf,  pleafes  itfelf,   and  is  capable  of  recei- 
 vii;g  and  returning  a  Favour,    is  preferable  to  one 
 that  does  nothing,  feels  nothing,  make?  no.  return, 
 unlefs  by  the  force  of  fome  external  Irnpulfe :  any 
 Per/on,  I  fay,    may  apprehend  this,    who^  remem- 
 bers  what  a  Difference   there  is  between  a  Child 
 carefling  his  Father,  and  a  Machine  turn'd  about  by 
 the  hand   of  the    Artificer.      There  is  a  kind  of 
 Commerce  betv/een  God,  and  fuch  of  his  Works 
 ar  are   endov/'d  wi:h    Freedom ;    there's  room  for 
 Covenant  and  mutual   Love.      For   there   is  fome 
 fort  of  A^ffion   on  both    Side*^,   whereby  the  CnM- 
 rure  may  in  lome  meafure  return  the  benefits  of  the 
 Creator,  at  Icaft  make  an  acknowledgement  for  thera ; 
 and  if  any  thing  in  the  Divine  Works  can  b:  cun- 
 ceiv'd  to  be  agreeable  to  God,  this  mull  certa'.'^ly 
 '    ■        "  b<? 
 
 God  has  2 
 compla- 
 cency in 
 his  Works, 
 and  if  no- 
 
 would  be 
 wanting 
 in  them 
 which  is 
 mofl  a- 
 greeable 
 to  the 
 Deity. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  385 
 
 be  fo  '^.  One  fuch  Adion  as  this  is  preferable  tO 
 all  the  Sportings  of  Matter,  or  the  LaSyrinths  of 
 Motion  :  if  there  had  been  no  free  Creatures,  God 
 iTiuft  have  ■  been  deprived  of  this  :  Compiacencys 
 which  is  almoft  the  only  one  worthy  of  him  that 
 he  could  receive  from  the  Creation.  'Tis  there- 
 fore as  much  agreeable  to  God  that  he  fhould  have 
 made  fuch  Beings,  as  it  is  to  the  World  that  they 
 lliould  be  made:  for  if  nothing  of  this  kind  had 
 been  created,  the  very  btft  thing  among  the  Crea-» 
 tures,  and  that  which  is  moft  agreeable  to  the  Dei- 
 ty, would  have  been  wanting.  .  'Tis  better  there- 
 fore to  permit  the  abufe  of  Liberty  in  fome  than 
 to  have  omitted  fo.  much  Good.  For  the  Defed:. 
 and  Abfencc  of  fuch  Agents  is  to.  be  efteemed  i. 
 greater  Evil  than  all  the  Crimes  confequent  upon 
 the  abufe  of  Liberty. 
 
 Vn.  Thirdly,    From  what   has    been   faid?    weNeceiTary 
 learn  that  fome  Evils   which  neceffarily  adhere  jq    ^'^^  *^^  ^ 
 things,  viz,.  Natural  ones,  and  thofe  of  Imperfedi- j^j^^^^^^'^^ 
 on,  did  not  hinder  the  Divine  Goodneis  from  crea°  Creation  • 
 ring  the  Good  with   which  they   were  conneded,  ofthings, 
 fince  the  cxccfs  of  Good  compenfared  for  the  fewer  ^^'"^^  ^<^f^ 
 and  lefs  Evils  which  were  unavoidable  :  Thus  God    f 
 chofe  fuch  Animals  as  were  Mortal,    afflifted  vach  JJiil^'^py^^ 
 Hunger,  Thirfl,    and  other    Padions,    rather    than  fible. 
 none  at  all.     If  then  thofe  Evils  vvhicli  w^i'tnkef" 
 fary  and  forefeen  did  not  hinder  God  from  creating 
 the  Good  that  was  annexe  to  them,  how  much  lels 
 fhould  the  pojjihle  Evils  ariling  from   the  abufe  of 
 Free-Will  hinder  his  (joodncis  from  creating  Free- 
 Agents  ?  To  enjoy  fi'ee  Choice  is  a  greater  Good 
 than  fimple  Life,  but  we  willingly  accept  this   lat- 
 ter with  all  the  train  of  Natural  Evils,  how  much 
 more  gratefully  inould  we  embrace  the  Gift  of  Li- 
 C  c  bertyg 
 
 *  See  Fiu-adiie  loll;  B,  3.  I.  -ico,  ^c. 
 
386  Of  Moral  E'-cil         Chap.  V. 
 
 berty,   attended  only  with  fome  Danger  of  Evils, 
 
 but  not  with  the  Evils  themfelves,  as  in  the  former 
 
 Cafes,  {61.) 
 
 Natural  VIII.  Fourthly,  It  muft  be  obferv*d  that  Elecfti'* 
 
 Evilj'are    ^ns  are  therefore  eOcem'd  Evil,    becaufe  they  lead 
 
 fhan^Mo-    ^^  ^^^^  Natural  Evils.     For  if  an  Eledion  contain 
 
 ral  ones,     nothing  abfurd  or  prejudicial,  'tis  not  a  wrong  one. 
 
 and  Free--  Hatred  of  God,  Rebellion  againft   his  Commands, 
 
 Will  a        Murther,    Theft,    Lying,   are   Sins,    becaufe  rhey 
 
 G^^dthan  ^'^^  hurtful  to  ourfelves  or  others,  becaufe  they  de- 
 
 theNatu-   pfive  US  of  natural  Good,  and  lead  to  Evil.   Eledi- 
 
 ral  Appe-    ons  therefore  are  wrong  and  undue  on  account  of 
 
 tites.  the  natural  Evils  which  fometimes  attend    them  ; 
 
 Natural  Evils  then  are  greater  than  Moral  "^ :  For 
 
 that  which  makes  any  thing  bad  muft  neceffarily  be 
 
 worfe  itfelf :  But  Free-Will  is  better  than  a  natural 
 
 Appetite,  and  a  Gift  more   worthy  of  the   Deity, 
 
 it  is  not  therefore  to  be  deny'd  to  the  Creatures  on 
 
 account  of  the  concomitant  Evils,    any  more  than 
 
 the    natural   Appetites   and    Propenfities:    both   of 
 
 them  indeed  fometimes  lead  us  into  the  fame  Evils, 
 
 but  with  this  DiiFerence,    that  the  one,    w^.  the 
 
 natural 
 
 N  OT  E  », 
 
 (61.)  In  relation  to  «j,  indeed,  a  Gift  which  is  intended  on- 
 ly with  tbe  pollibility  of  fome  inconvcnicncics,  appears  to  be 
 of  more  dignity  and  value  than  one  that  brings  fome  degree 
 of  unavoidable  Mifery  along  with  it,  and  as  fuch  it  ought  to  be 
 lecciv'd  with  proportionable  gratitude  by  us.  But  with  refpefl 
 to  a  Being  who  forefecs  all  the  Abufcs  of  Free-Will,  all  the 
 contingent  Evils  confequent  thereupon  arc  as  certain  as  the  na- 
 jnral  and  necelTar)'  ones,  and  therefore  ought  to  be  equally 
 provided  againft.  This  Argument  therefore  about  the  Contin- 
 _ff»f>' of  Moral  Evil,  fo  far  as  it  relates  to  the  Deity,  need  not. 
 be  infifted  on,  fince  our  Author  allows  the  Divine  Preiciencc, 
 and  confiftently  with  that,  oilers  reafons  Sufficient  for  the  Vir- 
 dication  of  th"^  other  Attributes  of  God  in  the  prefcnt  Cafe. 
 
 -  *  B(t  Chap.  4.  §.  4.  par.  8.  and  R,  i. 
 
Sta,  5.  Sub,  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  387 
 
 natural  Appetite,  loads  us  with  Evils  by  neceffity, 
 but  the  other,  viz,.  Free- Will,  not  of  neceffity,  but 
 only  if  we  pleafc.  Thefe  might  have  been  avoided 
 fince  they  are  contingent,  but  thofe  could  nor,  fince 
 they  force  themfelves  upon  us  againfl:  our  Wills : 
 If  therefore  it  was  not  unworthy  of  God  to  create 
 an  Appetite  which  was  attended  with  necefTary  Evils; 
 ?iow  much  more  agreeable  v/as  it  to  his  Goodnefs  to 
 have  endow'd  us  with  Free-Will,  by  which  thefe 
 Evils  may  be  avoided  or  at  leafl:  alleviated  ?  If  the 
 natural  Appetite  be  a  greater  Good  than  what  thefe 
 Evils  which  flow  from"  it  can  overballance,  and  there- 
 fore worthy  to  be  implanted  in  Animals  by  the  De- 
 ity j  how  much  more  excellent  a  Good  will  Free- 
 Election  be,  by  which  alone  we  become  capable  of 
 Happinefs,  tho'  join'd  with  the  danger  of  falling 
 into  Evils  by  abule  ? 
 
 IX.  Fifthly,  If  the  State  of  Man  would  be  worfe  The  State 
 without  Free- Will  than  with  it;  'tis  plain  that  Li-  of  Man 
 berty  diminifhes  inftead  of  increafing  the  Sum  of  ^°"''^.^^ 
 Evils,  and  is  beftaw'd  upon  us  for  that  end.     But  Prce-Will- 
 hov/  much  more  miferable  the  State  of  Man  would  were  ta- 
 be  without  Liberty  than  it  is  with  it,  will  appear  ken  away. 
 to  any  one  who  confiders  v;hat  fort  of  Creatures  we 
 fhould  be  without  Eledion.     For  if  Man  v/ere  not 
 free,  he  would  bs  driven  by  the  violence  of  Mat- 
 ter and  Motion,  and  fooner  or  later  be  quite  over- 
 v^helm'd  v/ith  thoCe  natural  Evils  which  neceffarily 
 arife  from  the  Nature  and  Laws  of  Motion.     But 
 It  is  better  to  ftruggle  with  fome  of  thefe  with  Li- 
 berty, than  all  of  them  with  neceffity ;  the  former 
 is  the  Condition  of  Men,  the  latter  of  Brutes  ^.    If 
 by  being  deprived  of  Eledrion  we  fhould  be  freed 
 from  all  kind  of  Evil,  we  might  complain  of  God 
 for  giving  it  i  but  feeing  that  whether  we  be  free  or 
 
 C  c  2  bound 
 
 *  OKiy  in  fome  pegree.     ^ee  the  Ohfervathn  from  Bayle  »> 
 Note  24J,, 
 
Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V^ 
 
 bound  by  the  chain  of  Fate  (while  we  have  Bodies)- 
 we  muft  necelfarily  endure  thofe  Evils  which  are 
 confequent  upon  the  affefitions  of  Bodies ;  (nay 
 thofe  very  Evils  which  v/e  were  afraid  of  falling  in- 
 to by  a  wrong  Choice)  'ris  in  vain  to  dtfire  the  ab- 
 Jence  of  Liberty,  by  relying  upon  which,  and  ufing' 
 it  aright,  we  may  avoid  the  moft  bitter  part  even  of 
 thefe  neceffary  Evils.  ' 
 
 Free  A-         X.  For  in  the  Sixth  place,  it  is  moft  manifefe  that 
 gents  only  tHe  greateft  Good,    and  that  whereby   Men  excel 
 arecapable  Qji^gf  Animals,  is  owing  to  Liberty.     By  the  affif- 
 Happ^ineis,  ^^^nce  of  this  we  rife  above  Fate,  and  when  attack'd 
 therefore    ^\oxw  without  by   adverfe  Fortune,    we   find  our 
 it  is  better  Happinefs  within  ourselves.      Other  Animals  have 
 to  enjoy    nothing  to   oppofe   to   a   Diftempcr,     Death,    or 
 '^'     Pain;    nothing    to   delight   themfelves    in,    except 
 Sleep,     Food,     and    the    Appetite   of   propagating 
 their  Species.      But  a  free  -Agent,  in  the  midft  of 
 Pains  and  Torments,    of  Hunger  and  Thirft,    nay 
 Death  itfelf,    has  wherewithal  to  pleafe  itfelf,    and 
 to  blunt  the  Edge  of  all  thefe   Evils.      We  com- 
 plain of  our  Bodies,  that  by  being  tied  to  them,  we 
 are  oblig'd  to  undergo  very  many  and  great  Hard- 
 fhips  J  how  much  more  full  of  Complaints  fliould 
 we  be  if  we  were  entirely  fubjefted  to  them,    and 
 hurried  into  Evils  without  any  Remedy  or  Relief? 
 Is  it  not  better  for  us  to  have  our  Happinefs  in  our 
 own  Power,  than  to  be  oblig'd  to  feek  it  elfewhere, 
 nay  rather  to   defpair  of  it?    Which  Happinefs  is 
 only  to  be  found  in  a  Free  Choice,  as  was  fliewn 
 before.     From  hence  it  appears,  I  hope,  fufficiently 
 why  God  created  Free  Agents  notwithftanding  the 
 abufe  which   they  were  liable  to.     For  he  chofe  a 
 Creature  which  would    fcmetimes  do  amifs,  rather 
 than  that  every  thing  fhould  be  dragged  by  Fate,. 
 
 and' 
 
S&a.  S-  Sub.  2:     Of  Moral  Evil.  j^p 
 
 and  a  Chain,  of  NeceiTity,    into  inevitable  Evilso 
 
 i6z.) 
 
 C  c  5  XI.  But 
 
 N  0  T  E  S.    ^ 
 
 (62.)  Our  AutKor  having  fhewn  in  Se£l.  2.  that  thegreateft 
 part  of  our  Happinefs  confifts  in  this  Principle  of  Eledion, 
 nere  points  out  fome  of  the  many  Inconveniencics  that  would 
 attend  the  lofs  of  it.  Firft,  If  there  was  no  fuch  thing  as  a 
 •free  Agent,  all  would  be  mere  Mechanifm  and  neceflary  Ef- 
 feifts  of  the  firft  Caufe,  ;.  e.  the  bed  and  nobleft  part  of  Nature 
 would  be  cut  off,  that  which  of  all  others  is  mpft  worthy  of 
 and  agreeable  to  the  Deity.  There  would  be  no  Cjeatures 
 capable  of  making  any  kind  of  return,  of  paying  any  reafonable 
 Obedience  and  Duty  to  God  ;  no  poflibility  for  him  to  difplay 
 his  Wifdom,  Goodnefs  and  Mercy  in  the  Government  of  them, 
 nor  any  means  of  bringing  them  to  the  fublimeft  Degree  of  In- 
 telleftiial  Happinefs,  vi%.  that  which  arifes  from  Morality.  Se- 
 condly, Thofe  paffive  Beings  themfelves  would  be  in  a  much 
 V/orfe  Condition  than  they  now  are.  They  would  be  deprived 
 of  all  the  Happinefs  which  they  now  enjoy  from  the  choice  of 
 indifferent  Objefts  ;  they  would  be  neceflarily  expofed  to  all 
 the  natural  Evils  arifing  from  the  general  Laws  of  Matter  and 
 Motion,  'c'/s.  Diflempei-s  of  the  Body,  Inclemency  of  the  Sea- 
 fons.  Hunger  and  Thirft,  ^c.  which  Liberty  enables  them 
 frequently  to  guard  againft  and  avoid,  and  frequently  to  bear 
 with  pleafure,  and  even  to  convert  to  their  fuperior  Good  : 
 nay,  they  mull  inevitably  undergo  the  greateft  part  of  thofe 
 very  Evils  which  at  prefeut,  by  this  Power,  they  have  at  mofl 
 oflly  a /^/^^//zVv  of  incurring.  Thirdly,  Without  Liberty,  the 
 other  moft  exalted  Powers  of  the  Mind  would  be  entirely  ufe- 
 lefs,  and  often  aggravations  of  our  Mifery.  "  A  Faculty  of 
 "  Underibnding  (fays  Dr.  Jenkhi  \a  1)  without  a  Will  to  de- 
 ^'  termine  it,  if  left  to  itfelf,  muft  always  think  of  the  fame 
 *'  Objed,  or  proceed  in  a  continued  feries  and  conneftion  of 
 "  thoughts  without  any  Aim  or  End  ;  which  would  be  a  per- 
 "  petual  Labour  in  vain,  and  tedious  Thoughtfulnefs  to  no 
 ?'  purpofe :  but  if  it  fhould  be  fometimes  determined  by  fome- 
 **  thing  external  to  new  Objefls,  yet  what  u!e  of  Reafon  could 
 <'  there  be  in  Contemplations,  which  were  merely  obtruded 
 "  and  forcM  upon  the  Mind?"  And  to  forefee  a  train  of 
 Evils,  without  any  power  of  acting  againft  and  oppoHug  them, 
 
 rnu|t 
 
 [«.]  R  eafonahlenefi  of  the  Chrijlian  Religion,   ?,d  Vol»  C.  12, 
 ^.  238.  5  thEdit, 
 
39C>  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V, 
 
 The  bene-      XL  But  you'll  fay,  that  you  defiie  the  Pleafure 
 p^°w-ii  ^"^^    Advantages  ariling   from   free  Eledions   but 
 "^^Idnot    '^^'^^'^  ^^^  have  the  Power  to  Sin,-  i.e.  you  would 
 be  had       ^ave  a  Liberty  refhain'd  by  Nature  within  certain 
 withouta    bounds,  fo  as  never  to  extend  to  Evil.     But  it  may 
 Power  of  be  juftly  doubted  v/hether  this  was  poffible  in  the 
 Sinning,    pref^nt   ftarg  of  things :   For  ^ree-Will  is  naturally 
 an  adivc  Power,    and  determines  itfelf  to  Aftion, 
 and  requires   nothing  more  in  Objeds,    than  that 
 they  fliould  give  occafion  for  the  Exercife  of  Elec- 
 tions ;  'tis  therefore  adive  in  its  own  Nature.    Now 
 whatfoever  is  limited  by  another  admits  of  bounds, 
 and  is  therefore  paffive  with  refped  to  iht  Limiteri 
 it  Teems  equally  abfurd  then  for  a  Free  Agent  to  be 
 thus  limited,  as  for  Matter,  which  is  in  itfelf  and  of 
 its  own  Nature  paffive,  to  determine  itfelf  to  AcTti- 
 OHj  ansi  is  perharps  no  lefs  impoffible.     C<^50 
 
 Xlik  Secondly. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 xnuft  be  only  anticipating  Mifery,  and  adding  the  future  to  the 
 prefentj,  and  a  fenfe  of  our  Inability  of  ever  helping  ourfelves  to 
 both.  Thefe  Confiderations  arc  fufficient  to  prove,  that  the 
 want  of  Liberty  in  general  would  be  an  irreparable  Damage  to 
 any  confcious  Syllcm. 
 
 For  a  fuller  Explication  of  them  fee  Mr.  Jackfons,  Defence 
 of  human  Liberty,  p.  79,  l^c,  and  Scott's  Chrijlian  Life,  Part  z. 
 C.  4.  Sect.  3.  p.  3  I  8,  crV.  "^-vo.  or  Sherlock  on  Pro'vidence,  C.  7. 
 p.  240.  2d  Edit,  or  D'Oyh's  Firji  Difftrtation,  C.  lO.  or  Dr. 
 Jenkin  in  the  Chapter  above  cited. 
 
 The  next  Enquiry  mult  be,  what  Confcquences  would  at- 
 tend either  theLiniit.ition  of  this  free  Power  to  iovat  particular 
 Obje^s,  or  the  Infringement  and  Sufpenfion  of  it  on  particular 
 Occafions. 
 
 (63.)  If  Matter  were  made  <7-7/'j,'£',  it  would  be  no  longer 
 Natter :  in  like  manner  if  a  felf  moving  or  active  Being  were 
 3-ender'd  paffive,  it  would  be  no  longer  what  it  now  is,  nor 
 Iiuve  the  fame  properties  which  it  now  has.  Hence  appears  the 
 abfurdity  of  fuppofing  a  Liberty,  properly  fo  call'd,  to  be  de- 
 teraiin'd  to  feme  particular  ways  of  ading,  'tis  the  fame  as  the 
 •  ■  Liberty 
 
Sea.  ^.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Evil.  391 
 
 XII.  Secondly,    If  the  Will  were  naturally  re-  The  will 
 flrain'd  to  choofe  Good  only,   it  muft  have  this  re-  ^°"''^  "°^ 
 ftraint  either  from  the  Objeli  or  the  Vnderfla.nAing  :  min'Vto 
 But  neither  could  be  done.     Iffome  things  were  in  Good  by 
 themfelves  always  Good,  and  others  Evil,  it  might  Objefts, 
 be  poffible  indeed  that  the  Will  (hould  no  more  ad-  finccthe 
 mit  of  Evil   than  the  Sight  does  of  Savours:  But  ^°°^^^^' 
 Moral  Good  and  Evil  are  very  frequently  not  ab-  generally 
 folute   things,  but  merely  relative :    for  there  is  al-  proceeds 
 mofl:  no  Adion  which  proceeds  from  Choice,  but  from  Eke- 
 what  may  be  good  or  Evil  upon  a  change  of  Cir-  ^'0"v 
 cumftances  *.      Even  Natural  Evils  theipfelves  are 
 fometimes  good  and  eligible.     Free- Will  then  muft 
 C  c  4  needs 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Liberty  of  a  Stone  to  fome  particular  Ways  of  moving,  i.  e.  no 
 Liberty  at  all.  The  very  EiTence  of  Liberty  includes  an  ablo- 
 lute  Phyfical  Indifference  to  either  Side  in  any  given  Cafe, 
 Such  a  Liberty  as  this  has  been  fhewn  to  belong  to  Man  in  le- 
 fpedl  of  Willing.  He  can  will  or  choofe  any  thing  in  Nature, 
 he  can  alfo  either  choofe  or  refufe  any  thing  in  Nature,  he  can 
 alio  either  choofe  or  refufe  any  thing,  and  therefore  to  deter- 
 mine his  Will  to  fome  Objefts,  or  incline  it  to  one  Side  in  any 
 given  Circumftances,  would  be  fo  far  to  deilroy  it.  The  Que- 
 ilion  then  is  not,  whether  a  Man  might  be  neceffarily  inclin'd 
 to  fome  particular  thing  or  aft,  and  yet  continue  to  have  Frec- 
 Will ;  for  that,  I  think,  is  a  contradidion.  But  whether  he 
 ihould  have  his  power  of  willing  deftroy'd  on  fome  particular 
 Occafions,  or  whether  he  fhould  be  fometimes  alter'd  and 
 made  what  at  prefent  he  is  not.  Whether  this  Change  of  Man's 
 Nature  would  in  the  main  prove  worthy  of  the  Deity,  or  be- 
 neficial to  the  World,  will  be  more  fully  examined  in  the  fol^ 
 lowing  Subfeclion  :  our  Author  proceeds  to  enquire  how  this 
 determination  could  poifibly  be  effefted  in  the  prefent  State  of 
 things,  and  if  upon  Enquiry  into  all  the  imaginable  Methods 
 of  effcfling  it,  they  appear  to  be  either  infufficient  for  the  En4 
 propofed,  or  attended  with  worfe  Confequences  than  the  pre- 
 Ertablifhment,  this  mult  be  an  invincible  Argument  againft 
 them. 
 
 *  See  Turner'/  Difcourfe  of  the  Lanvs  of  Nature,  and  the  rea- 
 Jon  of  their  Obligation,  Sedl.  23,  24.,  ox  Pufendorf  of  the  Laivi 
 f  Nature,  B.  J.  C.  2.  Seft.  6, 
 
3g2  Of  Moral /Ev'il  Chap.  V. 
 
 needs  be  indifferent    lo  all   external   Objids,    arid 
 
 thoTe  things  which  sre  now  agreeable,  become  (horr- 
 
 ly  difagrecablc,  according  to  the  infinite  variety  "<)f 
 
 eircumftances  and  the  Exigence  of  Affairs.     'The 
 
 Will  therefore  cannot  1  e  deteimii/d  to  Good  by  Ob- 
 
 jeds.     Nny,  to  confcfs  the  Truth,  we  pencratly  do 
 
 hot  choofe  Obje(5i:s  becaufe  rhcy  are  Good,  hut  they 
 
 become  Good  becaufe  we  choo';e  them.   .The  Good- 
 
 nefs  of  them  therefore  is  for  the  mofl:  part   dcter- 
 
 min'd  by  the  Ek^flion,  and  not  that  by  the  Good- 
 
 Rcfs.     For  we  have  fliewn  before  *,  that  this  is  tfie 
 
 Nature  of  an  Elcdive  ractilry,  and  fuch  it  ought  to 
 
 be,  otherwife  we  could  not  have  the  leafl:  pofTibility 
 
 1   ft"V    of  s^^^inirig  Happinefs  in  (o  great  a  variety  and  un- 
 
 ten  finds    t^^rtainty  of  outward  things  f' 
 
 nothing  XIII.  Thirdly,  The  Will  was  no  more  capable 
 
 good  in      of  being  derermin'd   perpetually    to  Good  by    the 
 
 things,  ex-  ^nderfiayiding^  than  by  OijJclIs.      For  the  Under- 
 
 thev  heb    ^^nding  ads  ncceffarily,    and  reprefenis  nothing  as 
 
 towards      Goodbut  what  proceeds  from   Objtdsi    if  therC" 
 
 the  attain-  fore  the  Will  were  determin'd  t-y  it,  it  would  nei- 
 
 mentofr.n  {\y^Y  be   free  nor  always  able    to  pleafe  itfelf.     For 
 
 Elcclior,    jj^g  Undcrllandins;  ofteq  repvefcnrs  al!  external  thinj^s 
 
 the  Will       ■    /•  J         >  >  ^  J  ^A  i       ^ 
 
 therek'ie    ^^  '^"  ^'^'^  unprofperous,    and   could  never  make  us 
 
 could  not  take  natural  Evils,  fuch  as  Death,    Labours,    Tor- 
 be  deter-    ments,  for  real  Good,  tho'  it  might  indu.e  us  to  bear 
 rnin'dto     t\^^iY\  in  profpedc  of  a  farther  End.     But  tp   endure 
 theUnd^-  ^  ^^^*"§  ^"^  ^'^^"^    '^^  ^  farther  End,    is   to  undergo, 
 ^andin"-.     prefect  Mifery  in  hopes  of  future  Happincfs^   i.  e. 
 to  weigh  3  prefenc  Evil  againfl:  a  future  Good,  and 
 of  two  Evils  to  choofe  the  lefs;  which  Reafon  in- 
 deed perfu'sdes  us  to  do,  fince  it  is  neccffary  that  it 
 iliould  be  done  :  but  this  helps  nothing   towards  a 
 Vindication  of  the  Divine  Goodnefs,  which  has  im^ 
 pofcd  this  Neceffity  upon  us :  nor  can  he  be  happy 
 
 »  Sea.  x.Subfea.  3. 
 
 ■\  §e£  par.  i6  and  ij  of  i his  Se3, 
 
Sed.  5-    Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  Ew\]:  39I 
 
 by  the  Judgment  of  his  own  Underftanding,  v/ho 
 muft  undergo  thefe  things.  But  if  it  be  granted 
 that  things  pleafe  us,  not  bccaufe  the  Und^rftand- 
 ing  judges  thtm  to  be  ehgible,  but  becaufe  we  re-^ 
 folve  to  exercife  our  Free-will  in  performing  them, 
 even  thefe  will  become  agreeable  by  Eledion,  and 
 the  Underrtanding  will  perceive  them  to  be  made 
 fo,  and  not  make  them  to  be  fo.  *Tis  not  there- 
 fore the  Office  of  the  Underftanding  to  govern  the 
 Will,  but  to  difcover  means  for  the  attainment  of 
 that  which  is  chofen,  and  to  give  warning  when  it 
 choofes  fuch  things  as  are  abfurd  or  impofiible: 
 For  the  Under  Handing,  as  we  faid  before,  judges 
 that  to  be  good  which  is  agreeable  to  our  Choice, 
 except  this  lead  us  into  Abfurditics.  In  order  there- 
 fore to  avoid  Abfurdities,  we  make  qfe  of  the  Un^ 
 derftanding  as  a  Monitor,  not  a  Mafter. 
 
 And  from  hence,  I  think  it  appears  how  incon- 
 venient ic  would  be  for  the  Choice  to  depend  in 
 all  cafes  upon  the  Underftanding.  For  fince  the 
 Judgment  of  the  Underftanding  depends  upon  the 
 Objeds  themfelves,  and  the  natural  congruity  which 
 they  bear  to  the  Appetites ;  if  the  Choice  were  to 
 be  determined  by  its  Judgment,  'tis  evident  that 
 we  muft  neceffarily  want  a  great  many  things 
 V'hich  the  Underftanding  judges  to  be  good,  and 
 ^ould  never  hope  for  folid  Happinefs,   (<^40  fince 
 
 Objeds 
 
 JV  0  T  E  S. 
 
 (64.)  That  is,  if  every  thing  which  the  Underftanding  re- 
 prefcnted  as  good  in  itfelf,  made  a  necejfary  Part  of  my  Hap- 
 pinefs, I  fhould  be  always  unhappy,  fince  I  could  never  attain 
 to  all  the  Good  I  faw.  Whereas  by  this  Power  of  willing,  I 
 cut  o(T'  fcveral  of  thefe  apparent  Goods,  and  only  make  fuch 
 be  conitituent  parts  of  my  Happinefs  as  I  choofe,  and  if  I 
 chofc  only  fuch  as  I  could  obtain,  I  might  be  always  Happy. 
 
 Thij 
 
394 
 
 The 
 Goodnefs 
 and  Wif- 
 dom  of 
 God  be- 
 ing equal 
 to  his 
 Power, 
 iindcr 
 iiim  from 
 phoofing 
 
 0/  Moral  Evil,         Chap.  V, 
 
 Objecfis  are  fix'd,  as  we  faid  before  *,  and  cap  never 
 anfwer  to  our  natural  Appetites  in  every  Particular. 
 In  order  therefore  to  the  attainment  of  continual 
 Happinefs,  it  was  neceffary  that  we  fhould  he  able 
 to  plenfe  ourfelves  in  feme  refped,  independently  of 
 the  Undefflanding,  and  by  Election  to  conftitute 
 thofe  things  good  and  agreeaole  to  us,  which  the  Un- 
 der (landing,  if  there  had  been  no  fuch  Eledion^ 
 would  have  pronounced  ofFenfive,  difagreeable  and 
 painful  :  From  hence  it  appears  how  fie  is  that  this 
 Power  fhould  be  freed  from  the  Government  of  the 
 Underftanding ;  but  if  it  is  freed,  it  could  not  be 
 determin'd  by  it. 
 
 XIV.  Fourthly,  It  is  to  be  obferv'd  that  the 
 Divine  Pov/er  is  Infinite,  and  that  there  are  innu- 
 merable things  pofliole  to  it  which  are  repugnant  to 
 one  another,  and  deftrudive  of  each  other,  and 
 cannot  by  any  means  be  confident.  If  therefore 
 Cod  Ihould  a»5l  according  to  the  Infinity  of  his 
 Power,  without  any  regard  to  his  other  Attributes 
 he  would  efFe(fl  nothing  at  all,  or  elfe  immediately 
 deflroy  what  he  had  effeded.  His  infinite  Wifdom 
 and  Goodnefs  therefore  gave  bounds  and  reftraint 
 to  his  Power,    which  would  otherwife    confound 
 
 every 
 
 I^7^  O  T  E  S, 
 
 This  Propofition,  ^viz.  that  all  Good  does  7iot  7nahe  att  Effential 
 Part  of  our  Happinefs,  becaiife  ave  do  not  ^u-ill  it,  is  aflertcd  by 
 Mr.  Locke  [h']  and  well  urg'd  asa  Reafon  why  the  greater  Good 
 does  not  abiolutely  determine  the  Mind  :  and  the  fame,  I 
 think,  might  as  juftly  be  aflirm'd  of  P^/w,  viz.  That  the  re- 
 moval of  all  Pain  does  not  make  a  neceffary  part  of  our  prefent 
 Happinefs,  fince  we  do  not  ahvays  abfolutely  ivill  or  dejire  to 
 remove  it ;  but  on  the  contrary  choofc  to  bear  it,  and  by  that 
 Choice,  often  produce  a  Pleafure,  which  does  more  than  cpuii 
 terballance  it.     See  C.  5.  Sed.  z.  and  Note  45. 
 
 *  Secfl.  I.  Subfea.  3.  par.  2. 
 \h^  Chapter  oi  Pox'jtr,  §.  43. 
 
Sea  5.  Sub.  2.      Of  Moral  Evil.  395 
 
 every  thing  ,•  and  thefe  muft  of  neceflity  be  equally 
 Infinite   with  his  Power,    otherwife  infinite  Evils 
 muft   certainly  arife  from   infinite    Power.      But  a 
 Creature,   as  his  Eledive  Power  neceffarily  extends 
 farther  than  his  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  is  made  na- 
 turally liable  to  fall  fometimes  into  Evils.     'Tis  well 
 known  that  Mathematicians  fometimes  fuppofea  Line 
 to  be  infinite  in  which  they  may  take  a  Point  where- 
 ever  they  pleafe.     Now   fince  our  Eledion  may  be 
 made  as  we  pleafe,  the  Wifdom  and  Coodnefs  where- 
 by it  is  to  be  govern'd,  ought  to  be  infinite  :  for  if 
 the  Line  be  finite,  a  Point  may  be  pitch'd  upon  be- 
 yond it :  and  in  like  manner,   if  the  Goodnefs  and 
 Wifdom  be  finite,  the  Choice  may  be  made  with- 
 out and  beyond  them,   that  is,    amifs.     But  fince 
 all  created  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  muft  neceffarily 
 be  finite,  it  follows  that  there  wants  a  fufficient  re- 
 ftraint  upon  Eledions,  and  that  every  free  Creature 
 is  neceffarily  defeBible.     As  then  all  created  Beings 
 are  neceffarily  imperfed  in  general,  fo  every  one  has 
 its  own  peculiar  Defed.     And  this  kind  of  Imper- 
 fedion,  viz.,  the  Po\yer  of  Sinning,   is  proper  and 
 peculiar  to  fuch  as  enjoy  Free- Will :    nor  can  they 
 be  conceiv'd  feparate  from  each  others  any  more  than 
 Contrariety  from  Motion.  (65.) 
 
 XV.  From 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (65.)  As  Motion  witliout  Contrariety  would  be  of  no  ufc, 
 fo  Liberty  without  a  Power  of  doing  amifs,  if  fuch  a  thing  were 
 poffible,  would  be  of  no  value :  it  would  not  have  the  good 
 EfFctIs  and  Ends  for  which  Liberty  was  given  :  particularly  it 
 would  not  be  attended  with  the  happy  confcioufnefs  ol  Defert, 
 or  the  Idea  of  receiving  a  Benefit  by  way  of  reward,  conferr'd 
 upon  us  for  having  done  what  was  right  and  good,  and  what 
 we  might  as  eafily  have  not  done.  From  which  Idea,  as  inclu- 
 ding Self- Approbation,  is'c.  we  frequently  feel  a  far  more  ex~ 
 quifite  Plcafure,    than  from  the  intrinfic  Value  of  the  Benefit 
 
 itfclf. 
 
39^  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V, 
 
 But  Man  XV.  From  hence  it  appears  that  a  Faculty  of  plea- 
 ^^y  fing  itfelf  by  Eledion  cannot  be  determin'd  to  Good 
 
 mifs  fince  ^^  Obje^s,  in  the  fame  manner  as  the  Sight  is  to 
 his  Good-  Light,  or  Tafte  to  Savours,  (fince  Goodnefs  is  not 
 ncfsand  always  an  abfolute  Quality  in  things,  like  Light 
 Wifdom  and  the  Objects  of  Sen(e)  nor  by  the  V^tderJIa^idm^y 
 nat  erare  ^^^^^  many  things  muft  be  chofen  in  which  the  Un- 
 jior  canbe         „       ,.  /  ^         .  r^      j 
 
 adequate    ncrltanamg  can  perceive  no  manner  ot  CjOgq,  except 
 
 to  his  that  they  are  capable  of  being  chofen,  and  when 
 Power.  chofen  pleafe,  becaufe  they  exercife  the  Faculty. 
 And  tho'  the  Objeds  of  Eledion  are  not  Infinite, 
 yet  in  a  finite  number  there  are  infinite  refpeds  in 
 which  Good  or  Evil  may  be  produced:  Theie's 
 need  then  of  infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  to  di- 
 ^  red  the  Choice,    lefi:  it  deviate   into  Evil.     Since 
 
 therefore  a  Creature  endow'd  with  Wifdom  is  finite, 
 it  is    impolTible   but  that  it   fhou'd   have  a  natural 
 Power  of  fometimes  choofing  wrong. 
 'Tis  better      XVL  Fifthly,  If  the  Will  was  confined  to  the 
 tobefome-  Choice  of  thofe  things  only  which  the  Underfland- 
 times  de-    j^g   (Jerlares  to  be    good,    or  was   refl:rain'd   from 
 vt^kh  Plea-  ^^^^oo^f^'g    ^^11  ^^'^^   Goodnefs   of  the   Objeds   were 
 {me,  than  apparent,    we  muft  of  necelTuy   helitate   in  many 
 to  be  al-     things,  and  be  anxious  and  folicitous  in  all.  For  fince 
 ways  foh-  things    are  conneded  together  by  a  long  chain  of 
 gitous.       Confequences,  it  is  impolTible  for  us  to  form  a  right 
 Judgment  of  the  abfolute  Goodnefs  of  them,  with- 
 out a  foreknowledge  of  rhefe    Confequences,    we 
 jnuft  therefore  have  been  oblig'd  to  ufe  all  poffible 
 
 Difquifitioa 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 itfelf:  Nay,  without  this  Idea,  to  be  loaded  with  Favours 
 would  prove  even  an  Uneafmcfs  to  a  generous  Mind.  This 
 Notion  will  be  farther  explained  and  vindicated  in  the  follow- 
 ing Subfeftion  ;  for  the  Trnth  of  it  we  mud  appeal  to  the 
 conflant  Experience  of  the  ingeniious  part  of  Mankind. 
 
Sect.  5^.  Sub.  2.     Of  Moral  fivil,  j'97 
 
 Difquifition  before  every  Eledion,  and  fufpendthe 
 Choice  where  any  Sufpicion  of  Error  or  Ground 
 of  Doubt  fhou'd  appear  :  but  fuch  a  Difquilition 
 and  continual  Solicitude  would  be  a  greater  Bar  to 
 Happinefs  than  many  Errors  and  natural  Inconve- 
 niencies.  For  if  the  Will  can  produce  Good  to  it- 
 felf  by  chooling,  the  Errors  and  Inconveniencies 
 to  which  it  is  expos'd  by  a  bad  Choice,  may  be 
 compen fated  by  the  Pleafure  which  arifes  from  the 
 Senfe  of  Liberty.  But  if  we  were  obliged  to  all 
 poffible  Enquiry,  more  inconvenience  would  be 
 felt  from  that  Obligation,  than  from  fonie  Errors 
 in  Eleftions ;  nor  v/ould  all  of  them  be  by  this 
 means  avoided  ;  for  after  all  poffible  Examination, 
 a  finite  Underuanding  may  be  deceiv'd.  Evil  Elec- 
 tions are  to  be  avoided  on  account  of  the  Uneafinefs 
 conicquent  upon  thtm,  if  therefore  fuch  a  Difqui- 
 fition as  is  neceflary  to  difcover  the  Good,  and  a 
 Sufpenfion  of  the  Eledive  Faculty  till  that  Good 
 be  diTcover'd,  would  bring  greater  Unealinefs  than 
 fom?  wrong  Eledions,  a  Man  will  be  more  happy 
 with  a  Power  of  doing  amifs,  than  if  he  were 
 6blig'd  to  wait  for  the  determination  of  the  Under- 
 ftanding  in  every  Cafe.  For  it  is  better  that  fome 
 Perfons  fhould  lometimes  do  amifs,  and  fufFer  Un- 
 ealinefs from  the  Confciencc  of  having  done  fo, 
 than  that  all  iVJen  fhould  in  every  Cafe  be  always 
 afraid,  uncertain,  and  folicitous,  nay  generally  ceafe 
 from  3il  minner of  Aftion. 
 
 XV I  r.    Su  h  is  the  nature  of  our  Will  that  it 'Tis  bet- 
 can  plvafe  itfelf  in  Election,  and  by  its  own  Power  ferto  be 
 make  \\vi   things  chofen   agreeable,    tho*  in  them-  i"  danger 
 felves  di ''agreeable  to  the  Apperires.     And  tho'  this  ^^^^„  \^^.^^ 
 cannot  be  dc-ne  at  all  times,    and  in  every  Objed,  to  ceafe 
 yet  it  is   better  to  run  the  hazard,    than  to  be  de-  fromElec- 
 prived  of  fo  ufeful  a  Faculty,    or  to  be  reftrain'd  ^^°"- 
 from  Election  till  an  imperfed  Underftanding,  fuch 
 
 as 
 
9^  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap,  V. 
 
 as  that  of  Man  neceflarily  is,  were  clearly  con-' 
 vinccd  of  that  Impoiribility.  It  is  therefore  con^ 
 venient  for  us  to  derive  our  peculiar  and  chief  Hap- 
 pinefs  from  the  Willitfelf;  for  if  it  depended  on 
 the  Underftanding  it  would  come  with  ,difficulty. 
 Pains  and  Anxiety,  and  we  could  feldom  enjoy  it 
 pure  and  unmix'd.  'Tis  better  therefore  iot  us  to 
 be  able  to  pleafe  ouifelves  without  a  long  Specu- 
 lation of  Antecedents  and  Confequences,  tho'  with 
 a  danger  of  Sinning,  than  to  ceafe  from  Elecflioti, 
 and  be  reftrain'd  from  the  Exercife  of  our  Facul- 
 ties, till  a  whole  train  of  thefe  were  perfedly  ap- 
 parent, which  if  it  could  be  at  all,  yet  would  not 
 be  without  Pain  and  Anxiety,  as  any  one  will  find 
 that  tries.  {66.) 
 
 SUBSECf* 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (66. )  All  that  Ba)'le  oh]t£ks  to  this  [r,]  is  taken  from  the  Na- 
 ture  of  Good  Angels,  and  Glorified  Souls,  who,  according  to 
 him,  are  no  Icfs  happy  in  themfelves,  nor  perform  a  lefs  ac- 
 ceptable Service  to  the  Deity  for  the  want  of  it;  and  wla^ 
 therefore  might  not  we? — To  what  was  obferv-d  about  the 
 Inconclufivencfs  of  all  fuch  Arguments  as  arc  drawn  from  Be- 
 ings of  a  different  Order  in  Note  H  we  fliall  here  add,  firlh 
 that  it  is  more  than  we  are  obliged  to  grant,  that  either  Angels 
 or  Saints  in  Heaven  arc  abfolutely  devoid  of  Liberty.  They 
 may  have  more  clear  Imprcllions  of  Good  and'  Evil  on  their 
 Minds,  more  enlarged  Underftandings,  fewer  and  lefs  Tem- 
 tations,  ^c,  without  being  lefs  free  [^^.];  nay  they  muft  be  in,' 
 one  fenfe  more  free,  the  more  they  are  fo  qualified. [^.]  This 
 way  of  reafoning^ therefore  proceeds  upon  a  falfe,  or  at  leail  un- 
 certain Hypothefis. 
 
 gecondly,  Tho'  it  fliould  be  granted  that  thefe  glorious  Be- 
 ings, fuppofing  them  all  neccflary,  might  have  as  ample  Know- 
 ledge, 
 
 [<■.]  See  his  Jnfwer  to  the  ^ieries  of  a  Provincial,  and  Crii. 
 Dit^.  Article  Marchionitcs,  Remark  F.  i^c. 
 
 [rt'.]  See  A.  Bp.  Davves'j  ^th  Serm.  p.  73,  74.  and  the  latter 
 end  of  Note  T. 
 
 [f  J  See  the  beginning  of  t^OiC  J z. 
 
kCl.  5.  Sub.  3.    Of  Moral  Evil,  S9? 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     III. 
 
 Why  God  does  not  interpofe  his  Omnipotence^ 
 and  occafionally  reftrain  the  Will  from  de- 
 praved Elections. 
 
 t  ''T^  I  S  evidf  nt  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  it  ^J^^'^^J'^I^ 
 X    was  agreeable  to  the  Divine   Gocdnefs  to  ^^j^would' 
 have  created    Free  Agents,    for  without  thefe  the  arifefrom: 
 Syftem  of  Nature  would  have  been  imperfeft:  nor  thence, 
 could  cheir  Adions  have  been  determined  to  Good  than  from; 
 by  any  natural   Propenfity   or   Limitation,    in   the  J^j^pr^,^ 
 fame  manner  as  the  Senfes  are  limited  by  Objefts  :  -y^in^ 
 But  yet  It  is  certain  that  they  depend   upon  God 
 for  their  Adions  and  if  he  fhould   fufpend  his  In- 
 fluence, they  v/ould  not  ad:  at  aU      Since  therefore 
 he  could  fo  eafily  hinder  the  abufe  of  Liberty,  why 
 does  he  fuffer  it  ?  Why  does  he  not   reftrain  Elec- 
 tions- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 ledge,  as  ardent  Love  of  the  Divine  Perfe£rions,  and  confe- 
 fjuently  be  as  happy  in  the  Enjoyment  of  God  and  themfelvcs, 
 )5  if  they  were  all  free  ;  tho'  they  might  have  no  ocrafion  to. 
 iee  or  experience  Vice,  in  order  to  their  being  fully  acquainted 
 with  the  Excellence  of  Virtue,  and  made  fenfible  of  the  infi- 
 nite Wifdom,  Pov/er  and  Goodners  of  the  Deity,  fhewn  in  the 
 Government  and  Suppreffion  of  the  former,  and  in  the  Pro- 
 duftion  and  Improvement  of  the  latter:  The',  I  fay,  thefe  ex- 
 alted Beings  could  be  luppofed  to  have  a  thorough  Intuition  of 
 all  the  Attributes  of  God  without  any  fuch  manifeftation  of 
 them  in  his  Works ;  (againft  which  Notion  fee  D'Oyly?  Firji 
 DiJJ'ertatioTt,  C.  8.  and  Conchfon,  p.  123.)  yet  it  does  not 
 feem  poffible  for  fuch  imperfccl  Creatures  as  <we  are,  to  attain 
 imto  this  excellent  Knowledge,  and  enjoy  the  happy  Effeds 
 of  ic  on  any  other  Terms  than  the  prefent.    We  could  not  furr 
 
 havg 
 
ibo  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chaf).  V. 
 
 tions  when  they  tend  to  Vice  and  Abfurdity  ?  We 
 
 grant  that  this  Objeftion  cannot  be  fatisfaftorily  an-^ 
 
 Iwer'd  otherwi(e   than  by  I'hewing  that  more  and 
 
 greater  Evils  would  bcfal  the  Univerle  from  fuch  an 
 
 Interpofition,  than  from  the  abufe  of  Free- Will.  In 
 
 order  to  which  it  is  to  be  confider'd. 
 
 It  would         ij.  In  the  firfl:  place,  That  this  cannot  be  effed- 
 
 Viden^e^^  cd    without    Violence  done  to  Nature,       'Tis  allow'd 
 
 to  prevent  '^^^'^  Eledions  ought  to  be  free,    and  that  thinking 
 
 theAftion  Beings  cannot  orherwife  be  happy:   God  himfelf  in 
 
 of  Free-      creating  them  has  determin'd,  as  it  were  by  a  Laiw,' 
 
 ^^M^'     ^^^^  ^^^y  ihould  be  free.       For  by  giving  them  a 
 
 on  of  the    Nature    endow'd   with   Choice,    he  allov/'d    them 
 
 Siin,  to  make  ufe  of  it.     They  cannot  therefore  be  hin- 
 
 der'd  without  Violence  done  to  the  Laws  of  the 
 
 Creation.     I  grant  that  God  can   difpenfe  with  the 
 
 Laws  of  Nature;    but  who   will  require  or  allow 
 
 this  to  be  done  frequently  ?     The  bounds  of  this 
 
 World,    and  the   number  of  thinking    Beings  are 
 
 unknown  to  us,  but  we  believe  that  the  Syftem  of 
 
 Nature  will  endure  for  ever.       Nov/  as  all  things 
 
 depend  upon  the  Will  of  God,  we  cannot  have  any. 
 
 other 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 have  had  fo  lively  an  Idea  of  the  Mercy  of  God,  if  there  had 
 never  been  any  proper  Objeds  of  it.  Wc  could. not  have  been 
 io  thoroughly  conlcious  of  our  Dependency  or  Danger;  nor 
 had  fo  grateful  a  fenfe  of  our  conilant  Support,  our  frequent 
 Deliverances,  nor  conftquently  have  arrived  to  fo  great  a  degree 
 cither  of  Virtue  or  Happincfs  in  this  Life  or  the  next,  by  any 
 other  Method;  as  will  be  further  fticwn  in  Notes  79  and  82. 
 Either  then  thefe  Happy  Beings  are  Hill  perfcdlly  free,  which 
 Freedom  conllitutes  the  greateil  part  of  their  Ilappinefs;  and 
 let  any  Man  try  to  prove  the  contrary  ;  or  at  Icalt  they  once 
 were  fo,  in  order  to  their  greater  Perte£lion,  and  are  now  on- 
 ly alter'd  by  being  tranflated  into  another  State,  and  put  out  of 
 larther  Trial ;  and  confcqucntly  they  belong  to  our  Author's 
 third  Expedient,  which  will  be  cxamin'd  in  Subfe<^.  5. 
 
Sea.  S'  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  EviL  401 
 
 other  Security  of  our  Happinefs,  and  of  the  Dura- 
 tion of  the  World,  than  the  Divine  Cottftancy  and 
 immurahility  :  the  Univerfal  Laws  of  Nature  are 
 the  AfTurances  of  this  Conftancy,  and  upon  them 
 does  the  Security  and  Happinefs  of  the  whole  Work 
 depend.  It  is  not  therefore  to  be  expeded  that 
 God  fliould  lighly  difpenfe  with  thefe  Laws,  much 
 lefs  alter  them  by  his  Omnipoteni^e  every  Moment. 
 Since  then  it  is  provided  by  an  Univerfal  Law,  that 
 Free  Agents  lliould  procure  to  themfelves  Happi- 
 nefs by  the  ufe  of  Ele6}:ion,  and  it  is  impofiible  but 
 that  thefe,  being  lef:  to  themfelves,  fhould  fome- 
 times  fall  into  deprived  Eledions,  would  it  not  be 
 an  Infringement  and  a  Violation  of  this  Law,  if 
 God  fliould  interpofe  and  hinder  the  ufe  of  that  Fa- 
 culty which  by  the  Law  of  Nature  he  had  eftabli- 
 fhed  ?  We  don't  exped  that  the  Situation  of  the 
 Earth,  or  Courfe  of  the  Sun,  fhould  bealter'd  on 
 our  account,  becaufe  thefe  feem  to  be  things  of 
 great  Importance,  and  we  apprehend  it  to  be  un- 
 reafonable,  I  that  for  our  private  Advantage  the 
 Order  and  Harmony  of  things  fliould  be  changed, 
 to  the  detriment  of  fo  many  Beings.  But  to  alter 
 the  Will,  to  (lop  Eledion,  is  no  lefs  a  Violation  of 
 the  Laws  of  Nature,  than  to  interrupt  the  Courfe 
 of  the  Sun.  For  a  Free  Agent  is  a  more  noble 
 Being  than  the  Sun,  the  Laws  of  jts  Nature  ace  to 
 be  efleem'd  more  facred,  and  not  to  be  changed 
 without  a  greater  Miracle.  There  would  then  be 
 a  kind  of  Shock  and  Violence  done  to  Nature,  if 
 God  fhould  interfere  and  hinder  the  Actions  of  Free- 
 Will ;  and  perhaps  it  would  prove  no  lefs  pernici- 
 ous to  the  Intelledual  Syftem,  thin  the  Sun's  ftand- 
 in  ftill  would  be  to  the  Natural.  His  Goodnefs 
 therefore  does  not  fufFer  him  to  interpofe,  except 
 when  he  forefees  that  the  Evils  ariiing  from  our  de- 
 praved Elections  are  greater  than  thofe  which  would 
 D  d  ^  cnfue 
 
402  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 en  rue  upon  an  Interruption  of  the  Courfe  of  Na- 
 ture,   which  he  only   can   know    who  knows  all 
 
 ter  o^  ^^^'  Secondly,  Such  an  Interruption  as  this  would 
 
 fingin  the  "°t  ^^^7  ^^  Violence  to  Nature,  but  quite  invert 
 Eleftions  the  Method  of  treating  Free  Agents.  This  Me- 
 of  his  thod  is  to  hinder  or  excite  Eleftions  by  Rewards 
 Creatures,  ^^^  Puniflimcnts :  To  divert  them  from  unreafon- 
 quite  in-  ^^^  ^^  abfurd  things,  and  draw  them  to  better  by 
 vert  the  the  perfuafion  of  Reafon.  But  it  is  doubtful  whe- 
 Method  of  ther  the  Nature  of  the  thing  will  permit  an  Eleftion 
 treating     jq  ^g  determined  by  Impulfe,  or  as  it  were  by  im- 
 
 J^^,  '  mediate  Contafl.  For  it  feems  equally  abfur'd  to 
 cents.  ,  r-  r-i   o-        1        ^       "^1 
 
 attempt  a  change  or  Election  by  any  other  means 
 
 than  thofe  above  menrion'd,  as  to  dclire  to  ftop   the 
 
 Motion  of  Matter  by  Intreaty  or  offering  Rewards. 
 
 May  we  not  with  the  fame  reafon  exped  that  Mat- 
 
 gents. 
 
 ter 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (67.)  By  this  lall  Concefiion  our  Author  evidently  allows 
 that  God  may  fometimes  have  fufficient  reafon  to  interpofe  in 
 matters  relating  to  our  Eleftions ;  (tho'  perhaps  he  ncv'cr  afts 
 upon  the  Will  by  P/'v/n«/ /w/>a//2',  or  irrefifliblv,  which  will 
 be  coniider'd  in  the  next  Siibfeftion.)  his  Defign  therefore  is 
 only  to  fhew  that  this  ought  not  to  be  done  fjequently,  or  as 
 often  as  Men  choofe  amifs.  Now  this  may  be  illuilated  in  the 
 fame  manner  as  we  treated  of  the  Laws  of  Motion.  That" 
 there  are  general  Mechanic  Laws  in  the  Natural  World,  the 
 Eftablifhment  and  Prcfervation  whereof  tends  more  to  the 
 Happinefs  of  the  Creation,  and  is  every  way  more  worthy  of 
 the  Deity,  than  to  aft  always  by  purtitular  Wills,  was  fhewn 
 in  Note  25  Jf  thefe  Laws  were  frequently  alter'd  and  unfix'd, 
 they  would  ceafe  to  be  Laws,  and  all  Aftion,  and  Contrivance 
 which  depends  upon  the  Stability,  and  computes  the  future 
 F. 'lefts  of  them,  muft  ceafe,  or  at  Icaft  prove  infignificant.  In 
 like  manner  Liberty  has  been  proved  to  be  an  Univcrfal  Law 
 of  Intelleftual  Beings,  and  the  great  Ufe  and  Excellence  of  it 
 cvinc'd,  and  therefore  we  have  equal  reafon  to  fuppofe  that  ic 
 could  not  be,  at  leafl  not  frequently,  fufpcadcd,  without  as 
 g.reat  Inconvenience   as  would  attend  the  Violation  of  thefe' 
 
Sea.  S'  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  EviL  403 
 
 ur  fhould  be  moved  by  Rewards  and  Punifliments, 
 as  the  Will  influenc'd  by  Phjjicd  Impnlfe,  ss  chey 
 call  it  \  For  it  i-.  by  tlufe  Means  that  they  would 
 have  God  to  (lop  or  alter  the  Choice.  So  prepof- 
 terous  an  Interpofal  would  confound  every  thing, 
 and  leave  nothing  certain  in  Nature.  How  iatal 
 fuch  an  Experiment  would  be,  and  how  it  would 
 afFeft  the  Minds  of  the  Obfervers,  or  what  Sufpi- 
 cions  concerning  God  and  their  own  Security,  ic 
 might  fugged  to  the  whole  Syftem  of  thinking 
 Beings,  God  only  knows.  We  fee  that  human 
 Laws  cannot  be  difi^ens'd  with,  wi'-hout  very  many 
 Inconveniencie:,  which  yer,  as  they  are  made  up- 
 on an  imperfed  Forefighr,  and  ran  provide  iGf 
 few  Cafes,  feem  naturally  to  require  fome  Inter- 
 pofal :  how  much  greater  Evils  may  we  apprehend 
 from  a  Difpenfation  v/irh  the  Divine,  the  natural 
 D  d  z  Laws; 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 gF  Mechanifm.  If  this  were  done  in  the  Rational  World,  ajl 
 Studies,  Entsrprifes,  Arguments;  all  kind  of  Reafoning  and 
 Policy  would  be  in  vain  and  ui'elefs  ;  all  rewardable  Adion, 
 and  its  concomitant  Happinefs  (of  which  in  Note  65  and  more 
 belcw)  muft  ertircly  ceafc.  Nay,  perhaps  to  deprive  a  ratio- 
 nal Being  of  Free-Will,  would  be  altogether  as  abfurd  and  in- 
 convenient, as  to  endow  a  Machine  with  Refleilion,  or  an 
 Edifice  with  Self-motion.  But  our  great  Ignorance  of  the  In- 
 tellciS-ual  World  mufl:  render  any  Argument  of  this  kind  very 
 uncertain.  However,  thus  much  we  are  fare  of,  that  fo  great 
 Violence  done  to  the  Will,  would  oe  direclly  contrary  to  the 
 general  Mc'.hod  of  God's  treating  rcafonable  Creatures,  and 
 quite  oppofite  to  the  end  of  all  thofe  Manifoilations  he  has  made 
 of  his  Nature  and  Will  ;  the  very  Reverfe  of  all  thofe  Argu- 
 ments, Exhortations,  Promifas  and  Threats,  which  are  the 
 Subjeft  of  Reveal'd  Religion  :  a  Man  that  believes  any  thing  or 
 thefe  fupon  the  Belief  of  which  I  am  novv  arguing)  can  never 
 imagine  that  they  are  all  made  ufe  ot  to  no  purpofe,  as  they 
 muft  be  in  a  great  mc.ifure,  if  the  Will  could  be  over-ruled 
 occalionally  without  any  confiderable  Inconvenience.  This  i? 
 what  our  Aiuhor  '^rJeavours  ta  prov?  in  the  following  Par*' 
 graph. 
 
404 
 
 He  would 
 take  away 
 thatwhich 
 is  the  371  oft 
 agreeable 
 lO  us  in 
 Eledlions, 
 I'iz.  a 
 Confci- 
 oufnefs 
 that  we 
 might 
 have  not 
 chofcn. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Laws,"  on  the  Obfervance  of  which  the  Good  of 
 the  whole  depends  ?  This  feems  to  be  the  reafon 
 why  God  makes  ufe  of  io  much  Labour  and  Pains 
 fo  great  an  Apparatus  of  Means,  (6S.)  lo  many 
 Precepts,  Perfuafions,  and  even  Entreaties  for  the 
 Amendment  of  Mankind  ,•  which  neverthelefs  he 
 could  cffed:  in  a  Moment^  if  he  were  pleas'd  to  ap- 
 ply force;  and  he  would  undoubtedly  do  it,  if  he 
 had  not  foreften  more  Inconveniencies  from  a  Chanpe 
 in  the  Order  of  Nature,'  and  Violence  done  to  Elec- 
 tions. 
 
 IV.  Thirdly,  That  which  gives  us  the  greateft 
 Pleafure  in  Eledions,  is  a  Confcioufnefs  that  we 
 could  have  not  chofen  j  without  this 'tis  no  Choice 
 at  all :  but  fuch  is  the  Nature  of  us  rational  Beings 
 that  nothing  pleafes  us  but  what  we  choofe.  In 
 order  therefore  to  make  any  thing  agreeable  to  us, 
 'tis  necefiary  for  us  to  be  coitfciom  that  we  choofe 
 it  voluntarily,  and  could  have  refufed  it  :  But  if 
 Goddeteimme  our  Eledion  extriniically,  the  moft 
 
 agree- 
 
 N  O  T  E  S. 
 
 (68.)  The  Hi  (lory  of  the  y^i^^  Nation  afFords  good  In- 
 llances  oi  this.  What  an  aparatus  of  outward  Means  '.\as  con- 
 tinually made  ufe  of  in  the  Government  of  that  ftiff-neclced 
 People  .?  What  frequent  Murmuring,-;,  Rebellions  and  Apofta- 
 cys  were  permitted,  and  ihen  punifli'd  ?  What  numerous  Aii-- 
 racle.s  both  6f  the  remunerative  and  vindictive  kind  were  ap- 
 ply'd,  in  ord«r  to  bring  them  to  fome  tolerable  fenfc  of  their 
 dependence  on  Go'd,  and  a  fuitable  practice  of  the  Duties  re- 
 ful ting  from  h>  All  v.hich  would  have  been  unneccfiary  at 
 lealt,  if  one  Miracle  exerted  on  their  Minds  cnuld  have  done 
 the  bufinefs ;  if  their  Underllandings  could  as  well  liave  been 
 illuminated  and  their  Wills  leform'd  at  once,  and  if  their  Prac- 
 tice produced  by  this  means,  and  as  it  were  extorted  from 
 them,  would  have  been  equally  agreeable  to  the  Deity.  And' 
 in  this,  as  well  as  many  other  refpccts  they  feem  to  liave  bee:* 
 Types  and  JRcprefcntarvss  of  all  Mankind. 
 
SqO:.  5.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil;  405 
 
 agreeable  Part  of  all  is  taken  away  (JT.)     For  we 
 
 muft  either  be  confcious  that  God  determines  our 
 
 D  d  5  Will 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 {X.)  'Tis  objefled,  tliat  this  explication  of  Free- Will  makes 
 Adam  more  unreafonable  in  the  ftatcof  the  Innocence  than  hi? 
 Pofterity  in  the  flate  of  Corruption.  For  according  to  this  it 
 xvould  have  grieved  him  to  think  that  his  choofing  right  was 
 due  to  God's  afiiftance,  and  that  he  would  not  have  believed 
 himfelf  happy,  if  when  he  was  ready  to  break  God's  Com- 
 mand, he  had  perceiv'd  that  God  by  his  Grace  had  interpofcd 
 and  enabled  him  to  refill  the  Temptation.  Whereas  in  truth, 
 luch  a  difcovery  would  have  made  him,  as  it  muft:  make  us, 
 more  happy,  tying  him  by  a  new  Obligation  to  acknowledge 
 the  Sovereign  Goodnefs  of  God,  and  on  that  account  to  love 
 and  adhere  to  him  the  more  clofely.  But  it  is  alledged  that 
 the  Author  is  abfolutcly  of  another  Opinion. 
 
 I  anfwer,  the  Objedlor  may  afl'ure  himfelf,  the  Author  has 
 no  fuch  Opinion,  nor  is  there  any  thing  like  it  in  the  Book  or 
 that  can  be  deduced  from  it.  What  the  Author  fays  is,  that 
 God  has  made  Man  an  intelligent  Creature,  capable  of  plea- 
 iing  himfelf  by  Choice  ;  that  the  proper  way  to  move  his  Will 
 is  by  Rewards  and  Punifliments  as  the  proper  way  to  move 
 Bodies  is  by  phyfical  Impulfe  ;  that  in  the  ordinary  Courfe  of 
 things  it  is  as  improper,  and  perhaps  as  impracticable  to  move 
 the  Will  by  any  other  force  than  that  of  rational  Motives,  as 
 to  attempt  to  move  a  Body  by  Rewards  and  Punifhments : 
 That  there  is  this  difference  between  them,  that  a  body  necef- 
 farily  moves  when  impelled,  but  the  Will  is  not  neceffitated  by 
 the  moral  Motives  propofed  to  it.  That  there  are  two  forts  of 
 Goods  which  may  be  propofed  to  a  Man,  one  that  arifes  from 
 the  conveniency  of  things  to  our  natural  Appetites,  and  is  an- 
 tecedent to  Choice,  and  another  that  is  founded  in  the  Choice 
 icfelf,  and  confequent  to  it;  and  that  the  ill  is  fubordinate  to 
 the  fecond. 
 
 When  therefore  thefe  two  interfere,  the  firft  gives  place  ta 
 the  latter :  and  hence  we  fee  many  Men  prefer  their  Choice 
 even  to  Life,  which  is  the  greatefl:  natural  Good,  tho'  'tis  true, 
 this  is  done  with  difficulty  and  reludiance.  But  when  there  is 
 no  fuch  interfering  between  the  Choice  and  Appetites,  thercj 
 the  Man  is  entirely  free,  and  can  make  the  thing  chofen  good 
 without  mixture,  which  happens  in  a  thoufand  Inftances  ojt 
 Life,  an4  therefore  there  \%  much  more  Good  than  Evil  iu. 
 it. 
 
 % 
 
4o6  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 Will  or  not  ,•  if  we  be  confcious  how  can  that  be 
 agreeable  which  is  obtruded  on  us  by  force/*  If  we 
 
 b6 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 As  to  Adam,  he  was  placed  in  this  Sta'^e  of  Freedom  becaiife 
 his  Nature  required  it ;  and  the  Author  believes  God  might 
 have  prevented  his  choofingamifs,  it  he  would  have  alter'd  his 
 Nature,  Motives  and  Circumftances,  that  is  made  a  new 
 World  for  him,  and  left  this  without  intelligent  Inhabitants. 
 I  do  not  deny  but  God  may  ftop  Man  from  executing  his 
 Choice,  when  he  is  ready  to  make  an  ill  one;  for  no  body 
 ought  to  prefumc  to  limit  the  Divine  Power,  But  f  fay,  when 
 a-free  Agent  is  ready  to  make  an  ill  choice,  and  wou'd  do  it 
 if  not  prevented  by  an  /\imighty  Power,  he  is  already  guilty 
 in  the  fight  of  God,  Rich  a  readinefs  is  an  obliquity  in  his 
 Will  and  a  moral  Evil,  and  therefore  God  is  not  obliged  to 
 prevent  the  Execution  of  it;  for  that  were  to  prevent  the 
 Punifliment,  tho'  the  guilt  be  contracted :  and  it  is  eafy 
 to  ice.  what  the  Coniequcnce  of  fuch  a  procedure  may  be 
 in  a  World  that  is  to  be  governed  by  Rewards  and  Punifhments, 
 and  what  effe(?:  it  might  have  on  thofe  innumerable  Myriads 
 of  intelligent  Beings  that  are  under  the  Government  of  God, 
 and  that  are  all  now  virtuous  by  their  Choice,  and  thereby 
 juilly  diftinguiln'd  in  their  Rewards  and  Circumitances,  and 
 poiTefs'd  of  that  mofc  valuable  perfedftion  and  only  moral  Good, 
 AW  active  conformity  to  the  Will  of  God.  Whereas  if  the  Will 
 of  Man  were  necefiitated  and  held  by  an  irrefiftible  force  from 
 chooiing  amifr,  the  whole  inte'lcdlual  Creation  would  be  let 
 loofe  and  under  no  kind  of  moral  Obligation  to  concern  them- 
 felves  about  their  Choices,  and  fo  there  cou'd  only  be  a  paffive 
 Conformity  to  God's  Will,  and  no  room  for  Virtue  or  Holi- 
 nefs,  which  are  the  molt  valuable  Goods  in  the  World  ;  and 
 hence  to  avoid  fome  Moral  Evil  there  wou'd  be  no  room  left 
 for  any  moral  Good. 
 
 Againil  this  it  is  urg'd  that  the  Ele^  are  thus  prevented  by 
 God's  Grace,  and  yet  no  body  denies  them  to  have  moral 
 Good.  The  Holy  Scriptures  teach  us  that  it  is  the  Spirit  of- 
 God  that  Works  in  us  to  will  and  to  do,  and  that  it  is  his 
 Grace  thai  efficacioufly  determines  the  Wilis  of  thofe  that  are 
 predeltinated. 
 
 To  this  I  ahfwer,  that  Man  by  his  ill  choice  and  abufe  of 
 his  Faculty  of  Free- Will  had  diiabled  it  from  choofing  Spiri- 
 tual Good.      When  a  Man  lofes  a  Limb  or  an  Eye,    or  is 
 
 wounded 
 
$e6:.  5.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  407 
 
 be  nor,  we  are  deceiv'd  in  the  Operations  of  our 
 own  Minds ;  neither  can  we  know  whether  the  E- 
 
 ledions 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 wounded  in  any  mortal  Part,  he  can't  have  that  Limb  reftored 
 ©r  be  recover'd  but  by  a  Miracle  ;  and  the  fame  will  hold  as 
 to  the  Spiritual  Funftions,  when  they  are  loft  or  difabled  only 
 he  that  gave  them  can  reftore  them.  Now  this  the  Holy  Scrip- 
 ture; nnd  the  Catholic  Church  have  taught  us  to  be  the  cafe  of 
 the  Will  of  Man  in  his  corrupted  State  as  to  fpiritual  Objefts, 
 and  therefore  the  efFeflual  interpofition  of  God's  Power  to  re- 
 ilore  Man  is  the  Chriitian  Do£lrine.  But  tho'  the  reftoring 
 the  Faculty  to  its  former  ftate  be  the  immediate  Work  of  God's 
 Spirit,  yet  the  afts  perform'd  by  that  reftored  Faculty  are 
 Man's,  and  he  is  free  in  the  exerting  of  them,  and  this  I  take 
 to  be  likewife  the  fenfc  of  the  Catholic  Church.  'Tis  true, 
 thofe  who  are  thus  ele£led  and  influenc'd  by  God  will  cer- 
 tainly ufe  their  Free  Will  right  fo  far  as  the  Gofpel  requires 
 in  order  to  their  Salvation  ;  but  it  is  not  becaufe  they  have  not 
 the  Power  to  do  otherwife,  but  becaufe  they  make  their  Choice 
 otherwife;  nor  doth  it  follow  becaufe  they  can  choofe  amifs, 
 that  they  will  do  fo.     A  poffe  ad  ej/e  non  valet  Confequcntia. 
 
 If  it  it  be  ask'd,  why  God  did  not  afford  this  help  to  all 
 Mankind.  I  anfwer  that  the  Ele6t  are  defign'd  for  a  ftation  in. 
 Hea'ven  void  for  them  by  the  fall  of  the  Angels,  or  fome  other 
 way,  and  that  a  certain  number  may  be  fo  provided  and  no 
 more;  and  when  the  number  of  the  Elect  is  full,  then  will 
 follow  the  Confummation  of  all  Things.  But  it  is  reafonable 
 to  permit  God  to  choofe  the  Perfons  to  whom  he  will  vouch- 
 fafe  this  fupernatural  Favour,  and  to  take  care  that  the  pardon- 
 ing and  recovering  ot  Sinners  may  not  have  an  ill  effect  on  the 
 reft  of  liis  Creatures  :  and  this  he  has  done  partly  by  letting  fe- 
 veral  of  them  fuffer  for  an  Example,  and  partly  by  appointing 
 fuch  a  SatisIa£lion  for  them  in  the  death  of  our  Saviour,  as  is 
 capable  to  deter  both  Men  and  Angels  from  failing  in  their 
 Duty,  more  than  the  Puniftiment  of  the  Malefadlors  cou'd  have 
 done.  For  nothing  could  more  fully  demonftrate  the  deter- 
 minate decree  of  God  not  to  difpenfe  with  Obedience  to  his 
 Laws,  on  the  Obfervation  of  which  the  Good  of  the  whole 
 depends,  than  that  he  would  not  pardon  a  few  on  a  lefs  Conli- 
 deration   than  the  interpofition  and  death  of  his  Son. 
 
 But  fecondly,  God  may  be  conceiv'd  to  have  p.eripitte4 
 4dam  to  fall  not  only  for  the  reafons  above,  but  likewife  be- 
 
 cauf;* 
 
4o8  ,  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 le<ftions  be  oiii  own  or  God's.     NdV  the  force  oi 
 Laws,  together  v.iih  the  Efficacy  of  P^ewards  and 
 
 Punidi- 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 canfeit  was  better  for  him  upon  the  whole  than  if  he  had  been 
 kept  fram  the  a£t  o^  Guilt  by  an  invilible  force.     He  hid  no 
 reafon  to  prefume  this,  but  the  Power  of  God  is  fo  great  that 
 he  brought  Good  out  of  Evil,  and  made  Jdams  State  after  his 
 Fall  more  advantageous  to  him  than  Innocence  had  been.  This 
 is  plain  from  Holy  Scripture  that  prefers  our  State  under  the 
 fecond  Adam  to  what  it  v\'as  under  the  firft.     And  as  it  was 
 better  for  Adam  himfclf,  foit  is  not  certain  but  it  was  befl:  for 
 his  Pofterity.     For  fome  of  them  it  andonbtedly  was,  1  mean 
 thofe  that  are  found  in  Chrift  :    ^nd  as  to  the  reft,  it  doth  not 
 appear  but  all  things  confider'd  it  was  as  good  for  them  too. 
 We  have  a  notion  that  xl  Adam  had  not  fillen  all  his  Pofterity 
 would  have  continued  innocent,  and  been  free  from  all  natural 
 Inconveniencies :  but  the  Author  lliews    that  neither  the  Holy 
 Scriptures   nor   the  Catholic  Church  has  determin'd  either  of 
 them  ;  nor  is  it  faid  how  every  one  that  was  to  be  born  would 
 have  ufed  his  Free-Will  if  he  had  been  tried,    nor  that  even 
 thofe  who  ufed  it  right  would  have  been  fubjedt  to  no  nataral 
 Evil.     And  therefore  'tis  a  very  uncertain  Argument  that  is 
 drawn  from  thefe  flippofiions,  and  ought  not  to  be  oppofcd  to 
 the  Goodnefs  of  God. 
 
 But  laftly,  however  this  Matter  ftand,  it  is  to  be  fuppofed 
 that  it  was  beft  for  the  whole  that  things  fhou'd  be  as  they  are, 
 and  that  the  hindring  Man  frou'  falling  by  an  irrefiftible  force 
 would  have  been  more  milchievous  in  general  than  his  Sin. 
 We  know  that  God,  as  the  Author  obferves,  is  to  govern  an 
 jnnumeral  multitude  of  Creatures  to  all  Eternity,  and  he  only 
 can  compiehend  Av  hat  influence  any  action  may  have  on  that 
 Syftem  in  infinite  Ages.  It  has  been  fliewn  that  there  ii  a  Com- 
 munity  and  Connexion  amongft  them  all,  aiid  each  Is  or  may 
 be  affeded  with  what  his  fellow  Creature  doth  or  futTcrs ;  and 
 it  is  impoflibie  for  any  but  God  to  be  a  judge  of  this.  We  fee 
 that  in  the  greatcft  Number  imaginable,  if  we  change  but  one 
 unit  after  a  few  Multiplications  and  Divifions  the  whole  pro- 
 Uufl  is  entirely  altered.  The  fame  might  happen  in  the  World 
 in  an  infinite  feries  of  Mutations,  if  any  onea^ion  were  chang- 
 ed: it  mull  be  of  great  conicqucnce  to  the  whole  if  God  fhould 
 Uiierpofeand  alter  any  the  miuuteft  thing,  and  perhaps  change 
 cUc  whole  original  Scheme.    If  therefore  that  Scheme  was  at 
 
 m. 
 
Sea.  5-  Sub.  3-     Gf  Moral  "EvW.  409 
 
 Punifhments,  would  be  quite  deftroy'd.  For  who 
 would  regard  Laws  or  Rewards,  when  he  was  cer- 
 taid  that  God  would  hinder  him  from  doing  any 
 thing  which  might  occafion  the  Lofs  of  Rewards, 
 or  make  him  incur  the  Punifhments  ?   But  however 
 
 this 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 fjril  contrived  to  the  befl  Advantage  of  thofe  Creatures  of 
 which  it  confided,  to  alter  any  thing  in  it  wou'd  certainly 
 make  it  worfe  ;  if  it  had  not  been  bell  for  the  whole  that  Man 
 fhou'd  be  permitted  to  fall,  God  wou'd  not  have  done  it,  and 
 if  i\.  was  bell  he  Ought  not  to  alter  it.  Free  Creatures  were 
 necelTary  to  the  pcrfe£lion  of  the  World,  that  is  fuch  Creatures 
 as  being  effentially  fhort  of  perfetlion  were  capable  of  choo- 
 fing  amifs.  And  to  make  them  thus  free  and  abfolutely  hinder 
 the  ufe  of  that  Freedom  appeared  a  greater  Evil  than  the  fall  of 
 a  few  :  for  that  wou'd  have  defeated  the  very  end  of  their  be- 
 ing made  Free  Agents,  which  was  that  they  might  make 
 thcnifelves  happy  by  choofing  right,  Thus  good  Men  here 
 are  happy,  the  blefled  in  Heaven,  and  all  the  Holy  Angels, 
 fo  far  as  we  know  of  them. 
 
 But  it  is  farther  urg'd.  cou'd  not  God  have  determined  their 
 Wills  to  good,  and  neither  let  them  nor  any  other  Creature 
 know  it,  and  then  the  ill  effefts  which  could  be  apprehended 
 fiom  the  Example  might  have  been  avoided  ?  The  meaning  of 
 this  Expedient,  fo  far  as  I  can  underftand  it,  is  that  God 
 fhou'd  have  deceived  and  cheated  all  rational  Creatures  at  once, 
 and  tho'  he  had  given  them  Faculties  to  dilcern  truth  from 
 falfehood,  yet  he  fhould  have  obliged  them  all  to  believe  a 
 I, ye.  Sure  he  delights  in  Treachery  and  Falfehood  that  can 
 fuggefl  fuch  an  Expedient. 
 
 But  fuppofe  God  fhould  deceive  Men  and  Angels  and  make 
 them  believe  that  they  choofe  when  really  they  do  not,  but 
 their  Wills  are  fecretly  determined,  yet  this  would  not  obtain 
 the  end,  or  fupply  the  ufe  of  Free  Choice  or  yieid  the  pleafure 
 which  is  therefult  of  it.  For  it  is  not,  as  obferv'd  before,  the 
 beliefof  our  being  free  that  gives  us  the  pleafure,  but  the  true 
 and  right  ufe  of  the  Faculty :  Tho'  a  Man  believ'd  never  fo 
 firmly  that  he  fees  or  knows  a  thing,  yet  if  his  Faculty  of 
 Sight  or  Knowledge  were  not  really  exercifed,  he  wou'd  nei- 
 ther have  the  ufe  nor  the  pleafure  of  them.  And  at  the  fame 
 rate  if  a  Man  have  not  the  free  exercife  of  his  Choice,  he  wj])' 
 neither  have  the  ?4fe  nor  pleafure  arifing  from  it,. 
 
'416  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 this  be,  'tis  very  certain  that  our  greateft  Pleafure, 
 nay  our  very  Reward,  confifls  in  being  conTcious 
 that  M-e  have  ufed  our  Choice  aright,  and  done 
 thoTe  things  which  we  might  not  have  done.  On 
 the  other  hand,  'tis  the  greatefl  Grief  and  Afflid-i- 
 on  to  have  omitted  fuch  things  as  would  have  tend- 
 ed to  our  Happinefs,  and  were  in  our  Power :  one 
 of  thefe  could  not  be  had  without  the  other,  and  if 
 none  were  fufFer'd  to  grieve  for  a  bad  Eledion, 
 none  would  rejoycc  for  a  g'  od  one.  But  it  is  bet- 
 ter that  fome  few  rtiould  grieve  for  their  own  folly, 
 than  that  all  fhould  be  deprived  of  the  Rewards  of 
 their  good  Aftions.  That  Privilcdge  then  of  doing 
 well,  and  pleafing  ourfelves  in  what  is  well  done, 
 could  not  be  had  without  the  hazard  of  Sinning ; 
 if  God  inould  take  away  the  one,  the  other  would 
 vanifh  of  itielf. 
 
 But  you  v/ould  have  the  Fleafure  whidi  arifes 
 from  Eledion  wijhout  the  Danger;  that  is,  the 
 End  without  the  Means :  Neither  do  you  obferve 
 that  th°  greateft  Pleafure  in  this  Cafe  is,  that  you 
 could  have  done  otherwife  :  and  this  arifes  from  the 
 very  Nature  of  Pleafure,  which  feems  to  be  no- 
 thing elfe  but  a  Senfe  of  the  Exercife  of  thoje  Facul' 
 ties  and  Pojvers  which  ue  enjoy.  The  more  there- 
 fore any  Ad:ion  is  ours,  the  more  it  pleafes  us;  and 
 {incc  a  free  Adlion  ('which  we  could  neither  cxerc 
 or  omir)  is  the  mod  of  all  ours,  it  mufl:  neceffari- 
 ly  pleafe  us  moft:  But  if  the  Will  were  confined  to 
 one  Sid:,  or  detain'd  fom  the  other,  the  Adion 
 would  ceafe  to  be  our?,  and  the  Pleafure  would  pe- 
 rifh  together  with  the  Senfe  of  Liberty.  A  Mind 
 confcious  of  Virtue  is  the  Pleafure  and  Reward  of 
 ^ood  A6l-ionSs    but  unlefs  it  were  pofTible  for  it  to 
 
 become 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub,  3.     Of  Moral  Evil,  411 
 
 become  confcious  of  Vice,  'tis  plain  it  could  not  be 
 confcious  of  Virtue.  {6^.) 
 
 you 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (69  )  In  oppofition  to  what  our  Author  h^s  here  ^dvancM, 
 JSay/e  [^.]  brings  a  great  many  Arguments  drawn  from  the 
 Tenets  oi  Calwnifis,  Spimxijh,  ^c.  who  believe  that  all  their 
 Aftions  are  necelTarily  determin'd,  and  yet  are  no  lefs  pleas'd 
 with  them.  Nay  fome,  fays  he,  rejoyce  in  this  very  thing,  that 
 they  are  under  the  abfolute  Dircftion  of  the  Deity.  Dij  me 
 tuentur—  \e.'\  and  to  be  naturally  determin'd  to  the  beft  was 
 always  look'd  upon  as  a  peculiar  Happinefs,  and  they  that  came 
 neareft  it  were  efteem'd  the  beft  Men,  as  the  known  Compli- 
 ments to  Cato  and  Fabricius  declare.  Some  are  as  well  plcas'd 
 with  what  they  have  by  Lot  or  Inheritance,  as  what  they  get 
 by  their  own  Labour  :  Witnels  the  Pride  of  antient  Families, 
 l^c,  Gaudeant  bene  nati,  is  a  common  Proverb ;  and  among 
 the  Thmgs,  quae  'vitam  f admit  beatiorem.  Martial  reckons  Res 
 non  parta  Lahore  fed  reliBa.  And  again  ;  If,  fays  he,  we  did 
 take  delight  in  choofing  things,  yet  it  would  be  enough  for  us 
 if  God  conceal'd  his  determination  from  us,  and  vve  only  be- 
 liev'd  that  we  were  free  to  choofe  and  a£b. 
 
 We  need  not,  I  think,  fpend  much  time  in  anfwering  fuch 
 Arguments  as  thefe.  For  the  Calvinijls,  ^c.  notwithttanding 
 all  their  abfurd  Tenets,  have  evidently  this  Confcioufnefs  of 
 Choice  within  them,  which  is  the  fecret  fource  of  the  Pleafure 
 that  attends  their  Aftions,  and  cannot  be  extinguifli'd  by  any 
 of  their  Principles,  but  overcomes  them  all,  and  conftartly 
 puts  thefe  Men  upon  fuch  endeavours  as  are  vain  and  ufelefs 
 upon  the  Suppofition,  and  inconfiftent  with  the  Belief  of  Fate 
 and  abfolute  Predeftination  :  which  iliews  us  that  thefe  Notions 
 are  neither  a£led  upon  in  Life,  nor  purfu'd  to  their  utmoft 
 Confequences  ;  that  they  reft  in  pure  Speculation,  and  are  ge- 
 nerally laid  afide  in  Praftice  j  in  (hort,  that  they  arc  abfolutely 
 inconfiftent  with  human  Nature,  as  well  as  human  Reafon. 
 
 Secondly,  Some  Perfons  may  rejoyce  in  being  under  the  par- 
 ticular Care,  Proteftion  and  Government  of  the  Deity ;  but 
 then  their  Joy  proceeds  not  fo  much  from  a  bare  Contem^^Iation 
 of  what  the  Deity  does  for  them,  as  from  confidering  on  'vohat 
 accoujit  he  does  it,  o^/z.  bccaufe  they  are  agreeable  to  him,  and 
 proper  Objects  of  his  Favour,  and  that  on  account  of  fomething 
 
 which 
 
 [^.]  Anpwer  to  the  ^eries  of  a  Pro'vindal.  p.  665.  FoL 
 [f .]  Horace,  B.  1 .  Ode  17. 
 
41 2  Of  Moral  Evil        Chap.  V. 
 
 You  may  urge,   that  you  had  rather  want  this 
 Pleafure  than  undergo   the  Danger ;    that  is,   you 
 
 had 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 which  they  themjehvei  have  done.  \i  Horace  meant  otherwife 
 by  his  Dij  mt  tuentur,  he  had  fmall  reafon  for  what  he  adds  in 
 the  next  Line,  Diu  Pietas  nua  &  Mufa  cordi  eJiJ  But  in  truth 
 this  and  moft  other  of  Bayles  Teltinionies  are  Rhetorical  or 
 Poetic  Flourifhes,  rather  than  Philolophic  Truths,  and  confe- 
 quently  not  worth  a  ferious  Examination.  To  drau  anything 
 like  an  Argument  from  another's  Words,  we  fhov.ld  at  leaft  be 
 fure  of  his  determinate  Meaning,  of  the  precife  number  of  his 
 Ideas,  as  well  as  the  juftnefs  of  their  Connexion  together, 
 which  we  muft  never  expedl  fjom  fuch  kind  of  random  Quota- 
 tions. It  may  not  therefore  be  improper  to  obferve  here  once 
 for  all,  that  Ba-^Ie's  ufjal  Method  of  reafoning  from  Authori- 
 ties muft  be  very  weak  and  unp hiiofophical;  and  calculated 
 rather  to  blind  Men's  Eves,  than  to  inform  their  Underftand- 
 ings. 
 
 Thirdly,  We  are  pleas'd  indeed  with  what  we  call  Good 
 Fortune,  when  a  gaeat  Sum  of  Money  comes  to  us  by  Lot,  or 
 a  large  Eftate,  or  a  Title  by  Inheritance;  and  are  perhaps  the 
 more  delighted,  the  greater  the  Change  is  in  our  Circumftan- 
 cesj  and  the  lefs  Expectation  we  had  of  it  [/I]  But  is  this 
 Pleafure  comparable  to  that  Intelleftual  or  Moral  Pleaiure,  that 
 fublime  Satisfaftion  and  Self  complacency,  which  we  feel  upon 
 acquiring  a  like  Sum  of  Money  by  fome  laudable  Aft,  or  egre- 
 gious Undertaking,  that  may  properly  be  called  our  oivn  ?  Is 
 it  equal  to  that  folid  Comfort,  and  Self  approb-ation  which 
 every  ingenuous  Mind  is  fenfible  of  from  his  doing  what  de- 
 feri'es  an  Eltate  or  Title,  and  receiving  thcfe  as  the  proper  Re- 
 compence  and  due  Tribute  of  fuch  Deeds  ?  The  Man  that  can 
 value  himfelf  more  upon  his  Dffcent  from  an  antient  Family, 
 than  upon  being  by  thefe  means  the  Founder  of  a  new  one,  is 
 a  difgrjce  to  his  Deicent,  and  unworthy  of  the  Arms  he  bears, 
 —  But  to  return  : 
 
 There  is  undoubtedly  an  agreeable  and  exalted  Confciouf- 
 nefs  attending  all  the  Bleflings  which  we  ourfelvcs  are  inftru- 
 ^Tiental  in  procuring,  infinitely  beyond  all  the  Satisiadion 
 which  they  could  afford  us,  if  we  knew  ourfelves  to  be  un- 
 concern'd  in  the  Attainment,  and  unworthy  of  the  Enjoymcrit 
 of  them.     This  is  the  great  Spur  and  Incitement  to  many 
 
 ncble 
 
 I/-]  See  Note  19. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  413 
 
 had  rather  be  a  Brute  than  a  Man :  neither  could 
 you  by,  this  means  avoid  thefe  natural  Evils  which 
 
 you 
 
 AT  0  TE  S, 
 
 hoble  Adlions  here,  and  will  be  part  of  the  Crown  and  Reward 
 of  them  hereafter,  (as  is  illuftrated  at  large  by  Dr-  Scoit  in  the 
 f.rft  Vol.  of  his  ChrlJIian  Life,  and  by  Dr.  Jenkin,  in  his  Ria- 
 fonahlenefs  of  Chrifiianity,  2d  vol.  C  12.  prop,  z)  And  tho'' 
 we  cannot  properly  wm/  any  thing  at  the  hand  of  God,  yet  the 
 Confcioufnefs  of  having  perform'd  fuch  Aftions  as  are  in  them- 
 Telves  acceptable  to,  and  rcwardable  by  him,  and  of  receiving 
 Bleffings  fi-bm  him  in  return  for  fuch  Acftions,  mufl:  very  much 
 increafe  our  Happinefs  in  the  Enjoyment  of  thefe  Blenings, 
 both  in  this  World  and  the  ne^t,  (as  is  fliewn  in  the  fame 
 places.)  Nor  laftly,  could  we  receive  this  Pleafure  which 
 now  refults  from  our  Choice  and  Acflion,  if  we  were  deter- 
 min'd  in  every  thing  by  the  Deity,  fuppofing  that  Determi- 
 n:jtion  conceaPd  fvom  us,  and  we  only  made  to  believe  that 
 we  were  really  free  to  choole  and  adt.  For,  as  our  Author 
 obferves,  this  would  be  to  a.rrive  at  the  End  without  the  Means^ 
 and  to  have  the  Effeft  without  the  Caufe.  All  our  Ideas  ot 
 Merit  arifc  from,  and  are  entirely  founded  in  Free  Chcice : 
 this  (as  far  as  we  can  apprehend)  is  the  neceflary  Medium  to 
 fuch  Moral  Happinefs ;  and  we  cnn  no  more  conceive  hoiv 
 one  fhould  come  without  the  other,  than  how  we  fhould  fee 
 without  Eyes :  and  for  us  to  have  tliis  Plealiire,  tho*  another 
 did  the  Aftion,  v/ould  be  the  fame  as  for  one  Man  to  be  con- 
 fcious  of  his  doing  what  fome  other  really  did,  or  for  him  to 
 fee  by  fome  other's  Eyes.  Such  Suppofitions  as  thefe  would 
 breed  endlefs  Confufion.  Fox  we  muit  either  know  whether 
 another  did  this  Adtion  or  not ;  if  we  do  know  this,  thea 
 how  can  we  attribute  that  to  ourlelves,  or  pride  ourlelves  in 
 that  which  we  know  belongs  to  another  ?  Jf  we  do  not  know 
 this,  then  how  can  we  attribute  to  ourfelves,  or  pleafe  our- 
 felves  in  any  thing  ?  Since  every  thing  in  and  about  us  may, 
 for  Vv^hatwe  know,  be  done  by  another,  and  fo  we  in  reality- 
 may  never  deferve  either  praifc  or  blame.  The  natural  conie- 
 quence  of  which  is,  that  we  might  as  well  never  aim  at  Dc- 
 fert,  or  ftrive  to  do  any  thing  at  ail  :  and  this  is  the  genuine 
 Produdl  of  all  luch  Suppofitions  as  queftion  the  Veracity  of  our 
 Faculties,  and  would  make  us  fufpeft  that  we  may  beimpofed 
 upon  even  in  the  regular  Operations  of  our  ov/n  Minds.  The 
 fame  Arguments  with  thofe  of  Bayle,  as  well  as  the  like  me- 
 thod of  reafoning,  are  made  ufe  of  by  the  Authgr  of  the  Phi- 
 
 lofophicfil 
 
414  ^f  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 you  dread  fo  much  as  foolillily  to  wifli  yourfelf  a 
 Brute,  left  you  iliould  fall  into  them.  But  fuppofing 
 it  were  convenient  for  you  to  be  a  Brute,    yet  ic 
 could  not  be  convenient  lor  all  Nature  :  The  Syftem 
 of  the  Univerfe  required  free  Agents :  without  thefe 
 the  Works  of  God  would  be  lame  and  imperfeft ; 
 his  Goodnefs  chofe  the  Benefit  of  the  Univerfe  ra- 
 ther than  that  of  yourfelf  j    efpecially  when  this  is 
 better  for  you  too>  tho'  you  fhould  be  fo  ungrateful 
 as  not  to  confefs  it. 
 p     p^,         V.  Fourthly,  As  it  would  be  prejudicial  to  Man, 
 gents  are    to  all  Nature,  for  God  to  hinder  bad  Eleftions  by 
 j)laced  as   his   abfolute  Power,    fo  nothing  can  be  conceiv'd 
 It  were  out  fo  be  more  difagreeable  to   himlelf.     We  have  faid 
 °^^v^  c     that  God  made  the  World  in  order  to  have  fome- 
 i)ivine       thing  wherein  to  exercife  his  Attributes  externally  : 
 jpocu;^r,the  But  iince  he  has  feveral  Attributes,  he  cannot  exer- 
 Govern-     cife  them  all  in  every  thing  alike.     His  Power  there- 
 rnent  of     ^^^^  exerts  itfelf  chiefly  in  one  thing,  and  his  Wif- 
 Aerefore    ^^^  ^^'^  Goodnefs  in  another.      He  exercifed  his 
 is  the  pro-  Power  in  crea  ing  the  World,   and  putting  it  into 
 per  Exer-   Motion;  his  Goodnef'  and  V/ifdom  in  the  Order 
 cife  of  the  ^^^  Agreement  of  things :    But  the  Divine  Wifdom 
 
 JVifdom,  ^^^"^^ 
 
 wherein  ^.  _  _ 
 
 God  dc-  NOTES. 
 
 lights. 
 
 lofophical  Enquiry,  p.  98,  ^c.  and  p.  71,  72.  Where  he  thinks, 
 "  It  may  not  be  improper  to  obferve,  that  fome  ot  the  Plea- 
 "  fures  Man  receives  from  Objeds  are  fo  far  from  being  the 
 "  Efied:  of  Choice,  that  they  are  not  the  Effc-t  of  the  lead 
 "  Premeditation,  or  any  A6t:  of  his  own,  as  in  finding  a  Trea- 
 "  furc  on  the  Road,  or  in  receivmg  a  Legacy  from  a  Perfon 
 "  unknown  to  him."  But  has  a  M;in  the  ianie  Pleafure  in  thefe 
 Cafes  as  if  he  had  done  fonicthing  to  dejtr've  a  Trcafure  of  the 
 Public  ?  or  had  the  Legacy  conferral  en  him  as  a  Reward  for 
 his  good  Deeds  to  the  decealed  Perfon,  his  \xXt  lov'd  Benefici- 
 ary or  intimate  Friend  ?  If  this  Author  can  find) a  difference  in 
 thefe  two  Cafes,  this  Obt'ervation  of  his  muil  be  improper: 
 if  he  cannot,  I  am  fare  he  h;<^  a  different  Senle  of  things  from 
 the  rclt  of  Mankind,  and  of  conlcquent  is  not  to  be  argued 
 with. 
 
Sea  5.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil  415 
 
 feems  to  have  fet  apart  the  Government  of  Free 
 Agents  as  its  peculiar  Province,  Herein  it  fully  ex- 
 ercifes  irfelf,  and  ads  up  to  its  Infinity;  for  if  it 
 were  finite  it  would  not  be  equal  to  fo  great  a  Task« 
 It  does  not  feem  a  very  extraordinary  thing  for  God 
 to  be  able  to  govern  and  abfolately  dired  fuch  Be- 
 ings as  are  merely  paflivc,  and  deprived  of  ail  Mo- 
 tion of  their  own,  whereby  jthey  mighr  make  any 
 Refinance.  For  thofe  things  obey  eafily  which  do 
 not  move  but  when  they  are  moved.  Neither  is 
 theie  need  of  infinite  Wifdom  to  govern  them,  for 
 infinite  Power,  with  a  moderate  ufe  of  Wifdom, 
 would  have  been  fufficient.  That  there  might  h€ 
 a  Subject  therefore  whereon  the  infinite  Wildom 
 of  God  fhould  difplay  itielf,  he  created  Free  Agents,- 
 which,  being  as  it  v*^ere  put  out  of  his  Power  and 
 left  to  themfelves,  might  ad  in  a  manner  indepen- 
 dent of  his  Will.  *Tis  evident  to  any  Perfon  how 
 much  more  difficult  it  is,  and  how  much  greater 
 Exercife  of  Wifdom  it  requires  to  dired  a  Multi- 
 tude of  thefe  to  a  certain  End.  and  make  them  con- 
 spire to  the  common  Good,  than  to  order  Brute 
 Beads,  and  fuch  as  have  no  Pov/er  of  themfelves, 
 in  what  manner  you  pleafe.  To  them  thit  confider 
 the  vafl  Multitude  of  Free  Agents,  which  is  almod 
 infinite,  and  their  Independence  (fince  every  one  is? 
 Gt  leaft  in  many  Cafes,  abfolute  Mafter  of  his  own 
 Adions  and  is  permitted  by  God  to  ad  according 
 to  that  Liberty^  God  feems  to  have  given  a  Speci- 
 men cf  the  Extent  of  his  Wifdom,  which  is  able 
 ihus  certainly  and  etFedually  to  bring  to  the  End 
 propofed,  fo  many  Free  Spirits  fo  many  Agents  that 
 were  in  a  manner  fet  at  Liberty  from  his  Dominion, 
 and  committed  every  one  to  his  own  Government. 
 Here  is  the  proper  place  for  Wifdom,  wherein  ffet- 
 ting  jfide,  and  in  a  manner  fufpending  the  Exer- 
 cife of  his  Power)  he  attains  his  Ends  by  Prudence 
 only,  by  mere  Dexterity  of  ading,   and  brings  it 
 
 to 
 
4i6  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 CO  pafs   that   fo  many  jarring  Wills  depending  on 
 themfelves  alofte,    and  no  more  inclined  to   either 
 Side  by  the  Divine  Power,   than  if  there  were  no 
 luch  thing,  fliall  yet  conlpire  together  to  promote 
 the  Good  of  the  Univerfe.     'Tis  impoffible  that 
 this  Exercife  of  Wifdom  Ihould  not  be  very  agree- 
 able to  the  Deity,  if  any  thing  in  his  Works  may  be 
 efteem'd  agreeable  to  him.     But  if  )he  were  obliged 
 to  interfere  with  his  Power,  t'would  feem  to  argue 
 a  Defe<5t  of  Wildom  ;  for  what  occafion  is  there  for 
 him  to  interpofe  and  flop   the  Liberty  of  Eleftion 
 before  granted,  if  his  Wifdom  could  provide  fuffi- 
 ciently  for  the  Good  of  the  whole  without  altering 
 his  Plan  ?  * 
 It  would        VL  From  hence  it  feems  fufficiently  evident  why 
 theretore  ^  q^j  would  not  intcrpofe  his  Power,  or  intermeddle 
 agreeable    ^'^^"^  ^^"^  Eledions,  Imce  that  could  neither  be  ad- 
 to  God,      vantageous  to  ouifelves  nor  to  the  whole  Syflem, 
 norufeful    nor  agreeable  to  God.     *Tis  no  wonder  then  that 
 to  us,  that  abfolute  Goodnefs  permits  Evil  Eleftions,  fince  for 
 fhouldal     ^^^  ^o^  part  they  could  not  be  prevented  without 
 ways  hin-  greater  Evils.     But  if  that  can  ever  be  done,  there's 
 der  bad      no  doubt  but  God  will  take  care  that  the  very  beft 
 Eledtions.    fhaH  be  done.  (70.) 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (70.)  What  has  been  urgM  in  the  foregoing  Subfcdion  a- 
 bout  the  Divine  Intcrpofition  in  human  Eleclions  mull  be  un- 
 derftood  in  a  limited  Senfe,  wz.  as  relating  only  to  an  itnme- 
 diate  Influence,  or  an  abrolute  Determination  of  the  Will,  /,  e. 
 
 to 
 
 *  5eeDr,]zr^\Xi,  2d  VoU  C.  12.  p.  240,  i£c.  5thEdit. 
 
Sedt.^.  Sub.4.     Of  ^foral  "Evil.  417 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     IV. 
 
 Concerning  the  Efficacy  of  Prayer, 
 
 I.  C  O  M  E   may  apprehend  that  God  is  not    fo  Devout 
 
 i3  averfe   from    interpofing   immediately  in  the  Men  hope 
 Affairs  of  this  World  as  is  here  afferted  ;    and  that  ^°^^„^ 
 the  Laws  and  Order  of  Nature  are  not  of  fo  great  -^^  ^^ 
 confequence  with  him,    but  that  he  may  be  eafily  courfeof 
 and    frequently    induced   to   difpenfe    with    them,  Nature, 
 contrary   to  what  we  have  here  advanc'd.      Nay,  through 
 this  feems  to  be  the  common  Opinion   of  Mankind,  p    .gi-g^ 
 Every  Supplicant  that  addrefles  himfelf  to  God,  be- 
 lieves that  this  is  effe(5led  by  the  Deity  thro'  his  Pray- 
 ers :    if  he  perceiv'd  it  to  be  otherwife,  he  could 
 
 hope 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 to  fuch  an  intcrmedling  with  Eleflions  as  would  make  them 
 to  be  no  Eledlions  at  all.  For  it  appears  from  the  following 
 Sabfeftion,  that  our  Author  did  not  intend  to  exclude  all  kind 
 of  Interpofition  in  the  Government  of  Free  Agents,  but  only 
 that  particular  fort  which  would  fubvert  their  natural  Powers, 
 or  be  deftruftive  of  their  Freedom.  Tho'  God  has  eilablifh'd 
 general  Laws  both  in  the  animate  and  inanimate  World,  yet 
 he  has  not  left  thefe  entirely  to  themfelves,  but  influences,  di- 
 refts,  and  governs  them  in  fuch  a  manner  as  is  mod  condu- 
 cive to  the  great  End  for  which  he  defign'd  them  ;  which  End 
 could  not  be  attained  without  fuch  a  particular  Influence,  as 
 Will  be  fhewn  below.  In  determining  the  manner  of  this  Go- 
 vernment we  mull  beware  ot  the  two  Extremes  of  fuppofing 
 either  firft,  that  the  Deity  always  influences  fecond  Caufes  of 
 acts  (as  Malebranch  terms  it)  by  particular  Wills,  in  the  Na- 
 tural or  Moral  World;  which  would  diflolve  all  Laws  of  Na- 
 rare,  deftroy  the  Liberty  of  the  Creature,  and  reduce  every 
 thing  to  Fate ;  or  fecondly,  that  he  never  interpoles  in  the 
 Government  of  either  World,  but  lets  the  general  Laws  of  Me- 
 E  e  ch.anifm 
 
4l8  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 hope  for  nothing  from  the  Prayers  he  offers  to  the 
 Deiry.  For  if  all  came  to  pals  according  to  the 
 natural  Order  of  things,  and  the  Series  of  Caufes, 
 who  could  hope  to  be  delivered  from  a  Diftcmper  or 
 Calamity  ;  from  Evil  AfFedions  or  Temptations, 
 by  virtue  of  Prayer  \  Thefe  things  are  either  effec- 
 ted by  the  immediate  Interpofition  of  the  Divine 
 Power,  or  are  requefted  of  God  in  vain.  For  if 
 they  depend  upon  their  own  proper  Caufes,  which 
 may  not  be  alter'd,  thofe  Caufes  would  produce  their 
 
 Effeds 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 clianifm  or  of  Liberty  take  their  natural  Courfe,  and  operate 
 as  it  were  independently  of  himfelf ;  which  would  entirely 
 dc^xoy  2.  particular  Pro-vidence,  and  render  the  _§-fw^rfl/ one  in 
 a  great  mcafure  ufelefs.  The  bad  Conlequences  which  would 
 attend  the  former  of  thefe  Schemes  have  been  touched  upon  a- 
 bove  :  The  latter  (which  is  particularly  efpous'd  by  Leibnitz 
 in  his  Syilcm  oi  Pre-ejlablijh''d  Harmony,  and  by  Mr.  Whijion 
 in  his  'Ne^u  Theory  of  the  Earth)  will  be  obviated  in  the  follow- 
 ing Subfedtion.  I  fhall  here  only  add  the  Opinion  of  Mi'. 
 Coluber  on  the  prcfent  Subject :  "  [j.]  'Twas  highly  fuitable 
 *'  to  the  Divine  Wifdom  in  the  Government  of  the  World, 
 *'  both  to  pre  ordain  fome  of  the  principal  Events  with 
 ^'  relation  to  the  entire  human  Community,  or  to  the  more 
 •*  confiderable  parts  of  it,  and  to  refervc  to  himfelf  a  Right 
 *'  of  interpofmg  and  influencing  particular  Agents,  as  in  other 
 ""  Cafes,  fo  more  efpecially  in  order  to  the  accompliflimcnt  of 
 *<  thefe  Events.  That  he  has  aftually  done  fo  is  abundantly 
 *'  clear  from  Scripture- Propliccics,  and  Hiftories.  And  that 
 "  in  fo  doing  he  hjs  aflcd  in  a  manner  moll:  worthy  his  Wif- 
 *'  dom,  IS  no  lefs  manifeft.  For  hereby  it  appears  that  the 
 ••  Divine  Government  is  equally  oppofed  to  Chance  and  De- 
 *'  ftiny.  Had  the  Deity  taken  no  Care  of  Futurity,  but  left 
 *'  every  Man  to  the  ConJudl  of  his  own  Inclination?,  and  na- 
 **  tural  EfFcds  in  general  to  the  Influence  of  their  Caufes, 
 "  without  ever  interpofmg  to  dircft  them  to  the  attainment 
 *•  of  his  great  Dcfign  i  this  would  have  been  almoft  in  cficdl 
 *'  todiveft  himfelf  of  the  Government  of  Rational  Agents, 
 '•  and  to  fubjefl  their  Affairs  to  Chance,  and  to  the  hazard  of 
 
 ths 
 
 f^-.]  Impartial  Ek(qHir)\  kz.  p.  1 15, 
 
fedl.  5-    Sub.  4:     Of  Moral  UvW:  419 
 
 EfFeds  as  well  upon  the  omiffion  as  the  offering  of 
 thefe  Supplications.  But  if  God  fometimes  vouch- 
 fafes  to  fufpend  or  change  the  Order  and  Laws  of 
 Nature  to  gratify  his  Votaries ;  why  may  not  the 
 fame  be  done  to  prevent  the  abufe  of  Free- Will  and 
 Natural  Evils  ?  Either  this  Interpofirion  mud:  be 
 admitted  in  order  to  oppofe  thefe  Evils,  or  it  muft 
 be  reicfted  with  regard  to  Prayers.  This  Difficulty 
 deferves  an  Anfwer.  We  attempt  to  folve  it  in  the 
 following  manner. 
 
 II.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  then,   in  the  firfl:  place,  God  does 
 that  all  Prayers  are  not  head  by  God,    nor  do  we  not  hear 
 hope  that  all  things  fliall  be  done  which  are  requeft-  ^^|,    ^^y° 
 ed  of  him  J   but  only  fuch  as  he  has  declared  to  be 
 E  e  2  agreeable 
 
 JVO  TE  S, 
 
 "  the  utmoft  Diforder  and  Confufion.  Or  had  he  on  the  con- 
 "  trary  abfolutely  or  fatally  determined  every  Event,  the'  this 
 "  would  have  been  far  enough  from  divefting  himfelfofthe 
 "  Government  of  the  World,  yet  it  would  have  been  a  Go- 
 *'  vernment  unworthy  of  the  Deity,  a  Government  entirely 
 "  exclufive  of  all  proper  Sin  and  Punifhment,  Virtue  and  Re- 
 "  wards  :  wherein  himfelf  would  in  efFcdl  have  been  the  only 
 "  Agent,  and  all  the  Creatures  ftupid  and  paffive.  Whereas, 
 **  by  pre-ordaining  the  mod  material  Events,  and  fuffering 
 "  the  Creatures  freely  to  exert  their  Faculties  in  all  convcni- 
 "  ent  Cafes,  he  appears  moft  wifely  to  have  chofen  the  middle 
 "  way,  and  thereby  to  have  equally  avoided  the  Mifchiefs 
 **  of  both  Extremes''.     See  alfo  p.  1 16. 
 
 All  the  Difference  betvv-een  this  ingenious  Writer  and  our 
 Author  is,  that  in  the  Government  of  the  World  he  fuppolcs 
 the  general  Law  of  Liberty  to  be  fometimes  fufpended,  as  well 
 as  the  Laws  of  Motion.  Whereas  our  Author,  tho'  he  afierts 
 the  fame  of  the  latter,  yet  he  denies  it  of  the  former ;  at  leafl: 
 does  not  grant  that  fuch  an  Abridgment  of  Liberty  is  neceffary 
 to  the  aforefaid  Government:  How  en  this  Principle  he  ac- 
 counts for  that  which  vre  generally  mean  by  a  Particular  Pro- 
 ,n}idence,  anfwering  the  Prayers,  and  thereupon  often  influen- 
 ^  ting  and  over-ruling  the  Affaif?  of  Mankind,,  will  be  fhewn  m 
 its  proper  pl.Ke= 
 
420 
 
 God  is  ob- 
 lig'd  to  the 
 Creatures, 
 by  his 
 Goodnefs 
 and  by 
 Covenant. 
 
 What  may 
 be  requeft- 
 cd  of  the 
 Deity  re- 
 lates ei- 
 ther to 
 the  Mind, 
 the  Body, 
 or  exter- 
 nal things. 
 
 God  does 
 Hot  give 
 Aflillance 
 to  our 
 Minds  at 
 random, 
 but  under 
 as  certain 
 Laws  as 
 thofc  of 
 the  Na- 
 tural 
 Wc-rl^. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 agreeable  to  his  Will,  and  has  in  fome  refped  pro- 
 mi/d  to  perform.  Thofe  things  then  which  are 
 unnecelTary,  trifling,  inconfiftcnt,  hurtful,  cr  peti- 
 tioned for  in  an  unlawful  Manner,  are  not  to  be  ex- 
 pefted  by  the  Petitioners,  tho'  they  be  requefted 
 never  fo  frequently. 
 
 III.  Secondly,  God  may  be  under  a  two-fold 
 Obligation  to  his  Creature,  firft  from  his  Goodnefs, 
 whereby  he  i^  oblig'd  fo  to  order  all  external  things, 
 that  Exiftence  fliall  be  better  than  Non-exiftence 
 to  all  who  duly  perform  their  Duty.  Secondly, 
 By  fome  Covenant  or  Agreement  whereby  he  engag- 
 ed, under  certain  Conditions,  to  beftow  fome  Fa- 
 vours upon  Men,  notwithflanding  they  were  Sin- 
 ners :  Which  Covenant,  tho'  it  may  not  beefteem'd 
 a  natural  one,  yet  it  cannot  be  judg'd  to  be  againfb 
 Nature,  or  to  offer  Violence  to  it. 
 
 IV.  Thirdly,  The  things  which  are  requefted  of 
 God  either  belong  to  the  Mind,  w^.  that  the  Mind 
 be  lound  and  vigorous,  and  able  to  govern  the  Affec- 
 tions, (frC'  or  to  the  Body,  that  Life  and  Strength 
 be  prolong'd,  c^c.  or  to  external  things,  that  the 
 Weather  be  ferene  and  feafonable  for  the  Fruits  of 
 the  Earth,  &e.  Now  thefe  differ  from  each  other, 
 and  ought  not  to  be  prayed  for  under  the  fame  Con- 
 dition'-. 
 
 V.  Fourthly,  As  to  the  Mind,  fince  the  Eleflive 
 Power  is  the  chief  Part  of  Man,  and  is  felf-motive, 
 'tis  fcarce  conceivable  how  it  fliould  be  determin'd 
 from  without  it(elf.  For  that  which  determines  it- 
 felf  is  entirely  different  from  that  which  ibnds  in 
 need  of  another  to  move  it,  and  ihefe  appear  to  be 
 no  more  applicable  to  the  fame  thing,  than  a  Square 
 and  Circular  Figure  are  to  the  fame  Surface,  at  leafl 
 their  Natures  rauft  be  chang'd  to  make  them  com- 
 patible. But  yet  this  Faculty,  as  well  as  others, 
 may  be  vitiated  by  abufe  and  a  perverfe  manner  of 
 
 afting. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  42  \ 
 
 acting,  and  when  it  is  thus  vitiated,  'tis  probable 
 that  God  only  can  reftore  it>  for  it  is  fuppofed  to 
 be  fubjed  to  him  alone. 
 
 This  Affiftance  mufl  be  afforded  to  Mankind  in 
 fuch  a  manner  that  no  bleraiili  be  thereby  call:  up- 
 on the  Divine  Conftancy,  nor  any  Prejudice  done 
 to  his  Wirdom  in  eftablifliing  the  {Laws  and  Order 
 of  Nature.  Now  that  all  kind  of  Interpo^tion  ^o^'s 
 not  prejudice  thefe,  appears  from  hence,  viz..  that 
 it  is  moft  worthy  of  the  Divine  Majefty  to  have  re- 
 fei  vcd  to  himfelf  a  Power  over  Nature,  efpecially 
 while  the  Beings  over  whom  this  Power  is  referv'd 
 enjoy  their  Liberty;  it  feems  not  only  proper  that 
 God  ihould  be  at  Liberty  to  ad  in  this  manner 
 with  them,  but  alfo  nece0ary,  provided  this  be  not 
 done  at  random,  but  under  fome  known  and  cerr 
 tain  Conditions.  And  here  the  Divine  Wifdom  has 
 exerted  itfelf  in  a  wonderful  manner,  and  devifed 
 a  Way  to  reconcile  the  Conftancy  of  God,  and  the 
 Sanftity  of  the  Laws  of  Nature,  with  that  Affif- 
 tance which  is  occafionally  afforded  to  Mankind 
 upon  their  Requefl.  Man  might  prefume  upori 
 fome  Method  of  effeding  this  before  Revelation , 
 but  'tis  to  this  alone  that  wc  owe  the  clear  and  un- 
 doubted Manifeftation  of  it.  From  hence  we  learn 
 that  God  will  give  his  Holy  Spirit,  under  fome  cer- 
 tain Laws  and  Conditions,  to  thofe  that  are  fitly 
 difpofed:  ^which  would  be  as  certain  and  conftant 
 a  Principle  of  Spiritual  A'Ttions  to  them  that  are 
 endow'd  with  it,  as  Nature  itfelf  is  of  the  Natural 
 Since  therefore  this  Spirit  by  its  Grace  affifts  our 
 depraved  Will,  and  in  fome  refped:  reftores  it  to 
 its  Vigour,  it  cannot  be  judg'd  to  violate  the  Or- 
 der of  Nature,  any  more  than  when  its  Influence 
 fuflains  natural  Caufes.  If  it  be  ask'd  what  thofe 
 Laws  are,  under  which  the  Influence  of  this  Spirit 
 is  promifed.  I  anfwer,  all  fuch  things  as  are  necef^ 
 E  e  5  fary 
 
422  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 fary  to  Salvation  are  promifcd  ro  them  who  make 
 
 a  right  ufe  of  their  prefent  Abilities,- that  pray 
 
 to  God  thro'  Chrijl  for  an  increare  of  them, and 
 
 that  celebrate  the  Sacraments  as   the  Law  of  God  re- 
 quires.    Upon  thefe  Conditions  this  Spiiit  defcends 
 into  the  Minds  of  Men,  and  by  its  holy  Infpirati- 
 on  forms  them  to  Piety. 
 The  Aid        V^*  The  giving  of  this  Spirit,  and  obtaining  it 
 of  the  ^5-  by  Chrift,  was  a  moft  miraculous  Work  of  Divine 
 ly  Spirit '\s  Power,    but  the  Operations    of  it,    fince  they  are 
 not  mira-  ^^^  produced  according  to  fix'd  Laws  and  a  fet- 
 
 CLllOU'^  ^ 
 
 tied  Order,  as  regularly  and  conftantly  as  the 
 Works  ol  Nature,  cannot  be  reckon'd  a  MiracU 
 any  more  than  thefe  are:  For  I  call  a  Miracle  a 
 fenfible  Operation  of  God,  which  is  perform'd  in  a 
 Way  contrary  ro  Nature;  and  as  it  happens  beyond 
 all  certain  and  fix'd  Order,  it  proves  God  to  be  the 
 immediate  Caufe  and  Author  :  But  the  Interpofiti- 
 on  of  the  Divine  Power  exerted  about  the  Will  is 
 not  an  Interpolition  of  this  kind;  for  it  is  done,  as 
 Vv^e  faid,  according  to  a  certain  Rule  and  Order, 
 and  therefore  cannot  be  miraculous.  I  confefs  that 
 this  is  indeed  an  Exception  from  the  general  Lav/ 
 of  Free  Agents,  (71.^  but  it  is  no  lefs   regular  than 
 
 the 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (71.)  He  docs  not  mean  that  this  is  an  Exception  from  the 
 Law  of  their  Libertx,  as  appears  from  what  immediately  fol- 
 lows; but  from  their  being  left  entirely  to  themfelves,  or  to 
 the  cafual  ImprefTions  of  thofe  External  Objects  and  Agents 
 which  furround  them;  from  their  acling  folely  upon  Principles 
 of  their  own  Formation  or  Difcovery,  and  following  the  Gui- 
 dance of  their  natural  Underftanding,  without  any  internal 
 Affillance;  which  feem 3  to  be  the  general  Law  -of  this  their 
 prefent  State  of  Probation.  The  Holy  Ghojl  then,  according  to 
 our  Author,  does  not  fubvert  and  fuperfcdc,  but  rather  llreng- 
 then,  prefervc  and  perfe(ll  our  natural  Freedom  ;  it  repairs  the 
 Breaches  made 'therein  by  the  Violence  of  Temptations,  by  the 
 
 Force 
 
Sea.  S'  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  423 
 
 the  Law  itfelf,  nor  any  more  repugnant  to  theii 
 Nature.     From  hence  it  appears  how  God  may  in- 
 
 E  e  4  terpofe 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Force  of  Evil  Habits ;  it  connterbflllances  the  Influence  of  Evil 
 Spirits,  and  reftores  the  Mind  to  its  mtivt  Equilibrium,  or  In- 
 difference. How  thefe  Effeds  may  be  fuppos'd  to  be  produ- 
 ced in  us,  and  of  what  kind  the  Influence  of  the  Holy  Ghoft, 
 of  Good  and  Evil  Angels  is,  will  be  confidcr'd  by  and  by. 
 We  Ihall  firft  give  the  Opinion  of  an  Author  {or  two  conceraip 
 ing  what  the  Holy  Spirit's  Operations  are  not,  or  that  they 
 cannot  be  in  any  refpeft  deftruftive  of  our  natural  Powers. 
 
 "  In  the  firll  place.  The  manner  of  the  Spirit's  Operation 
 *'  is  not  inconfiftent  with  the  Nature  of  Mankind  ;  which  fays) 
 *'  Dr.  Stekbifjg)  is  a  Truth  fo  fully  and  fo  liberally  granted  by 
 **  all  Parties,  that  nothing  needs  to  be  faid  to  prove  it.  Now^ 
 *'  Man  we  know  is  an  intelligent  and  rational  Being,  able  to 
 *'  defcern  between  Good  and  Evil ;  he  has  alfo  fuch  a  Freedom 
 *'  or  Liberty  of  Will a.s  makes  him  accountable  to  God  for  his 
 **  Behaviour  in  this  Life.  By  confequence  the  Spirit  mull  not 
 «'  be  fuppofed  to  operate  in  fuch  a  manner  as  not  to  make  the 
 "  leaft  ufe  of  the  Underftanding,  nor  muft  it  be  fo  far  incon- 
 "  fiftent  with  Freedom  and  Liberty,  as  that  a  Man's  Adtion's 
 "  may  not  properly  be  call'd  his  own  [/  ]".  Again,  "  fuch 
 *•  is  the  manner  of  the  Spirit's  Operations,  that  they  do  not 
 "  make  our  own  Care  and  Diligence  after  Virtue  and  Godli- 
 **  nefs  unneceffary,  but  that  on  the  other  hand  the  Operations 
 *'  of  the  Spirit  will  do  us  no  Good,  if  our  own  Endeavours 
 'f  be  wanting.  Thirdly,  He  does  not  produce  his  Effefts  in 
 *'  us  all  at  once,  but  in  fuch  Order,  and  by  thofe  Degrees 
 *^  that  fuit  with  our  Capacities  and  Qualifications  [«.]  Laftly, 
 **  His  Motions  are  not  difcernable  by  us  from  the  natural  Ope- 
 ^'  rations  of  our  Minds.  We  feel  them  no  otherwife  than  we 
 '*  do  our  Thoughts  and  Meditations,  v/e  cannot  diftinguifh 
 "  them,  by  the  manner  of  their  affecting  us,  from  our  natural 
 *'  Reafonings,  and  the  Operations  of  Truth  upon  our  Souls, 
 •'  fo  that  if  God  had  only  defign'd  to  give  the  Holy  Spirit  to 
 "'■  us,  without  making  any  mention  of  it  in  his   Word,  we 
 
 "  could 
 
 [/.]  Treatife  Concerning  the  Operations  of  the  Spirit,  C.  7^ 
 p.  123.  8w. 
 
 [a]  Ibid,  p,  124., 
 
424  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 terpofe  In  Matters  relating  to  the  Will,  and  yet  not 
 violate  the  Order  of  Nature,    nor  injure  his  Con- 
 
 fiancy. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 *'  could  never  h:ive  Inown,  unlefs  it  had  been  communicated 
 *'  to  us  by  fome  private  Revelation,  that  our  Souls  aie  moved 
 **  by  a  Divine  Power  when  we  love  God  and  keep  his  Com- 
 **  mandmcnts  [lu]"- 
 
 This  is  a  Confirmation  of  what  our  Author  has  declared  a- 
 bove,  particularly  that  the  Holy  Spirit's  Operations  cannot  be 
 call'd  miraculous.  A  larger  Proof  and  Illuftration  of  the  fore- 
 going Propofuions  may  be  feen  in  the  fame  Chapter,  The 
 Confequcnce  refulting  from  them,  viz..  that  the  Spirit  does  not 
 operate  in-efjiibly,  is  clearly  proved  and  defended  againil  Tur- 
 retin  in  Chap.  8,  9,  i^c. 
 
 '$>tc^\{oScott\  Chrijlian  Life,  Part  2.  Ch  4.  par.  5.  p.  237. 
 "  God  (fays  that  Author)  in  the  ordinary  courfc  of  his  Go- 
 *'  vernment  doth  as  well  Xzamz  free  Agents  to  the  natural  Free- 
 *'  do7n  with  wh.ch  he  firil  created  them,  as  necejfary  ones  to  thcfe 
 "  Necellities  which  he  firft  i tnpref 5'' d  wpon  their  Natures.  For 
 ♦'  his  Providence  \s  fuccedaneous  to  his  Creation,  and  did  at  firft 
 **  begin  where  that  ended,  and  doth  ^a\\ proceed  zs  it  began,  or- 
 "  dering  and  governing  all  things  according  to  the  fevera,! 
 *'  Frames  and  Models  in  which  he  firil  cajl  and  created  them  : 
 "  Nor  can  he  order  and  govern  them  others-wife  without  Mira- 
 *'  veliitg  his  own  Creation  and  making  things  to  be  otherwife 
 "  than  he  firft  made  them.  For  how  can  he  ordinarily  necef- 
 *'  fttate  thofe  Agents  whom  he  firft  made_/;-tf  without  changing 
 "  their  Natures  {xorufree  to  7ieceffary,  and  making  them  a  dif- 
 ^'  ferent  kind  of  Being  than  he  made  them  I  So  tliat  tho'  in  the 
 *'  courfe  of  his  Go\ernmcnt  God  doth  powerlullv  importune 
 *'  znd.  petfuade  us,  yet  he  lays  no  Neceffity  on  our  M'llis ;  but 
 "  leaves  us  free  to  choofe  or  refufe  ;  and  as  the  Temptations  of 
 *'  Sin  incline  us  one  way,  fo  the  Grace  of  God  inclines  us  ano- 
 "  ther,  but  both  leive  us  to  our  Liberty  to  go  which  Way  we 
 *'  pleafe." 
 
 See  alfoBp  Burnet  on  the  10th  Article  of  the  Church  of 
 England,  and  A.  Bp.  Tillotfuns  169th  Serm.  p.  455.  vol.  3.  or 
 147th  Serm.  p.  310.  3d.  Edit.  Fol.  or  Dr.  Rymer's  General 
 Reprefentation  of  Reveal'd  Religion,  C.  9.  p.  2io,  211. 
 
 ]f  the  foregoing  Oblcrvutions  be  true,  itfollow.s  that  the  or- 
 dinary Operation  of  the  Spirit  cannot  be  any  Pf.-yJUal  Infiuence, 
 
 [w.]  Ibid,  p,  125,   126. 
 
Sedt.  5.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  425 
 
 Oancy.  Not  that  God  adually  determines  the  Will 
 by  an  immediate  Influx,  for  by  this  means  the  A<3: 
 or  Election  would  change  its  Nature,  and  be  im- 
 puted to  God  rather  than  to  the  Will  of  the  Crea- 
 ture 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 or  immediate  Determination  of  the  Will ;  it  mufl  therefore  be 
 om!/  a  Moral  Influence,  or  mediate,  rational  Determination, 
 7'he  Manner  of  cfFe6ting  this  may  be  by  injecliug   Ideas  Re- 
 prefenting  Arguments,  exhibiting  Motives,  and   affifting  the 
 Undcrftanding  in  its  apprehenfion  of  them.     This  I   think  is 
 all  that  Mr.  WoUaJlon  could  mean  by  the  Words  Suggejiion,  Im- 
 pulfe,  or  Jilent  Communication  of  fame  Spiritual  Being  \x  ] :  and 
 I'eems  to  be  the  only  intelligible  Notion  of  the  Influence  of 
 either  Good  or  Evil  Spirits:  in  which  fenfe  I  believe  that  we 
 are  very  frequently   afted  upon  and  over- ruled  in  order  to  pro- 
 mote the  Good  of  the  whole,  and   com  pleat  the  Defigns  of  a 
 particular  Providence,  the  Author  lafl:  Mentioned  has  given  us 
 2  fine  Defcription  of  the  manner  in  which  this  Government  of 
 Free  Beings  may  be  exercifed  and  apply'd  to  the  Ends  above- 
 mention'd.     *'  It  is  not  impoffiblc  (fays  he,  y)  bufmany  things 
 *'  fuitable  to  feveral  Cafes  may  be  brought  to  pafs  by  means  of 
 *'  fecret  and  fometimes  fudden   Influences  on  our  Minds,  or 
 *'  the  Minds  of  other  Men  whofe  Afts  may  affed  ns.     For 
 **  inftance  ;  if  the  the  Cafe  fliould  require  that  N.  fliould  be  de- 
 "  livered   from  threatning   Ruin,    or  from  fome  Misfortune 
 *'  which  would  certainly    befall  hin\,  if  he  fliould  go  fuch  a 
 **  way  at  fuch  a  Time  as  he  intended  ;  upon  this  occafion  fome 
 ^'  new  Reafons  may  be  prelented  to  his  Mind  why  he  fliould 
 "  not  go  at  all,  or  not  then,  or  not  by  that  Road  ;  or  he  may 
 "  forget  to  go  :  or  if  he  is  to  be  delivered  from  fome  dangc- 
 '*  rous  Enemy,  either  fome  new  turn  given  to  his   Thoughts 
 *'  may  divert  him  from  going  where  the  Enemy  will  be,  or 
 "  the  Enemy  may  after  the  fame  manner   be  diverted  from 
 "  coming  where  he  ftiall  he,  or  his  (the  Enemy's)  Rcfentment 
 '*  may  be  qualify'd,    or  fome   proper  Method    may   be  fug- 
 "  gefied,  or  Degree  of  Refolucion  and  Vigor  maybe  excited. 
 *'  After  the  fame  manner,  not  only  Deliverances  from  Dangers 
 ''  and  Troubles,  but  Anvantages  and  Succefles  may   be  con- 
 *'  fcrr'd.     Or  on  the  other  Side,    yi,?.n  may,   by  way  of  Pu- 
 
 nifliment 
 
 ,  [x'\  Religion  of  Nature  delineated^  p.  io6. 
 [;J  Page  105. 
 
4.26  ,  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 ture,  but  that  in  fome  manner  he  reftores  the  Fa- 
 culty to  its  Perfedion,  and  makes  it,  when  thus  fit- 
 ly difpos'd,  exert  its  proper  A<5iions  according  to  the 
 Red:itude  of  its  Nature,  without  any  Diminution 
 of  its  Liberty. 
 
 VII.  Fifthly. 
 NOTES, 
 
 «•  nifhment  for  Crimes  committed,  incur  Mifchiefs  and  Cala- 
 •*  mitics.  I  fay,  thefe  things  and  fuch  like  may  be.  For  fince 
 ♦'  the  Motions  and  Adlions  of  Men,  which  depend  upon  their 
 *•  Wills,  do  alio  depend  upon  their  Judgments,  as  thefe  again 
 «*  do  on  the  prefent  Appearances  or  Non-appearances  of  things 
 *'  in  their  Minds;  if  a  new  profpeft  of  things  can  be  any  way 
 «'  produc'd,  the  Light  by  which  they  are  feen  altered,  new 
 ♦«  Forces  and  Dircftions  imprefsM  upon  the  Spirits,  Paffions 
 *'  exalted  or  abated,  the  Power  of  judging  enliven'd  ordebi- 
 *'  litated,  or  the  Attention  taken  off,  without  any  Sufpenfion 
 *'  or  Alteration  of  the  Handing  Laws  of  Nature;  then  with- 
 **  out  that,  new  Volitions,  Defigns,  Meafures,  or  a  ceffation 
 «■'  of  thinking  alfo  may  be  producd,  and  thus  many  things 
 •'  prevented  that  would  otherwife  be,  and  many  brought  about 
 *'  that  would  not."  See  alfo  Sherlock  on  Providence,  p-  51. 
 2d.  Edit.  Again  [;::.]  "  That  there  may  be  poiTibly  fuch  Jnfpi- 
 •'  rations  of  new  Thoughts  and  Counfels  may  perhaps  ap- 
 *'  pear  farther  from  this,  that  we  fo  frequently  find  Thoughts 
 *'  ariling  in  our  Heads,  into  which  we  are  led  by  no  Difcourfe, 
 "  nothing  we  read,  no  clue  of  Rcafoning,  but  they  furprife 
 "«  and  come  upon  us  from  we  know  not  what  Quarter.  If 
 i'  they  proceed  from  the  Mobility  of  Spirits  ftragling  out  of 
 f«  Order,  and  fortuitous  Affedions  of  the  Brain,' or  were  of  the 
 *'  Nature  oi  Dreams,  why  are  they  not  as  wild,  incoherent, 
 ««  and  extravagant  as  they  are  ?"  Is  it  not  much  more  reafon- 
 able  to  imagine  that  they  come  by  the  Order  and  Direction  of  an 
 all  feeing  and  all-gracious  God  who  continually  watches  over 
 us,  and  difpofcs  every  thing  in  and  about  us,  for  the  Good  of 
 ourfelves  or  others  ?  Not  to  fpeak  of  the  agreeableneis  of  this 
 Notion  to  the  Opinions  and  Belief  of  the  befl  and  vvifeft  Men 
 in  all  Ages.  The  Confequencc  Mr.  Wollajion  draws  from  the 
 whole  is  perfedly  agreeable  to  the  Scope  of  our  Author.  **  If 
 •♦  this  be  the  Cafe,  as  it  fccms  to  be,  that  Men's  Minds  are 
 ♦*  fufceptive  of  fuch  Iniinuations  and  Imprcffions  as  frequently 
 *•  by  ways  unknown  do  affcd  them,  and  give  ihem  an  Inclina- 
 "  tioii  towards  this  or  that,  how  many  things  may  be  brought 
 
 'to 
 f^..]  Page  107. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  427 
 
 VII.  Fifthly,  It  may  be  demonftrated  that  the  Prayers 
 Prayers   themfelves   have  fome  natural   Power   and  naturally 
 Efficacy  with  regard  to  the  Will:  For  Prayers  are  ^^g^feftthc 
 certain  Endeavours  towards  the  Exercife  of  Liberty,  Mind. 
 and  contain  in  them  Ads  of  Eledion,  tho'  perhaps 
 imperfe(fl  ones ;  and  fiich  is  the  Nature  of  all  Pow- 
 ers, that  they  acquire  Strength  by  trial  and  exercife, 
 
 and  every  A(fl,  tho'  imperieft,  is  a  Step  to  a  more 
 perfefl  one,  till  they  have  attain'd  to  a  Habit  and 
 Facility  of  Ailing.  The  conftant  Exercife  of  Pray- 
 er may  therefore  tend,  by  a  natural  Efficacy,  to  re- 
 ftore  the  proper  ufe  of  Free  Will,  and  regain  its  na- 
 tive Vigour. 
 
 VIII.  Sixthly,  The  fame  may  be  faid  concern-  And  to 
 ing  the  Government  of  the  Paffions  and  AflFedlions,  fubdue 
 which  conftitutes  fo  great  a  Part  of  human  Felicity  :  ^!^^  AfFec« 
 we  have  fhewn  that  the  Eleflive  Power  is  fuper'ior  ^^°^^^' 
 
 to  all  others,  and  has  the  Government  of  them, 
 and  that  v/hen  the  Mind  is  corrupted  with  Vice, 
 the  Will  in  a  great  meafure  falls  from  that  Power 
 which  nature  gave  it.  Yet  the  inferior  AflFeftions 
 of  the  Mind  have  not  quite  (haken  off  the  Yoke, 
 they  ftill  obey,  tho*  with  fome  difficulty,  but  ufe 
 and  exercife  are  necelfary  to  implant  an  Habit  of 
 Obedience  in  them.  Since  therefore  Prayers  con-^ 
 tain  in  themfelves  an  exercife  of  Eledion,  they  have 
 have  a  natural  Ei^cacy  to  flrengthen  the  Eledive 
 
 Adsjj 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 <*  to  pafs  by  thefe  means,  without  fixing  and  refixing  the 
 **■  Laws  of  Nature,  any  more  than  they  are  unfixM  when  one 
 **  Man  alters  the  Opinion  of  another,  by  throwing  a  Book 
 "  proper  for  that  purpofe  in  his  way  ? 
 
 To  the  fame  purpofe  fee  Scoih  Chrijlian  Life,  Part  2.  Vol.  7., 
 %.  I.  p.  81,  82. 
 
 I  hope  the  Reader  will  excufe  me  for  infilling  fo  long  on 
 this  Point,  fince  falfe  Notions  concerning  it  have  produc'd  the 
 moil  pernitious  Confequences  to  Religion  in  general,  as  weli 
 s«  the  principal  Ohjedtionsagainft  our  Authgr's  Syftem. 
 
4^^  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 K^'^y  and  by  the  fame  means  accuftom  the  AfFefti- 
 ons  to  obey :  for  a  repeated  Aft  augments  tlic  Power 
 and  overcomes  Refifbnce.  (72.) 
 
 IX.  Se^ 
 
 NOTE  S. 
 
 (72  j  Pruyer  puo  us  upon  making  good  Refoliitiuns,  and 
 endeavouring  to  fubduc  our  vicious  Inclinations :  it  animates 
 our  Zeal,  and  enflames  our  Afteflions  ;  it  exercifes  and  im- 
 proves our  Faith>  our  Hope,  and  CI\<iiitv  ;  and  therefore  is  in 
 itfeU'a  Means  of  llrcngthening  our  Faculties,  and  removing  all 
 Impediments  to  a  due  Exertion  of  them.  It  alio  makes  its 
 fenfible  of  our  ftricl  Dependence  on  the  Deity,  of  our  mani- 
 fold Want;5,  and  the  great  Benefit  of  his  Supplies,  and  of  con- 
 iequence  itnaturallly  fits  us  for  thcni,  and  inclines  us  to  make 
 a  right  ufe  of  them  when  \vc  do  receive  them.  "  It  is  not  on 
 J'  \y  a  Means,  (fays  Dr.  Barroiv  [a.']  )  hy  Impetration  acqui 
 «,  ring  tor  us,  but  it  is  an  efFcdual  Inilrument  working  in  us 
 ««  all  true  Good.  It  is  the  Channel  by  which  God  conveyeth 
 «*  Spiritual  Light  into  our  Minds,  and  Spiritual  Vigour  into 
 ••  our  Hearts.  It  is  both  the  Seed,  and  the  Food  of  Spiritual 
 »*  Life  by  which  all  holy  Dii'pofitions  of  Soul,  and  all  honeft 
 *<  Refolutions  of  Pra£lice  are  bred  and  no'uriflied,  are  aug- 
 »'  mented  and  Itrengthened  in  us.  It  exciteth,  it  quickencth, 
 «♦  it  maintaineth  all  pious  Affeftions,  The  love  of  God  can 
 *'  no  otherwife  than  by  it  be  kindled,  fomented  or  kept  in 
 *'  Life,  (without  it  we  certainly  fliall  have  an  Eftrangement 
 »«  and  Averfation  from  him)  it  alone  can  maintain  a  conftant 
 "  reverence  and  awe  of  God,  keeping  him  in  our  Thoughts, 
 "  and  making  us  to  live  as  in  his  Prefence.  It  chiefly  enli- 
 *«  veneth  and  exercifeth  our  Faith  in  God  ;  it  is  that  which 
 *'  fweetneth  and  endeareth  to  ourfelves  che  Pradticc  of  Pietv; 
 "  which  only  can  enable  us  with  delight  and  alacrity,  to  obey 
 *'  God's  Commandments :  It  alone  can  raife  our  Minds  from 
 -'  the  Cares  and  Concernments  of  this  World  to  a  fenfe  and 
 *'  defire  of  Heavenly  things. 
 
 '•  God's  End  (fays  Mr.  Chubb\  in  requiring  this  Duty  of 
 <'  Prayer,  is  wholly  and  folely  the  Good  and  Benefit  of  his  Crea- 
 *'  tures,  T-vz.  that  it  may  be  a  means  to  work  in  the  Petitiq- 
 "  ner  a  fuitabie  frame  and  temper  of  Mind,  and  to  difpofe  him 
 ••  to  a  fuitabie  Praflice  and  Converfation,  and  fo  render  him  a 
 "  fuitabie  and  proper  Objedl  of  God's  fpecial  Care  and  Lovx, 
 
 {a.']  Firi:  Vcl,  II^..  Edit.  p.  493. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  ^pp 
 
 IX.  Seventhly,  As  to  Material  Objcds,  viz.,  our  The  Adi- 
 own  Bodies  and   the  Elements,   'tis    plain  that  the  ^"^  ^^ 
 intelkftual  World  is  more  noble  than  the  Material,  fng^^^" 
 and  confequently  that  this  latter  was  made  for  the  produce  a 
 fake   of  the  former,    and  is  fubfervient  to  its  ufe:  contin- 
 But  fince  the  Adions  of  Beings  endow'd  with  Un-  gency  in 
 -derflanding  and  Will  are  ^\-^Q-,  and  on   that  account  ^^^"^^^ 
 contingent,    they  neceffarily   produce  a  Contingen-  thi^dois^' 
 cy  alfo  in  mateiial  Subftances  which  depend  upon  notofFer 
 rhem.     For  we  can  excite  certain  Motions  in  our  any  Vio- 
 own    Bodies,    and  communicate  them  to  the  adja-  ''^"cci^o 
 cent  ones,  which  Motions  are  not  in  this  Cafe  pro-  •'^^^'"■*" 
 duced  merely  according  to  Mechanic  Laws,  but  the 
 dircd:ion  of  the  Will. 
 
 Nor  would  tbey  have  happcn'd  at  the  time  or  in 
 the  manner  they  do,  if  the  Will  had  not  by  its  own 
 Liberty  excited  them.  Neither  do  we  fiippo'e  that 
 any  Violence  or  Diforder  happens  hereby  to  the 
 Laws  of  Nature;  for  Nature  itfeif  has  provided 
 that  the  lefs  fliould  give  way  to  the  more  noble, 
 that  is,  local  Motion  to  the  Adion  of  the  Will,  as 
 being  the  more  excellent  of  the  two.  We  mult  be- 
 lieve the  (ame  concerning  Agents  of  a  fuperior  Na- 
 ture,   and  the  more  nojle  Order  thev  are  of,    the 
 
 "     NO T  E  S 
 
 "  And  as  this  is  Gou's  End  in  appointing  this  Duty,  fo 
 "  for  this  End  he  requires  the  frequent  Returns  of  it,  that 
 "  the  Mind  of  the  Petitioner  may  be  habitually  feaioncd  with 
 *'  .1  fenfe  of  hiinfclf  [^.]  See  z\{o'Q^.  Patrick's  Difcourfe  con- 
 "  cerning  Prayer,  Ch.  8  and  9. 
 
 l^hefe  EfFcdis  and  Ufes  of  Prayer,  moft  of  which  are  difco- 
 verable  by  natural  Reafon,  prove  fufficicntly,  I  think,  that 
 Vi3.Ytxhz  natural  Dut)i.  Concerning  the  Efficacy  of  it,  and 
 the  manner  whereby  Providence  may  be  fuppofed  to  anfwcr 
 our  particular  Requefts,  fee  the  following  Notes  to  this  Sub- 
 Xc^-ion, 
 
 [>.]  Chthh':  Troff:,  p,  J  8c,  ^^f, 
 
430  bf  Moral  fevil.  Chap.  Vj 
 
 greater  Sphere  of  Adion  is  to  be  attributed  to  them* 
 Such  little  Creatures  as  we  Men  are   can   convey 
 Water  in  Canals,  drain  fuch  Parts  of  the  Earth  as 
 are  naturally  cover'd  with  Water,  drown  the  Dry- 
 Landj    and   produce  a  great  many  other   Changes 
 both  in  the  Earth,  the  Water  and  the  Air.    Who 
 then  can  affirm  but  that  there  may  be  other   Ar- 
 gents who    could   change    almoft   the  whole  Ele- 
 ments, if  they  were  not  prohibited  by  certain  Lavs  \ 
 All  who  acknowledge  the  Exiftence  of  fuch  Beings^ 
 are  agreed  that  thefe  things   are  poffible ;    now  it 
 muft  be  allow'd  that  whatever  is  perform'd  by  thefe 
 Beings,  is  done  according  to  the  Laws  of  Nature, 
 and  that  no  manner  of  Violence  is  hereby  ofFer'd 
 to  the  Order  of  it,  any  more  than  by  the  Aftions 
 of  our  own  Will. 
 There  is  a      X.  Eighthly,  And  as  all  material  Beings  are  con- 
 Syftem  of  neded  together,  and  by  mutu  J  Influence  aft  upon 
 intellec-      ^^^]^  other,-  viz.    the  Superior  upon  the  Inferior, 
 welUs      f^^  S^"  "P^*^  ^^^   iEther  and  the  Moon,  and  that 
 material     Upon  the  Air,  Water,  and  Earth ;  and  perhaps  vice 
 Beings,      verfa  ,•    fo  'tis  in  like  manner  probable  that  there  is 
 which  aa  ^  j-gj.jgjj^  Order  and  Syftem  of  intelkiflual  Beings 
 ^^™^'!,.,i,  conflituted,  whoarenolefs  fubordinate  to  one  ano- 
 
 upon  each  '  i         i        i  it 
 
 other.  ther,  and  operate  upon  each  other  by  a  mutual  In- 
 fluence, according  to  the  Laws  eflablifli'd  by  Na- 
 ture. 
 Godfnakes  XI.  Ninthly,  There  feems  to  be  no  reafon  why 
 life  of  the  (3od  fliould  not  make  ufe  of  the  Miniflry  of  thofe 
 ^fX^fe^l  ^^'"g^  ^^  ^^^  Government  of  this  World  ^  whcn- 
 in  the  Go-  ever  it  may  be  expedient.  This  we  fee  is  done  in 
 vernment  fome  meafure  upon  our  Earthly  Globe.  For  he 
 of  Man-  makes  ufe  of  Men  to  govern  other  Animals,  and 
 kind,  nor  ^^^^  ^/^^^  ^re  fet  as  Guardians  over  others.  And 
 Violence^  as  the  Attendants  of  Princes  and  Judges  perform 
 to  Nature.  their 
 
 *  See  the  Religion  of  Natnre  dcliitcated,  p.  io8,  109. 
 
Sed  5.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  431 
 
 their  Office,  not  as  they  themfelves  pkafe,  but 
 according  to  the  Appointment  of  their  Maflers, 
 or  the  Laws ;  fo  in  like  manner  we  are  to  believe 
 that  Agents  more  excellent  than  us  fwhich  we  flile 
 miniftring  Angels)  difcharge  their  Office  accord- 
 ing to  the  Laws  prefcribed  by  God.  Suppofe  there- 
 fore this,  about  affifting  fuch  as  regularly  apply 
 to  God,  to  be  one  of  rhefe  Laws;  let  them  be 
 commanded  to  relieve  thofe  who  make  their  hum- 
 ble AddrefTes  to  him,  and  let  the  manner  of  invok- 
 ing him  be  prefcribed  by  Nature,  or  fome  pofitive 
 Law :  Can  it  be  doubted  whether  they  would  not 
 as  readily  exert  their  Powers  for  the  Affiftance  of 
 thefe  Supplicants,  and  as  diligently  difcharge  the 
 Duty  of  relieving  them  from  diftrefs,  as  a  Judge's 
 Officer,  or  a  Prince's  Servant  performs  the  Com- 
 mands of  his  Mafter  ?  And  fo  long  as  thefe  things 
 are  done  according  to  the  general  Order,  and  un- 
 der fuch  Conditions  as  are  agreeable  to  Nature  and 
 Reafon,  they  can  be  no  more  deem'd  repugnant  to 
 the  Order  of  Nature,  or  the  Laws  appointed  for 
 the  Government  of  the  World,  than  civil  Govern- 
 ment and  the  Laws  among  Men  are.  Here  is  no- 
 thing contrary  to  or  inconfiftent  with  the  Laws  of 
 univerfal  Na:ure  :  for  it  does  not  feem  any  more  re- 
 pugnant to  thefe  that  Angels  fhould  ufe  their  Pow- 
 ers for  the  Relief  of  fuch  as  pray  to  God,  than  that 
 Men  fhould  help  each  other  according  to  their  Abi- 
 lities. If  it  be  granted  that  thefe  things  are  fo,  it 
 will  be  very  apparent  how  our  Prayers  may  have 
 their  Effect,  and  the  defired  Changes  may  be  pro- 
 duced in  our  Bodies,  and  the  Elements,  without  do- 
 ing Violence  to  Nature,  or  diflurbing  the  Order 
 eftabUfh'd  by  God.  N^y  it  may  be  provided  by  a 
 Law,  that  our  VVifhes  be  thus  fulfiil'd  :  and  v/e 
 need  not  declare  how  much  tiiis  Power  over  exter- 
 nal things  granted  to  free  Agents,  may  tend  to  raifc 
 "       '  ^  our 
 
432  Of  Moral  ^^il.         Chap.  V, 
 
 our  AfFedions  and   incline    the  Wills  themfelves. 
 
 *Tis  very  well  known  how  great  an  Influence  the 
 
 Temperature  of  the  Blood  and  Motion  of  the  Spirits 
 
 have  over  thefe.      Since  then  our  Bodies  are  by  a 
 
 Law  of  Nature  capable  of  being  moved  by  free  A- 
 
 gents,  at  leaft  when  we  defire  ir,  'tis  not  impofli- 
 
 ble  but  that  by  the  Means  of  thele  Bodies,  they  may 
 
 have  Acccfs  to  the  Soul  j    and  tho*  they  cannot  ad 
 
 upon  the  Will  immediately,  yet  they  may  indiredly 
 
 excite  it  to  exert  its  own  Aifls.  (73.) 
 
 God  is  not      XII.  Tenthly,  There's  neither  any  occafion  nor 
 
 obliged  to    room  to  explain  how  agreeable  this  is  to  Reafon  and 
 
 take  away  thg  Holy  Scriptures.     Let  it  fuffice  to  obferve  how 
 
 ofVree  ^    ^^^^^  ^  ^iq\<^  i>  heeby  open'd  for  Prayer,    and  how 
 
 Will.fince  efFedual  it  may  be  for  obtaining  the  Affiftance  not 
 
 he  has       Only  of  God  himfelf  immediately,  but  alfo  of  his 
 
 ellabliih'd   Minifters. 
 
 ^c'^%^'^  It  mult  be  confefs'd  that  God  fometimes  relieves 
 his  Wor-  ^^^  Diftrefs'd,  and  when  apply'd  to,  inrerpofes  in 
 fhippers.  Matters  relating  to  the  Will :  but  thefe  things  are 
 eifeded  according  to  the  Univerfal  Law  of  Na- 
 ture. And  tho'  this  be  fuperior  to  that  which  is 
 implanted  in  the  particular  Nature  of  fome  Beings ; 
 yet  it  is  no  lefs  natural  with  regard  to  the  Sydem 
 of  Univerfal  Nature;  neither  are  we  to  believe  that 
 
 this 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (73.)  That  is,  a  Man  is  excited  or  inclin'd  to  any  thing  by 
 :i  Profpc(ft  oi  the  Pleafure  or  Pain  which  may  attend  the 
 Profecution  or  Omiffion  of  it  ;  or,  as  we  commonly  fay,  by 
 another's  iK:orking  upcji  his  Paflions,  his  Hopes,  or  his  Pears ; 
 For  that  fuperior  Beings  act  upon  us  in  no  other  fcnfe,  that  their 
 InJluence  confilts  only  in  occafioning  plcafant  or  difagreeable 
 Ideas  in  us,  in  reprefcnting  Arguments,  Motives,  i^c.  to  us, 
 may  perhaps  be  gather'd  from  Note  71.  And,  I  think,  it  mull 
 be  allow'd  that  this  is  very  confiflcnt  with  that  Phyfical  Indif- 
 ference, or  nbfolutc  Fjcedoni  of  ihe  Will  above  defcribed. 
 
^ed.  5.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  <^23 
 
 Uiis  is  often  done,  bur  only  in  Cafes  where  a  parti- 
 cular Nature  cannot  be  bft  to  itfdf  without  Detri- 
 ment to  the  whole.  Nor  is  God,  becaufe  he  fome- 
 times  vouchlafes  to  interpofe  and  help  the  Suppli- 
 cant, aUo  oblig'd  entirely  to  remove  the  abufe  of 
 Free-Will;  that  is,  in  reality,  to  deftroy  the  Na- 
 ture itfelf.  By  a  Law  of  Nature,  the  Exercife  of 
 that  Faculty  belongs  to  fuch  Agents  as  are  endow'd 
 With  it,  and  tho*  that  L.iw  admit  of  an  Exception, 
 yet  it  cannot  be  quite  abrogated,  without  greater 
 Damage  done  to  the  whole  than  what  may  happen 
 from  the  abufe  of  it.  Nor  is  God  obliged,  becaufe 
 Prayers  have  their  Effed  with  him,  to  relieve  fuch 
 as  don't  pray  to  him  at  all. 
 
 XIII.  Eleventhly,    This  feems  to   eflabliih  the  The  £^- 
 Efficacy  of  Prayers  much  better  than    their   Opinion  '^^9°/ 
 who  hold  that  all  is  fix'd  by  God  in  a  fatal  Conca-  ^'''^y^''^ 
 tenation,   and  that  fuch  things  as  are  requeued  of  accouted 
 God,  and  leem  to  be  obtain'd,    are  not  in  any  re-  for  if  all 
 fpedl:  owing  to  the  Prayers,  but  that  God  has  by  his  things  be 
 Foreknowledge  join'd  the  Adions  of  the  Will  with  ^^^'^°  ^^'■ 
 corporeal  Motions,  in  fuch  a  manner  that  they  fhould  caufes" 
 happen  together,  but  without  any  other  relation  to 
 each  other  than  what  arifes  from  his  Preordination, 
 as  appears  in  the  Agreement  between  the  Index  of 
 3  Watch  and  the  Sun. 
 
 For  inftance  :  God  has  pre-ordain'd  a  Storm  from 
 neceflfary  Caufes,  and  that  fome  notorious  Offen- 
 ders fhall  be  failing  in  it ;  when  they  are  in  danger 
 they  fhall  repent  and  pray  to  God,  and  at  length 
 the  Wind  fhall  ceafe. 
 
 Thus  a  Calm  ensues  upon  the  Prayers  of  the  Pe- 
 titioners, but   without   any  Connection  or  Depen- 
 dence on  each  other,  merely  by  the  force  of  pre- 
 F  f      '  difpofed 
 
%24  ^f  ^^^^^  Evil.        Chap.  V, 
 
 difpofed  Caufes,   which  do  not  require  any  Inter- 
 pofition  of  the  Divine  Power.  ('74O 
 
 The 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (74.)  The  foremention'd  Hypothefis  of  a  pre  determin'd  and 
 neceffary  Connexion  between  Corporeal  Motions  ind  the  Ope- 
 rations of  the  Will,  is  advanc'd  by  Leibnitz  in  what  is  com- 
 monly caird  his  Syftem  o^  t\\c  Pre-ejiablif/jd  Harmony,  which 
 occurs  in  feveral  of  his  Works,  an  account  ofwhichmaybe 
 fcen  in  Fabricius  [^.]  An  Explanation  of  it  bv  G.  Ha7ifdusimy 
 be  found  in  the  Prefent  State  of  the  Republic  of  Letters,  Vol.  4. 
 for  0(koh.  1729.    There  are   fome  Objedions   againft  it   in 
 
 Boyle's  Dift.  Article  Rozarius.     Rem.    L.  But  as    the 
 
 ivnole  of  it  is  built  upon  a  Suppofition  that  the  Mind  has  not 
 a  Liberty  of  Indifference^  and  of  confequence  no  proper  Liber- 
 ty at  all,  we  need  not  fpend  any  time  in  confuting  it,  havings) 
 I  hope,  fufficiently  eft.iblifh'd  the  contrary  Principle  above, 
 and  thereby  remov'd  the  Foundation  of  it. 
 
 Mr.  Whifon  in  partecniar  has  cfpous'd  the  Opinion  which 
 our  Author  alludes  to,  and  enlarged  upon  it  in  the  following 
 Manner,  [c]  "Our  Imperfedion  is  fuch,  that  we  can  only 
 "  aft  pro  re  nata,  can  never  know  beforehand  the  behavour  of 
 **  a£lions  of  Men,  neither  can  we  forefee  v.-hat  Circumftances 
 **  and  Conjunctures  will  happen  at  any  certain  time  hereafter. 
 **  And  fo  we  cannot  provide  for  future  Events,  nor  pre- 
 *'  difpofe  things  in  fuch  a  manner  that  every  one  fhall  be  dealt 
 **  with,  or  every  thing  done,  no  otherwife  than  if  we  were 
 *'  alive  and  prefent,  we  fliould  thmk  proper  and  reafonable, 
 *'  and  (hould  aftually  do.  But  in  the  Divine  Operation  it  is 
 *'  quite  otherwife.  God's  Precience  enables  him  to  aft  after  a 
 **  more  fublime  manner,  and  by  a  conftant  Courfe  of  Nature 
 *'  and  Chain  of  mechanical  Caufes  to  do  every  thing  fo  as  it 
 *'  Ihall  not  be  dillinguifliablc  from  a  particular  Interpofition 
 *'  of  his  Power,  nor  be  otherwife  than  on  fuch  a  particular 
 *'  Interpofition  would  h.ive  been  brought  to  pafs.  He  who 
 **  has  created  all  things,  and  given  them  their  feveral  Powers 
 *'  and  Faculties,  forefecs  the  ElJcfts  of  them  all  ;  at  once 
 *'  looks  thro'  the  entire  Chain  of  Caufes  Adtions  and  Events^ 
 "  and  fees  at  what  Periods,  and  in  what  manner  'twill  be 
 *'  neceflary  and  expedient  to  bring  about  any    Changes,  be- 
 
 {b.'\  Delefcus  Argumentorum,  iffc.  p.  387,  &-c, 
 {c.}  Net'j  'Theor^'j  B.  4,  C,  4.  Solution  87* 
 
Sed.  5.    Sub  4.     Of  Moral  Evil:  435 
 
 The  Aflertors  of  this  Opinion  are  oblig'd    from 
 
 the  common  fence  of  Mankind  to  allow  that  God 
 
 F  f  2  is 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 '5'  bcftow  any  Mei-cies,  or  inflift  any  Punifhments  on  the 
 «'  World.  Which  being  unqueftionably  true,  'tis  evident  he 
 ♦'  can  as  well  provide  and  predifpofe  natural  Caufes  for  thofe 
 «*  Mutations,  Mercies  or  Judgments:  he  can  as  eafily  put  the 
 "  Machine  into  fuch  Motions  as  fhall,  without  a  Neceffity  df 
 «'  his  mending  or  correfting  it,  correfpond  to  all  thefe  fore- 
 <'  feen  Events  or  Aftions,  as  make  way  for  fuch  Alterations  af- 
 *'  terwards  giving  a  random  Force  to  the  whole :  and  when 
 ■«'  thefe  two  ways  are  equally  poflible,  1  need  not  fay  which  is 
 '«*  moft  agreeable  to  the  Divine  Pcrtections,  and  mod  worthy 
 "  of  God".  Jr.d again:  \dP\  Wc  pray  to  God  for  fruitful  Sea- 
 *'  fons,  for  Health,  for  Peace,  for  the  Succefs  of  our  Endea- 
 "  vours,  for  a  Bleffing  on  our  Food  and  Phyfick,  and  depre- 
 *'  Gate  the  contrary  Miferies  from  us.  Yet  at  the  fame  time 
 •«  we  fee  the  Seafons  depend  on  the  fettled  Courfe  of  the  Sun, 
 '"  or  other  natural  and  neceffary  Caufes ;  we  find  our  Health 
 *'  or  Sicknefs  to  be  the  proper  EiFedts  of  our  Dyet  and  Re- 
 «*  gimen  :  we  obferve  Peace  and  War  fubje<ft  to  the  Intrigues 
 ''  of  Princes,  and  the  plain  Refults  of  vifible  Conjuaftures  in 
 i"  human  Affairs :  we  know  that  worldly  Prudence  and  Cun- 
 «*  ning  has  a  main  ftroke  in  the  Succefs  of  Mens  Labours:  we 
 ♦'  feel  the  advantageous  Effeds  of  fome  Food  and  Phyfic,  and 
 *<  have  reafou  to  believe  that  the  fame  does  very  much  refult 
 *'  from  the  Goodnefs  of  the  Drugs,  the  fitnefs  of  the  Pro- 
 ."  portion,  and  the  Skill  of  the  Phyfician,  and  can  frequently 
 **  give  a  plain  and  mechanical  Reafon  of  the  different  Opera- 
 "  tion  of  all  thefe  things  i  neither  do  we  hope  for  the  Exer- 
 <*  cifeofa  miraculoHs  Vo\mqv  m  thefe  or  the  like  Cafes.  In 
 "  Ihort,  "  Second  Caufes,  fays  he,  will  work  according  to 
 "  their  Natures,  let  Mens  Supplications  be  never  fo  importu- 
 <*  nate :  and  to  expe£l  a  Miracle  in  anfwer  to  every  Petition, 
 *'  is  more  than  the  moft  religious  dare  pretend  to,"  See  alfo 
 Mr.  WoUafions  Illuftration  of  this  Hypothefis,  p.  104.  or  Dr. 
 Fiddes's  Body  of  Di'vinity,    ifl  vol.  p.  154. 
 
 We  fhall  propofe  an  Anfwer  to  it  in  the  following  Note. 
 Let  it  fufHce  at  prefent  10  obferve,  that  this  particular  Inter- 
 pofition  of  Divine  Power  which  our  Author  contends  for,  is 
 very  improperly  failed  miraculous,  as  may  be  feen  from  Note 
 71.  and  the  6th  Paragraph  of  this  Subfedion. 
 
 [^.3  Vdid^Xmllmh  P-  362,  ? ft  Edit 
 
436  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V- 
 
 is  to  be  invokM  and  that  fuch  as  duly  offer  up 
 their  t'rayers  have  their  Requefts  granted :  but  as 
 they  are  of  Opinion  that  things  go  by  Fate,  and 
 that  there  is  no  room  for  Contwgeyicu  or  a  parficu' 
 hr  Providence^  they  have  invented  this  Scheme  that 
 there  might  be,  or  at  leaf):  might  feera  to  be,  fome 
 room  for  Prayers.  But  all  this  is  to  no  purpofe  : 
 For  fincc  Cod  has  made  Agents  {rz^^  and  allow'd 
 them  the  iife  of  Liberty,  he  muft  alfo  have  referv'd 
 to  himfelf  a  Liberty  of  treating  rhem  according  to 
 what  their  Nature  requires,  which  cannot  be  done 
 without  a  peculiar  Providence,  and  immediate  In* 
 terpofition ,  without  thefe  no  Efficacy  will  be  left 
 to  Prayer,  no  Worfliip  to  God,  no  Honour  to  Re- 
 ligion j  For  if  the  Produflion  of  thofe  things  which 
 we  requeft  depend  upon  antecedent,  natural,  and 
 neceflary  Caufes,  our  Defires  will  be  anfwer'd  no 
 lefs  upon  the  Omiffion,  than  the  offering  up  of 
 Prayers.  Vows  and  Prayers  therefore  are  made 
 in  vain.  If  it  be  faid  that  the  Supplicants  could 
 not  omit  them,  flncethey  were  pre- ordain'd.  I  an- 
 fwer :  Fie  that  could  omit  them  could  not  poflibly 
 offer  them:  his  Omiffion  therefore  is  not  culpable: 
 And  he  that  is  employ'd  in  Prayer  to  God  under- 
 takes a  fuperfluous  Office  :  for  thefe  Petitions  in 
 reality  contribute  nothing  to  the  E,ffe<5i-,  and  no  rea- 
 fon  can  be  given  why  that  fhould  be  required  which 
 is  of  no  Benefit.  {'75.) 
 
 XIV, 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (75.)  Tho'this  Anfwer  is  very  (olid,  and  may  by  fome  per- 
 haps be  thought  fufficient ;  yet,  as  the  Point  helbrc  us  is  of  the 
 gieateft  Importance  ;  fmc6  wrong  Notions  concerning  itcaufe 
 Perplexities  which  difturb  the  Minds  of  moil  Men,  as  Mr. 
 IVhifion  obferves  [f.}  and  fincc  the  Scheme  ot  Providence  fo 
 
 elaborately 
 
 [/  ]  'Ri'^M  7hwy,  f.  365?. 
 
Sed:.  5.  Sub,  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  J37 
 
 XIV.  'Tis  fcarce  poflible  for  one  who  reads  this  An  Inti- 
 noc  to  think  of  that  famous  Difficulty,  viz,,  how  ^^"°JJ.  . 
 the  Contingency  of  things  can  be  confiftent  with  ncft^epug! 
 the  Divine  Prefcience :  Neither  is  it  proper  to  med-  nanttothc 
 die  with  it  in  this  Place :   For  it  would  require  a  Divine 
 
 F  f  3  whole  Prefcience. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 elaborately  difplay'd  by  that  Author  will  not,  I  fear,  help  tq 
 clear  them,  as  he  promifes,  but  rather  occafion  worfe  ;  —  on 
 thefe  accounts  it  will  not  be  improper  to  give  a  fuller  Confuta,- 
 tionofit  from  fuch  Authors  as  endeavour  to  prove  that  the 
 foremen tion'd  Scheme  ,of  Providence  is  both  impoffible  in  it- 
 felf,  and  attended  with  Confequenfes  deftrucElive  of  the  very 
 Notion  of  Prayer,  aijd  moil  other  Puties  of  jReligion.  "  The 
 *'  Abettors  of  the  mechanical  Hypothefis,  [/!]  fays  Dr.  Jenkin^ 
 *<  argue  that  he  is  the  belt  Artill  who  can  contrive  an  Engine 
 *'  that  fliall  need  the  lealt  meddling  with  after  it  is  made.  But 
 *'  it  ought  to  be  confider'd  what  the  Nature  of  the  Engine  is, 
 **  and  what  the  ends  and  ufes  of  it  are  ;  and  if  the  Nature  of 
 *'  it  be  fuch  that  it  cannot  anfwer  the  Ends  for  which  it  wa? 
 *.*  framed,  wjthout  fometimes  an  affifting  haijd,  it  would  be  no 
 *<  point  of  Wifdom  in  the  Artificier,  for  the  Credit  ot  his 
 <«  Contrivance,  to  lole  the  moft  ufeful  Ends  defign'd  by  it. 
 n  As  if,  among  other  ufes,  this  curious  Engine  were  defign'd 
 ii  to  reward  the  good,  punilh  bad  Men  ;  to  remove  the  Pu= 
 <(  nifhment  upon  Amendment,  and  to  renew  it  upon  a  re- 
 <«  lapfe :  fince  brute  Matter  is  incapable  of  varying  its  Motions, 
 ^t  and  fuiting  itfelf  to  the  feveral  States  and  Changes  ot  free 
 <«  Agents,  he  muft  affill  it,  unlcfs  he  will  lofe  the  chief  End 
 <(  for  which  it  is  to  ferve.  It  is  no  defe£t  in  the  Skill  and  Wif- 
 «(  dom  of  the  Almighty,  that  Matter  and  Motion  have  not 
 «  Free- Will  as  Men  have ;  but  it  would  be  a  great  defeat  in 
 «<  his  Wifdom  not  to  rnake  them  the  Inftruments  of  Reward^ 
 *t  and  Punilliments,  be.caufe  it  is  impofljble  for  them  of  them" 
 ti  felves  to  apply  and  fuit  themfelves  to  the  feveral  States  and 
 <si  Conditions  of  Free  Agents.  The  Nature  of  Matter  and  Mo- 
 ««  tipn  is  fuch,  that  they  cannot  ferve  all  the  Defigns  of  thei^ 
 ««  Creator,  without  his  Interpofition,  and  therefore  he  con- 
 «f  ftantly  doth  interpofe  according  to  a  certain  Tenor  whicl^ 
 «•  he  ha  til  prefcrib'd  to  himfelf" 
 
 ]f.\  Rea/enalhnefs  of  Chrijimnity,  24vp]-  P-  2X8,  5th  Ddi?. 
 
43^  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 whole  Book.     Let  itfufficeto  give  a  hint,  that  the 
 Solution  of  it  depends  upon  conlidering  the  Man-> 
 
 ner 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 He  proceeds  to  a  particular  Examination  of  the  Pre-ejla- 
 hlifiPd  Order  in  p.  221.  which  he  oppofes  with  much  the  fame 
 Arguments  as  thefe  that  follow  from  Dr.  Fiddes  \g^  "  As  to 
 *'  the  Opinion  of  thofe  who  fay,  God  upon  the  Forefight  of 
 **  the  Prayers  of  Men  to  him,  difpofcth  the  Order  of  things  in 
 *'  fuch  a  manner,  that  what  they  pray  for  fhall  happen,  or 
 **  what  they  deprecate  be  averted;  this  is  altogether  incon- 
 *'  ceivable;  or  rather,  in  the  Nature  of  things,  fuppofing  Men 
 *'  free  Agents,  impofllble.  For  tho'  God  does  forefee  which 
 **  way  Man  will  7.€i,  yet  nothing  upon  the  Mechanical  Hypo- 
 ♦'  thefis  can  follow  from  his  A£lion,  but  according  to  the  Laws 
 *'  ofMcchanifm.  In  cafe  any  one,  for  inllance,  fiiOuld  pray 
 *•  to  bedelivcr'd  from  the  danger  of  fome  infeclious  or  pefti- 
 *«  lentious  DiRenipcr,  the  Vapour  whereby  'tis  propagated, 
 *♦  will,  notwithihuiding,  purfuc  its  natural  Courfe,  and  pro- 
 «'  duce  its  EfFedl  wherever  it  falls  upon  a  proper  Subjecl ;  it 
 **  can  make  no  manner  of  DiRindion  betweem  him  that  fa- 
 **  crijiceth  and  him  \\i'\'ifacrijiceth  not.  God  may  indeed,  by 
 •*  fome  fecret  Impulfe  on  the  Mind  of  Man,  which  yet  he  is 
 *'  at  Liberty  to  follow,  be  the  occafion  of  diverting  him  from 
 ••  the  Scope  of  its  Motion  ;  or  perhaps,  on  fome  extraordinary 
 *'  Exigence,  by  an  invifible  Power,  retard,  acclerate,  or  ob- 
 *'  ftrudl  its  Courfe  ;  but  ftill,  if  all  things  operate  mechanically, 
 *'  whether  Man  pray  or  no,  it  will  unavoidably  have  its  pro 
 **  per  Effeft.  There  is  another  Cafe  wherein  the  Motives  to 
 *<  Prayer,  if  all  things  come  to  pafs  by  the  fixM  Laws  of  Me- 
 **  chanifm,  appear  ftill  more  ei'idently  groundlefs.  A  Man 
 *'  in  the  Heat  of  Rattle,  prays  that  God  would  prefervc  him 
 *'  from  the  Inftruments  of  Death,  which  fly  every  where  a- 
 *<  bout  him  ;  yet  a  Ball  from  a  Cannon  or  a  Mufquet  will  ne- 
 ♦«  ceflarily  purfue  the  line  of  its  direftion ;  it  depends  how- 
 <■«  ever  on  the  choice  of  Man,  Avhether  he  will  giv^e  it  fuch  a 
 «'  particular  Diredion  as  by  the  natural  tendency  of  it  will 
 "  take  way  the  Life  of  the  Perfon  who  depracates  the  Danger 
 **  wherewith  he  finds  himfelf  furrounded.  In  this  Cafe  it  is 
 **  irapoflible,  upon  any  forefight  of  his  Prayers,  that  the  order 
 *'  ot  Caufes,  which  are  in  themfclves  of  arbitrary  and  uncer- 
 **  tain  Determination,   ihould  be  difpos'd  after  fuch  a  man- 
 
 "  ner 
 
 C^.]  V.H9I.  spec.  B.  3.  Part  2.  C.  4.  p.  292, 
 
Sed.  s.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  4.3^ 
 
 »fr  by  which  we  apprehend  the  things  of  God.  (y6») 
 He  that  underftands  that  manner  rightly  will  never 
 ftick  at  this  Difficulty. 
 
 The 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 "  ner  as  certainly  to  produce  the  defired  EfFeft  of  them." 
 Concerning  the  Impoffibility  of  adapting  a  fix'd  and  immu- 
 table Law  to  the  State  and  Condition  of  Free  or  mutable 
 Agents,  fee  B.  2.  Part  i.  p.  154. 
 
 Laftly :  "  It  is  of  great  ufe  to  us  (fays  Dr.  Sherlock  {h."]  to 
 '  underftand  this  which  teaches  us  what  we  may  expedt  from 
 '  God,  and  what  we  muft  attribute  to  him  in  the  Govern- 
 '  ment  of  Nature.  We  muft  not  cxpeft  in  ordinary  Cafes 
 '  that  God  fhould  reverfe  the  Laws  of  Nature  for  us  $  that  if 
 •  we  leap  into  the  Fire  it  fhall  not  burn  us;  or  into  the  Wa- 
 «  ter  it  fhall  not  drown  us :  and  by  the  fame  reafon,  the  Pro= 
 '  vidence  of  God  is  not  concerned  to  preferve  us  when  we 
 ■  deftroy  ourfelves  by  Intemperance  and  Luft  :  for  God  does 
 '  not  Work  Miracles  to  deliver  Men  from  the  fvil  Effects  of 
 '  their  own  Wickednefs :  But  all  the  kind  Influences  of  Hea- 
 '  ven  which  fupply  our  Wants,  and  fill  our  Hearts  with 
 Food  and  Gladnefs,  are  owing  to  that  good  Providence 
 which  commands  Nature  to  yield  her  Increafe  ;  and  thofe 
 Diforders  of  Nature  which  infflidt  the  World  with  Famines, 
 Peflilence  and  Earthquakes,  are  the  Effedls  of  God's  Anger 
 and  Difpleafure,  and  are  ordcr'd  by  him  for  the  Punifhment 
 of  a  wicked  World.  We  mufl  all  believe  this,  or  confefs 
 that  we  mock  God,  when  he  blefs  him  for  a  healthful  Air 
 and  fruitful  Seafons,  or  deprecate  his  Anger  when  we  fee 
 vifible  Tokens  of  his  Vengeance  in  the  Diforders  of  Nature. 
 For  did  not  God  immediately  interpofe  in  the  Government 
 of  Nature,  there  would  be  no  reafon  to  beg  his  Favour  or 
 deprecate  his  Anger  upon  thefe  accounts.".^  And  to  the 
 
 fame  purpofe  he  urges,  p-  71.  That  without  this  Belief,  that 
 God  takes  a  particular  Care  of  all  his  Creatures  in  the  Govern- 
 jnent  of  all  Events  that  can  happen  to  them  (which  Belief  ap- 
 pears to  be  impoffible  upon  the  Mechanical  Hypothefis)  there  is 
 £0  reafon  nor  pretence  for  moft  of  the  particular  Duties  of 
 Religious  Worihip,  as  is  fully  proved  in  the  fame  place.  Se^ 
 alio  C.  9.  Concerning  the  true  Notion,  as  well  as  the  Reafon-' 
 ^blenefs  &ndi  NeceJJity  oil? txyzr,  fee  p.  381.  ib. 
 
 (76.)  He  means  the  Scheme  of  Analogy,  concerning  which 
 (ee  his  Note  C.  We  have  given  our  Notion  of  the  Wor4 
 
 PJ  On  fro-vidmi,  P»  8^,  ift  Edit, 
 
4^6  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 The  Reader  may  obferve,    that  in  this  and    other 
 Places,  I  interfperfe   lonie  things  which  belong  to 
 
 Revealed 
 NOTES. 
 
 Trefcience  in  Note  lo.  R.  e.    fee  alfo  Mr.  Jackfon  on  Hmr.ayf 
 Liberty,  p  62.     But  tho'  we    cannot  perhaps  determine  the 
 prefcti'c  manner  of  God's  knowing  the  free  Aifis  of  Men,  yet 
 we  are  certain  that  he  does  and  mufl;  always  know  them ;  fmce 
 otherwife  he  would  know  many  things  now  which  he  did  not 
 know  once,  and  confequently  his  Omnifcience  or  Infinite  Know- 
 ledge would  receive  addition  from  Events,  (which  as  we  have 
 made  appear  in  R.  I.)  is  contrary  to  the  true  Notion  of  Infinity. 
 This  general  Argument  drawn  from  God's  infinite  or  ferfeQ 
 Knowledge,  feems  to  me  the  only  one  which  can  come  near 
 to  a  Proof  that  he  mull  always  have  a  compleat  and  equal 
 Knowledge  of  fuch  adions  as    are  in    themlejves    abiolutely 
 contingent,  as  all  thofe  evidently  are  which  depend  upon  the 
 Free- Will  of  the  Creature.     Thefe  adions  (as  we  formerly  ob- 
 ferv'd)  may  properly  be    call'd  Future  with  refped  to  us  or 
 other  Men,  and  the  Knowledge  of  them  in  the  fame  refped  be 
 ililed  Fore  Knonvledge.     But  with  regard  to  the  Deity,  whofe 
 Exillence  and  Attributes  can  have  no  relation  to  time,  /.  e.  to 
 which  nothing  can  be  at  a  diflance ;  1  think,  the  Exprefiicn 
 is  abfurd  ;  and  we  mull  nccelTarily  either  admit  the  fore-men- 
 tion'd  abfurdity  of  fuppofing  his  Knowledge  limited,  or  elie 
 allow  that  all  things  are  at  all  times  equally  in  his  view ;  ap.d 
 confequently  that  Knowledge,  as  in  him,  hath  nothing  to  do 
 Yi'wh.  fore  ox  after. 
 
 If  we  admit  this  Notion  of  things  being  always  prefcnt  to 
 God,  tho'  fucceilive  to  us,  which  feems  to  be  the  only  way  of 
 conceiving  how  Contingencies  can  poffibly  be  Objeds  of  any 
 Knowledge  ;  If  this,  I  fiy,  be  allow'd,  then  all  things  ac- 
 tions, i^c.  which  can  properly  he  faid  to  exiil,  will  be  equally 
 proper  Ohjeils  of  God's  Knowledge,  fmcc  he  is  hereby  fup- 
 pofed  not  to  know  them  in  feri,  or  m  their  Caufe ;  but  in 
 effe,  ir  in  their  aBual  Exijhnce.  Which  at  the  l^ime  time  gives 
 us  the  Medium  of  their  being  knowable,  'viz.  Their  real  Exi- 
 gence ;  and  makes  it  as  cafy  for  us  to  imagine  how  God  fliould 
 always  know  them,  as  how  we  fhould  ever  know  a  thing  when 
 it  is  immediately  prefented  to  us- 
 
 'Tis  fubmitted  to  the  Reader,  whether  this  old  Notion  of 
 the  Schoolmen  be  not  ftill  the  bell  we  are  able  to  frame  upon 
 <he  prefent  Subjedt. 
 
Sed.  5.  Sub.  3.     Of  Moral  Evil.  44] 
 
 Revealed  Keligion,  contrary  ro  what  I  intend  at  firft  ,• 
 which  happen'd  becaufe  fome  Objedions  feem'd  to 
 arife  from  reveal'd  Religion,  in  oppofirion  to  the 
 Principles  and  Arguments  here  laid  down.  Since 
 therefore  I  had  determin'd  to  produce  nothing  bnt 
 what  was  perfeftly  agreeable  to  the  Articles  of  Faith, 
 and  the  Principles  of  the  Chriftian  Keligion,  I  found 
 it  neceffary  to  call  in  the  Scripture  to  my  Affiftance, 
 that  the  Anfwer  might  come  from  the  fame  Quar- 
 ter with  the  Objedions. 
 
 One  that  knows  nothing  of  Reveal'd  Religion 
 cannot  bring  thefe  Objedions ;  one  that  does  not 
 believe  it  has  no  right  to  urge  them.  For  if  he  be 
 fenfible  that  the  Objedions  are  of  any  force,  he 
 mufl:  of  neceflity  alfo  admit  the  Solutions,  fince 
 both  of  them  depend  upon  the  fame  Authori- 
 ty. (77.) 
 
 SUB  SECT. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (77.)  This  general  Argument  lies  againft  all  thofe  who  bring 
 Objeftions  from  the  Scripture  Account  of  the  Creation,  Fall, 
 i3'c.  viz.  either  they  believe  the  Truth  and  Divine  Authority 
 of  thofe  Books,  or  they  do  not;  if  they  do,  then  they  muffc 
 believe  them  alio  when  they  declare  that  all  the  Works  of  God 
 are  holy  and  juft  and  good  ;  and  confequently  that  the  fore- 
 mentioned  Difficulties  are  no  real  Arguments  againft  the  Di- 
 vine Attributes  :  if  they  do  not ;  then  the  whole  falls  to  the 
 Ground.  For  to  admit  one  part  of  an  account  and  reje£t  the 
 other,  when  both  depend  upon  the  fame  Authority,  is  evi- 
 dently unreafonable. 
 
 Obje£lions  therefore  drawn  from  the  Scripture  account  of 
 thefe  Matters  can  but  be  mere  Arguments  ad  hominem  at  beft : 
 and  are  of  no  force  eithar  to  make  or  juftify  an  Unbeliever, 
 
442  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     V. 
 
 Why  God  does  not  tranjlate  Man  tofome  other 
 Place,  where  nothing  would  occur  that  could 
 tempt  him  to  choofe  amifs, 
 
 ftme  aVi'/  ^'  'HP  ^  ^  P^^'*"'  ^^^^^ '"  ^^^^  P^'cf^nt  State  of  things 
 it  were  X     it  is  impoffible    for   Man  to  live  without 
 
 ask'dwhy  natural  Evils,  or  the  danger  of  erring.     'Tis  a  corn- 
 God  did     j^Qj^  QuelHon,  why  does  not  God  change  this  State, 
 T'Earlh   and  tranflate  Man  to  fome  other,  where  all  Occafi- 
 to  be  ^n-     ons  of  Error  and  Incitements  to  Evil  being  cut  off, 
 habited  by  he  might  choofe  only  Good,-  /.  e.  in  reality,  Why 
 the  Brutes  j^^s  ^g  placed  Man  upon  the  Earth  ?  Why  did  he 
 *^"^^''         not  leave  it  to  be  inhabited  by  the  Brutes  alone? 
 There  are  fome  perhaps  who  exped  fuch  things  as 
 thefe  from  the  Divine  Goodnefs,  but  without  any 
 Senfe  or  Reafon ;    fince  it  manifefHy  appears  to  be 
 better  that  we  fhould  contend  with  the  prefent  Evils, 
 than  that  the  Earth  (hould  be  void  of  all  rational 
 Inhabitants.  C78.) 
 
 Som? 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (78.)  To  a;k  why  Man  was  placed  in  fuch  a  World  as  this» 
 is  to  ask  why  he  was  created  at  all  ?  Since  if  he  was  to  be 
 made  what  he  is,  /.  e.  confilting  of  a  Soul  and  a  Body,  this 
 World  was  a  proper  place  for  him.  To  the  Queilion,  Why 
 fliould  he  be  made  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  denominates  him  Marty 
 or  placed  in  this  lower  Clafs  of  Beings  ?  a  fufficient  Anfwer 
 is  given  in  Note  24,  where,  I  think,  it  15  rendered  probable, 
 
 tha? 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub/5.     Of  Moral  Evil  443 
 
 Some  make  it  a  Queftion,  why  fo  great  a  Part  of 
 the  Earth  is  given  away  to  the  Brutes ;  but  thele 
 Men  would  have  it  all  left  to  them  ;  and  Mankind 
 itfelf  extinft. 
 
 II.  We 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 that  the  fame  Goodnefs  which  excited  the  Deity  to  create  Be- 
 ings of  the  higheft  Order,  would  induce  him  both  to  create  as 
 many  of  that  Order  as  could  commodioufly  exift  together,  or 
 be  confiftent  with  the  Good  of  the  whole;  and  likewifc  to 
 produce  a  Series  of  as  many  inferior  Orders,  and  as  many  par- 
 ticular  Beings  in  each  of  thofe  Orders  as  could  be  conceiv'd 
 to  exift  between  him felf  and  nothing:  or  fo  long  as  Exiftencc 
 in  the  very  loweft  Order  might  be  a  Benefit  either  to  the  Bcr 
 ings  of  that  Order,  or  to  thole  of  fome  other.  The  Confe- 
 quence  of  which  is,  that  we  mult  either  have  been  placed  in 
 the  Clafs  we  are  in  at  prefent,  or  no  where,  fmcc  by  the  Sup- 
 pofition  every  other  Clafs  is  full,  And  there  v/ill  appear  fuf-s 
 licient  reafon  for  our  being  created  in  this  Order,  and  placed 
 where  we  are,  rather  than  not  created  at  all,  provided  that 
 Exillence  be  a  Bleffing  to  hs,  or  that  we  receive  in  general 
 more  Happinefs  than  Mifery  in  this  prefent  State  :  which  point 
 will  be  confider'd  in  the  next  SubfeSiion. 
 
 That  thefe  feveral  Claffes  may  be  fuppofed  to  advance  gra- 
 dually towards  perfedion,  and  of  co^fequence  that  we  in  time 
 may  be  removed  into  fome  better  State,  fee  Note  1 9  and  T. 
 
 Thefe  Confiderations  will  fupply  us  with  an  Anfwer  to 
 Eaylis  Objedlion  againft  what  our  Author  advances  in  this 
 Paragraph.     '  This  (fays  he)  is  juft  like  as  if  ?.  King  Ihould 
 
 •  confine  feveral  of  his  Subjefts  in  his  Dungeons,    till  they 
 
 •  were    60  Years  old,  becaufe  thefe  Dungeons  would  other- 
 
 •  wife  be  empty.  But  to  make  any  likenefs  at  all  in  thefe  two 
 Cafes,  it  muft  be  made  appear  in  the  firft  place,  that  we  really 
 meet  with  more  Evil  of  all  kinds  than  Good  in  this  World  ; 
 and  confequently,  that  it  were  better  for  tis  to  be  out  of  it 
 than  in  it:  contrary  to  what  our  Author  has  proved  in 
 Ch.  2.  par.  7.  Ch.  4.  §.  8.  par.  7.  and  in  the  following  Sub- 
 feflion :  and  fecondly,  it  muft  be  fhewn  alfo,  that  we  might 
 have  been  placed  in  fome  better  World,  without  any  Incon- 
 venience to  the  reji  of  the  Uni'verfe,  contrary  to  what  may  be 
 Concluded  from  the  former  Part  of  this  Note,  and  that  Qihcf 
 to  which  it  refers. 
 
444  ^f  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 This  is  to-      II.  We  have  often  declared  that  Evils  are  chiefly 
 tally  ex-     jQ  i^g  avoided,  nay  that  they  are  prohibited  by  God: 
 AlTukbd    hecaufe  they  are  prejudicial  to  human  Nature,   but 
 how  much  worle  would  it  be  to  take  that  Nature 
 entirely  away  ?  They  therefore  who  rc(]uire  this  of 
 the  Divine  Goodnefs,  delire  the  greatcft  Evil  of  all 
 as  .1  Remcdv  for  Evils.     The  fame  Perfons  alfo,   that 
 with  fuch  Earneflnefs  delire  a  Change  of  their  Con- 
 dition   are  afraid  of  Death,    forgetting   that    this 
 Cl)ange  of  their  Condition  is  what  they  dread  the 
 moil  of  all  in  Death. 
 God  in  III.  Mankind  believes  indeed  from  the  Light  of 
 
 d:',ie  time  Nature,  that  God  will  tranflate  good  Men  intp  a 
 will  trail-  j3gjfj,j.  State,  but  it  is  necelfary  that  they  fhould 
 \Ien  to  a  ^^  prcfared  here,  as  Plants  in  a  Nurfcry,  before 
 Jjcrrcrihte  they  be  removed  into  the  Garden  where  they  are 
 but  the        to  bear  Fruit  (7^.)  Gcd  has  thertfoie  decreed  this 
 
 prefent  is  LJfg 
 
 as  necef- 
 
 Seed  time  NOTES. 
 
 is  to  Har- 
 
 ytil»  (79-)  Bay/e  obje£ls,  that  our  Author's  cornparifon  here  15 
 
 rot  a  juft  one,  fince  God  cannot  be  ty'd  to  the  ufe  of  common 
 fneans,  and  a  flow  Progrcfs  ot  fecond  Caufes.  He  is  not  ob- 
 h'ged  to  nurfc  us  up  as  a  Gardener  does  his  Plants,  but  might 
 as  well  have  produced  us  adult  and  ripe  in  Perfcftion,  and 
 have  made  us  happy  at  once. —  But  perhaps  it  may  appear  a 
 little  doubtful  to  a  Perfpn  who  attentively  confiders  Note  19. 
 whether  (his  could  be  done  even  in  »/2/»r<2/P]eafure.  However, 
 I  think,  'tis  abfolutely  inconceivable  how  it  fhould  be  eflefled 
 in  i!/cr<2/ Ha  ppinefs.  If  we  confidcr  the  Natuve  of  Virtue  and 
 of  Man,  it  will  not  be  pofiiblc  for  us  to  imagine  how  this 
 tould  be  implainted  in  him  at  firfl,  or  infufed  into  him  after- 
 wards, or  he  be  in  any  wife  made  morally  perfect  ox  good  on 
 a  fudden.  The  Idea  of  Virtue  confifts  in  a  repetition  of  free 
 Atls,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  received  pajfiaiely:  and  tho' 
 the  Difpofition  might  be  thus  communicated,  yet  to  compleat 
 its  Nature  and  make  it  actually  produdive  of  true  Moral  Hap- 
 pinefs,  there  mufl;  neceflarily  be  required  due  time  for  Exer- 
 cife.  Experience  and  confirmed  Habits,  as  may  be  gather'd 
 from  the  Preliminary  Dijfertntioa  i  and  will  farther  appeal^ 
 from  Notes  81  and  82. 
 
 fxoii^ 
 
S^a.  5.  Sub.  5.     Of  Moral  Evil.  445 
 
 Life  to  be  as  it  were  the  Pafiage  to  a  better.    Thus 
 this  Barth  is  replenilli'd  with  Inhabitants,  who  be- 
 ing 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 From  the  Nature  of  Man  alio,  or  a  Bei?ig  in  his  imperfcft 
 State,  we  may  fairly  infer  that  he  could  not  have  fo  great  an 
 Jdea  of  the  moral  Pevfeftions  of  the  Deity,  n6r  fo  clear  an  ap- 
 prehenfion  of  the  contrary  Qualities,  nor  confcquently,  a  fui- 
 table  a-ffedion  for  the  one,  and  an  abhorrence  o'i  the  other, 
 if  he  had  not  fome  experience  of  both.  \J.'\  "  \ 
 
 We  Jcnow  not  the  real  Value  of  a  good  thing,  we  cannot  be' 
 duly  fenfible  of  its  Excellence,  except  we  ha\e  been  in  fome 
 mcafure  acquainted  with  its  Oppofue,  oratlealt  have  perceiv'd 
 the  want  of  it  on  Ibme  occafion.  "  Does  any  one  (lays  Lsih- 
 "  nitz.  [k  ]  fiifficiently  relilh  the  Happinefs  of  good  Health  who 
 "  has  never  been  fick  ?  Is  it  not  moft  times  neceflary  thar  a. 
 "  little  Evil  fhonld  render  a  good  ihorc  ienfible,  and  confc- 
 "  quently  greater  ?"  See  alfo  Not  19.  The  fame  holds  ftrong- 
 er  ilili  in  Moral  Good  :  which  is  d  confirmation  of  the  Alter - 
 nalinje.  that  Lailantius  fpeaks  of  |/.];  and  which  is  well  de- 
 fcrib'd  by  A.  Gellius  I  w  J.  It  docs  not  therefore  feem  poffible 
 for  us  to  have  a  due  Knowledge  of  Virtue  if  we  had  never  fecn 
 Vice  Without  this  Knowledge  of  Virtue,  we  could  not  ar- 
 dcntly  defire  it,  without  i'uch  a  defire,  and  a  fedulous  profecu- 
 tion  of  that  defire,  we  could  not  attain  to  the  proper  cxcrcJfe 
 of  it,  and  without  this  attainment  we  could  not  have  any  con- 
 fcioufnefs  of  defert,  any  comfortable  I'elf  approbation,  or  true 
 Moral  Happinefs. 
 
 It  appears  then  that  Virtue  is  an  A61  of  our  own,  that  a  Se- 
 TJes  of  thefe  Adls  is  requifite  to  conilitutc  an  habit  of  Virtue;} 
 and  of  confequence  that  this  cannot  be  infpired  into  any  Being, 
 or  however  not  produced  in  one  of  our  weak  frame  o«  afudden: 
 and  in  the  lad  place,  that  this  prcfent  State  is  neceflary  (as 
 our  Author  fays)  to  train  us  up,  and  fit  us  fhr  a  better.  That 
 fhis  Life  is  properly  a  State  of  Tryal  and  Probation,  and  th? 
 Virtues  of  it  abiblutely  neceflary  to  the  Happinefs  oi  ths 
 next,  fee  Rymers  General  Reprefentaiion  of  RtnjeaVd  Religion^ 
 Part  2.  Ch.  3.  p.  385,  ^c.  and  Bcotfi  ChrijlianLife,  Vol.  2. 
 
 Ch.  4. 
 
 j^/.3  ^ee  Note  66. 
 
 {^k.~\  Memoirs  of  Literatnre,  V.  3.  Art.  25,  p.  118, 
 £7.3  De  Ira  Dei,  §.13.  fed.  fub  iin.  and  i^. 
 t«»J  B.  6.  Ch,  i. 
 
44^  Of  Mom!  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 ing  educated  under  Difcipline  for  a  while,  till  they 
 have  finifli'd  their  Courfe,  fliall  depart  into  ano- 
 ther State  luited  to  their  Defcrts.  They  who  find 
 fault  with  this  in  Cod,  feem  to  me  to  do  the  fame 
 as  if  one  who  knows  nothing  of  Harvefl:  or  the  na- 
 ture of  Agriculture  iliould  laugh  at  the  Sower  for 
 throwing  away  his  Corn.  For  there  is  no  doubt  but 
 the  prelent  State  of  things  is  as  neceffary,  not  only 
 to  the  Earth  left  it  fhould  be  void  of  Inhabitants, 
 and  to  the  Animals,  which  for  the  mod  part  depend 
 upon  the  Labours  of  Men,  but  alfo  to  Men  them- 
 
 felves  I 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Ch.  4.  §.  3.  p.  321,  335,  ^c.  2'vo.  and  Sherlock  on  Death, 
 C.  I.  §,  3.  p.  77,  ^'c.  4th  Edit,  or  Rel.  if  Nat.  delin.  p.  213, 
 214. 
 
 To  the  fame  purpofe  is  that  excellent  Paper  in  the  SpeSIator: 
 
 No.  447. "  The  lafl  ufe  I  fli.ill  make  of  this  remarkable 
 
 **  Property  in  human  Nature,  of  being  delighted  with  thofe 
 "  Aftions  to  which  it  is  accuftomed,  is  to  fhew  how  abfolute- 
 "  ly  neceflary  it  is  for  us  to  gain  habits  of  Virtue  in  this  I,ifei 
 '*  if  we  would  enjoy  the  pleafures  o{  the  next.  The  State  of 
 "  Blifs  we  call  Heaven  will  not  be  capable  of  aftecfling  thofe 
 "  Minds  which  are  not  thus  qualify'd  for  it;  we  muft  in  this 
 *'  World  gain  a  Relifh  of  Truth  and  Virtue,  if  we  would  be 
 "  able  to  taftc  that  Knowledge  and  Perfedioii  which  are  tp 
 "  make  us  happy  in  the  next.  The  feeds  of  thofe  Spiritual 
 "  Joys  and  Raptures  which  are  to  rife  up  and  flourifh  \n  the 
 •*  Soul  to  all  Eternity  muft  be  planted  in  her  during  this  her 
 **  prefent  State  of  Probation.  In  fhort,  Heaven  is  not  to  be 
 *'  look'd  upon  only  as  the  Reward,  but  as  the  natural  EfFecQ: 
 **  of  a  Religious  Life. '  See  alfo  Tillotfo7is  Scrm,  ift  vol.  Fol. 
 p.  51,  82,  85,  i^c.  and  the  78th  Serm.  2d  vol.  p.  591.  Con- 
 cerning the  true  End  of  Man,  and  the  Means  of  obtaining  it, 
 and  the  Nature  both  of  thofe  Virtues  which  will  conftitute  the 
 greateft  part  of  Heaven,  and  of  thofe  Injlrumental  Duties  by 
 which  we  are  to  acquire,  improve,  and  perfed  thefe  Heaven- 
 ly Virtues,  or  make  our  own  Heaven,  fee  Scott's  Chrijiian 
 Life,  vol  I.  particularly  Ch.  3.  which  Notion  is  alfo  well  de- 
 fended by  Dr.  Rymer  in  the  Chap,  above-mention'd.  See  alfo 
 Dr.  Laiighton$  Serm.  On  Rem.  6.  23. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  4.     Of  Moral  Evil.  447 
 
 felves :  and  as  requiiite  in  the  Divine  Adminiftra- 
 tion,  in  order  to  feme  better  Life,  as  Seed-time  is 
 to  Harveft,  ij.) 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (K)  But  it  is  ask'd,  iince  Man  is  capable  of  abetter  State, 
 \vhy  did  not  God  place  him  in  it  immediately  ?  Can  it  be 
 agreeable  to  an  infinitely  good  Being  to  delay  fo  great  a  Benefit, 
 and  make  his  Creatures  wait  for  it  with  a  long  train  of  Suf- 
 ferings, when  he  might  have  placed  them  in  that  happy  Con- 
 dition at  firft  ?  Wou'd  we  count  him  a  kind  beneficent  Man 
 that  fcrv'd  his  Friends  thus,  and  made  them  buy  his  Favours 
 With  a  long  attendance  and  a  fevere  exercife  of  Panencc  ?  Is  it 
 not  a  Rule  that  he  that  gives  frankly  gives  twice,  and  that  be- 
 nefits lofe  their  grace  when  diff-enfed  with  a  flo\v  hand  ? 
 
 To  this  I  reply,  that  Vve  fhou'd  not  be  furprizedif  we  were 
 able  to  give  no  reafon  for  God's  conduit  in  this  particular. 
 For  fmce  it's  impofTible  that  we  fhou'd  have  a  perfedt  view  of 
 the  contrivance  and  whole  fabric  of  the  Univcrfe,  'tis  likewife 
 impoifible  that  we  fhould  be  able  to  difcover  the  reafon  of  eve- 
 ry thing  in  it.  But  if  in  thofc  parts  that  we  are  acquainted 
 with,  we  defcern  apparent  footfleps  of  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs, 
 we  ought  to  conclude  that  the  fame  go  thro'  all  the  reft,  tho' 
 we  can't  trace  them. 
 
 But  zdly.  Tho'  this  anfwer  Le  true  and  fufHcient,  it  happens 
 that  we  have  no  occafion  for  ic  at  prefcnt.  For  we  believe 
 that  we  are  able  to  give  a  very  good  account  why  God  did  not 
 place  Mankind  in  the  fame  certainty  and  Degrre  of  Happinefs 
 that  we  expedl  in  Heaven.     Jn  order  to  this  let  us  confider, 
 
 I  ft.  That  the  World  {o  far  as  known  to  us  is  one  intire  Ma- 
 chine, in  whicii  all  the  parts  have  a  mutual  refpefl,  and  depen- 
 dance  on  one  another,  and  contribute  to  the  fupport  and  pre.- 
 fervation  of  the  whole.  This  is  a  proof  of  the  Unity  and 
 Wifdom  of  the  Maker. 
 
 zdly.  That  in  fuch  a  vaft  Machine  it  was  impofhble  all  the 
 parts  fliou'd  be  of  the  fame  fort  or  have  the  fame  Offices,  and 
 of  confequence  there  muft  be  in  the  fcveral  parts  of  the  Syf- 
 tcm  different  Bodies  of  different  Conftitutions  and  Qualities. 
 
 3dly.  That  every  one  of  thefe  were  capable  of  fubfifting 
 and  fupporting  animals,  but  then  it  Was  impofTible  that  all 
 thofe  animals  fhou'd  be  of  the  fame  kind,  or  have  the  fame 
 qualifications  or  conveniencies 
 
 4thly.  The  Cafe  being  thus,  all  that  cou'd  beexpeited  from 
 ^he  framer  of  the  whole  was  that  he  fhou'd  fill  each  of  thefe 
 
 pans 
 
44^ 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V, 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     VI. 
 
 r 
 
 Concerning  the  Scarcity  of  Happy  Pe^ons,  and 
 the  General  Corruption  of  Mankind, 
 
 Some  OTd- 
 
 jeflions 
 propofed 
 concern- 
 ing the 
 Rarity  of 
 Happy 
 Perfbns. 
 
 I.  T>  U  T  it  may  feem   ftrangc,  that  of  fo  great 
 j3  a  Multitude  of  Men,    fo  few  fhould  attain 
 to  Happinefs.     For  whether   that   be   fuppofed  to 
 arife  from  the  fruition  of  (uch  things  as  are  agree- 
 able 
 
 N  OT  E  Si 
 
 parts  of  the  Univerfe  v.iih  proper  Animals,  wlilch  miglit  en- 
 joy themfelves  and,  live  ai  conveniently  as  the  circumflances  of 
 the  place  allow'd:  and  where  the  circumftances  of  the  Itation 
 wou'd  not  afford  convcnicncies  greater  than  the  inconvcnien- 
 cies  that  attended  it,  that  place  fhou'd  be  left  void,  fincc  thar 
 was  better  than  to  fill  it  v^ith  miferable  Creatures.  By  milc- 
 /.ihle  I  underrtand,  as  the  Author  does,  creatures  whofe  Being, 
 taken  in  the  whole  duration  of  it,  has  more  evil  than  good. 
 
 5thly.  If  we  conceive  fome  of  thefe  Creatures  of  fuch  a  na- 
 ture that  they  may  either  forfeit  the  place  in  which  they  are, 
 or  grow  unfit  for  it  by  the  impcrfcdions  that  attend  their  bo 
 dies  or  circumftances,  a  cafe  which  we  fee  often  happen  to 
 Alcn  in  this  life ;  then  it  will  be  agreeable  to  the  wKdom  and 
 goodnefs  of  the  common  Author  to  contrive  the  Matter  (o 
 that  thofe  in  a  worfe  Ibtion  fhou'd  grow  up  to  a  capacity  of 
 iiiting  and  filling  thole  Habit.uions  uhich  the  others  defcrtcd 
 or  became  incapable  of  pofleHing  any  longer.  We  fee  fuch 
 tranfmutations  and  tranflations  happen  among  the  Animals. 
 
 Thus  Inrci,^s  being  gcncr.ued  and  prepared  in  Water,  at  a 
 proper  time  defert  their  Womb  of  Water  or  Earth,  get  Wings 
 and  mount  into  the  Air,  w)vi<;h  then  -affords  them  a  more  con- 
 venient hibit.uion. 
 
 6ih!y.  The 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6,     Of  Moral  Evil.  449 
 
 able  to  the  natural  Appetites,  or  from  free  Elefti- 
 oas,  'tis  manifeft,  that  not  even  one  of  a  hundred 
 
 thoufand 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 6thl7,  The  fame  may  be  faid  of  Men.  They  were  created  at 
 firft  on  the  Earth,  becaufe  there  was  no  other  Place  for  them, 
 al]  others  had  their  proper  Inhabitants,  and  were  full,  and 
 therefore  Man  mufl:  either  be  here  or  no  where.  Now  this 
 Earth  is  part  of  the  Uuiverfe,  and  of  fuch  a  Nature  that  it  was 
 impoffible  the  Animals  in  it  fliould  be  freed  from  all  Inconve- 
 riiencies,  that  is  exempted  from  all  natural  Evils  :  But  our 
 Good  and  Wife  God  fo  contrived  it  by  his  peculiar  Care  and 
 Favour  that  Man,  the  only  Intelligent  Being  in  it,  fhould  be 
 exempted  from  the  greateft  of  thefe  Evils,  that  is  abfoluteEx- 
 tindtion  by  Death,  and  be  capable  of  Tranflation  to  a  better 
 Place  when  it  fhould  become  void,  and  accordingly  the  fall  of 
 the  Angels  made  room  for  Men.  This  is  fo  eafy  a.  Thought 
 that  I  find  many  are  of  Opinion  that  Man  was  created  with 
 dcfign  to  fill  the  place  from  whence  the  Angels  fell,  and  that 
 thefe  Angels  are  not  fent  to  Hell  till  there  be  Men  enough  to 
 £11  their  place  in  Heaven. 
 
 ythly,  If  we  conceive  that  the  Creatures  thus  advanced  have 
 more  pleafure  in  their  Advancement  than  thofe  that  defert  or 
 change  their  Station  lofe  by  their  Fall,  it  feems  agreeable  to 
 the  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  of  God  to  permit  fuch  an  Ex- 
 change ;  for  by  that  means  his  Favours  are  more  equally  diltri- 
 butcd  to  his  Creatures,  and  there  is  more  Good  in  the  whole 
 World  than  would  be  if  this  were  not  permitted.  If  all  Crea- 
 tures were  equal,  and  in  Stations  equally  capable  of  Happi- 
 nefs  there  were  no  room  for  fuch  an  Exchange.  But  fmce 
 fuch  an  Equality  is  impoffible,  the  next  Good  to  it  is  to  let 
 each  intelligent  Creature  have  its  turn  in  the  bell  Station  or  at 
 leafl  a  poffibility  afforded  him  of  having  it. 
 
 8thly,  This  feems  to  be  the  Intent  of  Vvhat  the  Scripture 
 declares  concerning  a  certain  Number  of  Elc^,  which  mull  be 
 compleated  before  the  End  and  Confummation  of  the  World.  A 
 better  Reafon  cou'd  fcarce  be  given  why  a  certain  Number 
 was  to  be  hU'd  up  before  the  laft  Day,  than  that  this  Earth 
 was  defign'd  to  prepare  as  many  Inhabitants  to  be  tranflated 
 into  Heaven  as  were  wanting  ;  nor  how  any  fhould  be  want- 
 ing but  by  the  fall  or  departure  of  fome  of  the  Inhabitants 
 placed  there  by  God  at  firfl.  But  it  was  reafonable  that  this 
 mould  be  propofed  to  Mortals  by  v.-ay  of  Reward,  and  that  as 
 many  as  God  voB?hf^f?d  ?his  Favour  t9  fhould  be  at  Liberty 
 
 'G  g  by 
 
450  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 thoufand  is  truly  happy.  In  vain  then  do  we  enquire 
 about  the  Means   which   lead  to   Happinefs;   the 
 
 Power 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 by  a  trial  of  their  Virtues  to  fliew  themfclves  worthy  to  fuc- 
 ceed  the  fallen  Angels.  This  feems  to  offer  a  Reafon  why 
 God  permitted  Men  the  Ufc  of  Free- Will,  ^iz.  to  fhew  him- 
 felf  jiifl:  and  equitable  to  his  Creatures,  fo  that  thofe  of  a  lower 
 Clafs  cannot  complain  of  God  fince  he  has  put  it  in  their  Pow- 
 er to  better  their  Condition,  if  they  will  ufe  their  Faculties  a- 
 right :  nor  thofe  in  a  higher  State  be  too  proud  of  the  Divine 
 Favour  and  defpifc  their  inferiors,  fince  if  they  abufc  that  Fa- 
 vour they  fhall  be  obliged  to  quit  it  to  fuch  of  thefe  inferiors  as 
 fhall  better  deferve  that  Station.  Nor  could  there  polhbly  be 
 a  more  equal  Diflribution  of  things,  fuppofing  it  was  nereffa- 
 ry  that  there  fhould  be  an  inequality  among  Beings  and  diffe- 
 rent Degrees  of  Happinefs  among  rational  Agents. 
 
 Methinks  if  thefe  things  be  duly  confider'd  they  give  a  very 
 good  account  why  God  did  not  at  firfl  create  Man  in  as  good 
 a  Station  as  he  is  capable  of  filling.  Why  he  made  a  trial  of 
 him,  and  allow'd  him  the  Ufe  of  Free-Will.  Why  he  train'd 
 him  up  in  Labour  and  a  painful  Exercilcof  Virtue  in  order  to 
 make  him  a  fit  Inhabitant  for  Heaven.  He  did  not  confine 
 Man  to  the  Earth  as  a  Prifon.  But  as  a  prudent  Gardner  pre- 
 pares his  Plants  in  a  Nurfery  to  be  removed  into  the  Field  or 
 Garden,  as  foon  as  the  Trees  which  grow  there  have  been 
 converted  to  their  proper  ufe:  In  like  manner  does  the  nioffc 
 Wife  framer  of  the  World  prepare  Men  here  for  a  removal  into 
 Heaven  as  foon  as  a  place  fhall  be  ready  to  receive  them.  Or 
 like  an  indulgent  Father  who  educates  his  Children  at  School, 
 and  does  not  admit  them  to  the  Management  of  his  domeftic 
 Affairs  or  public  Bufinefs  till  room  be  made  for  them  by  the 
 removal  of  fuch  as  occupy  thefe  Pofts.  Hence  appears  the 
 Reafon  why  Men  are  born  weak,  ignorant  and  unfit  for  Bufi- 
 nefs, f/z.  to  keep  a  Proportion  between  their  prcfcnt  State,  and 
 the  Offices  they  arc  defign'd  for. 
 
 'Twould  be  to  no  pur;,  ofe  for  them  to  be  born  in  a  Condition 
 fit  for  public,  domeliic  or  manly  Fundlions,  when  at  the  fame 
 time  there  was  no  room  for  them  to  exert  themfch'es,  thefe 
 being  all  taken  up  by  others.  'Tis  reafonablc  therefore  that 
 they  fhould  wait  for  their  own  turn,  which  will  come  foon 
 enough  when  the  prcfent  Pofieffors .  arc  gone  of^'  the  Stage. 
 Nor  in  the  mean  time  are  they  in  a  Rate  of  Mifery,  and  as  it 
 Vicvfi  fhut  up  in  a  Dungeon,  but  in  a  Condition  fufhcicntly 
 
 happ7 
 
Sea.^.    S';b  6.     Of  Moral  ^wWl  451 
 
 Power  of  Elecflion  is  beftow'd  on  Man  to  no  pur- 
 pofe,  fince  it  fo  rarely  attains  the  end  for  which  it 
 was  imparted. 
 
 11.  Secondly,  The  far  grearer  pirt  of  Mandkind  That  the 
 negleding  this    Power    ot    pkahng    themfelves   in  P°^^"j^^ 
 Eleftions    or  rather,  to    confels  the  trnth,  not   in  j^  ^^^  ^^_ 
 the  leaft  obferving  thar  they  have  it,  or  that  Hap-  garded. 
 pinefs   is  to  be  expedcd   from  the  ufe  of  it :    give 
 themfelves  up  entirely  to  the  Government  of  their 
 natural  Appetites  and  Senfes,  and  are  plainly  hur- 
 ried on  according  to  the  Impetus  and  Direction  of 
 
 G  g  z  the 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 happy  and  eligible,  and  a  better  than  which  cou'd  not  be  gi^ 
 ven  without  ejeding  thofe  which  enjoy  it  at  prefent. 
 
 Farther,  if  we  conceive  certain  Creatures  that  by  their  Con- 
 ftitution  are  naturally  fubjeft  to  diffolution,  as  'tis  demonftrable 
 that  all  things  confifting  of  Matter  are;  and  that  the  railing 
 up  new  ones  in  the  Place  of  fuch  as  decay,  yields  a  greater  Plea- 
 fure  to  thofe  that  thus  grow  up,  than  fuch  as  are  already  come 
 to  maturity  could  enjoy  in  the  continuance  of  their  being, 
 then  will  it  be  agreeable  to  the  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom  of 
 God  to  permit  thofe  that  are  thus  grown  up  to  decay  accord- 
 ing to  the  tendency  of  their  Nature,  and  to  fubftitute  others 
 in  their  room  ;  rather  than  prevent  their  Difiblution  by  a  mi- 
 racle. Which  r:;f]iciently  juilifies  the  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom  of 
 God  in  permitting  that  Succeffion  of  Generations  which  we 
 lee  in  the  World.  God  does  not  therefore  deny  or  delay  his 
 Favours  thro'  any  want  of  kindncfs  and  beneficence,  but  be- 
 caufe  they  cou'd  not  be  beftowed  fooncr  without  detriment  to 
 others.  He  could  indeed  have  not  created  Men  before  the 
 beft  place  they  were  capable  of  was  ready  for  them.  But  in  the 
 interim  he  had  deprived  them  of  the  Benefit  which  they  now 
 enjoy,  and  there  would  have  been  no  room  for  Merit  or  De- 
 merit, for  Divine  Juftice  or  Mercy.  Is  it  not  more  reafonable, 
 more  worthy  of  God,  to  reward  them  with  the  Kingdom  of 
 Heaven  for  their  Obedience,  and  the  Proof  of  their  Virtues 
 exhibited  in  an  inferior  State,  than  out  of  mere  good  Pleafure 
 to  beftow  fo  great  a  Favour  on  them,  who  had  done  nothing 
 at  all,  had  given  no  Specimen  of  their  Difpofition  ?  The  ifV,. 
 you'll  fay  argues  greater  Munificence. 
 
 But 
 
4$^  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V, 
 
 the  Animal  Nature  as  much  as  Brutes.     If  therefore 
 we  have  this  Power  in  us,  it  feems  to  be  given  us 
 in  vain,  /.  e,  to  fuch  as  neither  ufe  if,  nor  are  con- 
 fcious  that  they  have  it. 
 That  III.  Thirdly,    Hence   all    Mankind  lie  polluted 
 
 there  is  an  arid  immers'd  m  Vice  and  Wickednefs;  and  'tis  not 
 
 cTruwion  °"^  ^^  ^^°'  ^^^  ^^^' ^  ^"^'   ^^^^  deviates  from  the 
 "'  right  ufe  of  Election.      How  can  thefe  things  be 
 reconcil'd  with  the  Care  and  Providence  of  an  in- 
 finite good  and  powerful  God  ? 
 Thefe  are      IV.  I  confefs,  that  this  Corruption  of  Manners, 
 beftan-      and  almoft  univerfal   Deviation  from  the   way  to 
 ^"^'^'lij^   Happinefs,  is  better  folv'd  from  Reveal'd  than  Na- 
 Rehgion     ^"^^^  Religion,   and  that  the  neceffity  of  a  Reiela- 
 tioK  is  from  hence  rightly  proved.     For  lince  the 
 true  Caufe  which  gave  rife  to  this  is  a  matter  of 
 Fad,  viz.,  the  Fall  of  the  fir  ft  Man,  it  cannot  be 
 difcover'd  merely  by  the  Strength  of  Reafon  i  but 
 we  ftand  in  need  of ////?<?r/V<«/ Tradition  to  tranfmit 
 
 this, 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 But  it  is  the  pnrt  of  Piiidence  to  moderate  Liberality,  and 
 fince  all  could  not  partake  of  it  equally  (as  in  this  Cafe  'tis 
 plain  they  could  n6t)  to  prefer  the  moll  defcrv^ing.  But  it  is 
 urg'd,  why  did  God  create  more  than  could  be  provided  fof 
 in  the  very  bcft  way  ?  I  anfwer,  becaufe  he  was  not  fo  fpar- 
 ing  of  his  Favours  as  to  deny  Exiftence  to  any  thing  to  wluch 
 it  would  be  a  Benefit,  and  which  might  enjoy  more  Good 
 than  Evil  in  it.  'Tis  plain  that  different  Order?  make  for 
 the  good  of  the  whole-  The  fuperior  ones  have  Facultie?  to 
 exercife  upfin  thofeina  lower  ilate,  by  the  exerrife  whereof 
 they  may  incieafe  their  own  Happinefs  and  alTill  others.  As 
 for  the  inferiors,  can  any  thing  contribute  more  to  their  Se- 
 curity and  Satisfadlion  than  to  find  themfelves  committed  to 
 the  care  of  fuch  powerful  and  beneficent  Guardians,  and  en- 
 joying their  Help  and  Protedtion  ?  Thus  the  whole  Work  of 
 God  is  admirably  conneftcd  together,  and  all  the  parts  fib- 
 fervent  to  each  other,  and  demonflratc  both  the  Wifdom  ani 
 tha  Goodjfiefs  of  their  Author, 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  4.5;  j 
 
 this,  as  well  as  other  matters  of  Faft,  down  to  Mf, 
 But  tho'  there  had  been  none  fuch,  and  we  were  ig- 
 norant of  the  Fall  of  the  Firft  Man,  yet  we  fhpuldf 
 have  been  furnifti'd  with  a  proper,  tho'  not  fo  clear 
 an  Anfwer,  fince  the  Mifery  or  Corruption  of  Man- 
 kind tho'  really  lamentable,  yet  is  not  fo  great  but 
 that  it  may  be  reconciled  with  the  good  Providence 
 of  God. 
 
 V.  For  as  to  the  firft  Objedion  taken  from  the  Many  at- 
 fewnefs  of  them  that  attain  to  Happinefs,  we  may  tain  to  a 
 reply  that  Happinefs  is  two-fold,  perfe^  and  ahjo'  moderate 
 lute,  or  moderate  and  partial.  I  call  that  perfeft  "^PP^"^"^ 
 which  anfwers  in  every  refped  to  our  Wiilies,  and 
 that  moderate  which,  tho*  it  does  not  equal  our 
 Defires,  yet  is  not  quite  deftitute  of  agreeable  En- 
 joyments with  which  Life  being  accompanied, 
 and  fweeten'd  as  it  were  by  the  Mitigation  of  its 
 Evils  and  the  Alleviation  of  its  Cares,  becomes  a 
 Blefling,  and  worth  a  prudent  Man's  Choice.  As 
 to  the  former,  'tis  certain  that  it  cannot  fall  to  the 
 Lot  of  any  Man  in  this  prefent  State,  nor  is  it  a 
 Debt  due  from  God  to  a  Creature,  tho*  never  fo 
 innocent.  Since  the  Condition  of  Men  is,  and 
 muft  neceffarily  be  fuch  (while  we  inhabit  this  Earth 
 in  its  prefent  State^  as  will  by  no  m^ans  admit  of 
 this  abfolutely  perfed  Happinefs.  For  Pains, 
 Griefs,  and  the  reft  of  thofe  which  we  call  natu- 
 ral Evils,  cannot,  as  things  now  ftand,  be  totally 
 avoided,  but  by  the  preternatural  Favour  of  the 
 Deity.  The  Earth  then  muft  cither  be  left  defti- 
 tute of  Inhabitants,  or  we  muft  take  up  with  a 
 moderate  fhare  of  Happinefs;  this  alfo  is  a  Gift 
 worthy  of  Qod,  and  fit  to  be  accepted  and  em- 
 brac'd  by  Man.  Neither  is  this  a  rare  Felicity, 
 and  which  happens  to  few  Men ;  for  all  may  en- 
 joy it,  and  moft  adually  do ;  efpecially  if  they 
 will  make  a  prudent  ufe  of  their  Eledions.  For  if 
 9ZI  ^herc 
 
454-  0/*  ^^^^^  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 there  beany  bitter  thins:  in  Life,  it  genera'ly  flows 
 from  depraved  Eledions,  and  by  a  right  ufe  of 
 thefe,  any  tiling  which  creates  uneafinefs,  or  can 
 •  make  us  weary  of  Life,  might  be  mitigated  or  re- 
 mov'd.  To  conclude,  tho*  we  complain  of  the 
 Miferies  of  Life,  yet  we  are  unwilling  to  part  with 
 it,  which  is  a  certain  Indication  that  it  is  not  a 
 burden  to  us,  and  that  not  fo  few  attain  this  mo- 
 derate Happinefs,  as  the  Objedion  would  infi- 
 nuate.  (Z.) 
 
 VL  As 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (Z.)  'Tis  obicftcd  thst  the  Proof  brought  here  to  fhcw  that 
 there  is  more  Good  than  Evil  in  the  World  can't  be  folid,  be- 
 caufcit  is  founded  on  one  of  the  greateft  and  moll  evident  In- 
 firmities of  our  Nature.  For  both  Divines  and  Philofophers 
 have  condema'd  ihh  fond  defire  of  Life  as  the  greatcll  Impcr-' 
 fefition  attending  Mortality,  and  have  judg'd  no  Evil  to  be  be 
 greater  than  the  fear  of  Death. 
 
 I  confefs  indeed  that  an  immoderate  Defire  of  Life,  as  alfo 
 the  dread  of  Death,  becomes  finful  when  to  preferve  one  or 
 avoid  the  othe."-,  we  are  hurried  into  the  Violation  of  the  Laws 
 of  God,  but  in' itfelf 'tis  neither  Evil  nor  an  Imperfeftion  ; 
 nay,  'cis  good  and  part  oftlic  Duty  we  owe  to  God  the  Gi- 
 ver of  Life,  and  to  ourfelvcs.  To  be  mortal  is  indeed  an  im- 
 perfeftion,  but  to  fear  Death  and  endeavour  to  avoid  it  by  all 
 lawful  A4eans  is  no.  new  Lifirmity  of  Nature,  but  a  necefiary 
 means  of  preferving  the  good  Gift  of  God  fo  long  as  he  thinks 
 proper  to  indulge  it.  'I'is  alfo  to  be  obferv'd  that  this  fear 
 cf  perifhing  is  tbundcd  in  the  {^^(q  or  opinion  of  the  Pleafure 
 and  Satisfation  which  we  have  in  Life,  and  thefe  muft  bear  a 
 proportion  to  each  other.  Jncreafe  the  Opinion  of  the  Good- 
 nefs  of  Life  and  the  fear  of  difiblution  increafes  likc^vife:  For 
 that  a  Man  Hiould  have  a  great  fenfe  of  the  Pleafure  and  Satif- 
 faftion  he  has  in  a  thing,  and  not  to  be  afraid  of  lofing  it  when 
 he  apprehends  it  in  danger,  is  abfurd  and  impoflible.  The  fear 
 of  Death  then  is  not  an  imperfeflion  but  a  prefervative  ot  Life, 
 and  a  neceHary  Confequence  of  that  great  Love  aiKl  Value 
 which  we  have  for  it. 
 
 But  zdly,  'Tis  urg'd  that  it  cannot  be  the  fenfe  of  the  good 
 we  find  in  Life  that  makes  us  delirous  of  it,  and  afraid  of  Death, 
 fince  Chriftians  that  areperfuaded  of  another  Life,  and  firmly 
 
 believe 
 
Sed.  ^.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  '45^ 
 
 VI.  As  to  the  fecond  thing  objeded,  'vtz,,  that  Men  make 
 mod  of  us  are  either  ignorant  or  regardlefs  of  this  u^eofthis 
 Power  of  pleafing  ourfelves  by  Eledion ;    upon  a  pQ^^fjJ^ 
 thorough  Enquiry  it  will  be  manifeft,  that  the  ufe  tho'  ^hey 
 of  this  Power  is  neither  difregarded,  nor  fo  rare  as  do  not  ob- 
 might  appear  at  firft  Sight.     I  own  there  are  few  ferveit. 
 G  g  4  who 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 believe  it  to  be  infinitely  preferable  to  the  prefent  are  yet 
 equally  defirous  of  living  and  afraid  to  die  with  thofe  that  have 
 no  fuch  Hope.  But  they  were  vvorfe  than  Pagans  if  the  reafon 
 of  that  Fear  v/as  becaufe  they  thought  there  was  more  good 
 in  this  World  than  in  Heaven :  and  therefore  it  is  no  good 
 Argument  to  prove  that  there  is  more  Good  than  Evil  in  the 
 World  becaufe  every  Creature  is  fond  of  its  Being,  and  defires 
 to  preferve  it. 
 
 To  all  which  I  anfwer,  that  from  hence  it  is  manifeft  that 
 the  fcnfe  of  all  animate  Creatures  and  the  Opinion  of  Mankind 
 both  bad  and  good  is  with  the  Author,  and  1  fliall  always 
 fooner  fufpedl  the  fubtilty  of  a  Philofopher  difputing  againft 
 common  Senfe  and  Experience  than  the  truth  ct  thofe. 
 
 But  2dly,  whereas  it  is  pretended  that  the  belt  Chriftians  are 
 afraid  to  die,  which  proves  that  'tis  not  the  Opinion  of  Good- 
 nefs  in  the  prefent  Life  makes  Men  fond  of  it. 
 
 I  anfwer.  That  the  Nature  of  things  is  and  ought  to  be  fuch 
 that  they  operate  more  or  lefs  according  to  their  dillance. 
 Thus  tlie  Sun  at  the  diftance  of  fo  many  Miles  feems  only  a 
 Foot  broad  ;  and  every  thing  in  like  manner  lelTens  both  it  its 
 apparent  magnitude  and  efficacy.  Now  fince  the  Pleafuresof 
 Heaven  are  at  a  great  diftance  from  us  and  caa  only  be  appre- 
 hended by  Faith  and  Hope,  'tis  no  wonder  thst  they  are  over 
 ballanc'd  by  the  Pleafures  of  this  Life  which  are  prefent  and 
 immediately  afFeft  our  Senfes. 
 
 If  any  ask  why  God  made  us  fo  that  things  at  a  diftance  are 
 lefs  affefting.  I  anfwer,  if  Caufes  did  operate  equally  at  all 
 diftances  it  wou'd  confound  the  Order  of  the  World,  and  bring 
 infinite  Inconveniencies  on  the  Creatures.  If  the  Sun  were  as 
 hot  at  the  prefent  diftance  as  it  would  be  if  we  touch'd  it,  nei- 
 ther Plants,  Animals,  nor  the  Earth  itfelf  could  fubfift  a  mo- 
 ment, but  all  muft  vanifh  into  Smaak.  In  the  fame  manner  if 
 things  paft  or  to  come  did  equally  affedl  our  Minds  anddifturb 
 the  PalTions,  Appetites,  ^c.  we  cou'd  not  pafs  one  Day  with 
 Eafe  and  Satisfaction,  God  therefore  has  well  and  wifely  pro- 
 vided 
 
^^6  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 who  take  notice  of  this  in  thcmfclves,    or  obfcrve 
 that  the  Pkafure   which  they  feel  in  afting  arifes 
 
 chefly 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 vided  that  wc  fliould  not  lofc  the  prefent  good  cither  thro' 
 dread  of  futurity  or  memory  of  what  is  part,  but  that  the  bene- 
 fits of  this  mortal  Life,  tho'  fmall  in  comparifon,  fliou'd  oftcn^ 
 affedt  us  more  than  much  greater  ones  to  come.  The  good  of 
 the  whole  Syiicm  required  that  wc  fhould  ftay  our  appointed 
 time  in  this  World,  was  it  not  therefore  gracioufly  ordain'd 
 that  this  World  fhould  appear  very  good  and  defirable  to  us  ? 
 But  2dly,  tho'  good  Chrirtians  believe  that  Heaven  is  much 
 better  than  this  prefent  State,  yet  the  bert  are  confcious  to 
 themfelves  that  they  are  Sinners,  and  have  often  orfended  a 
 juft  God,  and  conlequcntly  have  fome  doubt  and  terror  on 
 them  w^hen  they  are  fumon'd  to  appear  before  his  Tribunal. 
 
 Farther,  wc  are  fo  framed  as  not  to  attempt  great,  difficult 
 and  unexperincM  Matters  without  fome  Emotion  and  unufual 
 Aftonifhment  of  Mind:    which  was  neceffary  to  prevent  us 
 from  undertaking  fuch  things  raflily  and   carelclly    as  might 
 greatly  prejudice  ourfelves  or  others  e'er  we  could  forefee  the 
 Confequences.     Now  the  PafTage  from  this  Life  to  another  is 
 entirely  new,  untry'd,  unknown  :   'Tis  no  wonder  therefore 
 that  the  very   ftrangenefs  of  the  thing  and  greatnefs  of  the 
 Change  gives  Men  a  fliock  and  makes  them  rather  choofe  to 
 ftay  where  they  are,  efpecially  fmce  they  find  themfelves  well 
 pleafed  with  their   prefent  Life.       Neither   is   this  without  a 
 Providence.     For  if  the  Paflagc  to  another  World  could  be  en- 
 tered on  without  any  fuch  Pallion  or  Emotion,  and  every  thing 
 that  attended  it  were  as  clear  and  evident  to  us  as  the  Circum- 
 Ilances  of  this  prefent  Life,    all  delay  would  be  an  infuppor- 
 table  Torment  to  good  Men,    nor  could  they  wait  their  due 
 time  without  the  grcatert   pain,    impatience  and  uneafinefs. 
 How  much  better   has   the  good  Author  of  Nature  difpofed 
 things  by  providing  that  Mortals  fliould  be  content  and  happy 
 in  this  prefent  Life,    and  at  the  fime  time  enabled  to  bear  the 
 neceffary  Evils  of  it  by    the  profpedt  of  a  better?  Thus  is  ihc 
 Earth  furnifli'd  with  Inhabitants  which  arc  fo  well  pleafed 
 with  their  Lot  as  to  be  very  unwilling  to  quit  it,  and  yet  are 
 not  -without  hopes  of  fomething  greater.    This  fccms  to  have 
 been  long  fince  obferv'd  by  the  Poet. 
 
 Vidiurofque  Dji  celanty  lit  ini'sre  dnrent^ 
 Felix  ejje  Tnori. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  M>ral  Evil.  457 
 
 chiefly  from  the  Exercife  of  ir.     But  fteverthekfe 
 they  do  exercife  it,   and  tafte  the  Pleafure  arifing 
 
 tKere- 
 
 N  OT  E  S, 
 
 Bat  3dly,  'Tis  alledged  that  many  defire  Death  in  great  Af- 
 fli£lions,  but  arc  hinder'd  from  attempting  to  difpatch  thcm- 
 felves  either  firit-,  for  want  of  Courage,  or  zdly,  for  fear  of  In- 
 famy, or  ^dly,  for  fear  of  Damnation.  I  anflver,  we  fee  Men 
 live  and  very  fond  of  Life  that  are  rellrain'd  by  none  of  thefe. 
 Mei>  of  approved  Courage,  who  profefs  to  beUeve  nothing  af- 
 ter this  Life,  and  who  may  cafily  find  ways  of  putting  an  end 
 to  it  without  fufpicion  of  Suicide,  and  yet  they  live  on  and 
 willingly  bear  all  the  Inconveniencies  of  old  Age  and  Difeafcs. 
 Nay,  no  body  is  more  defirous  of  Life  than  fuch  Men,  as  was 
 obferv'd  in  the  Book  C.  4.  S.  8.  Par  7. 
 
 Farther,  as  to  Courage,  we  generally  look  on  it  as  cowar- 
 dice for  a  Man  to  kill  himfclf,  and  that  contributes  to  make 
 fuch  an  attempt  infamous.  But  zdly.  Courage  is  the  Power  of 
 attempting  hard,  painful,  and  difagreeable  things:  therefore 
 Mens  wanting  Courage  to  kill  themfelves  is  a  plain  Argument 
 that  Life  is  an  exceeding  great  Good,  and  that  a  Alan  can. 
 hardly  be  brought  to  'fuch  a  degree  of  firmnefs  and  calloufnefs 
 of  Mind  as  to  deprive  himfelf  of  it. 
 
 As  to  Infamy,  that,  as  we  faid  before,  may  eafily  be  avoid- 
 ed. A  Dofe  of  Opium  will  do  the  Bufinefs,  and  kave  no 
 room  for  Difcovery.  But  fuppofing  Difgrace  to  be  a  fure  at- 
 tendant on  Self  murder,  thefe  Men  are  often  notorioufly  profli- 
 gate and  know  themfelves  to  be  infamous  for  all  forts  of  Vice, 
 and  yet  difregard,  nay  glory  in  it.  Can  we  believe  fuch  Perfons 
 wou'd  be  rellrain'd  from  difpatching  themfelves  for  fear  of 
 hurting  their  Memories  after  Death,  which  they  think  they 
 fhall  feel  nothing  of,  when  they  defpife  much  greater  ignomi- 
 ny while  they  ftill  live  and  are  fenfible  of  it  ? 
 
 As  to  the  Fear  of  Damnation,  this  can  never  move  Atheifts, 
 and  yet  none,  as  we  obferv'd,  are  more  defirous  of  Life ;  they 
 profefs  to  love  it  above  all  things,  and  call  thofe  fools  and 
 Madmen  that  part  with  it  on  any  Account, 
 
 'Tis  alio  remarkable  that  a  kind  of  Religious  Melancholy 
 drives  moft  Men  to  Self  murder,  which  proves  that  the  fear  of 
 Damnation  is  no  fuch  hindrance  to  it. 
 
 But  lallly,  'tis  urg'd  that  the  Vulgar  are  incompetent  Judges 
 
 of  the  Benefits  and  Inconvenience  of  Life,  and  therefore  we 
 
 ought  to  appeal  to  the  Sentence   of  the  wife  Men  who  have 
 
 duly  confider'd  them  ;  and  if  ihefc  had  leaVc  given  to  live  their 
 
 ^     -  Lives 
 
45^  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 therefrom.  And  it  is  the  fame  in  the  Exercife  of 
 this  Power  as  in  fome  Organs  of  Senfe,  tho'  we 
 are  entirely  ignorant  which  they  are,  or  of  wh?.t 
 nature,  yet  we  ufe  them,  and  by  the  ufe  of  them 
 perceive  external  things.  Thus  we  pleafe  ourfelves 
 in  choofing,  tho'  we  are  not  aware  that  things 
 pleafe  us  becaufe  they  are  chofen.  Now  that  this 
 is  lo  will  be  evident  if  we  examine  thofe  things 
 ■which  afford  Pleafure  to  both  young  and  old,  wife 
 as  well  as  foolifli.  For  if  the  greater  part  of  them 
 have  no  manner  of  Conneclion  with  the  natural 
 Appetites,  nor  vs^ith  the  Neceffiries  of  Nature,  it 
 will  appear  that  they  have  plea'ed  us  no   o^herwife 
 
 than 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Lives  over  again,  they  would  not  accept  it  ;  as  Mothe de  Vr.yer 
 affirms  of  himlelf.  But  I  anfwer,  that  in  this  Cafe  there's  no 
 believing  Mothe  de  Vaycr,  or  any  Man  on  his  Word ;  the  Ex- 
 periment was  never  made  nor  had  he  ever  the  offer ;  and  therc- 
 fiare  he  neither  knew  what  he  would  have  done  in  fuch  Cir- 
 cumftances,  nor  have  we  any  Security  that  he  fpake  his  true 
 Sentiments.  Perhaps  he  was  an  old  Man  and  knew  he  mull 
 foon  die,  and  then  it  was  wifely  done  to  ufe  all  the  means  he 
 cou'd  to  put  himfelf  out  of  love  with  Life,  as  that  makes 
 Death  more  itx{y. 
 
 But  zdly,  I  obferv'd  before  that  Caufes  lofe  their  Efficacy 
 at  a  diftance,  now  the  Pleafures  of  Life  are  paft  long  ago  with 
 old  Men,  and  the  Inconvenicncies  of  Age  upon  them,  no 
 wonder  then  that  thofc  dillant  Pleafurs  do  not  influence  then^ 
 fo  much  as  to  make  them  defirous  of.Iiving  their  whole  Lives 
 over  again  for  the  fake  of  them  :  which  is  alfo  a  great  Provi- 
 dence to  perfons  that  are  necefTarily  Mortal,  and  feems  the 
 only  way  of  reconciling^  them  to  Death. 
 
 But  3dly,  The  propofing  to  a  Man  to  Live  his  Life  again  is 
 not  a  motive  equivalent  to  what  is  pail.  A  Man''s  being  igno- 
 rant of  futurity  eafes  him  from  the  anxiety  that  the  Knowledge 
 4)f  the  unfortunate  Parts  would  raife  in  him,  and  leaves  him 
 at  liberty  to  hope  the  beft  ;  which  is  a  great  part  of  the  Hap- 
 pir.efsof  Life.  Eyt  when  we  ofler  him  to  live  the  fame  Life 
 over  again,  we  cut  ofi  all  his  Hopes,  dcilroy  the  agreeable 
 Novelfy  of  the  good  Parts,  and  give  him  only  a  profped  of  the 
 
 uncafy 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil  459 
 
 than  by  virtue  of  Eled:ion.  Let  us  weigh  the  tri- 
 fles of  Children,  and  the  ferious  Affairs  of  Men  ; 
 the  Temerity  of  Fools,  and  the  Counfels  of  the 
 Wife;  and  it  will  be  evident  almoft  in  all  of  them 
 that  they  are  neither  determin'd  by  Reafon  nor  Na- 
 ture, but  pleafe  by  Eledion  only  '^.  This,  among 
 other  things,  may  appear  from  the  Diverfions  of 
 Cards  and  Dice.  Norhing  is  more  agreeable  to  all, 
 or  pleafes  more  ;  but  upon  no  other  account,  if  we 
 examine  it  thoroughly,  than  becaufe  we  will  be  thus 
 employ'd. 
 
 Nay  that  dire  Lujl  of  Rule  wich  bewitches  mor- 
 tal Minds,  and  tranfports  them  beyond  themfelves, 
 which  cannot  be  fatisfy'd  unlcfs  the  whole  World 
 \}Q  fubdued;,  and  even   not  then  j    this  neither  re- 
 ceives 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 lineafy  Paflages  that  he  muft  meet  with  in  it :  all  which  mufi; 
 make  his  Life  a  thing  quite  different  from  what  it  was  when  he 
 iirfl;  lived  it.  But  if  we  would  propofc  to  a  Man  of  fixty  Years 
 to  lengthen  his  I,ife  for  fixty  more  with  the  fame  ftrength  and 
 vigour  he  had  at  twenty,  and  let  him  take  his  Chance,  I  doubt 
 if  one  in  a  million  would  refufe  the  offer. 
 
 Laff ly ;  let  us  fuppofe  that  a  Man  has  lived  happily  many 
 Years,  and  at  length  falling  intofome  great  Misfortune  or  grie- 
 vous Pain  difpatches  himfelf  This  does  not  prove  that  he 
 thinks  the  Life  God  hath  given  no  benefit,  or  worfe  than 
 Death;  but  only  that  the  fmall  and  miferable  part  which  re- 
 mains to  him  is  not  worth  the  living.  A  Man  has  a  Veffel  of 
 good  Wine  which  he  drinks  with  Pleafure  to  the  Dregs,  then 
 throws  them  out.  Will  any  one  conclude  from  thence  that 
 the  Man  thinks  a  Veffel  of  Wine  no  valuable  prefent  ?  And 
 yet  this  is  exactly  the  Cafe  of  fuch  Self  murderers. 
 
 From  the  whole  I  think  it  manifeft  that  Life,  fuch  as  it  is, 
 is  a  valuable  Good,  and  confequently  fit  to  be  beftowed  on  us 
 by  a  good  God.  As  is  it  has  more  Good  than  Evil  in  it. 
 'tis  plain  we  are  obliged  to  him  that  gave  it ;  and  it  is  a  very 
 wicked  and  ungrateful  thing  for  any  one  to  pretend  the  Con- 
 trary. 
 
 *  See  7mrs  of  this  in  Se6t.  1.  Sub.  5.  par.  11,  12,  ^c. 
 
if6o  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 ccives  its  Origin  nor  Approbation  from  Nature  or 
 any  innate  Appetite. 
 
 But  the  force  of  Eleftion  is  never  more  apparent 
 than  in  fome  Men's  infatiable  Avarice,    and  conti- 
 nual Study  to  heap  up  unprofitable  Riches,  for  no 
 ufe,  no  end,  but   to  fatis fy  their  Choice.     Behold 
 the  covetous  Man  brooding  over  his  Gold;  a  Curfe 
 to  his  Relations,  a  Jcft  to  his  Neighbours,  a  Re- 
 proach  to    Nature;    depriving    himfelf  of  Food, 
 Sleep,    Reft,    and   other   Neceffaries,  and   yet    ap- 
 plauding himfelf  flill.     Why  do  thefe  things  pleafe 
 which  are  fo  natural,  fo  abfur'd,    fo  prepofterous  ? 
 Can  they    be  explain'd  otherwife  than    from    this 
 Principle  that  we  are  pleafed  with  what  we  choofe  \ 
 This  is  ftill  felt  and  purfu'd,  tho'  he  that  does  this 
 be  not  confcious  that  he  is  doing  it,  nor  does  he  ob- 
 ferve  what  it  is  which  pleafes  him.     It  is  not  there- 
 fore the  Diredion  of  the  Senfes,  or  the  Impulfe  of 
 Animal  Nature  only,  which  tranfporrs  us  into  Vi- 
 ces and  unlawful  Ad:s  \    thefe  are  commonly  done 
 againft  the  Remonftrance  of  thofe  Appetites  which 
 are  implanted  by  Nature,  againft  the  Remonftrance 
 of  Senfe  and  Inftinft,    no  lefs  than    Rcafon,    and 
 the  leaft  Crime  we  commit  is  in  obeying  them.    We 
 may  learn  then,  to  our  great  Misfortune,    that  we 
 are  not  entirely  driven   by  the  Impetus  of  Animal 
 Nature,   and  that  this  Power  of  pleafing  ourfelves 
 by  Eledion  does  not  lie  idle ;  but  rattier  that  it  is 
 the  too  great  and  inordinate  ufe  of  it  which  tranf- 
 ports  us  into  Wickednefs. 
 Eleaions       VII.  As  to  the  third  Objeftion,  viz.  that  the  Cor- 
 proQuce     Yuption  of  Mankind  is  almoft  univerfat,    it  is  to  be 
 cf^^'^^    oblerved  in  the  firft  place,    that  Ele(9;ions  produce 
 the  Moral  the  fame  effed  in  the  Moral,   as  motion  does  in  the 
 World  as   Natural  World  :  neither  is  it  any  more  to  be   ex- 
 Motion     peded  that  in  our  prefent  State  all  Elections  fhould 
 ^°^m"*,    be  confiftcnt  and  uniform,   than  that   all  Motions 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  461 
 
 flioiild  be  fo.  Now  as  contrariety  of  Motion  is  a 
 necefTary  Caufe  of  Natural  Corruption,  fo  the  in- 
 terfering ofEIedions  is  of  Vice  or  Moral  Corrup- 
 tion. God  could  indeed  take  away  both,  viz..  by 
 deftroying  Motion  and  free  Choice  ,•  but  while  thefe 
 are  permitted,  neither  of  the  Evils  could  be  prevent- 
 ed in  the  prefent  State  of  things. 
 
 VIII.  Secondly,  We  may  obferve  that  things  are  rp^^. 
 conneded  together,    and  have  a  mutual  dependence  are  con- 
 on  each  other,  on  this  account,  as  Machines  which  nefted  to- 
 require  the  moft  Workmanfhip  may  be  flopped  or  gether, 
 
 di (ordered  by  the  dtk&,  of  a  fingle  Nail  or  Wheel :  r"^  ?■  ^^" 
 fo  the  Error  or  Offence  of  one  Man  puts  the  rati-  afteasm"- 
 onal  Syftem  or  Society  of  Mankind  out  of  order.  nyothers> 
 Any   Perfon,    by  almoft  one  fingle  free  Ad,    may 
 deftroy  a  Houfe  or  Ship,  nay  a  City  or  a  Fleet  by 
 Fire  or  Wreck.     Any  King  or  Governor  can,   by 
 an  eafy  and  fi  ee  Ad,  overwhelm  v/hole  Nations  with 
 War,  Rapine,    Slaughter  and  Villany.      A  Father 
 may  beget  Sons,  who  being  yet  unborn,  are  fure  of 
 inheriting  his  Difcafes  and  Infirmities  as  well  as  his 
 Goods.     Nor  could  it  be  otherwife  while  the  Nature 
 and  Condition  of  Men  and  of  the  Earth  are  fuch 
 as  we  experience  them  to  be.     Either  therefore  Li- 
 berty and  the  Connexion  of  things  muft  be  dellroy- 
 ed,  or  thefe  Evils  tolerated. 
 
 IX.  Thirdly,    'Tis  certain  that  God  does  not  Vice  and 
 permit  any  bad  Eleftions,  but  fuch  as  may  be  re-  Wicked-^ 
 conciled  with  the  Good  of  the  whole  Syftem,  and  ^^f^'  ^^^ 
 has  digefted  and  ordered  every  thing  in  Inch  a  man-  j,,  them- 
 ner,   that  thefe  very  Faults  and  Vices  fhall  tend  ro  fclves,  Ao 
 the  Good  of  the  whole.      For  as  in  Mufick,  Dif-  not  impair 
 cbrds    if  heard   fepaiately,    grate   and    offend   the  ^^^  ^^f^J 
 Ear  with  harllmefs,    but    when   mix'd  in    confort  |yj,ojJ 
 "with  other  Notes,  make  the  more  fweet  and  agree- 
 able Harmony ;   in  like  manner   bad  Eledions,  if 
 confider'd  alone,    are   look'd    upon  as  odious  and 
 
 de'reflable. 
 
462  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 deteftable,  but  compared  with  the  v/hole  Syftem, 
 they  promote  and  increaie  the  Good  and  Beauty  of 
 the  whole.  For  when  they  are  temper'd  they  be- 
 come medicinal  to  each  other  by  that  very  Contra- 
 riety, and  thofe  which  would  poifon  feparate,  when 
 mix'd  become  a  Remedy. 
 
 For  inftancc,  One  by  a  depraved  Choice  raifes 
 an  immenfe  Sum  of  Money,  and  a  vaft  Eftate,  and 
 either  the  fame  Perfon  or  his  Heir,  by  his  Vanity 
 and  Profufenefs,  compenfates  for  what  he  had  ac- 
 quir'd  by  his  Extortion,  and  perhaps  does  as  much 
 Good  by  fquandering  away  his  ill-gotten  Wealth 
 to  the  moft  idle  Purpofcs,  as  if  he  had  beflow'd 
 all  upon  the  Poor.  For  he  applies  a  Spur  to  In- 
 duftry,  whereas  he  would  otherwife  afford  an  han- 
 dle to  Sloth.  The  rich  Man  offends  in  Luxury 
 and  Idlenefs  :  the  Poor  tran^greffes  no  lefs  by  too 
 much  Labour  and  Solicitude,  which  he  indulges 
 perhaps  for  no  other  End  than  to  provide  Inftru- 
 ments  of  Luxury  for  the  Rich  :  but  each  of  them 
 pleafes  himfelf  in  his  Choice,  and  'tis  almofl  the 
 fame  thing  with  refpeCr  to  the  benefit  of  the  Uni- 
 verfe,  as  if  one  had  converted  to  pious  Ufes  what 
 he  fpent  in  Luxury,  and  the  other  had  labour'd 
 moderately  to  provide  only  what  was  uTeful.  The 
 fame  almoft  may  be  faid  of  all  Vices,  they  are  pre- 
 judicial, but  only  to  the  Criminals  themfelves,  or 
 thofe  that  deferve  to  fuffer  ,•  nay  they  are  often  be- 
 neficial to  others ;  and  fo  long  as  the  whole  comes 
 to  no  harm,  'tis  fit  to  allow  every  one  the  ufe  of 
 his  own  Will,  and  let  them  fuffer  for  their  Sin.  God 
 could  indeed  cut  off  all  Occafion  of  Sin,  by  tdcing 
 away  free  Ele<5i:ions :  But  it  is  plain  that  this  would 
 be  far  from  an  Advantage  to  intelligent  Agents. 
 *Tis  our  Bufmefs  to  prevent  bad  Eledions,  and  if 
 we  will  not,  we  fuffer  for  our  Folly :    But  God 
 
 will 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  463 
 
 will  procure  the  Good  of  the  whole  by  our  Folly 
 no  lefs  than  by  our  Wifdcm.  (80.)    ' 
 
 X.  If 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (80.)  We  may  add,  and  by  our  Sin  no  lefs  than  by  our 
 ^ighteoufnefs.  Thus  it  may  be  laid  in  a  good  Senfe  that  private 
 ^wj  (as  well  as  private  Misfortune?)  ohenhecomo.  public  Bencjits, 
 tho'  the  Authors  be  no  lefs  liable  to  Puniflimcnt.  But  it  will 
 be  objedlcd,  that  this  makes  Vice  to  be  necellary  for  the  Pub- 
 lic Good,  and  therefore  to  be  no  Vice  at  all,  nor  confequently 
 punifhable.  For  a  tendency  or  oppofition  to  the  general  Hap- 
 pincfs  of  our  Syftem,  is  the  very  Nature  and  ElTcnce  of  Vir- 
 tue or  Vice :  If  then  Vv-hat  is  call'd  my  Wickednefs  tends  to  the 
 Good  of  the  World,  how  can  I  be  punillied  for  it  ?  And  if 
 my  Aftion  promotes  the  Glory  of  God,  nvhy  doth  he  yet  find- 
 fault  ?  We  anfwer,  Vice  naturally  and  in  general  tends  to  the 
 Mifery  of  any  Syftem  ;  fo  that  if  «// were  vicious,  all  would 
 be  wretched  ;  and  on  the  contrary,  if  every  one  were  virtu- 
 ous, all  muft  be  happy  ;  to  Le  vicious  and  to  be  productive  of 
 Pain  or  Milery,  would  then  be  convertible  terms  But  in  a 
 mix'd  irregular  State,  Vk'herc  fome  purfue  the  Rules  of  Virtue 
 and  others  do  not,  the  Cafe  is  very  much  alter'd,  there  Pain 
 or  Evil,  and  fuch  Adlions  as  produce  it,  may  often  be  the 
 moll  proper  means  to  remedy  fome  greater  Evil,  or  procure 
 fome  fuperior  Good  ;  to  reform  a  Vice,  or  improve  a  Virtue  ; 
 in  which  Cafe,  tho'  that  way  of  afting  which  in  general  tends 
 to  Milery,  happens  to  be  produftive  of  fome  real  Happinefs 
 which  could  not  have  been  produced  without  it,  yet  this  is  not 
 fufficient  to  excufc  or  juflify  it,  nor  is  it  fo  muck  the  confe- 
 quence  of  its  own  Nature,  and  attributable  to  its  immediate 
 Author,  as  an  effcft  of  the  fuperintendency  of  fome  other 
 Agent,  who  applies  it,  and  makes  it  inftrumental  to  fome  End 
 of  his  own  ;  who  brings  Good  out  of  Evil,  or  from  the  Evil 
 takes  occaiion  to  do  flill  more  Good  than  he  could  be  conceived 
 to  have  done  without  that  Evil. 
 
 All  this  I  think  may  be  fuppofed  of  God,  and  yet  the  dif- 
 ferent Natures  of  Good  and  Evil  continue  fix'd.  Man, 
 who  cannot  fee  all  the  Confequences  and  Connection  of 
 things,  muft  be  obliged  to  fome  general  Rules  of  acting,  and 
 whenever  he  deviates  from  thefe  Rules  he  doesamifs;  at  lead 
 when  he  intends  to  aft  againft  the  very  Endoi  thcfe  Rules,  /.  e. 
 the  general  Good,  he  evidently  lins,  let  the  Confequence  of 
 his  Adls  be  what  it  will.  Thus  the  Atlions  of  a  Man  may- 
 be often  morally  Evil  to  himfelf,  tho'    they  prove  naturally 
 
 Good 
 
464 
 
 If  this  be 
 apply'd  to 
 particular 
 Cafes,  it 
 accounts 
 for  the 
 univcrfal 
 Corrupt!- 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.         Ghap.  V. 
 
 X,  If  this  be  true,  it  is  a  fufficient  Vindication 
 of  the  JDivine  Goodnefs,  notvvithdanding  fuch  a 
 plentiful  Crop  of  Vices  be  permitted,-  nor  need 
 we  infift  upon  a  longer  enquiry  how  this  may  be 
 applied  to  particular  Cafes ;  for  whether  this  Cor- 
 ruption vas  occafion'd  by  the  Fail  of  our  jirji  Pa- 
 rents as  Truth  itfelf  declares,  or  by  any  other 
 Caufe  whatever,  'tis  certain  that  God  would  never 
 have  permitted  it,  if  it  could  have  been  prevented 
 without  greater  Damage  to  the  whole.     (8i.)  We 
 
 may 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 Good  to  fome  others :  they  may  proceed  from  a  bad  Intention 
 in  him,  or  he  may  be  a  TranfgrefTor  by  acting  againll  his  Rule ; 
 and  tho'  God  may  have  an  occafion  o'i  Glorifying  himfelf  there- 
 by, of  difplaying  his  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  ^c.  to  a  higher 
 degree  than  they  could  otherwife  have  been  exhibited ;  and 
 therefore  may  reafonably  permit  the  Actions  of  this  Man,  and 
 convert  them,  either  to  the  Punilhment  and  Corrcftion  of 
 himfelf  or  other  Sinners,  or  to  the  BlelTing  of  fome  righteous 
 Perfons;  yet  the  immediate  Author  is  nevcrthelefs  accountable 
 both  to  God  and  Man  for  fuch  his  Aftions.  Inftances  of  tliis 
 Jcind  are  innumerable,  and  may  be  fecn  in  Sherlock  on  Provi' 
 dence.  See  particularly  what  is  required  from  God's  Goodnefs 
 in  a  State  of  Difcipline.  p  221,  224,  230,  i^c.  2d  Edit,  or  in 
 Simplicins  on  Epifietui,  p.  83   4th  Ed.  Lofid.  1670. 
 
 What  has  been  faid  here  only  relates  to  God's  permittingVlQ- 
 ral  Evil,  fo  far  as  it  is  a  means  of  fome  prepollent  Good. 
 
 Mr.  Colliber,  in  his  Impartial  Enquiry,  ifjc.  carries  the 
 Matter  farther,  and  fuppofes  that  God  may  for  the  general 
 Good  decree  fome  fuch  Ads  as  may  be  morally  Evil ;  which 
 I  can  fee  no  reafon  or  ncceffity  for  fuppofing.  How  he  en- 
 deavours to  make  this  out  and  reconcile  it  with  the  Holinefs 
 and  Jujlice  of  the  Deity,  may  be  feen  in  Part  i .  Ch.  1 1 .  prop. 
 9.  p.  94,  i^c. 
 
 (8  i  )  Perhaps  fuch  a  Scheme  as  this  of  the  Fall  appears  to 
 be,  from  the  Reprefentation  given  of  it  and  its  eftcds  iu 
 Scripture,  was  neceffary  to  make  us  duly  fenfiblc  of  the  Na- 
 ture of  Good  and  Evil,  to  acquaint  us  more  fully  with  the 
 Mor.U  Perfeftions  of  the  Deity  (which  could  not  have  been 
 fo  clearly  exhibited  to  us  if  there  had  never  been  any  room  for 
 tiie  Kxcrclfc  of  them)  and  confcqucntly  lo  bring  us  to  an  Inii- 
 
 tatio-J 
 
Sea.  5.  -Sub  6,     Of  Moral  Evil.  465 
 
 mjy  wonder  indeed   that  almoft  all    Mankind  are 
 polluted  in  Wickednefs,  and  that  God  puts  no  flop 
 
 to 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 mltation  of  thefe  Perfeftions,  and  thereby  to  the  gfeateil  and 
 moil  refined  Happinefs  that  our  better  part  is  capable  of.  Mari 
 (as  we  obferv'd  In  Note  89.)  is  a  very  im perfect:  compound 
 Being,  who,  by  the  conftitution  of  his  Nature,  feems  inca- 
 pable of  being  made  truly  wife  and  virtuous,  or  which  is  the 
 fame  thing,  morally  happy  on  a  fudden,  he  mull  therefore  re- 
 ceive Improvement  gradually,  and  as  he  is  to  compleat  his 
 good  Habits  by  a  Series  of  virtuous  Ads,  fo  it  feems  proper 
 for  him  to  be  train'd  up  by  various  Difpenfations,  and  a  Series 
 of  Events  adapted  to  the  feveral  Faculties  of  his  Body  and 
 Mind,  the  various  conllituent  Parts  of  his  Nature,  and  diffe- 
 rent Sources  of  his  Happinefs :  accordingly  we  find  that  tiiC 
 Happinefs  of  Man  in  his  firft  Eflate  was  chiefly  Jnimal,  to 
 which  an  Earthly  Paradife  was  exquifitely  fitted;  a  Change  in 
 this  was  probably  requifite  to  introduce  the  rational  ox  moral 
 kind  into  the  World,  and  to  make  him  diredl  his  Thoughts  to 
 fomething  higher  than  mere  fenfitive  Delights.  This  we  are 
 told  was  the  Method  of  Divine  Providence  with  the  Jeivijh 
 Nation  in  particular,  who  had  a  Law  of  Carnal  Ordinances  to 
 exeicife  them  for  a  while,  and  lead  them  on  to  the  Expedla- 
 tion  of  better  things  ;  to  fpiritualize  their  Notions  by  Degrees, 
 and  prepare  them  for  the  Heavenly  Doflrines  of  MeJJiah.  And 
 why  might  not  the  like  Method  be  made  ufe  of  in  the  Govern- 
 ment of  Mankind  in  general,  or  even  all  rational  Beings  ?  ' 
 What  if  God,  willing  to  make  k'  ov/n  the  greater  Riches  of 
 his  Glory,  fufFer'd  our  firft  Parents  to  fall  foon  from  that  Con- 
 dition wherein  he  created  them  at  firll,  in  order  to  raife  them 
 and  their  Poflerity  to  a  much  higher  State  of  Glory  and  true 
 Happinefs  after?  And  who  can  prove  that  the  former  was  not 
 conducive  to  the  latter?  We  believe  that  the  Blifs  of  Heaven 
 will  infinitely  exceed  the  Pleafures  of  a  Terreftrial  Eden  ; 
 why  then  fhowld  we  not  fuppofe  that  the  lefs  might  be  in  fome 
 manner  ufeful  and  introdiidlory  to  the  greater  ?  Why  might 
 not  a  fhort  Life  in  Paradife  be  as  proper  a  State  of  Probation 
 for  the  Virtues  of  this  preient  World,  as  this  World  is  for  the 
 Glories  of  another  ?  There  is  a  Paflage  concerning  Paradife  ii\ 
 Sco//'s  Chriftian  Life  *  which  confirms  this  Notion  :  But  it  is 
 the  moil  fully  explain'd  by  Mr.  D'Oyly  in  hisjirji  Dijertation^ 
 H  h     '  '  C.  3, 
 
 '[^.j  Vol,  I.  p.  26, 
 
466  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 to  the  Progrefs  of  thofe  Vices  which  deform  his 
 Work  3  but  in  reality  this  is  no  more  to  be  won- 
 
 der'd 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 C,  3  31,  l^c.  I  fliall  tnnfcribe  io  much  as  may  be  necefTary 
 to  fhew  his  general  Defign.  "  If  we  confider  our  Nature  as 
 "  it  came  in  Innocence  out  of  the  hand  of  its  Creator,  God 
 "  forefaw  how  very  foon  it  would  fall  from  its  primitive  Puri- 
 "  ty,  and  therefore  defign'd  it  farther  for  a  much  happier  State, 
 "  raifed  and  refined  by  a  clearer  and  more  extenfive  Manifejla- 
 "  tion  of  himfelF:  But  had  it  flood,  the  Reward  fat  leaft  as  far 
 *'  as  we  know)  would  have  been  the  indefea'able  PofTeffion  of 
 "  Paradife  in  this  World,  the  enjoying  of  an  immortal  Life 
 *'  here  on  Earth,  chequer'd  as  it  were  with  Spiritual  and  Sen- 
 "  fitive,  or  Animal  Pleafures.  And  for  their  Conduft  in  that 
 **  State  God  feems  to  have  left  them  (one  or  two  Inftanccs 
 *'  excepted)  under  the  Direftion  of  the  Lavj  of  Nature,  the 
 "  Spiritual  or  Religious  Part  of  which  taught  them  to  look  up 
 **  to  him  as  the  Creator  of  the  World,  the  Lord  and  Author 
 •'  of  their  Being  ;  and  to  fear  and  obey  him  as  their  Almighty 
 *'  Sovereign.  The  C/i;// part  of  it  furnifh'd  them  with  right 
 *'  Reafon,  di£lating  what  was  neceflary  to  be  done  in  order 
 *'  to  their  well  being  in  this  World.  So  that  had  they  flood, 
 *'  their  Happinefs  would  probably  have  been — what  that  of 
 **  Mandkind  was  afterwards —  z  m\xX.nrcoi  rational  2,\\^fc7iji' 
 *'  tii'e  or  bodily  Enjoyments.  And  as  to  any  Knowledge  of 
 *'  God,  farther  than  that  now  mentioned;  it  may,  I  conceive, 
 <*  be  thought  reafonable  to  prefume  that  they  had  the  fame 
 *'  awful  fenfe  of  his  Fcracity  as  of  any  other  Attribute  ;  and 
 *'  yet  how  very  eafily  were  they  wrought  into  a  Belief  by  the 
 "  firfi;  Story  they  heard,  and  from  they  knew  not  whom, 
 "  that  he  had  z&.tdcolluji'vely  in  barring  them  the  Fruit  of  the 
 "  Ti-ee  of  Knonx:ledge,  deilgning  by  it  only  to  keep  them  down 
 ''  under  the  Veil  of  Ignorance,  aud  that  there  was  no  fuch 
 '«  imminent  Danger  of  Death  confequent  to  their  tailing  it, 
 '«  as  they  were  at  firft  made  to  believe?  Whatever  fuch  Know- 
 "  ledge  therefore  we  fuppofc  them  to  have  had,  it  may  be 
 •'  doubted,  its  ImpreiTions  were  not  vivid  and  forcible  enough 
 *'  to  influence  their  Wills  to  fuitable  Efforts  in  louing  and^/^vz- 
 **  wAg- fteadily  to  him:  fince  no  one  can  love  whom  he  does 
 "  not  believe,  and  without  Faith  'tis  as  impoflible  to  lo've  as  to 
 *'  pleafe  God:  So  that  thofe  Impreffions  could  not  confequent- 
 **  ly  be  very  inilrumental  in  making  an  Addition  to  their 
 "  Happinefs,  as  has  beea  fhewn  above.     Nay  as  to  Jdam  him- 
 
 ''  feJf 
 
Sea  S,    S';b.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil;  '  467 
 
 dcr'd  ar,  than  that  this  inferior  World  is  by  Mo* 
 
 tion   univerfally   lubjeded   to   natural  Corruption. 
 
 H  h  2  For 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 "  felfin  particular,  it  may  perhaps  fecm  reafonable  to  think 
 "  he  had  not  that  profound  Reverence  and  awful  regard  for  the 
 "  Div^ine  Majeity  which  he  might  juftly  have  been  expedled 
 "  to  exprefs,  (tho'  not  under  the  Circumftances  of  a  Criminal) 
 "  fince  after  the  Fait  committed,  he  fecms  attempting  to  fcreen 
 "  his  Guilt,  even  by  throwing  the  blame  obliquely  upon  God 
 "  himfelf,  where  he  anfwcrs.  The  Woman  whom  Thou  gaveil 
 "  to  be  with  me,  flie  gave  me  of  the  Tree  and  I  did  eat  [^■]-" 
 
 The  Author  proceeds  to  enquire  into  the  State  of  Religion 
 in  the  Antedeluvian  World,  the  Patriarchal  Ages,  and  dowu 
 to  the  Jevjijh  Difpenlation,  and  fhews  that  Mankind  could  not 
 from  the  Works  of  Creation  and  Providence  alone  (which  yet 
 were  their  only  means  of  Knowledge)  have  fo  extenfive  and 
 perfect  a  Knowledge  of  God  as  was  requifite  to  advance  their 
 Happinefs  properly  'io  call'd,  as  rational  Agents,  to  any  con- 
 fiderable  Degree;  nor  confequently  to  be  the  foundation  of  a 
 Worfhip  worthy  of  him.  From  whence  he  concludes,  "  The 
 "  Faculties  of  our  rational  Nature  mull  have  lain  dormant  and 
 "  ufelefs  as  to  the  greateft  Happinefs  it  was  capable  of  attaining 
 *'  by  the  Exercife  of  them  ;  and  as  to  the  higheft  Honour  and 
 "  moft  exalted  Worfhip  it  was  in  itfelf  qualify'd  to  pay  to  the 
 "  Divine  Majefty,  unlefs  he  had  pleas'd  to  make  provifion  for 
 *'  the  hxthcr  Manifefiation  or  himfelf :  which,  in  what  man- 
 *'  ner  he  has  in  his  infinite  Wifdon  and  Goodnefs  "determined 
 "  to  effedt,  will  appear  by  laying  open  the  moil  adnjantageom 
 "  Changes  which  have  been  made  as  to  thefe  and  other  refpecls, 
 *'  by  the  appearance  oi  Chr'iji  in  the  Flejh.  For  if  it  be  fhewn, 
 "  that  by  that  amazing  Tranfaftion  he  has  fo  difplay'd  the  in- 
 "  finite  Excellencies  and  Perfections  of  his  Nature,  as  to  give 
 *'  the  utmoil  poflible  Scope  to  the  whole  rational  Creation,  to 
 "  exert  their  noblell  Faculties,  and  llrain  them  up  to  the  moll 
 *'  exalted  aflonifhing  Thoughts  of,  and  feraphical  De-voiion  to 
 *'  him:  if  farther  he  has  thereby  apply'd  the  molt  proper  and 
 "  forcible  means  to  reftify  the  Moral  Errors,  reform  the  Vices, 
 *'  and  overcome  the  daring  Wickednefs  of  Mankind ;  and  laftly, 
 •'  if  it  be  fhewn  that  he  has  done  all  this  in  fuch  a  manner 
 *'  that  it  could  not  have  been  effected  to  fo  great  Ad-vantage  any 
 *'  other  way,  then  will  it  be  demonllratively  evident,  that 
 *'  whereas  he  forefaw  from  all  Eternity,  that  Man  whom  he 
 
 t\  had 
 
 {h-l  Differ t.  i.  p-  33. 
 
46B  Of  Moral  Evil.  Chap.  Y. 
 
 For  as  Contrariety  of  Motions  neceffarily  works  a 
 Change  in  folid  and  heterogeneous  Bodies,  and  tranf- 
 pofes  them  into  another  Form  and  Condition,  whence 
 neceffarily  proceed  DifTolution  and  Concretion,  Cor- 
 ruption and  Generation  :  In  like  manner  free  Choice 
 neceffarily  adminifters  occafion  of  Sin  to  Agents  en- 
 dow'd  with  an  imperfed  Underftanding,  and  ob- 
 noxious to  PafjTions  and  Affedions.  And  as  in  the 
 natural  World  the  Corruption  and  Contagion  of  one 
 thing  extends  itfelf  to  others,  and  acquires  Strength 
 by  fpreading ;  fo  alfo  in  the  moral  if  Eledion  once 
 deviate  to  Evil,  the  Poifon  is  diffufed  along  with  it, 
 and  feizes  and  infeds  all  about  it. 
 
 But 
 
 k or E  s, 
 
 «*  had  decreed  to  create  would  abufe  his  natural  Liberty,  and 
 "  fo,  being  tempted,  fall  into  Sin  :  There  was  infinite  reafon 
 "  on  this  account  why  he  might  have  pleas'd  alib  in  his  infi- 
 *'  nite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  to  have  decreed  to  permit  it, 
 "  thereby  to  open  a  way  for  the  rtupendous  Manifefiation  of 
 *'  himfelf,  as  above  exprefs'd.  And  particularly  ,—  that  by 
 **  what  follow'd  from  it,  Mankind  might  become  capable  of 
 **  attaining  i^i^x  greater  Happinefs  than  they  would  have  been-, 
 *'  had  our  firft  Parents  continued  innocent."  p.  43. 
 
 How  this  Author  makes  out  tlie  fore  mentioned  Par-ticulars 
 may  be  feen  in  the  remainder  of  his  Dijfcrtation. 
 
 See  alfo  Dr.  Jenkin  on  the  fame  Subjeft  {c.'\ 
 
 Now  this  is  not,  as  Bayh  objedfs  [^.]  *'  To  compare  the 
 «'  Deity  to  a  Father  who  ihould  fufFer  his  Children  to  break 
 "  their  Legs,  on  purpofe  to  fliew  to  all  the  City  his  great  Art 
 «'  in  fetting  their  broken  Bones.  Or  to  a  King  who  fhould 
 *•  fuffer  Seditions  and  Fadions  to  encrcafe  thro'  all  his  King- 
 *'  dom,  that  he  might  purchafe  the  Glory  of  quelling  them." 
 But  rather  like  ?  King  who  permits  fome  of  his  Subjeds  to  put 
 their  feditious  Defigns  in  practice,  and  to  promote  a  Revolt, 
 in  order  to  illuftrate  his  Wifdom,  Power  and  Goodnefs  more 
 fully  in  reducing  them  to  their  Duty,  and  to  convince  them 
 more  clearly  of  the  Expedience  and  abfolute  Necellity  of  obey- 
 ing him,  and  thereby  to  confirm  them,  or  at  leaft  all  the  reft 
 
 of 
 
 {f.]    'ReafonablenefsofChriJlianity,  zd  vol.  C.  12, 
 
 [^j  Crit,  Dia.  p.  2488. 
 
Sc6t.  S-  ^^^'  ^'     ^f  ^°^-^^  ^vil.  469 
 
 But  yet  both  natural  and   moral  Corruption  have 
 
 their    Bounds,    neither  does  God  permit  them  to 
 
 fpreid  farther  than  is  conducive  to  the  Good  of  the 
 
 whole  ^.    It  may  feem  ftrange  to  us  that  hefufFers 
 
 H  h  5  both 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 of  hig  Subjefts,  in  a  well  grounded  Obedience  to  his  Govern- 
 rnent,  in  which  their  Happinefs  entirely  confifts:  Or  like  4 
 Father  that  finding  his  Children  obllinately  difobedient,  fuf- 
 fers  them  fometimes  to  wander  aflray,  and  fall  into  fome  Dan- 
 gers and  Inconveniencies,  and  lets  them  fmart  under  the  Mifery 
 which  they  bring  upon  themfelves,  in  order  to  make  them 
 more  fenfible  of  their  need  of  his  Affiftance  and  Diredlion,  an4 
 thereby  more  dependent  on  him  for  the  future,  and  morefub- 
 je6t  to  him,  and  therefore  more  fure  of  Happinefs.  This  Com- 
 parifon  is  well  explained  by  Sherlock  on  P ronjidencey  Chap.  7. 
 p.  262. 
 
 Hence  it  will  appear  that  we  have  reafon  to  fuppofe  that 
 the  Fall  of  Man  from  Earthly  and  Animal  Delights,  was  de» 
 fign'd  to  raife  him  to  a  Rational  and  Heavenly  State  of  Happi- 
 nefs, and  to  make  way  for  fuch  a  wonderful  Difplay  of  all  the 
 Divine  Attributes  in  that  Expedient,  as  could  not  have  been 
 exhibited  at  all,  or  not  in  fo  high  a  Degree  without  it  i  anci 
 cpnfequently  that  this  Method  was  the  very  beft  even  for  our 
 oiin  Syfteni.  But  if  this  Suppofition  feem  improbable,  orin- 
 fufficient,  yet  why  may  not  all  the  Mifery  in  this  Syftem  of 
 ours  promote  and  encreal'e  the  Happinefs  of  fome  others  [?.]  ? 
 We  have  good  reafon  to  believe  that  there  is  fome  Connedioa 
 between  the  different  Syflems  of  the  Univerfe  ;  but  have  fmall 
 ground  to  imagine  ours  the  beft,  why  then  may  it  not  be  fub- 
 lervient  to  a  better  ?  This  indeed  is  only  Conjedture  ;  howe- 
 ver, I  think  it  would  be  no  eafy  Matter  to  confute  it ;  till 
 which  be  done,  we  may  very  fafely  conclude  with  our  Author, 
 that  the  Fall  it/elf,  as  well  as  all  the  Sin  and  Mifery  confequent 
 upon  it,  cou'd  not  have  been  prevented  without  greater  dy- 
 trimcnt  to  the  whole  :  and  ojie  may  fay  the  fame  of  Eve  as 
 the  Poet  did  of  the  hand  o{  Mutius  Scdvola  :  Si  non  erraffe^, 
 jHcccat  ilia  mi?iu5  [/^  j- 
 
 *  See  Sherlock  on  Pto'videtice,  Ch.  7.  p.  261.  2d  Edit,  ani 
 Scott'i  Chrijlian  Life,  V.  2.  C.  4.  par.  3.  p.  318,  ^V.  8<i;<?, 
 
 \e.']  See  Note  80. 
 
 [/]  See  Leibnitz  EJJais  de  Theodicee,  Part  3.  §.  239.  Con- 
 cerning the  Manner  of  the  Fall.  See  the  firft  7  Chapters  oi  Re- 
 rf  elation  examiiidiKii^h  Candour,  ox  the  Univerfal  Hijiory  C.  3. 
 
47<>  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 both  of  them  to  wander  over  this  World  of  ours 
 without  Reftraint ;  but  what  is  our  World  to  the 
 whole  Syftem  of  the  UniverCe  ?  How  fmall  a  Part ! 
 how  next  to  nothing  !  Let  this  whole  Earth  of 
 ours  be  ftain'd  with  Corruption  of  both  kinds; 
 fuppofc  it  clouded  and  benighted  with  Darknefs 
 and  Vice,  yet  it  will  be  but  like  a  very  fmall  Spot 
 in  a  very  beautiful  Body,  which  is  fo  far  from  lef- 
 fening,  that  it  cncreafes  the  Comelinefs  and  Beauty 
 of  the  whole.  The  Earth,  notwithflanding  it<;  Ob- 
 fcurity,  has  its  Ufe  and  Place  in  Nature,  which  it 
 could  not  commodioufly  fill  if  thofe  things  which 
 render  it  liable  to  Darkncls  and  Corruption  were 
 removed.  The  (ame  muft  be  faid  of  Men,  they 
 have  their  proper  Ufe  and  Station,  and  in  order  to 
 fill  it  commodioufly,  they  were  to  be  created  of 
 fuch  a  Nature  and  Difpofition  as  might  eafily  be 
 corrupted  with  Vice.  Neither  have  wc  any  more 
 reafon  to  conclude  that  all  free  Agents  ate  involv'd 
 in  Evil  Eleftions,  becaufe  this  happens  almoft  uni- 
 verfally  to  IVIen,  than  that  all  the  Region?  of  the 
 Heavens  are  fubjed  to  the  fame  Changes  that  our 
 Air  is  liable  to.  The  v.'hole  work  of  God  may 
 be  bright  and  beautiful,  tho'  that  Point  which  con- 
 fiitutes  our  World  (eem  by  itfelf  rude  and  una- 
 cforn'd  :  and  tho'  fome  Parts  appear  to  us,  who  have 
 not  a  View  of  the  whole  Contexture,  larger  or 
 lefi  than  the  juft  Proportion  requires,  yet  they  may 
 agree  with  others  in  the  moll:  perfed:  Symetry, 
 Nor  need  we  prefume  upon  the  Divine  Wifdom 
 2nd  Goodne's  in  the  MoraU  any  more  than  in  the 
 Natural  World.  The  Crimes  and  Vices  themfelve? 
 are  very   few  in   comparifon   of  the  free  Agents, 
 
 iA  A.) 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil:  471 
 
 (A  ui.)  and  may  contribute  to  the  Good  of  the 
 
 whole,  no  lefs  than  natural  Corruption  does  to  the 
 
 Hh  4  Preferva- 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 [J  A.)  Concerning  the  prcvalency  of  Moral  Evil  in  the 
 World,  the  Objeftor  is  fo  confident  as  to  declare  that  no  body 
 can  have  the  leaft  doubt  of  it,  and  he  dares  iay  the  Author 
 himfelf  believed  it.  But  the  Author  profeffes  himfelf  to  be  of 
 a  quite  different  Opinion.  He  firmly  believes  and  thinks  he 
 very  well  comprehends  that  there  is  much  more  moral  Good 
 in  the  World,  nay  in  the  Earth,  than  Evil.  He  is  fenfible 
 there  may  be  more  bad  Men,  than  good,  becaufe  there  are 
 none  but  do  amifs  fometimes,  and  one  ill  adl  is  fufiicient  to 
 denominate  a  Man  bad.  But  yet  there  are  ten  good  aits  done 
 by  thofe  we  call  bad  Men  for  one  ill  one.  Even  Perfons  of  the 
 very  worft  Charafter  may  have  got  it  by  two  or  three  flagrant 
 enormities,  which  yet  bear  no  proportion  to  the  whole  Series 
 of  their  Lives.  The  Author  doth  not  know  the  Objeftor,  nor 
 with  whom  he  converfes,  but  he  muft  profcfs  that  among  fuch 
 as  he  is  acquainted  with,  he  believes  there  are  hundreds  that 
 would  do  him  good  for  one  that  would  do  him  hurt,  and  that 
 he  has  rcceiv'd  a  thoufand  good  Offices  for  one  ill  one.  He 
 could  never  believe  the  Doftrine  of  Hobbs  that  all  Men  are 
 Bears,  Wolves  and  Tygers  to  one  another  ;  that  they  are  born 
 Enemies  to  all  others  and  all  others  to  them  ;  that  they  are 
 naturally  falfe  and  perfidious ;  or  that  all  the  good  they  do  is 
 out  of  Fear  not  Virtue.  He  that  defcribes  Mankind  in  this 
 manner  may  give  us  caufe  to  fufpe£t  that  he  himfelf  is  fuch, 
 but  if  Mankind  were  taken  one  by  one  perhaps  not  one  could 
 be  found  in  an  hundred  thoufand  that  could  truly  own  the 
 Charader,  Nay  the  very  Authors  of  this  Calumny,  if  their 
 own  Charatlers  were  call'd  in  Queftion,  would  take  all  pofTible 
 Pains  to  remove  the  Sufpicion  from  them,  and  declare  that 
 they  were  fpeaking  of  the  Vulgar,  of  the  bulk  of  Mankind,  and 
 not  of  themfelves.  Nor  in  reallity  do  they  behave  in  this 
 manner  toward  their  Friends  and  Acquaintance  ;  if  they  did, 
 few  would  own  them.  Obferve  fome  of  thofe  that  exclaim 
 againll  all  Mankind  for  treachery,  diflionelly,  deceit  and  cru- 
 elty, and  you'll  find  them  diligently  cultivating  Friendfhips 
 and  difcharging  the  fevcral  Oflices  due  to  Friends,  Relations 
 and  their  Country,  with  Labour,  Pain,  lofs  of  Goods,  and 
 hazard  of  Life  itfelf :  even  where  there's  no  fear  to  drive  them 
 to  it,  nor  inconvenience  attending  the  negled  of  it.    This 
 
 you'll 
 
472  Of  Moral  Evil.  Ch^p.  V. 
 
 Prefervaiion  of  the  Sydem,     Nay  one  Man's  Fault 
 is  often  corrcdcd  by  the  Vices  of  another,  and  the 
 
 Defoimiry 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 you'll  fay  proceeds  from  Cuftom  and  Education.  Beit  fo: 
 However  theWorld  th;n  h;is  not  (b  far  degenerated  from  Good- 
 jiefs  but  the  greater  Part  of  Mankind  exercife  Benevolence, 
 nor  is  Virtue  fo  far  exiled  as  not  to  be  fupported  and  approved, 
 praifed  and  praCtifed  by  common  Confcnt  and  public  Suffrage 
 and  Vice  :s  llill  dil'graceful.  Indeed  wc  can  (carce  meet  with 
 one,  unleis  prcfs'd  by  neceffity  or  provoked  by  injuries,  who 
 is  fo  b;irbirous  and  hard  hearted  as  not  to  be  mov'd  with  Com- 
 paflion  and  delighted  with  Beneficence  to  others;  who  is  not 
 inclined  to  fhew  Goodwill  and  Kindnefs  to  hi?  Friends, 
 Neighbours,  Children,  Relations  and  diligent  in  the  Difcharge 
 of  civil  Duties  to  all  ;  who  does  not  profefs  fome  regard  tar 
 Virtue,  and  think  himfelf  affronted  when  he  is  charged  with 
 Immorality.  If  any  one  take  notice  of  his  own  or  another's 
 Aftions  for  a  Day  together,  he'll  perliaps  find  one  or  two 
 blameable,  the  rell  alJ  innocent  and  inoffcnfive.  Nay,  'tis 
 doubtful  whether  a  Nero  or  Caligula,  a  Commodus  or  Caracalla 
 [_g.]  (tho'  Monllers  of  Mankind,  and  prone  to  every  a£t  of 
 wickednefs  and  Fury)  have  done  more  ill  than  innocent  Ani- 
 ons thro'  their  whole  Lives. 
 
 'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  in  the  fecond  place,  that  one  great 
 Crime  fuch  as  Murther,  Theft  or  Rapine  is  oftener  talk'd  of 
 more  univerfally  reported,  and  much  longer  remember'd  than 
 a  thonfand  good,  peacealic,  generous  Deeds,  which  make  no 
 noife  in  the  World,  nor  ever  come  to  public  notice,  but  are 
 filently  paffed  by  and  overlooked.  Which  very  thing  fliews 
 that  the  former  arc  more  rare  than  the  latter,  otherwife  they 
 •would  not  be  received  with  fo  much  Surprize,  Horror,  and 
 Aftonifhment. 
 
 3dly,  'Tis  obfervable  that  many  things  are  done  very  inno- 
 cently, which  Perfons  unacquainted  with  the  Views  and  Cir- 
 cumftances  of  the  Adors  eiteem  criminal.  'Tis  certain  we 
 cannot  judge  of  the  goodnefsor  badncfs  of  an  Adion  from  bare 
 Appearances,  but  rather  from  the  inward  Motions  and  Inten- 
 tions of  the  Mind,  and  the  light  in  which  the  thing  appear'd 
 to  the  Agent.  Hero  kill'd  a  Man  that  was  innocent,  but  who 
 knows  whether  he  did  it  out  of  premeditated  MaLcc  ?  Perhaps 
 
 foiije 
 
 ^3  See  Cardan's  Encomiim  of  Ner(f. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  473 
 
 Deformity  ftamp'd  upon  the  Works  of  God  by  the 
 Wickednefs  of  feme,   is  obliterated  by  the  fuper- 
 
 vening 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 fome  entrufted  with  the  care  of  his  Pei-fon,  or  a  flattering 
 Courtier,  whom  he  is  obh'ged  to  depend  on,  inforins  of  this 
 innocent  Man  as  plotting  a  confpiracy  againft  the  Emperor's 
 Life,  and  urges  difpatch  leil  he  be  firfl:  furprized  ;  Perhaps  the 
 Informer  is  impofed  upon  himfelf,  and  thinks  it  real :  'tis  plain 
 fuch  Circumfliances  very  much  lefTen  the  Guilt;  and  it  is  pro- 
 bable if  the  Crimes  of  Princes  were  weighed  impartially,  and 
 the  whole  Procefs  laid  open,  many  things  might  be  offerM 
 which  would  greatly  alleviate  them. 
 
 4thly,  Many  things  are  done  thro'  Ignorance  of  the  Law, 
 and  becaule  thofe  who  commit  them  do  not  know  that  they  are 
 vicious  ;  nay  they  are  often  efteem'd  Virtues.  Thus  St.  Paul 
 perfecuted  the  Church,  and  himfelf  owns  that  he  did  it  out  of 
 ignorance,  and  therefore  obtain'd  Mercy.  How  many  things 
 of  this  kind  are  done  daily  by  fuch  as  profefs  different  Religi- 
 ons ?  'Tis  true,  thele  are  Sins,  but  Sins  of  Ignorance,  which 
 cafily  obtain  Forgivenefs,  and  as  they  do  not  proceed  from  art 
 evil  Difpofition,  and  depraved  Will  are  fcarce  to  be  reckon'd 
 in  the  number  of  Moral  Evils.  Whoever  falls  foul  on  others 
 out  of  a  liOve  of  Virtue,  Hatred  of  Vice,  or  Zeal  towards 
 God,  does  wrong,  but  ignorance  and  an  honeft  heart  make 
 very  much  for  his  excufe.  This  Confideration  alone  wou'd 
 take  a  great  deal  off"  from  the  number  of  wicked  Perfons. 
 
 Neither  does  this  excufe  hold  only  in  matters  of  Religion  ; 
 Party  prejudices  have  alfo  a  fhare  in  it,  which  induce  Men  to 
 extirpate  with  Fire  and  Sword  thofe  that  they  believe  to  be 
 public  Enemies  and  Traitors  to  their  Country.  There's  no 
 Error  more  pernicious  to  Mankind  and  which  has  produced 
 more  or  greater  Crimes  than  this ;  and  yet  it  anfes  from  an 
 honelt  Mind.  The  Miftake  lies  here,  that  they  forget  that 
 their  Country  and  Commonwealth  ought  only  to  be  defended 
 by  jull  and  lawful  Means  and  not  at  the  expence  of  Huma- 
 Xiity. 
 
 5thly,  Prejudice  and  Surmife  makes  many  wicked  that  re- 
 ally are  not  fo.  The  moib  innocent  Converfation  between 
 Man  and  Woman  gives  the  Malicious  a  handle  to  fufpecl  and 
 flandcr  thein.  From  any  one  Tingle  Circumllance  that  ufuallv 
 attends  a  criminal  Aftion  the  fufpeded  Perfon  is  found  guilty 
 of  tjie  Fact  itfelf:   From  one  bad  AdJO(ia  Man's  whole  Life 
 
474  ^f  ^oral  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 veninglniquity  of  others.  By  the  vitiated  Elefli- 
 ons  of  forne,   a  Stop  is  put  to  the  Wickednefs  of 
 
 many; 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 IS  difpang'd  and  judg'd  to  be  of  the  fame  tenor  :  if  one  Mem- 
 ber of  a  Society  be  caught  in  a  fault,  all  the  reft  are  prefum'd 
 to  be  as  bad.  'Tis  fcarce  credible  haw  many  are  look'd  upon 
 as  fcandalouOy  wicked  thro'  fuch  Sufpicions,  who  are  very  far 
 from  it.  ConfefTors  and  Judges  in  criminal  Cafes  know  very 
 well  how  fmall  a  part  of  common  Fame  is  true,  how  little  it 
 is  ever  to  be  trufted. 
 
 6thly,  We  muft  diftinguifli,  and  the  Law  itfelf  fometimes 
 does,  between  iuch  things  as  proceed  from  Malice  and  preme- 
 ditated Wickednefs  and  thole  that  arife  from  violence  of  Paffion 
 and  diforder  of  Mind.  The  guilt  is  very  much  extenuatect 
 when  the  Perfon  offending  is  under  Provocation,  and  as  it  were 
 tranfported  beyond  himfelf  by  a  fudden  Fit  of  Refentment. 
 
 Thefe  things  are  all  known  to  our  moll  equitable  Judge, 
 who  will  pafs  a  merciful,  and  not  a  rigorous  Sentence  on  us: 
 and  for  thefe  Reafons,  we  believe,  he  forbad  us  to  judge  any 
 thing  before  the  time.  We  only  know  the  outfides  of  things 
 and  'tis  polTible  that  fuch  as  feem  to  us  the  greateft  Crimes, 
 wou'd  upon  feeing  the  whole  procedure,  and  making  proper 
 Allowances,  appear  to  be  the  leaft.  Many  Virtues  as  well  as 
 Vices  lie  in  the  Mind  invifible  to  human  Eyes :  'tis  fpeaking 
 at  random  therefore  to  pronounce  upon  the  number  of  one  or 
 other,  and  he  that  wou'd  from  thence  infer  the  necefTity  of  an 
 Evil  Principle  ought  to  be  efteem'd  a  rafh  Judge,  and  an 
 Ufurpcr  of  God's  Tribunal. 
 
 Laftly,  it  may  be  obferv'd  that  the  continuance  and  Increafe 
 of  Mankind  is  a  fure  proof  that  there  is  more  Good  than  Evil 
 in  the  World.  For  one  or  two  asfts  may  have  a  pernicious  in- 
 fluence on  many  Perfons,  nay  all  immoral  Adions  tend  to  the 
 deiUudlion  of  Mankind,  at  leall:  to  the  common  detriment  and 
 diminution  of  them:  Whereas  a  great  many,  even  numberlefa 
 good  adions  muft  ncceffarily  concur  to  the  prefervation  of  each 
 individual.  If  therefore  bad  A-flions  exceeded  the  Number  of 
 the  good  there  would  bean  End  of  human  kind.  We  have 
 clear  Evidence  of  this  in  thofe  Countries  where  Vices  multi- 
 ply, the  Number  of  Men  continually  decreafes  and  the  Place 
 grows  defolate  ;  but  upon  the  return  of  Virtue  and  Goodnefs 
 'tis  again  Rock'd  v/ith  Inhabitant;,. 
 
 This 
 
Sed.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil  475 
 
 many;    and  the  Virrue  and  Happinefs  of  a  great 
 many  is  confirmed  and  increafed  by  the  mifery  of  a 
 
 few; 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 This  is  a  fign  that  Mankind  cou'd  not  fubfiift  if  ever  Vi(^e 
 were  prevalent,  fince  many  good  a6ls  are  neceflary  to  repair 
 the  lofs  which  attends  one  bad  one.  One  (ingle  A£lion  may 
 take  away  the  Life  of  a  Man,  or  of  feveral ;  but  how  many 
 afls  of  benevolence  and  humanity  mufl:  neceffarily  contribute 
 to  the  bringing  up,  educating  and  preferving  every  one  ? 
 
 From  what  has  been  f.id  I  hope  it  appears  that  there  is  more 
 good  than  Evil  among  Men,  and  that  a  good  God  might  make 
 the  World,  notwithftanding  the  Argument  drawn  from  the 
 contrary  Suppofition.  But  almoll  all  of  this  is  unnecefTary, 
 fmce  the  whole  Univerfe  may  have  ten  thoufand  times  more 
 Good  than  Evil ;  tho'  this  Earth  of  ours  had  no  one  good 
 thing  in  it.  This  World  is  too  fmall  to  bear  any  proportion 
 to  the  whole  Syftem,  and  therefore  we  can  form  but  a  very 
 unequal  Judgment  of  it  from  hence.  It  may  be  the  Hofpital 
 or  Priibn  of  the  World,  and  can  any  one  judge  of  the  Health- 
 fulnefs  of  a  Climate  from  viewing  an  Hofpital  where  all  are 
 fick  ?  or  of  the  Wifdom  of  a  Government  from  a  Place  of 
 confinement  where  there  are  only  Madmen  ?  or  of  the  Virtuq 
 of  a  People  from  a  Prifon  where  there  are  none  but  Malefac- 
 tors ?  Not  that  I  believe  the  Earth  is  really  fuch  a  Place,  but 
 I  fay  it  may  be  fuppofed  fuch,  and  any  fuppofition  which 
 Ihews  how  a  thing  may  be,  deftroys  the  Mmiichean  Argument 
 drawn  from  the  impoffibility  of  accounting  for  it. 
 
 In  the  Interim  I  look  upon  this  Earth  as  an  Habitation 
 abounding  with  Delights,  in  which  a  Man  may  live  with 
 Comfort,  Joy  and  Happinefs ;  I  own  with  the  greatelt  Grati- 
 tude to  God  that  I  myfelf  have  lived  fuch  a  Life,  and  am  per- 
 fuaded  that  my  Friends,  Acquaintance,  Servants,  have  all  done 
 the  fame  :  and  I  believe  that  there's  no  Evil  in  Life  but  what 
 is  very  tolerable ;  efpeeially  to  thofe  wlio  have  hopes  of  a  fu- 
 tnre  Immortality. 
 
 For  a  T*  roof  that  the  good  of  both  kinds  in  the  Wotld  is  fuperior 
 to  the  evil,  fee  Sherlock  on  Providence  C.  7  Hutchefon  on  the 
 PaJJtons,  p.  177,  &c.  Leibnitz,  EJfais  de  Theodicee,  or  Memoirs 
 of  Lit.  Vol.  3.  or  Chubb'i  Supplement  to  the  Vindication  of  God'' s 
 Moral  Charafler.  TraSIs  p.  281,  &c.  or  LucasV  Enquiry  after 
 Happinefs.  Vol.  i.  Se£i.  2.  C.  2. 
 
476  OJ  Moral  Evil,        Chap,  V< 
 
 few  i  nay  an  opportunity  of  doing  Good  is  piFer'd  to 
 fuch  as  are  fo  difpofed,  which  never  could  have  heea 
 if  none  hada'oufed  their  Choice.  (82.) 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (82.)  Upon  the  whole,  from  that  little  which  we  know  of 
 the  ScheiTic  of  Divine  Providence  in  the  Formation  :ind  Go- 
 vernnient  of  the  Moral  World,  it  feems  very  reafonabic  foif  us 
 to  conclude  concerning  this^  in  the  fame  manner  as  we  did 
 concerning  the  Natural 'W odd,  'viz.  That  no  confiderbale  part 
 of  it  can  be  alter'd  for  the  better;  or  that  no  Evil  in  it  could 
 either  have  been  originally  avoided,  or  may  now  be  removed, 
 without  introducing  greater. 
 
 Since  the  whole,  Controverfy  depends  upon  the  truth  of  f;hls 
 general  Conclulion,  'tis  proper  that  Vv-e  fliould  be  as  fully  fa- 
 t'sfy'd  as  poihblc  about  the  ground  of  it.  But  to  attempt  to 
 denionflrate  it  by  an  Induction  of  Particulars  would  be  infi- 
 nite, I  fhall  therefore  choofe  rather  to  illuftrate  it  by  a  review 
 ot  forae  of  the  Principles  before  laid  down.  In  th£  firll;  place 
 then  the  Deity  is  fuppofed  out  of  pure  Benevolence  to  have 
 created  as  many  immaterial  Beings  of  the  noblell  kinds  as 
 were  agreeable  to  the  Order  and  Convenience  of  his  Syftem  ; 
 for  his  Benevolence,  being  unbounded,  feems  to  require  this 
 ns  much  as  it  does  the  Creation  of  any  Beings  at  all:  The 
 <ame  Benevolence  alfo  prompted  him  to  produce  more  imper- 
 feft,  mix'd  ones,  becaufe  even  thofc  were  better  than  none. 
 He  endow'd  thefe  with  an  abfolutely  free  Principle  of  Volition 
 and  ASlion,  becaufe  fuch  Freedom  was  abfolutely  requifite  to 
 their  Happinefs  in  every  rcfpeft,  efpecially  to  that  for  which 
 he  chiefiy  defign'd  them  ;  wz.  Goodnefs,  Virtue,  or  a  refem- 
 blancc  of  his  own  Moral  Qualities,  which  is  the  fupream  and 
 only  Happinefs  of  a  rational  Being.  He  continues  this  Free- 
 dom to  them,  tho'  many  abufe  it  to  the  Corruption  of  their 
 Natures,  and  Introdudlion  of  the  greateft  Mifery  ;  becaufe  this 
 abufe  proportionably  improves  the  Nature,  and  increaics  the 
 Felicity  oi others,  and  fo  Liberty  ilill  tends  to  the  Good  and 
 Perfection  of  the  whole:  and  this  it  may  be  conceived  to  do 
 in  the  following  manner.  The  mifcrable  EfFed  of  the  abufe 
 of  Freedom  by  fome  in  this  World,  makes  all  others  much 
 more  fenfible  of  the  Nature  and  Confequences  of  Sin,  and 
 more  careful  to  avoid  it,  and  renders  them  confcious  ofa 
 double  Pjcafure  in  ufing  their  Powers  aright :  it  cxcrcifetlr-^fome 
 Virtues  in  them  which  could  have  no  place  without  \y,  pr?- 
 fgrves,  improves  and  cxalteth  others,    and  conllsquentiy  raifes 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  7.     Of  Moral  Evil.  477 
 
 S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     VII. 
 
 Wherein  the  Principles  before  laid  down  are 
 apply' d  to  the  Solution  of  fome  Ohje^flons. 
 
 I.  T7  Iv  O  M  the  foregoing  Principle  it  Teems  not  Moral 
 
 X    impoflible  to  anfwer  fuch  Objcdions  as  are      '^^  ^''^- 
 commonly  brought  againft  the  Goodnefs  and  Pro-  fary  in  re- 
 vidence  of  God.     For  in  the  firft  place,  when  it  fpeft  of 
 is  obje^ed,  that  Moral  Evil  is  not  a  neceffaiy  con-  Free- 
 comirant  of  human   Nature,   and    therefore  is  vo-  ^^^^'  ^"^ 
 luntarily   permitted  by   God,    and  that  no  Benefit  ne^elTarv 
 arifes  from  the  permiflion  of  it,  as  there  does  from  with  re- 
 Hunger,  Thirf},  and  the  PalTions :   We  muft  re-  gard  to 
 
 ply    God,  To 
 ^  ^     that  he 
 NOTES,  muft  ei- 
 
 ther tole- 
 their  whole  Nature  to  a  higher  degree  of  Perfeftion  than  it  ^^^^e  thefc 
 could  othcrwife  acquire.     By  parity  of  Reafon  we  may  believe  ^^  greater. 
 in  the  next  World  alfo  the  Goodnefs  as  well  as  Happinefs,  of 
 the  Bleffed  will  be  confirmed  and  advanc'd  by  reflexions  natu- 
 rally arifing  from   their  View  of  the  Mifery  which  fome  {hall 
 undergo :  (which  feems  to  be  a  good  reafon  for  the  Creation 
 of  thofe  Beings  who  fliall  be  finally  ipiferable,    and  for  the 
 continua^tion  of  them  in  their  mifcrableExiftcnce*.) 
 
 "  To  have  efcaped  Hell,  and  to  find  ourfelves  in  the  un- 
 *'  changeable  Poffeffion  of  Salvation  by  the  free  Mercy  and 
 *•  Goodnefs  of  God,  and  by  the  Death  of  his  own  Son,  are 
 **  Thoughts  which  mult  create  a  new  Heaven  as  it  were  ir* 
 *'  Heaven  itfelf ;  I  mean  they  will  enlarge  our  Souls  to  the 
 **  utmoft  Capacity  of  our  Natures,  and  fill  and  actuate  them 
 «*  with  fuch  Divine  Ardors  of  Love,  as  if  we  had  been  kept 
 **  necellarily  from  all  Sin,  feem  impoffible  to  have  been  raifed 
 *•  in  us  f. 
 
 This 
 
 *  See  the  Appendix,  §.  2.  par.  9, 
 
 t  Jenkin,  zd  vol.  Ch.  12.  p,  244,  t^<,  5th  Edit* 
 
47S  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 ply,    that   Liberty  of  Choice  is  a  neceflary  Con- 
 comitant of  our  Nature,  and  that  the  Exercife  of 
 
 it 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 This  then  we  may  with  Reverence  prefume  to  have  been" 
 the  principal  Defign  of  God  in  permitting  all  Mankind  to 
 bring  themfelves  into  fuch  a  dangerous  Elbte,  and  fome  of 
 them  to  fiifFer  under  it ;  and  perhaps  the  fame  reafon  will 
 hold  for  his  permitting  the  Fall  of  Angeh:  For  I  think 
 it  plainly  appear'd  from  Note  13.  that  the  Good  or  rather 
 Goodnefs,  of  the  Creature,  is  properly  the  ultimate  End  of  all 
 the  Difpenfations  of  God,  and  not  his  own  Glory,  any  farther 
 than  it  is  means  to  it.  His  Glory  feems  to  be  difplay'd  no 
 otherwife  than  as  it  is  fubfervieiit  and  neceffary  to  this  End  ; 
 and  neceffary  it  is,  fince  Goodnefs  is  of  our  own  making,  and 
 muft  require  Knowledge,  Example,  Trial,  iSc.  (fee  Note  66) 
 as  Motives  and  Means  to  further  us  in  the  gradual  Formation 
 of  a  fuitable  Temper  and  proper  Habits  here,  the  Enlargement 
 and  Improvement  of  which  will  conftitute  our  Heaven  hereaf- 
 ter, as  Scott  and  Dr.  Rymer  have  fhewn  at  large. 
 
 Virtue  therefore  or  Moral  Good  cannot  (as  Bayle  imagines) 
 be  infufed  into  us  miraculoufly  ;  neither  could  God,  according 
 to  the  Order  of  our  Ideas,  have  acquainted  us  with  fo  much  of 
 his  adorable  Nature,  his  Mercy,  Long-fufferhig,  Goodnefs  and 
 Tntth  (as  he  himfelf  defcribcs  it)  [[/f]  nor  confequently  have 
 brought  us  to  fo  great  a  refemblancc  ot  it  by  any  other  Method. 
 Th$  folc  Idea  of  a  Being  irfinitely  perfed,  as  Bnyle  objedls  [z] 
 would  not  do  the  Bufmefs,  nor  if  it  were  receiv'd  and  would  have 
 been  attended  to,  could  it  be  of  fuihcient  force  to  influence  the 
 Minds  of  Men,  and  regulate  their  Pradlicc,  as  is  evident  from 
 daily  Experience.  The  prefent  Scheme  of  Providence  was 
 therefore  neceffary,  in  order  to  produce  in  the  generality  of 
 Men  the  grcateft  degree  of  Goodnefs  in  this  Life,  which  is  the 
 ground  and  foundation  of  their  Happinefs  in  the  next.  Even 
 there  alfo  may  the  Memory  of  their  former  Trials  (as  was  hin- 
 ted above)  the  Confcioufnefs  of  their  own  happy  Choice,  when 
 others  did,  and  they  had  the  fame  Power  and  the  fame  Temp- 
 rations  to  have  done  otherwife:  the  joyful  Rcflcflion  on  their 
 pall  Dangers  and  prefent  Safety,  and  the  natural  Confequence 
 of  all  this.  Love  and   Gratitude,  and  Glorj'^  to  God  in  the 
 
 High- 
 lit] Exod.  34.  6,  7. 
 j;0  Crit.  Ditt.  p,  248S. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  7.      Of  Moral  Evil.  479 
 
 Jt  cannot  be  hinder'd,  as  we  have  feen,  without 
 <»reater  Evils;  In  refped  then  of  our  own  Will, 
 ^  '  Moral 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 eft,  and  mutual  Congratulations  of  each  other — Thcfe  and 
 the  like  Contemplations  will  (as  Dr.  Je?ikin  fays)  create  a  new 
 Heaven  in  Heaven  itfelf 
 
 And  tho'  in  one  refpefl  a  view  of  the  Mifery  which  the 
 damned  undergo,  might  feem  to  detraft  from  the  Happinefs 
 of  the  Bleffed,  thro'  Pity  and  Commiferation  :  yet  under  ano- 
 ther, a  nearer,  and  much  more  efFefting  Consideration,  nji-z. 
 that  all  this  is  the  Mifery  which  they  themfelves  were  oftea 
 expofed  to,  and  were  in  imminent  Danger  of  incurring;  in 
 this  View,  why  may  not  the  fenfe  of  their  own  Efcape  fo  far 
 overcome  the  Senfe  oi  another's  Ruin,  as  quite  to  extinguifh 
 the  Pain  that  ufually  attends  the  Idea  of  it,  and  even  render  it 
 produftive  of  fome  real  Happinefs  ?  To  this  purpofe  apply  that 
 o^  Lucretius,  B.  2. 
 
 Sua've  man'  magna  t:4rbantibus  Aquora  njentis 
 E  terra  alter i us  magnum  fpedare  labor e?n  ; 
 Not:  quia  niexari  quevquatn  ejl  jucuncia  'uoluptas : 
 Sed  quibus  ipfe  malis  careas  quia  cernere  fuave  ejl. 
 
 But  however  this  be,  moft  of  the  foregoing  Reflexions  feem 
 juft  and  unexceptionable. 
 
 I  fhall  conclude  with  another  FafTage  from  Dr.  Jenkin  (/?} 
 which  fets  them  in  the  ftrongefl  Light. 
 
 "  It  muft  advance  the  Happinefs  both  of  Angels  and  Men 
 *'  in  Heaven,  that  upon  Choice  and  Trial  they  have  preferr'd 
 "  God  before  all  things,  and  upon  that  find  themfelves  con- 
 "  firm'd  and  eftablifh'd  in  the  perpetual  and  unalterable  Love 
 *'  and  Enjoyment  of  him.  This  very  Confideration,  that  they 
 "  might  once  have  fallen  from  Kis  Love,  infpires  them  with 
 *«  the  higheft  Ardors  of  Love,  when  they  rejoice  in  the  infi- 
 *'  nite  Rewards  of  fo  eafy  and  Ihort  a  Trial :  and  the  Reflec- 
 ■"  tion  upon  the  Dangers  efcaped  heightens  even  the  Joys  of 
 '*  Heaven  to  them,  and  makes  an  addition  to  every  Degree  of 
 "  Blifs.  The  remembrance  of  their  paft  Sins  and  Tempta- 
 **  tions,  and  the  Senfe  of  their  own  Unworthinefs  arifing  from 
 *'  that  Remembrance,  will  continually  excite  in  the  Blefled 
 "  frefh  A6i:s  of  Love  and  Adoration  of  God,  who  has  raifed 
 "  them  above  all  Sin  and  Temptation,  and  fix'd  them  in  an 
 "  everlafting  State  of  Blifs  and  Glory.      The  Trial  that  the 
 
 <'  Righteous 
 
 {k1  Page  242, 
 
48o  Of  Moral  Evil.         Chap.  V. 
 
 Moral  Evil  is  not  neceflary,  but  in  refped:  of  God 
 it  is,    /.  e.    he  mull:  either    tolerate  this  Evil  or  a 
 greater ;    from   hence   alfo   proceeds  no   fmall  Ad- 
 vantage to  univerfal  Nature,   as  well    as  to  Man- 
 kind. 
 Cicero's         II.  Secondly,    Hence    we   perceive  the  Anfwer 
 Objeaion  ro  Cicero's  Objedion  in  his  third  Book,  De  NatuYA 
 ^'^^y^'^^^y^  DeoYum^  where  Cotta.  is  introduced  arguing  in  this 
 an  who''   "^^nner  :  "  If  a  Phyfician  knows  that  his  Patient, 
 gives  his    "  who  is  order'd  to  drink  Wine,    will  drink  too 
 Patient      <«  much  and  dye  of  it  immediately,    he  is  greatly 
 Wine        <«  blameable   for  allowing  him   it.      Thus   is  this 
 
 w  en    c    tt  Providence   of  yours  to  be  blamed,    which  has 
 
 knows  that  .  J  ^     .  . 
 
 he  will      *'  given  realon  to  luch  as  it  knev/  would   make  a 
 
 die  of  it:   "  perverfe  and  wicked  U(e  of  it."     He  proceeds 
 
 Or  a  Fa-    a|fo  to  confute  thofe  Perfons   who    endeavour    to 
 
 ther  who   gj^^y^g  Providence,  by  fayine,    "  That  it  does  not 
 
 leaves  Ills  .  '      j      j     a 
 
 Eftatetoa"  foUow   that  we  are  not  very  well  provided  for 
 
 Prodigal    *'  by  the   Gods    becaufc  a  great    many   ufe   their 
 
 Son.  <«  Gifts  perverfely  ;  lince  many  make  a  bad  ufe  of 
 
 "  their  Paternal  Ellates,    and  yet  thefe  cannot  be 
 
 «*  faid  to  have  no  Benefit  from  their  Fathers."     To 
 
 which  he  replies  in   thefe  Words  :    *'  I  wifh  the 
 
 *'  Gods  had  not  beftow'd  that  Cunning  upon  Men 
 
 "  which  very  few  make  a  right  ufe  of;  Infomuch 
 
 "  that  this  Divine  Gift  of  Reafon  and  Deliberation 
 
 *•  may 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 **  Righteous  underwent  here,  makes  up  fonre  part  of  theit 
 "  Happinefs  in  Heaven  ;  and  in  what  Degree  focver  theit 
 **  Happinefs  can  be  fuppofcd  to  he,  yet  it  is  in  fomc  rricafiiri 
 «'  increafed,  and  as  it  were  endeared  to  them,  by  reflerting  on 
 "  their  former  State  of  Trial,  in  which  they  were  fubjedl  to 
 **  Temptation  and  Sin." 
 
 See  the  fame  handled  more  diftmifily  in  the  firil  of  Mr.  B" 
 Oylefs  four  Diifertations,  Ch.  lo.  A-Bp.  Drvtwi's  5  th  Scrmoii 
 on  the  Eternity  of  HellToifnentSy  Argument  the  4th.  p.  73. 
 isfr.  or  ^cott\  Chripan  Life,  Vol.  5 .  p.  1 00. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  481 
 
 *'  may  Teem  to  be  imparrcd  for  a  Snare,  and  not  a 
 *«  Benefit  to  Mankind."  He  adds,  "  We  leave 
 *'  Eftares  to  our  Children  in  hopes  of  leaving  them 
 '*  well,  wherein  we  may  be  decciv'd  ;  but  how  can 
 *'  God  be  decciv'd  \  " 
 
 III.  To  all  whicJi  we  reply,    Firfl:,    That  it  is  'Tisfhewn 
 very  unfair  to  compare  the  Realon  which  is  grant-  that  the_ 
 ed  to  Man  with  Wine  eiven  to  the  Sick.    For  a  fick  ?"^P^,7' 
 Perlon  may  enjoy  Life.,    and  even  recover,   with-      j.  ^^_ 
 out  Wine  ;   but  Man  cannot  be  what  he  i^  without  tween 
 lieafon.     The  Comparilon  thereof  is  very  impro-  Reafon 
 perly  made  between  things  that  are  c^ijparate.     Nei-  ^^f^^^j 
 ther    is    there  a  le(s   difference  between  Jinnwg  and  jj^J  g'ivW 
 dying.     'Tis  very   true,  that  no  body    would    let  a  of  Wine; 
 fkk  Perfon  take  Wme  which  he  knew  would  kill  and  that 
 him  :  but  yet  any  prudent  Phyfician  would  allow  G°^'  i^ 
 his  Patient  to  take  fome  Meat,    without  which  he  ^"^  ^j. 
 knew  that  he  certainly  mull:  die,  iho'  he  underftood  terty  for 
 that  upon  taking  it  the  Fever  would  encreafe  a  little,  fear  we 
 In  like  manner  God  has  given  Reafon  to  Men,  with-  ^^ould  fin, 
 out  which  tliey  would  not  be  Men,  tho'  he  fore-  rl°"^'\J^  • 
 faw  that  fome  Evils  would  arife  from  it.     Reafon  ^j^^j  ^ilh 
 therefore  ought  to  be  compared  to  Life,  and  natu-  his  Son 
 ral  Evils  to  the  Diftemper.     If  then  God  v/cre  to  for  fear  he 
 takeaway  Reafon  left  Men  fhould  ufe  it  amifs,  he  ^oul^be 
 would  be  like  a  iVlan  that  kills  his  Son  for  fear  he 
 fhould  be  fick. 
 
 IV.  Secondly,  Human  Reafon  is  improperly  com-  Reafon  is 
 pared  to  a  Patrmonjy  fince  it  is  the   very  Beirg  and  "°  '^^^  im- 
 Life  of  Man  :  and  who  would  rather  put  his  Son  ^^^^^  ^ 
 to  Death  than  fuffer  him  to  lead  a  fort  of  an  irre-  to  an 
 gnlar  Life  ?  Eftate. 
 
 V.  Thirdly,    We  ought  to  remember   that    we  j^  tends  to 
 are  not  born  for  ourfelves  alone,  but  are  fubfervient  the  good 
 to  Nature  as  Parts  of  the  Univerfe,    'tis  reafonable  of  the 
 therefore  that  we  Ihould  bear  fuch  things  as  tend  to  ^^°'^« 
 the  Good  of  the  whole,  tho'  they  be  a  little  inconve-  ourfelves 
 nient  to  us.    Now  v/e  have   fhewn  before  that  the  too,  thac 
 
 I  i  -      -     -  -      _^{jy(-g  ^ve 
 
482  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 we  fliould  Abufe  of  Reafon  cannot  be  prevented  without  Vi- 
 have  the  olence  done  to  the  Laws  of  the  Univerfe,  without 
 Fr^ee-Will-''^^''''"^^"^  to  Mankind  and  to  ourfelves.  If  there- 
 for we  had  f*^""^  a  Father  could  not  refufe  a  Son  his  Inheri- 
 rather  be  tance,  without  breaking  the  Laws  of  his  Country, 
 what  we  without  injuring  his  Family,  and  laftly,  without 
 are  than  in  jj^g  ^q^^  ^f-  j^j^   g^j^'^  ljjt^^    j^g  wou'd  not  deferve 
 
 dition  of  ^^  ^^  blam'd  for  giving  him  it,  tho'  he  underftocd 
 Brutes,  or  ^^^^  be  would  make  a  bad  ufe  of  it :  Efpecially  if 
 without  he  forefaw  that  the  Brothers  of  this  Prodigal  would 
 Reafon.  take  warning  by  his  Error  and  become  frugal,  and 
 that  the  Eltate  whi.h  he  fpent  would  turn  to  rheir 
 Benefit.  The  fame  muft  be  faid  of  the  Phyfician 
 who  gives  his  Patient  a  Glafs  at  his  Requefl: ;  which 
 if  he  did  not  give,  the  Patient  would  immediately 
 ftab  himfelf.  Is  he  culpable  if  he  compound  for  a 
 lefs  Evil,  in  order  to  avoid  a  greater  ?  More  efpe- 
 cially if  many  labour  under  the  fame  Di  Rem  per,  and 
 would  not  be  convinc'd  of  the  danger  of  ufing  Wine 
 but  by  Experiment,  would  it  not  be  better  to  let 
 one  or  two  make  the  Experiment  than  that  all  fliould 
 perifli  ?  God  therefore  knowingly  permits  us  lick 
 Perfons  to  ufe  Wine,-  for  tho*  we  abufe  it,  yet  our 
 Condition  will  be  better  than  if  he  had  not  beflow'd. 
 it  upon  us.  If  any  urge  that  it  is  better  not  to  be 
 at  all,  than  to  be  mifcrable,  and  confequently  that 
 it  is  more  proper  to  deprive  us  of  Life,  than  to 
 fuffer  us  to  abufe  it.  I  anfwer  as  before,  That  we 
 muft  make  a  Diftinf^ion  in  Mifery  ;  for  where  there 
 is  more  Evil  than  Grod,  it  is  indeed  preferable  not 
 to  be,  than  to  be  involv'd  in  this  kind  of  Mifery  ; 
 but  that  which  attends  human  Reafon  is  not  fuch, 
 by  our  own  Judgment.  For  we  had  rather  be  what 
 we  a.e  than  not  be  at  all,  or  be  without  Reafon. 
 Elfe  why  are  we  unwilling  to  change  our  Condition 
 with  the  Brutes,  or  Mad-men,  if  we  do  not  think 
 it  better  than  theirs  ? 
 
 VI.  But 
 
Sea.  S'   S';b.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  4^3 
 
 VI.  But  ro  conclude,  Cotta  in  Cicero  has  neither  CLyro  has 
 brought  pertinent  Similitudes,  nor  given  good  Ad-  ".^^J^^J^^^. 
 vice  to  Providence.     For  God,  as  a  Phyfician,  does  ^^^°f^^^ 
 not  give  Wine  ro  the  Sick  Perfon  to  kill  him  :  but  Similes, 
 to  one  that  will  die,    in  order  to  prevent  his  dying  nor  given 
 fooner.     Nor  has  the  Divine  Father  given  an  Inhc-  good  Ad- 
 ritance  to  his  Sons  that  they  may  wafte  it,  but  has  p^^^^^j. 
 beflow'd  it  upon    fuch  as  will  wafte  it,    left  they  ^q^cq* 
 lliould  want  Neceflaries.     Whereas  if  Cotta  had  been 
 Counfellor  to  Providence,    he  would  have  advifed 
 Phyficians  to  let  their   Patients   die   with  Thirft, 
 left  fome  of  them  ftiould  drink  too  much  ;  he  would 
 have  perfuaded  Parents  either  ro  kill  their  Children, 
 or  never  beget  them,  left  they  ihould  make  a  bad  ufe 
 of  their  Eftates  when   they  came   to  Age.  (83.) 
 (5  5.) 
 
 I  i  2  vir. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (83.}  The  fame  holds  good  againft  all  Bnyle's  Comparifons, 
 Cric.  Dia.  Art.  Paulicians.  Rem.  E.  F.  KAA,  l3\.  p.  2488, 
 where  he  fays,  that  to  permit  Men  to  fin  rather  than  to  over- 
 rule their  Wills,  is  like  a  Mother  that  lets  her  Daughters  go  to 
 a  Ball,  where  fhe  is  fure  they  will  lofe  their  Honour,  and 
 then  pleads  in  her  own  Juftification,  "  that  fhc  had  no  mind 
 "  to  reftrain  the  Liberty  of  her  Daughters,  nor  to  fhew  Dif- 
 "  truftofthem."  Jgain[_l']l'i  a  Son  fhould  fee  his  Father 
 "  ready  to  throw  himfelf  out  of  the  Window,  either  in  a  fit 
 "  of  Frenzy,  or  becaufe  he  is  troubled  in  Mind,  he  would  do 
 "  well  to  chain  him,  if  he  could  not  relcrain  him  otherwife." 
 And  to  name  no  more. 
 
 "  To  have  regard  to  the  Frec-Will  of  a  Man,  and  carefulir 
 <*  to  abftain  from  laying  any  reftraint  upon  his  Inclination, 
 *'  when  he  is  going  to  lofe  his  Innocence  for  ever,  to  be  eter- 
 *'  nally  damnd;  can  you  caii  that  a  lavviul  Obfervation  of  the 
 "  Laws  of  Liberty  ?  You  would  be  lefs  unreafonable  if  you 
 "  iliould  fay  to  a  Man  who  gets  a  Fall  near  you,  and  breaks  his 
 **  liCgs,  thut  nvhich  hinder  d  us  from  presenting  your  Fail  is, 
 "'  that  <voe  nuere  afraid  to  undo  fome  Folds  of  your  Goixn ;  tve 
 
 "■  had 
 
 [/]  Crit.  Diil.  p.  2497. 
 
484 
 
 The  Ob- 
 jedlion  of 
 Epicurus 
 pro'pofed 
 which  ac- 
 ciifes  God 
 of  Impo- 
 tence if  he 
 ivas  not 
 able ;  or 
 of  Envy, 
 if  he  was 
 able ;  to 
 remove 
 Evils. 
 
 Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 VII,  From  the  fame  Principles  we  may  folve  that 
 formidable  Objefti on  oi  Epicurus  againft  Providence, 
 which  La^amifis  enforces  in  his  Book  De  Ira  Dei  ^  : 
 and,  as  feme  think,  does  not  fufficienrly  anfwer. 
 Jt  ftands  thus :  "  Either  God  is  wiUing  to  remove 
 "  Evils,  and  not  able,  or  able  and  not  willing,  or 
 •'  neither  able  nor  willing.  If  he  be  willing  and 
 *'  not  able,  he  is  impotent,  which  cannot  be  ap- 
 "  ply'd  to  the  Deity  :  If  he  be  able  and  not  wil- 
 *'  ling,  he  is  envious ;  which  is  equally  inconfiftent 
 *'  with  the  Nature  of  God.  If  he  be  neither  wil- 
 «*  ling  nor  able,  he  is  both  envious  and  impotent, 
 *'  and  confequently  no  God.  If  he  be  both  willing 
 **  and  able,  which  is  the  only  thing  that  anfwers 
 "  to  the  Notion  of  a  God,  from  whence  come 
 "  Evils  ?  Or  why  does  he  not  remove  them  ? 
 
 VIII. 
 NOTES. 
 
 **  had  fo  great  a  refpeBfor  its  Symetry,  that  ive  rvjould  vot  un- 
 "  dertake  to  fpoil  it,  and  nve  thought  it  ^juas  much  better  to  let 
 *'  you  run  the  hazard  of  breaking  your  Bones,'"''  Sec.  [wj 
 
 In  all  which  this  Author  evidently  miftakes  the  Cafe,  by 
 comparing  the  DefiruBion  of  Free-lVill  (for  this  is  the  only 
 thing,  as  we  have  prov'd,  that  can  prevent  the  abufe  of  it) 
 which  Will  has  been  fhewn  to  be  the  very  Life  and  Soul  of 
 Alan  ;  to  fuch  mere  trifles  as  confining  his  Body  or  difcompo- 
 /ing  his  Habit:  Whereas,  from  the  foregoing  account  of  the 
 ineftimable  worth  of  IJberty  to  each  Individual,  and  the  many 
 Advantages  that  arife  in  common,  even  from  the  abufe  of  it, 
 it  plainly  appears  that  to  abridge,  or  which  is  the  veiy  fame, 
 to  deprive  a  Man  of  Liberty  for  fear  he  fliould  abufe  it,  would, 
 in  regard  to  him,  be  juil  as  good  as  to  knock  him  on  the  Head 
 for  fear  he  fhould  maim  or  disfigure  himfelf  And  with  rc- 
 fpe£t  to  the  Public,  he  would  be  far  more  unreafonable  who 
 fliould  defire  the  abfence  of  this  Liberty,  becaufe  of  its  frequent 
 abufe,  than  he  who  fliould  wifli  that  there  were  no  fuch  thing  as 
 Fire,  Wind,  or  Water,  in  the  World,  becaufe  fo  many  Men, 
 Houfes,  and  Ships  are  deftroy'd  by  them  —  As  the  refl:  of 
 Bajle's  elaborate  Similes  are  founded  on  the  fame  mifreprefenta- 
 
 tion. 
 
 *  §  12.  p.  435.  Cambr.  Edit, 
 !«]  Page  2+97. 
 
Sea.  5.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil.  485 
 
 VIII.  We  mud  take  the  third  of  thofe  four  Bran-  'Tis  a 
 ches  of  his  knotty  Argument ;  viz,.  That  God  nei-  ^^^^^^' 
 
 li  3 
 
 t^^er  that  all 
 
 rt  rr  r    c  Evils  be 
 
 JV  U  1    ho*  removed 
 
 from  crea- 
 tion, one  hint  of  this   kind  is,  I  think,  enough  to  invalidate  ted  Be- 
 them.  ings :  God 
 
 (5  B,)  'Tis  urg'd  that  the  Author  acknowledes  the  Good-  is  not  im- 
 refs,  Wifdom  and  Power  of  God  to  be  infinite,  and  that  it  was  potent 
 out  of  pure  Goodnefs  that  he  made  Man  and  gave  him  liberty  therefore 
 of  choice  as  a  means  of  Happinefs,    and  therefore  it  ought  not  becaufe  he 
 to  be  fuch  a  Liberty  as  may  be  abufed  and  become  a  means  of  does  not 
 Mifery,  at  leaft  God  fhould  have  fet  a  guard  on  it  that  when-  remove 
 ever  it  was  about  to  yield  to  Evil  he  might  have  interpofed  and  them, 
 prevented  it.     Thus  kind  and  wife  Parents  indulge  their  Chil- 
 dren in  the  ufe  of  their  Liberty,    but  fo  as  to  be  always  near 
 them  and  prevent  its  doing  them  mifchief.     A  good  and  pru- 
 dent Mother  will  fuffer  her  Daughter  to  go  abroad,  but  if  fhe 
 underftand  that  fhe  is  like  to  be  feduced,  flie  will  leave  her  play 
 or  bufinefs  and  run  to  relcueher  Child.     The  fame  is  obferv^d 
 of  a  Husband  in  regard  to  his  Wife  ;  and  the  Mother  or  Huf- 
 band  that  do  not  take  this  care  are  neither  counted  wife  nor 
 good.     How  then  can  God  be  infinitely  wife,  good  and  pow- 
 erful that  does  not  take  care  to  prevent  mens  choofing  ill,  efpe- 
 cially  fince  their  eternal  Happinefs  or  Mifery  depends  on  it  ? 
 
 jinj'w.  Thefe  Comparifons  are  not  appofue  to  the  purpofe, 
 particularly  in  the  following  refpeds. 
 
 I  ft.  The  care  of  a  Daughter  or  Wife  is  the  principal  part  of 
 a  Mother's  or  Husband's  charge,  fo  that  no  other  bulinefs  can 
 in  the  ufual  metliod  of  Management  be  compared  with  it,  and 
 therefore  the  Mother  or  Husband  that  fails  in  it,  are  wanting 
 in  that  which  ought  to  have  been  the  chief  part  of  their  Care. 
 Whereas  Sinners,  whether  Angels  or  Men,  are  but  a  fmall  and 
 inconfidcrable  part  of  thofc  that  are  under  the  direftion  of  Pro- 
 vidence, and  confequently  there  is  no  Parity  between  the  Obli- 
 gations. 
 
 adly.  The  Mothers  and  Husbands  in  the  foremention'd  In- 
 ilances  may  generally  take  care  of  their  Children  and  Wives 
 without  prejudicing  the  reft  of  the  World  or  interfering  with 
 their  other  Duties,  and  where  this  happens,  their  Negledl  is 
 inexcufable.  But  when  the  faving  a  Man's  Country  is  con- 
 cern'd,  or  any  publick  Good  atftake,  the  Husband  muft  leave 
 his  Wife  and  the  Mother  her  Daughter,  tho'  they  were  fure 
 
 that 
 
 [k]  §.  12.  p.  435.  Cambr,  Edit, 
 
4^6  Of  Moral  Evil.        Chap.  V. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 that  ly  their  abfence  tlieir  Children  and  Wife  wou'd  be  cor- 
 rupted. 
 
 3dly,  The  Mother  or  Husband  may  hinder  the  Corruption 
 of  their  Child  or  Wife  witliout  maiming  or  deftroying  them  ; 
 for  if  the  cafe  were  that  a  Mother  muft  either  venture  her 
 Daughter  and  let  her  take  her  choice,  or  icill  her,  I  luppofe 
 there's  no  Mother  but  in  fuch  circumllances  wou'd  let  her 
 Daughter  take  her  Courfe- 
 
 4thly,  In  the  inftance  before  us  here's  no  good  or  advantage 
 to  the  Perfon  I'educed  or  to  the  Family  by  letting  her  follow 
 her  Choice ;  but  in  the  other  Cafe,  'tis  often  more  advanta- 
 geous to  the  Perfon  that  choofes  amifs,  and  ahvays  to  the 
 World,  than  if  he  had  not  been  fufFer'd  to  ufe  his  Liberty, 
 And  if  there  were  no  more  but  the  confideration  of  God's  be- 
 ing able  to  turn  the  Sins  of  Men  to  the  beft,  whereas  a  Mo- 
 ther or  Husband  had  no  fuch  Power,  it  were  fufficicnt  to  Ihcw 
 the  Difparity. 
 
 The  Caie  therefore  ought  to  be  put  thus,  fuppofe  a  Mother 
 had  many  Millions  of  Daughters  that  by  their  very  Nature 
 were  capable  of  being  corrupted,  that  fhe  had  no  other  means 
 to  prevent  their  being  of  fuch  Nature,  but  by  not  bringing 
 them  into  the  World,  fuppofe  likcvvife  that  fhe  muft  either 
 fufFer  them  to  be  in  circumftances  which  will  expofe  them  to 
 Temptations  or  they  muft  have  no  Being.  Siippofe  laftly  that 
 fhe  had  no  poffible  Means  to  fecure  them  but  either  by  locking 
 them  up  altogether  from  Society,  or  adly  by  putting  out  their 
 Eyes  and  depriving  them  of  their  Senfes,  or  3d]y  by  deftroy- 
 ing all  Mankind  that  there  might  be  none  to  feduce  them. 
 i^Are,  were  it  more  goodnefs  in  a  Mother  to  futfcr  one  or  two 
 of  the  Millions  to  be  corrupted,  or  to  ufe  thefe  Remedies  to 
 prevent  it  ? 
 
 If  it  be  fiid  th.u  if  fhe  knew  who  they  were  that  would 
 yield  to  Temptations,  Ilie  would  confine  them  and  leave  the 
 reft  at  Liberty.  I  anfwcr,  if  the  permitting  thofe  few  to  fmart 
 under  the  Effefls  ot  their  ill  Choice  were  :he  very  Means  and 
 Motive  by  which  the  reft  were  induced  to  inake  a  good  one, 
 and  perhaps  all  wou'd  be  feduced  if  not  fixed  in  a  right  choice 
 by  the  terror  of  fuch  Examples,  it  wou'd  ftill  be  agreeable  to 
 Goodnefs  to  fufter  them  to  make  the  choice  and  feel  theEfte£ts 
 of  it. 
 
 Methinks  the  Cafe  thus  ftated  doth  much  better  reprefent 
 the  circumftances  of  God's  permitting  Sin,  than  as  the  Objec- 
 tion puts  it.    For  1  luve  already  fhew'd  that  Godi  has  created 
 
 as 
 
Sedl.  S.  Sub.  6.     Of  Moral  Evil;  487 
 
 ther  will  nor  can  remove  Evils.  (84.)  Yet  we  deny 
 the  Confequence.  He  is  neither  to  be  eftetm'd 
 Envious  nor  Impotent  becaufe  he  does  not  work 
 Contradi<5J:ions  :  But  it  is  a  Contradiction  that  all 
 Evils  fhould  be  removed,  without  removing  the 
 whole  Univerfe;  which  would  be  the  grcateft  of 
 all  Evils.  For  fome  kind  of  Evils  adhere  (as  we 
 have  often  declared)  to  the  very  Natures  of  things, 
 and  cannot  be  removed  while  any  created  Nature 
 continues.  For  when  a  Circle  is  once  made,  all  the 
 Lines  drawn  from  the  Centre  to  the  Circumference 
 muft  necelfarily  be  equal ;  neither  is  God  impotent 
 I  i  4  _  becaufe 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 as  many  indefeftible  Beings  (if  any  fuch  be   poffible,  which  is 
 indeed  very  doubtful)  as  this  or  any  Syftem  of  the  World  will 
 allow  :  that  he  has  placed  as  many  of  the  Beings  that  are  ca- 
 pable of  defedtion  in  Places  and  Circumllances  that  will  fecure 
 them  from  Tempation,  as  there  was  room  for,  in  this  or  any- 
 other  poffible  Model  of  the  Creation.     That  after  thefe  more 
 perfedl  Beings  were  created,  and  thefe  more  fecure  places  filled, 
 there  was  ftill  room  for  many  Creatures  of  other  forts,    and 
 that  many  fuch  were  poffible,  but  all  with  a  Capacity  of  choo- 
 fmg  ill,  and  the  inconveniency  of  Temptations ;  and  that  there 
 was  no  other  way  to  fecure  them  all  from  inconveniencies,  but 
 either  by  not  making  them  at  all,    or  not  allowing  them  the 
 ufe  of  their  Faculties,   or  laftly  changing  their  Nature  into 
 another  fort  than  the  Syftem  of  Creatures  would  allow.     In 
 this  cafe  the  Qaeftions  are,  whether  it  was  better  and  a  greater 
 Inftance  of  Goodnefs  in  God  to  condefcend  to  give  thefe  im- 
 perfeft  Creatures  a  Being,  and  to  difpenfe  with  their  Imper- 
 fedlions,  or  to  deny  it  to  them  ?   zdly.  Whether  it  was  greater 
 Goodnefs  in  him  to  give  all  his  Creatures  a  free  ufe  of  their 
 Liberty,    which  is  the  greateft  picture  of  a  rational  Creature, 
 and  without  which   they  cannot  have  a  full  Enjoyment  of 
 thcmfelves,  tho'  he  forefaw  one  in  many  Millions  wou'd  abufe 
 it ;  or  to  debar  the  whole  from  fuch  a  Satisfaclion  ?  Efpccially 
 when  the  Misfortune  of  that  one  fecured  the  reil  of  thofc  ma- 
 ny Millions. 
 
 (84.)  Leibnitz  would  rather  fay,  •'  that  God  could  take  them 
 ♦  away,  bat  he  was  not  willing  to  do  it  abfolutely  i  and  for 
 
488  Of  Moral  EviL        Chap.  V, 
 
 becaufe  he  cadnot  make  them  unequal  while  it  con- 
 tinues to  be  a  Circle  :  In  like  manner,  when  he  has 
 made  a  Creature,  he  mufl:  necefl'arily  tolerate  the  Evil 
 of  Imperfedion  in  it,  which  is  as  eflential  to  it  as 
 an  Equality  of  the  Radii  is  to  the  Circle.  When 
 therefore  Matter,  Morion  and  Fiee-Will  are  confti- 
 tuted,  he  mufl:  neccifarily  permit  Corruption  of 
 things,  and  the  abufe  of  Liberty,  or  fomething 
 worfe.  For  rhefe  cannot  be  feparated  (as  was  fhewn) 
 without  a  Contradiction.  God  therefore  is  no  more 
 impotent  becaufe  he  cannot  remove  iheie  Evils  from 
 things  while  the  things  themfelves  renrain,  than 
 becaufe  he  cannot  feparate  an  Equality  of  the  Radij 
 from  a  Circle.  The  Confequence  then  is  falfe  which 
 charges  God  with  Impotence  becaufe  he  cannot  re- 
 move Evils. 
 Godal-  IX.  Neither  is  that  AfTertion  lefs  falfe  which  at- 
 
 \\'3ys  tributes  it  to  Envy  that  he  will  nor.     For  he  that 
 
 thekail     a^ways  wills  the  beft,  and  the   leafl  of  many  Evils, 
 of  Evils,     is    abfolutely    Good   and  the  fartheft  from   Envy  : 
 and  there-  and  we  have  fhewn  that  this  is  the  Cafe  with  refpe(fl 
 fore  IS  not   po  God.     If  a  Perfon  had  his  Choice  either  to  abo- 
 envious.     j|^  or  not  to  abolilh  Evil,  he  would  be  malicious  if 
 he  did  not  abolifli  ir.     But  when  the  choice  is  be- 
 tween this  and  a  greater  Evil,  he  that  choofes  the  lefs 
 is  far  from  being  malicious.     The  Divine  Goodnefs 
 therefore  reduces  God  to  this  DifEculty,    that  he 
 muft  choofe  to  make  either  no  Creature  at  all,  or  an 
 imperfect  one  ;  either  no  fuch  thing  as  Matter  and 
 
 Motioa 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 **  a  very  good  reafon,  becaufe  he  flioiild  have  taken  away  the 
 *'  Good  at  the  fame  time,  and  becaufe  he  fhould  have  taken 
 *'  avvay  more  Good  than  Evil  [o  ]" 
 
 The  Jinfvoer  of  Ladantius  is  as  follo^ws.  "  Deus  poteft  quic- 
 *'  quid  velit,  &  imbecillitas  vel  invidia  in  Deo  nulla  eft: 
 **  poteft  igitur  mala  tollere,  fed  non  vult;  nee  ideo  tamen  in- 
 
 vidus 
 
 [o.]  Remar^uesp,  478. 
 
S361.  5-  Sub.  6.     Gf  Moral  Evil.  4S9 
 
 Motion,  or  tolerate  Contrariety  and  Corruption  in 
 things ;  cither  no  free  Agent,   or  admit  a  Power  of 
 finning.     He  muft  neccffarily  have  chofen  one  of 
 thefe,  and  'tis  eafy  to  fay  whether  of  them  was  more 
 diredly  oppofite  to  Envy  : 
 
 X.  To  fpeak  my  Thoughts,  I  dare  confidently,  God  couM 
 but   with   Reverence,    pronounce  that  God  would  neither  be 
 neither  have  been  infinitely  powerful  nor  good,    if  ^"""'tcly 
 he  could  not  have  made  any  thing  which  we  call  Evil,  ff  he^were 
 For  there  are  fome  things  poflible  which  are  not  con-  not  able  to 
 fiftent  with  each  other,  nay  are  repugnant  and  mu-  create  im- 
 tually  deftrudive,  i.e.  are  Evils  to  each  other:   ifperfetlBe- 
 God  were  unable  to  produce  any  of  thefe,  hov/  would  ^feature's  • 
 he  be  infinitely    powerful,    fince  he  could  not  do  or  things  * 
 all  that  is  poffible  ?    Nor  would  it  be  lefs  injuri- that  are 
 ous  to  his  Goodnefs  to  be  unwilling,   for  by  this  contrary 
 means  his  Power    mufl:  lie    idle  and   never    effeft  ^^^^^.  ■  ^ 
 any  thing  at  all ;  fince  nothing  can  be  fimply  Good  EvUs-  nor 
 and  exempt  from  all  manner  of  Evil,  but  God  him-  infinitely 
 felf.     If  therefore  the  Divine  Goodnefs  had  deny'd  Good,  it 
 Exifience  to  created  Beings  on  account  of  the  con-  ph^'i 
 comitant  Evils,  he  might  really  have  been  efieem'd  tested  in 
 Envious,  fince  he  had  allow'd  none  to  exift  befide  himfelf, 
 himfelf,  and  while  he  refufed  to  admit  any  kind  of  and  deny'd 
 Evil,  he  would  have  rejefted  all  the  Gcod.     Thus  Exiftence 
 yaniilies   this   Hercnkan  Argument  which  induced  ^IJj^Jg^'^fire 
 
 the 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 «  vidus  ell:  idcirco  enim  non  tollit  quia  fapientim  (ficut  edocui) 
 *«  fimul  tribuit,  &  plus  eft  boni  ac  jucunditatis  in  fapientia, 
 "  quam  in  mails  moleftiae  :  fapientia  enim  facit  ut  etiam  Deum 
 **  cognofcamus  &  per  earn  cognitionem,  imniortalitatem  alTe- 
 "  quamur,  quod  eft  fummum  Bonum.  Itaque  nifi  prius  ma- 
 *«  lum  agnoverimus,  nee  poterimus  agnofcere  Bonum  :  fed  hoc 
 «'  non  vidit  Epicurus,  nee  alius  quifquam,  fi  toUantur  mala 
 *•  tolli  pariter  Sapientiam,  nee  ulla  in  homine  remanere  virtu- 
 *'  tis  veftigia,  cujus  ratio  in  fuftinenda  &  fuperanda  malorum 
 *'  acerbitate  confiitit.  Itaque  propter  exiguum  compendium 
 "  fublatorum,  malorum,  maximo  &  vero  &  proprio  nobis  bono 
 *'  carercmus. 
 
49© 
 
 Epicurns 
 is  deceiv'd 
 who  en- 
 deavours 
 to  attri- 
 bute im- 
 potence 
 and  Envy 
 10  the  Dei- 
 ty, when 
 he  ought 
 to  have 
 inferr'd 
 the  high- 
 eft  Power 
 andGood- 
 
 Of  Mora!  Evil.  Chap.  V. 
 
 the  EpicunoMS  to  difcard  the  good  Deity,  and  the 
 Aianicheans  to  fub/titute  an  Evil  one. 
 
 XI.  EpictirHs  then  is  both  a  Deceiver  and  de- 
 ceived himfeir,  when  from  the  prefenr  Evils  he  con- 
 cludes againft  the  Omnipotence  and  Goodnefs  of  the 
 Deity.  Whereas  on  the  contrary  God  would  nei- 
 ther have  been  pov/erfui  nor  good  if  he  had  not  tole- 
 rated Evils.  From  a  compel  irion  or  (if  we  may  be 
 allow  c  the  Expreincn)  a  Lonflitt  ofuvo  Infinites,  i.  e. 
 Omnipotence  2nd  Gcodnefs,  Evils  neceffarily  arife. 
 Thefe  Attribute^  amirally  confpire  together,  and  ^ti 
 reftrain  and  limit  each  other.  There  is  a  kind  of 
 Struggle  and  Oppofition  between  them,  whereof  the 
 Evils  ,n  Nature  bear  the  Shadow  and  Refemblance. 
 Here  then,  and  no  where  elfe,  may  we  find  the  pri- 
 mary and  moft  certain  Rife  and  Origin  of  Evils  i 
 and  here  only  muft  we  look  for  that  celebrated 
 Principle  of  the  Antients, 
 
 N«Ke5  ^Xifjijtvo*  f^  ^)?p»5  dtfJt/ciTotinret. 
 
 The  Pejiilcntial  Strife  and  Bloody  Fights 
 
 Empedocles 
 
Sea.  I.  491 
 
 APPENDIX^ 
 
 Concerning  the  Dhine  Laws. 
 
 SECT.     I. 
 
 ^iy  God  made  Laws  when  he  knew 
 that  they  would  not  be  ohjerved. 
 
 I.  'Tp  H  E  Divine  Laws  are  either   thofe  which  ^,    _.. 
 
 X     God  has  implanted  in  the  Nature  of  every  vine  Laws 
 Being,  or  thofe  which  he  has  publillied  to  Mankind  are  either 
 in  a  particular  manner,  by  certain  Mejfengers  cholen  natural  or 
 and  lent  for  this  Purpofe.      For  fince  a  Lanj  is  the  po^i^i^^- 
 Will  of  a   Superior  fnjficiemly  promalgd  to  an  Inferior » 
 and    attended  7i>ith  the  Hope  or  Fear  of  Re7vard  or 
 Vnnifloment :    'tis  plain  that  God  may  be  conceiv'd 
 to  have  made  this  Declaration  of  his  Will  to  his 
 Creatures  two  Ways  :  Firft,  by  giving  them  fuch 
 a  Nature  as  requires  that  fome  things  be  done,  and 
 others  avoided,  in  order  to   its  Prefcrvation:  thofe 
 things  which  are  made  known  to  us  in  this  manner, 
 are  commanded  or  forbidden,  we  fay,  by  the  Law 
 of  Nature :    and  that  Law    which  thus  difcovers 
 itfelf  to  our    Underftanding  we  look  upon  as  the 
 Will  of  God  promulg'd  to  his  Creatures :   For  we 
 
 are 
 
49^  appendix.  Sed:.  i, 
 
 are  very  certain  that  God  according  to  his  Good- 
 
 nefs,  vvills  the  Good  and  Prcfervanon  of  all  things 
 
 which  he  himfclf  has  made,    as  far  as  is  polTible: 
 
 and  confequently  hates  any  thing  that  is  hurtful  to 
 
 the  Creature. 
 
 Particular        II,  Now  it  mufl  be  obferv'd  that  thefe  natural 
 
 Laws         Laws  are  either  Vnivcrjal  or  Particular ;  and  ''tis  fit 
 
 ought  to      ^Yic  particular  ones  lliould  give  way  to  the  more  Uni- 
 
 fa^mo^e      verfal,  and  thofc  of  lefs  iviornent  to  the  more  im- 
 
 gcncral       portant.     For  inftance,  'tis  of  the  Nature  of  Body 
 
 ones  fince    that  it  be  capable  of  Motion,  that  it  be  flopp'd  and 
 
 all  kind      broken  in  Pieces  by  meeting  with  others   m  IVIoti- 
 
 «     <^P"g"  Qri,  and  this  is  the  Vmverjal  Laiv  of  Bodies.     Cut 
 
 could  not    it  is  of  the  Nature  of  an  Animal   to  prelerve  itfelf, 
 
 be  avoided  and  ufe  its  utmoft  Endeavour  that  the  Parts  of  its 
 
 Body  be  not  feparated  or  diflblv'd,  and  this   is  the 
 
 particular  Law  of  Animals. 
 
 Now  fince  thefe  Laws  are  (ometimes  inconfiflent, 
 
 it  is  reafonable  that  the  latter,  as  being  a  particular 
 
 one  and  of  lefs  Confequence,   fhould  yield  to  the 
 
 former  :  and  this  is  evidently  the  Will  of  God.     If 
 
 It  be  ask'd.  Why  did  God  make  Laws  which  in 
 
 fome  refpeft  interfere  with  one  another  ?    I  anfwer, 
 
 as  before,  That  this  could  not  be  avoided  without 
 
 a  greater  Evil :    Since  therefore  of  two  Evils  the 
 
 le(s  is  to  be   chofen,    God    will'd   that    particular 
 
 Laws  and  thofe  of  lefs    confequence,    fliould  give 
 
 place  to  the   more  Univerfal  and   thofe    of  greater 
 
 Importance,  rather  than  remove  that  Inconfiftency, 
 
 there  are  arifing  lefs  Inconvenience  to  Nature  from 
 
 thence. 
 
 The  fame       I^^*  ^hc  fame  mufl:  be  faid  of  thofe  Laws  which 
 
 jmiil  be     relate  to    Morality.     'Tis    the    Univerfal    Law  of 
 
 faid  of       Free  Agents,    that  they    fliall  pleafe  thcmfelves  by 
 
 thofeLaws  j^ledjon,    but  there  are  fome  things  eligible  which 
 
 Tte  w  t'lie  "^-^y  ^^  prejudicial  to  fome  particular  Beings.     Now 
 
 iDoral        it  is  better,  as  was  faid  before,    that   Parciculars  be 
 
 Woid.  injur'd. 
 
bed.  I.  Appendix.  ^^^ 
 
 injur'd,  than  that  the  Univerfal  Law  of  Free  Agents 
 be  violated.  We  mud  luppofe  then  that  God  wil- 
 led this  as  the  lefs  Evil  of  the  two.  Men  are  per- 
 mitted therefore  to  abufe  their  Free  Will,  and  'tis 
 necefTary  that  God  fliould  tolerate  either  this  Incon- 
 venience or  a  greater.  But  it  is  not  at  all  necefTary 
 that  Man  fliould  make  an  Evil  Choice  ;  therefore  he 
 alone  is  faulry  ;  for  it  proceeds  from  his  Ad:  that 
 God  is  reduced  to  a  neceffiry  of  choofing  the  leaft 
 among  many  Evils. 
 
 IV.  From  hence  it  appears  that  all  the  Laws  of  Why  God 
 Nature  are  always  obferv'd  according  to  the  Will  is  faid  to 
 and  Intent  of  God.     For  he  will'd  that  theparticu-  '^^^n^J7 
 lar  fhould  give  place  to  the  General  ones,  and  that  jj^^  ^ 
 Man  fhould  fin  rather  than  be  driven  from  Sin  by  his  Will 
 force.     You'll  fay,   why  then  is  he  angry  at  Sin- is  always 
 nets,  fince  nothing  is  done  againfl:  his  Will  ?  I  an-  ^°"^- 
 fwer :   When  Anger  is  attributed  to  God,    'tis  af- 
 ttr  the    manner   of  Men  t  ;    whereas  it    is  ordered 
 and  affeded  by  the  very  Nature  and  Conftitution 
 of  things  that  whoever  does  any  thing  in  oppofi- 
 tion  to  any  Law  of  Nature,  tho'  it  be  a  particular 
 one,  fhall  bring  Tome  Inconvenience  upon  himfelf. 
 By  which  contrivance  God  has  taken  care  that  the 
 very  leaft  law  fliould  not   be  violated    raflily  and 
 without  Necefl'uy.     When  an  Offender   therefore, 
 who  willingly  breaks  a   particular  Lav/,  brings  cer- 
 tain Milery  upon  himfelf,  God  who  wifely  coup- 
 led thefe  together,  is  faid  to  be  angrj :    Becaufe  a 
 Man  in  Anger  would  not  take  any  other  or  more 
 effedual    Reverge  on   the   Perfon    that    provok'd 
 him  ;  and  the  Evil   which   naturally  attends  a  bad 
 Eleftion  is  to  be  efteem'd  a  Punifliment  inflifled  as 
 it  were  by  an  angry  God. 
 
 +  fee  Chap,  i.  §.  5.  par.  10.  and'^oXt  C. 
 
 V.  As 
 
494  Appendix.  Sed.  i. 
 
 God  may  V.  As  to  the  fecond  fort  of  Divine  Laws,  viz., 
 alter  or  the  Pojitive  i  'tis  certain  that  God,  who  is  the  Au- 
 add  toj^he  ji^^j.  ^£-  ]s^3j.yrg  ^^^  eftablil"h'd  the  Laws  of  it,  can 
 Nature  either  alter  them  or  add  to  them  when  he  fees  it 
 and  give  proper.  Neither  does  he  want  Means,  whenever 
 us  affur-  he  pleafes,  to  aflure  Mankind  that  he  will  do  it. 
 ance  that  When  therefore  we  find  any  Alteration  in  the 
 t^d'^'^fo-^  Laws  of  Nature,  we  may  from  hence  conclude 
 hence  the  that  Cod  demands  our  Attention.  And  hereupon 
 origin  of  we  efteem  the  Promulgation  of  a  new  Law  re- 
 pofitive  commended  to  us  by  this  Token  to  be  an  authen- 
 Lawsand  ^j^  Declaration  of  the  Will  of  God.  In  this  man- 
 tion.  "  ^^^  "^^^'"^  ^•^"'^  Mojaic  and  Evangelic  Laws  eftabliih'd  ; 
 viz,,  by  Miracles. 
 
 VL  But  it  is  ufually  a^k*d,  Why  did  God  efta- 
 Laws  are  blifl^  and  promulge  thofe  Laws  which  he  knew 
 tie  means  y^^^   would   not  obferve  ?    It  mufl   be   anfwer'd, 
 
 of  inform-       ,  ir^  »/.  r  •••!- 
 
 ing  Free-  That   theie  Laws  are   Means  of   acquamtmg  Free 
 
 Agents  of  Agents   with  what  is  expedient  for  them,  and  of 
 
 what  is  movine    them  to  the  choice  of  ir.     Neither  does 
 
 uieiui  or  ^i^gjj.  ^jfu^g  admit  of  any   that  are  more  efficaci- 
 
 tQ  them.  ^^"^  •  ^°''  ^^  ^^  ^^^^^  ^^  muft  be  perfuaded  and  not 
 compeli'd.  Notwithftanding  therefore  God  knew 
 that  his  Laws  would  not  be  obierv'd  by  all,  yet  he 
 propofes  them  to  all,  for  by  this  Means  a  great 
 many  learn  their  true  Intereft,  thankfully  embrace 
 the  Laws  and  obey  them  ;  and  the  reft  are  no 
 worfe  for  them,  lince  they  would  be  involv'd  in 
 the  fame  Evils  which  they  feel  from  the  Sanction 
 of  the  Laws,  and  perhaps  greater,  tho'  thcfe  Laws 
 had  never  been.  (85.) 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 (85.)  'Tis  a  very  ufeful  Obfervation  which  out  Author  makes 
 in  this  place,  and  illuftrates  in  the  following  Section,  par.  3 . 
 'v'.-r..  that  the  Divine  Laws  (efpecially  thofe  of  the  Chrijiian 
 DiipenOtion)  are  chiefly  Declarations   of  the  natural  and  ne- 
 
 ceffary 
 
Sed.  I.  Appendix.  49^ 
 
 But  granting  that  fome  who  tranfgrefs  the  Laws 
 meet  with  greater  and  more  Inconveniencies  than 
 they  would  have  done  without  them,  'tis  better  that 
 lome  iliould  (ufFer  Inconveniencies  thro'  their  own 
 fault,  than  that  all  fhould  be  depriv'd  of  ths  Bene- 
 fit of  the  Divine  Laws,-  God  therefore  out  of  in- 
 finite Goodnefs,  which  is  always  incUn'd  to  the  beft, 
 promulg'd  thofe  Laws  which  he  knew  all  Men 
 would  not  obferve. 
 
 SECT* 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 cefTary  Effects  of  Sin,  or  DireSiions  and  Means  to  avoid  them  ; 
 which  neceflary  Effefts  are  conceived  to  be  the  real  SanSlion 
 ot"  thefe  Laws.  Confequently  thcle  Laws  cannot  properly 
 bring  us  into  a  worfe  State  than  we  fliould  have  been  in  with- 
 out them. They  do  not  introduce  a  new  Train  of  arbitrary 
 
 and  additional  Evils,  but  on  the  contrary  are  defign'd  in  pure 
 Goodnefs  to  lefTen  the  Number  of  the  old  ones, to  fore- 
 warn us  of  the  natural  Confequences  of  our  own  Adls  and 
 Habits,  and  prevent  thofe  Moral  Evils  to  which  we  are  expof- 
 
 ■sd  by  the  very  conftitution  of  our  Being  ; which  the  uni- 
 
 verial  Law  of  Liberty  makes  it  pofTible  for  us  to  incur,  and 
 impoffible  for  God  to  hinder  by  any  other  means,  as  has  been 
 Ihevvn  above.  Farther;  this  Notion,  that  mofl;  of  the  Mifery 
 both  in  this  World  and  the  next  is  the  ncceJJ'ar^  Confequence 
 of  finful  Acftions  according  to  the  fix'd  Laws  of  Nature,  rather 
 than  any  pofitive  Punifhment  immedi.itely  inflided  by  the  De- 
 ity, will,  I  am  apt  to  think,  have  the  greateft  Influence  on 
 mofl  Men  to  deter  them  from  fuch  Aftions.  I  am  fure  I  find 
 myfelf  more  deeply  afFefted  with  this  Rcfle£tion  that  Mifery 
 will  follow  of  Courfe  upon  fome  certain  Praftices,  and  that  by 
 indulging  them  I  naturally  and  neceflarily  dellroy  myfelf,  thaji 
 I  fhould  be  by  a  Profpeft  of  the  very  lame  Degree  of  Paia 
 threatned  as  a  Punifliment  for  fuch  Practices.  And  the  Rea- 
 fon  of  this  is  evident:  I  am  apt  Itill  to  hope  that  the  latter  may 
 poffibly  be  remitted  ;  but  the  former  leaves  no  room  for  Hope, 
 Again,  A  due  attention  to  this  Doclrine  that  all  our  moral 
 Happinefs  in  this  World  muftbe  of  our  own  making,  and  that 
 diforderd.  Evil  Affedtions,  irregular  and  perverfe  Habits,  i^c. 
 will  conftitute  a  great  part  of  our  Hell,  in  the  next,  (which 
 might  be  fliewn  in  the  fame  manner  as  was  hinted  concerning 
 Virtuous  Habits,  in  Note,  79  but  is  rendered  «nneceflary  by 
 
 the 
 
49^  Appendix.  Scd.  2. 
 
 SECT.    II. 
 
 Concerning  Divine  Rewards  and 
 PuniJJjments, 
 
 Punifh-      l.TTT  was   proper  to  fay   fomething   concerning 
 
 mturar^        X  theP^",  fince  Punifhment  is  a  natural  Evil,  viz,. 
 
 Evil  con-    P^in?  Difappoinrment  of  Appetite,  or  Damage  an- 
 
 neaed        nex'd  to  a  wrong  Choice,  by  a  Forefight  whereof 
 
 with  ade-  we  might  be  deterr'd  from  making  a  wrong  Choice. 
 
 Choke       "^"  ^^^'^  confifls  the  Power  and  Efficacy  of  Laws, 
 
 nor  would  they  be  of  any  force  without  them.  Now 
 
 Good  or  Evil,  /.  e.  Rewards  and  Punilliments,  may 
 
 be  annex'd,  either  by  Nature,  cr  by  Laws  of  pofi  - 
 
 tive  Inftitution. 
 
 IL  As 
 
 NOTE  S, 
 
 the  Authors  there  mention'd.)  This  Dodrine,  I  lay,  if  right- 
 ly imderftood  and  apply'd,  would  dilcover  the  weaknefs  of  all 
 fuch  pretences  to  Salvation  as  are  built  upon  the  bare  Belict 
 of,  or  Confidence  in  what  any  other  has  done  or  can  do  for 
 us ;  or  even  of  what  we  do  ourfelves  purely  by  way  of  Opus 
 Operatum,  i.  e.  as  ultimately  relying  on  the  bare  Difcharge  of 
 any  Duty,  and  not  ufing  and  applying  it  as  a  means  to  Ibnie 
 farther  End,  v.  g.  on  Prayer,  as  the  mere  Labourof  the  Lips  ; 
 on  the  Sacrament  as  a  Charm  ;  on  Repentance  as  a  fimple  Att 
 entitling  us  to  Happinefs ;  in  fhort,  of  any  thing  which  does 
 not  enter  the  Heart  and  improve  the  Temper.  If  Heaven  be 
 not  fo  much  the  Rc^^iard  of  Religion,  as  the  natural  Confe' 
 qitence  oi  ^.  religious  Frame  of  Mind,  and  'vice  njerfa;  then 
 how  abiurd  is  it  for  us  who  are  afpiring  after  that  State,  to 
 flop  by  the  way,  to  rcil  in  any  particular  Afts  of  Religion  as 
 arbitrary  InlHtutions  procuring,  and  as  it  were  purchajing  it 
 iox  us,  inltead  of  ufing  them  as,  what  they  really  are,  fit  In- 
 
 ftrumcnts 
 
Sedl.  2.  Jlppendly:.  jgy 
 
 II  As  to  jVaturey    all  Evil  is   prejudicial  to  it,  Evil  is 
 i.e.  inteniipts  its  CoiiiTe :  Evil  therefore  proceeds  ^'"^'^nce 
 from   foine   Violence    done    to    Nature,   and    that  ^"^ '^. 
 which   offers    Violence   mafl:   neceffarily   fuffer  it;  i^j^'^t  "^J' 
 for  every  natuial  Adion  has  Re-aAion  join'd  with  natural 
 ir.     According    to  the  Laws   of   Mechanifm  then  Aflion  lias 
 Evil  done  to  another  is  for  the  mofl  part  repay'd  ^^  ''•'^t'on 
 with  Evil  to  the  Doer,  e.  e.  with  Punilliment.     By  denTto^it' 
 which  piece  of  Machinery  or  Contrivance  God  has  therefore  * 
 manifefted   both  his  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs.     For  he  that 
 by  this  Mean:>  he  has  taken  effecflual  Care  that  none  ^°'^^  ^'°" 
 (liould  tranrg'-efs  the  Eaws  of  Nature  without  Pu-  necSii^ 
 nifhment,  or  offer  unneceffary  Violence  to  the  Ap-  fufFerVio- 
 petites  of  others  j    or  if  it   were  neceffary  to  offer  Icnce, 
 !t,    yet  that  it    fliould   not    be   v/ithout  (ome  In-  ^^^^t  none 
 convenience  to  him  that  dees  offer  it.     h  is  better  "^7^"^ 
 that  a  Creature  fliould  be  able  to  provide  for  its  Punifli, 
 own  Safety  with  fome  Inconveniencies,  than  that  ment. 
 it  fliould  be  at  Liberty  to  offer  needlefs  Violence 
 to  others,  and  the  Laws  belonging  to  their  parti- 
 cular Nature  be  broken  to  no  manner  of  end :  For 
 by  that  means  there   would  be  more  Evils  in  Na- 
 ture than  there  are  at  prefentj  and  they  would  be 
 multiply'd  unneceffarily.     Hence   it    appears    how 
 worthy  it  is  of  God  to  have  formed  the  Nature  of 
 things  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  from  the  very  Con- 
 ftituiion   of  them  the  Intemperate,   Injurious,  the 
 Thief,    Robbers    Adulterer,    Proud,  Envious,  ^c. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 flrurnents  to  nuork  out  our  own  Suh'ation  by  prodacuty  this 
 frame  of  A'lincl  in  us;  as  proper  Helps  and  A iTiftances  enab- 
 ling us  to  acquire  this  Heavenly  Temper  ?  And  on  the  other 
 Side,  how  vain  muft  be  our  Hopes  of  efcaping  Hell  by  any 
 fuch  Methods  as  thefe,  if  we  ilill  carry  our  Hell  within  us  ? 
 
 'The  Mind  is  i?t  //s  oi'.v/  Place,  and  in  itjelf 
 
 Can  make  a  Heav'n  of  Hell,  e.  Hell  ofHea'v'it' 
 
 See  Par.   1 1 ,  offljefolloiving  Sed, 
 
 K  k  fliould 
 
49^  appendix,  Sed.  2. 
 
 Ihould  have  fomcthing  to  dread.  If  any  one  ask 
 why  there  are  not  luch  Punilliments  as  might  ef- 
 fedually  imprint  a  hvely  fenfe  upon  our  Minds 
 and  thereby  totally  reftrain  us  from  a  wrong  Choice? 
 I  anfwer:  A  greater  Evil  muft  not  be  done  on  ac- 
 count of  a  lefs ;  but  if  the  Punifhments  and  Dread 
 of  them  were  increas'd  to  fuch  a  Degree  as  to  be 
 fufficient  to  prevent  all  kind  of  Evil,  they  them- 
 felves  would  be  the  greareft  of  all  Evils,  and  the 
 dread  of  them  would  more  deeply  affecl,  and  be  a 
 greater  Afflidion  to  the  Minds  of  Men,  even  of 
 thofe  who  would  not  doamifs,  than  the  Evils  them- 
 felves  are,  for  the  Prevention  of  which  thefe  Pu- 
 nillmients  are  propofed  by  God.  It  was  therefore 
 fit  that  there  lliould  be  feme  meafure  in  Punifli- 
 ments;  'viz..  leaft  by  being  always  prefent  to  the 
 Minds  of  Mortals  they  fliould  prove  a  greater  Pre- 
 judice to  our  Eafe  and  Happinefs,  than  thofe  very 
 Evils  which  are  prohibited  under  the  Penalty  of  them 
 would  be,  were  we  forced  to  undergo  them. 
 Pofitlve  III.  As  to  the  Punifliments  which  God  has  af- 
 
 Lavys  ac-  fix'd  by  way  of  Santlion  to  pojitive  Laws-,  we  muft 
 ^"•^rV"^  afBrm  that  they  are  to  be  elieem'd  as  Admoniti- 
 Punifli-  °"^  ^"'^  Notices  of  the  Mifchiefs  confequent  upon 
 ments  evil  Ele<5lions,  rather  than  that  God  himfelf  will 
 which  at-  immediately  infiid  them.  Natural  Confcience  is 
 tend  de-  f-Q^.  ^j^g  jj^^fj-  p^^^  fufficiently  able  to  inform  us  what 
 Y%  j^g  '  is  Good  and  whan  Evil :  but  it  was  impoffible  for 
 from  the  Nature  to  acquaint  us  with  all  the  Confequcnces 
 Nature  of  which  attend  our  Adiions  in  an  Infinite  Train 
 the  thing,  and  Continuance  of  things.  Nov/,  Icafl  we  fhould  be 
 'l  •  involv'd  in  Evils  unawares,  and  contrary  to  our  Ex- 
 flifl  new  pedations,  God  ha>  inforn.'d  us  by  pofitive  Laws 
 ones.  what  our  Condition  m.uft  be  if  we  will  indulge  our- 
 
 felves  in  Evil  Elections.     And  has  promulg'd  thrra 
 by  way  of  Ptimjhmcnti  denounc'd,  rather  than  by 
 fimple  Preditlicn-,  that  they  might  enter  more  deep- 
 ly 
 
Seel.  2.  Appendix,  499 
 
 ly  into  our  Minds,  and  oblige  us  to  take  care  of  Tliat  the 
 ouifelves.  ^^^^?^'"S 
 
 ,,-„        -ri  1  1-  \  ■   ^     •  and  ni- 
 
 IV.  But  it  there  be  any  tmng  which  is  not  re-  ^^^^n'y 
 ducible  to  this  head,  and  feem^  to  prove  an  imme-  Puniflx- 
 diate  InflitJion  by  the  Deity,    neither  is   that  done  ments  pre- 
 without  Reafon.     For  it  is  fit  that  God  lliould  re-  ^'^'^^^ 
 move  that  Being  out  of  the  World  which  cannot  be  ^l^^^^^ 
 made  confiftent  with  the  Good  of  the  Univerfe  :  and  'Tis  ask'd 
 reform  that  by  Chaftifement  which  would  othervv-ife,  in  the  \jl 
 thro'  its  irregular  Motion,  prove  ofFcnfive  to  the  Au-  place, how 
 thor,  and  all  about  it.     Punilliments  then  are  annex'd  ^g^\"on- 
 to  Evil  Eledions  in  order  to  prevent  them,  and  in-  cii'd  with, 
 Aided   to  correB  and  amend  the  Offenders,    or   to  eternal 
 deter  others  from   the  like  Offences.     If  therefore  P^nifh- 
 the  Appointment  and  Infliftion  of  Punilliments  pre-  "^l^\ 
 vent  greater  Evils  than  they  are  themfelves ;  it  fol-  (jo^'t  feem 
 lows  that  God  has  chofen  the  better  Part  in  eftablilh-  capable 
 ing  and  exacting  them.  either  of 
 
 V.  It  may  be  a>k'd,  how  this  can  agree  with  the  reforming 
 Punilliments  of  the  V/icked,    which  the  Chrifiian  jfhed^or 
 Religion  declares  to  be    Eternal  ^^     For   in  the   firft  of  being  a 
 pbce,  'tis  plain  that  they  are  not  infiifted  either  to  warning 
 reform  the  Guilty   (for  there  is  no  room  for  Refor-  |^°  °^^^[^,^ 
 mation  in  Hell)    or  to  deter  others  from  the  like  j^  the^a^ 
 Guilt :  for  Sin  will  be  at  an  end,  and  the  very  polli-  pj^ce  how 
 bilicy  of  finning  taken   away  before  they  iliall  be  Punifh-? 
 inflifled.     They  can  neither  be  of  ufe  to  the  Dead  ^cnts  can 
 therefore,  nor  to  the  Living;   for  they  are  kept  fe-  f^^g^t'^g* 
 cret  while  they  might  be  of  any  ufe.     Confequent-  agreeable 
 iy  there  feems  to  be  forae  other  end  of  thefe  Pu-  to  Good- 
 niflinients,  viz.,  to  make  Saiisfadion  to  the  Divine  nefs  to 
 Vengeance  for  the  Injury  and  Affront  offer'd  to  his  ^^J^  "^^" 
 
 M^jefty-  ,  things  in 
 
 VI.  Secondly,  Thefe    Eternal  Torments  appear  fuch  a 
 to  be  not  very' agreeable  to  the  Divine  O Economy  manner 
 in  another  refpe(S.     For  it  is  to  be  obferv'd  that  ^^^  ^°" 
 God  has  framed  all  things   and  dtfpofed  them  in  ^\Xi  re- 
 fuch  a  manner,  that  nothing  may  repent  of  its  hav-  pentofits 
 
 K  k  i  ing  being  ? 
 
5GO  Appendix,  Sed.  2." 
 
 ibg  been  rnade  by  him :  for  when  it  is  come  to  this 
 that  its  Mifery  exceeds  its  Pleafure,  the  Being  pc- 
 rirhes,  and  is  withdrawn  from  both.     Not  to  exifi 
 therefore,  or  not  to  perceive  any  means  of  Relief, 
 is  the  very  word  Condition,  as  was  fliewn  before  t« 
 A  violent  Objeft  not   only  deftroys  the  Senfory, 
 but  takes  away  the  Senfe  itfelf  j  the  Divine  Good- 
 nefs  providing  that  no  Creature  fhould  be  worfe  by 
 its  Exigence  than  if  it  had  not  exifted.     And  as  far 
 as  appears,  thinking  Beings  ought  to  be  dealt  with 
 after    the  fame  manner,  viz..  When  Pain,  Sorrow, 
 Fear,  Anxiety,  and  the  reft  of  the  Paffions  and  Af- 
 fedions  increafe  to  fo  great  a  Degree  that  the  Mind 
 receives  more  Evil  than  Good  from   the  Senfe  of 
 its  Exiftence,  'tis  realonable  that  the  Excefs  of  thefe 
 fhould  exringuifti  Thought  itfelf,  as  the  Excefs  of 
 bodily  Pains  deftroys  the  Senfe  :     Otherwife  thefe 
 miferable  Beings  feem   to  receive  no  Benefit  from 
 God,  fince  Providence  has  reduced  them  to  a  State 
 worfe  than    that  Ncn-exljience   in  which    it   found 
 them  [p.]  Neither  does  it  feem  a  fufficient  Vindi- 
 cation of  the  Divine  Goodnefs,  to  fay,  that  this  be- 
 falls them  thro'  their  own  Fault,   for  it  is  hardly 
 sgreeable  to  Goodnefs  to  have  placed  any  Being  in 
 that  State  which  was  obnoxious  to  fuch  excelfive 
 Mifeiy:   For  who  would  choofe  Exiftence  attend- 
 ed with  a  danger  that  fo  very  much  over-ballances 
 it?  He  is  not  a  wife  Man  that  expofes  all  his  E- 
 Itate  to  hazard,  nor  a  good  Man  that  obliges  any 
 one  to  do  it, 
 'Tis  ask'd,      VII.  Thirdly,  Whatever  is  perpetual  muft  have 
 •^ly,\io\\  ^yi^my^i  2,n6. perpetual Cauje ;  for  a  perpetual  Miracle 
 ments  can  *^  "°^  ^^    ^^  expeded.     If  therefore  the  Punifh- 
 fubfift    '    ments  of  the  Wicked  be  eternal,  it  feems  neceffa- 
 ■vvithout  a  I  ry  for  thefe   Punifliments  to  arife  from  the   Laws 
 
 natural 
 
 t  Ch.  4.  §.  8.  par.  5. 
 
 [/]  See  Matth.  26.  24.  and  Mark  14.  24. 
 
Sedl.  2,  Appendix^  ^OX 
 
 and  Conftitution  of  Nature.  For  it  is  fcarce  con- 
 ceivable how  a  State  of  Violence  fnould  be  perpe- 
 tual. I  have  propofed  ihefe  Objedions  at  length, 
 left  I  fhoLild  feem  to  have  declined  them  on  ac- 
 count of  their  Difficulty.   (86'.) 
 
 VIII.  As  to  the  firft  Objeftion,  I  anfwer:  It  ap-  ^g  ^j^^ 
 pears  from  the  Light  of  Nature  that  there  fliall  be  firft'tisan- 
 future  Pumll.imentSi  but  Inot  that  thefe  fhall  be  Eter-  Twci'd, 
 nal:  we  muft  not  therefore  enquire  of  Natural  Rea-  "^^at  eter- 
 lon    why   they    are  infli(fted;    for  they  belong  to  n^ii^ients 
 reveal'd  Religion,   by   which  they  are  denounced:  are  made 
 that  is,  there  may  be  a  Reafon  for  them,  but  fuch  known  to 
 as  is  beyond  the  mere  natural  Sagacity  of  Man  to  "^  V  R^- 
 difcover.     Now  we  find  many  things  of  this  kind  ^^^^  ^'j""^' 
 in  Nature  j  it  does  not  therefore  follow,  becaufe  the  God  is  not 
 Goodnefs  of  God  has  reveal'd  to  us  that  the  Pu-  therefore 
 nifliment  of  the  Wicked  fhall  endure  for  ever,  that  oblig'd  to 
 
 ^  he  ^^vealhow 
 
 -'    -^  or  why 
 
 they  are 
 NOTES.  fo:  per- 
 
 haps  the 
 
 (86.)  The  chief  of  thofe  Authors  who  feem  to  oppofe  the  Reafon  is 
 ftri£},  abfolutc  Eternity  of  Hell  Torments,  are  ABp. '////o/yow,  above  our 
 7.  Burnet,  de  Statu  Mart.  Ch.  lO.  p.  290,  l3c.  T.  Sivinden  in   Compre- 
 thc  Appendix  to  his  Book  on  Hell.     The  Author  of  the  Anno-  henfion. 
 tations  on  Lux  Orientalis,   p.  73,  74.  S.  CoUiber  in  his  Impar- 
 tial Enquiry,  p.  105,  i^c.  and  his  EJfay  on  ReveaVd  Religion , 
 p.  142,  ^c.    Bayle,  Epifcopius,  and   the  Fratres  Poloni.     See 
 alfo  Fabricii  Deledus   ArgumentorHm,     ^c.    C.    47.    p.    7 20. 
 and  two  Pieces  in  the  Phenix.     Or  White's  Relloration   of 
 all  Things.  Printed   A.  D.    171 2.  in  the  Preface  to   which 
 many  other  Authors  both  antient  and  modern,  are  cited  to 
 the  fame  purpofe. 
 
 Some  of  thofe  who  have  particularly  infilled  on  the  Defence 
 of  it  are  ABp.  Da-ues,  Jenkin,  Fiddes,  Lupton,  Lake,  Sherlock. 
 on  Pro'vidence,  Ch.  2.  and  on  ^  future  State.  Rymer,  Part  I  ft. 
 Chap.  7.  Nicholas  Conference  nvith  a  Theifi,  Part  3.  p.  309,  &c. 
 Whitbv.  Appendix  to  zd  Theff.  Scott's  Chrijiian  Life,  Vol.  5. 
 p  91,  b'f.  Sw.  andDifcourfe  22d.  p.  435,  i^  2d  Vol.  of  his 
 Works,  Fol.  Patrick.  WitneJJh  of  Chriflianity,  Part  2d. 
 "^ates  on  the  Exijie-nce  of  Cod,  ^c.  Ch.  12.  Sec  the  follow- 
 ing Note  and  N.  90. 
 
 >         ,  (8;.;  S^e. 
 
502  Appendix,  Se^.  2. 
 
 he  is  alfo  obliged  to  reveal  why  and  how  that  comes 
 to  pafs.     For  perhaps  it  may  be  above  the  Power 
 of  our  Mind  to  conceive  it  in  the  prefent  ftate  of 
 Things. 
 It  docs  not      ]X.  Secondly,  Who  will  undertake  to  fiiew  that 
 appear  but  theEtern.il  Punifliment  of  the  Wicked  has  no  Ten- 
 Punifh-      dency  towards  confirming  good  fvien  in  the  Choice 
 ments  of    of  their  Duty  ?   (87.)    if  God  make  ufe  oi  A^leans 
 the  Wick-  for  that    End,    and  do  not  immediately    exert  his 
 ed  may  be  Omnipotence  aione,    fcarce  could  any  other  more 
 the^Good  ^^^^^ual  Means  be  found  out  to  make  the  BlelTed 
 '  approve  them.felves  in    their  Choice   conformed  to 
 the  Divine  Wi'l,    and  perfevere  therein,    than  the 
 continual  Contemplation  of  thofe  miferable   Beings 
 V'ho  have   done  otherwife.      Eledion  is  matter  of 
 Freedom,  and   not  to  be  excited  or   prevented   by 
 other  means  than  a  Reprefentation  of  Good  or  Evil 
 to  the   Underftanding.     Since   therefore   God   has 
 undertaken  to  condud  and  preferve  an  almoft  infi- 
 nite multitude  of  thinking  Beings  to  all  Eternity, 
 thro'  all   the  Changes  and  Succeffions  of  things,  in 
 as  great  a  degree  of  Happinefs  as  is  noffible,  without 
 
 Vio- 
 
 N  OT  E  S, 
 
 {^j.)  See  ABp.  Dnr^'cs's  Serm.  5.  p.  73,  is'c-  or  Note  83. 
 Or  it  may  be  for  the  perpetual  Benefit  and  Improvement  of 
 fome  other  Syftems ;  fee  the  latter  end  of  Note  Ri.  Or  per- 
 haps for  a  /landing  Monument  aud  Warning  to  the  Heathen 
 World  during  their  State  of  Probation,  which  for  ought  we 
 know,  may  be  extended  beyond  this  Life,  as  well  as  that  of 
 Chriftians  thcmfelves. 
 
 SttScotfa  Chrifiian  Ufe,  ^-vo.   2d  Vol   p.  551. 
 
 Something  of  this  kind,  I  humbly  apprehend,  muft  be  con- 
 teiv'd  as  the  Reafon  for  Hell-Torments,  in  order  to  make  them 
 confifient  with  perfeft  Goodnefs  [q.]  how  long  foever  this 
 may  be  neceflary  to  continue,  or  whatever  Ave  fuppofc  the 
 Nature  of  thefe  Torments  to  be;  of  which  beio'-v. 
 
 (3.']  See  Note  iz 
 
 (88.) 
 
Sed.  2.  Appendix,  ^o^ 
 
 Violence  done  to  Eledions;  where  is  the  Wonder 
 if  he  leave  a  few  to  the  Mifery  which  they  brought 
 upon  themfelves,  thereby  to  give  the  reft  a  Warn- 
 ing how  much  they  ought  to  ftand  upon  their 
 guard  againfl:  the  like?  There's  no  neceffity  there- 
 fore to  attribute  eternal  Punifliment  to  the  Divine 
 Vengecince-i  (nor  is  there  properly  any  fuch  thing  in 
 God,  but  it  is  afcribed  to  him,  as  other  human  Paf- 
 ilons  are  in  condefcenfion  to  our  Capaaty. )  For 
 lince  thefe  Punifhments  may  be  conceiv'd  to  pro- 
 mote the  good  of  the  whole,  they  may  arife  from 
 the  Goodnejs,  and  not  the  Vengeance  of  the  Deity. 
 
 X.  As   to  the  fecond   Objedion,    The   Matter  To  the  fe- 
 is  yet  in  debate  whether  it  were  better  to  be  mifera-  '^o"^  "^ 
 ble  than  not  to  be  at  all,  and  there  are  Arguments  on  jj/^t  the 
 both  Sides.  (88.)    'Tis  manifeft  that,  what  the  Ob-  matter  is 
 jedion  mentions,  v'lz,.  thofe  Evils  which  over-bal-  yctindc- 
 lance  the  Deiire  and  Happinefs  of  Life  put  an  End  to  ^'^^  .^^'^'" 
 Life  itfelf,  and  that  fuch  Oojecfts  as  are  hurtful  to  rhe  pj-g^rable 
 Senfe,  at  length  deftroy  it.     The  fame  feems  to  hold  to  be  mi- 
 good    in    thinking    Subftances,   viz..    thofe  things  ferable  or 
 which  affeft  the  Mind  to  a  higher  Degree  than  it  not  to  be 
 is  able  to  bear,  may  in  like  manner  put  an  end  to  ^^}'      * 
 it.     For  they  may  be  fuppofed  either  to  drive  us  theDlm^  - 
 to  Madnefs,  or  fo  far  to  diforder  the  thinking  Fa-  ed  may  be 
 cuhy,  as  to  make  us  think  of  nothing  at  all.     Who  likethatof 
 K  k  4  can  Madmen. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (88.)  A  moft  elaborate  Difputation  on  this  Subjeft  may  b? 
 feen  in  Bp.  Barlows  Remains,  p.  470,  i^c.  But  our  Author, 
 in  the  laft  Subfedl.  of  his  Book,  par  5,  ^c.  very  reafonably 
 grants,  "That  Non-exijleme  becomes  preferable  to  Exijievce  tuheu- 
 e^jer  the  Sum  of  Mifery  exceeds  that  of  Happinefs,  and  Evil  be- 
 comes predominant  in  the  n.vhole ',  and  therefore  if  he  takes  this 
 Queftion  in  the  fame  Senfe,  he  had  no  great  occafio-n  to  ftart  it. 
 Nay  the  Queftion  will  be  about  an  abfolute  Impojjibility,  if 
 any  Mifery  which  over  ballances  the  Happinefs  of  Life  do 
 ipfo  faSio  put  an  end  to  Life,  as  our  Author  maintains  in  this 
 very  Paragraph:  Concerning  which  Notioa  fee  Not?  37. 
 
5^4 
 
 The 
 
 Damned 
 
 choofe 
 
 their  mi- 
 
 ferable 
 
 State,  as 
 
 Lovers, 
 
 angry, 
 
 ambitious, 
 
 envious 
 
 Perfons 
 
 indulge 
 
 themfelvcs 
 
 in  thofe 
 
 things 
 
 which  in- 
 
 crcafe 
 
 their  Mi- 
 
 fery. 
 
 Appendix.  Se(fl.  2. 
 
 can  tell  then  whether  the  Pimifliment  of  the  Wick- 
 ed may  nor  lead  them  into  a  kind  of  Phrenfy  and 
 Madnef?  Thus  they  may  indeed  be  very  mifera- 
 ble,  and  become  a  lad  Spe<5^acle  to  others;  they 
 may  be  fenfible  of  their  Mifery  alfo,  and  ftrive  a- 
 gainft  it  with  all  their  Power;  but  while  they  don'c 
 obferve  or  beheve  that  it  is  founded  m  preverfe  E- 
 leftion,  they  may  hug  themfelves  in  the  Caufe  the 
 Effccfts  ^A^  hereof  they  abhor;  being  ftillwife  in  their 
 own  Opinion,  and  as  it  were  plealingthemielvesin 
 their  IVJi  ery. 
 
 Thus  the  more  they  labour  under  it,  the  more 
 they  embrace  the  Caule  of  it,  and  thereby  become 
 their  own  hindrance  from  ever  getting  free;  and 
 will  not  fuifcr  themfelves  ro  be  any  thing  but  what 
 they  are.  This  we  fee  done  daily  by  mad  and  fran- 
 tic Perfons,  and  reckon  it  a  pare  of  their  Unhap- 
 pinefs.  The  Divine  Goodnefs  therefore  is  not  to 
 be  charg'd  with  Cruelty  for  letting  them  continue 
 in  that  Exiflence,  tho'  it  be  very  miferable,  when 
 they  themfelves  will  not  have  it  remov'ci:  or  for 
 not  altering  their  Condition,  which  they  utterly  re- 
 fufe  to  have  alrer'd.  'Tis  better  i^or  them  indeed 
 not  to  be,  than  to  be  :  but  only  in  the  Opinion  of 
 wife  Men,  to  which  they  do  not  afient.  For  they 
 indulge  themfelves  in  their  obQinate  Eledrion,  and 
 tho'  every  way  fui  rounded  and  opprefs'd  with  Woes, 
 yet  will  they  not  alter  what  they  have  once  embraced, 
 We  have  frequent  examples  in  this  Life  rcfembling 
 thi>  kind  of  Obftinacy. 
 
 XL  We  fee  perverfe  People  voluntarily  under- 
 going Pain-,  Afiiidions,  Torments,  and  even  Death 
 itfelfi  rather  than  repent  of  their  Rcfolution  and 
 change  what  they  have  oncedetermin'd  in  their  Mind. 
 Nor  is  it  uncommon  for  fome  to  indulge  and  in  a 
 manner ^/^<^'^ themfelves  in  their  very  Miferies.  Thus 
 the  forrowful  love  all  fuch  thin.<TS  as  aojrravate  and 
 foment  their  Grief:    and  in  like  manner  the  En- 
 
 viousn 
 
Se£t.  2.  Appendix »  g>> 
 
 vious,  the  Angry,  the  Ambitiou?,  the  Defpairing: 
 not  that  they  are  infenfible  oF  Uneafinefs  under 
 thefe  PalTions,  or  don't  believe  themfclves  to  be 
 miferable;  but  becaufe  they  had  rather  have  that 
 Mifery  To  long  as  they  enjoy  their  Choice,  than 
 want  it  and  them  too ;  or  at  leaft  they  can  perfifl: 
 in  it,  becaufe  they  do  not  obferve  that  this  Mi- 
 fery arifes  from  thence.  When  therefore  the  Wick- 
 cd  obftinately  oppofe  themfelves  to  God,  and  re- 
 fufe  to  make  their  Eledions  conformable  fto  his 
 Will,  they  take  delight  perhaps  in  that  very  Op- 
 pofition  :  to  hate  God,  to  difobey  his  Commands, 
 and  ftrive  againft  him  with  all  their  Power,  is 
 pleafing  to  them ;  and  tho'  they  fee  themfelves  over- 
 whelm'd  with  innumerable  Evils,  yet  they  had  ra- 
 ther endure  them  all  than  repent.  As  Men  that  are 
 defperately  in  Love,  arpbitious,  envious,  choofe 
 to  bear  Torments,  lofs  of  Eftate,  and  hazard  of 
 Life,  rather  than  lay  afide  thefe  foolifn  and  be- 
 ■witching  Affections.  We  may  eafiiy  conceive 
 then  how  the  Wicked  in  Hell  may  be  in  very  grear 
 Mifery  upon  the  increafe  of  their  Obftinacy  and 
 Folly,  and  yet  unwilling  to  be  freed  from  them„ 
 All  fee  and  exclaim  againft-  the  Folly,  Mifery,  and 
 Madnefs  of  thofe  Men  who  fpend  their  Ellate  in 
 Vice,  impair  their  Health,  and  bring  on  an  un- 
 timely Death;  and  for  no  other  end  but  be- 
 caufe they  will  do  fo:  yet  they  perfift  in  this,  and 
 their  Obflinacy  increases  with  their  Evils.  Thefe 
 are  fome  Preludes  of  the  Mifery  of  the  Damned, 
 and  from  hence  we  may  underiland  that  thefe  Per- 
 fons  are  extremely  miferable,  and  yet  will  not  be 
 fet  at  Liberty  (89.) 
 
 It 
 NOTES, 
 
 f  (89./  From  hence  likewife  we  may  underiland  u' Lit  a  natu- 
 j:al,  abfolute,  and  iudilpenfible  Neceflity  there  is  for  watching 
 over  all  our  Hahits,  AffeSlions^  JppetiteS)  &c.  for  curbing  our 
 
 Paffion?^ 
 
 f 
 
 i   , 
 
fo6  Appendix,  Sedl.  2. 
 
 It  may  be  objefted,  that  thefe  miferable  Beings 
 may  receive  fome  kind  of  Pkcfure  from  their  £- 
 legions.  But  we  place  FeHcity  not  barely  in  the 
 j4B:  of  choofing,  but  much  more  in  the  Enjoyment 
 of  the  Objeds  chofen.  The  more  obfhnarely 
 therefore  any  one  choofes  abfurd  and  impolTible 
 thmgs  the  more  mifcrable  will  he  be  when  fruftra- 
 ted  of  his  Choice;  and  we  may  imagine  the  dam- 
 ned to  be  always  fruflritcd  :  neverthelefs,  after  fo 
 much  Warning  and  Experience,  they  don't  in- 
 tend to   alter    their   Eledions,    but   Itill  perfiH:  in 
 
 thems 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Paflions,  and  correfting  our  Defires  by  Reafon ;  for  raking  a 
 ftri£l  and  conftant  care  that  thefe  be  neither  violent,  irreguhr, 
 nor  fix'd  on  improper  Objefls  in  this  Life,  if  we  hope  to  avoid 
 Mifery  in  the  Life  to  come.  For  if  thefe  accompany  us  into 
 the  other  World,  (and  if  we  confider  what  Scott  and  Rymer 
 have  faid  upon  the  Subjcdt,  it  will  appear  infinitely  probable 
 that  they  do)  the  fame  or  greater  Unhappincfs  muft  unavoid- 
 ably attend  them  there.  If  we  fhall  have  any  Memory  in  the 
 other  World  of  what  pafs'd  in  this  (which  we  muft  have,  in 
 order  to  give  us  either  a  good  or  evil  Cotifcience,  and  to  make 
 us  capable  either  of  Reward  or  Punifhment  in  that  refpeft) 
 how  probable  is  it  that  we  fliall  then  alfo  feel  the  force  of  all 
 thoft  Habits  and  AJfodations  which  in  this  Life  were  fo  ftrong 
 as  to  raife  PafTions,  Affeftions,  ^c.  in  us,  and  make  us  con- 
 ftantly  proceed  upon  them  for  felf  evident  Principles,  and  pur- 
 fue  them  for  ultimate  Ends  of  Adion  ?  "  And  this  being  fo,  of 
 **  what  unfpeakable  confequence  are  the  Aftions  of  Men,  that 
 *«  thus  draw  after  them  a  Chain  of  Joys  or  Woes,  as  long  as 
 *'■■  Eternity  ?  And  how  careful  ought  we  to  be  to  vvhat  courfe 
 "  of  Life  we  determine  ourfelves,  confidering  that  our  Eternal 
 "  Fate  depends  upon  what  we  are  now  doing,  that  every  moral 
 *•  Adiion  we  perform  is  a  Step  to  Hea'vcn  or  Hell-^-uiards,  that 
 **  in  every  bad  Choice  we  make,  we  are  planting  our  Tophet, 
 "  or  our  Paradife,  and  that  in  the  Confequence  of  our  prefent 
 *•  Aftions  we  fiiall  rue  or  rejoice  to  eternal  Ages  ?  Scott,  2d 
 "  Vol  p,  26.  See  alfo  4th  Vol.  Ch.  6.  p.  992,  i^t.  Fol. 
 ■"  Edit  or  Hutchejon  on  the  Conduft  of  the  Paffions  and  At- 
 **  fcft'on:,  §.  4,  and  6.  or  Isote  81,  87,  90.  and  par.  14, 
 ''*  of  this  Seftiou. 
 
Sedl.  2.  Appendix.  J07 
 
 them,  opprefTed  with  the  Senfe  and  Weight  of 
 their  Mifeiy,  and  plung'd  in  deep  defpair.  For  it 
 is  poflible  that  they  may  be  rcgardlefs  or  ignorant 
 that  there  is  no  other  Way  for  them  to  be  freed 
 from  thefe  Miferies,  but  by  altering  their  Elec- 
 tions, and  not  know  how  to  do  this,  fo  as  to  per- 
 lift  in  them  for  ever,  and  become  more  defperate  by 
 Difappointments,  and  to  augment  and  multiply 
 their  Mifery  by  new  Attempts,  which  prove  no 
 lefs  unhappy.  The  Power  of  willing  the  State 
 they  are  in  is  not  therefore  of  any  Service  to  them 
 towards  the  Attainment  of  Happinefs,  but  renders 
 them  capable  of  Eternal  Mifery.  For  fuch  Elections 
 may  have  the  fame  Relation  to  this  kind  of  Mifery, 
 as  the  natural  Appetites  have  to  Pain. 
 
 XII.  Now  it  is  fufficiently  confonant  to  the  Di-  gy^jj  p^_ 
 vine  Goodnefs  to   permit   or   inflift  this  kind  of  ni/hment 
 Punifhment,    nor    would  ir  be    lefs   fubfervient  to  '^  very 
 the  Ends  for  which  Punifhment s  are  wont  to  be  ^^^^^'  an<J 
 impofed,  viz,»  that  by  a  previous  Apprehenfion  of  g^[^,  ""^ 
 them  we  may  learn  to  be  wife,  and  others  be  de-  the  End 
 terr'd  from  offending  by  our  Example.     For  who  "f  Diving 
 does  not  dread  Fury  and  Madnefs  as  the  mofi:  mi-  ^^Jnift- 
 ferable  ftate  of  Mind?    Who   does   not    condemn  "'"'''^^' 
 the  Folly  and  Madnefs  of  Men  in  Love,  of  envious 
 
 and  ambitious  Perfons  ?  Efpecially  when  he  beholds 
 them  labouring  thereby  under  innumerable  Evils, 
 from  which  they  will  not  be  delivered? 
 
 XIII.  But  allowing  that  Exigence  is  v/orfe  than  God 
 Non-exiftence    to    the  Damned,  let  them  imagine  ought  to 
 their  Mifery  to  be  greater  than    it  really  is.     Let  P^e^r  the 
 it  be  a  part  of  their  Mifery,  to  be  confcious  that  ^^j"'"."i> 
 they  were  the  only  Caufe  of  all  their  Grief:  yet  toth^at°o"f 
 lince  that  could  not   be  prevented  without  greater  particuhr^i 
 detriment   to  the  whole,    there's   no  room  for  ob- 
 jefting  againfl:  Providence  which   always  does   the 
 
 beft.  If  God  had  made  nothing  at  all,  and  been 
 contented    to   have  j lemain'd   alone,    there    wou'd 
 
 have 
 
JoS  Appendix.  Seft.  2, 
 
 have  been  nothing  that  could  fin,  that  could  choosfe 
 
 amifs,   that    could   be   miferable.     But    fince  it  is 
 
 impollDle   that   there    ftiould   be    more  Gods^  the 
 
 Deity  made  Creatures  fuch  as  the  Nature  of  a  Created 
 
 Being  allow'd.  Now  it  was  expedient,  for  the  Good 
 
 of  the  whole,    that  fome    of  them  fhould  have  a 
 
 Power  of  bringing  Miiery  upon  themfelves  by  evil 
 
 Eleftions.     Nor  can  any  thing  be  charg'd  upon  the 
 
 Goodiiefs   of  God   in  this,    unlefs  that  he  created 
 
 Akn,  and  not  Gods  equal  to  himfelf;  and  that  he 
 
 preferrM  the  Salvation  of  the  Generality  to  that  of 
 
 fome    Particulars.     He    chofe    therefore  that    fome 
 
 Ihould  regret  their  having  been  made?  by  God,  viz., 
 
 thro'  the  abufe  of  their  Free- Will,  rather  than  that 
 
 none  fhould  be  happy  by  ufing  it  aright. 
 
 Ana^er  to      xiV.  As  to  the  third  Cjedion,  I  believe  it  to 
 
 ObjeaTon.  ^e  a  S^e^^  Truth  that  the  Mifery  of  the  Wicked 
 
 Tis  pro-    arifes   from   the  very   Conftitution  of  the  Sinner, 
 
 bable  that  and  that  the  Laws  of  Nature  hold  in  evil  Eledions. 
 
 theMifery  "vV'e  lee  that  our  Bodies  may  be  maim'd  for  ever, 
 
 W'dfed      ^""^  ^^^  Limbs  diflocated  and  diftorted  to  fuch  a 
 
 arifcsfrom  <isg»*ce    as    to    become  totally    incapable   of  thofe 
 
 the  very     Functions  for  which  Nature  defign'd  them.     Why 
 
 >I<itiireof  fhould  we  not  have  the  fame  Opinion  of  the  Mind, 
 
 ^-  viz,,    that   by    depraved    Eleftions,    Paffions,    and 
 
 Affedions,    it   may    be   fo  far   diverted  from  'the 
 
 right  way  of  thinking,    as  to  becom?  equally  dif- 
 
 abled  and  unfit  for  governing  its  Adions  according 
 
 to  the  Dictates  of  Right   Rcafon,    as  a  lame   Man 
 
 is    for   a    Race  ?     We   may    fee    every    Day  that 
 
 jighr   Notions  of  things  are  capable  of  being  per» 
 
 verted  by  a  perverfe  Habit  of  thinking;  and  ic  is 
 
 evident  irom  Experience  that   we   miftake  and  are 
 
 ignorant  of  ufeful  things.     We  are  wont  to  labour 
 
 under    Prejudices   and  .be    averfe  to  (ober    Coun- 
 
 fels ;  in  fhort,  we  are  willing  to  endure  any  thing 
 
 rather   than    alter    our    Choice.     'Tis    a   common 
 
 thing  for  us  to  pleafe  ourfelves  in  Dangers,  in  the 
 
 Rui« 
 
Std.  2.  Appendix'.  ^09 
 
 Ruin  of  our  Foi  tunes,  in  the  Lofs  of  Eafe,  and 
 Life  itfelf ;  and  our  Volition,  perverfe  as  it  is, 
 fome'.imes  appears  more  defirable  than  Friends, 
 Kingdoms,  Pleafures,  or  even  Life.  If  therefore 
 God  does  not  interpoi'e  his  Omnipotence,  the  fame 
 Errors,  the  fame  Ignorance,  the  fame  Habit  of  a 
 perverted  Mind  and  obdinate  Propenfity  to  Evil, 
 which  here  draw  us  afide  from  the  right  Path,  may- 
 continue  with  us  for  ever  :  nor  will  the  Soul  that  h 
 immerb'd  in  this  kind  of  Evil  be  capable  of  curing 
 itfelf:  For  one  that  is  infe6led  with  thefe  Maladies 
 is  as  unfit  to  help  himfelf,  as  one  that  has  cut  off  his 
 Hands  and  Feet  is  unable  to  run  or  feed  himfelf  (po). 
 
 XV. 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (90.)  This  is  t;ie  true  Meaning  of  that  Mactila  Pcccafi  v^'hich. 
 is  faid  to  remain  and  fet  us  at  Enmity  with  God,  and  under  a 
 natural  Incapacity  ofHappinefs,  and  whicli  according  to  fome 
 n^-akes  it  impoffible  for  future  Punifliments  to  have  any  other 
 Period  than  the  total  Extinfti'on  or  Annihilation  of  the  Sub- 
 jects of  tiiem  ;  and  what  Ground  there  can  be  to  hope  for  that 
 may  be  feen  from  the  Authors  referr'd  to  in  Note  86. 
 
 Our  Author,  in  the  following  Paragraph,  explains  how  this 
 Mccula  may  be  conccivM  to  render  God  and  good  Men  our 
 Averfion,  and  'tis  cafy  to  apprehend  how  utterly  incapable  of 
 Happinefs  rhat  Man  muft  be,  whofe  whole  Soul  is  bent  ano- 
 ther way;  whofe  every  Motion,  Thought,  and  Inclination; 
 whofe  Deligns,  Defircs,  and  Hopes,  are  all  iix'd  and  riveted 
 to  thofe  Obiedls  which  can  never  fatisfy  them,  which  are  ei- 
 ther quite  different  from,  or  contrary  to  the  very  Nature  and 
 Idea  of  true  rational  Happinefs.  A  vic^v  of  the  Confequences 
 attending  each  inveterate  evil  Habit,  each  ungovernable  Paf- 
 •iion,  or  Afredion  mifapply'd,  will  fhew  the  abfurdity  offup- 
 pofing  any  Perfon  in  fuch  a  Cafe  to  be  happy  even  in  Heavea 
 itfelf*.  But  this  important  Dodlrlfie  of  the  force  of  Habits, 
 i^c.  in  this  World,  as  well  as  the  Continuance  of  them  in  the 
 aiext,  has  been  fo  well  ftated  and  inforced  by  the  Authors  re- 
 ferr'd to  above,  that  an  attempt  to  give  any  further  Illuftration 
 of  it  fcems  iraprafticable.     I  fhall  therefore  difmifs  it  with  a 
 
 PaiTage 
 
 £*]'Sff  the  Spcft^itor,  N.  $q. 
 
£;  I  o  Appendix.  Se6l.  2. 
 
 The  XV.  Secondly,  A  Perfon  of  this  Difpofition  of 
 
 Wicked,     Mind   hates  God,    for  he  fees  that  he  has  chofen 
 
 thro     g-    ^jj^j^  things,  in  the  Enjoyment  v/hereof  he  places 
 
 and  Error,  ^'^  Delight,  as  cannoc  be  confiftenc  with  the  Di- 
 
 will  de-      vine  Will.     He  therefore  looks  upon  God  as  his 
 
 light  in      Enemy,    and   confequently   avoids    all    Commerce 
 
 fuch  ^jj]^  i^jj^^    gp^^j   endeavours  to  abfcond  from  him, 
 
 thevcan-   ^^'^  never  thinks  of  changing  his  own  Will:    For 
 
 not  enjoy,  thro'  Error  and   Ignorance  he  knows  not  how  to 
 
 and  may     take  delight  in  any  thing  elfe.     Therefore  he  ap- 
 
 not  know   pij^j  gjj  \^^^  Endeavours  to  the  Attainment  of  fucU 
 
 tikede-     ^^^^^gs  as  cannot  really  be  attain'd,  and  drives  for 
 
 liijhtin      ever  in  vain  with  a  more  powerful  Being,  i.e.  God; 
 
 any  thing  nor  ceafes  from    flruggling,    tho*  full    of  Mifery 
 
 ^li^-  and  Defpair.     For  tho*  he  feels  himfelf  tormented 
 
 with  a  mofl:  exquifite  Pain,  yet  he  dreads  a  greater 
 
 from^he  change  of  his  Refolution:  he  fees  Mifery 
 
 invading   him  on  each  hand,   and  is   forced   either 
 
 to  oppofe  the  Deity  without  any  profped  of  Sue- 
 
 cefs,  or  to  give  over  the  Conteft,  and  lay  afide  all 
 
 Hopes  ol  enjoying  the  Objeft  of  his  Choice:  He 
 
 embraces 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Pafiage  from  the  Can/es  of  the  Decay  of  Chrljllan  Piety,  Ch.  i. 
 •'  Thofe  immaterial  Fehcities  we  expeft,  do  naturally  foggcft 
 "  to  us  the  neceffity  of  preparing  our  Appetites,  and  hungers 
 "  for  them,  without  which  Heaven  can  be  no  Heaven  to  us : 
 "  For  fince  the  Pleafure  of  any  thing  rcfults  from  the  Agree- 
 "  mcnt  between  it  and  the  Dciire,  what  Satisfaction  can  Sfiri- 
 "  ^W  Enjoyments  give  unto  a  Carnal  Mind?  Alafs,  whatDe- 
 "  light  would  it  be  to  the  Swine  to  be  wrapt  in  fine  Linen 
 "  and  laid  in  Odours  ?  His  Scnfes  are  not  gratify'd  by  any 
 "  fuch  Delicacies ;  nor  would  he  feel  any  thing  befides  the 
 "  Torment  of  being  \vith-held  from  the  Mire.  And  as  little 
 "  Complacency  would  a  brutilh  Soul  find  in  thofe  purer  and 
 "  refined  Pleaiurcs,  which  can  only  upbraid,  not  fatisfy  him. 
 "  So  that  could  we,  by  an  impoilible  Suppofition,  fancy  fuch 
 •'  an  one  aflum'd  to  thofe  Fruitions,  his  Pleafure  fure  would 
 *'  be  as  little  as  his  preparation  for  it  was.  Thofe  Eyes  which 
 
 "  have 
 
Sed.  2.  Appendix,  511 
 
 embraces  the  former,  as  the  lefs  Evil  of  the  two, 
 and  yet  a  greater  can  fcarce  be  deviled.  The  per- 
 verfe  Fool  may  be  pleafed  with  the  very  Conteft, 
 tho'  it  proves  to  no  manner  of  purpofe.  In  the  in- 
 terim God  leaves  fuch  an  one  to  himfelf,  who  by 
 'purfuing  abfurd  and  impoffible  things  will  become 
 troublefome  to  himfelf  and  others,  aflaulting  fome, 
 and  being  attack'd  by  others  like  himfelf.  We  fee 
 in  this  World  how  much  bad  Men  dehght  in  heap- 
 ing Mifery  on  others,  and  who  are  therefore  bad 
 Men  becaufe  they  take  delight  in  Mifchief.  The 
 Servant  of  an  abfurd  Mafter  is  unhappy,  and  fo  is 
 he  who  lives  near  a  malevolent  and  morofe  Neigh- 
 bour. Suppofe  then  the  Wicked  who  are  banillied 
 from  God,  and  od.ous  to  i.il  good  jMen,  alTociating 
 together,  and  'tis  eafy  to  conceive  what  kind  of 
 Society  thai:  of  Reprobates  and  Devils  muff  be,  how 
 grevious  and  offenfivc  to  each  other.  We  may 
 obferve  how  very  pernicious  a  wicked  Governor 
 is  in  his  Province,  how  miierable  they  that  are 
 fubjed:  to  fuch :  how  much  more  wretched  muft 
 the  ffate  of  the  Wicked  be,  who  are  fubjeded  to, 
 and  join'd  with  none  but  mad,  malicious,  envious  and 
 froward  Beings  \ 
 
 XVI.  'Tis  to  be  believ'd  that  God  ihas  provided  '^^^ 
 a  place  that  is  fuitable  and  proper  for  them,  and  to  ^^^'^^'^ 
 
 *  *^     *  1  •   I    are  con- 
 
 which  £nM  to 
 
 NOTES,  ^f  "^'" 
 
 places  and 
 
 *'  Jiave  continually  beheld  Vanity,  would  be  dazlcd,  not  de-      °™r^" 
 
 "  lighted  \v'\lh.t\\z  beatifc  Vijio'd-,  neither  could  that  Tongue  J^'^S    ^ 
 
 "  which  has  accullom'd  itlelf  only  to  Oaths  z^\^Blafphcmiei,     /tv/^"^ 
 
 "  find  Harmony  or  Mufic  in  Hallelujahs.     'Tis  the  peculiar  °^  ^^^^'^^■f 
 
 "  Privilege  of  the  pure  i?i  Heart,  that  they  fhall  fee  God  ;  and  ^^  ^T^  ^^ 
 
 "  if  any  others  could  fo  invade  this  their  Inclofure,  as  to  take  p      , 
 
 "  Heaven  by  Violence,  it  furcly  would  be  a  very  Joy  lefs  Pof-  * 
 
 "  feifion  to  thefe  Men,  and  only  place  them  in  a  Condition  to 
 
 *'  which  they  have  the  greateil  Averlion  and  Antipathy.     So 
 
 *'  that  Holinefs  here  is  not  only  nccefl'ary  to  the  acquiring, 
 
 *'  but  ihe  Enioyment  of  Blifs  hereafter. 
 
^i5  Appendix.  Sedt.  2. 
 
 >^Hich  they  are  as  much  confin'J  by  the  Laws  of 
 their  Nature,  as  Fillies  to  the  Sea,  or  terreftrial 
 AnimaK  to  the  Earth.  What  fort  of  a  Place  that 
 is  we  know  nor,  but  it  is  reafonable  to  believe  that 
 there  is  luch  an  one.  Men  in  this  Life  choofe  for 
 themfelves  Habitations  and  Companions  according 
 to  their  own  Genius,  Temper,  and  Difpofition  of 
 Mind:  and  Likenefs  begets  Love:  and  who  can 
 doubt  but  the  fame  thing  may  attend  the  bad  and 
 l^ood  after  Death  ?  The  Good  refort  therefore  to 
 the  Society  of  (joi,  Angels,  and  Spirits  of  Good  Men, 
 But  the  Wicked  choofe  thole  Gho'Js  which  were 
 Partake  s  in  their  Iniquity,  and  Devils  for  their 
 Companions:  And  this  may  poffibly  be  brought 
 about  by  natural  Infl:in<5l,  and  mere  human  Dif- 
 pofition. Nor  is  God  wanting  in  Goodnefs  if  he 
 iuffers  them  to  live  in  their  own  way,  and  enjoy 
 the  Life  themfelves  have  chofen.  For  this  could 
 not  be  prevented  without  doing  Violence  to  the 
 Laws  of  Nature.  And  thefe  PuniHiments  which 
 the  Wicked  voluntarily  bring  upon  themfelves, 
 tend  to  the  BenefiL  of  the  Univerfal  Syftem  of  Ra- 
 tional Beings, 
 The  d if-  XVIL  So  much  for  Mord  Evils,  Lavjs^  Re- 
 ■p\ixcd.\:)0\xt  wards  zndPumfljmcnts.  In  which  fbme  things  may 
 Moral  E-  appear  too  fubtle  for  common  Apprehenlion ;  but 
 w  re  ates  ^^  ouqht  to  remember  that  the  Difpute  is  con- 
 to  themind  .     t;  ,  •      n    1  ■  •     -v-  •  1 
 
 *ind  its       cerning  one  (A  the  niceft  thmgsm  Nature,  viz,^  the 
 
 Operati-     Operations  of  our  own    Mind  :    snd  whatever  is 
 
 ons,  and    {^iii  in  order  to  explain  thefe,  mufh  neceflarily  be 
 
 oil  that      fu[3tle.     On  this  Account  the  Art  of  Lp^/c  is  call'd 
 
 niuft\ie-    fubtle,  becaufe  it  has  thefe  for  its  Objeft,  and  any 
 
 celtarijy     thing  that  is  more  fubtle  than  ordinary  is  reckon'd 
 
 be  fonie-     Logical.     He  that  does  not  like  any  thing  that  is 
 
 P'[^^*  fubtle  therefore   ought  not  to  difpute  about  what 
 
 relates  to  our  own    Minds.  ^Jlforal   Evil  is  as  ici 
 
 were  the  Diftemper  of  our  Minds  arifing  from  the 
 
 irregular  JMotion  of  the  cogitative  Faculties  i    nowi 
 
 as 
 
Sed.  2.  Appendix. 
 
 as  'tis  difficult  to  difcovcr  the  Caufes  of  thofe  Dif- 
 tempers  which  inted  the  Body,  fo  it  is  much  more 
 difficult  to  find  out  the  Caufes  and  the  Motions  of 
 thofe  Maladies  which  afflid  the  Mind.  For  it  is 
 neceffary  that  we  perfedly  underftand  our  own 
 Minds,  the  Notions,  Operations,  and  Means  where- 
 by the  Will  is  moved,  and  the  Underftanding  ope- 
 rates, before  we  can  hope  to  make  a  full  Difcovery 
 of  thefe  Paffions  of  the  Mind,  and  the  Cau(es  of 
 them.  And  'tis  evident  to  any  one  how  difficulc 
 that  is:  what  nice  Abftradions,  and  long  Dedudi- 
 on  of  Confequences  it  muft  require.  *Tis  no  won- 
 der then  if  the  Invefligation  of  the  Caufes,  and  Ori- 
 gin of  the  Evil  of  the  Mind  require  fome  things  which 
 are  too  fubtle  for  all  to  comprehend. 
 
 513 
 
 L  1 
 
 SECT. 
 
5H 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 Sea,  3. 
 
 SECT.    III. 
 
 This  Que- 
 ftion  has 
 been  fo 
 well  treat- 
 ed by 
 many, 
 that  there 
 is  fcarce 
 any  room 
 for  fcruple 
 
 The  mat- 
 ter of  Fa£l 
 is  often 
 doubtful  : 
 for  it  is 
 not  good 
 Men  that 
 are  mife- 
 rable,  but 
 rather  re- 
 form'd  by 
 Adverfity : 
 Nor  are 
 bad  Men 
 profpe- 
 rous,  but 
 made  bad 
 by  Prof- 
 peri  ty. 
 
 Concerning  the  ^^ejlion^  Why  bad 
 Men  are  happy^  and  good  Men 
 mtferable* 
 
 I.  ^"Y^  HIS  Queftion  feems  to  have  fome  relation 
 \  to  the  former.  For  if  Vunipomentt  that  i  , 
 Natural  Evils,  be  inflided  in  Proportion  to  the  de- 
 fert  of  Evil  Eleftions,  whence  come  good  things 
 to  evil  Men,  and  Evil  to  the  Good?  'Tis  not  fo 
 difficult  to  anfwer  this  Queftion  upon  the  Suppo- 
 firion  of  a  future  State,  as  to  make  it  ncceflary  for 
 us  to  infift  much  upon  it.  And  it  muft  be  confefs'd, 
 that  it  has  been  treated  of  in  a  very  proper  Man- 
 ner by  feveral  Writers :  C71.)  fo  that  there's  fcarce 
 any  Room  for  Scruple.  Neverthelels  a  few  things 
 fhall  be  touch'd  upon,  and  very  briefly,  that  we 
 may  not  repeat  v/hat  has  been  faid  already. 
 
 II.  In  the  firft  place  then  the  matter  of  Fad:  is  very 
 often  doubtful,  notwithftanding  the  Complaints 
 which  many  Perfons   make  to  the  contrary.  ^VWe-f- 
 
 fee 
 
 NOTES, 
 
 (qi.)  Viz.  Sherlock  on  Judgment,  Ch.  i.  §.  3.  p.  76,  ^e. 
 
 I  ft  Edit. on  Providence  Ch,  7.  p.  258.  2d  Edit.  Cud- 
 
 ixorth,  p.  877.  Cockbur»y  EfTay  5.  prop.  7,  8.  p.  137,  &c. 
 Wollafion,  p-  7I)  and  no,  Iffc  Cradockon  Eccl.  9.  2.  Seneca, 
 Ep  24,  Fiddesh  Sermons,  Fol.  14  and  19.  Scott,  2  vol  Ch. 
 4- §•  3-  P-  33^'  ^'^  S'^"-  ^""^  Diicourfe  16.  p  320,  &c,  2d 
 vol.  Pol.  StiUingflect,  Origines  Sacra,  B.  3.  Ch.  3.  §.  21. 
 p.  3*6,  Cfff.  Fol.  Creiv,  Gofmologia  Sacra,  B.  3.  Ch.  2.  ^. 
 57.  58. 
 
Sea.  2'  Jppendix.  5^5 
 
 fee  indeed  good  Men  frequently  miferable,    but  ic 
 is  a  Query  whether  their  Goodne(s  may  not  be  ow  - 
 inn-  to  their  Mifery,  and  they  would  have  prov'd 
 wfckedifthey  had  been  tempted  by  Profpenty  ?   it 
 is  not  the  Good  then  that  are  affliaed,  but  the  Mife- 
 rable that   are  reclaimed. -^On  the  other  hand,  we^ 
 behold  happy,  rich,  and  powerful  Men  that  are  wick- 
 ed ;    but    their  Wickednefs  may   be  attributed  to 
 their  Profperity,  and  they  would  perhaps  be  very 
 jTood   if  the   Incitements  to    Evil    were  removed. 
 *Tis  not  the  Wicked  therefore  that  are  happy,  but 
 the  happy  that  are  corrupted  with  Prolperity,  and 
 therefore  fall  into  Wickednefs. 
 
 III.  Secondly,    We  are  blinded  ^v.th  Prejudice    We  are 
 and  thereby  rendered    very   pmrnl  Judges   ot    the  J^^^^^  ^^ 
 Goodnefs  or  Hadnefs  of  other   Men.     He  that  is  j^ierit : 
 our  Acquaintance  and  befriends  us  is  a  good  Man,  from  the 
 he  that  favours  our  Enemies  is   a   very  bad    one.  -fta^ce^^^ 
 Thus  Scipio  is  celebrated  by  the  Roman  Hihorians,  ^^^^  ^^^ 
 and    if  any    hard   or  unprofperous    Accident  betal  ^.-^-^^ 
 him,  they  begin  to  ask  whether  there  be  any  Gods? 
 Whether  Divine  Providence  takes   care  of  human 
 Affairs?  But  Hannibal  is  co'demn'd,  his  Vidories 
 are  chars'd  as  Crimes  on  Providence,  and  they  re- 
 pine at  liis  having  been  fo  long  fuccefsful.     Whereas 
 'tis    really   dubious  whether  of  the  two    was   the 
 worfe  Man ;    both  certamly  were   very  bad;.    For 
 their  Aim  was  to  put  the  World  into  Confulion,  to 
 fubdue  Nations  by  force  of  Arms,  the  one  intend- 
 ing to  make    Carthage,   the  other  Rome,    the  Head 
 cf  the  World,   by  Slaughter,    Rapine,    War,    and 
 Injuftice.     Now  the  Man  that   rtudie.   to  opprds 
 the  whole  World  in  Servitude,  and  bring  it  under 
 the  Power  of  that  Nation   to    which  he  belongs 
 this  Man  is  truly  wicked  and  unworthy  of  Succefs, 
 however  he   may   vel  hi^    Ambition,    Pride,   and 
 Fury  in  fome  parvicu.ar  Inilances,  unde-  the  fpeci- 
 ous  pretence  of  Clemencv  and  Love  of  his  Country. 
 
c;i6  Appendix,  Sedt.  3. 
 
 We  are  Qji=^\Y .  Thirdly,  as  we  are  partial  Judges  of  the 
 bad  Judges  Dcferts  of  other  Men,  fo  are  we  no  lels  unquali- 
 TT  '^^-  r  fv'd  to  pronounce  on  their  feliciiy.^For  wc  are  ta--^ 
 of  Men  :  ^^^n  With  the  pomp,  and  noile,  and  glittering  out- 
 for  thofe  fidc  of  things,  and  coiifequently  judge  the  Rich, 
 are  often  jj^g  Potent,  the  Noble,  £nd  the  Learned,  to  be 
 *H™^^  happy  ;  but  the  Poor,  Ignoble  and  Unlctter'd,  mi- 
 whomwe  f^rable.  And  yet  herein  we  are  very  frequently 
 efteem  miftaken,  flnce  neither  of  them  are  what  they  ap- 
 happy,  pear  to  be.  For  life  is  often  attended  with  more 
 and  the  Happinefs  among  Cottages,  Husbandry,  and  Trade, 
 contrary.     ^^^    .^^  ^j^^    ^-^^^^  ^f    -j^^^jl^,    p^:^^  '^^^  Dlfeafes  ; 
 
 than    among    Scepter^,    Diadems,    high    Pedigrees, 
 and  fuperfluous  Heaps  of  Books ;  fince^  as  we  have 
 fliewn  before,   and  Experience  teftifies,    Happinefs 
 lies  chiefly,  if  not  folely,  in  Eledion. 
 The  chief      y.    Fourthly,    It    is  to    be  obfervcd,    that   the 
 Happmefs  g^g^j^f].  pa^t  of  the  Happinefs  of  this  Life  con fifts 
 Ms  in       ml-Iope,  and  that  the  Fruition  of  the  defired  Ob- 
 Hope;       jcd  is  not  anfwcrable   to  the  Hope  pre-conceived, 
 which  is  a^vi-liich  mufl:  be  efleem'd  an  Indication  that  complete 
 fign  that     j^appinefs   is  referv'd  by  Nature  for  another  Life; 
 
 Happinefs  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^"  "^^^  ^'P''"^  ^^^^''»  ^"^  adhere  to  the 
 is  referved  prefent  Objeds,  the  lefs  Care  we  iliall  take , of  thofe 
 for  ano-  things  which  tend  to  our  future  Happinefs.  f  It  was-J- 
 ther  Life,  ff^cj-^fore  wifely  provided  by  God,  that  the  Good 
 thefe^  fhould  not  be  corrupted  with  too  plentiful  an  En- 
 things  joymcnt  of  the  things  of  this  Woild,  but  that  the 
 which  be-  Bad  fliould  have  them  in  abundance:  For  by  this 
 f?.]goodor  jp^ans  all  may  underiland  that  their  time  ought 
 bad  Men,    ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^  -^^  ^^^^^^  things,  but  that  the  Space 
 
 of  this  fliort  Life  fliould  be  employed  in  looking 
 after  other  Matters,  i.e.  fuch  as  regard  Eternity. 
 <5::x.To  conclude,  we  mu(}  afHrm  that  nothing  hap- 
 pens to  good  Men  which  may  not  prove  a  Means 
 of  greater  Good;  nor  to  the  Bad,  which  may  not 
 be  for  their  Puniflimcnt  or  Reformation. 
 
 are  means 
 toit . 
 
 VI. 
 
Sed.  3'  Appendix,  517 
 
 VI.  And  I  hope  it  appears  from  what  has  been  Conclu- 
 faid,   that  the    Objecflions  of  the  Mmkheans   and  ^i*^"  °^'^^^° 
 Tatilicians  are  not  fo  formidable  as  they  have  feem'd  ^^°^^' 
 to  fome;  and  that   human  Reafon  is  not  fo   blind 
 but  that   it   can  folve   thefe   Difficulties  from  the 
 Principles  laid  down,  and  fuch  Suppofitions  as  are 
 generally  admitted;    and  tho*   not    ahfolutely  cer- 
 tain, yet  probable  however,  and  fuch  as  we  uf;^  to 
 acquiefce  in,  in  the  Solution  of  other  Phenomena. 
 
 But  I  offer  all  thefe  things  to  the  Cenfure  of  the 
 Learned:  I  fubmit  them  entirely  to  the  Judgment 
 of  the  Catholic  Church,  efpecially  to  the  Governours 
 of  thofe  Parts  of  it  which  conftitute  the  Churches 
 of  England  and  Ireland,  If  there  be  any  thing 
 herein  which  feems  not  perfedly  agreeable  to 
 their  Faith,  as  I  hope  there  is  not,  and  would 
 not  have  it,  I  defire  that  may  be  look'd  upon  as  ab- 
 folutely  unfaid  andretrafted. 
 
 F   I  N  1   3, 
 
 LI 
 
Divine  Predejlination  and  Fore-know- 
 ledge^  confejlent  with  the  Freedom  of 
 Mans  Will 
 
 S  ERMON 
 
 Preach'd  at 
 
 Chrift-Church,  Duhlini^ 
 
 May  15,   1709. 
 
 Before  his  Excellency. 
 
 Ihomas  Earl  of  Wharton^ 
 
 Lord  Lieutenant  of  Irelandy 
 
 AND   THE 
 
 Right  Honourable  the  Houfe  of  Lords, 
 
 By  his  Grace 
 
 William  Lord  Archbifliop  of  Dublin^ 
 
 , — —  
 
 The  Sixth  Edition. 
 
Die  Lunas  i6°  Maii^  1709. 
 Orderedy 
 
 ON  Motion,  That  the  Lord  Vifcount 
 F  QUO  erf  courts  the  Lord  Vifcount  Ble- 
 Jington,  and  the  Lord  Vifcount  Strahane^  do 
 as  from  this  Houfe,  give  the  Thanks  of  this 
 Houfe  to  his  Grace  the  Lord  Archbifliop 
 of  Dublin^  for  his  Sermon  preach'd  yeflcr- 
 day  in  Chrijl- Church,  and  defire  his  Grace 
 to  Caufe  the  fame  to  be  printed. 
 
 Jo.  Smithy  Cler.'  Parh'amentor.* 
 
(3  ) 
 
 ROMANS  VIII.  29,  30. 
 
 For  whom  he  did  foreJ^iow,  he  alfo  did  predeftinate 
 to  be  conform'' d  to  the  Image  of  his  Son,  that  he 
 might  be  the  Firfi  -  Born  among  many  Brethren. 
 Aioreover,  71'hom  he  did  predefliniritc,  them  he 
 alfo  called  I  and  whom  he  called^  them  he  alfo 
 juflified  \  and  whom  he  jafifcd,  them  he  alfo 
 glorified, 
 
 §  I.  TN  thcfe  Words  the  Apoftle  lays  down  the 
 X.  feveral  Steps  by  which  God  proceeds  in 
 the  faving  of  his  Ele6t.  i//.  He  knows  and  con- 
 liders  thofe,  whom  he  defigns  for  Salvation,  zdly. 
 He  decrees  and  predeftinates  them  to  be  hke  his 
 Son  Jefus  Chrift,  in  Hohnels  here,  and  Glory 
 hereafter,  that  he  might  be  the  Firft-born  among 
 many  Brethren.  idly.  He  calls  them  to  the 
 Means  of  Salvation.  /\thly.  He  juiliifies :  And 
 laftly,  He  glorifies  them.  This  is  the  Chain  and 
 Series  of  God's  dealing  with  his  beloved;  in 
 which  he  is  reprefented  to  us  as  firft  defigning, 
 and  then  executing  his  gracious  Purpofes  towards 
 them. 
 
 I  am  very  fenfible,  that  great  Contentions  and 
 Divifions  have  happen'd  in  the  Church  of  God  a- 
 bout  Predeftination  and  Reprobation,  about  Elec- 
 tion and  the  Decrees  of  God;  that  learned  Men 
 have  engaged  with  the  greatefl:  Zeal  and  Fierce- 
 nefs  in  this  Controverfy,  and  the  Difputes  have 
 prov'd  fo  intricate,  that  the  mofl:  diligent  Rea- 
 der will  perhaps,  after  all  his  labour  in  perufing 
 them,  be  but  little  fatisfy'd,  and  lefs  edify'd  by 
 the  greateit  part  of  all  that  has  been  written  upon 
 this    Subjeci;,    And   hence  it    is  that   confidering 
 
 Men 
 
(4  ) 
 
 Men  of  all  Parties  feem  at  lafl,  as  it  were  by  con- 
 fent,  to  have  laid  it  afide;  and  feldom  any  now 
 venture  to  bring  it  into  the  Pulpit,  except  fome 
 very  young  or  imprudent  Preachers. 
 
 Not  but  that  the  Do6lrine  laid  down  in  my 
 Text,  is  undoubtedly  true  and  ufcful,  if  we  could 
 but  light  on  the  true  and  ufeful  way  of  treating 
 it;  for  fo  our  Church  has  told  us  in  her  ftver. reentli 
 Article,  where  fhe  informs  us.  That  as  the  ^dly 
 Confideration  of  Predeftination  is  full  of  f^eet^  pica- 
 fant,  and  ttnfpeakeable  Comfort  to  gcdiy  Pe  fons^  fo 
 for  curiom  and  carnal  Perjons,  laik^jtg  the  i^'pirit  of 
 Chrifi,  to  have  continuMlj  bfore  ibeir  Ejcs  the  Sen-- 
 fence  of  God's  PredeHin  a:o»,  tj  a  moi  dann^erotis 
 Downfall  7vheyc!?y  the  Dtvil  doth  thruft  them  cither 
 into  Deperai  on,  or  :^'o  Tf'^'acl':-^  eis  of  njoji  unclean 
 living. 
 
 1  lie  '  afe  hcrct"^.'::  oung  ;nu',  i  thall  endeavour 
 to  lay  before  you  that  whuh  I  rake  to  be  the  edi- 
 fying par'-  o\  the  Dxflrine  of  PrcddUnation  r,  and 
 in  fudi  a  manner  (I  ho-e)  as  to  avoid  every  thing- 
 that  may  give  occafion  to  ignorant  or  corrupt  Men 
 to  make  an  ill  ufc  of  it. 
 
 §  II.  In  order  to  this,  I  fliall 
 
 Firfi,  Confider  the  Reprefentation  that  the  Text 
 gives  of  God,  as  contriving  our  Salvation  j  and 
 fhall  endeavour  to  explain  how  thefe  Terms  of 
 Fore-knowing  and  Pre  deft  inating  are  to  be  underftood 
 when  attributed  to  God. 
 
 Secondly-,  Why  the  holy  Scriptures  reprefent  God 
 to  us  after  this  manner. 
 
 1  hirdly.,  What  ufe  we  are  to  make  of  this  Dodrine 
 of  God's  fore- feeing,  freely  ele^ing,  and predejiinating 
 Men  to  Salvation. 
 
 As  to  the  firft  of  thefe,  you  may  obferve  that  in 
 the  Reprefentacicn   here    given  of  God's  dealing 
 
 with 
 
(5) 
 
 with  Men,  there  are  five  Afts  afcrib'd  to  him, 
 Fore-kfiouHngf  Predejiinating^  Calling,  J^^Jiifyi^^gf  and 
 GloYifjing.  And  about  each  of  thcle  great  Dilputes 
 have  arilen  among  Divines,  and  Parties  and  Seds 
 have  been  form'd  on  the  different  Opinions  con- 
 cerning them.  However,  as  to  the  three  lafl:,  Vro- 
 tefiants  feem  now  pretty  well  agreed  ;  but  as  to  the 
 two  firft,  the  DiflFerence  is  fo  great,  that  on  ac- 
 count thereof,  there  yet  remain  foim'd  and  fepa- 
 rate  Parties,  that  mutually  refufe  to  communicate 
 with  one  another :  tho'  I  believe,  if  rhe  Differences 
 between  them  were  duly  examin'd  and  flated,  they 
 would  not  appear  to  be  fo  great  as  they  feem  to  be 
 at  firft  view;  nor  confequently  would  there  appear 
 any  jufl  reafon  for  thofe  Animofities,  that  yet  re- 
 main between  the  contending  Parties. 
 
 §  III.  In  order  to  make  this  evident,  we  may 
 confider, 
 
 (i.)  That  it  is  in  effedl  agreed  on  all  hands,  that 
 the  Nature  of  God,  as  it  is  in  it  felf,  is  incompre- 
 henfible  by  human  Undcrflanding :  and  not  only 
 his  Nature,  but  likewife  his  Powers  and  Faculties, 
 and  the  Ways  and  Methods  in  which  he  exercifes 
 them,  are  fo  far  beyond  our  reach,  that  we  are  ut- 
 terly incapable  of  framing  exaft  and  adequate  No- 
 tions of  them.  Thus  the  Scriptures  frequently  teach 
 us,  particularly  St.  Paul  in  his  Epiftle  to  the  Ro' 
 mans^  Ch.  ii*  v.  53.  O  the  depth  of  the  Riches  both 
 of  the  Wifdom  and  Kmivledge  of  God!  Hou>  unjearch- 
 able  are  his  Judgments,  and  his  Ways  fafl  finding  out. 
 Ver.  34.  For  ivhe  hath  knoivn  the  Aiind  of  the  Lord 
 or  "who  hath  been  his  Cottnfellor. 
 
 §  IV.  (2.)  We  ought  to  remember,  that  the  De- 
 feriptions  which  we  frame  to  our  felves  of  God,  or 
 of  the  divine  Attributes,  are  not  taken  from  any  di- 
 red:  or  immediate  Perceptions  that  we  have  of  him 
 or  them;  but  from  fome  Obfervations  we  have 
 made  of  his  Works,  and  from  the  Confideration  of 
 
 thofs 
 
(6) 
 
 thole  Qualificatiom,  that  we  conceive  would  enable 
 
 .^^^^        us  to  perform  the  like.  /  Thus  obferving  great  Or- 
 
 Q^-.'^sj:'  der,  Conveniency,  and  Harmony  in  all  the  feveral 
 
 Parts  of  the  World,  and  perceiving  that  every 
 thing  is  adapted  and  tends  to  the  prefervation  and 
 2dvant.ige  of  the  whole:  we  are  apt  to  confider 
 that  we  could  not  contrive  and  fettle  things  in  fo 
 excellent  and  proper  a  manner  without  great  Wif- 
 dom ;  and  thence  conclude  that  God  who  has  thus 
 concerted  and  fettled  Matters  mufl:  have  jVtfdom: 
 And  having  then  alcrib'd  to  him  Wifdom,  because 
 we  (ee  the  effeds  and  refult  of  it  in  his  Works,  we 
 proceed  and  conclude  that  he  has  likewife  Forejtght 
 and  Underflanding,  becaufe  we  cannot  conceive 
 Wifdom  without  thefe,  and  becaufe  if  we  were  to 
 do  what  we  fee  he  has  done,  we  could  not  expe6t  to 
 perform  it  without  the  exercife  of  thefe  Faculties. 
 
 And  it  doth  truly  follow  from  hence,  that  God 
 mufl  either  have  thefe,  or  other  Faculties  and  Pow- 
 ers equivalent  to  them,  and  adequate  'to  thefe  mighty 
 EfFeds  which  proceed  from  them.  And  becaufe  we 
 do  not  know  what  his  Faculties  are  in  themfelves,  we 
 give  them  the  Names  of  thofe  Powers,  that  we  find 
 would  be  neceffary  to  us  in  order  to  produce  fuch 
 Effefts,  and  call  them  Wifdom,  Underftanding,  and 
 Fore-knowledge:  But  at  the  fame  time  we  cannot 
 but  be  fenfible  that  they  are  of  a  nature  altoge- 
 ther different  from  ours,  and  that  we  have  nodi- 
 refl  and  proper  Notion  or  Conception  of  them. 
 Only  we  are  fure  that  they  have  Effefts  like  un- 
 to thofe  that  do  proceed  from  Wifdom,  Under- 
 ftanding, and  Fore-knowledge  in  us :  And  when 
 our  Works  fail  to  refemble  them  in  any  particu- 
 lar, as  to  Pcrfedion,  it  is  by  reafon  of  fome  want  or 
 defect  in  thefe  Qualifications. 
 
 Thus  our  Reafon  teaches  us'  to  afcribe  thefe  Atr 
 pibutes  to  God,  by  way  of  refcmblance  ?nd  analogy 
 
(  7  ) 
 
 to  fiich  Qualities  or  Powers  as  we  find  moft  valuable- 
 and  perfect  in  our  felves. 
 
 §  V.  (5  0  If  we  look  into  the  holy  Scripture?;,  and 
 confider  the  Reprelentations  given  us  there  of  God 
 or  his  Attributes,  we  l"hall  find  them  generally  of 
 the  lame  nature,  and  plainly  borrow'd  fiom  lome 
 refemblance  to  things  with  which  we  are  acquainted 
 by  our  Senfes.  Thus  when  the  holy  Scriptures 
 fpeak  of  God,  they  afcribe  Hands,  and  Eyes,  and 
 Feet  to  him:  Not  that  it  is  defigned  we  fliould  be- 
 lieve that  he  has  any  of  thefe  Members  according 
 to  the  literal  Signification :  S  but  the  meaning  is,-f-  -*55C^ 
 that  he  has  a  Power  to  execute  all  thofe  Afts,  to 
 the  effedtinc  of  which  thefe  Parts  in  us  are  inftru- 
 
 c 
 
 mental: -f That  is,  he  can  converfe  with  Men  as-/- 
 well  as  if  he  had  a  Tonj^ue  and  Mouth  ;  he  can  dif- 
 cern  all  that  we  do  or  hy  as  perfedly  as  if  he 
 had  Eyes  and  Ears;  he  can  reach  us  as  well  as  if 
 he  had  Hands  and  Feet;  he  has  as  true  and  fub- 
 ftantial  a  Being  as  if  he  had  a  Body;  and  he  is  as 
 truly  prefent  every  where  as  if  th:U  Body  were  in- 
 finitely extended.  Y^And  in  truth,  if  all  thefe  things  -h 
 which  are  thus  afcrib'd  to  him,  did  really  and  lite- 
 rally belong  to  him,  he  'could  not  do  what  he  does 
 near  fo  effedually  a>  we  conceive  and  are  fure  he 
 doth  them  by  the  Faculties  and  Properties  which  he 
 real'y  poflefles,  tho*  what  they  are  in  themfelves  bs 
 imknown  to  us. 
 
 After  the  fame  manner,  and  for  the  fame  reafon. 
 We  find  h  m  reprefented  as  affefted  with  fuch  Paf- 
 fions  as  we  perceive  to  be  in  our  felves,  viz,,  as  an- 
 gry and  pleas'd,  as  loving  and  hating,  as  repenting 
 and  changing  his  Refolutions,  as  full  of  Mercy 
 and  provok'd  to  Revenge.  And  yet  on  Refiedion 
 we  cannot  think  that  any  of  .thefe  Pallions  can  lite- 
 rally affefl  the  Divine  Nature.  VLEut  the  meaning  +  .c:— _  ) 
 confefTedly  is,  that  he  will  as  certainly  puniili  the 
 Wicked  as  if  he  were  inflamed  with  the  PafTionof 
 
 Anger 
 
(8) 
 
 Anger  againfl:  them :  That  he  will  as  infallibly  re- 
 ward the  Good  as  we  will  tho/e  for  whom  we  have 
 a  particular  and  afFedicnate  Love:  that  vvh^n  Men 
 turn  from  their  Wickednefs,  and  do  what  is  agree- 
 able to  the  divine  Command,  he  will  as  iurely 
 change  his  Difpenfations  toward^  them,  as  if  he 
 really  repented  and  had  chang'd  his  Mind. 
 
 And  as  the  Nature  and  Paffions  of  Men  are  thus 
 by  analogy  and  coraparifon  afcrib'd  to  God,  be- 
 caufe  thefe  would  in  us  be  the  Principle^  of  fuch 
 outward  Adions  as  we  fee  he  has  performed,  if 
 ve  were  the  Authors  of  them  :  fo  in  the  fame  man- 
 ner, and  by  the  fame  cpndelcenfion  to  the  weak- 
 '+ners  of  our  Capacities,)<we  find  the  Powers  and 
 Operations  of  our  Mind  afcri'j'd  unto  him. 
 
 As  for  example,  it  is  the  part  of  a  wife  Man 
 to  confider  beforehand  what  is  proper  for  him  to 
 do)  to  prefcribe  Means  and  Methods  to  obtain  his 
 Ends,  to  lay  down  fome  Scheme  or  Phn  of  his 
 Work  before  he  begins,  and  to  keep  refolutely  to 
 it  in  the  Execution;  for  if  he  fhould  beconceiv'd 
 to  deviate  in  any  thing  from  his  firft  purpofe,  it 
 would  argue  fome  imperfe^flion  in  laying  the  De- 
 ficn,  or  want  of  Power  to  execute  ir.  And  there- 
 fore  'tis  after  this  manner  the  Scripture  rcprefents 
 God,  as  purpofing  and  contriving  beforehmd  all 
 his  Works;  and  for  this  reafon  Wifdom  and  Un- 
 derRanding,  and  Counftl  and  Fore-knowledge  are 
 afcrib'd  to  him;  becaufe  both  Reafon  and  Scrip- 
 ture affure  us  that  we  ought  to  conceive  of  God 
 as  having  all  the  Perfection  that  we  perceive  to  be  in 
 thele  Attributes,  and  that  he  has  all  the  Advantages 
 that  thefe  Powers  cr  Faculties  could  give  him . 
 
 The  Adv^antages  that  Undcrflanding  and  Know- 
 ledge give  a  Man  in  the  ufe  of  them,  are  to  enable 
 him  to  order  his  Matters  with  convenicncy  to  him- 
 felf,  and  confiftency  in  his  Work-^,  fo  that  they 
 may  not  hinder  or  embanafs  one  another :  And  in- 
 
 afmuch 
 
(  9) 
 
 afmucli  as  all  the  Works  of  God  are  fo  order'dthat 
 they  have  the  greateft  Congniiry  in  themfelve?, 
 and  are  molt  excellently  adapted  to  their  feveral 
 Ufes  and  Ends,  we  are  fure  there  is  a  Power  in 
 God  who  orders  them,  equivalent  to  Knowledge 
 and  Underftanding ;  and  becaufe  v/e  know  not 
 what  it  is  in  itfelf,  we  give  ic  thefe  Names. 
 
 §  VI.  Lafilj,  The  ufe  of  Fore-knowledge  with 
 us  is  to  prevent  any  Surprize  when  Events  happen, 
 and  that  we  may  not  be  at  a  lofs  what  to  do  by 
 things  coming  upon  us  unawares.  Now  inafmuch 
 as  we  are  certain  that  nothing  can  furprize  God^ 
 and  that  he  can  never  be  at  a  lofs  what  to  do  in 
 any  Event,  therefore  we  conclude  that  God  has 
 a  Faculty  to  which  our  Fore-knowledge  bears  fome 
 analogy,  and  therefore  we  call  it  by  that  Name. 
 fi^-But  it  does  not  follow  from  hence  that  any  of 
 thefe  are  more  properly  and  literally  in  God,  after 
 the  manner  that  they  are  in  us,  than  Hands  or 
 Eyes,  than  Mercy,  Love,  or  Hatred  are;"^but  on  ^  ">L-> 
 the  contrary  we  muft  acknowledge  that  ihofe 
 things,  which  we  call  by  thefe  N.mes  when  at- 
 tributed to  God,  are  of  fo  very  different  a  nature 
 from  what  they  are  in  us,  and  fo  fuperior  to  all 
 that  we  can  conceive,  that  in  reaUty  there  is  no 
 more  likenefs  between  them,  than  between  our 
 Hand  and  God's  Power :  nor  can  we  draw  Con- 
 fequences  from  the  real  Nature  of  one  to  that  of 
 the  other  with  more  juftnefs  of  Reafon,  than  we 
 can  conclude,  becaufe  our  Hand  confifts  of  Fingers 
 and  Joints,  that  therefore  the  Power  of  God  is 
 dittinguilli'd  by  fuch  Parts. 
 
 ^And  therefore  to  ar^ue  becaufe  Fore-knowledge, 
 as  it  is  in  us,  if  fuppofed  infallible,  cannot  confift 
 with  the  Contingency  of  Events,  that  therefore 
 what  we  call  fo  in  G  .d  cannot,  is  as  far  from  R.ea- 
 fon,  as  it  would  be  to  conclude,  b:-caufe  our  Eyes 
 cannot  fee  in  the  dark,  that  therefore,  when  God 
 
 is 
 
(  10  ) 
 is  faid  to  fee  all  things,  his  Eyes  muft  be  enlighten'd 
 with  a  perpetual  Sunlliine ;  or  becaufe  we  can't 
 love  or  hate  without  Pallionj  that  therefore  when 
 the  Scriptures  afcribe  thefe  to  God,  they  teach  us 
 that  he  is  liable  to  thefe  Affed-ions  as  we  are. 
 
 ~-  We  ought  therefore  to  interpret  all  thefe  things 
 when  attributed  to  God,  as  thus  exprefs'd  only  by 
 way  of  condefccntion  to  our  Capacities,  in  order  to 
 help  us  to  conceive  what  we  are  to  expert  from  him, 
 and  what  Duty  we  are  to  pay  him  ;Xand  particu-'^  — 
 larly,  that  the  terms  of  Fore-knowledge,  Predefti- 
 nation,  nay,  of  Underftanding  and  Will,  when  af- 
 cribed  to  him,  are  not  to  be  taken  fl:ri(3:ly  or  pro- 
 perly, nor  are  \vq  to  think  that  they  are  in  him  after 
 the  fame  manner  or  in  the  fame  fenfe  that  we  find  them 
 in  ourfelvcs ;  but  on  the  contrary,  we  are  to  interpret 
 them  only  by  way  of  Analogy  and  Comparifon. 
 
 ((^;?»-That  is  to  fay,  when  we  afcribe  Fore-knowledge 
 to  him,  we  mean  that  he  can  no  more  be  furpriz'd 
 with  any  thing  that  happens,  than  a  wife  Man,  that 
 forefees  an  Event,  can  be  furpriz'd  when  it  comes 
 to  pa(s ;  nor  can  he  any  more  be  at  a  lofs  what  he  is 
 to  do  infuch  a  Cafe,  than  a  wife  Man  can,  who  is  mofl 
 perfeifl'y  acquainted  with  all  Accidents  which  may 
 obftruct  his  Defign,  and  has  provided  againft  them. 
 §  VIL  So  when  God  is  faid  to  predetermine  and 
 
 /'  ^  y^  p-  foreordain  all  things  accord'ng  to  the  Counfel  of 
 ^"^-^  '^'^p:>  -/his  WiII,+the  importance  of  this  Expreffion  is,  that 
 all  things  depend  as  much  on  God,  as  if  he  had 
 fettled  them  according  to  a  certain  Scheme  and 
 defign,  whivh  he  had  voluntarily  fram'd  in  his 
 own  Mind,  without  regard  had  to  any  other  con- 
 r»deration  befides  that  of  his  own  meer  Will  and 
 Pleafure. 
 
 If  then  we  underftand  Predetermination  and  Pre- 
 defiination  in  this  analogous  Senfe,  to  give  us  a 
 Notion  of  the  irrelillible  Power  of  God,  and  of  that 
 fuprcme  Dominion  he  may  exercife  over  his  Crea- 
 
(  ^I  ) 
 
 fares,  it  will  iiclp  us  to  underfland  what  the  So- 
 vereignty is  that  God  lias  over  us,  rhe  Submilli- 
 on  that  we  ought  to  pay  him,  and  the  Depen- 
 dance  we  have  upon  inm. 
 
 But    it  no  ways    follows   from  hence  that  this  _^  /    • 
 
 is  inconlident    with  the    Contingency    of  Events,  '""^ 
 
 or  Free-VVill.  And  from  hence  ir  appears  v/hat  it  i? 
 that  makes  us  apt  to  think  :'o :  which  ii  only  this,  that 
 we  find  in  our  felves  when  wc  determine  to  do  a 
 thing,  and  are  able  to  do  what  we  have  refolv'd 
 on,  that  thin?  can't  be  conrinL^ent  to  us :  And  if 
 God's  Fore-knowledge  and  Predetermination  were 
 of  the  fame  nature  with  ours,  the  fame  Inconfift- 
 cncy  would  be  juftly  infcr'd.  But  I  have  alrea- 
 dy fhew'd  that  they  are  not  of  the  fame  kind, 
 and  that  they  are  only  afcrib'd  to  him  by  way  of 
 Analogy  and  Comparifon,  as  Love  and  Mercy, 
 and  other  Pallions  are;  that  they  are  quite  of  another 
 nature,  and  that  we  have  no  proper  Notion  of 
 them,  any  more  than  a  Man  born  blind  has  of 
 Sight  and  Colours ;  and  therefore  that  we  ought 
 no  more  to  pretend  to  determine  what  is  confiftent 
 or  not  confjitent  with  them,  than  a  blind  Man 
 ouglit  to  determine,  from  what  he  hears  or  feels, 
 TO  what  Onjeds  the  fenfe  of  Seeing  reaches :  for 
 this  were  to  reafon  from  things  that  are  only  com- 
 paratively and  improperly  afcrib'd  to  God,  and  by 
 way  of  analogy  and  accommodation  to  our  Capaci- 
 ties, as  if  they  were  properly  and  univocally  the  fame 
 in  him  and  in  us. 
 
 ^"  If  we  would  fpeak  the  Truth,  thofe  Powers,  -^^^ 
 Properties  and  Operations,  the  Names  of  which 
 we  transfer  to  God,  are  but  faint  Shadows  and 
 Refemblances,  or  rather  indeed  Emblems  and  pa- 
 rabolical Figures  of  the  divine  Attributes,  which 
 they  are  defign'd  to  fignify ;  whereas  his  Attributes 
 are  the  Originals,  the  true  real  Things,  of  a  Na- 
 ture (o  infinitely  fuperior  and  different  from  any 
 
 M  m  thing 
 
(    12    ) 
 
 thing  we  difcern  in  his  Creatures,  or  that  can  be 
 conceiv'd  by  finite  Underftandings,  that  we  can't 
 with  reafon  pretend  to  make  any  other  Deductions 
 from  the  Natures  of  one  to  that  of  the  others,  than 
 thofe  he  has  allow'd  us  to  make,  or  extend  the  Pa- 
 rallel any  farther  than  that  very  Inflance,  which  the 
 refemblance  was  defign'd  to  teach  us. 
 __  _  Thus  Fore-knowledge  and  Predeili nation,  when 
 
 i  ^J\^  attributed  to  God,  are  defign'd  to  teach  us  the 
 Obligations  which  we  owe  to  him  for  our  Salvatioa 
 and  the  Dependance  we  have  on  his  Favour,  and  fo 
 far  we  may  ufe  and  prefs  them  :7<but  to  conclude-f 
 ficm  thence  that  thele  are  inconfifrent  with  Free- 
 will, is  to  fuppofe  that  they  are  the  fame  in  him 
 -/snd  us;iSand  juft  a^  reafonable  as  to  infer,  becaufe 
 Wifdom  is  compsr'd  in  Scripture  to  a  Tree  of 
 Life,  and  therefore  it  grows  in  the  Earth,  has  its 
 Spring  and  fall,  and  is  warm'd  by  the  Sun  and  fed  by 
 the  Rain. 
 
 §  VIII.  And  this  brings  me  to  the  fecond  Head 
 which  I  propos'd  to  my  felf  in  this  Difcourfe» 
 which  was  to  iliew  you,  10jj  God  and  heavenly 
 things  are  after  this  manner  reprefented  to  «s  in  holy 
 Scripture.  And  the  firft  Reafon  I  fliall  offer  is  that 
 we  mufl:  either  be  content  to  know  them  this  way,  or 
 — -f-not  at  all.  -^  I  have  already  told  you,  and  I  be- 
 lieve every  confidering  Man  is  convinc'd,  that  the 
 Nature  and  Perfeftions  of  God,  as  he  is  in  him- 
 fclf,  are  fuch  that  it  is  impoffib'e  we  Ihould  com- 
 prehend them,  efpecially  in  the  prefent  State  of 
 fmperfedion,  Ignorance,  and  Corruption  in  which 
 this  World  lies.  '/He  is  the  Object  of  none  ofour 
 Senfes  by  which  we  reciiveall  our  di reft  and  im- 
 mediate Preception  of  things;  and  therefore  if  we 
 know  any  thing  of  him  at  all,  it  mufl:  be  by  de- 
 ductions of  Rcaion,  by  Analogy  and  Compaiifon, 
 by  refembling  him  to  fcmething  that  we  do  know 
 and  are  acquainted  with. 
 
 'Tis 
 
(  >3  ) 
 
 1CC*~  'Tis  by  this  way  we  arrive  at  tlie  mod  noble  and 
 ufeful  Notions  we  have,   and  by  th  s  jMethod  we 
 leach  aud  inrtrud  others.  -fThus  when  we  would-/  ^.^^ 
 lielp  a  Man  to  feme  Conception  of  any  thing  that 
 has  not  fallen  within  the  reach  of  his  Senfes,  v/e 
 do  it  by  comparing  it  to  fomething    that  already 
 has,  by    offering    hnii    fome    Similitude,     Refem- 
 blance,  or  Analogy,  to  help  his  Conception,  y  As  t^ 
 for  example,  to  give  a  Man   a  Notion  of  a  Coun^ 
 try  to  which  he  is  a  Stranger,  and  to  make  him  ap- 
 prehend its  Bounds  and   Situation,    we  produce  a 
 Map  to   him  j    and  by   that  he   obtains   as   much 
 knowledge  of  it  as  ferves  him  for  his  prefent  pur- 
 pofe.      Now   a   Map  is  only    Paper  and   Ink,  di- 
 verfify'd  with  fevcral  Strokes  and  Lines,  which  in 
 themlelves    have    very   little    likenefs     to    Earth, 
 Mountains,     Valleys,     Lakes    and    Rivers.      Yet 
 none   can   deny  but   by   Proportion   and    Analogy 
 they  are  very  Inftrudive;  and  if  any  fhould  ima- 
 gine   that    thefe   Countries    are    really   Paper,    be- 
 caufe  the   Maps  that  reprefent   them   are  made  of 
 ir,  and  fliould  ferioufly  draw  Concl  ificns  from  that 
 Suppofition,    he  would  expofe  his  Underftanding, 
 and  make  himfelf  ridiculous  rtAnd  yet  fuch  as  ar- f 
 gue  from  the  faint  Refcmblances  that  either  Scrip- 
 ture or  Reafon  give  of  the  divine  Attributes  and 
 Operations,  and  proceed  in  their  Reafonings  as  if 
 thefe  mail   in  all  refpeds  anfwer  one  another,  fall 
 into    the    fame    Abfurdities  'that    thofe  would   (:e 
 guilty  of,    who    iliould   think   Countries  muft  be 
 of  Paper,    becaufe   the   Maps  that  reprefent  them 
 are  fo. 
 
 5c>^To  apply  this  more  particularly  to  the  Cafe  before 
 us:  We  afcribe  Decrees  and  Predeflination  to 
 God  J-  becaufe  the  things  Hgnify'd  by  thefe  words 
 bear  fome  refemblance  to  certain  Perfedio^ns  that 
 we  believe  to  be  in  him.  But  if  we'remenriber 
 that  thev  are  only  Similitudes  and  Reprefentations 
 "31111  z       .     "^^        of 
 
(  H  ) 
 
 oftliem,  and  that  there  is  as  little  likenefs  between 
 the  one  and  the  other,  as  between  the  Countries 
 and  Maps  which  reprefent  them;  and  that  the 
 likenefs  lies  not  in  the  Naruie  of  them,  butinfome 
 particular  EfFeft  or  Circumftance  that  is  in  feme 
 Meafure  common  to  both :  we  muft  acknowledge 
 it  very  unreafonable  to  expcfl:  that  they  fliouid  an- 
 fwer  one  another  in  all  things :  or  becaufe  the  dif- 
 fertnt  Reprefentations  of  the  fame  thing  can't  be 
 exactly  adjufted  in  c^■e^y  particular,  that  therefore 
 the  thing  reprefenred  is  inconfiflent  in  it(elf. 
 _y^„-..^-— "  -  „  -  Fore  -  knov.'ledge  and  Decrees  are  only  afUgn'd 
 ^2^y^— -^  to  Cod  to  give  us  a  Notion  of  the  Steddinefs  and 
 Certainty  of  the  divine  Adions;  and  if  fo,  for  lis 
 to  conclude  that  what  is  reprefented  by  them  is 
 inconfifient  with  the  Contingency  of  Events  or 
 Free-Wili,  becaufe  the  things  reprefenting  (I  mean 
 our  Fore-knov/ledge  and  Decrees)  are  fo,  is  the 
 fame  Abfurdiry,  as  it  is  to  conclude,  that  Chifja  is 
 no  bigger  than  a  Sheet  of  Paper,  becaufe  the  Map, 
 that  reprefenrs  it,  is  contained  in  that  compafs. 
 
 §  IX.  This  fecms  to  me  a  material  Point,  and 
 therefore  I  will  endeavour  to  illuftrate  it  with  an 
 ■^^-  Jnftanceor  two  more.  'Every  Body  is  fatisfy'd  that 
 "CJ— — ^  Time,  Motion,  and  Velocity,  are  Subjeds  of  ve- 
 ry ufeful  Knowledge;  and  that  adjulting  and  dif- 
 covcring  the  Proportions  that  thefe  be.ir  to  one  a- 
 nother,  is  perhaps  all  that  is  profitable  in  natural 
 Philofophy.  How  is  it  then,  that  we  proceed  in 
 our  Demonflrations  concerning  thefe  ?  Is  it  not  by 
 reptefenting  Time  by  a  Line,  the  Degrees  of  Ve- 
 locity by  another,  and  the  Motion  that  refults  from 
 both,  by  a  Superficies  or  a  Solid?  And  from  thefe 
 we  draw  Condufions,  which  are  not  only  very 
 true,  but  alfo  of  great  Moment  to  Arts  and  Scien- 
 ces; and  never  fail  in  our  Dedud-ions,  while  we 
 Ivcep  juOly  to  the  Analogy  and  Proportion  they 
 Lear  to  onQ  another  in   the  Prcdudion    of  natural 
 
 Eflcds; 
 
(  '5  ) 
 
 EfFeds :  neither  is  it  eafy,  nor  perhaps  poflible,  to 
 come  at  fuch  Knowledge  any  other  way. 
 
 Yet  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  there  is  no  great 
 Similitude  between  a  Line  and  Time ;  and  it  will 
 not  be  obvious  to  a  Perfon,  who  is  not  acquainted 
 with  the  method  of  the  skilful  in  fuch  Matters,  to 
 conceive  how  a  Solid  Hiould  anfwer  the  com- 
 pounded EfFed  of  Time  and  Motion.  But  if  any, 
 inflead  of  endeavouring  to  underftand  the  Me- 
 thod and  Proportions  ufed  by  the  Learned  in  fuch 
 Cafes,  in  order  to  difcovcr  to  them  thefe  ufeful 
 Truths,  fhould  rejed  the  whole  as  a  thing  impof- 
 fible ;  alledging  that  we  make  Time  a  permanent 
 thing  and  cxifling  altogether,  becaufe  a  Line 
 ■which  reprefents  it  in  this  Scheme  is  To;  we  fnould 
 think  that  he  hardly  deferv'd  an  Anfwer  to  fuch  a 
 foolilli  Objeftion. 
 
 And  yet  of  this  nature  are  moft,  if  not  all,  the 
 Objedions  that  are  commonly  made  againft  the 
 Reprefentations  that  the  Scripture  gives  us  of  the 
 divine  Nature,  and  of  the  Myfleries  of  our  Reli- 
 gion. 
 ^  ^>-§.  X.  Thus  the  holy  Scriptures  reprefent  to  us 
 that  Diftindion  which  we  are  obliged  to  believe  to 
 be  in  the  Unity  of  God,  by  that  of  Three  Perfons, 
 and  the  Relation  they  bear  to  one  another,  by 
 that  of  a  Father  to  his  Son,  and  of  a  Man  to  his 
 Spirit :  And  thofe  that  objedl  againft  this,  and  in- 
 fer that  thefe  muft  be  three  Subftances,  becaufe 
 three  Perfons  among  Men  are  fo,  do  plainly  forget 
 that  thefe  are  but  Reprefentations  and  Refemblan- 
 ces ;  and  fall  into  the  fame  abfurd  way  of  reafoning 
 that  the  former  do,  who  conclude,  that  we  make 
 Time  a  permanent  thing,  becaufe  a  Line  is  fo,  by 
 which  we  reprefent  it. 
 .  "'  §  XL  Again,  if  we  were  to  defcribe  to  an  igno- 
 rant American  what  was  meant  by  Writing,  and 
 ?ol4  him  that  it  is  a  way  of  making  words  vifible 
 
 M  m  5  '  "    anci 
 
(   i6  ) 
 
 and  perrr-ancnt,  fo  that  Perfor.s  at  any  diftance  of  1 
 Time  snd  Place,  may  be  able  to  fee  and  under- 
 ftand  them  :  The  Defcription  would  feem  very 
 ftrange  to  him,  and  he  might  objeft  that  the  thing 
 muft  be  impolTible,  for  Words  are  not  to  be  feen 
 but  heard  ;  they  pals  in  rhe  Speaking,  and  it  is 
 impofhble  they  Ihould  affed  the  Abfenr,  muchlefs 
 thofe  that  live  in  diltant  Ages.  To  which  there 
 need  no  other  anfwer,  than  to  inform  him  that 
 there  are  other  Ibrt  of  Words,  befide  thofe  he 
 knows,  that  are  truly  called  fo,  becaufe  equivalent 
 to  fuch  as  are  fpoken ;  that  they  have  both  the 
 fame  ufe,'  and  ferve  equally  to  communicate  our 
 Thoughts  to  one  another  j  and  that  if  he  will  but 
 have  patience,  and  apply  himfelf  to  learn,  he  will 
 foon  underfland,  and  be  convinc'd  of  the  Poflibi- 
 lity  and  Ufcfulneis  of  the  thing  :  And  none  can 
 doubt  but  he  were  much  to  blame,  and  aded  an 
 unwife  part,  if  he  refus'd  to  believe  the  Perfonthat 
 offer'd  to  inflrud  him,  or  ncgleded  to  make  the 
 Experiment. 
 ,..^^<  And  fure,  when  any  one  objc6ls  againft  the  Pof- 
 
 C. --*'     fibility  of  the  Three  Perfons  of  the  Trinity  in  one 
 
 God,  it  is  every  whit  as  good  an  Anfwer  to  tell 
 fuch  an  Ob) edor  that  there  are  other  fort  of  Perfons 
 befides  thofe  we  fee  amon?  Men,    whofe  Perfona- 
 lity  is  as  truly  different  from  what  we  call  fo,  as  a 
 Word  written  is   different  from   a  Word   fpoken, 
 and  yet  equivalent  to  it.     And  tho'  three  Perfons, 
 fuch  as  Men  are,  can't  be  in  one  human  Nature, 
 as  a  Word  fpoken  can't  be  vinble  and  permanent : 
 yet  what  we  call  three  Perfons  by  Comparifon  and 
 Analogy,   inay  conlift  in  the  Unity  of  ths  God- 
 head. 
 /O  •    r>  /'•^^~:P'     -A-nd  after  the  fame  manner  we  ought  to  anfwer 
 \//^^    vA-^    thofe  who  objed:  againfl:  the   Fore-knowledge  and 
 Titcrtt^  of  God,  as  inconfiilent  with  the  Freedom 
 of  Choice,    by   telling  them  that  tho'  fuch  Fore- 
 knowledge 
 
(  '7  ) 
 
 knowledge  snd  Decrees  as  are  in  our  Underftand- 
 ing  and  Wills,  cannot  confifl:  with  Contingency, 
 if  we  fuppofe  them  certain;  yet  what  we  call  fo  in 
 God  may,  being  quite  of  a  different  Nature,  and 
 only  called  by  thofe  Names,  by  reafon  of  fome  Ana- 
 logy and  Proportion  which  is  between  them. 
 
 >-►-.  And  if  Men  will  but  have  patience,  and  wait 
 '  the  proper  time,  when  Faith  fliall  be  pei  feded  in- 
 to Vifion,  and  we  fhall  know  even  as  we  are 
 known;  they  may  then  fee  and  be  as  well  fatisfy'd 
 that  there  is  no  Abfurdity  in  the  Trinity  of  Per- 
 fons,  or  Fore-knowledge  of  Contingency,  as  the 
 Indian  is,  when  he  has  learn'd  to  read  and  write, 
 that  there  is  no  impoffibility  in  vilible  and  permanent 
 Words. 
 
 r-^  §  VII.  Loijllj-i  It  is  obfervable,  that  no  Care, 
 Induftry,  or  Inflruflion,  can  ever  give  a  Perfon 
 born,  and  continuing  blind,  any  Notion  of  Light; 
 nor  can  he  ever  have  any  Conception  how  Men 
 who  have  Eyes  difcern  the  Shape  and  Figure  of  a 
 thing  at  a  diftance,  nor  im.igine  v/hat  Colours 
 mean:  And  yet  he  would,  I  believe,  readily  (on 
 the  account  he  receives  from  others,  of  the  Advan- 
 tage of  knowing  thefe  things)  endure  Labour  and 
 Pain,  and  fubmit  to  the  mod  difficult  and  tor- 
 menting Operations  of  Phyfick  and  Chirurgery,  in 
 order  to  obtain  the  ufe  of  hi)  Eyes,  if  any  reafon- 
 able  hope  could  be  given  him  of  the  Succefs  of  fuch 
 an  Undertaking.  -i^-And  why  then  fhould  not  we  as-f' 
 willingly  fubmit  to  thofe  eafy  Methods  which 
 God  has  prefcrib'd  to  us,  in  order  to  obtain 
 that  Knowledge  of  his  Nature  and  Attributes,  in 
 which  our  eternal  Satisfaftion  and  Happinefs  here- 
 after IS  in  a  very  great  meafure  to  confill:  ?  And 
 "'tis  certain  we  now  know  as  much  of  them  as  the 
 blind  Man,  in  the  Cafe  fuppos'd,  does  of  Light 
 or  Colours;  and  have  better  reafon  to  feek,  and 
 jnore  certain  hope  of  attaining  in  the  next  Life  to 
 IVl  m  4  a 
 
(   '"B  ) 
 
 a  fuller  and  a  more  complcac  Knowledge,  thui  fuch 
 a  Man  can  have  with  lehtion  to  rhe  ufe  of  his 
 Eyes,  and  the  advantage  of  feeing.  And  then  will 
 not  he  rife  up  in  Judgment  agamft  us,  and  con- 
 demn us  ?  Since  he  endures  To  much  to  obtain  Sight 
 on  the  imperfeft  Repref  ntations  of  it  made  to  him 
 by  other  Men,  whilfl:  we  will  not  believe  and  en- 
 dure as  much  for  eternal  Happinefs,  on  the  Tefti- 
 mony  of  God. 
 
 §  Xlir.  If  if  bcsslv'd.  Why  thefe  things  are  not 
 made  clearer  to  us;  I  anfwer,  for  the  fame  Reafon 
 that  Light  and  Colours  are  not  clear  to  one  that 
 is  born  blind,  even  becaufe  in  this  imperfed  State 
 we  want  Faculties  to  difcern  them:)^And  we  cannot*^ 
 expe»ft  to  reach  the  Knowledge  of  them  whilfl: 
 here,  for  the  fame  reafon  that  a  Child,  whilll:  he 
 is  fo,  cannot  fpeak  and  difcourfe  as  he  doth  when 
 a  grown  Man^  there  is  a  Time  and  Seafon  for 
 every  thing,  and  we  mufl:  wait  for  that  Seafon. 
 There  is  another  Stare  and  Life  for  the  clear  dif- 
 cerning  of  theie  Matters ;  but  in  the  mean  time 
 we  ought  to  take  the  Steps  and  Methods  which  are 
 proper  for  our  prefent  Condition  :  And  if  we  will 
 not  do  fo,  we  can  no  more  expccl  to  arrive  to  the 
 Knowledge  of  thefe  ncccifary  Truths,  or  that  State 
 which  will  make  them  plain  to  us,  than  a  Child 
 can  hope  he  lliall  ever  be  able  to  read  and  write, 
 who  will  not  be  persuaded  to  go  to  School,  or  obey 
 his  Mafler. 
 
 This  analogical  Knowledge  of  Cod's  Nature  and 
 Attributes,  is  all  of  which  we  are  capable  at  pre- 
 fent ;  and  we  muft  either  be  contented  to  know  him 
 thus,  or  fit  down  with  .in  intire  Ignorance  and  Neg- 
 le(5i  of  God,  and  finally  defpair  of  future  Happi- 
 ly ^nefs./  But  it  concerns  us  frequently  to  call  to  mind 
 the  Apoftle's  Obfervation,  i  Lor.  15.  12.  F&r 
 no-iij  we  fee  thro"  a  Glafs  darkly  y  bftt  then  face  to  face ; 
 noii^  I  kjiow  in  part,  but  then  I  fjall  know  even  as  I 
 
 din 
 
(  19  ) 
 
 urn  hnown,  Tho'  our  prefent  knowledge  of  divine 
 Things  be  very  imperfed,  yet  it  is  enough  to 
 jwaken  our  defire  of  more ;  and  tho'  we  do  not 
 anderftand  the  Enjoyments  of  the  BlefTed,  yet  the 
 Defcription  we  have  of  them  is  fufficient  to  engage 
 lis  to  feek  after  them,  and  to  profecute  the  Methods 
 prefcrib'd  in  Scripture  for  attaining  them. 
 
 §  XIV.  And  therefore  let  me  offer  it  as  a  fecond 
 j^eafon  why  God  and  divine  Things  are  thus  re- 
 prefented  to  us  in  Scripture,  viz,.  That  fuch 
 Knowledge  is  fufficicnt  to  all  the  Intents  and  Pur- 
 pofes  of  Religion ;  the  Defign  whereof  is  to  lead 
 us  in  the  way  to  eternal  Happinefs,  and  in  order 
 thereunto,  to  teach  and  oblige  :us  to  live  reafon- 
 ably,  to  perform  our  Duty  to  God,  our  Neigh- 
 bours, and  ourfelves,  to  conquer  and  mortify  our 
 FafTions,  j.and  Lufts,  to  make  us  beneficent  and 
 charitable  to  Men,  and  to  oblige  us  to  love,  obey, 
 and  depend  upon  God. 
 
 Now  it  is  eafy  to  fhew,  that  fuch  a  Knowledge, 
 as  I  have  defcrib'd,    is  fufficicnt  to  obtain  all  thefe 
 
 ■jCEnds  :f^For  tho'  I  know  not  what  God  is  in  him- 
 felf,  yet  if  I  believe  he  is  able  to  hurt  or  help  me, 
 to  make  me  happy  or  miferable,  this  Belief  is  fuffi- 
 cient  to  convince  me,    that  'ris  my  Duty  to  fear 
 
 ^  him.  ■/  If  I  be  affur'd  that  all  his  Works  arc  done 
 with  Regularity,  Order,  ;ind  Fitnefs ;  that  no- 
 thing can  furprize  or  difappoint  him,  that  he  can 
 never  be  in  any  doubt,  or  at  a  lofs  what  is  proper 
 for  him  to  do ;  tho'  I  do  not  comprehend  the  Fa- 
 culties by  which  he  performs  fo  many  admirable 
 and  amazing  things;,  yet  I  know  enough  to  make 
 me  adore  and  admire  his  Condud. -,t.If  I  be  fatif--^ 
 fy'd  that  I  can  no  more  exped:  to  efcape  free,  when 
 I  break  the  Laws  and  Rules  he  has  prefcrib'd  me, 
 than  a  Subject  can  who  affaults  his  Prince  in  the 
 iTiidd:  of  all  his  Guards;  this  is  enough  to  make  me 
 cautious   about  every   Word  I   fpeak,    and  every 
 
 Adiou 
 
(   20) 
 
 Adioa  I  pcifoim,  and  to  put  me  out  of  all  hope 
 of  efcaping  when  I  offend  him. 
 S^lf  I  am  convinced  that  God  will  be  as  fteddy  to 
 the  Rules  he  has  prcfcrib'd  for  my  Deportment  as  a 
 wife  and  juft  Prince  will  be  to  his  Laws;  this  a- 
 lone  will  oblige  me  to  a  ftrid  Obfervation  of  the 
 divine  commands,  and  affure  me  that  I  mull  be 
 judg'd  according  as  I  have  kept  or  tranfgrcf.'d 
 them. 
 
 ^Af  a  man  be  convinc'd  that  by  his  Sins  he  has 
 forfeited  all  Right  and  'litle  to  Happinefs,  and 
 that  God  is  under  no  Obligation  to  grant  him  par- 
 don for  them;  that  only  the  free  Mercy  of  God 
 can  put  him  into  the  way  of  Salvation;  and  tha: 
 he  may  as  well  v/ithout  Imputation  and  Tnjuflicf, 
 pardon  one,  and  pafs  by  another,  as  a  Prince  may, 
 of  many  equal  JV1alefa(3-ors,  reprieve  one  for  an 
 inftance  of  his  Mercy  and  Power,  and  fuffer  the 
 reft  to  be  carry'd  to  Execution  :  If  a  man,  I  fay, 
 finds  himfelf  under  thefe  Circumftances,  he  will 
 have  the  fame  Obligations  of  Gratitude  ro  his  God, 
 that  the  pardon'd  Offender  owes  to  his  Prince, 
 and  impute  his  Elcape  intirely  to  the  peculiar  Fa- 
 vour of  God,  that  miade  the  Diftinflion  between 
 him  and  others  without  any  regard  to  their  Merits. 
 If  we  believe  that  there  is  a  Diftinction  in  the 
 manner  of  the  fubfiftmg  of  the  divine  Nature, 
 that  requires  fuch  particular  Application>  from  us 
 to  God  as  v/e  pay  to  three  diftind  Perfons  here; 
 and  that  he  has  fuch  diftind  and  really  different 
 Relations  to  himfelf  and  to  us  on  this  account,  as 
 three  Men  have  to  one  another;  that  is  enough  to 
 oblige  us  to  pay  our  Addreffes  to  him  as  thus  di- 
 ftinguifli'd,  and  to  cxpccl  as  different  Benefits  and 
 BlelTings  from  hiin  under  this  Diftindion,  as  we 
 expccl  from  different  Perfons  here :  And  it  can  be 
 no  hindrance  to  our  Duty,  that  we  are  ignorant  of 
 the  nature  and  manner  of  that  Diftindion. 
 
(   21    ) 
 
 ^  Let  us  confider  how  many  hoftour  and  obey  their 
 Prince,  who  never  faw  him,  who  never  had  any 
 perfonal  Knowledge  of  him,  and  could  not  jdiflin- 
 guilli  him  from  another  Man  if  they  fhould  meet 
 him.  This  will  lliew  us,  that  it  is  not  neceffary 
 that  we  fhould  perfonally  know  our  Governor,  to 
 oblige  us  to  perform  our  Puty  to  him:  And  if 
 many  perform  their  Duty  to  their  Prince  without 
 knowing  him,  why  fliould  it  feem  ftrange  that  we 
 fhould  be  oblig'd  to  do  our  Duty  to  God,  tho'  we 
 do  not  know  any  more  of  his  Perfon  or  Nature  but 
 that  he  is  our  Creator  and  Governor  ? 
 -rrr^Lafilyt  To  (liew  that  this  kind  of  Knowledge  is 
 fufficient  for  Salvation,  let  us  fuppofe  one  who  takes 
 all  the  Defcriprions  we  have  of  God  literally,  who 
 imagines  him  to  be  a  mighty  King  that  fits  in  Hea- 
 ven, and  has  the  Earth  for  his  Footftool  i  th:t  at  the 
 fame  time  hath  all  things  in  his  view  which  can 
 happen  j  that  has  thoufands  and  thoufands  of  Mi- 
 nillers  to  attend  him,  all  ready  to  obey  and  execute 
 his  Commands ;  that  has  a  great  Love  and  Favour 
 for  fuch  as  diligently  obey  his  Orders,  and  is  in  a 
 Rage  and  Fury  againfl:  the  Difobedient :  Could  any 
 one  doubt  but  he,  who  in  the  fimplicity  of  his 
 Heart  fliould  believe  thefe  things,  as  literally  re- 
 prefented,  would  be  faved  by  virtue  of  that  Belief, 
 or  that  he  would  not  have  Motives  ftrong  enough 
 to  oblige  him  to  love,  honour,  and  obey  God? 
 
 If  it  lliould  be  objected  that  fuch  Reprefentations 
 do  not  exactly  anfwer  the  Nature  of  Things,  I 
 confefs  this  is  true ;  but  I  would  defire  you  to  con- 
 fider, that  the  beft  Reprefentations  we  can  make 
 of  God  are  infinitely  fhort  of  the  Truth,  and  that 
 the  imperfeiSlions  of  fuch  Reprefentations  will  ne- 
 ver be  imputed  to  us  as  a  Fault,  provided  we  do 
 not  wilfully  diflionour  him  by  unworthy  Notions, 
 and  our  Conceptions   of  him  to   be  fuch  as  may 
 
 fuffi- 
 
fufficienily  oblige  us  to  perform  the  Duties  he  re- 
 quires at  our  hands. 
 
 And  if  any  one  farther  alledge  that  he  who  takes 
 thefe  Reprefentations  hterally,  will  be  involv'd  in 
 many  Difficulties,  and  that  it  will  be  eafy  to  (hew 
 that  there  are  great  Inconfiftences  in  them,  if  we  un- 
 derfland  them  according  to  the  Letter. 
 
 I  anfwer,  He  is  to  be  look'd  upon  as  very  offi- 
 cious and  impertinent,  that  will  raife  fuch  Objec- 
 tions, and  put  them  in  the  Heads  of  plain,  honeft 
 People,  who  by  the  force  of  fuch  common,  tho' 
 figurative  Knowledge  (as  it  may  be  term'd)  prac- 
 tice the  fubftantial  and  real  Duties  of  Religion, 
 that  lead  them  to  eternal  Happinefs. 
 
 'Tis  true,  when  curious  and  bufy  Perfons,  by 
 the  unfeafonable  abufe  of  their  Knowledge,  have 
 rais'd  fuch  Objeclions,  they  muft  be  anfwer'd  :  and 
 it  is  then  neceflary  to  ffiew  in  what  Senfe  thefe  Re- 
 prefentations  ought  to  be  taken  ;  and  that  they  are 
 to  be  underflood  by  way  of  Comparilon,  as  Con- 
 defcenfions  to  our  Weaknefs. 
 
 But  tho'  thefe  Oojedions  are  eafily  anfwer'd. 
 yet  he  who  makes  them  unneceflarily  is  by  no 
 means  to  be  excus'd,  becaufe  they  often  occafion 
 difturbance  to  weak  People.  Many  that  may  be 
 fhock'd  by  the  Difficulty,  •  may  not  be  capable  of 
 readily  undcrftanding  the  Anfwers :  and  therefore 
 thus  to  raife  fuch  Scruples,  is  to  lay  a  Stumbling- 
 Block  in  the  way  of  our  weak  Brethren,  and  per- 
 plex them  with  Notions  and  Curiofities,  the 
 Knowledge  of  which  is  no  way  neceffary  to  Sal- 
 tation. 
 
 ^^^We  ought  therefore  to  confider  that  it  was  in 
 great  Mercy  and  Compaffion  to  the  Ignorance  and 
 Infnmity  of  Men,  that  the  holy  Spirit  vouchfaPd 
 to  give  us  fuch  Reprefentations  of  the  divine  Na- 
 ture and  Attributes.  He  knew  what  Knowledge 
 was  moft  proper  for  us,  and  what  would  moft  ef- 
 fectually 
 
(  23   ) 
 
 ftfllinlly  work  on  us  to  perform  cur  Duty  :  and  if 
 We  take  things  as  the  Scripture  reprefents  them,  it 
 can't  be  deny'd  but  they  are  well  adapted  to  our 
 Capacities,  and  muft  have  a  mighty  Influence  on 
 all  that  finccrely  believe  them,  in  truth  greater  than 
 all  thofe  nice  Speculations  that  we  endeavour  to  fub. 
 ftitute  in  their  Place. 
 
 §  XV.  But  thirdly,  If  we  confider  ferioufly  the 
 Knowledge  that  we  have  of  the  Creatures,  and  e- 
 ven  of  thofe  things  in  this  World  with  which  we 
 are  moft  familiarly*  acquainted,  it  will  appear  that 
 the  Conceptions  we  have  of  them,  are  much  of  the 
 fame  fort  as  thofe  are  which  Religion  gives  us  of 
 God,  and  that  they  neither  reprefent  the  Nature  or 
 cflential  Properties  of  the  things  as  they  are  in 
 themfelves,  but  only  the  EfFecls  they  have  in  rela- 
 tion to  us.  For  in  mod  Cafes  we  know  no  more 
 of  them  but  only  how  they  afFed  us,  and  what  Sen- 
 fations  they  produce  in  us. 
 
 Thus  for  example.  Light  and  the  Sun  are  the 
 moft  familiar  and  ufeful  things  in  nature  :  we  have 
 the  comfortable  Perception  of  them  by  our  Senfes 
 of  Seeing  and  Feelirg,  and  enjoy  the  Benefit  and 
 Advantage  of  them  ;  but  what  they  are  in  them- 
 felves,  we  are  intirely  ignorant. 
 
 I  think  it  is  agreed  by  moft  that  write  of  Natu- 
 ral Philofophy,  that  Light  and  Colours  are  nothing 
 but  the  EfFeds  of  certain  Bodies  and  Motions  on 
 our  Senfe  of  Seeing,  and  that  there  are  no  fuch 
 things  at  all  in  Nature,  but  only  in  our  Minds : 
 and  of  this  at  leaft  we  may  be  fure,  that  Light  in 
 the  Sun  or  Air,  are  very  different  things  from  what  ^ 
 they  are  in  our  Senfations  of  them;  yet  we  call  both 
 by  the  fame  Names  snd  term  that  which  is  only 
 perhaps  a  motion  in  the  Air,  Light,  becanfe  it  be- 
 gets in  us  that  Conception  which  is  truly  Light. 
 But  it  would  feem  very  flrange  to  the  generality  of 
 Men,  if  we  lliould  tell  them,  that  there  is  no  Light 
 
 m 
 
(    24   ) 
 
 in  the  Sun,  or  Colours  in  the  Rainbow;  and  yet 
 ilridly  fpeaking,  it  is  certain,  that  which  in  the 
 Sun  caufes  the  Conception  of  Light  in  us,  is  as  tru- 
 ly different  in  nature  from  the  Re'prefentation  we 
 have  of  it  in  our  Mind,  as  our  Fore-Knowledge  is 
 from  what  wf  call  fo  in  God. 
 
 §  XVI.  The  fame  may  be  obferv'd  concerning 
 the  Objects  of  our  other  Senfes,  luch  as  Heat  and 
 Cold,  Sweet,  and  Bitter,  and  v/hich  we  afcribe  to 
 the  things  that  affed  our  Touch  and  TaTre.  Where- 
 as it  is  manifert,  that  thefe  are  only  the  Senfations 
 that  the  Actions  of  outward  things  produce  in  u?. 
 For  the  Tire  that  burns  us  has  no  fuch  Pain  in  ic 
 as  we  feel,  when  we  complain  of  its  heat ;  nor  Ice, 
 fuch  as  we  call  Cold. 
 
 Neverthelefs  we  call  the  Things,  whofe  Adions 
 on  our  Senies  caufe  thefe  Senfations  in  us,  by  the 
 fairie  Name  we  give  to  our  Conceptions  of  them , 
 and  treat  and  (peak  of  them,  as  if  they  were  the 
 fame.  We  fay  the  Fire  is  hot,  becaufe  it  produ- 
 ceth  heat  in  us;  and  tliat  the  Sun  is  light,  becaufe 
 it  afftds  our  Eyes  in  fuch  manner,  as  enables  us  to 
 frame  that  Thought  which  we  then  perceive  in  our 
 felves.  But  in  the  mean  time  we  are  altogether 
 ignorant,  what  it  is  particularly  in  the  Fire  and  the 
 Sun,  that  has  thefe  Elfeds  on  us,  or  how  it  comes 
 thus  to  affed  us.  And  yet  this  Ignorance  of  ours 
 doth  not  hinder  us  from  the  Ufe  or  Advantage  that 
 Nature  defign'd  us  in  thefe  Senfations  ,•  nor  does 
 our  transferring  to  the  Objeds  themfelves  the 
 Names  that  we  give  our  own  Perceptions  of  them, 
 draw  any  evil  Confequences  after  it :  on  the  contra- 
 ry, they  ferve  the  Ufes  of  Life,  as  well  as  if  we 
 knew  the  very  things  themfelve";.  The  Sun  by 
 giving  me  the  Scnfacion  of  Light,  dircas  and  rc- 
 lieflies  me,  as  much  as  if  I  knew  what  its  Nature 
 and  true  Subflance  are.  For  in  truth.  Men  are  no 
 farther  concern'd  to  know  the  nature  of  any  thing, 
 
 than 
 
than  a-;  it  lehtcs  to  them,  and  has  fome  effe<5i:  on  them," 
 And  if  they  know  the  EfFetts  of  outward  things, 
 and  how  far  they  are  to  ufe  or  avoid  them,  ic  is 
 fufficient. 
 
 i:  If  then  fuch  Knowledge  of  natural  things,  as 
 only  iliews  the  effects  they  have  on  us,  be  fufficient 
 to  all  the  Ufes  of  Life,  tho'  we  do  not  know  what 
 they  are  in  themfelves;  why  ihould  not  the  hke  Re- 
 prelcntation  of  God  and  his  Attributes  be  fufficient 
 for  the  Ends  of  Religion,  tho'  we  be  ignorant  of  his 
 and  (heir  Nature  ? 
 
 Every  one  knows  that  Stcddinefs,  Regularity, 
 and  Order,  do  always  proceed  from  Wifdom* 
 When  therefore  we  obferve  thefe  in  the  higheft: 
 degree  in  all  rhe  Works  of  Cod,  lliall  we  not  fay 
 that  God  is  infinitely  wife,  becaufe  we  are  igno- 
 rant what  that  really  is  in  it  felf  which  produces  fuch 
 flupendous  Effefts  ?  tho'  after  all  Wifdom,  as  in  us, 
 be  as  different  from  what  we  call  fo  in  God,  as  Li^t 
 in  our  Conception  isdifferent  from  the  Motion  in  the 
 Air  ihar  caufes  it. 
 
 §  XVI I.  We  all  of  us  feel  a  tendency  to  the 
 Earth,  which  v/e  call  Gravity;  but  none  ever  yet 
 was  able  to  give  any  fatisfaiflory  account  of  its 
 Nature  or  Caufe;  but  inafmuch  as  we  know  that 
 falling  down  a  Precipice  will  crufh  us  to  pieces, 
 the  Senfe  we  have  of  this  Effed;  of  it,  is  fufficient 
 to  make  us  careful  to  avoid  fuch  a  Fall.  And  in  like 
 manner,  if  we  know  that  breaking  God's  Command's 
 will  provoke  him  to  dedroy  us,  will  not  this  be  fuf- 
 ficient to  oblige  us  to  Obedience,  tho'  we  be  igno- 
 rant what  it  is  we  call  Anger  in  him  ? 
 ■  -  ■§  XVIII.  I  might  go  thro*  all  the  Notices  we 
 have  of  natural  Things,  and  fhew  that  we  onlv 
 know  and  diflinguifli  them  by  the  Effeds  they 
 produce  on  our  Senfes,  and  make  you  fenfible  that 
 fuch  Knowledge  fufficiently  ferves  the  Purpofes  of 
 Life.     And  no  Reafon  can  be  given  why  the  Re- 
 
 preren" 
 
(  26  ) 
 
 prefentations  given  us  in  Scriptuie  of  God  and  di- 
 vine Things,  tho*  they  do  only  fliew  us  the  Effeds 
 that  proceed  from  them,  fhould  not  bejfufficient  to 
 anfwer  the  Purpofes  of  Religion. 
 
 Particularly  we  afcribe  Fore-knowledge  to  God, 
 becaufe  we  are  certain  that  he  can't  be  furpriz'd  by 
 any  Event,  nor  be  at  any  lofs  what  he  is  to  do  when 
 it  happens.  And  thereby  ,we  give  him  all  the  Per- 
 fedion  we  can,  and  allure  our  felves  that  we  cannot 
 deceive  him. 
 
 After  the  fame  manner  we  afcribe  Predeflination 
 to  him,  and  conceive  him  as  predetermining  every 
 thing  that  comes  to  pafs,  becaufe  all  his  Works  are 
 as  fteddy  and  certain,  as  if  he  had  predetermin'd  them 
 after  the  fame  m.anner  that  wife  Men  do  theirs. 
 
 We  farther  reprefent  him  as  abfolutely  free,  and 
 all  his  Aflions  as  arifins:  onlv  from  himfelf,  with- 
 out  any  other  Confideration  but  that  of  his  own 
 Willi  becaufe  we  are  fure,  the  Obligations  we 
 owe  to  him  are  as  great  as  if  he  a6led  in  this  wife. 
 We  are  as  much  oblig'd  to  magnify  his  free  Mercy 
 ?nd  Favour  to  us,  to  humble  our  Minds  before 
 him,  and  return  our  tribute  of  Gratitude  to  him,  as 
 if  our  Salvation  intirely  proceeded  from  his  mere  good- 
 Will  and  Pleafure,  without  any  thing  being  Tvquir'd 
 on  our  part  in  order  to  it. 
 
 §  XIX.  Let  me  in  the  fourth  Place  obferve, 
 that  as  we  transfer  the  Adions  of  our  own  Mind^ 
 our  Powers,  and  Virtues,  by  analogy  to  God,  and 
 fpeakof  him  as  if  he  had  the  like;  fo  we  proceed 
 the  fame  way  in  the  Reprefentations  we  make  to 
 one  another  of  the  Actions  of  our  Minds,  and  as- 
 cribe the  Pov'ers  and  Faculties  of  Bodies  to  the 
 Tranfddions  that  pafs  in  them.  Thus  to  weigh 
 things,  to  penetrate,  to  refled,  are  proper  Adions 
 of  Bodies,  which  we  transfer  to  our  Underftind- 
 ings,  and  commonly  fay,  that  the  Mind  weighs 
 or  penetrates  things,   that  it  refleds  on  it  felf,  or 
 
 Adion^; 
 
(27    ) 
 
 Adions;  thus  to  embrace  or  rcjetfl,  to  retain  or 
 let  flip,  are  corporeal  Performances  and  yet  we 
 afcribe  the  firft  to  the  Will,  and  the  lafi:  to  the 
 Memory.  And  it  ismanifeil  that  this  does  not 
 caufe  any  Confulion  in  our  Notions:  tho' none  will 
 deny  but  there  is  a  va(l  difference  between  weighing 
 a  piece  of  Money  in  a  Scale,  and  confidering  a 
 thing  in  our  Minds,-  between  one  Body's  palling 
 thro'  another,  which  is  prop.rly  penetrating,  and 
 the  Underftanding's  obtaining  a  clear  Notion  of  a 
 thing  hard  to  be  comprehended.  And  fo  in  all  the 
 reft,  there  is  indeed  a  refemblance  and  analogy  be- 
 tween them,  which  makes  us  give  the  fame  Names  to 
 each :  but  to  compare  them  in  all  particulars,  and 
 expcft  they  llioiild  exatily  anlwer,  would  run  us 
 into  great  Ablurdities.  As  for  example,  it  would 
 be  ridiculous  to  think  that  weighing  a  thing  in 
 our  Minds  ftiould  have  all  the  Etfecls,  and  be  ac- 
 company'd  with  all  the  Circumllances  that  are  ob- 
 fervable  in  weighing  a  Body. 
 
 §';XX.  Now  to  apply  this,  let  us  confider  that 
 Love,  Hatred,  Wifdom,  Knowledge,  and  Fore- 
 knowledge, are  properly  Faculties  or  Aftions  of 
 our  Minds;  and  we  afcribe  them  to  God  after  the 
 fam?  manner  that  we  do  Reflexion,  Penetrating, 
 Difcovering,  Embracing,  or  Rejeding,  to  our  in- 
 telleclual  AcSlions  and  Faculties,  becaufe  there  is 
 fome  analogy  and  proportion  between  them.  But 
 then  we  ought  to  remember  that  there  is  as  great  a 
 difference  between  thefe,  when  attributed  to  God, 
 and  as  they  are  in  us,  as  between  weighing  in  a 
 Balance  and  Thinking,  in  truth  infinitely  greater; 
 and  that  we  ought  no  more  to  exped  that  the  one 
 fhould  in  all  refpeds  and  Circumflances  anfwer 
 the  other,  than  that  Thinking  in  all  things  lliould 
 correfpond  to  Weighing.  Wou'd  you  not  be  lur- 
 priz'd  to  hear  a  Man  deny,  and  obftinately  perfift 
 in  it,   that  his  Mind  canreflefl  upon  it  felf,  becaufe 
 
 N  n  it 
 
(  28   ) 
 
 it  is  iinpoflible  that  a  Body,  from  whence  the  Ko- 
 tion  is  originally  taken,  ftiould  move  or  ad  on  it 
 felf;  And  is  it  not  equally  abfurd  to  argue  that 
 what  we  call  Fore-knowledge  in  God,  cannot  con- 
 fift  with  the  Contingency  or  Freedom  of  Events, 
 becaufe  our  Prefcience,  from  whence  we  transfer 
 the  Notion  to  the  divine  Underftanding,  could 
 not,  if  it  were  certain?  And  is  it  not  equally  a  fuf- 
 ficient  anfwer  to  both,  when  we  fay  that  the  Re- 
 fleftion  of  Bodies,  tho*  in  many  Circumftances  it 
 refembles  that  Ad:ion  of  the  Mind  which  we  call  fo, 
 yet  in  other  Particulars  they  are  mighty  unlike? 
 And  tho'  the  Fore-knowledge  that  we  have  in 
 fome.  things,  refembles  what  we  term  fo  in  God, 
 yet  the  Properties  and  Effeds  of  thefe  in  other  par- 
 ticulars, are  infinitely  different. 
 
 Nor    can  we  think  that  whatever  is  impoflible 
 
 in  the  one,  mufl:  be  likewife  fo  in  the  other.     'Tis 
 
 impoffible  Motion  fliould  be  in  a  Body,  except  it 
 
 be  mov'd  by  another,  or  by   fomc  other  external 
 
 Agent ;  and  it  requires  a  Space  in  which  it  is  per- 
 
 form'd,  aud  we  can  meafure  it  by  Feet  and  Yards ; 
 
 but  we  fhould  look  on  him  as  a  very  weak  Rea- 
 
 foner,    that  v/ould  deny  any  Motion  to  be  in  the 
 
 ■"  Mind,  becaufe  he  could  find  none  of  thofe  there. 
 
 And  we  fliould  think  that  we  had  fufficiently  anf- 
 
 wer'd    this  Objcc'^ion,    by   telling  him  that  thefe 
 
 two    Motions  are  of  very  different  Natures,   tho* 
 
 there    be   fome   analogy    and    proportion    between 
 
 _.y<      _--^i^-  them.     And  fliall  not  the  fame  Anfwer  fatisfy  thofe 
 
 Vu.— ^        ^^^^^  argue  againffc  the  divine  Fore-knowledge,  Pre- 
 
 defiination,  and  other  Adions  attributed  to  God, 
 
 becaufe  many  things  are  fuppofed  poffible  to  them^ 
 
 which  are  impoffib'e  tons, 
 
 §  XXI.  It  may  be  objeded  againft  this  Dodrine 
 that  if  it  be  true,  all  our  Defcripdons  of  God,  snd 
 Difcourfes  concerning  him,  will  be  only  Figures 
 and  Metaphors  J  that  he  will  be  only  figuratively 
 
 merciful. 
 
(    29    ) 
 
 merciful,  jurt-,  intelligenr,  and  fore-knowing:  and 
 perhaps  in  time,  Religion  and  all  the  Myikries 
 thereof,  will  be  loft  in  mere  Tigure'. 
 
 But  I  anfwer,  that  there  is  great  difference  be- 
 tween the  analogical  Rcprefcnrarions  of  God,  £ind 
 that;  which  we  commonly  call  Tigurative.  The 
 common  ufe  of  Figures  is  to  repreknt  things  that 
 are  otherwife  very  well  known,  in  luch  a  manner 
 as  may  magnifie  or  lefTen,  heighten  or  adorn  the 
 Ideas  we  have  of  them.  And  the  defign  of  purring 
 them  in  this  foreign  Diefs  as  we  may  call  it,  is 
 to  move  our  PalTions,  and  ingage  our  Fancies  more 
 efFedually  than  the  true  and  naked  view  of  them  is 
 apt  to  do,  or  perhaps  oughr.  And  from  hence  it 
 too  often  hap^  ens  that  thefe  Figures  are  employ'd 
 to  deceive  us,  and  make  us  think  better  or  worfeof 
 things  than  they  reisliy  deferve. 
 ^^  But  the  Analogies  and  Similitudes  rhat  the  holy 
 Scriptures  or  our  own  Reafon  frame  of  divine 
 Things,  are  of  another  nature,'  the  ufe  of  them  is 
 to  give  us  fome  Notion  of  tilings  whereof  we  have 
 no  dired  Knowledge,  and  by  that  means  lead  us 
 to  Perception  of  the  Nature,  or  ac  leaft  of  fome  of 
 the  Properties  and  EfFe<5i:s  of  what  our  UnderHand- 
 ings  cannot  direcftly  reach,  and  in  this  C.a(e  to  teach  us 
 how  we  are  to  behave  our  felves  tow3rd>  God,  and 
 what  we  are  to  do  in  order  to  obtain  a  more  perfe(5l 
 Knowledge  of  his  Attributes, 
 
 §  XXII.  And  whereas  in  ordinary  figurative  Re- 
 prefcntations,  the  thing  expreis'd  by  the  Figure  is 
 commonly  of  much  lefs  moment  than  that  to  which 
 it  is  compar'd:  in  ihefe  Analcgie-i  the  Ca^e  is  other- 
 wife,  and  the  thing;  reprefented  by  them  have 
 much  more  Reality  and  Perfedion  in  them,  than 
 the  things  by  which  we  reprefent  them.  Thus 
 weighing  a  thing  in  our  Minds,  is  a  much  more 
 noble  and  perfed  Adion,  than  examining  the  Gra- 
 vity of  a  Body  by  Scale  and  Balance,  which  is  the 
 N  n  a  original 
 
{  3°  ) 
 
 original  Notion  from  whence  it  is  borrow'd,  and 
 Refledion  as  in  our  Underftandings  is  much  more 
 conliderable  than  the  rebounding  of  one  hard  Body 
 from  another,  which  yet  is  the  literal  Scnfe  of  Re- 
 flexion. And  alter  the  fane  manner,  what  we  call 
 Knowledge  and  Forc-Knowkdge  in  God,  have  in- 
 finitely more  reality  in  them,  and  are  of  greater 
 moment  than  our  Underftanding  or  Prefciencfi 
 from  whence  they  are  transferr'd  to  him;  and  in 
 truth,  thefe  as  in  Man  are  but  faint  Communica- 
 tions, of  the  divine  Perfecflions,  which  are  the  true 
 Originals,  and  which  cur  Powers  and  Faculties 
 more  imperfectly  imitate  than  a  Pidure  does  a  Man : 
 ^-^ — •■:^::===^'  ancl  yet  if  we  reafcn  from  them  by  Analogy  and 
 KjL^  Proportion,  they  are  fufficicnt  to  give  us  fuch  a 
 Notion  of  God's  Attributes,  as  will  oblige  us  to  fear, 
 love,  obey,  and  adore  him. 
 
 ._  If  we  lay  thefe  things  together,  I  fuppofe,  they 
 ""-'"  will  furnifh  us  with  fufficient  Reafons  to  fatisfy  us 
 why  the  holy  Scriptures  reprefent  Divine  things  to 
 us  by  Types  and  Similitudes  by  Comparifons  and 
 Analogies,  and  by  iransf::ning  to  God  the  No- 
 tions of  fuch  Perftdions  as  v  e  obferve  in  our  felves, 
 or  other  Creatures:  fines  it  appears  that  we  are 
 not  capable  of  better;  that  fuch  Knowledge  an- 
 fwers  all  the  Defgns  of  Religion ;  and  that  when 
 the  Matter  is  duly  examined,  we  hardly  know  any 
 thing  Without  our  felves  in  a  more  perfed:  manner, 
 
 I  fliall  therefore  proceed  to  the  third  and  lafl 
 thing  I  profos'd,  which  was  to  fhew  the  Ufes 
 we  ought  to  make  jof  what  has  been  faid,  particularly 
 of  God's  fore-knowing  and  predeflinating  his  Eled 
 to  Holincfs  and  Salvation. 
 
 -    §   XXIII.  And  firfl,  fiom  the  whole  it  appears 
 ,2^         that  we  ought  not  to  be  furpriz'd,  when  we  find 
 the  Scriptures  giving  difFereni-  and  feemingly  con- 
 tradidory  Schemes  of  Divine  things. 
 
 It 
 
(  3'   ) 
 
 It  is  manifefl:  that  fev^ral  fuch  are  to  be  found  in 
 holy  Writ.  Thus  God  is  frequently  faid  in  Scrip- 
 ture, to  repent  and  tnrn  i(om  the  £vil  that  he  pur- 
 pos'd  againft  Sinners;  and  yet  in  othfr  places  we 
 are  told,  that  God  is  not  a  Man  that  he  jbotild  Ije, 
 ft  either  the  Son  of  Man  that  he  Jljo^'d  repent:  So 
 Numb.  23.  19.  Thus  FfaL  18.  ir.  God  is  repre- 
 fented  as  dwelling  in  thick  Darknefs :  He  made 
 Dark^iefi  his  fecret  place;  his  Pavilion  round  about 
 him-i  ivere  darl^  Waters,  and  thicl^  Clouds  of  the  Sky- 
 And  yet  i  Tim.  6.  16.  he  is  defcrib'd  as  divellingin 
 the  Light  which  no  Man  can  approach  untOy  iiAjom 
 no  Aian  hath  ieen^  nor  can  fee  :  And  I  yohn  i.  5.  God 
 is  Lights  and  in  him  is  no  Darkfiejs  at  all.  Thus  in 
 the  (econd  Commandment,  God  is  reprefented  as 
 vifiting  the  Iniquity  of  the  Fathers  upon  the  Chil- 
 dren, unto  the  third  and  fourth  Generation  of  them 
 that  hate  him:  and  yet,  Ez^e!^  18.  20.  The  Son 
 jhall  not  bear  the  Iniquity  of  the  Father^  neither  ^jall 
 the  Father  bear  the  Inic^uity  of  the  Son\  and  Ver.  4. 
 The  Soul  that  Jinneth,  it  full  die. 
 
 After  the  fame  manner,  we  are  forbid  by  our 
 Saviour,  Matt.  6.  7.  to  ufe  vzin  Repetitions  as  the 
 Heathen  do  ;  or  to  think  what  we  iliall  be  heard  for 
 our  mtich  Jpeaking;  becaufe,  Ver.  8.  Tour  Father 
 k^ows  what  thing'i  ye  have  need  of,  before  ye  ask^  him. 
 And  yQl  Luke  18.  I.  we  are  encourag'd  always  to 
 praji  and  not  to  faint:  And  this  h  recommended 
 to  us  by  the  Parable  of  an  importunate  Widow, 
 who  thro*  her  inceffant  Applications  became  un- 
 eafy  to  the  fudge,  and  by  her  continual  Cries  and 
 Petitions  fo  troubled  him,  that  to  procure  his  own 
 Eafe  he  did  her  Juftice:  Ver.  5.  Becaufe  this  Wi- 
 dow troubleth  me,  I  will  avenge  her,  lejl  by  her  continual 
 coming  fjje  wearj  me. 
 
 Thus  it  is  faid,  Exod.  33.  11.      The  Lord  fpake 
 
 unto  Mofes  face  to  face,    as   a  Man  fpeaketh  to    his 
 
 Friend,     And  yet  in  Ver.  20.    he  declares  to  the 
 
 N  n  3  fanje 
 
(    32    ) 
 
 fame    Afofes,   That*  canfi  not  fee  tMj  Face  :  for  there 
 frjall  no  Alan  fee  me,    and  live.      There    are    muUi- 
 tudes    of  oiher  Inftanccs  of  the  like  nature,    that 
 feem  to  carry  fome  appearance  of  a  Contradidion 
 .:/^  in  tluiDj'^but  are  purpofely  dellgn'd  to  make  us  un- 
 derhand  that    thefe   arc  only  afcri;)'d  to  God  by 
 way  of  refcmblance  and  .malogy,  and  to  corred  our 
 Imaginations,   that   we  may  nor  miftake  them  for 
 perfed  Reprefcntations,  or  think  that  they  are  in 
 God  in  the  fame  manner  that  the  SimiUtudes  re- 
 prefent  them,  snd  to  teach  us  not  to  flretch  thofe 
 _  to  all  Cafes,  or  farther  than  they  are  intended. 
 ..,-,  L>^^  §  XXIV.    We   ought    to   remember,    that  two 
 '-^        things    may  be  very  like  one   another  in  fome  re- 
 fpedts,    and  quite  contrary  in  others ;    and  yet  to 
 argue  againft  the  Likenefs  in  one  refpeft,  from  the 
 Contrariety  in  the  other,  is  as  if  one  fliould  difpute 
 iagainft  the  Liktnefs  c^  a  Pidure,  bec^ufe  that  is 
 made   of  Canvas,    Oil,   and  Colours,    whereas  the 
 Original  is  Flefli  snd  Blood. 
 
 Thus  in  the  prefent  Cafe,  God  is  reprefentcd  a^ 
 ah  abfolute  Lord  over  his  Creature  ,  oi  infinite 
 Knowledge  and  Power,  that  doth  all  things  for  his 
 mere  Pkafurc,  and  is  accountable  to  none;  as  one 
 that  ivill  have  A'iercy  on  iihom  he  will  have  AUY' 
 cy,  and  whom  he  7vill  he  hardenr,  that  forefeSi 
 fredefliftdtes-,  calls,  jttftifiei,  and  glorifies  whom  he 
 will,  without  any  regard  to  the  Creatures  whom 
 he  thus  deals  with.  This  gives  us  a  mighty  No- 
 tion of  his  Sovereignty,  at  once  ftops  our  Mouths, 
 and  filences  our  Objed:ions,  obliges  us  to  an  abfo- 
 lute Siibmiffion,  and  dependance  on  him,  and 
 withal  to  acknowledge  the  good  things  we  enjoy  to 
 be  intirely  due  to  his  p!eafu:e.  :^This  is  plainly  the  t 
 Defign  and  EfFeft  of  this  terrible  Reprefentation  : 
 and  the  meaning  is,  that  we  fliould  underftand 
 that  God  is  no  way  oblig'd  to  give  us  an  account 
 -f  of  his   Adions;fthat  we  are  no  more  to  inquire 
 
 into 
 
(  33  ) 
 
 'nto  the  Reafons  of  his  dealing  with  his  Creatures, 
 than  if  he  really  treated  them  in  this  arbitrary  Me- 
 thod. By  the  fame  we  are  taught  to  acknowledge, 
 that  our  Salvation  as  intirely  depends  on  him,  and 
 that  we  owe  it  as  much  to  his  pleafure,  as  if  he 
 had  bc'ftow'd  it  on  us  without  any  other  Confide- 
 ration,  but  his  own  Will  to  do  fo.  Thus  Jam^ 
 I.  1 8.  Of  his  own  Will  begat  he  as  with  the  Word  of 
 Truth,  that  ive  Pioitld  be  a  k[nd  of  Fir/t-fruits  of  his 
 Creatures,  And  that  we  might  not  think  there 
 could  be  any  thing  in  our  beft  Works,  the  pro- 
 fpeft  whereof  could  move  God  to  fliew  kindnefs  to 
 us,  the  Scriptures  give  us  to  underfhnd  that  thoie 
 good  Works  are  due  to  his  Grace  and  Favour, 
 and  the  Effects,  not  Can fes  of  them.  So  Eph.  2. 
 10.  For  we  are  his  Workman (Ijip,  created  in  Chrifi 
 Jefus  unto  good  Worki^  which  Cod  k4th  before  ordain  d, 
 that  we  flionld  waih^  in  them. 
 f^§  XXV.  All  v/hich  Reprefentarions  are  defign'd 
 as  a  Scheme,  to  make  us  conceive  the  Obligations 
 we  owe  to  God,  and  how  little  we  can  contribute 
 to  our  own  Happinefs.  >>And  to  make  us  appre--^  — ^^ 
 hend  this  to  be  his  meaning,  he  has  on  other  oc- 
 cafions  given  us  an  account  of  his  dealing  with 
 Men,  not  only  different,  but  feemingly  contradic- 
 tory to  this.  Thus  he  frequently  reprefents  him- 
 felf,  as  propofing  nothing  for  his  own  pleafure  or 
 advantage  in  his  Tranfaftions  with  his  Creatures, 
 as  having  no  other  Defign  in  them,  but  to  do 
 thofe  Creatures  good  as  earneftly  defiring  and  pro- 
 fecuting  that  End  only.  Nay,  he  reprefents  nim- 
 felf  to  u^,  as  if  he  were  as  uneafy  and  troubled 
 when  we  fail'd  to  anfwer  his  Expefrations ;  as  we 
 may  conceive  a  good,  merciful,  and  beneficent 
 Prince,  that  had  only  his  Subje(5ts  Happinefs  in 
 view,  would  be,  when  they  refus'd  to  join  with 
 him  for  promoting  their  owti  Interef^.  And  God, 
 farther  to  exprcfs  hjs   tendernefs  towards  ys,   and 
 
 N  n  4  -  -  j^^^^^ 
 
(  34  ) 
 
 Iiow  fjir  be  Is  from  impofing  any  thing  on  us,  lets 
 us  know  that  he  has  kit  us  to  our  own  Freedom 
 and  Choice  :  and  to  convince  us  of  his  imp:rriality, 
 declares  that  he  afts  as  a  jull:  and  equal  judge; 
 that  he  hath  no  refpeft  of  Perfons,  and  favours 
 nonei  but  rewardj  and  punifLies  all  JMen,  not  ac- 
 cording to  hii  own  pleaiure,  but  according  to 
 their  deferis :  3nd  in  every  Nation  he  that  fears  him, 
 and  7i'o,ks   Right eotijhefs^    is  accepted  with  hiw.   Ads 
 
 10.    2?. 
 
 '  §  XXVI.  Whoever  is  acquainted  with  the  holy 
 Scriptures,  will  find  all  thele  things  plainly  deli- 
 ver'd  in  them.  Th;.is  to  fliew  u  that  God  propofes 
 no  advantages  to  himlilfin  his  Dealings  wirh  us, 
 he  is  defcnbed  as  a  PerJon  wholly  difinterefted  : 
 ^Job.  11.  2,  5.  Can  a  A:\m  he  profitable  ttmo  Gody 
 as  he  that  is  wife  may  be  profit  a'- k  unto  himfilf\  Is 
 it  any  pleajure  :■;  the  Almighty  that  thou  art  rigbieous  \ 
 or  is  it  j^aittio  hint  that  thoH  mul^fi  thy  luajs  perfe5i^ 
 And  Chap.  55.  <>,  7.  If  that  pn:-iefiy  wh.it  dofi  thou 
 ^.ff^ainfi  him  ?  or  if  thy  Ir^mfigreffioTis  be  multiplied,  what 
 ?,ofl  thoti  unto  him  /"  If  thou  be  righteous-,  "whint  givefi 
 thou  him-i  or  what  recaveth  he  of  thine  hand  ? 
 I  And  as  to  his  itaving  us  to  the  liLerty  of  our  own 
 Choice,  obfcrve  how  he  is  reprelented,  Deut.  50. 
 19-.  /  call  Heaven  and  Earth  this  day  to  record  a- 
 gainfl  you,  that  I  have  fet  bejore  you  Life  and  Death:, 
 Blejfing  and  Curfing  ;  therefore  choofe  Life. 
 
 And  as  to  his  earnefl  Concern  for  our  Salva- 
 tion, he  orders  the  Prophet  Ez.eki<rl  to  deliver  this 
 MefTage from  him  :  Chap.  55.  11.  S^y  unto  them j 
 ^s  I  live^  faith  the  Lord  God.,  I  have  no  pleafure  in 
 the  death  of  the  I'Vicked,  but  that  the  Wicked  ti4rn 
 from  his  way  a:-,d  live.  Turn  jc,  turn  ye  from  your 
 evil  ways  ;  for  .why  will  ye  die,  O  Houfe  of  Ilrael  ? 
 And  Hofe a  11,  ^..  How  pall  I  give  thee  upy  E- 
 phraim?  Hoiv  fjjall  I..deliver  thee^  Ilrael?  How  floall 
 I  mal::^  thee  as  Adnah  ?  How  Jlpall  I  fet  thee  as  Ze- 
 
 boim  i 
 
(  3^)' 
 
 boim?     Mine    Heart  is   turned  ivithin  me,    my  Re\ 
 
 pentingi  are  kindled  together. 
 
 i^^Hvery  one  may  lee  how  diftant  this  view  of  God, 
 and  of  hi.  Dealings  wirh  his  Creati  res,  is  from  the 
 •^former ;  j^ and  yet  if  we  confider  it  as  a  Scheme 
 fram'd  to  make  us  conceive  how  gracioufly,  mer- 
 cifully, and  juftly  God  treats  us  notwithltanding 
 the  fapreme  and  abfolure  Dominion  he  has  over  us, 
 thete  will  be  no  inconfiltency  between  the  two. 
 ^<^ou  fee  here,  that  tho'  the  Creatures  be  in  his  hand, 
 as  Clay  in  the  Potter's,  of  which  he  may  make 
 Veflels  of  Honour  or  Difloonour,  without  any  injury, 
 or  being  accountable ;  yet  he  ufes  that  Power, 
 with  all  the  paflionate  Love  and  Concern  that  Pa- 
 rents fliew  towards  their  Children  :  and  therefore  we 
 are  to  conceive  of  him  as  having  all  the  tendernefs 
 of  AfFedion,  that  Parents  feel  in  their  Heart  to- 
 wards their  young  ones ;  and  that  if  he  had  been 
 fo  affeftedj  he  could  not  (confidering  our  Circum- 
 ftances)  have  gone  farrher  than  he  has  done  tofave 
 us ;  that  our  Deftrudion  is  as  intirely  due  to  our 
 felves  as  if  we  were  out  of  God's  Power,  and  ab- 
 folutely  in  the  hand  of  our  own  counfel. 
 
 §  XXVII.  If  we  take  thefe  as  Schemes  defign'd 
 .J"  to  give  us  different  Views  of  God,  and  his  Tran- 
 fadons  with  Men,  in  order  to  oblige  us  to  diflind 
 Duties  which  we  owe  him,  and  ftretch  them  no 
 farther,  they  are  very  reconcilable  :  And  to  go  a- 
 bout  to  cla fii  the  one  againfl  the  other,  and  argue, 
 as  many  do,  that  if  the  one  be  true,  the  other  can- 
 not, is  full  as  abfurd  as  to  objeft  agamfl  that  Ar- 
 ticle of  our  Belief,  that  ChriH:  fits  on  the  right  hand 
 of  God,  becaufe  Scripture  in  other  places,  and 
 plain  Reafon  aflures  Ur,  that  God  hath  neither 
 Hand  nor  Parts. 
 (5b>And  whilft  a  thing  may  in  one  refped  be  like 
 another,  and  in  other  refpeds  be  like  the  contra- 
 ry ;  and  whilfl  we  know  that  thing  only  by  refem- 
 
 blanccj 
 
(36) 
 
 blance,  fimilitude,  or  proportion ;  w£  ought  not 
 to  be  furpriz'd,  that  the  Rcprefenrations  are  con' 
 trary,  and  taken  from  things  that  fecm  irreconcila- 
 ble, or  that  fhe  different  Views  of  the  fame  thing 
 fhoul4  give  occafion  to  ditferenr,  nay  contrary 
 Scheines. 
 
 §  XXVIir.  We  ought  farther  to  confider,  that 
 thefe  gre  not  fo  much  dt  fign'd  to  give  us  Notions 
 of  God  IS  he  is  in  himlelf,  as  to  make  us  fenfible 
 ofourDuty  Co  him,  and  to  oblige  us  to  perform  it. 
 As  for  Example,  when  the  Scriptures  reprefent 
 God  95  an  abrolute  Lord,  that  has  his  Creatures  in- 
 tirely  in  hi>  Power,  and  treits  them  according  to 
 his  plea'ure ;  as  one  that  is  not  oblig'd  to  confider 
 their  Advantage  at  all,  or  any  thing  but  his  own 
 Will  i  that  may  elec^  one  to  eternal  Salvation,  and 
 pafs  over  another,  or  condemn  him  to  eternal  Mi- 
 fery,  without  any  otiier  reafon  but  becaufe  he  will 
 do  fo  :  When  we  read  this,  I  fay,  in  the  holy 
 Scriptures,  we  ought  not  to  difpute  whether  God 
 really  afts  thus  or  no,  or  how  it  will  fuit  with 
 his  other  Attributes  of  Wtfdom  and  Jttjiicc  to  do 
 fo ;  but  the  ufe  we  ought  to  make  of  it,  is  to  call 
 to  mind  what  Duty  and  Submiffion  we  ought  to 
 pay  to  one  who  may  thus  deal  with  us  if  he  pleafe, 
 and  what  Gratitude  we  ought  to  return  him,  for 
 elefting  and  decreeing  us  to  Salvation,  when  he 
 lay  under  no  manner  of  Obligation  to  vouchfafe  us 
 that  Favour. 
 
 Again,  when  we  find  him  reprefented  as  a  graf 
 cious  and  merciful  Father,  that  treats  us  as  Chil- 
 dren,  that  is  fbllicitous  for  our  welfare,  that  would 
 not  our  Death  or  Delirudion  ;  that  has  done  all 
 things  for  our  eternal  Happinefs,  which  could  be 
 done  without  violating  the  Laws  of  our  Creation* 
 and  putting  a  force  upon  our  Natures ;  that  has 
 j^iven  us  Fne-lVtll^  that  we  might  be  capable  of 
 Rewards   at   his  hands,   aad  have   the   pleafure  of 
 
 ehoofin? 
 
(  37  ) 
 
 choofing  for  our  fdves ;  which  only  cin  make  us 
 happy,  and  Hke  unto  himfelf  in  the  moft  noble 
 Operations  of  which  a  Being  is  capable :  that  has 
 given  us  all  the  Invitations  and  Encouragements  to 
 choofe  well,  that  Mercy  could  prompt  him  to,  or 
 that  the  Juftice  v/hich  \s  due  to  himfelf  and  Crea- 
 tures would  allow;  and  that  never  punifhesus,  but 
 when  the  Neceility  and  Support  of  his  Government 
 requires  he  fhould  :  When  we  hear  thefe  things 
 we  are  not  fo  much  to  inquire  whether  this  Repre- 
 fentation  exadly  fuits  with  what  really  pafles  in 
 his  Mind,  as  how  we  ought  to  behave  our  felves  in 
 fuch  a  Cafe  towards  him  that  has  dealt  fo  gracioufly 
 with  us. 
 
 §  XXIX.  And  tho'  thefe  Reprefentations  be  but 
 Defcriptions  fitted  to  our  Capacities,  thro'  God's 
 great  Condefcenfion  towards  us ;  yet  it  is  certain, 
 that  there  is  as  much  Mercy,  Tendernefs,  and 
 Juftice  in  the  Conduft  of  God,  as  this  Scheme  re- 
 prefents:  And  on  the  other  hand,  that  we  owe  as 
 much  Fe^r,  SubmiHion,  and  Gratitude  to  him,  as 
 if  the  firfl:  were  the  Method  he  took  with  us. 
 
 We  make  no  fcruple  to  acknowledge,  that  Love 
 and  Hatred,  Mercy  and  Anger,  with  other  Paf- 
 fions,  are  afcrib'd  to  God ;  not  that  they  are  in-^ 
 him,  as  we  conceive  them,  but  to  teach  us  how 
 wc  are  to  behave  our  felves  toward  him,  and  what 
 Treatment  we  mayexped  at  his  hands.  -And  if  fo, -f 
 why  fhould  we  make  any  difficulty  to  think  that 
 Fore -knowledge,  Purpojes,  EleUionSt  and  Decrees  are 
 attributed  to  him:  after  the  fame  way,  and  to  the 
 fame  intent  ? 
 
 -■^  §  XXX.  The  fecond  Ufe  that  I  fhall  make  of 
 this  Dodrine,  is  to  put  you  in  mind,  how  cautious 
 we  ought  to  be  in  our  Reafonings  and  Dedudions 
 concerning  things,  of  whofe  nature  we  are  not  fuHy 
 appriz'd.  'Tis  true,  that  in  Matters  we  fully 
 comprehend,  all  is  clear  and   eafy  to  us,  and   we 
 
 readily 
 
Qa- 
 
 (  38  ) 
 
 readily  perceive  the  Connexion  and  Confiflency 
 of  all  the  Parts :  but  it  is  not  fo  in  things  to  which 
 v/e  are  in  a  great  meafure  ftrangers,  and  of  v/hich 
 we  have  only  an  imperfed  and  partial  view,  for 
 in  thefe  we  are  very  apt  to  fancy  Contradidions, 
 and  to  think  the  accounts  we  receive  of  them  ab- 
 furd. 
 
 The  truth  of  this  is  manifefl:  from  Innumerable 
 Inftances:  as  for  example,  from  the  Opinion  of 
 the  Antipodes :  whilft  the  m.tcer  was  imperfeftly 
 known.  How  many  Objections  were  made  againft  it  \ 
 How  -many  thought  they  had  prov'd  to  a  De- 
 monftration  the  ImpoQibility  and  Contradiftion  of 
 the  thing?  And  how  far  did  they  prevail  wirh  the 
 generality  of  the  World  to  believe  them  ?  And 
 yet  how  weak,  and  in  truth  foolifh,  do  all  their 
 Arguments  appear  to  Men  that  know,  and  by  ex- 
 pi^rience  underftand  the  matter? 
 
 Others  will  fay  the  fame  concerning  the  Motion 
 of  the  Earth,  notwithflanding  thegre^.t  Confidence 
 with  which  many  hive  undertaktn  to  de.ionflrare 
 it  to  be  impofllble;  the  reafon  of  which  is  only  rhe 
 imperfed:  Knowledge  we  hive  of  the  thing  :  And  as 
 om-  underftanding  of  it  is  more  and  more  enlarg'd  and 
 clear'd,  the  Coatradidions  vanifli. 
 
 Ought  we  not  then  to  think  all  the  Contradidi- 
 ons  we  fancy  between  the  Fore-knowledge  of  God  and 
 Contingencj  of  Events,  between  Predeftination  and 
 Free-ivillt  to  be  the  Effeds  of  our  Ignorance  and 
 partial  Knowledge  ?  M.iy  it  not  be  in  this,  as  in 
 the  Matter  of  the  Antipodes,  and  Motion  of  the 
 Earth?  May  not  the  InconfiRencies  that  we  find  in 
 the  one,  be  as  ill-grounded  as  thofe  that  have  been 
 urg'd  againfl:  the  others  f  And  have  we  not  reafon 
 to  fufped,  nay  believe  this  to  be  the  Cafe ;  fince 
 we  are  fure  that  we  know  much  lefs  of  God  and  his 
 Attributes,  thnn  of  the  Earth  and  heavenly  Mo- 
 tions. 
 
 ^  XXXI. 
 
(  39  ) 
 
 §  XXXI.  Even  in  the  Sciences  that  are  mofi: 
 common  and  cerrain,  there  are  fome  things,  which 
 amongft  thofe  that  are  unacquainted  with  fuch 
 Matters,  would  pafs  for  Contradifcions.  As  for 
 example,  let  us  fuppofe  one  lliould  happen  to  men- 
 tion Negative  Ouayi'.ities  among  Perfons  ftrangers 
 to  the  Mathemacicks  i  and  being  ask'd  what  is 
 meant  by  thofe  Words,  fhould  anfvver,  That  he 
 underdands  by  them  Quantities  that  are  conceived 
 
 to  be  lefs  than  Nothim ;  and  that  one  of  their  Vro- 
 
 • 
 pertics  is   that  being  multiply 'd  by  a  Number  lefs 
 
 than  Nothing,  the  Produd  may  be  a  Magnitude 
 greater  than  any  alTign'd.  This  might  juftly  ap- 
 pear a  Riddle,  and  full  of  Contradid:ions,  and  per- 
 haps will  do  fo  to  a  great  part  of  my  Auditors. 
 Somethirjg  lefs  than  Nothing-,  in  appearance  is  a  Con- 
 tradidion ;  a  Number  Ids  than  Nothing.,  has  the 
 fame  face  :  Tnat  thefe  fliould  be  multi pliable  on 
 one  another,  founds  very  oddly  ;  and  that  the  Pro- 
 dud  of  lefs  than  Nothing  upon  lefs  than  Nothing, 
 fhould  be  pofitive,  and  greater  than  any  affign'd 
 Quantity,  feems  inconceivable.  And  yet,  if  the 
 moft  ignorant  will  but  have  patience,  and  apply 
 themfelves  for  Inflrudion  to  the  skilful  in  thefe 
 Matters  they  will  foon  find  all  the  feeming  Con- 
 tradictions vaniili,  and  that  the  Aflertions  are  not 
 only  certain,  but  plain  and  eafy  Truths,  that  may 
 be  conceiv'd  without  any  great  difficulty. 
 J|rr  Ought  we  not  then  to  fufped  our  ov/n  Igno- 
 rance, when  we  fancy  Contradidions  in  the  De- 
 fcriptions  given  us  of  the  Myfte.-  ies  of  our  Faith 
 and  Religion  ?  And  ought  we  not  to  wait  with  Pa- 
 tience, till  we  come  to  Heaven,  the  proper  School 
 where  thefe  things  are  to  learned?  And  in  the 
 mean  time,  aquiefce  in  that  Light  the  holy  Spi- 
 rit has  given  us  in  the  Scriptures;  which,  as  I  have 
 fhew'd,  is  fufficient  to  dired  us  in  our  prefent  Cir- 
 eumftances, 
 
 §  XXXII. 
 
(  40  ) 
 
 1^  f^-Z^--""^    §  XXXII.   The   third  ufe  I  Hull  make  of  this 
 '"'^  K^J^  Dodrine,  is  to  teach  us  what  anfwcr  we  are  to  give 
 
 that  Argument  that  has  puzzled  Mankind,  and 
 done  To  much  mitchief  in  the  World.  It  runs  thus : 
 «'  If  God  forefee  or  predeftinate  that  I  fhall  be  fa- 
 **  ved,  I  fliall  infallibly  be  fo  j  and  if  he  forefee 
 **  or  have  prcdeftinated  that  I  fhall  be  damned,  it 
 •«  is  unavoidable.  And  therefore  it  is  no  matter 
 ««  what  I  do,  or  how  I  behave  myfelf  in  this  Life," 
 Many  Anfwers  have  been  given  to  this  which  I 
 WLlliall  not  at  piefent  examine  :>^I  fliall  only  add,  that 
 if  God's  Fore-kriowUdge  were  exadly  conformable 
 to  ours,  the  conlequence  would  feem  juir;  but  in 
 afniuch  as  they  are  of  as  different  a  nature  as  any 
 two  Faculties  of  our  Souls  it  doth  not  follow  (be- 
 caufe  our  forefight  of  Events,  if  we  fuppofe  it  in- 
 falUble,  mufi:  prefuppofe  a  NecciTity  in  them)  that 
 therefore  the  divine  Prefcience  muft  require  the 
 fame  NecelTity  in  order  to  its  being  certain.":  It  is  -/- 
 true,  we  call  God's  Fore-kpcu'ledge  and  our  own  by 
 the  fame  Name ;  but  this  is  not  from  any  real 
 likenefs  in  the  nature  of  the  Faculties,  but  from 
 fome  proportion  ob'ervable  in  the  Effefts  of  them: 
 Both  having  this  advantage,  that  they  prevent  any 
 furprize  on  the  Perfon  endow'd  with  them. 
 B^"  Nov/  as  it  is  true,  that  no  Contingency  or  Free- 
 dom in  the  Creatures,  can  any  way  deceive  or  fur- 
 prize  God,  put  him  to  a  lofs,  or  oblige  him  to  al- 
 -f  ter  his  Meafures  :-rSo  on  the  other  hand  it  is  like- 
 wife  true,  that  the  divine  Prefcience  doth  not  hin- 
 der Freedom  ;  and  a  thing  may  either  be  or  not 
 be,  notwithftanding  that  Forefight  of  it  which  we 
 a'cribe  to  God.i-\X^hen  therefore  it  is  allcdged,  that 
 if  God  forefees  I  fhall  be  faved,  my  Salvation  is  in- 
 fallible, this  doth  not  follow;  becaufe  the  Fore- 
 knowledge of  God  is  not  like  Man's,  which  requires 
 Neceffity  in  the  Event,  in  Oider  to  its  being  cer- 
 talh,  but  of  another  Nature  confident  with  Con- 
 tingency : 
 
(  41  ) 
 tingency  :  i^And  our   inability  to  comprehend  xhh> 
 ariles    from    our    ignorance  of  the  tiue  Nature  of 
 what  we  call  Fore-knowledge  in  God.  ^ And  it  is +- 
 as    impoflible   we    fnould   comprehend    the  Power 
 thereof,    or  the  manner  of  its   Operation,    as  that 
 the  Eye  I'hould  fee  a  Sound)  or  the  Ear  hear  I-ight 
 and  Colours. 
 
 &(7^0nly  of  this  we  are  fure,  that  in  this  it  differs 
 fro.n  ours,  that  it  may  conlift  either  with  the  being 
 or  not  being  of  what  is  faid  to  be  forefeen  or  pre- 
 dedinated.  Thus  St.  Paul  was  a  chofen  VclfeU 
 and  he  reckons  himfelf  in  the  number  of  the  pre- 
 deftinated,  Ephef.  I.  5.  Having  prede(iinated  us  to 
 the  adoption  of   Children  by  Jefus   Chriji    to   hi^rjelf, 
 
 W-And  yet  he  fuppofes  it  poffible  for  h  m  ro  mils  of 
 Salvation :  And  therefore  he  look'd  on  himfelf  as 
 oblig'd  to  ufe  Mortification,  and  exercife  all  other 
 Graces  in  order  to  make  his  Calling  and  Eledioii 
 fure;  left,  as  he  teils  us,  i  Cor.  9.  zj.  That  by 
 any  means  v.'ben  I  have  preach' d  to  others,  I  my  filf 
 jhou'd  be  a  Cajl-aj-ay^  or  a  Reprohte,  as  the  word  is 
 tranflared  in  other  places. 
 
 U^  -^  XXXIIL  The  fourth  ufe  I  fliall  make  of  this 
 Dodrine,  is  to  enable  us  to  difcover  what  Judg- 
 ment we  are  to  pafs  on  thofe  that  have  manag'd 
 this  Controverfy :  And  for  mine  own  part  I  muft 
 profefs,  that  they  feem  to  me  to  have  taken  Sha- 
 dows for  Subfiances,  Refmblances  for  the  Things 
 they  reprefent;  and  by  confounding  thefe  have 
 embroil'd  themfelves  and  Readers  in  inextricable 
 Difficulties. 
 
 Whoever  will  look  into  the  Books  writ  on  either 
 lide,  will  find  this  to  be  true  :  But  becaufe  that  is 
 a  Task   too  difficult    for    the  generality  of  Men, 
 
 ?=»Jet  them  confider  the  two  Schemes  of  the  Pre- 
 defiinariam  aud  Free-JVillers,  in  the  prefent  Bifliop  of 
 S^ram's  Expofition  of  the  XVIIrh  Article  of  our 
 Church  ;  where  they  -.vil]  (as  I  think)  find  the  O- 
 
 pinions 
 
(  42   ) 
 pinions    of  both  Parties  briefly,    fully,    and  fairly 
 reprefented,   and   withal  perceive  this   Error    runs 
 thro'  both. 
 
 (Tt-'As  for  example,  the  great  Foundation  of  the 
 one  Scheme  is,  that  God  ads  for  himfclf  and  his 
 Glory,  and  therefore  he  can  only  conflder  the  Ma- 
 nifeftation  of  his  own  Attiibures  and  Perfedions  in 
 every  Adion  ,•  and  hence  they  conclude  that  hemufh 
 only  damn  or  fave  Men,  as  his  doing  of  one  or  other 
 may  mofb  promote  his  Glory. 
 
 '.-ir-But  here  it  is  manifeft  that  they  who  reafon  thus 
 4^  )  are  of  opinion,  that  the  defire  of  Glory  doth  real- 
 
 ly  move  the  Will  of  God  ;  i^  whereas  Glory,  and-«« 
 the  Defire  of  it,  are  only   afcrib'd  to  God  in   an 
 analogical  Senfe,    after  the  fame  manner  as   Hands 
 ^and  Feet,  Love  and  Hatred  areryAnd  when  God 
 is  faid  to  do  all  things  for  his  own  Glory,  it  is  not 
 meant  that  the  Defire   of  Glory  is  the  real   Und  of 
 his  Adions,    but  that  he  ha:  order'd  all  things  in 
 fuch  an  excellent  P^^cthod,   that  if  he  hid  defiga'd 
 them  for  no  other  End,  they  could  not  have  fet  it 
 forth  more  effeduJly.  .'  Now  to  make  this  figura- 
 tive Exprcdion  the  Foundation  of  fo  many  harHi 
 Conclufions,    and  the  occafion    of  fo  many  Con- 
 tentions and  Divifions  in  the  Church  fcems  to  me 
 the    fame    kind  of  Mifi:ake,    that    the  Church  of 
 Rome    commits    in  raking  the   words  of  Scripture, 
 This  is  wj  Body,  literally ;    from  whence  fo  many 
 Abfurdities  jnd  Contradidion^   to   our  Senfes  and 
 Reafon  are  inferr'd. 
 .^^^^"  §  XXXIV.  Secondly,  If  you  look  dil  gently  into 
 "^^ '         thefe  Schemes  you  will  find   a  great  part  of  the 
 Difpute  arifes  on  this  Queflion,    What  is  firft   or 
 fecond  in  the  Mind  of  God  ?-t  whether  he  r^rfl:  forc—f 
 fees  and  then  determines,    or  firft  determines,    and 
 by  virtueof  that  forefees?  This  Queftion  feem^  the 
 more    ftrange,    becaufe  both    Parties    are    agreed, 
 that  there  is  neither  firfl  nor  laft  in  the  Divine  Un- 
 
 deifland- 
 
(  43  ) 
 derflanding,  but  all  is  one  fingle  A6t  in  Iiim,  and 
 conriniies  the  lame  fiom  all  Ererniry.  What  then 
 can  be  the  meaning  of  the  Difpiue^KSure  it  can  be'!^i-«=«sr::^' 
 no  more  than  chis,  whether  it  be  more  honourable 
 for  God,  that  we  iliould  conceive  him  as  acting 
 this  way  or  that,  fince  it  is  confels'd  that  neither 
 reaches  what  really  pafTes  in  his  Mind."y-So  that  the 
 Queftion  is  not  concerning  the  Operations  of  God 
 as  they  are  in  thcmfelves,  but  concerning  our  way 
 of^  conceivm^jhem,  whether  it  be  more  for  his 
 Honour  to  reprefent  them  according  to  the  firll:  or 
 
 fecond   Scheme  :^)(^And  certainly  the  right  Method'^ -"-^7 
 
 is  to  ule  both  on  occafion,  (o  far  as  they  may  help 
 us  to  conceive  honourably  of  the  divine  Mjjefly; 
 and  to  deal  ingenioufly  with  the  World,  and  tell 
 them,  that  where  thefe  Schemes  have  not  that  ef- 
 fed,  or  where  thro'  our  ftret-  hmg  them  too  far, 
 they  induce  us  to  entertain  diflionourable  Thoughts 
 of  him,  or  encourage  Difobedience,  rhey  are  not 
 applicable  to  hjm/-rin  Ihott,  that  God  is  as  abfo-Y- 
 lute  as  the  firft  reprefents  him,  and  Man  as  frcQ  as 
 the  lafl:  would  have  him  to  be;  and  that  thefe  dif- 
 ferent and  feemingly  contradiflory  Schemes  are 
 brought  in  to  fupply  the  DefFed;s  of  one  another, 
 ?  §  XXXV.  And  therefore,  Thirdly,  The  Mana- 
 gers of  rhis  Controverfy  ought  to  have  look'd  on 
 thefe  different  Schemes  as  chiefly  defign'd  to  incul- 
 cate fome  Duties  to  us ;  and  to  have  prefs'd  them 
 no  farther  than  as  they  tended  to  move  and  oblige 
 us  to  perform  thofe  Duties.  Y-But  they,  on  the  con-^ 
 trary,  have  flretch'd  thefe  P^eprefentations  beyond 
 the  Scripture's  d.flgn,  and  fet  them  up  in  oppofi- 
 tion  to  one  another ;  and  have  endeavoiir'd  to  per- 
 fuade  the  World  that  they  are  iRConfiftcn'" :  info- 
 much  that  fome,  to  eftablifih  Contingency  and 
 Free-Will,  have  deny'd  God's  Prefcience ;  and 
 others,  ro  fet  up  Predcftinationj  have  brought  in 
 a  fatal  neceflity  of  all  Events. 
 
 O  o  An4 
 
(  44) 
 
 And  not  content  therewith,  they  have  accus'd 
 one  another  of  Impiety  and  Blafpiiemy,  and  mu- 
 tually charg'd  each  the  other's  Opinion  with  all  the 
 abfurd  Confequences  they  fancy 'd  were  deducible 
 V  from  it.  <  Thus  the  Maintainers  of  Free-Will  charge 
 the  Predeftinarians  as  [guilty  of  afcribing  Injuftice, 
 Tyranny,  and  Cruelty  to  God,  as  making  him 
 the  Author  of  all  the  Sin  and  Miferythat  is  in  the 
 World:  And  on  the  other  hand,  the  AfTerters  of 
 Predeftination  have  accus'd  the  others,  as  deftroy- 
 ing  the  Independency  aud  Dominion  of  God,  and 
 fubjeding  him  to  the  Will  and  Humours  of  his 
 Creatures.  And  if  either  of  the  Schemes  were  to 
 be  taken  literally  and  properly  the  Maintainers  of 
 them  would  find  difficulty  enough  to  rid  them- 
 '[  felves  of  the  Confequences  charg'd  on  them  :Xfeut 
 if  we  tjke  them  only  as  analogical  Reprefentations, 
 as  I  have  explain'd  them,  there  will  be  no  ground 
 or  reafon  for  thefe  Inferences. 
 
 §  XXXVI.  And  it  were  to  be  wifh'd,  that  thofe 
 who  make  them  would  confider,  that  if  they 
 would  profecute  the  fame  Method  in  treating  the 
 other  Reprefentations  that  the  Scriptures  give  us 
 of  God's  Attributes  and  Operations,  no  lefs  Ab- 
 furdities  would  follow  : -f  As  for  example,  when^ 
 God  is  faid  to  be  merciful,  loving,  and  pitiful,  all- 
 feeing,  jealous,  patient,  or  angry ;  if  thefe  were 
 taken  literally,  and  underftood  the  fame  way  as 
 we  find  them  in  us,  what  abfurd  and  intolerable 
 Confequences  would  follow;  (and  how  diflionour- 
 ably  mu ft  they  be  fuppos'd  to  think  of  God,  who 
 afcribe  fuch  Paffions  to  himfX^et  no  body  hi- 
 (hock'd  at  them,  becaufe  they  underftand  them  in 
 an  anological  Senfe.  And  if  they  would  but  allow 
 Predeftination,  Eleftion,  Decrees,  Purpofes,  and 
 Fore-knowledge,  to  belong  to  God,  with  the  fame 
 difference,  they  would  no  more  think  themfelves 
 oblig'd  to  charge  thofe  that  afcribe  them  to  him, 
 "^  V    /  with 
 
(  45  ) 
 
 with   Blafphemy   in  the  one  Cafe,    than  in  the  o- 
 
 _'Tis   therefore    incumbent    on   us   to  forbear  all 
 
 ^/^tuch  Deductions,    and  we  iliould  endeavour  'to  re- 
 
 concile  thefe   feveral    Reprefenrations    together,-HDy  i^-_ 
 teachin-  the   Peo,.le,-fthat  God's    Knowledge  i.  of  -f -^ 
 another  Nature  than  ours  ;yand  that  tho'  we  can-'f 
 nor,  in  our  way  of  thinking,  certainly  forefee  what 
 'is  free  and  contingent,  yet  God  may  do  it  by  that 
 "  Power  which  anlwers  to  Prefcience  in  him,  or  ra- 
 ther  in  truth,  fupplies  the  place  of  ir.  4- Nor  is  itV 
 any  wonder    that  we  cannot  conceive   how  this  is 
 done,  fince  we  have  no  dired  or  proper  Notion  ot 
 Cod's  Knowledge  ;  nor  can  we  ever  in  this  Life  ex- 
 pea  to  comprehend  it,   any  more  than  a  Man  who 
 never  faw  can  expecl  to  dilcern  the  Shape  and  Fi- 
 gure of  Bodies  at  a  diftance,   whiUl  he  continues 
 
 §  XXXVII.  The   fifth  ufs   we  are  to  make  of 
 what  has  been  faid,  is  to  teach  us  how  we  are  to 
 behave  ourfelves  in  a  Church,  where  cither  ot  thefe 
 Schemes  is   fettled  and  targht  as  a  Dodrine  :  and 
 here  I  think  the  Refolution  is  eafy.  ^We  ought  to -f. 
 b^   quiet,    and  not  unfeafonably   diUurb  the  Peace 
 of  the  Church;  much  lefs  llio.ld  we  endeavour  to 
 cxpofe  what  flie  profefTes,  by  alledging  Ablurdities 
 and  Inconfiftencies  in  it.     On  the  contrary,  we  are 
 oblig'd  to  take   pains   to  fhew  that  the  pretended 
 Confequences  do  not  follow,  as   in  truth  they  do 
 not;    and    to    difcoura^e    all   that    make  tnem,  as 
 Enemies    of  Peace,   and    faUe    Accufers   ot    their 
 Brethren,    by   charging   them   with    Confequences 
 they  difown;    and   that  have  no  other  Foundation 
 but  the  Maker's  Ignorance.  ,    -rr    i 
 
 For  in  truth,  as  has  been  already  fliew'd,  it  luch 
 Inferences  be  allow'd,  hardly  any  one  Attribute  or 
 Operation  of  God,  as  defcrib'd  in  Scripture,  will  be 
 free  from  the  Cavils  of  perverfe  Men. 
 
 O  o  1  Tis 
 
{  46  ) 
 
 ''*^'Tis  obfervable,  that  by  the  fame  way  of  reafon- 
 ing,  and  by  the  fame  (ort  of  Arguments,  by 
 which  (omc  endeavour  ro  deftroy  the  divine  Pref- 
 cicnce,  and  render  his  Decrees  odious,  Cona  long 
 ago  in  Cicero  atrack'd  the  other  Attributes,  and 
 undertook  to  prove  that  God  can  neither  have 
 Reafon  nor  UnderOanding,  Wifdom  nor  Prudence, 
 nor  any  other  Virtue.  And  if  we  underftand  thefe 
 hteraily  and  properly,  fo  as  to  fignify  the  fame 
 ■when  apply'd  to  God  and  to  Men,  it  will  not  be 
 eafy  to  anivver  his  Arguments:  but  if  we  conceive 
 them  to  be  afcrib'dto  him  by  Pro' ortion  and  Ana- 
 logy, that  is,  if  we  mean  no  more  when  we  apply 
 rhem  to  God,  than  that  he  has  fome  Powers  and 
 raciilties,  tho'  not  of  the  fime  nature,  which  are 
 analogous  to  thtfe,  and  whi.h  yield  him  all  the 
 Advantages  which  tliefe  could  give  him  if  he  had 
 them,  enabling  him  to  produce  all  the  good  Ef- 
 fects which  We  (ee  confecjuenr  ro  them,  when  in  the 
 greateft  Perfection  ;  then  the  Arguments  ufed  by 
 ^  Cotta  ai^ainlt  them  have  no  manner  of  force  : 
 fince  we  do  not  plead  for  (iich  an  Underftanding, 
 Reafon,  Juifice,  and  Virtue,  a^  he  obje(5ls  againft, 
 but   for   more  vaiu.ible   Perfedions  that   are  more 
 
 *  Qualcm  autem  Deiim  intelllgere  nos  poflumus  nulla  vir- 
 tute  pr^ditum  ?  Quid  enim  ?  prudentiamne  Deo  tribuemus  ? 
 Qiix  conllat  ex  fcientia  rerum  bonarum  &  nialarum,  &,  nee 
 bonar'Tm  nee  malarum  r  Cui  mali  nihil  ell:,  nee  cfle  potelt, 
 quid  huie  opus  eft  dele<5lu  bonoium  &  nialorum  ?  Quid  autem 
 rationer  quid  intelligentia?  quibus  utimur  ad  earn  rem  ut  apertis 
 obfcura  aflequamur.  At  obfcurum  Deo  nihil  poteft  cfTe.  Nam 
 juftitia  qux  luum  cuique  diftribuit,  quid  pertinet  ad  Deos  ? 
 hominum  enim  focletas,  &  communitas,  ut  vos  dicitis,  Jufti- 
 tiam  procreavit :  tcmperantia  autem  conftat  ex  prx'termitten- 
 dis  voluptatibus  eorporis :  cui  li  locus  in  caelo  eft,  eft  etiam  vo- 
 luptatibus.  Nam  fortis  Deus  intelligi  qui  poteft  ?  in  dolore, 
 an  in  labore,  an  in  pcriculo  ?  quorum  Deum  niliil  attingit. 
 Nee  ratione  igitur  utentem,  nee  virtute  ulla  pra:ditum  Deum 
 intclligere  qui  poiTuraus  ?  Cic.  de  Nut.  Dear.  L.  III.  Seft.  15. 
 
 than 
 
r 
 
 (47  ) 
 than  equivalent,  and  in  truth  infinitely  fuperlor  to 
 them,  tho'  caird  by  the  fame  Names;  becaufe  we 
 do  not  know  what  iheyarein  themfelves,  but  only 
 fee  their  EfFed:s  in  the  World,  which  are  fuch  a? 
 might  be  expecl' d  from  the  moft  confummate  Rea- 
 fon,  Underftanding,  and  Vircue, 
 
 And  after  the  fame  manner,  when  perverfe  Men 
 reafon  ag.nnfl:  the  Prefcience,  Predeftination,  and 
 the  Decrees  of  God,  by  drawing  rhe  like  abfurd 
 Confequencc,  as  Cotta  dorh  againll  rhe  poflTi :)ility 
 of  his  being  endow'd  wirh  Reafon  and  Undcrfland- 
 ing,  (^r. -itour  Anfwer  is  the  fame  as  before  men-V 
 tion'd.  If  thefe  be  fuppos'd  the  very  fame  in  all 
 refpefts  when  atrribuced  to  God,  as  we  find  them 
 in  ourfelves,  there  would  be  fome  colour,  from 
 the  Abfurdicies  ihat  would  follow,  to  deny  that 
 they  belong  to  God  ,-\hut  when  we  only  afcribe-f- 
 them  to  him  by  analogy,  and  mean  no  more  than 
 that  there  are  fome  things  anfwerable  to  them, 
 from  whence,  as  Principles,  the  divine  Operptions 
 proceed,  it  is  plain,  that  all  fuch  Argument^  not 
 only  lofe  their  force,  but  are  abfolutely  impertinent. 
 :7f^lx.  is  therefore  fufficient  for  the  Minifters  of  the -=v^ 
 Church  to  iTiew  that  the  eRablifhed  Dodrine  is  a- 
 greeable  to  Scripture,  and  teach  their  People  what 
 ufe  ought  to  be  made  of  it,  and  to  caution  them 
 againfl:  the  Abufe  j  whicii  if  they  do  with  Pru- 
 dence, they  will  avoid  Contentions  and  Divifions, 
 and  prevent  the  Mifchiefs  which  are  apt  to  follow 
 the  miftaken  Reprefemations  of  it. 
 
 §  XXXVIII.  This  is  the  Method  taken  by  our 
 Church  in  her  X  Vllth  Article,  where  we  are  taught, 
 that  Predejiin^aion  to  Life  is  the  everlafting  Pnrpofe 
 of  God,  ivhereby  before  the  Foundritions  of  the  World 
 "iiyere  laid,  he  hath  confiantly  decreed  by  his  Coanfil^ 
 jecret  to  us,  t9  deliver  from  Lurje  ani  Damnation 
 thofe  whom  he  hath  chofen  in  Chriji  out  of  Aifan- 
 kl*id,  and  to  bring  them  by  Cbriji  to  everUjling  S^il^ 
 
 O  Q  3  vaiioiu 
 
(48) 
 
 vat  ion.  -"■  '■'  y^f^d  that  the  ^odly  Ccnjideraiion  of 
 Prcdcjlraatiorij  and  our  Elefiic}}  in  Chrijl,  is  fall  of 
 fueet,  pleafAnti  and  unfpeak^blc  Comfort  to  godly 
 Per  J  onsi  i   as   well   becatifc  it    doth  greatly  efla- 
 
 hlijjj  their  Faith  of  eternal  Salvation^  to  be  enjoyed 
 thro*   Chriftt  as  becauje   it  doth  fervently   ki»dlc  their 
 
 Love  toward  God. •  ^ndyct  -ive  miift  receive  God's 
 
 Promijes,  as  thej  he  generally  Jet  forth  to  us  in  holy 
 Scripture.  Here  you  lee  the  two  Schemes  join  d 
 together:  And  we  are  alow'd  all  the  Comfort  that 
 the  Confideration  of  our  being  predeftinated  can 
 aifoid  us :  and  at  the  fame  time  we  are  given  to 
 unuaftand  that  the  Promifes  of  God  are  generally 
 condi'ional;  and  that  notwithllanding  our  belief 
 of  F-redeRination,  we  can  have  no  hope  of  obtaining 
 the  bcinefit  of  them,  but  by  fulfilling  the  Conditions. 
 And  I  hope  I  have  explain'd  them  in  fuch  a  way,  as 
 fhews  tiiem  tobe  confident  inthemfelve^,  and  of  great 
 ule  towards  making  us  holy  here,  and  happy  hereaftero 
 
SER  MON 
 
 ON  THE 
 
 FALL  of  MAN. 
 
 By  his  Grace 
 William  Lord  Archbifhop  of  Dublin. 
 
 The  Second  Edition. 
 
(  5'  ) 
 
 GEN.  IL  Ver.  i6>  17. 
 
 And  the  Lord  God  commanded  the  JWan,  faying^  of  every 
 Tree  of  the  Garden  thoH  mayft  freely  eat: 
 
 But  of  the  Tree  of  the  Knowledge  pf  Good  and  Evil  thoft 
 JJj.dt  not  eat  of  it :  For  in  the  Day  that  thou  eateji 
 thereof t  thou  jhalt  furely  die. 
 
 DAILY  Expererience   fhews  us  that  there  is 
 much  Ignorance,  Folly  and  Mifery  jamongfl: 
 Men ;   that  we  have  a  prolpecS:  of  thefe  as  foon  as 
 we  begin  to  think ;    and  that  nothing  more   im- 
 bitters  Life  than  that  View.     The  Beafts  are  fick, 
 and  want  and  die  as  well  as  JVlen ;  but  yet  are  not 
 fo  miferable,    becaufe  they  fee  no  farther  than  the 
 prefent,  and  therefore  are  not  tormented  with  the 
 remembrance  of  what  is  paft,    or  the  fear  of  what 
 is  to  come.     Whereas  Men  are  appriz'd  that  Pains 
 and  Difeafes,   Difappointments  and  Death  are  be- 
 fore them,  and  have  not  the  Uke  certainty  of  one 
 fingle  Ad  of  Pleafure  to  ballance  the  difmal  Confi- 
 deration.      This    fhould  make   us  fenfible  that  we 
 are  not  in  the    State  in    which   Nature  placed  us 
 fince  a  Good  God  can  hardly  be  fuppofed  to  have 
 made   a  Creature   with   lefs   Views   of  Happinefs 
 than  of  Mifery.     From  whence  we  may  conclude 
 that  our  prefent  Eftate  is  not  that  wherein  God  cre- 
 ated us,  but  that  we  are  fome  way  or  other  fallen 
 from  it.    The  Text  gives  us  the  occafion  of  that 
 Fall,  and  there  is  no  other  Account  to  be  given  of 
 our  prefent  Condition,  but  what   we  receive  here 
 from  the  Holy  Scriptures :   for  altho'  all  confider- 
 ing  Men  have  feen  and  bemoan'd  our  Mifery,  yet 
 j^one  could  ever  difcover  any  other  rational  ground 
 
 for 
 
(so 
 
 for  ir,   or  give  any  tolerable  Reafon  how  it  came 
 to  be  fo. 
 
 'Tis  furely  of  great  moment  to  us  to  be  acquainted 
 with  it,  becaufe  it  is  one  Step  to  the  Cure  to 
 difcovcr  theDifeafe.  'Tis  a  Subjed  not  commonly 
 handled  and  requires  Attention  in  You,  as  well  as 
 Diligence  and  Care  in  Me  to  inform  you  in  the 
 following  Particulars. 
 
 I  ft.  Of  the  State  and  Circumftances  of  Man, 
 when  this  Command  in  the  Text  was  given. 
 
 idly.  The  Command  irfclf  forbidding  Adam  to 
 eat  of  the  Tree  of  the  Knowledge  of  Good  and  Evil 
 
 ^dly.  How  Man  was  feduced  to  break  this  Com- 
 mand. 
 
 4thly.  The  Confequences  of  this  Difobedience. 
 
 As  to  the  State  and  Circumftances  of  Man  when 
 this  Command  was  given. 
 
 ift.  It  is  manifelt,  that  he  was  then  immediately 
 created,  and  being  juft  come  out  of  the  hands  of 
 God,  he  was  in  a  ftate  proper  to  his  Nature,  pure 
 and  innocent,  without  any  Stain  or  Corruption. 
 He  had  no  Law  but  that  of  his  Mind,  or  what  he 
 received  by  immediate  Revelation  from  God;  nor 
 any  defed,  but  that  which  is  unavoidably  incident 
 to  every  thing  created,  which  may  be  perfefl  in 
 its  kind,  but  cannot  be  abfolutely  lo;  that  being 
 proper  to  God.  For  to  fay  a  thing  was  created  is 
 to  confefs  that  it  depends  on  the  Will  and  Power  of 
 him  that  made  it;  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  felf- 
 fufficient  but  needs  the  continual  fupport  of  its 
 Creator,  and  rhe  aftiftance  of  fuch  of  its  fellow- 
 Crearures  as  God  has  been  pleas'd  to  appoint  as 
 neceffary  helpers  for  its  fubfiftence.  All  the  Per- 
 feftion  therefore  to  which  Creatures  can  pretend, 
 is  to  anfwer  the  defign  for  which  they  were  created. 
 This  is  that  Goodnefs  God  faw  in  them,  This  un- 
 doubtedly Man  had,  and  in  this  fenfe  he  v/as  very 
 
 good. 
 
(  S3  ) 
 
 gaod.  If  therefore  God  did  not  defign  that  Man 
 Ihould  be  felf-fufficient,  but  have  a  Communion 
 with  the  bodies  that  are  about  him,  and  ss  a  por.* 
 tion  of  the  Univerfe  depend  on  their  Afliftance  and 
 Influence  as  to  his  Material  part;  it  will  be  no  Im- 
 pel fedion  in  him  that  he  owes  his  Food  to  the 
 Earth,  his  Warmth  to  the  Sun,  and  his  Breath  to 
 the  Air.  For  (ince  God  has  made  all  thefe  necef-» 
 fary  to  his  Subfiftance,  he  anfwers  the  defign  of 
 Providence,  whilft  he  ufes  them  to  the  purpofes, 
 to  which  God  has  appointed  them. 
 
 idly.  We  muft  remember  that  if  Man's  Un- 
 derftanding  at  firft  was  never  fo  clear,  and  his  fen- 
 fes  and  faculties  never  fo  ftrong,  yet  having  made 
 no  Obfervations,  and  being  abfolutely  without  Ex-r 
 perience,  he  could  know  no  more  of  any  thing, 
 than  what  was  revealed  by  God  to  him.  And 
 there  was  no  neceflity  that  God  Ihould  /reveal  more 
 Knowledge  to  him  than  was  at  prefent  to  be  ufed 
 by  him.  You  may  obferve  in  the  iprh  Verfe  of 
 this  Chapter,  that  out  of  the  Ground  the  Lord  God 
 forntd  every  Beaji  of  the  Field,  and  every  Fowl  of 
 the  Air  J  and  broHght  them  to  Adam,  to  fee  ivhat  he 
 :ii^0Hld  call  ther^,  and  jvhatfoever  Adam  called  every 
 living  creature,  that  was  the  name  thereof.  This 
 v/as  the  way  by  which  God  taught  him  Language, 
 and  you  fee  it  went  no  farther  than  the  Names  of 
 the  Beafts  of  the  Earth,  and  Fowls  of  the  Air  a- 
 mongft  whom  he  lived,  and  over  whom  he  was  to 
 exercife  Dominion. 
 
 Now  was  it  any  Imperfedion  in  the  firft  Man, 
 that  he  was  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  things,  if 
 we  fuppofe  that  he  had  a  certain  way  to  come  to 
 that  Knowledge,  when  he  had  occafion  for  it.  For 
 the  defign  of  Knowledge  is  not  to  amufe  us  or  fill 
 our  heads  with  Notions,  but  to  ferve  and  dire(5t  us 
 in  the  Affairs  of  Life.  'Tis  only  this  fort  of  Know- 
 ledge that  IS  truly  valuable :  And  he  that  has  mofr 
 
 of 
 
(54) 
 
 of  it  and  bcft  applies  ir,  is  to  be  accounted  moft 
 wife.  If  therefore  Adam  had  a  certain  way  of 
 knowing  the  nature  of  every  Thing,  when  he  was 
 to  employ  that  Knowledge;  tho'  he  was  aL^ually 
 without  ir,  yet  he  was  in  a  better  State  than  any  of 
 his  Polierity,  who  have  made  many  Obfervations 
 and  are  furnilh'd  wirh  many  aclual  Norions,  but 
 have  no  certain  way  of  coming  to  fuch  Knowledge 
 as  upon  every  Occalion  is  necefTary  for  their  Di- 
 redions. 
 
 5dly.  Therefore  we  mufl:  conceive  that  Adam 
 was  under  the  immcdiare  Condud  and  direction  of 
 God,  and  was  not  to  judge  for  himlclf,  but  wa>  to 
 leave  himfelf  entirely  to  be  guided  and  direded  by 
 his  Maker.  You  fee  he  was  not  left  ro  determine 
 for  himfelf  what  he  fhwuld  eat:  But  God  by  Re- 
 velation affign'd  him  his  Food  and  provided  it  for 
 him.  So  Ch.  i.  v.  29.  And  God  /aid.  Behold  I 
 have  given  you.  every  herb  hear mg  feed  which  is  upon 
 the  face  of  ail  the  Earth.  And  every  Tree  in  -ivhich 
 is  the  fruit  of  a  Tree  yielding  feed,  to  you  it  Jhall  be 
 for  Meat.  And  in  the  Text,  of  every  Tree  in  the 
 Garden  thou-  mayfi  freely  eat.  This  leems  added, 
 becaufe  thefe  Trees  of  Paradife  were  not  planted 
 when  God  made  the  Revelation  of  the  firft  Chapter, 
 And  therefore  it  might  be  doubted  whether  they 
 were  intended  for  the  Food  of  Man,  or  given  him 
 by  the  former  Revelation,  if  God  had  not  exprefly 
 declared  it. 
 
 Now  if  a  Man  vvas  not  to  feed  him'elf  before 
 he  had  God's  Diredion  for  it,  which  faved  him 
 the  trouble  and  hazard  of  findin»  out  bv  Trial,  what 
 was  fit  for  h:m;  It  is  rcafonable  to  believe  that 
 m  every  Affair  of  Life  he  was  to  depend  on  the  fame 
 Direclion  ;  that  he  was  not  to  afilime  to  himfelf  that 
 Knowledge  ol  Good  And  Evil,  that  is,  of  what 
 was  prohrable  or  hurtful  to  him,  but  entirely  to 
 depend  on  Cod  for  the  Determination  thereof,  and 
 
 whilrt 
 
{  ss) 
 
 whilll  he  did  fo,  he  could  never  know  Evil,  be- 
 caufe  God  would  always  dired;  him  to  what  was 
 Good,  and  to  that  only. 
 
 'Tis  to  be  confider'd  that  Man  by  his  Confuta- 
 tion was  Mortal,  and  fubjeiS:  to  the  Impreflions  of 
 the  Bodies  that  fuiroundcd  him  ;  for  being  com- 
 pofed  of  the  Elements  as  to  his  material  Part,  in 
 which  he  refembled  oiher  living  Creatures,  thofe 
 might  be  feparated  and  dilfolv'd,  and  the  Separa- 
 tion of  the  Parts  of  our  Body  infers  Death.  And 
 therefore  Man  in  his  natural  Compofition  was  fub- 
 jed  to  it;  but  yet  was  capable  of Immorraliry,  to 
 which  he  could  not  be  intitl'd  but  from  a  fuperna- 
 tural  Principle,  and  the  peculiar  Care  of  God. 
 For  it  was  impollible  that  a  Man's  Underftmding 
 how  great  foever  fliould  be  To  perfed:  as  to  enable 
 him  of  himfelf  to  know  and  avoid  all  thofe  things 
 that  might  occafion  a  Decay  and  DifTolution  of  his 
 Body.  Only  God's  Knowledge  could  reach  this ; 
 and  therefore  it  is  manifeft  he  muft  depend  orr 
 that;  and  on  all  occalions  have  recourfe  to  it,  if  he 
 expefted  to  continue  Immortal. 
 
 Nor  4thly,  Was  his  being  oblig'd  to  fuch  de- 
 pendance  to  be  look'd  on  as  a  Defed:,  but  rather 
 a  mofl:  fignal  Favour.  I  obferv'd  before)  that  he 
 depended  on  the  Air  for  Breath,  on  the  Sun  for 
 Warmth,  snd  on  the  Earth  for  Food;  And  vet 
 none  of  thefe  could  be  reckon'd  an  Imperfeftion  ; 
 How  much  lefs  could  his  Dep^ndance  on  his  Crea- 
 tor for  the  inlightning  and  informing  his  Under- 
 flanding  for  the  Difcovery  of  what  was  Good  and 
 Evil,  either  in  his  Moral  or  Natural  Adions,  be 
 look'd  on  as  derogatory  to  his  Nature.  On  the 
 contrary  nothing  could  be  a  greater  Honour  to 
 him,  than  that  God  fhould  vouchfafe  to  become 
 his  Guide ;  nothing  could  be  a  greater  Security  or 
 Advantage.  This  mufi:  and  only  could  take  away 
 all  Doubt  and  Solicitoufnefs  out  of  his  Mind  and 
 
 render 
 
(56) 
 render  him  peiTccrly  eafy  and  fecure.     By  this  he 
 had  the  Benefit  ot  all  Knowledge,   and  was  freed 
 from  the  trouble  of  acquiring  it. 
 
 'Tis  true  that  we  have  now  an  unmeafurableThirfl 
 of  improving  our  Underftanding  and  penetrating  in- 
 to the  Nature  of  Things,  we  reckon  a  great  part  of 
 our  Happinefs  to  confift:  in  it,  and  value  ourfelves  on 
 it ;  but  we  are  not  to  imagine  that  it  was  fo  from  the 
 beginning.     The  reafon  of  our  E  -gernefs  for  Know- 
 ledge now  arifes  from  our  depending  on  our  own  Con- 
 dud.  Hence  on  alloccafrons  we  find  great  Ufe  for  it, 
 and  having  nothing  elfetotruftto,  that  can  lead  us  thro* 
 the  Difficulties  of  Life,  we  endeavour  to  know  as 
 much  as  we  can,  and  are  glad  when  we  can  attain  to 
 any  new  Notion ;  becaufe  we  find  ourfelves  often  at 
 a  lofs  and  can't  teil  how  foon  it  may  be  uieful  to  us. 
 But  whiin  Man  was  not  to  judge  for  himfelf,  whilft 
 he  depended  on  the  Omnilciency  of  God  to  diretH: 
 him,  he  had  no  fuch  occafion  for  knov/ing  the  Na- 
 ture of  Things,  nor  need  be  much  concern'd  about 
 them.     For  to  what  purpofe  fhould  udiiam  have  de- 
 'fired  to  acquire  Knowledge,  when  he  could  have  re- 
 courfe  to  the  infinite  Wildom  of  God  on  all  occa- 
 fions  to  inform  and  guide  him?  VVhilH  Children  are 
 Jfupply'd  by  their  Parents,    can  call  for  any   thing 
 they  want,  they  are  little  covetous  of  Money,  and 
 can  hardly  be  prevail'd  with  to  apply  their  Heads  to 
 the  Methods  of  acquiring  it ;  nor  are  they  fond  of  it 
 when  they  have  it:  But  a  Stock  being  once  put  into 
 their  Hands,  and  they  finding  that  they  muft  want, 
 if  they  do  not  provide  and  manage  induftrioufly. 
 They  do  by  degrees  grov/  thirfly  of  Gain  and  parfi- 
 monious ;  lay  projeds  and  eagerly  purfue  the  means 
 of  enriching  themfelves.     We  may  conceive  it  was 
 thus  with  Man  in  his  Innocency;  and  that  he  v/as 
 little  folicitous  about  acquiring  Knowledge,  whilft 
 he  could  recur  to  the  incxhauflible  Stock  of  God  his 
 Parent,  and  be  fupply'd  by  a  free  Communication 
 
 from 
 
(57) 
 
 from  thence  on  all  Occafions.     But  when  by  Sin 
 he  cut  himfelf  off  from  that,  and  became  his  own  Ma- 
 fler  to  judge  what  was  good  and  evil  for  himfelf,  he 
 then  found  himfelf  under  continual  doubts  and  Diffi- 
 culties; he  is  become  (enfible  of  his  Ignorance  and 
 Difability  how  to  determine  in  the  Affairs  of  Life, 
 and  has  no  other  Afliftance  than  his  own  Undcrftand- 
 ing :  This  makes  him  diligent  to  improve  it,  and  as 
 covetous  of  Knowledge  as  of  Money  ;  and  fo  fearches 
 for  the  treafure  of  the  one  with  as  much  Induftry 
 and  Pains  as  of  the  other.    Whereas  whilft  he  depend- 
 ed on  God  only  for  his  Direction,  he  was  freed  from 
 all  that  Labour,  Thiift  and  Anxiery  wherewith  he 
 now  profecutes  Knowledge,   and  was  content  with 
 the  inexhauflible  Treafure  of  Divine  Wifdom    to 
 which  he  had  an  eafy  and  ready  Accefs  on  all  Occa- 
 fions :  and  till  we  have  the  hke  again  we  can  never 
 be  happy  or  fecure.     God  is  the  Father  of  Spirits  and 
 as  a  Father  he  is  ready  to  make  Provifion  for  them,  if 
 they  will  have  recourfe  to  him  and  depend  on  him. 
 He  is  the  Light  of  Souls,  and  has  the  fame  propor- 
 tion to  them,  that  the  Sun  and  his  Beams  have  to  the 
 Eye.     Whilfl:  we  have  the  ufe  of  thefe,  we  know 
 our  way  and  can  fee  about  us;  But  when  thefe  are 
 abfent,  we  are  forc'd  to  ufe  artificial  Lights,  that  cm 
 never  perfedily  fupply  the  want  of  them.     All  our 
 acquir'd  Knowledge  is  but  like  thefe  artificial  Lights 
 that  can  never  fupply  the  Communication  of  Wif- 
 dom, which  God  was  pleas'd  to  impart  to  our  firft 
 Parents  in  that  State  of  Innocency,  and  of  which  he 
 depriv'd  them  for  their  Sin.    This  I  fuppofe  may  be 
 fufficient  to  teach  us  the  Condition   and  Circum- 
 ftances  of  Man  when  that  Command  in  the  Text 
 was  given  him. 
 
 As  to  the  Command  it  felf,  which  was  the  id  Head 
 of  my  Difcourfe,  Bat  of  the  Tree  of  the  Knowledge  of 
 Good  and  Evil,  thou  (lialt  not  eat  of  it,  for  in  the  Da.)  that 
 thoti  eatefi  thereof  thopf  (jMltfurely  die  \  We  are  to  confi- 
 der,  I  ft.  th^  Tree  here  mention'd,  z^\y. 
 
(53  ) 
 
 idly.  The  Congruity  of  God's  applying  it  to  the 
 prefent  ufe,  and 
 
 3dly.  The  reafonablenefs  of  God's  making  it  an 
 Inlfanceofour  Obedience. 
 
 Concerning  the  Tree  of  Knowledge  of  Good 
 and  Evil  here  niention'd,  Let  us  obferve  ift.  that 
 it  was  a  true  literal  Tree,  and  that  we  are  not  to  be 
 put  off  with  a  meer  Figure.  For  it  is  faid,  v.  9. 
 of  the  Chapter.  AniX  out  of  the  Gromd  made  the 
 Lord  God  to  grow  every  Tree  that  is  pleafint  to  the 
 Sight,  and  good  for  Food,  the  Tree  of  Life  alfo  in  the 
 midft  of  the  Garden,  and  the  Tree  of  Kyioniedge  of  Good 
 and  Evil.  If  the  Trees  for  (ight  and  food  were  true 
 literal  Trees,  then  fo  likewife  were  the  Trees  of  Life 
 and  Knowledge,  for  both  are  equally  fa  d  to  grow- 
 out  of  the  Ground.  And  when  God  in  the  Text  al- 
 lotvs  Man  to  eat  of  the  other  Trees,  he  forbids  him  on 
 pain  of  Death  to  eat  of  the  Tree  of  the  Knowledge  of 
 Good  and  Evil.  Now  to  underftand  eating  and  Treei 
 literally  in  one  part  of  the  Text,  and  figuratively  in 
 the  other,  when  there  is  no  intimation  or  ground  for 
 a  different  Senfe,  is  incongruous  to  reafon.  No  !  it 
 will  be  plain  to  any  one  that  confiders  the  defign  of 
 Alofes,  that  he  is  giving  us  here  the  literal  Hiftory 
 of  the  Creation  of  the  World,  of  the  Making  and 
 Fall  of  Man,  and  not  an  yillegory.  But  becaufe 
 this  does  not  fuit  with  the  Notions  of  fome  Men, 
 to  whom  the  Scripture  in  the  literal  Senfe  feemsnot 
 fufficiently  fpiritual,  therefore  they  endeavour  to 
 allegorize  the  Hiftory  of  Man's  Fall,  but  might 
 with  equal  reafon  turn  his  Creation  and  that  of 
 the  World  into  a  Figure.  And  'tis  obfervable 
 that  the  fame  Perfons  rhat  put  a  figurative  Senfe 
 on  the  Tree  of  Knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  and 
 on  the  manner  of  Man's  becoming  liable  to  Death, 
 as  the  Scriptures  deliver  it ;  do  the  fame  with  the 
 Methods  God  has  appointed  for  our  Recovery, 
 and   deny   not    only   the   literal   Sacraments,   but 
 
 hke. 
 
(  ^9  ) 
 
 likewlfe  the  Rcfurrcdion  of  the  fame  Uo.dy,  the 
 Power  of  the  hteral  Death  of  Chrifl:  and  the 
 Satisfadion  purcha^'d  by  it.  But  we  mud:  not  fe- 
 parate  the  hteral  from  the  myftical  Scnfe ;  as  we 
 muft  not  deny  the  Baprifm  oF  Water,  becaufe 
 we  acknowledge  that  of  the  Spirit,  nor  the  Re- 
 furreftion  of  our  Bodies  becaufe  we  own  another 
 of  our  Souls;  (o  neirher  rnuft  we  deny  a  literal 
 Tree  of  Knowledge  becaule  it  had  a  myftical 
 Senfe  and  Importance. 
 
 And  this  brings  me  to  the  fecond  thing  concern- 
 ing this  Tree,  the  congruity  of  God's  applying 
 it  to  the  ufe  mention'd  in  the  Text  :  For  the  Un- 
 derftanding  of  which  we  mulf  remember  that  God 
 in  all  his  Intercourfes  with  Men  has  conftantly 
 made  uTe  of  fome  vifii^le  or  outward  Means;  and 
 that  it  is  reafonable  it  Ihould  be  (o.  For  fince 
 Man  has  a  Body  as  well  as  a  Soul  ;  Scnfes  as  well 
 as  Underftanding;  and  that  the  Soul  does  make 
 ufe  of  the  Organs  of  the  Body  and  of  the  Senfes 
 for  its  Information;  and  that  this  is  the  natural 
 courfe  of  our  acquiring  Knowledge;  it  were  a 
 violence  to  the  Nature  of  Man  to  invert  the  Me- 
 thod or  feparate  the  one  from  the  other.  And 
 therefore  God  in  his  Communications  with  us 
 kerns  induftrioufly  to  have  avoided  it;  efpecially 
 where  the  joyning  them  together  may  contribute 
 to  the  certainty  and  effedualnefs  of  the  Revelation, 
 and  to  fecure  us  from  being  impofed  on  by  pre- 
 tenders. Whenever  therefore  God  has  fhew'd 
 any  Miracle,  he  has  made  ufe  of  fome  outward 
 Adion  to  prepare  the  minds  of  Men  for  it,  and 
 afcertain  them  of  his  prefence.  Thus  Mofes  did 
 all  his  Miracles  with  his  Rod,  Thus  EHjha  or- 
 der'd  Naaman  to  wafh.  feven  times  in  the  river 
 yord:,n  to  cure  his  Leprofie.  And  akho'  God  in- 
 duftrioufly avoided  affaming  any  fhape,  v/hen  he 
 pve  the    Law  j    yet  he  alTured  the   JPeople  of  If- 
 
 P  p  tM 
 
(  6o  ) 
 
 rael  that  he  was  prefent  by  Thunder,  Smoke  and 
 Fire  at  Mount  Simiy  2nd  by  a  burning  Bufh  at 
 his  firfl:  appearance  to  A^ofes.  Nor  did  our  Sa- 
 viour go  about  the  publick  execution  of  his  Office, 
 'till  anointed  by  the  Spirit  and  vifibly  commiilion'd 
 to  it  by  the  Holy  Ghofi  defcending  on  him  in  a  bo- 
 dily fliape  :  And  thus  he  ftill  communicates  to  us 
 the  Principles  of  our  new  Birth  by  Water,  and  his 
 Body  and  Blord  by  Bread  and  Wine.  Now  this  be- 
 ing the  manner  ot  God's  entertaining  an  Intercourfe 
 with  Man  thro'  the  whole  Scripture,  it  is  very 
 evident  that  the  two  remarkable  Trees  of  Paradife, 
 that  of  Life,  and  this  of  the  Knowledge  of  Good 
 and  Evil,  were  defign'd  for  thefe  myftical  pur- 
 pofcs,  and  intended  as  fettled  and  vifible  means  to 
 fupply  Man  with  God's  Influence  and  AlTiftance 
 in  thofe  cafes  in  which  he  cou'd  want  them. 
 
 For  I  ft.  Man  might  be  at  a  lofs  how  to  preferve 
 his  Body  from  Decays,  to  which  (as  was  obferv'd 
 before)  it  was  naturally  fubjed.  And  idly,  how  to 
 dired:  his  Adions.  For  the  firfl:  of  thefe  God  ap- 
 pointed the  Tree  of  Life.  Not  that  any  Tree  by 
 any  natural  Virtue  could  preferve  us  Immortal:  But 
 fince  God  commanded  Men  to  eat  of  it  as  often  as 
 he  needed  to  be  reftor'd  in  his  Body,  he  furely 
 was  ready  and  able  to  convey  his  fupernarural  Ai- 
 fifliance  to  him  by  it,  and  make  it  effedual  to  the 
 defign  for  which  it  was  appointed.  Man's  eating 
 therefore  of  it  with  Faith  and  in  Obedience  to 
 God,  was  the  Signal  upon  which  the  Divine  Power 
 was  pleas'd  to  exert  it  felf  for  the  Reftauration  of 
 him  to  his  primitive  Vigour.  And  there  is  no  more 
 difficulty  to  conceive  how  this  ffiould  be  done, 
 than  how  the  Ifraelites  in  the  Wildernefs  fhould  be 
 cured  of  the  Bitings  of  the  venomous  Creatures  by 
 looking  on  the  brazen  Serpent.  Every  faithful 
 Chriflian  c-xpeds  God  fliould  anfwer  his  Prayers, 
 and  grant  him  fome  things,    vhich   he  could  not 
 
 have 
 
(  6i  ) 
 
 have  without  a-king;  and  if  God  exert  his  Power 
 on  our  fpeaking  a  word  or  offering  a  defire,  which 
 have  no  Natural  Virtue  to  procure  the  Effed ;  he 
 may  do  the  fame  upon  our  giving  a  Signal  by  fome 
 Adion  appointed  by  him  to  that  purpofe.  If  he 
 gives  his  Holy  Spirit  to  tliem  that  ask  it  according 
 to  his  Promile,  why  not  to  thofe  hkewife  who  inO- 
 bedience  to  his  Command  are  baptifed  in  his  Name? 
 And  if  he  give  Life  and  Immortality  now  to  thofe 
 that  believe  and  are  baprifed,  why  might  he  not  give 
 and  preferve  Life  by  means  of  that  Tree,  to  the 
 ufe  of  which  he  had  promis'd  it,  when  they  in  Faith 
 fnould  eat  of  it?  Now  that  Life  was  annex'd  to 
 the  ufe  of  that  Tree  is  p^ain  from  Chap.  3.ver.  22. 
 ^ud  noiv  lejl  he  put  forth  his  hand,  and  take  alfo  of 
 the  Tree  of  Life^  and  eat  and  live  for  ever ;  therefore 
 the  Lord  Godjent  him  forth  from  the  Garden  o/Eden. 
 This  l"hews  that  the  reiloring  of  Strength  and  pre- 
 fervation  of  Life  was  annex'd  to  that  Tree  by  an 
 irrevocable  Decree :  for  the  Words  plainly  inti- 
 mate that  if  Man  after  his  fall,  could  have  continued 
 the  ufe  of  it,  he  had  been  Immortal. 
 
 And  as  God  provided  for  the  prefervation  of 
 his  Body  by  the  tree  of  Life,  fo  he  likev/ife  pro- 
 vided for  his  Soul,  and  taught  him  how  to  govern 
 it  by  the  tree  of  the  knowledge  of  Good  and  Evil, 
 and  this  he  was  not  to  eat,  nor  to  touch  it.  By  which 
 was  fignified  unto  him  that  he  was  not  to  pretend 
 or  any  way  to  judge  what  was  good  or  evil  for 
 him:  But  on  all  occafions  to  have  recourfe  to 
 God,  and  intircly  to  refign  and  trufl  himfelf  to 
 the  Divine  Condu6l.  That  as  it  was  by  the 
 Declarari(m  of  God  certain  Death  to  eat  of  this  Tree 
 on  account  of  its  being  a  Symbol  of  the  immediate 
 dependance  on  his  Maker,  for  the  diftinguifhing  of 
 what  was  good  or  evil  for  him;  fo  he  was  not  to  truft 
 to  his  own  Underftanding  for  the  determining  of 
 P  p  2  thele; 
 
/ 
 
 (62   ) 
 
 thefe ;  but  to  have  recouife  to  God  without  further 
 concerning  himlelf  a^-out  them. 
 
 And  this  fufficiently  fliews  how  congruous  it  uas 
 for  God  to  make  ufe  of  this  Tree  for  this  purpofe, 
 and  is  a  Step  to  dilcover  to  us  the  reafonablenefs  of 
 God's  makmg  Man's  abftinence  from  it  an  Inftance  of 
 Obedience^  which  was  the  3d  thing  to  be  fhew'd 
 concerning  it. 
 
 For  the  underftanding  of  which,  you  n.ufl:  obferve, 
 I  ft.  That  the  whole  Duty  of  Man  lay  in  obedience 
 to  this  Command,  as  the  whole  m.eans  of  Immortality 
 was  in  eating  of  the  Tree  of  Life.  VVhilfl  Man  re- 
 frain'd  from  eating  of  this  Tree,  he  could  have  no  o- 
 ther  Temptation,  he  could  neither  feel  nor  know  any 
 Evil,  for  he  was  under  the  immediate  care  and  pro- 
 tedion  of  God;  and  thole  were  fufHcient  to  prelerve 
 him  from  all  hurt  or  mifchef  j  which  his  own  Un- 
 derftanding could  never  do.  Man's  whole  Duty 
 therefore  and  Safety  were  comprehended  in  this 
 one  Command  :  and  as  the  ufe  of  the  Tree  of  Life 
 was  an  infallible  and  the  only  means  of  preferving 
 his  Body,  fo  the  eating  of  this,  and  thereby  violat- 
 ing the  Divine  Command,  was  the  only  way  to  hurt 
 his  Soul.  This  was  the  only  Door  by  which  Evil 
 could  come  in  upon  him,  and  if  he  had  kept  that  fhut, 
 it  could  never  have  enter'd. 
 
 idly.  We  muft  confidcr  that  Man  was  fallible 
 in  his  Underftanding,  peccable  in  his  VVill,  and 
 mortal  in  his  Body;  and  therefore  the  preferving 
 him  from  Deceit,  Sin  and  Death  muft  be  due  to 
 fome  fupernatural  Grace  of  God;  and  that  in  or- 
 der to  confer  that  Grace  there  ought  to  be  fome 
 obvious  means,  eafy  to  be  known  and  ready  to  be 
 ufed.  And  perhaps  it  will  be  hard  to  think  of  any 
 other  w^ay  fo  fuitableas  this  which  God  chofe.  For 
 if  fome  outward  means  ought  to  be  ufed,  this  re- 
 ftraining  him  from  the  ufe  of  one  of  the  Trees 
 fecms   the  moft  proper:    fome  fuch  Symbol  feems 
 
 not 
 
(  63  ) 
 
 not  only  rcafonable  but  neceflfary ;  and  food  being 
 the  only  thing  he  needed,  and  that  provided  for 
 him  out  of  the  fruits  of  the  Earth,  the  Inftance 
 could  not  be  (o  proper  in  any  other  matter. 
 
 jdly.  We  muft  remember  that  Man  was  created 
 a  free  Agent,  and  it  is  the  Nature  of  fuch  to  be 
 pleas'd  with  nothing  that  is  not  agreeable  to  their 
 choice.  The  befl:  and  moft  pleafing  thing  in  the 
 World  if  it  be  forced  on  us  againft  our  choice,  is 
 uneafy  to  us.  There  mufl:  be  fomething  of  choice  in 
 what  makes  us  happy  ;  and  could  there  be  a  more 
 eafy  thing  to  be  left  to  that,  than  not  to  eat  of 
 one  Tree  where  there  were  fo  many  ?  We  may 
 imagine  that  God  in  effed  faid  to  JVlan>  Your  Na- 
 ture requires  that  you  ihould  choofe  thofe  things 
 the  enjoyment  thereof  will  make  you  happy.  I 
 will  make  your  Duty  eafy  unto  you  ;  ahftain  from 
 this  one  Tree,  and  whilH:  you  do  fo,  I  will  take 
 care  that  you  iliall  not  choofe  amifs  in  any  thing 
 elfe.  Your  obedience  in  this  fnall  be  an  infallible 
 means  to  fecure  you  from  choolmg  wrong  in  any 
 other  thing.  WhilH:  you  ufe  your  Free- Will  right 
 in  this,  I  will  take  care  that  you  fhall  not  abufe  it 
 on  any  other  occafion.  Some  Inftance  of  your  free 
 Obedience  is  ncceffary  :  And  this  is  the  mofl:  eafy 
 that  could  be  provided  for  you.  But  by  your  wrong 
 ufe  of  Free- Will  here,  you  v/ill  open  a  Gate  for 
 Sin  and  Death  to  enter. 
 
 Surely  thi;  account  makes  this  Command  very  rca- 
 fonable, very  agreeable  for  God  to  give,  and  Man  to 
 receive.  And  from  this  it  appears  that  it  v/as  not  giv- 
 en meerly  as  an  arbitrary  tryal  of  fubmitlion  to  the 
 Will  of  God  ;  but  rather  as  a  means  to  facilitate  and 
 fecure  the  Obedience  we  owe  him.  When  Chriji  fent 
 the  blind  Man  to  the  Waters  oiSiloam  for  opening  his 
 Eyes,  no-body  will  fay  that  that  Command  was  a 
 meer  tryal  of  h'S  Obedience;  but  rather  a  means 
 to  reftore  his  Sight.     And  fo  when  God  command- 
 
 P  p  3  ed 
 
(64) 
 
 ed  Man  here  not  to  eat  of  the  Tree  of  Knowledge, 
 &c.  That  Abftincnce  was  not  impofed  upon  him 
 fo  muJi  by  the  wjy  of  tryal,  as  to  be  a  means  to 
 allure  him  of  the  Grsce  and  Affiftance  of  God. 
 This  gave  him  an  Intereft  in  his  own  Happinefs, 
 becauie  it  made  it  in  fome  meafure  depend  on  his 
 Free-Will,  wirhout  which  it  could  not  have  been 
 Happinefs,  as  has  been  fhew'd  before  i  and  yet  it 
 made  it  fo  eafy  to  him,  that  nothing  but  the  Good- 
 nefs  of  God  could  have  found  out  fo  very  fcallble 
 and  fo  effedual  a  means.  Thus  you  fee  a  fair 
 meaning  and  reafon  of  this  Command,  and  that 
 there  is  no  neceflity  of  for  faking  the  Letter  of 
 Scripture  to  juffify  God's  impofing  it. 
 
 Let  us  now  in  the  3d  place  confiderby  what  means 
 Man  was  feduced  to  break  this  Command.  Of  this 
 we  have  an  Account,  Ch.  3.  When  God  asks  the 
 Queflion  of  the  Woman,  (he  anfwers,  v.  13.  The 
 Serpent  heguiledme  and  I  did  eat.  Now  it  will  be  ne- 
 cefTary,  ifl,  to  confider  the  Seducer,  and  adiy,  the 
 Argument  by  which  he  prevailed  on  her.  As  to  the 
 Seducer,  'twas  a  Serpent,  Ch.  3.  v.  i.  Now  the 
 Serpent  7i'as  more  [ubtle  than  any  Beafl  of  the  Field, 
 jvhich  the  Lord  God  hn^d  made  ;  afid  he  f-id  unto  the 
 Woman^  yea,  hath  God  faid  ye  floall  not  eat  of  every 
 Tree  of  the  Garden  ?  Frrjm  which  you  are  to  ob- 
 ferve,  ifl,  that  this  was  a  literal  Serpent;  the  fame 
 Serpent  that  is  now  curs'd,  and  goes  on  his  Belly, 
 and  eats  Dufl,  that  is  hated  and  abhorred  by 
 Man,  that  is  fo  poifonous  and  pernicious  to  him, 
 between  whom  and  Man  there  is  a  natural  Enmi- 
 ty to  this  Day,  is  literally  meant  in  this  place, 
 and  is  not  to  be  allegorifed  away,  as  fome  would 
 have  it. 
 
 idly.  The  Serpent  was  then  the  mofl:  fubtle  and 
 cunning  of  Beafis,  we  muft  not  undcrfland  this  of 
 him,  as  now  f^upify'd  by  the  Curfe  of  God,  but  as 
 created    at  firfl   in  pcrfedion.     The   tradition   of 
 
 whofe 
 
(65  ) 
 
 "whofe  cunning  was  io  conftant  aod  univerfal  that 
 ic  became  proverbial  among  all  the  Antients,  with 
 whom  to  be  wife  as  Serpents  (meaning  the  firft  of  the 
 kind)  denotes  the  perfedion  of  Subtlety;  which 
 fhews  a  general  belief  that  he  had  at  firft  a  Sagacity 
 more  than  ordinary. 
 
 ^dly.  We  are  not  to  wonder  that  Eve  was  not 
 furpri'^'d  or  frighten'd  at  the  Serpent's  fpeaking  to 
 her;  for  a>  I  obferv'd  before,  fhe  had  yet  no  ex- 
 perience of  things,  was  ignorant  of  the  nature  of 
 Beafts,  and  for  ought  (he  knew,  all  of  them  might 
 fpeak  as  well  as  u4dam  did.  This  Ignorance  could 
 be  no  hurt  to  her,  for  if  Ihe  had  defir'd  to  know, 
 flie  had  no  more  to  do  but  to  apply  herfelf  to  God, 
 who  was  her  immediate  Diredor,  and  would  have 
 difcover'd  it  to  her,  if  fhe  had  ask'd  it ;  and  we 
 are  not  to  doubt  but  is  was  as  eafy  for  her  to  have 
 had  recourfe  to  him,  as  it  is  for  us  to  open  our  Eyes 
 in  order  to  fee;  and  therefore  fhe  was  as  inexcufable 
 as  a  Man  would  be  that  fhould  fall  into  a  Pit  becaufe 
 he  would  not  look  before  him. 
 
 But  4thly.  Tho'  this  was  a  true  literal  Serpent, 
 yet  there  was  more  in  it,  the  Devil  made  ufe  of  it 
 to  compafs  his  Ends:  And  he  was  the  Perfon  that 
 fpake  through  it.  This,  as  I  take  it,  is  confefs'd 
 by  all ;  for  no  Brute  could  ever  reafon  or  fpeak  of 
 itfelf :  And  it  ought  to  be  obferv'd  that  when  the 
 worfhip  of  the  Devil  was  fettled  in  the  World,  a 
 Serpent  was  the  Sign  and  Symbol  of  whatever  was 
 facred  to  him ;  he  was  worfhipped  under  that 
 form,  and  feem'd  to  take  a  pecuUar  Pleafure  to  ap- 
 pear and  receive  homage  in  that  Shape  in  which  he 
 deceived  Man.  Add  to  this,  that  a  Ssrpent  was 
 the  Beaft  by  which  he  vented  his  Oracles  in  many 
 Places,  and  the  very  Word  by  which  his  Divina- 
 tions are  fignified  in  feveral  Languages  is  taken 
 from  this  Animal;  as  if  the  Devil  were  flill  ading 
 his  Deceits  in  the  S?rpent. 
 
 P  p  4  As 
 
(  66  ) 
 
 As  to  the   Argun^ent  that  iic  ufed  to  fcdiice  onv 
 firft  Parents,  we  Ihall  find   it  a  very  plaulible  one. 
 'Tis  in  Ch.  3.  v.  4.  And  the  Serpent  /aid  unto  the 
 Woman,    ye  f:all  net  Jurelj  die ;   for  God  doth  k^ow, 
 that  iff  the  Day  je  eat  thereof,  then  your  Eyes  fJjall  be 
 opened,    and  je  Jhull   be  as  Gods  kHnv'wg  Good  and 
 Evil.     The    Meaning  of  this  feeiris  to  be  as  if  he 
 had  faid,  God  doth  but  mock  you,  when  he  threat- 
 ens you  with  Death  i  this  is  not  the  reafon  why  he 
 forbids  you  the  Ufe  of  this  Tree:   the  true  defign 
 is  to  keep  you  in  Ignorance,  to  bhndtold  you,  and 
 hinder  you  from  judging   for  yourfelves  by  your 
 own  Eyes  and  Reafon.     By   this  means  you  are 
 kept  altogether  in  a  depcndance  on  him,  and  oblig- 
 ed in  all  cafes  to  have   recourfe  to   him,    and   nor 
 fufFer'd   to  enquire  by   the  ftrength  of  your  owr» 
 Faculties,  what  may  huitor  help  you.     You  have 
 not  the  ufe  of  the  Senfes  and  Underftanding  you 
 poffefs  by  Nature,  but  are  kept  in   a  blind   unrea- 
 fonable  fubjedion  to  his  Will.     But  he  knows  if  you 
 eat  of  this  Tree,  you  fliall  be  freed  from  this  pu- 
 pilage of  Slave]  y.     That  you  will  of  yourfelves,  as 
 well  as  he,    underftand   what   is   good   or  evil  for 
 you,  and  fo   need  not    be  beholden   to    him:  He 
 judges  what  is  good  for  hlmfeif,  and  thac  Privilege 
 makes  him   God:   and  theiefoie  you  may  be  fure 
 it  is  apleafnt  thing  to  do  fo.     And  for  this  rea- 
 fon he  keeps  it  to  himfelf,  and  will  not  allow  it  you. 
 But  if  yen  wiil  venture  and  eat,  you  will  then  be 
 like  him,  nnd    be  competent  Judges  of  your   own 
 Advantages,  as  well  as   he  is.     Thus  our  firft    Pa- 
 rent \^as  pievail'd  on  to  (ufpcdt  God,  and  make  a 
 rryal  by  Difobcdience  whether  her  own  Hyes  and 
 Underftjnding  might  no'  be  (ufficient  to  direct  her. 
 Nor  is  it  any  wonder  fhe  was  deceiv'd,  ifwecon- 
 lider  her  want  of  Experience  and  innocent  Simpli- 
 city,    Not  that  fhe,  was  excufable,  fince  flie  had  no 
 more  to  take  care  of  but  this  one  thing,  and  flie 
 
 ought 
 
(  67) 
 
 ought  to  have  had  recourfe  to  God  or  her  Husband 
 before  (he  made  the  experiment.  But  the  Argu- 
 ment was  fo  framed  as  to  prevent  that  recourfe, 
 and  therefore  it  only  was  capable  to  deceive  her. 
 The  Serpent  fuggefted  to  her,  that  God  impofed 
 on  her,  and  therefore  it  feemed  improper  to  con- 
 fult  with  him,  when  flie  delired  to  difcover  whe- 
 ther it  was  fo  or  no.  This  is  fo  powerful  a  Method 
 of  deceiving  that  it  is  obfervable  it  feldom  fails  to 
 be  efreifliial,  and  that  an  Argument  almoft  like 
 this  corrupts  the  generality  of  Mankind.  Either 
 ill  Company  or  our  own  Heads  fuggeft  to  us,  when 
 we  are  Children  and  ignorant  of  our  Intereft,  that 
 our  Parents  Guardians  and  Tutors  debar  us  of  the 
 pleafures  of  Life,  out  of  envy.  We  argue  with 
 our  felves  and  one  another,  that  thefe  old  Fellows 
 keep  us  to  our  Books  and  to  our  Work,  debar  us 
 of  our  pleafures  and  recreation?,  bring  us  under 
 Rules  and  admonifh  us  to  be  aware  of  Luft,  and 
 Excefles,  that  they  may  engrofs  thofe  to  them- 
 felves  and  keep  us  in  a  dependance  on  them ;  that 
 therefore  they  will  not  fufFer  us  to  try  thefe  Enjoy- 
 ments, and  that  the  defign  of  all  is  to  make  us 
 flaves.  Whereas  we  are  apt  to  think,  that  we 
 have  Underftanding  enough  to  manage  our  felves, 
 and  therefore  why  may  we  not  be  left  to  our 
 own  guides  and  to  choofe  for  our  felves  ?  Hence 
 we  conclude,  let  us  make  the  Experiment  and 
 throw  off  the  Reftraints  our  condudors  would  put 
 911  us.  And  thus  thoufands  have  been  and  daily 
 ai'e  deceived.  And  few  young  People  are  able  to 
 refifl  the  force  of  this  Temptation ;  which  fhews 
 the  poV/er  of  it :  efpecially  when  it  comes  as  it  did 
 on  Eve^  cloathed  with  all  outward  advantage  of 
 Allurement,  as  in  the  (5th  v.  The  Tree  ivvs  gooi 
 for  food,  pleafant  to  the  Eyes,  md  a  Tree  to  be  dejird 
 to  make  one  wife.  So  wife  that  they  needed  no  more 
 to  confult  God  to  teach  them  what  was  good  or 
 
 Evil 
 
(68) 
 
 Evil  for  them.  Thefe  were  Charms  (he  could  not 
 eafily  refift ;  by  thefe  fhe  was  then  feduc'd,  and 
 deceived  her  Husband,  and  by  the  like  Temptations 
 her  Pofterity  daily  fall.  Whoever  knows  the  hu- 
 mour of  Youth,  and  ho^vit  was  with  himfelf  when 
 Young,  doth  alfo  know  that  this  Curiofity  of  try- 
 ing the  pleafures  of  Scnfe,  this  Itch  of  being  our 
 own  Mafters  and  choofing  for  our  felves,  together 
 with  the  charming  face  ot  Sins,  and  our  ignorance 
 and  inexperience  of  the  confequences  of  them,  are 
 generally  the  firfl  means  of  our  being  corrupted 
 againft  the  good  Maxims  and  Principles  we  receive 
 from  our  Parents  and  Teachers :  As  the  fairnefs 
 of  the  Fruit,  the  Teeming  propernels  of  it  for  food, 
 and  the  deiire  of  being  judge  for  herfeif  of  what 
 might  be  good  and  evil,  ot  being  under  her  own 
 Management  and  Government,  were  the  Induce- 
 ments that  prevailed  with  our  firft  Parent  to  throw 
 off  the  condud  of  God. 
 
 There  remains  now  the  4th  and  lafl:  part  of 
 what  I  propofed,  the  confequences  of  this  Dif- 
 obedience.  They  are  (o  difmal  and  numerous, 
 that  I  can  only  hint  at  fome  of  the  principal  of 
 them.  The  firft  of  them  was  the  opening  thefe 
 Sinners  Eyes,  Ch.  5.7.  ^nd  the  Eyes  of  them  both 
 were  opened,  A  Man's  Eyes  are  laid  to  be  open- 
 ed when  he  perceives  or  difcovers  fomething  re- 
 lating to  his  State  and  Condition  which  he  did  not 
 obferve  before.  Now  before  this  TranfgrelTion 
 Man  had  not  difcovered  any  v/ant  or  defe6t  in 
 himfelf:  He  was  direfted  by  the  Wifdom  of  God, 
 and  fupply'd  by  his  All-fufficicncy,  and  therefore 
 wanted  nothing  for  liis  Condud  and  Support.  But 
 "when  he  put  himfelf  out  of  the  Divine  Protecftion, 
 and  was  to  manage  and  fupport  himfelf;  he  foon 
 faw  and  felt  his  Imperfeftions  and  Wants.  Whild: 
 young  Children  are  under  their  Parents  Govern- 
 ment and  Care;   they  are  felicitous  about  nothings 
 
 They 
 
(  69) 
 
 They  are   not  concern'd  about  their  Meat,  Drink 
 or  Safety,  any  farther  then  to  call  to  their  Parents 
 for  them  when  they  want  them  :  nor  are  they  afraid 
 while  they  are  near  them :  but  if  they  fhould  with- 
 draw themfelves,   and  leave  their   Children  in  the 
 dark,    or  in  a  Wildernefs,  their  Eyes  would  foon 
 be  open'd,  they  would  foon  fee  and  feel  their  Im- 
 potence to  help  and  defend   themfelves,-    Concern 
 and  Terror  would  feize  them,    and  take  away  the 
 ufe  of  the  little  Reafon  they  have.     We  may  ima- 
 gine this  to  be  the  Condition  of  our  firft   Parents, 
 when   God  withdrew  his  Influence  and  Proteftion 
 from  them  upon  their  deferting  him.    Their  Eyes 
 were  opened    as  foon  as  they  were  left  to  them- 
 felves.    They  found  their  Neceffities  and  Wants. 
 They  found  the  fhortnefs  of  their  own  Power  to 
 help  them,  and   infufficiency  of  their  own  Under 
 ftanding  to  dired  them.      They  found  themfelves 
 incompetent  Judges  of  what  was  good  or  evil  for 
 them,  and  they  then  in  earnefi:,  to  their  cofi:,  knew 
 Evil,    that  is,  felt  it.     This  was  a  natural  Confe- 
 quence  of  their  fetting  up  to  be  their  own  Mafters, 
 and    to   judge  for   themfelves:     no    finite  Under- 
 ftanding  being  fufficient  to  forefee  or  know  what  in 
 the  infinite  variety  of  our  Circumftances  may  hurt 
 us,-   and  tho'  it  did  forefee  them,  yet  nothing  lefs 
 than    an   Almighty   Power   is    able  to  prevent  the 
 Mifchief.     The  opening  therefore  of  our  firft  Pa- 
 rents Eyes   to   fee   their   impendent  Miferies,    and 
 their  Irppotency  to  help  themfelves,    was  the  firft 
 efFed  of  their  Sin. 
 
 The  zd  was  their  fenfe  of  their  being  naked,  and 
 fhame  that  they  were  fo.  Shame  proceeds  from  a 
 Confcioufnefs  of  Weaknels,  or  of  Guilt,  and  from  a 
 fecret  Pride  that  makes  us  unwilling  to  own  it,  left 
 we  ihould  be  defpifed  for  it.  Man  could  not  be 
 confcious  of  either  before  his  Fall,  becaufe  he  was 
 innocent  from  Guilt,  and  was  covered  by  the  Power 
 
 of 
 
(7°) 
 
 of  God  againft  all  the  defers  of  his  natural  VVeak- 
 nefs;  but  being  now  left  to  himfelf,  he  felt  both. 
 He  had  offended  God,  and  had  no  defence  againft 
 his  fellow-Creatures :  the  Sun  fcorch'd  him,  the 
 Rain  wet  him,  and  the  Cold  pierc'd  him.  He 
 found  an  Inconvcniency  in  expofing  his  Bodys  and 
 was  afliam'd  of  the  Effeds  of  it.  He  found  him- 
 felf  mov'd  with  Luft  and  other  irregular  PalTions, 
 and  his  ReaTon  unable  to  curb  them.  Whereas  the 
 Power  of  God  whilll  he  was  under  the  Divine  Go- 
 vernment, had  kept  all  hi^  Faculties  in  pcrfed  or- 
 der. He  faw  therefore  now  great  hurt  in  Naked- 
 nefs,  which  no  way  incommoded  hi.Ti  whilft  covei'd 
 in  Innocency. 
 
 The  $d  Effeft  of  this  TrafgrefiTion  of  our  firft 
 Parents  was  Averfion  to  God.  Ch.  5.  v.  8.  And 
 Adam  and  his  Wife  hid  themfelves  from  the  Prejence 
 of  the  Lord  God  amongji  the  Trees  of  the  Garden: 
 ver.  10.  /  was  afraidi  becaufe  I  was  naked^  and  I 
 hid  my/elf.  This  was  a  very  natural  Eifed ;  for 
 fince  they  were  concern'd  to  fee  their  Nakednefs, 
 fince  they  were  afham'd  of  it,  and  it  now  difpleas'd 
 their  Eyes,  they  could  not  think  it  could  be  plea- 
 fing  to  God.  There  was  a  vifible  Prefence  of  God 
 in  Edeny  and  Man  no  doubt  was  taught  to  come 
 before  him  with  Decency  and  Reverence  :  And 
 being  now  blotted  and  ftain'd  with  Sin  in  his  Soul, 
 and  naked  in  his  Body,  he  mufl:  needs  be  afraid  to 
 appear  in  fuch  Circumftances  before  his  Maker, 
 When  he  was  alliam'd  to  fee  himf  If,  he  might 
 well  be  afraid  to  be  fecn  of  God.  A  Child  that  has 
 dirry'd  and  hurt  himielf  in  difobeying  his  Parent's 
 Command,  will  naturally  fly  his  Prefence.  Thus 
 it  far'd  with  Man  in  Paradife,  and  thus  it  conti- 
 nues with  us  his  Pofterity  to  this  Day.  V/e  are 
 afraid  of  that  Commerce,  and  flee  that  Commu- 
 nion with  God  that  was  the  great  Comfort  and  Se- 
 curity of  Man  in  his  Innocency. 
 
 The 
 
(  7'  ) 
 
 The  4th  Confequence  of  Man's  Tranfgreflion 
 was  God's  pronouncing  Sentence  on  each  of  the 
 Tranfgreflors;  on  the  Serpenr,  on  the  Woman, 
 and  lartly  on   uidi;im. 
 
 Firil  on  the  Serpenr,  And  the  Lord  God  faid  unte 
 the  Serpent,  Thoti  art  cttrfed  above  all  Cattle,  and 
 ebove  every  Beafi  of  the  Fields  upon  thy  Belly  jjjab 
 thou  goy  and  Dttji  /halt  thou  eat  all  the  Days  of  thy 
 Life ;  and  I  ivill  pHt  Enmity  between  thee  and  the 
 Woman,  between  thy  Seed  and  her  Seed,  it  flhill  brnfe 
 thy  Head,  and  thou  (loalt  bruife  his  Heel.  To  be 
 ciirfed  is  to  become  abominable  and  miferable ;  to 
 be  defigned  and  devoted  to  De(l-ru<5)-ion  ,•  to  be 
 under  the  Difpleafure  of  God  and  the  Execration 
 of  Men.  The  Serpent  carries  flill  the  Marks  of 
 this  Curfe,  and  is  forced  to  cover  and  hide  its  Head 
 on  all  occarion<^,  a?  being  ofFcnfive  to  the  Eye, 
 and  obnoxious  to  the  revenge  of  any  that  can  fur- 
 prife  it.  We  kill  other  Creatures  for  Food  or  Diver- 
 ilon,  but  Serpents  are  declar'd  Enemies;  we  equally 
 hate  and  fear  them,  and  therefore  deftroy  them  with 
 Pleafure  and  Eagernefs. 
 
 The  2d  Part  of  the  Serpent's  Punifliment  is  'to  go 
 on  his  Belly  and  feed  on  Duft.  How  he  was  framedat 
 firli  we  know  not,  but  fee  now  that  he  crawls  on  the 
 Ground,  and  can't  lift  up  his  Head.  This  was  a 
 jull  Punilliment  for  his  high  Attempt  in  oppofing 
 himfelf  to  God,  and  teaching  Man  to  queftion  the 
 Goodnefs  and  Veracity  of  his  Maker.  As  to  his 
 Food  which  God  has  here  decreed  to  be  Duft,  it 
 was  very  congruous  that  the  Serpent  who  had 
 tempted  our  firft  Parents  by  the  lovelinefs  of  the 
 Fruit  of  the  Tree  of  Good  and  Evil,  fhould  be 
 condemn'd  to  the  vileft  of  Meat,  and  be  obliged  to 
 feed  on  Filth  and  Dirtj  that  his  Fault  might  in 
 fome  meafure  be  feen  in  his  Punifhment. 
 
 The  3d  part  of  the  Sentence  pafs'd  on  the  Serpent, 
 is.  Enmity  between  hintj  and  Man  his  Lord,  which 
 
 con- 
 
(  72  ) 
 
 continues  to  this  Day,  their  very  Natures  being  con- 
 trary and  dertrudive  to  one  another.  There  is  a  per- 
 peiu.  i  War  between  them,  and  tho'  he  fomeiimes 
 hurts  or  wounds  his  Maifter  by  furprife  in  his  more 
 ignoble  Parts  j  yet  he  has  the  worft  of  it:  for  Man 
 bruifes  his  Head  and  effcdually  deftroys  him.  All 
 this  is  literally  true,  and  without  an  Allegory.  But 
 if  it  be  enquired  why  the  Serpent  was  thus  fen- 
 tenced,  when  he  committed  no  Fault,  but  was 
 aded  by  the  Devil.?  It  muft  be  anfwer'd,  that  he 
 was  the  only  vifible  Tempter  thatappear'd  to  Man, 
 and  therefore  the  Punifhment  was  firft  to  fall  on 
 him,  for  Example  fake,  and  to  beget  in  us  an  ab- 
 horrence of  the  Guilt.  The  Serpent  of  himfelf 
 was  no  more  capable  of  being  punifhed  than  of  fin- 
 ning ;  but  thefe  Marks  of  God's  Difpleafure  were 
 left  on  him  for  our  fake,  that  we  might  have  a  vi- 
 lible  Remembrancer  of  what  Sin  deferves.  If  the 
 Inftruments  of  the  Temptation  were  thus  ufed,  we 
 may  be  fure  the  principal  Ador  did  not  efcape  the 
 Vengeance  of  God. 
 
 But  idly.  If  we  fuppofe  the  Devil  poffeffed  the 
 Serpent,  and  was  as  it  were  incarnate  in  it  ,*  we 
 may  have  leave  to  think  that  the  Power  of  God 
 could  unite  them  as  clofely  as  our  Souls  and  Bodies 
 are  joined,  and  caufe  the  Punifhment  inflided  on 
 the  literal  Serpent  to  affed:  Satan  in  it,  as  well  as 
 the  Injuries  done  our  Bodies  do  reach  our  Souls ;  at 
 lead  while  that  very  Serpent  was  in  Being. 
 
 ^dly,  Inafmuch  as  the  Literal  Senfe  does  not  ex- 
 clude the  Mydical,  the  Curfing  of  the  Serpent  is 
 a  Symbol  to  us,  and  a  vifible  pledge  of  the  Ma- 
 ledidion  with  which  the  Devil  is  ftruck  by  God, 
 and  whereby  he  is  become  the  mod-  abominable 
 and  miferable  of  Creatures.  The  Serpent's  being 
 confin'd  to  go  on  his  Belly,  points  out  to  us  the 
 wretchcdncfs  of  that  Condition  to  which  the  Devil 
 is  reduced  :  his  eating  Duft,  the  blading  of  all  his 
 
 En- 
 
(  73  ) 
 
 Enjoyments,  and  debarring  him  from  all  thofe 
 Pleafures  that  flow  from  the  Right-hand  of  God ; 
 being  thrown  below  the  Feet  of  ail  other  Creatures, 
 to  be  trampled  by  them ;  that  is  to  be  confin'd  to 
 the  loweft,  vileft  and  moft  miferable,  as  well  as 
 mod:  contemptible  Eflate.  And  to  the  Serpent's 
 'Enmity  with  Man,  it  needs  no  great  pains  to  ap- 
 ply it  to  the  Devil.  It  is  plain  he  is  continually  lay- 
 ing Snares  for  us^  he  lies  in  Ambufli  and  furprifes 
 us ;  he  wounds  us  in  our  PaiTions  and  lower  Facul- 
 ties, and  by  thefe  fometimes  reaches  our  Souls : 
 tho'  that  can  never  be,  if  we  don't  confent  to  it» 
 and  by  that  make  it  our  own  Ad.  But  Man  by 
 the  help  of  the  Seed  of  the  Womm,  that  is  by  our  Sa- 
 viour, fhall  bruife  his  head,  wound  him  in  the  place 
 that  is  mofl  mortal,  and  finally  confound  and  de- 
 ftroy  him  with  eternal  ruin.  In  the  mean  time  the 
 enmity  and  abhorrence  we  hive  of  the  Serpent  is  a 
 continual  warning  to  us  of  the  danger  we  are  in  from 
 the  Devil,  and  now  heartily  we  ought  to  hate  and 
 abhor  him  and  all  his  works. 
 
 zdly.  As  to  the  Woman,  her  Punifhment  confifts 
 of  two  Parts,  ift,  in  the  Pains  of  Child-bearing,  v. 
 1(5.  of  Ch.  5.  And  to  the  Woman  he  faid  [  will  greatly 
 multiply  thy  Sorrow  and  thy  Conception.  In  Sorrow 
 thoH  jjjalt  bring  forth  Children.  This  wa>  a  very  juft 
 and  proper  Puniihment.  She  had  brought  Sorrow 
 and  Death  on  all  her  Pofteriry,  and  in  bringing 
 ■Tihem  forth  it  was  but  reafonable  ihe  fliould  fuffer 
 fomething  of  what  they  v/ere  to  fuffer  all  their 
 Lives :  And  it  is  continued  on  all  thofe  that  de- 
 fcend  from  her,  as  an  Item  and  Memorandum  of 
 the  Mifchief  brought  on  Mankind  by  Sin.  By  this 
 ihe  and  her  Defcendants  may  learn  how  much  God 
 abhors  Difobedience,  and  it  is  a  Pledge  to  them  of 
 God's  Anger  againfl:  the  Guilty. 
 
 The  zd  part  of  her  Punifhment  is  in  thefe  Words 
 in  the  fame  Verfcj  Thy  dejire  JJyall  be  to  thj  Hnsband, 
 
 and 
 
(74) 
 
 afi(^  he  Pjallrnk  over  thee.  This  too  was  a  moft  reafo- 
 nable  Sentence,  and  proportionable  to  her  Sin.  Her 
 Offence  was  an  Attempt  to  be  judge  of  Good  and 
 Evil  for  herfelf,  to  be  her  own  Miftrefs  and  depend 
 no  more  on  God  for  her  Government.  Inftcad  of 
 attaining  her  Defign,  God  makes  her  fubjed  to 
 her  Husband;  places  thofe  Defires  and  Inclinations  on 
 him  which  fhe  had  withdrawn  from  God,  and  con- 
 ftitutes  him  her  Ruler  and  Head.  By  this  llie  and 
 her  whole  Sex  became  Subjeds,  and  depend  on  the 
 froward  Will  of  thofe  Husbands  flie  had  corrupted  ; 
 being  oblig'd  to  endure  not  only  the  Miferies  of  her 
 own  choice,  but  likewife  a  Share  in  thofe  of  her  Huf- 
 bands.  This  is  a  Demonf^ration  to  us  of  the  Folly  of 
 an  Attempt  to  judge  of  Good  and  Evil  for  ourfelves. 
 and  the  great  Abhorrence  God  has  of  Sin,  fince  he 
 avenges  it  not  only  on  the  Perfon  immediately 
 guilty,  but  extends  the  Punillimcnc  to  the  whole 
 Sex. 
 
 As  to  the  Man,  his  Puniiliment  confifts  in  the 
 following  Particulars,  ift,  v.  17.     Bccaufe   thou  haji 
 hearkened  unto  the  Voice  of  thy  Wife,    and  haft  eaten 
 of  the  Tree  of  which  I  commanded  thee  frying,  Thott 
 (halt  not  eat  of  it,   turfed  is  the  Ground  fir  thy  fake. 
 In  forrow  jlmlt  thou  cat  oj  it  all  the  Days  of  thy  Life, 
 This  Punifhment  is  rightly  adapted   to  Man's  Sin. 
 He  would  not  be  content  with  the  Meat  God  had 
 provided  for  him,  which    the  Earth  of  itfelf  fur- 
 nifh'd  him  by  God's  Appointment,  therefore  God 
 decreed  that  it  fhould  do  fo  no  more,    but    Man 
 ihould  be  put  to  force  his  Food  out  of  it,  and  pro- 
 vide for  himfelf  with  Labour  and  Toil,  with  tha 
 Sweat  of  his  Brows  and  the  Anguilli  of  his  Heart. 
 By  this  we  may  underftand  how  much  better  it  had 
 been  to  have  left  the  provifion  of  Suffenance  for  us 
 to    God,  and  to  tiepend  on  him  for  ir,  as  well  as 
 for  the  Governmenrj    of  our  Adions.      Since  we 
 
 would 
 
(  7S  ) 
 
 would  not  do  the  latter,  God  har  icfLifed  to  do  the 
 former  for  us. 
 
 The  id  p.irt  of  God's  Sentence  pgainfl:  Man,  is 
 the  Condemnation  of  him  to  temporal  Death,  v. 
 19.  ofCh.  5.  For  Dufl  thou  art-,  and  unto  Daft  i ho n 
 /halt  retuuj.  'Twas  obferv'd  before  that  Man  by 
 his  natural  Conftiturion  was  JMortal,  and  that  it 
 was  only  by  the  efpecial  Favour  of  God,  that  he 
 was  to  be  preferv'd  from  Death.  Since  therefore 
 he  had  forfeited  that  Favour,  he  muft  of  courfe 
 fink  into  his  native  mortality.  It  was  not  neceffary 
 thac  God  lliould  alter  his  Nature  or  Conftitution 
 to  make  him  Mortal,  there  needed  no  more  but 
 taking  away  the  means  of  Immortality,  the  ufe  of 
 the  Tree  of  Life,  to  fubjcft  him  to  Death  ;  and 
 the  ufe  of  it  was  no  ways  due  to  his  Nature  :  God 
 therefore  did  him  no  Injuftice  by  depriving  him 
 and  his  Poftericy  of  Paradife  and  the  ufe  of  the 
 Tree  of  Life,  thefe  being  matters  of  Favour,  and 
 we  entitled  to  them  only  on  this  condition,  that 
 our  firft  Parents  fhould  continue  in  Obedience  to 
 God.  This  withdrawing  of  God's  Favour  is  a 
 great  and  dreadful  Punilhment,  but  far  from  In- 
 juftice, becaufe  it  takes  nothing  from  us  that  was 
 due  to  our  Natnre,  and  leives  us  ftill  in  a  condi- 
 tion preferable  to  not  being  at  all,  which  is  as  much 
 as  God  in  ftridnefs  of  Juftice  is  obliged  to  do  for 
 any  Creature.  Thus  we  find  ourfelvcs  fubjefted  to 
 the  Difpleafure  and  Wrath  of  God  by  our  defcenc 
 from  Adam,  fo  far  as  to  prevail  with  God  to  with- 
 draw from  us  his  peculiar  Favours  that  he  defign'd 
 for  us,  if  our  firft  Parents  had  continued  in  their 
 Obedience,  the  confequence  of  which  is  that  we 
 become  fubied  to  Pains  and  Miferies,  to  Sicknefs 
 and  temporal  Death. 
 
 But  2,dly.  The  Souls  of  Men  are  immortal,  and 
 capable  of  Mifery  or  Happinefs  after  this  Life, 
 and  the  Tranfgremon  of  Adam  does    like  wife   af- 
 
 Q.  q  fea 
 
(76) 
 
 h6t  ihem,  and  they  become  liable  to  Damnation 
 on  account  thereof.  It  feems  indeed  hard  that 
 God's  Anger  fhould  reach  (o  far  as  to  deprive  all 
 Mankind  of  eternal  Happinefs  for  the  Sin  of  one, 
 but  if  we  confider  Man  as  a  free  Agent,  we  ll^all 
 find  that  eternal  Happinefs  is  not  abfolutely  due 
 to  him,  but  only  the  poffibility  thereof:  and  if 
 God  has  not  deprived  us  of  that  poffibility,  he 
 has  done  us  no  Injuflice.  And  it  appears  from  the 
 very  Hiftory  of  Man's  Fall,  that  God  has  not 
 done  that :  for  he  has  enter'd  into  new  Terms  of 
 Salva:ion  with  us,  and  has  intimated  them,  tho' 
 obfcurely,  in  the  5d  Ch.  and  15th  ver.  when  he 
 declares  that  the  Seed  of  the  Woman  fiall  bruife  the 
 He  i'.d  of  the  Serpent,  Signifying  thereby  that  Man- 
 kind fhould  not  defpair.  For  notwithftanding  the 
 Devil  had  got  an  Advantage  over  thcro,  yet  by 
 the  means  of  Chrill  they  fhould  finally  conquer 
 and  vanquilh  him.  And  the  World  was  fo  far  pof- 
 feffed  with  the  belief  of  the  poUibiliry  of  a  Re- 
 conciliation with  God,  that  they  ihli  applied  to 
 him  with  Prayers  and  Sacrifices  j  and  he  gave 
 them  fufficient  Proof,  that  his  Mercy  towards 
 them  was  not  quite  extinft,  and  that  he  fHU  con- 
 tinued his  Goodnefs  to  the  wicked  PoRerity  of 
 wicked  Parents.  Hence  St.  Paul  ob(erves,  ^^s 
 14.  16.  That  tho'  God  in  Times  pafi  Jujfer'd  all  Na- 
 tiom  to  ivalk^  in  their  oa^n  ways,  yet  he  left  not  himjelf 
 without  iVitnefs  in  that  he  did  Good,  and  qave  Hi  Ram 
 from  Heaven^  and  fruitful  Seajons,  filing  our  Heart  i 
 with  Food  and  Gladnefs, 
 
 But  5dly.  We  may  conceive  a  double  Happi- 
 nefs, firu,  that  which  is  abfolute  and  perfeft,  ac- 
 cording to  the  utmofl  Capacity  of  the  Creature  that 
 enjoys  it.  zdly.  That  which  is  better  than  not 
 to  be,  but  yet  is  mix'd  with  Sufferings,  and  may 
 come  as  much  fhort  of  perfeft  BlefTednefs  as  our 
 prefenc  State  is  dillant  from  perfed  Eafc  and  Plea- 
 
 fure. 
 
(77) 
 
 fure.  The  latter  of  thefe  is  due  injufticeto  every 
 Being  that  God  has  made,  if  they  have  not  for- 
 feited their  Title  by  Sin.  But  the  firft  of  thefe  is 
 a  Favour  that  God  may  beftovv  on  whom  he  p!ca- 
 fes,  or  with-hold  from  them  upon  other  Confide- 
 rations  befides  guilt.  The  Sin  of  our  firft  Pa- 
 rents is  fuch  a  Motive  as  has  induced  God  to  de- 
 ny it  to  all  the  Poft^rity  of  u4dam,  however  adu- 
 aliy  Innocent.  And  this  is  a  great  Indication  of 
 his  Difpleafure  toward  them.  Upon  this  Account 
 the  moft  innocent  Children  are  eternally  banifhed 
 Heaven,  and  deprived  of  the  Prefence  of  God, 
 which  may  juftly  be  reckon'd  an  eternal  fpiritual 
 Death,  when  compared  with  the  Pleafures  and 
 Happinefs  that  otherwife  they  would  have  enjoy- 
 ed. For  tho'  we  cannot  fay  of  them,  that  it  had 
 been  better  for  them  never  to  have  been,  yec 
 their  Life  may  truly  be  reckon'd  a  Hell  compa- 
 tively  to  what  they  might  have  expefted  if  their 
 firft  Parents  had  not  offended,  and  brought  this 
 Punifhment  upon  their  Defcendant^-.  Tho*  this 
 may  feem  to  be  very  hard  on  Infants  that  never 
 adually  finned,  yet  it  cannot  be  called  unjuft,  be- 
 caufe  they  are  not  deprived  of  any  thing  that 
 was  abfolutely  due  to  their  Nature,  but  only  of 
 thofe  Favours  that  God  might  have  denied  them 
 on  other  Confiderations  befides  that  of  their  per- 
 fonal  guilt.  Neither  doth  this  infer  any  third  Stare 
 for  Souls  after  Death,  but  only  a  Difference  among 
 fuch  as  are  condemned  to  Hell.  There  is  fuch  a 
 Difference  acknowledged  in  the  State  of  the  Blef- 
 fed,  where  all  are  happy  according  to  their  feveral 
 Ca  laciries,  and  fo  it  is  in  Hell,  where  all  are  mi- 
 ferablc  if  compared  with  the  Condition  of  the  Blef- 
 fed,  but  in  different  degrees;  and  as  in  this  Life 
 fome  are  fo  unfortunate  that  it  were  better  for 
 them  not  to  be  at  all,  than  to  continue  always  in 
 the  State  m  which  they  are ;  fo  in  Hell  there  may  be 
 Q  q  2  fome 
 
(78) 
 
 fome  whofc  Condition  is  preferable  to  not  be- 
 ing; tho'  for  yadiis  and  luch  Sinners  it  had  been 
 better  they  had  never  been. 
 
 The  ^d  part  of  Man's  Punillinienc  v/a*?  rjiat  with- 
 drawing of  the  extraordinary  Grace  of  God  from 
 him,  that  was  rc.idy  to  guide  and  direct  him  in  all 
 his  Actions,    and  leaving    h:rn  to    his   own   Power 
 and  Faculties  to   conducl  and  (upport  him.     So  1 
 underftand    the    izd  v.  of  the  ^d    Ch.      u4nd  the 
 Lord  God  faidy    Behold  the   Alan  is  become  as  one  of 
 us  to  k^oiv    Good   and  Evil.     And   now   leajl  he  put 
 forth  his  Hand  and  take  aljo  cf  the  Tree  of  Life  and 
 eat  and  live  for   ever.     Therefore  the  Lord  God  fent 
 him  forth  jrom  the  Garden  of  Eden.     Some  take  this 
 for   an  Ironical  Speech,  whereby  God  mocked  and 
 upbraided  Man  for  his  Folly  ;    But  I  larher  rhink  it, 
 a  declaration  of  the  Divine  Will :  for  fin ce  Man  had 
 taken  on  him  to  choofe  for  himfelf  and  to  judge  what 
 was  good  and  evil  for  him  without  confulting  his 
 Maker,  therefore  God  re(olv'd  to  deprive  him  of  the 
 fupernatural  Aflilhnce  he  defign'd  to  afford  him,  and 
 leave  him  to  his  natural  Faculties  to  guide  and  direft 
 huii ;  li  t  him  be  as  it  were  his  own  God,  and  enjoy  the 
 liuit  of  his  choice.    To  this  purpofe  he  deprived  him 
 of  the  ufeof  the  Tree  of  Life,  drove  him  out  of  the 
 Garden  where  it  was,  and  fenced  it  againft  him.i 
 
 The  effeAs  of  Man's  bein£J  left  to  his  own  Pow- 
 ers  and  Faculties  for  his  diredion  and  lupport  are 
 many  and  fatal.  'Tis  eafy  to  fiiew  that  from 
 hence  come  all  the  Errors  and  Follies  of  our  lives. 
 For  our  Underftandings  being  finite,  wc  are  eve- 
 ry moment  at  a  lofs,  we  are  forced  in  moft  things 
 to  guefs,  and  being'  unable  to  find  Truth,  are 
 frequently  miftaken.  From  the  fame*  come  all  the 
 Sins,  Corruptions  and  Crimes  that  overwhelm  the 
 World.  I  or  being  left  to  our  choice,  we  not 
 only  midakc,  but  choofe  amifs.  One  Error  or  Sin 
 makes  way  for  another ;  we  proceed  daily  in  Cor- 
 
 rupti- 
 
(79  ) 
 
 ruption,  and  the  Infeftion  fpreads  as  the  World  grows 
 older,  Cuftom,  Education  and  Company  do  all  con- 
 tribute to  make  us  worfe  and  worfe;  And  in  nothing 
 of  this  God  is  to  be  blamed :  we  bring  them  on  our 
 felves,  and  they  are  not  to  be  prevented  without  a 
 Miracle,  which  none  can  fay,  God  is  obliged  to  work 
 for  us.  We  may  accufe  ourfelves  and  one  another  for 
 our  temporal  and  eternal  Evils,  but  muft  acquit  God 
 who  has  done  us  no  Injuftice.  He  has  allowed  us  a 
 poilibility  of  Happinefs,  as  has  been  obferv'd  before, 
 and  we  by  our  Sins  make  our  felves  incapable  of  it. 
 As  to  the  Children  that  die  before  they  come  to 
 choofe,  we  may  be  fure  God  will  deal  juftly  with 
 them,  and  put  a  great  difference  between  them  and 
 aftual  Sinners.  It  is  Mifery  and  Hell  enough  for  them 
 to  be  depriv'd  of  thofe  Felicities  to  which  they  could 
 not  pretend  but  by  the  Favour  of  God,  and  to  be  fub- 
 jededto  thofe  Sufferings  that  ballance  their  Bein^  and 
 hinder  their  Lives  from  being  a  blelHng  to  them. 
 They  are  the  feed  of  Rebells  and  Tray  tors  and  can- 
 not expeft  any  fpecial  Favour  from  God. 
 
 Thus  I  have  gone  thro'  the  Hiftory  of  the  Fall 
 of  Man,  and  fhewed  you  the  Confiftency  and  Rea- 
 fonablenels  of  the  account  the  Scripture  gives  of  ir. 
 Nor  ought  we  to  depart  from  the  Letter  thereof^ 
 fince  the  matter  of  fad  is  plain,  that  Man  is  cor- 
 rupted, that  the  literal  Underflanding  of  the  Scrip- 
 ture accounts  for  it,  and  no  other  Book  or  Record 
 gives  any  tolerable  reafon  for  ir. 
 
 I  might  draw  many  ufeful  Obfervations  from 
 what  I  have  faid,  but  I  fhall  content  my  felf  with 
 two. 
 
 Tfl.  You  may  fee  from  this  that  God  did  not 
 think  it  fit  that  Man  fhould  be  abfolutely  happy 
 in  the  State  of  Innocency  with^nt  Revealed  Religion , 
 and  the  ufe  of  Sacraments.  For  the  difcovery  of 
 what  was  Good  and  Evil  was  to  proceed  from  a  con- 
 tinued Cornmunication  of  Divine  Wifdom,  which 
 
 v/ould 
 
(8o) 
 
 would  have  been  equivalent  to  a  Revelation  ;  and  the 
 Trees  of  Knowledge  and  of  jLife  were  truly  Sacra- 
 mental; they  were  outward  and  vifible  Signs,  and 
 means   of  Grare,    which    is    the  true  notion  of  a 
 Sacrament.     And  then  judge  wirh  your  felves  what 
 Pride    and    Folly    it    is   for  any  in   this  corrupted 
 liftare    to  pretend   that  they  are  too   fpiritual   for 
 fuch,  or  that  they  need  them  not  in  order  to  Com- 
 munion with  God.     M;in  in  his  State  of  Perfedion 
 needed   them,    how    much    more   mufl:  we  in  our 
 Drefent  condition  of  Corruption  and  Averfion   from 
 God  ?  Let  us  not  therefore  defpife  or  a  )u'e  them. 
 Death  was  the  Confequence  of  the  violation  of  the 
 facramental    Tree    in   my    Text,    and  the  fame   is 
 threatned   as    the   PuiiiQiment   of  our    abufing  the 
 Chriftinn    Sacraments,    i    Or.    ii.    29.      He  that 
 eateth  and   drinketh    ttnworthilyj    e.iteth  aud   drinkcth 
 'Damnation  to  himfilf,  not  difcermn^^  the  Lord's  Body. 
 For  this   caufe   m^nj  are  weak,  <^nd  fichhj  arnong  you, 
 and  many  Jleep.     The  ne.^le6ling  of  them  is  no  Icrfs 
 penal,    Joh.  3.  5.     Except  a  Man  be  born  of  J  Vat  er 
 and  of  the   Spirit,  he  cant  enter  into  the  Kingdom  of 
 Heaven.  And  Joh.    5.    55.     Except  jc  eat  tk:e  Flefh 
 of  the  Son  of  Man   and  drinks  his  Blood,  ye   have  no 
 Lfe  in  you.      Thefe  are  exprefly  ofFer'd  to  us  in 
 ths  Sacrament  of  the   Lord's  Supper,     and  we  are 
 fure  in  that  the  faithful  feed  on  them.     And  tho' 
 their  feedmg  may  not  be  confined  to  the  ufe  of  the 
 outward  Elements  yet  whoever  rcjed:;  them,  debars 
 liimfelf  of   the   (Diritual    Food    communicated   by 
 them,  for  whsn   God  has   appointed  Means  to  ob- 
 tain a  Bleffing,  it  is  reafonable  to  believe  that  he  will 
 never  grant   it  to   thofe   who    ne^leCl  or  contemn 
 them. 
 
 But  idly,  as  it  is  a  great  Folly  to  defpife  the 
 Sacraments,  fo  it  is  much  greater  madnefs  to  think 
 of  Hap,:)inefs  without  revealed  ReMgion.  It  is  plain 
 we  have    a   profpeA  and  eager  deiire   of  a  future 
 
 Life, 
 
(8i  ) 
 
 Life,  and  in  mmy   Circumflanccs  there  is  nothing 
 bnc  that  hope  can  make  the  prelent  tolerable  to  us; 
 But  natural  Religion   can  neither  give  us  any  cer- 
 tain   clear  Security   of  it,    nor  meaas   to    attain  it. 
 Pvcvealed  gives  both,  and  the  view  is  to  comforta- 
 ble to  a  good  Man,  and  fo   ufeful    to  the    World, 
 that    it  feems   to   be  an    Imitation  of  the  Devil's 
 Spite  and  Malice  to  go  about  ro  deprive   us  of  it. 
 'Tis  this  hope  only  can  make  all  Men  equally  hr.p- 
 py  and  fend  the    Poor,   the    unfortunate  as   to  the 
 Cir.umftances  of  this    World-    and    the  opprelTed, 
 to   bed   as   contented    as  the  greateft  Prince.     *Tis 
 this    only    that    can    mike    us    chearfully    difpenfe 
 with    the    Miferies  and    Hardships    of    Life,    and 
 think  of  Death  with    Comfort.     Except  therefore 
 thefe  Patrons  of  natural   Religion   can  Ihev/  as  fure 
 and  effe(5lu3l  means  to  comfort  us  on  thefe  Occa- 
 fions    as    Revealed   Religion  affords    us,    they   are 
 fpiteful   and  unreafona'de;   for    they    go    about  to 
 take  from  us  that   which  gives   us   patience  in  our 
 Sicknefs,  relief  in  our  Dilbeffes,  and  hope  in  our 
 Death;  and  offer    us   nothing  in  lieu   of  it.     If  a 
 Mm    be   oppreffed   by   his  Enemies,  if  he    be  in 
 Sicknefs,     Pain  or   Anguilli,   if  the    Agonies    and 
 Terrors    of  Death  approach    liim,    what  Comfort 
 or  Support  can  he  have  without  Religion?    What 
 a  difmal  thing  mufl  it  i-e  to  tell  a  Man  that  there 
 is  no  Help,  no  Hope  for  him,   to  bid  him  defpair 
 and   die,  and   there  is  an  end  of  him.     Such  Re- 
 fieftioHS  may  make  a  Man  fullen,  mad,  curfe  him- 
 felf  and  natu  e;  but  can  never  give  him  any  Sa- 
 tisfadion  without  a  well-grounded  hope  of  a  blefl- 
 ed  Immortality.      Now  only  Revelation   can  give 
 the  generality  of  Mankind,    efpecially  the  unphi- 
 lofophical    part  of  it,    who  are  not  capable  of  long 
 or  fubtle  Reafoning,  fuch  a  clear  and  well-grounded 
 hope.     For    we  may  add    to  this  that  if  we  take 
 natural  Religion  with  all  the  Advantages  that  Rea- 
 
 fon 
 
(  8i  ) 
 
 fon  can  give  it,  yet  the  Rewards  and  Punifliments 
 difcbverable  by  it  are  not  io  clear  or  determined 
 as  to  be  a  fumcient  Encouragement  to  fuch  as  are 
 good,  or  difcouragement  to  the  Evil.  Revealed 
 Religion  ferves  all  thefe  ends,  and  therefore  we 
 ought  firmly  to  adhere  to  it,  and  not  hearken  to 
 "Wicked  and  unreafonable  Men,  or  fufFer  them  to 
 wreft  it  out  of  our  Hands.  It  is  our,  foy,  our 
 Comfort  and  our  Life  ;  it  carries  us  beyond  Death 
 and  fecures  our  eternal  Felicity,  [uftice,  and  Cha- 
 rity, and  Peace  are  the  Fruits  of  it  here*  and  Glo- 
 ry hereafter. 
 
 INDEX 
 
I    INDEX  to  the  NOTES. 
 
 A. 
 
 Bfolute  Infinity  what  it  is.  —  pag.  15.99-  100. 
 ^  Abfolute  Neccffity  an  abfurd  Term  20,  21,22. 
 cannot  be  the  ground  of  the  Divine  Exiflence,  tb, 
 and  74.  JS^^^'  ^^^  ^^"^^  ^s  Caufe  ib.  cannot 
 be  applied  to  the  Relations  of  things  294.  298. 
 302.  304.  inconfiftent  with  the  Divine  Freedom 
 and  diverfity  of  Attributes,  52,  53.  cannot  be 
 urg'd  a  -priori,  ib, 
 
 AbftraU  Ideas  what.  5.  of  Subftances,  Modes  and 
 Relations  5,  6,  7.  how  made  tb.  not  form'd  by  A- 
 nalogy  8.  have  no  objeclive  reality  5.  8.  arepofi- 
 tive  and  adequate.  7. 
 
 Accidents  how  to  be  diftinguifh'd  from  Subftance.  3. 
 
 ABion  twofold  234,  255.  cannot  be  necefTary  in  either 
 fenfe.  ib.  whether  all  human  Liberty  confifls  in  it 
 232.  233.  246,  ^c. 
 
 ABive  Powers  two  231.232.  244. 
 
 Adam  whether  naturally  mortal  147,  148.  170. 
 21 1,  2 12.  whether  his  Pov/ers  were  different  from 
 thole  of  his  Poflerity  ib.  and  406.  The  Scheme  of 
 Providence  in  his  Fall.  406,  407,  Gfc.  464,  465. 
 His  Happinefs  not  io  great  as  that  which  is  attain- 
 able by  us.  /J.66,  467,  ^c. 
 
 Agents  free,  the  necefiity  for  fuch  in  the  World.  389. 
 
 R  r  Alteration 
 
INDEX. 
 
 AlteratioUy  there  can  be  no  partial  one  in  this  Syftem 
 for  the  better.  139,  163,  ^c.  a  total  one  incon- 
 ceivable ibid.  The  fame  may  be  lliewn  in  the 
 moral  World.  476 — 483. 
 
 Alternati'-ce  of  Good  and  Evil  neceflary  to  improve 
 our  Happinefs.  124,  125.  444,  ^c.  If  we  were 
 incapable  of  the  one  we  could  not  attain  to  fo 
 high  a  Degree  of  the  other,  //>.  and  412.  446,  ^c, 
 a  general  Anfwer  to  J5i7)'/f's  Objedions,  411,  ^c. 
 
 Analogy  not  to  be  apply'd  to  the  whole  Nature  of  the 
 Divine  Attributes,  but  only  to  xht  Modus  oi  thtm. 
 88,89 — 9^-  applicable  to  the  Tr/Vz/Zy.  116,  117, 
 118.  to  Prefcience  440. 
 
 Angels  J  why  we  were  not  made  as  perfcdl  as  they. 
 134.  136.  whether  they  ftill  have  freedom  of 
 "Will.  398,  399.  fome  Reafons  why  their  Fall 
 might  be  permitted.  406,  ^c.  449.  477.  vide 
 Fall. 
 
 Antecedent  NecefTity  not  the  ground  of  the  Divine 
 Exiftence.  32.  y^,  76.  Nor  of  the  Relations  of 
 things  294.  296.  302.  The  very  fame  as  Caufe. 
 75.  in  no  fenie  capable  of  being  conlider'd  a  pri- 
 ori, ibid,  and  52,  53.  Whether  any  Relations  of 
 things  are  properly  antecedent  to  the  Will  of  God. 
 300,301,  e?c. 
 
 Anxiety,  in  what  Senfe  it  may  be  faid  to  determine 
 the  Will.  247.  does  not  determine  it  phyfically. 
 232,  233.  generally  confequent  upon  its  determi- 
 nation. 253,  254. 
 
 Appetites^  may  be  oppofed  and  overcome  by  the  Will 
 alone.  330.337. 
 
 Arbitrary  in  what  Senfe  the  Divine  Will  is  fo.  78. 
 288.  302,  303.  311.   this   inconfiilent  with  the 
 
 Notion 
 
I  N  D  E  X. 
 
 Notion  of  abfoluce  antecedent  Neceflity.  77,78. 
 
 AriUiment  apriort^  cannot  be  applied  to  the  Divine 
 Being.  52,  53.  c^^,  56.  74,  y^^.  in  what  Senfe  the 
 Author  agues  apriori.  63. 
 
 Attributes  of  God  primary  and  fecondary.  49  how 
 we  get  our  Ideas  of  them.  39,  90.  not  from  Analo- 
 gy. 90,91.  —  TOO.  Not  capable  of  being  proved 
 a  priori.  52.  74.  305. 
 
 B. 
 
 Bting  of  God,  proof  of  it.  46,  47. 
 
 Beincrs,  whether  all  ought  to  have  been  created  at 
 
 iirll  in  the  higheft  Degree  they  are  capable  of.  121. 
 
 131.  Arguments   for  the   affirmative.    123,   124. 
 
 Anfwer.    125. —  12S.    Scale  of  them,   131,  132. 
 
 142. 
 Body  mufl:  neceflarily  affc61:  the  Soul.  173. — 181.  its 
 
 Pains  unavoidable   idid 
 Bounds,    why  we  can  fet  none  to  Space^   Number, 
 
 Duration,  &c,  12,  13,  14.  this  does  not  infer  their 
 
 ublolute  Infinity,  ibid. 
 
 C. 
 
 Cahe?iifls,  tlie  confequences  of  their  believing  them- 
 felves  to  be  necefiarily  determin'd.  411, 
 
 Chance^  the  Will  not  determin'd  by  it.  397,  398. 
 the  Author's  notion  of  Liberty  different  from  it, 
 
 337>  ^^^'■• 
 Change^  every  one  requires  a  Caufe,  73.  There  cou'd 
 
 be  none  in  this  Syftem.   139,  163. 
 
 R  r  2  Chafm, 
 
INDEX, 
 
 Cbafrnt  none  in  the  Chain  of  Beings   132.  143. 
 
 Choice^  mofl  of  our  happinefs  confifts  in  it.  239,  240, 
 &c.  is  under  limitations  as  to  its  Exercife.  240, 
 241.  275,  276.  261.  the  Foundation  of  all  Merit. 
 
 279,  280. 
 
 ClaJ/es  of  Beings  down  from  God  to  nothing,  i-^i. 
 132.  llluftration  of  it.  132.  157,  158.  the  neceffi- 
 ty  for  fuch.  142,  143,  144.  442,  443.  Anfwer  to 
 Bayies  Obje(flion.  /<!?.  and  445,  &s. 
 
 Comparifons^  the  impropriety  of  thofc  of  B ay Ic  con- 
 cerning Free- Will.  483 — 487. 
 
 Compulfion^  freedom  from  it  not  fufficient  to  confli- 
 tute  moral  Liberty.  23  i — 232. 
 
 Confcience  of  Guilt  and  Mifery  very  diftincfl  percep- 
 tions. 327,  328,  329.  'tis  impoflible  to  have  a  guil- 
 ty Confcience  without  Liberty,  ih,  the  Confci- 
 ence of  having  ufed  our  Liberty  aright  is  the  fource 
 of  all  our  moral  Happinefs.  411,412. 
 
 Co ?iJcioi{JheJs  of  l^ihtny  proves  that  we  are  abfolutely 
 free.  251.  324.  349.  whether  all  Men  have  it.  411. 
 
 ConJ'equences  of  certain  Adlions  not  fufficient  to  ex- 
 cufc  the  doing  of  them.  463,  &c. 
 
 Contingency  as  certain  to  the  Divine  Knowledge  as 
 Neceffity.  440. 
 
 Contingent  Actions  may  be  objedls  of  the  Divine 
 Knowledge.  440. 
 
 Continuance  an  abflrad:  Idea.  6.  how  acquired,  ibid. 
 
 Corruptibility  a  neceffary  confequence  of  Materiality. 
 146,  ^c.  168    170,  171. 
 
 Corruption  a  confequence  of  the  Fall.   146.  148.  170, 
 
 Creation  did  not  add  to  the  Divine  Happinefs  or  Per- 
 fection. ^8,  59.   why  no  fooner.  ibid,  the  Effect  of 
 
 Goodnefs. 
 
INDEX, 
 
 Goodnefs.  6i.  in  what  fenfe  it  was  indifferent  to 
 God.  299.  303, 
 Creatures  not  all  ^ made  for  the  ufe  of  Man.  131, 
 330.  but  for  each  others  Happinefs.  ib.  and  137, 
 139.  none  cou'd  be  abfolutely  perfecft.  1 15.  whe- 
 ther all  ought  to  have  been  made  equally  perfecft 
 121,  122.  131,  132,  &c.  139.447,  &c,  or  abfo- 
 lutely fix'd  in  any  Degree  of  Perfedion,  122,  123. 
 Objedions  anfwer'd.  ib.  alteration  and  encreafe  ne- 
 cefTary  to  their  Happinefs.  125,  126,  127.  447,Gf(r. 
 
 D. 
 
 Death  y  a  neceflary  Confequence  of  the  general  Laws 
 ,  of  Nature.  146.  168.  cou'd  not  have  been  pre- 
 vented naturally  in  Paradife.  147,  148.  170,  211, 
 212.  the  Fear  of  it  necefTary.  178,  197.  198.  of 
 great  benefit  to  the  World,  ib,  is  not  the  occafion 
 of  our  fondnefs  of  Life.  456,  &c. 
 
 DefeB^  whence  this  Evil  arifes    129,  130.  whether 
 all  Defed:  require  a  Caufe.  78,  79 
 
 Degree  infinite,  what  is  to  be  underflood  by  it.  99, 
 
 D^^r^^iof  Being  and  Perfection.  121,  122.  131,  132. 
 Necefiity  for  them.  142.  144.  447,  448. 
 
 JD^r/ founded  in  Choice.  279  395.  the  Pieafure  at- 
 tending it.  412. 
 
 Dejire  the  fame  with  volition.   156.  cannot  be  oppo- 
 fed  to  it.  157. 
 
 Devily  the  manner  in  which  he  may  influence  Man- 
 kind. 425,  &c. 
 
 Difeafes  unavoidable.   147.  174.  Pains  of  them  necef- 
 fary  in  the  prefent  State.    177.  179,  180. 
 
 Diftance  leffens  the  Effecfts  of  cither  Pleafures  or 
 
 Pains.  455,  ^c. 
 
 J)ivifibility  inconfiftent  with  Thought.  35,  36. 
 
 R  r  3  Duration 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Duration  an  abftracl  Idea.  6.  67,  68.  how  form'd. 
 ibid,  not  applicable  to  the  Deity.  68,  69.  inca- 
 pable of  ablolute  Infinity,  13,  14,  ^c.jq. 
 
 E. 
 
 Earth,  the  advantages  of  its  prefent  Figure.    187.  Si- 
 tuation, ibid.  Motion,  Inclination  of  its  Axis  and 
 Parallel ifm.  ibid,  and  1S8. 
 Earthquakes^  the  Caufes  of  them.   189,  190. 
 
 Ele^y  how  far  free.  398.  406  407.  the  reafon  of 
 the  Diflindion  between  them  and  the  reft  of  Man- 
 kind. 407.  449,  &c. 
 
 EleBion  makes  things  agreeable.  239,  240.  225.  372. 
 
 Effence  what,  6.  94.  ElTences  of  things  in  what  fenfe 
 arbitrary.  288. 
 
 Eternal.,  fomething  mufl  be  fo.  46,  47.  every  thing 
 cou'd  not  be  fo.  78.  this  Syflem  cou'd  not.  ibid. 
 and  23  24.  whether  the  Matter  of  it  was  fo  an 
 iifelels  Controverfv.  ibid. 
 
 Eterjjal  "Truths,  the  meaningofthcfe  words,  85.  289. 
 in  what  fenfe  the  Relations  of  things  are  fo.  303. 
 
 Eternity  not  made  up  of  fncceffive  Duration.  66,  67. 
 nor  inllantaneous. .  69.  the  meaning  of  that  Attri- 
 bute. 66  69.  'ji. 
 
 Evil  natural  and  moral,  the  Diflindion  between 
 them.  318.  one  a  confequencc  of  the  other.  49. 
 83.  376.  how  far  either  is  predominant  in  the 
 World.   3  19,  320. 
 
 Evil  Principle,    the  manichean  notion  of  it,   104, 
 
 105.  The  abfurdity   of  fuch  a  fuppofition,     105, 
 
 106,  107.  Does  not  anfwer  the  End  prqpofed  by 
 it,   III,  IJ.2,  113.  Th^  Creation  cannot  be  owing 
 
 to 
 
INDEX. 
 
 to  it.  105.  The  Argument  for  it  propofed  at  length. 
 
 108,  109. 
 Evils  of  Life^  whether  they  ever  exceed  the  Benefits 
 
 of  it.  210.  whether   they  generally  do    fo.  454. 
 
 459.  472,  473,  &c.  Natural  ones  infeparable  from 
 
 Matter.  146.  172,  173. 
 Exijience,  our  own  felf-evident.  63.  the  abfurdity  of 
 
 attempting  to  prove  it.  ib. 
 Expanfion  cannot  be  applied  to  the  Deity.  37.  either 
 
 carries  the  fame  Idea  with  Extenfion  or  none  at  all. 
 
 ibid. 
 Experience,  whether  we  have  any  of  Liberty.  324, 
 
 325.357-  .  .0. 
 
 Extenfion  not  applicable  to  the  Deity.   28,  29.  nor  to 
 
 any  immaterial  Being.  33,  34,  ^c.  incapable  of 
 
 Simplicity  or  abfolute  Infinity.  ibi(,i. 
 
 F. 
 
 Faculties  fitted  to  the  Natures  of  things,   164,   165. 
 
 295. 
 iw//of  Man,  confequences  of  it.  211,  212.  Authors 
 
 -that  treat  of  it,    222.    Neceffity  for    it   in    the 
 
 Scheme  of  Providence.  406,  407,  408.  447,  448, 
 
 ^c,  the  advantages  arifing  to  Mankind  from  it, 
 
 ibid,  and  to  the  whole  Creation.  408.  448,  449, 
 
 ^c.  Objections  anfwer'd  ibid,  and  464,  465,  ^r. 
 
 Fear  of  Death  necefiary.  178.  197,  198.  of  great 
 benefit  to  the  World,  ib.  a  proof  that  Life  is  very 
 defireable.   454,  ^c. 
 
 Fermentation  the  Caufe  of  Earthquakes,  Storms, 
 Thunder,  ^c>  189^  190,  191,  the  neceflity  for 
 it.  ibid. 
 
 R  r  4  pigure 
 
INDEX.       ' 
 
 Figure  of  the  Earth,   the  advantages,  of  the  prefent 
 
 i87._ 
 Fit  in  itfelf^  an  improper  ExprefTion.  20,   21.  what 
 it  fhoii'd  mean.  84,  85. 
 
 Fitnefs  of  things^  what  this  ought  to  mean.  50.  84. 
 303.  a  relative  Term.  21.  84.  in  what  fenfe  eter- 
 nal and  immutable.  /^.  and  302,  303,  304.  in  no 
 fenfe  antecedent  to  the  Will  of  God.  ib.  and  293, 
 &c.  "jide  Relations. 
 
 F//^^  of  things  to  Faculties.   164,   165.  295. 
 
 Forek?20ivledge  an  improper  term  when  apply 'd  to  the 
 Deity.  72.440. 
 
 Freedom  of  God,  proofs  of  it.  47.  of  Man  348,  ^c, 
 vide  Liberty. 
 
 Free-Will,  the  meaning  ofthofe  words.  246. ■ 
 
 vide  Will, 
 
 G. 
 
 General  lde3.s,  what  they  are  5.  of  Subftances,  Modes 
 and  Relations.  6,  7.  how  form'd.  ib.  not  made  by 
 Analogy.  8.  have  no  Archetypes,  nor  any  Exif- 
 tence  but  in  the  mind.  ib.  are  pofitive,  adequate 
 and  univerfal.  ^y  S. 
 
 Ge?ieratio?is  infinite,  impofilble.  64,  65,  66.  the  rea- 
 fon  for  fucceilive  ones  in  the -World.  451. 
 
 G/or)' of  God,  v/hat  thefe  words  mean.  60,  51.  De- 
 Hre  of  Glory  apply'd  to  God  by  way  of  accommo- 
 dation, ib.  how  God  may  be  faid  to  do  all  things 
 for  his  own  Glory.  62.  this  coincident  with  the 
 Happinefs  of  Mankind,  ib. 
 
 God,  ^  relative  term.  79.  a  proof  of  his  Exigence 
 and  attributes.  46,  47,  &c'. 
 
 Good 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Good  is  that  which  produces  Happinefs.  84.  nothing 
 good  or  evil  in  itielf.  ib.  and  240.  does  not  abfo- 
 lutely  determine  the  Choice.  239,  (Sc.  393,  394. 
 natural  Good  the  foundation  of  moral .  83,84. 
 316.  nothing  made  fo  good  but  that  it  might  be 
 fuppofed  better.  293,  294,  Good  prepoflent  in  the 
 prefent  World.  471,  472,  &c. 
 
 Goodnefsj  Divine,  the  meaning  of  it.  299,  300.  proofs 
 of  it.  50,  51.  includes  all  the  moral  attributes.  52. 
 the  reafon  of  the  Creation.  61,62.476,  i^c.  this 
 no  bar  to  the  Divine  Liberty.  299,  300.  this  At- 
 tribute not  capable  of  a  proof  a  priori.  30  j. 
 
 Government  of  the  natural  and  moral  World,  the 
 manner  of  it.  418,419.  neither  by  pre-eftablifi'd 
 Harmony ^  nov  particular  Wills,  ibid,  and  437)  438, 
 &c. 
 
 H. 
 
 HabitSj  the  ftrength  of  them.  506,  the  foundation 
 of  our  Happinefs  or  Mifery  in  the  next  Life.  445. 
 495.  506.  Ufe  and  Application  of  this  Dodrine 
 
 495.  496. 
 Happinejs^  fenfitive  and  intele^lual  capable  of  per- 
 petual Encreafe  121,  122,  123.  requires  an  Alter- 
 native. T24.  i25.arifesfrom  paftdefedis.  726,  127. 
 Objedlions  anfwer'd.  ibid,  whether  there  might 
 have  been  more  in  the  prefent  Syftem.  138,  139, 
 &c.  why  not  communicated  immediately,  and  all 
 at  once.  447,  &c.  whether  the  Sum  of  it  exceeds 
 that  of  miiery  in  this  World.  454,  455.  472,  473, 
 (^c.  whether  it  will  do  fo  in  the  next.  477,  &c, 
 founded  chiefly  in  Virtue.  399,  400. 480,481,  &c^ 
 and  Eledion.  389,  390. 
 
 HelL 
 
INDEX. 
 
 HiU'torments,  the  Authors  who  have  treated  on  the 
 Eternity  of  them.  501.  according  to  fome  they 
 don't  feem  capable  of  any  other  End  befide  the 
 Annihilation  of  the  Subjeds  of  them.  509,  510. 
 511.  have  a  natural  foundation  in  the  evil  Habits 
 contraded  in  this  Life.446.  495.  506.  the  Ufes  to 
 which  they  may  ferve.  482.  502. 
 
 HoUnefs  of  God.  51. 
 
 Holy  Ghojf,  in  what  manner  it  influences  the  mind 
 422,  423.  this  not  detlrudive  of  our  natural 
 Powers.  425.  426.  but  rather  afiiding  and  reftor- 
 ing  them.  ib.  in  what  way  we  may  conceive  this 
 Influence  to  be  exercifed.  426.  not  properly  7nira~ 
 culous.  435. 
 
 I. 
 
 Idea,  what  the  Author  means  by  that  word.  8. 
 Idea  of  God,  whether  it  proves  his  Exiflence.  54, 
 
 55;  56- 
 yewijh  Nation,  the  manner  of  God's  governing  them. 
 
 Immutability  of  God.  48.  of  the  Relations  of  things. 
 288,  289.  303,  ^c. 
 
 hnperfeSiion^  whence  it  arifes  129,  130.  whether 
 properly  an  Evil.  137,  138.  140,  141.  why  per- 
 mitted.  138,  139. 
 
 Impidfe  phyfical,  cannot  be  apply 'd  to  the  Will.  402. 
 what  kind  of  Impulfe  confiilent  with  its  freedom 
 
 425-432. 
 Inclination  of  the  Earth's  Axis.   187. 
 Independence.  47.  the  fame  with  lelf  exiflence.  74, 
 
 75.  does  not  ilridly  infer  Unity.  80,  81. 
 
 Indifference^ 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Indifference^  the  Author's  notion  of  it.  267,  268. 
 368.  cannot  be  apply'd  to  the  whole  Man,  but 
 only  the  Powers  of  willing  and  afling.  ib.  in  what 
 fenfe  a  blind  Principle.  269.  337.  not  applicable 
 to  Perception  or  Judgment,  mull  be  applied  to 
 the  Will,  348,  349,  ^c.  the  benefit  of  it.  336, 
 348,  349,  efr.  363,  ^c,  367. 
 
 Indifferent^  in  what  fenfe  the  Creation  was  fo  to 
 God.  296.  300.  301.  this  confiffent  with  his  be- 
 ing determin'd  by  his  Goodnefs.  ibid. 
 
 Indifferent  Actions  prove  that  the  Mind  determines 
 itfelf.  249,  250.  Inftances  of  fuch.  ibid. 
 
 Infinite y  what  is  meant  by  that  word.  15.  95.  99^ 
 100.  the  fame  as  Perfeifion^  ib.  the  Idea  of  it  po- 
 fitive  ib.  and  previous  to  that  of  finite  ib.  how  it 
 differs  from  a  Mathematical  Infinite,  18.  all 
 Quantity,  or  that  which  confifts  oi  parts  inca- 
 pable of  it.   15,  ^c. 
 
 Infinite  Degree^  what  is  to  be  underflood  by  it.  98, 
 99.  the  fame  as  perfed.  ibid. 
 
 Infinite  Series,  the  abfurdity  of  it.  46.  in  Generati- 
 ons. 65,  66.  in  Number,  Motion,  Magnitude, 
 (^c.   15.  in  fucceffive  Duration.  66.h.2iSTioJVhole. 
 
 Inftin5ty  none  innate.  87,   88. 
 
 IntelleB,  fee  Knowledge. 
 
 Intercourfe  of  Creatures  with  each  other  unavoidable 
 
 Jiidgmfht^  always  pafiive.  230.  does  not  determine 
 the  Will.  232.  233.  250,  251,  332.  334,  (5c. 
 
 yi(/lice  Divine,  proof  of  it.  51.  infinite  Juilice  not 
 inconfiftent  with  infinite  Mercy.  100,  10 1. 
 
 Jtijlice  punitive,  what  it  means^  100,  10 1.  cannot  be 
 faid  to  oblige  or  demand  any  thing,  ib. 
 
INDEX, 
 
 K. 
 
 Knowledge,  what  Kind  and  Degree  of  it  beft  fulted 
 to  our  State.  165,  the  Pleafures  of  it  whence  de- 
 rived.  127. 
 
 L. 
 
 Labour,  the  Neceflity  and  advantage  of  it  to  both 
 
 Body  and  Mind.   192,193,194. 
 La£laf2tius,  his  Anfvver  to  the  Objedion  of  Epicu- 
 rus. 488,  489. 
 Laws  Divine,   the  Defign  of  them.  495,  496.  they 
 are  Declarations  of  the  Natural  Effedsof  Sin,  and 
 Diredions  to  avoid  them.  ib.  they  do  not  bring 
 us  into  a  worfe  State  than  we  fliould  have  been  in 
 without  them.  ib.  cf  no  force  without  Sandions. 
 ^5>86,  317.  the  difference  between  natural  and 
 pofitive  Laws.  286,287.  which  may  be  difpenfed 
 with.  317,318. 
 Laws  of  Nature,  the  Neceffity  for  fome  eflablifh'd 
 ones  in  the  natural  World.    150,  i^  i.  the  wifdom 
 of  fuch  an  Eftablifhment.  204,  402,  417.  the  fame 
 in  the  moral  World.   402.  the  ill  confequences 
 that  would  attend  the  contrary,  ib.  Yet  thefe  are. 
 not  left  entirely  to  themfelves.  418,  419    the  Di- 
 vine Interpofition  fometime  necellary,  and  the  na- 
 ture of  it.  428.438,  <Jc. 
 Liberty  fhewn   to  belong   to  God.  48.  and  alfo  to 
 Man.  348,  &c.  vide  mil.  Dr.  Clarke\  argument 
 for  It  inconclufive.  257,  258.  whether  we  expe- 
 rience It  in  ourfdves.  324,  325.  348,  349.  we  are 
 conlcious  of  It  before  we  try  it.  251.   the  different 
 
 Notions 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Notions  of  it.  231.  applicable  to /^(?//V/o;z  as  well 
 as  ABion.  232.  244.  377.  the  poflibility.  349, 
 350.  the  Value  of  it.  239.  240.  336,  337.  348, 
 ^c.  366,  367.  377.  391.  Inconveniencies  that 
 would  attend  the  want  of  it.  389,  390,  {sfc.  or  the 
 over-ruling  it  on  particular  occalions.  402,  403. 
 408,409.  412,413  even  the  abufe  ofit  tends  to 
 the  good  of  the  whole.  463,  464,  ^c. 
 
 Life,  as  much  in  the  World  as  it  is  capable  of.  136. 
 142,  143.  157.  185,  186.  the  prefent  Life  better 
 than  non-exiftence.  214,  /\^a..  why  fo  defirable. 
 455,  ©'<:.  what  defireofit  lawful.  454.  whether 
 mofl  perfons  would  not  choofe  to  live  their  Lives 
 over  again.  458,  459. 
 
 Limitation  of  any  Attribute  in  the  Deity  an  EfFedl 
 without  a  Caufe,  78,  79. 
 
 M. 
 
 Macula  Peccati,  the  true  meaning  of  thefe  Words, 
 509,  5,  2,  &c. 
 
 Man,  why  not  made  more  perfe6t.  131.  134.  140. 
 442.  why  placed  in  this  World,  ib.  Head  of  the 
 lower  part  of  the  Creation.  131.  137,  (^c.  all 
 things  not  made  for  his  immediate  Ufe,  but  to 
 enjoy  themfelves  and  be  fubfervient  to  each  other. 
 ibid. 
 
 Manichees,  their  Notion  of  an  evil  Principle.  104, 
 105.  the  abfurdity  of  it.  105,  106.  Creation  not 
 owing  to  it.  108.  the  ufelefnefs  of  fuch  a  Sup- 
 pofition.  Ill,  112,113.  the  Argument  for  it,  and 
 Authors  that  have  treated  of  it.    108,  109,  no. 
 
 Mariner  of  exiftence  diftind:  from  the  abftrad  nature 
 of  any  thing.  93.  97, 
 
 Matter 
 
INDEX, 
 
 Matter  as  dlftinguifli'd  from  Body  only  an  abflrad: 
 
 Idea.  5.  in  vain  to  difpute  about  its  Eternity.  24. 
 
 incapable  of  Thought  and  Self-Motion    34  35, 
 
 t^c.   134,  135.  Ufes  of  it  in  its  prefent  State,  ibid. 
 
 why  not  made  more  perfedt.   136.  trie  fource  of 
 
 natural  Evils.  146,  147,  ^c. 
 Mechatiical  Hypothefis,    an  accounr  "t)f  it.  434.  a 
 
 Confutation  of  it.  437. 
 Meliorityy  the  Scheme  purfued  by  the  Autlior.  224. 
 
 Divine  Judgments  no  exception  to  it.  203. 
 Mercy  not  inconfiftent  with  infinite  Juilice.   10 1. 
 Mm/ founded  in  Choice.  279,  280. 
 Mifery,  the  prefent  unavoidable.  173.   not  fo  great 
 
 in  general  as  Happinefs  in  this  Life.  458,  459. 
 
 472,  473.  nor  in  the  next.  477,478,  ^c.  whe- 
 ther that  of  the  damned  may  be  conceived  to  in- 
 
 creafe  the  Happinefs  of  the  bleiTed.  482,  483,  &c. 
 Moral  Attributes  certain,  tho'  not  capable  of  flrid: 
 
 Demonftration.  49.  nor   of  any  Proof  a  priori. 
 
 305.308.  in  what  fenfe  they  are  confequences  of 
 
 the  natural  Attributes,  ib. 
 Moral  ^oodi  and  evil  confills  in  producing  natural 
 
 good  and  evil.  49  and  83.  86.  3  16,  the  dillindion 
 
 between  them.  318. 
 ilfor^/  Obligation,  the  true  foundation  of  it.  87.  306, 
 
 &c.  311. 
 Moral  Senfe  alone  determines  us  to  approve  of  doing 
 
 good  to  others.  86,  87.  the  fame  with  Confcience 
 
 ib.  not  innate  or  implanted  in  us.  87,  88. 
 Mortality,    whether  a  Confequence  of  Materiality 
 
 146,  147,  Off.   168.  170,  171.  whether  proper  for 
 
 this  World.  451,  &c. 
 Motives,  whether  the  Mind  be  always  determin'dby 
 
 them.  236.  325.  332,  333,  334,  ^f.  348,  349. 
 
 whether 
 
I  N  D  E  X. 
 
 whether  ever  phyfically.  248,  Gfc.  in  what  fenfe 
 fome  are  caWed  Jfrofiger  than  others.  348. 
 
 Mofio!^  coud  not  be  from  Eternity.  15,  23,  24.  65, 
 66.73. 
 
 Mouj2tat?iSy  ufes  of  them.   16 1. 
 
 N. 
 
 Natural  Evils,    whether   infeparable   from   Matter 
 
 146,  147,  isc   171.  173.  181. 
 Nature  of  any  thing,  what  meant  by  it.  93,  94.  di- 
 
 ftin(ft  from  the  Modus  of  its  Exiilence.  ib.  and  96, 
 
 97.  Laws  of  Nature,  \\dQ  Laws. 
 Necejfary^  always  a  relative  Term.  20,  21,  22,  23. 
 
 apply'd  to  Means,  I'ruth  or  Exijience,  ib.  necefTa- 
 
 ry  in  itfelf  or  abfolutely  fuch,   improper  Expref- 
 
 fions.  ib. 
 NeceJJary  Exigence,  what  it  means.  20,  the  fame  as 
 
 Self  exiftence  or  Independence.  74  j^,  how  prov'd 
 
 ib.  cannot  be  underftood  pofitively.  ib.  nor  urg'd 
 
 to  prove  any  thing  a  priori.  52,  5:5.  j^^  76.  buik 
 
 upon  a  falfe  Maxim,  jy^  78. 
 NeceJJity^    inconfiilent  \\ith  the  Powers  of  willing 
 
 and  ading.  234,  235.  whether  the  perceiving  none 
 
 in  our  A(ftions  be  a  proof  that  there  is  none.  324, 
 
 325.  whether  it  can  be  apply'd  to  the  Will  in  any 
 
 Senfe.  333,  G^r. 
 Nothing,  in  what  (qi\{q  things  arofe  from  it.   129. 
 
 this  caufes  the  evil  of  DefciSl.    130,  131. 
 Novelty^    an  improvement  of  our  Happinefs.   126, 
 
 127. 
 Number y  why  we  cannot  fet  bounds  to  it.   13.,  14. 
 
 this  does  not  prove  it  to  be  abfolutely  infinite,  ib. 
 
 and  15,  16, 
 
i  N  D  E  X. 
 O. 
 
 OhUgatiorij  "what  that  Word  fignifies.  87.  whence 
 moral  Obligation  arifes.  ib.  and  306,  307. 
 
 Objlmacy^  what  it  is  founded  in.   ^42. 
 
 Ocean,  ufes  of  it.   161. 
 
 Omnipotence  proved.  47.  does  not  imply  Unity.  81. 
 
 OmjiipreJencCy  what  it  means.  82 ,  83 .  not  to  be  con- 
 ceiv'd  by  way  of  Extenfion,  ib.  with  what  fenfe 
 it  can  be  faid  to  fill  all  Space,  ib. 
 
 Omnifcience.  48.  proof  of  it.  440.  Contingencies 
 may  be  proper  Objects  of  it.  ibid. 
 
 Orders  different.  122.  131,  132,  133.  138,  139. 
 142,  143.  157.  447,  ^c.  make  for  the  good  of 
 the  whole.  452.  why  not  more  of  the  higher  ones 
 134.  136.  140.  144.  no  abfolute  higheft.  293, 
 294.       _ 
 
 Original  Sin.   1 1 1,  112. 
 
 P. 
 
 Pain^  all  Beings  join'd  to  Matter  capable  of  it.  147, 
 &c,   173,  174,  &c.  the  reafon  and  necelTity  for 
 
 our  prefent  pains.   165.176 181.  could  not  be 
 
 prevented,  ib.  We  do  not  always  defire  to  remove 
 
 it.  254,  155. 
 ParadtfCj  the  difference  between  that  State  and  the 
 prefent.  147,  148,  &c.  175,  176.465,466.  No 
 Arguments  can  be  drawn  from  that,  or  the  flate 
 of  Angels  and  blelTed  in  Heaven,  againfl  the 
 goodnefs  of  the  prefent  Syflem.   150.  176.  399, 
 
 400. 
 
 Pnrallelijhi 
 
I  N  D  E  X. 
 
 P^r^//(f////// of  the  Earth,  the  advantages  of  it.  187, 
 188. 
 
 Particular  Providence,  the  necefTity  for  it.  436,  ^c. 
 the  manner  in  which  we  may  fuppofe  it  to  be  ex- 
 erted, ib. 
 
 Particular  Wills,  the  Deity  does  not  ad:  by  them  in 
 the  government  of  either  the  natural  or  moral 
 World.  402,  403.  417,  418,  419.  yet  his  Inter- 
 podtion  is  fometimes  neceflary.  437,  438,  ^c. 
 
 Parts,  that  which  confifts  of  them  incapable  of  In- 
 finity. 15,  16.  in  what  fenfe  yards  feet,  years, 
 days,  &c.  are  no  aliquot  parts  of  Space  and  Time, 
 16,  17,  18, 
 
 PaJio?i5y  the  Ufes  and  neceffity  of  them.   173,  &c. 
 
 Perfedty  no  Creature  can  be  fuch.  1 15.  whether  all 
 ought  to  have  the  fame  Degree  of  Perfection.  122. 
 132,  133,  1-34.  whether  all  ought  to  be  fix'd  in 
 one  certain  Degree.  123,  124,  ^r.  Arguments  for 
 the  affirmative.  123,  124.  Anfwer,  125,  126,  ^c. 
 why  they  are  not  more  perfect.   138,  139. 
 
 PerJc5iiG7i,  the  fame  with  abfolute  Infinity.  15.  99. 
 that  of  Creatures  how  to  be  eftimated.    136,  137, 
 
 Pleafures  fenfible  and  intelledtual  fuited  to  our  pre- 
 fent  State.   164,  265. 
 
 Poijbns,  206. 
 
 Pojitive  Idea  does  not  infer  an  external  Ideafum.  10, 
 II.  pofitive  Infinite  what.  15.  99.  how  diftinguifh- 
 ed  from  the  negative  one.  16,  17,  18.  100.  pofi- 
 tive Laws  how  diflinguifii'd  from  natural.  287. 
 
 Pojfibility,  no  argument  from  infinite  pofTibilities 
 that  a  Power  adually  exifts  which  can  afFe(ft  them» 
 
 Powers  of  the  Mind  adtive  and  pafTive.  230,  231.' 
 232. 
 
 S  f  Prayer,, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Prayer,  the  natural  good  EfFeds  of  it  upon  ouf 
 Minds.  428,  God's  end  in  requiring  it.  429.  it  is 
 properly  a  natural  Duty.  ib.  the  Efficacy  of  it.  417, 
 418.  428.  of  no  ufe  without  a  particular  Provi- 
 dence, ib. 
 
 Predejiination.  434,  435 438,  ^c. 
 
 Pre-ejiabiijh'd  HsLTmonyy  an  account  of  that  Syftem. 
 434,  &c.  inconfiflent  with  the  ends  of  Religion. 
 
 437>  438'  439>  ^<^' 
 Preference  of  God,    an  improper  term.   72.    what 
 
 ihould  be  meant  by  it.  440. 
 Prevalency  of  moral  Good  in  this  World.  471,  472. 
 
 Probation^  the  neceffity  for  fuch  a  State  in  order  to 
 improve  our  Happinefs.  444.450,  ^f.  483,^^. 
 
 Providence,  the  manner  of  its  government"  of  both 
 the  natural  and  moral  World.  418,  419.  436. — 
 439.  the  belief  of  a  particular  one  necelTary  to 
 moft  Duties  of  Religion,  ib. 
 
 Punijhmenfs,  the  benefits  of  them  in  this  Life.  203, 
 204.  proceed  from  infinite  Goodnefs.  ib. 
 
 R. 
 
 Keafon,  whether  we  can  will  without  one.  236.239. 
 332,  333.  and  the  benefits  of  fuch  a  Power.  241, 
 &c. 
 
 Reafons  of  things,  vide  Relations. 
 
 Relations  of  things,  what  fhould  be  underftood  by 
 ihem.  84,  85,  86.  not  to  be  chofen  for  their  own 
 fakes  ib.  in  what  fenfe  they  are  immutable  and 
 eternal,  ib.  and  288,  289,  303.  not  antecedent  to, 
 or  independent  of  the  Will  of  God.  ib.  and  286, 
 2*87.  290.  302,  303,  i^c,    not  necefiary   to  the 
 
 deter- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 determmation  of  it.  293,  Q?^.  303,  &c.  310: 
 their  neceffity  only  hypothetical  and  fubfequent 
 to  the  Creation.  ii?td.  It  does  not  from  hence  fol- 
 low that  God  may  alter  them  while  the  Creation 
 continues.  286,  &c.  292 312.  Moral  Obli- 
 gation cannot  arife  from  them.   305,  306,  307. 
 
 S. 
 
 Scale  of  lacings  neceflary  for  the  good  of  the  Univcrfe. 
 
 131,  ^^32.  ^57^  158.442,  443.  447>^^-       _  ., 
 Scripture,    Objedions  from  it  concerning  the  t'all, 
 
 (^c.  of  no  force.  441. 
 
 Self-exiftence,  what  it  means.  74,  ']^,  76,  ^J.  how 
 proved,  ib.  the  fame  with  Independence.  47.  does 
 not  ftridlly  infer  unity.  80,  81. 
 Self-murther,  unnatural.    214.  what  chiefly  prevents 
 it.  457,  458,  ^c.  neither  want  of  Courage,  fear 
 of  Death  or  of  Damnation,  ibid. 
 Senje,  moral  not  innate.  87,  88. 
 Series  infinite.  46,  65,  ^c. 
 Simplicity  incompatible  with  Extenfion.  29,  30.  37. 
 
 or  Expanfion.  idid. 
 Sin,  why  permitted.  463.485,  486,  ^c.  anfwer  to 
 
 Bayle's  Objedions.  ib.  Original.  11 1.  112. 
 Situation  of  the  Earth,   advantages  of  the  prefent* 
 187. 
 
 Soul  neceifarily  affe^ed  by  the  Body.  173 181. 
 
 neceffity  for  the  prefent  Laws  of  Union  between 
 them.  ibid. 
 Space,  an  abftradl  Idea.  6.  not  capable  of  abfolute 
 Infinity.  12,  13.  why  we  cannot  fet  bounds  to  it. 
 ib.  various  ways  of  conceiving  it.  10.  13.  4I7  ^<^<' 
 Sf  2  apo- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 a  pofitive  Idea  of  it  does  not  infer  Exiftence.  lo, 
 whether  it  has  any  pofitive  Properties.  1 1.  inconfi- 
 ftent  with  fimplicity.  28,  29.  or  the  nature  of  pure 
 Spirit.  33,  34.  not  necefianly  exiftent.  ib.  may  be 
 all  fuppofed  away,  but  not  annihilated  by  parts. 
 40,  41.  the  imaginary  Subflratum  of  abftraded  Ex- 
 tenfion.41,  42,  43.  different  from  the  Idea  of  a 
 vacuum.  25.  26.  why  fo  often  confounded  with  it. 
 ib.  with  what  fenfe  it  can  be  affirm'd  that  the  De- 
 ity is  prefent  to  all  parts  of  it.   82,  83. 
 
 Spirit,  not  extended.  33,  34. 
 
 Spirits  good  and  bad,  the  manner  of  their  Influence. 
 
 Storms,  theCaufesof  them.  190.  unavoidable.  191. 
 
 Stoical  FsLtCy  different  from  that  of  the  Author  .368. 
 
 Subfiancey  of  Body  and  Spirit.  3.  improperly  fet  to 
 fignify  the  manner  or  Caufe  of  the  union  of  Pro- 
 perties 4.  nothing  more  than  all  the  effential  Qua- 
 lities taken  together,  ib.  in  any  other  fenfe  'tis  on- 
 ly an  abflrad  Idea.  ib. 
 
 Subjlratum^  an  abflrad:  Idea.  4.  particularly  belongs 
 to  Matter.  34,  35-. 
 
 Succejjion,  none  in  the  Deity,  ^j^  68,  ^c.  how  this 
 is  confiflent  with  the  Notion  of  Eternity,  ib. 
 
 Stifficient  reafon  or  Caufe  for  every  thing,  a  falfe 
 Maxim,  "jj^  78.  inconfiilent  with  the  Divine  Li- 
 berty, ibid,  and  335,  336. 
 
 Sum,  whether  that  of  Happinefs  exceeds  the  Sum  of 
 Mifery  in  this  World.  454,  455.  473,  ^^.  whe- 
 ther it  will  do  fo  in  the  next,  477,  478. 
 
 Summum  Bo?2um,  the  reafon  why  Philofophers  were 
 fo  uncertain  about  it.  259. 
 
 Sufpenjion,  the  power  of  it  lliews  that  we  are  abfo- 
 
 lutely  free  to  will  pr  not  to  will  \ii  any  given 
 
 '  '  ^         caie 
 
INDEX. 
 
 cafe.  24^.261,262.  not  founded  m  the  general 
 defire  of  Happinefs.  ibid,  nor  different  from  apy 
 other  exercife  of  the  will.  263. 
 Syjlem  what  meant  by  the  heft.  121.  in  what  man- 
 ner to  be  framed,  ib.  whether  any  cou*d  be  inji- 
 nite.  120.  whether  any  abfolute  beil  and  higheft. 
 122.  294,  C^c.  whether  any  fix'd  in  a  certain  De- 
 gree. 127,  (sc.  whether  the  prefent  might  be  infi- 
 proved.   138 — — >i40.  295. 
 
 thought  inconfiflent  with  Extenfion  or  Divifibility. 
 
 ^34>35>36. 
 
 Thunder,  the  caufp  of  it.   190,  191    a  neceffary  con- 
 
 fequence  of  the  prefent  Laws  of  Motion,  ib. 
 Titne  whsiiy  67.  not  applicable  to  the  Deity.  6^^  &c. 
 
 incapable  of  abfolute  Infinity.  16.  69,  70. 
 Trialy  neceffity  for  one  in  Virtue,  Labour,  &c.  444. 
 
 449,  &c.  advantages  of  it.  483. 
 Trinity.  1 1 6  — — 119. 
 Truthy  in  what  it  is  founded.  287.  the  Eternity  of 
 
 it.  85.  289. 
 Turpitude  of  Vice,  what  to  be  underftood  by  it.  3  i'j„ 
 
 V. 
 
 Vacuum^  different  from  Space.  25,  26.  often  con~ 
 founded  with  it.  ib.  arguments  ufed  againft  it  only 
 when  fo  confounded.  27,  28,  29. 
 
 Variety y  neceffary  to  improve  our  Happinefs.  126^ 
 127.444,445,446. 
 
 ^<7/70«i  ufes  of  moff  things  in  Nature,  161,  162. 
 
 Vera^ 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Veracity y  or  more  properly  Faithfulnefs,  a  Divine 
 .Attribute.  51,  52. 
 
 Vice,  its  natural  turpitude,  v/hat.  317.  evil  confe- 
 quences  in  general.  318,  319.  what  wou'd  be  the 
 ■  cafe  if  it  were  predominant,  ib.  reafon  of  its  be- 
 ing forbidden,  ib.  how  it  may  tend  to  the  benefit 
 of  the  Public.  463,  464.  and  therefore  be  per- 
 mitted by  the  Deity,  tho'  it  be  neverthelefs  pu- 
 nifhable.  ib. 
 
 Virtue,  the  foundation  of  our  greateft  Happinefs. 
 480,  481,  ^c.  cannot  be  infufed  miraculoufly  or 
 onafudden.  ib.  and  444,  445.  produced  only  by 
 -'{Exercife  and  Experience.  399.  478,  ^c.  450.  can- 
 not fubfifl  without  Liberty.  398,  ^c.  anfwer  to 
 the  Arguments  drawn  from  Angels  and  Saints,  ib, 
 why  required  of  us.  316,317. 
 
 Vnchangeablenefs  of  God.  48. 
 
 Vnderfianding,  of  God  the  foundation  of  Truth.  287, 
 
 'how  it  contains  the  Ideas  of  all  things.  293,  ^c. 
 
 Underftanding  of  Man,  whether  it  determines  the 
 
 Will.    332.  ^c.    this  inconfiftent  with  Liberty. 
 
 334,335-       '  .  .  ,         . 
 
 TJneaJinefs  in  what  fenfe  it  may  be  faid  to  determine 
 
 the  Will.  247,  &c.  vide  Anxiety. 
 Union  of  Soul  and  Body,    the  confequences  of  it. 
 
 173 181. 
 
 Unity  oiGoA,  arguments  for  it.  49.  an  Explanation 
 
 of  them.  79,,  8q,  81.  cannot  be  llridly  demon- 
 
 flrated.  ib.     "  '   '  ' 
 Volition  diftind  frotti  Adion.  23 1.  the  advantages  of 
 V  fuch  aPower.  240.242.  366,  367.  377.  391.413. 
 
 Inconveniencies  that  wou'd  attend  the  want  of  it. 
 
 389,  390.408,409. 
 -■s  Ufes, 
 
INDEX, 
 
 U/eSy  many  of  almoft  everything  in  Nature.  i6i, 
 162. 
 
 W. 
 
 IfFill,  Mr.  Lockes^rii  Definition  of  it.  255,  256.  In- 
 confident  with  Experience.  i/?id.  its  freedom  from, 
 both  Compulfion  and  Neceffity.  231,  232.  noc 
 properly  determin'd  by  any  thing  without  itfelf. 
 ii?.  and  247.  366,  &c.  nor  by  Chance.  279,  280. 
 can  conquer  all  other  Appetites.  332.  337.  creates 
 pleafure  in  things  by  choofing  them.  239,  240. 
 but  cannot  increafe  the  pleafure  in  infinitum,  240, 
 241.  275,  276.  372.  its  freedom  ftated  and  de- 
 fended. 348,  349,  ^c.  how  it  may  be  impair'd 
 and  rediify'd.  406,  407.  whether  it  is  or  can  be 
 determin'd  to  particular  Objeifts.  388,  389.  391, 
 the  Confequences  that  wou'd  attend  fuch  a  Limi- 
 tation of  it.  395.  408.  or  a  Sufpenfionof  it.  403. 
 485,  486,  ^c.  the  abufes  of  it  tend  to  the  good 
 of  the  whole.  476,  477,  ^c.  will  conftitutc  the 
 greateft  part  of  our  Happinefs  in  the  next  Life. 
 399,  400.  anfwer  to  Bayles  Objedlions.  ibid,  and 
 483,  &c.  the  method  of  treating  it  402,  403. 
 425.  never  determin'd  phyfically.  422.  423.  an- 
 fwer to  the  Objedion  from  the  Operations  of  the 
 Holy  Ghoft.  424,  &c. 
 
 PFi II  of  God,  in  what  fenfe  arbitrary.  78  288.302, 
 &c.  311.  the  ground  of  all  moral  Obligation  and 
 of  the  Relations  of  things.  286,  &c.  302.  305, 
 &c.  311.  not  to  be  feparated  from  his  other  At- 
 tributes. 289.  311.  how  any  thing  is  good  or  evil 
 in  regard  to  it.  297,  298. 
 
 Wifdom 
 
INDEX, 
 
 Wifdom  Divine,  proof  of  it.  51. 
 
 World,  not  eternal,  64,  65.  nor  infinite.  120.  why 
 no  iboner  made.  58,  59.  the  end  of  God  in  crea- 
 ting it.  61,  62.  none  fo  good  but  innumerable 
 others  might  be  conceiv'd  in  all  refpedls  equal. 
 295.  296,  therefore  the  pitching  upon  this  perfect- 
 ly arbitrary,  iifid. the  manner  of  governing  it.  418, 
 
 436.  more  good  than  evil  in  it.  471 475. 
 
 no  Evil  in  it  cou'd  be  removed  without  occafion- 
 ing  greater.  476,  &c. 
 
 F  I  N  I  S\ 
 
m